
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

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THE
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
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THE

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR:

ITS CAUSES, INCIDENTS, AND CONSEQUENCES.

EDITED BY

CAPTAIN H. M. HOZIER, F.C.S., F.G.S.,

AUTHOR OF "THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR," "THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA," ETC.

WITH THE

TOPOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF THE RHINE VALLEY,

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THE

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

PART I.

INTRODUCTORY.

CHAPTER I.

Perception of Cause and Effect in History—Prussia and German Unity—France and Revolution—The Treaty of Vienna—Its inefficiency—France under Louis Philippe—The revolutionary spirit in Italy and Spain—Russia and Turkey—Austria and Prussia—Congress of Laybach—Congress of Verona—French Interference in Spain—English Recognition of South American Free States—Temporary Suppression of Revolts—Rise and Independence of Greece—Russian Influence—The Czar Alexander I. and the Holy Alliance—Capture of Missolonghi—Battle of Navarino—War of Czar Nicholas with Turkey—Treaty of Adrianople—Erection of Belgium into an Independent Kingdom, Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg king—General Recognition by Treaty of 1839—Reforms in England in Taxation, Criminal Law, Religious Disabilities, Parliamentary Representation, Municipal Corporations, Poor-law, Charities, Free Trade, Irish Land Tenure, Education of the People—Constitutions given to British Colonies—Wars, Colonial, Indian, and Crimean—Revolution in Europe in 1848—Action and Reaction of Opinion—Radicalism, Chartism, Socialism, Republicanism—10th April in London—Lord Palmerston—Switzerland—Cracow—Metternich—Italy—Pope Pius IX., his Amnesty, Reforms, Dangers—Rome a Revolutionary Centre—Leopold Grand Duke of Tuscany—Charles Albert King of Piedmont and Sardinia—Austrian influence—Occupation of Ferrara—Ferment among Italians—The Cry of 'Independence of Italy'—Guizot's Policy—English Policy—Lord Minto's Mission—Demonstrations at Turin, Lucca, Rome, Naples—Concession of a Liberal Constitution by the King of Naples—Increased Excitement—Prevalence of the Revolution throughout Italy—Parliamentary Government in France—Charges of Corruption—Foreign Policy—Electoral Reform—Banquets—King's Speech, December, 1847—Stubbornness of Louis Philippe—24th February, 1848—Republican Manœuvres—Soldiers and National Guard—King's Unwillingness to shed Blood—Guizot's Resignation—Thiers—Odillon Barrot—Abdication of Louis Philippe—His Flight to England—Another Exile in London buys a Newspaper—French Republic—Lamartine—National Assembly—Organization of Labour—Insurrection of June—Four Days' Battle—Four Thousand Barricades—General Cavaignac Dictator—French Intervention at Rome—Assassination of Rossi—Roman Republic—Flight of the Pope—War in Lombardy—Radetzky—Battle of Novara—Abdication of Charles Albert—Restoration of Austrian Supremacy—War in Hungary—All Germany in Revolt—National Unity—King Frederic William at Berlin—The 'Vor-Parlament' at Frankfort—General Collapse of Revolutionary Projects.

POSTERITY will judge far more easily and accurately than the present generation possibly can, the relation of cause and effect, in the series of events culminating this year, 1870, in the tremendous struggle of nations on the banks of the Rhine. After the lapse of ages, the occurrences of a century are narrated in a few pregnant sentences, stating what was the germ, growth, and culmination of one or two fecund ideas, one or two national aspirations. The present decade, so memorable in Prussian history, commenced a hundred years after the triumphs of Frederic the Great in the Seven Years' War (1756–63). That far-off indication of Prussia's military power marked her as the leader of Germany, and the humiliations she endured at the hands of the first Napoleon served only to intensify in her a disposition to restore the German race to the honour and dignity which is its due. On the other hand, the revolutionary ideas which in France and neighbouring states produced astounding results, both for good and evil, eighty years ago, re-appeared in great force in the European uprisings of 1848. Again the French people, after a vain effort at self-government and liberty of action, yielded to the despotic sway of personal government, while the Germans strove for national unity with a national Parliament, also in vain. Yet the patient Germanic spirit, abiding its time, looked forward hopefully and eagerly to the day when unity should endow the nation with

commanding strength. To accomplish this great end many sacrifices were necessary, and much boldness, both civil and political, in the leaders. Above all, the elimination of foreign and heterogeneous elements from the national life was essential. France under the second Empire, as the child of Revolution, had raised the cry of "nationalities," and by a rude stroke at Austrian and papal power had brought about the unity of Italy. Germany, the seat of learning and of the highest civilisation, sighed at its own confederated impotence. There it lay, rich in all the elements of political greatness, but unable to combine them by reason of its division into petty principalities and dukedoms. The national aspirations pointed to the welding of these parts into one solid whole; but a great leader was wanting to give form and vitality to these aspirations. At length came the hour and the man. Count von Bismarck was made prime minister and minister for foreign affairs to the king of Prussia. He had deeply pondered all the intricate problems which the state of Germany presented. With profound insight he saw the causes of national weakness and laboured assiduously to remove them. With his one object in view, and with little tenderness for other courts or other princes, he began his great task at the easiest end, by despoiling the Danish crown of its German appanages. After a brief pause, he proceeded to get rid, as far as possible, of the non-German elements existing in the Austrian empire, and by a reconstruction of the German Confederation excluded that Slavonic and Hungarian compound of peoples from Germany proper. His wonderful success in these great achievements waited but the crowning step of a close federal union with the states of South Germany, when the emperor of the French, goaded by the jealous murmurs of his people, who can bear no rival near the throne of their supremacy, rushed into a war that seems destined to complete all Count Bismarck's designs, and make Germany the chief military power of Europe.

Of this general outline a few explanatory details will be necessary. The grand product of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars which ended in 1814 was that celebrated instrument, the Treaty of Vienna. Such at least it seemed in the eyes of men who do not observe the under-currents of history. It has been the vain boast of the admirers of this document that it preserved the peace of Europe for forty years; it had in truth very little to do with preserving the peace of Europe, and unquestionably it failed to secure the observance of its own provisions for even half that time. Even while the plenipotentiaries were seated round the Congress table, an ominous interruption compelled them to throw down their protocols and provisos, and hasten to their respective courts. The great disturber of the equilibrium which the Congress was attempting to restore had broken loose from Elba. His name once more inflamed the martial ardour of France, and he cast his last bloody die for empire on the field of Waterloo, forfeiting for ever his liberty and crown. The Congress was resumed—the Treaty solemnly signed and ratified. Its leading provision, in accordance with the ostensible purpose of the allied powers in making war against the usurper, was that the elder branch of the Bourbons should reign over France. This arrangement made no allowance for the vast change wrought in the French people, morally, intellectually, and socially, by the Revolution; and after a painful duration of fifteen years it crumbled into dust before the three July days of revolution in 1830.

Louis Philippe, the elected citizen king, with all his merits and accomplishments, did not suit the excitable nation over which he reigned for eighteen years. His government by party, in regular constitutional form, with a Right and a Left, a Centre, Right Centre, and Left Centre, was not adapted to the genius of Frenchmen. "La Gloire" seemed wanting in this system, and Beranger was still trumpeting forth in his songs the renown of their famous Corsican soldier. The name of Napoleon Bonaparte was a name of power when, in a feverish fit which seized them in February, 1848, the populace of Paris drove away the able and respectable family of Orleans, and prepared a way to the throne for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. The French, endowed with so much keen common sense in the transactions of private life, are lamentably under the sway of their imagination in matters of public concern. Thus came about another grievous infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, which had decreed in the most stringent manner that no Bonaparte should again reign in Europe.

The revolutionary spirit that wrought these changes in France, and rent in twain the artificial instrument elaborated by the Congress, had been

for years fermenting in all the countries of Europe. Organized by the Carbonari and other secret societies, it broke out in Italy and Spain with great violence in 1821, and virtually reduced King Ferdinand to a nonentity. At the same time Greece rose against her Turkish rulers, and sought to establish her independence. These events excited lively apprehensions at all the courts of Europe. France, in defence of royalty, would suppress the revolution in Spain, and put down the *communeros* (communists) and *descamisados* (shirtless) at all cost. Russia was not sorry to see Turkey embarrassed by the Greek insurrection, and England was favourable to the cause of liberty in both countries. Austria, in the person of her foreign minister, represented the principle of pure absolutism, and Prussia held a somewhat neutral position, siding now with Austria, anon with Russia. Austria with a strong hand suppressed the rising liberties of Italy, and at the Congress of Laybach (January, 1821) concluded arrangements which gave her virtual possession of the fairest parts of that peninsula. Another congress was erelong proposed to settle the difficulties of the hour, and in 1822 representatives of the various powers met at Verona. Divergence of opinion soon made itself apparent at this assembly. France, with her traditional jealousy of any foreign influence in Spain, would interfere in the Spanish question, and would allow no one else to do so. England deprecated interference, but the French views were supported by Russia, Austria, and Prussia. England desired the recognition as independent states of the revolted Spanish colonies in South America, which none of the other powers would agree to without the consent of the king of Spain. The result was that the duke of Wellington, the English plenipotentiary, refused to sign the *proces verbaux* of the conference, and the French government gained its point. The hero of Waterloo, on his way home, had an interview with Louis XVIII., and well nigh persuaded that monarch to abandon the line of policy marked out by the Verona Congress. But the current of public opinion setting the other way, the Duc d'Angoulême, at the head of a hundred thousand men, entered Spain on April 5, 1823, for the purpose of defending its Bourbon king against his own subjects. French soldiers once more marched along roads which they had disputed mile by mile with the soldiers of Wellington ten years before, between the Bidassoa and Madrid. This event excited not only lively scenes in the French Chamber, from which Manuel, an opposition member, was forcibly dragged by the gend'armes, but called forth expressions of loud indignation in the English House of Commons, where Mr. Brougham, in allusion to the help proffered to France by Russia and the German Powers, uttered the following prognostication:—"I say that if the king of France calls in the modern Teutones, or the modern Scythians, to assist him in this unholy war, judgment will that moment go forth against him and his family, and the dynasty of Gaul will be changed at once and for ever."

For all this, however, the French were successful in suppressing the revolution, and restoring Ferdinand unshackled to his throne. When the Duc d'Angoulême had returned in triumph to Paris, the English government, considering that they had sustained a defeat, carried out the measure they advocated at the Congress of Verona, and formally recognized the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies in South America. Spain "with the Indies" had been a power formidable to England. By finally separating from her "the Indies" she would be no longer formidable. "I called the new world into existence," said Mr. Canning, melo-dramatically, "to redress the balance of the old." Curiously enough, Chateaubriand, who was then the French minister for foreign affairs, has admitted in his memoirs, that his government had a plan for "breaking through or modifying the Treaty of Vienna, by establishing Bourbon monarchies in South America."

Poor Treaty of Vienna! its power for keeping the peace of Europe for forty years seems to have been but small.

Early in 1821, and not many months after the outbreak of the Spanish revolution, the Greeks, after four centuries of submission, rose against their masters the Turks. This insurrection was fomented by a secret society of "Hetairists," and supported by the friends of Greece in various parts of Europe calling themselves Philhellenes. Capo d'Istria, a Greek, who occupied the post of private secretary to Alexander, emperor of Russia, was a member of the society of Hetairists. The English poet Byron was an eminent Philhellene. Bound together by community of interest, religious and secular, it was supposed that Russia gave secret aid to this movement; but it is on record that the

Czar had so great a horror of insurrection, and felt so completely bound by the principles of the Holy Alliance, that he refused altogether to countenance the Greeks in their rebellion against the Sublime Porte. Not until his death and the accession of his more ambitious brother, the Emperor Nicholas, did the Greeks succeed in establishing that independence on behalf of which they had exhibited heroism surpassing the dreams of romance, and had committed atrocities exceeded only by the cruelties of their fierce Moslem oppressors. In 1822 the provisional Greek government had made an earnest application to the Congress at Verona, to be admitted into the European family of nations, and to be taken under the protection of the Western powers; but the members of the Holy Alliance, so powerful in that Congress, rejected the application of rebels, insisting upon the maintenance of sovereign rights even when symbolized by the domination of the crescent over the cross—the figure of Islam trampling upon the church of Christ. Four years' prolongation of the contest however, and the awful scenes which characterized the fall of Missolonghi into the hands of the Turks, fully aroused the sympathies of western Europe. The representatives of the people having signed a solemn act, in virtue of which "the Greek nation placed the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence, under the absolute protection of Great Britain," Mr. Canning took steps to make the desired protection effective. Terms of accommodation were arranged at a secret interview held in January, 1826, on an island near Hydra, between Mr. Stratford Canning (the present Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), British envoy at Constantinople, and Prince Mavrocordato, president of the Greek government. The duke of Wellington, on an embassy of congratulation to the Czar Nicholas on his accession, concluded with the Russian government a convention for the protection of Greece, which was signed on the 4th April, 1826. More than a year of negotiation however elapsed before the treaty between England, France, and Russia was signed (6th July, 1827) for the protection of Greece as an independent state. Meanwhile the Greeks had been reduced to a very low condition by Ibrahim Pasha and his Egyptian troops, and the Sultan, naturally indignant at the interference of the three allied powers, made preparations for resistance. A combined fleet of English, French, and Russian men-of-war, in all twenty-six sail, entered the Bay of Navarino, on the 20th October, 1827, and destroyed the Turkish fleet, while Ibrahim Pasha was away doing his best to exterminate the inhabitants of the Morea and render their homes desolate. The independence of Greece was secured by the battle of Navarino, but the pride of the Sultan and his divan was not subdued. Stiff-necked as ever, the indomitable tone of his reply to the allied ministers after his misfortune was worthy of a better cause, "My positive, absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them even to the day of the last judgment." That day, so rashly appealed to, seemed about to dawn upon Turkey in the war which shortly ensued between her and Russia. The contest bears little upon the questions agitating Europe in this year, 1870, excepting as showing the direction of Russian ambition, and as giving England a reason for watching the progress of that colossal power in the East. The war broke out in 1828, after the conclusion of a war with Persia, in which the Czar had been triumphant. After a series of brilliant successes, the Moslems were again humbled, and Russian superiority acknowledged in a treaty dictated by Marshal Diebitsch at Adrianople itself, in the closing month of 1829.

When Greece, in 1830, assumed the form of a constitutional monarchy, its throne was offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the widowed husband of Princess Charlotte of England. He declined the honour, but accepted a similar proposal made in June, 1831, on behalf of the people of Belgium. By the settlement of 1815 this country formed part of the kingdom of the Netherlands. Dutchmen and Belgians, however, found themselves but ill-mated; and on the 4th October, 1830, another infringement of the great treaty took place by the secession of the Belgians from the kingdom of Holland, and the formation of a provisional government with the sanction of Great Britain and France. The crown was offered to and refused by the Duc de Nemours, second son of Louis Philippe king of the French, and was finally bestowed upon Leopold. Some years elapsed before the recognition of this new and prosperous little kingdom was made by all the great powers. On the 19th April, 1839, a treaty was signed at London which established peaceful relations between King Leopold I. and the sovereign

of the Netherlands, and obtained the recognition of the kingdom of Belgium by all the states of Europe. It is by this treaty that Great Britain deems herself morally bound to protect the integrity of the state, and her neutrality when neighbouring kingdoms are at war. The special treaties of 1870 between England on one side, and France and Prussia severally on the other, extend only to the period of one year after the conclusion of peace between those belligerent powers.

The spirit of revolution, it will be seen, was not effectively restrained on the continent of Europe by the virtue of the Holy Alliance. In England that spirit accomplished changes and improvements of great national and social importance, but by gentler and more benignant courses than those employed in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. The heavy burdens of taxation entailed by a long and costly war were gradually lightened, the abuses of a paper currency were restrained, and trade was developed. A criminal law of Draconian severity was rendered more humane, while a corrupt and inefficient system of police was replaced by one that for more than forty years has fully justified the change. Gross injustice to a large section of the community was removed by the passing, after some violent agitation, of the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill, and some years later by a law relieving Jews from disabilities laid upon them by theological prejudice. This class of legislation was carried on by the regulation of ecclesiastical incomes in the church of England, by means of a standing commission; by the abolition of tests, and quite recently by the disestablishment of a Protestant state church in Ireland, a Roman Catholic country. In order to achieve most of these beneficent ameliorations of the law, it was essential to improve, first of all, the instrument of legislation itself. The Reform Act of 1832 abolished a large number of pocket boroughs, and gave representatives to large towns and important centres of trade which had been left unrepresented. By the later Act for reforming the representation of the people passed in 1867–68, the constituencies were indefinitely enlarged by the extension of the franchise to every rate-payer, and to lodgers. The Parliaments under the first Reform Act accomplished great things. Besides the measures mentioned above, there were the final abolition of the slave trade, the reform of the municipal corporations, the new poor law, the charity commission, the repeal of the corn laws, and the adoption of free trade with respect to almost every article of export and import. The partial substitution of direct for indirect taxation in the form of an income-tax, is not yet acknowledged as a public benefit with entire unanimity. The abolition of the newspaper stamp, and of the duty on paper, increased in an extraordinary degree the scope and influence of that great educator the press. The first Parliament under the new Reform Act has already performed great tasks :—The disestablishment of the church in Ireland, the adaptation of the law of land tenure in that country to the circumstances of the people, and finally, the education of the people of every parish by rate-supported schools. The adoption of the last-named measure is a remarkable proof of the progress made by public opinion in the direction of religious tolerance, and as an indication of the enlightenment and elevation of mind of the House of Commons, serves to rebut the charge of "Philistinism" so conceitedly brought forward against Englishmen by certain writers of the day.

Legislation has also been most beneficially employed in conferring upon the colonies of Great Britain free constitutions of their own, by which they will be fitted to stand alone when the time shall come for snapping asunder the slender thread that binds them to the mother country. The discovery of gold in many of these distant dependencies gave a vigorous impulse to the tide of emigration from home. As many as seven million emigrants have quitted the United Kingdom since 1815, the greater number directing their steps to the boundless and fertile territories of the United States.

All the wars in which England has engaged since the Congress of Vienna have been, with the exception of Navarino, the China, and the Crimean wars, on behalf of her colonies or her Indian possessions. The Kafirs at the Cape of Good Hope, the Maoris in New Zealand, the Affghans of Northern India, the warriors of Scinde, the inhabitants of Burmah, and most formidable of all, the mutinous Sepoys of Hindostan, have all in turn come into deadly collision with England's military power, and have all been compelled to yield. After the suppression of the Indian mutiny of 1857, the government of that vast dependency, which had been vested in the East Indian Company, under the control of a government board, was formally

transferred by Act of Parliament, in 1858, to the crown. The war with China, not highly honourable in its commencement, had the noteworthy effect of giving to Europeans tolerably free access to that jealously guarded country, and of opening up a commerce of yearly increasing magnitude. The Crimean war was a development of the Eastern question, in which England became entangled through a careful jealousy of Russia's power in the East. In 1854 was seen the singular spectacle of a deadly quarrel on account of Turkey, by the three powers who twenty-seven years previously united at Navarino to secure the infant kingdom of Greece against the oppression of Turkey. England and France stood forward as protectors of the quondam oppressor against his powerful and ambitious assailant, Czar Nicholas. All the belligerents suffered severely in this war, which lasted more than two years, the heavy losses sustained by the Russians, and the fatal discovery made by the Czar, that his apparently boundless resources were cankered and eaten away by official corruption, broke the proud sovereign's heart and induced his successor, the Emperor Alexander II., to sue for peace. The main result of the war was the dissipation of an illusive and vague dread that lay like an incubus on the mind of Europe, to the effect that the "Colossus of the North" was irresistible. Germany especially was supposed to be paralyzed by this tremendous overhanging power. The hollowness of these vast pretensions was made manifest in the Crimean war; but the Western Powers had to pay a high price for the dismissal of their vain fears, and for the knowledge that the dreaded Colossus had his weak points. The principal gainer by this war was England's ally, the emperor of the French, who acquired by it that which he so much wanted—prestige.

It will now be necessary to recur to the rise of this prince to power, and to the violent disturbances which shook Europe like an earthquake in 1848, before proceeding to explain the complication of German politics in Holstein, Austria, and Prussia, and the vigorous development of the last-named power, which has excited the jealousy of other nations, and has brought it into such violent collision with military France.

During the thirty years succeeding the peace of 1815 a new generation of men had come into existence in Europe, who felt little of the misery produced by the revolutionary wars, and who yet learned by hearsay and by reading what a glorious struggle had taken place on behalf of the rights of man. By the Treaty of Vienna an attempt was made to restore that balance of power which had kept Europe steady during the greater part of the eighteenth century, and had served to protect small states as well as large, with the notable exception of Silesia, which was annexed by Prussia, and of Poland, which was partitioned. Under the old system nations were too exclusively identified with their nominal rulers, and the interests of the empire, kingdom, or duchy were too liberally presumed to be the same as the interests of the emperor, king, or duke. The revolution of 1789 was a protest against this presumption; but a protest of so violent a kind that reaction was inevitable, and the triumph of the sans culottes at Jemappes led ultimately to the Holy Alliance of the absolute monarchs of Europe. The first great rebound of public opinion from this union of absolutists brought about the revolution of July, 1830, in France. The next swing of the political pendulum produced the tremendous concussion, or rather series of concussions, of 1848.

All Europe was convulsed. Under the several standards of Radicalism, Chartism, Socialism, Communism, Republicanism, the masses of the people, with one consent, rose against their rulers, and demanded a new programme of life. In England the forms of regulated freedom permitted the Chartists to make a harmless show of strength, that evaporated with the display. On occasion of the monster procession (10th April, 1848) which bore the people's charter, in the shape of a huge petition to the House of Commons, a counter demonstration, equally harmless, was made by the easier classes of society, who took the oath and staff of special constables for the maintenance of the peace of London. Among these improvised officials stood, according to authentic report, Lord Palmerston and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Anti-chartist as Lord Palmerston showed himself at home, he was radical enough abroad. Only a few months before this, at the close of 1847, he had, as English secretary for foreign affairs, incurred the resentment of the potentates of Europe by his open encouragement of the Radicals of Switzerland, who triumphed over the reactionists in a civil war. Words written at this time by the Vaudois

deputy, M. Druey, expressed the thoughts of many thousands of his contemporaries. Addressing a French radical, he said:—"We sympathize with you, and you sympathize with us. The time has now arrived when it is necessary, on both sides the Jura, to transfer from the region of ideas to that of action the great principles of liberty, equality, fraternity, which constitute the happiness of men, as well as the glory of societies." Here was the watchword of the insurgent nations. To the credit of Switzerland it must be said, that she alone, of all competitors in the race for freedom, achieved anything like a realization of the great principles of liberty and equality. Meanwhile the rupture of the *entente cordiale* between England and France, in consequence of the Spanish marriages, gave Austria an opportunity of absorbing the republic of Cracow, the last remnant of independent Poland. Metternich, the Austrian minister, seemed supreme in European affairs, and his country at the height of prosperity and power, when suddenly the absolutist system gave way, and the mighty dominion of the emperor of Austria fell gradually to pieces, only to be reconstructed partially, and after many humiliations.

The revolutionary explosion was first heard in Italy, and the hand that applied the spark to the combustible mass of liberalism, which lay ready to receive it, was that of the pope of Rome—Pius IX—after his election in June, 1846. The particulars of this extensive outbreak, as derived from Alison's History, will serve to explain with tolerable accuracy the course taken by the revolutionary eruptions in the other countries of Europe. "The first important act of the new pontiff," says the conservative historian, "was one eminently popular. An amnesty for the large number of persons convicted of political offences was greatly desired. Yielding alike to his own inclination and the general wish, Pius IX. proclaimed the desired act of oblivion, and the joyous news was early on the morning of the 16th July placarded all over Rome. No words can paint the transports which ensued. The prison doors were opened; their country was restored to 1500 captives or exiles. From morning to night crowds of all ranks and professions hastened to the Quirinal to express to the holy father the unbounded joy which the act of mercy had diffused. Twice in the space of a few hours the pope gave his blessing to successive multitudes which filled the place, and on their knees received the sacred benediction; and as a third crowd arrived from the more distant parts of the city, he came out, contrary to etiquette, after nightfall, and by torchlight again bestowed it amidst tears of joy. A spontaneous illumination lighted up the whole city."

The general hopes thus awakened were not damped by the first administrative acts of the new pope. On the 8th November three commissions were issued, composed of prelates and laymen, to report on the reform required in the criminal procedure, on the amelioration of the municipal system, and on the repression of vagrant mendicity, and various decrees were shortly after published for the establishment of primary schools, agricultural institutions, hospitals for the poor, the reorganization of the army, and that of the ancient and far-famed university of Bologna.

The holy father speedily found himself beset with difficulties inseparable from the new state of affairs—difficulties which were much enhanced by the personal character of the pope, who yielded alternately to the solicitations of opposite parties, and deprived government of all real consideration by taking from it the character of consistency.

The dangers of the situation were much augmented in the close of 1846, by the great confluence of refugees who, taking advantage of the amnesty, flocked to Rome, and brought with them not only the liberalism of their own country, but the concentrated spirit of revolution from all other states. The Eternal City became the headquarters of the movement from all parts of Europe. Liberals from France, Spain, Poland, Germany, the Austrian states—all flocked thither, as at once to an asylum from the persecution of the governments which they had offended, and a central point from which they could renew their machinations for ulterior aggressions. No practical or useful reforms by the Papal government could keep pace with the heated imaginations of this band of enthusiasts. They openly aspired, not merely to reform the Holy See, but to subvert the government in all the adjoining states, and realize the dream of a united Italian Republic, one and indivisible.

Several also of the temporal princes of Italy embarked in a liberal policy. Leopold, grand-duke of Tuscany, was the first to adventure on the inviting but perilous path. That beautiful duchy had long been more lightly and equitably governed

than any of the other Italian states, and it embraced a greater number of highly educated and enlightened persons. To them a certain intervention in the affairs of government had long been the subject of desire, and the moderation of their temperament and extent of their information pointed them out as peculiarly fitted for this enjoyment. Their aspirations were now in a great measure realized. Leopold emancipated the press from its shackles, and adopted other reforms which were acceptable to his subjects.

Sardinia also shared in the movement. Charles Albert, who in early youth had fought by the side of the Liberals in 1823, looked to that party alone for the support of his favourite project of turning the Austrians out of Italy. To conciliate them during the general ferment of men's minds in the peninsula consequent on the amnesty and reform of Pius IX., he commenced some changes, and promised more. Seeing that Sardinia was the power which could alone in the peninsula face the Austrian bayonets, and which must necessarily take the lead in any efforts to assert the independence of Italy, these symptoms excited the utmost interest in the inhabitants of the whole country. The hopes that had been excited by the general enthusiasm, and the direction it was taking, were clearly evinced by what occurred in the beginning of winter. On a given night in December bale-fires were simultaneously lighted on the principal heights of the Apennines, which reflected the ruddy glow from the mountains of Bologna to the extreme point of the Calabrian peninsula.

Meanwhile the pope grew alarmed at the storm he had raised, and on the 12th June, 1847, a *Motu Proprio* appeared, which was soon after followed by a more detailed exposition of the views of the Papal government. "The holy father," said this document, "has not beheld without grief the doctrines and the attempts of some excited persons, who aim at introducing into the measures of government maxims subversive of the elevated and pacific character of the vicar of Jesus Christ, and to awaken in the people ideas and hopes inconsistent with the pontifical government." These decided words seemed a mortal stroke to the exalted Liberals; they immediately lost all confidence in the pope, who, they declared, had fallen entirely under the Austrian influence; and to the enthusiastic transports which had signalized his accession a year before succeeded a cold indifference.

Metternich and the cabinet of Vienna made a movement professedly to support the government of the pope, really to terminate the ascendancy of the Liberals in his councils, which threatened to prove so dangerous to Austrian rule in Italy. By the sixty-third article of the Treaty of Vienna the Austrians were authorized to keep a garrison in the citadel of Ferrara; but the custody of the gates of the town was still intrusted to the pontifical troops. Now, however, a more decided demonstration was deemed necessary. On the 10th August a division of Austrian troops crossed the Po, and took entire possession of the fortress, threatening to put to the sword whoever offered any resistance.

The Papal liberal government, assured of the support of France, protested energetically against this occupation, and the general feeling underwent a change attended with important effects. The holy father was no longer regarded as the head of the revolutionary, but of the national party; and to the cry of "Long live reform!" succeeded the still more thrilling one of "Italian independence!" which soon spread beyond the Roman states; animating all the states of the peninsula, and embracing numbers of the higher and educated classes, who, albeit opposed to organic changes in the form of government, were yet passionately desirous of emancipating the country from the degrading state of tutelage in which it had so long been kept to the northern powers.

In Turin especially, at the cry "Independence of Italy!" a general enthusiasm seized all classes, and Charles Albert let drop hints that the time was not far distant when he would draw his sword for the "Sacred cause."

In France M. Guizot's policy at this period was directed to the double object of preventing an explosion of revolutionary violence in Italy, and of taking away all pretext for Austrian interference. We are at peace and on good terms with Austria, he said, and we wish to continue on such; for a war with Austria is a general war and universal revolution.

The English government resolved to send out a confidential diplomatic agent to examine the state of the peninsula, and give such counsel to its various governments as might best tend to bring them in safety through the dangers by which they were surrounded. Lord Minto, who was selected for the mission, was looked upon as the champion

of Italian independence; manifestations of popular feeling preceded or followed him wherever he went; Turin, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, Sicily, had no sooner hailed his arrival than they became violently agitated; and at Milan the people broke out into open riot amidst cries of "Down with the Austrians!" which were only repressed after collision and bloodshed.

At Turin the king issued a very liberal programme of the changes which the government were about to introduce into the internal administration of the kingdom. These concessions produced universal transports; the popularity of Charles Albert equalled that which Pius IX. had enjoyed a year before; the whole capital was spontaneously illuminated for several nights; he could not leave his palace without being surrounded by an enthusiastic crowd; and when later in the autumn he set out for Genoa, the greater part of the inhabitants of both cities attended him with joyous acclamations, both on his departure and return. Nor did the acts of the sovereign belie these flattering appearances; for he communicated at this time to the French government his resolution, in the event of the pope requiring his assistance against the Austrians, not to refuse his armed support.

A demonstration in favour of Liberal opinions and Italian independence in Lucca, brought that beautiful little duchy into unison with Tuscany, much to the joy of the inhabitants of both duchies.

It was in the midst of the effervescence caused by these events that Lord Minto arrived at Rome, and at once became the object of a popular ovation. A few days after his arrival a vast crowd, which assembled in the Corso, suddenly entered the *Piazza di Spagna*, and soon filled the inner court of the Hotel Melza, where Lord Minto resided. Cries of "Long live Lord Minto!" "Long live Italian Independence!" were heard on all sides. White handkerchiefs were seen to wave in reply from the windows of the hotel, and augmented the general enthusiasm. The Radical journals in France immediately published an inflated account of the event, accompanied by a statement that England had openly put itself at the head of the league for promoting Italian independence; and the appearance of some leading Liberals in Lord Minto's box at the opera a few nights after, when they were received with thunders of applause, dispelled all doubt in the minds of the ardent patriots of the truth of the report.

Seriously alarmed at the turn which affairs were taking, which threatened not only a revolutionary convulsion in Italy, but the lighting up of a general conflagration in Europe, M. Rossi, the French ambassador, in several conferences with the pope, endeavoured to convince his Holiness of the necessity of admitting some laymen into his cabinet, and after considerable difficulty succeeded in extorting this concession from the monopolizing ecclesiastics. At the same time he used his utmost endeavours to point out to the Liberals the danger which they were incurring, not only for their country, but for Europe, by rushing headlong into a war with Austria, with the feeble warlike elements which were alone at their disposal.

The times were past, however, when these warnings could produce any effect. The train had been laid, the torch applied, and the explosion was inevitable. Power had changed hands at Rome. It had slipped from the feeble grasp of the pope and the cardinals, and been seized by the hands of violent men, destitute alike of information or prudence. Hardly a day passed without something occurring which demonstrated the deplorable prostration of government, and the entire contempt into which the pope, recently so popular, had fallen.

At Naples, whither Lord Minto proceeded from Rome, the king outstripped all the concessions of the other Italian sovereigns by the publication of a constitution, by a decree which removed nearly all the restrictions on the liberty of the press, and by a large amnesty for political offenders.

It is difficult for a stranger, especially in a free country to the north of the Alps, to form a conception of the sensation which these decrees, following each other in rapid succession, and all breathing so liberal a spirit, produced in Italy. It seemed impossible that the antiquated fabric of superstition and despotism could any longer be maintained in the peninsula, when the most absolute monarch within its bounds had become the first to stretch forth his hand to pull it down. The cabinets in the centre and northern parts of the country were thunderstruck at the intelligence; but ere long the enthusiasm became so general, the torrent so powerful, that they saw no chance of escape but in yielding to it. Constitutions on the model of that of Naples were

speedily published at Turin and Florence. In Rome, even, the extreme difficulty of reconciling the forms and popular powers of a constitutional monarchy with an absolute government based on theocracy, yielded to the same necessity. In a word, Italy, save where kept down by Austrian bayonets, from the base of the Alps to the point of Calabria, was as completely revolutionized, though as yet without the shedding of blood, as France had been by the innovations of the Constituent Assembly.

Meanwhile, in France parliamentary government was undergoing a severe strain. The king as he advanced in years, yielding to the temptations of his position, strove to keep the reins of government more and more in his own hands. His cabinet, which was conservative in politics, seemed a tool in his hands. Rightly or wrongly, it was said that the subserviency of his ministers and the fidelity of the majority in the two Chambers were bought with a price. Charges of peculation and corruption were openly brought against officials, and scandalous trials ensued. The peerage, at the same time, was greatly disgraced in the popular mind on the murder of Marshal Sebastiani's daughter by her own husband, the Duc de Praslin, who had conceived a guilty passion for their children's governess. There was scarcity in the country, also, to stimulate the rising exasperation. The foreign policy of the government, so tender towards Austria, so timid on behalf of the movement in Italy, exposed the king and his ministers to the charge of pusillanimity. "Yes," said Lamartine, "a revolution is approaching, and it is the revolution of contempt."

In this state of things the liberal party then in opposition raised the question of parliamentary reform. The constitutional liberals, with their leader M. Thiers, fondly imagined that the question would be argued within the limits of due parliamentary order, and end in a peaceable party triumph. But the vivacious sections of Communists, Socialists, and Red Republicans had other views, which they resolved audaciously to carry out if opportunity offered. The opportunity was not long in arriving. The approved mode of carrying on a political agitation was by means of banquets in the principal cities, at which leading men delivered orations of more or less power and effect. The speeches, printed in the newspapers, exercised a wide influence. Thus Odillon Barrot and Duvergier de Haurane invited the Parisians, at Chateau Rouge, to return to the pure principles of the July government; while Lamartine, at Maçon, set forth in glowing colours the virtues of a beneficent communism. The movement was sufficiently pronounced to require notice in the king's speech at the opening of the Chambers, in December, 1847. "In the midst of the agitation," he said, "which hostile and blind passions have fostered, one conviction has animated and supported me; it is, that we possess in the constitutional monarchy, in the union of the three powers of the state, the most effectual means of surmounting all our difficulties and of providing for all the moral and material interests of our dear country." A long and animated debate on the address ensued. It was moved that the words "hostile and blind," which were repeated in the address, should be left out. The ministry, however, defeated the amendment by a majority of 43, and the Liberals began anew their agitation out of doors. It was determined to hold a great meeting in the capital, at a banquet which had already been forbidden by the police, and the day fixed for it was the 22nd of February. This defiance of the executive gave hopes to the turbulent, which were raised still higher when a monster procession was also agreed upon. The king was firm to obstinacy. "Reform," he said, "meant a change of ministry, and a change of ministry meant war with foreign powers;" that is to say, encouragement of the revolutionary parties in Europe and defiance of the absolute monarchies. The 22nd of February, however, passed with small disturbance, yet enough to induce the government to occupy the streets with soldiers on the 23rd, and to call out the national guard. This force, to which the king was thought to owe his throne, had grown dissatisfied, and some radical leaders persuaded them to take up a position of apparent neutrality between the military and the populace.

That this neutrality was not impartial may be gathered from the following passage in Alison's history:—

"The 23rd February opened upon a city agitated but undecided, ready to obey the strongest impulse, to surrender the direction to whoever had the courage to seize it. The presence of the military in all the principal quarters sufficiently revealed the apprehensions of government—the conduct of the civic force too clearly evinced to which side it

would incline. At ten, M. Flocon, a determined revolutionist, entered in haste the office of the *Reforme*, and exclaimed, 'Quick, all clothe yourselves in the uniform of the national guard: never mind whether they are your own or not: intimate to all patriots to do the same. As soon as you are dressed, hasten to the mayor's, calling out, Vive la réforme! Directly you are there, put yourselves at the head of the detachments as they arrive, *and interpose them between the soldiers and the people*. Quick, quick! the Republic is to be had for the taking.' These directions, emanating from the headquarters of the movement, were too faithfully adopted; and the national guard, timid, desirous to avoid a collision and avert the shedding of blood, were in general too happy to follow them. The orders of government being that all the posts should be occupied by the troops of the line and the civic forces jointly, the latter were everywhere on the spot with the soldiers, and, in conformity with their injunction, they constantly interposed between the military and the populace, so as to render any attempt to disperse the assemblages impossible, as no officer would incur the responsibility of engaging in a conflict with the national guard of the capital. Several of the legions openly joined the people, at least in words, and traversed the streets, crying out, 'Vive la réforme!'

The Republic *was* had for the taking. The agitation in the capital became greater every hour, and with it grew the alarm at the Tuileries. The queen having suggested the resignation of M. Guizot, that statesman proudly gave up his office and announced the fact in the Chamber of Deputies. The Liberals and Ultra-liberals received this concession with transports of delight. The former trusted that the battle was over, and that new men and new measures would restore tranquillity. The latter thought there was a chance for establishing their cherished form of government—a republic. The untamed classes of society emerged from their squalid homes and swelled the crowds around the Tuileries, the Palais Bourbon, where the Chambers sat, and the offices of the radical newspapers. Such power as the secret societies possessed was brought into play. The national guard had gone home content and eager to illuminate their houses in honour of victory, when a ragged crowd, armed with sabres and pikes, was led by one Charles Lagrange to the Foreign Office, still occupied by M. Guizot and guarded by a detachment of infantry. Lagrange fired a pistol in the direction of the military, who deeming themselves attacked replied with a volley, which brought down some fifty men. The revolution had begun. All that night Paris continued in a state of frantic excitement. Marshal Bugeaud was appointed commander of the forces, and by seven o'clock in the morning of the 24th had taken military possession of the capital. M. Thiers, however, who had succeeded Guizot as prime minister, disapproved of the employment of military force, and requested the withdrawal of the troops. This step, instead of calming, served but to intensify the public excitement. At ten o'clock Thiers resigned office in favour of Odillon Barrot. The king was very unwilling to shed blood. The military, surrounded and pressed upon by the populace, received no orders to fire, and began to fraternize with the mob. A rabble broke into the Palais Royal, and did great damage. Matters grew rapidly worse. In a few hours the reins of government had slipped out of the king's hands. Change of ministers availed nothing. Abdication was mentioned, and the king abdicated; and by one o'clock in the afternoon of that 24th February his discrowned Majesty, with the queen and princesses, quietly escaped from Paris to the sea-coast, on their way to England. Never, perhaps, in the history of the world did so great an event happen so unexpectedly as this sudden fall of Louis Philippe. The news spread like wildfire, and as the newsmen of London were bawling it through the streets of that metropolis it was heard by a lonely refugee there, at the moment he was undergoing the manipulations of his barber. He sprang from his seat to buy the printed message, which Destiny at length had sent to call him to a splendid throne. It was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, of whom much yet will have to be said. In Paris, after a brave attempt to secure the appointment of the infant Comte de Paris as successor to his grandfather, with his mother, the duchess of Orleans, for regent, a provisional government was formed and the Republic proclaimed.

The republican sentiment, however, as Lamartine, the chief of the provisional government, afterwards admitted, was weak in France. The National Assembly that met on the 4th May, and which was elected by universal suffrage, showed a majority against the socialists and ultra liberals.

A vain attempt was made to "organize labour;" but the national workshops established at the public expense developed more idleness than industry in the population. It soon became necessary to abolish these burdensome institutions, which the people were very unwilling to abandon. A most sanguinary struggle in consequence took place in Paris between the populace on the one side, and on the other the executive government, supported by the national guard and the regular soldiery. The contest lasted from the 23rd to the 26th of June, forced the nomination of General Cavaignac to a dictatorship, engaged some fifty thousand men on each side in bloody conflict, and caused the death of about twenty thousand men of all ranks, who had fought for the possession of about four thousand barricades, erected in the different streets of Paris. Never were the fighting qualities of the Parisians more fiercely displayed than in this stubborn effort to destroy each other. The most striking incident of the insurrection was the death of the archbishop of Paris, who was shot while surmounting a barricade, cross in hand, with a view to negotiate an accommodation. General Cavaignac's conduct on this occasion exposed him to blame from both parties. The Red Republicans condemned his resolute suppression of the insurrection, while the moderate party openly accused him of wilful tardiness in attacking the insurgents, when in truth the force at his command was not sufficient to insure victory. He incurred additional unpopularity by acceding to a request, made by the pope, for assistance against his rebellious subjects. The revolution at Rome had been stained by the cruel assassination of M. Rossi as he entered the Chamber of Representatives. He had been ambassador for France at the Papal court, and was induced to accept office as minister of the Interior and of Finance under the pontiff. He meditated many useful reforms, but seeming to be disposed to a compromise with Austria, the national enemy, he was slain by order of the secret societies. The pope fled to Gaeta. A republic was established in Rome, and the assistance of France invoked against it. The conflict between her domestic and foreign policy exhibited by France at this juncture, is to be explained by jealousy of Austria, and the fear lest that power should be beforehand in assuming a protectorate of the pope and his church. Meanwhile Austria had been hotly engaged in strife for the preservation of her power in Lombardy and Venice. The veteran Marshal Radetsky had retreated from Milan before the Italians, under the leadership of Charles Albert, king of Sardinia and Piedmont. But the old soldier after a time avenged this blow by the battle of Novara, at which Charles Albert was humbled to the dust, and the Austrian sway in Lombardy was restored.

On the evening of his defeat, the 23rd March, 1849, the unhappy king of Sardinia abdicated in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel. "This is my last day," he said; "let me die. I have sacrificed myself to the Italian cause. For it I have exposed my life, that of my children, and my throne. I have failed, and remain the sole obstacle to a peace now necessary to the state." Having said these words, he dismissed his attendants, wrote a farewell letter to his wife, and at one o'clock in the morning went over to the Austrian lines. As Count de Barge, a Piedmontese officer on leave, he was allowed to pass on to Nice, whence he reached Portugal, where he remained until his death. His son has lived to fulfil more than all the hopes and wishes of this patriot king. The democrats of Italy fought hard for their principles, but strove in vain to keep the trophies. Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Two Sicilies, yielded one after the other to the power of Austria, until Rome remained the sole refuge of the Italian republic. The triumvirate which governed her, consisting of Mazzini, Armellini, and Saffi, was greatly strengthened by Garibaldi, who had returned from the war in Sardinia, and by Avezzana, who had been driven from Genoa. But France (now under the government of Prince Louis Napoleon) sent a military force under General Oudinot to take possession of the Eternal City. The Italian patriots, strongly suspecting that their neighbour republicans were not altogether friendly to their cause, resisted and repelled their invasion, only, however, to be again attacked with fatal success. The French possession of Rome dates from 3rd July, 1849. In the following month Venice, and the gallant Daniel Manin, capitulated to the Austrians, and Italy returned once more under the dominion of her ancient rulers, conscious, nevertheless, of having made a great advance morally towards national unity and independence. The fulfilment of her aspirations she was destined to owe in great measure to the ruler of France, who in exile

had been a member of her secret societies, and had there learned the art that enabled him to maintain a lofty position in the world for more than twenty years. The Austrian government, however, had to encounter rebellion in other quarters besides Italy. Her German and Hungarian subjects raised the standard of revolt, and achieved so many important successes, that the house of Hapsburg seemed doomed, when Nicholas, the autocrat of all the Russias, came to the rescue with overwhelming force, and overturned the democratic government established in Hungary under the presidency of the great orator Kossuth. The civil war in Hungary, be it noted, turned upon questions of race and nationality, rather than on the distribution of political power, just as national unity was found ultimately to be a stronger motive to revolution with the Italians and Germans than mere forms of government. In the smaller German states the revolutionary shock which overthrew Louis Philippe acted with extraordinary rapidity and force. The sovereigns taken by surprise offered no resistance, and the conservative element of society, though destined soon to recover its vigour, seemed suddenly dissolved. The grand duke of Baden publicly acknowledged the sovereignty of the people, and established a national guard; the king of Würtemburg abolished feudal rights, and also accepted civic guards; the king of Saxony appointed a liberal ministry, and convoked the Chambers for the purpose of settling a new constitution; the king of Bavaria not only parted for a time with his unworthy favourite Lola Montes, but subsequently abdicated his throne. Belgium and Holland escaped the convulsion by reasonable concessions. King Leopold frankly told the Chamber of Deputies at Brussels, that he only valued his crown because it had been given to him by popular election; and that if they liked to have it back again, it was at their disposal. In Prussia the agitation was very great. The scholarly and amiable king sympathized in many points with the German liberals, and committed himself somewhat too hastily to the popular view. In a proclamation issued by him on the 18th March, 1848, he said: "Above all we demand that Germany shall be transformed from a federation of states into one federal state. We demand a general military system for Germany—a federal army assembled under one federal banner, and we hope to see a federal commander-in-chief at its head." A federal tribunal, a common law of settlement, the abolition of all custom-houses impeding internal commerce, a general Zollverein for the whole of Germany, and uniformity of weights, measures, and money, formed other material points of the royal proclamation. For the execution of this just and liberal programme a firm hand was needed, and a mind thoroughly made up as to the course to be followed. Such was not the case with King Frederick William. In the midst of the joyful demonstration caused by his prompt concessions, a tumult arose, in which several persons were killed by the troops, and more wounded. The sincere regret of the king at what he thought a lamentable accident, emboldened the republican party to push forward their pretensions. The dead bodies of the citizens killed on the 18th March were on the 22nd paraded with great pomp before the royal palace, where his majesty from the balcony bowed his head as the lifeless remains were carried by. A national guard was established in Berlin, and the king announced his intention of putting himself at the head of a restored and united Germany. "His Majesty," said his minister in the assembly of Prussian Estâtes, "has promised a real constitutional charter, and we are assembled to lay the foundation stone of the enduring edifice. We hope that the work will proceed rapidly, and that it will perfect a great constitutional system for the whole German race." Prussia, however, was not as yet destined to be the instrument of this great work.

The popular party had succeeded in gathering at Frankfort an assembly of three hundred representatives, to which was given the name of the "Vor Parlament." This body decided the form of election to the German National Assembly, which was to meet at Frankfort in May, the members being returned on the radical principle of electoral districts—one deputy for every 7000 voters. The Assembly, when duly constituted, elected a regent of United Germany in the person of Archduke John of Austria. The choice was highly distasteful to the Prussian court, and King Frederick William soon began to show that his ardent liberalism was tempered by events. The counsels of his brother, then Crown Prince, now King William, a conservative in principle, exercised considerable influence over him. Armed force was employed to control the radical members of the Parliament assembled in Berlin, and it was not long before

similar treatment was brought to bear upon the national representatives gathered at Frankfort. In September, 1848, a revolt of the democrats in Frankfort against the national government was put down by Prussian and other federal soldiers. A similar insurrection in Baden, under the leadership of Struve, was suppressed with corresponding vigour. Altogether the German National Assembly did not prosper. Its aims were greater than its power to attain them. To Austria, especially, the democratic nature of the constitution propounded was extremely distasteful. So also was the growing importance of Prussia, whom Austria, in Metternich's time, had succeeded in relegating to a subordinate position in German affairs. As the dangers which threatened monarchy in 1848 diminished, the dualism of Austria and Prussia came out in stronger light, to the disadvantage of the National Assembly and its great work—German unification. The men assembled at Frankfort were stigmatized as a body of professors unacquainted with practical politics. While the revolutionary impulse was upon them and behind them, the idea of unity exercised a potency that seemed likely to give it permanence in the heart and mind of the nation. But these worthy gentlemen lost invaluable time in debating over paragraphs of the constitution, and fencing round principles of law and right, until their antagonists, the existing governments, regained strength, and "the ideal fabric of a new Germany dissolved like a castle in the clouds." In March, 1849, when the Assembly voted that the king of Prussia should be requested to become emperor of Germany, that monarch politely declined the honour; the Archduke John immediately resigned the office of regent, and the government at Vienna openly set at nought the Assembly, from which a few days later 121 Austrian members altogether withdrew. The rest of the Assembly split in two—part remaining in Frankfort, part going to Stuttgard. The latter made some noisy attempts to democratize the institutions of the country, and were extinguished by the Würtemburg police. Thus the celebrated Frankfort assembly finally broke up, having sown precious seed in the popular mind, and laid the groundwork of a federal constitution which one day or other should be made compatible with the benefit of the whole country and the rights of single states—no easy task.

It became more and more evident that no unity was possible in Germany while two powers so nearly matched were rival competitors for the leadership. Whatever was undertaken or promoted by Prussia was either secretly or openly opposed by Austria. "Germany," says Dr. Strauss, "fell into the condition of a waggon with one horse before and another of equal strength behind, pulling one against the other, with no hope of moving." In 1850 these powers went so far as to attempt to make two confederacies: Prussia had her union of princes (twenty-two and more) at Erfurth, while Austria collected her royal supporters at Munich, and matters were brought to a crisis by both parties interfering in a dispute which the elector of Cassel had with his Chamber of Representatives. Prussia having sided with the Chamber, and Austria with the sovereign, both sent into his territory troops, which were on the verge of a collision that would have anticipated 1866, when the emperor of Russia interposed his authority, and secured the treaty of Olmutz. Germany resumed for a time its former shape, as settled by the Confederation treaty of 1815, and the old Diet met again at Frankfort in May, 1851. The vexed question of Schleswig and Holstein was also settled upon its ancient basis. After a sharp war, in which the Danes gained the victories of Fredericia and Idstedt, the insurgent German population returned to their allegiance without abandoning their claim to separate constitutions, as parts of the German Confederation. The battle of Idstedt was one of the first occasions on which the needle gun was employed in war. That terrible instrument was destined to play no mean part in the work of "blood and iron," by which alone the "thirty-seven rags" of Central Europe, as Max Müller expresses it, were to be sewed together in one strong garment of German unity. One important bond uniting the separate states had been patiently woven by Prussia in the course of years. It was the Zollverein, or Custom's Union, commenced in 1818, and gradually extended by treaty to an extent of country bounded by the Netherlands and Russia, by the Baltic, Switzerland, and Bohemia. Throughout this wide territory freedom of commerce has now prevailed for years, and a commodity, whether for consumption or transit, that has once passed the frontier of the league, may be conveyed without let or hindrance throughout its whole extent. The trials endured by Austria in the year of revolution, and her war of nationalities between Teuton and Magyar, have been alluded to, and will be again treated of hereafter.

Engraved by W. Holl from a [illegible]graph

CHAPTER II.

Rise of Napoleon III.—His youth and training—Worship of Napoleon I.—Descent on Strasburg—His capture and examination—His character drawn by Mr. Kinglake—Expedition to Boulogne—Louis Napoleon a prisoner—Tried by Chamber of Peers—His defence—Imprisonment at Ham—Faith in his Star—Promoter of the Nicaraguan Canal—Escape from prison not much regarded—Residence in England—Revolution of February—Election of Louis Napoleon to the Assembly—Unfavourable impression made by him—Elected President by Universal Suffrage—Differences with the Assembly—Coup d'État of 2nd December, 1851—Arrest of leading Generals and Deputies—Massacre of the people in Paris—The President's oath and speech—Antagonism of rural and urban population of France—Proclamation of 2nd December—The Empire is peace—Napoleon III. voted Emperor—Married to Countess Eugenie Teba—Difficulties in the East—Keys of the Church in Jerusalem—Differences with Russia—Crimean War—Peace of Paris—De Tocqueville on Napoleon—Austria and Italy—Felice Orsini—Attempt to assassinate the Emperor and Empress—Vapouring of French Colonels against England—Lord Palmerston's Conspiracy Bill defeated—Sardinia—Her Minister at the Paris Congress—Sketch of Count Cavour and his Policy—His opposition to Mazzini—Gioberti—D'Azeglio—Victor Emmanuel—Cavour's interview with the Emperor at Plombières—Differences between France and Austria—New Year's Day, 1859—Baron Hübner—Retrospect of events in Austria from 1848 to 1859—Preparations in Piedmont—Ultimatum sent from Vienna to Piedmont—War begun—Battles of Magenta, Solferino, San Martino—Armistice—Interview of the Emperors at Villafranca—Peace preliminaries—Treaty of Zurich—Indignation in Italy—Resignation of Cavour—Rulers of the Central Provinces deposed—Farini—Ricasoli—Cipriani—Cavour reinstated in office—Parliament of Italy—Garibaldi—Sicily—Naples—The Kingdom of Italy—Rome.

It is necessary now to give an outline of the career of that remarkable man who exercised so much influence over events in Europe for the following twenty years—Napoleon III.

Born at Paris in 1808, he was but seven years old when he last saw his uncle the emperor, at Malmaison, during the Hundred Days. On the banishment of his family from France the same year, he accompanied his mother Hortense, ex-queen of Holland, to Geneva, thence to Aix in Savoy, to Carlsruhe, and to Augsbourg. In the last-named ancient German city he was a student at the gymnasium, and became an enthusiastic admirer of Schiller, one of whose poems he subsequently translated into French. When of sufficient age he served as an officer in the Swiss federal army. After the French revolution of 1830 he asked permission to re-enter France, which was refused. He and his elder brother then joined the Italians of Romagna in a struggle for independence. The brother died of his wounds, and Louis, after a dangerous illness, escaped with his mother to Paris, which they were ordered forthwith to quit. After a brief visit to England, he returned to his mother's house on Lake Constance, the Château d'Arenenberg. In 1831 the Poles offered him the dangerous distinction of being their leader in insurrection against Russia, but before he could reach Warsaw that city had been captured. The death of the duke of Reichstadt in 1832 left him heir to the first Napoleon; and as Louis Philippe persistently turned a deaf ear to his solicitations for leave to reside in France, thoughts of entering his native country by other means began to press upon his mind. That the prince had reasons for wishing to re-enter France that fully justified the king's prohibition, the sequel will show. He was a diligent student and a busy writer, with a subtle and penetrating brain, subject to the influences of a vague, cloudy imagination, and an indecisive, not to say irresolute will. He paid great attention to artillery and engineering, and though he wrote and published many things of historical and literary interest, his best work is one entitled "Studies on the Past and Future of Artillery." For the memory of his uncle he entertained a feeling nearly allied to worship, and relied upon the magic of his name for doing great things some day. The throne of the citizen king was not very firm. Abominable plots and attempts at regicide were frequently coming to light, and the king, with a shortsighted deference to the national vanity, encouraged the popular worship of Napoleon I. by erecting monuments to his memory, placing his portrait in public buildings, and finally by bringing his remains from the grave in St. Helena to be buried with great pomp in Paris. This was playing into the hands of the sombre watcher on the Castle of Arenenberg. The first attempt made by the young pretender to seize the throne of France was ridiculously inadequate to the occasion. He trusted almost entirely to the magic of the name Napoleon, which he

seemed to think would produce as startling an effect as did the emperor's return from Elba in 1815. Leaving his home on the 25th October, 1836, for Strasburg, the wheel of his carriage came off at Lahr, delaying his project for a day, and filling a mind much given to ponderings on destiny with the weight of an evil omen. He reached Strasburg on the 28th, at eleven o'clock at night, and having gained over Colonel Vaudrey and about a dozen officers, he went next morning at six o'clock to the artillery barracks, where he was received with some cheers. Proceeding further with a band of music before him, he tried to impose himself and his cause on General Voirol, but without success. That stout-hearted soldier had the prince arrested. The examination which followed throws some light on the Napoleonian ideas of that time:—"What urged you to act as you have done?" "My political opinions and a wish to see my country again, of which foreign invasion had deprived me. In 1830 I asked to be received as a simple citizen, and I was treated as a pretender; very well, I have now behaved like a pretender." "You wanted to set up a military government?" I wished to set up a government founded on popular election." Having declared that he alone assumed all responsibility of the movement, he was removed to Paris, and by the 21st November was on board a frigate bound for America, dismissed from custody with a royal clemency that smacked strongly of contempt.

Here will be seen the force of Mr. Kinglake's estimate of the prince's character:—"He had boldness of the kind which is produced by reflection, rather than that which is the result of temperament. In order to cope with the extraordinary perils into which he now and then thrust himself, and to cope with them dexterously, there was wanted a fiery quality which nature had refused to the great bulk of mankind as well as to him. But it was only in emergencies of a really trying sort, and involving instant physical danger, that his boldness fell short. He had all the courage which would have enabled him in a private station of life to pass through the common trials of the world with honour unquestioned; but he had besides now and then a factitious kind of audacity produced by long dreamy meditation; and when he had wrought himself into that state, he was apt to expose his firmness to trials beyond his strength. His imagination had so great a sway over him as to make him love the idea of enterprises, but it had not strength enough to give him a foreknowledge of what his sensations would be in the hour of trial." There is much justice in this elaborate analysis of character, as events have amply proved. The love of imaginary enterprise, which made the prince a participator in the Eglinton Tournament, was the same ingredient in his character as that which led him to his second descent upon France. This singular transaction, which only escapes the epithet of ludicrous from its having been the cause of an honest man's death, took place at Boulogne on the 6th of August, 1840. After a few months' stay in New York the prince had returned to Europe in the autumn of 1837, to be present at his mother's death, and subsequently, in consequence of representations made by the French government to the government of Switzerland, he had quitted the latter country to reside in England.

The following is a contemporary account of what was characterized as an "insane expedition:" The prince having hired, as for a voyage of pleasure, the *Edinburgh Castle* steamer from the Commercial Steam Navigation Company, embarked from London in August, accompanied by about fifty men, among whom were General Montholon, Colonels Voisin, Laborde, Montauban, and Parquin, and several other officers of inferior rank. At three o'clock on the morning of the sixth they landed at Wimereux, a small port about two leagues from Boulogne, and directed their march to that town, where they arrived about five o'clock. They distributed their proclamations to every body they met, and strewed five franc pieces to a rabble which preceded them. After traversing the lower town, they at length reached the barracks, where they found a company or two of the 42nd regiment of the line just rising from their beds. The soldiers, assured that a revolution had been effected in Paris, and summoned to join the eagle of the Empire, were for some time puzzled as to how they should act. One of their officers, however, hurrying to the barracks, relieved the men from their perplexity, and they recognized his authority. Louis Napoleon drew a pistol, and attempted to shoot the inopportune intruder; the shot took effect upon a soldier, who died in the course of the day. After this fruitless experiment, an attempt

was made on the post of St. Nicholas, which was occupied by four men and a sergeant. This post was firm, and would not yield. The prince then directed his march on the Upper Town, but found the gate which opens on the Esplanade shut before he reached it. Forced to make a tour round the town, the prince took the Calais road to the Colonne de Napoleon, which one of his party entered by breaking open the door at the foot, and, mounting to the top, placed their flag upon it. General Montholon and Colonel Parquin went to the port, expecting to have better success with the maritime part of the population, but they were there arrested by the commissary of police.

The town authorities and national guard then went in pursuit of the prince, who, being intercepted on the side of the column, made for the beach, with the view to embark and regain the packet in which he had arrived. He took possession of the life-boat; but scarcely had his followers got into it when the national guard also arrived on the beach, and discharged a volley on the boat, which immediately upset, and the whole company tumbled into the sea. In the meantime, the steam-packet was already taken possession of by the lieutenant of the port. The prince was then made prisoner, and three hours after his attempt on Boulogne he and his followers were in the castle prison.

The prince was removed to the castle of Ham, and placed in the rooms once occupied by Prince Polignac. The most ludicrous feature of the exhibition is omitted by the chronicler; namely, that the pretender bore with him a trained eagle, that was to fly from his arms to Paris, an emblem of his victorious march thither, and a living souvenir of the first empire. Tried before the Chamber of Peers, in September, the prince delivered an able speech, evidently the fruit of much study, and intended to interest his hearers in the Bonapartist claims. His peroration terminated with words that have been often quoted; words that made a profound, if unwholesome impression, on the martial mind of France, while they revealed the secret of a line of conduct that was to lead the utterer to a throne, and of a subsequent policy that was to end in his captivity. "One last word, gentlemen!" he said; "I represent before you a principle, a cause, and a defeat: the principle is the sovereignty of the people; the cause is the empire; the defeat, Waterloo. The principle you have acknowledged; the cause you have served. The defeat you wish to avenge." This appeal to the coarsest national instincts sank into the minds of numberless Frenchmen, and bore fruit after many days. The prince was condemned to perpetual imprisonment, and removed with General Montholon and Dr. Conneau to the castle of Ham, where he employed his enforced leisure in study and literary composition. One of his lucubrations, viewed by the light of recent events, possesses just now a peculiar interest. It was a paper contributed by him on the 7th May, 1843, to a journal called *Progrés du Pas de Calais*, for which he wrote several articles at different times, and it sets forth very clearly the great superiority of the military organization of Prussia over that of France. He describes the four great elements of the Prussian forces, the army, the reserve, the landwehr, and the landsturm, and adds, "Thus Prussia, whose population scarcely amounts to two-fifths of that of France, is enabled for the defence of her territory to call into action 530,000 trained men, and this armed force does not cost her 50,000,000 francs a year, while a few taps of the drum suffice to make these troops assemble or return to their homes." After condemning the conscription as a "white slave trade, briefly defined as the purchase of a man by him who has the means to obtain remission from military service, and thus to send a man of the people to be killed in his stead;" he says, "In Prussia there are no substitutes," and proceeds to develop a plan by which France, if she were to adopt the Prussian system, would possess for the defence of the country an army of a million and a half of men, and costing less to the national exchequer than the then existing army of 344,000 men. Most remarkable is the conclusion of the article:—"Subtracting the 30,000 men required in Algeria, 14,000 gendarmes, the veterans and the garrisons of Paris and of Lyons, France would not be able to bring 200,000 men into line upon the frontiers, while upon the line of the Rhine alone upwards of 500,000 could be collected against her in less than a fortnight." What strange mental blindness and perversity can it have been that hid from the eyes of the emperor of 1870 the momentous facts which were so clearly visible to the meditative prisoner of Ham twenty-seven years before? An authentic anecdote is related of him at this time, which serves to illustrate the strong faith he had

in his star or destiny. The leading dentist in Paris, an American, went to see the prince professionally during his incarceration at Ham. At the moment of separating there happened to be a heavy shower of rain. "I have not even an umbrella to lend you," said the captive; "yet, do you know, I am persuaded that I shall one day be emperor of the French!"

In 1846 the prince was invited to undertake the guidance of a project for uniting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by a ship canal in Nicaragua. At the same period his father, the ex-king of Holland, fell seriously ill at Florence. Unable to obtain his release from the French government, he took measures for escaping from prison, and with the aid of his physician, Conneau, he walked out of the prison gate in the disguise of a workman on the morning of the 25th May, 1846. "We cannot," said a writer of the time, and a supporter of the government of M. Thiers, "we cannot speak of the escape of the Prince Louis Napoleon as of a political event. The liberty of that singular pretender is no more a danger to public order than his captivity was a guarantee of it." The writer of these contemptuous words shared with many others in the ignorance of a potential element of mischief that was latent in the mass of French society, in the form of worship of Napoleon Bonaparte. M. Thiers himself was one of those who by their writings encouraged this false idolatry, and revived a cruel lust for military glory, by playing upon which Prince Louis at length gained his ends. After his escape, abandoning the Nicaraguan scheme, he resided in England, awaiting and watching events. At length, on the 24th of February, 1848, he learnt in the manner already described, that his hour had come. With characteristic indecision, however, he still waited, and even after being elected a member of the National Assembly by five or six different constituencies he declined, in the face of a very slight opposition, to take his place in the Chamber. After the awful purification which the Republic underwent in the murderous insurrection of June, fresh elections ensued, and Louis Napoleon, returned by five several departments at once, took his seat on the 17th September. He found himself, says one biographer, face to face with three clearly defined conditions; to wit, the hostility of the Executive, the distrust of the Assembly, the confidence of the Electorate. The two first he had to subdue, the last to strengthen and extend. His reception by the Chamber was not encouraging. His impassive countenance, German accent, and slow utterance, gave little promise of intellectual power. "He is a wooden-headed fellow," said M. Thiers. "I will not," said M. Thouret in his presence, "do pretenders the honour to think aught of them individually." Nevertheless, the election of President of the Republic by universal suffrage was at hand, and on the 10th December the prince was raised to that distinction by five and a half million votes. Having thus conquered the "hostility of the Executive," whom he had supplanted, he prepared for his encounter with the mistrustful Assembly, whom he overthrew after three years' struggle by a conspiracy that has been described with highly coloured embellishments in the first volume of Mr. Kinglake's celebrated "History of the Invasion of the Crimea." The actual Assembly called the Constituent, to which Louis Napoleon was first sent as deputy, was dissolved in May, 1849, and a new Assembly—the Legislative—elected. It was in this body, better disposed though it was to the chief of the state, that M. Ledru Rollin and the Mountain proposed an impeachment of the president and his ministers for having violated the constitution by their intervention at Rome. Some tumult ensued (13th June, 1849), and Paris for a while was placed under martial law. The Right or moderate section of the Chamber succeeded, on the other hand, in placing some restriction on the universality of the suffrage, and evinced a determination to control the supplies. The president, on his side, made progresses through the provinces, where he delivered conciliatory speeches. He also caressed the army, granting them indulgences of wine and cigars, and sought popularity in every possible way. Not having obtained the confidence of any leading statesmen or distinguished members of the best class of society, he was resolved to place his reliance on the "confidence of the Electorate" already spoken of; and associating himself with certain adventurous spirits, who had everything to gain by the change, and little to lose in case of failure, he prepared the celebrated coup d'état of 1851. On the Monday night, says Mr. Kinglake, between the 1st and the 2nd of December, the president had his usual assembly at the Elysée. Ministers who were loyally ignorant of what was going on, were mingled with those who were in the plot. Vieyra was present. He was spoken to by the president, and he undertook that the

national guard should not beat to arms that night. He went away, and it is said that he fulfilled his humble task by causing the drums to be mutilated. At the usual hour the assembly began to disperse, and by eleven o'clock there were only three guests who remained. These were Morny (who had previously taken care to show himself at one of the theatres), Maupas, and St. Arnaud, formerly Le Roy. There was, besides, an orderly officer of the president, called Colonel Beville, who was initiated in the secret. Persigny, it seems, was not present.

Morny, Maupas, and St. Arnaud went with the president into his cabinet; Colonel Beville followed them. Mocquard, the private secretary of the president, was in the secret, but it does not appear that he was in the room at this time. Fleury too, it seems, was away; he was probably on an errand which tended to put an end to the hesitation of his more elderly comrades, and drive them to make the venture. They were to strike the blow that night.

The president intrusted a packet of letters to Colonel Beville, and despatched him to the state printing office. These papers were the proclamations required for the early morning, and M. St. Georges, the director, gave orders to put them into type. They said that there was something like resistance; but in the end, if not at first, the printers obeyed. Each compositor stood, whilst he worked, between two policemen, and the manuscript being cut into many pieces, no one could make out what he was printing. By these proclamations the president asserted that the Assembly was a hot-bed of plots; declared it dissolved; pronounced for universal suffrage; proposed a new constitution; vowed anew that his duty was to maintain the Republic; and placed Paris and the twelve surrounding departments under martial law.

In one of the proclamations he appealed to the army, and strove to whet its enmity against civilians, by reminding it of the defeats inflicted upon the troops in 1830 and 1848. The president wrote letters dismissing the members of the government who were not in the plot; but he did not cause these letters to be delivered until the following morning. He also signed a paper appointing Morny to the Home Office.

At six o'clock a brigade of infantry, under Forey, occupied the Quai d'Orsay, and other troops in considerable force occupied important points in the capital. Almost at the same time Maupas, chief of the police, who had been instructed to arrest the disaffected, had his orders carefully obeyed. At the appointed minute, and whilst it was still dark, the designated houses were entered. The most famous generals of France were seized. General Changarnier, General Bedeau, General Lamoriciere, General Cavaignac, and General Leflô, were taken from their beds and carried away through the sleeping city, and thrown into prison. In the same minute the like was done with some of the chief officers of the Assembly, and amongst others with Thiers, Miot, Baze, Colonel Charras, Roger du Nord, and several of the democratic leaders. Some men, believed to be the chiefs of secret societies, were also seized. The number of men thus seized in the dark was seventy-eight. Eighteen of these were members of the Assembly. When the light of the morning dawned, people saw the proclamations on the walls, and slowly came to hear that numbers of the foremost men of France had been seized in the night-time, and that every general to whom the friends of law and order could look for help was lying in one or other of the prisons. The newspapers to which a man might run in order to know, and know truly, what others thought and intended, were all seized and stopped. The gates of the Assembly were closed and guarded. In the course of the morning the president, accompanied by his uncle Jerome Bonaparte and Count Flahault, and attended by many general officers and a numerous staff, rode through some of the streets of Paris. Upon the whole, the reception he met with seems to have been neither friendly nor violently hostile, but chilling, and in a quiet way scornful. Prince Louis rode home, and went in out of sight. Thenceforth, for the most part, he remained close shut up in the Elysée. There, in an inner room, still decked in red trousers, but with his back to the day-light, they say he sat bent over a fireplace for hours and hours together, resting his elbows on his knees, and burying his face in his hands.

The remnant of the Assembly, to the number of 220 deputies, having met at the mayoralty of the tenth arrondissement, was driven out and marched between files of soldiery through the streets to the D'Orsay barracks, where they were held in custody. At a quarter before ten o'clock at night a large number of the windowless vans which are used for

the transport of felons were brought into the court of the barracks, and into these 230 members were thrust. They were carried off, some to the fort of Mount Valerian, some to the fortress of Vincennes, and some to the prison of Mazas. Still, there was a remnant of the old insurrectionary forces, which was willing to try the experiment of throwing up a few barricades. Having formed a Committee of Resistance, several members of the Assembly went into the Faubourg St. Antoine, and strove to raise the people. They also caused barricades to be thrown up in that mass of streets between the Hotel de Ville and the Bouvelard, which is the accustomed centre of an insurrection in Paris.

In the afternoon of the 4th, numbers of spectators, including many women, crowded the foot pavement. These gazers had no reason for supposing that they incurred any danger, for they could see no one with whom the army would have to contend. According to some, a shot was fired from a window or a house-top near the Rue du Sentier. Some of the soldiery in reply fired point blank into the mass of spectators who stood gazing upon them from the foot pavement, and the rest of the troops fired up at the gay crowded windows and balconies. Of the people on the foot pavement who were not struck down at first, some rushed away and strove to find a shelter, or even a half shelter, at any spot within reach. Others tried to crawl away on their hands and knees, for they hoped that perhaps the balls might fly over them. The impulse to shoot people had been sudden, but was not momentary. The soldiers loaded and reloaded with a strange industry, and made haste to kill and kill, as though their lives depended upon the quantity of the slaughter they could get through in some given period of time. They broke into many houses, hunted the inmates from floor to floor, caught them at last and slaughtered them. These things, no doubt, they did under a notion that shots had been fired from the house which they entered, but it is certain that in almost all these instances, if not in every one of them, the impression was false. The whole number of people killed by the troops during the forty hours which followed upon the commencement of the massacre of the Boulevards will never be known. The burying of the bodies was done for the most part at night. In the army which did these things, the whole number of killed was twenty-five. Before the morning of the 5th, the armed insurrection had ceased. The fate of the provinces resembled the fate of the capital.

These are the things which Charles Louis Napoleon did. What he had sworn to do was set forth in the oath which he took on the 20th of December, 1848. On that day he stood before the National Assembly, and lifting his right arm towards Heaven thus swore:—"In the presence of God, and before the French people represented by the National Assembly, I swear to remain faithful to the democratic republic, one and indivisible, and to fulfil all the duties which the constitution imposes upon me."

What he had pledged his honour to do was set forth in the promise which of his own free will he addressed to the Assembly. Reading from a paper which he had prepared, he uttered these words:—"The votes of the nation, and the oath which I have just taken, command my future conduct. My duty is clear. I will fulfil it as a man of honour. I shall regard as enemies of the country all those who endeavour to change, by illegal means, that which all France has established."

So little did oaths and declarations avail to secure the constitution, when craft and force united to overturn it. Yet all the guile and violence of the world would not have achieved this sad victory had there not been developed in the French nation principles of division, that form a potent auxiliary to every usurper and every political adventurer that knows but how to use them. There are, says an able publicist, in France two intense political passions—the passion of property among the country peasants, and the passion for socialism among the town *ouvriers*. And, unhappily, these passions are entirely opposed. "Socialism" is an obscure term, and the idea in the minds of those who cleave to it is of the vaguest and wildest kind; still, on the whole, it means a system wishing to amend property—a system incompatible with present property. The passionate part of the Republicans in 1848, the only part of them who were eager and many, meant more or less distinctly what Louis Blanc said distinctly. He aimed avowedly at a system in which wages received should be proportionate, not to work done, but to wants felt. He would have given a man with many children much, and a man with few children little; and he would have taxed without limit existing property for that object. A still more violent reasoner invented the celebrated

phrase *La propriété, c'est le vol*, or "Property is robbery." And this is only a strict deduction from the elementary wish of socialists that all men are to "start fair." In that case all inherited property is unjust, and all gifts among the living by which the children of the rich become better off than the children of the poor are unjust too. Both violate the equality of the start; both make life an adjusted and "handicapped" race—an existence where accidental advantages impair or outweigh intrinsic qualities. Roughly it may be said that the main desire of the city socialists in France, on grounds more or less honest, is to attack property; and that the sole desire of the country peasants is, on grounds more or less selfish, to maintain property. And between the two how can you mediate? or out of the two combined how can you make anything? The antagonism is as perfect as between *plus* and *minus*: you can make up no compound; you can find no intermediate term; you must choose between the two.

The selection can, we fear, only be made by force; hitherto at least it has been so. Paris is France for the purpose of making a government, but it is not France for the purpose of keeping a government. The Parisians put in a Republic by revolution resting more or less on socialism and the artisans. The Republic, as its nature requires, appeals to the people—that is, to the country. In response to the appeal back comes an assembly full of dislike to the socialistic Republic, above all things anxious for property, full of the panic of the proprietary peasantry. And then begins the strife between the conservative Chamber and the innovating mob—a strife which is too keen and internecine to be confined to words only, which soon takes to arms and to the streets, and settles the victory there. If the Republic asks France not for a Chamber, but for a president, the result will be the same in essence. The President Louis Napoleon was the nominee of the country, while the Republic was the choice of the towns.

The proclamation which greeted the waking eyes of the Parisians on that 2nd December, 1851, contained the following five propositions, on which France was required to vote "aye" or "no" by universal suffrage. 1. A responsible chief, elected for ten years. 2. A cabinet appointed by him alone. 3. A council of state, consisting of the most eminent men, who are to prepare the laws which are to be introduced, and support them before the legislative body. 4. A legislative body named by universal suffrage, without any scrutiny of the votes. 5. A second assembly formed of all the eminent men in the country, at once the guardians of the fundamental paction and the public liberties. These proposals, which, to a people in mortal terror of socialism and the red revolution, seemed plausible enough, were voted for by 7,481,231 hands, and practically secured imperial power to Louis Napoleon. The simple issue of *aye* or *no* left the people little choice. A large deportation also of ultra-republicans, to the extent of 30,000 men, helped to paralyze the intellectual and political independence of the country. The voters of *no* amounted to no more than 684,399. Thus by an overwhelming majority France closed the convulsions of the revolution of 1848 by a military despotism based on universal suffrage. A great crime was committed, but surviving France had peace for a time, and material prosperity returned to her. Again, in the summer of 1852, the president made a progress through the provinces, and at Bordeaux delivered a speech which revealed his intention to make further changes:—"France seems to wish to return to the Empire" he said, "but a certain fear exists which I would dispel. Certain persons say that the Empire means war, but I say the Empire means peace! Peace because France wishes it; and when France is satisfied, the world is tranquil." After this the senate, on the 7th of November, voted the re-establishment of the Empire, which decision was confirmed by another plebiscitum, in which there were 7,824,189 affirmative votes; and on the 1st December, 1852, the prince president was solemnly proclaimed at St. Cloud to be "Napoleon III., by the grace of God and the will of the people, Emperor of the French." In the following month (29th January, 1853), the emperor married Eugenie Marie de Guzman, comtesse de Teba, a lady with Scotch blood in her veins, and twenty-seven years of age. Thus enthroned and domesticated the *parvenu*, as his Majesty described himself, in announcing his marriage to the Senate, sought to strengthen his position by occupying his people in a foreign war. England, in the person of Lord Palmerston, had been in haste to recognize his accession to the imperial throne, and England would serve well if she could be drawn into a close alliance, offensive and defensive. The reader who wishes to know how such

an alliance was brought about, is referred to Mr. Kinglake's History, which, though exaggerated in tone and bitter in temper, is substantially correct as regards the main facts. English jealousy of Russian power in the East was the moral engine used to draw her into the Crimean war. That England "drifted" into that war without good reason, and at a vain sacrifice of blood and treasure, is now generally admitted. Its history in brief is this:—It had long been the annual practice of Christians of the Latin and of the Greek church to make a pilgrimage to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, and when there in numbers sufficient, to show their mutual animosity by a quarrelsome tumult that had to be suppressed by the Mahometan soldiers of the Sultan. The czar of Russia, self-elected protector of the Greek Church, demanded possession of this church, and the emperor of the French, self-elected patron of the Romish church, also demanded the key. The general question of the protection of and influence with the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte underlay this petty squabble. The Czar, with a covetous eye on Constantinople, revealed to the English ambassador at his court, that in his opinion Turkey was like a sick man, the division of whose inheritance it would be well to anticipate. He hinted pretty plainly that England might take Egypt, if Russia were allowed to take Constantinople. The publication of this imprudent conversation created much ill feeling between the countries. Russia pushed her claims upon Turkey for fresh privileges to the Christians under Ottoman rule. The Porte, learning that France and England would give support, assumed a determined aspect, and resented an affront offered to the Sultan by the Czar's envoy Prince Mentschikoff. Hereupon Russian troops crossing the river Pruth entered Turkish territory, and the English and French fleets approached the Dardanelles. The Turks had a fleet at Sinope in the Black Sea, which the Russians surprised and burnt to the water's edge. Indignation was roused in the West by this act of destruction, and war began in earnest. At Sevastopol in the Crimea the Russians had built at enormous cost a very strong fortress, which, commanding the Black Sea, was a perpetual menace to Turkey. Against this a joint expedition was undertaken in September, 1854, by the naval and military forces of England, France, and Turkey, with the subsequent addition, early in 1855, of a contingent furnished by the king of Sardinia. The victorious battle of the Alma (20th September, 1854), was followed by the tedious siege of Sevastopol, which lasted 330 days, having cost many thousand lives from cold and disease, as much as from the bullet and the sword. The battles of Balaclava, Inkermann, and Tchernaya were brilliant episodes in this siege. Czar Nicholas being dead, his son Alexander II., after the fall of Sevastopol (September 8, 1855), made peace on easy terms with the allied powers at a congress which met at Paris in February, 1856. England gained little in this contest but the honour of having fought. To the Emperor Napoleon such honour was of great value, as it placed him on a level with the ancient sovereigns of Europe, and revived in a faint degree the remembrance of the first Napoleon. Yet a keen-sighted man and profound politician, the late M. de Tocqueville, formed no high opinion of the emperor's capacity for conducting a great war like this. Speaking of it in 1854, he said:—"The real prime minister is, without doubt, Louis Napoleon himself. But he is not a man of business. He does not understand details. He may order certain things to be done; but he will not be able to ascertain whether the proper means have been taken. He does not know, indeed, what these means are. He does not trust those who do. A war which would have tasked all the power of Napoleon, and of Napoleon's ministers and generals, is to be carried on, without any master mind to direct it, or any good instruments to execute it. I fear some great disaster." If these words had been spoken of the Prussian war, in 1870, they would have been more apt and prophetic.

Since the reconquest of Italy by Austria in 1849, the elements of revolt had been fermenting. The secret societies laboured to bring about a republic in obedience to the promptings of their indefatigable leader Mazzini. But the prospects of success seemed to diminish daily, and a rancorous feeling against the man who had driven the triumvirate from Rome, and still held the possession of the Eternal City, urged these impetuous spirits to avenge their wrongs by his death. A plot for the assassination of Napoleon III. was arranged in London, and it fell to the lot of Felice Orsini, an enthusiastic republican of good education, to be the emperor's executioner. Evading the vigilance of the French police, he and three accomplices reached Paris in February, 1858, and on the 14th of that

month, as the emperor and empress were going to the opera in state, three bombs were flung at the cortege and exploded with fatal effect. The imperial carriage was broken, and several passers by and soldiers of the escort were killed and wounded, but the emperor and empress remained unhurt. Great was the indignation that this criminal attempt caused throughout France, not only against the conspirators but against the place of their refuge. England was vilified as being a nest of assassins, and certain vapouring French colonels talked of avenging Waterloo there and then. To the surprise of Englishmen a somewhat dictatorial letter of Count Walewski's on the subject, was not answered with the spirit that men expected from Lord Palmerston, the then minister. On the contrary, a bill was brought into Parliament, in compliance with the wish of the French government, in order to strengthen the law against aliens who should plot against sovereigns in friendly alliance with England. The offence, which had previously been a misdemeanour, was to be made a felony, and to be visited with a punishment proportionately condign. Not unfair in itself, this bill by its occasion excited the anger of the English public; and the House of Commons, responsive to the popular feeling, threw out the bill, and with it Lord Palmerston and the ministry. It is not impossible that this sharp rebuff taught the French emperor, that the *defeat* of which he styled himself the representative, namely, Waterloo, was not just then to be avenged with advantage to himself. The next January revealed other schemes, resulting it may be in part from impressions produced on the mind of the old Carbonaro by Orsini's attack, his language when in prison, and the letter written by him on the eve of execution, in which he called upon the emperor to deliver his country from the yoke of the foreigner. Italy should be freed, and Austria humbled.

Europe had not seen without surprise Sardinian troops taking part in the expedition to the Crimea. The presence of Cavour, the minister of Victor Emmanuel, at the Paris congress, and the language he held there, led sagacious observers to think that more would come of this alliance between Sardinia, France, and England, than then appeared on the surface. At the congress he protested in the name of his government against the new extension of Austrian influence in the Italian peninsula in defiance of treaty stipulations, and averred that if nothing were done to remedy this state of things, grave dangers to the peace of the world might ensue. Count Walewski, president of the congress, taking this protest into consideration, invited the attentive solicitude of the assembled plenipotentiaries to the internal condition of Italy, and in this he was warmly supported by Lord Clarendon, the English envoy. A word or two on Count Cavour will not be misplaced here.

Camillo Benso di Cavour was born at Turin in 1810, five years before the Congress of Vienna had concocted that treaty, the deadly effects of which in Italy he was destined within half a century to counteract. His father held office in Piedmont under Prince Borghese, who married Pauline Bonaparte, the sister of Napoleon I. Young Camillo, being god-child to these high personages, had an early predilection in favour of the Bonaparte family. The revolutionary changes accomplished in Italy under the first Napoleon, in which so many of the divisions of territory disappeared, planted in his mind fruitful ideas favourable to Italian unity. As a boy he served Charles Albert, then known as a liberal, in the capacity of page. While an officer of engineers he was for his free speech on political topics ordered to the fort of Bard for a year, at the expiration of which he resigned his commission, and devoted his mind to the social and political questions of the day. In reply to a letter of condolence at this time (1832), he wrote these prophetic words:—"I thank you for the interest you take in my misfortune; but believe me I shall still accomplish my career in spite of it. I am a very, an enormously ambitious man, and when I am minister I shall justify my ambition; for I tell you, in my dreams I already see myself minister of the kingdom of Italy." On the accession of Charles Albert, the father of Cavour was appointed vicario of Turin, an office involving the charge of the police and the duty of watching the liberal party. The odium connected with this office was partly reflected on the enthusiastic young liberal, who, on the other hand, was disliked by the aristocratic party for his opinions. He went to Geneva, to Paris, to London, and studied the English constitution with great satisfaction and profit. Returning to Italy in 1842, he took part in such social reforms as were feasible, and published many valuable papers on historical subjects and on questions of political economy. As the year 1848 approached, more momentous interests came into

view. Cavour, says Signor Botta, in his admirable discourse on this statesman, regarded the projects of Mazzini as utterly powerless to lighten the burden of domestic rule, and to emancipate the country from foreign domination. A practical man by nature, and a statesman of the school which acknowledges Machiavelli as its founder, and Richelieu and Burke as its great representatives, his policy was not engendered in the secret chambers of conspiracy, but was moulded on a comprehensive knowledge of the forces which patriotism could command, and on the just appreciation of the necessity of the time. Accordingly he believed that the conquest of nationality could only be effected through the harmonizing of many antagonistic interests, and the combination of many clashing tendencies, the control of which depended entirely on slow, patient, and steady action. From the first appearance of Mazzini, he had not only refused to take any part in his futile and spasmodic efforts, but he had unreservedly discouraged and condemned his policy as anti-national, and big with calamities. Regarding the growth of public sentiment as the true regenerative force, he now hailed with delight the favour with which the more conservative views of Cesare Balbo, Massimo d'Azeglio, and Vincenzo Gioberti were received.

These writers, however discordant in minor points, all agreed in urging upon their countrymen the necessity of radically changing the method of revolutionary action, of doing away with all secret conspiracies, and of openly labouring for the attainment of national independence. They strove to enlist in the cause the interest and ambition of the Italian princes, and insisted on the possibility of a compact between them and the states, by which the rulers were to grant concessions calculated to infuse new life into the country, and the people to extend to them the tenure of their power. Had the princes followed that course they would have been thrown into the onward current, and, soon separated from Austria, they would have been forced into a confederation in order to protect themselves from the common enemy, who sooner or later would have been expelled from the peninsula. So, while Mazzini struggled for nationality by attempting to establish a republic—an enterprise rendered impossible by the condition of Europe and Italy herself—the chiefs of the new party proposed to accomplish the same object through the existing monarchy, renovated, however, by constitutional liberty.

Prominent among these leaders was Gioberti. A man of lofty patriotism and saintly character, a philosophical writer of great renown, distinguished by depth, breadth, and novelty of thought, as well as by brilliancy of style, his influence was powerful and salutary. Considering the papal and the Austrian governments as the two main stumbling-blocks to Italian independence, in his works he aimed at the overthrow of both. The Papacy he did not directly attack, as his predecessors in philosophy had done, but he attempted to flank and turn it into the service of the nation. He sketched an ideal Papacy, youthful and vigorous, which he endeavoured to assimilate to the old and worn-out institution of the Vatican, and to place at the head of the Italian movement. The appearance of Pius IX. in the garb of a reformer seemed for a moment to reduce his theory to fact, though in reality it rendered the discrepancies and incongruities between the ideal and the real Papacy more conspicuous and irreconcilable. When Pius IX. abandoned the Italian cause, which as pope he could not consistently support, Gioberti, leaving at once the Papacy to its own destiny, sought other more substantial bases for national existence, and pointed out the house of Savoy as the only hope of Italy.

The project of an Italian confederacy, under the nominal presidency of the pope, and the actual leadership of Sardinia, being the only form of national existence which at that time appeared practicable, was accepted by Cavour, and he shaped his policy accordingly, giving, however, but little importance to the papal element. When the censorship of the press was somewhat relaxed, he established in Turin, in connection with Cesare Balbo and others, the *Risorgimento*, a daily paper, of which he became the chief editor, and which, owing to his skilful management, exerted a great influence on the course of events. In this paper he advocated the independence of Italy, union between princes and people, progressive reform, and a confederation of the Italian states; he developed also those more general principles of free government which he afterwards carried out in his administration. In the beginning of 1848 Cavour took the still more important step of demanding from Charles Albert a constitution for his native state, till then under absolute sway.

Whatever may have been the effect of this communication, it is certain that the constitution was soon after granted, and he who was first to demand it was, within a few years, called to mould it into the corner stone of the liberties of the whole Italian people. Had Charles Albert longer resisted the advancing tide of public opinion, his dynasty would in all probability have been swept away with those of the other Italian rulers. In 1848 he waged war, and issued the famous proclamation by which he placed himself at the head of the revolution, and secured for his state the leadership of the nation. Occupying a commanding position between the Alps and the Mediterranean, inhabited by a people distinguished by their practical sense, vigour of character, and warlike spirit, and ruled by a dynasty whose power in Italy had been gradually augmented during eight centuries, Sardinia seemed peculiarly fitted for the destiny assigned her. From this time she made common cause with the whole nation; and bravely entering into the arena, staked her own existence on the issue. Believing the democratic tendencies of the times utterly ruinous to the national cause, Cavour fearlessly threw himself against the prevailing current of opinion, and thus greatly increased his unpopularity. But this could not deter him from performing what he considered his duty, for he did not belong to that class of politicians whose love of country is subservient to self-interest, and whose object is confined to flattering popular passions and prejudices. It was a striking spectacle to see him at that time, from his seat in the Chamber, defying the storm of hisses and yells with which he was frequently assailed from the galleries. Often he called them to order, or moved that they should be cleared, according to the rules. "I am not to be prevented from speaking," said he on one occasion, "by shouts and hisses. What I believe to be true, that will I speak out. If you compel me to silence, you insult not me alone, but the Chamber; and now I shall proceed:" and with his usual self-possession he resumed his discourse. The disasters of 1848 and 1849 were mainly owing to the want of unity in the pursuit of national independence. As the first campaign had failed through the defection of Pius IX. and other princes, the misfortunes of the second were chiefly due to the attempts of the minority to introduce republican governments into some of the states. So Italy fell; on the plains of Novara, on the lagoons of Venice, within the walls of her ancient capital, she was defeated because she was not united; because while Nice was fighting for the common cause, Naples and Palermo bowed under the iron yoke of the Bourbon, and Rome and Florence allowed themselves to be led astray by the mad hallucinations of Mazzini. With Italy Sardinia was crushed; she saw her king in disguise pass through the camp of the enemy on his way to exile, her standards trailed in the dust, the stronghold of Alessandria garrisoned by the Austrians, her army almost destroyed, her finances ruined, her commerce obstructed, her people distracted, her very existence imperilled. Victor Emmanuel pledged his word to uphold the free institutions of the state, and to retain the leadership of the nation; he intrusted himself and the administration of the country to Massimo d'Azeglio, whose name alone was a symbol of nationality. No man represented the cause more entirely, and none was more fitted to guide the state through that dangerous period. Though born in Turin, he had passed his life chiefly in Rome and Florence, and from the study of Italian history, literature, and art, he had derived that national character by which his career has been so singularly marked.

In 1848 he had laid aside the pencil and the pen for the sword; he had fought gallantly, and had been wounded on the field; and thus prepared both by thought and action, on the accession of Victor Emmanuel he was called to the premiership of the cabinet. His high moral nature, his earnestness, his accomplishments, the simplicity and the refinement of his manners, softened by the influence of literature and the arts, his eloquence, and his devotion to the country, endeared him to the people; while his aristocratic connections, his well known moderation and prudence, and his open opposition to the Mazzini party, rendered him acceptable to the courts of Europe. When reaction menaced the only free state of the peninsula, and the republicans by their futile attempts at revolution seemed bent on precipitating a crisis that would involve the armed intervention of Europe, the constitutional party stood by Azeglio, and opposed the enemies of the constitution both at home and abroad. Thus Sardinia was saved from the dire calamities prepared for her by the conspiracies concocted, at the same time and for the same purpose, in the cabinets of diplomacy and in the secret councils of agitators. The con-

stitutional party found in Cavour its most powerful and devoted supporter; and when the storm had somewhat subsided, he at once urged upon the government more progressive measures. Vastly surpassed by Azeglio in aesthetic attainments, Cavour towered over him in extent of knowledge, comprehensiveness of intellect, quickness of perception, force of character, and energy of action; and while the one in great crises advanced timidly and slowly, feeling his way, the other, with his object clearly in view, and the full consciousness of his power, overleaped all impediments.

These peculiarities in the character of the two statesmen nature had impressed even on their external appearance. The slender form, the delicate features, and the poetical expression of Azeglio, marked him as a man of refined sensibility and romantic sentiments; as the keen eye, the broad brow, and the sturdy figure of Cavour indicated at once the iron will and the power to enforce it. Cavour urged on Azeglio vigorous measures of reform, and advocating a progressive policy, he thus addressed the administration, "Go on boldly, then, in the path of reform. Do not hesitate because you are told that the time is inexpedient; do not fear lest you should weaken the constitutional monarchy intrusted to your charge. Instead of weakening it you will cause it to take such firm root in the country, that even if the storm of revolution should arise around us, the monarchy will not only not succumb to the onslaught, but, collecting around it all the vital forces of Italy, will lead our nation to the lofty destiny prepared for her."

In the autumn of 1850, on the death of Count Santa Rosa, Cavour was named his successor as minister of agricultural and commercial affairs; he was soon after charged with the department of the navy, and later with the still more important one of finance. It is said that when his appointment was suggested by Azeglio to the king, he remarked with striking foresight, "It is very well, but this man will soon supplant you all;" and indeed Cavour was not long in the cabinet before he became its ruling spirit. He was scarcely seated in his ministerial chair before he made overtures to all the principal governments of Europe, which soon resulted in commercial treaties with England, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, the Zollverein, Switzerland, Holland, and even with Austria. He strove to open new avenues to commerce, planted a consulate wherever he could find a ship, and urged the establishment of a line of steamers between the Mediterranean and the two Americas. Indeed, free trade became in the hands of Cavour a political engine as well as an economical principle; and by making Sardinia a free market, and connecting her with the commerce of other nations, he rendered her expansion and prosperity an object of interest to them all. The principle of free trade has probably nowhere been so successfully tested as in Sardinia, although it had its first trial at a time when the resources of the country were crippled by two disastrous wars, by mysterious diseases which long affected the two staples, silkworms and vines, and by various commercial crises in Europe and America. To Cavour Sardinia is also chiefly indebted for the network of railroads which furrows her territory. It was only one year from the time when he entered the cabinet, and so vigorously commenced the work of retrieving the country from its prostrate condition, when the night of the 2nd of December, 1851, closed upon the grave of the French Republic. Three years before the coup d'état took place, pointing out the dangers by which France was menaced, Cavour had predicted in so many words, that the socialistic tendencies which then prevailed would bring the nephew of the great emperor to the imperial throne.

The political condition of France has always reacted on other nations, and after the coup d'état despotism became more threatening towards Sardinia. News of that event had scarcely reached the capitals of Europe before remonstrances from various governments were addressed to the court of Turin, urging the necessity of abolishing or curtailing the guarantees of liberty secured by the constitution. The cabinets of Vienna, Florence, and Naples went so far as to intrude their advice on the king, and to insist that Sardinian institutions should be brought into conformity with those of the other states, for despotism abhors all contact with liberty.

In consequence of a political alliance that he formed with Ratazzi, Cavour had to retire from office, and during the parliamentary recess again visited England and Scotland. While in London he made a midnight tour of inspection, under the guidance of a detective, through the lowest haunts of vice and crime in that metropolis, in order to make himself acquainted by personal observation with the actual condition of the lower classes. On his return to

Paris he met Ratazzi by appointment, and the two statesmen had important interviews with the emperor, to whom they had the opportunity of representing the true condition of affairs in Sardinia, and of urging upon him the claims of Italy. On the resignation of Azeglio, Cavour became president of the council, and from this time to the period of his death, with the exception of a short interval, continued to hold the reins of government, and at once impressed a deeper character of nationality upon foreign policy.

The Crimean war was the first event which opened the way to this more extended arena. Although the alliance of the two western powers of Europe originated in the necessity of checking the menacing preponderance of Russia in the East, Napoleon had another object in view, that of breaking the union of those governments which by the Treaty of Vienna had dishonoured France, and brought about the downfall of his dynasty. Cavour perceived at once the motives and bearings of the Anglo-French alliance; he saw that Sardinia had a paramount interest in excluding Russia from the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the keys of the Mediterranean, and that the time had come when the Treaty of Vienna, the rock on which Italy had been wrecked, was about to be shivered into fragments. The treaty of alliance was signed, and an army greater than had even been stipulated was despatched to the Crimea. The day when the Sardinian troops withstood the first shock of the enemy at the battle of Tchernaya, and so bravely contributed to his defeat, was the dawn of Italian independence. There, in the far east, where once flourished the Italian colonies, Sardinia, by the side of the French and English armies, consecrated in the blood of her sons the right of leadership in the national cause, and won the recognition of that right from the allied powers.

After the fall of Sevastopol Cavour accompanied the king on his visit to France and England. Everywhere received with marks of that regard secured to him by his high character and position, he availed himself of this opportunity to unite in closer ties of friendship the house of Savoy with the sovereigns of those countries, and to place before the representatives of public opinion the true aspect of affairs in Italy, as yet greatly misunderstood.

Meanwhile the government of Vienna felt that a revolution was brooding, the more formidable because under the auspices of monarchical institutions. That an insignificant state, which a few years since had been entirely under her control, and twice crushed beneath her iron heel, should dare to summon the Austrian empire before the bar of the civilized world, and to denounce it as the disturber of the public peace, and the violator of those very treaties by which it held its dominions, was more than the proud house of Hapsburg could bear.

A brisk interchange of diplomatic notes between Vienna and Turin followed, in which the pedantry and the dullness of Count Buol were ill matched against the power and cutting irony of Cavour. At length the Austrian chargé was recalled, and one fine morning it was whispered among the Turinese that Cavour had left for Plombières.

This visit to Napoleon had been planned and brought about by Cavour himself; and it was on this occasion that the preliminaries of the alliance between France and Sardinia was settled, and the marriage of the Princess Clotilde with Prince Napoleon determined on as the symbol and bond of the alliance. Whatever might have been at that time the opinion of Napoleon on the possibility of avoiding the conflict between Austria and Sardinia, it is certain that Cavour considered war as inevitable. The principles represented by the two countries were so opposed, and their estrangement was so complete, that from the first he saw that no compromise was possible, and that Italy must submit to Austrian rule, or be free from the Alps to the Adriatic. He, however, adhered to the terms of mediation which England sent to Vienna, and afterward to the proposal of a congress made by Russia, simply to prove to Europe that Italy was disposed to maintain peace, if by peace she could obtain satisfaction.

The first indication of the approaching storm was the emperor's new year's greeting to Baron Hübner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris. It was one of those theatrical displays that Napoleon delighted in, and almost a repetition of the first Napoleon's scene with Lord Whitworth, when he wished to break the peace with England. "I regret," said his Majesty to the astonished envoy, in the hearing of all the diplomatic circle, "I regret that our relations with your government are not as good as they have been heretofore; but I beg you to tell the emperor that my personal sentiments in regard to him have not changed."

This startling language was followed by a speech from the throne to the Parliament at Turin, in which Victor Emmanuel announced that the political horizon was not entirely serene. Professing himself not insensible to the cry of anguish which reached him from all parts of Italy, he pledged himself to march resolutely forward to meet the events of the future; "a future" said he, "which could not but be prosperous, since the policy of my government rests on justice, love of country, and liberty, and on the sympathy which these ideas inspire." In the meantime, Cavour, holding a kind of dictatorship under the king, was vigorously urging on preparations for war. He replenished the treasury, increased the army, strengthened the fortifications, reorganized the militia, and intrusted to Garibaldi the enlistment and command of the volunteers who from all parts of the peninsula were flocking to the national standard; while in his foreign policy he strove to secure the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of the European governments, and to cast upon the court of Vienna the responsibility of approaching hostilities. To the same end, on his return from Plombières he had made a tour to Baden, to visit the regent of Prussia (now King William), and had granted to Russia the privilege of making Villafranca a coal depot and a harbour for her steamers; a concession intended both to gratify that power and to deal a blow to Austria, whose interests in the Mediterranean were thus counterbalanced by those of a rival empire.

Although the war against Austria, says Count Arrivabene, had been decided upon by the emperor of the French, intelligence reached Cavour about the end of March, 1859, that a change had occurred in the imperial mind. On the 25th of that month, therefore, the count went in all haste to Paris to judge for himself how matters stood. He found the emperor wavering, as was his wont on the eve of great enterprises, and as if he were almost afraid of engaging in the war he had promised to undertake for the independence of Italy. Indeed, after his first interview, Cavour thought that Napoleon was desirous of withdrawing from his solemn engagement; and he made up his mind to carry out the plan of his country's redemption by rousing all the revolutionary elements of Italy, and trusting to the strength of his cause and the valour of his countrymen.

Baron Hübner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, had got scent of the change in Louis Napoleon's mind, and desired Count Buol to adopt a tone of greater hostility, as he assured him that both the ruler of France and his ministers had decided on abandoning Sardinia to her fate.

The advice of Baron Hübner was so far accepted at Vienna, that Austrian indolence soon gave place to decision. However, though the Austrian representative was well informed at the beginning of the transaction, he was not so at its end. Italy had two powerful friends in Prince Napoleon and Count Persigny; and Cavour, having had a second conversation with the emperor, succeeded in making him change his mind. It was then decided that the first pretext should be seized upon to declare war against Austria. Count Cavour returned to Turin completely victorious, while Baron Hübner still thought that his adversary had failed in his negotiations.

It was toward the middle of April, 1859, that Garibaldi was suddenly summoned to Turin by Count Cavour. The famous Italian leader was, as usual, in bad humour with the prime minister of the king. Distinguished by courage, disinterestedness, and public spirit; bred to simple and daring occupations; endowed with an unbounded frankness—Garibaldi had no great liking for Cavour. He thought him too proud of his descent and of his intellectual superiority. In the opinion of this honest and fearless republican, Count Cavour bore a lively resemblance to those noblemen of the *ancien régime* who looked down with disdain on the common people, and governed them accordingly. But the little sympathy he felt with Cavour did not prevent him from hastening to his summons. Garibaldi arrived at the palace of Piazza Castello at five o'clock in the morning. He was shown into the well-known red room, where he found himself in the presence of Victor Emmanuel, of his prime minister, and of Farini.

"Well, general," said Cavour, "the long expected day is near at hand: we want you. The patience of Count Buol is nearly exhausted, and we are only awaiting the moment when he will have lost it altogether."

"I am always ready to serve my country," replied Garibaldi, "and you know that I shall put all my heart into the work. Here in the presence of our *Re galantuomo* I must, however, be permitted to speak my mind openly. Am I to understand that you are going to summon all the forces of the

country, and declaring war against Austria, to attack her with the irresistible power of a national insurrection?"

"That is not precisely our plan," answered Count Cavour. "I have not an illimitable faith in the power of the insurrectionary element against the well-drilled legions of Austria. I think, moreover, our regular army too small to match the 200,000 men our enemy has massed on the frontier. We must therefore have the assistance of a powerful ally; and this is already secured. You will now," added the count, "fully understand the meaning of the words addressed by the French emperor to the Austrian ambassador on the 1st of January."

"Although my principles are known both to you and to the king," Garibaldi is reported to have answered, "I feel that my first duty is that of offering my sword to my country. My war cry shall therefore be 'Italian unity, under the constitutional rule of Victor Emmanuel!' Mind, however, what you are about, and do not forget that the aid of foreign armies must always be paid for dearly. As for the man who has promised to help us, I ardently wish he may redeem himself in the eyes of posterity by achieving the noble task of 'Italian liberation.'" Garibaldi could not forget the French expedition against Rome ten years before. At this moment the king, who always felt a deep regard for Garibaldi, took him by the hand, assured him that Louis Napoleon had always desired to see Italy free and happy, and added that he (the king) had consented to the marriage of his daughter with Prince Napoleon, because he was certain of the emperor's good intentions towards Italy. The campaign of Garibaldi and his Cacciatori delle Alpi, a corps of volunteers organized by General Cialdini, is not the least interesting part of this war. With scarcely 3000 men in the picturesque and mountainous scenery of Northern Italy, he baffled and defeated the manœuvres of the Austrian General Urban, who had 10,000 regular soldiers under his command.

It was while the preliminaries of a European congress were under discussion, that Francis Joseph suddenly broke off all negotiations and sent his ultimatum to Turin, requiring the government to disarm immediately, on penalty of an invasion. Ten years had elapsed since Austria, by a prodigious effort, and by help of the skill and courage of her army, had recovered from a state of prostration that to many observers had seemed final and irremediable. In the revolution of 1848 her ancient and despotic government was assailed, not only as other German governments were, by political malcontents seeking reforms in domestic administration, but the animosities of race came in and threatened the heterogeneous dominion of the Kaiser with absolute dissolution.

On the first tumultuous outbreak in Vienna in March, 1848, the universal cry was for the liberty of the press, religious liberty, universal education, a general arming of the people, a constitution, and the unity of Germany. "Long live free and independent Germany!" "Long live the Italians in arms!" "Long live the Magyars!" "Long live the patriots of Prague!" Such were the cries which rose from the crowd, and were no sooner heard than they were frantically cheered. Though the insurgents were for the most part cultured men, students from the university and professors, Prince Metternich was subjected to personal outrage; and having resigned his office, he retreated into England. The insurrection conquered the government at Vienna, at Presburg, and at Prague. The Magyars of Hungary, under the leadership of Kossuth, and the Tchecks of Bohemia, endeavoured to secure the independence of their several countries, retaining the emperor of Austria as their nominal king. The Tchecks, being of Sclavonic race, sought a union of all the Sclaves of Europe, including the inhabitants of Croatia, Sclavonia, Servia, Bohemia, Moravia, Livonia, and Gallicia, and looked ultimately to the czar of Russia as their chief. Panslavism, however, was a doctrine that was not sustained by any practical or vital force. A violent revolt of the people took place at Prague, where the governor's wife, the Princess Windischgrätz, was killed in a cowardly manner as she stood at a window, by a shot fired from the crowd, and soon after the town was bombarded into submission. The proud, aristocratic Magyars, on their side, demanded the elimination of every German element from the administration of Hungary, and the concession of self-government to their race. The emperor yielded so far as to grant a constitution, by which Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia were erected into a separate kingdom, having its own ministers, legislature, taxes, its own army and civil and municipal government. Other parts of the empire participated in the benefits of like concessions. But a reaction soon commenced. The

four or five million Magyars wished to be themselves free from German control, but they grudged the position of equality granted to their ruder neighbours, the Croats. United by the Hungarian constitution with that kingdom, the Croatians, Sclavonians by descent, perceived only a fatal deterioration of their position in the predominance of the Magyar magnates and race in the National Assembly at Pesth. The ancient hatred of Sclavonian to Magyar broke forth with unextinguishable fury at this prospect. Too weak to contend, either in the field or the Assembly, with the Hungarian power, the Croatians saw no prospect of protection but in the German race and the shield of the emperor. "The emperor, and the unity of the empire," became in this manner the war-cry of the Croatians, as that of "the unity and independence of Hungary" was of the Magyars. No sooner, accordingly, did it distinctly appear what turn affairs were taking, and the pretensions of the Magyars were openly declared, than a deputation from Croatia set out for Vienna, to lay before the emperor the assurances of their devotion and the expression of their apprehensions. They were willing to spend the last drop of their blood in behalf of the imperial crown, and to preserve the integrity of the empire; but they could not hope for success unless he placed at their head a chief in whom they had confidence. Jellachich alone was this man. The deputation met with the most favourable reception; mutual confidence was at once established from the perception of common danger. Jellachich was immediately elevated to the rank of *Ban*, or governor of Croatia, and shortly afterwards created field-marshal, councillor of the empire, colonel-commandant of two regiments, and commander-in-chief of the provinces of Bannat, Warasdin, and Carlsbadt, in the Illyrian districts.

The emperor now fled from Vienna to the Tyrol, and thence issued a proclamation condemning the violence of his German and Hungarian subjects. The Croats, on their side, publicly declared that they would never consent to the separation of Hungary from the imperial crown, and prepared to support their declaration by force of arms, averring that they would prefer the knout of the Russians to the insolence of the Magyar. The bitterness of feeling between the opposing parties found expression at a conference which took place at Vienna on the 29th of July. M. Bach, the minister of justice, and Baron Jellachich, supported it, on the one side; Count Louis Bathiany and Prince Esterhazy, on the other. It began in a solemn manner, and with measured expressions on both sides; but ere long the intensity of feeling broke through their courtly restraints, and the debate became animated and violent in the highest degree. "Between the cabinets of Pesth and Vienna," said Count Bathiany, "there is now an insurmountable barrier." "Which you have raised up yourselves," replied Bach. Take care, count, there is behind that barrier on your side an abyss, the name of which is Revolution." "And who has dug that abyss?" "You know better than we do; ask Kossuth. Meanwhile, I will tell you what will fill it up, oceans of blood, thousands of corpses; perhaps your own, count." Before separating, Count Bathiany approached Jellachich, and taking him by the hand, said, "For the last time, do you wish peace or war?" "We wish for peace," replied the Ban, "if the Magyars, better inspired than they now are, are willing to render to Cæsar what belongs to Cæsar, and to Austria what belongs to Austria; but if they persist in wishing to shiver to pieces the fundamental laws of the empire, then we are for war." "May God protect the right," replied Bathiany; "the sabre must now decide betwixt us. Adieu, baron; I assign a rendezvous on the banks of the Drave." "We shall meet before on those of the Danube," replied Jellachich; and he was as good as his word. With these words they separated, and both sides prepared for war.

Taking advantage of this national animosity, and acting upon their old maxim, *Divide et impera*, the Austrian government set about reducing Hungary to submission by means of Jellachich and his Croats. The ultimatum they sent to Pesth was that the ministries of war, finance, and foreign affairs in Hungary should be united to those of Vienna, and that an entire community of right should be established between all the inhabitants of Austria and Hungary, be they Magyars, Germans, Croats, Slovaks, or Servians. The last clause was especially distasteful to the proud Magyar. Hostilities were precipitated by the barbarous murder of Count Lamberg on the bridge at Pesth, where he was attacked by an infuriated mob as he was on his way to the Diet to present the emperor's rescripts. The fear of being deprived of their newly-recovered nationality, and of being again absorbed in the despotism

of Austria, maddened the populace. The war in Hungary had scarce begun when a fresh revolution, aided by a mutiny of the soldiers, broke out in Vienna, resulting in fearful carnage, and the murder of Count Latour, the minister of war. The emperor again fled from his capital (October 7, 1848), which was left in the hands of the insurgents until the arrival of Jellachich from Hungary, and Windischgrätz from Bohemia, each with an army, turned the scale against them. The barricades were stormed, and after a stubborn resistance carried with great slaughter. The town was set on fire in six and twenty different places, and the rebels, with their leader, the Polish General Bem, capitulated. While the terms of capitulation were being carried out, however, an army of Hungarians was seen approaching the city to assist the insurgents; and all the tumultuous excitement began again, to be rigorously and finally suppressed with fire and sword. Though the imperial authority was thus far restored, the burden of government was too heavy for the Emperor Ferdinand to bear. On the 2nd December, at Olmutz, he abdicated the throne in favour of Francis Joseph, then eighteen years of age, and the son of Francis Carl, the emperor's brother, who also renounced his right to the crown. In his first proclamation the young emperor boasted that "Austria had crushed the rebellion in Lombardy, driven back the Piedmontese into their own territory, planted the Austrian flag again in triumph on the walls of Milan, which had for centuries been a fief of the house of Hapsburg." In Hungary, too, he added, "the imperial arms have been uniformly successful, and there is every reason to expect a victorious issue to the campaign." Much had to be done before that expectation was fulfilled. Kossuth, the president of Hungary, Bem, Dembinski, Georgey, Klapka, and other military leaders, with their brave troops, taxed all the energies of the veteran Windischgrätz, who strove manfully to restore imperial authority in the rebellious kingdom. At length General Pückner being in a strait solicited the aid of the Russian General Luders, who at once sent troops across the frontier from Wallachia, where he was stationed. This happened in the month of February, 1849, yet in April the Hungarians recovered possession of their capital Pesth, and threatened the safety of Vienna itself. On the 14th of April Kossuth issued the proclamation of Hungarian independence, to the great displeasure of Georgey and the Magyar aristocratic party, who desired to maintain the union with Austria. Russian aid was once more invoked by the Kaiser, and the Emperor Nicholas, hating democracy and uneasy about Poland, was only too glad to assist in crushing the independence of such dangerous neighbours as the Magyar republicans, while he laid an onerous obligation upon the emperor of Austria.

Unfortunately for the Hungarian cause, General Georgey had an invincible repugnance to Kossuth and his schemes for independence, and was as a matter of course not trusted by him with the command of all the troops. This division in the camp proved a more potent auxiliary to the Austrians than even the Muscovite bayonets. After several bloody battles, in which prodigies of valour were performed, the cause of the Magyars was by the month of August rendered utterly desperate. Kossuth's eloquent proclamation of that date well expresses the condition into which they had fallen:—

"After several unfortunate battles, in which God, in the latter days, has proved the Hungarian nation, we have no longer any hope of continuing with success our defensive struggles against the considerable forces of the Austrians and Russians. In this state of affairs, the safety of the nation and the security for its future have come to depend entirely on the general who is at the head of the army; and I am profoundly convinced that the prolonged existence of the present government would not only be useless to the nation, but might be attended with serious evils. I make known to the nation, as well in the name of myself as of the entire ministry, that, animated by the same sentiments which have guided all my steps, and induced the sacrifice of my entire existence to the good of our country, I retire from the government, and invest with supreme military and civil power the general, Arthur Georgey, until the nation, in the exercise of its rights, sees fit to dispose of it otherwise. May he love his fatherland as disinterestedly as I have done, and may he be more fortunate than I have been in securing the prosperity of the nation! I can no longer be of use to the country by my actions; if my death can be of any service to it, I willingly give it the sacrifice of my life. May the God of justice and mercy be with the nation!

"KOSSUTH.

"*Dated*, Fortress of Arad, *August* 11, 1849."

This transfer of authority was effected in the hope that Georgey would obtain better terms from the Russians than the democrat leader was likely to do. On the 13th of August the Hungarian army, 28,000 strong, laid down their arms, and Georgey surrendered to Count Rudiger. Austria once more swayed the country, and glutted her vengeance by the death of many of the brave Magyar officers on the scaffold. They were in some sort avenged by the acrimonious feelings that arose between the conquerors, the Austrians and Russians, each of whom affected to ignore the services of the other during the campaign. The sore feeling that arose from this unlucky alliance engendered a covert enmity that did effective mischief to Russia during the Crimean war, and of which the world may possibly yet see bitter fruit.

Austria had barely passed ten years' breathing time when Russia had the grim satisfaction of seeing her exposed to a violent and unjustifiable attack from France. By the joint action of French and Italian diplomacy matters were so contrived that Austria was led to take the first warlike step; and in the hope of repeating Radetzky's Novara campaign, her army crossed the Ticino into Piedmontese territory on the 26th of April, 1859. This was made the ostensible ground of French interference, and on the 3rd of May Napoleon III. issued a proclamation declaring war against Austria. It was in this proclamation that he charged the Austrian government with having brought things to that extremity "that either she must rule right up to the Alps, or Italy must be free as far as the Adriatic." "The end of this war," he continued, "is to restore Italy to herself, not to give her a change of masters; and we shall have on our frontiers a friendly people who will owe to us their independence."

The French emperor did feel, nevertheless, the sting of certain expressions in the manifesto of Francis Joseph, that seemed aimed at the Bonapartist policy. "When the shadows of revolution," said the Kaiser, "which imperil the most precious gifts of humanity, threatened the whole of Europe, Providence made use of the sword of Austria to dissipate those shadows. We are again on the eve of one of those epochs, in which doctrines subversive of all order are preached, not only by sectarians, *but are hurled upon the world from the height of thrones*." This was the voice of a champion of legitimacy challenging the monarch who reigned by the will of the nation, and who represented in some sort the principles of the Revolution of 1789. The emperor quitted the Tuileries on the 10th of May to join his army, which had entered Piedmont by Mont Cenis, the Col de Genevre, and by Genoa, and established his head-quarters at Alessandria. The first engagement took place at Montebello on the 20th of May, and on the 4th of June occurred the general action of Magenta, in which the Austrians were defeated by General MacMahon, who won the title of duke and the baton of a field-marshal. The emperor had directed the previous movements of the army, and in order to signalize his mastery of the art of war had placed the French army in a position that a prompt and skilful enemy might have used to his ruin—a movement not unlike that which has led to the disaster of Sedan. To avoid making a direct attack on Giulay's two strongest positions at Pavia and Piacenza, the Austrian left, Napoleon led the whole of his army against the enemy's right at Buffalora, on the upper Ticino; his object being to make the Austrians abandon their positions and accept battle on ground that was not of their own choice. The danger of this movement, which began on the 28th of May and was not completed till the 2nd of June, was extreme, as it was performed at a very short distance from the enemy, who, with but a small display of alertness, might have attacked the French on their march and destroyed them in detail. The victory of Magenta followed by that of Melegnano dislodged the Austrians from Milanese territory; and on the 9th of June Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their solemn entry into Milan. The emperor, in an address to the Milanese, defended himself from the charge of personal ambition. "If there are men," said he, "who do not understand their epoch, I am not of the number. In the enlightened state of public opinion, a man is greater nowadays by the moral influence he exercises than by sterile conquests; and this moral influence I seek, proud to aid in giving liberty to one of the most beautiful parts of Europe." The master of legions was also a great master of phrases. But the war was not over, and the decisive battle of the campaign was fought on ground that had long been consecrated to war. The Austrian General Giulay having proved his incompetence at Magenta, the young Kaiser himself assumed the command of the army, with General Hess for his right hand. The army of Germans had retired to Mantua and Verona, and the French emperor with his marshals, together

with Victor Emmanuel and the Sardinian army, went marching on secure in the thought that their antagonists were on the other side the Mincio, when suddenly they found themselves opposed by 140,000 armed men. On the 23rd of June General Hess had caused this vast army to sally out from the Quadrilateral, and re-occupy positions which they had but partially abandoned three days before. Though uninformed as to the exact whereabouts of his enemy, the general had formed a skilful plan to be executed on the battlefield, near Castiglione, where Prince Eugène in Marlborough's day, and Napoleon I. more recently, had severally exhibited their military genius. The Austrians occupied a space of hilly ground almost in the form of a parallelogram about twelve miles long and nine wide, the centre of which was Cavriana, where Francis Joseph established his headquarters. The key of the position was the village of Solferino, which stands on an eminence commanding a most extensive view of the country. From the summit of a tower in this village, named the "watch-tower of Italy," the eye embraces an extent of country reaching from the Alps to the Apennines. Mantua, Verona, Ceresara, Bozzolo, Cremona, and the broad plain beside it are distinctly visible. The Lake of Garda, the bluest and most transparent sheet of water in the Italian peninsula, appears on the edge of the farthest slope of hills stretching away into the heart of the Tyrolese Alps. The battle to which this village has given a name, identified as it is with the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke, merits a brief notice. The French troops began their forward movement before dawn on Midsummer day, and by five o'clock had commenced a battle which lasted altogether sixteen hours. When Napoleon arrived at Castiglione, ascending the steeple of St. Peter's church, he surveyed the whole ground, being directed by the smoke of the guns to the movements of the different corps. To the left Baraguay d'Hilliers was encountering a tremendous artillery fire from the enemy, while MacMahon was advancing towards him through the fields bordering the Mantua road. The several French corps had been marching too widely apart, and the Austrians had very nearly succeeded in separating them one from the other. General Niel was in such expectation of being outflanked by the enemy, that he sent word to Canrobert that it was impossible to afford him any support until their respective corps had effected a junction. As the battle proceeded, the hill of Solferino became the object of the severest contest. Regiment after regiment was driven back by the Austrians, under Stadion, with fearful loss to the French as they ascended the slopes, but at length the mount was occupied and the Austrian artillery captured. The Tower Hill, still higher up, continued to be most vigorously defended. At length General Forey gave orders to storm the steep ascent. The drums beat, the trumpets sounded; shouts of "Vive l'Empereur" rent the air; voltigeurs of the imperial guard, chasseurs, and battalions of the line, rushed to the assault with an impetuosity that the Austrians could not withstand. The heights were covered in a moment by thousands of French troops, and the tower of Solferino was won. Lebœuf brought his artillery to bear on the retreating regiments, but the battle still raged furiously along the extensive field. The Sardinians and their king at San Martino had a fierce struggle with his terrible antagonist, Benedek, and 20,000 Austrians. About four o'clock in the afternoon the Algerian sharpshooters and the voltigeurs of the guard, after a hand to hand fight with the prince of Hesse's division, carried Cavriana, the Kaiser's headquarters, and a general retreat of the Austrians became inevitable. Two hours afterwards the house which had been the temporary dwelling of Francis Joseph opened its doors to receive the rival emperor. When the retreat began the scene of battle was visited by a fearful tempest—one of those summer storms which envelope in a whirlwind of rain and fire the region they fall on. Dark clouds hung over, and thunder and lightning rivalled with their elemental horror the glare and clamour of the contending artillery below. When the storm abated, the French resumed the offensive, and Canrobert, who had been inactive all day, came to continue, in the plain below Cavriana, the conflict that had been carried on with so much stubborn valour all day upon the hills. Night came at last to close the dreadful scene, the Austrians retiring in good order, and with a feeling that though they had been defeated, the French had paid dearly for their victory. The Austrians retired beyond the Adige, and after a short week's pause the French army followed them, crossing the Mincio on the 30th of June. Another battle seemed at hand, which, as the Italians hoped, would drive their German masters out of the country, and liberate the peninsula from

the Alps to the Adriatic. But the Emperor Napoleon had a surprise in store for them. Two days after the battle of Solferino, Count Cavour and his secretary Nigra had a long interview with the emperor, whom they found very proud of the achievements of his army and its triumphs over the Austrians, but much disgusted with the quarrels of his generals, and deeply impressed with the horrible nature of the scenes he had for the first time witnessed on the battlefield. They were made to understand, however, that the war would proceed, and that his Majesty was lending a favourable ear to the requests of the Hungarian refugees, who demanded help for the liberation of their country from Austrian domination.

But there was work enough yet in Italy if the formidable fortresses of the Quadrilateral were to be taken. On the 7th of May the French were ranged about Valeggio in strong military array in expectation of a general engagement, which it was thought the enemy was not unwilling to commence, when General Fleury returned from a secret mission on which he had been sent to Verona. This was no less than a proposal for peace, which Napoleon, in his mysterious, theatrical way, had sent the night before to the Emperor Francis Joseph, without saying a word to his ally Victor Emmanuel, or to any of his marshals save Vaillant. He had soon tired of the war, and probably began to feel that he might do too much for Sardinia, which now showed signs of absorbing all Italy, and that a show of generosity to Austria might secure him a powerful friend in the person of a legitimate emperor, to say nothing of hints and rumours that Prussia might interfere. So, as his biographer says, "by a sudden inspiration, he resolved to propose an armistice in the middle of his victorious army's march. The conqueror asks for peace, what grandeur! moderation in victory is so rare." The Kaiser was taken so much by surprise, that he suspected a snare, and deferred his answer to Napoleon's letter, which he received on the 6th July, till the morrow. An interview was agreed upon, and the two sovereigns met on the 11th at Villafranca, a village half-way between Solferino and Verona. It was arranged with all those accessories that the French know so well how to employ, in order to produce a dramatic effect. Napoleon rode at the head of his troops until he saw Francis Joseph approaching at the head of his escort, when he galloped forward alone to meet him, and the two emperors having shaken hands, dismounted, entered the house of a M. Morelli, in Villafranca, and in a conversation of nearly two hours, settled the preliminaries of the peace of Villafranca, which were ratified subsequently by the treaty of Zurich. These preliminaries consisted of seven clauses:—1. The two sovereigns are favourable to the creation of an Italian confederation. 2. This confederation shall be under the honorary presidency of the Holy Father. 3. The emperor of Austria cedes to the emperor of the French his rights over Lombardy, with the exception of the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera, in such a manner as that the frontier of the Austrian possessions shall start from the farthest radius of the fortress of Peschiera, and extend in a straight line along the Mincio as far as Grazia; from thence to Scarzarola and Suzana to the Po, whence the existing frontier line shall continue to form the borders of Austria. The emperor of the French will transfer the ceded territory to the king of Sardinia. 4. Venetia shall form part of the Italian confederation while remaining under the crown of the emperor of Austria. 5. The grand duke of Tuscany and the duke of Modena shall re-enter their states on granting a general amnesty. 6. The two emperors will request the Holy Father to introduce the reforms that are indispensable in his states. 7. A full and complete amnesty is granted on both sides to all persons compromised by recent events in the territories of the belligerents.

What a falling off was here from the mighty plan on which the Italians had built their lofty and sanguine hopes! Deep and bitter was the disappointment to them. The people felt that the dignity of their honest king, and of the whole nation, had been lowered, and their most cherished ambitions thwarted. Victor Emmanuel bore himself with the composure of a king, and coldly thanked Louis Napoleon for the service he had rendered to Italy. To Cavour the news of the peace was a crushing blow. He seemed, says Professor Botta, to feel the concentrated bitterness of the nation. The cry of anguish which arose from the Italians fell upon his heart like a reproach, and the blood of those who had fallen on the plains of Lombardy cried to him from the ground. The very darkness in which he was left as to the motives of that sudden interview made him suspect that he and his country had been betrayed. For

a time he lost his usual self-control, and in a stormy interview with his royal master, declined to see the emperor, urged the king to reject the terms of peace, to recall his army, and to leave Napoleon to his designs. His advice not being accepted, he resigned office, and retired to his country seat at Leri, feeling that the destinies of Italy had been transferred from the hands of men of action to those of diplomatists with whom he knew himself to be in bad odour. The whole story and its moral are well summed up in a simple poem by Mrs. Barrett Browning, entitled "A Tale of Villafranca:"—

My little son, my Florentine,
Sit down beside my knee,
And I will tell you why the sign
Of joy which flushed our Italy
Has faded since but yesternight;
And why your Florence of delight
Is mourning as you see.

A great man (who was crowned one day)
Imagined a great deed:
He shaped it out of cloud and clay;
He touched it finely till the seed
Possessed the flower: from heart and brain
He fed it with large thoughts humane,
To help a people's need.

He brought it out into the sun—
They blessed it to his face:
"Oh, great pure deed, that hast undone
So many bad and base!
O generous deed, heroic deed,
Come forth, be perfected, succeed,
Deliver by God's grace!"

Then sovereigns, statesmen, north and south,
Rose up in wrath and fear,
And cried, protesting by one mouth,
What monster have we here?
A great deed at this hour of day?
A great just deed, and not for pay?
Absurd——or insincere!

"And if sincere, the heavier blow
In that case we shall bear;
For where's our blessed status quo,
Our holy treaties, where
Our rights to sell a race, or buy,
Protect and pillage, occupy,
And civilize despair?"

Some muttered that the great deed meant
A great pretext to sin;
And others, the pretext, so lent,
Was heinous (to begin).
Volcanic terms of *great* and *just?*
Admit such tongues of flame, the crust
Of time and law falls in.

A great deed in this world of ours
Unheard of the pretence is:
It threatens plainly the great powers;
Is fatal in all senses.
A great just deed in the world?—call out
The rifles! be not slack about
The national defences.

And many murmured, "From this source
What red blood must be poured!"
And some rejoined, "'Tis even worse;
What red tape is ignored!"
All cursed the doer for an evil,
Called here, enlarging on the devil,
There, monkeying the Lord.

Some said, it could not be explained;
Some, could not be excused;
And others, "Leave it unrestrained,
Gehenna's self is loosed."
And all cried, "Crush it, maim it, gag it!
Set dog-toothed lies to tear it ragged,
Truncated, and traduced!"

But he stood sad before the sun:
(The peoples felt their fate).
"The world is many, I am one;
My great deed was too great.
God's fruit of justice ripens slow;
Men's souls are narrow; let them grow.
My brothers, we must wait."

The tale is ended, child of mine,
Turned graver at my knee.
They say your eyes, my Florentine,
Are English: it may be:
And yet I've marked as blue a pair
Following the doves across the square,
At Venice by the sea.

Ah child, ah child! I cannot say
A word more. You conceive
The reason now why just to-day
We see our Florence grieve.
Ah child, look up into the sky!
In this low world, where great deeds die,
What matter if we live?

The most humiliating part of the transaction to Sardinia was the sacrifice it had to make to France, in compliance with a secret treaty, of its ancient possessions, Savoy and Nice, given by vote of the population, be it said, to its powerful friend, as a "compensation and for the rectification of his frontier." On the other hand a secret stipulation made by Napoleon at Villafranca was of immense service to Italy, inaugurating as it did the great principle of popular sovereignty. It was to the effect that no coercion should be employed to enforce the offensive terms of the treaty there agreed upon, a proviso that came to be the keystone of Italian nationality. The provinces which had been freed from their petty tyrants were, said the letter of the treaty, to be restored to them; but the restoration of the runaway dukes and duchesses, and the re-establishment of his Holiness's authority over the Legations, were only to take place with the concurrence of the populations, uninfluenced by the armed force of foreign powers. The Italians, in fact, for the first time since the middle ages, were really left to themselves. Alarmed at the outbreak of the war, and the accompanying manifestations of popular feeling, the smaller sovereigns had fled to the protecting wing of Austria. The government of their states then devolved upon the Constitutional Assemblies, who acted with promp-

titude and vigour. In Modena and Parma a dictator was appointed in the person of Farini, while the Tuscans conferred similar authority on Baron Ricasoli, a noble of the antique Roman type. The Legations, which had cut themselves free from the papal dominion, acted under the directions of Cipriani. With these men Cavour kept up continual communication, for though no longer minister, he was the recognized leader of the national movement. When he discovered that non-intervention was the principle of the Zurich treaty, he felt that Italy would be able after all to achieve unity and consolidation, spite of Napoleon's schemes for a confederation. The people of the Tuscan and Æmilian provinces positively refused to receive back their princes, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of the emperor of the French, and declined every plan of adjustment save that of annexation to Sardinia. At this juncture, in the spring of 1860, Cavour was recalled to power, and having previously mapped out the central provinces into electoral districts, he appealed to the inhabitants to elect representatives who should take their seats in the Parliament of Italy. This was done, and the northern part of the peninsula was united under Victor Emmanuel, the constitutional king of Italy. Well might the king, in addressing the new Parliament, congratulate the country that "Italy was no longer the Italy of municipal governments, or that of the middle ages, but the Italy of the Italians." Attended by his minister, he went to visit the new dominions, which not the sword, says Signor Botta, but the hearts of the people, had bestowed upon him. The enthusiasm with which the visitors were received in the new provinces exceeds description. For the first time the sentiment which before had been so long restrained by the boundaries of cities and states overleaped all barriers, and was merged in the deep emotion of patriotism; all traces of ancient feuds vanished; the once rival cities emulated each other in their expressions of mutual affection. Genoa restored to Pisa the chains of her harbour, which seized centuries before, had been retained as a trophy; the sword bequeathed in the fourteenth century by Castruccio Castracani to him who should deliver the country, was presented to Victor Emmanuel, and Niccolini, the venerable poet, carried to the king with tottering steps his master-piece, the "Arnaldo de Brescia," blessing the "kind fate that had allowed him, before his eyes closed on the sweet air of Italy, to see the aspiration of his life accomplished."

But another act of the great drama now opens, another hero appears on the stage — Guiseppe Garibaldi. We search in vain the archives of history for heroic deeds and marvellous achievements like those which, at the time here spoken of, sent a thrill of admiration and joy through the hearts of all the friends of liberty. For this, says Sig. Botta, we must go back to the legendary ages, when the gods mingled with men, the ages of Hercules and Theseus, of Odin and Thor. When centuries shall have passed, and Italy shall again have reached the summit of her greatness, the memory of the great chieftain will be embellished by popular imagination, and the name of Garibaldi will be invested with a mythical glory surpassing that of the Cid in Spain, and Joan of Arc in France. On the 11th of May, 1860, Garibaldi, at the head of one thousand patriots, landed at Marsala. He came, he saw, he conquered. Within less than four months he had delivered ten millions of Italians from the hated yoke of the Bourbons. For a work like that which Garibaldi had accomplished Cavour had no power. A statesman far removed from revolutionary impulses, his genius consisted rather in directing events than forcing them. Believing in the ultimate union of the nations, his original plan had been the consolidation of northern Italy into one kingdom, which should gradually absorb the entire peninsula. But the peace of Villafranca having defeated that design, his next object became the annexation of central Italy. The instinct of the people, however, outstripped this process of gradual absorption, and hastened to precipitate the immediate union of the whole country. Of this instinct Garibaldi was the great representative. Essentially a man of the masses, sharing their virtues as well as their faults, with the heart of a lion in the frame of an athlete, trained amidst the tempests of the ocean, and on the battlefields of the old and new worlds, and burning with the fire of liberty and patriotism, the hero of Caprera became the leader of the national movement at the time when it began to assume a more revolutionary character.

This was the most embarrassing period of the political career of Cavour. On one hand it was impossible for Sardinia openly to take part in the expeditions of Garibaldi, directed against the king of the Two Sicilies, still on his throne, and with whom

Victor Emmanuel held neutral, if not friendly relations. Such a step would probably have induced Austria again to take the field, and in the face of such a flagrant violation of international law, France would have been unable to protect the country from an armed intervention. On the other hand, that movement could not be prevented without seriously endangering the national cause. The idea of political unity had taken such deep hold on the public mind, that any attempt to check its development would have resulted in revolution. Again, the court of Rome was gathering the papist mercenaries of Europe to its support, and having secured the services of General Lamoricière, it threatened the new kingdom with an alliance with Francis II., openly supported by Austria and other powers. In this emergency Garibaldi appeared, and organized his expeditions for the deliverance of Southern Italy. Although his success might be doubtful, his bold attempt would spread terror among the enemy, divide the forces of Naples and Rome, and drive them from their threatening attitude. So, without either encouraging or preventing the departure of Garibaldi, Cavour awaited events, ready to avail himself of all the advantages which might result from the daring enterprise, or to avert any danger which it might provoke. This policy evinced scarcely less boldness than the achievements of the dashing leader himself. The principle of national rights over dynastic interests was regarded as so heretical by the cabinets of Europe, that it was mainly due to the skill of Cavour that their opposition on this occasion was confined to protest. By appealing to their conservative tendencies, and by representing that an effort to put down the movement by force of arms would cause a revolution throughout the peninsula, and endanger the existence of monarchical institutions, he saved the expeditions from an armed intervention. But when success appeared certain, Cavour changed his policy of inaction to one of active sympathy, and not only allowed volunteers to depart from the ports of the state, and subscriptions for their aid to be widely circulated, but he himself afforded the enterprise direct assistance. Before the war of 1859, Sardinia had proposed an alliance with the king of Naples on condition of his granting a constitution to his people and joining in the war against Austria. Hitherto he had resisted all advances. But now that Garibaldi, having possessed himself of Sicily, was knocking at the gates of Naples, Francis II. hastened to accede to those terms, and proposed to share with Sardinia the pontifical dominions. But it was too late. Since the war had commenced such changes had occurred in the peninsula, that Cavour in turn declined the proposed alliance; and as England, France, and Russia urged upon him its acceptance, he wisely insisted on delaying all negotiations on the subject until that sovereign should prove himself able to maintain his throne; and in the meantime claimed as a preliminary that he should recognize the independence of Sicily. But Garibaldi left no time for decision; he at once made his triumphant entry into Naples, while the fugitive king took refuge in Gaeta.

Between Cavour and Garibaldi, as has been already said, there existed great differences of character, which are pointed out with admirable discrimination by Signor Botta. The one was endowed with comprehensive genius, with a clear, keen intellect, that neither imagination nor impulse could seduce; affluent, aristocratic, reserved, often satirical and imperious, unyielding in his opinions, with power to bend the convictions of others to his own; too confident in himself to court popular favour, and devoted to labours more calculated to excite the admiration of the thoughtful than to dazzle the multitude. The other, of more limited capacity, but of wider sympathies, was ruled by imagination and impulse; disposed to regard all questions from a single point of view; democratic by birth and principles, of Spartan simplicity of life and manners, despising rank and wealth; kind, straightforward, easily influenced by all who approached him in the name of patriotism, and from his wonderful success as well as from his rare personal qualities, the idol of the masses.

Both true patriots, both equally courageous and energetic, while the one exerted his genius in diplomatic strategy, the other was engaged in irregular warfare. Both equally ambitious to serve their country, while one accepted the honours bestowed on him, the other disclaimed all distinctions, but delighted to appear in public in his worn red shirt. Both of sterling integrity, while the one on entering office disposed of his shares in the public stocks to place himself beyond the reach of suspicion, the other during his dictatorship received but two dollars a day from the public treasury, and after conquering a kingdom, retired, like Cincinnatus of

old, to his farm, to live by the labour of his hands. These characteristics, combined with an intense hatred of all diplomacy, produced in Garibaldi a personal antipathy to Cavour, which on the surrender of Nice culminated in open hostility. That his birthplace should have been ceded to Napoleon, whom he disliked still more than Cavour, he regarded almost as a personal insult; and although that surrender had been approved by the Parliament and the king, and voted for by the people, Cavour appeared to him as its sole author. He did not see that had Nice been refused the Italian cause would have been in danger, and that the minister who should have incurred the responsibility of the refusal would have been liable to impeachment as a traitor. He overlooked the fact that his expeditions had found a supporter in Cavour, who had protected them from foreign intervention; and that it was in no small degree due to his efforts that he was enabled to enter Naples alone, and to be received with open arms by the Neapolitan troops, who still held possession of the city. His prejudice was no doubt, in great measure, the effect of the influences by which he was surrounded. He had early in life been connected with Mazzini, and long continued to manifest his sympathy with the republican party. But when Manin, the Venetian patriot, urged the union of all parties under the leadership of the house of Savoy, he renounced his former alliance, and generously gave his adherence to the constitutional monarchy of Victor Emmanuel. Later, on becoming personally acquainted with the king, he found in his character simplicity, straightforwardness, and patriotism, much that was congenial to himself, and he conceived for him a loyal attachment.

This course was at the time bitterly condemned by his former associates, and by Mazzini himself. But now, in the hour of his triumph, those who not long before had been engaged in vilifying his name in Europe and in America flocked to Naples, insinuated themselves again into his confidence, and by playing on his real or fancied grievances, strove to widen the breach between him and Cavour, whom they justly regarded as the great supporter of constitutional monarchy, and the staunch opponent of their schemes. Good, unsophisticated, generous, and new in the art of government, the hero of the battlefield became a child in the hands of those adventurers. Naples and Sicily fell under their control, and exhibited more completely than ever the effects of that disorganization to which they had been previously reduced by a long reign of despotism. From Gaeta, Francis II. now threatened an invasion of his former dominions, whilst Austria from Verona and Mantua, and Lamoricière from Ancona, were preparing to act in concert with him. In this state of things it was necessary that Southern Italy should at once declare her union with the northern and central provinces, and thus justify the intervention of Sardinia, by which alone regularity could be introduced into the administration, and the invasion repelled. The great majority demanded annexation; but Garibaldi, who had taken possession of the kingdom in the name of Victor Emmanuel, seemed to waver between his former adherence to Mazzini and his fidelity to the king. Pressed by public opinion to consult the vote of the people, he at last consented to open the ballot-box, but only on condition of the dismissal of Cavour from the cabinet. Such a request, destructive of all constitutional liberty, found no favour with the king; and Cavour, receiving new assurances of confidence from the Parliament, decided on a bold movement. The situation was growing every day more alarming; while anarchy threatened Naples, the mercenaries of the pope were pouring in from all quarters, and Garibaldi himself was held in check on the Volturno; the republicans began to speak openly of attacking the French garrison at Rome, and the Austrians in the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. Baffled in their plan of removing Cavour from the government, the same party prevailed on Garibaldi to subordinate the annexation of Southern Italy to the deliverance of Rome and Venice, and he, in fact, proclaimed that he would allow the union to be consummated only when he could crown Victor Emmanuel king of Italy on the Quirinal. Cavour saw that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring certain defeat, involve Sardinia in a war with Austria, break up the French alliance, cause the abandonment of the non-intervention policy, and probably sacrifice the conquests already achieved. Had Garibaldi been able to carry out his dream, to make his triumphal passage across Umbria and the Marches, rout the troops of Lamoricière, put to flight the French army, expel Austria, and bring aid to Hungary and Poland, his very successes would have provoked an armed intervention. His triumphs as

well as his defeats appeared equally fatal to Italy. There was no time to lose; "If we do not reach the Cattolica before Garibaldi, we are lost," said Cavour. By a master stroke of policy, he determined at once to take possession of Umbria and the Marches, push forward the army to Naples and Sicily, and wrest from Garibaldi the leadership of the nation. The deputations from these provinces, demanding immediate annexation, were at once favourably listened to. Cardinal Antonelli was summoned, in the name of Italy, to disband his mercenaries, the Sardinian army crossed the frontier, and the fleet set sail for the Adriatic. By the victory of Castelfidardo and the siege of Ancona the papal army was scattered to the winds, Lamoricière taken prisoner, Perugia avenged, and the national flag unfurled over the papal dominions.

Victor Emmanuel, at the head of his troops, now entered the Neapolitan territory, and on approaching the camp at Capua was met by Garibaldi, who, amidst the enthusiastic cheers of the two armies, saluted him King of Italy. The wisdom of the policy followed by Cavour on this occasion can only be questioned by those who make the principle of nationality subservient to the interests of dynasties and to the claims of despotism.

By taking possession of Umbria and the Marches, and by occupying Southern Italy, he defeated the rash designs of the Republicans, and put an end to the not less menacing projects of Lamoricière and Francis II. He showed also a just appreciation of the character of Garibaldi, on whose patriotism, loyalty, and generous instincts he confidently relied; and he was not mistaken; for scarcely had the king announced his intention to proceed to Naples when the great chieftain, listening to the voice of his heart, summoned the people to the ballot box, and the annexation being voted for by a large majority, he at once resigned his dictatorship and retired to his humble home.

On the 18th of February, 1861, the first Italian Parliament representing united Italy was convened in the old capital of Sardinia. The roar of the cannon which celebrated its first meeting mingled with that which announced the fall of Gaeta; the sound echoed throughout the peninsula, and bore to Austria and the papacy a warning of their approaching downfall. Italy at last revived in the unity of her people, her constitution, and monarchy. She rose from beneath the ruins of thrones which crushed her and divided her as by barriers, and now she has taken her place among the nations. Her standard proudly waves from Milan to Palermo; her army marches in triumph from Monte Rosa to Ætna; her navy rides joyfully on the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. Another war in later years fought unsuccessfully by Austria against other enemies, bore fruit to Italy in the restoration of Venice and the Quadrilateral; and as these lines are penned, the troops of Victor Emmanuel are taking possession of Rome in the name of the Italian people.

But Cavour did not live to see this wondrous conclusion, which gave so marvellous a completeness to his plans for the regeneration of his country. The ill feeling entertained towards him by Garibaldi was one among several causes to which his last fatal illness has been attributed. The occupation of Naples by Sardinian troops, the yielding to Louis Napoleon on the Roman question, and government measures for disbanding the volunteers when the war was over, were three sources of the increased bitterness which the hero of the volunteers felt toward the statesman. Garibaldi, with his contempt for policy, declined at first to sit in the Italian Parliament, to which he was elected by several constituencies; but at length he consented to represent a district of Naples, and on the 18th April, 1861, he made his first appearance in the Chamber of Deputies for the purpose, as it soon appeared, of making an attack on the prime minister. The debate that arose was upon the subject of the volunteers, concerning whom Baron Ricasoli had moved for papers, with a view to bring about a reconciliation between the two eminent men in question. Garibaldi entered the hall in his worn red shirt, surrounded by his friends, amid the cheers of the house and the galleries, and after hearing Ricasoli and the secretary of war, he rose to address the Chamber. He thanked Ricasoli for introducing a subject of such vital importance to him, as it concerned the interests of his companions in arms; he admitted the disagreement existing between him and Cavour, but declared that he was always ready to yield whenever the welfare of the country demanded it. Then, instigated, it is said, by some of his most reckless adherents, he gave way to a lamentable burst of ill feeling. He repeated an old taunt that Cavour had made him a foreigner in his native land (Nice); reproached him for having blighted his success in Naples by his cold and baneful influence; and rising to a climax of bitterness, he accused him

of having instigated civil war and of being the enemy of his country. Wounded to the quick, Cavour rose to protest. But the Chamber protested for him; the members sprang to their feet as one man, and amidst the general confusion and shouts of an indignant assembly, the chairman declared the house adjourned. This protest found an echo through the civilized world; and the press of Europe and America, while they bestowed their tribute of admiration on the great volunteer, were unanimous in the expression of their sorrow, that he who represented the arm of Italy should have indulged in such an attack upon him who represented the national mind. Order being restored in the house, General Bixio, a warm friend of Garibaldi and one of his bravest lieutenants, made an earnest appeal to him not to sacrifice to his feeling the holy cause in which they all with equal patriotism were engaged; he implored Cavour to forgive his chief, and both to unite their efforts in accomplishing the great work which Providence had intrusted to their hands. Cavour was the first to accept the proposed reconciliation, and with his usual urbanity offered not only forgiveness but oblivion of what had just occurred; he had even the magnanimity to justify the attack of his adversary by remarking that "from the grief which he himself felt, when he thought it his duty to advise the king to cede Nice and Savoy, he could well understand the feelings of the general and the resentment he had shown." The house by an overwhelming majority expressed its adhesion to Cavour's policy, but Garibaldi still showed distrust, even after the king had made a personal effort to reconcile him to the great statesman. Cavour, though victorious in Parliament, felt deeply the wound inflicted on him by the misappreciation of his labours proclaimed so loudly and persistently by Garibaldi and the most extreme among his followers. Incessant labour, immense responsibility, and bitter disappointment, began to affect his health, and he had two or three attacks of brain congestion. For the first time he complained of fatigue, of the inability to rest, and confessed to the feeling that "his frame was giving way beneath his mind and will." He wished for time to finish his work. Then he would care little what might happen; "indeed," he said, "I should be glad to die." Still he worked on with redoubled zeal till the last; he was every day at his post in the Parliament, answering questions, initiating the new house into the proceedings of constitutional government, urging forward measures best adapted to accomplish the unity of the nation, and explaining his policy with increased power and earnestness, as if a secret voice told him it was the legacy he was to bequeath to his country. As the head of the executive department, his labours were still greater; the sudden annexation of so many new provinces increased his duties to a prodigious extent. Old abuses were to be done away with, new institutions introduced, clashing interests reconciled, finances systematized, taxes revised, ways and means provided, the codes reformed, railroads marked out and built, telegraphs extended, the army and navy increased, every department re-organized, and, in short, order created out of chaos. As minister of foreign affairs the whole burden of the complicated relations with other countries rested upon him; and he was forced to keep a constant watch over the chess-board of European diplomacy, in order that he might influence the movements of friendly powers, ward off the attacks of enemies, and seize the moment in which he might checkmate the emperor of Austria and the government of Rome. In fact, he had the control of a Titanic revolution, which his position obliged him to direct solely through diplomatic skill and energy.

On Thursday, the 4th of June, alarming symptoms began to appear in the sufferer, and the news of his dangerous condition spreading through Turin, cast a deep gloom over the city. The streets leading to his palace were soon filled with a silent and sorrowful multitude, eagerly awaiting reports from the sick chamber. Those who but the day before had been his bitter opponents, now laying aside all party considerations, mingled with that anxious crowd; eyes which had regarded him with coldness or envy were now wet with tears, and many a one among that throng would willingly have given himself a sacrifice to save the life on which the fate of the nation seemed to hang. And when, toward the last, that deep silence was broken by the sound of the bell of the Viaticum, alternating with the prayers for the dying; and the solemn procession of torch-bearers, led by the good Frà Giacomo bearing the Host, was seen entering the palace—a sob of anguish arose from that multitude, as if the last hope of the country was about to be extinguished for ever. Within, beneath the roof under which he was born, conscious that his last hour had come, yet calm, confident, and serene, lay the dying statesman, dying at the close of the

first festival of the national birthday, thus rendered doubly sacred to posterity; surrounded by his household and friends, in the embrace of the king to whom he had given the crown of Italy; amidst the anxiety of all Europe, expressed by the hourly telegrams received from the various capitals; dying as he lived—an honest man, a true patriot, opposing to the last the papal church, whose sacraments, the symbols of Christianity, he received in spite of her excommunication, thus showing that he could be a Christian without being a Papist. Whether in the full possession of his faculties or in the wanderings of delirium, no bitterness or rancour escaped his lips, but he spake words of cheer and consolation to his friends, assuring them that all was saved, that Italy was secure; and as the morning of the 6th June dawned he gradually sank, still absorbed in the one thought of his country, for whose greatness he had lived, and uttering faintly and at intervals the darling names of Italy, Venice, Rome.

The grandeur of Cavour's character as a statesman must be estimated by the magnitude of his object, the boldness and the prudence with which he executed his designs, and the extraordinary power which he possessed of foreseeing results, and of converting obstacles into means. He combined the originality and depth of a theorist with the practical genius of a true reformer; he understood the character of the age in which he lived, and made it tributary to his great purposes. He made self-government the object of legislation, political economy the source of liberty, and liberty the basis of nationality. Aware that neither revolution nor conservatism alone could produce the regeneration of his country, he opposed them in their separate action, while he grasped them both with a firm hand, yoked them together, and led them on to conquest. He saw that Italian independence could only be attained through the aid of foreign alliance. He recognized in Napoleon III. the personification of organized revolution, and the natural ally of the Italian people; and the work which he foreshadowed in the union of the Sardinian troops with the armies of England and France in the Crimea, and for which he laid the foundation in the Congress of Paris, was achieved with the victories of Magenta and Solferino, and was followed by the recognition of the new kingdom of Italy by all the states of Europe save two—Austria and Spain. The thought of Venice and the Quadrilateral lay heavy on his heart in his last hours. Another and a foreign statesman was destined to accomplish the completion of the new kingdom on that side—a statesman who doubtless pondered deeply over the career of Count Cavour, and who undertook a task of kindred nature to his, of yet larger scope, the task of unifying the German nation. Of that statesman, Count von Bismarck, and of his work for Italy as well as for his own country, much will have to be said in future chapters. It is enough to indicate here the resemblance of the work he had to do with that which was so admirably performed by the long-lamented Cavour.

The Roman question, unsolved at the time of Cavour's death, was taken up by his successor in the ministry, Baron Ricasoli, who, full of respect for the church, endeavoured to reconcile its head with the state and the king. In August, 1861, he wrote a most conciliatory letter to the pope, in which he reminded his Holiness of the events of 1848 and 1849, when "Italy, moved by words of gentleness and pardon which came from your lips, conceived the hope of closing the series of its secular misfortunes, and beginning the era of its regeneration." The pope's resistance, he went on to say, or rather his want of co-operation with the cause of independence, filled the minds of the Italians with bitterness. "But the rights of nationality are imperishable, and the See of Holy Peter, by virtue of a divine promise, is imperishable also. Since neither of the two adversaries can disappear from the field of battle, they must become reconciled, so that the world may not be thrown into terrible and endless perturbations." The good baron proceeds to argue that a free church in a free state would be the very thing to suit both pope and people. "You can," he concluded, "you can, Holy Father, once more change the face of the world; you can raise the Apostolic See to a height unknown to the church in past ages. If you wish to be greater than kings of the earth, free yourself from the miseries of this royalty which makes you only their equal. Italy will give you a secure see, an entire liberty, a new grandeur. She venerates the pontiff, but she cannot arrest her march before the prince; she wishes to remain Catholic, but she wishes to be a nation free and independent. If you listen to the prayer of this favourite daughter, you will gain in souls more power than you have lost as a prince; and from the height of the Vatican, when stretching your hand over Rome and

the world to bless them, you will see the nations re-established in their rights, bending before you their defender and protector." Impressive words and true, but the pope was too much a man of the world not to know that his temporalities were worth having as long as he could keep them; and neither the blandishments of Ricasoli nor the abuse of Petrucelli made his Holiness loose his hold on the temporal power, so long as there was protection at hand. The letters were sent through the French government, and all the answer vouchsafed to them was that the pope was "not in a humour" to entertain such proposals. The "most holy Janus," as Petrucelli styled him in the Italian Parliament, relied on French bayonets, and answered every appeal of his fellow-countrymen for friendly alliance by a *non possumus.* A Janus indeed, "with two faces, one that of the pontiff, serene and august; the other, that of the king of Rome, idiotic, ferocious, brutal." Still the French held Rome, and bound over the Italians to keep the peace with the spiritual "head of all the faithful."

Garibaldi, however, was not restrained by the same power, and about a year after the rejection of Ricasoli's proposals, the volunteer chief improvised an expedition that, starting from Genoa, landed in Sicily, passed thence into Calabria, and marched towards Rome, in the hope of planting the flag of Italy on the walls of the Eternal City. He endeavoured to secure the sympathy and assistance of the Hungarians, upon whom the Austrian rule still pressed heavily, and who, as Garibaldi trusted, would rise in thousands at the trumpet call of revolution. But the "sons of Arpad" were deaf to the voice of the charmer, and their feelings were expressed in a very sober, sensible letter, addressed by Klapka from Turin to the Italian chief, and pointing out that neither time nor place were propitious to revolution, and that the Hungarians would do well to wait for a more favourable opportunity. King Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation condemning the expedition in grave and emphatic terms, and General Cialdini was sent to oppose it with Italian troops. The latter sent forward Major-general Pallavicino from Reggio to overtake Garibaldi. He found him on the morning of the 29th of August encamped at the foot of the plateau of Aspromonte. An engagement ensued, in which the rebels had no chance. They were surrounded on all sides, and both Garibaldi and his son Menotti were wounded, the former having a bullet in his ankle, which was not extracted without considerable difficulty. A very characteristic letter from Garibaldi bewailing the conflict of Italian against Italian, appeared in the month of September. "They thirsted for blood, and I wished to spare it. I ran to the front of our line crying out to them not to fire, and from the centre to the left where my voice and those of my aides-de-camp could be heard, not a trigger was pulled. It was not thus on the attacking side. . . . If I had not been wounded at the outset, and if my people had not received the order under all circumstances to avoid any collision with the regular troops, the contest between men of the same race would have been terrible. However, far better as it is. Whatever may be the result of my wounds, whatever fate the government prepares for me, I have the consciousness of having done my duty; and the sacrifice of my life is a very little thing if it has contributed to save that of a great number of my fellow-countrymen." A prisoner so simple-minded, and so illustrious by deeds of heroism, could not be dealt with harshly, and the king with the consent of his ministers granted a slightly qualified amnesty to all the prisoners, and a free pardon to their leader, who again returned to his island home at Caprera. Thus the pope continued to sit on his temporal throne at Rome, or rather upon French bayonets, performing agreeably to his high pretensions what Talleyrand pronounced to be an impossibility. "You can do anything with bayonets but sit upon them," said the witty diplomatist when speaking once of the military occupation of a foreign territory. The French emperor, to obviate the inconvenience of further expeditions like Garibaldi's, contracted a treaty with the king of Italy, which is generally known as the September Convention. It defined the period within which the Papal States were to be evacuated by the French troops, and contained the following four articles:—1, Italy engages not to attack the present territory of the Holy Father, and to prevent, even by force, every attack upon the said territory coming from without; 2, France will withdraw her troops from the Pontifical States gradually, and in proportion as the army of the Holy Father shall be organized. The evacuation shall nevertheless be accomplished within the space of two years; 3, The Italian government engages to raise no protest against the organization of a Papal army, even if composed of foreign Catholic volunteers, sufficing to maintain the authority of

the Holy Father, and tranquillity as well in the interior as upon the frontier of his states, provided that this force should not degenerate into a means of attack against the Italian government; 4, Italy declares herself ready to enter into an arrangement to take under her charge a proportionate part of the debt of the former states of the church. This convention, as its name implies, was dated on the 15th of September, 1864.

At the same time it was determined to remove the capital of Italy from Turin to Florence. Several reasons conspired to make this a desirable change, but the chief was the exposed situation of Turin, in case of war, to attack either by France or Austria. Florence is beneath the shelter of the Apennines; and except Rome, which at that time was unattainable, it is, amongst the principal towns of Italy, the one that lies nearest the centre of the kingdom. But the population of Turin were naturally opposed to a measure which would reduce their fair city from a capital to a provincial town, and the demeanour of the crowd assembled in the square or place opposite the palace was so turbulent, that the soldiers fired upon it and several lives were lost.

A bill brought into the Chamber to authorize the transfer of the capital, gave rise to a long debate at the end of November, in the course of which General Cialdini delivered a speech remarkable for its spirit and eloquence. "Italy," he said, "has two-thirds and more of her frontier washed by the sea. The other third is joined to the continent by the circle of the Alps. In a sublime contrast at the foot of these gigantic and snowy Alps stretch out the vast and fertile plains of Lombardy and Piedmont. The Apennines, as if weary of the Mediterranean, bend back and cross over to the Adriatic, forming a great curtain, an immense towering curtain, between the two seas, from Genoa to La Cattolica. In front of the Apennines you have the vast and beautiful valley of the Po, in which you find the Austrian encamped in his strong Quadrilateral, and of which —I mean the valley of the Po—we can neither fortify nor defend the principal outlets, because they are not" (this was spoken in 1864) "in our hands. The valley of the Po, therefore, shows us an enemy solidly established in a house which has its door open to whoever chooses to enter. Can it be pretended or desired that the capital of the kingdom should be in this valley of the Po? Let us hasten to remove behind the Apennines, not only the capital, but the arsenals, the depôts, the reserves, all our resources, all our most vital interests; then let the passes of the Apennines be put in a state of defence. From Genoa to La Cattolica the roads across them are only seven or eight. All these roads offer gorges, defiles, which are real Thermopylæ, where a few earthworks, a few guns, and a handful of brave men, can arrest a whole army. Let us erect some solid fortifications at La Cattolica to secure the flank, and then multiply as far as possible the permanent and portable means of passing from one bank of the Po to the other, and thus prepare the possibility of useful, rapid, and decisive manœuvres. Whenever this general system of defence of the state is accepted and carried out, the destinies of Italy can never depend on the uncertain issue of a battle. At our pleasure, and according to circumstances, we can retire behind the Po, and beyond the Apennines to await better days; or, if it suits us, if we are in a position to fight, we may come down and try the fate of arms in the valley of the Po. I too," he continued, in allusion to the grievance of the Turinese, "have a heart which profoundly feels the bitterness of political life, and can understand great affections and great sorrows. Heaven forbid, therefore, that a word, a single syllable, should fall from my lips which should in any degree wound those affections, those sorrows, which I fully comprehend and thoroughly respect. But when the security, the greatness, the future life of Italy are at stake, affection must be silent, the heart must not speak; logic alone, cold and inexorable, must reason. An eye filled with tears does not see. A heart wrung by profound pain has only sad previsions, mournful presentiments. A suffering brain is oppressed by black images, by sorrowful ideas. But are we to pause, dismayed by presentiments, previsions, fears? Oh! if all the prophecies of misfortune had been verified, what would have become of us, what would have become of Italy? Let us take heart, and recognize that a secret force, more quick-sighted, stronger, more enlightened than we, guides Italy on a determined course; let us acknowledge that the Italian revolution pursues its march, slow and pacific, but more irresistible than we could have imagined or desired, beyond the limits which we ourselves had imagined and traced out. I deplore the injury to Turin as much as any one, as on the field of battle

I have often wept over fallen soldiers and friends; but, not to lose soldiers and friends, ought we to renounce combats and victories! Not to cause local injuries and sorrows, shall we sacrifice the general interest, shall we sacrifice the public weal? With Turin, seated at the foot of the Alps, at the extremity of the state, but a few miles from the French frontier, in the most eccentric conditions which can be laid down, I dispute with pain, but with entire conviction, the title of a capital. If from this solemn place you tell the cities and provinces whence you come, that the sacrifices asked are indispensable for the safety, the strength, the future of Italy, be sure the people will believe you. If you tell them that liberty, independence, national unity, are blessings for which too high a price can never be paid, the people will believe you. Tell them so, I implore you. The school of sacrifice ennobles great causes, retempers the soul, and magnifies the national character of peoples. Prometheus could transform clay into men. Sacrifice alone changes men into heroes?"

Such noble eloquence, vivid even in a bald translation, was borne, in the gallant general's native tongue, to the inmost hearts of his hearers. The bill was carried by a majority of 134 to 47, and on the 11th of December appeared a royal decree, declaring that the capital of the kingdom should be transferred to Florence within six months, which decree was duly carried into effect in the year 1865. Rome and Venice only were wanting to complete the kingdom of Italy, and already had begun that solemn march of events which was to lead to the fulfilment of the Italian patriot's dream.

CHAPTER III.

Prussian history from 1848 to 1864—Queen Louisa and her two sons—Death of Frederick William IV.—Accession of William—His political inheritance—Triumph of Prince Schwartzenberg at Olmutz—Humiliation of the Prussian Army—Desire for revenge—Effect on Germany of the war in Italy—Growing feeling for German unity—Cavour and Bismarck—Schleswig and Holstein—An old Historical Question—Holstein the northern frontier of Charlemagne's empire—Settlement of Germans in Schleswig—Separate administration of the Elbe Duchies and Denmark—Prussia retires from the Duchies in 1850—Treaty of London, 1852, guarantees the integrity of Denmark—Ratified by all the Powers save by the Diet of the German Confederation—European opinion—Outcry against England—Political intrigues—Herr Otto von Bismarck—Lord Russell's innocuous interference—His Gotha despatch—His "Forfeiture" Letter from Blairgowrie—Its stoppage—Bismarck's change of policy—Re-combination of the European cabinets—King Christian IX.—Prince of Augustenburg—Federal execution—Austria and Prussia in the Diet—Troops in Holstein and in Schleswig enter Jutland—The London Conference—The war before and after the Conference—Action at Mysunde—March on Fredericia—Siege of Dybhöl—Its storm and capture by the Prussians—Suspension of hostilities—Break-up of the Conference—Hostilities renewed—Attack upon Alsen—The Rolf-Krake—Defeat of the Danes—Prussians expel the Federal troops from Rendsburg—Negotiations at Vienna—Treaty of Peace—Remarks—Co-occupation of the Duchies by Austria and Prussia—Dissensions between the two Powers—Convention of Gastein—Division of the Duchies—Anger of the Cabinets of London and Paris—Dissatisfaction of Austria—Preparations of Prussia—The Prussian Army—Its reconstruction by Scharnhorst—Its defects visible in 1850, 1854, and 1859—Reorganization—The Needle Gun—Austrian ascendancy undermined.

The spirit of Louisa, the heroic queen of Prussia, would have been soothed in the darkest hour of her depression and her country's humiliation had she been able to foresee, that on two of her sons in succession the eyes of all Germany were to be steadfastly fixed as leaders in the great movement for the unification of the Fatherland. The eldest son, King Frederick William IV., trusted to have accomplished the great task by placing himself at the head of the liberalism of Central Europe; but he failed. The second son, King William I., allied himself with the conservatism of his country, and by military prowess succeeds in the great achievement. "Prussia disappears, Germany is called into existence," was one of the significant utterances of Frederick William during the revolutionary epoch of 1848–49. His refined and cultured nature shrank, however, from the excesses committed by the insurgents of that day, and he refused the proffered crown of Germany, on the plea that it was the fruit of revolution. The liberal constitution granted by him to his own subjects, and proclaimed in the first month of the year 1850, was subsequently modified by him on eight different occasions: namely, once in April, 1851; once in May, and again in June, 1852; after that twice in May, 1853; then in June, 1854; and in the following May, 1855; and finally in May, 1857. The result of these numerous modifications by royal decree was a tolerably conservative constitution, vesting considerable power in the executive. The king did not long survive the last change that was made. His health had suffered from the excitement produced by the scenes in which he participated at the time of the national convulsions, and in the autumn of 1858 he was unfitted for the duties of government by an attack of apoplexy. He died in January, 1861, at the age of sixty-six, and was succeeded on the throne by his brother William, who had been regent for more than two years, and who at the time of his coronation was in the sixty-fifth year of his age.

Two political legacies bequeathed to the new king were destined to be fruitful of important consequences: they were the Schleswig and Holstein question, and the humiliation which the late king had received from Prince Schwartzenberg, the Austrian prime minister, in the matter of Hesse-Cassel. As already mentioned, Austria had insisted that Frederick William should withdraw his troops, both from the duchies north of the Elbe and from Hesse. The king was undecided and unhappy. For a moment he thought of resistance, delivered a warlike speech at the opening of the Chambers, and nominated Herr Radowitz to the ministry. The army was put on a war footing, and the landwehr called out. A warlike spirit breathed through the nation, which began to recall the glorious days of the Great Frederick. But Schwartzenberg drew closer his alliance with Bavaria, and gathered a formidable army of 180,000 men on the Hessian frontier with a promptitude that astonished Europe, and revealed for the first time the great change that the use of railways had introduced into strategy. War seemed inevitable. The heir to the Prussian throne and the conservative party wished for it. Already shots had been ex-

changed by the outposts, when M. Prokesch, the Austrian envoy, summoned Prussia to quit Hesse in four and twenty hours. At the critical moment the king's kindly nature made him shrink from the responsibility of war between German and German. He gave way, dismissed the Radowitz ministry, and sent M. Manteuffel to Olmutz to submit to the dictation of Prince Schwartzenberg. Prussia was obliged to sacrifice her allies, the popular party in Hesse and in Schleswig respectively, and to recognize the authority of that Diet in which her rival reigned supreme.

The day of the treaty of Olmutz sank deep into the heart of Prussia, and was remembered by the army especially as a time of shame and ridicule that called for vengeance—a vengeance that was not slaked until the "crowning mercy" of Sadowa had visited their arms. For a time Austria was triumphant, and endeavoured even to incorporate all her various populations, German, Magyar, and Sclavonic, in the German Confederation, with a view to perpetuate her absolute preponderance in central Europe. But France and other foreign powers were so strongly opposed to this scheme that it was given up. Indeed, every step that had been taken towards national unity seemed to end only in greater disunion. "German unity," said an Austrian pamphleteer of this time, "is like squaring the circle; when you think you have got hold of it you discover that it is impossible. It is like our cathedrals; there is not one that is finished."

The war which Louis Napoleon carried into Italy brought new hope to the German unionists, although it excited the anger of the sovereigns, and almost drove Bavaria into an alliance with Austria. "The Italian war," wrote the democratic socialist Lasalle, "is not only sanctified by every principle of democracy, but it is an enormous advantage for Germany, to whom it brings salvation. Napoleon III., when he invites the Italians to drive the Austrians out of the peninsula, performs a German mission; he overthrows Austria, the eternal obstacle that prevents the unity of our country. If the map of Europe is reconstructed on behalf of the nationalities of the south, let us apply the same principle to the north. Let Prussia act without hesitation. If she does not she will have given a proof that monarchy is incapable of national action." Did this challenge of the socialist and democrat sink into the heart of the trenchant conservative Karl Otto von Bismarck? Unquestionably he pondered deeply on the Italian war, and was himself the author, as it is confidently reported, of a pamphlet entitled, "La Prusse et la Question Italienne." To him the career of Count Cavour must have been profoundly instructive and full of suggestion, as will be seen anon.

It behoves now to speak of that second unpleasant political heritage which had descended to King William from his brother—the Schleswig-Holstein question, the intricacy of which demands some care on the part of the writer to unravel, and on the part of the reader some patience to follow. Lord Palmerston used to say there was only one man besides himself who understood the Schleswig-Holstein question, and that man was dead. It is in perfect keeping with the character of the most learned people of Europe that the first appeal to arms made on behalf of German national unity should rest on historical questions nearly a thousand years old. Was the duchy of Holstein a fief of the empire, and therefore part of the Germanic empire? If it was, could Schleswig be said to exist in the same dependence by virtue of a union with Holstein that had existed from a remote period of time? Schleswig, it was clear, never had, *per se*, been a fief of the empire, for the northern boundary of Charlemagne's territory was known to be the river Eider, which divides Schleswig from Holstein. Only part of the population of Schleswig, moreover, was of German race, settlers who at various times had straggled across the river from the southern duchy; and nc theory of nationality can justly demand the absorption of the Danish population of North Schleswig by the Germanic Confederation. Such were the questions discussed with great heat and learning in all the German universities, but in none more hotly or more learnedly than in the university of Kiel in Holstein; nor did the most accomplished civilians of Europe disdain to attempt an elucidation of a subject so thorny and so obscure. It has been seen on a previous page that, in the year of universal revolution (1848), the Holsteiners, prompted by the men of Kiel, had risen in insurrection against the Danish government, had been assisted by the Prussians armed with the authority of the German Diet, had achieved a temporary independence, and finally had succumbed to the Danes after two pitched battles in which they were grievously defeated. The conquerors, following up their advantage, resolved to deprive the duchies

of the separate constitution under which they had been governed, and to incorporate the duchy of Schleswig at least in a common constitution with the kingdom of Denmark. This proceeding was deeply resented by the German population of the duchies, and by their kindred on the continent of Europe. In view of the death of King Frederick VII. without male heirs, the great powers of Europe, "taking into consideration that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the balance of power in Europe, is of high importance to the preservation of peace, signed a treaty at London on May 8, 1852, by the terms of which the succession to the crown of Denmark was made over to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, and to the direct male descendants of his union with the Princess Louise of Hesse-Cassel, granddaughter of King Christian VIII. of Denmark." This unfortunate treaty, the latest production of the effete "balance of power" doctrine, was soon brought to the test, having to face the new and infinitely more potent principles known by the names of "nationality" and "non-intervention." In the month of November, 1863, King Frederick died, and Prince Christian ascended the throne of Denmark, with the style and title of King Christian IX. The signatories of the treaty of London of 1852 were England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who all by their governments ratified the provisions of it—provisions made for dynastic purposes, and in complete disregard of the wishes of the German population of the Elbe duchies. The treaty, in fact, ought not to have been made, and as events are sometimes stronger than promises, even the most solemn, so it proved in this case. All the five powers found themselves under the necessity of breaking faith with their brave ally Denmark. Yet, in the nature of things, it was hardly possible to do otherwise. The Germans of Schleswig and Holstein had every right to be freed from the yoke which the Danes were striving to render more galling every day. The common constitution, of which more anon, proved to be, among other things, a means of giving all the offices of the duchies into the hands of Danes, to the exclusion of Germans. Christian IX., when king of Denmark, practically ceased to be duke of Schleswig and Holstein. Yet the treaty and the five powers upheld this anomalous state of things. One political body alone had declined to ratify the treaty, the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, and that body, strong in two of its members, Austria and Prussia, took action in the Schleswig-Holstein matter, and brought about the war with Denmark of 1864. The strange spectacle offered by Austria and Prussia, of two states that individually acknowledged the validity of the treaty of 1852, yet jointly trampled upon it at the bidding of the Diet, was not edifying. Russia was not anxious to see the nationality theory applied in the north of Europe, yet abstained from interference. France had cooled towards England because the latter had declined to share in the support of the Polish insurgents, and had rejected her proposal for a general congress; while the Emperor Napoleon, consistently with the principles of the treaty of Zurich, again practised the doctrine of non-intervention towards a nation shaking off the yoke of a foreign race, and would not second the English cabinet in its endeavours to preserve the integrity of the Danish kingdom. Upon England fell the greatest amount of obloquy in this matter, because the government—wisely, in the interest of the nation, yet not without ignominy—failed to maintain the guarantee inconsiderately given by treaty. That she failed in company with her co-signatories was rightly held to have been no sufficient excuse.

The reasoning on the subject at the time bears upon a somewhat analogous state of things at the present day, and may not unprofitably be briefly reviewed.

"They haven't heart of grace to fight." "Was ever England brought into such a contemptible position?" "No language can describe the degree of ignominious shame and degradation to which we have fallen." "What must Europe think of us?" Such were a few of the mildest phrases current in the social and political circles of Westminster and the surrounding neighbourhood. They expressed feelings that properly belong to the days of Pitt and of Castlereagh. In some instances they were uttered by relics of that age. That was the time of England's greatest glory. Standing for a while alone against the mighty power of Napoleon, she succeeded in forming a vast combination by which the proud Corsican was at length overthrown, and England became the first of the nations of the earth. The cost was great, a heavy debt had to be repaid or to be borne for an indefinite number of years, with an annual charge of twenty-eight millions sterling. What of that? Has not our

country prospered ever since? Did not the influence then secured make her voice potent for the settling of many a dispute without recourse to arms, open new regions to our commerce, and make us feel so safe that the council of the nation could settle down to wise and liberal legislation which has borne fruit a thousand-fold? We have surely got our equivalent for the *cost* of the war; and, taking their own base view of the matter, the peace-at-any-price men ought to consider that trade and industry and the material wealth of the country have been developed to their highest pitch *since* our great naval and military triumphs in the Napoleonic war. Viewed from higher ground, the truth that a nation cannot live by commerce only is as certain as that man cannot live by bread alone. Look at Holland! With a glorious beginning leading to power that made her respected by the greatest and most ancient nations, having rich dependencies in every quarter of the globe, she has become, by a too exclusive devotion to trade interests—what she is.

Let us save England from sinking like that.

This is a fair statement of the doctrine of "vigorous measures," a doctrine which Lord Palmerston, with his motto "*Civis Romanus sum*," and Lord Russell, with his waving-banner-like inscription of "God defend the right," both had opportunities of applying on behalf of Don Pacifico, the Sultan, his Danubian provinces, &c.

Happily for mankind, however, the opposite political doctrine of non-intervention, which some years ago could hardly hold its ground at all, took deep root in the popular mind, and rapidly spread among all classes of society.

The difficulties of the British government in 1864 sprang from a want of courage in declaring boldly and distinctly at the outset of the Danish quarrel, that England did not mean again to intervene by force of arms in mere European squabbles. The senior members of the cabinet were hampered with the traditions of English policy, as it was half a century earlier. They knew that the country was opposed to intervention, and as representatives of the national will acted rightly in abstaining from warlike demonstrations, but as exponents of that will they failed. They used threatening language and made confident boastings at the beginning of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, in the hope that Germany would pause before it encountered the phantom terrors of British wrath. But the Polish correspondence had revealed the emptiness of ministerial "tall talk," and the Germans felt safe in pursuing their own course. A truly brave English minister had only to say, "I hold my office by virtue of that public opinion which has intrusted to me the interests of the British nation. Those interests demand a friendly intercourse with all nations, interference in the affairs of none. Our commercial and political relations are so extensive in all the quarters of the globe, in America, in Asia, in Australia, in Africa, that really it is of very little moment what Europe may say or think of us. We can better do without Europe, than Europe can do without us. Therefore if you wish to be friendly with us we shall be happy to reciprocate amity; if not, we shall know how to defend ourselves. In a great cause we will assist our neighbours, but your own dynastic quarrels you must, if you please, settle at home without British interference." Such language would have been fully understood by the youngest generation of our politicians as being quite consistent with the honour and dignity of England on the one hand, and with the peace and welfare of the world on the other. Let the last rags of the old flag of intervention be flung away, and let the principles of non-intervention be openly avowed without fear of the loss of influence. Halting between two opinions, divided by feelings of the past and feelings of the present, our ministers spoke ill and wrote ill, but, thank God, they acted right. Whether to save their own credit or from an abstract love of truth and justice, they obtained a conference, at which all that could be done was done to induce the belligerent powers to come to terms. This was humane and deserving of credit. By what secret schemes and intrigues they were foiled it is impossible to say. The passions of the antagonists alone suffice to account for the resumption of hostilities. Surmises of many kinds were floating in the air. "Cousin Bernadotte" was directed in 1807 by Napoleon I. to occupy Denmark either as friend or foe, according to the circumstances of the hour. The descendant of that French general was from the throne of Sweden a spectator of the dismemberment of Denmark without the smallest loss of *sang froid*. Had he been inspired from the Tuileries with the notion, that if he waited the ripe pear would drop into his mouth? If so, the approval of the German invasion of Holstein and Schleswig by Napoleon III. would become

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intelligible. By the small sacrifice of King Christian IX. and the annexation of Jutland and the islands to Sweden and Norway, France as she faces Europe would have had on her advanced left a mighty ally in the new Scandinavian kingdom, as she had already on her advanced right a pretty strong friend in the new kingdom of Italy. A formidable neighbour indeed would France, under such circumstances, appear, were English interests in north-eastern Europe of a nature to be endangered by French preponderance! Russia, it is to be hoped, however, will take care of that part of the world. This political surmise must be taken for no more than it is worth. Meanwhile, let England not fail to maintain her ancient alliance with Germany, as long as she can do so with a good conscience.

The conflict had long been inevitable. It was a struggle, not for the uplifting of every different nationality into independence, but for the absorption of the small nations by the great. German literature, science, and art had long before invaded Denmark, and must ultimately conquer it, unless the Scandinavian mind derive new force from a union of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The tendency of our age is the destruction, not the restoration, of small separate nationalities; and it is not a tendency to evil.

Since the times shadowed forth in the history of the Tower of Babel, mankind has been striving to recover from that fearful curse of dispersion and division of tongues which constitute the principal element of distinct nationalities. It is not good to attempt to thwart this process of amalgamation. Its success will be the strongest guarantee of the permanency of modern European civilization. The Roman empire maintained its great power for five centuries under atrocious tyrants and corrupt governors by virtue of the cohesion derived from the amalgamation of the provinces with Rome, that is, by the total destruction of nationalities, accompanied by a large measure of municipal freedom.

What Julius and the other Cæsars did for the pagan world eighteen hundred years ago, railways, steamboats, the electric telegraph, and the public press are now doing for Christendom. Puny efforts to arrest the march of events by recurring to old systems, traditionary policies, and the like, will be not only futile, but fatal to those who make the attempt. England has more weighty duties to perform than to defend gallant little nations that run their heads into danger. Private feeling may lament the result of an unequal struggle between Danes and Germans, but public duty teaches that war on merely chivalrous grounds must be avoided. The Prussian monarch believed that his mission was to liberate Schleswig and Holstein from the Danes. England has nothing to fear from Prussian ambition, her advantage lying rather in the formation of a strong, united Germany, that will divide Russia from France.

The future destiny of England is bound up with vaster interests and wider regions than Europe possesses. Animated with a nobler ambition than that which war engenders, the people of these islands are qualified by their freedom, their knowledge, their wealth, and even by their geographical position, to make England the real metropolis of the world, the centre and fountain-head of the civilization of mankind. To peril so great a destiny by engaging in disputes concerning other people's boundaries, on principles that place "honour" (the offspring of lawless ages) above the Christian duty which we profess to follow, is not only impolitic and unpatriotic, but inhuman. Such was the train of reasoning that shaped the conduct of the English government in the Dano-German dispute, with certain qualifying protests made by the foreign secretary, Lord Russell.

To return to the duchies. In March, 1863, a proclamation had been issued from Copenhagen, establishing an administrative separation between Holstein and the rest of the monarchy. The laws of Holstein, the budget of Holstein, even the army of Holstein, were to be under the control of the Holstein Estates, and made entirely independent of the *Rigsraad*, which was only allowed to deliberate on those subjects so far as they regarded Denmark Proper and Schleswig. The object of this arrangement was evidently to cut off Schleswig from the German influence of Holstein, by separating the latter as much as possible from the rest of the state, and thus leaving the Danes unimpeded in their attempts to make Schleswig Danish. On the 14th of July, Frederick VII. being still alive, the Federal Diet protested against the proclamation, and threatened execution unless it was withdrawn. The Danish government, however, disregarding both protest and threat, submitted their scheme, which included the "common constitution" of Schleswig and Denmark

Proper, to the *Rigsraad*, by whom it was adopted. On the 14th November, 1863, it was embodied in a charter, and became the ostensible cause of a war that led to the dismemberment of Denmark.

In the diplomatic campaign which preceded and accompanied the military one, the palm for political insight and strategic skill fell to Herr von Bismarck, the king of Prussia's prime minister. It is true that he derived a great advantage over some of his antagonists, by the facility with which he seemed to shift his policy to suit his ends; but underneath this apparent unscrupulousness lay the one grand aim of his life, the healing of the divisions of his country—the welding together of Germany into one grand whole. When Prussian envoy at the Diet, of which Count Rechberg, the Austrian envoy, was president, Bismarck made no secret of his opinion that the policy of Austria should be turned in an eastern direction, and that her intervention in the affairs of Germany was misplaced and unnatural. Count Rechberg doubtless smiled at his colleague's presumption, and abated not one jot of the Kaiser's pretensions to absolute preponderance in the Diet and in Germany. It is believed that the meeting of sovereigns at Frankfort in 1863, on the invitation of Austria, to deliberate on the reform of the Federal Union, was the occasion on which Bismarck resolved to labour with all his energy at the exclusion of Austria from all participation in German affairs. The king of Prussia did not attend that meeting, which when not under the influence of his minister he seemed disposed to favour. Herr von Bismarck's first step on coming to power was to secure the support of Russia while he followed his own bent, by a policy that was strongly condemned by the rest of Europe. In February, 1863, he made a convention with the stern master of Poland, that any Polish insurgents who might take refuge in Posen or other parts of Prussia, should be sent back across the frontier into Russian Poland; that is, into the hands of the enemy from whom they fled. This convention brought much obloquy on its author; but he knew well what the alliance of Russia was worth, and the result proved that he had no cause to fear the hostility of France and England. In the Danish question, his predecessors left him the opportunity of attacking a weak power, and he was not the man to throw away such an opportunity. He began by cautiously feeling his way with some modest expressions of opinion, such as that Denmark was bound in honour to fulfil her engagements towards Germany, and that she was blameable for having resisted the mediation of England. After the proclamation of the 13th of March, he joined in the protests of Austria against the new Danish projects. When execution was threatened by the Federal Diet, Lord Russell in alarm suggested to that body, that it would be "desirable that nothing should occur to augment the already existing dangers and complications of Europe." Upon this all the German governments hastened to calm the fears of his lordship by the allegation that an execution did not mean a war; and Herr von Bismarck went so far as to declare that "if a war did take place, it would be an offensive war on the part of Denmark against the Germanic Confederation."

The situation was, indeed, at that time sufficiently perilous for Prussia to necessitate the greatest caution on the part of her ministers. England, France, and Austria were united on the Polish question, and it almost seemed as if a general crusade was preparing against Russia and her audacious ally. There is now no doubt that the unfortunate declarations made by Lords Russell and Palmerston in July, 1863, which were afterwards appealed to as giving Denmark a claim to the armed assistance of England, were the fruit of the general feeling that, in any European difficulty, the policy of France and England would be identical; and if Prussia had then taken any precipitate step in the Danish affair, it is pretty certain she would at once have received a humiliating check. But Herr von Bismarck was too wary to expose himself to such a danger. He quietly bided his time, expressing himself to foreign powers in ambiguous terms about the duchies, firmly adhering to the Russian alliance, and rivalizing with Austria for influence in Germany. He had not to wait long. The failure of the Polish negotiations produced a coolness between France and England, and when Lord Russell proposed to the French government, on the 16th of September, a common intervention in favour of Denmark, he was answered with a refusal. Herr von Bismarck now began to assume a more decisive attitude, and proposed to the Diet that Prussian troops only should be employed in the execution which was now imminent. But, towards the end of September, the famous speech of Lord Russell at Blairgowrie seemed to offer a chance of reviving the Anglo-French alli-

ance. The despatch declaring that the Czar had forfeited his rights to Poland was fully agreed to by France; and Herr von Bismarck, with that ready adaptation to circumstances which is so characteristic of him, immediately proposed, much to the disappointment of Germany, a compromise with Denmark. The terms of this compromise—namely, that Denmark should declare herself ready to give satisfaction to the Diet in regard to the claim of Holstein and Lauenburg to control their own legislation and expenditure of all money raised in the duchies, and to accept the mediation of Great Britain for the arrangement of the international or Schleswig question—were agreed to by Denmark; and all seemed to be going well when Herr von Bismarck dropped his plan, and prepared to carry out the "execution." This apparently unaccountable conduct was thus explained by those who were said to be behind the scenes. The "forfeiture" despatch of Lord Russell, which was to have consolidated the Anglo-French alliance, never reached its destination, but at the earnest representation of Herr von Bismarck, who expressed his conviction that Russia would regard it as a *casus belli*, was stopped on its way to St. Petersburg, and a meaningless document, without object or conclusion, was sent in its place. The situation was now completely changed. France and England were isolated, Prussia had the support of Russia and the Confederation, and Austria, though unwillingly, was forced by the break-up of the Western alliance to join Prussia. Bismarck triumphed on every side, and could now give full scope to the audacious policy most in accordance with his character and abilities. The proposal of the congress, which followed close upon the affair of the "forfeiture" despatch, strikingly displayed the changes which a few months had brought about in the relative positions of the European powers. England refused the proposal of France, and these two powers, which in the summer of that very year had rebuked Prussia and Russia for their conduct towards Poland and Denmark, now sought the aid of the cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg for carrying out their respective views. After a long negotiation Russia adopted the English view, and talked of the "perfect harmony" with which "the four governments (*i.e.*, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England) thought and acted." Herr von Bismarck was more difficult to manage. He had his policy to carry out on the Eider, and was in no hurry to put an end to a situation where France and England both strove for his favour; he therefore coquetted with them both, and satisfied neither, until the matter dropped of itself. His "moderate views," as they were called by Prince Gortschakoff, however, soon changed when the publication of the November charter and the death of King Frederick VII. made it necessary for him to assume a more active attitude.

The right of succession established by the treaty of London now came into force, and under the treaty Christian IX. became the new king of Denmark and the duchies; but the Confederation refused to be bound by the treaty which it had not signed, and appointed a committee to inquire into the pretensions of the young duke of Augustenburg, who now claimed the sovereignty in Schleswig and Holstein. No blame could be attached to him for advancing a claim, as he had not joined in his father's renunciation; nor could the Confederation be bound by a treaty to which it had not adhered, and which was in direct opposition to the wishes of the German nation. The fault really lay with Austria and Prussia, who ought not to have signed the treaty of London (a treaty regulating the succession in a German federal state) except as representatives of the Confederation, and with the mediating powers, who did not negotiate in this question with the Confederation, but with Austria and Prussia. These two powers had now determined not to let the matter out of their hands. Count Rechberg, dreading above all things the democratic tendencies of the rest of the minor states of Germany, agreed to the views of Herr von Bismarck, and rashly associated himself with Prussian policy in the duchies. Both Austria and Prussia held firmly to the treaty of London, and both overtly rejected the pretensions of Prince Frederick. After the occupation of Holstein by federal troops on the 21st of December, Bismarck openly declared that Prussia could not bind herself to any particular line of policy in a question, the aspect of which was constantly changing; and proposed to the Diet that the Austrian and Prussian troops should occupy Schleswig as a guarantee for the performance by Denmark of her engagements of 1851–52. The smaller German states meanwhile organized a strong opposition against Prussia, but after fruitless struggles were forced to yield her the ascendancy. Bismarck marched his troops on Holstein, and became master of the situation. On the 16th of January he

summoned King Christian to abolish the November constitution in two days, and on a hesitating response sent the Prussian troops into Schleswig. He compelled the recalcitrant middle states to comply with his views, and on the 25th February Prussia and Austria declared to the Diet that they were about to assume the military and civil command in the duchies, which had hitherto been under the authority of the Confederation, an announcement to which no one dared object. Bismarck further strengthened his position by concluding a convention with Austria, binding his government to give her material assistance in case her possessions in Italy should be attacked, and at the same time consolidated the alliance between the three northern courts, by persuading Count Rechberg to proclaim a state of siege in Galicia, and thus give the final blow to the Polish insurrection. Seven days afterwards the troops of Austria and Prussia entered Jutland.

When Denmark was all but overrun, one effort more was made to obtain peace, by the assembly of plenipotentiaries at a conference in London. They met on the 29th of April, and after a session of six weeks broke up without coming to any decision. The only purpose served by this diplomatic assemblage was, that it gave Prussia and Austria an opportunity of formally declaring that the state of war with Denmark absolved them from all engagements entered into before the war began. The conference also brought into view the by-play of the great powers, when the Czar of Russia ceded all his family claims on Holstein to the duke of Oldenburg, who was put forward as a rival to the prince of Augustenburg. The plan for making an independent sovereignty of the united duchies under one of these princes, was quite opposite to Bismarck's scheme of national unification, and he was only ready to accede to it provided that the nominal sovereign gave up the control of the naval and military forces, the principal ports, and the projected sea-canal, to Prussia. These conditions Augustenburg, the popular candidate in the duchies, declined to accept. The course of the history has here been somewhat anticipated in order to bring the military narrative into a consecutive story. The war now to be described began two months before the conference at London, and was ended about two months after that conference, by the severance of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenberg from the ancient kingdom of Denmark.

On Tuesday, 2nd February, 1864, hostilities were begun by the Austro-Prussians attacking the Danes at Misunde. Misunde, or Mysunde, is situated on the narrowest part of the Schlei, just before it widens into the large lake which forms the natural protection of the town of Schleswig. It consists of a group of five or six forts, which completes the line of the Dannewerk on the east. The Dannewerk, or as the Danes call it, Dannevirke, is one of the two strongholds of Schleswig; the other being the island of Alsen with its approaches. This line of fortification, which is made up of twenty-seven forts, runs some thirteen miles in a south-westerly direction as far as Hollingsted, a town on the river Freene, midway between Frederickstadt, on the Eider, and Misunde. Besides the defences of the Dannewerk, the Danes had batteries round the north bank of the great pond, or lake, made by the Schlei between Misunde and Schleswig. The Austrians and Prussians, under the command of Field-marshal von Wrangel, marched from Kiel, by way of Eckenförde, and met with some resistance from the Danes, under Lieutenant-general Gerlach, at the outposts of Misunde. The next day the Austrians made an attack at Bustrup, a point in the Dannewerk about three miles from the town of Schleswig. Night prevented the assailants from reaping the benefit of whatever advantage they had over their enemies. It is probable that, had daylight lasted, or had they known the extent of their success, they might have taken the town. Nothing further was done on the one side or the other till the 5th February, when the Danes evacuated the Dannewerk. The abandonment of this stronghold was decided upon by the council of war very suddenly. As late as ten o'clock in the evening of the day that this step was taken, one of the brigadiers, who had placed himself at the head of his columns, with the full understanding that he was to make to the advanced posts at Fredericksburg and Bustrup, received orders to change his march to Flensburg. The news of this resolution created great dissatisfaction among the Danes, both soldiers and people generally. The government at Copenhagen so far gave way to public opinion, as to recall the commander-in-chief, General de Meza, and appoint Lieutenant-general Gerlach in his place, seemingly for no other reason than because, by some accident, the latter happened to be absent from the council that determined on the evacuation. When the

strength of their army, the condition of their artillery, and their resources are considered, the wisdom of the decision will remain unchallenged by every one acquainted with the great superiority of the German army in numbers and artillery. To defend thirteen miles of forts, and the unprotected line beyond them to Frederickstadt, the Danes had but 30,000 men. In all the forts there was not one rifled gun; and no gun had more than 100 charges of powder. The question of the expediency of the retreat to Alsen, where their defences presented a far more contracted front, is not doubtful. Alsen, too, was nearer Jutland, and proportionately more inclined to the Danish cause. In Schleswig there was the great disadvantage of the presence of much unsympathetic feeling. In some instances the carelessness of the Schleswigers for their defenders took the more positive form of rendering secret assistance to the Austro-Prussians. With this half hostile population around them the Danes could not make any movement without the enemy's knowledge. The weather, which for five or six days before the 5th had been soft and sloppy, on this day changed. A boisterous north-east wind set in, bringing frost, accompanied with a heavy fall of snow. The roads soon became difficult for locomotion. In this inclement weather the Danish army set out on its march about eleven o'clock at night. No preparation had been made for the slipperiness of the roads by roughing the horses' shoes. Neither horses nor men could keep their feet. The cavalry had to dismount and lead their beasts. The artillery had to be drawn by the men. The progress of the army was soon checked by the fallen horses. Guns, waggons, and ambulance vans had soon to be left with them, encumbering the way still more. The first part of the journey was the most calamitous. In nine hours little more than six miles were made. Flensburg was not reached till four o'clock the next day. They halted here for two hours, and then continued their march to Alsen by way of Krasan and Gravenstein. The difficulties of the preceding night had to be encountered in a more aggravated form. At length, after eight and forty hours of toiling and suffering, they arrived at their destination. That their retreat was not more disastrous was owing to the comparatively short distance they had to traverse. Time was the only element wanting to have made this march rival in horrors the retreat from Moscow. As it was, many died from exposure to the cold and from fatigue. If, however, the loss of life was not very great, that of *matériel* was very serious, and was one that could be ill afforded. Everything they had to abandon fell into the hands of the Austrians. Their retreat did not escape the attention of the Austro-Prussians, who entered Schleswig about five hours after they had left the town, and without any delay set out after them. The inclemency of the weather, which had put such an obstacle in the way of the retreat of the Danes, was no less unfavourable to their enemies' pursuit. Although the Austrians when they started were ten miles only in the rear, they did not come up with the Danes till Saturday afternoon, the 6th. About five miles from Flensburg they came into collision with two regiments, the first and eleventh, under the command of Colonels Müller and Beck. The Austrians greatly overmatched the Danes in numbers. They had, moreover, with them some squadrons of hussars and sixteen cannon; while their opponents had but two field pieces and no horse. The Danes offered a brave resistance, meeting the cavalry with the bayonet. They had to fall back at last, after suffering severe losses, especially among their officers. One of the companies of the first regiment lost its whole staff. This was the only engagement between the Austrians and Danes worthy of mention. The result of this contest is a sample of the fortune that pursued them in every open field. Their very resistance insured their defeat. To make any stand against their enemy was to give him time to gather fresh strength, like another Antæus. As the whole force of the Danish army was not thought necessary to defend Alsen, 4000 men, chiefly cavalry, received orders from Copenhagen to march to Fredericia in Jutland. Shortly after, the third division, under General Wilster, was directed to embark for the same town. This division consisted of about 10,000 men, including two field batteries and half a regiment of dragoons. Their forces were thus divided into two. Their example was followed by the Austrians and Prussians, who parted company, the former making for Jutland, and the latter proceeding to the reduction of the Danish position at Dybböl.

This siege was the greatest event of the war. In fact, it was the only place in Schleswig at which the Danes made a decided stand. A

description of the defences of Dybböl will render more intelligible the plan of attack which was carried out to so successful an issue by the Prussians. The island of Alsen is separated from the continent by a sound about thirteen miles in length, and about two or three miles in width at its entrance. At Sönderborg the width of the sound narrows to about 150 yards. Here the mainland of Söndered is connected with the island by a bridge. On the mainland, beyond the bridge, was the Dybböl stronghold, consisting of four distinct lines. First, there was the *tête du pont* proper, immediately across the water, a narrow gorge or defile winding between two hills of moderate height, flanked on either side by two batteries, and barred by a double range of palisades. Beyond that, after an esplanade of about half a mile, there was the second line, or Dybböl line proper, on Dybböl Hill, consisting of ten forts, disposed on a somewhat circular line from No. 1, close to the water's edge, on the Vemmingbund to No. 10, at a very little distance from the Alsund shore. The Dybböl windmill was nearly in the middle of this arc, somewhat in the rear of forts Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, and close to the main road leading from Sönderborg to Nyböl, Graasten, and Flensburg. The third line was made by the broad skirts and summit of the Arnbjerg, by the village of Dybböl, and by the somewhat broken and uncleared ground of Rageböl. The fourth line was drawn across two woods, called Stenterupskov and Boffel Kobbel, lining the above-mentioned road on either side. All these four lines stretched out in concentric arcs, and had their centre at the Sönderborg bridges, from which they were placed at the respective distance of half a mile, one mile, a mile and a half, and two miles. About half a mile from the fourth line, on the north, was Nyböl, and at the southern was the isthmus which joins the little peninsula of Broagerland to the Söndered mainland. The second line extended for about one and a half mile, and its ten forts were mounted with one hundred heavy cannon. The Dybböl position, taken altogether, was very strong by nature. In 1849 the Danes successfully withstood a siege here; and they had great confidence in the result of one in 1864. Little or nothing was done this year toward strengthening their position. They contented themselves with restoring their old works and batteries of 1849. In fifteen years, however, a revolution had taken place in the art of war, to which they had paid no heed. The little peninsula of Broagerland was left unprotected, and became the key by which the Prussians opened the stronghold. Before the days of rifled guns Dybböl was quite safe on this side; but the case was different in 1864. The Danes manned the first and second lines only, using the third and fourth as outposts. Flensburg was the headquarters of the Prussian army; but their outposts extended as far as Nyböl on the south, and Sattrup on the north. At the southern extremity of the Danes' fourth line was the neck of the Broager peninsula, which was covered with the woods of Stenterup and Boffel above mentioned. These woods were, by an unpardonable supineness of the Danes, occupied by pickets only. The importance of the position was seen by the Prussians, who during the whole campaign showed themselves superior to the Danes in foresight. The Danish outposts were driven back, and the peninsula seized by the Prussians. The same want of providence on the part of the Danes in the case of the village of Dybböl, which they had not fortified, stood the Prussians in good stead on the 22nd February. On this day, coming up by the woods of Stenterup Skov and Boffel Kobbel, which they now held, they attacked the Danes in great force and drove them from Dybböl village. Although at the end of the day the Danes succeeded in recovering their position, it was only at a great sacrifice of life. For some time after this reconnaissance of the Prussians there was almost a complete cessation of arms. Indeed, the whole war evinced such a listlessness on the part of invaders and defenders, that it is difficult at times to believe that either one side or the other was in earnest. It was the custom of the pickets, when being changed, to send a parting shot to the enemy, and this for a long time was the extent of the firing on both sides. On one occasion, even, the Danes and Prussians were seen snowballing each other. Meanwhile the Austrians had made their way towards Fredericia. They drove the Danes before them from Gudsö, Taarup, Bredstrap, and other places, all across the isthmus of the peninsula to Fredericia. This fortress was invested, and the towns of Stoutstrup and Erritso occupied by their forces. From these places their artillery commanded the whole sound of the Little Belt, so that all intercourse between Jutland and Alsen had to be carried on by the other side of Fünen. As

at Dybböl, no affair of any importance occurred. In one or two skirmishes, however, the Danes lost rather heavily. At Erritsö General Wilster, the commander-in-chief at Fredericia, was wounded, and at Gudsö Captain Tane was surprised by a superior force of Austrians, and had to surrender. As soon as Fredericia was invested and its garrison masked, the same inactivity prevailed as at Dybböl. The fires of war blazed out afresh at Dybböl on the 17th of March. The Prussians had not neglected the advantages which the possession of the peninsula of Broagerland gave. They erected batteries all along the cliffs that lined the sound. From these batteries they could throw shot or shell into the town of Sönderborg, and could reach the most distant bastion of the Dybböl forts, while they themselves were entirely out of the range of the Danish guns. Batteries also were built on the heights of Rageböl, a hill to the right of the Danish position. On the morning of the 17th the Prussians opened fire on both town and forts. During the cannonade they advanced with great force against the village of Dybböl and the heights of Arnbjerg. Warned by their previous attack on the 22nd of February, the Danes had done their best to strengthen this position. The churchyard, which had a commanding situation, had been fortified, and here they entrenched themselves. The defence was as obstinate as the attack was violent, and the Danes reconquered lost ground by three successive charges. They had, however, to give way before overwhelming numbers, and as the day closed the Prussians remained masters of the field. The heights of Arnbjerg, as was explained above, closed in the third line of the defensive works of Dybböl. It is on the left of the road, and about the same distance from the Danish bastions as Dybböl. The Danes disputed the possession of this hill with great gallantry. It was taken and retaken, again and again; but the victory in the end remained with the Prussians. With the loss of Arnbjerg the doom of Alsen was sounded, the first knell of which might have been heard when the Prussians were allowed to occupy the Broagerland peninsula. As a strategic position it was of more importance than the possession of the village; for from the top the whole line of forts could be swept by the Prussian fire with ease.

An attempt was made next day by the Danes to recover their lost ground; but the value of their late acquisitions was too well recognized by the Prussians for them to be taken unprepared, and the Danes were repulsed. The Danes made no other attempt to disturb the Prussians in their possessions by assault; but confined themselves to keeping up an incessant firing, to prevent the erection of any batteries. Their guns, however, did not delay their enemies, who proceeded steadily with the work, using field artillery till they mounted their heavy rifled ordnance.

As soon as these guns were placed in position, they began a cannonade which they kept up day after day with great precision and effect.

On the 28th March, under cover of a fire from all their batteries, the Prussians made an assault on the Danish lines. Their chief efforts were directed against the bastions on the extreme left, which they thought had been silenced by the previous day's firing. The Danes had, however, repaired their works, and remounted their guns, which, though smooth bores, were of a very heavy calibre, and made great havoc among the Prussian infantry. An iron-clad of the Danes, the *Rolf-Krake*, steamed into the Vemmingbund Bay, and by keeping under the cliffs of Broagerland succeeded in escaping the guns of the Prussian batteries. When she was in range, she opened a most destructive fire upon the flank of the Prussians, who were then obliged to make a precipitate retreat.

After this repulse the Prussians renewed their former operations, and kept up an incessant storm of shot and shell against the Danish batteries. Bastion after bastion was shattered and the guns dismounted, which the Danes in the lulls of the firing endeavoured, with only partial success, to remount. The Prussians were not merely content with this employment of their guns, but turned them against the town of Sönderborg. This they bombarded till two-thirds were either burnt or levelled to the ground. Nor did the town only suffer, but outlying farmhouses and buildings shared its misfortunes. Nothing was respected that was in the range of the Prussian guns. Besides the destruction of private property, as no notice had been given to the inhabitants to quit the town, a serious loss of life occurred amongst them. It is difficult to discover what object the Prussians had in thus disregarding what has become almost an article of war—the respect due to an unarmed town. Even war has not escaped the influence of civilization, but has grown merciful, in the case of non-combatants and wounded soldiers, to an extent

perhaps hardly anticipated in former times. The horrors of war were, however, in 1864, brought bitterly home to the defenceless inhabitants of Sönderborg by the Prussians.

The condition of the Dybböl forts had now got so desperate, that it was not without murmurs that the Danish soldiers marched to their appointed posts. Nor were their complaints without reason. The hopelessness of holding out any longer was seen by every one in Alsen; but orders had come from the government at Copenhagen, that Dybböl was to be held at all costs; and the Danes had no other course open to them than to seek what shelter their fast-falling ramparts gave them from the enemy's shot and shell. They could themselves do no harm to the Prussians, yet even in their batteries their numbers were diminished by a hundred a day.

At length the day came that was to end the sufferings and toil of the besieged and besiegers. On the 18th of April the Prussians swarmed up against Dybböl, accompanied by a furious cannonade from their whole line of batteries, to which the Danes returned what answer their few remaining guns enabled them to make. The ironclad *Rolf-Krake* which had done such service on the occasion of the previous assault of the Prussians, again steamed into the Vemmingbund Bay. But this time the ill-fortune of her owners followed her. As she was passing the Prussian batteries she was struck by two shells. Her deck, which was of one and a half inch plate only, was broken through. Several men were killed, and so much damage done, that she was compelled to return to her anchorage in Hörup Hav.

The Danes made every resistance in their power, but all was useless. They were borne down by the superior numbers of the Prussians from fort to fort; till step by step they were thrust beyond their defences, and over the sound into Alsen. Here they gained a little breathing time by destroying the bridges they had crossed. Their losses in killed and wounded were very serious; and great numbers were left prisoners in the hands of the Prussians. Certainly less than half the army escaped into Alsen. Among the many officers that fell in this engagement was gallant General du Plat. He was at the rear of his retreating columns, encouraging and cheering on his men, when he was struck down by several rifle bullets. The last words he uttered as he fell were: "Hold out, my friends! Hold out for God and Denmark"! The Prussians paid the respect due to his bravery, and sent his body, with those of several other officers, to the Danes for burial. On his head two wreaths of laurel were placed by Prince Frederick Charles and Marshal Wrangel; a token of the high estimation in which they held his heroic resistance. The Prussian loss was comparatively slight.

With the fall of Dybböl the cause of the Danes in Schleswig was lost. The whole province was in the undisturbed possession of the Austro-Prussians; and to fill up the measure of Danish reverses, shortly after the fortress of Fredericia had to be evacuated and abandoned to the Austrians. There was nothing now to prevent the Austrians from overrunning the whole Cimbrian Peninsula from end to end.

To console them in their defeat, the Danes had the consciousness of having done their best to keep what they considered, rightfully or wrongfully, as their lawful possession, and of having succumbed only to superior numbers.

Whatever differences of opinion there may be on the questions involved in the war, no side will hesitate to give the Danes due meed of praise for the manful stand they made in a struggle in which they were over-matched.

Meanwhile it was at length resolved at the conference, that hostilities should be suspended by land and sea from the 12th of May to the 12th of June, Denmark raising her blockades; and at the sitting of the 2nd June this armistice was prolonged, after some difficulty, until the 26th of June. The conference terminated on the 22nd of June, all the belligerents rejecting the mediatory proposals of Great Britain, and at the end of the month hostilities were renewed.

On the 29th the Prussians crossed over to Alsen soon after midnight in considerable force, and landed on the opposite shore without much opposition. The Danish troops in the island soon afterwards came up; but after a sharp engagement they were compelled to retreat with a loss in killed and wounded of between 2500 and 3000 men. The ironclad Danish man-of-war, *Rolf-Krake*, lay in Augustenburg Bay, and attempted to prevent the crossing of the enemy; but she was met by such a concentrated fire from the Prussian batteries, that she was compelled to retire and seek shelter behind an intervening promontory. The Prussians were

very proud of their victory, and an official account of the capture of Alsen, which appeared in Berlin, stated that the difficulties of this undertaking were very considerable, and apparent even to an unpractised eye. History contains few examples of the passage of a river in front of the enemy. Here it was requisite to cross an arm of the sea, whose width, depth, and rapid current prevented the erection of a bridge, and whose hostile shore bristled with numerous well-armed batteries and intrenchments. It was necessary to expose the troops to a foreign element in a number of slight boats, not only threatened by wind and weather, but by many hostile war ships commanding the sea, the ironclad vessels in particular capable of inflicting serious losses. Even if the landing of the first battalion succeeded, it was necessary to be prepared for encountering a superior enemy who, long since expecting this attack, would have had time enough, during the suspension of arms, to reorganize his troops and make every preparation for energetically repulsing all attempts to land. When the boats were about 200 yards distant from the hostile shore, the first shots of the enemy's outposts blazed at them through the twilight. The forces in the boats returned the fire, and replied to the first hail of grape from the enemy's batteries with a thundering hurrah. Springing out of the boats, and wading through the shallows, the brave Brandenburgers rapidly gained the opposite bank, stormed the hostile batteries, and drove the enemy back into the Fohlen-koppel wood, notwithstanding his desperate attempts to hold his rifle pits. The capture of Alsen and abandonment of Fredericia decided the issue of the struggle, and Denmark, isolated as she was in the unequal war, found herself compelled to yield and consent to peace.

But her enemies were not at perfect peace among themselves. In the middle of July an ominous quarrel arose at Rendsburg in Schleswig between some Prussian soldiers on the one hand, and some Saxon and Hanoverian soldiers on the other. Much bad feeling had already existed between the Federal and Prussian troops, and the result of the squabble was, that a strong Prussian force was marched into Rendsburg, and Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, acting upon orders from Berlin, took military possession of the place. General von Hake, who commanded the Saxons, protested against this as an unwarranted act of usurpation, saying that it was impossible for him to consent to the occupation of Rendsburg by Prussian troops, but also clearly out of his power, independent of other important reasons, to think of offering military opposition with a weak garrison of four companies. He declared, therefore, that he should withdraw for the present the Saxon troops from Rendsburg, to avoid a conflict. This affair caused much ill blood against Prussia in Saxony and the minor states of Germany, but in the end good sense prevailed, and possibly a feeling that Prussia was leading them to unity and greatness induced submission to her lead.

Negotiations for peace took place at Vienna between the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Denmark, for the purpose of settling the preliminaries between those powers; and at last, on the 1st of August, they were signed by the respective parties, and were as follows:—1. His Majesty the king of Denmark renounces all his rights to the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, in favour of their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, engaging to recognize the arrangements their said Majesties shall make in respect of those duchies. 2. The cession of the duchy of Schleswig comprehends all the islands belonging to that duchy, as well as the territory situated upon the mainland. To simplify the boundary question, and put an end to the inconveniences resulting from the portion of Jutland territory situated within Schleswig, his Majesty the king of Denmark cedes to their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria the Jutland possessions situated to the south of the frontier line of the district of Ribe, laid down on the maps. On the other hand, their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria consent that an equivalent portion of Schleswig, comprising, in addition to the island of Arroe, the territories connecting the above-mentioned district of Ribe with the remainder of Jutland, and rectifying the frontier line between Jutland and Schleswig from the side of Cölding, shall be detached from the duchy of Schleswig and incorporated in the kingdom of Denmark. The island of Arroe will not make part of the compensation by reason of its geographical extent. The details of the demarcation of the frontiers shall be settled by the definitive treaty of peace. 3. The debts contracted either by Denmark or any of the duchies, to remain

the charge of each country. All war expenses of the allied powers to be paid by the duchies.

A protocol was at the same time signed respecting the terms and duration of the armistice. This provided that there should be a complete suspension of hostilities by land and sea, until the conclusion of the peace. The king of Denmark engaged to raise the blockade of the German ports, and the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, while maintaining the occupation of Jutland, under the existing conditions of the *uti-possidetis*, declared themselves ready to keep in that country no larger number of troops than their majesties might judge necessary, according to purely military considerations. A treaty of peace in accordance with the above preliminaries was signed at Vienna on the 1st of October, 1864. The ratification of the treaty was followed by a sharp correspondence between the Prussian minister and the ministers of foreign powers, in which the English minister especially indulged in splenetic observations, which may have been deserved, but were of no use to any person or to any cause. The game to be played out was only begun, and the mighty task which Herr von Bismarck had undertaken was to be accomplished by steps more arduous, if not so unscrupulous, as this conquest of the Elbe duchies.

In a history of the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, it has been observed on this subject, that when, in the first instance, the Germanic Confederation undertook the Danish war, Prussia was not sufficiently confident in her strength to set aside, with her own hand alone, the decrees of the Diet. To have done so would have raised a storm against her, against which she had no reason to suppose that she could successfully bear up. England was excited, and the warlike people of that country eager to rush to arms in the cause of the father of the young princess of Wales. France was discontented with the refusal of the English cabinet to join her proposed congress, but might have accepted a balm for her wounded pride in a free permission to push her frontier up to the Rhine. Austria would have opposed the aggrandizement of Prussia, and all Germany would at that time have supported the great power of the south in the battle for the liberation of Holstein from the supremacy of the Hohenzollerns, as eagerly as from that of the House of Denmark. The efforts made for the independence of Holstein, which could not be opposed by open force, had to be thwarted by stratagem. Prussia sought the alliance of Austria with a proposal that those two great powers should constitute themselves the executors of the Federal decree, in order to put aside the troops of the minor states. Austria agreed, and rues at this hour the signature of that convention. Yet she had much cause of excuse. To allow Prussia to step forward alone as the champion of German national feeling, would have been for Austria to resign for ever into the hands of her rival the supremacy of Germany. Old traditions, chivalrous feeling, and inherited memories caused Austrians to look upon their emperor as the head of Germany, the modern representative of the elected holder of the crown and sceptre of the Holy Roman Empire. Prussia was approaching that supremacy with gigantic strides. Austria was already reduced to the position of being the advocate of German division and of small states, purely because amalgamation and union would have drawn the scattered particles not towards herself, but within the boundaries of her northern neighbour. To permit Prussia to act alone in the matter of the Elbe duchies, would have been to see her surely obtain important territorial aggrandizement, and also to lose the opportunity of creating another independent minor German state, which, if not a source of strength to Austria, might prove an obstacle in the path of Prussia.

The war against Denmark was undertaken. The Danes, terribly inferior in numbers, organization, equipment, armament, and wealth, after a most gallant resistance lost their last strongholds; while the Western powers, which had encouraged the cabinet of Copenhagen in the delusion that other soldiers than Danes would be opposed to the German invaders of Schleswig, calmly looked on. The Danish war terminated in the treaty signed at Vienna in October, 1864; and the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were handed over to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. It is noteworthy, says Sir Alexander Malet, that before the invasion of the duchies no precise stipulations had taken place between Austria and Prussia as to the disposal of the conquests which they might safely reckon upon making. This was a grave fault on the part of Austria, and most probably, continues Sir Alexander, a calculated omission on the side of her Prussian ally. Though the condominate rights of the two

sovereigns in whose favour the cession of territory was made were equal, the military forces left by each for its occupation differed in strength. Of Prussians there remained eighteen battalions of infantry to five battalions of the Austrians, eighteen squadrons of cavalry to two of theirs, and three batteries of artillery to one of theirs. After the military occupation and a provisional government were settled the popular will was consulted, in a hasty superficial way, as to the future government of the land. At the public meetings held in different parts of Holstein, the generally expressed wish of the population was in favour of a union with the Germanic Confederation, under the sovereignty of the prince of Augustenburg. A small fraction, however, of landed proprietors, led by Baron Scheel Plessen, put forward the wish for annexation to Prussia, which was met by many vehement declarations of a contrary opinion. Against these demonstrations the Prussian government acted in a manner that showed she would not suffer any overt assertion of independence. During a debate on the subject in the Prussian Chamber, Herr von Bismarck said that Kiel, and indeed the entire duchies, were owned by Prussia. True, they were owned in common with the Kaiser; but the share Prussia had in the property would never be abandoned except on condition of Kiel harbour being handed over to her for good. This port was ardently coveted as a nursery for the German navy which would grow out of the Prussian fleet, by developing the maritime resources of the other states of northern Germany. On a similar occasion the minister of state replied in remarkable words to the reproaches of the public press, and of the Chamber of Deputies, who assailed the government for having formed an alliance with Austria. "On this question the future will throw a clearer light. Any other course of policy would have made the late war a war between the Federal Diet and Denmark. The former would have intrusted to us the conduct of the war, but would not have taken into consideration our plans for the organization of the duchies, as does Austria who is friendly to us. . . . I am bound," he said in conclusion, "to limit myself to these statements, on account of the publicity which will be given to my speech." This was spoken in January, 1865, when with all his extreme candour the speaker had things in his mind which Austria, however "friendly to us," would have learned with dismay—things upon which a future of not much more than a year threw a terribly clear light.

A new complexion was ostentatiously given to the co-possession in the month of June, when Herr Wagner, during a discussion in the Chamber at Berlin on the bill for defraying the expenses of the late war, moved an amendment to the effect, "that the government be requested to endeavour to bring about the annexation of the duchies to Prussia, even by indemnifying, if necessary, any claimant to their possession." The words of the prime minister, in reply, were significant. "The programme for the solution of the question of the duchies," he said, "has been completely carried out, excepting the installation of the prince of Augustenburg as duke of Schleswig-Holstein. This can take place any day upon the prince proving his hereditary right to the duchies, which up to the present time he has failed to do. In a conversation with me last year, his Highness rejected the moderate demands of Prussia, and expressed himself as follows:—'Why did you come to the duchies? We did not call you. Matters would have been settled without Prussia.' Annexation to Prussia is the best thing for Schleswig-Holstein; but there is no prospect of its accomplishment, on account of the large debts for which it would be necessary for Prussia to render herself liable. After the refusal of our moderate demands by the prince of Augustenburg, we shall be justified in subsequently increasing them." On another occasion the minister declared again and again, that nothing would be abated of the claims which Prussia had on the duchies she had rescued for Germany from Denmark. He professed not to grudge them their duke, nor to trouble himself about any democratic institutions they might be tempted to establish; but it was his duty, he said, to prevent a third Schleswig-Holstein campaign, and to arrange matters in a way which should not expose him to the necessity of taking Dybböl again. As to the concessions made by the duke of Augustenburg, they were dependent on the sanction of the Schleswig-Holstein Estates, even supposing them to be sufficient for Prussian purposes. In reality, no concessions whatever had been made, and nothing remained for Prussia to do but effect an arrangement with the Kaiser on the one hand, and the future duke on the other; if indeed the title of a

single person to the whole of the duchies could ever be established. It was growing very clear that neither duke nor Kaiser would stand in the way of Prussian claims while Prussia had the force to prevent it. No votes of the Schleswig-Holstein Estates, no proclamations of the pretenders, would drive Prussia from the duchies. She would stick to her programme, and defend its justice and necessity to her very last man. The people of Prussia and the Chamber at Berlin were no less loath than the minister to give up their hold on the fair prize within their grasp. They too wanted to place Germany in a defensible condition by sea, and to avoid the necessity of another attack upon the Dybböl fortifications. So eager were the Chambers for annexation, that Bismarck endeavoured to wring a money vote from them, by promising that Kiel should become Prussian, adding, "If you doubt our right to it, make a condition with us, and say, "No Kiel, no money." If the pretenders could prove no better title to the dukedom than the right of conquest which Prussia claimed, their pretensions would be disregarded, and no one should contest the right of the sovereigns of Prussia and Austria to make an arrangement between themselves for the disposal of the spoil. Such an arrangement, as will be presently seen, was ere long brought to pass.

Meanwhile co-possession soon disturbed the harmony that seemed to exist between the two great German powers. The double government under an Austrian and Prussian commissioner offered endless opportunities for the old rivalry between the two countries to break out; and the manifest desire of the Prussians to annex the convenient territory served to aggravate the natural jealousy of their ally, who strove to countermine the project by secretly but efficaciously supporting the Augustenburg party. The estrangement between the two powers greatly increased when, on the announcement of the September convention concluded between Italy and France, the Prussian minister refused to acknowledge Austria's claim for assistance founded on promises made during the Danish war. Herr von Bismarck said that their agreement was to assist Austria in case her Italian possessions were attacked in consequence of her share in the Danish war, not otherwise, and that such an engagement could in no way apply to the September convention. The Austrian government felt itself duped, and Count Rechberg, the prime minister, resigned office. The feeling between the two nations increased in soreness, and opportunities were sought for breaking off the now detested alliance. Although several disputes led them to the very verge of a rupture, war was avoided, more especially by Austria, whose finances were so much crippled, and her various subjects so discontented, that she saw how a war at that time would inevitably have led her to bankruptcy and dismemberment. The middle states were willing to help her, but their assistance had very little military or political value, and their opposition to Prussia in the Diet only served to whet the resolution of Herr von Bismarck to accomplish in his own good time a very radical reformation both of the Diet and of the Confederation it proposed to represent.

A commission of crown lawyers was appointed by the two powers to examine into the merits of the claims severally made to sovereign power in the duchies by the king of Denmark, the duke of Augustenburg—the popular candidate, especially in Holstein, who would certainly have been elected duke had the matter been decided by a plebiscitum—and the duke of Oldenburg. Their decision was, that King Christian IX. was by right of succession the undoubted possessor, and that from him the duchies had passed by right of conquest to the victors in the war—the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia. The three claimants being thus swept out of the way, the scheme of annexation was further developed by a treaty between the conquerors regulating a division of the spoil.

On the 14th of August, 1865, this important convention was signed at Gastein by Herr von Bismarck and Count Blome; and it was afterwards signed at Salzburg by the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria. The convention began by stating that "their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, having become convinced that the co-dominion hitherto existing in the countries ceded by Denmark, through the treaty of peace of the 30th of October, 1864, leads to inconveniences which endanger the good understanding between their governments, and also the interests of the duchies; their Majesties have, therefore, come to the determination no longer to exercise in common the rights accruing to them from the third article of the above-mentioned treaty, but to divide geographically the exercise of the same until further agreement."

The following articles were then agreed upon:—

Article I.—The exercise of the rights jointly acquired by the high contracting parties, through the Vienna treaty of peace of the 30th of October, 1864, will, without prejudice to the continuance of these rights of both powers to the whole of both duchies, be transferred as regards the duchy of Schleswig to his Majesty the king of Prussia, and as regards the duchy of Holstein to his Majesty the emperor of Austria.

Article II.—The high contracting powers will propose in the Federal Diet the establishment of a German fleet, and the appointment for that purpose of the harbour of Kiel as a federal harbour. Until the execution of the Diet's resolutions referring thereto, the war-vessels of both powers will use this port, and the command and police of the same will be exercised by Prussia. Prussia is authorized not only to construct the necessary fortifications for the defence of the entrance opposite Friedrichsort, but also to erect marine establishments corresponding with the object of the military port upon the Holstein shore of the bay. These fortifications and establishments are also placed under Prussian command, and the requisite Prussian naval troops and men for their garrison and guard may be quartered in Kiel and the neighbourhood.

Article III.—The high contracting parties will propose at Frankfort to raise Rendsburg into a German federal fortress. Until the settlement by the Diet of the garrison relations of this fortress, its garrison will consist of Prussian and Austrian troops, with the command alternating annually upon the 1st of July.

Article IV.—During the continuance of the division agreed upon by Art. I. of the present convention, the Prussian government will retain two military roads through Holstein; one from Lubeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg. The more detailed regulations respecting the halting places for the troops, and also respecting their transport and maintenance, will be settled as early as possible by a special convention. Until this takes place, the existing regulations for Prussian halting places on the roads through Hanover will be in force.

Article V.—The Prussian government retains control over a telegraph line for communication with Kiel and Rendsburg, and the right to send Prussian post vans with Prussian officials over both routes through the duchy of Holstein. Inasmuch as the construction of a railway direct from Lubeck through Kiel to the Schleswig frontier is not yet assured, the concession for that object for the Holstein territory will be given at the request of Prussia upon the usual terms, without Prussia making any claim to rights of sovereignty with respect to the line.

Article VI.—The high contracting parties are both agreed that the duchies shall join the Zollverein. Until this takes place, or until some further understanding, the system hitherto in vogue, and including both duchies, shall remain in force, with equal partition of the revenues. In case it should appear advisable to the Prussian government, pending the duration of the division agreed upon in Art. I. of this present treaty, to open negotiations with respect to the accession of the duchies to the Zollverein, his Majesty the emperor of Austria is ready to empower the representatives of the duchy of Holstein to take part in such negotiations.

Article VII.—Prussia is authorized to carry through Holstein territory the German Ocean and Baltic Canal, to be constructed according to the results of the technical examinations directed by the king's government. So far as this may be the case, Prussia shall have the right of determining the direction and dimensions of the canal; of acquiring the plots of ground requisite for its site, by way of pre-emption in exchange for their value; of directing the construction; of exercising supervision over the canal, and its being kept in repair; and of giving assent to all orders and regulations affecting the same. No other transit dues or tolls upon ships and cargo shall be levied throughout the whole of the canal than the navigation duty, to be imposed by Prussia equally upon the ships of all nations for the use of the passage.

Article VIII.—No alteration is made by this present convention in the arrangements of the Vienna peace treaty of October 30, 1864, with regard to the financial obligations to be undertaken by the duchies, as well towards Denmark as towards Austria and Prussia, save that the duchy of Lauenburg shall be released from all duty of contribution to the expenses of the war. The division of these obligations between the duchies of Holstein and Schleswig shall be based upon a standard of population.

Article IX.—His Majesty the emperor of Aus-

tria makes over the rights acquired by the above cited Vienna peace treaty to the duchy of Lauenburg to his Majesty the king of Prussia, in exchange for which the Prussian government binds itself to pay to the Austrian government the sum of 2,500,000 Danish dollars, payable at Berlin in Prussian silver coin, four weeks after the confirmation of this present convention by their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria.

Article X.—The execution of the above agreed division of the co-dominion shall commence as early as possible after the approval of this convention by their Majesties the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, and be terminated at latest by the 15th of September. The command-in-chief, hitherto existing in common, shall, after the completed evacuation of Holstein by the Prussian, and of Schleswig by the Austrian troops, be dissolved, and at latest by the 15th of September.

It will be seen through all the specious wording of the treaty, that Austria had not the best of the bargain, and that Prussia derived immense advantage from her purchase of the imperial rights in Lauenburg for two million and a half dollars in silver, money down. The frugal management of her finances, which kept ready cash in the treasury, for good investments, was never more signally rewarded. The possession of Lauenburg was like the thin end of the wedge, opening the way to further acquisitions of territory. Great was the anger of the other European cabinets when the Gastein convention became known, and another proof was given that all the learned arguing exhibited at the London conference was so much breath thrown away. It is extremely disagreeable to statesmen, as to other men, to have their cherished ideas and traditions summarily and unceremoniously overthrown. Lord Russell wrote to British diplomatic agents abroad a severe letter, in which, among other things, he said, "All rights, old or new, whether based upon a solemn agreement between sovereigns, or on the clear and precise expression of the popular will, have been trodden under foot by the Gastein convention, and the authority of force is the sole power which has been consulted and recognized. Violence and conquest, such are the only bases upon which the dividing powers have established their convention."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister for Foreign Affairs, was even more cutting in his tone. "Upon what principle," he asked, "does the Austro-Prussian combination rest? We regret to find no other foundation for it than force, no other justification for it than the reciprocal convenience of the co-partners. This is a mode of dealing to which the Europe of to-day has become unaccustomed, and precedents for it must be sought for in the darkest ages of history. Violence and conquest pervert the notion of right, and the conscience of nations. Substituted for the principles which govern modern society, they are an element of trouble and dissolution, and can only overthrow the past without solidly building up anything new." But though the English fleet was recalled from the Mediterranean, to manœuvre, by way of menace, with the French fleet at Cherbourg, the great consolidator, Herr von Bismarck, held steadily on his way, and, for all these marks of discontent, firmly resolved to build up something very new and very solid—a united German Fatherland.

The plans of the Prussian premier were ripening; a project he had formed for making an alliance with Italy, at once the oldest and most recent foe of the Kaiser, was becoming feasible. Friendship with the Emperor Napoleon was also being sedulously and successfully cultivated. But above all, the re-organization of the Prussian army, which, since its defects became apparent in 1859, had been proceeding under the able direction of General von Roon, was tolerably complete. This indispensable task had been an arduous one, accomplished in opposition to the repeated decision of the Chamber of Deputies, who on this point were in a state of chronic variance with the king and his minister session after session.

It is not a little remarkable that the popular constitution of the Prussian army, that renders it now so formidable to France, should derive its origin from the arbitrary conditions of peace exacted by the French emperor, Napoleon I., after the battle of Jena. Baron Scharnhorst, says Alison, contrived to elude the hard conditions imposed on Prussia in the treaty forced upon it by Napoleon in 1806. One condition was to the effect that she must have only 40,000 men under arms, a condition which was kept to the letter, but evaded in the principle by retaining the soldiers only three years with their colours, and training thereby to the use of arms triple the number at any one time present with the standards. It was this admirable system, gradually adopted in other German states, which was the main cause of the successful resur-

rection of Prussia in 1813, and the glorious stand she then made on behalf of the liberties of Europe. Everywhere the whole male inhabitants, without distinction of social position, between eighteen and twenty years of age, were liable to serve in the ranks of the regular army, in which they did duty for three years. They then retired into pacific life, to make way for others, who had to go through the same system of military training and discipline, and dismissal. Thus the whole male population was trained to the use of arms, an admirable system for purposes of defence and under a wise and beneficent government, but terrible to bad rulers in times of commotion and revolution. During the convulsions of 1848-49, it was a common saying in Germany that the sovereigns must be overthrown, for their enemies were old soldiers, and their defenders young recruits.

The organization of this army, which will be fully treated of in the second part of this work, underwent considerable changes in 1860 and the following years. These changes made the standing army as large in peace as it would have been before with the addition of the whole first call of landwehr. They were very unpopular changes nevertheless, and for six successive years encountered the firm remonstrance of the Chamber of Deputies, while the Upper House as steadily applauded and supported them. The popular party failed to shake the position which had been taken up by the cabinet, and their efforts had little other effect than to hurry on the foreign policy of the government to the rupture with Austria, for which the transformation of the army had been expressly made.

The Kaiser's vain attempt in 1863 to create a German Parliament, prince-governed and ready to prolong his Imperial Majesty's presidency, taught the bold Prussian minister that the time for action was drawing near, and made him determine to have his instruments of war ready and well in hand. In the Schleswig-Holstein campaign, Prussia, by a bold spring, took the lead in action against Denmark, and placed Austria in the secondary position of a half-willing ally. At the same time the Bund was made to see its own impotence by the joint occupation of the duchies by the two powers, in spite of the decrees of the Diet. Austria was forced from one concession to another, and yet Prussia, while degrading her by policy, feigned just so much unwillingness to quarrel as might avoid giving pretext for foreign interference, or an excuse for the Kaiser to arm.

By the year 1866 the military system of 1859 was fairly complete in all its parts. The active forces were complete in their cadres; the reserve lists full of trained men; and the whole could be made ready for the field at less than a month's notice. The officers were entirely devoted to the crown, and the power of discipline was relied on for carrying the mass as boldly forward through a campaign as though the whole nation had gone to war. The needle gun gave evidence of its enormous power in the Danish war, though its first employment had been against the Baden insurgents in 1849. It was generally thought that its use would tend to so much waste of ammunition as to render it unavailable for general use. By careful instruction, however, and a distribution of small-arm reserves of ammunition, the danger of exhausting the supply before an action is concluded has been avoided, and observers can only wonder at the supineness of other governments and military chiefs who waited to see Prussia gain over Austria the most astounding victories, before they took steps to provide their own soldiers with some weapon as easily managed and as destructive as the breech-loader.

It has just been intimated that the resolution to attempt the forcible expulsion of Austria from the Confederation, took date in Herr von Bismarck's mind from the meeting of the sovereigns in Frankfort, in 1863. Before that, however, in 1862, while exercising for a brief period the functions of Prussian representative in Paris, there is reason to believe that he had found occasion to broach his views on German affairs to the Emperor Napoleon. This at least is the opinion of Sir Alexander Malet, an old diplomatist himself, who was personally acquainted with the Prussian and with many other German ministers at the Frankfort Diet. The same writer goes on to say that Bismarck had taken special care to make Prussian policy agreeable to France, in the matter of the treaty of commerce, so soon as, by taking office at Berlin, the power of influencing his country's counsels fell into his hands. In 1864 a meeting took place between him, then holding office as Prussian premier, and M. Rouher at Carlsbad. Some fraction of the many conversations which are said to have there passed between the two statesmen on European affairs, have

taken their place in the domain of public belief, and Herr von Bismarck's habit of speaking his thoughts is so well known, that credence may be given to utterances attributed to him, which from almost any other person living would be counted as extravagances of indiscretion and audacity. Of this nature was the suggestion which he is generally supposed to have thrown out, that France might indemnify herself by taking possession of Belgium, for the contemplated Prussian aggrandizements in Germany and those to be made at the expense of Denmark. Herr von Bismarck's aim was to impress the French minister with the idea, that the advantages he was aiming at for his own country might be compensated to France by equivalent territorial acquisitions. Whether the bait held out was a possible cession of the coal basin of the Saar, of the duchy of Luxemburg, or even the prospect of active assistance in annexing Belgium to France, is immaterial. The general impression sought to be produced, continues Sir Alexander, that Prussia was by no means hostile, that she might indeed be helpful to France, was adroitly produced; and subsequent conversations with the emperor at Biarritz took, there can be little doubt, the same direction, and confirmed the effect. Herr von Bismarck, on his second visit to Biarritz, met indeed with some difficulties. The French circular referring to the treaty of Gastein had been followed by the meeting of the English and French fleets at Cherbourg, apparently as a threat to Prussia, and the king of Prussia raised objections to his minister's taking a journey which, under such circumstances, seemed incompatible with the dignity of Prussia. In this conjuncture, seeing the indispensable need of removing the mistrust of the emperor of the French, Herr von Bismarck contrived to induce the French cabinet to modify the terms of their circular; and the king's consent being thereupon given, he went at once to Paris, and thence continued his journey to Biarritz. His success was complete: how brought about can only be vaguely surmised. One point, however, may be shrewdly guessed at with tolerable certainty, that the alliance of Prussia with Italy, for the purpose of war with Austria, was promised. The emperor did not insist on any positive engagements for contingent advantages to accrue to France. He had not that superb confidence in the ability of Prussia to vanquish Austria, even with Italian aid, indulged in by Bismarck. It is much more likely that he looked forward to the exhaustion of the combatants, when both or either of them might appeal to his not altogether disinterested good offices to appease their strife. The emperor foresaw, however, with tolerable certainty, the probable liberation of Venetia, an object he had greatly at heart; and it is perfectly well known that Herr von Bismarck returned to Berlin with such assurances of sympathy and absolutely benevolent neutrality on the part of France, that he could make his arrangements for employing the Rhenish garrisons, and leaving Saar-Louis, Coblentz, Luxemburg, and Cologne partially stripped of artillery, and with a small force of landwehr for their protection, all which would have been impossible had he been insecure as to the dispositions of France.

These confidences of the veteran British envoy, tinged though they be with a jealous prejudice against the Prussian minister of state, are valuable as evidence of the secret workings of diplomacy in the arrangement of state affairs, and especially in the bringing about of great wars. They recall, too, an expression attributed to the Emperor Napoleon while at Wilhelmshöhe, which merits a permanent record as indicating, by presumption at least, his Majesty's opinion of a formidable antagonist. "The minister of King William," he is reported to have said, "will wind Jules Favre round his finger. I have been quite duped by him—I to whom everybody agrees in attributing penetration and taciturnity. How then will it fare with Monsieur Favre, whose strength lies in fluency of speech? All his words will be turned against him in the form of an agreement with his pacific intentions. Count von Bismarck will throw the responsibility of a refusal on his august Majesty. The talent of this diplomatist consists in his knowing how to throw on others the responsibility of resolutions that have been taken." Surely there is a souvenir here of the interviews at Paris and Biarritz that were so fruitful of consequences. "Count von Bismarck," said the ex-emperor in conclusion, "is an able man, but it is his audacity that makes him so. This is what distinguishes him from Cavour, the greatest politician I have ever met. If Cavour had been the minister of King William, the German empire would have been completed, and that without a shot."

CHAPTER IV.

War between Austria and Prussia—Premonitory Symptoms—Bismarck at Carlsbad in 1865—His conversation with Duc de Gramont—His observations to Herr von der Pfordten—Dalliance with the Central States of Germany—Freiherr von Beust—His desire to reduce Prussia to a level with the minor states—Mental Conflicts of Count von Bismarck—His Impression that he was providentially saved from the Assassin Blind—The Second Chamber at Berlin—Annexation of Lauenberg—The King's reluctance to War with a German State—Gloomy opening of the year 1866—Austrian Liberalism in Holstein antagonistic to Prussian Conservatism—Meeting of Delegates from Schleswig and Holstein Associations countenanced by Austria—Protest of Count von Bismarck and threat of separate policy—Severe decrees of the King of Prussia in Schleswig against supporters of the Prince of Augustenburg—Vienna Government resolve to lay the matter before the Diet—Support of the minor states requested by Austria—Count Karolyi's interview with the Prussian Premier—Alliance between Prussia and Italy—Austria cautiously makes military preparations—The Prussian Minister complains that Austria is arming—Aims a first blow at the Diet, and recounts in a Circular (24th March, 1866) Prussia's grounds of complaint against Austria—Suggests Reformation of the Bund—Austria unwilling to break the Peace—Prussia's readiness for War—Preparations in Italy—Proposal for a common reduction of Armaments—Italy the stumbling-block—Austrian statement of the 26th April—Prussian statement—The negotiations exhausted—Attempt at intervention on the part of other powers—Conference proposed and consented to save by Austria, who objects to the discussion of a cession of territory—Manteuffel marches from Schleswig into Holstein with Prussian troops—Gablenz with the Austrians retires to Altona, crosses the Elbe, and reaches friendly territory—Prussia declares war against Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse—First Prussian army enters Saxony—Overruns Hesse—Proclamation of Prince Frederick Charles—Second army under the Crown Prince—Third army (of the Elbe) under General Herwarth—Movements in Silesia and Bohemia—General Benedek—Crown Prince of Saxony—Clam Gallas—Prussians cross the mountains—Communications kept up by telegraphic wires—Münchengrätz—Turnau—Louwitz—Nachod—Skaliz—Königinhof—Schweinschädel—Capture of Jicin—General order of the Crown Prince of Prussia at Prausnitz—Junction of the Prussian armies—Pursuit of the Austrians to Gitschin—Königgrätz—King of Prussia arrives at Gitschin—His address to the municipal authorities—Great battle—Account of an eye-witness—Village of Chlum—Austrian force and commanders—Artillery contest—Village of Sadowa—Benetak in flames—Attack on Sadowa—Tremendous fire of artillery and needle-guns—Great havoc—Fransky's attack on the wood above Sadowa—3000 Prussians and 90 officers enter the wood, 300 men and 2 officers only leave it—Herewarth's army is engaged with the Saxons at Nechanitz—The first and third Prussian armies brought nearly to a standstill—The moment critical—Village of Chlum on fire—Timely arrival of the Crown Prince of Prussia with the second army on the field of battle—Austrians at a disadvantage—Their obstinate resistance—"All is lost"—Austrian request for an armistice rejected—Forward movement of the Prussians—Remarks on the battle of Königgrätz or Sadowa—The corps of Knobelsdorf and Stabberg in Silesia—Generals Goeben and Manteuffel in Hanover—Beyer in Hesse-Cassel—Allies of Austria at Göttingen, Bamberg, and Frankfort—Prince Charles of Bavaria—General von Falkenstein—Campaign in Hanover—Armistice—Terms proposed to King George rejected—Battle of Langensalza on the 27th June—Hanoverians masters of the field—Hemmed in, nevertheless, by superior numbers, they capitulate to the Prussians, and the king becomes an exile—Campaign of the Main—Bavarian army—Federal army—Battle of Wiesenthal—Victory of the Prussians over Bavarians—Battle at Hammelburg on the Saale—Severe engagement at Kissingen—Actions on the Main between Prussians and the Federal forces under Prince Alexander of Hesse—Battle of Lanfach—Prussians capture Aschaffenburg—Federals evacuate Frankfort, which Falkenstein enters at the head of the Prussians—Large sums of money exacted from the burghers—March from Frankfort southwards—Actions on the Tauber—Occupation of Franconia by Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin—Armistice accorded at Wurzburg to the Central States—March of Prussians on Brunn, Pressburg, and Vienna—Preliminaries of Nikolsburg—Peace of Prague—Italian Campaign.

The historian Schmidt says that, as early as the month of July, 1865, Count von Bismarck at Carlsbad had said to the French ambassador at Vienna, the now too famous Duc de Gramont, that he considered war between Prussia and Austria to have become a necessity. The statement is disputed, but there is little doubt that the thought was at that time in Bismarck's mind. His reported conversation, in the same month, with Herr von der Pfordten, the Bavarian prime minister, is still more remarkable. He said, avers Schmidt, "that war between Austria and Prussia was very likely, and close at hand. It would be a duel between the two powers only, and the rest of Germany might stand by as passive spectators. Prussia never contemplated extending her power beyond the line of the Main. The settlement of the controversy would not take long. One blow, one pitched battle, and Prussia would be in a position to dictate conditions. The most urgent need of the central states was to range themselves on the side of Prussia. A localization of the war in Silesia was determined upon, and was deemed feasible by the best military authorities. The central states, by proclaiming neutrality, might contribute to this desirable localization, and Bavaria had only to remember that she was the natural heir to the position of Austria in South Germany." How deep and far-seeing were these tempting suggestions thrown into the minds of men who were possible allies or probable foes! The treaty of Gastein, by leaving the central states in an

ambiguous position, had already proved that Austria had not their interests very deeply at heart.

The leader of what was called the central state policy was Freiherr von Beust, prime minister of the king of Saxony. His endeavour was to keep alive the old dualism of Austria and Prussia, conceding nothing to either power, but labouring solely to preserve the independence of the smaller central states. So long as this policy prevailed, the unification of Germany was impossible. Had the ideas of the central state party been large and bold, they might have decided the question of national union, and kept Prussia in a subordinate place, by agreeing with Austria to form a great state, by means of a solid combination of her German territory and population, with their own numerous states. But there was no leader among them with power to conceive and energy to carry out to the end any scheme of this kind, and the genius of the Prussian minister forestalled them. Sacrifices for the sake of unity were demanded of the princes; sacrifices for Germany, not for Prussia, who would have herself to make greater sacrifices than any of them. In the struggles at the Diet, while Austria maintained her ascendancy, great efforts were made to reduce Prussia to an equality with the central states, to their intense gratification. They were ready to make any sacrifice, except independence, if Prussia were subjected to the same; such was their jealousy of Prussian greatness, and their desire to magnify the power of the Federal Diet. For this reason it was that the majority of votes was constantly in support of Austria. They strove to deceive themselves and the world with the notion that Germany and the Federal Diet were identical, and that Prussia was non-German and refractory when she refused to submit to the decrees of Austria and her supporters in the Diet. In combating these principles at Frankfort, Count von Bismarck schooled himself for the greater and more active conflicts that were to follow.

Of extreme interest is the history of the conflicts in the minister's own mind, as the great crisis of his public life approached. The mixture in him of worldly wisdom with unsuspected religious fervour, recalls the history of Oliver Cromwell's great strivings and searchings of heart. The inward strife and agitation which he suffered throughout the spring of 1866 is said actually to have been calmed by the attempt to assassinate him made by the crazy enthusiast, young Blind, on the 7th of May in that year. Bismarck looked upon his escape from death as a sign from heaven, encouraging him to pursue the path on which he had set out. How severe had been the six years' struggle with the second chamber of the Diet on the question of re-organizing the army, can only be known to the participators in that contest. The chamber had both the letter and the spirit of the constitution on its side, and was justified in complaining that the political part of legislation had been brought to a standstill. Important questions of education, trade, and provincial administration, awaiting settlement, were unceremoniously shunted on one side, on account of this unexplained zeal for reforming the army. Bismarck's personal influence could not be exercised over a large assembly, to which it was impossible to reveal a bold and comprehensive plan for revolutionizing Germany without exposing the plan to ruin. The opposition, therefore, in the second chamber was stronger than ever, and early in February manifested itself by voting a resolution to the effect that the annexation of the duchy of Lauenberg to the crown of Prussia should not take place until it had been approved of by both the chambers. Such an interference with the great scheme could not be brooked, and the session was abruptly terminated by the king on the 23rd February. There can be little doubt that the hostile attitude of the faithful commons helped to precipitate the international crisis that was approaching. The minister knew that he was doing right in combating their constitutional views. He alone seems to have had his scheme planned out clearly before him, and when he had successfully defied the Parliament, he had the difficult task of conquering the king. His Majesty's reluctance to go to war with a German state, and with a friendly young monarch like the emperor of Austria, was not easily overcome, but yielded at last to urgent reasons of policy, brought to bear upon his mind with consummate skill and characteristic ardour, by his able minister.

On the opening of the year 1866, symptoms were visible of the dissolution of that hollow friendship between Prussia and Austria, which had been ostensibly cemented at Gastein not many months before. Singularly enough, the first overt ground of offence arose from the liberalism of aristocratic Austria; but it was liberalism in Holstein, where Prussian interests required

a strictly conservative and repressive policy. Austria secretly favoured the pretensions of the duke of Augustenburg, which Prussia would not for a moment countenance after the adverse decision of the commission upon the claims to the duchies. The Prussian ministry, moreover, were irritated at perceiving the sympathy expressed by the Austrians for the recalcitrant members of the Berlin parliament, whose opposition to the government seemed a source of weakness in Prussia that was far from disagreeable to the statesmen of Vienna. Thus when the Austrian government was informed of a project for assembling delegates of Holstein and Schleswig associations on January 23, in Altona, it issued a warning against the holding of any such meeting, as calculated to bring new dangers on the country. Upon an assurance, however, being given by the promoters of the meeting, that all agitating questions should be avoided, the Austrian government did not prevent the meeting from taking place. This occurrence drew forth a note from the Berlin cabinet, dated January 26, to their envoy at Vienna, complaining of the conduct of the Holstein government as seriously impairing the relations of the two states. Count von Bismarck appealed to the recollections of the meetings of Gastein and Salzburg, and remarked, that he had allowed himself to hope that at that period Austria was not only convinced of the necessity of combating the revolution, but had agreed as to the mode of combat. The conduct of Austria in the affair of the notes to the Frankfort senate had already somewhat shaken this agreeable persuasion; matters, however, now assumed a far graver aspect. The conduct of the Holstein government could only be designated as aggressive. It ill became the imperial government openly to use against Prussia the same means of agitation against which they fought together at Frankfort. If at Vienna it was thought that they might tranquilly contemplate the revolutionary transformation of the people of Holstein, so distinguished by their conservative spirit, Prussia was resolved not to act in a similar manner. The treaty of Gastein had indeed provisionally divided the administration of the two duchies. But Prussia had the right of claiming that Austria should maintain Holstein in *statu quo*, just as much as Prussia was bound to keep Schleswig in that state. The royal government saw no difficulty in putting an end to the agitation, the scandals, and injuries to the principle of royalty going on in the duchies. The Prussian government entreated the Vienna cabinet to weigh the situation, and to act accordingly. If a negative or evasive reply was given, Prussia would at least be assured that, influenced by her ancient antagonism, Austria could not durably act together with her. This conviction would be a painful one, but Prussia needed to see clearly. Should it be rendered impracticable for her to act with Austria, she would at least gain full freedom for her policy, and might make such use thereof as suited her interests.

This ominous threat of a rupture, which seemed to produce little impression at Vienna, was ere long followed by acts of unmistakable self-assertion in the duchies. Early in March the king of Prussia issued a decree in Schleswig, which declared that any Schleswiger signing an address or delivering a speech in favour of the duke of Augustenburg, would thenceforth be liable to be imprisoned for a period varying from three months to five years; while the actual attempt to abolish the Austro-Prussian sovereignty over the duchies, and hand over the country to any of the rival pretenders, rendered the offender liable to a penalty of from five to ten years' hard labour. This was asserting an authority in matters pertaining to Holstein which Austria could not but resent, as it was tantamount to declaring the treaty of Gastein to be abolished. The government at Vienna, therefore, resolved to bring the matter before the Diet, and let that body decide the question of appropriating the duchies. The minor states were requested to support Austria in the Diet, and to vote for making a summons to Prussia to declare herself; and in case the danger of a rupture of peace became more imminent, they were asked to vote for setting in motion the several army corps, under the command of the Diet, and placing them in communication with the Austrian army. It was in March, according to Sir A. Malet, that Count Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, received orders to ask the Prussian premier if he meant to break the treaty of Gastein. "No!" said his Excellency very decidedly in reply; adding, however, "If I had the intention, do you think I should tell you?" Karolyi hastened to inform his government, which seemed blind to the fact, that he considered war inevitable.

Meanwhile, before the end of March, a secret treaty of alliance was entered into between Prussia

and Italy, the terms of which, so far as they were known, show how resolved the two countries were to engage in war with Austria. According to these, Italy engaged to declare war against Austria as soon as Prussia should have either declared war or committed an act of hostility. Prussia engaged to carry on the war until the mainland of Venetia, with the exception of the fortresses and the city of Venice, either was in the hands of the Italians, or until Austria declared herself ready to cede it voluntarily; and King Victor Emmanuel promised not to lay down his arms until the Prussians should be in legal possession of the Elbe duchies.

Austria could not mistake acts of such extraordinary significance as an alliance between Italy and Prussia, although she remained in ignorance of the terms of the treaty. Slowly and hesitatingly she commenced military preparations, which though conducted with great caution, and not calculated to excite serious alarm, were sufficient to furnish Count von Bismarck with grounds of complaint against his Gastein ally, and induce him to make the first openly hostile demonstration.

The Prussian premier struck his first blow at the Diet, and warned the several states of the Confederation, in a circular letter. He complained that Austria had acted in direct opposition to the treaties of Vienna and Gastein, by which the Elbe duchies had been legally transferred to the two powers, and had sought to hand it over to the prince of Augustenburg, "who had no right thereto." The intimate relations of the two powers were endangered by the manifest symptoms of ill-will on the part of the Vienna cabinet. Correspondence had ceased, but no reference to war had been made, nor was war intended. But Austria, while reproaching Prussia with intentions of disturbing the peace, was herself arming and sending from her eastern and southern provinces considerable forces, north and west, towards the Prussian frontier. The gratuitous Prussian supposition that the Kaiser wanted to compel the continuance of the Gastein intimacy, is ludicrously flimsy. Prussia at all events would arm, it being impossible that she could allow Silesia to be beset with troops without making counter preparations of defence. This was not enough; the cabinet at Berlin, having experienced the slight trust to be placed in the Austrian alliance, was bound to look to other quarters for guarantees of safety and peace. National independence was only to be found in the basis of German nationality, and in strengthening the ties which bound the purely German states together. The Bund or Confederation was manifestly insufficient for this purpose, and for the active policy which important crises in Europe might require. Prussia could not rely on the slow-moving Bund for help in the time of need, but must trust to her own good arm and the support of such German states as were friendly to her. The Bund must be reformed, and in a sense that would be for the interest of other German states as much as of Prussia. The interests of the latter state were, by geographical situation, identical with those of Germany, whose fate was involved in Prussia's. If the power of Prussia were broken, Germany would exist on sufferance, and in a great European crisis might undergo the fate of Poland. Strong arguments these to address to a reflective people like the Germans, and they had their effect. In the rupture between the two great powers, the decision of each of the smaller states as to which it would take was of vital importance to itself. Prussia was evidently able and willing to fight, and if she gained the victory it was clear that she meant to have the command of the military force of the proposed new Confederation, at which Count von Bismarck hinted in his circular. Count Karolyi was instructed to answer that circular, by formally assuring the king that the emperor of Austria had not the slightest intention to make a breach of the peace. The reply sent to Vienna was, that nothing could explain away the extensive military preparations made by Austria in the direction of her northern frontier. Owing to the admirably organized military system which they had perfected, the Berlin statesmen were able to make this charge without fear of a retort, for their own army could be mobilized and brought to the field of action in rather less than three weeks' time.

The Prussian force quartered in Silesia at the end of March was about 25,000 men, with eighteen batteries of artillery, while the Austrians had, according to the official Prussian accounts, an army of 80,000 men, with 240 guns in Bohemia, not far from the Silesian frontier. By orders issued between the 28th of March and the 1st of April, Prussia was enabled to put on a war footing considerably larger forces than Austria could possibly oppose to them. On the 25th of March the Italian minister of war gave orders to increase the national force

by 100,000 men. Having advanced so far with their preparations, neither party was willing to recede, though King and Kaiser both declared their intention not to commit an act of aggression. Meanwhile, Count von Bismarck created a great ferment throughout Germany by submitting to the Diet at Frankfort his proposition that the Diet should be reformed, and that a national German Assembly should be convoked to consider the means and methods of this said reform. On 18th April the emperor proposed to reduce his armaments if King William would do the same, and the proposal was joyfully accepted by the old king. But other events and other influences were working in a less peaceful direction. Italy was excited in the highest degree at the prospect of another war with Austria, in which the Italians felt presumptuously confident that, with or without the aid of Prussia, they would recover Venetia and the Quadrilateral. Their attitude could not be disregarded by the imperial government, and on the 26th of April a missive from Vienna reached Berlin, which, while expressing the emperor's deep satisfaction at the covenanted disarmament on the Bohemian frontier, informed the royal government that the Austrian army in Italy would have to be put on a war footing, in order to defend the river Po and the sea-coast against the subjects of Victor Emmanuel. The Prussian government expressed grievous disappointment at this announcement, and declined further negotiations unless all the imperial army were reduced to a peace footing. The correspondence rapidly became warm, and Count Karolyi, on the 4th of May, informed the Prussian minister that Austria had now exhausted the negotiation for the simultaneous withdrawal of military preparations on both sides.

The following is the statement made on the 26th of April by the Austrian minister at Berlin:—"The emperor has received with sincere satisfaction the announcement that Prussia has accepted the proposition for a simultaneous disarmament of the two powers. His Majesty had expected nothing less from the conciliatory sentiments of King William. The emperor is now perfectly ready to give orders that the troops which have been directed upon Bohemia for the reinforcements of the garrisons there, shall be withdrawn into the interior of the empire, and thus put an end to any appearance of a concentration of force against Prussia. But we are now in a position which requires us to increase our means of defence in another direction, and we ought to be assured that this circumstance will not prevent the Prussian government from responding to the retirement of our troops from the Bohemian frontier by the reduction of the Prussian corps which have been mobilized. In fact, the latest intelligence from Italy evidently proves that the army of King Victor Emmanuel is preparing for an attack upon Venetia; Austria, therefore, is forced to place its Italian army upon a war footing, by calling in the men on furlough, and by making proper provisions for the defence, not only of its frontier upon the Po, but also of its extended coast line, which cannot be done without the movement of considerable bodies of troops within the interior of the monarchy. We think it necessary to acquaint the cabinet of Berlin with these facts, in order that we may not be exposed to the false interpretations which might be placed upon the circumstance that, while we are withdrawing our troops from Bohemia, we are at the same time making military preparations in another part of the empire.

"I request you, therefore, to explain to the king's government that these preparations are being made solely with a view to the eventuality of a conflict with the Italians, and that we shall begin at once to carry out the proposition of reciprocal disarmament, as soon as we shall be assured that the king's government will not permit the measures which we are compelled to take in our own defence against an attack from the south, to exercise any influence adverse to the re-establishment of the normal state of relations between Austria and Prussia."

Count von Bismarck framed on the 30th of April the following reply to this despatch:—"The Austrian government thus demands that Prussia shall countermand her, in themselves, modest defensive armaments, which have remained unchanged since the 28th of March, while Austria certainly withdraws her reinforcements of garrisons from Bohemia, but extends and hastens her arrangements for the establishment of an army upon a war footing. I cannot conceal from your excellency that, after the exchange of mutual declarations upon the 18th and 21st, hailed by us and by Europe as a guarantee of peace, we were not prepared for this demand. In justification of the altered attitude it takes up in the des-

patch of the 26th, the imperial government adduces the intelligence it has received from Italy. According to this, the army of King Victor Emmanuel is said to have been placed upon a war footing to proceed to an attack upon Venetia. The information which has reached us direct from Italy, and that we have received through the medium of other courts, coincides in stating that armaments of a threatening character against Austria have not taken place in Italy, and confirm us in the conviction that an unprovoked attack upon the empire is far distant from the intentions of the cabinet of Florence. If, in the meantime and recently, military preparations may have commenced in Italy, these, as well as the measures adopted by us upon the 28th of March, may probably be regarded as the consequence of the armaments begun by Austria. We are persuaded that the Italian armaments would be as readily discontinued as our own, provided the causes through which they have been occasioned ceased.

"In the interest of the preservation of peace, and the cessation of the pressure which at present weighs upon the relations of policies and trade, we therefore again request the imperial government to adhere without wavering to the programme it laid down itself in its despatch of the 18th, and which his Majesty the king accepted without delay, in the most conciliatory sense, and as a mark of his personal confidence in his Majesty the emperor. In execution of the same, we should expect, first, that all the troops sent to Bohemia, Moravia, Cracow, and Austrian Silesia, since the middle of March, should not only return to their former garrisons, but also that all bodies of troops stationed in those provinces should be replaced upon the former peace footing. We await a speedy authentic communication as to the execution of these measures, *i.e.*, of the restoration of the *status quo ante*, as the term of the 25th of April, fixed by the imperial government itself for the return to a peace footing of the troops assembled against our frontiers, has long since expired. We hope that the imperial government will at once, by further inquiry, arrive at the conviction that its intelligence as to the aggressive intentions of Italy was unfounded; that it will then proceed to the effective restoration of a peace footing throughout the imperial army, and thereby enable us to take the same step, to his Majesty's satisfaction."

The manner in which this despatch was received by the cabinet of Vienna, is best explained by the orders issued early in May by the emperor of Austria, authorizing the whole army to be placed on a footing of war, and for directing a part of it to be concentrated upon the frontiers of Bohemia and Silesia; and as early as the 4th of May, Count Mensdorff forwarded an address which he had drawn up, to the Austrian minister at Berlin, which, after referring to the despatch of Count von Bismarck, dated the 30th of April, proceeds, "According to this despatch, the government of his Majesty the king of Prussia thinks there is no reason why Austria should prepare to ward off an attack on her possessions in Italy. It declares that, if Austria should not think fit to place the whole imperial army on a real peace footing, it will not be possible for Prussia to carry on the important and momentous negotiations with the imperial government in any other way than by maintaining an equilibrium in the warlike preparations of the two powers. Your excellency will understand that we, after this declaration, must consider the negotiations for a simultaneous disarmament on the part of Prussia on the one side, and of Austria on the other, as being at an end. After the solemn assurances given by us in Berlin and in Frankfort, Prussia can have no reason to apprehend aggressive proceedings on our part, and Germany can have no cause to fear that we shall disturb the peace of the German Confederation. Just as little does Austria think of attacking Italy, although on all occasions the forcible detachment of a part of the Austrian territory has been the already pronounced programme of the Florence government. It is our duty to provide for the defence of the monarchy, and if the Prussian government finds in our measures against Italy a motive for upholding her own readiness for war, we can but fulfil that duty—which admits of no foreign control—without entering into any further discussion as to the priority or magnitude of the several military measures. In Berlin it cannot be unknown that we have not only to provide for the integrity of our own empire, but also to protect the territory of the German Bund against an aggressive movement on the part of Italy; and we therefore may, and must, in the interest of Germany, seriously ask of Prussia whether she thinks the demand that the frontiers of Germany shall be left unguarded, compatible with the duties of a German power."

The two opposite influences at work, antagonistic to the welfare of Austria, were shortly to undermine the monarchy, and by their united effect exalt the two countries that exercised them. Italy was to gain a triumphant freedom from Austrian rule, and Prussia an ascendancy long desired, but almost unlooked for. Yet, had the power of Prussia in the north proved as weak as that of her Italian ally in the south, Austria would have had a comparatively easy task, and have gained a double triumph. Austria's mistake was in having almost a needless fear of Italy, mixed with contempt and an affectation of slighting the strength of Prussia.

On another question of moment, that of the Elbe duchies, Austria made a proposal that was excessively disagreeable to Prussia. The proposal was to the effect that the two powers should make a common declaration, that they would cede the rights over the duchies which they had acquired by the treaty of Vienna, to that claimant of the sovereignty whom the Diet should recognize as lawful. Prussia should have the military position of Kiel, Rendsburg, and Sonderburg given to her by the treaty of Gastein; and Kiel should become a federal fort. Austria also would support Prussia's reasonable demands for territory requisite to complete the fortifications of Dybböl and Alsen, and obtain facilities for making the projected ship canal between the Baltic and North seas. Prussia declined to treat with a third party like the Diet on the subject of the duchies, but was willing to make a bargain with Austria if she were disposed to cede her share of the rights accruing by the treaty of Vienna.

Saxony, having made military preparations with a view, as Herr von Beust affirmed, to support her position in the Diet, the Prussian cabinet complained and warned the Saxon government of the consequences. Austria began to arm in earnest. The fortresses of Theresienstadt and Josephstadt were equipped, Cracow strengthened, Königgratz made defensible. The regiments in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia, were raised to their full war complement.

Early in May a motion was made and carried in the Diet at Frankfort, by the representative of Saxony, to the effect that the Bund should summon Prussia to give a formal declaration that her intentions were of a pacific nature. A week or ten days later there was a conference held at Bamberg, of the middle states, in which the representatives of Bavaria, Würtemburg, Baden, and Grand-ducal Hesse took part with those of the Saxon duchies, Brunswick and Nassau, in formulating the following propositions for the decision of the Diet:—The Diet will request those members of the Confederation which have taken any steps for military preparations beyond their peace establishment, to declare in the next sitting of the Diet, whether, and on what conditions, they will be prepared simultaneously to reduce their armed force to the peace establishment, and on a day to be agreed upon in the Diet's sitting. The vote was to be taken on the 1st June, on which day Baron Kübeck, on the part of Austria, charged Prussia with having made a "lamentable alliance with a foreign opponent of the empire;" adding, that his government, being imperilled on two sides, and uncertain whether the first attack would take place on the south or on the north, must preserve an attitude of defence. Their efforts, he continued, to come to an understanding with Prussia for a settlement on Federal principles of the question of the Elbe duchies, had been frustrated, and they should leave all future decisions with respect to it to the Diet, seeing that all Germany had a common interest in Schleswig and Holstein. This last fling at Prussia's known desire to annex the provinces, struck home, and was followed by orders to General Gablenz, the Austrian governor of Holstein, to convene an assembly of the states for the 11th of June, for the purpose of deciding on their future form of government. By this act, according to Prussian jurists, the treaty of Gastein was abrogated, and the cabinet of Berlin, falling back upon the treaty of Vienna, and the rights of co-possession which it conferred, ordered General Manteuffel to lead a sufficient military force from Schleswig into Holstein. This was done on the 8th and 9th of June, and Gablenz, finding himself outnumbered, and in danger of being caught in a trap the moment war should be declared, wisely withdrew from the duchy to a place of safety. As for the Frankfort Diet, it was informed by Baron Savigny that since they could not restrain Austria and Saxony from threatening Prussia by their formidable armaments, Prussia would protect her own interests without regard to the decisions of the Diet. One more sitting only, of great importance, was the Diet destined to hold. Her decrees were like the fibres of a spider's web, strong enough to hold small flies, but torn to shreds by a bee or a

wasp. On the 11th of June, at this memorable meeting, Austria moved that all the Federal contingents saving that of Prussia should be mobilized and placed on their full war establishment, concentrated within fourteen days, and then be ready to take the field within twenty-four hours. This was tantamount to a declaration of war by the whole Confederation against Prussia. Undismayed however, by the formidable aspect of the situation, Prussia replied by the counter proposition of a scheme for reforming the Bund, of which she moved the immediate adoption. This bold scheme consisted of ten articles, the most salient of which were the convocation of a national representative body to be elected by universal suffrage, and to sit periodically, and the exclusion of Austria from the Confederation. The representative of the Kaiser, so long paramount in the Diet as by right prescriptive, must have indeed felt on this occasion that the genius of Count von Bismarck, as Louis Napoleon says, lies in his audacity. The Austrian proposal, however, was carried on a division by nine against six votes. Thereupon Baron Savigny said that his master the king now considered the breach of the Federal compact to be consummated, and his participation in the proceedings of the Diet came to an end. The assembly dispersed on the 14th, never to meet for independent action again, being destroyed, after an existence of fifty years, by the minority of its members. Prussia lost no time in summoning the governments of Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel, to declare for or against her, offering to guarantee the sovereign rights of their rulers if they took her side. Saxony refused peremptorily; the other two states delayed their answers; and all three received from Prussia an immediate declaration of war.

One more effort in favour of peace was made by the other great powers, who united in proposing a conference. Prussia, Italy, and the Diet agreed to the proposal, but Austria accepted only on condition that the negotiations should exclude all pretensions on the part of any one of the powers to obtain an aggrandizement of territory. The fulfilment of this condition would have foiled Prussia in her hopes of annexing the Duchies, Italy in her expectation of recovering Venetia, and France in her general views; she being favourable to both of those projects. The idea of a conference was therefore abandoned, and the trumpet sounded for war. "With God, for King and Fatherland," resounded through Berlin and in every town and village of Prussia, while an Austrian archduke, assuming for the first time a national tone, closed an order of the day in Italy with the words, "For God, with Emperor and Fatherland." Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon were now frequently to be seen walking together in the summer evenings under the fine trees of the garden attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Berlin. There, on the night of Thursday the 14th June, the thought flashed upon Count von Bismarck to set the Prussian army in motion twenty-four hours sooner than was intended. Moltke retired to his cabinet, opened a drawer from which he took out orders that had been carefully prepared, and by means of the telegraph wires delivered those orders to every corner of the kingdom ere the next day had fully dawned. All that thought, knowledge, foresight could do in preparation for a great war, was done by the Prussian government. Austria, on her side, was also full of confidence. She was leader of Germany by prescription, and she certainly did not expect to be overthrown by a power long treated by her as an inferior.

When the prospect of a war, says the "History of the Seven Weeks' War," arose between Austria and Prussia in the spring of 1866, then came Italy's opportunity to complete the work which had been commenced at Magenta, to secure and unite to herself the only province which, still under the rule of the foreigner, prevented her from being free from the Alps to the Adriatic. Italy naturally drew as close to Prussia as she possibly could. Austria requires a long time to mobilize her army, and had begun her preparations for war in the middle of February. Public attention was directed to this fact by a council of war held at Vienna as early as the 10th of March, to which Feldzeugmeister (general of artillery) Benedek was summoned from Verona. At this council the party in favour of war was strongly predominant, and decided that Austria was powerful enough to take the field against Prussia and Italy at the same time, provided that measures were taken to isolate Prussia in Germany, and to draw the states of the Confederation to the Austrian side. The grand error of this council was that too high an estimate was formed of the strength of Austria, and far too low a calculation made of the powers of Prussia; no doubt seems to have been entertained but that Austria would emerge from such a war decidedly

the victor. Italy was so detested that every Austrian wished for an Italian war. Prussia, it was thought, weakened by an internal political conflict, could hardly unite her contending parties in a common foreign policy. Nor was a high opinion entertained of her military resources and organization. The professional papers and periodicals of Austria ingeniously demonstrated that Prussia, however hardly pressed, could not place her normal army on a complete war footing, because trained men would be wanting. The writers of these articles calculated that the battalions of infantry could only be brought into the field with a muster-roll of eight hundred men; no consideration was paid to the landwehr; in fact, doubts were in some cases thrown upon the existence of the landwehr soldiers at all, and those who believed in their existence entertained no doubts of their certain disloyalty. It was also calculated that the Prussian army would have to make such strong detachments for the garrisons of fortresses, that a very small force would be left for operations in the field. These false calculations, the first step and perhaps the most certain to the bitter defeat which ensued, were due to defective information. The war office at Vienna was lamentably deficient in those detailed accounts of foreign military statistics, without which any government that undertakes great military operations must necessarily grope in the dark.

Meanwhile the government of Prussia was not idle. By order of the king the entire army was mobilized, five corps d'armée being placed upon a war strength by the 4th of May, while the remaining four corps of the standing army received orders to be augmented and mobilized. The execution of these orders was conducted with such remarkable alacrity and precision as indicated how careful Prussia had been for a considerable period to prepare, in case of the outbreak of war, a force adequate to the severest exigencies of either defence or attack. The equipment of the entire Prussian army was fully effected at the end of a fortnight, when it mustered 490,000 men, unsurpassed in efficiency, and fully provided for a campaign. It was on the 7th of May that the Prussian troops concentrated in Schleswig crossed the frontier, and occupied Holstein; while the Austrians, not having at this point a sufficient body of men to resist their entry, retired to Altona. General Manteuffel, the Prussian governor of Schleswig, then published a proclamation declaring to the inhabitants of Holstein that the provisional government established in 1866 was discarded, and a Prussian president was appointed for the general administration of the affairs of both the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The expedition with which Prussia made her preparations appeared a matter of almost as much surprise to themselves as to the Austrians. The army of the latter power, however, although starting with a priority of ten weeks for its formation, was in an incompetent state to open the campaign when the day for action arrived. Had the Prussians then taken advantage of the backward state of their enemy's preparations, the campaign might have been even more marvellously brief and decisive than it was. Why Prussia did not avail herself of the opportunity thus afforded has not been clearly explained. Was Prussia, it has been asked, really so moderate as her advocates would have the world believe? Was it desire of peace or fear of failure which stayed her hand, and held her marshalled corps on the north of the mountain frontier of Bohemia? It may have been both, but the results of the war show that the latter entered into the calculations of those who planned the Prussian strategy. The army was ready and might have attacked Austria; but it would in its advance have exposed its communications to the assault of the minor states, and until forces were prepared to quell these, the main army could not assume the offensive. This was probably the cause why the troops were not at once concentrated, and pushed immediately into Bohemia. At the very beginning the Prussian army confined itself to taking up defensive positions to cover the provinces most exposed to attack, especially towards Bohemia. The Austrian army of the north had commenced its concentration in Bohemia on the 13th May, and Feldzeugmeister Benedek had there taken over the command-in-chief on the 18th. The first, fifth, and sixth Prussian corps d'armée were posted in Silesia, the second and third corps in Lusatia, and the fourth corps round Erfurt. The guards corps was still left at Berlin, and the seventh and eighth corps were retained in Westphalia and the Rhine provinces, respectively.

Italy had made such progress in her preparations for the coming struggle, that by the end of May her armaments were fully formed. A decree published at Florence having appointed General Gari-

baldi, the great guerilla chieftain, to the immediate command of twenty volunteer battalions, which were ordered to form under that patriot's standard, the volunteers responded to the call in such numbers that the battalions had to be doubled. Upon this Austria committed towards her Italian dependency one of her last acts of tyranny, by raising a compulsory loan in Venetia of twelve million gulden. This act excited Italian feeling to such a state of desperation, that Victor Emmanuel found the utmost difficulty in restraining his troops from striking the blow for liberty till the proper hour had arrived. Thus Austria was placed between two menacing foes, both acting in concerted measures, yet each relying upon its own strength.

Notwithstanding these active preparations, the actual commencement of hostilites was still averted, and though swords were not imbrued with blood, diplomatic pens, as we have seen, were actively engaged in paper war. Prussia was engaged in putting forward her motion for reform of the Germanic Confederation. The attempt made by the other great powers to bring about a reconciliation between the rival claimants for supremacy in Germany having failed, war became inevitable.

The subjoined chronological table of the principal features of the political prologue is taken from the "History of the Seven Week's War:"—

October 20, 1864.—Treaty of Vienna.

August 14, 1865.—Convention of Gastein.

March 12, 1866.—First preparations of Austria for war in Bohemia and Moravia.

March 30, 1866.—First preparations of Prussia.

April, 1866.—Negotiations concerning those armaments.

April 23, 1866.—Great armament of Austria in Venetia.

April 26, 1866.—Proposal of Austria to submit the question in dispute to the Diet.

May 7, 1866.—Declaration of Prussia of the incompetency of the Diet to decide in international questions, and suggestion of the desirability of the reform of the Confederation.

Until May 28, 1866.—Armaments in all Germany and Italy.

May 28, 1866.—Proposal of a Conference by the three non-Germanic powers.

May 29, 1866.—Prussian acceptance of this proposal.

June 1, 1866.—Submission of the Schleswig-Holstein question to the Diet.

June 5, 1866.—Summons by General Gablenz for assembly of Holstein Estates.

June 10, 1866.—Prussian proposal for the reform of the Federal constitution.

June 11, 1866.—Austrian motion for the decree of Federal execution against Prussia.

June 14, 1866.—Acceptance of the Austrian motion by the Diet.

June 15, 1866.—Declaration of war by Prussia against Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Saxony.

June 20, 1866.—Declaration of war by Italy against Austria and Bavaria.

It must be remembered that the Westphalian and Rhenish provinces of Prussia were divided from the rest of the kingdom by the interlying territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau. Of these powers, all favouring Austria, the first possessed a well-armed, well-trained force of 20,000 men—more than a match, it was thought, for the Prussian landwehr, and fit to be a powerful advanced guard to the forces which Bavaria and her allies upon the Main were about to raise. To meet this danger the Prussian chief ordered half of Vogel's corps to assemble at Minden, where, aided by the southward march of Manteuffel's regiments from Holstein, they were soon in a position to occupy Hanover and overrun Hesse-Cassel. The other half of Vogel's corps was united to Herwarth's, and formed the third or Elbe army, which, after occupying Saxony, became part of the general force employed in the invasion of Bohemia.

The actual commencement of hostilities took place on the 15th June, the day after that on which the Diet had decreed the mobilization of the Federal forces. The Prussians marched into Saxony, and took possession of Leipsic. On committing this bold act of invasion, Prince Frederick Charles, who commanded the Prussians, issued to the inhabitants of Saxony a proclamation, dated Görlitz, June 16, in which he said, "We are not at war with the people and country of Saxony, but only with the government, which by its inveterate hostility has forced us to take up arms." At the same time Hesse-Cassel was also overrun by the Prussians, who met with no impediment. The entire Prussian force was formed into three distinct armies. The first army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, was in occupation of Saxony, and threatened the Bohemian frontier. The second army, under the command of the

Crown Prince, was in movement in Silesia; and a third army, designated the army of the Elbe, and commanded by General Herwarth, was prepared to march on the right flank of the first army.

The emperor of Austria, on the 17th of June, issued an address "To my Peoples," in which the circumstances which brought about the impending hostilities were reviewed, and reasons given why Austria was under the necessity of entering into the combat. "While engaged in a work of peace," said his Majesty, "which was undertaken for the purpose of laying the foundation for a constitution which should augment the unity and power of the empire, and, at the same time, secure to my several countries and peoples free internal development, my duties as a sovereign have obliged me to place my whole army under arms. On the frontiers of my empire, in the south and in the north, stand the armies of two enemies, who are allied together with the intention of breaking the power of Austria as a great European state. To neither of these enemies have I given cause for war. I call on my Omniscient God to bear witness that I have always considered it my first, my most sacred duty, to do all in my power to secure for my people the blessings of peace."

After alluding to his former alliance with Prussia, and to some minor topics, he says, "The assurances given by my government of my love of peace, and the repeated declarations which were made of my readiness to disarm at the same time with Prussia, were replied to by propositions which could not be accepted without sacrificing the honour and safety of the monarchy. Prussia not only insisted on complete disarmament in the northern provinces of the empire, but also in those parts of it which touch on Italy, where a hostile army was standing, for whose love of peace no guarantee could either be given or offered. The negotiations with Prussia in respect to the Elbe duchies, clearly proved that a settlement of the question in a way compatible with the dignity of Austria, and with the rights and interests of Germany and the duchies, could not be brought about, as Prussia was violently intent on conquest. The negotiations were therefore broken off, the whole affair was referred to the Bund, and at the same time the legal representatives of Holstein were convoked."

The emperor then refers to the intervention of the three powers to avert if possible the outbreak of war, and he attributes the failure of the attempt to the ambitious aims of Prussia. "The recent events clearly prove that Prussia substitutes open violence for right and justice. The rights and the honour of Austria, the rights and the honour of the whole German nation, are no longer a barrier against the inordinate ambition of Prussia. Prussian troops have entered Holstein, the estates convoked by the imperial stadtholder have been violently dissolved. The government of Holstein, which the treaty of Vienna gives to Austria and Prussia in common, has been claimed for Prussia alone; and the Austrian garrison has been obliged to give way to a force ten times as strong as itself. When the German Bund accepted the Austrian proposition to mobilize the Federal troops, Prussia, who prides herself upon being the defender of the interests of Germany, resolved to complete the work she had begun, by violently severing the tie which unites the German races. Suddenly announcing her secession from the Bund, she required from the German government the acceptance of a so-called project of reform, which in reality is a division of Germany, and now she employs military force against those sovereigns who have faithfully discharged their federal duties.

"The most pernicious of wars, a war of Germans against Germans, has become inevitable, and I now summon before the tribunal of history, before the tribunal of an eternal and all-powerful God, those persons who have brought it about, and make them responsible for the misfortunes which may fall on individuals, families, districts, and countries." Turning from this almost pathetic strain, the Kaiser expresses his delight at the patriotic spirit evinced by his people:—"My heart beats high at the sight of my gallant and well-appointed army—the bulwark against which the force of the enemies of Austria will be broken—and of my faithful peoples, who are full of loyal confidence and self-devotion. The pure fire of patriotic enthusiasm burns with equal strength and steadiness in all parts of my vast empire. Joyfully do the furlough men and reserves take their places in the ranks of the army; numerous volunteers present themselves; the whole of the able-bodied population of the countries which are most exposed are preparing to take the field." He also flatters his people with the prospect, that "we shall not be alone in the struggle which is about

to take place. The princes and peoples of Germany know that their liberty and independence are menaced by a power, which listens but to the dictates of egotism, and is under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandizement." The emperor ends his lengthy manifesto by testifying his implicit faith in the justness of his cause, and his belief in a consequent success.

On the day of its publication a general order was also issued by Benedek, the commander-in-chief, to the Austrian army of the North, from his head-quarters at Olmütz. In this document the Austrian commander betrays woful ignorance of the quality of the army opposed to him. "Soldiers," he says, "we are on the eve of grave and sanguinary events. I have the full and entire conviction that you are aware of and are worthy of the mission confided to you. Have confidence also in me, and be assured that on my part I will exert my best efforts to bring this campaign to a speedy and glorious termination. We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line and partly of landwehr. The first comprise young men not accustomed to privations and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important campaign. The latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which rather than fight against us would prefer the downfall of their government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle. Veterans of the Mincio and of Palestro, I hope that with tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an adversary. On the day of battle the infantry will adopt their lightest campaign accoutrement, and will leave behind their knapsacks and camping material, in order that they may be able to throw themselves with rapidity and promptitude upon the heavily-laden enemy. The officers will discontinue the use of their wide scarves, and all the useless insignia of their ranks, which but renders them too easily distinguishable in action. Every man, without distinction of name or position, shall be promoted whenever he shall distinguish himself on the field of battle. The enemy have for some time vaunted the excellence of their fire-arms; but, soldiers, I do not think that will be of much avail to them. We will give them no time for fire-arms, but attack them with the bayonet and with cross muskets; and when, with God's help, we shall have beaten and compelled them to retreat, we will pursue them without intermission, until you find repose upon the enemy's soil, and those compensations which a glorions and victorious army has a right to demand."

General Benedek distributed his forces along the frontier separating Moravia from Saxony and Silesia; he evidently had no conception of the rapidity of the Prussian movements, but contemplated meeting them at his leisure and cutting them off in detail, while they were traversing the mountain passes that separate the two countries, and entering at various points the Austrian territory.

General von Moltke arranged the plan of the Prussian campaign in Berlin, and to his remarkable foresight and skilful arrangements its crowning success is mainly due. But the shrewd combinations of the able general derived extraordinary strength from the unexpected efficiency of the new weapon that the Prussian government had adopted, the now famous "needle-gun"—a breech-loading arm, which, by the fearful rapidity of its fire, utterly paralyzed the Austrians, and proved to them a terrible engine of destruction. It had been used to some extent in the war against Denmark, but its marked superiority was not made universally manifest till now. The promptness of the Prussians in action was much commented upon at the time. A writer already quoted says, they "were all alert. For some years the king has been fighting his Parliament in order to be in a position to fight Austria and take possession of Germany, and has thus been able to form a regular army. He first used this force to overawe his subjects, and compel them to submit to the new military organization, and then, by calling up the whole adult population of his kingdom, he began the war with an overwhelming force. Austria suddenly found herself overmatched in numbers, while those numbers were trebly multiplied by the superior weapons of the foe. The Prussians came on at a double quick with ambulances, transports, and munitions complete, and even timbers cut to the size of the railway bridges which they expected to find destroyed." Prince Frederick Charles, with the first army, established his headquarters at the village of Hirschfeld, situated on the banks of the Neisse, a short distance east of the frontier town of Zittau, commanding the outlet of the passes stretching from Reichenberg and Friedland, in Bohemia, through

the range of mountains into the district in Saxony called Lusatia. It overlooks also the railway lines from Pardubitz to Bautzen.

On the following day the first Prussian army crossed the Bohemian frontier in two columns, one marching by way of Görlitz, and the other by Zittau; it reached, after a few skirmishes with cavalry, the Bohemian town of Reichenberg. On the 26th of June an artillery engagement took place between an Austrian battery and the Prussian advanced lines, which resulted in the Austrians withdrawing to Münchengrätz. Here, on the 28th, a desperate struggle ensued, and the Austrians, aided by the Saxons, offered a most strenuous resistance; but the Prussians finally drove them back, and pursuing them towards Gitschin, formed in position on the high ground facing that town.

While these engagements were taking place the second Prussian army, commanded by the Crown Prince, had to march into Bohemia from Silesia, through the long and narrow passes of the Sudetian mountains. For the purpose of deceiving the enemy various feigned movements were made on the south-east frontiers of Silesia, the object of the Prussians being to lead the enemy to prepare to meet them crossing into Bohemia from Neisse, through Weidenau. While, however, the Austrians were looking this way for the approach of the invaders, the main body of the second army faced to the right, and appeared with considerable alacrity on the west at Nachod and Trautenau in Bohemia, having in their march passed the frontier at Reinerz and Landshut without meeting any opposition. The Crown Prince, before traversing the defiles of the mountains separating Silesia from Moravia, on the 20th June, issued from Neisse a general order to his troops, in which he said, "Soldiers of the Second Army—You have heard the words of our king and commander-in-chief. The attempts of his Majesty to preserve peace to our country having proved fruitless, with a heavy heart, but with strong confidence in the spirit and valour of his army, the king has determined to do battle for the honour and independence of Prussia, and for a new organization of Germany on a powerful basis. I, placed by the grace and confidence of my royal father at your head, am proud, as the first servant of our king, to risk with you my blood and property for the most sacred rights of our native country. Soldiers! for the first time for fifty years a worthy foeman is opposed to our army. Confident in your prowess, and in our excellent and approved arms, it behoves us to conquer the same enemy as our greatest king defeated with a small army. And now, forward with the old Prussian battle cry—'With God, for King and Fatherland.'"

The reason why the armies of Prussia debouched into the Austrian territory by different roads, will be understood when it is known that the troops, carriages, &c., of the first army alone, when entering Bohemia, on two lines, covered twelve miles of road; and had the second army and the army of the Elbe marched the same road, any obstructions would have made progress extremely difficult. Nor could the Austrian general hope effectually to repel the invaders by blocking each pass through the mountains, since he would have had to make too many divisions in his forces, and have thus exposed them to the risk of being beaten in detail.

Lieutenant-colonel Cooke, in a sketch of this campaign, says, "The position of the Austrian corps was made known to the Prussians on the 11th June, by means of a little book which had been printed and distributed to the superior officers of the Prussian army. In this small volume the positions of the Austrian corps and their organization were given with great minuteness. Whether the information was obtained by the treachery of some Austrian, or by the exertions of the Prussian Intelligence department, is not known. According to this book, the first corps was at Prague, the second at Hohenmauth and Zwittau, the third at Brünn, the fourth and sixth at Olmütz, the eighth at Auspitz, and the tenth at Brünn. The crown prince of Saxony was to join the first Austrian corps with his army, and take command of both.

On the 22nd the first Prussian army, and the army of the Elbe, prepared to advance. The first army broke up from Görlitz, and moved to the frontier of Bohemia on the Zittau and Friedland roads. The army of the Elbe advanced by the Rumberg road. On the 23rd the first army entered Bohemia, marching on fine roads towards Reichenberg, and after a halt there made another advance on the 26th, for the purpose of securing the passage of the Iser, over which are bridges at Turnau, Podol, and Münchengrätz. The road from Reichenberg, by which Prince Frederick Charles was advancing, passes through Liebenau, and, when near the Iser, forks to the left to the

bridge at Turnau, and to the right to the bridge at Podol, where the road crosses the river, and continues to Münchengrätz. The portion of the Austrian army opposed to the Prussians on this side were behind the Iser, in the neighbourhood of Münchengrätz. They consisted of the first corps, under Clam Gallas, and the Saxons under their crown prince. They held the bridges at Münchengrätz and at Podol, and had an advanced guard consisting of cavalry and artillery at Liebenau, but they seem to have omitted to occupy Turnau in any force. At Liebenau the advanced guard of the Prussian army, consisting of the first division under Horn, met the Austrian advanced guard, and, after some resistance, drove them back. The latter retreated across the Iser at Turnau, and broke the bridge there; but the Prussians threw a bridge over the river, and occupied the place on the same night with two divisions.

At the same time the Prussians marched on Podol, which they reached at about eight p.m. A severe fight ensued here, which ended in the victory of the Prussians, who drove the Austrians across the Iser, and seized the road and railway bridges. They thus secured the passage of that river, both at Turnau and Podol. Meanwhile the army of the Elbe had continued its advance, and on this day had a successful encounter with the Austrians at Hünerwasser. Prince Frederick Charles determined to endeavour to turn the Austrian right flank by an advance along the Turnau road, while a portion of his army attacked them in front at Podol, and the army of the Elbe assailed them at Münchengrätz. He accordingly advanced on the morning of the 28th with this object; but the Austrians, after a severe fight, in which they lost 2000 men, of whom 1400 were prisoners, abandoned their position in time, and retired towards Jicin.

It is now time to turn to the second army, which entered Bohemia by three different routes; the first corps by the Trautenau road; the guards by Braunau; the fifth corps (followed by the sixth) by Nachod. It had a more difficult task to perform than the first army, as it was nearer the bulk of the Austrian forces. Benedek's head-quarters were at Böhmish Trübau on the 25th, and were moved a day or two after to Josephstadt. He appears to have had three corps immediately available, with which to dispute the Crown Prince's advance; the tenth at Trautenau; the sixth at Opoino, to the south of Neustadt; and the eighth in the neighbourhood of Josephstadt.

It is necessary to trace the passage of the left columns of the Prince's army through the mountains, and to show how, on the 30th of June, it was able to effect a junction with the right and central columns on the bank of the Elbe.

On the 27th of June the first corps of the Crown Prince's army, under General von Bonin, seized Trautenau, a town lying on the river Aupa, in a basin surrounded by mountains. A barricade on the bridge having been broken down by the Prussians, the town was entered and a severe street fight ensued, the Austrians being gradually driven back from house to house. After a heavy loss on both sides, the Austrians were thrust out into the open country. There the celebrated Windischgrätz dragoons stood waiting to sweep the Prussians from the ground, as soon as they should emerge from the town. They met their match, however, in the first Prussian dragoon regiment, composed of young Lithuanians, who spend their life on horseback. The two regiments advanced to the encounter without exchanging a shot, and as they closed, both sides raised a cheer, welcoming the hug of battle. For a few minutes the mass of combatants swayed slowly backwards and forwards, and then the Austrians suddenly gave way, scattering in their flight and leaving the Prussians masters of the field. Mondel's Austrian brigade of infantry, posted on the hillside of Capellenberg, were forced to retire by an attack of Prussian foot. The village of Hohenbrück was occupied by the Prussians, and so confident of victory was Von Bonin, that he declined an offer of assistance made to him by the commander of the Prussian guards, who marching by way of Steinthal had reached Qualitch, and heard the heavy firing at Trautenau. At three o'clock in the afternoon the action seemed to be over. Half an hour, however, had scarcely elapsed, when the commander of the tenth corps of Austrians, General Gablenz, advanced with his whole force from Pilnikau and attacked the weary Prussians. After an hour's combat he had retaken the village of Hohenbrück, and by five o'clock the Prussians had begun to retreat. This operation was covered by the forty-third Prussian regiment stationed on the hills north of Capellenberg, and supported by the third grenadiers. For some time these regiments, at great loss to themselves, stopped the Austrian pursuit. General von Bonin intended

to hold the line of the Aupa on the north of Trautenau, but Gablenz pressed upon him and he was forced to continue his retreat to the position he had occupied on the morning of the 27th. The first Prussian corps lost in this action, in killed and wounded, sixty-three officers and 1214 men, while the Austrian tenth corps, owing to the murderous effect of the Prussian needle-gun, lost 196 officers with 5536 men. The victory of the muzzle-loader was purchased at a cost well nigh as great as that of a defeat.

The reverse which the Prussians had sustained under Von Bonin was promptly rectified by the advance of the prince of Würtemberg from Eypel at the head of the first corps of guards early in the morning of the 28th of June. General Gablenz, finding his right flank threatened, had to change his front, a movement which he protected by the heavy fire of sixty-four pieces of artillery that did much damage to the advancing Prussians. The advance of the latter nevertheless was steadily maintained, the Austrians were driven back at Burgersdorf, Alt-Rognitz, towards Koniginhof, and one brigade into Trautenau itself, which the Prussians took by storm, capturing 3000 prisoners and a stand of colours.

To the fifth Prussian corps, which formed the head of the left column of the army of the Crown Prince, was the most difficult task given. Only one narrow road leads from the county of Glatz to Nachod, a road which beyond the Bohemian frontier runs in a winding course near the town of Nachod, through a difficult defile. A corps d'armée, with all its trains and baggage advancing by one road, forms a column of march twenty miles long. If only the combatants themselves and the most necessary train, such as ammunition waggons and field hospitals, form the corps, it still will stretch over ten miles; so that if the head of the column is attacked as it issues from a defile where the troops cannot move off the road, the rearmost battalion will not be able to support the most advanced until four hours have passed.

In order to insure the safe issue from the mountain passes, the advanced guard of the fifth corps, under General von Löwenfeld, was pushed forward as far as Nachod, on the evening of the 26th June. The Austrians held the defile with a very weak force, and did not stand obstinately in the castle of Nachod, so that the Prussian advanced guard occupied that strong post with very slight opposition. General Ramming, who had been posted with the sixth Austrian corps, and a portion of the first division of reserve cavalry at Opoino, about ten miles to the south of Nachod, marched on the 26th towards Skalitz, by order of Feldzeugmeister Benedek. The next day the advanced guard of the Prussian fifth corps brought on the action of Nachod.

On the 27th, the same day that the first corps of the Prussians was defeated at Trautenau, the advanced guard of the fifth Prussian corps d'armée was, about ten o'clock in the morning, moving out of Nachod towards Skalitz, when it was suddenly assailed by a heavy fire from the Austrian artillery, and two Austrian cuirassier regiments drew up across the road to bar the way against the Prussian infantry. These were supported by two infantry brigades, while a third stood in the rear as a reserve. The Prussians were then in a dangerous position, for the road through the defile at Nachod behind them was choked with the carriages of the artillery, and only a few battalions and two squadrons had gained the open ground. General von Löwenfeld, who commanded the advanced guard, threw his infantry into a wood which was beside the road, where, protected by the trees to a certain extent from the shells of the Austrian guns, they maintained their position until their artillery had cleared the defile. At the same time the small body of Prussian cavalry who were with the infantry charged straight down the road against the centre of the line of the cuirassier regiments. The Austrians numbered eight times as many sabres as the Prussians, and their cavalry bore the highest reputation in Europe. All expected to see the Prussians hurled back, broken and destroyed, by their collision with the Austrian line, but the result was far different; the Prussian squadrons thundered down the road, and seemed merely by the speed at which they were galloping to cut clean through the centre of the line of cuirassiers. But though they were thus far successful in their first onslaught, they were quickly assailed in flank and rear by overwhelming numbers, and with difficulty escaped being cut to pieces. Many, however, managed to shake themselves free from the *mêlée*, and, galloping back, rallied under the protection of the fire of their infantry in the wood. The Austrians pressed forward, forcing their foes to retire; and it seemed that the mouth of the defile would be lost, for the Austrian infantry were quickly coming

up, and were preparing to attack the wood held by the Prussians. Thus upon Löwenfeld's battalions depended not only the safe passage of the fifth corps through the defile, but also the preservation of the whole of the artillery, for so crowded with carriages was the road that, had the Austrians pressed on, every gun and waggon must have fallen into their hands. But the Prussian infantry proved worthy of the trust placed in them, and nothing availed to dislodge them from the trees, though the shells went whistling in quick succession through the trunks, and the splinters carried away the branches above the heads of the soldiers, and tore up the turf beneath their feet.

The Crown Prince was in Nachod when the firing commenced; he pushed his way with difficulty through the crowded defile, and came to his advanced guard in order to show himself to his soldiers in their time of trial. Behind him followed as quickly as possible the battalions of the main body of the corps, and the guns of the artillery were also pushed forward; but the road was long and crowded, and both regiments and guns made their way with difficulty. In the meantime the Austrians pressed hard upon the little band in the wood, and seemed as though they would pass it by, and close the defile with their columns. But before they could do so the battalions of the main body gained the end of the defile, and the Prussian guns began to come quickly forward; for waggons and all encumbrances had been pushed off the road into the ditches, to facilitate the free passage of the troops going into action. The newly-arrived troops reinforced those in the wood, and the artillery replied to the Austrian batteries; yet at noon the battle was still stationary, the Prussians not having advanced their position since the beginning of the fight, and the Austrian cavalry standing prepared to charge the Prussian infantry if it attempted to move forward on the open ground. The Crown Prince knew that on breaking that cavalry line depended the passage of the fifth corps into Bohemia, and he sent against it the eighth Prussian regiment of dragoons, and the first regiment of Uhlans. It was an exciting moment. The Prussians, nerved by the importance of the issue of their charge, and with the eyes of their infantry upon them, sprang forward readily. The Austrian horsemen, proud of their high renown, and eager to wipe out the memory of the former skirmish, also bounded forward as soon as they saw the Prussians approaching. The two lines met about half way, for one moment formed a tangled struggling crowd, and then the Prussian Uhlans, with their lance points low and heads bent down, were seen pursuing. The most famous cavalry in Europe had been overthrown.

Before and during this charge, both divisions of the fifth Prussian corps had cleared the defile; and scarcely had the effect of the cavalry charge been seen when General Steinmetz, who commanded, determined to assume the offensive. The Prussian infantry and artillery dashed forward after their cavalry. Some of the battalions, turning aside, marched against the village of Wisokow, already in flames from a Prussian shell, with their bayonets at the charge. Among the burning houses the Austrians waited for them; a sharp struggle ensued, but the village was carried, and the Austrians driven out.

In the meantime, the Austrian heavy horsemen had rallied, and again returned to the charge. This time they advanced with skill as well as courage, and bore down upon the flanks of the Uhlans; but their approach was seen, and before they had reached the Prussian line it had quickly changed its front, and met the advancing squadrons face to face. Again the Austrians recoiled, but now without a chance of rallying; they were broken and scattered, and the Uhlans, spreading out in pursuit, went dashing in small knots over the plain after them, and captured two guns from their horse artillery. This cavalry charge decided the fortune of the day, and the Austrians retired, pressed by the Prussian infantry. General Steinmetz, who commanded the fifth corps, which was here engaged, led forward all his troops, having only three battalions of the royal regiment in reserve; and pushed the enemy back. But the most of his men, after a long march and severe action, being too much fatigued to pursue, were halted, and the cavalry, with one or two battalions, alone followed up the pursuit, from which they brought back two thousand prisoners and three guns, besides the two taken by the Uhlans. The Crown Prince thanked General Steinmetz on the field in the name of the king for the victory, and well did the general and his troops merit the compliment, for all the first part of the action was fought with twenty-two battalions against twenty-nine, and with an inferior force of cavalry and artillery.

This victory cost the Prussians a loss of 900

men killed and wounded; among the latter were the two generals, Von Ollech and Von Wunck. The fifth corps, notwithstanding its march on the 27th over fifteen miles through a narrow defile, and an engagement that lasted eight hours, was still so strong and so confident that General Steinmetz resolved to resume the attack without loss of time.

General Ramming, who had deservedly the reputation of being one of the most able and talented generals of the imperial army, after having engaged the Prussians at Nachod with his whole force, retreated to Skalitz on the evening of the 27th. On arriving at that place he sent a despatch to the head-quarters of the army, in which he requested that the eighth Austrian corps, which was posted at Josephstadt, might be allowed to assist him with two brigades. Benedek thereupon ordered the eighth corps to advance to Skalitz, and be prepared to engage in the first line, while that of General Ramming should form its reserve. One brigade of the Prussian sixth corps, which was to follow the fifth corps through the defile of Nachod, had reached Nachod on the evening of the 27th, and was ready to advance with General Steinmetz. At the same time the Austrian General Ramming, who had been reinforced by the eighth corps, also advanced from Skalitz in order to drive the Prussians back into the defile of Nachod. Hence arose the action of Skalitz.

The Austrians were soon forced to quit the offensive, and energetically to assume the defensive in front of Skalitz, on the road and railway, which are flanked on the north and south by two woods. The country was entirely unfavourable for the action of cavalry. Either side brought up as much force as possible. The battle swayed hither and thither, but ultimately the superior strength and armament of the Prussian soldier told against his weaker antagonist.

On the north of the railway the thirty-seventh and fifty-eighth Prussian regiments, and the twelfth brigade advanced; while on the south the king's own regiment, though exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, gained the wood on the south of the town, and there succeeded in sustaining the assaults of far superior numbers, until the forty-sixth and fifty-second regiments could come up to its aid, and join in an attack on Skalitz.

The Austrian position was forced, and the Archduke Leopold compelled to fall back to a strong position behind the Aupa, where he intended to hold his ground, supported by his numerous artillery. The position was, however, carried by the Prussians, after hard fighting, and by it they gained the command of the defile of the Aupa. General Steinmetz, by this victory, captured four thousand prisoners, eight guns, and several stands of colours. In the meantime the first Prussian corps had reached Trautenau, and found the Austrian tenth corps posted immediately to the south of the town. They attacked them at once, but were driven back, and not only failed to recover their ground, but were obliged to retire in the night to Liebau. The guards on this day had advanced without opposition to Eypel and Kosteletz. They had offered to come to the assistance of the first corps; but, as the day was then favourable to the Prussians, their offer had been declined. The guards, however, hearing of the check which the first corps had received, advanced at three o'clock in the morning of the 28th to their assistance. They took the Austrians in flank and rear, surprised them, and drove them over the Elbe at Neuschloss, with immense loss. The fifth corps again advanced, and finding the sixth and eighth corps of the enemy drawn up at Skalitz to oppose their progress, they attacked and defeated them. On the actions of the 27th and 28th depended the success of the army of Silesia in effecting its passage over the mountains of Bohemia. The corps of the guards was engaged at Trautenau, the fifth corps at Nachod and Skalitz. The Crown Prince, in person, could not be present at either action. He was obliged to choose a position between the two, whence he could proceed to any point where his presence might be necessary. He accordingly posted himself on a hill near Kosteletz, where the heavy cavalry of the guards took up its position on coming through the hills, and where it was joined at a later period of the day by the reserve artillery of the guards. The time passed heavily on that hill of Kosteletz. The thunder of cannon rose ever louder from Skalitz on the south, and from the direction of Trautenau on the north. With anxious ears the commander-in-chief and his staff listened to the progress of the cannonade, and with eager eyes scanned the positions of the eddying clouds of white smoke which rose from the engaged artillery. It was the instruction of the Crown Prince,

if an unfavourable report of the progress of the action on either side was brought to him, to repair to that point, and in person to encourage his pressed troops. But every orderly officer, every aide-de-camp, brought the intelligence that the battles in both places were going well for the Prussians.

At last, between three and four o'clock, the commander-in-chief received the positive report from General Steinmetz, that he had stormed Skalitz, and driven back two of the enemy's corps. No longer had the Crown Prince to give a thought to this side. He immediately started for Eypel, in order to be present at the action in which the guards were engaged. At this place the news reached him that the guard had also victoriously achieved its task, and not only had forced the defile from Eypel, but had also opened the pass from Trautenau. Here, then, were the three issues from the mountains, the defiles of Trautenau, Eypel, and Nachod, popularly called the gates of Bohemia, in the secure possession of the second Prussian army, and the junction of the hitherto separated corps almost certain to be effected on the following day. To accomplish the junction of his united army with that of Prince Frederick Charles, the Crown Prince ordered the advance the next morning to be made as far as the Elbe. The Crown Prince had thus successfully brought his whole army across the mountains, and had secured as trophies 9000 prisoners and twenty-four guns.

The Austrians and Saxons, on retreating from Münchengrätz, had taken up an extended position to the north-west of Jicin, between Lochow on the Münchengrätz road, and Diletz on the Turnau road. The crown prince of Saxony is said to have received from Benedek at noon on this day, the 29th, a despatch written on the previous day, to the effect that "the third corps would arrive at Jicin on the 29th, and that four corps of the main army would advance on the 30th against Turnau and Lomnitz." The Crown Prince and Clam Gallas, therefore, prepared to maintain their positions in front of the Jicin. They were attacked in force by the Prussians at about three o'clock. At seven o'clock in the evening a second message was received from Benedek, "to avoid engaging with a superior force, and to effect a junction with the main army, by Horitz and Miletin, and that the four army corps had in the meantime received other instructions." The allied force was, however, already engaged with superior numbers, and only succeeded in effecting a retreat in great disorder, and with the loss of 5000 men, of whom 2000 were prisoners. The Prussians entered Jicin about midnight. On the same day the army of the Elbe made a forward movement towards Jung Bunzlaw, and the advanced guard of the first division of guards drove the Austrians on this day out of Königinhof, near which place the corps of guards encamped. The first corps advanced to Pilnikau, the fifth corps towards Gradlitz, defeating three brigades of the fourth Austrian corps at Schweinschädel, and forcing them to retreat to Jeromir. On the 30th the first Prussian army was concentrated round Jicin, where it opened communication with the second army, which was between Arnau and Gradlitz, the head-quarters of the Crown Prince being at Prausnitz, the sixth corps having already joined the second army from Nachod.

Benedek had taken up his position along the railroad fronting the Elbe, between Königinhof and Josephstadt; but the capture of Jicin having exposed his left flank, he quitted his position on the morning of the 1st July, and prepared to take up a new one behind the Bistritz.

The strategical operation of concentrating their armies on the other side of the frontier, may now be said to have been successfully accomplished by the Prussians; for although the junction was only actually effected on the field of Königgrätz, yet they were now sufficiently near to afford each other mutual support in case of attack. Before entering upon the description of the battle fought on that field, it will be well to review the operations on both sides which led to it.

The operation which the Prussians undertook was, as before stated, a dangerous one. They entered the mountains at points sixty or seventy miles apart, separated by lofty mountain ranges, and allowing of no lateral communication, and they had to concentrate their armies on some point in the plain which was held by the Austrians.

The control of the operations is generally attributed to General von Moltke. At Berlin the telegraph wires flashed to him from day to day the positions of the armies, and he was able to regulate their movements so that they should advance by proportionate steps. Had one of the armies met with so serious a check as to have compelled it to retreat, he would probably have prevented the others from being compromised by

too forward an advance; and the danger of any serious disaster was much diminished by this use of the telegraphic wires. To adopt a homely proverb, he would not let the hand be stretched out farther than the arm could bring it back. But the most important questions in considering the danger and merit of the movements are, how far was the Austrian general prepared to meet them, and what knowledge had the Prussian generals of their enemy's positions? It has been shown that the best situation for the Austrian general would be to have the enemy advancing on him at unequal distances, to keep the one farthest off in check, and to throw himself on the other and crush it before it could receive assistance; and an additional element of success would be, that he should be able to advance on the army nearest him without throwing open his communications to the other.

On July 1 the Crown Prince issued a general order from Prausnitz, in which the brief events of this famous campaign are heralded forth, but without arrogance or vain boasting. "But a few days," he said, "have elapsed since our entering Bohemia, and already brilliant victories have been won, giving us command over the Elbe, and enabling us to effect a junction with the first army. With this our primary task is fulfilled. The brave fifth corps d'armée, under the command of its heroic leader, with distinguished gallantry, on three successive days defeated three different corps of the enemy. The guards gave battle twice, each time discomfiting the enemy with signal triumph. The first corps d'armée, under the most trying circumstances, displayed extraordinary hardihood. Five colours, two standards, twenty guns, and 8000 prisoners, have been captured by us, added to which are many thousand dead and wounded, proving the total loss of the foe to be greater than can now be calculated. We, too, regret the loss of many a brave comrade, removed by death or wounds from our ranks. The consciousness of dying for king and country, and as victors, will have given them comfort in death, and will tend to alleviate the anguish of the sufferers. I pray God to grant future victories to our arms. I thank the generals and officers, as well as soldiers, of the second army, for their gallantry in battle and their steadiness in overcoming the most adverse circumstances, and I am proud to lead such troops."

As before observed, Benedek had taken up his position, on July 1, fronting the Elbe, between Königinhof and Josephstadt; but Count Clam Gallas having attacked the Prussians contrary to orders, was driven out of his position, pursued by the victorious Prussians through the town of Gitschin, and followed the next day by their cavalry to the river Bistritz. The consequence was that General Benedek's left flank at Dubenec was exposed, and he was compelled to order his army to retire in the direction of Königgrätz. In the words of "a special correspondent," Benedek, who had taken up a strong position, with his centre near Dubenec, his left towards Miletin, and his right covered by the river and by Josephstadt, found himself in the twinkling of an eye placed in a position of the greatest danger; his left was "in the air." The Prussians were not only on his left, but in his rear; and at the same time another great army was marching to effect its junction with them in a direction where he was altogether exposed. He instantly wheeled back his left and centre, and then retiring his right, took up a line at Königgrätz at right angles to the line he had occupied to the west of Josephstadt.

Fully aware of the dangers to which his new position exposed him, Benedek seems to have questioned the *morale* of his troops; for prior to the impending battle he sent a telegram to the emperor at Vienna, bearing the foreboding words, "Sire, you must make peace."

The arrival of the king of Prussia, on the 2nd July, at Gitschin, had a twofold effect, inspiriting his already elated troops, who, flushed with conquest, were prepared to triumph over all impediments. It also had a salutary influence over the tributary states through which his legions had marched. The authorities of Gitschin drew up a petition and laid it before him, when his Majesty thus addressed them:—"I carry on no war against your nation, but only against the armies opposed to me. If, however, the inhabitants will commit acts of hostility against my troops without any cause, I shall be forced to make reprisals. My troops are not savage hordes, and require simply the supplies necessary for subsistence. It must be your care to give them no cause for just complaint. Tell the inhabitants that I have not come to make war upon peaceable citizens, but to defend the honour of Prussia against insult."

On July 2 the disposition of the combined armies of Prussia was as follows:—The first

army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, formed the centre; the Elbe army, commanded by General Herwarth, the right; and the second army, commanded by the Crown Prince, the left wing. The seventh division marched in front of the first army, through Göritz, Czerkwitz, and Sadowa, to effect a junction with the Crown Prince's right wing. The eighth division marched upon Milowitz, its destination being Königgrätz. The second army was to base its operations upon Donalitz, south of Sadowa. The third army corps formed the centre reserve force. The Elbe army advanced from Smidar towards Nechanitz. The Crown Prince's army was directed from Königinhof, in a direct line, upon Königgrätz.

The Austrian army was extended on a range of small hills between Smiritz and Nechanitz, and ranged over an extent of about nine miles; the position of the centre was on a hill, on which is situate the village of Klum, which formed the key of the manœuvres; the site was, moreover, distinguished by a group of trees.

The scene of the memorable battle fought here has been well described by one who had the advantage of being an eye-witness of the conflict with the army of Austria, and who obtained a complete prospect of the scene from the top of a tower in the stronghold of Königgrätz.

Lying nearly north of Königgrätz, says this writer, is Josephstadt; but there was nothing going on in that direction at eight o'clock. From the neighbourhood of Josephstadt a continuous line of low undulating hills, with plateau-like tops, or of rolling fields, extends from the right till it slopes away on the left into the meadows watered by the Elbe. Beyond this line, again, and running nearly parallel with the first, about half way where it recedes towards the west and north, is a similar ridge, appearing to be of greater elevation. Further back is still the picturesque broken country, formed by the projecting spurs and lower ranges of the Riesengebirge. This must be taken as a general description of the appearance of the landscape from the spot where I stood. There are many cross valleys permeating both ridges towards the Elbe, and on both there are hills or hillocks, some almost like tumuli, on which villages and their little churches nestle in the woods. In the valley between the first and second ridge runs the Bistritz rivulet, on which Sadowa and Nechanitz are situated. It is traversed nearly at right angles by the main road from Jicin to Königgrätz. In the valley between the first ridge and the rolling ground which lies towards the Elbe runs a road from Smiritz, or Smiric, to Königgrätz, coming out on the Jicin road; and more to the west is another road, branching from the Jicin road, and running by Nechanitz to the main road between Prague and Königgrätz. There are numerous other small roads, connecting the nests of villages which are to be seen in all directions. Immediately below the city of Königgrätz the land is level and marshy; but towards Smiritz, which is nearly halfway to Josephstadt, there is a projecting spur approaching the river, which is one outshoot of the first line of hills, and thence in front of us from left to right a gradual elevation from the river takes place, in a series of irregular terraces. On the top of this first ridge there is the village named Smiritz. This is near the right of the scene of the battle. Then the ridge runs southwestward (to the left) without any more remarkable object on the sky-line than a very large tree, which stands quite alone. There are several villages on the inner side of the slope between Königgrätz and the river. From the big tree the line continues to the left hand till about the centre, where its undulating contour is broken by a wooded knoll or hill, rising rather steeply, on which is placed the church and village of Klum, or Chlum, embowered in thick trees and gardens. Thence to the left the line of the ridges is depressed and carried towards the village of Nechanitz, and gets lost in broken hills, among which are, or rather were, villages unknown to our geographers; now heaps of cinders and ashes, surrounded by dead and dying, for these were the very centres of the tremendous battle. The army with which General Benedek had to defend his position consisted of at least 225,000 men; but a large deduction must be made for the baggage guards, the various escorts, the garrisons of Josephstadt and Königgrätz, the sick and those tired by marching, and the killed, wounded, and prisoners in recent actions; so that probably he had not more than 190,000, or 195,000, actually in hand. The ground he had to cover from right to left was about nine miles in length. On his extreme left in his first line, near the rear of Nechanitz and towards the Prague road, he put the Saxons; the tenth army corps, under Field-marshal Lieutenant Gablenz; the third corps d'armée,

under Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Thun; the fourth army corps, under Field-marshal Lieutenant Count Festetics (who was wounded early in the day); and the second army corps, under Field-marshal Lieutenant Archduke Ernest—were placed from left to right on the slope on the second range or ridge. His second line and his reserves consisted of the eighth corps d'armée, under Field-marshal Lieutenant the Archduke Leopold; the first army corps was under Cavalry-general Count Clam Gallas, and the sixth army corps under Field-marshal Lieutenant Ramming. He had at his disposal a grand army of cavalry, composed of the first light cavalry division, under General-major Edelsheim; the second light cavalry division, under Count Taxis; the first heavy cavalry division, under the prince of Holstein; the second heavy cavalry division, under General-major Faitseck; and the third heavy cavalry division, under General-major Count Coudenhove. His artillery consisted of about 540 guns.

The Prussian cavalry and horse-artillery were preparing early in the morning of the 3rd of July to commence the attack, and by seven o'clock they commenced their advance down the declivity towards the Bistritz. Here the guns of the Austrians commenced playing upon them, from a battery near the village of Sadowa, at a point where the main road crosses the little river. The seventh division of Prussian artillery bombarded the Austrian right, directing their fire to the village of Benatek, and from the centre of both lines a fearful cannonade was commenced, and equally sustained; neither side appearing to give way. A writer who witnessed the battle from the Prussian side, says:—

While the cannonade had been going on, some of the infantry had been moved down towards the river, where they took shelter from the fire under a convenient undulation of ground. The eighth division came down on the left-hand side of the causeway, and under the cover of the rising ground formed its columns for an attack on the village of Sadowa; while the third and fourth division, on the right-hand side of the road, prepared to storm Dohilnitz and Mokrowens. A short time before their preparations were complete, the village of Benatek, on the Austrian right, caught fire, and the seventh Prussian division made a dash to secure it. The Austrians, however, were not driven out by the flames, and here for the first time in the battle was there hand-to-hand fighting. The twenty-seventh regiment led the attack, and rushed into the orchards of the village, where the burning houses having separated the combatants, they poured volley after volley at each other through the flames, until the Prussians found means to get round the burning houses, and taking the defenders in the reverse, forced them to retire with the loss of many prisoners.

It was ten o'clock when Prince Frederick Charles sent General Stuhnapl to order the attack on Sadowa, Dohilnitz, and Mokrowens. The columns advanced covered by skirmishers, and reached the river bank without much loss; but from thence they had to fight every inch of their way. The Austrian infantry held the bridges and villages in force, and fired fast upon their enemies as they approached. The Prussians could advance but slowly along the narrow ways and against the defences of the houses; and the volleys sweeping through their ranks seemed to mow the soldiers down. The Prussians fired much more quickly than their opponents, but they could not see to take their aim; the houses, trees, and smoke from the Austrian discharges shrouding the villages in obscurity. Sheltered by this, the Austrian jägers fired blindly at the places where they could tell by hearing that the attacking columns were, and the shots told tremendously on the Prussians in their close formation. The latter, however, improved their positions, although slowly, and by dint of sheer courage and perseverance; for they lost men at every yard of their advance, and in some places almost paved the way with wounded. To help their infantry, the Prussian artillery turned its fire, regardless of the enemy's batteries, on the villages, and made tremendous havoc among the houses. Mokrowens and Dohilnitz both caught fire, and the shells fell quickly and with fearful effect among the defenders of the flaming hamlets. The Austrian guns on their side also played upon the attacking infantry, but at this time these were sheltered from the fire by the intervening houses and trees.

In and around the villages the fighting continued for nearly an hour, until the Austrian infantry, driven out by a rush of the Prussians, retired, but only a short way up the slope into a line with their batteries. One wood above Sadowa was strongly held, and another stood between Sadowa and Benatek, teeming with riflemen, to bar the

way of the seventh division. But General Fransky, who commanded this division, was not to be easily stopped. He sent his infantry at the wood, and turned his artillery on the Austrian batteries. The assailants, firing into the trees, found they could not make any impression, for the defenders were concealed, and musketry fire was useless against them. Then Fransky letting them go, they dashed in with the bayonet. The Austrians waited for the onslaught, and in the wood above Benatek was fought out one of the fiercest combats known in that war. The twenty-seventh Prussian regiment went in nearly 3000 strong, with 90 officers, and came out on the further side with only 2 officers and between 300 and 400 men standing; all the rest were killed or wounded. The other regiments of the division also suffered much, though not in the same proportion; but the wood was carried. The Austrian line being now driven in on both flanks, its commander formed a new line of battle a little higher up the hill, round Lipa, still holding the wood which lies above Sadowa.

General Herwarth, the commander of the Prussian army of the Elbe, on the left of the Austrians, was also engaged in an attack on the Saxon troops at the village of Nechanitz, situate on the Bistritz, seven miles from Sadowa. The Saxons fought bravely, but were at length driven back slowly and with great difficulty towards Lipa, contesting every inch of the ground with great tenacity. The Austrians had placed artillery in a wood above the villages of Sadowa and Dohilnitz, which being fired through the trees occasioned considerable losses in the ranks of the Prussian infantry, now making a rapid advance to carry the wood. After a vigorous attack the Austrians were driven back; but at once forming their batteries beyond the trees, their fire told terribly on the Prussians, who were advancing in the wood.

The whole battle line of the Prussians was unable to gain more ground, being obliged to fight hard to retain the position it had won. At one time it seemed as if they would lose that. Some of their guns had been dismounted by the Austrian fire; in the wooded ground the needle gun had not a good field for the display of its superiority, and the infantry fighting was very equal.

Herwarth, too, seemed checked upon the right; the smoke of his musketry and artillery, which had hitherto been pushing forward steadily, stood still for a time. Fransky's men, cut to pieces, could not be sent forward to attack the Sadowa wood, for they would have exposed themselves to be attacked in the rear by the artillery on the right of the Austrian line formed in front of Lipa. All the artillery was engaged except eight batteries, and these had to be retained in case of a reverse; for at one time the firing in the Sadowa wood, and of the Prussian artillery on the slope, seemed almost as if drawing back towards Bistritz. The first army was certainly checked in its advance, if not actually being pushed back.

It was an eminently critical moment, and the Prussian generals were waiting in trepidation for tidings of the Crown Prince, who was to attack the Austrians on the right. This incident recalls that of Napoleon on the field of Waterloo, anxiously awaiting the approach of Grouchy, but with better results for the Prussians than for the French. The Austrian centre was retained by the third and fourth corps in front of Klum and Lipa, constrained to make a backward movement with the first corps in reserve, as was also the sixth corps, on the right facing Smiralitz. The army of the Crown Prince came up at about half past one o'clock in the afternoon, and attacked the right flank of the Austrians. The village of Klum had caught fire, and the troops of the Prussian centre were making desperate efforts to drive the Austrians out of it, when the latter suddenly found their right exposed to a withering cross fire from the advancing army of the Crown Prince. The Austrian army was now in a critical position. The observer who was watching the action from the top of the tower in Königgrätz says, "Suddenly a sputtering of musketry breaks out of the trees and houses of Klum right down on the Austrian gunners, and on the columns of infantry drawn up on the slopes below. The gunners fall on all sides, their horses are disabled, the firing increases in intensity, the Prussians press on over the plateau. This is an awful catastrophe; two columns of Austrians are led against the village, but they cannot stand the fire, and after three attempts to carry it, retreat, leaving the hillside covered with the fallen. It is a terrible moment. The Prussians see their advantage, and enter at once into the very centre of the position. In vain the Austrian staff officers fly to the reserves, and hasten to call back some of the artillery from the front. The dark blue regiments multiply on all sides, and from their edges roll perpetually spark-

ling musketry. Their guns hurry up, and from the slope take both the Austrian main body on the extreme right, and the reserves in flank. They spread away to the woods near the Prague road, and fire into the rear of the Austrian gunners. . . The lines of dark blue which came in sight from the right teemed from the vales below, as if the earth yielded them. They filled the whole background of the awful picture, of which Klum was the centre. They pressed down on the left of the Prague road. In square, in column, deployed, or wheeling hither and thither, everywhere pouring in showers of deadly precision, penetrating the whole line of the Austrians, still they could not force their stubborn enemy to fly. On all sides they met brave but unfortunate men, ready to die if they could do no more. At the side of the Prague road the fight went on with incredible vehemence. The Austrians had still an immense force of artillery, and although its concentrated fire swept the ground before it, its effect was lost in some degree by reason of the rising ground above, and at last by its divergence to so many points, to answer the enemy's cannon. . . Cheste and Visa were now burning, so that from right to left the flames of ten villages and the flashes of guns and musketry contended with the sun that pierced the clouds, for the honour of illuminating the seas of steel, and the fields of carnage. It was three o'clock. The efforts of the Austrians to occupy Klum, and free their centre had failed; their right was driven down in a helpless mass towards Königgrätz, quivering and palpitating, as shot and shell tore through it. *Alles ist verloren!* "All is lost!" Artillery still thundered with a force and violence which might have led a stranger to such scenes to think no enemy could withstand it. The Austrian cavalry, however, hung like white thunder clouds on the flanks, and threatened the front of the Prussians, keeping them in square and solid columns. But already the trains were streaming away from Königgrätz, placing the Elbe and Adler between them and the enemy.

General von Gablenz, a brief while after this terrible defeat, was despatched from the Austrian centre to the Prussian head-quarters, to solicit an armistice; but his proposal was at once rejected, as the entire ranks of Prussia were preparing to advance. Prince Frederick Charles directed his army for the road leading to Brünn, the capital of Moravia, the army of the Crown Prince took the course to Olmütz, and the army of the Elbe, under General Herwarth, proceeded to advance westward toward Iglau.

The extreme importance of this battle, whether viewed in a political or military light, will be more strikingly apparent as time goes on. Variously named Königgrätz and Sadowa, the conflict has been the theme of much military criticism. One anonymous writer says, "The Austrians should have been victors here, if positions could win a battle, for better positions they could hardly have had. Their line extended over nine miles, and was throughout one stretch of high ground; while the Prussians advanced through a country rather unfavourable — through woods and villages that afforded cover here and there. Benedek had offered battle at Debenec, but the Prussians having the option in their hands, declined the conflict. This new position left them no choice, and they boldly accepted the gage, though defeat would have been annihilation. They had taken the measure of the Austrian commander; they knew their own strength, and they made their dispositions with a view to victory, not to provide for a retreat. Their line extended from Jicin to Skalitz. but it was of such length that the two divisions were practically distinct armies, and for some hours were without communication. The centre of the Austrian line was Klum, the head-quarters were at Königgrätz, a city at the junction of the Elbe and Adler, strongly fortified, and surrounded by well-filled moats, while a certain area round was inundated by the river. The Austrian line covered the railway station; and while its left was guarded by the fortress of Josephstadt, Königgrätz protected the right. Their force was about 200,000, and that of the Prussians 260,000, a numerical superiority greatly enhanced by the Prussian arm, the needle gun. The battle commenced about eight in the morning; the Austrians having the advantage till about two o'clock, when a fatal oversight gave the victory to the Prussians. The whole line was engaged by ten o'clock, though the division of the Crown Prince had not come up, as it was to approach the field by a detour, so as to fall on the Austrian line at Lipa. The Prussians attacked with superior numbers, yet the Austrians faced the needle-gun without availing themselves of the cover afforded by their position, and again and again drove the enemy back. In like manner the Austrian artillery

did yeoman's service in these onslaughts; but from being too closely packed the eight-pounder field-pieces, which are very effective and very well served, did not produce the impression which they are capable of making. On the other hand, the Prussian needle-gun was very efficient, killing at close quarters, and disabling where it did not kill, though owing to the smallness of the ball the wounds were of a character easily cured. The Austrian column bore steadily down through volleys of shot, and through flaming villages, and everywhere beat back the advancing Prussians, who at eleven o'clock were flung panting on the slopes of the opposite hills.

"The Prussians then called in their reserves, and, urged on by their officers, made a furious rush on the Austrian left and centre, at the same time dashing round the Prague road, with the intention of turning the left. They were met with equal ardour, and a desperate conflict ensued, when the Prussians gave way, and were driven further back than before. There was a momentary pause in the struggle. The smoke gathered thick, and hid the armies from each other; then cleared to show the Prussians again reinforced, and once more in battle array. The next assault shook the wearied Austrians; but they yielded no ground, and after a murderous conflict the Prussians recoiled. Here both sides brought up their artillery, and the smoke again favoured the Prussians, who bore down on the Austrian right with irresistible force. The Austrians, victorious on the left and centre, were pushing their advantage, when the success of the Prussians on their right threatened to sever them from Königgrätz. At this juncture the Prussians were joined by their second army, under the Crown Prince, who advanced on the very point the Austrians had left open. The gap seems to have reminded the Prussian commander of Ney's project at Waterloo, where the French general, deluded by the ground, thought the English centre unguarded, and rushed to destruction. Nor was the centre at Sadowa really unwatched. The Austrian commander could have confronted the Prussian battalions with 20,000 of the finest cavalry in Europe, cavalry which had already saved his army, and might now have given it the victory. But this supreme moment found the general at the end of his resources, hesitating and bewildered. With the battle won on the left, and in his own hands on the right, he allowed the enemy to reach his centre—to pierce the heart of his army, and thus lost the day. The Austrians retreated hurriedly, but not in disorder, and the cavalry, which might have secured the victory, kept the victors at a respectful distance. Benedek was still at the head of an army, though he left a third of it on the field, or in the hands of the enemy, and his abandoned guns were enough to equip another army for a campaign."

Captain Webber, R.E., who visited the scene of carnage, says:—"On the tenure of the woods and villages depended the success of the Austrians in the battle on the west front. The former appears to have been retained long after the latter had been evacuated. The villages were not placed in a proper state of defence, the entrances not having been even closed. Abattis were insufficiently used, and the strong stone buildings, which were quite capable of resisting field artillery, not loopholed. As some portion of the Austrian army was at Sadowa two days before the battle this would have been practicable. The defences of Chlum were incomplete, the north and north-west only being touched. The Crown Prince attacked it on the north-east side. Breastworks without abattis may be useful to cover a handful of determined men, but advancing troops will run over them. If possible, the one kind of defence should never be used without the other."

The battle, indeed, was a great victory for the Prussians, though its full advantages were not known by them until the following day. One hundred and seventy-four guns, twenty thousand prisoners, and eleven standards, fell into the hands of the conquerors. The total loss of the Austrian army was nearly 40,000 men, while that of the Prussians was not 10,000. The *morale* of the Austrian army was destroyed, and their infantry found that in open column they could not stand against the better-armed Prussians. The Austrians had hoped to be able to close with the bayonet, and so neutralize the effects of the needle-gun; but the idea of superiority in the use of the bayonet, in which the Austrian army prided itself, is one of those vanities which are common to every nation; and this was proved, that at close quarters the stronger men of Prussia invariably overcame the lighter and smaller Austrians. The number of cartridges fired by the Prussian army in the battle barely exceeded one per man on the ground. Hardly any soldier fired so many as ninety, and

few more than sixty. The average number of rounds fired by the artillery of Prince Frederick Charles' army was forty-two per gun, and no gun of that army fired more than eighty rounds. Excellent as was the Prussian artillery it would not have won the battle without brave men to guide and follow it. The quality of the Prussian troops may be illustrated by one anecdote. On the evening of the battle an officer of the Ziethen hussars, who were forward in the pursuit, rode alone as far as the gates of Königgrätz, and finding there was no sentry outside, rode in. The guard, immediately on seeing him in his Prussian uniform, turned out and seized him, when, with admirable presence of mind, he declared he had come to demand the capitulation of the fortress. He was conducted to the commandant, and made the same demand to him, adding that the town would be bombarded if not surrendered within an hour; the commandant, unconscious that he was not dealing with a legitimate messenger, courteously refused to capitulate; but the hussar was conducted out of the town, passed through the guard at the entrance, and got off safely to his troop. The vigilance of the Austrians was often at fault. From the high bank above Königinhof, a staff-officer, lying hidden in the fir-wood, could almost with the naked eye have counted every Prussian gun, every Prussian soldier that the Crown Prince moved towards Miletin. Yet the arrival of the second Prussian army on the scene of action seems to have been a complete surprise. The eyes of the Austrian army failed on more than one occasion during the campaign. The inferiority of their patrol system to that of the Prussians seems to have been due to the want of military education among the officers to whom patrols were intrusted. In the Prussian army special officers of high intelligence were always chosen to reconnoitre—properly so, for the task is no easy one. An eye unskilled, or a mind untutored, can see little, when a tried observer detects important movements. The Prussian system never failed, never allowed a surprise. The Austrians were repeatedly surprised, and taken unprepared.

The telegram in which Benedek first announced to Vienna the loss of the battle, stated that some of the enemy's troops, under cover of the mist, established themselves on his flank, and so caused the defeat. How the Prussian guards were allowed to get into Chlum appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum church tower the whole country can be clearly seen as far as the top of the high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally supposed, could have easily seen any movement of the troops as far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite distinctly Herwarth's attack at Hradek, and, except during occasional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surrounding country except where the configuration of the ground or the heavy smoke overcame the sight. The top of Chlum church spire generally stood out clear over the heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill from Benatek to Nechanitz. So little apprehensive, however, was Benedek of an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower; and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any view towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and houses of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of the advance of the guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes, and passed through Maslowed. From that village, without opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line, apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlum and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps, to whom the defence of the ground between Maslowed and Nedelitz was intrusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Fransky in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing forwards towards Benatek, quitted their proper ground. A short time afterwards the second Austrian corps was defeated by the Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards the bridge at Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retreat of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, through which the Prussian guards marched unmolested, and without a shot seized the key of the position. Once installed they could not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the Austrians. The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed, for the men were fatigued, night was coming on, and the Prussian cavalry of the first army had suffered severely. The Austrian cavalry was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Elbe lay between the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The victory, although fortuitously decisive, was not improved to such advantage as it ought to have been.

Before proceeding to review the events which,

in the meantime, were taking place in the western theatre of war, it is requisite to cast a glance upon the operations of the two Prussian corps which had been left to guard the province of Silesia. On the concentration of the Austrian army in Bohemia, a corps of 6000 men, under General Trentinaglia, had been left at Cracow. Two Prussian independent corps had been stationed at Ratibor and Nicolai, to shield south-eastern Silesia against a probable attack from this corps. The former was commanded by General Knobelsdorf, and consisted of the sixty-second regiment of infantry, the second regiment of Uhlans, a few battalions of landwehr, and one battery. The latter, under General Count Stolberg, was formed of landwehr alone, and mustered six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of jägers, and one battery. The corps of Knobelsdorf was to defend the Moravian frontier, that of Stolberg the Galician; and both, in case of attack by overwhelming numbers, were to fall back under the protection of the fortress of Kosel. On the 21st June, Stolberg's corps obtained its first important although bloodless success. On that day it marched rapidly, many of the men being conveyed in waggons, to Pruchna, blew up the railway viaduct there, and so destroyed the communication between General Trentinaglia and the main Austrian army.

On the 24th and 26th June, as well as on the intermediate days, several parties of Austrians made demonstrations of crossing the frontier near Oswiecin, and large bodies of troops appeared to be in the act of concentration at that place. General Stolberg determined to assure himself of the actual strength of the enemy there, by a reconnaissance in force. To aid this, General Knobelsdorf sent a part of his troops to Myslowitz, to cover the rear of Stolberg's corps, while it marched on Oswiecin. Stolberg, finding in the latter place a considerable force of the enemy, seized the buildings of the railway station, placed them hastily in a state of defence, and determined by a long halt here to force the Austrians to develop their full force. After he had achieved this object, he retired to his position near Nicolai. The detachment at Myslowitz had, at the same time, to sustain an action there, and fulfilled completely its purpose of holding the enemy back from Oswiecin.

On the 30th June, Stolberg's detachment was so weakened by the withdrawal of his landwehr battalions, which were called up in order to aid in the formation of a fourth battalion to every regiment, that it could no longer hold its own against the superior Austrian force near Myslowitz. It retired accordingly nearer to Ratibor in the direction of Plesz, and from this place undertook, in connection with General Knobelsdorf, expeditions into Moravia against Teschen, Biala, and Skotschau, annoying the Austrians considerably, and making the inhabitants of Moravia regard the war with aversion.

CAMPAIGN IN HANOVER.

We turn now to the operations in the western theatre of the German war. The Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel occupied on the 19th June the following positions:—The divisions of General Goeben and General Manteuffel were in the town of Hanover, and that of General Beyer in Cassel. Of the allies of Austria the Hanoverian army was at Göttingen, the Bavarian in the neighbourhood of Würzburg and Bamberg; the eighth federal corps in the vicinity of Frankfort. The latter consisted of the troops of Würtemburg, Baden, Hesse Darmstadt, Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel, to which was added an Austrian division. The soldiers of the (Hanoverian) reserve, and those who had been absent on furlough, nobly responded to the call of their king, and made their way through the country, which was in Prussian possession, and sometimes even through the lines of the enemy, to join the ranks at Göttingen. By their firm determination to reach their regiments, they afforded an earnest of the gallantry and courage which they afterwards displayed upon the field of battle. On the arrival of these men the army at Göttingen mustered about 20,000 combatants, with fifty guns.

Southern Germany expected great deeds of the Bavarian army. It might have thrown serious difficulties in the way of the Prussian successes, had not uncertainty and vacillation pervaded all its operations. Prince Charles of Bavaria, the commander-in-chief, under whose orders the eighth federal corps was also afterwards placed, seems to have conducted his campaign without a definite strategical object, and without energy in its prosecution. Against him, in command of the Prussian army of the Maine, was a general gifted with prudence and clear foresight, who pursued his aim with iron rigour. The Bavarian is a smart soldier in time of peace, and conducts himself well in battle;

but he is too much dependent upon good diet, the want of which grievously maims his capacity for undergoing the fatigues of war. Nor do the ranks of Bavaria contain such intelligence as do those of Prussia; for men drawn for military service are allowed to provide substitutes, so that only the poorer and less educated classes of society furnish recruits for the army. The troops had no knowledge of the causes for which they were to shed their blood, and in this respect contrasted with the Prussian soldiery, which held that the honour, integrity, even the existence of their Fatherland, was in jeopardy. The reader will remember the anecdote current during the recent Rhine campaign, of the Bavarian soldier, who, addressing the Crown Prince of Prussia after a victory, exclaimed:—"Ah! your royal highness, if you had been our commander in the last war, we should have beaten those pestilent Prussians." The Federal troops did not fail in bravery; but no enthusiasm thrilled through their ranks. Individual bodies were doubtless animated by high courage, and in many cases displayed a heroic devotion to their leaders and their princes. But the mass did not work evenly; a want of harmony existed among its heterogeneous units, which, together with the clouded plans of the federal chiefs, facilitated the task of the Prussian general, Von Falckenstein. There was also dissension in the federal councils. Prince Alexander not only habitually disagreed with his superior, Prince Charles, but was often engaged in petty squabbles with the lieutenants who commanded the different contingents. All these things conduced to the catastrophe of the Hanoverian army, which marched from its capital almost totally unprepared to undertake a campaign. It stood in dire need of several days' rest to allow time for the formation of a transport train, as well as for the clothing and armament of the soldiers of reserve who had been recalled to the ranks, and also for the horsing of part of the artillery. It was forced on this account to halt until the 20th June at Göttingen, and the favourable moment for an unmolested march to unite with the troops of Bavaria was allowed to slip away. The Prussian staff took most prompt measures to cut off the Hanoverian retreat, and to occupy the principal points on their line of march with troops. The duke of Coburg had declared openly and decidedly on the side of Prussia, and his troops were in consequence at the service of the Prussian government. On the 20th June Colonel von Fabeck, the commandant of the Coburg contingent, received a telegraphic order from Berlin to post himself with his two battalions at Eisenach, where it was expected the Hanoverians would first attempt to break through. Three battalions of landwehr, one squadron of landwehr cavalry, and a battery of four guns, were sent from the garrison to reinforce him. A battalion of the fourth regiment of the Prussian guard, which had reached Leipzig on the 19th, was also despatched to his aid, a detachment of which, on the 20th, rendered the railway tunnel near Eisenach impassable. By these movements the king of Hanover was compelled to give up the idea of uniting with the Bavarians, and instead of marching from Heiligenstadt by Eschewege and Fulda, he, on the 21st, ordered his whole army to move upon Gotha, and crossed the Prussian frontier with his troops. He took leave of his people in a proclamation, in which he mournfully expressed his hope soon to return victorious at the head of his army, to the land which he was then temporarily forced to quit.

The Hanoverian army reached Langensalza on the 24th of June. The force opposed to the Hanoverians consisted only of six weak battalions, two squadrons, and four guns. There can hardly be any question but that, if the king of Hanover had marched rapidly on Gotha that day, Colonel von Fabeck would have been quite unable to hold his position. But the Hanoverian leaders failed to take advantage of this last opportunity. The king rejected a proposal made by Colonel von Fabeck, that his army should capitulate; but he applied to the duke of Coburg, and asked him to act as a mediator with the Prussian government. An armistice was agreed upon, but upon some misunderstanding was quickly violated on the night of the 24th by the Hanoverians, who advanced to the Gotha and Eisenach Railway, and broke up the line near Frötestadt. General von Alvensleben then sent a proposal from Gotha to the king of Hanover, that he should capitulate. To this no answer was returned; but the king expressed a wish that General von Alvensleben should repair to his camp, in order to treat with him. His wish was complied with early on the 25th, when an extension of the armistice was agreed upon, and General von Alvensleben hurried back to Berlin for further instructions. It was not at this time the interest of the Prussians to push matters to extremities. The Hanoverians seem to have been

ignorant of how small a body alone barred the way to Bavaria, and to have hoped that time might be afforded for aid to reach them. On the night of the 24th a messenger was sent to the Bavarian head-quarters to report the situation of the Hanoverian army, and to solicit speedy assistance. To this request Prince Charles only replied that an army of 19,000 men ought to be able to cut its way through. In consequence of this opinion only one Bavarian brigade of light cavalry was advanced on the 25th of June to Meiningen, in the valley of the Werra, while a few Bavarian detachments were pushed along the high road as far as Vacha. This procedure of Prince Charles of Bavaria was alone sufficient to condemn him as a general; he held his army inactive, when, by a bold advance, not only could he have insured the safety of the Hanoverians, but could in all probability have captured the whole of the enemy's troops at Gotha. Thus he would have saved 19,000 allies, have captured 6000 of his adversary's men, have turned the scale of war by 25,000 combatants, and have preserved to his own cause a skilled and highly-trained army, proud of its ancient military reputation, and only placed in this most precarious and unfortunate position by the faults of politicians.

On the 25th the Prussians were closing in upon the devoted Hanoverians: but telegraphic orders were forwarded from Berlin to all their commanders, not to engage in hostilities until ten o'clock on the morning of the 26th. Colonel von Döring was despatched to Langensalza by the Prussian government, with full powers to treat with the king of Hanover; he proposed an alliance with Prussia, on the basis of the recognition of the Prussian project for reform of the Germanic Confederation, and of the disbandment by Hanover of its army. To these terms King George would not agree; though deserted by his allies, to them he was still faithful, and still expected that the Bavarians must come to his aid.

By the morning of the 26th 42,000 Prussians were placed on the south, west, and north of this devoted army, within a day's march of its position, and all hopes of escape into Bavaria, or of aid from its southern allies, appeared to be vain. On the 26th the armistice expired at ten o'clock in the morning, but the Prussian commander-in-chief did not immediately commence hostilities. His dispositions were not yet perfected. The Hanoverian army drew more closely together, either with the object of accepting battle, or as some say, with the intention of moving by Tennstadt, and endeavouring to join the Bavarians by a circuitous route. In the evening the Hanoverians took up a position between the villages of Thämsbrück, Merxleben, and the town of Langensalza. None of these places were well suited for defence, and no artificial fortifications were thrown up on the southern side of the position, where General Flies lay. On the northern side a few insignificant earthworks and one battery were erected, to guard the rear and right flank of the army against the Prussian corps under General Manteuffel, which lay in the direction of Mühlhausen. The soldiers were weary with marching and privations, but eager to join battle with the Prussians, who of late years had spoken in a disparaging and patronizing tone of the Hanoverian army. The 27th of June had been appointed by royal command to be observed as a solemn day of fast and humiliation throughout Prussia, and the Hanoverian leaders appear to have imagined that on this account the Prussian generals would not attack. In this they were deceived, for before evening there had been fought the bloody battle of Langensalza.

The position occupied by the Hanoverian army on the morning of the 27th, lay along the sloping side of the line of hills which rises from the left bank of the river Unstrut. The right wing and centre rested on the villages of Thämsbrück and Merxleben, the left wing between the villages of Nägelstadt and Merxleben. The third brigade (Von Bülow) formed the right wing, the fourth brigade (Von Bothmer) the left, while in the centre was posted the first brigade (Von der Knesebeck), which at the beginning of the action was held in rear of the general line. The village of Merxleben, and the ground in front of it, was occupied by the second brigade (De Vaux), which had its outposts pushed as far as Henningsleben, along the road to Warza. The artillery and cavalry of the reserve were posted behind Merxleben, near the road to Lundhausen, where the scanty depots of ammunition and stores were established. The front of the position was covered by the river, which with its steep banks impeded at first the Prussian attack, but afterwards was an obstacle to the offensive advance and counter-attack of the Hanoverians.

At about one o'clock on the morning of the

27th, the two Coburg battalions, which formed the advanced guard of General Flies' column, reached Henningsleben, and attacked the Hanoverian outposts there. These withdrew to Langensalza, occasionally checking their pursuers by the fire of their skirmishers. One Hanoverian battalion remained for a short time in Langensalza; but then the whole Hanoverian troops, which had been pushed along the Gotha road, withdrew across the Unstrut to Merxleben, and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before ten o'clock. General Flies then made his arrangements for an attack on the main Hanoverian position. His artillery was very inferior numerically to that of the enemy, so he relied chiefly on his infanty fire. He sent a small column to make a feint against Thämsbrück, while he advanced two regiments of infantry against Merxleben, and detached a column of landwehr to his right in order to outflank, if possible, and turn the Hanoverian left.

On the Hanoverian side the first gun was fired between ten and eleven, from a battery of rifled six-pounders attached to the second brigade, and posted on the left of Merxleben. The first brigade was immediately pushed forward to the support of the second brigade, and took up its position on the right of that village. By a singular error, the Hanoverians failed to hold a wood and bathing-establishment, close to the river, on the right bank opposite Merxleben. Into these the Prussian regiments threw themselves as they advanced against the village, and sheltered by the cover, they opened a biting musketry fire on the Hanoverian gunners and troops near the village. This fire caused great loss to the Hanoverians, and rendered their subsequent passage of the bridge most difficult and dangerous. The Prussian columns on the right, pressing forward against the Hanoverian left, bore on their line of retreat, and threatened their flank. The Hanoverian leader seizing his opportunity, resolved to attack with vigour the wide-spread Prussian line. At mid-day the first brigade in the centre, with the third brigade on the right wing, advanced from Merxleben, while the fourth brigade on the left moved forward at the same time against the Prussian right. Here, however, the sides of the river were steep, and the time occupied in descending and ascending the banks, and wading through the stream, permitted only one battalion of rifles of this brigade to take a share in the onset. The rest of the troops, however, supported by their artillery, pressed steadily forward, and bore down upon the Prussians, who retreated. Many prisoners were taken, but not without severe loss to the assailants, who soon occupied the wood and bathing establishment beside the river.

The Prussians then drew off from every point, and a favourable opportunity occurred for a vigorous pursuit. But the disadvantage of a river in front of a position now became apparent. The cavalry could not ford the stream, nor approach it closely, on account of the boggy nature of its banks, and had to depend upon the bridges at Thämsbrück, Merxleben, and Nägelstadt. The duke of Cambridge's regiment of dragoons issued from the latter village and dashed forward quickly, but unsupported, against the Prussians, taking several prisoners. As soon as the heavy cavalry of the reserve had threaded its way across the bridge of Merxleben, it also rushed upon the retreating Prussians. Two squares broke before the advancing horsemen, and many prisoners were made, while Captain von Einein, with his squadron of cuirassiers, captnred a Prussian battery. But the Hanoverians suffered fearfully from the deadly rapidity of the needle-gun, and Von Einein fell amidst the cannon he had captured. About five o'clock the pursuit came to an end, and the Hanoverians, masters of the field of battle, posted their outlying pickets on the south of Langensalza. Their total loss in killed and wounded was 1392. The Prussians lost 912 prisoners, and not much less than their enemies in killed and wounded. It is said that the Hanoverian infantry engaged did not number more than 10,000 men, becanse the recruits were sent to the rear, and during the day 1000 men were employed in throwing up earthworks. The Hanoverian cavalry consisted of twenty-four squadrons, of which eighteen certainly took part in the pursuit, mustering at least 1900 sabres. The artillery in action on that side consisted of forty-two guns. The Prussian force numbered about 12,000 combatants, with twenty-two guns. It is extremely questionable how far General Flies was justified under these circumstances in precipitating an action. The battle of Langensalza was of little avail to the gallant army which had won it. The Hanoverians were too intricately involved in the meshes of Falckenstein's strategy. This general on the 28th closed in his divisions, and drew them tightly

round the beleaguered enemy, who, by the action of Langensalza, had repulsed but not cut through their assailants. The division of General Manteuffel, and the brigade of General Wrangel, were pushed into the Hanoverian rear, and took up positions at Alt-Gottern, Rothen, Helligau, and Bollestedt. The division of General Beyer was advanced from Eisenach to Hayna. General Flies was at Warza, and the brigade of General Kummer at Gotha was held ready to move by railway to Weimar, in order to head King George, in case he should march to the eastward on the left bank of the Unstrut. Forty thousand hostile combatants were knitted round the unfortunate monarch and his starving but devoted troops.

When these positions of the Prussians were reported to the king, he determined to avoid a holocaust of his soldiery. An action could hardly have been successful; it must have been desperate. The terms of capitulation which had been formerly proposed by Prussia were agreed to on the evening of the 29th. Arms, carriages, and military stores were handed over to the Prussians: the Hanoverian soldiers were dismissed to their homes: the officers were allowed to retain their horses and their swords, on condition of not again serving against Prussia during the war. The king himself and the crown prince were allowed to depart whither they pleased beyond the boundaries of Hanover. Political errors, and the supineness of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had thus suddenly made a whole army captive, and blotted out from the roll of independent states one of the most renowned of continental principalities. Hanoverians look with a mournful satisfaction on Langensalza, and British soldiers feel a generous pride in the last campaign of an army which mingled its blood with that of their ancestors on the battle-fields of Spain and Belgium.

CAMPAIGN OF THE MAINE.

Opposed to the Prussian army of the Maine stood, after the capitulation of the Hanoverians, the seventh and eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation. The seventh federal corps consisted of the army of Bavaria, which was under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, who was also commander-in-chief of the two corps. The Bavarian army was divided into three divisions, each of which consisted of two brigades. A brigade was formed of two regiments of infantry of the line, each of three battalions; a battalion of light infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. There was also a reserve brigade of infantry, which consisted of five line regiments and two battalions of rifles. The reserve cavalry consisted of six regiments, the reserve artillery of two batteries. The first division was under the command of General Stephan, the second under General Feder, and the third under General Zoller. The infantry of the reserve was commanded by General Hartmann, the cavalry by a prince of the house of Thurn and Taxis. The whole army numbered over 50,000 sabres and bayonets, with 136 guns. The chief of the staff of Prince Charles was General von der Tann, who was a tried commander of division, but failed to meet the necessities of a position even more arduous than that of commander-in-chief. The Bavarian army in the middle of June was posted along the northern frontier of its own kingdom, in positions intended to cover that country from an invasion from the north or east. Its head-quarters were at Bamberg, its extreme right wing at Hof, and its extreme left wing near the confluence of the Franconian Saale with the Maine, between Schweinfurt and Gemünden.

The eighth federal corps, under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse, consisted of the Federal contingents of Würtemburg, Baden, Hesse, and a combined division which included the Austrian auxiliary brigade and the troops of Nassau. The whole corps mustered 49,800 sabres and bayonets, with 134 guns. Prince Alexander assumed the command of this corps on the 18th June, and established his head-quarters at Darmstadt. The elector of Hesse-Cassel had sent his troops to the south as soon as the Prussians invaded his territory. By a decree of the Diet of the 22nd June, they were placed under the orders of the commander of the eighth federal corps. On account of their rapid retreat from Cassel, their preparations for war were incomplete, and little could as yet be expected from them in the open field. The troops of Würtemburg and Baden also still wanted time; those of Baden particularly, for their duchy entered unwillingly into the war against Prussia. Würtemburg had sent an infantry brigade, a regiment of cavalry, and two batteries on the 17th June to Frankfort. These were intended to unite with the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt already assembling there. The next Würtemburg brigade joined the corps only on the 28th June, and the last brigade on the 5th July.

The first Baden brigade reached Frankfort on the 25th June, where the Austrian brigade had arrived only a few days before. The rest of the troops and the transport trains did not come in till the 8th July, so that the 9th July must be considered to have been the earliest day on which the eighth federal corps was ready to take the field. While these minor governments were still assembling their small contingents, the troops of Prussia had entered into possession of Saxony and Hesse, had caused the surrender of the Hanoverian army, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the main forces of Austria.

The Bavarian army lay along the Maine, with its first division towards Hof, and its fourth towards Gemünden. The Bavarian government was anxious to make an advance upon Berlin, by way of Hof; but the general strategical movements of all the allies of Austria were, in virtue of a convention concluded between Austria and Bavaria on the 14th June, directed from Vienna. The directing genius decided against any offensive movements in a north-easterly direction, and insisted strongly on a junction of the Bavarian and eighth federal corps between Würzburg and Frankfort, in order to make a move against the Prussian provinces on the north-west. The aim of Austria was to compel Prussia to detach strong bodies from her troops engaged with Benedek, and so to weaken her main army. In his own immediate command Prince Charles showed vacillation and uncertainty. He did not strive with energy to liberate the Hanoverians, and failed to unite them with his own force. Nor, when he found himself too late to achieve this object, did he take rapid measures for a concentration of his forces with the eighth corps. On the contrary, instead of making towards his left, he drew away to his right, apparently with the object of crossing the difficult country of the Thuringian forest, and placing that obstacle between himself and his allies, whilst he left the valley of the Werra open to his antagonist as a groove, down which to drive the wedge that should separate the Bavarians entirely from Prince Alexander. On the 4th July news came to the head-quarters of this prince, to the effect that strong Prussian columns were moving on Fulda from Hünfeld and Gerze, towns which lie between the Werra and the Fulda. An advance of the eighth corps, with all precautions and in preparation for battle, was ordered for the next day. Meanwhile, however, the Prussian and Bavarian troops had come into contact.

General Falckenstein, after the capitulation of the Hanoverians, had on the 1st July concentrated his three divisions at Eisenach. To this united corps was given the name of the Army of the Maine. On the 2nd July he took the road which leads from Eisenach by Fulda, to Frankfort, and reached Marksahl that day. His intention was to press the Bavarians eastward. These occupied a position at that time with their main body near Meiningen, on the west of the Werra. Two divisions were posted on that river near Schmalkalden, to cover the passage of the stream against a Prussian corps which was expected from Erfurt. The cavalry was intended to open communication with the eighth corps in the direction of Fulda. On the night of the 2nd July, the same night that the troops of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia were moving towards the field of Königgrätz, a Bavarian reconnoitring party fell in with one of Falckenstein's patrols, and on the following day the Prussian reconnoitring officers brought in reports that the Bavarians were in force round Wiesenthal, on the river Felde. It was clear to Falckenstein that this position was held by the heads of the Bavarian columns, which were moving to unite with the eighth corps. The Prussian general could not afford to let the enemy lie in a position so close and threatening, on the left flank of his advance. He ordered General Goeben to push them back on the following morning by forming to his left, and attacking the villages on the Felde in front, while General Manteuffel's division should move up the stream, and assail them on the right flank. The third division, under General Beyer, was in the meantime to push its march towards Fulda.

On the 3rd, the Bavarian general having been informed of the vicinity of the Prussians, concentrated his army, and in the evening occupied the villages of Wiesenthal, Neidhartshausen, Zella, and Diedorf, in considerable strength. His main body bivouacked round Rossdorf, and in rear of that village. At five o'clock in the morning of the 4th July, General Goeben sent Wrangel's brigade against Wiesenthal, and Kummer's against Neidhartshausen. The latter village, as well as the neighbouring heights, were found strongly occupied by the enemy. They were carried only after a long and hard struggle, the scene of which was

marked by the numbers of Prussian killed and wounded. Towards noon the Bavarian detachments which had been driven from Neidhartshausen and Zella received reinforcements. Prince Charles determined to hold Diedorf. He ordered a brigade to advance beyond this village, and take up a position on the hills on the further side. The Prussians opened a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms from Zella upon the advancing Bavarians, who could gain no ground under such a shower of missiles, nor produce any change in the positions of the combatants at this point, until the termination of the action. A severe combat, meanwhile, was being fought at Wiesenthal. When General Kummer left Dermbach, he detached two battalions to his left, with orders to occupy the defile of Lindenau, while Wrangel's brigade advanced against Wiesenthal. Wrangel's advanced guard consisted of a squadron of cavalry and a battalion of infantry, which moved along the road in column of companies. Hardly had it reached the high ground in front of the village, when it was sharply assailed by a well-directed fire of bullets and round shot. Heavy rain prevented the men from seeing clearly what was in their front, but they pressed on, and the enemy was pushed back into the barricaded villages, and up the hills on its southern side. Before the Prussian advanced guard reached Wiesenthal, the rain cleared up, and the Bavarians could be seen hurrying away from the place, in order to take up a position with four battalions, a battery, and several squadrons at the foot of the Nebelsberg. The Prussian battalion from Lindenau had arrived on the south flank of Wiesenthal; another came up with that of the advanced guard, and the Prussians occupied the village. The Prussian artillery also arrived, and came into action with great effect against a Bavarian battery posted on the south-west of Wiesenthal. At the same time the needle-gun told severely on the Bavarian battalions at the foot of the Nebelsberg. Three of these retired into the woods which cover the summit of that hill, while the fourth took post behind the rising ground. Swarms of Prussian skirmishers swept swiftly across the plain in front, and made themselves masters of the edge of the wood; but the Bavarians held fast to the trees inside, and would not be ousted. Two fresh batteries of Bavarian artillery, and several new battalions, were seen hurrying up from Rossdorf. At this moment it was supposed that Manteuffel's cannonade was heard opening in the direction of Nornshausen. It was in truth but the echo of the engaged artillery; but the Prussian columns, animated by the sound, hurried forward, and dashed with the bayonet against the wood-crested hill. The Bavarians awaited the charge, and their riflemen made a serious impression upon the advancing masses, but the men of Westphalia still rushed on. After a short, sharp struggle, the hill was carried; and the Bavarians fled down the reverse slope, leaving hundreds of corpses, grisly sacrifices to the needle-gun, to mark the line of their flight. General Goeben, having achieved his object, halted his troops and prepared to rejoin Falckenstein. Leaving a rear-guard of one battalion, three squadrons, and a battery to cover his movement, and the removal of the killed and wounded, he withdrew his two brigades to Dermbach. The Bavarian march, undertaken for the purpose of uniting with the eighth corps, had been checked, and Falckenstein had lodged his leading columns securely between the separated portions of his adversary's army. The Bavarians in the night, finding their road barred, retired, to seek a junction with Prince Alexander by some other route. They did not, however, move over the western spurs of the Hohe Rhöne, in the direction of Bruckenau, whence they might have stretched a hand to Prince Alexander, who on the night between the 5th and 6th July was only seven miles from Fulda. They preferred moving by the woods on the eastern side of the mountains towards the Franconian Saale and Kissingen. This movement separated them from their allies, instead of bringing the two corps closer together. Prince Alexander had sent an officer to the Bavarian camp, who was present at the action at Wiesenthal, and returned to his head-quarters with a report of the failure of the Bavarians. On the receipt of this intelligence, Prince Alexander appears to have abandoned all hope of effecting a junction with Prince Charles north of the Maine. He faced about and moved back to Frankfort, a town, which, until its subsequent occupation by the Prussians, appears always to have had a singular attraction for the eighth federal corps.

On the same 4th July that General Goeben pressed the Bavarians back at Wiesenthal, the leading division of Falckenstein's army had a singular skirmish in the direction of Hünfeld. As General Beyer, who commanded the Prussian advanced

guard, approached that town, he found two squadrons of Bavarian cavalry in front of him. Two guns accompanying these horsemen opened fire on the Prussians. The weather was wet, and a clammy mist held the smoke of the cannon, so that it hung like a weighty cloud over the mouths of the pieces. A Prussian battery opened in reply. The first shot so surprised the Bavarians, who had not anticipated that there was artillery with the advanced guard, that the cuirassiers turned about and sought safety in a wild flight. They left one of their guns, which in their haste they had not limbered up. Beyer pressed forward, and found Hünfeld evacuated by the enemy. It is said that these cuirassiers, who had been pushed forward by Prince Alexander to open communication with Prince Charles, were so dismayed by one well-aimed cannon shot, that many of them did not draw rein till they reached Würzburg. As Prince Alexander withdrew towards Frankfort, Falckenstein pushed forward. On the 6th he occupied Fulda with Beyer's division, while Goeben and Manteuffel encamped on the north towards Hünfeld, and the object of the Prussian advance was obtained. On the 5th July the Bavarians and the eighth Federal corps were separated from each other by only thirty miles; on the 7th, seventy miles lay between them.

On the 8th General Falckenstein commenced his march from Fulda. He did not turn towards Gelnhausen, as was expected in the Bavarian camp, but moved against the position of Prince Charles, reaching Brückenau on the 9th, when orders were given for a flank march to the left over the Hohe Rhön against the Bavarians on the Saale. Beyer's division moved as the right wing along the road to Hammelburg; Goeben advanced in the centre towards Kissingen; and Manteuffel on the left upon Waldaschach. On the morning of the 10th, at nine o'clock, Beyer's division, which had received very doubtful intelligence of the presence of the Bavarians in Hammelburg, began its march towards that town, and in an hour's time the head of the advanced guard fell in with the first patrols of the enemy's cavalry in front of Unter Erthal, a small village on the road from Brückenau, about two miles south of Hammelburg. The patrols retired on the Prussian advance, but unmasked a rifled battery posted between the houses. A Prussian field battery quickly unlimbered and came into action. Under cover of its fire an infantry regiment made a dash at the bridge by which the road from Brückenau crosses the Thulba stream, which was not seriously defended; and after a short cannonade the Bavarians drew back to Hammelburg. At mid-day three Prussian batteries topped the Hobels Berg, and after a few rounds from them, the infantry rushed down with loud cheers to carry the houses. This was not an easy task, for part of the Bavarian division Zoller, numbering some 3000 men, held the town, and determined to bar the passage of the Saale. The odds, however, were too unequal, for the Prussians numbered about 15,000 men. Yet the Bavarians clung with courage to the houses, and opened a sharp fire of small-arms on the assailants. Their artillery, too, well supported the infantry defence. Two Prussian infantry regiments threw out skirmishers, and attempted to put down the fire of the Bavarian riflemen. But these were under cover of the houses, and their artillery from the hill of Saalch splintered its shells among the ranks of the Prussian sharp-shooters. For about an hour the fight was equally sustained; then two more Prussian regiments and two additional batteries came into play. The Prussian pieces threw their heavy metal upon the Bavarian guns at Saalch, until the fire of the latter grew weaker, and was at length silenced by superior weight. Some houses, kindled by the Prussian shells, at the same time caught fire, and the town began to burn fiercely in three places. Still the Bavarians clung to the bridge, and stood their ground, careless equally of the flames and of the heavy cannonade. Beyer sent forth his jägers to storm the place, and the defenders could not endure the assault. The quick bullets of the needle-gun rained in showers among the burning buildings, scattering death among the garrison. The stoutly defended town was abandoned, and the Bavarians, pursued by salvos of artillery, drew off to the south-east, while the Prussians gained the passage of the Saale at Hammelburg.

On the day that General Beyer fought the action of Hammelburg on the right, Falckenstein's central column was heavily engaged with the main body of the Bavarians at the celebrated bathing-place of Kissingen. On the 5th July eighty Bavarian troopers, flying from Hünfeld, passed in hot haste through the town. Visitors and inhabitants were much alarmed; but the burgomaster quieted them by a promise that he would give twenty-four hours'

warning if the place were in danger of being attacked by the Prussians. This assurance had all the more weight, because even so late as on the 8th July Bavarian staff-officers were sauntering about the Kurgarten as quietly as if in time of the most profound peace. Some of the troops which had been quartered in Kissingen and its neighbourhood were, on the 9th, sent to Hammelburg. All appeared still, yet the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages were flying from their houses to avoid the Prussians. The Bavarian intelligence department does not appear to have been well served. By mid-day on the 9th it was too late for the burgomaster to give his warning, that the Prussians were near. The Bavarians concentrated about 20,000 men, and took up their position. Neither visitors nor inhabitants could now retire, but had to remain involuntary witnesses of a battle. Those who lived in the Hotel Sanner, which lies on the right bank of the Saale, were allowed to move into the less exposed part of the town. No one was permitted to quit the place, lest he should convey intelligence to the enemy of the dispositions of the Bavarian army. Three of the bridges over the Saale were destroyed; but the supports were left to one made of iron, in front of the Alten Berg. It was by the assistance of these supports that the Prussians gained the first passage of the river; for they knew the localities well, many of their staff-officers having frequented the fashionable watering place. The stone bridge was barricaded as hastily as possible, and its approach protected by two twelve-pounder guns. Five battalions, with twelve guns, held the town itself. The Bavarians, who were commanded by Zoller, general of the division, had chosen a very strong position; they held the houses next to the bridge, as well as the bank of the Saale beyond the bridge. Their artillery was posted on the Stadt Berg, but not on the important Finster Berg. A battery on the latter hill would have prevented the Prussians from gaining the passages of the river from the Alten Berg. Behind the village of Haussen guns were also in position. All the bridges outside of Kissingen were destroyed, and all points favourable for defence occupied by infantry.

On the 10th July, at early morning, Prussian hussars made their appearance, and were followed by columns advancing on the roads towards Klaushof and Garitz, west of Kissingen, while a battery came into position on a hill between Garitz and the river. At half past seven in the morning, the Bavarian guns near Winkels and the two twelve-pounders at the bridge opened on the leading Prussian columns, which consisted of General Kummer's brigade. Kummer's artillery replied, and in a short time the rattle of musketry, mingling with the heavier booming of the guns, told that he was sharply engaged.

The main body of Goeben's division had, in the meantime, reached Schlimhoff. Here it received orders to detach three battalions by Poppenroth and Klaushof, who were to attack Friedrichshall under the command of Colonel Goltza. When General Wrangel's brigade approached Kissingen it received orders to advance on the right wing of Kummer's brigade to seize the Alten Berg, and if possible, extending to its right, to outflank the Bavarian position. The Alten Berg being quickly cleared of Bavarian riflemen by the Prussian jägers, a company under Captain von Busche was sent against the bridge to the south of Kissingen, where, though partially destroyed, the piers had been left standing. Tables, forms, and timber were seized from some neighbouring houses, with which very secretly and rapidly the broken bridge was restored so far that before mid-day men could cross it in single file. Von Busche led his company over the stream, and into a road on the further side, from the corner of which the enemy's marksmen annoyed his men considerably. This company was followed by a second, and as quickly as possible the whole battalion was thrown across the stream and gained the wood on the south-east of Kissingen, where a column was formed, and under the cover of skirmishers advanced against the town. More men were pushed across the repaired bridge, and ere long two battalions and a half of Prussians were engaged among the houses in a street fight. The remaining portion of Wrangel's brigade was at this time directed in support of Kummer against the principal bridge. Infantry and artillery fire caused the Prussians severe losses; but they pushed on towards the barricade. Their artillery outnumbered that of the defending force, and protected by it they carried the bridge.

The passage of the stream by the Prussians decided the action. They secured the Finster Berg and the Bodenlaube, with the old castle of that name, and pushed forward with loud cheers into the heart of the town. Here the Bavarian

light infantry fought hard, and, suffering heavy sacrifices themselves, inflicted grievous loss upon the Prussians. The Kurgarten, held by 300 riflemen, stormed unsuccessfully three times by Wrangel's men, was carried on the fourth assault. A young lieutenant, who commanded the Bavarians, refusing with the whole of his men to ask quarter, fell in the place they held so well. At a little after three the whole town was in possession of the Prussians.

The Bavarians did not yet renounce the combat. The corps which retreated from Kissingen took up a position on the hill east of the town, and renewed the battle. Wrangel's brigade received orders to clear the hills south of the road which leads to Nullingen. The Bavarians had taken up a position on both sides of the road, and greeted the Prussians with an artillery fire from the Linn Berg. They continued the fight till seven o'clock in the evening, when Wrangel occupied Winkels. The Bavarians were supposed to be retiring, and Wrangel's troops were about to bivouac, when a report came in that the Bavarians were advancing in force. General Wrangel in person went to the outposts, and was receiving the reports from the commanding officer of the nineteenth regiment, when some rifle bullets came from the southern hill into his closed columns. The Bavarians, under Prince Charles himself, had come down with nine fresh battalions of their first division, had seized the hills which lie to the north of the road, and were pressing rapidly forward under cover of their artillery. The Prussians were pushed back, and took up a position on the heights south-east of Winkels, where two batteries came into play. From thence troops were sent by Wrangel into the hills north and south of the road flanking the enemy, and immediately afterwards the whole brigade advanced in double-quick time, with drums beating, to a charge that succeeded, though with loss. The Bavarians were driven back, the Prussians regained their former position, and Prince Charles relinquished his attack.

The Prussian left column, which was formed by Manteuffel's division, on the 10th July secured the passage of the river at Waldaschach about five miles above Kissingen, and at Haussen. At neither place did the Bavarians make any obstinate stand. In these actions on the Saale the Bavarians appear to have been taken by surprise. The Prussian march, previous to the battle of Kissingen, was so rapid that their attack was not expected till the following day. In consequence, the Bavarian force was not concentrated on the river. The troops which held Kissingen and Hammelburg were unsupported, those which should have acted as their reserves being too far distant to be of any service. Not reaching the scene of action till their comrades had been defeated, they, instead of acting as reinforcements, met with a similar fate.

The army of Bavaria boasted to have had at that time 126 cannon. Of these only twelve came into action at Kissingen, five at Hammelburg. The rest were uselessly scattered along the bank of the Saale, between these two places. The staff was unprepared, having no maps of the country, except one which the chief of the staff, General von der Tann, had borrowed from a native of one of the small towns near the field.

When Prince Alexander of Hesse turned to retreat on the 5th July, he might still, by a rapid march along the road which leads from Lauterbach to Brückenau, have made an attempt to unite with the Bavarians before they were attacked at Kissingen by the Prussians. This course he appears, however, to have considered too hazardous, for he retired to Frankfort, and on the 9th July concentrated his troops round that town. Frequent alarms made it evident how little confidence pervaded the federal corps of Prince Alexander. The news of the victory won by the Prussians at Königgrätz was widely circulated through the ranks by the Frankfort journals. Every moment reports were rife that Prussian columns were advancing towards Frankfort from Wetzlar, or Giessen; and on one occasion an officer, by spreading the alarm, caused a whole division to lose their night's rest, and take up a position in order of battle.

No firm union existed between the different divisions of the eighth corps, which had not been concentrated for twenty-four years. The organization, the arms, the uniforms, were all different. The hussars of Hesse-Cassel, for instance, were dressed and accoutred so similarly to Prussian cavalry, that the Austrians fired upon them at Asschaffenburg.

The day after the victory at Kissingen, General Falckenstein turned his attention against this heterogeneous mass without fear of any assault on his rear by the Bavarians, who after the battle of Kissingen had retired in such haste

towards the Maine, that Manteuffel's division, sent in pursuit, could not reach them. On the 11th July Beyer's division marched by way of Hammelburg and Gelnhausen on Hanau, without falling in with the Würtemburg division which held Gelnhausen. On the 14th the Würtemburgers retired in great haste, without throwing any obstacle in the way of the advancing Prussians, either by breaking the bridges or by any other means. The division of General Goeben was directed, at the same time, through the defile of the Spessart, upon Aschaffenburg, and found the passes unoccupied and unbarricaded. Notwithstanding the presence in the district of large numbers of foresters, no abattis or entanglements were placed across the road. None of the almost unassailable heights were occupied, either to prevent the direct progress of the Prussians, or to threaten their line of march in flank. The railway, which was still serviceable, was not used to convey the small number of riflemen and guns, which at Gemünden, as at many other points, might have thrown some difficulties in Goeben's way. Manteuffel's division followed Goeben's, and scoured the country in the direction of Würzburg. Between Gemünden and Aschaffenburg the river Maine makes a deep bend to the south. Into the bow thus formed, the mountainous region of the Spessart protrudes, through which the road and railway lead directly westward from Gemünden to the latter town. On the 13th July, Wrangel's brigade was approaching Hayn, when a report came in that the enemy's cavalry and infantry were advancing from Laufach. They were troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, and were without difficulty pushed back, while the village of Laufach was taken, and the railway station occupied. The enemy with eight or nine battalions—about 8000 men—and two batteries, resumed the offensive. The Prussians occupied the churchyard and the village of Frohnhöfen, and after a severe contest, in which all Wrangel's available troops were engaged, not only repulsed all the assaults of the Hessians, but made a counter-attack which was attended with complete success. The Hessians drew off from all points towards Aschaffenburg, leaving more than 100 prisoners, with 500 killed and wounded, in the hands of the victors. On the Prussian side the loss was very small, twenty men and one officer.

The advantages of ground, disposition, and leading were all on the side of the Prussians, who gained their success, although very weary from a long march, without any exertions worthy of mention. They had so quickly and skilfully availed themselves of each local advantage, for the defence of their line by infantry and artillery fire, that all the reckless bravery of the Hessians had no other result than to inflict upon themselves very severe losses. After the action of the 13th July, Wrangel's brigade bivouacked at Laufach, with an advanced post of three battalions round Frohnhöfen. On the 14th, at seven in the morning, the further march on Aschaffenburg commenced. On the hill of Weiberhofen, Wrangel's brigade fell in with that of General Kummer, which had moved by a route on the south of the railway. General Goeben then ordered a general advance. He moved Wrangel's brigade along the road, Kummer's on the railway embankment; and with a hussar and cuirassier regiment drawn from the reserve, covered his right flank by moving them through the open fields on the south of the road. Hösbach was found unoccupied by the enemy, as was also Goldbach. On the further side of the latter village the infantry fire opened. The Prussian regiments pushed forward to the wooded bank of the Laufach stream. The Federal corps here consisted of the Austrian division under General Count Neipperg, formed of troops which had originally garrisoned Mainz, Rastadt, and Frankfort. There were also some of the Hesse-Darmstadt troops, whose fire caused the Prussians little loss. An Austrian battery, posted on a hill south of Aschaffenburg and admirably served, greatly annoyed the Prussians, and held them at bay until three of their battalions pushed along the stream nearer to the village of Daurm, and made themselves masters of a hill surrounded by a tower walled in. Protected by this the infantry succeeded in forcing the enemy's artillery to retire, and in checking the advance of some squadrons of Federal cavalry. As soon as the Austrian battery drew back, a general advance was made against Aschaffenburg, which is surrounded by a high wall that offered the Austrians cover, and a convenient opportunity for defence. The Prussian artillery coming into action on the top of a hill, soon showed itself superior to that of the Austrians; and after shelling the environs of the town, and the gardens which lay in front of the walls, the Prussians stormed and gained the walls without much loss. There was a sharp

conflict at the railway station, but nowhere else in the town. Aschaffenburg having only two gates, the Austrians in their retreat towards the bridge over the Maine came to a dead lock; 2000 of their number, mostly Italians, were made prisoners. Reconnoitring parties were at once pushed on towards Frankfort, and the reward of victory was reaped in the evacuation of that important town, and of the line of the Maine, by the Federal forces.

Wrangel's brigade was pushed forward by forced marches to Hanau. About five o'clock on the evening of the 16th July, the first Prussians, a regiment of cuirassiers and a regiment of hussars, arrived near Frankfort, brought in a train from Aschaffenburg. They got out of the carriages a short distance from the city gates, and took up a position on the Hanau road. At seven a patrol of the hussars, led by an officer, halted before the city gate, and in another quarter of an hour the head of the vanguard passed in. The populace were for the most part sullenly silent. A few insulting cries to the Prussians were occasionally heard from some of the windows, but the soldiers took no notice of them. Generals Vogel von Falckenstein, Goeben, Wrangel, and Treskow, surrounded by the officers of the staff, rode in at the head of the main body, while the bands of the regiments played Prussian national airs. Before ten o'clock the whole line of march had entered. The telegraph and post-office were occupied. The railway station was garrisoned, and guards established over all the principal buildings. The town of Frankfort was virtually annexed to the Prussian monarchy. Next day the remainder of Falckenstein's force entered the town, and some troops, pushing forward south of the city, captured a Hessian bridge train. The general established his head-quarters in Frankfort, and published a proclamation announcing that he had assumed temporarily the government of the duchy of Nassau, the town and territory of Frankfort, and the portions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt which his troops had occupied. The civil functionaries of these districts were retained in their posts, but were directed to receive no order except from the Prussian commander-in-chief. Several of the Frankfort papers, which had always been distinguished for strong anti-Prussian feeling, were suppressed. The eleven armed unions (*Vereine*) which had existed in the city were abolished; and the functions of the senate and college of burghers established by a general order. Six millions of gulden (£600,000) were demanded from the town as a war contribution, and after much grumbling paid by the citizens. When afterwards, on the 20th of July, an additional contribution of twenty millions of gulden (£2,000,000 sterling) was demanded, a universal cry of indignation and horror arose. In the meantime, General von Roeder had been appointed governor of the town, and to him the burgomaster represented, on the 23rd of July, that the town had already furnished six millions of gulden, and about two millions of rations, and begged to appeal to the king against the second tax. So much did this misfortune of his city weigh on the burgomaster's mind, that he committed suicide the same night. The town sent a deputation to Berlin, which supported by the foreign press succeeded in averting the second contribution. Frankfort shortly afterwards was united definitively to Prussia, and the first contribution of six millions, though not actually returned to the citizens, was retained by the government to be expended in public works for the benefit of the city.

On the 14th July General Falckenstein issued a general order to his troops, recapitulating their victories and expressing his thanks. The thirteenth division, he said, was "fortunate" in being generally at the head of the corps, and the first to come into collision with the enemy. It showed itself worthy of this honourable post, as did the intelligence and energy of its leader in taking advantage of his opportunities. In less than fourteen days this fortunate general had defeated two armies, each as strong as his own, and in a country by no means advantageous for the offensive, had so manœuvred as to separate by seventy miles adversaries who at the beginning of the contest were within thirty miles of each other. On the 16th of July he was able to report to the king, that all the German territory north of the Maine was in possession of the Prussians.

CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE.

The day that General Falckenstein published his general order to the troops, the army of the Maine lost its commander. For some as yet unexplained offence to the king or his courtiers the rough old general was recalled, and was offered the appointment of military governor-general of Bohemia, an appointment which he did not accept

until solicited by the king to do so. The importance of the communications of the main Prussian armies with the provinces of Saxony and Silesia, which were threatened by the three fortresses of Theresienstadt, Josephstadt, and Königgrätz, led the king of Prussia to appoint General Falckenstein as military governor-general of that province.

General Manteuffel assumed the command of the army of the Maine, and on the 18th July occupied Wiesbaden. On the 20th, Kummer's brigade was pushed southwards as an advanced guard, and entered Darmstadt; but the main body of the army halted at Frankfort until the 21st, for reinforcements. Of the 12,000 auxiliaries which came up from the Hanse towns and other places, 5000 men were left to hold the line of the Maine at Frankfort, Hanau, and Aschaffenburg, and the remainder served to raise the active army to a strength of 60,000 combatants.

A second reserve corps to the number of 23,000 men was formed at the same time at Leipzig, under the command of the grand-duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. It was intended to enter Bavaria by way of Hof, and either to act against the rear of the united Bavarian or federal corps, while engaged with General Manteuffel, or to force the Bavarian army to form front towards the east, and prevent Prince Charles of Bavaria from acting in concert with Prince Alexander against Manteuffel.

By the 21st July the railroad from Frankfort to Cassel had been repaired and was available throughout its whole length, not only for military transport, but also for private traffic. On that day the main body of the army of the Maine quitted Frankfort, and moved towards the south, while Beyer's division advanced from Hanau. The Bavarians had concentrated, and were in position near Würzburg. It appeared probable that part of the eighth federal corps intended to hold the defiles of the Odenwald, and the line of the Neckar, while the remainder joined the Bavarians near the Tauber. To take advantage of two roads, in order to move quickly upon Prince Alexander before he was firmly linked with the Bavarians, and to shield his own right flank against any detachments lurking in the Odenwald, General Manteuffel moved Goeben's division by Darmstadt on Könieg, while Flies and Beyer pushed up the valley of the Maine by Woerth.

On the 23rd the army of the Maine occupied a position near Mottenberg and Amorbach. It was found that the enemy was in force on the Tauber, and that his advanced posts were pushed over the river as far as Hundheim. On the 24th two actions took place on the Tauber, an affluent of the Maine, which falls into the latter stream below Wertheim. General Manteuffel moved against the Tauber in three columns. At Tauberbischofsheim the Würtemburg division, under General Hardegg, was posted, to hold the place itself, and then issue from the valley on the road towards Würzburg, in case of an attack by the Prussians. The artillery fire of the advanced guard brigade of Goeben's division caused great loss among the defenders, and soon forced them to retire from the village. General Hardegg withdrew his troops, but endeavoured to hold the Prussians in the houses, and to prevent the advance of their batteries, by blowing up the bridge over the Tauber; he thus for a time prevented the progress of the Prussian artillery. After a hot combat, which lasted three hours, the Würtemburgers were relieved by the fourth division of the eighth federal corps. The action increased in fury, but ultimately the Prussians gained the passage of the Tauber at Bishopsheim, and pushed their outposts a short distance along the road to Würzburg.

After several other conflicts, in which the Prussians were always victorious, the crowning engagement took place when Kummer pushed his skirmishers close up to Marienberg, and with them forced the enemy to quit some earthworks which they had begun to throw up. The whole artillery of the army of the Maine was then posted on the right and left of the road, and opened a cannonade on the houses, to which the enemy's guns actively replied. The arsenal and the castle of Marienberg were set on flames, after which the batteries ceased firing. The day after that cannonade a flag of truce was sent from the Bavarians to General Manteuffel, who announced that an armistice had been concluded between the king of Prussia and the Bavarian government. The cessation of hostilities rescued the allied army from a very precarious situation in the elbow of the Maine, where it was all but cut off from the territories which it had been intended to defend. In these engagements the strength of the Bavarian and eighth Federal corps, which mustered together at least 100,000 men, was frittered away in isolated conflicts, instead of being concentrated for a great

battle. Such conflicts could have had no important result, even if they had been successful.

A word or two remains to be said on the occupation of Franconia by the second reserve corps. On the 18th July the Grand-duke Frederick Franz of Mecklenburg-Schwerin assumed command of the second Prussian reserve corps at Leipzig, and on the same day ordered this corps to move upon Hof, in Bavaria. On the 23rd a battalion of the guard crossed the Bavarian frontier, capturing a detachment of sixty-five Bavarian infantry, and on the day following the grand-duke fixed his head-quarters at Hof. There he published a proclamation to the inhabitants of Upper Franconia, informing them that his invasion of their country was only directed against their government, and that private property and interests would be entirely respected by his troops. In consequence of this assurance he was able to draw from the inhabitants the means of supplying his men with rations. The fine old city of Nürnberg being declared an open town, was occupied without resistance by the Prussian advance guard, and spared the havoc of a bombardment. The Prussian troops were everywhere victoriously pressing forward, and the disruption of the German Confederation became daily more complete.

On the 1st August General Manteuffel, at Würzburg his head-quarters, concluded an armistice with General von Hardegg, for Würtemburg and with the representatives of Hesse-Darmstadt. On the 3rd a plenipotentiary from Baden came to Würzburg, and obtained terms for the grand-duchy. The relics of the Diet advanced rapidly towards dissolution. On the 28th July the troops of Saxe-Meiningen had already been permitted by the governor of Mainz to leave that fortress, which, in virtue of subsequent treaties, was given over, as was Frankfort, by a decree of the Diet, entirely to Prussia. This decree, dated the 26th of August, 1866, was the last act of the Diet of that Germanic Confederation which had been constructed after the fall of the first French empire. In this self-denying document the Diet practically published its own death-warrant.

MOVEMENTS IN MORAVIA.

To return to the Prussian advance from Königgrätz. After Benedek's disastrous retreat from the field of battle he dispatched the tenth corps, which had suffered most severely, to Vienna by railway, and ordered the remainder of his army to move on the entrenched camp at Olmütz, while he left his light infantry division to watch the road from Pardubitz to Iglam, and his second to delay the enemy, if possible, on the road between Pardubitz and Brünn.

On the 4th July he also sent General Gablenz, one of the most able of the Austrian generals, to the Prussian head-quarters, in order to treat for a suspension of hostilities, as a preliminary to the conclusion of peace. This was a new proof of the desperate condition of the Austrian army. Gablenz reported himself at mid-day on the 4th at the outposts of the Crown Prince's army, and received permission to go to the king's head-quarters. He was conducted blindfold through the army to Höritz, and when he reached that town, found the king absent on a visit to his troops in the field of battle. Being taken on to meet him, the general fell in with his Majesty between Sadowa and Chlum, and was thought to be a wounded Austrian general, fit object of royal condolence. King William, being informed of his visitor's mission, ordered the bandage to be removed from his eyes, and bade the Austrian general return with him to Höritz. Here Gablenz expressed Benedek's desire of an armistice; but no truce could be granted, for Prussia and Italy were mutually bound to consent to no suspension of hostilities without a common agreement. General Gablenz returned unsuccessful to the Austrian head-quarters, and the Prussians commenced their victorious march to Brünn, where they halted on the 13th July; having given proofs of power of endurance which have rarely been equalled in the annals of war. Their marches had not been made by small detachments, or over open ground, but in large masses over deep and heavy roads, encumbered with artillery and crowded with carriages.

While the army halted here, reserve troops were being advanced into Bohemia to secure the communications with Saxony, and to keep order in rear of the armies, where the peasantry, having possessed themselves with weapons from the field of battle, had began to plunder convoys and to attack small escorts or patrols. General Falckenstein, as we have seen, was summoned from the army of the Maine to be the commandant of Bohemia. Still it was thought that these preparations were useless, and that the army would never

move south of Brünn. The visit of the French ambassador to this town, quickly reported from billet to billet, fell like a cold chill on the enthusiasm of the troops, who longed to conclude the campaign by an entrance into the Austrian capital. The mediation of the emperor of the French with the Prussian court in favour of peace, they looked upon with aversion, and anticipated with disgust an armistice by the conditions of which the army might be retained at Brünn for a considerable time.

Benedek, as observed, did not offer to rally his army beyond the line of the Elbe, or to fortify any position to retard the advancing Prussians. He despatched the tenth corps, the Saxons, and part of the cavalry, to Vienna, and effected a hasty retreat with the remains of his army to Olmütz, expecting the Prussians would not venture to steal a march upon Vienna, with a fortress and army in their flank. He was, however, greatly deceived; for on the 5th the Prussians had crossed the Elbe at three points, and in three columns were advancing towards Vienna.

Archduke Albert, who had recently won a victory at Custozza, superseded General Benedek, on the 12th July, as commander-in-chief of the army of the north. He at once transmitted orders to Benedek to bring his entire force of five corps to Vienna. But as the railroad and nearest road from his position at Olmütz to Vienna were seized by the Prussians, the unlucky general had to effect a difficult march through mountain roads and passes over the lesser Carpathians. The second and fourth corps commenced marching from Olmütz by Tobitschau on the 14th, and Benedek with the first and eighth corps, and the cavalry division of Taxis, followed on the 15th, whilst the sixth corps was sent by Meiszkirchen.

General Bonin, commander of the first corps of the second Prussian army, who was at Pressnitz, received orders on the 14th to destroy the railway bridge at Brerau, south-east of Olmütz, and in following out these orders his troops came into collision with the retreating Austrian divisions not far from Tobitschau. An engagement took place, in which the latter were defeated with a loss of 1200 men, including 500 prisoners and eighteen guns.

Benedek quickened his retreat across the little Carpathians to Pressburg, at which place the second corps arrived on the 22nd; but the advanced guard of the ex-commander-in-chief only reached Tirnau on the same day, and Benedek himself, with the first, sixth, and eighth corps, did not arrive at Pressburg till the 26th.

The Prussians learnt by the evening of the 14th that the negotiations for an armistice had failed, upon which Von Moltke retired to his quarters and was closeted with his maps, making new plans for the further progress of the campaign, and for the occupation of Vienna. With such leaders, with a better arm than their enemies, with every mechanical contrivance which modern science could suggest, adapted to aid the operations of the army, it is little wonder that the stout-hearted and long-enduring Prussian soldiers proved victorious on every occasion on which they went into action. The Prussian march to the Danube was resumed on the 19th. The advance had been so rapid, that it was almost impossible to realize that the army was within thirty miles of Vienna. The men of the first army would have been glad of some visible proof assuring them of its proximity; but as yet they could have none. Prince Frederick Charles knew that on the 22nd General Benedek would throw his leading divisions over the Danube at Pressburg. If then he could seize that place, the remainder of the Austrian force would have to make a *detour* by Komorn before arriving at Vienna.

The seventh and eighth divisions advancing on Pressburg, engaged the Austrians at Blumeneau on the 22nd. A brigade having crossed the mountains were occupying a position in the Austrian rear, when orders were received that an armistice had been concluded. But the battle had commenced and the fire could not be checked, till an Austrian officer advanced towards the Prussian lines with a flag of truce; the signal to cease firing was sounded along the Prussian ranks, and the combat was broken off. But for this truce the Prussians would undoubtedly have obtained a victory at Blumeneau which would have jeopardized Benedek's army; for on the day of the conclusion of the truce he was at some distance from Pressburg with two of his corps, and in all probability he would have been compelled to fall back.

A curious scene occurred directly the action was over, that illustrates the artificial nature of warfare produced by state policy, and its freedom from personal animosity. The men of Bose's Prussian brigade, who had been planted across the Pressburg road, and a few hours before had been standing ready, rifle in hand, to fire upon

the retreating Austrian battalions, were surrounded by groups of those very Austrian soldiers whom they had been waiting to destroy. The men of the two nations mingled together, exchanged tobacco, drank out of each other's flasks, talked and laughed over the war in groups equally composed of blue and white uniforms, cooked their rations at the same fires, and lay down that night, Austrian and Prussian battalions bivouacked close together, without fear, and in perfect security.

For five days longer the Prussian troops remained in the March Feld. The preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon at Nikolsburg on the evening of the 26th, and the war was certainly at an end, as far as Austria and the North German States were concerned. Late at night on the 26th a courier arrived from the king's head-quarters at Nikolsburg, with a letter from General Moltke to Prince Frederick Charles, stating simply and without details that a glorious peace had been arranged. The preliminaries, signed that evening at Nikolsburg between Prussia and Austria, included the following terms:—That Austria should go out of the Germanic Confederation, should pay a contribution towards Prussia's expenses in the late war, and should offer no opposition to the steps which Prussia might take with regard to Northern Germany. These steps were, to annex Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt which lies on the north bank of the Maine; to secure the reversion of Brunswick on the death of the present duke, who has no children; to force Saxony to enter into the new North German Confederation headed by Prussia; and to hold the entire military and diplomatic leadership in that confederation. The war contribution to be paid by Austria was fixed at 40,000,000 thalers, of which 15,000,000 were to be paid up: 15,000,000 were credited to Austria for the Schleswig-Holstein expenses, 5,000,000 for the support of the Prussian armies in Bohemia and Moravia, and 5,000,000 to be paid at a future date to be afterwards settled. The Prussian armies were, on the 2nd of August, to retire to the north of the Thaya, but were to occupy Bohemia and Moravia till the signature of the final treaty of peace, and to hold Austrian Silesia until the war contribution was paid.

It was a strange coincidence, says a recent German writer, that the magnificent castle of Nikolsburg had passed through the female line from the house of Dietrichstein to Count Mensdorff of Lothringian descent, like the Hapsburgs, so that peace was actually negotiated in the country house of the Kaiser's minister for foreign affairs. Other historical recollections belong to the place. Napoleon I. sojourned here after Austerlitz, just as William I. did after Sadowa. Bismarck, on his arrival, gazed at the magnificent pile intently, and remarked, with his grim humour, "My old mansion of Schönhausen is certainly insignificant in comparison with this splendid building, and I am better pleased that we should be here at Count Mensdorff's than that he should now be at my house." After the excitement of the battle of Sadowa, and the exposure in the marching which followed, the minister president was assailed by his old complaint of nervous rheumatism. His difficulties at Nikolsburg were neither few nor small. In a letter he wrote in Bohemia, on the 9th July, occur these words: "If we do not become extravagant in our demands, and do not imagine that we have conquered *the world*, we shall obtain a peace worth the having. But we are as easily intoxicated as cast down; and I have the unthankful office of pouring water into this foaming wine, and of making it clear that we do not inhabit Europe alone, but with three neighbours." Wise words that bore good fruit in 1866, in a peace glorious for Prussia and beneficial to the rest of Germany.

The definitive treaty of peace between Austria and Prussia was signed at the Blue Star Hotel at Prague, on the 23rd August, and consisted of fourteen articles. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 29th August, also at Prague. As a consequence of the exchange of the ratifications the Prussian troops began to vacate Austrian territory, and by the 18th of September there was not a spiked helmet or a needle-gun in Bohemia or Moravia. There were great rejoicings in Berlin to celebrate the return of the army, and on the 19th of September a public festival in their honour took place. On the evening of the 21st the king assembled at dinner, in the Schloss, 1200 of the generals and principal officers who had served in the campaign. Directly after dark the whole city was lighted up. Special performances were given in all the theatres in honour of the triumphant termination of the war. Prologues were delivered which detailed the glorious deeds of the army; and the plays which were written

for the occasion dwelt upon the actions and personal adventures of the heroes of the campaign, and recalled the memories of the concluding wars of the first French empire.

The Prussian government now concluded the programme of events by the formation of the North German Confederation; measures were at once proceeded with, and practically northern Germany was united into one confederate power, under the sceptre of the house of Hohenzollern, by the end of October, 1866.

The fortune that attended Italy during the war will now be briefly touched upon. Her arms had suffered defeat both by land and sea; yet the glorious victories of her Prussian allies procured her the benefits of the peace.

THE WAR IN ITALY.

When Prussia had declared that she regarded the Austrian proceedings at Frankfort as a declaration of war, King Victor Emmanuel, in consequence of his alliance with the government of Berlin, declared war against Austria; and on the 20th of June General La Marmora, chief of the staff of the Italian army, sent an intimation to the commandant of Mantua that hostilities would commence on the 23rd. The Archduke Albrecht accepted the intimation, and made ready for action.

The theatre of war in which the troops of Italy and the Austrian army of the south were about to engage, has often been the battle-field of Europe. It communicates with Vienna by two lines; by the railway, *viâ* Trieste, through Goerz, Udine, Treviso, and Padua to Verona, connecting the Quadrilateral with the capital; and by a line through Salzburg, Innsbrück, Botzen, and Roveredo, which though not completed between Innsbrück and Botzen, afforded a subsidiary way for the supply of troops camped under the protection of the fortresses. The Quadrilateral itself consisted, as our readers know, of the strongly entrenched camp of Verona on the Adige, the less important fortress of Legnano on the same river, the lately strengthened fortifications of Peschiera at the issue of the Mincio from the Lago di Garda, and the fortress of Mantua, which lies further down the Mincio, with its citadel and fort St. George on the left bank, and its minor works on the right of the stream. The fortified Borgo Forte supports the line of the Mincio in front of the confluence of that river with the Po; while Venice, with many adjacent forts, protected the rear of the Quadrilateral towards the sea.

The Italians, in acting against the Quadrilateral, might either advance across the Mincio, and rush headlong against its parapets and embrasures, or, by advancing from the Lower Po, push towards Padua, and endeavour to cut the main line of communication with Vienna. General La Marmora had a very difficult problem to solve, and was not fortunate in the conditions he introduced into its solution. His information as to the Austrian designs was greatly at fault, while that of the Archduke Albrecht was excellent. The Italian general was bound to assume the offensive for political reasons. Neglecting a plan of campaign which had been forwarded from Berlin, he adopted one that had, it is said, been determined upon in 1859 by a mixed council of French and Italian officers. The main attack was to be made against the Mincio and Adige, by the principal army, under the personal command of King Victor Emmanuel. The whole army, including the division of reserve cavalry, mustered about 146,000 men, with 228 guns. The Italian staff, presuming that the Archduke Albrecht would await an attack behind the Adige, determined to cross the Mincio, and occupy within the Quadrilateral the ground not held by the Austrians. After taking up this position, and so separating the fortresses from one another, the main army was to give a hand across the Adige to General Cialdini, who was to lead his corps across the Lower Po, from the direction of Ferrara. General Garibaldi, with his volunteers, was to support the movement on the left by attacks on the passes leading from Northern Lombardy to the Tyrol. The day before the declaration of war, the main body of the king's army was moved towards the Mincio, and on the 22nd June the headquarters of the first corps were at Cavriana, those of the third at Gazzoldo, those of the second at Castelluccio, while the king himself went to Goito.

On the morning of the 23rd Cerale's division crossed the Mincio at Monzambano; Sirtori's, at Borghetto and Valeggio; Brignone's, at Molino di Volta; and the reserve division of cavalry, followed by the four divisions of the third corps, at Goito. The two divisions of Bixio and of Prince Humbert were pushed to Belvedere and Roverbella, while the divisions of Govone and Cugia encamped near Pozzolo and Massinbona.

Confident of his information, General La Mar-

mora on the 24th ordered the advance without any preparation having been made for combat. Scouts even were not sent out to observe the roads from the fortresses, and the soldiers were hungry and weary under the broiling sun of an Italian midsummer. This negligence and temerity met with its just reward. The moment news reached the archduke of the entry of the Prussians into Holstein, he concentrated his troops between Pastrengo and San Bonifacio, so that they could easily be united on either bank of the Adige, in case of need, and mustered, after deductions for necessary detachments, about 60,000 foot, 2500 horse, and 270 guns.

BATTLE OF CUSTOZZA.

In the night between the 23rd and 24th a heavy fall of rain took place, which laid the dust, and made the air cool on the following day.

At three o'clock on midsummer morning the sixth Austrian corps moved on Somma Campagna, the fifth on San Giorgio, and the reserve division on Castelnuovo. The cavalry brigades spread over the plain, on the left of the ninth corps, while the advanced guards pushing forward fell in with those of Victor Emmanuel, which were moving in the opposite direction The Italian divisions were engaged under pressure of superior force, and were compelled to retire to Oliosi, where Cerale made a determined stand. The archduke reinforced his reserved division, and after a hot fight, in which great bravery was displayed on both sides, Oliosi caught fire, and Cerale, who was wounded, was forced to retreat to Monte Vento. Here, though reinforced by Sirtori's division, whose advance from Valeggio to Santa Lucia covered his right wing, he could not withstand the assault of the Austrians, who took Monte Vento by storm, and forced Cerale to retreat on Valeggio.

As soon as the Austrians advanced against Sirtori at Santa Lucia, the Italian general quitted his position, and also retreated to Valeggio. Meanwhile General Hartung, having occupied Berettara and Casa del Sole in force, advanced on Custozza, where he fell in with Cugia's division, supported on the right by that of Prince Humbert. The latter was exposed to frequent attacks of the Austrian cavalry, and was often obliged to throw its battalions into square, in one of which the prince himself found shelter from the enemy's horsemen. On Cugia's left Brignone's division was led into action by La Marmora himself against the Austrian brigade of Sardier, supported by two other brigades. Shortly after mid-day, and after two commanders of brigades, Gozzani and Prince Amadeus, had been wounded, Brignone was forced to retreat to Custozza, making room for Govone's division, which soon found itself hard pressed by the Austrian seventh corps. Cerale had been driven from Vento, Sirtori from Santa Lucia; and now Cugia, outflanked on his left, was forced to quit Madonna Della Croce, so that at five o'clock the retreat of the Italian army was general. But so slowly did the third corps retire from the field of action, that it was not till seven o'clock in the evening that the Austrians occupied the heights of Custozza. Bixio's division and the reserve cavalry covered the retreat across the plain, where some detachments of the second corps also came to blows with the enemy.

The Austrians lost 960 killed, 3690 wounded, and nearly 1000 prisoners, who were for the most part captured by Pianelli. The Italians lost 720 killed, 3112 wounded, and 4315 missing. The Italian army required time to recover from this disaster. On the 30th detachments of the Austrian cavalry crossed the Mincio, and pushed as far as the Chiese; but the Archduke Albrecht had no intention or design of invading Lombardy.

The volunteers under General Garibaldi amounted to about 6000 men, the main body of which was collected by the 20th of June in front of Rocca d'Ans, while a small detachment was placed near Edolo, on the road leading through the pass of the Monte Tonale into the Tyrol, and another detachment near Bormio on the road which leads over the Stelvio. The main body crossing the frontier near Storo, found the population of the Tyrol entirely opposed to them, and staunchly loyal to the house of Hapsburg. On the 25th of June a sharp combat took place at the frontier bridge of Cassarobach, in which the Italians were worsted. They retired towards Bogolino, when they were attacked by an Austrian detachment on the 3rd July, again suffered a reverse, and saw their general wounded.

When, after the battle of Königgrätz, Venetia was offered by the government of Vienna to the emperor of the French, the fifth and ninth Austrian corps were withdrawn from Italy, and forwarded to the Danube, leaving, besides the garrisons of the fortresses, only one Austrian corps in

Venetia, and in the Tyrol a weak detachment under General Kuhn.

The Italian army rested for a while after the battle of Custozza; but an advance was rendered necessary by the treaty with Prussia. La Marmora's defeat having deprived him of the confidence both of the country and the army, the command-in-chief was given to General Cialdini, who was ordered to cross the Lower Po, and push troops against the Tyrol and into Eastern Venetia. Accordingly on the evening of the 7th July, leaving a division to watch Borgo Forte, and another near Ferrara, he concentrated seven divisions near Carbonara and Felonica, and threw some detachments of light troops across the Po at Massa. On the night following three bridges of boats were thrown across the stream at Carbanarola, Sermide, and Felonica, and on the 9th the army crossed at three points, covered from any attack by the marshes which here lie between the Po and the Adige. Cialdini then made a flank march to his right, gained the high road which leads from Ferrara by Rovigo to Padua, and opened his communication with Ferrara by military bridges thrown across the river, to replace the road and railway bridges which the Austrians had blown up. On the 10th his head-quarters were at Rovigo, and on the 14th, after securing the passage of the Adige at Monselice, his advanced guard occupied Padua. Meanwhile the division which he had left under Nunziante, in front of Borgo Forte, besieged that place, which on the night of the 18th was evacuated by the Austrian garrison, and occupied by the Italians, who captured seventy guns, and magazines of all kinds.

As the progress of events in the north pointed to the conclusion of an armistice, the terms of which would compel, in all probability, the troops on both sides to remain in their actual positions, the Italians determined to gain as much ground as possible before diplomacy might cause their army to halt. Cialdini, on the 19th, had with him about 70,000 men, and an expeditionary army of 70,000 more was being prepared to reinforce him. The Austrian troops in Italy which could take the field mustered little over 30,000 men. The Italian general advanced from Padua to Vicenza, along the left bank of the Brenta to Mestre, so as to cut Venice off on the land side, while the fleet should attack it from the sea. At the same time the Austrian field troops under General Maroicie withdrew from the Quadrilateral, and retired gradually behind the Piave, the Livenza, the Tagliamento, and finally behind the Isonzo. On the 22nd they evacuated Udine, which, two days later, was occupied by the Italians. No resistance was made by the Austrians until the Italian advanced guard passed beyond Palmanoro, when a sharp skirmish took place with the Austrian rear-guard, but it led to no results. In the meantime, Cialdini had pushed detachments by Schio towards Roveredo and by Belluno, as far as Avronzo, on his left, while on his right his troops were close up to Venice and Chioggia. A truce was agreed to on 22nd July, which was extended from week to week, until on the 12th August an armistice was concluded. The line of the Indrio was fixed as the line of demarcation between the troops on either side. The conclusion of the armistice between Prussia and Austria had already liberated the Austrian troops which had been transferred from Venetia to the Danube, and they were immediately sent back to the Isonzo, but were not called upon to act.

In the meantime, operations had been carried on against the Southern Tyrol. On the 22nd July Medici with his main body marched against the Austrian works at Primolano, which were promptly evacuated. Next day he entered Borgo, and on the 24th pushed his advanced guards to Pergine and Vigolo. General Kuhn being reinforced by 8000 men from Verona, determined to fall upon Medici, and thrust him back. A slight combat took place between some of Kuhn's outposts and the Italian advanced guard near Sorda on the 25th, but news of the armistice prevented further conflict. Garibaldi had made some movements from the west against the Tyrol, but without great success. He had captured the small fort of Ampola, and resisted several attacks made by the Austrians; but, though he attempted to gain as much ground as possible, he occupied at the time of the armistice only the valley of the Chiese for a length of ten miles from the Italian frontier, and the Val di Conzei, two miles north of Riva.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Of the Italian fleet great things were expected. The long coast line of Italy, and the mercantile habits of the natives of many of her sea-board towns, had for a long succession of years been calculated to foster seamen, and to lay the foundation for an efficient navy. The result of the war,

in its naval operations, caused bitter disappointment to the Italian people.

The Italian fleet was assembled at Tarento in the middle of May, under the command of Admiral Persano, who divided his force into three squadrons. The first, under his own immediate command, consisted of seven iron-clad vessels, and a flotilla of five gun-boats. The second, or auxiliary squadron, was formed of seven unplated frigates, and five corvettes. The third squadron consisted of three battering vessels and two gun-boats, while the transport squadron included fifteen vessels, capable of conveying 20,000 men across the Adriatic.

On the declaration of war, the fleets sailed from Tarento to Ancona, where Persano having heard of the disaster of Custozza, resolved to wait until a new plan of operations had been decided on. On the 29th of June the Austrian fleet, under the command of Admiral Tegethoff, appeared in front of Ancona. Some shots were exchanged between an Italian cruiser and the leading Austrian vessel, but no further engagement took place; for before Persano could weigh anchor the Austrian fleet retired. Persano remained inactive in Ancona until Cialdini advanced into Venetia, when being ordered to act he determined to attack Lissa. The island of Lissa lies in the Adriatic, some thirty miles south of Spalatro. Between it and the mainland lie the islands of Lesina, Brazza, and Solta. Between Lissa and Lesina there is a strait about fifteen miles broad. The two ports of Lissa are San Giorgio and Comisa. On the 16th July Persano left Ancona with a fleet of twenty-eight vessels, of which eleven were iron-plated, four screw frigates, two paddle-wheel corvettes, one a screw corvette, four despatch boats, four gun-boats, one hospital ship, and one store ship. The frigate *Garibaldi* remained at Ancona for repairs. Messages were sent to all vessels at Tarento or Brindisi to sail towards Lissa, the *Affondatore* especially being ordered up.

On the evening of the 17th Persano issued orders that Admiral Vacca, with three iron-clad vessels and a corvette, should bombard Comisa; that the main force, consisting of eight iron-clads, a corvette, and despatch boat, should assail San Giorgio; and that Admiral Albini, with four wooden frigates and a despatch boat, should effect a landing at the port of Manego on the south side of the island, in rear of the works of San Giorgio. Two vessels were to cruise on the north and east of Lissa during these operations, in order to give timely warning of the approach of the Austrian fleet. Vacca finding that his guns could not attain sufficient elevation to do much damage to the works at Comisa, gave up the attack and sailed for Port Manego, where Albini attempted in vain to effect a landing. Persano had begun to bombard San Giorgio at eleven in the morning of the 18th, by three o'clock, when joined by Vacca, he had blown up two magazines, and silenced several Austrian batteries. He could not, however, succeed in sending his ships into the harbour, and the prosecution of the attack was postponed till the next day.

The whole of Persano's fleet was now assembled in front of San Giorgio, strengthened by the ram *Affondatore* and three wooden vessels. That evening the admiral was informed that the Austrian fleet was leaving Fasana to attack him. Calculating that the enemy could not approach Lissa before nightfall on the 19th, Persano determined to make a second attack upon the island. But the attack, though well planned, was postponed from hour to hour, in case Tegethoff might arrive; and when in the afternoon the cruisers signalled that no smoke was to be made out on the horizon, the cannonade began. The floating battery the *Formidabile* entered the harbour, and taking post at the extreme end, 400 yards distant from the Austrian batteries, opened fire. A battery on the northern side told severely upon her, and Persano ordered the *Affondatore* to open upon this battery through the mouth of the harbour. This was done, but without much effect.

Vacca formed his three iron-clads in single line, steamed into the harbour, and opened on the batteries inside; but he could not effectually support the *Formidabile*, both because she herself covered the Austrian batteries, and on account of the difficulty of manœuvring in the narrow space within the harbour, which is only about 100 fathoms wide. He was soon forced to quit the harbour, and was followed by the *Formidabile*, which had lost sixty men, and suffered so considerably that it was sent the same evening to Ancona for repairs. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt at landing. The wind blew fresh from the south-east, and the boats could with difficulty approach the beach on account of the surf. The next day at daybreak, though the weather was still stormy, Persano again ordered a landing to be made. Two iron-clads bombarded

Comisa. Albini and Sandri, with the wooden vessels and gunboats, supported the landing at Port Carobert. But the surf was so high that the landing could not be effected, and it was about to be abandoned when a cruiser bore hastily down through the rainy mist, and signalled that the enemy was approaching from the north. Tegethoff with the Austrian fleet was at hand to relieve the beleaguered island.

BATTLE OF LISSA.

On the 17th July Admiral Tegethoff at Fasana heard, by telegram, of the Italian fleet being near Lissa. He concluded that its appearance there was but a demonstration, to draw him away from the coast of Istria. On the 19th, however, being assured by fresh telegrams that the attack on the island was serious, he determined to proceed thither. His fleet was in three divisions, and consisted of seven ironclads under his own immediate command; seven large wooden vessels led by Commodore Petz; and a third division of seven smaller wooden vessels and four despatch boats—making up the number of twenty-five vessels, mounting about five hundred guns.

The Austrian admiral left the roads of Fasana about mid-day on the 19th of June, and on the morning of the 20th his despatch boats reported a vessel of the enemy in sight. The wind was blowing strong from the north-west. At first Tegethoff steered a course from the north-west to south-east, parallel to the Istrian coast; but off Lirona and Solta he altered his course to one directly from north to south. Persano on hearing of the Austrian approach, ordered his vessels to form in line of battle; and by nine o'clock his ironclads formed in a straight line, while steering almost from west-south-west to east-north-east in three divisions. Persano, at the same time, moved in person from the *Re d'Italia* to the *Affondatore*, which he ordered to take up a position on the flank of the column furthest from the Austrian attack. When Admiral Tegethoff could clearly make out the Italian fleet, it was steering from west to east. He bore down upon it in the following order:—His twenty-one vessels were arranged in three divisions of seven ships each, the first consisting of iron-clads; the two others of wooden vessels. The line of iron-clads led, with the admiral's flag-ship slightly in advance, from which the other vessels, falling a little astern, formed a wedge-like order. The seven heaviest wooden vessels followed the iron-clads, and were themselves followed by the lighter vessels in a similar formation.

Tegethoff bore down upon the gap between Vacca's three vessels and the central Italian group, and drove his own flag-ship, the *Ferdinand Max*, straight upon the *Re d'Italia*, which he rammed several times and sank. Only a small portion of the crew were saved. The *Palestro* attempted to aid the *Re d'Italia*, but Tegethoff turning upon her, ruined her steering apparatus. At the same time she was attacked by other ironclads, and quickly caught fire. She fell away before the wind, and as the fire could not be got under, she with all her ship's company, save sixteen men, was blown into the air. Thus of the Italian central division two vessels were lost, while the *Affondatore* remained inactive, apart from the battle. The third vessel of this division, attacked by the seven Austrian ironclads, as well as by the three wooden vessels, was severely handled, and forced to retreat.

The Italian division under Vacca had, with a north-easterly course, sailed along the flank of the Austrian iron-clads as they advanced, and exchanged some broadsides with them. When his leading ship, the *Carignano*, was clear of Tegethoff's iron-clads, Vacca ordered a change of direction, and brought his three vessels in line between the second and third Austrian divisions. His fire told severely on both, especially on the *Kaiser*, the flag-ship of the Austrian second division. The Italian division under Ribbotty, when it saw the central division engaged, altered its own course, and moved against the Austrian wooden ships, which were thus brought between two fires. Ribotty fiercely attacked the *Kaiser*, commanded by Commodore Petz. The latter using his wooden vessel as a ram, ran with full steam against the *Re di Portagallo*, and then lay alongside of her. At the same time he was attacked by the *Maria Pia*, and his vessel suffered severely. Tegethoff, by this time, had disposed of the Italian central division, and he brought his iron-clads back to aid his wooden vessels. Under their protection the *Kaiser* got away, and was taken to Lissa. After this a closer and fiercer battle was maintained between the whole of the Austrian vessels and the six Italian iron-clads, while the Italian wooden squadron, and the *Affondatore* looked on from the distance. The smoke was so thick that either side could with difficulty tell their own vessels; and

Tegethoff, hauling off, signalled to his fleet to form in three columns, with a north-easterly course so that the iron-clads formed the northernmost line, nearest to the Italians. By this manœuvre the Austrian fleet was brought in front of the strait between Lissa and Lesina. Vacca, under the impression that Persano had gone down in the *Re d'Italia*, ordered the Italian iron-clads to assemble, and with them in a single line steered slowly towards the west, waiting for the *Palestro*. She soon blew up. It was now about two o'clock, and the action had lasted four hours. At this time Persano joined Vacca's squadron with the *Affondatore*, placed her at the head of the line, and ordered the other vessels to follow her movements. These movements appear to have consisted in no more than a steady pursuit of a westerly course to the harbour of Ancona. By the battle of Lissa the Italians lost two iron-clads, the *Re d' Italia* and the *Palestro*. The *Affondatore* sunk at Ancona, after reaching harbour. For three days the Italian people were led to believe that a victory had been won at Lissa. The mortification of the defeat, which then became known, was thereby increased. Persano was summoned before the Senate, and was deprived of all command in the Italian navy. One remark appears patent, even to those who are quite unskilled in naval matters, that in the sea-fight Tegethoff led his fleet, Persano only directed his; another, that the Italian admiral, with superior forces at his command, allowed a section of his own fleet to be attacked and defeated at the decisive moment by a smaller force of his adversary.

On the 21st, the Austrian admiral returned, without a vessel missing, to the roads of Fasana.

PEACE BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA.

The armistice concluded between Austria and Italy was to last from mid-day on the 13th August to the 9th September.

In the meantime negotiations for peace were opened at Vienna; and on the 3rd October a definitive treaty was signed. By it Austria recognized the kingdom of Italy, and sanctioned the cession of Venetia to that power by the emperor of the French. The ratifications were exchanged as soon as possible. The Austrian commissioner-general Möring formally gave over Venetia to the French commissioner-general Lebœuf, when a plebiscite took place. The annexation to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel was almost unanimously voted by the people of Venetia, and Italy became one great country, united under the sceptre of the House of Piedmont, and free of any foreign dominion, " from the Alps to the Adriatic."

The Austrian surrender of Venetia to the emperor of the French, and not to the king of Italy, was considered at the time a gratuitous insult to the latter power; but whether it was initiated by Austrian or French politicians has not yet been clearly ascertained. Louis Napoleon had reasons for wishing to play the patron to Italy, and may have thought of reviving his plan of an Italian Confederation, with Venetia as a nucleus. Austria, at least, was compelled to show deference to France in some way, if she would make terms with Prussia short of total ruin; and France accepted the present of Venetia for the sake, it is to be hoped, of the magnanimous pleasure of giving it back to its right owner. How far the emperor yielded to the pressure of united Prussia and Italy it would, perhaps, not be polite to surmise; but that the Kaiser was disappointed with the use made of his gift, and the cheapness with which Italy made its acquisition, was generally believed. Yet there can be no doubt, and the Austrians by this time must be willing to admit the fact, that they are as much stronger, safer, and happier without Venetia, as Italy is stronger, safer, and happier with it. To the one nation it was a fretting incumbrance, always breeding sores in the body politic. To the other it is the completion, on one of its sides, of an organic body that will grow and develop with all the more success that its component parts are fairly welded together. Something, no doubt, was due to the policy which dictated Cialdini's march towards Venice after Austria's cession of the territory to France. Viennese politicians imagined that the Italians would not dare to invade "French territory;" but the army of Victor Emmanuel and its leaders were not so easily frightened, and their constancy was rewarded by the non-intervention of the French. The influence exercised by Louis Napoleon on the settlement of the Austro-Prussian quarrel was not so great as had been expected. He secured a nominal independence for the kingdom of Saxony, and a vague promise that the people of North Schleswig, who for the most part are Danes, should some day or other be allowed to settle their nationality, whether they would be German or Danish, by a popular vote. That day has not arrived yet, after a lapse of four years.

Prussia's gain by the war was enormous. Her rival Austria was absolutely turned out of Germany, almost as completely as she had been turned out of Italy. Saxony was completely subordinate to Prussia. Hanover, Cassel, Darmstadt, and Nassau were bodily annexed to her. With a large compact territory north of the Maine, with some thirty millions of people homogeneous in language, culture, taste, and mainly in religion, trained to arms and inspirited with the remembrance of great successes, she found herself at the doors of the smaller states south of the Maine who were unable to resist her influence or her arms, and felt constrained to agree to the military conventions which, for all purposes of peace and war, made the Germans a mighty irresistible nation. Prussia emerged from the war powerful abroad as well as at home. She could show that, having crushed Austria, she was afraid neither of France or Russia, and those great domineering powers found themselves compelled to respect the new power that had arisen in Europe. Well for France had she seen as clearly as her ruler the power of the neighbour who quickly defied him, and denied him the smallest concession by way of restoring the equilibrium of the great powers of Enrope.

Much as Prussia has done by her military power and her excellent organization, English readers will do well to recollect the price that is paid for that state of national drill, which makes the whole population a powerful machine in the hands of a king, his ministers, and generals. We as a people should be very loath to sacrifice our personal freedom and individual independence to the exigencies of a rigorous military system, that with harsh if equal legality takes the squire from the hall, the peasant from the plough, the merchant from his counting house, the clerk from his desk, the artist from his studio, the tradesman from his shop, the artizan and the operative from their bench and from their loom, to serve an apprenticeship to the bloody genius of war. The battle for freedom which England fights most successfully has to be waged in the region of opinion and moral influence; though she is obliged by the practices of her neighbours to maintain a large reserve of physical force, she will by her legislation, her literature, and her commerce, encourage peace among nations and the domestic development of individual prosperity in all parts of the world. The glory of carrying on such a work will be far greater than the barbarous *prestige* conceded to military conquerors—a false glory, which it is fervently to be desired will at no distant date disappear, as the renown of being a successful duellist has already ceased to be an object of honourable ambition in civilized society.

The great power and influence acquired by Prussia in her war with Austria and the overthrow of so many of the princelets of Germany was, men feared, to be used in favour of a feudal reaction, that should once more build up society on the basis of the divine right of kings, the blessedness of privilege, and the virtue of blue blood. But there is too much culture on the one hand, and too thorough a love of liberty on the other, for such a reaction to be possible in a territory inhabited by thirty or forty million people of Teutonic race. Despotism tempered by humanity, knowledge, and wisdom may be submitted to by a nation in times of crisis and transition, but its permanent enthronement will never be endured. Nor is it likely that unbridled democracy will gain possession of united Germany; but a peaceful, orderly, representative government, in which every interest is allowed a voice, and a career is open to all talent, is that which seems destined to bind together for ages those parts of the great German family which have been so long separated by the narrow selfishness of feudal lords and petty princes.

CHAPTER V.

Leading Actors in the great Drama—The King-President of the North German Confederation—His Ancestry and their labours for Prussia—Progressive enlargement of Territory and increase of Population—Conquests of Napoleon I.—Restorations and Additions at the Congress of Vienna—Birth of William—Flight from Berlin with Queen Louise—Maxim of Kant the Philosopher—Death of Louise—William in the War of Liberation—His sister Charlotte married to Nicholas of Russia—Friendship of the Brothers-in-law—Journey to Russia—Bite from a chained mastiff—Amateur actor in "Lalla Rookh"—Journey into Italy—Marriage with Princess Augusta of Saxe Weimar—William becomes Crown Prince and Governor of Pomerania—Opposed to violent Changes of the Constitution—Intercourse with Bunsen—Tour in England and Scotland—Conversation with the Duke of Wellington—Attitude of the Crown Prince in 1848—Sudden visit to England—10th April, 1848, in London—Election to the Constituent Assembly—Command in Baden—Political Re-action—Governor of Westphalia and the Rhinelands—Residence at Coblentz—Illness of his brother the King—William made Regent—His first acquaintance with Bismarck—Accession to the Throne—Appoints Bismarck Prime Minister—In Denmark, 1864—At Gastein—Receives an ovation in Berlin, 29th June, 1866—Goes into Bohemia—Risk of Capture—Anxious suspense at Sadowa—The King under fire—Triumphal Return to Berlin—The King's Brothers, Son, and Nephews—The Crown Prince—His Popularity—Military Talent—Domesticity—Prince Frederick Charles—"Always in the Front"—His Campaigns—Important Remarks on the Reformation of Military Tactics—Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, son of the King's sister—General Baron von Moltke—Sketch of his life—In Denmark, Prussia, Turkey, and Bohemia—His Lesson to a French officer—General von Roon, Minister of War—Vogel von Falckenstein in the War of Liberation—In Denmark—On the Maine—In Silesia—Austrian Notabilities—Archduke Albert—General Benedek—Results of the War to the two Antagonists—Prussia's gain—In Territory incorporated—In Influence over the New Confederation of North Germany—Sketch of the Confederation and its Constitution—Austria's loss—Of Territory in Italy—Of Influence in Germany—Her gain in Union with Hungary—New Constitution of the Double Austro-Hungarian Empire—Provincial Diets—Reichsrath—The Executive—Hungarian Chamber of Magnates and Deputies—County Meetings—Executive—Sketch of Count Beust—Speeches of Beust and of the Emperor—Deak Ferencz—History of his Labours for Hungary—Proceedings in Berlin—King's Speech—Coolness towards France—Address of the Chamber—Speech of Count von Bismarck—Application of the Prussian Constitution to the Incorporated States—Possibility of a renewal of War—The right of Prussia to annex is the right of Germany—Bill of Indemnity passed in favour of the Prussian Government—Reconciliation of the Chambers and the Government—The King's apology for annexing Hanover, &c.—Bismarck on the attitude of France in December, 1866—Prussian Indulgence and Modesty—Austria's severance from the Confederation a positive advantage to France—France a match for the North German Confederation—Difficulty of ceding North Schleswig to the Danes with an Ethnological Frontier—Pressure on the Subject from France at Nikolsburg and Prague—Italy's fidelity to Prussia under temptation of the cession of Venetia through France—Remarks on the Delay of Prussia in fulfilling her Engagements with respect to North Schleswig—Germans not likely to prove an Aggressive Nation—Their Enthusiasm for the Unity of their Country traced back—Sufferings from Disunion—The Literature of Patriotism—Karl Theodor Körner—"Father, on Thee I Call"—Professor Jahn—The poet Arndt—"What is the German Fatherland?"—Niklas Becker—Max Schneckinger—The Rhine Watch, or "Who'll Guard the Rhine?"—A Song by Ruckert—Uhland.

THE elaborate narration of the events recorded in the last chapter was due not only to their intrinsic importance, but also to their especial bearing upon the history which forms the substance of the present work. The Seven Week's War turned into a channel of practical effort all the streaming patriotism that had agitated the German mind for a century. The changes resulting from the successful conclusion of the war were pregnant with other results very momentous, but not necessarily disastrous to Europe. It is necessary now to give a more personal account of the leading actors in that great drama, since they have all survived to play principal parts in the more tremendous tragedy yet to be described.

To begin with KING WILLIAM, the President of the North German Confederation. The kings of Prussia, says Mr. Martin in his excellent "Statesman's Year Book," trace their origin to Count Thassilo of Zollern, one of the generals of Charlemagne. His successor, Count Frederick I., built the family castle of Hohenzollern, near the Danube, in the year 980. A subsequent Zollern or Hohenzollern, Frederick III., was elevated to the rank of a prince of the Holy Roman Empire in 1273, and received the burgraviate of Nuremberg in fief; and his great grandson Frederick VI., being invested by Kaiser Sigismund, in 1411, with the province of Brandenburg, obtained the rank of elector in 1417. A century after, in 1511, the Teutonic Knights, owners of the large province of Prussia on the Baltic, elected Margrave Albert, a younger son of the family of Hohenzollern, to the post of grandmaster, and he, after a while, declared himself hereditary prince. The early extinction of Albert's line brought the province of Prussia to the electors of Brandenburg, whose own territories meanwhile had been greatly en-

larged by the valour and wisdom of Friedrich Wilhelm, the "Great Elector," under whose fostering care rose the first standing army in central Europe. The great elector, dying in 1688, left a country of one and a half millions, a vast treasure, and 38,000 of well drilled troops to his son Frederick I., who put the kingly crown on his head at Königsberg, on the 18th of January, 1701. The first king of Prussia made few efforts to increase the territory left him by the great elector; but his successor, Frederick William I., acquired a treasure of 9,000,000 of thalers, or nearly a million and a half sterling, bought family domains to the amount of 5,000,000 thalers, and raised the annual income of the country to 6,000,000, three-fourths of which, however, had to be spent on the army. After adding part of Pomerania to the possessions of the house, he left his son and successor Frederick II., called "the Great," a state of 47,770 square miles, with 2,500,000 inhabitants. Frederick II. added Silesia, an area of 14,200 square miles, with 1,250,000 souls. This, and the large territory gained in the first partition of Poland, increased Prussia to 74,340 square miles, with a population of more than 5,500,000. Under the reign of Frederick's successor, Frederick William II., the state was enlarged by the acquisition of the principalities of Anspach and Baireuth, as well as the vast territory acquired in another partition of Poland, which raised its area to the extent of nearly 100,000 square miles, with about 9,000,000 souls. Under Frederick William III., nearly one half of this state and population was taken by Napoleon I. At the Congress of Vienna, however, not only was the loss restored, but much territory was added; to wit, parts of the kingdom of Saxony, the Rhinelands, and Swedish Pomerania, moulding Prussia into two separated districts of a total area of 107,300 square miles.

King William of Prussia, as already stated, is the second son of King Frederick William III., and of the heroic Queen Louise, who sustained the spirits of her husband and her countrymen during the terrible trial they underwent at the hands of Napoleon I. He was born in 1797, nine months before his father's accession to the throne. He is therefore old enough to remember the anguish of his parents and the humiliation of his native land. He was one of the children who fled with the beautiful queen, their mother, after the battle of Jena, from Berlin to Stettin, from Stettin to Königsberg, from Königsberg to Memel. Here the royal family lived in a simplicity that approached penury; the king having coined his plate to assist in the contribution exacted by the French. The queen and her eldest daughter were not above helping in affairs of the house. She looked more charming then, says an eye-witness, seated near a shabby table in a simple room, than at the grandest court festival crowded with golden uniforms and stars.

The tutor of the young folks at this time was a Monsieur Chambeau from the French colony, who accompanied the family in their flight. One maxim of Kant's, the Königsberg philosopher, was thoroughly inculcated into the minds of both the princes and princesses—"What a state loses in outward importance, must be replaced by inward greatness and development." Precious are the uses of adversity! and wisely did Prussia, under the guidance of men like Stein, Gneisenau, Hardenberg, and others, apply to practice the profound maxim of her great thinker. It was at Königsberg, to which the simple court returned from Memel after the treaty of Tilsit, that the queen gathered learned Germans to her evening parties, discussed methods of education, and encouraged outbursts of patriotic song, destined to penetrate and elevate the down-trodden nation. To all this young William was not insensible. Bitter to him and to them all was the premature death of their mother, in 1810, a year after her return to Berlin. The prince was bred to arms, and bore a part in the famous campaigns of 1813 and 1814, in which the power of the Corsican conqueror was broken at Leipzig and other places. The Westphalian kingdom of Jerome Bonaparte was restored with other spoils to the Prussian crown, and the four bronze horses were replaced in their rightful position over the Brandenburg gate at Berlin.

When the Grand-duke Nicholas of Russia sought the hand of the Princess Charlotte of Prussia, she made a confidant of her brother William, who was able to tell the Russian prince that his advances were not disagreeable to the young lady. From that time a fast friendship subsisted between the two princes, who, a year or two afterwards, became brothers-in-law. Their predilection for military occupations knitted their friendship with the bond of a common sympathy, as did their high notions of the royal prerogative and the right

divine of kings. When the princess, in 1817, after two years' probation in the mysteries of the Russo-Greek Church, proceeded to Russia to her marriage, her brother William bore her company, and participated in the great bridal festivals that took place in Petersburg and Moscow. On their arrival at the Russian capital, the Emperor Alexander introduced the young prince to the empress-mother, with the words, "Allow me to present to you my new brother;" on which the sorely-tried widow of Paul I. replied, as she embraced him, "And I, too, gain a son." This simple record of an act of courtesy is a slender historical link uniting the invader of France in 1870 with the murdered monarch of Russia, who perished in 1801. The gorgeous splendour of the Russian court offered a strong contrast to that of Berlin; but Prince William's mind was always more set on solid advantage than on showy appearance, and he was little affected by the oriental display of magnificence that he witnessed in the ancient and modern capitals of the Czar. His natural easy bearing in his intercourse with Russian society, his activity in movement and liveliness of spirits, contrasted favourably with the stiff and formal manners of the Russian archdukes, and won him golden opinions. While at his sister's country palace of Pavlosk he was one day bitten by a chained mastiff. As no one could say what the consequences might be, he was cauterized, and bore the operation with a good humour that caused the dowager-empress to exclaim, "No wonder! for he is a Prussian prince."

In his old age the gallant king suffers, in the person of his subjects, from a chained mastiff of a fiercer kind, who has both inflicted and received wounds that nothing but the Lethean influence of time can heal or obliterate. Prince William was again in Petersburg in 1819, and was one of the few recipients of that momentous secret which the Emperor Alexander then first communicated to his second brother, to the effect that he proposed abdicating his throne in favour of Nicholas. Constantine had consented to the arrangement, and the king of Prussia was credited with a similar plan in favour of his eldest son. Neither plan came into operation; but on Alexander's death, six years' later, Nicholas did supersede Constantine, the rightful heir to the throne, and had to suppress a military revolt in consequence. It is difficult to imagine the stern King William of the present playing a part on the mimic stage even fifty years ago; yet such was the case in 1820, when he and his elder brother appeared at a court spectacle in Berlin as sons of Aurungzebe in Moore's "Lalla Rookh." Ernest, duke of Cumberland, played Abdallah in the same representation, little dreaming doubtless that the pleasant young man elbowing him in the crowd would one day oust his son and grandson from the crown and kingdom of Hanover. Not long after this, in 1822, the prince went into Italy with his father and brother At Rome, while the learned Niebuhr conducted the king to all objects of interest in the city, the young prince's guide was the scholarly Bunsen, who found Prince William "a sober and manly" young gentleman. The marriage of the latter, in 1829, to the Princess Augusta of Saxe Weimar, sister to his brother Karl's wife, was the occasion of festivities as brilliant in their way, that is, in the frugal, practical, Prussian way, as had been the wedding ceremonies of his sister the empress of Russia. During the life of his frugal father, the prince seems to have received little or no advancement in the public service. Yet his mind, though given principally to military studies, was not indifferent to the art and literature which flourished with so much lustre at his father's and his brother's court. On a visit to Peterhof in 1847 he is found advising with his brother-in-law, the Czar, upon architectural improvements, and discussing the merits of the public buildings, not of Italy only, but of England, a country not generally credited abroad with fine architecture. By the accession of his brother to the throne in 1840 William became Crown Prince, and was that year made governor of Pomerania.

During the discussions on the new Prussian constitution, which took place in 1844, so decidedly opposed was the Crown Prince to certain liberal proposals which the king seemed inclined to adopt, that he avowed his intention of quitting the country if they were adopted. These proposals, it was said at court, emanated from Bunsen, who had been summoned from the embassy in London, and was daily closeted with the king, a circumstance that disposed the prince to regard the ambassador with an unfriendly eye. The feeling, however, quickly passed away; for in August that year his royal highness paid a visit to Queen Victoria on the birth of her second son, and seized the opportunity of making a rapid tour

through England and Scotland, with Bunsen for his guide. The king, who had a great liking for Bunsen and reverenced his character, was anxious that his brother should profit by the intercourse which this English trip afforded him. In a letter to his ambassador he wrote, "Talk over with William all things as much as possible, politics, church matters, the arts, Jerusalem in particular. I have begged him, on his part, to discuss everything unreservedly with you; that will be most useful and very necessary." His present Prussian Majesty does not appear to have been deeply impressed with the "Jerusalem" part of the conversations. He took an affection for England, however, and admired her greatness, which he attributed to her religious and political institutions. He took every opportunity of exchanging ideas with English notabilities, Bunsen acting as interpreter. The duke of Wellington readily replied to questions on military subjects. Only one of his answers unfortunately is recorded, and is a reply to a question about military regulations:—"I know of none more important," he said, "than closely to attend to the comfort of the soldier: let him be well clothed, sheltered, and fed. How should he fight, poor fellow! if, besides risking his life, he has to struggle with unnecessary hardships? Also he must not, if it can be helped, be struck by the balls before he is fairly in action. One ought to look sharp after the young officers, and be very indulgent to the soldiers." These words of the veteran were not forgotten by the prince.

Conservative in politics, his royal highness met the democratic outbreak of 1848 with a very different countenance from that of his brother the king, who had dreams of universal philanthropy. So notoriously unpopular was he with the masses, that on news of the revolution being communicated to the alarmed empress of Russia, she fainted away, after exclaiming, "And my brother William!" He did, in fact, take temporary refuge in England, and was in London on the famous 10th of April, when the Chartists carried their monster petition through the streets, and tumults were anticipated. His royal highness was much struck with the duke of Wellington's reply to Bunsen's inquiry, "Your grace will take us all in charge, and London too, on Monday the 10th?" "Yes," was the answer, "we have taken our measures; but not a soldier nor a piece of artillery shall you see, unless in actual need. Should the force of law—the mounted and unmounted police—be overpowered or in danger, then is their time. But it is not fair, on either side, to call them in to do the work of police; the military must not be confounded with the police, nor merged in the police." The prince had arrived in London unexpectedly on the 27th of March, and after a stay of exactly two months he returned to Berlin, having been elected, in May, member of the Constituent Assembly by the constituency of Wirsitz in Posen, and he took his seat in that assembly on the 8th of June. The main cause of his unpopularity was doubtless due to his fondness for arms and the armed force, and his readiness to make use of them for the maintenance of order. To him in the main is Prussia indebted for coming out of the crisis of 1848–49 in her ancient form of a kingdom, although it was with modifications. In June, 1849, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces sent against the revolutionists of Baden; when with the partial use of the needle-gun he quelled the insurrection, and contributed no little to the return of the tide of re-action throughout Europe. He was soon after appointed military governor of Westphalia and the Rhine provinces, and settled in Coblentz. His regard for Prince Albert and the Queen brought him again to England "straight from Russia," in 1850, in order to be present at the christening of their son, his godchild, Prince Arthur. At the time of the war between Russia and the Western Powers he openly expressed an opinion, that if Prussia had assumed a firm attitude the Czar would not have proceeded with his aggression, and war would have been prevented. In that year, 1854, he was appointed colonel-general of Prussian infantry, and governor of the federal fortress of Mayence. The mental disorder of his brother, the king, had reached a very advanced stage in 1857, and long before the men in office would admit his incapacity. The Crown Prince, however, would not accept the responsibilities of a ruler without the full power of regent, to which office he was at length called in October, 1858.

His first acquaintance with his now celebrated minister dates as far back as 1836, when Bismarck and another law student of equally great stature were introduced to Prince William. "Well!" said the prince, gaily, "Justice seeks her young advocates according to the standard of the guards;"

a chance remark that, so far as Bismarck is concerned, has been verified in more senses than one. Yet, in 1851, when the Crown Prince was received at Frankfort by the Diet, he rather disapproved of "that militia lieutenant"—for Bismarck had appeared in uniform—being the representative of Prussia in the Diet of the Confederation. He also thought him too young at the age of thirty-six for so responsible an office. He was not long, however, in discovering the ripeness of the minister's understanding, the vivacity of his ideas, and the strength of his character, which rapidly attracted the prince's good will, and a regard which soon ripened into intimate friendship. King Frederick William IV. died on 2nd January, 1861, and William ascended the throne. He spent part of the summer at Baden-Baden, where Bismarck, on leave from his Petersburg mission, had much conversation with his new majesty. Upon one subject these two were thoroughly agreed, that unless a total re-organization of their army were to take place, Prussia would not attain to a high position in the world. The consequence of this agreement became apparent the following year, when the king, after sending his friend on a brief embassy to Paris, appointed him minister-president. Here was the man to battle with liberalism and parliamentarianism, and to make a good army and a strong government! and the liberal ministry had to make way for him. It is a *coup d'état!* exclaimed the democrats, and fiercely angry was the opposition which the appointment roused. Such strife as ensued in the Chamber of Deputies for the six years following has no parallel in parliamentary annals; but the courage and constancy of the king and his minister triumphed over the fiery eloquence, and the really popular cause, of the opposition deputies. The king owned on one occasion the extent of his debt to his minister's pluck and perseverance. On being complimented during those troublous days on his own good looks, he pointed to Bismarck, and said, "There's my doctor!" In 1863 his Majesty accepted the invitation of the emperor of Austria to a congress of princes at Gastein, where a reform of the Federation was proposed, under the direction of Austria. To this Prussia would not consent, nor would King William attend the subsequent meeting of German sovereigns at Frankfort, which was thus rendered inoperative. After the storming of Düppel by Prince Frederick Charles in 1864, the king proceeded to the seat of war, in order to congratulate his troops on the field of victory. In the autumn of the following year was concluded with Austria the Convention of Gastein, for reasons that probably were based on the king's personal regard for the emperor rather than from motives of policy, for it was plain that it must from political necessity soon be set at nought. The king's life was not an easy one. Working incessantly with his ministers at negotiation, and at administration, military, financial, and general, he had also frequent occasion to know that his life was in danger at the hands of excited enthusiasts of the liberal and democratic party.

At length, in 1866, came the great event, the war with Austria, the triumph and enlargement of Prussia, which, in the eyes of his subjects, condoned all past errors, and made them proud of their king, his ministers, and his generals. The first news of victory over the Austrians was received in Berlin on the 29th June, while the king and Count von Bismarck were still in Berlin. The excitement among the people was tremendous. They sang Luther's hymn in front of the palace, "A strong tower is our God, a trusty shield and weapon," that hymn which ever since the battle of Leuthen has time after time aroused and sustained the Prussian soldier on the march to battle; and the king spoke to them from his balcony words known to be of thanks and congratulation, but inaudible in the deafening roar of human voices below. The minister-president also received an ovation, and ended his reply with a salute to the king and army. As he spoke, a tremendous peal of thunder reverberated over the city, which was illuminated by the accompanying flash of lightning, and Bismarck's ringing voice was heard shouting above the multitude, "The heavens fire a salute." Next day the king set out for the seat of war, accompanied by his ministers. On the way they were so little guarded, that by the admission of Count von Bismarck himself, the Austrians, "had they sent cavalry from Leitmeritz, might have caught the king and all the rest of us." They met Prince Frederick Charles on the road to Gitchin on the 2nd July, and after a council of war held at midnight, resolved on the momentous battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, which began amid fog and rain at eight o'clock in the morning of the 3rd. Till mid-day the battle went on furiously, and the Austrians were certainly not worsted. "Noon arrived, says

Hezekiel, in a striking picture of the scene, "but no decisive news from the Crown Prince. Many a brave heart feared at that time for beloved Prussia. Dark were the looks in the neighbourhood of the king; old Roon, and Moltke of the bright face, sat there like two statues of bronze. It was whispered that Prince Frederick Charles would have to let loose against the foe his Brandenburghers—his own beloved third corps, whom he had held in reserve—his stormers of Düppel, which would be setting his hazard on the die in very deed. Suddenly Bismarck lowered the glass through which he had been observing the country along which the Crown Prince was expected to come, and drew the attention of his neighbours to some lines in the far distance. All telescopes were pointed thitherward, but the lines were pronounced to be ploughed fields. There was a deep silence till the minister-president, lowering his glass again, said decidedly, 'They are not plough furrows, the spaces are not equal; they are marching lines!' He had been the first to discover the advance of the second army. In a little while the adjutants with the intelligence flew about in every direction—The Crown Prince and victory are at hand!" The warlike old monarch dashed into the grenade fire of the enemy, on which Bismarck, who kept close to him, begged him to pause. 'As a major,' he said, 'I have no right to counsel your Majesty on the battlefield; but as minister-president, it is my duty to beg your Majesty not to seek evident danger.' 'How can I ride off when my army is under fire?' replied the stout-hearted king." The march on Vienna and the armistice of Nikolsburg soon followed.

On the 20th September the victorious troops made their triumphal entry into Berlin, with the king, the royal princes, the ministers, and principal generals at their head. There rode Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke, Voigts-Rheetz, chief of the staff of the first army, Blumenthal, chief of the staff of the second army, and other personages almost as distinguished. Rejoicings and feastings ensued, and the now popular king anticipated a long and steadfast repose on his laurels.

"We have always," said Count von Bismarck, in a speech delivered to some Holsteiners in December, 1866, some three months after the peace of Prague, "we have always belonged to each other as Germans; we have ever been brothers; but we were unconscious of it. In this country there were different races—Schleswigers, Holsteiners, Lauenburgers; elsewhere too, there are Mecklenburgers, Hanoverians, Lübeckers, and Hamburgers. They are all free to remain what they are, in the knowledge that they are Germans—that they are brothers. To the wisdom and energy of one man we owe it, that at length we are able to recognize, vividly and with joy, our common German descent and solidarity. Him we must thank—our lord and king—with a hearty cheer, for having rendered this consciousness of our common relationship a truth and a fact. Long live his Majesty, our most gracious king and sovereign, William I.!" This pithy expression of satisfaction at the great work achieved is as honourable to the minister who prompted the task as to the sovereign who responded to the call made on his energies in carrying it out.

Other skilful aid he had besides that of his minister-president. More fortunate than many kings, he found conspicuous valour and ability in members of his own family. To say nothing of his brothers Karl, commander of the Prussian artillery, and Albrecht, general of cavalry, who held high military command with credit, there were his son the Crown Prince, and his two nephews, Prince Friedrich Karl and the Grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who distinguished themselves in the field of battle.

THE CROWN PRINCE.

The Hohenzollerns, says Carlyle in his "History of Frederick the Great," are men who seek no fighting where such can be avoided; but who can, when it is necessary, carry on a brisk and vigorous attack. These words apply not only to the present head of the family, but peculiarly to the person of his son. Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia was born on the 18th October, 1831, the anniversary of the day on which the great battle of Leipzig was fought, the battle of German deliverance from the Gallic yoke. This anniversary has always been marked by the fires which burn on the German hills, and in the year 1831 these fires proclaimed a happy day. From his mother, Queen Augusta of the royal house of Weimar, the prince inherited the unassuming kindness and true-heartedness of disposition which distinguish him, together with a certain gentleness in judging others, and liberality in political affairs, which have not hitherto charac-

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terized members of the family. The prince was educated at the University of Bonn, and after finishing college studies, he began the service of the pike and drum. He married on the 28th January, 1858, Victoria, princess royal of Great Britain and Ireland, who has borne him a numerous offspring. A pleasant and genuinely German family life is that of the prince. Art and science are much encouraged by him. A tall stately man, says one who saw him at Berlin in 1867, with a brave handsome countenance, and looking taller in his light blue dragoon uniform with the yellow collar, which he wears but seldom. When engaged in conversation the serious, almost solemn, look which marks his face in repose, gives way to an expression of pleasant animation.

The inexhaustible humour and good temper with which the prince took part in the winter campaign against Denmark, made him beloved by the soldiers. The year 1866 strengthened the confidence he had already won. On the day of Königgrätz he had the difficult task, described in the previous chapter, of debouching with the second army through narrow dales and vast forests, until towards mid-day he succeeded in surrounding the left wing of the enemy. The movement that he effected despite so many difficulties determined the issue of the battle. The correct eye of the prince, which sees quickly the right thing to be done, his indefatigableness and energy, are the theme of admiration to those who know him. One striking proof of the confidence reposed in him by his father's subjects, is the exclamation not seldom heard uttered by parents of the youths summoned to march under the standard: "It's all right if they join the Crown Prince, they will be in good hands." The emphatic testimony of one of the German historians of the war, who compares the generalship of the Crown Prince with that of his cousin Friedrich, is to the effect that the method of the former in conducting the campaign calls to mind the masterly enterprise of renowned captains. The conflict between the Government and the House of Deputies brought him trouble too. It was to the Crown Prince, whose predilection for free parliamentary government he well knew, that Count von Bismarck on one occasion made the remarkable statement of his devotion to the idea of German unity. "What matter," he said, "if they hang me, provided that the rope by which I am hung, bind this new Germany to your throne." Worthy son of a worthy sire, the prince gives promise that the splendid crown awaiting him, will rest on brows which, however they may ache with toil and care, will never harbour an ignoble thought or unmanly purpose.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES.

"Prince always in the front" (*Prinz allzeit vorauf*), thus the people named the Hohenzollern cavalry general in the year 1866, and even as "*allzeit vorauf*" he has lived in the minds of the people ever since cannon shot for the first time crashed around him at Missunde. The German soldiery have a more affectionate regard for that *sobriquet* than for the newer title given by the people, of "Red Prince." Born in 1828, as the son of Prince Karl, brother of the king, he quickly ascended the step-ladder of military honour. With the Hohenzollerns it is an old piece of family pride to show themselves worthy of such honours by unwearied care and study, and in the service of their house to use it for the best interests of the army. In the year 1864 the prince first had an opportunity of showing the world that Prussian skill and bravery had not degenerated during a long time of peace. In 1866 he led the first army into Bohemia, and won the unreserved confidence of his soldiers and the fame of a bold general. A critic, already quoted, says of this prince's conduct of this campaign, that he pursued his way with extraordinary circumspection, following the tactics of a wary general, anxious for the security of his flanks, driving the enemy quietly before him, but leaving little to chance; doing his work cleanly, but too slowly for the attainment of the combined plans. In his operations, as well as in battle, he was always concentrated, and moved frontwise, whereas the Crown Prince generally took up a broad front, threatening and attacking the enemy in flank, forgetting his own line of retreat, but looking sharply after that of his opponent. Prince Frederick's method is correct according to the systematic teaching of the school of Archduke Charles. His leisure after the Bohemian campaign was employed in preparing a pamphlet about French military science, the delicate thorough observations of which show that his courage was coupled with superior intellectual power. Up to 1859 the Prussian tactics, says Colonel Chesney, remained as they were left after Waterloo, and thought was first bestowed upon them when the French

fought and won the battle of Solferino. This battle aroused the deepest anxiety in the minds of the Prussians, and the well-known lecture of Prince Frederick Charles, who put before the Prussians the principles upon which the French had fought and conquered, took a deep hold, not merely because the lecturer was a prince, but because men felt that he dealt with a want of their time. The prince pointed out that the French fought in loose formation, but above all, with a design; and from that time the great subject of study was, "How to beat the French by using their own freedom of movement." The result was that the Prussian system was changed in 1861. The Prussian Tactical Instructions of 1861 laid aside all attempts to teach men by rule—officers were given principles, and left to work out their applications by themselves. The proposals of Prince Frederick Charles led to breaking up battalions, so as to allow of the formation of company columns, gaining thereby elasticity in the movements of infantry. The Austro-Prussian war, which followed soon after, was too short to display fully the effect of the new tactics; but there were two remarkable mistakes and failures, at Langensalza and Trautenau, where the defeat of the Prussians occurred from special causes. It is a remarkable fact in favour of the Prussian system, that the general in command at Trautenau is in high favour at the present time, and the subject of that defeat has been a matter of special study by the Prussians since, showing that they are not ashamed of profiting by their own mistakes. If to know his enemy accurately be a condition of victory, the Prussian commander of the first army in Bohemia was well qualified for his position.

GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG.

Another nephew of the king distinguished as a military commander is Frederick Francis, grand-duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, son of the Grand-duke Paul Frederick, and of the Princess Alexandra of Prussia. He was born on the 18th February, 1823, and carried on his studies at the university of Bonn, when the death of his father, on the 7th of March, 1842, left him possessor of the grand-ducal throne. The revolutionary movement of 1848 obliged him to make some liberal modifications of the constitution; but in 1851 the aristocratic party among his subjects managed to get the old state of things re-established. In 1849 the grand-duke married Augusta Mathilda Wilhelmina, daughter of Henry, prince of Reuss-Schleiss. By her he has had several children, the eldest of whom, Francis Paul, was born on the 19th March, 1851. In 1866 he was appointed to the command of the second Prussian reserved corps at Leipzig, and on the 18th of July was charged with the duty of occupying Franconia, a task he accomplished with as much promptitude and skill as humanity and kind feeling towards the inhabitants of the invaded territory. He was on his way to unite his forces with those of General Manteuffel, when news of the armistice put a stop to further operations. The king of Prussia on this occasion sent the "order of merit" to the grand-duke with an autograph letter.

GENERAL BARON VON MOLTKE.

The first rank after the royal commanders of the Prussian forces is unquestionably due to General von Moltke. So unobtrusive has been the life of this eminent man and so opposed to display is his character, that materials for his biography are extremely scanty. "And that is really Von Moltke!" said one who saw the great strategist for the first time; "that tall thin man without any moustache or whiskers, his hands behind his back—the officer with very short greyish hair, and a face cut with many fine lines, his head slightly stooped, his eyebrows pronounced, and the eyes deep set." Yes, there is the man whom the Junkers of Berlin called "the old schoolmaster." "What a lesson he has taught the enemies of his country!" He is the man who caught Benedek in a vice at Königgrätz, and prepared for greater things to come. "He always looks very grave." He is pre-eminently a nineteenth century man, having been born in the year 1800, and a self-made man, having been a soldier since his twentieth year, owing his advancement to his own efforts. "I like self-made men," once remarked Count von Bismarck, "it is the best sort of manufacture in our race." The birthplace of Moltke is Gnewitz in Mecklenburg, the Slavonic name of which signifies "anger." The Christian names of the baron are Helmuth Charles Bernard, the first of which being purely German may be interpreted by the word "heroism." If the general's history should pass, in a remote future, into the mythic stage, here are two points that

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will be valued by the epic poet who may treat the subject.

On completing his college career young Moltke entered the military service of the king of Denmark, but in 1822 passed over to that of Prussia. By a process of self-teaching he acquired a remarkable knowledge of modern languages, an accomplishment which gave rise to the familiar saying that he was "silent in seven tongues." When he had been ten years in the Prussian service his talents and large information procured him an appointment on the staff. In 1835 he travelled in the East and was presented to Sultan Mahmoud. That sovereign, full of schemes of military reform in his empire, requested the German officer to enter his service; and failing in that request persuaded him to obtain a long furlough for service of a limited period, that he might initiate the Father of the faithful in new theories of strategy, and direct the military reforms his Majesty had so much at heart. The earnest and fruitful study he made of the military art at this time may be seen in his excellent "History of the Russo-Turkish Campaign, 1828–29," which is full of shrewd observation and practical instruction. This work was published in 1845, after his return to Berlin, and was translated into English at the commencement of the Crimean war in 1854; the translator, who is anonymous, makes a statement in his preface that proves how thoroughly Moltke kept out of the sight of the world. "Baron von Moltke, *who is now dead*, was despatched to the Turkish army by order of his own sovereign, at the express request of Sultan Mahmoud, and served with it through the campaigns here described." The campaign he did serve in was that of Syria, which took place in 1839. He published another work in 1841 concerning Turkey, entitled "Letters on the Occurrences in Turkey from 1835 to 1839." Two earlier literary productions attributed to him may be mentioned here, namely, an historical view of Belgium and Holland, published in 1831; and the year following a paper upon Poland. Soon after his return from Turkey to Prussia he was appointed in 1846 aide-de-camp to Prince Henry, who lived in retirement at Rome, and died there the ensuing year. After executing missions intrusted to him in his capacity of an officer on the staff, Moltke in 1856 became aide-de-camp to Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the present Crown Prince, who doubtless owes to him much of that military knowledge and skill of which he has proved himself master. Three years later Moltke was made chief of the staff of the army, and his first important task was to draw up a plan of operations with a view to intervention in the Franco-Austrian war in Italy of 1859. The peace of Villafranca obviated the necessity of any military movements at that time; but the effort to be in readiness had revealed to the practised eye of the chief of the staff defects that needed absolute cure ere the Prussian army could become an instrument of any considerable weight in Europe. The maxim of the great Königsberger already quoted fermented in a powerful mind, and "the loss that the Prussian state had sustained in outward importance was now to be rapidly replaced by inward greatness and development in a military sense." The first successful operations of the re-organized army in the Danish campaign of 1864 were conducted on a plan advised by Baron von Moltke, who accompanied Prince Friedrich Karl, the commander-in-chief, throughout the expedition.

The very next year he was actively engaged in preparing a plan of campaign in anticipation of war with Austria, and when war was declared somewhat later, in 1866, his plan was faithfully carried out. Accompanying the king into Bohemia, he directed the march on Vienna which had such a stimulating effect on the Austrian authorities, and induced the acceptance of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. It was Moltke who on the 22nd June granted the truce of five days, that led to the armistice. The entire confidence of the king in his able lieutenant was pleasantly illustrated by his Majesty's reply to some general who wanted troops detached for his reinforcement, "Ask him there!" pointing to Moltke, with a smile, "he wants them all; I dont know if he will let me have my body guard for long." It was on the occasion of the armistice of Nikolsburg that the king decorated Baron von Moltke with the distinguished order of the Black Eagle. That short and sharp campaign did indeed render fully manifest the remarkable powers of the general, and enforced the claims made for him by his admirers to be the greatest strategist of the age. War has been to him a purely scientific study, wholly devoid of passion, of political or personal feeling. He has acquired his knowledge as a skilful chemist comes to know chemistry—by study, by experiment, and by combination. All possible aids that he can

discover or think of are brought in as auxiliaries to victory. The remarkable use made of the telegraph wires in the Bohemian campaign is an instance of this. The carriages conveying the telegraphic instruments formed a nearer adjunct of the staff at head-quarters than the ammunition or provision waggons.

The following interesting glimpse of the general as a teacher is from the pen of a recent French writer:—"MacMahon is supposed to have adopted tactics which are not new; namely, to act above all with his artillery, said to be formidable, and to spare his men as much as possible. Napoleon I., of whom General de Moltke is only the pupil, never proceeded otherwise. He it was who first imagined the great concentration of troops by rapid marches. M. de Moltke, his fervent admirer, has always manifested the greatest contempt for our strategy. I remember having heard quoted some of his very words addressed to a French officer on a mission to Berlin—'Do not talk to me of your military education in Africa. If you have never been there, so much the better; when you become general you will be glad of it. The war you have been carrying on for forty years against the Arabs is a guerillerie of an inferior order. Never any skilful marches, no feints, no countermarches, rarely any surprises. With that school you will do nothing more than form other schools like it. The first great war will demonstrate your inefficiency; and were I not in presence of a man of your merit, sir, I should not hesitate to laugh at your ignorance of the trade to which you devote yourselves. Amongst you—do not deny it—a pioneer is almost a ridiculous person, and in general the working man is one of mean intelligence. Here, on the contrary, the most conscientious studies are in the order of the day, and the lowest captain knows as much as your staff-officers who are so brilliant in the ball-room. Have you even a superficial smattering of the elements of the military art on leaving your special schools? I am tempted to doubt it. Come now,' continued General de Moltke, taking the other by the hand, 'I wager that you do not know what is the most valuable piece of furniture for the chamber of an officer in garrison. Come with me.' So saying, the old Prussian led his interlocutor into a small bed-chamber suited to a sub-lieutenant; a small bed without curtains, three straw chairs, shelves of books from the floor to the roof, and in the middle of the room a black wooden board on an easel, the ground strewed with morsels of chalk. 'It is with this that we beat our adversaries every morning,' murmured the old tactician. 'And for drawing, here is all we want,' and M. de Moltke exhibited some geographical maps."

GENERAL VON ROON.

Albert Theodore Emile von Roon is a general, a statesman, and a man of letters. He was born on the 30th of April, 1803, and after an education at the cadet school, entered the army as an officer in 1821. From 1824 to 1827 he followed the higher course of the general military school, and became instructor in the cadet school at Berlin. He soon acquired the reputation of a master in geography and military science. Some of his works published at this time obtained a large circulation, notably, "Principles of Ethnographical and Political Geography," published in 1832, of which an elementary abridgment appeared two years afterwards. He also published, in 1837, "Military Geography of Europe;" and in 1839, "The Iberian Peninsula in its Military Aspect." This last work refers more especially to the civil wars of Spain. Notwithstanding his literary labours, Herr von Roon pursued his professional career with the utmost regularity. Having made in 1832 a campaign of observation in Belgium at the time of the siege of Antwerp, he was attached first to the topographical department, then to the general staff, and in 1836 became captain. His succeeding grades came at intervals of a few years; major in 1842, chief of the staff in 1848, lieutenant-colonel the year following, major-general in 1856, and lieutenant-general in 1859. From the year 1848 he held various commands, and fulfilled several important missions. On two occasions he was charged with the duty of mobilizing the army, particularly in 1859, when the French emperor's precipitate peace with the Kaiser obviated the necessity of assembling the Prussian army. To Roon was confided the education of Prince Frederick Charles, whom he accompanied to the university of Bonn, and in divers voyages about Europe. On the 16th April, 1861, he was called to preside over the ministry of marine, to which a few months later was added the more responsible function of minister of war, which he has retained ever since. At the head of these united services

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he displayed much energy and perseverance during the ensuing troublous years of parliamentary warfare, heartily seconding the king's projects for military re-organization. These, as we have seen, he realized, spite of the adverse majority in the Chamber. He had much to do in preparing for the Bohemian and other campaigns of 1866, accompanied the king with other ministers to Sadowa, and contributed no small share to the greatness which his country achieved in that eventful year. Well did the king say of him and his distinguished colleague, "Von Roon has sharpened our sword, Von Moltke has guided it."

EDWARD VOGEL VON FALCKENSTEIN

is one of the most popular men in Germany. He is admired as the veteran soldier of the war of liberation, and for the inexhaustible vigour of youth which leads him at a great age from fight to fight, and from victory to victory. The general was born on the 5th January, 1797, the same year with the king, and at sixteen years of age entered the West Prussian grenadier regiment as volunteer jäger, only to be promoted to lieutenant, after he had fought in the battles of Gross-Görschen, Bautzen, and Hatzbach. The campaign of 1814, in which he fought at Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry, Thionville, Mercy, and Laon, brought him the iron cross. In the year 1815 he was on duty in front of Paris. He was in Schleswig for the first time in 1848, and again in 1864. He was appointed in 1866 to be commander general of the army of the Maine, and after a display of consummate generalship entered Frankfort, as we have shown, at the head of the cuirassiers, with his trumpeters pealing out the Prussian national song. A bitter hour was it for the general when he was called away from the command of the army of the Maine, in consequence of events not yet fully explained. He was appointed military governor of Bohemia, which appointment he declined, until reconciled by the kind advances of King William at Nikolsburg. In the autumn of 1866 he received the command of the first army corps, from which the king called him to the shores of the Baltic.

Many other eminent leaders were there in the Prussian army—Manteuffel, Steinmetz, Göben, Voigts Rhetz, and others whose names are emblazoned on the roll of military renown. Of the great mover of this momentous war, the schemer of the mighty changes which have followed it, Count von Bismarck, a detailed biographical sketch is given at the end of Chapter III., in the second portion of this work. To turn to the Austrian side, there were three commanders of their army more distinguished than the rest, though but one of them enjoyed the glory of a victory. They are the Archduke Albert, who was victorious at Custozza, the Crown Prince of Saxony, and General Benedek. Of the Emperor Francis Joseph himself a sufficient account has already been given in the course of this historical introduction.

ARCHDUKE ALBERT.

The archduke was the inheritor of military fame if not of ability, being the son of that Archduke Charles who was the most successful antagonist of Napoleon I. in the early part of the conqueror's career. Albert was born in 1817, and educated for the army, in which he obtained early command, not only as a privilege of his rank, but in deference to his knowledge and merit. He first distinguished himself as a general of cavalry. In the troublous days of 1849 he served under the veteran Radetzky, and bore an important part in the battle of Novara, so fatal to the Piedmontese. At the end of the Italian campaign he was appointed to the command of the third Austrian army corps. On the reduction of Hungary to submission he was appointed governor general of that kingdom, an office which he retained until 1860. The previous year he had been sent on a mission to Prussia, which proved fruitless, and in the Franco-Austrian war he commanded a force that was not called into action. For a short time he took the place of Count Grüner at the head of the war office. In 1861 he replaced Benedek, during a temporary absence, in the command of the Austrian forces in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. In the war of 1866 he held the supreme command of the imperial Austrian army of the South, and, as already described, inflicted upon the Italians a severe blow in the battle of Custozza. After the defeat of Sadowa he superseded Benedek as commander-in-chief of the imperial forces.

THE CROWN PRINCE OF SAXONY.

This prince was possessed of excellent military qualities, and would probably have been more fortunate in the war of Bohemia had he

not been fighting, in the opinion of many of his father's subjects and soldiers, against the German cause. Descended from one of the oldest reigning houses in Europe, which gave an emperor to Germany in the tenth century, the prince, whose name is Frederick Augustus Albert, was born in 1828. Though his father is known as the German translator of Dante, and his uncle the late king was celebrated as a botanist, the present crown prince was trained to the profession of arms, and as lieutenant-general was made commander of the infantry force of Saxony. Commander of the Saxon army in 1866, he found himself obliged to retire from his own country before the superior force of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, and he joined the Austrian army in Bohemia with a force of 25,000 combatants and sixty guns. He was hotly engaged in the battle of Gitschin, and obstinately defended the village of Diletz, but his gallant troops fell in heaps before the murderous needle-gun, and he, his father, and country had to submit to the will of the conqueror, whose terms, though hard enough, would have been still more humiliating to Saxony but for the intervention of the French emperor.

FELDZEUGMEISTER LOUIS VON BENEDEK.

This general was born in 1804 at Œdenbourg in Hungary, the son of a doctor. He studied military science in the academy at Neustadt, entered the Austrian army in 1822 as cornet, and rose rapidly to the rank of colonel, which he attained in 1843. Two years later, at the time of the insurrection in Galicia, having distinguished himself by his courage and military talents, he was commissioned by the Archduke Ferdinand d'Este to make peace with the western part of the province. His skilful movements there enabled General Collin to march forward and take Podgorze by storm. On this occasion Benedek obtained the insignia of the Order of Leopold. In 1847 he was at the head of the Comte de Giulai's regiment of infantry, when he received orders to rejoin the army of Italy. During the campaign of 1848 he showed much presence of mind in the retreat from Milan, at Osone, and especially at the battle of Curtatone, where he was the last to withstand the enemy's attacks. Lauded for distinguished service in the order of the day by Marshal Radetzki, he was presented with the Order of Maria Theresa.

On the renewal of hostilities in 1849 he was present at the surrender of Mortara, and fought at the head of his regiment at Novara. On the 3rd April, 1849, Benedek was appointed major-general and brigadier of the first reserve corps of the army of the Danube, and took an active part in the military affairs of Hungary. At Raab and at Oszöny he commanded the vanguard, and was slightly wounded at Uj-Szegedin. At the battle of Szörnyeozs-Iväny he was hurt by the explosion of a shell. At the end of this war he went into the second corps of the army in Italy, in the capacity of chief of the staff.

During the war of 1859 against Piedmont and France he covered the Austrian retreat from Milan to the Mincio, and at the battle of Solferino he commanded the right Austrian wing, which at one instant had the advantage over the left wing of the allies. He afterwards supplied the place of Marshal Hess in the chief command of the army. After the peace of Villafranca the feldzeugmeister remained in Venetia at the head of the Austrian troops, and the proclamations which he made to his soldiers attracted much notice, as eloquent appeals, calculated to keep them faithful to their allegiance, despite the variety of nationalities and the differences of their political opinions. In 1866, after much caballing and opposition on the part of the aristocratic party at the court of Vienna, which would confer high rank and supreme power on nobody less than an archduke, he was raised to the command of the army, which consisted of 250,000 men, and had a fine artillery of 600 guns. That he was beaten so disastrously by the Prussians was due perhaps as much to the defective organization of the force he commanded, and, as is said, to the reluctant obedience of some of his high-titled subordinates, as to the superior strategy of the Prussian generals.

RESULTS OF THE WAR TO THE TWO COMBATANTS.

The results of the contest carried on by these men and their followers was to Prussia, first of all, a gain of territory to the following extent. To the nine provinces of which the kingdom previously consisted were added by incorporation, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hesse-Homburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Lauenburg; that part of Hesse-Darmstadt that lies to the north of the Maine, and the little principality of Hohenzollern—the cradle of the Prussian royal




PRUSSIA.
CATTEGAT
JUTLAND
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
ZEALAND
FUNEN
LAALAND
HOLSTEIN
MECKLENBURG
Copenhagen
Malmo
Kiel
Rostock
Berlin
Hamburg
Bremen
Hanover
Magdeburg
Halle
Leipzig
Cassel
Frankfort
Darmstadt
Luxembourg
Metz
Strasburg
Carlsruhe
Pilsen
Ratisbon
Scale of English Miles
Railways
Hohenzollern which belongs to Prussia shown on Map of Southern Portion
Longitude East



N, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

house, situated on the borders of Lake Constance, between Würtemburg and Switzerland. Prussia was thus formed into a compact state of 137,066 square miles, with a population of 22,769,436 souls. Added to this was her leadership of the new Confederation into which Saxony and other minor powers were compelled to fall after the victory of Sadowa. The basis of a new German empire was firmly laid by Prussian genius and valour; and to Prussia rightly belonged the headship which it is fervently to be hoped she will not abuse.

The ancient Germanic empire was dissolved in 1806 by the Conqueror Napoleon I., reconstituted as a confederacy of thirty-nine states by the peacemakers of Vienna in 1815, again dissolved in 1866, and partially restored, without Austria, after the treaty of Prague, as the North German Confederation. Pending their final union under one government, presciently wrote Mr. Martin in his Year-book of 1869—pending that union which every patriotic German felt to be certain of speedy accomplishment—the old states of the Confederation were ranged provisionally in two groups, North Germany and South Germany. The former, including twenty-one states, was placed under the absolute undivided leadership of Prussia; while South Germany, numbering five states, formed an unconnected cluster of semi-independent sovereignties. The two divisions were to some extent bound together by treaties of peace and alliance between Prussia and the three principal states of the south, Bavaria, Würtemburg, and Baden. By the treaty between Prussia and Bavaria, dated August 22, 1866, the two contracting powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their respective territories, with all the military forces at their disposal; it being further stipulated that, in case of war, the king of Prussia should have the supreme command of the Bavarian army. The treaties between Prussia and Würtemburg, and Prussia and Baden, dated 26th August and 18th August, 1866, were precisely of the same tenour, both providing a strict military alliance and union of armies in time of war. These diplomatic achievements, which in the autumn of 1866 crowned the victorious war, were followed in the spring of 1867 by legislative acts of no less importance. A representative assembly elected by universal suffrage, at the rate of one member for 100,000 souls, met at Berlin on the 24th of February, and by the 16th of April had discussed and adopted a constitutional charter, by which the whole of the states of North Germany were united into a federative empire. The charter entitled "the constitution of the North German Confederation," consists of fifteen chapters, comprising seventy-nine articles, with a preamble declaring that the governments of the states enumerated form themselves into a perpetual confederation or union for the protection of the territory and institutions of the union, and for the care of the German people's welfare. The twenty-one states enumerated in the charter are, Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Saxe-Meiningen, Anhalt, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg, Waldeck, Lippe-Detmold, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Reuss-Schleiz, Reuss-Greiz, Schaumburg-Lippe, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen. When it is recollected that Henry, the twenty-second Prince of Reuss-Greiz, reigned over a population of about 40,000 souls, and that the public income of his realm was less than £30,000, and that six or seven of his co-princelets were in no better condition, the reader will doubtless sympathize with the strong German feeling that desired to see these frittered atoms of power welded together in one mighty sceptre. The executive power of the confederation was vested in the Prussian crown. The king of Prussia, under the title of Lord President, had to act on behalf of the Confederation in its intercourse with foreign states. To him was given the right of appointing ambassadors, of declaring war, or of concluding peace. He also had to appoint a chancellor of the Confederation, who should preside over the Federal council, and his first and inevitable choice was Count von Bismarck. The lord president enforces the observance of federal laws, and has the right to compel disobedient or negligent members to fulfil their federal duties. He has also the unrestricted command of the army and navy of the federation, the organization of the naval service, and the appointment of all officers and civil functionaries. The contributions of the several states in the Confederation to the cost of the general administration, is regulated by the rate of population.

By the terms of the charter the legislative power of the Confederation was vested in two representative bodies; the first delegated by the various governments, called the Federal Council, or Bundesrath, and the second elected by the

population, and styled the Diet of the realm, or "Reichstag." To the council each of the twenty-one governments of the Confederation sends a deputy, who has one vote with the following exceptions:—The deputies from Brunswick and Mecklenburg-Schwerin have two votes each, the delegate of Saxony has four votes, and the representative of Prussia seventeen; making a total of forty-two votes, and giving the Prussian government a preponderance that may easily be turned into an absolute majority, by the subservience of one or two neighbouring states. The Diet is elected by universal suffrage for the term of three years, and meets in annual session. It is independent of the council, but the members of that body have the right to be present at the sittings, in order to make known the views of their respective governments. The initiative of legislative acts belongs to the Diet.

Austria, the other antagonist in the war of 1866, though suffering deeply in every point that was dear to her ancient traditionary policy, was yet not irreparably injured. Indeed, in many respects, she will no doubt discover in the course of time that her disasters of that year were pregnant with future national benefits. She lost Venetia, and with it happily the Lombardo-Venetian debt, which was transferred to Italy by the terms of the treaty of Prague; but her own debt was augmented by the addition of three hundred million florins (£30,000,000), by reason of the war. Her military and financial position was severely shaken, and for a time there was danger of internal disruption, owing to the universal dissatisfaction of the people of Hungary. She was thrust out, too, of the German Confederation, a circumstance far from agreeable to her 8,000,000 German subjects. Grown wiser at last, and profiting by the hard lessons they had received, the emperor and his ministers set sincerely to work at reforming the evils complained of by the several nationalities of the empire. To the Germans were granted free speech, free press, free education, and a popular Parliament. The pope and his cardinals were told that perfect toleration in matters of religion would henceforth be observed throughout the empire, and that the stringent provisions of the last concordat would cease to operate. To Hungary was restored her national constitution, which is of very ancient date, and is based mainly upon unwritten laws that have acquired authority in the course of centuries. Austria, in fact, became a bipartite state, consisting of a German monarchy headed by the emperor, and a Magyar kingdom, with the self-same chieftain bearing the ancient title of king.

The constitution granted in 1849, after the great revolutionary outbreak, had been repealed by an imperial decree of the 31st of December, 1851, which substituted a more absolute form of government. New edicts in the ensuing years altered the national charter, until by a patent of February 26, 1861, the constitution was established which, though suspended in the years 1865 and 1866, has been since 1867 the form of government prevailing in the empire. Very significantly the path of political reform in Austria, and of reconciliation with Hungary, was entered upon by a ministry led by Baron von Beust, an ancient rival of Count von Bismarck in the old Diet, and for some time the prime minister of the king of Saxony. The main features of the new constitution are a double legislature, connected together under one sovereign, the hereditary emperor-king, by a common army and navy and by a governing body known as the Delegations. The Delegations form a Parliament of 120 members, of whom one half are chosen by the legislature of German or Cisleithan Austria, and the other half represent Hungary, the Transleithan kingdom. The Upper House of each kingdom returns twenty deputies, the Lower House forty. In all matters affecting the affairs of the whole empire, the Delegations have a decisive vote, which requires neither the confirmation nor approbation of the assemblies from which they spring. Austrians and Hungarians sit generally in separate chambers; but when disagreements arise, the two bodies of delegates meet together, and without further debate give a final vote, which is binding for the whole empire. Specially within the jurisdiction of the Delegations are all matters affecting foreign affairs, war, and finance, involving an executive of three ministers representing those three departments, who are severally and solely responsible to the Delegations.

The separate constitution of German Austria, or Cisleithania, consists, first, of the Provincial Diets, representing the various states of the monarchy; and secondly, a Central Diet, called the Reichsrath, or Council of the Empire. There are fourteen

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Provincial Diets, namely, for Bohemia, Dalmatia, Galicia, Higher Austria, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Bukowina, Moravia, Silesia, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, Istria and Trieste; all which are formed in nearly the same manner, differing only in the number of deputies. Each consists of one assembly only, composed, first, of the archbishop and bishops of the Roman Catholic and Oriental Greek churches, and the chancellors of universities; secondly, of the representatives of great estates, elected by all landowners paying not less than 100 florins, or £10, taxes; thirdly, of the representatives of towns, elected by those citizens who possess municipal rights; fourthly, of the representatives of boards of commerce and trade unions, chosen by the respective members; and fifthly, of the representatives of rural communes, elected by such inhabitants as pay a small amount of direct taxation. The Provincial Diets are competent to make laws concerning local administration, particularly those affecting county taxation, the cultivation of the soil, educational, church, and charitable institutions, and public works executed at the public expense.

The Reichsrath, or Parliament of the western part of the empire, consists of an Upper and a Lower House. The Upper House is formed—1st, of the princes of the imperial family who are of age; 2nd, of a number of nobles—sixty-two in the present Reichsrath—possessing large landed property, on whom the emperor may confer the dignity of state councillors; 3rd, of the archbishops and bishops who are of princely rank; and 4th, of any other life-members, nominated by the emperor on account of being distinguished in art or science, or who have rendered signal services to church or state, of whom there are forty-seven in the present Reichsrath. The Lower House is composed of 203 members, elected by the fourteen Provincial Diets of the empire, in the following proportions:—Bohemia, 54; Dalmatia, 5; Galicia, 38; Higher Austria, 10; Lower Austria, 18; Salzburg, 3; Styria, 13; Carinthia, 5; Carniola, 6; Bukowina, 5; Moravia, 22; Silesia, 6; Tyrol and Vorarlberg, 12; Istria and Trieste, 6. The election for the Lower House of the Reichsrath is made in the assembled Provincial Diets, the elected deputies to be members of such Diets. The emperor has the right, however, to order the elections to take place directly by the various constituencies of the provincial representatives, should the Diets refuse or neglect to send members to the Reichsrath. The emperor nominates the presidents and vice-presidents of both chambers of the Reichsrath, the remaining functionaries being chosen by the members of the two Houses. It is incumbent upon the head of the state to assemble the Reichsrath annually. The rights which, in consequence of the diploma of October 20, 1860, and the patent of February 26, 1861, are conferred upon the Reichsrath, are as follows:—1st, Consentient authority with respect to all laws relating to military duty; 2nd, Co-operation in the legislature on trade and commerce, customs, banking, posting, telegraph, and railway matters; 3rd, Examination of the estimates of the income and expenditure of the state; of the bills on taxation, public loans, and conversion of the funds; and general control of the public debt. To give validity to bills passed by the Reichsrath, the consent of both chambers is required, as well as the sanction of the head of the state. The members of both the Upper and the Lower House have the right to propose new laws on subjects within the competence of the Reichsrath, but in all other matters the initiative belongs solely to the government.

The executive of Austria Proper consists, under the emperor, of the following branches of administration:—1st, the president of the council; 2nd, the ministry of finance; 3rd, the ministry of the interior and national defence; 4th, the ministry of public education and ecclesiastical affairs; 5th, the ministry of commerce and agriculture; 6th, the ministry of justice. The responsibility of ministers for acts committed in the discharge of their official functions was established, for the first time, by a bill which passed the Reichsrath in July, 1867, and received the sanction of the emperor.

The constitution of the eastern part of the empire, or the kingdom of Hungary, including Hungary Proper, Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania, is of very ancient date, and based mainly upon unwritten laws that grew up in the course of centuries. There exists no charter, or constitutional code, but in place of it are fundamental statutes, published at long intervals of time. The principal of them, the "Aurea Bulla" of King Andrew II., was granted in 1222, and changed the form of government, which had until then been completely autocratic, into an aristocratic monarchy. Almost all subsequent rulers endeav-

oured, though with little or no success, to extend the royal prerogatives, the struggle lasting, with more or less interruption, till the year 1867, when the present king, having failed in his attempt to weld Hungary to his imperial dominions, acknowledged and took oath upon the ancient constitution. The form of government established by it is oligarchical in essence, leaving the whole legislation and internal administration of the country in the hands of the native nobility, comprising above half a million individuals, and giving to the king little more than the chief command of the army, and the right and duty to protect the realm against foreign enemies. The power of legislation and of taxation is vested in two great representative bodies; the first the Diet, or Parliament, and the second the County Meetings. Since 1562 the Diet consists of an upper and lower house, the first known as the Chamber of Magnates, and the second as the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Magnates is composed, first, of the prelates, comprising thirty-five Roman Catholic and twelve Greek archbishops and bishops, headed by the primate, the archbishop of Gran; secondly, of the "barones et comites regni" or peers of the realm, in two classes; thirdly, of the great officers of the crown, with the lords-lieutenant of the fifty-two counties; and fourthly, the barons summoned by royal letters, including every prime count and baron of twenty-five years of age. Magnates who are absent depute representatives, as do also the widows of magnates; but these deputies sit in the second Chamber, where they can speak, but have no vote. The Lower Chamber is made up of representatives of the towns and rural districts of the kingdom, the latter elected at the County Meetings. Much of the business of the Lower Chamber is previously discussed in a committee of the whole house, called a "circular session," in which strict forms are not observed, and each member speaks as often as he can get a hearing. The speeches in both chambers are usually made in Hungarian. Among the magnates some few speak Latin; but this language has almost entirely fallen into disuse. The "personal" or president of the Lower Chamber, who is also chief judge of the "royal table," is appointed by the crown. When the Diet assembles the "propositions" of the crown are first presented to it for consideration, and these form the great business of each session; but proposals also originate in the Lower Chamber, which, when agreed to by the Magnates, are sent to the king, who communicates his assent by a royal "resolution." Many propositions rejected by the crown are voted anew in every Diet, under the title of "Gravamina." Scarcely inferior in political importance to the Diet are the County Meetings. They are of two kinds, called respectively "Restorations" and "Congregations." In the former the parliamentary deputies, as well as all county officers, are chosen, while the latter are occupied with local legislation and taxation, and the general business of the district. A large amount of this business consists in framing instructions for the representatives at the Diet, who are considered mere delegates, bound to adhere to the will of their constituents, to whom they apply for directions in all difficult or doubtful questions. The County Meeting may even recall a refractory member, and send another in his place, thus assuming direct control over the Diet. The executive is exercised, in the name of the king, by a responsible ministry, consisting of eight departments, namely:—1st, the presidency of the council; 2nd, the ministry of national defence; 3rd, the ministry of finance; 4th, the ministry of the interior; 5th, the ministry of education and of public worship; 6th, the ministry of justice; 7th, the ministry of public works; 8th, the ministry of agriculture, industry, and commerce; 9th, the ministry for Croatia and Slavonia.

The sovereign of Hungary, though emperor of Austria, is styled "king" in all public acts, and the regalia of the crown are guarded by a special corps of halberdiers in the palace at Buda, whence they are only removed for the sovereign's use on state occasions. The grand officers of the court and household are numerous, and are termed "aulæ ministeriales." These are the grand justiciary, or "index curiæ;" the ban of Croatia; the arch-treasurer, or "tavernicorum regalium magister;" the great cup-bearer, or "pincernarum reg. mag;" the grand carver, or "dapiferorum reg. mag.;" the master of the household, or "agazonum reg. mag.;" the grand porter, or "janitorum reg. mag.;" the master of the ceremonies, or "curiæ reg. mag.;" and the captain of the body guard, or "capitaneus nobilis turmæ prætorianæ." The exchequer is managed by the "Hofkammer," which has its seat at Buda, and under which are the collectors of taxes, the mining boards, and the directors of the crown domains.

Modern history, says a recent writer, exhibits no such example of the hopeless confusion and seemingly inevitable dissolution of a great historical power, as Austria afforded after the defeat of Sadowa. At the close of 1866 men thought that the empire was falling asunder, and that nowhere among its fifteen nationalities, all strangers to each other in language and race, was there any conscious principle of Austrian unity and independence. At least, no such idea showed anywhere signs of life. Many able politicians considered that the disappearance of Austria from the map was only a question of time; and prudent statesmen thought it necessary to make this eventuality a factor in their calculations of the future. Neither Prussia after Jena, nor the French empire after Moscow, Leipzig, and Waterloo, nor Austria herself during the Revolution of 1848, can be compared with Austria after the peace of Prague. Conquered and prostrate, owing her nominal existence to the selfish intercession of doubtful friends, shut out from Germany, despaired of but hardly regretted by her peoples, with her forces demoralized and dissolved in spite of their victories in Italy and on the Adriatic, and on the brink of national bankruptcy, Austria saw her rival and conqueror rise in a few weeks from a dubious rank to be supreme over Germany, and the dictator of Central Europe, whose commands no one of the great powers ventured to gainsay, and whose apparent tendencies to national unity found a ready echo either in the hopes and admiration, or in the fears and hallucinations, of the German populations and their princes.

COUNT VON BEUST.

Three years passed, and the relative position of the two German powers was greatly modified by the revival of Austria and the reform of her institutions. The principal author of these reforms was Count von Beust, whose name will henceforth be inseparably connected with this remarkable epoch in Austrian history. At the beginning of the war of 1866 he accompanied his then master, the king of Saxony, into Austria to oppose the Prussian invasion. There was an ancient antagonism, dating from long past discussions in the Frankfort Diet, between Beust and Bismarck; and when peace was made between Saxony and Prussia after Sadowa, the latter insisted upon the dismissal of the former from the council of the Saxon king. Though the minister of a small state, he had frequently been concerned in questions of European importance. By a curious coincidence, he had taken a peculiar part in the Prussian crisis which ended in the elevation of Count von Bismarck to the premiership, and the count's hostility was not diminished by these little known circumstances.

Frederick Ferdinand, Baron von Beust, was born at Dresden on the 13th January, 1809. Brother to the eminent Saxon geologist, Frederick Constantine Beust, he studied with him at Göttingen, where he acquired a taste for politics and diplomacy, under the teaching of Sartorius, Heeren, Eichorn, and men of like calibre. He underwent his examinations and took his degrees at Leipzig, and on his return to Dresden, in 1831, he entered the foreign office of the Saxon government. After holding the post of assessor of land-survey in 1832, he spent between two and three years in visiting Switzerland, France, and England. He became secretary of the Saxon legation at Berlin in 1836, occupied the same post at Paris in 1838, was chargé d'affaires at Munich in 1841, resident minister in London in 1846, and ambassador to the court of Berlin in 1848. In February, 1849, he was appointed minister for Foreign Affairs for Saxony in the so-called Held cabinet, and received the portfolio for Agriculture in the following May. He took a prominent part in the discussions preceding the treaty of 1852, and in 1853 became minister of the Interior, when he resigned his post as minister of Agriculture. At the time of the crisis brought on by the question of constitutional organization, he declared himself opposed to the constitution, claimed the support of Prussia, and became a member of the Zchinsky cabinet as minister for Foreign Affairs, and of Public Worship also. In this latter capacity he introduced several improvements into the administration of ecclesiastical affairs. On the breaking out of the Danish war in 1863, Baron von Beust distinguished himself by his fidelity to Federal interests, and by a rebuke he administered to Lord Russell in answer to a despatch from the latter. He represented the Germanic Diet at the London Conference of 1864, during the continuance of which he twice visited Paris to confer with the Emperor Napoleon, whose guest he was afterwards at Fontainebleau.

A short time after the peace of Prague, it was proposed to make him foreign minister at Vienna. He had had ample means of studying the affairs of Austria, and had also become acquainted with her

populations. But his position only gave him a single voice in the council of ministers, and that not a decisive one in home affairs. There were many people who, at his accession to office, thought it safe to predict for him a speedy fall, as soon as he proved an obstacle to Belcredi and Esterhazy. The public at large received him with little confidence, and with small expectation of his liberal principles being carried out. For they did not reflect on the peculiar conditions which affected the system he had administered amongst the middle states. Napoleon III. showed that he understood him better, when he said to him, "Saxony is too small for you." His first act as minister was to issue the pacific circular of the 2nd November, in which he defined his position. In this circular he protested that he came to his post perfectly free from all resentment and all predilection, and that the imperial government, whose urgent duty it was to efface the traces of a disastrous war, would remain faithful to its policy of peace and conciliation. On the emperor's return to Vienna, Baron von Beust received the further appointment of minister of the household.

To the new minister a hearty reconciliation with Hungary was a matter of primary importance. Renewed negotiations were opened at Vienna with the deputation from Pesth, to which place Baron von Beust went on the 21st December with the Hungarian chancellor. It appeared certain that this business had been taken out of the irresolute hands of Belcredi and the reactionists, and the lock in the cabinet was at an end. Still Beust's original and comprehensive ideas had by no means prevailed. Many such brave beginnings had within the last twenty years withered beneath the powerful court influence of the Austrian nobility and clergy. It was not likely that a foreigner, a Protestant, a "small baron," should succeed in breaking down the bulwark of tenacious traditions, exclusive interests, and inveterate prejudices. Or if he gained a momentary success, there were still intriguers and flatterers to catch him in their more deceitful toils. Again, there was no demonstration that he was master of any extraordinary ideas, bold schemes, or daring resolutions, or that he had the energy and prudence to carry them out. In his new career he had not yet succeeded: in his old one he had been baffled. Thus the year 1866 was drawing to a close, amidst the intense expectation of the patriots, when suddenly, just at its end, on the 28th December, a purely absolutist decree ordered the immediate completion of the army, and a new regulation of public defence for the whole empire, except the Military Frontier. This blunder of his rivals, and similar unconstitutional propositions, brought on a crisis in the cabinet, and Baron von Beust threatened to resign. He gained his point. A complete rupture was made with the system hitherto prevailing; and an imperial decree of the 4th of February restored the operation of the constitution so far as it did not affect the compromise with Hungary. Three days afterwards Belcredi and Esterhazy were dismissed; and Beust then became president of the council, minister for Foreign Affairs, and chancellor of the empire. Deak was called to Vienna, and had an interview of special importance with the emperor. The principles of the revived constitution were clearly defined; and the question now was, whether the practice would answer to the theory. It was a time of deliberate and decisive measures, and complete reconciliation with Hungary was resolved on.

The Reichsrath was not assembled before the 20th of May, nor the convoking patent issued before the 26th of April, because it was necessary that the Hungarian Parliament should have previously accepted a compromise compatible with imperial government. Here also there were difficulties; the democratic party in the Hungarian Parliament maintained an obstinate fight for ten days in favour of the merely personal union; and the victory, at one time considered doubtful, was only obtained by a brilliant speech from Deak, which was followed by a division of 257 against 117 on the 30th of March, 1867.

In the Upper House the compromise was unanimously accepted, after an insignificant opposition, on the 3rd of April. And now the regeneration of the eastern part of the monarchy seemed to be accomplished; and Baron von Beust was entitled to regard with complacency the results of his system and of his efforts. But he could not forget that as yet he had only half finished his task of reconstruction; for he had to persuade the Reichsrath to accept, *après coup*, a compromise on which it had not been consulted, and he had to establish the constitutional institutions of the western portion of the empire on another basis of com-

promise altogether foreign to Hungarian wants and tendencies.

The chancellor's popularity was rapidly increasing, but he could not easily make a strong ministerial party in the Austrian Chambers. Hungarian jealousy being allayed, however, the questions connected with the army, finance, and foreign affairs were settled in the Reichsrath without much opposition. A very important novelty was introduced at the same time into the administration by the baron, in the form of the Red Book—the first of a series of publications of diplomatic papers and parliamentary debates, on the affairs of the whole Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The documents gave evidence of a clear, consequent, and uniform policy, that inspired confidence both by its directness and its freedom. The Prussian press attacked the Red Book, and suggested to the Hungarians that it was a covert for imperial intrigues; but their inuendoes did no harm to Austria. The Reichsrath, under the guidance of the chancellor, did noble work in the session of 1868; confirmed the compromise with Hungary, reviewed the concordat with Rome, and in fine, rebuilt the constitution of the Austrian empire. The following extracts from speeches of the chancellor and of the emperor will show how minister and master agreed in their views, and what great things they were enabled thus to work out for their country.

At the end of October, Baron von Beust having in his speech on the army budget represented the political situation of Europe as rather critical, was reminded that Lord Stanley, the English foreign minister, had a short time before spoken of it in more favourable terms; upon which he said, "My position differs materially from that of the English secretary of State. Lord Stanley is the minister of a country surrounded and protected by the sea: I have the honour of directing the affairs of a state which has every reason to beware of its neighbours. We should, of course, be glad to be on friendly terms with Prussia, and are even endeavouring to improve our relations with the St. Petersburg cabinet; but, as I said, we must be on our guard, though there is nothing to excite our immediate fears."

There was, however, little confidence at Vienna in either Prussia or Russia. "That Austria's military preparations are merely defensive, remarked the semi-official journal, must be plain to any one that is not wilfully blind. To assume the contrary is simply to offend against common sense, or to enact over again the old story of the lamb and the wolf. But, of course, we owe it to our own interests not to allow ourselves to be netted and bagged. Our rival is showing an unmistakable intention of reviving the Oriental question, to enable him to cross the Maine. It is this policy which encourages Russia to assume a haughty and menacing attitude towards Western Europe, and which is evidently intent on encompassing Austria with flames of revolutionary fire, from the Red Tower Pass to the Alps, from the River Save to the Bocca di Cattaro." In October, Baron von Beust made a speech, justifying the necessity of keeping the Austrian army on the war footing of 800,000 men. "Austria," he said, "maintains the best relations with France and England, and is also upon the most friendly footing with Italy. The latter power, however, has not always complete freedom of action. Austria remains unchanged in her resolve to abandon all policy of revenge against Prussia, while with Russia she seeks to maintain friendly relations. In view, however, of the possibility of a conflict between France and Prussia, Austria is obliged to remain armed, as much to cause her own neutrality to be respected, as to keep back other powers who might be inclined to attack."

To the same effect was the emperor's address to the army on the 8th December:—"The monarchy wants peace; we must know how to maintain it. For this purpose I have had presented to both legislatures a bill by which, in case of necessity, the whole population may rise in arms to defend the dearest interests of the country. Both legislatures have passed it, and I have sanctioned it. The re-organization of the empire has been effected on those historical bases on which it reposed in the times when it fought out the most difficult wars successfully. Both sides of my empire will have henceforth the same interests in defending its security and power. My army thereby gains an auxiliary which will support it in good and ill fortune. My people, without distinction of class, will now, according to the law, rank under my colours proudly. Let the army be the school of that courage without which empires cannot maintain themselves. My army has gone through hard trials, but its courage is not broken, and my faith in it is not shaken. The path of

honour and loyalty, on which the brave sons of my empire have followed hitherto, may be their path henceforth too. Let them be faithful to their past, and bring with them the glorious traditions of former times. Progressing in science, and in the spirit of the times strengthened by new elements, it will inspire respect to the enemy, and be a stronghold of throne and empire."

In his speech on closing the Diet, as king of Hungary, he said, "We called you together three years ago, under difficult and anxious circumstances, to accomplish a great task. Our common aim and endeavour has been to solve all those questions which, not only in these last times, but for centuries, have been the sources of distrust and of collisions. I having been crowned with the crown of St. Stephen, inherited from my ancestors, the Hungarian constitution has become a full reality. The union of Hungary and Transylvania, of Croatia and Sclavonia, has become an accomplished fact, and the integrity of the empire of St. Stephen has been restored in a way in which it has not existed for the last three hundred years. You have recognized the necessity of a common army; you have inaugurated a system of education which will serve as a support to material and intellectual progress. You have extended the civil and political rights which the citizens belonging to the different races had already enjoyed, to the use of their language likewise, granting all those wishes which are not in opposition to the law and good government. You have extended political rights to the Israelites, who, until now, knew only the charges, and not the advantages, of the constitution. You have regulated the relations of the different confessions on the basis of civil and religious equality. By the new regulation of judicial procedure you have facilitated the prompt administration of justice and the consolidation of private credit. The symptoms of material and moral improvement which are apparent everywhere may fill your hearts with joy, and if once the success follows with which Providence rewards perseverance and energy, posterity will gratefully remember those who have been the instruments of the welfare of the country. May the Almighty make this loyal understanding lasting—this understanding which has not only produced great political results, but which has linked together sovereign and people in the bonds of mutual confidence and love, and which has made us feel that only a happy nation can have a happy sovereign." Noble words spoken with royal frankness and sincerity, and exhibiting a picture of national revival in the space of three years, hardly to be paralleled in the history of nations.

DEAK FERENCZ.

The peaceful restoration of Austria to the rank of a great power could hardly have been brought about in so brief a space of time, spite of the able efforts of Count von Beust, had it not been for the extraordinary influence and wise moderation of one man, Deak the Hungarian patriot. In him, says M. de Laveleye, we see a simple lawyer, unknown to Europe, borne to the head of an heroic nation by dint of his public virtue alone, dictate the conditions of the reconstitution of the Austrian empire, confirm to the descendant of so many emperors the crown of St. Stephen, and by wielding the confidence of his fellow citizens, determine the fate of that powerful state at a time of momentous crisis. A sketch of his life and opinions cannot but be instructive and interesting. Francis Deak, or Deak Ferencz (for in Hungary the practice is to place the baptismal name after that of the family), was born on the 13th of October, 1803, at Sojtor in the county of Zala, the son of a country gentleman, who farmed his own land. He was educated at Raab, where also he entered the profession of law, and followed at the same time with eagerness the politics of the day. The resistance of the Magyars to the encroachments of the court at Vienna had been suspended during the Napoleonic wars, but broke out with fresh vigour about the time when the young advocate attained his majority. When after long delay the Diet was assembled at Presburg in 1825, a spirit of independence was manifested that thoroughly alarmed the imperial government. That was the "revival Diet." Deak engaged heart and soul in the contest. Entitled to take part in county meetings by his rank of gentleman (of whom there were 600,000 in the kingdom, for the most part poor as Job), and also by his position as member of a liberal profession, he soon distinguished himself as an orator at those quarterly assemblies. The appointment to local offices in Hungary is made almost always by popular election, and gives frequent occasion to animated debates. A strong supporter of modern ideas on the subject

of personal freedom and equal justice for all, he was at the same time a staunch maintainer of the ancient privileges of his country, her language, her institutions, her nationality. He soon became the leader of his party in the county, and a fit and proper person to represent it in the National Assembly. He was elected, at the age of twenty-two, to succeed his brother as member for their native county in the Diet of 1825. He was well received by the opposition party, the party of progress, to which he belonged, at the head of which was the celebrated Count Széchenyi, and he was complimented by his first opponent in debate, Pazmandy. It was, however, in the Diet which sat from 1832 to 1836 that he came to the front rank. His speeches were lucid and convincing rather than brilliant, replete with knowledge and sound logic without much ornament. With these he came by degrees to master a most excitable assembly, which he patiently educated up to his own point of view. At the close of that Diet a word from Deak would command a majority. The government at Vienna obstinately opposed all the demands of the Magyars, and the Diet of 1839 came together full of anger. Deak, at the head of the opposition, forced an amnesty from the government for the politicians of his party who had been imprisoned; and the ministry found it prudent to concert measures with him in order to secure the tranquillity of the country. This eminent position he had attained at the age of thirty-six. A robust broad-shouldered man, with short neck and round head, full of humour and geniality, thick eyebrows shading his shrewd yet kindly eyes. Like his celebrated English contemporary, Mr. Bright, there was no indication in his external appearance of the masterly intellect that controls popular assemblies, and wields them at pleasure by the power of oratory. Dressed in black, with an ivory-headed cane in his hand like a good Presburg burgher, he would meet the members of his party on the eve of a great debate in a club smoking room. After hearing all they had to say, he would give his opinion in a conversational tone, show the points on which all were agreed, and how the end was to be attained; indicate with precision the way to success, the weak point of the other side, what concessions could be made, and those points on which his friends must stand firm. He enlivened this common-sense exposition of the matter in hand with jocular comparisons and anecdotes, and ruled his fellow men with a sceptre of which the weight was not perceptible.

At the election of 1843 Deak had the courage to give his supporters a lesson which they would not soon forget. He had been thrown out at one election, by means of the unscrupulous employment of corruption and intimidation on the part of his adversaries. He was put up again, and his friends resolved to employ similar means to secure his return. Deak protested against this course, and vowed that he would not sit if returned, but they refused to believe him. He kept his word nevertheless, was elected and declined the seat, to the bitter chagrin of men who had spent themselves in conquering success for him, and who could see nothing but overstrained and inflated virtue in this desertion of his party. Deak's absence from the Chamber was deeply felt, and generally bewailed. In 1846 he was obliged to travel for the benefit of his health, and the years that immediately followed were occupied with the sad events of the revolutionary outbreak, and its suppression. He could not agree with the advanced opinions of Kossuth. "I am a reformer," he said, "not a revolutionist." Yet he would not oppose altogether the national party, though he was a firm supporter of union with Austria. The overthrow of 1848 and 1849 filled him with sadness, and drew from him the frequent exclamation, "It is the beginning of the end!" He formed part, however, as minister of Justice, of the ministry of Count Louis Batthyani, and found the labours of office at that period of change in legislation very great indeed. He worked at the emancipation of the peasantry, the amelioration of the criminal law, and the adoption of trial by jury. His desire to accomplish reconciliation and union with Austria by legal means, exposed him in those days of revolution to the charge of treachery, hurled against him by the democrats. He quitted the ministry in October, 1848, but not the Chamber. On the 31st December he was appointed, by a vote of both houses, one of the deputation that attempted to open a negotiation with Windischgrätz in his camp. When that misguided general refused to see the delegates, on the plea that he could not treat with rebels, the dogs of war were let loose, and Deak, who had not wished the revolution, but, on the contrary, had done his best to prevent it, withdrew from public life. He remained in retirement full ten years,

living chiefly at Pesth, studying the progress of events around, distributing a share of his modest income in alms, and enjoying the society of his friends. In December, 1860, after the Austrian constitution had been decreed, Deak and his friend Eötvös had a long private conference with the emperor at Vienna, which seems to have given him hope that the breach between his country and the imperial government would soon be closed. On reaching home he at once re-entered public life with his old vigour. He was elected member for Pesth in the Diet of 1861, and had to exert all his talent and influence to induce the extreme radical party to follow moderate counsels. He achieved a great parliamentary triumph on the 13th May of that year, carrying his address to the emperor in the face of an adverse majority. This address was laid, as was well said at the time, on the threshold which divides Hungary from Austria, to be taken up by every emperor who goes to the "hill of coronation" to be crowned king of Hungary. The address was ill-received at Vienna, and met by an imperial rescript that irritated the Chamber at Pesth. The main point of difference was on the subject of representation—whether the Hungarians would, or would not, send their representatives to the German Reichsrath, and abandon their own ancient Diet; a decided negative was skilfully and respectfully drawn up by Deak. The Diet was dissolved on the 21st August, but Deak felt sure of victory sooner or later, and went to play his favourite game of *quilles*, or skittles, much to the disgust of his more excitable friends. Things went on thus, Deak keeping his people from insurrection, until 1865, when the emperor, aware that danger was thickening around him, made overtures to Deak, and paid a visit to Buda, where he was heartily received. A few months afterwards his Majesty in person opened the Diet in Pesth. Still the separate Hungarian ministry was not accorded, and the war of 1866 had to be borne with Hungary in a bad humour. After the peace of Prague, and the subsequent accession of Baron von Beust to the head of the ministry of Vienna, Deak's programme was accepted without discussion, and the dual form of government for the empire was established, practically leading to what, according to the Hungarians, was the only bond between the two countries of old, a personal union embodied in the sovereign. The Austrian chancellor and the Pesth deputy settled the matter between them. Imperfections in the scheme of dual government there were, which Deak felt equally with other men; but the agreement arrived at by him and Baron von Beust, in all probability, saved Austria from dissolution and Hungary from a dangerous decline. The sage of Hungary, as he was called, would receive no other reward for his services than the satisfaction of having rendered them. The emperor, the Diet, the ministry, pressed upon him various offers, but he declined them all. At the coronation of the king of Hungary, it is an ancient custom for the Count Palatine to ask the assembly present if they accept the sovereign elect, and then to place the crown upon the king's head. In 1867 there was no Count Palatine, the office being about to be abolished. A question arose as to who should have the honour of performing the ancient ceremonial. Every voice pronounced in favour of Deak, the creator of the new state of things, and the Diet by a unanimous vote appointed him to the honour. The patriot declined, gently at first, but when insistance was made, furiously; declaring that he would rather resign his seat in the House than consent to take so prominent and ostentatious a position. Though holding no office, Deak dictates the policy of the Hungarian government, whose supporters are known by the name of the "Deak party." His high position in the opinion of his countrymen does honour to the Hungarians, for he has neither the eloquence of Kossuth nor the brilliancy of Szèchenyi; but he appeals to the reason with all the force of sound logic, and persuades by force of common sense. He offers a striking contrast to the generality of his countrymen, fiery and romantic as they are; but it is by simplicity and purity of life, by earnestness of purpose and thorough disinterestedness, that he has so completely conquered their esteem and respect.

PRUSSIA AFTER THE PEACE OF PRAGUE.

The seal and sanction of public opinion in Germany was given to the great changes wrought by Prussia, by the Chambers which met in new session at Berlin on the 5th of August, 1866. The treaty of peace had not yet been ratified, and some of the speeches delivered in the Chambers exhibited a certain distrust of Austria and other powers. But the king and his ministers were forgiven their

unparliamentary offences of preceding years; and the annexation of territory, as well as the subjection of minor states to absolute dependence on Prussia, by the formation of the new League or Confederation of North Germany, was cordially, if not unanimously approved. In the king's speech at the opening of the Chambers, not a word was said about France and the important part taken by the French emperor in bringing the war to a close by his mediation. Nor was Italy even mentioned. All that the king said was, that his army was supported "by few but faithful allies." These omissions naturally gave great offence both to Italy and France; and in France especially much irritation was felt in consequence.

The address of the Upper House sought to remedy the omission, and expressed its recognition of the disinterested mediation of a foreign power in the peace preliminaries. It declared the hopes of the Upper House that the separated portions of the monarchy would be united, and that the future frontier line of Prussia would form a guarantee for her security and her position as a great power. The noble "Herren," or Lords, were further of opinion, that after the withdrawal of Austria from the Germanic Confederation friendly relations would subsist between her and Prussia. The new organization of Germany would be the means of preventing any future bloodshed in conflicts between German states. The reform of the military organization, too, had been put to the test, and had been completely justified by the brilliant results obtained.

In bringing forward a bill for the incorporation of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort, with the Prussian dominions, Count von Bismarck said that he hoped the Chambers would leave the details in the hands of the king, who would act with the necessary consideration. The preamble of the bill stated, that "Prussia did not embark in the war with the intention of acquiring territory. The hostile attitude of the above-named states required that their independence should cease. It was to be hoped that, in course of time, the populations of the annexed countries would be thoroughly satisfied with the incorporation." But a strong feeling was manifested by the Chamber that the Prussian constitutional charter should be introduced into the new provinces before the expiration of a year, instead of being postponed indefinitely, as the bill proposed. Count von Bismarck at once assented to this view, and said that, without consulting his colleagues, he would take it upon himself, in the name of the government, to approve of it. A few days afterwards (August 28) he accepted an amendment, which provided that the Prussian constitution should become law in Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, and Frankfort, on the 1st October, 1867; and in the course of his speech he made some remarks that have a certain historical value.

"It was just possible," he said, "that Prussia would be called upon to vindicate the possession of what she had acquired. The first Silesian war produced a second and a third, and there was no telling whether they might not have to go through a similar succession of campaigns in the present instance. He therefore wished to have the matter promptly settled, so as to give foreign powers no further opportunity for interference. To do a necessary thing at once was to gain a double advantage from it. The cabinet had difficulties to contend with in various quarters, and might well expect the House to second its action, considering what the circumstances of the times were. The right of Prussia to annex the states mentioned was a more sacred right than that of conquest. It was from the right of Germany to live, breathe, and exist, that Prussia derived her commission to incorporate with her own body politic such *disjecta membra* of the nation as had been won in honest warfare. The interval between now and the extension of the Prussian constitution to the new provinces he would employ to proclaim the laws of military service in them, and establish the right of all subjects of the crown to reside and carry on trade in any part of the united kingdom. He had no doubt that, before long, all classes in the states annexed would unite in acknowledging the wisdom of this proceeding. This was a transition period; but its attendant difficulties could be easily overcome by the adoption of the proper means. He was not surprised to find that, when people in the minor states had so long enjoyed an existence undisturbed by great political cares, there should be some among them averse to the duties of a more responsible position. But the great majority took a more extended view even now, and the rest would come round soon enough. In point of fact, the only choice they had was to become the citizens of a great German state, or to be at the mercy of foreign powers."

At a later period, a bill of indemnity to save the government from the consequences of having acted in violation of the law in preceding years, by collecting taxes which had not been voted by the Chambers, was passed by a large majority. The minister of the Interior stated, that by the adoption of the bill the government would be morally compelled to act in a friendly spirit towards the House. The indemnity was not an armistice with the government; its adoption would be the preliminaries of a real and lasting peace. This anxious desire on the part of a so-called despotic king and minister, for the sanction of their high-handed dealings by a law to be voted by Parliament, is very significant of the force of public opinion in Germany, and contains excellent promise for the future development of well-ordered freedom in that newly united country.

The king's reply to the address of the Lower House contained a sort of apology for the annexation of neighbouring territories:—"I thank you, gentlemen," he said, "for communicating to me the feelings of your illustrious body. To God alone be all honour. On setting out for the seat of war, I certainly hoped that we should be able to hold our own, as we always have. But I did not expect the rapid victories we achieved, and am doubly grateful to my gallant army for accomplishing them. Since the war I have been obliged to dispossess certain sovereigns, and annex their territories. I was born the son of a king, and taught to respect hereditary rights. If, in the present instance, I have nevertheless profited by the fortune of war to extend my territory at the cost of other sovereigns, you will appreciate the imperative necessity of the step. We cannot permit hostile armies to be raised in our rear, or in localities intervening between our provinces. To preclude the recurrence of such an event was a duty imposed upon me by the law of self-preservation. I have acted for the good of the country, and I beg you to convey my sentiments to the House."

To a deprecatory address from a Hanoverian deputation his Majesty used similar language, to the effect that annexation had become a duty on account of geographical position, and that the rapid victories which led to it were a visible interposition of Providence. Indeed, the national appetite for conquest was clearly not yet satisfied. In the debate on the bill for determining the mode of election to the new German Parliament (September 12), Count von Bismarck had to defend the government against a charge of not having profited sufficiently by the late victories. Again, in December he made a long and instructive speech in the Lower House on the question of the union of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with Prussia. It will be remembered that French influence was exerted to secure the cession of the northern part of Schleswig to Denmark, if, on an appeal to the inhabitants, they determined by a plebiscite in favour of such a re-annexation. The passages of the president's speech which relate to the attitude of France, and seem to excuse the deference shown to her in the negotiations at Prague, have no unimportant bearing on the present history. "Foreign nations," said the minister, "were accustomed to look upon us as abandoned to the tender mercies of France, and to make the permanent necessity of help, under which they fancied we were, their reason for speculating upon our indulgence and modesty. By Austria and a portion of our German allies, this speculation had been carried very far during the last ten years. But were they at all right in their fancies? War with France is not in the interests of this country. We have little to gain even by beating her. The Emperor Napoleon himself, differing in this from the accepted politics of other French dynasties, wisely recognized the fact that peace and mutual confidence should prevail between the two neighbouring nations. But to maintain such relations with France, a strong and independent Prussia is alone competent. If this truth is not admitted by all subjects of Napoleon III., it is a consolation to know that his cabinet, at least, thinks differently, and that we officially, at any rate, have to deal with his cabinet only. Looking upon this vast country of Germany from the French point of view, his cabinet cannot but tell themselves that, to combine it again with Austria into one political whole, and make it a realm of 75,000,000 inhabitants, would be contrary to the French interests. Even if France could make the Rhine her boundary, she would be no match for so formidable a power, were it ever established beside her. To France it is an advantage that Austria does not participate any longer in our common Germanic institutions, and that a state whose interests conflict with her own in Italy and in the East, cannot henceforth constitutionally

rely upon our armed assistance in war. It is natural for France to prefer a neighbour of less overwhelming might—a neighbour, in fact, whom 35,000,000 or 38,000,000 of French are quite strong enough to ward off from their boundary line in defensive war. If France justly appreciates her interests, she will as little allow the power of Prussia as that of Austria to be swept away. The present dynasty of France having identified itself with the principle of nationality, always looked upon the question of the duchies in a temperate way, and from the very outset was less adverse to our claims than any of the other powers.

"You are aware that to carry that principle through on the Dano-German frontier is simply impossible. Germans and Danes so intermingle there, that no line of demarcation can be drawn which will separate all members of the one race from those of the other. Yet France, wishing to see her adopted principle acknowledged in this particular instance, as in so many preceding ones, mooted the question, repeatedly bringing on a discussion between us, Denmark, and other powers. In all our communications with the powers, we never concealed it from them, that we would not allow our line of defence to be impaired by any territorial re-arrangement of the kind; but we also intimated that, under certain circumstances, we might be inclined to pay some regard to wishes assiduously uttered by the population, and undoubtedly ascertained by us. Thus the matter stood when, in July last, France was enabled, by the general situation of Europe, to urge her views more forcibly than before. I need not depict the situation of this country at the time I am speaking of. You all know what I mean. Nobody could expect us to carry on two wars at the same time. Peace with Austria had not yet been concluded; were we to imperil the fruits of our glorious campaign by plunging headlong into hostilities with a new, a second enemy? France, then, being called on by Austria to mediate between the contending parties, as a matter of course did not omit to urge some wishes of her own upon us. We had to determine, not whether we thought the terms offered compatible with the expressed desires of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, but whether we were to accept or to reject in a body the overtures of Austria, as imparted through France. Long negotiations were impracticable under the circumstances. Our communications were interrupted, telegrams requiring three, or even six days to travel from our headquarters to Berlin. In this condition his Majesty determined to adopt the programme submitted to his decision. It is true we were strongly backed by Italy remaining true to her engagements, and standing by us with a fidelity which I cannot too highly appreciate and extol. The Italian government resisted the temptation thrown in its way by a present from Austria, of renouncing its alliance with us, and suspending military operations against the common enemy. This is a fact which I hope guarantees the continuance of friendly relations between Italy and Germany. But, notwithstanding the valuable aid rendered us by our Italian allies, both on the battlefield and in our diplomatic negotiations with friend and foe, we did not think ourselves justified in proceeding to extremities, and involving all Europe in war, merely because a single item of the terms proffered was unpalatable. Had we insisted upon having every thing our own way, the most serious complications might have arisen. I thought it my duty to advise his Majesty to sanction the terms submitted as they stood, rather than jeopardize our previous success and gamble for more."

In the result, the House resolved to postpone the question of the cession of Northern Schleswig to a later period. It has been stated quite recently by an Austrian in authority, that the Vienna cabinet committed an error in accepting French mediation so hastily. The Prussian minister had made proposals for a direct negotiation, in which no mention of any indemnity was made; and Austria would have been spared a fine of thirty million florins if she had only declined to avail herself of the assistance of France.

The failure to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of Prague relating to North Schleswig, has no doubt drawn much obloquy upon the government of King William. Germans in high station have openly disapproved, and some publicists have placed it side by side with the French occupation of Rome as an act politically immoral. The continued occupation, says one writer, of North Schleswig, which is Danish, by Prussia, not as resulting from a compliance with, but in defiance of, the provisions of the fifth article of the treaty of Prague in 1866, is not only a wrong done to Denmark, but it does violence to that European public opinion which Prussia, like France, is so

anxious to conciliate. And not merely is this continued occupation a wrong, but it is a wrong of which the treatment and persecution of the Danish inhabitants by Prussia has largely increased the magnitude and intensity. Persecutions are spoken of, and the expulsion of clergymen and others, either actual or virtual, as the result of arbitrary and oppressive measures, in the teeth of the provisions of most solemn treaties. It is to be hoped that the conclusion of war will witness the payment by Count von Bismarck of a debt of strict though tardy justice to Denmark, at the instance of Germans themselves, who are not found wanting as individuals in a sense of justice or in genuine kindness both of heart and sentiment. There can be no reason why the relations between Prussia and Denmark should not be friendly for the future. If, as matter of fact, Germans have, by peaceful emigration, superseded in certain parts of Schleswig the earlier Danish population; and Germany, having taken possession of those parts by conquest, is now desirous of retaining them—that surely is no reason why, in defiance of recent treaty obligations, those parts of Schleswig in which the Danish element is all but unmixed, or at all events, very largely preponderant, should be incorporated with Germany, although the inhabitants most earnestly desire, and have a treaty right, to return to their old allegiance.

That appetite for annexation, which has hitherto distinguished Prussia, will not, it may be well hoped, characterize the policy of a strong united Germany. Germany has won success enough in the field, not merely to immortalize the prowess of her sons and Von Moltke's matchless organizing skill and strategy, but to protect her from all risk through future aggression. It is contrary to her interest to inspire in other nations, by territorial cupidity in Denmark or elsewhere, distrust and suspicion which might lead to a European coalition against her. The prospect for Europe would then be a dark one. To protect the independent and unmutilated existence of a certain number of small states, and to prevent their absorption in the military monarchies, is to maintain the best of guarantees for peace and liberty in Europe. It is this consideration which would seem to have actuated England and the English government in their efforts to maintain inviolate the neutrality and independence of Belgium. Prussia is strong enough to be just in the case of North Schleswig, without fear of consequences. She is victorious, and she is rich enough to be generous. She might now find in North Schleswig and Germany—perhaps may find elsewhere—a fit opportunity for giving to the world an example of those qualities of moderation and magnanimity which form the brightest jewels in the victor's crown. The heart which great successes leave untouched is cold indeed. But such is not the heart of Germany.

The really difficult part of the question so warmly argued is, doubtless, as it was in the case of Hanover, a geographical one. It must be well nigh impossible to draw a distinct line of demarcation between two races that intermingle, and having drawn it, to preserve it. The suspicion that Germany, under the guidance of Prussia, may become an aggressive military nation has almost no foundation. Her power rests upon a military system so onerous to a studious and a commercial people, that it cannot be imposed upon millions of men like the Germans, save for the most sacred of causes—the spirit-stirring cause of their native country in danger. The vast Teutonic population of Central Europe has been possessed with a dominant idea of unity, that has rapidly increased in intensity in recent years. Germany, one and indivisible, homogeneous, united in policy and in principle, is the thought which inspires the bosom of every ardent German patriot. The realization of this thought involves sacrifice on the part of princes and people. The victory of an idea means the extinction of existing rights. All claims and appeals are silenced before it. The old order perishes to give place to the new. The unity of Germany is inevitable, even though France, the only possible opponent of the unification, should declare herself hostile to it. If France declare war against Germany, wrote a French writer in 1869, she will act for the advantage of militarism and Prussia; if she prove friendly to German unity, she will act for the advantage of European freedom.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN FEELING FOR UNITY.

The origin of the enthusiasm that possesses the German race for the unity of their Fatherland, must be sought in past history. The people of Germany have had to undergo a harsh training in the school of adversity, before the need and advantage of having but one common interest have been fully realised. The teachings of this school were, un-

happily for Germany, barren of results for nearly four hundred years. From the time of Kaiser Maximilian, the "white king," through the reigns of Charles V. and of the later emperors and empresses antagonists of Louis XIV., XV., and of Frederick, called the Great, down to the era of the French Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon I., Germany was, politically speaking, a sea of trouble, chiefly for want of political cohesion. Not till the beginning of the present century, when, perhaps, the cruelest lesson was given to the Germans, did they begin taking the precepts of calamity to heart, and endeavour to find some good in evil. The sad condition to which their country had been brought by disunion, at length startled them from their apathy. Then was born that passionate patriotism, of which the embers now burn with a brightness and steadfastness unequalled in any other nation.

The utter subjection to which Germany had been brought while the first Napoleon's star was at its zenith, was the immediate cause that kindled this glowing virtue. Nothing less than a national enthusiasm had the power to join discordant elements, and inspire men with that singleness of purpose necessary to break the chains that fettered a great people. The patriot Arndt thus described the manner in which he was affected by the sad consequences of disunion, "When after vain struggles Austria and Prussia both were fallen; then first my soul began to love them and Germany with real love, and to hate the French with a true and righteous rage. Just when Germany had perished by its disunion, my heart embraced the full notion of its oneness and its unity." This was spoken immediately after the heavy blows inflicted on his country by the battles of Austerlitz and Jena; when similar thoughts and feelings began to agitate the hearts of the whole German-speaking folk. Compelled at last by the disastrous plight in which their country lay, to sink their political differences and act in unison, the Germans succeeded in removing the ban of servitude under which they had so severely suffered. Thinking men, too, looked beyond the simple rescue of their land from the tyranny of a foreign yoke in 1813. They looked into the future, and saw Germany occupying the place among the powers of Europe she was entitled to, secured by her strength and concord against interruption from other nations in working out internal reform.

Voices were not wanting to express in ever living words the feelings that then swayed the German race. Nor were the writers of that period singers and preachers only. They were the great movers in the regeneration of Germany; by books and deeds they aroused and fanned the patriotic spirit of their countrymen to enthusiasm. Where statesmen had failed, poets met with success, and created a monument of their labours in the literature of patriotism—the most precious record of that time of Germany's struggle for freedom. Here may be read how the longing ot Germans for unity was engraven in their hearts, and acquired the sanctity of a religion. That, in spite of all opposition made by the jealousy of statecraft, in spite of the long frustration of their hopes, this desire is still so active, may be easily understood, when the influence of popular poetry is understood. "Give me the making of a nation's ballads, and I care not who makes its laws," said Fletcher of Saltoun, whom this sentence has perhaps made more memorable than any other act or speech of his. The history of the patriotic feeling that has pervaded Germany during the last fifty years, is an argument for the justice of the aphorism.

The literature of Germany is peculiarly rich in its store of patriotic songs, forming a reflex of events that have happened from the earliest times. So early as the first century, the Roman historian Tacitus considered the war songs of the Germans worthy of mention, from the influence they exercised on their spirits in battle. There are very few salient features in German history which will not be found registered in popular ballads. Whenever the people have been strongly moved by disaster or triumph, their feelings have sought expression in this shape. During the War of Independence in 1813 this was particularly the case, and from that period till the present day numerous song-writers have appeared, whose productions have acquired a popularity that has been owing as much to the fact of their having given a channel for the thoughts of the Germans, as to the intrinsic merit of the songs themselves.

Among the most distinguished of modern patriotic writers of Germany who stirred their countrymen from base submission, and moved them to throw off the yoke of the stranger, was Karl Theodor Koerner. Although the youngest of the band, his influence was not the least. Perhaps his years and standing lent power

to the effect of his poetical talents. He shines out as the representative youth of the time of the war of liberation, and especially of the student class, which has always formed an important element in German society. The manner in which death took him, as he was fighting his country's foes, gave additional lustre to his writings. He had lived but twenty-two years, when Germany put forth her greatest efforts, and, in that short life he had experience enough of the miseries entailed on her by the mischievous policy of the ruling states. What impression these lamentable circumstances made on him, and what influence they had on his genius, can be read in his works. In 1813 he joined the Prussian army as a volunteer.

The regiment in which Koerner enrolled himself began the campaign with a kind of consecration service, when a hymn of his composition was sung. It was while he was performing soldier's duty, at the watch fire, on the march, in the battle even, that most of his battle songs were written, and they were repeated by thousands and tens of thousands as they joyously marched to the places of rendezvous. In the very heart of conflict he bursts out with the following prayer:—

"Father, on Thee I call!
Heavy around me the cannon smoke lies;
Like spray is the flash of the guns in my eyes.
Ruler of battles, I call on Thee!
Father, oh lead me!

Father, oh lead Thou me!
Lead me as victor, by death when I'm riven.
Lord, I acknowledge the law Thou hast given,
E'en as thou wilt, Lord, so lead Thou me!
God, I acknowledge Thee.

God, I acknowledge Thee!
So when the autumn leaves rustle around me,
So when the thunders of battle surround me,
Fountain of grace, I acknowledge Thee!
Father, oh bless Thou me!

Father, oh bless Thou me!
Into Thy care I commend my spirit;
Thou canst reclaim what from Thee I inherit.
Living or dying, still bless Thou me!
Father, I worship Thee!

Father, I worship Thee!
Not for earth's riches Thy servants are fighting,
Holiest cause with our swords we are righting;
Conq'ring or falling, I worship Thee.
God, I submit to Thee.

God, I submit to Thee!
When all the terrors of death are assailing,
When in the veins e'en the life-blood is failing,
Lord, unto Thee will I bow the knee.
Father, I cry to Thee!"

The same spirit of religious fervour breathes in all his songs. With Koerner it was no war of kings to which he had devoted himself—

"It is no war of which but kings are 'ware—
'Tis a crusade, a people's holy war."

He calls to his companions, you are "fighting for your sanctuary." That old world virtue of patriotism cannot be said to be lost to us of this later time; nor while Koerner's words live in his countrymen's hearts will it ever die.

"One lasting German virtue have we still,
That breaks all fetters with its mighty will.
• • • • • • •
Let Hell belch out its threats, its power
Reaches not hitherto. It no star can lower
From Heav'n, where our star is steadfast set;
And tho' the night o'ershadow for an hour
Our virtue's joyance, yet our will lives yet!"

So inspired, the German soldier could meet death joyfully, with "Vaterland" upon his lips.

There were other and older men to fan the flame of patriotism, and to prevent disaster and defeat quenching its brightness; who, if more moderate than young poetical students like Koerner, were yet better able to guide this ardour into some practical path. Professors not only shared and fostered, but also directed, their pupils' zeal. In the history of this outburst of enthusiasm the name of Jahn, to which Germany delighted to add the epithet "father," must not be passed over in silence. Though not with songs, he gave much help to the great cause. From his professor's chair he taught that great love of all that was German, which is yet extant in a later generation. That he might give greater force to his teachings, and show by his example that words were worthless if unaccompanied by actions, he served his country as a soldier, nor did he lay down his arms till its foes were conquered. Such was the character of the leading spirits of Germany in the movement that brought about the decisive battle of Leipzig. Others, too, there were, whose names have become a household possession in Germany, as Arndt and Uhland, who set to music the aspirations of their countryman. The time, as Koerner said, demanded great hearts; and hearts were there to answer.

Arndt was one of the first to perceive the significance of the events of his time, and to recognize the forces that under skilful leadership would bring the German people into a haven of safety. With this conviction, he put out all his energies to procure for his fatherland more than present sal-

vation; and resolutely taking his stand, worked for the present, while he looked to the consequences of his labours in the future. To him belongs the honour of the authorship of that most famous song, "What is the German Fatherland?" a composition which alone would have made his name memorable, from the great part it played in the German War of Independence. This song has become the national anthem of Germany, the text-book of patriotism and of the aspirations of the German race for unity. For the impression it made and the popularity it acquired at the time of its production, it can only be compared to the "Marseillaise," or that old ballad of "Lillibullero," which, its author boasted, had sung king James II. out of three kingdoms; but it has surpassed every other national song, by the hold it has ever since retained on the minds of the Germans. This inspiration of Arndt's, which deserves to be as well known as that of Rouget de Lisle, is quoted as a fact in the history of his country, as worthy to be noticed as any broken treaty or ponderous protocol.

"What is the German Fatherland?
Is't Prussian land or Suabian land?
Where grapes grow thick on Rhine's rich trees?
Where sea-mews skim the Baltic seas?
Oh! no! for thee
The Fatherland must greater be.

What is the German Fatherland?
Bavarian or Styrian land?
Where kine on Holstein's marshes graze?
Where toiling miners iron raise?
Oh! no! for thee
The Fatherland must greater be.

What is the German Fatherland?
Westphalian, Pomeranian land?
Where sand from northern headland blows?
Where Danube's mighty water flows?
Oh! no! for thee
The Fatherland must greater be.

What is the German Fatherland?
Oh! name to me that glorious land!
Can Austria, proud, the title claim,
So rich in victory and in fame?
Oh! no! for thee
The Fatherland must greater be.

What is the German Fatherland?
Tell me, at last, that mighty land!
Wide as is heard the German tongue,
And songs to God in heaven are sung—
That shall it be;
That, valiant German, shall it be.

That is the German Fatherland,
Where close will be the clasp of hand,
Where truth will from the bright eyes start,
And love live warm within the heart.
That shall it be;
That, valiant German, shall it be.
One whole great nation shall it be.
O God in heaven, we look to Thee;
Give us the courage, strength, and will,
To keep it safe from woe and ill.
That shall it be;
One whole great nation shall it be."

In 1813, the year of Germany's deliverance from Napoleon, the subject of the most popular song was the Rhine, which has always been associated with the German's patriotic utterances. When, in driving Napoleon back into France, the German soldiers saw the Rhine for the first time, they are said to have broken out into uncontrollable joy. Tears trickled down many cheeks, and the enthusiasm passing from rank to rank, soon a hundred thousand voices joined in one "hurrah!" At this time the Germans began to cast their eyes on the country that lay beyond the Rhine, as the following lines added to the song above referred to will show:—

"The Rhine shall no longer be our boundary;
It is the great artery of the state,
And it shall flow through the heart of our empire."

On this favourite subject the song of Niklas Becker,

"O no! they ne'er shall have it,
The free and German Rhine,"

long possessed the greatest popularity. It is said to have been set to music by no less than seventy different composers, and owed its inspiration to the preparations and menaces of Thiers in 1840. Arndt sent Becker a congratulation on his successful composition:—

"At once, from north to south,
Its echo clear and strong,
Became in every German's mouth
The nation's charter song."

Becker's song subsequently yielded in popularity to one by a man but little known, named Max Schneckinger. This is the famous "Rhine Watch," which has become the lyrical watch-word of the Germans in the present war. The musical setting of the "Rhine Watch" is far superior to any of the seventy to which Becker's song is sung, and is one of the causes of the great hold it has on the Germans. The words of the song, as far as is possible in another tongue, shall speak for themselves.

WHO'LL GUARD THE RHINE?

A cry ascends like thunder crash,
Like ocean's roar, like sabre clash:
"Who'll guard the Rhine, the German Rhine,
To whom shall we the task assign?"
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine,
Firm stand thy sons to guard the Rhine.

From mouth to mouth the word goes round,
With gleaming eyes we greet the sound;
And old and young we join the band
That flies to guard the sacred strand.
Dear Fatherland, &c.

And tho' grim death should lay me low,
No prey wouldst thou be to the foe;
For rich, as thy resistless flood,
Is Germany in heroes' blood.
Dear Fatherland, &c

To Heav'n we solemnly appeal,
And swear—inflamed by warlike zeal:
"Thou Rhine, for all their flippant jests,
Shalt still be German, as our breasts,
Dear Fatherland, &c.

"While there's a drop of blood to run,
While there's an arm to bear a gun,
While there's a hand to wield a sword,
No foe shall dare thy stream to ford."
Dear Fatherland, &c.

The oath is sworn—the masses surge,
The flags wave proudly—on we urge;
And all with heart and soul combine
To guard the Rhine, our German Rhine.
Dear Fatherland, &c.

A song by Ruckert, published in 1865, the year before the battle of Sadowa, will show what development the love of Fatherland reached, in the shape of the idea of unity. The events that happened in the year following its appearance were, however, a practical contradiction to the spirit of Ruckert's composition, which seems to assign to Austria the leading position in the approaching effort to attain national unification:—

"Against the foe went marching
Three comrades staunch and good,
Who side by side together
In many a fight had stood.

The first a sturdy Austrian,
The next a Prussian brave,
And each one praised his country
As the best a man could have.

And where was born the other?
No Austrian was he,
Nor yet of Prussian rearing,
But a son of Germany."

Then as the three were fighting together they were all struck down by the enemy's bullets. The first, in falling, raises a cheer for Austria.

"'Hurrah! for Prussia,' cried the next,
His lifeblood ebbing fast;
Undaunted by his mortal wound.
What cry escaped the last?

He cried 'Hurrah for Germany!'
His comrades heard the sound
As right and left beside him
They sank upon the ground.

And as they sank, they nearer came
And close together pressed,
At right of him and left of him,
As brothers, breast to breast.

And once more cried the centre one
'Hurrah for Germany!'
The others echoed back the cry,
And louder still than he."

The love of their land and of freedom, which their poets have raised to the height of a passion, has begotten the all-pervading longing for unity that now possesses the Germans. The disunion, that had rendered humiliation so easy, and that no enemy hitherto had entirely effaced, was a giant which taxed all the strength that enthusiasm gave. Difficulty after difficulty had to be encountered and conquered; now by the slow and doubtful ways of policy, now even by bloodshed of kindred peoples. Those who first worked for this object died without seeing the accomplishment of their desires, and almost despairing of the possibility of an undivided empire. Now perhaps the end is not far off, and the shores of the promised land can be descried without straining of eyes. Aspirations of patriots were despised and looked on with suspicion, if no worse befell. Statesman could understand or recognize no form of thought, that did not emanate from themselves. Arndt, who for his services had in 1818 been appointed professor of history at Bonn, fell under the displeasure of the Prussian government, because he continued to display the same zeal for Germany's welfare, in peaceful times, as that which had effected so much towards her deliverance from the yoke of Napoleon. He had not filled his professor's chair for more than two years, when he was suspected of harbouring designs and thoughts that savoured of republicanism. His papers were seized, and charges brought against him of favouring the formation of secret societies and associations; of misleading the youth, over whom his influence was so great; of dreaming of a rebuilding of the state on republican plans, and reforming the Fatherland. The right and justice of a trial were not accorded to him; he was removed from his post, and lay under the ban of accusation for more than two and twenty years, when, to the unbounded joy of Germany, he was reinstated by the late king of Prussia. In his "Recollections," which he wrote when he was past seventy years of age, he discusses, at length, the offences of which he was accused. "I have, indeed," says he, "preached

a dangerous unity of the German people. I am, however, but a miserable late growth, a poor after-preacher, when I recall the many renowned preachers that have spoken before me from quite other hearts and minds. I mean, this sermon is as old as the history of our people." He almost thinks it necessary to write his apology for the vehemence with which he had pursued his idea of an united Germany; and he reiterates in detail the position of his country in Europe, and her many assailable points, for which there was no other defence or protection than the concerted action that a perfect union alone made possible. To his patriarchal years, however, was granted, at last, a glimpse of the goal for which he had so long and so hopelessly yearned and striven.

The conservative spirit of the policy of the ruling states of Germany has always been a great impediment in the way of plans prompted by the popular enthusiasm. In vain might a patriot like Uhland raise his voice in the cause of liberty. He was met everywhere by an overwhelming opposition, against which public opinion was powerless. Whether he combated laws to restrain the freedom of the press, or laws against "public associations," which had been referred to the Diet, the antagonism of the leaders of Germany bore down the weight of his objections. On every possible occasion patriotism met with rebuffs, since it had gravitated to the liberal section in politics, of which it seemed at last to become almost the peculiar possession. Uhland, in a speech made at the Diet in October, 1848, laid bare the stumbling-block that obstructed the agreement of the German people and their rulers. The subject of the debate was the proposition to exclude Austria, the favourite candidate for the imperial sceptre, from the Germanic Confederation; and to make the leadership hereditary with Prussia. Uhland took the popular side, and declared himself in favour of a periodical election of the empire's chief, by a national assembly of the German people. "No head," said he, "can give light to Germany, that is not anointed with a full drop of democratic oil." It was this drop of democratic oil in which the great difficulty lay. All the plans made for Germany's regeneration, that had the sympathy of liberal opinion, were discouraged and frustrated by Prussia and other states. Unity, in the eyes of the men who held the helm of government, appeared to be shorn of its advantages, if it could not be compassed without the alloy of democracy and the admission of the element of personal freedom. While popular enthusiasm contented itself with singing national and patriotic airs, it was borne with; or if it moved men to subscribe towards the purchase of ships to protect the commerce of the Fatherland, under the fostering care of Prussia, the vessels were bought, and the charge accepted.

However wise or unwise the method of the German governments has been, it has certainly made the idea of the unity of the German race a tangible fact to the present generation, which owes no small share of gratitude and praise to those men who were the first to conceive the idea in all its force, and who in fighting against foreign oppression were conscious of the great interests at stake, beyond their own present deliverance. In the words of a biographer of the poet Koerner, they could see that "the further fruit of the struggle would ripen, gradually only, yet surely, in ever-developing freedom; and that no power on earth would be able to hinder or limit its grand consummation."

CHAPTER VI.

Effect of the Prussian triumphs on the rest of Europe—Proposed division of Germany into a Northern and a Southern Confederation forced upon Prussia by France—Failure of the Plan owing to the Mutual Jealousies of the Southern States and the separate Treaties of each with Prussia—Danger to the Southern States from the Demands of France—Saving Clause in the Treaty on "National Ties"—Parties in Germany that looked to France—Saxony profited by French Interference, and paid a smaller Fine than other States—Meeting of Southern Powers at Nordlingen, in 1868—Dispute over the Federal Fortresses—Rejection of Bavaria's claim to precedence—Project of a Southern Confederation abortive—Austria's patient determination not to re-open the quarrel—The local limitation of Modern Wars due to Commerce, Education, and Public Opinion—Peculiar Situation of the Great Powers affecting International Policy—Warlike Attitude of France alone—Her Demands for a Rectification of Frontier in Compensation for the Aggrandizement of Germany—Incapacity of the French Emperor to resist the Spirit of Nationality—Bearing of the Changes in Germany on the smaller Neutral States—Switzerland a Conservative Republic—A Refuge and a School for the Democrats of Europe—Its Neutrality to be observed strictly by neighbouring Nations—Luxemburg gives rise to a Controversy that threatens War—Anecdote of Count von Bismarck—History of the "Luxemburg Question"—Transfer of the Duchy to Belgium—Eastern portion restored to Germany and the House of Orange—Fortress occupied by a Federal Garrison of Prussians—Neutrality in 1866—Proposal of the King of Holland, Duke of Luxemburg, to sell the Duchy to the Emperor Napoleon—The Proposal entertained, but the Consent of Prussia withheld—War between France and Prussia imminent—Conference proposed by King of Holland—Assembled in London—Guarantee by the Powers of the Neutrality of the Duchy—Fortifications demolished—Roumania—Election of Charles of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen to be Reigning Prince—Attitude of Russia and Turkey—Internal State of Russia after Emancipation of the Serfs—Attempt on the Czar's Life—Reorganization of the Russian Army—Explosive Bullet Treaty signed at St. Petersburg—Erroneous Policy of Russia towards her German Subjects—In England Domestic Affairs divert Attention from Germany—Reform Bill—Change of Ministry—Another Reform Bill—Commercial Panic—Fenians—Foreign Policy of Great Britain—Alabama Claims—Abyssinian War—King Theodore—General Napier—The Nations of Latin Race in Europe and their Attitude to Germany—Italy—Spain—Unpopularity of Queen Isabella—Successive Ministries—Death of Narvaez—Appointment of Bravo—His Arbitrary Conduct—Banishment of the Generals and the Duke and Duchess Montpensier—Insurrection—Admiral Topete and the Fleet—Marshal Serrano—General Prim—Flight of Queen Isabella into France—Provisional Government—The Principle of Monarchy adopted—No Monarch to be obtained—Serrano made Regent—Prim, Prime Minister—Duke of Genoa invited to be King; declines—Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern accepts the offer—To avert a War he afterwards withdraws—Prince Amadeus, Second Son of Victor Emmanuel, proclaimed King of Spain—Marshal Prim assassinated on the day before the new King's Landing—Sketch of Prim's Career—The thread of French History resumed with the year 1860—Expedition to China—Syria—Mexico—Withdrawal from the latter of the English and Spanish Contingents—Arrival of General Forey—Capture of Puebla and Mexico—Offer of the Crown to Archduke Maximilian—His Acceptance on Promise of French Support—Unpopularity of the Expedition in France—Menacing Attitude of the United States' Government—Withdrawal of French Troops—Desperate Situation of Maximilian—Journey of Empress Charlotte to Europe—Failure of her Mission—Capture of Maximilian by the Juarists—His Sentence and Execution—Outcry against Napoleon III.—French Policy in Italy—Insurrection in Poland—Probability of French Intervention on behalf of the Poles—Nothing done—Prestige of the Empire rapidly declining—Efforts made by the Emperor to restore Prestige and establish his Dynasty—Concession of Parliamentary Government and Responsibility of Ministers—Appointment of M. Ollivier—General Jubilation checked by the Emperor's recourse to the Plebiscitum—Servility of the Ministry—M. Thiers' Expression of the National Jealousy of Germany—Secret Manufacture of the New Weapon, the Mitrailleuse—Confidence of the Emperor in its Formidable Powers, and in his Complete Readiness for War—Germany, the only possible Antagonist, apparently unprepared and engaged in the Pursuits of Learning or the Peaceful Avocations of Commerce and Agriculture.

It is necessary now to show the effects produced by the Prussian triumphs of 1866 upon other countries of Europe. It has been stated that Austria, when expelled from Germany by the treaty of Prague, stipulated that the country should be divided into two confederacies, a northern and a southern. It was, in fact, France that made this stipulation, Austria being then too thoroughly humbled to prescribe terms, or do more than appeal for help to France, who gave the solicited aid. Prussia, not wishing to provoke a second war before the first was at an end, accepted the conditions forced upon her; and bisection instead of unity seemed to await Germany, notwithstanding the brilliant victories achieved by the Prussians. The Northern Confederacy, as we have seen, was forthwith organized under Prussian auspices, and speedily gained strength and solidity. Not so the Southern. Being too much alike in power and size, none of the southern states were prepared to invest one of their number with the superior dignity and influence of carrying on their common affairs. Meanwhile, Count von Bismarck had boldly and skilfully neutralized the impending danger of a new dualism in Germany, by secretly contracting offensive and defensive alliances individually with each state south of the Maine. They thus enjoyed the protection of the Northern Confederacy, in exchange for the chief command of their armies in time of war, conceded to the king



HESSE CASSEL
DARMSTADT
NASSAU
PALATINATE
BAVARIA
LUXEMBURG
WURTEMBERG
SWITZERLAND
Cologne
Deutz
Bonn
COBLENTZ
Wiesbaden
FRANKFORT
Hanau
Aschaffenburg
Marburg
Giessen
Fulda
Wurzburg
Mannheim
Worms
Spire
Landau
Bruchsal
Heilbronn
Rastadt
Kaiserslautern
Zweibrucken
Saarbruck
Treves
Luxemburg
Metz
Nancy
Luneville
Epinal
STRASBURG
Offenburg
Colmar
Mulhausen
Basle
Freyburg
Schaffhausen
CONSTANCE
Lake of Constance
Lindau
Bregenz
Zurich
Lake Zurich
Luzern
Zug
BERN
Thun
Interlaken
Lausanne
Neuchatel
Sigmaringen
Tubingen
ULM
Ellwangen
Belfort
Vesoul
Montbeliard
Aarburg
Solothurn
Fribourg
Chur
Glarus
Wallenstadt
Rapperswyl
S.t Gall
Winterthur
Andermatt
S.t Gothard
Arlberg
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

SOUTH
GERMANY,
(BAVARIA,&c.)
BOHEMIA
BAVARIA
Scale of English Miles
Railways already open
The territories colored green form part of the North German Confederation
Comparative lengths
Germany 10 Miles
England 50 Miles
PRAGUE
MUNICH
RATISBON
AUGSBURG
NUREMBERG
Innsbruck
Saltzburg
Linz
Passau
Landshut
Regensburg
Bayreuth
Chemnitz
Plauen
Eger
Pilsen
Budweis
Brenner
Gross Glokner
Drei Herrn Spitz
To Vienna
To Olmutz & Vienna
R. Elbe
Danube

of Prussia. Under these circumstances they had nothing to gain by the additional formation of a southern bund.

The arguments used by Prussian diplomatists to persuade Bavaria, Würtemburg, and Baden to sign the treaties just mentioned, brought forcibly into relief the danger to which they were exposed from the probable demands of France for compensation and rectification of the frontier on the Rhine, in consequence of the unification and aggrandisement of North Germany. France, tormented by envy at the steady growth of German power, might any day fall upon Germany in the midst of peace on the flimsiest pretext. In such case, it was but too evident that Prussia would rather let her neighbours be sacrificed than pay the required compensation with her own territory. Looking forward, however, with some confidence to the result of a struggle if it should come, the Prussian minister had secured a reservation in the objectionable clause of the treaty of Prague, which he hoped would one day subserve the great interests of German unity. Though north and south were only to be at liberty each to form a separate union, they were at the same time allowed the benefit of "national ties" to bind them together. This is one of those convenient phrases in a treaty, which are found to yield the interpretation most agreeable to the strongest party in any controversy about it. Yet the relations between the North German Confederation and Austria and the South Germans were not very satisfactory during the three years that followed the treaty of Prague. There was a strong party in the minor states that dreaded absorption by Prussia, and looked to France for succour. Saxony had profited considerably by French interference, retaining her king and court and the management of her domestic affairs. Her contribution to Prussia for the expenses of the war was but 10,000,000 thalers (£1,500,000), while that of Bavaria was 30,000,000 florins (£3,000,000). Würtemburg had to pay 8,000,000 florins; Baden, 6,000,000; and Hesse, 3,000,000. Bavaria had also to cede territory—two districts near Orb and Karlsdorf, containing 34,000 souls. Hesse-Darmstadt gave up the landgraviate of Hesse-Homburg, with some other fragments of territory, and as far as concerned her possessions north of the Maine, she entered into the confederation of North Germany. True, she acquired in return some portions of Upper Hesse.

One feeble attempt at united action was made by the southern states in 1868, at the meeting at Nordlingen, and it ended in a lamentable failure. The question was how the old Federal fortresses situated in Southern Germany were to be managed in future. There was Ingolstadt in Bavaria, Ulm in Würtemburg, Rastadt in Baden, and in part Mayence, where Electoral Hesse was obliged to furnish a part of the garrison. Both Ulm and Rastadt are more expensive than Ingolstadt; the tendency, therefore, of both Baden and Würtemburg was to keep the right of garrisoning these fortresses within their territory, and get Bavaria, which is the largest, to pay a part of the expense of keeping them up. Bavaria objected to this unless it was allowed a corresponding influence in the management of these fortresses, to which the others objected. A most original expedient, which well characterizes the whole spirit of this conference, was proposed; namely, to call on Prussia, who contributed most to the garrison of Mayence, to take a share in the expense of maintaining the other fortresses likewise, but without having any voice in the management of the fortresses themselves. All the fortresses in Germany were thus to have been kept up by common expense, to which naturally the North would have contributed most; but all the southern fortresses were to have remained in the hands of the sovereign in whose territory they were situated. This liberal offer was gratefully declined by Prussia; and the only result of the conference of Nördlingen was to prove that it was a hopeless task to try and bring about an understanding between the southern states of Germany on any point whatever.

It was the old story of family feuds and family jealousies, which are invariably more bitter than those with strangers. Bavaria, which is larger in territory and population than all the other three taken together, claimed naturally more or less the position which Prussia held in North Germany, and the others, if they could not maintain their entire independence, would rather make an arrangement with the Northern Confederation than allow Bavaria the precedence. Thus, the project for a Southern Confederation suggested by the fourth article of the treaty of Prague proved still-born; for Hesse could not bring it into being, Baden would not, and Würtemburg and Bavaria would never agree. The idea of such a confederation was nothing more than a sort of political

plaster to soothe the wounds of Austria and of the southern states.

While Prussia brooded over the new state of things resulting from her successful war, uncertain whether she should absorb the neighbouring states into her own system, or herself sink into the vast hegemony of a new German empire, Austria patiently and prudently observed a pacific, if not a friendly, line of conduct towards her recent and powerful antagonist. The revelation of the secret military treaties between Prussia and the southern states did not rouse her. Prussia's disregard of the treaty of Prague relating to North Schleswig did not provoke her. In the Luxemburg difficulty she sided neither with France nor Prussia. She made friendly advances to the king and government of Italy, and while anxious for the inviolability of Rome and the pope, would do nothing for his holiness in the way of armed intervention. Indeed, the new laws passed by the legislature at Vienna, on marriage and on education, withdrawing them both from ecclesiastical jurisdiction, did virtually abolish the concordat, and establish religious freedom in Austria. That the Prussian victories should result in substantial benefit to Austria is a fact that, whether foreseen or not by the cabinet of Berlin, is an additional justification of the policy by which they revolutionized Germany.

The great changes that ensued could not but excite fears and apprehensions in other neighbouring states of smaller dimensions. Upon former occasions, the slightest concussion of arms on the Danube or the Rhine was the signal for a general appeal to the sword throughout Europe. No sooner did warriors of Saxony measure swords with Tilly and Wallenstein, than France, Sweden, Spain, and Savoy rushed to the encounter, thinking to make some profit out of the transaction. It was the same when Daun and the great Frederick were pitted against each other; the Czar and Louis XIV. took part, and ultimately changed sides, in the quarrel. In fact, when a musket was fired on the Rhine, the quarrel went on multiplying itself, until the whole world was involved in it. Happily for the rest of Europe, the general conflagration which one spark of war could formerly excite, was not brought on by the very fiery brand of the Bohemian war. Governments had other occupations besides intrigue and war; commerce opened a new sphere for their energies, which were greatly influenced also by the advanced education of the people, and the public opinion that makes itself felt through the press, as well as through representative institutions. Both rulers and the ruled have come to consider it the wisest policy to leave foreign nations to settle their own disputes among themselves, and to adopt whatever institutions are congenial to their tastes, provided these do not become an offence to their neighbours. The peculiar situation of the great powers favoured these views. Spain weakened; Britain pacific; Russia too glad to have a strong barrier against France, in Prussia, and a weak barrier, in Austria, against her own aggressions in the East; Italy only interfering in the dispute to secure Venice as a copestone to the edifice of her own country—all these things gave uncontrolled action to the principles of international policy.

France alone, at the threshold of the dispute, with her hand on the sword, spoke about the necessity of a rectification of frontiers in the event of an aggrandized Prussia. But the French emperor, isolated, felt too weak to struggle alone with the law of inevitable necessity. Outwitted by Cavour in Italy, and foiled by Bismarck in Germany, he was, by the moral forces which those ministers arrayed against him, incapacitated from preventing the universal rally round a national banner of either Germans or Italians. The spirit of nationality, which he was the first to raise effectually, became too mighty for his exorcism when he sought to allay it. For a time, indeed, it was feared that the changes in the political relation and geographical boundaries of the chief continental powers would bear injuriously on the smaller neutral powers, one of which, Switzerland, lies in the midst of three great continental nations, and has a share in the speech and nationality of all three. Germany and Italy might think of claiming the annexation of the German and Italian cantons, while France, it was thought, would hardly be prevented from making attempts on Switzerland or Belgium. But Germany and Italy better understood the teaching of past history, of international law, and of national interest in the higher and wider sense. No desigu against Switzerland seems to have been entertained by either of these governments. On the ground of nationality France could not claim a single Swiss canton. The small, ancient, conservative republic, in no way threatened the neigh-

bouring monarchies, the republican propaganda forming no part of its policy. For centuries it had ceased to be proselytizing or conquering, and aimed only at preserving its own boundaries and its own liberties. Experience shows that Switzerland can, as a republic, live on the best terms with the neighbouring monarchies. Princes who rooted up commonwealths everywhere else, have shown Switzerland special favour. The elder Bonaparte, who overthrew republics of every variety, from France to Ragusa, showed a real regard for Switzerland, gave her a constitution which was at least an improvement on the previously existing state of things, and inflicted less damage on her than on any other of his dependencies. So, the allied princes who overthrew him showed no jealousy of the republican state, but enlarged its borders and guaranteed its independence and neutrality. Should monarchical Prussia feel jealous of the little state, let her call to mind that the republican spirit which exists in Germany alongside of the monarchic spirit, and which in times past produced German commonweaths and leagues, needs an expression somewhere, and that expression is now found in the Swiss republic. Switzerland has often proved, not only a safe refuge, but a useful school for German democrats. Those who had been dreaming extravagant republican dreams, have gone back to their own country a great deal wiser for their experience of an established and rational republican government, following not the dictates of theory, but those of common sense. It is well for many reasons that Switzerland should remain a neutral ground for all nations, and to this end she must carefully guard the neutrality which she has guarded so long, and which, among other advantages, saved her from the horrors of the Thirty Years' War. "She must stand," says the writer from whom we have quoted, "ready to repel, whether by arms or by diplomacy, any encroachment on her own rights; she must not, whether by arms or by diplomacy, meddle in any way in any possible quarrels of her mightier neighbours."

The fate of another small state locked in between two of the great powers became, in 1867, the cause of great commotion in the cabinets of Europe, and excited very general apprehensions of war between Prussia and France. To Count von Bismarck's firmness and moderation at that time, is probably due the maintenance of peace for three years more. At his dinner-table, a short time after Luxemburg had been declared neutral, a learned man gave an opinion, that Prussia ought to have made the question a *casus belli* with France. Bismarck answered very seriously:—"My dear professor, such a war would have cost us at least 30,000 brave soldiers, and in the best event would have brought us no gain. Whoever has once looked into the breaking eye of a dying warrior on the battle-field, will pause ere he begins a war." And, after dinner, when he was walking in the garden with some guests, he stopped on a lawn, and related how he had paced to and fro upon this place in disquiet and deep emotion, in those momentous days of June, 1867, when he awaited the royal decision in an anguish of fear. When he came indoors again, his wife asked what had happened that he looked so overcome. "I am excited," he replied, "for the very reason that nothing has happened."

The history of the Luxemburg question was briefly as follows:—By the treaties of 1815 the whole of Luxemburg was assigned to the king of the Netherlands, while at the same time the grand duchy was included in the German Confederation. After the secession of Belgium from the Netherlands, it was provided by the treaty of London in 1831, that the western portion of Luxemburg should be assigned to the king of the Belgians in full sovereignty, the federal relations of that part of the duchy being transferred to Limburg, which, together with Eastern Luxemburg, was secured to the king of the Netherlands. The refusal of Holland to accede to the treaty caused the French siege of Antwerp, and the blockade of the Scheldt: and after the termination of hostilities, the whole of Luxemburg remained provisionally in possession of Belgium. In 1839 negotiations for a definite peace were renewed, and Austria and Prussia, on behalf of the confederation, required Belgium to comply with the stipulations of 1831. The western part of Luxemburg was accordingly detached from the confederation, while the remaiuing portion continued to form a German state under the sovereignty of the house of Orange. The town of Luxemburg, from 1815 to 1866, was a Federal fortress occupied by a Prussian garrison. The plenipotentiary of the grand-duke voted for the motion which provoked from Prussia, in 1866, the declaration that the Bund was dissolved, but no hostile measures were taken on either side; and at the close of the war the Prussian government abstained from

including the grand-duchy in the Northern Confederation. The garrison still occupied the fortress, and the king of Holland seemed to take possession of the vacant sovereignty as of a derelict without a claimant. After assuming the right of succession to this member of the defunct confederacy, the king seemed to infer that he had a selling as well as a holding title; and through the medium, it is said, of a lady residing at Paris, he proposed to transfer Luxemburg to the Emperor Napoleon, who was willing, if not anxious, to make the bargain. But the defence of the fortress of Luxemburg had for half a century been intrusted to Prussia, who could scarcely abandon the place in deference to the demand of France.

The Emperor Napoleon committed an error in demanding a concession which could not be granted by Prussia, except at the cost of wounding the national feeling of Germany; while Count von Bismarck, on his side, had been guilty of an oversight in allowing Dutch Luxemburg to remain, even for a time, outside the confederacy. War seemed imminent, for the French emperor having once stated his willingness to bargain for the duchy could not recede without seeming to fear Prussia, and grievously wounding the sensitiveness of the French nation. In order, however, to give him the means of drawing back without discredit, a conference, proposed by the king of the Netherlands, was sanctioned by the neutral powers, and assembled in London, under the presidency of Lord Stanley, the minister for Foreign Affairs. The conference ended in a compromise, in which Prussia conceded something. The duchy was declared neutral, with the guarantee of all the powers represented at the conference. Prussia withdrew her troops from the fortress, and the fortifications were demolished. Thus the crisis was tided over, and hopes began to be once more entertained that Europe was entering upon a long term of peace.

Meanwhile, by a curious coincidence, a prince of a junior branch of the house of Hohenzollern had been raised from comparative obscurity to sovereign power, in the early part of that year which had proved so eventful to the royal family of Prussia. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen was elected reigning Prince of Roumania in March, 1866, in the twenty-seventh year of his age. He was installed in May, and recognized by the Turkish government in July. Roumania is the name that was given to the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia when they were united by a firman of the Sultan, in December, 1861, under Colonel Couza, who had been hospodar of both principalities and assumed the style and title of Prince Alexander John I. With a constitutional form of government, an annual revenue of nearly £3,000,000, a population of about 4,000,000 spread over an area of 45,000 English square miles, Roumania contains the elements of prosperity which wise government may develop and confirm. The reign of Prince Alexander, however, was not a happy one. His government and the popular assembly fell into a state of chronic antagonism on the subject of finance, parliamentary representation, and legislation in general. In May, 1864, the prince issued a decree, proclaiming a new electoral law and certain changes in the constitutional charter. His conduct was approved by a *plebiscitum*, or vote of the people, and the prince began to rule as a dictator, to the depletion of the treasury and the misery of his subjects. In the month of February, 1866, a general insurrection broke out, and the prince, abandoned by the army, was compelled to abdicate and surrender himself a prisoner. After a brief detention, he was allowed to leave the country. The Chambers then proclaimed the Count of Flanders, brother of the king of the Belgians, as prince of Roumania; but the count declined the uneasy throne. The lot then fell upon Prince Charles, whose brother, Prince Leopold, was destined to make so great a commotion in Europe four years later, by his acceptance of the offer of the crown of Spain.

It did not at the time appear that the susceptibilities of either the Russian or the Turkish governments were excited by the apparent extension of Prussian influence to the region where the "Eastern Question" might become the object of renewed complications. Russia, indeed, had her own cares in rebuilding the fabric of her society, which had been seriously dislocated by the humane, but somewhat hasty, scheme of emancipating the serfs. The reckless and profuse members of the upper classes suddenly found themselves brought to the verge of pauperism, their vast estates deprived of labourers, their serfs converted into small landowners, with no capitalists at hand to undertake the farming of the masters' land. The peasantry, however, with few exceptions,

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used their newly-acquired freedom wisely and moderately. In the communal assemblies they quietly voted for the abolition of all class privileges that pressed unequally on local taxation, and they were generally victorious. By degrees the landholders grew reconciled to the new state of things, finding that with good management their position was materially as well as morally improved by the independence of their peasantry. For awhile the career of reform which the czar had pursued since his accession to the throne was threatened with interruption in 1866, when his majesty's life was attempted by a wild fanatic imbued with the notions of a party styled "the Nihilists," a party that aimed at destroying all existing social differences and distinctions, church and state together, by physical force. The emperor dismissed his reforming ministers, and called conservatives and reactionists to his council. A curb was put on the public press, and governors with repressive tendencies were appointed to all the northern and western provinces, save Poland, which was indulged with a liberal secretary of state. Public opinion, however, reasserted itself ere long, and a vigorous effort was made to reform the military administration and reorganize the army. The old lengthened service of twenty-five years, by which a soldier, before the emancipation, had been able to earn freedom for himself and his posterity, was abolished, and a short term adopted. Corporal punishment was abandoned; new arms of precision were introduced, and improved artillery adopted; the militia was reconstituted on a more popular basis; the cadet schools were reformed, and a more scientific training afforded to the youths destined to become officers. Nor were the Cossacks overlooked; but certain ameliorations in discipline, and improvement in supplies at the military colonies, served to reconcile them to the hardships of their service.

A signal mark of the high position as humanitarians of the leading men in Russia, is to be found in the fact that the "Explosive Bullet Treaty" was signed at St. Petersburg in November by the representatives of Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Würtemburg. The document thus drawn up with a view to mitigate the horrors of war, marks an epoch in civilization and merits record. It is to the following effect:—

"Considering that the progress of civilization ought to result in diminishing as much as possible the sufferings inseparable from war; that the only legitimate object pursued in war is to weaken the force of the enemy; that to attain this it suffices to place as many men as possible '*hors de combat;*' that to make use of expedients which will unnecessarily enlarge the wounds of the men placed *hors de combat*, or entail inevitable death, is incompatible with the before-mentioned object; that to make use of such expedients would, moreover, be contrary to the teachings of humanity; the undersigned, in virtue of the instructions given them by their governments, are authorized to declare as follows:—

"1st. The contracting parties engage, in the event of war between any of them, to abstain from the use of missiles of any description possessing explosive power, or filled with explosive or inflammable material, weighing less than 400 grammes. This restriction to apply to the army and navy alike.

"2nd. They likewise invite all those states not represented at the deliberations of the military commission assembled at St. Petersburg, to subscribe to this mutual engagement.

"3rd. In the event of war this engagement is to be observed only towards the contracting parties, and those that may subsequently subscribe to it. It need not be observed towards any who have not signified their assent to the above stipulations.

"4th. The above engagement likewise ceases to be valid if a state that has not signed it takes part in a war between parties that have signed it.

"5th. Whenever the progress of science results in any new definite proposals being made for improving the equipment of the troops, the contracting parties, as well as those who have subsequently joined this engagement, will assemble to maintain the principles laid down to reconcile the acquirements of war with the demands of humanity."

Turkey, who had not been unprosperous since the Crimean war, not only held Egypt well in check, but showed signs of weariness of her protectors, the western powers. The peace of Paris, in 1856, in laying heavy conditions on Russia with regard to the Black Sea, imposed disabilities on Turkey also. The Sublime Porte did not like its men-of-war to be kept out of the Euxine, nor that the mouths of the Danube and the navigation of that river should be under the control of a European

commission. Rather let us have the old state of things back again, muttered the Divan, we have a good army and a good fleet, and Russia will not be in a hurry to quarrel with us. As the government of the czar feels the resentment of that treaty even still more keenly, it is not impossible that the long pending Eastern Question may find a peaceful solution. The war of 1866, though in strengthening Prussia it crippled Austria on the west, yet left the latter power strong on the east, and with a fresh stimulus for extending its influence in that direction, to the detriment of Russian influence in the same quarter. Forces round the Euxine being thus rendered more equal, the temptation to any one of the powers to make a war of conquest is proportionately diminished.

One most unfortunate popular error has been dangerously encouraged by politicians in Russia, who have more zeal for their "nationality" than discretion. It is the prejudice of race against the Germans. The exclusion of Germans from offices of trust has become a popular cry, the fulfilment of which would give a most injurious, if not a fatal check, to the progress of culture and civilization in Russia. How much the development of Russia's power and enlightenment is due to foreigners, and especially to Germans, every student of her history must know. The attempt to develop a Slavonic culture, unsustained by the vigorous qualities of German thought and learning, cannot but end in ridiculous or disastrous failure. In this respect the brotherhood of nations will assert itself; and the Russian, who by nature is volatile and superficial, has more need than other Europeans of the compensating ballast which the deep, meditative character of the German alone can give.

To turn our view homewards, the German war of 1866, fortunately, did not in any way involve the British government in its toils. Occupied by a lively discussion on the domestic question of parliamentary reform, the country paid little more attention to the politics of Germany than that of spectators of the war. Mr. Gladstone, leader of the House of Commons in the ministry of Earl Russell, introduced on the 12th of March a reform bill, which was vigorously opposed, not only by the Conservatives, but by the more timid Whigs, as represented by Mr. Horsman, Mr. Lowe, and Earl Grosvenor. Ministers being defeated on a division by 315 votes against 304, resigned on the 26th of June, not without an effort on the part of the queen to retain them. The earl of Derby became prime minister, with Mr. Disraeli for chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons, the cabinet being completed a few days after the battle of Sadowa. The defeat of the reform bill produced some excitement among the working classes, who felt that they were unjustly deprived of the right of voting for members of Parliament. By way of demonstrating the popular feeling, the Reform League organized a long procession of trades' unions and other societies of working men, to march into Hyde Park. Some foolish writers in the newspapers raised a cry against this meeting, as an improper interference with the comfort of pleasure-seekers in the park. The government ordered the park gates to be shut, and sent a posse of policemen to protect them. The crowd waited patiently outside, until, finding the exclusion continued, they pressed against the feebly rooted iron railings and swayed them from their fastenings. Entrance thus obtained on one side of the park, the railings were uprooted in other quarters, and with little resistance from the police the whole crowd entered the park and held their meeting. Every advantage was sought to be taken by the reactionary press of this scene of violence, such as it was; the Reform League, Mr. Bright, and the Russell ministry incurred much obloquy. Meanwhile the Fenians began to break the peace in Ireland, and a bill was passed for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. A tremendous commercial crisis, too, commenced with the failure, on the 10th of May, 1867, of the celebrated discounting firm, Overend, Gurney, and Co. The widespread ruin that followed penetrated, with various degrees of intensity, to nearly every family in the British islands. Early in the parliamentary session of 1867 Mr. Disraeli introduced a reform bill so very liberal in its principles that three of his most conservative colleagues resigned office. The rest of his party he had "educated," as he said, up to a point that lowered the suffrage to a degree far beyond anything attempted by the Liberals in the previous session. Of this the Liberals could not complain, and they helped the Conservative ministry to pass a measure that practically led to household and lodger suffrage. The result was seen after the dissolution of Parliament, in the return to the House of Commons of a large majority of Liberals, which in the session of 1868 displaced Mr. Disraeli and his friends, and restored to power the liberal leaders.

The reform agitation, the commercial panic, and the Fenian insurrection, diverted the attention which might possibly have otherwise been given to German affairs. Neither the traditional friendship with Austria, nor the dynastic connection with Hanover, served to rouse England from the policy of non-intervention that she had learnt from Mr. Cobden; Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative, when in office, alike observed this attitude of abstention. The English government, indeed, offered its services to the belligerents in the interests of peace, and supported France both in the proposal of a conference before the war, and in suggesting an armistice soon after the battle of Sadowa. In the Luxemburg question, which seemed likely to lead to a war between Prussia and France, the British cabinet intervened with effect. The conference proposed by the king of Holland was, as before stated, held in London, and by the treaty then and there signed England, in common with the other powers represented, engaged to guarantee the neutrality of Luxemburg. Favouring the change that had taken place in the Roumanian provinces, yet not encouraging the revolt of the Cretans, England pursued with regard to the Ottoman empire her traditional policy of upholding the strength of Turkey while promoting the improvement of her administration. Crete was not to be made independent, while Moldavia and Wallachia were placed on a vantage ground by the government of Prince Charles, under the nominal suzerainty of the sultan. The relations between Great Britain and France continued very friendly, as did those we had with all the European powers; but there was a coolness in the official intercourse of the United States with the British government, on account of what are called the "Alabama claims." These claims arose out of the depredations committed during the American civil war by the Confederate cruiser, the *Alabama*, which having been built in England, had sailed away before the government in London knew for certain her character and destination. She was far away from England when she received a warlike armament and crew, and commenced a cruise that was fatal to many merchantmen belonging to the Northerners of America. The owners of the merchantmen demanded compensation from the British government, on the ground that it was their duty to prevent the *Alabama* from quitting the English shores. In consequence of this soreness of the Americans, the insurrection of the Fenians was not heartily discouraged in the United States. Raids into Canada were winked at, and the annexation of that colony became a subject of public talk. The subsequent welding together of all the British provinces of North America into one dominion, did much to avert a danger that might have become threatening.

In one memorable instance, England broke through her resolution to maintain peace, and showed to the world how well she could conduct an arduous expedition, when the safety and freedom of her citizens were at stake. The Abyssinian expedition, from its inception to its successful conclusion, is a signal proof that the much decried military administration of Great Britain is quite capable of planning with skill, and executing with vigorous courage, great and warlike enterprises. For four years Theodore, king or negus of Abyssinia, had held in captivity certain British subjects, including an envoy from the queen. Every means of reconciliation were tried with him in vain, and that respect paid to Englishmen in various parts of the world, which is the security for her commercial transactions, was in danger of being forfeited in the East. In the summer, therefore, of 1867, it was resolved that an expedition should be sent from India into Abyssinia, under the able guidance of Sir Robert Napier; and a special session of Parliament was held in November, to vote the sums necessary for the conduct of the war. An additional penny in the pound income-tax was agreed to, which produced £1,500,000. There was also a surplus in the treasury, and the Indian government had to pay a large part of the cost. The estimate that £3,500,000 would suffice proved delusive.

The merit of the expedition lay in the completeness of its organization, not in any brilliancy of action. A force of some twelve thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with followers at least equally numerous in the transport, commissariat, and kindred services, were conveyed by ships from Bombay to Annesley Bay, and thence marched across the rugged highlands of Abyssinia to Magdala, the mountain fortress of King Theodore, which was stormed and taken without the loss of a man, and with only thirty wounded. Theodore having shot himself rather than be taken prisoner, General Napier returned to the sea-coast with the

rescued British subjects, after burning down Magdala and its fortifications, lest it should become a nest of tyranny in the hands of some chieftain of the neighbouring tribes. So well satisfied was England with the completeness of the achievement, and with the respect it procured her among foreign powers, that there was much less murmuring than might have been expected at the undue measure in which the cost of the expedition exceeded the estimate. The total amount of outlay was fully three times as much as the three millions first voted by Parliament. The pasha of Egypt was perhaps not sorry to see this formidable expedition leave the African shore. His relations with the sultan his suzerain were not very cordial, and an old ally of the Ottoman Porte might mean mischief to the commander of the Red Sea. Nothing happened, however, to justify these suspicions.

If the effect produced by the Prussian triumphs was not very distinctly marked in Great Britain, Russia, or Turkey, the Latin race inhabiting Europe was strangely influenced by this new development of Teutonic power. Italy, as we have seen, was a gainer by the defeat of Austria; France, as we shall see, was strangely moved by the same series of events; and Spain, dissevered as she seemed from German interests, became in a singular manner entangled in the mesh of intrigues which rival politicians were weaving. The kingdom of Spain has during these latter years undergone many trials, much suffering, and one great and wholesome change wrought, not by the hands of a foreign enemy or interfering neighbour, but by her native population. The people, spontaneously breaking through the bonds and fetters that held them, hurled the last of the Bourbons from a throne which she had in every sense disgraced. The ague of revolt had afflicted this magnificent country at pretty regular intervals for many years with no positive results, until in April, 1868, an insurrection broke out in Catalonia, and that province was placed in a state of siege. On the 23rd of the month Marshal Narvaez, the prime minister of Queen Isabella Maria, died. In consequence of this event, the ministry resigned and were replaced by a new cabinet under Gonzalez Bravo, whose first important act was to banish the chiefs of the army, and to send them, without trial or notice of any kind, across the sea to the Canary Islands. At the same time her most Catholic Majesty's sister, with her husband the Duc de Montpensier, were ordered to leave Spain. On their refusal to comply with the ministerial order, on the ground that an Infanta of Spain could receive orders only from the sovereign, the queen signed a decree exiling the royal pair, who were conveyed in a Spanish man-of-war, the *Ville de Madrid*, to Lisbon. Some idea of the feeling existing in the navy, and indeed through the entire country, in consequence of the arbitrary proceedings of the new ministry, may be formed from what occurred on board the *Ville de Madrid*. The captain-general of Andalusia was ordered to accompany the royal exiles to the ship, the commander of which, on receiving them, whispered to the duke, "Say but one word, and the captain-general shall remain a prisoner on board, while we sail to the Canaries and bring back the banished generals." The duke declined to utter this word, and lost the crown of Spain, as his father by a similar tenderness of conscience had lost the crown of France. Not long after the perpetration of this arbitrary act, in the month of September, a revolution broke out. The exiled generals were summoned home from the Canaries by the revolutionary leaders, and General Prim, who had escaped to England, returned to his native country. When the latter reached Cadiz the Spanish fleet lying in that port, under the command of Admiral Topete, and the troops of the garrison, declared for the revolution. A proclamation was issued by General Prim in which he said, "Yesterday you were groaning under the yoke of a despotic government; to-day the flag of liberty waves over your walls. Until the moment arrives when Spain, freely convoked, shall decide upon her destinies, it is incumbent upon us to organize ourselves to carry on the struggle, and to save the people from being bereft of all law and authority." A prominent leader of the revolutionary movement was Marshal Serrano, duke de la Torre.

When the province of Andalusia pronounced against the government, the ministry under Gonzalez resigned, and General Concha was appointed by the queen to the presidency of the council. The royal army under the command of the marquis de Novaliches marched upon Cordova, where the insurgents were in force. Upon the issue of this movement depended the future of Spain, and the most strenuous exertions

were made by both parties in preparing for action. A severe skirmish occurred at Burgos, at the close of which the royal troops fraternized with the people, a circumstance by no means inspiriting to the gallant and loyal marquis in command, whose fate was worthy of a better cause. Before the end of the month he had reached the river Guadalquiver, and found the insurgents posted at the bridge of Alcolea, about fifteen miles from Cordova, under the command of General Serrano. In the action which ensued the royalist troops were defeated, and their gallant commander fell mortally wounded. The army of the queen broke up and dispersed, while its royal mistress fled from Spain across the Pyrenees into France, reaching Biarritz on the 30th of September. Here she met the Emperor Napoleon, and after a short interview with him proceeded on her journey to Bayonne. On the 20th October a manifesto was issued by the Provisional Government established on the departure of the queen, explaining to the people the necessity which had forced them to rise and expel the Bourbon dynasty. "The people," it said, "must now regain the time which it has lost; the principle of popular sovereignty which is now naturalized in Spain is the principle of national life, and the ideal type of the nation's operations." The document also expressed the desire of the government to keep on good terms with foreign powers, "but if even the example of America in recognizing the revolution were not followed, Spanish independence was not threatened, and there was no foreign intervention to fear."

In another manifesto the government said they should quietly proceed to choose a form of government, without pretending to prejudice such serious questions; though they noticed as very significant the silence maintained by the Juntas respecting monarchical institutions: "if the popular decision should be against a monarchy, the provisional government will respect the will of the national sovereignty." On the 3rd October, Marshal Serrano entered Madrid at the head of the revolutionary army, and was received with enthusiasm by the people, to whom he announced, that after communications with General Espartero, he had been authorized to exercise supreme power and to appoint a ministry provisionally until a constituent assembly should meet. "Let tranquillity," he said, "continue to prevail, and do not allow your confidence in the issue of our efforts to diminish; the unity and discipline of the army, its fraternization with the people, and the patriotism of all, will accomplish the work of the revolution, avoiding equally the impulse of reaction and the discredit of disorder." The affairs of the country were now carried on by a provisional government, a government, as its name implies, existing from hand to mouth, ruling much by circulars and manifestoes. In one of these it was said, "The government has taken in hand the reins of the state, in order to lead the nation to liberty, and not allow it to perish in anarchy." A protest issued by the queen from her asylum in France, met with the following comment:—"Queen Isabella has addressed a manifesto to the Spaniards. The Junta refrains from making any criticism on it. The people have passed their judgment on the acts of the queen, and can now pass their verdict on her words." Meanwhile the Society of Jesuits was suppressed throughout the kingdom and colonies; their colleges and institutions were ordered to be closed within three days, and their property sequestrated to the state. The censorship on literary publications was also suppressed, and the absolute liberty of the press proclaimed.

The ministers of France, Prussia, Portugal, and Great Britain, forwarded despatches recognizing the provisional government. Prim, the guiding spirit of the revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, and immediately issued an order, forbidding soldiers to interfere in politics, or to attend meetings connected with political objects. A reform bill, or electoral law, was passed by the government, entitling every citizen of twenty-five years to vote at municipal elections, and at elections for the Cortes. An electoral committee, formed to carry out the provisions of the bill, pointed out in a manifesto the form and shape of the future government. "The monarchical form," it said, "is imposed upon us by the exigencies of the revolution, and the necessity of consolidating the liberties we have acquired. Monarchy, by divine right, is for ever dead. Our future monarchy, in deriving its origin from popular rights, will be a consecration of universal suffrage. It will symbolize the national sovereignty and consolidate public liberty, the right of the people being superior to all institutions and powers. This monarchy, surrounded by democratic institutions, cannot fail to be popular."

When the provisional government had, as they believed, finally decided on the permanent form of government under which Spain could flourish, the difficulty was to find a man of noble blood, possessing the qualities necessary for a ruler of Spaniards—one who would be acceptable to the Spanish nation, and who would be acceptable also to the various governments of the Old and New World; one who could steer himself and the country through the crooked intrigues and diplomacies continually in action at the European courts, and who could strengthen and consolidate the power of Spain before the eyes of Europe.

At the general election in January, 1869, the monarchical party obtained a large majority of votes in the Cortes, a majority, however, which was divided into two parties—the Unionists, quondam followers of O'Donnell, and the Progressistas, who were attached to Espartero. At the end of this month the governor of Burgos was murdered in the cathedral by some priests, to the great scandal of the church; the pope's nuncio narrowly escaped death by the mob in consequence, and great excitement prevailed. The occasion was not lost by the liberal party, some of whom stimulated the passions of the people against the clergy. Order was at length restored by the trial of the assassins by court-martial, and by the execution of one who was found guilty. On opening the Cortes on the 11th February, Marshal Serrano, the president, invited the representatives of the nation, now that the obstacles to progress were removed, to construct a new edifice, of which the provisional government had prepared the foundations and designed the plan. It proclaimed with enthusiasm the essential principles of the most radical liberalism, namely, liberty of worship, of the press, of public education, of public meeting and association. On the 25th February the marshal announced his assumption of the executive power, simply from patriotic motives and utterly without selfishness; it was impossible, he said, for him to abuse his power, as neither the right of veto or the power of making peace or war had been given to him, so that he had very little power to abuse had he wished to do so. The government, it was said, would endeavour to disarm the republican party by a most liberal policy; yet Senor Castelar's proposal for an amnesty for political offences was opposed by the government and lost by a large majority.

Questions arose from the republican ranks as to the right of the Duc de Montpensier to hold the position of captain-general of Spain, he being brother-in-law of the late queen and son of Louis Philippe, a Bourbon by birth. Prim answered that the appointment was made by the late dynasty, and that the provisional government had no right to interfere. Admiral Topete declared that he would rather have Montpensier as king than a republic. Subsequently when the articles of the new constitution were carried, the minister for the colonies declared that the authors of the revolution would never have undertaken the task, had they suspected that the result would have been the establishment of a republic. In reply to Senor Castelar, Admiral Topete, minister of marine, declared the Duc de Montpensier to be the most eligible candidate for the throne; a monarchy, a regency, or a republic, he said, seemed equally impossible. "Beware," said he, "lest if you make every solution impossible, some insolent daring man undertake to cut the knot you are unable to solve. You will not applaud me now, but you will understand me." This remarkably strong hint had an effect, and on the 6th June Marshal Serrano was elected by a large majority regent of the kingdom. The Cortes with much noise and ceremony sware to support him, and Prim his prime minister. This state of things did not last long; the old difficulty as to who should be king continually cropped up until, on the 28th September, it was resolved to propose the young duke of Genoa as a candidate for the vacant throne. The young gentleman was at this time a student at Harrow school, in Middlesex. His father, the brother of King Victor Emmanuel, died in 1855. His mother was a daughter of John, king of Saxony, and his sister was wife to the heir apparent of the Italian crown. Neither the prince, however, or his relatives would have anything to do at this time with the Spanish crown. His refusal of the proffered dignity occasioned a split in the ministry of General Prim, and the republicans throughout the country, taking advantage of the unsettled state of things, broke out into open insurrection. The regular troops marched against the disaffected, who being once more overthrown, all moderate men became convinced of the necessity of a governing head, capable of wielding supreme power. Prim advised delay, but professed himself a monarchist; "such I was, such I am, and such I will continue

to be. The country requires a dynasty." Senor Castelar, professor of history, and leader of the republican party, made a powerful speech, historically memorable, showing that the soil of Spain had never been favourable to dynasties, and that the ancient system of monarchies having died out, nothing was left by which men could enjoy their right of freedom but a republic. In consequence of these cabals and discussions, the year 1869 passed away without giving Spain a king. Matters were, however, rapidly approaching a crisis.

In July, 1870, a deputation was sent from the Spanish Cortes through the prime minister, General Prim, offering the crown to Prince Leopold Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, a very distant relative of the king of Prussia, with, as Prim had every reason to believe, the concurrence of the emperor of the French; this belief is supported by the statement that the prince had offered to communicate his nomination to the court of the Tuileries in person. There had been satisfactory communications with the Spanish minister on the subject, but it has been whispered that, at the last moment, the Empress Eugenie determined to support the pretensions of the ex-Queen Isabella, and of her son. The deplorable result of this most unfortunate determination is before us. M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, informed the king of Prussia that his master, Louis Napoleon, would not permit the candidature of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern Sigmaringen to the crown of Spain, and would hold the Prussian government responsible for the consequences if it was persisted in. Prince Leopold, through his father, withdrew as a candidate for the crown of Spain, to the annoyance of the monarchical party in Madrid and the surprise of Europe; but so determined was the Napoleon party in the French government to pick a quarrel, that King William of Prussia had to give a rebuff to the French ambassador in the public gardens of Ems. The ambassadors returned to their respective courts, and in a few days it was known throughout Europe that France had declared war upon Prussia. The powers of Europe stood aloof, as it were, until the fierce onset of the belligerents had shown by its result how greatly the prowess of France had been over-estimated, and the Spanish government being freed from any further dictation from Louis Napoleon, brought their own affairs to a crisis by electing Prince Amadeus of Savoy, duke of Aosta, and younger son of Victor Emanuel, king of Italy, to the crown of Spain. He had been proposed by General Prim in 1868; the offer was then declined by the Italian government in consequence, partly, of the disordered state of Spain at that time, and partly by his position as heir presumptive to the crown of Italy. These difficulties no longer exist. Spain is reduced into order by the energy and patience of General Prim's government, and the crown of Italy is provided for by the birth of a son and heir to the prince's elder brother. We may therefore look forward with hope to an era of increasing power and prosperity to Spain, under the guidance of a prince of the house of Savoy.

General Prim has unfortunately fallen a victim to his fidelity to the cause of monarchy, having been assassinated by political enemies in Madrid, on the very day before the landing of King Amadeus at Carthagena. He was a man holding one of the most exceptional positions known to the students of modern history—that of ruler during an interregnum; a king who was not a king, and never meant to be a king. He ruled a great country with success for two years, yet never looked upon himself as a possible candidate for the permanent sovereignty. He was born in December, 1814, at Reuss in Catalonia, not far from Tarragona, the son of a colonel who had grown old in the Spanish service. With a strong inclination for a soldier's career, Prim at an early period enlisted in the Spanish service as a cadet. Scarcely had he entered the service when the war of the Spanish succession broke out, which lasted from the death of King Ferdinand, in 1833, down to the peace of Bergara, in 1839. In this struggle Prim ranged himself under the constitutional standard, against Don Carlos. He first distinguished himself, not in the regular army, but in one of the free corps. He came to Madrid at the head of one of those wild and lawless bands, the "Marseillais of Spain," which astonished the more sober Castilians by their fierceness of look and bearing, no less than by the strangeness of their attire. Before his twenty-second year he gained his promotion to the rank of captain, and three years later that of colonel, with other military distinctions.

At the end of the civil war, Prim began to devote himself to politics, and was elected a deputy in several successive parliaments. In this capacity he was busy, active, and intelligent, and took a very

prominent part in the organization and management of political clubs. He gained rapid promotion, both professional and political, being advanced to the rank of brigadier-general and to the dignity of Comte de Reuss. The year 1844 found him implicated in a conspiracy against Narvaez, then at the head of the Spanish government, who escaped assassination at the cost of his aide-de-camp Rasetti's life. Prim was convicted of participation in the murder, but his sentence was revoked by the queen, and he was afterwards appointed captain-general and governor of Porto Rico. On the breaking out of a negro insurrection at Santa Cruz, he went at once to the rescue of the Danes, and was mainly instrumental in the subjugation of the rebels. His conduct, however, was not satisfactory to the colonial minister at home, who recalled him because he had removed the garrison, and exposed Porto Rico to the attacks of the negroes there, who were as ready for a revolt as their brethren in the Danish colony. Prim's next step was to become involved in a conspiracy against Bravo Murillo, by whom he was banished. However, after a short absence he returned, and in 1854 was sent as Spanish military commissioner to the camp of the allies during the Crimean war. On his return from the East he passed through Paris, where, in 1856, he married a Mexican lady, Senora Echevarria; the marriage was solemnized under the auspices and in the presence of Queen Christina.

On the 31st of January of that year Prim was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general, and in 1858 he was raised to the senate, where he soon distinguished himself by a very remarkable speech on the Mexican question. The war of Morocco broke out soon afterwards, and Prim, who commanded, attained a high reputation by a variety of exploits, which were crowned by the battle of Castillejos, near Melilla, where, seeing the regiment of Cordova broken and turned to flight, he threw himself on the path of the fugitives, rallied them, and, with their colours in his hand, led them with such impetuosity against the enemy that he secured the victory for the Spanish arms. This heroic deed was rewarded with the title of marquis de los Castillejos, and the rank of grandee of Spain of the first class. In 1861 the joint expedition to Mexico of England, France, and Spain was projected, and Prim was sent out in command of the Spanish contingent, being charged at the same time with the duties of a minister plenipotentiary. How Prim proceeded to Mexico with the French and English contingents, and came back with the latter, leaving to the former alone the task of a complete subjugation of Mexico, and the instalment of an Austrian dynasty there, is related elsewhere. Prim's conduct at this juncture, however severely censured by some of his countrymen, received the fullest sanction of the Cortes. We have not space to follow the career of Prim under the ministry of Senor Mon, or under the Narvaez and O'Donnell administrations. Soon after O'Donnell's accession to power, Prim seemed to recall to memory his former political predilections. He leagued himself with Espartero, and threw himself with all his influence into the interests of the Progressistas. In January, 1866, several regiments in various parts of Spain made demonstrations against the government. Placing himself at the head of the revolted regiments, Prim succeeded in reaching the mountains of Toledo. The royal power, however, was at that time too strong to be overcome. The people failed to respond to the movement; and finding himself unable to cope with the forces brought against him, the leader of the insurrection retreated into Portugal with the bulk of his followers. Prim afterwards repaired to London, where he remained in seclusion until the organization of a counter-movement afforded him the opportunity of re-entering Spain.

After the insurrection which drove Queen Isabella from the Spanish throne, Prim had the singular honour of offering the Spanish crown to some half dozen "eligible candidates," and the mortification of meeting with refusals from all, except Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern (who withdrew his acceptance almost as soon as he had notified it), and Prince Amadeus, the present king of Spain. During these twenty-seven months of difficulty and danger, when a sound head and nerve were required, Marshal Prim was not found wanting in tact and administrative talent. Indeed, it may be safely said that to his firm hand, in a very great measure, Spain owed such tranquillity, as, in spite of at least one insurrection, fell to her lot during the long abeyance of regal authority. In Spain it is as indispensable for every political party to have a military champion, as for a troop of bullfighters to have its own matador. Espartero once held that place among the old Progressistas, Narvaez among the Moderados, and O'Donnell among those who would call themselves Liberal

Conservatives, or moderate Liberals. The more advanced Liberals always claimed Prim as their typical hero, and such in reality he was, though some men accused him of inconsistency for accepting the title of Count, while he professed ultra-democratic opinions. The marshal was very strongly addicted to the pleasures of the chase, for the gratification of which taste he kept up a magnificent house and establishment.

In person he was considerably below the middle size, with a small and slender, but wiry and active frame, a lively intelligent countenance, with a very bad complexion. His eyes were large and expressive, his features tolerably regular, with no other marked peculiarity than the high cheek-bones. His manners were courteous and winning; his speech fluent, forcible, and not inelegant, both in his native language and in French. He was not a great genius, yet occupied a position very remarkable for a man of ordinary capacity. He was a good officer, possessing that valuable quality of bravery that increases as danger grows more imminent. His idea of government was to maintain military order, and to leave the rest to his colleagues. The wants and grievances of Spain seemed to trouble him but little. He knew the limit of his own powers, and his ambition led him to make a king rather than be a king. His assassination was due, perhaps, as much to the popular hatred of a foreign monarch as to republican hatred of royalty. Anyhow it was a dastardly deed, disgraceful to the party by whom it was instigated or permitted.

Meanwhile France, the greatest power among the Latin races, was successfully developing her material prosperity, if not her political institutions, under the rule of Napoleon III. We resume the thread of her history where we left it in Chapter III., namely, in the year 1860. The alliance of France and England continued to grow more close and friendly. The treaty of commerce successfully negotiated by Mr. Cobden gave the two nations a community of interests, and the feeling of amity was strengthened by certain joint expeditions of a warlike nature. In 1860 public attention in France was, for a time, diverted from the Italian question to events in the remote East. Notwithstanding the great distance of China from the West, that country has long enjoyed the advantages, or disadvantages, of foreign intervention. Unlike Mexico, it has no powerful and civilized neighbour jealous of European interference. Both China and Japan are in an unfortunate position in this respect. Possessing no effective means of resistance against the improved appliances of war and the training of the West, they have been unable to withstand the imposition of treaties of trade, and have been compelled, in spite of themselves, to abandon their seclusion and open their ports to foreign commerce. Whatever good may eventually accrue by the opening of the country to Europeans, it is surely the right of the Chinese government to determine whether or not it is for the advantage of their country to open their doors to other nations. Before commercial interests, however, many scruples have to give way. The conduct of Europeans in China, and not least that of the English, cannot be regarded as free from violence and wrong.

When a ratification of the treaty of Tientsin was refused, and the Chinese treacherously opened fire upon the English forces in time of peace, war was again declared by England and France against the government at Pekin. Two separate expeditions were organized without delay, General Montauban, afterwards created Comte de Palikao, commanding the French, and General Sir Hope Grant the English contingent. Baron Gros and Lord Elgin, the English and French ambassadors, suffered shipwreck on their voyage to China, and narrowly escaped with their lives. The allied forces opened the campaign with an attack on a fort at Tangku, which, after an assault, was entered by both armies at the same time. The Taku forts gallantly withstood an assault made by the French, and only yielded to a combined attack of both French and English, leaving the whole of their war material in the hands of the allies. The Chinese government then, as a pretext for delay, entered into negotiations for peace, but faithlessly seized the English commissioners, together with some other gentlemen, and subjected them to many indignities and cruelties. All negotiations were at once broken off, and the allied forces advanced into the country, overcoming all opposition, until they reached the neighbourhood of Pekin, which Lord Elgin threatened to storm unless his terms were acceded to. The Chinese evaded these demands, and the armies advanced, the French making their entry into the emperor's summer palace. The conquerors did not show the virtues of their superior civilization in the face of a semi-barbarous

enemy. The acts of the French troops recall the depredations of the early English navigators on the Spanish coast of America. The pillage was wholesale, the destruction most wanton. The public reception hall, the state and private bedrooms, ante-rooms, boudoirs, and every other apartment, were ransacked; articles of virtu, of native and foreign workmanship, taken or broken, if too large to be carried away; ornamental lattice-work, screens, jade-stone ornaments, jars, clocks, watches, and other pieces of mechanism, curtains and furniture—none escaped destruction. There were extensive wardrobes of every article of dress; coats richly embroidered in silk and gold thread, in the imperial dragon pattern, boots, head-dresses, fans, &c., in fact, rooms all but filled with them, store-rooms of manufactured silk in rolls, all destroyed.

The English followed the French, and in order to intimidate the Chinese, and to make it plain to them that their semi-barbarism gave them no advantage in the face of Western civilization, burnt the palace to the ground. The Chinese government, now convinced, against their will, of the uselessness of further resistance, accepted the conditions offered by the allies.

It deserves notice that the Emperor Napoleon, in his speech on the opening of the French Chambers in March, 1860, vindicated himself against the charge of meanness in exacting Nice and Savoy as the price of his aid to Italy. "Looking at the transformation of North Italy, which gives to a powerful state all the passes of the Alps, it was my duty, for the security of our frontiers, to claim the French slopes of the mountains. The re-assertion of a claim to a territory of small extent has nothing in it to alarm Europe, and give a denial to the policy of disinterestedness which I have proclaimed more than once; for France does not wish to proceed to this aggrandizement, however small it may be, either by military occupation, or by provoking insurrections, or by under-hand manœuvres, but by frankly explaining the question to the great powers. They will doubtless understand in their equity, as France would certainly understand it for each of them under similar circumstances, that the important territorial re-arrangement which is about to take place, gives us a right to a guarantee indicated by nature herself."

Neighbouring nations did not take the view of the annexation which the emperor would have had them take. But what could they say when an appeal to universal suffrage among the natives confirmed the annexation?

Switzerland raised a feeble protest against the absorption of these provinces into the empire of France; but she met with a response due to her weakness. About this time the massacre of Christians in Syria by the Mohammedans called the attention of the Western powers to that part of the world. Armed intervention was acknowledged to be the only effective means to quell the disturbances; and a convention was signed by England and France, in virtue of which France, with the consent of Turkey, sent a brigade, under the command of General de Beaufort d'Hautpool, to the scene of disorder, in August, 1860. The appearance of the French flag speedily put an end to the evils under which the Christians were suffering. By the terms of the convention the time of the French occupation had been fixed for six months. During this time it had been arranged, that a commission made up of representatives of France and England was to meet at Beyrout, and to concert measures for the maintenance of order, and the safety of the Christian inhabitants of Lebanon. The six months expired on the 3rd March, 1861, and in February the commissioners had not completed their labours. The English government was little disposed to favour an extension of the stay of the French brigade, but consented to a limited delay of four months. On the 5th July the French troops evacuated Syria. A good deal of ill-feeling was excited in France by the conduct of England in this matter. The French could not understand the jealousy with which their sole interference in the affairs of the East was regarded by English politicians.

The French troops had hardly returned from Syria, when fresh employment was found for them in the Western hemisphere. For some years the internal affairs in Mexico had presented nothing but a scene of confusion. Revolution succeeded revolution. Anarchy alone seemed to possess any stability. This state of things finally called for the intervention of those governments whose subjects had been the chief victims of the exactions of the various Mexican rulers. On the 10th November, 1861, a convention was signed by France, Spain, and England, by which these powers agreed to demand by force of arms redress for their injured countrymen. This undertaking by no means met with universal approval in France. The French

people had grown tired of distant campaigns, and showed small desire to have in America a pendant to the wars in Asia. The successes of the French army in Cochin China, where some few thousand men strove bravely against superior numbers and the dangers of the climate, for the sake of establishing a French colony, had not been received with general approbation. It was felt that the losses and the expenses of the expedition would far exceed any substantial gain, and the imperial government was accused of being swayed too easily by the national taste for military affairs. It was thought, moreover, unwise to create complications in America, when so many beset the very borders of France.

At the time the allied expedition set out, Juarez, the chief of the liberal party, held the reins of power. The intentions of the European governments, as officially declared, were "to compel Mexico to fulfil the obligations already solemnly contracted, and to give a guarantee of a more efficient protection for the persons and property of their respective countrymen;" but the allied powers declined any intervention in the domestic affairs of the country, and especially any exercise of pressure on the will of the population with regard to their choice of a government. The first act of the allies was to sign a convention with Juarez at La Soledad, confirming the president's authority. The allied forces were allowed, during the progress of negotiations, to occupy the towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, places favourable to the health of the soldiers, while the Mexican flag, which had been lowered at the approach of the allies, was allowed to float over Vera Cruz. England, abandoning all intention of advancing into the country, ratified the signature of its plenipotentiary. Spain, though not giving up the enterprise so readily, did not disavow the signature of General Prim. France, however, declared boldly that she could not accept the convention of La Soledad, which was "counter to the national dignity."

This step of the French government at once roused the suspicion that its interference in Mexican affairs was prompted by other considerations than the simple interests of Frenchmen residing in Mexico. As soon as the Spanish and English realized the awkwardness of their position, their only anxiety was not to let slip any opportunity of breaking with their ally. A pretext soon came. Among the French staff had come a Mexican exile, by name Almonte, who was an object of suspicion to Juarez on account of his monarchical opinions. Juarez demanded his surrender as a traitor, and was supported in his demands by England. The French could not in honour, even if they had been willing, listen to a demand of this kind. The result of this difference was that the French, about 5000 in number, were left alone, while the English and Spaniards returned to Europe together. Hostilities soon broke out, and an attempt made by the French to take Puebla signally failed. In the winter of 1862, however, General Forey arrived with 30,000 men, captured that city, and then marched to Mexico, where he met with no opposition. The programme of French policy was now fully declared, and the Archduke Maximilian of Austria was announced as a candidate for the throne of Mexico at the instigation of the church or reactionist party, whose motto, "God and order," was opposed to that of the liberals or Juarists, "Liberty and independence."

Maximilian, on receiving the offer of the sceptre of Mexico, hesitated long ere he yielded to the persuasions of the Mexican commissioners, backed by the French cabinet. His acceptance of the throne took place on April 10, 1864, and was followed by the treaty of Miramar, concluded between him and France, which bound the latter power to maintain a military force in Mexico on certain settled conditions. By the beginning of the year 1865, thanks to General Bazaine's zeal and activity, Mexico, for the first time since its independence, was almost at peace. A national army had been organized; important towns had been put into a state of defence, so far as earthworks and guns availed for that end, and the various government factories of arms had been re-organized and refurnished. Could Maximilian have insured the continued presence of a European force, his plans might have been carried out to a successful issue, and order established in Mexico on a firm basis; but, unfortunately, he soon discovered the futility of single attempts to ameliorate the condition of a degenerate people. Wherever the French troops put down opposition, and confided their conquests to Mexican troops, liberals would immediately reappear in arms and retake their old positions. Not till the end of 1865 was Juarez, who still styled himself the president of the republic, at length subdued. He was driven from Chihuahua, the last stronghold of the liberal cause, into the territory of the United

States. The spring of 1866, however, opened unhappily on the new empire. Its resources were not equal to the strain of constant warfare, and the troops, not receiving their pay, resumed their more natural character of marauders. The imperial finances fell into such a critical position, that Bazaine took upon himself to advance Maximilian money, to the no small displeasure of the cabinet of the Tuileries. In fact, the government and people of France were beginning to regret their share in the founding of the new Mexican empire. The French people, who had been induced by the statements of the ministers to take up two Mexican loans, had gradually been enlightened as to the real state of matters, both military and political, in Mexico. Other causes influenced the French government. On the one hand, events happened in Germany in 1866 that made France anxious to have all her available strength within reach; and, on the other, the United States' government had informed the French cabinet, even in 1864, that the unanimous feeling of the American people was opposed to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. As time wore on, and the Washington government had more leisure for external affairs, they expressed themselves in more decided terms. To a note addressed to the Tuileries in December, 1865, the French government was constrained to answer that it was disposed to hasten as much as possible the recall of its troops from Mexico. Emboldened his success, Mr. Seward, the American minister, on the 12th February, 1866, worded a still more pressing message, the rudeness of which was very galling to French dignity. Mr. Seward, however, gained the day, and the emperor agreed to make arrangements for the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico, a step that would leave Maximilian to his own resources, by the autumn of 1867.

Bazaine had the unpleasant task of communicating his orders to Maximilian. The return of Almonte, whom the emperor had sent to Napoleon to endeavour to procure fairer terms, and on whose embassy both he and the empress had built great hopes, in nowise changed the aspect of affairs. The imperial family naturally complained of the breach of faith on the part of France. Maximilian asserted that he had been tricked; that a formal convention had been entered into between the Emperor Napoleon and himself, which guaranteed the assistance of the French troops till the end of the year 1868. He felt that but one course was left for him. On July 7 he took pen in hand to sign his abdication. The empress, however, prevailed on him to delay this step till she had tried in her own person to gain a favourable hearing from the ruler of the destinies of France. With this design the Empress Charlotte landed in France on the 18th August, 1866, and hastened to Paris, where her success was as small as might have been expected. Napoleon tried to evade giving her an audience; but her entreaties were so passionate that he was compelled at last to give way. The answer she received crushed all her hopes, and completely unhinged the poor lady's mind. In the meantime the dissolution of the Mexican empire went on. Maximilian perhaps hastened its pace, by leaving the party which had supported him, because it was the French party, and by selecting his cabinet from the extreme clerical party. The effect was to immediately increase the growing disaffection. On December 1, 1866, Maximilian further crippled himself by signing a convention extorted by France, by which half the proceeds of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico were assigned to France in payment of her debt. The evacuation of Mexico by the French troops was the signal for risings and desertions. To the trouble of his empire was added the anguish caused by the intelligence of his wife's illness. He then recurred to his former purpose, and prepared to leave for Europe; but the members of the extreme clerical party prevailed on him, by offers of active support in money and men, to change his intention and return to Mexico. The clerical party kept their promises; but their measures excited the opposition of almost every class in the country but the priests. The French withdrew from Mexico even before the time announced to the United States as the term of the French occupation, exacting from their unfortunate protegé heavy pecuniary claims ere they left him. Bereft of every aid save that of native Mexicans, Maximilian's empire quickly fell. His troops, which the presence of French soldiers had not been sufficient to keep in thorough subordination, yielded everywhere to the successful liberals. Town after town fell into the hands of Juarez or of his generals. On the 19th June, 1867, the final act of the tragedy was played, Maximilian,

who had foolishly left Mexico for Queretaro, an unfortified town, fell into the hands of Juarez, was tried by court martial, and by the president's orders condemned to be shot. This heinous crime was not without excuse. The refusal of the imperialists in Mexico to look upou Juarez in any other light than as a guerilla chief in rebellion, naturally exasperated the feelings of the liberals, who, as events showed, possessed the sympathies of the majority of the Mexican nation. Juarez was, as he persisted in proclaiming himself, president of the Republic. A decree of Maximilian's issued in October, 1865, had excited feelings of revenge, for it declared that execution awaited every man taken in arms against the emperor, and by virtue of it Generals Arteaga and Salazzar were executed. A few days after Maximilian's death Mexico capitulated; and on the 27th June Vera Cruz was occupied, as the last of the foreign troops were embarking. Thus the attempt to establish monarchical government in Mexico ended in a failure, of which one of the terrible consequences was the cruel death of a distinguished representative of one of the noblest families in Europe. His tragical end, and the scarcely less mournful fate of his brave and amiable consort, must ever remain a dark stain on the history of the second French empire.

Both the military and the political prestige of Napoleon III. were dimmed by the melancholy issue of the Mexican expedition. Complications, too, in other quarters troubled him. His relations with Italy were not the least embarrassing. Committed to the support of the political unity of Italy, he was yet fully aware that the critical position of the pope, in regard to his temporal power, exasperated the Catholic feeling in France. The clergy gave the signal of opposition, and seized every opportunity to hamper the imperial government. In fact, the policy of the French cabinet, like most temporizing measures, was pleasing to hardly any party, either in France or Italy. The friends of Italy in France demanded the recall of the French troops from Rome, while the opposite party still more vehemently urged an energetic intervention in favour of the pope and the dispossessed Italian sovereigns. The emperor had no easy task in mediating between these two extremes. It was not without hesitation and delay that the emperor had recognized Victor Emanuel as king of Italy. In notifying this determination to the cabinet at Turin, the imperial government declared that it declined beforehand every responsibility in enterprises likely to disturb the peace of Europe; and that the French troops would continue the occupation of Rome until the interests which had brought them there were covered by sufficient guarantees. The recognition of the kingdom of Italy put an end to many doubts and uncertainties. Diplomatic relations were renewed with Turin, where M. Benedetti was accredited in quality of minister plenipotentiary. The principal difficulty was, however, with Rome. On the 28th May, the ambassadors of Spain and Austria had addressed joint despatches to offer the aid of their governments, should France think the opportunity a fit one, to unite the efforts of the Catholic powers in securing the pope's temporal power. This proposition rested on the assumption that Rome was the property of Catholicism, and that its sovereignty could not be placed under the protection of any but the spiritual head of the Catholic church. The French minister of foreign affairs evaded the difficulties raised by this step of Spain and Austria, by declaring that the French government, in its general policy towards Italy, would not join any combination that would be incompatible with its respect for the dignity and independence of the papacy. For that answer the Italians expressed themselves grateful, and the Catholic party could offer no further opposition to French policy.

Napoleon addressed excellent advice to the pope; but his holiness was not of a character amenable to any advice that clashed with his cherished opinions. "The Holy Father," he said, "cannot consent to anything which, either directly or indirectly, ratifies in any manner the spoliation of which he has been the victim." The Gordian knot which diplomatists were endeavouring slowly to untie, Garibaldi resolved to cut with the sword, by the expedition already described, that terminated so unfortunately for him at Aspromonte. It was on the 15th September, 1864, that Napoleon signed, with the Italian government, the treaty which is known as the September Convention, the articles of which were as follows:—1st, Italy engaged not to attack the papal dominions, and to prevent even, by force, every attack upon the said territory coming from without. 2nd, France agreed gradually to withdraw her army from the pontifical states in proportion as the pope's army should be organized. The evacuation, nevertheless, was to

be accomplished within the space of two years. 3rd, The Italian government undertook to raise no protest against the organization of a papal army, even if composed of foreign Catholic volunteers, sufficing to maintain the integrity of the frontier of the papal states, provided that the force should not degenerate into a means of attack against the Italian government. 4th, Italy declared herself ready to enter into an arrangement to take the burden of a proportionate part of the debt of the former states of the church.

In accordance with the terms of this convention, on the 11th December, 1866, the French troops left Rome for Civita Vecchia, and embarked for France. The Italians soon began to exhibit signs of impatience at the restraint diplomacy had put on their movements. Insurrectionary committees were formed throughout Italy, with no attempt at repression on the part of the government. Men were openly enlisted by them. Ratazzi, the Italian minister, at length bestirred himself to check any measures the Italian nation might take without the sanction of the government. Garibaldi was arrested on his way to the papal frontier. Everywhere, however, and from all classes, Garibaldi received an ovation, while Ratazzi met with proportionate disfavour. Bowing to this expression of the popular will, he allowed Garibaldi to return to Caprera. He endeavoured to palliate his conduct to the French ambassador by intimating to him that Garibaldi had given it to be understood that he would not leave his island again without the permission of the Italian government—a statement that was denied by Garibaldi as soon as it reached his ears. At the request of Victor Emanuel, Napoleon, who had ordered the French fleet to return to Italy, rescinded his order. Garibaldi, meantime, contrived in a small boat to pass the ships set to watch Caprera, and getting on board an American vessel, landed on the continent. He made no secret of his design, but publicly harangued the populace at Florence. Rejecting the advice offered him by General Cialdini, he set out in a special train for the frontier. His presence soon united the scattered elements of disaffection; and entering the papal dominions, on the 25th October he gave battle to 3000 pontifical troops, whom he defeated, at Monte Rotondo. His aim was to push on to Rome without delay, and get possession of the city by a *coup de main*, before the arrival of the French troops. His plan was frustrated, however, by the resistance he met with from the pope's forces. The French army, which on the receipt of the intelligence of Garibaldi's escape from Caprera had at once embarked for Italy, landed at Civita Vecchia on the 29th October, and hastened to the scene of action. This second occupation of Rome by foreigners sorely wounded Italian pride; and Menabrea, the general of the regular Italian army, was ordered to enter the pontifical states. Commands were issued to Garibaldi, at the same time, to fall behind the royal lines. In carrying out this order, Garibaldi, with 5000 men, was attacked on the 3rd November at Mentana, by 3000 of the papal soldiers, and 2000 French, under the command of Generals Kanzler and Polhès. The fight lasted four hours. At night, so little was known for certain of the issue of the engagement, that fresh troops were sent from Rome. A little later, however, Mentana capitulated, and Garibaldi, leaving 500 dead on the field and 1600 prisoners in the hands of his opponents, effected his retreat into Italian territory, and surrendered with his followers to General Ricotti, by whom he was sent to Fort Varignano, near Spezzia. He was soon after allowed to return once more to Caprera. The victory of Mentana was in a great measure due to the fact that the French contingent was armed with Chassepot rifles. The advantage the possession of this weapon gave may be estimated by the fact that the Garibaldians left 600 dead and 200 wounded behind them, while the French losses amounted to only two men killed and thirty-six wounded. The pope's soldiers lost twenty men killed and had 123 wounded. After the episode of Mentana the Italians made no further attempt forcibly to dispossess the pope of his temporal power, but resigned themselves to the tedious ways of diplomacy. The only consequence of Garibaldi's efforts in 1867 was that the French tricolor again waved over Italian soil.

In the rest of Europe France had not played the high-handed part she did in Italy. The year 1863 witnessed an act of Napoleon which deserves mention, notwithstanding its failure, as giving signs of a wiser policy than had hitherto prevailed in European councils. The emperor issued to the various sovereigns of Europe letters of invitation to a congress, at which all the questions that were filling the minds of politicians with anxiety were to be settled, and tottering peace established on

a surer basis. While the embers of war were smouldering, and before they had kindled into a blaze, Napoleon hoped by an appeal of this nature to stay a conflagration of which he could see the disastrous effects. It seemed, too, reasonable to expect that the patching up of continually widening rents in the old treaties, or their recasting, which would have to follow a war, could be done better and with a greater hope of durability than if the work were left till conflict had exasperated the tempers of nations. To the surprise of France the first refusal, not too courteously expressed, of the emperor's proposal came from England, and produced a soreness in the relations between the two countries. The example of England was soon followed, on various pretexts, by the other great powers. The good intentions of the French emperor were not questioned by any, as every minister in his reply took pains to assure him, but doubts were freely expressed as to any substantial results of the congress. Moreover, Napoleon was informed that no state could allow a representative to take part in any proceedings without a previous knowledge of the questions to be discussed, and their proposed settlements.

The idea of French intervention in Poland had been found impracticable. The insurrection which broke out in that country in 1863 was suppressed by the Russian government with great harshness. Sympathy for the cause of the Poles was pretty general, but in France great indignation was expressed at the treatment they were receiving at the hands of their conquerors. The French government was ready to go to war for Poland, if they could have secured the co-operation of England and Austria. A proposal was, in fact, made to these countries to form an alliance with France, for the purpose of obtaining in concert from Russia some guarantees for the better regulation of Polish affairs. The diplomatic methods were first to be followed, and if these did not succeed other means were to be resorted to. No country except France, however, was prepared to go this length, and the emperor's proposal was declined, though each of the three powers made separate representations to Russia, couched in similar terms. They severally asked Russia to agree to an armistice, that negotiations might be entered into with a view of restoring order in the insurgent provinces, and thus great bloodshed be stayed. Russia replied with an absolute refusal. She would not recognize the right of any other nation to offer advice, or interfere in any manner with her internal policy, and pursued the strong measures which had called forth their remonstrances, with no less harshness than before.

The year 1866 was an eventful year, and full of serious import for all countries in Europe; but nowhere did the circumstances that took place in Germany attract more attention than they did in France. The settlement of the question of the duchies of the Elbe, about which Austria and Prussia had fought side by side two years before, attracted the attention of France in the beginning of 1866 to Germany. The conduct of Prussia in this affair, and the consequences to the peace of Europe that many foreboded from it, added to ignorance of the policy likely to be pursued by the government in the expected crisis, created great uneasiness amongst all classes in France. The mercantile world suffered a panic from this general feeling of insecurity. The funds and personal securities were affected to as great an extent as if France herself had been at war. When, later in the year, the worst anticipations were realized, and the six weeks' war between the leading powers of Germany was waged, the feeling of anxiety and alarm was not lessened by the success of Prussia. With the exception of the actors in this event, no country felt the effects of the victory of Prussia so much as France. For when the North German Confederation became nominally a league of independent states, but really an empire of which Prussia held the entire control, the position of ascendancy in Europe that France had so long occupied was shaken. In face of the new power, which had shown itself possessed of such capital military organization, and had evinced such ability in conducting the operations of war, the French people began to feel distrust in the capacity of the imperial government to vindicate the interests of their country. Suspicions, indeed, floated about, that the neutrality of France in the struggle between Austria and Prussia had been bought with a promise that was not to be fulfilled. The price was even hinted at. There was to be, so went the rumours, a rectification of the frontier at the expense of either Germany or Belgium. The emperor was believed to have been overreached, and to have been unable to get the compensation, whatever it was, which Prussia had engaged to give. Thiers did not hesitate to

upbraid the government for its tolerance of Prussia's acts. This statesman's patriotism, which objected to the unity of Italy, would have had France oppose by force the amalgamation into one nation of the separate and independent states beyond the Rhine. Now that Germany had achieved her unity, with the co-operation of the emperor, as he said, Thiers pressed upon the government the adoption of a firm policy, supported by a vigorous organization of the military forces of France. It was in vain that the emperor by his despatches tried to reassure the people of the unaltered position of their country. Popular opinion was on the side of Thiers. With the intent to inspire the people with greater confidence, a new map of Europe was published in 1868, under the auspices of the government. In this map was shown how France in resources and population still surpassed Germany, after all the changes that had taken place in that country. Had only these resources been handled with ability and honesty, France would, indeed, have had no just cause for fear.

The ill-gotten power which Napoleon had wielded for eighteen years in France and Europe was evidently on the wane, and he cast about anxiously for an opportunity of re-establishing his authority, if he could not recover his fame for successful cleverness. Germany, the object of such burning jealousy ever since Sadowa, offered itself as a field for some striking warlike achievement. France has been an evil neighbour to Germany for nearly 400 years, says an eminent writer. All readers of history know what a persistent spirit of universal aggression and dictation set in with the ministry of Richelieu and the reign of Louis XIV. Both the Napoleons upheld France's right to give law to Europe. Details of the negotiations between England and France in 1831 and in 1840, prove that under the Orleanists and the peace-loving monarch, Louis Philippe, the encroaching and dictatorial spirit of the nation was as rampant and ingrained as ever. The whole life of M. Thiers, an eminently representative man, a typical Frenchmen; all his writings, all his speeches, every action of his ministerial career, have been inspired by this spirit, and have breathed the pretension, that France's voice ought to be, and must be made, paramount in determining all political and international arrangements, and that no other nation must be suffered to grow strong lest France should grow relatively weak.

The unfortunate Prevost Paradol, also a leading spirit among the better class of Frenchmen, in the last melancholy chapter of his "France Nouvelle,' warned his countrymen in the most solemn manner, that the unity of Germany, if once accomplished, would be the fall and humiliation of France; that talent, literature, the graces and the pleasures of existence, might still remain to her, but that life, power, splendour, and glory would be gone. At the unification of Germany France would disappear from the political scene.

The Great Frederick of Prussia, wrote one of the most moderate of French organs of public opinion after Sadowa, perfectly comprehended that the expansive force of France was turned to the side of Germany. "France," said he, "is bounded on the west by the Pyrenees, which separate it from Spain, and form a barrier which nature herself has placed there. The ocean serves as a boundary on the north of France, the Mediterranean and the Alps on the south. But on the east France has no other limits than those of its own moderation and justice. Alsace and Lorraine, dismembered from the empire, have carried to the Rhine the frontier line of the domination of France." That this, continues the French writer, the only side on which, according to Frederick, we are not suffocated by the obstacle of a natural barrier, should be closed upon us by the mass of an enormous state, is a fact so contrary to all our national existence, and to the natural constitution of France, that it is impossible that French bosoms should not be oppressed by it. The idea of suffocation is very characteristic of the excitable French mind. England has to endure being suffocated by ocean all round her, and content herself with expansion in colonies and dependencies. Italy is equally shut in by the Alps; Spain by the Pyrenees. But France, like a steam-boiler, must have an open valve—must have the means of expansion; and the spirit of colonisation is not in her people.

The emperor had carefully watched the development in the national mind of that alarmed jealousy of French ascendancy which had been at work ever since 1866. The completeness and unexpectedness of the Prussian victories in the war waged by King William with the rest of Germany, had been fondly attributed to the destructive power of the needle-gun. The emperor, therefore, not only gave the French army a more deadly weapon

in the Chassepot rifle, the arm that was used with such fatal effect at Mentana, but applied his own special knowledge of artillery to the invention of a still more formidable engine of destruction, since known to the world as the mitrailleuse. Armed with this new man-slayer he might, he thought, defy the German, and he waited for a convenient moment to throw down the gauntlet and fight for ascendancy in Europe. Meanwhile, to pacify men's minds at home, and perhaps to conceal the real tendency of his foreign policy, he suddenly in December, 1869, announced his intention of abandoning the personal government which he had maintained so long, in exchange for a Parliamentary system that would make the ministers of the crown responsible for their measures to the Chambers, and not to the emperor personally. More than once before had Napoleon shown a desire to relax the restrictions of various kinds with which his reign had been inaugurated, but his hand had always been held back by those partisans who had risen to power with him, who feared to loose their hold from the necks of the people, who were more Bonapartist than the Bonapartes, more imbued with Cæsarism than Cæsar himself. Let every reader remember, as he reads the following pages, that Napoleon III. was no longer an exile, seeing public affairs with disabused eyes; but a man whose high station and considerable power tempted the designing to keep him, for their own selfish interests, in ignorance of much that was going on around him. The more blind they could keep him, the easier for them was it to work out their own ends. His bad health and undecided will favoured their narrow unpatriotic conduct. Even when he conceived a project evidently safe and calculated to prove beneficial to the country, his ministers, the instruments of his will, as they were supposed to be, took care to pare down every concession to the tone of their own minds, and to the level of their own interests. Such is the inevitable result of personal government.

Whether this truth had impressed itself on the emperor's mind, or no, is not in evidence. Certain it is, however, that two days after the Christmas-day of 1869, the imperial cabinet was dissolved, and a letter from the emperor was published, inviting M. Emile Ollivier, an eloquent liberal and opposition member of the Chamber, to aid in the task his Majesty had undertaken, to bring into regular working a constitutional system. There were not unnatural suspicions in the public mind, that the emperor by this step meant rather to give the semblance than the substance of liberty to his subjects; that though he might govern under changed forms, he would govern all the same. Had he been sincerely converted to the theory of constitutional government, it was thought the direction of the new ministry would have been confided to the one man in the Assembly who had more talent, political knowledge, and parliamentary experience than any of his colleagues—M. Thiers. This veteran statesman had for six years occupied a seat in the Legislative Assembly of the second empire, where, by dint of skilful debating and attractive oratory, he had succeeded in forming an opposition to the imperial cabinet which, if not very formidable, was far from despicable. Its influence in the country was undoubtedly greater than its influence in the Chamber, where a majority of imperial nominees did all that could be done to stifle discussion.

In M. Emile Ollivier, a man of unquestioned ability, the emperor expected doubtless to find a more pliable and manageable minister than he would have had in the ex-premier of Louis Philippe, and his Majesty was not disappointed. One great blot of the old system was the injurious pressure by prefects and other officials at the election of deputies, in favour of government candidates. The liberal party in the Chamber disputed the validity of these elections, and attempted to exclude the deputies so returned from the Assembly. M. Ollivier, after his appointment to office, forgetful of his liberal creed, instead of supporting his old friends in carrying out this purification of the Chamber, voted with the government majority that confirmed the election of all the official candidates, with the solitary exception of one, thus rendering the verification of returns as mere a form as it had been in the worst days of personal government. Conduct like this alienated many supporters from the new minister, and excited general suspicion. He found a difficulty in forming a respectable cabinet, and was, it has been conjectured, compelled to promise specific measures of reform, electoral and other, in order to induce men like Count Daru and M. Buffet to accept portfolios. The experiment of a constitutional empire, a compromise between personal government and a republic, was not without its perils. The emperor, though disposed to give it a

fair trial, had himself no faith in the system, and unless his ministers could show that they were backed by the majority of the people of France, he would in all likelihood resume the power of which he had lately, by his own free will, relieved himself.

The position of the new ministry was beset by an unexpected difficulty, in an incident that reflected much discredit on the Bonaparte family, and rendered it the object of intense hatred among the extreme republicans. Two or three journalists, including M. Victor Noir, belonging to that party, feeling offended by a letter that Prince Pierre Bonaparte had written, called at that gentleman's house for the purpose of obtaining an explanation. In the interview and altercation which ensued M. Victor Noir was shot dead by the prince, and the other journalists fled from the room. That a savage act of this kind should be committed by a relation of the emperor's, however distant, was enough to serve the purpose of agitators who were greedy for opportunities of attacking the empire. M. Ollivier, as minister of justice, at once announced that a high court of justice would be assembled at Tours to try the Prince Pierre for the crime with which he was charged. There was no truckling to the emperor in that matter. On the other hand, the law had to vindicate itself against the violent and unconstitutional language of the extreme republicans. M. Rochefort, a friend and fellow-journalist of Victor Noir's, and a member of the Chamber, was tried for libel. If the ministers acted without fear of the emperor, they also acted without fear of the mob. These were symptoms of success in the constitutional experiment. The firm attitude of the government overawed the would-be rioters who followed Victor Noir's remains to the grave, and the demonstration which was planned for the day of the funeral ended in the bloodless discomfiture of Rochefort and his red republicans. The preservation of order, the repression of violent revolution, was, indeed, the only thing now that inspired devotion to Bonapartism. The glory of the first empire, and of its warlike founder, had at length lost its glamour, and well would it have been for France if Napoleon III. had thoroughly understood this fact.

Early in February there was a foolish outbreak of democrats, headed by Gustave Flourens, which aimed at the release of M. Rochefort from prison. It had the effect of keeping Paris uneasy for three days, but in all other respects was harmless; for although six hundred persons were arrested, the greater number of them were speedily released.

As the year advanced it seemed to grow more evident, from speeches of Count Daru and M. Ollivier, that the emperor had adopted the constitutional system in all sincerity. The time had at last arrived, as people thought, for the long promised "crowning of the edifice" of government with liberty. But the emperor found it easier to humble himself before the force of circumstances than to humble some of his servants, and had no small difficulty in inducing the Senate to adopt with him "all the reforms demanded by the constitutional government of the empire." It is possible that his faith in parliamentary rule was no stronger than of yore, and that he had determined to give it a trial under a conviction that it would fail, and personal government again become necessary. Anyhow, a suspicion of this kind was engendered in the minds of some leading politicians on the publication of the senatus consultum at the end of March. In this document the imperial government declared that "the constitution cannot be modified except by the people on the proposition of the emperor." The emperor was evidently determined to maintain and extend that untrustworthy political instrument, the plebiscitum. The senatus consultum further limited the succession to the throne, and provided for an election by the people in case of failure of heirs. It vested the government of the country in the emperor, his ministers, the Council of State, the Senate, and the Corps Législatif—the last two assemblies sharing with the emperor the power of legislation. The emperor was made responsible before the French people, to whom he had the right to appeal, his prerogatives being those of chief of the state. His ministers were held responsible to the Chambers, of which they were members *ex officio*. The character of the Senate was considerably changed, and the power given to it in 1852 nearly all transferred to the lower house, the Legislative Assembly. To the surprise of every one who believed in the good faith with which these advances to constitutional freedom had been made, a week had barely elapsed from the publication of the senatus consultum, when the emperor revealed his determination at once to put in practice the principle he had promulgated of his right to appeal to the people. Representative government was at once discredited. Responsible ministers were treated as puppets, and

their legislative labours as toys to be cast to the variable winds of a popular vote. The emperor apparently had resolved to show the Chambers that there was a power superior to them in the country, which he could use whenever he chose. What use in legislating for reform, or anything else, if laws, when passed by the Assembly and the Senate, could be reversed by a plebiscitum; for the minister of the Interior, with the army of prefects and local officials at his command, could always insure that the vote should be agreeable to the emperor. How the consent of any of the ministers to this self-stultifying resolution was obtained can only be conjectured. Certain it is that two of the most eminent amongst them, the minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Daru, and M. Buffet, the minister of Public Instruction, resigned office. The Chamber seemed to accept the slight it had received with perfect humility, and an entire sense of its own insignificance; for on a hint from M. Ollivier that it might be in the way during the plebiscitary period, it adjourned, abnegating its functions at the most critical moment of a parliamentary crisis. Personal government was, in fact, restored under the vain show of parliamentary forms.

On the 23rd of April a decree, written, it is said, by the emperor's own hand, was issued, convoking the French nation for the 8th of May in their comitia, to accept or reject the following plebiscitum:—"The people approve the liberal reforms effected in the constitution since 1860 by the emperor, with the co-operation of the great bodies of the state, and ratifies the senatus consultum of the 20th of April, 1870." The votes were to be simply "Aye" or "No," and the manifesto was to be sent to every voter, who would learn, probably for the first time—such was the political ignorance of the majority of the population—that the constitution had undergone a change, and that Napoleon was the author of what was good in that change. Thus the usage of parliamentary government, that the sovereign should not speak in his own name of political matters, but by the mouth of a responsible minister, was unceremoniously ignored. The voters would be led to the polling booths like flocks of sheep, to vote as they were told, and practically to restore their "saviour of society" to undisputed autocratic power.

This series of contradictory transactions, so perplexing to ordinary observers, was very characteristic of Napoleon III., who was always feeling his way and making tentative experiments. The truth seems to be that the emperor and the imperialists had been considerably alarmed at the success of the liberals at the elections in the autumn of 1869, and had made these proposals for a representative government under the influence of fear; but as soon as they discovered that the liberals, after all, formed only a minority that might safely be disregarded, they took measures to retrace their steps, and applied the plebiscitum as a test of their strength. The emperor, in a proclamation, clearly refused to recognize the acts of the Assembly as the acts of the people. "I believe," he said, "that everything done without you is illegitimate." Representation, delegation of power, was not, in his opinion, good for the people, who, to the number of eight millions, were called upon to give a direct vote; a vote, too, that should show by a large majority how strong the government was in the popular esteem. Virtually the vote to be taken was for the emperor and personal government, against the liberals and parliamentary government. In point of numbers there was no doubt on which side the majority would be, but the minority would include nearly all the intelligence and political honesty of the country. M. Ollivier, whom Guizot styled "a practical Lamartine," cruelly betrayed the cause of liberalism when he consented to remain in office and promulgate the plebiscitum. Had he joined Count Daru and M. Buffet, the whole cabinet would have resigned, and the emperor would have given way rather than face such a crisis. On the 29th of April the French police discovered, or professed to have discovered, a plot against the life of the emperor. Many people were sceptical as to the genuineness of this conspiracy, believing it to be a theatrical invention to prepare the popular mind for the plebiscitum of the 8th of May, by exciting horror of the bloodthirsty projects of the revolutionists, and sympathy for the person of the emperor. The result of the voting on that day was 7,138,367 Ayes, against 1,518,385 Noes. In the towns the majority was generally against the emperor, and a still more ominous preponderance of Noes came from some of the garrisons. To a man in the position of the emperor, dependent as he was upon the army, this partial defection of the troops was food for very serious reflection. These men had not of late been coaxed and petted, and their humour had been soured by the addition to their numbers of

men from discontented districts. They had no military employment, but spent an idle, dissatisfying, inglorious barrack life. The emperor showed how sensitive he was on the subject of the army, by writing a public letter to Marshal Canrobert to thank the troops for their admirable behaviour in suppressing some popular riots that took place in Paris the day after the plebiscitum. "He assured them that his confidence in them had never been shaken." No one had said it had; but the military vote of the 8th of May might justify a want of confidence, which his Majesty loudly professed he did not feel. Three important results flowed from the plebiscitum—the liberal party with their parliamentary constitution were overthrown, and their nominal leader, M. Ollivier, politically demoralized, was converted into an obsequious tool of the emperor's will; the emperor was restored to a blind confidence in his power and in the imperial destiny of his son; while at the same time he made the discovery, which ought to have been a warning, that there was no enthusiasm in the army either for him or for his dynasty.

Quem Deus vult perdere dementat is a maxim that many events of history have verified, but of no historical personage can it be said with more truth than of Napoleon III. in the eighteenth year of his reign. With the immense resources that he commanded, the countless channels of information he controlled, he was enveloped in a cloud of ignorance and falsehood both as to his real power and means, and as to his position relatively to his neighbours, that none but an autocrat could have endured. Self-deception bore no small part in the creation of the fool's paradise in which he lived and dreamed. His knowledge of artillery, his success in two wars, the deference paid him by foreign potentates, the number and costliness of his army, the vote of his seven million subjects, the defeat of his political opponents at home, the divisions, as he believed, of his enemies abroad, and the self-seeking flattery of his courtiers and ministers, all combined to make Louis Napoleon resolve on striking a final and victorious blow for the dynasty of the Bonapartes. An ingenious writer has endeavoured to draw a parallel between the Bonapartes in 1869–70 and the Bourbons in 1789–90. At both periods France was engaged in the same kind of task—trying to make a constitution and avoid a revolution. The reigning monarch in each case attempted, with apparently honest intentions, to convert an absolute into a representative government. The elections to the Legislative Assembly in 1869 pointed to a new era, as clearly as did the elections to the Tiers Etat in 1789. The differences in the personages are as striking as the resemblance of the circumstances. Louis Napoleon was neither so dull nor so innocent as Louis Capet, the sixteenth of his name. The Empress Eugenie could hardly be compared with the daughter of Maria Theresa, Marie Antoinette, nor Prince Napoleon Jerome with Orleans Egalité, while Rochefort fell considerably short of Robespierre, and Ollivier missed being a Necker. France, too, in 1870 had no such work before her as that which the first revolution threw upon her hands. The privileges of the church and aristocracy then destroyed had not been restored. Social equality was established, and a career opened every where to talent. Sansculottism, in Mr. Carlyle's words, had got itself breeched, and the mass of the people, knowing the value of property, however small, had come to fear and hate violent revolutions. But as the national rapture and exultation which marked the first revolution was followed by the awful miseries of the Reign of Terror, so, alas! was the corresponding jubilation thoughout France that welcomed the concessions of the emperor at the commencement of 1870, destined to terminate in disaster and mourning and woe. Upon whom was the onslaught of France to be made? the calculated attack that had so long occupied the meditations of Napoleon III? Upon a nation to all appearance lapped in dreams of peace; a people absorbed in the peaceful occupations of art, learning, commerce, and agriculture; the artists of Münich and Dresden; the professors and students of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Leipzig, and Berlin; the merchants of Hamburg, Bremen, and Dantzig; the ploughmen of Bavaria, the fishermen of Pomerania, and the sturdy peasantry of Schleswig and Holstein, quite newly re-united to the Fatherland. All these would have to be summoned to the war, and thousands of them to die; their homesteads left to women and children, their fields standing untilled, their country houses and warehouses closed, and their ships locked in port or captured by hostile men of war. Fearful is the responsibility of those who engage in war, great should be the provocation that can justify it, for awful are the consequences of the first step that sets in motion that bitterest scourge of the human race.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

Attitude of France and Prussia—A Pretext only required for War—The German Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern chosen as a Candidate for the Spanish Throne—Great excitement on the subject in Paris—Important Speech of the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif—Military preparations—Warlike tone of the French Press—Stock-exchange panics—The King of Prussia denies having been in any way connected with the selection of the Prince—Refusal of the French Government to accept this statement—Critical position of affairs—Apparent solution of the difficulty, the Candidature of the Prince being withdrawn—Calm tone of the Prussian Press and Government to this point—Further demands from Prussia by the French Government—Interview of M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, with the King of Prussia, at Ems—Diplomatic relations broken off—Great excitement in Berlin—Important communication from the French Government to the Chambers—Declaration of War—Speech in opposition to such a procedure by M. Thiers—Votes for the Army and Navy—Enlistment of volunteers—Great animation in Paris—Speeches in the English Parliament—Communications between the Senate and the Emperor—Receipt of the news of the Declaration of War in Prussia—Address to the King—Patriotic proclamation of the German Liberal Union—Meeting of the North German Parliament—Speech of the King—Supplies voted with enthusiasm—Proclamation of the King—Important Circular of the Duc de Gramont—Speech of the Emperor—Proclamation to the French Nation.

THE events narrated in the previous pages have shown that in consequence of the marked success of Prussia in the war between her and Austria in 1866, and the subsequent formation of the North German Confederation, with Prussia at its head, France considered herself menaced by a too powerful neighbour; and it became evident that a struggle between them, for the purpose of deciding their military supremacy and future position in Europe, was only a question of time and opportunity. The circumstance which was at last made the pretext for a declaration of war, was, however, in itself apparently the most unlikely to have led to such a result, and affords one of the most striking historical illustrations of the ancient adage:—

"What mighty ills from trivial causes spring."

The throne of Spain had remained vacant from the flight of Queen Isabella, in 1868, notwithstanding that the Cortes had, by a large majority, decided in favour of continuing the monarchical form of government. Several candidates had been proposed, but all had been deemed more or less unsuitable, until in June, 1870, General Prim, with the full approval of the ministry, offered it to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the eldest son of the reigning prince of Hohenzollern, who had, in 1849, surrendered his sovereign rights to Prussia. The prince, who had been married to the sister of the king of Portugal in 1861, was thirty-five years of age, and a Roman Catholic in religion; and the offer was accepted by him subject to the approval of the Cortes, which it was believed was certain to be obtained.

No sooner, however, was the news of the event officially made known in Paris, on Tuesday, July 5, than the greatest excitement was caused; the selection of him being regarded there as the work of the Prussian Count von Bismarck, with the view of either causing a rupture with France, or of making Spain little better than a dependency of Prussia. In the Legislative Assembly on the following day, the Duc de Gramont, the foreign minister, in reply to a question on the subject, said that the negotiations which had led to the prince accepting the offer of the crown had been kept a secret from the French government. They had not transgressed the limits of strict neutrality in reference to the pretenders to the Spanish throne, and they should persist in that line of conduct; but, the duke added, amid the cheers of the deputies, "We do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to suffer a foreign power, by placing a prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium to our disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and the honour of France. We entertain a firm hope that this will not happen; to prevent it we count upon the wisdom of the German nation, and the friendship of the people of Spain; but in the contrary event, with your support and the support of the nation, we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation or weakness."

This important statement was read, not spoken, thus showing that it had been carefully considered; in fact, the terms of it were settled at a council held at St. Cloud in the morning, at which the

emperor presided. The assertion that the candidature of the prince had been kept secret from the French government, and had consequently taken them by surprise, was only true in a technical sense; for it was afterwards proved that the French ambassador at Madrid had known of it as being probable for several months. The matter had also been discussed in the German, and even alluded to in the French press, and on the prorogation of the Spanish Cortes on June 11—three weeks before the excitement in Paris—General Prim made a series of explanations as to the non-success which had attended his endeavours to procure a suitable candidate for the throne; and after alluding to the ex-king of Portugal, the duke of Aosta, and the duke of Genoa, he mentioned a fourth candidate, of whom he said he had great hopes, but who, after going so far as to send two emissaries to Spain, had refused, owing to their report of the divisions in the Cortes, and an insurrection in Catalonia which took place during their stay. He asked to be permitted not to name this candidate—his object being to prevent the raising up of any obstacle to his renewal of negotiations. It was at once concluded, however, that he could be no other than Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Baron Mercier, the French ambassador, who was present when the explanation was made, quite agreed in this, and was by no means backward in stating so to his friends in the diplomatic gallery; and it is unreasonable to suppose that, even if he had not done so before, he did not state the fact in his communication to the French government on the following day. The name of the prince was also mentioned in the Madrid papers the same evening, and it would, therefore, certainly appear that the "surprise" of the French government, as expressed by the Duc de Gramont, was feigned; and that whatever other reason may have induced the emperor to delay objecting to the candidature of the prince, it could not have been because he was not aware of its being in contemplation.

At the same sitting of the Corps Législatif, M. Ollivier, the prime minister, declined to accede to a request for the production of documents on the subject. He said that the declaration made by the Duc de Gramont betrayed no uncertainty as to the question whether the government desired peace or war. The government passionately wished for peace, but with honour. The ministry was convinced that the Duc de Gramont's statement would bring about a peaceful solution; for whenever Europe was persuaded that France was firm in her legitimate duty, it did not resist her desire. There was no question here of a hidden object, and if a war was necessary, the government would not enter upon it without the assent of the Legislative Body. Great excitement prevailed in the Chamber during the delivery of both speeches. On the following day M. Picard asked the government to communicate to the House copies of the despatches exchanged since the previous day between the courts of Paris and Berlin. M. Segris, in the absence of the minister for foreign affairs, replied that the government would, when expedient, communicate everything which did not compromise the peaceful settlement it was endeavouring to bring about. M. Jules Favre supported M. Picard's request, and upon M. Ollivier moving the adjournment of the debate, exclaimed, "Then it is a ministry of stock-exchange jobbers." At this there was great uproar, and the speaker was called to order. M. Ollivier afterwards declared that when the government deemed the time opportune, it would lay before the House all the information received at the foreign office. Meantime the country might rest assured of its firmly maintaining its dignity. Orders were immediately issued to the military authorities throughout the empire not to grant any further leave of absence; officers were ordered to return at once to their regiments, and the frontier fortresses were thoroughly inspected.

The French press, with only two or three exceptions, at once assumed a very menacing and hostile tone, and undoubtedly did much to enkindle that bitter feeling against Prussia which it was afterwards impossible to quell, even had such a thing been desired. One important journal declared that if France had once more submitted to be insulted and outwitted by Bismarck, "no woman of character would have consented to be seen on a Frenchman's arm;" another compared Prussia to an eagle, which, drunk with repeated successes, had rashly pounced upon a lamb, not knowing that the shepherd's rifle was ready for her; and, as if determined to do all in its power to provoke a quarrel, it asked if the shepherd was not to fire merely because the eagle might be scared into dropping her prey, although sure some day to return, and then perhaps seize, not lamb, but mutton? "Sooner or later," it

said, "France and Prussia must fight, and it is best to get it over at once." Nearly all the papers re-opened the old sore of the rectification of the Rhine frontier—an admirable method of playing into their enemy's hands, by making the quarrel German instead of Prussian; but they were too excited and angry to be diplomatic. One journal had the candour to say plainly that, the instant war was proclaimed, all talk of the Hohenzollern question ought to be at an end: to fight about whether a German prince should or should not sit on the Spanish throne, would, it said, be simply a "*guerre impie*," an iniquitous war.

This warlike tone of the French press, and the uncertainty which consequently prevailed as to the continuance of peace, naturally caused a great convulsion in all the European exchanges, but especially on the Paris Bourse and the London Stock Exchange. The panic in London on Monday, July 11, was more severe than any which had been witnessed there for the previous sixteen years. All kinds of stocks and shares, many totally unconnected with European complications, and some even which would be likely to be benefited by war, were all heavily borne down, and in some instances were almost unsaleable. Consols fell to 91⅜; a price about 2 per cent. below the average point at which they were maintained during the two years of the Indian mutiny, and exactly the same as during the four equally anxious years of the American struggle. Foreign stocks could scarcely be disposed of at all during the height of the panic. Some of them fell 7 or 8 per cent., and taking them at their money value, Spanish had at one time fallen 25 per cent. The total depreciation during the week, reckoning all classes of securities common to the Paris and London exchanges, could not have represented a sum of less than from £60,000,000 to £100,000,000. Among a few persons at Paris, enjoying early information, great gains were made; but the amount of general distress occasioned was unusually severe, owing to the fact, that for the previous six months operations for a rise had been extensive and continuous in all markets.

In the meantime Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, proceeded to Ems to consult with the king, and received from him an assurance that he had had nothing to do with the selection of the prince of Hohenzollern. The official *North German Gazette*, published at Berlin, also stated that the declaration of the Duc de Gramont, in the French Chamber, that the prince had accepted the offer of the crown of Spain, was the first definitive announcement to that effect received there. The French government, however, responded that it could not accept the answer of the king, and that either he must forbid the prince's persistence in his candidature, or war must ensue. An ultimatum to this effect was presented to the king by M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, and in the meantime military preparations were actively pushed on. On Tuesday, July 12, the Spanish ambassador in Paris received a despatch from the father of Prince Leopold, stating that, in consequence of the opposition his son's candidature appeared to have met with, he had withdrawn it in the name of the prince. On the following day the communication was read aloud in the "Salle des Conférences" adjoining the Chamber of the Legislative Body, and M. Ollivier, being eagerly questioned as to what it portended, said, France had never asked for more than the withdrawal of the prince's claims, had said nothing about the treaty of Prague, and the whole affair was therefore now at an end. Shortly afterwards the Duc de Gramont made the announcement officially to the Legislative Body, but added the significant words:—"The negotiations which we are carrying on with Prussia, and which never had any other object in view than the above-mentioned solution, are not as yet terminated ; it is therefore impossible for the government to speak on the subject, or to submit to-day to the Chamber and to the country a general statement of this affair." On being pressed, he declined to add anything to his statement, and said he had nothing to do with rumours circulating in the lobbies of the Chamber; evidently referring to the announcement just before made by M. Ollivier, and from which it would appear, either that there had not been complete harmony in the cabinet, or that the Duc de Gramont had been made the special medium of the emperor's wishes. After some discussion it was decided that the question should be debated on the following Friday. Much dissatisfaction and surprise prevailed in Paris at the vague and incomplete character of the duke's statement; but the general opinion was that war had been averted, at least for a time. The *Constitutionnel*, one of the oldest and most respectable journals, said the

prince would not reign in Spain, and France asked for nothing further. All her just demands had been satisfied: "We receive with pride this pacific solution, and this great victory which has been obtained without one drop of blood having been shed."

Up to this point the Prussian government and press had preserved great calmness throughout the whole proceedings. The semi-official *North German Correspondent* said, that Prussia had hitherto avoided all interference in the question of the Spanish succession, and was resolved to adhere to the same policy in the future. The Spaniards themselves ought to be the best judges of what was fitting for their country; whether a republic or a monarchy, this prince or that, a Spaniard or a foreigner. The Prussian government, whilst it respected the independence of Spain, was not conscious of having received any special mission to solve the complicated constitutional question on which the attention of Europe was fixed, but believed it would be most safe and politic to leave this problem in the hands of the Spanish people, and their accredited representatives. Similar views were expressed in a communication sent from the foreign office at Berlin to the representatives of the North German Confederation; and it was added that those views were already known to the French government, but explanatory and confidential utterances had been prevented by the tone which the French minister had assumed from the beginning.

On the following day (Wednesday, July 13), everything was changed, and the question again assumed a phase of exceeding gravity. The king of Prussia, unattended by a minister, was at Ems for the benefit of the waters; and as he was walking in the public garden he met M. Benedetti, the French ambassador, and told him he had a newspaper in his hand which showed that the prince had withdrawn his candidature. To his surprise the ambassador then made the further demand of a pledge, that he would never, under any circumstances, approve or give his consent to the candidature of the prince. The king replied that this was a step he could not take, as he must reserve to himself the right of action in future circumstances as they arose. Soon afterwards he found that the ambassador had asked for a fresh audience, and he sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that the prince's candidature had been withdrawn, and that in the same way and to the same extent as he had approved of it, he approved of its withdrawal, and he hoped, therefore, that all difficulty on that point was at an end. On subsequently meeting the ambassador, the king wished to know if he had anything to say to him other than the proposition he had already made, and which he had declined. M. Benedetti replied that he had no fresh proposition, but had certain arguments to adduce in support of the former one, which he had not been able to urge. His Majesty said that with regard to himself he had already given his decision; but that if there were a political question to be discussed, he had better go to Count von Bismarck, and discuss with him the arguments which were to be adduced. M. Benedetti asked if the count was expected the next day, and when told he was not, he said he would be content with the king's answer. Unfortunately the fact of the king's refusing to renew the discussion was telegraphed to Paris without the addition of the reference to Count von Bismarck, and the pressure put upon the king by M. Benedetti was published in Germany without the explanation that it was by way of sequel to a conversation the king had himself initiated. Neither the king nor M. Benedetti realized the offence that had been given and received, till Paris and Berlin informed them that each had been insulted.

It afterwards transpired, from the despatches presented to the North German Parliament, that in addition to this demand on the king of Prussia at Ems, on July 13, in a conversation on the previous day M. Ollivier and the Duc de Gramont requested Baron Werther to communicate to Count von Bismarck their demand that the king should write a letter of apology to the emperor, and that no allusion must be made in it to the fact of the Catholic Hohenzollerns being near relatives of the Bonapartes. In his reply to Baron Werther, Count von Bismarck said he had no doubt misconceived the meaning of the French ministers, and that he had, at all events, better desire them to put their demand down in writing, and have it communicated to the Prussian government in the usual way through their ambassador at Berlin.

The king caused the circumstances connected with the fresh demands made on him by Count Benedetti at Ems, and of his having refused to accede to them, to be immediately telegraphed to Count von Bismarck at Berlin, who lost no time in publishing it; at nine o'clock the same evening

boys in great numbers, in all the principal thoroughfares, distributed gratis a special supplement to the official *North German Gazette* relating what had occurred. The effect this bit of printed paper had upon the city was tremendous. It was hailed by old and young. It was welcomed by fathers of families and boys in their teens. It was read and re-read by ladies and young girls, and in patriotic glow finally handed over to the servants, who fondly hoped their sweethearts would soon be on the march. As though a stain had been wiped out from the national escutcheon, as though a burden too heavy to be borne for a long time past had been cast off at last, people were thanking God that their honour had been ultimately vindicated against intolerable assumption. There was but one opinion as to the conduct of the king; there was but one determination to follow his example. By ten o'clock the square in front of the royal palace was crowded with an excited multitude. Hurrahs for the king and cries "To the Rhine!" were heard on all sides. Similar demonstrations were made in other quarters of the town. It was the explosion of a long pent up anger against the French attempts to interfere with the domestic concerns of Germany since 1866, and in the first flush of excitement people absolutely felt relieved at the prospect of circumstances permitting them to fight it out. Thank God! They now could hope to unsheath the sword in a rightful quarrel. Their love of peace, till the day before faithfully preserved even under the trying events of the previous week, had been mistaken for fear by a nation of an entirely different intellectual type. Their king had been affronted beyond endurance, and had given the only possible reply. The crisis had arrived. They yearned to prove the present error of the French in estimating their national character, to avenge past injuries and obviate their recurrence, and so provide against the constant imperilling of peace, industry, and civilization for the future. Everywhere the same sentiments were uttered, the same resolves announced. In all the clubs and taverns, in many a private house, people remained together nearly the whole night, and only at break of day the streets assumed their usual aspect.

The most intense excitement also prevailed in Paris during the night, and on every one's lips was that word of evil omen, "*la guerre*." Bodies of men paraded the principal streets up to a late hour, mixing up in a very odd fashion the cries of "A Berlin!" "A bas la Prusse!" "Vive l'empereur!" and the singing of the revolutionary war song, the "Marseillaise." It was a somewhat significant fact, that though this public singing of the "Marseillaise" was illegal, and was before occasionally put down with great energy by the gend'armes, even though it was only indulged in by a few revellers returning late from a supper party, and not sufficiently numerous to be very formidable to the safety of the state, it was now allowed to pass without notice; and hence the general impression was that the government were not sorry to give the patriotic anti-Prussian sentiment full play, partly to see what it was worth, and partly to make war popular.

On the morning of Thursday, July 14, the Emperor Napoleon went from St. Cloud to Paris, and presided at a cabinet council, which sat for several hours. The two Chambers expected a communication from the government, but none was made. On the following day, July 15—a day which must now be ever memorable in the history of Europe—a communication drawn up at the council of ministers on the previous day was simultaneously made by the government to the Senate and Corps Législatif, explaining the situation of affairs, and terminating in a declaration of war. The communication was as follows:—

"Gentlemen—The manner in which you received the declaration of the 6th inst., afforded us the certainty that you approved our policy, and that we could count upon your support. We commenced then negotiations with the foreign powers, to invoke their good offices with Prussia, in order that the legitimacy of our grievances might be recognized. We asked nothing of Spain, whose susceptibilities we did not wish to wound. We took no steps with the prince of Hohenzollern, considering him shielded by the king of Prussia, and we refused to mix up in the affair any recrimination upon other subjects. The majority of the powers admitted, with more or less warmth, the justice of our demands. The Prussian minister of foreign affairs refused to accede to our demands, pretending that he knew nothing of the affair, and that the cabinet of Berlin remained completely a stranger to it. We then addressed ourselves to the king himself, and the king, while avowing that he had authorized the prince of Hohenzollern to accept the nomination of the Spanish crown, maintained that he had also been a stranger to the

negotiation, and that he had intervened between the prince of Hohenzollern and Spain as head of the family, and not as sovereign. He acknowledged, however, that he had communicated the affair to Count von Bismarck. We could not admit this subtle distinction between the chief of the family and the sovereign. In the meanwhile we received an intimation from the Spanish ambassador, that the prince of Hohenzollern had renounced the crown. We asked the king to associate himself with this renunciation, and we asked him to engage, that should the crown be again offered to the prince of Hohenzollern, he would refuse his authorization. Our moderate demands, couched in equally moderate language, written to M. Benedetti, made it clear that we had no *arriere pensee*, and that we were not seeking a pretext in the Hohenzollern affair. The engagement demanded the king refused to give, and terminated the conversation with M. Benedetti, by saying that he would in this, as in all other things, reserve to himself the right of considering the circumstances. Notwithstanding this, in consequence of our desire for peace, we did not break off the negotiations. Our surprise was great when we learned that the king had refused to receive M. Benedetti, and had communicated the fact officially to the cabinet. We learned that Baron Werther had received orders to take his leave, and that Prussia was arming. Under these circumstances we should have forgotten our dignity, and also our prudence, had we not made preparations. We have prepared to maintain the war which is offered to us, leaving to each that portion of the responsibility which devolves upon him. Since yesterday we have called out the reserve, and we shall take the necessary measures to guard the interest, and the security, and the honour of France."

In both Houses the ministerial declaration was received with great applause. In the Corps Législatif, however, a considerable minority were indisposed to approve the policy of the government—at least, without fuller information. M. Jules Favre called upon the ministers to communicate the documents which had passed during the negotiations, and especially the Prussian despatch addressed to foreign governments admitting the refusal of the king of Prussia to receive M. Benedetti. M. Buffet opposed the demand for papers, and M. Jules Favre's motion was rejected by 164 votes against 83. An important speech was also made against the proceeding of the government by the veteran statesman, M. Thiers, who eloquently denounced the inprudence and impolicy of the war. He had been as deeply vexed as any one by the events of 1866, and earnestly desired reparation, but he considered the present occasion ill chosen: "for," added he, "when the satisfaction we had a right to demand had been granted; when Prussia had expiated by her withdrawal the grave fault she had committed in stepping beyond the limits of Germany, where lies her strength, and raising hostile pretensions suddenly in our rear; when Europe with honourable readiness declared that we were in the right—then for the government to have listened to susceptibilities upon questions of form might one day cause them regret." The opposition speakers could not, however, get a fair hearing, no tolerance being shown for those who differed from the majority. "I am about to quit the tribune," said M. Thiers, "borne down by the fatigue of speaking to people who will not hear me. I shall nevertheless have demonstrated that the interests of France were safe, and that you aroused the susceptibilities from which war has issued. That is your fault."

In the evening sitting of the Legislative Body, after a noisy debate, a credit of 50,000,000 francs was voted by 246 votes against 10; a credit of 16,000,000 francs for naval purposes was also voted by 248 votes against 1. A motion to call out the Guard Mobile to active service was adopted by 243 votes against 1. Another motion, authorizing the enlistment of volunteers for the duration of the war, was adopted by 244 votes against 1.

During the night, extraordinary animation prevailed throughont Paris. Numerous crowds, each numbering several thousands, came forth from the suburbs and traversed the Boulevards, singing the "Marseillaise" and the "Chant du Départ," and shouting "Vive la guerre! A bas la Prusse! Vive l'Empereur! A Berlin!" It has been suggested that these patriotic displays were organized by the police. The soldier, however, became the hero of the hour, and could hardly show himself in the streets without being surrounded and applauded. In fact, the people became intoxicated by martial enthusiasm, and so blinded by jealous passion, that they were really not open to argument as to the right and wrong of the quarrel, and it became far less a question of a Hohenzollern pretension and a Benedetti rebuff.

than one of seeing which was the stronger nation. Animosity against Prussia had vented itself so long in words, and it had become such a constant habit with many Frenchmen to speak of some future day of reckoning with their upstart rival as a matter of necessity, that the actual declaration of war seemed to afford relief to a very strong national feeling, and little else was thought of at first. Most Frenchmen had been fighting Prussia in imagination for the previous four years, and giving her the lesson her presumption deserved; the imagination and the longing had been so strong, and the reality for some days so tangible, that the transition from the one to the other was scarcely felt. It is true that the Republican journals, representing the opinions of the mass of the artizans, were from the first against war, nor was it at all popular with the peasantry, to whom it meant only a wider conscription and increased taxation; but in the heat of the excitement all prudential considerations were forgotten, and the voices and opinions of those who deplored the result to which matters had been brought had no influence with those who had the power and were determined to use it. Some attempts made by artizans and others in Paris, on the evening war was declared and on the following day, to get up counter-demonstrations in favour of peace, were immediately put down by the police.

The news of war having actually been declared reached England immediately, and when Parliament met the same afternoon, Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the Opposition, asked the prime minister, Mr. Gladstone, if he could inform the House of the real cause of the rupture, as he could not bring himself to believe that in the nineteenth century, with its extended sympathies and its elevated tendencies, anything so degrading as a war of succession could take place; and he reminded the House that only about two years before, in the matter of Luxemburg, both France and Prussia had invited the good offices of England, and they were successful in removing difficulties which then threatened a rupture. France and Prussia had thus, in his opinion, no moral right to go to war without consulting England, and he wished to know whether the government had taken any steps to impress this upon them. With great solemnity of manner he concluded, "I will only venture to express my individual opinion, that the ruler of any country who at this time disturbs the peace of Europe, incurs the gravest political and moral responsibility which it has ever fallen to the lot of man to incur. I hear, Sir, superficial remarks made about military surprises, the capture of capitals, and the brilliancy and celerity with which results which are not expected or contemplated may be brought about at this moment. Sir, these are events of a bygone age. In the last century such melodramatic catastrophes were frequent and effective; we live in an age animated by a very different spirit; I think a great country like France, and a great country like Prussia, cannot be ultimately affected by such results; and the sovereign who trusts to them will find at the moment of action that he has to encounter, wherever he may be placed, a greater and more powerful force than any military array, and that is the outraged opinion of an enlightened world." Mr. Gladstone, excusing himself from the same freedom of remark in which the leader of the Opposition had indulged, justified the right of England to intervene in the cause of peace, not only on moral grounds, but on the strength of the protocol of Paris in 1856, which set forth the duties of all of the powers there represented to submit to friendly adjudication any causes of difference, before resorting to the last extremity. Neither France nor Prussia had, however, shown any indisposition to listen to her Majesty's government on this occasion, and the foreign secretary had therefore not deemed it necessary to make an express representation, in the sense suggested by Mr. Disraeli.

At a reception of the members of the Senate by the emperor at St. Cloud, on the following day (Saturday, 16th July), M. Rouher, addressing his majesty, said—"The guarantees demanded from Prussia have been refused, and the dignity of France has been disregarded. Your majesty draws the sword, and the country is with you trembling with indignation at the excesses that an ambition over-excited by one day's good fortune was sure, sooner or later, to produce. Your majesty was able to wait, but has occupied the last four years in perfecting the armament and the organization of the army." M. Rouher added his hope that the empress would again act as regent, and that the emperor would take the command of the army. The emperor replied—"Messieurs les Senateurs, I was gratified to learn with what great enthusiasm the Senate received the declaration which the minister of

foreign affairs has been instructed to make. Whenever great interests and the honour of France are at stake, I am sure to receive energetic support from the Senate. We are beginning a serious struggle, and France needs the co-operation of all her children. I am very glad that the first patriotic utterance has come from the Senate. It will be loudly re-echoed throughout the country."

In Prussia the news that France had determined upon war was received with enthusiasm. King William arrived at his palace in Berlin on Thursday night, July 14, and was received with the greatest possible loyalty and warmth. Upwards of 100,000 persons were assembled, from the Brandenburg Gate to the palace, cheering loudly and singing the national anthem. The Unter den Linden was illuminated, and decorated with the North German and Prussian flags. King William came forward repeatedly to the windows of the palace, saluting and thanking the crowd.

The following "Proclamation to our Countrymen" by the National Liberal party—the most numerous both in Parliament and among the people — is a fair specimen of the numerous addresses which were at once issued by both public and private societies:—

"War has become inevitable From the plough, the workshop, the office, and the study, our brothers congregate to ward off an enemy that menaces the highest treasures of the nation. The army whose onslaught they are going to encounter is differently composed from our own. It consists of mercenaries and conscripts, without any educated and well-to-do people among them, and for this very reason is liable to be made a tool of by an unjust and frivolous cabinet. Since the Corsican's nephew, by conspiracy, perjury, and every description of crime, surreptitiously obtained the throne of France, his only means of concealing domestic decline was to engage in foreign adventure. The French nation, humiliated at home, was to be reconciled to its fate by martial triumphs, flattering to its national vanity. Through cunning and force France was to be raised to an artificial supremacy over the rest of the world. To disturb the peace of Europe has ever been the only policy of Bonapartism, the vital condition of its existence. Since Louis Napoleon ascended the throne, all his hypocritical assurances of pacific sentiments have never sufficed to give any one a firm confidence in the continuation of peace; since he has been reckoned among sovereigns war has always been considered a mere question of time, and the utmost exertion of the industrious classes has been barely sufficient to cover the military expenditure of the various states. There is no country in Europe with which he has not meddled. He has quarreled with all, menaced all. Even if a state allied itself to him it was not safe from his treachery, as Italy experienced to her cost. The Poles were encouraged by him to rebel, only to be left to their terrible fate when it no longer suited him to play their patron. Neutral Belgium, German Luxemburg, and even some cantons of Switzerland, that tower of peace erected between contending nations, have at various times been the objects of his cupidity, and were only saved by the vigilance of the other powers, and their instinctive opposition to the immorality and mendacity of the Napoleonic politics. As long ago as the Crimean war Napoleon endeavoured to find a pretext for occupying the Rhine province. While we were fighting Austria he again had his eye upon the Rhine, and if we had not so quickly conquered, would have pounced upon us and have kindled universal war. Is it necessary to enumerate other instances of his disgraceful interference? Italy had to pay with two of her provinces for the French alliance, and at his hands, besides suffering many other indignities, was destined to provide the human bodies which first attested the efficiency of the 'miraculous' Chassepot. In Spain French influence has long been the strongest impediment in the way of progress, and although the independence of nations has ever been pompously paraded by him, Napoleon assisted the slave breeders in America, invaded Mexico, and in Germany calculated upon Austria being victorious. That he was mistaken in this latter calculation, and that the German people have at last found, and are steadily marching on, their way towards unity, makes him perfectly restless. It was certainly no very becoming act on the part of French diplomacy, when we had defeated Austria, to come to us begging for a small douceur in the shape of a province or two to reward them for their evil-disposed neutrality; nor was it very honest on the part of the same worthies to attempt to deprive us of our Italian ally by bribery and deceit. Again, it was France, who, by her perfidious intermeddling, prevented us from imposing such conditions of peace upon Austria as would have extended the ties of

national unity to the southern states. In thus keeping them out from the Confederacy, Napoleon hoped to make the southern sovereigns tools in his hands and traitors to the Fatherland. We submitted to his arrogance on all these occasions, as also when the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet, because we hoped to be able to avoid war. But his latest demands, and the manner in which they have been preferred, exceed everything that has gone before. To mask his domestic embarrassments, to save his throne, which would otherwise succumb to the hatred and contempt of his own subjects, the sanguinary adventurer has embarked in his last military job. In taking up the gauntlet thrown down to us, we are actuated by a sense of honour, and also by a desire at last to free ourselves from the dangers and solicitudes of the fictitious peace we have endured so long. More injurious than open war, the armed peace to which we have submitted has exhausted our resources, undermined our industry, stopped the advance of our culture, and, worst of all, kept us in constant dread of the sword suspended over us by a hair. In contending against the execrable system of Bonapartism, we shall be fighting, not only for our independence, but for the peace and culture of Europe. Unknown to the Germans is the lust of conquest; all they require is to be permitted to be their own masters. While protecting our own soil, language, and nationality, we are willing to concede corresponding rights to all other nations. We do not hate the French, but the government and the system which dishonour, enslave, and humiliate them. The French have been inveigled into war by their government misrepresenting and calumniating us; but our victory will be also their emancipation. We are firmly convinced that this will be the last great war the German nation is destined to undergo, and that the unity of our race will be the result of it. The God of Justice is with us. The insolent provocation of the French despot has done away with our internal divisions. The Main even now is bridged over. Party divisions are extinct, and will remain so as long as our united strength is required to overthrow the common enemy, who is equally the enemy of Germany and humanity. Inspired by the magnitude of the task before us, we are all united, a people of brethren, who will neither tarry nor rest until the great object has been accomplished."

Not a few passages in the above document would make the reader imagine it proceeded from a radical source. But its authors, the National Liberals, are the most temperate section of the liberals in Germany, and for the most part include the wealth and rank of the nation. If a class of politicians, whose sobriety and, in many instances, tameness had become proverbial, was moved to employ such language as the above, the feeling and expressions of the less moderate can be easily imagined.

The mobilization of the whole of the North German army was ordered on 16th July, and on the following Monday the king received an address from the Berlin town council, thanking his majesty for having repelled the unheard-of attempt made upon the dignity and independence of the nation, and asserting that France having declared war against Prussia, every man would do his duty. The king, in reply, expressed his gratitude for the sentiments contained in the address, and said:—

"God knows I am not answerable for this war. The demand sent me I could not do otherwise than reject. My reply gained the approval of all the towns and provinces, the expression of which I have received from all parts of Germany, and even from Germans residing beyond the seas. The greeting which was given me here on Thursday night last animated me with pride and confidence. Heavy sacrifices will be demanded of my people. We have been rendered unaccustomed to them by the quickly gained victories which we achieved in the last two wars. We shall not get off so cheaply this time; but I know what I may expect from my army, and from those now hastening to join the ranks. The instrument is sharp and cutting. The result is in the hands of God. I know also what I may expect from those who are called upon to alleviate the wounds—the pains and sufferings—which war entails. In conclusion, I beg you to express my sincere thanks to the citizens for the reception they have given me." At the termination of the royal address, which was delivered with much earnestness and gravity, the assembly, in a transport of enthusiasm, shouted unanimously, "Long live the king!"

The North German Parliament was opened on the next day (Tuesday, July 19), with a speech from the throne delivered by King William in person. In the course of it he said:—

"The candidature of a German prince for the Spanish throne—both in the bringing forward and withdrawal of which the Confederate governments were equally unconcerned, and which only interested the North German Confederation in so far as the government of a friendly country appeared to base upon its success the hopes of acquiring for a sorely-tried people a pledge for regular and peaceful government—afforded the emperor of the French a pretext for a *casus belli*, put forward in a manner long since unknown in the annals of diplomatic intercourse, and adhered to after the removal of the very pretext itself, with that disregard of the people's right to the blessings of peace of which the history of a former ruler of France affords so many analogous examples. If Germany in former centuries bore in silence such violation of her rights and of her honour, it was only because, in her then divided state, she knew not her own strength. To-day, when the links of intellectual and rightful community which began to be knit together at the time of the wars of liberation join—the more slowly the more surely—the different German races; to-day that Germany's armament leaves no longer an opening to the enemy, the German nation contains within itself the wish and the power to repel the renewed aggression of France. It is not arrogance that puts these words into my mouth. The Confederate governments, and I myself, are acting in the full consciousness that victory and defeat are in the hands of Him who decides the fate of battles. With a clear gaze we have measured the responsibility which, before the judgment seat of God and of mankind, must fall upon him who drags two great and peace-loving peoples in the heart of Europe into a devastating war.

"The German and French peoples, both equally enjoying and desiring the blessings of a Christian civilization and of an increasing prosperity, are called to a more wholesome rivalry than the sanguinary conflict of arms. Yet those who hold power in France have, by preconcerted misguidance, found means to work upon the legitimate but excitable national sentiment of our great neighbouring people, for the furtherance of personal interests and the gratification of selfish passions.

"The more the Confederate governments are conscious of having done all their honour and dignity permitted to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and the more indubitable it shall appear to all minds that the sword has been thrust into our hands, so much the more confidently shall we rely upon the united will of the German governments, both of the north and south, and upon your love of country, and so much the more confidently we shall fight for our right against the violence of foreign invaders. Inasmuch as we pursue no other object than the durable establishment of peace in Europe, God will be with us, as He was with our forefathers."

When the House met in the afternoon for the despatch of business, Count von Bismarck informed the members that the French chargé d'affaires had delivered a declaration of war against Prussia. Hereupon all present arose, and greeted the announcement with loud cheering; the persons in the gallery shouting "Hurrah!"

On the following day the Parliament, in reply to his speech, presented the king with an address, in which they said:—

"One thought, one resolve, pervades all Germany at this grave juncture.

"With proud satisfaction has the nation witnessed your Majesty's dignified attitude in rejecting a demand of unprecedented arrogance put forward by the enemy. Disappointed in his hope of humiliating us, the enemy has now invented a sorry and transparent pretext for levying war.

"The German nation has no more ardent wish than to live in peace and amity with all nations that respect its honour and independence.

"As in 1813, in those glorious days when we freed the country from foreign aggression, we are now forced again to take up arms to vindicate our rights and liberties against a Napoleon.

"As in those well-remembered days, all calculations based upon human frailty and faithlessness will be destroyed by the moral energy and resolute will of the German nation.

"That portion of the French people which by envy and selfish ambition has been seduced into hostility against us, will, too late, perceive the crop of evil sure to grow out of sanguinary battle-fields. We regret that the more equitably inclined in France have failed to prevent a crime aimed no less at the prosperity of their own country than the maintenance of amicable international relations in this part of the world.

"The German people are aware that they have a severe and portentous struggle before them.

"We confide in the gallantry and patriotism of

our brethren in arms, in the indomitable resolve of an united people to sacrifice life and treasure rather than suffer a foreign conqueror to set his foot on German necks.

"We confide in the guidance of our aged and heroic king, who when a young man, more than half a century ago, warred against the French, and who, in the evening of life, is destined by Providence decisively to terminate a struggle he then began.

"We confide in the Almighty, whose judgment will punish the bloody crime perpetrated against us.

"From the shores of the German Ocean to the foot of the Alps the nation has risen as a single man at the call of its allied princes. No sacrifice will be too heavy for it to make.

"Throughout the civilized world public opinion recognizes the justice of our cause. Friendly nations are looking forward to our victory, which is to free some from the ambitious tyranny of a Bonaparte, and to avenge the injury he has inflicted upon so many others.

"The victory gained, the German nation will at last achieve its unity, and on the battle-field, held by force of arms, with the common consent of its various tribes, erect a free commonwealth, which shall be respected by all peoples.

"Your Majesty and the allied German governments see us and our brethren in the South ready to co-operate for the attainment of this object. The prize of the war is the protection of our honour and liberty, the re-establishment of peace in Europe, and the promotion of the prosperity of nations.

"With profound respect and in loyal obedience,

"THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERACY."

Immediately after the passing of this address, and as an incontrovertible proof that it meant something more than words, a loan of 120,000,000 thalers (£18,000,000) was voted by acclamation. In neither case was there a discussion. As the sum granted was equal to a fourth of the whole Prussian debt, there was a significant eloquence in the figures which ought not to be overlooked by the contemporary historian. Smaller grants, but which in the aggregate reached nearly a third of the Federal loan, were in the next two days likewise devoted to military purposes by the various state parliaments and governments of Northern and Southern Germany.

On Thursday the Parliament was prorogued. Count von Bismarck read a message from the President of the Confederation, and concluded as follows:—"After the words that the king has twice addressed to the Parliament, I should have nothing to add, were it not that his Majesty has commanded me to express his warmest thanks to the Parliament for the rapidity and unanimity with which it has provided for the requirements of the nation. In thus fulfilling the king's order, I declare Parliament closed." Dr. Simson next addressed a few words to the House, and said:—"The labours of the representatives of the people are for the present at an end, and the work of arms will now take its course. May the blessing of the Almighty descend upon our people in this holy war! Long live King William, commander-in-chief of the German army!" The session terminated amid loud and prolonged cheering.

The same day the king issued the following proclamation to his subjects:—

"I am compelled to draw the sword to ward off a wanton attack, with all the forces at Germany's disposal. It is a great consolation to me, before God and man, that I have in no way given a pretext for it. My conscience acquits me of having provoked this war, and I am certain of the righteousness of our cause in the sight of God. The struggle before us is serious, and it will demand heavy sacrifices from my people and from all Germany. But I go forth to it looking to the omniscient God and imploring His almighty support. I have already cause to thank God that, on the first news of the war, one only feeling animated all German hearts and proclaimed aloud the indignation felt at the attack, and the joyful confidence that Heaven will bestow victory on the righteous cause. My people will also stand by me in this struggle as they stood by my father, who now rests with God. They will, with me, make all sacrifices to conquer peace again for the nations. From my youth upwards I have learnt to believe, that all depends upon the help of a gracious God. In Him is my trust, and I beg my people to rest in the same assurance. I bow myself before Him in acknowledgment of His mercy, and I am sure that my subjects and fellow-countrymen do so with me. Therefore I decree that Wednesday, the 27th of July, shall be set apart for an extraordinary solemn day of prayer and divine service in all our churches, with abstention from all public occupa-

tions and labour, so far as may comport with the pressing necessities of the time. I also decree that while the war lasts prayers shall be offered in all divine services, that in this struggle God may lead us to victory, that He may give us grace to bear ourselves as Christian men even unto our enemies, and that it may please Him to allow us to obtain a lasting peace, founded on the honour and independence of Germany.

(Signed) "WILLIAM.
(Counter Signed) "VON MÜHLER.

"Berlin, July 21."

On July 21 the Duc de Gramont addressed a circular to the French representatives abroad, with the object of proving that the nomination of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne had been mysteriously promoted by Prussia, in the hope that France would be obliged to accept it as an accomplished fact. The circular stated:—"Either the cabinet of Berlin considered war necessary for the accomplishment of the designs it had long since been meditating against the autonomy of the German states, or not satisfied with having established in the centre of Europe a military power redoubtable to its neighbours, it desired to take advantage of the strength it had acquired to displace definitely, for its own benefit, the international equilibrium. The premeditated intention of refusing us the guarantees most indispensable to our security as well as our honour, is plainly exhibited in all its conduct.

. . . . .

"France has taken up the cause of equilibrium, that is to say, the interest of all the populations menaced like herself by the disproportionate aggrandizement of a royal house. In so doing does she place herself, as has been asserted, in contradiction to her own maxims? Assuredly not. Every nation, we are foremost to proclaim, has a right to govern its own destinies. That principle, openly affirmed by France, has become one of the fundamental laws of modern politics. But the right of each people, as of each individual, is limited by that of others, and any nation is forbidden, under the pretext of exercising its own sovereignty, to menace the existence or security of a neighbouring nation. In that sense it was that M. de Lamartine, one of our great orators, said, in 1847, that in the choice of a sovereign a government has never the right to pretend, and has always the right to exclude. That doctrine has been admitted on several occasions, and Prussia, whom we did not fail to remind of those precedents, appeared for a moment to give way to our just demands. Prince Leopold withdrew his candidateship; there was room to hope that the peace would not be broken. But that expectation soon gave place to fresh apprehensions, and then to the certainty that Prussia, without seriously abandoning any of her pretensions, was only seeking to gain time. The language, at first undecided, and then firm and haughty, of the chief of the house of Hohenzollern, his refusal to engage to maintain on the morrow the renunciation of yesterday, the treatment inflicted on our ambassador, who was forbidden by a verbal message from any fresh communication for the object of his mission of conciliation, and, lastly, the publicity given to that unparalleled proceeding by the Prussian journals, and by the notification of it made to the cabinets—all those successive symptoms of aggressive intentions removed every doubt in the most prejudiced minds. Can there be any illusion when a sovereign who commands a million of soldiers declares, with his hand on the hilt of his sword, that he reserves the right of taking counsel of himself alone, and from circumstances? We were led to that extreme limit at which a nation who feels what is due to itself cannot further compromise with the requirements of its honour. If the closing incidents of this painful discussion did not throw a somewhat vivid light on the schemes nourished by the Berlin cabinet, there is one circumstance not so well known at present, which would put a decisive interpretation on its conduct. The idea of raising a Hohenzollern prince to the Spanish throne was not a new one. So early as March, 1869, it had been mentioned by our ambassador at Berlin, who was at once requested to inform Count von Bismarck what view the emperor's government would take of such an eventuality. Count Benedetti, in several interviews which he had on this topic with the chancellor of the North German Confederation and the under secretary of state intrusted with the management of foreign affairs, did not leave them in ignorance that we could never admit that a Prussian prince should reign beyond the Pyrenees. Count von Bismarck, for his part, declared that we need be under no anxiety concerning a combination which he himself judged to be

incapable of realization, and during the absence of the Federal chancellor, at a moment when M. Benedetti considered it his duty to be incredulous and pressing, Herr von Theile gave his word of honour that the prince of Hohenzollern was not and could not seriously become a candidate for the Spanish crown. If one were to suspect official assurances so positive as this, diplomatic communications would cease to be a guarantee for the peace of Europe; they would be but a snare and a source of peril. Thus, although our ambassador transmitted these statements under all reserve, the Imperial government deemed fit to receive them favourably. It refused to call their good faith into question until the combination which was their glaring negation suddenly revealed itself. In unexpectedly breaking the promise which she had given us, without even attempting to take any steps to free herself towards us, Prussia offered us a veritable defiance. Enlightened at once as to the value to be attached to the most formal protests of Prussian statesmen, we were imperiously obliged to preserve our loyalty from fresh mistakes in the future by an explicit guarantee. We therefore felt it our duty to insist, as we have done, on obtaining the certitude that a withdrawal, which was hedged round with the most subtle distinctions, was this time definite and serious. It is just that the court of Berlin should bear, before history, the responsibility of this war, which it had the means of avoiding and which it has wished for. And under what circumstances has it sought out the struggle? It is when for the last four years France, displaying continual moderation towards it, has abstained, with a scrupulousness perhaps exaggerated, from calling up against it the treaties concluded under the mediation of the emperor himself, but the voluntary neglect of which is seen in all the acts of a government which was already thinking of getting rid of them at the moment of signature. Europe has been witness of our conduct, and she has had the opportunity of comparing it with that of Prussia during this period. Let her pronounce now upon the justice of our cause. Whatever be the issue of our combats we await without disquietude the judgment of our contemporaries as that of posterity."

Immediately this circular reached Berlin both Count von Bismarck and Herr von Theile issued one, denying most positively that any such pledge was ever given, and in no ambiguous phrase affirming that M. Benedetti had made a statement quite unfounded in fact. On search at the French Foreign Office, however, a despatch narrating the circumstance was found, but as previously stated by the Duc de Gramont, it was marked "under all reserves," a sterotyped phrase of diplomatic phraseology of a rather elastic nature.

On July 22 the emperor received the members of the Legislative Body, and the president, M. Schneider, addressed him as follows :—

"Sire,—The Legislative Body has terminated its labours, after voting all the subsidies and laws necessary for the defence of the country. Thus the Chamber has joined in an effective proof of patriotism. The real author of the war is not he by whom it was declared, but he who rendered it necessary. There will be but one voice among the people of both hemispheres, throwing, namely, the responsibility of the war upon Prussia, which, intoxicated by unexpected success and encouraged by our patience and our desire to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, has imagined that she could conspire against our security, and wound with impunity our honour. Under these circumstances France will know how to do her duty. The most ardent wishes will follow you to the army, the command of which you assume, accompanied by your son, who, anticipating the duties of maturer age, will learn by your side how to serve his country. Behind you, behind our army, accustomed to carry the noble flag of France, stand the whole nation ready to recruit it. Leave the regency without anxiety in the hands of our august sovereign the empress. To the authority commanded by her great qualities, of which ample evidence has already been given, her Majesty will add the strength now afforded by the liberal institutions so gloriously inaugurated by your Majesty. Sire, the heart of the nation is with you, and with your valiant army."

The emperor replied :—

"I experience the most lively satisfaction, on the eve of my departure for the army, at being able to thank you for the patriotic support which you have afforded my government. A war is right when it is waged with the assent of the country and the approval of the country's representatives. You are right to remember the words of Montesquieu, that 'the real author of war is not he by whom it is declared, but he who renders it necessary.' We

have done all in our power to avert the war, and I may say that it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decisions. I confide to you the empress, who will call you around her if circumstances should require it. She will know how to fulfil courageously the duty which her position imposes upon her. I take my son with me; in the midst of the army he will learn to serve his country. Resolved energetically to pursue the great mission which has been intrusted to me, I have faith in the success of our arms; for I know that behind me France has risen to her feet, and that God protects her."

On the following day, July 23, the emperor addressed the following proclamation to the French nation:—

"Frenchmen,—There are solemn moments in the life of peoples, when the national sense of honour, violently excited, imposes itself with irresistible force, dominates all interests, and alone takes in hand the direction of the destinies of the country. One of those decisive hours has sounded for France. Prussia, towards whom both during and since the war of 1866 we have shown the most conciliatory disposition, has taken no account of our good wishes and our enduring forbearance. Launched on the path of invasion, she has provoked mistrust everywhere, necessitated exaggerated armaments, and has turned Europe into a camp, where reigns nothing but uncertainty and fear of the morrow. A last incident has come to show the instability of international relations, and to prove the gravity of the situation. In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia, we made known our protests. They were evaded, and were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts. Our country resented this treatment with profound irritation, and immediately a cry for war resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains to us to leave our destinies to the decision of arms.

"We do not make war on Germany, whose independence we respect. We wish that the people who compose the great German nationality may freely dispose of their destinies. For ourselves, we demand the establishment of a state of affairs which shall guarantee our security and assure our future. We wish to conquer a lasting peace, based on the true interests of peoples, and to put an end to that precarious state in which all nations employ their resources to arm themselves one against the other. The glorious flag which we once more unfurl before those who have provoked us, is the same which bore throughout Europe the civilizing ideas of our great revolution. It represents the same principles and will inspire the same devotion.

"Frenchmen! I am about to place myself at the head of that valiant army which is animated by love of duty and of country. It knows its own worth, since it has seen how victory has accompanied its march in the four quarters of the world. I take with me my son, despite his youth. He knows what are the duties which his name imposes upon him, and he is proud to bear his share in the dangers of those who fight for their country. May God bless our efforts! A great people which defends a just cause is invincible.

"NAPOLEON."

CHAPTER II.

Unusual lull in Foreign Affairs immediately before the events which led to the Declaration of War—The determination of the French Government to resist the Candidature of Prince Leopold made known to the English Ambassador at Paris, and the Mediation of England solicited—Principles acted upon by the British Government throughout—M. Ollivier's private views of the whole matter—Lord Lyons, the English Ambassador at Paris, uneasy at the effect produced by the Duc de Gramont's strong-worded declaration in the Corps Législatif—The Duc's explanation with regard to it—English Mediation again invoked—Interview between Lord Lyons and the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris—The French Ambassador in London and Lord Granville—Important Communication from the latter to Lord Augustus Loftus, the English Minister at Berlin, urging Prussia to endeavour to have the Prince withdrawn—Despatch to Mr. Layard, the Ambassador at Madrid, to the same effect—Count Bernstorff's statement of views of the North German Government—Further despatch to Mr. Layard urging the withdrawal of the Prince—Surprise of Lord Lyons at the rapidity of the proceeding of the French Government—The Duc de Gramont's solution of the question—Hopes entertained of an Amicable Arrangement—Lord Granville's regret at the tone adopted by the French Press—The matter as it stood on July 10, stated by the Duc de Gramont—The Spanish Government's views of the whole question, and their strong Desire for Peace—Remarks of General Prim—State of public feeling in France—Important Interview between Lord Lyons and the Duc de Gramont—The former's regret that the renunciation of the Candidature of the Prince is not at once accepted, and his warning to the French Government—Lord Granville's representation to the French Government of the immense responsibility they were incurring—He also denies that he had ever admitted that the Grievances complained of by France were legitimate—Further pressing appeal by Lord Lyons, and another explanation of the Duc de Gramont—Important statement by him in writing as to what France required to have the matter settled—Further appeal to Prussia—Count Bismarck's reply to the whole question—Feeling in Germany—No fear as to the result of a War—The fatal telegram from Ems—Interesting despatch from Lord Lyons describing the change caused by it in France—Thanks of the French Government to England for her efforts in trying to preserve Peace—The real *gravamen* of the offence against France—Last effort made by England, under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, to prevent hostilities—Replies from both France and Prussia declining the proposal—Efforts made by other European Powers in the cause of Peace—Successful endeavours made by England to secure liberal terms for Neutrals—Proclamation of Neutrality, and notification with regard to the ships of both belligerents—Passing of a new and stringent Foreign Enlistment Act—Description of its chief provisions.

HAVING thus brought the course of events to the declaration of war, it will be better to retrace our steps a little, for the purpose of showing the earnest efforts made by the British government to avert so great a calamity. When, in consequence of the death of Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville became secretary of state for Foreign Affairs in July, 1870, so little was any fear entertained in England of a premature disturbance of the peace of Europe, that Mr. Hammond, the able and experienced permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, told his lordship he had never before known such a lull in foreign politics.

The first intimation of the candidature of Prince Leopold was received officially in England on Tuesday evening, 5th July, in a telegram from Mr. Layard, the British ambassador at Madrid, stating the fact, and that it was expected he would be accepted by the requisite majority. A letter was received the next morning from Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, stating that the Duc de Gramont had just informed him that France would not permit the selection to be carried into effect: she "would use her whole strength to prevent it." Nothing, the duke added, could be further from the wishes of the French government than to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain; but the interest and dignity of France alike forbade them to permit the establishment of a Prussian dynasty in the Peninsula. They could not consent to a state of things which would oblige them, in case of war with Prussia, to keep a watch upon Spain which would paralyze a division of their army. The proposal to set the crown of Spain upon a Prussian head was nothing less than an insult to France, and with a full consideration of all that such a declaration implied, he said the government of the emperor would not endure it.

It will thus be seen that, from the first day on which the matter was officially made known, the British government were informed that unless the project were relinquished war would certainly ensue. Nothing more would have been necessary to have called forth the immediate intervention of England, but in addition to this, the Duc de Gramont concluded the conversation to which we have referred by expressing to Lord Lyons his earnest hope that the British government would co-operate with that of France in endeavouring to ward off an event which, he said, would be fraught with danger to the peace of Europe.

As will be shown in the following narrative of events, the principle acted upon by the British government throughout, and which secured for it the approval, not only of persons of all parties in England, but the thanks of both France and Prussia, was, that though it could not recognize the election of Prince Leopold as being a danger to France, or that France would be entitled to put it forward as a cause of war either against Prussia or Spain, yet considering the fact that France was violently excited on the subject, and that the imperial government was fully committed to resist the election by force, it was a public duty to obtain the abandonment of the project. In the words of Lord Granville, who so ably conducted the negotiations throughout, its course was to urge the French government to avoid precipitation, and, without dictation, to impress on Prussia and Spain the gravity of the situation. "I felt that our position was very much that of trying to prevent a fire with inflammable materials all around, and with matches all ready to ignite; that it was not the moment to go into any elaborate inquiries as to who had brought the materials, or the rights and wrongs of the case, but that we should endeavour as soon as possible to remove those materials and to prevent one of the greatest calamities which could happen to the world." To this practical end the efforts of the English government were, therefore, directed, and with complete success so far as France had asked for its co-operation—the withdrawal of the prince's candidature.

After writing his letter of the 5th of July, Lord Lyons attended a reception at M. Ollivier's, the head of the French government. The latter took him on one side, and spoke at some length and with considerable emphasis, respecting the news just received. His language was in substance the same as that held by the Duc de Gramont in the afternoon, but he entered rather more into detail, and spoke with still more precision of the impossibility of allowing the prince to become king of Spain. Public opinion in France, he said, would never tolerate it, and any government which acquiesced in it would be at once overthrown. For his own part, he said, it was well known he had never been an enemy to Germany; but with all his good will towards the Germans, he must confess that he felt this proceeding to be an insult, and fully shared the indignation of the public. Lord Lyons urged that the official declaration to be made on the subject in the Chamber on the following day should be moderate, and M. Ollivier assured him that it should be as mild as was compatible with the necessity of satisfying public opinion in France; but in fact, he said, our language is this, "We are not uneasy, because we have a firm hope that the thing will not be done; but if it were to be done, we would not tolerate it." After this conversation, Lord Lyons said, in a despatch written on July 7, that he hardly expected the declaration (which is given in the previous chapter) would have been so strongly worded as it proved to be. He admitted, however, that, forcible as it was, it did not go at all beyond the feeling of the country, and it was only too plain that, without considering how far the real interests of France might be in question, the nation had taken the proposal to place the prince of Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain to be an insult and a challenge from Prussia. The wound inflicted by Sadowa on French pride had never been completely healed, but time was producing its reconciling effects in many minds when this matter had revived all the old animosity: both the government and the people had alike made it a point of honour to prevent the accession of the prince, and had gone too far to recede. Lord Lyons added, however, he did not believe that either the emperor or his ministers wished for war or even expected it: on the contrary, he thought they confidently hoped they should succeed by pacific means in preventing the prince from wearing the crown of Spain, and conceived if that should be so, they should gain popularity at home by giving effect energetically to the feeling of the nation; and that they should raise their credit abroad by a diplomatic success. They were, moreover, not sorry to have an opportunity of testing the public feeling with regard to Prussia, and they were convinced that it would have been impossible, with safety, to allow what, rightly or wrongly, the nation would regard as a fresh triumph of Prussia over France.

In the afternoon of the same day (July 7) Lord Lyons had an interview with the Duc de Gramont, and told him he could not but feel uneasy respecting the declaration which he had made the day before in the Corps Législatif, and thought that milder language would have rendered it more easy to treat both with Prussia and Spain for the withdrawal of the pretensions of Prince Leopold. The duke said he was glad Lord Lyons had mentioned

this, as he wished to have an opportunity of conveying to the British government an explanation of his reasons for making a public declaration in terms so positive. As minister in a constitutional country, he was sure Lord Granville would perfectly understand the impossibility of contending with public opinion, and on this point the French nation was so strongly roused, that its will could not be resisted or trifled with, and nothing less than what he had said would have satisfied the public. His speech was in fact, as regarded the internal peace of France, absolutely necessary; and diplomatic considerations must yield to public safety at home. Nor could he admit that it was simply the pride of France which was in question. Her military power was at stake, for, as king of Spain, Prince Leopold could make himself a military sovereign, and secure the means of paralyzing 200,000 French troops, if France should be engaged in a European war. It would be madness to wait until this was accomplished ; if there was to be war it had better come at once; but he still trusted much to the aid of the British government, and by exercising their influence at Berlin and Madrid they would manifest their friendship for France, and preserve the peace of Europe. As regarded Prussia, the essential thing was to make her understand that France could not be put off with an evasive answer ; it was not to be credited that the king of Prussia had not the power to forbid a prince of his family and an officer of his army from accepting a foreign throne. It was, however, in Spain that the assistance of the British government could be most effectually given to France. The regent might surely be convinced that it was his duty to separate himself from a policy which would plunge Spain into civil war, and cause hostilities in Europe. The same day (July 7) Lord Lyons reported to Earl Granville a conversation he had just had with the Prussian chargé d'affaires at Paris, who considered the Duc de Gramont's declaration to have been too hastily made, and expressed his belief that neither the king nor Count von Bismarck was aware of the offer of the crown to Prince Leopold; but that he hardly knew what power the king of Prussia might possess of enforcing a renunciation, but certainly, being in the army, he could not leave it without the king's permission. Lord Lyons observed that much as they might deplore it, they could not shut their eyes to the fact that the feelings of the French nation would now render it impossible for the government, even if they wished, to acquiesce in the elevation of the prince to the throne. Neither Prussia, nor any other nation that he knew of, had any real interest in making the prince king of Spain ; but all nations were deeply interested in preventing war, and that nation would most deserve the gratitude of Europe which should put an end to this cause of disquiet and danger. It seemed to him, therefore, that the king of Prussia, more than any other sovereign, possessed the means of putting a stop to the whole imbroglio in a dignified and honourable manner.

On the previous day, 6th July, M. de Lavalette, the French ambassador in London, had called on Lord Granville, and urged on him the importance of endeavouring to induce the obnoxious candidate to retire; and in compliance with this request, the latter promised to write at once to Lord Augustus Loftus, the English minister at Berlin; but at the same time he expressed his regret at the strong language reported to have been used to the Prussian representative in Paris, and guarded himself against admitting that France was justified in her complaints. In his letter to Lord Augustus Loftus he said, both Mr. Gladstone and he himself were taken very much by surprise by the news received the previous evening; and although the British government had no wish to interfere in Spain or to dictate to Germany, they certainly hoped, and could not but believe, that this project of which they had hitherto been ignorant had not received any sanction from the king. Some of the greatest calamities in the world had been produced by small causes, and by mistakes trivial in their origin, and in the then state of opinion in France, the possession of the crown of Spain by a Prussian prince would be sure to lead to great and dangerous irritation. Of this, indeed, there was conclusive evidence in the statements made by the minister to the French chamber. In Prussia it could be an object of no importance that a member of the house of Hohenzollern should occupy the throne of the most Catholic country in Europe. It was in the interest of civilization, and of European peace and order, that Spain should consolidate her institutions; and it was almost impossible that this should be accomplished if a new monarchy were inaugurated, which was certain to excite jealousy and unfriendly feelings, if not hostile acts, on the part of her immediate and powerful neigh-

bour. He therefore hoped that the king and his advisers would find it consistent with their views of what was advantageous for Spain, effectually to discourage a project fraught with risk to the best interests of that country. Lord Augustus Loftus, however, was cautioned to say nothing which could give ground for the supposition that the English government controverted, or even discussed, the abstract right of Spain to the choice of her own sovereign; and for his own information it was added, that they had not in any measure admitted that the assumption of the Spanish throne by Prince Leopold would justify the immediate resort to arms threatened by France. On that topic, however, he was not then to enter into communication with the Prussian government. The groundwork of the representations which he was instructed to make was prudential. To considerations, however, of that class, Earl Granville said he could not but add the reflection, that the secrecy with which the proceedings had been conducted as between the Spanish ministry and the prince who had been the object of their choice, seemed inconsistent with the spirit of friendship or the rules of comity between nations, and had given, what the government could not but admit to be, so far as it went, just cause of offence.

The following day (July 7) Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Layard at Madrid, calling his attention to the great disfavour with which the candidature of the prince had been received in France, and said that although her Majesty's government had no desire to recommend any particular person whatever to Spain as her future sovereign, or to interfere in any way with the choice of the Spanish nation; still, entertaining as they did the strongest wish for the well-being of Spain, it was impossible that they should not feel anxious as to the consequences of the step thus taken by the provisional government, and they therefore wished him, whilst carefully abstaining from employing any language calculated to offend them, to use every pressure upon them which in his judgment might contribute to induce them to abandon the project.

Similar views were urgently impressed on the Spanish minister in London, who called on Lord Granville the same day; and it was forcibly represented to him that the step, if persevered in, might, on the one hand, induce great European calamities, and on the other, was almost certain to render the relations of Spain with a power which was her immediate neighbour, of a painful, if not a hostile character. A monarchy inaugurated under such auspices would not consolidate the new institutions of the country, and difficulties abroad would certainly find an echo in Spain itself. Senor Rances, the Spanish minister, explained that the project had not been intended as hostile to France; that it was the natural result of other combinations which had failed; and that it was to meet the ardent wish of the liberal party for the election of a king, in order to consolidate their institutions. He promised, however, to represent to his government, in as strong terms as were consistent with the respect due to them, the earnest wish of her Majesty's government, that they would act in the matter with a view to the maintenance of peace in Europe, and the future welfare of Spain.

On July 8 Count Bernstorff, the ambassador of the North German Confederation at London, called on Lord Granville, and informed him that he had received letters from the king of Prussia, and also from Berlin and Count von Bismarck, from the general tenor of which it appeared that the reply of the North German government to the request first made to them by France, for explanation respecting the offer of the crown to Prince Leopold, was to the effect that it was not an affair which concerned the Prussian court. They did not pretend to interfere with the independence of the Spanish nation, but left it to the Spaniards to settle their own affairs; and they were unable to give any information as to the negotiations which had passed between the provisional government of Madrid and the prince of Hohenzollern. He added, that the North German government did not wish to interfere with the matter, but left it to the French to adopt what course they pleased; and the Prussian representative at Paris had been directed to abstain from taking any part in it. The North German government had no desire for a war of succession, but if France chose to commence hostilities against them on account of the choice of a king made by Spain, such a proceeding on her part would be an evidence of a disposition to quarrel without any lawful cause. It was premature, however, to discuss the question as long as the Cortes had not decided on accepting Prince Leopold as king of Spain; still, if France chose to attack North Germany, that country would defend itself. Count Bernstorff went on to say that these views

were held by the North German government, and also by the king of Prussia. His Majesty, he added, was a stranger to the negotiations with Prince Leopold, but he would not forbid the prince to accept the crown of Spain. The count dwelt much on the violent language of France. Lord Granville repeated to him the principal arguments of the despatch to Lord Loftus given above, and added that the position of North Germany was such that, while it need not yield to menace, it ought not to be swayed in another direction by hasty words uttered in a moment of great excitement.

The same day (July 8) Lord Granville sent Mr. Layard copies of the despatches just received from Lord Lyons, showing in what a very serious light the matter was received by the French government, and how imminent was the risk of great calamities, if means could not be devised for averting them. The provisional government of Spain would not, he was sure, wish to do anything which would be unnecessarily offensive to France, from whom they had received much consideration in the crisis through which their country was passing. In turning their thoughts to the prince of Hohenzollern they probably looked at the matter in an exclusively Spanish, and not in a European point of view; and being convinced of the necessity of the speedy re-establishment of a monarchy, and disheartened by the successive obstacles which they had encountered in attempting to bring it about, they turned their attention to a prince who might be ready to accept the crown, and who, in other respects, might be acceptable to the Spanish people. Her Majesty's government could quite understand that the excitement which their choice, looked at from a European point of view, had called forth, was unexpected by the provisional government, whose wish, they felt sure, could never be to connect the restoration of the monarchy in their country with a general disturbance of the peace of Europe, and which could not fail to be fraught with danger to Spain itself. The English government had no wish to press their own ideas upon the government of Spain; but they believed it would have been unfriendly to have abstained from thus laying before them some of the prudential reasons which seemed to them of vital importance to the best interests of their country. They hoped that their doing so would be accepted as the best evidence of their anxiety for the greatness and prosperity of Spain, and of their admiration of the wise course of improvement which had been inaugurated under the provisional government; and they trusted that this frank communication might induce the Spanish government to avoid all precipitation, and devise some means, consistent with their dignity and honour, to put an end to the cause of dissension.

On the same day (July 8) Lord Lyons had an interview with the Duc de Gramont in Paris, when the latter expressed great satisfaction with a report he had received from M. de Lavalette, of the conversation between him and Lord Granville on the 6th, and desired that his best thanks should be conveyed to him for the friendly feeling he had manifested towards France. He then went on to say he was still without any answer from Prussia, and that this silence rendered it impossible for the French government to abstain any longer from making military preparations. Some steps in this direction had been already taken, and the next day the military authorities would begin in earnest. The movements of troops would be settled at the council to be held at St. Cloud in the morning. On Lord Lyons manifesting some surprise and regret at the rapid pace at which the French government seemed to be proceeding, M. de Gramont insisted that it was impossible for them to delay any longer. They had reason to know—indeed, he said, the Spanish ministers did not deny it—that the king of Prussia had been cognizant of the negotiation between Marshal Prim and the prince of Hohenzollern from the first. It was therefore incumbent upon his Majesty, if he desired to show friendship towards France, to prohibit formally the acceptance of the crown by a prince of his house. Silence or an evasive answer would be equivalent to a refusal. It could not be said that the quarrel was of France's seeking. On the contrary, from the battle of Sadowa up to this incident, France had shown a patience, a moderation, and a conciliatory spirit which had, in the opinion of a vast number of Frenchmen, been carried much too far. Now, when all was tranquil, and the irritation caused by the aggrandizement of Prussia was gradually subsiding, the Prussians, in defiance of the feelings and of the interest of France, endeavoured to establish one of their princes beyond the Pyrenees. This aggression it was impossible for France to put up with. It was earnestly to be hoped that

the king would efface the impression it had made, by openly forbidding the prince to go to Spain.

There was another solution of the question to which the Duc de Gramont begged Lord Lyons to call the particular attention of the English government. The prince of Hohenzollern might of his own accord abandon his pretensions to the Spanish crown. He must surely have accepted the offer of it in the hope of doing good to his adopted country. When he saw that his accession would bring domestic and foreign war upon his new country, while it would plunge the country of his birth, and indeed all Europe, into hostilities, he would certainly hesitate to make himself responsible for such calamities. If this view of the subject were pressed upon him, he could not but feel that honour and duty required him to sacrifice the idle ambition of ascending a throne on which it was plain he could never be secure.

A voluntary renunciation on the part of the prince would, M. de Gramont thought, be a most fortunate solution of difficult and intricate questions; and he hoped the English government would use all their influence to secure it.

These views were at once communicated to Lord Granville, and hopes were entertained that an amicable arrangement of the difficulty might soon be found. On the next day Lord Granville wrote to Lord Lyons directing him to urge forbearance, and in another despatch, written on the same day, he said her Majesty's government regretted the tenor of the observations successively made in the French Chambers and in the French press, which tended to excite rather than allay the angry feelings which had been aroused in France, and might probably call forth similar feelings in Germany and Spain; and their regret had been increased by the intimation now given by the Duc de Gramont that military preparations would forthwith be made. Such a course, they feared, was calculated to render abortive the attempts which the English government were making to bring about an amicable settlement, and was calculated to raise the serious question as to the expediency of making any further efforts at that time for the purpose, which such precipitate action on the part of France could hardly fail to render nugatory, and of rather reserving such efforts for a future time, when the parties most directly interested might be willing to second them by moderation and forbearance in the support of their respective views. When these opinions were represented to the Duc de Gramont on the following day, he told Lord Lyons that in this matter the French ministers were following, not leading, the nation. Public opinion would not admit of their doing less than they had done. As regarded military preparations, common prudence required that they should not be behindhand. In the midst of a profound calm, when the French cabinet and Chamber were employed in reducing their military budget, Prussia exploded upon them this mine which she had prepared in secret. It was necessary that France should be at least as forward as Prussia in military preparations.

He said the question now stood exactly thus:—The king of Prussia had told M. Benedetti on the previous evening that he had in fact consented to the prince of Hohenzollern's accepting the crown of Spain; and that, having given his consent, it would be difficult for him now to withdraw it. His Majesty had added, however, that he would confer with the prince, and would give a definitive answer to France when he had done so.

Thus, M. de Gramont observed, two things were clear: first, that the king of Prussia was a consenting party to the acceptance of the crown by the prince; and, secondly, that the prince's decision to persist in his acceptance, or to retire, would be made in concert with his Majesty, so that the affair was, beyond all controversy, one between France and the Prussian sovereign.

The French government would, M. de Gramont added, defer for a short time longer (for twenty-four hours, for instance) those great ostensible preparations for war, such as calling out the reserves, which would inflame public feeling in France. All essential preparations must, however, be carried on unremittingly. The French ministers would be unwise if they ran any risk of allowing Prussia to gain time by dilatory pretexts.

Finally, he told Lord Lyons that he might report to Lord Granville that if the prince of Hohenzollern should, on the advice of the king of Prussia, withdraw his acceptance of the crown, the whole affair would be at an end. He did not, however, conceal that if, on the other hand, the prince, after his conference with the king, persisted in coming forward as a candidate for the throne of Spain, France would forthwith declare war against Prussia.

The next day (July 11) Lord Lyons had another

interview with the Duc de Gramont, and stated that the information which had been received from Spain and other quarters, gave good reason to hope that peaceful means would be found for putting an end, once for all, to the candidature of the prince; and he urged that, this being the case, it would be lamentable that France should rush into a war, the cause for which might be removed by a little patience. M. de Gramont replied that the French ministers were already violently reproached, by the deputies and the public, with tardiness and want of spirit. Any further delay would seriously damage their position; and there were military considerations much more important, which counselled immediate action. The government had, however, determined to make another sacrifice to the cause of peace. No answer had yet reached them from the king of Prussia. They would, nevertheless, wait another day, although by so doing they would render themselves one of the most unpopular governments which had ever been seen in France. Lord Lyons replied that the unpopularity would be of very short duration, and that the best title which the ministry could have to public esteem, would be to obtain a settlement of the question, to the honour and advantage of France, without bloodshed. In reporting this conversation to Lord Granville, Lord Lyons stated it was quite true that the war party had become more exacting. It had, in fact, already raised a cry that the settlement of the Hohenzollern question would not be sufficient, and that France must demand satisfaction on the subject of the treaty of Prague.

In a despatch from Madrid, written on July 12, Mr. Layard said the Spanish government fully appreciated the consideration and friendly feeling of that of England, and the equitable and impartial tone of their despatches. They maintained, however, that they had become involved in the difficulty most unwittingly; that they never entertained the remotest thought of entering into a Prussian alliance, or into any combination hostile or unfriendly to France; and they were most desirous of withdrawing from the position in which they had unfortunately placed themselves, if they could do so consistently with the honour and dignity of the country. At Mr. Layard's request they promised to make a communication to this effect to the European powers, as they were desirous to come to any arrangement which might save Europe from the calamities of a war. In an interview, General Prim the same day personally desired Mr. Layard to thank the English government for its good offices, and disclaimed in the most energetic way any intention to take a step hostile to France. He said that he himself was intimately connected with France and Frenchmen; he had experienced great kindness from the emperor; had married and had many relations in that country; and was consequently the last man to wish to menace or offend France or her ruler. He also desired Mr. Layard to remind the English government of the great difficulties of his position; that when, after the revolution, Spain was without a king, and he was going from door to door in search of one, no European government gave him any help, and that he was everywhere repulsed. But when the Cortes and the country had insisted upon having a king, and when, after having been accused of wishing to maintain the interregnum for personal objects, he had at last succeeded in finding the only eligible candidate, he was immediately accused of having laid a deep plot against France, and of having sought to violate the international law of Europe. He repudiated in the strongest terms any desire of secrecy in order to deceive France or any other power: the reserve which had been maintained during the negotiations was absolutely necessary to save the country from the humiliation of making overtures to a fresh candidate, which might be again refused.

It was on this day (July 12) that the candidature of Prince Leopold was withdrawn, and Lord Lyons then had another interview with the Duc de Gramont on the subject. The latter said the king of Prussia was neither courteous nor satisfactory. His Majesty disclaimed all connection with the offer of the crown of Spain to the Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and declined to advise the prince to withdraw his acceptance. On the other hand, Prince Leopold's father had formally announced in the name of his son that the acceptance was withdrawn. In fact, the prince had sent a copy of a telegram which he had despatched to Marshal Prim, declaring that his son's candidature was at an end.

The duke said that this state of things was very embarrassing to the French government. On the one hand, public opinion was so much excited in France that it was doubtful whether the ministry would not be overthrown if it went down to the Chamber the next day, and announced that it

regarded the affair as finished, without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia. On the other hand, the renunciation of the crown by Prince Leopold put an end to the original cause of the dispute. The most satisfactory part of the affair was, he said, that Spain was, at all events, now quite clear of the transaction. The quarrel, if any quarrel existed, was confined to France and Prussia.

Lord Lyons did not conceal from the Duc de Gramont his surprise and regret that the French government should hesitate for a moment to accept the renunciation of the prince as a settlement of the difficulty. He reminded him pointedly of the assurance which he had formerly authorized him to give to the English government, that if the prince withdrew his candidature the affair would be terminated; and he also urged as strongly as he could all the reasons which would render a withdrawal on his part from this assurance painful and disquieting to that government. Moreover, too, he pointed out that the renunciation wholly changed the position of France. If war occurred, all Europe would say that it was the fault of France; that France rushed into it without any substantial cause—merely from pride and resentment. One of the advantages of the former position of France was, that the quarrel rested on a cause in which the feelings of Germany were very little concerned, and German interests not at all. Now Prussia might well expect to rally all Germany to resist an attack which could be attributed to no other motives than ill-will and jealousy on the part of France, and a passionate desire to humiliate her neighbour. In fact, Lord Lyons said, France would have public opinion throughout the world against her, and her antagonist would have all the advantage of being manifestly forced into the war in self-defence to repel an attack. If there should at the first moment be some disappointment felt in France, in the Chamber, and in the country, he could not but think that the ministry would in a very short time stand better with both if it contented itself with the diplomatic triumph it had achieved, and abstained from plunging the nation into a war for which there was certainly no avowable motive.

After much discussion, the Duc de Gramont said a final resolution must be come to at a council which would be held in presence of the emperor the next day, and the result would be announced to the Chamber immediately afterwards. He should not, he said, be able to see him (Lord Lyons) between the council and his appearance in the Chamber, but he assured him that due weight should be given to the opinion he had offered on behalf of the English government.

The result of this interview was made known at once to the English cabinet, and Lord Granville immediately wrote regretting that the renunciation had not been accepted as a settlement of the question, and said he felt bound to impress upon the French government the immense responsibility which would rest on France if she should seek to enlarge the grounds of quarrel, by declining to accept the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a satisfactory solution of the question. With regard to the statement made by the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif, that all the cabinets to which the French government had referred the subject appeared to admit that the grievances complained of by France were legitimate, he said such a statement was not applicable to her Majesty's government. He had expressed regret at an occurrence which had, at all events, given rise to great excitement in the imperial government and French nation; but he had carefully abstained from admitting that the cause was sufficient to warrant the intentions which had been announced, while, at the same time, he had deprecated precipitate action, and recommended that no means should be left untried by which any interruption of the general peace could be averted.

In an interview with the French ambassador the same day (July 13), Lord Granville earnestly entreated him to represent to his government that her Majesty's government thought, after their exertions at the request of France, they had a right to urge on the imperial government not to take the great responsibility of quarrelling about forms, when they had obtained the full substance of what they desired, and which M. de Gramont had told Lord Lyons, if obtained, would put an end to everything. All the nations of Europe had now declared their ardent wish that peace should be maintained between Prussia and France, and her Majesty's government believed that the imperial government would not give the slightest pretence to those who might endeavour to show that France was desirous of going to war without an absolute necessity.

The same day Lord Lyons, in a letter which

was sent specially to St. Cloud, and delivered at the table at which the ministers were still sitting in council, in the presence of the emperor, again urged upon the Duc de Gramont in the most friendly, but at the same time most pressing, manner, to accept the renunciation of the prince as a satisfactory settlement; and in a personal interview with him in the afternoon—just after his statement in the Corps Législatif, that although the candidature of the prince was withdrawn, the negotiations with Prussia were not concluded—he expressed his surprise and regret that his declaration to the Chamber had not consisted of a simple announcement that the whole question with Prussia, as well as with Spain, was peaceably settled. The duke said he would explain in a few words the position taken up by the government of the emperor. The Spanish ambassador had formally announced to him that the candidature of Prince Leopold had been withdrawn. This put an end to all question with Spain. Spain was no longer a party concerned. But from Prussia France had obtained nothing, literally nothing. He then read to Lord Lyons a telegram, stating that the emperor of Russia had written to the king of Prussia soliciting him to order the prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw his acceptance of the crown, and had, moreover, expressed himself in most friendly terms to France, and manifested a most earnest desire to avert a war. The king of Prussia, M. de Gramont went on to say, had refused to comply with this request from his imperial nephew, and had not given a word of explanation to France. His Majesty had, he repeated, done nothing, absolutely nothing. France would not take offence at this. She would not call upon his Majesty to make her any amends. The king had authorized the prince of Hohenzollern to accept the crown of Spain; all that France now asked was, that his Majesty would forbid the prince to alter at any future time his decision. Surely it was but reasonable that France should take some precautions against a repetition of what had occurred when Prince Leopold's brother repaired to Bucharest. It was not to be supposed that France would run the risk of Prince Leopold suddenly presenting himself in Spain, and appealing to the chivalry of the Spanish people. Still France did not call upon Prussia to prevent the prince from going to Spain; all she desired was that the king should forbid him to change his present resolution to withdraw his candidature. If his Majesty would do this, the whole affair would be absolutely and entirely at an end.

Lord Lyons asked him whether he authorized him categorically to state to his government, in the name of the government of the emperor, that in this case the whole difficulty would be completely disposed of. He said, "Undoubtedly;" and on a sheet of paper wrote the following memorandum, which he placed in the hand of the English ambassador:—

"Nous demandons au roi de Prusse de défendre au prince de Hohenzollern de revenir sur sa résolution. S'il le fait, tout l'incident est terminé." ("We ask the king of Prussia to forbid the prince of Hohenzollern to alter his resolution. If he does so, the whole matter is settled.")

Lord Lyons observed to the duke that he could hardly conceive the French government really apprehended that, after all that had occurred, Prince Leopold would again offer himself as a candidate, or be accepted by the Spanish government if he did; to which the duke replied that he was bound to take precautions against such an occurrence. and that if the king refused to issue the simple prohibition which was demanded, France could only suppose that designs hostile to her were entertained, and must take her measures accordingly. Finally, he asked whether France could count upon the good offices of England to help her in obtaining from the king this prohibition; to which Lord Lyons said that nothing could exceed the desire of her Majesty's government to effect a reconciliation between France and Prussia, but that, of course, he could not take upon himself to answer offhand, without reference to the government, a specific question of that kind.

The substance of this was at once telegraphed to Lord Granville, and the following day Lord Lyons was informed that. in the opinion of the English government, a demand on Prussia for an engagement covering the future could not be justly made by France. Nevertheless, and although they considered that France, having obtained the substance of what she required, ought not in any case to insist to extremities upon the form in which it was obtained, they had at once and urgently recommended to the king of Prussia, that if the French demand was waived, he should communicate to France his consent to the renunciation of Prince Leopold. This renunciation

had been placed before the king on behalf of the English government, in the following terms; namely, that as his Majesty had consented to the acceptance by Prince Leopold of the Spanish crown, and had thereby, in a certain sense, become a party to the arrangement, so he might with perfect dignity communicate to the French government his consent to the withdrawal of the acceptance, if France should waive her demand for an engagement covering the future. Such a communication, made at the suggestion of a friendly power, would be a further and the strongest proof of the king's desire for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

On July 13 Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with Count von Bismarck, and congratulated him on the apparent solution of the crisis by the spontaneous renunciation of the prince of Hohenzollern. The count, however, appeared somewhat doubtful as to whether this solution would prove a settlement of the difference with France. He told Lord Augustus Loftus that the extreme moderation evinced by the king of Prussia under the menacing tone of the French government, and the courteous reception by his Majesty of Count Benedetti at Ems, after the severe language held to Prussia both officially and in the French press, was producing throughout Prussia general indignation. He had that morning, he said, received telegrams from Bremen, Königsberg, and other places, expressing strong disapprobation of the conciliatory course pursued by the king of Prussia at Ems, and requiring that the honour of the country should not be sacrificed.

The count then expressed a wish that the English government should take some opportunity, possibly by a declaration in Parliament, of expressing their satisfaction at the solution of the Spanish difficulty by the spontaneous act of Prince Leopold, and of bearing public testimony to the calm and wise moderation of the king of Prussia, his government, and of the public press. He adverted to the declaration made by the Duc de Grammont to the Corps Législatif, "that the powers of Europe had recognized the just grounds of France in the demand addressed to the Prussian government;" and he was, therefore, anxious that some public testimony should be given that the powers who had used their "bons offices" to urge on the Prussian government a renunciation by Prince Leopold, should likewise express their appreciation of the peaceful and conciliatory disposition manifested by the king of Prussia. He added that intelligence had been received from Paris (though not officially from Baron Werther), to the effect that the solution of the Spanish difficulty would not suffice to content the French government, and that other claims would be advanced. If such were the case, he said, it was evident that the question of the succession to the Spanish throne was but a mere pretext, and that the real object of France was to seek a revenge for Königgratz.

The feeling of the German nation, said Count von Bismarck, was that they were fully equal to cope with France, and they were as confident as the French might be of military success. The conviction, therefore, in Prussia and in Germany was, that they should accept no humiliation or insult from France, and that, if unjustly provoked, they should accept the combat. But, said he, we do not wish for war, and we have proved, and shall continue to prove, our peaceful disposition; at the same time we cannot allow the French to have the start of us as regards armaments. He had, said he, positive information that military preparations had been made, and were making, in France for war. Large stores of munition were being concentrated, large purchases of hay and other materials necessary for a campaign being made, and horses rapidly collected. If these continued, they should be obliged to ask the French government for explanations as to their object and meaning. After what had occurred they would be compelled to require some assurance, some guarantee, that they would not be subjected to a sudden attack; and must know that this Spanish difficulty once removed, there were no other lurking designs which might burst upon them like a thunderstorm.

The count further stated that unless some such assurance were given by France to the European powers, or in an official form, that the present solution of the Spanish question was a final and satisfactory settlement of the French demands, and that no further claims would be raised; and if, further, a withdrawal or a satisfactory explanation of the menacing language held by the Duc de Gramont were not made, the Prussian government would be obliged to seek explanations from France. It was impossible, he said, that Prussia could rest, tamely and quietly, under the affront offered to the king and to the nation by the insulting language of the French

government. He could not, he said, hold communication with the French ambassador after the menaces addressed to Prussia by the French minister for Foreign Affairs in the face of Europe. In communicating these views to Lord Granville, Lord Augustus Loftus said he would perceive that unless some timely counsel, or friendly hand, could intervene to appease the irritation between the two governments, the breach, in lieu of being closed by the solution of the Spanish difficulty, was likely to become wider. It was evident to him, he said, that Count von Bismarck and the Prussian ministry regretted the courteous attitude and moderation shown by the king towards Count Benedetti, thinking that after the menacing language used in France with regard to Prussia he ought not to have received him at all; and in view of the public opinion of Germany, they felt the necessity of taking some decided measures for the safeguard and honour of the nation. The only means, he thought, which could pacify the wounded pride of the German nation, and restore confidence in the maintenance of peace, would be a declaration of the French government that the incident of the Spanish difficulty had been satisfactorily adjusted; and in rendering justice to the moderate and peaceful disposition of the king of Prussia and his government, a formal statement that the good relations existing between the two states were not likely to be again exposed to any disturbance. He greatly feared that if no mediating influences could be successfully brought to bear on the French government to appease the irritation against Prussia, and to counsel moderation, war would be inevitable.

These views from Prussia were communicated to the English Foreign Office on 13th July, but did not reach there until the 15th. As previously stated, on the previous day, 14th July, Lord Granville had telegraphed to Berlin, and recommended the king of Prussia to communicate to France his consent to Prince Leopold's renunciation, if, on her part, France would withdraw her demand of a guarantee for the future. The suggestion was declined; and Count von Bismarck expressed his regret that her Majesty's government should have made a proposal which it would be impossible for him to recommend to the king for his acceptance. In justification of the reasonableness of the plan suggested by the English government it should, however, be stated, that when the facts became rightly known it transpired that, in his communication with M. Benedetti at Ems on the previous day, as described in the preceding chapter, the king had himself voluntarily taken the identical course they recommended. When declining the suggestion, Count von Bismarck told Lord Augustus Loftus that Prussia had shown, under a public menace from France, a calmness and moderation which would render further concession on her part equivalent to a submission to the arbitrary will of her rival, and would be viewed as a humiliation which the national feeling throughout Germany would certainly repudiate. Under the irritation caused by the menaces of France, the whole of Germany had arrived at the conclusion that war, even under the most difficult circumstances, would be preferable to the submission of their king to any further demands. The Prussian government, as such, had nothing to do with the acceptance of the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and had not even been cognizant of it. They could not, therefore, balance their assent to such acceptance by their assent to its withdrawal. A demand for interference on the part of a sovereign in a matter of purely private character could not, they considered, be made the subject of public communication between governments ; and as the original pretext for such a demand was to be found in the candidature itself, it could no longer be necessary now that the candidature had been renounced.

The fatal telegram, detailing the supposed insult to the French ambassador at Ems, arrived in Paris on July 13, and in a despatch sent on the following day Lord Lyons thus reported the change which immediately occurred in public feeling :—

"PARIS, *July* 14, 1870.

"My Lord,—In my despatch of yesterday I communicated to your lordship the account given to me by the Duc de Gramont of the state of the question regarding the acceptance of the crown of Spain by Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and the recent withdrawal of that acceptance.

"My despatch was sent off at the usual hour, 7 o'clock in the evening. During the early part of the night which followed, the hope that it might yet be possible to preserve peace gained some strength. It was understood that the renunciation of his pretensions by Prince Leopold himself had come to confirm that made on his

behalf by his father, and that the Spanish government had formally declared to the government of France that the candidature of the prince was at an end. The language of influential members of the cabinet was more pacific, and it was thought possible that some conciliatory intelligence might arrive from Prussia, and enable the government to pronounce the whole question to be at an end.

"But in the morning all was changed. A telegram was received from the French chargé d'affaires at Berlin, stating that an article had appeared in the Prussian ministerial organ, the *North German Gazette*, to the effect that the French ambassador had requested the king to promise never to allow a Hohenzollern to be a candidate for the throne of Spain, and that his Majesty had thereupon refused to receive the ambassador, and sent him word by an aide-de-camp that he had nothing more to say to him.

"The intelligence of the publication of this article completely changed the view taken by the French government of the state of the question. The emperor came into Paris from St. Cloud, and held a council at the Tuileries; and it was considered certain that a declaration hostile to Prussia would be addressed at once by the government to the Chambers.

"I made every possible endeavour to see the Duc de Gramont, but was unable to do so. I sent him, however, a most pressing message by the chief of his cabinet, begging him, in the name of her Majesty's government, not to rush precipitately into extreme measures, and, at all events, not to commit the government by a premature declaration to the Chambers. It would, I represented, be more prudent, and at the same time more dignified, to postpone addressing the Chambers at least until the time originally fixed—that is to say, until to-morrow.

"In the meantime, although the news of the appearance of the article in the *North German Gazette* had not become generally known, the public excitement was so great, and so much irritation existed in the army, that it became doubtful whether the government could withstand the cry for war, even if it were able to announce a decided diplomatic success. It was felt that when the Prussian article appeared in the Paris evening papers it would be very difficult to restrain the anger of the people, and it was generally thought that the government would feel bound to appease the public impatience by formally declaring its intention to resent the conduct of Prussia.

"The sittings of the Legislative Body and the Senate have, however, passed over without any communication being made on the subject, and thus no irretrievable step has yet been taken by the government.

"I cannot, however, venture to give your lordship any hope that war will now be avoided. I shall continue to do all that is possible, in the name of her Majesty's government, to avert this great calamity; but I am bound to say that there is the most serious reason to apprehend that an announcement nearly equivalent to a declaration of war will be made in the Chambers to-morrow.

I have, &c.,
"LYONS."

The next day M. Ollivier made, in the Corps Législatif, a statement equivalent to a declaration of war; and shortly afterwards Lord Lyons had another interview with the Duc de Gramont, when the latter desired him to express to the British government the thanks of the government of the emperor for the friendly endeavours which they had made to effect a satisfactory solution of the question with Prussia. The good offices of her Majesty's ministers had, however, he said, been made of no effect by the last acts of the Prussian government, who had deliberately insulted France by declaring to the public that the king had affronted the French ambassador. It was evidently the intention of the government of Prussia to take credit with the people of Germany for having acted with haughtiness and discourtesy, to humiliate France. Not only had the statement so offensive to France been published by the government in its accredited newspaper, but it had been communicated officially by telegraph to the Prussian agents throughout Europe. Until this had been done, the duke said, the negotiation had been particularly private. It had, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, been carried on directly with the king of Prussia. The Prussian minister for foreign affairs, Count von Bismarck, had been in the country, and it had been impossible to approach him. The acting minister, Herr von Thiele, professed to know nothing of the subject, and to consider it as a matter concerning, not the Prussian government, but the king personally. Although the distinction was not in principle admissible, still it obliged France to treat with the king directly, and

the French ambassador had been sent to wait upon his Majesty at Ems. The negotiation had not proceeded satisfactorily, but so long as it remained private there were hopes of bringing it to a satisfactory conclusion. Nor, indeed, had the king really treated M. Benedetti with the rough discourtesy which had been boasted of by the Prussian government. But that government had now chosen to declare to Germany and to Europe, that France had been affronted in the person of her ambassador. It was this boast which was the *gravamen* of the offence. It constituted an insult which no nation of any spirit could brook, and rendered it, much to the regret of the French government, impossible to take into consideration the mode of settling the original matter in dispute which was recommended by the English cabinet.

Lord Lyons having, at Lord Granville's request, called the attention of the duke to the statement made by him in the Chamber, that all the cabinets to whom he had applied had appeared to admit that the complaints of France were legitimate; the duke affirmed that he certainly intended to include the government of Great Britain in the statement, and that he must confess he still thought that he was perfectly justified in doing so. In fact, he said, the friendly efforts made, under Lord Granville's instructions, by her Majesty's minister at Madrid to get the candidature of Prince Leopold set aside, and the representations made for the same purpose by her Majesty's government in other countries, surely indicated that they considered that France had reason to complain of the selection of this prince, and the circumstances which had attended it.

Lord Lyons reminded the duke that the English government had throughout carefully abstained from admitting that this matter was sufficient to warrant a resort to extreme measures: to which he replied, that neither did his statement in the Chamber imply that the governments to which he alluded had made any such admission. The statement had been made at a comparatively early stage of the negotiation, and before the insult which had rendered extreme measures necessary. Finally, he said, he knew the English way of proceeding, and was aware that the English detested war, and therefore were not disposed to look favourably upon those who were the first to commence hostilities. Still, he trusted that France would not lose the sympathy of England. Lord Lyons said that if her Majesty's government had not been able to take exactly the same view of this unhappy dispute as the government of the emperor, he thought that they had, nevertheless, given most substantial proofs of friendship in the earnest endeavours they had made to obtain satisfaction for France. He could not deny that her Majesty's government had reason to feel disappointed, not to say hurt. They had been led to believe that the withdrawal of the prince of Hohenzollern from all pretensions to the crown of Spain was all that France desired. They had exerted themselves to the utmost to obtain this, and were then told that France required more. However this might be, there was, he said in conclusion, most certainly no diminution of the friendly feeling which had now for so many years existed between the two governments and the two nations.

As a last resource, on 15th July Lord Granville wrote simultaneously to the English ambassadors at Paris and Berlin, expressing his deep regret that the breaking out of war between the two countries seemed imminent. But being anxious not to neglect the slightest chance of averting it, the English government appealed to the twenty-third protocol of the conferences held at Paris in the year 1856, in which "Les plénipotentiaires n'hésitent pas à exprimer, au nom de leurs gouvernements, le vœu que les etats entre lesquels s'éleverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances admettraient, aux bons offices d'une puissance amie." ["The plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express, in the name of their governments, their strong desire that states between which any serious difference may arise, before appealing to arms, should have recourse, so far as circumstances will admit, to the good offices of a friendly power."] And they felt themselves the more warranted in doing so, inasmuch as the question in regard to which the two powers were at issue had been brought within narrow limits.

Her Majesty's government, therefore, suggested to France and to Prussia, in identical terms, that before proceeding to extremities they should have recourse to the good offices of some friendly power or powers acceptable to both; the English government being ready to take any part which might be desired in the matter.

This well-intentioned effort on the part of England was decisively but courteously rejected by

both countries. M. de Gramont thanked the English government for the sentiment which had prompted the step, but said he must recall to their mind that in recording their wish in the protocols, the Congress of Paris did not profess to impose it in an imperative manner on the powers, which alone remained the judges of the requirements of their honour and their interests. This was expressly laid down by Lord Clarendon, after the observations offered by the Austrian plenipotentiary. However disposed they might be to accept the good offices of a friendly power, and especially England, France could not now accede to the offer of the cabinet of London. In face of the refusal of the king of Prussia to give the French government the guarantees which his policy had forced them to demand, in order to prevent the recurrence of dynastic aims dangerous to their security, and of the offence which the cabinet of Berlin had added to this refusal, the care of the dignity of France allowed no other course. At the eve of a rupture which the kind efforts of friendly powers had been unable to avert, public opinion in England would, he believed, recognize that under the circumstances the emperor's government had no longer a choice in its decisions. On the other hand, Count Bismarck said, the king of Prussia's sincere love of peace, which no one had had a better opportunity of knowing than the English government, rendered him at all times disposed to accept any negotiation which had for its object to secure peace on a basis acceptable to the honour and national convictions of Germany; but the possibility of entering into a negotiation of this nature could only be acquired by a previous assurance of the willingness of France to enter into it also. France took the initiative in the direction of war, and adhered to it after the first complication had, in the opinion even of England, been settled by the removal of its cause. If Prussia were now to take the initiative in negotiating, it would be misunderstood by the national feelings of Germany, excited as they had been by the menaces of France.

In addition to the unceasing efforts of England for the preservation of peace, endeavours in the same direction were made by Russia, Austria, and Italy. Count Beust, the Austrian minister, also told Lord Bloomfield, our ambassador at Vienna, that perhaps no one was better able to judge of the state of feeling in the South German states than himself; and he was convinced that if France counted on the sympathies of those states, she would make a great mistake. With a view, therefore, to discourage her from looking to anything like support from that quarter, he had thought it well, in the interests of peace, to bring this conviction to her knowledge.

War having thus been actually brought about, notwithstanding all they had done to avert it, the English government turned their attention to securing the rights of neutrals. Renewed assurances that the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland would be respected were given by both France and Prussia. Time was also requested for neutral vessels, and protection for neutral property; and both powers at once conceded everything on those points that could, with good grace, be asked. French vessels which were in German ports at the beginning of the war, or which entered such ports subsequently, before being informed of the outbreak, were allowed to remain six weeks, reckoned from the outbreak of the war, and to take in their cargoes, or to unload them. In France the period allowed was thirty days. They were provided with safe-conducts to enable them to return freely to their ports, or to proceed direct to their destination. Vessels which had shipped cargoes for France, and on account of French subjects, in enemy's or neutral ports previously to the declaration of war, were declared to be not liable to capture, but were allowed to land freely their cargoes in ports of the empire, and to receive safe-conducts to return to the ports to which they belonged. The French government, however, declined to extend to the enemy's vessels, with neutral cargoes, the same privileges granted to them with French cargoes. It was also agreed that the following stipulations, agreed to at the treaty of Paris in 1856, should be recognized by both countries during the war:—

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

On 19th July a proclamation of strict neu-

trality was issued by the English government, in which the queen's subjects were expressly forbidden to equip or arm any vessel for the use of either belligerent, and warning all who should attempt to break any blockade lawfully established that they would rightfully be liable to hostile capture, and the penalties awarded by the law of nations in that respect, and would obtain no protection whatever from the government.

A notification was also isssued from the Foreign Office, stating that no ship of war, of either belligerent, would be permitted to take in any supplies at any port in the United Kingdom or her colonies, except provisions and such other things as might be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and only sufficient coal to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination. All ships of war were prohibited from making use of any port or roadstead in the United Kingdom, or her colonial possessions, as a station or resort for any warlike purpose; and no vessel of war was to be permitted to leave any port she might have entered for necessary supplies, from which any vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same were a ship of war or a merchant ship) should have left at least twenty-four hours.

As an additional proof of the sincerity of their desire to remain thoroughly neutral during the struggle, and to prevent the possibility of any justifiable complaint from either belligerent, the government introduced and carried a new Foreign Enlistment Act, which went far beyond any law ever before passed in any country for the purpose of enforcing neutrality, and involved a total revolution in the ideas of English statesmen with regard to the duties of neutrals. The chief provisions of the Act are, that a penalty of fine and imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court, may be imposed for enlistment in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any state at peace with her Majesty, or inducing any other person to accept such service. Similar penalties are imposed for leaving her Majesty's dominions with intent to serve a foreign state, or for embarking persons under false representations as to service. Any master or owner of a ship who knowingly receives on board his ship, within her Majesty's dominions, any person illegally enlisted under any of the circumstances above described, is made liable to fine and imprisonment; his ship may be detained till all the penalties have been paid, or security given for them; and the illegally enlisted persons are to be taken on shore, and not allowed to return to the ship. The object of these latter clauses is, of course, to strike at the former practice of hiring men for an ostensibly peaceful and legal service, and afterwards, with or without their connivance, employing them in a military or naval expedition.

But the most interesting and important division of the Act is that which relates to illegal shipbuilding and illegal expeditions. As in the previous Act, it is declared to be an offence to commission, equip, or despatch any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state. The offender is punishable by fine and imprisonment; and the ship, in respect of which any such offence is committed, with the equipment, is to be held forfeited to her Majesty. But over and above this the new Act embodies a provision, making the building of a vessel under such circumstances an offence in itself; and what is more, the onus of disproof lies with the builder:—"Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, or is delivered to or to the order of such foreign state, or any agent of such state, or is paid for by such foreign state or their agent, and is employed in the military or naval service of such state, such ship shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state." Further, it is declared an offence to augment the warlike force of any ship for the use of a belligerent. These clauses are intended to check the practice adopted during the American war of building or fitting out a vessel in this country and then sending her either out to sea, or to some other neutral port, to take on board an armament sent to meet her in some other ship. No distinction of this kind as to time or place will, under the new Act, suffice to elude the law. The mere building of a ship with the intent or knowledge that it is afterwards to be equipped and used for purposes of war against a state with whom we are at peace, is ranked as an offence, quite apart from the actual

equipment and despatch of the ship for this purpose. The defects of the law were strikingly illustrated by the two cases of the *Alabama* and the rams. While the former escaped, because the authorities had not authority to seize her, even though her intended use and destination were perfectly notorious, in the other instance the government took the law into their own hands, and arbitrarily seized the rams on their own responsibility. The law is now sufficient to meet all cases of this description, and to spare the authorities any necessity of straining it, in order to discharge the obligations of a neutral. This branch of the measure is completed by two other clauses, enacting that illegal ships shall not be received in British ports, and making it an offence, punishable with fine and imprisonment, to prepare or fit out, or in any way assist in preparing, any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of a friendly state; all ships forming part of such an expedition being forfeited to the crown.

The remaining clauses of the Act relate to the legal procedure in regard to the offences described, the courts which are to try cases, the officers authorized to seize offending ships, &c. A special power is given to the secretary of state, or chief executive authority, to issue a warrant to detain a ship, if "satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing" that it is being built, equipped, or despatched for an illegal purpose. The owner of a ship so detained may apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release, and if he can show that the ship was not intended for the use suspected it will be restored to him. If he fails in this proof the secretary of state will be at liberty to detain the vessel as long as he pleases; the court having, however, a discretionary power to release the vessel on the owner giving security that it shall not be employed contrary to the Act. If there has been no reasonable cause for detention, the owner will be entitled to an indemnity to be assessed by the court. The "local authority" may also detain a suspected ship until reference can be made to the secretary of state or chief executive authority. The secretary of state may issue a search warrant in any dockyard in the queen's dominions, and he is to be held free from legal proceedings in connection with any warrant he may issue, and is not bound to give evidence as a witness except with his own consent. The decision of the important question whether a ship is or is not rightly suspected, is withdrawn from the cognizance of a jury and submitted to the consideration of a judge, so that there can be none of those failures of justice which formerly took place in consequence of the misdirected patriotism of juries.

CHAPTER III.

Important Statement of the French Emperor—He declares that he neither expected nor was prepared for War, but that France had slipped out of his hands—A thoroughly National War—His Version of a very important conversation with Count von Bismarck—Publication of a Proposed Secret Treaty between France and Prussia, by which France was to acquire Luxemburg by purchase and conquer Belgium with the Assistance of Prussia, on Condition of not interfering with the Plans of Prussia in Germany—Great Excitement on the Subject in England and Belgium—Statements of the English Government in both Houses of Parliament—Manly Speech of Mr. Disraeli—Letter from M. Ollivier, the Head of the French Government, repudiating the Treaty—General State of Feeling on the Question in France—Explanation of the *Journal Officiel*—The Prussian Version of the Transaction—Other Propositions of a Similar Nature made by France to Prussia divulged, including an offer of 300,000 men to assist in a War against Austria, in return for the Rhenish Provinces—Continued Efforts of France to "lead Prussia into Temptation"—Count von Bismarck's Reasons for not divulging the Proposals at the time they were made—Explanation of M. Benedetti, the Proposer of the Secret Treaty—He states that it was well known that Prussia offered to assist France in acquiring Belgium in return for her own Aggrandisement—Such Overtures persistently declined by the French Government—The Secret Treaty written at the Dictation of Count von Bismarck—The Proposals rejected by the French Emperor as soon as they came to his Knowledge—Count von Bismarck's only Reason for publishing them must have been to mislead Public Opinion—French Official Explanation on the same Subject from the Duc de Gramont—The idea of France appropriating Belgium a purely Prussian one, to avert Attention from the Rhine Provinces—Offer of Prussian Assistance to accomplish it—The Emperor steadily refused to entertain the Idea—Emphatic Denial that France intended to offer to conclude Peace on the Basis of the Secret Treaty if it had not been published—Proposals made by France to Prussia through Lord Clarendon to reduce their Armaments—The Proposition rejected by the King of Prussia—Further Proofs adduced by Prussia against France—Anxiety in England—Action taken by the Government—£2,000,000 and 20,000 men enthusiastically voted by the House of Commons—Great Debate on the whole Matter—Mr. Disraeli stigmatises the Pretext for War as "Disgraceful," and Proposes an Alliance with Russia—Guarded Statement of Mr. Gladstone—Dissatisfaction at it in the House—Spirited Speech of Lord Russell in the House of Lords in Favour of supporting Belgium at all Cost—Reassuring reply of Lord Granville—Important Statements in both Houses of Parliament by the Government as to the Course they had adopted, and Comments thereon—The Complete Text of New Treaty agreed on to preserve the Neutrality of Belgium—Feeling of Reassurance in England—Altered State of Feeling in Austria towards France—Biographical Notices of Count von Bismarck and M. Benedetti.

In the two preceding chapters the circumstances connected with the war have been consecutively described from the 5th July, when the first official announcement of Prince Leopold's candidature reached England and France, to the 23rd July—a week subsequent to the actual declaration of war by France. Immediately this event took place, both countries commenced massing troops on their respective frontiers, and were so engaged for the next fortnight. Only a few slight skirmishes, however, took place between the reconnoitring parties of the two armies; and before proceeding to describe the more stirring events of the contest, we must, in order to continue the narrative of events consecutively, devote a chapter to the now celebrated "Secret Treaty"—a document which for a time excited even more interest in England than the war itself, and which led to some important steps being adopted by the British Parliament.

Simultaneously with the publication of the Treaty (Monday, 25th July) another communication was published, which would doubtless have created much more attention than it did had it not been that everything else was, for a time, to a great extent overlooked. We, however, reproduce it here, before describing the treaty, and shall then have no further cause to refer to it. It was an account of an interview with the Emperor Napoleon, in the previous week, and was inserted in the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper under the signature of "An Englishman," who said he had his Majesty's free consent to its publication. It stated that the emperor, after speaking upon some private matters, turned suddenly to the political situation of France and of Europe. He said: "One fortnight before the utterance of the Duc de Gramont in the Corps Législatif—which utterance has, as it seems to me, been so unjustly reflected upon by the English press—I had no notion that war was at hand, nor am I, even at this moment, by any means prepared for it. I trusted that, when the Duc de Gramont had set me straight with France by speaking manfully in public as to the Hohenzollern candidature, I should be able so to manipulate and handle the controversy as to make peace certain. But France has slipped out of my hand. I cannot rule unless I lead. This is the most national war that in my time France has undertaken, and I have no choice but to advance at the head of a public opinion

which I can neither stem nor check. In addition, Count von Bismarck, although a very clever man, wants too much, and wants it too quick. After the victory of Prussia in 1866, I reminded him that but for the friendly and self-denying neutrality of France he could never have achieved such marvels. I pointed out to him that I had never moved a French soldier near to the Rhine frontier during the continuance of the German war. I quoted to him from his own letter in which he thanked me for my abstinence, and said that he had left neither a Prussian gun nor a Prussian soldier upon the Rhine, but had thrown Prussia's whole and undivided strength against Austria and her allies. I told him that, as some slight return for my friendly inactivity, I thought that he might surrender Luxemburg, and one or two other little towns which gravely menace our frontier, to France. I added that in this way he would, by a trifling sacrifice, easily forgotten by Prussia in view of her enormous successes and acquisitions, pacify the French nation, whose jealousies it was so easy to arouse, so difficult to disarm.

"Count von Bismarck replied to me, after some delay, 'Not one foot of territory, whether Prussian or neutral, can I resign. But, perhaps, if I were to make further acquisitions, I could make some concessions. How, for instance, if I were to take Holland? What would France want as a sop for Holland?'

"'I replied,' said the emperor, 'that if he attempted to take Holland, it meant war with France; and there the conversation, in which Count von Bismarck and M. de Benedetti were the interlocutors, came to an end.'"

The only notice of importance which was taken of this document was in a debate in the House of Lords, in which Lord Malmsbury said he knew the writer (Honourable F. Lawley) was worthy of all credence, and in the official *North German Gazette*, which admitted the truth of the description of the conversation between Count von Bismarck and the emperor down to the word "resign," but said the remainder of the statement (that concerning Holland) was altogether fictitious.

On the same day (25th July) as this document appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Times* startled the world by publishing the "Draft of a Secret Project of Alliance, Offensive and Defensive, between France and Prussia," which, on account of its importance, and the results to which it led, we give both in the original French, and also in an English version. The only variations from the text of the actual proposed treaty, and the copy of it published in the *Times*, are indicated by italics and brackets.

PROPOSED TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse et sa Majesté l'empereur des Français jugeant utile de resserrer les liens d'amitié qui les unissent et de consolider les rapports de bon voisinage heureusement existant entre les deux pays, convaincus d'autre part que pour atteindre ce résultat, propre d'ailleurs à assurer le maintien de la paix générale, il leur importe de s'entendre sur des questions qui intéressent leurs relations futures, ont résolu de conclure un traité à cet effet, et nommé en consequence pour leurs plénipotentiaires, &c., savoir:

Sa Majesté, &c.;

Sa Majesté, &c.;

Lesquels, apres avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants:—

Article I.—Sa Majesté l'empereur des Français admet et reconnait les acquisitions que la Prusse a faites à la suite de la dernière guerre qu'elle a soutenue contre l'Autriche et contre ses alliés [*ainsi que les arrangements pris ou à prendre pour la constitution d'une Confédération dans l'Allemagne du Nord, s'engageant en même temps à preter son appui à la conservation de cette œuvre*].

Article II.—Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse promet de faciliter à la France l'acquisition du Luxembourg; à cet effet la dite Majesté entrera en négociations avec sa Majesté le roi des Pays-Bas pour le déterminer à faire, à l'empereur des Français, la cession de ses droits souverains sur ce duché, moyennant telle compensation qui sera jugée suffisante ou autrement. De son côté l'empereur des Français s'engage à assumer les charges pécuniaires que cette transaction peut comporter. [*Pour faciliter cette transaction, l'empereur des Français, de son côté, s'engage à assumer accessoirement les charges pécuniaires qu'elle pourrait comporter.*]

Article III.—Sa Majesté l'empereur des Français ne s'opposera pas à une union fédérale de la Confédération du Nord avec les etats du midi de l'Allemagne, à l'exception de l'Autriche, laquelle union pourra être basée sur un Parlement commun, tout en respectant, dans une juste mesure, la souveraineté des dits etats.

Article IV.—De son côté, sa Majesté le roi de Prusse, au cas où sa Majesté l'empereur des Français serait amené par les circonstances à faire entrer ses troupes en Belgique ou à la conquérir, accordera le secours [*concours*] de ses armes à la France, et il la soutiendra avec toutes ses forces de terre et de mer, envers et contre toute puissance qui, dans cette éventualité, lui déclarerait la guerre.

Article V.—Pour assurer l'entière exécution des dispositions qui précèdent, sa Majesté le roi de Prusse et sa Majesté l'empereur des Français contractent, par le présent traité, une alliance offensive et défensive qu'ils s'engagent solennellement à maintenir. Leurs Majestés s'obligent, en outre et notamment, à l'observer dans tous les cas où leurs etats respectifs, dont elles se garantissent mutuellement l'intégrité, seraient menacés d'une aggression, se tenant pour liées, en pareille conjoncture, de prendre sans retard, et de ne décliner sous aucun prétexte, les arrangements militaires qui seraient commandés par leur intérêt commun conformément aux clauses et prévisions ci-dessus énoncées.

TRANSLATION.

His Majesty the king of Prussia and his Majesty the emperor of the French, deeming it useful to draw closer the bonds of friendship which unite them, and to consolidate the relations of good neighbourhood happily existing between the two countries, and being convinced, on the other hand, that to attain this result, which is calculated besides to assure the maintenance of the general peace, it behoves them to come to an understanding on questions which concern their future relations, have resolved to conclude a treaty to this effect, and named in consequence as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say,

His Majesty, &c.;

His Majesty, &c.;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

Article I.—His Majesty the emperor of the French admits and recognizes the acquisitions which Prussia has made as the result of the last war which she sustained against Austria and her allies [*as also the arrangements adopted or to be adopted for constituting a Confederation in North Germany, engaging, at the same time, to render his support for the maintenance of that work*].

Article II.—His Majesty the king of Prussia promises to facilitate the acquisition of Luxemburg by France: to that effect his aforesaid Majesty will enter into negotiations with his Majesty the king of the Netherlands, to induce him to cede to the emperor of the French his sovereign rights over that duchy, in return for such compensation as shall be deemed sufficient or otherwise. On his part, the emperor of the French engages to bear the pecuniary charges which this arrangement may involve. [*In order to facilitate this arrangement, the emperor of the French engages, on his part, to bear accessorily the pecuniary charges which it may involve.*]

Article III.—His Majesty the emperor of the French will not oppose a federal union of the Confederation of the North with the southern states of Germany, with the exception of Austria, which union may be based on a common Parliament, the sovereignty of the said states being duly respected.

Article IV.—On his part his Majesty the king of Prussia, in case his Majesty the emperor of the French should be obliged by circumstances to cause his troops to enter Belgium, or to conquer it, will grant the succour [*co-operation*] of his arms to France, and will sustain her with all his forces of land and sea against every power which, in that eventuality, should declare war upon her.

Article V.—To insure the complete execution of the above arrangements, his Majesty the king of Prussia and his Majesty the emperor of the French contract, by the present treaty, an alliance offensive and defensive, which they solemnly engage to maintain. Their Majesties engage moreover, and specifically, to observe it in every case in which their respective states, of which they mutually guarantee the integrity, should be menaced by aggression, holding themselves bound in such a conjuncture to make without delay, and not to decline on any pretext, the military arrangements which may be demanded by their common interest, conformably to the clauses and provisions above set forth.

This treaty had, of course, been supplied to the *Times* by the Prussian government; and in its comments on the matter in a leading article—evidently written under inspiration—the great English journal stated that it was rejected at the time it was tendered, but that it had recently again been offered as a condition of peace. At all events, means had been taken to let it be understood that the old project was open, and that a ready acceptance of it would save Prussia

from attack. The suggestion had not, however, been favourably received; on the contrary, matters had, as was well known, been so far advanced that it was impossible to arrest the progress of the war by a *coup de théâtre*.

As will be readily understood, the publication of this document caused the greatest sensation, not only in England, but on the Continent, and especially in Belgium. England was, of course, most deeply interested, because by the treaty of 1839 she, in common with France, Prussia, and other great powers, had guaranteed the independence of the Belgian kingdom. The subject formed the sole topic of conversation in the city during the day, and had a considerable effect on the stock markets, producing a fall both in consols and foreign securities. The excitement at the meeting of the House of Commons in the afternoon was so great, that an octogenarian member said he remembered no more stirring spectacle since 1815. Questions were addressed to the government in both Houses, but they replied that they could give no information as to the source from which the *Times* had obtained the document. They were, however, convinced that, after the announcement of the existence of such a draft treaty, both the governments of France and Prussia would immediately and spontaneously give an explanation to Europe of the matter. In prefacing his question in the House of Commons, Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the opposition, said, amidst loud and general cheering, that the policy indicated in the treaty was one which England had never approved, and never could approve. He should look upon the extinction of Belgium as a calamity to Europe and an injury to England, and therefore he trusted such an attempt would not be made; but if it were, the engagements into which England had entered with respect to that kingdom would demand the gravest consideration. An increase of distrust was observable in all the markets in the city on the following day, the observations in both Houses of Parliament having coincided with the feeling previously entertained as to the gravity of the disclosure regarding the treaty. At the same time, however, there was an augmented sense among all the mercantile classes of the importance of maintaining a strict neutrality.

The same day M. Emile Ollivier, the head of the French government, sent the following letter to a friend in England, evidently with a view to publication:—

"Paris, *July* 26, 1870.

"My dear Friend,—How could you believe there was any truth in the treaty the *Times* has published? I assure you that the cabinet of the 2nd of January never negotiated or concluded anything of the kind with Prussia.

"I will even tell you that it has negotiated nothing at all with her. The only negotiations that have existed between us have been indirect, confidential, and had Lord Clarendon for their intermediary. Since Mr. Gladstone slightly raised the veil in one of his speeches, we may allow ourselves to say that the object of those negotiations, so honourable to Lord Clarendon, was to assure the peace of Europe by a reciprocal disarmament. You will admit that this does not much resemble the conduct of ministers who seek a pretext for war.

"You know the value I set upon the confidence and friendship of the great English nation. The union of the two countries has always seemed to me the most essential condition of the world's progress. And for that reason I earnestly beg you to contradict all those false reports spread by persons who have an interest in dividing us.

"We have no secret policy hidden behind our avowed policy. Our policy is single, public, loyal, without after thoughts (*arrieres pensées*); we do not belong to the school of those who think force is superior to right; we believe, on the contrary, that good right will always prevail in the end; and it is because the right is on our side in the war now beginning, that with the help of God we reckon upon victory.

"Affectionate salutations from your servant,

(Signed) "EMILE OLLIVIER."

The excitement created in France was, however, by no means so great as in England. At first the authenticity of the document was boldly denied, but when this was no longer possible, people said, "Well, if it be true, where is the harm of it?" for the idea of annexing Belgium had more than once been broached in the numerous pamphlets which had been published from time to time, advocating a rectification of the French frontiers; and it was not seriously believed by scarcely one Frenchman in a hundred that England would go to war to prevent it. The first formal notice taken of the matter was on Wednesday, July 27, when the

Journal Officiel said, "After the treaty of Prague several negotiations passed at Berlin between Count von Bismarck and the French embassy on the subject of a scheme of alliance. Some of the ideas contained in the document inserted by the *Times* were raised, but the French government never had cognizance of a written project; and as to the proposals that may have been spoken of in these conversations, the Emperor Napoleon rejected them. No one will fail to see in whose interest, and with what object, it is now sought to mislead the public opinion of England."

The treaty was published in the Berlin journals the same day (July 27), accompanied with the statement that it had been submitted to Count von Bismarck by M. Benedetti, the French ambassador, and that the original, in his handwriting, was in the Berlin archives.

On the following day a long telegraphic despatch was forwarded to the Prussian ambassador in London, to be at once communicated to the English government, with a notification that a fuller account of the whole transaction in writing would be despatched forthwith. This latter document was received a few days after, in the shape of a circular to the North German representatives at the courts of neutral states; and as it contains the complete version of the Prussian side of the question, and is of great historical importance, we give it in full.

"BERLIN, *July* 29, 1870.

"The expectation expressed by Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone in the British Parliament, that more exact information in reference to the draught treaty of M. Benedetti, would be furnished by the two powers concerned, was in a preliminary manner fulfilled on our side by the telegram which I addressed to Count Bernstorff on the 27th inst. The telegraphic form only enabled me to make a short statement, which I now complete in writing.

"The document published by the *Times* contains by no means the only proposition of a similar nature which has been made to us on the part of the French. Even before the Danish war, attempts, addressed to me, were made both by official and unofficial French agents to effect an alliance between France and Prussia, with the object of mutual aggrandizement. It is scarcely necessary for me to point out the impossibility of such a transaction for a German minister, whose position is dependent on his being in accord with the national feeling; its explanation is to be found in the want of acquaintance of French statesmen with the fundamental conditions of existence among other nations. Had the agents of the Paris cabinet been competent to observe the state of German affairs, such an illusion would never have been entertained in Paris as that Prussia could permit herself to accept the aid of France in regulating German affairs.

"Your excellency is, of course, as well acquainted as I am myself with the ignorance of the French as regards Germany.

"The endeavours of the French government to carry out, with the assistance of Prussia, its covetous views with reference to Belgium and the Rhine frontier were brought to my notice even before 1862—therefore before my accession to the ministry of Foreign Affairs. I cannot regard it as my task to transfer such communications, which were purely of a personal nature, to the sphere of international negotiations; and I believe it will be best to withhold the most interesting contribution which I could make towards the elucidation of the matter from private letters and conversations.

"The above-mentioned tendencies of the French government were first recognizable by the external influence on European politics and the attitude favourable to us which France assumed in the Germano-Danish conflict. The subsequent bad feeling which France displayed towards us in reference to the Treaty of Gastein, was attributable to the apprehension lest a durable strengthening of the Prusso-Austrian alliance should deprive the Paris cabinet of the fruits of this its attitude. France before 1865 reckoned upon the outbreak of war between us and Austria, and again willingly made approaches to us as soon as our relations with Vienna began to be unfriendly. Before the outbreak of the Austrian war proposals were made to me, partly through relatives of his Majesty the emperor of the French, and partly by confidential agents, which each time had for their object smaller or larger transactions for the purpose of effecting mutual aggrandizement.

"At one time the negotiations were about Luxemburg, or about the frontier of 1814, with Landau and Saarlouis; at another, about larger objects, from which the French Swiss cantons and the question where the linguistic boundaries in Piedmont were to be drawn were not excluded.

"In May, 1866, these pretensions took the form of a proposition for an offensive and defensive alliance, and the following extract of its chief features is in my possession:—

"'1. En cas de Congrès, poursuivre d'accord la cession de la Vénétie à l'Italie et l'annexion des Duchés à la Prusse. 2. Si le Congrès n'aboutit pas, alliance offensive et défensive. 3. Le roi de Prusse commencera les hostilités dans les 10 jours, la séparation du Congrès. 4. Si le Congrès ne se réunit pas, la Prusse attaquera dans 30 jours après la signature du présent traité. 5. L'empereur des Français déclarera la guerre à l'Autriche, dès que les hostilités seront commencées entre l'Autriche et la Prusse en 30 jours, 300,000. 6. On ne fera pas de paix séparée avec l'Autriche. 7. La paix se fera sous les conditions suivantes—La Vénétie à l'Italie, à la Prusse les territoires Allemands ci-dessous, 7 à 8 millions d'après au choix, plus la réforme fédérale dans le sens Prussien; pour la France, le territoire entre Moselle et Rhin, sans Coblence et Mayence, comprenant 500,000 âmes de Prusse, la Bavière, rive gauche du Rhin, Birkenfeld, Homburg, Darmstadt, 213,000 âmes. 8. Convention militaire et maritime entre la France et la Prusse dès la signature. 9. (Adhésion du roi d'Italie.)'

[1. In the event of a Congress, to agree upon the cession of Venetia to Italy, and annexation of the duchies to Prussia. 2. If the Congress come to nothing, an alliance offensive and defensive to be concluded. 3. The king of Prussia to commence hostilities within ten days of the breaking up of the Congress. 4. Should the Congress not reassemble, Prussia to attack in thirty days after the signature to the present treaty. 5. The emperor of the French to declare war against Austria as soon as hostilities shall be commenced between Austria and Prussia, and in thirty days to have 300,000 men in the field. 6. No separate peace to be concluded with Austria. 7. Peace to be made under the following conditions—Venetia to be given to Italy, the German territories, with about seven or eight millions of inhabitants according to their choice, to go to Prussia, besides the prosecution of the Federal reform in the Prussian sense; for France the territory between the Moselle and Rhine, excepting Coblentz and Mainz, comprising 500,000 Prussians, Bavaria, left bank of the Rhine, Birkenfeld, Homburg, Darmstadt, with 213,000 inhabitants. 8. A military and maritime convention between France and Prussia, dating from the signature. 9. The king of Italy's adhesion to be obtained.]

"The strength of the army with which the emperor, in accordance with Article 5, would assist us was in written explanations placed at 300,000 men; the number of souls comprised in the aggrandizements which France sought for was 1,800,000 souls, according to calculations which, however, did not agree with the actual statistics.

"Every one who is familiar with the secret diplomatic and military history of the year 1866 will see, glimmering through these clauses, the policy which France pursued simultaneously towards Italy (with whom she at the same time secretly negotiated), and subsequently towards Prussia and Italy.

"In June, 1866, after we had rejected the above scheme of alliance, notwithstanding several almost threatening warnings to accept it, the French government began to calculate on the Austrians being victorious over us, and upon our making a bid for French assistance after the eventuality of our defeat, to pave the way for which diplomatically French diplomacy was occupied to the uttermost. That the congress anticipated in the foregoing draught of alliance, and again proposed later, would have had the effect of causing our three months' alliance with Italy to expire without our having profited by it is well known to your excellency, as is also the fact that France, in the further agreements relative to Custozza, was busied in prejudicing our situation, and if possible bringing about our defeat. The patriotic affliction of the minister Rouher furnishes a comment upon the further course of events. Since that time France has not ceased leading us into temptation by offers at the cost of Germany and Belgium. I had never any doubt as to the impossibility of acceding to any such offers; but I considered it useful in the interests of peace to permit the French statesmen to hold these illusions peculiar to them, so long as it should be possible so to do without giving even a verbal assent to their propositions. I imagined that the annihilation of the French hopes would endanger the preservation of peace, the maintenance of which was in the interest both of Germany and Europe. I was not of the opinion of those politicians who considered it unadvisable to shun by all the means in one's power a war with France, on the ground that such a war was

in any case unavoidable. No one can so surely foresee the designs of Divine Providence; and I look upon even a victorious war as an evil in itself, which the statesmanship of a country must strive to spare its people.

"I could not in my calculations leave out the possibility that, in the constitution and policy of France changes might arise which would relieve the two great neighbouring peoples from the necessity of war—a hope which was favoured by each postponement of the rupture. For these reasons I was silent about the propositions made, and delayed the negotiations about them, without ever on my side giving a promise. After the negotiations with his Majesty the king of the Netherlands fell, as is well known, to the ground, extended proposals were again addressed to me by France, including in their purport Belgium and South Germany. At this conjuncture comes the communication of the Benedetti manuscript. That the French ambassador, without the consent of his sovereign, and on his own responsibility, drew up these propositions, handed them to me, and negotiated them, modifying them in certain places as I advised, is as unlikely as was the statement on another occasion that the Emperor Napoleon had not agreed to the demand for our surrendering Mayence, which was officially made to me in August, 1866, by the French ambassador, under threat of war in case of our refusal. The different phases of French bad feeling and lust for war which we have gone through from 1866 to 1869, coincided with tolerable exactness with the willingness or unwillingness for negotiations which the French agents believed they met with in me. In 1866, at the time when the Belgian Railway affair was being prepared, it was intimated to me by a high personage, who was not a stranger to the former negotiation, that in case of a French occupation of Belgium, 'nous trouverions notre Belgique ailleurs.' Similarly, on another occasion, I had been given to understand that in a solution of the Eastern question France would seek its share, not in far-off places, but close upon its boundaries. I am under the impression that it was only the definite conviction that no enlargement of the frontiers was to be achieved with us, that has led the emperor to the determination to strive to obtain it against us. I have besides reason to believe that, had the publication in question not been made, so soon as our and the French preparations for war were complete, propositions would have been made to us by France jointly, and at the head of a million armed men, to carry out against unarmed Europe the proposals formerly made to us, and either before or after the first battle to conclude peace on the basis of the Benedetti proposals, and at the expense of Belgium.

"Concerning the text of these proposals, I remark that the draught in our possession is from beginning to end from the hand of M. Benedetti, and written on the paper of the Imperial French Embassy; and that the ambassadors here, including the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Würtemburg, who have seen the original, have recognized the handwriting. In Article I. M. Benedetti, at the very first reading, withdrew the closing passage, placing it in brackets, after I had remarked that it presupposed the interference of France in the internal affairs of Germany, which I, even in private documents, could not allow. Of his own accord he made an unimportant marginal correction in Article II. in my presence. On the 24th inst. I informed Lord A. Loftus verbally of the existence of the document in question, and on his expressing doubts invited him to a personal inspection of the same. On the 27th of this month he took note of it, and convinced himself that it was in the handwriting of his former French colleague. If the imperial cabinet now repudiates attempts for which it has sought since 1864, both by promises and threats, to obtain our co-operation, this is easily to be explained in presence of the political situation.

"Your excellency will please read this despatch to M. ——, and hand him a copy.

"VON BISMARCK."

The French side of the question is given in the following explanatory letter of M. Benedetti to the Duc de Gramont, and the latter's reply to the circular of Count Bismarck:—

"PARIS, *July* 29, 1870.

"M. le Duc,—Unjust as they were, I did not think it proper to notice the observations which were made upon me personally, when it was known in France that the prince of Hohenzollern had accepted the crown of Spain. As in duty bound, I left to the government of the emperor the task

of setting them right. I could not keep the same silence in face of the use which Count von Bismarck has made of a document to which he seeks to give a value which it never possessed, and I request your excellency's leave to re-establish the facts exactly as they occurred.

"It is a matter of public notoriety that Count von Bismarck offered us, before and during the last war, to assist in uniting Belgium to France, as a compensation for the aggrandizements of which he was ambitious, and which he obtained for Prussia. I might, on this point, appeal to the testimony of the entire diplomacy of Europe, to whom the whole affair was known.

"The government of the emperor constantly declined these overtures, and one of your predecessors, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, is in a position to give, on this subject, explanations which must remove every doubt. At the moment of the conclusion of the Peace of Prague, and in face of the emotion which was excited in France by the annexation to Prussia of Hanover, of Electoral Hesse, and of the town of Frankfort, Count von Bismarck again showed the strongest desire to re-establish the balance of power, which had been disturbed by these acquisitions. Various combinations having reference to the integrity of the states neighbours of France and Germany were put forward; they became the subject of several conversations, during which Count von Bismarck was always disposed to make his personal ideas prevail.

"In one of these conversations, and in order to give myself an exact idea of his combinations, I consented to transcribe them in a manner ("en quelque sorte") at his dictation. The form, no less than the substance, shows clearly that I confined myself to reproducing a project conceived and developed by him. Count von Bismarck kept this document, wishing to submit it to the king. On my side, I reported in substance to the imperial government the communications which had been made to me. The emperor rejected them as soon as they came to his knowledge. I am bound to say that the king of Prussia himself did not seem to wish to accept the basis of them; and since that time, that is to say, during the last four years, I have never again entered upon any new exchange of ideas on the subject with Count von Bismarck.

"If the initiative of such a treaty had been taken by the government of the emperor, the project would have been drafted by the Foreign Office, and I should not have had to produce a copy of it in my own handwriting; it would besides have been drawn up differently, and it would have led to negotiations which would have been simultaneously carried on at Paris and Berlin. In that case Count von Bismarck would not have been satisfied with indirectly publishing the text, particularly at a time when your excellency was correcting, in despatches which were inserted in the *Journal Officiel*, other errors which attempts were also being made to propagate. But in order to attain the end which he had in view—that of misleading public opinion, and anticipating the revelations which we ourselves might have made—he employed this expedient, which relieved him from the necessity of defining at what time, under what circumstances, and in what manner this document had been written. He evidently flattered himself that, thanks to these omissions, he should suggest conjectures which, whilst freeing his personal responsibility, would compromise that of the emperor's government. Such proceedings need no comment; it is enough to point them out, by submitting them to the appreciation of the public opinion of Europe.

"Receive, &c.,

"(Signed) BENEDETTI."

The following was the French reply to Count von Bismarck, and which was addressed as a circular to the diplomatic agents of France at foreign courts:—

"PARIS, *August* 3.

"Sir,—We now know the full meaning of the telegram addressed by Count von Bismarck to the Prussian ambassador in London to announce to England the pretended secrets of which the Federal chancellor alleged that he was the depositary. His despatch adds no material fact to those which he has already put forth. We only find in it a few more improbabilities. We shall not attempt to point them out. Public opinion has already done justice to affirmations which derive no authority from the audacity with which they are repeated, and we regard it as completely established, notwithstanding all denials, that never has the Emperor Napoleon proposed to Prussia a treaty for taking possession of Belgium. That idea is the property of Count von Bismarck. It is one of the expedients of that unscrupulous policy which we trust is now approaching its end. I should, there-

fore, have abstained from reverting to assertions which have been proved to be false if the author of the Prussian despatch, with a want of tact which I noticed in so marked a degree for the first time in a diplomatic document, had not mentioned relatives of the emperor as having been bearers of compromising messages and confidences. Whatever repugnance I may feel at being compelled to follow the Prussian chancellor, and to engage myself in a manner so contrary to my habits, I overcome that feeling, because it is my duty to repudiate perfidious insinuations which, directed against members of the imperial family, are evidently intended to apply to the emperor himself. It was at Berlin that Count von Bismarck, originating ideas the first conception of which he now seeks to impute to us, solicited in these terms the French prince whom, in defiance of all customary rules, he now seeks to draw into the controversy. 'You desire,' said he, 'an impossible thing. You wish to take the Rhenish Provinces, which are German. Why do you not annex Belgium, where the people have the same origin, the same religion, and the same language as yourselves? I have already caused that to be mentioned to the emperor; if he entered into my views, we would assist him to take Belgium. As for myself, if I were the master and I were not hampered by the obstinacy of the king, it would be already done.' These words of the Prussian chancellor have been, so to speak, literally repeated to the court of France by the Count von Goltz. That ambassador was so little reticent upon the subject, that there are many witnesses who have heard him thus express himself. I will add that at the period of the Universal Exhibition the overtures of Prussia were known to more than one high personage, who took note of them and still remembered them. Moreover, it was not a mere passing notion with Count von Bismarck, but truly a concerted plan with which his ambitious schemes were connected; and he pursued his attempts to carry them out with a perseverance which is amply attested by his repeated excursions to France, to Biarritz, and elsewhere. He failed before the immovable will of the emperor, who always refused to connect himself with a policy that was unworthy of his loyalty. I now quit the subject, which I have touched upon for the last time, with a firm intention of never again recurring to it, and I come to the really new point in Count von Bismarck's despatch. 'I have reason to believe,' he says, 'that if the publication of the projected treaty had not occurred, France would have made us an offer—after our mutual armaments had been completed—to carry out the proposition which she had previously made to us, as soon as we found ourselves at the head of a million of well-armed soldiers in the face of unarmed Europe; that is to say, to make peace before or after the first battle upon the basis of M. Benedetti's propositions at the expense of Belgium.' The emperor's government cannot allow such an assertion to pass without notice. In the face of all Europe, his Majesty's ministers defy Count von Bismarck to adduce any fact whatever to justify a belief that they have ever manifested, directly or indirectly, officially or by secret agency, an intention of uniting with Prussia to accomplish together in respect of Belgium the deed she has consummated in respect to Hanover. We have opened no negotiation with Count von Bismarck, either concerning Belgium or any other subject. Far from seeking war, as we have been accused of doing, we besought Lord Clarendon to interpose with the Prussian cabinet, with a view to a mutual disarmament, an important mission which Lord Clarendon, through friendship towards France and devotion to the cause of peace, consented confidentially to undertake. It was on these terms that Comte Daru, in a letter of the 1st of February, explained to the Marquis de Lavalette, our ambasador in London, the intentions of the government:—

" 'It is certain that I should not mix myself up with this affair, nor should I ask England to interfere in it if the question was one simply of an ordinary and purely formal nature, intended only to afford Count von Bismarck an opportunity to repeat once again his refusal. It is a real, serious, positive proposition, which it is sought to act upon. The principal secretary of state appears to anticipate that Count von Bismarck will at first manifest dissatisfaction and displeasure. That is possible, but not certain. With that possibility in view, it will be well to prepare the ground in such a manner as to avoid at the outset a negative reply. I am convinced that time and reflection will induce the chancellor to take into his serious consideration the proposition of England. If at first he does not reject all overtures, then the interests of Prussia and of all Germany will speedily speak out sufficiently to lead him to modify his opposition. He

would not be willing to raise against himself the opinion of his entire country. What, indeed, would be his position if we took away the sole pretext upon which he relies, that is, the armament of France?'

"Count von Bismarck at first replied that he could not take upon himself to submit the suggestions of the British government to the king, and that he was sufficiently acquainted with the views of his sovereign to foretell his decision. King William, he said, would certainly see in the proposition of the cabinet of London a change in the disposition of England towards Prussia. In short, the Prussian chancellor declared 'that it was impossible for Prussia to modify a military system which was so closely connected with the traditions of the country, which formed one of the bases of its constitution, and which was in no way abnormal.' Comte Daru was not checked by this first reply. On the 13th of February he wrote to M. de Lavalette:—

"'I hope that Lord Clarendon will not consider himself beaten nor be discouraged. We will shortly give him an opportunity of returning to the charge, if it should be agreeable to him, and to resume the interrupted communication with the Federal chancellor. Our intention is, in fact, to diminish our contingent. We should largely have reduced it if we had received a favourable reply from the Federal chancellor. We shall make a smaller reduction, as the reply is in the negative; but we shall reduce. The reduction will, I hope, be 10,000 men. That is the number I should propose. We shall affirm by acts, which are of more value than words, our intentions—our policy. Nine contingents, each reduced by 10,000 men, make a total reduction of 90,000 men. That is already something; it is a tenth part of the existing army. The law upon the contingent will be proposed shortly. Lord Clarendon will then judge whether it will be proper to represent to Count von Bismarck that Prussia alone in Europe makes no concession to the spirit of peace, and that he thus places her in a serious position amid other European societies, because he furnishes arms against her to all the world, including the populations which are crushed beneath the weight of military charges which he imposes upon them.'

"Count von Bismarck, closely pressed, felt it to be necessary to enter into some further explanations with Lord Clarendon. These explanations, as far as we are acquainted with them, from a letter from M. de Lavalette dated the 23rd of February, were full of reticence. The chancellor of the Prussian Confederation, departing from his first resolution, had informed King William of the proposition recommended by England, but his Majesty had declined it. In vindication of the refusal, the chancellor pleaded the fear of a possible alliance between Austria and the states of the south, and the ambitious designs that might be entertained by France. But in the foreground he especially placed the anxieties with which the policy of Russia inspired him, and upon that point indulged in particular remarks respecting the court of St. Petersburg which I prefer to pass by in silence, not desiring to reproduce injurious insinuations. Such were the pleas of non-acceptance which Count von Bismarck opposed to the loyal and conscientious entreaties several times renewed by Lord Clarendon at the request of the emperor's government. If, then, Europe has remained in arms; if a million of men are about to be hurled against each other upon the battle-field, it cannot be contested that the responsibility for such a state of things attaches to Prussia: for it is she who has repudiated all idea of disarmament, while we not only forwarded the proposition to her, but also began by setting an example. Is not this conduct explained by the fact that, at the very time when confiding France was reducing her contingent, the cabinet of Berlin was arranging in the dark for the provocative nomination of a Prussian prince? Whatever may be the calumnies invented by the Federal chancellor, we have no fear; he has forfeited the right of being believed. The conscience of history and of Europe will say that Prussia has sought the present war by inflicting upon France, while she was engaged in the development of her political institutions, an outrage which no high-spirited and courageous nation could have accepted without meriting the contempt of nations.

"Agreez, &c., "GRAMONT."

The Prussian reply to this circular was issued a week afterwards, not, it was stated, with the view of taking advantage of the abundant matter it contained for criticism, but of supplying a fresh piece of evidence, and requesting the Prussian representatives at foreign courts to bring it under the notice of the respective governments to which they were accredited. Count von Bismarck said:—"If

I have not made use of this evidence before, it was owing to my reluctance, even in a state of war, to drag the person of a monarch into the discussion of the acts of his ministers and representatives; and also because, considering the form of government which avowedly existed in France up to the 2nd of January last, I was not prepared to hear that the draught treaty and the other proposals and arrogant demands alluded to in my despatch of the 29th should have been submitted to me without the knowledge of the Emperor Napoleon. But certain statements which appear in the latest French utterances necessitate my having recourse to a different line of conduct. On the one hand, the French minister of Foreign Affairs assures us that the Emperor Napoleon has never proposed to Prussia a treaty having the acquisition of Belgium for its object (*que jamais l'Empereur Napoleon n'a proposé à la Prusse un traité pour prendre possession de la Belgique*); on the other, M. Benedetti gives out that the draught treaty in question emanates from me; that all he had to do with it was to put it on paper—writing, so to say, from my dictation (*en quelque sorte sous ma dictée*), which he only did the better to apprehend my views; and that the Emperor Napoleon was made cognizant of the draught only after its completion at Berlin. Statements such as these render it indispensable for me to make use of a means at my disposal calculated to support my account of French politics, and to strengthen the supposition I have previously expressed respecting the nature of the connection between the emperor and his ministers, envoys, and agents. In the archives of the Foreign Office at Berlin is preserved a letter from M. Benedetti to me, dated 5th August, 1866, and a draught treaty inclosed in that letter. The originals, in M. Benedetti's handwriting, I shall submit to the inspection of the representatives of the neutral powers, and I will also send you a photographic fac-simile of the same. I beg to observe that, according to the *Moniteur*, the Emperor Napoleon did pass the time from the 28th of July to the 7th of August, 1866, at Vichy. In the official interview which I had with M. Benedetti in consequence of this letter, he supported his demands by threatening war in case of refusal. When I declined, nevertheless, the Luxemburg affair was brought upon the carpet; and after the failure of this little business came the more comprehensive proposal relative to Belgium embodied in M. Benedetti's draught treaty published in the *Times*."

The profound impression created in England by the publication of the treaty increased and deepened with the charges and counter-charges made by and against the respective governments, and the confidence before reposed in the friendship of both countries was put to a severe test. Questions were repeatedly asked of the government in both Houses of Parliament, but without eliciting any further facts than those already given; and the nation became thoroughly in earnest on the subject of its naval and military strength, and the number of breech-loaders already served out and in store.

On Monday, August 2, Mr. Cardwell, the War Minister, laid on the table of the House of Commons a supplementary estimate of £2,000,000 "for strengthening the naval and military forces of the kingdom, including an addition to the army of 20,000 men of all ranks during the European war." There was much cheering on both sides of the House when the estimate was read; and in reply to questions addressed to him immediately afterwards, Mr. Cardwell stated that the whole force of the army was only about 2000 below the establishment; that the militia regiments, with a few exceptions, were recruited up to their full strength; and that the Supply Department was in a position to meet any emergencies.

The same evening Mr. Disraeli, leader of the Opposition, called the attention of the House, according to previous notice, to the position of the country with reference to the war. By way of justification for his interposition, he said that, having witnessed the outbreak of several great wars during his parliamentary career, he had noticed that much injury had been done by the reserve and silence observed by the House of Commons on such occasions, which, instead of assisting and strengthening the hands of the government, had embarrassed it. He spoke contemptuously of the ephemeral and evanescent pretexts for the present war. Whether there was a pretender to the Spanish throne, or whether there was a breach of etiquette at a watering place, or whether Europe was to be devastated on account of the publication of an anonymous paragraph in a newspaper—were pretexts which would have been disgraceful in the eighteenth century, and could not now seriously influence the conduct of any body of men; he pointed out

that its real causes were to be gathered from the public declarations of the leading statesmen on both sides, such as M. Rouher and Count von Bismarck; and the recent revelations showed that vast ambitions were stirring in Europe, and subtle schemes were being devised, which had brought about this war, and might produce other events of the utmost importance. After some remarks on the treaties guaranteeing Belgium and Luxemburg—of the former of which he said that it had been negotiated by distinguished Liberal statesmen, and was in accordance with the traditional policy of England—Mr. Disraeli reminded the House that at the Treaty of Vienna England had guaranteed to Prussia her Saxon provinces. That engagement, he contended, ought to have given her an overpowering influence with Prussia; but Russia had undertaken a similar guarantee, and Russia, too, was as anxious to be neutral as England, and in this coincidence he discerned a means by which, from the joint action of these two powers, peace might be restored. The policy of England should be an armed neutrality, and at the proper time she might step in, and in conjunction with Russia, exercise the most considerable effect on the course of public affairs. This led him to consider whether the armaments of the country were in such a position as to enable her to take that line, and to require from the government more complete information as to the strength of the fleet and the army, the condition of stores, and the progress made in the fortifications; insisting that at a crisis like the present no effort should be spared to put the country in a position of complete security. He earnestly urged the House to profit by the lessons of the Crimean war, which might have been prevented had England spoken out at the right moment. She had then as strong a government as at present; but the House of Commons maintained a reserve, and there followed discordant councils, infirmity of action, and, finally, war. If the government spoke to foreign powers with that firmness which could only arise from a due appreciation of their duty, and a determination to perform it, Mr Disraeli predicted that England would not be involved in the war, and her influence, combined with that of Russia, might lead to the speedy restoration of peace. But, above all, England ought to declare in a manner not to be mistaken that she would maintain her treaty engagements, and thereby secure the rights of independent nations.

Mr. Gladstone, the prime minister, confessed that the particular incident out of which the war had arisen had taken him by surprise, though, of course, he was perfectly aware of the state of feeling of which that incident was a symptom. He next sketched the steps taken by the government to preserve peace, which have been fully detailed in Chapter II. During the negotiations, the position of England had been that of a mediator, and her attitude now was one of neutrality; but not an "armed neutrality"—a phrase which he strongly deprecated as having an historical significance totally opposed to the friendly disposition which ought to be preserved towards both belligerents. But he agreed that England's neutrality ought to be accompanied with adequate measures of defence; that it ought to be what he called a "secured neutrality." As to the suggestion of joint action with Russia, he merely said that he saw no objection to coalescing not only with one, but all the neutral powers, for the restoration of peace; but he differed entirely from Mr. Disraeli's idea of the claim which the Saxon guarantee gave England. The dissolution of the German Confederation and the recent aggrandizement of Prussia had destroyed its binding force, and England could not have advanced it without involving herself in the responsibilities of war. Describing next the attitude of the government with regard to the future, he said that the "projected treaty" was considered by the government to be a most important document, giving a serious shock to public confidence, and the country ought to feel indebted to those who had brought it to light. The government had taken the whole circumstances attending it into their consideration, and the propositions they meant to make to the House in their opinion met the necessity of the case, and were calculated to establish perfect confidence and security. Having explained the various steps the government had taken to maintain neutrality, he warmly defended it against Mr. Disraeli's charge of undue reduction of the services in the early part of the year. In every reduction they had made real strength had been arrived at, and efficiency had been increased. The country had 89,000 soldiers at home, there was a considerable Channel fleet afloat, the armament for the forts was ready, the supply of arms of precision was adequate, and stores were in excellent order. The House, to some extent, must rely on the responsibility of the government; but

he assured it that they were deeply sensible of the discredit of weakening the power of this country, and that, having made the most careful inquiries, they would take up and maintain that dignified position which would enable England at the proper time to interfere for the restoration of peace.

The studious reserve maintained by Mr. Gladstone throughout his speech upon the obligations of Great Britain under the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, caused great dissatisfaction, and from the tone of every speech subsequently made, it was evident that the feeling of the House was unmistakable in its recognition of England's duties to the fullest extent. Subsequent events proved that in its negotiations with both France and Prussia the government had been by no means so reticent, and had given them clearly to understand that England felt herself fully bound by the treaty of 1839, and that in case of any violation of the neutrality or independence of Belgium she would at once interfere on her behalf.

On the following evening Lord Russell, in an energetic speech in the House of Lords, which stirred even the well-bred repose of his aristocratic audience, and drew hearty cheers from both sides of the House, asserted the duty of England to defend Belgium to the uttermost. After reviewing the treaty obligations of Great Britain, and referring to the secret treaty, and the explanations to which it had given rise between France and Prussia, he said it would be impossible to feel in future perfect confidence in either of the parties, and unwise to ignore the danger that the treaties in regard to Belgium might be violated. "For my part," he said, "I confess I feel somewhat as if a detective officer had come and told me he had heard a conversation with respect to a friend of mine whom I had promised to guard as much as was in my power against any act of burglary or housebreaking, and that two other persons, who were also friends of mine, had been considering how they might enter his house and deprive him of all the property he possessed. I should reply, under such circumstances, that I was very much astonished to hear it, and that I could not, in the future, feel perfect confidence in either of the parties to that conversation." As to the beginning of the war, it might be a question whether as regards France the charioteer had not himself lashed the horses which he found himself afterwards unable to guide; but, putting aside that point, England's duty was clear. "It is not a question of three courses. There is but one course and one path—namely, the course of honour and the path of honour—that we ought to pursue. We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her engagements, and not to shrink from their performance. I am persuaded that neither France nor Prussia would ever attempt to violate the independence of Belgium. It is only the doubt, the hesitation, that has too long prevailed as to the course which England would take which has encouraged and fostered all these conversations and projects of treaties, all these combinations and intrigues. I am persuaded that if it is once manfully declared that England means to stand by her treaties, to perform her engagements, that her honour and her interest would allow nothing else, such a declaration would check the greater part of these intrigues, and that neither France nor Prussia would wish to add a second enemy to the formidable foe which each has to meet. I am persuaded that both would conform to the faith of treaties, and would not infringe on the territory of Belgium, but till the end of the war remain in the fulfilment of their obligations. When the choice is between honour and infamy, I cannot doubt that her Majesty's government will pursue the course of honour, the only one worthy of the British people. The British people have a very strong sense of honour, and of what is due to this glorious nation. I feel sure, therefore, that the government, in making that intention clear to all the world, would have the entire support of the great majority of this nation. I need hardly speak of other considerations which are of great weight. I consider that if England shrunk from the performance of her engagements, if she acted in a faithless manner with respect to this matter, her extinction as a great power must very soon follow. The main duty of the hour therefore is, how we can best assure Belgium, assure Europe, and assure the world that we mean to be true and faithful, that the great name which we have acquired in the world by the constant observance of truth and justice, and by fidelity to our engagements, will not be departed from, and that we shall be in the future what we have been in the past."

Lord Granville replied briefly, declining to enter upon a general discussion, and justifying the reserve of the government. He gave a positive assurance that the government were aware of the duty this country owed to Belgium, and declared his perfect confidence that if they followed judiciously and actively the course which the honour, the interests, and the obligations of the country dictated, they would receive the full support of Parliament and the nation. He added, that the ministry had taken steps in the previous week to convey to other powers in the clearest manner, though without adopting an offensive or menacing tone, what England believed to be right.

The speech of Lord Granville was received with cheers that testified to a feeling of relief, and when he had concluded, the unfavourable impression which had been produced by Mr. Gladstone's caution on the previous evening was removed. The country now felt it had reason to be satisfied, and waited patiently for the additional communications on the subject which were promised to Parliament as soon as diplomatic considerations would permit. This promise was redeemed on the following Monday (August 8), when statements were made by the ministerial leaders in both Houses. Earl Granville, in the Lords, said that from the first the government were determined to deal in no vague threats or indefinite menaces. At the Cabinet Council of July 30 he was authorized to write to the courts of France and Prussia in the same terms, *mutatis mutandis*, renewing the expressions of the satisfaction of the British government at the assurances given by the emperor and the king respectively, that they intended to respect the neutrality of Belgium. There could be no doubt, he said, as to the duty of both countries to maintain the obligations of the treaty into which they had thus entered with Great Britain and the other signataries; but he pointed out that the assurance was not complete, because each power made a reservation in case the neutrality of Belgium was violated by the other. In the event of a violation of the neutrality by Prussia, France was to be released from her obligation, and in the case of a similar event on the part of France, Prussia was to be released from hers. Her Majesty's government therefore proposed, either by treaty or otherwise, to place on solemn record the common determination of the great powers who were signataries to the treaty of 1839 to maintain the independence of Belgium, and satisfactory replies had been received from Austria and Russia. France also accepted the principle of the new treaty, and as regarded Prussia, Count von Bismarck was ready to concur in any measure for strengthening the neutrality of Belgium, and the king, as soon as he saw the draught treaty, authorized Count Bernstorff, the Prussian ambassador in London, to sign it. Lord Granville next described the treaty, which is given on page 214, and which, as will be seen, renewed all the obligations of the treaty of 1839. It provided that, if the armies of either belligerent violated the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain should co-operate with the other in its defence, but without engaging to take part in the general operations of the war. The other powers would pledge themselves to a corresponding co-operation, and the treaty was to hold good for twelve months after the war. The government had thus endeavoured clearly to announce their own determination in this matter without menace or offence to the two belligerents, with whom they were still in friendly alliance Expressing a hope that this treaty would remove the alarm which had been felt, while it would in no degree weaken the force or impair the obligations of the treaty of 1839, he said he trusted it would be seen that her Majesty's ministers had not been unmindful of their responsibilities with regard to this great and important question.

The duke of Richmond, the leader of the opposition, expressed a general approval of the attitude of the government, and a fervent hope that Great Britain might preserve her neutrality, and at the same time her honour inviolate during the war.

In the Commons a statement similar to that of Lord Granville was made by the Premier, and Mr. Disraeli, while guarding himself against giving any decided opinion on details so suddenly communicated to the House, expressed his belief that the determination at which he assumed the government to have arrived—to defend the neutrality and independence of Belgium—would give general satisfaction to the country. At the same time he doubted as a general principle the wisdom of founding any other engagements on the existing treaty of guarantee. Neither could he understand how, if England joined with one of the belligerents, her interference was to be limited to the defence of the Belgian frontier, nor how she was to avoid being involved in the general fortunes of the

war. Mr. Disraeli concluded by repeating his gratification at finding that the government had pursued a wise and spirited policy, and not the less wise because spirited; and to lay down as a general principle of statesmanship that England, though not merely an European but an Asiatic and Oceanic power, could not absolve herself of all interest in the peace and prosperity of the European states. The coast from Ostend to the North Sea, he held, should be in the possession of powers from whose ambition England and Europe had nothing to fear.

Parliament was prorogued on the following Wednesday (10th August), and in consequence of Lord Cairns' desire to express his opinion on the treaty, and to obtain a fuller and more detailed statement with respect to it, the House of Lords met at the unusual hour of twelve o'clock in the morning. Whilst expressing cordial approval of the object in view—the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium—Lord Cairns objected to the new engagement into which England had entered, as containing the seeds of considerable embarrassment and possible complication. The natural course would have been to announce to the two belligerents, but not by way of menace, that England was prepared to maintain the treaty of 1839, and to oppose any attempt by either or both to violate it. Russia and Austria ought to have been informed of these communications, in order that arrangements might be made for a united course of action in any contingency which might arise. Pointing out certain elements of danger in the treaty, he examined in turn the consequences of its violation by France or Prussia. It would be impossible to agree as to the particular operations which might justly be required of us, while if England joined any of the belligerents the other would necessarily declare war against her, and carry it on wherever she could be struck at and injured. It was the object of each belligerent to obtain the alliance and co-operation of England, and a skilful strategist might so arrange matters as to compel the other belligerent to violate the territory of Belgium. The engagement would be useless if both the belligerents violated the neutrality of Belgium, because there could then be no co-operation with England on the part of either. He also feared that the treaty might involve England in difficulties with Austria and Russia.

Lord Granville denied that the course taken by the government was either menacing or offensive, and argued that the plan proposed by Lord Cairns would not have been successful. The government had received from Austria the assurance of her readiness to adhere to their proposal, assuming that France and Prussia did not object to sign it. Russia sent her most friendly assurances, but declined to join the signataries, because she considered herself as already bound by the original treaty. She also desired an understanding of a much wider description, the effect of which would have been to bring England under obligations by which she was not at present bound. England having now entered upon the treaty was limited to its obligations. He did not believe the contingency contemplated would arise, but if it did England would be obliged to act upon it. It would, however, be an enormous advantage to have a power numbering its soldiers by hundreds of thousands co-operating with the British army and fleet. He repudiated as gratuitous the suspicion that such a piece of strategy as that suggested by Lord Cairns would be attempted, or that after the solemn renewal of this treaty obligation, binding on the personal honour of the emperor of the French and the king of Prussia, they would either of them, within a very few months and in the face of the world, violate such an engagement. While the treaty would, he believed, prevent a particular event which would be most disagreeable and entangling to Great Britain, he strongly denied that it would weaken the obligations of the treaty of 1839. Replying to the objection that the action of her Majesty's government had been disrespectful to Belgium, he stated that she had not been at first consulted in the matter because it was not desired to compromise her with either belligerent; but he officially informed the Belgian government of the negotiations when they had reached a certain point, assuring them that he wished to act in harmony with Belgium, and that England's sole object was the independence and neutrality of that country. These assurances were entirely satisfactory to the Belgian king and Chambers. So far as the treaty had gone, there was reason to believe that it would be the best means of preventing a great difficulty which had excited much alarm and anxiety both at home and abroad.

In reply to a question of Lord Cairns, as to what progress had been made with the treaty, and whether he could give the text, Lord Granville

said the treaty with Prussia was signed by Count Bernstorff and himself on the previous day. The French ambassador had authority to sign as soon as his full powers arrived. He then read the following draught of the treaty between England and Prussia, explaining that the treaty with France was, *mutatis mutandis*, identical with it:—

"DRAUGHT OF TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND

"PRUSSIA RESPECTING BELGIUM.

"Her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the king of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in the seventh article of the treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:—

"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.

"And his Majesty the king of Prussia, &c.

"Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:—

"Art. I. His Majesty the king of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France, her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with his Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with his Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

"It is clearly understood that her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium as defined in the treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

"Art. II. His Majesty the king of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing article, to co-operate with her Majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and the case arising, to concert with her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

"Art. III. This treaty shall be binding on the high contracting parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace concluded between those parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the 1st article of the Quintuple Treaty on the 19th of April, 1839.

"Art. IV. The present treaty shall be ratified, &c."

In the House of Commons, on the same day, the treaty was vigorously attacked by Mr. Bernal Osborne, who said he would prefer to have no treaty rather than the extraordinary document which had been laid on the table in so extraordinary a manner, and which he characterized as "a childish perpetration of diplomatic folly." It was not only superfluous, but it superseded the previous treaties; and if it had been submitted to the House he was confident it would have been unanimously rejected. He maintained, too, that England was bound to stand by Belgium, not only in honour but by interest, for her liberties and independence would not be safe for twenty-four hours if Belgium were in the hands of a hostile power.

Mr. Gladstone protested with all the emphasis at his command against Mr. Osborne's extravagant and exaggerated statement that the liberties of England would be gone if Belgium were in the

possession of a hostile power, and maintained that England's concern in the preservation of Belgian independence was substantially no greater than that of the other powers. The government had not been moved by any such selfish spirit, nor had they based their action solely on the guarantees to which an impracticably rigid significance had been attached, against which he felt himself bound to protest. Far wider and stronger than interest or guarantees was the consideration whether England could warrantably stand by and see a crime perpetrated by the absorption of Belgium, which would have been the knell of public right and public law in Europe. He dwelt, too, on the claims Belgium had on their friendship as a model for orderly government, combined with perfectly free institutions; and answering Mr. Osborne's criticisms, he maintained that the treaty of 1839 was not weakened nor superseded by this addition, and that the peculiar circumstances of the case justified this departure from general rules.

It will be seen from the events just narrated, that the uneasiness and excitement which had so universally prevailed on the first publication of the secret project, and the subsequent revelations made in connection with it, were finally allayed; and that the demand of the country that the defence of Belgium against foreign aggression should be again put forward as a cardinal principle of English policy, was complied with by the government in the manner they deemed best calculated to secure the end in view—although on that point much difference of opinion prevailed. The end, however, having been attained, people cared little about the particular means which had been employed to attain it; and when Parliament broke up the feeling of security which had been somewhat interrupted in the country had quite returned.

The publication of the statement of Count von Bismarck, that before the war of 1866 France had offered her alliance to Prussia, with a promise to declare war against Austria and to attack her with 300,000 men, provided that Prussia would consent to make certain territorial concessions to France on the left bank of the Rhine, had an immense influence in Austria, and put an end to all thought of a French alliance, which up to that time had been considered probable. As a suitable conclusion to this chapter, in which their names have figured so largely, we annex biographical notices of Count von Bismarck and M. Benedetti.

KARL OTTO, COUNT VON BISMARCK, whose name will always be identified with the great work of the unification of Germany, was born at Brandenburg, in 1813, or as some accounts affirm, on the 1st April, 1814. Although the period is comparatively short since his name has become generally familiar in England, he has shared about equally with Napoleon III., for several years, most of the attention bestowed by the readers of English newspapers on continental affairs. His earlier reputation as a Prussian politician is now lost in his renown as one of the greatest statesmen of Germany, and this which is his good fortune now will no doubt be his glory in after ages. His career divides itself naturally into two parts, answering to these two characters: what we may call a Prussian part, in which he figures principally as the most strenuous upholder of divine right in the Prussian monarchy: and a German part, in which his principal *role* is that of the great presiding genius of German unification. Descended from a noble and very ancient family, he was educated at the universities of Göttingen, Greifswalde, and Berlin, and apparently at first was destined for a military career, which he commenced in an infantry regiment as a volunteer, after which he attained the rank of a lieutenant in the landwehr. He became a member of the Diet of the province of Saxony in 1846; and the year following was elected a member of the German Diet, where his character and abilities soon attracted attention, and the reputation which he bore for some years afterwards was fixed by some of those paradoxical utterances in which his toryism and his wit found vent together, such as his reported saying that he wished that "all the large manufacturing and commercial towns, those centres of democracy and constitutionalism, could be abolished from the surface of the earth," so that a purely rural population might submissively obey the king's decrees. One of the earliest notices of his public life which have fallen under our notice, one written shortly after his first appearance in the Diet, speaks of him as, if not a deep political thinker, at any rate an expert debater, whose wit and irony were often displayed with trenchant effect. It would now have to be allowed, perhaps, that the irony and the wit of which he is master, have been often since used to further the plans of a deep enough thinker. In the revolutionary year, 1848, Bismarck was of course one of the most unpopular men in Germany; he was excluded from the

National Assembly of that year, but next year he took his seat in the Second Chamber, where he resumed his post of uncompromising opposition to the movements of the liberal party in Parliament. This, if it increased his unpopularity, also marked him out for royal favour. In 1851 he entered the diplomatic service as first secretary of legation to the Prussian embassy at Frankfort, a post which he exchanged after a few months for that of ambassador at the sittings of the Federal Bund. Bismarck's nomination to it was a decisive proof that he was already regarded by the king as his most able as well as most zealous servant. He showed himself worthy of this proof of confidence in his ability and his intentions. Count Rechberg was the representative of Austria at the Diet, and presided at its meetings. Austria, in Bismarck's opinion, was the power that Prussia had to withstand and outwit. Rechberg and Bismarck therefore had frequent encounters, in which the dignity of the one, it is said, suffered terribly from the witty sallies of the other. Till 1858 Bismarck was principally occupied in various places, and on various grounds, in this struggle with the representative of the Austrian empire. It is said that a pamphlet on "Prussia and the Italian question," which appeared in 1858, and which, referring to the ancient enmity between Austria and Prussia, recommended an alliance between France, Prussia, and Russia, was indited or inspired by him. Be this as it may, in the following year he went to St. Petersburg as ambassador, and there gained the friendship and confidence of Gortschakoff, and of his master the Czar, who conferred on him one of his orders of nobility. In the month of May of the same year he was transferred to the capital of France, to the court of the sovereign with whose history his own was afterwards to be mixed up in some of the most remarkable events of this century. He remained in Paris over two years; but in September, 1862, returned to Berlin to undertake the task of forming a new ministry, the previous cabinet having succumbed to adverse votes respecting their war budget. In the ministry which was thus formed by him he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs. The difficulties which in this position he had to face were not those of his own department. They were not of relations to foreign powers, but chiefly of the relations of the government to the representatives of the people. The policy of the administration, which was declared to be violently reactionary in all its tendencies, was especially obnoxious in respect to military re-organization. The Prussian Parliament then became for a period a scene of perpetual struggle of the fiercest description, in which, by large majorities, the deputies opposed the government at every important step. It is curious now, after the wars which Prussia has waged with Denmark, Austria, and France, and waged with such astonishing success, to remark that these fierce struggles were fiercest as to the army budget and military reforms; the administration contending for the extension of the period of compulsory service in the army, and the Chamber bitterly resisting that proposal. Bismarck, who has never been afraid of strong measures when they were required, finding the majorities in the Chamber thus unmanageable, closed the session. His administration, however, continued to be signalized by the same parliamentary scenes which marked its commencement. His policy in respect to Poland was severely blamed; by a majority of 246 to 46 votes he was severely censured for entering into a secret treaty with Russia, having reference to Polish affairs. In 1865–66 the relations of the administration to the Chamber were at the worst. Unable to govern Parliament, the executive governed without Parliament altogether. Stormy debates constantly occurred; there were memorable oratorical encounters between Bismarck and Virschow, but the result, practically, was that military organization, the premier's great project, was proceeded with according to his wish; and several sessions of Parliament were closed or dissolved like that of 1862, by royal decree, and without the sanction of the Chamber. During this period restrictions were laid upon the press, and in several instances opposition journals were subjected to penalties. What the result of all this might have been, had there been nothing to distract attention from home affairs, it would be difficult to say; but the death of the king of Denmark having re-opened the Schleswig-Holstein question, an opportunity was afforded to the administration of exhibiting in actual war the soundness of their policy of military re-organization; and though this did not avail to reconcile to them the majority of the Chamber, or put a stop to parliamentary recriminations, it materially helped to avert a serious crisis in the relations between the two parties, until a much larger question than that of the duchies began to occupy public attention.

Engraved by W. Ho[illegible] from a Photograph

and to divert it from home to foreign affairs. This larger question was that of war with Prussia's great rival in the struggle for the leadership of the German empire. The history of this question has been already related in the first part of this work, and need not here be recapitulated, especially as almost every one is familiar with the leading incidents of the period which intervened between the disputes of Austria and Prussia touching the duchies of the Elbe at the beginning of 1866, and the third day of July in that year, memorable in the history of Germany as the day of the battle of Königgrätz, and that which finally determined not so much the ascendancy of one German power over the rest, as the union of all in one great empire. Just before the declaration of war against Austria an attempt was made upon the life of Bismarck. An assassin named Blind fired four times from a pistol at the minister, who however, was only slightly wounded. Bismarck, whose courage and coolness have been tested in various ways, and have seldom failed, himself arrested the criminal. In the year following the conclusion of the war with Austria he had advanced his great project another stage. The North German Confederation was formed—by far the most important political work of this century, yet far more than otherwise the work of one single man. The first chancellor of the Confederation could be no other than Count von Bismarck, who was appointed to that office at the first meeting of the Federal Council. At this point the character of Prussian politician, which he has maintained hitherto, merges in that of the greatest of the living statesmen of Germany. The popularity which in the one character he has despised, now of course pursues him in the other. In the dispute with France respecting the Luxemburg frontier, which followed the Austrian campaign, and which threatened to embroil Europe in war, Bismarck of course played an important part. At the beginning of 1868 he was obliged, on account of his health, which was very seriously impaired, to retire temporarily from public life. His retirement, it was expected, would be lengthy, but it proved to be short. In October he was again at his post in Berlin, and occupying himself as energetically and as ably as ever, in pushing forward the confederation of the various states of the empire. His difficulties in this work were destined to be largely removed by an event, the end of which and the consequences of which it is difficult to foresee. What was needed to do in a day in respect to that work which it would still have taken years to accomplish, was a declaration of war against Prussia, the head of the German Confederation, by some rival power. That declaration of war was made by France in the month of July; and since then Bismarck, whose life has alternated between the camp and the court, has followed the fortunes of the German army in its campaign on the soil of France.

In 1865 Bismarck was promoted to the rank of count. After Königgrätz he was gazetted a general. His great distinction is that, beginning public life as a Prussian, he has made himself at length the representative of Germany. His personal character and manners are well defined and well known. His imperious earnestness and vehemence in public life contrast wonderfully, and yet agree, with his genial humour and merry wit and perfect unaffectedness in private. Not only the stories which are constantly told of him, but letters which he has allowed to be published, exhibit the great statesman of Germany as, in private life, a brilliant ornament of society.

M. Vincent Benedetti is of Italian extraction, and was born in Corsica about 1815. He was educated for the consular and diplomatic service, and began his career in 1848 as consul at Palermo. From this post he was subsequently advanced to that of first secretary of the embassy at Constantinople. In May, 1859, he was offered, in succession to M. Bourrée, the post of envoy extraordinary at Teheran, but he declined to accept that mission, and was shortly afterwards nominated director of political affairs to the foreign minister, and it was in this capacity that he acted as editor of the protocols in the Congress of Paris in 1856, and as secretary to those ministers who drew them up. In 1861, when the French emperor recognized the newly-established kingdom of Italy, M. Benedetti was appointed minister plenipotentiary from his country at Turin, but resigned that post in the autumn of 1864, upon the retirement of M. Thouvenel from the ministry of Foreign Affairs. On November 27 of that year he was appointed to the post of French ambassador at Berlin, a position in which he remained until the outbreak of the war. He was made a chevalier of the legion of honour as far back as June, 1845, and after passing through the intermediate stages of promotion, he was nominated a grand officer in June, 1860.

CHAPTER IV.

Necessity of understanding the Military Organization and Strength of each Combatant—Foundation of Prussia by the "Great Elector"—Its rapid extension—Frederick William I.'s singular passion for Tall Soldiers—His able Military Administration—First Successes of his son, Frederick the Great—The perfection to which he brought his Army—The Seven Years' War against the united forces of Russia, Saxony, Sweden, France, Austria, and the small German States—Its varying results and the state of Prussia at its close—She is admitted as the Rival of Austria for the leadership of Germany—Frederick's Bloodless Campaign, known as the "Potato War"—Policy of his nephew, Frederick William II.—Prussia's share in the spoliation of Poland—The French Revolution opposed by Prussia—Alliance with Austria—War declared against France—Complete failure of the Expedition, and the French frontier advanced to the Rhine—Humiliated and demoralized position of the Prussian Army—Popular fury against Napoleon for forcing a passage through their country, in spite of its neutrality—The King appeased with the bribe of Hanover—Battle of Austerlitz and humiliation of Austria—Insults offered to Prussia by Napoleon—Determination of the people to endure it no longer without a struggle—Battle of Jena and complete defeat of Prussia—The country overrun by French troops, and the King made little better than a vassal of France—Appearance of the great statesmen Stein and Scharnhorst on the scene—Foundation of the present Military System of Prussia with the approval of the whole Nation—Its fundamental principles, and the composition and numbers of the Army and Reserves under it—The Landwehr called out in 1830—The military spirit of the people found to have considerably evaporated—Further defects of the System discovered in 1848, 1850, 1854, and 1859—Material alterations and increase in the numbers of the Army made in 1860—Remonstrances on the part of the House of Deputies useless—Reasons for the alterations and additions—Extension of the term of service—Increased security conferred on the rest of the population—The great advantages of the New System shown in the War of 1866—Extension of the Prussian system to the whole of the North German Confederation in 1867—Present number of the Armies of the Confederation, and of the South German States—Divisions of the Armies in time of War, and their composition—Difference in the numbers of the Armies on paper and those actually engaged on the Field of Battle explained—The requirements of an Army on a Campaign—Extraordinary elasticity of the system proved in 1866 and 1870—The details of it easy enough to be universally understood—Steps taken when the Army is Mobilized, and the rapidity with which they can be executed—The equipment of the different arms of the service after Mobilization—Detailed description of the Prussian organization for insuring regular Supplies to the Army, attending to the Diseased and Wounded, and maintaining the number of Combatants at their full strength during the progress of hostilities—A defect in the Prussian system in the formation of garrison troops—The difficulty of insuring proper Supplies for an Army—Admirable provisions of the Prussian system in this respect, and its great success in the War—The Prussian hospital trains—The employment of Spies—Reconnoitring Parties—Field Signals and Telegraphs—Great ability of the Prussian officers—Peculiarities of the system for obtaining them—Necessity of a previous training in the ranks—Severity of their examinations—The *esprit de corps* which pervades the whole body, but strong development of class spirit—Special examination for the Artillery and Engineer officers—Admirable system of officering the Landwehr—Re-enlistment of men not much encouraged in the Prussian Army—All ordinary Government Appointments reserved for Non-commissioned Officers after they have served twelve years—Frequent alterations in Prussian tactics—The plan adopted by them at present—Salutary effects of the Military Training on the Prussian population—Economy of the Prussian system—The strain on the Resources of the Country if the Campaign is prolonged—Certainty of any War undertaken by Prussia being a national one—The Prussian Artillery—Description of Krupp's Monster Gun—Description of the Needle-gun—The Prussian Navy.

In order to estimate correctly the position and resources of both Prussia and France, it is necessary, before entering upon the detailed record of the deadly struggle in which they engaged, that we should put before the reader a statement of their military growth, their most recently invented weapons, the constitution and strength of their respective armies, and the methods adopted in each country to recruit them.

The "Great Elector," Frederick William, may be regarded as the founder of the present grandeur of the Prussian throne. Under his able rule, from 1640 to 1688, the whole strength of Brandenburg and Prussia was directed to securing the acknowledgment of the independence of the latter dukedom, originally held separately as a fief from Poland. His success in this enterprise was soon followed by claims on Juliers, Cleves, and Berg, skilfully urged by the pen, and boldly supported by the sword; and the limits of the dominions handed to his son were thus extended from the Oder to the Rhine. Lower Pomerania had been among the additions gained by the treaty of Westphalia, and Frederick William used the opening it afforded to the Baltic, to lay the foundation of the navy, which Prussia's statesmen even thus early regarded as essential to support her claim to a distinguished place among the great European powers. The same policy, rather than any love for Austria or hatred of the Turk, led to the despatch of a contingent to the relief of Vienna, when threatened by the Sultan in 1683.

Under his successor, grandfather of the Great Frederick, and first king, the Prussian troops were in constant service as allies of Austria in her Turkish and French wars; and various small prin-

cipalities, obtained as reward or purchased, swelled his now extensive though scattered dominions. He was succeeded in 1713 by his son, Frederick William I., whose habits were entirely military, and whose constant care was to establish the strictest discipline among his troops. He had such a ridiculous fondness for tall soldiers, that in order to fill the ranks of his favourite regiment, he would use force or fraud, if money would not effect his object, in order to obtain the tallest men in Europe. Indulging freely this singular passion, the father of Frederick the Great was in all else economical to parsimony; and without straining the resources of his five millions of subjects, he left his son an abundant treasury, and the most efficient army in Europe, to be at once the temptation and the instrument for continuing the family policy. The most important measure which Frederick William I. adopted in the military organization of Prussia, was one in which we may clearly trace the origin of her present formidable system of recruiting. In 1733, seven years before his death, the whole of his territories were parcelled out by decree into cantons, to each of which was allotted a regiment, whose effective strength was to be maintained from within its limits; and all subjects, beneath the rank of noble, were held bound to serve if required. With this ready instrument for supplying the losses of a war, and with an army of 66,000 men, more splendidly equipped and trained than any other of the time, his son, then known as Frederick II., stepped into the field of European politics.

Surpassing his predecessors no less in the scope of his policy than in ability for carrying it out, the new sovereign's ambition was favoured by the stormy times in which he came to the throne. His first success in the seizure of Silesia only fanned his aspirations for further conquest, and he strove next to extend Prussian rule beyond the newly-gained mountain frontier into the northern districts of Bohemia, where his successor's arms in 1866 afterwards met with such signal fortune. On this occasion, however, his strength proved unequal to the new task of spoliation. The king was fairly worsted, and forced out of Bohemia by Daun and Prince Charles of Lorraine; and although the ready tactics of Hohenfriedberg and Sohr proved his increasing dexterity in handling the machine-like army he had trained, he was soon glad to come to terms, and to resign his audacious attempt to aggrandize Prussia upon condition that she retained her late acquisitions.

During the ten years of comparative tranquillity that followed, Frederick employed himself in bringing his troops into a state of discipline never before equalled in any age or country, with the view of concentrating his whole resources on the deadly struggle, not far distant, whose issue, as he foresaw, would be all-important to his dynasty.

Secret information of an alliance between Austria, Russia, and Saxony, gave Frederick reason to fear an attack, which he hastened to anticipate by the invasion of Saxony in 1756. This commenced the Seven Years' War, in which he contended, almost single-handed, against the united forces of Russia, Saxony, Sweden, France, Austria, and the great majority of the other German states. Various were the changes of fortune that befel him during the next six years, success alternating from one side to the other. The glories of Rosbach, Prague, and Leuthen were overshadowed by the disasters of Kollin, Hochkirch, and Kunersdorf. Frederick himself at times seemed to despair of any issue but death for himself and dissolution for his realm. Yet his boldness as a general and readiness as a tactician remained undiminished by defeat, failure, or depression. These qualities, with the excellent training of his troops, his good fortune in possessing the two finest cavalry officers a single army has ever known, and the moral and material support consistently given by England, sufficed to save the struggling kingdom from the ruin that so often, during this tremendous struggle, seemed inevitable. What Prussia suffered whilst it lasted may be conjectured from a few words occurring in the king's own correspondence. On this subject he, of all men, would be little likely to exaggerate. He says, "The peace awakens universal joy. For my own part, being but a poor old man, I return to a city where I now know nothing but the walls; where I cannot find again the friends I once had; where unmeasured toils await me; and where I must soon lay me down to rest in that place in which there is no more unquiet, nor war, nor misery, nor man's deceit." After all his many vicissitudes of fortune, however, the king was left in 1763 in the peaceful possession of his paternal and acquired dominions; the position of his country was assured, and the policy steadily pursued for three successive generations had attained

its first great aim. The principality, raised out of obscurity by the Great Elector, and made a kingdom by his son, was henceforth to hold a solid position as one of the first powers of Europe, and the admitted rival of Austria for the leadership of Germany. Her land had indeed a long rest after the great strife for existence; but Frederick, whilst watching diligently over its internal improvement, took care to insure its independent position by refilling as soon as possible the gaps in his army. The standing forces which he maintained and handed over to his successor were scarcely inferior in strength to those which Prussia, with more than three times his resources, kept in pay before the war of 1866; and the greatness of the burden thus imposed is better understood when it is known that the three per cent. of the population which, under Frederick, were actively kept in arms, supply under the present system the whole peace army, the landwehr of the first call, and most of those of the second.

The only other military enterprise of any pretensions undertaken by Frederick was a campaign against Austria, distinguished by its marked difference of character from the somewhat reckless strategy for which he had been famed, and the striking parallel which its opening afforded to that of the great war of 1866; for its scene lay on the very ground where Benedek was afterwards called to oppose another Prussian invasion of Bohemia. The great general's conduct, however, was here in truth very different from that of the Frederick of twenty years before, and we can only account for it by admitting either that his intellect and daring were dulled by coming infirmity, or by supposing that he believed the objects of the campaign could be fully attained without the risk and bloodshed of a great battle. Certain it is, that in this the closing military adventure of his life, he appeared as though utterly foiled by the adversaries he had so often in earlier days worsted in fair field. Frederick, however, if losing some of his military prestige in the bloodless campaign (known familiarly as the "Potato War") of his old age, found sufficient consolation in its political results, and the admission practically made by Austria that her imperial position had sunk to the mere presidency of a confederation. Henceforth, there was recognized in Prussia a power whose consent was a first condition for any action of Austria within the Germanic empire; a power to whom every element hostile to the Kaiser would rally, should the constant rivalry for the control of Germany break out into open hostility.

The military force so ably used by Frederick in enlarging the influence of Prussia at the expense of Austria, was for some years employed with scarcely inferior success in other quarters by his nephew and successor, Frederick William II. Interfering in the civil war in Holland (1787), the well-drilled Prussian battalions without difficulty put down the popular party, and restored the Stadtholder to his shaken seat; and the king had the double satisfaction of increasing the moral weight of his influence in Europe, and of asserting that principle of divine right, to him no less dear than to the first monarch of the line, or to their present representative. A more material gain was that achieved under the guidance of his unscrupulous minister, Herzberg, at the second partition of Poland, when Dantzic and Thorn, districts long coveted as including the mouths of the Vistula, were obtained as the price of Prussia's complicity in a spoliation carried out with an amount of diplomatic fraud even greater than that in which Frederick had shared.

The intervention of Prussia in the affairs of Holland had not long ceased to excite attention, and the final partition of Poland was still unaccomplished, when that mighty storm arose in the west which was destined for a time to extinguish the rivalries and animosities of German powers in their general humiliation, and to school them by common sufferings, by common hatred and fear of a foreign foe, into the union which was only dissolved by the outbreak of 1866. Austria was to be laid prostrate by republican armies, Prussia to be humbled in the dust, and for years to bear the chain of the victor. A new general was to eclipse the achievements of Frederick, and a bolder and more unscrupulous diplomacy than the Great Elector's was to change the whole map of Europe, and remove her most ancient landmarks. The French Revolution and Napoleon came; and the march of Prussian progress was arrested until the overthrow of the latter at Waterloo.

Prussia hesitated considerably before showing any practical opposition to the proceedings of the Republic, and not until the sacred rights of kings were attacked in the person of Louis XVI., after his flight to Varennes, did Frederick William move

to the rescue. By the treaty of Pillnitz (August, 1791) he then entered into an alliance with Austria for an armed intervention on behalf of the French sovereign, and with a force mainly composed of Prussian battalions, under the duke of Brunswick, entered Champagne in 1792, having first issued a boastful proclamation against the Revolution and its abettors. Relying too much on the promised support with which they nowhere met, the Prussian staff threw aside the prudent, but cumbrous, arrangements of magazines by which Frederick had always prepared for his offensive movements; and their troops, plunging into an inhospitable district in unusually bad weather, perished by the thousand for lack of supplies. The sickness that ensued, and the unexplained vacillation of the king or of the duke of Brunswick at Valmy, proved the ruin of the expedition, and the turning point of the revolutionary war. Thenceforth the republican armies grew in *morale* as rapidly as in numbers, and a system of tactics destined to replace that which Frederick had bequeathed to Europe, was initiated by the revolutionary generals, and brought to its perfection under Napoleon's master hand, to overthrow the troops of each great power in turn. The failure of the Prussians in their campaign was as great a surprise to Europe in 1792, as the sudden collapse of the Austrian army in 1866, or that of France in 1870. The disasters proved a powerful motive for Frederick William's withdrawal from a struggle in which there was nothing for Prussia to gain, but which had brought a victorious enemy to the borders of her own western provinces. The treaty of Basle soon followed, and Europe saw with dismay the great German power, whose arms, forty years before, had defied France, though leagued with half the Continent, admitting the claim of the aggressive Republic to advance her frontier to the Rhine.

The conduct of the war that Prussia thus relinquished had dimmed her former fame no less than the peace that closed it; yet no administrator rose at this time competent to point out the causes of the ill success which, save in the desultory but brilliant skirmishes conducted by Colonel Blucher and his cavalry, had invariably attended her arms. The activity of this daring trooper was, however, exceptional, and the chief commanders illustrated every degree of military imbecility, while their troops retained only the drill of the battalions of Frederick, and exhibited nothing of their heroic spirit. In spite of the severe system of conscription by districts, enforced by every penalty which the law could employ, a trade in permits for absence had long been established as a perquisite of the captains. Those who could pay well for the exemption were thus allowed to escape the allotted service, the bribes received being partly put in the pockets of the recipients and partly used to attract an inferior class of recruits to the ranks of an army which an iron discipline, maintained in every detail, made thoroughly distasteful in time of peace. Composed thus of indifferent material, brought together by a system of corruption, the companies were as ill-led as they were badly composed, and the army which had once been acknowledged the first in Europe, was now inferior to others in fitness for the field. It was specially ill-suited to meet the growing enthusiasm of the French soldiery, whose ardour, springing from political fanaticism, was sustained through the sternest trials by the hope of professional advancement.

Frederick William III., who succeeded in 1797 to the throne, continued for nearly ten years the neutral policy inaugurated by his father. The indignity, however, which Napoleon inflicted upon Prussia by forcing a passage through the country on his way to Ulm and Austerlitz, excited such a fever of popular fury through the kingdom as shook the royal power, and showed alike the antipathy of the whole German race to the progress of French influence within the empire, and the necessity which thenceforth lay upon the king to adopt a policy more conformable to the wishes of his subjects. To incur the active hostility of Prussia, besides that of Russia and Austria, was what Napoleon was just now anxious to avoid, and he watched with some uneasiness the feeling gathering against him. The entreaties of queen, ministers, and people, had well-nigh swept away the vacillation of the king, and war was to be declared by Prussia on December 15 against the French emperor. At this crisis Napoleon, feigning reconciliation and friendship, adroitly offered a bribe, the temptation of which proved irresistible; and on the very day on which war was to have been declared, Frederick William accepted at the hand of the crafty emperor the coveted gift of Hanover, which now, more honestly won, extends the limits of the once petty margraviate from Russia to the German Ocean.

Austria, meantime, unaided by Prussia, had encountered Napoleon at Austerlitz, and was now writhing under the humiliation of a crushing defeat. The degrading acquisition of territory which Prussia had made was not long destined, however, to reward its public treachery. The bribes of Napoleon Frederick William found to be no free gifts. Bavaria was enlarged at the expense of his kingdom. Cleves and Berg were surrendered to provide the despot's brother-in-law with a new duchy, and fresh insults followed with contemptuous rapidity. From the rank of a great power Prussia found herself suddenly fallen to the condition of a French dependency, and her monarch treated as the French emperor's vassal. Yet she had attempted no struggle and suffered no defeat; had looked on unscathed whilst her neighbours bled; and now, waiting for their loss to make her gain, found herself isolated, exposed, and humbled without pity—a warning for all time to statesmen who make a traffic of neutrality. If the court could endure this, the people could not. Alike the noble, the burgher, and the peasant felt a warlike fever fire their veins, and that tempest of passion swept over the nation, which is to individual fury as the trampling of a multitude to the footfall of a man. Without counting the cost or measuring the odds—without waiting for the aid of Russia, still hostile to Frauce—Frederick William was forced into the struggle he dreaded, and Prussia, single-handed, faced Napoleon and his vassals. Planted already by Bavarian permission within easy distance of the chief strategic points; armed with the might of superior numbers, long training, and accumulated victory; led by a chief whose bold strategy had not yet degenerated into limitless waste of men's lives; the French poured up on the flank exposed by the rash and ill-considered advance of their enemy. Jena was fought and won by the French almost within sight of the little hill of Rosbach, which had given name to their defeat half a century before, and that signal victory was avenged tenfold by the battle which laid Prussia prostrate at the conqueror's feet.

With a rapidity of which even Napoleon's troops were scarcely thought capable, the kingdom was overrun, the remains of its army annihilated, and its cities occupied. The hollowness of its military condition was manifested alike by the evil condition of its fortresses and the overthrow of its columns. Blucher, indeed, fought fiercely to the last; but with this, and two other less noted exceptions to the shameful imbecility of the commanders, generals and governors seemed to vie with each other in surrendering their posts with the least effort at resistance. Reduced, however, as Frederick William was, to a single city and a few square miles of territory, he refused to submit to the harsh terms required of him, until the disaster of Friedland, and the subsequent retreat of the allies, compelled that abandonment of his unhappy kingdom which was one of the conditions imposed by the conqueror when he met Alexander at Tilsit.

No need is there for us to repeat the fatal story of Jena and of Friedland. The bitter lesson taught the nation then has stamped itself ever since upon the national armament, and Prussian administrators strive now as earnestly to be in advance of all Europe in warlike knowledge, as they then clung warmly to the traditions of obsolete tactics which all Europe but themselves had abandoned. But the penalty of truckling policy and pedantic manœuvring was undergone; and for the next six years the kingdom suffered such humiliation as no other civilized country in modern years has endured. French soldiers swaggered on the pavements of the garrisons. French officers forbade the concert-room its national airs. French generals lived at free quarters in the pleasant squires' houses, which even the all-pervading rapacity of Tilly's and Wallenstein's hordes had not always reached. French battalions lay scattered in the secluded villages, and roused a jealous demon in the dullest Hans whose sweatheart was exposed to the audacious attentions of wandering chasseurs. French *douaniers* checked and controlled and took bribes for the little trade which the long maritime war had spared. And all these intruders were to be maintained at the expense of the quiet orderly land of which they seemed to have taken permanent possession. The Prussian army seemed to have disappeared, so diminished were its numbers. The enslaved monarchy was guarded by the ablest and most feared of the rough soldiers, whom the long course of French victories had brought to eminence; and Davoust headed a garrison so large and highly organized, that even warm patriots shrank from a hopeless contest with its strength. The history of that sad time, with all the irritating details of the French occupation, is written in the municipal records of every Prussian town, in village legend, in popular romance.

The burden is always the same: French insults endured in the hope of revenge to come; ardent longing for the day of freedom; tears for the fate of brave Major Schill, warrior of the true heroic type, who, unable to bear longer his country's shame, rode forth one morning at the head of such of his men as would follow him, to declare war single-handed with oppression, and give his life freely in a conflict without hope. Multiply the story of one village by a thousand, the indignation of one citizen by millions, and it will be seen that each day of the French occupation served to give strength and depth to the growing hatred which henceforth must burn in every Prussian breast, and in due time burst forth in furious action.

No doubt the confidence which Bohemian victories gave the nation in its arms has much to do with the readiness for a struggle on the Rhine which Prussia has since displayed. No doubt the vague desire for German unity has been strengthened into passionate longing since Austria has ceased to bar the way. But the ancient loathing of French rule, the ancient detestation of French interference, the deep memory of the time when a Napoleon was indeed "the Scourge of the Fatherland," was all that was needed to touch the heart of the nation with that fire which we have watched this summer so fiercely blaze forth into action.

Stripped of half her territory, the rest a mere field for French tax-gatherers, or exercise-ground for French troops, the policy of Prussia for the six years succeeding Jena seemed to consist but in different degrees of servility to the master whose chains she had no power to shake off. Her revenues were swallowed up by foreign exactions, her army reduced to a mere corps by the decree of Napoleon, and her means of rising against the oppressor seemed hopelessly gone. But whilst despised by both foe and ally, Prussia had yet within her the elements of self-purification. The hard school of humiliation did not break her spirit, nor turn her statesmen aside from the deliberate endeavour to retrieve the past. Frederick William was happy in his counsellors, for there were those among them who never lost sight of the past greatness of their country, and in her hours of deepest darkness strove to fit her for a better destiny than that of a vassal province. Stein, her great minister, laboured indefatigably to prepare her recovery, by raising the legal condition of her peasantry, and breathing into them the spirit of patriotism through measures of domestic reform. Scharnhorst gave no less efficient aid by devising that system of short service in the regular army, on which the existing organization rests. By Napoleon's decree the standing army was not to exceed 40,000 men; but no restriction was named as to the time the men should serve. By Scharnhorst's plan the actual time of service was limited to six months, with frequent calls of recruits succeeding each other in the ranks, and thence returning home to be embodied in the militia, so as to spread through the suffering nation a general knowledge of arms against the day of need. The laws of promotion were modified, and many of the exemptions from military service abolished; to each company was allotted twice the necessary number of officers; and the disbanded men assembled from time to time in their cantons, and were provided with arms, stores, and clothing from the depôts disseminated over the country.

The immediate result of Stein's reforms was a vast increase of national spirit and strength. The military service of the country was accepted by all without reluctance, in tacit preparation for the day of reckoning with France; and the struggle of 1814 once over, the minister was encouraged by every class to elaborate a complete project for the perpetuation of the system which had restored glory and freedom to Prussia. The foundation of the permanent constitution of the national force was laid by the remarkable law of September 3, 1814—which for more than forty years was the charter adhered to by government and people as binding on both sides, and which in its introduction is declared to be the issue of the wishes of the whole nation—and in the landwehr ordinance of 21st November, 1815.

"In a lawfully administered armament of the country lies the best security of lasting peace." Such is the principle proclaimed as its groundwork, together with the more immediate necessity of maintaining intact by the general exertions the freedom and honourable condition which Prussia had just won. All former exemptions from service in favour of the noblesse were from this time abrogated. Every native of the state, on completing his twentieth year, was to be held as bound to form part of her defensive power; but, with a view to the avoiding inconvenient pressure on the professional and industrial population, the armed force was to be composed of sections whose service

should lessen in severity as their years advanced. The whole system comprised, 1st, a standing army, the annual contingent of recruits to which was laid down at 40,000 men, who were to form the nucleus of the regular army of 140,000; 2nd, a landwehr of the first call; 3rd, a landwehr of the second call; and 4th, the landsturm.

The standing army was to be composed of volunteers willing to undergo the necessary examinations for promotion, with a view to the adoption of a regular military career; of men voluntarily enlisting without being prepared for such examination; and of a sufficient number of the youth of the nation called out from their twentieth to their twenty-fifth year—the first three years to be spent by these latter actually with the colours; the other two as "reserved" recruits, remaining at home, but ready to join the ranks at the first sound of war.

The landwehr of the first call, composed of men from twenty-five to thirty-two who had passed through the regular army and reserve, was designed for the support of the standing army in case of war, and was liable to serve at home or abroad, though in peace only to be called out for such exercise as is necessary for training and practice.

The landwehr of the second call was intended in case of war for garrison duty, or in special need, to be used in its entirety either for corps of occupation or reinforcements to the army. It consisted of all who had left the army and the first call. The drill of the second call was in time of peace only for single days, and in their own neighbourhood.

The landsturm was to be called out only in provinces of the kingdom actually invaded, and then must be summoned by a special royal decree. It included all the men up to the fiftieth year who were not regularly allotted to the army or landwehr; of all who had completed their landwehr service; and of all the youth able to carry arms who had attained their seventeenth year. It consisted of civic and local companies in the towns, villages, and open country, according to the divisions of the districts for other governmental purposes. No provision, however, was made for the exercise of these companies, which have, in fact, existed only on paper.*

* In the preceding historical sketch, as well as in the similar portion of the following chapter on the military system of France, we have been considerably indebted to a very able work by Colonel Chesney and Mr. Henry Reeve, on "The Military Resources of Prussia and France" (London, Longman & Co., 1870).

From what we have just said it will be seen that by the law of 1814 every Prussian subject capable of carrying arms was called upon to serve from the age of twenty to twenty-three in the active army; from twenty-three to twenty-five in the reserve; from twenty-five to thirty-two in the first call of the landwehr; and from thirty-two to thirty-nine in the second—the landsturm comprehending all citizens from the age of seventeen to forty-nine who were not incorporated in the army or landwehr. The Prussian forces were therefore composed in the following manner:—1st. The standing army in time of peace, 140,000; and by the embodiment of the reserve on a war footing, of 220,000. 2nd. The first call of the landwehr, infantry and cavalry, numbering in time of war 150,000. 3rd. The second call of the landwehr, numbering 110,000. If we add to these figures the 50,000 men capable of being recruited by the anticipation of their time of service, we attain a total of 530,000, of which 340,000 composed the armies in the field, and the rest the depôts and garrisons. Only a quarter of these forces were maintained by the state in time of peace.

Such was the achievement of Scharnhorst, and of those patriots whom yet Prussia remembers with gratitude. The organization subsisted, almost without modification, during the two reigns of Frederick William III. and of his son, Frederick William IV., brother of the reigning king. During many years no occasion arose to consecrate on the field the system initiated in 1813. While Prussia seemed for ever condemned to inaction, Russia was skirmishing in the Caucasus, Austria was kept in arms by her Italian difficulties, and France had ever in Algeria a school of war in which to form her officers and prove her troops. It was feared that time had in a great measure deadened the spirit of 1813, and that the enforced military service had become odious to the people. In 1830, under the influence of a strong popular emotion, the Prussian government called out a part of the landwehr, and the result undeniably showed that the enthusiasm kindled by the War of Independence had considerably evaporated. Nevertheless, it was judged dangerous to modify the existing system, since it contained the essential germ of an ideal army: obligatory service. In 1848, in 1850, in 1854, and in 1859, the landwehr was again embodied; and though no hostilities followed to test the system by the stern proofs of war, the

government found it unready for action, and ill suited to the needs of a bold policy. On each occasion it was observed that the tactical combination of elements so differently constituted worked badly in practice. The landwehr officers showed a keen jealousy of the assumed superiority, both of their comrades of the line and of the staff, who controlled the whole. Educated in a thoroughly military course; possessed generally of more means than the regulars; and commanding soldiers as good, at the least, as the recruits under the latter; endowed, moreover, constitutionally, with a sort of military equality, they manifested an unmistakable impatience in appearing in the field to support a policy which, in two instances at least, was not heartily favoured by the sympathies of the nation.

The royal government saw clearly enough that an army thus composed could not be relied upon for accomplishing the vast scheme of German supremacy, bequeathed by the Great Elector as his hereditary legacy to the Hohenzollerns. The decrees of November, 1850, and of April, 1852, aimed at remedying these evils. The formation of the army was materially altered. Infantry brigades were thenceforward to be composed of two regiments of the line and one corresponding body of landwehr. In March, 1853, a ministerial order completed this amelioration, and the arrangement was highly effective in amalgamating the two elements which composed the national forces. These alterations, however, were trifling compared to the measures of 1860, in which year the national forces underwent, at the mere will of the executive, a change, in regard to numbers, as great as any ever wrought by republican vote or imperial decree; and notwithstanding six years of firm remonstrance on the part of the House of Deputies, the new system was maintained in every detail until the long-prepared-for war came to justify its authors in the eyes of the nation. At one stroke the annual supply of recruits actually drafted into the line was raised from 40,000 to 63,000. The standing army was augmented by 117 infantry battalions, 10 regiments of cavalry, 31 companies of artillery, 18 of engineers, and 9 battalions of train for the hitherto insufficient transport departments.

The authors of the re-organization took for the starting-point of their calculations the fact that the resources of the country in point of population and revenue had so increased since 1815 that the army was no longer in proportion with them. When the fundamental law of 1814 first took effect, a call to arms was made of $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of the population; and though the standing army was now augmented from 140,000 to 217,000, the proportion still remained below $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., so rapid had been the increase of population. The pecuniary sacrifices were also relatively much inferior to those accepted without a murmur in 1814. At that epoch, in spite of the impoverished condition of the nation, the army of 140,000 cost 35 per cent. of the state receipts. On the eve of the Austrian war, the army of 217,000 then absorbed but 29 per cent. of the budget of receipts. It will be thus seen that the augmentation of the active army in 1860 was consistent with the spirit and letter of the law of September, 1814. But the king's object was not only to multiply the numerical force of the army in proportion to the growth of population, but to give that army a permanent consistency that should abrogate the necessity of drawing able-bodied men from "the people under arms," and thus relieve the country from the indisputable evils attendant upon the landwehr system pure and simple.

The most serious innovation of 1860 remains to be noticed. It will be remembered that, under the law of 1814, the recruit owed the state three years of active and continual service, and two years of service in the reserve. The re-organization decree of 1860 prolonged the service in the reserve to four years. The increase of taxation thus caused, and the prolongation of military service, were amply compensated, however, by the security conferred upon the rest of the population. Under the old system the army could only be placed on a war footing by drafting into it large bodies of the landwehr. It is easy to understand the constant perturbation and anxiety the possibility of such an event created among the people. The line of policy that led Prussia into the war of 1866 might not have possessed the suffrage and consent of the whole nation; but the discontent would have been immeasurably more open and serious had the 610,000 men that expressed the strength of the Prussian army in July, 1866, been obtained principally by means of the landwehr. The actual means employed were found to be less costly than the former system. Even a partial mobilization entailed enormous expense, each commune having to be in-

demnified for its relief of the families left destitute by the departure of the male members. Statistics prove that the cost of each soldier was considerably lessened by the re-organization. In 1820 a soldier cost annually 211 thalers; in 1830 the expense had fallen to 177 thalers; during the mobilization that took place in 1859, the cost reached 214 thalers. After the re-organization it was rated at 196 thalers. Though the Schleswig campaign was undertaken in the winter of 1864, it was not found needful to call upon any part of the landwehr, or indeed to mobilize all the standing army corps. In 1866, however, under the pressure of a heavier strain, Prussia was obliged to have recourse to the landwehr, and the great advantages of the system were then fully demonstrated. The number of men from the landwehr incorporated in the army of 610,000, at the disposition of the Prussian government in 1866, was estimated at 191,500; but of the 261,000 combatants who took part in the battles of Turnau, Münchengrätz, Trautenau, Skaliz, Nachod, Gitchin, and Sadowa, only 27,000 had been summoned from it. How completely the victories of that year swept away all opposition to the Bismarck régime and the royal military system; how the current of democracy, long dashing vainly against the power of the monarchy, turned aside to flow in the tempting channel of national aggrandisement; how German patriots came to look upon their great standing army as no useless attribute of absolutism, but the mighty instrument of completing the once ideal Fatherland, and framing, for the vision of past days, a solid existence: these are now matters of familiar history.

The campaign of 1866 added four millions of the most warlike races of Germany to the Prussian dominions; and to the whole of these the obligation to serve in the army was extended. The eight corps of the old Prussian army were raised to twelve and a half by the formation of one in Schleswig-Holstein, another in conquered Hanover, a third in Cassel and Frankfort, a fourth created out of the fine Saxon army, and a division raised in the northern half of Hesse-Darmstadt. The Prussian system was also introduced into the independent North German States, and every North German is, therefore, now liable to service, and no substitution is allowed. The Federal troops take the oath of fealty to the Federal generalissimo, and all form one army under one command.

Within less than a year of the victory of Sadowa, when the South Germans still sorely felt their defeat, and murmured at their coming Prussianization, and when the new army of the Northern Confederation existed only on paper, Prussia had to face the prospect of a war with France on the Luxemburg question with the lesser resources that had proved so sufficient, and had served her so well, against Austria. But France was then supplied with inferior weapons. Her troops would have had to face the breech-loader at the same risk as those of Benedek; and though the danger of collision passed away for a season, it was certainly not from any fear on the side of the military guides of Prussia, who afterwards avowed that their sole strategy would have been to have massed the armies lately victorious in Bohemia in two great columns on the Rhine, and march straight for Paris, trusting to the needle-gun. The Luxemburg question, however, was solved at the instance of Europe, and by the special interposition of England, and the mortal struggle of the two countries was postponed for three years; and how were these three years spent by the Germans? The field army was vastly increased, as were also the reserves, by the application of the Prussian system to the new Confederation and its allies. These additions were the natural result of annexation and alliance, and concerned the infantry chiefly; but most important changes and additions were also made in the artillery and cavalry departments, which will be alluded to further on in our description of those branches of the service.

In a case where the whole male population may be said to be trained for arms, it is, of course, not an easy matter to arrive at the exact total of men capable of being brought into the field. According to official returns, however, which recent experi ence has shown to be below rather than above the numbers, the total strength of the army of the North German Confederation amounts to 316,224 men on the peace footing, and to 952,294 men on the war footing. This war establishment comprises:—Field troops, privates and non-commissioned officers, 553,189; depôts, ditto, 185,623; garrison troops, ditto, 208,517; staff, 4965. These are the armies of Prussia, or rather the one army of the North German Confederation. But as the non-confederate states of the South have made common cause in defence of the Fatherland, in the war of which this work treats, we must add

their forces to the total. The Bavarian army numbers 73,419 men, or, by calling in the reserves, 96,804. Wurtemberg can furnish in war time 29,392 men, and Baden 24,386.

It must not be supposed that the Prussian system involves the training for arms and personal service in the ranks of the *entire* male population. The peculiarity of the system is more in the universal *liability* to service, without any option of substitution. The number of young men who every year arrive at the age of twenty is, however, much larger than the annual contingent to be drafted into the army. Those who are not required for the annual contingent are placed in the second Ersatz reserve. They are liable to be called on in case of war; but as the landwehr have to go first, the chance of their ever being so is exceedingly remote. A very large number of able-bodied men in Germany are never enrolled. It is true that the landsturm includes all men between seventeen and fifty not forming part of the army or landwehr; but this force is only liable to be called out in case of actual invasion.

The Prussian army which takes the field in time of war consists of twelve corps d'armée of troops of the line, and of the corps d'armée of the guard. Each corps d'armée is organized with the intention of being a perfectly complete little army of itself, so that without inconvenience it can be detached from the main army at any time. Each corps d'armée of the line in time of war consists of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a military train. Each division of infantry is composed of two brigades, each of which has two regiments, and as each regiment contains three battalions, in a division of infantry there are twelve battalions; to every infantry division is also attached one regiment of cavalry of four squadrons, and one division of artillery of four batteries, making the total strength of the force under the command of every infantry divisional general twelve battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries.

A cavalry division consists of two brigades, each containing two regiments, and as every regiment has in the field four squadrons, the division contains sixteen squadrons; it has also two batteries of horse artillery attached to it. The Prussian cavalry bore itself gallantly in action in the war of 1866, and proved of abundant service in outpost work in Bohemia; but difficulties were experienced from the admixture of half-broken horses and unpractised riders. These evils it was judged necessary to avoid in future, by raising very considerably the peace effective of the cavalry by adding a fifth squadron to each regiment, and increasing the number of regiments—a change which made the Prussians in the war of 1870 show a more marked superiority in that arm over the enemy, than Europe had witnessed since the Archduke Charles outmanœuvred Moreau and Jourdan on the Danube by the dexterous use of his horse.

The reserve of artillery consists of one division of field artillery, which forms four batteries, and of two batteries of horse artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of ammunition.

This gives the strength of a corps d'armée as twenty-four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, and sixteen batteries of artillery. Besides this, however, each corps has one distinct "Jaegerbataillon" (battalion of sharpshooters), the men of which are all "picked." The sons of "Waldhüter," "Förster," "herrhosaftliche Jaeger," all from their childhood familiar with the handling of a rifle, are chosen for this service. Their uniform is dark green instead of dark blue. The corps has also one battalion of engineers, besides an engineer train for the transport of materials for making bridges, and a large military train which carries food, hospitals, medicines, fuel for cooking, bakeries, and all the other necessaries not only of life, but of the life of an army, the members of which require not only the same feeding, clothing, and warming as other members of the human race, but also bullets, powder, shot and shells, saddlery for their horses, and who from the nature of their life are more liable to require medicines, bandages, splints, and all hospital accessories than other men.

If we do not consider the train when we are calculating the number of combatants who actually fall in, in the line of battle, every battalion may be considered to consist of 1002 men. Thus the force of infantry and engineers in a corps d'armée numbers over 26,000, and on account of men absent through sickness may in round numbers be calculated at this figure. Each squadron of cavalry may be calculated at 150 mounted men, which makes the whole cavalry force about 3000 men. Each division of four batteries of horse artillery brings into the field 590 actual combatants, and each of field artillery the same, so that the whole

artillery force of a corps d'armée is about 2350 men. The actual number of combatants with a corps d'armée is in this way seen to be 31,350 men, which may be stated in round numbers at 31,000. The guard corps d'armée differs chiefly from the line corps in having one additional rifle battalion, one additional fusilier regiment, and two additional cavalry regiments, which increase its strength by about 5150 actual combatants; the total number of combatants in this corps may be safely assumed as 36,000 men, in round numbers.

If we turn, however, to the list furnished by the military authorities, we find that the army is said to consist of 553,189 men, with 165,591 horses, of which only about 102,000 belong to the cavalry and artillery, and that it is accompanied by a waggon train of 17,743 carriages, of which only 5000 belonging to the artillery perform any service on the field of battle.

What has then become of these 90,000 men, 60,000 horses, and 11,000 carriages which form the difference between the returns we find of an army on paper and the actual number of men engaged on the field of battle? This difference represents the moving power of the combatant branches; it is this difference that feeds the warriors when they are well, that tends them when wounded, and nurses them when struck down with disease. Nor are these the only duties of the non-combatant branches. An army on a campaign is a little world of itself, and has all the requirements of ordinary men moving about the world, besides having an enemy in its neighbourhood, who attempts to oppose its progress in every way possible. When the line of march leads to a river, over which there is either no bridge or where the bridge has been destroyed, a bridge must be immediately laid down, and, accordingly, a bridge train is necessarily always present with the army. When a camp is pitched, field bakeries have to be immediately established to feed the troops; field telegraphs and field post-offices must be established for the rapid transmission of intelligence. A large staff must be provided for, which is the mainspring which sets all the works going. And these are only ordinary wants, such as any large picnic party on the same scale would require. When we consider that 200 rounds of ammunition can easily be fired away by each gun in a general action, that every infantry soldier can on the same occasion dispose of 120 rounds of ball cartridge, and that this must be all replaced immediately; that all this requires an enormous number of carriages, with horses and drivers; that outside of the line of battle there must be medical men, their assistants, and nurses; that within it and under fire there must be ambulance waggons, and men with stretchers to bear the wounded to them; and that 40 per cent. of the infantry alone in every year's campaign are carried to the rear, we may understand how the large difference between the number of actual fighting men and of men borne upon paper is accounted for.

Each corps d'armée of the line in time of peace is quartered in one of the several provinces of the kingdom; its recruits are obtained from that province, and its landwehr are the men in the province who have served seven years and who have been dismissed from actual service, but are subjected to an annual course of training. The provinces to which the different corps d'armée belong are:—1, Prussia Proper; 2, Pomerania; 3, Brandenburg; 4, Prussian Saxony; 5, Posen; 6, Silesia; 7, Westphalia; 8, Rhine Provinces; 9, Schleswig-Holstein; 10, Hanover; 11, Cassel, &c.; 12, Saxony. The guards are men chosen from the strongest of the military recruits throughout all the provinces of the kingdom. They are from five feet nine inches to six feet one inch in height, and from twelve stones to thirteen and a half stones in weight. The landwehr of the guard consists of the men who have formerly served in it.

The extraordinary elasticity of this organization was first manifested during the campaign of 1866. In a wonderfully short time the large armies which fought at Königgrätz were placed on a war footing, and brought about 260,000 combatants into the very field of battle, besides the necessary detachments which must be made by a large army to cover communications, mask fortresses, and so on; but the detachments made from the Prussian army were very small compared to those which would have had to be separated from an army organized on a different system; for as the field army advanced the depôt troops moved up in rear, and formed both depôts and reserves for the first line, while some of the garrison troops of landwehr came up from Prussia, and formed the garrisons of Saxony, Prague, Pardubitz, and all the other points on the lines of communication. At the same time General Mülbe's corps, formed for the most part of reserve and depôt soldiers, pushed up to Brünn, and was hastening to take its place in

the first line, when its march was stopped by the conclusion of the long armistice. In the present war the system was shown to even greater perfection than in 1866; for not only were all gaps in the ranks speedily filled, but the Germans were able to leave 290,000 fighting men for the sieges of Strasbourg and Toul and the investment of Metz, and yet have over 270,000 at the battle of Sedan, and 50,000 men in the line of communication.

Though the part of the Prussian organization which refers to the recruiting of the army and to the filling up of the ranks in case of war had a great deal to do with the success of the campaigns in 1866 and 1870, on account of the facility and rapidity with which by its means the army could be mobilized and brought upon a war footing, the portion of the Prussian organization which relates to the combination of the recruits so obtained in pliable bodies, which can be easily handled, easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different arms as to be capable of independent action, did not fail to be appreciated most fully by those who, with its assistance, gained such tremendous results. This portion of the military organization of the Prussian army is so simple that almost every man in the ranks can understand it. Jealous of expense in time of peace, it allows for a wide expansion, without hurry and without confusion, on the outbreak of war. It provides at the same time for the broadest questions and the most minute details, and is so clearly laid down and so precisely defined, yet at the same time admits of so much elasticity, that the Prussian officers can find no words strong enough to express their praise of it.

As has been previously stated, the Prussian system is a strictly localized one. Every district has its line and landwehr regiment. Adjoining districts are combined in the same military division, and adjoining divisions are united in the same corps d'armée. Each regiment, division, and corps d'armée has thus its local head-quarters, so that the regimental rendezvous is within easy reach of the soldiers' homes, and the combination of the several regiments into their divisions, and of the divisions into their corps, can be easily effected. The military and civil staff remain at the respective head-quarters, and once a year, after the harvest has been got in, the entire machine is put together, its readiness for service tested, and any defects supplied by calling out the active army for a series of military manœuvres by which the officers of all ranks, as well as the men, are exercised and instructed.

In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobilization of the army, every officer and every official knows during peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the moment the decree for the mobilization is issued, and the moment that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most distant stations every one sets about his necessary duty without requiring any further orders or any explanations.

When a war is imminent the government decrees the mobilization of the whole army, or of such a portion as may be deemed necessary. Every commanding general mobilizes his own corps d'armée; the "Intendantur" the whole of the branches of the administrative services; the commandants of those fortresses which are ordered to be placed in a state of defence take their own measures for strengthening the fortifications and for obtaining from the artillery depôts the guns necessary for the armament of their parapets. A telegraphic signal from head-quarters puts the whole machinery in operation at once. In the landwehr offices of every village the summonses for assembly lie constantly ready, and have only to be distributed. The mobilization of the whole army is soon complete in every branch. In the present campaign, within four days of the order for mobilizing, military trains began to run at the rate of forty a day towards the Rhine frontier, and in about a fortnight every arm of the service was deposited in their selected places, completely equipped for the field, even to the removers and helpers of the wounded.

The process of the mobilization may be classed under the following five heads:—1, The filling in of the field troops to their war strength; 2, the formation of depôt troops; 3, the formation of garrison troops and the arming of the fortresses; 4, the mobilization of the field administration; 5, the formation of the head-quarter staffs, &c., who are to remain in the different districts to supply the places of those who march to the seat of war.

The completion of the rank and file of the field troops to war strength is effected by drawing in some of the reserve soldiers, who supply half the total war strength of the infantry, one-third of that of the artillery, and one-twenty-fifth of that of the cavalry. The cavalry has, of course, on account of being maintained in such force during peace, a superabundance of reserve soldiers avail-

able on a mobilization; these, after the men required for the cavalry itself have been drawn from them, are handed over to the artillery and military train, so that these services thus obtain many valuable soldiers, well accustomed to mounted duties. The reserve soldiers who are to be enrolled have orders sent to them through the commanding officer of the landwehr of the district in which they live, who can avail himself of the services of the provincial and parochial civil authorities to facilitate the delivery of these orders. The men are, immediately on the receipt of their orders, required to proceed to the head-quarters of the landwehr of the district, where they are received, medically inspected, and forwarded to their regiment, by an officer and some non-commissioned officers of the regiment which draws its recruits from the district. Officers who are required to fill up vacancies in the regular army on a mobilization are obtained by promoting some of the senior non-commissioned officers and calling in reserve officers.

A great advantage accrues to the Prussian army from the fact, that the country supplies horses in sufficiency for every branch of the service. Of these, as of the men, the local authorities in every hamlet keep a register, and the requisite number is called for as the demand arises. On a mobilization, the whole army requires about 100,000 horses more than it has in time of peace; in order to obtain these quickly the government has the power, if it cannot buy them readily from regular dealers, to take a certain number from every district, paying for them a price which is fixed by a mixed commission of military officers and of persons appointed by the civil authorities of the district.

Each regiment of field artillery forms nine ammunition columns, in each of which are waggons to carry reserve ammunition for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the proportions in which experience has shown that ammunition is usually required. In the field these ammunition waggons follow directly in rear of the field army, but are kept entirely separate from the field batteries, the officers of which are justly supposed to have enough to do in action in superintending their own guns, without being hampered with the supply of cartridges to the cavalry and infantry.

Every battalion of engineers forms a column of waggons which carries tools for intrenching purposes, and also a heavy pontoon train and a light field bridge train for which all is kept ready during peace. If a portion of the army is mobilized merely for practice, or goes into camp for great manœuvres, as is done nearly every summer during peace, one, or perhaps two or three, engineer battalions make their trains mobile, in order to practice the men and to accustom them to the use of the *matériel*. Arms and ammunition which are required to complete the war strength of regiments are supplied from the artillery depôts. Officers are allowed soldier servants on a more liberal scale than in the English army, but no officers' servants are mustered in the company; they form, with all the non-combatant men of each battalion of infantry, the train which is attached to every battalion: this consists of the officers' servants and the drivers of the regimental waggons; every one else borne on the muster-roll draws a trigger in action, so that the muster-rolls actually show the number of rank and file who are present, and do not include any of the followers, who often never come up into the line of battle at all. On service the captain of every company is mounted, and is required to have two horses, to aid in the purchase of which he is allowed a certain sum of money by the state.

The strength of an ordinary battalion on active service is one field-officer, four captains, four first lieutenants, nine second lieutenants, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one paymaster, one quartermaster, 1002 non-commissioned officers and privates. The train attached to this battalion is, besides officers' servants, the drivers of the ammunition waggon, which has six horses; of the *Montirung Wagon*, which carries the paymasters' books, money chest, and a certain amount of material for the repair of arms and clothing, and is drawn by four horses; a hospital cart with two horses, an officers' baggage waggon with four horses, and men to lead four packhorses, each of which carries on a pack-saddle the books of one company.

The baggage of a cavalry regiment on service consists of one medicine cart with two horses, one field forge with two horses, four squadron waggons, each with two horses, one officers' baggage waggon, with four horses; the total strength of a cavalry regiment in the field being 23 officers, 659 men, of whom 600 fall in in the ranks, 713 horses, and seven carriages.

The nine ammunition columns which are formed by each artillery regiment for the supply of ammunition to the artillery and infantry of the corps

d'armée to which the regiment belongs are divided into two divisions, one of which consists of five columns, and has a strength of two officers, 175 men, 174 horses, and 25 waggons; the second, consisting of four columns, has two officers, 173 men, 170 horses, and 24 waggons. This division is made to facilitate the dispatch of the two divisions separately to the ammunition depôt to have the waggons refilled after their first supply of cartridges has been exhausted, or to allow one division to be detached with each infantry division, in case of the corps d'armée being divided, in which case four columns can conveniently be attached to each infantry division, and one column to the cavalry division of the corps.

The reserve ammunition park from which these ammunition columns are replenished, is also divided into two divisions, each of which has a strength of nine officers, 195 men, 264 carriages, and is further subdivided into eight columns of thirty-three waggons each. It is brought into the theatre of war either by railway or water carriages, or by means of horses hired in the country where the war is being conducted. Generally it is one or two days' march in rear of the army.

A siege train for attacking fortresses is not generally organized at the beginning of a war, unless the general plan of the campaign should be likely to lead the army into a country where fortresses exist, which could not be either neglected or masked, and which must be reduced. If a siege train is organized, it is formed with especial reference to the fortresses against which it is to act, and follows the army in the same manner as the reserve ammunition park.

It is thus that the Prussian army is formed in peace, that its field forces can be made ready to march in a few days in case of war, and that the troops in the field are supplied with the powder and shot which give them the means of fighting. But *l'art de vaincre est perdu sans l'art de subsister* (the art of conquering is as nothing without the art of maintaining the conquering army). An organization of even more importance lies still behind—the organization of the means of supplying the warriors with food when in health, with medicine and hospitals when diseased or wounded, and for filling up the gaps which are opened in the ranks by battle or pestilence; an organization which has always been found to be more difficult and to require more delicate handling than even strategical combinations, or the arraying of troops for battle.

The Prussian army can enter the field with 760,000 men in its ranks; but, as is well known, no army, nor any collection of men, can maintain its normal strength for a single day; in such a host, even of young healthy men, ordinary illness would immediately cause a few absentees from duty, much more so do the marches, the hardships, and the fatigues to which a soldier is exposed on active service before the first shot is fired. Then as soon as an action takes place, a single day adds a long list to the hospital roll, and the evening sees in the ranks many gaps which in the morning were filled by strong soldiers, who are now lying torn and mangled or dead on the field of battle, The dead are gone for ever; they are so much power lost out of the hand of the general; nor can an army wait till the wounded are cured and are again able to draw a trigger or to wield a sabre. Means must be taken to supply the deficiencies as quickly as possible, and to restore to the commander of the army the missing force which has been expended in moving his own army through the first steps of the campaign, or in resisting the motion of his adversary. What is the amount of such deficiencies may be estimated from Prussian statistics, which have been compiled with great care, and from the experience of many campaigns; these state officially that at the end of a year's war 40 per cent. of the infantry of the field army, 20 per cent. of the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and 12 per cent. of the military train would have been lost to the service, and have had to be supplied anew.

It is for the formation of these supplies of men, and for forwarding them to the active army, that depôts are intended. The depôts of the Prussian army are formed as soon as the mobilization takes place, and it is ordered that one half of the men of each depôt should be soldiers of the reserve, who, already acquainted with their drill, can be sent up to the front on the first call; the other half of each depôt consists of recruits who are raised in the ordinary way, and of all the men of the regiments belonging to the field army which have not been perfectly drilled by the time their regiment marches to the seat of war. The officers of the depôts are either officers who are detached from the regular army for this duty, or are officers who have been previously wounded, and who cannot bear active

service, but can perform the easier duties of the depôt, besides young officers, who are being trained to their duty before joining their regiments.

Since the re-organization of 1859, the number of depôt troops kept up during a war has been quite doubled; formerly every two infantry regiments had one depôt battalion, and every two cavalry regiments one depôt squadron. When the army was re-organized, it was foreseen that this amount of depôt troops would never be sufficient in case of a war of any duration or severity, so by the new regulations each infantry regiment has one depôt battalion of 18 officers and 1002 men; each rifle battalion, a depôt company of 4 officers and 201 men; each cavalry regiment, a depôt squadron of 5 officers, 200 men, and 212 horses; each field artillery regiment (96 guns), a depôt division of one horse artillery battery, and three field batteries, each of four guns, with 14 officers, 556 men, and 189 horses; every engineer battalion, one depôt company of 4 officers and 202 men; every train battalion, a depôt division of two companies, which muster together 12 officers, 502 men, and 213 horses. All this is required to feed the army in the field with supplies of men to take the places of those who pass from the regimental muster roll into the lists of killed, died in hospital, or disabled; for those who are only slightly wounded return to their duty either in the depôt or at once to their battalions, as is most convenient from the situation of the hospital in which they have been.

As a rule, four weeks after the field army has marched, the first supply of men is forwarded from the depôts to the battalions in the field. This first supply consists of one-eighth of the calculated yearly loss which has been given above. On the first day of every succeeding month a fresh supply is forwarded. Each of these later supplies is one-twelfth of the total calculated yearly loss. If a very bloody battle is fought, special supplies are sent at once to make up the losses of the troops that have been engaged.

The troops in depôt are provided with all articles of equipment with which they should take the field. When a detachment is to be sent to the front, all who belong to one corps d'armée are assembled together; the infantry soldiers are formed into companies of 200 men each for the march, the cavalry into squadrons of about 100 horsemen, and are taken under the charge of officers to the field army, thus bringing to the front with them the necessary reserves of horses. The places in the depôts of those who have marched away are filled up by recruiting.

An army, though of great strength and well provided with supplies of men, cannot always be sure of taking the initiative, and by an offensive campaign driving the war into an enemy's country. Judging from the experience of both the Prusso-Austrian and Franco-Prussian wars, there seems no doubt that an offensive campaign is much better for a country and much more likely to achieve success than a defensive one. But political reasons or want of preparation often force an army to be unable to assume the offensive, and with the loss of the initiative make a present to the enemy of the first great advantage in the war. In this case the theatre of war is carried into its own territory, when an army requires fortresses to protect its arsenals, dockyards, and its capital, to cover important strategical points, or to afford a place where, in case of defeat or disaster, it may be re-organized under the shelter of fortifications and heavy artillery. It has been seen in this war that small fortresses do not, as a rule, delay the progress in the field of a large invading army, which can afford to spare detachments to prevent their garrisons from making sallies. Bitsche, Phalsburg, and Thionville did not delay the German armies for a day, though they are each strong places; but they were masked by detachments, the loss of which from the line of battle was hardly felt by the main body, and the great lines of the German armies passed in safety within a few miles of their paralyzed garrisons.

Under certain circumstances, however, it was found that small fortresses may prove a very serious inconvenience to an invader, who generally counts upon using the main roads and lines of railway of the country through which he passes. In the case of Toul, during the late war, a third-rate fortress, with a garrison ridiculously small compared with the overwhelming number of besiegers, prevented the Germans for full six weeks from using the main railway to Paris; thus obliging them to make a wide detour over a toilsome road, with all their heavy guns and provisions. It was a double inconvenience, inasmuch as the very essential Prussian field telegraph could not be attached to and used with the ordinary lines, but was obliged to be laid across the open country, where, notwithstanding the innumerable patrols,

it was being constantly cut by the French peasants.

As long as fortresses exist they require garrisons, but the troops which are formed in Prussia on the breaking out of a war are not intended, in case of an offensive campaign, only to hang listlessly over the parapets of fortified places. When an army pushes forward into a foreign country, it leaves behind it long lines of road or railway over which pass the supplies of food, clothing, medicines, and stores, which are vitally important to the existence of an army. With an unfriendly population, and the enemy's cavalry ready always to seize an opportunity of breaking in upon these lines of communication, of charging down upon convoys, and destroying or burning their contents, and of thus deranging seriously what might be called the household economy of the army, it is necessary, especially on lines of railway, that strong garrisons should be maintained at particular points, and that patrols should be furnished for nearly the whole line. Towns have to be occupied in rear of the front line, depôts of stores have to be guarded and protected, convoys have to be escorted, telegraph lines watched, the fortifications which may fall garrisoned. To detach troops for the performance of all these duties dribbles away the strength of an army. To provide for these duties, and to allow the main armies to push forward in almost unimpaired strength, Prussia forms on the mobilization of the field army her so-called garrison troops.

For the formation of garrison troops the Prussian government makes use of the landwehr men, or men who have passed through the army and reserve, and are between twenty-seven and thirty-two years of age. The landwehr battalions can be called out either of a strength of 402 men each, by calling in the younger men of the landwehr, or as it is technically called, the first augmentation of the landwehr. By calling in the older men in the second augmentation each battalion is raised to a strength of 802 men. These battalions can be placed in the field formed into divisions of the same number of battalions as the divisions of the regular army. In the campaign of 1870 five such landwehr divisions were actively employed in France.

In some respects, which are easily seen, the Prussian landwehr resembles the British militia, but there are two vital differences between our organization and that of Prussia. The first is, that in England when a militia regiment is formed it is made up of men who are not old soldiers, and consequently, if the regiment is for some years disembodied, all its late recruits know nothing of their work except what they can pick up in the short period of annual training; so that in course of time, if a regiment remains for many years without being embodied, the mass of the ranks contain men who from want of training are not qualified to step at the outbreak of war into the line of battle. In the second place, the landwehr is as much an attendant and concomitant of an army in the field as the park of reserve artillery; and it is this which makes the landwehr so valuable, because it thus takes up the duties which otherwise would have to be performed by detachments from the active army. If the Prussian armies in 1866 had been obliged to leave detachments in Leipsic, Dresden, Prague, Pardubitz, and along the railway from Görlitz to Brünn, besides troops in Hanover, Hesse, and on the lines of communications of the armies which were fighting against the Bavarians, how many troops would have formed the first lines of battle either on the Danube or in the theatre of war near the Main? The armies which were collecting, together 225,000 regular troops, for the attack upon Vienna, would, unless they had had these landwehr behind them, have been reduced to under 125,000 men. In fact, an English army under the same circumstances would have been shorn of almost half its strength.

When a Prussian army with its unimpaired strength is preparing to fight a battle in an enemy's country, when supplies of men are already coming up in anticipation of the losses which the action will cause, and when its lines of communication are guarded and secured by the garrison troops in its rear, it musters an enormous number of soldiers, who must every day be provided with food, without which a man can neither fight, march, nor live; and not only must it provide for itself alone, but also for the prisoners of the enemy who may fall into its hands—not only food, but hospitals, medicines, and attendants for the sick, surgeries, assistants, and appliances for the wounded, and the means of conveying both sick and wounded from the places where they fall helpless to convenient spots where they may be tended and healed at a safe distance from the danger of battle, or of being

taken in case of a sudden advance of the enemy. It is extremely difficult from mere figures to realize what a gigantic undertaking it has been to supply even food alone to the armies which have fought in the late campaign. The difficulties of such a task may be conceived if we remember that the front line of the Prussian armies invading France, while Metz, Strasburg, and Toul were still unsubdued, mustered twelve times the number of British troops with which Lord Raglan invaded the Crimea; that close behind this line lay a second large army, and that this army and the army which was besieging Strasburg were alone stronger by 200,000 men than all the British, German, and Spanish troops that fought at Talavera; that behind them again was a large mass of landwehr; that during the siege of Sebastopol the British army was stationary, and had the great advantage of sea transport to within a few miles of its camps, while in the late campaign the Prussian army moved forward at an enormously rapid rate; and that the men to be fed in the front line alone numbered about 270,000—a population larger than that of the twelfth part of London. He would be a bold man who would undertake to supply the twelfth part of the whole population of the metropolis with one day's food; a bolder still who would undertake the task if this portion of the population were about to move bodily on that morning down to Richmond, and would require to have the meat for their dinner delivered to them the moment they arrived there, and who, without railway transport, agreed to keep the same crowd daily provided with food until moving at the same rate they arrived at Plymouth; and yet a general has to do much more than this in giving food to his men—he has, besides the ordinary difficulties of such a task, to calculate upon bad roads, weary horses, breaking waggons, the attacks of an enemy's cavalry; he has not only to get the food to the troops, but in many cases he has to provide it in the first place; he has to keep his magazines constantly stocked, to increase the amount of transport in exact proportion as his troops advance; to feed not only the fighting men, but all the men who are employed in carrying provisions to the combatants, to find hay and corn for all the horses of the cavalry and for the horses of the transport waggons, and to arrange beforehand so that every man and horse shall halt for the night in close proximity to a large supply of good water. This is not the lightest nor the least of a general's duties. It was the proud boast of England's great soldier that "many could lead troops; he could feed them." When the enemy is in front, and any moment may bring on an action, a general has little time to turn his mind to the organization of a system of supply. Then he must sift intelligence, weigh information, divine his adversary's intentions almost before they are formed, prepare a parry for every blow, and speed a thrust into any opening joint of his antagonist's harness. The means of supplying troops ought to be given ready into the hands of a general; they should be all arranged and organized beforehand, so that he has but to see that they are properly administered and made use of.

The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field, exclusive of the waggons of each battalion, the artillery, engineer, and ammunition trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided under two heads. The first and larger portion is under the direction of the Intendantur department, and is maintained solely for the supply of food, forage, money, and extra clothing to men and horses. The second portion is also under the Intendantur, but is placed at the disposal of the medical department, and carries the medicines and hospital necessaries for the sick and wounded, together with the means of carrying disabled men.

The first portion in charge of the Intendantur department consists, in the first place, of a certain amount of waggons, which are in time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and immediately on the mobilization of the army are provided with horses and drivers from the military train, who are entirely under the control of the principal officer of the Intendantur. Each army has a principal Intendantur officer; each corps has with its headquarters an Intendantur officer of high rank, and one of the next inferior grade is attached to each division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants, form the first links of the chain by which a general draws food to his troops. The Commissariat columns of each corps d'armée, which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilized, consists of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers, 101 men, 165 horses, and 32 waggons. If the corps d'armée is broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and the reserve artillery, and to each of

these divisions an officer of Intendantur is attached. The Prussian plan of thus giving each column a "Proviant Meister," with waggons, &c., under his command, and making him responsible, has been proved beyond all doubt to be the best in practical working—far superior indeed to the French *Intendance*, to the utter failure and break-down of which their earliest disasters are believed to have been due. Under the Prussian system of dividing the responsibility into sections, not only is everything more manageable and simple, but the blame can be laid on the right shoulders when anything goes wrong; whereas in a great cumbrous central organization like that of the French it is difficult to make any single individual responsible. In the present war the Prussians, at a distance from their own supplies, and consequently compelled to maintain a long line of communication through an enemy's country, were actually better furnished with material and food than the French. They succeeded in moving their wounded more rapidly from the field of battle; and their operations were never once impeded by a want of transport. The French system is described in the next chapter, and it will be seen that it is essentially one of centralization, whereas that of Prussia is exactly the reverse; and instead of providing one *Intendance* of the whole army, it makes each corps d'armée complete in itself.

The Prussians carry no tents, and sleep with nothing but their cloaks between them and the ground. They, however, secure a slight protection from the weather when convenient and necessary by constructing *tentes d'abri* with the boughs of trees. When the men arrive at the end of their day's march, they select the driest and most convenient place of ground they can find, and set to work at once to bivouac. Having halted, the arms are piled, the battalions being drawn up in line of contiguous columns at quarter distance; the men then take off their helmets, and each man places his helmet on his rifle, which acts as an effectual protection from any wet getting down the barrel; the companies then break off by subdivisions to the right and left of their arms, the knapsacks are placed in a row, the camp kettles taken off, and the fatigue squad falls out from each company to draw water. Meantime the remainder dig small, oblong holes in the ground for their fires; a couple of sticks at each end, and another resting across, completes the simple but practical arrangement. On this stick hangs the camp kettles, generally speaking by twos—one for the potatoes, and the other for the soup and meat. This soup is the mainstay of the German as well as of the French, and indeed of most continental armies. It is very simply made. Into the camp kettle is put very much whatever comes to hand, and a savoury mess, at least for hungry men, is soon made. At night big fires are got to burn, cloaks are then spread upon the ground, and in ten minutes the bivouac is complete. The officers are exactly on the same footing as the men, and quite as much exposed. Upon coming to the ground where it is intended to halt for the night, the officers commanding battalions tell off an officer and twelve men to bring up provisions for the troops. There is no pillaging of the villages permitted; the strictest orders protect the inhabitants everywhere, although it is difficult to prevent the cavalry from making free quarters of every village they come to, inasmuch as they are in the advance of every column of troops. The men sometimes think it hard that in a conquered country they are not allowed to dig the potatoes; but the general's order is strict, and a speedy punishment awaits the offender.

The 160 waggons which form the Commissariat columns carry three days' provisions for every man in the corps d'armée; as soon as the waggons which carry the first day's supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to supply the fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the other waggons will have been emptied. As it is easier to carry flour than bread in these waggons, each corps d'armée is accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of 1 officer and 118 men, 27 horses, and 5 waggons, which are distributed among the troops as may be most convenient; and as the horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have very hard work, a depôt of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers, accompanies each corps d'armée. These provision columns thus carry three days' provisions, but in a country where supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way of collecting food; their duty is simply to bring provisions from the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army advances these magazines must advance

also, and that means must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collection of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of transport; this transport is obtained by hiring waggons and carts in the country where the war is being carried on, or in the countries near it. Waggons hired in the country are also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision columns only carry food for the men.

When it was found that the country was not laid waste, the provision waggons in some cases were filled in the neighbourhood of the troops by requisitions; but this was found not to be so good a plan as to send them back to the magazines where the provisions were collected ready for them, because the time taken up in gathering together driblets of food and forage from each village, and the great distances over which waggons had to move, imposed an enormous amount of work on both the men and horses. Although the requisition system was very useful, it was only regarded as an auxiliary means of supply, for the armies moved prepared every day to find that the country in front of them might be devastated, and Germany was always looked upon as the real source of supplies; and this was absolutely necessary, because it would have been impossible to feed such a large force as the Prussian armies presented by requisitions alone: for requisitions cannot conveniently be made at great distances from the direct line of communications, and in a very short time the quarter of a million of men who were in the front line alone would have eaten up everything in the country around them if they had been dependent on that tract of country only for supplies. Then, even if the troops could have got food from more distant places, the villagers and country people would have starved; and it is the interest of a general to make his requisitions so that they do not drive the inhabitants to destitution, for terrible sickness always follows in the train of want, and if pestilence breaks out among the people of the country, it is certain immediately to appear in the ranks of the invading army. A Prussian regiment of infantry (3006 men, with 69 officers) has a medical staff of six surgeons attached to it. All these belong to the highest class of the profession, and have passed their degrees as physicians. Each cavalry regiment (602 men, with 26 officers) has three surgeons, and each detachment of artillery (540 men, and 18 officers), likewise three surgeons in its train. Accordingly, there is more than one surgeon to every 500 combatants, apparently an ample provision when it is considered that the ordinary proportion in Prussian society is one to 2000. In addition to the medical there is a special *Krankenträger* or sick-bearer service. This is divided into detachments, three detachments belonging to each corps d'armée. Each detachment comprises 150 bearers, eight nurses, eight lazarethe assistants (a lower order of the craft), one apothecary, seven doctors, and three military officers. Six carriages for the transport of the wounded, and four carriages with bandages, lint, medicine, &c., are allotted to a detachment. To assist the *Krankenträger* in their work, four men in every company of infantry (250 men) have been instructed in the best way of lifting and carrying the wounded from the field. When fighting occurs, one half the doctors attached to each regiment accompanies the combatants into action; the other half, at a short distance in the rear, dressing the wounds of those whose cases were not attended to on the battle-field itself.

Each soldier carries in his breast some lint and a bandage, so that when he falls the surgeon can instantly run up, open his coat, and apply a bandage. A certain number of tourniquets are also carried by the non-commissioned officers of each regiment; and, although in the heat of a pitched battle the non-commissioned officers could not stop to apply tourniquets to the wounded, yet, as a proportion of these also fall, the instruments are always at hand for the surgeons, and in the skirmishes, or in regiments not exposed to the full brunt of a conflict, there will yet be a certain number of wounded, many of whose lives, which would otherwise be lost, may be saved by the prompt application of a tourniquet or bandages. Round each man's neck as he goes into action, also, is a card upon which is his name. As he falls the surgeon who examines and binds up his wounds sees at once whether it is of a nature which will permit of the patient being moved to a distance or not. According to its severity, then, he writes on the card whether the man is to be taken to the field hospital close at hand, or to the hospitals further in the rear. Accordingly, when the ambulance arrives, it is seen at once where the wounded man is to be conveyed.

A field lazarethe is provided with everything necessary for 200 sick and wounded. Five doctors, a number of inferior assistants, and from three to four carriages, form its staff, which in case of need is augmented by *Krankenträger* or common soldiers. Each army corps has twelve field lazarethes, or, to give it in figures, there is provision made for the perfect and scientific treatment of 2400 out of every 30,000 men. If sufficient formerly, this was found inadequate in this first breech-loading campaign, when it has occurred that every third man in a regiment has been disabled. The field lazarethe moves with the troops. Modern warfare involving many battles in a short space, it would be impossible to detain the staff of the field lazarethes long in one locality. Accordingly, all the slightly wounded, as soon as they can be transported, are sent off to the war hospitals in Germany—institutions both public and private, the extent of which may be gathered from the fact that they contain a total of 65,000 beds. The number of the reserve doctors, which has always been found too small, in this sanguinary war has proved so utterly insufficient as to cause the appointment of 200 extra surgeons to be employed wherever most required. The action of the medical service on the battle-field is directed by division doctors. The next above them in rank are the *General Aertze*, or physicians-general, one to each corps d'armée, who receive their instructions from the *General Stabs Arzt*, or chief of the medical staff. To give the soldiers the benefit of the best help, all the most eminent surgeons of the country were besides requested to repair to the front, and accept high military grades, created for them on purpose, and held only during the war.

To convey the wounded from France into the home hospitals, thirty physicians and some hundred lazarethe assistants and nurses were engaged by the government. Each transport of a hundred wounded had an escort of one or two doctors, two lazarethe assistants, and thirteen nurses. The thirty physicians set apart for this duty saw their melancholy convoy only as far as one of the three *Haupt Etappen* or principal stations on the frontier, by which the army communicates with home. Thence to the hospitals the journey was made under the direction of one of another body of thirty physicians distributed over the *Etappen*. The sum total of the doctors employed in the army at the time of the battle of Sedan exceeded 2700.

To facilitate the treatment by successive doctors, the one who sees the patient first writes his diagnosis on a card, which is fastened round the sufferer's neck. This useful bit of pasteboard is, of course, attached only when a man falls ill; but another is fastened to his arm the very day he leaves his garrison for the field. Containing the number of his regiment and *his* number *in* the regiment, it serves for identification in case of death. The men are perfectly aware of the reasonableness of this novel arrangement, and regard it as a proof of the anxious solicitude borne them by the government; yet they have an instinctive dislike to the fatal badge, and, in grim allusion to its purpose, dubbed it their "tombstone" (*grabstein*).

Special arrangements are made for the conveyance of the wounded by rail. The fourth-class carriages of German lines are entered by doors at each end, and thus a considerable space can be obtained when the seats are removed. The space is made available by screwing into the opposite sides of the carriages stout hooks, from which the field-stretchers, bearing the wounded, are suspended by elastic rings. There is, therefore, no transfer of the patient from one bed to another, and the motion of the carriage is very little felt, less even than on board ship in a hammock.

When the field army, the depôt and garrison troops, and the provision and medical department trains have been mobilized, the Prussian army is fit to take the field. The necessary commandants and staffs of the districts where the depôt troops are stationed, are composed either of officers detached from the regular army, or of reserve or landwehr officers. When the army takes the field, its movements must be directed not only so as to pursue the original plan of the campaign, but also so as to keep pace with the enemy's combinations, and the movements of its different parts must be guided by orders from the directing general.

The Prussian army has its own arrangements for feeling its way through a hostile country. The commander of the advancing corps selects a clever and determined officer, and in the Prussian army such men are numerous. Some fifteen or twenty picked horsemen are confided to him, and the officer then takes a man previously acquainted with the country to serve as guide. The spot which the party desires to investigate has been explained to him, and pointed out on an excellent

map carried by the officer. The place is often twenty or twenty-five miles from the Prussian lines. To the rear of the first horseman, who is ordered to proceed slowly, following byroads and sometimes going across country, at a distance of 200 paces, follow two light troopers. A hundred paces behind them comes the officer, followed at a short distance by eight or ten of his men, charged to protect him if necessary, The rear guard is like the advance guard. If the foremost horseman is surprised he fires off his carbine and the band takes to flight, with the exception of the officer and his escort, who advance to reconnoitre before flying. Even in the case of an ambush, it is almost impossible to prevent two or three of the scouts getting back to camp.

The above is a sketch of the general system on which the Prussian army is normally organized. How such an army is worked in the field, how its resources are made available, and how it achieves the objects for which it has been mobilized, must depend in a great measure upon the skill of the general to whose direction it is intrusted. What an army so organized can effect when its motions are guided by a skilful hand and far-seeing intellect like that of Moltke, the rapid victories of the late campaign have shown. When the field army enters on the theatre of war, the organizer and administrator has done with it; his province is then to take care that its recruits are forthcoming and its supplies are ready when required. But when an army is handed over to the general who is to use it, he has a right to expect that when he receives his divisions he shall also receive the means of manœuvring them; and when he assumes the command of his corps he shall be provided with every appliance which can help him to move them in the combination and unison without which different bodies of troops are not an army, but a series of scattered detachments, which must be easily defeated in detail, or in isolation taken prisoners by an active and energetic enemy. After the plan of a campaign has been once decided upon, the means by which a general moves his troops into positions where they may act most advantageously, and from which they may strike the heavy blows that will gain a speedy and profitable peace—for a peace is the ultimate object of all wars—may be classed under the heads of Information, Intelligence, and the Transmission of Orders. Information of the enemy's preparations, of the number of troops he can put into the field—how those troops will be armed, organized, and administered—should be obtained by the government of the country to which the army belongs, and communicated to the general when he takes the command of the army.

To acquire this information concerning foreign armies during peace every country in Europe devotes a special department of its war office, which is ever busy collecting and compiling statistics of every foreign army, because, however friendly the relations of any two countries may be, it can never be known how long they will remain so. As soon as hostilities are imminent, a war office has little chance of obtaining much information from inside the lines of the probable enemy; then the duty of collecting information devolves upon the general himself, who must, by every means he can avail himself of, discover, as far as possible, every position and intention of his adversary's troops. For this purpose, during war, spies are generally employed. Spies have a dangerous task, and not an honourable one; consequently, except in very rare and extreme cases, officers will not accept the invidious duty, and it is often extremely difficult to find persons who will consent to act as spies sufficiently conversant with military matters to make their information worth having. Money is the great means of obtaining good spies; needy adventurers and unscrupulous men will, if well paid, do the work, and for the sake of a sufficient sum run the risk of the certain death which awaits them if discovered in disguise within the hostile outposts.

The information collected from spies is not, in most cases, completely trustworthy. In the first place, the men who undertake this duty are nearly always mercenary wretches, who will sell friend and foe alike as best suits their own interest; in the second place, spies are seldom sufficiently acquainted with military matters not to exaggerate movements of slight importance and miss observing vital combinations. To test the accuracy of their reports intelligence is collected by means of reconnoitring officers, who, either alone or attended by a few troopers, get as close as they can to the enemy's posts; observe as far as possible, without the use of disguise and in full uniform, the positions of his troops; and when discovered and pursued by his patrols, fight or ride to bring their intelligence safe home to their own outposts. In the Prussian army the Uhlans, or lancers, are

often employed in this service, and their great successes in the present campaign proved how admirably they were suited for it. Intelligence is also culled by every vedette and every advanced sentinel, but the reconnoitring officer is the main source. To reconnoitre well requires not only a brave but a very able officer, with a quick eye, a ready memory, and a great knowledge of the indications which tell the presence of hostile troops, and allow an estimate to be formed of the force in which they are. When the reconnoitring officer regains the shelter of his own outposts, he must either personally bring or by some means send his intelligence as quickly as possible to head-quarters. The plan usually pursued in European armies has been for the officer himself to ride quickly to his general, and to be the first bearer of his intelligence. This means has, however, been found by experience to be too slow, and the Prussian army in the late campaign was accompanied by a telegraphic corps. By means of this corps signals were flashed from post to post, and the intelligence collected by the reconnoitring officer sometimes arrived at head-quarters within a few minutes after the officer had reached the outposts.

When a general receives intelligence, he has to weigh it, consider it, and often strike the balance between conflicting information. He has then to move his own divisions in accordance with his deductions, and must send word to any co-operating force of what he has heard, and what he is about to do. Undoubtedly, the quickest way for a reconnoitring officer to despatch his reports to his general, and for the general to communicate with his own divisions and with his colleagues, would be by electric telegraph; but it would be almost impossible for a reconnoitring officer always to communicate with head-quarters by electricity. Reconnoitring expeditions are made so suddenly and so uncertainly that, quick as the Prussian field telegraph is laid down, this means of communication is not always available with the outposts. Nor is the electric telegraph easily used to communicate with every division: it might be so used, but its application would require a number of extra waggons to be attached to every division, and would bring a confusing number of lines into the office of the chief of the staff. During the late campaign orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted officers, who were attached to head-quarters for this special purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a certain number attached to every general. These troopers form the general's escort, and act as orderlies to carry unimportant messages. When an officer is sent with an important order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in case of his being killed, to carry the order themselves to its destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken. During the campaign the communications between head-quarters and divisions were usually kept up by means of mounted officers; but communications between the head-quarters of each army and the king were always maintained by means of the field-telegraph.

To understand the Prussian field telegraph system, it should be borne in mind that the army is composed of various corps d'armée, and each corps of two divisions; therefore the telegraph is divided into three sections—1, the station at the commander-in-chief's; 2, the station at each corps; 3, the station at each division. Each station has one inspector and five secretaries or clerks, four carriages, two smaller ones, and six waggons. The first-named contain the cable, the second the apparatus and batteries, and the last-named the posts upon which the wires are fixed. Each carriage contains twenty English miles of cable, and the average time it takes to lay it is three hours to every four miles. The process of laying is naturally the most scientific part of the arrangement, and is conducted in the following manner:—An intelligent officer from the army with some assistant with him, is intrusted with the general supervision of the telegraph of each army, and to him is committed the task of directing where the main line shall run. He rides on ahead of the waggons, which proceed at a footpace, the cable being passed out over a wheel, and indicates to the drivers by means of a piece of paper stuck on a stick or a blazed tree the direction they shall follow. In the meantime, the foot soldiers attached to the telegraph, who are selected from the regiments for superior intelligence, and wear a different uniform, with a large T on the shoulder-strap, are divided into what is called

troops, or, in navvy language, "gangs," of three men each. The first take the wire as it is payed out, lay it on the ground, and on it a post for every 100 yards; the second, coming after them, twist the cable round the insulator, which is made of gutta-percha, not glass as with British telegraphs, and erect the posts in the ground. This is a matter of great ease, they being about twelve feet high, and about the thickness of the butt end of a salmon rod, slightly tapering towards the top. The third troop strain the wire, and ascertain that it is clear of all wood, &c., and, in short, "runs clear." Whenever it is possible, the trees are used as telegraph posts, being easily ascended to the requisite height by means of a light ladder. The whole of the cable carried is seldom all required, for the lines of the communications of armies usually run along railways, and as far as possible the permanent wires are repaired by the men of the division, and made use of for the telegraphic communication of the army. The obstinate resistance, however, of several fortified places, Toul especially, prevented the carrying out of this plan for several weeks in the late war. Each division carries with it five miles of insulated wire for the purpose of laying through rivers or lakes, if these should come in the way of the line. The wires are coiled inside each waggon on rollers, from which they can be uncoiled as the waggon moves along, or in bad ground the roller can be transferred to a stretcher, which is carried between two men. The wire is carried about ten feet high, so that where it crosses roads it may pass clear over the heads of mounted men. As it is equally culpable in war to prevent communication by unfair means within the lines of an army, as it is to seek to obtain the same in disguise between the enemy's sentries, any enemy not in uniform, or any one in the enemy's pay who is detected cutting the telegraph wire, is regarded as a spy, and treated accordingly. When on the field of battle, the telegraph is worked by a machine fixed inside one of the carriages, unless a house is obtainable, when a room is instantly turned into an office.

One of the most highly prized services of the army is the Field Post. Each corps d'armée has a head postmaster, under whom are the following staffs:—Six clerks attached to the office of the head-quarters, four at the head-quarters of each division, and three with the reserve of each corps. Besides this he has fourteen letter-sorters and nineteen postillions. The head-quarter's staff post of a corps d'armée has three waggons, one chaise, and one fourgon. The first ply with the letters, the second carries the postmaster and his second when on the march, as well as small parcels; and the third carries the luggage, such as tables, chairs, sorting-boxes, &c., necessary for the despatch of business. Each division of each corps has two waggons. The authorities issue cards to each regiment, on one side of which is printed,

"Feld Post Correspondenz Karte.

To

Address,"

and on the other side the letter is written in pencil or ink. If in the former, it is rendered perfectly secure against being rubbed out by the application of a wet cloth across it, which, thanks to some preparation on the surface of the card, secures its legibility to the end of its journey. Early each morning the field post rides through the camp or past the ranks of the troops on march, to collect the letters written during the preceding evening. Armed with posthorn and leathern bags, he rides up and down the ranks, receiving right and left, with both hands, the letters the soldiers hold out to him. On some days the task of this galloping letter box is much heavier, owing to most of the troops, in view of an impending battle, of which notice has been issued, having on the evening before written their letters of farewell. The number of letters sent off after a battle also are almost incalculable. In order that every chance of writing should be given, postillions ride over the field with cards and a pencil the day after the battle, and any wounded man who is still there can either write or dictate his message home. Poor fellows thus left have frequently been noticed to hold up their arms to attract the postillion's attention in preference to waving for the ambulance waggon. Remembering that in no country is education so universal as in Prussia, and that from the very composition of the German army no soldiers of any country have so many home connections, it will not be surprising to hear that during the first three months of the war upwards of twelve million letters were transmitted through the Field Post.

Another humane improvement has been introduced to lessen the horrors of war. By order of the postal department letters to soldiers who die in the war will be returned to the writers, not by the

ordinary postmen, but by the civil authorities. The latter are charged in each case to prepare the writers for the melancholy intelligence they have to impart.

The pages describing the chief engagements of the war will show how greatly the Prussian army has been changed from the stiff unbending machine which was transmitted by his father to Frederick the Great, and which, in his hands, won the victories of the Seven Years' War. On the conclusion of that war, all Europe hastened to adopt the Prussian model, and England, more than other countries, blindly accepting the outward appearance without the principle, padded, starched, and strangled with stocks her soldiers, under the impression that by obtaining the rigidity, she would also obtain the discipline and vigour of the Potsdam grenadiers. And even now, with but slight alterations, the system of drill and military carriage introduced into Prussia by the greatest sergeant-major that ever lived may be observed by the antiquary on the hills of Aldershot or the parade-ground of St. James'. But in the country where it was produced and perfected, it is a thing of the past. The crowning disaster of Jena proved to Prussia the antiquity and weakness of its military tactics, and convinced her administrators of the necessity of adapting their military tactics to altered times and circumstances. On this principle they have since unswervingly acted, and every decade has seen a steady advance in the tactical organization of the Prussian army. The present system may be briefly described. The front line of battle engaged with the enemy is composed of long lines of skirmishers, supported by small columns, which take up convenient positions wherever they can be sheltered from the enemy's fire by any variations of the ground. In the rear of these supports, reserves are stationed to reinforce the first line, or to repulse an attack made through or over it. These reserves and the first line are supposed, under the guidance of the officers who lead them, to carry out the general object of the commander-in-chief, who himself keeps in hand the chief reserves, to be moved to a flank which may be threatened by the enemy, or to drive home an offensive movement undertaken by the troops in front. The consequence of this precaution is, that a long thin line is spread in front of the hostile position, which is probably outflanked at the very commencement of the action, while behind the skirmishers and their supports, additional forces are held ready to decide victory or avert defeat. This practice, no doubt, is the secret of those sudden flank attacks which have so surprised the French officers in the late war, and caused them such severe losses in prisoners. Its usefulness in resisting the most impetuous onslaughts of the French will be especially seen, as early in the campaign as the battle of Woerth.

Manœuvring on Prussian field-days is quite a different matter from the displays to which the British soldier is accustomed. At Aldershot marshes are drained, turf walls levelled, all difficulties cleared away, and the men are put through the routine farce of a sham fight, every detail of which is known to them all from the beginning. In Prussia, on the contrary, everything is arranged with a view of inculcating thorough self-reliance, and to drawing out the individual abilities of those in command. The positions chosen for exercising are those with considerable natural obstacles, such as might be met with in actual warfare, and the following sentence occurs in the official instructions:—It will be perceived by those who understand the purport of these exercises, that no movement is dictated, no time fixed; all must be left to the discretion of the commander. Beyond the general idea, he has received no instructions defining the issue of the affair. In fact, the situation at the end of the manœuvre should be the *bona fide* result of his own dispositions.

During the war of which the present work treats, the excellence and military aptitude of the Prussian officers have been the subjects of frequent comment. All accounts agree in crediting the Prussian officer with a knowledge of his work, and a professional zeal, which have contributed in a very marked degree to the successful issue of the various brilliant operations upon which the army has been engaged. It is therefore worth while to inquire what the system is under which such officers are produced. Its main peculiarity is that in all cases, with one single exception, a certain length of service in the ranks is an indispensable condition of obtaining a commission; and that proof of having received, first, a good general education, and, secondly, a certain amount of professional instruction, is required from every one before appointment to the rank of officer. The one exception to the rule about a preliminary service in the ranks occurs in the case of the young

men who, after a course in one of the preparatory cadet schools, obtain admission to the *highest* class —the *Selecta*—of that institution. But of these young men there are only fifty annually commissioned; all other officers must go through a certain preliminary training in the ranks. There are two main classes of officers:—1. Those who enter from civil life. 2. Those who enter the army from a cadet school.

The military schools of Prussia are under the general control of an inspector-general of military education, who is assisted by a council called the supreme board of military studies. To this department also belongs the military examination commission. As already stated, the first examination of the aspirant for a commission, the ensign's examination, is in subjects of general knowledge. But the rank of ensign, or *Portépée-fahnrich*, cannot be obtained until after six months' actual service in the ranks. The young *Avantageurs* on joining their regiments have the rank, and receive the pay and clothing, of private soldiers. The mode of treating them during their service in the ranks depends much upon the commanding officer of the regiment, the regulations in some regiments being much stricter than in others. For a certain time they have to perform the actual duties of private soldiers, to mount guard, and in the cavalry to clean their horses. In some regiments they are even required to live, sleep, and mess with the privates, though the period for which this is exacted seldom exceeds six weeks. In most regiments they are allowed to find their own lodgings, and to mess with the officers, by whom, except when on duty, they are treated almost as equals. The general principle which regulates their treatment is that they should, by actual performance of the various duties, learn the work of privates, corporals, and non-commissioned officers. There are thus two qualifications for the grade of *Portépée-fahnrich*, the test of the examination and the six months' service in the ranks. The examinations are held in Berlin before the supreme military commission. They are held constantly every week for about nine months of the year, each examination occupying a week. There are thus about forty examinations in all during the year, at each of which on an average twenty-five candidates present themselves, making in all about 1000 candidates yearly. The examination, after a nomination is obtained, is partly on paper and partly *viva voce*. The following subjects are obligatory:—German, Latin, French, mathematics, geography, history, and drawing, including hill sketching. The questions are fewer in number and more comprehensive in character than in the military examinations in England; the answers are expected to approach nearly to the form of short essays. The main object is to find not so much positive knowledge as intellectual capacity to put knowledge to a useful purpose. There is no competition; the candidates are only required to come up to a certain qualifying standard. A candidate failing is allowed a second trial, or even a third frequently; the number of final failures does not exceed 10 per cent.

A certificate of having passed the *abiturient's*, or leaving examination of a gymnasium, or *real-schule*, which qualifies for admission to a university, exempts from this ensign's examination; and young men entering from the Cadet Corps are examined while still at the Senior Cadet House at Berlin. At least 200 *abiturienten* enter the army yearly, and are said to prove a very superior class of officers. The second or officer's examination is in purely professional subjects. Ten months in a war school is the usual preparation; but a small number of cadets, who have obtained admission to the highest class (the *Selecta*) of the Berlin Cadet House, receive their military instruction in this class instead of at a war school, and pass their officer's examination before quitting the Cadet House; and exemption from attendance at the war school is also granted to young men who have studied for at least one year at a university before entering the army, and to landwehr officers who have received permission to be transferred to the active army. About 800 candidates are examined yearly for the rank of officer. The examination is not competitive. The subjects are tactics (including drill), science of arms, fortification, surveying, knowledge of military duty, and military drawing. Those who fail are allowed another trial, after a certain interval; but failures are very rare, and this examination is considered much less severe than that for the grade of ensign. Those who succeed are qualified for commissions as second lieutenants. But they must wait, according to seniority, for vacancies; and on a vacancy the senior ensign's name cannot be submitted to the king for his appointment without a document stating, on the part of the

officers of the regiment, that he has the requisite knowledge of the duties of the service, and that they consider him worthy of admission among them. If the majority is opposed to his admission, the name of the next ensign in order of seniority is brought forward. Comparatively few cases of veto occur; it is generally ascertained at a prior stage of a young man's career that he will not be ineligible. Still, the existence of the right of veto exercises an influence on conduct. In the majority of cases the officer's examination is passed between the ages of eighteen and a half and twenty-one.

The Royal Cadet Corps is under the command of a general officer, and is intended as a nursery for officers of the army. It includes pensioners, or paying pupils, and the king's cadets, who are educated at the cost of the state. After receiving a general education in the junior schools the cadets proceed at fifteen or sixteen to the upper school at Berlin, where they pass one year in the *secunda* class and one year in the *prima.* About seventy of the best pupils are retained for a third year to go through a special course of military instruction in the *Ober-prima* and *Selecta* classes. The discipline is strict. The most scrupulous neatness in dress is enforced; and any cadet seen in public, on leave, without his gloves or with his belt improperly put on would be severely "chaffed" by his comrades. The cadets appear upon the whole to work steadily, and few fail to pass the ensign's examination. The universal liability to military service in Prussia supplies a most powerful incentive both to industry and to good conduct. Idleness or bad conduct may entail the forfeiture of all prospect of obtaining a commission, and necessitate the performance of the legal period of service in the ranks. The advantage of passing through the Cadet Corps is that a general education is obtained at a cheap rate, and that a commission can be gained at an earlier age than by entering the army direct from civil life. It cannot be said that cadets as a rule show more professional ability, or rise to greater distinction in the service, than men who have not passed through the Cadet Corps. Equally distinguished officers are to be found in both classes; General Steinmetz and Herwarth von Bittenfeld are old cadets; General von Moltke entered the army from civil life. Among commanding officers of regiments there appears to be generally a feeling unfavourable to the cadets, partly perhaps because every cadet who is appointed to their regiments deprives them of the patronage of a nomination, but mainly because they prefer their young officers to be men who have had the more liberal education afforded by civil schools. It is maintained by many distinguished officers that the exclusively military atmosphere by which cadets are surrounded from so early an age has a narrowing effect upon the mind, and that the almost monastic system in which they are brought up is fatal to freedom of thought and development of character. Others are of opinion that the admixture of the two classes is of advantage to the service.

The war schools afford to candidates for commissions, after a certain length of service in the ranks, the professional instruction necessary to fit them for the duties of regimental officers. The subjects of instruction are tactics, the science of arms, fortification, drawing and surveying, military regulations, and military correspondence. The system of small classes is adopted, not exceeding thirty in each. Each class attends lectures separately. A certain portion of each lecture is devoted to questioning, and the students are frequently set to write essays and memoirs. Progress is tested by quarterly examinations, both on paper and *viva voce;* great importance is attached to the latter as a means of cultivating readiness of resource and rapidity of judgment. Practical as well as theoretical instruction is given. The students have fencing and gymnastic lessons every second day, alternately with riding; they have artillery gun drill and aiming drill about once a week, and two hours' practice weekly in the regimental drill of their own arms, in addition to the more general instruction in drill which they receive during the lessons of application in connection with the course of tactics. The ensigns of artillery and engineers have additional instruction in the special duties of their corps. The students are more particularly instructed in the drill of the arms to which they respectively belong, but they also learn the general elements of that of the other services, and both the infantry and cavalry ensigns go through a course of instruction in the service of field guns. Battalion and regimental movements are practised by means of skeleton drill. The chief object kept in view in teaching both drill and gymnastics is that of fitting the young ensigns for the duty of giving instruction in these subjects when they become officers; and for this purpose individuals are constantly called out to put their comrades through field move-

ments. There is a course of swimming for those who are unable to swim. The last portion of the ten months' course is termed more especially the "practical course." Reconnaissances of military positions are then executed and reported, and dispositions for attack and defence have to be described by the students; there is musketry practice, and artillery practice is attended; field works are traced, and operations in sapping, bridging, &c., attended. Schemes are set for putting villages or houses into a state of defence, throwing up hasty intrenchments, and the like. Great importance is attached to rapid sketching without instruments, and to sketching on horseback. Some days are spent at a fortress.

The final examination on which depends an ensign's fitness for the rank of officer is held at the war schools, under the superintendence of the supreme examination commission. The paper work occupies about four days; the *viva voce* examination then follows. Candidates for the scientific corps, after some months' service with the troops, and passing through the war schools, go through a course of special instruction in the artillery and engineer school, and pass a further examination in their special subjects. They also, for practical instruction, serve with their regiments as supernumerary officers for a time, before receiving their definitive commissions. A thorough acquaintance with practical duty, acquired thus by service, is enforced before their special instruction as officers of the scientific corps commences. This system is considered by Prussian officers superior to that by which, as in England and France, the theoretical instruction is given before any regimental duty is performed. It is maintained that theory can be more easily understood if it is based upon a groundwork of actual experience; and that officers of the age of twenty-three or twenty-four, with a practical knowledge of their duties, derive more advantage from study than young men of seventeen or eighteen who have no practical acquaintance with the subject to which their studies relate.

The French and Prussian systems agree in this, that no attempt is made to give a special military education at an early age; that a general education is made the groundwork of the professional training; and that at least up to the age of seventeen or eighteen the future officer receives the same kind of education as the civilian. But the principle of deferring military education to a comparatively late age is in Prussia carried even to a greater extent than in France, for all professional instruction is postponed until after the service has been entered, and regimental duty been performed for nearly a year. The theory of the profession is not studied until after the practice of it has been learnt. Much of the progress made is ascribed to the unity now given to the whole system of instruction. The general management of military education is vested in a single officer, the inspector-general; but he is assisted by the board of studies and the supreme examination board, and at the same time each of the educational institutions has its own board of studies, on which the civilian professors are represented. In discipline the heads of the various schools are almost entirely supreme. A marked point of contrast between the French and Prussian systems of military education consists in this, that in Prussia the principle of competition is little adopted, and never, perhaps, strictly adhered to. In a country where military service is compulsory, the desire to escape duty as a private soldier is a great inducement to exertion, and the object is to form a general estimate of the abilities, character, and military capacity of each man, rather than a comparison of the attainments of several. A remarkable feature of the system of teaching is the care bestowed upon the higher objects of education, upon forming and disciplining the mind and encouraging habits of reflection. The teachers are instructed to endeavour to develop the faculties, and to cultivate powers of thought and reasoning. The system of small classes enables them to devote attention to each student, and adapt the instruction to varieties of ability. The examination questions are framed with a view to test an intelligent acquaintance with a subject, and the power of turning knowledge to a useful purpose. In the Prussian method of instruction there is almost an entire absence of the minute detail as to numbers, dates, and facts, to which importance is attached in military teaching in England. The students are left to study in private in order to teach them self-reliance and encourage habits of work. The aim throughout is the development of the mind. The cultivation of special talents is ever kept in view at the war schools; the attainment of a high standard in individual subjects is regarded as of much greater importance than average requirements in all.

It follows from the above that those who regard

the Prussian system of officering the army as a system of promotion from the ranks, in the ordinary sense of the phrase, are greatly mistaken. Promotion from the ranks is, on the contrary, extremely rare, and the few individuals who obtain commissions in this manner are seldom left with the army, but are pensioned off or provided with civil appointments. The result is that admission to the *offizier corps* of the Prussian army is regarded as conferring distinctive privileges. The strong *esprit de corps* which pervades the whole body of officers undoubtedly creates an extremely high tone and a gentlemanly feeling which resents any conduct that might be considered discreditable to the character of an officer; on the other hand, its tendency is to make the officers of the army somewhat of an exclusive caste. There is probably no service in the world in which class spirit is so strongly developed, or which is so aristocratic in character, as that of Prussia. It is necessary to point this out, because otherwise there might be a tendency to entertain the erroneous idea—an idea which in one form or another is continually cropping up—that the only way to obtain a professional body of officers is by an indiscriminate system of promotion from the ranks. By observing the Prussian system we may see how at once education and professional requirements of an exacting order can be combined with careful selection, a high tone, and much *esprit de corps.*

Promotion in the Prussian service is by seniority, tempered by selection. If an officer is passed over two or three times, he generally accepts it as a hint to retire. If he does not take the hint, he is gazetted out. There are no examinations for promotion, except in the artillery and engineers. Not the slightest favour seems to have been shown to rank or position, as such, in the appointment of officers at the commencement of the war; but in all cases the men who occupied high command were such as had proved title to it by their experience and proved ability. The government, thinking it better to hurt the feelings of a man than to confide the fate of many thousands to him, if doubting his military talent or health, in several cases promoted juniors over the heads of the highest officers.

The landwehr is officered either by officers of the regular army who have quitted it within the limits of age, which render them liable to serve in the landwehr, or by means of an important provision which allows all young men of the educated classes who can clothe and arm themselves, to take service in the rifle corps and other light infantry; and after completing one year at their own expense to receive furlough to the end of their regular call, upon application. This rule was introduced, no doubt, to save the wealthy and well-born the degradation which, in a country essentially aristocratic, the mixture in a barrack-room with recruits of the lowest classes would necessarily imply; and there has been built upon it, during the last half century, the elaborate system of *Einjahrige*, or one-year volunteers, which has solved at once two difficult problems. The universality of the conscription has been maintained without open opposition from that important middle order, the wealth and influence of which has grown in Prussia as much as in any part of Europe, and which, notwithstanding its claims, is excluded from the higher parts of the army; while a body of efficient officers, trained in all the duties of the line, has been provided for the staff of the landwehr without expense to the state. As a necessary consequence of the growing wealth of the commercial classes, the number of these *Einjahrige* has annually increased; and it has long been a regular part of the education of the son of every manufacturer, proprietor, professional man, and even of every well-to-do shopkeeper, to spend one of the three years between his seventeenth and twentieth birthdays in passing through his volunteer course.

As might be expected where military service is compulsory, there are comparatively few among the privates who make soldiering a profession, and re-enlistments into the ranks of the standing army are not very numerous nor much encouraged. If a man wishes to re-enlist after the completion of his three years' term of service he is allowed to do so, provided the general commanding his brigade approves him; but he only re-enlists for one year, at the end of which either party can break off the engagement: or, if both consent to continue, a re-enlistment can be effected for another year, and so on. In time of war the soldier cannot break off his engagement at the end of the year, but must continue to serve till the war is over. At any time he can be discharged for misbehaviour. A man who re-enlists, generally, if well educated, becomes a non-commissioned officer; but neither the pay nor the position of a non-commissioned officer is

high enough to induce men to stay long in the army under ordinary circumstances. But a sufficiently powerful inducement is found in the fact that, after a man has served twelve years, during nine of which he has been a non-commissioned officer, he is certain to obtain a good civil appointment; for all vacancies among railway and telegraph officials, government clerks, overseers of the public forests, gendarmes, non-commissioned officers of police, post-office clerks, and gaolers, are filled from the ranks of the non-commissioned officers whose times of service in the army have expired.

As regards dress, the German army exhibits less variety than the soldiers of any other country. The prevailing colour, however, is such as not to unduly expose the men to the observation of an enemy. The uniform of the Prussian guard differs only from that of the line in having white ornaments on the collars: they wear the helmet, dark-blue tunic, white belt,* and black trousers with red stripes, similar to that of the British line. Their knapsacks, and those of the whole Prussian army, are of brown, undressed cowhide. The artillery differ from the line soldiers only in wearing black sword-belts instead of white, and in carrying a short rifle with a sword-bayonet, instead of the long rifle and straight bayonet of the line. This general uniformity between infantry and artillery gives a certain monotony to the appearance of large bodies of Prussian troops, as compared with those of other nations. There are exceptions, however. The chasseurs are dressed in dark green, with shakos similar to those of the British infantry, but larger; they carry a short rifle and short bayonet. The artillery carry their blanket, which is green, in a roll over the shoulder. Upon the whole, the only distinguishing mark of the various regiments is the colour of the facings. The Hessian contingents are distinguishable by their light-blue facings. The Bavarian infantry has not adopted the Prussian style of uniform, and retains the national green with red facings. The dragoon regiments are light blue. The hussars are red, black, green, brown, and light and dark blue. They wear shakos of miniver fur, and braided jackets. The Uhlans are principally dark blue, with lancer caps; they are the heaviest cavalry of the Prussian army, with the exception of the ten cuirassier regiments, who wear white uniforms, with steel breast and back plates and helmets, with high buff leather boots and gauntlets.

In the face of the astounding events of the late campaign, the Prussian system needs no one to point out its superiority in the attainment of its one great object—success in war. But nations do not live for war, and people may well ask themselves what sort of effect the organization has on the nation at large apart from its warlike ends?

The serious disadvantages of universal military service are of course obvious to every one. The ordinary German is compelled to serve for three years; for three years, therefore, his regular occupations are interfered with; and though this drawback is to some extent remedied by the one year's service of those who have received a certain amount of education, fixed by government, the interference is, no doubt, very serious. This objection really sums up nearly every disadvantage which has been ascribed to the Prussian military system; and without denying its validity, it may be well to ask what the system has to give in return for so great a sacrifice?

The first point, which may sound very like a paradox, is that the Prussian military organization is essentially anti-warlike; it affords a guarantee against war. Just because every man is a soldier, just because war leaves hardly a home in Germany unscathed, just because every mother and every wife is "feelingly persuaded" what war means, the system tends to discourage war. The army is not composed of a set of professional soldiers to whom war means wealth, honours, and advancement, but of peaceful citizens called from their occupations, from the plough and from the study, from the workshop and the law court, who fight with a savage indignation, which carries all before it, when provoked, but at the same time affords a safe guarantee that war will not be undertaken for purposes of conquest or the establishment of a dynasty. Other advantages of the system are that, in addition to its military character, it is at the same time a system of education. Every soldier has had a certain amount of education in his youth; but when he comes to serve his time it often happens that his knowledge is, to say the least, very rusty, and sadly in want of a little brushing up. This the recruit receives with his drill, and what he

* A great many regiments have now been permitted to adopt the black belt, and it is believed that the black belt will ultimately become universal.

then learns is not so easily forgotten, owing to his riper age. But the Prussian system does more than merely freshen up the memories of those who come immediately under it. It stimulates education throughout the country by dismissing, after one year's service, those who possess certain attainments fixed by government, and by requiring every officer to pass a special examination.

Almost of equal importance with the mental is the bodily training which every German has to pass through as a soldier. Even in England a little drilling is considered a good thing for young men; at any rate we have our games, our cricket and football, our rackets and fives, to strengthen our muscles and lengthen our wind. The Germans have nothing of the sort. To such a people the value of drilling, and the installation of a little soldierly pride, is hardly to be over-estimated. In his soldier-life the German learns habits of self-control and neatness, and a certain amount of dandyism which to him at least is little more than a wholesome corrective.

In another respect the military system does what in England is one of the most valuable results of her public schools and universities. It brings together on a footing of perfect equality high and low, rich and poor. It is a mill in which men "rub each other's edges down." The aristocrat learns to understand the feelings of the democrat, and the democrat finds that the aristocrat is after all a man very much like himself. Of greater value still is military service to that class rapidly increasing in Germany, which is devoted to the pursuit of money. A young banker's son, who hardly knows what hardship means, suddenly comes to know that other things have a value besides money. He finds no amount of money will save him from exactly the same duties which his groom has to perform, and learns military obedience and devotion.

Among the lower orders, the necessity of military service encourages saving, while it delays marriage till the time of service is past. The German knows that he will have to leave his farm and occupations for a time, and therefore prepares for the time of need. At the same time his absence raises the importance of the women of his family. They must be prepared to undertake the management of his business, and must be acquainted with all its details, so that to a certain extent the position of the women is elevated.

The benefits derived from such a system are thus many and obvious. Its economy is also evident when we reflect that Prussia conducted two European campaigns (1864 and 1866) at about the same expense that England incurred in the expedition to Abyssinia. Although the Prussian is the most perfect of all armies in its equipments, the Prussian soldier is maintained at an average cost of about £29 10*s.* per head per annum. The French army, which shared with it the economy resulting from compulsory, and therefore underpaid labour, and which could not boast of anything like its efficiency in the non-combatant departments, cost above one-third more, or £41 10*s.* per head; whilst in England the expense is three times as great, being over £90 a year per man.

Another immense advantage, at least to a nation with a free form of government, is the absolute certainty that no such nation would ever incur the horrors of war except in a truly national cause and as a case of necessity. While hostilities last Prussia and North Germany have only one business in hand—the war. All other labour and industry is in abeyance, and every one out of three in the million of men under arms represents the sustenance of a family, a unit in the aggregate sustenance of the state. What a strain a campaign of twelve months' duration would be upon a community organized on Prussian military principles has not yet been tried; but it is an experiment from which Prussian rulers must at all times shrink. War reduces Germany to a state of suspended animation. Were the ordeal indefinitely prolonged, utter exhaustion must ensue. In England, a man may say, "Well, it will cost me twopence, perhaps fourpence, or even sixpence in the pound additional income tax; but that is the worst that can happen, and if we only win, I can stand that." But the same individual would think, speak, and vote very differently if he knew that he himself would have to shoulder his musket, leave home, friends, and comfort, to brave the perils of the field.

The Prussian system, brought as nearly as can be to perfection, has been seen to work admirably in the last three campaigns in which the nation has been engaged. It has been tried to the uttermost, and unmistakably asserts its superiority over every other. In fact, it is undoubtedly the greatest triumph of perfect organization the world has ever seen. On the 15th of July war against

Prussia was declared by France, and no great difficulty was supposed to stand in the way of a rapid dash across the Rhine and a triumphant progress to Berlin. On the 17th of July, however, General von Moltke is reported to have said, "Give me to the 3rd of August, and we are safe." Just three days after the given date, on the 6th of August, the French army was driven back, and the German nation in arms commenced its victorious progress into the very heart of France.

The lessons taught by every campaign of modern times have been carefully studied by Prussia with a view to improvement. While Europe gazed astonished at her successes in 1866, the Prussians themselves, so far from boasting, were not at all satisfied, and set to work immediately to remedy what experience showed to be the weak points of their army; notably in the case of their artillery, to the performances of which much of their success in France was due, and to which the emperor attributed the disasters to his army, resulting in the most memorable capitulation ever recorded in history—that of Sedan.

Part of the Prussian batteries at Sadowa were of the old smooth-bore construction, but of the breech-loading guns many batteries had been carried into the field. In the war of 1870 all confusion and uncertainty had passed away, and the simplest and most efficient breech-loading piece had been adopted throughout. The artillery service aud the proportion of horses and drivers maintained in peace had also been brought up to a higher standard; the experience of 1866 having clearly shown that a large infusion of raw elements into the field artillery, to strengthen it suddenly, defeated its object by crippling the efficiency of the batteries. A full comparison between the Prussian and French artillery, and the system generally pursued in each arm by this branch of the service, is given in the next chapter; but as relating exclusively to Prussia, we give here a description of the great Prussian gun, illustrated on Plate 4, which was one of the articles sent by the firm of F. Krupp, of Essen, in Rhenish Prussia, to the Paris exhibition, 1867. At the commencement of the war of 1870 it was placed to defend the naval port of Wilhelmshaven. It is a rifled breech-loader, made entirely of cast steel, and supported on a steel carriage. The central cylindrical tube forming this piece of ordnance is made of a solid forging of steel, and weighs by itself, in its finished state, about twenty tons. The weight of the cast-steel block employed in the manufacture of this tube was forty-eight tons, there being a waste of more than 50 per cent. of the original ingot caused by the operations of forging, turning and boring, and by cutting off the crop ends of the rough block. There are three superposed rings shrunk on to this central tube, the last ring inclosing the breech being forged in one piece with the trunnions, and made without any weld. The rings are of different lengths, as usual with built-up guns; and the whole is diminished in thickness towards the muzzle, only not tapered, but turned in parallel steps of decreasing diameter. The three superposed rings weigh thirty tons in all, and they are produced by a process similar to that followed in the production of weldless steel tyres. All these parts were hammered under the fifty-ton hammer constructed by M. Krupp for his own use. The weight and dimensions of this gun are as follows:—

Total weight, including breech, .	50 tons.
Weight of breech-piece, . .	15 cwts.
Diameter of bore, . .	14 inches (English).
Total length of barrel, . .	210·25 inches.
Rifling.	
Number of grooves, . .	40.
Depth of grooves, . .	0·15 inch.
Pitch, ...	980 inches and 1014·4 inches
Projectiles.	
Weight of solid steel shot, . .	1212 lbs. (English).
Total weight of steel shell, 765 lbs.	
Lead coating, . . 200 lbs,	
Charge, . . . 16 lbs.	
	981 lbs. Pruss. or 1080 lbs. Eng.
Weight of powder charge, . .	110 to 130 lbs. (English).

The gun carriage weighs about fifteen tons, and is placed upon a turntable, the total weight of which comes up to twenty-five tons. This also is made wholly of steel. The arrangements for working the gun are such, that it can be managed by two men with sufficient speed and accuracy for all practical requirements.

The manufacture of this piece of ordnance occupied a time exceeding sixteen months, the work being carried on without interruption day and night, including Sundays. There were no railway trucks in existence sufficiently strong to transport this gun, so M. Krupp designed and built a special truck at his own works for that purpose. This truck is made entirely of steel and iron, runs on six pairs of wheels, and weighs, when empty, twenty-three tons. The price of the gun was 105,000 Prussian dollars, without the carriage.



KRUPP'S 1000-POUNDER GUN.



The complete piece, with carriage and turntable, cost 145,000 thalers, or £21,750.

It will be a fitting conclusion to our explanation of the Prussian military system, if we give a description of the weapon which Prussia was the foremost nation to adopt, and the remarkable success of which has caused quite a revolution in the manufacture of small-arms. To be loaded at the breech, and to be fired by the penetration of a needle into a detonating cap within the cartridge, are distinct attributes in a weapon. And although the latter system has only been before the public for about thirty years, systems for breech-loading have been tried, accepted, and abandoned without number during the last three centuries. Indeed, a sort of instinct dictates that loading at the breech is the preferable course; and all the earlier muskets were so made, the system being doubtless abandoned from the difficulty of accurately closing the breech, in those days of rough workmanship. The extraordinary efficacy, however, of these combined principles only came into special prominence during the Prussian wars of 1864 and 1866. In the face of such an irresistible argument, every other power hastened to either prepare new arms, or to convert their existing stock into needle-firing breech-loaders of as good a construction as circumstances would permit.

The first patent for the needle-gun was taken out in England, December 13, 1831, by one Abraham Adolph Moser, who pressed his invention upon the British government, but meeting with no encouragement tried his fortune abroad, and at last obtained the patronage of the Prussian war office. Various improvements were suggested by Dreyse, a gunmaker of Sömmerada, and the perfected arm was put into the hands of the Prussian infantry in 1848. Other modifications have since been introduced, so as to render it lighter and more manageable, and considerable improvements were about to be introduced into it just as the present war broke out, and which were in consequence postponed. On Plate 3 two engravings of the weapon are shown, and in its present stage of development it may be described as follows:—

The barrel is closed by a sliding plunger or bolt, which can be pushed forward against the barrel, or withdrawn for the admission of the cartridge. In the former position it is secured by turning it, with the assistance of a small knob or lever, a quarter circle to the right, on the principle of a common door bolt. The plunger is hollow; its front end forming, when the arm is shut, a sort of cap to the back end of the barrel, the two being coned to correspond with each other. The long steel needle, from which the gun derives its name, and by which the explosion of the charge is effected, works in the hollow bolt, being driven forward by means of a spiral spring. The spring and needle are set, and the needle, so to speak, cocked by means of a trigger. The action of the trigger likewise releases the needle, which is shot forward into a patch of detonating composition in the centre of the cartridge.

The ammunition consists of an egg-shaped bullet, whose base is imbedded in a *papier-mâché* sabot. The fulminate is placed in the hinder part of the sabot; and behind this again, in a thin paper case which is choked over the apex of the bullet, is the powder.

The alterations proposed in the needle-gun, but which were deferred by the advent of war, are very slight. The whole change consists in the insertion of a caoutchouc ring, which does not increase the efficiency, but facilitates the handling of the arm, and in a new cartridge with a smaller ball, and a proportionate increase in the thickness of the case. As the barrel remains the same, both the old and new cartridge may be employed indiscriminately, the only difference being that the smaller ball would have a wider range than the larger one. A comparison of the relative merits of the needle-gun and the Chassepot, as also of the artillery of the two countries, is given in the next chapter.

A characteristic of the Germans during the war with France was the deliberation with which the men aimed and fired, though they had in their hands a needle-gun, tempting them to fire eight shots a minute. As long as the Prussians had their old firelocks they stood in three ranks, if standing in line of battle. The two foremost ranks fired only; the men in the third rank had only to charge their guns, and to exchange them for the empty ones of the second rank. Now two ranks only are formed in battle, but the great amount of firing is done by skirmishers kneeling or lying. It is an old experience that the soldiers, if firing quick, very frequently do not take time to bring their guns in the right position, but fire without aiming, and before the barrels of their guns are in a horizontal position. Those

that fire in a kneeling position cannot fire high, without doing it purposely.

The formation of the Prussian navy only dates from 1848, and even up to 1864 it was very insignificant. But the result of the Danish war in that year, and the annexations made in 1866, rendered the possession of a powerful navy more than ever necessary to the welfare of Prussia. At the commencement of the present war she had six powerful iron-clads, the largest being the *König Wilhelm*, designed by Mr. E. J. Reed, then chief constructor of the English navy, and originally built for the Turkish government at the Thames Ironworks. The Sultan, however, being unable to pay for her, she was offered at the same price to the Board of Admiralty, who declined to buy her, and Prussia at once came forward and offered £487,500, or £30,000 more. Seeing their mistake, the English Admiralty then tried to outbid, but was too late. The vessel has a speed of fourteen knots, is plated with eight-inch armour, and carries twenty-eight guns, four 300-pounders, and twenty-four rifled 96-pounders made of Krupp's hammered steel, and capable of being fired with seventy-five lbs. charges twice in a minute. Besides this and five other iron-clads, there were nine screw frigates and corvettes, and eighty-six small vessels and sailing ships, carrying in the whole 542 guns, and manned by 5000 men and marines. The sailors and marines are raised by conscription from amongst the seafaring population, which is exempt on this account from service in the army. Great inducements are held out for able seamen to volunteer in the navy, and the number who have done so in recent years has been very large. The total seafaring population of North Germany is estimated at 80,000.

During the last few years Prussia has done her best to strengthen her power in the Baltic and North Seas. On both these seas she has an important and an uninterrupted line of coast, where she has endeavoured to establish ports which might be useful either in time of peace or war. On the Baltic she has three ports: Dantzic, on the extreme east; Stralsund, midway between Memel and Holstein; and Kiel, the most important, which is established in a fine bay in Holstein. Of these three ports Kiel is the strongest and most formidable, and is supposed to be regarded by Russia with some degree of suspicion and alarm. The most superficial glance on the map will show its importance to the Prussians. When complete, it is so well situated, both geographically and locally, as to show that it may easily be made the Cherbourg of the Baltic. It is said that the Baltic will then be merely a Prussian lake, and that Prussia, without any difficulty, will not only be able to close the entrance to foreign fleets, but will possess the most complete power over Copenhagen. Wilhelmshaven, in the bay of Jahde, in the North Sea, one of the most important harbours for the newly-founded German navy, was opened by King William I. in 1869. It forms a vast artificial construction of granite, and comprises five separate harbours, with canals, sluices to regulate the tide, and an array of dry docks for ordinary and iron-clad vessels. Its total cost of construction was £1,500,000.

CHAPTER V.

Sketch of the Organization of the Regular Army in France—State of things prior to the time of Louis XIV., and from that period to the Great Revolution—"Levée en Masse" in 1793—The Genius of Carnot—Wonderful Successes of the French Army in 1794—Introduction of the Law of Conscription—Nothing done by Napoleon to improve the Organic Constitution of the Army—Exhaustion of France after the Battle of Waterloo—Re-establishment of the Army in 1818—The State of the Army under the Second Empire—Alarm at the Success of Prussia at the Battle of Sadowa—Most important alterations made in 1868—The chief provisions of the Army Re-organization Act explained—The system of purchasing Substitutes—Broad Results of the New Act, and the Number and Composition of the Army intended to have been secured by it—Great Power given to the Emperor—Comparison of the French and Prussian Systems—Objections to the former—Serious effect of the Conscription on the Population in France—Failure of the Act of 1868—Reasons of Failure stated—Delusion entertained as to the National Guard—Actual Force in France at the commencement of the War—Weakness of the French Commissariat—The System explained—Contrast with that of Prussia—Rapid Strategy and Mobility of Force essential to Modern Warfare—Favour shown in France to the Corps d'Élite a weakness to the general Army—The Accoutrement of the French Soldier far too heavy—No important alteration made in the System of Tactics in France for nearly eighty years—Prussian Tactics the subject of incessant study and improvement—Enthusiasm of the French Troops of no use against Modern Weapons—Difference of Discipline in the French and Prussian Armies—Want of respect for their Officers amongst the French—Causes of the absence of Discipline on the part of the French traced chiefly to the tone of Society under the Empire—The Conscription now regarded only as a Blood-tax on the Poor for the benefit of the Rich—Evils of the "Exoneration" system—Paper Soldiers—Corruption on the part of the Government—Education and Training of the French Officers not calculated to create habits of command—Too many Court Generals, and incapacity of the État Major—The Destructive and Marauding Habits of the French Troops increased of late years—Rapidity of the decline in the *Prestige* of the French Army—Full description of the Chassepot and its Cartridge—Comparison with the Needle-Gun—The Mitrailleuse—Description of the Weapon, and also of the Gatling Gun—Importance of Artillery in War—Superiority of the Prussian Field Artillery over that of the French—The Guns and Projectiles, and the practice of firing in both Armies explained and contrasted—Breech *versus* Muzzle Loaders—The Strength and Composition of the French Navy.

THE history of the organization of the regular army of France commences in the middle of the seventeenth century. Prior to the reign of Louis XIV. war was carried on by men-at-arms, troops of horse, and bodies of sharpshooters who bore little relation to a modern army. The soldier was equally brave, and more independent; but the art of acting in great masses, and the discipline by which the individual is entirely merged in the corps to which he belongs, is of comparatively recent date. The formation of regular armies required systematic organization—uniformity of arms and dress, regularity of advancement, stricter conditions of service, graduated pay, and more certain methods of insuring the sustenance of troops.

These are the elements of which Louvois was the first great master, and by his careful application of them he contributed more to the success of the arms of Louis XIV. than Turenne and Luxemburg, who led the French forces to victory in the field. The organization of Louvois lasted, with no material changes, until 1793; it perished in that great convulsion which overthrew the monarchy and the privileged classes, who had played so great a part in it. In the French army, thus constituted during the eighteenth century, most of the peculiarities prevailed which have now disappeared from every European army but that of England. The men were raised by voluntary enlistment. The regiments retained a local name and character from the districts to which they belonged; the brigades of Picardy, Normandy, Champagne, and Auvergne corresponding to the Coldstream Guards, Sutherland or Gordon Highlanders, Connaught Rangers, or Welsh Fusileers in the United Kingdom. The king's household troops were a privileged corps, with this distinction, however, that in the Royal Guards and Musketeers the purchase system never obtained, and that they were open to all ranks of society. In the rest of the army, regiments and companies having been originally raised by private persons for the service of the crown, had become a species of property, like commissions in the British army. The old French army was a highly aristocratic institution; for although the purchase of commissions was tolerated, Louvois had contrived to make the military service rather onerous than profitable, and the consequence was that the rich and the noble alone could hold them. The French nobility served with unflinching courage and enthusiasm; they were as ready to spend their fortunes in the purchase of a step as to spend their blood on the field of battle. Commissions were sometimes

vouchsafed by the king to private soldiers of signal valour and merit, but the *noblesse d'épée* may as a rule be said to have officered the army. The latter was essentially royal and aristocratic when the revolutionary storm of 1789 burst on France, and swept away both the nobility and the throne.

In 1791 the French army consisted of 166 regiments of foot and horse. These troops were well trained, but the corps were numerically weak; and the political agitation of the time had shaken the unity and self-reliance of the army. The consequence was that the outset of the war was disastrous; and the prodigious enthusiasm and energy of the volunteers of 1792 and 1793 alone restored victory to the standards of the Republic. The events of these years proved at once the value and the weakness of a great volunteer movement. The popular movement of 1792 saved France; but in the following year, when it was opposed to the renewed operations of regular troops, the spell was broken, the charm was over. The army of the Rhine was thrown across the Lauter; the army of the north was driven out of Belgium; and it became more than ever difficult to raise men for the necessary service of the country. On the 1st of January, 1793, the eight armies of the French republic had not more than 150,000 men in their ranks. For, as the Duc d'Aumale, in an able work on the military institutions of France, has said:—"It is of the essence of special volunteer corps not to renew their strength, although the mere existence of these corps seriously interferes with and may arrest enlistment for the line." It might be worth while for the leaders of public opinion in England to consider how far this remark applies to our popular volunteer movement, as well as to the great French rising of 1792. The French patriots of 1791 having enlisted for one year, took their discharge when that time had elapsed, and 60,000 of them returned home. The Convention called out 300,000 national guards, but the measure failed for want of authority to raise them. Toulon was taken by the English, Lyons was in insurrection, the eastern departments were invaded, the country was in a supreme hour of danger, when Carnot joined the Committee of Public Safety, and six days afterwards the "*levée en masse*" of the nation was decreed by the Convention. At that moment sprang to life the national army of France. A former law had placed all citizens from the age of eighteen to forty (at one moment even from sixteen to forty-five) under the grasp of arbitrary rule, and subjected them to the caprice of a local authority. The law of the 20th August, 1793, was more harsh in appearance, but less vexatious and oppressive in reality. It abolished the local discretionary power, confined itself to men from eighteen to twenty-five, but within those limits *took them all.* In six months all the pressure of the Reign of Terror had failed to raise 300,000 men under the earlier law. In three months the general levy was effected without serious opposition under the later law, and on the 1st January, 1794, the strength of the army had risen to 770,932.

This vast army was consolidated by the genius of Carnot into one uniform machine. All distinctions of corps, and even the grades of the non-commissioned officers, were abolished. Local appellations of regiments were superseded by numbers, and the uniform of the whole army became identical; the white livery of the Crown being exchanged for the blue tunic of the Republic. Such was the constitution of the immortal armies of the "Sambre et Meuse," and of the "Rhin et Moselle," which saved France on the plains of Fleurus, won twenty-seven victories in a year, captured 3800 guns, and dissolved the European coalition.

The law of conscription was first established in France on the 5th September, 1798, fourteen months before the 18th Brumaire; and the statute which placed the population at the disposal of the state, as each succeeding generation completed its twentieth year, preceded the power which was to make so tremendous a use of it. From that time to the present, the youth of France just entering upon manhood has been cropped by law, like the tracts in a forest set apart for annual felling; and though the amount has varied, the principle of conscription is now deeply rooted in the law and the habits of the nation, although it devours so large a proportion of the adult male population. The first act of the First Consul was to demand, not an instalment of the conscription, but the whole class of the year, amounting to 100,000 men, and to take severe measures against every evasion of the law. These demands and measures increased in intensity throughout his reign. It is remarkable, however, that Napoleon, the greatest master of the art of modern warfare, did nothing to improve the organic constitution of the army. He employed

the military resources of the country with consummate ability, and with insatiable rapacity; but he consumed everything that he created. The permanent military strength of France could not keep pace with his extravagant demands upon it; and the termination of the empire was the annihilation of the force by which it had been raised to the highest pinnacle of power and glory.

For three years after the battle of Waterloo France remained without an army, and the allied forces were not all withdrawn from her territory, when Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, minister of war under the Restoration, undertook in 1818 the difficult task of re-organizing the military institutions of the kingdom. The peace establishment of the army was fixed at 240,000 men, to be raised by an annual conscription of 40,000 men, enlisted for six years. The reserve was to be composed of soldiers belonging to the levies of the preceding ten years, but this part of the scheme failed. No man could be an officer, who had not passed a certain time in the ranks, or gone through one of the military schools. The guard was retained, and consisted of 30,000 men. The annual conscription on the peace establishment was raised successively to 60,000 and 80,000 by the government of Louis Philippe. Under the second empire it became at least 100,000; and during the Crimean and Italian wars 140,000 men was the annual contingent.

The efficient strength of the French army in 1867, including the staff, the gendarmerie, and the military train, was 389,604 men; of whom 23,105 were officers, 70,850 non-commissioned officers, 26,374 unclassed companies, musicians, &c., and 229,275 private soldiers. From this number, 80,000 must be deducted for home garrisons, depôts, and the force serving in Africa. A further deduction must be made of at least one-seventh for the raw conscripts of the year, and of another considerable fraction of men entitled to their discharge, as having served their time. By calling in the whole reserve of the contingents, the nominal strength of the army might have been raised to 600,000 men, but the actual strength was very far below that figure. As conscripts were allowed to commute or buy off their actual service by paying a certain sum to the military chest, a further deduction must be made for those who paid their debt of military service in money, and not in person. From 1856 to 1865 the average annual number of these exceeded 20,000 men, or one-fifth of the whole conscription, in years of peace; but in 1859 and 1860, when the army was on a war footing, and the conscription was raised to 140,000, the number of "exonerations" exceeded 44,000, or nearly *one-third of the whole* contingent.

The result is, that in the wars of the Crimea and of Italy, France could only send to the field, and maintain by reinforcements, an army not much exceeding one-fourth of her nominal effective strength; and it is well known that in 1867, when the Luxembourg question was supposed to threaten war, the Emperor Napoleon could not immediately have sent above 150,000 men to the Rhine, and these, in case of a check, could not, under several months, have been supported by a second army. The startling success of the campaign ending with the battle of Sadowa caused a shock of surprise and alarm through France; and in the uneasiness that followed, the highest military authorities of the nation came to the conclusion that they were not in a position to meet on an equal footing the state of things which the system of the Prussian armies and the consolidation of Germany had produced in Europe.

Accordingly, in 1868, most important alterations were introduced by the "Army Re-organization Act." The conscription system was still retained, and the forces of the country classified in three divisions: the Active Army, the Army of Reserve, and the National Guard. The duration of service in the active army was fixed at five years, at the expiration of which time the soldier had to enter the reserve for four years longer. The period of service of the young men who had not been comprised in the active army, was four years in the reserve, and five in the national guard. The young men drawn for the active army were permitted to purchase substitutes from the government, but the privilege was withheld from the men of the reserve. They might, however, interchange with those of the National Guard, or furnish as substitute a man under thirty-two years of age, fulfilling the conditions required for military service, and liberated from all other obligations. Substitutes were formerly procured through private agencies, but an imperial decree in 1855 made the right to furnish them a government monopoly. The price to be paid for substitutes was fixed annually, and varied. In 1868 the minister of war settled it at 2500 francs, or £100. This sum, increased by various other items, was supposed to be thrown

into an army fund, out of which the substitutes were paid a certain amount at the time of enlistment, besides receiving an increase of pay at the end of seven years, another increase at the end of fourteen, and a pension of one franc, or tenpence a day, was to be given after a service of forty-five years. Soldiers were allowed to re-enlist as long as they were fit for service, and re-enlistments were greatly encouraged, so as to give the army a standing nucleus of experienced troops, who had made the military service their life-profession.

By the terms of the Act of 1868, the number of men to be drafted every year was fixed at 160,000, but more might be voted. The number to be called out in each department was settled by imperial decree, and the contingent for each canton by the prefect. The broad result of the law was to give the emperor the absolute command, for military purposes, of the entire male population between the ages of twenty and thirty. Every Frenchman, on attaining his twentieth year, was liable to nine years' military service. Previous to 1832, the period of compulsory enlistment was eight years, and from 1832 to 1868 seven years. Under the new system, not only were two years added to the enlistment, but the chances of escaping it were greatly curtailed. It was intended to maintain about 400,000 men in the active army, 430,000 in the reserve, and 408,000 in the national guard. The latter force was destined as an auxiliary to the active army in the defence of the fortresses, coasts, and frontier of the empire, and in the maintenance of order in the interior. The preceding figures give a total of 1,238,000 men, but the emperor could increase the force at pleasure. In any year he could, if he chose, call on the whole "class" of young men twenty years old, supposed to number about 300,000; the reserve could be rendered available for service in the field on the same conditions as the army; and the national guard called out for active duty in the room of the reserve by a special law, or, in the interval of the session, by a decree which was to be presented within twenty-one days to the legislative body. It will be thus seen that from 1868 conscripts were for nine years at the call of the government, their service being divided between the army (five years) and reserve (four years), or between the reserve (four years) and the national guard (five years). The regulation stature was reduced to 5 feet 1¼ inches, a modification favourable to tall men, as the number of conscripts was thus increased, and they had a better chance of not serving in the active army. The reserves could, it is true, be called out by the emperor in time of war, but it was understood that such expeditions as those of Rome, or Mexico, or China, or Syria, did not constitute a time of war, which term, in fact, implied a serious menace of collision with some great Continental power. A French soldier was able to marry after having passed one year in the reserve, unless stopped by an imperial decree calling out that force. The married men of the reserve had to perform the same duties as their single comrades. Substitutes were again allowed, and the old offices where a man could step in and purchase another fellow to serve in his stead rose from their ashes. The movable national guard consisted of such Frenchmen as did not belong to the active army or reserve, and had no legal cause of exemption. If a man had a substitute in the active army or reserve, he must, nevertheless, belong to the national guard. These men served for five years, and in this force no substitutes were allowed, as in time of peace the duties would be light, and in time of war every man would be required at his post.

The amended plan was avowedly based on the Prussian system, but with two important differences. The period of service in the active army, which was five years in France, is only three years in Prussia. Again, only half of the French reserve was composed of conscripts who had seen actual service—the other half were of inferior efficiency. In Prussia, on the contrary, the reserve is wholly composed of experienced troops, who have spent three years under colours. In France the conscript was free at the age of twenty-nine, while in Prussia the war office retains its hold over him till he is thirty-two, and, indeed, if the landsturm is taken into account, for a longer period. But in peace a Prussian conscript is after three years practically at liberty to return to civil pursuits, the distribution of the reserve being so arranged that the men composing it can remain in their own town or village among their friends and associates, except during the brief annual exercises. The French conscript, however, was bound for five years in the army; and if the reserve had been made really efficient, the conscripts who there began their military career would have had to devote more time to it than the Prussian reserve men

(who have already been trained, and need only a little "setting-up" drill to freshen their recollection), and would have found the requirements of the service injuriously interfere with their ordinary occupations. The French plan, therefore, while more oppressive than the Prussian one, provided a less efficient reserve.

When the proportion between the conscription and the population is considered, a still more serious objection arises to the French system. It is calculated that about 320,000 young men every year reach the age of twenty in France, but of these quite *half* obtain exemption from military service on account of being included in one or other of the following classes:—Those below the standard; those whose infirmities unfit them for soldiering; the eldest of a family of orphans; the only son or eldest son, or, in default of son or stepson, the only or eldest grandson of a widow, or of a blind father, or of a father aged seventy; the eldest of two brothers drawn for service, if the younger is fit to serve; those who have a brother actually serving, not as a substitute; those who have had a brother killed or disabled in the service. Hence there were only some 160,000 men to supply the contingent of the year. Formerly the contingent stood at 100,000 in times of peace, but the Act of 1868 having raised it to 160,000, it will be seen that the conscription every year carried off every young man who was twenty years of age, and fit for service; and no margin was left for the necessities of war. Accordingly, the whole able-bodied male population of France was bound to military service of one kind or another between the ages of twenty and thirty. In Prussia there is some chance of escape from the army, even for those who are not cripples or invalids. The nominal "class" of the year is 170,000; deducting men unfit for arms, there remain some 75,000 to supply the annual contingent of 60,000. In Prussia, a conscript can marry after his three years' service under the colours. In France, six years at least was the period during which marriage was forbidden.

If we consider the French conscription in its effect upon the population, the case assumes a most serious aspect. At least a century of peace was necessary after 1815, to enable the population to recover from the tremendous drain of the wars of the first empire. Statistics prove that the levy of 100,000 men, more or less, under arms, instantly produces a marked effect on the population. When the conscription was 40,000 men the population rapidly increased; with 60,000 the progress was slower; with 80,000, slower still; with 100,000 it was arrested; with 140,000 (in 1854 and 1855) it positively declined. The population of France has for many years increased more slowly than that of any other country, and under the Army Act of 1868 there seemed no prospect before it but rapid decline. No surprise can be felt at such a phenomenon when we remember that 160,000 stout and able-bodied young men were marched off every year to the barracks or the camp; that for at least six years they were unable to contract marriage; and that their more fortunate contemporaries who remained at home, cultivated their fields, married, and reared children, were precisely those who were rejected by the conscription on account of their diminutive size, their feeble constitutions, or other infirmities.

So far as results are concerned the Act of 1868 may really be said to have been a failure. In execution it fell very far short of its express intention, viz., of enabling the emperor to have 800,000 fighting men at his disposal, and of raising the available military strength of the empire to upwards of 1,200,000 men. The reasons of its failure are not hard to find. The imperial government did not possess the unequivocal or undivided confidence of any class of French citizens. The emperor, whose will was the only tangible form of authority, could not boast of high military talents, and had been unfortunate in several of his military experiments. After him there had not been for many years in France any general of such indisputable pre-eminence and authority, that he could at once give the vigour and unity of paramount command to the whole military system. As there did not exist any immediate and stirring motive for such a measure of national armament beyond the successes of a neighbour, the measure did not meet with popular sympathy; and a government whose relations with the people were never the most cordial, hesitated to enforce to the letter an objectionable law. The government even lacked the courage or strength to put into execution some of its mildest and least vexatious provisions, such as the training and arming of the garde mobile. If the policy of Napoleon III., after the passing of the Act of 1868, had not been characterized by such infirmity of purpose and fatal timidity and vacillation, the so-called "Army of the Rhine" of 1870

would not have been so hopelessly overwhelmed, outnumbered, and broken up as it was by the Prussian forces.

The great national guard, of which so much was expected, having been wilfully maintained in a condition which rendered it perfectly worthless in time of war, the notion that France had a great reserve on which to fall back, was found, when too late, to have been a delusion. The regular army were soldiers; but the national guard had neither drill, nor arms, nor officers worthy of the name. The reason of this is manifest enough in the extreme reluctance of the Bonapartist ministry to place arms in the hands of the civil population; and it must be remembered that before the French army had suffered a single reverse, the disaffection of the garde mobile had been so abundantly demonstrated in the camp at Chalons, that it was thought prudent to teach the bulk of the men drill with sticks instead of Chassepots.

At the commencement of the war the regular army of France was 400,000 men, of whom 40,000 were at Cherbourg getting ready for the Baltic, 5000 in Italy, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in Paris and Châlons, 10,000 in Lyons, and at least 30,000 more in Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, L'Orient, Rochefort, and the hospitals, leaving only 270,000 efficients for the front—that is, eight corps d'armée of 30,000 each, and the guard. On this army rushed, by German official accounts, the Crown Prince with 210,000 men, Prince Frederick Charles with 220,000 more, and Steinmetz with 90,000, or 520,000 in all. In addition to these, to reinforce German losses, there was "the second line"—the 200,000 soldiers encamped between the Rhine and the Weser.

An element of very considerable weakness in the French system, was to be found in what is called the administration of the army, better known in England as the commissariat. In time of peace it is difficult to learn the art of supplying an army in the field. In peace the delivery of contracts is perfectly simple, regular, and easy. In war everything—time, place, and demand—is urgent, difficult, and irregular. The only method of dealing with so many unforeseen contingencies is not by military routine, but by a ready and complete knowledge of business. But all the officers of the French commissariat had served for years in the army itself; and the heads of the department, or intendants, were superannuated generals. The consequence was, that these persons knew nothing of the operations of trade, by which alone supply can adjust itself to demand. During the Italian campaign of 1859, the French troops were often without bread, in one of the richest corn-bearing regions of Europe. Biscuit was equally deficient, and an attempt was made to supply the place of these necessaries by polenta, which the men could not eat, because they did not know how to cook it! The commissariat knew nothing about buying and selling food; they could only distribute it.

It will be seen, therefore, that the French were not only outnumbered and out-generalled, but that their organization completely broke down. The Prussians, at a distance from their own supplies, and consequently compelled to maintain a long line of communication through an enemy's country, were better furnished with matériel and food than the French. They succeeded in moving their wounded more rapidly from the field of battle; and their operations were never impeded by a want of transport. It is impossible, on the other hand, to explain some of the delays of the French generals except on the supposition that their transport failed them. Even the great disaster at Sedan might have been averted, or lessened, if MacMahon had been able to move at the rate of twenty miles a day. An admirable organization enabled the Prussians easily to accomplish distances which a want of it made it hopeless for the French to attempt.

On the French system the ministry of war, through a great department—the Intendance—monopolizes the whole business of the army. It musters the troops, checks the pay lists, issues provisions, fuel, forage, and clothing, supervises the hospital service, manages the whole transport of the army, and takes charge of all the matériel of war. The system of the Prussians is the exact reverse. Instead of centralizing, they have decentralized. Instead of providing one intendance for the whole army, they have aimed at making each corps d'armée complete in itself. Each corps has its own stores and its own reserves, and draws its supplies from its depôts without the necessity of reference to a central authority. In France the entire transport is under the control of the Intendance, and the vehicles may be used for any purpose or for any regiment for which they may be temporarily required. In Prussia the duties of

the central authority are confined to the simple task of replenishing the depôts from which each corps draws its stores; every corps Intendance has control over its own carriages, which can only be used for the service of the particular corps to which they are attached. Each corps has means at its disposal for the carriage of its reserve ammunition, its hospital service, its stores, and its supplies, and not only is adequate transport provided for each corps, but sufficient vehicles are furnished for each object. The ammunition waggons, the hospital carts, the store train, are all distinct from each other, and under the orders of separate officers, though subject to the commands of the general of the corps. The preference which has been shown by many high authorities for the French plan, is based on the supposition that the requirements of an army are so various and so incapable of being foreseen, that it is wasteful to maintain separate matériel for each regiment. One regiment may be stationed in a barren country, the other in a fertile one. The one may be far from its resources, the other near them. In either case the one would require more elaborate means of transport than the other, and, if each were provided with the same amount, half the horses in the one case would be standing idle, while all the beasts in the other would be worked to death. But this criticism overlooks the fact, that the Prussians knowingly provide a transport which in some cases may prove extravagant, in order that they may be quite sure that in every instance it may be adequate. And thus, at the outbreak of war, each regiment in the Prussian army is ready to move at a moment's notice, while the French cannot move a step till the Intendance has undertaken a preliminary distribution of stores, matériel, and transport. The French, from the nature of their system, were organizing while the Prussians were marching. Their organization may prove admirable, if they can fight at their own time. It must fail before an enemy prepared to assume at the very outbreak of the war an active offensive. In short, it is suited for the dilatory operations of ancient warfare. It is wholly unfitted for the sudden and rapid movements of modern armies.

The same principles of rapid strategy and mobility of force have ever been the keys of victory, whether this rapidity and mobility have been gained by improvement of roads, improvement of organization, adaptations of scientific discoveries, or superiority of armament. The same skilful application of the science of war has turned the scale in every campaign from the days of Alexander to those of Moltke. Every great general who has handed down his name as a mighty master of his art has owed his successes and his reputation to the discovery or appreciation of some new means of rendering his army more easy to move, or more easy to concentrate for decisive action, than that of his opponent. Alexander conquered by means of the discipline and equipment of the troops handed down to him by his father, which enabled them to move more rapidly than the cumbrous forces of his enemies, in exactly the same manner as Frederick the Great triumphed over his enemies by means of the discipline and equipment of the troops handed down to him by his father. Cæsar gained victories by the mobility of the legions, exactly in the same manner as Napoleon did by the adoption of the system of divisions and corps d'armée, first advocated by Moreau. Wherever we turn in the history of war, we find the same broad principles the foundation of success. The French gained the great victory of Jena by having adopted a system of manœuvre which was as superior in mobility to that handed down from the time of Frederick the Great as is the system of the present day, by which the Prussians have turned the tables on the French, to that of the first Napoleon. The art of war, like every other art, is ever progressive, ever advancing. There is no such thing as chivalry in war. A general who gave up an advantageous position nowadays to meet an enemy on equal terms, would be thought as great a madman as a knight would have been considered in the so-called days of chivalry, if he had taken off his armour and fought without protection. War is, always has been, and always must be, the means of doing the maximum of damage to an enemy with the minimum injury to oneself. And the principles of war have remained the same in all ages. They may be summed up briefly as the meaus of moving most rapidly against your enemy when he is unprepared, and of hitting him hardest when you get near him. Could soldiers fight more bravely than those of the French army did in the war? They showed a courage in the field of battle which allowed them to retire from even an unsuccessful struggle with every honour. Yet

of what avail was their gallantry for the defence of the country which they were maintained to defend? Their enemy had mastered the present conditions of the art of war, and all their gallantry and bravery was ineffectual and abortive.

The favour shown by the French military authorities to their *corps d'élite*, has a tendency to drain the line of its best men. By common consent the infantry of an army is its most essential and important element. The foot soldier of the French army, carrying on his back a weight of thirty-five kilogrammes, or seventy-five lbs., which is more than one-third of the regulation burden of a camp mule, has to march, to watch, to work, and to fight, for the support and defence of the whole service. In the Chassepot the voltigeur certainly has a much lighter weapon than the old muzzle-loader, but "the pack" is still greater than any man can be expected to carry on a long march without exhaustion. First, there is the Chassepot, 7½ pounds; next, the sword bayonet and scabbard, 3 pounds; 10 pounds of ammunition, distributed partly in two pouches, and partly in his knapsack; a pair of shoes; a four-pound loaf of bread; a canvas bag slung over the left shoulder, and containing any creature comforts the man may have procured; Over the knapsack—first, a great-coat; secondly, a blanket; thirdly, his share of the canvas for the *tente d'abri*, and sticks for the same; and fourthly, a huge camp kettle. Inside the knapsack he has a second pair of trousers, comb, brushes, needles, thread, buttons, a pair of gloves, a couple of pairs of socks, and three shirts; in addition, a flask capable of containing about a quart of liquid is flung over the right shoulder. A long march with such a weight must incapacitate all but the very strongest men. Yet how is the infantry of the line formed? It is what may fairly be called the *residuum* of the conscription. The artillery and engineers have the first choice, as they must have men of physical strength and superior intelligence. Then the big men are taken for the heavy cavalry regiments. Then the most agile and hardy men are selected for the light-infantry corps (*chasseurs à pied*); and when the regiments of the line are formed, the best men are drafted out of them to serve in the imperial guard, or to form the two picked companies of each battalion. What remains after all this selection, is of necessity the dregs of the whole mass. No error can be more fatal than this fostering of picked bodies of troops at the expense of the whole army. The forces are weakened by continually subtracting their strongest ingredients; and the army, as a whole, loses that uniform solidity which is essential to great operations.

When we remember that it was the Emperor Napoleon I. who said that, to preserve the superiority of an army in war, the system of tactics required to be changed every ten years, it seems remarkable that the French military authorities should have been the last in Europe to act upon the principle. Yet such was the case. The exercises and manœuvres of the French line when the war with Prussia commenced were still almost those of 1791; indeed, they were introduced and copied from the drill of Frederick II., after the battle of Rosbach. In process of time these regulations, revised and amended in a thousand ways, reached an enormous bulk—some 846 articles of evolutions, most of which could not be executed in actual war. They are still essentially the regulations of Potsdam, devised by Leopold Von Dessau, soon after Frederick had adopted the iron ramrod, which was the needle-gun of the last century. The minuteness and complexity of these details exceeds all belief, and the study of them diverts the mind of an officer from the true objects of war. The whole drill should be reduced to a few pages; and now that the inflexible rigidity of the old Prussian line of battle has been superseded by elasticity, mobility, and the relative independence of its components parts, it is evident that simplicity and clearness in theory, and rapidity in execution, have become the absolute law of modern manœuvres and tactics. While French infantry tactics are thus complicated and old-fashioned, those of the Prussian army were the subject of incessant study and improvement from the battle of Jena, when their old system broke down, to the battle of Sadowa, when their new system culminated in victory. The German armies are now in the highest state of efficiency which can be reached by scientific preparation for war, by concentration, by compact discipline, and by forethought.

The French army has always been remarkable for a degree of enthusiasm in their fighting far beyond that of other nations; and the wars of the present generation show that this peculiarity has not altered. It is due, in the first instance, to the nervous, high-spirited temperament of the men; but it has been increased, rather than coun-

teracted, by the influence of the campaigns in Algeria, the great school of modern French arms. The loose formation and desultory warfare of Africa against the Arab tribes, have given to men and officers a high degree of individual resource and self-reliance, but they have weakened that severe discipline and close connection which is essential to regular movements against an enemy in line of battle. French soldiers take up their ground with extreme promptitude and gallantry: when the fire of the enemy begins to tell upon them they rush forward with irresistible ardour, but with some degree of confusion. In their European campaign of 1859, the French beat the Austrians by furious assaults with the bayonet; but that sort of thing, it was found, would never do with the present range and rapidity of firearms, and a novel system of movements had therefore to be introduced. The Prussians supplied this want, simultaneously with the adoption of the breech-loader, and successfully practised their new manœuvre of fighting in dispersed columns four years ago. The French have yet to adapt themselves to this particular requirement of the age. Their noisy and impetuous movements are ill-timed and inconvenient; and in the event of a check inflicted by an enemy under stricter discipline and control, are followed by the most disastrous consequences.

In most of their campaigns of late years, before the war with Germany, the French troops were opposed to an enemy far inferior to themselves in soldierly qualities. They found that a well-directed attack generally secured them victory, and became, therefore, confirmed in the belief that nothing could withstand their rush. They seem to have forgotten that Germans, the most military of the continental nations, fighting for all they held dear, and imbued with the deepest feelings of nationality, were not men likely to yield without a desperate struggle. They did not recognize that with arms of precision, and especially with breech-loaders, calmness, steadiness, and resolution are more than a counterpoise for dash and enthusiasm. Even French writers noticed that the French conscripts fired wildly, and what does firing wildly with the Chassepot mean? It means a useless expenditure of ammunition from a rapidly loaded rifle, and an utter disregard of the value of accuracy. Possibly breech-loading arms may be better adapted for the slow and steady German than for the eager and impetuous Frenchman. It now requires a great degree of calmness on the part of the soldier, when under a heavy fire, to refrain from expending his ammunition. Courage, apart from excitement, is necessary to enable him to keep cool and to use his arm of precision. Few who have studied the events of the war will be able to avoid the thought that, armed as soldiers now are, steady troops will have the advantage over those who trust to *élan* for their superiority, and seek by enthusiasm to replace the firm persistency which characterizes the northern nations.

It will not be out of place if we indicate here one or two other features of the campaign, which will to a great extent account for the overwhelming reverse of fortune which has overtaken the military power of France. No doubt a very large portion of the Prussian success may be accounted for by the superiority of numbers and the great talents of the strategists and generals who have planned and executed the various movements; but it would show a disregard of the lessons of war if the influence attaching to the composition of their rank and file were overlooked. In the first place, few can fail to be struck with the difference between the discipline of the German and French regiments, not only when defeat had tested to the utmost the quality of the latter, but even before the war had actually commenced, and during the march of the troops to the front. There was an earnestness and determination among the German soldiers which contrasted favourably with the excitement and effervescent enthusiasm of the French troops. What can be more marked in their difference than the narratives of the departure of the regiments from Berlin and Paris! In the former city quiet, order, and determination not unmixed with sadness, characterized the march of the men who had left home and family to fight for a cause which they believed to be identical with the existence of Germany as a nation. In Paris, on the contrary, the wild conduct of the Zouaves and Turcos was applauded as the natural outbursts of soldiers who by mere *élan* were to overcome their enemies and override Europe. To hold within bounds of discipline such soldiers requires a strong hand and a firm will. Neither of these seems to have been employed. Unprejudiced spectators have narrated how French regiments behave on the line of march; how the soldiers straggle, fall out, and lag behind; how the officers ride in front, careless of their men, and intent only on securing for themselves good quarters and good food. The necessary results

follow. The stragglers, released from the restraints of discipline, plundered and oppressed even their own countrymen, and in some instances, without the excuse of hunger or want, sacked the baggage of the army, which had been left without a sufficient guard. On the other hand, the marching of the Prussian regiments received the well-merited commendation of all who witnessed it, while their conduct in the enemy's country showed how well discipline had been preserved, not only by the power of military rule, but by the influence of men of education and good character on their comrades in the ranks. Neither the officers nor men of the German army shrunk from the hardships of war; all equally experienced them; and the generals, the staff, and the regimental officers, alike shared with their men the bivouac in the open and the inconvenience it entailed. The French officers do not appear to have considered necessary such a similarity of life between themselves and their men. Take the account of the capture of St. Privat by the Prussian guards, on the occasion of the battle of Gravellotte. They advanced across the open, up a steep hill, their generals and mounted officers in front, in face of a most withering fire from an enemy entrenched behind the walls and houses. Their mounted officers were all either dismounted or killed, their ranks were more than decimated; but they pressed on, drove the French from their position, and took their camp. The captured camp afforded unwonted luxuries. These Prussian guardsmen, men of the highest families of Berlin, were amazed at the comforts which abounded in the tents of the French officers. Their own generals and officers of all ranks were accustomed to sleep on the ground; but these gentlemen of France had beds, chairs, carpets, curtains, and looking-glasses, and, as a Prussian staff officer naïvely remarked, "we then quite understood why the French could not march so rapidly as we do."

The French army did not bear well the strain of disaster. To judge by the narratives of eye-witnesses, the soldiery appear to have broken loose from the bonds of discipline, and the officers to have lost all control over their men. The climax of this absence of discipline and of the good feeling which in a well-regulated army exists between all ranks, was reached in the last hours of the terrible battle of Sedan. In that awful time, when the organization of the best troops would have been subjected to the severest trial, the discipline of the French army completely succumbed. Soldiers fired on their officers, and officers who surrendered themselves as prisoners were not ashamed to curse their men in the presence of their captors. But it may be said these troops by their behaviour on the battle-field wiped out any stain that might attach to their conduct in camp. Doubtless they showed great courage, which was worthily recognized by their enemy, and the whole world beside; but does not the cool determination of the soldiers of Germany appear to be more suitable for the proper use of the weapons of modern war, than the fierce enthusiasm of the French with its accompanying disorganization? The breech-loading rifle requires a steady and a thinking man to appreciate the effects of its power of accurate shooting, and the necessity of carefully husbanding every cartridge. Nor when the time arrived for attack over the open did the German soldiery fail. With a patient endurance and hardy courage contrasting greatly with the favourite French quality, no men, nevertheless, could have faced death more readily than they did when ordered to assault the French in their entrenched positions; while, probably for the first time in war, skirmishers in extended order not only received the charge, but actually advanced to the attack of heavy cavalry.

It is well worth while to ask what cause lay at the bottom of this absence of discipline on the part of the French? were similar faults observed in the great wars of the first empire? and are all armies when tried by defeat equally insensible to the calls of duty? These questions are difficult to answer, because their solution lies in a correct idea of what discipline implies, and on the means by which it can be best secured. An army is only an integral part of a nation, and as such contains within itself the particular virtues and vices of its society. This is especially true of armies raised by conscription, as they necessarily embrace representatives of all classes. Now the tone of society, using the term broadly, of the French nation under the empire was eminently selfish, luxurious, and vicious. Noble aims and worthy ambitions were set aside. Material prosperity alone was extolled. The rich lived for pleasure, and neglected all the duties of their position. The poor, longing for pleasures in which their superiors indulged, and envious of their supposed good fortune, imbibed eagerly the doctrines of Socialism. Amid the many changes of government loyalty became extinct, and even party

was regarded solely as a means of enriching self. The army did not escape these influences. The good feeling which in Great Britain unites class with class, and which may be observed in the village equally as in the barrack, did not exist. No common bond of sentiment united officers and men. Each acted for himself. The officers, looking for promotion, attached themselves to the party in power; the soldiers, imbued with Socialistic ideas, regarded their superiors with envy.

Another cause of an evil so novel and so strange, we believe will ultimately be found in the fact that the moral force of the conscription has at last entirely broken down. It is now considered not a blood-tax on France, but a blood-tax on the poor for the benefit of the rich. Owing partly to the spread of habits of comfort, partly to the demands for Algerine service and the frequency of foreign expeditions, but chiefly to the new development of the desire to make money, the reluctance to enter the service has of late years greatly increased; the mothers save more carefully to purchase immunity for their sons, and the whole burden of the war falls upon the poor, who again have been aroused by the liberal press and the artizans in the ranks to a perception that it is so—that equality before the law is a mere phrase. This feeling has sunk deeply into the peasantry, so deeply as to produce a deadly hatred of all who purchase exemption, and a bitter dislike of the service, and distrust of those in it who are above themselves. This feeling, which in Picardy especially has been openly manifested, has been fostered by the workmen ever since the soldiery were employed to put down strikes, and though quiet in ordinary times, breaks out under defeat with terrible violence. Then the conscript remembers that he is serving under compulsion, while the rich are exempt, and while his officer, whose mistake, as his men think, exposes rank and file to slaughter, is serving voluntarily. A spirit first of grudging, then of disaffection, and then of disgust springs up, which any accident, a defeat, a want of food, a harsh commandant, or even a severe order, may exasperate into a fury fatal to discipline and wholly incompatible with success in the field. It must be remembered that the defect of the French character, its special and persistent foible, is envy, and that the love of equality is in all classes, and more especially among the peasantry, a passion which is capable of inciting them to terrible acts, and undoubtedly fosters that spirit of Socialism which the officers complain has crept into the army.

In enumerating the causes of the French misfortunes in the war, too much stress cannot be laid upon the evils of the "exoneration" system. Formerly substitutes were procured through private offices, but as before stated, of late years this business was made a government monopoly; and it became not only the means of infinite corruption, but a source of incalculable evil to the country. In theory France had an immense army; but when actual service was required, the nation, waking from a terrible and fatal delusion, found that its forces were largely composed of mere paper soldiers. If a young man who had drawn an unlucky number did not wish to be a soldier, his parents went to the government office appointed for that purpose, and paid, say, two thousand francs. Their dear lad was exonerated. Now, it was understood that with the two thousand francs a substitnte, a *remplaçant*, was bought. This was the bargain between (1) the exonerated youth, (2) the government, and (3) the nation. While the traffic in men was in the hands of private companies the government took care to have their substitutes, since they had no interest in suppressing them. But when they turned dealers themselves, their interest lay at once in a different direction. They took the money from the pockets of families, and put it into their own. The substitute money did not buy a substitute. The effect of this was that the right number of men were put upon paper. To the public, who knew nothing of the dishonest transaction, the companies of French regiments were a hundred strong; and consequently the regiments, it was believed, had each 3000 men under the flag. But what was the actual truth? That in many instances the actual available men were not more than thirty to the company. Regiments that upon paper were at their full strength would barely muster 1800 fighting men, and some even less than this. This might almost be said to have been the key to the disasters which redden the brow of every Frenchman.

The education of the French officer does not seem calculated to create habits of command. A large number are trained in the great military schools of St. Cyr and Metz, which they enter by competition. They are then kept under the closest surveillance, and are forced to acquire in a short time a great amount of knowledge. No responsi-

bility is allowed them, and until they become officers they are treated in a way which no English schoolboy would endure. They consequently never attain habits of command; and, as the majority do not enter from the higher classes of society, have never, even as boys, received the rudimentary training which teaches how to rule and how to obey. Another portion of the officers (nearly a third) enter from the ranks, and are selected either by favour or merit from the non-commissioned officers. These seldom attain a higher grade than that of captain, and consequently continually see young men who have merely passed through the schools promoted over their heads. Again, the staff form a distinct corps, and are almost entirely separated, even at the commencement of their career, from the regimental service. Consequently they are ignorant of the feelings and prejudices of the soldiery, and have little or no sympathy with them. In times of victory, when success glosses over defects and even crimes, all goes well. The martial spirit of the French troops carries them through difficulties and dangers; while lookers-on are so dazzled by the blaze of glory that they fail to perceive the defects which lie beneath the surface. Ambition has been always held up to French soldiers as the incentive to action. Phrases, such as the soldier carrying in his knapsack the bâton of a marshal, have been repeated until it has been forgotten that those who are left behind in the race for glory may possibly feel a keen discontent, unknown to those who have been actuated by the humbler aim of doing their duty and being a credit to their regiment.

A country paying 600 million francs for its army, as France did, should have had the right of expecting itself always prepared for war, but the money was to a great extent thrown away in the pay of the generals and marshals who spent their lives at the court. The Etat Major, a body whose chief duties ought to consist in the study, in time of peace, of strategical positions all over Europe, and of reconnoitring in time of war, were officers who were not apparently up to their work. The Prussians sent usually a couple of dozen of Uhlans, as they call their lancers, using their original Polish name, with three or four officers, and if one of them came back safely with some useful information they were quite satisfied, thinking the purchase worth the expense. Thus they knew everything about the French army, while the French knew nothing about them.

The destructive and marauding habits of the French troops are well known. In the war the French villagers said they were often much worse treated by their own soldiers than by the Prussians. The difference between them and the English in this respect particularly struck General Trochu in the Crimea, and when asked how he would propose to correct this license, so common to French soldiers, he answered, "En les faisant vertueux." He had soon the opportunity of showing how far this assertion was neither paradoxical nor pedantic; for in the Italian war his division combined all the military qualities with a regard for the persons and properties of non-combatants hitherto unexampled. He began by degrading a non-commissioned officer to the ranks for insulting a peasant woman, and through the whole line of march the site of his encampment was always distinguishable by the uninjured dwellings and the mulberry trees still clothed with vines green amid the field of desolation. This power of restraining military disorder was, however, given to very few French commanders in recent years. For a long time two causes operated to the damage of the traditionally amiable and friendly character of the French soldier. The first was the prominent position given to the Zouaves, and the infection of their rowdy and violent spirit. The other, and far more serious, was the recruitment of the old soldiers. These are generally men who have failed to establish themselves in civil life, and who re-enter the army with the worst habits and principles. It may have been the hope of the originators of this system that the veterans who returned to the service would infuse into the younger portion of it certain imperial associations of which it was deficient; but the effect is acknowledged on all hands to have been most detrimental to discipline. Indeed the quiet, gay, gentle, and simple *piou-piou* (infantry soldier) of the French line became the exception rather than the rule.

The decline in the *prestige* of the French army is the more surprising from its extreme rapidity. If we only recur to 1854, we find that France then possessed a great many comparatively young officers, who had served in high positions in Africa at the time when there was still some serious fighting there; and that in the Algerian special corps were troops undoubtedly superior



Fig. 1.—PRUSSIAN NEEDLE-GUN (Breech Open).

Fig. 2.—SECTION OF THE PRUSSIAN NEEDLE GUN.

CHASSEPOT BREECH-LOADER.—Fig. 3, Elevation; Fig. 4, Longitudinal Vertical Section; Fig. 5, Longitudinal Section of Cartridge.

SMALL ARMS.



to any other in Europe. The numerous substitutes and re-enlistments (which latter were much encouraged by the emperor), provided a larger number of professional soldiers who had seen service, real veterans, than any other continental power. The one thing necessary was to elevate as much as possible the mass of the troops to the level of the special corps. This was done to a great extent. The *pas gymnastique* (the "double" of the English), hitherto practised by the special corps only, was extended to the whole infantry, and thus a rapidity of manœuvring was obtained previously unknown to armies. The cavalry was mounted, as far as possible, with better horses; the *matériel* of the whole army was looked to and completed; and, finally, the Crimean war was commenced. The organization of the French army showed to great advantage beside that of the English; the numerical proportions of the allied armies naturally gave the principal part of the glory—whatever there was of it—to the French; the character of the war, circling entirely round one grand siege, brought out to the best advantage the peculiarly mathematical genius of the French as applied by their engineers; and altogether the Crimean war again elevated the French army to the rank of the first in Europe.

Under these circumstances the Italian war was undertaken, resulting in additional "glory" and increased territory to France. If after the Crimean war the French *chasseur à pied* had already become the *beau ideal* of a foot soldier, this admiration was now extended to the whole of the French army. Its institutions were studied; its camp became instructing schools for officers of all nations. The invincibility of the French became almost a European article of faith. In the meantime, France rifled all her old muskets, and armed all her artillery with rifled cannon. But the same campaign which elevated the French army to the first rank in Europe, gave rise to efforts which ended in procuring for it, first a rival, then a conqueror. The year 1870 came, and the French army was no longer that of 1859.

In point of armament, the Prussians forestalled the other armies of Europe in the introduction and use of the breech-loading rifle; but this inequality in their favour disappeared after the introduction of the French Chassepot, a weapon which will be better understood from the accompanying illustrations. Fig. 3, Plate 3, is an elevation of this rifle, the bolt being shown elevated to a vertical position, and the hammer cocked; and fig. 4 is a longitudinal vertical section of the arm, with the hammer in the position it assumes after firing, and the breech closed by the bolt, the handle of which assumes a horizontal position. The breech, *a*, is screwed on to the barrel; it is open on the upper surface, as well as on the right hand side, in order to allow of the working of the bolt, *g*. It is through this lateral opening that the cartridge is introduced. The rear face or end of the barrel serves as a stop to the front, *h*, of the bolt, *g*. The trigger mechanism, for holding the hammer when cocked, consists of two pieces, *c* and *d*, connected by a screw, *e*. The piece, *d*, tends always to project in the interior of the breech by the action of a spring, *b*, which forces upon the trigger the rear end of the piece, *c*, working on a centre at *f*. The pressure exerted upon the trigger is transmitted to the tumbler, *d*, which on being depressed releases the hammer, and allows it to act under the influence of a balance spring, and to strike the priming of the cartridge. The bolt, *g*, serves to open and close the chamber. It carries a piece, *h*, provided with a handle, *i*, for actuating it. Between the end of the bolt, *g*, and a shoulder formed on a movable head, *j*, there is fitted a washer of vulcanized india-rubber, composed of three superposed layers of different degrees of hardness. At the moment of igniting the charge the pressure exerted on the movable head, *j*, of the bolt is transmitted to the washer, which, being thus compressed, forms a perfect packing, and prevents the escape of gas. The portion which terminates the piece, *j*, is intended to form a space behind the cartridge for the expulsion and combustion of the fragments of paper which may remain in the barrel after the charge has been fired. The rear and upper part, as well as the left side of the bolt, *g*, are provided with two longitudinal slots of unequal size; the first acts as a safety notch, and the other forms the working notch. There is between the axle of these two grooves or slots a space of 90° when the breech is open. The cock or hammer is in front of the safety notch, so that if it accidentally becomes released no dangerous result will follow; it only corresponds with the working groove when the bolt closes the breech and is firmly held in its position by the handle, *i*, which will then be in a horizontal position. The bolt is also provided

with a groove or notch opposed to the piece, *h*, the object of which is to permit, when charging, of drawing the bolt back without it being stopped by the trigger piece. A second groove formed on the right-hand side serves as a stop for the bolt, and prevents it leaving the breech when the screw, *r*, is in place. The hammer is composed of four parts, connected together with pins; these are, the hammer proper, *k*, the roller, *l*, the tumbler, *m*, and the spring-bearing spindle, *n*. The gun is cocked, not, as formerly, by causing the hammer to describe an arc of a circle, but by pulling it back longitudinally. The front part of this hammer terminates in an extended portion, *p*, which engages in the upper opening of the breech, and to the end of which is fixed the screw, *q*. It is this screw which, on penetrating one or other of the two grooves before referred to, brings the hammer into the safety notch, or permits it to strike the needle. The sliding of the hammer is facilitated by the roller, *r*.

The helical spring on the rod, *n*, is intended to give the impact of the needle on the priming, and has its bearing at *s*. The striking end of the needle is pointed, whilst the opposite end is fixed in a small holder, *t*. The following are the movements in using this arm, it being held in the left hand, with the butt pressed against the right side: —*First movement:*—Place the forefinger against the trigger guard, and draw back the hammer with the thumb. *Second movement:*—To open the arm, turn the lever from left to right, and draw back the bolt. *Third movement:*—To load, seize the cartridge in the right hand, and insert it into the barrel through the opening made in the right side of the breech. *Fourth movement:*—To close the arm, push the bolt forward, and turn the lever from right to left. *Fifth movement:*—To fire, press upon the trigger. In order to place the arm upon the safety notch after the breech has been closed, the handle of the bolt must be elevated so that the smallest notch in the bolt shall be opposite the hammer, which must be followed up till its screw, *q*, arrives at the bottom of this notch. When it is desired to fire, it is simply necessary to turn the bolt to the side and draw the trigger.

The following is a description of the cartridge intended to be used with the Chassepot arm. Fig. 5 is a longitudinal section of the cartridge. It is composed of six elements, namely, the priming, powder case, powder, cardboard wad, ball case, and ball. The priming consists of a copper cap, *u*, similar to those used in the army, but rather smaller. It is perforated at the bottom with two holes, diametrically opposite to each other, and which are intended for the free passage of the flame. The fulminating powder, *v*, is placed at the bottom of the cap; a small wad, *x*, of cloth or wax covers it in order to preserve it from external shock. The cap thus prepared is fitted with a small washer, *y*, of thin tin; this washer is connected to a paper disc, intended to form the bottom of the cartridge, when the priming will be complete. The powder case consists of a band of paper, *z*, rolled on a mandril, and cemented at the edges. The charge of powder introduced therein, equal to five grammes five decigrammes, is slightly rammed to give rigidity to the cartridge. A wad of card, b^1, is placed on the powder, of about two millimètres in thickness, and having a perforation therein of about six millimètres in size, through which the ends of the case, *z*, are pressed; the excess of paper being removed with a pair of scissors. The ball case consists of a covering of paper, c^1, making two turns round a conical mandril, and cemented at the base only. The ball, the form of which is shown in Fig. 5, weighs 24 grammes 5 decigrammes. After having placed this ball in its case, the cartridge is completed by uniting the ball-case to the powder-case by a ligature in a groove made a short distance in the rear of the cardboard wad. As a final operation, the whole height of the cartridge corresponding to the ball, less the ogive or tapered end of the bullet, is to be greased, when the cartridge will be ready for use. The Chassepot carries a sabre bayonet, and the length of the two is 6 feet $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches.

The Chassepot has a longer range, but less precision, than the Prussian needle-gun. The Chassepot has an incipient velocity of 1328 feet per second, the needle-gun of only 990; but the semi-diameter of the scattering circle at a distance of 300 paces is as much as $13\frac{1}{2}$ inches in the case of the former, and only $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches in that of the latter. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the range of the needle-gun is quite as far as the eye can aim with anything like accuracy, considerably reduces its inequality as compared with its rival. Under some circumstances, however, the longer range of the Chassepot gives tremendous advantages to the troops who use it, but the experience of the war shows it to have been a superior

FIG. 1.

FIG. 1.—MITRAILLEUSE IN ACTION.

FIG. 2.

FIG. 4.

FIG. 3

FIG. 2.—VERTICAL SECTION OF THE WEAPON AND CARRIAGE.

FIG. 3.—SECTION OF THE BREECH END.

FIG 4.—SECTION OF THE BREECH (WITH THE BLOCK OR CLOSER DRAWN DOWN).

FRENCH MITRAILLEUSE.

weapon badly handled. The Chassepot allows of about ten or eleven, the needle-gun only of seven or eight discharges per minute; but as to fire even seven effective rounds per minute is beyond the capacity of the ordinary soldier, the advantage the Chassepot has in this respect is again imaginary rather than practical. It is, moreover, counterbalanced by a serious drawback; in rapid fire the Chassepot barrel has, after twelve or fourteen rounds, to be cleared of the remnants of cartridges. A really strong point of the Chassepot, the smallness of its calibre, which permits a Frenchman to carry ninety-three cartridges against the seventy-two lodged in the German pouch, has been likewise secured for the needle-gun by the alterations which have been adopted. Besides, the smaller number of cartridges is a disadvantage which tells considerably less against a German soldier than it would against a Frenchman. Far from being taught to blaze away as rapidly as possible, the German soldier is educated not to use his rifle, except when he has a fair aim; and as the instances rarely occur when "quick fire" can be of any good, troops no longer fighting in massed columns, the German soldier, upon the whole, has been found to have enough and to spare in his seventy-two shots. To meet extraordinary exigencies, however, an additional allotment of cartridges is sometimes carried in the knapsacks. The effective range of the Chassepot is 1800 paces, and that of the needle-gun only 600. Such a superiority of range was severely felt on several occasions by the Prussians in charging, when they had to traverse a distance of 1200 paces entirely exposed to a destructive fire to which they were powerless to reply. It is inexplicable, however, why the French did not make use of the boasted long range of their Chassepots to pick off the Prussian gunners on many occasions, especially at the battle of Gravelotte, where the Prussian artillery was extremely destructive.

The campaign of 1870 tried a previously unknown weapon, the mitrailleuse; but the rough verdict of war has been, upon the whole, unfavourable to the novelty. The words mitrailleur and mitrailleuse are indifferently employed to denote a class of arm which has imitated but not surpassed the mitraille or case shot fire of our present field pieces. The new mitraille is hurled by engines which avail themselves of rifling, of breech-loading, and of the skill of the mechanical engineer, and seek to prolong the scathing effects of the old case, which barely reached to 400 yards, to at least 2000; but they are not so useful as ordinary field-guns in practical war.

The principle of the French mitrailleuse will be seen from the accompanying engravings. Fig. 1, Plate 1, represents the weapon in action; fig. 2 is a sectional elevation of the weapon and carriage; fig. 3 is a section of the breech end; fig. 4 is a section of the breech end, with the block or closer drawn down, leaving the barrels free to be loaded; and fig. 5 is a sectional plan, with the cartridges in the barrels and the closer screwed home. This compound gun is composed of a series of barrels, which are fitted between plates, A A, which stretch across from one side to the other so as to firmly unite the two side plates, B B, upon which the trunnions are formed for supporting the mitrailleuse upon a carriage, so that it can be removed from place to place and employed in field operations. The rear ends of the side plates, B B, are of greater thickness than the other portions, and are slotted so that the guide plates of the closer can work therein. These plates are centred upon pins, which are kept in position without working loose by means of tappets acting upon the nuts on their ends. The breech-closer plates, G, extend a distance beyond the rear end of the barrels, and have near their ends long holes, which serve to hold secure a transverse bar, J. The central portion of the transverse bar is of larger diameter, or is thicker than the other parts, so that the threaded rod, L, which passes through it, may be turned so as to bring the breech-closer nearer to or further from the rear of the barrels. The front of the threaded rod, L, is rounded, the rounded portion being fitted between two half plates, *q q*.

The under side of the closer plate has lugs, *v v*, for carrying a pin, V, to which the upper end of a link or lever bar, U, is jointed. The lower end of the link is pinned to a lever, Q, so that the closer, when released from the barrels, can be raised and lowered upon their joint pins, H H, which are fitted in the side plates, B B. The under side of the rear of the side plates has projections for the closer to slide upon as it is being moved, and when it has travelled such a distance as to be tilted, it rests upon a plate, *h*, which forms part of the closer frame, G G. The front of the closer or breech block, O, has a face plate, P, secured thereto. This plate is provided with a series of holes correspond-

ing to the number of barrels fitted in the frames upon the carriage. The holes are threaded for the reception of screw plugs or nipples, through which pins are fitted. The inner ends of these pins rest upon a disc of horn or other yielding material, so that when the explosion takes place the force of the recoil is diminished. The distance the pins may project is regulated by a washer or plug screwed into the back of the plate, P. Under the rear of the breech end of the barrels is attached one end of an elevating screw, by which the depression or elevation of the barrels is governed. The lower end of the screw works in a block or socket on the carriage.

The drawing back of the breech-closer is regulated by the hand lever, Q, and it can be retained at the required point by means of a pawl working in the teeth of a ratchet wheel fitted on the side of the frame. When the barrels are filled or loaded with cartridges, and the breech-closer brought in contact with the rear of the barrels by means of the lever handle, the fire can be communicated by means of a percussion cap or fuse or quickfire at one side of the barrel framing, which fire is instantly forced through a hole, and impinges against the cartridge case with sufficient impulse to break it and explode the powder therein. The explosion in the barrel causes fire to be driven through another hole, which leads from the first barrel to the second, and this causes the second charge to be fired in the same manner as the first and from the second to the third barrel in succession until the whole of the barrels on that level have been discharged. The fire then passes up to a second series of barrels, placed above the lower series in succession, and in a similar manner to a third series of barrels.

The French were foremost in adopting the new weapon, but various other powers now use machine guns of different constructions, mostly embodying the principle of the mitrailleuse. The United States of America, from which, we believe, the original invention came, have adopted one known as the Gatling gun. Russia has been supplied with the same. As the British government has also favoured the Gatling mitrailleuse, we give an illustration of the gun and of its cartridges. (Plate 2, figs. 1, 2, and 3).

It is said by those who have carefully studied the subject, that when war must be undertaken it is practically less destructive to life to employ the most potent and fatal agent in its prosecution. In this view of the case scarcely any modern implement of war can equal the Gatling battery gun, which, from its wonderful powers of destruction, may be said to take rank as the foremost of philanthropists. To give the reader an idea of the character of this gun, it may be said that it can be fired, when well manned, from 400 to 500 times per minute. Its main features may be briefly summed up as follows:—First, it has as many locks as there are barrels, and all the locks revolve with the barrels. The locks also have, when the gun is in operation, a reciprocating motion. The forward motion of the locks places the cartridges in the rear ends of the barrels, and closes the breech at the time of each discharge, while the return movement extracts the cartridge shells after they have been fired. When the ten-barrel gun is being fired, there are five cartridges at all times in the process of loading and firing; and at the same time, five of the shells, after they have been fired, are in different stages of being extracted. These several operations are continuous when the gun is in operation. In other words, as long as the gun is supplied with cartridges (which is done by means of "feed-cases," in which they are transported), the several operations of loading, firing, and extracting the cartridge shells are carried on automatically, uniformly, and continuously. The locks operate on a line with the axes and barrels, and are not attached to any part of the gun; but as the gun is made to revolve, they play back and forth in the cavities in which they work, like a weaver's shuttle, performing their functions of loading and firing by their impingement on stationary inclined planes or spiral projecting surfaces. Second, it can be loaded or fired only when the barrels are in motion, that is to say, when the barrels, the inner breech, &c., are being revolved. Third, it may justly be termed a compound machine gun; since the ten barrels, each being furnished with its own loading and firing apparatus, form, as it were, ten guns in one. This is a valuable feature, for in the event of one of the locks or barrels becoming impaired, the remaining ones can still be used effectively. The Gatling also has a feeding drum into which 400 cartridges can be poured, materially increasing the rapidity of firing; and an automatic mowing movement, which distributes the fire of the mitrailleuse horizontally, and thus removes the chief fault of the French piece—a too concentrated

Fig. 5.



Fig. 5.—SECTIONAL PLAN OF FRENCH MITRAILLEUSE.
(With the Cartridges in the Barrels and the Closer screwed home).

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 1

THE GATLING MITRAILLEUSE.

delivery. The gun bears the same relation to ordinary fire-arms that the printing press does to the pen, or the railway to the stage coach. It may safely be said that no other gun which can be rapidly fired has so great a range and accuracy as the larger-sized Gatling guns, which have an effective range of 2000 to 3000 yards.

The Prussians, a long time previous to the war with France, tried both the Montigny and Gatling mitrailleuses, but rejected them as useless for field purposes, at the same time admitting their utility for fortresses, ditch defence of intrenchments, and defiles. In the early part of the campaign they were supposed to possess a mysterious weapon, called the *kügelspritzen*, but nothing transpired respecting its special performances. The new weapon will never supersede artillery or small arms, and it is doubtful if it will ever hold an important position as a powerful adjunct to them.

All accounts of the battles during the late campaign concur in ascribing much of the success of the Prussians to their superiority in field artillery. The Chassepot is acknowledged to be a quicker shooting and further ranging rifle than the needle-gun, and more accurate, though the excitability of French troops has apparently prevented them from making the most of their weapons. But, on the other hand, the Prussian artillery fire has almost invariably triumphed over the opposition of the enemy; and it is evident from such descriptions of battles as have reached us, that the German infantry could never have stormed the positions taken up by the enemy in every battle, but for the strong protecting fire of the guns.

The first Napoleon, himself an artillery officer, was deeply impressed with the value of field artillery. No one knew better than he how to prepare the way for the advance of his infantry by concentrating a powerful artillery fire on one portion of the enemy's position; and, what is more, his generals learnt from their great chief the art of using field artillery as a separate arm, and not merely as scattered throughout the divisions of an army. At Eylau and Friedland Senarmont handled his artillery admirably. At Friedland it is related by General Marion—

"That thirty-six pieces of artillery did what Ney and Dupont, with more than 20,000 men, had been unable to do, and what the three reserved divisions of Victor would probably not have done; in view of the steady courage with which the Russians, when their retreat had been cut off, resisted the attacks of the triumphant army, it may well be assumed that victory would have been impossible to any other arm than artillery; but Senarmont advanced his guns and obtained the most brilliant success."

It is important to understand that, though in this battle Senarmont concentrated thirty-six guns in a small space, it was only when the nature of the ground obliged him to do so. As long as he could, he carried out the great law of distributing the guns but concentrating their fire.

When rifled small-arms came into use, field artillery fell for a short time into the shade; for it became very dangerous to bring the smooth-bore guns into action against infantry at short ranges, and their fire at longer ranges was, comparatively speaking, inefficient. It may almost be said that, if breech-loading rifles had been brought into use before rifled artillery, the employment of field guns would have ceased. But, as the range of the infantry weapon was increased to 600 and 800 yards, the action of the field guns was made available at a distance of 2000 or 3000 yards, while their accuracy was equally improved.

In the campaign of 1859 the French obtained great advantages by the use of their rifled field guns. In 1866 the Austrian rifled field artillery, acting independently, saved the infantry from annihilation after the battle of Königgrätz; and 1870 proved again and again the invaluable services of field artillery, culminating in the grandest achievement of modern times. At Sedan the numerous and gallant army of MacMahon, defended by the ramparts of a fortress, had to lay down its arms, not because of any immediate want of food, not in expectation of the place being stormed, but because the Prussian rifled field guns were disposed upon every hill in the neighbourhood of the fortress, at a distance outside the range of smooth-bore guns, but yet so near that resistance would only have converted the town into a slaughter-house. The battle preceding the capitulation was a great proof of the value of field artillery; for a vital position, rendered almost unassailable by the fire that came from behind its earthworks, was converted from unassailable to indefensible by the enfilade fire of Prussian rifled guns.

Sir Joseph Whitworth sent to the last Paris Exhibition two specimens of his steel field-pieces, the one a ten-pounder, and the other a three-

pounder. These guns, having attracted the notice of the emperor, were sent by his desire in the first instance to Versailles, and afterwards to the camp at Chalons, for exhaustive experiment. The result of repeated trials clearly proved the great inferiority of the field guns, made of bronze, with which the French artillery was equipped in the war with Prussia, at least as compared with English steel guns. This evidence is supplied by a series of tables in the official report, in which the performances of these latter guns are compared with those of the *canon de quatre de campagne*, as regards range, lowness of trajectory, retention of velocity at long distances, and accuracy. In all these particulars the French bronze gun was much inferior to both of the steel guns, and in some respects is so inferior as to bear no reasonable comparison with them. Even at five degrees of elevation, the range of the three-pounder exceeded that of the French ten-pounder by 290 mètres, while the English ten-pounder exceeded the other by 440 mètres. But as the range increased, the inferiority of the French became much more marked. Thus, at ten degrees the French gun ranged 2350 mètres, the English three-pounder 3120, and the English ten-pounder 3320. At twenty degrees the ranges were 3480, 5000, and 5490 mètres respectively; and at thirty degrees, while the range of the French gun was but 4100 mètres, the English three-pounder had a range of 6100, and the ten-pounder 6890 mètres. These inferior ranges of the French gun are associated, as they must be, with correspondingly high flights or trajectories, rendering the aim of the artilleryman very uncertain in the field, where distances have to be judged hastily and by the eye alone. In ranging 2000 mètres the French shell rose to a height of eighty-three mètres, while the highest point of the trajectory of the three-pounder was fifty-four mètres, and of the ten-pounder only fifty-one mètres. At 3000 yards' range the *maximum* ordinate of the trajectory of the last-named gun was 136 mètres, that of the three-pounder 137, and that of the French gun 253 mètres! Those who understand the relation between a low trajectory and good aim in the field will discern the immense disadvantage of the French gun in this comparison. Not less remarkable is its want of *conservation de la vitesse*, or the quality of keeping up the power to hit hard throughout its flight; and as the penetrating effect of a shell depends upon its velocity, it is easy to see how inferior the French arm must be in this respect likewise. Its inferior accuracy is also very remarkable, especially at long ranges, but we have not space to record all the figures. Those already given are taken without alteration from the official report. It is only necessary to add that bronze is of less than half the strength of good steel, or of Whitworth metal, and that much of the inferiority of the French gun is attributable to its use; it being quite impossible to fire the full charges of powder and length of projectile from a bronze gun of given bore without speedily destroying it.

The Emperor Napoleon, after his terrible experience of the Prussian artillery at Sedan, is said to have remarked that the German victory was due to the "superiority of their artillery, not in numbers, but in weight, range, and precision." His Majesty was, however, mistaken. The Prussian field-pieces were considerably superior in number, which is almost enough in itself to account for their success, supposing them to be even equal in power and equally well handled. The word "weight" in the emperor's dictum, whether it applies to the guns or the shells, is quite incorrect, unless we suppose that the heavier class of the Prussian guns (six-pounders carrying 15 lb. shells) were opposed to the lighter class of the French guns (four-pounders carrying 9 lb. shells), a most improbable supposition, considering the enormous number of guns engaged on either side.

Superiority in range and precision the Prussian guns undoubtedly had; but it must be remembered those of the French were the first rifled guns made, and that other powers, having had the benefit of previous experience, improved upon the French model in establishing their own patterns. The main cause of this inferiority is to be found in the large bore adopted. The French four-pounder (9 lb. shell) has a bore of 3·41 inches in diameter, and the area of the cross section opposed to the resistance of the air is, in round numbers, 9 square inches; the bore of the Prussian four-pounder (9 lb. shell) is 3·089 inches, and the area opposed to the air is 7·5 square inches. Again, the French gun, with a larger relative charge of powder of between one-seventh and one-eighth of the weight of the projectile, has an initial velocity of 1066 feet per second; while the Prussian gun, with a relative charge of one-eighth, has a velocity of 1184 feet per second. We thus see that the French shell starts at a slower rate than the Prussian, and as it opposes a larger area to the resistance of the air in

the ratio of 1·27 to 1 (the shells being of the same weight), it loses its velocity much more quickly. The trajectory, therefore, is more highly curved.

The Prussian artillery has but one explosive projectile, a common shell burst by a concussion fuse. The French have common shells and shrapnel, some three-fourths of the ammunition being of the former nature, both usually exploded by time fuses. Now, all artillerymen know that common shells are most efficient when burst by concussion fuses, because the pieces of the shell are more likely to hit the object fired at when exploded on flat, hard ground, than when the shell bursts in the air by a time fuse, and because, under the former circumstances, the pointsman at the gun can see better whether his shells are bursting correctly, by observing the relative position of the cloud of smoke of the bursting charge and the front of the enemy, than when the cloud is up in the air. In addition, then, to the Prussian guns having greater range and precision, their shells during the late actions, for the reasons adduced, were more correctly burst by their concussion fuses than the French shells by their time fuses.

Another point of difference is that the Prussians fired slowly and the French quickly. The simple consequence was an immense waste of ammunition. Did not common sense show us, *a priori*, how much more efficient and in every way advisable deliberate fire is than quick fire, the English experiments at Shoeburyness have proved the point to a demonstration. The Prussian books giving instructions in laying a gun and correcting the practice are elaborate, and go to the bottom of the question. What is called "the light of nature" is in no wise depended upon. Every gunner is taught what the difference of range will be by the addition or subtraction of one-sixteenth of an inch to or from the height of his tangent scales. Again, he learns what the mean difference of range at any given distance may be expected to be. If his shell falls at an estimated distance from his enemy within double the mean difference of range, he knows that he will not improve matters by altering his elevation, as his error is within that inherent to the gun. If, after two or three shots, he finds they all err in the same way, all being too short or too long, he then alters his elevation, allowing as many sixteenths on his tangent scales as he knows will give an increase or decrease of range equivalent to the amount of his estimated error. In French drill-books the question of laying a gun is much more generally treated, and no minute instructions for correcting the practice are there to be found.

There is also a great difference in the mobility of the pieces, for the French, like the English, carry the gunners chiefly upon the waggons, and the waggons do not go into action with the guns. The men, therefore, must run on foot if they would keep up with their guns when the latter move with any rapidity. On the other hand, the Prussians have comfortable seats for two gunners above the axle-tree of the gun-carriage. The Austrians and Russians effect the same object by slightly different means. Whatever, therefore, be the speed at which the gun is called upon to move, it always carries with it sufficient men to serve it in action. This is a very considerable advantage. The exigencies of modern warfare require guns to be moved swiftly from one part of the field of battle to another; and of what possible utility are the guns if the men who serve them come up heated, breathless, and well-nigh exhausted with running?

The artillery practice of the war does not seem to have exhibited any very decided advantages to be derived from breech-loading over muzzle-loading guns. Because the Prussians, armed on the breech-loading system, have in two gigantic campaigns beaten their adversaries, armed on the muzzle-loading system, it does not therefore follow that the former system is better than the latter for field-guns. It is easy to see how false such a conclusion is, by applying the argument to the respective merits of the needle-gun and Chassepot. Because the Prussians beat the French, *ergo* the needle-gun is better than the Chassepot. An artillery officer standing ten yards in rear of a Prussian four-pounder battery in action, describes the loading of the guns as anything but easy, inasmuch as after each discharge the gunner had to tug very hard at the breech-closing apparatus to get it open, and that on one occasion a lever had to be used for that purpose. Proof enough and to spare has been found during English experiments, that muzzle-loading guns properly made shoot as rapidly and accurately as breech-loaders; that a stronger powder charge may be used, thereby obtaining higher velocity and lower trajectory; while the simplicity both of gun and

projectiles is greatly increased, and everybody is now familiar with the phrase, "What is not simple in war is impossible."

Although they did so very little with it, the French had the advantage of a navy which, for age, tradition, and size, far exceeded that of Prussia. As in the case of the army, the navy is manned by conscription; but the marine conscription is of much older date than that of the land forces, having been introduced as early as the year 1683. On the navy lists are inscribed the names of all individuals of the "maritime population;" that is, men and youths devoted to a seafaring life, from the eighteenth to the fiftieth year of age. The number of men thus inscribed fluctuates from 150,000 to 180,000. Though all are liable, the administration ordinarily dispenses with the services of men over forty and under twenty, as well as of pilots, captains, fathers of large families, and able seamen who have signed for long voyages. The law of maritime conscription was modified by an imperial decree of October 21, 1863. The decree was intended to give greater encouragement to voluntary enlistments, by allowing youths from sixteen to twenty-one to enlist for four years, in order to make themselves sailors, and those of more than sixteen and less than twenty-three to engage for seven years as apprentice seamen. Every one whose name stands on the maritime inscription continued, as before, to be liable to conscription at the age of twenty, unless he can furnish legal claims to exemption. Formerly the custom was to keep sailors on board for an obligatory period, which was generally three years, after which they returned to their homes. Many, however, finding the advantage of immediately fulfilling their full period of six years, re-engaged, in order that at the expiration of their full term they might be no longer liable to be called upon, unless by an extraordinary decree. This plan was continued, but with the modification that during the six years renewable furloughs were given, with or without pay, according to the occupations in which the men might employ themselves during such leave of absence. They were at liberty to enter into any kind of seafaring pursuit; but those who engaged in coasting or home fishery only received a quarter of the pay allowed them when on shore by way of pay, *en disponibilité*.

The ordinary number of sailors in the French navy is about 35,000, which, together with officers, navy surgeons, and other *personnel*, brings the grand total of men engaged in the service of the fleet up to 43,000. On the war footing, the number of men is raised to 66,535. From these figures are excluded the marines and coast-guard.

The progress of the French navy in the course of nearly a century is represented by the following figures:—In 1780 the fleet of war consisted of 60 first-class ships, 24 second-class, and 182 smaller vessels: altogether 266 ships, with 13,000 guns and 78,000 sailors. In 1790 the number had decreased to 246 ships, with 51,000 sailors and less than 10,000 guns; while at the battle of Trafalgar, 1805, in which the greater part of the imperial naval force was engaged, there were only 18 French men-of-war, with 1352 guns. In 1844 the navy had increased to 226 sailing vessels, and 47 steamers, with 8639 guns and 24,513 sailors; and this strength was not increased till the year 1855, when the government ordered the entire re-organization of the navy, including a substitution of iron-clads and steamers for wooden and sailing vessels.

The actual strength of the French navy at the commencement of the war was: 59 iron-clads, including 27 floating batteries, carrying a total of 810 guns; 237 unarmoured vessels, including ships of the line, frigates, corvettes, transports, gunboats, &c., mounting 956 guns; 73 paddle steamers, with 208 guns; and 111 sailing vessels, carrying 776 guns. Total: 480 ships and 2750 guns.

The most remarkable among the iron-clads are —the *Magenta*, *Solferino*, *Couronne*, *Normandie*, *Invincible*, and the cupola ship *Taureau*, all heavily plated and armed. The *Taureau* carries a single 20-ton gun, and her deck is covered for its entire length with a cylindrical ball-proof dome, so inclined that it is not practicable to walk on it. Four of the iron-clads are turret ships; another, the *Rochambeau*, formerly the *Donderberg*, was bought from the United States for £480,000. Several are armed with heavy spurs or beaks, and all the first-class vessels can be driven at a high speed.

CHAPTER VI.

French hopes of support from South Germany—Searching Questions of the French Government for obtaining information on this point—Real State of Feeling seriously misrepresented to them—Germany thoroughly united through the action of France—Enthusiastic Meetings on the subject in various parts of Germany—Concurrence of all Parties for the Defence of Fatherland—Ultimatum of the French Government to the South German States—French Official Repudiation of any desire to make War on Germany—Decisive means adopted to prevent the Enlistment of a Foreign German Legion in France—Hopes in France of an Alliance with Denmark—Position taken by Russia and Austria—State of feeling on the War in England and Ireland—Soreness in France at the want of Sympathy for her in England—Complaints from Prussia as to England's one-sided Neutrality—Important Official Circular by Lord Granville, and correspondence between the two Governments on the Subject—Policy of the French Government towards the Press—Correspondents peremptorily forbidden to accompany the French Armies—Different system pursued by Prussia—Wonderful Organization displayed throughout Germany—The temper of the People—Contrast with the feeling manifested before the War with Austria in 1866—Enthusiasm throughout the whole country—Rapid Mobilization of the Army—Sacrifices made by all Parties—More Volunteers for the Army than could be accepted—Closing of the Universities to enable the Students to join their Regiments—The Enthusiasm spread even among Boys—Societies universally established for the Benefit of the Army and the Relief of the Wounded—Refreshment Associations formed in most towns to supply the Soldiers on their way to the Front—Assistance from Germans in Great Britain and America—No fear of ultimate defeat in Germany, but determination to become thoroughly united whatever might be the result of the struggle—Departure of the King from Berlin—Enthusiastic Demonstration—Proclamation to the Prussian people—Resuscitation of the much-valued Order of the Iron Cross—Departure of the Emperor from Paris for Metz—The young Prince Imperial and his Mother—Proclamation to the French Army—Delusions in France as to the state of preparation of the Army and what it would be able to accomplish—Change of feeling after the Emperor's Proclamation—Recapitulation of what had been accomplished in the fortnight from July 15—Composition, Numbers, and Positions of both Armies on the Frontier—The Address of the Crown Prince on taking the command of the South German Forces—Large number of German Princes in the field against the French.

When contemplating the struggle which the Emperor Napoleon foresaw would be certain to take place sooner or later between France and Prussia, one of his great hopes was to obtain the support of the South German states, or at all events, to insure their isolation from the North German Confederation, and also to take advantage of the disaffection which prevailed in some of the northern provinces acquired after the war in 1866. If either the active or passive support of the southern states could have been insured, the French, by a rapid dash across the Rhine, with as large a force as could be collected, somewhere between Germersheim and Mayence (Mainz), and an advance in the direction of Frankfort and Wurzburg, would have found themselves virtually masters of the situation, and would have compelled Prussia to bring down to the Main, as hastily as possible, all available troops, whether ready or not for a campaign. The whole process of mobilization in Prussia would have been disturbed, and all the chances have been in favour of the invaders being able to defeat the Prussians in detail as they arrived from various parts of the country. With the object of ascertaining the state of feeling in South Germany, and the amount of support to be expected there, the following searching questions were confidentially addressed by the French minister of foreign affairs to the imperial envoy at Stuttgard, the capital of Würtemburg, some months before the war took place:—

1. What was the state of parties previous to the war of 1866?

2. What changes in the division of parties have been caused by the war of 1866?

3. What is the relative strength of the democratic party? What of the Catholic party, the conservative party, and the Prussian or unity party?

4. What means are employed by the various parties to promote their objects? What are their journals, their leaders, and their most important members?

5. Which party is the most popular, and has the greatest chance of success?

6. What opinions are entertained by the different classes of society?

7. Is the dynasty popular? Has it a party? Would any particular exertions be made to defend it?

8. Which have been the principal political events in Würtemburg since the war?

9. Which are the principal laws enacted since that period?

10. What has been the relative position of parties since the war in the First Chamber? What in the Second?

11. What impression has been produced in the country by the new laws enacted in consequence of the military and financial connection of Würtemburg with the North German Confederacy—viz., the army bill, the introduction of the impost upon tobacco and salt, and the new government loan?

12. Is the new distribution of the franchise in favour? Is universal suffrage liked?

13. What influence on the future of the country can universal suffrage be expected to exercise?

14. Are people satisfied with the re-organization of the army? And has it been successful?

15. How is Würtemburg situated respecting its commerce and industry?

16. What influence have recent events had upon its commerce and industry?

17. Has prosperity increased since 1866?

18. What is the amount of the Würtemburg imports? What of the exports?

19. Have the events of 1866 had any permanent reaction on the state of the money-market?

20. The creation of the Customs' Parliament, being the most important event in the last few years, what is thought of it? What is anticipated concerning its future?

21. Why have the Prussian party been defeated in the late elections to the Customs' Parliament?

22. What prevented the establishment of a South German Confederacy?

23. What are the reasons of the jealousy which keeps the South German states separate?

24. Are there any pecuniary interests opposed to the formation of a South German Confederacy?

25. Are the interests of the South bound up with those of the North? Would it be possible to separate the two?

26. Are there no ties of common interest binding the southern states to Austria?

27. Would it not be possible to create a flourishing commerce between Southern Germany and the Adriatic, and make it a connecting link between the Levant and Western Europe?

28. What is Prussia's policy towards the southern states?

29. Has Prussia abandoned the thought of German unity?

30. How is it that Austria does not seek to regain her former influence over Southern Germany?

31. What are the present politics of the Würtemburg government? What are its relations to the various political parties in the country. What attitude does it maintain towards Austria and Prussia?

32. Does the Würtemburg government regret the offensive and defensive alliance binding it to Prussia?

33. In the event of war, would the Würtemburg government side with Prussia?

34. In the event of war with Prussia, would France find any allies in Southern Germany?

35. How is the Würtemburg army disposed?

36. Why does the Würtemburg government Prussianize (*prussianiser*) the organization of its army?

37. Does the Würtemburg government intend to join the North German Confederacy?

38. What are the political opinions and tendencies of the leading members of the Würtemburg Cabinet?

39. What influence has Queen Olga on the politics of the kingdom?

40. Does Russia support Würtemburg?

41. Will the present state of things last? And what may one expect in the future?

The replies returned to these questions were generally favourable to France; and the press of the ultra-democratic party in all the southern states tended to foster the delusion by its continual tirades against Prussia. The whole of the extreme Ultramontane party went, of course, in the same direction, and did much to deceive the French government, and involved them in many of their subsequent disasters. In fact, could they have foreseen anything like that which subsequently took place with regard to this particular matter, it is scarcely credible to believe they would have ventured on war at all. It is true that now and then a journal with German affinities, scientific and religious—such as the *Temps*, for example—warned the public not to trust to German quarrels for furnishing French alliances in the hour of need; but the caution thus thrown out was quite powerless to destroy the pleasing delusion that an invading army would be hailed as liberators. In vain it was urged that a few Ultramontanes in South Germany, who hated Prussia, especially as a Protestant power, or a few discontented Hanoverian officers, were all that could be relied upon. France insisted on regarding the South German states as distinct from Prussia, and resolved to declare war against the latter power exclusively.

As soon, however, as matters had begun to assume a really serious aspect—even before the interview between M. Benedetti and the king of Prussia at Ems—Bavaria and Baden tendered an all but unqualified promise to stand by Prussia; and on July 19 the Bavarian Chambers rejected, by a majority of 101 to 47, the proposition for an armed neutrality that had been brought in by some of the Ultramontane members, and at once granted subsidies to the government to carry on the war; Würtemburg almost immediately afterwards gave in her adhesion; and immediately after the declaration of war the Saxon war minister waited upon the king of Prussia, to solicit for the Saxon army the honour of forming the van of the German forces. Only four years before, in the campaign of 1866, the Saxons were the most dangerous of all the enemies of Prussia! A great opportunity for a demonstration of the public feeling was also given at Leipzig by the performance in the new theatre of Schiller's "William Tell." Every line in which an allusion to the then position of the Fatherland could be detected was received with a storm of sympathetic applause. This was especially the case when it came to the Rüttli scene; the words of the sworn liberators:—

> One single people will we be of brothers,
> We will not part in any need or danger,

were drowned in the shouts of appreciative patriots, and the public showed equal excitement when Tell exclaimed—

> The best of men can never live at peace
> If 'tis not pleasing to his wicked neighbour.

In fact, France found to her cost, when too late, that Germany was thoroughly united, and that her action had at once done more to cement that unity firmly, than ordinary causes could have effected in several years. No sooner was war declared than enthusiastic meetings were held in many parts of Germany, with the view of expressing popular opinion on the subject, and it was unanimously resolved to withstand the aggression of France to the utmost. Some of the largest meetings were held in places in which the anti-unity party were supposed to muster in considerable strength. Thus, for instance, amongst the towns were Hanover, where many of the inhabitants cherished a lingering predilection for the old *regime;* Schleswig, where local interests were ever uppermost in men's mind; and Munich, whose ancient and not unjustifiable pride had revolted at the idea of being absorbed by a larger state, and of thus being reduced to a provincial town. The more notorious these places had been for the strength of the anti-unity party within their walls, the more anxious they were in the present emergency to testify to their love for the common Fatherland. If there was any town in Germany where a hostile feeling to the Prussian government had been kept up it was Frankfort. Yet this city, where the French hoped to find almost partisans enough to enact the old comedy of liberating one part of Germany from the alleged yoke of another, was among the most forward to show her hatred of the invader. On the Senate of the city asking the town council for 100,000 florins to defray certain local expenses incidental to the war, the council voted twice that sum, and offered to bear any other burdens that might be required. All the officers of the late Frankfort troops, who resigned on the annexation of the city in 1866, asked permission to rejoin the service, and in no town in Germany was more enthusiasm observable. In Munich, the old stronghold of the Ultramontanes, fifteen thousand people—nearly a tenth of the inhabitants—went to the palace and congratulated the king for siding with the North; and so many students in that city volunteered, as to obtain the permission of the military authorities to form a battalion of their own. Similar demonstrations took place at Stuttgard; in Hanover the Guelphian party, called together by their leading paper, passed a vote repudiating the assistance of the foreigner for the attainment of their purposes; in Schleswig the particularists, in Brunswick the socialists, and in Stuttgard the republicans, were likewise prompted to declare that, although opposed to the present political arrangements of Germany, they would not be outdone by any other party in defending its independence against all comers.

It was this marvellous concord between the various local and political parties which constituted the strength of Germany; this political unity, so firmly established, even before the first shot had been fired, which so completely frustrated the calculations of France. Never since the days of the Hohenstaufens had the like been witnessed. National feeling may have been strong enough long after that date, and remained a living force until it evaporated in the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; but apparently there never existed such a willing-

ness to merge local in common interests, and obey the dictates of the leading sovereign, as in the memorable summer of 1870. This intensely unanimous feeling of the people was naturally reflected in the press, and to whatever journal one refers—north or south, democratic or conservative, Prussian or Suabian—the same tone prevails in every article. Intense hatred of the French emperor and his supporters, mingled censure and compassion for the French people, and determination to put an end to a state of things which exposed to the periodical recurrence of massacres a pacific, industrious, and highly cultivated race—such are the contents of the thousands of leading articles that were then composed on the one absorbing topic of the day.

After this outburst of feeling it was of course more as a matter of form than in the hope of its leading to any practical result, that France addressed an ultimatum to the South German states, leaving them the option between neutrality—in which case their territory was not to be touched—or war, when they would be treated with the utmost severity. To the last, however, France maintained that she had not gone to war against Germany, but against Prussia, or rather against Count von Bismarck's policy. This may easily be seen from the following manifesto, published in the *Journal Officiel*:—"It is not with Germany we are at war; it is with Prussia, or, more properly, with the policy of Count von Bismarck. Careful of patriotic sentiments, and respecting the principles of nationality, the emperor and his government have never assumed towards the great German race any but the most friendly attitude. By arresting at Villafranca the victorious march of our troops, his Majesty was influenced by a desire to spare himself the regret of being compelled to fight Germany in order to liberate the peninsula. When in June, 1860, he visited Baden, he there met King William, then prince regent of Prussia, the kings of Bavaria, Würtemburg, Hanover, and Saxony, the grand-dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Saxe-Weimar, and the dukes of Coburg and Nassau, and by tendering them the most cordial assurances he offered loyally to those princes his friendship and that of France. When King William, in 1861, visited Compiègne, he received a cordial and courteous welcome. Previous to Sadowa the emperor wrote to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at that time his minister for Foreign Affairs, a letter which sketched out the programme most favourable to the prosperity of the Germanic Confederation and most congenial with the aspirations and the rights of the German nation. To yield to Prussia all the satisfactions that were compatible with the liberty, the independence and the equilibrium of Germany, to maintain Austria in her great position among the Germanic populations, to assure to the minor states a closer union, a more powerful organization, and a more important position—such was the plan proposed by his Majesty. The realization of those ideas, so consistent with the desires and the interests of all the German populations, would have been the triumph of right and of justice; it would have spared Germany the misfortunes of despotism and of war. Let us compare the emperor's programme with the theories which Count von Bismarck has succeeded in carrying out in practice. For many years profound peace had existed among all Germans. For that peace the Prussian minister substituted a war which broke up the Germanic Confederation, and created an abyss between Austria and Prussia. By excluding from Germany a monarchy which was one of its principal sources of strength, Count von Bismarck was a traitor to the common country. In order to augment Prussia he sensibly diminished Germany, and the day is not far distant when all true patriots across the Rhine will reproach him bitterly for it. Not content with destroying the bonds which connected Prussia with the Germanic Confederation, he has not shrunk from brutally despoiling princes whose only crime was their fidelity to federal duties. Let the countries which have been annexed to Prussia compare their present lot with their situation before 1866. Tranquil, rich, honoured, lightly taxed, they presented a pattern of moral and material prosperity. Popular dynasties established an intimate relationship between the people and the government. To-day those countries profoundly regret their princes. Crushed under the weight of excessive taxation, ruined in the manufacturing and commercial life, compelled to leave agricultural work to be done by the women, they are now required to lavish their gold and their blood for a policy whose violence is hateful to them. Hanoverians, Hessians, inhabitants of Nassau and Frankfort, it is not enough that you should be the victims of Count von Bismarck's ambition. The Prussian minister desires that you should become

his accomplices: you were worthy of a better cause. It is lamentable to behold to what lengths a monarch may be led who, instead of listening to the dictates of his heart and mind, places himself under the control of an unscrupulous minister. How far distant is the time when King William said, upon accepting the regency, 'Prussia should make none but moral conquests in Germany.' If that prince, whose intentions were loyal, and who had a respect for right, had then been told that a day would come when, without cause or pretext, he would violently dispossess the most respectable princes of Germany, or that he would seize not only the crown but the private fortune of a sovereign so irreproachable as the king of Hanover, or that in the ancient free city of Frankfort he would give a slap in the face to the long-established glories of Germany, he would never have credited such a prediction. Will he, then, not distrust a minister who only yesterday dared to reproach him for giving a courteous reception to the representative of France, and who maintained to the English ambassador at Berlin that that conduct had provoked general indignation throughout Prussia? If we have witnessed with sorrow the excesses committed against the princes of North Germany, we have not been less grieved at the treatment to which the princes of Southern Germany have been submitted. Can the peoples of Southern Germany have any ground of resentment towards France? Bavaria, immediately after Sadowa, did she not address herself to us to preserve the integrity of her territory? and did we not hasten to respond to her desire? Who was it that demanded for the states of the South an independent national existence? Who was it that desired that the sovereigns of those countries, instead of being transformed into crowned prefects, should preserve all the prerogatives of a real sovereignty, which would have been the guarantee of the independence and liberty of their states. Full of respect for the qualities of those fine populations, honest and laborious, we knew that, ready as they might be to take part in a truly national war, they would be afflicted by being called upon to join in a purely Prussian war. Our traditional sympathies with the states of the South survive even in the present war, and we hope that the hour will come when the people of those states will perceive that we were their real friends. The emperor has said so in his proclamation. He desires that the countries which compose the great Germanic race should freely dispose of their own destinies. To deliver Germany from Prussian oppression, to reconcile the rights of sovereigns with the legitimate aspirations of the people, to put an end to incessant encroachments which are a perpetual menace to Europe, to preserve the Danish nationality from complete ruin, to conquer an equitable and lasting peace, based upon moderation, justice, and right—such is the general idea which governs the present contest. The war now beginning is not on our part a war of ambition—it is a war of equilibrium. It is the defence of the weak against the strong, the reparation of great iniquities, the chastisement of unjustifiable acts. Far from being influenced by motives of rancour or hatred, we enjoy that calmness which arises from the performance of a duty, and we appeal in full confidence to public opinion, the arbiter of peoples and of kings. We desire that Germany, instead of placing her strength at the disposal of Prussian egotism and ambition, should re-enter the paths of wisdom and of prosperity. The future will prove the elevated views which govern the imperial policy, and the Germans themselves will unite to render justice to the loyalty of France and her sovereign."

This appeal was reprinted in several of the South German journals, and commented on in terms of scorn and derision. The *Darmstadt Gazette*, the official organ of the Hesse government, said that only "a born idiot" (*gimpel*) would trust the emperor. For the authorized organ of a royal government this was certainly strong language, but it only re-echoed public opinion, and was a verdict alike approved by peasant and king.

As soon as war was actually declared, the French ministers to all the minor German courts had their passports delivered to them, and even the French consuls resident in localities where military movements could be advantageously observed were requested to withdraw. At the same time, another more serious measure was taken by the government. Having ascertained that the emperor of the French intended to form a Hanoverian legion, the chancellor of the Confederacy published a decree, commanding all North Germans serving in the French army to return home without delay. Those not obeying the summons, if taken prisoners, were to be shot. The proclamation applied equally to German volunteers in the Algerian force, a class

not very numerous, but which had never been entirely wanting since the first landing of the French in Africa. South Germans were also informed that they would experience the like treatment at the hands of their respective sovereigns.

In addition to their hopes of support from South Germany, the French were exceedingly desirous to enter into an alliance with Denmark—chiefly for the purpose of being able to disembark safely and without molestation a force sufficiently large for the invasion of Northern Prussia; and so far as the majority of the people was concerned such an alliance would at one time have been very agreeable, for the Danes have never forgiven the Prussians for the loss of Schleswig-Holstein. But from the first the king and the government determined on the observance of a strict neutrality, foreseeing doubtless that if Germany were victorious their country would be annexed to Prussia, and that even if victory remained with France the lost provinces could never be regained. As the news of the successive French reverses reached them a re-action set in on the part of the people, who then saw reason to be thankful to their government for not having thrown their fortunes and hopes into the same scale with France, and thus have saved them from a complete overthrow in her downfall.

Immediately after the declaration of war Count Beust issued a circular stating that, like England, Austria had not attempted to pass judgment on the question in dispute between France and Prussia, but had confined herself to recommending the withdrawal of the prince of Hohenzollern's candidature. Now that war had been declared, it was her wish to moderate its intensity, and in order to arrive at that result she would maintain a passive and consequently neutral attitude. That attitude did not, however, exclude the duty of the government "to watch over the safety of the monarchy, and protect its interests by placing it in a position to defend it against all possible dangers," and accordingly a loan of 12,000,000 florins was immediately raised to increase the army to the ordinary peace establishment.

These military preparations in Austria drew Russia into the field. For a short time it seemed uncertain whether the Emperor Alexander would be prevailed upon to side with his old ally of Berlin, or whether, in return for French connivance in the East, he would leave Prussia to fight it out single-handed, even against more than one adversary. It soon became evident, however, that if Austria came forward as an ally of France (as was thought highly probable before the publication of the proposals made to Prussia by France with regard to Austria in 1866, Russia would join Prussia and Germany. The official journal of the Russian government said, "The Czar is determined to observe neutrality towards both belligerent powers, as long as the interests of Russia remain unaffected by the eventualities of the war." The meaning of this announcement was plain. As Russia's interests in the war could be touched much more easily by Austria and France, her competitors in the East, than by Prussia, who had always been comparatively indifferent to the affairs of the Levant, it was evident that the victory of the two former powers would have been more prejudicial to her than the triumph of the latter. Such an interpretation of the official language, conclusive enough in itself, was moreover supported by direct intelligence from the Russian metropolis, and was gladdening news indeed to the Prussians, as it freed them from danger in the rear, and left them at full liberty to ward off the attack in front. To prepare for all eventualities Russian troops were concentrated on the southern confines of Poland.

At the commencement of the quarrel nearly the whole of the English press sided with Prussia. One strong reason for this was the general reprobation always felt in England towards the aggressor in a quarrel; towards him who strikes the first blow, especially when he can show no other reason for doing so than is involved in a long argumentative recrimination. It was felt, too, that with France on the Rhine and in Belgium, and with no hope of reversing the issue, England's influence as a European power would be curtailed; while a German coalition dictating terms of peace at Paris could scarcely by possibility have any demands to make incompatible with the honour and advantage of England.

There were, however, many well wishers to France, and many whose reasons for being so, as well as their openness in avowing them, were very honourable. Many, for instance, could not overcome their hostility to Prussia as the originator of the complications which indirectly led to the war of 1870, by her, in their opinion, overbearing injustice to Denmark and her well-timed assault on Austria. Many, too, were influenced by a strong sense of the

loyal friendliness of France towards England for many years previously, and on them the memories of the joint contest in the Crimea acted more forcibly than the fears or jealousies of the present. And there were more than might have been at first supposed, belonging at least to the higher, if not the more powerful classes, in whose eyes the quarrel assumed something of a religious complexion. The French Roman Catholic journal, the *Monde*, assured the public the war was to be regarded as a crusade; that it was imperatively necessary, in order to check the progress of German Protestantism and infidelity. Strange as such an appeal to the God of battles in such a cause may have been, it undoubtedly struck an answering chord in many hearts in England. Such sentiments, more or less pronounced, were not confined to Romanists, but were shared by the section of the English upper classes whose feelings lead them into the nearest approximation to Rome, and whose favourite object of aversion is crude Calvinistic Protestantism. In Ireland, also, the feeling was enthusiastically on the side of the French amongst the Catholic portion of the population, but the Protestants were generally in favour of Prussia.

The fact of nearly the whole of the English press siding with Prussia created a feeling of soreness and disappointment in France, where it was said, and doubtless believed, that all the faults were on the side of Prussia; and even if it were admitted that they were equally divided, and that both sides were bent on a fight and took the first opportunity of engaging in it, the French people could not understand why England should not wish them success. They seemed to forget the great efforts she had made to preserve peace, at the request of France, which efforts were rendered of no avail, through what was generally believed in England to have been her too precipitate action, and they also appeared to lose sight of the obligations of a neutral power. The English had, however, so long been on the most friendly terms with France, that the latter could scarcely, perhaps, feel otherwise than pained and aggrieved at not enjoying their full moral support.

On the other hand, notwithstanding this general feeling in favour of Prussia, and of the issue of the proclamation of neutrality and the passing of the Foreign Enlistment Act described in a previous chapter, scarcely had war been declared than the Prussian official newspapers commenced making accusations against the good faith of England and its one-sided neutrality, accusations which soon bore their intended fruit in the shape of a marked soreness on the part of the Prussian people. The chief charges made against England were that she allowed the export of coal, arms, and ammunition to France, and thus benefited her at the expense of Germany. It was afterwards shown from official statistics, that the reports of the exportations had been enormously exaggerated, and that in reality unusually small quantities of the articles named had been sent from this country; and with the view of setting the whole matter right, a diplomatic circular on the subject was written by Lord Granville, stating that the English government had learnt with much regret that an impression existed in Germany that Great Britain was deviating from the attitude of neutrality which she had announced her resolution to observe, by giving France facilities for obtaining certain articles useful to her for war purposes, such as munitions of war, horses, and coal, while such facilities were not accorded in an equal degree to the allied German states. It was not unnatural that, in a moment of excitement like the present, the German people should be more than ordinarily sensitive in watching the attitude of nations which were taking no part in the struggle; and it could not be wondered at that they should for a time accept as facts unfounded rumours, and that they should somewhat hastily condemn as breaches of neutrality proceedings which, at a calmer season, they would not hesitate to pronounce, with that impartiality of judgment for which they were distinguished, to be strictly in accordance with the usages of international law and comity. Her Majesty's government lost no time, after the declarations of war had been exchanged, in announcing the determination of Great Britain to maintain a position of neutrality between the contending parties; and that position had been faithfully observed. It was not true that any facilities had been given, or any restrictions imposed, which were not equally applicable to both belligerents. The steps taken by her Majesty's government had been strictly in accordance with precedent, and with the principles by which neutral nations, including Prussia herself, had been guided in recent wars. But it now appeared to be wished that Great Britain should go further; and that she should not only enjoin upon British subjects the obligations of neutrality, but that she should take

it upon herself to enforce those obligations in a manner and to an extent wholly unusual. It was demanded that she should not only forbid, but absolutely prevent, the exportation of articles contraband of war; that is to say, that she should decide herself what articles were to be considered as contraband of war, and that she should keep such a watch upon her ports as to make it impossible for such articles to be exported from them. It required but little consideration to be convinced that this was a task which a neutral power could hardly be called upon to perform. Different nations take different views at different times as to what articles are to be ranked as contraband of war, and no general decision had been come to on the subject. Strong remonstrances, for instance, were made against the export of coal to France; but it had been held by Prussian authors of high reputation that coal was not contraband, and that no one power, either neutral or belligerent, could pronounce it to be so. But even if this point were clearly defined, it was beyond dispute that the contraband character would depend upon the destination; the neutral power could hardly be called upon to prevent the exportation of such cargoes to a neutral port; and if this were the case, how could it be decided, at the time of departure of a vessel, whether the alleged neutral destination were real or colourable? The question of the destination of the cargo must be decided in the prize court of a belligerent, and Prussia could hardly seriously propose to hold the British government responsible whenever a British ship carrying a contraband cargo should be captured while attempting to enter a French port. Her Majesty's government did not doubt that, when the present excitement had subsided, the German nation would give them credit for having honestly acted up to the duties of neutrality to the best of their power; and they were confirmed in that conviction by the recollection that, when Prussia was in the same position as that in which Great Britain now found herself, her line of conduct was similar, and she found herself equally unable to enforce upon her subjects stringent obligations against the exportation even of unquestionable munitions of war. During the Crimean war, arms and munitions were freely exported from Prussia to Russia, and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian government prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign states. Reflection upon these points would doubtless make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position occupied by her Majesty's government.

Some further important correspondence on the subject took place between the two governments; and although it will slightly anticipate its proper position, according to the chronological order of events, which we wish to maintain as far as practicable, we give the substance of it here, so that there may be no necessity to refer to the matter again. On August 30, the North German ambassador at London, in a despatch marked "confidential," reminded Lord Granville that English public opinion, as well as English statesmen, had unanimously pronounced the war on the part of France "a most flagitious breach of the peace." The right of Germany, on the other hand, to enter upon a defensive war was freely admitted. Germany was therefore led to expect, that the neutrality of Great Britain, her former ally against Napoleonic aggression, however strict in form, would at least be benevolent in spirit to Germany, for it was impossible for the human mind not to side with one or the other party in a conflict like the present. But in what way had England shown the practical benevolence Germany had a right to expect? It was best to reverse the question, and to put it in this shape:—If Germany had been the aggressor, and consequently condemned by public opinion, in what way could the government and the people of the United Kingdom have been able to avoid taking an active part in the struggle, and, at the same time, to prove to France their benevolent intentions? Being short of coal, the French would have been allowed to find here all they needed for their naval expeditions. Their preparations for war not being so far advanced, and not so complete as they first thought, the French would have found the manufacturers of arms and ammunition in this country ready to supply them with, and the British government willing not to prevent their obtaining here, all the material they wanted. This, Count Bernstorff thought, would have been the utmost aid which Great Britain could have granted to France, without transgressing the letter of the existing neutrality laws, had the parts of aggressor and attacked, of right and wrong, been the reverse of the present condition. Facts, however, openly

boasted of by the French minister of war, and not denied by the British government—the continuous export of arms, ammunition, coal, and other war material to France—proved that the neutrality of Great Britain, far from being impartial towards that party which had been pronounced to be in the right, was, on the contrary, such as it might possibly have been if that party had been wrong in the eyes of the British people and government. Count Bernstorff did not admit that there was any necessity, in order to carry out such a neutrality as he conceived ought to have been maintained, to hamper the trade with neutral countries. Had the government declared such exportation to the belligerents to be illegal, it would have remained an exception, subject to penalty if detected. The *bona fide* trade with neutrals would not in the least have been affected thereby. But the government, far from doing this, refused even to accept such propositions as might have prevented direct or clandestine exportation of contraband of war to France; besides, it could not be admitted that such prohibitive measures could in reality damage the regular and lawful trade of the English people at large. They would merely prevent some rapacious individuals from disregarding the verdict of the nation, and realizing enormous profits, which never would have legitimately been made under ordinary circumstances. The rapid increase of the private fortunes of a few tradesmen by such ventures, could not appreciably add to the national wealth of the country. But, on the other hand, the nation could be held morally responsible for the blood which was being shed through the agency of those individuals. It would be said that the war would have ended sooner, and that fewer German soldiers would have been killed and wounded, had not the people and government of England permitted such abuses. It hardly could be seriously meant to say that the Germans were at liberty to bring each case before their prize courts, for it would be out of place thus to taunt Germany with not being mistress of the seas. . . . The policy of the British government, notwithstanding the verdict of public opinion in this country in favour of the German cause, was, if not intentionally, at least practically, benevolent to France, without there being any real foundation for the excuse that the commercial interests of the country would be seriously affected by a different course. The allusion which had been made in England to Prussian neutrality during the Crimean war was disposed of by Count Bernstorff by the remark, first that the cases were in no way parallel: but even if they were, Great Britain remonstrated at the time against the alleged wrong of Prussia. There was (Count Bernstorff proceeded) but one possible alternative. Either the complaints of the British government were well founded, or they were not. If they really were, how could it be maintained at present that the complaints of Germany were unfounded, should even the great difference of the two cases be entirely disregarded? By declaring the present grievances of Germany devoid of foundation, the British government disavowed implicitly the bitter charges they preferred at the time, and condemned the ill-feeling created by them, and partly entertained ever since in England against Prussia.

Count Bernstorff concluded by remarking, that should the position occupied by the British government in regard to Germany, notwithstanding the admitted justice of her cause, continue to be maintained, it would be difficult even for the stanchest advocate of friendship between England and Germany to persuade the German nation that they had been fairly dealt by.

Earl Granville's reply, which is dated the 15th of September, extended to twice the length of the ambassador's remonstrance. The foreign secretary pointed out that the demand for "benevolent," as distinct from impartial neutrality, was something new, and therefore it was necessary at the outset to consider what it meant and what would be its practical effect. The new principle, if accepted, could only be accepted as a principle of international law, and as such susceptible of general application. Thus applied, then, its effect would be as follows: that on the outbreak of a war between two nations, it would be the duty of each neutral to ascertain which belligerent was favoured by the public opinion of its subjects, and to assume an attitude of neutrality benevolent towards that belligerent. But such neutrality should not, as he gathered from his Excellency's memorandum, be confined to sympathy, but should be exhibited in practice; that is to say, the measures adopted by each neutral should be favourable to one belligerent, and proportionately unfavourable to the other. It seemed hardly possible to push the examination further without being met by insuperable difficulties. Where could the line be drawn

between a departure from the usual practice in order to confer material advantages on one belligerent state to the exclusion of the other, and a participation in hostilities? The sympathies of nations, as of individuals, were not invariably influenced by abstract considerations of right or wrong, but swayed by material interests and other causes. Neutrals would probably, therefore, be found ranged on different sides. What would be the material relations of such neutrals? What their relations with the belligerent to whom they were opposed? It seemed hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departed from strict impartiality, ran the risk of altering its essence; and that the moment a neutral allowed his proceedings to be biassed by predilection for one of two belligerents, he ceased to be a neutral. The idea therefore of benevolent neutrality could mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.

Earl Granville examined at length Count Bernstorff's two propositions, that the conduct of Prussia during the Crimean war was not applicable in the present argument because the cases were not parallel, and that, whether the cases were parallel or not, England remonstrated with Prussia. The foreign secretary insisted that the cases were parallel, and then proceeded to deal with the dilemma in which it was sought to place her Majesty's government. "You observe," he says, "that Great Britain remonstrated strongly against the state of things above described, and you add that either those remonstrances were founded, or they were not. If founded, how, you ask, can the present complaints of Germany be held to be unfounded?"

Her Majesty's government do not complain, continued Earl Granville, of the Prussian government making an effort to alter a state of things which they conceive to be at this moment disadvantageous to them; but her Majesty's government are of opinion that the answers which the Prussian government made during the Crimean war more than justify the reply which, to my great regret, I have been obliged on several occasions to make, and now again to repeat, to your Excellency. The nature of those answers will be seen on referring to the correspondence which passed at the time between the two governments, which shows also the nature of the remonstrances addressed to Prussia by Great Britain. On ascertaining that the Prussian government did not mean to restrict the export of arms or contraband of war of native origin, but intended to prohibit the transit of such articles, her Majesty's government consulted the legal advisers of the Crown as to the extent to which they would be justified in making representations founded on their rights as belligerents. The answer was clear, that her Majesty's government would be entitled to remonstrate only in the event of violation of Prussian law; and it will be found, on reference to the correspondence, that though the large direct exportations from the states of the Zollverein certainly formed occasionally the subject of representations and discussions, the strong remonstrances to which your Excellency alludes were, with few exceptions, made on the subject of the continuous violation of the injunctions of the decrees forbidding the transit of arms, which violation was so systematic that, in only one case, of the stoppage at Aix-la-Chapelle of some revolvers concealed in bales of cotton, were the customs authorities successful in interposing a check on it.

Pointing out that what Prussia seemed to require was alterations of practice and the creation of restrictions on trade in a sense favourable to Prussian interests, Earl Granville went on to dispute the statement that the policy of her Majesty's government had been practically benevolent to France, and that the British nation, which had not prevented the export to France of contraband of war and supplies useful for warlike purposes, would be held morally responsible for the blood which was being shed. Admitting to the fullest extent the difficulty of defining the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutrals, and fully recognizing that the present feeling of the German nation was under the circumstances not unnatural, Earl Granville said both belligerents entered on the war with a full knowledge of the rules of international law, and of what had been the almost uniform practice of neutrals; and each belligerent had consequently a right to expect that the existing rules and former practice would be maintained, and might with reason have complained if any change had been made. It must be remembered that obligations upon neutrals had become more strict with the progress of civilization; but the present question was one which was not raised or discussed at the Congress of Paris in 1856; and the Royal Commission, composed of some of the most eminent jurisconsults in England, who inquired into the neutrality laws in

1867, decided that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic.

Turning next to the German specific demand that the export to France of arms, ammunition, coal, and other contraband of war should be prevented, the foreign secretary said there was no doubt that the executive had, under the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, the legal power to prohibit the export of contraband of war ; but the highest authority could be adduced to show that such exportation was not forbidden by English municipal law, and it had not been the practice to prohibit it except when the interests of Great Britain, as in the case of self-defence, were directly and immediately concerned in the prohibition : and even in some of these cases, such as the Crimean war, considerable doubts arose during its continuance whether the prohibition, when actually attempted to be enforced, was as disadvantageous to the enemy as it was inconvenient to ourselves.

Earl Granville argued that if the export of arms were prohibited a clandestine traffic would be carried on, in order to prevent which the most vexatious interference with neutral vessels would be necessary, and, with regard to coal, observed:—"Your Excellency includes coal among the articles to be prohibited, on the ground that coal is more useful to France than to Germany during the present war. This raises the question of the prohibition of all articles, not contraband of war, which might be of service to a belligerent. But if this principle were admitted, where is it to stop? In the American war no cargoes would have been more useful to the Southern states than cloth, leather, and quinine. It would be difficult for a neutral, and obviously inadmissible for a belligerent, to draw the line. It must be remembered, too, that the features of a war may change. Articles invaluable to a belligerent at one period may be valueless at another, and *vice versâ*. Is the neutral to watch the shifting phases, and vary his restrictions in accordance with them? Again, the XIth Article of the Treaty of Commerce between this country and France expressly provides that the contracting parties shall not prohibit the exportation of coal. Can this solemn treaty stipulation be lightly disregarded, as long as we remain neutral!"

In conclusion, Lord Granville said that her Majesty's government feared that no means could be devised for securing, at that moment, a calm discussion of the subject. "They by no means desire to claim exceptional rights for this country. They would be prepared to enter into consultation with other nations as to the possibility of adopting in common a stricter rule, although their expectations of a practical result in the sense indicated by the North German government are not sanguine. We took the course which appeared to be according to the dictates of practice and precedent, at a time when it was impossible to know how the fortune of war would turn. Since then France, notwithstanding the display of her usual courage and gallantry, has met with nothing but reverses. Germany has, on the other hand, given extraordinary proofs of her military ability and power, accompanied, as it has been, by continuous success. Your Excellency, as the representative of a great and chivalrous nation, must agree with me that it would not be possible that we should now change the policy which we declared to our Parliament to be usual, just, and expedient, because it was stated by the victorious belligerent to be in some degree favourable to the defeated enemy."

In his reply, dated October 8, Count Bernstorff, the North German ambassador, informed Lord Granville that he delayed answering him because he hoped the conclusion of peace might have rendered an answer unnecessary, as he would have much preferred to discontinue the controversy. As, however, that hope had disappeared for the present, he felt bound to reply. The answer which he made divided itself into two parts: a complaint that the attitude of the British government in the dispute had changed, and an endeavour to prove that the new attitude it had taken up was unjustifiable either by English municipal or by international law. What Count Bernstorff said in effect was, that up to the 13th of September Earl Granville had never questioned the German position, that the government ought to prevent the export of articles contraband of war. In answer to numerous complaints the foreign minister had asked for proofs, but none of his replies contained a positive statement to the effect that her Britannic Majesty's government regarded the traffic in contraband of war compatible with their neutrality, and that they could not interfere. On the contrary, said Count Bernstorff, it had been repeatedly left to him to search after particular cases with the means at his disposal, in order to bring them under

the notice of her Majesty's government. He proceeded to say:—"After I had succeeded by my notes of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th ult., in bringing a series of irrefutable facts before her Britannic Majesty's government, a sudden change took place. In your note of the 13th ult., while acknowledging the correctness of a large number of cases pointed out by me, your Excellency declared that the traffic, which had been quite openly carried on, was legitimate, and that the customs authorities had no power to stop it. Had her Majesty's government from the commencement of the discussion taken this standing point, they would certainly not have induced me to institute the above inquiries; and far less would they have had reason to subject the correctness of my information to a practical test. I therefore consider myself justified in concluding, that her Britannic Majesty's government, since the receipt of my memorandum, has materially changed the position previously occupied in regard to our complaints. It was unavoidable that this change should be reflected in the answer to my memorandum penned under different conditions; for I had started with the supposition that the legal means at the disposal of the executive had hitherto not been applied simply from motives of convenience. I had been under the impression that it would only be necessary to prove the serious extent of the supply of France with arms and ammunition on the part of England, in order to convince the British government that the time had arrived to make use of their powers. I had therefore not entered upon a judicial examination of the question of English neutrality, not because I had reason to shun its discussion, but merely because I had hoped that by abstaining from it I should be bringing about a more rapid practical decision, and therefore considered it sufficient to restrict myself to the practical and political aspect of the question."

In answering Lord Granville's arguments contained in his lordship's despatch of the 15th of September, Count Bernstorff commenced by denying that he ever asked from England "a benevolent neutrality." On the contrary, he said, "I have on the one hand merely given expression to my satisfaction that the public opinion had ranged itself on our side in this war wantonly thrust upon us, and had on the other hand combined with it the reflection, how difficult it is to reconcile the faith in the practical value of public opinion with the neutrality policy actually pursued by her Britannic Majesty's government." He had only wished a return from a lax neutrality, whereby one party was benefited, to a strict and really impartial neutrality. "For I am unable to admit that it is compatible with strict neutrality that French agents should be permitted to buy up in this country, under the eyes and with the cognizance of her Britannic Majesty's government, many thousands of breech-loaders, revolvers, and pistols, with the requisite ammunition, in order to arm therewith the French people, and make the formation of fresh army corps possible, after the regular armies of France have been defeated and surrounded."

Before proceeding to his main argument Count Bernstorff drew Earl Granville's attention to the extent to which arms and ammunition were being exported from England to France. According to his information, which could be partly tested upon oath if that should appear desirable, the number of fire-arms shipped from England to France since his memorandum of the 30th September was treble and fourfold the number of 40,000 announced by Count Palikao; and a number of manufactories, especially in Birmingham and London, were working day and night for French agents and their men of straw. He was in possession of authenticated copies of contracts concluded between the French government and English contractors. The events of the war had quite recently delivered into the German hands an official letter of the French minister of War, dated the 18th September, to a French officer at the French embassy in London, and in which the then expected despatch of 25,000 Snider rifles was mentioned, and reference was made for the payment to the funds at the disposal of the French chargé d'affaires for the purchase of arms in general. In like manner authentic proofs were before him that the export of fire-arms and ammunition to France has been thoroughly organized in some British ports.

Taking advantage of Lord Granville's own admission, that the executive had the power to prohibit the export of contraband of war, but that the practice was to make use of this right only in the interests of England, as in the case of self-defence, Count Bernstorff quoted a letter of the duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated the 30th of August, 1825, and reprinted in a London newspaper immediately "after the indiscretion of Count Palikao," which, he said, refuted this assump-

tion, proving that England, as a neutral, had repeatedly prohibited the export of arms by an "Order in Council." In one part of the duke's letter the words occur, "I am afraid, then, that the world will not entirely acquit us of at least not doing our utmost to prevent this breach of neutrality of which the Porte will accuse us."

Count Bernstorff quoted the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, cap. 107, sec. 150, to prove that her Britannic Majesty's government had at their disposal the means to put a stop to the traffic objected to, without the necessity of introducing a new machinery of officials for the purpose. Some other sections of the same Act were referred to, and were held by the ambassador to prove that only the right intention of her Majesty's government was required. That British action in such matters varied from time to time was proved, he thought, by the different language of two instructions issued to the customs authorities of the United Kingdom on the 2nd of June, 1848, and the 8th of September, 1870, respectively. In the first, which originated at the time of the Danish-German complications, Sir Charles Trevelyan, one of the secretaries to the lords commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, informed the commissioners of customs in a Treasury minute, that if they should be satisfied that any arms or warlike stores were embarked to be sent from the United Kingdom for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish government, they were to give instructions to prevent the exportation. On the other hand, the instructions dated September 8, 1870, were as follows:—"The board directs you, when it is supposed that arms and ammunition are being exported, to ascertain the fact, and, if so, what is the nature of the arms and ammunitions, and in what quantities, by whom, and to what destination they are to be shipped; but you are not in any case to delay the shipment longer than is sufficient to obtain the above particulars."

After quoting from the French law for the sake of proving that it was not impossible for a government to secure that articles cleared for a neutral port should really be delivered there, Count Bernstorff went on to the behaviour of Prussia in the Crimean war, respecting which he still held that, if the complaints of England against Prussia at the time of the Crimean war were warranted, those of Germany against England at the present time were at least equally well founded.

In the course of his arguments on the international aspects of the question, the North German ambassador said, "The present controversy simply centres in the question whether the refusal of her Majesty's government to prohibit the export of arms is not at variance with the still unaltered general rules of international law regarding the duties of neutrals towards belligerents, and with the laws of this country not yet repealed by the legislature for the better fulfilment of these duties. That such is the case I believe I have proved by the existing facts and the laws themselves."

The ambassador thus concluded, "As for the hope expressed by your Excellency, that the German people will in a cooler moment judge less severely the attitude of the government of Great Britain in this question than now in the heat of action, I regret that, in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, added to the knowledge that our enemy is being daily equipped with British arms, I cannot share it. Should this state of things continue, I could only look forward to the soothing influence which the numerous and actual proofs of sympathy given by the English people, and the manifold testimonies of public opinion in favour of Germany and its good right, may have upon the feelings of the German nation."

In his reply to this note of Count Bernstorff, dated October 21, Lord Granville expressed a hope, that the calm discussion of the subject would not only remove present misunderstandings, but pave the way for an eventual solution. He denied that there had been since the beginning of the war a change in the policy of the British government, as alleged by the Count. "From the date of the outbreak of the war the cabinet has never hesitated as to the course which should be pursued. The views of the House of Commons were clearly manifested when, on the 4th of August, an amendment, by which it was proposed to insert in the Foreign Enlistment Act, then under discussion, a clause prohibiting the exportation to belligerents of arms or munitions of war, was rejected by a large majority; and the same opinions were shown to be held in the House of Lords in the debate of August 8, on the same bill, in which the lord chancellor, the lord privy seal, and Lord Cairns took part. I myself, in answer to a question addressed to me in the House of Lords by the marquis of Clanricarde on the 22nd of July, went so far as to express some doubts whether a policy

of prohibition was advisable even in self-defence; and in the constant conversations on the subject which I have had with your Excellency since the commencement of the war, I have invariably explained to you that the new Foreign Enlistment Act neither diminished nor added to the powers of the government as regarded the exportation of munitions of war, and that it was our intention to adhere, on that point, to the usual practice of this country, which practice we believe to be in conformity with the established principles of public law."

The foreign secretary further pointed out that the mere fact of the English government having instituted inquiries into the truth of certain alleged exportations did not imply an acknowledgment that such exportations, if they had actually taken place, constituted an offence on the part of England. These inquiries were called for by the "wild rumours" which were in circulation, and by the anxiety of the government to make sure that the shipments of arms were not of such a nature as to bring them within the operation of the clauses of the Foreign Enlistment Act, forbidding the despatch of store-ships or the fitting out of military or naval expeditions. Independent information from the customs officials, from the Board of Trade, from the police, and from the small-arms department of the War office, must, of course, be more trustworthy than information from the sources to which the German government had access, and Lord Granville could not, of course, suppose that any importance would be attached by his Excellency to reports given in return for pecuniary rewards.

After reminding the Count that his former "series of irrefutable facts," as he called them, had nearly all been shown to be quite unfounded, Lord Granville proceeded to demolish his fresh accusations. Count Palikao's statement, as reported in the *Journal Officiel*, was merely that arms had been ordered *à l'étranger*, not in England; no trace could be discovered of the order ever having been received in this country, and it was certain that if it was received it was not executed. Again, full returns showed that the supplies of arms drawn by France from the United Kingdom, between the two specified dates, were less than those drawn by her from the United States. This reference to the United States suggested an expression of surprise that a monopoly of the German complaints have been reserved for Great Britain, while the exports from the United States and the positive assertion of the president of the privileges of neutrals had elicited no remark from the North German government. In conclusion, Lord Granville congratulated his Excellency on having withdrawn from the untenable doctrine of "benevolent neutrality," for though "good offices may be benevolent, neutrality, like arbitration, cannot be so;" and, repudiating all jealousy of German unity, repeated his assurance of the friendly and sympathetic feelings of Great Britain towards Germany.

From the first the French government adopted the policy of keeping the public as much in the dark as possible with regard to the progress of events, and an Act was passed inflicting heavy fines and suspension on any newspaper which published war news other than that supplied officially. This measure raised such a protest from the journals of all parties, that the government were obliged to give way to the extent of allowing them to deal with all the past events and accomplished facts of the war, and only to abstain from revelations which might possibly be useful to the enemy. Nothing, in fact, was to be said of "operations and movements in course of execution," but as regarded other matters the papers were free to discuss and publish them. Formal orders were, however, issued by the emperor that no journalist whatever, French or foreign, was to be permitted to accompany the army, and very many who attempted to do so were arrested as spies, and in some cases treated with considerable severity. His Majesty's feeling was that the encounter would be so severe, that he could not afford to give the enemy even the slightest, and, apparently, most superficial advantage; and he believed that assistance furnished to the opposite side by a band of correspondents in the French camp, eagerly reporting whatever news they could pick up, would be by no means slight. However much this might have been the case with some of the less thoughtful of the French writers, the experience obtained in all previous wars in which duly authorized English correspondents had been permitted, might have convinced him that his fears were groundless so far as they were concerned; and it is undeniable that the belligerent from whose camp the most minute and well-written intelligence is forwarded, is sure to obtain the greatest amount of sympathy as regards neutral nations. In the present instance the exclusion of impartial and friendly representatives of the press

from the French armies is to be especially regretted, as it prevented that full record of their gallant conduct from being given to the world which would otherwise have been obtained, whilst shortcomings would have been more fairly extenuated, and the blame of disasters would have been more conclusively laid where it was to a great extent due—not on the brave soldier, whose conduct in most of the earlier battles at least was beyond all praise, but on the incapacity of those in supreme command.

Before the actual outbreak of hostilities, the Prussian government felt it necessary to warn the press of their country against publishing matters which would not only be likely to direct the enemy's attention to supposed weak points in their line of defence, but which might show him the ways and means by which he could best profit by this information. They, however, as in the war of 1866, freely permitted duly authorized representatives of the press, both English and German, to accompany the armies, relying on their good judgment for suppressing anything which was likely to prove of service to the enemy; and as a natural consequence, we have such a true and faithful record of the war, as could not possibly have been obtained by any other means.

The wonderful combination of activity and quiet which characterizes Prussian institutions, were peculiarly remarkable during the days occupied in sending the troops to the front; and nothing could possibly have been more admirable than the manner in which the railway transport was worked. On July 17 orders for the mobilization of the army were issued from Berlin, and within a fortnight there stood massed on the French frontier upwards of half a million of men, with all the supplies and provisions needful for such a host. Incessantly, by day and by night, hourly, and in some instances half-hourly, trains filled with soldiers, horses, and artillery ran on the three main arteries of railway communication that converge on the Rhine district. From every part of Germany the available rolling stock was impressed into the service of transport, and with a regularity and punctuality which amounted almost to perpetual motion, at identical intervals, long trains laden with men and stores hurried along the lines towards the central stations which constituted the points of disembarkation, in a curve extending from Bingerbrück to Rastadt. But if the celerity and perfect system exhibited by so rapid a concentration were astounding, there was something yet more deserving of admiration, and something yet more significant of the temper in which the struggle was being entered upon, in the frame of mind universally exhibited by the soldiers and the population. What made this especially noteworthy was its contrast with the disposition exhibited in 1866 on the outbreak of the war against Austria. On that occasion demonstrations were made against the war by corporations, by mercantile communities, and, in more than one instance, by the landwehr regiments summoned from their avocations of peaceful industry by a then unpopular minister, to fight for his ambitious aims against an empire of German affinities and German relations. But now from one end of the country to the other the movement was one of spontaneous, heartfelt, undeviating, and unlimited enthusiasm, but an enthusiasm manifested in a calm, collected, and earnest way, which had in it no swagger and no levity. In fact, although the excitement among such usually quiet persons was wonderful, what Macaulay said of the Prussians fighting at Leuthen was equally true now—their excitement was shown after the fashion of a grave and earnest people. The sternness of their military organization, which inflicts death for desertion or disobedience, was not needed, for all were willing; but the sternness made men prompt, and in all parts of the country the same spectacle was presented; the announcement of war arrived at noon, at night came the summons to all enrolled citizens, and the next day all those of the youth who were liable, ready as veterans, and as skilled, were on their way to the headquarters of their divisions. Entering at one gate of the barracks, clothed in every variety of mufti, they emerged in a few moments from the opposite entrance in complete uniform, with their trusty needle-gun in hand, ready, without the least confusion, to take the place in the ranks they had occupied during their period of training. Never, probably, in the history of the world had anything more striking been observed than this great military exodus; for it was literally the exodus of a people going forth to do battle in defence of their own, and in what they believed to be a holy cause. To show, however, how grossly the French people were deceived on this, as on most other points, at this time, it may be as well to quote a despatch sent from Metz to the *Gaulois*, a very widely circulated

Paris newspaper, on July 21st:—"Calling out of the landwehr difficult; conscripts weep; great fear of the French, especially of the Turcos; they are carried off by force in waggons."

To those not specially conversant with the social condition of Prussia, it would be difficult to realize the intense personal sacrifices of such a mobilization as that of 1870, which invaded almost every household that comprised male members in the bloom of life, and brought under arms a million subjects of the North German Confederation. It was needful to be on the spot to have brought home to your mind in all its force the full practical working of such a system that so sharply, and without distinction of persons, gathers in all liable to service, whatever might be their social position. Of course such a summoning to arms strikes heavily, not merely individual existences, but also the country, through the disturbance it creates in many industrial establishments. By way of exemplifying the public loss, it is known to every one what an enormous foundry is that of M. Krupp, at Essen, in Rhenish Prussia. Nearly 8000 workmen are employed in it, and of these on the present occasion no fewer than 1500 had to join their colours, to the great loss of the foundry, as they were the skilled and absolutely indispensable artizans. Yet nowhere did the least murmuring arise among the population at the calls imposed on them. Nobles and peasants, men and women, were all equally determined, and ready to make the greatest sacrifices. Those amongst the male population of the proper age, who found themselves forcibly exempted from service for infirmity, frequently had recourse to various devices to obtain admission into the ranks, and those only were disheartened who were deemed to remain in fortresses, without any prospect of facing the enemy.

Volunteers flocked to the army in thousands, but most of them were not accepted, as there was no need for more than those who could be legally called upon. No less than 400 young men, all just below the regulation age, asked permission to volunteer into one regiment at Berlin—the 1st Dragoons. Several of the universities had to close on account of the students leaving to join the army in such large numbers; in fact, the movement which converted incipient scholars into warriors extended even to the first form of the grammar schools. In Glogau alone fifty "Gymnasiasten" left Sophocles for the stern realities of life; at Berlin, Treves, Cologne, &c., many more flung Cicero into the corner and put on the spiked helmet, in proof that the lessons of civic virtue inculcated into their ripening minds by the classics had not been thrown away upon them. The enthusiasm even caught boys (as in the time of the Crusades), and on one occasion seventy-two of them concealed themselves under the seats of the railway carriages going from Berlin to the Rhine. The boys, from ten to fourteen years of age, wanted to enlist, and cried with vexation when they were discovered and pulled out of their hiding places.

For that part of the population physically incapacitated from taking the field, but financially able to contribute to the expenses, the establishment and support of relieving societies became an earnest and well-observed duty. In every town, and almost in every street, offices were opened for the reception of subscriptions and of the thousand-and-one articles which an army in the field or a soldier in the hospital stand most in need of. Wine, coffee, extract of meat, lint, linen, stockings, and cigars, were the principal commodities brought forward; and to regulate and control the action of the many local societies established for this purpose, some central committees, all co-operating with each other, were set afoot in Berlin. To give a tangible reward to courage, at least fifty gentlemen offered prizes to soldiers who might capture French flags and cannon. In most towns refreshment committees and associations were established for the purpose of providing refreshments for the soldiers as they passed through, and it was a very touching sight to see the little maidens, and boys and old men with red and white rosettes and ribands, with their baskets and trays, distributing the supplies.

Congratulatory telegrams and promises of assistance were also received in large numbers from Germans in America; those resident in St. Louis alone telegraphed to the speaker of the Federal Parliament that they would send him a million dollars as their contribution to the expenses of the war. In many parts of the United Kingdom, too, enthusiastic meetings were held and large sums subscribed, and most of those residing in this country who were liable to serve in the army, left to join it of their own accord, and before the notices from their government could possibly have reached them.

Throughout the whole of Germany the idea of defeat—ultimate defeat—seemed out of the question. Whatever happened, people said, they must ultimately be the gainers. Whatever success might attend the French arms, it was utterly impossible that France could retain possession of an inch of German soil. Were the whole country to be overrun and the nation paralyzed for a time, the struggle would be renewed again and again until Germany was free once more. Should, on the other hand, their efforts be crowned with that success which a just cause merited, and which they confidently believed would attend them, then would victory over a common foe be the keystone of German unity, binding all the Fatherland into one whole and undivided nation. But even if the fortune of war were against them, if reverses followed and the blood of thousands of their countrymen were poured out for hearth and home — still would their new-born unity, baptized in that blood, bound and sanctified by the bond of common suffering, rise triumphant at the last, so firm, so fixed, that no petty jealousy, no internal quarrels, could ever again cause dissension among them.

The king of Prussia left Berlin for his head-quarters at Mayence on the evening of 31st July, his departure being made the occasion of a most moving popular demonstration. The way to the station was lined with a dense crowd of enthusiastic subjects, who gave vent to their feelings in the most unmistakable manner. His Majesty was accompanied to the station by the queen, who graciously responded to the cheers of the public, but was unable to repress her tears at the thought of the perils her husband was about to encounter. At the terminus, which was decorated with flowers, and occupied by an immense multitude, the king was received by General von Moltke and Count von Bismarck, his military and diplomatic premiers. As on a preceding occasion of a similar nature, the well-matched couple were to be his companions in the coming eventful journey. It was a moving scene when the king embraced his queen, when all voices were hushed while the two were shaking hands for the last time, and when the hurrahs which had momentarily ceased thundered forth again directly his Majesty had taken his seat in the carriage. His Majesty evidently suffered from feelings of deep emotion, which he could with difficulty restrain. For some days previous—in fact, since the declaration of war—it was noticed that he was not in his usual joyous spirits. He spoke with devout confidence, and trusted in the justice of his quarrel, but nevertheless appeared unusually grave. Count von Bismarck and General von Moltke, as well as the king, became the heroes of a perfect ovation before they could enter their carriage.

Before his departure the king issued the following proclamation:—

"To my People!—On my departure to-day for the army, to fight with it for Germany's honour and the preservation of our most precious possessions, I wish to grant an amnesty for all political crimes and offences, in recognition of the unanimous uprising of my people at this crisis.

"I have instructed the minister of state to submit a decree to me to this effect.

"My people know, with me, that the rupture of the peace and the provocation of war did not emanate from our side. But being challenged, we are resolved, like our forefathers, placing full trust in God, to accept the battle for the defence of the Fatherland.

"WILLIAM."

How much in earnest the Prussians were in all military matters was proved by his Majesty on his journey, which occupied thirty-six hours from Berlin to Cologne. The distance in ordinary times occupied only twelve hours; but though the king was the passenger, and was an aged gentleman to boot, who must suffer severely from the fatigue of a long journey, the arrangements for the transport of the troops occasioning the delay were not in the least interfered with. Before military law all Prussians are equal, the king not excepted.

His Majesty arrived at Mayence on August 2, and at once issued the following proclamation to his army:—

"All Germany stands unanimously in arms against a neighbouring state, who has surprised us by declaring a war against us without any motive. The defence of the threatened Fatherland, of our honour and our hearths, is at stake. To-day I undertake the command of the whole army, and I advance cheerfully to a contest which in former times our fathers, similarly situated, fought gloriously. The whole Fatherland, as well as myself, trusts confidently in you. The Lord God will be with our righteous cause."

His Majesty also revived the Order of the Iron Cross, than which, among all the orders and medals of honour known to history, none have ever shown more brightly or decorated its bearers more gloriously. It was first instituted on March 10, 1813, by Frederick William III., and was conferred only for gallantry against the French. Its very simplicity and lack of intrinsic value were intended to bring back to memory the hard iron times by which it was called into existence, the terrible hand-to-hand fight with an over powerful enemy, and the noblest treasures of a nation that were to be regained by the war: freedom and independence of the Fatherland, moral and political honour, security of the fireside, of the family, of law, and of religion. Thousands of these iron crosses were distributed among the patriots who, fired with the love of country, and full of indignation against the foreign usurper, performed deeds of intrepid valour and noble self-sacrifice. The cross insured its wearer a small pension, but especially the grateful esteem and reverence of his countrymen. Fifty-five years, however, had elapsed since the close of the war which called it into existence, and the large number of knights of the iron cross had consequently dwindled down to a small handful, while the comparatively small number of iron crosses transmitted to the present generation were beginning to be looked upon as relics of a great and glorious age, and the time did not seem to be far distant when the only iron cross on exhibition would be that of Blücher, which is preserved in the historical museum in Berlin. The few survivors who were entitled to wear them were, in late years, on all public occasions treated with the honours accorded to the high dignitaries of state.

The only difference between the old and the new cross of iron is in the initials of the king, and the number of the year, 1870, being used instead of 1813–14; in all other respects, and also in the classes of the order, the new order is exactly like the old. The form of the cross is the same as that of the order of the Teutonic knights, the founders of old Prussia. It is made of black cast-iron with silver borders. As when first instituted, the order included two classes, with a grand cross as a third; but the latter could only be conferred on a general in command for gaining a battle, capturing a fortress, or some such decisive exploit. Had anything in the world been possible to have increased the enthusiasm and valour of the Prussian soldiers of all ranks during the forthcoming campaign, it would certainly have been the resuscitation of this much-coveted order of the iron cross.

On Wednesday, July 27, a decree was published appointing the empress regent during the absence of the emperor, and on the following day his majesty left Paris for Metz, for the purpose of assuming the command. Instead of proceeding publicly through the city, as was at one time intended, his departure was conducted as privately as possible, which proceeding had a bad effect on the lower orders, who inferred from it that he did not go willingly, or that his health was bad, and also indulged in some other unfavourable suppositions. He was accompanied by his only child, the Prince Imperial, only fourteen years of age. The latter had previously worn his hair rather long and curling, but just before his departure he had it cut to the French military regulations, which was not quite so becoming, but which his mother thought suited him extremely well. Before leaving he gave a lock of his hair to all the ladies of the palace. The empress superintended the preparation of the young soldier's "kit," and packed his trunk with her own hands. As usual on occasions when firmness and energy were required, she showed to great advantage—bearing the parting with much fortitude, and replying cheerfully to those who condoled with her on the separation. It was right, she said, that the prince should thus early begin his apprenticeship to the noble profession of arms, and prove himself worthy of France, of the name of Napoleon, and of that of the valiant race of Guzman, from which, on her side, he sprang.

The emperor was enthusiastically received on his arrival at Metz, and immediately issued the following proclamation to the army:—

"Soldiers,—I am about to place myself at your head, to defend the honour and the soil of the country. You go to fight against one of the best armies in Europe, but others which were quite as worthy have been unable to resist your bravery. The same thing will occur again at the present time. The war which is now commencing will be a long and severe one, since it will have for the scene of its operations places teeming with fortresses and obstacles; but nothing is too difficult for the soldiers of Africa, the Crimea, China, Italy, and Mexico. You will again prove what the French army, animated by the sentiment of duty,

maintained by discipline, and inspired with love of country, can perform. Whatever may be the road we take beyond our own frontiers, we shall everywhere find glorious memorials of our fathers. We will prove ourselves worthy of them. All France follows you with her ardent wishes, and the eyes of the world are upon you. The fate of liberty and civilization depends upon our success.

"Soldiers,—Let each one do his duty, and the God of armies will be with us.

"NAPOLEON.

"The Imperial Head-Quarters, Metz, *July* 28."

This proclamation had an important effect in France. As stated in a previous chapter, when war was first declared, it was openly announced that for four years France had been specially providing for the crisis which had now arrived, and therefore it was presumed that little remained for her to do. General Lebœuf, the responsible minister for war, on being interrogated by his imperial master as to the efficiency of the army, replied with epigrammatic brevity, "Nous n'avons qu'à ouvrir nos armoires." The military wardrobe of France was complete: all that was necessary was to place the army in the field. For this purpose the network of rails which connected the capital with the eastern provinces was more than sufficient. The activity and precision, it was said, which on all former occasions had distinguished the French military system, would suffice to concentrate an army on the frontier which, before the slow and ponderous forces of the North German Confederation could be mobilized, would be prepared to enter at once upon its triumphal progress to Berlin. The *matériel* of the French army was magnificent. The common soldier was armed with the Chassepot, which had worked such marvels on the field of Mentana. The majority of the staff, from the imperial commander downwards, had learnt the art of war at Magenta and Solferino, or beneath the burning sun of Mexico. Many had distinguished themselves at Alma and Inkermann, and had gathered laurels at the glorious storming of the Malakoff. The cavalry of France was the finest in the world. Her artillery had no superior and few equals. The habits of organization so distinctive of the French people, had been exercised to perfection in the civil departments of her forces. The commissariat was more than equal to any strain that could be put upon it. Above all and for the first time, the mysterious and dreaded *mitrailleuse* was to assist the chassepot and the field gun in clearing the way to the capital of Prussia. That the enemy would content itself with harrassing the flanks of the steadily advancing legions was possible; that it would offer compact resistance in the open was an idea too absurd to be entertained for a moment. It was true that the battle of Sadowa was still fresh in the memories of men, where the Prussians beat the Austrians. But then the Austrians were at best, and notwithstanding their magnificent appearance on parade, merely an inferior kind of Prussians. Germans might beat Germans, but nothing could contend against the *élan* of the French soldier in the peculiar tactics of the Zouave and the Turco. (The employment of the latter troops by France in a purely European contest, was considered by many a disgrace to her, and a strange commentary on the emperor's proclamation, describing the war as a "mission of civilization" on the part of France.)

The estimate by which the French soldier was taught to gauge his German antagonist was well illustrated in the pages of *Charivari*, where a Turco, with laboured politeness, thus addressed Count von Bismarck:—"Pardon, m'sieu, peut être vous me croyez un nommé Benedek." In another cartoon a French soldier was represented working a mitrailleuse; in the distance was a field covered with dead Germans, and the soldier was made to exclaim, "Dear me, I have only been working ten minutes, and the battle is over; I suppose I must have turned the handle too fast." With these feelings so general in France, it is perhaps no wonder that M. Ollivier, the head of the government, surveyed General Lebœuf's preparations for a holiday campaign with conscious pride; and that the "lightness of heart" with which that statesman said he entered on the campaign should have found a ready echo in the feelings of his too confident countrymen.

As another specimen of French arrogance at this period, we may quote a few lines from a thoroughly representative and able Frenchman, M. Edmond About, who was sent to the seat of war as correspondent for the *Soir* newspaper, and whose letters to that journal obtained an exceedingly wide circulation. He thus described the passage of the first French soldiers across the Saar:— "Our advanced posts are in Prussia: they mean to pass the night there. Not only have we violated the

inviolable soil of Germany, but the French soldier even prepares to sleep quite comfortably upon it. An event so overwhelming does not astonish, or excite, the manly population of this place. No one seems greatly moved at hearing, or even seeing, that our troops have crossed the frontier. If it were our territory, ours, that was invaded, every man would be furious; every pulse would give 120 beats to the minute; that fatal day would engrave itself ineffaceably in the recollection of every spectator. But it seems as if the neighbouring territory were made to be conquered right away, and confiscated in a trice. Tradespeople and the peasantry, like the soldiers, seem to think the thing quite natural. They have made no more ceremony about taking the country of ale than about drinking a glass of its brew. The enemy's bayonets shine by their absence on the horizon. We are free to suppose that the army of King William has chosen another field of battle, and does not mind abandoning the provinces to us."

The importance, and still less the possible duration of the war, was for some time by no means clearly apprehended in France. The popular idea put into popular language, was that France was about to send her army across the frontier to give the Prussians a good lesson, the result of which would be, perhaps, a territorial aggrandizement on the Rhine, and certainly, what was far more important, the recognition of French military supremacy by the rest of Europe. The notion of the war going beyond its professional limits, of war on French soil, of war involving not only the possibility of national gains, but the risk of national losses—of war, in a word, with its horrors and its hazards, entered very few heads. Moreover, as has already been stated, though a fight with Prussia for military supremacy was not only admitted but desired, it is an undeniable fact that war with united Germany, a battle of nations, was never contemplated by the vast majority of Frenchmen. When, therefore, in his "Proclamation to the Army," the emperor spoke of the war being a "long and severe one," it came as a discouragement to the country at large, and as the time to commence drew nearer, the immense difficulties of the enterprise revealed themselves, confidence diminished, and the directors and promoters of the vast operations thought it prudent to be less sanguine in their assurances.

After his arrival at Metz, the empress telegraphed to the emperor, saying she desired to come to see him, to embrace her son, and to show herself to the army and endeavour to increase the enthusiasm for the war, as it was apt to be increased on such occasions by a woman's presence. She had previously gone to Cherbourg, to be present at the departure of the fleet for the Baltic. The emperor replied, thanking her for her wishes and intentions, but requesting her not to carry them out, as he should have left Metz before she could arrive there, and he was unable to tell where she would be able to find him.

We have now traced the events connected with the war to the time at which the armies of France and Germany were brought face to face, in the valley of the Saar, to commence the struggle which was to decide for this century the leadership of Europe; and have described, as impartially as possible, the different feelings by which the inhabitants of the two countries were animated. The emperor of the French had allowed his great adversary, whose fearful strength, as we have already seen, scarcely any one in his empire but himself seemed to have thoroughly comprehended, to secure the fourteen days which was all he needed for preparation. And what had been accomplished in those fourteen days? In a silence like that of the grave, silence absolutely without precedent, and explicable only by a willing submission to an inexorable rule, Germany, from Memel to the Lake of Constance, rolled itself together in arms to bar the invader's road; the whole country was turned into a camp, her youth, *en masse*, into soldiers, and her cities into fortified positions. More than a million of men, three-fourths of them (on July 14) peaceful citizens, scattered over countries many times the size of England, had flung down their tools, stepped silently into places marked out for them for years, and on railways, turned at an hour's notice into a branch of the transport service of the state, had been carried as fully-equipped and organized soldiers to points selected for their rendezvous by Baron von Moltke years before. Through great provinces, which but a short time before were independent; amidst "tribes" divided or hostile for centuries; using governments whose manifestoes against Prussia were hardly dry as trusted instruments—the splendid Prussian organization had worked as smoothly as some magnificent machine.

Before proceeding to describe the first engage-



Comparative length

England ... Mil

France 600 Mile

Dunkirk

I. of Wight

ENGLAND

ENGLISH CHANNEL

CHANNEL ISLANDS

BAY OF BISCAY

SPAIN

PROVINCES

Flanders	1
Artois	2
Picardy	3
Isle of France	4
Champagne	5
Lorraine	6
Alsace	7
Franche Comte	8
Burgundy	9
Nivernois	10
Bourbonnois	11
Berry	12
Touraine	13
Anjou	14
Maine & Perche	15
Orleannois	16
Normandy	17
Bretagne or Brittany	18
Poitou	19
Aunis Saintogne & Angoumois	20
Limousin	21
Marche	22
Auvergne	23
Lyonnois & Bresse	24
Dauphiny or Dauphiné	25
Provence	26
Venaissin	27
Languedoc	28
Guienne & Perigord	29
Gascogne or Gascony	30
Navarre & Bearn	31
Roussillon	32
Gex	33
Nice	34

Provincial Boundaries - - - -

Longitude West from Greenwich

FRANCE

IN DEPARTMENTS

Scale of English Miles

0 20 40 60 80 100

Railways opened

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

CORSICA

GULF OF LYONS

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Longitude East from Greenwich

ments between the two armies, a short description of the armies themselves, and the positions they occupied, will be useful.

The following was the number and position of the French army about the fourth week in July:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
IN FIRST LINE.			
Strassburg, 1st Corps, MacMahon, . .	35,000	3,500	90
Bitsche, 5th Corps, De Failly, . . .	26,250	2,600	72
St. Avold, 2nd Corps, Frossard, . . .	26,250	2,600	72
Thionville, 4th Corps, L'Admirault, .	26,250	2,600	72
IN SUPPORT OF THIONVILLE AND ST. AVOLD.			
Metz, 3rd Corps, Bazaine, ...	35,000	3,500	90
IN SECOND LINE TO SUPPORT EITHER FLANK: MOVED AFTERWARDS TO METZ.			
Nancy, Imperial Guard, Bourbaki, . .	16,650	3,600	60
Forming a grand total of, .	165,400	18,400	456
IN RESERVE.			
Forming at Chalons—			
6th Corps, Canrobert, ...	35,000	3,500	90
Cavalry Reserve, ...		6,250	36
Forming at Belfort—			
7th Corps, Felix Donay, ...	26,500	2,600	72
Total Reserve, ...	61,500	12,350	198

The above force, numbering altogether 226,150 infantry, 30,750 cavalry, and 654 guns, together with the African army of from forty to fifty thousand men, one division watching the Spanish frontier, and the troops destined for the Baltic expedition, exhausted all the regular troops of France immediately available. Outside these were the fourth battalions, very imperfectly drilled, and the garde mobile, totally untrained, which supplied the only means of increasing the strength of the army in the field.

Looking at the positions of the different corps d'armée on the map, it will be seen that they possessed remarkable facilities for concentration and mutual support by means of frontier railroads; Strassburg, Bitsche, St. Avold, Metz, and Thionville being all situated on the same line of railroad, while a second line in rear of the first placed Strassburg in communication with Nancy and Metz by Saverne, Sarrebourg, and Luneville. Strassburg and Nancy, again, communicated to their rear by two railroads, placing both these towns in connection with Belfort, where Felix Douay's corps was, and with Lyons; while Nancy and Thionville respectively communicated with Paris by two railroads, the one passing by Toul, Vitry, Chalons, and Epernay; the other by Montmedy, Mezieres, Rheims, and Soissons.

Thus the French were in possession of railroad communication all along their strategical front, as well as to their rear from the centre and from both flanks; and their general position was strengthened by the strong fortresses of Metz and Strassburg, by the forts of Bitsche, Petite Pierre, and Phalsbourg, blocking passes over the Vosges mountains; and by the fortified places of Thionville and Toul, both on the Moselle river, and both commanding railroads which lead to Paris. Strassburg was the base of supply for MacMahon and De Failly on the right; Metz for the remainder of the army.

The German army consisted of:—

1st or East Prussian Corps, . . .	General Manteuffel.
2nd Pomeranian, ...	" Fransetzky.
3rd Brandenburger, ...	" Von Alvensleben II.
4th Prussians, Saxons, and Thuringians,	" Von Alvensleben I.
5th Poseners, ...	" Von Kirchbach.
6th Silesians, ...	" Von Tümpling.
7th Westphalians, ...	" Von Zastrow.
8th Rhineland, ...	" Von Göhen.
9th Schleswig-Holstein, ...	" Von Manstein.
10th Hanoverians, ...	" Von Voigts Rhetz.
11th Hesse and Nassau, ...	" Von Böse.
12th Saxons, ...	" the Crown Prince of Saxony.

The Guards, under Prince Augustus of Würtemburg, and the armies of South Germany—Bavaria, Würtemburg, Baden, and Hesse Darmstadt.

These forces were divided into three armies as follows:—

First Army.—The army of the Saar, under General von Steinmetz—the 7th and 8th and part of the 10th corps, and the 4th or Brandenburg division of cavalry, with thirty-one batteries of artillery. Total strength, 70,000 men and 186 guns.

Second Army.—The army of the Rhine, under Prince Frederick Charles—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 10th, and 12th corps, the Hesse Darmstadt division, the garrison of Mainz, and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th, and 12th cavalry divisions, with 110 batteries of artillery. Total, 250,000 men with 660 guns.

Third Army.—The army of the South, under the crown prince of Prussia—the corps of the Guard, the 5th, 6th, and 11th corps, with the 6th cavalry division, the Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavarian contingents, and 110 batteries of artillery. Total, 250,000 men, with 660 guns.

The total strength of the three German armies was therefore 570,000 men, with 1506 pieces of artillery.

In addition to these immense forces there were 200,000 men in the second line, between the Rhine and the Weser; 150,000, under General von Falkenstein, in the coast provinces in the North; and 150,000 in garrison eastward, especially in Posen and Silesia. This gives a total of 1,070,000 troops in actual readiness. The numbers, as numbers of efficients, seem almost incredible, but they correspond almost exactly to the number of efficients which would be produced by a conscription throughout Germany of all men of 21, 22, 23, and 24 years of age. Such a conscription would yield 1,600,000 men, and the Germans, whose surgeons are not to be bribed, do not reject more than one in four.

Up to the 28th July, the first army had alone reached the frontier, where it occupied the line of the Saar; from Saarburg on the right, with advanced posts at that place and at Merzig, Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and Bliescastel, with its main body massed somewhat behind in convenient situations for support at Ottweiler, Neuenkirchen, Homburg, and Landstuhl.

The second army, under Prince Frederick Charles, with the royal headquarters, having crossed the Rhine at Mayence and Mannheim, was pressing on in the rear of Steinmetz, and on the 1st August prolonged the line of that general's outposts towards the left by the occupation of Zweibrücken and Pirmasens; and having the main body echeloned from the left of the first corps at Landstuhl, along the line of railway joining that place with Landau, at Kaiserslautern and Neustadt.

About the 2nd and 3rd August the third army, under the Crown Prince, coming from the east bank of the Rhine by Mannheim and Germersheim, took up the line from the left of the second army, occupying as outposts Bergzabern, on the road leading to Weissenburg and Wenden, the junction of the railroads coming from Carlsruhe in one direction and from Mannheim by Neustadt in the other, and having its main body at Neustadt, Spire, Landau, and Germersheim.

By again referring to the map it will be seen that the Prussians, like the French, obtained great advantages of concentration from their system of railways.

Beginning on the right, Steinmetz communicated with Prince Frederick Charles, and he with the Crown Prince, by the railroad passing from Trèves, through Merzig, Saarlouis, Saarbrück, Ottweiler, Homburg, Landstuhl, Neustadt, and Landau, all occupied by their troops, to Wenden junction, the extreme left outpost of the Crown Prince's army The course of this railroad between Saarbrück and Wenden is in the form of a curve, concave towards the French; that is, having the flanks advanced and the centre retired, and it obviously gave remarkable facilities for massing troops on the flanks, which were the only parts of the German line exposed to attack.

The different armies communicated to their rear as follows:—Steinmetz, by the railroad to Mayence, which passes by Wenden, Sobernheim, and Bingen; Prince Frederick Charles, also with Mayence, by the railroad passing by Neustadt, Mannheim, and Worms; or, if preferable, by Mannheim with Heidelberg; while the Crown Prince had the choice of two lines of retreat equally secure—the one by Mannheim either to Mayence or Heidelberg, the other by railroad from Wenden junction to Carlsruhe.

The strong fortresses of Mayence, Landau, and Germersheim greatly strengthened the Prussian general position, which was far more compact than the strategical position of the French army.

The appointment of the Crown Prince to the head of the army in which the South German forces were to be included, caused great satisfaction in those states, and it was regarded by them as an especial compliment. On assuming the command he issued the following address:—

Soldiers of the Third Army.

Appointed by his Majesty the king of Prussia to the command in chief of the Third Army, I send greeting to the troops of Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemburg, and Baden, who from this day are united under my command.

It fills me with pride and joy to march against the enemy at the head of the united sons of every part of the German Fatherland, to fight for the common national cause, for German right, for German honour.

We are entering on a great and severe struggle; but in the consciousness of our good right, and confident in your valour, your perseverance and discipline, I rely on a victorious issue.

Let us then stand together like true brothers in

arms, and with God's help let us unfurl our standards to new victories, to the glory and peace of our now united Germany.

FREDERICK WILLIAM,
Crown Prince of Prussia.

Before placing himself at the head of their troops his Royal Highness, in accordance with military etiquette, paid a flying visit to the three southern sovereigns, and was most enthusiastically received at Munich, Stuttgard, and Carlsruhe. The courts and people absolutely vied with each other in showing their regard for the heir to the Prussian throne, and their joy at his having been appointed to take the command of their armies. The Prussian generals, too, who had been appointed to command in the south, met with the cordial sympathy of the people and troops.

It was also a strange commentary upon the value of the information which had been supplied to the French emperor, and the trustworthiness of his envoys, that when the German armies were on the eve of their advance, Bismarck and Von Moltke sat down to dinner on South German territory with men sentenced by Prussia in 1849 to death and imprisonment, and that aristocrats and extreme democrats clinked their glasses in German fashion as they pledged the German arms in the national war.

The Crown Prince had Lieutenant-general von Blumenthal as chief of his staff, as at Königgrätz; Prince Frederick Charles had with him in a like capacity Colonel von Stiehle; and General Steinmetz was advised by Major-general von Sperling. Lieutenant-general von Obernitz commmanded the Würtemburg division, and General von Beyer the Baden division.

The king was the commander-in-chief of the German armies, but all the strategical operations were directed by General von Moltke. In addition to the king of Prussia, the Crown Prince, and Prince Charles, several other German princes took the field against the French. The king was attended in his headquarters by the grand-duke of Saxe-Weimar, the grand-duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the crown prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Prince Luitpold of Bavaria, and Prince Charles of Prussia. The duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha accompanied the Crown Prince, and some other illustrious personages were in the camp of Prince Frederick Charles.

CHAPTER VII.

Early Skirmishes in the neighbourhood of the River Saar—Description of the River and surrounding Country—Dash and Enterprise shown by the Germans—Destruction of the Bridge of Kehl by them—The French cross the Frontier and fire at a Military train—Attempt to destroy the German Railway repulsed—Brilliant Exploit of the Prussian Lancers—Skirmish at Niederbronn—Death of the First Officer, an Englishman in the service of the Grand-duke of Baden—Delay of the French after the Emperor's Arrival at Metz, on July 28—The Great Opportunity of inflicting Serious Injury on the Germans lost—Contrast of the Strategy on both sides—The Emperor's own Version of his Proceedings up to this point—Alteration of the German Plan of the Campaign in consequence of the French delay—Determination of the French to strike a blow for Political rather than Military Purposes—Description of the town of Saarbruck, the Scene of the First Engagement—The French Attack and "Victory" on August 2—The Prince Imperial's "Baptism of Fire"—Sketch of the Engagement by the Prince—Return of the Emperor to Metz—Enthusiasm and Admiration of the Inhabitants—Intended departure of the Emperor for Strassburg postponed through Illness—Detailed Description of the Position of both Armies on August 3—The French Situation very badly chosen for Defence—Their Inaction and Carelessness a source of great Assistance to the Germans—French Council of War on August 4—A previous German Council of War has unanimously determined to assume the Offensive—Position and description of Wissembourg and surrounding Country—The Battle there on August 4—The German Tactics—Heroism displayed on both sides—The Attack on the Geisberg—Superior weight of the Germans—The Bayonet and the Breech-Loader—Results of the Battle, and Losses on both sides—Position of the Crown Prince during the action—Generous Rivalry caused by placing the Prussian and Bavarian Regiments side by side—Feeling of Satisfaction throughout Germany at the Result of the Engagement—The Moral Effect of it on both Armies.

ALMOST immediately after the declaration of war, the usual skirmishes which always precede more serious engagements, consequent upon the reconnaissances made by two hostile armies in order to obtain information, took place in the neighbourhood of the river Saar, as it is named in German, or Sarre, as it is called in French.

This river rises in the Vosges mountains, in Alsace, and flows northward to Sarreguemines, whence it enters the Prussian territory, bending to the north-west, and passing the towns of Saarbruck, Saarlouis, and Merzig, till its junction with the Moselle, above the city of Trèves (which the Germans name Trier), finally sending its waters into the Rhine at Coblentz. The valley of the Saar, lying deep between wooded hills, crosses a tract of uneven country, some thirty miles wide, inclosed by the Vosges mountains on the south, and the Hochwald, or highlands of the Moselle, on the north. It is not unlike the valley of the Wye, or that of the Lynn in Devonshire.

In most instances the early skirmishes were little more than an interchange of shots between videttes, without leading to any definite result; but in all the Prussians showed a dash and enterprise which might more naturally have been expected from their adversaries.

The first really important act of the war occurred on July 22, when the Prussians blew up the railway bridge between Strassburg and Kehl. This handsome structure, which crossed the Rhine and effected the junction between the French and German railways, was built between 1858 and 1861, at the common expense of both nations, and was so formed that communication could be broken off by either side in a few hours. The bridge was built in three portions; the central one, which consisted of an iron trellis on stone piers of three spans, each about sixty yards long, was fixed, while that at each end was movable, swinging round on a pivot. At the commencement of hostilities the German, and subsequently the French portions, were swung round, thus destroying communication without permanently injuring the bridge. Teutonic prudence, however, did not stop here, and accordingly the German division of the bridge was blown up—an act which called forth from the French the most

bitter accusations of Vandalism; but it was in reality an evidence of the stern reality with which the Germans had entered upon the struggle. The explosion was terrible; large masses of stone and iron being projected as far as the French bank.

On July 23 the French, crossing the frontier with a couple of guns, north of Forbach, fired at a military train between Burbach and Linsenthal, two villages on the Saarlouis-Saarbruck line. The soldiers escaped unhurt; but four peasants in an adjoining field were slightly wounded. On the evening of the same day the French, having again crossed the frontier, and penetrated as far as the neighbourhood of Saarlouis, fired at a Prussian patrol and wounded two horses. Early on the morning of the 24th, another reconnaissance led to a more sanguinary result. From Forbach, where a French division had been stationed for the previous few days, a strong detachment marched to endeavour to destroy the Prussian railroad at Volklingen, between Saarlouis and Saarbruck. Soon after establishing themselves on German territory they were met by the Germans and repulsed with the loss of ten men. A rival exploit performed on the same night by the Prussians was much more successful, and was altogether a feat of considerable brilliancy. The railway on which Saarbruck stood, after it crossed French territory, and passed Forbach, threw out a connection at a little place called Hochern. This connection ran eastward, skirting the frontier at a greater or less interval, till it reached Haguenau, where it turned southward to Strassburg. It is easy to see what a valuable line this would have been to the French, as a feeder to their forces on the frontier. By it they could concentrate or disperse, reinforce or withdraw. The task of interrupting the continuity of the line was committed to Lieutenant von Forght and thirty picked men of his regiment, the seventh lancers. They first proceeded to Neuenkirchen, from the ironworks and collieries around which they obtained a supply of artificers conversant with blasting operations. Thence they went to Zweibrucken, and from that base reconnoitred the frontier. They found the French in considerable strength, and after the frustration of two direct attempts, it became evident that a sudden dash from the flank was the only means of reaching the viaduct of the railway, which had been selected as the most eligible point for destruction. It was a work of considerable magnitude, crossing, in arches, a valley a few miles to the west of Bitsche. Some riding lessons having been given to the civilian engineers, to enable them to sit troop horses at a gallop, the party, on the night of July 24, penetrated the French territory at an unfrequented point on a forest road, galloped forward some seven miles to the viaduct, dropped the engineers, and extended in covering order. In a remarkably short space of time the centre arch of the viaduct went up in the air with a loud explosion, which brought the French outposts inland from the frontier at speed. The Uhlans, as the Prussian lancers are called, kept them off, however, till the engineers had completed the demolition of the viaduct, destroyed a quantity of railway and other *matériel*, and caused damage which it would have taken some weeks of uninterrupted labour to have repaired. Then the lieutenant, having quietly drawn in his covering parties, remounted his engineers, and cantered off over the frontier, without suffering the slightest casualty in an enterprise which for sagacity, courage, and success, deserved the highest credit.

On July 25 a skirmish took place at Niederbronn, which was chiefly noticeable from the fact that it resulted in the death of the first officer killed in the war—a young Englishman named Winsloe, in the service of the grand-duke of Baden—and in the capture of the first prisoners by the French. The French journals at the time greatly exaggerated the importance of the affair; but the real facts were, that a captain, two lieutenants, and twelve troopers of a regiment of Baden cavalry, were sent to obtain information, and cut the telegraphic wires on the French frontier. They crossed on the Sunday morning near the French town of Lauterburg, were seen by numbers of people, cut the wires at the Huntspach station while the inhabitants were at church, passed the day in riding about the country, and advanced no less than thirty miles into the enemy's territory. Early on the following morning they found themselves on the height of Neiderbronn. Wishing to rest and refresh themselves, they halted at an inn, which was in part also a large barn; and, although they were close to the enemy, they had the imprudence to unsaddle and unbridle their horses. A platoon of

French cavalry on the scout discovered them, and took ten of the troopers prisoners without any difficulty. The other two escaped over a wall, but eventually were captured and conveyed to Metz. All this time the officers were breakfasting in the inn, when a sergeant of the French cavalry, impetuously and single-handed, rushed into the room. He was at once shot by the captain of the Baden cavalry, who had the presence of mind to spring into the saddle of a cavalry horse—that belonging to the French sergeant—and so effected his escape. In the firing which took place during the scuffle, the Englishman was mortally wounded, and died the same evening. Count Zepplin, the captain, escaped amidst a shower of rifle balls, and successfully carried off to the Crown Prince the information which the party had come to seek. An English journal stigmatized them as "madmen," but there is no reason to suppose that their madness was without method. At all events, twelve days after the reconnaissance, the headquarters of the victorious German army were established near the very scene of Mr. Winsloe's death.

On 28th July the Emperor Napoleon reached Metz, and on the following morning he assumed the command of the army of the Rhine. According to Napoleonic traditions, that date ought to have marked the beginning of active operations; but day after day passed, and nothing was done. It is now well known that when the Emperor left Paris for Metz, his intention was to advance across the frontier at once; and had he done so he would have been able to have disturbed his enemy's plans very materially. The military force of France was a standing army, and this was so organized that at the beginning of a war it was supposed to be superior in strength to anything that Germany could bring into the field, though in the long run it would be weaker in numbers, because its mode of recruitment was slow, and it was only fully upheld by the national levies which, in imitation of the German system, had been recently arrayed to give it support. But Germany was an armed nation; if at the outset her standing army would be much less numerous than that of France, it would quickly assume immense proportions; and behind it were vast masses of reserves, composed of the martial flower of the race, which experience had shown would flock to the standards of the regular troops with astonishing speed, and which, if once collected, would form an array far exceeding the united musters of France. The great hope of France lay, therefore, in assuming the offensive as rapidly as possible.

On the 29th and 30th of July, the German armies were still far from being concentrated. The south Germans were still converging by rail and road towards the bridges of the Rhine. The Prussian reserve cavalry was passing in endless files through Coblentz and Ehrenbreitstein, marching southwards; and a resolute advance at that time could scarcely have failed to have brought the French up to the outlying forts of Mayence (Mainz), and to have insured them considerable advantages over the retiring columns of the Germans; perhaps it might have enabled them even to have thrown a bridge over the Rhine, and protected it by a bridge-head on the right bank. At all events, the war would have been carried into the enemy's country, and the moral effect upon the French troops must have been excellent.

Who, indeed, can tell what the result would have been, had a general like the first Napoleon at this time commanded the army which, in the pride of its strength, already grasped with its leading divisions the as yet unprotected German frontier? It is by no means improbable, that if he had been in the field in such circumstances, he would have completely changed the character of the campaign. But feebleness and indecision occupied the place of genius and skill in the camp of France, and the occasion was lost on which, perhaps, the destiny of two nations depended. The emperor had delayed at Paris some time longer than he ought to have done; and the long and irresolute pause which he made after actually assuming the command, was of evil omen to his future operations. The excuse put forward by him, as we shall hereafter see, is, that he discovered that his corps was weaker than he had supposed, and that his commissariat was extremely defective (and that such was the fact is certain); but in the actual position of affairs, when a rapid attack was still the true game, considerations of this kind would not have paralyzed a really great commander.

The delay which had allowed Germany to arm and pour into the Rhineland had caused the French army to be outnumbered nearly two to one on the line chosen by its own commanders; and, literally before a blow had been struck, its chances of success had well nigh vanished. A mere calculation of numbers, however, will not convey an adequate

notion of the danger in which it was now placed, and of the difference between the energy and skill displayed conspicuously by the German leaders, and the false strategy of the French commanders. A glance at the map will show that the corps which, from Thionville to the north of Strassburg, formed the advanced line of the French army, were not only scattered on a wide front and feebly connected, if at all, but were thrown too far beyond their supports at Metz, and were thus liable to be isolated, and beaten in detail by a daring enemy. This was especially the case with the corps of Frossard, De Failly, and MacMahon, which, separated from each other and from the bodies in the rear, were in a position somewhat similar to that of the French before the first Napoleon succeeded in the operations of Landshut and Ratisbon. On the other hand, the corps of the Germans, collected upon a narrow front from within Saarlouis to Wissembourg, with their supports close at hand from Neuenkirchen to Homburg, Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, and Landau, and holding three railways and numerous roads, were already in a position to throw a preponderating force on the French line at almost any point of attack; and, having driven it in, to roll into France an overwhelming tide of invasion. In fact, as regarded the French front, they were in possession of the chord of the arc, from Thionville to Bitsche and Strassburg, with easier means of concentration; and they had the power of seconding a vigorous advance by an offensive movement of crushing strength. The combinations which produced these results reflected the highest credit on the German commanders, and on the martial arrays they led; they showed skill, forethought, energy, and boldness; and they were conducted with that secrecy and swiftness invaluable in military operations. Already the cloud of war which overhung the Saar threatened the forces of France with serious disaster.

As it is our wish above all things to give a thoroughly impartial account of everything connected with the war, it is only fair, perhaps, after what we have just stated, that we should, in justice to the emperor, give his own account of the proceedings up to this point, and in which it will be seen he endeavours to excuse himself from much of the blame that is generally laid to his charge. In a now celebrated historical pamphlet, published at Brussels under the title of "Campagne de 1870: des Causes qui ont amené la Capitulation de Sedan, par un officier attaché à l'Etat Major-Général," and which was dictated by the emperor himself during his retirement at Wilhelmshöhe, it is stated that when war was declared, and the emperor assumed the command-in-chief, he frequently gave expression to the thought, reflected in his initial proclamation, that the campaign about to open would be surrounded by the greatest difficulties. In the midst of the satisfaction occasioned by the enthusiasm which everywhere greeted his footsteps, many observed the look of sadness with which he listened to shouts of "Onward to Berlin!" uttered by the excited multitude—as if the enterprise was destined to be merely a military promenade, and a march forward would suffice to vanquish the European nation most thoroughly exercised in the profession of arms, and best prepared for war.

The emperor knew that Prussia was ready to call out, in a short time, 900,000 men, and, with the aid of the southern states of Germany, could count upon 1,100,000 soldiers. France was only able to muster 600,000; and as the number of fighting men is never more than one-half the actual effective force, Germany was in a position to bring into the field 550,000 men, whilst France had only about 300,000 to confront her. To compensate for this numerical inferiority, it was necessary for the French, by a rapid movement, to cross the Rhine, separate Southern Germany from the North German Confederation, and, by the éclat of a first success, secure the alliance of Austria and Italy. If they were able to prevent the armies of Southern Germany from forming their junction with those of the north, the effective strength of the Prussians would be reduced 200,000 men, and the disproportion between the number of combatants thus much diminished. If Austria and Italy made common cause with France, then the superiority of numbers would be in her favour.

The emperor's plan of campaign—which he confided at Paris to Marshals MacMahon and Lebœuf alone—was to mass 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg, and 50,000 at the camp of Chalons. The concentration of the first two armies, one on the Sarre, and the other on the Rhine, did not reveal his projects; for the enemy was left in uncertainty as to whether the attack would be made against the Rhenish Provinces or upon the duchy of Baden. As soon as the troops should have been concentrated at the points indi-

cated, it was the emperor's purpose to immediately unite the two armies of Metz and Strassburg; and, at the head of 250,000 men, to cross the Rhine at Maxau, leaving at his right the fortress of Rastadt, and at his left that of Germersheim. Reaching the other side of the Rhine, he would have forced the states of the south to observe neutrality, and would then have hurried on to encounter the Prussians. Whilst this movement was in course of execution, the 50,000 men at Chalons, under the command of Marshal Canrobert, were to proceed to Metz, to protect the rear of the army and guard the eastern frontier. At the same time, the French fleet cruising in the Baltic would have held stationary, in the north of Prussia, a part of the enemy's forces, obliged to defend the coasts threatened with invasion. The sole chance of this plan succeeding, was to surpass the enemy in rapidity of movement. To accomplish this it was necessary to muster, in a very few days, at the points decided upon, not only the number of men required, but also the essential accessories of the projected campaign; such as waggon equipages, artillery parks, pontoon trains, gunboats to cover the passage of the Rhine, and, finally, the commissariat necessary to supply a large army on the march.

The emperor flattered himself with the hope of attaining these results, and in this he was deceived; as, in fact, everybody was led astray by the supposition that, by means of the railways, men could be concentrated, and horses and *matériel* brought forward, with the order and precision indispensable to success, where preparations had not been made long in advance by a vigilant administration. "The delays incurred arose," said the emperor, "in a great measure from the defects of our military organization, as it has existed for the last fifty years, and which revealed themselves from the very beginning." Instead of possessing, as was the case with Prussia, army corps always in an organized state, recruited in the province itself, and possessing on the spot their *matériel* and complete accessories, in France the troops composing an army were dispersed over the whole country, whilst the *matériel* was stored in different cities in crowded magazines.*

* "Three years ago," says the pamphlet, "orders were given by the emperor to ascertain the time necessary to set up the waggons dismounted at Vernon, when it was proved that this simple operation would require six months' labour. These waggons were thereupon divided between Paris, Chalons, and Satory. The concentration still remained too great, and has been fraught with deplorable consequences."

In case it was decided to form an active division upon any given point of the frontier, the artillery generally came from some distant place, and the train equipage and ambulances from Paris and Verdun. Nearly all the munitions and provisions were brought from the capital; and as for the soldiers of the reserve, they rejoined their regiments from all parts of France. The consequence was, that the railways were insufficient for the transportation of the men, horses, and *matériel;* confusion took place everywhere; and the railway stations were often encumbered with objects of which the nature and the destination were equally unknown.

In 1860 the emperor had resolved that the recruits of the second portion of the annual contingent should be drilled in the depôts of their respective provinces, thence to be drafted, in time of war, into the regiments destined for the campaign. This plan combined the advantages of the Prussian with those of the French system. The men belonging to the reserve, being simply obliged to go from their place of residence to the principal town of the department, were there assembled, speedily equipped, and divided among the different regiments. Still, although rapidly completed, the regiments were not, as in Prussia, made up from the population of an entire province. Unfortunately, this plan was modified by the war office in 1866, and each soldier, after being mustered into the service, was immediately assigned to a regiment. The result was that, in 1870, when the reserve was called out, the men belonging to it, in order to rejoin their various regiments, were in many instances obliged to follow a long and complicated route. Thus, for example, the men who were at Strassburg, and whose regiments were actually stationed in Alsace, instead of at once joining the ranks at Strassburg, were sent to their respective regimental depôts, which might be in the south of France, or even in Algiers, and were thence obliged to return again to Strassburg for incorporation. It may be easily conceived what delays in the assembling of the troops were caused by so defective an organization. The same fact existed with respect to the camping material, the ambulance waggons, and the officers' transportation. Instead of being distributed among the depôts, in the centre of each department of the empire, they were all stored in a limited number of military warehouses; so that many troops belonging to the reserve were

forced to join their corps only imperfectly equipped, destitute of haversacks, *tentes d'abri*, pannikins, saucepans, and camp-kettles—all objects of first necessity.

To these defects must be added the limited power intrusted to the generals in command of the departments, and to the military commissariat. The most trifling thing required a ministerial authorization. It was, for instance, impossible to distribute to officers or men the most indispensable adjuncts, even the necessary arms, without an express order from Paris. This administrative routine deprived the generals of the activity and foresight which may sometimes remedy defective organization.

"We hasten to add, however," continues the pamphlet, "that, to make up an army, less account must be taken of individual intelligence than of substantial organization, moved by simple machinery, and capable of working regularly in time of war, because it has been habituated to working regularly in time of peace. Yet, notwithstanding all the deceptions we encountered, justice must be rendered to the functionaries at the war office, who, at a moment of profound tranquillity, were invested with the task of setting in motion the entire military power of France. Taking into consideration the defective French administration, it was in reality a *tour de force* to bring into line, in so brief a period, armies incompletely formed; no previous measure for the purpose having been carried into effect.

"No doubt the objection will be made that some, at least, of the faults heretofore mentioned ought to have been remedied in advance. But the difficulty of conquering inveterate habits and prejudices must not be forgotten. The Chambers, too, persistently refused the aid necessary to accomplish the most important reforms. Who does not remember the objections and protestations to which the bill providing for a new military organization gave rise? The opposition adhered to their vain theory of levies *en masse*, and the bill was everywhere badly received. On the other hand, the emperor, confident in the armies which had achieved such glorious successes in the Crimea and in Italy, was not indisposed to believe that their irresistible rush (*élan*) would compensate for many deficiencies, and render victory assured. His illusions were not of long duration.

"The army of Metz, instead of 150,000 men, only mustered 100,000; that of Strassburg only 40,000, instead of 100,000; whilst the corps of Marshal Canrobert had still one division at Paris and another at Soissons: his artillery, as well as his cavalry, was not ready. Further, no army corps was even yet completely furnished with the equipments necessary for taking the field.

"The emperor gave precise orders to the effect that the missing regiments should be pushed on with all possible speed; but he was obeyed slowly, excuse being made that it was impossible to leave Algeria, Paris, and Lyons without garrisons.

"Nevertheless, the hope of carrying out the (original) plan of the campaign was not lost. It was thought that the enemy would not be ready before us. His movements were not known, nor in what quarter his forces were being massed; but all uncertainty on this point was soon cleared away by the events in the first week in August."

As might have been expected, the delay on the part of the French produced an evident change in the German plan of operations. Originally believing the French would force the fighting, they had shown no other anxiety than to be prepared to resist their impetuosity. They deemed it inexpedient to await an onset on the Saar, but wished to decoy the French away from their base of operations at Metz, and to await them in their own formidable position near Mayence. The whole district between the Moselle and the Rhine was left almost defenceless. Moltke had resolved on sacrificing no men in detail, and in fact on the spur of the moment he had no men to mass; but with each day of reprieve his forces accumulated in geometrical progression, until at length he could draw a sigh of relief, satisfied that Germany had both the generalship and the soldiers; and as action was felt to be necessary to them, it was resolved, that as the French delayed making the expected advance, they would assume the offensive, so that the parts assigned to the two countries by long-established traditions were reversed. With this object in view, a general advance of the German troops was made from their second line on the Rhine, to their more advanced one between it and the Lauter.

General Steinmetz with the first army came from Cologne across the Eifel mountains, and from Coblentz up the Moselle to Trèves and Saarlouis. The Crown Prince moved onwards from Speyer, across the Rhine to Germersheim and Landau; while Prince Frederick Charles brought forward the

centre by Kaiserslautern and Birkenfeld, towards Saarbruck.

Prepared or not, however, political considerations compelled the French emperor to make at least some show of actual hostilities, for the Parisian public were already murmuring loudly at the delay; and it was accordingly decided to strike a blow at one of the least defended and most accessible points on the frontier. The place thus chosen was Saarbruck, a manufacturing town of considerable importance, situated in a rich coal district, and which has, with its suburb of St. Johann, with which it is connected by two bridges, a population of 14,000. The town stands on the south, or French side of the river Saar, and consists of long streets, with a slight ascent, running parallel to the river. A broad hill rises immediately behind the town, from whose summit there is a good view of the broad valley, bounded in front by the heights of Spicheren. These latter hills are called—to commence from the left—the Winterberg, Reppersberg, Frilles, and Galenberg, and the Exerciesplatz. The town is an open one, and being completely commanded by heights, its defence entered so little into the plans of Prussian strategists, that it had at first hardly any garrison at all. In fact, had they cared to have done so, almost as soon as war was declared the French could easily have gained possession of the place without firing a shot, and the major in command had been only left in his exposed position whilst the mobilization was proceeding, at his own urgent request. For several days in the last week of July the French from Forbach and from Sarreguemines, under Generals Frossard and De Failly, had been occupying the surrounding hills, unimpeded by the Prussians, and rearing their batteries, under cover of the woods on the plateau at Spicheren, on the right of the road from Forbach, and advancing with heavy columns upon the village of St. Arnual on the right, and Gersweiler on the left of the central plateau. From this height the range of the French cannon had been tried at 1800 mètres' (about 2100 yards') distance with perfect success. A reconnaissance and attack on the town by the French, which took place on Saturday, July 30, was, however, repulsed; but on the following Tuesday, August 2, the attack was renewed with much greater force, and with ultimate success. The attacking troops consisted of the second division (General Bataille) of the second army corps (General Frossard). The advance was made by the Forbach road, the first object to be attained being the complete occupation of the heights immediately commanding Saarbruck. This was easily accomplished, the Prussian videttes falling back as the enemy advanced. There was indeed but little opposition until the French were fairly posted on this vantage ground, from which their guns commanded the town where the Prussians were posted. The combat then became one of artillery, and, on the part of the French, of mitrailleuses, from which so much was expected. The town was held by three companies of the fortieth regiment, amounting to about 800 men, supported by two light guns (four pounders) and about 250 cavalry. The emperor and prince imperial left Metz by special train about half past eight in the morning, so as to be present at the engagement, which commenced at about eleven, and was continued for nearly three hours. At the end of that time, the position being evidently untenable, was evacuated by the Prussians, who retired by way of Grosswald, and it was during their retreat across the bridge that the mitrailleuses were brought into play upon two detachments of troops. The effect was said by the French to have been marvellous, "the enemy being at once scattered, and leaving half their number dead or wounded;" but the Prussian official statement of their whole loss was only two officers and seventy men, and a trustworthy Englishman, who witnessed the action from the town, said he noticed particularly that nearly all the mitrailleuse bullets fell short. He said the pluck and enthusiasm with which the Prussians contested every inch of ground, in spite of being so much outnumbered, showed of what material they were made; and the steady way in which they brought their needle gun up to their shoulder and deliberately took aim, contrasted favourably with the excited random shots of the French with their Chassepots; the French idea apparently being that it was desirable to consume as much ammunition as possible, regardless of results.

The following was the account of the action supplied to the emperor, by the general commanding the troops engaged on the French side:—

August 2.

Sire,—I have the honour to report to your Majesty the movements effected this day by the second army corps in pursuance of your orders,

to take possession of the positions on the left bank of the Saar, which command the heights of Saarbruck.

General Bataille's division, supported on the right by that of General Laveaucoupet and one of the twelve-pounder batteries of the reserve, and on the left by the first brigade of the division of General Vergé, with a second battery of twelve-pounders, formed the first line. General Bastoul, encamped at Spicheren, and intrusted with the duty of directing the movement on our right, was ordered to send two battalions to occupy the village of St. Arnual and the heights above it; whilst the remainder of his brigade, crossing the ravine in front of Spicheren, was to make a front attack on the positions to the right of the road from Forbach to Saarbruck. The other brigade of the Bataille division was to move on to the position known as the exercising ground. Three squadrons of the fifth mounted chasseurs preceded it to clear the way. Finally, Colonel du Ferron, of the fourth mounted chasseurs, with two battalions of the first brigade of the Vergé division, was to push on a reconnaissance to Guerswiller to connect the movement of the second corps with that of Marshal Bazaine. The troops left their bivouacks between nine and ten o'clock. Lieutenant-colonel Thebeaudin, with two battalions of his regiment (the sixty-seventh), in advancing to the attack of the village of St. Arnual, found it strongly occupied and defended by batteries of position planted on the right bank of the Saar. To demolish this artillery, General Micheler, whose brigade had come forward to support the movement of General Bastoul, ordered into action a battery of the fifteenth regiment, which effectually opened fire on the Prussian guns. Supported by a battalion of the fortieth regiment of the line, and by the company of sappers and miners of the third division, materially assisted by the flank movement of Colonel Mangin, who, with the remainder of the sixty-seventh regiment and the sixty-sixth regiment, descended the heights on the left, Lieutenant-colonel Thebeaudin was able to carry the village of St. Arnual, and occupied it with a battalion of the fortieth regiment and the company of sappers and miners. The battalions of the sixty-seventh, with great *élan*, rushed up the slopes of the hillock of St. Arnual, and established themselves on the crest opposite Saarbruck. The sixty-sixth, with equal resolution, took possession of the heights up to the exercising ground, driving the enemy from all his positions. At the same time, General Bataille rapidly moved his first brigade to the rising ground on the left of the Saarbruck road, connecting his movement with that of his second brigade by advancing a battalion of the thirty-third regiment. Advancing in line, the battalions of the twenty-third and eighth regiments, their front covered by numerous skirmishers, resolutely carried the many ravines which run across the ground, which is very difficult and thickly wooded. One battalion of the eighth regiment, working its way across the woods, followed the railway as far as the village of Frotrany, where it effected its junction with the other battalions of the regiment, and together they attacked the exercising ground of the right. On gaining the heights, General Bataille planted one of his batteries in front of the lines of the sixty-sixth regiment, and another on the exercising ground, to fire on the railway station and silence the enemy's artillery, which had taken up a position on the left of Saarbruck. It was unable to sustain our fire, and had to fall back. The twelve-pounder battery of the reserve was ordered by me to support the fire of the batteries on the exercising ground, and finally a battery of mitrailleuses of the second division threw into utter disorder the enemy's columns of infantry, which were evacuating the town. During this artillery duel the troops were able to acclaim his Majesty the emperor and the prince imperial, on the very ground from which they had just dislodged the enemy. The movements of the infantry were excellently seconded by the fifth regiment of horse chasseurs, under the orders of Colonel de Seréville. The squadrons, supported by infantry in skirmishing order, searched every nook in the ground, and rapidly gained all the crests of the hills whence they could descry the enemy. The twelfth battalion of foot chasseurs, and the company of sappers and miners of the second division, formed the reserve of General Bataille; they joined the troop of the first brigade on the exercising ground. The first brigade of the Vergé division, which formed the second line, constantly kept at 400 or 500 métres from the first line, and availed themselves of every rise in the ground to cover themselves. The reports I have received up to this time announce the following losses:—The sixty-sixth regiment had one officer killed, M. de Bar, lieutenant of the francs-tireurs; Captain Adjutant Major Privat has a very dangerous gunshot wound; Lieutenant Laramey received a bullet through his shoulder; fifteen

or sixteen rank and file were killed or wounded. The sixty-seventh had no casualty among its officers. Rank and file, twenty men killed or wounded. The eighth regiment, two rank and file wounded. The third division reports a sergeant killed and a private wounded. I have not received the report of Colonel du Ferron. I am told that he was engaged, and had about ten men wounded. Neither have I received the report of the commander of the tenth battalion of foot chasseurs, which has pushed forward on the right along the road from Sarreguemines to Saarbruck. The troops are encamped on the ground they have gained. I have had a few entrenchments thrown up in front and flank of their position. Some *epaulements* have also been established to protect our guns and gunners. I was greatly pleased with the dash and resolution of the troops. They showed great energy in marching up steep ground, and also in action. The heads of the several corps congratulate themselves on the steadiness of their men, their intrepidity, and the growing confidence they show in their weapons. I will make known to your Majesty the names of the officers and men of all ranks who specially merit being pointed out. Our losses amount to six killed, and sixty-seven wounded.—Receive, &c.,

FROSSARD.

The "victory" was of no importance whatever to the French in a military point of view, as no further advance was made, and no advantage taken of the success. In fact, the town, which had some of its houses burned during the fight, was not even occupied, as the Prussian guns completely commanded it from the heights behind. The "victory," however, enabled the emperor to send the empress a telegram which has now become historical, announcing the fact that the young prince imperial had received his "Baptism of Fire." The document ran thus:—"Louis has just received his baptism of fire. He showed admirable coolness, and was not at all affected. A division of General Frossard has captured the heights which overlooked the left bank at Saarbruck. The Prussians made but a short resistance. We were in the front rank, but the bullets and cannon balls fell at our feet. Louis has kept a bullet which fell quite close to him. Some of the soldiers wept at seeing him so calm. We have lost one officer and ten men killed.

"NAPOLEON."

At the same time the emperor's private secretary announced the victory to the minister of the Interior as follows:—

"METZ, *August* 2, 4.30.

"By the emperor's orders, get the following inserted in the *Official Journal*, in the non-official part, and give a copy to all the Paris papers:—This day, August 2, at eleven in the morning, the French troops had a serious engagement with the Prussian troops. Our army assumed the offensive, crossed the frontier, and invaded Prussian territory. In spite of the strong position of the enemy, a few of our battalions succeeded in taking the heights which command Saarbruck, and our artillery very soon drove the enemy out of the town. The engagement began at eleven o'clock, and was over at one. The emperor was present at the operations, and the prince imperial, who accompanied him throughout, received the 'baptism of fire.' His imperial highness's presence of mind and his *sang froid* in danger were worthy of the name he bears. The emperor returned to Metz at four o'clock."

In the evening after the combat the prince, who has a great natural taste for drawing, made a sketch of the engagement, and presented it to M. Tristan Lambert, who was a great friend of his, and who had volunteered as a private in one of the regiments of the guards for the campaign. This sketch was very exact and precise, the march of the troops, the encounter, the bridge, the spot where, with the emperor, he stood during the affair, all being clearly indicated. In one corner of the sketch were written these lines:—"A mon ami Tristan Lambert. Le 2 Aout, après avoir vu le feu pour la premiere fois.

"LOUIS NAPOLEON."

On the return of the emperor to Metz in the evening (or, as was officially announced, "in time for dinner"), he sent for the mayor, and after an interview of a few moments' duration the latter stated publicly to his friends and acquaintances on the Place Napoléon that the French troops had taken the town of Saarbruck, that the town was on fire, and the Prussians running away. The inhabitants immediately gave themselves up to the most extravagant expressions of joy. In some parts of the town music, singing, and dancing were kept up all night. Some of the oldest inhab-




BATTLE OF SAARBRÜCK.
August 2nd 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
English Miles
Ensdorf
Schwalbach
Sprengen
Rittenhofen
Sellerbach
Lisdorf
Griesborn
Engelfangen
Knausholz
Derlen
Puttlingen
Ritter strasse
Bouss
Wadgassen
Hostenbach
Schaffhausen
Neudorf
Völkingen
Rockershausen oder Louisenthal
Wehrden
Differten
Furstenhausen
Burbach
Ottenhausen
Communal Forst von Furstenhausen
Gerslautern
Der Warndt Wald
Clarenthal
Ludweiler
Konigl. Fst.
Stifts Wald von St Arnual
Krughutte
Schœneck
Vielle Verrerie
Pte Rosselle
Gde Rosselle
FORET DE FORBACH
Verrerie Sophie
Karninshesberg
Creutzberg
FORBACH
Kleinwald
RAILWAY
Bois Wieberg
Kelschberg
Oelingen
Morsbach
Remsing
Gaubivinet
Folckling
Cocheren
SAAR R.



Engraved by R. Walker

NERS HALL

DINBURGH & GLASGOW

itants reminded the mayor that the custom of Metz was to ring a merry peal from the bells of the cathedral at every victory of France over her enemies, and regretted that he did not order it to be rung immediately. They also suggested that an official notice of the victory might be very conveniently posted up at the Prefecture, and also at the Hotel de Ville. The mayor, upon this, returned to his Majesty to ask permission both to ring the bells, and to post up the bulletin of the entrance of the French army into Saarbruck. But he came back considerably disappointed: the emperor had said, in answer to his loyal application, "Never mind about the bells nor the official notice either." This was considered by the masses as an example of the most admirable modesty and abnegation in which an imperial sovereign could possibly display his *haute sagesse*, and when at last people did betake themselves to bed, they amused themselves by constantly repeating the words *sage*, *prudent*, *modeste et grand homme!* During the night and all the following morning, officers who had been in the affair came to Metz, and when the real truth came out it considerably reduced the noisy enthusiasm of the citizens and the soldiery.

Marshal MacMahon went from Strassburg to Metz on Sunday, July 31, and had a long interview with the emperor; and after his departure orders were given to prepare for the emperor's departure for Strassburg on Wednesday morning, August 3, at five o'clock. Every thing was ready accordingly, but when the time came it was found that the emperor's state of health did not permit him to make the journey; the travelling and the excitement of the previous day had exhausted his strength so much that neither physician nor surgeon would consent to his leaving the house.

For the purpose of more clearly understanding subsequent events, it may be well if we here briefly recapitulate the general situation of the two armies at this time (Wednesday, August 3). The emperor kept his corps scattered along the Prussian and Bavarian frontiers, MacMahon covering the right, between Strassburg and the Lauter; L'Admirault on the left at Thionville; Frossard overlooking Saarbruck and at Forbach, on the left centre, supported by Bazaine and the guards in rear; and De Failly about Bitsche, protecting the branch railroad from Sarreguemines to Haguenau. Marshal Canrobert's corps was in second line at Chalons or Nancy, and Douay's to the south-east of the whole at Belfort. Most of these positions had been occupied for many days, and an advance by Forbach and Saarbruck was looked for by the main body as the natural complement of the attack on Saarbruck of the 2nd; for although suited for attack, the whole French position was about the very worst that could have been chosen for defence, the outstretched wings being distributed over a front 100 miles long, and inviting attack at half-a-dozen points from a vigorous enemy.

The position of the four French front corps, though too scattered for defence, might have been turned by the staff to one special end with great advantage. Had each chief exerted himself to the full to gain intelligence of the enemy's proceedings, had they impressed this necessity on their subordinates, their cavalry might in their earlier days of expectation have penetrated every point of the Prussian and Bavarian districts before them, and done such service as at least to have changed the aspect of affairs at the outset. Frossard's advanced troops should have destroyed the junctions of the three railroads which met from Trèves, Bingen, and Mayence, within twenty miles of his front. L'Admirault might have discovered the truth of the reports already rife, of au assembly of Germans behind Saarlouis about Trèves. De Failly's horse should have penetrated into Rhenish Bavaria, at least sufficiently far to discover whether Landau was being garrisoned in force. Without doubt, a little exertion on the part of the two former would have at least discovered the enemy's plan sufficiently to have made known the vital importance to the coming German concentration of the railroad junctions of Saarbruck and Neuenkirchen. Had De Failly been moderately active, he would have infallibly discovered that a third of the German armies were being gathered within a morning's ride of his videttes. As to MacMahon's own share in this strange state of indolence, it is beyond question that he had about Strassburg some means at least of feigning a passage of the Rhine in force, and so drawing his enemy's attention that way. But not one of these things was even attempted.

The following was the Prussian situation at the same time (August 3). On the right, the first army, organized by Herwarth at Coblentz, had General Steinmetz, another veteran of the Waterloo period, assigned to its head in the field. It consisted of the seventh, eighth, and half of the first corps; but in spite of every exertion, only

three of the five divisions had reached the district where the Saar flows into the Moselle above Trèves (Trier). The central, or second army, was less advanced. Prince Frederick Charles had only taken up his head-quarters at Mayence (Mainz) on the 1st, and was occupied in pushing his leading corps (the third, under Alvensleben), direct through the Vosges towards the point of junction on the Saar, so long threatened by the French troops of Frossard. Marching partly, and partly using the Kreutznach-Bingen line of railway, this corps was now more than half over the hundred miles which lie between Mayence and Forbach. How important to Prince Frederick Charles was the inaction of the French we have already alluded to, may best be understood by again observing, that their advance for fifteen miles only beyond Saarbruck would have brought them upon the second junction station before them, that of Neuenkirchen, where the Kreutznach-Bingen line unites with the main railroad from Metz to Mannheim. The French main body, therefore, if they had pushed less than twenty miles from the Saar, would have completely severed the communication of the troops on the Bingen line from those on the Mannheim, and both of course from that to Trèves by Saarbruck, except so far as the Prussians might have used the cross-roads of a difficult country.

Whilst the right and centre of the Prussians were thus still far from facing the enemy in strength, the case was very different with their left, where General Moltke had directed so large a force to assemble as to give to the Crown Prince and his army (the third) great independence of action. Here were no mountains to be passed, no wide districts to be traversed before the enemy was found. The river Rhine and its petty affluent, the Lauter, had from the first separated the outposts of MacMahon from those of the Badish and Bavarian levies first summoned to cover the frontier. Dashing expeditions of horsemen were made across it, chiefly from the German lines; and whilst these occupied the attention of the French, the third army was being collected undiscovered in their front. The fifth and eleventh Prussian corps, and the first Bavarian, were the earliest to arrive at the designated passages of the Rhine at Germersheim and Mannheim, and for fourteen days consecutively 5000 men a day were passed through the latter city alone, and sent on by rail to Landau, where the Crown Prince had his head-quarters on the 3rd, and where he was joined also by divisions from Baden and Würtemburg, the latter only that evening.

The fortress of Landau is but a short march from the frontier on the Lauter, and as the German side of that stream was wooded, it was not difficult to mass a great part of the allied troops close to it on the 3rd. The line of the stream was observed by the French with a single division of MacMahon's corps, under General Abel Douay, who, though ignorant of the movements on the other side, was so rash as to keep the bulk of his troops almost upon the frontier. It was open to him to have held the line with pickets of his cavalry, and kept his command so far to the south as to have had ample notice of the advance of the Prussians over the stream.

Trusting, however, to a vague idea that the enemy were on the defensive, he neglected this obvious precaution, although aware that there were other unguarded passages by which he might be attacked, as that of Lauterburg, a small place ten miles to his right, near the Rhine. His position, therefore laid him at the mercy of the superior numbers who were gathering before him unobserved, and as will be immediately described, the Crown Prince promptly used the advantage thus offered by the enemy, whose camp was but a mile beyond the Lauter. The secrecy preserved by the Prussian generals, and in some measure, too, the carelessness of the French authorities, prevented the latter from ascertaining the true strength and position of their adversaries, whilst the Prussians were kept unusually well informed as to the movements and strength of the French, and availed themselves of every opportunity to obtain such information, and without much impediment being placed in their way. It was, for instance, only natural that the Prussians should obtain information from some of the peasants of Alsace and the German part of Lorraine, and the first measure taken by the French should have been to prevent all communication on the frontier. Instead of this, up to the very moment that an attack was made by the Prussians, women and children living in the various villages adjacent to the Palatinate and the Rhenish provinces went daily across the frontier, pursuing their usual trade in rural produce; and a girl thirteen years of age gave, for a thaler, much useful information concerning the division of General Douay. It is thus obvious that the Prussians, exerting all their efforts for getting news, and speaking German with the

borderers, who are German all along the frontier, had an enormous advantage over the French in this respect; for they neither took the trouble to send reconnoitring detachments across the frontier, nor could expect Prussian or Bavarian peasants to come over to talk with them. No wonder then they were taken so completely by surprise! The country itself, too, broken by ravines and densely wooded, was admirably adapted to conceal the movements of the German troops.

No important event occurred on Wednesday, August 3; but on the following day a French council of war was held at Metz, at which MacMahon and Bazaine were present; and at which, it is believed, an advance in force was decided upon, involving an independent movement of MacMahon's corps towards the Rhine, while Bazaine was to force back the troops in front, and cut off all communication with Trèves. A German council of war held earlier in the week, at Mayence, immediately after the arrival of the king of Prussia, was unanimously of opinion that the German armies should act on the offensive.

The South German army was already massed between Landau and Bergzabern, before the French could be persuaded that the Crown Prince had emerged from the Black Forest; and while the French council of war was assembling at Metz, on Thursday, August 4, the first great battle of the campaign had already been decided.

On the morning of that day the Prussians and Bavarians crossed the Lauter by various passages near Wissembourg (or Weissenburg, as spelt by the Germans), a frontier town which forms the western apex of a triangle, of which the Rhine forms the base, and the little streams of the Otter and the Lauter the sides. It formed the extreme right of the French position, commanding the railway to Haguenau and Strassburg, as well as the high roads to Niederbronn and Bitsche. The town was formerly a free city of the German empire, and was ceded to France by the Treaty of Ryswick. For six years, 1719 to 1725, it was the residence of the unfortunate Stanislas Leczynski, duke of Lorraine, and elect king of Poland. It has more than once owed its selection for a battle-ground to the works with which its neighbourhood was furnished by Marshal Villars, in the reign of Louis XIV., after his conquest of Alsace. In 1705 the marshal caused a series of redoubts and intrenchments to be constructed from near the Geisberg, which stands near the town, above the southern bank of the Lauter, to nearly as far as Lauterburg; and these lines have, time after time, been captured and recaptured. They were stormed more than once during the War of the Succession; and on October 13, 1793, they were carried by the Austrians, under Prince Waldeck. It is somewhat remarkable too, that its loss on that occasion by General Beauharnais, the maternal grandfather of Napoleon III., was expiated by that unlucky servant of the Republic on the guillotine. The Germans, however, held them only for a short time, as on Christmas Day of the same year they were retaken by the French; and from that time Wissembourg enjoyed an interval of peaceful existence as the chief place of the department of the Bas-Rhin. It was, until 1867, a fortified town, and although it is now dismantled, is still naturally protected by the hills upon which stood once the redoubts of St. Germain, St. Paul, and St. Remy. The town is distant twenty-seven miles north-east from Strassburg, by the railway which passes through Haguenau, seven miles from Wissembourg, and which there forms a junction with the main railway, the Great Eastern of France, leading to Luneville, Nancy, Chalons, and Paris. The valley of the Lauter at Wissembourg forms a gorge which opens upon the Rhenish plains to the south, and into the Vosges on the west. About two miles and a half to the west, upon the road to Bitsche, is a hill, which rises nearly 2000 feet above the valley of the Lauter. The ground from Wissembourg to this peak, for about half a mile, rises gently; and then suddenly at the bend of the Bitsche road to the right the ascent becomes more steep, and the road climbs up it with many easy gradations. The road to Climbach, shown in our battle-field plan, runs through a woody country, easily defended, traverses the forest of Mundat, and after running rather more than a mile beyond, reaches the little village of Lembach, which lies on high ground. The road then descends, passes through the forest of Ratzenthal, lying in a small valley, and terminates at Bitsche, a fortress of great natural strength, twenty-five miles distant.

Early, then, on the morning of Thursday, August 4, the Crown Prince emerged from the Bienwald, at Schweighoffen, a Bavarian village just over the frontier, and surprised the town of Wissembourg, in which, as we have stated, MacMahon's second division was posted under the command of General

Abel Douay, brother of the commander of the French seventh corps d'armée. The French had made a reconnaissance on the previous day, but had not discovered the neighbourhood of their enemy, although within a short distance of the heights of Schweighoffen, from which the attack was first made, there were drawn up the greater part of the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps and the first Bavarian corps, numbering at least 50,000 men. It is easy, however, to understand how this surprise was effected. The Crown Prince's advanced posts were at Bergzabern (which lies nearly due north of Wissembourg little more than six miles distant by road), and at Wenden Junction, on the north-east of Wissembourg, distant from that place by rail eleven miles, and from Bergzabern also by rail six miles. Troops massed at these places could therefore easily be brought down under cover of the night. Besides, the road from Bergzabern skirts the forest of Mundat, on the lower spurs of the Vosges, which afforded facilities for concealment. The French reconnaissance had been superficial, or had not been pushed far enough. Parties of a few daring troopers radiating from Wissembourg on the 3rd in all directions, would have revealed to Douay that a concentration of hostile forces was taking place dangerously near to his isolated position. The French troops at and near Wissembourg consisted of three regiments of the line, the sixteenth chasseurs, the zonaves and turcos of General Pellè, three batteries of artillery, and one mitrailleuse battery—the total force being about 8000 men. The attacking force of the Germans numbered altogether about 40,000 men, and the Baden division occupied Lauterbach and Hagenbach at the same time.

A Bavarian division commanded by General Bothmer led the assault, which was covered by a powerful cannonade. The French, as we have said, were utterly surprised, not having had the slightest idea that the Crown Prince was so close upon them. In fact, the men of one of the regiments were busy cooking their morning meal when the shells and bullets began to rain into their camp. General Douay was riding away from the town to examine the adjacent country, when he was recalled by the firing. The troops in the town, having been reinforced by some of those who had been stationed on the adjoining ridges, held their own stoutly; and the Bavarian division, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, made little impression in their attack on the town, till the ninth division of the fifth corps (Von Sandrart) came up and turned it on the south-east by Altenstadt, which was taken at 11·30 a.m. Then, whilst one of its brigades (Voight Rhetz), stormed the position on the Geisberg, part of the other joined the Bavarian attack on Wissembourg. The attack on the Geisberg was further sustained by the forty-first brigade (Schachtmeyer) of the eleventh corps. The French fought desperately—in fact, throughout the day they made almost superhuman efforts to cast back the enemy's masses beyond the Lauter; and although so enormously outnumbered, they charged again and again, as if under the idea that mere valour would stop bullets. Whilst the attack on the Geisberg was proceeding, the gates of Wissembourg had been demolished by artillery fire, and the place stormed; and after attempting a counter attack on the summit of the Geisberg at two o'clock, the French were compelled to retreat on all sides. Before three there was a general advance of the German troops. The French continued fighting along the main road, but gradually quickened their pace as they were pressed; although they made a stand at two of the villages on the way, and were only dislodged with loss. The Germans also behaved remarkably well during the engagement; their advance up the hill of Geisberg being, in the opinion of an English officer (Colonel Walker) who was present, like that of the British troops at the battle of the Alma, to which the position offered some resemblance. "Upon the crest were the French with their Chassepots and mitrailleuses. When the order to storm it was given, the Germans went at it without flinching. A storm of balls rained upon them. Whole ranks were swept away, but the rest rushed on without a pause. No single shot was fired in return. They trusted entirely to the bayonet, and the instant they gained the crest they swept the French before them by sheer weight." The king's grenadiers (7th regiment) of the guard and the fifty-eight regiment of Silesia advanced at a run with shouts of "Up, Prussians! the Bavarians need help!"

The German advantage in weight was very great, as was afterwards found by weighing some prisoners; two Germans on an average weighed nearly as much as three Frenchmen. In a hand-to-hand struggle this difference of weight gave a preponderance to the German which was


BATTLE OF WISSEMBOURG
August 4th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
Erlenbach
Barbelstein Chateau
Bruchweiler
Lauter R.
Rombach
Bondenthal
Reichsdorf
Schlettenbach
Die Reichbach
Nothweiler
Bobenthal
Schönau
Schauffelshalt
Lauter R.
Iatschoff
Hieschthal
Durrenberg
Schee Wald
Wald
Ft. de Froensbourg
Thalenberg
Diebels
Diebhalt
Wingen
Foret de Katzenthal
Foret de Steffels
Jungen Wald
Climbach
Berg Wald
Cleebourg
Foret
Drachenbronn
B de Kirchspiel
Birlenbach
Keffenach
Lobsann
Memelshoffen
Retschwiller



Drusweiler
BERGZABERN
Bellenborn
Teutschhof
Dierbach
Dorrenbach
Gapplumeyhof
Gultenberg Chateau
Ob Otterbach
Otterbach
Schaidt
Rechtenbach
Hustelhof
St Paul
Schweigen
Cappsweyer
RAILWAY
WISSEMBOURG
Schweighoffen
Bayrischhoff
les Picards
Altenstadt
Mundat Wald
BIEN WALD
Ft St Remy
Ligne de Wissembourg
Lauter R.
Guthleuten Fme
HARTWALD
Oberhoffen
Geisberg
Schobusch Fme
Hausaunbach
Steinselt
B. Denschanhoff
Lehwiesbaechel
Grossenwald
Riedseltz
Riedseltz Oberdorf
Geitershoff
Schleithal
Euenbrunnen Graben
Bruch Wald
Salmbach
Ingolsheim
Oberseebach
Seigan
Ob Lauterbach
Hunspach
Niederseebach
Keidenburg
Trimbach

overwhelming, and as just stated, the French lines were broken instantly by the impetuous onslaught of the Prussian and Bavarian troops. It was certainly very singular, that whereas military men had almost come to the conclusion that the bayonet was a weapon which had ceased to be of any great utility, for that it was next to impossible that cavalry could ever come to close quarters with infantry armed with breech-loaders, or that two infantry regiments could ever come to a hand-to-hand struggle; that upon their first battle between troops alike armed with breech-loaders one party should have charged and defeated the other with the bayonet and clubbed muskets. Theoretically, and upon paper, it would seem impossible for troops to charge up a hill exposed to a fire from breech-loaders and mitrailleuses; and the fact that the feat was here performed, showed that improved arms after all have not modified the system of fighting, as military men had concluded that it must do, and that weight and strength, when accompanied by desperate courage, still count for much.

In their retreat the French lost their baggage, camp equipments, &c., and left about 500 killed and wounded on the field, besides 800 prisoners (including 18 officers) and one six pounder, of which, however, all the horses had been killed, and which had been spiked before it was abandoned.

Most of the prisoners were taken as skirmishers in a cave, which formed their cover, and where they were cut off by the rapid and continuous advance of the Prussians. A few others, who were taken on the field, had expended all their ammunition (as at Saarbruck on the previous Tuesday, the French fired at such a distance as made hitting a mere matter of chance, and also very rapidly, and consequently widely); but they refused to surrender, and kept on fighting at the point of the bayonet. As the Prussians did not wish to kill them, they rushed at last in a body upon them and threw them down wrestling. The Turcos behaved infamously; many of them, after asking for and receiving quarter, stabbed with their sword bayonets the soldiers who had spared them, or snatched up the muskets they had thrown down, and treacherously shot the victors.

General Douay himself was killed by a shell early in the action while rallying his troops, and Brigader Montmarie was wounded. The former was buried in the town the day after the battle, with full military honours; his body was followed to the grave by an entire German regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery, and the last salute was fired by a whole company. On the way to the churchyard the band played the French national hymn, and, returning after the burial, the popular German song, "Die Wacht am Rhein." The French regiments which suffered most in the engagement were the Turcos (of whom 500 were taken prisoners), and one of the regiments of the line. The German loss amounted to 700 men, including 76 officers, which accounted for the telegram from the Crown Prince announcing the victory, and describing it as a "brilliant but bloody" one. General Kirchbach was wounded, and the king's grenadiers and the fifty-eighth regiment suffered very severely. The casualties amongst the inhabitants of the town were three killed and fifteen wounded; amongst the former a young girl, the acknowledged beauty of the town, who was standing at her father's house-door with a younger brother, talking to a neighbour, when a shell burst close to the group. One fragment struck her in the body, and another took off her brother's hand and wrist. She died next day in great agony.

The German front extended altogether over a length of two miles. During the chief part of the engagement the Crown Prince and his staff were on the left of their line, the artillery was in the centre, and the columns of their troops were massed on the right.

The disposal of Prussian and Bavarian regiment side by side evoked a rivalry in daring most honourable to both; and if anything could have enhanced the satisfaction felt at the success throughout Germany, it was the fact that the first action in the war had been gained, to a great extent, through the assistance of the very South Germans from whom the French emperor had hoped so much; and the convincing proof that it afforded, that although divorced from each other for centuries by religious animosity and political differences, the two great sections of Germany had, in an age of mutual tolerance, been reunited at last by patriotism and a sensible appreciation of their common interest.

Throughout the action the Prussian artillery was splendidly served.

Although the fight lasted so long, no supports were sent to the French general from Marshal MacMahon; but in the midst of the battle a detach-

ment of the line happened to arrive by rail, entirely ignorant of what was going on. The soldiers immediately joined in the engagement, but were of course powerless to avert the disaster. In fact, the engagement was conducted by the Germans with such a superiority of numbers as to make success, sooner or later, almost certain. For the isolation of his division MacMahon must be held in some degree responsible; but Douay had himself chiefly to blame for the temerity which exposed his troops to a surprise by a greatly superior force. There was no military purpose gained by thrusting his camp close to the frontier which would not have been in every sense better answered by keeping it ten miles to the south, and watching the passages of the little stream with detachments of cavalry. Probably the convenience of being near the town, and the fact that there was a good position behind looking towards the Lauter, decided the general's choice. Choosing thus, however, he put himself, as we have seen, completely at the mercy of his enemy, and the Crown Prince, like a judicious commander, took care to insure success, and to make it certain that the first blow he struck—a matter of vital importance in war—should be irresistible and completely decisive.

To prevent their retreat on Bitsche from being intercepted, the French retreated by their left, and by the Col de Pigeonnière, in the direction of that fortress.

The moral effect of the battle on both armies, as the first serious engagement of the war, was of course great, and the result was exceedingly useful to the victors as giving their arms that credit and presumption of success so valuable at the outset of a campaign. Confident though the Germans were that victory would sooner or later crown their cause, they were yet extremely anxious about the issue of the first battle. It was felt by them that the alleged superiority of the Chassepot might prove to be a reality, and that the dash of the French soldiers might be irresistible. With a feeling of relief as much as of satisfaction they learned that the confidence they entertained as to their own strength was not misplaced. On the other hand, at the French head-quarters at Metz the news fell like a thunderbolt, and, of course, the emperor's plans were completely deranged.





Drawn under the superintendence of Captain Hozier

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

Drachenbronn
Ingolsheim
Keffenach
Lobsann
Lampertsloch
Gross Wald
Schœnenbourg
SOULTZ
Sous Forets
La Seltzbach R.
Hoffen
Feldbach
Hohwiller
Leiterswiller
Oberrœdern
Nieder Wald
Grass Wald
Kuhlendorf
Sourbourg
Reunerswiller
RAILWAY
Hatten
Schwaabwiller
Oberbetschdorf
Biberbach R.
FORET D'ASCHBRUCH
Eberbach R.
HAGUENAU
Brumbachel R.
HAGUENAU
BATTLE OF WŒRTH.
August 6th 1870
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
English Miles

CHAPTER VIII.

Advance of the Crown Prince into French Territory—Another Opportunity of Striking a Severe Blow at the Germans lost—Change of Front by the Prussians—Their Arrival near Woerth and Description of the Village—The Position occupied by MacMahon—The Nature of the Country—MacMahon's choice of Position excellent for Strategical Purposes—His want of Foresight in not ascertaining the Strength of his Enemy—Over-confidence on the Part of the French—Battle of Woerth brought on a day before either Commander expected—Description of the Action and of the Manœuvres on both sides—Bravery displayed by the Troops of both Armies—Brilliant Charge of the French Cuirassiers at the close of the Engagement—Incidents in connection with it—Renewed Fighting at Niederbronn—The Disgraceful Flight of the French after the Battle—The Scene at Haguenau—Corresponding picture in the Retreat from Niederbronn—The Losses on both Sides—Large Capture of Trophies by the Germans—Comparison between Woerth and Solferino—Great Advantage of the Victory to the Germans—The Telegrams from the Crown Prince and King announcing it—Interesting Letter from the Duke of Saxe-Coburg describing the Scene at the close of the Battle—The Injury done to the Villages—Animosity of the Peasantry—Review of the Battle and the Strategy displayed by both Commanders—The Battle of Forbach on the same day—Description of the Country near Saarbrück—The Great Strength of the French Position at Spicheren—Advance of the German Army of the Centre—The French surprised—Details of the Fighting—Heroism of both Armies—Heavy Losses—Observations on the Battle and its Results—The Frontier crossed by the Germans the next day—Unopposed Occupation of Forbach—The Scene at Metz on the receipt of the News—Flight of the Villagers—Festival of the Peace Society at Saarbrück only three weeks before—Remarks on the Political and Military "Situation"—The Hesitation and Incapacity of the French Generals contrasted with the Ability and Decision of the German Commanders.

BATTLE OF WOERTH.

The Crown Prince established his headquarters at Schweighoffen on the night of August 4, and on the following day pushed boldly into the French territory. He did not turn to his right, and pursue the road along the frontier towards Bitsche, but came down that leading nearly due south to Soultz (Sous Forêts), where it touches the railway from Haguenau to Wissembourg. He had, as we know, suffered a good deal the day before; many stragglers encumbered the march of his columns, and if De Failly, from Bitsche, with the French fifth corps, combining with a French force in front, had vigorously attacked the Germans in flank, as they threw their right wing forward, it is not impossible that a check might have been inflicted on the Prussian commander. Nothing, however, of the kind was attempted; and while De Failly sent one division, which could be of little avail, across the hills, he misinterpreting, it is said, his orders, remained immovable with his main force, while the German army was being concentrated.

The Crown Prince did not descend quite as far as Soultz, but kept a little to the west, near to the slopes of the Hoch Wald; for during the day authentic intelligence was received at the German headquarters that Marshal MacMahon was busily engaged in concentrating his troops on the hills west of Woerth, and that he was being reinforced by constant arrivals by railway. In consequence of these advices the Germans resolved to lose no time in effecting a change of front, which had been determined upon a few days previously, but not yet executed. The second Bavarian and the fifth Prussian corps were to remain in their respective positions at Lembach and Preuschdorf; the eleventh Prussian corps was to wheel to the right and encamp at Hölschloch, with its van pushed forward towards the river Sauerbach, and the first Bavarian corps was to advance into the neighbourhood of Lobsann and Lampertsloch. The cavalry division remained at Schoenenbourg, fronting the west. Werder's corps (the Würtemburg and Baden divisions) marched to Reunerswiller, with patrols facing the Haguenau forest.

The fifth Prussian corps, on the evening of the 5th, pushed on its van from its bivouac at Preuschdorf to the heights east of Woerth, and on the other side of the Sauerbach numerous camp fires of the French were visible during the night. The village of Woerth is a small place of about 700 inhabitants, lying in a valley between two rows of long low hills, covered with vineyards, corn and potato fields, and woods; and beyond these again are higher ranges of hills, on which the contending armies were posted. Woerth lies on the direct road from Soultz to Niederbronn. Above the village there is a height of considerable extent, on which stand the villages of Froeschwiller and Elsasshausen, the road from Woerth traversing this height through the former village, and thence to Reichshoffen and Niederbronn.

MacMahon had heard of the disaster of his lieutenant at Wissembourg too late to remedy the fault which had exposed a small division to be crushed by an army; and having rallied the troops flying from that town upon his other divisions, he advanced from Haguenau, took up a strong defensive position fifteen miles to the south-west of Wissembourg, on the lower spurs of the Vosges, and drew his forces together with the object of covering the railway from Strassburg to Bitsche, and the chief channels of communication between the eastern and western sides of the Vosges. The position occupied by his troops, according to his own report to the emperor,* was as follows:—

The first division was placed with the right in front of Froeschwiller, the left in the direction of Reichshoffen, resting on a mound which covers that village. It detached two companies to Neehwiller, and one to Jaegersthal.

The third division occupied, with its first brigade, the jutting hill which detaches itself from Froeschwiller, and terminates in a point towards Goersdorf. The second brigade rested its left on Froeschwiller, and its right on the village of Elsasshausen.

The fourth division formed a broken line on the right of the third division, its first brigade facing Gunstett, and its second *vis-a-vis* with the village of Morsbronn, which it was unable to occupy from want of sufficient force. The Dumesnil division of the seventh corps, which joined early on the morning of the 6th, was placed in rear of the fourth division. In reserve was the second division, placed behind the second brigade of the third division and the first brigade of the fourth. Finally, further in the rear was the brigade of cavalry under the orders of General de Bonnemain: the brigade of Michel cavalry, under the orders of General Duchesne, was placed behind the right wing of the fourth division.

It will be thus seen that MacMahon's front, looking generally north-east, was semicircular, the right thrown back so as to be parallel to the great road and railroad from Wissembourg along the Rhine to Strassburg, while his left pointed rather to the west, covering the railroad which turns off from the main line just mentioned, at Haguenau, and traverses the Vosges by the pass of Bitsche. In fact, the position taken up by Marshal MacMahon formed, so to speak, the keystone of the whole French system of communications across the Vosges; that is, between the main army and its right wing, which originally rested on the Rhine, below Strassburg.

The nature of the country was difficult and broken. The crests of the hills in that part of the Vosges are wooded, and the ravines, though not precipitous, are usually deep, with steep descents on either side. The plateaux above are smooth and often open, and the difficulties of the ascent before MacMahon—with the occupation of the villages of Froeschwiller in his centre, Reichshoffen to his left, and Elsasshausen, covering his right, wooded patches lying all about them—formed the strength of his position. It was impossible that an enemy's force could pass by towards Haguenau and Strassburg without danger to its flank, whilst to penetrate into the Vosges the Germans must dislodge him by direct attack. He had also so placed himself that he could draw supports from De Failly, should that general come to his aid, and, unless in the event of an utter rout, he could fairly cover his own line of retreat. In fact, he had done the best that could have been expected from an able commander, and his position was not only strong in itself, but strategically well-chosen, had the opposing forces been anything like fairly matched. As before stated, however, the Crown Prince pushed on steadily from Wissembourg on the 5th, and was close to MacMahon that evening with 130,000 men, while the French had not more than 50,000, even with the reserves which arrived on the morning of the 6th. The French, moreover, had a front to defend exceeding four miles in length; a fact which made the disproportion in number all the more serious, notwithstanding that the Germans would be compelled to cross the valley under the fire of their artillery before they could commence the work of driving them from their fastnesses.

The Crown Prince had been kept admirably informed of the strength and position of MacMahon; but the latter, with utter disregard of the consequences of such a want of foresight, and in spite of the surprise at Wissembourg, although he knew that the prince was marching upon him with an army flushed by victory, had no idea of that army's

* This was the only official report of any engagement issued by the French during the war, excepting that of the small affair at Saarbrück, given in the previous chapter. By a singular confusion—pardonable enough, perhaps, under the circumstances—the marshal, who dated his despatch from Saverne on the 7th of August (Sunday), spoke of the battle as having been fought on that day.

strength, and was even unaware of its exact whereabouts or proximate approach until within a few minutes of the hour at which he saw its vanguard appearing on the summits of the hills, exactly over against his own ground, and about a mile and a half distant from him. He had no scouts or spies thrown out, no organization of outposts, none of the precautions usually adopted by a leader of armies to warn him of his enemy's vicinity.

The general opinion in the French camp seemed to be that they would have to fight only two Prussian corps, or, altogether, from 60,000 to 65,000 men, and at these odds they felt convinced that their triumph would be complete. In fact, the word "convinced" only half expresses the absolute certainty the French entertained of gaining the battle, and of driving the German force back beyond the frontier.

A military correspondent of the *Temps*—usually one of the best informed of the French journals—stated, that as soon as the marshal became aware of the superior forces before him, he telegraphed to headquarters stating such was the case. "Attack them," was the reply. He telegraphed again, insisting on the disproportion of strength; but still the wires reiterated "Attack!"

On the afternoon of the 5th three shots were fired by the French into the opposite woods, to which, of course, there was no reply; and during the whole of the day men were hard at work destroying the bridges across the Sauerbach, so as to prevent the passage of the German army. About six o'clock in the evening several German columns were seen from the French camp to be taking up their position at Dieffenbach and Goersdorff. At seven, the mayor of Gunstett and some country people arrived at Woerth, and reported that the Germans were occupying their village, which is about a mile and a half distant.

During the night Woerth was evacuated by the French, and was not occupied by the Germans. The former left it as a trap for the latter, and *vice versâ*. From nine P.M. until after daybreak the rain poured down in torrents, and with the exception of a few random shots, there was no firing until nearly six A.M., when a few companies of Prussians pushed up to the village to feel for the French army, and were met by a patrol of the latter on the same mission. Some shots were exchanged, but nothing more happened till about seven, when the Germans sent a couple of shells into the steeple of the village church. Just before, a battalion of Zouaves had come down the hill to reconnoitre. The men were pitiful to see. They were wet through and through, and had had nothing to eat for twenty-four hours. They were, however, in excellent spirits, and were joking that they would eat the Germans' dinner before night; but of this very regiment there were, four hours later, little more than half left, and most of those were prisoners! Immediately the church was struck, all the French soldiers rushed back to the camp, and the streets cleared as if by enchantment. A few moments of quiet followed this signal of combat. Some German sharpshooters, who had arrived by the road to Soultz, next crossed the only bridge which had not been destroyed. They passed through the village, and went towards the French centre, being followed by other troops, who took possession of the hill of Dieffenbach, and the meadows on the Prussian right. The sharpshooters commenced firing into the vine-clad hills at the foot of Elsasshausen, and the artillery of both armies at once opened fire, the discharges being slower on the German side than on the French; so slow, in fact, that it was evidently rather a *reconnaissance* in force than an attack.

MacMahon himself did not believe he should be attacked till the 7th, and the Crown Prince would have preferred waiting till that day, for he had made a long march on the 5th, and had left many stragglers on the road; in addition to which some regiments of the fifth corps had suffered severely at Wissembourg, and found their muster rolls already strangely weakened. By waiting till the 7th, too, the cavalry would have arrived, and been able to have rendered him much valuable assistance after the battle; the nature of the ground being such as to prevent their use to any large extent during the fight. The impatience of his outposts, however, as we have seen, brought on heavy firing at Woerth early on the 6th, and almost immediately afterwards, the battle was fairly joined, but in another direction; for the first real attack was opened by the Bavarians, who, holding to their own right along the base of the steeper heights, debouched by Goersdorf, and with great determination endeavoured to turn the French left.

They attacked so vigorously, that MacMahon, to prevent his general position being turned by its left, executed a change of front by wheeling

up his left wing on Froeschwiller as a pivot, so that his position now extended nearly in a straight line—as shown in our plan of the battle. At eight o'clock the steady firing in this direction, and the French fire directed against Woerth, caused the Prussians to station the entire artillery of their fifth corps on the heights east of that place, and they thus succeeded in relieving the Bavarians. A little later the fifth corps was ordered to break off the engagement, it being the intention of the German generals to begin the battle against the concentrated forces of the French only when the entire German army was ready to be brought into action. At a quarter to eight o'clock Bothmer's fourth division of the second Bavarian corps (Hartmann's) induced by the heavy fire of the outposts near Woerth, had left their bivouac at Lembach, and, proceeding by Matistall and Langen-Soulzbach, after a sharp engagement penetrated as far as Neehwiller, where they spread, fronting to the south. At half past ten this Bavarian corps, supposing the order to break off the engagement, which had been given to the fifth Prussians, to extend to themselves, withdrew to Langen-Soulzbach. The French, being thus no longer pressed on their left, turned all their strength with the greatest energy against the fifth Prussians at Woerth, and endeavoured to crush this isolated part of their antagonist's forces. Finding them so earnest on this point, and perceiving the eleventh Prussians approaching vigorously in the direction of Gunstett, the fifth Prussians immediately proceeded to the attack, so as to defeat the French if possible, before they had time fully to concentrate. The twentieth Brigade was the first to defile through Woerth, and marched towards Elsasshausen and Froeschwiller. It was promptly followed by the ninteenth Brigade. Eventually, the ninth division being drawn into the fight, the whole fifth corps found itself involved in the sanguinary conflict raging along the heights west of Woerth.

For more than three hours the battle raged here with the greatest fury. Chassepots, needle-guns, mitrailleuses, field artillery, and shells, all played their part in the terrible fray. Undismayed by the havoc spread through their ranks, the Germans marched down the eastern slopes, across the valley, and attacked the opposite heights in the face of a tremendous fire.

The most sanguinary part of the strife commenced at the foot of the hills occupied by the French. In the vineyards the Zouaves and Turcos had taken up their position, and they possessed the twofold advantage over the impetuous advance of the Germans, of being under cover, and of being in a position to take good aim at their foes; the Germans at the same time being entirely exposed, and compelled to fire almost at randon. Two, three, and in some places even four times, were the Germans repulsed, but on each occasion they fell back on their reserves, and the reserves again on their supports, in the best order. In fact, nothing could possibly have exceeded their steadiness and coolness under fire. The French, too, fought with the greatest bravery, and twice did they succeed in recapturing Woerth: in fact, at one period they looked upon victory as almost certain, and the state of affairs was decidedly critical for the Germans. As a proof of the determined manner in which the French fought at this time, we may state that, on one of the occasions when the first and second Zouaves were pressing the Prussians back through the streets of the village, they were taken in flank and rear, completely cut off, and, after heroically striving to fight their way through to their supports, were all killed, wounded, or captured. A single incident will suffice to show the terrible nature of the struggle at this point. A captain of the first Zouaves, who was wounded in the village, had been ordered to advance to the support of another company of his regiment engaged in the streets. He had with him sixty-eight men and two subalterns when he entered the place; by the time (about twenty minutes later) his sergeant-major informed him that the rear of his company was threatened, only thirty-six remained; and when he had broken through the first lot of Prussians that attempted to stop his retreat, he found himself at the head of eleven men. Things looked so bad—more Prussians hurrying up and a fire from the houses being sustained—that he stopped, and said to his men, "Eh bien! que dites-vous?" to which all replied, "Nous allons nous defendre." On he went, with his small but heroic following. When he got into the open ground by the river, his eleven men were reduced to three, besides his sergeant-major, who, as well as himself, fell the next moment, the one wounded in the shoulder. the other through the leg.

At last the French, who were threatened with

being outflanked, were compelled to fall back inch by inch on their own centre, and it was now the turn of the Germans to again advance.

At half-past one o'clock orders were given to the first Bavarian corps (Von der Tann's) to leave one of its two divisions where it stood, and sending on the other as quickly as possible by Lobsann and Lampertsloch, to seize upon the French front in the gap between the second Bavarian corps at Langen-Soulzbach, and the fifth Prussian corps at Woerth. The eleventh Prussians were ordered to advance to Elsasshausen, skirt the forest of Nieder Wald, and operate against Froeschwiller. The Würtemburg division was to proceed to Gunstett, and follow the eleventh Prussians across the Sauerbach; the Baden division was to remain at Sourbourg.

At two o'clock the combat had extended along the entire line, and the struggle was most severe. The fifth Prussians were fighting at Woerth; the eleventh Prussians near Elsasshausen. At the strong positions of the French on and near the heights of Froeschwiller, they offered the most intense resistance. The first Bavarian corps reached Goersdorf, but could not maintain their ground; the second Bavarian corps had to exchange the exhausted troops of Bothmer's division, who had spent all their ammunition in the fierce fights of the morning, for Walther's division. While Bothmer's troops fell back, Schleich's brigade, belonging to Walther's division, marched upon Langen-Soulzbach, and the Würtemburg division approached Gunstett.

At two o'clock fresh orders were given by the Germans. The Würtemburg division was to turn towards Reichshoffen by way of Ebersbach, to threaten the French line of retreat. The first Bavarian was to attack at once and dislodge them from their position at Froeschwiller and in the neighbouring vineyards, and thus roll up the right of the French lines.

Clouds of German skirmishers crossed the marshy bottom to the east of Woerth, between Elsasshausen and Morsbronn, under the cover of a tremendous artillery fire from sixty guns, posted on the opposite heights of Gunstett; large masses of infantry pressed forward in support, and the Germans made vigorous endeavours to force the French right wing back upon the Haguenau-Bitsche road, so as to compel it to retreat towards Bitsche—a movement that would have been fatal. The conflict raged with tremendous fury; prodigies of valour were displayed by the French, who, anticipating the hostile attack, advanced again and again to the charge, only to recoil before the fresh troops whom the Germans incessantly brought up, "as if," said a captured officer, "they sprang out of the ground."

The village of Froeschwiller, which was burnt during the struggle, was at last carried by a fierce hand to hand encounter; the houses being stormed one by one, the doors burst open by the butt ends of the guns, and many Zouaves and Turcos made prisoners. The assaulting parties of Würtemburg and Prussian troops, fighting their way from opposite sides, met in the centre of the village, at the foot of the church tower.

Between two and three o'clock the French, bringing fresh troops into the field, and advancing with consummate bravery, assumed the offensive against the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps; and about three o'clock it appeared as if MacMahon would so far carry the day, that he would take possession of the only bridge upon the Sauerbach, and break through the German centre. Had he done this, and been able to hold what he was possessed of, he would have captured a vast portion of the German artillery, and have inflicted a fearful punishment upon every battalion of them that had crossed the bridge. But the French had to deal with a much larger force, far more orderly, and better handled, than their own. The Prussians fought like soldiers in the highest state of discipline; the French now seemed to behave more like a gallant mob. There appeared to be no order in their formation after the first ten minutes of their being under fire. Any advantage which they had in the superior range of the Chassepot over the needle-gun they threw away, by advancing—rushing would be the better word—so near their enemy that they were placed upon an equality with him. In numbers, also, they were less than one to two.

A little after three came the turning point of the battle. After some sharp fighting, the Prussian advance against the French left was so far successful that the village of Reichshoffen was carried; but not until the Crown Prince had developed his chief and crowning effort against the French right centre, where the fifth corps, supported by the second Bavarian, advanced in heavy columns, covered by a tremendous cannonade, and

carried at a rush the village of Elsasshausen, from which MacMahon's third division had hitherto commanded the wide valley of the Sauerbach, which before divided the opposing armies at this part. From the moment at which this movement commenced, it was evident that the French were outnumbered, outflanked, and beaten; and nothing was left to MacMahon but to throw his right completely back upon the centre—a movement so finely executed in the face of adverse circumstances and a superior force, as to win admiration from his enemy.

The pressure soon became overwhelming, and, assailed fiercely in front and flank, the French right and centre were cut in two, and rolled away in shattered and divided fragments. About the same time the Crown Prince made his last manœuvre by bringing up some Würtemburg troops not previously engaged, beyond the extreme right flank of the French; and the whole right being thus completely outflanked, was driven in and crushed, and the magnificent and renowned Algerian army, which had crowned the range of Woerth at sunrise, soon became a ruined mass of disheartened fugitives.

A fierce charge of the French cuirassier regiments against the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps, was made at the close of the fight, in the hope of either retrieving the day, or at all events of facilitating the retreat of the rest of the army. Nothing could possibly have been more brilliant than the manner in which they advanced; but it ended, as such charges of heavy cavalry must almost of necessity do in the face of modern artillery and the breech-loader, in the all but annihilation of the daring horsemen. The artillery awaited them in a stationary position, and inflicted on them a very heavy loss. The infantry, too, with their needle-guns, were many of them placed in the protecting orchards, and from behind the trees came another terrible fire through which the men rode to their death. As they came within range they were swept down, and not a single man reached the German line. It was simply destruction; but having received their orders, they charged again and again (according to some accounts not fewer than eleven times), and rode as gallantly to be shot down without a chance of retaliation, as though they were following up a victory. When the battle was ended, the ground over which they had charged was strewn with the steel helmets and cuirasses of the extinct regiments. Some 200 prisoners were taken, and a few stragglers were left to take part in the subsequent flight; but the brave regiments were no more, and when asked, during the retreat, "Where are the cuirassiers?" MacMahon replied that they did not exist. In the destruction of these troops the Coburg Gotha regiment greatly distinguished itself, and Duke Ernest, who rode throughout the day by the side of the Crown Prince, having witnessed their bravery, galloped up to them and expressed his pride and gratitude at their gallant conduct. A little incident in connection with the charge of the cuirassiers is worth mentioning, as showing the bravery of the Germans as well as of the French on the occasion. In a hop plantation lay a company of the ninety-fifth regiment, and some pioneers of the eleventh battalion, the latter armed with the short-barrelled needle-gun. The lieutenant-commander of the latter was a man of dauntless bravery and coolness. To these troops, covered by the hops and tree trunks, presently approached one of the cuirassier regiments. Until within a distance of fifty paces, when the French word of command to push forward was called out, the Germans believed them to be Bavarians. No further doubt was, however, possible, and for the moment the German position seemed a fearful one; it looked like madness for a few infantry to attempt to withstand that mass of cavalry, charging with uplifted sabres, and so the Germans turned to the right-about, to retire as fast as possible. But the lieutenant stood firm and cried out, "Children, are you going to leave me here alone?" His brave fellows instantly stood still, and at a few steps' distance, fired rapid volleys which greatly decimated the horsemen, and those who charged were shot down by other troops. The colonel, the beau ideal of a soldier, a stately, handsome, middle-aged man, had led the charge to the very line of the needle-guns, and came down, as his horse rolled dead, with a heavy crash in his cuirass. He was afterwards presented to the Crown Prince, and was forwarded to the railway station on foot, his cuirass being taken off, with orders that he should receive every attention.

An unusually horrid circumstance occurred during the third charge of the cuirassiers; for the Germans saw coming towards them at full speed a horse carrying a rider whose head had just been carried off by a cannon ball. This mutilated

corpse was that of M. de la Futzun de Lacarre, of the third regiment. The same ball had cut the trumpeter of the regiment in two, and carried off the hand of the captain who was by his side.

About four o'clock the troops of MacMahon, thoroughly broken and exhausted, retired in great confusion towards Reichshoffen and Niederbronn. Here a new engagement took place. Niederbronn is the point at which the roads to Bitsche and Saverne diverge: and the Prussians strove hard to seize that village. The Bavarians pressed forward over the heights by Neehwiller, now abandoned by the French left; and they might have succeeded in occupying the cross-roads, but for the fortunate arrival of a division of the fifth French corps, which had been sent by De Failly by rail from Bitsche, and which had been prevented from coming up in time for the battle in consequence of the mistake of a telegraphic operator. It took up a position covering Niederbronn, and maintained itself there until night had fallen, and some of the remnants of MacMahon's corps had gained the road to Saverne. We say, some of the remnants, because many others escaped by way of Haguenau, towards Strassburg. The retreat of the latter, which had chiefly formed the French right during the engagement, was in reality a panic-stricken rout, although they were not pressed at all after their ground was once yielded. In fact, nothing worse has occurred in modern history, except, perhaps, the flight of the raw fugitives at the battle of Bull's Run on the opening of the American War. Fleeing madly, though wholly unpursued, crowds of men on foot, or worse, on horses stolen from the guns and trains, rushed pell-mell through Haguenau. The scene was vividly sketched by the correspondent of the Vienna *Wehr Zeitung*, who happened to be a witness of it. "About four o'clock," he said, "a riderless horse galloped into the town, then a second, and a third; but the first intimation of how the day had gone was brought by a cuirassier, who came spurring through without cuirass or arms, his horse covered with foam and blood. Next arrived an artillerist on an unsaddled horse, his face distorted with inexpressible alarm. Some minutes later a mob of some twenty horsemen hurried past, among whom two Zouaves clinging upon one horse were conspicuous; the others were cuirassiers in every stage of fright and terror, some wildly swinging their sabres; others as if out of their wits, flogging their poor exhausted horses, several without saddles, most of them without arms. One cuirassier halted his horse just before me, loosened his cuirass, threw off his helmet, next his heavy sword, lastly his weighty breast-plate, and then, laughing contentedly, rode leisurely on. A pause of some five minutes followed. The townsmen had all fled inside the gates. Presently, up gallops a field gendarme, halts his half-dead horse, and calls out 'Shut the gates instantly, the Prussians are at my heels.' The field-watch turned white. I exclaimed, 'What madness! Haguenau is an open town. There can be no defence, and if the Prussians are really at hand, the best thing for the town is to open the gates as wide as possible.' His face brightened up. The tumult, however, became greater. Among a crowd of cuirassiers some lancers were mixed up; then came hussar uniforms. The road becomes thronged; unmounted horses gallop past as if driven on by panic; on all sides are swarms of artillerymen in shirt-sleeves, many of their horses with the traces cut, ridden by infantry or artillerymen, but having no officers with them.

"While this motley crowd of cavalry was galloping through, a train rushed past laden with infantry. All the waggons were filled—on the roofs, hanging on by the handles, with half their bodies in the air, on the gangway boards, some fully accoutred, some half naked, no wounded. By five o'clock the rush of horsemen began to abate, and then came a stream of conveyances, four or five carriages all completely harnessed, yet without their guns. Then jolted and rattled past a broken ammunition waggon crammed with Turcos; next a peasant's waggon filled with bedding and household gear, but no owner; a Zouave led the horses; two frightfully wounded Turcos lay on the top, a cluster of unarmed soldiers of all arms clung round it. Now followed infantry on foot. It was about half past five; still no officers. In dense swarms come the chancery cars, the carriages of three general brigades, the archives of a division, four or five empty ammunition trucks, every kind of ambulance waggon, all packed with uninjured soldiers. On one car lay three corpses, and a few pitifully draggled Turcos followed in the crowd in dumb resignation. Then came a lot of sutlers and camp-followers. The infantry had all flung away their packs, many their guns, some were in their shirt-sleeves, most of them had loaves stuck on

their swords and swung on their shoulders. About half past six an orderly troop of cuirassiers, under the command of a captain and two subalterns, about forty men strong, rode past. They were almost all properly accoutred, and kept step. Between four and seven o'clock a disorderly rabble hurried by absorbed in themselves and in their miserable existence; in the whole body not more than forty in marching order, altogether some 8000 to 10,000 men, very few wounded, some three or four cavalry officers, two artillery, and about eight infantry officers in the entire swarm."

Shameful as the disorder was on this side, the centre and left of MacMahon's forces behaved hardly better in their retreat after leaving Niederbronn, which, in fact, their own misconduct turned into a disastrous rout. Their officers, who had neglected to maintain order in time of peace, found it impossible to rally them under the pressure of panic, and when MacMahon, on the following evening, reached Saverne after a cross march through the hills, but three of his infantry regiments had kept their ranks. The fatal disregard of discipline, the total want of mutual confidence between officers and men, the utter prostration under reverse which constantly characterized the army of the Second Empire during the war, were at once fully manifested in this shameful retreat—the sad presage of greater misfortunes to come.

The official statement of the loss of the Germans in the battle was 8000 men. The regiments which suffered most may be estimated from the number of officers they lost. The fifty-eighth lost thirty-two; the fifty-ninth, twenty-three; the seventh (guards), thirty-five; the forty-seventh, twenty-nine; the forty-sixth, thirty-three; the fifty-seventh, thirty; the sixth, twenty-eight; the thirty-seventh, twenty-five. It is perhaps worthy of notice, that of the troops engaged, nearly all were non-Prussians; that is, the fifth corps, Poseners; eleventh, Nassauers, Hesse Casselers, Saxe Coburgers, &c., and the rest Southern Germans.

The French loss in killed and wounded was almost as great as that of the Prussians, and in addition the Germans captured 6000 prisoners on the field, and about 4000 afterwards. The disastrous rout already described must also have entailed on the French a loss, chiefly in stragglers, of nearly a third of the whole army; for the highest estimate ever given of those rallied afterwards mentioned no more than 18,000 men, including 3000 who escaped to Strassburg, where they were at once incorporated in the garrison.

The French also lost thirty-six cannon, six mitrailleuses, two eagles, innumerable arms, their entire baggage and treasure, and two railway trains containing provisions. Even MacMahon's personal baggage, his official and private letters, the plan of the French campaign in cipher (which was soon deciphered), &c., fell into the hands of the conquerors. It was characteristic of modern French strategy, that no maps of France, especially of the Vosges, were found in the officers' baggage; while routes to Coburg, Berlin, &c., were discovered, as well as sketches of the country beyond the Rhine. It was also significant of the luxury which was too prevalent in the French army, that among other trophies was a gaudy collection of ladies' dresses and female finery.

At Solferino the French took 6000 prisoners, thirty guns, and two standards. The tactical importance of Woerth was therefore quite equal to that of Solferino; and the moral effect on the German forces of such a signal success over the best general and one of the finest armies France could place in the field was, of course, exceedingly great. The fearful havoc inflicted on MacMahon's troops and the disastrous nature of his rout, not only quite freed South Germany from any fear of invasion, but on the other hand laid open the whole right of the French line of defence, and left Marshal Bazaine with two armies to watch, where he was already overmatched with one.

As early as half past four in the afternoon the Crown Prince had sent home the following despatch announcing the victory:—

"*Battle-field near Woerth, Saturday, August* 6, 4.30 *p.m.*—Victorious battle near Woerth. I have completely defeated Marshal MacMahon, with the greater part of his army. The French were driven back to Bitsche.

"FRIEDRICH WILHELM, Crown Prince."

A little later the king informed her Majesty, Queen Augusta, of the result as follows:—

"Wonderful fortune! This new great victory won by Fritz. Thank God for his mercy! We have taken thirty cannons, two eagles, six mitrailleuses, 4000 prisoners. MacMahon received reinforcements from the main army."

The scene at the close of the battle was well

described in a letter from the duke of Saxe-Coburg, from which we annex an extract:—"We were able to watch the whole battle from the nearest proximity; and where we stood the Crown Prince was in a position to give his command. When the last "hurrah" had rung forth, we chased into the line and up the hostile height, after we had for hours witnessed around us the explosion of shells. But what a sight presented itself close by! It is indescribable. A beautiful calm summer's evening, and straight along burning farms and villages; between, accumulations of the dead and the dying, and the exulting outcry of our victorious troops The banners were displayed, the military bands were playing the national hymn, men embraced and fondled each other in joy, and the hand of many a dying comrade was yet clasped. And I heard no one complain, notwithstanding the horrible devastation. Right on we went, through thousands of French prisoners, and through the captured fire-arms, around which the serving men lay in heaps of dead and wounded. There was no eye without a tear. It was the grandest and most appalling sight that can be witnessed in life. Slowly night set upon this awful scene, and wiped away the terrible view. How can I find words for my joy and sorrow when I came to our decimated regiment, which had taken a glorious part in the secured laurels?"

The district in which the engagement took place, of course, suffered terribly. Many of the houses in Woerth were destroyed, and at Froeschwiller it was even worse. In this village, too, the church was shelled, and then burnt down after a fearful hand-to-hand combat had taken place within its walls. The orchards in all parts of the battle-field were knocked to pieces: the vines and hops ruthlessly cut down, the potatoes annihilated, and the meadows turned into desolate tracts of rugged soil.

All the German troops which had taken part in the engagement bivouacked on the battle-field that night. On the following morning the cavalry corps began the pursuit of the disorganized French troops; and for some days after they were continually capturing fresh prisoners, and finding the shattered *débris* of MacMahon's army.

After the battle great animosity was displayed by the peasants, and some of them were guilty of the grossest barbarity towards the wounded Germans. At Gunstett alone, twenty-eight peasants, caught red-handed gouging and maiming, were tried and shot; and at one time as many as forty lads, between the ages of twelve and eighteen, were in the hands of the provost marshal, under accusation of having committed similar outrages. In fact, the fanatic hatred of the Alsatian peasants against the German invaders excited much surprise and regret. In no case did the soldiers take the law into their own hands, but brought in the persons whom they found committing the outrages to the proper military authorities.

In consequence of the fearful losses on both sides and the hasty flight of the French, the sufferings endured by the wounded were unusually great; for even twenty-four hours after the engagement hundreds of them still lay untended, and the air was polluted with the stench of unburied corpses blackening in the sun's hot rays.

In calmly reviewing the whole circumstances connected with the battle, it must be admitted that the manner in which it was contested was honourable alike to conquerors and conquered. The Germans certainly were in irresistible force; but this was not felt until after mid-day, and for several hours the French possessed the advantage of a formidable position. When the German attack was fully developed, it proved, as might have been expected, crushing; yet for some time they fought with a superiority of numbers not too great to render the struggle wholly unequal. On the other hand, the French attacked frequently with splendid courage, and resisted with determined resolution; they generally manœuvred, too, with the ease, the celerity, and the precision of a well-trained army. Yet, as we have seen, they showed signs of panic towards the close of the fight; they broke up rapidly on being outflanked, and fled from the field in wild confusion. The terrible defect of the French troops—their inability to resist the temptation to hasty firing offered by the breech-loaders—began to tell as early as two o'clock in the afternoon, for by that time there was a want of ammunition on several parts of the French lines. It would appear, too, that this characteristic of the French was aggravated in some parts of the field by the orders given by MacMahon. His experience had chiefly been in Algeria, where the troops are often ordered to put off their knapsacks, with a view to move more freely, and this was the order he gave his troops at Reichshoffen. The result was, that out of the ninety cartridges which a French soldier is provided with, he had

only thirty; the remaining sixty having been left on the battle-field, together with the knapsacks. On the other side, the steadiness, rapidity, and accuracy of the German fire was such, that the French believed they were using mitrailleuses (as will be seen further on, it was so stated in the telegram from the emperor announcing the result of the engagement), and to these they attributed much of the terrible slaughter in their ranks. One chief result of the battle was, in fact, the demonstration of the close connection between the value of arms of precision and the constitutional temperament of those in whose hands they are placed. The best troops of France were mown down because the German soldier kept cool and took good aim, while the effect of the rapid firing of the French was greatly inferior.

The Germans, like generous enemies, frankly admitted the gallantry which could not withstand them; and the soldiers who were present on both occasions said that nothing in the hottest of the fighting at Königgrätz could at all compare with the fighting at Woerth. The German generals, too, admitted that they never witnessed anything more brilliant than the bravery of the French troops, but their own troops were not to be denied. With tenacity as great, and a fierce resolution, they pressed on and on, up heights where the vineyards dripped with blood; and although checked again and again, still persevered with a furious intrepidity which the French could not, at last, withstand. In fact, the Germans showed such an absolute disregard of death, and such a desperate valour, as excited the astonishment and admiration of the French. Their steadiness, in spite of the most frightful carnage, was abundantly proved by the returns of killed and wounded.

Personally, MacMahon acted throughout the fight in the bravest possible manner. Nearly all his staff were killed; and he himself, after having been fifteen hours in the saddle, was found in a ditch, faint with fatigue, and revived by a soldier with a draught of brandy. He remained all night on the heights of Phalsburg, and when in the morning he tried to count his losses, and to rally the remains of his unfortunate divisions, the great heart of the brave marshal failed at the task Overcome by emotion, tears were seen flowing from his eyes, and his head was bowed under the weight of his disasters.

The following was his address to those of his troops who remained with him a day or two after the battle:—

"Soldiers!—On the 6th of August the fortune of war betrayed your courage. You only lost your positions after an heroic resistance which lasted not less than nine hours. You were 35,000 against 140,000, and were overwhelmed by numbers. Under such conditions a defeat is glorious, and history will record that at the battle of Froeschwiller the French displayed the greatest valour. You have experienced heavy loss; but that of the enemy is heavier still. If he did not pursue you, it was because you had hit him so hard. The emperor is satisfied with you, and the whole country thanks you for having so worthily upheld the honour of your flag. We have had a great ordeal to go through. You must forget it. The first corps is about to be re-organized, and, with God's help, we shall soon take a brilliant revenge.

"MACMAHON."

The *Figaro* opened a subscription, which was liberally responded to, for the purpose of presenting a sword of honour to the general, whose defeat it regarded as one of the most brilliant achievements in the history of France!

As regards the tactics displayed by the two commanders, the movements of the Germans at the beginning of the day scarcely seem to have been well timed; their attacks were partial and disunited, and MacMahon had more than one chance, especially against the centre at Woerth, which, had De Failly's corps been added to his own, might have caused the result to have been very different. It is acknowledged, too, by the Germans themselves, that their cavalry ought to have done more. Had that arm been boldly and vigorously employed after the French flanks had been finally turned, MacMahon's army might have been destroyed; it is at least probable that it would have been more cut up than it was, and that it would have lost nearly its whole artillery. The manner, however, in which the Crown Prince disposed his forces for the double attack on both the French flanks was admirable, if not altogether free from danger; and though it may be said that he acted cautiously, with some hesitation, and perhaps without the hope of great success, he nevertheless gave proof of the powers of a real general at the decisive moment. MacMahon's

Engraved by W. Holl from a Photograph

conduct in the first part of the day was worthy of his high reputation. He made the most of his troops and his ground, and handled his army with quickness and skill; but probably he ought to have effected his retreat while as yet an opportunity remained, when the great flanking attacks were being developed.

A slight incident of the battle revealed very strikingly the want of information among the French troops of what was happening, and had happened, in their vicinity. After the Crown Prince had completely beaten MacMahon, and the whole line of communication was in German hands, a train started from Haguenau with 1000 French soldiers, who steamed away quietly and comfortably to find themselves prisoners in the centre of the German army.

As a fitting conclusion to our description of this battle, in which MacMahon played such an important part, and as an accompaniment to the annexed portrait, a few particulars respecting the previous career of the French general will not be out of place. His full baptismal name is Marie Edme Patrick Maurice, and by his surname he recalls one of the noblest families of the old Celtic princes of Ireland, who suffered severely in the wars of Cromwell in that country, and who risked and lost their once proud position in the cause of the last of the Stuart kings. It is said that the sept of MacMahon carried their national traditions, their ancestral pride, and their historic name, to France, where they mingled their blood by intermarriages with the old nobility of their adopted country. The future marshal was born in the year 1808, at the Château de Sully, near Autun. Up to seventeen years old young MacMahon was educated at the quiet seminary of Autun. He was then, however, transferred to the military school of St. Cyr, which, two years afterwards, he left as *sous-lieutenant élève*, and as such joined the Staff School of Application.

His first fighting experiences were made in Algeria in 1830, while acting as orderly officer to General Achard. In this capacity he accompanied the first Medéah expedition, and greatly distinguished himself in an engagement on the Mouzaïa by carrying an important despatch through a whole army of Arabs to Blidah, escaping his enemies by leaping down a frightful abyss. Though his horse was killed, the young lieutenant escaped with a severe shaking, and accomplished his mission in safety. For this gallant exploit he received the cross of the Legion of Honour. In 1832, still with General Achard, MacMahon was present at the siege of Antwerp, at the close of which he was created captain. Returning to Algeria in 1836, he was wounded at the second siege of Constantine in the following year, while acting as aide-de-camp to General Damrémont. Recompensed here with the rank of officer of the Legion of Honour, we subsequently find him, in 1840, aide-de-camp to General Changarnier in Algeria, where, shortly after, he obtained the command of a regiment of Chasseurs à pied, a body afterwards greatly relied on by the French, but which were then being organized by the duke of Orleans. With these he gained fresh honours, commanding several expeditions against the Kabyles, and assisting to subdue the renowned Arab chief, Abd-el-Kader.

In August, 1855, he replaced General Canrobert, who was obliged to return invalided, in the command of the 1st Division of the French Crimean Army, and when the chiefs of the allied armies resolved upon the final assault of Sebastopol, they assigned to General MacMahon the post of carrying the works of the Malakoff. The well-known storming of this strong fort rendered his name famous in European, as it already was in African annals. Elevated to the dignity of Senator in 1856, he again returned to Algeria, and took an active part in the campaign of 1857, and in 1858 was named commander-in-chief of the whole Algerian forces. Summoned in the following year with his troops to the Italian war, he gained on two successive days, the 3rd and 4th of June, the celebrated victories of Turbigo and Magenta. This latter success won him his bâton and the title of Duke of Magenta, both being granted on the field of battle.

Amongst the romantic and sentimental incidents of the war of Italian liberty, one of the most characteristic was General MacMahon's triumphal entry, at the head of his troops, into the city of Milan; carrying on the pommel of his saddle a little Italian child, whom he had picked up on the road. The enthusiastic Milanese wept for joy. He represented France in 1861, as ambassador extraordinary to Prussia, on the coronation of the king. He was soon afterwards made governor-general of Algeria, in which position he remained until called to the chief command of the first corps d'armée in the campaign against Germany.

BATTLE OF FORBACH.

On the same day as that on which the battle of Woerth was fought (Saturday, August 6), from before noon till after seven in the evening, the Germans and French were engaged in a not less desperate battle near Saarbrück, on the same hill of Spicheren, and near the same village of St. Arnual, where the emperor and the prince imperial had witnessed a mere rehearsal of a battle on the Tuesday, only four days before.

The news of a sudden advance of a force of unknown strength through Wissembourg, and of the disaster that Douay's division had suffered, reached the French headquarters on the 5th, and spurred the emperor's staff to take steps for that concentration which had hitherto been only generally designed. Though even yet neither L'Admirault nor Bazaine was moved up to support him, orders were given to General Frossard to withdraw the troops left overlooking Saarbrück on the previous Tuesday, consisting of the second corps, numbering about 28,000 men, with 72 guns, lest a similar surprise to that of Douay should be attempted from the woods beyond the German frontier-line. On the morning of the 6th, therefore, the French had evacuated the position gained by them with so much pomp and superfluous energy four days before, and were out of sight of the town. They were encamped chiefly on the heights of Spicheren, which consist of an abrupt hill (or rather a spur of a range of hills), possessing naturally great strength for purposes of defence, and which was reinforced by field works most scientifically thrown up. The distance from Saarbrück is about two and a half miles, and the last cover which the Germans (advancing from that town to attack the heights) could have, before arriving at the base of the hill, is about 1900 paces. They had to advance this distance over a plain with occasional slight undulations, none of which, however, were of sufficient depth to afford them shelter from the fire of the heights. The entire plain is destitute of trees, hedges, bushes, or natural cover of any kind, and had been mostly cultivated for potato crops. Between the town of Saarbrück and this plain lie the range of hills which had been occupied by the French after the affair on the 2nd, and which are inferior in elevation, and nearly parallel to the Spicheren heights. These latter commence by a gentle slope from the plain for about 200 paces; then rise with great abruptness to an elevation of 110 to 130 feet; and are so steep that it is exceedingly difficult to ascend them, even without the encumbrance of rifles and knapsacks. In fact, as an old Crimean officer remarked, the ascent of the Alma was almost child's play compared with climbing them. They form a natural fortress, which needs no addition from art to be all but impregnable. Like so many bastions the hills project into the valley, facing it on all sides, and afford the strongest imaginable position for defence. Some French officers who were taken prisoners confessed to having smiled at the idea of the Germans attacking them in this stronghold, and there was scarcely a man on the French side who was not persuaded, that to attempt to take the Spicheren hills must lead to the utter annihilation of the attacking force. Fortunately for the Germans, the French were left by their generals with a most inadequate supply of artillery—one of those unaccountable mistakes which marked French generalship as a main cause of the disasters to the imperial armies in the campaign.

As we have said, the heights form the spur of a range running in a general direction from east to west, but at this spot taking a south-west turn towards the village of Forbach, where the French left was placed, and distant about three and a half miles as the crow flies. The hills themselves are thickly wooded; but this portion is tolerably bare of trees. Forbach lies in the valley, and on the other side of that village the ground again slopes up to other woods. A country road from Saarbrück runs across the plain, and winds round the east side of the spur to Spicheren village, rather more than a mile in the rear of the heights which bear its name. Round the top edge of this spur a parapet was thrown up from the inside, before the engagement, which formed an earthen breastwork extending all across the front and along the western side of the spur for about 180 or 200 yards; the eastern side being almost precipitous. The spur itself on the summit is about 100 yards broad, and 250 or 300 yards long.

On the forenoon of August 6, the seventh German corps of the army of the centre pushed its vanguard to Herchenbach, about five miles north-west of Saarbrück, with outposts stretching as far as the river Saar. They did not intend to

commence hostilities that day; but, as before stated, the previous night the French had evacuated their position on the drill ground of Saarbrück, and about noon on the 6th the German cavalry division, under General Rhein Gaben, passed through the town. Two squadrons formed the van; and the moment they reached the highest point of the drill ground, and became visible to spectators on the south, they were fired at from the hills near Spicheren.

The French, however, were not anticipating an engagement on that day; in fact, General Frossard was still in the act of further withdrawing a portion of his troops when the Germans arrived, and he mistook their first advance for a reconnaissance in force. Even when a German battery had been brought up and posted on the external slope of the heights abandoned by the French the night before, and had commenced a sharp fire, the arms of the French infantry regiments were still piled, the men were lounging about in easy *déshabillé*, some of them lying in their *tentes d'abris*, some cooking, and some cleaning their accoutrements: the same symptoms were observable among the gunners, and nothing betokened any expectation of trouble or disturbance from the enemy.

Immediately, however, all was hurry and bustle, and orderlies and aides-de-camp began to tear backward and forward along the road to Forbach. A battery of artillery was got into position facing up the valley, the arms of the infantry were unpiled, their tents were struck as quick as lightning, a working party were hard at work throwing up an intrenchment in front of their position, and those troops which had been withdrawn were at once turned round to re-occupy the heights.

Between twelve and one o'clock the fourteenth German division arrived at Saarbrück, and proceeding south, it encountered a strong French force in the valley between Saarbrück and Spicheren, and opened fire forthwith.

The division at first had to deal with far superior numbers; and yet to have limited the attack to the French front would have been useless, as their left could have come down the slope and closed in force upon their enemy. General von Kamecke, therefore, while engaging the front, also attempted to turn the French left flank by Stiring. The troops he could spare for these operations were, however, too weak to make an effectual impression upon the much stronger numbers of the French, and two successive assaults on the steep range of heights in the French centre, and forming the key of their position, were successfully repulsed by General Frossard, the Germans leaving long lines of dead and wounded on the slopes of the hill.

Eventually, however, the roar of the cannon attracted several other German detachments. The division under General von Barnekow was the first to be drawn to the spot. Two of its batteries came dashing up at full speed, to relieve their struggling comrades. They were promptly followed by the fortieth infantry (the regiment which had been engaged at Saarbrück on the 2nd) under Colonel Rex, and three squadrons of the ninth hussars. At this moment the vanguard of the fifth division was espied on the Winterberg hill. General Stülpnagel, whose van had been stationed at Sulzbach the same morning, had been ordered by General von Alvensleben to march his entire division in the direction from which the sound of cannon proceeded, and two batteries advanced in a forced march on the high road. The infantry were partly sent by rail from Neuenkirchen to Saarbrück.

As early as half-past one the woods near Stiring, on the opposite side of the plain to the French left, were filled with German infantry, who were keeping up a murderous fire on the French infantry in the open, and on some artillery which was replying to certain German guns now in position in the plain below, and firing up the valley in the direction of Forbach.

It was here that the heavy losses of the French were sustained. Obviously they fought at a tremendous disadvantage, and the effect produced by the fire of their tirailleurs upon the enemy, who kept themselves carefully concealed, must have been infinitely less than of that which was directed against them from the dense cover of the woods. It would be impossible to over-rate the dash and valour of the French infantry at this point, or to pay too high a tribute to their endurance under such trying circumstances. A hundred times they advanced close up to the wood with a desperate impetuosity; but although they did all that could be expected of brave men, they were time after time obliged to retire, dropping in scores at each successive advance or retreat. This sort of fighting went on steadily for a couple of hours. At one time the Germans were so far successful

that they carried the village of Stiring and captured several mitrailleuses, but the repeated attacks of their companions in the front having totally failed, both the village and mitrailleuses were retaken, and for a time the Germans in both places were thrown on the defensive.

At about half-past three o'clock Kamecke's division had been sufficiently reinforced to enable General von Göben, who had arrived in the meantime and assumed the command, to make a more vigorous onslaught on the enemy's front. He therefore ordered the attack to commence, at the same time massing a large body of cavalry, composed of cuirassiers, lancers, hussars, and dragoons, on either flank. Skirmishers were also deployed to harass the French right from the woods of St. Arnual. The chief aim of the attack on the centre was the wooded portion of the declivity of Spicheren. The fortieth infantry, supported on its right by troops of the fourteenth division, and on its left by four battalions of the fifth division, made the assault. A reserve was formed of some battalions of the fifth and sixteenth divisions, as they came up.

About six German batteries opened fire on the French position to cover the advance of the first line, which this time gained the foot of the hill with but little loss. The conflict then became sanguinary, as every inch of ground was most obstinately disputed, and the continual roll of musketry was terrific. Gradually, however, the French retired and the wood was occupied. Still ascending, the Germans at last drove the French to the top of the hill. Here the latter made a stand, and combining the three arms of the service for a united attack, endeavoured to retrieve the day. The loss to the Germans was now fearful, and it is believed that about nine of them fell for every Frenchman. They were only about sixty yards distant, were ill-concealed and had to fire up and climb an exceedingly steep height, whilst the French were naturally protected by the crest of the hill, and had the advantage of firing down on their enemy.

For an hour, the struggle for possession of the crest of the hill was hot and furious. At length the French gave way, and the German infantry steadily advanced. No sooner had the French reached the suburbs of Forbach, than they opened a hot fire of artillery upon the right of the German line, causing the cavalry placed there to change their position to the left flank. Here the whole cavalry division, some 8000 sabres, were massed behind a sheltering hill. It was at this juncture that the artillery of the fifth German division accomplished a rare and most daring feat. Two batteries literally clambered up the hills of Spicheren by a narrow and precipitous mountain path, and contributed materially to the success of the day; for with their help a fresh attack of the French was repulsed. A flank attack, directed against the German left from Alsting and Spicheren, was also warded off in time by battalions of the fifth division stationed in reserve.

About five o'clock the battle languished all along the line, and, in fact, died out altogether for a little time; but shortly after a tremendous cannonade recommenced, for the French had received reinforcements from General Bazaine from the direction of Sarreguemines, consisting of four or five regiments of chasseurs and dragoons, and several regiments of infantry.

The cavalry pushed rapidly up the inner section of the valley, but were not advanced into the outer plain. The infantry, on the other hand, were thrown at once into the woods on the right, and were advanced to reinforce the French line all along its extent. The battle now recommenced with redoubled vigour; but the efforts of the Germans were apparently directed for the time chiefly against the French right.

They were also at this time strongly reinforced, and an immense column of their infantry descended into the plain from the direction of Saarbrück. Their cannonade then became more and more vigorous, and the whole French line gradually gave way. At this critical juncture a sudden cannonade was opened in a totally new direction, for the Germans had suddenly descended from the heights and shown themselves in force opposite the French left, which their fire, directed across the railway and high road, was threatening to turn and cut off from their communication with Metz. The French reply was as feeble as possible, and already along the road ominous symptoms of retreat began to be visible. The Germans had been strongly reinforced, simultaneously, at either extremity of their line; whereas the French reinforcements had been sent away to their right and right-centre, and there was nothing to meet the Prussian attack when it fell thus unexpectedly on their left.




BATTLE OF FORBACH.
August 6th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
Völkingen
Wehrden
SAAR R
Rockershausen oder Louisenthal
Differten
Fürstenhausen
Gerslautern
Communal Forst von Furstenhausen
Ottenhausen
Saar B
Der
Warndt
Wald
Ludweiler
Clarenthal
Konigl. Fst.
Stifts Wald
von
Krughutte
Gerslautern
Vielle Verrerie
St. Arnual
Schœneck
Pte Rosselle
Gde Rosselle
FORET DE FORBACH
Verrerie Sophie
Karninshesberg
Emersweiller
FORBACH
Kleinwald
RAILWAY
Bois Wieberg
Kelschberg
Oelingen
Morsbach
Rossbruck
Nass Weiller
Reimsing
Gaubivinel
HOCH WALD
Folckling
Cocheren
Theding
Ebering
Foreberswiller
FORET ROYALE
Dibling
Henriville
French Kilometres
English Miles



NER HALL
EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

The German troops which arrived so opportunely at the crisis of the engagement, were part of the corps d'armée of General Zastrow, which in the early part of the day were on the line of railway connecting Saarbrück with Treves, where they were informed by telegraph of the state of affairs. Beyond Volklingen, at a distance of some eight or nine miles from Saarbrück, the disposable regiments of Zastrow's corps—among them the fifty-second and the seventy-seventh—crossed the Saar, and the lofty range of hills which there surmount its left bank, hurried on at a run for two miles and a half, and, entering the wood which closed in the French position on the left, attacked the French in flank and in rear, inflicting terrible losses upon them and deciding the day. While the battle was raging on Spicheren hill, the thirteenth German division crossed the Saar at Wehrden, and carried the town of Forbach by assault. Great carnage took place here: out of a whole battalion of chasseurs de Vincennes only three were left alive. The Germans not only succeeded in driving out the French, but seized vast magazines of food and clothing, and forced General Frossard to withdraw to the south-west, leaving free the road to St. Avold and Metz. The town of Forbach had been set on fire during the latter part of the engagement, and the inhabitants were flying in wild terror, not only before the flames, but also before the shower of bullets.

The command of the Germans was taken by General von Steinmetz towards the close of the battle, and shortly afterwards Prince Frederick Charles arrived.

Darkness fast setting in, afforded its valuable aid to the French in effecting their retreat. To cover this backward movement their artillery were stationed on the hills skirting the battle-field on the south, where they kept up a continuous but harmless fire for a considerable time.

The ground was too difficult for the German cavalry to take any part in the action. Nevertheless, the fruits of the victory were very remarkable; the corps under General Frossard being entirely demoralized and dispersed. The road it took in its hasty flight was marked by numerous waggons with provisions and clothing; the woods were filled with hosts of stragglers, wandering about purposeless (altogether 2000 prisoners were taken); and large stores and quantities of goods of every description fell into the hands of the Germans. Among the stores were several railway vans full of confectionery! The losses were exceedingly heavy on both sides; but no official return of either has ever been published. The fifth German division alone had 230 dead, and about 1800 wounded. The twelfth infantry had 32 officers and 800 men dead or wounded, and next to them the fortieth, eighth, forty-eighth, thirty-ninth, and seventy-fourth German regiments suffered most. Some companies left nearly one-half their men on the spot, as for instance the fifth company of the forty-eighth (Rhinelanders), which went with 250 men into the fire and came out with 129, and the first company of the eighth (King's Own—Brandenburgers), which, on the evening of the battle, consigned 107 comrades either to the grave or the hospital. The batteries, too, encountered terrible loss. The success of the fortieth regiment in scaling the height was accomplished at a cost of 600 men and 16 officers. Their advance in face of the fearful fire that was poured upon them was magnificent. They were as steady as if on parade, and although on the first two occasions they were unsuccessful in their endeavour, they retreated in the best order. The thirty-ninth regiment had only forty men left in one company, and no officers; and in one grave were buried the captain, lieutenant, and three ensigns.

The awful slaughter thus caused in particular regiments in this and succeeding battles, showed in one respect, perhaps, a disadvantage in the German system of recruiting. As we have fully explained in Chapter IV., in that country every regiment is recruited on its own ground; first, to intensify its *esprit de corps*, the soldier fighting, as it were, among his kinsmen and neighbours, so that he must stand his ground or be condemned to local infamy as a coward; secondly, to keep up social discipline, the squire commanding the peasants, who think him their natural leader; and thirdly, to make the evasion of a summons more difficult. Under this system, however, heavy slaughter in a corps d'armée may throw a province into mourning, and the loss of a division often decimates a whole district. The majority of the Prussian reserves are married men, and if their regiment or division suffers severely, in the districts to which they belong there is scarcely a family which is not thrown into mourning. The husbands and sons and brothers of a whole neighbourhood

are swept away at a single blow, and the distress caused is terrible. By no other method of recruitment could such a calamity as this be possible. In any other army, were three or four brothers forced away to the war, the chances, at least, are that only one of the four regiments to which they would be allotted would suffer greatly. By the Prussian system they would stand shoulder to shoulder, and all might fall together. What heart-rending affliction, for instance, must the official list of killed and wounded in this battle, which was very far from being the bloodiest of the war, have carried into many a quiet hamlet! Half the able-bodied population swept away at once! This is, indeed, to intensify the horrors of war, by making them fall with crushing severity upon localities. By ordinary systems, although a heavy loss may be widely spread, it is at least diminished by the wideness of its dissemination. A village could scarcely lose more than two or three of its able-bodied men. The gap would not be so noticeable; if some loved ones were gone, many would be spared. In Prussia, as we have seen, the whole of the male population in the army from each district are ranged side by side, and their destruction throws those dependent on them upon the country for subsistence.

To show the spirit with which the German soldiers were animated, it may be stated that the matter which chiefly troubled the wounded, both after Woerth and Forbach, was their being prevented from taking their part in the fighting, and in many cases convalescents protested against being sent to distant hospitals, as it would interpose unnecessary delay, they said, in the way of rejoining their regiments.

The French losses at Forbach, as well as the German, were exceedingly severe; the seventy-seventh, seventy-sixth, sixty-sixth, sixty-seventh, third chasseurs à pied, with the twenty-third and thirty-second regiments, one regiment of dragoons, and one of chasseurs à cheval, being almost destroyed.

The way in which the people of Saarbrück behaved to the wounded offered a very pleasing contrast to the feeling manifested by the peasantry at Woerth. The women were absolutely running about on the field of battle giving drink to the wounded, and every house in the town at once turned itself into an hospital. Country carts, with wine and eatables, lined the road to Forbach, and all possible means to alleviate suffering were employed.

As we have already described, at the battles of Wissembourg and Woerth the French were not only out-generalled, but also crushed by superior numbers. The latter, however, was by no means the case at Forbach; where the advantage in this respect was for a long time in their favour. The attack was made by the fourteenth division, supported by the fortieth regiment—in all fifteen battalions. They alone, of infantry, fought for hours against the three divisions, or thirty-nine battalions, which Frossard brought up successively. When they were nearly crushed, but still held their position, the fifth division came up, and took part in the engagement—all in all, twenty-seven battalions of Germans. They drove the French from their position, and it was only after the retreat had commenced that the head of the thirteenth division reached the field of battle, fell upon Forbach, and turned the retreat into a rout by cutting off the direct road to Metz. Thus, if at Wissembourg and Woerth the French were crushed by superior masses, they were beaten by inferior numbers at Forbach. The troops on both sides showed a degree of valour and heroic endurance which it is impossible to overpraise. Telegrams from Wissembourg, announcing the German victory at Woerth on the same day, were communicated to many of the troops before going into action, and naturally incited them to deeds of greater daring.

The movement by which General Göben, finding another corps joining his left, allowed them to occupy the attention of the enemy, whilst he transferred the weight of his attack to his right, and thus, without difficulty, mastered the main road the French should have covered, was as remarkable an instance of tactical readiness as any modern action has displayed.

All through the battle, indeed, the dispositions of the German commanders were very able, even if the advance of their first troops was premature. Their reinforcements were quickly brought into the field; they chose the right points of attack, and with great skill used the cover of the woods to harass and ruin the French. On the other hand, while the French soldiers fought gallantly, they were very badly handled; in fact, the tactics of their commanders could not well have been worse. They were surprised in the morning, while they

ought easily to have crushed the first German division, and they attacked in force only when it was altogether too late. They were left with no reserve echeloned in their rear, except at a great distance, and some of the troops sent to help them only came up in time to assist, or rather impede them in their retreat. There is no precedent in war for supposing that French soldiers, properly supported, could have been turned out of such a position as they occupied—which must be seen to be realized in its full strength.

It seems almost incredible, but according to the Comte de la Chapelle, the correspondent of the *Standard* English newspaper, who was present at the engagement, and who not only stated it in his letter from the field, but has since deliberately repeated it in his little work, "The War; Events and Incidents of the Battle-Fields,"—while a similar statement has also been made by others—General Frossard, with inconceivable carelessness, left the battle-field after giving a few orders, treating the affair as a mere engagement without importance. He quietly remained several hours in the house of his friend, the mayor of Forbach, enjoying a luxurious lunch, and discussing with that worthy magistrate the magnitude of his arrangements; and in the meantime new German columns had arrived on the battle-field. The French soldiers, headed by the brave General Bataille, had to sustain the tremendous shock of an enemy increasing continually in number. Message on message was sent to the general-in-chief, but to no purpose; and instead of a new combination, or a movement of retreat which might have saved the day, the French divisions were left without new order, and had to succumb by degrees under the tremendous shock of their opponents.

Had the Germans known the full extent of their victory and pursued in earnest, Metz might have been taken and the first campaign ended; for during some hours after the engagement the town was in anarchy. The emperor and his staff were in the railway station ready to start for the battle-field, when the news of the defeat and retreat was brought by a messenger on an engine. This, of course, completely altered his Majesty's plans, and he at once started for the préfecture, consternation being plainly visible on his countenance. The staff, by the testimony of all eye-witnesses, utterly lost its head, did not know where the different corps were, could give no orders, and expected to see the enemy before the town every moment. The emperor sat writing despondent telegrams. Metz was full of beaten soldiers, and but one perfect corps was within the lines. The Germans, however, did not at first realize the extent of their success; they also wanted ammunition and reinforcements, and contented themselves with throwing forward their immense strength of cavalry.

The two Prussian divisions camped on the roadside and on the heights for the night; next morning they crossed the French frontier and marched on Forbach, which, to their great surprise, they found totally abandoned. The French retreat had been so precipitate, that they did not even destroy the railroad nor blow up a single bridge.

The result of the two actions of August 6 to the French was a loss of between 20,000 and 30,000 men, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, and the complete defeat and dispersion of two of their best corps. The engagements also compelled them to assume a purely defensive attitude.

The emperor himself was obliged to admit his defeats, and he did so in the two telegrams annexed:—

"METZ, *Sunday*, 3.30 a.m."

"My communications with MacMahon being interrupted, I had no news from him up to yesterday. It is General L'Aigle who announces to me that MacMahon has lost a battle against considerable forces, and that he has retired in good order. On another side on the Saar an engagement commenced about one o'clock. It did not appear to be very serious, when little by little masses of the enemy considerably increased; without, however, obliging the second corps to retreat. It was only between six and seven o'clock in the evening that the masses of the enemy becoming continually more compact, the second corps and the regiments which supported it retired on the heights. The night has been quiet. I go to place myself at the centre of the position.

"NAPOLEON."

"In yesterday's engagement at Forbach only the second army corps was engaged, supported by two divisions of other corps. The corps of General L'Admirault, that of General Failly, and the imperial guard did not take part in the fight. The engagement commenced at one o'clock, and ap-

peared unimportant, but soon numerous troops concealed in the woods endeavoured to turn the position. At five o'clock the Prussians appeared to be repulsed, and to have abandoned the attack, but a fresh corps arriving from Wehrden on the Saar obliged General Frossard to retreat. To-day the troops, which had found themselves divided, are concentrated on Metz. In the battle which took place near Froeschwiller, Marshal MacMahon had five divisions. The corps of General Failly was unable to join him. Only very vague details have been received. It is said that there were several charges of cavalry, but *the Prussians had mitrailleuses, which caused us much harm.**

"NAPOLEON."

When the defeats of both MacMahon and Frossard became generally known in Metz on Sunday morning, a spirit of despair for a time seemed to have seized both officers and troops. The former considered and acknowledged that all was lost for France; and amongst the latter "Tout est perdu" was the motto which within a few days had replaced the boasting of a military promenade to Berlin.

"The Germanic Empire is made" was the sentence repeated everywhere; and whatever victories the French might win in the future, they would not be able to shake the Prussian influence and prestige. Such was the prevailing opinion.

A panic also seized the civil population; the disposition to exaggerate so inherent in French minds had already created imaginary dangers; and the Germans being momentarily expected, all the carriages and vehicles were chartered to convey the alarmists and their families far from the seat of war; the emperor himself was preparing for departure, and it was asserted that the quartier impérial and the état-major of the armée du Rhin would be immediately transferred to some other city in the interior.

Later in the day the equipages of the emperor and some officers of his staff actually left the town; but at the same time a somewhat reassuring feature was observed in a large assembly of the citizens of Metz, who had congregated in the court of the Hôtel de Metz, and swore to put aside all causes of political antagonism, and to join in the defence of their city.

* This statement with regard to the mitrailleuses was altogether erroneous; no such weapons having been used by the Prussians at the battle.

Amongst the lower classes the excitement reached almost to madness; bands of men paraded the streets, clamouring for revenge, and stopping any lookeron who had a foreign appearance. Several English and American correspondents were roughly handled by the mob; and the authorities were compelled to put them under arrest to protect them from the infuriated people, who fancied they saw in them Prussian spies.

An exceedingly painful episode of the battle of Forbach was the flight of the villagers, disturbed in their homes in the valleys between Saarbrück and Forbach. They would not have been illtreated by the Prussian soldiers had they remained, but hundreds of families, amazed by the French defeat, hurried off in the utmost terror. The correspondent of a daily journal, who was a witness of the scene, thus described their condition:—

"Among this panic-stricken crowd we found ourselves, and we thought it better to continue with them and avail ourselves of their knowledge of roads and byways, whereby to get, at all events, to a more comfortable distance from the Prussians. When we had reached the summit of the heights, and were actually out of immediate danger of the Prussian shot and shell—when, in fact, the poor people could think of something beyond the instant peril of life and limb—they seemed suddenly to realize the entire ruin which had fallen upon them; they also began to think of their families and friends, who were all scattered, flying in desperation through the deep woods, where the darkness was deepening with the falling night. Such scenes of anguish and misery I never saw before, and hope never again to see. Mothers, who had lost their children, seeking for them with frantic cries and gesticulations; old, tottering men and women stumbling feebly along, laden with some of their poor household gods, silent with the silent grief of age; little children only half conscious of what all these things meant, tripping along, often leading some cherished household pet, and seeking for some friendly hand to guide them; husbands supporting their wives, carrying their little ones (sometimes two or three) on their shoulders, and encouraging the little family group with brave and tender words; the woods ringing with shrieks and lamentations—with prayers to the Saviour and the Virgin. It is impossible to describe in language the sadness and the pathos of that most mournful exodus. If all the world could

only catch a glimpse of such a scene, I will venture to say that war would become impossible; that fierce national pride and Quixotic notions of honour, and the hot ambitions of kings and emperors and statesmen, would be for ever curbed by the remembrance of all the pity and the desolation of the spectacle."

It is a fact worthy of record, as showing how instantaneously the spark once kindled burst out into the full flame of war, that three weeks before the two battles near Saarbrück we have described in this and the preceding chapters, the Peace Society of Paris sent their deputies to that town, to celebrate an international festival held there by the corresponding society in Prussia. It was held at the station, one of the first places in flames on Tuesday, August 2. The German soldiers re-christened the hill on which the prince imperial stood on that day, and on which part of the deadly contest raged on the 6th, which before was known as the Speikerberg, "Lulu-berg;" Lulu being the sobriquet by which he was known.

In the previous chapter we have alluded to the fatal mistake of the French in allowing their troops to remain scattered over so wide a line (nearly a hundred miles), by which they laid themselves open to defeat in detail at the hands of a vigorous enemy with superior forces. In this we have seen that the attempt of MacMahon to retrieve the disaster of Wissembourg had the effect of separating the right wing still more from the centre, and laying open his line of communication with it. While, too, the right wing was being crushed at Woerth, the centre was severely beaten at Spicheren! The other troops were too far away to come up to their assistance. L'Admirault was still near Bouzonville, the rest of Bazaine's men and the guards were about Boulay, the mass of Canrobert's troops turned up at Nancy, part of De Failly's were lost sight of completely, and Felix Douay, on the 1st of August, was at Altkirch, in the extreme south of Alsace, nearly 120 miles from the battle-field of Woerth, and with but imperfect means of railway conveyance. In fact, the whole of the French arrangements from the commencement indicated nothing but hesitancy and vacillation. Could anything possibly have been worse than allowing three of the eight corps of the army to be defeated in three days, and in each case in detail? and where was the generalship which permitted Frossard to fight at Forbach all day, while to his left, and within about ten miles from the line of the Saar, seven divisions were looking on?

Everywhere along the whole front line of the French army there was the same story. Supreme incapacity presided, and hurled it hopeless on its fate. Not the faintest attempt was made to ascertain the movements of the enemy or to combine the movements of the troops until too late. The French soldiers fought splendidly; but they were sacrificed, and fought and died knowing that they were sacrificed, by the utter imbecility of those at the head of affairs. In fact, the French strategy was only worthy of the Austrians in their most helpless times; and, as will be shown in Chapter X., it enabled the Germans to advance at once into France and do what they liked.

On the German side, from the first, everything had been carried out in the most admirable manner. The concentration of their troops took place rapidly but cautiously, and every available man was brought to the front. The effect of their enormous numerical superiority was yet further increased by superior generalship and splendid strategy; for, as has been seen, they at once altered their whole plan of intended operations, entered upon an offensive instead of a defensive campaign, and carried it out successfully without a single hitch or flaw at any point. In fact, no more perfect or awful implement of destruction than the German army ever did its destined work. It was the physical force of a nation brought together and driven against its enemy after such training and discipline, and with such a ready co-operation of every man in the array, that it acted like a single individual.

CHAPTER IX.

Disappearance of Enthusiasm in Paris after the Departure of the Emperor—Distress and Discontent caused by the calling out of the Garde Mobile—Seditious Cries in the Streets—News of the First Victory—Praying for Success and Safety—Uneasiness at the absence of further News—A Hoax—Great Excitement—The News of the Defeat at Wissembourg—M. Ollivier and the Populace—Woerth and Forbach—Proclamations by the Empress and Ministers—The capital placed in a State of Siege—Explanation of such a Measure—Demonstration in favour of a General Arming, and Excitement on the Boulevards—The Defences of Paris and Resources of the Nation—Run on the Banks—Another Proclamation from the Ministers—General Trochu refuses to accept the post of War Minister unless the Empress lays down the Regency—Remarkable Address in the *Journal Officiel*—Assembling of the Legislative Bodies—The National Guard fraternises with the People—The Mob charged by the Cavalry—Great Excitement in the Corps Législatif—M. Jules Favre calls for the return of the Emperor, and proposes the immediate Arming of all French Citizens and the appointment of a Committee charged with the Defence of France—The Effects of the Proposal on the Chamber—Stormy Scene—Resignation of the Ministry and Formation of a New Government under Count Palikao—Biographical Notice of the Count—Public Feeling with regard to the Emperor and Empress—First Measures of the New Cabinet—Expulsion of Germans from Paris—Petition to the King on the Subject—Views of the German Press on the Matter—Offers from the Orleans Princes to assist in the Defence of France—Charges against the Emperor and Marshal Lebœuf—Contrast offered by Paris and the Rural Districts—Another Stormy Scene in Corps Législatif on a Proposal to try Marshal Lebœuf—Speech of M. Thiers—Introduction of a Forced Currency—The chief provisions of the Measure and its Effects—Resignation of Marshal Lebœuf—Appointment of Marshal Bazaine as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Army—Meeting of both Chambers on Sunday—More Stormy Scenes—The Emperor's Fête-day, 15th August—Contrast as compared with former years—Paris in Gloom—Reflections on the Situation—Reception of the News of the First Successes at Berlin—Enthusiasm of the People—Arrival of the First French Prisoners at Berlin—Kindness of the Germans—Unanimous Feeling throughout the whole Country.

To give a clear and consecutive form to our narrative of the incidents connected with the war, it is necessary to retrace our steps to Paris. As already stated in Chapter VI., the warlike enthusiasm of the capital materially subsided after the departure of the emperor for the scene of operations, and the issue of his proclamation to the army. It had become increasingly evident that a contest with Germany meant a prolonged struggle against a million of armed combatants, determined to defend their own country, and, if possible, to give the French such a lesson that for the future the emperor's peculiar mode of making his reign an era of peace by attacking his neighbours should be rendered impossible. The announcement that the fortifications of Paris were to be placed in a condition of defence, and the emperor's admission that the war would be a long one, greatly damped the ardour of those who imagined that within a fortnight a glorious peace, re-establishing the supremacy of French arms, would be signed in Berlin. The calling out of the garde mobile, too, caused much distress and discontent throughout the country, and a bad spirit prevailed in that force, which the Republican party did its utmost to heighten. The press was requested not to speak of it, but it is a fact, that when the first battalion of the mobiles went off by railway to the camp at Châlons, seditious cries were heard, both from the soldiers and a great crowd which had assembled to see them depart. There were shouts of "Down with Napoleon!" "Vive la République!" "A bas Ollivier!" "Les Ministres à Cayenne!" and the mob sang scurrilous songs, abusive of the government, to the hackneyed revolutionary air of *Les Lampions*. Another matter, also, threatened to disturb the anticipated course of events. An official intimation was given on the Tuesday following the emperor's departure that the spirit of reform was so strong in France, that during the progress of the war his Majesty would no doubt make several visits to Paris, and the Bourse experienced a shock when it became known that the celebrated surgeon Nelaton had left the capital to fulfil a promised visit to the emperor. As yet, however, although no forward movement of consequence had been made by the army, the Parisians awaited the development of the campaign with confidence.

It was on the evening of Tuesday (August 2) that Paris received the news of the "first victory" at Saarbrück. The emperor's despatch was handed to the empress as she was walking in the park at St. Cloud. On perusing it her Majesty burst into tears, walked straight to the guardroom, and read it aloud to the soldiers, by whom it was received with deafening cheers. By the Parisians generally the announcement was also accepted with extravagant delight. Everything thus far had suc-

ceeded *à merveille*, and the first step had been taken on the road to the Prussian capital. Both the emperor and the heir to the throne had been present, and the young prince, on whom were fixed the hopes of France, had escaped the bullets which fell around him. The language in which the emperor's telegram was couched, his reports of the "baptism of fire," and the soldiers shedding tears at the sight of the Prince Imperial, excited at the time the liveliest enthusiasm, and called forth apparently sincere expressions of attachment to his dynasty. At a later period, however, it formed the basis of insulting and injurious aspersions on the courage and patriotism of the imperial family.

When hostilities had actually commenced the inner heart of Paris was greatly moved at the dangers of the battle-field. All day long, at the great old-fashioned church of Our Lady of Victories, the open space in front was crowded with carriages, while a continuous stream of anxious people poured into and out of the edifice. In the huge antique interior, hung round with enormous oil-paintings, the altar and all about it was ablaze with votive candles; and there the mothers and sisters of Paris, praying, formed a touching scene. There, too, were Frenchmen and French officers, with sons, perhaps, at the front. The scene was fitted to increase their devotion, as every inch of the walls of the church is incrusted with small marble tablets, literally in thousands, each with an inscription of acknowledgment for some prayer heard or favour received.

The ill effects of the government regulations respecting the supply of news from the seat of war soon became apparent. The dearth of information was a cause of uneasiness, and the position taken by the authorities tended to the worst results. Towards the end of the week it gradually dawned upon the capital that something had happened to Marshal MacMahon, but no one distinctly knew what. On Friday (August 5), it was rumoured from the Bourse that he had captured Landau, taken forty guns, and held the Crown Prince and 20,000 Prussian prisoners. So eagerly was the rumour embraced, that many flags were hoisted, and signs of rejoicing everywhere displayed. The Rentes went up, the people prepared to illuminate, and kissed each other in the streets, amid shouts of victory! Popular singers were compelled to sing the "Marseillaise" in the public thoroughfares, and the judges sitting in the Palais de Justice stayed proceedings to announce the triumph of the imperial arms.

The rumour, however, proved false, and had been got up only to serve the purposes of the Stock Exchange. The real fact was the defeat of Wissembourg, which the ministry concealed for some twelve hours after it was known in England; and then simply published a laconic despatch from the emperor. This appeared just as the London papers arrived with fuller particulars, and the real truth created tremendous excitement. Crowds of people rushed through the streets, many of them armed with cudgels; compelled the flags to be taken down from the houses from which they had been displayed; and subsequently threatened to burn the Bourse. A couple of unfortunate money-changers with German names, though of French and Belgian origin, had their shops attacked and their windows broken; the one for having made some unguarded remark on the success achieved by Prussia, the other because he was believed to be engaged in supplying specie to the enemy. On the shutters of the latter the following notice was posted—"Shut up till Berlin is taken." The inflamed mob also rushed to the Place Vendôme, demanding that the originator of the false reports should be exposed. M. Ollivier appeared on the balcony, announced the arrest of the author, and promised that precautions should be taken to prevent the repetition of so scandalous an act. He further intimated that, confiding in the patriotism and patience of the people, all news should in future be immediately published, whether good or bad. The minister then besought the crowd to separate with the cry of "Vive la Patrie," reminding them that such proceedings as theirs, often repeated, would be a great victory for Prussia. Later in the evening the council of ministers issued an address to the same effect. On that day, also, the first cannon was placed upon the fortifications of the capital.

The Parisians already began to doubt the wisdom that presided over the conduct of the campaign; but their confidence in the army itself was rather raised than weakened by the reports of heroic feats performed by individuals and separate corps, and they firmly believed that Wissembourg would be terribly avenged.

But while Paris felt thus, the emperor, away at Metz, was despatching the dismal news of repeated

defeats, which appeared on the following morning, Sunday, August 7, in the annexed telegram:—

"Marshal MacMahon has lost a battle. General Frossard, on the Saar, has been compelled to fall back. The retreat is being effected in good order. All may be regained (*tout peut se rétablir*).

"NAPOLEON."

Subsequent despatches acknowledged that MacMahon's communications had been intercepted, that the defeat of Frossard had been a surprise, and that the emperor was going to place himself "in the centre of the position." A message at half-past four conveyed the re-assuring statement that the troops were full of spirit, and the situation was not compromised, although the enemy was on French territory, and could only be repelled by a serious effort. Such was the discouraging intelligence that reached Paris on the day after the disasters of Woerth and Forbach. As early as five o'clock in the morning the empress had hastened from St. Cloud to the Tuileries, summoned MM. Rouher and Schneider, the presidents of the Senate and Corps Législatif, and at once issued the following proclamation:—

"Frenchmen!—The opening of the war has not been in our favour. Our arms have suffered a check. Let us be firm under this reverse, and let us hasten to repair it. Let there be among us but a single party, that of France; but a single flag, the flag of our national honour. I come into your midst. Faithful to my mission and to my duty, you will see me first, where danger threatens, to defend the flag of France. I call upon all good citizens to preserve order; to disturb it would be to conspire with our enemies.

"EUGENIE.

"The Tuileries, *August* 7."

The council of ministers remained sitting *en permanence*, and issued an address on the state of affairs which concluded as follows:—"In the face of the grave news which has come to hand, our duty is clear. We appeal to the patriotism and energy of all. The Chambers are convoked. Let us first place Paris in a state of defence, in order to facilitate the execution of the military preparations. We declare the capital in a state of siege. Let there be no weakness, no divisions. Our resources are immense. Let us fight with vigour, and the country will be saved."

During the day the following report from General Dejean, the *ad interim* minister of war, was addressed to the empress regent:—

"Paris, *August* 7, 1870.

"Madame,—Existing circumstances require that measures be taken for the defence of the capital and for the raising of fresh troops, which, combined with those remaining under the orders of the emperor, will be enabled to fight in the open field against an enemy emboldened by his first successes to attempt to march upon Paris. But Paris will not be taken unawares. The external forts have long since had their protective armament. Great efforts have been made to complete it, and the armament of the *enceinte* was commenced at the outbreak of the war. The completion of this state of defence, moreover, is connected with the execution of certain works, the plans of which have been prepared, and which will be begun to-morrow. It will be speedily done. The exterior forts will be put into a condition to sustain a regular siege; and within a few days the *enceinte* will be in the same condition. Neither the labour nor the good-will of the inhabitants of Paris will be wanting for this work. The national guard will defend the ramparts which it has contributed to render impregnable. Forty thousand men taken from their ranks, added to the present garrison, will be more than sufficient to offer a vigorous and efficient defence against an enemy presenting a very extended front. The defence of Paris will therefore be assured. But it is a point of not less essential importance to provide for the voids which have occurred in the ranks of our army. With the aid of the marine troops, of the regiments still available for service in France and in Algeria, of the 4th battalions of our 100 infantry regiments, completed to the strength of 900 men by the incorporation of gardes mobiles, and by the formation from a portion of our gendarmerie of regiments which should be constituted as *corps d'élite*, a force of 150,000 men can, without difficulty, be placed in the field. Then, again, the calling out of the conscripts of 1869, the young soldiers forming which will join their corps between the 8th and the 12th of August, will give us 60,000 men, who, within a month, will be true soldiers. Thus, without reckoning what could be furnished by the cavalry, artillery, engin-

eers, and others arms, 150,000 men can at once be obtained, and at a later period, another 60,000 to place in front of the enemy. But the garde nationale mobile may take part in the struggle, as also the volunteer companies of francs-tireurs, which are everywhere asking for permission to organize themselves. They would amount to 400,000 men. Finally, we could rely upon the sedentary garde nationale; so that France can call to arms 2,000,000 of defenders. Their muskets are ready, and there will still remain 1,000,000 in reserve.—I am, &c.,

"GENERAL V. DEJEAN."

The report was followed by the annexed decree:

"Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will, emperor of the French, to all present and to come—Having heard the counsel of our ministers, we have decreed and do decree:—

"Article 1.—All capable citizens between thirty and forty years of age, not already forming part of the sedentary garde nationale, shall be incorporated in it.

"Article 2.—The garde nationale of Paris is intrusted with the defence of the capital, and the placing in a state of defence the fortifications.

"Article 3.—A *projét de loi* will be prepared providing for the incorporation in the garde nationale mobile of all citizens under thirty-three years of age, who are not at present included in that force.

"Article 4.—Our ministers of the interior and of war are charged with the execution of this decree.

"Done at the Palace of the Tuileries, August 7, 1870. For the emperor, by virtue of the powers he has confided to us,

"EUGENIE."

Later in the day another proclamation, signed by all the ministers, was issued:—

"Frenchmen!—We have told you the whole truth; it is now for you to fulfil your duty. Let one single cry issue from the breast of all—from one end of France to the other. Let the whole people rise, quivering, and sworn to fight the great fight. Some of our regiments have succumbed before overwhelming numbers, but our army has not been vanquished. The same intrepid breath still animates it; let us support it. To a momentarily successful audacity we will oppose a union which conquers destiny. Let us fall back upon ourselves, and our invaders shall hurl themselves against a rampart of human breasts. As in 1792 and at Sebastopol, let our reverses be the school of our victories. It would be a crime to doubt for an instant the safety of our country, and a greater still not to do our part to secure it. Up, then, up! And you, inhabitants of the Centre, the North, and the South, upon whom the burden of the war does not fall, hasten with unanimous enthusiasm to the help of your brethren in the East. Let France, united in success, be still more united under trial, and may God bless our arms!"

These proclamations were read by the disappointed crowds with a deep melancholy, and with conflicting speculations as to the utility of a "state of siege;" which they knew, at all events, would interfere largely with the liberty of the subject. The law giving this power to the ministry was passed in 1849, and provided that the military tribunals could take cognisance of crimes and offences against the security of the state, against the constitution, against order and the public peace, whatever might be the quality of the principal offenders or of their accomplices. It also gave the authorities the right to search by day or night in the houses of citizens; to remove returned convicts, and any individuals not domiciled in the places subject to the state of siege; to order the surrender of arms and munitions, and to take measures for seeking and removing them; to forbid such publications and such meetings as might be held to be of a nature to excite or prolong disorder.

The Parisians, however, were now thoroughly aroused, and in the evening a demonstration was made in the Place Vendôme in favour of a general arming. There was also extraordinary excitement on the Boulevards, where vast crowds were carrying flags and singing the "Marseillaise." A fear possessed the people that the events were even worse than reported, and deep were their murmurs when they learnt from the foreign journals how large were the numbers of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

On the morning of Monday, August 8, the feeling of alarm manifested itself in a run upon the Bank of France, and other similar establishments, by persons wishing to change their securities

and notes for cash. The ministry showed themselves fully alive to the critical nature of the situation, and to calm the public excitement issued the following proclamation:—

"Parisians! Our army is concentrating itself, and preparing for a new effort. It is full of energy and confidence. To agitate in Paris would be to fight against our army, and at the decisive moment to weaken the moral force necessary to conquer. Our enemies reckon on this. A Prussian spy, brought a prisoner to headquarters, was found with the following paper in his possession:—'Courage! Paris is in a state of revolt. The French army will be taken between two fires.' We are preparing the armament of the nation and the defence of Paris. To-morrow the Corps Législatif will join its action to ours. Let all good citizens unite to prevent crowds and manifestations. Those who are in a hurry to get arms may have them directly by presenting themselves at the recruiting offices, where they will be at once supplied with a musket to go to the frontier." —(Signed by all the Ministers.)

Such sentiments, however, failed to influence the conduct of the people, and the government summoned General Trochu to Paris, and asked him to take the post of minister of War. The general peremptorily refused, unless the empress should lay down the regency. This drove the ministers to their wits' end, and they convoked the Chambers for the following day (Tuesday). The evening *Official Journal* also published an extraordinary address, not only to the French nation, but to the European courts generally. This remarkable document said:—

"There exists in the life of nations solemn and decisive moments, in which God gives them an opportunity of showing what they are and of what they are capable. That hour has come for France. It has sometimes been asserted that, though intrepid in the dash of success, the great nation supports reverses with difficulty. What is now passing before us gives the lie to this calumny. The attitude of the people is not one of discouragement; it is one of sublime and patriotic rage against the invaders of France, who in France must find a tomb. All Frenchmen will rise like one man; they remember their ancestors and their children. Behind them they see centuries of glory, before them a future that their heroism shall render free and powerful. Never has our country been better prepared for self-devotion and sacrifice, never has it shown in a more imposing and magnificent manner the vigour and pride of the national character. It shouts with enthusiasm, 'Up; to arms!' To conquer or die is its motto. While our soldiers heroically defend the soil of France, Europe is rightly uneasy at the successes of Prussia. People ask themselves to what lengths the ambition of that insatiable power would carry her if she were intoxicated with a decisive triumph. It is an invariable law of history that any nation which by unbounded covetousness disturbs the general equilibrium challenges a reaction against its victories, and turns all other countries into opponents. This truth cannot fail to be again demonstrated by the results. Who is there interested in the resurrection of the German empire? Who is there that desires the Baltic to become a Prussian lake? Can it be Sweden, Norway, or Denmark—countries that a Prussian triumph would annihilate? Can it be Russia—Russia which is more interested than any power in saving the equilibrium of the North against German covetousness? Can it be England, which, as a great maritime power, and as the protector of Denmark, is opposed to the progress of the Prussian navy? Can it be Holland, which is already so much threatened by the audacious intrigues of Count von Bismarck? With regard to Austria, the restoration of the German empire to the advantage of the House of Hohenzollern would be the most fatal blow, not only to the dynasty of the Hapsburgs, but to the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. . . . The decisive victory of the Hohenzollerns would not be less fatal to Italy than to Austria, and the regeneration of the former would be compromised. We appeal with confidence to the wisdom of governments and peoples to root Prussian despotism out of Europe, to aid us, either by alliance or sympathy, in saving the European equilibrium."

The address also intimated that England was fully satisfied with the declarations given with regard to Belgium. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark showed an attitude "trembling with patriotism." The emperor of Russia honoured their ambassador with his particular good will. The emperor of Austria and the king of Italy, with their governments, manifested dispositions more and more satisfactory. In conclusion, it was

added—"Our diplomacy will not be less active than our army. France is making a supreme effort, and our patriotism rises equal to every danger. The more serious the circumstances, the more will the nation be energetic. All divisions cease, and the French press unanimously express the most practical and most noble ideas. The concurrence of the Senate and Legislative Body is about to lend fresh strength to our troops, and the France of 1870 will show the peoples of Europe that we have not degenerated."

Before the commencement of hostilities the emperor had said France did not seek any allies; but on the first experience of disaster this melancholy wail was immediately issued and telegraphed in full to all the courts of Europe. Even before the assembling of the Chambers, the address had sealed the fate of the ministry, and to none could it have caused more consternation than to the emperor himself. To the losses on the field was now added the incompetence of the government, and thus were intensified those feelings of wounded pride and fierce anger, which were subsequently displayed both inside and outside the Legislative Assemblies.

Tuesday (August 9) was a day of such tumult and excitement as even Paris had seldom seen without bloodshed. No further despatches having arrived from the seat of war, the popular interest was concentrated on the Chambers. Long before noon a dense crowd thronged the quay in front of the palace of the Corps Législatif, the court of which was occupied by large bodies of troops, 10,000 men of the infantry of marine having arrived from Cherbourg and other ports on the previous day. The ministers were received with shouts of "Vive Rochefort!" "Des Armes!" "A bas les Ministres!" M. Jules Favre made an attempt to address the crowd, but failed to secure a hearing. Seizing the hand of a national guard, he gave the mob to understand that that force sympathized with the people, an announcement which called forth applause, the national guards waving their shakos on the ends of their rifles. On the arrival of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, commandant of the army of Paris, he ordered the drums to beat, and summons to be made to the crowd to retire. But though it was repeatedly charged with cavalry, there was happily no bloodshed. The troops were assailed with such cries as "Lâches, fainéants, à la frontière; battez vous avec les Prussiens!" but the majority of the crowd contented themselves with shouting "Vive la Liberté!" "Vive la République!" and, above all, "Des Armes! des Armes!" The readiness with which the crowd took advantage of any bit of scaffolding or broken wall, which the cavalry could not get over, showed their hereditary turn for street fighting, and what mischief they might have done had their appeal for arms been heard. "Once," said an eye-witness, "the pursuers were thus rendered so baffled and helpless that they were glad in their turn to retreat before the merciless volley of abuse heaped upon them, though they got their revenge by running another group into a *cul-de-sac*, and belabouring them with the flat of their drawn swords."

At the meeting of the Senate little business of any interest was transacted. M. de Parieu, president of the council of state, delivered a speech intended to re-assure the members of the body, upon which discussion was not allowed, and the proceedings closed.

The scene inside the Corps Législatif, however, was very exciting. When M. Schneider proceeded to read the decree of the emperor convoking the Chambers, no sooner had he uttered the words, "Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will emperor of the French," than he was assailed with cries to pass it over. M. Ollivier, while explaining why the Chambers had been convoked, was subjected to continual interruptions. One member, on an allusion having been made to the valour of the troops, chimed in with, "Yes, lions led by asses; as was remarked by Napoleon I." M. Arago called upon the ministry to "retire, and then the army would conquer." M. Jules Favre said the presence of the ministry in the Chamber was a disgrace. When M. Ollivier remarked that the Chamber would be wanting in its duty if it supported the government, having the smallest want of confidence in it, and said that he was probably addressing them as minister for the last time, the Left shouted out, "We hope so, for the salvation of the country!" The minister of War having introduced a project of law ordaining the embodying of all citizens of thirty years of age in a national garde mobile, M. Jules Favre, amid breathless attention, proposed the immediate arming of all French citizens, and the appointment of a committee of fifteen deputies charged with the defence of France. He also called for the return

of the emperor. "The fact is," said M. Favre, "that the fate of the country is compromised, which is the result of the operations of those who have the direction of military affairs, and of the absolute incapacity of the commander-in-chief. It is therefore necessary that all our forces should be placed in the hands of one man, but that man must not be the emperor."

This movement of the leader of the opposition had an indescribable effect on the Chamber; it was like throwing oil on fire. In the tumult which followed it was impossible to hear any of the speakers, who, in spite of the president's efforts to maintain order, indulged in an angry discussion across the Chamber. The proposition of M. Favre, enthusiastically approved by the Left and Left Centre, was most violently protested against by M. Granier de Cassagnac, who increased the turmoil by declaring that, were he the government, he would have the whole Left tried by court-martial, and shot. M. Ollivier for some time vainly tried to obtain a hearing, but at length succeeded in intimating to the House that several of his colleagues had asked him if he meant to have the Left shot. Here M. de Gramont was understood to interrupt his chief (although he afterwards denied it) by exclaiming superciliously, "Seulement!" At this supposed insult M. Estancelin rushed across the Chamber, and shook his fist in the face of the foreign minister; he was followed by M. Jules Ferry, while M. Jules Simon, inaudible from the uproar, beat his breast to signify that he longed for the government bullet. A battle appeared imminent; but the Right intervened, and under its sheltering wing M. de Gramont left the Chamber. The president put on his hat, and the sitting was suspended.

On the resumption of business M. Clément Duvernois, who was in the confidence of the emperor, proposed a resolution to the following effect:—"That the Chamber is determined to support a cabinet which is capable of providing for the defence of the country." This resolution was carried, under the protest of the ministry, with only six dissentients, whereupon M. Ollivier, with his colleagues, retired to the Tuileries. On his return, the prime minister rose and said—"After the vote of the Chamber the ministers have tendered their resignations to the empress regent, who has accepted them, and I am charged by her to declare that with the assent of the emperor she has intrusted Count Palikao with the task of forming a cabinet."

The sitting then closed amidst great excitement, and the result speedily became known throughout Paris. The crowd outside the Palais Bourbon was immense, and the ministers were again received with loud cries of "Vive Rochefort," "A bas les Ministres," "Des Armes!" M. Jules Ferry had a perfect ovation, and M. Jules Simon was carried through the streets in triumph. The crowd, however, soon dispersed, and Paris had a few hours of quiet after the intense excitement of the previous days.

It is here worthy of remark, that whatever were the failings of M. Ollivier as prime minister of France, he was not responsible for the war, having in the first instance opposed it. But defeat had overtaken the imperial arms; it became necessary that he should be sacrificed in the interests of the dynasty, and hence the resolution moved by a favourite courtier of the emperor, who was more afraid of the republicans than of the Prussians.

The new ministry was formed without a moment's delay. General Cousin Montauban, Comte de Palikao, having received his commission at the hands of the empress, appointed his cabinet as follows:—M. Chevreau, minister of the Interior; M. Magne, minister of Finance; M. Clément Duvernois, minister of Commerce and Agriculture; Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, minister of Marine; Baron Jérôme David, minister of Public Works; Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Grandperret, minister of Justice; M. Jules Brame, minister of Public Instruction; M. Busson-Billault, president of the Council of State.

General Montauban, the head of the cabinet and minister of War, was a thorough soldier. Born in 1796, he entered the army at an early age, and greatly distinguished himself as a cavalry officer in the Algerian wars. Major in 1836, he was gradually promoted, and became a general of brigade in 1857. His most notable exploits were performed in China, where, appointed French commander-in-chief of the Anglo-French expedition of 1860, he gave proof of great military talent by the way in which, with but a very small army and with literally millions of opponents, he conquered the fort of Takow, gained over the Chinese general, Sang-ko-lin-sin, the celebrated victory of Palikao (whence his title was derived), and

triumphantly entered Pekin itself. From that war Montauban came back enriched with plunder. He was rewarded with the grand cross of the legion of honour, the title of count, and the dignity of senator; but the Corps Législatif refused to vote him a pension, and he retired into comparative obscurity as commander of the fourth corps d'armée. In the dilemma of the 9th August he was summoned by the empress and chosen as the safest Napoleonic premier. With regard to the other members of the new cabinet, they were statesmen of but ordinary mark, although of a thoroughly imperialistic and military character.

The Palikao ministry was avowedly constructed as a "Cabinet of Defence," and instead of representing any particular party in the legislature, was pronounced a ministry of "Arcadians."* There was abundant reason why the new body should be composed of men of military energy. But the Parisians were mistrustful. Great indignation was displayed at the incapacity of the emperor, who was tabooed even by the Legislative Body, and whose name was carefully omitted in all official documents. The empress, who had never been a favourite with the people, was regarded with suspicion in her conduct of the regency, as it was believed that she had attempted to infuse her influence into public affairs. Added to these considerations, the antecedents of the Comte de Palikao gave rise to fears of overt acts of indiscretion on his part. "Montauban," it was said, "is very firm; but he is not very scrupulous."

On the first appearance of the Palikao cabinet in the Corps Législatif (August 10), great precautions were taken for the protection of the Chamber. In addition to the cavalry and infantry force previously on duty, two batteries of artillery were put in requisition. The proceedings, however, were comparatively quiet. A proposal was adopted to declare urgent a resolution to postpone all payments for one month. M. Forcade de la Roquette read the report of the committee appointed to consider the means of raising new levies, and the House unanimously adopted a proposition to call out the soldiers no longer liable to serve of the classes from 1858 to 1863, by which might be obtained 300,000 men who had seen service; that a levy should be made of all citizens who had been under arms; and that all men between twenty-five and thirty-five who were unmarried, and had no children, should be required to join the army. It was further agreed to raise the grant of 4,000,000 francs for the assistance of the families of the national guard to 20,000,000 francs. M. Forcade de la Roquette then moved a vote of thanks to the French army, as having deserved well of the country. Enthusiastic cheering, three times renewed, greeted this motion, and the Chamber decided that the president should transmit it to the army. M. Estancelin moved that the Legislative Body should sit *en permanence* until the Prussians evacuated France; but on a vote there were 117 ayes against 117 noes, and the motion was consequently lost. M. Jules Ferry questioned the cabinet as to the use it intended to make of the powers conferred upon it by a state of siege, and criticised the repressive measures resorted to; but no reply was given by the government. M. Lecesne proposed a resolution with a view to establishing the forced currency of bank-notes; but the urgency of such a measure was disputed, and the House quietly separated.

Outside the Chamber, also, peace reigned, the excitement of the previous day having in a great measure subsided. But 40,000 regular troops and marines were retained in the capital to keep down the Republicans, and the old policy of repression was pursued, as if France were in insurrection against the Empire instead of Prussia.

It began to be feared, too, that increased troubles would come from without, and preparations were commenced against the contingency of having the German battalions before the walls of the city. Among the first acts of the Ministry of Defence was the demolition of the little memorial chapel of St. Ferdinando, erected by Marie Amélie to the memory of the duke of Orleans, who was killed on the site in 1848. The emperor had often wished to get rid of that interesting relic of the Orleans family. The district of Belleville (Rochefort's circonscription) also fell in the way of the preparations, and much of it was destroyed, as well as many of the trees in the city, which might hinder defensive operations.

The Germans residing in Paris were reduced to great hardships in consequence of the state of siege. Immediately after the declaration of war, both the Prussian and Saxon ambassadors placed

* That it was not formed on a permanent basis, was shown by the fact that the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, M. Chevreau, and M. Grandperret only consented to act on condition that the several positions vacated by them should be held open to meet future possible contingencies.

their diplomatic archives under the protection of the American Legation. Mr. Washbourne also applied to the Duc de Gramont to allow German subjects to leave France for the Fatherland; but the request was refused, on the ground that all able-bodied Germans were liable to military duty, and would at once take up arms against France. A change of policy, however, had ensued. As early as the 5th of August the prefect of police had issued an edict, rendered necessary by the "internal manœuvres of certain foreign residents against the safety of the state;" and the Legislature subsequently decreed that the Germans (to the number of some 40,000) should be expelled the capital—a "humane" precaution, it was said, as Paris was too excited to tolerate foreigners. German residents had been menaced, many "spies" shot, and one poor workman killed with spades. The decree was effectively enforced, and hundreds of German families had to make a hasty flight. On arriving at Berlin, many of these refugees presented a petition to the king, in which they complained that, in the department of the Seine alone, 80,000 persons had been obliged to leave their business, their property, many even their wives and children, and flee like criminals from a country whose prosperity they had for years done much to secure. Three days only had been granted to them—the same time as ordinarily intervened between a sentence of death and its execution—and in a period so brief no effective arrangements could be made. "In the places of business, the workshops, and the dwelling-houses, everything had to be left as it stood; they were locked and left to the care of Providence, and we fled the country where Germans were deprived of their rights, and left without protection to the rage of a fanatical people." The official journals of Germany threatened revenge, though not in the form of expelling Frenchmen from the country. "Frenchmen residing among us," said they, "may tranquillize themselves; they will, like the rest of the world, become convinced that it is Germany that marches at the head of civilization."

The expulsion was entirely without precedent, unless it be in the first Napoleon's detention of the English in Verdun; still it was not contrary to the principles of international law, as every nation maintains an Alien Act, which may be enforced in any special emergency.

At this period, also, it is notable, that all the members of the Orleans family visited Brussels, whence they addressed letters to the French government, offering their services in defence of their country. Prince de Joinville wrote to Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, the French minister of marine:—"In presence of the danger which threatens our country, I ask the emperor to be allowed to serve on the active army in any capacity, and request my old comrade to assist me in obtaining this permission." The Duc d'Aumale, writing to the minister of War, said—"You call out all Frenchmen to fight for the defence of the country. I am a Frenchman, an able-bodied soldier, and have the rank of general of division. I ask to serve in the active army." The Duc de Chartres wrote—"As a Frenchman, and as a former officer in the American and Italian wars, I request to be employed on active service. My most ardent wish is to fight for my country, even if it be only as a volunteer." For obvious reasons these several offers were declined.

It was about this time that the damaging stories in regard to the malversation of stores, the rottenness of the administration, and the incompetence of the emperor to lead armies or to continue the system of personal government, became rife in Paris, and most of them were at once received as foregone conclusions. The cry of treason was raised against the blunderers of the war and the plunderers of the commissariat, in which both Napoleon and his marshal, Lebœuf, came in for their share of the popular indignation. Bitter also was the feeling against the government for placing France in so ignominious a position, and warnings were thrown out of a day of future reckoning. "Give us news of the war," said the Parisians. "Let us be satisfied that Paris is safe, and that the honour of France can be redeemed; we can settle such a minor matter as our next form of government later."

During these events, however, no contrast could have been more complete than that between Paris and the rural districts of France. Having recovered from the panic caused by the affair of Woerth, the capital, moved by alternating hopes and fears, was full of excitement; but in the villages there was generally a blank look of misery and submission to their fate. Soldiers left Paris in uniform for the scene of conflict, gaily singing patriotic songs; but each individual warrior left his hamlet, in his blouse and wooden shoes, with

a heavy heart. At almost every provincial railway station groups of sorrowing rustics waited for the train to carry them to the camp. But they left their peaceful avocations behind them, with the feeling that the tillage of the land and the various industries of their districts would suffer ruin. "Why," said the peasantry, "did you not tell us the plebiscite meant war? We would never then have said 'Yes.'"

Even in most of the large towns of France there was comparatively little excitement. The influence of affairs at the front told by far the most heavily upon the capital, giving a colouring to the egotistic boast of the Parisians that "Paris is France."

It is here necessary to turn again to the proceedings in the Legislative Body, where on Thursday, August 11, M. de Keratry caused a mighty uproar, by proposing the appointment of a committee to try Marshal Lebœuf. Not another word of his, however, could be heard for a time; but the senator folded his arms and leant back in an attitude of supercilious endurance, while the members shouted and gesticulated at him and at each other. This scene lasted for some minutes, when "the order of the day, pure and simple," was voted. Nothing daunted by his colleague's failure, another member of the Left, M. Guyot Montpayroux, insisted on being told whether Marshal Lebœuf was still *Major-Général de l'Armée*. The previous uproar was instantly renewed in a longer and far more furious style. The minister of War contrived to say that he considered that *les convenances* precluded a reply, at which M. Montpayroux flung himself in the direction of the minister, literally foaming at the mouth; but not a syllable he shouted was audible. Physical exhaustion compelled him to resume his seat; but at the first lull in the storm he again sprang up, and insisted on an answer, "Yes or no," fiercely challenging every member of the House to rise and express approval of the conduct of Marshal Lebœuf. The Right replied with a shout of defiance and derision; the Left rose as one man, and after gesticulating with such violence that a hand-to-hand fight seemed imminent, prepared to leave the House. At this juncture M. Thiers, whom Right and Left were eager to hear, was observed slowly making his way to the tribune. He began in tones so low that every head was bent forward to catch his words, and the deep stillness, following such a storm, was singularly impressive. He said that the present was not the time for raising such discussions, and appealed to his hearers whether it was right to call to the bar of the House a brave soldier, who was baring his breast to the bullets of the enemy. The speech of M. Thiers, though short, produced the desired effect, and the House, which from all parts loudly applauded him at the close, settled down to business at once in real earnest.

The ministerial programme carried through at this sitting was of a remarkable character. Soon after the war broke out the *Journal Officiel* contradicted a rumour that it was the intention of the bank of France to obtain a forced currency for its paper, and stated that the bank possessed 1,200,000,000 francs in specie to meet 1,400,000,000 francs in notes. Thus there was no reason for establishing a forced currency, nor was any such design entertained. Within a month, however, of the declaration of war, the Palikao ministry proposed this very measure, and the Corps Législatif voted it with only one dissentient. Article 1 declared that from the date of promulgation, the notes of the bank of France should be received as legal tender by the public treasuries and by private persons. Article 2 relieved the bank from the obligation of cashing its notes. Article 3 limited the issues of the bank to 1,800,000,000. Article 4 applied the law to the bank of Algeria; and article 5 permitted the issue of 25-franc notes. These legislative enactments produced a marked effect. The suspension of specie payments by the bank of France, the increase of the war credit from £20,000,000 to £40,000,000, and the granting of a period of grace for the payment of bills and other liabilities, gave rise to much discussion on the London Exchange.

The authorized issue of the bank under the forced currency was limited to £72,000,000, and as the amount of notes in circulation was £63,340,000, the balance available for increasing it amounted to £8,660,000. The bullion during the week, August 6 to 13, experienced a further decrease of £2,730,000, making a total reduction of £11,630,000, and the sum of £41,140,000 remained in hand. The war demand, coupled with that on the part of the people, must in a very short time have caused another heavy diminution, which would probably have swept away the balance. It was therefore thought better that it

should remain in the vaults of the bank, to serve as the foundation for a resumption of payment at the proper time. Of course, as a natural result of the measure, gold rose to a premium throughout France, and extra prices had to be paid for all imported necessaries of the people; but in such a crisis a more promising or practicable method could not have been resorted to, and its efficiency in carrying countries through the most severe trials, and enabling them to raise any amount of loans, has been exemplified from the time of the earlier wars of England down to the more recent American struggle.

In the Corps Législatif on Friday, August 12, Count Palikao announced the resignation as major-general of the army of the Rhine of Marshal Lebœuf, who had been universally impeached of presumption, negligence, and ignorance. The minister was loudly cheered while describing some vigorous measures which had been taken for raising troops, and promising that, within two days, two *corps d'armée* of 35,000 men each should be sent to the front. M. Gambetta, on behalf of the Left, expressed strong approval of the ministerial action.

On Saturday, August 13, the Legislative Body unanimously adopted the bill raising the issue of bank notes to 2,400,000,000 francs. A bill, opening a credit of 5,000,000 francs in the budget of Paris for the distressed families of mobile guards who were engaged at the front, was also urgently pressed. In the course of the sitting the minister of war stated that Marshal Bazaine had been appointed sole commander-in-chief of the whole army, and that the defences of Paris would soon be complete. Replying to M. Gambetta, Count Palikao said that the ministers, placing confidence in all parties of the Chamber, and claiming like confidence in return, would accept a discussion on the question of appointing a committee of national defence. The president likewise requested the deputies not to leave Paris, so as to be at hand if required.

Meanwhile the work of completing the defences of the city was rapidly pushed forward, and detachments of naval gunners arrived from Cherbourg to work the cannons at the gates. Although the measures of the government placed at its disposal millions of men, and consequently many more than it could possibly arm, the cry was still for more. The Left demanded that the youths who had taken refuge in the religious colleges should be dragged thence, and take their share in the defence of the country; and a bill was also brought in demanding that all persons born in France should be drafted into the army. The consequence was that crowds of Englishmen, born of British parents and not in the enjoyment of civic rights in France, claimed their passports and prepared for a hegira. Lord Lyons very properly protested against the proposed law in a semi-official manner, and asked that, in the event of its being carried, Englishmen should at least be allowed forty days to reflect whether they would risk life for the French government or return to England.

Both Chambers met on Sunday, August 14, the first meeting that had been held on a Sunday since the establishment of the empire. In the Corps Législatif there was a most animated debate, brought on by M. Gambetta accusing the government of withholding news; the entrance of the Prussian cavalry into Nancy at three on Friday afternoon not being made public in Paris till nine o'clock on Sunday morning. Rage and confusion seized the Chamber, and M. Schneider strove in vain to restore order. Many had a suspicion that the emperor interfered with the military operations, and M. Jules Favre presented a petition signed by a large number of Parisians, urging that the emperor should come back to the capital, and that all military men should be sent to the front. The reading of this petition produced a strange sensation, which boded ill for the future of his imperial majesty.

The stormy scenes of the Chamber on this particular Sunday found a reflex on the boulevards and in the city. In the afternoon a disgraceful riot occurred in the north-eastern suburb of La Villette, where a body of about sixty armed men attacked the firemen's barracks, shot down a solitary fireman who was on guard, and mortally wounded the first sergent de ville who arrived on the spot. The mob then plundered the post of a few Chassepots and some ammunition, after which they beat a hasty retreat to the heights of Belleville, shouting "Vive la République!" and firing off their revolvers. Sudden and unexpected as was the dastardly attack, a strong body of police was soon in pursuit, and most of the rioters were captured.

Throughout the entire night of the 14th dis-

turbance and disquiet reigned in Paris. Arrests of spies, real or supposed, were made by the authorities; acts of violence were committed in the streets; and thus the morning of August 15, the day of the "Fête Napoleon," was heralded in by ominous disorder.

That day, so long identified in the minds of sightseers of every nation with brilliant reviews, salvos of cannon, and monster displays of fireworks, found France invaded and the Empire tottering. The previous year had celebrated the centenary of the first Napoleon amidst great splendour, and for nearly twenty years the fête-day had been distinguished by galas and rejoicings, garlands of light and wreaths of flowers. But the imperial festival of 1870 saw no such signs. The times were too mournful for holiday sports; the workshops were shut, but the people were in no mood for pleasure and gaiety. The Corps Législatif, however, did not assemble; business was partially suspended; the churches were open, their candles ablaze, and their priests in their richest canonicals, while the solemn chant rolled out into the streets; and truly there never was more occasion for singing *Domine, salvum fac Napoleonem.*

It had been confidently expected that this day would bring tidings of a victory from the army of the Rhine; but the official news of a Prussian attack on the banks of the Moselle at Longueville having been repulsed after four hours' fighting, did little to remove the gloom hanging over Paris; nay, it was even felt as a just source of dissatisfaction, that the intelligence was not conveyed by Marshal Bazaine to the minister of War, but sent in a telegram from Napoleon to the empress. The people read the despatch with incredulity, which was turned into wrath by the fact that French territory was the scene of the reported events.

The night closed in on Paris without a solitary token of rejoicing; there were no fireworks and illuminations; the theatres were but scantily filled, and many were entirely closed. In fact, throughout the city the spirit of gloom rested heavily, the counterpart of that which must have pressed on the mind of the emperor away at the front.

The day of the emperor's fête, according to the French idea at the beginning of the war, was to have found the imperial troops in the "Unter den Linden," at Berlin. When the day came, it only served to show in stronger colours the great fall which the empire had sustained. To many of the thoughtful inhabitants of Paris it seemed surprising that the emperor should have hazarded so much on the war. He left with the full knowledge that defeat would imperil his dynasty. The Germans in front were scarcely more formidable than enemies left at home. But justice requires it to be noted, that in the eyes of most of the French his crime was, not the going to war, but commencing it before France was ready; and therefore on his head the results of defeat ought to fall, for to the French mind their troops were invincible. To add to the crushing effect of disaster in the field, not one among his thousand servants showed sign of real devotion to him. The first thing done by his council was to omit his name in all proclamations; and the first thought of his ministry was to summon the rival power—the Legislative Body. Deserted by his flatterers and enfeebled in bodily health, his fête-day, about which he was always wont to have a superstitious feeling, as if it were a day of destiny, brought ample food for gloomy memories and still gloomier anticipations.

Whilst the remarkable proceedings narrated in the previous pages were occurring in the distracted capital of France, a widely different feeling pervaded Berlin and the entire German nation. France was prepared only for success, failing which anarchy and disorganization threatened the empire; Germany awaited with calmness either victory or defeat, regarding it as quite probable that the emperor's troops would gain a few dashing triumphs at the outset, and even advance a longer or shorter distance beyond their frontier; but the Teutons none the less firmly believed in their power ultimately to hurl back the enemy with disastrous effect. The *élan* of the French was to be met and conquered by German "phlegm." "We shall, perhaps, be beaten at first," said the Crown Prince, as he started for the front; "but do not mind: we are quite sure to win in the end."

Nevertheless, the official announcement of the evacuation of Saarbrück had at first a somewhat depressing effect on the capital. It was not supposed that actual defeat had been sustained, and the accuracy of the bulletin was unquestioned, seeing that during the war with Austria the Prussian government carefully avoided either exaggerating its successes or glossing over its losses. The inhab-

itants, however, from the queen downwards, were grave and anxious, less from the fact that the opening of the war had witnessed a slight check to their army, than the feeling engendered by the danger of their friends in the ranks, now that hostilities had commenced in earnest.

On the afternoon of Thursday, August 5, imperfect accounts of the affair at Wissembourg were circulated throughout Berlin, and the tidings that the Crown Prince had crossed the Rhine and was fighting on French ground caused great excitement. The ordinary business of the city came to an immediate standstill, and a crowd assembled before the king's palace, in which many of the first bankers and merchants were content to jostle with people of all sorts aud conditions. It soon became known that a telegram of vital importance had been received by the queen, who delegated a general officer to report the news from the king of the first Prussian victory, in the following terms:—

"MAINZ, *August* 4.

"To the Queen Augusta.

"Under Fritz's eyes to-day a brilliant but bloody victory has been won by the storming of Weissenburg, and Geisberg behind it. Our fifth and eleventh corps, and the second Bavarian army corps fought. The enemy in flight: 500 unwounded prisoners, one cannon, and the encampment in our hands. General Douay dead. Of us, General von Kirchbach slightly wounded. My regiment and the fiftieth heavy losses. God be praised for the first glorious action! May he help us further!"

This despatch was posted up about the streets, and gladdened the hearts of the entire population. "God be praised." That was the universal feeling; and the terrors of Chassepots and mitrailleuses ceased to disquiet the minds of the people. The news of the victory was announced after nine in the evening, and in less than half an hour all the windows of the principal streets were lit up in token of the general rejoicing. The feeling of jubilation lasted far into the night, and was renewed on the morning of Friday by a message which raised the number of French prisoners from 500 to 800, and stated that batches of them might shortly be expected in Berliu.

The afternoon of Saturday (August 6) brought the tidings that the Crown Prince had beaten MacMahon at Woerth, and driven his army in headlong rout. The inhabitants turned out *en masse* at this news, and the telegram announcing the victory was read by General Hanenfeld from the balcony of the royal palace. It caused a burst of joy through all Berlin. Till midnight the crowd continued crying, "Long live the king!" and "Long live the Crown Prince!" Four times the queen came forward, waving her handkerchief, while the people responded in loud hurrahs. Unter den Linden, Friedrich-strasse, and all the leading thoroughfares, were illuminated, and the signs of rejoicing continued through the night. Early on Sunday morning the bands of the different regiments played in honour of the victory, and the event was celebrated by salvos of artillery.

The news of the successful engagement on the heights of Spicheren, under General Steinmetz, on the 6th, did not arrive till late at night, and only became generally known on Sunday morning. It was reported in the simplest language, and not even called a victory, although quite as important as Woerth.

These successes left in the hands of the Germans some 20,000 wounded and unwounded prisoners, who were distributed in Posen, Passau, Glogau, Spandau, Berlin, &c. On the 6th August, a first batch of 600, part of those taken at Wissembourg, were lodged in the casemates of Graudenz. On their passage through Frankfort, Berlin, and other cities, these prisoners were lionized, and treated with the utmost kindness by the public, which stared at, talked to, and good-naturedly cheered them by thousands. The Berlin police had previously issued a notice that French prisoners were coming through the city, and begged the people to show that they knew how to treat a vanquished enemy with courtesy. This intimation was more than fulfilled. The Frenchmen were regaled with huge piles of butterbrödchen and other delicacies, and with unlimited quantities of sausages, cigars, tobacco, wine, and beer. The ladies who supplied the viands, as well as the officers and many of the privates forming the escort, spoke French fluently, to the great surprise of the prisoners, many of whom seemed to have been persuaded that they were warring with a race of semi-barbarians, ignorant of everything save their own jargon.

It was originally intended that the French prisoners for Spandau, *viâ* Berlin, should be

marched through the capital, and a crowd of 100,000 assembled to witness the spectacle. At the request of the queen the intention was abandoned; the prisoners were conveyed across the city by the connecting line of rails, and forwarded to the Frankfort station.

The Turcos, of whom a large number were captured, excited the greatest curiosity. Ugly, swarthy, slight in physique, they did not improve on acquaintance. Even their fellow-prisoners appeared ashamed of their companionship. It was likewise rumoured that they had been caught mutilating and massacring the wounded on the battle-field, which created in Germany a strong feeling of repulsion against them, and of indignation that the emperor should have employed such savages in European warfare.

More slowly the wounded Prussians, as well as the wounded French who had been captured, were forwarded to Berlin, and many a moving scene took place at the Potsdam railway station on their arrival. It was likewise noticeable, that the spirit in which the Germans received the news of the brilliant victories of their armies, contrasted favourably with that excited by the fictitious tidings of MacMahon's triumph in Paris, already described. From the sovereign who led them to the poorest subject, the one cry which arose was that of Luther's grand old hymn, "Nun dankt alle Gott"—Now let all thank God—mingled with an honest pride in the fearless courage of their civilian army. The first natural impulses of joy were succeeded by thoughful sympathy and care for the wounded. In every town and village systematic means were taken to lighten the sufferings of the sick and disabled.

The joy of the people was far beyond that caused by the triumphs of Prussia in 1866. After Königgrätz, many of the chief cities of the Fatherland were sorrowful and humiliated. German had shed the blood of German. But in the war of 1870 they had united against a common enemy; while the brilliant exploits of the campaign were fully shared by the southern Teutons, whose apocryphal enfranchisement was one of the pretexts advanced by the French emperor to justify the war. In fact, throughout Germany, at this time the war was felt to be but a means to an end, and that end was not so much the humiliation of France as the construction of Germany. And what could draw the bonds of union tighter than common sufferings and mutual services? A Bavarian corps comes to the rescue of a Prussian one in the hour of need; North German soldiers have every attention lavished on them as they pass South German Mayence; South Germans are cared for tenderly at Prussian Saarbrück and Treves. The religious barrier also was breached, and Catholic priests and Protestant clergymen were busied in smoothing the same pillow, and Sisters of Charity glided about the beds of the Northern Lutherans and Calvinists. In fact, the Bavarian, the Swabian, and the Prussian, each rejoiced in the prowess of their brothers and sons, and looked forward with fervent hope and prayer for their speedy and safe return to Fatherland.

Meanwhile, still poring over its war maps and tracing out the line of opposed army fronts, Berlin waited in the assurance that genius, courage, and numbers combined to make failure all but impossible. Success also led the Prussians to consider what they should exact from the vanquished, and already it was said that Alsace must once more be German territory.

As the days advanced towards the 15th August, by which time the French had calculated to enter Berlin in triumph, it became increasingly gratifying to all with German sympathies to see how large a tract of French ground was held by King William, who had issued proclamations addressed to the French inhabitants of the provinces held by the Prussian army, intimating that while the Germans were fighting the emperor's troops, they were desirous to live at peace with the French people.

United Germany had formed a determined purpose to make it the last war with France. They were afraid otherwise that their dearly-bought victories would prove fruitless, by having the work to do over again. "Stop short of Paris," they said, "as we stopped short of Vienna! certainly not. *They* were for marching into Berlin. *Their* cry of invasion was 'to the Rhine!' We have beaten them back to the Moselle, and are masters of all the country between. We have nearly regained our old province of Alsace. We shall starve out Strassburg. We shall starve out Metz or take it, and shall keep beating them back and back to Châlons. Paris will be ours; and, come all Europe, we will not be denied our triumph and revenge."

CHAPTER X.

Brief Recapitulation of the Results of the Battles of Woerth and Forbach—The Scene at Saverne on the arrival of the *débris* of MacMahon's Army—The Troops of the Crown Prince advance to Haguenau—Surrender of the Town—MacMahon's retreat westward—Capture of Lichtenberg and La Petite Pierre—Resistance of Bitsche and Phalsbourg—Description of both Fortresses—The Baden Contingent despatched to besiege Strassburg—Address of the Baden General to the Alsatians—General description of German advance into France—Proclamation of the Crown Prince—Arrival at Nancy—Panic in the Town—It is actually taken by Four German Soldiers—Junction of the Crown Prince with the other German Armies—Position of the Different French Corps after the Battles of Woerth and Forbach—Generous Conduct of Canrobert—Another Fatal Delay on the part of the French—The Advance of the First and Second German Armies—Address of the King to the Soldiers—Gallant Conduct of a Young German Lieutenant in the Capture of Saargemund—The German Tactics as regarded the Advance of their different Armies—Their Commissariat—Novel description of Food introduced—Praiseworthy Conduct of the Troops at St. Avold—Passage of the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson by the Germans—Proceedings at the French Headquarters—Removal of Marshal Lebœuf—The Emperor resigns the Command-in-Chief—Arrival of General Changarnier at Metz—Appointment of Marshal Bazaine as Commander-in-Chief—Biographical Notice of him—The Evils of a Divided Command—Bazaine Resolves on a Retreat—Departure of the Emperor from Metz—Proclamation to the Inhabitants—Attempt of the Prussians to capture the Emperor—His Flight to Verdun, and Ride to Châlons in a Third-Class Carriage—Comments on the Cruelty of uselessly exposing the Prince Imperial—General Review of the Situation at this time—The Tactics which might have saved France—The Emperor's own Explanations of his Proceedings—Description of the City and Fortress of Metz.

The first act of the military drama of 1870 may be said to have closed with the battles of the 6th of August, described in Chapter VIII. Their result was the evacuation of Northern Alsace and the retreat of the French army—now thrown entirely on the defensive—beyond the line of the Vosges; the main body falling back upon Metz, the right wing making its way as best it could, in utter disorganization, towards Nancy and Châlons. The following week was employed by the Germans in bringing up their second line, composed almost exclusively of regiments from the old Prussian provinces; while the troops which had been already engaged were pushed forward as fast as supplies could be procured and communications established with the rear, with the double object of preventing the reunion of the two sections of the French army, and either intercepting the main body in its retreat, or forcing it to fall back upon Châlons by a northerly and circuitous route, along which it could be incessantly harassed, or, if necessary, even thrown back upon the Ardennes, where it would be compelled to give battle in a district devoid of supplies, and with a neutral territory in the rear.

But we must not anticipate. As we have already briefly described in Chapter VIII., after the terrible defeat which MacMahon's army had suffered at Woerth, it was dispersed, and a large part of his broken right wing escaped towards Haguenau and Strassburg, while the remains of his other troops were scattered over the roads that run southwards athwart the Vosges. The marshal made an effort to reach De Failly's corps and Bitsche, in order to rejoin the main army, and attempted a stand at Niederbronn; but his troops gave way at the sight of the Germans, and he fell back hastily upon Saverne.

When they arrived at this town a complete panic seized the inhabitants. According to a correspondent of the *Siècle*, who happened to be present, "all the houses were closed—hotels, cafés, beer-houses. I was scarcely half an hour in my chamber when the landlord entered, and told me to leave as soon as I could, for he was going to conceal himself in the mountains of the Vosges. I was shortly in the street, and beheld hundreds taking the paths which lead to the mountains. The army also thought it wise to retreat, and to fall back on Sarrebourg. Not being able to follow the army, I followed the people on foot, as neither vehicles nor horses were to be had. I left my luggage in the house of a person whom I do not know, and who had the politeness to open the door and pitch it inside, when he locked the door and was off to the hills as fast as his feet and legs could carry him. I do not know exactly where they are going, but I know where the crowd is going, and what a crowd—old men, women with their babes, and little girls of some four years climbing across chamois paths, amid cries, tears, and desolation. They brought with them as much as they could, and more than they could carry. Men bend under the load; even the children have their

burdens. All these people speak German. After an hour's march we arrived at the first village, which has already heard the news, and is itself preparing to decamp. Oxen, cows, &c., are driven before us. Beds, linen, &c., are heaped in carts, and at each step the number of the flying is increased. I ask some persons whom I hear speaking French, where we are going, and when will our journey come to an end. I am told we are going to a plateau where we will encamp for the night as best we can after a journey of five or six hours."

M. Edmond About, who also contrived to reach the town on Saturday night, after a very perilous journey, thus described the state of affairs:—

"At the gates of Saverne, the panic-stricken were flying along the railway or hiding in the gardens; but some good regiments of the line were tramping in step through the streets. Their passage, calm and courageous, was not over before eleven o'clock at night. I found the little town a prey to a panic really fabulous. In the twinkling of an eye Saverne saw itself filled with the first corps, which the foe, very luckily, believed to have retired upon Bitsche. They massed themselves together where they could—those most fortunate in the houses of the townsmen; those who had brought away their knapsacks and camp equipage, under their tents; many upon the pavement, in the fields, under heaven's canopy. The night was passed in terror. If the enemy had known how to profit by the opportunity, he might have made 10,000 or 15,000 prisoners at one blow. The population was only half re-assured by the presence of troops broken-down, starved, and discomfited. Some families got off by the mail-train at mid-day, the last that went from Strassburg to Paris. Some others regained confidence in waiting for the officers, who said, "You have nothing to be afraid of so long as we are here." But on Sunday at six o'clock, upon I know not what false alarm—perhaps only because three or four scouts of the enemy were announced on the side of Steinburg—the Duc de Magenta caused the *générale* to be beaten, and Saverne thought itself lost. Whilst officers and soldiers threw themselves pell-mell upon the Phalsbourg road, three-fourths of the people went off wildly towards the neighbouring forests. The example—a sad example—was set by the gendarmes and the sergents-de-ville. The townsfolk closed the shops, piled up the furniture upon carts; some farmers drove their cattle before them as in the time of Abraham; there were incredible accumulations formed, both of men and animals, in the houses of the foresters and in the ruins of old castles.

"Poor France! She granted all and pardoned all to a man who said to her at first, 'The Empire is peace!' who said to her afterwards, 'The Empire is glory and victory, the revision of shameful treaties, the rectification of frontiers, war for principle, war for interest, war for luck, but war always successful, and the prestige of the French name always more dazzling every day! France believed all she was told; she believed in her master's 'star.' What an awakening! To-day the empire means defeat by the incapacity of its chief, panic of the generals, invasion with all its following of grief and misery, the Prussian soldier tramping triumphantly over three or four departments after a campaign of eight days!"

On Sunday the 7th the troops of the Crown Prince, following the track of the French, proceeded to Haguenau. The capture of 200 French soldiers and an enormous mass of military stores at this town, by about a dozen German dragoons, headed by a couple of young lieutenants—Von Schonau and Von Freydorf—was one of the most brilliant little episodes of the war, and illustrated the utter demoralization of the French troops. About one o'clock p.m. the first and second dragoons took possession of the town, and the two lieutenants just named, followed by a few troopers, rode off to the great barracks, which were still in the hands of some 200 French soldiers. The pair summoned the occupants to surrender, which they at once did, marching out and piling their arms.

MacMahon commenced his retreat from Saverne, westwards, on Sunday afternoon. The same evening the town was occupied by the advance troops of the Crown Prince, who with the bulk of his army afterwards pressed forward in the same direction, taking care, however, to send strong detachments to his right, either to capture or mask the fortresses of the Vosges in their way. The small hill fort of Lichtenberg was taken, after some resistance, on the 9th, and shortly after another post of some importance, commanding a pass to the westward, called La Petite Pierre by the French and Luetzelstein by the Germans, where a stout resistance was expected, was abandoned

by the French in such haste that they left large quantities of ammunition and some guns behind them. This fort is situated on the very crest of the Vosges, in a country covered with forest, and looks down from the Altenberg on the little town at its feet. Its advanced works, cut in the rock, are strengthened by thick walls, but it offered in its mass of exposed masonry a huge target to artillery fire. By capturing it the passage of the Vosges may be said to have been accomplished, and the way opened to Sarre Union, Sarre Albe, Sarre Werden, and further, to Fenestrange, Gros Tenquin, and other villages more immediately on the road to Nancy.

The Germans had, however, been compelled to mask the fortresses of Bitsche and Phalsbourg, as both refused to surrender, and in fact withstood longer sieges than any other places during the war. The first-named fort commands a main road, and also the railway from Sarreguemines to Haguenau, with its guns only a few score yards off the line. A proof of the value of even a small fortress in impeding an army, was afforded in the detours the Germans were obliged to make to avoid it. The fortress is situated about thirty miles north of Strassburg, and fifteen from Sarreguemines. The citadel stands in a valley upon a steep rock, 1000 feet above the level of the sea. The town, formerly called Kaltenhausen, nestles at the foot of the threatening cliff, near a large shallow lake, whence the Borne takes its source. The 3000 inhabitants live on the profits of the fine pottery for which they are famous, construct paper snuff-boxes, or labour in the great glassworks of Munsthal. The rock, vaulted and casemated, with four bastions and a half-moon battery, mounts eighty pieces of cannon, and has a good supply of water. Though not a Gibraltar, or even an Ehrenbreitstein, Bitsche, as the events of the war proved, is quite inpregnable to ordinary artillery.

In the détenus' time (1803–1814) the garrison consisted of seventeen gendarmes and one hundred veterans. "The place of tears," as the English prisoners during the old Napoleon war used to call it, for it was then the depôt for the lees and dregs of Verdun, is ascended on one side by a zigzag footpath, on the other by a winding carriage road. Both these roads meet at a drawbridge that communicates with an inclined plane raised upon arches, leading to a gate at the entrance to the fort, the approaches to which are swept by the fire of ten heavy guns. The entrance is by a tunnel cut through the rock, 120 feet long, with a massive gate at each end, and one in the centre. The rock is cut through in two places as low as the ditch, one extremity being called the Grosse Tête, and the other the Petite Tête, and both are connected with the body of the fort by drawbridges. On the west side there is a mortar battery. In the centre of the fort stand two large barracks, and at the two ends are storehouses and magazines. The rock is hollowed to contain the garrison and the provisions, and is divided by compartments connected by narrow passages with massive doors. There is also a subterranean passage communicating with the town below. Although the fort is of solid rock, cut down perpendicularly 90 to 150 feet, it is faced nearly all round with masonry. The place cost so much to fortify, that Louis XIV., when asked for more money to complete it, inquired with a smile if they were building it of louis-d'ors.

Phalsbourg, the other fortress which was left in the hands of the French, is on the high road from Strassburg to Paris, overlooking the hill of Saverne, and commanding the mountain defiles of the Upper Barr, the Roche Plate, the Bonne Fontaine, and the Graufthal. Its bastions, demi-lunes, and advanced outworks, extend in zigzag lines over a rocky platform. From a distance the walls appear so low that one might expect to stride over them; but on approaching nearer, further advance is stopped by the moat, 100 feet wide and 30 feet deep, beyond which are the grim ramparts, cut out of the solid rock. The buildings of the town are concealed behind the glacis, except the churches, the townhall, and the gate-houses, with their fronts shaped like a mitre, erected at the two entrances, named the Porte de France and the Porte d'Allemagne. Such is the little town of Phalsbourg. It is not without a certain grandeur of appearance, and is especially imposing when one first crosses the drawbridge, and enters by the deep and massive gateway, defended by an iron portcullis and chevaux-de-frise. The whole place has a military aspect, and is well known to all who have read Erckmann-Chatrian's charming tales of French popular life and soldiership during the wars of Napoleon I. It was here that Joseph Bertha, the conscript of 1813, lived as apprentice to the good watchmaker, M. Goulden; and his sweetheart Catherine lived

at the adjoining village of Quatre-Vents. The sufferings of the town in 1814 are vividly pourtrayed in "Le Blocus." The railroad, avoiding the rugged eminence on which the town stands, is carried some distance to the south, beyond the reach of the guns of the fort, and therefore, when the line was completely in the hands of the Germans, and in working order, the place proved much less inconvenient than would have been the case had their troops and supplies required to be taken along the main road, as in former times. The garrison was commanded by General Talhouet, and made a stout resistance on the 14th, when the town was cannonaded by the Germans. Some of the houses were burned by the shells, but the guns were too light to make any breach in the ramparts; and the place was then regularly blockaded.

In addition to capturing or masking these forts in the Vosges, the Crown Prince, on his arrival at Saverne, executed a much more important operation of a similar kind, in detaching his Baden contingent, under General Beyer, to lay siege to Strassburg—an operation which its position on the frontier, and close to the main lines of the German railways, rendered comparatively easy. The commandant, General Uhrich, resolutely rejected the summons of the besiegers, and prepared for a vigorous defence. All the approaches were barricaded, and the obstructions on the glacis cleared away. The details respecting its siege and capture are given in Chapter XVIII. Its investment so very early in the war caused no surprise; for when MacMahon, after his defeat at Woerth, retreated to Saverne, twenty miles northwest of Strassburg, he virtually abandoned that place to its fate; as his position could only secure his own retreat towards Nancy, while it could not prevent an overpowering hostile force from throwing off a comparatively small part of its strength to invest or mask the fortress, and to destroy its communications with the country on every side.

Soon after his appointment, the Badish general issued the following address to the inhabitants of Alsace:—"I have to address to you a serious word. We, your neighbours, used amicably to confer with each other in times of peace. We speak the same language. To you I appeal. Let the language of the heart, let the voice of humanity, reach you. Germany is engaged in war with France—in a war which was not desired by Germany. We were compelled to invade your land. But we regard every human life, and all property that can be spared, as a gain which is blessed by religion and by humane sentiments. We stand in the midst of war. The armed fight with the armed in honest open contest. But we will spare the unarmed civilians, the inhabitant of the towns and the villages. Maintaining severe discipline, we expect—nay, I demand it most rigorously—that the inhabitants of this country shall refrain from overt or secret hostility. To our deep sorrow we have been compelled with severe retribution to visit provocations, cruelties, and savage acts; I therefore expect that the local authorities, the clergy, the schoolmasters, will charge the communes, and the heads of families will charge their relatives and subordinates, that no hostilities be practised upon my soldiers. All misery that can be averted is a benefaction in the sight of Him who watches over mankind. I admonish you, I warn you, be mindful of this!"

The sixth German corps, which had been in the rear on the day of Woerth, was further detained by reports that De Failly, with the fifth French, having got away from Bitsche and Sarreguemines, across their front, was holding the branch railroads to the south of them, with the design of slipping round and raising the siege of Strassburg. When this sixth corps reached the city, they supplied the place of some of the original besiegers, who were moved along the great route which leads westward into the interior.

In their march across the Vosges, most of the infantry of the Crown Prince used every available path and by-road, to leave, as far as possible, all the main routes for artillery, cavalry, and baggage, but still holding them in immense force. The general scene was thus described by an eyewitness:—

"There has been a shifting of quarters from village to village since I last wrote; indeed, the army of the Crown Prince is so active, that this shifting of quarters is an almost daily occurrence. Everything is done in perfect order. The carriages are told off in a slow moving column, with mounted troopers at intervals to regulate the line of march, and when all are placed, there is a halt of a few minutes to allow the prince and his staff to pass. The style in which the troops march is such as to justify all the praise lavished on the Prussian

infantry. The usual walking pace of a good horse is considerably faster than that of an ordinary march. The prince's staff scarcely ever check that pace of their horses. Mile after mile the infantry, carrying knapsacks, coats, and cooking-tins, in the very heaviest marching order, go on in front of the horses in a six hours' march, mostly up a series of ascents, and only halt once, except for half an hour in the middle of the day. There is little talking in the ranks as they march, but the men sing, a few beginning, and the rest joining in chorus with very pretty effect. With each advance, the Prussians bring forward their field-post and their military telegraph. A more perfect system of organization it is difficult to imagine. The columns of provisions creep like great serpents over the country. The active detachments of telegraph men push on, with their light poles set up at intervals, and their slowly-decreasing coil of wire; and the field post-office brings letters to the different divisions. From side to side for many a mile, the whole country is on the move. Well may the villagers stare at the show, for they are not likely to see again so many fine horses and bright uniforms. Old and young crowd the wayside as his royal highness goes by, and doff their caps respectfully, but without any sign of welcome. It is curious to see these German Frenchmen, or rather these Gallicised Germans, dealing with the invaders. The power of understanding one another makes their intercourse much less disagreeable than might be supposed. Yet, nevertheless, there is a strong sympathy with France among the Alsatian peasants, because they have, thanks to the conscription, such a number of their sons serving in the French army. I notice that the younger folks can all speak a little French, though they answer the question of the soldiers, "Parlez vous Chassepot," with a sententious "nein," which seems to imply utter ignorance of the language referred to. Poor souls! They are very much frightened by this astounding invasion, and make the most of their rough Alsatian dialect, as a means of propitiating the new and dreaded invaders of the empire. I must say, in justice to the German troops, that this dread is founded on a notion of what might be, rather than what really happens. Beyond compulsory service in country waggons to carry wounded men or loads of hay, and compulsory sales of provisions to the military authorities, there is little to complain of. It is as with Wellington's army in Southern France in 1814, rather than as with the Allied armies in that memorable year. No invasion can be pleasant to the conquered people; but this one of 1870 is conducted on the humane principles of modern warfare. The Crown Prince of Prussia has resolved to strike only at the French government, and at the armed forces which oppose him. The consideration and gracious courtesy of his royal highness to all brought in contact with him, are quite beyond acknowledgment when one reflects on the cares which press upon his mind in this tremendous moment; and whatever may be the necessities and severities and horrors of this war, there is not a member of the Peace Society, nor a humanitarian in England, or out of it, who is more profoundly moved by the sufferings inflicted on the people, and so averse from war for its own sake, as the Crown Prince. He possesses the confidence and affection of those serving under him, and never comes in sight without their giving him the hearty cheer which cannot be simulated, and which is the most grateful sound to a leader's ear."

The following proclamation was issued by his royal highness soon after reaching French territory:—"We, general commanding the third German army, seeing the proclamation of his Majesty the king of Prussia, authorizing the generals commanding-in-chief of the several corps of the German army to frame special regulations with relation to the measures to be taken against communes and persons who may be acting in contravention of the usages of war; and with relation to the requisitions which may be judged necessary for the wants of the troops, and to fix the difference in the rate of exchange between German and French moneys—have decreed, and do decree the following regulations, which we make known to the public.

"1. Military jurisdiction is established by this decree. It will be extended to all the territory occupied by German troops, to every action tending to endanger the security of those troops, to causing them injury, or lending assistance to the enemy. Military jurisdiction will be considered as in force, and proclaimed through all the extent of a canton as soon as it is posted in any locality forming part of it.

"2. All persons not forming part of the French army, and not proving their quality as soldiers by outward signs, and who (*a*) shall serve the enemy as spies; (*b*) shall mislead the German troops when

charged to act for them as guides; (c) shall kill, wound, or rob persons belonging to the German troops, or making part of their suite; (d) shall destroy bridges or canals, damage telegraphic lines or railways, render roads impassable, set fire to munitions and provisions of war, or troops' quarters; (e) shall take up arms against the German troops—will be punished by death. In each case, the officer in command will institute a council of war, with authority to try the matter and pronounce sentence. These councils can only condemn to death. Their sentences will be executed immediately.

"3. The communes to which the culprits belong, as well as those whose territory may have been the scene of the offence, will be condemned in a penalty for each case equalling the annual amount of their taxes.

"4. The inhabitants will have to supply all necessaries for the support of the troops. Each soldier will receive daily 750 grammes of bread, 500 grammes of meat, 250 grammes of lard, 30 grammes of coffee, 60 grammes of tobacco or 5 cigars, ½ litre of wine, or 1 litre of beer, or 1-10th of brandy. The rations to be furnished daily for each horse will be six kilogrammes of oats, two kilogrammes of hay, and one and a half kilogramme of straw. In case of the inhabitants preferring an indemnity in coin to one in kind, it will be fixed at two francs each soldier daily.

"5. All commanders of detached corps will have the right to order a requisition of provisions needful to the support of their troops. The requisition of other articles judged indispensable to the army, can only be ordered by generals and officers acting as such. In all cases, nothing will be demanded of the inhabitants except what is necessary for the support of the troops, and official receipts will be given for everything supplied. We hope, therefore, that the inhabitants will not offer any obstacles to the requisitions which may be deemed necessary.

"6. With regard to individual bargains between the troops and the inhabitants, we fix as an equivalent for 1 franc, 8 silbergros or 28 kreutzers.

"The general commanding-in-chief the third German army,

"FREDERIC WILLIAM,

"Prince Royal of Prussia."

The Germans had succeeded in forcing the beaten French troops so far south, that they could only rejoin the rest of the army by taking a very circuitous route; but they still kept close after them, marching straight on to Luneville and Nancy. Their advanced troops reached the latter city—the old capital of Lorraine and one of the prettiest towns in France—on Friday, August 12, but the prince's headquarters were not established there till five days later. The town is open, and proclamations had been issued by the authorities enjoining the inhabitants to offer no resistance to the troops. There was not, however, much necessity for this, as a day or two before the arrival of the Germans, a few carriages of wounded, brought from MacMahon's corps, threw the whole town into despair; and the men who a fortnight before frantically sang the "Marseillaise" along the pretty street, were now running away and spreading alarm everywhere. Inhabitants of Saverne and similar places, arriving at Nancy on their way from the parts of the country actually occupied, deepened still more the despair and demoralization of the people of the very places which had in former times been distinguished for valour and courage. The readers of Erckmann-Chatrian's romances will remember that the action of the best of them takes place near where Marshal MacMahon lost in two battles more than 10,000 men, and whence the inhabitants now ran away as if none of them had either bone or muscle to defend their native soil. Seeing the long train of chariots loaded with peasant families, about to take their refuge in the forests between Nancy and Commercy, or the noisy groups of the bourgeois with weeping women and children assembled before some crowded hotel, unable to give them anything in the shape of a bed, one could not help thinking that either Erckmann-Chatrian had too much idealized their heroes, or that human nature had greatly changed in that part of France since the beginning of the century.

Nancy, the chief town in the department of the Meurthe, containing 40,000 inhabitants, was actually taken possession of by four German soldiers, who reached it about three o'clock in the afternoon. About half an hour later a detachment of twenty-six Germans marched through the city and took possession of the railway station; the station-master was made prisoner, but left at liberty on parole. The mayor was ordered to wait upon the German commander, encamped on the road between St. Max and Pont d'Essey. Mean-

while an officer of Uhlans followed by two orderlies galloped over the town to reconnoitre. On the mayor's return the municipal council was compelled to vote 50,000 francs to the victorious Germans, together with large rations of oats; and some of the inhabitants were compelled to tear up more than a mile of rails, from Nancy to Maxville, which the Germans flung into the canal. They also cut down the posts for the telegraphic wires.

The French troops—retreating to Châlons—had only abandoned the town at a very early hour the same morning, and much indignation was expressed in Paris at the conduct of the municipal or military authorities in not making an attempt to defend it.

As already stated, the Crown Prince himself did not reach Nancy till August 17, but three days before he had effected a junction with the other German armies at Gros Tenquin, and on the 14th, troops of both the second and the third armies occupied Pont-à-Mousson, a railway station about midway between Metz and Nancy. The third army was, therefore, now so placed as to be ready if necessary to carry out General Moltke's original design, which was to bring it on the southern flank of the French forces defending the Saar or Moselle against the first and second. As it happened, however, the combinations against the French main body had been so hurried forward by the force of events as to leave no room for the action of the Crown Prince; and having thus traced the progress of his army from the battle of Woerth to the occupation of Nancy, in pursuit of MacMahon, with the débris of his corps, to Châlons, we now leave them for awhile, and return to the remaining French corps and the first and second German armies.

After the rout of MacMahon at Woerth, the other French corps, in endeavouring to effect their junction in Lorraine, were swayed to and fro by the pressure of the enemy, and compelled to make more than one false movement in consequence of the distance between their first line on the Saar, and their second at Metz. Of the fifth French corps (De Failly's), which had lain between the armies routed at Woerth and Forbach, we know that a division arrived at Niederbronn on the afternoon of the 6th, just in time to cover the retreat of MacMahon's broken battalions upon Saverne. This division afterwards retreated by Bitsche, and ultimately effected its junction with Bazaine at Metz, but the other two divisions, finding that the defeats on both sides of them had rendered their position untenable, retreated southwards with the greatest precipitation, and was lost to view for ten of the most critical days of the campaign. After having made an immense détour, they only succeeded in joining MacMahon at Châlons on August 20. Frossard, after the rout of Forbach, had fled with the wrecks of his corps towards Metz, abandoning St. Avold and several good positions. L'Admirault, also, though as yet unassailed, but involved in the common disaster, evacuated Thionville with the fourth corps, and was in retreat towards Metz along the Moselle. Bazaine, meanwhile, with the third corps, had been directed to advance from Metz, in order to rally the forces in his front, and had taken a position upon the Nied; a step which, perhaps, could not have been avoided, but which obviously threw a considerable portion of the French army dangerously forward, and exposed it to more than one mischance. At the same time, while the imperial guard remained in camp about Metz, a part of the sixth corps of Canrobert had been moved towards the great fortress, while the remainder continued at its post at Nancy. The conduct of Canrobert at this time was very commendable; as soon as he heard of his sovereign's disasters he speedily brought up part of his troops from Châlons, and placed himself ungrudgingly at the disposal of his junior, Bazaine, who had by that time been appointed commander-in-chief. The seventh corps, that of Douay, had been left in the place it had held far to the south, and except the division which had fought at Woerth, it was still distant from the theatre of operations. Thus the German victory at Woerth had this important effect, that for nearly three weeks it completely neutralized three out of the eight corps of which the French army consisted—MacMahon's, De Failly's, and Douay's.

About three days after the battles of Woerth and Forbach, the general position of the combatants may then be thus described:—MacMahon, with his broken right wing, towards which De Failly was inclining, was completely cut off from the main body of the French; their left and centre, hardly united, were gathering in front of and at Metz, exposed to be defeated in detail, and in part advanced on a line on which they were liable, if beaten, to

serious disaster. This force, too, the principal hope of France, composed of only three intact corps, of the routed second, and of part of the sixth, numbering, perhaps, 150,000 men, with between 400 and 500 guns, was well known to be wholly unequal to the immense masses moving against it, and already victorious within the frontier. Nearly 200,000 men, from the armies of Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, were on their way from the Saar to the Nied; while to the left the Crown Prince, in communication with them, was sweeping through the passes of the Vosges, and along the highways that lead into Champagne. In these circumstances we cannot be surprised that the emperor, having fortunately succeeded in rallying a respectable force on the Nied, should have fallen back without delay on Metz, and drawn under the protection of the fortress the whole remains of his left and centre. Well would it have been had the retrograde movement then been continued; but of this more presently. In the meantime, let us trace the progress of the first and second German armies.

As stated in a previous chapter, the king of Prussia, with his advisers, arrived at Mayence on 3rd August, and took command, officially, of the whole of the German armies; but before he could reach the front the important battle of Forbach had been fought and won, and the French line on the Saar irretrievably broken.

On Sunday, 7th August, the headquarters of the king were advanced to Homburg, within fifteen miles of the French frontier, and the same night Steinmetz, commanding the right of the German line, had his headquarters a little to the north of Saarbrück, while Prince Frederick Charles was at Bliescastel, a village about ten miles due east of that town. Up to this time the advanced divisions of the Prussian right had occupied Forbach, the centre had crossed the Saar and occupied Sarreguemines, or, as the Germans call it, Saargemund; while the army of the Crown Prince had taken possession of Haguenau. Thus the whole line of the French frontier railway was in the hands of the Germans, from Haguenau, only twenty miles north of Strassburg, to Bening Merlbach, the station near Forbach, where this line is connected with that from Metz to Saarbrück.

While at Homburg the king of Prussia addressed the following proclamation to his army:—"Soldiers—Already a great portion of our army, engaged in pursuit of the enemy, thrown back after bloody combats, has passed the frontier. This day and to-morrow several corps d'armée will enter French territory. I expect that you will consider it a point of honour to distinguish yourselves in the enemy's country, above all by the excellence of discipline, of which, up to the present time, you have given a glorious example. We do not make war on the peaceable inhabitants of France; and the first duty of a loyal soldier is to protect private property, to preserve intact the high reputation of our army, and to prevent its being soiled by one solitary act even of want of discipline. I count on the elevated spirit which animates the army; and I rely no less on the severity and watchfulness of all its chiefs.

"WILLIAM.

"Headquarters, Homburg,
"*8th August*, 1870."

Prince Frederick Charles and General von Steinmetz addressed similar proclamations to the soldiers:—"Show, by the uprightness of your behaviour to friend and foe, that you are worthy children of Prussia. Show that you belong to an army which represents the cultivation of the century, by decent and friendly behaviour, by moderation and respect for foreign property, whether of friend or foe. Each one of you is responsible for the honour and reputation of the whole Fatherland."

The French had left Saargemund only about twelve hours before the Germans entered it. A young lieutenant of the Brunswick Hussars had orders to patrol towards the town with a couple of his men. As he approached it, to his astonishment he saw no signs of French troops; and with the audacity of youth he cantered into it, followed by his two hussars. He reined up opposite the market-place, inquiring the nearest way to the burgomaster's house, which was pointed out to him. In the meantime a crowd had collected, who began to give some indications of hostile designs. He had his revolver in his hand, when one of the peasants said, "What's the good of that? He dare not fire at us." "Daren't I?" replied the hussar, at the same time levelling his pistol and firing over the man's head, which so intimidated the townsfolk, that they instantly cheered him. He then proceeded to the burgomaster, and demanded quarters for two infantry regiments and a battery of artillery, which he expected would shortly enter the town. This

granted, he sent one of his hussars back to his regiment, about five miles off, with the intelligence that the place was empty, and in two hours the Brunswick Hussars, trotting into it, proclaimed it a captured town. The lieutenant, a mere boy, named Herr von Kœnig, was for these two hours entirely at the mercy of 1000 inhabitants at the least.

The advance of all the German armies towards the Moselle could not, of course, on all points of their extended lines be equally rapid. After invading France and making good their stand in the country, their forces were disposed, as we have seen, between Forbach and Haguenau, forming a line which stretched east-south-east. The Moselle between Metz and Nancy flowing straight south and north, a portion of the troops, of course, found themselves considerably nearer the river than the rest. Their first or northernmost army, under General Steinmetz, was in closer proximity to the stream than the second, under Prince Frederick Charles; the third, under the Crown Prince, being the most distant of all, and, moreover, separated from the Moselle by the most difficult ground. As it was expected that the French would try to concentrate their forces as soon as possible, and make another stand in the favourable position on the banks of the Nied between Metz and Marsal, orders were given to the different German armies to time their advance, so as to remain in close contact with each other, and form gradually into a straight continuous line. While their whole cavalry were keeping almost in sight of the enemy, the three armies followed so closely as to prevent the French from forming again, notwithstanding that violent storms had swelled the streams and made the roads heavy. The French army had also exhausted the resources of the country, and fresh supplies had to be brought up from Germany. The king had commanded that every German soldier billeted upon a French household was to be fed by his host; but only in very few cases could the German soldier get from his French entertainer the 750 grammes of bread, 500 grammes of meat, 250 grammes of bacon, 30 grammes of coffee, 60 grammes of tobacco, and half a litre of wine, which he was authorized to demand daily. Mostly he lived upon the biscuit, bacon, beef, and coffee provided by the military authorities, and in some cases the French inhabitants themselves had to be fed by the German commissariat to prevent absolute starvation. An important help in victualling the troops was afforded by a novel description of food used in China. It consisted of the pease pudding, for centuries employed in keeping body and soul together among the Celestials; a cheap article that does not deteriorate for a length of time, and contains a large quantity of nutritious matter in a small compass. To make it more palatable the Germans improved upon the Chinese pattern by mixing smoked meat, chopped up small, with the pease. Whether boiled or cold it is equally good, and a small quantity will suffice a man for a day.

On Wednesday, August 10, the first army, forming the right of the German position, was at Les Etangs, a village on the left bank of the Nied, about nine miles east by north of Metz, and here they halted for a short time. The second army, meanwhile, were circling round towards the Moselle, south of Metz, to the chief points of passage, Pont à-Mousson, Pagny, and Corny. On Saturday morning, the 13th, the Prussian infantry compelled a French battalion to withdraw in all haste from the first-named town, the largest on the Moselle between Nancy and Metz, and afterwards took possession of it. A proclamation was issued the moment possession was taken, promising security to the inhabitants on certain conditions:—1. All arms to be given up at the Mairie within two hours, each arm labelled with the name of the owner, that it might be restored to him at some future period. It was added, that after the expiration of two hours, patrols would visit every house, when, if arms were discovered, the occupier would be treated "with all the severity of the military law. 2. No groups to be formed in the streets. 3. Shutters to be kept open, blinds drawn up. 4. The inhabitants to supply troops marching through the town with water. 5. No impediment to be offered to the advance of the troops. "Any one offering impediments of any kind," concluded the proclamation, "will be at once taken and shot." It was not thought necessary to visit the houses; and it was, indeed, improbable, in the face of such a proclamation, that any arms would be retained. Most, however, of the population capable of bearing arms had disappeared before the arrival of the Germans, and it may be presumed that they did not leave their arms behind.

A reference to a map will show, that during the

week of which we have been treating, the whole German army had pivoted upon its right, wheeling as a column wheels upon a fixed point; and the centre advanced at a slower pace than the left, till the line which, on Wednesday the 10th, ran from Les Etangs, in a south-east direction, through Foligny, Faulquemont, Gros Tenquin, Fenestrange, and Saarburg, on Saturday the 13th ran from Les Etangs to Pont-à-Mousson, Frouard, and Nancy, while the headquarters of the king were fixed in rear of the right centre of the line at Herny, a station on the railway from Metz to Forbach. His Majesty had entered France by way of Saarbrück, on leaving which he addressed the following proclamation to the French people—a proclamation which was very often referred to after the capitulation of the emperor and his army at Sedan, to prove that the German ideas with regard to the war had then materially changed:—

"We, William, king of Prussia, make known the following to the inhabitants of the French territories occupied by the German armies.

"The Emperor Napoleon having made by land and by sea an attack on the German nation, which desired, and still desires, to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command of the German armies to repel this aggression, and I have been led by military circumstances to cross the frontiers of France. I am waging war against soldiers, not against French citizens. The latter, consequently, will continue to enjoy security for their persons and property, so long as they themselves shall not by hostile attempts against the German troops deprive me of the right of according them my protection. By special arrangements, which will be duly made known to the public, the generals commanding the different corps will determine the measures to be taken towards the communes or individuals that may place themselves in opposition to the usages of war. They will, in like manner, regulate all that concerns the requisitions which may be deemed necessary for the wants of the troops, and they will fix the rate of exchange between French and German currencies in order to facilitate the individual transactions between the troops and the inhabitants."

His Majesty, exercising the rights of war, also abolished the conscription in the French territories occupied by his armies; forbidding the inhabitants to render military service to his enemy. It was, of course, hardly to be expected that he should allow the French government to levy soldiers in the rear of his army.

His Majesty left Saarbrück on the 11th, and on the following day his headquarters were fixed at St. Avold, the walls of which were placarded with proclamations from him and General von Alvensleben, the commandant of the town, to the effect that, Prussia being at war only with the soldiers of France, the troops were to pay for whatever they took, and that any attempt at plundering would be most severely punished. "Several of the inhabitants have assured me," said a reliable correspondent, "that not only are they well treated by the soldiers, but that they prefer Prussian to French troops, the latter being none too careful of the distinction between *meum* and *tuum*. The only difficulty I have heard of is about the Prussian money, the soldiers not understanding sous and centimes, and the inhabitants thalers and silbergroschen. In the garden of the house in which I am quartered, or, to speak more correctly, in which I have quartered myself, not a flower has been picked, not a bed trodden upon, and there are some plums and apples which must look singularly tempting to the men after a long march. I know of only one way of putting these German soldiers out of temper, and that is to hint that peace will be made before they get into Paris. This they seem to look on as quite a reflection on the army, and they resent it accordingly. At present, in spite of the wet weather and the hard fighting, the men all look well and hearty, and tramp away under their heavy kits, as if they already saw the towers of Notre Dame."

A good proof of the utter defeat of the French at the battle of Forbach was found by the Germans in the fact, that although extensive preparations had been made beforehand to defend St. Avold, they did not find it practicable to avail themselves of this advantage, but turned their troops off in another direction. Had they thrown themselves into St. Avold, they must have stopped the German advance for a day at least. The hills near the place were studded with rifle pits, and a large farmyard, with solid wall, which has absolute command of the road from St. Avold to Metz, had been converted into a little fortress, and if properly defended would have cost many lives. This surrender of a strong and well-fortified position is sufficiently accounted for by the experience of the French generals at Forbach and

Saarbrück. As we know, the ground from Forbach to Saarbrück had been carefully got into order for defence. Earthworks had been thrown up in positions already strengthened by nature; everywhere arrangements had been carefully made to force the Germans to fight exposed to full fire from the French. Hence their unbounded astonishment at seeing the Germans scaling the acclivities without firing a shot or uttering a sound; and when they knew that after having reached the summit of the hills near Saarbrück, and from the deepest silence breaking out into loud hurrahs, they fired a volley and then took to the bayonet, the French doubtless thought it useless to occupy the fortified hills of St. Avold.

Considerable as the stream of the Moselle is, the German army possessed bridge-trains amply sufficient for several passages of it; and the temptation was great to surprise Bazaine by advancing both wings of their army at once, so as to unite them on his communications with Paris through Verdun, and shut him off with the emperor from the rest of France. Yet this plan, though presenting brilliant prospects, also offered great chances to a resolute adversary who might divine it in time; which would have secured to the French the cover of the fortress to which they evidently clung, and from which no direct attack, short of a siege, could possibly have forced them. It seemed easier therefore to manœuvre them from under its shelter, and deal with them in the open field; and for this purpose, as we have seen, the bridge and road through Pont-à-Mousson, twenty miles higher up, lay conveniently placed. Accordingly, on the 14th the German army made a general movement by its left in a south-westerly direction on Pont-à-Mousson. To cover this the more effectually, General von Steinmetz, whose army was to the left of that of Prince Frederick Charles, was directed to make a demonstration against Bazaine's troops, then lying partly between him and Metz, as well as all round the face of the eastern side of the fortress. A severe action (the particulars of which are fully given in the next chapter) was the result, in which half of the seventh corps, first engaging the French right wing, and supported by successive divisions of the Prussians, forced the French from an intrenched position back to the cover of the outworks of Metz. Meanwhile, the passage of other corps went on steadily by Pont-à-Mousson, and they were distributed on the further side of the Moselle so as to prepare for an advance westward.

Leaving the German armies for a short time, we now turn to see what had been going on at the French headquarters.

When the double defeats of Forbach and Woerth became fully known there, it was felt by the emperor and by those around him, that an immediate change of leaders was among the steps urgently necessary to restore confidence to the troops, disheartened not more by the news than by the general retreat that immediately followed. Marshal Lebœuf, too hastily raised to the rank he had done nothing to earn—and who was looked upon as the principal cause of the reverses—was at once put aside; and as the emperor also desired to give up the chief command of the army, the great object was the appointment of a leader popular enough to inspire confidence, and who would not hesitate to take such a serious responsibility. Changarnier, the old and tried general of Africa, had in the meantime arrived at Metz. He came in the moment of danger to offer his sword to the monarch who had signed his imprisonment in 1848, and sent him into exile; and he brought the services of his rare experience to the *patrie en danger*. He was handsomely received by the emperor, and from that moment took a great interest in the council of war, and exerted a genial influence over its decisions.

At a meeting of the chefs-de-corps, to discuss the appointment of a new général-en-chef, the emperor presided; and after a few remarks on the reasons which had induced him to resign his command, he urged his lieutenants to put aside all feeling of ambition, in presence of the grave events which had occurred, and of the great task they had to fulfil; for himself, he was determined not to influence their decision in the least: and after those few sentences, the emperor buried silently his face in his hands, and waited, without adding a word, for the nomination of his successor to the command-in-chief of the armée du Rhin.

According to the Comte de Chapelle, the meeting was a stormy one. He says the favourites of the court and those egotistical men, the generals *de salon* of the second empire, could not entertain the idea of giving up their prospects of ambition and be commanded by Marshal Bazaine, for whom some of them had not much respect. But Changarnier's resistance overcame the petty intrigues,

and Bazaine was appointed to the supreme command of the armée du Rhin, in conjunction with MacMahon, who was to take the command-in-chief of his own corps, of the corps De Failly, Félix Douay, and of the new columns in formation at Châlons.

It is difficult to see how any other choice could have been made. MacMahon had more than enough upon his hands in saving the relics of his beaten corps. Canrobert was still at Châlons, and moreover had decidedly failed in the Crimea as a commander-in-chief; the part being ill-suited to a man who, though of high courage, lacked utterly the firmness necessary to keep his subordinates in order, and his troops up to the full measure of their work. Bazaine was the only remaining marshal. He was the youngest and most active officer of that high rank, and had never during his arduous service in Mexico made a serious mistake, or let his men decline in their necessary discipline. The command, therefore, on being resigned by the emperor, seemed to fall most naturally to him; and the difficulty arising out of MacMahon's previous high services and seniority was, as we have seen, got over by leaving him as an independent commander-in-chief, subject only to the ministry at Paris.

As we shall not find a more suitable place, we may here give a few particulars of the previous career of the general thus raised to the command of the French army, and whose portrait is annexed. He was born at Versailles in 1811, of a family well known in the annals of French engineering, both military and civil. He pursued his studies with remarkable intelligence till the age of twenty, when he felt an irresistible vocation for the military career, and engaged himself as a volunteer in a regiment of the line. He had no reason to regret this engagement, for in two years (1833) he was appointed sub-lieutenant, and in this capacity was sent to Africa, where he passed a couple of years in constant activity, and distinguished himself in a high degree by his talent and bravery. In 1835 he was present at the famous combat of La Machta, and was made chevalier of the Legion of Honour for having, notwithstanding his severe wounds, ably sustained the retreat of his column. As soon as he recovered he joined the French auxiliary division in Spain, and took an active part in those campaigns against the Carlists in Catalonia which raised so highly the renown of the French Foreign Legion, composed of volunteers of all nations, but commanded by French officers. Among such discordant elements the young lieutenant not only reaped new laurels, but also succeeded in gaining the respect and affection of his comrades. On returning to Algeria in 1839 with the rank of captain, he took part in the expeditions to Morocco, Khabylia, and Sahara, and assisted in the capture of Millianah. At this date the corps of the celebrated chasseurs de Vincennes was organized; and as the most difficult tasks were thenceforth to be confided to the picked men forming the first battalion of that afterwards famous branch of the French army, Bazaine was appointed to the command of a company, and carried off the officers' prize as the best shot in a rifle contest. The next twelve years were passed in constant fighting and gradual promotion in Africa, where he rose to the rank of colonel in 1851. Three years later he embarked, as brigadier-general, in the Crimean expedition, and co-operated in all the principal undertakings during the long and glorious siege of Sebastopol. He also commanded the French portion of the division which reduced Kinburn. He was frequently mentioned with distinction in the commander-in-chief's reports; and on the 8th of September, 1855, after having been seriously wounded in the assault of Sebastopol, was appointed general of division and governor of Sebastopol, a post he occupied till the return of the French troops to their native country. Several honourable military positions were subsequently confided to him. In 1859 he crossed the Alps as commander of the third division of the first corps d'armée. At Marignan he covered himself with glory, having resisted for an entire day the constant attacks of an enemy in great force. Here he was again wounded, and had the honour of being mentioned in the order of the day by the Emperor Napoleon; but in spite of his sufferings he was found in the thickest of the melée at the decisive battle of Solferino, where he again attracted the approbation of his sovereign.

When the French expedition was despatched to Mexico, in 1862, General Bazaine received the command of the first division of infantry under General Forey. In October of the following year Forey was recalled, and Bazaine advanced to the chief command. In July, 1863, he led his army into the city of Mexico, and commenced a series of vigorous operations in order to expel President Juarez, whom he drove to the frontier of the

republic, and whom he apparently believed he had expelled. This, at least, is the only assumption on which a number of executions of duly commissioned officers of the republic, who had been taken prisoners in regular war, can be explained. This return to practices worthier of a semi-savage Hispano-American settlement than of the magnanimous French people was the more regrettable, inasmuch as it was afterwards made the excuse for the execution of the unhappy Maximilian, whose death was said to be a just reprisal for similar murders committed under the French occupation in his name. General Bazaine did not maintain a good understanding with the Emperor Maximilian, who at length avoided him, to follow a course dictated by a sentiment of personal honour. The tragical end of the enterprise is known. The French marched for Vera Cruz, after Bazaine had called the Mexican notables together, and told them that it was impossible to maintain the empire, and that the war against Juarez was without object and without hope. On his return his conduct was severely criticized in French journals and periodicals, but the emperor consistently protected him. As early as 1856 he had been made commander of the Legion of Honour; in 1862 he was promoted to the dignity of a grand cross of the Legion, and soon afterwards, in 1864, was presented with the bâton of a field marshal. On his return home, in 1867, he first had the command of the third corps d'armée, and afterwards that of the imperial guard.

Possibly an instinctive feeling of the emperor, that it was unsafe to leave an absolutely supreme control in the hands of one of so decided a character as Bazaine, and so tempt him to play a part of his own in the coming events, may have influenced the decision, and outweighed the known evils of a divided command. Napoleon knew his great uncle's maxim, that one indifferent commander in the field is better than two good ones. Possibly he also remembered that, in the earlier Peninsular campaigns, the first Napoleon subordinated this truth to the supposed political necessity of not confiding too much in any single general; and in imitating his practice, for the like reason, he forgot the warning example of the French defeats that followed. For good or for ill, the original army of the Rhine was henceforward to be under two commanders, on whose exact co-operation its safety, in the face of superior forces, necessarily depended.

According to the official telegrams published at the time, Bazaine received the command of the four corps (second, third, fourth, and guards) at Metz, to which was soon after added the bulk of the sixth, moved up by Canrobert from Châlons, with a number of newly raised battalions, on the first cry of the emperor for reinforcements on Tuesday, August 9; but it will be seen from a defence of his conduct, published by himself, and of which we have given an abstract at the end of Chapter XII., that he evidently wished it to be inferred he was not responsible for the movements of the entire army till Sunday, August 13. Be that as it may, the French had now to resolve at once the great question whether the line of the Moselle should be held. The temptation to pivot round Metz for this purpose was great in a tactical point of view; but the danger of being outflanked and shut in by vastly superior forces, should MacMahon and De Failly, who were retreating rapidly to the west, not halt on the same line to support them, was imminent and certain, and over their forces those in command at Metz had no control. Yet the fatal course was adopted of waiting until the Germans actually mustered their strength before them, regardless of the possibility that the south part of the Moselle line would probably soon be left undefended.

On the 14th of August, after six most precious days had been wasted, Bazaine came to the conclusion that it was too serious a responsibility to attempt to hold his position unsupported. He therefore persuaded the emperor to depart for Châlons, and put three of his corps across the Moselle. But part of the third and the whole of the fourth were still on the eastern bank, and with the same reckless improvidence shown by the French staff fifty-seven years before at Leipzig, the retreat was conducted slowly over the regular bridge of the town. Nothing was done to facilitate the passage; so that it would not have been completed that day, even had not Steinmetz's attack with Manteuffel's corps to the south of the fortress delayed these rear corps still longer, and given ample time to develop the flank movement on Pont-à-Mousson, by which Von Moltke was preparing to pass the river.

Before leaving Metz the emperor issued the following proclamation:—

"In leaving you to combat the invasion I confide the defence of this great city to your

patriotism. You will not allow the foreigner to possess himself of this Boulevard of France, and you will rival the army in courage and devotedness. I shall ever feel grateful for the reception given me within your walls, and I hope in happier times to return to thank you for your noble conduct.

"IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, METZ,
"*August* 14, 1870."

The emperor left the city at half past three on Sunday afternoon, August 14, for Longueville, near Metz, where he went to the house of Colonel Hènocque, his staff encamping on the lawn. Always well informed, the Prussians formed the project of carrying off his Majesty. Hiding themselves during the night in the little thickets round the Château Frescati and the neighbouring farms, they sent a squadron of Uhlans across the railroad, while they opened fire on the village of Moulins, situated to the left of Longueville, in order to intercept all aid. Fortunately for the emperor, the French engineers blew up the railway bridge under this fire, and the Uhlans being cut off, and finding a strong force at Longueville, surrendered. The next night the emperor passed at Gravelotte in the house of a farmer named Plaisant, and at four a.m. he got into an open chaise with the prince imperial and drove away, taking the valley the most remote from the Moselle, as the Prussian gunners were already getting in motion. It had been found necessary to protect the retreat by a strong escort, but no one except the imperial party had anything to eat this morning. Even the horses were not fed, but had managed to crop a little grass in the fields during the night. On they rode, however, the long escort winding its way along the hills which the road follows there. The composition of the escort was, first, a regiment of chasseurs d'Afrique by fours, keeping a sharp look out; next, a peloton of cent gardes; next the emperor, and his staff; another peloton of cent gardes, three imperial carriages, then four cent gardes, and the regiment of the dragoons de l'Impératrice. The emperor passed through Conflans, breakfasted at Etain, and entered Verdun without further molestation. At this moment Bazaine was engaged in checking the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and Marshal Steinmetz. A staff officer galloped into Verdun with the news, but the emperor had just left by train for Châlons with the prince imperial, and hardly any escort. At the station he asked for a train. "Sire," said the station master, "I have nothing to offer you but a third class carriage." "I will content myself with that," replied the emperor, who took his seat as he found it, refusing a cushion from his carriage. He asked for a glass of wine, and got it in the glass he had just used at breakfast. The prince imperial, who was greatly fatigued, washed his hands and face with water from the same glass, using his handkerchief for a towel. On the morning of the 17th the emperor and his son reached Châlons.

When the war broke out it was expected that the presence of the prince imperial would enlist the sympathies of all on behalf of the imperial family, but it soon had a contrary effect. The cruelty of uselessly exposing the poor child to such unnecessary danger, hardships, and privations, was severely criticized; and the emperor was compared to one of those female beggars who carry about a half-clad infant on a cold day, to provoke the compassion of passers by. It was said, "C'est touchant, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

After this invasion of only eight days by the German troops, France had already a third of her army scattered; her generals had abandoned Alsace and the passes of the Vosges, her emperor had been compelled to leave Metz, with the army of the enemy close to the fortifications, double the number of his own. Paris was in deep wrath at the course events had taken. Steadily and surely the dark-blue columns of the Germans had marched onwards, covering the eastern departments, and pushing their way into the heart of France. The whole army moved with the unity of a single will. Without noise, without haste, but without halting for a moment unnecessarily, it seemed bent on accomplishing a preconceived design, and proved that the plan of the campaign was settled before a hostile column had entered upon French territory, for it bore in every step of its progress the impress of a single mind. The effect was enhanced by the contrast presented by the armies of the defence. From the beginning of the war their movements were distracted, their attempts purposeless, and their efforts consequently without effect. One wing did not know the design of the other, and an object was proposed only to be abandoned as soon as anything was done towards attaining it. At Paris, too, as has been shown in the previous chapter, great mis-

takes had been committed. Had General Trochu been appointed dictator when the news of the first French disasters reached the capital, as he would most probably have been had the Corps Législatif contained fewer nominees of the Tuileries, or had Paris not been stricken for once with an excess of moderation, there might have been an appreciable chance for the country. As it was, the interests of the Napoleonic dynasty and those of the nation were everywhere clashing, until time, which should have been counted by seconds, was wasted by days. The single prospect for France after the fatal demoralization produced by Woerth and Forbach (demoralization which spread with almost inconceivable rapidity, till, as already stated, even in central France authority seemed paralyzed, and villagers far from the war rushed helplessly to the mountains), was to concentrate power in one strong hand; to abandon Metz to a determined garrison, with orders to perish there, but to employ 50,000 Germans while they were perishing; to withdraw the whole army of the Rhine to Châlons; to urge forward to that point every soldier in Paris, Lyons, the centre, and the south; to fill all weakened battalions with gardes mobiles, who under vigorous regimental control would be twice as efficient; to bring up every gun the trains could carry; and then to fight, on the best-known exercising ground in France, the first grand battle of the Republic. Could that policy have been carried out at once and with revolutionary energy, the penalty for slackness, disobedience, or cowardice being certain death, Bazaine might have had 300,000 efficients at Châlons, might have stopped the tide of invasion, and revived once more the spirits of the people, now sinking under the feeling that to fight for France was also to fight for the emperor. Unhappily the Chamber in the decisive moment shrank from extremities; a compromise was accepted between the dynasty and the country; and effort was almost paralyzed by the necessity of aiming at a double purpose. Had the plan here indicated been adopted, at least ten days would have been gained for the organization of new levies, who would have fought well in an entrenched position with Paris and all France behind them; for the Prussians would have found the difficulties of advance increasing with every yard, having to drag behind them a lengthening chain. The fortresses of Metz, Toul, Verdun, Thionville, Bitsche, and Phalsbourg would have taken 80,000 troops to mask or besiege; and their one railway being interrupted by the garrison of Toul, the Prussian trains and supplies must have moved slowly.

The emperor's own explanation of his conduct at this period, as given in "Campagne de 1870: des causes qui ont amené la capitulation de Sedan," which we have already referred to, is that after the battles of Woerth and Forbach he became profoundly depressed on finding all his combinations destroyed; and driven at once to abandon all thoughts of any but a defensive position, he resolved immediately to lead back his army to the camp of Châlons, where it might have gathered together the débris of Marshal MacMahon's army, Failly's corps, and that of Douay. This plan, when communicated to Paris, was at first approved by the Council of Ministers; but two days afterwards a letter from M. E. Ollivier informed the emperor that, upon mature consideration, the council had decided that it had been too hasty in sanctioning the retreat of the army upon Châlons, since the abandonment of Lorraine could not fail to produce a deplorable effect on the public mind; in consequence, he advised the emperor to renounce his project, and to this counsel he yielded!

The effective force of the army of Metz was brought up to 140,000 by the arrival of Marshal Canrobert with two divisions and the reserve, and it received orders for its concentration around Metz, in the hope that it might be able to fall upon one of the Prussian armies before they had effected their junction.

Unfortunately, as if in this campaign all the elements of success were to be denied to the French, not only was the concentration of the army retarded by the combat at Spicheren and by bad weather; but its action was paralyzed by the absolute ignorance which existed concerning the position and the strength of the hostile armies. So well did the Prussians conceal their movements behind the formidable shelter of cavalry which they deployed before them in all directions, that, notwithstanding the most persevering inquiries, it was never really known where the mass of their troops was, nor, in consequence, where the chief efforts of the French should be directed. On the 14th of August, as also on the 16th, no one imagined that the whole Prussian army had to be dealt with; no one doubted at Gravelotte that

Verdun could easily be reached on the morrow. At Paris they were no better informed.

These melancholy openings of the campaign must, naturally enough, have affected public opinion in a painful manner. The emperor felt that he was held responsible for the wretched situation of the army, whilst that army was charging Marshal Lebœuf with the delays and with the insufficiency of the organization. He decided, therefore, to give the command to Marshal Bazaine, whose ability was recognized on all sides, and to suppress the functions of the post of major-general.

Whilst these events were taking place several generals implored the emperor to leave the army, pointing out that it might happen that communication with Paris would be cut off, and that then, locked up in Metz and separated from the rest of France, the head of the state would be incapacitated for conducting the affairs of the country, or of giving them proper direction, and that revolutionary agitations might arise from this situation. These considerations had an indisputable weight which did not escape the emperor, who, however, did not wish to leave the army until it had recrossed the Moselle on to the left bank. This movement, of which Marshal Bazaine fully appreciated the importance, the emperor hurried on as much as possible; but the bad weather, and the encumbrance of baggage, delayed its prompt execution. Arrived at Gravelotte, the emperor, not foreseeing a general battle, and only looking for partial engagements, which might retard the march of the army, decided to precede it to Châlons.

Leaving the contending forces in their respective positions in and around Metz until the commencement of the next chapter, we shall conclude this with a description of that city and fortress, which will serve to explain the accompanying plan, and is warranted by the exceedingly important events of the war which took place in connection with it.

The town was the capital of the French department of Moselle, and is distant 228 miles from Paris, 20 from the frontier towards Saarlouis, its German counterpart on the Saar, but 40 from the frontier at Saarbrück and Sarreguemines. It was well known to the Romans, and six of their great military roads met at the spot. They called the place, surrounded by vine-clad hills, Divodurum; but by the half German tribe known as the Mediomatrici, the name of the strong fort on the Moselle was corrupted, about the fifth century, into Mettis, and eventually it slid easily into Metz, or Mess, as it is now pronounced. Grey old Roman walls remain here and there; near the southern outworks are fragments of an amphitheatre and naumachia (for small sham sea-fights); and a great aqueduct once stretched away southward, of which 17 gigantic arches still remain out of 168. Metz was much troubled about A.D. 70 by Vitellius, and in 452 by Attila, whose Huns sacked, burned, and destroyed everything portable, consumable, and destructible. At the death of Clovis the city became the capital of the kingdom of Austrasia, and later the capital of Lorraine. In 988 it was made a free imperial town, and became a self-supporting neutral fortress on the border of Charlemagne's old domains.

Metz played an important part in the wars between Maurice of Saxony and Charles V. The French, as allies of Maurice, marched into Lorraine in 1552, and took Toul and Verdun. The Constable Montmorency, having artfully obtained permission to pass through Metz with a small guard, quibbled about the word "small," and took advantage of it to introduce troops enough to capture the strong city. Charles almost immediately advanced to besiege Metz, to which Francisco of Lorraine, duke of Guise, had already been sent by Henry II. to direct the operations of its 66,000 inhabitants. This brave, sagacious, and ambitious prince had brought with him Condé, several princes of the blood, and many noblemen of rank, as volunteers to aid in the chivalrous defence against 100,000 Germans.

The duke found the town in a confused and helpless state. The suburbs were large, the walls in places weak, and without ramparts. The ditch was narrow, the old towers stood at too great a distance apart. He at once ordered the suburbs to be pulled down, with the monasteries or churches, not even sparing St. Arnulph, where several French kings had been interred; the holy robes and the sacred remains being, however, all removed in solemn processions. The duke and his officers laboured with their own hands in pulling down the old houses that impeded the fire from the walls. The magazines were filled with provisions and military stores, the mills in the nearest villages burnt, and all the corn and forage removed or destroyed. The young duke created such enthusiasm in the town, that the people were longing

to see the enemy's banners approaching; and the moment the duke of Alva and the marquis of Marignano, Charles' generals, appeared, the inhabitants attacked the vanguard with great success. The sallies of the French were so hot and incessant, indeed, that the duke had frequently to hide the keys of the gate to prevent the young French gallants, his companions, from too rashly and frequently exposing their lives. Behind every breach made by the German cannon new works immediately sprang up. It was now October, but Charles, against the advice of his generals, determined to press the tedious siege on through the winter, in spite of the incessant rain and snow. He himself, though ill with the gout, was brought from Thionville to Metz to urge forward the batteries. Provisions now became scarce, for the French cavalry were cutting off the convoys, and disease was spreading among the Italians and Spaniards, who formed part of the besieging forces, and were suffering from the climate.

Charles, maddened at the delay, ordered a general assault; but the discouraged army, seeing the troops of the enemy eager for the combat, refused to advance, and the emperor, protesting that they were unworthy of the name of men, retired angrily to his quarters. He then tried the slower and more secure way of sapping; but the duke of Guise sunk counter-mines, and everywhere stopped his advance. After fifty-six days before the town, the emperor at last reluctantly consented to retire: 30,000 men had fallen by the enemy's steel and lead, or by the invisible sword of the pestilence. The French, when they broke out of Metz, found the imperial camp full of the dead and dying. The old Porte des Allemands on the east of the town still bears traces of the emperor's cannon shot. The city was finally secured to France by the peace of Westphalia in 1648. When Blucher passed it in 1814 he merely left a Prussian division to watch it.

Metz was not only the strongest inland fortress in France, but possessed one of the largest artillery arsenals, with a cannon foundry, and the principal school for the instruction of French military engineers and military officers. Owing to its position upon a rising ground and several islands, the whole nearly surrounded by the confluent waters of the Moselle and the Seille, which joins the Moselle just below the town, it is most favourable to military defence. It was, in fact, the centre of the permanent defence of France between the Meuse and the Rhine. In a war with Germany it was the French Mayence. As just stated, its position is one of the best on which a great stronghold could be placed—at the junction of two rivers. A fortress on a river where communications cross, not only fulfils the condition of security, but commands both banks, and gives opportunities for attacking the enemy that attempts to pass the stream. It is also more difficult to invest, from the necessity of constructing and maintaining bridges above and below it. Metz, on the west, is washed by the Moselle, which makes a bend, and then traverses the town, where it is crossed by fifteen bridges. The Seille enters the place on the south, diverging into two branches, one of which flows between the ramparts, while the other runs through the town. This abundance of water became an important element in the defence of the fortress. By closing the sluices of the Seille the waters could be raised twenty-four feet, so as to form a lake more than six miles in extent. There are nine gates to the town, and as many draw-bridges. The enceinte was planned by Vauban, and continued by Marshal Belleisle. The chief works in advance of the enceinte are the Double Couronne works of Moselle and Belle-Croix (constructed by Cormontaigne, one of the greatest masters of the art of fortification which France ever possessed), and considered his *chef d'œuvre.*

The main works have been often increased and strengthened since his time, but his principle has not been much interfered with. Cormontaigne resided at Thionville, and reconstructed most of the fortifications in this part of France. Improving upon Vauban's system, he carried the salient point of the ravelin—that two-faced, wedge-like work, which is opposite the curtain, in front of the tenailles—much further out. By this construction it became impossible for an enemy to ascend the glacis of a bastion until he had got possession of the two collateral ravelins, owing to the fire which might be directed from these upon his approaches; thus the time necessary for conducting a siege was increased.

It will be noticed in the plan that two bridges, the Pont des Morts and Pont Tiffroy, lead from the town proper to the Place de France, in the northern suburb. Here are vast ranges of barracks, magazines, and military store-houses, with an hospital to accommodate 1500 patients. Behind

PLAN of METZ and its FORTIFICATIONS.

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No.	Building	Square
1	Practical School of Artillery & Engineering	C D 3
2	School of Artillery	E 4
3	Artillery Barrack	F 3
4	Engineers Barrack	C 4
5	Engineer Arsenal	C D 6
6	Arsenal of the Citadel	C 4
7	Coislin Barrack	D 5
8	Barracks	D E 1 & E 4
9	Head Quarters	D 4
10	Intendance	C 5
11	Magazines	B 4 D E & F 1
12	Hospital	E 1

PUBLIC BUILDINGS

No.	Building	Square
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14	Hotel de Ville	D 4
15	Palais de Justice	C 3
16	Library Museums	E 4
17	Imperial College	D E 3
18	Zoological Gardens	E 4
19	Market	D 3
20	Theatre	D 3
21	St Nicolas Hospital	C 5
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23	Prison	C 4
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25	Tobacco Factory	D 2
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CHURCHES &c

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27	Episcopal Palace	C 4
28	Cathedral	D 3
29	Church of St Maximin	D 5
30	St Eucaire	E 5
31	Ste Segolene	E 4
32	St Martin	C 4
33	St Vincent	E 3
34	Notre Dame	D 4
35	St Clement	E 3
36	St Simon	E 1
37	Seminary	C 5
38	Protestant Church	E 4
39	Synagogue	E 4



these, extending to the water's edge at each end, and entirely closing this side of the town, is the twofold series of ramparts, called the Double Couronne de Moselle, built in 1728. It is an intricate arrangement of walls and ditches, in various angles more or less projecting, so placed as to cover and protect each other, and to afford the garrison ready communication between all parts of the interior, while combining their artillery to destroy the assailant outside. The fosses, or moats, can be kept full of water from the river at each end. The road to Thionville, accessible from the Pont Tiffroy, passes out through these fortifications to the open country. It was by this gate that the Emperor Napoleon, with the prince imperial and his suite, escaped from Metz on Sunday afternoon, the 14th of August, when a portion of his army was actually fighting with the Prussians about three miles away, on the other side of the city. There is another strong fort towards the farther extremity of the Ile Chambière; but the most conspicuous and important feature in the fortifications on the eastern side is the Double Couronne de Bellecroix. This complicated range of massive bulwark is even more stupendous than the one just noticed at the Thionville gates. It extends like a crest along the ridge of the hill which rises from the right bank of the river Seille, just above its confluence with the Moselle. The Bellecroix fortifications would be an almost insurmountable obstacle to any attack from the direction of the position first taken by the Prussians when they approached Metz from St. Avold, on the east side. A movement from that road to the left, in order to cross the Seille towards the railway station at the Porte Serpenoise, would be opposed by the Redoute du Paté (which is so built that it can easily be converted into an island), and other detached forts.

The defences of Metz were not, however, confined to its fortifications. It had several exceeding strong forts (many of them new) outside it, which made it a great intrenched camp. These had each sixty guns, casemates, and bomb-proof barracks, and ditches five yards deep. They stand chiefly on the summit of a high hill, which overlooks for miles the broad valley in which the city stands. Their guns could play with tremendous effect on any enemy advancing up the valley to attack the town at its feet; and, as the event of the war showed, a large beaten army was able to find ample shelter in the valley, guarded on one side by the guns of the town, and on the other by the forts. In fact, no force could get near the fortress of Metz proper while the outworks held out; and had the place been properly garrisoned and provisioned, it might have kept its ground for years.

The population of Metz, approaching 60,000; its fine bridges, public gardens, quays, and esplanade; its magnificent Gothic cathedral of the fourteenth century, with spire 373 feet high, and with splendid painted glass windows; its church of the Knights Templars, joined to its historical renown—made this ancient city an object of justifiable pride to every Frenchman.

CHAPTER XI.

Critical Position of the French at Metz—Vacillation of Bazaine—His Attempted Retreat to Verdun, on Sunday, August 14, frustrated by an Attack of the First German Army—Severe Engagement brought on in the neighbourhood of Metz—The Strong Position occupied by the French and Deadly Fire of the Chassepot—The Struggle near Borny—The Attack on the German Right by General L'Admirault—Panic amongst the French Recruits—The Artillery on both Sides—Special Incident of the Battle in this quarter—Gallant Conduct of the Germans—The French ultimately driven back at all Points, and compelled to seek Shelter under the Guns of Metz—The Engagement a "Soldiers' Battle," and its Success due solely to Hard Fighting on the part of the Germans—Victory claimed by both Sides—Descriptions of the Battle by the Emperor and King of Prussia—The Losses in both Armies—Want of Care for the Wounded shown by the French—The Object of the Germans in commencing the Action completely gained—Ought the French to have fought at all?—The Progress of the German Armies on the 15th and 16th—Complete Success still thought doubtful by the King of Prussia on the 15th—The Movements of the French on this Critical Day—Fatal Delay on the part of Bazaine—Impedimenta on the March and consequent confusion—A Despatch which never became True—The Battle of Vionville commenced early on the morning of the 16th by the Cavalry of the Third German Corps attacking the Second French Division—The French again taken completely by Surprise owing to Inexcusable Negligence—Great Bravery of the Brandenburgers in Resisting the whole French Army for several hours—The Germans fighting with their Faces to the Rhine within a Fortnight of the real Opening of the Campaign—Description of the Scene of the severest part of the Struggle—The Gallant Advance of the Eleventh German Regiment—Great Destruction caused by the French Shells—The Troops of both Armies at very Close Quarters—The Great Attack on the French Right Centre—The Prussians several times repulsed, but after Three Hours' Fighting succeed in bringing up their Artillery—An Artillery Duel—Final Retreat of the French in this part of the Field—Frightful Execution caused by a Battery of Mitrailleuses—1800 Men in one Regiment placed *hors de combat* out of 2000—The Fighting further west at Vionville and Mars-la-Tour—Gallant Cavalry Charge—Expected Infantry Corps failing to arrive another Grand Cavalry Attack on the French Artillery and Infantry is resolved on—The German Balaclava—Graphic Description of the Combat by the Major of the Regiment—A Gloomy Bivouac—Arrival of Prince Frederick Charles on the Field and the Tenth (Hanoverian) Corps—The Battle yet remains stationary for Two Hours—Ultimate Retreat of the French—The Losses on both Sides and General Result of the Engagement—The King of Prussia sleeps on the Field of Battle—The Desperate Position of the French—Bazaine's Determination—His Arrangements for another Engagement—Tactical Skill—Precautions taken by the Germans to Prevent the French from retreating by the North Road to Etain—Their Proceedings on the 17th—The Awful Scenes on and near the Battle-field on this Day—Two other Movements which might have been adopted by Bazaine after the Battle of the 16th.

BATTLES OF COURCELLES AND VIONVILLE.

In the previous chapter we have described the concentration of the whole of the French army—except, of course, the corps of MacMahon, Douay, and part of that of De Failly—under the guns of Metz; the transference of the command-in-chief from the emperor to Marshal Bazaine; the fatal mistake of the French in delaying a retreat by Verdun on Châlons, where, as Schiller says, "Measureless spread is the table dread, for the wild grim dice of the iron game," and where only they could have hoped to effect a junction with their defeated right, and thus renew the re-organization and strength of their whole army. We have also noticed the steady and systematic advance of the Germans to the stronghold to which the French had retired for protection, and the admirable strategy displayed by Von Moltke.

On Saturday, August 13, the columns of Steinmetz had advanced to the northern verge of the fortress of Metz; a large part of the second army was within a few miles upon the east, while the remainder, under Prince Frederick Charles, had crossed the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, and moving northwards, was already in a position to threaten the line of the French retreat, and even reach the flanks of the French army, should it seek to march by Verdun on Châlons; or to assist in investing it if it should remain in its place. Not far from 250,000 men, with about 800 guns, had filled the country round the stronghold of Lorraine; and the much weaker force which had become bound to it was encompassed by dangers on every side.

After wasting three precious days,* on Sunday, the 14th, the vanguard of the French began crossing the Moselle on the road to Verdun, and its leaders had evidently no notion that a German force was already on the way to intercept its retreat. The emperor was with the body which

* One reason given for Bazaine's delay is, that his reserve ammunition could not be discovered, and that he could not, of course, go far until it was found. "On the 13th this turned up; it had been forgotten somewhere until somebody remembered it; it was too late to do much, and then it was discovered that thirty millions of cartridges were rendered useless by the dampness of the paper envelope they had been so hurriedly inclosed in." See the "Fall of Metz," by G. T. Robinson, p. 37.

effected safely the passage of the river, and evacuated Metz without loss, but halted at no great distance. As we saw in the previous chapter, however, he next day moved off, and ultimately reached Châlons. But the mass of the French army did not attain the Moselle on the 14th; nearly three of its corps — that of Frossard, the third, now commanded by General Decaen instead of Bazaine, and part of that of L'Admirault — continued in the camp on the east of Metz, and did not attempt beginning their march until the afternoon. The position they occupied was a circle outside the eastern ramparts of the fortress, including the villages of Ars-Laquenexy, Borny, Colombey, Montoy, Noisseville, and Nouilly, and the three different camps extended over a space of nine kilomètres, or nearly six miles. Frossard occupied the left, protecting a deep, wide valley; on the right was the third corps; and over on the other side of the valley was L'Admirault and the part of the fourth corps which was not engaged in crossing the Moselle. As the French troops crossed from north to south here, a portion of the German army crossed from south to north higher up the river. Had the French been in a position (as they ought and might easily have been) to have harassed their enemy whilst they were crossing the river, the battles of Vionville and Gravelotte need not have been fought, and Bazaine's route through Briey would have been left open to him. But even on the morning of this day the marshal's mind was not quite made up, and there was great vacillation still evident. An order was given to one corps d'armée to march southward upon Pont-à-Mousson, where the Germans were crossing the Moselle; an hour afterwards it was recalled, and no sooner was L'Admirault well settled on the slope of St. Julien than he was ordered once again to cross the river by the Ile Chambière, and retreat to the other side of Metz. This movement was being carried out when the battle, known as that of Courcelles, was commenced by the Germans.

Before the engagement the first German army occupied the following positions:—The first corps was at Les Etangs, on the road between Metz and Boulay, with the first division at Courcelles-Chaussy, on the road from Metz to St. Avold. The seventh corps with the thirteenth division was at Pange, with the fourteenth division at Domangeville. The eighth corps was in reserve at Varize and Brouville. The third cavalry division was on the right wing of the army at St. Barbe, and the eleventh division on the left at Frontigny. All the outposts were in feeling with the French around Metz, while the main body of the army encamped on the river Nied.

About four o'clock in the afternoon evident signs of retreat were perceived on the part of the French, and this caused the German advanced posts to make a reconnaissance, as General Steinmetz was aware of the great importance of detaining his enemy until the German flanking movement beyond the Moselle, under the direction of Prince Frederick Charles, described in the previous chapter, had been sufficiently developed. With the view, therefore, of occupying them, of covering the march of the troops crossing at Pont-à-Mousson, and of delaying the general retreating movement of the French army, the German commanders resolved on an immediate attack. Besides holding the villages above named the French army had intrenched themselves at points in their front; and although at first the engagement was little more than a skirmish, they soon showed such a determined opposition and came out in such force, that they caused General von Manteuffel, the commander of the first army corps, and General von Zastrow of the seventh, to bring the whole of their corps into action.

The vanguard of the seventh corps, and the brigade of General von der Goltz, announced at four p.m. that the first division (Von Bendheim) was advancing to the attack of General Decaen's corps, which occupied the village of Colombey, and was soon engaged in a very severe struggle, for the ground was obstinately contested; the fire of the Chassepot, which in the previous encounters had been comparatively wild and irregular, being now especially deadly from the rifle pits, in which the French lay concealed. The woods also afforded good cover. The German troops, however, by bringing up their reserves, succeeded in maintaining themselves in the position at Colombey against considerably larger forces until the arrival of the brigade of General von der Osten. General von Zastrow arrived at five p.m. to the east of the village, undertook the command, and at once ordered the entire corps to advance. The contest now became so severe, that some detachments of the troops under General Frossard were obliged to

hasten to the assistance of their comrades. General Glümer then brought his division of East Saxons to the front, and about six p.m. the whole of it was under fire at Colombey, and with difficulty maintained its position against the overwhelming numbers of the French. The division of General Kameke was concentrated at Maizery at half-past six p.m. At this time six batteries were under fire, the others acting as artillery reserves, and stationed to the south of Coincy. To assist and support the division of General Glümer, at half-past six General von Zastrow ordered the brigade of General Voyna to attack the right wing of the French; and this movement was executed with such effect that they were driven out of their position, and material assistance was given to the brigade of General von der Osten to take up its ground in the wood to the north of Colombey.

One after another the Germans then succeeded in taking the pits and intrenchments near Ars-Laquenexy, Grigy, and Borny, and some other hamlets which, surrounded with hedges, presented considerable difficulties for attack. The fight, however, was most vehement and sanguinary; and as the French stood on the defensive, and only popped up out of their shelter to fire, their loss here was chiefly in killed, who were nearly all shot in the head. In one entrenchment alone 781 corpses were found—an incontestable proof of the correctness of the aim of the German sharpshooters.

The fight in this part of the field had all through been of the most severe character, and every inch of ground had been obstinately contested. From every hill and wood there burst forth a fearful roar; cannons, mitrailleuses, Chassepot, and needle-gun, all yelled out together, from both sides of the valley. One German regiment alone here lost 32 officers and 890 men, and some of the French regiments suffered almost as severely. Decaen, wounded before, had his horse killed, and in falling, crushed once more the smashed knee the general had refused to dismount for. General Castigny was also hit, and all around were huge heaps of dead.

The engagement about Borny, as described by an eye-witness who was in the very midst of the French troops there, was unusually severe, and especially disastrous to the Germans. The latter, who after their advance were protected by the natural rampart of the woods of Borny, had twice succeeded in taking a mitrailleuse from the French; and the recapture of it by the fourty-fourth French infantry was the cause of drawing out from their shelter an immense body of Germans, who precipitated themselves like an infuriated torrent on the French divisions. The imperial guard, commanded by Bourbaki, had, however, been kept in reserve; their artillery, from a strong position, began the defensive; the grenadiers advanced, and from that time till the Germans retreated, at about a quarter to nine, the contest raged here with tremendous fury—the French deriving much assistance from Fort de Queuleu, whose powerful batteries swept the flank of the enemy's columns.

Simultaneously with the advance of the seventh corps towards the French centre and right, the vanguard of the first corps, followed by the corps itself, under General von Manteuffel, proceeded along the roads from St. Avold and Les Etangs towards Metz—the first division to Montoy, and the second towards Noisseville. The Germans succeeded in placing fourteen batteries on the heights northwest of Montoy, and their concentric fire caused the French serious injury; whereas the French artillery did little damage, as nearly all the German wounds, even those of their artillery, came from the Chassepot. The German artillery would have done even more, had it not had to contend against two difficulties—the direction of the wind, which wrapped the enemy's position in thick clouds; and the sun, which shone in the face of the Germans and prevented the accurate aiming of the guns.

The conflict in this part was thus graphically described by a thoroughly reliable eye-witness (Mr. G. T. Robinson, of the *Manchester Guardian*) who was present on the French side:—

"The first division of L'Admirault's corps descended the hill to cross to the left bank of the river; the second division was on the move, under General Grenier, when the first sound of the enemy's approach was heard. That sound grew louder; and into the retiring forces of L'Admirault, at four o'clock, fell the first shell—the first instalment of that enormous quantity of Prussian iron we were to have presented to us. Our artillery, which was in our rear, quickly turned round, taking up a position on our left, so as to enfilade the ravine and cover the rising ground in front of Servigny. General Veron orders up the fifth battalion of chasseurs, the thirteenth and the forty-third, and takes up a position in front of, and a little higher up the slope, than the little wood of Mey. Orders are sent forward, and the troops which were retiring


BATTLE OF COURCELLES.
August 14th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
English Miles
METZ
Woippy
Saulny
Lorry
Devant-Metz
Plappeville
Lessy
Sey
Chazells
Rozericules
Moulins
St Ruffine
Jussy
Vaux
Montigny
le Sablon
Magny sur Seille
Jouy aux Arches
Augny
Marly sur Seille
Pouilly
Peltre
Jury
Mercy le Haut
Chesny
Grigy
Borny
Colombey
Lauvallier
Vantoux
Vallieres
Mey
Nouilly
Chieulles
Vany
Malroy
Charly
Failly
Antilly
Mechy
Argancy
Olgy
Rugy
Chailly
Ban St Martin
Devant les Ponts
Ft Moselle
Ft St Eloy
Ft Belle Croix
Plantieres
Ft les Bottes
Ft Queleu
Embarcadere
Longeville-les Metz
I. St Simphorien
St Privat
MOSELLE R.
RAILWAY
Seille R.



TIONERS HALL

ON, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

upon Metz are brought back at the double. Whilst these things are being done, down from the superior heights of St. Barbe came the fire of the Prussian artillery. L'Admirault pushes forward his to reply, but our fire cannot reach their guns; all we can do is to push forward, under the cover of our fire, a strong force of infantry in skirmishing order. These creep off into the vines and disappear. Down from the hill roll long lines of Prussian troops, who likewise melt away into the green vineyards and disappear also. The hill sides throw up a sudden fog of smoke, as each army blazes away at his hidden enemy. The Prussian torrent never seems to stop; it overflows the hills and fills the valleys, and its smoke gets nearer. Our men drop suddenly, too fast, and we have to retire. The wood of Mey is behind us, and to that wood, with the ancient instinct of their race, these Germans want to get. Our sixty-fourth holds well for a time, but their ammunition is expended, and they break cover and run. Now the thirteenth go to their aid, but they have 600 new recruits with them, who joined only yesterday. They run too; the deadly hail of the needle-gun is too strong for undisciplined soldiers. The Prussians, with a wild hurrah, gain the wood; then, bush by bush, tree by tree, the place is fought over, and we are driven out. The Prussians have now pushed forward their infantry, and occupy Servigny; they place their batteries on the Buzonville road, and Vernon's brigade is forced to retire under a heavy shower of shells. Their shells, too, filled our men with horror, especially the new recruits. Many had never seen such things before; and these percussion shells, which exploded where they struck, and left no time to get out of their way, created much uneasiness in the minds of all who saw them now for the first time. Indeed, such a panic did they occasion that all our reserve ammunition ran away. The horses were frightened, the men said. The horses said nothing about it; but if they had spoken they would probably have said much the same thing of the men.

The Prussians now pushed up the valley in two strong bodies, and no one seemed inclined to stop them. L'Admirault's corps on the left thought Decaen's corps on the right would do it, and between the two General Pritzelwitz pushes his men between them. I don't know if his name was then made known to L'Admirault and Decaen, but think it must have been, and their astonishment at the sound of it momentarily paralyzed them. There is no other supposition I could for a moment entertain; it must have been their astonishment at this which allowed so great an advantage to be gained so easily. After a little while General Pradier makes up his mind to face the Pritzelwitzers; and rushing into the gorge, he throws out a couple of battalions along the side of the valley in skirmishing order, and drives them back for a while. They move up a few guns and rake the valley, forcing us to retire. Then they advance under cover of their fire, and our artillery opens on to the valley. Crash comes after crash, as shell fired from the French batteries comes into the mingled mass; what with the fire of friend and foe, those French soldiers there had a very bad time of it. But the end comes. The Prussians carried that position; the north side of Lauvallier is theirs."

One of the incidents in the battle in this quarter is worthy of special mention. A part of the Germans were stationed behind a small wood, which could only be approached by a narrow lane on their left, running for about a quarter of a mile down to the main road from Metz to St. Avold. About seven o'clock, the Prussian sentinels stationed there to watch came running in to the main body, to say they saw the French skirmishers advancing up the road, and thought they could distinguish columns following them. The men of the most advanced company of the Prussians ran to occupy the lane, which was bordered by trees on both sides, and in some places by juniper bushes, so thick that even in the daytime it would be impossible to see through them. Here some 200 men awaited the French onset. Not a shot was fired till the two French columns, consisting of two regiments of the line, and a battalion of chasseurs à pied as skirmishers, had got within about 150 yards of the hedge. Then the Prussians fired, and the effect was terrible. Within 100 yards more than fifty French soldiers were immediately killed—nearly all shot through the head. One of the regiments drew back to the road, after receiving the first Prussian volley, the men falling all the way. The other tried to charge up the lane, to dislodge the Prussians; but the latter, whose supports had not yet come up, and who had little more than a company of 250 men engaged against the immensely superior forces of the French, retired

to the end of the lane, where those left behind had thrown up a breastwork. From behind this they shot down the French soldiers as they advanced up the lane, and all along it the French corpses lay in groups of two and three, sometimes piled on one another, officers and men literally "in one red burial blent." Meantime, the Prussian supports had come up, and at once rushed forward to drive back the French, who had been forced to the main road, which they held for a mile. They were attacked in front and on their right flank, which was protected by a sharp hill, from the brow of which they did great execution on the advancing Prussians, who, however, in spite of a battery of field guns brought up by the French, succeeded in driving them from their position, and forced them to take shelter under the walls of the fortress.

Whilst the fighting was going on in other parts of the field, the first German cavalry division, under General von Hartmann, advanced at the extreme wing against Mercy-le-haut, and their battery took up a position facing the front. The thirty-sixth infantry regiment, belonging to the ninth corps, which formed the right wing of the second army, also proceeded to the east along the same road, and joined in the engagement.

Towards eight p.m. the French were driven back at all points under the guns of Metz; and to avoid further losses from the guns, from which they had already suffered very severely, the Germans did not pursue their victory. They therefore made few prisoners and obtained few trophies of the victory.

General von Steinmetz, as soon as it was announced that an engagement was going on, hurried up with his staff and made the requisite dispositions for the night and the following day, in order to place the army again in order of battle, but the French did not attempt any further attack; and leaving behind the first army corps and both cavalry divisions to guard the communications towards Forbach, on the following day the first army commenced marching along the right bank of the Moselle, without meeting with any hindrance either then or in crossing the river, which was effected at Corny and Ars.

The nature of the conflict, at first known as that of Pange, but which the king of Prussia afterwards ordered to be called Courcelles, prevented the display of any remarkable strategy on the part of the commanders on either side. The engagement was, in fact, emphatically a "soldiers' battle," and the success of the Germans in driving back their opponents was attained solely by hard determined fighting. The French resisted with great obstinacy; and the admission of the king of Prussia that many of their wounded were safely taken into the fortress, was a testimony that the imperialist soldiers made a good retreat, and fought a battle resembling rather a Corunna or a Busaco than a Woerth or a Forbach. In fact, the French soldiers looked forward to a renewal of the engagement and a decisive victory on the morrow.

Both sides claimed the victory. The emperor, in a despatch to Paris dated Longueville, ten p.m., said, "The French army commenced to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle this morning. Reconnoitring parties announced the presence of the Prussian vanguards. When one half of the army had crossed, the Prussians attacked in great force, and after a fight which lasted four hours they were repulsed with considerable loss. Generals L'Admirault and Decaen manœuvred so as to bring the Prussians under the fire of the forts, causing them thereby considerable loss."

At first the French reports of the German losses were absurdly exaggerated; they were set down at from 16,000 to 18,000, whilst they had not lost more than 1000! Ranks of men, it was also said, were mown down with the regularity of grass under a mower's scythe, and living men were found under the dead. "All this was the work of the French mitrailleuse!"

On the other hand, the king of Prussia telegraphed to the queen from Herny on Monday morning, that a "victorious battle" had taken place before Metz, and that he was about to proceed immediately to the battle-field. In the evening he sent the following account of the affair:—"I returned from the field of battle at Metz at three o'clock to day. The advanced guard of the seventh army corps attacked the retreating enemy at about five o'clock yesterday evening. The latter made a stand, and was gradually reinforced by the troops from the fortress. The thirteenth division and a part of the fourteenth supported the advanced guard, as also parts of the first army corps. A very bloody fight ensued along the whole line, and the enemy was thrown back at all points. The pursuit was continued up to the glacis of the outworks. The nearness of the fortress allowed the

enemy in many instances to secure his wounded. After our wounded had been secured, the troops marched to their old bivouacs at dawn. The troops have all fought with incredible and admirable energy, and also with enthusiasm. I have seen many, and have thanked them heartily. The rejoicing is really affecting."

The French losses were estimated by their opponents at 4000, and the Germans admitted their own to be exceedingly heavy. As in the previous actions, some particular regiments suffered very severely. The forty-eighth (Rhinelanders) lost thirty-two officers and 891 rank and file, or about one-third its complement. A rifle battalion in the same locality was by the enemy's fire deprived of nine of its officers and 270 rank and file, or a third of the officers and a fourth of the men.

The regiments most closely engaged on the French side were the sixty-ninth, ninetieth, forty-fourth, sixtieth, eightieth, thirty-third, fifty-fourth, sixty-fifth, and eighty-fifth of the line, the eleventh and fifteenth foot chasseurs, and the eighth, ninth, and tenth batteries of the first regiment of artillery. Those which suffered most were the forty-fourth and ninetieth line, and fifteenth foot chasseurs. The forty-fourth, especially, was greatly shattered; while the eighty-fifth, though in the thickest of the action, lost but thirty-five men killed and wounded. Loud complaints were made by the Prussians of the want of care for the wounded shown by the French, who after the fight sent not a single surgeon from Metz to see even those of their own wounded left on the field.

Although the German loss had been so considerable, the result of the action completely justified it, as they had gained their object in delaying the retreat of the French until Prince Frederick Charles had time to complete his turning movement with fatal effect. Had the action not been fought, a considerable portion of the French army would have been on its way to Verdun. It is not very easy to understand why the French should have stood to fight when they might have fallen back within the lines of Metz, as they were forced to do ultimately, and as they actually did after losing 4000 men. They had nothing to gain by fighting. Had they maintained their ground and beaten the Germans, they would still have been under the necessity of retreat, and must have withdrawn from the battle-field. No victory could have rendered it other than imperative on them to leave Metz and cross the Moselle. Their heavy loss was therefore so much strength thrown away; for although the Germans suffered as much, they could far better spare the men.

During the 14th, 15th, and 16th of August, the whole of the second German army, together with the seventh and eighth corps of the first, had successively crossed the Moselle, leaving only the first corps, with the third cavalry division, on the right bank, in the position near where the action of the 14th had been fought. The ninth corps, which had manœuvred on the left of the first and seventh corps on that day, covered this movement on the south side of Metz, where the railways to Saarbrück and Nancy debouch from the fortress.

The whole of that portion of the first German army which crossed the Moselle on the 15th had, of course, done so south of Metz. To have crossed on the north, whilst the second army was on the other side, would have given the French a coveted chance of striking right and left at the divided portions—a chance that may possibly have counted for something in the fatal delay of the French on this day, which will be more particularly alluded to immediately. Between Metz and Nancy, therefore, where the country was wholly in German hands, must the point of crossing be sought. Pont-à-Mousson, which was a day's march from the German camps, with nearly a day's march back again to the French line of retreat, was too far off, and was therefore not employed. But between Pont-à-Mousson and the fortress there were two passages across the river. Half-a-dozen miles distant, the viaduct at Ars carries to the right bank the railway from Paris and Nancy by Frouard, which hitherto runs down the left bank; while near the village of Corny, eight or nine miles from Metz, a departmental road strikes off from the highway between that place and Nancy, passing over a bridge (which the French had neglected to destroy) to the left bank, where it continued to run north-westward, ascending the heights that border the river, until at Mars-la-Tour it abuts upon the main route from Metz to Verdun.

On Monday the 15th, the German generals pressed forward the march of the columns of both their first and second armies in this north-westerly direction towards the road to Verdun, and seized

upon the wooded valleys to mask at once their numbers and their movements. It appears, however, from despatches of the king of Prussia about this time, that complete success was thought still doubtful, and the escape of the French not yet impossible. At Gravelotte, six or seven miles west of Metz, the road to Verdun, some thirty-five miles distant, divides; one branch (one of those straight highways, fringed with rows of tall poplars, familiar to every traveller in France) tending a little to the southward, runs through Rezonville (nine miles from Metz), Vionville (twelve miles), Mars-la-Tour (fifteen miles), and Manheulles; the other, bending slightly northward, passes by Doncourt, Conflans, and Etain. The two roads are never more than eight or ten miles apart; at Vionville they are about six, at Rezonville, at most three, miles asunder.

Meantime Bazaine, who thenceforward must be held solely accountable for what happened—even supposing him to have been influenced by the advice of the emperor in not attempting his retreat earlier—had defiled with the bulk of his army through Metz, which was now left to its garrison under General Coffinières, and crossed to the left bank of the Moselle. He had also sent forward a part of the baggage and other impedimenta of his troops, and rejoining his vanguard, had advanced his outposts to Mars-la-Tour and Doncourt, on the two lines of road described, leading respectively to Verdun and Etain, his main force stretching towards Metz backwards. As he ought to have known that the Germans were converging towards him and making for his only line of retreat, this march seems to fall short of what it ought to have been; and his proceedings have therefore been very generally censured, as showing that want of decision and promptitude which characterized all the French movements in the early part of the campaign.

In fact, circumstances which came to light after the first accounts of the French movements on this and the next day were made known, render the conduct of their generals more extraordinary than ever. It seems that, even as early as the morning of the 15th, the cavalry division of Legrand had been pushed on as an *avant garde* so far as Mars-la-Tour, and that it was there arrested by a strong column of German cavalry who held the height. Forming in charging order to force his way through the opposing ranks, Legrand saw the German cavalry open, wheel to the right and left, and a battery of four-pounders belched out a murderous fire against him. To charge would have been useless, and Legrand therefore retired. This demonstration checked the advance, and Legrand had to wait until the rest of the army approached, or, at any rate, until valid supports arrived. It was, however, evident thus early that the enemy's onward march had not been seriously arrested by the battle of the 14th, and that only a portion of their forces had then been engaged. Whilst the French were fighting one division of the army there, the Germans had been racing the other divisions here, and they had so far won. On the same day the maire of Gorze sent word to Frossard that the country to the south of Metz was being filled with German troops, and early the next morning he went himself, but no notice whatever was taken of him. "I know all you have to tell me," said the general, "and you know nothing about the enemy's forces?" The maire went back a little way to Gorze, only to find that the Germans had occupied his country to the verge of the wood in front of Frossard's corps; but the Germans would not, of course, permit him to return again to the French general.

The French front was thus being gradually hemmed in, whilst their rear was yet dragging its enormous length slowly out of Metz. All day and night of the 15th, and all the morning of the 16th, there filed out from the city a thickly-packed line of baggage waggons and auxiliary carts. So certain, it seems, did Bazaine feel that his march to Châlons would be unimpeded, that nothing was left in Metz, and consequently never scarcely was any army accompanied by anything like such a collection of impedimenta. They blocked up the roads in all directions. Artillery could not get forward. Troops had to leave the highway and flounder through the fields and by-ways, cavalry took to steeple-chasing, and everbody swore at everybody, especially at the immovable, stolid, stupid, hindering body of auxiliaries. These men, picked up anyhow, anywhere, and under no known direction, were always clubbing themselves and their carts at a corner, or getting into a hopelessly inextricable confusion, and neither threats, prayers, nor blows could induce them to be anything but hindrances.

If, instead of having thus allowed himself to become encumbered with these impediments, with

their inevitable confusion and delay, Bazaine had made the necessary arrangements for a determined and rapid advance, there can be little doubt that on the 15th the road to Verdun was still open, at least to an army of the strength of his; the German generals feared that he might be in time to retreat; and it is quite probable that if he had advanced with more celerity on that momentous day, and had massed his divisions closely, he might have succeeded in breaking through the toils which his vigilant antagonists were winding round him. It seems, however, that he was not fully aware of the peril which was becoming imminent; for on the night of the 15th, or the next morning, he despatched a message that he would be "with all his army at Etain on the 16th." On the strength of this despatch it was officially announced in Paris that he had actually arrived there. Had he succeeded so far he would, of course, have got beyond the immediate reach of his enemy; whereas we know the night found him not a dozen miles on his way.

The loss of this day, however, led to the most disastrous consequences to the French, for on the following morning (August 16) about nine o'clock, Bazaine was attacked on the lower of the two roads we have mentioned, by the cavalry of the third German corps (Brandenburgers), which had arrived on the left flank of the French, and broke out upon them from the woods at Vionville. It may be remembered that it was this corps which, under Alvensleben, came so opportunely upon the ground to Göben's support at Forbach. These horsemen, with that stubborn daring which characterized the operations of the Germans whenever a great stake was to be won, fell on the enemy, and succeeded in stopping him until their infantry supports came up, and rendered the fight somewhat more equal. It is indeed said, that the German troops at first mistook those before them for the rear of the hostile army, which they supposed to be in full march westward, and for that reason they attacked at once; but the fight had not lasted long before they became aware of their error, and that they had to deal, not with the lingering remnant, but with the main body of their enemy. Fortunately for them, perhaps, the leading column of the French attacked chanced to be a part of the routed corps of Frossard, demoralized by the effects of its defeat at Forbach; and panic-stricken by the German onslaught, it fell into confusion in attempting to deploy, and made only a feeble resistance. This was doubtless partly due to the fact that, as at Wissembourg and Forbach, the French were again taken completely by surprise. Frossard, as we know, would take no notice of the statement of the maire of Gorze, that the Germans were rapidly advancing, and not one of his officers knew of the vicinity of the enemy until their attack actually commenced! This is the more extraordinary, as General Forton was camped on the rounded edge of the hill, looking out on the valley which creeps up from Gorze. Both sides of the hill he occupied form watersheds, the one towards Trouville, and the other towards Rezonville. It was thus the very place for a keen look-out, and yet the general knew nothing of the Germans' whereabouts. Indeed, so little did he think about them, that when the attack began his men were in their camp, without a single thing packed up, and he himself was comfortably sitting down to breakfast. The colonel of the fourth chasseurs had just been to him, and asked for orders, but the general had none to give. "It is evident," said he, "that your regiment won't be wanted to-day." The intendant-en-chef even sent a couple of commissariat agents to Trouville, not two miles away, to make a requisition for cattle, not knowing that Trouville had been in the German hands all night, so ignorant was everybody of that which they ought to have known. Before Frossard's men were on the move, before he had finished his breakfast, and before these commissariat agents could set out for Trouville, the German attack commenced, and created the wildest surprise. So unprepared was every one, in fact, that all General Bataille's artillery horses were at the time away at a watering place.

Had another corps than Frossard's led the van, the French might possibly have shaken off the obstinate Brandenburgers, and pushed on towards the Meuse, showing, of course, a powerful and resolute resistance to their pursuers. But it was not so to be. The cavalry, striking the French fiercely in flank, threw them in a short time into complete disorder, which spread to the next column, as it was advancing to the aid of the one in front; but, unable to clear the road, it fell back baffled and disconcerted. Bazaine was thus forced to stop and deploy Frossard's corps, and by degrees to bring into line, to the right and left, the corps of Decaen, L'Admirault, Canrobert, and the imperial guard.

For nearly four hours the daring horsemen who had commenced the action, assisted, after the lapse of about an hour, by a brigade of infantry and some small batteries, kept the whole French force in check, but suffered very severely in doing so. Ultimately, however, the nearest German divisions (the third of the tenth corps, and late in the evening the division of the ninth corps) appeared on the scene, and the action now developed into a very severe battle, extending over several miles of broken country, from Mars-la-Tour to Rezonville. At first the German line looked northward, but as the corps successively took ground to the left they at length formed a line looking eastwards, the left extremity of which reached to the northern of Bazaine's two lines of retreat—that by the road to Etain. Thus, in exactly a fortnight from the celebrated affair at Saarbrück, the German second army was fighting with its front facing the Rhine, whilst Bazaine's front was turned towards Paris—a strategical result which may be not unfairly held as eclipsing Napoleon's proceeding with Mack at Ulm in 1805.

The severest part of the struggle was on an undulating plateau near Gorze, a town with 1500 inhabitants, situated about eight miles south-west of Metz, on a small stream running into the Moselle at Noveant les Près. It is about four miles south from Rezonville and six from Gravelotte. The first two miles from Gorze to these places are covered with dense woods, hanging over deep valleys, in some places almost like ravines, and apparently unassailable. On emerging from these woods is the undulating plateau already described, which extends to the Verdun road about one mile and a half, and is about three miles in length. On this plateau the French had taken up a most formidable position, and it was only by resolute bravery that the Germans could obtain possession of it. On the French right the ground rises gently, and this was the key of their position, as the artillery, which could maintain itself there, swept the whole field. More towards the centre are two small valleys, one of which, from its depth, was most useful to the Germans in advancing their troops. In the centre of the field is the road from Gorze to Rezonville and Gravelotte, joining the main road to Verdun, between the two villages. From the woods to Rezonville, on the Verdun road, there was no cover, except one cottage, midway on the Gorze road. The action here was sustained on the German side by the infantry of the third corps. When it arrived, under General von Alvensleben, it came up from the south-east, through the defiles of Gorze, with its advance, composed of the eleventh regiment, concealed by the Bois des Ognons, and it was thus enabled to attack the enemy on his left flank. The divisions under General Frossard and L'Admirault, which now formed about the centre of the French army, at once changed front, resting their base upon Rezonville, and immediately advanced to take possession of the wood at the back of the plateau of which we have spoken, but that was now held by the Germans. The mistake was irreparable, so the artillery of the imperial guard opened a tremendous fire of shrapnell and shell upon the wood. The eleventh German regiment were the first to emerge from it and advance to the attack, whilst the thirty-fifth, the "fighting fortieth" (which, it will be remembered, was engaged at Saarbrück and suffered severely at Forbach), and the seventy-second, advanced through the wood to the left. All these regiments suffered greatly from the French shells, which now literally lit up the wood. No sooner did the right battalion of the eleventh emerge and deploy, than the French opened fire at 700 yards, and fearfully effective was the discharge, which caused the loss of their colonel and five officers, besides a considerable number of men. They then retired into the wood until the whole line could advance together, the French shells meanwhile inflicting fearful loss upon them, although under a screen of foliage. Whenever the German advance appeared the French troops opened fire, the assailants falling literally in heaps; but "*Immer vorwärts!*" was the cry, and, under a storm of shot and shell, the gallant fifth division, led by the troops above-mentioned, moved on to meet the foe. For fully an hour they fired at each other from a distance of fifty paces, the French, who had not until now suffered much, losing many men. The first line of their troops then gradually retired, and three regiments of the garde impériale stood the brunt of the German advance almost, for the moment, alone in their glory. Here the German line was strengthened, and at twenty to thirty paces the fire was fearful, so much so that the French guard had to fall back. Behind the German position were the woods they had gained, and in front of them the ground rose



Orne R.
Auboue
Valleroy
Bois d'Abbeville
Serry
Moineville
Cornville
Roncourt
Beaumont
St Privat
la Montagne
St Marie
aux Chenes
Hatrize
St Ail
Bois de Ponty
Batilly
Amanvil
Labry
Habonville
Conflans
en Jarnisy
Giraumont
en Jarnisy
Jouaville
Bois de la Cusse
Yron R.
Jarny
Bois Dosenillons
Verneville
Doncourt
en Jarnisy
Chateau
Bois de Genivaux
Malmaison
Bruville
St Marcel
B. de le Jureé
Villers
aux Bois
Gravelotte
Ville
sur Yron
Yron R.
20th Div.
Rezonville
Mars-la-Tour
Vionville
Bois
des
Ognons
Flavigny
Tronville
6th Div.
18th Div.
B. de St Arnould
Bois
la Dame
Puxieux
Bois
des Chevaux
Bois des Pretres
Côte Mousa
Xonville
Bois de St Pre
GORZE


BATTLE OF VIONVILLE.
August 16th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
English Miles
Metres 1000 500 0
Chains 80 40 0
Marange
Foret de
Jaumont
Bronvaux
Feves
Bois de Feves
Norroy
Plesnois
Villers
B. de Plesnois
Saulny
Bois de Saulny
Bois de Lorry
Bois de Chatel
les Rappes
Woippy
Maison Rouge
Ft St Eloy
St Eloy
Thury
MOSELLE R.
Bois de Grimont
Grimont Fme
Ft St Julien
St Julien les Metz
Vigneulles
Lorry Devant Metz
la Maison de Planche
le Coupillon
le Sansonnet
Leipzig
Ft les Carrieres
Tignomont
la Ronde
Devant les Ponts
Ile Chambiere
Vallieres
Plappeville
Ft Moselle
Pte de France
Ban St Martin
Moscou Fme
Chatel St Germain
Lessy
Mt St Quentin
Ile Saulcy
Ft Belle Croix
les Bottes
Plantieres
METZ
Pte de la Citadelle
Gisors
St Hubert
Longeau
Sey
I St Simphorien
Embarcadere
Chazells
Longeville les Metz
Redte du Pate
Rozericules
Moulins
Ft Queleu
Queleu
St Ruffine
Montigny
le Sablon
Grigy
Jussy
Seille R.
Bois de Vaux
Vaux
St Privat
la Hte Bevoye
la Bse Bevoye
MOSELLE R.
RAILWAY
RAILWAY
Magny sur Seille
Ars sur Moselle
Bois de Gorgimon
Rouge ville
Jouy aux Arches
Augny
Marly sur Seille
Aney sur Moselle
Bois de Pouilly
Pouilly
Hte Rue
Cte St Blaise
Engraved by E. Weller

slightly, for a long distance, along the sides of the road leading to Rezonville.

About one p.m., when the whole finally emerged from the wood, General Stulpnagel rode round to the heights on their left to observe the position of the enemy. After a few minutes' consultation, the eleventh regiment was advanced along the road on the French centre, having for their object the lone cottage on the road already spoken of, and in which the French mitrailleurs were posted. This, however, was unknown to the Germans when the order to advance was given. Simultaneously, the fortieth, sixty-seventh, sixty-ninth, thirty-fifth, and seventy-second were ordered to advance on the fortified heights on the French right centre. This was the key of their position; hence the number of men (15,000), sent against it at once. The French, knowing how vitally important it was to keep possession of the hill on the right, as soon as their troops began to fall back from the woods, threw up a hastily made earthwork to shelter their infantry lying down. Behind them again were the sixty-second regiment of the line, with several batteries of artillery firing over their heads. The Prussians came up the slope, but were several times repulsed; and it was not till after three hours' fighting that they drove the French from the heights, and succeeded in bringing up their own artillery. As battery after battery of Krupp guns was moved up the heights, the gunners using their spurs and whips freely, the French were partially outflanked; and it became evident that, however bravely they might fight (and the Germans allow that they fought splendidly), they must ultimately give way. Their batteries, driven from their first position, retired to the hill dividing the two valleys on their right, and a regular artillery duel took place between them and the Prussian batteries on their recently conquered hill; the short distance, only about 500 yards, insuring frightfully "good practice." The hills were strewn with the *débris* of men, gun-carriages, limbers, and horses (the latter in greatest number, many of them literally blown to pieces); and the ground was ploughed with shells. After two hours' cannonade the French guns retired to the heights over the second valley, where another engagement with the German batteries took place, as the latter of course galloped to the French position as soon as they were driven from it. The French then fell back to another rise behind, and maintained themselves there with great loss till eight p.m., when they retired under cover of the dark. In their retreat there had not been the least appearance of rout or confusion; on the contrary, they retired steadily and in perfect order, fighting every inch of the way.

In the meantime charge after charge was made up the Gorze road by the Germans on the lone cottage, and the half battery of mitrailleuses in it, which were admirably served, and did frightful execution, as the ground was perfectly open. They were also supported by a regiment of the grenadiers of the imperial guard, and the twenty-first of the line. The eleventh German regiment, which was the first to charge the French, went into action over 2000 strong (it had lost heavily at Spicheren), and in the evening only 200 men answered to their names! But the house was at last carried, as more and more German troops were brought up by the road from the wood.

In spite, however, of the greatest bravery, the Germans were unable to drive back the French until their artillery gained the hill on their right. The precision of the fire of the French artillery at this point then told with proportionate effect on the advancing columns, and it was only by the pushing on of regiment after regiment, regardless of loss, and with a view to victory at any cost, that the French were driven back fighting, and with heavy loss to themselves.

Although the most important part of the battle was fought on this plateau to the north of Gorze, there had also been a most severe and bloody struggle a little further west, in the vicinity of the villages of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour; after the former of which the engagement was officially named by the king of Prussia. Near these villages the action had begun by the attack of the German cavalry of the third corps, supported shortly afterwards by a brigade of infantry and a half dozen batteries. At the commencement the Germans were opposed to a force which certainly quadrupled theirs. They advanced in the shape of a half moon. The French retired towards their left rear, holding the village of Vionville with great obstinacy, covered by artillery on the heights. This was in turn answered by the Germans, and the French were then observed to retire. At eleven o'clock the first brigade of German infantry, under the command of General Lehman, came into action, advancing in echelon of

regiments under the most galling fire of mitrailleuses —three on the right and five battalions in the same formation on their left rear. The whole force then brought its left forward, and advanced on the enemy.

The infantry were all engaged, both on right and left, when L'Admirault hurled the chasseurs d'Afrique at a battery which, from the nature of the ground, his artillery could not reply to. A strong force of riflemen supported the enemy's artillery; and though the chasseurs at length, after severe loss, carried the position, they did not know how to spike the breech-loading guns. Before they could find out, a Prussian hussar regiment dashed into them. The heavy lancers of the French guard next charged these hussars in flank, and after them pressed the third dragoons (the empress' regiment). A dreadfully confused struggle now ensued. The Prussians pushed forward regiment after regiment, and so did the French. When they at last emerged, the valley was thickly strewn with men and horses. The only trophies captured by the French, a standard and two guns, were carried off during this *mêlée*.

From the beginning, however, it was apparent that the German force here was too small to cope with that before them, and it became a matter of life and death to bring up infantry. One corps d'armée which had been expected failed to arrive, and was anxiously looked for.

Up to this time, the soldiers' opinion was, that throughout the day the fire on the part of the French had been fearful, that they had never on any occasion stood their ground better. In consequence, the Germans suffered grievously from the first. Gradually their numbers were reduced; till at last, as we have seen, the French could venture to attack their guns, and although this attack had been warded off, it was noticed that the French were again massing their columns for another. It was nearly three o'clock in the afternoon, and they had been under fire from ten in the morning. What was to be done? In this critical emergency there seemed to be nothing left but to send the remaining cavalry against the hostile battalions. Experience in the early part of the day had indeed proved that, to let cavalry charge infantry at a distance which exposed them to several rounds of fire, would be to sacrifice vast numbers without, perhaps, producing any adequate advantage. But necessity knows no law. The attack was ordered and executed. Two regiments of dragoon guards and one of cuirassiers, the whole forming a column of 1900, rode against the enemy—a thundering block of steel. Decimated long before they could flash their swords, their shattered remnants sufficed to cut down or disperse whole battalions. Then, attacked in their turn by cuirassiers, and immediately rescued by their own swift hussars, they again cut a path for themselves into the enemy's ranks, and actually succeeded in preventing his contemplated assault.

The cuirassier regiment which took part in this brilliant cavalry charge—worthy of the best deeds of Seidletz—was the Halberstadt, more generally known as the Bismarck cuirassiers, Count von Bismarck being *à la suite* of the regiment, and wearing the uniform, though the chief is the duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. The major of the regiment, Count Schmettow, in a graphic description of the engagement, which he wrote soon after the battle, said, "I quite agree that a commander would be inexcusable in leading his troops into such a mess unless there were the most urgent reasons. But such was the case in the present instance. The chief of the staff of the third corps d'armée came to our brigadier, Von Bredow, whom we have on every occasion been accustomed to see in the thick of it, and said, 'General, in concert with General von Rheinbaben, commander of the cavalry division, the commander-general has decided that you must break through at the wood, and you are still standing quietly here!' General von Bredow replied, 'Am I to understand that cavalry is to break through infantry and artillery here by the wood?' 'Certainly,' was the answer, 'we have already taken the hamlet, but cannot reach the wood, so the issue of the battle depends upon your clearing away everything along the forest. You must attack, and with the utmost energy.' So you see we had got to do it. We formed two divisions, the cuirassier regiment on the left wing along the edge of the wood, the dragoon regiment on the right wing, and one hundred paces further back. Our brave general, with his staff of four officers, three of which he lost, was nearly on a line with the cuirassiers. Before the French battery had discharged its third gun we were masters of it. The honour of challenging the French commander I could not leave to another, and I rather think I found him. It was clear to me that in this death-ride the object was not to bring home trophies, but to strike down

everything between the wood and the road. At the battery all were put to the sword, and then we went in tearing course at an infantry column, which was ridden over and cut down. Its remnants, however, sent a good many shots after us. At this moment the dragoons were close on our heels. A second battery was attacked, aud all who did not run were put to the sword. Then, as many as were left of us made for a second infantry column. Just before reaching it two squadrons of French cuirassiers wheeled from a woody hollow into the gaps of our little handful, and after the last infantry column had been ridden down we wheeled to the right and rushed back. By this time we were pell-mell with the French horse. Before the battery I received two shots, which went through my helmet, without, however, touching me. The adjutant, hit by two bullets, fell from his horse; one trumpeter was shot down, the horse of the other wounded. I was just speaking with Captain Heister when he also fell. Lieutenant Campbell was for a while by my side until, in the attempt to tear away from the French cuirassiers the standard he had seized with his left hand, he was fearfully maltreated. Some one helped him to cut his way out. I shall never forget my ordering the first trumpeter I found, nearly on the same spot where we set out on our ride of nearly a quarter of a German mile, to blow the regimental signal. The trumpet had been bored through by shots, and a sound came out that pierced me to the quick. At my call three sections out of the eleven (three had been detached) assembled. A gloomy bivouac followed, as little more than a fourth of the regiment had responded to the call."

The other regiments also suffered terribly; but the attack was so far successful that it gave time for the tenth German corps to come up in support of the gallant fellows of the third, and for the capture of two French eagles. It was even superior to the famous English charge of Balaklava, inasmuch as it served the highest military purpose—the winning of the battle; superior also to the French heavy cavalry charge at Woerth, as it was done with a chance of success. The French at Woerth threw away their cuirassiers, whilst the Prussians in this battle saved a corps d'armée by the heroic self-sacrifice of cavalry regiments; and although it had cost the lives of so many hundreds of brave men, the loss in a military sense was as nothing to the advantage.

Some time before this charge, Prince Frederick Charles appeared on the battlefield and assumed the command. Eager to share the dangers, and if possible, the laurels of his troops, he had ridden the eighteen miles from Pont-à Mousson in an hour. He was just giving orders to his cousin, Duke Wilhelm of Mecklenburg, who led the cavalry charge, when the long-expected succour at last appeared. It was the head of the tenth (Hanover) corps d'armée, under General von Voigt Rhetz, which, after a forced march on the plateau rising from the valley of the river, fell upon the enemy's right flank, and the fight now extended lengthways to Mars-la-Tour, a hamlet three miles beyond Vionville upon the same main road. But although the Hanoverians advanced with a gallantry worthy of the military renown of their race, and were commanded by a most able general, the battle remained stationary for two more hours—a sort of duel going on between the combatants which, though at some distance, was near enough to have fearful results. At last the French again retired, but scarcely a quarter of a mile, where they remained to the close of the battle. Late in the evening the German reserve cavalry were ordered to charge the infantry. This they did with loud hurrahs, but sustained great loss from the murderous fire poured into them. As in all other parts of the field, the fighting at Mars-la-Tour had been of a very obstinate character. This village was held by the fourth regiment of the line, part of Canrobert's corps; and six times did the Germans advance from the wood in front of this position, and as many times retire, whilst of the fourth French hundreds of men and most of its officers were either killed or wounded. The imperial guard under Bourbaki arrived about three o'clock, and their additional weight bore back the Prussian left, so that they retired behind Mars-la-Tour, seeking again the friendly shelter of the woods, and at the close of the fray at this point neither side could be said to have gained ground.

During the greater part of the day the French had considerably outnumbered their opponents, having at least 180,000 men engaged, whilst the Germans had only 75,000 altogether under fire, and not more than 40,000 for a long time. Bazaine does not appear to have thoroughly comprehended the enemy's tactics, or perceived the extent of his own danger; and he should have cut his way

through at any sacrifice, on this the last day on which he could have done so. He was fighting not only for the very existence of his army as an active field force, but also for the safety of the capital.

Both sides claimed the victory. In his despatch to Paris on the following morning, Marshal Bazaine said that the enemy had been repulsed, and the French had passed the night in the positions they had conquered, but he should delay his further movements a few hours, in order to largely increase his ammunition. In another despatch he said they had everywhere maintained their position; had inflicted considerable loss on the enemy; and at eight o'clock in the evening they had been repulsed along the whole line. Their own loss had, however, been very serious.

The German accounts were as follow:—Pont-à-Mousson, August 17 (7.10 p.m.).—Yesterday, Lieutenant-general von Alvensleben advanced with his army corps westwards of Metz, on the road of the enemy's retreat towards Verdun. A bloody fight took place between the divisions of Generals Decaen, L'Admirault, Frossard, Canrobert, and the imperial guard and the third and tenth corps, successively supported by portions of the ninth corps. Notwithstanding the great superiority of the enemy, they were driven back to Metz, after a hot fight lasting twelve hours. The loss of infantry, cavalry, and artillery on both sides is very considerable. On our side Generals von Doering and Von Wedel have been killed, and Generals von Rauch and Von Groeben wounded. His majesty the king greeted the troops to-day on the field of battle, upon the glorious manner in which they had retained possession of the ground."

"Marshal Bazaine, while retreating from Metz to Verdun, was attacked at nine a.m. on the 16th by the fifth Brandenburg division (the same which was victorious in the battle of Saarbrück), and was stopped on his march. Our troops showed heroic courage, being opposed by four French corps d'armée, including the imperial guard, who fought well, and were ably led. Our troops were only reinforced after six hours' fighting, by the arrival of the tenth corps d'armée. The losses on both sides are considerable, but our success is complete, as the French have been prevented from continuing their movement of retreat, and have been driven back to Metz. They have lost 2000 prisoners, two eagles, and seven cannon."

The statement of the French commander, that his troops had everywhere maintained their positions, was certainly not in accordance with fact; for on that night the largest portion of them had fallen back to Gravelotte, having yielded several miles of the road by which he had marched on the 15th. It was no doubt true that the French inflicted more loss on the Germans than they sustained themselves, as the German commanders were obliged to hurl forward their men as rapidly as they could bring them up; but, measured by their strategical results, the operations of the day were unquestionably most disastrous to the French, although they did not at the time see the whole truth, and undoubtedly believed they had achieved a certain success. This was especially the case with the sixth (Canrobert's) corps, at Mars-la-Tour, where, as we know, there was some ground for the belief. On the following day one of his aides-de-camp wrote a letter to a friend in Paris, in which he said the contest had been horribly obstinate on both sides, but that the French had carried off all the honours of the day in spite of their great losses, and that the Germans were routed.

In fact, however, the real advantage had all been on the other side; for notwithstanding their fearful loss the German commanders had attained their object, and Bazaine's retreat westward had been effectually stopped. At night-fall the south road from Metz to Verdun had been occupied and retained, and their extreme left had also reached to within a short distance of the northern road which the French general had intended to use; so that there now lay between him and the Meuse an army strong in number, and stronger still in courage, discipline, and the superiority which consciousness of victory bestows.

As already stated, the losses on both sides were appalling. The Germans admitted no less than 17,000 being killed, wounded, and missing; and the French must have lost at least from 10,000 to 15,000 men, including a large number of the imperial guard. Four German generals were killed or wounded; on the French side Generals Frossard and Bataille were injured; and at one moment an audacious irruption of the hostile cavalry (uhlans), into the French lines nearly resulted in the capture of Marshal Bazaine himself, and led to the destruction of twenty men of his escort. On the German side the best blood of the

country was spilt like water. Within a few moments, by the unexpected unmasking of the mitrailleuse battery, Count Westarp, Count Wesdelen, Baron Kleist, Henry VII., prince of Reuss, Baron Grimm, Baron Witzleben, and many other noblemen of high rank and position were killed; and the battle, altogether, cost that country twice as many men as that of Königgrätz. Some regiments especially suffered very terribly. The twelfth infantry lost 61 officers of the 69 it had, and 1500 rank and file of the 3000 forming its full complement. The forty-seventh, almost equally unfortunate, had 47 officers and 1400 men removed from the ranks; the sixty-fourth, 41 officers and 1000 men; the seventy-second, about 30 officers, 13 of whom were killed, and 1000 men. Gloomiest of all, however, was the doom of the eleventh, which lost 1800 men and nearly all its officers. Of the dragoon guards nearly one-half the rank and file, and more than a proportionate number of officers, were either killed or wounded. The announcements of officers' deaths in the newspapers filled whole columns, and fathers, brothers, and brides, left all parts of Germany to fetch the corpses of their beloved ones. The Germans had, however, determined to succeed at any cost, and they stood firmly and toughly to be shot down until help arrived, and the tremendous slaughter inflicted on them at some points by the French fusillade completely failed to shake their determination.

The king of Prussia, on the night of the battle, slept on the field among his troops, and was very well pleased to get a plate of rice and soup from a neighbouring camp-kettle, after a long day on horseback, and at the age of seventy-three!

The Germans had now (for a time at least) frustrated the retreat of the French, by forcing them from their forward positions on the Verdun and Etain roads, and, having closed on their flanks and front, were already upon the principal lines by which they could make good their way to Châlons. It therefore became absolutely necessary for the French general to face the question—What if the enemy, whose united strength was largely superior to his own, should plant himself firmly on these avenues, should oppose an invincible barrier to him, and hemming his army in upon Metz, should completely sever their communications, and lock them up imprisoned in the fortress? Marshal Bazaine, therefore, like a brave soldier, resolved, to the best of his judgment, to make the most of the situation; and having managed to persuade his lieutenants that they had been victorious on the 16th, and that the army had only fallen back "in order to obtain ammunition," set himself to oppose his enemy with a vigour he had not before displayed. If on the 15th he was remiss, and on the 16th did not display the fierce determination which the exigency required from a great commander, now, when the peril was becoming manifest, he strenuously set himself to avert it. He still had 160,000 men, after making all allowances for sick and losses; his first care was to choose a strong position, where he could offer a vigorous resistance, retain his hold on his lines of retreat, and whence, if victorious, he could break forth and make good his intended movement to Châlons. Such a position was found in the range of uplands which, intersected at points by ravines, with brooks and difficult ground in front, and belts of wood in the near distance, extends from the village of Gravelotte to the north-east to St. Privat-la-Montagne, beyond the road that runs from Metz to the frontier. The 17th of August Bazaine spent in stationing his troops along this line, and in collecting every means of defence which could increase its natural strength; and his arrangements certainly gave proof of the tactical skill for which he is renowned. Their old position of the 16th, from Rezonville to the Moselle, was still occupied; but the right, now thrown back at rather a sharp angle, extended from Rezonville by St. Marcel (on the north Verdun road, three miles from Gravelotte, and eight from Metz) and Verneville to St. Privat (on the road from Metz to Briey, eight miles from Metz). Rezonville, at the angle, thus formed the centre. St. Privat formed the extreme right, on a commanding hill whose steep slopes were perfectly bare of cover, and its natural strength was enhanced by all the resources of engineering art. The left, occupying Gravelotte, at the junction of the roads from Verdun and Etain, and thence prolonged by the high road to Metz, held a range of heights, with a wood beneath, which commanded all the neighbouring approaches. Protected in front by lines of intrenchment, with rifle pits and a formidable artillery, and resting on the fort of St. Quentin in the rear, it might be considered well-nigh impregnable. The French centre, though not so strong, had also the advantage of rising ground, with numerous obstacles along the front; it like-

wise had been fully intrenched. Bazaine posted about 140,000 men along this formidable defensive line, clinging to Gravelotte with his best troops, and leaving about 20,000 as a reserve near Metz.

These dispositions of the French commander, viewed simply as defensive, displayed real ability and skill ; but the result was to illustrate the truth of the saying of the first Napoleon, that a defensive position is always defective if it does not afford facilities for offence, since it enables your enemy at his leisure to search out the weak points in your armour. The French could only resist passively along the whole extent of their front; they had no means of attacking in return, and ranges of woods beyond their reach, which stretched before a great part of their centre and right, gave a daring adversary a vantage-ground to turn their position at the weakest end. In justification of Bazaine, it ought perhaps to be remembered, that he commanded soldiers who from the beginning of the campaign, before he assumed the command, had known nothing of victory, and who also believed that they were ever immensely outnumbered; though even then, as at Vionville, it was not true. He might naturally expect that such would be the case in the great trial of strength which was now impending, and may therefore have felt that his present duty was simply self-preservation, as far as possible, leaving future contingencies to be met in the best way he could, according to circumstances.

It was considered by the Germans that the flank march by the north road, or by making a wide *détour* further north, might still be possible to the French. Although such a retreat exposed them to great dangers, it appeared probable that they would undertake it, as the only mode of escape from a highly unfavourable position, in which the army would be cut off from Paris, and all its means of assistance. On the German side, the 17th was therefore turned to account in bringing forward for a final struggle the necessary corps, part of whom had already crossed the Moselle, while part had in the night thrown various bridges over it above Metz. At the same time the enemy's movements were carefully watched by the cavalry. His Majesty the king remained on the spot until, from the advanced hour of the day, further watch was unnecessary.

Count von Moltke could not have foreseen the perfect success of the action of the 16th, at the time he ordered his great flank movement with the view of intercepting the French retreat; and it was therefore necessary to push forward some of the corps which crossed the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and Dieulouart, to a great distance west of the river, in order to be prepared to catch up the left flank of the French army, in case it should succeed in effecting its retreat by the north road. On the 17th, and up to mid-day on the 18th, it was not known at the German headquarters whether Bazaine might not have succeeded in gaining this road, through the hilly country north of Moulins and Gravelotte. All these corps d'armée had therefore to march northward on the 17th from their respective positions towards the southern road, and parallel with the river; and others which had crossed at Dieulouart, Pagny, and Corny had to march to the north-west. In directing the troops, it had equally to be considered that the enemy might try to escape by the north road, and, perceiving the great difficulty of this, might prefer to accept battle immediately before Metz, with his back turned towards Germany.

This night, or early the following morning, the Germans had thus succeeded in bringing into line the second, seventh, eighth, ninth, and twelfth corps, with the guards and artillery of the third corps; so that, including the third and tenth corps already in position, the king concentrated for the inevitable attack eight corps d'armée with the artillery of the first corps. The first corps, as we know, was left under Von Manteuffel, on the east side of the Moselle. The French, on the other hand, had not of course been able to increase their strength by a single regiment, for all their reserves lay far away at Châlons, and behind the fortifications of Paris.

Thus Wednesday, August 17, was passed in the awful hush between two mighty conflicts, while the dead lay sweltering in the sun, or were laid in yawning pits; and the wounded were by thousands bleeding out their lives on the field, whence it would have needed ten times the available staff to have removed and properly attended to them.

An eye-witness of the scene in the morning of this day, said it was beyond all description. Every two or three yards on the road from Gorze to the battle-field, by which most of the Germans had advanced, might be seen either one who had died of his wounds in the night, or some poor wretch waiting for the stretcher and surgeon's knife.

Blood was literally running down the hill to the town. Now and then might be passed six or seven wounded lying side by side, attended by doctors and nuns—improvised out-door hospitals, for every house in Gorze was full. There was at that moment in and around the town 18,000 French and German wounded, and as its population was only 1500, it may be imagined what sort of accommodation these unfortunates had. At the Château St. Catherine, one mile on the other side of the town, belonging to an old chevalier of the Legion of Honour, there were 1500 French and German soldiers and officers in different states of mutilation. Great indignation was felt by the Germans, that the French did not send out any doctors to take charge of their wounded after the battle.

Before proceeding to describe the great battle of the 18th, it may be proper to notice two other movements which might have been made by Bazaine after the battle on the 16th, and for not adopting which he has been blamed by some military critics. In the first place, it is said by some—amongst others, by the writer who so ably sketched the progress of the war week by week in the *Saturday Review*, and to whom we would here express our indebtedness—he ought to have resumed offensive operations early on the morning of the 17th. Of the troops under his command a very large proportion had not been seriously engaged the day before. They had suffered nothing of the depression of defeat, and, although strategically outmanœuvred, officers and men at that moment undoubtedly regarded the day's proceedings as successful, and would have been in good spirits to recommence the engagement. The Germans could certainly not have brought more than half their army at most into action before late in the next day. Their total strength in the district was a paper force of 330,000 men, reduced by casualties, and the actual necessity of leaving one corps on their communications eastward of Metz, to 220,000. Bazaine might therefore have resumed the offensive early on the 17th with a preponderance of force on his side all the early part of the day, and with the impetus derived from a supposed success already won (that element of good fighting so peculiarly essential to the French soldier), to impel his men to their utmost efforts. Possibly, perhaps even probably, he might have attacked only to be severely beaten. But it is clear that he could not have suffered much more at the time, nor more at all in the end, than he did by adopting the determination of falling back to fight a wholly defensive action within reach of the works of Metz, and in what he judged a safer position, from its own natural strength and its proximity to the works, for receiving the enemy. Two most material consequences followed. The veil at once fell from the eyes of his men, who found themselves henceforth half imprisoned, struggling for liberty instead of striking for victory; and, besides, every mile that he retired made easier the task which devolved on Von Moltke of following up the retreat, and wheeling the whole second army to the right, corps by corps, to front the enemy completely. The marches of the guards and Saxons, for instance, who formed his extreme left, were diminished one half by this move of his adversary, and the next day saw the whole German army with its face towards the east, and its back to the enemy's communications, in a manner that would have been wholly impossible had Bazaine retained a more advanced position.

Other critics think Bazaine missed a great opportunity, on the night of the 17th and the morning of the 18th, in not retreating with a large portion of his forces through Metz, and endeavouring to entice the Germans back over the Moselle, and defeat them in detail. The data on which they base their conclusions are, that the distance from Metz to his different divisions varied from one to eight miles. On the night of the 17th the king's army had all passed to the western side of the Moselle, taking along with it even the artillery of Manteuffel's (first) corps, which was left alone on the eastern bank to observe Metz, and to protect the German communications. Here, then, was a rare opportunity. To reach and overwhelm Manteuffel, Bazaine's troops could march by the diameter, through the town and over the bridges of Metz, while, to sustain him, the German troops must move round the circumference, their most available bridges being at a distance of nearly ten miles from the town. For this purpose the French divisions of the right wing, extending from Rezonville to St. Privat, should have been withdrawn in succession from the right, before dawn on the 18th; the line of outposts being left to face the enemy to the last moment. The turning movement of the Germans by St. Privat was not completed until past three in the afternoon of the 18th, and the whole country being thickly wooded, the with-

drawal of the French could not have been discovered at the earliest before noon, when the first attack was made on them at Verneville by the ninth corps. This, to say nothing of the advantage in distance, would have given them a start, in time alone, of eight hours, which ought to have sufficed for the discomfiture of Manteuffel east of Metz. Owing to the position of the bridges, the German divisions nearest to the river would have had to march at least twelve miles to succour Manteuffel, and the sound of the French guns would have given the first intimation of the necessity. Had they come to his support one after another, they might have been beaten in detail; and any attempt of the German corps, which had reached the Briey and North Verdun roads, to follow the French into the fortress, would have been obviously hopeless, and just what Bazaine ought to have desired. The operation was safe and easy, and if properly conducted, must have succeeded. Even though the result physically might not have been great, the moral effect of such a success would have been of incalculable advantage to the army and to the nation. "All military science," say the critics who take this view of the case, "is useless, if the possession of a secure central situation—between the two parts of a superior hostile army, separated from each other by obstacles or by distance—is to confer no advantage to remedy the disproportion of numbers." The marshal's own explanation of his conduct at this time is given at the conclusion of the next chapter.



Drawn under the superintendence of Captain Hozier


BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE.
August 18th 1870.
Before the Fight
FRENCH
After the Fight
Before the Fight
PRUSSIANS
After the Fight
French Kilometres
Metres 1000 500 0 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometres
English Miles
Chains 80 40 0 1 2 3 Miles
Bois de Coulange
Silvange
Bois de Silvange
Marange
Mezieres
Bronvaux
Feves
Semecourt
Norroy
St Remy
Malroy
Charly
Plesnois
Villers
B. de Woippy
Rupigny
Failly
Chieulies
Vany
Saulny
Thury
Maison Rouge
Ft St Eloy
St Eloy
Bois de Grimont
Villers l'Orme
Woippy
Vigneulles
Grimont Fme
Ft St Julien
St Julien les Metz
Mey
Nouilly
Lorry Devant Metz
Tignomont
Ft les Carrieres
Devant les Ponts
Vantoux
Plappeville
Ft Moselle
Ile Chambiere
Vallieres
Lauvallier
Ban St Martin
Bellecroix
Ft Belle Croix
Lessy
Mt St Quentin
les Bottes
Plantieres
Ft les Bottes
METZ
Sey
Longeau
St Simphorien
Embarcadere
Borny
Colombey
Chazells
Longeville-les Metz
Rozericules
Moulins
Ft Queleu
B de Borny
St Ruffine
Montigny
le Sablon
Queleu
Grigy
Jussy
Vaux
MOSELLE R.
RAILWAY
St Privat
Mercy le Haut
Peltre
Magny sur Seille
Jury

CHAPTER XII.

Position of the First and Second German Armies on the morning of August 18—The Tactics of their Commanders—March right across the French Front—The great importance of this Operation—The Germans hope to surround Bazaine and his Army—Commencement of the Great Battle of Gravelotte by the Ninth German Corps, at Verneville—Extension of the Action to the whole of the French Right and Right Centre—The Storming of St. Privat by the Prussian Guards—Description of the Village and strength of its Position—Gallant Advance of the Germans—Fearful Slaughter in their Ranks—A Halt commanded—Resumption of the Attack and Dislodgement of the French—The Luxuries in the French tents—A German Officer's opinion of the French Soldiers—Description of an Attack on the Village further to the Left—Sanguinary Encounter—The Prussian Guards lose exactly half their number—Similar loss amongst a Battalion of Rifles—Extract from a Letter written on the spot by one of its Officers, giving a vivid Description of the Engagement—The French lose a great opportunity in not assuming the Offensive—Successful Bayonet Charge by the Germans—Success of the Germans at Verneville—Panic in the Village of Rezonville—Heroic Conduct of the Medical Staff—The Attack on the Formidable Position occupied by the French Left at Gravelotte—They are not to be out-manœuvred—Murderous Contest on the Slopes of Gravelotte—Description of the French Position on their Summit, and the Farm-house of La Villette—Excellent Practice of the French Artillery—Advance of the Germans—Shelling the Farm-house of Malmaison by the French, and Retreat of the Germans from it—Gradual advance of the German Cavalry—Desperate effort of the French to maintain their hold on the Verdun Road—They are at last driven back, and the Germans concentrate all their attack on the French Centre at La Villette—The most fearful massacre ever known in War, caused by some Batteries of Mitrailleuses—Regiment after Regiment driven back—Coolness and Bravery of both Officers and Men—General Steinmetz and the Artillery Officer—The King of Prussia and Count von Bismarck on the Battle-field—The firing slackens on both sides—It is suddenly re-opened by the French and a Regular Panic is caused in the German Ranks—A Grand Opportunity missed by the French—The Flying Troops rallied by the King in Person—Opportune arrival of the Second (Pomeranian) Corps and successful Storming of the French Position at the Crest of the Plateau—The Position occupied by the King and his Staff to witness this Attack—Gallant Conduct of the Troops on both Sides—The French Right and Centre having been outflanked the Left is obliged to retreat—Capture of some Citizens of Metz who had come to witness the Battle—His Majesty and Staff after the Engagement—Arrival of Count von Moltke with the tidings of Victory—A Painting made of the Scene by the King's orders—Letter from His Majesty on the following day describing the Battle—Official Description of the Engagement—The Losses in both Armies—General Review of the whole Engagement and its Results—The Scene on the Battle-field and in the neighbouring Villages—The opinion of German Critics as to what Bazaine might have done the day after the Battle—Description of the Action as it appeared to an Impartial Observer on the French Side, and General Opinion there with regard to it—The German Success attributed solely to their Unfailing Supply of Men—Scarcity of Ammunition on the part of the French—Extraordinary Conduct of their Generals—A Regiment shot down without being able to fire a shot in return—Shelling an Ambulance—Fearful Scene—A Regiment with only 68 men left out of 1100!—Disgraceful Panic whilst retreating—Scene on the Road—Inactivity of the French Guard—Valour of the Germans—State of the French Troops—Uselessness of the Engagement on the part of the French—General Order of Marshal Bazaine—His own Explanation of his Conduct from the time he assumed the Command to his being shut up in Metz—Construction of a Railway by the Germans—Instance of the Wonderful Foresight manifested by them.

THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE.

On the morning of the 18th the first and second German armies stood thus: first corps and third cavalry division at Pange, on the right bank; seventh corps at Ars-sur-Moselle and Vaux; eighth and ninth corps and first cavalry division at Gorze. The task allotted to this portion of the first army was to prevent the enemy from debouching by Moulins les Metz, whilst the second army was performing a movement intended, first, to prevent the French from retreating by the north road to Etain, and secondly, to assist an attack on their left at Gravelotte, should it be ascertained that they were not attempting to continue their retreat. The position they had taken up at this village was so strong, that it was seen it would be exceedingly difficult to carry it; and it was therefore resolved to move a large part of the vast force now at the disposal of the German commanders across the front of Bazaine's army, to assail and turn his right wing, while the left was simultaneously attacked, in the hope that through the pressure thus brought on it, the whole French line would gradually give way, and be driven under the guns of Metz, there to be isolated and completely cut off. For this purpose, not less than five corps were to execute the great turning movement, while three occupied the French left. The strength of the Germans would, it was considered, render the march across the front of Bazaine less dangerous than it appeared, while the intervening lines of wood would cover the movement in a great degree, and prevent a serious attack by the French. The leading corps of the second army were thus to form an *échelon* from the left wing forwards: the twelfth corps advancing from Mars-la-Tour on Jouaville; the guards to the east of Mars-la-Tour by Bruville on Doncourt-en-

Jarnisy, and still farther to the east between Vionville and Rezonville; and the ninth corps by St. Marcel to Cautre Ferme: in fact, as already stated, they started from the south road to gain the end points just named on the north road, that in the first instance they might possibly come on the flank of the French army filing off towards Etain by the same way. Large bodies of Prussian and Saxon cavalry preceded these columns, which were followed by a second line consisting of the tenth and third corps, with the second corps, the last of which marched from Pont-à-Mousson by Buxières at two o'clock in the morning, as a last reserve. At half-past ten it was evident that Bazaine's force had not left the environs of Metz; and the corps forming the *échelon* received orders to turn to the right, the ninth corps from Cautre Ferme by Verneville and Amanvillers, the guards and the twelfth corps from Doncourt-en-Jarnisy, on St. Privat la Montagne and Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, with the view of bringing them out on the high road leading from Metz to Briey, and shutting up Bazaine in Metz.

Non-professional readers can hardly comprehend sufficiently the merits of an operation of this magnitude. Upwards of 200,000 infantry and cavalry, with an immense force of artillery, were directed with such precision against a line about eight English miles in length, that not one single opening was left to the enemy to effect a breach in the German line. The credit of conceiving such a manœuvre is due to Count von Moltke, but the rapid and precise working out of the details reflects the greatest credit on Prince Frederick Charles and his staff officers.

The position of the different French corps at this time was as follows:—Canrobert, with the sixth, was camped on the high lands of St. Privat; L'Admirault and the fourth, between St. Privat and Amanvillers, forming, with Frossard and the second, the centre of the position; whilst Lebœuf and the third extended down towards Gravelotte. Marshal Bazaine and the imperial guard occupied Châtel, perched on the edge of the river which separates that high table-land from St. Quentin.

The Germans hoped at one time to have been able to do even more than shut up the French in Metz. It had been decided that if they were found intrenched on the Etain road, only a slight attack should at first be made on their right, hoping thus to tempt Bazaine from the strong position he occupied near Gravelotte. In that case the Germans could immediately have thrown between him and the forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville, and the town of Metz, the whole of their seventh army corps, which had been brought up from Gorze on the previous night through the Bois des Ognons, and now lay concealed by it on their extreme right. They would thus have had troops enough to surround Bazaine and his army. If they could not cut him off from this position on his left, their course then was to attack him there at any risk, and drive him into Metz. Had Bazaine fallen into the trap thus set for him when a feeble attack was made at the commencement of the battle by the German left, and abandoned the strong position on his left in the belief that the enemy were not in great force, the subsequent disaster at Sedan was not more complete than his would then have been.

The ninth German corps was the first to engage, about mid-day, some advanced detachments of the enemy at Verneville, a hamlet in the centre of the French position. From the German batteries at this point to Lebœuf's position in front of Amanvillers, runs a long ridge of land, and on this was a small farm called Montigny la Grange. It was there that the first shells fell, and soon after the artillery thundered out on both sides all along the line to St Privat. Taking advantage of the two woods of Dosenillions and De la Cusse, the Germans pushed forward enormous masses of men, not only with the view of supporting the attack here, but of assisting in that which they knew would soon be made from Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes on the strong French position at St. Privat.

Meantime the Prussian guards, followed by the twelfth corps, continued their north-easterly march towards this point. When they reached St. Privat, which was not till half-past three, they wheeled up to the right for the attack; the twelfth corps in the rear doing the same, and prolonging the line towards the left. The third and tenth corps, at first held in reserve, filled the gap between the ninth corps (engaged at Verneville) and Vionville. Thus gradually the French right and right centre, from Amanvillers to Roncourt, was beset by a vast host of assailants, who, issuing from the woods and swarming up the heights, endeavoured to seize the road to Verdun and to break through or outflank the enemy's line. The resistance, however, was fierce and obstinate; every point of defence was hotly contested; and it was not until the evening that St. Privat was stormed

by the Prussian guards, and a lodgment effected there in the French position.

The storming of this village, the extreme right of the French, and after which the battle is generally called by them, was exceedingly sanguinary, and the loss amongst the Prussian guards was fearful. The village stands on a steep and lofty cliff, which commands the ground for many miles round. It had many stone buildings of considerable height, which offered great facilities for defensive purposes; and both its position and the houses had been turned to excellent account by the French. In fact, the earthworks they had thrown up, and the heaps of manure and trenches that existed, gave them almost the advantages of a regular fortress. They also felt all the more secure, as the ground around is perfectly bare; and as the attacking party, as soon as it could be descried in the distance, would be unavoidably exposed to the full effect of their guns, they thought they had done enough, and might confidently await coming events.

The German artillery, consisting at first of nine, and afterwards eleven batteries, under the command of General Prince Hohenlohe, began the attack. Towards four o'clock, that is, after an incessant cannonade of three hours, the enemy's guns were silenced by these batteries, and the infantry were then ordered to advance. It was essential to come to close quarters before dark, as the enemy might otherwise effect his retreat without very serious losses, and force another battle upon the Germans the day after. At five o'clock, therefore, the brigade which formed the first line of the assaulting party left a ravine in which it had sought shelter, and marched against the village. As soon as they were observed a most destructive fire was opened upon them. After a few minutes numbers of them were lying on the ground, and the nearer they proceeded the greater the losses they sustained. Nor had they even the satisfaction of retaliating upon their adversaries, who, stationed behind houses and walls, or crouching in ditches, were perfectly invisible to the advancing troops, and could not be fired at with any effect. All the generals and staff-officers were mounted in front of the attacking party, and after a short time were either shot or had their horses killed under them. The enemy's fire was like a hailstorm, extending over a distance of at least 1500 paces in front of the hills. The noise it made completely drowned the German commands, and the smoke rendered it impossible for their men to handle their weapons with the remotest chance of success. Yet the guards did not hesitate for a moment. On they went, strewing the ground with their dead and wounded, determined to conquer or to fall. Long before they had reached the enemy their losses had, however, been so tremendous, that the prince of Würtemburg, their commander, gave orders to halt until the Saxons had made some impression on the right wing of the hostile position. This and another engagement of artillery, who were again sent to the front and resumed operations against the solid masonry of the village, delayed the progress of the advancing troops for some time. At last the village took fire, and they had some hopes of being able to penetrate through the shower of missiles which were still falling as fast and thick as ever. At half-past six they resumed the charge. The French, though their flank had been now turned by the Saxons, still fought with desperate valour, and defended every single house in the place. Within fifteen minutes, however, the Germans dislodged them entirely, when their ranks suddenly broke, and the mass, which had made so long and obstinate a resistance, at once retreated towards Metz.

The cost of victory, however, in this part of the field as well as at Gravelotte, necessarily damped the joy of the Germans. Nearly all the officers in the brigade which first advanced were either killed or wounded. The rank and file likewise presented a frightful quota of casualties. Every one lamented the death of a relation, a friend, or an acquaintance. They passed the night on the battle-field, many of them sleeping in the tents which the enemy had left behind him. Abundant luxuries and comforts were discovered in those of the officers. Beds and chairs, rockers, curtains, and carpets adorned the temporary abodes of these refined gentlemen; nor was there any lack even of perfumery and looking-glasses. What a contrast to the Germans, who had been sleeping on the bare ground, their generals lying down with the rest whenever they could not find shelter in a village! A German officer who was present said, "When we looked at the French tents, and the numerous *impedimenta* contained in them, we quite understood why they cannot march so rapidly as we do. But, to give them their due, they fought well while under cover. As long as

they kept behind walls, their conduct *etait tout ce qui peut être desiré*. As to assuming the offensive, they never thought of it. They are brave soldiers, and slaughtered us in the most terrific style; yet there is no denying that they have lost the *élan* that formerly distinguished them, and place greater confidence in a ditch and a long-range gun than in anything else."

Another brigade, which attacked the village to the left of that whose movements we have just described, had to adopt the manœuvre of advancing at a double and then lying down some half dozen times, leaving an enormous number of dead and wounded in their rear as they advanced, until at last they gained the road, which was some 400 or 600 yards from the village; they then sought cover in the ditches, and only showed the points of their helmets. Their leader and several officers had already been wounded and withdrawn to the rear. When they had sheltered themselves in the ditches they poured forth volley after volley, until they had expended fifty cartridges, and then came the order to storm the village. The men, springing up, formed in the middle of the road and advanced at the charge; but the enemy's fire became so deadly that they were driven back to the ditches again. At this important moment artillery, which had hitherto been unable to advance owing to the inequality and roughness of the ground, appeared in the rear and opened fire. The first shot demolished a wall which had served as a cover for more than 100 of the enemy's men, who were now exposed to the fire of German musketry. A second shot struck the roof of a stable, smashing the tiles and setting it in flames, which caused a whole division of the enemy to make a speedy exit. The German artillery kept up their fire, demolishing walls and burning houses and stables, until at last nearly every building was destroyed. Meantime, the brigade advanced to the principal entrance of the town. With their bayonets, and the butt-ends of their muskets, they broke open the barred doors and windows of the first house; and on their entrance fifty of the enemy, finding all hope of retreat cut off, surrendered themselves into their hands. From each stable, cellar, and corner issued the French, and the combat was renewed with the fiercest obstinacy. The arrival of the Augusta regiment and the artillery upon their right, and the second regiment of the guard and the fusiliers upon their left, enabled them to drive the enemy completely out of the village and capture a large number of prisoners. The French had, however, here made a very stout resistance. When the Germans were all collected in this place, a division of the enemy's artillery took up a position in a neighbouring village and poured volleys of grape amongst them; but they were soon silenced by the advancing troops of the Saxon corps d'armée.

In these encounters the guards lost exactly half their number, and more than that proportion of officers. Amongst the latter was Prince Salm, who accompanied the Archduke Maximilian to Mexico, and so narrowly escaped sharing his fate. On his right arm being shattered by a shot, he picked up his fallen sword with the left and continued the attack. Another shot in the arm he disregarded, until he was mortally struck in the chest. "Have we conquered?" he asked a clergyman who stood by his couch. "Yes." "Then all is well; comfort my wife," were his last words. The Queen Augusta regiment, to which he belonged, had on this day 28 officers and 900 rank and file struck off its muster-roll.

By the side of the guards, between Verneville and St. Privat, fought a battalion of rifles, which also left more than half its men on the ground. The following extract from a letter, written by one of its officers immediately after the battle, gives a good description of the scene:—

"After a march of thirty miles we reached the village of Mars-la-Tour, where the guards met. We slept in the cottages and mustered at four o'clock in the morning. At five o'clock we left, but proceeded slowly, our rear being some distance behind. At a quarter to eight we were in our allotted position. Colonel Knappe had just given us the *ordre de bataille* when the news arrived the enemy had drawn off. But it was a false report. We lay down on the ground, and at half-past twelve were ordered to form columns of attack and proceed to the front. Marching forward, we soon heard the thunder of the guns and the harsh grating of the mitrailleuse. Presently the needle guns join in on our right, and the military orchestra, which we have listened to so many times before, was again complete. The ninth corps d'armée was engaged at Verneville. When the guards attack and the Saxons outflank the enemy's left, he will not be long in giving way. So we are led to think; but man proposes and God disposes.

"Towards one o'clock we saw the battle before

us. The artillery of the guards and the Saxons were already engaged. Close to us we had the first division of the guards, concealed by an undulation of the ground; to our left the Saxons were struggling manfully. We watched the shells of our artillery as they burst with remarkable precision among the tirailleurs of the enemy. Queen Augusta's regiment was the first ordered to support the Saxons; the turn of a battalion of the 'Emperor Alexander' came next. The Saxons were evidently gaining ground in their flank movement, and all went well. I must say we began to be disgusted with playing the part of spectators. At last we moved to support the Hessians on our right. We stopped again in a slight hollow, until at last there came the command, 'Rifles to the front!' Now we are in for it in right earnest. It is a quarter to five, and as we begin to advance we get a taste of Chassepot balls.

"'Second company to the right; first to the left.' As we are turning a copse we are suddenly in the thick of it. Into the copse then, and along its outskirts. The fire is heavy, but as yet the balls fall short of us. At first we are at a loss to make out whence they come. Can it be that we are fired at from the heights in front, at a distance of at least 1800 paces? As we proceed our doubts are set at rest. We have the enemy really before us, and in a few minutes begin to suffer very perceptibly. Forward! forward! Spreading out in thin lines, we are running on while our breath lasts. But we are exhausted even before we can see the enemy, so great is the distance, and so steadily ascending the long-stretching slope we have to go over. Stop! We are still at 1000 paces from the French, and must take breath before we proceed. Not a shot is fired. Now on again a few hundred paces, right into a potato-field. Stop again, fire a few shots, and now at them at a run.

"At last we succeeded in getting near enough to see the heads of the French popping out of their ditches. As usual, they were in rifle pits on the slope and top of the hill.* By this time very many of us had fallen, and we halted, on wholly unprotected ground, to exchange some rounds with the enemy. Captain Baron von Arnim was shot in the foot, but remained sitting in our midst to direct the movements of the company. He soon got another ball in his breast, when he had to give it up. Finding we could not do much execution, we betook ourselves to our feet again, and ran to within 500 paces of the enemy. Now at last we had a fling at them. I measured the distance myself, took a dead man's rifle, and popped away as fast and as well as I could. At this juncture Major von Fabeck was shot, Captain von Hagen was shot, four men next to me were shot. We were in skirmishing order, and beginning to melt away like wax. In front stood the French, concealed in excavations up to their very eyes; behind us, for a distance of 800 paces, the ground was strewn with dead and wounded. If we had been strong enough we should have tried to cross bayonets, but our numbers had already been so very much reduced that we could not think of making the attempt. Indeed, had the French assumed the offensive they must have taken or killed every man of us. But according to their practice they kept in their ditches, and were quite satisfied with slaughtering us at a distance. The thing became perfectly unendurable, and there arose a low murmur in our lines that we had better fly at them at any expense, and knock down as many as we could while there were any of us left to do it. At this moment Captain von Berger, the adjutant of our brigadier, came up at a gallop, shouting from a distance, and ordering us to remain where we were if we would escape being taken prisoners. So we just stood our ground until troops were perceived coming to our support in the distance, when we all advanced again, and at 300 paces once more opened a murderous fire. All through my men were very calm and self-possessed. Under the circumstances they could not but know that the greater part, and perhaps all of them, had got to die. Yet they were as tranquil as the few of their officers still remaining, and looked with perfect equanimity upon the

* It would seem that the statements of the Germans with regard to the French having availed themselves so much of the protection of rifle-pits in these battles around Metz, must be accepted with reserve. At all events Mr. Robinson, of the *Manchester Guardian*, who was present on the French side at each of the three engagements, says in his "Fall of Metz," "I would here disabuse the minds of those who have imbibed the idea that the French always fought from rifle pits. Unfortunately it is not true. Spade drill, I am sorry to say, has no existence in the French service. Had it existed, many a thousand men now dead might still be living. The supposition of these mythic rifle pits has probably arisen from the fact that when thrown out in skirmishing order, the French soldier almost always fires *à plat ventre*, so that only his head is seen. I am sorry to say I never saw so sensible a thing as a rifle pit all the time I was with the army of the Rhine. No, poor fellows, they lay down along those little hill-crests in hundreds. Every little natural hollow in the ground was filled with them: they could try to take care of themselves when the chance presented itself, but no one cared so much for them as to teach them spade drill. *Elan*, that fatal word, did not need a spade except to bury its victim with."

French relieving again and again their tirailleurs in the ditches. We were now near enough to see that they had four rows of rifle-pits, the one over the other. The fire was terrific, and Königgrätz in comparison to it mere child's play. By and by our cartridges got exhausted, and we had to empty the pouches of the dead and wounded. As many of the latter as had a spark of life left did all they could to assist us in this. But everything has an end, and so had our ammunition. I had given orders that every man was to reserve two cartridges in case the French took the offensive; and with these two cartridges in our possession we confronted the enemy even after we had ceased to fire. After a little while, which seemed to us terribly long, our supports came up. They were skirmishers of Queen Elizabeth's regiment; and the moment they joined us I heard their captain give the command in my rear, 'Charge with the bayonet!' I was lying on the ground with a shot in my left arm and shoulder-blade; but as I heard those glorious sounds I jumped up, and halloaing to my men, fiercely repeated the word of command, 'Charge with the bayonet!' But, alas! there were only three men left to respond to my call. With the exception of a few who had joined another company, the whole of my men were down. I do not know whether the three survivors took part in the attack. As for myself, I could not do it, and sat down on the ground. The moment the Elizabeth regiment charged, the French jumped out of their ditches and ran away. An enormous quick fire was opened upon them, and, as I can assure you, to some purpose.

"The French were driven from their whole position. The villages around were on fire, and the shooting continued here and there. We had been opposed to the guards, who were the last to retreat. All the officers of the battalion are either dead or wounded; and of the 1000 men with whom we went into battle, only 400 are left."

The battalion which met with this melancholy fate was one of the finest in the Prussian army. The men were crack shots, and the officers belonged to the best Berlin society.

In addition to their victory at St. Privat the Germans were also ultimately successful in their attacks on Verneville, although determined resistance was offered, and the village was set on fire during the struggle. Advancing steadily from the ground they had so hardly won and maintained, they pushed back the French out of the village of Rezonville, which was more shattered than any other on the battle-field, and was the scene of a rather critical episode in the struggle. In a large building at the northern extremity of the village, which had at the side, level with the road, a large oblong walled garden, the Prussian ambulance established their hospital, and its rooms were quickly filled. Suddenly the tide of battle was heard rolling back towards it. A hurried message was quietly delivered to the surgeon-in-chief, that the French were storming the village at the other end. He hastened into the garden to inquire as to the fact. Louder and nearer grew the musketry firing; the garden wall was breached with cannon shots. A throng of fugitives rushed up the road confusedly, horses broke loose, waggons, and a troop of cavalry whirled past in wild disorder. The surgeon summoned his colleagues into the garden, and after a hurried consultation they resolved to remain at their posts and abide the issues. Hardly was this decision formed before thundering hurrahs were heard, and advancing columns of fresh troops were seen descending the slope. The fugitives were headed; officers galloped to and fro, calling out the numbers of the broken regiments, which rallied, and once more the tide of war ebbed back. It had been a momentary, but while it lasted a wild panic, arising from the horses in some ammunition waggons taking fright and dashing madly through the lines of the advancing regiments.

Whilst this fighting had been taking place on the French right and right centre, the German seventh and eighth corps had made a tremendous attack on the strong position occupied by the French left, near Gravelotte, from which village the whole action was afterwards named by the king of Prussia.

Soon after the first attack on the French centre had commenced at Verneville, it was evident that Bazaine was not to be drawn away from Gravelotte, but was quite aware of the disagreeable proximity to his left flank of the seventh German army corps. Suddenly therefore, seven or eight four and six pounder field-guns, which had been protected on the Vionville road by earthworks, began to rain shells into the Bois des Ognons, where the Germans were concealed. General von Göben, who commanded here, perceiving that the French general was not

to be out-manœuvred this time, as the Germans had hoped, gave the order for a general attack. Some forty or fifty guns were set in motion for different places, and in five minutes were in positions to the right and left of the Bois des Ognons, and pouring a destructive fire of shells into Moscow, Malmaison, and St. Hubert. An hour after the first shot was fired the action had become general here, and the outskirts of the village of Gravelotte were soon won; but the slopes beyond proved the scene of one of the most murderous contests recorded in the annals of war, and were at last carried by direct assault at an expenditure of life not before reached even in these days of improved weapons.

The French position on these heights was very formidable, as it was only approachable from the front by a steep hill, reached by a winding road, a mile in length, from the village of Gravelotte to the French batteries. On the French right centre here was a wood, which was filled with their skirmishers. In this wood, half-way down the hill and to the right of the road leading from Gravelotte, was a farm-house, named La Villette, which was one of the chief French defences. It commanded the road up the hill, which for nearly every yard of the way from Gravelotte runs in a deep cutting, open only in places on one side, and thus the house afforded a very favourable *point-de-mire* for the marksmen. On the German left was another large farm-house, named Malmaison.

The French had strengthened themselves by a succession of entrenchments, and had also thrown up small works to protect their guns. The walls of the gardens and the houses near their position, were also made as defensible as possible, and had been lined with tirailleurs, who could pour an incessant cross fire upon troops advancing up the road from Gravelotte. The situation had been taken up with extreme judgment, as from it almost every movement the Prussian troops made was distinctly visible, even to the shifting of the position of a single man, which accounts for the fearful slaughter the French were able to inflict. The top of the plateau was commanded by powerful artillery, with an ample sprinkling of mitrailleuses, and all the Germans could see of their enemies was the tops of their kepis. Behind the Germans lay the bloody battle-field of Gorze, fought two days previously, the dead still unburied, and some of the wounded still uncared for, the French having left theirs to the tender mercies of strangers. The sun struck fiercely upon the plateau, and the stench from the putrefying bodies was almost insupportable.

The chief occupation of the Germans at first was the shelling of the woods to the left of Gravelotte, which were filled with French skirmishers, and the road leading to Verdun, which, running along the brow of the hill, commanded Gravelotte, and was occupied by a couple of French batteries, that sent shrapnel and case shot among the German battery of horse artillery, on the right of Gravelotte, with wonderful precision. After some two hours' shelling the French fire grew slacker, and at 1.40 p.m. the German batteries advanced, and took up fresh positions 500 yards closer to the French guns, which, as they advanced, shelled them persistently, knocking the ammunition waggons to pieces. When, however, they had once got forward, they soon compelled the two French batteries on the road to retreat, and shortly after two o'clock cleared it. But in withdrawing their batteries of field artillery, the French had left a battery of eight mitrailleuses for the benefit of the troops as they came to close quarters. Each of these mitrailleuses was placed behind a small epaulement, which protected them in a great measure from the fire of the German skirmishers, and they were shortly destined to cause fearful havoc in the German ranks.

The cavalry now moved forward and massed near Gravelotte, and the infantry began to advance rapidly on the right; but in the meantime the French held good on the left, and so tremendously shelled the farm-house of Malmaison, on the hill to the left of Gravelotte, filled by German sharpshooters, as to set the place on fire, soon rendering both the house and garden untenable; when the Germans retired to the left, and took up a fresh position in the distance till their batteries could silence those of the French.

At 2.20, therefore, their artillery was pushed forward to the left of Gravelotte, and opened on the Verdun road, but even so late as half-past two the French continued to throw shells at the farmhouse of Malmaison. The Germans, however, paid little heed to this, but gradually got up their cavalry on each side of the road. As the uhlans and cuirassiers wheeled to the right on their way to the front, the batteries of the imperial guard threw some shells among them in a style which even their enemies admired. The cavalry and two regiments of cuirassiers, two of uhlans, and

two of hussars, pressed forward all along the line, although they were not actually sent into action for some time.

The French now made a desperate effort to hold on to the last bit of the Verdun road, between Rezonville and Gravelotte. It was, however, unavailing, for every man in their ranks had two to cope with, and their line at this point was already beginning to waver. It was soon plain that the French right here was withdrawing to a new position, which was swiftly taken up, under protection of a continuous blaze of their artillery from heights beyond the village. The movement was made in good order, and the position reached was one that nine out of ten military men would have regarded as normally impregnable.

The Germans having succeeded in compelling the French right at this point to shift its position, concentrated their efforts entirely on La Villette, their central position in this part of the field. And now commenced what may be called a massacre of the German troops, for regiment after regiment went up the fatal slope, and was compelled to retire, always with heavy loss. A fierce fire of artillery from 120 pieces was kept up all along the German line on the French works, and after about half an hour's shelling the thirty-third Prussian regiment dashed up the hill. When they were half-way up the mitrailleuses opened on them, and did terrrible execution at close quarters. The men, however, pressed on, and though they were literally falling by hundreds, they actually got into the works, and a half battery of four-pounders, which had followed them, got more than half-way up the hill. But the French ran their mitrailleuses 400 yards farther back before they could be caught, and from them and their guns, which had been drawn back a couple of hours before, opened so deadly a fire that the thirty-third was compelled to retire down the hill. Then the French mitrailleuses were dragged forward again, and sent a terrible fire into the retreating infantry. The half battery endeavoured to return their fire, but it was silenced, and all the horses being either killed or wounded, the guns had to be left on the hill-side. Of course their breech-pieces were withdrawn, so that they were useless to the French, who, besides, did not dare to take them, the German tirailleur fire being far too severe. Then the Prussians, according to their system of sacrificing masses of men to gain their purpose, made an attempt to charge the hill with cavalry, and the cuirassiers and uhlans dashed up at the batteries; but men and horses rolled over in the hollow road, and they were in turn compelled to retire. Then another infantry regiment, the sixty-seventh of the line, tried the attack in skirmishing order instead of in column. Their men crept from bush to bush and from rock to rock, taking advantage of the slightest inequality of ground to shelter themselves, but were unable to accomplish their object. Another attack was then made up the road, covered by a tremendous artillery fire; but though the men again got to the French works, they were again shot down in such numbers that they could not hold their ground. In fact, no living being could exist on the road. The men who had only seen the mitrailleuses fire at a distance despised them, and now rushing on them recklessly, were frightfully butchered. These murderous instruments, each behind its separate earthwork, were so placed that it was next to impossible for the German artillery to reach them, as they were a little lower than the road, and just sweeping it, which not only served to protect them from the enemies' shells, but prevented the gunners from firing at too great distances, for the mitrailleuses were placed so low down that they could only reach the Germans either on the road itself or on the last 200 yards up the slope. Never did troops go into action more bravely than the Germans on this occasion; and when, more or less severely wounded, they returned from the fatal heights, many of them made a joke of their wounds, and said the position was sure to be taken in the end. From three until half-past four there was one continuous fusillade: first the rattle of the Chassepots; then the reports of the needle-guns of the German tirailleurs crawling up the hill; and lastly, the sullen roar of the mitrailleuses as regiment after regiment rushed forward or returned always in good order, but often with the loss of half their number on the hill above. Under the cirumstances, it was wonderful to see the coolness of both officers and men. More than one of the former, as soon as their wounds were bound up, returned to their charge as if nothing had happened. But all the while the house of La Villette and the sharpshooters on the hill continued their fire. In addition to their infantry, the Germans also again and again brought forward regiments of cavalry to the scene of contest; but the slaughter, especially from the mitrailleuse, was

still so great that they were killed in large numbers, and were for a time unable to make any more impression on the enemy than the infantry had done.

After a time, however, the Germans got two guns to the angle that the Verdun road makes with itself; but the infantry had not yet come up to that point; and so fearful a fire was rained upon these two pieces that General Steinmetz deemed it proper to issue an order to bring them back. On riding up to execute this order, Hauptmann von Schmelling found but one surviving officer and three men with the two cannon, one of which was destroyed. There were still sufficient horses to bring the other out of action, or to a place nearer supports; but the young officer in charge, proud of his foremost position, heedless of the danger, and vexed at having to retire from lack of proper support, replied from the midst of his dying comrades, "Tell General Steinmetz where guns have advanced, there can also infantry. Let him send supports to me; I will not retire to them; rather will I die on my gun-carriage, and rest here with my comrades." He was as good as his word; he did not retire from his position until he had expended his last shot, and brought his gun, which he had worked with the assistance of three men, safely out of action; for the infantry did not come forward here until much later.

From the severe fighting at St. Privat and Gravelotte—the extreme right and left of the French position—about half-past four it seemed not altogether impossible that the French might regain possession of the very central Verdun road for which the armies were struggling; and accordingly the Germans brought up a large body of fresh troops, and placed them along the road out of immediate danger, but ready to fall upon the Freuch centre had it defeated those with which it was contending. The French thus seeing themselves hopelessly out numbered, the struggle at that part became very weak on their side, but it was carried on with redoubled fury on their left.

At a quarter past five the king rode slowly along the Gravelotte road, scanning with grave and serious eye the scene of havoc around him. Count von Bismarck was intent only on the battle, and could not conceal his excitement and anxiety. At half-past five there was a partial cessation in the firing. The Germans got a battery (the third) in position just to the right of the Gravelotte road, and about 1500 yards from the French post. They then commenced shelling the farm-house of La Villette, from inside which and from its garden such a destructive fire had come. At twenty-five minutes to seven the firing had again greatly slackened, and was confined to the skirmishers on either side. The Germans then brought up reserve ammunition, of which nearly all their batteries were short, preparatory to another attack before dark. Just after this, however, the French began to fire with new life along their whole line, and attacked with such suddenness and brilliancy as to cause a panic in the German ranks. Advancing from the rifle pits to which they had retired, they took possession of their original position; and according to the testimony of the Hon. C. A. Winn, who was present, had the French cavalry at that moment charged down the hill nothing could have resisted them, for the German soldiers, surprised and startled by the suddenness of the attack, instinctively ran like hares. (See "What I saw of the War at Spicheren, Gorze, and Gravelotte," by the Hon. C. A. Winn.)

"Any one coming up at that particular moment would have been under the impression that the Prussians had been completely routed. Such a stampede I never saw before, and I should think few military men had. Artillery, foot-soldiers, baggage-waggons, ambulances, every species of troop conceivable, in our immediate neighbourhood were rushing pell-mell to the rear. The words, 'the French cavalry are coming,' were on every Prussian's lips, except the officers, who shouted themselves hoarse with summoning the flying soldiers to 'halt.' All this had happened in an incredibly short space of time. I was standing at the door watching it all, and wondering when the French cavalry would come, and when they would begin to shell the village. Soon I heard, faintly in the distance to the rear, the national anthem, and I knew that the king in person was rallying his troops. On looking through my glass I found to my surprise that the French were not advancing from their original position of this morning, which they had just re-occupied.

"It has ever been a mystery to the German officers present at this stampede, why the French did not follow up their advance by charging the village of Gravelotte with cavalry. They must have taken

many prisoners and guns, and might have gained the position a step further on the Verdun road. To show how convinced every one was that at this point the battle had been lost, while I was away a major of the Prussian army who was shot through the leg and unable to stand, implored my companion not to leave him alone, but to help him off somehow, as he would rather endure any pain that dragging his broken limb after him might entail than be made prisoner by the French. Anybody that knows the Prussian character, will know that it takes a good deal to make one of those officers work himself into a state bordering on excitement."

His Majesty, who displayed wonderful vigour in the rallying of his troops, had arrived from Rezonville, and had temporarily placed General von Steinmetz, who had hurried up, in command of the second army corps, giving him permission to draw supports from it should he need them. This corps had been marching since two a.m, and had not yet been before the enemy. Under the eyes of General von Steinmetz, who had ridden into the defile with his staff, within rifle range, these brave troops, with loud hurrahs, drums beating, and bugles blowing the advance, rushed up the dark woody ravine to deploy on the other side, and hurl themselves upon the foe.

About a hundred yards from the centre of the village of Gravelotte, on one of the Verdun roads, stands a farm-house, with inclosures, in a line directly facing that upon the higher ground, with a ravine between, called Moscow. This, named Mogador, is much larger. On the 16th it had served as the chief hospital of the French, and was filled. In their retreat from Gravelotte backwards towards Moscow, the wounded were got out. It was here that, in the large, slightly hollow-backed meadow between Mogador and the main Gravelotte road, King William and his staff gathered, to witness this final and crowning achievement of the day, the storming of the position occupied by the French, who were now chiefly posted on the crest of the plateau, upon which stood the farm-houses with their high walled inclosures—Leipsic, Moscow, and St. Hubert. Here were massed powerful batteries, protected by entrenchments, and a number of mitrailleuses. From Gravelotte to the bottom of the hollow the road for 700 yards runs somewhat steeply down and straight as a line; it rises again to the crest at a slant, and nearly midway, upon the roadside slope, stands St. Hubert, effectually commanding its approach. The attack, which fell chiefly to the seventy-second regiment, who charged up the slope, followed by a regiment of hussars, was preluded by a fierce artillery duel on both sides, in which Mogador and Moscow were both fired and reduced to bare walls. This was the moment of which the king speaks in his despatch, "The historic grenades of Königgrätz were not wanting;" the positions, within near range and point blank opposite each other, were perilous, and General von Roon did right to insist upon the king's withdrawal. Slowly, and at fearful sacrifice, St. Hubert was at last carried, but further progress was long arrested, and the struggle relapsed into a fresh cannonading! Though the German guns enfiladed part of the enemy's position, hardly any ground was really won, and the resistance was still as heroic as the attack. But in the interval, the great turning movement of the morning had produced its effect; the right of the French had been outflanked and their centre slowly compelled to give way; and the line of fire which gradually receded from Verneville, Amanvillers, Jaumont, and St. Privat, warned the brave defenders here on the left that the time for a retreat had come. They fell back sullenly, fighting to the last, and protected by the mitrailleuse; but the Germans now gained the blood-stained slopes over Gravelotte, and the whole French army yielding the position, retired under the cover of Metz. The battle did not terminate till it was quite dark, and for some time the direction of the troops could only be traced by the fiery paths of their bombs or the long tongue of fire darting from their cannon's mouth.

A number of the citizens of Metz who had come in carriages to see the fight, and were stationed on the road just below the crest, were captured by the Prussians and treated as prisoners.

After witnessing this last attack on the French position, the king of Prussia and his staff rode back to Rezonville, where a watch-fire was lit, and where, failing a stool, his Majesty sat upon a saddle raised upon some logs. At his side were Prince Charles, the Grand-duke of Weimar, the Hereditary Grand-duke of Mecklenburg, Count von Bismarck, and General von Roon. Roon had taken off his helmet, and, contrary to his custom, was wearing a field cap. The king had his helmet on. All were very silent, expecting that about this time the decisive tidings must arrive.

Presently Moltke, much heated, rode up to the king:—"Your Majesty, we have conquered. The enemy is driven from all his positions." A vigorous hurrah from the bystanders was the response, and by the firelight Bismarck took down from his sovereign's dictation the following telegram, announcing the victory to the queen:—

"BIVOUAC NEAR REZONVILLE,
"*August* 18, 9 P.M.

"The French army, occupying a very strong position to the west of Metz, was to-day attacked under my leadership, and after nine hours' fighting was completely defeated, cut off from its communications with Paris, and driven back towards Metz.

"WILLIAM."

This extraordinary historical scene was sketched on the spot by Fritz Schulz, a painter in the royal suite, and from the sketch a painting was afterwards executed by the king's commands. The telegram despatched, refreshments were thought of; a sutler standing not far off was called up, and the party filled their flasks. The king drank out of a broken tulip-glass, while Bismarck complacently munched a large piece of ammunition bread. His Majesty did not leave the field, as he was desirous to ascertain by the break of day on the 19th whether the French had actually withdrawn into the fortress. Everything was therefore at once got ready for him and his attendants to bivouac on the spot, but in the distance a solitary farm-house was discovered standing, though terribly devastated. Yielding to the advice of his staff, who insisted on the necessity of his having a night's rest, in view of the possible renewal of the fight the next day, his Majesty withdrew for a few hours to a small room of this farmstead, while the generals put up with such accommodation as they could find in the stables.

According to another account, some cutlets were with difficulty obtained for the king; and Count von Bismarck, after eating some unboiled eggs, went with his attendants to seek a lodging. Several houses at which he made inquiries were full of wounded. At one house where he received the same answer, he asked whether there was not some straw "up there," pointing to a gloomy window on the first floor; but that, too, he was assured was full of wounded. He insisted, however, on seeing the room, and discovered two empty beds, on one of which he threw himself, while the Grand-duke of Mecklenburg appropriated the other, and the American General Sheridan made himself comfortable on the floor.

His Majesty remained all the following morning on the battle-field, receiving despatches from all quarters, and afterwards sent the annexed letter to her Majesty:—

"REZONVILLE, *August* 19.

"Yesterday was a day of renewed victory, the consequences of which cannot yet be estimated. In the early morning of yesterday the twelfth corps, the corps of the guard, and the ninth corps proceeded towards the northern road of Metz-Verdun as far as St. Marcel and Doncourt, and were followed by the third and the tenth corps, while the seventh and the eighth corps, and subsequently also the second, halted at Rezonville, facing Metz. When the first-named corps wheeled towards the right, in a very wooded terrain, towards Verneville and St. Privat, the last-mentioned corps began their attack upon Gravelotte, but not vehemently, in order to await the corps engaged in the great flank movement against the strong position of Amanvillers as far as to the road of Metz. The corps effecting this wide flanking march only entered into the fight at four o'clock, co-operating with the pivot corps, which had been engaged in the action since twelve o'clock. The enemy opposed us in the forests with violent resistance, so that we only slowly gained ground. St. Privat was taken by the corps of the guard, Verneville by the ninth corps; the twelfth corps and artillery of the third corps now joined in the contest. Gravelotte was taken by troops of the seventh and eighth corps, and the forests were scoured on both sides with great loss. In order to attack once more the hostile troops, forced back by the outflanking movement, an advance was made at dusk across the Gravelotte. This was met by such tremendous firing from the parallel ranges of rifle-pits and from the artillery that the second corps, just arriving, was obliged to charge the enemy at the point of the bayonet, and by this means it conquered and maintained the strong position. It was half-past eight when on all sides the firing gradually subsided. At the last advance the shells—of Königgrätz memory—were not wanting, at least where I was standing. This

time I was removed from their range by the minister Von Roon. All the troops I met cheered me with enthusiastic hurrahs. They performed miracles of bravery against an equally brave enemy, who defended every step, and often undertook offensive attacks, which were repulsed each time. What fate is in store for the enemy, who is now pent up in the entrenched and very strong camp of the fortress of Metz, is beyond present calculations. I shrink from inquiring after the casualties and names, for by far too many acquaintances are mentioned, often without just grounds. Your regiment is said to have fought splendidly. Waldersee is wounded seriously, but not mortally, as I am told. I had intended to bivouac here, but after some hours I found a room, where I rested on the royal ambulance, which was brought here, and as I have not taken with me anything of my equipment from Pont-à-Mousson, I have remained in my clothing these thirty hours. I thank God that he granted us the victory.

"WILLIAM."

The German official report of the battle was much more elaborate than this letter, but in consequence, we suppose, of the great area over which the conflict extended, it fails, as do nearly all the popular accounts of the action, to give anything like an adequate idea of the fearful nature of the struggle at St. Privat; and from reading it one might almost imagine that scarcely anything of importance took place elsewhere than in the neighbourhood of Gravelotte.

The report states that, at the commencement of the day, the first army (that of General Steinmetz) kept in concealment, and allowed the second army (Prince Frederick Charles's) to carry out its movement towards Verneville and St. Marie-aux-Chênes. When, however, towards noon, cannonading was heard from Verneville, and reports came in that the head of the ninth army corps had already reached that place, and was engaged with the enemy, the first army received orders to advance. The seventh army corps brought up strong batteries to the south and east of Gravelotte, who advanced with the greatest precision under an effective fire from the enemy's artillery. The infantry of the corps remained—until a later occasion should arise for them to be employed—in a covered position in the wooded valley separating Gravelotte from the heights of Point du Jour. Only the brigade of General von der Goltz, which was in position at Ars-sur-Moselle to secure the valley of the Moselle, had already been engaged. They captured the village of Vaux, in the valley of the Moselle, and afterwards stormed the heights of Jussy, the possession of which they maintained. Simultaneously with the seventh army corps, the eighth army corps advanced from Rezonville against the Bois de Genivaux, and attacked the enemy. The eighth corps at once opened a powerful battery from its front on to the road from Vancour-en-Jarnisy, whilst the first cavalry division at once took up a covered position in the rear, and the infantry advanced to attack the Bois de Genivaux in front, which was occupied by the enemy. Here also the enemy's artillery was quickly silenced, while the infantry met with a most obstinate resistance in the Bois de Genivaux. A close and bloody fight raged here for hours. Owing to the density and impenetrability of the wood, the combating parties were completely intermingled, and at certain parts of the Prussian lines so obstinate a resistance was encountered, that they were only able to press slowly forward; whilst in other parts they reached the eastern skirt of the wood, and, even breaking through it, advanced to attack the opposite heights and farm-houses of St. Hubert. The latter were at last taken by slow degrees, after repeated attacks, and held, whilst all attempts to proceed further to the ridge of the heights were baffled by the strongly occupied rifle pits. The infantry encounter came to a standstill, the artillery of the enemy being almost silent, and our guns not having any effective object to be achieved by firing.

It being imagined that the enemy was now about to withdraw, two batteries of mounted artillery and a regiment of cavalry were ordered to pursue; but it soon became apparent that the French had only sought cover from the artillery fire of the Prussians, and the pursuers were very hotly received. They maintained their position, however, and fought against serious odds until relieved late in the evening by the cavalry reserve. More than half of the men and horses were killed. The conclusion of the battle is thus described by the official writer:—"From the left wing the heavy roll of infantry rifles, mixed with the thunder of cannon, was heard between Verneville and Amanvillers, which had been eagerly awaited. Apparently the sound came nearer—a favourable

sign of the approach of the army of Prince Frederick Charles. Our infantry maintained the battle more tenaciously than ever, the appearance of the second army promising to bring up support, and the brave artillery, despite their severe losses, served their guns as if on the parade ground. The French continued their fire the whole day, especially from the rifle-pits, with their Chassepot rifles, at a range of 2000 paces, whereby the position was continually held in insecurity, and occasioned considerable loss. The French were in a desperate situation, surrounded on all sides, and nothing remained for them but to retreat into the fortress of Metz, into which their army was forced to disappear. About seven p.m. they made one desperate attempt to break through by Gravelotte from Metz to Paris. Thick clouds of skirmishers, one behind the other, uttering loud shouts, and keeping up a continual volley, rushed forward from behind the heights against the wood in the ravine. Our weak decimated infantry squads were nearly all dispersed, and the danger was great that this attack, made apparently in force, would be successful against our exhausted troops. But our brave artillery opened upon them over the heads of our infantry so effectively, that the attack was repulsed by the combined action with the infantry, which once more made a stand. Material and decisive support was, however, at hand. His Majesty the king had arrived during the battle from Rezonville, in the northern direction towards Gravelotte, and had temporarily placed General von Steinmetz, who had hurried up, in command of the second army corps, giving him permission to draw support from this corps should he need it. This second (Pomeranian) army corps, which had not yet been before the enemy, hastened up in quick step, inspired by lust of battle, and at nightfall decided the conflict. The discharges from the guns shone out brightly in the dark night; but the line of fire grew more and more distant, and although many a brave man sacrificed his life, and the losses were fearfully large, yet the slope and the hostile heights were ours. So ended the battle of the 18th of August. On the following morning the enemy had evacuated the heights, and withdrawn within the fortifications of Metz. The battle-field is strewn with corpses and wounded men. The victory was dearly won, but it was brilliant and decisive, as the enemy is now shut up in his fortress."

Such then was the desperate battle of the 18th of August, as nobly contested as any ever fought, and unquestionably the cruelest conflict waged in this generation. The French, brought to bay, never—not even at Waterloo nor at Borodino—fought more splendidly. They are not usually supposed to excel in defence, but they held the hill above Gravelotte in a way that the troops who kept the heights of Inkermann would have been proud of, and their bravery and skill won admiration even from their enemies. That after so much fighting on the previous Sunday and Tuesday, under the most discouraging conditions, they should on this day have so well resisted the attack of greatly superior numbers for nine hours, reflected infinite credit upon their courage and resolution; and never, in fact, even in its most triumphant campaigns, did their army win more real glory than in this disastrous attempt to retreat from Metz. They are said to have lost 19,000 men; and the sudden wail which broke out from Germany attested the fearful gaps which were made in her army. There can be little doubt that, near Gravelotte, the assailants suffered in the proportion of nearly three to one compared with the defenders (the Hon. A. Winn, indeed, estimates that the Germans there lost as many thousands as the French did hundreds); nor is it improbable that the Germans were weakened by more than 25,000 soldiers. Amongst the wounded were two sons of Count von Bismarck, and a son of General von Roon, the Prussian minister of War. The fearful loss on the side of the Germans proves the energy of the French resistance, and does credit to the tactical power of Bazaine, who, with an army inferior in numbers, and already shaken by serious reverses, contrived to strike his adversaries with such terrible effect. The dispositions of the marshal, however, were, as we have seen, entirely defensive; and though this may have been unavoidable, the inability of the French to assail the Germans as they were making the turning movement, exposed them ultimately to defeat. The long march round on the French right, though fully justified by the event, and owing to the peculiarities of the ground much less hazardous than it might have been, was, nevertheless, not without peril to the Germans; for experience has shown what may be done under such circumstances by great generals, who have the means of attacking during an outflanking movement.

During the terrible hours of the assault, the Prussians were so many live targets to be shot at by the French; while they were to the Prussians an intangible enemy, whose existence was known less by the eye than the ear. To march against their position would, it was clear, be certain death to a large proportion of the attacking forces; yet march they repeatedly did, until at last their efforts were crowned with dearly-bought success. At Gravelotte, as at Woerth, victory was ultimately insured by a flank attack assisting the charge in front; but in both instances the ground from which the flank attack proceeded had to be first wrenched from the enemy, and only after a fearful contest. Looking, however, at the operations as a whole, although Bazaine fought a good battle and the losses of his foe were immense, the German commanders had fully succeeded in their grand if somewhat hazardous strategy. The French, driven completely into Metz, had been forced off their line of retreat; their enemy encompassed them on every side, and occupied their communications with Châlons; the roads to Verdun and Etain had been lost; and nothing but a decisive victory over an adversary immensely superior in strength could extricate them from their position. Bazaine's army, including the flower of the French troops, was altogether isolated and cut off from the other forces of France; imprisoned within the fortress, it had no prospect but to force its way through at great odds, or to surrender; and well would it have been if it had not attracted a relieving army to its assistance; which, in a vain attempt at rescue, as we shall see in the next two chapters, became involved in its defeat and ruin.

The battles of Tuesday and Thursday had the same object and the same general result; first, to make it impossible for the French army to continue its retreat towards a point where it might have effected its junction with the other military forces of France; and, secondly, to cut it off from communication with the government of the country, on which it depended for orders, money, reinforcements, and succour of all kinds. The difference between the battles was that, whereas on Tuesday night Marshal Bazaine's army, although temporarily and seriously disabled, was at least in a condition to fight again, by Thursday night it was completely defeated and rendered to a great extent useless.

The scene in Gravelotte and the villages around, after the battles of both the 16th and 18th, was awful. After eight days, in spite of every exertion, corpses still lay on the field; and after three days, wounded were still found who had not been attended to. The desperately wounded lay on straw, littered down on the floors of the deserted houses and out-buildings. The devoted nurses, male and female, who attended them dressed them three or four times a day, stooping over them in the most painful positions, for there were no seats, and to kneel upon the floors, drenched with blood and other secretions, was impossible. To clean the floors there were no brooms, no cloths, nor was there soap or water even to wash the sufferers. When darkness, too, came on, there were no candles nor matches; and the brave men, French and German, who had given their best blood for their country, were left to die in the dark.

We have thus reached the end of a week of battles; a week, perhaps, in which more men fell by the hands of their brother men than in any similar period since war was known on the earth; and it is, we believe, no exaggeration to say, that in the fortnight which elapsed between Thursday, August 4, when the Crown Prince fought the battle of Wissembourg, and the evening of Thursday, the 18th, when his father won the battle of Gravelotte, 100,000 men had fallen on the field.

Disheartened as his men now were by finding that their chief had counted their supposed victory of the 16th a disadvantage, and by their subsequent decided defeat in the position he had selected for this battle, it is extremely doubtful whether an instant march northwards from Metz (which the French commander was afterwards blamed by some for not having attempted) would have been of any service to them. It is true that the Saxon cavalry were the only bar in his way to Thionville early on the 19th; but to have started thither along the flank of the victorious Prussian general must have brought Bazaine between a now practically superior force and the Belgian frontier, and by this it is probable enough he would have anticipated with his army the disaster of Sedan. But German critics of a high class believe that, had he marched due south, starting from the works above Metz on the Moselle, he would for the time have got clear of their army, which had suffered so heavily on that flank just before dark, that it could not have been fit to move early. On the other hand, it is clear he would have met the fourth corps return-

ing from its movement toward Toul, and fresh for action, as it lay just in his way on the left bank, while the first was similarly detached on the right; and it could only have been by promptly overwhelming one of these, before his rear was severely attacked, and driving it so clean out of his way as not to allow it to fall back for support on the Crown Prince's army, that he could have carried the bulk of his troops away. The propriety of encountering this risk may have been somewhat doubtful, even supposing he had his troops sufficiently in hand; but a general of higher order would doubtless not have tamely allowed himself to be shut in, when the German army, in forming its line, had thus left an opening on its flank by which to escape. More than this, it is very possible that in doing so such a general would have dealt the first army, or right of Von Moltke's line, such a counter-stroke as would have more than atoned for the defeat of the day before, which, after all, the victors paid for heavily.

Instead of this, Bazaine sank into a state of perfect quiescence for eight days, which gave to the Germans invaluable time and opportunity of counter-intrenching their army so strongly as not only to make egress from Metz difficult, but, as we shall see, to enable the three corps forming their new fourth army to be withdrawn to occupy the line of the Meuse, and completely bar the rash attempt which MacMahon made to relieve his brother marshal.

The foregoing description of the battle has been compiled chiefly from the best accounts of it as it appeared to reliable observers on the German side; but it cannot fail to be interesting if we give the views and opinions of an able and thoroughly trustworthy witness who was present with the French, Mr. G. T. Robinson, the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, and author of the "Fall of Metz." As at the preceding battles of Courcelles and Vionville, he was again on this occasion the only English writer present on the French side, and witnessed the battle in the neighbourhood of Verneville and St. Privat. He considers that the whole proceedings of the Germans on this day involved a loss of life on both sides as unnecessary as it was fearful; and believes they could have attained their object of hemming in the French without it, as it was almost impossible for the latter to act on the offensive. He says, that as the Germans poured on their men the French batteries of mitrailleuses established on the heights mowed them down at 1200 to 1400 yards distance in long black rows. There was no science in their (the German) attack, it was simply brute force and stupidity combined; the more the French killed, the more there seemed to be to kill. After a time they knew it would be physically impossible for them to keep on killing them, as both their men and ammunition would be exhausted; so on they kept pouring fresh troops after fresh troops in murderous wantonness. To crush by force of numbers seemed the only idea. "There was no attempt to outflank us, which might so easily have been done, as their line was longer than ours, and we could not advance, they holding the roads in check. If they had worked up the Orne they would have compelled us to retire with hardly firing a shot. As it was, we were simply beaten, not by tactics, but because we could not butcher any more. At last our ammunition failed us, and then the generals lost their heads. Regiments were ordered into impossible places, overlapping each other in the clumsiest fashion, simply placed where they could be the most conveniently killed, and then forgotten; no supplies of ammunition were brought up, and Canrobert's corps was absolutely pushing back the enemy from his position on our right, really bending him back, when the last round his artillery had was fired. At the same time the sixty-seventh stood for three hours right in front of a wood, being leisurely shot down by the Prussians without a single cartouch to fire; not a single non-commissioned officer came away from that wood; and two-thirds of the regiment remained with them. An ambulance was pitched at a place appointed by Frossard, who in half an hour afterwards had so far forgotten where it was that he ordered some artillery immediately in front of it. Of course, the Prussian fire comes plunging into this to silence it, and over it into our ambulance, to silence many there. Bursting in the midst of the poor maimed, wounded, and amputated men, come the shells, and the horrors of war are intensified to a pitch beyond the power of the most devilish imagination to surpass. Here are poor men killed over and over again, that is, they go through the horrors of death many times; and what with their generals and what with their doctors, it's a wonder there are any left. Cer-

tainly glory is very beautiful when it is encountered in a shelled ambulance; and one is rather puzzled to define what is murder, or what not.

"A regiment of the fourth corps was also placed in position with a muster-roll of 1100, and came out 68! It was very fortunate for human nature that King William had not the power of the Jewish commander, for had that day's sun been stayed, scarcely a Frenchman there would have lived, and the slaughter of their enemies would have been even greater than it was. Truly, indeed, the soldiers say, in speaking of that day, 'It was not war, it was a massacre.' All the ammunition being expended, we had nothing to do but to withdraw; and now commenced a scene of most disgraceful confusion. Seeing the forces retire, and perhaps being rather more than usually sworn at, those wretched auxiliaries took fright, and a regular stampede occurred amongst them; their terror threw them into an even greater confusion than usual. They rendered the road utterly impassable. Waggon after waggon was emptied, and huge piles of provisions were set fire to. Sugar, coffee, biscuit, fodder, private baggage, anything and everything, was heaped together, and more than 100,000 francs worth of provisions were there and then destroyed, under the pretext of preventing them falling into the hands of the enemy. All along the road from the village of Gravelotte, from which our left was rapidly retreating under a heavy fire from the Prussian advancing forces, the ditches were choked with huge boxes of biscuit, bearing the familiar English record of their weight, and the inscription, 'Navy Biscuits,' in most stumpy British characters. Broken open by their fall, they scattered their contents all over the road, and were ground into the dust by the wheels of the waggons. Whole cart-loads of sugar lay on the roadside; the soldiers filled their sacks with, or shouldered great loaves of it, and sold them in Metz for a few glasses of wine or spirits; everything that could be destroyed was, and the vehicles rolled empty down the hill in one mad panic. A quartermaster in French uniform galloped by. 'Fly, fly for your lives!' he cried, and he fled. It was of course afterwards said that he was a Prussian spy in disguise; such things always were said, all these things were done by Prussian spies, who acted the character they assumed to a marvel, and were always on the spot at the right time—clever fellows. The Prussian batteries had now crept round to St. Privat, following our retiring silent artillery, silent from want of ammunition, and began to rake our lines. The noise of the panic in the rear reached the soldiers; it spread like wildfire, whatever that may be, it seized hold upon them at once; encampments were abandoned, arms were flung away, knapsacks, great-coats, everything which could encumber flight was cast aside; *sauve qui peut* was the order of the day; and if that quartermaster had been a spy, he would have ridden forward to the Prussians, and Bazaine's army would have been annihilated. Fortunately the enemy did not know of it; he did not follow up the retreating rabble; indeed, I have heard that something similar occurred on his side, too, but as I only heard of it from some prisoners, I do not know if it is true.* Night kindly and charitably covered us and our disgrace. Some of our men held the quarries of Amanvillers, and kept up a semblance of a resistance. Canrobert's silent artillery held bravely in the rear, and probably the Prussians feared a feint; but the major part of the army rushed away down into the ravine, and never stopped until it found itself, panting and exhausted, safely under cover of St. Quentin and Plappeville. Some few troops remained on the ground all night in front of Amanvillers. Pradier's division of L'Admirault's corps held their ground till seven in the morning of the 19th, having been twenty-one consecutive hours under arms and without food. On our left the second battalion of the eightieth held the little inn of St. Hubert until three p.m., checking the advance of the Prussians until their shells set fire to the place, and only allowed eighty-six of our men to come away. As for the guard, they did nothing; they stayed at Châtel St. Germain, perfectly safe, and Marshal Bazaine stayed with them. He had had enough of erratic charges on the 16th, when he was so nearly being taken prisoner, and did not want to see any more uhlans, so he kept at a very safe distance. One shell, it is true, did reach the quarters of the guards, so they claim to have been under fire that day; their list of killed, wounded, and missing amounted to one!

"Thus terminated that murderous, needless day of St. Privat, or, as the Prussians call it, Gravelotte; a day nothing could have converted into a useful victory for the French, and one which was only made into a Prussian one by wholesale

* It will have been seen before, that such was actually the case.

slaughter. Very bravely fought their soldiers; they marched to certain death with heroic coolness; right up the slope they came, only to die the faster the nearer they approached; up to within two hundred yards some made their way, and there they rested for ever; nor was it until our ammunition failed us, and our men were physically exhausted, that one ever reached our lines. Incessant marching, three days' fighting, without food, without rest, and without ammunition, our men gave way, overcome more by these things than even by the number of their foes without. It was their foes within which conquered them; and many a man lay down and died there without a wound, slain solely by too much fatigue and too little food. For three days some of them had eaten nothing but unripe grapes, and so, of course, they died. What our losses were we never knew; but these two days' fighting at Rezonville and here must have cost us at least 30,000 men, and this day's fighting must have been trebly murderous to the Prussians, and for what? Not a single thing was gained by all that slaughter. The untenable and useless position was abandoned, and what was left of the army now retired upon Metz, where it might just as well have taken up its quarters after the 16th, if, as the marshal demonstrated by his taking up so defensive a position, it found itself too ill provided and too ill provisioned to proceed. On the 20th came out this order of the day, a collective sort of 'order,' embracing all the fighting of this bloody week:—

" 'General Order.

" 'Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army of the Rhine,—You have fought three glorious battles, in which the enemy has suffered grievous losses, and has left in our hands a standard, some cannons, and 700 prisoners. The country applauds your success.

" 'The emperor delegates me to congratulate you, and to assure you of his gratitude. He will reward those amongst you who have had the good fortune to distinguish themselves.

" 'The struggle is but commencing; it will be long and furious; for who is there amongst us who would not shed his last drop of blood to free his native soil?

" 'Let each one of us, inspired with the love of our dear country, redouble his courage in the field, and bear with resignation fatigues and privations.

" 'Soldiers,—Never forget the motto inscribed on your eagles, *Valour and discipline*, and victory is certain, for all France is rising behind you.

" 'At the Grand Quartier-Général of Ban St. Martin, 20th August, 1870.

" 'The Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief,

" '(Signed.) BAZAINE.'

" Three large battles, and only that! One standard, 'some,' that is to say, two, cannons, and 700 prisoners. We knew we lost two eagles, and a good many more than two cannons, and I hope many more than 700 prisoners. I say hope, for if not our list of dead and wounded must be great indeed. The country applauds, and the emperor is grateful; verily the survivors have indeed their reward, but I cannot help feeling that the dead have been needlessly sacrificed. At the same time that the marshal's 'order of the day' appeared, came out also an official communication from the quartier-général. It, of course, endeavoured to palliate these repeated disasters, and congratulated everybody that for two days the army had not been harassed by the enemy, and that they have been quietly allowed to take up those positions round Metz appointed for them by the marshal. But as these positions were behind the forts, it struck all who thought upon the subject, that the cause for congratulation was not much; the enemy, we thought, might congratulate himself more on the fact that he was allowed to take up his position on the other side of them equally quietly. 'It is unfortunately true,' says this correspondence, 'that certain regiments had not received a sufficient quantity of ammunition, and that at certain points we have to deplore the existence of momentary panics, which in some degree compromised the issue of the day, and of which the ill effect was felt in the town, giving a certain feeling of faint-heartedness, soon, however, overcome. These are only accidental occurrences, and we can truly say that the enemy's plan of the 18th has not succeeded.' As, however, Bazaine's army was now completely cut off from all the rest of France, and as our communications were entirely stopped, none but the very sanguine amongst us felt much satisfaction at the thought that whatever other plans the enemy might have had, he had succeeded thus far, and a faint shadow of the coming events began to envelop us. MacMahon was our hope, and we relied on him much more than on Mar-

shal Bazaine, possibly because we knew so much less of him. We were told that he was coming from Châlons to our help; so we waited for the good time and MacMahon coming together, and unfortunately neither came so far as Metz."

Under the title of "A Brief Report of the Operations of the Army of the Rhine, from the 13th August to the 29th of October, 1870," Marshal Bazaine, after the capitulation of Metz, published a justification of his conduct in relation to the events described in this and the preceding chapters. He practically disclaims any share in all that went on up to the 13th of August, the day on which he officially took the command. The decree appointing him, and at the same time abolishing the functions of Lebœuf as major-general to the emperor, was only dated on the 12th; and by his utter silence as to all previous transactions, Bazaine would clearly wish it to be understood that he had nothing to do with the command until the official transfer was made. This may be, of course. On the other hand, we have on record the semi-official telegrams from Metz of the 9th, stating distinctly that "Marshal Bazaine is charged with the direction of the operations," closely followed by "official" telegrams of the same date, not signed, but accepted as coming from the emperor himself, and calling the whole force round Metz "the army of Marshal Bazaine." In the emperor's pamphlet, to which we have already more than once referred, there is great obscurity as regards this particular episode. The secret history of the unhappy and fatal delay of the six days is not yet known, and Napoleon cannot be absolved from having had to do with it. But neither can the marshal be exempt if, as the telegrams led the world to believe, he was already named commander-in-chief of the whole army. The crisis required that rare quality of moral courage which would have insisted on receiving full and immediate power corresponding to the responsibility to be imposed on him. This quality was not displayed, and hence we have the strange fact of an emperor and commander both suffering in reputation for the loss of precious time, and neither able to acquit himself of share in the blame. From the 13th Bazaine first admits his unfettered leadership, as indeed it was then officially his; and in his pamphlet is the fatal admission that the paucity of the bridges kept his last two corps, Decaen's and L'Admirault's, from concentrating on the left bank, before marching off, until the 16th came, and with it the battle of Mars-la-Tour. It is noteworthy that the latter of these corps is stated to have "almost completed its passage over the stream" on the morning of the 14th, and to have been brought back voluntarily in order to support the other, the third, against the assault which Steinmetz's troops suddenly made. The object of the Germans is distinctly said to have been, as indeed it unquestionably was, to delay the passage of the French, who, however, had on that side only to withdraw within the works, instead of accepting Steinmetz's challenge, in order to be perfectly safe. In place of doing this, the French staff played into their enemy's hands by bringing part of L'Admirault's corps across to join in the fight; and for this, as no excuse whatever is offered by Bazaine in his defence, we may presume there is none, save that they did not then discern what he saw very clearly afterwards. So the rest of the 14th was thrown away in a useless combat, and the 15th and morning of the 16th were consumed in attempting to repair the mistake by re-crossing the fourth corps to the west bank, and after it bringing over the third. Meanwhile, though the safety of the whole army was already known to be imperilled by the slowness of its movements, "the bridges were insufficient in number," simply because the marshal and his engineers had neglected to prepare additional means for the coming emergency. Then follows the next episode of this history of disasters. Bazaine, having fought the indecisive action of Mars-la-Tour, and, as he says fairly enough, "kept the enemy in check for the moment," found himself ill-provisioned as to rations, and particularly short of cartridges for his artillery and infantry. It is true that the intendance had put several millions of the latter (five-sixths, in fact, of the whole reserve) where the responsible officer was unaware of their existence; and the marshal is not to be blamed for this fatal error of centralization which, with others of a similar kind, helped so much to destroy the army it was designed to serve. We must take his view, therefore, as formed according to the circumstances reported at the time. But even allowing that these were alarming, his putting his advancing army suddenly on the defensive by the retreat which he determined on, led to such fatal results that it seems to stand self-condemned. It was done, as he informs us, to get rid of the wounded, to obtain supplies for a march, and to avoid further immediate action which should impede

the hoped-for retreat. It ended in the army being shut in with its wounded, the march being wholly stopped, and the battle of Gravelotte being fought and lost on the very next day. The marshal pleads also want of water in his previous position; but the well-known surprise and reluctance manifested by his army at the order to fall back sufficiently refute his plea. He takes especial pains at this point to contradict those who say that he should have continued the action at once, instead of falling back on the St. Privat position. But the two causes stated as making this impracticable form perhaps the most unsatisfactory part of the defence. They are that the Prussians "had sent forces to occupy the position of Fresnes, before Verdun," and that the French had not only been hotly engaged, but were obliged to wait for the fractions of their army left behind, "especially the grand reserve park which was at Toul!" The Prussians had, in truth, had quite enough to do to hold their own on the day of Mars-la-Tour without making detachments to their rear to take up fresh positions; and as their whole army was now pressing on across the line between Bazaine's forces and Toul, and had on the 17th its back to the latter place, with one corps echeloned towards it, he might just as well have waited for the runaways of MacMahon who had got shut into Strassburg, as for the reserve park he speaks of. Had he risked an action, he adds, "the army might have experienced a severe check, affecting disastrously its further operations." Possibly it might, but the check could certainly not have been more serious than the defeat of Gravelotte, nor the consequences more disastrous than being shut up in the position in which he found himself in and around Metz. Even if Bazaine could not make up his mind to assume the offensive at daylight on the 17th, before the Germans received more succour, in the opinion of many military critics it was still open to him to have sent back such of his trains as were near Metz, and, masking the movement with a part of the troops which still faced the enemy about Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, to have filed the rest of his army behind it on the northern road, which had not then been reached by the Germans, and so have pushed on towards Verdun by Briey. The Germans, we know, believed that such a movement would be attempted, and immediately they had observed it there would doubtless have been a pursuit; but a short start, carried out with activity, might have carried Bazaine to Verdun, and the line of the Meuse once gained, he should hardly have allowed himself to be intercepted in attempting to join MacMahon, who could have moved to meet him. To have accomplished such a flank movement, from the front of a resolute enemy, would unquestionably have been no slight task, and could not have been attempted successfully unless decided on promptly and carried out energetically; and it must be admitted that promptitude and energy seem to have been qualities sadly wanting amongst the French staff at this time. It is necessary, however, in order to obtain a complete understanding of the whole campaign, to show that there was not strictly, at this crisis of the war, an absolute necessity for choosing between renewing the bloody attacks of the 16th and falling back and fighting defensively before Metz; but that the means of escaping, without the risk of a general action, were still at hand, had the French commander had the quickness and resolution to have availed himself of them.

As the sequel of the battle of Gravelotte (called by the Marshal, from the central village of his position, the Defence of the Amanvillers Lines), he says that the French army on the following morning took up its position among the detached forts round Metz, and from that day (it should rather have been said, from after the preceding battle of the 16th), remained on the defensive. No word is said as to the possibilities which the Germans have noted that, instead of retreating finally to this shelter, the marshal should at least have attempted to debouch at once by one of his flanks, before they had time thoroughly to inclose him. The marshal points out exactly enough what was then the chief desire of his enemies, and how real were their fears of its frustration, when he says in his next sentence, "they lost not an instant in completing our investment by destroying the bridges over the Orne (a small stream which flows into the Moselle north of Metz) and breaking up the railroad to Thionville on the other side." In excuse for his inaction at this crisis of the fate of his army, he alleges the necessity of giving it some repose, and refilling the diminished cadres of officers. No one has ever pretended that the German losses were less than his own, and their activity, which he confesses, is a sufficient refutation of this so-called necessity.

As the fortress of Metz interrupted the railway from Saarbrück, through Pont-à-Mousson to Paris, and by Nancy to Strassburg, General Von Moltke, as early as the 20th of August, directed the construction of a railway fourteen miles long from Metz, to unite the Metz and Saarbrück with the Metz and Paris line. Herr Weisshaupt undertook its construction; skilful civil and military engineers were placed at his disposal, many of the neighbouring peasantry and 3000 unemployed miners from the Saarbrück collieries were set to work, and amid the thunder of cannon the undertaking was commenced. The railway leads from Pont-à-Mousson to Remilly, on the Saarbrück and Metz line; and it was prosecuted night and day so actively, that in spite of the partially very difficult country it had to pass through, it was opened in a few weeks, and then Metz caused no obstruction to the German communications. By means of it, too, supplies and *matériel* could easily be conveyed to any part of the siege works that might be desired. As a proof of the marvellous foresight of the Prussians in everything connected with the war, it has been stated on apparently good authority that the survey of the line was made three years before, immediately after the settlement of the Luxemburg question, which the Prussians as well as the French understood was not a settlement of the general question. The survey, it is said, was made by a Prussian engineer who took employment, in 1867, at some ironworks near Metz, and employed his leisure in surveying the country.

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival of MacMahon at Châlons on August 16—Description of the Camp and of MacMahon's Fugitives—Arrival of Reinforcements and Re-organization of the French Troops—Progress of the Third German Army, under the Crown Prince—Capture of Marsal—Unsuccessful Attempt to take Toul—General Sketch of the Advance of the Germans—Behaviour of the Troops and Feeling on the part of the French—Full Explanation of the German System of "Requisitions"—Proclamation of the Crown Prince to the Inhabitants of Nancy—The Courses open to MacMahon—His Intention to retreat to Paris is objected to by the Government, and he is compelled to undertake the Desperate Task of attempting to relieve Bazaine—Statements of the Emperor on the Subject—Critical Examination of the Peril of the Proposed Undertaking—Breaking up of the Camp at Châlons—The Composition of the French Army—MacMahon delayed at Rheims—His Plans for the Future—Insubordination on the part of the French Troops and want of Confidence in their Officers—A Fourth Army formed by the Germans to operate against MacMahon—Wonderful Promptitude displayed by it—The Crown Prince joined by his Father—Alteration of their Plans on hearing of MacMahon's Movement—Extraordinary Marching on the part of the Germans—General Positions of the French and German Armies on August 27—Cavalry Encounter at Buzancy—MacMahon seeing the hopelessness of his Enterprise resolves to retreat, but is again over-ruled by the Government at Paris—Capture of Vrizy by the Germans—The Battles of Beaumont and Carignan on August 30—The French at Beaumont again taken completely by surprise—Stout Resistance on their part, but they are ultimately compelled to retreat—The fighting in the town of Beaumont—Description of the Engagement and of the State of the French Troops by a French Officer—The Battle at Carignan—Skill and Decision displayed by MacMahon, but he is obliged to retreat for fear of being outflanked—The last Proclamation ever issued by the Emperor to the French Army—The Positions of the Contending Forces on the following morning—The best course open to MacMahon is not taken—Description of the Position taken up by him near Sedan—Operations of the Germans on the 31st with the view of encircling their Enemy—Desperate Position of the French at Nightfall.

THE events of the war require that we now return to the south and south-east, and follow the movements of the French corps which had formed the right of their army at the commencement of hostilities, and of the third German army under the Crown Prince.

In Chapter X. we have detailed the disgraceful flight of MacMahon's forces after the battle of Woerth, and the retreat of that general from Saverne to Nancy, where he arrived on August 12, and where he effected a junction with a small portion of the sixth corps (Canrobert's) which had been left there, the remainder having previously joined Bazaine at Metz, from Châlons. Retreating with this force, he, on the 16th, reached Châlons, at the junction of the roads leading directly from the Vosges, and covering the approaches to Paris; this being evidently the position on which the remainder of the French army, falling back from the frontier, would concentrate.

At Mourmelon, about twenty miles to the north, was a large permanent camp, which had been long used for military manœuvres in time of peace, and where the reserve forces of the empire were collected in order to be organized into a second army, consisting of the marine infantry and other troops withdrawn from the naval expedition fitted out at Cherbourg and Brest, and intended to have operated in Northern Prussia, with the garde mobile, recruits, volunteers, and the few regiments or battalions of the line which had been left in different parts of the country. The composition and organization of this force was, however, very unsatisfactory. The garde mobile, whom the government had been afraid to arm properly in time of peace, were then only beginning to learn the use of their rifles; and as many of them were persons of means, and were continually treating their less wealthy brethren in arms, the camp presented a scene very different from what might have been expected, considering the serious position in which the country was placed, and which boded ill for the future. A day or two before the arrival of MacMahon, an eye-witness said that, short of battles, the place presented a spectacle which he hoped neither this century, nor any other, would ever witness again. There was not a minute's silence. Troops were coming in, troops going out; caissons rumbling along the street; carts, cannons, donkeys, horses, men, drays, ambulances, wounded men and straining runaways (in great number)—all pervaded by the din of singing and shouting in every direction. "Well, notwithstanding all these signs, which denote assuredly the throes of a nation dangerously struck, the place is full of Paris prostitutes, and the *cafés chantants* here never made such a harvest before. Although in three days the floods of a routed army may sweep over this very place, closely followed by the hordes of an infuriated enemy, although every man in France

feels this now, and has put aside his *jactance*, dissipation is just as great, and amusement as eagerly sought after as ever. The streets are thronged with people; and numbers of men in blouses, who seem to have it all their own way, mingle with soldiers of every possible corps and arm, all half, if not quite, drunk, and render circulation anything but pleasant. The mob, in fact, are thoroughly in the ascendant, and shout, sing, drink, smoke, and swagger about as they like. As I write parties of mobiles are passing under my window, and one of the group shouts 'Vive l'Empereur!' to which the others all answer by an exclamation of disgust and contempt. This kind of chorus I have heard several times to-day. It is just on the cards that by staying here I shall see a spectacle dreamt of nowhere excepting in the Apocalypse, under the name of the Battle of Armageddon; for if the French should lose the next battle this would be the scene of the final slaughter; I will not say battle, for one it would not be."

The following order of the day was read at the camp on Monday, 15th August, the anniversary of the Fête Napoleon:—

"Gardes Mobiles,—The 15th of August is, under ordinary circumstances, a day of rejoicing in France. But it would be out of the question for you, or any one whose heart pulsates within him, to keep a holiday so long as the land is desecrated by an invader's foot. You are about to receive arms. Learn quickly how to use them, in order to go forth and avenge your brothers, whose blood flowed at Forbach and Reichshoffen. They fell as brave men should fall, before the enemy. Let their last cry uttered when about to die be also yours, Long live France! Death to the Prussians!"

The omission of Vive l'Empereur! in this production was remarkable; but already amongst nearly all, except the soldiers, the feeling began to be openly expressed that they would have no more of him—"*Nous n'en voulons plus.*"

MacMahon, as already stated, reached the camp on Tuesday, August 16, bringing with him at the most 15,000 disheartened men—the relics of the 55,000 whom he had ranged in battle-order at Woerth; three-fourths of whom, instead of one-fourth, might have been preserved to his standards but for the shameful loosening of the bonds of discipline which defeat and retreat had induced. As the soldiers reached the camp, they presented a strange medley of all arms and regiments, without arms, without cartridges, without knapsacks; the cavalry had no horses, the gunners no guns; a motley demoralized crew, whom it would take a long time to form into battalions, squadrons, and batteries. The work of re-organization—resurrection one officer called it—was, however, at once commenced, and within a few days the French marshal received further reinforcements, including the twelfth corps, under General Lebrun, which had been hastily put together, the administration of Count Palikao at Paris having strained every nerve to repair the French disasters. But the forces now under MacMahon were of very inferior quality compared with the well-trained legions he had commanded in the Vosges, although they contained the elements out of which a good army might have been formed had there been time for the purpose.

Meanwhile the seventh corps, that of General Douay, the only one in the first French line which as yet remained intact, had been hurried from Belfort to Châlons via Paris, and two divisions of De Failly's fifth corps had arrived from Bitsche. Terrified at the disasters of the 6th, De Failly, by a forced march from Fenetrange and Nancy, escaped along the west of the Vosges, between the hostile armies on either side. It is due to him to say that this movement was well executed; and though it is not improbable that the fortifications of Bitsche, which checked a detachment of the Crown Prince, contributed to his safety, his retreat appears to have been rapid and judicious. By the 20th of August Marshal MacMahon, who had been rejoined by the emperor from Metz (whose body-guard from that place was incorporated with the army), had concentrated in the great camp at Châlons from 130,000 to 150,000 men, with above 500 guns; but this force, however imposing in numbers, was from its composition unsafe and feeble as an instrument of war, more especially for offensive operations.

While the right wing of the French army had in this manner avoided destruction, and was being recruited on every side, though separated from the centre and left at Metz, the triumphant forces of the Crown Prince had followed it through the passes of the Vosges; and in Chapter X. we have traced their progress to August 14, when a part of them had effected a junction with those of the army of Prince Frederick Charles at Pont-à-Mousson, between Metz and Nancy. On the 15th the

small fort of Marsal, after having been bombarded for a short time, capitulated to the Bavarian army corps under the Crown Prince. It is five miles east-south-east of Château Salins, on the road from Dieuze to Vic and Nancy. It had been passed several days before, but its fall gave the Germans better command of the road, besides the war material of the place, and forty cannon.

An attempt to capture Toul, a fortified town with 8000 inhabitants, and a station on the direct railway to Paris, was less successful. The garrison, consisting of garde mobile, two battalions of regulars and artillery, had a battery on St. Michel, which commands the town, and covered their front with earthworks. The officer in command of the artillery, M. Barbè, did all he could for defence. The attack was made by two columns of Prussian and Bavarian troops, who hoped to storm the works and take the place by surprise; but the French, quite prepared, received the onslaught with firmness, and a deadly fire from their guns in position and from musketry inside the works. The attack failed, and the German loss in that and in a subsequent one, which also failed, was about 300 killed and 700 wounded. As nothing short of a regular siege could reduce the place, which was not worth the sacrificing of more lives in attempts to carry it by main force, a small corps was left to mask it. As will be seen in Chapter XVIII., it held out gallantly a very considerable time, affording another instance of the inconvenience caused to an enemy, and of the advantage rendered to the country invaded, by even feebly-fortified places against which only field artillery can be brought.

The Crown Prince's headquarters were established at Nancy several days; for so long as there seemed a chance that the French might get away from Metz—that the desperate efforts of their guard might turn the scale against the skill and spirit of the Germans—it was necessary to hold the third army in readiness to march northward. While, therefore, the battles were raging near that fortress, on the 14th, 16th, and 18th, this army lay in the country about Nancy and Luneville, half expecting to be ordered up in support of the other German forces. When the news of the defeat of the French by Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles arrived, there was, of course, no further occasion to hesitate about invading central France, and the third army was free to continue its march. It received considerable reinforcements from Metz, and having turned the fortress of Toul both to the north and south, advanced rapidly on the Marne. The general scene at this time was thus vividly pourtrayed by one of the many very able correspondents sent to the war by the *Daily News*:—"The roads are crowded with trains of ammunition waggons, with stores of provisions, and with masses of infantry. Woe to the luckless wayside villages; woe to the farmers who have crops in wayside fields; there is no danger to life or limb among the peaceable inhabitants, but there is danger of being fairly eaten out of house and home. There is an unavoidable trampling down of crops in the fields where the soldiers pass, and there is such a demand for means of transport as leaves little chance to the farmer of keeping his horses for himself. He gets a receipt of some sort in most cases. But no amount of paper security will comfort the average French farmer in the present crisis. Poor man! It is such an unexpected blow. 'Why does the emperor make war,' I have heard a dozen sad-looking men in blouses exclaim, 'if he knows not how to make it?' A plebiscite in the occupied districts at this moment would need no foreign pressure to be flooded with 'nons.'

"There is a straight and rapid march westward of the third army, supported by other troops all full of confidence, flushed with victory, and splendidly organized. Three or four columns are marching abreast on some of the roads; two go by the road itself, and in some cases two more move through the fields to right and left, or at least one other column makes a way which is a little out of order serve the purpose of the moment. Great are the blocks and crushes, tremendous the swearing at critical corners. But, on the whole, it is remarkable how well these columns are directed; how carefully they choose their routes through the invaded provinces. Wheels are rumbling, and whips are cracking along many a road. The columns are halted to rest in some places, and there may be seen the bright bivouac fire twinkling in the fields, or long lines of horses standing silently at supper. Though many columns are halted others are moving on. The road is still alive with military preparation. Do not fancy the pomp and circumstance of war as attending the march of the columns of supply. It is a pretty sight to see the lancers or dragoons who lead the invasion trotting over hill and dale, with every nerve strained to detect a

possible foe. There is an impressive force about the advance of the dusty and tired infantry—the murmur of many voices, and tramp of many feet passing forward like a storm sighing in the woods. Even the weight and slowness of the guns has its own peculiar dignity. They are deadly weapons in charge of determined fighting men. But the innumerable columns of supply, the baggage and ammunition, the food and provender, are very prosaic, though very necessary. There are miles of hay waggons—a good omen for cavalry horses. Further on are other miles of bread waggons, of bacon and beef waggons. Horned cattle are led along by the score to become beef in due time; clothes and equipments, medicines, and blankets, are brought rumbling on into France. If the people were astonished at the earlier stages of the journey, they are now simply bewildered beyond all power of recovery. An avalanche has fallen upon them. One cannot see it for oneself, but the sight of the advancing host, as a wayside village sees it, from first to last, must be something to remember. The people will tell in a dreamy way how they heard that the Prussians were coming. There was news of them four, five, six days ago, as the case may be. Yes, *ma foi*, they heard that they were coming, but did not believe it. Then there was a party of lancers seen upon the road. The people wondered what would happen. Monsieur le curé told them that in modern wars they did not kill those who remained quiet, so their confidence was enough to keep them at home. The village shop was shut, and everybody closed his door and peeped from the window. Now the lancers rode into the street, and a few came forward to the principal house—the hotel de ville, if the place ranked as a 'bourg,' or small town. The soldiers asked for food and drink, said they would do no harm if they were not molested, and presently got off their horses. With details very slightly varying I have heard of this first entry in several places, and have heard how infantry soon began to come: one regiment—two, three, a dozen regiments. The bread was eaten, the wine was drunk, and the people were well nigh ruined by feeding their guests. Were they bad fellows in their way? A delicate question this, and one to which a stranger can expect but a guarded answer. What sort of fellows were they, these invading soldiers? 'Oh, not very bad, if only they had not such dreadful appetites, and if they could make themselves understood.' It is hard to be shaken and growled at in La Belle France itself for not speaking the language of the German Fatherland. It is harder still to have a slip of paper, negotiable, Heaven knows when, instead of a good cart-horse or fat bullock. I have, however, heard no complaint of personal violence, and the women do not seem at all afraid of the rough, loud-voiced fellows who swarm around them. The fact is, that if we start with a notion of war founded on what the armies of the French Republic did to their enemies in 1795–96, this German invasion of France in 1870 will seem very civilized and merciful. If, on the contrary, we take our stand on the rights of private property and the highest English ideal of a 'ready-money commissariat,' there will seem to be something harsh and oppressive in the quartering of troops on the villagers. All foreigners have this notion, that troops should be quartered on the conquered people, who find their visitors in food. The luckless village which lies near the road is eaten up by thousands of unwelcome guests, and the more remote village escapes with a trifling loss. This is a bitter time for the conquered French, and many individuals—farmers, horse-dealers, and wayside cottagers—suffer grievous loss."

And here it may be well to explain more fully the German system of requisitions. It was this:—Every town or village occupied by German troops had to furnish a certain quantity of provisions for the use of the soldiers and supplies for their cavalry, to be paid for by cheques, which were to be honoured at the end of the war by the vanquished, If Germany won France was to pay; if France, Germany was to pay her own cheques and any the French might draw on German ground. The superior officers alone could make requisitions, and if people were uncivil or obstinate, they were treated to a few of the smaller horrors of war.

In the interesting little work, "From Sedan to Saarbrück," by an artillery officer, the writer, who is certainly very impartial in his statements, says, "One point which we took the greatest pains to clear up, was the oft-asserted and contradicted integrity of the Prussians, in paying for all they took by means of bonds. These, which might more properly be called receipts, were invariably given for every franc's worth exacted; but our suspicions were first aroused by finding that their recipients looked upon them as so much waste paper, and considered themselves robbed. Hence

the continual phrase, '*Ils nous ont pillé partout.*' On this doubt, then, the whole question hinged; and in order to remove it we were persevering in addressing our inquiries to every grade of authority, high and low. It would not perhaps be quite fair to mention their names, but in many cases their status was such as to preclude the possibility of inaccurate information. Our questions usually took the following form:—

"'As for these bonds, do you look upon them as redeemable at Berlin at the end of the war?' (*With a laugh.*) 'Certainly not. Our own national pecuniary losses will be heavy enough as it is, without our burdening ourselves with our enemy's debts.'

'But you will probably obtain an indemnity from the French at the end of the war. Will not this be calculated on a scale which may enable you to redeem these bonds?' 'Ah, no! We shall want all the money we can get to pay our own bill.'

"'Well, then, you will at least make it one of the conditions of peace that the French government shall take up and honour them?' 'I think you misunderstand the whole matter. When these bonds are once signed and delivered, we entirely wash our hands of them; we ignore them completely, and recognise no claim founded on them.'

"'Then what is the good of issuing them?' (*With a shrug.*) 'Well, it is more orderly. Besides, when peace is concluded, the French will perhaps make some national efforts to relieve the poverty of the districts in which requisitions were made, by calling for the assistance of those departments which have not suffered. In such a case our bonds will enable the maires, sous-prêfets, and prêfets to distribute their funds equitably.'

"This, then, the Prussians call paying for all they take; and the world praises their honesty. There seems to be an unusual amount of balderdash talked on subjects connected with the war. Possibly they may have little choice in the course they have pursued; but it is, we think, indisputable that these French peasants are as completely stripped of their possessions as were the Hamburgers under the rule of Davoust; only, in the present instance, the process is carried on in a more civil way. The medium of communication is the maire. On him the Prussian commandant issues the requisitions for forage, provisions, billets, carts, horses, rations, &c.; and the former distributes the burden as evenly as possible. All that comes under the head of 'luxuries' is supposed to be paid for; though even in this respect the rule does not seem to be very clear. For instance, we noticed at Conflans that, instead of the everlasting, big, hanging pipe, every soldier was puffing away at a cigar. On inquiry, the Prussian officer told us that they had that day obtained (? obtained) an unexpected supply from the neighbourhood of 6000 cigars; which, distributed among 250, gave 24 cigars per man.

"There is also apparently great laxity in conniving at the private soldiers helping themselves, provided there is no theft of money. They laughingly told us that their men were very sharp in discovering the hidden treasures of best wine. One woman came to complain of forcible abstract tion of wheat for the horses by some men billeted on her:—

"'Did they rob you of any money?' inquired the commandant. 'No, monsieur; but——.'

"'Then,' interrupted the other, 'I cannot redress your complaint. Our horses must be fed; and if we cannot obtain oats, we must take wheat.'"

During the stay of the Crown Prince at Nancy, some of the inhabitants were prevailed on to assist in restoring the railway which was to join his own main communication; and on hearing of it he issued the following proclamation:—

"Germany is making war against the emperor of the French, not against the French. The population has no reason to fear that any hostile measures will be used towards it. I am exerting myself to restore to the nation, and to the people of Nancy in particular, the means of communication which the French army has destroyed, and I hope that industry and commerce will soon resume their usual way, and functionaries of every class continue at their work. I only require for the support of the army the surplus of provisions over what is necessary for the French people. The peaceful part of the nation, and Nancy in particular, may count upou the utmost consideration."

By the 20th of August the Crown Prince's columns had not advanced far beyond Nancy, though his uhlans had reached St Dizier and Vitry. It will be remembered that from his arrival at the camp of Châlons on the 16th to this date (August 20), MacMahon had been busily engaged in endeavouring to re-organize his troops, and had just

been joined by De Failly. When he became aware that Bazaine had been prevented from making his intended movement on Châlons, and that the Crown Prince had resumed his westward march, several alternatives must have presented themselves to the French general for choice: (1) He might fall back on Paris for the purpose of assuring its successful defence, if besieged, or if fighting outside, with it still behind him to receive his army in case of defeat; (2) he might retreat northwards by Rheims, Soissons, and Compiegne, constantly threatening the right flank of the German advance on the capital, but never allowing himself to be drawn into any serious engagement; (3) he might, on the other hand, draw off to a flanking position on the south, having Lyons in the rear with the new levies there in course of formation: in either of these cases he could have kept an untouched district behind him from which to feed his army, and at the same time threaten the communications by which the Germans must needs supply theirs; (4) if, instead of either of these safe courses, he decided to attempt the relief of his beleaguered comrade at Metz, he could either proceed first to the southward and then to the north-east according to circumstances, and if the enemy came on him on the way he would have two-thirds of France on which to fall back; or he could break up suddenly and as secretly as possible from Châlons, and by forced marches hope perhaps to elude both the Crown Prince and any other force that might be sent to intercept him; in which case he might fall on the rear of the investing force at Metz, and having, in combination with Bazaine's army, defeated it, then with an united army of 250,000 men, encouraged by victory, and with France in good heart, oblige the Germans to begin the game again almost from the commencement.

According to a letter published by him after the disaster at Sedan, the first course—to fall back on Paris—was that which MacMahon intended to adopt; but by order of the minister of war, Comte de Palikao, and the Committee of Defence at Paris, he was compelled to attempt the last, and enter on an undertaking fated to prove most disastrous to the arms of France. "This," he says in his letter, "is what infallibly happens when people take upon them to direct the movements of distant armies from the closet. In these circumstances one can draw up a general plan, but one cannot descend to details; and this is what Comte de Palikao forgot."

The marshal's statement is fully borne out by the emperor, who says that, as soon as he reached the camp at Châlons from Metz, he found there the duke of Magenta (Marshal MacMahon) and General Trochu; the latter had been nominated by the minister of war commander of the troops at the camp. These two general officers were summoned by the emperor to a council, at which were present Prince Napoleon, General Schmitz (General Trochu's chief staff officer), and General Berthaut, the commander of the national garde mobile. It was decided that the emperor should nominate General Trochu to the command of the army in Paris; that the troops collected at Châlons should be directed towards the capital, under the orders of Marshal MacMahon; that the national garde mobile should go to the camp of St. Maur, at Vincennes; and that the emperor should go to Paris, where his duties called him.

The following draught of a proclamation to be issued by Marshal MacMahon was also agreed to:—

"IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, . . . 1870.

"Soldiers,—The emperor has confided to me the command of all the forces which, with the army at Châlons, are about to assemble round the capital. My most ardent desire would have been to go to the help of Marshal Bazaine, but after close examination I am convinced this enterprise is impossible under present circumstances. We could not reach Metz for several days, and before that time Marshal Bazaine will have broken through the obstacles which detain him. Our direct march upon Metz would only . . . . During our march towards the east, Paris would be uncovered, and a large Prussian army might arrive under the walls. After the reverses Prussia suffered under the first empire she has formed a military organization enabling her to rapidly arm her people, and within a few days place her entire population under arms. Prussia has, therefore, a considerable force at her disposal; the fortifications of Paris will stop the flood of the enemy, and give us time to organize the military forces of the country; the national ardour is immense, and I am convinced that with perseverance we shall conquer the enemy and drive him from our territory."

The emperor says that when the decision of this council of war was made known to the government in Paris, it excited an animated opposition. "Paris," it was said, "is in a perfect state of defence; its

garrison is numerous. The army of Châlons ought to be employed in breaking the blockade of Metz; the national garde mobile would endanger the tranquillity of the capital; the character of General Trochu inspires no confidence; in fact, the return of the emperor to Paris would be very ill interpreted by public opinion." Nevertheless, it was decided to carry out the orders of the emperor, whilst the propriety of succouring Bazaine was still insisted upon. But Marshal MacMahon informed the minister of war that the march towards Metz would be one of the greatest imprudence. He pointed out all the dangers of such a movement in the then position of the German armies, and declared his unwillingness to expose troops, still imperfectly organized, in making an extremely perilous flank march in the face of an enemy very superior in point of numbers; but he announced his intention to make his way towards Rheims, whence he could proceed either to Soissons or to Paris. "It is only," said he, "under the walls of the capital that my army, when rested and reconstituted, will be able to offer the enemy any serious resistance." "But," says the emperor, "the language of reason was not understood in Paris; it was wished, at all hazards, to give public opinion the empty hope that Marshal Bazaine would still be succoured; and Marshal MacMahon received from the council of ministers, to which had been joined the privy council and the presidents of the two Chambers, a most pressing injunction to march towards Metz. The government had taught Paris to expect the junction of the two marshals, and he was assured by them that every facility should be given him to carry out their wishes by sending him stores and more men."

Marshal MacMahon, a man, above all things, of duty, obeyed, and resolved to take the chance placed before him. Anything which resembled a sacrifice for the public good recommended itself to him; and he was flattered by the idea that, by attracting towards himself all the forces of the enemy, he was for the moment delivering the capital, and giving it time to finish its means of defence. As to the emperor, he says he made no opposition. "It could not enter into his views to oppose the advice of the government and of the empress regent, who had shown so much intelligence and energy in the midst of the greatest difficulties; although he perceived that his own influence was being completely nullified, since he was acting neither as head of the government nor head of the army. He decided to follow, in person, the movements of the army, fully sensible, however, that if he met with success all the merit would in justice be ascribed to the commander-in-chief; and that in case of a reverse, its responsibility would fall upon the head of the state."

But by what route, and with what means, was the operation to be accomplished? It was certainly known in the French capital that the Crown Prince was marching on Châlons in too great strength to be attacked; it was probably known that powerful corps were being moved from Metz to his aid; and it might be assumed that the other German armies were in possession of the main roads which led by Etain and Verdun to Châlons. An advance, therefore, by the direct routes to the Lorraine fortress was not to be thought of; such a movement could only lead to a battle against very superior forces, and the object was to unite with Bazaine and avoid an engagement with any part of the enemy except that besieging Metz. It seemed to the French leaders, the best way of accomplishing their purpose would be to advance northwards on the railway line from Rheims to Rethel, thence push on rapidly by forced marches through the Argonne hills and across the Meuse, reach Montmèdy and Longuyon, and descending from Thionville on Metz, and taking the beleaguering force in reverse, thus relieve the defenders of the fortress. This plan, undoubtedly, was not free from danger, for the march from Rethel to Montmèdy and Thionville would be long, and through a difficult country, in which the enemy might be able to gain and fall on the army's flank, when a vigorous attack might not only baffle the whole operation, but expose the French to serious defeat. But until Rethel was attained the movement would be necessarily masked; it was not likely that the Crown Prince would be in a position to arrest it; any German divisions upon his right would be insufficient by themselves to stop it; and Thionville once passed, Bazaine would co-operate with the relieving force, and engage the armies around Metz. Besides, was it to be assumed that the Crown Prince and the corps on his right, supposed to be on their way to Paris, would turn northwards to attack MacMahon? If they did, could they reach him in time? And was it not probable that they would advance at once to Châlons, would pause, hesitate, and do nothing, until it was too late to prevent the move-

ment? Great risk there might be, but the plan if successful would justify and compensate it; for could the two French armies reunite at Metz, not only would Bazaine be set free, but the German armies there endangered, and the Crown Prince, advanced into the heart of France, would be exposed to serious disaster. It would then be the turn of the German commanders to be isolated and divided from each other; and what might not be hoped from the soldiers of France, burning to avenge unexpected defeats?

Such was the operation planned at Paris, and such, it is said, were the reasons for it. It is unfair to judge of strategy by the event; but in this instance it may be safely said that the scheme was at least hazardous. It is true that, at the time, the Crown Prince was many miles distant on the great road from Nancy to Châlons; and the result showed that if MacMahon's army had marched with even tolerable speed, the Crown Prince, though he moved northwards, would not have succeeded in reaching the French, at least until after they had crossed the Meuse. It is true, also, that the German corps detached from Metz to the Crown Prince's right, might have been unable, on the supposition that they alone were to assail MacMahon, to drive back the French; and, undoubtedly, the presence of Bazaine at Metz would necessarily detain a very large part of the first and second German armies on the spot, and prevent them from turning against another enemy. Nor can it be disputed that, could it have been accomplished, the French scheme was extremely promising—nay, that, as some admirers boasted, it might have been attended with as mighty results as the march from the Douro upon Vittoria. But in war, as in everything else, means must be proportioned to ends. Let it be conceded that up to Rethel the intended movement would not be understood; that the Crown Prince would be unable to stop it until the Argonnes and the Meuse had been passed; that the corps on his right could not alone defeat it, and that Prince Frederick Charles and General Steinmetz would not be strong enough to turn on MacMahon in force—the operation, nevertheless, was very daring. The French army, in advancing from Rethel by Montmèdy upon Metz, must have moved along an extensive arc of which the enemy held at all points, and in very superior strength, the chord; and, once checked, it must have been exposed to the most tremendous defeats. It was almost inevitable that it would be reached by the German corps on the Crown Prince's right, as it approached the region of the Argonnes and the Meuse, for these were already not far from that line; and if this were done, and time were gained for the Crown Prince's army to come up with it, a disastrous reverse was to be expected. Nay, more, supposing these perils were escaped, and that MacMahon made good his way to Montmèdy, there was nothing to prevent the Crown Prince from turning backward, and, having attained Metz, from effecting his junction with the other German armies and beating his enemy as he advanced by Thionville. In fact, the manœuvre was an immense and most dangerous flank march by a disorganized and raw army, within certain range of a formidable adversary in possession of all the interior lines, and, when at all united, of overwhelming strength. Local circumstances, too, not only rendered this march especially liable to failure, but exposed MacMahon, if beaten, to ruin. His path lay across the Argonnes and the Meuse by indifferent roads and an intricate country, and the Meuse once crossed, he would be close to the frontier along the whole way from Montmèdy to Thionville. He was, therefore, going upon an enterprise in which he would probably be caught in flank, and brought to bay by superior numbers; and once defeated, he would most likely be cut off from the chance of retreat, or forced into the territory of Belgium, where his soldiers would be obliged to lay down their arms. As for the notion that the Crown Prince would go on to Paris, and would not turn round when he had ascertained the direction of the French marshal's movement, it is strange it could ever have been seriously entertained by those who had learnt by experience how the Prussian troops can march.

This was the operation to save France, and to annihilate the vain-glorious German princes, which paper strategists in Paris compared to the Alpine march that led to Marengo. Its designers may have had in mind the celebrated movement of Napoleon I. in 1814, when, leaving the allies to advance on Paris, he fell back towards his frontier fortresses to draw in their garrisons to his diminished army. But there was much difference between the two cases. Napoleon, when he retreated on St. Dizier, was not sufficiently strong to cover Paris, then, it must be remembered, wholly unfortified; he had reason to believe that the timid Schwartzenberg would

pause and halt when the dreaded emperor was known to be threatening his rear; above all, he ran no risk of being destroyed on his way into Lorraine, and when he reached Metz he was absolutely certain to be rejoined by a considerable force which, after the glories of Montmirail, might at least have prolonged a doubtful contest. His movement, therefore, was compelled by his needs; in a military point of view it had a prospect of success; it did not place his army in danger; and had the allies been as feeble as of old, or had Paris held out for a single week, momentous consequences might have ensued. But MacMahon had more than sufficient means to defend Paris, now well fortified; his army was exactly in the condition for being so employed. The French government ought to have counted that the Crown Prince, as a matter of course, would turn on him as he marched northwards; especially ought they to have seen—and this is the distinctive point—his advance to Metz along the Belgian frontier would inevitably expose him to danger, and very probably lead to a catastrophe; and as the enterprise on which they ordered him was not dictated by any exigency, it was precisely that which should not have been attempted. It had hardly a reasonable chance of success, and it might involve France in a tremendous calamity; for it abandoned all direct communications with Paris to the mercy of the enemy, it drew the last available forces of France away from the centre towards the periphery, and placed them intentionally farther away from the centre than the enemy was already. Such a move might have been excusable, had it been undertaken with largely superior numbers; but here it was undertaken with numbers hopelessly inferior, and in the face of almost certain defeat. And what would that defeat bring? Wherever it occurred it would push the remnants of the beaten army away from Paris towards the northern frontier, where they might, as we have shown, either be driven upon neutral ground or forced to capitulate. MacMahon, in fact, by undertaking the move, deliberately placed his army in the same position in which Napoleon's flank march round the southern end of the Thuringian forest in 1806 placed the Prussian army at Jena. A force numerically and morally weaker was deliberately placed in a position where, after a defeat, its only line of retreat was through a narrow strip of country leading towards neutral territory or the sea. Napoleon forced the Prussians to capitulate by reaching Stettin before them. In the most favourable case, MacMahon's troops could hardly have done more than escape to the northern fortresses, Valenciennes, Lille, &c., where they would have been quite harmless, and France would at once have been completely at the mercy of the invader. Even without his explanation and that of the emperor on the subject, it could hardly have been believed that a commander of great experience and proved ability was the author of this scheme; but the pressure put upon him does not relieve him from the responsibilily of so fatal a step. In his position he ought to have refused to lead his troops into peril so evident.

On Sunday, August 21, he broke up suddenly from the camp at Châlons, burning everything in it that could be of the least use to the enemy; and fell back with his forces to Courcelles, a few miles from Rheims. It was here that Count Palikao transmitted to him his final and pressing orders to effect a junction with Bazaine, and on the following day his army commenced its fatal march northwards. Its aspect and movements ought to have warned a prudent commander that it was unfit to undertake a perilous enterprise, in which celerity was indispensable to give a chance of success. The guns were ill-horsed and ill-mounted, the trains insufficient and out of order, the cavalry inferior and too few in number; and the infantry, made up of a medley of regiments, of raw levies, and of disheartened soldiers, was wanting in the real elements of power. The emperor's own description of the force was, that the first corps, formed principally out of regiments from Africa, that had given proof at Woerth of a heroic bravery which only the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy had forced to succumb, were still strongly impressed by that defeat and by the tremendous effects of the German artillery. They came away from the field of battle with dissatisfied and mutinous feelings, which the retreat upon Châlons, long and incessant marches, and physical privations, had still further aggravated. Marshal MacMahon did not shut his eyes to this, and considered that, before leading them again under fire, they needed repose and time to strengthen themselves after their defeat. These were the oldest of the French veterans. The renown which rightfully belonged to them as the soldiers of Africa, they had amply justified. The effect which their

discouragement might have on the rest of the army was, therefore, doubly to be feared. Already, indeed, was the fifth corps specially feeling that effect. Exhausted, like the other, by forced marches from Bitsche across the Vosges, by Neufchateau and the Haute Marne, to the camp at Châlons, and having lost without a fight a portion of its equipments and almost all its luggage, this corps had an appearance of disorganization sufficient to inspire the most lively anxiety. The seventh corps, whose tardy organization was scarcely finished, had not encountered the same trials as the two foregoing; but in consequence of the long march from the rear, from Belfort, through Paris, to the camp of Châlons, it did not show such solidity as might have been desired. As to the twelfth corps, of very recent formation, it comprised elements of different degrees of value: the first division was composed of new regiments, upon which there was reason to depend; the second, of four marching regiments formed out of fourth battalions, with incomplete staff, and of soldiers who had never fired a gun; and, lastly, the third division was composed of four regiments of marines, which bore themselves bravely at Sedan, but which, little accustomed to long marches, dotted the roads with stragglers. Such were the troops upon whom was to be imposed a most difficult and dangerous campaign.

It was not until the afternoon of August 23 that MacMahon's army passed through Rheims. Anxious, and knowing that everything depended on speed, he addressed some columns as they toiled onwards, reminding them that French soldiers had marched thirty miles a day under the sun of Africa. The difference, however, was great between raids made by a few light regiments and the advance of a raw unwieldy mass; and though the marshal endeavoured to hurry them forward, he was confronted with almost insurmountable obstacles. Scarcely had the army made a march towards establishing itself at Bethniville, on the Suippe, when commissariat difficulties obliged him to re-approach the line of the railway. He made a movement on his left, and reached Rethel on the 24th, in order to obtain for his troops several days' subsistence. This distribution occupied the whole of the 25th.

From the commencement of the war to this time the Prince Imperial had accompanied his father; but in view of the exceptional dangers which were now threatening, Marshal MacMahon and the emperor both insisted that he should be removed from the theatre of war. He therefore set out for Mézières, and thence entered Belgium, where he was soon to learn the news of the capitulation of Sedan.

As the direction of the French movement could not now be concealed, at this point MacMahon made arrangements for marching with all possible rapidity. It may be doubted, however, whether Napoleon himself, at the head of the grand army, could have made the haste which the marshal designed with his raw and partly demoralized troops. He divided his forces into three parts, and having despatched about 20,000 men by the railway line from Rethel to Mézières, where they were to join an auxiliary corps coming up from Paris under General Vinoy, and to close on his rear when he had passed the Meuse—he advanced in two great columns by the parallel routes which lead through the Lower Argonnes, a hilly and thickly wooded district watered by the Meuse. In these dispositions there is nothing to blame: the fatal enterprise had been entered on, and we may believe that the marshal endeavoured to hasten forward as quickly as possible. He doubtless hoped to pass round the right flank of any force moving in the direction of Paris from Metz, and had gained, as he supposed, such a start on the Crown Prince as would enable him to evade pursuit by the latter, should he turn northwards after him. His right was at first directed on Montmèdy, an important station on the French line of railroad which runs along the Belgian frontier, and connects the fortresses of Mézières and Sedan with Longwy and Thionville, where it strikes the Moselle. His left went more westward towards Sedan; and though thus obliged to divide his columns for the sake of speed, he doubtless hoped, on reaching the railroad, to use it for the purposes of supply and concentration (it had, however, been cut by the Germans on the 25th), and to push on to the Moselle with, if not the whole, at least so much of his force as might enable him to make a powerful effort on the rear of the Prussians watching Bazaine. But to do this it was necessary to march first to the north-east, and finally a day more to the south, before he could come within such a distance of Metz as would enable him to signal to Bazaine; so that he was, in fact, attempting to get round three sides of an irregular quadrangle, within which were

gathered, a week before, the eight Prussian corps which had fought the battle of Gravelotte.

It would have been scarcely possible to do this with the best troops in the world. As matters were, his army was altogether unequal to forced marches, and moved at this critical moment with the sluggishness inherent in its defective organization. Encumbered with stragglers, badly pioneered, and checked by hindrances of every kind, it made hardly ten miles a day; and it was the 27th of August before its right column, still far from the Meuse, passed through Vouziers, and the left reached Le Chêne.

The defective composition of the army was shown not only in the slow progress it made, but in the want of discipline, and in a spirit of lawlessness and even mutiny, which augured very ill for the future. Before the departure from Châlons some of the stragglers commenced pillaging their own army, and selling the articles for a trifle. For more than two hours the railway station was pillaged by three or four hundred men from the corps of General de Failly, many of them belonging to the artillery. They broke or opened 150 goods waggons, and threw out on the line, at the risk of accidents, barrels of wine and gunpowder, cartridges, shot, shell, biscuits, bales of clothing, coffee, salt meats, and other provisions. These they sold to hucksters who waited outside. Officers' trunks were also forced and plundered, and amongst the articles sold was part even of the emperor's baggage. His sheets went for four sous each; loaves of sugar brought only fifty centimes, and bales of coffee a franc. The railway servants attacked the plunderers with sticks, but were in return pelted with cartridges. The whole scene was described as being more heartrending to a soldier than a battle-field. Great excesses, of a somewhat similar character, were also committed at Rheims; and worst of all, scarcely any notice could be taken of such disgraceful conduct.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the army altogether doubted the ability of its chiefs, became weary of their orders and counter-orders, and exasperated by the obvious want of a comprehensible plan. It fretted with impatience, and wore itself out by marches without advance. The weather was bad, and the distribution of food rare and insufficient. Nor was it ever known, for want of scouts, whether the enemy was marching away, or coming near. The headquarters on the 25th August were fixed at Rethel, and on the 27th they were at Chêne, evidently in hesitation. The want of a good and numerous cavalry became every hour more apparent.

In a note-book found on an officer of De Failly's corps who was killed at Sedan, under the date of August 26, it was said:—"There is no distribution of rations; we have, however, reserve biscuits to last us to the 28th. . . August 27. Awakened at three a.m. An order from the commander-in-chief that we are to march against the enemy. The positions each division has to take are distinctly indicated by the names of the villages. We start in the same order as yesterday; but the whole day is spent in marches and counter-marches, very trying, and, as we learn afterwards, quite unnecessary. Our general of division (Guyot de Lespart), not conforming to orders, wandered *à l'aventure*, with no other result than that of exhausting and greatly discontenting his troops. Both men and horses are quite worn out by marching over tilled ground, softened for several days by almost incessant rain. In a village we pass through the inhabitants give all the bread and other food they have to our soldiers, some of whom were absolutely begging for it. On our arrival at Bois-les-Dames we see on all sides uhlan videttes, against which we are forced to send out riflemen. The uhlans go to and fro, in full gallop, over the very places on which we intended to take up our bivouac."

Leaving MacMahon for a short time, we must now turn again to the Germans. From the moment when the battle of Gravelotte had shut up Bazaine in Metz, MacMahon's army was the next object kept in view, not only by that of the Crown Prince, but by all other troops which could be spared from before Metz. Within two days of the battle of the 18th, a great force of landwehr had reached the fortress to fill up the losses in the late engagements, and a considerable part of the regular troops was thus set free for new operations. A fresh army was placed under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, and detached from Metz about the 19th of August, to co-operate with the Crown Prince of Prussia, and join his right wing on his way to Châlons. It was composed of the Prussian guards, of the twelfth Saxon corps, and of the fourth German corps (the latter had not taken part in the battles at Metz), altogether about 70,000 or 80,000 men in the highest state of

efficiency; and it was advanced beyond Verdun upon the Meuse with the view of ultimately attaining Châlons by the line of Clermont and Ste. Menehould.

The Saxon corps under Prince George, with which went the Crown Prince of Saxony's headquarters, did not receive orders to move westward from before Metz as part of the fourth army until the 22nd. At the close of the fourth day's march the headquarters were at Jubecourt, six miles from Clermont, in the centre of the Southern Argonnes, and nearly fifty miles in a direct line from the position quitted before Metz. During these four days the fourth army had marched almost wholly on cross-roads, made the passage of the Meuse, and lost some time as well as some lives in a rash attempt upon Verdun, where finding their first attack repulsed, they did not choose to waste time in minor operations.

The position of this fourth army, owing to the promptitude it had displayed, fully answered the masterly design of General von Moltke, since it was ready to move on towards Paris on lines parallel to those followed by the Crown Prince, whose main body was at Bar-le-Duc, two days' march to the south. Thus any position to oppose him taken up by MacMahon would have been imperilled by this fourth army. If he fought at Châlons he could be opposed by both armies, and, if defeated, pushed back to Paris; and if he retired on Paris without fighting, the two crown princes, moving side by side, would follow him with overwhelming forces. On the other hand, should he make, as he did make, the desperate attempt to slip past them, a two days' march northward would plant the fourth army directly in his way, and close the defiles of the Northern Argonnes until the third army came in on his flank.

Meanwhile the king, with a small escort, had set off to join the Crown Prince, his son, by Pont-à-Mousson and Commercy. The weather about this time was unusually inclement for the season—being very cold, and heavy rain falling almost incessantly. This caused the Germans much suffering, as they never carry tents. Some of them had slept for three weeks on the wet ground, in potato fields, or under hedges. They had no blankets—nothing but their cloaks, and up till then, some straw. From the scarcity of forage, however, they were now denied even that luxury.

On the morning of the 26th of August the king and the Crown Prince had their headquarters at Bar-le-Duc, still at a considerable distance from Châlons. The mass of the third German army was before Bar-le-Duc, and to Ligny backwards, though its cavalry filled the whole of the adjoining region, and had even advanced beyond Châlons and taken possession of the town. This feat was performed by five Prussian dragoons and one officer. One of the privates rode into the town smoking his pipe with imperturbable coolness. The French General de Brehault, who had been quartered there with a small force of cavalry, had just previously withdrawn, doubtless in pursuance of orders. The mayor issued a proclamation, telling the citizens that, as they had no means of even checking the enemy's advance, they should keep quiet.

The presence of the king of Prussia at Bar-le-Duc, even if a single Prussian soldier had not made a mile's march beyond, was highly significant. It meant that, without firing a shot, the French armies had abandoned the line of the Meuse and the Argonne, just as they abandoned the line of the Moselle when they allowed the Crown Prince to occupy Nancy. Thus another of the natural defences of France had fallen without a blow, and the invaders of 1870 had already advanced farther than those of 1792 ever reached—farther than those of 1814 had attained before the great Napoleon had dealt some thundering strokes against their converging hosts.

The German commanders thought that MacMahon was awaiting them near the great camp of Châlons, or that he would fall back on Paris; and did not credit the rumour, already floating on the 25th, that he had gone north. But next day the report was confirmed, and the Prussian staff, in common with the rest of the world, understood what was meant by the premature declaration of Count Palikao in Paris, that a grand scheme had been formed by which the two French armies were to co-operate. Had the general conception been in any degree carried into effect, of drawing the Prussians near to Paris, and letting them pass by the army of MacMahon, so that he might fall straight on the rear of that before Metz, there would have been some excuse for this boast. As it was, it only had the effect of arousing the vigilance of the Germans.

We have said that on the 26th the rumour of MacMahon's northward movement was confirmed, by the capture of letters by the Prussian cavalry,

and that on the morning of this day the German headquarters were advanced in the direction of Paris as far as the fine town of Bar-le-Duc. The road from Ligny to this place inclines to the north-west, so that the movement brought the Germans indirectly somewhat nearer Sedan, and it opened to them the best of the cross-roads which lead through the Argonnes district towards the passages of the Meuse near that town. The headquarters were but seventy miles due south of it that evening; and though MacMahon had broken up from Rheims, about the same distance to the south-west, four days before, he had made so little progress, that he was still to the west of the line on which the Germans would move when they marched northward, which on this very morning they were ordered to do. At night the headquarters of the king were at Clermont-en-Argonne, twenty-three or twenty-four miles distant.

Never, in fact, were plans better laid than those of the Crown Prince and the chief of his staff, General Blumenthal. Some days before, when it was thought possible, but scarcely probable, that MacMahon might attempt the movement he made, the whole manœuvre of doubling up the French line by swinging round upon it, "left shoulders forward," was discussed at the prince's headquarters. It was calculated that, by a very rapid march, the fifth and eleventh Prussian corps, the Bavarians, and Würtemburgers, might effect such a concentration as would baffle the French should they attempt the relief of Metz. The sixth corps was scarcely able to get up in time, by any efforts, that is, to swing round in its wide circle to the westward; but it would be ready to guard the left flank of the Germans, and to act as a support to the Würtemburgers in case of need. Here was the trap ready laid. Here was a repetition of the shutting in of a French force northward of the main road such as had been effected at Metz. But this time it was even more serious for those who might be so shut in. The Belgian frontier was the rock ahead in case of defeat. Had the French been strong enough to have a well-appointed corps of observation, say 80,000 men, to the southward of Vitry, this wheeling round of the Prussians could hardly have been risked. But the Crown Prince disregarded the slight danger of an attack upon his rear by ill-organized militia, and with the sixth corps covering his left, more from necessity than choice, closed upon MacMahon.

On the 27th it was openly boasted of in Paris that MacMahon had gained at least forty-eight hours' start of the Crown Prince, and his coming success was firmly counted on by the imperialist cabinet, whereas, in reality, the whole scheme was foiled beforehand by Von Moltke's and General Blumenthal's prompt combination. The French government had overlooked the fact, that the corps forming the fourth army, numbering at this time on the lowest estimate 70,000 men, were immediately in his way. Moltke had directed them on the Argonnes between Verdun and Sedan. He knew that, owing to increased cultivation and improved roads, this historic district, which had once starved and ruined a Prussian force, might be as easily traversed by an army as any ordinary part of France. He was not afraid, therefore, of a repetition of the failure of 1792, and was only anxious that an opening should be left by which either MacMahon's or any other important body of troops should be left behind in the combined movement towards Paris.

As soon as the northward movement of the Crown Prince was decided on, intelligence was despatched to the fourth army, who were ordered to stay the enemy on the Meuse passages at all costs. On the 27th the Saxon corps was accordingly lining the river about Dun and Stenay, prepared to stop the passages, but their services were rendered unnecessary by the slowness of their enemy's movements.

MacMahon left Rheims on the 23rd, only a few hours later than the prince of Saxony quitted Metz. Mouzon, the point on the Meuse which he chiefly aimed at, is the same distance from the one starting point as the other. Yet five days afterwards the main body of the French were about Vouziers, scarcely half-way to that passage; whilst the Saxons had first gone past it on their way to Paris, then halted, and moved northward to the points on the Meuse next above it, making two sides of a large triangle, the French not having yet gone over half of the third side of one of similar extent. If in fighting, in the boldness of their cavalry, the activity of their staff, the cool firing of their infantry, and the skilful tactical use of their guns, the superiority of the Germans to their antagonists had been already proved; it only required the contrast now presented between the movements of the two armies to show, that in no point had the difference of training and moral

feeling told more in favour of the invaders than in that of the marching, on which the elder Napoleon so often relied for his advantage over these very Germans. Quickness of movement, as in his earlier campaigns, and hardly less in those of the Confederate General Lee, has often made up for inferior numbers. But when combined with numerical majority, it leaves no chance to the weaker party.

The causes of the slowness of the French march towards Sedan have already been explained. The Germans, on the other hand, both those of the Crown Prince's army, who had accomplished the toilsome passage of the Vosges and the long direct movement to the valley of the Marne, and those under the prince of Saxony, who had just taken a share in the tremendous fight at Gravelotte marched with a speed, order, and endurance indicative at once of physical energy and high spirits and discipline. This will appear the more surprising to those who have not noticed the bodily activity of the heavy-looking youth of Germany, when it is remembered that more than a third of the infantry, *i.e.*, the two last years' recruits of the peace strength of the battalions, and nearly the whole of the *einjährige* volunteers who were suddenly called by the war to that real service which few of them were designed to share, were under twenty-two years of age, and had probably not reached the full limits of their muscular power. Whatever might be the respective merits of the Zundnadelgewehr and the Chassepot, there is no doubt that this dogged perseverance of the Germans in marching, and their utter indifference to fatigue, had in this instance done more than their steady fusillade to win success for their cause.

We have now shown the movements of the contending forces in the eventful period from the 20th to the 27th of August, but that with a map the reader may understand more clearly the important events which immediately followed, it may be as well to recapitulate very briefly their respective positions at this time. The new scene of hostilities to which the operations of the belligerents had so suddenly been transferred, may be described as an equilateral triangle, whose sides are about sixty miles long, and whose angles are marked by Rheims and Verdun at the base, and by a spot just within Belgian territory not far from Bouillon at the apex. The sides are formed by the road and railway from Verdun by Ste. Menehould and Suippes, to Rheims, on the south; the road and railway from Rheims, by Rethel, to Mézières, on the west; and the course of the Meuse from Verdun, by Dun and Stenay, to Sedan, on the east. From Suippes a road runs northward to Attigny and Mézières; and from Ste. Menehould another road runs parallel by Monthois as far as Vouziers, where it diverges on the left to Rethel, and on the right to Le Chêne and Sedan. These routes are crossed by only one main road, leading from Rethel to Vouziers; but there it sends off branches to Stenay and Montmèdy by Le Chêne on the north and Buzancy on the south, and to Verdun by Grand Prè and Varennes; the two lower roads diverging at La Croix aux Bois, a few miles east of Vouziers. When Marshal MacMahon quitted Rheims on the 23rd he marched north-eastward to Rethel, and thence eastward to Vouziers, pursuing his way towards the Meuse both by the routes of Le Chêne and of Buzancy, which form a loop, and meet again at Laneuville-sur-Meuse, just opposite Stenay, and some twelve miles from Montmèdy. Thus his main columns might have been expected to strike the Meuse about midway on the eastern side of our triangle, with subsidiary columns directed along the country roads that lead from the eastern side of the Argonne forest to Mouzon on the north, and to Dun on the south of Stenay, all three places commanding the passage of the river.

Of the triangle we have described, two sides—the base and the eastern—were now occupied by the German troops, while the French, engaged far from their base on the western side, were several days' march farther from the capital than the invaders. The army of the Crown Prince, turning to its right from the roads direct to Paris, was now pouring into the triangle, and MacMahon in reality possessed but a very small portion of it towards the north and east. Every hour, too, that he failed to force his way across the Meuse to join Bazaine, saw him more narrowly hemmed in between the Germans advancing from the south and those holding him in check in the east. By this time, according to reasonable calculations, he should have been close to the Meuse; and, as a glance at the map will prove, he ought thus, on the line between Rethel and the river, to have escaped the third German army, about two marches still to the southward. This, however, does not place the strategy of the French in a very favourable degree; for before MacMahon could have reached Metz by Montmèdy and Thionville, he

could not miss being intercepted by the Crown Prince of Saxony, or even by the Crown Prince of Prussia, and placed in a very critical position. He was still about twenty-five miles from the Meuse, with a somewhat intricate country between; and as he was altogether late, and must have expected that the German armies would endeavour to fall upon his flank, he ought to have spared no effort to advance speedily. Yet, between the 27th and the morning of the 29th, the right column of the French army had only its outposts at Buzancy, while the left, though its outposts touched Stenay, was only at Stonne and Beaumont, both columns spreading a long way backward; in other words, they were still a march from the Meuse, which they ought to have passed three days before, and their rearward divisions were yet distant. The German armies, from the 26th to the 29th, made astonishing exertions to close on MacMahon as he crossed towards the Meuse, and success was already within their grasp. The force of the Crown Prince of Saxony, in two columns, had reached the Meuse at Dun on the 27th, and was thus in a position to arrest and retard the vanguard of the French whenever it attempted to cross the river. Meanwhile the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, hastening forward by Varennes and Grand Prè, and to the left by Senuc and Suippe, had arrived close to the line of march of MacMahon's right column, and by the evening of the 28th had occupied it about Vouziers. A step farther, and this immense army would be upon the positions of the luckless French, who, assailed in flank and rear by superior numbers, could not fail to be involved in terrible disaster.

We are, however, slightly anticipating the course of events, for as early as Saturday, the 27th, the opposing forces came into collision at Buzancy, on the southern road by which the French were marching from Vouziers to Stenay. It was, however, only a sharp and brilliant cavalry combat between four squadrons of the third Saxon regiment, one squadron of the eighteenth uhlans, and a Saxon battery, on the one side, and six French squadrons, detached from De Failly's corps to cover the cross roads, on the other. The victory was with the Germans, who completely cut up the twelfth regiment of French chasseurs and took its commanding officer prisoner. It was now evident that the whole French army was very near, and every exertion was made by the Germans to close with it. On this day, too, MacMahon, observing that the enemy so completely surrounded him, felt more than ever satisfied that it would be impossible to carry out the plan which had been prescribed to him at Paris; and to save, if possible, the sole army which France had at her disposal, he accordingly resolved to turn back in a westerly direction. He immediately gave orders to this effect, and sent the following despatch to the superior commandant at Sedan:—

"Le Chêne, *August* 27, 3.25 p.m.

"I beg you to employ all possible means for forwarding the following despatch to Marshal Bazaine:—

"*Marshal MacMahon, at Le Chêne, to Marshal Bazaine.*

"Marshal MacMahon warns Marshal Bazaine that the Crown Prince's arrival at Châlons forces him to carry out his retreat on the 29th on Mézières, and thence to the west, unless he hears that Marshal Bazaine's retreating movement has commenced."

The same evening he sent the annexed telegram to the Count Palikao, at Paris, in which it will be seen he predicts almost the very fate which was so soon to overtake his army:—

"Le Chêne, 27*th of August*,
8.30 p.m.

"The first and second armies, more than 200,000 men, blockade Metz, chiefly on the left bank. A force, estimated at 50,000 men, is established on the right bank of the Meuse, to obstruct my march on Metz. Intelligence received announces that the Crown Prince of Prussia's army is moving to-day on the Ardennes with 50,000 men. It must be already at Ardeuil. I am at Le Chêne with rather more than 100,000 men. Since the 9th I have no news of Bazaine; if I attempt to meet him I should be attacked in the front by a part of the first and second armies, which, favoured by the woods, can deal with a force superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by the Crown Prince of Prussia's army, cutting off all line of retreat. I approach Mézières to-morrow, whence I shall continue my retreat, according to events, towards the west."

In reply to this, the government sent a telegram to the emperor at eleven o'clock the same night,

telling him that if they abandoned Bazaine there would certainly be a revolution in Paris, and they would themselves be attacked by all the enemy's forces. "Paris," continued Count Palikao, "will protect itself against the external attack. The fortifications are completed. It seems to me urgent that you should rapidly reach Bazaine. It is not the Crown Prince of Prussia who is at Châlons, but one of the princes, the king of Prussia's brothers, with an advanced guard and considerable cavalry forces. I have telegraphed to you this morning two pieces of information which indicate that the Crown Prince of Prussia, feeling the danger to which your flank march exposes his army and the army which blockades Bazaine, has changed his course and marches towards the north. You have at least thirty-six hours' start of him, perhaps forty-eight hours. You have before you only a part of the forces which blockade Metz, and which, seeing you withdraw from Châlons to Rheims, had extended themselves towards the Argonne. Your movement on Rheims had deceived them. Like the Crown Prince of Prussia, everybody here has felt the necessity of extricating Bazaine, and the anxiety with which you are followed is extreme."

The emperor admits that he could unquestionably have set this order aside, but "he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the regency, and had resigned himself to submit to the consequences of the fatality which attached itself to all the resolutions of the government." As for MacMahon, he again bowed to the decision intimated to him from Paris, and once more turned towards Metz.

These orders and counter-orders naturally occasioned further delay, and the French headquarters had reached no further than Stonne on the 28th. The intention of MacMahon was to reach Stenay, and thence Montmèdy, but, as has been seen, the Germans were in strength in the first of these towns two days before. The mistake, too, which had been committed in the first part of the campaign was again repeated; for the different French corps, isolated from each other, as we shall see, were attacked separately, and easily defeated.

On August 28, Vouziers, an important crossing of roads in the Argonnes, was in possession of the Germans, two of whose squadrons charged and took Vrizy, a village situated between Vouziers and Attigny, which was occupied by infantry. The defending force, including two officers of MacMahon's staff, were taken prisoners; a feat of which there is but one previous example in modern history, the taking of Dembe Wielkie by Polish cavalry from Russian cavalry and infantry, in 1831.

On Monday, August 29, De Failly occupied the country between Beaumont and Stonne, on the left bank of the Meuse; while the main body of the French army, under MacMahon in person, had crossed the river, and were encamped on the right bank at Vaux, between Mouzon and Carignan, and on the morning of the 30th the emperor telegraphed to Paris that a brilliant victory might be expected. MacMahon's position was in a sharp wedge of country formed by the confluence of the rivers Meuse and Chiers, and it was his intention to advance towards Montmèdy. The other part of his army was close to the river on its left bank.

The troops opposed to MacMahon's force consisted of both the third and fourth German armies, the former commanded by the Crown Prince and the king of Prussia, and the latter by the Crown Prince of Saxony. It may, perhaps, be useful if we here recall to mind the corps of which these armies were composed. The third army comprised the fifth corps, from Posen; the sixth, from Silesia; and the eleventh, from Hesse and Nassau; and the first and second corps of the king of Bavaria's army, with the Würtemburg division. The first Bavarian corps was commanded by General von der Tann. The army of Prince Albert of Saxony was formed by taking three corps, each of about 30,000 men, from the second German army, that of Prince Frederick Charles, which had been found larger than was required at Metz. These corps were:—(1.) The Prussian guards, under Prince Augustus of Würtemburg; (2.) the fourth, composed of men from the Saxon provinces of Prussia, and the Saxon duchies of Weimar, Coburg-Gotha, Altenburg, and Meiningen, under General von Alvensleben; and (3.) the twelfth, which consisted of subjects of the kingdom of Saxony, led by their Crown Prince. The last was the corps which fought under that leader against the army of Prussia in July, 1866, at Gitschin and Königgrätz, in Bohemia. Of the whole German force assembled on the Meuse, it will thus be seen that two Bavarian and one Saxon army corps, numbering scarcely less than 90,000 men in all, were not soldiers of the kingdom of Prussia, but served the other German





Chenery
Angecourt
B. de Agasse
Villers dev.t Mouzon
Bulson
Haraucourt
Gros Bois la Giens
Autrecourt
Rourry
B. du Chenois
MOUZ
Raucourt
B. de Cogneux
Pouron
Villers dev.t Raucourt
Maisoncelle
Bois Gemaux
Flaba
Bois d'Yoncq
B. de Yoncq
Artaise le Vivier
Bo Girande
Yoncq
B. de Raucourt
la Besace
la Harnoterie F.
Stonne
Warniforet
la Thibaudine F.
Mt Damion
BEAUMONT
B. de la Berliere
Gdes Armoises
B. de Fay
Bois de Pierremont
la Berliere
Mt des Gignes
B. des Murets
Beausejour F.
Belle Volee F.
Sy
B. de Sommauthe
B. du Pont Gerache
Bois du Pt Dieulet
Oches
Sommauthe
Etang
le Gd Etang
Verriers
Pierremont
Vaux en Dieulet
Canal
Belval
Bois des Dames



BATTLE OF BEAUMONT.
August 30th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
English Miles
Euilly
Vaux
B de Vaux
Faubourg
Moulins
B de Moulins
B. de Blanchampagne
Malandry
La Ferte sur Chiers
Bois du Flavier
Bois de Seneval
Bois d'Alma Givors
Autrey
B d'Inor
Olizy
F. St Remy
St Helene
B d'Olizy
Inor
Lamouilly
Letanne
Pouilly
Prouilly Fe
Nepvant
Martincourt
B des Pasques
Luzy
Cesse
Servisy
FORET DE DIEULET
Laneuville sur Meuse
STENAY
Baalou
Bois du Chesnois
Beaufort
LA MEUSE R.
LA CHIERS R.
RAILWAY
Wamme R.
la Wiseppe R.



states, which, having vainly opposed her in 1866, were now allied with her.

The two Bavarian corps of the third army were sent to join the twelfth corps of the fourth; these together marched up the left bank of the Meuse, while the guards and fourth corps of the fourth army marched up the right bank. The fifth and eleventh corps of the third army were on August 29 at Stonne, seven miles west of Beaumont; while the twelfth corps of the fourth army, joined with the first Bavarians, and having the second Bavarians advancing in their rear, were close to Beaumont.

BATTLE OF BEAUMONT.

Bearing in mind that the design of MacMahon was to move southward up the course of the river, but still if possible to keep possession of both its banks until he should arrive opposite Montmédy, it will at once be perceived that an immediate collision was inevitable. Accordingly, the battle—or rather series of battles, for the fighting extended over three days—which was to decide whether or not he would reach Metz and liberate Bazaine, began in earnest a little before noon on Tuesday, August 30.

The French had been so careless in their movements that they were taken completely by surprise, especially on the left bank of the river near Beaumont. Here they were close to the very ground on which the right of the third German army was to unite with the left of the fourth. Had they been at all vigilant in their outlook towards the south, and strongly guarded the cross roads leading thence upon their right, their adversaries would hardly have dared to effect the junction of the third and fourth armies by a single road close to ground held by De Failly's corps, and that afternoon at least might have been gained to MacMahon. The affairs at Buzancy and Vouziers on the preceding days should have roused a spirit of watchfulness in the most careless staff officer; but so confident was General Guyot, who commanded this division, that the Germans were not near him, that he omitted even the most ordinary precaution of placing outposts and sending out scouts in the woods immediately in his front. The first division of Von der Tann's Bavarians, admirably led by General Stefan, advanced along the road that runs directly north from Buzancy to Raucourt, passing through the village of La Besace, which is about three miles distant from the latter place. About half-a-mile on the Buzancy side of La Besace is a branch road leading to the right, and almost at right angles with the town of Beaumont, about three miles to the eastward. General Guyot's division was encamped on both sides of this road; and the Bavarians, learning from their scouts that the enemy was so near, made all their dispositions under cover of the woods. The French, simultaneously attacked with artillery from the heights behind the wood, and with infantry from the wood itself, were, as we have said, completely surprised; but yet they made a stout resistance, for after the fight the road was found lined on both sides with bodies—the Bavarians, for the most part, lying on the side nearest Buzancy, the French on that nearest Raucourt. When the Germans had driven them from the road, the French retreated—some in the direction of Raucourt, and some (the greater part) towards Beaumont itself. They were pursued in both directions; those who had gone towards Beaumont were followed into the place, which was at the same time attacked along another line of road leading to the same point, and, after a very severe struggle, occupied by the Germans. The French made a desperate stand at the entrance to the town, firing from windows and from behind walls, and taking advantage of every possible kind of cover. After retiring into the market-place they renewed the contest, inflicting heavy losses on their opponents. Ultimately, however, the Germans drove them out of the town, and pushed them past La Besace towards Raucourt. The whole country between these places is a succession of hills and dales. Here and there the hills are very high, and in many parts thickly wooded; whilst the dales form deep valleys. This is the general character of the district for miles around, in every direction; and it was, therefore, open to the weaker side either to defend itself on the heights, to seek the shelter of the woods, or to endeavour to march unobserved along the lines of the valleys. To prevent the complete success of either of these courses, orders were given to the Bavarian cavalry to observe the woods; the infantry went down into the valleys, and up the hills on the other side; and the artillery threw their shells over the heads of their infantry into the dales beyond.

The advance of the first Bavarians in the centre of the line had the effect of turning the French right rear, which had taken up a strong position

at Stonne, and had withstood, with apparent firmness, up to that time the advance of the Crown Prince of Prussia's left columns, the fifth and eleventh corps. The fourth and twelfth Saxon corps, belonging to the fourth army, co-operated with the Bavarians on their right, nearer the Meuse; and aided in driving the French from Beaumont, on to the passage at Mouzon, whither De Failly now pressed to put the river between himself and his enemies. He succeeded in crossing by the bridge at Mouzon, and effected a junction with MacMahon on the other side. In the evening, after a short cannonade against the fourth Prussian corps and the Bavarians, the French retreated from Mouzon in the direction of Sedan; and the Germans then gave up the pursuit, but not before they had captured twelve pieces of cannon, six mitrailleuses, and several thousand prisoners.

The following extract from the diary of an officer of the chasseurs de Vincennes, who was fatally wounded at Sedan, presents a striking picture of the causes that led to this great disaster, and the state of the army near him, as well as of the retreat itself:—

"August 30.—We arrive at Beaumont, a hilly and woody country, at four a.m. The men were utterly exhausted by the march, by hunger, and above all by want of sleep. There is no possibility of bringing order into the ranks. The presence of the generals was indispensable, but none of them were to be seen on the spot, and the soldiers fall down asleep, without guard, without a single sentry. The sight was most lamentable; but the enemy being supposed to be still in his old position, and the desire for rest being invincible, every one brings his thoughts to silence as best he can. At nine or ten a.m. the men begin to wake up. A distribution of bread is going on. Six or eight loaves are given to each company, and 150 men must be content with them. This is all they have to restore their strength after endless marching, with only a few hours' sleep. But scarcely has the bread been swallowed, when a lively fusillade begins from the neighbouring wood, some 400 mètres distant. A couple of minutes pass in consideration as to what it can mean, when several shells, falling into the very heart of the camp, leave no more doubt about the matter. The whole camp seizes its arms in disorderly fashion; the officers do their best to give some kind of organization to the first movements; the artillery is soon at work, and the battle begins. But a tremendous panic arises in the village, crowded with unarmed soldiers, who were gone from the camp in search of provisions. A frantic rush begins in the direction of Mouzon; and the flying mass would naturally have drawn with it a part of the troops already in line on this side of the village, if the officers had not intervened, pistols in hand. The generals, just as much surprised as the troops, presently come to their senses. They take the command; the retreat is gradually organized, and on reaching rather elevated ground we come out from under the intolerable fire. The cannonading begins to be less intense; and a discussion arises between General de Failly and his *chef d'état major*, General Besson, with reference to the advisability of changing our position. The latter uses very strong language in support of his opinions, but the position remains the same. Ten minutes after this discussion the Germans appear on our left flank, and open fire on us at a distance of 1000 mètres. Such is the morale of our troops now, that at the very first shot from this side infantry and artillery break front and begin to run away—the former into the wood, the latter into the plain close to it, leaving several guns in the impracticable part of the ground. However, the batteries soon regain another hill, open fire, and begin to protect a little the retreat of the infantry, which takes the direction of Mouzon. It is six o'clock, and we see on the height the seventh corps appearing on the left flank of the Prussians, while a part of the twelfth corps was found by us in the plain to which we were rushing. These two corps now take our place in the struggle with the enemy. The enemy had, however, already established his batteries, some fifty guns strong, on the same hill where a few moments ago our artillery stood. These batteries send death into all the lines of the newly arrived forces, and compel them to retreat. The seventh corps retires to the position whence it came to our aid, while the twelfth takes the direction of the bridge of Mouzon, the cavalry and artillery having, happily enough, found a ford in the river, so that the bridge is mainly left for the use of the infantry. But still what confusion prevails! What a lamentable spectacle! It is the last rout of the day; and it is the more painful for our corps because we witness it in the mere capacity of onlookers. Soon in the background of the sad picture rises to heaven a large black cloud of smoke. The fire has commenced which must level to the

ground the unhappy village of Mouzon. We see war now in all its cruel reality. Such was the day of the 30th, which will never be forgotten by me, and the result of which must be a sufficient punishment for the general with whom rests the responsibility of the disaster. But what is our corps to do now? Is it to camp on its position, or to move? If it is to move, in what direction? The generals decide that they will start at once, and the soldiers are to march again all night. Thus, after several days' fatigue, we have two consecutive nights of marching, with a day's desperate fighting between, and with no other refreshment than the bread distributed at Beaumont. We are retiring in the direction of Sedan. Fearful and miserable night! Our men fall asleep by the side of the road, and to awaken them is impossible. Towards two a.m., amid the obscurity of a dark night, we meet on the junction of two roads the first and the twelfth corps. They left their positions at midnight, and are also marching towards Sedan. Here disorder reaches its climax. Men, horses, and ammunition-waggons are almost heaped upon one another in dreadful confusion. No possibility of moving, no possibility of seeing anything; and, notwithstanding this, almost dead silence reigns over this enormous incoherent mass. A terrible silence it was, at which one shudders to think. Malediction upon those who are responsible for all this!"

BATTLE OF CARIGNAN.

On the right bank of the Meuse another contest, far more bloody and resolute, had been going on at the same time as the action between the Bavarians and De Failly's corps on the opposite side. Here the main body of the French army, under Marshal MacMahon, moved gaily forward in the morning from its camp at Vaux, between Mouzon and Carignan, hoping to reach Montmèdy, about twelve miles distant, the same day. Their left wing was, however, surprised on the march between Carignan and Stenay, by the cavalry of the Prussian guards, aided by their horse artillery, and before they could effectually resist the unexpected onset, they were forced to retire on the heights where they had encamped on the previous night. In this emergency MacMahon displayed great skill and decision. The return to Vaux was effected in good order; and the marshal then rallied the whole of his army, keeping the Germans on the other side of the Meuse in check, meantime, by a deceptive show of force on the river banks. The heights of Vaux were obstinately defended by the French, who in this separate affair considerably outnumbered their opponents. Indeed, in the middle of the day, they gained some advantages, and in all probability would have been able to hold their own independently; but they were compelled to retreat by the threatening of their flank and rear, for they heard the thunder of the guns on the other side approach nearer and nearer to Mouzon, as the converging forces of Von der Tann and the Prussians of the fourth army drove De Failly pell-mell towards the bridge at that place. As night came on, the French retired through Carignan, two miles from Vaux on the road to Sedan; and thus the issue of the battles on both banks of the river was the same, though the last hours of the combat near Carignan were desperate in the extreme, and there was great slaughter on both sides. The French cavalry, cuirassiers, and chasseurs, suffered considerably. At five o'clock the emperor and his staff were at Carignan; and the cannonade, which had been considerably increasing for two hours, was at its height. About an hour later the emperor left for Sedan, and the artillery fire entirely ceased soon after eight o'clock. A firm belief in a success had been entertained all the afternoon in the little town of Carignan. The presence since the evening before of the fine army of Marshal MacMahon, the arrival of the emperor, the officers of his household looking out for night accommodation, and the encampment of the troops at Vaux, had all combined to inspire the inhabitants with confidence; so that, notwithstanding the engagement was so near, no anxiety was felt, and a victory was looked for as a matter of course. But when in the evening the emperor, who had made arrangements to sleep at Carignan, was seen leaving the town suddenly, followed by the couriers and suite, and the cannonade was heard approaching nearer and nearer, a complete panic seized the population. Masses of soldiers now arrived, and the people began to flee in every direction, though the Prussians did not enter the town till next morning. The emperor arrived at Sedan during the night of Tuesday. Nothing would have been easier for him than to have gone on to Mézières, and thus have secured his personal safety. The proposition to do so was made to him; but he rejected it, desirous not to separate

himself from the army, and determined to share its fate, whatever it might be. On the morning of the 31st the following proclamation was issued to the troops:—

"Soldiers!—The opening events of the war not having been fortunate, I determined to set aside all personal considerations, and give the command of our armies to the marshals more particularly indicated by public opinion.

"Up to the present time success has not crowned your efforts; nevertheless, I learn that the army of Marshal Bazaine has re-formed under the walls of Metz, and that of Marshal MacMahon met yesterday only a slight reverse. There is, then, no reason to be discouraged. We have prevented the enemy from penetrating to the capital, and all France is rising to drive back her invaders. Under these serious circumstances—the empress worthily representing me in Paris—I have preferred the rôle of soldier to that of sovereign. No effort shall be spared by me to save our country. It still contains, thank God! men of courage; and, if there are cowards, the military law and public contempt will mete out justice to them.

"Soldiers, be worthy of your old reputation! God will not abandon our country if all do their duty.

"Given at the Imperial Headquarters, at Sedan, August 31, 1870.

"NAPOLEON."

This proclamation, which there was barely time to distribute, was the last appeal which the emperor addressed to his soldiers.

In judging of MacMahon's conduct on this occasion, it should always be remembered that he had to fight at a grievous disadvantage, from being compelled to cover the retreat of De Failly; and that, notwithstanding this, he succeeded in keeping his enemy in check for some time, a gleam of his well-known tactical skill being observable in the manner in which he masked his retiring movement, so disposing his forces that the commander of the fifth German corps reported to the Crown Prince of Prussia that he was in the presence of at least three complete divisions of the enemy, and was not strong enough to attack! Yet at that moment MacMahon was withdrawing his troops rapidly across the Meuse to the neighbourhood of Sedan; and had he not so skilfully hid his movements by the disposition of his artillery and mitrailleuses, and so deceived his assailants, his whole army must then have been utterly routed.

Thus ended the fatal 30th of August. The vanquished troops lost twenty guns, including several mitrailleuses, an encampment, and about 7000 prisoners, besides a large amount of warlike material. The substantial success of the victors consisted in thwarting the attempt of MacMahon to move upon Metz, and in forcing the French back upon a small fortress only seven or eight miles from the neutral frontier of Belgium. Well might the Prussian official report of the affair state, that "after this engagement it became probable that the French army of the north was fast approaching a final catastrophe!"

The Germans were now in line from Stonne across the Meuse, near Mouzon, to Carignan. The greater part of their army remained on the left bank, but the forces of the Crown Prince of Saxony, having crossed the river, advanced beyond Mouzon in the direction of Carignan and Sedan. Early in the night and at daybreak the French corps which had been routed at Mouzon fell back along the right bank of the Meuse in a state of panic and demoralization, throwing their arms and accoutrements into the stream; and were stopped only when they had passed the Chiers, a deep narrow river which, flowing to the north-west, falls into the Meuse near Remilly, about three miles above Sedan. They crossed this stream by the bridge at Douzy, four or five miles from Sedan. At the same time the other French corps which had retreated before the Crown Prince of Saxony, retired from Carignan behind the Chiers, and effected a junction with their defeated comrades. The two corps commanded by Ducrot and Lebrun, who were to the eastward on the 30th, being the nearest, came in first; Douay's and De Failly's following them, and approaching Sedan by all the roads from the south. The whole army then took up its position about a mile and a half from Sedan, on the strong heights above Bazeilles, covering the approach to that fortress.

Such were the positions of the contending hosts on the morning of Wednesday, the 31st August; and MacMahon had now to make up his mind speedily to some decisive course. To force his way onwards with troops demoralized by their rapid retreat, and by the defeat which had cost them thousands of prisoners and many guns, was





Drawn under the Superintendence


BATTLE OF CARIGNAN.
August 30th 1870.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
Metres 1000 500 0 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometres
English Miles
Chains 80 40 0 1 2 3 Miles
Ste Cécile
Watrinsart
Fontenoile
Chassepierre
Lambermont
Bois du Barnel
Pure
Clemency
Mathon
Chemin des Romains
le Tremblois
Haute
Basse
les Deux Villes
Mogues
Williers
Bois de Valansart
R. de la Palle
Bois de Puilly
Bois d'Orval
Ruines de l'Abbaye d'Orval
Les Forges d'Orval
Puilly
Charbeaux
ARIGNAN
Blagny
Linay
Villers devt Orval
Auflance
Margny
Marche R
Sapogne
Herbeuval
Fromy
Villy
LA CHIERS R
Moiry
Margut
Montlibert
Signy
Malandry
la Ferte sur Chiers
Thonne le Thil
Olizy

not now to be thought of. The Germans, indeed, held Mouzon and Carignan, the two points through which he had attempted to pass eastward, and so completely barred the road to Montmèdy. There remained, therefore, only three courses—either to attack the enemy before he could further concentrate; to attempt to slip from him by a rapid flank march on Mézières; or to continue solely on the defensive. The first would have been the natural course, had mutual confidence existed between the marshal and his army. It would have been in keeping with the old reputation and tactics of the French service; and if conducted with skill, there seemed in theory no reason why a bold attack should not have severed the extended line held by the enemy, and crushed the portion assailed. MacMahon's army was concentrated behind the Chiers; the Crown Prince of Saxony was alone before him; and the Crown Prince of Prussia was on the left bank of the Meuse, at some distance, and with the river between them. The French general had about 100,000 men. Breaking out with these he might have fallen on the Crown Prince of Saxony, who had not more than 70,000 or 80,000, and endeavoured to crush him and extricate himself before the Crown Prince of Prussia could have crossed the Meuse, and overwhelmed him with superior numbers. But MacMahon was an old enough soldier to know thoroughly the truth of the maxim, that in war "the moral force is to the physical as three to one," and to feel that his troops wanted the discipline, energy, and heartiness necessary for any such sudden combination. He should, therefore, have instantly despatched Ducrot or Lebrun to seize and guard the passages of the Meuse below Sedan, and, sacrificing perhaps a single corps to this duty, have filed the rest of the army at once behind Sedan on Mézières, by the roads on the north side of the river. Instead of this the marshal, feeling that the French army was not equal to a great offensive movement, took up a position strictly defensive. He certainly was not aware that the whole army of the Crown Prince of Prussia was close to his right flank, though on the other side of the Meuse. He had therefore some reason to hope that, by compelling the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony immediately in his front, and the only one, as he thought, that was then near him, to attack his troops while they occupied a strong position, he might yet be able to defeat the enemy, and retrieve his late disaster. Subsequent events proved that he really took the most fatal course of all; for he was obliged to stand his ground against immensely superior numbers, round a mere nominal fortress, not large enough to shelter his troops if beaten, nor powerful enough in armament to affect the fortune of the battle, and commanded in every direction by hills within the range of modern field guns. Yet the position he took, though essentially faulty in these and other respects, and not as well occupied as it might have been, had, nevertheless, certain strong natural advantages, and in his forlorn situation was the best he could have chosen. Behind the Chiers, and in the angle formed between that stream and the course of the Meuse, a series of heights intersected by ravines, with hills and intricate ground between, stretch from Givonne on the Belgian frontier, to Sedan on the Meuse; and, with the villages of Balan and Bazeilles in front, on the main road from Sedan to Carignan, make, with the Chiers, like a fosse, before them, a succession of formidable lines of defence to an enemy advancing directly against them. Givonne, resting on masses of forest which spread densely across into Belgium, affords a good position to an army's wing, which could not there be easily outflanked; and Sedan, on the other side, presents advantages in many respects as a defensive point to another wing. The town is on the right bank of the Meuse, with a small suburb on the left; and in passing it the river forms a huge loop, flowing to the north-west, and returning in a southerly direction, opposing a kind of double barrier to an enemy assailing it from that quarter. Behind Sedan, and on its side of the loop, the eminences near Floing and La Garenne, crowned with woods and villages, command the river, and in case of an attempt to force it, could be stoutly defended against an attack to the rear of the town.

Whilst MacMahon rested on the 31st, and strove to strengthen the open hills to the west of Sedan with fieldworks, the combined armies of the two crown princes extended right and left to inclose his position. Their numbers, including the sixth corps, which was still behind, just doubled his; and the moral superiority they had gained enabled them to dispense with large reserves, and to extend on a wide curve, twelve miles long, outside of and parallel to the enemy's position. The third German army executed the following movements on the 31st. The first Bavarian corps marched

by Raucourt to Remilly. The eleventh Prussians proceeded from Stonne to Chemery and Cheveuge, with orders to stop on the left bank of the Meuse, and encamp opposite Donchery, a little town on the other side of the river. The fifth Prussian corps followed the eleventh, and the second Bavarians the first. The Würtemburgers likewise moved on to the Meuse by way of Vendresse and Boutencourt. The routes prescribed to the different portions of this army thus converged on Sedan, while the Prussian guards of the fourth army, after occupying Carignan in the morning, pressed forward to Douzy; the object being to surround the enemy, and compel him either to surrender, or to retreat beyond the Belgian frontier. As the latter contingency was considered very possible, it was provided by the order of the day, that in the event of the French not being immediately disarmed on the other side of the border, the German troops were to follow them into Belgium without delay. The second Bavarian corps and the Würtemburgers had no difficulty in carrying out their orders; but the fifth Prussian corps, which went by Chemery, and there defiled past the commander-in-chief, did not reach its allotted position till a late hour in the evening.

This day (Wednesday, the 31st) passed without any very important encounter, though a heavy cannonade was kept up at some points. At Remilly the first Bavarians fell in with the French troops; and, making a rash attack on Bazeilles, were driven back by Lebrun's corps with considerable loss. During this engagement, four or five batteries of the Prussian guns were sedulously employed in shelling the village, a suburb of Sedan, surrounded by gardens and trees, amidst which were a fine château and several handsome residences. The ill-fated village was set on fire in half-a-dozen places, and at one time burned so furiously all over that the French could not occupy it; and though the Bavarians seized it for a short period, they, too, were forced to retire. Fighting also commenced early in the morning, as the French were crossing the plain of Douzy; and for three hours this engagement extended over nearly four miles of country, between Douzy, Armigny, and Brevilly, about five miles from Carignan, in the direction of Sedan. Here also the French drove back the enemy, and ultimately occupied the heights whence, an hour before, the German artillery had made fearful havoc in their ranks. In the afternoon another attack by the Saxons on the left of MacMahon's position was likewise repulsed; and these partial successes so raised the hopes of the emperor, that he telegraphed to Paris that "all was going on well, and that a brilliant victory might be expected!" But that negligence which throughout the campaign had marked the conduct of the French officers, again caused their defeat. Not only had they omitted to destroy the bridge over the Chiers, as they fell back after their reverses on the 30th; but even now the cavalry which should have watched the passage of the river, were more than a mile away, so that the Germans were enabled gradually to cross unopposed; and turning the left of MacMahon's army, compelled the victorious right and centre to retreat. Thus the Germans recovered the advantage they had lost, and ere the night had fallen they had swung round their right to the north of Sedan, and neared the villages of La Chapelle and Givonne, which command the high road to Bouillon, twelve miles off, in Belgian territory, on the slopes of the Ardenne forest. The general object sought was, therefore, all but attained that day, and was fully accomplished early on the morrow, when the French army in Sedan was completely shut off from all the avenues by which it might have escaped; and nothing remained but the alternative of capitulation, or a resolute attempt to cut a way out through the forces of an enemy superior in numbers, and flushed with victory. In fact, MacMahon's position was much worse even than that of Bazaine at Gravelotte, on the 18th of August, a short fortnight before. Bazaine had in his rear a first-class fortress, with an entrenched camp, and more than two months' supply of provisions; while Sedan, a neglected second or third rate place of 15,000 inhabitants, had scarcely three day's food for MacMahon's army within its walls. So completely had the German troops got their prey in their power, that Von Moltke had been able to dispense with reserves, and throw his whole force, one corps alone excepted, in a vast circle round the French position, a tactical movement fully justified by the event, but which, against any but ill-led and very disheartened troops, might have been the ruin of the assailants





B. des Gde Fagnamonts
Bois Conde et Mazarin
B. du Grd Canton
BOIS DE
Bois Daigny
Gernelle
Bosseval
B. de la Falizelte
Issancourt
Fleigneux
St Menges
Illy
Vrigne aux Bois
Viviers au Court
Iges
Briancourt
Mortimont
Md d'Iges
Floing
Givon
B. de la Garenne
LA MEUSE R.
Vrigne R.
Canal
Cazal
Final Position of French
Pierremont
Glaire
le Dancourt
Villette
6th Cavy Divn
2nd Cavy Divn
Vrigne Meuse
5th Corps
11th Corps
DONCHERY
4th Cav Dn
Torcy
SEDAN
Pt Torcy
Wurtemburgers
Dom-le-Mesnil
Crown Prince
Frenois
Wadelincourt
la Moncelle
2nd Bavarian Corps
King
Balan
Villers sur Bar
Bazeilles
Hannogne
Bar R.
Canal des Ardennes
Bois de la Marfee
Cheveuge
1st Bavarian Corps
LA MEUSE R.
Noyers
St Aignan sur Bar
Bois de la Queue
Remilly sur Meuse
Thelonne
Chaumont St Quentin
Chemery
Headquarters of Crown Prince the night of 31st
Bar R.
B. de Fors
B. d. Oimcourt
Angecourt
Oimcourt
Bulson
Connage
Haraucourt
B. de Haye

BATTLE OF SEDAN

September 1st 1870.

FRENCH PRUSSIANS

Metres 1000 500 0 French Kilometres 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometres

Chains 80 40 0 English Miles 1 2 3 Miles

Bois du dos le Loup
la Chapelle
Bois de Francheval
Villers Cernay
Muno
B. de Messincourt
Pouru aux Bois
Guards
Francheval
le Chênois
le Bois Chevalier
Escombres
Bois de Pure
Rubecourt
Lamecourt
Pouru St. Remey
Messincourt
12th Corps
B. Boulucourt
4th Corps
Pure
Douzy
Sachy
Clemency
la Chiers R.
Brévilly
Osnes
Tetaigne
Mairy
Remilly
Lombut
CARIGNAN
Amblimont
Euilly
Villers dev.t Mouzon
Headquarters of C.P. of Saxony the night of 31st
Sailly

Engraved by J. Walker



CHAPTER XIV.

Peculiarity of the French Position on September 1—Description of the Town of Sedan and the Country around—The Position of both Armies before the commencement of the Action—The Fatal Objection to that occupied by the French—Strategy of the German Commanders—The Night before the Battle—The Germans commence marching at one a.m. on September 1, in order to commence the Action at Daybreak—A Fog of great assistance to them—Negligence of the French in not destroying the Bridges over the Chiers—The French Left Wing rapidly gives way, and retires in confusion—Successful Movements of the two German Armies to encircle the French—Desperate Encounter at Floing—Deadly fire of the Mitrailleuses—Fruitless Charges of the French Cuirassiers—Junction of the two German Armies—The French are ultimately driven in—Fearful Scene as they retire into the town of Sedan—The Fighting on the French Front and Right—Desperate resistance at those points—MacMahon is Wounded, and the command devolves on General Wimpffen—Description of Fighting at Bazeilles by Mr. Winterbotham, M.P.—Affecting Incident in connection with the Wounded on both sides—German and French Accounts of the burning of Bazeilles—The French completely surrounded about Two O'clock—Proposal to the Emperor by General Wimpffen to cut a passage through is declined—Rumour that Bazaine was approaching, and recapture of Balan by the French—Hopeless Disorganization amongst the French in Sedan—Shelling of the town by the Germans—The Emperor orders the White Flag to be hoisted—The King of Prussia refuses to grant anything but the Unconditional Surrender of the whole of the French Army—Surprise of the Germans on finding that the French Emperor is in Sedan—He surrenders himself to the King of Prussia—The Letters which passed between them—Remonstrance by General Wimpffen against the Surrender of the Army—The Emperor refuses to accept his resignation—He then proceeds to the German Headquarters to endeavour to obtain better terms, but Von Moltke is Inexorable—The return of the Crown Prince to his Troops—The number of Men and Guns captured during the Battle—The Killed and Wounded on both sides, and the terrible Scenes on the Battle-field—The State of Sedan during the night—The Germans mass in immense numbers around the town on the following morning, in order to convince the French of the utter hopelessness of their position—A French Council of War decides that Capitulation is Inevitable—The Terms agreed to between Count von Moltke and General Wimpffen—Speech of the King of Prussia to the German Princes after the Capitulation had been agreed to—Despatch to Her Majesty by the King of Prussia—Address of General Wimpffen to the French Army—Frantic Conduct of the Troops on the Capitulation becoming known—The number of Prisoners, Guns, &c., surrendered—Severe privations endured by the French—Count von Bismarck's interesting Official Account of the Capitulation—The Interview between him and the Emperor of the French—The latter attempts to obtain better Terms for his Army, but declines to Negotiate for Peace—Meeting of the King of Prussia and the Emperor at Bellevue—The Palace of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, is chosen as the place of Residence of the Emperor during his Captivity in Germany—Consideration shown by the King—The Emperor's Journey to Wilhelmshöhe—Interesting Letter from the King to the Queen of Prussia—Anecdote in connection with it—Toast of His Majesty at a Military Banquet on the day of the Capitulation—General Review of the Engagement and its Results, and Criticism of the Strategy on both sides—The Personal Demeanour of the French Emperor during the Battle—Great Sortie from Metz in the hope of acting in conjunction with MacMahon—The Preparations which had been made by the Germans to prevent the Success of such an Operation—Misgiving on the part of the French—Description of the Country in which the Sortie was made—Want of Preconcerted Action on the French side—The Village of Servigny taken from the Prussians—A Grand Opportunity Missed!—Fresh Troops continuously poured in by the Germans during the night—Negligence of the French—The Action recommenced on the following Morning, and the French compelled to retire—Their Reflections on the Event.

THE BATTLE OF SEDAN.

A LARGE army driven into a corner does not easily succumb. It took three desperate battles to teach Bazaine's troops that they were shut in before Metz; nor did the engagements of Beaumont and Carignan suffice to induce those of MacMahon to confess that they were hopelessly defeated. A fresh battle—the greatest and most bloody of all the series—had to be fought around Sedan before the French soldiers fully realized the disastrous position into which they had been driven. The situation in which MacMahon was placed was singularly curious. The fortresses of Mézières, Sedan, and Montmèdy were constructed to meet an invasion of France from the Belgian territory. A French army facing the north and resting on these fortresses, must have been the state of affairs anticipated when they were built. Yet now, at this very spot, was a French force with its rear to Belgium, standing an attack from an enemy operating from the interior of France. *L'homme propose, mais Dieu dispose.* Never surely were human plans more completely frustrated.

It was originally intended by the Germans to put off the decisive blow till the 2nd of September, to give a day's rest to the Saxon army, which had undergone considerable fatigue in their forced marches and fighting on the 30th and 31st of August. But between five and six o'clock in the evening of the 31st, as the king passed Chemery on his way to his headquarters at Vendresse, he held a consultation with the Crown Prince and Generals von Moltke and Blumenthal, when it was

determined that the attack on Sedan, and the French lines between the Meuse and the Ardennes, should be undertaken on the ensuing day.

The plan of the battle-field which accompanies this chapter will make the situation of the opposing forces so clear to every reader, that it is only necessary here to point out, very briefly, the leading features of the country.

Sedan, a manufacturing town containing about 15,000 inhabitants, chiefly engaged in the woollen trade, is situated at one of the finest points of the valley of the Meuse, which runs close under the walls of the town. It is built in a hollow, commanded by heights about a mile off, which are crowned with forests and rise in terraces on either side of the river. On the right bank is a narrow strip of meadow-land by the waterside, which by a temporary overflow of the Meuse was converted into a broad sheet of water resembling a lake, artificially contrived to strengthen the military defences, and spreading a couple of miles on the south side of the town. On the same bank of the river, and a little to the left of Sedan, is an open plain, with the town of Donchery pleasantly situated in its centre. This plain is traversed by a slight elevation. To the right of it the Meuse makes an extraordinary bend or loop, inclosing a strip of land two miles and a half in length. In this peninsula, which is for the most part bare, lie the hamlets and mansions of Glaire, Villette, and Iges. Between Iges and Sedan, on the right bank of the river, is the village of Floing; and, further to the right, Illy and Givonne. The main road between Donchery and Sedan proceeds from a bridge at Donchery, and touches the village of Frenois. To the south-east are, or rather were, the large suburban villages of Balan and Bazeilles. Balan, the nearest to the city, indeed just outside the walls, is close to the sheet of water formed by the overflowing Meuse; and about a mile and a half further to the south, on the Carignan and Montmèdy high road, was the unhappy village, or small town, of Bazeilles, the birthplace of Marshal Turenne, and the scene of a battle in 1641 during the civil wars in France. Douzy, where the guards crossed the Chiers, is on the extreme right. Sedan is a fortress of the second class, the approaches to which are not, as at Metz and other places, defended by works and advanced forts. At this time, too, the supply of ammunition in the town was very deficient, and the armament altogether incomplete. Undoubtedly, in the time of the old field and siege guns, it was a strong fortress; but notwithstanding its walls, its gates, its fosses, and its series of earthworks studded with guns of position, it is now to all intents an open town to modern artillery occupying the heights around. The fortifications are high, but these hills are still higher; so that, from the moment the German artillery possessed itself of them, Sedan was as good as taken. It is generally admitted that when the capitulation took place, successful resistance was impossible, and that to have prolonged the struggle would have been to insure the destruction of the town with all its inhabitants.

On the evening of Wednesday, the 31st of August, the German armies had reached their prescribed positions, and before dawn on Thursday the commanders reported that on each side everything was complete. The troops on the left stood ready to cross the Meuse; those on the right, under the Crown Prince of Saxony, were waiting for orders to assume the offensive; and from one end of the position to the other they were able to close in on Sedan at the shortest notice. On the Meuse, opposite Bazeilles and Balan, the first and second Bavarians formed the right wing of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army; next them was that of the Crown Prince of Saxony, the fourth and twelfth corps, facing towards Moncelle, Daigny, and Villers Cernay, while the guards were marching towards La Chapelle. To the west of Sedan was the Crown Prince of Prussia's fifth and eleventh corps, the former moving towards Fleigneux, the latter to St. Menges and Floing. The loop formed by the Meuse rendering escape in that direction impossible, no troops were posted between St. Menges and Donchery; but at Dom-le-Mesnil, a little to the left of Donchery, the Würtemburgers were stationed, who not only covered the rear against sallies from Mézières, but watched the road against any attempt of the French to break through in that direction. As MacMahon's right was, however, completely outflanked by the fifth and eleventh corps, none of his troops appeared in that quarter. Towards the close of the battle, the Würtemburg artillery was brought up to take part in the bombardment which was to reduce the enemy to terms; but it only arrived in time to learn that further proceedings had been stayed by a flag of truce. Count Stolberg's second, and the fourth and sixth cavalry divisions under Prince Albrecht,

were at different points in the plain of Donchery, covering and connecting the German right wing.

Before night closed in on Wednesday, MacMahon, who, allowing for the losses of the previous two days, had little more than 100,000 men and about 440 guns, must at last have realized the extent of his peril. The prince of Saxony, with his whole army, was in his front, beyond the Chiers; and to his right, on the other bank of the Meuse, were the forces of the Crown Prince of Prussia. Had his soldiers only been able to hold their ground, he occupied a naturally strong position on the outer line of the heights around Sedan, and he made the best possible arrangements with the forces at his disposal; though it is certain he only expected an attack in front and on his right flank, for he could not foresee in what other direction than on the right the Crown Prince of Prussia was to operate against him. The right and front of the French position was intrusted to the corps commanded by Generals Ducrot and Lebrun; the left was defended by Generals Wimpffen and Douay. The seventh corps (Douay's) occupied the ground from Floing and St. Menges to Illy and Fleigneux, on the north of Sedan; the fifth (Wimpffen's, formerly De Failly's) was posted partly in the town and partly on the heights which command the gully of Givonne; the first (Ducrot's, formerly commanded by MacMahon himself) stretched from Petite Moncelle to Givonne; and the twelfth (Lebrun's) occupied Bazeilles in force and also held La Moncelle, about a mile higher up. The French army was thus formed in a semicircle round Sedan, the two wings leaning on the Meuse. The left, which rested on Givonne and the adjoining forest, was composed of the feeblest troops, as it was considered that, from the obstacles in the way and its being in the neighbourhood of a neutral frontier, it could not be turned. The French line extended thence along the ranges of heights which trend back to Sedan; the right occupied Bazeilles and Balan, and MacMahon stationed in considerable force his best divisions in these prominent positions, in order to hold the main road to Carignan, and to give strength to his projecting front. The defensible positions along the line from Givonne to Sedan were made the most of; guns, with masses of infantry, crowned the eminences or commanded the wooded valleys between; and at some points entrenchments were thrown up to baffle any hostile attack. The right of the French was protected in part by the course of the Meuse, in part by the western edge of the town, and in part by the artificial inundation of the river over the meadow land before described; and beyond Sedan on the other side the plateaux and ridges of Floing and La Garenne were occupied by large bodies of troops, though a dangerous attack at this point was not thought probable. The Chiers, from Douzy to Remilly, flowed directly across the French front, and opposed a natural barrier to the Crown Prince of Saxony. In this situation, covered by two rivers and behind obstacles of every kind, MacMahon awaited the German attack. The position of the French, though strong at some points, and formidable in its natural defences, was open to the fatal objection that everything depended upon their making a successful stand; if defeated at any point, no loophole was left for a safe retreat. Their projecting front was liable to a cross fire; once driven in, defeat would be inevitable; and while their wings would find it difficult to move, the turning of either would imperil both, and cause the whole mass to recoil inwards, where it would be involved in utter confusion. Sedan, on which, in that case, they would inevitably crowd for protection, was exposed to the fire of field guns from the heights of the valley of the Meuse; and if the slopes to the rear of the town were taken, it would be literally crushed by the weight of artillery.

The German commanders were not slow to perceive the advantages within their grasp; and, as we have already seen, on the 31st August they formed the plan of enveloping the French army, hemming it in upon Sedan, and cutting it off from the one chance which despair alone might prompt it to attempt, that of retreating across the Belgian frontier. They had about 220,000 men, and from 600 to 700 guns; with this immense superiority of force, and the ascendancy obtained by unbroken success, they were justified in determining on operations which, against a stronger and more confident foe, would have been attended with no little danger. The Crown Prince of Saxony was to attack and turn the extreme left of the French, assailing their front at the same time; this done, he was to send a force right round in their rear, which, meeting a detachment from the third German army, was to close completely upon them. Meanwhile the Crown Prince of Prussia was, with the Bavarian corps, to attack MacMahon's right at the projecting points of Bazeilles and Balan,

effecting a junction with his colleague; he was also to overwhelm the French right wing as it was thrown backward behind Sedan, and to the north his troops were to meet those of the Crown Prince of Saxony and complete the hemming in of the enemy. Altogether, about 170,000 men, with nearly 600 guns, were to be engaged in the shock of battle; the remainder were to close round on the French, or watch the roads against any attempt to break through.

Such was the plan of the German commanders; and considering the strength of the opposing hosts, and the great results looked for from it, it was alike daring and admirable. Though not without risk, it was less hazardous than that which had issued in Bazaine being driven back into Metz; while, on the other hand, its success would insure the annihilation of MacMahon's army.

The night of the 31st was bright, and the horizon showed like a huge red vault, as, far on either bank of the Meuse, innumerable watch-fires marked the bivouacs of the armies awaiting the fight of the morrow. About one a.m. on September 1 the Crown Prince of Saxony received orders to advance, with a view to opening fire at five o'clock. The Crown Prince of Prussia left his headquarters at Chemery at four a.m.; and, with General Blumenthal and his staff, took up his position on an eminence overlooking the valley of the Meuse, near the town of Donchery, in front of a small newly built mansion called Château Donchery. From this point the whole of the German army could be surveyed, and the progress of the battle observed in all directions. Three hours later, the king of Prussia, with Count von Bismarck, General von Moltke, General von Roon, the Prussian minister of War, and a numerous staff (including Generals Sheridan and Forsyth, belonging to the army of the United States of America), arrived, and watched the movements of the troops from a high hill near Frenois, about a mile to the right of the Crown Prince, and three miles from Sedan. This spot commanded an excellent bird's eye view of the country round, including the hills on the king's left hand, to the west and north of the fortress, and the long bend of the Meuse; while he could look down on his right, over the southern suburbs, to Bazeilles, and towards the Saxon corps. Between the position which he occupied and Sedan is a lower ridge, with a wide gently-sloping valley intervening; and beneath the shelter of this ridge (for it was scarcely within range of the French batteries) masses of Prussian troops of all arms were drawn up in readiness for a forward attack, or for detachment to any threatened or critical point. These splendid slopes, interspersed with thickets, and unbroken by hedges, banks, ditches, or any other obstacle, offered great facilities for rapid movement, to which in some measure, no doubt, was due the success of the battle. To this the field telegraph, a method of communication neglected by the French, also contributed.

At daybreak part of the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia crossed the Meuse at Donchery by means of two pontoon bridges, under cover of the morning fog and of a thick wood close to the river's bank. The advanced guard of the Crown Prince of Saxony also took advantage of the fog to cross the Chiers a little after five o'clock; while the Bavarians, who had previously passed the Meuse, came into line with his left wing, and made preparations to attack Bazeilles. With the negligence which throughout the campaign too often disgraced the French staff, the bridges over the Chiers had not been broken; and the first line of MacMahon's defences was carried without loss, the French cavalry outposts not even attempting resistance. At half-past seven the sun broke out, clearing away the dense fog which covered the valleys and the hills; and as the day advanced it became hot and sultry. Between five and six o'clock, simultaneously the Crown Prince of Saxony's columns were directed upon Givonne in order to turn the French left, and against the heights which protected their left centre; while the Bavarians pressed forwards to storm Bazeilles, and force their front inwards towards Sedan. At the sight of the enemy the inefficient troops which held the important point of Givonne began to give way; and after a brief but decisive combat the French left wing was turned and driven in, crowds of fugitives hurrying into the woods, while others fell in on the now pressed centre.

About ten o'clock the victorious Saxons were pressing forwards from Givonne towards Illy and St. Menges, to the extreme left of the French army, in order to effect the junction with the Crown Prince of Prussia which led to such important results; and meeting with no opposition, they easily accomplished their object. At the same time the German left wing prepared to turn the other flank of their enemy. The eleventh corps

proceeded along the slight elevation in the midst of the plain by Donchery; the fifth marched straight on to get to the rear. According to the plan of the battle, these corps were to meet the right wing, and, by surrounding the enemy, to cut off his retreat towards the Ardennes. The Würtembergers and the cavalry division, subsequently sent to their support, were to protect the plain in case the French should push forward in this direction; which, however, from the difficulty they must have found in crossing the Meuse, was not very probable, as they had themselves destroyed the railway bridge between Donchery and Sedan. MacMahon seems to have thought that on this side his line was not exposed to serious danger, and that his breaking down the railway bridge was a sufficient protection. As we have seen, however, the Crown Prince of Prussia crossed over his pontoon bridge unperceived by the French, and the fog enabled him to crown with batteries the crest of the hills which overlook Floing and the surrounding country. At a quarter past nine the eleventh corps had so far turned the French flank as to come close upon them. Then the German troops, under the protection of their guns, attacked in force the astonished enemy, who, caught in their rear, could do nothing save in the way of defending the positions they still held. Their main defensive point on the north side of Sedan was at Floing, on the east of the long loop of the Meuse. Here they had entrenched themselves upon the crown of a hill just above the village; and as this spot was the keystone of MacMahon's left, it was most hotly contested. On it were placed six mitrailleuses, which completely commanded the valley in front, so that, as the Germans advanced to the attack, whole masses, numbering perhaps 200 men, were swept away by a single discharge. In this instance the destructive effects of the mitrailleuse were confessedly greater than could have been produced by common shell. Nothing, indeed, could withstand a fire so murderous, and the Prussians fell back in confusion. Almost exactly opposite the French, however, at a distance of about three quarters of a mile, was a conical hill, named the Mamelon d'Atoi, which had been left undefended, an omission for which MacMahon has been severely criticized. But it would seem he had only a choice of evils. To defend the hill as an isolated post would have been useless, and to extend his line so as to embrace it within his general position would have dangerously weakened his front. The Germans at once seized upon this height, and to use the words of an English artillery officer on viewing the scene shortly afterwards, "with a judgment amounting to genius" twelve field guns were immediately posted on it in such a position that, while they themselves were in great measure protected from fire on the reverse brow of the hill, the French were forced to choose between the alternative of being made a target of by the direct fire in their front, or of seeking shelter from it by retiring over the crest, there to be enfiladed from their right. It is not too much to say that the successful attack on the Floing ridge, and consequently the decisive results of the battle, were in no small degree due to the effective fire from these two batteries. The Germans now plied their artillery fast and furiously on the opposite hill, and quickly silenced the enemy's guns. At ten minutes past twelve the French infantry, no longer supported by their artillery, were compelled to retire from their position at Floing, which was at once seized by the Prussian infantry. At twenty-five minutes past twelve were to be seen clouds of retreating French infantry on the hill between Floing and Sedan, and a Prussian battery in front of St. Menges making good practice with percussion shell among the retreating ranks. The whole hill for a quarter of an hour was literally covered with "Frenchmen running rapidly." "Less than half an hour after, at fifty minutes past twelve," says the special correspondent of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, who was viewing the battle from the hill occupied by the king and Count von Bismarck, "General von Roon called our attention to another French column in full retreat to the right of Sedan, on the road leading from Bazeilles to La Garenne wood. They never halted until they got to a small red-roofed house on the outskirts of Sedan itself. Almost at the same moment General Sheridan, who was using my opera-glass, called my attention to a third French column moving up a broad grass road through La Garenne wood immediately above Sedan, doubtless to support the troops defending the important Bazeilles ravine to the north-east of the town. At fifty-five minutes past twelve the French batteries on the edge of the wood of La Garenne and above it opened a vigorous fire on the advancing Prussian columns, whose evident intention it was to storm the hill north-west of La Garenne, and so gain the key of the position on

that side. At five minutes past one yet another French battery near the wood opened on the Prussian columns, which were compelled to keep shifting their ground till ready for their final rush at the hill, in order to avoid offering so good a mark to the French shells. Shortly after we saw the first Prussian skirmishers on the crest of the La Garenne hill above Torcy. They did not seem in strength, and General Sheridan, standing beside me, exclaimed, 'Ah! they are too weak; they can never hold that position against all those French.' The general's prophecy soon proved correct, for the French advancing at least six to one, the Prussians were forced to retire down the hill to seek reinforcements from the columns which were hurrying to their support. In five minutes they came back again, this time in greater force, but still terribly inferior to the huge French columns. 'Good heavens! the French cuirassiers are going to charge them,' said General Sheridan: and sure enough the regiment of cuirassiers, their helmets and breastplates flashing in the September sun, formed up in sections of squadrons, and dashed down on the Prussian scattered skirmishers. Without deigning to form line—squares are never used by the Prussians—the infantry received the cuirassiers with a most tremendous 'schnellfeuer' (quick fire) at about 108 yards, loading and firing as fast as possible into the dense squadrons. Over went men and horses by hundreds, and the regiment was compelled to retire much faster, it seemed to me, than it came. The moment the cuirassiers turned bridle, the plucky Prussians actually dashed in hot pursuit after them at the double. Such a thing has not often been recorded in the annals of war. The French infantry then came forward in turn and attacked the Prussians, who waited quietly under a most rapid fire of Chassepots until their enemies got within about 100 yards, when they gave them such a dose of lead that the infantry soon followed the cavalry to the 'place from which they came'—that is, behind a ridge some 600 yards on the way to Sedan, where the tirailleurs could not hit them. The great object of the Prussians was gained, as they were not dispossessed of the crest of the hill, and it was fair betting that they would do all that in them lay to get some artillery up to help them before Napoleon III. was much nearer his deposition. 'There will be a fight for that crest,' says Sheridan, peering through his field-glass at the hill, which was not three miles from where he stood, with the full fire on it from behind us. At half-past one the French cavalry—this time I fancy a regiment of the carabineers—made another attempt to dislodge the Prussians, who were being reinforced every minute. But they met with the same fate as their brethren in the iron jackets, and were sent with heavy loss to the right about, the Prussians taking advantage of their flight to advance their line a couple of hundred yards nearer the French infantry. Suddenly they split into two bodies, leaving a break of 100 yards in their line. We were not long in seeing the object of this movement, for the little white puffs from the crest behind the skirmishers, followed by a commotion in the dense French masses, show us that 'ces diables de Prussiens' have contrived, heaven only knows how, to get a couple of four-pounders up the steep ground, and have opened on the French. Something must have at this point been very wrong with the French infantry, for instead of attacking the Prussians, whom they still outnumbered by at least two to one, they remained in columns on the hill, seeing their only hope of retrieving the day vanishing from before their eyes without stirring. The cavalry then tried to do a little Balaklava business, but without the success of the immortal 'six hundred.' We *took* the guns in the Balaklava valley. Down came the cuirassiers once more, this time riding straight for the two field-pieces. But before they had got within 200 yards of the guns, the Prussians formed line as if on parade, and, waiting till they were within fifty yards, gave them a volley which seemed to us to destroy almost the whole of the leading squadron, and so actually blocked up the way to the guns for the next ones following. After this last charge—which was as complete a failure, although most gallantly conceived and executed, as the two preceding ones—the infantry fell back rapidly towards Sedan, and in an instant the whole hill was covered by swarms of Prussian tirailleurs, who appeared to rise from the ground. After the last desperate charge of the French cavalry, General Sheridan remarked to me, 'I never saw anything so reckless, so utterly foolish, as that last charge—it was sheer murder!' The Prussians, after the French infantry fell back, advanced rapidly, so much so that the retreating squadrons of French cavalry turned suddenly round, and charged desperately once again. But it was all of

no use. The days of breaking squares or even lines are over, and the 'thin blue line' soon stopped the Gallic onset. It was most extraordinary that the French had neither artillery nor mitrailleurs, especially these latter, on the hill to support the infantry. The position was a most important one, and certainly worth straining every nerve to defend. One thing was clear enough—that the French infantry, after once meeting the Prussians, declined to try conclusions with them again, and that the cavalry were trying to encourage them by their example. About two, more Prussian regiments came over the long-disputed hill between Torcy and Sedan, to reinforce the regiments already established there."

Another better known and most able special correspondent, Dr. Russell, of the *Times*, in a vivid description of the fearful nature of the struggle in this part of the field, said, "the Prussians coming up from Floing were invisible to me. Never can I forget the sort of agony with which I witnessed those who first came out on the plateau raising their heads and looking around for an enemy, while, hidden from view, a thick blue band of French infantry was awaiting them, and a brigade of cavalry was ready on their flank below. I did not know that Floing was filled with advancing columns. There was but a wide, extending, loose array of skirmishers, like a flock of rooks, on the plateau. Now the men in front began to fire at the heads over the bank lined by the French. This drew such a flash of musketry as tumbled over some and staggered the others; but their comrades came scrambling up from the rear, when suddenly the first block of horse in the hollow shook itself up, and the line, in beautiful order, rushed up the slope. The onset was not to be withstood. The Prussians were caught *en flagrant délit*. Those nearest the ridge slipped over into the declivitous ground; those in advance, running in vain, were swept away. But the impetuosity of the charge could not be stayed. Men and horses came tumbling down into the road, where they were disposed of by the Prussians in the gardens, while the troopers on the left of the line, who swept down the lane in a cloud of dust, were almost exterminated by the infantry in the village. There was also a regular cavalry encounter, I fancy, in the plains below, but I cannot tell at what time; the cuirassiers, trying to cut their way out, were destroyed, and a charge of two Prussian squadrons, which did not quite equal expectations, occurred. The feat of those unfortunate cavaliers only cleared the plateau for a little time. In a few minutes up came the spiked helmets again over the French *épaulement*, crossing their sabred comrades, and, therefore, all alive to the danger of cavalry. They advanced in closer order, but still skirmishing, and one long, black parallelogram was maintained to rally on. As the skirmishers got to the ridge they began to fire, but the French in the second line of *épaulement* soon drove them back by a rattling fusillade. The French rushed out of the *épaulement* in pursuit, still firing. At the same moment a splendid charge was executed on the Prussians, before which the skirmishers rallied, on what seemed to me to be still a long parallelogram. They did not form square. Some Prussians too far on were sabred. The troopers, brilliantly led, went right onwards in a cloud of dust; but when they were within a couple of hundred yards of the Prussians, one simultaneous volley burst out of the black front and flank, which enveloped all in smoke. They were steady soldiers who pulled trigger there. Down came horse and man; the array was utterly ruined. There was left in front of that deadly infantry but a heap of white and grey horses—a terrace of dead and dying and dismounted men and flying troopers, who tumbled at every instant. More total dissipation of a bright pageantry could not be. There was another such scene yet to come. I could scarce keep the field-glass to my eyes as the second and last body of cavalry—which was composed of light horse also—came thundering up out of the hollow. They were not so bold as the men on the white horses, who fell, many of them at the very line of bayonets. The horses of these swerved as they came upon the ground covered with carcases, and their line was broken; but the squadron leaders rode straight to death. Once again the curling smoke spurted out from the Prussian front, and to the rear and right and left flew the survivors of the squadrons. The brown field was flecked with spots of many colours, and, trampling on the remains of that mass of strength and courage of man and horse, the Prussians, to whom supports were fast hastening up right and left and rear, pressed on towards the inner *épaulement*, and became engaged with the French infantry, who maintained for some time a steady rolling fire in reply to the volleys of the Prussians. To me the

French force seemed there very much superior in number. But they had lost courage, and what was left of it was soon dissipated by the advance of a Prussian battery, which galloped up to the right flank of their infantry, and opened a very rapid fire, to which there was no French battery to reply. The French left the *épaulement*, and made for a belt of wood, dropping fast as they retreated, but facing round and firing still. In a few moments more the plateau was swarming with the battalions of the eleventh corps, and the struggle there was over. Only for a minute, however, because from the flanks of the wood came out a line of French infantry. The musketry fire was renewed; but it was evident the Prussians were not to be gainsaid. Their advance was only checked that they might let their artillery play while their columns assisted it by incessant volleys. A fierce onslaught by the French, made after they had retired behind the wood, only added to their losses. The Crown Prince's army, notwithstanding the cavalry success at the outset, had by three o'clock won the key of the position of the French with comparatively small loss."

In the meantime the fifth German corps had performed the long distance to the extreme heights, and after a sharp encounter succeeded in driving back the detachments making for the Ardennes; only a few scattered bodies of infantry, about 12,000 men altogether, having succeeded in effecting their retreat across the Belgian frontier, about six miles off, and where they laid down their arms. Affairs had, in fact, assumed a very favourable aspect for the Germans; and the Saxons, who had designedly reserved their strength, pressed forwards with an overpowering force. As early as midday, from the fire of the Prussian batteries on the right and left wings, so rapidly closing in on each side, it was evident the enemy would soon be completely surrounded. "It was a grand sight," says the German official report of the battle, "to watch the sure and irresistible advance of the guards, marching on, on the left wing, partly behind and partly by the side of the twelfth corps d'armée." Since a quarter-past ten the guards, preceded by their artillery, had been pushing towards the woods to the north of Sedan. The advancing smoke of their guns showed how fast they were gaining ground; and when, from the line of fire passing beyond Givonne, the Crown Prince of Prussia learned the defeat of the French left, and the progress which his Saxon colleague had made, he could spare more than enough of men to hem the enemy in on all sides, and render the flight of the French impossible. Their line receded from point to point, and at last breaking into a confused mass, was driven headlong into the town by the weight of a crushing artillery. "Soldiers of all corps were crushing against each other in the struggle to get inside the town. Dismounted cavalry were climbing over the ramparts, cuirassiers were jumping, horses and all, into the moats, the horses breaking their legs and ribs. Guns, with their heavy carriages and powerful horses, forced their way into the throngs, maiming and crushing the fugitives on foot. To add to the confusion and terror, the Prussian shells began to fall into the midst of the struggling masses. On the ramparts were the national guard, manning the guns, and striving to reply to the Prussian batteries. It was a scene of indescribable horror."

Meanwhile a struggle of a different kind, worthy of their martial renown, was raging along the French front, where the fortunes of the day long hung in the balance. The hill ranges were fiercely disputed; every slope was the scene of a stern encounter; and though the French line receded gradually before the crushing effects of the enemy's guns, the fight was gallantly contested. The Prussians began firing before five o'clock, first against the French right and centre, from Balan and Bazeilles to Moncelle, which were the scene of the most terrible conflicts of the day. To these points the French, conscious of their vital importance, clung with desperate tenacity; and though the Bavarians advanced with resolute bravery, supported by batteries able to pour in a destructive cross-fire, they were at first steadily repulsed, and the resistance was long-sustained and heroic. The slope before Bazeilles was covered with their killed and wounded; but in spite of the destructive fire from the French mitrailleuses, the Bavarians stormed the bridge leading into the town, where, as early as six o'clock, they obtained a footing from which they could not be dislodged.

The solidly-built, compact town, with its wide communications, presented rare capabilities of defence, and a stubborn resistance was made at every step, until the contest became one of almost unparalleled fury. The French, evidently determined not to surrender, surpassed their former deeds of valour; while the German obstinacy and perse-

verance appeared equally decided. The splendid courage of the French troops was, unfortunately, of no avail, and they were gradually driven back in the direction of Sedan, though at a late hour in the afternoon the murderous contest was still doubtful.

At five o'clock in the morning MacMahon proceeded to the advanced posts near Bazeilles, to reconnoitre the positions, and sent to inform the emperor, who mounted horse soon afterwards, and rode to the field of battle. While apparently almost seeking death the gallant marshal was struck on the hip by a piece of bombshell which exploded near him, killing his horse; and he fell, severely wounded, into a deep trench by the side of the road near Bazeilles. He was immediately placed in an ambulance waggon, and carried back into the town. The command was then taken by General Wimpffen, who had arrived from Algeria only two days before, and had been ordered at once by the Parisian ministry to supersede De Failly, who, as has been shown in the previous chapter, by allowing himself to be surprised on Tuesday at Beaumont, opened the door to the three days' flood of disasters. This change of generals at the commencement of the action was unfortunate; for while the army had unbounded confidence in the bravery and skill of MacMahon, his successor was comparatively unknown to them; and he, on the other hand, knew nothing of the marshal's plans, or even the disposition of the corps on the plateaux above Sedan. Indeed, it is said that MacMahon felt this so strongly, that he at once gave his instructions to General Ducrot, whom he knew well, and would no doubt have preferred as his successor; but when Wimpffen came and asserted his right, as the senior, to the chief command, he obtained it as a matter of course. The consequence, however, was that in many parts of the field in reality nobody commanded, and divisions and regiments were left to fight their own battle.

In their repeated attacks upon Bazeilles and Balan the Bavarians suffered enormously. After they had crossed the Meuse by their pontoons and by the railway bridge, they could receive but little protection from their own artillery on the heights; and they were exposed to a fire of infantry in the houses, and to the guns of the works, as well as the musketry from the parapets. In the strenuous attempts of the French to repulse them, the marines from Cherbourg particularly distinguished themselves; and three divisions of Bavarians, who began to fight at four o'clock in the morning, sustained three distinct onslaughts from the town, and from the troops under the walls. At one time it appeared as though the Germans must be overpowered; but a partial success at this point would scarcely have secured the French army from its ultimate fate.

The following interesting description of the fighting at this point is taken from a letter published a few days afterwards, by "an English M.P." (Mr. Winterbotham, the member for Stroud), who was present with the German army as a member of an ambulance corps:—"We were about the middle of a valley some three miles long, stretching from Remilly on the south-east to Torcy on the north-west. Through it flowed the Meuse, as broad on our right as the Thames above Teddington. Between the road and the river on our left ran the rail, which, just at this spot, turns sharply across the river by an iron bridge into the town of Bazeilles, which stood a little back from the river, immediately in our front, on the opposite side of the valley. Close behind us, and forming the south-west side of the valley, was a range of hills, the tops and sides of which, forming the north-east side of the valley, were covered with woods, not one continuous wood, but patches of twenty or thirty acres, with sloping glades of grass between. It was on these open slopes that I found, after the battle, most traces of German losses. They must have suffered severely in driving the French from the woods, which were well lined with mitrailleuses. The artillery and troops crossed the river on the south-east side of Bazeilles by a pontoon bridge they had constructed in the night. The town of Bazeilles had already been seized by the Bavarians, though with great loss, before six o'clock in the morning; and two hours afterwards artillery, followed by infantry, were mounting the ridge beyond, on the right of the valley or gully running up from Bazeilles to Givonne. At the top of this ridge, about midday, I first saw the Saxons. Both Saxons and Bavarians kept up a heavy fire of artillery from this spot over the gully against the French, who were in front of us on the opposite ridge. When the French were driven from this, we crossed the gully, occupied their position, and began again at the next ridge. This was wooded, and the French clung to it till between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, when we

saw them making off fast down the hill towards the river; in fact, to the village of Balan, which lay between Bazeilles and Sedan, at the foot of the ridge. In crossing the gully between Bazeilles and Givonne from ridge to ridge, and retreating up the valley from Bazeilles, the French fought well, and clung to every house and bit of wood; yet the Bavarians were so close upon them that some of them were cut off and left in Bazeilles. Here they remained concealed in the houses while the Bavarians passed through. It was only about eleven o'clock, when I happened to be in the town, that they were discovered. Bazeilles was then on fire in several places; and the flames had reached a large house at the corner of two streets in the centre of the town. Suddenly, from the windows of this house, was opened upon us a sharp fire, and the men of the small Bavarian force then in the place began to fall fast. The little garrison in the house refused to surrender. The Bavarians fired in vain, and straw was then heaped against the doors and lighted, but the wind blew the flames steadily back, leaving the front of the house untouched; and from the cellars and the ground floor on that side the French still kept up their fire. At last their officer fell, mortally wounded, from the window. He was picked up and brought in by our men, and soon afterwards the remnant of the little force surrendered. There were 200 men of the marines in that house. Their gallant young commander would not hear of a surrender, and only forty came out at last unhurt. In other houses smaller bands were found. Some of the inhabitants, not soldiers, and even women, fired on the Bavarians. *I saw them taken with arms in their hands;* and I was assured they would be hanged the next day. Returning to the Bavarian batteries on the ridge west of the gully, I saw the Bavarian infantry twice advance below me to seize Balan, and twice repulsed. The third time they did not return; and I concluded that the village, which was hidden in trees, was won.

"Taking advantage of a lull in the firing about three o'clock, I went forward over the open ground in front towards the woods, which I thought the French had left. In a little hollow over which the Bavarians had twice passed, by a willow tree (the only sign of vegetation around), I found some eight or ten wounded men—five French, the rest Germans. With my little stock of bandages and my flask I did what I could for the poor fellows, but before I could return the firing recommenced. The bullets and balls whistled and hummed over me and around me, and patted or thudded the ground close to my feet. I crept under the slender shelter of the willow stump, and sat down among my wounded friends. I thought that half-hour would never end. The wounded Frenchmen groaned dreadfully. The Germans, though equally badly wounded, were more quiet and less complaining. This I found, too, in the hospitals. I think the French are more tenderly made. It was heart-rending to see so much misery I could do so little to relieve. I laid this one on his back, with his knapsack for a pillow, turned that one on his side, covered another's head with a cloth to shelter it from the burning sun, put a bit of shirt on this man's wound, unbuttoned the throttling coat of the fifth, took off the boot from the wounded foot of another, gave all a little cognac, and then sat down and talked with them. How grateful they were! How polite, in the midst of all his sufferings, was one poor French soldier! and, most touching of all, how kindly helpful the poor fellows were to one another, French and German alike! 'But, monsieur,' asked one poor Frenchman, 'are the Prussians Christians?' 'Certainly,' said I. I knew he was thinking of those heathen Turcos of his. 'Then,' said my poor friend, breathing heavily (he was badly wounded in the chest), 'why do we kill one another?' I interpreted our conversation to his German neighbours, and, the fire having slackened, I left them to seek the bearers to carry them off. The one question each asked was, 'Tell me, tell me, shall I die?' I am not a doctor, so I took refuge in a hope for each; but how some lived a minute I cannot tell. One poor fellow, a Bavarian, had been struck down by a bullet just between the eyes, leaving a clean hole as large as a fourpenny piece. He was lying on his back, yet I saw him raise himself deliberately on his elbow, and heard him distinctly ask me for water. I gave it him. He drank it, said 'Thank you, thank you,' and lay down again. In the evening, when the firing had again ceased, I brought back bearers with stretchers, and carried off all my poor friends to the field hospital."

The alleged participation of the inhabitants in the obstinate defence at Bazeilles, led to one of the most horrible incidents of the war. On the previous day (the 31st of August), the

houses bordering on the Meuse were fired by missiles from the Bavarian artillery, on account of their serving as a protection to the French defending the passage of the river. This was a simple strategic necessity; and a number of people who had taken refuge in their cellars were undoubtedly buried in the ruins. The shells thrown into the place on Thursday, September 1, also raised a conflagration here and there; but so enraged were the Germans at the conduct of the inhabitants that orders were given to raze the whole town to the ground; and in the evening, after the battle, the Bavarian troops returned and destroyed what remained of it, by firing masses of straw in each separate house. They did their work so effectually as to make Bazeilles as complete a ruin as Pompeii: indeed, there are houses at Pompeii in a better state of preservation than any left here, for not a roof nor a floor remained to any one of them. An English artillery officer, who visited the spot three weeks afterwards, and gave his experience in an interesting work entitled, "From Sedan to Saarbrück," declared that the ruins were then still smoking! The same gentleman adds, that a woman who lived in the place confessed that the Germans sought for and removed the helpless before applying the torch, and proceeds:—Bazeilles was something more than a prosperous village; it must have been a flourishing town emerging into importance, with substantial stone houses, numerous wide streets, hotels, churches, many factories, and several large public buildings. Now, only enough remains to show what they once were. Not a house is left standing —scarcely one stone upon another. All around is a mass of ruins. Long rows of cleft wall, ready to totter over with a breath, show the outline of the streets; piles of fallen masonry block up the road; masses of rubble, house fittings, and splintered furniture, perplex the eye. Shot and shell manifestly did their work here, as elsewhere; but the charred skeleton walls standing in ghastly isolation show that fire was the chief element by which such destruction was wrought. Here are exhibited in all their frightful reality the murderous results of wanton cruelty; though which side was most to blame for these horrors it is difficult to determine. Indeed, the accounts of the events which preceded this terrible retaliation are so varied and conflicting, that it is almost impossible for an impartial writer to arrive at the real truth; but there can be little doubt that, after the place had surrendered, many of the attacking force were shot down in the streets, from the houses, by men not in uniform, and even by women. Some of the former, perhaps, were francs-tireurs; but many were believed to be ordinary working men. Thereupon the Bavarians broke into the houses, made prisoners of the inhabitants found with arms in their hands; and, some hours later, burned the town and shot their captives. The number so executed is admitted by the Germans themselves to have been at least forty. One old woman was seen to shoot three Bavarian officers in succession, with a pistol fired from a window. Again, two officers of one of the Bavarian regiments that first entered the town and recaptured it after a repulse, asserted positively that, upon this second entry, their troops missed the wounded they had left helpless in the streets, and presently discovered their bodies half consumed in some of the burning houses, to which they must have been dragged or carried a considerable distance. A wounded Bavarian officer also declared that the inhabitants poured hot oil over him as he lay helpless in one of the streets! These statements tend to show that the severity of the German troops was not unprovoked; and therefore we can hardly wonder at the excesses by which the rough soldiery (who believed most implicitly that these atrocities had been committed) avenged their hapless comrades.

M. Hermann Voget, writing to a German newspaper, states that he was in Bazeilles from one o'clock in the morning till five in the evening, and was himself a witness of the brutal misdeeds which led to the destruction of that ill-fated place. The following extract from his letter gives a most thrilling picture of the scene from a German point of view:—"Suddenly, what a tumult, what a wild clamour! What an unusual rushing sound! It was the bullets striking on the stones. In reality, not forty paces in front of us, at the entrance to the street, raged the fight. The Bavarians were being hurled back by the French. A wild scream of jubilee filled up the brief intervals between the crackling musketry fire. It came from the inhabitants, who took part in the fight, and exultingly celebrated the victory of their troops. But their joy was premature. It was but a few minutes, and our people drove them back. It was the last time that the enemy had any success at this point. I hurried into the

streets to see how the battle ended. I took post behind a garden wall: some holes in it which had visibly served as firing apertures afforded me a prospect of a large, strongly-built house, round which for many hours the fight had raged. It looked towards two streets, and from the windows on both sides a continuous firing had been kept up. Many Bavarians had already fallen victims to this fire. The house seemed an enchantment against which the bravery of our soldiers would melt. The pointing of artillery against it was impossible, owing to its situation, and a general bombardment of the hamlet was forbidden by the many wounded who lay in its streets and houses. To destroy the enemy's wall of defence nothing remained but the invocation of flames. Some pioneers, at great peril, made a circuit, burst in the back of the house, and flung firebrands into the breach. The flames bursting forth compelled the French to abandon their position; they retreated through the garden. The Bavarians stormed after them through the blazing house; but they were, as I was later informed, too hasty in pursuit, and in consequence, as they rushed pell-mell through the garden, encountered the enemy's reserves, who, so far, had taken no part in the fight. Now again, for our people, was the moment come for a retreat. But this was now well-nigh become an impossibility. The fire had in the interim made such progress that the house they had rushed through was no longer passable. Two standards were for some time in danger of falling into the enemy's hands. A quick, cool, sharply maintained fire, which teased the pursuing foe, enabled, during their confusion, the standard-bearers to make a rapid escape over a wall not too high, but many officers who had advanced too far in the attack were cut off and made prisoners.

"While this struggle was going on behind the houses I walked up the street. Frightful was the wretchedness I saw there. I was the first person to appear after the storm of battle had passed further away. Dead and wounded lay piled indiscriminately together. Hundreds of dying eyes looked at me imploringly. I was seized with shuddering. I sought to go away. Too terrible was the scene, and yet what was it compared with the barbarity which I had directly afterwards to witness! A wild cry, more like that of an animal than of a human being, rang in my ears. I looked towards the place whence the sound came, and saw a peasant dragging a wounded Bavarian, who was lying on the ground, towards a burning house. A woman was so far aiding that she continued kicking the poor creature in the side with her heavy shoes. The heart-rending cry of the wretched man had drawn three of his comrades to the spot. 'Shoot her down; no, hang her.' Two shots rang out, the peasant dropped. The Megæra laughed, and before the soldiers had gone three steps forward, she stood once more beside her victim. The woman must be mad. One blow cleft her skull. 'Hang her up; into the fire with the brute.' While the troops gave vent to their evidently outraged feelings, I stooped down to the ill-used soldier. He was dead. His last breath had passed with his cry for help. He was a fine, powerful young fellow. Well was it for his loved ones that they had not heard the last cry of agony of their son or their brother. I shall never forget his cry. It will haunt me while I live. I had but just quitted this scene of cruelty, when a new horror encountered me. From a house close behind me came the reports in quick succession of two shots. I turned, and saw a krankentrager, in the exercise of his duty, fall convulsively to the ground. The wounded man he was carrying rolled with him in the dust. From that house proceeded the shots; five, six Bavarians force a way in, the door breaks under the blows of their butt-ends. But the soldiers stand as if stunned. On the threshold appears, armed with a double-barrelled gun, a tall woman; she may be fifty years old, for dishevelled gray hairs fall around a fine—yes, a noble face. As she regards the soldiers her features are distorted, she laughs wildly; the laugh of this woman is a fearful thing. *Vous êtes une bête*, calls out a doctor hurrying by. Her laugh is silenced, a torrent of tears gushes down her face, she exclaims softly, but in tones of heartrending pain—'*Non, je suis épouse, je suis mère! Vous avez assassiné mon mari; vous avez assassiné mes deux fils. Tuez moi aussi! Je vous en remercierai. Si vous ne me tuez pas, c'est moi qui vous tuerai.*' With the last words the old wrath returns. She again raises the gun. The soldiers have not understood her. They seek to avenge their comrade and to protect themselves. The doctor stands shuddering, like myself. Before we can say a word the unhappy woman falls, struck by two bullets in the breast. 'Let her die in quiet,' calls out the doctor to the men, who seem not yet to

have satisfied their revenge; 'she has lost her husband and her two sons.' That makes an impression on the soldiers, and they silently turn away. I turn back with the doctor. We stoop down to the poor woman. Her wounds are fatal. She regards us wildly. I take her hand, and involuntarily my lips utter '*pauvre femme*.' The words seemed to have pleased her, she feels they come from the heart. Her eyes grew dim; and as she clasped my hand firmly her bosom heaves a last sigh. I was most deeply moved, and in silence I traversed the burning hamlet, scarcely noticing that the flames were ever extending farther. . . New tidings of horror arrived. The flames menaced a French hospital established in a mansion. To extinguish the fire was impossible. Our force were to proceed to the rescue of the wounded from the flames. Wounded krankentragers appeared, and complained that they were being fired upon from the houses. These complaints were renewed at short intervals, and directions had to be given to search the houses to eject the parties firing. It was a perilous undertaking, costing many a soldier his life, and though more than fifty men and women were made prisoners, though more than twenty who resisted were shot on the spot, the firing from the houses did not cease. Persistently were the krankentragers aimed at, and on all sides was the destruction of the hamlet demanded. Not until fifty of our people had been struck was the order given to fire every house from which shots proceeded. It was punctually fulfilled. The soldiers, heated by the fight, and angered at the concealed firing upon them, made short work wherever resistance was shown. The inhabitants—who had been reduced to beggary, and had each lost one, if not more, of their relatives—had but one feeling, that of revenge. Like that unhappy mother whose end I have narrated, they had no fears for the bullets of their enemy, but welcomed the destroying lead, if first they had slain one of the hated '*chiens Allemands*.'"

We gladly leave the scene of desolation and horror, to resume our account of the general progress of the battle. It has been seen that, during the whole of the forenoon, the German left was sweeping on from the west to the north of Sedan, whilst the guards, forming the right of the Crown Prince of Saxony's forces, had advanced in a north-westerly direction on the road to Bouillon. Shortly before two o'clock the two armies united near Fleigneux, and from that time the day was completely lost to the French; for all around Sedan, from Donchery on the west, to Givonne on the north, to Douzy on the east, to Remilly and Cheveuge on the south, they were encompassed by a cordon of enemies, in at least two-fold strength, and occupying commanding positions on the heights. The junction of the two armies was witnessed, amidst intense excitement, by the king of Prussia and his staff, who were stationed on the hill near Cheveuge. Here and there villages and hamlets were still burning, and the roar of cannon had not ceased; for, almost at the gates of the fortress, the remainder of the French army was yet fighting. But unable to unite, their corps could no longer offer a combined defence, so that only small detachments were continuing the struggle in isolated localities. As the French fell back, step by step, the fire of the German guns, superior from the first and gradually converging, became more deadly; and at last their disordered and despairing columns were absolutely thrust down into the bottom of the funnel represented by Sedan. Then, indeed, all hopes of escape, of successful resistance, or even of honourable death, had to be abandoned. The engagement had, in fact, become a mere battue, and the army lay as it were prostrate at the mercy of the victors, who, crowding their guns on the closely surrounding hill-tops, whence they could peer into the town, seemed to menace both it and its defenders with annihilation. So desperate was their position that an officer of the British artillery, who subsequently visited the spot, declares that his original surprise at the capitulation of the French, and wonder at their not having attempted at all hazards to cut their way out of the trap, was changed into amazement that, on awakening on the morning of the 1st of September, and finding themselves in such a fearful predicament, they could have summoned resolution to fight at all; for from the moment the first shot was fired the result must have been all but a foregone conclusion.

About four o'clock General Wimpffen, reluctantly abandoning all hope of further resistance, sent a letter to the French emperor, proposing that he should place himself in the middle of a column of men, who would "deem it an honour" to cut a passage for him through the enemy in the direction of Carignan. The following is a copy of this now historical document:—

"Sire,—Je me décide à forcer la ligne qui se trouve devant le Gl. Lebrun et le Gl. Ducrot plutôt que d'être prisonnier dans la place de Sedan.

"Que votre Majesté vienne se mettre au milieu de ses troupes, qui tiendront à honneur de lui ouvrir un passage.

"DE WIMPFFEN.

"4hr., 1*st Sepre.*"

Napoleon, aware of the impossibility of leaving the place on horseback, replied that he could not rejoin the general (one of the officers who came with the proposal was himself unable to get back to General Wimpffen); that, moreover, he could not consent to save himself by the sacrifice of a great number of his soldiers; and that he was determined to share the fate of the army.

About this time a rumour spread among the soldiers that Bazaine had arrived, and immediately enthusiasm and hope took the place of despair. It is quite probable that the approach of this general may really have been believed by Wimpffen, for, as we shall see at the conclusion of this chapter, his breaking out from Metz and assisting MacMahon was to have formed part of the general operations of the day. The French commander, therefore, collected about two thousand of his troops, who rushed forward to the gate of Balan with a valour and determination which nothing could withstand, and in a few minutes they were complete masters of the village. But they quickly discovered that they had been deceived; and, not being supported by their comrades, the gallant band was once more compelled to retire before the renewed attacks of the Germans, who returned in overwhelming numbers.

Meanwhile, among the troops surrounding the town there had been a general rout, and the army had been beaten back into Sedan, a shapeless, hopeless horde of mutinous and starving men. All the efforts of the officers to rally them were fruitless, and the belief was general throughout the ranks that they were betrayed. Several generals went to the emperor and announced that further resistance was impossible. Their soldiers, after having sustained an unequal fight for nearly twelve hours, almost without food, were so weakened by fatigue and hunger that they were easily driven back against the walls and thrown into the ditches, where they were decimated by the enemy's fire. As they fled into the town they crowded against each other in the streets in utter confusion. While thus choked with the *débris* of all the corps, Sedan was bombarded on all sides, and the Prussian shells, falling amongst the struggling mass, carried death at every stroke. Many of the officers and men were killed in the streets, amongst the former being two generals. Live shells were poured into the town, and set fire to a large straw shed, from which a column of dense black smoke rose immediately to the sky. The emperor was painfully reminded of the imminent danger of his position, by several shells which burst on the roof and in the court of the sub-prefecture. Others set many private houses on fire, and struck the wounded who had been carried into them. The great barracks, converted into an hospital, upon the top of which floated the red-cross flag, were not spared; and men and horses, huddled up in the court-yard, were continually hit. The emperor then endeavoured to make known to General Wimpffen the advisability of asking for an armistice, since every moment of delay only increased the number of victims. Not receiving any tidings of the general, and seeing such a useless waste of life, and the situation so hopeless, he ordered the white flag to be hoisted upon the citadel. At the time it was fixed upon the ramparts Napoleon sat in the court-yard of the prefecture, his staff standing apart. His face was buried in his hands, and he appeared completely overwhelmed by the catastrophe. Owing to the severe disease from which he suffered he was compelled to dismount several times during the battle, and to great physical exhaustion moral prostration was now added.

The signal of surrender was for some little time unnoticed by the Prussians, and a lancer's flag was waved from the battlements, while a trumpet sounded; but in that infernal din and turmoil neither the sight nor the sound attracted the notice of the besiegers, so that it was only when the gates were opened that they saw the first indication of their stupendous victory. The news spread rapidly; and about five o'clock the cannonade, which was gradually suspended along the whole line, entirely ceased. The Crown Prince of Prussia sent the message, "Complete victory," to headquarters; and immediately after, with the duke of Coburg, the other princes, and his orderly officers, he proceeded to join the king.

A French colonel, escorted by two uhlans—one of whom carried a white duster on a faggot stick as

a flag of truce—rode out from Sedan to the hill of Cheveuge, to ask the king of Prussia for terms of capitulation; but after a brief consultation between his Majesty and General von Moltke, he was told that, in a matter so important as the surrender of at least 80,000 men and an important fortress, it was necessary to send an officer of high rank. "You are, therefore, to return to Sedan, and to tell the governor of the town to report himself immediately to the king of Prussia. If he does not arrive in an hour our guns will open fire again. You may tell the commandant that it is useless trying to obtain other terms than unconditional surrender." The *parlementaire* rode sorrowfully back with that message.

Up to this time the Germans had no idea that the French emperor was shut up in Sedan; but now among the king's staff there arose a sudden cry, "Der Kaiser ist da!" (The emperor is there!), which was followed by a loud hurrah. About half-past six General Reilly (who was personally known to the king of Prussia, having been appointed to attend him when he visited Napoleon at Compiègne), accompanied by the Prussian Lieutenant-colonel von Brousart, the officer intrusted with the negotiations on the part of the Germans, brought from the emperor of the French to the king an autograph letter, containing these few words:—

"Monsieur mon frère,—N'ayant pas pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu'à remettre mon épée entre les mains de votre Majesté. Je suis, de votre Majesté le bon frère,"

"NAPOLEON."

[TRANSLATION.]

"Sire, my brother,—Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops, it only remains for me to resign my sword into the hands of your Majesty. I am, your Majesty's good brother,"

"NAPOLEON."

On receipt of this letter there was a short consultation between the king, the Crown Prince, Count von Bismarck, Von Moltke, and Von Roon, after which the king sat down, and with a chair for his table wrote the following reply:—

"Monsieur mon frère,—En regrettant les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous rencontrons, j'accepte l'épée de votre Majesté, et je vous prie de bien vouloir nommer un de vos officiers munis de vos pleins pouvoirs pour traiter de la capitulation de l'armée qui est si bravement battue sous vos ordres. De mon côté j'ai désignée le Général Moltke à cet effet. Je suis de votre Majesté le bon frère,"

"GUILLAUME.

"DEVANT SEDAN, *le Sept.* 1, 1870."

[TRANSLATION.]

"Sire, my brother,—Regretting the circumstances under which we meet, I accept the sword of your Majesty, and I pray you to name one of your officers provided with full powers to treat for the capitulation of the army which has so bravely fought under your command. On my side, I have named General Moltke for this purpose. I am, your Majesty's good brother,"

"WILLIAM.

"BEFORE SEDAN, *Sept.* 1, 1870."

When the king had written this letter, he himself handed it to General Reilly, who stood bareheaded to receive it, the Italian and Crimean medals glittering on his breast in the last rays of the setting sun; and again escorted by the uhlans, he at 7·40 left for the beleaguered town.

When General Wimpffen found that, unknown to him, the white flag had been hoisted on the citadel by the emperor's orders, and that *parlementaires* were being received at the imperial quarters, he proceeded thither and protested very warmly that these acts properly belonged only to himself as commander-in-chief. Refusing to carry on the negotiations, he then proceeded to his quarters, and sent in his resignation. The emperor refused to accept it, and wrote him the following letter:

"General,—You cannot be allowed to resign while it is possible to save the army by an honourable capitulation. You have done your duty all day. Do it still. You are doing a service to the country. The king of Prussia has accepted an armistice, and I am awaiting his proposals. Believe in my friendship.

"NAPOLEON."

General Wimpffen now seeing no hope of escaping from the enemy's grasp, submitted to the inevitable.

General Reilly, who had taken the emperor's letter to the king of Prussia, also carried General Wimpffen's proposal for a capitulation of the army. In answer to this, General von Moltke, at the king's

desire, sent word that the only terms that could be allowed were the absolute and unconditional surrender of the whole force, with guns, horses, and *matériel*. General Wimpffen at first declared that he would die sooner than sign terms so disgraceful, for even then he could scarcely believe that his situation was so desperate. Arriving, as we have said, only two days before from Algeria, he found on his hands an army already beaten, and now his name would go down linked to a humiliating capitulation for all time! Being informed that, in the event of the proposals not being accepted, hostilities would be resumed on the following morning, he went himself to the Prussian headquarters at Donchery, and endeavoured to obtain more favourable conditions; but although the negotiations were continued far into the night, Von Moltke was inexorable. The French general was told that he might hold out if he preferred the destruction of his army; but to show him that such must inevitably be the issue, maps were produced, and the position and force of the corps of the German army and of its batteries indicated. "Your force," said Von Moltke to him, "does not number more than 80,000 men; we have 230,000, who completely surround you. Our artillery is everywhere in position, and can destroy Sedan in two hours. Your troops can only go out by the gates, and cannot possibly form before them. You have provisions for only one day, and scarcely any more ammunition. In such a case the prolongation of your defence would be only a useless massacre, the responsibility of which must rest upon those who will not prevent it."

The discussion ended without any definite decision, and General Wimpffen returned to Sedan. Meanwhile, night had closed on the woeful spectacle, and while the Germans rested on the positions they had won, the French lay meshed, as it were, in a deadly coil—a ruined and helpless army, within the grasp of its mighty conquerors. The victorious soldiers everywhere evinced the greatest eagerness to learn the details of the action. It was obvious they had comprehended the importance of the day, and were proud of having contributed to a success seldom equalled in the annals of history. The Crown Prince of Prussia returned to his headquarters at nine o'clock, when his men vied with each other in giving him a festal reception. The main street of the village was illuminated, and the soldiers who lined the way, in default of better materials, held small ends of tallow candles in their hands. Loud hurrahs welcomed the arrival of his royal highness; and the bands played, first, the German national anthem, and then the Dead March, in honour of the fallen.

The Crown Prince of Saxony's division made 11,000 prisoners during the day, and also captured twenty-five guns, seven mitrailleuses, two flags, and one eagle. The fifth and eleventh corps of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army also took more than 10,000 men, and adding to these those taken by the Bavarian troops, a total of about 25,000 men fell into the hands of the victors during the battle alone.

With regard to the killed and wounded, so terrible was the German artillery fire, so completely were whole French divisions taken in flank, in rear, and all round the compass, as their enemies closed upon them, that it is pretty safe to fix the French loss at about twice that of the Germans, or even two and a half times, and this would make it from 18,000 to 24,000 men. The splendid cavalry regiments were literally annihilated, and the ground for miles was strewn with corpses, where the Prussian shells had burst among the helpless masses.

The scene on the battle-field was unusually terrible. An eye-witness not unaccustomed to such sights said, "No human eye ever rested on such revolting objects as were presented by the battle-fields around Sedan. Let them fancy masses of coloured rags glued together with blood and brains, and pinned into strange shapes by fragments of bones. Let them conceive men's bodies without heads, legs without bodies, heaps of human entrails attached to red and blue cloth, and disembowelled corpses in uniform, bodies lying about in all attitudes, with skulls shattered, faces blown off, hips smashed, bones, flesh, and gay clothing all pounded together as if brayed in a mortar, extending for miles, not very thick in any one place, but recurring perpetually for weary hours—and then they cannot, with the most vivid imagination, come up to the sickening reality of that butchery. No nightmare could be so frightful. Several times I came on spots where there were two horses lying dead together in harness, killed by the same fragment. Several times I saw four, five, and six men, four, five, and six horses, all killed by the explosion of one projectile; and in one place there lay no less than eight French soldiers who must have been struck down by the bursting of a shell over a com-

pany, for they lay all round in a circle with their feet inwards, each shattered in the head or chest by a piece of shell, and no other dead being within a hundred yards of them. A curious, and to me unaccountable phenomenon, was the blackness of most of the faces of the dead. Decomposition had not set in, for they were killed only the day before. Another circumstance which struck me was the expression of agony on many faces. Death by the bayonet is agonizing, and those who die by steel, open-eyed and open-mouthed, have an expression of pain on the features, with protruding tongue. A musket ball wound, which is at once fatal, does not seem to cause much pain, and the features are composed and quiet, sometimes with a sweet smile on the lips. But the prevailing expression on this field of the faces which were not mutilated, was one of terror and of agony unutterable. There must have been a hell of torture raging within that semicircle in which the earth was torn asunder from all sides with a real tempest of iron hissing, and screeching, and bursting into the heavy masses at the hands of an unseen enemy."

The losses on the German side were comparatively small; in fact, for the first time since the war began they were enabled to announce them as moderate. The Bavarians suffered more than any other of the German troops, and 1800 of them were buried in one field at Balan—a proof, if any were needed, of the severe fighting around Bazeilles.

Amongst the killed on their side was a gallant Englishman, whose death caused the deepest general regret. We allude to Lieutenant-colonel Pemberton, who was acting as correspondent for the *Times*. In the evening he was riding by the side of H.R.H. Prince George of Saxony, who commanded the twelfth army corps. Towards the close of the battle they observed a column of French soldiers making signs with handkerchiefs. They rode towards them, thinking they had surrendered, when they were at once fired upon, and Colonel Pemberton fell. The bullet entered his temple, and death was instantaneous.

The night of Thursday was indeed a very sad one for the French army and its chiefs, completely defeated, fatigued, and dispirited as they were by three days' continued fighting. The fact, too, that almost the only provisions in Sedan were the horses shot in the battle added to their misery. "Even before the battle," said a resident in the town, "our men had lost all heart, and never anticipated success. After it, I saw broken masses of French troops rushing about the streets, breaking their Chassepots, setting their officers at defiance, and even shooting at them." "Hell," it has been said, "was let loose in Sedan;" the bonds of discipline were utterly broken, and the despairing officers had lost all power over an infuriated and mutinous soldiery.

The morning of the next day (Friday, 2nd September) revealed to the French the serried masses of their victorious enemies; and the smoking ruins of Bazeilles and Balan, destroyed by shells and fire the day before, gave fearful presage of the fate of Sedan, should it attempt to hold out against the artillery ready to open upon it. To make assurance doubly sure, and to show that the *gros bataillons* were on the side of the Germans, a great display of force was made all round the town, whose entire circuit was covered with the Prussian hosts; even the Würtemburgers having been ordered up from the direction of Mézières. The hill tops were black with troops, and all along them clustered the batteries in position. Then it was that the French commanders became thoroughly convinced their hour was come. When General Wimpffen assembled a council of war, it was mournfully admitted that the impending doom could not be averted, and that it was necessary to submit to whatever terms the victors thought fit to impose. Of about thirty-two general officers present, there were only two dissentient voices.

To have gone on fighting would have been madness, for the German troops held every approach to the town, and the French troops, shattered and discouraged, could not have hoped to cut their way through. They were reduced to so small a circle of outworks that, whilst they attacked one German corps, they might have been cannonaded in rear by most of the others. In a word, their condition was desperate.

General Wimpffen accordingly again repaired to the German headquarters, where the negotiations were continued for several hours, and it was past eleven o'clock before some modifications which he urged as to the officers' side arms and parole were agreed to. The following is a copy of the formal act of capitulation, which was signed towards noon in the chateau of Bellevue, near Frénois:—

"Between the undersigned the chief of the staff of King William, commander-in-chief of the German

armies, and the general-commandant of the French army, both being provided with full powers from their majesties King William and the Emperor Napoleon, the following convention has been concluded:—

"Article 1. The French army placed under the orders of General Wimpffen, finding itself actually surrounded by superior forces round Sedan, are prisoners of war.

"Article 2. Seeing the brave defence of this French army, exemption is made in respect of all the generals and officers, and also of the superior *employés* having the rank of officers, who pledge their word of honour in writing not to bear arms against Germany, nor to act in any manner against its interests, until the close of the present war. The officers and *employés* who accept these conditions will retain their arms and personal effects.

"Article 3. All arms, as well as the *matériel* of the army, consisting of flags, eagles, cannon, horses, ammunition, &c., shall be immediately delivered at Sedan to a military commission appointed by the general-in-chief, in order to be forthwith handed over to German commissaries.

"Article 4. The town and fortified works of Sedan shall be given up in their present condition at latest on the evening of the 2nd of September, and be subject to the disposition of his Majesty King William.

"Article 5. Those officers who shall not have accepted the engagement set forth in Article 2, together with the disarmed troops, shall be marched out, ranged according to their regiments or corps, in military order. This proceeding will commence on the 2nd of September, and will terminate on September 3. These detachments will be marched to the districts bordering upon the Meuse, near Iges, to be handed over to German commissaries by their officers, who will then resign their commands to their sub-officers. The chief surgeons, without exception, will remain behind to attend to the wounded.

"VON MOLTKE.
"WIMPFFEN.

"FRENOIS, *Sept.* 2, 1870."

The detention of the Emperor Napoleon in Germany was understood to be a part of the stipulations. The king of Prussia received a copy of the capitulation soon after twelve o'clock, on the very spot whence the Crown Prince had watched the movements of his army on the previous day; and after reading it aloud to the princes and staff who surrounded him, he addressed them as follows:—"Gentlemen, you now know what a great historical event has happened. I am indebted for this to the distinguished feats of the allied armies, to whom I feel bound on this occasion to express my kingly thanks; the more so as these great successes are calculated to rivet more closely the bond which unites the provinces of the North German Confederation and my other allies, whose numerous princely representatives I see assembled round me. We may thus hope for a happy future. Our task, however, is not completed with what has occurred under our eyes, for we do not know how the rest of France will accept and estimate it. We must, therefore, remain ready to fight; but, meanwhile, I present my thanks to every one who has contributed a leaf to the laurel crown of fame of our Fatherland." In speaking these last words, the king rested his eye especially on Prince Leopold of Bavaria and Prince William of Würtemburg, to whom he afterwards extended his hand. His Majesty then sent the following despatch to the queen:—

"BEFORE SEDAN, *Sept.* 2.

"A capitulation, whereby the whole army at Sedan are prisoners of war, has just been concluded with General Wimpffen, who was in command instead of the wounded Marshal MacMahon. The emperor only surrendered himself to me, as he himself has no command, and left everything to the regency in Paris. His place of residence I shall appoint after I have had an interview with him at a rendezvous, which will immediately take place. What a course events have assumed by God's guidance!"

General Wimpffen performed the painful duty of announcing the capitulation to the French troops, by at once issuing the following proclamation:—

"Soldiers!—Yesterday you fought against very superior forces. From daybreak until nightfall you resisted the enemy with the utmost valour, and expended almost your last cartridge. Exhausted by the struggle, you were unable to respond to the appeal made to you by your generals and your officers to attempt to gain the road to Montmèdy and to rejoin Marshal Bazaine. Two thousand men only were able to rally in order to make

a supreme effort. They were compelled to stop at the village of Balan, and to return to Sedan, where your general announced with deep sorrow there existed neither provisions nor ammunition. The defence of the place was impossible, its position rendering it incapable of offering resistance to the numerous and powerful artillery of the enemy. The army collected within the walls of the town being unable either to leave it or defend it, and means of subsistence for the inhabitants and the troops being wanting, I have been compelled to adopt the sad resolution of treating with the enemy. Having proceeded yesterday to the Prussian headquarters with full powers from the emperor, I could not at first resign myself to accept the clauses which were imposed. It was only this morning, when threatened by a bombardment to which we had no means of replying, that I determined to make further efforts, and I have obtained conditions which relieve you as far as possible from the humiliating formalities which the usages of war usually exact under such circumstances. Nothing now remains for us, officers and soldiers, except to accept with resignation the consequences of necessities against which an army could not struggle—want of provisions and deficiency of ammunition. I have at least the consolation of having avoided a useless massacre, and of preserving to the country soldiers who are capable at some future time of rendering good and brilliant service.

"The General Commanding-in-chief,

"DE WIMPFFEN."

As the news of the capitulation spread, curses both loud and deep, with fierce cries of treachery and revenge, broke forth from the armed crowds. The French colonels burned the flags and eagles of their regiments; some of the soldiers threatened to turn their arms against their own officers; others threw their guns, their swords, ammunition, &c., into the Meuse, and broke up everything, that it might not come into the hands of the enemy. The impotent fury of despair, however, was vain; the French army, broken into defenceless masses, was huddled into camps where a few guns and regiments sufficed to control it; and the passion of the soldiery only provoked comments from the stern Germans on their want of discipline. Yet there were nobler spirits who, in their misfortune, showed themselves worthy of the French name.

Though this memorable capitulation was the eighteenth that had occurred in Europe since 1700, it was the only one which included a sovereign, and it was also by far the most important in point of numbers. Besides the 25,000 soldiers taken in the battle, 84,450 became prisoners of war by the surrender, and 14,000 French wounded were found in and around Sedan. More than 500 guns, including 70 mitrailleuses, 330 field and 150 fortress guns, 10,000 horses, 100,000 Chassepots, 80,000 cwts. of gunpowder, and large quantities of other war *matériel*, also fell into the hands of the victors. When parked, the artillery alone covered several acres. Among the prisoners were an emperor and a marshal of France, 39 generals, 230 staff and 2095 other officers, nearly all of whom chose to accompany the soldiers into captivity, rather than be liberated on parole. The remainder of the army, about 14,500 men, with 12,000 horses, cannons, and gun carriages, succeeded in reaching the neutral territory of Belgium. MacMahon's army of 150,000 men had thus, within three days, ceased to exist, almost every man being either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner; for even those who escaped to Belgium were immediately disarmed and confined in the fortresses of that country.

The vast body of captives having been stationed on the peninsula formed by the Meuse between Iges and Villette, the Prussians took possession of Sedan, and made requisitions, but did not attempt to pillage the town. General von Moltke issued an order that the prisoners were to be victualled from provisions which, in accordance with the promise of General Wimpffen, their late commander-in-chief, would be sent from Mézières by rail to Donchery; but at first they were compelled to endure the most severe privations, though probably this was unavoidable. Within a few days they were sent off to Germany, partly by Stenay, Etain, Gorze, and Remilly, and partly by Buzancy, Clermont, St. Michiel, and Pont-à-Mousson. The horses taken were immediately portioned out among the various German forces.

The history of the capitulation is given at length in Count von Bismarck's official report to the king—a document so full of historical and general interest that we reprint it entire:—

"DONCHERY, *September* 2.

"After I had repaired hither last evening by your Majesty's command, in order to take part in

the negotiations as to the capitulation, they were interrupted till about one a.m. by the granting of time for consideration. This General Wimpffen begged for after General von Moltke had firmly declared that no condition other than a laying down of arms would be approved, and that the bombardment would be resumed at nine a.m. if the capitulation were not previously concluded. Early this morning, towards ten o'clock, General Reilly was announced to me, and he informed me that the emperor wished to see me, and was already on his way from Sedan. The general immediately turned back in order to tell his Majesty that I was following him, and shortly afterwards, half-way between here and Sedan, in the vicinity of Frénois, I found myself opposite the emperor. His Majesty was in an open carriage with three superior officers, and with a like number on horseback close by. Among the latter, Generals Castelnau, Reilly, Moskowa, who appeared wounded in the foot, and Vaubert, were personally known to me. Arrived at the carriage, I dismounted, stepped up immediately to the emperor's side, and asked his Majesty's commands. The emperor expressed a wish to see your Majesty, apparently thinking that your Majesty was at Donchery. After I had replied that your Majesty's headquarters were at the moment three German (about fourteen English) miles distant, at Vendresse, the emperor asked whether any place had been fixed in the locality whither he might repair, and, in fine, what my opinion was on the matter. I replied that I had come here when it was quite dark, the country being unknown to me, and placed at his disposal the house occupied by me at Donchery, which I would at once vacate. The emperor accepted this, and proceeded towards Donchery, but halted about 100 paces from the Meuse bridge leading into the town, before a working man's house standing by itself, and asked whether he could not dismount there. I sent Count Bismarck Bohlen, who, in the interim, had followed me, to inspect the house, and after he had announced that its internal accommodation was very poor and narrow, but that it was free from wounded, the emperor dismounted and directed me to follow him inside. Here, in a very small room, containing one table and two chairs, I had about an hour's conversation with the emperor. His Majesty was extremely anxious to obtain more favourable terms of capitulation for the army. I declined to discuss this matter with his Majesty, when so purely military a question was pending between General von Moltke and General Wimpffen. On the other hand, I asked emperor whether his Majesty was inclined to the negotiate for peace. The emperor replied that, as a prisoner, he was not now in a position to do so; and on my further question by whom, in his view, the executive authority of France was at present represented, his Majesty referred me to the government at Paris. He declared that, as he had given full powers to the regency, with it alone could negotiations for peace be conducted; that he merely delivered his own person into the hands of the king, claiming nothing for himself, but appealing to his generosity for the army and for France. After the clearing up of this point, which from the emperor's letter of yesterday to your Majesty could not be certainly judged of, I perceived, and did not conceal this from the emperor, that the situation, to-day as yesterday, offered no other practical question than the military one; and I signified the necessity which therefore rested on us of obtaining before all things, through the capitulation of Sedan, a material pledge for the stability of the military results already achieved. I had already, yesterday evening, considered the question on all sides with General von Moltke, whether it would be possible, without prejudice to German interests, to offer more favourable conditions than those laid down, in deference to the military feeling of honour of an army which had fought well. After due consideration we had felt ourselves obliged to settle this question in the negative. When, therefore, General von Moltke, who meanwhile had come from the town, went to your Majesty for the purpose of laying before you the emperor's wishes, this was not, as your Majesty knows, with the intention of supporting them.

"The emperor then went out into the open air, and invited me to sit by him before the door of the house. His Majesty submitted to me the question whether it was not practicable to allow the French army to cross the Belgian frontier, in order that they might be disarmed and 'interned.' I had already, the previous evening, conversed on this eventuality with General von Moltke. As regarded the political situation, I on my side did not take the initiative, nor did the emperor, except that he deplored the misfortune of war, and affirmed that he himself had not desired war, but had been forced into it by the pressure of public opinion in France.

"Through inquiries in the place, and especially through a search by officers of the general staff, it had, meantime, between nine and ten o'clock, been ascertained that the château of Bellevue, near Frénois, was suited to the reception of the emperor, and, moreover, was not occupied by wounded. I mentioned this to his Majesty, fixing Frénois as the place which I should propose to your Majesty for the interview; and accordingly put it to the emperor whether his Majesty would wish to proceed thither at once, as to remain within the small working man's cottage was inconvenient, and the emperor would possibly require some rest. His Majesty gladly acquiesced, and I accompanied the emperor—a guard of honour of your Majesty's body cuirassier regiment preceding him—to the château of Bellevue, where in the interim the emperor's additional suite and equipages, the arrival of which out of the town had till then appeared uncertain, had come from Sedan. General Wimpffen also arrived, with whom, in expectation of the return of General von Moltke, the discussion of the capitulation negotiations, broken off yesterday, was renewed by General Podbielsky, in the presence of Lieutenant-colonel Verdy and General Wimpffen's chief of the staff, both which officers drew up the protocol. I only took part in them by sketching the legal and political situation according to the explanations given me by the emperor himself. From Count Nostis, commissioned by General von Moltke, I received the announcement that your Majesty would see the emperor only after the conclusion of the capitulation, an intimation on which the hope on the other side of obtaining other conditions than those laid down was given up. I rode off upon this with the intention of informing your Majesty of the position of affairs towards Donchery, but on the way I met General von Moltke with the text of the capitulation approved by your Majesty; and this, after we went with him to Frénois, was then accepted and signed without dispute. The conduct of General Wimpffen, as also that of the other French generals the previous night, was very becoming. That brave officer could not refrain from expressing to me his great pain at being called on, forty-eight hours after his arrival from Africa, and half a day after taking the command, to subscribe his name to a capitulation so deplorable for the French nation. Want of provisions and munitions, however, and the absolute impossibility of any further defence, imposed on him as a general the duty of restraining his personal feelings, as further bloodshed could not alter the situation. The concession of the release of the officers on their word of honour was accepted with warm thanks, as an expression of your Majesty's intention not to overstep the limits which our political and military interests made necessary with regard to the feelings of an army which had fought bravely. To this sentiment General Wimpffen afterwards gave expression in a letter, in which he thanked General von Moltke for the very considerate manner in which the negotiations were on his side conducted.

"(Signed.) BISMARCK."

As an instance of the scrupulous respect paid to the fallen emperor, it is related that the Prussian minister of state uncovered his head, and stood, hat in hand, while Napoleon alighted from his carriage. On the latter requesting him to put it on, the count replied, "Sire, I receive your Majesty as I would my own royal master."

When all had been arranged the two sovereigns met in the château of Bellevue—a pretty, new country house, built in imitation of an old château, and provided with glass conservatories at the angles, which stands on a wooded knoll sloping down towards the Meuse at Frénois, a short way outside Sedan, and separated from it by the river. The house well deserves its name, for it commands a lovely and extensive prospect. About two o'clock on Friday afternoon the king of Prussia, with his body guard and an escort of cuirassiers, attended by the Crown Prince and a staff of general officers, proceeded to this château, which was charmingly furnished. The emperor, who came with his personal followers and staff in charge of a strong cavalry escort, which was ranged on the other side of the avenue leading to the mansion, facing the cuirassiers, had been for some time awaiting his Majesty's arrival. Napoleon received the victor of Sedan at the foot of the steps leading to the house. When the king approached he took off his military cap and made a deep and respectful bow. Both then retired into the glass house, off one of the saloons on the drawing-room floor, where they could be seen by the staff outside engaged in earnest conversation. From the windows of the little room in which they met, Sedan itself, the heights where the armies were still encamped, and the large masses of troops which occupied them,

were all visible. During the meeting Napoleon was informed that the palace of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel (a favourite summer residence of his uncle, King Jerome), was to be the place of his abode during his captivity in Germany. An account of this interview, understood to emanate from the French emperor himself, says:—"At this conference the king showed the lofty feelings which animated him, by exhibiting to the emperor all the consideration which his misfortunes demanded, and the emperor preserved an attitude of the utmost dignity. General Wimpffen, who had told the emperor that the army counted upon his intervention with the king of Prussia for better conditions, was informed of the fruitlessness of his efforts." After this meeting, which lasted about half an hour, the emperor had a few minutes' conversation with the Crown Prince, during which he was much agitated when alluding to the kind and courteous manner in which he had been received. His great anxiety seemed to be not to be exhibited as a prisoner to his own soldiers. Wishing to escape one humiliation, however, he was exposed to another, for when his course was altered to avoid Sedan, he had to pass through the lines of the Prussian army.

The easiest route to his destination was through Belgium; and the permission of that government having been readily granted, his departure took place at nine o'clock on Saturday morning, amid a terrible storm. The city of Sedan had been occupied by the Prussians on the previous day, and all the French soldiers disarmed and put under guard as prisoners of war; but the emperor, instead of re-entering the town, was permitted to stay on Friday night in the château or villa at Frénois, from which he started in a close carriage with four horses and two postillions for the Belgian town of Bouillon, on his way to Germany. The carriage was escorted by a troop of Black Hussars, some riding before and some behind it. An open carriage, with several French and German officers appointed to wait on his Majesty; a dozen other carriages, in which were his personal attendants and domestic servants; and a number of fine saddle-horses belonging to him, formed part of the procession. The emperor himself, who wore the kepi and undress uniform of a lieutenant-general, with the star of the Legion of Honour, but without his sword, looked pale and worn, yet quite self-possessed. Beside him in the carriage sat the prince de la Moskowa, a son of Marshal Ney. Among his attendants were General Castelnau, one of his aides-de-camp, Generals Reilly and Vaubert, and twenty other French officers. All the carriages bore the imperial escutcheon, and were drawn by horses from the imperial stables. There was a crowd of curious spectators, who, however, gave no outward sign of their feelings. On entering Belgian territory the escort was changed for one of Belgian chasseurs. His Majesty passed Saturday night at the Hotel des Postes, at Bouillon, where he dined with thirty guests. On Sunday he went on by railway to Liege and Verviers, and proceeded next day to the palace of Wilhelmshöhe.

Some days before the battle of Sedan the Prince Imperial had been sent into Belgium for safety. On his journey to Germany the emperor received a telegram announcing the safe arrival of his son at Maubeuge.

After his interview with the emperor the king of Prussia addressed the following telegram to the queen:—

"*September* 2.

"What a thrilling moment that of my meeting with Napoleon! He was cast down, but dignified in his bearing and resigned. I gave him Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, as the place where he will stay. Our meeting took place in a small castle in front of the western glacis of Sedan. From there I rode through the ranks of our army round Sedan. The reception by the troops—thou mayst imagine it—indescribable! I finished my five hours' ride at nightfall at half-past seven, but only arrived back here at one a.m. May God aid us further."

Later in the day the king wrote her Majesty the accompanying letter:—

"VENDRESSE, South of Sedan, *Sept.* 3.

"You will have learnt through my telegrams the whole extent of the great historical event which has just taken place. It is like a dream, even when one has seen it unrol itself hour by hour; but when I consider that after one great successful war I could not expect anything more glorious during my reign, and that I now see this act follow destined to be famous in the history of the world, I bow before God, who alone has chosen my army and allies to carry it into execution, and has chosen us as the instruments of

his will. It is only in this sense that I can conceive this work, and in all humility praise God's guidance and grace. I will now give you a picture of the battle and its results in a compressed form. On the evening of the 31st and the morning of the 1st, the army had reached its appointed position round Sedan. The Bavarians held the left wing near Bazeilles, on the Meuse; next them the Saxons, towards Moncelle and Daigny; the guards still marching on towards Givonne, the fifth and eleventh corps towards St. Menges and Fleigneux. As the Meuse here makes a sharp bend, no corps had been posted from St. Menges to Donchery, but at the latter place there were Würtemburgers who covered the rear against sallies from Mézières. Count Stolberg's cavalry division was in the plain of Donchery as right wing; the rest of the Bavarians were in the front towards Sedan. Notwithstanding a thick fog, the battle began at Bazeilles early in the morning, and a sharp action developed itself by degrees, in which it was necessary to take house by house. It lasted nearly all day, and Scholer's Erfurt division (reserve fourth corps) was obliged to assist. It was eight o'clock, when I reached the front before Sedan, that the great battle commenced. A hot artillery action now began at all points. It lasted for hours, and during it we gradually gained ground. As the above-named villages were taken, very deep and wooded ravines made the advance of the infantry more difficult, and favoured the defence. The villages of Selg and Floing were taken, and the fiery circle drew gradually closer round Sedan. It was a grand sight from our position on a commanding height behind the above-mentioned battery when we looked to the front beyond St. Torcy. The violent resistance by the enemy began to slacken by degrees, which we could see by the broken battalions that were hurriedly retreating from the woods and villages. The cavalry endeavoured to attack several battalions of our fifth corps, and the latter behaved admirably. The cavalry galloped through the interval between the battalions, and then returned the same way. This was repeated three times, so that the ground was covered with corpses and horses, all of which we could see very well from our position. I have not been able to learn the number of this brave regiment, as the retreat of the enemy was in many places a flight. The infantry, cavalry, and artillery rushed in a crowd into the town and its immediate environs, but no sign was given that the enemy contemplated extricating himself from his desperate situation by capitulation. No other course was left than to bombard the town with the heavy battery. In twenty minutes the town was burning in several places, which, with the numerous burning villages over the whole field, produced a terrible impression. I accordingly ordered the firing to cease, and sent Lieutenant-colonel von Broussart with a flag of truce, to demand the capitulation of the army and the fortress. He was met by a Bavarian officer, who reported to me that a French *parlementaire* had announced himself at the gate. Colonel von Broussart was admitted, and on his asking for the commander-in-chief, he was unexpectedly introduced into the presence of the emperor, who wished to give him a letter for myself. When the emperor asked what his message was, and received the answer, "To demand the surrender of the army and fortress," he replied that on this subject he must apply to General de Wimpffen, who had undertaken the command, in the place of the wounded General MacMahon, and that he would now send his adjutant-general, Reilly, with a letter to myself. It was seven o'clock when Reilly and Broussart came to me, the latter a little in advance; and it was first through him that I learned with certainty the presence of the emperor. You may imagine the impression which this made upon all of us, but particularly on myself. Reilly sprung from his horse and gave me the letter of the emperor, adding that he had no other orders. Before I opened the letter I said to him, "But I demand, as the first condition, that the army lay down its arms." The letter began thus:—"N'ayant pas pu mourir à la tête de mes troupes, je dépose mon epée à votre Majesté," leaving all the rest to me. My answer was that I deplored the manner of our meeting, and begged that a plenipotentiary might be sent with whom we might conclude the capitulation. After I had given the letter to General Reilly, I spoke a few words with him as an old acquaintance, and so this act ended. I gave Moltke powers to negotiate, and directed Bismarck to remain behind in case political questions should arise. I then rode to my carriage and drove here, greeted everywhere along the road with the loud hurrahs of the trains that were marching up and singing the national hymn. It was deeply touching. Candles were

lighted everywhere, so that we were driven through an improvised illumination. I arrived here at eleven o'clock, and drank with those about me to the prosperity of an army which had accomplished such feats. As on the morning of the 2nd I had received no news from Moltke respecting negotiations for the capitulation, which were to take place in Donchery, I drove to the battle-field, according to agreement, at eight o'clock, and met Moltke, who was coming to obtain my consent to the proposed capitulation. He told me at the same time that the emperor had left Sedan at five o'clock in the morning and had come to Donchery, as he wished to speak with me. There was a château and park in the neighbourhood, and I chose that place for our meeting. At ten o'clock I reached the height before Sedan. Moltke and Bismarck appeared at twelve o'clock, with the capitulation duly signed. At one o'clock I started again with Fritz, the Crown Prince, and escorted by the cavalry and the staff; I alighted before the château, where the emperor came to meet me. The visit lasted a quarter of an hour. We were both much moved at seeing each other again under such circumstances. What my feelings were—I had seen Napoleon only three years before at the summit of his power—is more than I can describe. After this meeting, from half past two to half past seven o'clock, I rode past the whole army before Sedan. The reception given me by the troops, the meeting with the guards, now decimated — all these are things which I cannot describe to-day. I was much touched by so many proofs of love and devotion. Now, farewell. A heart deeply moved at the conclusion of such a letter.

"WILLIAM."

An anecdote in connection with this letter, derived from a very good source, deserves to be recorded. It illustrates the kindly nature of the man whom the duties of his exalted position compelled to give the word of command in so many sanguinary battles. When the Feldjäger officer who was to carry it to Berlin entered the royal apartment, the king was just sealing the letter. On seeing the officer his Majesty suspended his occupation, and, turning to him, said:—"Before giving you this packet I must tell you one thing. You will yourself place it in her Majesty's hands, and you will take care to tell her Majesty, even before she breaks the seal, that this time, at least, our losses are moderate in comparison to the result."

At the military banquet given by the king of Prussia to his principal officers, on the brief rest-day which followed this "crowning mercy," champagne was served in honour of the great occasion (*vin ordinaire* only, say the German chroniclers of the campaign, having previously appeared at the royal table); and his Majesty proposed a toast in the following terms:—"We must to-day, in gratitude, drink to the health of my brave army. *You*, war minister Von Roon, have sharpened our sword; *you*, General von Moltke, have guided it; and *you*, Count von Bismarck, by your direction of the national policy for years, have brought Prussia to her present pitch of elevation. Let us then drink to the health of the army, of the three I have named in connection with that toast, and of every one present who has contributed, according to his power, to the results now accomplished."

Such is the history of the memorable battle and capitulation of Sedan—the darkest spot in the chequered military annals of France, and unquestionably the most remarkable military event since the retreat from Moscow. Neither Crecy, nor Agincourt, nor Pavia, nor St. Quentin, nor Blenheim, nor Waterloo, was so calamitous; modern history seeks in vain for a parallel to the dire catastrophe, for no modern European nation had ever received so crushing a blow. Since Pavia no French monarch had been taken in siege or battle. This untoward consummation was the natural result of the fatal strategy which had led the French to the frontier of Belgium, with an army wanting in every element of military power; while their enemies, twice as strong and efficient, were in a position to overtake and crush them by overwhelming numbers. Doubtless, the tardiness of MacMahon's movements, the want of discipline of his troops, and the faults of his lieutenants, contributed largely to the unhappy result; but the original error was in the design of a march from Rheims by Montmèdy on Metz, while the Germans held all the shorter lines—a march all but certain, with such an army as MacMahon's, to end in disaster. The marshal also made a grave mistake on the 31st of August, when he took no means to prevent his being shut into Sedan by superior forces, and did not discover this danger until he was in the presence of the enemy that surrounded him

on the morning of the 1st of September, when, after being wounded, he thought of a retreat on Mézières. Had an order to that effect been issued twenty hours earlier, it would almost certainly have saved the bulk of his army. But after the battle had begun it was far too late to try this movement, which he ought to have attempted the day before, the instant he had brought his troops back to Sedan after their defeat on the 30th. Then the Prussian left was many miles away from the Meuse; and it took the fifth corps and the Würtemburg division the whole of the 31st to reach their assigned points of passage. Certainly, on the afternoon at least of that day, it was in MacMahon's power to make a swift and compact movement in retreat towards Mézières; and it is hardly too much to assert that a determined resolve to avoid another general action by instantly falling back on the fortresses in the north-east of France, and the sacrifice of a corps at Sedan and Mézières to gain a day or two's march, might have saved from a humiliating fate the greater part of the soldiers who were surrendered. At Mézières MacMahon would have been joined by General Vinoy's corps, which was marching up to his aid; and although even then the Prussians could easily have cut him off from Paris, if they failed to intercept him before he gained the shelter of the nest of fortresses about Valenciennes, yet the task of besieging the capital under those circumstances would have been difficult and dangerous, if not impossible.

In reply to this view of the case it has been said, that a movement in the direction we have indicated, with the Crown Prince's army hanging on his flank, would have led to MacMahon's being destroyed before he could reach the shelter of the nest of fortresses beyond Mézières, which at a later period covered Faidherbe's operations. Very probably, if we may judge from the marked inferiority of the French in marching no less than in fighting, destruction would have been the end of such an attempt. But it is quite clear that there would have been hopes of saving some part of the army by sacrificing the rearmost corps; whilst the fatal resolution of taking up a simply defensive attitude round Sedan was the short way to such complete ruin and disgrace as no French commander had ever met before, since Dupont lost his head and surrendered to a mob of Spaniards at Baylen. Other critics have denounced the timidity which induced the French to withdraw the part of their army which had got beyond the Meuse on the 30th, only to fall back before the German cavalry. Ducrot's corps, which had reached Carignan, might, it is said, have been pushed on to advance separately to the succour of Bazaine. But to this criticism little serious importance need be attached, since a single corps could hardly have produced an appreciable effect on the vast operations near Metz; and isolated between the German armies, it would almost infallibly have been cut off without accomplishing any object worth the risk of separation.

As stated in the preceding chapter, it subsequently became known from official documents that this celebrated flank march of the French army was only undertaken in obedience to express orders from the ministry in Paris, which of course, to a great extent, absolves MacMahon from blame. Still it should never have been commenced; and if anything could add to the conclusive proofs of the folly of taking such a step, it is the consideration that Marshal Bazaine was not then in want of immediate relief; that MacMahon's army was the main hope of France; that it was instantly required to protect the capital; and that if it had fallen back on Paris, as it could easily have done, the subsequent situation might have been wholly different from what it was. The manner in which the German commanders availed themselves of their antagonist's mistakes was admirable, for the annihilation of MacMahon's army was due quite as much to the promptness with which these were turned to account by General von Moltke, as to the fatuity which led to their being committed. An impartial historian cannot fail to notice the prescience with which the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony was moved in order to aid the Crown Prince of Prussia; the readiness with which it was marched towards the Meuse; and the energy with which the two German armies were, without the delay of more than a few hours, turned northwards to stop and destroy MacMahon. These are truly great illustrations of the art of war; nor are the final operations less instructive, by which the whole French army, brought to bay at Sedan, was cut off from the possibility of retreat, and compelled to surrender. The Prussian staff were better acquainted with the difficulties of MacMahon's situation than he was himself. At least four days previous to his selecting that position, General Blumenthal, putting his finger on the map, said, "MacMahon is quite lost. There he

must stand and fight, and there he must be beaten without a chance of escape. They are quite lost. I wonder what they can mean." In proof of their utter helplessness, it is stated that some time afterwards an English military man remarked to some Prussian staff officers, that the surrender at Sedan of so large an army had struck him as rather inglorious; and asked them whether in the circumstances of the country and the capital, the army ought not rather to have cut its way out at the expense of half its numbers. They answered that the surrender was not inglorious, for there was no other resource left. "They ought not to have got into such a position; but once there, there was no getting out of it." The ability of the German chiefs was ably seconded by their troops, who in their operations gave proof of power, vigour, and celerity of movement, not easily matched in military annals.

From our previous description it will have been noticed that the leading feature of the battle of Sedan was a prolonged artillery duel at comparatively long ranges, followed up by desperate charges of infantry. There was hardly any manœuvring during the day. The whole German army formed a vast semicircle, with the horns of the crescent pointing to the Belgian frontier, and slowly approaching one another. When these horns met to the north of Sedan, the great mass of the French army was forced steadily back upon the town: then the German circle grew ever smaller, until at length its circumference was, at some points, inside the outworks of Sedan itself. The strength of the French position—on an inner line of heights on either side of the fortress—counterbalanced the disparity in numbers so long as they maintained their ground. But when they gave way, however slightly, and allowed the hostile crescent to contract, they became necessarily exposed to a converging fire, from which it was impossible to escape unless by thrusting back one or other of the inclosing armies: and as this was hopeless, the French were compelled to remain on the defensive throughout.

On two occasions during the day the French emperor providentially escaped being instantly killed. In the confusion which ensued upon the irruption of the panic-striken French into Sedan, when riding slowly through a wide street swept by the German artillery, and choked by the disordered soldiery, he paused for a moment to address a question to a colonel of his staff. At that instant a shell exploded a few feet in front of him, leaving him unharmed, though to all around his escape appeared miraculous. An eyewitness affirms that the emperor continued on his way without manifesting the slightest emotion, and greeted by the hearty *vivats* of the troops. Later, while sitting at a window, inditing his celebrated letter to the king of Prussia, a shell struck the wall just outside, and burst only a few feet from his chair, again leaving him unscathed and unmoved.

GREAT SORTIE FROM METZ.

During the movements before the battle of Sedan, communications—it is believed through a subterranean telegraph to Mézières—had been maintained between Marshals Bazaine and MacMahon, and a sortie was prepared by the former on August 26, eight days after the Germans had succeeded in imprisoning his army in Metz, had intrenched themselves in every direction, and had organized a telegraphic communication all round the city, by means of which 8000 men could be collected at any one spot in fifteen minutes, and 22,000 men in twenty-eight minutes; and the weak German force on the eastern side could be enabled to hold its own until the arrival, at the end of five and six hours respectively, of two additional corps from the western side, passing over pontoon bridges at Argancy and Hanconcourt. Bazaine's sortie was to have been made on this eastern side, along the right bank of the Moselle, and three corps were moved for the purpose; but it was abandoned in consequence of a torrent of rain coming on.

Nothing further was attempted till the 30th, when advices dated from Rheims were received by Bazaine from the emperor, stating that an attempt would be made to relieve the imprisoned force. It was therefore determined that a sortie on a large scale should be attempted on the following day; it was again to be made due eastwards at first, and if successful there the French hoped to be able to obtain possession of the roads leading down the right bank of the Moselle on Thionville, and render that fortress accessible without having to cross the Orne. The engagement which ensued was rather on an extensive scale.

By far the best description of the sortie yet published is that of Mr. G. T. Robinson, the

special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who was shut up with the French army in Metz during the whole of the siege, and to whose interesting work on the "Fall of Metz" we have been more than once indebted. He says that when, on the evening of the 30th, the soldiers heard of the attempt proposed for the morrow, they were full of glee, though somewhat in doubt. A similar report was circulated on the 26th of August, and although the weather was then miserable, and the roads almost impassable, the attempt had begun. The troops came down from Plappeville, and the Ban St. Martin emptied. Round from Montigny came long lines of troops, and they marched all the way up the hill of St. Julien, and then they marched down again, after displaying themselves to the enemy, and doing nothing more. This time, however, the weather was fine. The hot sun had dried up the roads, and before daybreak the troops commenced their march. It was three o'clock in the morning when they began to move. They passed over temporary bridges to the Ile Chambière, rejoining behind the fort Bellecroix the various corps which had come from the other camps. Here, however, their first misgiving awaited them. They were in hopes it was going to be an attempt to make a real *trouée*—a serious intention to cut a way through the wall of Prussians which day by day kept growing thicker around them. But here was the baggage, which was evidently not going. The tents were not packed, and the army was not in the order for a long march. Still they had faith.

Before describing the attack on the Prussian lines we may take a bird's-eye view of the position as seen from Metz, in which a glance at the plan of the battle of Courcelles, given in Chapter XI., will greatly assist the reader. To the east was the high hill of St. Julien, up the western side of which winds the little village of that name, and whose summit was capped by the long horizontal lines of its as yet unfinished fort. From this point runs out the long straight crest of a continued hill, descending somewhat at first, and then gradually rising again until it reaches a culminating point, crowned by the lofty steeple of a church. That steeple marks St. Barbe. Having an elevation of some 90 feet above even the fort-crowned hill of St. Julien, and rising some 400 feet above the flat plain of the Moselle, the importance of the situation was evident. Marvellous, indeed, was it that such a hill should have been left unguarded; but the enemy was quietly allowed to take possession of it, and thenceforth it was one of the watch-dogs of Metz. On the sloping ground which gently falls to the south of this long-crested hill are the villages of Servigny, Nouilly, and Mey, whilst placed on the little stream which cuts its quiet way at the bottom of the valley are the villages of Valliers and Vautoux, and on the opposite side of the stream, on a very gently ascending slope, are those of Noisseville and Montoy. On the northern slope, which runs down to the Moselle, rapidly, indeed almost declivitously, at St. Julien, but flattening as the valley widens, are the villages of Vremy, Failly, Charly, and Chieulles, almost all of which played their part in this two days' tragedy. Roughly speaking, the area of the battle-field was that of a scalene triangle, whose apex was at St. Julien, and whose base extended from Vremy to Montoy; its longest side being about six miles in length, whilst its base was about five miles. That was the area of the main portion of the fight. Detached skirmishing of course extended its dimensions very considerably; but the chief interest lay within these bounds. The importance of the position of St. Barbe was immediately recognized by the Germans, and the place, strong by nature, was strengthened by art. Epaulements were thrown up along the hill sides. Redoubts were erected wherever any jutting spur of higher ground projected into either of the two valleys which it dominated; and whoever held St. Barbe held possession of the road to Sarrelouis on the one side, and the lower hills, which yet were high enough to guard the valley of the Moselle, on the other. It has been necessary to be somewhat discursive on this point at first, in order to render more intelligible the description of a battle cut by the formation of the ground into two distinct parts, and extending over two days.

Although it was early morning when the march began, it was nearly four o'clock in the afternoon before the first shot was fired. On the left was the corps of Marshal Canrobert, in the centre was that of Lebœuf, and on the right that of Frossard. There appears to have been some want of preconcerted plan amongst them, something which could not be settled without a long and serious delay; for the French forces rested nearly twelve hours on

the slope of St. Julien without doing anything; resting, too, right in full view of the enemy, who had thus ample time to bring up his reinforcements to the point so deliberately threatened. Marshal Bazaine stopped in the Château Gromont. At last the troops received orders to move, and on went the dragoons, with their glistening helmets. General de Clerembault led them off the first, that they might guard the French extreme right against any surprise. The Moselle did this duty for them on the left. There are a few short words yet to be spoken to the Marshals. Canrobert, the echo of Bazaine, gives his last orders as the clock strikes four, and all are on the march. Straight out from the fort St. Julien, towards the village of Chieulles, runs the road for Buzonville. That is the line of Marshal Canrobert; he has to guard it, and all the land lying between it and the river, and as much of the rising ground up to the crest of the long-ridged hill as he can manage. Along the crest goes Marshal Lebœuf, this day taking the place before occupied by Bazaine, and leading on that third corps d'armée which the commander-in-chief led when the war began. He has to march along the crest of the hill straight on to St. Barbe, if he can, co-operating with Canrobert on his left, and touching with his right the second corps of Frossard. Between Marshals Canrobert and Lebœuf marches the division of General L'Admirault, whilst the aged General Changarnier occupies a corresponding position between Marshal Lebœuf and Frossard. Thus they diverge; and the worst of it is they do diverge. Canrobert pushes forward with the intention of reaching Malroy, and cutting the enemy's communication by the river. Vany and Chieulles are attacked by the tenth and fourth regiments of the line, with the desire to turn the enemy back upon himself, and drive him into the river. L'Admirault's corps marched right up to the village of Servigny, where, for some unknown reason, it waits for two hours under a heavy shower of shells. At last the charge is sounded. At the village they go. There is what is very rare now-a-days; there is hand to hand work, and bayonet crosses bayonet at every corner. Each house is a fortress, but it must be carried. The French long 24-pounders of St. Julien silence a Prussian battery at Gras which troubles them, and Servigny is once more French. Two hours it took to take it, and two hours under such circumstances were very long. During this long struggle here the villages of Chieulles and Vany were carried, and Canrobert's corps almost touched the walls of Failly. The twelfth line are pushed forward in open order on Charly, and its sharpshooters creep under cover of the rolling broken ground up to within three hundred yards of a Prussian battery there. For two hours and a half do they pepper at it, until at last it is compelled to retire behind the wood which backs up the little village.

If Canrobert would only now make a dash at Malroy it could be carried from the right, as this battery covers the road; but the opportunity is not seized, and it never occurs again. Meanwhile the extreme right of our forces has pushed its cavalry on to Coincy, arresting the progress of the Prussians, who, called by the heavy firing, came up from Remilly and Courcelles at the gallop. The dragoons dismount and hold the village, the Prussians file off.

Montauban pushes up the first division of the third corps to Montoy, and forces his way right up to Flanville, where, touching the line of attack assigned to Frossard, he finds himself hardly strong enough for the work, and sends to the commander of the second corps for assistance. None comes; Frossard wants to be well taken care of, and for an hour and a half Montauban holds unsupported this post, till at last, poor fellow, he falls. At length up comes General Magnan with his division (second corps), and taking charge of his own and that of Montauban, launches forth the sixty-second and eighteenth battalions of the chasseurs-à-pied and the fifty-first of the line. At the village they go, the sixty-second leading, with drums and trumpets playing. On come the fifty-first; "*à la baionnette*" they shout, and plunge into the village, whilst the eighteenth deploys to the right, and covers the road to Retonfay, along which the Prussians retreat, with a line of fire and dead men. It was a brilliant bit of work, but it cost dear, and the sixty-second left 13 officers and 400 men on that little bit of road which leads on to Flanville. In the centre Nouilly has been carried by the ninety-fifth and the thirty-second of the line, under Lebœuf; at least by what is left of these two regiments. They have both suffered heavily in this war, and the thirty-second has lost more than 1000 rank and file and 45 officers since it came to Metz. Nouilly carried, they push impetuously

forward, and serve Noisseville the same; and as the last sun in August sets the whole line is ours. Charly, Failly, Servigny, Noisseville, Flanville, Coincy, are all carried.

But, alas, night comes on, and those ten hours which were wasted in the morning are sadly wanted now. Advance in the dark without more strength they could not. They did not know where the enemy was; but they knew the French position only too well, and they kept up an almost continual fire upon them. But, worst of all, Canrobert has not pushed on far enough, and the bridges of Malroy are yet in the hands of the Prussians, who keep pouring fresh troops into the threatened position. These in their turn come down upon the French, and between ten and eleven at night they are attacked in considerable force on the villages of Noisseville and Servigny. But the Germans did not venture in, and the French did not venture out; so the firing served more to check the advance of either foe than any other purpose. This was the position of things when the fighting ceased. The French were hopeful that during the night fresh forces would be brought up, and that the morrow would prove a grand day in their history. Not a single soldier, however, was brought up, nor was aught done to strengthen their weak points, whilst the enemy had all the night been making preparations for the day's hard work. By the bridges Canrobert should have taken, and by the road Frossard should have cut—from Ars-Laquenexy and Courcelles, from Remilly and Corny—did the Germans bring up fresh men, while the French, with all the imperial guard behind them, and numerous troops in Metz, moved not one man nor brought forward a single gun!

The action recommenced between five and six o'clock in the morning, the French centre being then the chief point of attack. The village of Noisseville was soon a vortex of fire, and for a time the whistling sound of the shells in the air was as continuous and as loud as that of a locomotive blowing off steam. The French, seeing they were outnumbered, and that they would not be able to hold the village much longer, brought a battery of mitrailleuses up the hill, to give the enemy as warm a reception as possible. The village was now on fire in several places, and many poor wounded fellows made their way to the rear. Meanwhile not a fresh soldier was brought up. The poor fellows who fought all the previous afternoon, and partly through the night, had now to bear the brunt again. They can stand it no longer, and, borne back by numbers, they retire. Now begins the horrible grind of the mitrailleuses. Gr-r-r-rutt it goes as the Germans rush forward, and the column wavers and spreads, leaving a large black patch on the ground. Gr-r-r-rutt, gr-r-r-rutt from each, and the first advance is silenced for ever. But it is the French turn to suffer now, and shell after shell comes right amongst them, making their position much too hot for them. Some of their horses are knocked over, but as yet none of their men are hit. The shells, however, fall too thickly to be endured, and once more Noisseville was German.

Finding the Prussian fire becoming too warm, and that the French were being pushed back in the centre, Mr. Robinson says he went over to the most extreme right, hoping that by closing in upon the enemy there the French might even yet outflank them, and change the fortune of the day by creating a diversion in their rear. Crouching down on the ground he found a regiment of chasseurs-à-pied, ready to spring up in a moment if necessary. "They don't wait long, for the order comes to deploy in skirmishing order and advance. Hurrah! we are going forward; we shall win yet. Up comes, at a swinging pace, the twenty-fifth, and we rush together for the big villa with the large grounds there. Hurrah! we are first; its wall shelters us and the game begins. Rattle all along the line goes the musketry; pop, pop, from the vineyards on our left goes the sharpshooters' quiet fire. There is a Prussian battery right in front of us, but we drive the men away from the guns. We are rushing forward, when all at once sounds the retreat. Good Heaven! what has happened? We had almost snatched the victory. One's heart almost stops suddenly still.

"The troops obey the sound, and sulkily retire. As we turn to come back we see an isolated patch of French soldiers out on the hill in front of us. Who they are, or what they do there, no one knows. It turns out to be a portion of the second corps, which, touching on the right of the third, had been forgotten both by the marshal and the general. Once it indeed was remembered, and two counter-orders reached it at the same moment, and they did not know which to obey, so they send back for *written* instructions, which never came. They remained in front of Flanville, having the

honour of being the last men to retire from this useless slaughter, only reaching our lines fully an hour after every other man was within them. The Prussians advance, they establish themselves at their guns, and shell us horribly. All around us the shells drop, and I am suddenly awakened to the fact that I am between the two fires, and in comfortable killing distance from both of them. Action follows reflection rapidly, and I execute a strategic movement to the rear worthy of a French general. It was a retreat all along our line. Slowly we returned down the hill, and very sadly too. We established battery after battery; but we had given up the heights to the Prussians, and their fire was longer than ours. No sooner were we in position than their shells came plunging into us, and we had to draw back again. It was thus, little by little, that we returned towards Metz, and by mid-day we had lost all we took the night before. There, as we climbed the hill again, we came in sight of all those reserves massed on Saint Julien. There, too, we saw the grim old grey-towered château of Gromont, from which the marshal saw the fight. 'Beaten again from want of a general,' exclaims each one; and a good many fists are shaken towards Gromont.

"Thus sadly ended our last hopeful day at Metz. Never again had we any confidence in the military qualities of the commander-in-chief. We saw a movement commenced at daybreak, suspended until evening in view of the enemy. We saw a force sent out with divided councils. We saw the movement arrested when a night's march could have carried the position. We saw a force, weakened by a fair day's work and a long night's watch, left unsuccoured. We saw our victory snatched from us when, in spite of these disadvantages, we had almost grasped it; and the shock was too rude."

The Hon. C. A. Winn, who witnessed the engagement from the German side, corroborates the statements of Mr. Robinson in all main particulars, and says there is no doubt that as far as regarded increasing their lines, and progressing towards freedom, the French on the 31st gained all the ground they could have expected in the time they had to do it in; and when darkness made artillery useless, and the firing ceased, they found themselves in a fine position for carrying the main points of St. Barbe and Malroy by night assault. He has not the slightest doubt that Bazaine, but for his inaction, would have found himself and the greater part of his troops beyond the Prussian lines in the morning. He does not, however, believe that any advantage would have accrued to him; as once out in the open country with no baggage, in a famished district, his entire army would have soon fallen an easy prey to the combined Prussian corps, long before he could have reached Thionville.

END OF VOL. I.

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Engraved by Francis Hall, from a Photograph

THE

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR:

ITS CAUSES, INCIDENTS, AND CONSEQUENCES.

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THE

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

CHAPTER XV.

Popular Feeling in Paris—Excitement on hearing of the Fighting around Metz and Hostile Feeling against the Government—Appointment of General Trochu as Governor of Paris, and brief Biographical Notice of him—Complete Exemplification of his Views with regard to the French Army—His First Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Paris—Favourable Reception of it by all Parties—Cheering Assurances of M. Thiers as to the Capacity of Paris to withstand a Siege—His Proposal to make a Waste of the Country surrounding the Capital, and to bring the Inhabitants and their Produce within the City—False Statements made by the Government as to the Battles around Metz and the reputed slaughter in the Quarries of Jaumont—The Feeling of the Extreme Opponents of the Government—The First Arrivals of the Wounded in Paris—Execution of Spies—Fearful Atrocity at Hautelaye—Important Decree published by the Empress appointing a Committee of Defence—Proclamation of General Trochu to the National Guard—Sketch of the Sieges of Paris, and Historical and General Description of the Fortifications—Activity displayed in placing the latter in a thorough State of Defence—Armament of the Forts—Gunboats launched on the Seine to assist in the Defence of the City—Minute Information possessed by the Germans as to the Fortifications of Paris—Improved Tone in the Feeling of the Parisians, and Activity manifested in the Organization of the Troops—Expulsion of the Germans and of all the "Dangerous" Classes, and Voluntary Exodus of the Well-to-do Classes and Foreigners—Closing of the Theatres—Arrival of the Outside Population within the City, with Huge Droves of Sheep and Cattle—The Country aroused at the Danger of the Capital—A Loan of £30,000,000 rapidly subscribed for—Proceedings in the Corps Législatif—Impressive Remarks by M. Thiers—The Party of the Left gradually gaining the Upper Hand—Important Communication from the Government and Reply from the Inhabitants—Statement to the Corps Législatif by Count Palikao relating to the Sortie from Metz and Battles around Sedan—The Surrender of the Emperor and his Army still kept from the People—Great Agitation in the Chamber, and demand of M. Jules Favre that the *de facto* Government should cease—Levy *en Masse*—Instances of the Changeability of the French Character—The Sad Feeling in Germany caused by the Fearful Losses in the Battles around Metz, and increased determination to put down France effectually—Behaviour of the French Wounded—Remonstrances of the well-known Authoress, Fanny Lewald, against the Attention shown to the French Prisoners—Increasing Feeling of Hostility against the French Government and People—Germany's wishes with regard to Alsace and Lorraine—Protests against Foreign Interference in the Struggle—The Jubilation in Berlin and other German Cities on the Reception of the News of the Surrender of the Emperor and the French Army at Sedan.

Having brought the narrative of the events connected with the war to the surrender of the emperor and his army at Sedan, we suspend the further description of active operations in the field, to glance at the situation of affairs in the French capital, where most important political and other matters had naturally occupied the attention of the authorities and people generally. We shall also, at the same time, briefly notice the feeling manifested in Germany.

In Chapter IX. we described the progress of events and the state of the public mind in the French and Prussian capitals down to the emperor's fête day (August 15)—a day which had been fixed on by many enthusiastic Frenchmen for the triumphant march of their troops into Berlin! As already stated, the usual festival was not celebrated; and the Parisians suffered keenly from suspense and mortification occasioned by the early disasters of the campaign. The festival of the church, however, was duly honoured. On the day following the festival (August 16) the city was again plunged into a state of the most intense excitement, when it became known that severe fighting had been going on upon the banks of the Moselle, the details of which were, in vain, eagerly sought for; while the excitable disposition of the Parisians was embittered by the minister of the Interior posting a despatch to the effect that "some travellers" had reported a great battle, in which 40,000 Prussians were placed *hors de combat.* Taught a lesson by the false news spread after the battle of Woerth, this proceeding of M. Chevreau only served to increase

the hostile feeling of the people, whose menaces began to be formidable.

The 17th of August deserves especial notice as the day on which General Trochu, who afterwards played so important a part in the defence of the capital, was appointed governor of Paris. Nothing could have shown more clearly the precarious condition of the empire than this appointment. General Trochu had displayed the qualities of an able soldier and a high-minded gentleman; but his sympathies were professedly Orleanist, and little in accord with the regency of the empress. He had likewise requested of the emperor a command in the army of the Rhine, which was refused. He had, however, been sent to the camp at Toulouse to organize the troops, and was subsequently appointed to the command of the twelfth army corps stationed at the camp at Châlons, whence he was recalled for the defence of the capital.

This general, Louis Jules Trochu, was born in 1815, and educated at the military school of St. Cyr. He was appointed lieutenant in 1840, captain in 1843, and subsequently served in Algeria, where he became the favourite aide-de-camp of Marshal Bugeaud, who had remarked his great bravery at the battle of Isly. He became major in 1846, and colonel in 1853. During the Russian war he served in the Crimea as aide-de-camp to Marshal St. Arnaud, gaining by his gallant conduct at the siege of Sebastopol the commander's cross of the Legion of Honour. After the Marshal's death he was promoted to the rank of general, and commanded a brigade of infantry until the end of the war. During the Italian campaign of 1859, which ended with the victory of Solferino, he served with distinction in command of a division. In 1861 he was promoted to the rank of grand officer of the Legion of Honour, having then been in the army twenty-five years, and served in eighteen campaigns, in one of which he was wounded. General Trochu was also elected a member of the consulting committee of the Etat Major, and chosen in the place of his father a member of the Conseil Général of Morbihan, in the canton of Belle Isle. In 1866 he helped greatly in the reorganization of the army, and in the following year published anonymously a book entitled "The French Army in 1867," which passed through ten editions in six months. In it he severely criticized the organization of the army, and especially the changes introduced into it under the empire, which tended to render the soldiery a caste, severed in interest and feeling from their civilian countrymen. He maintained that its manœuvres were antiquated, its organization very imperfect, and "that the main secret of success in every war was to be more completely prepared for action than the enemy;" a theory strikingly exemplified in the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866, and still further verified by the French reverses during the late conflict.

General Trochu's appointment as governor of Paris was mainly owing to the acknowledged merits of this treatise; and so highly were his qualifications valued by the community, that it was only by promptly installing him in the office the government prevented a proposition in the Corps Législatif to place him in it. Count de Palikao, however, in announcing the appointment, was careful to state that it had no political signification. On the morning following his appointment the general issued the subjoined proclamation:—

"Inhabitants of Paris,—In the present peril of the country I am appointed governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of the forces charged with defending the capital in a state of siege. Paris assumes the rôle which belongs to her, and desires to be the centre of great efforts, of great sacrifices, of great examples. I associate myself with it with all my heart. It will be the pride of my life and the brilliant crowning of a career till now unknown to the most of you. I have the most implicit faith in the success of our glorious enterprise, but it is on one condition, the nature of which is absolute, imperative, and without which our united efforts will be powerless. I mean good order; and I understand by that not only calmness in the street, but in-doors, calmness of mind, deference for the orders of the responsible authority, resignation under those experiences which are inseparable from the situation, and, finally, that grave and collected serenity of a great military nation which takes in hand, with a firm resolution, under solemn circumstances, the conduct of its destinies. I will not refer, in order to secure to the situation that equilibrium which is so desirable, to the state of siege and of the law. I will demand it from your patriotism, I shall obtain it from your confidence, while I myself repose unbounded confidence in you. I appeal to men of all parties, belonging

myself, as is known in the army, to no other party than that of the country. I appeal to their devotion; I entreat them to restrain by moral authority those ardent spirits who cannot restrain themselves, and to do justice by their own hands on those men who are of no party, and who perceive in our public misfortunes only the opportunity of satisfying detestable desires (*appétits*). And in order to accomplish my work—after which, I assure you, I shall retire into the obscurity from which I emerge—I adopt one of the old mottoes of my native province of Brittany, 'With God's help, for the country' ('Avec l'aide de Dieu, pour la patrie').

"GENERAL TROCHU."

This proclamation was greatly approved by the inhabitants of Paris, and favourably commented on by journals of nearly every shade, especially for its patriotic spirit, firmness, and modesty. In relation to that part of it which speaks of summary justice being done by the people, the general subsequently explained as follows:—"A time may come when Paris, threatened at all points, and subjected to all the hardships of a siege, will be, so to speak, given over to that particular class of rascals (*gredins*) who in public misfortunes only see an opportunity for satisfying their detestable appetites. These are the men, as you know, who run through the affrighted town, crying out, 'We are betrayed!' who break into houses and plunder them. These are the men whom I told all honest folk to lay hold of in the absence of the public force, which will be required on the ramparts. That was what I meant." It is noticeable that General Trochu simply announced his appointment, without indicating the authority whence it emanated.*

These proceedings, coupled with declarations by M. Thiers as to the capacity of the fortifications of the capital to withstand a siege, somewhat cheered the spirits of the Parisians. At the sitting of the Corps Législatif he (M. Thiers) also expressed a hope that, in case of necessity, Paris would be able to offer an invincible resistance to the Germans. With a view to this, and in order to secure abundance in the capital, he suggested that a waste should be made around it, and that the inhabitants of the surrounding country, with all their produce, should take refuge in it.

As regards the communication of news from the front, the government fell into the error of their predecessors. The truth respecting the battles around Metz on the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August, which led to the investment of Marshal Bazaine and his entire army within the lines of the "maiden" fortress, was uniformly withheld from the people. The minister of War spoke of the affair of the 14th as a brilliant combat, in which the enemy had sustained severe losses; but refused to give any details of the engagement. A despatch subsequently published intimated that the French had been able to carry their wounded into Metz; that the Prussians were compelled to retire to their former lines; that they had been repeatedly repulsed in an unsuccessful attempt to carry the French position; and that Bazaine had rejoined MacMahon, with the prospect of a decisive victory.

In published despatches it was also announced that in the battle of the 16th Marshal Bazaine had repulsed the German army, had everywhere maintained his ground, and that his troops had passed the night in the position they had conquered. The place, however, whence the latter announcement had been issued was not mentioned; and although the despatch had been sent on the night of the 16th, it was not published in Paris till the 18th. The actual state of affairs was subsequently learned from German despatches published in the English newspapers. No information was communicated respecting the hard-fought battle of Gravelotte on the 18th, but the Parisians were firmly persuaded that a great victory had been obtained; and on Friday (19th) the Boulevards were crowded with enthusiastic multitudes singing the Marseillaise and shouting "Vive la France!" "Vive Bazaine!" "Vive l'Armée!"

In the Chamber, on Saturday, August 20, although no despatch was produced from Bazaine, Count Palikao made the following communication:—"The Prussians have circulated the report that they gained advantages over our troops on the 18th. I wish formally to state the contrary. I have shown to several deputies a despatch, from which it appears that three Prussian corps united made an attack upon Marshal Bazaine, but that they were repulsed and overthrown into the quarries of Jaumont (*culbutés dans les carrières de Jaumont*)." The minister likewise intimated that Bismarck's cuirassiers had been cut to pieces, and the Prussian troops had sustained

* See note at the end of Chapter.

great loss, while Bazaine's position secured to him entire freedom of action. These statements were at the time loudly cheered; but subsequently, pressed by the Left, Count Palikao failed to substantiate them. Assailed by M. Gambetta, he said that a premature communication of good news from the seat of war would imperil the success of the commander's plans; but the Opposition contended that if there was only bad news it could not come too soon, since, until the country was made aware of the worst, it would not nerve itself for the sacrifices to which it would have to submit.

It was, however, well understood in Paris that the success of Bazaine was absolutely necessary to meet the circumstances. When on the 15th Count Palikao announced in the Chamber that on the 13th the marshal had shaken off the Germans, and rejoined MacMahon, there appeared in the Paris journals on the same day long articles showing the critical character of the dangers which had been surmounted, and congratulating Bazaine on his safety. Little did the writers know that the information they had received was utterly opposed to the facts; and it was but indifferent consolation they subsequently professed to find in believing that their favourite general had failed to shake off the hold of the German strategists, only because he had resolved to engage the enemy with the best troops of France, while the raw levies were being drilled into efficiency in the camp at Châlons!

The reticence of the government, combined with the flagrant distortion of the actual facts, had the usual damaging effects. The inhabitants of the capital, in their feverish discontent, encouraged the fabrication of false news. Thus, according to the *Liberté*, on the 18th the Prussians were totally defeated, leaving 40,000 wounded on the battle-field, and had to demand leave to send them to Germany through Belgium and Luxemburg. Imaginative writers also described "the terrific drama of the Quarries of Jaumont, near Metz, where 20,000 Prussians were represented to have been precipitated into an abyss with vertical sides and a depth of 100 feet, and afterwards buried *en masse* with sand by Belgian peasants employed at ten francs a day, while groans yet issued from the mass on the fourth day after the catastrophe, a catastrophe which caused many French soldiers who witnessed it to burst into tears." On the other hand, the most alarming rumours were current that the French army had been utterly beaten and destroyed. The following extract from the *Centre Gauche* (subsequently suppressed) shows the feeling of the extreme opponents of the government at this time:—"How absurd are the organs which boast of a 'victory.' Is it victory because the emperor just escaped being made prisoner? Is it victory because our army was not cut in two on the Moselle? Is it victory because, after four days' fighting, we at length shook off an enemy which all that time had harassed our retreat? If it is victory, where are the prisoners, the guns, and the flags to show for it? If the Prussians should take the emperor prisoner, let them keep him. Not a particle of our national genius or honour will go with him. Let his wife and son share with him the carefully prepared luxuries of an opulent exile. At all events, may the hand which traced the proclamation abandoning Metz to its fate draw up no more bulletins of the grande armée on the banks of the Meuse. May such sad comedies be spared us in future. He is already called by his former flatterers in the Corps Législatif, His Majesty Invasion III., and it is notorious that only to avoid difficulties while the enemy is at our gates his deposition is postponed for a short time by a tacit compromise."

Added to the restlessness engendered by uncertainty, the heart of Paris was further saddened by the arrival of the battered remnants of cavalry regiments, reduced to mere handfuls by the vicissitudes of the campaign. Weary, footsore, and wounded, the chargers passed along the thoroughfares; while the troopers, thin and haggard, looked like men who had fought hard and fared badly. Not even the march of troops still in course of being forwarded to the front could now awaken the enthusiasm of the Parisians, and regiment after regiment passed through the streets in silence. Meantime, many of the rioters at La Villette were condemned; "spies" were executed; reports were in circulation implicating even the ladies of the palace, and the mind of the capital was agitated by news of outrages in the provinces. An outrage of a specially frightful character was perpetrated on the deputy mayor of Beaussac. Misinterpreting a remark made by the unfortunate gentleman as favourable to the Prussians, a mob of some 200 ruffians attacked him with barbarous ferocity, and having wounded and battered his person, kindled a

fire in the market-place of Hautelaye, and literally burnt him alive.

The serious turn which the course of events had taken was evidenced by the following decree, published in the *Journal Officiel* of the 21st August, signed by the empress and countersigned by the Count de Palikao:—

"Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will, emperor of the French. To all present and to come, salutation. We have decreed and do decree as follows:—1. The Defence Committee of the fortifications of Paris is composed of general of division Trochu, president; Marshal Vaillant, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, Baron Jerome David, minister of Public Works, general of division Baron de Chabaud la Tour, Generals Guiod, d'Autemarre, d'Erville, and Soumain. 2. The Defence Committee is invested under the authority of the minister of War with the powers necessary for carrying out the decisions at which it may arrive. 3. For the execution of such decisions our minister of War will attach to the Defence Committee such generals, military intendants, and other officers as may be required. 4. The Defence Committee will meet every day at the War Office. It will receive a daily report of the progress of the works and armaments, the stores of ammunition and provisions. 5. The Committee will report its proceedings every day to the minister of War, who in turn will report to the Council of Ministers. 6. Our minister of War is charged with the execution of this decree. Done at the Palace of the Tuileries, 19th of August, 1870, for the emperor, by virtue of the powers intrusted to her.

"EUGENIE."

To the names given in this proclamation, the Chambers, contrary to the wishes of the executive, subsequently persisted in adding others; and three deputies, MM. Thiers, De Talhouët, Dupuy de Lôme, and two senators, General Mellinet and M. Béhic, were placed on the Committee of Defence.

General Trochu also issued the following proclamation, which was published in the same number of the *Official Journal*:—

"To the national guard, the national garde mobile, to the land and sea troops in Paris, and to all the defenders of the capital in a state of siege. In the midst of events of the utmost gravity, I have been appointed the governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of the forces assembled for its defence. The honour is great, but for me equally so is the danger. Upon you, however, I rely to restore by energetic efforts of patriotism the fortunes of our army, should Paris be exposed to the trials of a siege. Never was a more magnificent opportunity presented to you, to prove to the world that a long course of prosperity and good fortune has in no degree enervated public feeling nor the manhood of the country. You have before you the glorious example of the army of the Rhine. They have fought one against three in heroic struggles, which have earned the admiration of the country, and have inspired it with gratitude. It wears now mourning for those who have died.

"Soldiers of the Army of Paris. My whole life has been spent among you in a close intimacy, from which I now derive hope and strength. I make no appeal to your courage and your constancy, which are well known to me. But show by your obedience, by a firm discipline, by the dignity of your conduct and behaviour, that you have a profound sense of the responsibilities which devolve upon you. Be at once an example and an encouragement to all. The governor of Paris,

"TROCHU."

From these proceedings on the part of the governing authorities, the people saw clearly the dangers of the position. Notwithstanding the "glorious example" and "heroic struggles" of the army of the Rhine, the facts came out that Bazaine was shut up in Metz; that the camp at Châlons had been broken up and evacuated; and that the Crown Prince of Prussia, with a powerful army, was pursuing the southern route in order to attack Paris. The attention of the capital was thus centred upon the fortifications which thirty years before had been constructed by the ministry of M. Thiers—now a member of that Committee of Defence whose duty it was to place those structures on a war footing.

Before proceeding further with our narrative, we think it cannot fail to be interesting if we here give a very brief sketch of the sieges of Paris prior to that of 1870–71, and a short historical and general description of the fortifications which proved so effective during its investment on the present occasion, and of which a plan is annexed.

It is worthy of note that the first mention we have of Paris in history is connected with the

record of an investment. Fifty years before Christ it was a stronghold of the Gauls, when Labienus, the most able of Cæsar's generals, marched an army against it, and after crossing the Seine forced the insurgents to evacuate it, after Vercingetorix, the chief of the Gauls, had burned what there was of a city. Paris was originally confined to an island, formed by a river and surrounded by inaccessible swamps. After the Germans conquered France, Chlodwig, the leader of the invading tribe, reconstructed ancient Lutetia, and made it the centre of the new empire. When the authority of his descendants began to decline, the defence of Paris against a foreign enemy gave a prestige to one of their generals that enabled him to usurp the throne of the decaying dynasty. Nearly 900 years after Christ, Charles le Gros, a degenerate scion of Charlemagne, was attacked by the Normans. A helpless imbecile, he had no choice but to make his peace with the predatory bands. On the occasion of a second raid, however, Paris gallantly held out for a whole year under the command of Count Otto, one of the king's nobles. By this feat of arms Otto acquired such renown, that on Charles' death, in 888, the Frankish nobility elected him king. A nephew of his, Hugh Capet, was the ancestor of the Bourbons.

Meantime, the German conquerors of France, absorbed by the subject of nationality, had quarrelled with the old country whence they had proceeded. In 978, when the German emperor Otto II. was celebrating the festival of St. John at Aix-la-Chapelle, he was surprised by King Lothaire of France at the head of an army of 30,000 men. Otto, however, crossed the frontier on the 1st of October, and marched straight upon Paris, overcoming all resistance in his way. Before winter set in he stood at the foot of Montmartre, and invested the city. But to ward off the hosts attempting its rescue he had to detail a portion of his army, which was eventually decimated by the cold of winter and disease. He was ultimately obliged to withdraw without effecting his object, and returned the way by which he came.

The strength of the place having thus been proved by experience, King Philip Augustus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, extended its fortifications, adding several hundred towers to the walls. In the latter part of the fourteenth century King Charles V. surrounded the new suburbs with a fresh *enceinte*, built a citadel called the Bastille, and constructed a fort on the Isle of St. Louis. Notwithstanding these new defences, the English, after the battle of Agincourt, 1420, took Paris. The Maid of Orleans, attempting to recapture it in 1429, was repulsed; but seven years later, through the gallantry of Dunois, the Bâtard Royal, the English were obliged to evacuate it.

King Henry IV. was the next to assail the devoted capital. As he was a Protestant, it would not recognize his authority. Having defeated the Catholic League at Ivry, 17th March, 1590, he approached the city by forced marches; and occupying Corbeil, Lagny, and Creil, cut off the supply of provisions, then chiefly received by the river. He next planted his guns on Montmartre, and from this commanding position left the Parisians to choose between starvation and bombardment: 15,000 of the inhabitants died of hunger before negotiations were opened with the king. At that very moment, however, the Spaniards, who assisted the Catholic League, sent General Prince Farnese with a large army from Belgium to the rescue. Henry was thus compelled to raise the siege, and only entered Paris four years later, when, having embraced Catholicism, he was welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm.

The power of France rapidly increasing, Paris remained more than 200 years unvisited by an invading army. In the reign of Louis XIV. the mere idea of the foreigner venturing into the heart of the country had come to appear so preposterous, as to lead to the razing of the fortifications. Louis XV., in 1726, again encircled the city with a wall, which, however, was not intended for military purposes; and as an open town Paris passed through the storms of the Revolution.

In 1814 the allied armies appeared in front of Paris to avenge the deeds of Napoleon I. At that time Joseph Bonaparte acted as regent, and a few redoubts, hastily thrown up, were all the impediments in the way of the enemy; 25,000 regulars under Marmont and Mortier, and 15,000 national guards, with 150 guns, formed the city garrison. The allied sovereigns arrived on the evening of the 29th of March at the château of Bondy, and resolved to attack Paris by the right bank of the Seine. They planned three simultaneous attacks. That on the east, under Barclay de Tolly, with 50,000 men, was to carry, by Passy and Pantin, the plateau of Romainville; that on the south,

under the Prince Royal of Würtemburg, with about 30,000 troops, was to pour through the wood of Vincennes on the barriers of Charonne and the Trône; the third by the north, in the plain of St. Denis, was to be headed by Blucher himself, and to march on the right of Montmartre, Clichy, and Etoile. On the French side, Marmont had to scale the escarpments of Charonne and Montreuil, and establish himself on the plateau of Romainville; while Mortier, traversing the exterior boulevard from Charonne to Belleville, and descending by Pantin, La Villette, and La Chapelle, to the plain of St. Denis, established his right wing on the canal of the Ourcq, his left at Clignancourt, at the foot of Montmartre. Marmont, finding the Russians in possession of Romainville, with 1200 men threw himself on their rear-guard and drove them back on Pantin and Noisy. Barclay de Tolly, vexed at his repulse, resolved to retake Romainville, and called up his reserve. General Mezenzoff, who had been repulsed in the morning, pushed forward his stubborn grenadiers and won the height. The Russian cuirassiers, driving along the plateau of Montreuil, tried to charge the retiring French infantry, but were repelled. The French batteries, served by mere Polytechnique lads with skill and devoted courage, kept up a most determined plunging fire with great effect. Ledru des Essart's young guard had also reconquered, tree by tree, the wood of Romainville, and thus outflanked the Russian troops. Marshal Mortier had already taken up his position on the plain of St. Denis. On the north, Blucher was advancing over the plain of St. Denis. The bulk of the Prussian infantry advanced to the foot of Montmartre; General York's corps, on the left of the allies, moved on La Chatelle; and the corps of Kleist and Woronzoff, still more to the left, bore down on La Villette. The Prince Royal of Würtemburg also advancing, and carrying the bridge of St. Maur, made a circuit round the forest and attacked Charenton by the right bank. The brave national guards had tried to defend the bridge at Charenton with l'Ecole d'Alport; but finding their rear in danger, they abandoned the position, and pushed across the country to the left of the Seine. The allied forces were now in line, and the firing commenced in one broad belt. To the north Prince Eugene fell on Pantin and Près St. Gervais, and grappled with the Boyer de Rebeval and picked divisions of the young guard. The French, driven out, rallied, however, at the foot of the height, and supported by well-posted artillery, returned to renew the struggle for the unhappy villages. On the plateau of Romainville there was equally hard fighting, but the French had not the same success. Pressed on both flanks, Marmont struck a bold blow for life rather than for victory. He threw himself in front of four battalions, formed in column, and pushed like a battering-ram straight at the Russian centre. Twelve cannons loaded with grape gave a rude welcome to the intruders, Marmont being at the same moment attacked in front and in flank. The four French columns fell back after a furious hand-to-hand fight. Marmont was already weighed down by his assailants, when a daring officer, named Ghesseler, broke from a wood with 200 men, and rushed at the Russian columns, to give time to Marmont to retreat towards Belleville. Bravely as they had resisted, the French were everywhere outnumbered; and along the line from St. Denis to the Barrière du Trône, the allies, according to Thiers, had lost already 10,000 men, the French 6000. The allies, however, dreaded the return of Napoleon, and the blow of despair he might strike. About three in the afternoon Brigadier Paixhan placed heavy guns on the declivity of Mènilmontant by Belleville, and Chaumont. His gunners waited with stern calmness for the masses of Russians and Germans, whose front ranks were mowed down by the relentless fire. The allies, however, pushed on and attacked Marmont in the rear; who, to prevent being cut off, collected his forces, and rushed on the Russian grenadiers, whom he broke and drove back beyond the barrier, and then resumed the defence at the octroi wall. Mortier, in the plain of St. Denis, was also in an all but hopeless condition, though he still kept a brave front to the enemy. The divisions at La Villette were now in the centre of a mass of Russians and Germans, when Mortier rushed with part of the old guard down on La Villette, and drove out the Prussian guard with great carnage. But fresh masses poured in, and drove him over the plain into the barriers of Paris. The heights of Montmartre were then wrested from a handful of sappers, and subsequently the Clichy barrier, which the national guards, under Marshal Moncey, were bravely defending. As M. Thiers says eloquently, when he reaches this point in his history: "Such

was the termination of two and twenty years of victory. The triumphs at Milan, Venice, Rome, Naples, Cairo, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna, Dresden, Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow, now closed disastrously before the walls of Paris." Marmont, desirous of saving the city from ruin and bloodshed, sent three officers to Prince Schwartzenberg to propose terms. At that moment General Dejean arrived in breathless haste, to announce that Napoleon would appear within two days with 600,000 men, and that, therefore, the enemy must be resisted at any cost, or cajoled by a sham parley. But it was too late; the imperial star was waning, fortune had hidden her face. The allies refused to resume negotiations till Paris surrendered, and hostilities were suspended. The marshals consented to save Paris by evacuating it that night, and retiring to Fontainebleau. Meanwhile, Napoleon was flying to save the city, but at Fromenteau he met General Belliard, and heard the fatal news that struck him like a thunderbolt. He sat down by the two fountains on the Juoisy road, hid his face in his hands, and, in those moments of agony, struck out a great plan to still save France, which, however, it was not permitted him to accomplish. On March 31 Frederick William III. of Prussia, aud Alexander I. of Russia, made their entry into the city.

The following year witnessed a repetition of the feat. On the 2nd of July, 1815, the Prussians, under Blucher, took Montrouge and Issy by storm, while Wellington forced his way into the northern and eastern suburbs, and on the 7th the English and Prussian guards once more trod the Boulevards.

Projects for fortifying Paris had been entertained from the Revolution in 1789. Since the works opposed to the Allies in the operations above referred to had utterly failed, Napoleon I. had other plans in view in the latter years of his reign, and while at St. Helena ordered a memorial of his intentions to be drawn up. After the revolution of 1830 the project was again revived, and in 1831 the works were commenced by Louis Philippe; but on the return of peace, after the siege of Antwerp, they were abandoned for a second time.

It was reserved for M. Thiers, in 1840, to carry out the projects to their fullest extent. Louis Philippe had made up his mind to fortify the capital, and with his council and generals held that the best system of defence was the erection of several fortresses, built in front and around it. The Opposition in the Chamber, on the other hand, contended that the only way to fortify the city efficiently was to build a rampart all round it. At this juncture the duke of Orleans, the intelligent but unfortunate heir-apparent to the throne, proposed a new project, combining the two plans, viz., to have Paris fortified with circular ramparts as well as with detached fortresses.

The opponents of the scheme, however, declared that the notion of a siege or of an assault of the capital of the civilized world, with its public monuments, its riches, and its population of near two millions, was insensate. How could whole legions of men be got to occupy all the points of that vast *enceinte?* Even if they could be got together it would, with the city blockaded, and the enemy's flying columns devastating the country, be impossible to feed them, not to speak of the multitude of refugees from the surrounding villages and towns who would be forced to take shelter within its walls. Nor would it be possible to keep in order such a mass of human beings on the brink of famine, liable to frequent panics and seditions, and but too ready to impute their disasters to treason. If Paris was to be defended it should be at the frontier. In a political point of view, a series of bastilles, enveloping in a circle of fire the city which represents the whole of France, would be full of peril to liberty and the free institutions of the country. The idea of fortifying Paris was not merely an illusion, it was a menace and a danger; and the treasure which it was proposed to lavish on it, the amount of which could not be fixed beforehand, but which, in any case, must be enormous, would be more usefully spent in making roads, canals, railways, steamships, &c.

The defenders of the project, which was submitted to a committee consisting of M. Billault, General Bugeaud, Matthieu de la Redorte, Allard, Liadéres, General Boguereau, Bertin, Odillon Barrot, and Thiers, contended that, far from exposing Paris to a siege, the fortifications would for ever prevent it. The capital was not more than six days' march from the frontier, and the centralization in it of all the impulsive forces of the nation rendered France utterly incapable of resistance were Paris taken. When it was entered in 1814 and 1815 all France surrendered. Paris, as an open city, seemed to invite the enemy, who would be anxious only to hurry on and strike the decisive blow. Paris fortified, that sort of war would be

impossible, and the enemy would be obliged to employ regular tactics, to take fortified places, and to secure his communications before venturing to approach the interior of France. That which without fortifications was little more than a *coup de main*, would become with fortifications an undertaking of magnitude and hazard. And should Paris be besieged, it would certainly know how to defend itself. Valenciennes, Lille, Mayence, Dantzic, Hamburg, and Strassburg had proved that the genius of Frenchmen was not less fitted for sieges than for battles. It was likewise asked how Paris could be fed. The question should be —How an army that besieged Paris could be fed? In ordinary times the capital always had provisions for five weeks at least, and in case of invasion little effort would suffice to supply it for two months; and where was the army of 200,000 or 300,000 men that could live a single month concentrated in such a space? Moreover, how could Paris, with fortifications eighteen leagues in circumference, be blockaded? The besieging army should extend on a front of twenty-two leagues, cut up stream and down stream by the great course of the Seine! The attempt would be madness. A good deal had been said about terrorism, panic, want of confidence, &c. To this it was replied that before the first line of outer works was carried Paris would certainly be delivered—either the army, which there would have been time to reform, or the want of supplies, would force the enemy to retire. Regarding the danger to liberty, where, it might be asked, could be found a tyrant so barbarous, and withal so stupid, as to fire on his capital, and confound in his wrath friends and foes? With respect to expense, even exaggerating all the calculations, it would scarcely amount to 160,000,000 francs; and what was that compared to the 2,000,000,000 francs which two invasions cost France?

At the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on the 1st of February, 1840, the bill for carrying out the fortifications, which had been amended in some matters of detail and completed by some guarantees, was again presented, and passed by 237 votes against 162. Its adoption was chiefly owing to the Opposition, who were the majority in the committee, and had named the reporter who supported it during the debate with remarkable talent. M. Odillon Barrot, then the leader of the Left, defended the bill in the tribune. The Radical or Republican Opposition had the patriotism to abstain from all opposition on a question which so deeply concerned the defence of the country. They not only did not oppose, but combated in the columns of the *National*, then their principal organ under the management of Armand Marrast, the objections brought forward against the fortifications; and a speaker of the extreme Left, M. Arago, in a speech which attracted much attention, defended the system of the *enceinte continuée*. Having passed the Chamber of Deputies, it was carried up to the Peers on the 11th of February, when, after a discussion which lasted six weeks, it passed by a majority of 147 against 85.

M. Thiers and his cabinet entered heartily into the work, and the duke of Orleans, with the concourse of officers of the *génie*, submitted plans of the fortifications to a full council of the ministers, which were ordered to be executed under the direction of Marshal Dode de la Brunnerie.

The district in which the city is situated is crossed by four longitudinal roads—1. From Paris to Strassburg by Meaux, Chateau Thierry, Epernay, and Châlons, now skirted by a railway. This was the route taken by Blucher's army in its march to Paris. 2. From Paris to Châlons by Meaux, Fertè-sous-Jouarre, Montmirail, and Champaubert. This route Blucher took in his first march in 1814, when his army was destroyed by Napoleon in the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau Thierry, and Vauchamps. 3. From Paris to Vitry by Langwy, Coulommiers, Fertè Gaucher, Sezanne, and Fère Champenoise. The allies took this route in 1815, in their last march on Paris, when they defeated at Fère Champenoise and Fertè Gaucher the corps of Marmont and Mortier. 4. From Paris to Nogent-sur-Seine by Brie Comte Robert, Mormans, Nangis, and Provins. This was the route taken by Schwartzenberg's army in its first march on Paris, when it was beaten by Napoleon at Mormans, Nangis, and Montereau. These four roads are intersected by four cross-roads:—1. From Châlons to Troyes by Arcis. 2. From Epernay to Troyes by Vertus, Fère Champenoise, and Plancy. 3. From Epernay to Nogent by Montmirail and Sezanne.

The city, placed between the confluence of the Marne, the Oise, and the Seine, in the midst of a wide plain, is divided into two unequal parts by the river, from 200 feet to 300 feet in breadth, which runs from east to west, forming an arc of a circle. On the right bank of the Seine, the height

of which is about 80 feet above the level of the sea, rise the hills of Montmartre, 426 feet high; of Belleville, 311 feet; of Mènilmontant, and of Charonne. On the left bank are the heights of Mont Valérien, 495 feet; of St. Cloud, 306 feet; of Sevres, Meudon, and Issy. The district lying to the north of the Seine is the larger and lower of the two; that to the south of the river is considerably higher. Twenty-one bridges keep up the communications. The form of the city may be compared to an ellipse, somewhat flattened on the right side, the longer axis of which is about nine miles. According to the census of 1866, Paris had 1,825,274 inhabitants, and 90,000 houses. The systematic reconstruction of the interior of the city, which Napoleon III. caused to be executed by the eminent prefect of the Seine, M. Haussmann, completed the works of fortification. These form probably the most complete and extensive military engineering works ever constructed. As will be seen from the accompanying plan, the fortress consists of a continuous inclosure (*enceinte continuée*) of a roughly pentagonal form, embracing the two banks of the Seine, bastioned and terraced with ten mètres (about 33 English feet) of escarpment faced with masonry. The general plan of the *enceinte* presents 94 angular faces (fronts), each of the medium length of 355 mètres (about 1450 feet), connected by curtains, with a continued fosse or line of wide wet ditches in front, the bottom laid with masonry, of the medium depth of six mètres; thence to the top of the parapets of earth raised over the wall is a height of 14 mètres in all, or about 46 feet. This is for artillery, &c., and forms entrenchments for the defenders. The continuous outline of the work is broken by V-shaped projections, the two sides of each of which are commanded by a flank fire, and thus every part of the front may be swept by the guns of the garrison. At different points are drawbridges, magazines, &c., and several military roads of communication. The distance of this regular zone or belt from the irregular cutting formed by the octroi wall of the capital varies from two-fifths of a mile to nearly two miles. Taking as a point of departure the western extremity of Bercy, on the right bank of the river, it crosses the road to Charenton, traverses the avenues of St. Maudè and Vincennes, goes to the south end of Charonne, behind Père la Chaise to Belleville, then to Romainville, and, crossing the Route de Flandre, reaches the Pont de Flandre at La Villette. Thence passing westward, it proceeds to La Chapelle St. Denis, crosses the great northern road, leaves Montmartre to the left, and traversing various routes, &c., passes by Clignancourt to Batignolles, &c., till it reaches the eastern point of the park at Neuilly, when crossing the road it cuts into the upper part of the wood of Boulogne and ends at Auteuil. Resuming the line on the opposite bank, it incloses the suburbs of Grenelle, Vaugirard, cuts the line of the Versailles Railway, leaves Montrouge outside, passes Gentilly, traverses the plain of Ivry, and crosses the line of the Orleans Railway before arriving at its limit opposite Bercy, on the left bank. The entire circle of inclosure comprises a length of 35,914 yards (upwards of 20 miles).

In their outer extent the ditches are of considerable width, and the escarpment is lined with a wall which is covered by the glacis. The military road inside is paved. Near to this, and frequently parallel to it, embracing the entire series of fortifications, is the line which joins all the railways running into Paris and their eight termini. Sixty-six gates are pierced in the fortifications. On the north side of the city the hill of Montmartre, which, as before stated, is 426 feet high and 318 feet broad, forms a commanding eminence close on the boundary, inaccessible on all sides except that towards the town. It is a position of surpassing strength, and, if well defended with artillery, almost impregnable. Montmartre is separated from Belleville by the plain of St. Denis. These three positions—the plateau of Belleville, 460 feet high, and extending from 984 feet to 4920 feet in breadth, the hill of Montmartre, and the plain of St. Denis—form the natural defences of Paris; and as it was evident in the late campaign that the Prussians had determined on marching on the city, these positions, especially the heights of Montmartre, were strengthened, and a fine battery of naval guns established, worked by a detachment of the sailors from the fleet.

The exterior fortifications (*forts détachés*) present sixty-one fronts, and are so many small but complete fortresses, with lodgings for at least 500 men each, and dwellings for the officers. Adopting the line traced in the preceding description of the *enceinte*, the first in order is the Fort de Charenton; 2, the Fort de Nogent; 3, the Fort de Rosny; 4, the Fort de Noisy; 5, the Fort de Romainville; 6, the Fort de l'Est; 7 and 8, Couronne du Nord and

Fort de la Briche, one on either side of St. Denis; 9, Fort du Mont Valérien; 10, Fort de Vanves; 11, Fort d'Issy; 12, Fort de Montrouge; 13, Fort de Bicêtre; and 14, Fort d'Ivry.

The detached forts may be considered in three groups. One group formed the north-east line from St. Denis to the north of Montmartre. On the left of St. Denis, close to the railway leading to Enghien and Montmorency, and behind the confluence of the canal of St. Denis, with the Seine, is the fort of La Briche, covering the branch of the railway to Pontoise to the north; on the other side of the stream of Rouillon, the fort of La Double Couronne du Nord, containing in it the crossing of the principal north, north-eastern, and north-western roads; and on the south-east the fort de l'Est, a regular bastioned square. These three points are united by ramparts and ditches which can be readily filled, and which are covered by the redoubt of Stains. At 4400 paces to the south-east of Fort de l'Est is that of Aubervilliers, an irregular bastioned pentagon. Between the two passes the railway to Soissons, and behind this line the canal of St. Denis. The earth which was dug out of the canal formed before it a sort of parapet fortified by three redoubts. At a distance of 4200 paces from the other side of the Canal de l'Ourcq and of the Strassburg Railway, on the continuation of the height of Belleville by Pantin, stands the fort of Romainville, a bastioned square, 1800 paces from the principal wall of defence. A series of intrenchments extends from the fort towards the Canal de l'Ourcq, while on the other side two redoubts defend the passage. Further off to the east and to the south, still on the outer side of the same line of hills, and almost in a line parallel to the railway to Mulhouse, the works of the fortifications, which are united by a paved road, are continued at about equal distances —the forts of Noisy (3500 paces), Rosny (3200 paces), and Nogent (3800). There ends the line of hills which begins near Belleville, and descends by a steep incline towards the Marne. Between the above-named forts are placed at short intervals the redoubts of Noisy, Montreuil, Boissière, and Fontenay. The Marne, which is here 100 paces in breadth, forms a natural defence, fortified also by an intrenchment of 2800 feet in length, consisting of a parapet and ditches covering the isthmus of Saint Maur, where a bridge crosses the Marne. The two extremities of the intrenchment are flanked by the redoubts of Faisanderie and Gravelle, which the railway of Vincennes and La-Varenne passes. All these works inclose in a semicircle the castle of Vincennes, in which is the principal arsenal of Paris, on the edge of the great field for manœuvring artillery close to the Marne. On the other bank of this river, in the triangle formed by the union of the Seine and the Marne near Alfort, on the right side of the Lyons Railway, is the fort of Charenton, a bastioned pentagon which closes the first line of defence. What adds to its strength is that the *enceinte* inclosed by the fortifications serves admirably for an intrenched camp, in which 200,000 men may be placed.

The next group of detached forts form the southern line of exterior defences. Opposite Fort Charenton, at a distance of 4000 paces, on the left bank of the Seine, begins the southern line, with the fort of Ivry, another bastioned pentagon, which commands the neighbourhood. In a straight line, nearly from east to west, the forts of Bicêtre, covering the road to Fontainebleau, Montrouge (a bastioned square), Vanves (an irregular bastioned quadrilateral), and Issy (a bastioned pentagon), follow at equal distances of about 3000 paces. The last-named rises to a height of about fifty feet above the Seine, which here leaves the city. Between them are the railways of Limours and Versailles.

The third group of detached forts are those on the western side of Paris. This line of outside defence is naturally very easy, for the Seine, flowing in the direction of the north and north-east, turns towards St. Denis by St. Cloud, Boulogne, Surennes, Puteaux, Courbevoie, Neuilly, Asnières, Clichy, and St. Ouen, places on the banks of the river. Between it and the town is the celebrated Bois de Boulogne. On the line indicated five bridges cross the Seine; and near the station at Asnières, on the left bank, the railways from Dieppe, Normandy, St. Germain, and Versailles unite, and cross the river by a common bridge. A single fort, but the largest and strongest of all—that of Mont Valérien, a large bastioned pentagon, situate 415 feet above the Seine, and from which there is a magnificent view of Paris—commands this space. A paved road joins Mont Valérien with the Bois de Boulogne, by the bridge of Surennes.

The distance from Fort Mont Valérien to the nearest of those about St. Denis is nearly seven miles, and from the fort of Issy about four miles.

Consequently at this point there was a great gap in the system of defence; a defect met by the construction of extensive works, on the plan organized for the defence of Sebastopol by General Todleben, between Mont Valérien and the sides of Meudon, at Montretout, which commanded the valleys of Sévres and Ville d'Avray. The extreme diameter is that between Mont Valérien and the Fort de Nogent. It follows exactly the parallel, and at a distance of 27,000 paces, or nearly eleven miles; while in the southern direction the greatest distance between St. Denis and the fort of Bicêtre is 20,000 paces, or eight miles. A line of circumference joining the exterior forts would be twenty-six miles, or twelve and a half hours' march. All the exterior forts possess bastions, and the forts of Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent have hornworks. The scarps and counterscarps are as high as those of the fortifications of Paris; covered ways, with trenches of masonry and bomb-proof powder magazines, are everywhere. All the forts communicate by telegraph with Paris, and with each other.

To place the fortifications in a condition for active defence, at the period at which we interrupted our narrative, in order to give the preceding description of them, 12,000 "navvies" worked day and night to cut through the roads and carry the fosse completely round the walls. The smaller gates were blocked up by the banks of earth and strengthened on the inside by palisades. Dams were constructed across the Seine by which the waters could be forced into the trenches. Three gates only, those of Bercy, Italy, and Orleans, were left open, which were approached by drawbridges and defended by massive outworks. The trees which grew upon the glacis were cut down to within a foot or two of the ground, and the sharpened stumps left standing to impede the advance of a storming party. On every bastion from eight to ten twelve-pounders were mounted to the number of about 1200, and the outlying forts were armed with heavy naval breech-loaders, throwing projectiles of great weight, and served by marine artillerymen. From St. Denis to Vincennes, and thence to Issy, the forts are so close that their cross-fire sweeps the intervening space; and between Issy and Mont Valérien to St. Denis, as before stated, intermediate works were constructed.

These detached forts, thus placed with reference to the range of their guns, and supporting one another, were capable of filling the spaces between them as with a hail of iron or a wall of fire. Within their protection an army could manœuvre with freedom, or retreat in safety. The actual armaments of the detached forts—which were subsequently materially strengthened by supplementary defences—were approximately as follows:—The southern forts, Issy, Vanves, Montrouge, Bicêtre, and Ivry, mounted from forty to seventy guns each; the eastern forts, Charenton, Nogent, Noisy, Rosny, Romainville, and Aubervilliers, from fifty to seventy; the northern forts of St. Denis, Forts de l'Est, du Nord, and de l'Ouest, from forty to sixty guns; and Mont Valérien, the only fort on the western side of the city, was armed with about eighty cannon. There was also a strong field of artillery drawn up in the Champs Elysées, the Palais de l'Industrie, and other localities.

Besides upwards of 2000 heavy guns mounted on the forts and ramparts of the city, and manned by 18,000 sailors, the flower of the French navy, several light gun-boats were launched upon the Seine, to assist in the defence of the city, placed under the command of Captain Thomaset. These small vessels were very broad in the beam in proportion to length, being iron-plated, and the decks were covered with iron. Each vessel contained two guns, pointing forward in a line with the keel, with a slight training limit to each side. Two large helms with double screw were fixed, and in six small projections on each side the forecastle, covered loop-holes for musketry.

While, however, the French authorities were putting Paris into a state of defence, the Germans had the most minute information of every addition to the fortifications. The officers were furnished with maps of France more complete than any which the French possessed; and in particular the defences of the capital were perhaps not better known to M. Thiers and General Trochu than to Count von Bismarck and General von Moltke.

During the last days of August, as the situation grew more serious, an improved tone was manifested by the inhabitants of the capital. General Trochu likewise showed great activity in the organization of the troops, and took energetic measures for the expulsion of German residents from Paris. To effect this the following decree was issued:—"Article 1. Every person not a naturalized Frenchman, and belonging to one of the countries actually at war with France, is called upon to quit Paris and the department of the Seine within the

space of three days, and to leave France or to withdraw into one of the departments situated beyond the Loire. Article 2. Every foreigner coming within the scope of the preceding injunction who shall not have conformed to it, and shall not have obtained a special permission to remain, emanating from the governor of Paris, shall be arrested and handed over to the military tribunals to be judged according to law.

"The Governor of Paris, TROCHU."

A further order was issued to rid Paris of that loose class of society which finds its opportunity in times of national trouble. Accordingly a great number of arrests were made from the disreputable dens and suspicious cafés of the city; while a raid was made upon the ranks of the courtesans, whose language and gestures after arrest were a public scandal. Several thousands of these worse than "useless mouths" were conveyed to villages outside the fortifications. Most of the theatres were also closed, the musicians and other attendants joining the ranks of the army. There was moreover a voluntary exodus of the well-to-do classes, of ladies and children, and of foreigners of all nationalities, who hurried to the railway stations in order to escape from the city. Side by side with the movement outward, thousands of farmers and peasants living in the environs flocked in with vehicles crammed with furniture, and waggons laden with corn and flour and all kinds of agricultural produce. This immigration was hastened by the action of the government, who had invited farmers to deposit their stores in the municipal warehouses free of all charge, and threatened that all grain remaining outside the walls would be burnt, to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy. Huge droves of sheep and cattle arrived from the provinces, and were placed in the beautiful grounds of the Bois de Boulogne and other open spaces; the pens covered many acres, and a market was rapidly constructed. The preparations to receive the invaders were made with a ruthless hand. The handsome entrance gates from the Avenue de l'Impératrice to the Bois de Boulogne gave way to a massive bulwark in stone; the line of gilded railings at La Muette was replaced by a high wall, loopholed for musketry; and the woods upon the glacis were cut down.

The danger to the capital effectually roused the nation. Recruits poured into the various depôts with great rapidity. Regiment after regiment passed through Paris for the protection of its outer defences; masses of gardes mobiles were drilled at the camp of St. Maur, and thousands volunteered for the corps of francs-tireurs and other irregular troops. Many aged men, among whom were Auber the composer, and Carnot, grandson of the celebrated military organizer mentioned in Chapter V., also joined the ranks. Fortunately, too, although composed of most discordant elements, the various bodies of defenders showed great confidence in the character and sagacity of the governor.

The ministry of Count Palikao, while displaying great activity in raising troops to meet the contingency, by calling out all old soldiers between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age, all officers formerly in the army up to sixty, and all able-bodied generals up to seventy, also put forth strenuous efforts to obtain the necessary military equipments. Large demands were made upon foreign markets, and much satisfaction was felt at the discovery of 300,000 Chassepots which were not known to be in store. The patriotism of the people at this juncture was strikingly manifested in the readiness with which they replenished the coffers of the government. On the 21st of August a decree was issued announcing a new loan for the sum of 750,000,000 francs (about £30,000,000). The subscription opened on the 23rd, and on the 25th the *Official Journal* stated that more than the amount had been received.

The proceedings in the Corps Législatif during this period of intense interest to the Parisians, were of a most unsatisfactory nature, and similar scenes to those recorded in Chapter IX. were repeated in the Chamber. Great difficulty continually arose from the incapacity of the Legislature. There was, however, one honourable exception. M. Thiers, who so boldly opposed the declaration of hostilities, and was reviled by the Chamber for doing so, forgot past slights, and applied himself with all the vigour and ardour of youth to the work of the national defence. His appointment by the government to the Committee of Defence was approved by acclamation of the Chamber; and a few words of his address are worthy a place in the records of the crisis. Although his voice was feeble, there was something peculiarly impressive in the tone and manner in which he said:—"Believe me, gentlemen, that I do not desire at this moment to create difficulties

for the government or for you, for they would also be difficulties for the country itself; but I have all my life endeavoured to keep my conduct perfectly clear, not in the eyes of blind partisans, for whom nothing is clear, but with just and prudent men. And I cannot consent that the slightest cloud of doubt should rest upon the act to day imposed upon me. What I yesterday was I to-day am; I do but bring an unofficial and devoted co-operation to the common work—unfortunately a very inadequate co-operation; I say it, believe me, without false modesty! . . . The efforts of everybody are inadequate in the emergency in which we find ourselves. I ask your pardon for these details and beg you to excuse them, but I desire that my conduct and my life shall be for my country, and for all parties whatsoever, as clear as daylight."

Subsequently, the veteran statesman of seventy-three years was out for hours before breakfast, superintending the arming of the fortifications, and giving the benefit of his suggestions to the officials in charge.

But during this period the more resolute party in the Chamber was gradually gaining the upper hand, although the fierce onslaughts of the Left, generally headed by M. Gambetta, whose impetuosity was most remarkable, were pretended to be treated either with threats or contempt: while General Trochu, whose popularity was his great crime, was opposed by the empress, and regarded with ill-concealed suspicion by the cabinet, as explained more fully in the note at the end of the chapter. Count Palikao stated publicly in the Chamber that he would suffer no distribution of arms to be made to the national guard by "one of his subordinates;" and a disposition was even shown by some members of the Right to place the general at the bar of the Chamber, to ask explanations relative to his proclamation to the people and the army of Paris; but an officer so valuable as Trochu could not be sacrificed thus lightly. Ernest Picard, in the *Electeur Libre*, said, "We cannot believe the position of General Trochu to be seriously menaced; the government will not brave public opinion; if it has any doubt as to what that opinion is, let it go to the next review of the national guard."

It was soon felt, however, that it was no time for internal discord, and on the 26th of August M. Chevreau made the following communication to the Corps Législatif:—"Messieurs,—The army of the Crown Prince appeared yesterday and the day before to be retreating, but it is now marching onwards. It is the duty of government to inform the Chamber, France, and the Parisian population of this fact. I need not add that the Committee of Defence is taking every measure for the eventuality of a siege. The utmost reliance may be placed on the energy of the minister of War and of the governor of Paris, and we on our part believe we may rely on the valour of the Parisian population."

This statement drew forth a spirited reply signed by the eighteen mayors of the capital:—"Monsieur le Ministre,—You announced to the Corps Législatif that the enemy was marching on Paris. The citizens of our arrondissements are ready for every sacrifice, every act of devotion and courage. They will receive the enemy with calm and resolution. The inhabitants of Paris will prove to the whole world that France is still the grand nation. Let the enemy come. We await him with arms in our hands. The mayors of Paris will be in the front rank of the defenders of the country."

Notwithstanding the gravity of the situation, the Bourse held firm, and the greatest activity prevailed in the city. The Chamber, too, did not fail to applaud the gallant conduct of Strassburg, which was declared to have "merited well of the country." A firm protest was also entered by M. André against malevolent aspersions as to alleged dealings of the Protestant population of the provinces with the enemy; certain honourable pastors having been pursued with the cry of "A bas les Prussiens." The deputy was loudly cheered, and the good sense of the Chamber possibly saved the country from the dangers of a religious war.

The opening days of September brought news to Paris unfavourable to the French cause. The contending armies were closing in. Success was already attending the enemy's operations; and after being puffed up with falsehoods regarding the exploits of their army, the Parisians were rudely awakened to the truth that their two greatest generals, with the flower of their troops, had been signally defeated. In the Corps Législatif, on Saturday, September 3, Count Palikao, very much depressed, made the following statement:—

"Messieurs les Députés—I have promised to tell you the whole truth, and I am now here to keep

my promise, painful as it is to do so. The news I have to give is even yet not official; but it comes from a certain source. Marshal Bazaine, after a great engagement and some advantages, has been obliged to fall back upon Metz; but he may perhaps yet make sorties. There is the first bad news. The next is that of a battle fought near Mézières by Marshal MacMahon. There was a long series of combats attended by reverses and successes. A part of the Prussian army was driven into the Meuse; but after a terrible fight our army was obliged to retreat either to Mézières or Sedan, and a few took refuge in Belgium. There is other serious news in circulation about another battle fought by Marshal MacMahon, but as the government has no official news it cannot give details for fear of being accused of alarming the country. We therefore come here to-day to make a fresh appeal to the whole valid force of the nation. The mobile national guard is organized throughout France. A part of it will come to assist in the defence of Paris, and the rest will be sent to reinforce the regular army. I trust that France, responding to our appeal, will enable us to drive the enemy out of the country."

Thus at last the truth was told, with one all-important reservation, that of the surrender of the emperor and his army. The statement of the minister, however, caused great agitation, and M. Jules Favre intimated that the time had come for the *de facto* government to cease. The country must henceforth rely on itself. Before the Chamber separated a resolution was passed that a levy *en masse* of the nation should be made forthwith.

The development of the crisis illustrated the truth of Carlyle's estimate of the French nature, "so full of vehemence, so free from depth." One day towards the close of August, a large black cloud hovering over Paris took a shape which was thought to betoken victory, and the crowds on the boulevards eagerly accepted the auspicious omen; on the 3rd of September, when the news of defeat began to spread among the citizens, their depressed and despairing attitude was saddening to witness; next day, when the news was received of the crowning disaster of Sedan and the capture of the emperor, Parisians, frantic with joy, were rushing into each others arms, and shouting and singing with the glee of school-boys set free for a holiday. In the cry of "Vive la République!" they forgot the awful peril of their position; that the enemy was steadily advancing; that the flower of their army had been cut down on the red battle-field; and that the effective force with which they could oppose the victorious Prussians was comparatively small and inefficient. Enough that Paris had effected a revolution, and was delivered from imperialism!

But the events of this day, September 4, must form the first subject of the succeeding chapter of our narrative.

The progress of events which led to the collapse of the imperial *régime* in France naturally caused great satisfaction throughout Germany. The opening victories of the campaign inspired her people with confidence, and prepared them for the news of further successes. Great irritation, however, was felt at the manner in which their opponents professed to regard their victories. Even the defeat of MacMahon at Woerth and Frossard at Forbach were made light of, and the Vosges mountains, according to French journalists, were to be the grave of the Prussian troops. "Two more such victories as they had won, and the German army would cease to exist." Such statements, so little in accordance with the facts, incited the Germans to caricature the failure of the French programme, and to display cartoons the reverse of flattering, especially after receipt of the news that Nancy, the chief city of Lorraine, had capitulated without a battle in its defence, thus placing in the hands of the Germans the direct line of railway between Metz and Paris.

The issue of the hard-fought battles around Metz produced in Germany a subdued feeling of exultation. The people saw the importance of the advantage obtained by their commanders in isolating Marshal Bazaine and cutting in two the army of the Rhine; but they had hardly the heart to exult over the news of victory so dearly purchased. As the king had written to his queen from the battle-field that he could scarcely bring himself to ask after his acquaintances, so many of them were dead or maimed, the joy of the inhabitants generally was sensibly damped by the same cause. The terrible slaughter of the 16th and 18th August more particularly cast a gloom over the nation. At Berlin the people received the news with melancholy thankfulness, and no demonstrations were made in the streets. But in the absence of outward displays, their interest in the sanguinary

events of the war was the more intense, and the wish to prevent a recurrence of them was general. Although the German army was not composed of mercenary soldiers, but citizens in uniform, the pith and flower of the country, who were being slaughtered in those murderous contests, the universal cry was to "put down France," and render it impossible for her again to indulge in "military promenades" at the expense of her neighbours. In fact, though shocked at the frightful bloodshed and the untold miseries it entailed upon their families, the Germans were yet firmly determined to crush the enemy before mentioning terms.

Germany indeed had sad experience that close upon the heels of victory follows the ghastly shadow of suffering. Into the larger cities of the Fatherland, after the sanguinary battles of the middle of August, poured continuous streams of wounded men, many with the impress of death upon their faces. Train after train brought regiment upon regiment of sufferers, stretched on beds extemporized to receive them; all the surgeons available, besides many strangers and foreign volunteers, troops of sisters of charity, and bands of girl and woman nurses, assiduously sought to relieve the sufferings of the wounded, and friends and enemies were treated with equal kindness. Especially in the earlier stages of the war, the Germans displayed great general philanthropy, and their kindness to the individual Frenchman was beyond all praise. That, however, which raised their indignation was the employment of the Turcos, who even when wounded bit at the very fingers which tended them, and actually attempted to outrage the sisters of charity. For that crime ten of their number were shot off-hand at Berlin in one day. "Conceive," said the Germans, "these men masters of our towns, with our wives and daughters at their mercy;" and they became the more embittered against the French.

A sterner feeling was also enkindled among many by the lavish attentions bestowed upon the French wounded and other prisoners by German ladies. In the *Cologne Gazette*, a well-known authoress (Fanny Lewald) reminded them that such benevolent proceedings had their limits, and, addressing the women of Germany, concluded with the following:—"You would not be worthy of the German men who are standing in the field for us and our country if you could forget but for a moment who are the authors of the fearful misfortune brought upon hundreds of thousands of Germans, if you could forget what you owe to the memory of our fallen heroes, to the anguish of the mourners, to your country, to your fellow-women, and to your own dignity. We should not forget the man in the prisoner, the wounded, the Frenchman; but we should not, and will not, forget that he is at this moment our enemy and the enemy of our country. Let him testify on his return that we are merciful and know what is becoming, and what we owe to ourselves. Do not let us substantiate the caricatures with which, at the expense of German women, French vanity and immorality filled the soldiers knapsacks when they started." Indeed the hostile feeling towards both the French government and people was manifestly deepening, and such articles as the following from the *Staats Anzeiger* found a hearty response in public opinion:—

"Three battles have been fought in the short space of time between the 14th and the 18th. In each of them the main army of the French, headed by the guards and commanded by its most able generals, has been defeated. Let us place laurel wreaths on the coffins of our departed brothers, to whose self-sacrifice we are indebted for these victories; but let us acknowledge that we are witnessing a judgment of God Almighty. God is punishing a people which obstinately persists in insolence and blindness even in the hour of trial, and of whose moral depravity we see such appalling proofs before us. High and low in France behave at this moment with equal frivolity. Lies are incessantly propagated at our expense, to stir the passions of the populace against us. A hollow grandiloquence appeals in vain to the patriotism of the inhabitants. Fanatic party divisions interfere with all real devotion to the country, and as they cannot vanquish our armies they presume to hate us as a race, and to injure, oppress, and expel the few Germans living among them. The infamies perpetrated against German residents in France will be a lasting stain upon that country. In the meantime, our sons and brothers are fighting the good fight of Germany. Many have already sealed with their blood the vow they took; none have given way before the enemy, and all have manifested that spirit of moral elevation and discipline, the symbol of which the Prussian colours have ever been. We celebrate their exploits, and we

mourn the dead. In seeing the noblest of our race taken from us by an untimely death we have one consolation. If our fathers warded off the unjust attacks of France without deriving any permanent benefit from their efforts it will not be so this time. We shall settle accounts with this race, so eaten up with arrogance and the lust of conquest, which has threatened and endeavoured to humiliate us for centuries, and which has robbed Germany of some of her finest provinces. The Lord, who has helped us to overcome the lying mendacity and frivolity of France, will not permit our victims to be offered up in vain. He will bless our aged king, and accord him the noble privilege of establishing a safe and durable peace, guarded by our united, our free, upright, and pious Fatherland."

A still more notable production appeared in the official *Provincial Correspondenz*, broadly intimating that the social and political disorganization displayed by France could not have supervened so soon unless her people had been morally corrupt long before. After noticing her arrogant claims to take the lead in European affairs, the writer continued:—" By the reviving power of Germany this overweening superiority of one state is at last to be reduced to its proper limits. . . . In a state of perfect intoxication the French government and people entered upon the war. Events which have recently occurred could not but arouse them from their dreams. Yet the same giddiness, the same deficiency in moral sense, which have conjured up the evil, are noticeable in their conduct. . . . What has surprised us most is the precipitation with which extreme measures are adopted by the ministry and sanctioned by the Chambers. Steps which in great and well-ordered states are, as a rule, only resorted to in the last extremity, we find resolved upon after a few preliminary disasters. This betrays a state of corruption and internal rottenness more intense and more comprehensive than one could have imagined to exist. Not by her misfortunes in war, but by her pitiable self-despair, France has forfeited the prestige she so long regarded as her due."

Sentiments similar to these were widely disseminated by the German press, and contemporaneously an article appeared in the *Provincial Correspondenz*, headed " Germany's wishes with regard to Alsace and Lorraine," which contained the following:—

" These provinces which were torn away from the German empire have become France's chief points of support for menacing attacks upon Germany. How should it be possible, after the glorious victories of the German army, after the re-conquest of two old German provinces, and after the heavy and costly sacrifices by which our triumph has been gained; how should it be possible to avoid the irresistible conviction that the honour and the safety of Germany imperatively demand the removal of the lasting shame—a German country serving as a starting point for German enslavement? The European powers, true to the attitude of neutrality which they have assumed, will not arbitrarily endeavour to arrest the consequences of the war, so long as no substantial European interest is injured by the conditions of the treaty of peace. The German people, however, is conscious that in its demand it does not aim at any preponderance over other nations which might endanger the so-called European equilibrium, but that it seeks only a firmly-established peace, which it intends to wring for itself and for other nations from the old enemy of the peace of Europe."

Large public meetings, also, were held in Germany, protesting against foreign interference, and contending that the mere substitution of one form of government for another in France would not afford the necessary guarantees against another war of aggression. Since 1552, it was said, France, under every possible form of government, and under the control of the most opposite parties, had never ceased to extend her territory at the expense of her neighbours, and Germany had been the principal sufferer. The time had at length come when the Fatherland must cease to be molested by her, and secure for itself a long period of peace. Alsace and Lorraine must again form an integral portion of the German empire.

This resolve on the part of the Germans was greatly favoured by the subsequent course of events; and while they watched with intense interest the movements of the combatants on the field, many of the well-informed anticipated to some extent the gradual closing in of their warlike hosts upon the bewildered and disorganized French. But no anticipations could have come up to the reality; and when, early on Saturday, September 3, a telegram proclaimed the astounding news of the crowning victory at Sedan and the surrender of the French army, Berlin immediately

gave way to unwonted jubilation. Unter den Linden was crowded, and everywhere the city became alive with processions. Flags and banners were exhibited in endless profusion, and wreaths and streamers covered the great monument of Frederick the Great, and every other public situation. The veteran Marshal Wrangel was early on his way to the palace to offer his congratulations; and on returning to his residence in the Pariser Platz was attended by an enthusiastic crowd, who cheered him as he passed the sentries at his gate, waved flags under his windows, and sang "Borussia." These jubilant demonstrations continued throughout the day, and were followed in the evening by brilliant illuminations from almost every dwelling, public and private; the unusual glare increased by torchlight processions and displays of fireworks. Similar scenes occurred in every corner of Germany. In all the larger cities the moment the capture of Napoleon and his army became known, the population rushed into the streets, and assembled in the churches, town-halls, and other places of public resort. Schools and workshops, and, in some cases, even the courts of justice, were closed. Everywhere the bells were rung and royal salutes fired in honour of the day. In many towns meetings were improvised on the market-place; in others, a regular service was celebrated in the churches; and rarely, indeed, had the places of worship been so filled as they were on that Saturday and the ensuing Sunday. All the various capitals had their processions, and forwarded congratulatory telegrams to the king of Prussia and the Crown Prince of Saxony. Important and cordial addresses were presented to King William of Prussia, thanking him and the army for their achievements in the field, insisting upon the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine as the only means of securing Germany from future attack, and recommending the immediate reunion of Northern and Southern Germany. Thus the victors, rejoicing over their marvellous successes in the field, eagerly sought, at the same time, to possess themselves of the fruit of their conquests.

The intelligence of the emperor's surrender created a profound sensation in England and throughout all the nations of the Continent, while the Atlantic cables flashed the news across the seas to the Western hemisphere. East and west alike, men looked on in surprise and bewilderment, exclaiming, in the words of the Jewish patriot, "How are the mighty fallen!"

NOTE.

The exact circumstances attending General Trochu's appointment as governor of Paris were neither known nor understood correctly until he himself laid them before the National Assembly sitting at Versailles in June, 1871, and in the course of his statement on that occasion considerable light was thrown upon some of the incidents of this part of our narrative. After describing the causes of the military decadence of France, General Trochu, on the occasion referred to, said that as early as the commencement of August, he, being the only general in Paris, perceived the importance of the capital being prepared to withstand a siege. He wrote a letter to the emperor to that effect, warning him that all other events were secondary, and that an army of succour collected before Paris was the only resource left. The general also asked for the recall of the army of Marshal Bazaine, subsequently to be joined by that of Marshal MacMahon, which was unanimously approved by a conference of generals, but political considerations prevented this measure from being carried out. This support failing, the safety of Paris was thenceforth seriously compromised. General Trochu was present at a conference held on the 17th August at Châlons, at which the emperor, Marshal MacMahon, Prince Napoleon, and several other officers were present. The question discussed was whether the emperor should give up the command of the army or abdicate altogether, the emperor himself being desirous of resuming the reins of government. General Trochu accepted, with the title of Governor of Paris, the task of preparing for the return of the emperor, on the express condition that the army of Marshal MacMahon should be ordered to fall back on the capital to act as an army of succour. The appointment was couched in the following terms:—"General Trochu, appointed governor of Paris and commander-in-chief, will immediately start for Paris; he will precede the emperor by a few hours. Marshal MacMahon will march on Paris with his army." The general also received the following order:—"Camp of Châlons, August 17, 1870. Mon cher Général,—I appoint you governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of all the forces intrusted with the defence of the capital. Immediately on my arrival at Paris you will receive communication of the decree officially conferring these functions upon you; but in the meanwhile take all the measures that may be necessary to fulfil your mission. Receive, mon cher général, the assurance of my friendly feelings—Napoleon." The empress, however, distrustful of what was being done, formally opposed the return of the emperor. Count Palikao, too, received General Trochu coldly; refused to allow the army of Marshal Bazaine to come to Paris; and decided to send all disposable reinforcements to Verdun and Metz. The peculiar fact, too, that no authority was given by General Trochu for his appointment was also fully explained in his speech before the National Assembly, to which we are referring. On presenting himself to the empress on the night of the 17th of August, General Trochu said, "I have brought with me the proclamation in which I desire to make known to the population that I have been appointed governor and commander-in-chief during the siege. That proclamation begins thus:—'In the presence of the peril that threatens the country, the emperor has appointed me governor of the capital in a state of siege.' The empress here interrupted me. 'General, the emperor's name must not appear in a proclamation at a time like this.' 'But, madam, I represent the emperor. I said that I would come here to defend him. I cannot address the population of Paris without referring to the emperor, and saying that it is by his orders that I have undertaken the defence of the capital.' 'No, general, believe me. In the present state of the public mind there would be serious objections to allow this reference to the emperor.' Thereupon it was struck out." Farther on in this remarkable speech, General Trochu fully confirmed the inharmonious nature of his relations with Count Palikao and the empress. In their views of the situation of affairs the governor and the minister strongly disagreed, and General Trochu was regarded with a distrust which was shared in by all the imperial authorities. "The council of the empress," continued the general, "consisted of the ministers of the privy council, of the president of the Corps Législatif, and of the president of the Senate. I experienced at its hands great and growing distrust; my loyalty, my sincerity were insufficient to disarm those who showed me so plainly their feelings."



In fact, for some days the general was virtually relieved from his command, and until the time of the revolution on the 4th of September was at constant variance with the minister of War.

To this defence of General Trochu before the National Assembly, Count Palikao subsequently replied in a letter to the president. That document, however, essentially confirmed the statement of General Trochu, especially as to the unfortunate relations existing between him and the count. The latter admits that the general conceived that the whole war should be reduced to the defence of Paris, with MacMahon's army hovering at a distance round the capital till it gathered strength to come to the rescue. His plan was laid before the emperor's council at Châlons: it was approved and intrusted to Trochu himself for execution. Trochu, however, found himself, on arriving at Paris, in a subordinate position. His scheme clashed with the views of the War minister, which were also those of the empress-regent and of her cabinet, who held at that moment the supreme power. Count Palikao's own plan was to reinforce MacMahon at Châlons, so as to enable him to defend the line of the Marne, and even to recover lost ground on the Meuse and the Moselle, eventually advancing to the release of Bazaine at Metz. In pursuance of this strategy, both Trochu himself and the emperor's council, in whose name he spoke, were utterly ignored. By Palikao's own admission, Trochu was "taught his place," "it being the habit of the minister never to discuss with his subordinates when he had orders to give them." The most serious charge made by Count Palikao against General Trochu in his letter was, that when he returned to Paris from Châlons, "in pursuance with the order which he communicated to the Chamber, he brought back with him eighteen battalions of the Paris mobiles who were quartered there." "We all know," continued Count Palikao, "the innate gallantry of the Parisians under fire, and all the world is equally aware of the dangers their presence in Paris must bring about. So that, instead of leaving at Châlons these eighteen battalions, who, at a given moment, might have performed prodigies of valour and decided the issue of a battle, the general brought back in his train a phalanx of revolutionists, whose presence here must further complicate our trying situation. Several of these battalions belonged to the most dangerous quarters of the town. By this step we were deprived of so many men against the enemy, who were arrayed against the cause of order, as experience proved soon after, under the very eyes of General Trochu." Count Palikao also intimated that matters were rendered still worse by a proclamation, in which General Trochu asserted that "the mobiles had a right to be in Paris, and to stay there." He further admitted that he ceased to communicate with the general, and added, "As to his presence at the Council of Ministers, he was summoned to attend whenever a question which came within his province was to be discussed, and he was admitted whenever he wished to be present. But I must frankly confess that in the midst of the urgent business to be transacted during those critical times, the length of the speeches which the general's great facility of elocution led him to indulge in were greatly dreaded."

It is thus easy to perceive that some, at least, of the misfortunes of France at this time arose as much from a conflict of opinion as from a collision of authority. The division was not, however, only between the two generals; it was also, as we have proved in a previous chapter, between the government in Paris, presided over by the empress, and the government in the field, with the emperor at the head of its councils. The views of the former prevailed, and resulted in the catastrophe of Sedan, involving alike the ruin of the regency, of the empress, and of the dynasty of Napoleon.

CHAPTER XVI.

Overthrow of the Second Empire—General Trochu called upon to assume the Government of the Country—Midnight Sitting of the Corps Législatif—M. Jules Favre moves that the Emperor and his Dynasty have forfeited all Rights conferred by the Constitution—Government Proclamation on Sunday, September 4, admitting the Surrender of the Emperor and his Army—Its effect on the Parisians—The National Guard fraternize with the People, and the Gendarmerie allow them to proceed to the Corps Législatif—The Scene inside the Chamber—The National Guard replace the Soldiers on guard outside—The crowd calls for the immediate Dethronement of the Emperor and the Proclamation of a Republic—The National Guards and the Citizens at last invade the Chamber—The President is driven from the Chair, the *décheance* voted by an immense majority, and the New Republic established—The Extraordinary Scenes in the City on the News becoming known—Public Proclamation of the Republic by M. Gambetta—The Palace of the Tuileries entered by the Crowd, and everything connected with the Imperial régime destroyed—Protest of a Meeting of the Deputies against the Proceedings in the Chamber—A Provisional Government formed of all the Members for Paris except M. Thiers—The Last Sitting of the Senate—The Opinion of the American Ambassador on the Events—Biographical Notice of M. Jules Favre, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs—Flight of the Empress from Paris, and safe arrival in England—Proclamation of the new Government decreeing the Formation of the Republic and granting an Amnesty for all Political Offences—Important Circular by M. Jules Favre, blaming the Emperor for the War and throwing the onus of continuing it upon the King of Prussia, but asserting that the French will cede neither "An Inch of their Territory nor a Stone of their Fortresses"—The feeling produced by the Circular in France and abroad—The Prospects of Peace increasingly doubtful—The Military Spirit throughout the Country aroused—Disturbances in Lyons—Extraordinary Proceedings—Excitement in Marseilles and other towns—Re-appearance of the Extreme Section of the Press—Magniloquent Addresses of Victor Hugo—Arrival of the Orleans Princes in Paris, but their offer to serve the Government declined—Address of the Comte de Chambord—Characteristic Letter from Garibaldi—A Constituent Assembly to be called—Another Important Circular by M. Favre—Unremitting Exertions to Provision and Defend the City—Review of the whole Armed Force in Paris by General Trochu, and subsequent General Order—Destruction of the Bridges leading to Paris, and of the Woods near the City—Removal of the Government to Tours—Fruitless Mission of M. Thiers to the different European Courts—The Financial Position of Affairs—Recognition of the Republic by the United States of America—Manifestation of Feeling on the part of the Germans in America—Acknowledgment of the Republic by Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal—Action of the British Government on the Subject—Meetings of the Working Classes and Deputation to the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone—Interesting Letter of M. Guizot—Feeling in Germany on hearing of the Proclamation of the Republic, and of its prompt recognition by the United States—The action of England treated with indifference—Impulse given to the cause of German Unity by the Events of the War.

The news of the French disaster at Sedan sealed the fate of the second empire. Scarcely seven weeks had elapsed since the declaration of hostilities was made with a "light heart" by the Ollivier ministry. During that time the capital of France had been deluded with false reports of successes. Even when the fact of the crushing reverses she had sustained became generally known, the people still clung to their belief in the invincibility of their army, and cast the blame of defeat, first upon the cabinet, which crumbled under the heel of popular displeasure, and subsequently upon the emperor and his generals. These circumstances paved the way for the events which form the subject of the present chapter.

We have already shown that in the Corps Législatif on Saturday afternoon (September 3) Count de Palikao prepared the public mind for the reception of the disastrous intelligence. A similar statement was made in the Senate by Baron Jerome David. The ministerial statements roused public indignation, though very few were yet aware that the emperor was a prisoner. But later in the evening, on the publication of confused reports in the special editions of the papers, an assemblage of about 6000 persons sent a deputation to General Trochu, calling upon him to assume the government of the country. He replied that he was not in a position to respond to such a proposal, but would do his duty in defending Paris. This answer was received with shouts of "Abdication!" "Abdication!" Another assemblage of about 10,000 persons sent a deputation to him with the same object, and got a similar reply, which was followed by cries of "Abdication!" "France for ever!" "Trochu for ever!" The Boulevards were densely crowded, and though the people were silent, the approaches to the Chamber were guarded by a strong force of cavalry and infantry.

While the Legislative Body were still in session at midnight on Saturday, Count de Palikao communicated the news of the surrender of the emperor and the capitulation of the army, and asked the Chamber to postpone discussion as to what should next be done till the following day; but M. Jules Favre rose and moved that the emperor and his dynasty should be declared to have forfeited all rights conferred by the constitution.

He also demanded the appointment of a Parliamentary committee to be invested with powers to govern the country and take measures for expelling the enemy from French territory, and that, in the meantime, General Trochu should be maintained in his post as governor of Paris. This proposal was received with profound silence, broken only by a protest from M. Pinard. The Chamber thereupon resolved to hold a sitting at noon on the following day, Sunday, September 4.

Early on the morning of this day the cabinet posted the following proclamation, which was also published in the *Journal Officiel*, signed by the full council of ministers:—"Frenchmen! a great misfortune has befallen the country. After the three days of heroic struggles kept up by the army of Marshal MacMahon against 300,000 enemies, 40,000 men have been made prisoners. General Wimpffen, who had taken the command of the army, replacing Marshal MacMahon, who was grievously wounded, has signed a capitulation. This cruel reverse does not daunt our courage. Paris is now in a state of defence. The military forces of the country are being organized. Within a few days a new army will be under the walls of Paris, and another is in formation on the banks of the Loire. Your patriotism, your concord, your energy will save France. The emperor has been made prisoner in this contest. The government co-operates with the public authorities, and is taking all measures required by the gravity of these events."

By this intelligence the Parisians seemed for a time to be well-nigh paralyzed. The streets were deserted; the shops were either not opened, or were closed again long before the usual hour. The faces of the few stragglers who might be seen reading the ominous placards, were expressive of doubt and anxiety as to what might be their effect. Even on the principal boulevards, between ten and eleven o'clock, comparatively few persons were abroad. Everything wore that look of silent and suppressed emotion which in Paris has so often proved the premonitory signal of a coming explosion. About eleven o'clock, however, vast bodies of men approached from the Boulevard Montmartre, all armed, and displaying a perfect forest of bayonets. In a moment the whole scene on the boulevards changed. The *trottoirs* suddenly became densely crowded, and every window and balcony filled with the heads of eager spectators. The column proved to be national guards, and though in every sort of attire, they marched in excellent order, with each officer in his place. Loud cries of "La déchéance! La déchéance!" "Vive la France!" and "Vive la Republique!" were raised, equally by the national guards and the people, with a vehemence and unanimity which left no doubt as to the nature of the movement which was taking place. The cry of "La déchéance" especially was repeated by the national guards; and the shout of "Vive la Republique!" was universal. An order had been issued by General Trochu for the national guards to muster in force around the Chamber, and they were now evidently marching from all points of the city towards the Place de la Concorde, which rapidly filled with a prodigious multitude, and glittered with thousands of bayonets. The number of armed men, almost all of whom had a musket, was appalling. But complete unanimity prevailed, and in the satisfaction of putting down the imperial government and crying "La déchéance," the news of the morning—the German invaders, the defeat, indeed every other fact and feeling—seemed to be forgotten. There was an entire absence of hostile demonstration. The crowd in the Place de la Concorde continued to increase. The gates of the Tuileries gardens were closed, and one or two soldiers only were visible inside; but the imperial flag still floated above the palace. As each successive battalion of the national guard debouched into the Place, it was hailed with deafening shouts, which were answered with like enthusiasm. Often the entire battalion raised the butt-ends of their muskets in the air, and flourished them in token of complete sympathy with the crowd, in the midst of which numbers of ladies were walking about without apprehension. Every now and then the multitude caught up the refrain of the *Chant du Depart* or other revolutionary air, and sang it in chorus with inspiring effect. The whole scene resembled some immense jubilation or Sunday *fête*. Civilians gathered twigs from the neighbouring trees and stuck them in their hats, while every garde national inserted one into the end of his musket, so that the entire Place soon presented a display of green branches instead of bayonets. The men marched steadily across the Place and up to the Pont de la Concorde in front of the Corps Législatif, where a slender body of gendarmerie à cheval had been drawn up across the entrance to the bridge, who had received orders from Count de Palikao to

"do their duty," and prevent the invasion of the Chamber. When the head of the column came up, the officer in command of the gendarmerie refused to let it pass, and the national guard were brought to a stand-still. There was much angry vociferating by the crowd, and gesticulation and remonstrance, followed by menace, on the part of the captains of the citizen troops. The gendarmerie, expecting to be attacked, drew their swords, and so frightened the spectators as to send them to the rear. It was an anxious moment: some of the horses, pressed by the crowd, got restive, and the officers, mounted and foot, found it difficult to negotiate. Suddenly there was a cheer from the spectators; the gendarmerie opened its ranks, and the national guards, with drums beating and colours flying, passed on to the bridge. When half across, however, another obstacle presented itself in the shape of a squadron of helmeted troops belonging to the municipal guard. The civic troops, uncertain how to act, halted for a few minutes, until orders were sent them from the Chamber to wheel about, and on the steps of the Corps Législatif some fifty deputies were immediately observed, who uncovered and cheered. There was a responsive cheer from the populace; again the drums of the national guard were sounded, and the men effected the passage of the bridge without bloodshed. The various battalions then took possession of every available space outside the Chamber, the general crowd following them unimpeded across the bridge.

Meanwhile, a noonday sitting was being held inside the Chamber, and before the other proceedings commenced, M. de Keratry complained of the presence of a great body of regular troops massed about the Corps Législatif, contrary to the orders of General Trochu. Count de Palikao then brought in a *projet de loi* signed by the empress, for instituting a council of government and national defence, to consist of five members elected by the Legislative Body, himself occupying the post of lieutenant-general of the council. M. Jules Favre claimed priority for his motion already proposed, to the effect that the emperor and his dynasty had forfeited all rights conferred on them by the constitution. M. Thiers also brought forward a proposition, signed by forty-five members of the left and right centres, to appoint a commission of government and national defence. The Chamber declared urgency for all the three propositions *en bloc*, and they were collectively referred to the bureaux with a view to the appointment of the commission. The sitting was then suspended for a short time, during which the crowd penetrated into the Salles des Quatre Colonnes and de la Paix. In the latter, M. Jules Ferry, mounting on a bench, amid cries of "Vive la Republique!" "Vive Ferry!" informed the multitude that he had given Count de Palikao his word that the people would not enter the hall where the deputies of the Corps Législatif deliberated. M. Ferry having called upon the national guard to defend the entry, the soldiers on guard retired, and the crowd continued calling for the dethronement, which, they urged, ought to be immediately proclaimed. M. Ernest Picard then addressed them, saying that the Chamber was about to pronounce on this very question, and begged them to wait patiently the decision of the deputies, which could not but be favourable to the unanimous demand of the people. M. Emmanuel Arago next came forward, observing "that they knew for what the democratic party in the Chamber had combated, but that it was for the people to decide who should govern them." He was followed by the president, M. Schneider, who had been requested by several deputies and officers of the national guard to speak. He had always, he said, been devoted to the empire and his country; and he begged the crowd to allow the Chamber to deliberate calmly, and not to let it appear that their representatives acted under popular pressure. "Before all," said he, "we must save France," which produced shouts of "Yes, yes! Vive la Republique?" Meanwhile, M. Glais Bizoin, in the Salle des Quatre Colonnes, called on the people in the name of liberty not to compromise what they were about to proclaim; and M. Ferry, conducted into the Salle de la Paix by several national guards, was invited to address the assemblage there. "Citizens," he said, "I do not call on you to evacuate the Corps Législatif, but be calm and allow us to deliberate." M. Steenackers followed in a similar strain; but the crowd insisted on getting into the "Salle des Séances," clamoured about the members to be designated to form a provisional government, and a paper, on which was written the names of seven deputies of the Left, was hung on the statue of Minerva. The pillars and walls were also covered with demands for the dethronement of the emperor and the proclamation of the republic, which were

re-echoed by the incessant clamours of the crowd.

Inside the Chamber there was an attempt to get through business, amid cries of "down with Bonaparte." M. Gambetta ascended the tribune, and thrice addressed the galleries; while groups of citizens and national guards invaded and persistently kept the floor of the Chamber. President Schneider occupied the chair for the last time, and addressed a few words to the Corps Législatif, represented by the Left and a few members of the Right who had timidly taken their seats. Count de Palikao shortly appeared, but M. Brame was the only minister who faced the storm. In spite of a spirited protest by M. Schneider against all attempts at intimidation, there arose fierce cries for the republic, the Chamber was again invaded by a fresh rush of the mob, the benches were taken by storm, and the president was driven from his chair. In the midst of this scene of utter confusion the new republic was born. Numerous slips of paper were passed eagerly from hand to hand, containing the names of persons who should be appointed to form a new government, and many deputies were summoned, all of them belonging to the Left, excepting M. Thiers. M. Jules Favre then gained possession of the tribune, and proclaimed the downfall of the Bonapartist dynasty, backed by M. Gambetta, who acted as "reporter." The *déchéance*, indeed, had been previously voted in committee by the immense majority of 195 deputies to 18.

Outside the Chamber it was immediately known that the *déchéance* had been pronounced and the republic proclaimed. The shout which arose left no doubt as to the opinion of those present upon what had been done. The cry of "à l'Hôtel de Ville!" was soon after raised, and the whole body of national guards began to move in that direction. On their way they removed the eagles from the flagstaffs, and the frightened householders followed the example, throwing them amongst the crowd. Arrived at the Place de la Concorde, the populace forced the sergents-de-ville to give up their swords, which were immediately broken, and the fragments thrown at the feet of the statue representing Strassburg, which had been crowned with flowers on the preceding day.

As the army had made common cause with the national guards there was, of course, no fear of armed collisions. The scene at the barracks of the Quai d'Orsay was thus graphically depicted by an eye-witness, and was a specimen of what took place in other parts of the capital:—"From the windows of those great barracks, formerly peopled with troops every man of whom was supposed to be ready to die for his emperor, I saw soldiers smiling, waving handkerchiefs, and responding to the cries of 'Long live the Republic!' raised by gendarmes, cavalry, soldiers of the line, national guards, and people, below. Well-dressed ladies in open carriages shook hands with private soldiers and men in blouses, all crying 'Long live the Republic!' Nay, strangers fell on each others' necks, and kissed each other with 'effusion.' In the neighbourhood of the Pont Neuf, I saw people on tops of ladders busily pulling down the emperor's busts. I saw the busts carried in mock procession to the parapet of the Pont Neuf and thrown into the Seine; clapping of hands and hearty laughter greeting the splash which the graven image of the mighty monarch made in the water."

The scene which took place at the Hotel de Ville, to which the more prominent members of the Left had retired, was almost equally extraordinary. The mob soon became masters of the building, and vented their rage on everything connected with the emperor or his family. Portraits of him and the empress were cut to pieces and thrown out of the window to be trodden upon by the people, the number of whom was now enormous. A discussion arose as to the choice of the flag to be used by the new government, but the tricolour was ultimately decided on —the proposal of some workmen to adopt a red one having been objected to by MM. Gambetta and Schœlcher. As soon as the provisional government had actually been formed, a deputation from them went to the prison of St. Pelagie, and demanded the release of M. Henri Rochefort, a most violent republican, and one of the members for Paris, who was confined there for a political offence. The officials at once acceded to the demand—thus acknowledging the authority of the new rulers as readily as every one else—and he was triumphantly drawn through the streets to the Hotel de Ville; where on appearing at the window he was vehemently cheered by the vast crowd below. At forty-five minutes past four, M. Gambetta appeared at one of the windows, MM. Jules Favre and E. Arago standing a little behind him, and then and there he publicly proclaimed the republic, and

the installation of a provisional government. This proclamation was received with every possible demonstration of enthusiasm, and a few minutes afterwards the Phrygian cap of liberty was planted on the top of the flagstaff in place of the eagle.*

Meanwhile the crowd, in company with national and mobile guards, moved towards the Tuileries, tore down the eagles that surmounted the railings, and bursting open the gates made their way to the reserved garden, where a considerable number of voltigeurs of the guard were massed. A deputation sent in advance to hold a parley with the general in command, informed him that the republic had been proclaimed, and that the people demanded entrance to the palace. At this moment the imperial flag was lowered, the signal that the empress had fled from the Tuileries. The general then mounted upon a chair, and expressed his willingness to march out the troops, providing the post was confided to the charge of the national guards. This agreed to, the crowd was allowed to roam at will over the apartments of the palace, which were deserted by all except the servants in the kitchen.

The people, however, were soon cleared out by a detachment of national guards, who throughout the day behaved with great propriety. As in all Parisian tumults, the wits were busy, and covered several prominent places with "Appartements à louer," "liberté, egalité, fraternité," and other stock phrases of the previous revolution. The crowd, however, unlike that of 1848, not only did not destroy the furniture, but showed some disposition to respect property. Then, however, as on the following day, they busied themselves in erasing and destroying every vestige of the imperial regime. Thus many of the public buildings were defaced, and the shopkeepers, either from predisposition or force, speedily removed all tokens of imperial patronage, even to the vignettes on Exhibition prize medals. All portraits and photographs of the imperial family immediately disappeared, and the Avenue de l'Impératrice and other thoroughfares associated with the cast-off dynasty were renamed after republican or patriotic celebrities.

The deputies who left the Chamber when it was invaded met in the afternoon at the president's residence; vice-president Alfred le Roux presided. It was agreed to advise the nomination of a committee of government elected by the Corps Législatif; the Chamber, at the same time, protesting that it recognized in no single body of citizens the right of controlling the destiny of the country. A deputation was then appointed to wait upon the deputies of the Left at the Hotel de Ville, for the purpose of inculcating the necessity of reliance upon the representatives of the nation, the only legal and organized force, in the forming of a government and combining of efforts against the enemy. The bearers of the proposal were informed that it could not now be entertained, as the republic had already been proclaimed and accepted by the people. It was promised, however, that some of the members of the provisional government should attend an evening meeting of the deputies. At this sitting, which took place under the presidency of M. Thiers, and comprised nearly 200 members of the Corps Législatif, amongst them MM. Jules Favre and Jules Simon, it was explained that the new government were anxious to have the support of the deputies, though these, it was considered, might be able to render better service to the country in the departments. "If," added M. Favre, "you will kindly give the new government your ratification, we shall be grateful to you for it; if, on the contrary, you refuse it, we shall respect the decisions of your conscience, but we shall preserve the entire liberty of our own." He also stated that M. Rochefort was a member of the provisional government, which comprised all the deputies for Paris except M. Thiers, who had refused to form part of it. The veteran statesman, however, counselled a passive concurrence in accomplished facts. "Our duty," said he to M. Favre, "is ardently to desire your success in the defence of Paris. We desire this because your success would be that of our country." Nothing, however, came of this interview, beyond the issue of a protest on the part of the deputies present against the events of the afternoon. The exclusion of other members than those of Paris from the government, was justified by M. Favre on the ground that the defence of the capital was their primary duty.

The Senate on that eventful Sunday had also held its last sitting. M. Rouher took the chair at noon, and warmly protested against the proposition of M. Jules Favre for dethroning the dynasty. The protest evoked some applause, and one or two senators cried, "Vive l'Empereur!" M. Baroche said a few words in defence of the empire, as did also Prince Poniatowski; but with these feeble and expiring forms the body became defunct.

* See note at the end of Chapter.

Engraved from a Photograph

Referring to these events, the American minister wrote to his government:—"In a few brief hours of a Sabbath day I have seen a dynasty fall and a republic proclaimed, and all without the shedding of one drop of blood."

At six o'clock in the evening a decree naming the members of the provisional government was issued, stating that the *déchéance* had been pronounced by the Corps Législatif, the republic proclaimed at the Hotel de Ville, and a committee of national defence had been appointed. The provisional government originally consisted of the following members:—General Trochu, president; Emmanuel Arâgo; Cremieux, minister of Justice; Jules Favre, minister for Foreign Affairs; Jules Ferry; Gambetta, minister of the Interior; Garnier Pagés, Glais-Bizoin, Pelletan; Ernest Picard, minister of Finance; Rochefort; and Jules Simon, minister of Public Instruction. Subsequently General Leflô, minister for War; Admiral Fourichon, minister of Marine; M. Dorian, minister of Public Works; M. Magnin, minister of Agriculture and Commerce; Count de Keratry, prefect of police; and M. Etienne Arago, were added—forming eighteen members in all.

Jules Claude Gabriel Favre, the minister for Foreign Affairs, and vice-president of the Committee of Defence, was one of the most distinguished members of the new cabinet. He was born at Lyons in 1809, and took a prominent part in the revolution of 1830, being at the time a law student at Paris. Practising as a barrister at Lyons, he warmly espoused the cause of the working classes, and gained great distinction by his ultra-radical opinions. In 1835, at the Paris bar, he especially distinguished himself in a speech before the Cour des Pairs, when, commencing with *Je suis Republicain*, he pleaded for four hours, though he was then dangerously ill. In the revolution of February, 1848, he was appointed secretary-general of the ministry of the Interior, took a prominent part in the prosecution of Louis Blanc and Caussidiére for the attempted insurrection of the 15th May, and refused to join in the vote of thanks to General Cavaignac. After the election of Louis Napoleon as president, Jules Favre became one of his bitterest opponents; and though he acquiesced in the vote for the Italian expedition, he objected to the direction it was taking, and demanded that the president and ministry should be proceeded against. On the *coup d'état* of the 2nd December, M. Favre retired from political life for six years, refusing to swear fidelity to the new *régime*. He reappeared in the Corps Législatif as a Paris deputy in 1858, and defended those involved in the Orsini conspiracy with such power that, in reference to his speech, the procureur-général said, "En presence de l'echafaud qui se dresse on avait élevé une statue pour celui qui doit y monter." In the general elections of 1869 he was rejected by his native town, but was elected for the seventh circonscription of Paris. He was known as the author of a number of political pamphlets, and in 1868, in company with MM. Hénon and E. Picard, founded *L'Electeur*, a weekly political journal.

It had become evident about mid-day that the Tuileries was no longer a safe residence for the empress, and she determined on immediate flight. As she passed into the streets a *petit gamin* recognized her, and shouted "Voilá l'Impératrice!" which called forth from the crowd the rejoinder, "A la guillotine!" No violence, however, was offered her Majesty, who hastened to the house of a friend. As it was considered hazardous to travel by railway, she left Paris without luggage of any kind, and drove to the little northern port of Deauville. An English cutter yacht, the *Gazelle*, lay in the harbour, ready to sail on the following day for England with Sir John and Lady Burgoyne. A few hours before the time appointed for the *Gazelle* to weigh her anchor the empress presented herself, announced her rank and difficult position, and claimed the protection of Sir John as an English gentleman. Lady Burgoyne was at once introduced to the empress, who became her guest for the voyage across the Channel. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 7th September the *Gazelle* left for England, and reached Ryde on the afternoon of the 8th. The empress then crossed by steamer to Portsmouth and proceeded to Hastings, where she was joined by the Prince Imperial, who had already arrived in England. After her flight a despatch was found on her table from M. Pietri, the prefect of the police, announcing that the situation was grave; that the national guards were hostile; and that the troops would not march.

The officials of the imperial *régime* had shown themselves quite as fully alive to the dangers of the situation as the empress. Count de Palikao and his colleagues in the ministry fled immediately after the proclamation of the republic, and the "official

majority" instantly disappeared. In fact, as soon as it became really known that the emperor had succumbed, his wife, his son, his throne, his system, and his supporters, shared in the general collapse. An exodus of the able-bodied youth of the capital followed, and as the Germans approached, England, Belgium, and other countries received an influx of of visitors from Paris evading the *levée en masse.* Thus France rewarded him who had given her the first place in Europe for eighteen years, and during the same time had preserved her internal quiet, and held in order the turbulent masses of Paris.

On Monday morning (September 5) the *Journal Officiel* was superseded by the *Journal of the French Republic*, which contained the following proclamation:—"Frenchmen! The people have disavowed a Chamber which hesitated to save the country when in danger. It has demanded a republic. The friends of its representatives are not in power, but in peril. The republic vanquished the invasion of '92. The republic is proclaimed. The revolution is accomplished in the name of right and public safety. Citizens! watch over the city confided to you. To-morrow you will be with the army avengers of the country." A decree of the ministry dissolved the Corps Législatif, and abolished the Senate and the presidency of the Council of State. The manufacture and sale of arms was declared absolutely free, and a complete amnesty proclaimed for all political crimes and offences. Four prisoners, sentenced to death for their participation in the La Villette riots on the 14th August, were also released.

A proclamation was also issued to the army, in the following terms:—"When a general has compromised his command, it is taken away from him. When a government has imperilled by its faults the safety of the country, it is deposed. This is what France has just done. In abolishing the dynasty which was responsible for our misfortunes, France accomplished an act of justice, and at the same time performed an act of necessity for her own preservation. The nation has only to depend upon herself, and only to reckon upon two things —the revolution, which is invincible; and your heroism, which has no equal, and which, amid undeserved reverses, excites the astonishment of the world. We are not the government of a party, but a government of national defence; and have but one object and one will—the safety of the country by means of the army and the nation grouped around the glorious ensign which made Europe draw back eighty years ago. To-day, as then, the name of the republic signifies the hearty union of army and people in the defence of the country."

All public functionaries of every class were released from their oaths; the ambassadors to England, Austria, and Russia were dismissed; and all Germans not in possession of special permissions were ordered to leave the departments of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise within twenty-four hours. Count de Nieuwerkerke was dismissed from his post of superintendent of the fine arts and museums. New prefects were appointed all over France; new mayors in all the Paris arrondissements; and M. Gambetta, the minister of the Interior, addressed the following letter to all the provisional administrators and prefects of departments:—"In accepting power at a time of such danger to the country we have accepted great perils and great duties. The people of Paris who on the 4th of September found themselves again in existence, after so long an interval, have so understood the emergency, and their acclamations plainly mean that they expect from us the preservation of the country. Our new republic is not a government which permits of political dissensions and empty quarrels. It is, as we have said, a government of national defence, a republic of war to the knife against the invader. Support us, then, citizens, animated, like ourselves, by the paramount desire of saving the country, and prepared to shrink from no sacrifice. Into the midst of these improvised workers bring the coolness and vigour which should belong to the representatives of a power resolved on everything in order to vanquish the enemy. Sustain every one, by your unlimited activity in all the questions which concern the armament and equipment of the citizens and their military instruction. All prohibitory laws, all the restrictions so unfortunately placed on the manufacture and sale of arms, have disappeared. Let every Frenchman receive or seize a gun, and place himself at the disposal of the authorities. The country is in danger! Day by day information will be given you respecting the details of your duties. But do much spontaneously, and especially endeavour to gain the co-operation of all minds, so that by a gigantic and unanimous effort France may owe its deliverance to the patriotism of all its children."

The fact that the revolution had been achieved

without bloodshed gave rise to the hope in some quarters that peace might be established. But the illusion was speedily dispelled. On the 6th September M. Favre, vice-president of the government of national defence and minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed to the French diplomatic agents abroad the following very important and historical circular:—

"Sir,—The events which have just taken place in Paris explain themselves so well by the inexorable logic of facts, that it is useless to insist at length on their meaning and bearing. In ceding to an irresistible impulse, which had been but too long restrained, the population of Paris has obeyed a necessity superior to that of its own safety; it did not wish to perish with the criminal government which was leading France to her ruin; it has therefore pronounced the deposition of Napoleon III. and of his dynasty: it has registered it in the name of right, justice, and public safety; and the sentence was so well ratified beforehand by the conscience of all, that no one even among the most noisy defenders of the power that was falling raised his voice to uphold it. It collapsed of itself under the weight of its faults, and amid the acclamations of an immense people, without a single drop of blood being shed, without any one individual being deprived of his personal liberty; and we have been able to see—a thing unheard of in history—the citizens, upon whom the popular voice conferred the perilous mandate to fight and to conquer, not thinking for a moment of their political adversaries, who but the day before threatened them with execution. It is by refusing to their adversaries the honour of being subject to any sort of repression, that they have shown them their blindness and their impotence. Order has not been disturbed for a single moment. Our confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the national guard and of the whole population permits us to affirm that it will not be disturbed. Rescued from the shame and the danger of a government which has proved itself a traitor to all its duties, each one now comprehends that the first act of the national sovereignty, at last reconquered, must be one of self-control—the seeking for strength in respect for right. Moreover, time must not be lost: the enemies are at our gates; we have but one thought, namely their expulsion from our territory. But this obligation, which we resolutely accept, we did not impose upon France. She would not be in her present position if our voice had been listened to. We have energetically defended, even at the cost of our popularity, the policy of peace; we still maintain the same opinion with increasing conviction. Our heart breaks at the sight of these human massacres wherein is sacrificed the flower of two nations, that a little good sense and a great deal of liberty would have preserved from such frightful catastrophes. We cannot find any expression capable of rendering our admiration for our heroic army sacrificed by the incapacity of the supreme commander, but showing itself greater in its defeats than in the most brilliant victory: for in spite of the knowledge of faults which compromised its safety, the army has immolated itself with sublime heroism in the face of certain death—redeeming thus the honour of France from the stain cast upon her by her government. All honour to the army! The nation looks towards it with open arms! The imperial power wished to divide them: misfortune and duty join them in a solemn embrace sealed by patriotism and liberty. This alliance renders us invincible. Ready for every emergency, we look with calmness on the position of affairs made what it is, not by us, but by others. This position I will explain in a few words, and I submit it to the judgment of my country and of Europe. We loudly condemn the war, and while protesting our respect for the rights of peoples, we asked that Germany should be left mistress of her own destinies. We wished that liberty should be at the same time our common tie and our common shield. We were convinced that these moral forces would for ever insure peace, but as a sanction we claimed an arm for every citizen, a civil organization, and the election of leaders. Then we should have remained invincible on our own soil. The government of the emperor, which had long since separated its interests from those of the country, opposed that policy. We take it up with the hope that, taught by experience, France will have the wisdom to put it into practice. On his side the king of Prussia declared that he made war, not against France, but against the imperial dynasty. The dynasty has fallen to the ground. France raises herself free. Does the king of Prussia wish to continue an impious struggle, which will be at least as fatal to him as to us? Does he wish to give to the world of the

nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two nations destroying one another, and in forgetfulness of humanity, reason, and science, heaping corpse upon corpse, and ruin upon ruin. He is free to assume this responsibility in the face of the world and of history. If it is a challenge, we accept it. We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses. A shameful peace would mean a war of extermination at an early date. We will only treat for a durable peace. In this our interest is that of the whole of Europe, and we have reason to hope that, freed from all dynastic considerations, the question will thus present itself before the cabinets of Europe. But should we be alone, we shall not yield. We have a resolute army, well-provisioned forts, a well-established enceinte, and above all, the breasts of 300,000 combatants determined to hold out to the last. When they piously lay crowns at the feet of the statue of Strassburg, they do not obey merely an enthusiastic sentiment of admiration, they adopt their heroic *mot d'ordre*—they swear to be worthy of their brethren of Alsace, and to die as they have done. After the forts we have the ramparts, after the ramparts we have the barricades. Paris can hold out for three months and conquer. If she succumbs, France will start up at her appeal and avenge her. France would continue the struggle, and the aggressor would perish. Such is, sir, what Europe must know. We have not accepted power with any other object; we will not keep it a moment if we should not find the population of Paris, and the whole of France, decided to share our resolutions. I sum up these resolves briefly, in presence of God who hears me, in the face of posterity which shall judge us. We wish only for peace; but if this disastrous war, which we have condemned, is continued against us, we shall do our duty to the last, and I have the firm confidence that our cause, which is that of right and of justice, will triumph in the end. It is in this manner that I invite you to explain the situation to the minister of the court to which you are accredited, and in whose hands you will place a copy of this document. Accept, sir, the expression of my high consideration.

"JULES FAVRE,

"Minister of Foreign Affairs,

"*September* 6, 1870."

This document attracted much notice. By the journals of Paris and the people generally it was received with great satisfaction, and it had a favourable effect on the Bourse. But in all these proceedings neutral nations saw little hope for a peaceful solution of the quarrel. It was seen that the republic could not avoid the responsibility of the previous reign; that it was held to answer for the acts of the imperial government, the war among the rest; because, whatever the sentiments of French republicans, the rule of the deposed emperor had been accepted and maintained by the majority of the French people. In the language of the *Siècle*, he was the man "whom the misguided country had accepted as chief." Even the democratic *ouvriers* of France, addressing their brethren across the Rhine, did not scruple to repeat the declaration made to the coalition of Europe in 1793, that "the French people concludes no peace whatever with an enemy occupying its territory." But the reference implied a misapprehension of facts. The coalition marched against France unchallenged and unprovoked, to re-establish the ancient monarchy in all its privileges. The German armies appeared on French soil because they were attacked by the armies of France, and with every demonstration of popular enthusiasm. There were other difficulties in the way of peace. The government undoubtedly wished for peace, but it could not say so. In the first place, an extreme republican party was prepared instantly to denounce any concession to the enemy as treason, and would have been borne to power in their stead had it promised an ever-credulous public to bring victory back to the standards of France. The government felt that the national honour would scarcely be safe if hard conditions were accepted while Paris was unattacked and Metz and Strassburg untaken; and thus the prospect of peace became increasingly doubtful.

The revolution in Paris was at once followed by an impulse to the military spirit throughout the country. In most of the provincial towns a numerous response was made to the levy *en masse* of the provisional government, and squads of recruits, of all ages and all ranks, assembled in the public squares for the purpose of being drilled, but very few had at this stage either arms or uniform. The drill sergeants were generally old soldiers, who, having retired from the army, were following various civil avocations.

The new *régime*, however, was not established without more or less difficulty in some of the larger cities, notably in Lyons. By stifling open discussion the imperial system had driven the people to seek political information in secret reunions; and many of the working men of Lyons were deeply imbued with the spirit of Socialism and Communism. The *canaille* of the city, moreover, had been reinforced by many of the dangerous classes who had been expelled from Paris by General Trochu. The news of the emperor's surrender was fully known early on the morning of the 4th of September, and at eight o'clock a large crowd assembled in front of the Hôtel de Ville, speedily invaded the edifice, arrested the prefect, M. Sencier, constituted themselves a Comité du Salut Public, and proclaimed the republic, thus forestalling the capital by several hours. Happily the day ended without accidents, and the *bourgeoisie*, having formed themselves into a garde nationale, ransacked the forts until sufficient arms had been secured. When, however, the prefect appointed by the provisional government, M. Lacour, arrived, he found the Lyons committee comfortably installed in the Hôtel de Ville, and little disposed to resign their functions. He was informed that these gentlemen considered their appointments to be quite as valid as his own; and they retained a body guard of chosen men at their disposal day and night. In the course of a few days they abolished the *octroi*, thus depriving the town of ten millions of francs per annum. They also issued a decree that priests should serve in the army like other people, and no person was allowed to leave the town without permission. Many gentlemen who had filled public offices were arrested, although in most cases they were not detained more than a few hours. The patriotic citizens of the committee, on the principle that services rendered to the state should be paid for, generously voted themselves a certain sum per day out of the public purse. The prefect avoided a collision, and in the meantime hastened forward the election of the municipal council. The committee were induced to quit the Hôtel de Ville and take up their position in the central bureau de police in the Rue Luizerne; but the red flag, the emblem of the advanced party, was still allowed to float over the town-hall. After the municipal elections a certain number of the more intelligent and respectable members of the original committee were chosen, and the council entered upon its duties under the presidency of the mayor, M. Hénon, formerly deputy for the Rhône; but the amateurs of the Rue Luizerne were not disposed to part with the sweets of office. M. Baudy, a former colleague, was deputed to explain that their services could now be dispensed with, as there was a regularly elected council to do the work, and that in any case their salary would be stopped. M. Baudy, however, was reproached as a renegade, a traitor, and a pickpocket, and put under confinement. But the councillor's constituents having sent a threatening message to the Rue Luizerne, he was released. A few days later the Comité du Salut Public ceased to exist; but its members, powerless in public, were indefatigable in secret. They also received a powerful ally in the person of "General" Cluseret, an ex-officer of the French army, who had been holding meetings, accusing the existing administration of a want of vigour, and calling upon the people to rise and turn them out. At a meeting in the Rotonde, it was resolved that all existing authority should be done away with; that everything should be left to be settled by the justice of the people; that taxes should be abolished; that all moneys required for the good of the country should be furnished by the rich; that the payment of private debts should not be enforced by laws; and that all the officers of the army should be ejected! The inflammatory speeches in which these resolutions were urged had the desired effect. A demonstration was immediately got up; the Hôtel de Ville was taken; the prefect arrested; and the municipal council abolished. The ringleaders then harangued the crowd from the balcony. The Citoyen Saigne, a plasterer, proceeded to appoint the Citoyen Cluseret commander-in-chief of all the military forces of the south of France; an appointment which M. Cluseret, with becoming modesty, accepted—promising to save the country. His first step was to call up the Quartier de la Croix Rousse, and then to seize the general in command at Lyons. The inhabitants were in apprehension of disturbance. The assembly was sounded all over the town, and the gardes nationales flew to arms. The first battalion to arrive was composed of Cluseret's friends of the Croix Rousse; but they proceeded to the town-hall and set the prefect at liberty. Other bodies came up with loaded rifles, when the "general" and his colleagues retired, vowing to return with sufficient

strength to carry all before them, but in this valorous intention they failed. The prefect subsequently informed the garde nationale that he had received unlimited powers from the government over the regular troops, so as to be able to deal effectively with any attempt at disturbance. He was everywhere well received, and the soldiers swore to support him to the utmost.

At Marseilles, also, great excitement followed the news of the surrender of the emperor. The people rushed *en masse* to the Bourse, decapitated the statue of Napoleon, and derisively rolled the trunk through the streets and flung the eagles into the port. They pitched inkstands at the picture of the imperial family, breaking furniture, tearing curtains to shreds, and finally regaling themselves from the cellars. The news was received at Bordeaux with similar popular manifestations. An equestrian statue of the emperor, erected in the Allées de Tourny, was torn from its base, and in falling broke into fragments. Thousands of people then paraded the streets, and shouted "Vive la Republique!" before the Hôtel de Ville. Similar proceedings took place at Toulouse, where an informal committee was constituted in much the same manner as at Lyons.

With the earliest days of the revolution reappeared the extreme section of the press, which had been suppressed during the Palikao ministry. The *Marseillaise* attacked the provisional government. The *Reveil* and the *Rappel* were moderate in their tone, but enthusiastic in their praise of the republic. In the latter journal, Victor Hugo, who had returned to "save Paris," issued to the German people a magniloquent address, which commenced as follows:—"Germans, he who speaks to you is a friend. Three years ago, at the epoch of the Exposition of 1867, from exile, I welcomed you to our city. What city? Paris. For Paris does not belong to us alone. Paris is yours as well as ours. Berlin, Vienna, Dresden, Munich, Stuttgard, are your capitals; Paris is your centre. It is at Paris that one feels the heart of Europe beating. Paris is the city of cities; Paris is the city of men. There was Athens, there was Rome, there is Paris. Paris is nothing but an immense hospitality. To-day you return there. How? As brothers, like you did three years ago? No, as enemies. Why? What is this sinister misunderstanding? Two nations have made Europe. Those two nations are France and Germany. . . . This war, does it proceed from us? It was the Empire which willed it. The Empire is dead. It is well. We have nothing in common with that corpse. It is the past, we are the future. It is hatred, we are sympathy. It is treason, we are loyalty."

M. Victor Hugo also addressed a long and inflated epistle to the Parisians, for the purpose of encouraging them under the anticipated hardships of the siege:—"Two adversaries," said the writer, "are in presence at this moment. On one side is Prussia, with 900,000 soldiers; on the other Paris, with 400,000 citizens. On one side, force; on the other, will. On one side, an army; on the other, a nation. On one side, night; on the other light. It is the old contest between the Archangel and the Dragon which is recommencing. It will have now the same termination as before; Prussia will be cast down. This war, frightful as it is, has hitherto been but trifling; it is about to become great. I am sorry for you, Prussians, but it is necessary that you should change your method of dealing."

Among the arrivals in Paris at this period were the Orleans princes, the Duc d'Aumale, the Duc de Chartres, and the Prince de Joinville, who under the Palikao ministry had previously offered their services, which were not accepted. On the 7th September they reached the capital from Brussels, and communicated with the government of national defence; presuming that, as exceptional laws had been practically repealed by the revolution, the decree which exiled them was also set aside, and expressing their desire to be allowed to serve their country *in propria persona*. The government, however, apprehensive that their presence might be misconstrued, declined their offer; and in very courteous and sympathetic terms appealed to them, in the name of patriotism, to depart, upon which they immediately left the capital. Meanwhile, the Legitimist candidate for the French throne, the Comte de Chambord, issued an address in which he said:—"Amid all these poignant emotions, it is a great consolation to see that public spirit, the spirit of patriotism, does not allow itself to be cast down, but rises with our misfortunes. Above everything it is necessary to repulse the invasion, to save at any price the honour of France, the integrity of its territory. Every dissension must be forgotten at this moment, every after-thought put aside. We owe our whole energy, our fortune, our blood, to

the deliverance of our country. A true mother will rather abandon her infant than see it perish. I experience the same feeling, and say incessantly, May God save France, though I should die without seeing it again!"

General Garibaldi also, writing from Caprera, September 7, addressed the following to his friends:—"Yesterday I said to you, War to the death to Bonaparte; I say to you to-day, We must help the French republic by all possible means. I am an invalid, but I have offered myself to the provisional government of Paris, and I hope it will not be impossible for me to perform some work. Yes, my fellow-citizens, we should regard assistance to our brothers of France as a sacred duty. Our mission will not certainly consist in combating our German brethren, who, being as the arm of Providence, have overthrown in the dust the germ of the tyranny which weighed upon the world; but we should sustain the only system which can assure peace and prosperity among nations."

To strengthen the authority of the provisional government, the ministry, on the 8th of September, issued in the *Journal Officiel* the following proclamation for the appointment of a Constituent Assembly:—"Frenchmen,—In proclaiming four days ago the government of the National Defence, we ourselves defined our mission. Power was lying in the dust. What had commenced by a crime finished by a desertion. We simply grasped the helm which had escaped from powerless hands. But Europe has need to be enlightened. It is necessary that she should know by irrefragable testimonies that the entire country is with us. It is necessary that the invader should meet on his route not only the obstacle of an immense city resolved to perish rather than yield, but an entire people erect, organized, represented—an assembly, in short, which can carry into all places, and in spite of all disasters, the living soul of the country. Consequently, the government of the National Defence decrees:—Art. 1. The electoral colleges are convoked for Sunday, the 16th of October, for the purpose of electing a National Constituent Assembly. Art. 2. The elections will be held by collective voting, conformably to the law of the 15th of March, 1849. Art 3. The number of members of the Constituent Assembly will be 750. Art. 4. The minister of the Interior is charged with the execution of this decree. Given at the Hôtel de Ville of Paris, September 8, 1870."

This proceeding was regarded as of the first importance, and subsequently the provisional government fixed on the 2d of October for the elections. M. Jules Favre issued a second diplomatic circular, dated the 17th September, the language of which was more moderate in its tone than that of the document already quoted. The minister of Foreign Affairs thus concluded—"I will sum up our entire policy. In accepting the perilous task which was imposed upon us by the fall of the imperial government we had but one idea; namely, to defend our territory, to save our honour, and to give back to the nation the power emanating from itself, and which it alone could exercise. We should have wished that this great act might have been completed without transition, but the first necessity was to face the enemy. We have not the pretension to ask disinterestedness of Prussia. We take account of the feelings to which the greatness of her losses and the natural exaltation of victory have given rise to her. These feelings explain the violence of the press, which we are far from confounding with the inspirations of statesmen. These latter will hesitate to continue an impious war, in which more than 200,000 men have already fallen. To force conditions upon France which she could not accept, would only be to compel a continuance of the war. It is objected that the government is without regular power to be represented. It is for this reason that we immediately summon a freely-elected Assembly. We do not attribute to ourselves any other privilege than that of giving our soul and our blood to our country, and we abide by its sovereign judgment. It is therefore not authority reposed in us for a day. It is immortal France uprising before Prussia—France divested of the shroud of the empire, free, generous, and ready to immolate herself for right and liberty, disavowing all political conquest, and all violent propaganda, having no other ambition than to remain mistress of herself, and to develop her moral and material forces, and to work fraternally with her neighbours for the progress of civilization. It is this France which, left to her free action, immediately asks the cessation of the war, but prefers its disasters a thousand times to dishonour. Vainly those who set loose a terrible scourge try now to escape the crushing responsibility, by falsely alleging that they yielded to the wish of the country. This calumny may delude people abroad, but there

is no one among us who does not refute it as a work of revolting bad faith. The motto of the elections in 1869 was peace and liberty, and the *plébiscite* itself adopted it as its programme. It is true that the majority of the Legislative Body cheered the warlike declarations of the duke of Gramont; but a few weeks previously it had also cheered the peaceful declarations of M. Ollivier. A majority emanating from personal power believed itself obliged to follow docilely and voted trustingly; but there is not a sincere person in Europe who could affirm that France freely consulted made war against Prussia. I do not draw the conclusion from this that we are not responsible. We have been wrong, and are cruelly expiating our having tolerated a government which led us to ruin. Now we admit the obligation to repair by a measure of justice the ill it has done; but if the power with which it has so seriously compromised us takes advantage of our misfortunes to overwhelm us, we shall oppose a desperate resistance; and it will remain well understood that it is the nation, properly represented in a freely-elected Assembly, that this power wishes to destroy. This being the question raised, each one will do his duty. Fortune has been hard upon us, but she is capable of unlooked-for revolutions, which our determination will call forth. Europe begins to be moved; and sympathy for us is being reawakened. The sympathies of foreign cabinets console us and do us honour. They will be deeply struck by the noble attitude of Paris in the midst of so many terrible causes for excitement. Serious, confident, ready for the utmost sacrifices, the nation in arms descends into the arena without looking back, and having before its eyes this simple but great duty, the defence of its homes and independence. I request you, sir, to enlarge upon these truths to the representative of the government to which you are accredited. He will see their importance, and will thus obtain a just idea of our disposition."

In the previous chapter we recounted the energetic measures of the authorities for the defence and provisioning of the capital. On the morning of the day (September 4) when the republic was proclaimed, the Crown Prince of Prussia and the Crown Prince of Saxony, accompanied by the king of Prussia and Count von Bismarck, started on their march to Paris. As the German armies drew nearer day by day, unremitting exertions, which had been commenced by the Count de Palikao, were continued to man and provision the city, and to put the *enceinte* and the detached forts in a condition to sustain a lengthened siege, while the surrounding belt of country was cleared of its inhabitants. The completeness of these preparations was amply attested by subsequent events, and the prolongation of the siege.

On the 14th September a grand review of the whole armed force in Paris was held by General Trochu. Apparently the spectacle was one of the most stirring on record, and for the first time in twenty years Paris appeared openly and fully armed. The troops consisted of soldiers of the regular army, national guards, and the garde mobile, to the number of 300,000, who were drawn up in line, extending from the Place de la Bastille to the Arc de Triomphe. The number of regular troops was considerably increased by the return of General Vinoy and his army, who had failed to join MacMahon before the battle of Sedan, and also by the scattered remnants of defeated soldiers who had managed to make good their escape. As General Trochu, accompanied by a brilliant staff, rode along the ranks, he was received with great enthusiasm, amid cries of "Vive Trochu!" and "Vive la Republique!" The feeling of the troops was admirable; but, beyond the regulars, few were armed with the Chassepot, and the uniform of many consisted only of the *kepi*. While the troops marched back to their quarters after the inspection the air resounded with patriotic songs, and the muzzles of many of their muskets were ornamented with bouquets and tricoloured flags, which gave a lively and brilliant appearance to the scene. The governor subsequently issued the following general order:—

"To the National Guards of Paris and the Gardes Mobiles of Paris and the Departments,—Never before has any general witnessed so grand a spectacle as that which you have presented; three hundred battalions of citizens organized and armed, enveloped by the entire population of the city, unanimously proclaiming the determined defence of Paris and of liberty. If those foreign nations which doubt you, if the armies which are marching upon you, could only have heard that, they would have understood that misfortune has done more in a few weeks to rouse the soul of the nation than long years of prosperity have done to abase it. The spirit of devotion and of sacrifice

has infused itself into you, and to it you owe that hearty union which will prove your safety. With our formidable effective force the daily guard of Paris will be 70,000 men. If the enemy by a fierce attack, or by a surprise, or by effecting a breach, should pierce our protecting fortifications, he would encounter barricades which are being prepared, and his columns would be driven back by the successive attacks of ten reserves stationed at different points. Remain, therefore, perfectly assured, and know that the *enceinte* of Paris, defended as it is by the persevering efforts of public spirit, and by 300,000 muskets, is impregnable. National guards of the Seine and gardes mobiles, in the name of the government for the National Defence, of which I am towards you but the representative, I thank you for your patriotic solicitude for the cherished interests which you have in charge. Now let us proceed to work in the nine sections of the defence. Let there be everywhere order, calmness, and devotion; and remember that you are charged, as I have previously informed you, with the police of Paris during this critical period. Prepare to bear your task with constancy, and then you will not fail to conquer."

The provisional government meanwhile completed its preparations against the impending investment of the capital. Communications with the departments were abandoned, bridges were destroyed, sometimes too hastily, telegraphs severed, obstacles placed in the path of the advancing enemy, and the woods near Paris filled with combustibles. In the beautiful woods of the Seine and Marne, the forests of Lagny, De Ferriéres, Clamart, Bellevue, Bondy, and the woods around St. Cloud, openings were effected by the axe of the garde mobile and francs-tireurs, large numbers of whom were told off for the service. The *Journal Officiel* published decrees authorizing the minister of justice, M. Crémieux, to transfer the criminal chamber to Tours; and placing 40,000 francs at the disposal of the Scientific Committee of Defence. All legal appeals were suspended, together with the *octroi* duties upon the importation of goods. The government further decided to sit at a town in the interior of France during the siege; and besides M. Crémieux, the minister of Marine and M. Glais-Bizoin established themselves at Tours, where they were joined by Lord Lyons and several other foreign ambassadors. The envoys of the United States, Belgium, and Switzerland resolved, however, to remain in Paris.

While the government were thus taking their measures of defence, M. Thiers was sent to England, and thence to Vienna and St. Petersburg, charged with a diplomatic mission. But the difficulties in the way of the veteran statesman were insurmountable. Count von Bismarck had determined to decline all intervention, and the courts of Europe, to whom M. Thiers was delegated, thus found no favourable opportunity to enter upon negotiations.

It is worthy of notice, too, that before the government had been in existence a fortnight they had the courage to abolish the entire system of police surveillance. A short time before the Prussians finally invested the capital, M. de Keratry, the prefect of police, addressed to the provisional government a report recommending the suppression of an institution which had proved a ready and efficient instrument in the hands of successive governments for seventy years. The system had been most abused under Napoleon I., by whom it was founded in 1800, and who had extended its powers during his reign. So great was the importance attached to it, that at the change of each *régime* the first care of the victors was to secure its influence.

A brief review of the financial condition of the country, prior to the final investment of Paris, will be found suggestive. The trade bills under discount at the bank of France amounted at the close of June to £26,000,000. On the 8th of September they had increased to £57,000,000, or nearly 120 per cent.; and while the aggregate of cash and bullion in the bank continually diminished, the paper circulation increased. The weekly drain of the precious metals is represented by the following table:—

	Cash and Bullion in Bank of France.		Freuch Bank Notes in Circulation.	
	Amount.	Weekly Decrease.	Amount.	Weekly Increase.
July . . 7	£50,723,000	—	£57,557,000	—
" . . 14	49,809,000	£914,000	58,209,000	£652,000
" . . 21	48,590,000	1,219,000	58,808,000	599,000
" . . 28	45,775,000	2,815,000	61,092,000	2,284,000
August . 4	43,875,000	1,900,000	61,044,000	48,000*
" . 11	41,142,000	2,733,000	61,344,000	300,000
" . 18	36,244,000	4,898,000	66,705,000	5,361,000
" . 25	34,742,000	1,502,000	68,340,000	1,635,000
September 1	33,764,000	978,000	69,206,000	866,000
" 8	32,320,000	1,444,000	69,800,000	594,000

* Decrease.

On the 12th August the bank suspended payments in specie, and the following week nearly £5,000,000 was withdrawn. At the same time the note circulation was increased by upwards of £5,250,000.

With regard to the foreign relations of the provisional government, it may be stated that the republic was early recognized by the United States of America. On the 5th of September M. Favre officially notified its institution to the American ambassador, Mr. Washburne, who, on the day following, replied:—"I have the satisfaction of announcing to you that I have received from my government a telegram empowering me to recognize the government of the National Defence as the government of France. I am consequently ready to enter into relations with the government, and, if you wish it, to treat with it on all the matters arising out of the functions with which I am invested. In making this communication to your excellency, I beg to tender to yourself and to the members of the government of the National Defence the congratulations of the government and people of the United States. They will have learnt with enthusiasm the proclamation of the republic which has been instituted in France without the shedding of one drop of blood, and they will respond heartily and sympathetically to the great movement which they hope and believe will be fertile in happy results for the French people and for humanity at large. Enjoying for nearly a century immeasurable benefits from a republican government, the people of the United States cannot but witness with the deepest interest the efforts of the French people, attached to them by the bonds of a traditional amity, who seek to found institutions by which will be assured to the present generation, as well as to posterity, the invaluable right of living, by working for the welfare of all." M. Jules Favre, in acknowledging this letter, hailed as a happy augury for the French republic that the American government should have been the first to recognize and countenance it. Subsequently a large gathering of citizens visited the American legation, and gave enthusiastic cheers for the United States. The crowd then waited on M. Jules Favre, who replied, "I am happy to hear of your demonstration. I am, as you know, the personal enemy of war, which divides and tears in pieces mankind. I retain the hope of an honourable peace; but if it is necessary, we will sacrifice everything to the very last for the defence of the country."

In the United States the successes of the German arms, and the surrender of Napoleon, caused exuberant rejoicings among the German population and those of Teutonic origin, as well as among a large part of the nation itself, whose sympathies were against the French empire. In Philadelphia long processions, bearing torches and transparencies, and led by the German musical societies, went singing through the streets, while the offices of the newspapers favourable to the German cause were serenaded, as well as the residence of the German consul. With this feeling throughout the country, there was a general hope of a speedy peace. On the intelligence of Napoleon's downfall, the premium on gold fell from above 117 to 113¾.

The news of the establishment of the republic in Paris, however, caused a sensible diminution of the sympathy with the Germans, and, combined with the overwhelming defeats inflicted on the French, excited a general desire for peace on moderate terms. France was more frequently spoken of as "our ancient ally," and, as already stated, the government promptly recognized the republic. Nevertheless, with France as a military nation, or with her military standards of morality, there was little sympathy. The democrats, however, gained courage in their denunciations of Germany from the French defeats, and the Irish grew more noisy than ever in their demonstrations of fellow-feeling, especially with the disasters of MacMahon, who was generally believed amongst them to be the lineal descendant of an Irish king. There was undoubtedly a strong dislike of the Germans in the country.

The new government in Paris was also acknowledged by Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Switzerland expressed a hope that the republic "would be able shortly to procure for France the blessings of an honourable peace, and to consolidate for ever liberty and democratic institutions." Chevalier Nigra informed M. Jules Favre that he had received instructions from Florence to keep up relations with the provisional government in every way conformable to the sympathies existing between the two countries. A similar statement was made by Senor Olozaga, the Spanish ambassador, to whom M. Jules Favre replied, "It is precisely at this cruel moment for

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France that we see clearly manifested the wisdom which would join in one single tie three nations that really form but one family, and awaitiug only the signal of liberty to recover their family titles."

The action of the British government at this juncture caused considerable discussion both in England and France. The fall of the empire and the proclamation of a republic gave a new character both to the French resistance and the German invasion, which greatly influenced opinion in England, particularly amongst the political leaders of the working-classes, in relation to the war. While up to Sedan the public sympathies generally were with the German cause, a change of phase in the politics of the war wrought a change of feeling in English working men. Mass meetings were held in favour of the French, and an address was issued by the International Working Men's Association with the same object. On the evening of the 10th September a large gathering of the working classes took place under the presidency of Mr. Edmond Beales. While France was blamed for the initiation of a war of conquest, Germany was called upon by the meeting to exercise moderation and magnanimity in her hour of triumph, especially as the republican government then in power was composed of the very men who had protested against and denounced the imperial policy. The English cabinet was also urged to use every effort to procure the cessation of hostilities, and to prevent the territorial spoliation of France. Again, on the 13th September, a deputation, organized by the Labour Representation League, waited upon the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone. The deputation, which consisted of about 100 representatives of the leading London and provincial trade societies and industrial organizations, expressed to him that great dissatisfaction existed throughout the country, and especially amongst the working classes, at the non-recognition of the French republic by her Majesty's government, and urged that the spoliation of France by any annexation of her territory by Germany would sow the seeds of a future war, and lead to complications dangerous to the peace of the whole of Europe. They therefore prayed her Majesty's government to use their influence with the German government not to insist upon any annexation of territory as the terms of peace. By this course, the deputation believed that the terrible war might be brought to a speedy and honourable termination, without further humiliation to the French nation. In the course of an elaborate reply, Mr. Gladstone said that her Majesty's government had acted on the principle of international arbitration when the war was on the point of breaking out, and had done their utmost to prevent it. But although he shared the desire of the deputation that bloodshed should cease, they must expect great nations to claim for themselves to be in the first instance, and in the last resort, the proper judges of their own affairs. Any opportunity for mediation, however, would be eagerly seized by her Majesty's government. With regard to the recognition of the provisional government the premier continued :—"Even if the men who constitute that government were questionable in point of character, I do not think it would be for us to criticize them; but, on the contrary, I believe them to be men of honour, character, and intellect. Therefore do not suppose anything like a cessation of intercourse is signified by the fact that official recognition has not taken place. I am far from saying that the great question of recognition is unimportant; because undoubtedly the question of recognition is an acknowledgment that a combination of men has acquired a certain position, and that recognition undoubtedly strengthens them. I think we have no business to inquire whether France prefers one government or another. If it could be shown we are proceeding on principles less favourable to the government of France than any other government, we should be adjudged wrong in the face of the whole world. Our business is to proceed upon principles of perfect equality, and look impartially upon any government that may be established in France, independently of its being democratic, parliamentary, monarchical, or whatever it may be. Then what is the principle on which we are to proceed? That we acknowledge it as the government of France which France chooses to accept for herself. But, as it is not our business to lag behind in that respect, so it is not our business to go before France. Before the government exercising power in France has been recognized, are we to be expected to pronounce an opinion which France has not expressed? What is the position of the French government exercising power in Paris and Tours? How did they describe themselves? They are not themselves carrying out the government. They have been appointed for the calling together of some body—referring their case to that body, and deriving their title from the

approval of that body. Now, surely it is plain that we cannot travel faster than France in this matter; and we cannot travel faster than the present government of France. The recognition of the late empire of France did not take place until after the vote of the people. The vote of the people took place on the 1st of the month, and the recognition took place on the 4th. We were in hopes the vote of France was going to take place on Saturday next; and if it did take place, we would not have been less prompt than any former government has been to recognize that which has been established. But if you step in before the judgment of the people, you are really recognizing that which the great, high-minded, and civilized people of France have not recognized themselves."

The general feeling amongst moderate and intelligent Frenchmen at this time was admirably expressed in a letter from the veteran statesman, M. Guizot, to an English friend, in the course of which he said—" If we were only beginning this unhappy war, I would tell you frankly what I think of its evil origin and its lamentable errors; and I am sure that a large majority of the French nation think as I do about it. But we are not beginning the war. The opinion of the French nation on the main points of the question is unchanged; but no one thinks about them now, and, indeed, we cannot and ought not to think about them. For the present we ought to occupy ourselves—and, in fact, we do occupy ourselves —with war, and war only. We are engrossed by it, not only because of the unexpected reverses which we have experienced, but also, and above all, because of the designs which the Prussians manifest, and the character which they have stamped upon this war. On their part it is manifestly a war of ambition and for the sake of conquest. They proclaim loudly that they intend to take back Alsace and Lorraine, provinces which have been ours for two centuries, and which we have held through all the political vicissitudes and chances of war. The Prussians do more even than this. Although they occupy these provinces very partially and only temporarily, they already presume to exercise the rights of sovereignty over them. They have issued a decree in Lorraine abolishing our laws of conscription and recruiting for the army. Ask the first honest German whom you meet if this is not one of those acts of victorious ambition which pledge a nation to a struggle indefinitely prolonged, a struggle which can only be terminated by one of those disasters that a nation never accepts—one that if it experiences it never forgives. Be sure that France will never accept the character and consequences which Prussia desires to give to the war. Because of our first reverses we have our national honour to preserve, and because of the claims of Prussia we have to defend and keep our national territory. We will maintain these two causes at any price and to the very end. And let me tell you, and that without presumption, that, being as resolute as we are, we are not seriously uneasy as to the result of this struggle. At the very beginning the Prussians made an immense effort; there is another effort yet to be made; it is on our part, and it has, as yet, scarcely begun. We were greatly to blame that we were not better prepared at first; but with all our shortcomings we have seen what our troops are worth, and this will be seen and felt more and more as time goes on. We are superior to the Prussians in men, money, and territory, and we will equal them in perseverance, even should they persevere, as they will need to do if their projects are to have any chance of success. The age is with us, and we will not fail the age. This, I tell you in all frankness and sincerity, is the actual condition of facts and of men's minds in France. I am very anxious that it should be known in England, and that there should be no mistake there as to our national sentiments and the possibilities of the future. I devoted my whole political life to creating and maintaining bonds of friendship and unfettered alliance between France and England. I thought, and I still think, that this alliance is a pledge of the moral honour of the two nations, of their material prosperity, and of the progress of civilization throughout the world. I can recall the sorrow and apprehension which I felt in 1857, when I thought that the power of England was endangered by the great Indian mutiny. I remember also that the sentiments of France at that time were in complete harmony with my own. It is therefore with sorrow, not unmixed with surprise, that I now see many Englishmen so openly hostile to France."

We have already described the jubilation of the German people after the news of Napoleon's surrender. But their satisfaction was somewhat modified by the proclamation of the republic, and

especially by the tone of Jules Favre's first circular, which presented terms of peace that could not be conceded. The German press insisted that the altered circumstances could not affect these terms, and "trusted that the German giant, who so long had had nothing but his head free to think and dream with, while his hands and feet were fettered, would now, when for the first time free and conscious of his strength, make a right use of it by retaining Alsace and Lorraine, no matter how 'unstatesman-like' that might appear to his neutral friends, patrons, and advisers."

Considerable dissatisfaction was felt at the promptitude with which the French republic was recognized by the United States, and still more by the heartiness of the letter of the American minister to Jules Favre. "Mr. Washburne," said the *National Zeitung*, "doubtless is a sound republican, but he is deemed a weak politician; and the fate of the Germans in Paris should have been placed in abler hands by the German governments. He simply received from Washington by telegraph authority to recognize the new republic, which was a matter of course in regard to the views and principles prevailing there. The rest are his own personal sentiments. Of these he would have done well to address a share to the Germans, whose protection he has taken upon himself, and who are persecuted and put under ban by Monsieur Gambetta more cruelly than they were before."

The action of England was treated with something like indifference in Germany. It was generally thought Great Britain might, by a timely and energetic interference, have prevented the breaking out of the war; but since nothing had been done to avert the storm, the Germans were not disposed to admit any interference in ulterior negotiations, or regarding their dictation of the conditions of a peace so dearly purchased. Confident of victory, exasperated by the cruel sacrifices to which the country had been subjected, and naturally indignant at the unwarrantable and unprovoked attack made upon it, they regarded the exactions proposed by their rulers as a minimum which could not be reduced by an iota. They were also somewhat indignant at the treatment accorded to the captive emperor at Wilhelmshöhe, where he could not, they alleged, have received more attention had he been a guest instead of a prisoner. In the endeavour to tone down this feeling, the semi-official journals indicated that Count von Bismarck had not wholly given up the Bonapartist dynasty.

An immense impulse was given to the cause of German unity by the events of the war. With the accounts brought to Berlin of general rejoicings for victories, came announcements of meeting after meeting, and resolution after resolution, all tending to show the united spirit of the nation, north and south. At a cabinet council, held on the 9th September, the Bavarian government decided on taking the initiative in opening negotiations with Prussia, with a view to accession to the North German Bund. After a warm expression of thanks to the army and its leaders, and of confidence in those at the head of affairs, it was declared that Germany, now united as she had never been before, had fought her battles and beaten the enemy without allies, and would therefore conclude a peace without the interference of neutrals. The French must be brought to feel themselves defeated before lasting peace could be hoped for; and a false generosity would only encourage fresh aggressions. The recovery of Alsace and Lorraine held out the only guarantee against that hankering after German territory which had been displayed under every new government in France. As the Germans went united to the war, so should peace also find them united, by the fusion of the southern and northern states, and the acquisition of long-lost territories. One people, one army, one Diet, one constitution, were the guarantees of lasting peace for Germany and for Europe. These sentiments found ready assent amongst the various other states, and thus were the shadows broadly cast of important coming events.

NOTE.

In his celebrated "Defence Speech," before the National Assembly, at Versailles, in June, 1871, to which we alluded at the end of the previous chapter, General Trochu gave the following account of the transactions of this memorable 4th of September, so far as he was personally concerned:—"In the morning I went to the Tuileries. I saw the empress regent surrounded by many anxious persons. She herself was perfectly calm. I addressed to her these few words:—'Madam, the hour of great dangers has arrived. Strange things are taking place here, but this is not a time for recrimination. I remain at my post, but be assured that the crisis is a serious one.' I received neither from the War Office nor the Tuileries any orders, news, or notice of any kind. About one o'clock in the afternoon I saw General Lebreton, the questeur of the Corps Législatif. He said to me: 'General, the peril is at its height; there is a tremendous crowd on the quay about to break into the House—the troops have allowed the mob to break through their lines. You alone, by a personal effort, may perhaps stave the danger off.' I replied, 'General, I am the victim of an unprecedented situation. In fact, I have no com-

mand; I did not order the troops you mention to be posted where they were.' Here, gentlemen, I beg to say that I am thoroughly convinced that if I had been in command the case would have been precisely the same. I further said to General Lebreton, 'Look here, general, you want me single-handed to stop the advance of half a million of men who are surging up towards the Assembly; and yet you must know as well as I that it cannot be done; but as you make this demand in the name of the Corps Législatif, I will attempt the effort, though I am well assured of its failure.' Ten minutes later I was on horseback, on my way to the Corps Législatif. At the same moment I despatched General Schmitz to the Tuileries to inform the empress of what I was going to do. I was accompanied by two aides-de-camp, and had no difficulty in getting through the Carrousel, though the place was crowded, because nobody seemed to want to penetrate into the Tuileries; but when I got to the quay I had great difficulty in moving through the huge mass, which stretched from a long way beyond the Pont Neuf, far up in the Champs Elysées. I witnessed, not without fear or emotion, such a sight as I had never beheld, although I had seen both 1830 and 1848. An immense multitude of men, women, and children, wholly unarmed, and in which kindliness, fear, anger, and good nature were oddly mingled, surged up all around me and wholly prevented my advance; men with sinister faces threw themselves on my horse's reins, and shouted, 'Cry "Vive la Sociale!"' Yes, gentlemen, 'Vive la Sociale.' I said to them, 'I will not cry anything at all; you want to bind my free will—you shall not do it.' Other men, understanding my position, remonstrated, and shouted, 'He's right.' It took me nearly an hour to get to the corner of the Pont de Solferino. There I was compelled to come to a stand-still. I had long since lost my two aides-de-camp, and could neither go forward nor back. I kept parleying with the crowd, trying to get them to open a way for me, when a tall man elbowed himself up. I did not know him; he was under the influence of great emotion. He said, 'General, where are you going?' 'I am going to try and save the Corps Législatif.' 'The Corps Législatif has been invaded. I was there—I saw it. I give you my word it is so. I am M. Jules Favre.' M. Jules Favre added, 'That is the culminating disaster; here is a revolution being consummated in the midst of the disasters of our armies. You may be sure that the demagogues who are going to try and turn it to account will give France her death-blow if we don't prevent it. I am going to the Hotel de Ville: that is the rendezvous of the men who wish to save the country.' I replied, 'Monsieur, I cannot take such a resolution at present;' and we parted. It took me about an hour longer to get back to the Louvre. Whilst these events were taking place, the empress had left the Tuileries. General Schmitz had found her gone, and had been received by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, who had remained at the palace. The official historiographers, whose narratives I have read, generally add—'The principal functionaries of state crowded round the empress to take leave of her; alone General Trochu did not appear.' No, I did not appear, because at that time, instead of paying compliments of condolence to the empress, I was making an attempt personally to protect the Corps Législatif, at the request of General Lebreton. A little after my return to the Louvre a group of persons, utterly unknown to me, presented themselves. The person who led them said, 'I am M. Steenackers, a deputy. I am sent to you with these gentlemen to tell you that a real drama is being enacted at the Hôtel de Ville; it is surrounded by the mob; deputies have met there to form a Provisional Government; but there are no troops; there are no soldiers; there are no means of enforcing any decision that may be arrived at; they imagine that your name will be a kind of sanction, and that the troops dispersed all over Paris would rally round you.' I asked for five minutes to see my family, and went to the Hôtel de Ville. What I saw there was striking enough. There were the same enormous crowds as during the morning, but very much more mixed. Shouts, clamours, and threats arose on every side. The Hôtel de Ville itself was filled with so dense a crowd that it was only by devious ways that I was able to reach a closet, about four times the size of this tribune, in which the Provisional Government had stationed itself by the light of a solitary lamp. I didn't know whether the men I saw there for the first time—with the exception of M. Jules Favre, whom I had seen during the day—were really usurpers, vultures soaring down on power as a prey; but they did not look like it. I felt that they and I were exposed to a great peril. One of them said, 'General, in this formidable crisis we are especially anxious that the government should not fall into the hands of the people in the next room. Just now, taken aback by the suddenness of events, they are assembled, but they are not yet armed; but they will be to-morrow. If you consent to be the minister of War of the Provisional Government to-morrow, the officers and soldiers in Paris will gather round your name, and there will be some means of enforcing the measures that must be taken for the preservation of order in Paris.' I replied, 'Before making up my mind it is my duty to go to the War office and acquaint the minister, who is my chief, of what is going on here.' I went and found General Palikao in his office a prey to intense grief; he thought that his son, a clever young officer, had been killed at Sedan. On this occasion he received me with the greatest cordiality. 'General,' he said, 'the revolution is a *fait accompli*; if you don't take the direction of affairs it is all up with us; if you do, probably the result will be just the same; but the soldiers will rally round you.' I returned to the Hôtel de Ville, where I found the Provisional Government had received during my absence an addition to its numbers in the person of M. Rochefort. I told them, 'If you want me to be of any use at this fearful crisis I must be at the head of affairs. M. Jules Favre is president; I must be president in his place.' Such, gentlemen, in a very condensed form, is the history of September 4."

In his letter to the President of the National Assembly, referred to at the end of the previous chapter, Count Palikao, referring to this part of General Trochu's defence, said:—"On the morning of the 4th the council met as usual, and only broke up at half-past eleven, as the ministers had to go to the Chamber; none of the persons whose duties called them elsewhere were therefore with the empress—we all knew the dangers of the situation as well as the governor of Paris. I was the last to leave the Corps Législatif. I had strenuously contended with the insurgents in the *Salle des pas Perdus* until the very last moment, exposed to the brutality of an infuriated mob, excited against me by a member of the Extreme Left; and was only rescued from the hands of these misguided men by my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-colonel Barry, and Captain de Brimont, my orderly officer. I had one last duty to fulfil—to wait upon the empress. It was three o'clock when I got to the Tuileries; at that hour the guard were leaving their posts and the mob had invaded the palace. The empress had gone, no one knew whither. It was therefore impossible for me to take her orders. I returned to the ministry at four o'clock; the Revolution had conquered through an insurrection doubly criminal, from the fact of its taking place before a victorious enemy. At five o'clock General Trochu called upon me, to inform me that he had replaced me at the War Office; he wished to know my opinion as to what he had to do. He did not mention his meeting M. Jules Favre, nor what he had done during the day. I replied, that as disturbances might entail the greatest calamity, the presence of men of order such as he could not but be useful. He could not ask me—nor could I give him—advice as to what his conscience might dictate. I have not seen him since."

CHAPTER XVII.

The Situation and Possibilities on both sides after the Battle of Sedan—The great mistake of the French in not constructing Intrenched Camps and making the Sea the Base of their Operations for the relief of Paris—Commencement of the March of the Germans on Paris the day after the Battle of Sedan—Their Forethought and Organization—The Routes taken and System adopted by the Armies in their March to the Capital—Escape of a French Corps which had been sent to assist MacMahon—No resistance offered to the Germans—Their Arrival at Rheims, and Surrender of the City—Catastrophe at Laon, which caused the Explosion of the Powder Magazine in the Citadel—The Commandant declared innocent by the Germans—Letter from him to his Wife on the General State of Affairs—Description of Laon and its History—Skirmishes as the Germans approached nearer to Paris—Their Investment of the City—General Trochu's Plans—Engagement between the French under General Ducrot and the Germans under the Crown Prince of Prussia, on September 17—The French are completely defeated—A more severe Engagement on the 19th, in which the Germans are again Victorious—Disgraceful Conduct of part of the French Troops—Manifesto of General Trochu on the Subject—Entry of the Germans into Versailles—Sketch of the Palace, in which their Headquarters were established, and Town—Negotiations for an Armistice—Count von Bismarck's opinion on the general Situation—His difficulty in dealing with "the Gentlemen of the Pavement"—The German intention of starving the City out, and the only Terms on which Germany could consent to Peace—Meeting between Jules Favre and Count von Bismarck at Ferrières—Epitome of the Reports issued by each on their Interview—The French Government reiterate their Determination not to cede "an Inch of their Territory, or a Stone of their Fortresses"—The Action taken by the English Government between both Belligerents—The Operations of the Besiegers up to the end of September—The Feeling in Germany—Speech and Imprisonment of Dr. Jacoby—Events in Italy—The French Troops withdrawn from Rome on the outbreak of the War, and the Italians at once determine to take possession of the City—Enthusiasm in the Army—Triumphant Entry of the Troops on the 20th of September, after three hours' fighting—The Fall of the Temporal Power proclaimed—A Plebiscitum declares unmistakably in favour of the New Order of Things.

BEFORE proceeding further, it may be of service that we pass in brief review the situation and possibilities on both sides, at the time to which our narrative now reaches, as they were estimated by an able writer in the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1871.

First, as to France. Starting with the assumption that Paris could resist for three months, we find the French bent on continuing the struggle—a determination which appears to have been intensified by every fresh disaster; but the only elements of success were supplied by the superior numbers and wealth of the defenders. Of able-bodied men there was no lack; but they were at first without arms and without officers to organize them. Especially were they deficient in field artillery, a deficiency for which no amount of courage or numbers could make up. The action of the civilian prefects in many cases disgusted the officers of the regular army; and the hoisting of the red flag at Lyons and Marseilles, referred to in the previous chapter, threatened at one time to divide the French people into two hostile camps.

While such was the state of affairs without the city, the temper of the Parisian populace could not be counted on. Dissensions were known to exist, and the Belleville clique, headed by Flourens, were noisy and violent. As already stated, the armed force at the disposal of Trochu was of a mixed character, consisting of regular troops, mobiles, and national guards; the regulars greatly disheartened by the events of the war. This force too, wanted organization, and was very imperfectly armed. The garrison was almost destitute of field artillery. Guns had to be cast, and the horses and gunners trained, while the enemy was thundering at the gates. Until this was effected, sorties in force, though the soul of the defence, could not be successfully undertaken.

Thus the composition and equipment of the garrison were in every respect so inferior to those of the approaching besiegers, that the salvation of the city depended absolutely on the formation of such an army without the walls as, in co-operation with the army within, might be able to drive the Germans from their prey. Now, the organization, arming, and provisioning of such a force required both time and a place where, secure from molestation, it might be drilled, and disciplined, and supplied with all the *matériel* and provisions necessary to enable it to take the field with any prospect of success. Such a place the sea alone could furnish. During the whole war the sea was at the command of France, and should have constituted the base of operations for the relief of Paris. Three harbours, Bordeaux and Havre being two of them, might have been fixed on as the rallying points for the whole of the French levies; by united and ceaseless effort on the part of all who were able to

labour, entrenched camps might have been constructed round those ports, the flanks resting on the sea; and the works armed with heavy guns from the fleet, which should have been recalled to the defence of France and divided between the three ports, to which the whole available merchant-marine should have been constantly employed in bringing field-guns and breech-loading rifles for the equipment of the armies, as well as the stores of food and forage required for their maintenance in an advance on Paris. The three camps, each garrisoned by 150,000 fighting men, and armed with guns very superior to any the Germans could bring against them, would easily have defied attack, and divided the operations of the enemy. To assail them, indeed, it would have been necessary to employ three powerful armies, so widely separated from each other in a hostile country as must have rendered intercommunication tedious and difficult; and those armies could not even have been brought into the field, and provided with the requisite heavy guns, except by abandoning the siege of Paris.

The defence of the three camps, on the other hand, might be considered as *one;* since they could have maintained constant and rapid communication by steam, and reinforced each other according to need. As soon as they were ready to take the field, the French marine could have easily transported the armies of the two southern camps to Havre, from which an united army of 450,000 men might have marched to raise the siege of the capital. To the last a screen of troops should have been maintained as far as possible in advance of the two camps; but all serious engagements in the open country, where success might be doubtful, and especially all attempts to defend open towns, should have been avoided.

After Sedan the only organized army remaining to France was shut in at Metz, under Bazaine, and consisted of 150,000 men, exclusive of the regular garrison of the fortress. This force was now hemmed in by strong lines of circumvallation, and invested by the first and second German armies under General Manteuffel and Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of seven corps and three divisions of cavalry, reinforced later by one infantry division. Thus, a German force, never probably exceeding 210,000 men, spread over a circumference of twenty-seven miles, which was divided into two parts by the Moselle, was found sufficient to hold fast 150,000 French occupying the centre of the circle, and with every strategical advantage in their favour.

At Strassburg a French garrison of 19,000 was besieged by 70,000 Germans. By one Prussian division, under the grand duke of Mecklenburg, a garrison of 2000 mobiles was besieged at Toul, whose cannon, commanding the railroad from Nancy by Châlons and Epernay to Paris, compelled the Germans to unload their trains some distance east of the town, to transport their supplies on wheels by a long detour, and to reload them on trains to the west of the fortress. Thus the persistent defence of the garrison, which only surrendered in the last days of September, contributed largely in delaying the operations of the besiegers of Paris. Thionville, Longwy, Montmèdy, and Mézières, all held French garrisons, and prevented the Germans from using the railroad passing by these places to Rheims and Paris. Thionville and Montmèdy were blockaded, and the blockades of Bitsche and Phalsburg were continued; they were defended chiefly by mobiles, and occupied about 18,000 German troops.

To compensate somewhat for their inferiority in the field, the French, as fighting in defence of their own soil, had this advantage, that instead of being limited to one general line of retreat, they could, in the event of defeat, retire in any direction save the one barred by the enemy. With such an extent of seaboard and a powerful fleet they would have been secure of finding safety and support on reaching any point on the coast where local conditions were favourable; and this circumstance would evidently give them a real tactical advantage in battle.

Turning, now, to the Germans. The capture of Paris was the one great object they proposed to themselves in continuing the war, as its attainment, they considered, would lead to the immediate submission of France. The siege of the capital, therefore, was the one great central operation to which all the other military movements were accessory. Had the Germans foreseen the resistance they would have to encounter, it is not improbable that, after Sedan, they would have offered terms of peace which the French might have accepted; but they were under the impression that Paris would yield on the mere appearance of their forces before it, and thus they were committed to a

tedious and difficult enterprise, the duration of which gave France all the chances arising from the mutability of human affairs in general, and the changes which time might work in the opinions and conduct of the other European powers.

Destitute as France was at this period of any organized military force in the field, the most obvious way of reducing her to subjection was to prevent the assembling and training of such a force, by sending strong movable columns of the three arms into every district. But from the large extent of France it was impossible, even with the overwhelming numbers at the disposal of the Prussian monarch, to coerce in that manner more than a small portion of her area. The German columns could command only the ground on which they encamped, with a certain zone around it; and the fire of hatred and resistance, smouldering over the whole surface of the country, would thus be stamped out in one quarter only to burst forth with increased violence in another. To this it was owing that the French government was left so long unmolested at Tours, as it would have been hazardous, in view of the strength of the garrison, to detach to so great a distance from Paris a large force from the investing armies, and a small one would have run the risk of being overpowered.

The base of operations for all the German forces was formed by the line of frontier extending from Saarbrück on the north to Basle on the south, and all their movements were necessarily regulated by that consideration.

The lines of communication for the army engaged in the primary operation of the siege of Paris took their departure from the northern half of this base; and on these lines were situated all the strong places excepting Strassburg, such as Thionville, &c., which the Germans were besieging at the period of the fall of Sedan. The southern half formed the base of operations for the troops engaged in the siege of Strassburg, and for those subsequently employed in reducing Schlestadt, Neu Brisach, Belfort, &c.; as well as for the armies operating by Dijon towards Lyons, and to the south of Belfort towards Besançon.

The position of the investing army at Paris formed a secondary base, from which radiated the different columns acting towards Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Evreux, Amiens, St. Quentin, &c.; the capital being, as it were, the centre of the wheel, of which these columns represented the spokes. The object for which they were employed, was the collecting of supplies, and preventing the siege from interruption by the different bodies of French troops which were organizing all over the country.

With these explanations clearly apprehended, the movements of the German forces, which otherwise would appear confused, will assume in the mind of the reader a methodical and symmetrical arrangement.

On the evening of the 2nd September, the day on which the surrender of Sedan was consummated, the German armies received their marching orders, and on the morning of the 3rd broke up in different directions, *en route* for Paris. The readiness and rapidity with which they resumed their march were noteworthy. An army of 120,000 prisoners, with their personal arms, artillery, camp baggage, ammunition, military train, and military stores, had to be received and transported on a sudden emergency. The transport, store, and commissariat services were thus put to a severe strain; and the victors were hampered in proportion to the magnitude of their victory. The men and horses which came into their hands required to be fed, and the sick to be provided for. The ease, however, with which all this was accomplished was equally astonishing with the victory itself, and showed extraordinary forethought and organization. The demolition of the French army and capture of the emperor seemed only a little episode, by which the stern purpose of the invaders remained unshaken and unaltered. Their goal was Paris; and orders were issued that by the 14th of September the battalions were to be each in position at a distance of ten leagues from the city.

The eleventh corps and first Bavarians, both belonging to the third Prussian army, were detailed to escort the prisoners to Pont-à-Mousson, whence, having handed over their charge to the tenth corps, employed before Metz, they were to make all speed to join the Crown Prince of Prussia in his march to Paris.

The third and fourth armies marched on the capital by two different routes. The third, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, passed by Rethel, Rheims, and Epernay, to the south bank of the Marne; and continued its march by Montmirail to Coulommiers, whence the different corps diverged to take up their respective investing positions from Lagny, on the Marne, towards Versailles. The

Crown Prince of Saxony, with the fourth army, moved his columns to the south-west, but without encroaching on the roads to the west of the line formed by Remilly, La Besace, and Le Chêne. They passed by Vouziers, Rheims, and generally by the north bank of the Marne to Claye, whence the several corps diverged to their respective positions for continuing the investing line from Lagny on their left, round by Gonesse to St. Denis and Argenteuil, north of the city. The tracks of the two crown princes intersected each other at Rheims. That one army of 80,000 men, with all its trains and impediments, should, without serious inconvenience, have been able to cut across the march of another numbering 120,000, added another proof to the excellence of the working staff amongst the Germans.

Each army marched in parallel columns, the lateral communication between which, as well as between the two armies, was kept up by the cavalry; and in particular, the outward flanks of both were protected by strong bodies of mounted troops. Their front was, at the same time, covered by a chain of advanced guards, at a distance of from twenty to thirty miles, in communication with each other by means of cavalry patrols, thus forming a continuous circle, either for protection or conveying information, enveloping the head of the line of march of both armies.

A new French corps d'armée, which had been formed in Paris, under the command of General Vinoy, was despatched by rail to Soissons, Laon, Marle, Vervins, &c., to join MacMahon on his way from Rheims to Stenay, to attempt the relief of Bazaine at Metz. This thirteenth corps consisted of the four last regiments of infantry and two of light cavalry that had arrived from Algeria, and the *débris* of one of MacMahon's cuirassier brigades; to which were added *regiments de marche* composed of fourth battalions and depôts. The corps, however, did not get beyond Mézières; but retreating as quickly as possible, escaped by rail, *via* Laon, Soissons, and Villers-Cotterets, to Paris, before the first-named town surrendered to the cavalry division of Duke William of Mecklenburg.

The march of the Germans met with little opposition. After the defeat at Sedan, although France still had considerable elements of military power, they were for a time so disorganized that they could offer but a feeble resistance to the advance of the enemy. As yet, however, hardly a single fortress of the invaded country had fallen; and Bazaine was still in occupation of Metz with an immense force. The Germans had not, indeed, mastered even one of the main roads or railways necessary to maintain their communications with the interior and with the frontier of Germany, but they still pressed forward, not doubting that Paris would soon be within their reach. Their march was well described by a correspondent of the *Daily News*:—"All through the fertile province of Champagne, down the straight roads, with their lines of poplar trees, and among the pleasant villages on the vine-covered slopes, the Prussians advanced towards Paris. There was a great bend to the northward when the Crown Prince swung round upon MacMahon, and pinned him in against the Belgian frontier at Sedan. There was a momentary pause after the success of September—a pause merely to rest the exhausted troops; then a second movement, as decided and almost as rapid as that of the shutting in of MacMahon. The German forces returned to the main road to their promised goal. They came slanting back to the line of the Marne, and occupied village after village and town after town, with astonishing quickness. The French had no time to prepare a systematic defence. Before the national guard could even be armed, far less exercised, those fluttering pennants of black and white which told of the Prussian lancers, or those spiked helmets of the Prussian dragoons, were seen approaching. Everything had to be abandoned. The armed force, such as it was, dispersed or retreated, and the people submitted themselves to the inevitable in the way of war contributions." On and on marched the invaders. Heralded by their trusty cavalry, the immense armies moved in open order, although never beyond the reach of their prescient strategist, who required but a few hours' notice to mass them for any possible contingency. Dr. Russell also wrote as follows to the *Times* on the subject:—"One thing which causes astonishment to me is the perfect impunity with which the Prussian communications have been preserved. Their military administration is most vigorous, and its apparent severity prevents bloodshed and secures their long lines against attack. It is 'Death' to have any arms concealed or retained in any house. It is 'Death' to cut a telegraph wire, or to destroy anything used for the service of the army. What can a disarmed popula-

tion, however hostile and venturesome, attempt even against small bodies of armed men who always move with caution, and against troops who do not make night marches unless in large bodies? The Prussian cavalry are everywhere. There is no neglect, no *insouciance*. Nothing is taken on trust. The people in the towns and villages are quite aghast."

On the 5th of September the Germans entered the ancient cathedral city of Rheims. In the morning a few cavalry soldiers entered the town, one of whom was attacked by an old Frenchman; the hussar fired his pistol, wounded his assailant, and then, with his companions, galloped out of the city. In the afternoon a large body of troops appeared, followed by the main army, whereupon the mayor formally surrendered the town, and the king of Prussia's headquarters were established in the episcopal palace.

A notable incident occurred when the Germans, under the Duke William of Mecklenburg, arrived at the fortress of Laon, which General Vinoy's corps left early on the morning of the 6th September. On the evening of that day three uhlans presented themselves at the gate, and demanded admission; but the gardes mobiles fired on them, and they were dismounted and made prisoners. On the following day three more uhlans arrived with a flag of truce. One was admitted, after having had his eyes bandaged; but General Theremin d'Hame, the commandant of the citadel, would not treat with him on account of his inferior rank. On the 8th of September more Prussians appeared; a lieutenant-colonel presented himself as *parlementaire*, and was received by General d'Hame, who refused to surrender the citadel, but the maire came to terms for the town. On the 9th, however, the general received a telegram from the War minister to surrender, as the place was not in a state to defend itself. Two officers of the mobile were sent to the Prussian camp to make the announcement; and accordingly, towards noon a corps of Prussian infantry, a thousand strong, preceded and followed by cavalry, escorting a group of superior officers, entered the town with their band playing. A portion of this force immediately marched to the citadel, just before occupied by the mobiles, who laid down their arms and were declared prisoners of war on parole. At the moment the mobiles were defiling the powder magazine exploded, causing fearful consternation in the ranks both of friends and foes. Fifty Germans and 300 gardes mobiles perished in the catastrophe, and several hundred soldiers and civilians were more or less severely wounded. Roofs were blown off the houses and windows broken, both in Laon and the neighbouring village of Vaux. This sanguinary incident naturally caused great irritation among the Germans, who immediately placed the commandant under arrest. The king of Prussia ordered a judicial investigation to be made into the cause of the explosion, which resulted in establishing the complete innocence of General Theremin d'Hame, who died shortly after of his own injuries. The perpetrator was declared to be a certain inspector of artillery, missing after the catastrophe, and believed to have had no accomplices. By a portion of the French press the perpetrators of the barbarous deed were eulogized as devoted patriots, who preferred death to dishonour. The following abbreviation of a touching letter, written by the unfortunate General to Madame d'Hame shortly after the explosion, shows that he held a contrary opinion, and gives a glimpse of the condition of affairs at the period of which we are writing:—"You will be in great anxiety on my account, beloved. To-day I am able to write and comfort you, which the injuries to my head would not let me do before. A hard trial has fallen on me. You know that sixteen days since the command of this department was assigned to me, without staff, or a single man or officer of the regulars. I was left alone with a battalion of mobiles, who had been called out on the 8th of August. The men, terrified at the rumours flying about, deserted wholesale, and were reduced one half. We had no means of resistance, and a telegram from the minister told me, if necessary, to fall back on Soissons. Unhappily this came too late. The Prussian summons to surrender arrived soon after it, and there was no means of withdrawal. After two days of parleying, I was obliged to surrender, the citadel being in face of a whole army corps. When the duke of Mecklenburg entered he was astonished to see who had defended the place—mere peasants in blouses, many of them without a cartridge-box. The duke had asked me whether I was related to F. Theremin, formerly of our foreign office, and I had scarcely answered this, and one or two other friendly questions, when a terrific explosion

covered the ground with dead and dying. The event was so surprising that one could only attribute it to treason, and to-day it is manifest to all that the garde d'artillerie is alone responsible for it. Yet all my life long I shall be grieved that so rascally a deed was perpetrated where I had the command. Happily the duke and his brigadier, Count Alvensleben, are only slightly wounded. I was to have had my freedom, and my sword had been given back to me. All is changed now. I am a prisoner and in hospital, and know not when I may be well and free again. But as soon as permitted I will, by a pass, hasten to you and my daughter, who must, for the present, use her Christian faith to bear the trial that has come upon us." A month after the above was written General d'Hame died of his wounds.

The town of Laon is situated seventy-five miles north-east of Paris, and is the capital of the department of the Aisne. Its traditionary history extends back to the reign of Clovis, and during the Carlovingian dynasty it formed a part of the possessions of the crown. The city was surrounded by an ancient wall, and possessed a handsome cathedral dating from the twelfth century. The fortress had sustained frequent sieges, and in 1594 was taken from the League by Henry IV. During the campaign of 1814 it was the scene of a sanguinary engagement between Napoleon I. and Marshal Blücher, in which, after a conflict of great obstinacy and varying success, the French were finally beaten, with a loss of forty-eight guns and between 5000 and 6000 prisoners.

After the affair at Laon the German armies continued to advance uninterruptedly (with the exception of a few futile attempts at obstruction by the felling of trees and the blowing up of bridges) towards Paris, which, as previously arranged, they approached by three main roads, the one from Soissons, through Villers-Cotterets and Dommartin; the second from Meaux, through which they had come from Epernay and Château-Thierry; and the third from Provins, through Brie, which leads to the junctions of the rivers Seine and Marne, close to Paris on its south-east side. When they reached so near the capital their progress was not allowed altogether undisputed. At Chateau-Thierry a Prussian reconnoitring party was driven back by a body of French cavalry. At Montereau and Melun engagements took place between uhlans and francs-tireurs, and heavy fighting occurred near Colmar between these irregulars and the Germans, in which the French sustained defeat and lost several prisoners.

It was in the suburban village of Créteil, on the Marne, two miles in front of the Fort de Charenton that the Prussian scouts made their first appearance on the 16th September. Two days before, the main body of the German armies had reached the streams which fence Paris on its eastern front. The Crown Prince of Saxony was posted at Meaux, on the Marne, and the Crown Prince of Prussia at Melun, on the Seine, with the design of converging from those points on their destined prize. The fortifications of the city, however, saved it from a sudden attack, although, as yet, they were comparatively ill armed, and had not the support of an army outside. Their unprotected state enabled the invaders from the first to seize positions which gave them the power of effectually investing the capital, and which never could have been occupied had the French possessed an army of such strength as that with which MacMahon undertook his fatal march to Sedan.

General Trochu, who well knew the importance of preventing the enemy from closing in on the city, had endeavoured, as far as was in his power, to retard the investment, and to strengthen the external line of the defences where they were weakest. With this object he had stationed troops outside the eastern and southern forts, with orders to attack the Germans in flank as they advanced, and, if possible, to drive them back; and he had constructed, and partly armed, works on the heights which, from Clamart to Chatillon, command the forts of Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge, along the southern verge of Paris.

With any considerable number of good troops and an adequate field artillery, General Trochu would at this time have made it impossible for the Germans to take up their investing line on such an enormous circumference without defeating again a French army. The French, holding the centre, might have struck vigorously at different portions of the force closing round the city, and might have cut it into fragments before it found time to construct entrenchments and batteries, to tighten its hold upon its victim.

On the 18th September, a feeble fragment of the French regular army, under General Vinoy, attacked the leading columns of the Crown Prince

of Saxony as they debouched into the valley of the Marne; but it was soon forced to fall back before them. The next day another attack was made by the French between St. Denis and Gonesse with a similar result; in the evening, on the southern side, they put forth an effort more vigorous and protracted, but still fruitless. On the 17th, the third army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, was headed by the fifth corps, which, at Villeneuve St. George threw pontoon bridges over the Seine, by which the fifth, sixth, and second Bavarian corps passed, to take up their positions in the investing line from the Seine westward by Sévres to Bougival, north-west of the city. To cover this operation, the seventeenth infantry brigade of the fifth corps, supported by two squadrons and two batteries, occupied a strong position on the heights of Limeil, extending across the high road to Melun and the Lyons railway, to Boissy St. Leger. Five companies occupied the woods of the Château Brevannes, at the foot of the hill on the Paris side of the position. At two p.m. eight battalions of French regulars, and two batteries, under the command of General Ducrot, debouched from Charenton on the tongue of land lying between the Seine and Marne. The ground was admirably chosen, as both flanks of the attacking force were covered by rivers; but notwithstanding the advantage of their position, the French were defeated and driven back in wild confusion by the five German companies posted in the woods of Brevannes, aided by the two batteries on the heights of Limeil. On the 18th, the fifth German corps, covered by a squadron of cavalry on the side towards Paris, advanced with its leading division (ninth) to Bièvre, and the tenth division to Palaiseau. The head of this column had a slight skirmish with some French troops posted to the north of Bièvre, near Petit Bicêtre, in the afternoon. On the same day the second Bavarian corps had crossed the Seine and occupied Longjumeau (on the left bank), while the head of the sixth corps arrived at the bridge, and prepared to pass it early the next morning, in the meantime constructing another bridge.

On the morning of the 19th the following corps commenced their march: the fifth on Versailles, in two columns, by Bièvre and Jouy; the Bavarians on Chatenay, by Palaiseau; the sixth on Chenilly, by Villeneuve le Roi and Orly. The head of the ninth division (fifth corps), after debouching from Bièvre, was again attacked by a French force in the fortified position at Petit Bicêtre, but the attack was soon repulsed. The division was about to resume its march on Versailles when it was once more attacked, and this time so vigorously and by so large a force (the whole of the French fourteenth corps), that it was very hard pressed. But one Bavarian brigade, which had reached Chatenay, came to its assistance at Villa Coublay (on the summit of the plateau); and another, advancing on Sceaux, threatened the enemy's flank, whilst a third marched on Bourg-la-Reine, to cut off his retreat; the remaining brigade of the Bavarian corps meanwhile occupying Croix de Bernis. The tenth division, fifth corps, arriving on its march from Palaiseau, at Jouy, at this time, was, with the reserve artillery, also directed on Villa Coublay, and the fire of the latter, from the plateau, caused the French to evacuate their position at Petit Bicêtre, and retreat rapidly on Chatillon, so that the fifth German corps was enabled to resume its march on Versailles soon after eleven o'clock a.m. By their retrograde movement the Freuch were brought into closer contact with the advance of the Bavarians at Bourg. To gain time to carry off the guns which had been placed in the earthworks near Chatillon, they occupied a strong position along the edge of the plateau and towards Meudon, bringing twenty-six field guns into battery, and even threatening Fontenay and Plessis with attacks which seemed sufficiently serious to cause the Bavarian general, Von Hartmann, to suspend the advance of the two brigades in front until he could bring the other two up to their support. A pause thus ensued in the fire on both sides. About an hour after, it was again opened with renewed vigour by the Bavarians, who, perceiving that the enemy was withdrawing his "position" guns and preparing to retreat, made a general attack and carried the redoubt at three p.m., capturing eight pieces of artillery, and driving the French under the guns of forts Vanves and Montrouge. During these proceedings the sixth corps crossed the river, and advancing on Villejuif and Vitry, by Choisy, Orly, and Thiais, came up on the right of the Bavarians; but its further progress was arrested by the fire of a large French redoubt on the heights above Villejuif. On the evening of the 19th the third army occupied the line of Bougival, Sèvres, Meudon, Clamart, Bourg-la-Reine, L'Hay, Chevilly, Choisy-le-Roi, and, in conjunction with the Würtemburg division, the

space between Choisy-sur-Seine, and Monneuil-sur-Marne. On the morning of the 20th the city was thus invested on all sides.

The behaviour of a part of the French troops engaged in the combats around the city rendered of no effect the superior advantages of their position. They had belonged to regiments of MacMahon's own corps; but demoralized through repeated defeats, they fled panic-stricken from the field at the first appearance of danger, and refused to renew the contest. The losses of the French were few in killed and wounded, but the number of prisoners was variously estimated at from 2000 to 3000, besides the eight guns captured in the redoubt, as already mentioned. On the German side the Crown Prince of Prussia reported that the investing of the city had been effected with little loss—the chief casualties occurring in the seventh regiment. In Paris the establishment of a court-martial for the trial of "cowards and deserters" was proclaimed by the minister of War; and General Trochu issued to the garrison of the capital a manifesto containing the subjoined passage, which strikingly illustrates some of the difficulties with which the French military leaders had to contend:—"In the fight of yesterday, which lasted during nearly the whole day, and in which our artillery, whose firmness cannot be too highly praised, inflicted upon the enemy enormous losses, some incidents occurred which you ought to be made acquainted with, in the interest of the great cause which we are all defending. An unjustifiable panic, which all the efforts of an excellent commander and his officers could not arrest, seized upon the provisional regiment of zouaves which held our right. From the commencement of the action the greater number of those soldiers fell back in disorder upon the city, and there spread the wildest alarm. To excuse their conduct the fugitives have declared that they were being led to certain destruction, while, in fact, their strength was undiminished, and they had no wounded; that cartridges were deficient, while they had not made use, as I ascertained for myself, of those with which they were provided; that they had been betrayed by their leaders, &c. The truth is, that these unworthy soldiers compromised from the very beginning an affair from which, notwithstanding their conduct, very important results were obtained. Some other soldiers of various regiments of infantry were similarly culpable. Already the misfortunes which we have experienced at the commencement of this war had thrown back into Paris undisciplined and demoralized soldiers, who caused there uneasiness and trouble, and who from the force of circumstances have escaped from the authority of their officers and from all punishment. I am firmly resolved to put an end to such serious disorders. I order all the defenders of Paris to seize every man, all soldiers and gardes mobiles, who shall be found in the city in a state of drunkenness, or spreading abroad scandalous stories and dishonouring the uniform which they wear." The misfortunes caused by these panic-stricken troops were increased by the French engineering department having constructed the redoubt captured by the Germans between the villages of Chatillon and Clamart, apart from the permanent defences of the city. When the Germans crossed the Seine the work was unfinished, and should have been dismantled and destroyed; but was left, armed, to fall into the hands of the enemy, who immediately transformed it into a redoubt facing towards forts Vanves and Montrouge. Captain Bingham, in his "Siege of Paris," says, that had the Prussians followed up their advantage the city would have been at their mercy—the regular troops being demoralized and the mobiles and national guards being quite untrained. The people felt highly indignant that after so many lessons their soldiers should again have allowed themselves to be so ignominiously routed; and there was a loud outcry against the Zouaves especially, who, as representatives of the late *régime*, were denounced as dastardly prætorians, fit to act against unarmed citizens, but useless when opposed to armed troops.

The entry of the Germans into Versailles may be noticed in a few sentences. On the 18th of September three death's head hussars presented themselves at one of the town gates and demanded a parley with the authorities, but the maire refused to treat with any soldier under the rank of a general, or who was not furnished with full powers. The next morning the demand was renewed by an aide-de-camp, followed by a single cavalry soldier, and a long discussion ensued. Since six o'clock the cannon had been booming on the road from Versailles to Sceaux, about three miles from the town. The aide-de-camp required accommodation for the wounded, and the keys of all forage stores. These demands having led to a warm debate, the officer departed to consult his general. In less than an hour an aide-de-camp to the general commanding

the fifth corps arrived, and the discussion was renewed. At a quarter past eleven a.m. M. Rameau, the newly-appointed maire, taking his station at the Paris gate, read the conditions of capitulation at last agreed to, which were :—" 1. That property and person should be respected, as also public monuments and works of art. 2. The confederate German forces should occupy the barracks with their soldiers, but the inhabitants were to lodge the officers, and soldiers also, if the barracks should afford insufficient accommodation. 3. The national guard should retain its arms, and, for the common interest, should be intrusted with the internal police of the town, except that the confederates should occupy at their discretion the gates at the barriers. 4. There should be no requisition for money, but the town should supply at money rates all that might be needed for the passing or stationary forces. 5. On the same day the Grille des Chantiers would be opened to allow the fifth corps to enter." Shortly before ten o'clock the German columns began to defile through the Rue des Chantiers. The procession lasted until past five o'clock in the afternoon, the total number of troops being variously estimated at from 25,000 to 40,000 men. Versailles was immediately fixed on as the headquarters of the Crown Prince and king of Prussia, and so remained till the end of the siege.

The palace of Versailles, in which the German headquarters were established, was founded in 1661 by Louis XIV., being erected on the site of an old hunting lodge of Henry IV., situated in the midst of a large forest. The timber, however, was soon cleared, and a splendid park formed twenty miles in circumference, the grounds laid out in a style of great magnificence, and a supply of water obtained for the ornamental fountains at an enormous outlay. It is reported that the palace, grounds, and waterworks cost upwards of £40,000,000 sterling, and an outlay of 10,000 francs has to be incurred every time the whole of the fountains are played. The palace itself is in the Ionic style, and more remarkable for its vastness than its architectural beauty ; but the rooms and galleries are most elaborately decorated, and stored with the choicest works of art. Versailles had always been a favourite residence of royalty ; and although the palace and gardens suffered considerably during the first revolution, they were fully restored and improved by Louis Philippe, whose object was to make Versailles a grand historical museum. The town of Versailles itself has an interesting history, and contains several handsome monuments and an old cathedral dedicated to Our Lady. In 1815 it was occupied by the Prussians under Blücher, and pillaged by the troops.

Previous to the investment of the capital negotiations had been entered into for an armistice. Even before the German headquarters had arrived at Rheims, on its march to Paris, Earl Granville, the English Foreign minister, had conveyed intimations to Count von Bismarck that the provisional government were anxious to discuss terms of peace. The proclamation of the republic, however, and the institution of the provisional government, were viewed with little favour by the German chancellor, and he intimated that he could not recognize M. Favre as minister of Foreign Affairs for France, or as capable of binding the nation. In the course of a conversation, reported about this time by a correspondent of the *Standard*, Count von Bismarck observed:—" When I saw the emperor, after his surrendering himself a prisoner, I asked him if he was disposed to put forward any request for peace. The emperor replied that he was not in a position to do so, for he had left a regular government in Paris, with the empress at its head. It is plain therefore that, if France possesses any government at all, it is still the government of the empress as regent, or of the emperor." When asked if the flight of the empress and of the prince imperial might not be regarded as an abdication, he said very positively he could not so construe it. The empress had been forced to go by the " gentlemen of the pavement," as the Corps Législatif had been obliged to suspend its sittings, but the actions of these " gentlemen " were not legal. They could not make a government. " The question was," continued the count, " Whom does the fleet still obey? Whom does the army shut up in Metz still obey? Perhaps Bazaine still recognizes the emperor. If so, and we choose to let him go to Paris, he and his army would be worth considerably more than the gentlemen of the pavement and the so-called government. We do not wish to dictate to France her form of government : we have nothing to say to it ; that is her affair." Count von Bismarck also significantly added : " The present is the twenty-fifth time in the space of a hundred years that France has made war on Germany on some pretext or other. Now, at least, our terrible disease of divided unity being cured,

we have contrived, by the help of the hand of God, to beat her down. It is idle to hope to propitiate her."

A large section of the German people thought it highly improbable that Paris could withstand the rigours of a siege; and Colonel von Holstein took a bet of 20,000 francs with M. de Girardin that the Prussian army would defile before his house in the Avenue du Roi de Rome by the 15th of September. This, however, was not the opinion of Count von Bismarck, who publicly declared that the German policy was not immediately to attack the capital. "We shall," said he, "enter the city without attacking it; we shall starve it out." He is also credited with having used the expression, that the Parisians would be made "to stew in their own juice." In the conversation to which we have just alluded the conditions of peace were freely canvassed. "For the improvement of the frontier," said the German chancellor, "we must have Strassburg, and we must have Metz; and we will fight ten years sooner than not obtain this necessary security." Count von Bismarck admitted that the French would regard with a rancorous hatred the possession of these two fortresses; but he suggested that, as it was already, France would never forgive the Germans for the complete overthrow of their grand army. They must therefore secure material guarantees against future attack. The above conversations were generally confirmed by official circulars issued by Count von Bismarck from Rheims on the 13th and Meaux on the 16th of September, in which he threw the entire responsibility of the war upon France, and assumed that Prussia was a highly pacific and ill-used nation. But these sentiments appear to have been used, in every case, simply as a preface to the fact that Germany was now determined to "strengthen her frontier," which she could not adequately do till Metz and Strassburg were in her possession.

Previous to the final investment of the capital, and while the German armies were on the march, negotiations of an official character were, however, entered into. The report of M. Jules Favre, issued on the 21st September, stated that the day after it was established the provisional government received the representatives of all the powers in Paris. North America, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal officially recognized the French Republic, and the other powers authorized their representatives to enter into semi-official relations with the new government. On the 10th of September M. Favre asked Count von Bismarck if he was willing to enter into negotiations as to the conditions of an arrangement. He replied that he could not entertain any proposal in consequence of the irregular character of the provisional government, but asked at the same time what guarantees that government could offer for the execution of any treaty that might be concluded. Earl Granville, who had acted as intermediary, considered it desirable that M. Favre should proceed to the Prussian headquarters; and on the 16th September Count von Bismarck decided to receive him, first at Meaux, and subsequently at Ferrières. In the course of these interviews, M. Favre declared the fixed determination of France to accept of no condition which would render the proposed peace merely a short or precarious truce. Count von Bismarck said that, if he believed a permanent peace possible, he would conclude it without delay; but he thought the provisional government was not to be depended on, and that its overthrow by the populace, should Paris not be captured in a few days, was a very probable event. "France," he added, "will as little forget the capitulation of Sedan as Waterloo or Sadowa, which latter did not concern you." On being pressed by M. Favre to state exactly his conditions of peace, he replied that the possession of the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine, of the Moselle, with Metz, Chateau-Salins, and Sonines, was indispensable, as a guarantee for the security of his country, and that he could not relinquish them. He acknowledged the force of the objection, that the consent of the people of those districts to be thus disposed of was more than doubtful, and that the public law of Europe would not permit him to act without that consent; but he added, "As we shall shortly have another war with you, we intend to enter upon it in possession of all our advantages." M. Favre urged that the European powers might regard the claims of Prussia as exorbitant, and that France "will never accept them. We can perish as a nation, but we cannot dishonour ourselves. The country alone is competent to decide upon a cession of territory. We have no doubts as to its sentiments, but we will consult it." The charge that Prussia, carried away by the intoxication of victory, desired the destruction of France,

Count von Bismarck utterly denied; but to a demand for time to allow of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, he, according to M. Favre, replied that for the purpose an armistice was necessary, which he could on no account grant. At the second interview, however, on the evening of the 19th of September, at Ferrières, he appeared to consent to an armistice of fifteen days; and next day, at eleven a.m., he sent M. Favre the following conditions, namely, the occupation of Strassburg, Toul, and Phalsburg; and as the French minister had stated that the Assembly would meet in Paris, one of the forts commanding the capital—Mont Valérien, for instance—must be placed in the hands of the Germans. M. Favre said that it would be a more simple arrangement to give up Paris at once. Count von Bismarck replied, "Let us seek some other combination." M. Favre then proposed that the Constituent Assembly should meet at Tours, in which case no guarantee relative to Paris would be required. Against a further demand that the garrison of Strassburg should surrender as prisoners of war, M. Favre expressed himself in terms of strong indignation. Upon this Count von Bismarck went to consult the king, who accepted the second combination, but insisted on the surrender of the garrison of Strassburg as proposed." "My powers were now exhausted," continued M. Favre; "I rose and took my leave, expressing to him my conviction that we should fight as long as we could find in Paris an element of resistance." On his return to the capital he forwarded to Count von Bismarck the following despatch:—

"M. le Comte,—I have faithfully expressed to my colleagues in the government of National Defence the declaration that your excellency has been good enough to make to me. I regret to have to make known to your excellency that that government has not been able to accept your propositions. They will accept an armistice having for its object the election and meeting of a National Assembly; but they cannot subscribe to the contingent conditions. As to myself, I can say with a clear conscience that I have done my utmost to stop the effusion of blood, and to restore peace to two nations which would be so much benefited by that blessing. I have only been stopped by an imperious duty, which required me not to yield the honour of my country, which has determined energetically to resist such a sacrifice. I and my colleagues associate ourselves without reserve in that determination. God, our judge, will decide on our destinies. I have faith in his justice.—I have, &c.

"(Signed), JULES FAVRE.

"*Sept.* 21, 1870."

The French minister concluded his report to his colleagues, with regard to the whole negotiations, as follows:—"I have done, my dear colleagues; and you will think with me that, if I have failed in my mission, it has still not been altogether useless. It has proved that we have not deviated. From the first we have conducted a war which we condemned beforehand, but which we accepted in preference to dishonour. We have done more; for we have laid bare the equivocation on which Prussia relied, and let Europe now assist us in dissipating it altogether. In invading our soil, she gave her word to the world that she was attacking Napoleon and his soldiers, but would respect the nation. We know now what to think of that statement. Prussia requires three of our departments: two fortified cities—one of 100,000, the other of 75,000 inhabitants; and eight or ten smaller ones, also fortified. She knows that the populations she wishes to tear from us repulse her; but she seizes them nevertheless, replying with the edge of the sword to their protestations against such an outrage on their civic liberty and their moral dignity. To the nation that demands the opportunity of self-consultation she proposes the guarantee of her cannon planted at Mont Valérien, and protecting the scene of their deliberations. That is what we know, and what I am authorized to make public. Let the nation that hears this either rise at once or at once disavow us when we counsel resistance to the bitter end."

This memorandum of M. Jules Favre drew forth a reply from Count von Bismarck, addressed to the North German embassies and legations. The language of this document approached the extreme of curtness, not unmixed with a tone of scorn. On the whole, however, the German chancellor admitted that M. Favre had endeavoured to convey an accurate account of the transaction, although the drift of his entire argument was not the conclusion of peace, but of an armistice which was to precede it. Count von Bismarck continued:—"As to our terms

of peace, I expressly declared to M. Favre that I should state the frontier we should claim only after the principle of cession of territory had been publicly conceded by France. In connection with this the formation of a new Moselle district, with the arrondissements of Saarbrück, Château Salins, Saargemund, Metz, and Thionville, was alluded to by me as an arrangement included in our intentions; but I have not renounced the right of making such further demands as may be calculated to indemnify us for the sacrifices which a continuance of the war will entail. M. Favre called Strassburg the key of the house, leaving it doubtful which house he meant. I replied that Strassburg was the key of our house, and we therefore objected to leave it in foreign hands. Our first conversation in Château Haute Maison, near Montoy, was confined to an abstract inquiry into the general characteristics of the past and present ages. M. Favre's only pertinent remark on this occasion was that they would pay any sum, 'tout l'argent que nous avons,' but declined any cession of territory. Upon my declaring such cession to be indispensable, he said, in that case, it would be useless to open negotiations for peace; and he argued on the supposition that to cede territory would humiliate —nay, dishonour—France. I failed to convince him that terms such as France had obtained from Italy, and demanded from Germany, without even the excuse of previous war—terms which France would have undoubtedly imposed upon us had we been defeated, and in which nearly every war had resulted down to the latest times—could have nothing dishonourable in themselves to a nation vanquished after a gallant struggle; and that the honour of France was of no other quality or nature than the honour of all other countries." Count von Bismarck further said that the conversations at Ferrières took a more practical turn, referring exclusively to the question of an armistice; and this, he contended, disproved the assertion that he had refused such a question under any conditions. "In this conversation," he continued, "we both were of opinion that an armistice might be concluded, to give the French nation an opportunity of electing a Representative Assembly, which alone would be in a position so far to strengthen the title to power possessed by the existing government as to render it possible for us to conclude with them a peace valid in accordance with the rules of international law. I remarked that to an army in the midst of a victorious career an armistice is always injurious; that in the present instance, more particularly, it would give France time to reorganize her troops and to make defensive preparations; and that, therefore, I could not accord an armistice without some military equivalent being conceded to us. I mentioned as such the surrender of the fortresses obstructing our communications with Germany; because, if by an armistice we were to be detained in France longer than was absolutely necessary, we must insist upon increased means of bringing up provisions. I referred to Strassburg, Toul, and some less important places. Concerning Strassburg I urged that, the crowning of the *glacis* having been accomplished, the conquest of that place might be shortly anticipated; and that we therefore thought ourselves entitled to demand that that garrison should surrender as prisoners of war. The garrisons of the other places would be allowed free retreat. Paris was another difficulty. Having completely inclosed this city, we could permit it renewed intercourse with the rest of France only if the importation of fresh provisions thereby rendered possible did not weaken our own military position and retard the date at which we might hope to starve out the place. Having consulted the military authorities and taken his Majesty's commands, I therefore ultimately submitted the following alternative: 'Either the fortified place of Paris is to be given into our hands by the surrender of a commanding portion of the works, in which case we are ready to allow Paris renewed intercourse with the country, and to permit the provisioning of the town; or, the fortified place of Paris not being given into our hands, we shall keep it invested during the armistice, which latter would otherwise result in Paris being able to oppose us at its expiry, reinforced by fresh supplies, and strengthened by new defences.' M. Favre peremptorily declined handing over any portion of the works of Paris, and also refused the surrender of the Strassburg garrison as prisoners of war. He, however, promised to take the opinion of his colleagues at Paris respecting the other alternative under which the military *status quo* before Paris was to be maintained. Accordingly, the programme which M. Favre brought to Paris as the result of our conversations, and which was rejected there, contained nothing as to the future conditions of peace. It only included an armis-

tice of from a fortnight to three weeks, to be granted on the following conditions, in order to enable the election of a National Assembly to be held: Firstly, in and before Paris the maintenance of the military *status quo;* secondly, in and before Metz the continuance of hostilities within a circle hereafter to be more accurately defined; thirdly, the surrender of Strassburg with its garrison, and the evacuation of Toul and Bitsche, their garrisons being accorded free retreat. I believe our conviction that this was a very acceptable offer will be shared by all neutral cabinets. If the French government has not availed itself of this opportunity for having a National Assembly elected in all parts of France, those occupied by us not excepted, this indicates a resolve to prolong the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a valid peace, and to ignore the voice of the French people. From all we see here, the conviction is forced upon us, as it no doubt is likewise upon the rulers at Paris, that free and unbiassed general elections will yield a majority in favour of peace."

It will thus be seen that the negotiations failed to procure peace. The ministers in Paris issued a proclamation reiterating their determination not to cede "an inch of territory, or a stone of a fortress." As a sequel to this proclamation a manifesto of the delegation at Tours appeared as follows: "To France! Before the investment of Paris, M. Jules Favre, minister for Foreign Affairs, wished to see M. de Bismarck to learn the intentions of the enemy. Here is the declaration of the enemy: Prussia wishes to continue the war, and to reduce France to the rank of a second-rate power; Prussia claims Alsace and Lorraine, as far as Metz, by right of conquest; Prussia, to consent to an armistice, has dared ask for the surrender of Strassburg, of Toul, and of Mont Valérien. Paris, enraged, would sooner bury itself beneath its ruins. To such insolent pretensions, in fact, we answer only by a struggle *à outrance.* France accepts this struggle, and relies on her children."*

The correspondence subsequently published by the British government, relating to this period, showed more clearly the significance of the above negotiations. The English foreign minister, Earl Granville, had all through the proceedings acted with dignified consistency, abiding by the propositions that England would make no attempt at mediation unless with the concurrence of both belligerents; that where military questions came in, the government would rigidly abstain from offering any opinion; and that England would not formally recognize the government of National Defence until it had received an express recognition from the French nation. But any project of successful mediation was rendered difficult on account of the ground taken by the combatants. On the one hand, the Germans had stated that they must and would have territory; while, on the other, the republican government held to their famous declaration that they would yield neither an inch of territory nor a stone of any fortress. And then, again, the French cabinet never felt exactly secure of its own position, and repeatedly acknowledged that in order to bind the nation it ought to have the sanction of a National Assembly; while at the same time the calling together of that Assembly was indefinitely postponed, and even the councils general suspended. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the Germans soon perceived that they had miscalculated the resistance which Paris would make, and therefore in negotiating would not yield a single point which they considered of military importance. There were also indications that some divergence of opinion existed among the German leaders. Count von Bismarck foresaw political difficulties which Germany might be creating for herself, and wished the war to end; while General von Moltke thought of nothing but how to carry on the war so as to lose no advantage that could be obtained. The principal objection to an armistice was that the German position round Paris was so fraught with danger, that the possibility of diplomatic successes could not be set against the peril of giving Paris three weeks more breathing-time, while the armies behind the Loire were being organized.

The active operations of the besiegers from the period of the final investment of the city up to the end of September were carried on with vigour and with caution. No immediate attack was made upon the outworks, but the capital was effectually blockaded in a circumference of about forty miles. On the 23rd the French attacked the besieging force at Drancy, Pierrefitte, and Villejuif. The fight was sustained by the sixth Prussian corps; and in the two last-mentioned localities the advantage was in favour of the French; but as the sorties in either case were hardly pushed beyond

* How differently does this braggadocia read to the firm, clear, and, we must acknowledge, moderate argument of the German chancellor.

the range of the heavy guns of the forts, they were evidently intended by General Trochu only as military training for the troops, and were in themselves of little or no importance. Meanwhile the Germans, amounting to from 200,000 to 230,000 men, occupied the heights surrounding the city, fortified their various positions, and established batteries, supported by infantry connected with each other by squadrons of cavalry, which were kept in unceasing movement. All this time the heavy siege guns of the Germans were arriving, and the camp was kept in constant watchfulness by reports from inside Paris that "its defenders, especially the garde mobile, demanded an immediate sortie in force." To this treacherous impatience General Trochu eventually yielded; and on the 30th of September General Vinoy directed a large force of all arms again to the south-east, where the sixth Prussian corps was strongly intrenched. In this action the French were repulsed after two hours' fighting, and retired under cover of their forts. Their loss amounted to upwards of a thousand men, including several hundred prisoners. The German official account admitted a loss of only 200—the troops having fought chiefly under cover. The Crown Prince of Prussia commanded in person, and the French General Giulham was killed.

Many of the German journals at this period regarded the annexation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine almost as good as accomplished. The large majority of the people, likewise, were resolved that these provinces should be united to Germany. "If we make no military conquest," said they, "we have no lasting peace, but only a short truce; we must always remain in full military equipment; there can be no thought of reducing our armaments in time of peace, and any one can foresee the effect of this on our internal development." Expressive of the same feeling, the *New Prussian Zeitung* said:—"Germany can conclude with France such a peace only as, by giving her a strong position against France, will make her wholly indifferent as to what passes in France. In the possession of Alsace and German Lorraine, in the possession of Strassburg and Metz—the two opening doors for French plundering expeditions—Germany will have the guarantees of peace in her own hands, and, secured by this possession, she can quietly look on at whatever explosion volcanic France in the distance gives herself up to." Still, a section of the German people regarded the annexation of these provinces with disfavour. A writer in the *Cologne Gazette* represented the inhabitants of Lorraine as thoroughly French in all their physical and intellectual characteristics, and condemned the proposed acquisition of that territory. Other writers expressed the same views, which were held by a considerable number of German democrats and conservatives. But a public meeting at Konigsberg for the consideration of the subject of annexation was specially distasteful to the Prussian authorities. At that meeting Dr. Johann Jacoby, a politician of republican tendencies, made the following remarkable speech:—"The chief question, the decision of which alone has any importance for us, is this: Has Prussia or Germany the right to appropriate Alsace and Lorraine? They tell us Alsace and Lorraine belonged formerly to the German empire. France possessed herself of these lands by craft and by force. Now that we have beaten the French, it is no more than what is right and proper that we should recover from them the spoil, and demand back the property stolen from us. Gentlemen! do not let yourselves be led away by well-sounding words, and though they offer you the empire of the world, be not tempted to worship the idols of power. Test this well-sounding phrase, and you will find that it is nothing but a disguise of the old and barbarous right of force. Alsace and Lorraine, they say, were formerly German property, and must again become German. How so, we inquire? Have, then, Alsace and Lorraine no inhabitants? Or are, perchance, the inhabitants of these provinces to be regarded as having no volition, as a thing that one may at once take possession of and dispose of just as one likes? Have they lost all their rights through the war, have they become slaves, whose fate is at the arbitrary disposal of the conqueror? Even the most ardent and incarnate partisans of annexation allows that the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine are in heart and soul French, and wish to remain French. And however much they might have offended us, it would be contrary to all human justice should we try to Germanize them compulsorily, and incorporate them against their will either with Prussia or any other German state. Gentlemen! There is an old German proverb, which has been raised to a universal moral law on account of its being so true—'Do not unto others what you would not they should

do unto you.' What should we and our 'national Liberals' feel if at some future time a victorious Pole should demand back and seek to annex the provinces of Posen and West Russia? And yet the same grounds might be urged for this that are now brought forward to support an annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. No, Gentlemen! It is our duty to oppose such tendencies of national egotism. Let us hold fast to the principles of justice as much in public life as in private life! Let us openly declare it to be our deep and inmost conviction that every incorporation of foreign territory against the wishes of the inhabitants is a violation of the right of self-constitution common to all people, and therefore as objectionable as it is pernicious. Let us, without being led astray by the intoxication of victory, raise a protest against every violence offered to the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine. Only he who respects the liberty of others is himself worthy of liberty."*

General Vogel von Falckenstein, who during the war exercised all but supreme power over the district under his control, immediately arrested Dr. Jacoby, as well as the chairman of the meeting, Herr Herbig, both of whom were conveyed to the fortress of Lötzen. Dr. Jacoby, however, protested by letter to Count von Bismarck; and the authorities, either not prepared to sanction the extreme measure of General Falckenstein, or unwilling to arouse a feeling of irritation among the democrats of Germany and Europe at large, subsequently ordered the release of Dr. Jacoby and his colleague. But undoubtedly the great national party firmly adhered to the policy of annexation, and their leaders were already foreshadowing a federal constitution, in which an imperial crown should be awarded to the house of Hohenzollern.

To describe, briefly, one of the "incidents" arising out of the war, it is necessary to look for a little at the state of matters in Italy. For many years it had been the aspiration of Italian statesmen to accomplish the unity of that country, by making Rome the capital. But although this desire was almost universally shared by the people, it could not be carried into effect in consequence of the occupation of the city by French troops, to support the temporal power of the pope. On the outbreak of the war, however, the French government immediately determined to evacuate Rome, and an announcement of their purpose was made by M. Ollivier on the 30th of July. These proceedings greatly alarmed the pope and the clerical party; but the Italians saw their opportunity was come, and resolved to embrace it, notwithstanding that intimations were rife that Prussia would interfere on behalf of Pius IX. The popular excitement was intense, and even the loyalty of portions of the papal troops appeared doubtful. Some of the French regiments, on their march for embarkation to Marseilles, shouted "Vive l'Italie!" the papal legions of Antibes refused to garrison Civita Vecchia, were engaged in constant strife with the German carabineers quartered with them, and many of them deserted, while the attitude of the inhabitants became sullen and threatening. Before leaving Rome, General Dumont told Cardinal Antonelli that the emperor had exacted from the Italian government guarantees for the protection of the pope; to which the cardinal replied, "There are three persons who do not believe in these guarantees: the emperor, yourself, and I." Eight Italian ironclads were ordered to cruise before Civita Vecchia as soon as the French had embarked. To meet the emergency, great activity prevailed in the pontifical war department; the troops were armed with the most approved weapons, recruits sought from the bandit population of the Abruzzi, and the urban guard mobilized.

All uncertainty, however, was speedily dispelled by the action of the Italian ministry. On the 29th of August the people of Florence were startled by the following announcement in the *Gazetta d'Italia*:—"All those whose terms of lease for apartments, separate lodgings, shops, and public-houses have expired, or are about to expire, are informed, that in one of the latest councils of ministers held here, it was decided that the immediate and decided transfer of the government from this provisional capital to Rome shall take place before the end of September next."

By the disasters to the French arms, the catastrophe of Sedan, and the revolution of the 4th September, Italian statesmen considered themselves as freed from their engagement, and that a bold and rapid attack upon the temporal power of the papacy was the only security against the revolutionary contagion. To meet contingencies,

* Dr. Jacoby, at Königsberg, did not regard the necessity of a barrier between Germany and the feverish population of France with the same solicitude as the inhabitants of the more threatened provinces.

the army was raised to 300,000 men. The spirit of the troops was excellent, and on the official declaration reaching the camp, all the tents were illuminated. On the 8th of September a manifesto was sent to the pope by Victor Emmanuel, through Count Ponza di San Martino, embodying the following propositions:—The pope to retain the sovereignty over the Leonine portion of Rome, and all the ecclesiastical institutions of the city. The income of the pope, the cardinals, and all the papal officers and officials to remain unchanged. The papal debt to be guaranteed. Envoys to the pope and cardinals to retain their present immunities, even though not residing in the Leonine city. All nations to be freely admitted to the Leonine city. The Catholic clergy in all Italy to be freed from government supervision. The Italian military, municipal, and entail laws to be modified as regards Rome. These propositions Pius IX. refused to entertain.

On the morning of Sunday, September 11, the king ordered the Italian troops to enter the papal territory. They consisted of 50,000 soldiers, in five divisions, led by Generals Mazé de la Roche, Cozenz, Ferrero, Angioletti, and Bixio, under the supreme command of General Cadorna. At the approach of General Bixio, on Sunday night, the garrison at Montefiascone withdrew without striking a blow. At Aprona, on Monday, a brigade of Italian troops, on crossing the papal frontier, were enthusiastically received. At Bagnorea, twenty zouaves and officers surrendered. At Civita Castellana the zouaves fired upon General Cadorna's vanguard; but on receiving a few shots in return, at once surrendered. Viterbo was occupied without opposition, and no serious resistance was offered to the royal army on its march to the capital. General Cadorna issued a proclamation to the Romans, assuring them that he did not bring war, but peace and order, and that "the independence of the Holy See will not be violated."

The division of General Bixio approached Rome from Civita Vecchia by the left, or west, bank of the Tiber; the division of Angioletti came from the south, out of the Neapolitan territory; and the other divisions, which had entered the Papal States from Tuscany, approached the city on its eastern side. It was therefore ordered that Bixio should attack the western gate, called Porte San Pancrazio, by which the French took the city in 1849; that Angioletti should attack that of St. John Lateran; while the rest of the army should direct their efforts against Porta San Lorenzo, Porta Pia, and a part of the city wall, between Porta Pia and Porta Salara, where the papal zouaves had taken up their position. The garrison, exclusive of some of the pope's Italian troops who refused to fight, numbered above 9000 men—the zouaves, the carabineers, the Antibes legion, the dragoons, the squadriglieri, and the gendarmes. The gates of the city were barricaded and fortified by ramparts of earth. The defence was commanded by General Baron Kanzler. The garrison had sixty pieces of artillery; and the walls, built of solid brick, and forming a circuit of thirteen miles about the city, were of great height and thickness, having been erected to a great extent in the times of the ancient Roman empire, in the reign of Aurelian.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 20th September the Italian artillery opened on the city, accompanied by a sharp interchange of musketry between the papal zouaves and the royal bersaglieri, with the loss of life on both sides. After about three hours' fighting, each division of the Italian forces had succeeded in opening a breach; and when they poured into the city, prepared to charge with the bayonet, the papal soldiers beat a hasty retreat. On this the pope ordered General Kanzler to capitulate; a white flag was waved all along the line, and a messenger informed General Bixio that a treaty had been opened with General Cadorna. The number of killed on the Italian side was 21, including 3 officers; and of wounded, 117, of whom 5 were officers. Of the papal troops, 6 zouaves were killed, and 20 or 30 wounded. The prisoners amounted to 10,400 of all arms.

During these proceedings the pope had taken refuge in the Vatican, and sent to the various diplomatic agents a protest against the action of the Italians. The citizens, however, crowded to the capitol to proclaim the fall of the temporal power, but were fired upon by the squadriglieri, who still retained their arms. A vast multitude subsequently assembled at the Coliseum, where, in accordance with an intimation from the Italian authorities, they elected a provisional giunta, composed of forty-two members, the leading liberals of the city. In the evening, the political prisoners in Castello and St. Michele were liberated by the soldiers and the populace. In St. Michele prison, Cardinal Petroni, condemned for life, had already been a captive for nineteen years; the Doctor Luigi

Castellozzo, Count Pagliani, Giulio Ajani, and Cesare Sterbini, were also lying under the same sentence. Victor Emmanuel had given instructions that the papal territory should not be formally annexed to Italy until a plebiscitum had been taken. In the meantime the elected giunta, in the midst of considerable indications of the tumultuous disposition of the inhabitants, prepared the way for the popular vote. The principal dissatisfaction was occasioned by the fact that the rule of the Leonine city had been secured to the pope, an arrangement which 6000 inhabitants of the Borgia deeply resented, and showed their resentment by popular demonstrations.

The formula of the plebiscitum was, "The Romans, in the belief that the Italian government will guarantee the free exercise of his spiritual authority to the Holy Father, answer *Yes*." The vote was taken on the 2nd of October, amidst great popular enthusiasm, resulting in 136,681 voting *Yes*, and 1507 *No*.

The total collapse of the pontifical *régime*, and the occupation of Rome by the Italian government, form a remarkable epoch in the history of Europe; yet so completely were the minds of men engrossed by the startling occurrences of the war, that these events received at the time a comparatively small amount of attention, and a brief notice in the columns of the European press. In a few days, with a mere show of resistance and a minimum of internal commotion, were accomplished the dream of generations, and the fulfilment of the long-cherished but almost hopeless aspirations after unity by the Italian people.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Extensive Siege Operations of the Germans in September—Description of Strassburg and its Fortifications, and Sketch of its History—Brief Biography of General Uhrich, the Governor—State of the City after the Battles of Wissembourg and Woerth—Number and Description of the Garrison at the Commencement of the Siege—Council of War Determines on a Vigorous Resistance—Proclamation of General Uhrich—Number and Description of the Besieging Force under General von Werder—The Positions occupied by them—Commencement of Hostilities on 12th August—The Superiority of the German Artillery over that of the French—Reconnaissances by the French—Commencement of the Bombardment, in earnest, on 21st August, causing great Destruction of Property and Loss of Life—The Germans consent to spare the Cathedral as much as possible—General Uhrich again refuses to Surrender—The Bombardment is discontinued, and a Regular Siege commenced—Strange Apathy of the French during the Proceedings of the Besiegers—Extraordinary Completeness of the German Works—Great Sortie on 2nd September—The hopes of the Besieged raised by a piece of extraordinary False News—General Uhrich refuses to believe in the Disaster at Sedan—M. Valentin, the Prefect of the Lower Rhine, appointed by the Republican Government, reaches the City after a very Narrow Escape—Hospitality of the Swiss towards the Aged and Destitute Inhabitants, whom the Germans permitted to leave —Fearful State of the City during the Latter Part of the Siege, and Gallant Conduct of the Inhabitants—Capture of Three Lunettes by the Germans—Two Breaches made in the Walls preparatory to the intended Storming—Final Demand for Surrender, with the Alternative of an Immediate Assault—Song written during the Siege to be Sung by the Troops as they marched into Strassburg—Determination of the Governor to capitulate—Proclamation announcing the Fact to the Inhabitants and Garrison—German Preparations to receive the French Delegates—Disgraceful Conduct of some of the French Soldiers whilst Surrendering—Triumphant Entry of Part of the German Army into the City—Affecting Scenes as the Inhabitants emerged from the Cellars in which they had lived so long—German Rejoicings on 30th September, the day on which the City had been taken from them 189 years before—Impressive Religious Services—Speech of General Werder—The Fearful Effects of the Bombardment on the City—The Irreparable Loss of the Library—State of the Cathedral—Total amount of Damage done to the City estimated at £8,000,000—The Aspect of the Botanic Garden, which had been used as a Burying-Ground—Destruction of Kehl, opposite Strassburg, by the French—Quantity of Shot, &c, fired during the Siege of Strassburg—Number and Value of the Guns captured by the Germans—The Siege of Toul—Description of the Town—Gallantry of the Inhabitants and Garrison —Determination of the Germans to Storm the Town averted by its Capitulation—Reasons for adopting such a course on the part of the French—Scenes in the Town on the Entry of the Germans.

FALL OF STRASSBURG AND TOUL.

In Chapter X., describing the march of the third German army into France, after the defeat of MacMahon at Woerth, we stated that the Badish troops in it were despatched to lay siege to the fortress of Strassburg. We now proceed to relate the chief events of that siege, from the time the city was first invested to its fall on September 28, and also the leading incidents connected with the siege of Toul, which was likewise invested by a portion of the Crown Prince's army a few days after Strassburg.

About the third week in September the Germans were, in fact, prosecuting four important sieges; any one of which would, in ordinary times, have been regarded as a great operation. Strassburg, the centre of the defence of the French frontier of the Rhine, and one of the strongest fortified cities in Europe, was besieged by a corps of about 60,000 men, composed of one division of Badish, one of Prussian, and one of Prussian guard landwehr troops, with pioneers and garrison artillery from the South German states. Toul, on the direct line of railway to Paris, was surrounded by a Prussian division, under the Grand-duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, and still blocked all communication to the capital from South Germany. Metz, the centre of the defence of France between the Meuse and the Rhine, the strongest fortress in all France, surrounded by forts forming an entrenched camp, and held not only by its own garrison, but by the army under Marshal Bazaine, was invested by seven Prussian army corps and three divisions of cavalry—altogether, about 200,000 men. And above all, Paris, defended by more than half a million of armed and disciplined men, was shut in by the third German army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the fourth, under the Crown Prince of Saxony, numbering more than 250,000 men. It will be remembered that in his interview with M. Jules Favre, described in the preceding chapter, the only conditions on which Count von Bismarck would consent to an armistice, were that the fortresses of Strassburg, Toul, and Phalsburg should be placed in the hands of the Germans. As the French were not disposed to accede to these conditions, the conference ended. Two of the fortresses named were, however, destined to fall immediately. While M. Jules Favre and Count von Bismarck were conferring at Ferrières,


SIEGE OF
STRASBOURG,
1870.
Scale of English Miles
Mile
8 Furlongs
Englischer Hof
Redoute
Paul
Sand
ILL R.
Zu
Ruprechts
Au
Redoute
SCHILTIGHEIM
RAILWAY
Ruprechts
od. Roberts Au
Leder Fabr
Wacken
Marne
Rhein
Canal
Canal des Français
Redoute
Stein Thor
Bahnhof
Orangerie
Fink matt
Saverne Thor
Bahn Hof
Fischer Thor
Rathaus
Münster
ILL R.
CITADELLE
National Thor
Esplanade
KLEINER RHEIN
RIV. RHEIN
Zoll Amt
Hafen
RAILWAY
Bahnhof
KEHL
Dorf Kehl
Redoute
ILL R.
Kirch St Urbain
Bahnhof
RAILWAY
Sporen
Insel
Els
Au
Schleuse
Säge M.
Leder Fab.
Metzger
Au
Neudorf
Leim Fabr
Hippodrome
Ziegelwasser
Krumme
Rhein
Redoute
Ochsen
Worth
Linzen
Kopf
Poligone
Artillerie
Schiessplatz
Mein
Au
Meinau
Weghausel
Rissoffen
ILL R.
Drawn under the Superintendence of Capt Hozier
ENTERED AT STATIONERS HAL
WILLIAM MACKENZIE, LONDON, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

General Uhrich and a council of war were deliberating as to the surrender of Strassburg, which capitulated on the 28th of September.

At the time to which our history refers, Strassburg was a French fortified town of the first rank, situated in the valley of the Rhine and of the Ill. Its extensive series of fortifications formed roughly an isosceles triangle, having for its base the southern front, which, at its eastern extremity, close to the Rhine, was defended by a pentagonal bastionned fort. The Germans made their principal attack on the north-west. The two fronts covered by the river Ill could be easily inundated, and the ditches were generally full of water. The north front, like the two others, was composed of a strong system of bastions, with lunettes and fortified works, communicating with the interior by a double line of casemates. Both extremities were defended, the northern by Fort des Pierres, and the southern by Fort Blanche. A military road ran at the foot of the ramparts.

The founder of the fortress, Daniel Speckel, Speckle, or Specklin, was born at Strassburg in 1536, and was at first a mould cutter and silk embroiderer, but subsequently took to the study of architecture. After travelling extensively in the north of Europe he settled at Vienna in 1561, and entered the service of the imperial architect, Solizar. In 1576 he formed an engagement with Duke Albert of Bavaria, and erected several buildings at Ingolstadt; but in 1577 he was called to his native town, and commissioned to construct the fortifications, a wooden model of which, previously made by him, was placed in the town library. In 1589 he completed the task, and died in the same year. Vauban built the citadel, and subsequently outworks were added.

Strassburg was never taken by force until the late war in 1870. When in 1681 it surrendered to the French, it had disarmed itself by the dismissal of the regular Swiss militia; and on the 30th September in that year it was surprised by a French force, drawn together under the pretext of manœuvring in the neighbourhood. On the 28th of September, 1870, it fell, after a long and laborious siege, into the hands of a combined Prussian and Baden corps. Louis XIV. took it just as he had Nancy a few years before, in the midst of peace, and without even giving himself the trouble of declaring war, or assigning a reason for his rapacity. He knew that the German empire, torn to pieces by a religious feud, was not in a position to avenge the injury which the Grand Monarque therefore thought himself justified in committing. In vain the captured city sent envoys and special messengers to the emperor and Imperial Parliament, soliciting assistance in ridding it of those whom it then considered foreigners and enemies. Domestic quarrels were then rife in Germany, and combined action hopeless.

As often as France has aimed at dominion on the Rhine (1688–97, 1703, 1733, 1796, &c.), the outlet for attack on Germany was strengthened by the fortification of Kehl, immediately opposite Strassburg. Kehl, indeed, sustained a two months' siege by the Austrians in the winter of 1796–97. The Rhine fortress, scarcely accessible in consequence of its being surrounded by water, was first invested by the Russians and Badeners on the 7th of January, 1814. It was cannonaded, but without success, on the 14th of February. On the 13th of April the entry of the allies into Paris and the deposition of Napoleon was first known in Strassburg; on the 14th the white flag of the Bourbons was hoisted, on the 16th there was an armistice, on the 2nd of May Kehl was razed, and on the 5th the blockade of Strassburg was raised, the besieging army settling itself in the neighbourhood. On Napoleon's return from Elba, in 1815, the garrison and citizens of Strassburg were among his first supporters. In the end of June, and of course subsequently to the second deposition of the emperor (June 22), the French army, under General Rapp, after several engagements, was shut up in Strassburg by the Crown Prince of Würtemburg. On the 4th of July the Würtemburgers were replaced by Austrians and Badeners. A sortie by General Rapp on the 9th of July, against Hausbergen, caused the loss of many men on both sides. This was the last deed of arms. On the 22nd of July an armistice was concluded, and on the 30th the Bourbon dynasty was recognized by the garrison, which was disarmed and dismissed on the 6th of September, and on the 15th the blockade was raised.

The resolute resistance of Strassburg in the siege of 1870, the heroism of its governor, General Uhrich, the intrepidity of its garrison, the patriotic devotedness of its inhabitants amidst a bombardment of unprecedented severity, during a contest which began on the 17th of August and ended on the 28th of September, have secured for the

unfortunate city an undying record in military annals. General Uhrich, the gallant veteran whose name is associated with the heroic defence, had been long known in the French army as a brave and skilful officer. A true son of Alsace, born at Phalsburg in 1802, at eighteen years of age he left the military school of St. Cyr to join the third light infantry as sous-lieutenant. Captain in 1834, and colonel of his old regiment in 1848, Jean Jacques Alexis Uhrich was made general of brigade in 1852, and in the second year of the Crimean war became general of division. In the Italian campaign he was attached to the fifth army corps, and in 1862 received the grand cross of the legion of honour, having been made commander in 1857. For some time after he was in charge of one of the territorial sub-divisions of the army of Nancy. In 1867 he retired from active service, but on the outbreak of the war with Germany he asked and obtained the command of Strassburg. His firmness in the panic which followed the rout at Woerth, and during the terrible bombardment of the city, won praise even from his enemies.

Strassburg had been chosen as headquarters of the first corps d'armée of Marshal MacMahon; but on the 2nd of August he quitted the place with his divisions, leaving a garrison composed of the eighty-seventh regiment of the line, of the depôts of the eighteenth and ninety-sixth regiments, and of the tenth and sixteenth battalion of chasseurs.

On August 5 the town was plunged into deep consternation, the news of the battle and defeat at Wissembourg having arrived in the middle of the night. By the next day, however, the bustle and excitement had nearly died away; and notwithstanding the appalling tidings, crowds of officers sat outside the cafés as usual, lounging, smoking, and chaffing, all wearing a pacific and unexpectant air, truly disheartening to anxious citizens, who considered that but twenty-four hours before their brethren in arms had suffered a bloody check not easily forgotten. A sound of distant cannonading was heard throughout the day; and while rumours that another battle of greater importance still was then raging, waggons full of wounded drove at a slow pace through the streets.

At nightfall on Sunday, the 7th, the first fugitive from the fatal field of Woerth entered the city. All the inhabitants had turned into the streets, and the tumult was beyond description. Bells began to toll from every steeple, and from one end of the town to the other rang the fearful cry, "MacMahon is defeated; our army is put to flight!" Soon there set in a stream of soldiers with bare heads, covered with blood and dirt, wearied with a protracted struggle, famished with hunger, dying of thirst, beaten, and humbled. At seven o'clock a panic seized upon all citizens, for the news spread like wildfire that the enemy was fast approaching the town. There was a rush to the arsenal for arms. The drawbridges were pulled up, and for the first time the inhabitants passed the night expecting to hear the thunder of cannons, for it was generally supposed that the siege of Strassburg would be the immediate consequence of the disaster of Woerth.

In this grave crisis, General Uhrich immediately assembled a council of war to consider the resources of the city, and the best course to be adopted. Admiral Excelmans had arrived with a detachment of sailors and marines to serve a flotilla of gun-boats, which were never forthcoming, and he now undertook to remain and assist in the defence. The director of the custom-house formed with his men a battalion of 500 douaniers, and two regiments, one of cavalry and one of infantry, were formed out of the unpromising material which, flying from Wissembourg and Woerth, had taken refuge behind the Strassburg outposts. The garrison was thus found to consist of 7000 infantry, including sailors and douaniers, 600 cavalry, 1600 artillery, a battalion of mobiles, and 3000 national guards, forming altogether an effective force of 15,000 men. The barracks, fitted up with beds, could accommodate 10,000 men. The supplies consisted of bread for 180 days, and provisions for 60 days; but the quantity of live stock was limited. The council of war unanimously decided on resisting, and that the garrison should be divided into three bodies, one-third for the service of the ramparts, another third for marching, and the last for reserve. It was also decided to put the supplies in cellars for security against the bombardment, to turn out of the town all persons of loose character, and to urge the aged, the women, and the children, to leave at once. The following day the council, under the presidency of General Uhrich, held several meetings, at which measures were taken for the defence of the city and resolutions formed to resist to the utmost extremity.

On the 9th of August an envoy, bearing a flag of truce, approached the fortifications, and on behalf

of the general commanding the enemy made the usual summons to surrender. From the Saverne gate, by which the envoy entered, to headquarters, he was accompanied by the townspeople, who cried in German, so that he might understand, "We will not surrender." When he had delivered his message to General Uhrich, the latter, by way of reply, opened the window and showed him the people, who cried out, "Down with Prussia! Long live France! No surrender!" Next morning the following proclamation was issued to the inhabitants of Strassburg:—

"Unfounded rumours and panics have been spread within the last days in our brave city; some individuals have dared to assert that the place would surrender without defending itself. We energetically protest, in the name of the courageous population, against that cowardly and criminal weakness. The ramparts are armed with 400 cannons, the garrison composed of 11,000 men and of the national guard. If Strassburg is attacked, Strassburg will be defended so long as a soldier, a biscuit, or a cartridge is left. The brave can be tranquillized, the others may leave.

"GENERAL UHRICH."

"10*th August*, 1870."

Marshal MacMahon's corps d'armée had retreated on Saverne, Luneville, and Châlons. The investment of Strassburg was likely to follow the defeat of the first corps. For the purpose, therefore, of watching the movements of the enemy, the march of its columns and of its convoys, General Uhrich's first care was to establish an observatory, which was formed by the erection of a platform on the highest tower, not the spire, of the cathedral. From this observatory strong German columns, composed of men of all arms, were signalled on the 11th of August at 4 p.m., advancing from Schiltigheim on the Lauterbourg road. They took up their positions on the north, a few miles from the advanced works, in the villages of Koenigshoffen, Oberhausbergen, Mittelhausbergen, and Schiltigheim, forming a circle of three miles. General Uhrich at once sent a strong force to occupy the outer works, and, in anticipation of the bombardment, he next day issued a proclamation calling in all remaining provisions, fuel, &c., ordering the closing of the gas-works, and cautioning the inhabitants to be prepared with baths of water on every floor, wet cloths, earth, and dry sand, to quench the first outbreaks of fire.

On the 14th of August, Lieutenant-general von Werder assumed the command of the besieging force, which consisted of the Baden division, the Prussian first reserve division, the Prussian landwehr guards division, and a detachment of artillery and technical troops, numbering in all about 60,000 men. Lieutenant-general von Decker and Major-general von Mertens were appointed commanders, respectively, of the artillery and the engineers. After the arrival of the two Prussian divisions the fortress was closely surrounded; General Werder's headquarters being established at the village of Lampertheim, some five or six miles north of the defences of Strassburg, and to the left of the railway leading thence to Werdenheim, from which it branched to Haguenau and Saverne. The left of the army of the besiegers rested on the Ill, and was thus protected from flank attack, while between the Ill and the Rhine were marshes unfavourable for the movements of troops. At the same time the headquarters were concealed from the fire of the place by the heights of Oberhausbergen. Hence the German lines encircled Strassburg till they met the river Ill again south of that town, near Illkirch, close to the famous Canal Monsieur, which connects the Ill with the Rhone.

For general defence, the *perimeter* of the town was divided by Governor Uhrich into four districts, under the command of General Moseno, Admiral Excelmans, and two colonels. The provisional regiments were sent to occupy the fortifications; the mobiles were designed to help in the operations. The ambulances, under Intendants Brisac and Milon of the Intendance, were immediately organized, and the students aided the direction of the medical service. On the 12th, the Prussians from their positions at the north-west, in the rear of the villages, commenced hostilities by sending a few shells against the fortifications, which were answered by the garrison; and on the following day, to ascertain the real strength of the besiegers, General Uhrich ordered a reconnoitering sortie by two squadrons of cavalry and two companies of infantry, who advanced on the villages of Neuhaff and Altkirch, captured 100 oxen and some supplies, and returned without meeting with any serious encounter.

On the night from the 13th to the 14th the cannonade and discharge of musketry gave the

inhabitants a foreshadowing of the evils which were about to befall their unfortunate city. At daylight the placing of a Prussian battery and of three howitzers between the lines of railway to Saverne and Bâle was signalled from the observatory. The firing of the besiegers became stronger, and from the range of their large guns, and the skilful aiming of their artillerymen, its effects were at once felt, while the shot from the forts scarcely reached them.

In the afternoon of the 14th General Uhrich sent Moritz, the colonel of engineers, on a second reconnoitering excursion on the left bank of the Ill. With 900 men of the line, fifty of cavalry, and two field-guns, he attacked the besiegers, and after a sharp engagement retreated on the town. The same day General Barral, who, as the chief of artillery, aided so materially in the defence of Strassburg, succeeded in finding his way into it under the disguise of a workman.

The 15th of August was the *fête* of the emperor, and a *Te Deum* was sung in the cathedral. On the same day the Prussians brought their guns to bear upon the second district of defence, approached nearer the town, and increased the rapidity of their fire. The immense superiority of their artillery to that of the French was now apparent, and led the garrison and the inhabitants to augur the worst. During the night several of the inhabitants were killed, and the city was fired in several places. The following day brought fresh misfortunes.

General Uhrich, wishing to test the enemy's designs and to prevent the construction of new batteries, ordered another reconnaissance to be made by two battalions, two squadrons, and a battery of artillery. The column advanced to the north-west. and an important engagement took place in which the French were repulsed, leaving in the hands of the Prussians three guns and numerous prisoners and wounded.

On the 17th, from the cathedral tower masses of German troops were seen advancing in the direction of Wolfisheim, about three miles from the fortified works of Strassburg. The 87th regiment of the line was sent to reconnoitre, and to protect 400 workmen busy in cutting the trees and clearing the ground near La Porte Blanche, in front of the second district of defence. The soldiers, under the command of their colonel, advanced to the village of Schiltigheim, which they found barricaded and well defended; and after a vain attempt to dislodge its occupants, they were compelled to retreat, having sustained considerable loss. The fire of the besiegers continued on the 18th, and on the 19th the bombardment with the heavy guns began in right earnest.

Hitherto the firing upon the town had been the result rather of accident than of deliberate intention on the part of the Germans. Notwithstanding the strength of Strassburg, its system of defence was old-fashioned. There were no detached forts, and the ramparts inclosed the inhabited parts of the town within so narrow a circle, that many of the houses necessarily suffered when the works were attacked. The garrison being comparatively weak, and the inhabitants very numerous, the German commander assumed that menacing the town would certainly induce them to supplicate the French general to surrender. General Werder, first of all, offered to allow a number of the women, children, and infirm to leave the city; but Uhrich declined, ostensibly on the ground that it would be difficult to choose from a population of 80,000. On the 21st of August, therefore, the bombardment was opened upon the town, after due warning had been given to the commandant, who does not appear to have communicated it to the citizens, probably fearing its effect upon the more timid part of the population. For six days were the inhabitants exposed to the pitiless fiery storm. Notwithstanding every precaution, the destruction of life and property was enormous, the proportion of civilians killed and wounded, of course, far exceeding that of the military. Uhrich, stern and unbending as he appeared, was compelled on the 24th to ask a favour of his enemy. He sent out a *parlementaire* with the request that General Werder would spare lint and bandages for six hundred wounded citizens of Strassburg, now lying in agony within the town, their injuries having been mostly sustained in the streets during the last three days' bombardment. The general at once sent in an ample store of both, and it was noticed that the fierceness of the besieger's fire visibly slackened from this time.

To lessen the damage caused by falling shells within the city, the squares and places were covered deeply with loose earth; and the inhabitants, having closed up their windows with mattresses, retired to what often proved to be a vain security in the cellars; for frequently would a falling shell pierce through roof and floors, and burst in the crowded basement, killing or wounding the whole of its occupants. On the 25th of August a shell

from one of the giant mortars penetrated a house of six stories, and exploding in the cellar, killed sixteen persons. The bombardment, however, so far from scaring the citizens into a craven submission, roused a spirit of indignation, and a stronger determination than ever to support General Uhrich in resistance.

On the 26th, at four a.m., the firing was suspended till noon at the intercession of the aged and venerable bishop of Strassburg, who came over to the Prussian outposts, and asked for an interview with the general commanding-in-chief (Werder), stating that it was his earnest desire to intercede with his excellency on behalf of the minster in particular and the non-military part of the town in general. The bishop's request was communicated in due course to the general, who, however, declined to receive him, but informed him, through an aide-de-camp, that every possible precaution would be taken by the German army to avoid injuring the cathedral, and that no more harm than could be helped would be done to the town. His lordship was escorted back to the gate of the city, and at the same time a *parlementaire* was sent in to General Uhrich, conveying to that officer a full and detailed account of the reverses sustained by the French army before Metz, and urging upon him the surrender of the fortress upon the ground that further resistance would only be spilling blood to no purpose, the defence of Strassburg against the foes gathered round it being absolutely hopeless. To this communication the general only condescended to return the verbal message that "he meant to hold Strassburg as long as he had a man under his orders;" and the French fire was at once resumed by way of postdictum. The bombardment was resumed at the expiry of the respite, and continued till the 27th, when the German commander, abandoning the hope of intimidating the city into surrender, gave orders to discontinue firing upon it, and commenced a regular siege. A vast quantity of additional artillery had in the meantime arrived, and on the 29th of August numerous siege batteries were commenced to enfilade and batter the guns of the place. In the following night the first parallel was opened against the north-western front of the fortress, at a distance of from 600 to 800 paces from the walls. In the night of the 31st the approaches to the second parallel were dug, and in the ensuing night the second parallel itself, distant 300 paces from the fortress. To accomplish this a detachment was called out from the Rupprechtsan, and led by roundabout ways in a zig-zag direction, so as to disguise the design, up to a field behind Reichstett, where they halted to await sunset and the arrival of the engineers. When it became dark they started again. Without speaking a word, they marched along the road through the three neighbouring villages of Höhenheim, Bischheim, and Schiltigheim. Armed with hatchets and spades, the iron turned upwards to avoid noise, they proceeded through the streets between the shut-up houses, over the doors of which small lanterns were glimmering. At last the spot was reached. Posted at arm's length from each other, the men began to dig, eagerly, noiselessly, indefatigably. A trench three feet broad and three deep was the task for each. The night was dark. The fortress was 300 steps before them, but they saw nothing either of it or of the battalions placed in front to protect them. Close behind a battery launched shells ceaselessly into the city. The loud yelling of dogs, disturbed by the proximity of the enemy, resounded from Schiltigheim. The work lasted almost the whole night. The men were wetted and chilled by the falling dew, and they had not a morsel of bread. Hunger and thirst spoiled their tempers. At last the task was done, and cheered by their success they retired at break of day to their quarters, to occupy immediately the small island of Watte.

One great mystery of the siege, to most of the scientific officers belonging to the German army, was the character of the French defence, so far as concerned the construction of the parallels and their communications by the besieging forces. From the night when these first broke ground, till the completion of the fourth parallel, the pioneers were scarcely ever molested in their task from the walls or outworks ; but as soon as their work was finished, and they were well sheltered by six or seven feet of earth, a *feu d'enfer* was invariably opened upon the newly completed trench and the villages behind the approaches, which did very little damage to the parallels, and inflicted only slight loss on their occupants, but destroyed a vast amount of property owned by French subjects. The amount of work done in the construction of the parallels may be judged by the fact that the trenches before Strassburg were eight feet deep, and wide enough for three or four men abreast. Part

of the second parallel was driven through the churchyard of Ste. Hélène, between Koenigshoffen and Schiltigheim, and skeletons and partly decayed corpses were turned up, to the great discomposure of the soldiers. The ground before the city was clay, and difficult to work either in dry or wet weather. In addition to the parallels, batteries were built, and in their neighbourhood powder magazines arranged, which had to be protected against even shells dropping from the heights. These batteries evinced the singular perfection to which the Germans had brought all the details of their organization. Not only were they so arranged as to inflict the greatest damage on the enemy with the least possible danger to themselves, but also to insure a degree of comfort which could have been little expected under the circumstances. Good solid platforms were erected for the guns; and wooden traverses between each gun gave house accommodation to both officers and men. Garden seats beside the guns for the men to sit upon, and small gardens at the end of each traverse, with flowers and a border of cannon-balls, presented something of the aspect of a summer residence, in spite of the grim realities of war. British officers who remembered the trenches before Sebastopol would have been surprised to find in the same kind of works before Strassburg, roomy apartments, tables with cloth covers, arm chairs, books, maps, walnuts, and an ample supply of beer at command. Each battery was furnished with a large plan of the city and fortifications, upon which was indicated the points specially to be operated upon; and as an instance of care and accuracy it may be stated, that when a fire was directed to be opened on particular public buildings, although these were not to be seen, so correct were the information and aim, as was afterwards ascertained, the doomed structures were destroyed without the least injury to buildings immediately adjoining. Life in these trench batteries, however, was frequently anything but safe or agreeable. Sorties from the garrison, and the mud produced by sixty hours of almost continuous rainfall, rendered the trenches so unpleasant that the men would have preferred the risk of half a dozen battles in the open to their twenty-four hours turn of duty under ground. Besides this, the latter parallels approached so near the city walls that the splinters caused by the German guns sometimes wounded their own artillerymen.

The most important sortie during the siege was made on the 2nd of September, when both wings of the German army were attacked at the same time. Owing to the incompleteness of the parallels, which did not as yet form continuous lines, or rather curves, surrounding the fortifications, but were dug at considerable intervals, and not uniformly in connection with one another, the French contrived, in the darkness of a cloudy and stormy night, to get between the first and second parallels, and succeeded in surprising a battery established near the extramural railway goods station. This battery, and the trench containing its infantry supports, were, for a few minutes after they became aware of their assailants' proximity, restrained from firing upon the latter by the impression that they were some of their own people—German soldiers retiring from the second parallel before a superior force of the enemy. This misapprehension was soon dispelled by the French attack, made with great resolution and fierceness; but the consequence of the untoward hesitation caused by the natural desire of the Prussians to avoid injuring their friends was an unusually heavy loss in killed and wounded. The men behaved with admirable steadiness, recovering themselves from their surprise almost immediately, and delivering so deadly a fire upon the Frenchmen that, after a desperate attempt to disable some of the guns in the battery known as No. 3, the latter fell back in disorder, and despite the exhortations of their officers, fled to the glacis, pursued by the Prussian soldiers, leaving between sixty and seventy of their number dead between the parallels. Their retreat, as usual, was covered by a furious cannonade from the walls, which was distinctly heard at Rastatt. Nothing was gained by the sortie, beyond ascertaining the position of the beleaguering forces, for which a heavy price in killed and wounded was paid. The attack was repulsed by the thirtieth Prussian infantry, and the second Baden grenadiers.

The spirits of the garrison had in the morning of the same day been revived by a report which, by some means, found its way into the city. Instead of the news of the battle of Sedan, which would have been received in the ordinary course, the following despatch appeared:—"France saved! Victory at Douancourt and at Raucourt. Great victory at Toul: 49,000 killed, 35,000 wounded, 700 cannons taken from the Prussians. Steinmetz's corps in full retreat, routed by Generals

Douay and De Failly. MacMahon at Châlons-sur-Marne, with 400,000 men. Alsace saved in two days. MacMahon to the minister of the Interior. The French soldiers are making ramparts of the Prussian dead. From a despatch given by an emissary to Colonel Rollert."

The first intimation conveyed to the Strassburgers of the victory of Sedan was not understood. It came to them in the form of a salute of twenty-one guns, concerning which the *Courrier du Bas Rhin* said, on the following day:—"Yesterday the enemy's batteries threw, at regular intervals, twenty shells into the town" (the reporter had miscounted—there were twenty-one). "Our batteries made a vigorous reply, but after the twentieth shell had been fired the Prussian guns were silent."

During a two hours' truce, agreed to upon his request for the burial of those who had fallen in the sortie, the commandant of Strassburg was made acquainted with the crowning disaster that had befallen his imperial master. But he refused to lend the slightest credence to the telegrams shown him or the statements of the superior German officers, saying that they were all Prussian lies, made up to induce him to yield, and that he was not to be deceived by such shallow contrivances. A few days afterwards, however, the news of Sedan was confirmed by the same newspaper which had noticed the salute, the *Courrier du Bas Rhin*, the only one which appeared regularly throughout the siege.

The news of the revolution in Paris was first brought to Strassburg on the 12th September by the Swiss delegates. The Republic was proclaimed, and a new mayor elected, who issued a proclamation strongly condemnatory of the Bonaparte family—"that disgraceful family which three times in half a century has brought upon France the horrors of an invasion."

The Republican government appointed M. Valentin, who represented Strassburg in 1848, prefect of the department of the Lower Rhine, and urged him to obtain admission to Strassburg with the least possible delay. He obeyed, and entered the city by an indirect and difficult road. Disguised as a peasant, and availing himself of his acquaintance with the German tongue, he made friends with Prussian soldiers quartered in Bischeim. From them he obtained full particulars regarding the position and character of the works erected between that village and the city. He remarked that at one o'clock the fire of the besiegers was weakest, and the vigilance of their sentries most relaxed, as the soldiers then dined. Passing through the Prussian lines, between one and two o'clock on the 22nd of September, he arrived in safety at the ditch, across which he swam. The French soldiers fired at him repeatedly, but their bullets missed him. At last he reached a spot near one of the gates, where he was sheltered from the fire directed from the walls. Again and again he begged the soldiers to take him prisoner, and carry him before Governor Uhrich. Finally, they consented. When brought before the governor, he presented the official document containing his appointment as prefect. Its validity was at once recognized, and on the evening of the same day he issued a proclamation formally announcing his assumption of the post, and the establishment of the Republic. He was, however, little more than a week in office.

The Swiss delegates were the bearers not only of good news, but also of kind propositions. Switzerland, mindful of its old relations with Strassburg, made the generous offer to receive and provide refuge for its unfortunate citizens, should General von Werder permit them to emigrate *en masse*. As many as 4000 applications were addressed to General Uhrich for permission to quit. He sent the full list of names, with a notification of the age and condition of each applicant, to General von Werder, who began by granting safe-conducts to 400, either aged persons or who had been burned out. The first departure of emigrants was on the 17th of September, the second a few days after, and the third was fixed for the 27th, the very day on which the white flag was hoisted. Altogether, 1400 men, women, and children left Strassburg for Switzerland, who were hospitably received.

From a strictly military point of view it might be doubted whether General von Werder was justified in thus authorizing so numerous an exodus from the city. If he erred in exercising the virtue of mercy, however, it was on the right side. The delegates from the cantons of Basle, Zurich, and Berne took a practical and humane view of the bombardment. It may or may not, they thought, be justifiable in a military view to burn private homes, throw shells into girls' schools, and slaughter inoffensive men, women, and children

indiscriminately. Setting aside this question, and without considering their own personal risk, the Swiss only saw that there was suffering in Strassburg, such as, fortunately, had not been known in Europe for half a century, and determined to relieve it. They first applied to General von Werder, with whose permission they sent in a letter, under a flag of truce, to General Uhrich. His answer was as follows:—"The work you have undertaken, gentlemen, is so honourable that it insures for you the eternal gratitude of the whole population of this city, as well as of its civil and military authorities. For my own part, I cannot find words in which to express my appreciation of your noble and generous initiative. But I feel it my duty to tell you how much I am touched by the step you have taken. A flag of truce shall be sent to Eckbolsheim to-morrow about eleven o'clock, and the bearer will have orders to accompany you here."

When the first band of emigrants, 400 in number, left, they were accompanied by General Uhrich to some distance beyond the gates, the bombardment being suspended for the time. At the first line of German outposts there was a barricade, which it was necessary to take down to let the emigrants pass. Great hesitation was shown by the officers and men in charge, which, however, was ultimately overcome by General Uhrich promising to allow two hours for reconstructing the barricade, during which the outpost should not be interfered with. Further on the delegates and their charges were met by Prussian officers, who made a liberal distribution amongst them of such small comforts and necessaries as could be readily spared. The second convoy, a few days later, was much larger, and still more singular. Every description of vehicle was made available for the transport of goods and human beings, furniture, and families. Cabs, carts, hotel and railway omnibuses, huge market waggons, one-horse buggies, nondescript traps, seemingly made up of coachbuilders' odds and ends, followed each other in slow and solemn procession, laden with household stuff of the most incongruous description—mattresses and canary birds in cages, kitchen utensils and bonnet boxes, wardrobes and watering pots, all huddled together, without order or coherence, as if their owners had snatched them up just as they came to hand, irrespective of their value or utility. The number of men, women, and children in this long train of a hundred and twenty vehicles was over a thousand, one-third of whom consisted of well-to-do people, and the remainder mostly of the lower middle class. The feelings displayed by them were of a mixed kind—despondency on account of being driven into exile, the heavy losses they had sustained by the siege, and the reverses of French arms; joy at being so fortunate as to get away from the doomed city, and, in some cases, at the proclamation of a republic; for the Alsatians were by no means ardent imperialists. Amongst the carmen and cabdrivers permitted to convey the fugitives out of the town, and to return after performing that duty, might have been detected some gentlemanly-looking, intelligent faces, which unmistakably belonged to French officers, travestied for the nonce, who would doubtless have an interesting tale to tell of the German positions and dispositions when they presented themselves to General Uhrich a few hours later; though their reports could do no great harm to their enemies, who had Strassburg so tightly within their grasp, and whose strength was so overwhelming, that they could afford to tolerate and laugh at such small espionage.

It is a curious fact, which tells its own tale, that the avowedly vicious portion of the female population begged for permission to leave Strassburg under a flag of truce, the morning after the first bombardment, whereas the nuns and sisters of charity remained to the end. To the petition addressed to General von Werder by the members of the former class, his excellency replied that they might go where they pleased, provided they kept clear of his army, and did not attempt to enter the Grand Duchy of Baden.

The exit of the inhabitants caused but a momentary cessation of the bombardment. Day and night, with relentless activity, deadly projectiles from more than 240 heavy guns poured upon the doomed fortress, whose reply daily became more feeble. The guns were in reality insufficiently manned, General Uhrich having principally to depend upon some two or three hundred marine artillerists, originally intended for Rhine gunboats. Of these a large number were now killed or wounded; and although many of the line and mobile garde had been in some degree trained to take their places, they were next to useless for the



Drawn under the Superintendence of Captain Hozier

Engraved by Robert Walker

professional operations of sighting, elevation, &c., so that in numerous instances one man had practically to serve several guns. Owing to this the French fire was sometimes suspended for several hours, and then broke out in a spasm of salvos, all along the line, which, after a few minutes, was again followed by another long interval of silence. Fortunate indeed were those whom German humanity permitted to fly from the precincts of the miserable town. The prices of provisions, notwithstanding the diminution in the number of consumers, rose enormously, and hunger was added to the horrors of the bombardment. The soldiery, grown impatient of control, gave themselves up to drunkenness and debauchery; whilst, despite all the endeavours of the besiegers to restrict their fire to the fortifications and purely military establishments, the town was frequently on fire in a dozen places at once, and burnt for days and nights together.

Several monster mortars were established near the fortress; and the projectiles they threw, weighing each two hundred pounds, caused fresh ruin and devastation with every discharge. While the German batteries were fast reducing the fortifications to heaps of battered and shapeless rubbish, riflemen were day and night firing at one another with Chassepot and needle gun, at distances ranging between one and two hundred yards; the patter and rattle of the musketry filling up the short intervals between the roar and crash of the great siege guns and mortars. The town was begirt with a semicircle of white smoke which melted into pale blue vapour as it rose from the trenches, whilst over-head hung a cloud of brown, gloomy fog, proceeding from the burning houses of its faubourgs.

Amidst all the carnage and destruction the Strassburgers bore themselves like men. Every day the municipal council met, not to trouble General Uhrich with their complaints, but to consider of measures for the public safety. An extra service of fire-engines was organized; a project for constructing bomb-proof places of shelter was discussed; refuges were publicly notified for those who had been burnt out of their houses, some of whom slept in churches, close to the entrance, where the architecture was most solid, some behind parapets on the quays of the canals, and some in the theatre, where nearly 200 poor persons were lying the night it took fire, and was burned to the ground. Many of the leading burghers helped to man the walls, to work the guns, to repair the damages caused to the works, and gave their money and their lives freely in a hopeless cause. They also exerted their influence over their poorer fellow citizens to prevent any attempt at pressure upon the military governor in favour of surrender. And throughout the German army, from the general downwards, all justly admired and honoured General Uhrich for the brilliant and heroic defence which he made against forces whom he knew to be overwhelming.

On September 21 and 22 the terrible grasp of the enemy upon the fortress was further strengthened by the capture of three of the lunettes, known as Nos. 53, 52, and 51 respectively. The two lunettes first taken were small detached works, lying several hundred feet in advance of the main rampart, surrounded by wide inundations. After they had been battered with the heaviest guns for a fortnight, mines were ultimately sunk under the water up to these islet strongholds. Their explosion destroyed a portion of the walls and laid them open to attack from without. A way had to be made across the water. In the case of one of the lunettes, which was protected on one side by only a broad ditch, a dyke was improvised of stones, sandbags, fascines, &c.; a work which, as the French had evacuated the place beforehand, was completed without much delay. Another lunette, with a sheet of water in front 180 feet wide, and a still larger one in its rear, gave more trouble. Under cover of night a bridge was made of a string of beer barrels, overlaid with boards, and placed between what may be called the mainland and the fortified isle. Though the French had been forced to clear out of this lunette also, the greatest caution was required in making this makeshift bridge, as the slightest sound would have attracted the attention of the sentinels on the main rampart in the rear, and spread the alarm. But so well had everything been prepared, and so noiselessly was the work carried on, that not a shot was fired on the French side until the first 100 men had got over, and with spades and axes were making themselves at home in the dilapidated shell of the deserted work. The next 100 crossed under a rattling fire; and as the shot now began to pour into the lunette, the greatest despatch had to be used in throwing up the breastwork which eventually sheltered the bold adventurers. Into the commanding

positions thus obtained the Germans quickly conveyed artillery, which assisted materially in the formation of two breaches, one of them sixty feet wide, preparatory to the intended storming.

As General Uhrich yet showed no sign of yielding, the German commander now contemplated this final act of the fearful drama. It had been hoped that so excellent an officer as the governor of Strassburg had in everything proved himself, would have made a virtue of necessity, and by yielding up a charge he could no longer keep, avoided the dreadful alternative of having the fortress and town taken by storm. The time had arrived when a successful assault was clearly practicable, although it was calculated that the passage of the water defences alone would cost the Germans 2000 men; and wide as was the breach which had been made, the steep slope down to the water's edge, caused by the fallen *débris*, was still formidable enough to startle the boldest forlorn hope.

From the captured lunettes there ran a narrow dam across the intermediate lake up to the bastions of the main rampart. Along this dam, and up the breach, was the only way open to the assaulting party, with fire above and water below. It was, however, with aversion and horror that the German commanders contemplated the necessity of the extreme measure, both on account of the tremendous loss of life that would certainly ensue to their own troops, should they be compelled to adopt it, and on account of the additional misery to which the inhabitants would be exposed during the state of furious excitement invariably experienced by the soldiery immediately after a successful assault. The men who composed the army before Strassburg were of an exceptionally humane temper as a rule; the large majority of them belonged to landwehr regiments, every second man in which was married and the father of a young family. Such troops were less likely to commit excesses in a conquered town than regular liners—mostly lads from twenty to twenty-three years of age, inexperienced in the cares of life and grave family responsibilities. But even German troops and landwehr, obedient as they were to their officers, and superior in civilization to the soldiers of any other army, might not easily be restrained from excesses when their blood was fevered with the fury of a successful but hardly-contested storm.

General Werder, however, determined, on the breaches being effected, to force the capture of the place. Accordingly, on the 27th September, a demand for surrender was made, with the alternative of an immediate assault. The German soldiers looked forward to the enterprise, although perilous, with anything but feelings of aversion. Trench duty had become tedious and harassing, and all were eager in the expression of their hope that it might soon come "zum Stürmen," and that they might be led out against the fortress to take it by assault, instead of being pent up in small country hamlets or kept crouching night after night in damp trenches. A soldier had written a new war song to the old popular tune of "Ich hatte einen Camerad," to be sung by the troops as they marched into Strassburg, and the camp now frequently resounded with the chorus, chanted by stalwart Baden grenadiers. Possessing a special interest, from its having been composed in the midst of this memorable siege, we reproduce it here:—

SONG OF THE GERMAN SOLDIERS IN ALSACE.

In Alsace, over the Rhine,
There lives a brother of mine;
It grieves my soul to say
He hath forgot the day
We were one land and line.

Dear brother, torn apart,
Is't true that changed thou art?
The French have clapped on thee
Red breeches, as we see;
Have they Frenchified thy heart?

Hark! that's the Prussian drum,
And it tells the time has come.
We have made one "Germany,"
One "Deutschland," firm and free;
And our civil strifes are dumb.

Thee also, fighting sore,
Ankle-deep in German gore,
We have won. Ah, brother, dear!
Thou art German—dost thou hear?
They shall never part us more.

Who made this song of mine?
Two comrades by the Rhine;—
A Suabian man began it,
And a Pomeranian sang it,
In Alsace, on the Rhine.

Shortly after the siege began, General Uhrich received a deputation from the council formed for the defence of the city, between whom and the governor opinions were freely and frankly interchanged. The result was a unanimous resolution by the council to strain every nerve to prevent the city from falling into the hands of the besiegers. General Uhrich, on his part,

pledged himself to avert from the city the horrors of an assault, but reserved to himself the sole right of determining when the critical moment had arrived. Enough, he now felt, had been done for honour; hunger would soon reduce the city to the last extremity, even if spared immediate capture by the Germans; the garrison was fast becoming disorganized and mutinous; the threatened entrance of the Germans could not be successfully opposed; and to avert the sacrifice of many thousand lives which the assault would inevitably cause, the governor determined to capitulate. At five o'clock the white flag waved from the minster tower, and the air ceased to resound with the fatal thunder of artillery. The capitulation was announced in the following proclamation:

"Inhabitants of Strassburg,—As I have to-day perceived that the defence of the fortress of Strassburg is no longer possible, and as the council of defence unanimously shared my opinion, I have been obliged to resort to the lamentable necessity of entering into negotiations with the commander of the besieging army. Your manly attitude during these long and painful trials has enabled me to defer the fall of your town as much as possible; the honour of the citizens and of the soldiers is, thank God, unimpaired. Thanks also are due to you, the prefect of the Lower Rhine, and the municipal authorities, who, by your activity and unanimity, have given me such valuable co-operation, and have known how to assist the unfortunate population and maintain their dependence on our common fatherland. Thanks to you, officers and soldiers! To you, too, especially, members of my council of defence, who have always been so united, so energetic, so devoted to the great task which we had to accomplish; who have supported me in moments of hesitation, the consequence of the heavy responsibility which rested upon me, and of the sight of the public misfortunes which surrounded me. Thanks to you, representatives of our marine force, who have made your small numbers forgotten by the force of your deeds. Thanks, finally, to you, children of Alsace, to you, mobile national guards, to you, francs-tireurs and volunteer companies, to you, artillerymen of the national guard, who have so nobly paid your tribute of blood to the great cause which to-day is lost, and to you, custom-house officers, who have also given proofs of courage and devotion. I owe the same thanks to the *Intendance* for the zeal with which they knew how to satisfy the demands of a difficult position, as well with regard to the supply of provisions as to hospital service. How can I find language to express my sense of the services of the civil and military surgeons who have devoted themselves to the care of our wounded and sick, and of those noble young men of the medical school who have undertaken with so much enthusiasm the dangerous posts of the ambulances in the outworks and at the gates? How can I sufficiently thank the benevolent persons, the ecclesiastical and public authorities, who have opened their houses to the wounded, have shown them such attentions, and have rescued many from death? To my last day I shall retain the recollection of the two last months, and the feeling of gratitude and admiration which you have excited in me will only be extinguished with my life. Do you on your part remember without bitterness your old general, who would have thought himself happy could he have spared you the sufferings and dangers which have befallen you, but who was forced to close his heart to his feelings, for the sake of the duty he owed to that country which is mourning its children. Let us, if we can, close our eyes to the sorrowful and painful interest, and turn our looks to the future; there we still find the solace of the unfortunate—hope. Long live France for ever.—Given at headquarters, 27th of September, 1870. The divisional general, commandant of the sixth military division,

"UHRICH."

The mayor's proclamation, issued on the following day, stated that the surrender was inevitable, on account of two breaches and a threatened storm, which would involve frightful loss. The general, he said, would save Strassburg from the payment of a war ransom, and would insure it mild treatment. He exhorted the people to abstain from any hostile demonstration towards the enemy, as the least act of hostility would entail severe reprisals on the entire population. The laws of war decreed that any house from which a shot was fired should be demolished and its inhabitants shot down. "Let everybody," said the mayor, "remember this, and if there are people among you who could forget what they owe to their fellow-citizens by thinking of useless attempts at resistance, prevent them from so doing. The hour for resistance is past. Let us accept the unavoidable."

Immediately after the hanging out of the white

flag firing ceased on both sides. Not a single gun was discharged from the walls or the trenches after half-past five o'clock. About eleven Lieutenant-colonel von Lesczynski and Captain Count Leo Donnersmarck rode out through Koenigshoffen, and asked of the French sentinels to see the general commanding the fortress. Their request was sent into the town; and, after waiting an hour sitting on the stumps of felled trees, close by the Porte Nationale, a field-officer came to them, saying that the general was "gone out," that he lodged at a great distance, and that the officer did not know where to find him. With considerable coolness under the circumstances he then inquired—"What did *ces messieurs* want?" *Ces messieurs* explained that they desired to know what was meant by the exhibition of the white flag, and to see the general, or some person duly authorized by him to communicate with them. The officer returned into the fortress, and the German plenipotentiaries went to Koenigshoffen, where they set about preparing a place to receive the expected Frenchmen. They fixed upon a small tent on the railway, hard by a detached first-class carriage which had for some weeks served as a resting-place for the officers belonging to covering parties stationed round a 24-pound battery. Over the table which had been brought into this tent was hung a portrait of MacMahon, in compliment to French military gallantry. Outside was stationed half a company of Prussian infantry and a few drummers. These preparations completed, the German plenipotentiaries waited the coming of the French delegates; but it was not till past one o'clock that the approach of the second commandant and the artillery director of the fortress was signified to Colonel von Lesczynski. The drums were immediately beaten, and the half company paraded before the tent. The delegates appeared much gratified at being received with military honours, and proceeded at once to fulfil their mission by making an unconditional surrender of the fortress. The treaty of capitulation, framed on the basis or model of that of Sedan, was drawn up, read, and finally signed at half-past two in the morning. The four commissioners took leave of one another with great courtesy, and Strassburg ceased to be a French fortress. At eight o'clock the French guards were relieved by Germans, who took possession of the gates and all other important posts. The garrison surrendered at eleven o'clock. The German army was paraded on an open ground, abutting on the glacis between the Portes Nationale and De Saverne, General Werder at its head, surrounded by a brilliant staff in full uniform (*de gala*). As the clock struck eleven, General Uhrich, followed by his staff, emerged from the former gate, and advanced towards the German commander, who, alighting from his horse, and holding out his hand, stepped forward to meet him. Next came Admiral Excelmans, Brigadier-general de Barral, and the other superior officers; then the regulars, marines, douaniers, and mobiles, numbering in all 15,347 men and 451 officers, with flags flying and arms shouldered. With the exception of the marines and douaniers, who made an excellent appearance, the troops behaved disgracefully, contravening the terms of the capitulation in a way that too plainly showed the state of utter insubordination into which they had fallen. At least two-thirds of the men were drunk; hundreds, as they stumbled through the ruined gateway, dashed their rifles to pieces against the walls or the paving stones, and flung their sword-bayonets into the moat; from one battalion alone came cheers of "Vive la Republique!" "Vive la Prusse!" "Vive l'Empereur!" The officers made no attempt to keep the men in order, or prevent them from destroying the arms which the signers of the capitulation had engaged to deliver up to the victors. Many of the men even danced to the music of the Prussian and Baden bands; some rolled about on the grass, uttering inarticulate cries; others made ludicrous attempts to embrace the grave German legionaries, who repulsed them in disgust at their unworthy bearing. The whole scene was calculated to bring the French army into contempt, and to extinguish the small remnants of respect for *les militaires français* that still survived in the breasts of a few of the foreign bystanders. In the course of the afternoon the whole were sent off under an escort, as prisoners of war, to the fortress of Rastatt, in Baden, the officers having the option of liberty on parole.

After the surrender the Germans entered, about 3000 strong, with banners flying, drums beating, and bands playing the "Watch on the Rhine." Although it was half-past eleven, and the inhabitants must have heard of the capitulation some hours previously, there were few people in the streets to witness the martial procession. It seemed as if they felt uncertain whether the bombardment they had endured so long might not

begin again, or as if they preferred looking at their conquerors from the windows before trusting themselves to a nearer acquaintance. They had been living for six weeks in cellars and other underground localities, and could not at once realize that their dreaded enemies might now be safely met. By degrees they emerged from their retreats. The manure and mattresses with which the cellar windows had been protected against bullets were removed; the doors of the subterranean abodes were thrown open to admit light and air, and one by one, pale men and women, sickly by confinement, crept up into the sunshine they had missed for weeks; children, timid and emaciated, slowly came out into the open air, to be rewarded for their temerity by the sight of fresh uniforms and the sound of military music. Many afflicted parents went to the spot in the courtyard, where, in default of a more sacred resting-place, one of their beloved ones had been laid during the siege; the way to the cemetery, which was at some distance, having been too dangerous to admit of burial there. Having ventured so far, people, or, at any rate, as many as had their houses left standing, went up stairs to enjoy the long missed luxury of a room, and the everyday comforts it brings with it. At last, after the Germans had been in the town for hours, people came abroad to acquaint themselves with the new order of things, and to visit the relations and friends from whom they had been separated while cannon balls were flying about. What joyful embracings when those they sought were found alive! What pangs when they were found to have died a premature and violent death!

With one exception the inhabitants treated their conquerors with great consideration. On the evening of the 28th a Baden soldier was shot in a by-street near the cathedral, and another wounded. The assassin fled, but was captured by several citizens, and immediately shot by the German soldiers. As soon as General Werder heard the tidings, he ordered the city to pay a heavy contribution, and threatened to humiliate the inhabitants by making a triumphal entry into the town with his whole army. But being ultimately convinced that the act was entirely attributable to isolated ruffians, he cancelled the orders, and relieved the city from the onerous contribution of four millions of francs. The next day the Prussian commandant issued the following notice:—

"The state of siege still continues. Crimes and offences will be punished by martial law. All weapons are immediately to be given up. All newspapers and publications are forbidden till further orders. Public houses to be closed at 9 p.m.; after that hour every civilian must carry a lantern. The municipal authorities have to provide quarters, without food, for all good men.

"MERTENS."

No salute was fired when Strassburg fell. The 28th and 29th of September passed without any signs of rejoicing; and it was not till the 30th—the same day on which, 189 years before, Louis XIV. by fraud and treachery became master of the town—that the joy of the Germans at regaining possession of a place which they looked upon as their indisputable property, was expressed in the form of thanksgiving; a Protestant service being performed on one side of the Orangerie Gardens, a Catholic service on the other. The officiating pastor in the Prussian religious camp was the chaplain of the 34th regiment. The troops were formed into a hollow square, in the middle of which stood a group of officers. The chaplain took his place on one side of the square, beside an improvised altar composed of drums built up against a tree, and nothing could be more simple or impressive than the whole service. He took for his text the opening verses of the 105th Psalm, and gave thanks to God for the recovery of Strassburg from the hands of the foreigner and its restoration to the German race, from whom, for nearly two centuries, it had been unjustly kept. The 30th of September, instead of being associated with the loss of Strassburg, would now, he said, be regarded as the happiest day in its history, the second birthday of the ancient German city.

After the services in the Orangerie a thanksgiving was celebrated in the Protestant church of St. Thomas, at which General von Werder and his staff were present. The general was received at the door by the clergy. The principal pastor delivered an address, in which he assured General von Werder that the "immense majority" of the population of Strassburg were German in feeling. There is no doubt that the Protestants of the city were well disposed towards Germany, and this, perhaps, the speaker chiefly meant. It is possible that General Werder, remembering the desperate

resistance of the Strassburgers, and the 150 lb. shells which he had lately been throwing into their houses, may have doubted the accuracy of the statement that the "immense majority" were glad to see him. Be that as it may, he kept his eyes firmly fixed on those of the much-protesting pastor, held him all the time, as if affectionately, by the hand, and having heard him to the close, without altering his gaze or relaxing his grasp, replied. His answer, simple enough in itself, was delivered very impressively, and had a great effect on all who heard it. Still standing on the threshhold, he said:—"I am obliged to you for the manner in which you receive me. One thing ought to reassure you—my first visit in Strassburg is to the church. I am pained at the manner in which I have been forced to enter this German city; and, believe me, I shall do my utmost to heal its wounds. From my soldiers you have nothing whatever to fear. Their order and discipline are perfect; but do not forget that the same order will be expected and required on the part of the civil population. Once more I thank you for your expressions of good-will."

The service then began. The body of the church was full of troops, the general and his staff occupying seats in front of the pulpit. The sermon was preached by Emil Frommel, royal garrison chaplain of Berlin, and field-division chaplain of the guard landwehr division. The discourse was founded on 1 Samuel vii. 12, and was a fair sample of the military field preaching in the German armies. Pitched in the key of exultation which at the time found an echo in all German hearts and households, it had the ring of the song of Deborah and of Barak, or of those drumhead discourses to which Cromwell's grim Ironsides listened after Marston Moor and Dunbar.

The redoubts and other fortifications constructed by the besieged, as they appeared on the day after the surrender of Strassburg, betrayed the tremendous effects of the German artillery fire. The parapets and epaulements were knocked into hopeless masses of loose earth. Most of the embrasures had been closed with sand-bags; and the earthen tops of the stone-built magazines, in some cases forming the epaulements, had sand-bags added to preserve them, and to aid their power of arresting the flanking fire of the besiegers. The fire from the Prussian batteries was so well directed that most of the shells struck the top of these epaulements, and bursting at the same moment, sent destruction to the men and guns underneath. There was not a gun but bore evidence that the flying fragments of shell had left their mark. Many of the guns were knocked over; wheels and carriages were smashed beyond repair; broken guns and fragments of carriages lay in and behind the batteries. In the two principal redoubts attacked, the appearances tended to indicate that the guns had not been replaced for some time, and that the garrison had ceased also to repair the embrasures and parapets.

Amongst the private property of the town nothing was more striking in the ravages of the bombardment than its searching character. It was a fiery furnace, under the scorching flames of which all constructive shams and artifices perished. No traces were left of paper-hanging, cornices, mouldings, or ornamentation; the walls, after the ordeal, wore an aspect not far different from that they would exhibit if left to bleach in the rain and sunshine of centuries. The suburbs immediately exposed to the German fire were literally a heap of ruins, scarcely a house being left standing.

The devastation was greatest in the Jews' quarter, the fishermen's quarter, St. Nicholas, Finkenmatt, Broglie, and the neighbourhood of the Stein Strasse—all of them wearing exactly the aspect of the exhumed remains of Pompeii and Herculaneum. In the town itself nearly all the principal buildings were reduced to ashes. The prefecture, the Protestant church, the theatre, the museum, the artillery school, infantry barracks, military magazine, railway station, and, worst of all, the library, with its invaluable contents, were entirely destroyed. In the immediate neighbourhood of the public buildings many inhabited houses escaped with comparatively little damage; the reason assigned being that, in the public buildings, there was no one at hand to extinguish the first flames, and when these were seen ascending into the air, they served as a mark for the enemy's guns. At night (and the severe bombardments were always at night) flames made a tempting target for the besiegers. The hotel de la Ville de Paris received forty shells during the siege, but engines and water-buckets were kept in readiness on all the floors, and fires in this building were no sooner kindled than they were extinguished.

The numerous handsome bridges which spanned the canal existed so far as their roadways were concerned, but scarcely a vestige of parapet remained, while the canal itself was almost choked —quite choked towards its southern extremity—with barges and boats of every kind smashed and sunken with everything they contained.

All that remained of the citadel, at one time deemed by its possessors almost impregnable, was huge masses of rubbish produced by the incessant fire from the batteries of Kehl on the one side, and the bombs thrown from those near Schiltigheim on the other.

One of the first acts of Lous XIV. on taking the city in 1681, was to dislodge the Protestants from the cathedral, which they had occupied from the period of the Reformation. The Dominican church, which had long been secularized, was allotted to them instead, and had its name changed to that of the Temple Neuf. It had one of the most famous organs of Silbermann. In the choir, divided from the nave, was lodged the special glory of Alsace—its library, the finest on the Rhine, in which the archives, antiquities, topography, and early printing collections were treasured. All perished. Since the apocryphal burning of the library of Alexandria, perhaps no equally irreparable loss has occurred. Unfortunately no catalogue of its many treasures exists. An elaborate one in MS. had been prepared by the librarian, but that also perished. A very fine work, the "Alsace Antiquary," perished among them—sixteen folio vols. of MS. upon Strassburg. Greatest loss of all was that of the most precious record connected with the discovery of printing—the documents of the legal process instituted by Gutenberg against the heirs of his partner Dreisehn, to establish his right as the inventor of typography. Among the early specimens of typography there was a copy of the first German Bible, printed by Mentelin about 1466, but undated; also three early Latin Bibles by Mentelin, Jenson, and Eggestein, the last bearing the manuscript date 1468. There was, besides, a rare copy of Virgil by Mentelin, a still rarer Commentary of Servius upon that poet, printed by the celebrated Valdarfer; a Jerome's "Epistles," by Schoeffer, 1470; and about 4000 other books printed before the beginning of the sixteenth century.

The inner part of the town, although it escaped the measure of devastation inflicted upon the fringe of suburbs and outer circle of buildings adjoining them, but belonging properly to the city within the Ill, suffered heavily. The stately picture gallery in the Klèberplatz was gutted from basement to roof; the archiepiscopal and imperial palaces, as well as other fine mansions near the minster, were much damaged; and bridges over the canals were entirely smashed, and the houses in the Quai des Bateliers, Quai des Pêcheurs, Place de Broglie, &c., were all greatly injured. The cathedral was to all external appearance uninjured. The spire, though it had been struck in more places than one, was as attractive a spectacle as ever. The cross on its summit appeared to have been touched by a projectile, as it leaned to one side. Some of the ornamental work had been carried away, and a portion of the stone stair in one of the side towers destroyed. The outer roof of the nave had been burned, and the windows here and there pierced with balls; but the famous clock escaped, and the cathedral was on the whole in excellent condition, owing to the orders of the Prussian commander, who would not permit a single bullet to be fired against it, except at the commencement of the siege, when the French used it as an observatory. In the promenade, where the bands were wont in times of peace to play of afternoons, trees and lamp-posts were lying about amongst Louis Quatorze chairs and all sorts of old fashioned furniture saved from burning houses; whilst even the little orchestra, struck by a shell, was partly smashed and partly burnt. No less than 448 private houses were entirely destroyed, and out of the 5150 in the town and suburbs nearly 3000 were more or less injured; 1700 civilians were killed or wounded, and 10,000 persons made houseless. The estimate of the total damage to the city was nearly £8,000,000.

Immediately after the capitulation, subscriptions were opened in Berlin and Frankfort to relieve the suffering Strassburgers, and restore the town; but towards the latter object little was raised, as the magnitude of the ruins seemed to render the efforts of private charity utterly inadequate.

In the narrow space of the botanic gardens, hardly exceeding an acre, the anguish of the siege was epitomized. At its commencement the city had three cemeteries, one of which was occupied for its defence; another was overflowed; the third was in the hands of the enemy, whose parallels

were driven through it. As the only space available, the botanic garden, adjoining the arsenal and citadel, was turned into a burying-ground. After the siege it wore, as did, in fact, all the garden-ground for miles round, the aspect of a neglected overgrown wilderness. Along its eastern side a trench, much deeper and broader than that of the parallel, had been driven in two rows; and in piles, four and five above each other, the dead of the last six weeks had there been crowded. In this dense mass of mortality it was painful to witness the anxiety displayed by survivors not to lose sight of the remains of their relatives. Wooden crosses, with brief inscriptions, immortelles, bead wreaths, statuary, floral bouquets, crowded each other.

The open town of Kehl, opposite Strassburg, met with an even worse fate than the latter. It was bombarded early in the siege of Strassburg, an act considered by the Germans a piece of wanton and unjustifiable destruction, as its utter uselessness was apparent. By reducing Kehl to ashes the French did not retard by one day the progress of the besiegers, nor cripple them in the slightest degree. The batteries on either side of the town were as effective, after the inhabitants had been driven forth by showers of shells from their burning houses, as they were before. Pitiable as the destruction in Strassburg appeared, the streets and dwellings of Kehl presented a spectacle even more saddening. Not above five houses remained intact; and the only object which indicated that the ruins in the main street had once been habitable dwellings was a porcelain stove, standing erect amid the heaps of charred rubbish.

The catalogue of the guns employed and the shot fired in the siege of Strassburg deserves to be mentioned. There were 241 pieces placed in battery outside the walls. During the thirty-one days over which the regular operations extended these fired 193,722 rounds, or, on an average, 6249 per day, 269 per hour, or between four and five per minute. Of the total of the rounds, 45,000 shells were fired from the rifled 12-pounders, 28,000 shells from the long rifled 24-pounders; 23,000 7-pound bombs, 20,000 25-pound bombs, and 15,000 50-pound bombs from smooth-bore mortars; 11,000 shrapnels from the rifled 12-pounders, 8000 shells from the rifled 6-pounders, 5000 shrapnels from the rifled 24-pounders, 4000 shrapnels from the rifled 6-pounders, 3000 long shells from the 15 centimètre guns, and 600 long shells from the 21 centimètre guns.

A valuable prize fell into the hands of Germany through the surrender of Strassburg. No fewer than 2000 cannon were found in the fortifications, arsenal, and foundry: 1200 of them were bronze guns of various calibre, mostly rifled, and the large majority new, having been made in 1862, 1863, and 1864, and never fired; 800 were iron, some of them very large, smooth-bored and rifled. One hundred and fifty tons of powder made up in cartridges, and four hundred and fifty tons in bulk, were discovered in store; besides many thousand stand of arms, including hosts of excellent Chassepots, although the mobiles and sédentaires were armed only with "tabatières." Clothing also was found, enough for a very large body of men. The military authorities estimated the value of the *matériel*, which by the capitulation legitimately became the property of Germany, at more than two millions and a half sterling. In hard cash they took 10,000,000 of francs (£400,000) deposited in the military chest of the garrison.

Subsequently a commission was appointed by the Tours delegate government to investigate the reasons for the surrender of Strassburg. It is needless to say that no imputation on the courage and patriotism of its defenders could be for a moment sustained.

The fortress, which was not taken either in 1814 or in 1815, made on this occasion a most heroic defence against an overwhelming force, furnished with tremendous artillery; and it is hard to say whether the inhabitants or the garrison should be held as entitled to most praise. The endurance of the citizens was certainly not less conspicuous than the bravery of the troops; and perhaps the truest symptom of patriotic feeling which the French nation showed during the days of adversity in the late war, was exhibited in the hearty loyalty with which the Parisians laid their laurel wreaths at the base of the civic statue of Strassburg. General Uhrich undoubtedly "made himself an everlasting name" by his defence of the Alsatian city, which will be narrated by Frenchmen in future generations as one of the few bright spots in a singularly gloomy period of the national history.

The siege of Toul is chiefly remarkable for the bravery and endurance with which its small garrison held out for six weeks against a force of 20,000 Prussians under the duke of Mecklenburg,

and thus deprived the German armies during that time of the advantage of direct railway communication from the Rhine at Coblentz and Mayence *viâ* Nancy to Paris. The town lies in the valley of the Moselle, and its stout and prolonged resistance has led many to suppose that it occupied an elevated position. On the contrary, it stands in a sort of basin formed by an abrupt curve of the Moselle, and may be said to be completely commanded by the surrounding heights, inasmuch as the two hills St. Michel and St. Maurice overlook it at a distance of about 4000 yards. It is regularly fortified on Vauban's system; and has excellent walls, six bastions, and deep fosses filled with water. It was formerly deemed a very strong fortress; but as it possessed no outworks or detached forts, it proved to be untenable for any lengthened period before new long-range siege artillery. The most conspicuous object seen on approaching the town is the fine old cathedral, one of the most famous Gothic edifices of the sixteenth century. Orders were given by the German commander to spare it as much as possible; but injuries to the external walls were unavoidable, and a large window was destroyed. The public building that suffered most severely by the bombardment was the stately residence of the mayor, which was pierced in every part. It seems, however, that for five weeks the besiegers had only ordinary field-guns in use, against which the fortress held out stoutly, and had evidently no intention to give in. It capitulated only when the regular siege artillery of the Germans, heavy rifled breechloaders, came up. On the 20th, the besiegers advanced a battery within range of the bastions, and some well-directed rounds drove the French from the walls, whence they had kept up a vigorous musketry-fire. Six Bavarian batteries planted on the heights made terrible havoc, 2000 bombs and grenades being fired daily at the fortress. By the fearful bombardment of the 22nd and 23rd September, when the town was on fire in twenty-three places at once, whole streets were destroyed, and the barracks, hospital, and chapel, situate on the plateau of the rock forming the fortress, became a heap of ruins. As the German armies around Paris were suffering serious inconvenience from the railway being held by Toul, the grand-duke had determined to storm the place. Before, however, the siege had been begun in earnest, and the first parallel dug out, on the 23rd September, while the bombardment was proceeding on all sides, suddenly a large white flag was exhibited from the Cathedral tower. All the batteries at the grand-duke's command were immediately silent, and a Prussian *parlementaire* rode into the town, who soon returned with the commandant of Toul, Colonel Hück. After long negotiations, the capitulation was agreed to; and as darkness had meanwhile set in, the commandant and the chief of the grand-duke's staff appended their signatures by the dim light of a stable lantern. The entire garrison of about 2500, including 500 infantry and artillerymen, the others being mobile guards, surrendered as prisoners of war. The terms of the capitulation were that the fortress, war material, and soldiers should be given up, with the exception of those mobile and national guards who were inhabitants of the place prior to the outbreak of the war. In consideration of the gallant defence of the fortress, all officers and officials having the rank of officers, who gave their word of honour in writing not to bear arms against Germany, nor to act contrary to her interests in any other way, had their liberty, and were allowed to retain their swords, horses, and other property. An inventory of the war material, consisting of eagles, guns, swords, horses, war chests, and articles of military equipment, was to be given to the Prussians. The convention thus far was similar to that of Sedan; but there was another article which said:—"In view of the lamentable accident which occurred on the occasion of the capitulation of Laon, it is agreed that if a similar thing should happen on the entry of the German troops into the fortress of Toul, the entire garrison shall be at the mercy of the grand-duke of Mecklenburg."

Some eighty officers, including all those belonging to the mobile guards, chose to give their parole and remain in France. Seventeen superior officers, including Commandant Hück, who was complimented on his bravery by the grand-duke, preferred Prussian captivity. The reasons given by the commandant for capitulating were, that he had only ammunition for three or four days, when he would have been forced to surrender, after all Toul had possibly been destroyed; and that the mobile guards were undisciplined and not sufficiently practised in arms to offer a long defence or to repulse a storming attack. The same evening the French garrison marched out and bivouacked in a meadow under guard. The next day they were sent by railway to Prussia, and the

Mecklenburg troops occupied the place, which was entered by the grand-duke with a brilliant staff at the head of some regiments.

After the surrender Toul presented a scene very different from what is usually seen on such occasions. Instead of the bitter feeling on the one side and the exultation on the other, which are commonly exhibited, both parties, when the gate was opened, seemed to meet like the best of friends. The French garrison were delighted to be out, and the German besiegers no less so to find their work at an end. As there were many Alsatians among the garrison, besiegers and besieged at once entered into conversation, shared the contents of their flasks with each other, and but for the stringent rules separating prisoner from conqueror, would doubtless have made a jovial night of it. The anxious families had passed the last days chiefly in their cellars, the windows of their houses being thickly covered with manure. All now came creeping out, sunning themselves, and spreading out their beds everywhere to dry and air, as they had become damp in the underground abodes. Pale faces were visible everywhere, and loud lamentations were heard; but the habitual French elasticity and cheerfulness were soon manifested, the inhabitants being gladdened by the thought that the siege was ended, and life and health were no longer endangered. Excursions into the country were immediately undertaken, and civilians, with officers released on parole, were seen driving about and inspecting the positions which had so recently menaced them.

The following officers, men, arms, and munitions of war, &c., were captured at the surrender of Toul:—109 officers, 2240 men, 120 horses, one eagle of the garde mobile, 197 bronze guns, including 48 pieces of rifled ordnance, 3000 rifles, 3000 sabres, 500 cuirasses, and a considerable quantity of munitions and articles of equipment. Soldiers' pay for 143,025 days, and rations for 51,949 days, also fell into the hands of the Prussians.

It is no idle phrase that Strassburg and Toul "deserved well" of their country. Citizens, as well as regular soldiers, appear to have conducted the defence of the two cities. All that could be done was done. Among the incidents of a campaign prolific in startling illustrations of the collapse of the military system of France, it must ever be remembered, as a redeeming fact, that a fourth-rate fortress, defended by a garrison consisting almost entirely of civilians, held out for six weeks against the invading force, and blocked up for that time the direct communications between Germany and the bulk of her army.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Position of the German Armies in the beginning of October—Their Depot Battalions of the Line serving as Cadres—The great importance in Modern Warfare of Large Intrenched Camps, with a Fortress for their Nucleus—Count von Moltke's Plans—Occupation of Beauvais by General Manteuffel—The duty of General von Werder's Army—Levée en Masse ordered by the French Government—Formation of New Armies—Sad want of Discipline and Good Officers—The Franc-Tireurs—Severe Treatment of them by the Germans—Burning of Ablis and other Places—Inconsistency of Prussia in attempting to put down Irregular Warfare—Decree of the French Government with the view of protecting the Franc-Tireurs—More Prudence than Courage shown by the French in many Places—Panic at Orleans—Confusion in both the Military and Political System of France—Great Want of a Real General—M. Gambetta leaves Paris for Tours in a Balloon—Biographical Sketch of Him—Narrow Escape on his Aerial Journey—Address presented to him at Rouen—His Arrival at Tours, and his First Impressions of the State of Affairs—Important Proclamation issued by Him—Arrival of Garibaldi at Tours—He is despatched to the East to take Command of a Body of Irregular Troops—The Extraordinary Energy of M. Gambetta—Engagement between the French and Germans at Toury—Easy Victory of the French—Uneasiness at the German Headquarters, and Despatch of the First Bavarian Corps Southwards—The French are completely surprised at Artenay and easily overcome—Gross Neglect of the French Commanders—Obstinate Encounter near Orleans—Panic amongst the Franc-Tireurs and Terror in the City of Orleans itself—Disgraceful Conduct of the Troops—The City is entered by the Germans—Proclamation of the German Commander to the Inhabitants—The French Army of the Loire retire to Bourges—General d'Aurelles de Paladines appointed to command it—His First Order of the Day—Importance of the Capture of Orleans to the Germans in two ways—The Franc-Tireurs in the Forests around the City prove a great annoyance to them—Chartres and Châteaudun fortified—Determined Resistance at the Latter Town—Chartres capitulates on Favourable Terms—The Military Operations in Eastern France—German Victory between Raon l'Etape and St. Diey—Capture of Epinal, by which Lorraine is cut off from the rest of France—Arrival of Garibaldi on the Scene, and Proclamation to his Irregular Troops—No Combined Action between him and the French General Cambriels, who is actively pursued by General von Werder—Another German Victory—Resignation of General Cambriels—The dislike of the Catholics to Garibaldi, and the obstacles placed in his way—Appointment of General Michel in the room of Cambriels—Surrender of Schlestadt—Siege and Bombardment of Soissons—Acquisition of a Second Line of Railway to Paris—Gallant defence of St. Quentin—Final occupation of it and other Towns in the North of France—The Excitement in Rouen and Amiens—General Bourbaki appointed to the command of the French Army of the North—Short Sketch of his Career—First Proclamation issued by him—Preparations for defence in Brittany under Count de Keratry—A Company of Volunteer Engineers formed in Eastern France to operate on the German Lines of Communication—Plan of their Operations—The Germans compel the most respected Inhabitants in the District to accompany the Trains or Locomotives—The Great Mistake of the French in not establishing suitable Cavalry Corps to harass the German Line of Communication—The Prospects for France brighter at the close of October than at the beginning, chiefly owing to the energy of M. Gambetta—Martial Law Established in all the Departments within Seventy Miles of the Enemy's Forces—Formation of Camps and adoption of Severe Measures in various parts of the Country—The extreme Republicans alone devoid of Patriotic Feeling—A Loan of £10,000,000 contracted—Appeals from France to England and other Countries for Intervention and Assistance—A Negotiation with the view to an Armistice is agreed on—Interview between M. Thiers and Count von Bismarck—Great mistake of the French in breaking off the Negotiations on the Question of Re-victualling Paris—The General Feeling in France when the Failure of the Negotiations became known—The Germans disappointed at the Prolongation of the War, but determined to support their Political and Military Leaders until Alsace and Lorraine had been recovered—Manufacture of the Pen with which to sign the Treaty of Peace—Count von Bismarck's Reply on receiving it—The serious Consequences of the War in France—The advantage, both in France and Germany, of the Women being able to undertake Agricultural Operations.

During the sieges of Metz and Paris, the chief interest of the war, of course, centered in those two cities. But while France watched with pride the endurance and determination displayed by her greatest fortress and her magnificent capital, the beleaguered garrisons and citizens in each case were anxiously looking for the armies of the provinces to come to their rescue, and assist in dispersing the besieging hosts. In the present chapter we propose to review the state of France, and the military operations of both the French and Germans elsewhere than at Paris and Metz, during the month of October.

It is a remarkable fact that, even after the fall of Strassburg, nearly the whole of the immense German army in France was fully employed, although not one-sixth of the territory of the country was held by the invaders. Metz, with Bazaine's army inclosed within its line of forts, found occupation for eight army corps (the first, second, third, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, the division of Hessians, and General Kummer's division of landwehr), in all, sixteen divisions of infantry. Paris engaged seventeen divisions of infantry (the guards, fourth, fifth, sixth, eleventh, twelfth North German, first and second Bavarian corps, and the Würtemburg division). The newly formed thirteenth and fourteenth corps, mostly landwehr, and some detachments from the corps already named, occupied the conquered country,

and observed, blockaded, or besieged the places which, within it, still belonged to the French. The fifteenth corps, the Baden division, and one division of landwehr, set free by the capitulation of Strassburg, were alone disposable for active operations.

These forces comprised almost all the organized troops of which Germany disposed. In accordance with their original purpose, the depot battalions served as cadres for the drill and organization of the men intended to fill up the gaps which battles and disease caused in the ranks of their respective regiments. Proportionately as the thousand men forming the battalion were sufficiently broken in to do duty before the enemy, they were sent off by detachments to join the three field battalions of the regiment; this was done on a large scale after the severe fighting before Metz in the middle of August. But the officers and non-commissioned officers of the battalion remained at home, ready to receive and prepare for the field a fresh batch of 1000 men, taken from the recruits called out in due course. This measure was absolutely necessary in a war as bloody as the present one, and the end of which was not to be foreseen with certainty; but it deprived the Germans of the active services for the time being of 114 battalions, and a corresponding force of cavalry and artillery, representing in all fully 200,000 men. With the exception of these, the occupation of scarcely one-sixth of France and the reduction of the two large fortresses in this territory—Metz and Paris—kept the whole of the German forces so fully employed that they had barely 60,000 men to spare for further operations beyond the territory already conquered. And this, while there was not anywhere a French army in the field to oppose serious resistance!

If ever there was needed a proof of the immense importance, in modern warfare, of large intrenched camps with a fortress for their nucleus, here that proof was furnished. The two intrenched camps in question were not at all made use of to the best advantage, for Metz had for a garrison too many troops for its size and importance, and Paris had of real troops fit for the field scarcely any at all. Still, the first of these places held at least 200,000, the second 250,000 enemies in check; and if France had only had 200,000 real soldiers behind the Loire, the siege of Paris would have been an impossibility. As it was, however, France was virtually at the mercy of a conqueror who held possession of barely one-sixth of her territory.

Count von Moltke's plan of operations embraced not only the siege of the capital, but also the occupation of the northern and eastern departments as far as was possible with the forces at his disposal, thus pressing at once on Paris and the provinces, and rendering each unable to assist the other.

On September 29 Beauvais, the capital of the department of the Oise, was occupied by the first Prussian corps, under General Manteuffel, who, with a portion of the army which had been engaged at Sedan, was commissioned to carry the war into the north-west of France; from this point threatening Rouen on the west and Amiens on the north. The fall of Toul and Strassburg in the last week of September liberated 80,000 German troops, part of whom were sent to assist in the investment of Paris, while the remainder, about 70,000, were formed into an army under General von Werder, to be employed in operations over southern Alsace and the south-eastern districts of France. It was to seize any points at which it might be attempted to form military organizations, to disperse the corps, break up depôts, and destroy stores. It was, further, to levy contributions upon towns which had not as yet felt the pressure of the war, and which expressed a desire for its continuance. It was hoped that in this way accurate conceptions of the state of the country and the helplessness of its government would be communicated to that part of the French public which had hitherto derived its impressions from the bulletins published at Paris and Tours.

On October 1 the Tours government issued a decree for a *levée en masse* of all Frenchmen of the military age—from twenty-one to forty—to be organized into a mobilized national guard. Had this decree been carried out, it would have supplied at least three millions of men, for not one in three, even of those liable to serve, had been as yet enrolled. The larger towns had done their part, but the country districts were surprisingly apathetic, and those who possessed any means and desired exemption from service obtained it with little trouble.

From this date, however, commenced the formation of new armies in the north, south, east, and west of France. Indeed, immediately after the events of the 2nd September, the government had adopted vigorous measures to raise fresh troops by means

of a forced conscription, embracing soldiers whose term of service had long since expired, and youths not yet arrived at the legal age; and by calling out all the retired, invalided, and pensioned general and other officers, with all the depôt and garrison troops, gardes mobiles, marines, and gendarmes. The result was that, early in October, there were, in various parts of France, an immense number of men ready for service when provincial armies should be organized. This was especially the case in the district of the Loire, where a very well-defined nucleus of an army had already been got together. Its headquarters were about fifty-five miles south of Orleans, at Bourges, a place containing a large cannon foundry, and of strategical importance owing to its being situated within the loop formed by the Loire, and at the junction of the different roads leading to Tours, Blois, Orleans, and Nevers, all commanding passages over the river. The force numbered, on October 1, about 60,000 men, well armed, but greatly deficient in artillery. The regulars, mostly fugitives from Sedan, were in the proportion of one in nine; but even out of this unpromising material a very formidable army might have been obtained with a fair amount of discipline. There was, however, a strong republican feeling amongst them; they did not yield a willing obedience to superiors; they thoroughly distrusted those in command; and this, coupled with the want of good officers, went far to neutralize the efforts of the government.

Simultaneously with the formation of armies, irregular corps of volunteers, or franc-tireurs, began to spring up all over the country. Many of these were expert marksmen, and caused great annoyance to the Germans by cutting off their convoys, carrying out night surprises, and lying in wait and falling unexpectedly on their outposts or rearguard. Many others were merely highwaymen under a different title, who shot and plundered friend and foe alike. On the ground that these franc-tireurs wore no distinctive uniform, and had no regular officers, the Germans claimed the right, under the laws of war, of treating them as unrecognized combatants, trying them by drum-head court-martial, and shooting them as soon as captured. In fact, the whole policy of the Germans, at this time, seems to have been marked by extreme although necessary severity. Their rule was that every town or village where one or more of the inhabitants fired upon their troops, or took part in the defence, should be burned down; that every man taken in arms who was not, according to their notion, a regular soldier, should be shot at once; that where there was reason to believe that any considerable portion of the population of a town actively sided against them, all able-bodied men should be treated with merciless severity. A squadron of German cavalry and a company of infantry took up their quarters in Ablis, a village of 900 inhabitants, just off the railway from Paris to Tours. During the night the inhabitants, giving way to a patriotic impulse, with the aid of franc-tireurs attacked the sleeping men, killed several, and captured or dispersed the rest. The next day the German general sent a force which burnt Ablis to the ground, and a neighbouring village from which the franc-tireurs had come. The threat, by the French, of reprisals upon the captured hussars, alone prevented more of the able-bodied men of the place from being shot. This was but one of numberless instances. A Bavarian detachment in the neighbourhood of Orleans burned down five villages in twelve days. Thus the mode of warfare which was pursued in the days of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., in 1870 was again found necessary. The Prussian armies should have been the last in the world to treat with severity irregular warfare; for in 1806 Prussia collapsed from the absence of that spirit of national resistance which in 1807 those at the head of affairs, both in the civil and military departments, did everything in their power to revive. At that time Spain showed a sagacious example of resistance to an invasion, which the military leaders of Prussia—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz—all urged their countrymen to emulate. Gneisenau even went to Spain to fight against Napoleon. The new military system, then inaugurated in Prussia, was an attempt to organize popular resistance to the enemy, as far as this was possible in an absolute monarchy. Every able-bodied man was to pass through the army, and to serve in the landwehr up to his fortieth year; the lads between seventeen and twenty, and the men between forty and sixty, were to form part of the "landsturm," or *levée en masse*, which was to rise in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy, to harass his movements, intercept his supplies and couriers, and to employ whatever arms it could find, and whatever

means were at hand to annoy him. "The more effective these means the better." Above all, they were to "*wear no uniform of any kind*, so that the landsturmers might at any time *resume their character of civilians*, and remain unknown to the enemy." It was proposed more than once that the Prussian "landsturm ordinary" should be printed and issued to each franc-tireur as his guide-book, by which, upon his capture, he could at least show the Prussians that he had only been acting upon the instructions issued by their own king.

With the view of protecting these guerilla troops as much as possible, on the 1st of November it was decreed by the French government, that from that date every corps of franc-tireurs, or volunteers, should be attached to an army corps on active service, or to a territorial division ; and they were strictly prohibited acting independently or beyond the assigned limits, under penalty of being disarmed and dissolved.

By the imposition of a fine of a million francs upon any department in which bands of franc-tireurs should be met with, the German authorities strove to keep down the perilous annoyance. On every town which fell into their hands after resistance offered, they also made heavy requisitions in money. Under these circumstances, and remembering what had happened at Ablis and elsewhere, it is not surprising that the local municipalities sometimes evinced more prudence than courage.

In the night of the 26th to the 27th September, General Polhès, the commandant of the military division of Orleans, suddenly turned out the garrison, and in hot haste took his departure southwards. The Prussians were coming. Next day it was discovered that they were not coming; that there were only a very few of them in the neighbourhood, who certainly were not advancing on Orleans. So General Polhès came back. A couple of hours after his departure, however, two regiments of French cuirassiers had arrived in Orleans from Blois, who, finding no one to give them orders, and hearing that the commander had retreated, also returned. In the forest of Orleans about 800 men, apparently forgotten, had been left without any orders. All this evidence of haste naturally spread alarm : the consequence was that the railway authorities went off with their rolling stock towards La Ferté and Beaugency, and those connected with the telegraph carried off their apparatus. The prefect, thus deprived of the means of recalling the runaway garrison, managed at last to press a one-horse chaise into the service of the state, to convey to the general letters informing him that a spontaneous deputation was about to start for Tours to ask of the government a general able and willing to defend the forest of Orleans and its environs. Meanwhile the money in the banks and public money-chests had all been removed; the municipal council had met and protested against the abandonment of the city; and all was confusion and fear.

The whole military and political system of France was in fact at this time in a state of hopeless confusion, without a directing head to set it right. The arrangement which gave the prefects the military command of their respective departments, was producing its natural results in disconnected and useless efforts and conflicting authority. Marseilles and Lyons were threatened with a red republican insurrection, which was only prevented by the good sense and patriotism of the masses. At Grenoble, General Monnet, a Crimean veteran, was, at the instigation of a few riotous citizens, deposed from his command of the garrison and imprisoned. The prefect of Lyons, without a shadow of justification, arrested General Mazure, in command of the troops in the city, and because the senseless act was approved by his colleagues of the government delegation at Tours, Admiral Fourichon resigned the portfolio of War. On the other hand, thirteen departments banded together to demand the nomination of a general of independent authority, to organize the defence of the western provinces. Here and there might be heard murmurs of revenge, and in certain districts corps were formed which the government would fain have dignified with the name of armies. But there was no man to stir up popular enthusiasm, or turn it to account; and France merely waited, every day increasing her peril. With an enemy 700,000 strong in their country, the French forces were without a commander-in-chief! No energetic man fit to be endowed with supreme authority, and capable of reducing the chaos to order, was forthcoming. Bazaine, the only man thought to be equal to the present emergency, was closely besieged in Metz, and with him were Canrobert, L'Admirault, Jarras, Coffinières, Lebœuf, and Bourbaki. MacMahon was a prisoner at Wiesbaden,

Uhrich was bound down by his parole, while Trochu, Vinoy, and Ducrot were busy defending Paris. Large forces were being concentrated both on the Loire and the Rhone, but no one had been yet appointed, or even nominated to command them. The ministry of war, by Fourichon's resignation, was vacant, and M. Cremieux, an amiable, easy lawyer, minister of justice in the Provisional Government, was acting war minister. His appointment, at such a crisis, was very unsuitable, and there were loud demands for transferring the war administration to a commission composed of MM. Glais-Bizoin, Laurier, Steenackers, Frayssinet, Le Cesne, and Alphonse Gent. The nation was becoming absolutely frantic with impatience and despair at the inaptitude of those who had the direction of affairs, and at the utter demoralization, both civil and military, which was spreading through every department.

In these circumstances M. Laurier, the acting manager for the department of the Interior, a man of considerable capacity, devoted to the cause of the nation, and faithful to the trust reposed in him by M. Gambetta, his chief, thought that the moment had come when the government of Paris should be informed of the serious state of things. Two words, translated "Come at once," were addressed by him to Gambetta, and intrusted to the carriage of a "pigeon traveller." The minister of the Interior knew his agent well. Without delay he consulted with his colleagues, who all felt convinced that his presence at Tours was indispensable, and that he ought to proceed thither immediately.

M. Léon Gambetta, the young barrister who was thus destined to play such an important part in the struggles of his country, won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1869, as one of the members for Paris, and distinguished himself by his bold attacks on the imperial policy, and his advocacy of democratic principles. A native of the south of France, but of Genoese family, he was endowed with all the ardent physical and moral qualities of that passionate Italian race. His eloquence and capacity for business were proved by many successes at the French bar, achieved by the time he was thirty-two years of age; but he came first into public note as counsel for some of the accused under the government prosecutions of 1868, against the promoters of the subscription for a monument to Baudin, one of the members of the National Assembly killed in the street-fighting after the *coup d'état* of December, 1851.

For fully a week did this energetic young statesman have to wait in Paris for a favourable opportunity of starting. Morning after morning the Place de Saint-Pierre at Montmartre was thronged by people eager to witness his departure, and morning after morning pilot-balloons were sent up, in order to ascertain the direction of the aerial currents; but the wind kept persistently in the west, and would probably have carried the balloon into the parts of France occupied by the enemy, and possibly into Germany itself, had the attempt been made to ascend. At length it changed to the south-east; and at eleven o'clock on the morning of Thursday, October 7, M. Gambetta, accompanied by his secretary and the aeronaut Trichet, ascended in the *Armand Barbès*, carrying with him an immense quantity of letters and several pigeons. During the night, however, a contrary breeze sprung up. On Friday morning the aeronaut in charge of the balloon, believing they were not far from Tours, allowed the machine to descend—but only to find out that they were hovering over Metz, two hundred miles away to the east. The Prussian troops fired volley after volley at the travellers. The balloon was made to rise again, but not a moment too soon, for already some half dozen balls had pierced the car; and even one of the cords which attached it to the balloon was cut, and had to be spliced by the minister himself, who was slightly wounded in the hand. All through Friday the travellers made little or no progress, but on Saturday, at daylight, they descended in the neighbourhood of Montdidier, a small town about four leagues from Amiens, and one league off the railway between it and Paris. M. Gambetta was here met by a gentleman who conveyed him in his carriage to Amiens, whence he shortly after departed for Rouen, where a great demonstration was made by the national guard and the populace, and at the railway station the following address was presented to him:—"Illustrious Citoyen Gambetta; self-sacrifice is everywhere, but energy, foresight, and management are wanting. Raise up these, and the enemy will be driven forth, France saved, and the republic founded definitively and for ever. Vive la France! Vive la Republique!" M. Gambetta made a stirring reply, addressed specially to the people of Normandy, and concluding with the words, "If

we cannot make a compact with victory, let us make a compact with death." Immediately after he left for Tours. Here the enthusiastic republican was unpleasantly impressed with the aspect of the place, the number of officers and soldiers idling about the cafés, and the absence of that stern concentration of thought on one object which he left behind him in Paris. He also found that little had been done, that there was a lack of resource and vigour ill befitting the gravity of the crisis; and it was with ill-concealed displeasure that he appeared at the Prefecture window in answer to the clamorous crowd below. In a few brief words he acknowledged the honour done him and, deprecating demonstrations, concluded as follows:—"Let us work and fight. I bring you the instructions and decisions of the Paris government. As I cannot speak to you all, I have written. In an hour's time you will be able to read the object of my mission. Once more, gentlemen, let us work and fight, for we have not a minute to spare. Everyone to his post. 'Vive la Republique!'" He at once held a council with his colleagues, and at night a decree was published, postponing the intended elections for a National Assembly, chiefly because twenty-three departments were more or less in the hands of the invader. Simultaneously with the decree, he issued the following circular:—

"By order of the republican government I have left Paris to convey to you the hopes of the Parisian people, and the instructions and orders of those who accepted the mission of delivering France from the foreigner. For seventeen days Paris has been invested, and offers the spectacle of two millions of men who, forgetting all differences to range themselves around the republican flag, will disappoint the expectations of the invader, who reckoned upon civil discord. The revolution found Paris without cannon and without arms. Now 400,000 national guards are armed, 100,000 mobiles have been summoned, and 60,000 regular troops are assembled. The foundries cast cannon, the women make 1,000,000 cartridges daily. The national guard have two mitrailleuses for each battalion. Field-pieces are being made for sorties against the besiegers. The forts are manned by marines, and are furnished with marvellous artillery, served by the first gunners in the world. Up till now their fire has prevented the enemy from establishing the smallest work. The enceinte, which on the 4th of September had only 500 cannons, has now 3800, with 400 rounds of ammunition for each. The casting of projectiles continues with ardour. Every one is at the post assigned to him for fighting. The enceinte is uninterruptedly covered by the national guard, who from morning until night drill for the war with patriotism and steadiness. The experience of these improvised soldiers increases daily. Behind the enceinte there is a third line of defence formed of barricades, behind which the Parisians are found to defend the republic—the genius of street fighting. All this has been executed with calmness and order by the concurrence and enthusiasm of all. It is not a vain illusion that Paris is impregnable. It cannot be captured nor surprised. Two other means remain to the Prussians—sedition and famine. But sedition will not arise, nor famine either. Paris, by placing herself on rations, has enough to defy the enemy for long months, thanks to the provisions which have been accumulated, and will bear restraint and scarcity with manly constancy, in order to afford her brothers in the departments time to gather. Such is without disguise the state of Paris. This state imposes great duties upon you. The first is to have no other occupation than the war; the second is to accept fraternally the supremacy of the republican power, emanating from necessity and right, which will serve no ambition. It has no other passion than to rescue France from the abyss into which monarchy has plunged her. This done, the republic will be founded, sheltered against conspirators and reactionists. Therefore, I have the order, without taking into account difficulties or opposition, to remedy and, although time fails, to make up by activity the shortcomings caused by delay. Men are not wanting. What has failed us has been a decisive resolution and the consecutive execution of our plans. That which failed us after the shameful capitulation at Sedan was arms. All supplies of this nature had been sent on to Sedan, Metz, and Strassburg, as if, one would think, the authors of our disaster, by a last criminal combination, had desired, at their fall, to deprive us of all means of repairing our ruin. Steps have now been taken to obtain rifles and equipments from all parts of the world. Neither workmen nor money are wanting. We must bring to bear all our resources, which are immense; we must make the provinces shake off their torpor, react against

Engraved by W. Hall from a Photograph.

foolish panics, multiply our partizans, offer traps and ambushes to harass the enemy, and inaugurate a national war. The republic demands the co-operation of all; it will utilize the courage of all its citizens, employ the capabilities of each, and according to its traditional policy will make young men its chiefs. Heaven itself will cease to favour our adversaries; the autumn rains will come, and detained and held in check by the capital, far from their homes, and troubled and anxious for the future, the Prussians will be decimated one by one by our arms, by hunger, and by nature. No, it is not possible that the genius of France should be for evermore obscured; it cannot be that a great nation shall let its place in the world be taken from it by an invasion of 500,000 men! Up then in a mass, and let us die rather than suffer the shame of dismemberment! In the midst of our disasters we have still the sentiment left of French unity, and the indivisibility of the Republic. Paris, surrounded by the enemy, affirms more loudly and more gloriously than ever the immortal device which is dictated to the whole of France:—'Long live the Republic! Long live France! Long live the Republic, one and indivisible.'"

While the minister of the new French republic was careering through the clouds in a balloon, another and more celebrated republican was hastening from an opposite direction to meet him. Till lately Garibaldi had been virtually a prisoner in his island home, the Italian government keeping a vigilant eye on him. Ever since the fall of the empire, however, it had been his anxious desire to come to the assistance of the newly declared republic. His services in the field were at once offered, but the reply of the delegate government to his offer had been delayed. A brief but characteristic letter to his son-in-law, M. Canzio, explains his position in the meantime:—

"Caprera, *September* 13, 1870.

"My dear son—From the French government I have not received any reply, and that rubbish (*quella robàccia*) which calls itself the government of Italy, holds me prisoner."

"G. GARIBALDI."

The pope's temporal power, however, had fallen before the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel. Rome had become the Italian capital; and if the Italian cruisers still hovered round Caprera, at least Garibaldi found no great difficulty in eluding their vigilance, and escaping to France in what was there known as a *yack*. He arrived in Tours the same day as Gambetta (October 9), and so unexpectedly, that no preparations had been made for his reception. On the news of his arrival becoming known, however, a large number of franc-tireurs assembled before the prefecture window, at which the general presented himself, and in reply to the enthusiastic cheers with which he was greeted, said:—"My children, your welcome and that of your brothers overwhelms me. I am only a soldier like yourselves. I come to place myself among you, to fight for the holy republic!"

Garibaldi brought with him a name, but little more, to the aid of the republic he loved. The liberator of Italy, whose kindly face, loose grey cloak, and scarlet shirt, were familiar to every child in Christendom, more fitly represented the idea of a republic than any other man in Europe; and it was hoped that his presence in France at this time would give to the popular rising throughout the country an impetus, such as the appeals and proclamations of the new government had failed to impart. The state of his health, however, totally unfitted him for regular warfare; he knew little of the duties of a general in command of a large army; and he was looked on as the most dangerous and wicked of men by a large portion of the French, and by such persons as Colonel Charette and the pontifical zouaves, whose aid in this moment of need had also been tendered to and accepted by the French government. Singularly enough, Colonel Charette was also at Tours on this memorable day, exercising his troops, fresh from the defence of the pope.

To General Cambriels, who commanded in the east, Garibaldi was despatched to Besançon, to take command of the free corps and of a brigade of mobiles in the Vosges. He carried a strong letter of recommendation from Gambetta, and he seems to have been received with the utmost consideration by the civil and military authorities, as well as with great enthusiasm by the people.

M. Gambetta at the head of affairs, issuing commissions to parties so antagonistic as Garibaldi and the champions of the temporal power, offered to the imagination a strange, if not grotesque, combination of circumstances. But although he and his curious allies or subordinates were all animated with the most intense desire to benefit France, it seemed impossible that elements so dis-

cordant should long cohere, unless welded together for a time by a success which they shared in common. At present a bright spot in the fortunes of France was nowhere visible; but the courage and resources of her people were great, and their feelings of hatred against the invaders intense; and in these circumstances it was impossible to say what change to the better might not yet take place. Even a small advantage gained over a German force in a fair fight, might have the effect of reviving the confidence of the French, and inciting them to put forth the great power they undoubtedly possessed. With all the energy of which he was capable, M. Gambetta set about organizing armies in all the provinces of France, admonishing prefects, displacing and appointing generals, and showing himself whereever his presence could stimulate flagging patriotism or remove the depression caused by reverses. He issued a decree, establishing four military *régions:* 1, the Northern, to be commanded by Bourbaki, at Lille; 2, the Western, with General Fiereck commander, and Le Mans for head-quarters; 3, the Central, commanded by General Polhès, at Bourges; 4, the Eastern, commanded by General Cambriels, at Besançon. Besides these, General La Motte Rouge on the Loire, General Esterhazy at Lyons, Count Keratry in the west, and Garibaldi in the east held distinct commissions; eight in all, acting independently of each other. The wonderful energy thus displayed by M. Gambetta had a very inspiriting effect on the country, and the despair almost universally depicted on the countenance of French patriots shortly before gave way to hope.

Meanwhile the Prussians, on their part, were carrying out a preconcerted programme in their movements to the north and south of Paris, and in the east of France. The whole district between Paris and Orleans was daily scoured by them for requisitions. At Toury a large force under Prince Albert of Prussia protected the operations for supplying the army of Paris, and an immense quantity of provisions, sheep, and cattle had been collected here from the plains of La Beauce.

Early in October the efforts of the French to raise an army behind the Loire had produced some little result; and on the 5th General Reyan, having re-occupied Orleans, which General Polhès had abandoned so hastily some ten days before, pushed northwards to Arthenay and Toury with 10,000 men against the German foraging forces. An engagement took place at Toury, which lasted from seven a.m. till twelve. The German artillery dismounted several of the French guns, but by his great superiority of numbers General Reyan obtained an easy victory, and pursued the enemy for several hours. About fifty prisoners were taken, and a number of cattle and sheep, which the Germans were unable to carry with them.

Such a sign of life on the part of the army of the Loire gave some little uneasiness to the German commander at Paris; and to extinguish this first gleam of success, which was already exciting new enthusiasm in the country, the first corps of Bavarians under Von der Tann, which had arrived last at Paris from Sedan and had been purposely held in reserve, was now therefore ordered to march southwards to discover the movements of the enemy. It was strengthened by half the infantry of the twenty-second Prussian division, and by the cavalry divisions of Prince Albert and Count Stolberg, which were already in the district.

There was a more direct line of railroad than that through Orleans to Tours, diverging to the westward of it at Bretigny, and running through Châteaudun and Vendôme. This line it was necessary to watch with cavalry, in order to cover the right of Der Tann. It was the advanced guard of a column sent for this purpose which, on the night of the 7th, was surprised and cut up by the franc-tireurs at Ablis, about thirty-three miles from Paris, and which led to the destruction of that village on the following day, as stated in the early part of the chapter.

Von der Tann marched from his late quarters about Longjumeau on the 6th, and on the 8th gained Etampes, which had been held for some days previously by the foraging party driven out from Toury, twenty miles further off, by General Reyan, on the 5th. The latter had fallen back a day's march from Toury, after the trifling success reported, and left his advanced guard of a brigade of troops at Artenay, the next large village to the south. The officer in command, General de Longuerue, seems to have kept no better look-out than those who suffered for their carelessness at Wissembourg and Beaumont. Early on the morning of the 10th the Bavarians were close upon him, and soon began to drive his troops southwards. Ignorant of the enemy's strength, he hastened to support his advanced guard with

about 10,000 men, all that he had ready to his hands. Probably Der Tann's advance was mistaken for a separate and isolated detachment. At any rate, the raw French troops were soon engaged with a body of Germans of immensely superior strength, and although they fought desperately for several hours, they were of course overcome, and, with the loss of many prisoners and some guns, forced back towards Orleans, twelve miles from the scene of the morning's action. General Longuerue and a large body of the fugitives gained the forest of Orleans, where, awaiting reinforcements, they resolved to defend themselves.

The army of the Loire, now under the chief command of General La Motte Rouge, numbered at least 60,000 men. Of these, 15,000 had been left the whole of this day to withstand a force three times their numerical strength, and possessing six times their effective value as a military body, while 45,000 were idle, within easy reach of the battle-field. Although it was well known that the Germans were coming southwards by forced marches, no measures seem to have been taken to signal their approach, or to assemble reinforcements on any particular spot. The roar of the artillery in the battle of the 10th was distinctly heard in Orleans, and to bring out the mobile guard the tocsin was rung all day. In the course of the afternoon and throughout the night La Motte Rouge arranged to get together about 40,000 troops of all descriptions, including regulars, garde mobile, the foreign legion, and the pontifical zouaves; and with these he determined to prevent, if possible, the further advance of the enemy.

The renewed engagement began early on the morning of the 11th, and lasted nearly all day. The occupation by the French of the forest of Orleans, by which they obtained the cover of the wood, proved some compensation against the superior artillery of the Germans, and towards evening gave the affair the character of a skirmish rather than of a battle. At eleven o'clock the Prussian vanguard was in position at La-Croix-Briquet, between Artenay and Chevilly, close to the railway line and the main road, which passes through the village. The other corps were placed towards Artenay, facing the borders of the forest of Orleans.

The French, advancing from Chevilly and Cercottes, took up a line to cover their retreat on the forest, and extending in the direction of Orleans. They occupied the villages of Le Vieux, Cercottes, Salan, and the château of Les Quatre-cheminées and that of La Vallée, nearly reaching Orleans.

The two armies were soon engaged along their whole line, and the fighting was well sustained by both. The Bavarians, however, gradually gained ground. Their artillery, the arm in which the French were deplorably weak, approached nearer and nearer, and occupied the best positions. The woods between Cercottes and Chartan and the village of Salan were fiercely contested, but ultimately captured. The bloodiest part of the day was the afternoon. About 3 p.m. the French were giving way on all sides towards Orleans, but at St. Jean de la Ruelle, a far-stretching suburb on the north, they made a last and desperate stand. From four till seven the fighting went on; and it can only be compared to the storming of Bazeilles. The German troops were fired on from the interior and the roofs of all the dwellings, and from the church tower; and several houses at different points were set on fire. While the great body of the Bavarians now advanced in front, the Prussian infantry division undertook a flank movement, supported by the cavalry, who could not, however, get speedily through the vineyards and narrow roads. When the bulk of the French, mobiles and franc-tireurs, saw the danger they were in of being outflanked, most of them discharged their guns at haphazard, and a panic set in, during which 3000 prisoners were made, and three guns taken.

As the conflict drew close to the city of Orleans, the shells reached the houses, and the confusion and terror was extreme. Soldiers and artillerymen crossed the Boulevards close to the railway. Their route was stopped by mobiles, but they continued their retreat, and the terrified inhabitants ran in all directions, exclaiming, "Les Prussiens! Les Prussiens!" Reinforcements arrived in the town while the battle was going on; but instead of proceeding to the field, they idled in the streets and cafés, the officers playing cards and the men roaming at discretion. When the flying army began to pass, those men hastened to join the rout, flung away their arms or broke them, and crossed the bridge over the Loire. Fortunately the principal columns of the French force had already retreated without confusion on La Ferté St. Aubin, at Olivet, on the little river Loiret. During the battle the regulars behaved very ill,

throwing away their weapons and scampering off as if in panic; the mobiles, the foreign legion, and the pontifical zouaves fought nobly, having contended for nine hours continuously with forces in every way superior.

At eight o'clock the Germans entered the city. The municipal council was sitting at the Hotel de Ville, intent on taking some decisive steps; the prefect Pereira, and the bishop, Monseigneur Dupanloup, met the Germans at the Faubourg Bannier, and tried to arrange a basis for negotiations. All the works of defence prepared during the last few days had now been abandoned at the approach of the enemy, and it was evident that peaceful arrangements alone could save the place from devastation.

On the 13th, the morning after the occupation, General von der Tann demanded from the mayor a contribution of 1,000,000 francs in specie, to be paid in twenty-four hours, but subsequently consented to accept provisionally 600,000 francs. Monseigneur Dupanloup wrote to the king of Prussia, praying for the remission of the remaining 400,000, in which, however, the prelate was not successful. Another demand was made of 600 cattle, 300,000 cigars, and all the horses in the town. The soldiers were billeted on the inhabitants, and the jewellers' shops and *objets de luxe* were strictly respected.

On the following day the German commander issued the following proclamation:—

"French Citizens,—As I wish to alleviate as far as in my power the fate of the population visited with the evils of war, I appeal to their good sense, in the hope that the sincerity of my words will not fail to open their eyes to the existing state of things, and determine them to range themselves on the side of the reasonable party, desirous of making peace. Your late government declared war against Germany. Never was a declaration of war more frivolous. The German armies could do nothing else than reply to it by crossing the frontier. Another government succeeded. It was hoped that it would restore peace. It has done nothing of the kind. And why? It feared to render itself impossible, and under the pretence that the conditions proposed by the German army were not acceptable, it preferred to continue a war which can only lead to the ruin of France. And what are the conditions of the victorious army, which it was deemed impossible to accept? The restitution of provinces which belonged to Germany, and in which the German language still prevails, in the towns as well as in the country, viz., Alsace and German Lorraine. Is this claim an exaggerated one? What claims would victorious France have made? You have been told that the aim of the operations of the German armies was to degrade France. This is simply a lie, invented in order to excite the passions of the masses. It is, on the contrary, your government which, by its way of acting, brings the German armies necessarily into the heart of France, brings ruin thither, and will succeed, if it persists, in really degrading *La Belle France*, which might be the best friend of the very nation whom she has forced to fight her.

"The General of Infantry,

"BARON VON DER TANN.

"ORLEANS, *October* 13, 1870."

With quickness and energy the German general had thus struck the only force that could venture to the relief of the capital, and inflicted on the army of the Loire a severe, though not fatal blow. Its commander would seem to have been insensible to the lessons of experience, which should have taught him that the Prussian tactics were not to rest on a defeat, trifling perhaps, as in the case of Toury on the 6th; and that after a repulse or disadvantage large bodies would certainly be moved up, to take a decisive revenge. And yet, instead of a combined advance of the whole army on and beyond Orleans, isolated columns were sent, and a few brigades left to sustain for a whole day an overpowering attack. General La Motte Rouge was now relieved of his command, and the army of the Loire looked forward to a brighter future under D'Aurelles des Paladines, a general on the retired list, but with the reputation of a resolute soldier and stern disciplinarian, qualities much needed at the time, and of the possession of which he soon gave proof.

At Orleans, the Germans had reached the line usually regarded as marking the boundaries between northern and southern France. The provinces bounding on the Loire—Touraine, Orleanois, Anjou, Poitou—have been styled the garden of France. "C'est le pays de rire et de ne rien faire;" but Orleans is a comparatively poor and decaying

city, notwithstanding its historic fame and its fifty thousand inhabitants.

The army of the Loire retired into comparative obscurity after its misfortunes at Orleans, and removed its headquarters to Bourges, which, as a great depot and foundry for artillery, possessed special advantages for strengthening the French in this most essential arm. Large reinforcements were also daily coming in, which General d'Aurelles des Paladines was energetically preparing for offensive operations. His first order of the day to his troops was in substance as follows:—"Soldiers, what I ask of you, above all things, is discipline and firmness. I am, moreover, thoroughly determined to shoot any one who hesitates before the enemy; and should I myself fail to do my duty, I tell you to shoot me."

A short time after the investment of Paris was completed, the German commanders seemed disposed to abandon the system of "requisitions," which was better suited for an advancing army than for one needing regular supplies. The first steps in this direction, however, called forth proclamations forbidding the sale of food to the Germans upon any terms; and the prefect of the Eure announced that any one found disposing of corn, hay, or provisions to the enemy, would be liable to be tried by court-martial and sentenced to death. As the enemy, however, were not inclined to starve while there was anything to eat, they helped themselves to what they needed. The region north of Orleans, the so-called Beauce, was the most fertile district they had as yet entered. It supplied Paris with enormous quantities of excellent wheat, and abounded in steam and water mills. Of oats also, there was a large supply, a great acquisition for the German cavalry. The conquest of Orleans, therefore, served a very important double purpose for the Prussians. It not only relieved the army investing Paris on the south from any fear of being molested, but the rich provinces now occupied furnished such an abundance of provision as to materially relieve the railway from Germany, which the invader was now able to use more exclusively for bringing up to Paris additional troops, siege guns, and all kinds of war *matériel.*

Von der Tann did not follow up his successes with the rapidity which might have been looked for. He lay at Orleans for some days after it was captured, the main body of his army occupying a line of about thirty miles from Jargeau to Beaugency, while his cavalry scoured the valley of the Loire for provisions.

Between Châteaudun and the capital were the large forests of Rambouillet, Batonneau, Gazeleau, and Bienonvienne. Extending to the very neighbourhood of Versailles, these immense woods had been haunted from the first by franc-tireurs, who constantly harassed the German patrols, and from their leafy retreats had in the course of the last few weeks shot at and killed many a solitary vedette. Emboldened by impunity, these bands gradually attracted strong reinforcements from the south, until the whole district was infested by them. A small army was thus collected in the rear of the besiegers, not dangerous, indeed, but numerous and active enough to cause serious annoyance. General von Moltke had recently taken vigorous means to clear the country of them near Paris, in consequence of which they fell back from the neighbourhood of Versailles to the southern outskirts of the forest, where they partially fortified some of the towns, especially Chartres and Châteaudun. To prevent renewed annoyance to the besieging army of Paris, Von der Tann sent General Wittich from Orleans with 7000 infantry, a detachment of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery towards these towns, which had now become the headquarters of the franc-tireurs.

On the morning of the 18th of October the Prussians appeared before Châteaudun, which, though defended by only irregular troops, gave proof of the determined stuff of which these were made, and of what might have been done by them had they been combined under good leadership, instead of being scattered in petty bands over the whole country. About 4000 strong, they had blocked up every entrance to the town, and so skilfully posted themselves behind cover, that the Germans had to bombard the place for eight hours before they could venture on a more direct and effective attack. It was nine p.m. ere the thirty guns that had opened the work of destruction were ordered off to make way for the storming columns; but the progress of the assaulting parties was stopped by the most solid barricades yet encountered in this war of sieges. Behind a thick layer of fascines, a wall of earth was heaped up five feet high and three wide. The earth was backed by stones and felled trees, to give additional solidity to the whole, and to form a sort of breastwork

on the top. This formidable obstruction, lined with dense rows of Chassepots, proved impregnable to the infantry who advanced, drums beating, with levelled bayonets. After one or two vain attempts to get at the defenders, the artillery was set to work again, with like results; its shells bursting in the earthworks and doing comparatively little injury. Orders were then given by General Wittich to beat in the side walls of the houses, and thus penetrating from one dwelling to another, to take the barricades in the rear. But even this did not discourage the French, who disputed the possession of each house, and did tremendous execution among the engineers, as with pickaxe in hand they smashed in the walls. By this time nearly half the town was in flames, and the defenders fought with the fury of despair. At eleven o'clock the combat seems to have ceased by mutual consent. The Prussians drew off their troops, and camped outside the town; the French, collecting their forces and the inhabitants, retreated unmolested and in good order, a fact which shows the deep impression which the desperate defence must have made upon the Prussians.

The loss of the French in killed and wounded was about 300; that of the Germans probably more, including Pastor Schwabe, chaplain to the 22nd Prussian division, who, while in attendance on the wounded, was killed in the streets of Châteaudun. The gallant defence was duly recognized by the Tours government, which declared in a decree of the 21st that Châteaudun deserved well of the country, and granted 100,000 francs in aid of the houseless inhabitants.

Chartres, the capital of the department of the Eure and Loire, and having one of the largest corn markets in France, was invested on the morning of the 21st by the Prussian division which had attacked Châteaudun, and detachments arriving from Rambouillet, Etampes, Angerville, and Patay. On finding that the German artillery had been planted before the city, the curé of Morancy begged permission to enter it in order to persuade the authorities to capitulate. General Wittich consented to grant a respite till 1 p.m., but the investment of the place was meanwhile proceeded with. Happily, the authorities agreed to a capitulation, by which half the garrison were allowed to retire; only 2000 mobiles being disarmed. The terms, more favourable than those obtained by any other place since the commencement of the war, showed that the Germans were not unwilling to avoid a repetition of the Châteaudun street fighting. The Prussian troops entered and enthusiastically cheered Prince Albrecht, before whom they defiled. It had been stipulated that all the shops should be kept open, and that the town should be exempt from requisitions. The streets were lighted up, and the inhabitants, who collected in considerable numbers, were perfectly quiet. On the following day the troops, whose demeanour was very becoming, mustered in the famous crypt of the cathedral, and by lamp-light inspected every part of that elaborate structure.

The principal military operations during October, other than those between Paris and Orleans, were connected with the eastern department of France. Along with another army, which entered French territory across the Upper Rhine about Freiburg, General von Werder, with the Prussian and Baden troops released from Strassburg, co-operated in occupying upper Alsace, and in besieging Belfort, Schlestadt, and Neu-Breisach. From an early period of the war a very considerable force, alternately known as the army of Lyons and the army of the Rhone, was said to be forming in the south and south-eastern departments. According to French reports this army now numbered 100,000 men, and was stationed between Belfort and Langres. To disperse such a force, if it really existed, the German operations in this quarter were pushed forward with considerable energy. On October 6 the Baden troops, under General von Degenfeld, fell in with a French army under General Dupré, in the Vosges mountains between Raon l'Etape and St. Diey, about thirty miles south-east of Luneville. An engagement ensued, which lasted from 9 a.m. till 4 p.m., when the French were defeated and driven back on Rambervillers. Their force consisted of a few regular troops and a large number of franc-tireurs, altogether about 14,000 men. The Germans were only about 7000 strong, but their superior *morale* and the cavalry and artillery in which they vastly excelled gave them immense advantages. General Dupré was wounded, and lost 1500 in killed and disabled, and 660 prisoners; the Germans lost about 450. The villages of St. Rémy and Nompatelize and the wood of Jumelles were carried at the point of the bayonet by the Baden troops, but their victory was by no means easy, as the

French fought gallantly and made three vigorous onslaughts.

The beaten army retreated to Epinal, the principal town of the department of the Vosges, but was driven out on the 12th; and the capture of Epinal cut off Lorraine from the rest of France. The franc-tireurs ran away, and the national guards made the best resistance they could after the mass of the army had abandoned the town. General von Werder then turned southward and gained Vesoul, from which he drove the French so rapidly as to cut them in two, sending part on to Besançon and Dijon, and part to Belfort, in the opposite direction.

General Cambriels, recently appointed by the Tours government to the command of the French army of the east, now advanced with what miscellaneous forces he could obtain, as far as Belfort. Fearing, however, to be cut off, he fell back on Besançon, where he met with Garibaldi, who had been appointed to the command of the irregular troops of the east. Garibaldi shortly afterwards removed his headquarters to Dôle, where he issued a proclamation reminding those under his command, that "in the country occupied by the foreigner, every bush, every tree, should threaten him with a shot, so that his men may fear to leave their column or cantonments. Numerous guerillas would render very difficult, if not impossible, those requisitions which hitherto a simple enemy's corporal has presumed to make wherever he sets his foot." The Italian hero recalled, in conclusion, the defence of Monte Video for nine years against 28,000 men inured to war, although that town had then but 30,000 inhabitants. "Monte Video sold its palaces, its temples, its customs rights, present and to come, unearthed the old cannon which served as boundaries in the streets, forged lances to supply the place of missing guns; while the women gave to the country their last jewel. A village of France has more resources than Monte Video had then. Can we doubt of the success of the national defence?"

There was no combined action between Garibaldi and Cambriels, whose forces the German general still pursued with relentless activity. Indeed, so far from acting in concert, after his first interview with Garibaldi, General Cambriels tendered his resignation, which was declined by Gambetta; but the government now accepted it. The appointment of the Italian leader to a command so important and apparently rival, was viewed by Cambriels as equivalent to superseding him, and he was certainly not alone in regarding Garibaldi with disfavour. The acceptance of his services by the government was looked upon by all good Catholics, especially those of Brittany, as the last bitter dregs of France's humiliation. It is clear that momentary impulse rather than love or admiration had prompted the shouts of "*Vive* Garibaldi!" for, from his first arrival in the east, all manner of obstacles were placed in his way by those who should have assisted him. French officers viewed him with extreme jealousy, and even his own Breton auxiliaries thwarted him on every opportunity. There was no doubt that General Cambriels stood his ground as well as was possible with the material at his command; but he doubtless thought that, had the forces of Garibaldi, which had done nothing at all, been with him, his position would have been better. He shared largely, moreover, in the peculiar feelings of the Catholics towards Garibaldi, whose appointment, indeed, was soon found to be far more hurtful than advantageous to the French cause.

The successor of General Cambriels was, however, a more congenial colleague to the great guerilla chief. General Michel, who was now appointed to the command of the French forces in the east, was in sentiment a republican and a freethinker, and was one of the superior officers who managed to evade the capitulation of Sedan, by cutting his way through the Prussian lines at the head of 2000 horsemen.

Part of the Baden corps which had driven the French before them at St. Rémy on the 6th, next proceeded to invest Schlestadt, which was then subjected to a regular siege. After it had been vigorously bombarded several times, preparations were made for taking it by assault. For this purpose the south-west side was selected, as the water from the Ill could be diverted from the fosses, the ditches laid dry, and the town more effectively cannonaded. On the night of the 22nd the first parallels were easily raised at a distance of only 500 to 700 paces from the fortress, and the guns brought into position. But when the commandant saw the number of guns constantly increasing, new troops coming up, and no chance of relief, the avoiding of useless sacrifices became the subject of imperative consideration. Like his colleague at Strassburg, he had no engineer detachment, the

artillerymen only sufficed for the manning of the guns; and he therefore capitulated on Monday afternoon, October 24, surrendering 2400 prisoners and 120 guns, with abundance of provisions and war material.

The siege of Neu-Breisach was commenced early in the month; but as there was some apprehension that all the disposable German force might be needed in the field by General von Werder, operations were not pushed forward against the little fortress with much vigour.

The chief interest of the war in the north centered round the two towns of Soissons and St. Quentin. Soissons occupies a strategic position of the first importance, and its value, in a military point of view, as commanding a passage over the Aisne, is shown by its fortunes in the campaign of 1814, when it was besieged three times. On the 13th of February, the Prussian General Chernicheff took it by a *coup de main*, when General Rusca, its governor, was killed by a cannon-shot on its antiquated ramparts. But on the same day the French retook it, and Chernicheff was compelled to withdraw. Napoleon, who attached the greatest importance to the possession of it, urged its garrison to hold out to the last; and if the French governor had been an Uhrich, Marshal Blucher and the army of Silesia, pursued by Napoleon across the Marne, would probably have been annihilated. But the governor capitulated, Blucher escaped, all the emperor's plans were overthrown, and the surrender decided his fall. Owing to what it has suffered by wars, Soissons has a modern look, although it is one of the oldest towns in France. It was here that Clovis established the throne of the Franks, and his successors were called kings of Soissons. The town and fortress were dominated by heights which formerly would have given no advantage to an assailant, but from which an enemy with rifled cannon could now destroy the whole place. When Toul fell, a number of the heavy guns which had been employed there were sent to Soissons; but though invested, it was not seriously bombarded until the 12th of October. The garrison made a stout resistance, sacrificing everything to the defence of the city. As one of the suburbs, the Faubourg of Rheims, covered the position of the Prussians, it was resolved to burn it, an operation which was effected on two successive evenings. The guns of the place protected the march of the incendiaries, who suddenly invested the high street of the faubourg. Amid a shower of bullets, the houses occupied by the Prussians were set on fire, and the French, in order to dislodge the enemy, were obliged to break open the doors with the butt-ends of their muskets. At length an enormous column of smoke shot up, and in less than an hour were destroyed more than 200 dwelling-houses, a large sugar refinery, a foundry, a mill, and the houses of the Sisters of Mercy, besides many fashionable villas. Several of the inhabitants lost their lives. On October 12 the heavy guns of the Germans opened in full force on the unfortunate city, and for four days and nights poured an incessant and furious stream of deadly missiles into it. The havoc done to the people and their houses was greater than to the fortifications, in which not more than one hundred men were killed during the bombardment. On the 16th the fortress capitulated, as two breaches opened on the previous day, and the threat of an assault by the Prussians, accompanied with the offer of honourable terms, gave resistless force to the entreaties of the population for immediate surrender. By its fall, 4700 prisoners, 130 guns, 70,000 rounds of ammunition, and a considerable sum in the military chest, passed into the hands of the Germans. A still more important acquisition by the surrender was the opening of a second line of railway from Châlons to Paris, as the direct line along the valley of the Marne was interrupted beyond Meaux by the destruction of the tunnels and bridges. Of the 22,000 Germans under the duke of Mecklenburg, which formed the besieging force, the greater number marched at once to Paris.

To St. Quentin, a town of some 40,000 inhabitants on the line between Paris and Lille, within ten miles of the fortress of Ham, in which the ex-emperor of the French had been a prisoner for six years, the Prussians sent a considerable party to obtain provisions. On Saturday, October 8, they were announced to be at a few kilomètres' distance from the town, on the road to La Fère. The drums beat to arms. The national guards hastened to their posts. The prefect, M. Anatole de la Forge, wearing a plain uniform of the national guard, appeared in the chief square of the town with a broadsword in one hand and a revolver in the other, and urged the population to fight. Four formidable barricades had been constructed during the previous fortnight in the Rue d'Isle—one on the banks of the canal; two at 200 mètres' distance

Engraved from a Photograph

from each other, in the interior of the town; and the fourth closing the road from La Fère to the top of the Faubourg d'Isle. Ten men could defend this barricade for a brief space. At the entrance of the town, close to the Grand Canal barricade, which formed, indeed, a very strong position, the fight began, and while it lasted the prefect remained in the first post of danger. The Prussians, numbering about 750, intrenched themselves in the railway station. Taking advantage of the angles of the houses, and of the openings in the railway balustrades, they endeavoured to deploy as sharpshooters, but failed to reach the national guard, and suffered rather serious losses, every man who showed himself being shot. The struggle lasted from half-past ten until about two o'clock, when the Prussians retreated, taking the road to Marle. On October 21 they returned, at least 5000 strong, and with twelve field-guns they for half-an-hour cannonaded the town. No resistance being offered, they entered, and demanded 2,000,000 francs, 1,500,000 of which (£60,000) was paid—an exaction which, the Germans said, would have been very much less had not the town defended itself on the first occasion.

Clermont was captured, after a brief resistance, in the end of September. Beauvais, Breteuil, Montdidier, Vernon, Gisors, and Gournay were also occupied, and from these points the Prussians scoured the country for provisions for the army around Paris. Here and there the national guard showed in force; but in these cases a requisition was made that all arms should be given up, under penalty of death, and the result generally was that, a few hours afterwards, waggon-loads of muskets poured into the German camp. In Rouen, Amiens, and the larger towns, the inhabitants were kept in a feverish state of excitement by the frequent raids made in the places around. The national guards were called out, equipped, and drilled, and throughout all the northern departments very large enrolments of garde mobile took place, who displayed a better spirit than was shown in many parts of the country; but it needed a responsible master-hand to introduce organization and discipline amongst them. Considerable spirit was shown by the irregular troops of the northern departments, who on every opportunity harassed the Germans, and caused them the loss of a gun—the first sacrificed by them in the campaign—in an attempt to cut the railroad between Amiens and Rouen. Early in the month General Bourbaki, the able commander of the imperial guard, and right hand of Bazaine, as we shall see in the next chapter, found his way out of Metz and through the Prussian lines, in connection with a mysterious intrigue, the exact nature and object of which did not at the time transpire. Suffice it here to relate that he came over to England, to visit the empress at Chiselhurst, who, as it turned out, had not expected him, and had nothing to say to him. He recrossed into France, hoping that the Prussian staff would allow him to rejoin Bazaine; but as they threw obstacles in his way, he repaired to Tours, and placed his sword at the disposal of the Provisional Government, by which he was at once appointed to the command of the army of the north.

This general is of Greek origin, and his father, a staunch imperialist, rendered important services to Napoleon I. It was he who, in the Egyptian campaign of 1798–99, went over from France in a felucca, and aided by his nationality, succeeded in duping the English cruisers and entering Egypt. He brought Napoleon such news as decided him on returning immediately to Paris, to which circumstance he owed his throne. Seventeen years later the same faithful adherent was sent to inform Bonaparte of the decision of the Allies, that he should be transferred to St. Helena.

General Bourbaki especially distinguished himself by his cool and determined courage in that training-ground of all modern French generals—Algeria. In the Crimean war he served as general of brigade, and his gallantry at the Alma, Inkerman, the Malakoff, and the taking of Sebastopol, is too well known to be dwelt upon here. General of division in 1857, he took no mean part in the Italian war, and in 1870 was nominated commander of the second camp at Châlons. At the beginning of the war he was appointed to the command of the imperial guard, joined Marshal Bazaine, and was forced with him into Metz, where he remained until his extraordinary release. He was one of the French generals who received a decoration from the king of Prussia in 1864. No name was better calculated to restore confidence and inspire energy into the newly-enrolled troops throughout the North, to whom, on his appointment, he issued the following proclamation:—

"FRENCH REPUBLIC.

"Citizens, national guards, soldiers, and mobile

guards,—I have been called by the minister of War to the military command of the region of the North. The task which devolves on me is a great one, and I should think it above my strength were I not sustained by the feelings of patriotism which animate you. All my endeavours tend to the creation, as speedily as possible, of an active army corps, which, provided with a war *matériel*, can take the field and proceed to the assistance of the fortresses, which I hasten to place in a good state of defence. As to me, who have loyally offered my sword to the government of the national defence, my endeavours and my life belong to the common work which it prosecutes together with yourselves, and in the moment of danger you will see me at the head of the troops who will soon be organized. To fulfil this difficult task, and to make our implacable enemy pay dear for each step on our territory, concord and confidence must reign among us, and our hearts must be animated with only one wish—to save and avenge our unhappy France. You may rely upon the most energetic co-operation and the most absolute devotedness on my part, just as I rely upon your courage and patriotism.

(Signed) "BOURBAKI.

"LILLE, *October* 29, 1870."

Brittany and the district west of Paris began in October to show signs of activity in contributing towards the national defence. Early in the month the command of the western levies was intrusted by the government to Count de Keratry, a Breton noble, who forthwith issued a proclamation urging his compatriots to emulate the noble example of their brethren of Brittany who at that moment manned the ramparts of Paris. The army of the West had not, it is true, assumed large proportions as yet; but with good organization it was sufficiently numerous to be no mean auxiliary to the army of the Loire, in any attempt for the relief of the capital. Before Count de Keratry took the command of the army of the West it had been a continued source of misfortune to the district, by its ill-disciplined and scattered bands offering resistance to the German requisition columns, which, while utterly ineffectual, brought down severe vengeance upon unoffending villages, several of which were ruthlessly destroyed. The count soon afterwards assumed the command of the irregular forces of the West, franc-tireurs, &c., for the organization of which he was well fitted by his influence and experience. General Fiereck was appointed over the western regular army.

Besides the several field armies organizing in the provinces in October, a corps of volunteer engineers was formed, to operate upon the German lines of communication. These companies—known as "The Wild Boars of the Ardennes," "The Railway Destroyers," &c. — were composed of artisans of all classes, and carried picks, crowbars, mining tools, hatchets, powder petards and cases, for pulling up rails, blowing up bridges, felling trees, and mining roads. Two companies were specially designed to guard them when at work, and one to collect provisions and attend generally to the commissariat. In at least one instance the operations of this corps were eminently successful, and several railway accidents were caused to the German trains. To stop these proceedings, however, the Prussians issued an order that the trains should "be accompanied by inhabitants who are well known and generally respected, and who shall be placed on the locomotive, so that it may be made known that every accident caused by the hostility of the inhabitants will, in the first place, injure their countrymen." At Nancy the first hostage was M. Leclair, the venerable president of the Court of Appeal. On another occasion, Procureur-général Isard was "invited" to make an involuntary journey. Escorted by two Prussian gendarmes, he had to mount the tender and travel to Luneville, where his colleague in that town took his place. The president of the Chamber of Commerce, a judge, and a barrister, also occupied in turn the post of danger.

While speaking of the "railway destroyers," it may be remarked that, although the war we are now reviewing gives no actual examples of the working of the well-known theory of Marmont, that mounted infantry should play a striking part in the warfare of the future, we see at least that the German cavalry would have found their movements in the interior of France paralyzed by the hostility of the armed bands which lurked in every covert, had they not fallen upon the device of attaching to each brigade a detachment of riflemen, to assist in dispersing these secret enemies. The clearing and occupation of the country south of Paris was accomplished mainly by the aid of the Bavarian riflemen who were employed with the fourth and sixth cavalry divisions; and when, after

the fall of Metz, Manteuffel advanced to occupy the north of France with the first army, his flank and front were kept clear by the first division under Göben, who carried similar small parties of riflemen with each of his brigades, and used them constantly in his occupation of villages and other inclosed posts. Such infantry, however active, would of necessity have been a heavy clog upon the movements of the horse, had they not been repeatedly hurried forward in country carts or other wheeled carriages. Indeed, the device was simply a rude expedient to meet an emergency for which the Germans were not prepared. Had the events of 1870 been fully foreseen, some such scheme would doubtless have been fallen upon as raising bodies of mounted riflemen for the express purpose of ridding the advanced guards from lurking franc-tireurs. There is the highest authority—that of the most successful of the generals who have used this modified form of cavalry on a great scale—for asserting that, had the French early in this war trained up a mass of horsemen such as those that followed Sheridan during the American civil war, instead of devoting their whole efforts to the collection of masses of raw infantry and artillerymen, they might have so threatened the line of railroad which fed the German host before Paris as to render a continued investment impossible. Few at least will doubt that such a body, acting upon the communications of the Germans, would have done more to hinder the conquest of the country than tenfold their numbers sent on foot to be fresh food for the enemy's powder.

That the month of October closed with far brighter prospects for France than it opened, was due mainly to the energy and indefatigable activity of M. Gambetta. From the date of his arrival at Tours he had virtually been *the* government of national defence. Indeed the various proclamations and decrees issued rarely bore even the signatures of his colleagues, MM. Cremieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon. That some of these decrees were in spirit extremely revolutionary there is no doubt; but it is equally certain that under the exceptional circumstances of the country they offered the best remedies for its misfortunes. They did not result in the salvation of France, because in the hour of need no great military genius arose to enforce them. Could the minister have relied upon a colleague in the field of equal daring and energy with himself, it would have fared hard even with the magnificent armies of Germany. The first decree of October, for a *levée en masse* of all men between twenty-one and forty years, ought in a month to have been answered by a number several times larger than any trained army which Germany could bring into the country; and with very moderate organization, numerical strength so vastly superior should have had a proportionate effect on the fortunes of the war. October, however, closed with at least 700,000 German soldiers on French territory, to oppose which there were not 250,000 organized forces outside Paris and Metz. Twelve fortresses of France—namely, Strassburg, Toul, Marsal, Vitry, Sedan, Laon, Lützelstein, Lichtenberg, Weissemburg, Soissons, Schlestadt, and Metz—had been captured by the enemy; and Phalsburg, Bitsche, Paris, Thionville, Mézières, Montmèdy, Verdun, Longwy, and Neu Breisach were besieged.

One of the earliest and most questionable of Gambetta's decrees was that which abolished the laws of regular promotion in the army, and opened every grade to civil talent. With the most orderly army, such an experiment would be dangerous in the most favourable circumstances; it was especially so in the midst of such confusion. M. Gambetta thought, however, that the only hope of France was in the creation of entirely new armies out of the civil population; and while he betrayed no little distrust of the regulars, he lost no opportunity of praising and encouraging the new levies, upon whom he imagined all the hopes of his country now rested.

All provinces within a hundred kilomètres (about seventy miles) of the enemy's forces were placed under martial law, and in each a commission of defence was appointed to concoct plans of defence, to fortify the points most suitable for defensive purposes, and to direct the local forces. It was further decreed that camps should be formed at a distance of not less than two miles from each town where the troops of all arms mustered over 2000, and that officers and men alike, taking up their abode there, should not return to town without a special permission. In these camps they were to undergo severe drill, and other discipline, to fit them in every way for service. Another decree enjoined on the prefects of invaded or threatened provinces to see that the country was laid waste, and all carts, horses, cattle, and sheep removed to

a distance. Soldiers quitting their posts, or flying before the enemy, were to be brought before a court-martial, and shot. Any commanding officer whose troops should be surprised by the enemy, or who should have advanced upon a position "without suspecting the hostile presence," was also to be brought before a court-martial. The authorities of every town were to defend the place, or to show sufficient reason for not doing so.

Another edict was issued for the purpose of establishing proper systems of information. Hitherto the authorities had literally been acting in absolute ignorance of the movements and intentions of the enemy, while the Prussians, by their widely-spread system of espionage and their innumerable cavalry scouts, kept themselves perfectly informed of the position and intentions of the French. The government now ordered every maire to employ throughout his commune gardes champêtres, workmen, &c., who should instantly report to him the approach and direction of any body of the enemy, with an approximate estimate of their force and composition; and that this information should be immediately despatched to the prefect, to be telegraphed to the government. Every maire who failed in these details was to be tried by court-martial.

In the earlier part of the month the conduct of the extreme republicans, who alone of all the French nation showed themselves devoid of patriotic feelings, paralyzed the efforts of the large towns. Imperialists, Legitimists, Orleanists, alike laid aside their partialities and prejudices, and combined with the government for the national defence. The extreme republicans alone preferred party to patriotism, caused dissension, sacrificed France, under pretence of saving her, and thus gave a dim presentiment of the terrible scenes which, in Paris, were to aggravate the horrors of the war at its close. Paris, Bordeaux, Rouen, Lille, Havre, all great centres of industry, nobly allowed nothing to interfere with the national defence; while Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, and Toulon were sources of weakness, rather than of strength, to the country. The establishment of communal institutions and of the extremest forms of republicanism were deemed matters of greater importance than the expulsion of the invader. Ardent republican though he was, so ashamed was Gambetta of the conduct of the Lyons republicans, that on receiving the delegates of a committee from that city he exclaimed, "Your commune of Lyons is a disgrace to France and a laughing-stock to Europe. Out with you at once!"

To meet immediate claims, and supply articles necessary for the purposes of the war, the Tours government, on the 26th of October, contracted a loan of £10,000,000. The result of the subscription to it proved that if France was doomed to succumb in the war it would not be for want of means to fight, nor of the spirit to use them. In her then critical situation, with the capital invested, and over a score of rich departments terror-struck by Prussian legions, it was thought that a loan of this extent must be a failure. For the first time, therefore, a French loan was opened in a foreign country—England. Subscriptions were, nevertheless, invited in France, and in less than three days the result was an amount equal, in round numbers, to £3,750,000. When it is remembered that a large proportion of the country, the metropolis included, could take no share in the subscriptions, and that local loans to an enormous amount had been contracted in all quarters for purposes of defence, such a result was a striking proof of the internal resources of France, and of confidence in the credit of the state.

Throughout October the French government continually appealed to England and the various European cabinets for interposition or assistance. In an important interview with Lord Lyons on the 15th, the French delegate minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that England, either singly or in concert with other neutrals, should request Prussia to state the conditions of peace which she would accept; that France should then submit her views; and that the neutral powers should in a conference, or by exchanging notes, give out with authority what in their opinion were equitable terms of peace, and call upon both belligerents to accept them. M. de Chandordy seemed to think that both must of course listen to the voice of Europe; but as this was by no means probable, his suggestion was not adopted.

Count von Bismarck had indeed pretty plainly intimated already the extent of the German territorial claims; for in a short despatch to Count Bernstorff on the 1st October, in which he combated the statement of M. Favre, that "Prussia means to continue the war and to bring France back to the position of a power of the second rank," he said:—"The cession of Strassburg and Metz, which we seek in territorial connection,

implies a reduction of French territory equal in area to the increase through Savoy and Nice, while the population of these provinces obtained from Italy is about 750,000 larger. When it is considered that France, according to the census of 1866, numbers 38,000,000 of inhabitants without Algiers, and with Algiers now furnishing an essential part of the French war forces, 42,000,000, it is palpable that a decrease therein of 750,000 effects no change in the importance of France as against foreign countries."

M. de Chandordy represented to Lord Lyons that, to these claims of Prussia, France could never submit. He added, that "he felt he was entitled to appeal to the rest of Europe for support. The time for good offices had passed. The powers should now speak to Prussia in a tone which could not be mistaken, and take measures to insure their being listened to." Lord Granville, however, replied that England was not prepared to support by force any representations they might make to Prussia; and further instructed Lord Lyons, should opportunity arise, to point out that her Majesty's government thought the rigid determination expressed by M. Favre, not to yield an inch of territory nor one stone of a fortress, was a great obstacle to peace.

But though the English government could not yield to the appeals of France, they took advantage of a circular of Count von Bismarck's respecting the danger of famine with which Paris was threatened, to make a formal suggestion that both belligerents should agree upon an armistice for the convocation of a French constituent assembly, which might decide the question of peace or war. This proposal Lord Granville pressed with great energy, and informed Count Bernstorff that M. Thiers, backed by the personal intervention of the emperor of Russia, had proposed to undertake the negotiation. Russia, Austria, Italy, and Spain joined in urging the armistice; Italy, indeed, appeared to desire even more decided intervention. M. Tissot again pressed Lord Granville to call on Prussia to state her terms of peace, "bring them within fair limits, and then communicate them to the French government." All the principal powers, however, were agreed in restricting the proposed negotiations to the question of an armistice.

In virtue of these proceedings, M. Thiers had his first interview with Count von Bismarck, at Versailles, on November 1, when the general arrangements for an armistice of twenty-four or twenty-eight days were agreed to. The main difficulty arose out of the revictualling of Paris, to which the Prussian chancellor ultimately consented, on condition that, as a "military equivalent," the Germans should have at least one of the Paris forts. The veteran French statesman had not expected this, and with considerable warmth he replied: "It is Paris that you ask from us; for to deny us the revictualling during the armistice is to take from us one month of our resistance; to require from us one or several of our forts is to ask for our ramparts. It is, in fact, to demand Paris, while we should give you the means of starving or bombarding her. In treating with us for an armistice you could never suppose its condition to be that we should give up Paris herself to you —Paris, our chief strength, our great hope, and for you the great difficulty, which, after fifty days of siege, you have not been able to overcome." M. Thiers then left to consult with M. Favre, who, in turn, took counsel with his colleagues of the government in the city. The result was, that on the following day, November 6, M. Thiers received instructions to break off the negotiations, and at once left the German headquarters. For a third time, therefore, the hopes of peace were frustrated, and both parties girded themselves for a war *à outrance*.

Considered in the light of subsequent events, the French committed a grave diplomatic blunder in refusing the terms offered by the Germans, and allowing the negotiations to be broken off on the question of revictualling Paris. The king of Prussia and his advisers consented to the armistice under the mistaken idea that there was no prospect of an efficient force being formed in any quarter for the relief of the capital. The French had up to that time been everywhere beaten, and were therefore supposed to be incapable of again showing any head in the field. On the contrary, the several armies forming in the provinces only needed time to render them, both in number and organization, extremely formidable to the Germans. With regard especially to the army of the Loire, twenty-eight days would have enabled D'Aurelles to complete his cavalry and artillery, to establish discipline, and to concentrate his army in a state of readiness for an immediate advance. The Breton levies would have been prepared to operate from the west in force, and aid in a simultaneous march to the capital.

In order to keep the truce, Prince Frederick Charles, who was now on the way from Metz, would have been arrested at full twelve days' march from Orleans, so that whatever French forces could have been collected within one hundred miles of Paris during the armistice would have been free from immediate danger of the overwhelming German reinforcements which presently proved their ruin. We cannot see how the revictualling of Paris would have affected matters at all. The inhabitants would not have been any worse off at the end of the armistice, supposing they had obtained no new supplies, since there was at any rate plenty of food to last them for that time. If, therefore, the German armies would have been compelled to raise the siege in December at all, after an armistice, they would have been forced to abandon it whether Paris were revictualled or not.

The news of the failure of the negotiations produced a momentary feeling of regret and disappointment in most parts of France. On November 10, however, there occurred the first German reverse of any magnitude during the war, resulting in the defeat of Von der Tann and the retreat of the Bavarians from Orleans. This raised the hopes of the nation, gave a new light to the failure of M. Thiers' mission, and England and the neutral powers generally were bitterly denounced for having suggested a temporary cessation of hostilities. Many of the journals and prefects, especially of southern France, repudiated with scorn the idea of peace, or even of an armistice, until satisfaction had been obtained from Prussia for the injuries she had inflicted upon their country. Thus the *Progrès* of Lyons said that the idea of an armistice could only enter into the skull of a Prussian, and could only have been proposed by an Englishman. "It is only when the Prussian hordes are hunting for their food like wolves in our provinces that our felon ally (England) dares to dash her bucket of water upon the brasier of our patriotism. Now that the French nation is upon the point of turning the victories of our enemies into unprecedented disaster, the quaking thrones of this supreme resurrection are trembling upon their bases, and seek, by means of an armistice, to smother the threatening flame." The prefect of the Haute Garonne was equally opposed to a cessation of hostilities, and stated in a proclamation that "we will establish the republic upon the corpse of the last Prussian and the body of the last monopolist." The prefect of the Ain declared that, "whether the traitors are Prussians, or still dare to call themselves Frenchmen, the bullet and the axe shall render equal justice to both."

Lord Granville's despatch, urging the arrangement of an armistice, was, in the first instance, met on the part of Count von Bismarck by the intimation that any overtures for negotiations must be made by France; and that the benevolent offices of England were regarded with no less coldness by Germany may be gathered from the following remarks of the *Cologne Gazette:*—"The Gladstone-Bright ministry, and especially the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, unfortunately did not do its utmost to prevent the outbreak of this great war. Indeed, one may say not its least—viz., the public declaration that France had no right to commence this wanton war. This sin of omission is now, alas, too late admitted even by the English. We carry on this war in a certain degree for England, for had imperial France conquered in it, Napoleon would certainly have seized on Belgium, which he coveted more than the left bank of the Rhine. It would then have been seen how England defended Belgium, after formally assuming the protection of it; and Napoleon III. would certainly have gained what was his ultimate object in his powerful naval armaments—the humiliation of England, the revenge for Waterloo of which the French are always thinking. We willingly do justice to the considerations on which England now seeks to arrest the destruction of Paris. It is only a pity that England's *prestige* suffered so grievously through its cowardly attitude at the commencement of the affair. *Per se*, we should regret as much as anybody the destruction of a city inhabited by more than a million of women and children, and in which so many treasures of art and science, which can never be made good, are collected. The entry into Paris, however, is a necessity for the German army, and an event which cannot now be averted, especially after the fall of Metz. May the Parisians therefore come to their senses, and by the acceptance of reasonable conditions of an armistice and peace, release us from that lamentable necessity!"

The feeling throughout Germany during October was one of extreme disappointment at the prolongation of the war, which every one expected would have ended soon after Sedan. But it would have been erroneous to mistake this wish of a speedy

cessation of hostilities for a disinclination to continue it, should that appear imperative. Notwithstanding that the military system of the country made war sensibly felt, yet such was the general confidence in the military and political leaders that, as these held the objects of the campaign were not yet attained, the people were willing to support them to the end. If the generals had not declared the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine to be necessary for the protection of the German frontiers, the vast majority in the country would have been in favour of concluding peace at once, and on the terms proposed by M. Favre; but as the German generals were, and indeed had been for the last hundred years, of the opposite opinion, the nation was determined to profit by the opportunity, and acquire the territory which was to enable them to ward off future invasions with a greater chance of success than hitherto. Count von Bismarck was but too accurate an interpreter of the thoughts of his countrymen when, in his negotiations with M. Thiers, he spoke of the probability of future collisions with France, and of the duty the Germans owed to themselves to prepare for coming attacks of the fiery Gaul. The French were now reaping the fruits of the treatment they had accorded Germany for centuries both in word and deed. The people were but too keenly aware how frequently they had been invaded in the past, and could not help remembering with what intense hostility they had been spoken of by nearly every political celebrity in France up to the very outbreak of the war. It was the knowledge of the inveteracy of this feeling on the other side of the frontier, coupled with the observation that the French even now deemed themselves invincible, which led popular feeling in Germany to look forward to another war in the wake of the one in which they were then engaged. Had the French admitted that they were beaten, and that they had better give up battling with Germany for the mere sake of *prestige*, they would perhaps not have been suspected of a design to resume the fray as soon as they could after the conclusion of peace. But with M. Gambetta declaring the final victory of France a matter of course, and indispensable to civilization to boot, the Germans asked—"What can we expect but to see them come down upon us whenever the opportunity occurs? And the contingency being so very probable a one, ought we not to guard against it by securing those military and territorial advantages commended by the generals, whose experience and judgment we have every reason to confide in? Is not every peace with the French merely an armistice while they do not renounce their old ambition; and should we not be actually encouraging them to attack us again were we to permit them to repeat the thing under the same favourable conditions as formerly?"

An extract from the Bremen *Weser Zeitung* is subjoined as illustrative of this state of popular feeling:—"It is remarkable what an important influence a single trait in the national character of the French exercises upon the destinies of Europe. The constitutional vanity of the French, their inability to realize and recognize unpleasant facts, becomes as terrible a scourge to themselves as to the nations around them. Vanity has stirred them up to a frivolous war, vanity prevents the restoration of peace. Very characteristic in this respect is that passage in M. Favre's last circular, in which he depicts the ravishing aspect France will wear when perishing amid the flaring halo of glory and renown. The consciousness of playing an imposing *rôle* before the world to a certain extent consoles him for the ruin of his country. But is ruin likely to follow the acceptance of the German terms? Will not the French remain a powerful, gallant, rich, and highly-gifted nation even after the forfeiture of their German provinces? And, instead of revelling in the prospect of fine tragical catastrophes, had they not better look realities in the face, consider the common-sense question how to get out of a bad job, and extricate themselves at as cheap a price as possible? All the statesmen of Europe have had to do this occasionally, and history mentions even some French ministers who capitulated when there was nothing left but to capitulate. But it is quite true, while other nations praise those of their statesmen who in the hour of defeat averted greater evils by timely concessions, the French have always called Talleyrand a traitor for procuring them the best terms possible after the discomfiture of 1815. Though Talleyrand saved all he could for them, the French, in their uncontrollable conceit, only look to what he was compelled to sign away, and therefore insist upon regarding him as a rascal. They have no Talleyrand now, no man sufficiently courageous to bend to the inevitable. Sheer compulsion alone can terminate the war. We know it, and are prepared for it."

About the same time the Prussian government issued an important manifesto in the semi-official *Provincial Correspondenz*. Considerable impatience was exhibited in Germany at the delay in the siege operations before Paris. After ascribing this delay to purely military reasons, the article went on to speak generally of the prospects of the war in these terms:—

"Natural as it is to wish for a prompt termination of the war, we are perhaps not wrong in seeing the finger of Providence in the retribution which the French are thus bringing in full measure upon themselves. It seems to be decreed that they are to empty the cup of bitterness to the dregs, and, by having their insolence thoroughly chastised, be weaned from their bellicose propensities and converted into better neighbours for the future.

"All of us would have been delighted had the last shot in this sanguinary contest been fired on the heights of Sedan. Yet there is no denying that had peace been concluded then and there, the idea of holding universal supremacy, so firmly rooted in the French mind, would have regained irresistible ascendancy the moment we left the country. Even now the majority of the French deem themselves unconquerable, and, indeed, unconquered. They have heard of nothing but of victories, with, perhaps, a few insignificant reverses now and then. They have accustomed themselves to pooh-pooh the fancy that their armies have been subdued, and tell you, with the most implicit confidence, that if he liked Bazaine might easily get out of Metz and crush the forces besieging it. They smile at the thought of Paris ever falling into our hands when it is defended by hundreds of thousands of mobiles, and attacked only by German soldiers. Last, not least, they will swear that Europe will come to the rescue of their holy city, and save what they are pleased to call the 'metropolis of the world.' With these hallucinations the French are consoling themselves in the present disastrous period of their history. Were peace to be re-established before they have been cured of their self-sufficiency, they would doubtless flatter themselves that they have not been vanquished at all—that the war might have been continued, and that if it has not been, its premature conclusion is mainly owing to the pusillanimity and treachery of those in power. With these intoxicating illusions filling their brains, so arrogant a people as the French would not wait long before they attempted to win back what they had lost.

"Only after the Parisians, and with them the entire population of France, have been humbled to the dust; only when the military strength of their country has been entirely broken, and the hope of creating fresh armies is everywhere annihilated—will they become conscious of the magnitude of their defeat, and perhaps perceive and remember that to invade a neighbour may be attended with unpleasant consequences to themselves."

That at this period (October) the Germans were sanguine of a speedy conclusion of peace, is shown by the fact that the pen with which Count von Bismarck was to sign the treaty was already prepared. Herr Bissinger, jeweller, of Pforzheim, manufactured out of massive gold an imitation of an ordinary stout goosequill. The quill itself was polished, in order that it might be more conveniently handled, but the feather closely resembled a real quill, every fibre being represented, while the back of the feather was thickly studded with brilliants, and below them a count's coronet and Bismarck's monogram were engraved. Besides the engraver and maker, two goldsmiths were engaged on it for five weeks. The gold used was of eighteen carats, and that part in which the brilliants were set was of twenty-one carats.

In acknowledging its receipt Count von Bismarck wrote:—"Your beautiful and very artistic present has been delivered to me by Herr Jolly. I feel some difficulty in knowing how to express my thanks for it. At a time when the sword of the German nation has performed such illustrious feats, you render the pen almost too much honour in making it so costly. I can only hope that the use to which you have destined the pen in the service of our country may conduce to its permanent welfare in a fortunate peace, and I can promise you that, with God's help, it shall in my hand subscribe nothing unworthy of German feeling and of the German sword."

Serious as were the consequences of the war for Germany, under a military system by which almost all the able-bodied male population were liable to be called away from their occupations, its effects upon the French were far more serious. A policy of prolonged though apparently hopeless resistance might, indeed, in the end have caused extreme perplexity to the Germans; but, on the other hand, it seemed as if the king of Prussia was not far wrong in his assertion that the social system of France was falling to pieces under the enormous

pressure of disorderly war. It is not too much to say that no words could be too strong to describe the critical condition of the French cities and great towns, seeing that all the familiar phenomena (save one) of the first French revolution were showing themselves at Rouen, Lyons, Dijon, and Marseilles. The clubs, the mobs, the municipalities claiming to be supreme over every other authority, the wholesale imprisonment of priests and so-called reactionists, the rumours of conspiracy, and specially of conspiracy in the prisons, the popularity of newspapers of the class of the *Père Duchesne*, seemed a prelude to another reign of terror. One thing only was wanting. There was an almost complete absence of clamour for civil blood, and when all the rest was so like, it was natural to wonder at the difference. Had the humanitarian spirit which when nations are at peace shows itself in effeminate reluctance to inflict painful punishment, but which when they are at war fails to save them one drop of blood, at least achieved this? Were French mobs less murderous because they had grown to be more humane? or was it that attacks on life had been exchanged for attacks on property? In Lyons the manufactories were still at work, and the workmen were receiving the highest wages required by the rules of the International Union. But the manufacture was only continued through fear of the consequences of stopping it; and it appeared as if general bankruptcy must sooner or later show what strain socialist theories were capable of bearing. Lyons doubtless spun and wove silk for the whole world, and thus, in spite of the impoverishment of all foreign customers indirectly caused by the war, may have been better able than other manufacturing towns to bear up against the loss of the home market, so long as its commodities found access to sea. But some of the cities most seriously threatened by revolutionary fury were wholly engaged in manufacturing goods to be consumed within France itself. In this condition was the great city of Rouen, which, with its surrounding villages, barely maintained itself against the competition of Manchester in the best of times, with the assistance of duties still largely protective. Certain political economists, distinguished for peculiar tenderness to all the heresies of the working class, have argued that the share of profit which workmen associated in trade unions may wring from their employers, is greater than an older generation of economical teachers had supposed. But the new doctrine is at best only intended for times of prosperity, and we have yet to learn how an arbitrary rate of wages can be long exacted from a manufacturer deprived of customers. The moment at which calamitous war and socialist convictions are found in presence of one another in any country, may well be regarded with terror.

Deplorable as was the case of both France and Germany in an agricultural point of view, it would have been incalculably worse if the women had not been trained to do much of the farm work which in England devolves on men alone. Every tourist in Rhineland and the south of France has noticed, and deplored, the extent to which female labour is there employed—not only for the lighter tasks of weeding and hoeing, as with us, but for ploughing, reaping, and all the more important branches of husbandry. It was now seen that such a condition of things renders the country far better able to sustain the requirements of war than otherwise it could be. With us the sudden demand on so large a proportion of our male population would almost suspend all agricultural operations; for steam, although it reduces the number of hands employed, throws the work more than ever upon the men. We notice these facts from no desire to see the women of Great Britain converted into farm drudges; but merely to show that soil, climate, and social habits abroad have combined with custom to render southern countries less dependent upon male labour than can be the case with us.

CHAPTER XX.

The Great Strength of Metz—Complete Blockade the surest means of Capturing it—Treble Cordon thrown around it, and other Measures taken by the Germans—Detailed description of their Positions, and of those occupied by the French—Genial Feeling between the Foreposts for some time—The completeness of the Prussian Forepost System—Repose in the City in the first days of September—Excitement in the German Army when the victory of Sedan became known—The Disastrous News conveyed into Metz by General Wimpffen, and a Request made to Bazaine to Surrender the City—His Reply, and general disbelief of the News in Metz for some days—Proclamation of General Coffinières urging Resistance to the uttermost—Bazaine, at last, compelled to admit the Unwelcome News relating to Sedan to his Troops—Establishment of a Balloon Service for Postal Purposes—Novel Contrivances in their Manufacture—The "Spy" Mania in Metz—Capture and Execution of a real Spy—The "Intelligence Department" organized by the Germans to remove the stigma attached to a Spy—Efforts of the Metz Newspapers to keep alive the spirits of the Inhabitants—Chief Events in the City in September—The Relative Positions of General Coffinières and Marshal Bazaine—Organization of a Corps of Sharpshooters for Dangerous Service by the French—The Legion of Honour refused on Two Occasions—Life in the Besieger's Camp—General absence of Excitement—Burning of Nouilly by the Germans—Daring of Lieutenant Hosius and Fifteen Men—Discovery of Underground Electric Wires by the Prussians—General von Steinmetz relieved of his Command, and Prince Frederick Charles appointed sole commander of the Besieging Forces—Sortie and obstinate contest on September 22—Complete Victory of the Germans—More serious Sortie on the 24th—Severe fighting—Fruitless attempt of the French to Capture the village of Noisseville—Coolness of the Germans under Fire—Successful Foraging Expedition by the French on September 27—Fearful Scene in a Convent—The Monotonous Life within the City and its depressing effects on the Inhabitants—Review of the National Guard—Dissatisfaction at no real attempt to break through the Besieging Army being made—Bazaine thereupon determines upon a vigorous Sortie—The Battle of Maizières—Ruse of the Germans at the Chateau of Ladonchamps—Description of the Country and of the German Positions between Maizières and Metz—The French advance under the cover of a dense fog, and succeed in capturing several Villages—Fearful slaughter in the ranks of two German Landwehr Regiments, who would neither Retreat nor Surrender—The French succeed in carrying off a large quantity of Forage, but are unable to maintain their Positions—Desperate and Bloody Encounter in Storming the Villages by the Germans—Gallant Cavalry Charge—Another Desperate Fight at Norroy—The Results of the Battle and the Losses on both Sides—Particulars of an Intrigue attempted with the view of restoring the Imperial Dynasty—General Bourbaki leaves Metz on a visit to the Empress—The Inhabitants of Metz anxious to Garrison the Forts, so that all the Military Forces should attempt a Sortie on a Gigantic Scale—Marshal Bazaine declines to accede to the Request—The Provisions becoming exhausted—Starvation or Surrender?—The Measures taken to prevent such a Calamity are too Late—Domestic Life and Prices in the City in October—Horse-flesh the chief food—Suppression of Newspapers and Retaliation of the Editors—"The Beginning of the End"—Wholesale Desertions from the French Army—A Large Number of the Inhabitants also make a fruitless attempt to get through the German Lines—Proposals for Capitulation—Important Interview between General Boyer and Count von Bismarck—General Coffinières declines to give up the Fortress—Meeting of General Changarnier and Prince Frederick Charles—An Unconditional Surrender demanded by the Germans—Settlement of the Terms of Capitulation, and Departure of part of the German Troops for Paris—Proclamation of General Coffinières and General Order of Marshal Bazaine—Excitement and Scenes in the City when the truth became known—Meeting of the Municipal Council for the Last Time and Manifesto to their Fellow Citizens—General description of the Scene presented by the French laying down their arms and marching into Captivity, and of the Triumphant Entry of the Germans into Metz—Proclamation of General von Kummer, the new German Commandant—The terrible calamity to France involved in the loss of Metz—Feeling in the German Army at the Result—Proclamation of Prince Frederick Charles and Dispatch from the King of Prussia—Reception of the News throughout France—Proclamation of M. Gambetta—Bazaine unfairly denounced as a Traitor—An Impartial Estimate of his Conduct and Proceedings during the Siege.

THE SIEGE AND CAPITULATION OF METZ.

In previous chapters we have given a description of the city of Metz and its fortifications, of the retreat of the French army thither after the great battles of August 16 and 18, and of the sortie made on the 31st, with the view of assisting the movements of MacMahon in his attempt to relieve Marshal Bazaine. In the present chapter it is proposed to relate the chief incidents of the siege, from the close of August to the date of the capitulation of the city on October 27.

As the record of the siege of Strassburg shows, the German armies were exceedingly well supplied with all the necessary means for carrying on such operations, and their superior officers excelled in scientific and professional attainments. But, even with the immense *matériel* and resources at their command, they could not repeat before the great Moselle stronghold the process by which Strassburg was reduced. The fortifications of Metz were of enormous extent and strength, and on the outbreak of war its natural position, so admirably fitted for resistance, had been further strengthened by trenches, new forts, bastions, and earthworks. To such extent, indeed, had the fortress been rendered impregnable, that to attempt to storm it would have been madness. The actual works of Metz could not be attacked, nor the city approached sufficiently near to render bombardment possible, without first

carrying strong detached works, which were protected by heavy guns on the heights, and could not be held or even passed without a heavy sacrifice of lives. The frightful price at which the recent victories of Vionville and Gravelotte were won, had induced the king to issue an order that further effusion of blood should be spared; and as it was considered that the complete blockade of Metz must, sooner or later, answer the purpose of the Germans, it was resolved so to invest the city as to render any further sortie from the fortress a forlorn hope indeed.

For this purpose a treble cordon of investment was thrown around the place; every village through which these lines passed being strongly fortified, its streets barricaded, its houses loopholed, and every wall that could shelter a man or gun converted into a rough and ready fortification. At intervals in the first line were earthwork batteries, surrounded by rifle-pits and trenches, each battery having ten 12-pounder brass guns, capable of throwing shells of between twenty-three and twenty-four German pounds weight. The batteries in the second line, laid out in the same manner, commanded the several military roads. Beyond as well as between these lines, the trees were felled and the fields lined with rifle-pits and trenches. Outposts and sentries were placed so closely, that it was hardly possible to escape without notice; and strong patrols passing from point to point kept up constant communication. The foreposts, forming the first line, lay either in single houses well fortified by entrenchments and barricades, or in the field, behind earthworks of no inconsiderable magnitude. The next line, the *feldwachts* ("field-watches"), occupied woods or the gardens of chateaux, and comprised about two companies each, which rested, arms in hand, ready for a sortie at any moment. In front of these, and within easy shot of a Chassepot from the French ramparts, were the single sentries. The soldiers remained a week in the most advanced line; then they retired, and the line behind took their places, thus giving a change of position, and at the same time a change of duties. In the third line the *qui vive*, or look out, was easy, and the men got more rest. Near the foreposts, at intervals, were the Prussian beacons, made of bitumen, placed on long poles and covered with straw, so that they looked not unlike poplar trees, which are so common in France. All round the Prussian lines, at almost every half mile or so, two of these were placed; and their purpose was to give an alarm in case of a night attack. By lighting one, the exact direction of the attack could be indicated to the troops around, and it would serve as a guide by which they could move forward to the rescue. There were guards at each beacon, and a small wooden hut, in which were kept the means of lighting up.

Two observatories were erected: one at Mercy-le-Haut, the other, which was the principal, near Corny, the German headquarters. A very favourable point for the purpose was here obtained in St. Blaise, an old ruin situate on the top of a hill, nearly facing Fort St. Quentin, and having to its left Fort St. Privat, the village of Jouy, and the Moselle at the foot of the hill. From this point a magnificent view could be had of the picturesque valley of the Upper Moselle, everywhere dotted with rich vineyards, sheltering woods, villages and hamlets, suggestive of anything rather than of war. Yet each of these quiet, dreamy-looking villages was but a link in the fatal chain drawn around the maiden fortress; all nooks and corners being filled with troops who turned everything to account in strengthening their defensive position. The walls of each house were pierced with several rows of loopholes for musketry; and the garden walls, likewise, were "crenellated," or notched with indentations at the top, like battlements, through which the barrel of a rifle could be pointed at the foe outside. All the trees and bushes around the houses were cut down to deprive the approaching enemy of cover; the roads were barricaded with trunks and branches of trees, to prevent cavalry or artillery from coming near; and trenches were dug to form a covered way for the defenders of the post, from house to house, and from village to village.

From St. Blaise the besiegers had a view of the entire town and environs of Metz, and, by a powerful telescope mounted in the observatory, could see every movement of the French army. Concentrated here were the telegraphic wires, which ran in an unbroken circle round the beleaguered town, and by which the Germans could at a moment's notice convey intelligence to any army corps, or order movements of concentration on any threatened point from a score of different directions. They could thus in fifteen minutes collect 8000 men upon any spot, and on more than one occasion, when the assembly

was sounded, a force of 22,000, consisting of every branch of the service, was, within twenty-eight minutes, in full marching order, ready to proceed to the front. In every village notices were issued that the German authorities would hold the inhabitants responsible for damage done to the telegraphic wires; and that this was no idle threat is attested by the fact, that the people of one of them were fined in the sum of 200,000 francs for the destruction of the wires in its vicinity.

From the commanding position of St. Blaise the line of French outposts could easily be traced.* Starting from Bevoye, Magny, in front of Montigny, and from Moulin-les-Metz, on the other side of the Moselle, it ran in the direction of St. Hubert, between St. Ruffine and Chazells; from this point, in front of Sey, right under Mont St. Quentin, as far as Lessy; then taking a bend northwards by Plappeville to Devant les Ponts, and thence to Vigneulles and Woippy. The first German forepost on the right of the observatory was in the village of Peltre; next to that, La Papetrie; nearer to the Moselle and closer to Metz was the outpost of Frescaty. From Frescaty the line ran backward slightly to the Moselle, a little in front of Ars-sur-Moselle. On the slope on the western side of the river there was a forepost at Vaux, a village in the middle of that gloomy forest the glades of which were checkered with so many graves of the dead who fell at Gravelotte. Thence for a space the foreposts lay among the mementoes of the slaughter of that day. That at Châtel St. Germain was on the fringe of the plateau which was the closing scene of that desperate struggle on the 18th of August. From St. Germain the intrenched line ran across the plateau to Saulny, thence by Semecourt down into the alluvial plain on the west of the Moselle to the north of Fort St. Eloy, and thence due east to the river's brink. Not only was it possible from Mont St. Blaise to see the positions of the respective foreposts and their supports, but also the lines where Bazaine's army, as distinguished from the garrison proper of the fortress of Metz, in divers camps was disposed. These occupied the suburbs in every direction, under the protection of the outworks of St. Quentin, Plappeville, St. Julien, Queleu, and Montigny. In the space so environed, and outside Metz, the French had in all four great lagers or camps. The first and probably the largest was on the slope of Mont St. Quentin, looking toward St. Blaise, where the rows of tents athwart the slope, and past the village of Sey, stretched almost down to Chazells. Another, beginning at Longeville, a village on the west bank of the Moselle, in a line between St. Quentin and Metz, straggled up the river margin, first to St. Martin, where Bazaine had his headquarters, and on to the north as far as Devant les Ponts. A third great camp was in front of St. Julien, towards Vauloux, Vallieres; and the fourth was around Borny and Grigy. Besides these camps, there were two great collections of sick—one on the esplanade in front of the cathedral at Metz, and along the river brink, and the other on the island of Saulcy.

* The reader who wishes to obtain a clearer impression of the German positions than it is possible to convey in a written description, should compare this with the Battle Plans of Courcelles, Vionville, and Gravelotte, in which nearly all the places here named are shown.

Between the foreposts of the two armies a tolerably genial feeling prevailed until September 28, when, after a small engagement, a wounded Prussian officer was found robbed and mutilated in a most barbarous way. On one occasion a note was left under a stone, addressed to the French officer in command of the foreposts, and requesting a bottle of champagne for the Prussian forepost officer. At the next round the Prussian patrol found the bottle of champagne, along with a request for a small piece of salt, which, of course, was granted. The completeness of the forepost system was a marked feature of the Prussian army, and one of the leading causes of its success. At night the *feldwacht* advanced to the post occupied during the day by the furthest outlying sentry. Here it broke right and left into small pickets, leaving a strong nucleus in the centre. The front, at a distance of two or three hundred yards, was occasionally traversed by cavalry patrols, who sometimes rode right in among sleeping Frenchmen, whose system of night vigilance was far from perfect. Then there was a pistol shot and round of bootless Chassepot firing in the dark; the daring horseman dashing out through the French back to his supports. At times, and especially after the incident above alluded to, considerable asperity was shown between the respective advanced parties. A strict order was issued by the Prussian authorities against firing at small detached groups; but a single man could not show himself without a volley from the French. Not an uncommon amusement of the besiegers was to expose a hat, which was speedily riddled. The long range

of the Chassepot gave the French a decided advantage in this kind of play; but ere long the Prussian foreposts were also supplied with those weapons, a considerable number of which had fallen into German hands; indeed, one regiment (the thirty-fifth) was entirely armed with them.

During the first days of September there was absolute repose in Metz. The marshal and the army, ignorant of the doings without, knew nothing of the fate of MacMahon. For his army, however, they confidently anticipated success, and daily expected to see their brothers in arms, victorious over the foe, approaching towards the walls, with the welcome message of relief. But on the 4th September the German camp and villages around became more than commonly animated. The Prussian soldier seemed to have thrown off his usually stolid air; stout sergeants were ardently embracing one another; privates throwing their caps into the air, and shouting like maniacs; Frenchmen, gathered together in little knots, talked and gesticulated vehemently; and hussars and mounted officers were galloping about in every direction. All this extraordinary excitement was caused by the following official bulletin from the king of Prussia, which was here and there read aloud from newspapers to astonished groups:—"This day, September 1, in the neighbourhood of Sedan, Marshal MacMahon has surrendered himself and the French army of 80,000 men to the Crown Prince. His Majesty the Emperor of the French has also given himself up as a prisoner of war." A few days later a flag of truce, accompanied by General Wimpffen, who had assumed the command of the army when MacMahon was disabled by his wounds, conveyed into Metz the disastrous news of the annihilation of the forces which had been destined for its relief. A request was at the same time made to Bazaine to surrender the city without further bloodshed. His answer was that he did not believe the report, that he should hold Metz to the last, and that, if the Prussians wanted it, they must come and take it. The news was indeed regarded as a device of the Germans for obtaining easy possession of the greatest stronghold of France, and was not believed, even when both French and German newspapers were received, containing detailed accounts of the capitulation. The hopes thus cherished, however, soon received a crushing blow. In the August battles around Metz the French had captured about 750 Prussians; but judging that he might require all the provender of Metz for his own army, Bazaine turned out those prisoners directly after the failure of the sortie of August 31. The courtesy of war demanded that a like number of French should be returned, but just then Prince Frederick Charles had no prisoners, having sent them all off to Germany. On September 9, however, 750 men, chosen from different regiments taken at Sedan, were sent into the town, bearing only too palpable evidence to the tale of France's humiliation. With such corroboration there were few French soldiers or citizens in Metz so sceptical as not to believe, or so light-hearted as not to mourn, the dismal tidings. The Orleanist sympathies of portions of the army, and the republican leanings of others, were soon made manifest, while the guards appeared to be the only troops who were decidedly imperialist. Bazaine counselled and maintained a dead silence; but General Coffinières issued within the city the following proclamation:—

"Inhabitants of Metz,—We have read in a German journal—the *Gazette de la Croix*—the very sad news of the fate of a French army crushed by the numbers of its enemies after a three days' struggle under the walls of Sedan. This journal also announces the establishment of a new government by the representatives of the country. We have no other evidence of these events; but we are not able to contradict this.

"In these very grave circumstances our only thoughts should be for France. The duty of each one of us, whether as simple citizens or as officers, is to remain at our posts, and to vie with each other in defending Metz. In this solemn moment, France, our country, is summed up for each one of us in the word Metz! that city which has so many times before successfully resisted our country's foe.

"Your patriotism, of which you have already given such proofs by your care for our wounded soldiers, will never fail. By your resistance you will make yourselves honoured and respected, even by your enemies. The memory of the deeds of your ancestors will sustain you in the coming struggle.

"The army which is about our walls, and which has already shown its valour and its heroism in the combats of Borny, Gravelotte, and Servigny,

will not leave you. With you it will resist the enemy which surrounds us, and this resistance will give the government time to create the means of saving France—of saving our country.

"L. COFFINIERES,
"General of Division, Commandant of Metz.
"PAUL ODENT,
"Prefect of the Moselle.
"FELIX MARECHAL,
"Mayor of Metz.

"METZ, *September* 13, 1870."

The result of Bazaine's persistent silence was that the army felt angry at not receiving any official information of that with respect to which the town was informed; and on the 16th the marshal felt compelled to issue an order of the day, stating that, according to two French journals brought in by a prisoner who had made his escape, the emperor had been interned in Germany after the battle of Sedan, that the empress and the prince imperial had quitted Paris on the 4th, and that "an executive power, under the title of the Government for National Defence," had "constituted itself" in Paris. The names of its members were then given, and the marshal continued:—"Generals, officers, and soldiers of the army of the Rhine, our military obligation towards the country in danger remains the same. Let us continue then to serve it with devotion, and with equal energy defend its territory from the stranger and social order against evil passions. I am convinced that your *morale*, of which you have already given such proof, will rise to the height of the circumstances, and that you will add new claims to the admiration of France." The announcement was a good deal criticized, and political factions of all shades of opinion started up, and reviled each other with the utmost heartiness from day to day. In other respects within the town the days passed wearily by, cold and wet, and signalized by few events. The gates of the town were only opened two hours in the morning, between six and eight, and two in the evening, between five and seven. If any of the beleaguered inhabitants got out within three or four miles in any direction they reached the Prussian outpost, which cut off the chance either of return or of further progress, and such outside rambles were, therefore, generally avoided. One event which occurred, however, gave unfeigned delight to the citizens, namely, the establishment of a means of communication with the outer world. The discovery of an old balloon, which had done the French good service eighty years before, suggested to Mr. Robinson, the besieged correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* (and to whose "Fall of Metz" we are indebted for many incidents in this chapter), that balloons might be used for communicating with the provinces on the present occasion. Mr. Robinson soon found himself installed as balloon manufacturer-in-chief, assisted, and sometimes hampered, by Colonel Goulier, of the Military Engineering College, and Captain Schultz, the inventor of the mitrailleuse. An "aerostatic post" was opened, and the first balloon manufactured after a world of pains. It was fashioned out of the ordinary white lining paper used by paper stainers, and on being experimentally inflated with lighted straw, after the primitive method of Montgolfier (for the stock of coal in the city was too small to allow of gas being used), was found to succeed extremely well. Admiration at its graceful proportions was being expressed on all hands, when one of the workmen, in his delight at the success, shouldered a ladder in a manner rather more triumphant than usual, and accidentally sent the end of it straight through into the machine, which of course collapsed. It therefore became necessary to produce another, and on the 15th of September the first balloon was launched. It carried 8000 letters, fastened in an india-rubber cloth, and accompanied by a notice, promising a reward of 100 francs to any one who, finding the packet, and taking it to the nearest post-office, or to the mayor of the commune, should there obtain a receipt for it. The balloon first went nearly due south, in the direction of Vesoul and Besançon, at the rate of about nearly thirty miles an hour. Several others were then made, either of thin paper lined with muslin, or of cotton cloth, the ordinary "Manchester goods," of which there was then a fair stock in Metz. Both were inflated with atmospheric air, by means of a huge fan bellows. The cloth balloon was made by Captain Schultz. It was heavier and stronger than those made of paper, and could therefore carry a greater number of letters. It took up a freight of 45,000 letters; but, after rising to an immense height, it slowly descended, was fired at by the Prussians, and fell within their lines. The

cause of this failure was never ascertained; but it had the effect of discrediting the captain, who was not allowed to make another trial, though, according to Mr. Robinson, his idea was a very good one.

Nevertheless, the aerostatic plan was not abandoned. The worthy Englishman and his assistants still kept working away, building paper balloons, improving each one, and ended by adding an hydraulic apparatus to serve as an automatic ballast, aud so correct the too rapid ascent and the loss of gas by the sudden expansion thus created. This hydraulic ballast consisted of a flask holding about two litres of water; its neck was corked and turned downwards, and two glass tubes, a long one and a short one, were inserted in it. The long one admitted the air, the short one emitted the water, and the gradual leakage thus created corrected the sudden ascensional power of the balloons. To one balloon was appended a couple of carrier pigeons, with a notice attached to their cage offering a supplementary reward of another 100 francs for any one who would send them back with news of the outer world. Poor birds! their fate was a pie. The balloon was captured by a distant band of Prussians, who ate the pigeons, and sent word back by a *parlementaire* that they were both welcome and tender.

The spy mania reached Metz, and arrests were of every-day occurrence, but as they generally turned out mistakes they ceased to excite attention. That a large number of spies entered and left the city with impunity there is no doubt, for it subsequently appeared that Prince Frederick Charles was kept thoroughly informed of everything that passed, even to the deliberations of the French councils of war. On one occasion a spy rode right through the place in the uniform of a sous-intendant, asking all sorts of questions about the supplies, and only betraying himself by inquiring where the bread for the army was baked. Such a question on the part of a commissariat officer so utterly astonished the gendarme to whom it was put, that before he could reply the clever Prussian saw the tell-tale mistake he had made, and decamped. Orders were sent round to all the gates to let no sous-intendant out that night without strict examination, and those of them who happened to be in the town had to prove that they were what they professed to be, before they were permitted to join their quarters; but the spy was a great deal too clever for the gendarmes, and probably rode out as a mounted gendarme, perhaps arresting an actual sous-intendant on the way. Early in August, one real spy was caught and shot in the fosse, a more honourable fate than he deserved; for he took pay from both sides, and probably served neither. The French, indeed, attributed their disaster at Woerth to the intelligence he gave the Prussians; but every disaster was attributed to a like cause. This man, named Nicholas Schull, would seem to have been a person of intelligence and fortitude. A Hungarian by birth, a scion of the noble house of Degelmann, educated in Vienna, a naturalized American, who had long dwelt in Mexico as a partisan of the Emperor Maximilian, from whom he received the decorations of the order of Guadaloupe, he had seen much of the world and its ways. He was captured on the night of the 10th of August, on the railway, while surveying the new earthworks which were in course of being raised in every direction to strengthen the already strong fortress of Metz. It seemed that about the 19th of July he was presented to General Ducrot at Strassburg, announcing himself as the sworn enemy of Prussia, and as equally the sworn friend of France. Without much hesitation or inquiry his services were accepted. On the 21st he left Strassburg and returned on the 26th, with an amount of information which induced the general to give him 800 francs, in German cash, with which to enter the Prussian camp and carry out his object. From that time until his arrest the French military authorities saw nothing of him. That he did visit the Prussian camp is certain; for on his arrest there was found on him a *laisser passer* from Soleski, the quartermaster general of the Prussian army at Mayence, and dated the 6th of August, requiring all military authorities to let him go where and when he would. With his appointment from General Ducrot, and this from General Soleski, he had the entire run of both armies. With characteristic sagacity the Prussian army had organized an "intelligence department," with different grades, promotions, and good pay. By this means the reproach associated with espionage was taken away, and a man of patriotic enthusiasm and a taste for adventure might enter such service without necessarily exposing himself to the contempt with which the spy is commonly regarded. When arrested, there was found on Schull the medal carried by all the Prussian spies, to be produced

as a voucher of their being enrolled in the intelligence department. This and 1000 francs in gold were quite enough to convict him without the *laisser passer*, which, strange to say, was written, not in German, but in French. The council of war, after a few minutes' deliberation, condemned him to death. Half an hour's walk through the town amidst a drizzling rain, at five o'clock in the morning, brought him to the fosse of the citadel, where in a few minutes he stoically met his fate.

The Metz newspapers did their best to keep alive the spark of hope in the breasts of the citizens, by informing them that the latest arrivals from Prussia were the landsturm, old men more affected by rheumatism than by desire of military glory; that in the ranks around the town dysentery prevailed; and in a few more days the besiegers would cry for quarter. For publishing the effective of the army of Metz one journal was suppressed on September 6. Three days after another informed the public that "Italy, Austria, and Denmark, for reasons easy to comprehend, are hastening to our side, in order to profit by our certain victory." There followed an urgent appeal to stop the church bells, which were tolling all day in honour of the dead, and terrifying the living. On the 10th there were 13,500 wounded and sick in the hospitals, and 1500 in private houses. On the 11th an order was issued by Marshal Bazaine that private persons should reserve from their stores thirty days' forage, and give up the surplus, to be paid for. On the 13th the water of the fountain upon the Esplanade became corrupted by washing in it the dirty linen of the wounded; a circumstance the more unfortunate as the inhabitants were now compelled to drink veritable Eau de Moselle, the Prussians having cut off the water supply at Gorze. On the 15th all the grain in the city was ordered to be brought into a common stock. On the 15th *l'Independant* reported a decree of the town council for extracting salt from the tanneries. Horseflesh was now rising to a degree which caused anxiety, although the military administration undertook to deliver some horses to the city daily. Prices were fixed at from sixpence to one shilling and threepence the kilogramme. A line of rails was carried from the station into the Place Royale, the area of which was turned to account by railway carriages being converted into ambulances. Later in the month a saline spring was found, from which the inhabitants were allowed to fetch water, and vine tendrils were recommended for forage. Mock telegrams were issued from time to time, one of which, from King William to the queen, may serve as a specimen:—"Thank God for our astonishing victory; our losses are enormous; the enemy displays prodigies of valour; two regiments have twice, like a hurricane, traversed the ranks of our army." Among other grim facetiousness at times attempted in the same paper, the cattle market report of September 19 bristled with columns of ciphers, the only animals for sale being nineteen pigs. The Prussians, having opened depôts in the surrounding villages to supply the inhabitants, were requested to open some in Metz, where they would get good prices. On September 28 appeared an order from General Coffinières, prohibiting the sale of the new vintage as unwholesome, and announcing a distribution three days a week of horseflesh for the poor. Early in September the papers published an address from Bazaine to his army, telling them not to be downcast, still less to give way to disaffection, as in a few weeks he would turn the tables on the Prussians by taking the larger proportion of their guns and great store of their provisions. In the meantime he enjoined vigilance and alertness, and instructed his officers to study the writings of the Archduke Charles and Frederick the Great, and the History of the Thirty Years' War, to learn how to conduct the defence of a fortress. It is impossible to avoid thinking that, had the officers received a proper military education, there would have been little need for counselling them to "read up" now when the pinch had come.

Considerable unpleasantness sometimes arose from the relative positions of Bazaine, as the commander-in-chief of the army, and General Coffinières, as commandant-in-chief of the town of Metz. Their functions often clashed, and they were divided in their opinions. This they had in common, that both knew the city well, Bazaine having been born on the hills which surround it, and Coffinières having not only been a pupil of the *Ecole d'Application du Genie à l'Artillerie* in the town—the one great military engineering school of France—but also for many years a resident in Metz itself. General Coffinières was about some sixty-three or sixty-four years of age, a large-built, kind-hearted man, but of no great vigour of mind. Like most officers of engineers and artillery, his political proclivities were towards republicanism

rather than imperialism. Under the imperial rule artillery and engineering officers in France were not generally intrusted with high commands, and many of them were thus of republican tendencies. General Coffinières presented no exception to the rule, save that promotion had naturally modified his dissatisfaction with the imperial *régime*. Appointed commandant by the emperor himself, and responsible only to him, he was supreme within the town and the detached forts, but beyond that he had no power. Strictly speaking, Bazaine had nothing to do with the defence of Metz. No legislator on military matters could ever suppose that a commander-in-chief would exhibit so little knowledge of the art of war as to leave permanently inactive before a fortified town a large army, whose active force neutralized the passive force of the fortifications. This strong fortress, instead of serving as the refuge for a small body of men, who by the aid of scientific engineering multiplied their force, became smothered by the number of friends which surrounded it, and who consumed those provisions in a few weeks which would have sustained an ample garrison for many months. Under these circumstances no provision had been made for the presence of a commander-in-chief of an army in the field at the council of defence, which, as stated in chapter xxx. of the "Réglement du 13 October, 1863," the last statutes of war of the French army, consisted of the commandant-in-chief of the place (*commandant supérieur*), the commandant of the place, the commandant of artillery, the chief of the engineers, and some other officers of minor grade. Not being included under the law, Marshal Bazaine would almost seem to have considered himself above it; and thus, taking advantage of General Coffinières' easy disposition, he ruled to a certain extent in Metz as well as out of it, very little being done without his opinion and consent.

The affairs with Prussian outposts at times furnished plenty of excitement. One of the most daring leaders of the French guerillas was a man of the name of Hitter. He was a good shot, and brought down the Prussian videttes and sentinels with deadly skill. He used also to intercept convoys of provisions and forage, and ultimately he organized a regular body of sharpshooters for night service. A great deal of execution was done on a small scale, and Hitter became so popular in Metz that Marshal Bazaine offered to decorate him. The blunt patriot, however, said that if he was forced to accept the decoration he would wear it on his back, and very far down too; and the marshal, of course, thereupon ceased to insist. The Legion of Honour was given away by Marshal Bazaine rather freely during the siege, but was subsequently refused in another instance besides the one just mentioned. A certain M. Bouchotte was to receive this order for his eminent qualities displayed in the service of the town during its investment. He, however, declined the honour with the following remarks: "I will not receive a decoration signed with the hand which has signed the capitulation of Metz." There was indeed no lack in Metz of those who were willing to undertake extraordinary and dangerous service, which well merited more than ordinary reward. It was thus that the French were generally kept well informed of the exact position and strength of the Prussian batteries. They had plans of all of them, and these they obtained by the daring of men who devoted themselves to the task of observing the works of the enemy. Night after night they went forth, bearing a pocket compass, a pistol, and a poignard, and in secrecy and danger they did the work that was required of them.

Save that it was possible to hear of everything going on in the country, and keep up communications with home and the outer world, life in the camp of the besiegers was as devoid of incident as among the besieged. There was nothing of the excitement of the Strassburg siege, as the work was very much of the nature of a blockade; and instead of opening parallels and breaching fortresses, a strict though tedious guard against approach of help from without or of exit from within the doomed city was all that was required. Now and then a small skirmish or forepost engagement relieved the monotony; but it seemed as if Bazaine had given up all idea of troubling his gaolers by any endeavour to regain his freedom.

A little excitement was caused in the camp for one night by the burning of Nouilly, a village which had been regarded as neutral ground, from its being situated between the foreposts of the respective armies, and directly under the fire of Fort St. Julien and Les Bottes. Considerable stores of provisions were known to have been secreted by the villagers, who were now inside Metz. These stores the Prussians could not succeed in unearthing; but the peasants revealed

to their countrymen the place where they had been deposited, and it was believed the French had more than once stolen in at night and conveyed some of them away. To prevent a repetition of this, the Prussian commandant resolved to burn the village, with the secret stores it contained, and issued a commission to that effect to Lieutenant von Hosius, of the fifth regiment. Out of quite a company who clamoured to be sent on the expedition, fifteen were selected who had not left wives in the Fatherland; for in truth the dangerous undertaking partook not a little of the nature of a forlorn hope. A few hundred yards in the rear of Nouilly the Prussians, it is true, had a *feldwacht;* but the French were nearer it on the other side, by Mey and the Bois de Grimont, and had strong temptations for entering it by night. Hosius might possibly encounter a force of French inside the village, and in that case, of what service would be his fifteen volunteers? It was, indeed, almost certain that the party would meet with fierce resistance in the execution of their task, and would probably on their return be shelled both by St. Julien and Les Bottes. But as it was now close upon nine o'clock, the hour appointed for starting, there was little time for these considerations. Supper was hastily disposed of, the lieutenant thrust his "Adams'" revolver into his belt, and sallied out to the spot where his little band was drawn up. In a few minutes was heard the measured tread of the party, marching at the Prussian quick step, which is quicker than that of most armies; and after a parting salute to their comrades, they disappeared in the darkness. For a while the crash of feet through the vines fell on the ear; then came the hoarse challenge of the *feldwacht* rear sentry, after which all was quiet.

An anxious and excited group, comprising nearly all the officers of the battalion, soon gathered round the bright watch-fire, where everybody tried to appear unconcerned, though it was certain that none was. The regiment, it was known, had never failed in any duty assigned it, and the chance of its failure now, though apparent in the minds of all, was a subject which no one cared to broach. Von Hosius was in no hurry to relieve the suspense. An hour had gone—Nouilly was but ten minutes' distance from Noisseville, and the colonel's nervousness was ill-concealed as he hacked at the burning log with his naked sword, and drove his spur into the leg of his chair.

A smothered shout from the lieutenant of the post caused all to spring to their feet. Flame-coloured smoke at last, and plenty of it; but it surely could not be so far away! It was indeed a false alarm, for the lowering smoke was on the other side of the Bois de Grimont, and arose from a private bonfire of the French. The dead silence that reigned in the valley, however, was favourable. Von Hosius had evidently encountered no French in the place, else the rattle of the musketry would have been heard long ere now, and the battalion, which was standing to its arms at the various company posts, would have been lining the entrenchment with the needle-guns poked over the earthwork. Another half-hour of suspense, and then a loud "Ha!" simultaneously from the lieutenant on duty and the sentry. This time it was no mistake. Von Hosius had taken his time, that he might do his work thoroughly. From six places at once belched out the long streaks of flame against the darkness above, and the separate fires speedily met. In ten minutes the whole place was in a blaze; the church steeple, standing out in the midst of the sea of flame, calling to mind the old motto of the Scottish Kirk, "*Nec tamen consumebatur*." But the steeple, after all, was not the burning bush; for a fierce shower of sparks bore testimony to its fall. Here and there against the flame could be seen a human figure in frantic flight, and on a bluff, just outside the village, stood in the strong light a woman wringing her hands. These were the innocent victims of war!

Presently was heard again the crashing through the vinebrake, and the Prussian outpost sentry challenge. The watchword was returned in the hearty voice of Von Hosius, and in five minutes more the little party was inside the entrenchment of the *replie*. The affair was singularly successful. The duty had been executed without the exchange of a single shot. The village burnt till five the next morning; whatever stores were in it must have been consumed; and so coolly had the enterprise been gone about, that a respectable old horse, found in one of the stables of the village, was led back in triumph as a trophy. The French held their fire simply because they did not know whither to direct it. To have shelled Nouilly would only have been playing into the hands of the Prussians. The party which wrought the destruction might have come from Servigny, Noisseville, the Brasserie,

or Montoy; and as the line of their retreat was not known, to have fired at haphazard would have been a useless waste of ammunition.

It was rumoured that, notwithstanding the strict investment, Bazaine contrived by some means to maintain communications with parties outside Metz. With apparent reason, the Prussian authorities doubted the statement, until, about the middle of September, it was corroborated by the discovery of underground insulated wires, leading, on one side of Metz, to Strassburg, on the other to Thionville, Longwy, Montmèdy, and Sedan. That a mode of communication so obvious, though invisible, should have escaped such engineers and electricians as the Prussian officers appears incredible. When the French besieged Sebastopol, they cut short, shallow trenches in all the directions from which they thought the batteries could communicate. When they stormed the Malakoff they had a picked corps of 200 men with sharp spades, who cut behind it when they got possession, and severed the wires supposed to communicate with the mines under the work, which were afterwards actually found. In this the French did not show their usual sagacity, nor the Russians their usual alertness. The wires were actually there, passed under the harbour across the Star Fort, and had the Russian electrician got any intimation, even by signal, he might in the moment of triumph have blown the French corps d'armée into the air, and, with the English defeat at the Redan, have changed the whole current of the war.

On the 21st of September General von Steinmetz, who till then had played a most important part in the war, was removed from the command of the first army round Metz, and appointed to the governorship of Posen. To him is due the credit of many of the brilliant and resolute attacks which issued in Prussian victories during the war; but he sometimes erred in attacking too rashly, and permitting his battalions to advance too far unsupported. Where, however, there was danger, or the army received a check, the first man in the breach or at his post was General von Steinmetz. He left the first army commanding the respect of every one—the friendship of but few.

The command-in-chief of the besieging forces, which hitherto had been somewhat divided, now devolved entirely upon Prince Frederick Charles; and it would seem as if Bazaine at once resolved to put his abilities to the test. On the 22nd of September, the day after the removal of General Steinmetz, there occurred the first sortie in any considerable force which had been attempted since the memorable one of August 31. The operations of the French, however, though not conducted on a vast scale, had sufficed to keep the German troops actively occupied, for at several points of the siege circle the men were frequently under arms for thirty-six hours at once, with but short intervals for rest and food. The object of the present movement was to harass the investing forces while ascertaining by strong armed reconnaissances the strength of the German positions. Under cover of a heavy cannonade from Fort Queleu, preceded by a shower of shells—some of which struck the Grange, and others fell as far behind as Ars-Laquenexy, and did considerable damage to the church—a strong division of French troops, composed of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, advanced in the direction of La Grange-aux-Bois. From an excellent point of observation they had previously been reconnoitred by the Germans, who knew their composition, strength, and direction, and were therefore at once prepared to meet them and to avoid at the same time a useless sacrifice of lives at their outposts. The French infantry were thrown into the woods round the village in skirmishing order and in large force, occupying a line which extended for about one mile to the Prussian right. This, of course, rendered the position of the Prussian outposts at La Grange-aux-Bois untenable. The Prussians in retiring availed themselves of every tree and knoll, and from behind a series of breastworks, which they had thrown up to strengthen their position, fired steadily upon the advancing enemy, and inflicted some severe losses. In order to reach the point at which their main supports were concentrated they had to pass over about half-a-mile of ground, every inch of which was gallantly contested. It was now about three o'clock. The French, in advancing, lost the advantage of the support of their artillery and cavalry; for the Germans had so obstructed the roads by frequent and strong barricades, constructed of hewn trees which lined the military road to Metz, and the nature of the ground, covered with dense woods, was so unfavourable, that mounted forces could not act, and guns could not be brought forward. All this time, however, a heavy and continuous rain of shells of great weight was poured upon Mercy-le-Haut and Ars-Laquenexy from

Forts Queleu and St. Julien. At the junction of the roads leading from Mercy and Ars—which meet nearly at right angles—the Germans met their supports. A large body of troops of all arms had been concentrated here, and were posted in strong positions. The Germans at once assumed the offensive, and rushing impetuously to the attack, fairly drove back the French at a more rapid pace than that at which they advanced. All the German troops engaged carried their knapsacks, mess-tins, and cloaks. The fashion of having the cloak slung crosswise over the shoulder, round the knapsack, and under the opposite arm, turned many a bullet and saved many a soldier's life in this and other engagements. So equipped, they poured upon the French infantry so heavy and close a fire that they could not hold their ground. Already in advancing thus far they had found how effective a resistance could be made by a small body of men, fighting with vigour and handled with skill, on ground whose natural strength had been increased by every available means. The German troops, after having cleared the woods, drove the French back through the open, with considerable loss. La Grange-aux-Bois was speedily re-occupied, and by five o'clock the French had been forced to retire within their lines. The affair lasted altogether about four hours. This village had now the second time been taken by the French, but in both instances their occupation of it had been brief. Their attacking force was principally composed of Marshal Lebœuf's corps, and the regiment which bore the brunt of the onset on the German side was the thirteenth of the first Westphalian infantry division. The loss of the Prussians was one officer and fifteen men in all, wounded, and one killed. The French losses in killed and wounded were considerable, besides numerous prisoners left in the enemy's hands.

The sortie of the 22nd was but the prelude to a more serious attack on the 24th. Rightly guessing that, on the previous occasion, the observatory at Mercy-le-Haut had enabled their enemy to provide so warm a reception for them, the utmost efforts of the French were used on the 23rd to render it untenable. A large number of the projectiles with which it was continuously shelled took effect, and made far more holes in the roof than were needed for the purposes of observation. The shelling was continued on the morning of the 24th, but from the position, nevertheless, strong bodies of troops were observed gathering under the walls of Fort St. Julien, which presently poured out along the road leading from the fort, and extending towards the Prussian right. They advanced in marching order, the infantry well supported by artillery and cavalry. Despatches by orderlies and telegraph carried information of all the movements of the French, and the threatened points received timely warning, while preparations were made for immediate concentration. It was now two o'clock, and presently the fire began. The guns of Fort Queleu opened a heavy fire, and the shells dropped fast among the woods immediately to the left and below the château where the Prussian troops were hidden. For the first time, too, the guns from Fort les Bottes, the strong earthwork recently constructed immediately in front of the château and below the fort, delivered a maiden fire. The majority of the shells, however, pitched too high, passed over the woods, and fell into the meadows. There was a continuous roar of cannon on the right and left flanks, and volleys from both Prussian and French infantry in the *chaussées* showed that sharp fighting was going on at close quarters. Some mitrailleuses then opened fire with a hoarse grating sound, as if a ship had let go her cable and the chain was scraping out through the hawsehole. For some time the French advanced far into the enemy's lines; but as the dusk fell the vivid flashes breaking from the now gray woods, and the louder roar of cannon, told that the Prussians had once more held their own, and were driving back their adversaries under shelter of the forts, by this time ablaze with signal lights.

The most exciting part of the day's encounters occurred during an attempt on the village of Noisseville, which had already changed hands several times. The attack was conducted with the greatest caution, as a French company had, only an hour or two before, been severely cut up in advancing on a château out of which they imagined the enemy had been driven, but where he suddenly appeared in great force. The place, however, was ultimately taken, and, that it might not be the occasion of another surprise, was set fire to and burnt. Making this house a turning point, a considerable number of skirmishers advanced towards the little village, which had been so drenched with French and German blood. They could not tell if it was occupied. Not a blue coat

was to be seen; all was perfectly still. A shell or two from field-pieces was tried; not a shot was returned. St. Julien sent in one of its long twenty-four shells at it, which went crash into the first house on the left, and made a great hole in it. Still not a movement. Another shell from St. Julien struck the house on the right side of the street with the same result. Still no sign. The French praised the admirable practice of St. Julien, but after the ruse of the little house they knew not what to expect from the big village. Meanwhile the men crept steadily on. Crack went the Chassepot whenever any one thought he saw something worth firing at. Still no reply. Were the enemy there or were they not? Just then, from the other side of the hill, was noticed a column of Prussian cavalry crawling out of the woods of Failly, like a big black snake, half a mile long. The officer in command gave orders to sound a retreat, and the men drew back again. Then began the fire. Noisseville was not empty now. Out of every loophole, from behind every wall, from every little hedge, sprang up armed men, who fired with an impetuosity that made up for their previous patience; but luckily the French were not quite near enough, and the Prussians thought it wise not to pursue. Under cover of their artillery, which went to the front, the French gradually got again within the shelter of the guns of St. Julien.

On the 27th of September another sortie in considerable force, intended as a great foraging expedition, was made with even more success in a military view than those a few days before. Peltre was the nearest railway station to Metz on the line which connected it with Prussia, and was therefore the great commissariat station for the Prussian camp to the westward, as the stations of Courcelles and Rémilly were for the eastern portion. The French had therefore a double object, to destroy the German provisions and get some for themselves, and to seize the opportunity, should any occur, of sending a few men through with despatches. All being ready, very early in the morning, before the sun was up, the French set out. To effect a greater confusion, simultaneous demonstrations were made in the direction of Borny and Ladonchamps; but the main line of attack was Peltre. The force consisted principally of the seventieth and eighty-fourth regiments of the line, supported by a battalion of chasseurs, and accompanied as before by cavalry and guns. The early hour, the suddenness of the attack, and the sallying out at different points, if they did not surprise the Prussians, at all events rendered them less prepared than usual to make any effectual resistance. The railway was still available for some considerable distance of the road, and the French troops were placed in the carriages, a field-piece or two mounted on some vans in front, and the engine placed behind the train. Alongside the line marched the rest of the troops, and a battery of mitrailleuses took up their position above the wood of Basse Bevoye. Quietly round towards the castle of Crepy crept the infantry, and the affray began. Hitherto the Prussians had but little notice of the approach of the troops; but now it became earnest hard work. Rattle after rattle of musketry fire rang out from one side or the other. At last the Prussians were overcome, captured, and their rifles broken, after which they were set free again. Meanwhile, another portion of the French force pushed on rapidly to the villages of Peltre and Mercy-le-Haut, which they occupied and fired, completely razing the observatory. In one part of their retreat the Germans entered a convent—called the Sisters of Providence—whose walls were already loop-holed; but under a deadly fire an entrance was forced, and now commenced a horrible sight for those poor peace-loving sisters. Their church became a charnel-house; the very sanctuary was stained with blood; and the house of mercy was turned into the house of vengeance. The Prussians craved, the French gave, no quarter, and flight there was none. The railway station close by was carried; men were killed at every step; but there were here some patient looking quadrupeds which must be saved, whatever became of the bipeds. The order of the day was to take care of the cows and sheep. Cattle trucks were broken open, sheep pens invaded; the cows were driven up the line, and the sheep tucked under the arm, or borne on the shoulder. Sugar, coffee, hay, straw, all needed, were found there, and the railway carriages were filled and sent back again. The German forces first assailed had fallen back as far as Ars-Laquenexy, on the road to Courcelles, which they supposed to be the point of the French attack. Meanwhile another corps, the first corps of the second army, prepared to attack the French in flank, and to cut them off from retreat to Metz. They, however, saw their danger in time and withdrew, carrying with them their dead and wounded, the captured provisions, and a hundred

prisoners. The guns of Fort Queleu kept up a heavy fire during the whole affair, and Forts St. Quentin and St. Julien also vigorously cannonaded the Prussian positions opposite to them. In driving back the French, the Prussian field-guns, which opened a heavy fire on them, caused severe loss, and set fire to the villages of Colombey and La Grange-aux-Bois, both of which were wholly destroyed. So rapid and well-executed was the sortie, that at 11.30 a.m. all was again comparatively quiet, and, save the burning villages, little trace appeared of an affray in which about 8000 men on each side had been engaged.

Bazaine had been blamed for giving up the advanced position of Peltre, which for a time was in French hands; but the sortie was not made with a view of escaping from Metz, so much as obtaining food for his army and provender for his horses, both of which were getting exceedingly scarce in the town. So far, therefore, the object of the sortie was attained, and the measure of success which attended it encouraged the French on the following day to make a similar effort, on a smaller scale, in nearly the same direction. The Prussian foreposts occupied in no great strength the village of Colombey, where were three large châteaux, in the upper stories of which a considerable store of grain had been left by the original occupants, who had taken refuge in Metz, and probably gave information of the existence of these stores. At all events, in the afternoon of the 28th, the French, in large numbers, and covered by the artillery of St. Julien, made a dash at Colombey, their advance followed by a number of empty waggons. Once more they surprised the comparatively weak Prussian foreposts, and drove them out of the village. Covering their operations by throwing forward tirailleurs into the woods to the front and towards La Planchette, they filled the waggons with the grain, and started on the return journey. In the meantime, however, the Prussian artillery had come to the front, and the shells fell thick among the Frenchmen in Colombey and the convoy on the road. The former fell back in great haste under the guns of St. Julien, and the waggons went on at a gallop, but out of thirty-six only fourteen succeeded in getting safe off. The others were arrested *in transitu*, in consequence of the animals which drew them being disabled by the Prussian shells. Among the men the loss in killed or wounded was not great on either side.

But while outside the city walls the monotony of life was varied by these occasional sorties, within Metz the autumn wore on heavily. There was much to be feared. To calculate the duration of the food supply; to speculate on what Bazaine was doing, or meant to do; to build frail anticipations on the prospect of a relieving army, and to find them crumble into ruins; to make paper balloons, which, with their freight of letters, frequently fell into the hands of the enemy; to split into coteries, and wrangle about the future of France; to hunt down spies, to vex the Prussian outposts, and occasionally to engage in sorties—these were now the sole resources of the beleaguered citizens and army. The weather was often rainy and cold, and the spirits of the people were depressed by the sense of confinement and the monotony of existence. The Prussians were in no hurry; they could very well afford to let the Metzers wear themselves out. The Metzers fretted against the manacles that bound them, but fretted in vain. Every day brought the end nearer; yet still the way seemed long and wearisome. The citizens felt that they were shut up in a large prison, under sentence of being slowly starved; and they knew that their fate had been decreed by a power which never faltered in its will or failed in its resources. A little excitement was caused on Sunday, September 25, by a grand review of the national guards in the Place d'Armes in front of the cathedral. They numbered four corps, and, together with the volunteer artillery, mustered about 7000 men. They were clad in blouses, but with distinctive marks, giving roughly the character of a uniform to the dress. Their arms were old-fashioned percussion muzzle-loaders, of various patterns, and very ineffective. Not that there were not plenty of Chassepots in store; but the national guards were suspected of republicanism, and were therefore neglected and discouraged by the military authorities, though popular with the townsfolk.

The sorties we have referred to, of course, occupied comparatively few of the large army now encamped around Metz; and although a circle of defence extending over nearly thirty miles afforded ample employment for a still larger number, the fact that no determined effort was made to break away from the town, whose provisions were being rapidly diminished by those outside, created great dissatisfaction in it, and caused considerable relaxation of discipline among the troops themselves,

great numbers of whom had taken no active part in the war since the engagement of August 31; indeed, the imperial guard had not fired a shot, or ever moved from their encampment, since August 18. Bazaine, therefore, notwithstanding the almost hopeless nature of the attempt, determined, early in October, to make a vigorous endeavour to break out in the direction of Thionville, about half way between Metz and Luxembourg. Thionville was at this time besieged by a large force under General Zastrow, but was extremely well supplied with provisions, the obtaining of which would have been of immense advantage to the marshal and his army. And even if this scheme could not be fully carried out, it was thought that a large part of the army might possibly reach the Dutch frontier, thus leaving Metz with so many the less mouths to fill, and by surrendering to a neutral save the ignominy of capitulating to the enemy. The foggy morning of the 7th October was therefore appointed to usher in what turned out to be the most important and determined sortie made by Bazaine since the failure of the 31st August. The Germans recognized it as the "Schlacht bei Meziéres." Battles there were in plenty in this bloody campaign that showed a larger total of killed and wounded; but the "Battle of Meziéres" made widows and orphans in the Fatherland far beyond proportion, for the men who bore the brunt of it were husbands and fathers—the stout landwehr men of the Division Kummer.

At an early stage of the blockade the Prussians seized upon the fine old château of Ladonchamps, which had often played an important part in the history of Metz. As it was necessary the French should carry the position, a field-battery was brought against it; but though there were the guns and the sentinel, not a shot was returned from it. Presently volumes of smoke rose up from behind the château. The farm was evidently burnt, and a rush was made to save the house. After a few musket shots had been fired the Prussians evacuated, and the French entered the place to find that the guns they had so much feared were simply portions of poplar trees neatly mounted on the wheels of broken carts, and that the "sentinel" was a man of straw. Such ruses, which were not uncommon during the war, caused many a mirthful moment, and relieved the weary tediousness of the siege.

Ladonchamps was taken by the chasseurs, who held it, with some few intervals, up to the day of the surrender of Metz, and it formed the *avant garde* of the French lines. To the right of it were Great and Little Maxe, and in front the two large farms of Great and Little Tapes. It was felt by the Prussians that it was dangerous to allow the French to continue in possession of Ladonchamps, as from it their batteries enfiladed the whole of the besiegers' front across the valley. On October 6, therefore, it was subjected to a most severe bombardment, resulting in the retirement of its garrison towards Metz. The Prussians then threw forward troops, establishing their *replis* in its rear, and sent sergeants' parties to occupy it and Grandes and Petites Tapes villages, which formed the key to its possession. St. Rémy constituted the chief support, and here lay the fifty-ninth regiment of the landwehr. Maxe, close to the river and considerably in advance, was occupied by outposts sent forward by the tenth army corps, on the other side of the Moselle. The two divisions of the landwehr stretched right across the valley from the bridge at Argancy, where they touched the tenth army corps, to near Marange, where they met the fifth, and to them was confided the keeping of the flat alluvial tract on the western side of the Moselle.

From Metz to Meziéres, which was now the headquarters of General von Kummer, commanding the landwehr, there is a long trough with a flat bottom, the alluvial margin of the Moselle. This tract, which is about four English miles wide, is bounded on the west by the heights of Le Horiment, and nearer Metz by Norroy and Saulny. On the east it is bounded by a lower series of bluffs, on which stand the villages of Olgy and Malroy; but between them and the bottom runs the Moselle, infringing considerably on the flat expanse just opposite Olgy. Across this bottom, at the narrowest part, lies a series of villages—the two Tapes and St. Rémy, with Maxe and Ladonchamps, respectively, slightly to the east and west front. In all of them there were more or fewer Prussian troops.

About one o'clock on the 7th the Prussian batteries at Semecourt were heard delivering a vigorous fire, which was supposed to be caused by the tardy evacuation of Ladonchamps by the French. Over the valley hung a mist, which prevented any extended observation; but little importance was attached to the firing, although it grew louder and

louder, until an aide-de-camp galloped up, spreading the alarm in every direction, and dashing on to General Kummer's quarters for instructions to guide the front.

Covered by the dense fog, Bazaine had made his dispositions with such adroitness, that when it cleared away a little past one his arrangements were already all but complete. The imperial guard came down from the hills of Plappeville and defiled into the valley of the Moselle. Several regiments of infantry, under the direction of General L'Admirault, pushed their way through the woods to the left in the direction of Nassoy and Feves. The sixth corps sent some few regiments to assist the guards, and together they marched into the valley. A strong assault was first directed against Ladonchamps, which the landwehr outpost held as if they had been 10,000 instead of 100 men, and the French infantry swarmed into it while their artillery played upon it. On went the French infantry, shell after shell falling thick amongst them, but they knew the nearer they got the less likely they were to be stopped. They encountered a very determined resistance. In addition to several fixed batteries, the Prussians brought on the ground a large number of field pieces, all converging on the French line of advance. The brave General Gibon, who that day for the first time carried his *galon* as a general in the field, cried out, "Never fear, my lads, I'll serve as a bastion for you;" and, placing himself at the head of his brigade, on he went. But his career was brief; he fell in the affray mortally wounded. On rushed the guards, unchecked by the bullets which, like a storm of hail, assailed them. The shock of exploding shells made the ground tremble. Fire succeeded fire. The smoke of the sacrifice rose not to heaven, but hung over the earth. Inch by inch the ground was won, and Les Grandes Tapes was at length reached. Twice round the outworks a picked body of seventy-five guards went; at last, espying a "coign of vantage," they with a shout leapt the trenches, followed by their comrades, and Les Grandes Tapes was theirs. Suddenly, also, the villages of Petites Tapes, St. Rémy, and Maxe were overwhelmed by a rush of Frenchmen. The fifty-ninth landwehr in St. Rémy would not fall back, as in common prudence it should have done, but stood in the street till the French, having played upon it with their artillery, and rained on it Chassepot and mitrailleuse bullets, finally, by sheer numbers, pushed backward the shattered remnant on to the *chaussée*. The fusilier battalion of the fifty-eighth occupied Grandes Tapes before, and occupied it now, but with the dead and the wounded. The battalion would not give ground, and may be said to have been annihilated, as the men stood with their backs to the wall and their faces to the foe. The other battalions of the same regiment also suffered severely. As soon as they had gained possession of Les Grandes Tapes, the French began loading their wagons with forage; and, though the Prussians shelled them vigorously, they did not cease until they had got all they wanted.

So far, then, Bazaine had succeeded. He had re-occupied the chain of villages athwart the valley, and had got a few batteries of artillery out to their front to reply to the Prussian fire. But the *status quo* he neither wished nor had the ability to retain, prevented as he was by the Prussian artillery throwing its projectiles from three sides of the parallelogram. It seemed clear, however, that Bazaine would not have done what he did had he not contemplated something more; and that, there could be no doubt, was a sortie to establish connections with Thionville. His tactics were well conceived. From St. Rémy and the two Tapes he kept the Prussian fire engrossed, both musketry and artillery. He sent forward from Grandes Tapes swarms of tirailleurs, who fared very ill at the hands of the landwehr. He massed nearly 30,000 men on the bank of the Moselle, under cover of the houses of Maxe, with the design of cutting through the Prussian environment where it was weakest, close to the river. The moment was critical. The landwehr had all been sent forward against the villages, with the exception of one brigade that was in reserve. But the tenth army corps had been crossing the pontoon bridge, and massing between the river and Amelange; General von Voigt Rhetz, who was in command of the day's operations, gave the order for several regiments to advance. It was a sight never to be forgotten. First came the fusiliers, extending at a rapid run into skirmishing order, and covering the whole plain with their thin long lines. Then the dense columns of companies of the grenadiers, with their bands playing and their colours unfurled. But all the work was not left to the infantry. The artillery, letting the villages alone, concentrated

their fire on the advancing columns of the French by the Moselle. Want of fodder, which caused many of his horses to die of starvation, and the demand for horse flesh as food, both in the camp and town, had left Bazaine singularly weak in field artillery, and the only reply to the enemy was from the fort of St. Julien or from the ramparts of St. Eloy. But the mitrailleuse sounded its angry whirr; making the skirmishers recoil as they crossed the line of fire, and tearing chasms in the fronts of the solid masses of which they were the forerunners. The dense columns of the French staggered and then broke, and a *sauve qui peut* ensued into the village of Maxe. Once within shelter, they obstinately refused to go further. In vain the Prussian artillery, advancing closer and closer in alternate order of batteries, fired on the villages, with a precision and rapidity that could not have been exceeded on Woolwich Common. That obstinate battery in front of Grandes Tapes would not cease, and the French tirailleurs still lined the front of the *chaussée*. It was now nearly four o'clock, and the German columns halted, as if for breathing time, before storming the enemy's position. A shell from St. Julien, falling near a captain of cavalry, blew him and his horse into fragments; disturbing at the same time a hare, which bounded from its form, and scampered across the battle-field right in a line with the gun fire. As the landwehr stood in suspense, a staff officer galloped along the front line with orders for a general advance to take the villages by storm. The advance was to consist of four brigades of the landwehr, supported by two of the tenth army corps. In a few minutes the command came sounding along the line, and the men, springing from their cover, went forward with that steady, quick step so characteristic of the Prussian marching. The shells from the battery in front of Grandes Tapes tore through the line, the mitrailleuse and Chassepot poured against it their bullets; but still the landwehr, silent and stern, went steadily to the front. Those who had been in many engagements had never experienced a more furious fire than that to which the centre of this line was exposed. General von Brandenstein, commanding the third brigade of the landwehr, was shot down as he rode, and several of his staff were wounded. At length the entrenchments were reached, behind which were lying the shattered remnants of the fifty-ninth and fifty-eighth landwehr. The fraternization consisted in the cry of "Hurrah Preussen," and then "Vorwärts—immer vorwärts," and the line threw itself to its front in a run. The gunners from the battery, brave men and stubborn, had barely time to get round the corner before the landwehr were upon them. The guns they left perforce. In the villages the French made a last stand, but it was at serious cost. The landwehr, with less of the conventional warrior in them than the line, were not so much inclined to give quarter. Many a Frenchman that afternoon had for a shrift a bayonet thrust. They fought furiously in the narrow ways of the villages, and used the mitrailleuses with rare judgment and effect. But then came the steady, resolute stride of the landwehr, who by the lusty use of the bayonet soon cleared Les Tapes and Maxe of all save victors, dead, and wounded. The village of St. Rémy was also taken in the same way by the eighty-first regiment at nine o'clock in the evening, with a loss to the Prussians of five officers and over one hundred men. The end of the day found the French, though dislodged from the neighbouring villages, still in possession of the old château of Ladonchamps, to the shelter of which and its barricades they retired after the determined charge of landwehr, which had proved as resistless as that of the imperial guard at an earlier hour. From this shelter after dark a large body of troops sallied out, under the impression that a regiment of their comrades were still outside, and near the Prussian lines. A dim outline in the distance was supposed to be that of the absentees. On a closer inspection, however, the outline was resolved into a body of Prussian cavalry, who, for the purpose of disguise, were singing a French chanson. The French officer hesitated a moment or two, when all at once the charge was sounded. There was no disguise then. Horses' hoofs ploughed the ground, as, shouting now in German, the riders came on. A scamper was made by the French, which the Prussians hastened by a roll of carbine fire. Up to the very barricades they went, but the French were ready, and many a riderless horse dashed on almost into the outworks. The infantry having reformed, a stream of fire from Chassepots ran all along the front, which after a while caused the Prussians to retire, leaving the enemy in undisturbed possession of the château.

In another part of the field, westward of St. Rémy, and the two hotly-contested villages of Les

Tapes, the position held by the Prussians on the wooded and hilly ground in the neighbourhood of Norroy and Semecourt, formed from the peculiarity of the situation a natural fortress. It had, however, been strengthened by art. The ground in front and facing Woippy had been cut up into a regular honeycomb of "Schutzengraben," whilst behind every wall a bank had been carefully erected, and the masonry pierced for rifles. The Prussians had become so accustomed to fortifying the small villages they occupied, and had besides so many opportunities of observing the dexterity with which the French made such places tenable, that in a very short time a battalion would convert a farmhouse, a garden-wall, or a hamlet, into a fortification from which generally nothing but artillery could dislodge them. In the present instance, however, all this elaborate defence proved of little avail, for the well-conducted steady advance of the French guard was irresistible. They carried the village of Norroy, and were moving on Semecourt and Fèves, with the intention, apparently, of penetrating towards Thionville by way of Marange, when they were attacked in flank by the troops lying at Amanvillers, St. Privat-la-Montagne, and Roncourt. The fire from Plappeville assisted them so long as they were in the neighbourhood of Saulny; but that assistance failed as soon as they got clear of their own outworks and carried Norroy. Here an obstinate fight continued for many hours; but the Prussians having been reinforced, the French fell back towards Saulny and Woippy, contesting every inch of the road. With the light of a brilliant moon, the big guns had no difficulty in opening fire. Plappeville, the works in Devant-les-Ponts, and some heavy pieces of the town itself, now took part in the action; but the Prussians seemed determined to take Woippy, which they eventually did at nine o'clock. They could not, however, hold it for any length of time, and when about eleven p.m. the action ceased, the French had regained Woippy, and the Prussian troops held Saulny.

This battle, the severest and most important which had taken place before Metz since the 31st of August, was without positive benefit to either side, as both lost heavily without gaining any advantages. The sortie only demonstrated to Marshal Bazaine the utter hopelessness of any attempt to break the bars of his iron cage, while the Prussians found it impossible to follow up their victory by penetrating into the immediate vicinity of the fortress. The French losses in killed and wounded were stated to be 1100. The estimate was published in Metz as, in some sort, a reply to the clamour for another sortie, which Bazaine was reluctant to risk. There is, therefore, every reason to believe this total correct. If so, the French losses were far less than those of their enemy. Eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and sixty-five officers, were the fearful sum-total of these few hours, among the landwehr alone—who, indeed, bore the brunt of the fray, and checked the rush of the French advance, by holding the villages while they had a man that could stand upright and fire the needle-gun. To them also was intrusted the grand final advance which swept the French out of the villages. The Prussian force engaged consisted of the nineteenth, fifty-eighth, and fifty-ninth landwehr regiments, forming the Posen and West Prussian brigades; the first army corps, the twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, eighth, and seventh line regiments, and a portion of the seventh army corps. The number of French engaged exceeded 45,000. The roar of the artillery, mingling with the deadly clatter of the mitrailleuse, was indescribable; for not only were the French and Prussian field and horse-artillery engaged, but during the whole battle the forts kept up a continual blaze from their garrison guns. Singularly enough, this fire was fiercest about nine o'clock, as if the French feared an attempt upon the fortress, to follow up the day's success.

During the time when these important events were occurring, the imperialist cause, though unpopular, had not been quite forgotten by some of its former supporters. At least one intrigue had been attempted with the view of restoring the Napoleonic dynasty; and as it was partly carried on in the city of Metz, it may be right to notice it here.

M. Regnier was a landed proprietor in France, and the Prussians were but a few leagues from his residence when he and his family took flight for England, which they reached on the 31st of August. On the 4th of September the Empress Eugenie quitted Paris. On the 11th he knew she was at Hastings, and on the 12th wrote to Madame Lebreton a letter, which he requested should be communicated to her Majesty, apprising her of his intention to submit proposals to the emperor at Wilhelmshöhe for the preservation of the Napoleonic

dynasty. The first of these proposals rested on the assumption that the regent ought not to quit French territory, of which the imperial fleet was a part, and that a portion of the fleet ought, therefore, to be occupied by her as the seat of government.

Madame Lebreton gave an interview to M. Regnier at the Marine Hotel, Hastings, when she told him that the empress had read his letter, but that she felt that the interests of France should take precedence of those of the dynasty, and that she had the greatest horror of any step likely to bring about a civil war. M. Regnier then addressed another letter to Madame Lebreton, and subsequently saw three officers of the imperial household, who told him that the empress would not stir in the matter. He then proposed that certain photographs of Hastings, which he had bought for the purpose, might be inscribed by the prince imperial to the emperor. On the 17th of September, M. Regnier got back his photographs, on one of which was a note running thus:—" My dear papa,—I send you these views of Hastings, hoping they will please you.—Louis Napoleon." The empress, through M. Fillion, told M. Regnier that there would be great danger in carrying out his project, and begged him not to attempt it. Of course, M. Regnier made light of the caution; and on the 20th of September, the very day of Jules Favre's interview with Count von Bismarck, he was standing in the presence of the North German chancellor. From him he requested a pass permitting him free access to the emperor at Wilhelmshöhe, at the same time hinting that his object was to give peace to France by restoring Napoleon to power. On seeing the photographic view inscribed by the prince imperial, Count von Bismarck seemed disposed to attach a little importance to M. Regnier's mission, and explained to him the extremely embarrassing position in which the Prussian government found itself by not having a definite government in France with which to treat. He also expressed his regret that the emperor and his advisers had not accepted his suggestion, and signed a peace on Prussian terms after Sedan; adding, that as the self-constituted government of France also refused to treat on those terms, Germany had no alternative but to continue the war until a disposition was shown to concede the indispensable alteration of frontier.

Later in the day, after the famous conversation with M. Favre, in which the latter refused to yield a " stone of the fortresses or an inch of territory," Bismarck saw M. Regnier again, and the latter expressed his determination to go at once to Metz and Strassburg, to see the commander-in-chief of each place, and to make an agreement that those towns should only be surrendered in the emperor's name. Count von Bismarck's answer was:—Sir,—Fate has already decided; to blind yourselves to that fact is the action not of an indomitable, but of an undecided nature. Nothing can prevent what is from being as it is. Do what you can to bring before us some one with power to treat with us, and you will render a great service to your country. I will give orders for a " general safe-conduct" which will allow of your travelling in all German possessions, and everywhere in the places occupied by our troops. A telegram shall precede you to Metz, which will facilitate your entrance there.

Disguised, and aided by Count von Bismarck's safe-conduct, M. Regnier proceeded to Metz, which he entered on the 23rd of September, and made his way to the presence of Marshal Bazaine, who told him that his position was excellent, and that he had hope of holding out for a long period. Afterwards, however, he changed his tone, and said it would be as much as he could do to keep his ground till October 18, and that only by living on the flesh of the officers' horses. The marshal hailed with evident satisfaction a proposal that he should be allowed a free passage for himself and army, with their colours, artillery, ammunition, &c., through the enemy's lines, on strict parole not to fight against the Germans during the remainder of the campaign; it being moreover understood, first of all, that he and his army would put themselves at the disposal of the Chamber and the imperial government, which would then be, *de facto*, the only legal one.

To explain all this to the empress, and pave the way for a treaty of peace and the return of the emperor, it was arranged that General Bourbaki should leave Metz for Chislehurst; travelling, however, in strict incognito, and not allowing the real object of his mission to transpire. Though one of the bravest of French generals, Bourbaki was little skilled in diplomacy; and as soon as he found himself outside Metz his one feeling was that of regret that he had left it. Meeting a comrade on his way through Belgium, who taunted him with treason in flying from France, he indignantly produced the authorization of Marshal Bazaine,

and in maintaining his military honour exposed the whole intrigue. He presented himself before the empress at Chislehurst, on the understanding that he was there by her orders, and was of course surprised and chagrined to find that he had been made the tool of imperialist manœuvres. Bazaine signed his name under that of the prince imperial on the stereoscopic view of Hastings, as a proof to Count von Bismarck that he had authorized M. Regnier to treat. On the 28th of September, when the latter again saw the German chancellor, he was told that his powers were not sufficiently defined, and that there could be no further communication between them. Nevertheless, Count von Bismarck sent a telegram to Bazaine, asking whether he authorized M. Regnier to treat for the surrender of Metz, and received for answer, "I cannot reply in the affirmative to these questions. I have told M. Regnier that I cannot arrange for the capitulation of the city of Metz." Here the whole scheme of the latter appears to have broken up. He reached Chislehurst on the 4th of October, to find that General Bourbaki had done absolutely nothing in the affair committed to his charge, and that he had left *en route* for Tours to offer his military services to the provisional government. M. Regnier laboured to persuade the empress to persist in endeavouring to re-establish the dynasty. He told her of the fearful misery he had witnessed in the country; village after village entirely deserted, the inhabitants seeking refuge in the woods, and camping there without shelter or knowing where to find food, and that on the approach of winter famine would certainly overtake them, threatening to involve all in destruction. All was, however, in vain. He could not alter the opinions of the imperial exile, who feared that posterity would only see in her yielding a proof of dynastic selfishness; and that dishonour would attach to the name of anyone who should sign a treaty based upon a cession of territory. Thus M. Regnier's scheme, which had been effected with much trouble and danger, ended, and with it the hopes of those who saw in the imperial restoration the only chance of maintaining future order in France.

The failure of the sorties did not much depress the people of Metz. On the contrary, they wished to make common cause with the army, and memorialized the governor to be allowed to garrison the forts while the whole disposable military force made another sortie on a gigantic scale. The expression of this wish they conveyed to him through General Coffinières. At the same time energetic attempts were made to effect a fraternization with the army, and a spirited address, signed by numbers of the citizens and national guards, was circulated in the camps. "We will shed with you," it said, "our last drop of blood; we will share with you our last crust. Let us rise as one man, and victory is ours. Long live our brothers of the army! Long live France, one and indivisible!"

The marshal, however, who had accompanied his men to the hottest part of the fight on the memorable 7th October, and who knew the utter inutility of the fearful sacrifice of life which another sortie must occasion, declined for the present to accede to the citizens' request. He was deterred also by a consideration of the state of his army, which was suffering exceedingly from the exposure of their camps and the privations to which they were subjected. About the 13th, the date of the memorial, there were, of soldiers alone, 23,000 in ambulances and private houses. There was also an enormous increase of sickness amongst the civilians, as might be expected in a place crowded with double the ordinary number of inhabitants; the surplus largely consisting of the poorer class of agricultural labourers, who naturally soon fell ill in a town abounding in hospitals fitted only to be human abattoirs, surrounded by huge camps where all sanitary rules were utterly neglected. It was, indeed, a marvel that Metz was not one huge lazar-house; but except amongst infants and the aged, the death-rate was by no means excessive, and the dead were buried without murmuring.

We have already said that as a fortification Metz might well have been deemed impregnable. It was handed down to the present generation, by Cormontaigne and other great engineers of the last century, as a very strong fortress—strong in its defensive works. The Second Empire added to these a circle of seven very large detached forts at distances of from two and a half to three miles from the centre of the town, so as to secure it from bombardment even with rifled guns, and to transform the whole into a large entrenched camp second to Paris only. With an army, however, of about 180,000 men

added to the usual population of 60,000, and whole villages of country people who had sought shelter behind the forts, it was evident that the stock of provisions, however large, must soon be exhausted, and the terrible alternative of starvation or surrender arise. This moment of grief appeared now to have arrived. Whispered at first, with bated breath, in quiet corners; then talked of amongst twos and threes; then murmured in coteries and cafés; and at last the general commanding the town called the municipal council together and told them that the bread was done, and the city must capitulate. "Capitulate—never! not whilst a boot remains to be eaten," was the response. Measures were now taken to at least postpone it. But they came too late. Not a pastry cook was allowed to bake a bun for luxury, bran was mixed with the flour already existing, and no more white flour was allowed to be made. Other expedients were adopted, and good brown bread was daily to be had. All were placed on rations; if any went out to dinner they had to take with them their own bread; but generally indeed, dining out simply meant a feast of reason, with an interlude of horse flesh. In the early part of October a leg of mutton fetched eight francs the pound. Potatoes rose to one or one and a half franc the pound, and then disappeared altogether. Salad vegetables existed, but the places in which they were kept were very hard to find. Fowls fetched almost any price, and the lucky *avant poste* who could kill a rabbit under the pretext of firing at a Prussian was a wealthy man; forty francs being the least he might expect as a reward for his dexterity, plus the rabbit. Eggs rose to one franc each, and sugar sold at five francs and even at nine francs the pound. Coals there were none, and the supply of gas was almost exhausted when the end came. But the greatest privation was salt; nine francs had been paid for a pound, and he who could give a pinch of it was regarded as a valued friend; for the only absolute suffering arose from the want of it. Horse flesh required some seasoning to make it palatable. All sauces had disappeared, and food was equine in the extreme: horse-flesh soup usually excellent; boiled horse flesh by no means bad, often very good; horse beans as a *legume*, varied by lentils occasionally and a *roti* of horse, often tough beyond mastication—made the unvarying round. Such rations were unsatisfying and far from nutritious, as the animal had generally lived as long as possible, and was only killed to prevent his dying. The army was often worse off than the town, frequently from want of direction rather than of food. The *avant postes* were often forty-eight hours without victuals through the carelessness and neglect of the intendance; and as no additional means of grinding corn had been adopted, grain alone was often served out instead of bread. Of this the soldiers had to make the best use they could, bruising rather than grinding it in coffee mills, and boiling or baking the crushed mass.

The tedium of the siege to the inhabitants was increased at this time by the rather arbitrary suppression of several journals; and a curious feature of the siege was the excessive tenderness of the authorities towards the enemy. One newspaper, the *Indépendant*, was even suppressed for inserting an article severely condemning the Prussian proclamation which described the franc-tireurs as traitors, and threatened them with death whenever captured. The author of the article indignantly protested against the suppression, declined writing again under such liabilities, and threatened that, in a day not far distant, he would once more use his pen "to write history." To refer with any amount of respect to the republic also procured the exclusion of the article—for all articles had now to undergo a preliminary inspection. At length the journals retorted by suppressing anything that came to them from the military authorities, or by refusing to insert any communication with the word "capitulation" in it. Numberless sly hits were made at the marshal, with that adroitness of inuendo in which the French are always so felicitous; and the town swarmed with secretly printed pamphlets, not very complimentary to the powers that were. There was a great scarcity of paper in Metz at the time, and the journals came out in all shades of colour, from the brightest red to the deepest blue. The people, however, considered themselves lucky when they could get anything at all to read; and were equally compelled to be satisfied if they could obtain a meal of horse-flesh and a ration of brown bread.

With such a state of things existing in the town and camp, it was impossible not to see that the end was fast approaching. Other indications were not wanting. From about the 15th October neither besieged nor besiegers fired a shot, and a feeling of

cordiality again grew up between the outposts. The officers bowed to each other, and the men took off their caps in sign of friendship, and talked together. Sorties indeed continued, but their character was wofully changed. Instead of brilliant and impetuous battalions, they consisted first of tens, then forties, fifties, and even hundreds, of wretched, haggard, half-starved deserters. For a time these were received by the Prussians; but on a body of 800 presenting themselves, they were told they must go back and endure their troubles a little longer. Another day, through the driving sleet which flew like a thick mist across the plain, a black mass was descried advancing towards the Prussian lines, which at first was supposed to indicate a last desperate effort, and the alarm was at once given. As the shower passed there stood before the Germans, not soldiers, but thousands of men, women, and children, the civil inhabitants of Metz. The officer at once despatched orderlies in all directions, with orders to the foreposts to allow no individual to pass, and to fire upon any who should persist in the attempt. One man, sent as advance guard of this band, advanced a little too near, and was shot. The unfortunate citizens came to a standstill; but a woman advanced with a white pocket-handkerchief fastened on the point of a stick. The Prussians by this time were keeping up a sharp fire over the heads of this jaded crowd, who took the warning, and in a short time went back to Metz. The female kept advancing, but, on looking round and seeing herself deserted, she also turned and fled.

But if military operations were for a time suspended, diplomacy was not idle. On the 17th of October Marshal Bazaine's aide-de-camp, General Boyer, passed blindfolded through the German military lines to the headquarters of Prince Frederick Charles. On the 18th he went to Versailles and was conducted to Count von Bismarck. His appearance created such a sensation among the French inhabitants, that a guard had to be sent for to keep an open space in front of the count's windows. According to an apparently trustworthy account of their interview, published in the *Debats* in June, 1871, and when there had thus been ample time to obtain correct information, the general, after a few formal remarks, asked Count von Bismarck what were his aims and objects; in a word, what he desired as the result of the war. To this Count von Bismarck replied very frankly, that his policy was most simple; that the French might do as they please, that as for themselves (the Germans) they were sure of Paris, its fall being merely a question of time. "The French took Rome without injuring its monuments; the Germans will do the same with Paris, which is a city of art in which nothing shall be destroyed. I have nothing to say to the various considerations that you lay before me. You tell me that your Metz army is the sole element of order remaining in France, and that it is alone capable of establishing and upholding a government in the country. If this is the case, constitute this government; we will offer no opposition, and we will even render you some assistance. The marshal will repair to some town to be named with his army, and summon the empress thither. In our eyes the sole legal government of the country is still that of the plebiscitum of the 8th of May; it is the only one we recognize. You speak to me of the necessity for putting an end to a war such as this one; but whom am I to treat with? There is no Chamber. I had proposed to let the elections be held on the 2nd of October; the departments occupied by the Prussian troops would have had full liberty in the selection of their deputies. This offer was not taken advantage of. I then suggested the date of the 18th of October, with no better success." Count von Bismarck, entering into another train of ideas, then said with no little warmth, "I cannot say what will befall France, nor what is the future that awaits her; but I do know this, that it will redound to her shame, to her eternal shame in all time, in all ages, and in all tongues, to have abandoned her emperor as she did after Sedan. The stain which she will never wash out is the revolution of the 4th of September." Finally, returning to what was peculiarly the object of the interview, the chancellor repeated that he would offer no opposition to the reconstitution of a government by Marshal Bazaine and his army.

General Boyer stayed two days at Versailles, had two interviews with the count, and then returned to the neighbourhood of Metz, before entering which, however, he visited Wilhelmshöhe. On the 23rd he once more repaired to Versailles. From his statement it appeared that Bazaine was now quite willing to surrender with his army, but the commandant of Metz, General Coffinières, would not consent to give up the fortress. Prince Frederick Charles very naturally objected to take charge of 80,000

or 90,000 soldiers, hampered with the condition of having the same battle to fight for the city, and his answer simply was, "Metz, or nothing at all." Meanwhile, so confident were the German authorities of the early surrender, that a château at Frescati was prepared for the expected negotiations. Morning after morning every eye was turned anxiously in the direction of the town and outworks, until, on the 25th, a flag of truce appeared with a despatch to Prince Frederick Charles, intimating that General Changarnier would wait upon him at twelve o'clock that day.

Marshal Bazaine had received, almost at the same moment, a despatch from General Boyer, and another from Count von Bismarck, in which the latter declined all negotiations save on the basis of unconditional surrender. On receipt of these documents, which destroyed the marshal's hopes and plans, he immediately convoked his council of war. The council decided unanimously, with one exception, that the capitulation was necessary. Almost up to the last moment General Coffinières desired to make another attempt to break through the Prussian investment. By seven o'clock in the evening, however, Bazaine had succeeded in convincing Coffinières that, even if successful, such an attempt would only postpone the capitulation for a few weeks, at a great sacrifice of life; and accordingly a messenger was sent to Prince Frederick Charles, intimating an intention to surrender. This was the first proposition which included both the fortress and the army of Bazaine encamped outside. In expectation of an outbreak on the 24th, Bazaine, whether rightly or wrongly, had fully made up his mind that further sorties were useless, and that Metz must speedily succumb. The Viscount de Valcourt contrived to escape in disguise through the Prussian lines, with a despatch in a hollow tooth, covered with a top dressing of gutta percha. This was addressed to the authorities at Tours, and ran thus:—"I must give up Metz in a day or two. Make peace as soon as you can.—Bazaine, Marshal," &c. On the 25th October the marshal communicated to the council of war that he had received a despatch from General Boyer, stating that the empress would not accept the regency. Bazaine added, that as Bismarck had now refused to separate the fate of the town from that of the army, nothing remained to be done but to endeavour to get the best terms possible, and to accustom both soldier and civilian to the idea of capitulation.

General Cissy was then sent to arrange a meeting between the headquarters of the two armies, and, as we have just stated, General Changarnier subsequently had an interview with Prince Frederick Charles. It was hoped that the veteran soldier of France now sent to negotiate would be able to obtain exceptionally honourable terms for a valiant army, which had held the Prussians in check for three months and a half, after having been beaten by them several times. The prince gave the general an affable and cordial reception, but told him, that as he did not form part of the active army, he could not treat with him regarding the conditions of the capitulation; and that their conversation must be confined to pure and simple details respecting local events. He said, he knew well that Metz had victuals for only three days, and showing Changarnier a train in the railway station crammed with different kinds of provisions, he added: "That is for the city of Metz and for your army, which is in want of everything. We wish to put an end to your suffering!" Changarnier, however, proved to the prince that, although holding no separate command, he was nevertheless officially attached to Bazaine, and was acting in this matter with his authority. He pleaded hard to obtain for the soldiers the privilege of returning to their homes and families; but of course such a request could not be granted, and it is almost surprising that so old and experienced an officer should have thought of making it. At the conclusion of the interview he was almost heartbroken, and said, with a flood of tears, "We shall fall, but with honour. I wish, gentlemen, that neither you nor any brave soldier may ever experience this." Changarnier was then conducted back, as he had been brought, blindfolded, through the Prussian camp, and General Cissy was once more sent to continue the negotiation. He urged that though the army capitulated, that was no reason why Metz should surrender. The prince replied: "Before the declaration of war, we knew as well as you, down to the most minute details, the state of the defences of the town. Then the forts were scarcely sketched out, and the town could only make a feeble resistance. It is since the presence of the French army under its walls that Metz has become what it is. Through your exertions it has been converted into a fortress of the first class, and

must accept, as a consequence, all the conditions of a capitulation which will make no distinction between the town and the army." As no mitigation of the humiliating terms thus seemed possible, submission only remained, and General Jarras, of the marshal's staff, was sent to arrange the clauses of the capitulation.

The discussion of these details was long, obstinate, and often warm, the terms demanded by the Germans appearing to their adversaries extremely and needlessly severe. The evening of the 25th, the whole of the 26th and the 27th, was occupied before the clauses were finally settled. So certain, however, were the Germans of the ultimate issue of whatever negotiations were carried on, that their second corps received marching orders for Paris at noon on the 25th, and was on its way early in the evening. On the 26th the interview became very stormy on the part of the French commissioners. They insisted on the officers retaining their side arms, and it was found necessary to telegraph to the Prussian king at Versailles for specific instructions. The king conceded the privilege in a telegraphic despatch which arrived at three a.m. on the next day. Early on the morning of that day the commissioners again met, there being present General Jarras, Marshal Bazaine's chief of the staff, and Colonel Fay and Major Samuele on the part of General Coffinières, the commandant of the fortress. The German commissioners were Generals Stiehle and Wartensleben. The conference lasted until eight o'clock at night, when a draught was signed for the absolute surrender of Metz and all its fortifications, armaments, stores, and munitions, together with the garrison and the whole of Bazaine's army.

In addition to the leading points of the surrender, the draught stipulated that the French troops should be conducted, without arms, by regiments or regimental corps, in military order, to some place to be afterwards indicated by the Prussians; that the French officers in command of the men should, after their arrival at this place, be at liberty to return to the entrenched camps, or to Metz, on giving their word of honour not to quit either place without an order of permission from the German commandant; that the troops, after surrender, should be marched to bivouac, retaining their personal effects, cooking utensils, &c.; that the French generals, officers, and military employés ranking as commissioned officers, who should engage by written promise not to bear arms against Germany, or to agitate against Prussian interests during the war, should not be made prisoners, but should be permitted to retain their arms, and to keep their personal property, in recognition of the courage displayed by them during the campaign. It was also agreed that all questions of detail, such as might concern the commercial rights of the town of Metz, and the interests and rights of civilians and non-combatants, should be considered and treated subsequently in an appendix to the military paper of capitulation; and that any clause, sentence, or word which might present a doubt as to its exact meaning, should be interpreted in favour of the French people.

The Metz municipal council, wrought up to the highest pitch of excitement by the reticence of the military authorities, went on the 24th to General Coffinières and demanded to be informed how matters stood. The governor told them he had no information to give, either as to the position of affairs in the rest of France or of those more immediately outside Metz; and advised them to apply to the marshal, which they agreed to do. The result of the inquiry confirmed their worst fears, that a capitulation was in course of arrangement. A thrill of rage and consternation passed through the city as the truth flashed upon it. The town council now met daily, and in answer to their persistent demand for a true statement of the situation, General Coffinières, on the morning of the 27th, issued the following official proclamation:—

"Inhabitants of Metz,—It is my duty to faithfully state to you our situation, well persuaded that your manly and courageous souls will rise to the height of this grave occasion. Round us is an army which has never been conquered, which has stood firm before the fire of the foe, and withstood the rudest shocks. This army, interposed between our city and her besiegers, has given us time to put our forts in a complete state of defence, to mount upon our walls more than 600 pieces of cannon, and has held in check an army of more than 200,000 men. Within our walls we have a population full of energy and patriotism, firmly determined to defend itself to the last extremity. I have already informed the municipal council that, notwithstanding the reduction of rations, notwithstanding the perquisitions made by the civil and

military authorities, we have no more food than will serve till to-morrow. Further than this, our brave army, tried already by the fire of the enemy, has lost 42,000 men, after horrible sufferings from the inclemency of the season and privations of every kind. The council of war has proof of these facts, and the marshal commanding in chief has given formal orders, as he had the right, to direct a portion of our provisions for the purposes of the army. With all this, thanks to our economy, we can still resist up to the 30th inst., but then our situation will not be sensibly modified. Never in the annals of military history has a place resisted until its resources have been so completely exhausted as this has, and none has ever been so encumbered with sick and wounded. We are, then, condemned to succumb; but it will be with honour, and when we find ourselves conquered by famine. The enemy, who has so closely invested us for more than seventy days, knows that he has almost attained the end of his efforts. He demands the town and the army, and will not permit the severance of the interests of the one from that of the other. Four or five days' desperate resistance would only place the inhabitants in a worse position. Rest assured that your private interests will be defended with the most lively solicitude. Seek to support stoically this great misfortune, and cherish the firm hope that Metz, this grand and patriotic city, will remain to France.

"F. COFFINIERES,"
"the General, &c.

"METZ, 27*th October*, 1870."

This proclamation, though full of kindly feeling, did not satisfy the people. The old question was asked and re-asked—Why were we not told of the shortness of provisions before? Why were not some means taken to prevent waste? Waste indeed there had been. On the retreat from the battle of Gravelotte, coffee, sugar, and biscuits, to the value of more than 100,000 francs, were burnt because they encumbered the roads. More than seventy carriages, which had been in the morning full of provisions, entered Metz empty. The roadside ditches were choked with boxes of biscuit bearing the English weight, and with the familiar inscription, in large black letters, "Navy biscuit." Soldiers filled their sacks with sugar, which they sold in town, or returned with a sugar loaf on each shoulder as a trophy of the maladministration of the army and the weakness of their generals. "How was it," it was inquired, "that in the early days of the siege officers were allowed to draw their double rations in camp, and then to come into the town and eat and drink as though no allowance had been made them! There were for three-quarters of the time an average of 8000 officers, with double rations for at least fifty days of the blockade, giving a total of 800,000 single rations, and who, meanwhile, fed upon the provisions of the town. All this, if you knew we had not sufficient provisions for a lengthened time, you should have prevented."

There seems to have been some truth in this, but expostulation came too late to serve any good purpose; already upon the walls was the proclamation of Marshal Bazaine, announcing the dreaded event in even plainer terms than that of the commandant. It ran as follows:—

"GENERAL ORDER.—No. 12.

"*To the Army of the Rhine.*

"Conquered by famine, we are compelled to submit to the laws of war by constituting ourselves prisoners. At various epochs in our military history brave troops, commanded by Massena, Klèber, Gouvion St. Cyr, have experienced the same fate, which does not in any way tarnish military honour when, like you, their duty has been so gloriously accomplished to the extremity of human limits.

"All that was loyally possible to be done in order to avoid this end has been attempted, and could not succeed.

"As to renewing a supreme attempt to break through the fortified lines of the enemy, in spite of your gallantry and the sacrifice of thousands of lives, which may still be useful to the country, it would have been unavailing, on account of the armament and of the overwhelming forces which guard and support those lines: a disaster would have been the consequence.

"Let us be dignified in adversity. Let us respect the honourable conventions which have been stipulated, if we wish to be respected as we deserve to be.

"Let us, above all, for the reputation of our army, shun acts of indiscipline, such as the destruction of arms and *matériel*, since, according to military usages, places and armament will be restored to France when peace is signed.

"In leaving the command I make it a duty to express to generals, officers, and soldiers all, my gratitude for their loyal co-operation, their brilliant valour on the battle-field, their resignation in privations, and it is with broken heart that I separate from you.

"The Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief,

"(Signed) BAZAINE."

It is almost impossible to describe the excitement which prevailed when this order was issued. The bewildered citizens ran to and fro in the streets, seeking a leader but finding none. The national guard refused to give up its arms, and assembled in the Place d'Armes. Some few officers of different regiments would have placed themselves at their head, but they were without any plan or point of union, and ran about like ants in an invaded ant-hill. The door leading to the clock-tower was broken in with the butts of muskets; the staircase was carried, and the great alarm bell of Metz was rung for the first time since 1812. The population streamed into the square from all quarters, and the streets were crowded with angry citizens. In the caserne of the engineers, a huge building on the esplanade, a band of officers of artillery and engineers, who had long been discontented with their enforced inactivity, were gathered together, and 8000 officers and men, divided into bodies, hidden in different parts of the town, were ready to put themselves under a general who had promised to lead them; but at the last moment he failed, and consternation and disorder were the result.

Now was exhibited a ridiculous feature of the outbreak. Foolish men crept in, and wise men crept out. An editor of one of the Metz newspapers, who had before achieved glory by entering the ante-chamber of General Coffinières and breaking down the harmless bust of the ex-emperor, preserving the whip with which he had done it as a trophy of his prowess, mounted his horse armed with a revolver, which he fired repeatedly in the air. He was attended by a young lady, the daughter of a gunsmith, who, mounted on one of her father's horses, and armed with one of his pistols, having a pocket handkerchief tied to it, bore aloft her standard, like a second Joan of Arc, through the streets of Metz. Ridicule speedily put an end to the silly movement; but it had the effect of defeating the seriously-entertained design of spiking the guns which yet remained in position, breaking the small arms contained in the arsenal, and finally blowing up the forts. Men were willing to brave death, but they feared being laughed at. The voltigeurs of the imperial guard, accompanied by the half of a regiment of the line, quickly suppressed the disorderly demonstration. The arms of the national guard were taken from them, and the few officers who could fled in sorrow from their last hope. Some of them managed to steal through the gates of the town, and tramped along the muddy road to Grigy, joined here and there by a few stragglers. They crept through the dark wood, but there all hope was lost. At four mètres apart stood the Prussian outposts; to proceed was death, to go back shame. They chose the shame, and the last night they entered Metz was one of weeping and tears.

Once more, and for the last time, the municipal council of the French city of Metz assembled, and, as if ashamed of the childish display of their fellow-townsmen, addressed to them a manifesto as follows:—

"Dear Fellow-citizens,—True courage consists in supporting an evil without those agitations which but serve to aggravate it. Afflicted as we all are by that which has fallen upon us to-day, not one of us can reproach himself with having failed, even for a single day, to do his duty. Let us not present the wretched spectacle of intestine strife, nor furnish any pretext for future violence, or for new and worse misfortunes. The thought that this trial will only be a transient one, and that we have assumed none of the responsibility to the country or to history attached to it, should be in such a moment our consolation. We confide the common security to the wisdom of the population."

This proclamation was signed by the mayor and all the council, but it had no date. The date was, in fact, sufficiently fixed by the circumstances. That black Friday—a day henceforth doubly unlucky in the history of the city of Metz—needed no formal date.

At one o'clock on the 28th it was ordered that the French army should formally lay down its arms within the city. There was no set ceremony, yet the affair was imposing from its very simplicity. Each corps, in order, laid down its arms in the neighbourhood of its own station. The third army corps—that

of Lebœuf—began the movement, and the marshal himself came first, with a scowl upon his swarthy features. He wheeled to one side, and stood by the single Prussian officer whose duty it was to superintend the stacking of the arms. Regiment after regiment, the men defiled past, piling their arms in great heaps at the word of command from their own officers, who gave their parole, and were allowed to retain their swords. Some, however, declined accepting the terms, and preferring to go into captivity in Prussia, laid down their swords as the men did their Chassepots. The disarmed troops then returned into their bivouacs, which they occupied for one night more, before quitting for others round which should stand Prussian sentries.

The weather on the 29th of October was as dismal as the day was a dark one in the history of unhappy France. Thick masses of black clouds rolled overhead, and the rain poured down in torrents as the Frenchmen came forth and rendered themselves to their captors. Prince Frederick Charles, with his staff and officers, had posted themselves behind Jouy, on the Frescati road. Bazaine appeared first of all; he rode at the head of his officers to the prince, to whom he simply said: "Monseigneur, I have the honour to present myself." The prince motioned him to his side, and then began the march of the officers and the army, partly classified according to their arms, partly pell-mell. Those who had a command were on horseback; the others had their arms in the state in which they afterwards laid them down in the town. Each corps, as it marched out, was received by the Prussians covering the respective section of the environment. They were led by their own officers, who formally handed them over to those of Prussia, after which those who had given their parole were at liberty to quit the ranks and return to Metz. The men were then marched out to the bivouac places, where wood for fires had been collected, and a supply of provisions was ready for distribution. The demeanour of the French troops was on the whole becoming, though here and there was evidence of considerable demoralization, the men being in a state of intoxication, and their clothes disarranged in utter disregard of decency. The officers, however, were taciturn and downcast. The reception of the prisoners, in the meadows near the Jouy road, lasted from 1 till 9. The last corps that finished the procession as evening closed in was the finest of all—the grenadiers of the guard, and they, as they parted from their officers, in many instances embraced them, kissing them on both cheeks. Never was seen more quiet, soldier-like demeanour than that exhibited by this splendid body of men as they marched past in perfect silence. Not a word was spoken. All that could be heard was the measured tread of thousands of feet as they splashed along the muddy road. The Prussian officers gazed with surprise and no little admiration, as regiment after regiment filed past, and congratulated themselves that they had no longer to fight such men.

At the same hour that the French commenced leaving the city, a battalion of the seventh army corps marched forward and took possession of La Porte Serpenoise, one of the gates of Metz, and another battalion from the same corps occupied the Porte Moselle. Two hours before the occupation of the fortress, an artillery officer and a small body of under-officers, accompanied by engineers, had been sent forward from each of the occupying detachments, to take over the powder-magazines and the respective forts, and not till they had reported that all was in order were the troops allowed to march in. This precaution was no doubt dictated by a recollection of the catastrophe at Laon. As the party approached the gate their wonderful discipline revealed the secret of their victory. Steady, resolute, unimpassioned, not a sign of exultation was visible on their faces. At a word they scaled the slippery glacis, and ranged themselves with mathematical precision along the rampart's crest. Their officers marched in front, keenly scanning the fosse, and guarding against every possibility of surprise; possession of the town was taken with as much caution as though its occupants had formed the grand guard of an impending battle-field. First the *tête du pont* was passed, the ravelin was reached, and the same minute surveillance was used. Lastly, the town's gate was entered with even greater precaution, and at twenty minutes past one o'clock the first Prussian foot fell within the city of Metz-la-Pucelle. Possession was quietly taken of the Place Moselle, and at four o'clock in the afternoon the battalion marched through the sad and silent streets (in some of which the houses were completely shut up), playing victorious German tunes. They entered the Place d'Armes, where the first object they saw was the black-draped statue of the gallant Marshal Fabert, who, as the inscription on the pedestal recalled, would, "rather than yield up a place intrusted to

him by his sovereign, place in the breach himself, his family, his goods, and all he had, and never hesitate a moment." Four bodies of infantry, whose burnished helmets glistened in the fading light, marched and counter-marched in the square, speedily clearing it of the few idle gazers of the lower classes who had gathered in it.

General von Kummer was appointed provisional German commandant of Metz, and on the day after his entry he issued the following proclamation:—

"The fortress of Metz was occupied yesterday by the Prussian troops, and the undersigned is provisionally commandant of the place. I would wish to maintain among the Prussian troops their known discipline, the liberty of the person, and the security of property. Difficulties may occur at first to the inhabitants before all affairs are properly regulated; but they ought to be brought to me, and I shall know how to appreciate the circumstances under which the difficulties have occurred. If I encounter disobedience or resistance, I shall act with all severity and according to the laws of war; whoever shall place in danger the German troops, or shall cause prejudice by perfidy, will be brought before a council of war; whoever shall act as a spy to the French troops, or shall lodge or give them assistance; whoever shows the roads to the French troops voluntarily; whoever shall kill or wound the German troops, or the persons belonging to their suite; whoever shall destroy the canals, railways, or telegraph wires; whoever shall render the roads impracticable; whoever shall burn munitions and provisions of war; and, lastly, whoever shall take up arms against the German troops, will be punished by death.

"It is also declared that, (1) the houses in which, or from out of which, any one commits acts of hostilities towards the German troops will be used as barracks; (2) no more than ten persons will be allowed to assemble in the streets or public places; (3) the inhabitants must deliver up all arms by four o'clock on Monday, the 31st of October, at the Palais, rue de la Princerie; (4) all windows are to be lighted up during the night in case of an alarm.

"VON KUMMER.

"METZ, *October* 30, 1870."

By the capitulation of Metz a terrible blow, indeed, was inflicted on the French nation. Metz the invincible, Metz which was always French in tongue and race, even when it was a city of the holy Roman empire, Metz which had been incorporated in France for more than three hundred years—indeed, from before the English lost Calais—Metz had fallen, and three marshals of France and a vast army had surrendered with it to the enemy. To the victorious Prussians the Sedan prize of an emperor was of little use. But the great stronghold and the beautiful city that the French loved, along with the very flower and front of the army of France, and a mass of munitions of war, among which were 400 pieces of artillery, 100 mitrailleuses, and 53 eagles—all these formed a trophy which the German armies looked upon as shedding a new brilliancy on their victorious banners. The material gains indeed were past calculation. The strongest fortress in France, surrounded by works so extensive and formidable that the army of Bazaine could take refuge behind them without fear of a direct attack, was now in the hands of the Germans. On French territory they held a place from which all the armies of France, if France had armies, could not drive them. It was easily accessible from their own frontier, connected with North and South Germany by lines of railway, and possessed of it they could, even if they held nothing else, command the north-east of France up to the Argonne. Nor was this all. Metz was an arsenal as well as a fortress; to the guns on its fortifications must be added those which were found inside, as well as a vast machinery ready for the fabrication of arms and munitions of war. The spoils of the greatest army that had ever laid down its arms within historical times were in the hands of the victors. The entire army of the Rhine was armed with the Chassepot, and every weapon, except those which the French soldiers destroyed in their rage and despair, would be available to arm the German levies; while such was the quantity of field artillery, both of guns and mitrailleuses, which now fell into German hands, that it would be in the power of the king of Prnssia to equip a first-rate army with the spoils of a single day. As to Metz itself, the French were, as we have said, intensely proud of their, till now, virgin city—proud of her historical fame, proud of her great strength, proud of her gardens, and bridges, and promenades that made her the queen of the valley of the Moselle. Her cathedral, if less renowned than that of Strassburg, was yet a noble and stately building; and there was this

further point in her favour, when contrasted with Strassburg, that she was a French city, and had never belonged to Germany. It is true that she was once, as a free town, under the protection of the German empire; but then, as now, Metz was French in all her ways and habits, her speech and costume. And in her present days of bitter distress France had never ceased to look towards Metz for some faint gleam of consolation and hope. The sunlight that touched the grey forts of the capital of Lorraine, seemed to shed from thence a vague warmth and light of comfort through the gloom that lay dark over the nation. The hope of France was with Bazaine. Bazaine was to do this and that; the army of the Rhine was suddenly to appear in the rear of the Germans besieging Paris. Wild stories and rumours grew and flourished amid these eager anticipations. Bazaine could get away if he wished. Bazaine was amply provisioned for three months. Bazaine was lying inactive only that he might delude his foes, and strike hard and sharp when the moment came for his co-operation with the nebulous armies which, from over the whole of France, were supposed to be floating like clouds towards him. Nay, Bazaine had already broken through, and was at Thionville. Such were some of the delusions which the French people, following the example of their rulers, had invented for each other to believe.

Long anticipated as it had been, the capitulation of Metz came upon the German army with a strange suddennesss. It had been announced but a day or two before that the negotiations had been definitively closed; and men prepared themselves as they best could for another tedious period of on-waiting, diversified with fighting. It was not till the following proclamation of Prince Frederick Charles was issued, that the men could fully comprehend the extent of the victory their patient courage had achieved:—

"Soldiers of the First and Second Armies,—You have fought and invested in Metz an enemy whom you had vanquished, for seventy days, seventy long days, which have made most of your regiments the richer in fame and honour, and have made none poorer. You allowed no egress to the brave enemy until he would lay down his arms. This has been done. To-day at last this army, still 173,000 men strong, the best in France, consisting of more than five entire army corps, including the imperial guard, with three marshals of France, with more than fifty generals, and above 6000 officers, has capitulated, and with it Metz, never before taken. With this bulwark, which we restore to Germany, innumerable stores of cannons, arms, and war material have fallen to the conqueror. Besides these bloody laurels, you have defeated him by your bravery in the two days' battle at Noisseville and in the engagements round Metz, which are more numerous than the surrounding villages after which you name these combats. I acknowledge your bravery gladly and gratefully, but not it alone. I estimate almost higher your obedience and your composure, cheerfulness, and resignation in enduring difficulties of many kinds. All this distinguishes the good soldier. To-day's great and memorable success was prepared by the battles which we fought before we invested Metz, and—as we should remember in gratitude to him—by the king himself, by the corps then marching with him, and by all those dear comrades who died on the battle-field or through maladies here. All this previously rendered possible the great work which, by God's blessing, you to-day see completed—viz., the collapse of the power of France. The importance of to-day's event is incalculable. You soldiers, who were assembled under my orders for this object, are about to proceed to various destinations. My farewell, therefore, to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the first army and Kummer's division, and a God speed to further successes.

"(Signed) The General of Cavalry,
"FREDERICK CHARLES."

"HEAD-QUARTERS, CORNY BEFORE METZ,
"*October* 27, 1870."

On hearing at Versailles of the fall of Metz, the king of Prussia telegraphed to Queen Augusta as follows:—

"This morning the army of Marshal Bazaine and the fortress of Metz capitulated, with 173,000 prisoners, including 20,000 sick and wounded.

"This afternoon the army and the garrison will lay down their arms.

"This is one of the most important events of the month.

"Providence be thanked!"

There was at the time a general disposition to sneer at his Majesty's way of describing a military

catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude as the "most important event of the month." And yet a very slight effort of memory will show that the language was as strictly warrantable as simple. July had the declaration of war and the arming of Germany; August the triumphs of Woerth and Spichern, of Vionville and Gravelotte; September the capitulation of Napoleon's army at Sedan; and October, ere its close, gave into the hands of the monarch of an united Germany the maiden fortress which in other times Charles Quint beleaguered in vain! On the 28th the king conferred the dignity of field-marshal on the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles; and it was about this time that rumour first began to speak of a restored empire of Germany in the person of the Prussian monarch—a project which was carried into effect not many months later, and to which the extraordinary successes of the war were manifestly leading the thoughts, and probably the desires of the German people.

On the 3rd of November the event was further alluded to in the following order of the day:—

"Soldiers of the Confederate Armies!—When we took the field, three months ago, I expressed my confidence that God would be with our just cause. This confidence has been realized. I recall to you Woerth, Saarbruck, and the bloody battles before Metz, Sedan, Beaumont, and Strassburg—each engagement was a victory for us. You are worthy of glory. You have maintained all the virtues which especially distinguish soldiers. By the capitulation of Metz the last army of the enemy is destroyed. I take advantage of this moment to express my thanks to all of you, from the general to the soldier. Whatever the future may still bring to us, I look forward to it with calmness, because I know that with such soldiers victory cannot fail!

"WILHELM."

That King William did not overrate the importance of the great event of October 27, was abundantly shown by the way in which the news was received throughout France. Her armies might be defeated, her emperor made prisoner, her fortresses of minor rank, or even Strassburg, fall into the hands of the enemy; but that Metz, her virgin and greatest stronghold, should share the same fate, seemed never to have entered the minds of Frenchmen. At Lyons, some persons who repeated the rumour of the capitulation were assaulted and taken to the police station. Several days after the *Journal de Genève* ventured to intimate that Bazaine had surrendered, but the Lyonnais set upon the vendors, tore their papers, and threatened to drown all who should be found reading them; while the copies which had been supplied to the public establishments of the city were publicly burned. In Marseilles, and several other large towns, the news was received with a feeling of grief and depression befitting the greatness of the calamity. Immense crowds of workmen, displaying flags draped in mourning, but crowned with immortelles, marched bareheaded and in silence to the prefectures. When rumours of the capitulation reached Tours, the delegate government were besieged with crowds of excited citizens eager to know the truth, and the following official notice appeared in the *Moniteur* on the evening of the 28th:—

"Grave news, concerning the origin and veracity of which, in spite of my active researches, I have no sort of official information, reach me from all sides. The rumour of the capitulation of Metz circulates. It is good that you should know what the government thinks on the announcement of such a disaster. Such an event could only be the result of a crime, whose authors would deserve to be outlawed. I will keep you informed of what occurs; but be convinced, whatever may happen, that we will not allow ourselves to be cast down even by the most frightful misfortunes. In these days of vile (*scélerates*) capitulations there is one thing that cannot, and must not capitulate, and that is the French Republic.

"LEON GAMBETTA."

As the unwelcome truth was gradually confirmed, those of the French papers formerly published in Paris, but which now appeared at Tours, Poitiers, and Bordeaux, all commented upon the fall of Metz in terms expressive of pungent sorrow, and more or less of indignation. The *Français* referred "with deep grief to this great catastrophe. But before judging and denouncing we feel bound to wait for an explanation of the cruel necessities which induced Marshal Bazaine to take that fatal step, and also for a statement of the clauses of the capitulation. The disaster of

Sedan struck us down; that of Metz overwhelms us. It is now a time to repeat, with supplications and tearful eyes, 'May God protect France!'" The *Gazette de France* recorded the fact "with a broken heart. It is almost impossible to believe that such a thing is possible. What curse is it that weighs upon France? 150,000 men formerly sufficed to gain victories over 400,000 enemies, but now they only serve to hasten the capitulation of a fortress. What a melancholy history is this! Strassburg fell because it had not a sufficient number of defenders, while Metz, in whose walls the enemy's cannon had made no breach, succumbed because it had too many soldiers shut up within its defences."

The fall of Metz was an event so grave as to justify a little caution in making it known to the French nation, in the excited state in which it then was. Anxious, however, to account for the event in such a way as to save the credit of the country, and at the same time, to detract from the triumph of their enemy, the Tours government scrupled not to heap upon the head of Bazaine charges of the vilest treachery. The gallant Uhrich of Strassburg, after having his praises sung throughout France for weeks, was at last accused of treason; and after making a surrender on a far greater scale, Bazaine could never have hoped to escape the same fate. M. de Valcourt, the officer of his staff who had escaped from Metz and arrived at Tours as the bearer of a despatch, drew up a long indictment against his chief, according to which Bazaine never seriously attempted to make an exit from Metz, from the 18th of August, when he was first driven under its walls. With a view to his own aggrandisement, he first of all deeply involved himself in imperialist intrigues, and proposed to the king of Prussia that the army of Metz should, after being neutralized for a time, return to France to "insure the liberty of elections;" his real design being to establish himself as regent during the minority of the prince imperial. But when his majesty declined to listen to any overtures except those of unconditional surrender, and Bazaine became convinced that he could only bring France and the Prussians to adopt the idea of a Bonapartist restoration, by adding to the other misfortunes which were already weighing down the unhappy country that of the capitulation of Metz, then, said M. de Valcourt, the marshal made it his business to hasten it; and to secure his own ambitious ends, delivered to the Prussians the town and fortress of Metz, with the army of 120,000 men encamped in the intrenched *enceinte*.

Unless they could be fully established, charges such as these against a soldier who had served his country with distinction for forty years, came with little grace from the delegate government. There is no doubt that, for at least eight days after the defeat at Gravelotte and retreat to Metz, Bazaine gave way to a culpable inactivity. This time was invaluable to the Germans; it gave them the means of counter-intrenching their army so strongly as to make egress from Metz very difficult, and enabled them to withdraw the three corps forming their new fourth army, to occupy the line of the Meuse, and frustrate the effort of MacMahon to relieve his brother marshal. The latter waited for his coming, and at his supposed approach attempted his one real sortie, that of the 31st of August, which opened the Prussian line eastward of Metz at the time. But this attack was so feebly followed up that at daybreak on the 1st the enemy recovered easily the positions he had lost. Strategically, indeed, it was so ill-directed that for the time its success would have carried Bazaine towards the Sarre, and left the first and second armies between his own and that of MacMahon which he had expected.

As to the later stages of the investment, when we examine the French and the German accounts, and compare with them the narrative already alluded to of Mr. Robinson of the *Manchester Guardian*, who spent the ill-fated seventy days with the army in Metz, we find the most perfect agreement on one point. No sortie after the 1st September ever showed the slightest indication of a real design to break out of the German lines. That of the 7th October, the most important, was conducted on a scale which sufficed to draw the attention of both armies to it, and to convince the French soldiers of the difficulty of the undertaking; but it was plainly not a serious attempt. It is perhaps possible that loyalty to the Empire, the political state of France, and the supposed prospect of an imperialist restoration influenced Bazaine's conduct; chiming in, as it does, with his direct communication with Versailles and Chislehurst, and with all that is known of his movements during the seven weeks in question. With this may possibly have been mixed up the idea, that in case of the tide of the Prussian

success being stayed in some other quarter, France would have been better served by her intact army within the Metz lines than by its disorganized remains, after a long and fiercely contested retreat in open field. To those who witnessed the events transpiring outside, it was clear that in detaining a German army of more than 200,000 men around Metz, Marshal Bazaine was rendering his country a signal service, to the value of which every day added greatly. Thus, had he held out until the French victory of Coulmiers, that is, just fifteen days longer, the Germans must have raised the siege of Paris. The fact of his capitulating at the end of October, was, for France, the most calamitous event of the war; as, just when a gleam of success seemed to dawn on her struggling arms, it released an immense army to sweep down upon her and stifle for ever her newly-born hopes.

That a retreat was very difficult it is extremely easy to see. Of course there would have been a severe sacrifice. But it is doubtful whether this sacrifice would have achieved this just result. It was not only his army which the French marshal must force through the German intrenchments, but all the transport stores and provisions necessary to keep that army in a state fit to march. When we remember that the necessary transport for Bazaine's army would have covered 120 miles of road, if arranged along one road; that this line would have been perpetually assaulted in flank and rear by the German forces; and that no resting-place nor basis of operations offered him a friendly aid—we may well stand aghast at the boldness of the criticisms which have been so frequently indulged in in the siege of Metz. Undoubtedly there was great sickness among the troops, and it is said that one marshal, twenty-four generals, 2140 officers, and 42,350 men had been struck down by the enemy's fire. The statement of Marshal Bazaine, if correct, and there is no reason to doubt it, that when he surrendered he had only 65,000 men available for offensive operations, supplies, when collated with the numbers comprised in the capitulation, at once the strongest condemnation of the soldiery, and an undeniable excuse for their commander's inaction.

A calm investigation of all the circumstances inclines us to believe that Marshal Bazaine was forced to capitulate by the immediate prospect of starvation which threatened both his army and the city. But on the other hand, there is no doubt that the early exhaustion of food was the result of the grossest waste and mismanagement, and that no self-denial or restraint was practised by the French officers, such as might have been expected under the circumstances. Had the Metz supplies been properly husbanded, and every one placed upon rations at an earlier period, the place could have held out for the few days then so inestimably precious to France. But who at the commencement could have foretold this?

CHAPTER XXI.

The Early Days of the Investment of Paris—The National Guards and their New Duties—General Trochu's Plan of Action according to his own Explanation—The German Lines of Investment strengthened and lengthened—Proclamation of M. Gambetta, to raise the Spirits of the People after the fall of Strassburg and Toul—Extraordinary Precautions taken to prevent the Enemy from obtaining access to the City through the Sewers or Subterranean Passages—Surgeon-major Wyatt's Report on the Condition and Prospects of Paris at this time—The Rothschilds serve on the Ramparts—Reconnaissances from the City—Payment of Rent postponed—Demands of the Extreme Republican Gardes Mobiles, especially as to the Election of a Municipal Commune—Exciting Scene at the Hotel de Ville—Speech of Jules Favre—Count von Bismarck and the Diplomatic Corps in Paris—Fruitless Visits of General Burnside to Paris in the hope of securing Peace—The Headquarters of the King of Prussia established in the Palace of Versailles—Description of his Triumphal Entry into the Town—Distribution of the Order of the Iron Cross—The Extensive Preparations being made inside Paris—Firing of the First Shell by the Besiegers—Sortie of the Garrison—Defeat of the French, but Great Improvement observable in their Troops—Burning of the Palace of St. Cloud by the French—Sketch of its History—Proclamation of General Trochu as to the Mobilization of the National Guard—His wish to obtain good Artillery before attempting Sorties on a large scale, and determination to pursue to the end the Plan he had traced out to himself—The System pursued by the Germans in resisting Sorties—The Country around the City very unfavourable for such Operations—The Germans massed in the largest numbers at some distance from the City, so that a Sortie was like "Pressure against a Spring"—All Troops for outpost duty changed every Four Days—Great Sortie from Mont Valerien on October 21—General Description of the Engagement which ensued—Improved Behaviour of the French Troops—General Ducrot and his *parole*—The Germans prepared to raise the Siege if necessary—The Investing Circle widened—Attack on Le Bourget by the French—The Prussians completely surprised, and the French thoroughly successful—Orders of Von Moltke to retake the Village at any cost—Very severe fighting on October 30—Incidents of the Engagement—Complete Victory of the Prussians, who captured 30 officers and 1200 men—The Great Loss amongst the Francs Tireurs—Depressing Influence of the Engagement on the Parisians, and Disturbances in the Capital on receipt of the News of the Fall of Metz—Attack on Felix Pyat for asserting that Bazaine was in treaty for the Surrender of that City—Arrival of M. Thiers in Paris on October 30, confirming the News and bearing Proposals for an Armistice—Riots in the City—The Commune demanded—The Rioters form themselves into a Committee of Public Safety, and arrest the Members of the Provisional Government—Energy of M. Picard on behalf of his Colleagues—The Rioters' Feast and Disgraceful Conduct at the Hotel de Ville—Their Attempts to obtain possession of the Government Offices defeated—Liberation of the Members of the Government without Loss of Life on either side—Proclamation from General Trochu to the National Guard, explaining the real state of affairs—Plebiscite in the City—Enormous Majority in favour of the Government—The hopes of the Germans that the Disturbances in the City would lead to its speedy capture not realized—The Position of the Government much strengthened by the result of the Plebiscite.

In a previous chapter we have described the course of events in Paris up to the time of its final investment by the Germans, and have shown how fully alive the Parisians were to the imminent danger of their capital, and with what earnestness and energy they set about defending it. The last communications received from it by the ordinary channels stated that the authorities were doing their utmost in organizing troops, in manufacturing arms and munitions of war, in strengthening the weak points of their defences, in connecting the outlying forts with chains of earthworks, and in husbanding their commissariat in view of a lengthened siege. The *morale* of the troops engaged during the early days of the investment indicated an undoubted source of weakness. The governor and his generals were therefore unceasing in their efforts to raise the standard of discipline; and by accustoming the soldiery to the military duties of the ramparts, to the manning of the forts, to meet the exigencies of the outposts, and to occasional reconnaissances of the enemy's position, laboured to familiarize them with the perils of actual warfare. This latter phase of General Trochu's duties was a most important task. The Parisian national guards formed a large part of the army of defence. Thousands of those, before the outbreak of the war, were indolent and pleasure-loving, the *petits crevés* of the boulevards, inveterate loungers, "who would have thought it preposterous to rise at nine, and would have been horrified at getting their feet wet." The hardships and fatigues of the siege were weighty matters to such luxurious citizens, although they passed their twenty-four hours' duty, often in the cold and rain, without a murmur. Each division of the national guard did duty by rotation on the ramparts, when it was the object of every one to make himself as cheerful and as comfortable as possible. Besides his usual accoutrements he provided himself with a store of personal comforts, by which, amid the vivacious conversation of his comrades, the duty was lightened, and often regarded more as a pleasure than a necessity. During the chilly nights, however, the

uncomfortable arrangements of their tents awakened the guards to tantalizing recollections of their warm cafés and comfortable beds, and rendered welcome the sound of the *réveille*, at which they turned out in the most fantastic costumes, smoked their cigarettes, drank their morning coffee, greeted with cheers the relieving company, and then marched to their quarters in the city.

Of the real business of a siege, however, the Parisians for some time remained ignorant. The main body of the armed defenders of the city had hardly seen a German soldier. Even the garrison of the forts, the regular troops, and the *élite* of the provincial mobiles, who were stationed permanently without the *enceinte*, knew as yet but very little of their assailants.

A dangerous feature of the case, according to the statement made by General Trochu in the National Assembly in June, 1871, was that, in the quota of National Guards returned by certain quarters of the capital, there were some 6000 revolutionists, and 25,000 returned convicts, whose influence was often felt during the siege, and told with terrible effect after the capitulation.

General Trochu, in conjunction with General Ducrot, had formed a plan for encountering the invasion, which was at once intelligent and bold, and under more favourable conditions would most probably have insured success. It was not, however, as generally supposed at the time, founded upon the principle of making Paris the great centre and rallying point of national resistance; of detaining the Germans around its walls until formidable armies organized throughout the country should move to the relief of the capital, and, by co-operating with the armed masses inside, should compel the invaders to raise the siege. The project, as subsequently explained by General Trochu before the National Assembly, was rather to utilize the forces under his command, to break through the enemy's lines at a point the least expected, to force a passage to Rouen, there to establish a base of operations, and provision Paris by the Lower Seine. Unlike the majority of his countrymen, General Trochu did not depend on the assistance of the army of the Loire, which he knew could render none. A hastily got up and undisciplined army, such as that was, could never prevail in the field against a regular organized force. The general wished that the army of the Loire should confine itself to amusing the enemy, by defending to the best of its power such towns as might be attacked, while he was preparing his troops and field artillery for active operations. Circumstances, however, did not favour the development of the scheme, which was never seriously attempted, as will be seen in succeeding chapters.

It is, perhaps, not a matter of surprise that no important sorties were attempted in the early days of the siege, although the red republican party in the capital were inclined to clamour for more offensive proceedings against the enemy. The disciplinary operations above alluded to were, however, continued with vigour, until the ramparts bristled with artillery, and a constant fire was kept up which interfered in a considerable degree with the works of the besiegers, who on their side were most active in securing their positions around the capital, until their lines of investment began to assume formidable proportions. The outer circle formed a huge chain of nearly seventy miles, the inner line extending over fifty; and day by day their grasp of the beleaguered city became more tight and rigid. As soon as it was seen that Paris would make a stubborn resistance, the invaders applied themselves to strengthen their communications, increase their forces, and accumulate stores and supplies for a regular siege. In this work they were very greatly assisted by the surrender of Toul on the 23rd, and the fall of Strassburg on the 28th of September, which gave them a line of railway and main road of communication. These facilities were immediately taken advantage of for the transport of heavy siege guns and munitions of war, while detachments were told off to keep open the communications, and flying columns organized to collect provisions and other necessaries. The German army, in fact, took the place of the population of Paris. The fertile country within a radius of some thirty miles from the capital, which in time of peace supplied the inhabitants with a large percentage of their daily food, now yielded its supplies to the invader, usually on payment, sometimes on compulsion. The whole region had become an immense camp of armed men, and with some degree of complacency a German writer avowed himself unable to guess how, after the departure of the German troops, the population of what was once the richest and most luxurious district of Europe would find subsistence in a region which would be as devoid of provisions as

the Desert of Sahara. While collecting supplies, the foraging parties served at the same time as a sort of observing force, intended to baffle any attempt to disturb the operations of the besiegers.

The great extent and immense strength of the fortifications, of which we have treated fully in a previous chapter, presented obstacles to the approach of the besiegers which would have deterred a less resolute enemy. On reconnoitring the neighbourhood of St. Denis, to the north of the capital, where four distinct and formidable fortresses formed a square, the Germans found that it would have to be reduced by a regular siege before Paris could be touched. The west side, between Mont Valerien and St. Denis, was the next point selected as most vulnerable. Between these two great fortresses there is a space of seven miles, partly protected by the river Seine, which, after skirting Paris on the west, runs midway between them. To fill up this gap the French had been hastily constructing a redoubt at Gennevilliers, half-way betwixt Valerien and St. Denis. This, however, like other projected defences, was so incomplete when the siege commenced that it had to be abandoned. Again, the east side of Paris, as being the most exposed, was fortified with almost superfluous precaution, with a number of detached forts lying close together, and enfilading the approaches to each other, at Aubervilliers, Romainville, Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent, with Vincennes and Charenton on the south. This rendered attack very difficult, although the Germans diverted the water of the Ourcq Canal in order to strengthen the position of the Prussian guards. Due south the same system of forts was kept up by Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, and Vanves. The Germans therefore resolved on attacking the south-west side. A concentration of forces accordingly took place around Versailles, and their first attentions were paid to Fort Issy. When, however, the commandant was summoned to capitulate, he replied that he would not, "as long as breath remained in his body." Shortly after the commencement of the siege the villages of Sèvres and St. Cloud were occupied by the enemy, who erected batteries opposite the Bois de Boulogne. The terraces of Meudon, the heights about St. Cloud, and the works at Montretout, were also all occupied by the German artillery. Thus the beginning of October found Paris so completely blockaded that its only means of communication with the outer world was by carrier pigeons or balloons, which sometimes fell into the hands of the Prussians.

The discovery that the difficulties of the siege would be greater than had at first been anticipated, did not for one moment deter the German commanders from facing them. Their unshaken confidence was the more remarkable, when it is remembered that General Trochu had 500,000 men under his command, half of whom were employed as the garrison of Paris, and the remainder formed into two armies intended for operations outside.

A momentary gloom was cast over Paris by the the surrender of Toul and Strassburg—especially Strassburg, the defence of which the Parisians had followed with intense interest. Their demeanour, however, was quiet and diguified, and the minister of the Interior issued a stirring and patriotic proclamation, which did much to raise the spirits of both soldiers and people. "Citizens," wrote M. Gambetta, "the increasing strokes of bad fortune can no longer disconcert your minds nor lower your courage. You wait for France, but you depend upon yourselves—ready for all things. Toul and Strassburg have just succumbed. During fifty days these two heroic cities have been exposed to veritable showers of bullets and shells. In want of ammunition and of provisions, they still defied the enemy. They have only capitulated after having seen their walls crumble under the fire of the assailants. In falling they have cast a look towards Paris, to declare once more the unity and integrity of *La Patrie.* The indivisibility of the republic devolves on us the duty of delivering them, with the honour of avenging them. *Vive la France! Vive la Republique!*" General Trochu likewise issued a short but re-assuring proclamation to the troops. The elections for a National Assembly were further deferred till, as was said, they could be freely held throughout the entire country.

As yet there had been no military demonstrations of an important character, but great activity prevailed within the capital. A peculiar feature of the defence was the armed vigilance of the *égoutiers*, employed in the main sewers of the capital. These labourers were placed on guard lest the enemy should attempt to debouch from the outlets of those subterranean passages on the banks of the Seine, into the very heart of Paris.

The engineers also fortified the interior both of the sewers and aqueducts, while they blocked up the shafts entering the catacombs and underground quarries, and walled up every gallery that might give access from the outside to the inside of the circle of defences.

Besides the various journalists, whose communications furnished much valuable information respecting the daily progress of events, Surgeon-major Wyatt, of the Coldstream Guards, who had arrived a day or two before the final investment, on a mission from the British government to observe and report on matters of sanitary hygiene and military surgery in connection with the French medical staff, reported very favourably on the condition of Paris with respect to provisions. During the first weeks of the siege he expressed a firm conviction that the capture of the fortresses would prove a very difficult undertaking. "The zealous patriotism of all ranks," he said, "is remarkable, and no exceptions are asked for, the Rothschilds taking their turn of duty on the ramparts, equally with all the other citizens, as privates in the garde mobile. The Prussians have now certainly lost all chance of success by assault, for delay has rendered the place almost impregnable."

The forts continued to throw shells into the enemy's works, and reconnaissances were made in several directions—a party from the Fort de Noisy dislodging the Prussians from a post at Bondy. A series of such movements was continued in conjunction with the fire of the forts, but generally with little result beyond disturbing the operations of the enemy. For instance, in front of Fort de Nogent, three companies of mobiles and a detachment of spahis drove back the advanced posts of the Prussians, but falling into an ambush, were compelled to retire after placing some twenty men *hors de combat*. Reconnoitring parties were also despatched towards Clamart and Creteil, Malmaison and Gennevilliers, and on the route of the Lyons railway; but on each occasion they were driven back, the Germans having been seasonably reinforced.

Decrees were published by the government postponing the payment of the Michaelmas quarter's rent, and ordering the reproduction, in bronze, of the statue of the city of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde. On the 3rd of October General Giulham, killed in the engagement of the 30th September, was buried with military honours, when General Trochu briefly addressed the troops. In the afternoon of this day some 10,000 armed national guards, under the command of M. Gustave Flourens, marched to the headquarters, and demanded of the government that the levy *en masse* of the entire nation should be decreed; that an immediate appeal should be made to republican Europe; that all suspected government functionaries, in a position to betray the republic, should be discharged; and that a municipal commune should be speedily elected, through which distribution should be made of all articles of subsistence existing in the capital. Once again during the week Flourens headed five battalions of national guards at the Hotel de Ville, demanding to be armed with Chassepots, which it was not in the power of the government to supply. A day or two later a still more serious demonstration was made, organized by the central republican committee, in conjunction with citizens Ledru Rollin, Felix Pyat, Blanqui, Delescluze, and Flourens, at the Hotel de Ville, with the view of forcing the government to consent to the immediate election of a municipal commune. Many thousands of people assembled, including a considerable number of national guards; and in front of the open windows of the Hotel de Ville, where several members of the government were seated, shouts of *Vive la Commune* were raised. The only response to this appeal was the display of an armed battalion of national guards drawn up in line in front of the building, behind which numerous companies of gardes mobiles, with fixed bayonets, were posted. Some delegates were eventually admitted, who were told by M. Jules Ferry that the government would not entertain their demand. Gradually the crowd had enormously increased, when General Trochu appeared, and rode unattended round three sides of the Place, assailed with cries of *La Commune! La Commune!* uttered in a menacing tone, to which, however, he made no response. The gates of the Hotel de Ville were closed, and the *rappel* beaten, which brought other armed national guards on the scene, prepared to support the government. The commander-in-chief of the national guards rode from group to group, haranguing the more violent among the crowd, but to no purpose. They demanded, and would have, the commune of Paris; and not until the place became completely occupied by national guards who were friendly to the

provisional government, and pronounced emphatically against the election of the commune, were the agitators quieted. At this moment the members of the government appeared on the scene, and passed the national guards drawn up in line in review. The warm reception they met with from these citizen soldiers, and the great majority of the people massed around the three sides of the Place, furnished a convincing proof that the demands made by the more violent demagogues were entirely out of favour with nine-tenths of the Parisians. Shouts of *Vive la France! Vive la Republique! Vive le Gouvernement! Pas de Commune!* arose on all sides, and were prolonged until the members of the government retired in front of the entrance to the Hotel de Ville. There M. Jules Favre made an eloquent speech to the officers of the national guard, congratulating them upon the attitude of their corps and the union that had been shown to prevail, and urging them not to harbour any feelings of animosity in reference to what had transpired that day. "We have no enemies," said he; "I do not think we can call them adversaries. They have been led astray, but let us bring them back by means of our patriotism." Such demonstrations oft-repeated during the siege were a source of constant embarrassment to the authorities, who, however, generally pursued a conciliatory course, combined with firmness sufficient to prevent an actual outbreak.

As before stated, diplomatic agents of various states determined to remain in Paris during the siege. But difficulties speedily arose. In the first place, a request in their name by M. Jules Favre that Count von Bismarck should give a week's notice before opening the bombardment, and that there should be a weekly courier for the passage of despatches to their respective governments, was refused, though permission was granted for the passage of open letters expressing no opinion on the subject of the war. Against this, however, the diplomatists protested, in a document signed by the papal nuncio, the ministers of Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Honduras and Salvador, the Netherlands, Brazil, Portugal, the United States, Monaco and San-Marino, Hawaii, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Peru. But the German chancellor was inexorable. After reminding them of his previous warning that diplomatic intercourse must be subordinate to military exigencies, he further said:—"The present French authorities have thought proper to fix the seat of their government within the fortifications of Paris, and to select that city and its suburbs as the theatre of war. If members of the diplomatic body, accredited to the former government, have decided to share with the government of the national defence the privations inseparable from residence in a beleaguered fortress, the responsibility for this does not rest with the Prussian government."

Several journeys, to and from the besieged capital, which the German authorities permitted the American General Burnside to make at this time, naturally excited considerable attention, but their significance was in many quarters over-estimated. The first visit had exclusive reference to the diplomatists just alluded to; but General Burnside had at no time any official authority. It was simply from yielding to a generous impulse, that he endeavoured, without any commission, to effect some conciliatory arrangement between the hostile parties. All the communications he carried to the Provisional Government from the Germans related to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, and an indemnity of £80,000,000, which it was hinted at this early stage of the siege Count von Bismarck also demanded. These terms the French government would not listen to, and his visits thus led to no diplomatic result.

Outside the city the besiegers continued very active. On the 5th of October the king of Prussia left Meaux for his future headquarters in the old palace at Versailles, and was met near that place by the Crown Prince, attended by General von Blumenthal and a portion of his staff. The inhabitants of the town also turned out in considerable numbers to see King William establish himself in the heart of France, and re-occupy the historical palace of their kings. The streets were lined with German troops; and awaiting his arrival were General von Kirchbach, General von Voigts-Rhetz, commandant of the city, and their staff, the duke of Coburg, the duke of Augustenburg, two dukes of Würtemburg, the Prince Hereditary of Würtemburg, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, the Prince Hereditary of Mecklenburg Strelitz, with their officers in waiting.

At half past five in the afternoon the king, accompanied by the Crown Prince, arrived in an open carriage, amid the vehement cheers of the officers

and troops, and the triumphal sound of drums and trumpets. Count von Bismarck and General von Moltke had been looked for with scarcely less eagerness, but neither the one nor the other was recognized by the crowds of soldiers or citizens, and they passed unobserved to their quarters.

Nothing could have brought home more vividly to the French nation the true nature of the crisis, than this undisturbed possession of Versailles by the Germans. On the day following the entry of the king, he and his generals paraded the grounds amid the cheers of the invading army. The German colours waved over the palace, wounded Germans were tended in the hospitals of the town, and a little later the ceremony was gone through of distributing the order of the Iron Cross to the German soldiers who had distinguished themselves in the campaign. The order of merit was distributed by the Crown Prince, who referred in glowing terms to the acts of heroism which had entitled the recipients to the honour.

Inside Paris the spirit of the people was now thoroughly roused. The iron-masters of the city were turning out immense siege guns and batteries of field artillery and mitrailleuses, while the women were making a million cartridges daily. General Trochu was likewise rapidly arming the immense levies called to the defence of the capital. He had already upwards of 200,000 breechloading rifles, more than sufficient for his regulars and the mobiles; while M. Dorian was busily engaged in manufacturing similar weapons for the national guards.

On the 11th of October the first shells were fired from the besiegers' works, one of which lodged in Fort Ivry, and called forth a tremendous reply from the southern line of forts, which was taken up by the entire series of batteries. Owing to this incident, probably, and to the agitation of the Socialistic section of the populace for more active efforts, the garrison made a second sortie on the 13th of October. The attacking force, consisting of General Blanchard's division, issued from the French lines in three columns, against the besiegers' works on the heights of Clamart, Châtillon, and Bagneux, southward of the city. To clear the way for the troops the guns of Montrouge, Issy, and Vanves opened a heavy fire in the early morning, and the brigade of General Lusbielle attacked with considerable intrepidity the barricaded villages in their front. After a severe hand-to-hand contest the enemy was dislodged and driven out of his advanced positions; the French, elated by this success, somewhat recklessly exposed themselves, and Prussian reinforcements having arrived on the ground, they were forced to fall back with considerable loss, including the *chef de bataillon*, Count Dampierre. In this action, however, the besieged showed great improvement in the manner of handling and serving the field-guns, as well as in the manœuvring of their troops. The guns of the forts commanded the ground occupied by the Germans, and it is clear from the fact of their subsequently demanding an armistice to take away their dead, that their loss was heavy, including some fifty prisoners.

Nor was this action the only notable event of the day. The French regarded with a jealous eye the occupation of St. Cloud by the Prussians, who used it as an outpost, and had previously poured a heavy fire in the supposed direction of their works. The Duke Max of Würtemburg had also been wounded there by a French tirailleur. To prevent the château being turned to account by the enemy, the guns of Mont Valerien now opened fire upon the palace, and struck it with shell after shell. Speedily a sheet of flame shot upwards from it, as the batteries of Mortemart and Issy joined those of Mont Valerien; and a few hours sufficed to render the elegant château a smouldering ruin. The village of St. Cloud was also made a desolation by the French guns. The history of St. Cloud is peculiarly interesting. As early as 533, some sailors, intrusted with a little child for the purpose of its destruction, deposited it on the banks of the Seine in order to save its life. Thus providentially preserved, Clodoald became a monk, and founded a monastery, whence the district derived its name of St. Cloud. Being one of the prettiest environs of Paris, it was always a favourite summer residence, and the old French kings often stayed there. The village was burnt by the English in 1358; and it was there that Henri III. was assassinated in 1589. In 1658 Louis XIV. presented the place to his brother, the duke of Orleans, in whose family it remained for more than a century, when it again became a royal residence. It was at St. Cloud where Napoleon Bonaparte discussed and settled the arrangements which made him master of France, and it afterwards became his favourite residence. After witnessing various other historic evolutions, it fell into the

possession of Napoleon III., who with the Empress Eugenie were its frequent occupants, and it was from it that the emperor started on the disastrous campaign of 1870.

On the 16th October General Trochu issued a proclamation to the mayors of Paris concerning the mobilization of the national guards. From this document he appears to have taken an exact measure both of the exigencies of his position and of his resources for meeting them. After referring to the difficulties and delays which had taken place in the matter, and the "very animated and legitimately impatient patriotism" of the public mind, he said:—"It is my duty to enlighten it while resisting its enthusiasm, and to prove to it that no one has more than I at heart the honour of the national guard of Paris, and the care of the great interests which will be at stake the day that that guard carries its efforts beyond the *enceinte*. When I undertook the defence of Paris, with the co-operation of devoted fellow-workers whose names will one day be remembered by the public gratitude, I had to face a sentiment vastly different from the one I am now discussing. It was believed and asserted that a city like our capital, governed by such various interests, passions, and requirements, was incapable of being defended. It was hard to believe that its *enceinte* and its forts, constructed in other times and under very different military circumstances to those which prevail at present, could be prepared in such a manner as to offer, unsupported by an army operating from without, a serious and durable resistance to the efforts of a victorious enemy. Still less was it admitted that the inhabitants could reconcile themselves to the sacrifices of every kind, to the habits of resignation, which a siege of any duration implies. Now that this great trial has been made, that is to say, that the placing of the city in a state of defence has reached a degree of perfection which renders the *enceinte* unassailable, the outer fortifications being at a great distance; now that the inhabitants have manifested their patriotism, and of their own accord reduced to silence the small number of men whose culpable views subserved the enemy's projects; now that the enemy himself, halting before these formidable defensive preparations, has confined himself to surrounding them with his masses, without venturing upon an attack, the public mind has changed, and shows now but one preoccupation—the desire to throw out in turn masses of soldiers beyond the *enceinte* and to attack the Prussian army. The government of the national defence cannot but encourage this enthusiasm of the population, but it belongs to the commander-in-chief to direct it, because with this right are connected, for him, unlimited responsibilities. In this respect it is necessary to be guided solely by the rules of the general experience of war, and by those of the special experience which we owe to the painful events that have overwhelmed the army of the Rhine. These rules demonstrate that no infantry, however steady it may be, can be safely brought face to face with the Prussian army unless it be accompanied by an artillery equal to that which the enemy has at his disposal; and it is to the formation of this artillery that I am applying all my attention. In the next place, our percussion guns are excellent arms behind a rampart, where there is no need to fire quickly. But troops who with such arms engage others provided with rapidly-firing rifles, would expose themselves to a disaster that neither bravery nor moral superiority could avert. As regards the appeal made to the patriotism of the companies destined for outside service, the government cannot address itself exclusively to the battalions provided with rapidly-firing arms; hence the absolute necessity for a friendly exchange of arms, effected by the mayor of each arrondissement, so that the volunteers destined for war service shall be armed with the best rifles of their battalion."

After giving directions for recruiting and equipping the mobilized battalions, and intimating that the battalions taking the field would be placed exclusively under the orders of generals commanding the active divisions of the army, and subject to military laws and regulations, the document concluded as follows:—

"In the month of July last the French army, in all the splendour of its strength, passed through Paris amid shouts of *à Berlin! à Berlin!* I was far from sharing their confidence, and alone, perhaps, among all the general officers, I ventured to tell the marshal-minister of War that I perceived in this noisy manner of entering upon a campaign, as well as in the means brought into requisition, the elements of a great disaster. The will which at this period I placed in the hands of M. Ducloux, a notary of Paris, will one day testify to the painful and too well-grounded presentiments with which my soul was filled. To-day, in presence of the

fever which has rightly taken possession of the public mind, I meet with difficulties which present a most striking analogy with those that showed themselves in the past. I now declare that, impressed with the most complete faith in a return of fortune, which will be due to the great work of resistance summed up in the siege of Paris, I will not cede to the pressure of the public impatience. Animating myself with the sense of the duties which are common to us all, and of the responsibilities which no one shares with me, I shall pursue to the end the plan which I have traced out without revealing it; and I only demand of the population of Paris, in exchange for my efforts, the continuance of that confidence with which it has hitherto honoured me."

On the 21st of October occurred a vigorous sortie in the direction of Malmaison; and as it was made under almost exactly similar conditions to those of Chevilly and Châtillon, previously narrated, it may be as well to notice the system of investment by which the Germans so successfully resisted these repeated attacks.

It must be observed that the country around Paris was not favourable for making sorties on a large scale. The first difficulty was the river. It was impossible to lay the bridges without the movement being observed by the enemy, and to march a large force across pontoons required a considerable time. Again, on those sides of Paris which are most open to attack—those not naturally guarded by the Seine—the defences are so close together as not to leave sufficient room for the manœuvring of troops. A third obstacle existed in the natural formation of the ground, which is hilly and broken, except in close proximity to the river; and in the immense number of villages, hamlets, and detached houses existing in all directions.

The Germans did not form a fixed or continuous line round Paris, but were massed in the villages and hamlets; and the further behind the advanced posts the more numerous were the troops. The besieging army surrounded the city in three concentric zones. In the inner belt were the outposts and the rifle-pits, where the advanced guards were sheltered; behind these were the infantry of the army corps, with a large proportion of the horse, and a smaller division of artillery; and outside of all, the great mass of the field batteries, supported by the reserves of the infantry and cavalry. The pickets and advanced posts were generally within easy communication with each other, their supports, and the regiments from which they were drawn, being placed as near as circumstances would permit; but all the heavy bodies of men were massed at a considerable distance from the front. In consequence of this arrangement, any sortie in force sufficed to drive in the outposts; but, as has been well remarked by an English writer, it was like pressure exerted against a spring. The Germans had to retire to a distance proportionate to the pressure. But as they retired they gathered strength, until at last, the momentum and impetus of the opposing force being overcome, the spring expanded, and the French were driven back within shelter of the forts.

To the comfort of the men occupied in the dangerous and arduous work of the German outposts every attention was paid. Great care was taken that they should be well and warmly clothed, and the very best provision obtainable was supplied them by the commissariat. Those at Versailles lived in comparative security and luxury; and all regiments and detachments were therefore changed every four days, so that the entire army might share the privileges as well as the privations incidental to their position.

The preparations for the sortie of the 21st were made with great discretion and secrecy, and it was the nearest approach to a surprise by the French that had yet occurred. The attacking force was under the command of General Ducrot, who massed his troops in the rear of forts Mont Valerien and Issy. On the night of the 20th a feint was directed against the southern front of the investing lines, and on the morning of the 21st Mont Valerien opened a heavy fire on the supposed positions of the enemy. Shortly afterwards General Ducrot led out some 12,000 men, well supported by artillery, and a strong force in reserve. The alarm was soon taken at Versailles, and the troops were immediately called to arms and thrown towards the front, while the boom of the guns could already be heard in the distance. The king of Prussia, with his staff, hastened towards St. Germains, and in company with the Crown Prince watched the proceedings from the top of the aqueduct of Marly, which commanded a fine view of the scene of battle.

The French made a spirited advance under cover of their guns, throwing out long lines of

skirmishers to ascertain the situation of the enemy. The attack was directed against the high ground in front of La Celle, St. Cloud, and the strong position which the Prussians had taken up at Bougival. The French were well led by their officers, who could be seen at the head of their regiments waving their swords and encouraging the men. The most vigorous attack was made upon the heights of Berene; but it made no impression upon the Prussians, who had fallen back into the woods, from which they could not be driven. As the French advanced across the open they caught sight of the spiked helmets of the enemy, who, commanded by General Kirchbach, were stationed along the vine-clad ridges in front of La Jonchère, awaiting the attack. The French were constantly strengthened from their reserves, and threw forward a battery of their field artillery, which incessantly shelled the woods in their front; but the Prussians held their ground, and their assailants appeared to contemplate a dash at them. The fire of the needle-guns, however, was rapid and constant from the cover; and although Ducrot gallantly rode in front of his troops, and a couple of guns were detached from the foremost batteries to fire on the German position, the French could not be induced to advance across the open ground. The critical moment had now arrived; reinforcements appeared in the rear of the Germans, and speedily some battalions of the landwehr of the guard, headed by their skirmishers, caused the French to falter, and eventually to give way, leaving their two advanced guns to fall into the hands of the enemy, while four battalions of zouaves narrowly escaped capture. The Germans then pushed forward, and among the vines a fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which bayonets were crossed and a heavy fire of musketry maintained for a considerable time. The French were ultimately forced to retire, but their retreat was covered by reinforcements which arrived, and prevented the further approach of the enemy. The Prussians, however, had held their ground; and from that circumstance, coupled with the fact of their having, as before stated, taken two guns and above a hundred prisoners, they considered their success complete. The official list of killed, wounded, and missing on the French side was given at 443, while the German loss was estimated at 380. In this action the French behaved well; but the force engaged was insufficient to effect any important practical purpose, and led to little more than the casualties mentioned.

It may here be stated that General Ducrot, who commanded on this occasion, and whose services throughout the siege of Paris were highly valued by General Trochu, was especially obnoxious to the Germans, who officially accused him of having broken his *parole* after the catastrophe at Sedan, and of having returned to Paris to take a high command in the army. But in a letter to the governor, which was forwarded to the German headquarters, he indignantly denied the charge of a breach of honour, and showed that he had escaped the Prussian sentries disguised as a workman, after he had surrendered himself prisoner at the appointed rendezvous. "The German press," replied the general, "doubtless inspired by competent authorities, accuses me of having made my escape while a prisoner on parole, of having committed a breach of honour, and of thus having placed myself outside the pale of the law, and thereby of having given to an enemy the right to shoot me, should I again fall into his hands. I heed the threat but little. Whether I am shot by Prussian bullets on the field of battle, or when leaving a prison, the result is always the same. I am conscious of having done my duty to the last, both as a soldier and a citizen, and failing other inheritance, I shall leave to my children a memory honoured by all good men, both friends and enemies." That his version was substantially correct was shown by the subsequent withdrawal of the charges by the Germans.

The operations of the besieged which have been detailed produced one result which might have been serious for the Germans, had not the backward state of General Trochu's immense levies prevented him from making more effective diversions. The investing circle, although not broken through, was widened, and the guns of the forts swept the country in every direction to an extent so considerable as to render an actual attack by the besieging army very difficult. It is also probable that at this period the investing army was at its lowest point in numbers judged by the German strategists to be safe, and the result of the sortie of the 21st was awaited with considerable anxiety. In the event of a reverse the Germans, ever prepared for eventualities, had arranged for the immediate removal of their headquarters, and even for the raising of the siege of Paris, had it

transpired that the immense forces of General Trochu were strong enough to break through their lines, and defeat them in the open field. The practical failure of these first sorties from the capital, however, tended to render the Germans confident of ultimate success, and from this time the belief was general that no assault would be necessary. They considered that they held Paris as in a trap, as in the case of Sedan, and that little else was required than to starve it into surrender.

The month of October, however, did not pass without another sortie, which was of the most sanguinary character, although again resulting in no practical advantage to the French. The hamlet of Le Bourget, situated on a small rivulet that runs into the Seine on the north-eastern side of Paris, lay in the middle of a considerable plain midway between the French and Prussian outposts. The rivulet had been dammed up by the enemy, and the country flooded. The village was occupied by a company of Prussian guards to prevent its being used for offensive purposes against them. The attack on it on October 28 was planned with great secrecy by General Bellemare, who ordered Commander Rolland, of the "Franc-tireurs of the Press," to make a night assault, supported by a part of the thirty-fourth regiment and the fourteenth battalion of the mobiles of the Seine. Taken by surprise, and not knowing the strength of the attacking force, the Prussians gave way, and retired in disorder, leaving knapsacks and helmets behind. The French continued their advance on the village. As the Prussians made a show of defending the church, with the design of taking them in flank the supports were ordered up, and several guns and a mitrailleuse were thrown forward, while a couple of heavy guns were posted in front of Courneuve. On this the Prussians were compelled to retreat, and on the arrival of General Bellemare at eleven o'clock the French were in complete possession of the village. Orders were then given to strengthen the position; provisions were brought up; the sixteenth mobiles and twenty-eighth regiment of the line appeared to relieve and support their successful comrades; and engineers and sappers worked unremittingly in making communications, crenellating houses, and erecting barricades. The loss of the French amounted to some twenty wounded and four or five killed, while the Prussians appear to have suffered considerably. The capture of Le Bourget, said General Bellemare's report, "enlarges the circle of our occupation beyond the forts, gives confidence to our troops, and increases the supply of vegetables for the Parisian population."

The Prussians, however, were not disposed to bear their defeat with indifference. Throughout the 29th they battered the village with their artillery, and at one time a deadly combat raged between the outposts of the combatants, in which the bayonet was freely used.

The result of the attack had been at once communicated to the German headquarters, and Count von Moltke issued orders to the general commanding the second division of guards to retake the place at any cost—an order which they were not slow to obey. General Budritzki, early on the morning of the 30th, in turn surprised the French with seven battalions of guards, and a bloody fight ensued, in which the Prussians displayed great exasperation of feeling, but were met with most obstinate resistance. The French having barricaded the streets, and made the most of every available means of defence, it required a desperate effort to force them out of their stronghold. At the moment when the fight was at the hottest, and the Prussians appeared in danger of getting the worst of it, General Budritzki rode to the front of the Elizabeth regiment on their advance, and, dismounting, seized the standard in order to lead them to the storm. With heavy sacrifices a firm foot was at last planted in the village. The Queen Augusta regiment had also reached Le Bourget. A detachment was about to advance, when the colonel, Count Waldersee, who had so far recovered from a wound at Gravelotte that he rejoined his regiment ten days previously, was struck by a ball which killed him on the spot. An officer was hastening to catch the falling leader in his arms when he too was shot. Colonel Zaluskowski of the Elizabeth regiment, and Count von Keller, were also killed. These losses appear to have roused the vengeful feelings of the Germans, and shouting fiercely, they made an irresistible onslaught, and swept the French out of the village at the point of the bayonet, to within a short distance of St. Denis; and so closely pursued them, that some 30 officers and 1200 men were captured, including a whole company of mobiles, stationed to the north of Le Bourget, who had not fired a shot. The franc-tireurs were so cut up that, out of 380 men, only 150 remained;

and being all Parisians, their fate caused great mourning to their friends in the city, who had lately rejoiced at their success. The fourteenth mobiles also suffered fearfully. Out of a strength of 800 men, 200 only answered the roll call after the retreat. The Prussians also paid dearly for their victory, for besides those whose names have been already mentioned, the Augusta and Elizabeth regiments lost at least 30 officers killed and wounded, and upwards of 400 men. Gallantly as the French acted in this affair, it was altogether an unfortunate mistake, undertaken without the authority of General Trochu, and executed without any of that forethought and pre-arrangement which were necessary in order to turn the temporary advantage to account. Supposing it had been desirable to leave a small French force in so advanced a position as Le Bourget, it should have been solidly supported.

The result of the engagement had a very depressing influence upon the Parisians, and coupled with the unexpected news of another and far more serious disaster, caused considerable disturbances in the capital. On the 26th October a paper published in Paris by the notorious communist Felix Pyat, announced that Bazaine had been negotiating with the Prussians for the surrender of Metz. On the 27th the *Journal Officiel* contained a very emphatic contradiction, which read strangely enough in the light of subsequent events. After arraigning the "odious lines" before the tribunal of public opinion, the official organ said, "The author of these malignant calumnies has not dared to sign his name; he has signed *Le Combat* —surely, the *combat* of Prussia against France; for in lieu of a bullet which could reach the heart of the country, he levels against its defenders a double accusation equally false and infamous. He asserts that the government deceives the public by concealing from it important news, and that the glorious soldier of Metz is disgracing his sword and turning traitor. We give these two figments the most emphatic contradiction. Officially brought under the notice of a court-martial, they would expose their inventor to the most severe punishment. We think the sentence of public opinion will prove more effectual. It will stigmatize with just severity those sham patriots whose trade it is to sow distrust with the enemy at our gates, and undermine by their lies the authority of those who fight him." The punishment of Felix Pyat, however, was not left entirely to public opinion; for on the afternoon of the same day, the 27th, he was mobbed and hustled on the boulevards, and ran a narrow risk of falling a victim to the indignation of the crowd. On the following day his office was invaded by national guards, who, abusing him for vending false news, hauled him to the Hotel de Ville before M. Jules Ferry and M. Henri Rochefort, who, after hearing what he had to say for himself, dismissed him with the assurance that he must have been hoaxed.

As has been related, however, in the previous chapter, the "hoax" was an accomplished fact at the moment when M. Pyat was being mobbed in Paris for hinting at its possibility—a fact which, much as the Parisians might be indisposed to believe it, was soon forced upon them by evidence that could not be gainsaid. On the 30th of October M. Thiers arrived in Paris with a safe-conduct, confirming the surrender of Bazaine and the fall of Metz, and bringing proposals of an armistice by England, Russia, Austria, and Italy, with the view of arranging for the convocation of a National Assembly. These proposals, as we have seen in Chapter XVII., led to no result, owing to the French insisting on the victualling of Paris as a condition of the armistice.

Thus a three-fold humiliation was inflicted upon the Parisians. In the affair at Le Bourget they were robbed of the first success, small enough in itself, which had attended the military operations of the siege; by the fall of Metz the last barrier was removed to the full outpouring upon their capital of all the warlike resources of Germany; and to add to their mortification, their rulers were actually willing to treat for an armistice with the victors. It is therefore little surprising that the temper of the revolutionary section of Paris was inflamed, and their rage indiscriminating. Bazaine was at Wilhelmshöhe, beyond their reach, but the government of defence was at hand, and daring to suggest terms of agreement with the Prussians. *Jamais! A l'ennemi! La guerre à la mort! A bas les traitres!* cried the infuriated populace; and by noon on the last day of October the Place de l'Hotel de Ville and its approaches were densely crowded by an excited mass from all parts of Paris, demanding the resignation of the government and the election of the commune. In the crowd were many national guards, armed and unarmed, including a considerable number from

the neighbourhood of Belleville and other communist quarters, some of whom carried placards inscribed "No peace!" or "No armistice!" and "The commune for ever!" General Trochu, Jules Simon, and others, attempted at intervals to address the insurgents, but their voices were drowned by shouts of *Pas d'armistice! Guerre à outrance!* During the tumult a shot was fired by an individual in the crowd, when immediately a tremendous uproar ensued, accompanied with cries that the citizens were being fired upon. Some of the mob, calling themselves a delegation from the people, a number of ultra-democrats, having previously assembled in the hall of St. John, forced their way into the Hotel de Ville, and in an insolent and threatening manner demanded explanations from the government on the Bourget affair, the capitulation of Metz, and the proposed armistice. This self-styled delegation brought with them the following decree:—"In the name of the people, the provisional government of national defence is dissolved. The armistice is refused. The election to the commune will take place within forty-eight hours. The provisional committee is composed of the members whose names are affixed. The delegation will signify the purport of this decree to the members of the former government, who remain always confined 'to the hall of their deliberations.'"

The delegation was received, in the first instance, by M. Jules Ferry, speedily joined by General Trochu and Jules Favre. Respecting Le Bourget, General Trochu stated the facts which have just been detailed. As to the capitulation of Metz, he assured the delegates on oath that the government knew nothing of it, and disbelieved it on the morning of the 26th, when it was announced in the *Combat*. With regard to the obnoxious armistice, he assured them that nothing was decided, nor would be, without first consulting the popular wishes. The latter part of his discourse was drowned by tumultuous cries of "Down with the government!" "No armistice!" "The commune!" A scene of indescribable confusion followed; all the ill-disposed battalions of the national guard surrounded the Hotel de Ville. Hundreds of them, following the delegation, and headed by M. Flourens, forced their way into the apartment where the government were deliberating, and proceeded to form themselves into a committee of public safety. Flourens, mounting the table at which the government were sitting, intimated to them that they were under arrest. General Trochu and his colleagues, who in the critical circumstances acted with calmness and dignity, were called upon to sign their resignation, and otherwise grossly insulted. A little later a red flag was hoisted from one of the windows of the Hotel de Ville, and in the balcony underneath appeared MM. Blanqui, Flourens, Ledru Rollin, Pyat, Mottu, Greppo, Delescluze, Victor Hugo, and Louis Blanc, who proclaimed themselves the government, and that M. Dorian had been nominated president, which post, however, the minister of Public Works prudently declined. The announcement was received with loud applause by the revolutionary section below, and the name of M. Rochefort was added to the list.

But the success of the commune on this occasion was short-lived. M. Ernest Picard had succeeded in making his escape from the Hotel de Ville, and hastened to the ministry of Finance, where he took the speediest possible measures to counteract the movements of the revolutionists, and release his colleagues from their hands. He wrote to the staff of the governor and the staff of the national guard, ordering the call to arms to be made in all the quarters of Paris. He had the national printing office occupied by troops, and prohibited the *Official Journal* from printing anything not sanctioned by the governor. He also sent word to the different ministries to hold themselves ready for defence. In these conservative measures he was assisted by the characteristic doings of the revolutionary party themselves, who, instead of immediately securing the various ministries, fell upon the provisions stored in the Hotel de Ville, devouring the dinner prepared for the government, distributing the other viands, and broaching innumerable casks of wine, of which they freely partook. They then set about amusing themselves by destroying the furniture, breaking the mirrors, and injuring the pictures in the palace, and defiling the sofas and the painted walls and wainscots. One of their partizans, however, did not forget the "sinews of war." A messenger from the Hotel de Ville was sent to the ministry of Finance, with an order signed by Blanqui for 15,000,000 francs, payable to bearer, who was, however, immediately arrested, while M. Picard retained possession of the order, as proof of Blanqui's participation in the events of the day. Another communist, Citizen

Millière, thinking to steal a march on his colleagues, left them at the dinner table and went to instal himself as minister of Finance, but he, too, was checkmated and missed his aim. An officer of Blanqui's battalion, who repaired to the *état major* of the national guard to give orders, was also placed under arrest. The prefecture of police was surrounded by 300 or 400 persons demanding admission, but M. Adam, the prefect, resolutely refused to yield to their demands.

After having lasted several hours, the tumult was rapidly suppressed. A meeting of officers was held at the Bourse, the assembly was sounded, and Admirals de la Roucière and De la Chaille placed themselves at the service of M. Picard, who throughout the disturbance acted with a coolness and presence of mind worthy of the highest commendation. At nine o'clock he arrived at the Hotel de Ville with the 106th battalion of the national guards, who immediately ascended the staircase, forced their way through the commune guard, and having released General Trochu and M. Jules Favre, compelled the insurgents to lay down their arms and quit the building. The governor, as soon as liberated, proceeded to the Louvre, and being joined by M. Picard, General Ducrot, and other officers, organized active measures for the restoration of order, and the deliverance of his colleagues who still remained in the hands of M. Flourens and his party. Under Trochu's orders several battalions of mobiles quickly assembled, and the national guard at the same time collected in the Place Vendôme. Just before midnight parties of these troops defiled in the direction of the Hotel de Ville, where MM. Garnier Pages, Jules Simon, and Magnin were still kept in confinement as hostages by two battalions from Belleville. M. Jules Favre had shown great firmness with the rioters, telling them that, as he had been chosen by the whole population, he would only retire at the bidding of his constituents. The agitators who surrounded Flourens demanded that the members of the government should be sent to Vincennes; some made even more menacing proposals. About half-past twelve seven battalions of mobile guards concentrated behind the Hotel de Ville, where those from Belleville had barricaded themselves. A company of the mobiles now succeeded in effecting an entrance by a subterranean passage from an adjoining barracks, and proceeded to open one of the large gates, by which they admitted a goodly number of their comrades, who gradually drove back the rioters to the upper stories. At the same time numerous battalions of the national guard arrived on the spot, shouting, "Long live the Republic! Long live Trochu!" The mobiles, once masters of the Hotel de Ville, shut the rioters up in the cellars, from which they subsequently brought them out, disarmed them, and set them at liberty. Their leaders were also treated with great leniency, and freely allowed to depart, although the Citizen Blanqui subsequently complained of rough usage at the hands of the troops. The mairies of the first and eleventh arrondissements had been taken possession of by the rioters. The former was occupied by a Dr. Pillot, who was ejected at two o'clock on the following morning by the commander of the eleventh battalion of national guards, and carried off in custody to the hotel of General Trochu. The other mairie was seized by the ex-mayor, Citizen Mottu, who had been dismissed a week or two before for forbidding all kinds of religious instruction at the schools in his district, and even interdicting the masters and mistresses from taking their pupils to church. He was, however, apprised of the order given for his arrest, and thought it prudent to decamp in the course of the night. At three a.m. all was quiet. The movement was merely a surprise, and the national guard, by their behaviour in the course of the evening, showed that it met with no sympathy from them. The riot might have been suppressed much sooner, but for the wish to avoid bloodshed; and happily the proceedings of the 31st of October, as well as those of the 4th of September, terminated without loss of life on either side.

On the following day General Trochu issued the subjoined proclamation to the national guards:—

"Your firm attitude has preserved the republic from a great political humiliation, possibly from a great social danger, certainly from the ruin of our forces for the defence. The disaster of Metz, foreseen though it was, but deeply to be lamented, has very naturally disturbed the public mind, and doubled the anguish of the public. In connection with that sad event the government of the national defence has been insulted by the supposition that it was aware of it, but kept it concealed from the population of Paris, when, I affirm it, we only heard of it for the first time on the evening of the 30th. It is true that the rumour was circulated by the

Prussian outposts for the two days previous, but we are so used to false statements of the enemy, that we had refused to believe it. The painful accident which happened at Le Bourget, through a force which had surprised the enemy allowing itself to be surprised in its turn by its utter want of vigilance, had also deeply affected public opinion. Finally, the proposal for an armistice unexpectedly proposed by the neutral powers has been construed, in utter disregard of truth and justice, as the prelude to a capitulation, when in reality it is a tribute to the attitude and firmness of the population of Paris. That proposal was honourable for us. The government itself arranged its conditions in terms which it considered firm and dignified; it stipulated a suspension of hostilities for twenty-five days at least, the revictualling of Paris during that period, and the right of voting for the election of a National Assembly for every citizen in all the French departments. There was a wide difference between these conditions and those previously offered by the enemy—to wit, 48 hours' truce, very limited intercourse with the provinces to prepare the elections, no revictualling, a fortress to be given up by way of guarantee, and the exclusion of the citizens of Alsace and Lorraine from any participation in the elections. The armistice now proposed has other advantages to recommend it which Paris can fully appreciate, without its being necessary to enumerate them; and this is what is reproached to the government as a weakness, nay, rank treason. An insignificant minority, which cannot pretend to represent the feelings of the population of Paris, has availed itself of the public excitement to try and substitute itself by violence in the place of the government. The government, on the other hand, is anxious to have protected interests which no government ever had the duty of watching over simultaneously—the interests of a besieged city of two millions of souls, the interests of absolutely unlimited liberty. You have co-operated in the discharge of that duty, and the support you have afforded the government will for the future give it strength to put down our enemies from within, as well as to oppose our enemies without."

After the above episode in the history of the siege, the conduct of the government of national defence became somewhat dubious and vacillating. Early on the morning of the 1st of November the walls of Paris were found covered with a notice, signed by MM. Arago, Dorian, Schoelcher, and other officials, apprising the inhabitants that they were to elect on that day four representatives in each arrondissement. An ambiguous notice, intended as a disavowal of the one signed by the mayor and the minister of Public Works, appeared later in the day; and later still, fresh intimations were posted up all over Paris, intimating that the people would have an opportunity afforded them of saying whether they desired the commune or not. Again, on the 2nd November, the *Journal Officiel* published a decree, to the effect that, on the day following, they would be called upon to vote Yes or No, whether they wished to maintain the government of national defence, and that on Saturday the elections of the mayors and adjoints of the different arrondissements would be proceeded with. Decrees were also published revoking the commands of numerous *chefs de bataillons* of national guards, including that of M. Flourens, compromised in the proceedings of the 31st; and announcing that any battalion going out armed without superior orders would be forthwith disarmed and dissolved, and the commander brought before a court-martial. By these proceedings the position of M. Rochefort in the government of national defence was rendered untenable, and his resignation was forthwith announced, avowedly in consequence of the postponement of the municipal elections.

Notwithstanding that the plebiscite was ordered immediately after the tumult caused by the communists, the actual voting took place amidst the utmost order and quietude. The machinery for the working of the ballot in France is simple and complete, and very easily put into operation. The 3rd of November, therefore, passed off much as any ordinary day; the only difference observable being some small crowds collected in front of the various mairies and other places where the votes had been appointed to be taken. In the evening it was commonly known that the government had obtained an enormous majority; and at ten o'clock a proclamation of the result, so far as then ascertained, was made by torchlight, on the Place de l'Hotel de Ville, by M. Etienne Arago, the mayor, in presence of an immense assemblage, composed principally of national guards. The crowd next proceeded to the hotel of General Trochu, and with enthusiastic cheers saluted the members of the government who were there assembled. They, in

turn, all made their appearance on the steps of the entrance doorway, from which General Trochu and M. Jules Favre addressed short speeches to the populace, thanking them for the confidence they had shown in them by that day's voting. On the following morning the official announcement of the result of the plebiscitum showed that 321,373 had voted Yes, against 53,585 No. The voting of the army, which was not included in the above, was subsequently published, with the following results: 236,623 Yes, against 9053 No; giving a general total of 557,996 Yes, against 62,618 No, being as nearly as possible at the rate of nine to one. By order of the government, in the course of the day about a dozen of the leaders in the proceedings of the 31st were arrested, amongst them Citizen Felix Pyat, who was at once conducted to the Conciergerie. Citizens Flourens and Blanqui succeeded in concealing themselves. A decree appeared in the *Journal Officiel* appointing General Clement Thomas commander-in-chief of the national guard, in place of General Tamisier, who had been severely injured in the tumult of the 31st.

The news of the proceedings which have just been related reached the besiegers in an exaggerated and distorted form, and raised their expectations of a speedy capture of the city. Internal discord had from the first been reckoned upon by Count von Bismarck as a powerful ally; and it may therefore be easily understood that the intelligence of the outbreak after the surrender of Metz was received with great satisfaction, which was, however, followed by disappointment when the actual truth came to be known.

To the great bulk of the French community this futile attempt at open rebellion brought a positive relief. The fact of its utter failure secured them to a certain extent against the efforts of the disaffected, and by means of the plebiscite afforded an opportunity of placing General Trochu and his colleagues more firmly in their seats. Backed by the universal suffrages of the citizens, the provisional government had now real claims to general respect, and was enabled to proclaim that henceforth it would not permit "a minority to attack the rights of the majority, and by defying the laws, to become the effective allies of Prussia."

CHAPTER XXII.

The Provisional Government at Tours and the Fall of Metz—Imprudent Proclamation charging Marshal Bazaine with Treason—Bad Feeling caused by it in the Army—Protest of the *Moniteur* against the Proclamation and its Reasons for the "betrayal" of France—Reception of the News of the Capitulation in other parts of France—General Feeling in the North that it was useless to attempt to continue the Struggle after such a Disaster, and Efforts made there to bring about Peace—The Actual Position of Affairs at this Time—Patriotic Addresses and Promises of Resistance from other parts of France—Strange Proceedings of the "League of the South"—Divisions, and Distrust of the Republic in many Quarters—The Energetic Exertions of M. Gambetta—The Capitulation of Metz most fortunate for the Germans—Improvement in the French Troops and slight Successes on their Side—The German Commander arranges for raising the Siege of Paris if necessary—Capture of Dijon by Von Werder—The German Mistake as to the Strength of the French Army of the Loire—Hesitation of its Commander—The Actual Condition of that Army at this time—Its strange medley of Uniforms and Arms—Qualifications of General d'Aurelles de Paladine for its Command—His Strict Discipline and its Beneficial Results—He resolves to attempt to annihilate the Bavarian Force in and around Orleans—Repulse of a Bavarian Reconnoitring Party on November 6—The French prepare to assume the Offensive—Retreat of Von der Tann from Orleans—The Battle of Coulmiers—General Description of the Engagement—Fierceness of the German resistance at Baccon—They are at last compelled to retreat and leave the French Masters of the Field—General Review of the Engagement and its Results—Energetic Measures of Von Moltke to prevent the expected March of the French on Paris—M. Gambetta visits the French Camp and issues a Proclamation of Thanks to the Troops—The Mistake of the French in not following up their Victory—General Paladine's Reasons for refusing to Advance—Temporary Alarm of the German Headquarters—The Operations in the North of France under General Manteuffel—Capture of Verdun after a Prolonged and Determined Resistance—Bombardment and Capitulation of Thionville and La Fère—The Germans advance to Amiens—Great Battle near the City on November 27—Defeat of the French after a most Obstinate Struggle—Retreat of the French from Amiens and the Entry of the Germans—Vain Attempt to defend the City by the Commandant of the Citadel.

On receipt of intelligence of the fall of Metz, the Provisional Government at Tours seem to have been lost in rage and humiliation. Assuming that Metz could have held out, and that Bazaine had betrayed it to the enemy, they issued an imprudent proclamation, declaring that he had "committed treason," had made himself the accomplice of the "man of Sedan," had been guilty of a "crime beyond the reach even of the chastisements of justice;" and that the "army of France, deprived of its national character, had unknowingly become the instrument of a reign of servitude." So great was the irritation created among officers by this proclamation, that on the following day the Tours government issued another to the effect, that the soldiers were "deceived, not dishonoured;" that "those who called them accomplices were calumniators;" that "their brothers of the army of the Rhine have already protested against the cowardly attempt, and have withdrawn their hands with horror from the accursed capitulation"—which, considering they were not asked to sign, but only to submit to it, and did submit, was not very intelligible. Altogether, the conduct of this government at Tours was not fitted to reassure the public. M. Gambetta and his companions, in fact, forgot at the time that they occupied the position of ministers of France, and that language and behaviour which might be pardonable in a demagogue holding no office, and without any feeling of responsibility, were inexcusable in the leaders of a great nation. It would seem, indeed, as if the government were eager to accuse, lest they should themselves be accused. It was of them that France had a right to demand why, during their six weeks' tenure of power, nothing whatever had been done or attempted to relieve Metz. They had allowed the enemy to go where they liked outside Paris, and to besiege and capture such towns as seemed best to them. Not a single victory or success of importance had the republic yet obtained; and fearing lest it should be asked of them why Metz had been allowed to fall unaided, after a siege of ten weeks, the government apparently hastened to throw the blame upon the generals who commanded. Their accusation succeeded with the mass, whose favourite cry was ever treachery, but it lost them much of the respect and confidence of intelligent France.

The effect of the proclamation on the army was pernicious. The serious difficulties which the several commanders had to encounter in maintaining discipline, proved that the soldiers were not so well disposed to obey and confide in their chiefs that the minister of War could afford thus to inspire them with mistrust. Admiral Fourichon refused to sign the proclamation. A triumvirate of three civilians it was that brought the accusation against

Bazaine—the soldier who had fought the battles most honourable to France during the campaign, who gave breathing time to Paris to fortify itself, who had occupied 250,000 of the enemy's troops for two months and a half, who had held out until forced by famine to surrender—and that accusation was recklessly urged without inquiry and without knowledge. The army was indignant that no efforts, no bravery, no sacrifices were accounted of in the moment of a reverse, and that the men who were trumpeted as heroes one day should be denounced as traitors the next. The *Moniteur*, without mentioning the proclamation itself, indignantly protested against this cry of "treason" being raised upon the occasion of every misfortune. We have been betrayed, indeed, it said, but not as the multitude imply, by one or more individuals, who have sold us to the enemy for some pieces of money, but by the incapacity and carelessness of most of those who have exercised an influence upon the success of the war, either in declaring it, or preparing for it, or conducting it. The sovereign first was betrayed, a little by the reports of his ambassadors and marshals, much by his own blindness, his obstinacy before the hostilities had commenced, and his indecision afterwards. The generals have been betrayed by their incapacity, and by the disorganization of the administration, and by the negligence of their subordinates. The inferior officers have been betrayed by the vices of an organization, which doubtless it was not their place to reform; but they have been betrayed also by their too great confidence, by the insufficiency of their military knowledge and preparatory studies. The soldiers, in their turn, have been betrayed by the bad tactics of their chiefs; but they have betrayed themselves frequently by their insubordination and undiscipline. Let us examine and correct ourselves, and we shall be no longer betrayed.

Throughout the country the news of the fall of Metz was variously received, and to many Frenchmen, chiefly in the northern departments, it appeared hopeless to continue the war after so terrible a misfortune, following on the crushing blows that had descended on the nation. Almost the last regular army of any importance which France possessed had been handed over to the enemy, with weapons and munitions of war that could not easily be replaced. Of the fighting men who remained the majority were raw troops, hastily raised, imperfectly drilled and armed, whom it seemed vain, as well as cruel, to send against the tried and successful warriors of Prussia; and many who had been hopeful till then now cried for peace. Winter was approaching, which would tell, indeed, against the invader, but would also aggravate the sufferings of the poorer classes of Frenchmen. The harvest had been bad, the fields in many places cut up by the struggles of embattled hosts; trade and commerce were almost destroyed; rinderpest was spreading with alarming rapidity among the cattle; and the requisitions of the Germans became more onerous every day. In the north of France, where this feeling of apprehension especially prevailed, an appeal to the members of the provincial councils was circulated in favour of peace. This document stated that, as the ministry had postponed the elections till the retreat of the enemy, while Prussia would only conclude peace with a government empowered by the nation; and that as these conflicting views might prolong the war, it behoved men of influence, such as those composing the councils, to meet, and send a petition or deputation to the government, urging the importance of taking immediate steps to enable the nation to declare either for peace, or for the continuation of the war, if the Prussian conditions should be deemed unacceptable. "One must place justice higher even than patriotism," the circular proceeded, "and must confess that it was France which, badly influenced, declared war against Prussia, and that, had the fortune of war been so favourable to it that its armies had penetrated to Berlin, it would scarcely have made peace except on a rectification of frontier at the expense of Germany. France, therefore, should not deem it unreasonable if Prussia to-day makes the same demand, as long as it restricts it within reasonable limits. They will not be humbled who submit to a peace, but rather those senseless people who, in their mad pride and presumptuous patriotism, approved the war, and contributed to its being declared."

The tone of several of the northern papers was in somewhat similar strain. The *Courrier du Havre* exclaimed: "Peace! That is the cry which at this moment millions of voices raise in all quarters of the earth, as well as in down-trodden France; in Germany, intoxicated with unexpected triumph, in intelligent England, in practical America, in far-sighted Russia, in loyal Spain, and in Italy,

where war is still fresh in people's recollection. Everywhere this cry is raised to the Almighty, and seeks to make heaven gracious, seeing that the leaders of the peoples are without mercy." The *Journal de Fécamp*, commenting on this article, said: "Yes; conquered and humbled France desires and demands peace. All resistance is for the future unavailing. It will only add new hecatombs of a million of corpses to the million of corpses mouldering on the fields of Wissembourg, Reichshofen, Jaumont, and Sedan. We are conquered, scattered, as a nation has never been before. Let us cease to delude ourselves with new hopes, and to calculate on an impossible resistance. We are honourably conquered. Our army, which is no more, has made heroic exertions. It has even won the respect of the victor. Honour is saved. We are conquered. Let us humble ourselves. Let us assume the dignity of misfortune. Silent and modest, let us submit. Peace, peace alone, which is everywhere demanded by all France, can save the country's future, by its men and resources being spared. In view of the country's misfortune, we must at this hour have the courage to bow our necks, and sue for peace."

Looking to the heroic efforts subsequently put forth by Frenchmen on the Loire, or even by those in the northern departments themselves, such language appears craven and unpatriotic; but a calm review of the situation at this time could hardly fail to excite the most anxious fear for the future of France. The war had been begun with 400,000 men, ready for service, with some 1200 field-pieces, and with two first-class fortresses on the frontier to support the operations: 100,000 men killed and wounded had fallen, and 300,000 were prisoners. The 1200 field guns had nearly all been captured, and the fortresses had surrendered; the emperor and his imperial guard were in the enemy's hands, the most experienced officers wounded or prisoners; and would France, with a third of its territory occupied, be able with raw levies to turn the tide which had swept away its veteran army? The loss of men sustained by the Germans in actual fighting was not greater than that of the French, while the balance of prisoners was enormously in their favour. It would be next to a miracle if the raw levies of France could chase away the invader, or even long hold him in check.

In spite, however, of such discouraging prospects, from almost every part of France except the north addresses were sent to Tours, assuring the government of support, and declaring that the population were ready to die rather than surrender, or accept a dishonourable peace. At Marseilles the body styling itself the League of the South issued a manifesto; concluding with a decree that, in all the departments which have adhered to the League, all citizens must hold themselves in readiness to quit their homes at the first summons, and to march under the standards of the republic against Prussian and monarchical despotism. "The point of rendezvous for the national forces will be the city of Valence and the surrounding plains. The delegates of the co-operating departments are designated as general commissioners of the League of the South. They will traverse the departments to preach a holy war, to call together republican committees in the various localities, and to act in concert with them in order to effect, by all possible means, a general uprising." The expense of equipping the forces of the League was to be met by public subscription, and the general commissioners were to arrange with the republicans of each department for the election of cantonal delegates, who should attend the general assembly of the League of the South at Marseilles, on November 5. The document concluded by saying, that "In the name of the republic, one and indivisible, the members of municipal and administrative bodies owe the most energetic assistance, as citizens, to the members of the League of the South, created for the defence of the republic, and to their representatives. Done at Marseilles, October, 1870."

It would have been better for France had these southern republicans seen, that the safety of their country at this painful crisis depended not so much upon the promulgation of the republic, as upon unity of co-operation with the government of "National Defence," and the sinking of all political predilections until the common enemy had been overthrown. M. Gambetta himself, however, had set the example of so mixing up republicanism with his measures for national defence that, of the two, he frequently appeared to be holding up rather the banner of the revolution than that of France; which led one of the most influential papers, referring to his proclamation after the surrender of Metz, to remark, "It is the republic, one and indivisible, that must be greeted before

everything. One and indivisible! And how are you to avoid the division of the territory when you scatter broadcast divisions in hearts and minds, by charging with treason all those who do not bow the knee before you, or who destroy, even unintentionally, your calculations and your lies?" The article went on to observe that, while Gambetta was stigmatizing Bazaine as a traitor, a Marseilles club was condemning Gambetta as a scoundrel. "How," it was asked, "could any new form of government be permanently established in the midst of such revolting confusion? or what chance existed of the struggle being effectively carried on against the invasion?" A French clerical paper, the *Union*, also speaking of the sarcasm implied in the words "one and indivisible," when compared with the distracted state of the country, said that "at this moment it would be betraying our country not to tell the truth. Every day which is passing is only deepening the abyss into which we are plunged. Resistance to the enemy is weak; the Prussian flood is still rising, and anarchy is extending its ravages more and more. There are two governments, one at Paris, the other at Tours. The investment of the capital renders concert impossible, and the official bulletin is exposed to registering contradictory decisions. There exists at Marseilles a revolutionary power, which is self-constituted, and oppresses a noble city; Lyons has again become a free town in this sense, that as the violent administration of that great city only breathes demagogic ardour, it is free from everything which restrained it. In almost all our departments there is a tendency among the prefects to obey Paris or Tours as little as possible. The country is on the way to being covered with governments, and all this being developed alongside the Prussian invasion. These are frightful complications which have no name in political language."

There was a great deal of truth in all this, though it is difficult to say that any one in particular was responsible for the state of semi-anarchy that prevailed. In fact, when it is considered that France had now been two months without any definite ruling power, and that nowhere in the world is faction so general, it seems almost a wonder to find order or unity of action present at all. As a rule, the artizans supported a republic, while the peasantry and trading classes were in favour of some form of monarchy. The republic, however, though not generally loved for itself, was accepted as representing, for the time being, the principle of nationality and the determination to fight; and with the majority the Provisional Government, up to the present time (November), had gained rather than lost in popularity by its determination not to lower the national flag. Men argued that France was lost if she permitted herself to be disheartened, even by such a succession of defeats as those she had endured; and no people that values its own historic reputation can blame them for so thinking. M. Gambetta became the most influential man in the Provisional Government, because he was the most earnest in devising means for continuing the war. Being minister of the Interior as well as of the department of War he had, by the authority of the government in Paris, been invested with two votes in the Ministerial Council of Tours. He thus acquired nearly dictatorial powers; for unless all the other three voted against him—a not very likely circumstance—his will would be law. The present and succeeding chapters will show with what almost frantic energy he used this power. The national defence during the autumn and winter was mainly due to him; and though the prolonged and agonizing struggle was destined to fail, the endeavour cannot be said to have been utterly vain, for, as we shall presently show, France was never so near victory during the whole course of the war, as in the autumn months that followed the capitulation of Metz.

The internal state of the country being so unsettled, the prospects of France in entering on another stage of the war, were thus far from cheering. On the one side were the hosts of Germany, by this time flushed with their unbroken successes, and, confident in their skilful generals, their splendid organization, their enormous resources, and their perfect discipline and equipment, regarding themselves as invincible. On the other side were the half-formed armies of France, consisting for the most part of men who knew nothing of actual war, who had never been under fire, who had little confidence in themselves and less in their leaders; who in many instances were poorly furnished with the necessary weapons, and some of whom seemed to think that little more was needed in meeting the enemy than to cry "Long live the Republic." As we shall see, however, in their future struggles they displayed

in many instances heroic courage and self-sacrifice; and they more than once inflicted most serious blows on their enemy.

For the German armies the capitulation of Metz on October 28 came in very good time. Although the enormous forces around Paris, and those on the Loire, on the Saône, on the Somme, and elsewhere, had hitherto held their ground with unshaken firmness, still it was no wonder if they began to feel the strain which the task before them put upon their energies. And there were not wanting signs that the hastily-gathered levies of France were beginning to gain the necessary martial confidence and discipline that would enable them to hold their own before the well-drilled soldiers of Germany. In an engagement between the Prussian royal guards and some of the Paris garrison, General Trochu's raw levies did not fly in "wild confusion," as they were wont to do on former occasions. At Le Bourget, near St. Denis, on October 21, the German outposts were driven in by a sortie of the French, who proceeded to entrench themselves on the spot, from which they were not dislodged by the guards till the 23rd; and then only after a well-contested engagement, in which the Prussians took more than 1200 prisoners, and among them thirty officers, but not without sustaining "heavy losses themselves." In the north, on the 21st October, at Formerie, a town of the Oise, between Amiens and Rouen, an attempt made by the Prussians to cut the railway line was frustrated by a party of French regular infantry and mobiles, who were left masters of the position.

These, indeed, were trifling advantages, only to be noticed as slight breaks in that uniform run of ill fortune which had so long attended the French. But, independently of such incidents, there was undeniable evidence that, on the one hand, the German line around Paris had been somewhat inconveniently thinned to strengthen the detached forces under General von der Tann and Prince Albrecht; and on the other, that the Paris garrison had been making the most of the respite allowed to it in acquiring that steadiness, the lack of which had hitherto proved a bar to its success. Besides, Von der Tann, though apparently equal to maintaining his position at Orleans and on the Loire, seemed to evince some hesitation as to any further advance, and awaited the onset of the French army under Aurelles de Paladine; who, it was supposed, would soon muster up strength and courage either to force the Prussian general's position at Orleans, or to turn its flank and steal a march upon it on the way to Paris. In the north, again, the invasion seemed to have abated in activity, and people wondered how long it would be ere Bourbaki had collected, out of the various frontier garrisons and the solid populations of those districts, a force large enough to embolden him to take the offensive; while, again, Bazaine's army at Metz, exhausted and dispirited though it was said to be, hung in the rear of the German forces, and created some apprehension of danger, however indefinite and remote, that it might break loose and throw itself upon their lines of communication.

Bazaine's capitulation put an end to these apprehensions, and rendered Germany stronger, almost to the full extent of the forces by which she protected herself against danger from that quarter; for, besides placing 173,000 men, four marshals of France, 6000 officers, and one of the strongest places in Europe in the hands of the victors, it set free nearly 200,000 of them for new efforts and triumphs. The general importance of this event was, of course, apparent from the first; but not until some weeks afterwards did it fully appear how seriously its occurrence at this particular time affected the fortunes of the war. Had Bazaine been able to prolong the defence for another month, a relieving army, of which even the existence had come to be doubted, would almost certainly have made its way to the neighbourhood of Paris. In view of this contingency, indeed, as we explained near the end of Chapter XX., the German commander had actually arranged for raising the siege.

Of the immense force now liberated, one part remained to garrison Metz; another, nearly 50,000 strong, was despatched against the French army of the north; a third, comprising a single corps, was sent to Paris to aid the besiegers; and the remainder, about 75,000 men, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, was directed to the south and east of France, to occupy the Upper Loire, and to co-operate with the army under Werder. For it must be remembered that, besides the campaigns on the Loire and the Somme, there had been for some time in the east of France another struggle, which had resulted in the advance of a German army, under this general, into the

departments of the Vosges, the Upper Saône, and the Doubs, to Epinal, Vesoul, and Besançon; at which latter place he seemed to pause, fearing, it was said, the opposition of General Cambriels, at the head of the so-called army of the Vosges. Cambriels had recently reported that he had checked the enemy on the Ognon, compelled him to fall back upon Gray, and relieved from uneasiness not only Besançon and Dôle—his own and Garibaldi's head-quarters—but also Belfort and Dijon. As a practical reply to this boast, Von Werder, who had gone back to the Saône at Gray, followed the course of that river to Pontailler, and struck across the country to Dijon, due north of Lyons and almost due east of Bourges, at about 100 miles' distance from either place. He appeared before it on October 29, and took it after a short cannonade.

It will thus be seen that no portion of the German forces liberated by the capitulation of Metz was moved, in the first instance, against the French massed on the Lower Loire, whom, indeed, a combination of circumstances had caused the German commanders, with less than their wonted caution, to disregard. As stated in a previous chapter, one corps of that army had been defeated with great ease, in the middle of October, by a Bavarian detachment, which had captured Orleans and still held it; and as the entire body had since made no sign, its real strength was not known, and it was supposed to be worthless.

To serve a purpose, no doubt, there had indeed been an immense amount of mystification about this army, especially a statement that it had been sent off northwards. Reports varied from day to day regarding its discipline, proficiency in drill, numbers, armament, equipment, artillery, transport. All that was known with any degree of certainty respecting it was that it wanted officers, arms, horses, all kinds of *matériel*, and especially time. It had its origin in a collection of companies, of squadrons of regiments, where the lancers mingled with the chasseurs, the dragoon with the Turco, the chasseurs de Vincennes with the zouave, a battalion of infantry with a battery of artillery, gardes mobiles with franc-tireurs. The large admixture of the latter corps gave an extremely picturesque aspect to the miscellaneous aggregate. Obedient to the summons, they had flocked together in larger or smaller bodies from every province of France, from the colonies, from the United States and Canada, from Algeria and Greece, from Italy and Spain, from Rio Janeiro and Monte Video. Almost all wore the short tunic or thick woollen blouse, generally of dark colours, black, green, blue, and brown, while some few corps adopted the grays and buffs in favour among English volunteers. There were Tyrolese and wide-awake hats of every description, with cockades of all sizes and feathers of every tint. The brigand was largely represented, reminding the stranger of Fra Diavola and Massaroni, and other well-known types and theatrical celebrities. The South American corps was got up with a particular eye to effect. Its chief, M. de Friés, received the name of D'Artagnan, after Alexandre Dumas' hero, and Mélingue himself never looked the part better. He and his men wore the South American poncho as an overcoat, carried the lasso, and could noose a horse at full speed and bring him to the ground. The Basque battalion, composed of hardy mountaineers used to toil up Pyrenean steeps, and wearing their national head-dress, the flat *bèret*, red, blue, or white, with a tassel pendant from its centre, presented a good appearance. Then there was the mysterious company of the Gers, consisting of fifty picked men, in black costume, with skull and cross-bone facings, and who never spoke. The arming of the troops was various. Those worst provided had the old Minie, but for this the Remington or Chassepot was substituted as soon as obtainable. Numbers of them carried revolvers and poniards. The "Foreign Legion," which, it is only just to say, was always cheerfully in the front when the greatest danger and hardest fighting were to be met, comprised among others about a score of finely-built, soldierly-looking Englishmen, and several Irishmen, lured to France at this juncture either by zeal for the cause or by a love of adventure. Not the least picturesque feature was the Arab cavalry, formed in the colony of Algiers, of volunteers recruited in the great tribes of the desert. The original design was that every province should supply a contingent; but it is doubtful if the total number of these Spahi warriors in the Loire army ever exceeded 600 men. Their presence was generally heralded by a clang of barbaric trumpets, and a chief with a face like a bronze statue headed the rather straggling columns of fiery little Arab horses. The men wore their native dress, their heads, as usual, being wrapped up as if they had all been afflicted with toothache,

and they sat perched high up on their peculiar Moorish saddles. The chasseurs d'Afrique, the hussars, and the chasseurs à cheval, mustered largely, but it could not escape notice how absurdly overweighted the whole cavalry force was, by having to carry all sorts of cooking pots, *tentes d'abri*, and other *impedimenta*, which rendered them utterly useless in a charge. Smartness, cleanliness of horses, and pride of corps, as known in the English service, seemed not to exist in the cavalry of this army; and the men, seen on the march, always gave one the idea that their first and last business in life was to make their soup, not to fight. Besides their sabres, which they were hardly taught how to use, they were armed with a long, lumbering carbine, which was slung at their backs, and greatly hindered the use of the sword-arm.

Such was some of the rather unpromising material, gathered from every quarter of the globe, which, in the hope that it might be welded into something like an army, was intrusted to the command of General d'Aurelles de Paladine, a soldier who had seen hard service in the field, and had come out of his well-earned retirement to organize the forces of his country. By birth he was of an Auvergnat house. At an early age he entered the army, and in 1843 served in a campaign against Abd-el-Kader, under the Duc d'Aumale, who was then governor of Algeria. At that time d'Aurelles was *chef de bataillon* of the sixty-fourth infantry, and considered an excellent officer. He had the reputation of being a strict disciplinarian; and his passion for order and prompt obedience specially qualified him for reducing into shape the loose mass of regulars, gardes mobiles, foreigners, and franc-tireurs, dignified with the name of the Army of the Loire, which he found little better than a mob, and succeeded in rendering almost a match for the best troops of Prussia. The mutinous spirit which prevailed when he took the command he put down by offering the alternative of obedience or death; and before firing a shot at the Germans he shot down several score of his own men. General d'Aurelles de Paladine in several respects was like General Trochu. Both were strongly imbued with a religious spirit; both had lived in retirement for years—the one unknown, the other known only to strategists; and on the exertions of both seemed now to depend the last hopes of France.

As may be imagined, the task of D'Aurelles was not an easy one. For several weeks the troops were kept in the open air, exposed to all vicissitudes of weather, and engaged incessantly in the varied exercises which were necessary to accustom them to the tactics of war. To enforce good discipline amongst them proved for a time most difficult. Their idea of subordination seemed to be extinguished—a spirit which could be overcome only by a rigorous discipline, like that maintained in the Prussian army, in which insubordination is always punished by death. There were many loud and bitter complaints of D'Aurelles' severity; but the good fruits of the hardy training were soon seen in improved solidity and promptitude in manœuvring, in the excellent health of the troops, and in their renewed hope and confidence.

The most ardent hopes of the French government, therefore, now centred in this army of the Loire. Should it have the fortune to gain a considerable victory, the effect throughout France, it was felt, would be incalculable in putting down resistance to the government, and in converting into soldiers, inspired with some confidence in their leaders and some respect for themselves, those hordes of armed men by courtesy styled armies.

The forces under General d'Aurelles de Paladine, early in November, amounted to 180,000 men, with 400 guns, and nearly 15,000 cavalry. Since the disaster of Metz the authorities waited with intense anxiety for some serious movement on the part of this army before the victorious legions of Prince Frederick Charles should have time to approach. Although composed, as we have seen, of such heterogeneous masses, it was from its numbers by no means despicable; and at this conjuncture an opportunity was afforded its leader of striking a blow of which the results might have been momentous. At the beginning of November it was separated by a few miles only from a single Bavarian corps of not more than 25,000, scattered somewhat disorderly between Orleans and Châteaudun, and virtually forming the only German force between Orleans and the lines round Paris. General d'Aurelles de Paladine saw the favourable opportunity, and laid his plans for cutting off, and if possible annihilating, the small hostile corps which lay temptingly in his front. For this purpose he resolved to cross the Loire below and above Orleans, thus, by a converging movement, to close in completely on his

foe; and in case he should succeed in sweeping away this only obstacle in his path, he intended to march straight on Paris, and endeavour to relieve it.

It thus happened that the 9th of November, which witnessed the surrender of Verdun, brought to the French, as a compensation in another quarter, their first gleam of success. After the battles before Orleans, Von der Tann, reduced to his own corps by the recall of the twenty-second division to Paris and the detachment of Prince Albrecht's cavalry to Chartres, remained inactive on the Loire. A force of 20,000, including Prince Albrecht's horsemen, was at Chartres about the end of October, to hold in check the army of Brittany; and Von der Tann's right flank was covered by a detachment at Châteaudun. Columns of various strength, detached from the investment on the different roads, occasionally suffering a reverse, formed a large semicircle round the rest of Paris from Compiégne on the north, by Montdidier, Breteuil, Beauvais, Evreux, Chartres, and Châteaudun, to Orleans on the south.

The occupation of Orleans, indeed, had proved scarcely less difficult than its capture. For more than a month the Bavarian general had kept the French constantly employed and himself informed of their movements, by a system of reconnaissances and patrols, which extended over a comparatively wide area, and necessarily exposed those engaged in them to the constant attacks of franc-tireurs concentrated at Tours, whose most energetic efforts were directed to harassing the troops in the occupation of Orleans, while the larger army was forming below the Loire to attack the comparatively small force at the disposal of General von der Tann. The occupation of Chartres and Châteaudun by General Wittich weakened the army at Orleans, which, receiving no reinforcement from other quarters, and reduced to a force of about 15,000 men, began to find itself in a somewhat critical position. The position, in fact, of the Prussian garrison of Orleans was one of even greater danger than Von der Tann suspected, for by about the end of October General d'Aurelles' army had assumed a form which enabled him to act, and it was agreed that he should begin to move forward from Blois on the morning of the 29th, with the intention of driving back the Bavarians, and then trying to reach Paris. But at the last moment D'Aurelles changed his mind; he telegraphed to Tours on the night of the 28th, to say that the roads were bad, the equipment of part of the garde mobile very insufficient, and that it was consequently imprudent to attempt an action. It transpired subsequently that the news of the capitulation of Metz had become known to General d'Aurelles that very afternoon, some hours before the Tours government heard of it; and this was the main cause of his resolution not to move. His decision caused great disappointment at Tours, where it was immediately recognized that the Red Prince's army, suddenly set free, would come westward as fast as possible, and that it was indispensable to relieve Paris before its arrival, which was expected to take place about the 16th or 18th of November. But instead of hastening forward, the Loire army was delayed by various circumstances which it is difficult to determine with precision, amongst which, however, the current reports that an armistice had been concluded appear to have had much influence on General d'Aurelles, and to have disposed him to stop where he was. The despatches afterwards made public, and a work published at the close of the war by M. de Freycinet, M. Gambetta's delegate to the ministry of War, show that the hesitations of the commander-in-chief were the object of continual correspondence between that officer and the ministry of War; but however strong may have been the pressure employed, it was not till the 6th November, more than a week after the date originally fixed, that the French army at last marched forward.

While this was going forward along the Loire, the Prussians had decided to send reinforcements to General Von der Tann. Some 30,000 men had therefore been detached from the army before Paris, and had been sent towards him under the orders of the duke of Mecklenburg. The arrangement was made too late; for on the same day (the 11th November) that the duke reached Toury *en route* for Orleans, Von der Tann entered the same town with the remnant of his valiant but thoroughly beaten troops, who, swept forward by the masses of D'Aurelles, had escaped entire capture only by a kind of miracle. We will, however, revert to the first dispositions of the French commander, which had resulted in this signal reverse for the German arms.

On November 6, leaving one corps at Mer, on the north bank of the Loire, to cover Tours, three others, moving from their headquarters at La Ferté (twelve miles south of Orleans), crossed

the river at Beaugency and formed, with the corps from Mer, a general line extending from the Loire, on the right, to Marchenoir, behind the forest of that name, on the left. To ascertain the real nature of this movement, which appeared to threaten the Bavarian communications with Paris, Von der Tann, on November 7, ordered a reconnaissance, which, led by Count Stolberg, was pushed as far as Autainville, in the direction of Vendôme. This showed that the French were massed in the forest of Marchenoir, in that neighbourhood, in a force estimated at 60,000 men. The reconnoitring party consisted of 6000 men, with cavalry and artillery, and had been despatched with the further object of dislodging the French, if possible, from the wood. The Bavarians, however, had seriously under-estimated the number of their enemies, and were repulsed with loss. The French, elated with their success, on the following day assumed the offensive, marched forward to occupy various positions, with the view of cutting off the communications of the Bavarian army, and by interposing between Orleans and the base of operations, render their escape impossible. De Paladine had carefully studied the situation, and a curious chance had furnished him with the most reliable and precise information. A paper, torn into the smallest pieces, was found lying on a table in a château which had been the headquarters of General von der Tann. It proved to be the rough draft of his orders to his officers, with a plan for the dispositions of the troops. The pieces were carefully pasted together by a person in Orleans, who obtained a translation of their contents into French, and sent them to the minister of War at Tours. This paper, containing the exact number of troops to be engaged, precise instructions as to their disposition, and even the place of each gun, was transcribed with fear and trembling, in a house actually filled with Bavarians; it proved of incalculable use to the French troops, who, as the Germans owned, had never before been so well directed as now. The French army of Beaugency was ordered to advance towards Orleans; the right wing to halt on the side of Ormes; but the centre and left wing, pivoting on the right, were to proceed in the direction of Gemigny, St. Péravy, Boulay, and Briey, to meet the cavalry corps which General Martin des Palliéres, stationed a few leagues above Orleans, at St. Benoit-sur-Loire, was bringing towards Cercottes.

As soon as General von der Tann perceived this design, he ordered the immediate retreat of the baggage and heavy material of the army by the direct road towards Paris; and, compelled to leave about 1000 sick and wounded in the hospitals of Orleans, he put himself at the head of the fifteen battalions which still remained to him, and marched directly to meet the enemy. Wishing to extricate himself from the maze of woods and vineyards, and to reach the open plain, where his cavalry and artillery would tell, he moved in a north-westerly direction. For a day or two previously there had been some excitement, the cause of which the French inhabitants of Orleans could not make out. It was supposed that a battle was going on, but where no one knew. On the night of the evacuation, however, all became clear. At about ten p.m. there was a general running in the streets, into which the inhabitants were not allowed to go; but the greater the running of the Germans, and the driving of all sorts of carriages, the stronger was the temptation of Frenchmen to learn the cause of the stir. At midnight the Place du Martroi, the Rue Royale, the Rue Bannier, and all the adjacent streets were blocked with gun, provision, and ammunition carriages, and in the morning the regiment of Bavarian guards were all that remained to tell of a German occupation. About noon on the 9th these filed off, with drums beating and colours flying, by the Rue Jeanne d'Arc and Rue Bannier, as though they had been going out for a *promenade militaire.* The townspeople were naturally delighted when, at the close of the day, they saw troops advancing towards the town under the tricolor instead of the abhorred black and white. Their exultation was natural, though, judging from the following notice issued by the municipality, it was rather overstrained:—"The mayor of the city of Orleans appeals to the generous feeling of the population; he is sure that the German wounded and prisoners will be treated by his fellow townsmen in conformity with the dictates of humanity. The mayor warns those of his fellow citizens who may have in their possession arms and ammunition, consequent on the disarming of the German soldiers, that they must immediately lodge them at the Hôtel de Ville. They belong to the state, and those detaining them will be prosecuted according to law.—ORLEANS, *November* 10."

There is no doubt that there was some haste in

the retreat of the Bavarians; and that they were followed up pretty closely, is proved by the capture of Von der Tann's carriage and other articles of his property, by the leaving of the sick and wounded, and by the fact that many of the inhabitants made prisoners of the soldiers who had been billeted upon them. It was these accidental captures to whose "disarming" the notice pointed.

Early on the morning of November 9 the two armies became aware of each other's presence near Coulmiers, between that place and Baccon, a small village about fourteen miles to the west of Orleans. About ten o'clock the engagement began. The spot had already been rendered classic as the scene of a battle in 1409, in which the French, under the Maid of Orleans, defeated the English under Sir John Fastolf.

In the present instance, also, and for the first time in the history of this war, the tide of victory turned in favour of the French, who outnumbered the Germans in the proportion of four to one, and could not have been fewer than 90,000 men, with 120 field guns. The most that General von der Tann could hope to accomplish against such overwhelming odds, was to make good his retreat in the direction of Paris with the least possible loss of men and material. The nature of the country was such as to render cavalry operations impracticable, and for more than seven hours his small force, of little more than 12,000 infantry, succeeded in holding the whole French army in check. The action commenced by a well-sustained attack on the German centre and right wing, forcing the latter to give way, until General Orff, with the second Bavarian brigade, wheeled round the left wing to its support, and for a moment almost seemed about to change the fortunes of the day. The French, however, brought up strong reinforcements, and were supported by an admirably served marine artillery; an arm hitherto little feared in their hands, but which was now employed with a precision and efficiency which were the theme of universal remark among the German officers, who perhaps, considering their past experience, had begun to fall into the not unnatural error of underrating their enemy.

From this time the French continued to advance steadily towards Baccon, *i.e.*, from the south-west to the north-east. The Bavarians had taken up a position which formed an acute angle with the French line, their line of battle being nearly parallel with the range of woods extending from Chaingy to some distance beyond Bucy St. Siphard. To deploy their forces they availed themselves of the ground between the farm of La Renardière, the fields of Huisseau, the farms and plantations of Coulmiers on the one hand, to Rosieres and the fields around Gemigny. At Baccon the French met with a stubborn resistance. The Germans had loopholed the houses, constructed barriers, and taken advantage of every wall and every hedge for cover. The village of Baccon is built on a hillock, on which the houses rise in tiers; the lowest being scattered about the plain at its foot. From that culminating point the Germans kept up a murderous fire on the French troops, who promptly responded to the orders of their officers to move forward. After a brief but desperate struggle, Baccon was carried by storm, and the Germans gave way. The French, even to the mobiles, most of whom were in this action for the first time under fire, behaved with great bravery and steadiness in the heat of the fight; but to the marine infantry and artillery, previously alluded to, D'Aurelles subsequently awarded the highest praise.

Notwithstanding, however, the repeated and furious assaults of the French, and the fearful loss they managed to inflict upon their opponents, they could not force them from the position they had occupied during the day, and night closed in, leaving the Germans worn out and decimated by the fight, but not vanquished. They had already marched all the preceding night; they had fought during the whole day of the 9th; and now their only chance of escape was to make another night march on Artenay. Leaving about 700 of their comrades, including 42 officers, dead and wounded, in the hands of the enemy, they turned their backs on the bloody field of Baccon as soon as the darkness set in, and under a fall of sleet and snow tramped their weary way to Artenay, having for thirty-six hours scarcely tasted a mouthful of food. It is said that, when Prince Frederick Charles asked Marshal Bazaine why the French army did not follow up their partial success on the 16th of August, and escape from their critical position before Metz during the night, he replied, "On ne marche pas la nuit." The Germans under Von der Tann, eschewing this comfortable principle, succeeded in reaching Artenay on the following morning in perfect order, and without much loss of material. The Bavarian life guards, who, it

will be remembered, had been left at Orleans, and who quitted that city on the 9th, found themselves separated from the main body of the army by the events of that day, and came into unexpected proximity to the enemy, from whom they only escaped by a forced and arduous night march of fifteen hours, during which they were compelled to pass almost within earshot of the French position. Finally, the morning of the 10th found the gallant little army of Von der Tann united at Artenay, where, by having outmarched the enemy, they were enabled to enjoy a day's rest after their brilliant retreat, and take up a defensive attitude.

The result of the engagement was made known to the government at Tours by the following despatch on the 10th:—"The army of the Loire, under the command of General d'Aurelles de Paladine, carried Orleans yesterday after two days' fighting. Our losses in killed and wounded do not reach 2000; those of the enemy are more considerable. We have taken more than 1000 prisoners, and this number is being increased by the pursuit. We have also captured two guns of Prussian make, more than twenty powder and munition waggons with their horses, and a large quantity of fourgons and provision waggons. The principal seat of the action was round Coulmiers, and the ardour of the troops was admirable, notwithstanding the bad weather."

While the French thus acknowledged a loss of 2000, the official report of the German commander gave that of the Bavarians, in killed and wounded, at 42 officers and 667 men. The 1000 prisoners were the sick and wounded left at Orleans, and the two guns were two small unlimbered useless cannon which the Germans abandoned, as encumbering their movements. The despatches and report of General d'Aurelles de Paladine respecting the battle of Baccon were, however, written with a fairness and modesty which were new to the French, and the advantages he gained were not overstated. Had he claimed to have reduced the effective strength of the Bavarian corps by at least 4000 men, he would have been quite within the truth. Nor was this the only advantage gained. The *morale* of both men and officers was much improved. Cheered by a victory after continuous defeat, they did their duty better and more smartly; and all believed that the day had at last come when they would be able to beat back the invader, and re-assert their old standing amongst the warriors of Europe. Under their commander the new army had learned the very important lesson of light infantry duty, which the first French armies seemed to have quite forgotten—the art of protecting flanks and rear from surprise, of feeling for the enemy, surprising his detachments, procuring information, and taking prisoners. It was at length the Germans who had to grope in the dark in order to ascertain the position of the enemy.

But the energetic measures which General von Moltke took to meet its expected march upon Paris, furnished the most remarkable proof of the respect which the army of the Loire now inspired. As we have before remarked, so well had the preparations of this army been concealed that its very existence was doubted amongst the Germans. Now, however, even at the risk of actually raising the investment of Paris, the Prussian strategist found it necessary to hold in readiness against it the greater portion of the blockading forces on the south side of the city. He changed at once the direction of march of the two armies arriving from Metz, so as to draw them closer to Paris, that thus the whole of the German forces might be concentrated around it; and steps were also taken to surround the siege park with defensive works.

M. Gambetta was not slow to congratulate the army on its success. He at once visited the camp, and published the following proclamation to the troops:—

"Soldiers! Your courage and your efforts have brought back victory. To you France owes her first consolation, her first ray of hope. I am happy to convey to you the expression of the public gratitude, and the praises and recompenses which the government awards to success. Led by chiefs vigilant, faithful, and worthy of you, you have recovered discipline and strength, you have retaken Orleans with the ardour of old troops accustomed to conquer, and have proved that France, far from being overwhelmed by reverses which have no precedent in history, intends to assume in her turn a vigorous and general offensive. The advanced guard of the country, you are on the road to Paris! Let us not forget that Paris awaits us. Our honour is staked upon our succeeding in loosening the grasp of the barbarians who threaten her with fire and pillage. Redouble

your constancy and your ardour. You now know the enemy. Their superiority consists in the number of their cannon. Recover the French dash and the fury which ought to help to save the country. With such soldiers the republic will issue victorious from the struggle."

The army of the Loire, however, had yet to prove its mettle in a general engagement with the "barbarians" in numbers more nearly equal; and as subsequent events showed that it was unequal to this task, we are confirmed in the opinion that it was a fatal error its success at Baccon was not at once followed up.

It is impossible for Frenchmen to recall the important phase of their great struggle which we have just described, without a pang of bitter regret that the successes of D'Aurelles at Baccon were not promptly followed up, presenting, as they did, by far the fairest and most promising opportunity during the war for reversing the ill-fortune of France. The Germans themselves admitted that if they had been pursued, every one of them, from the general to the last camp-follower, would inevitably have been taken prisoner. Having marched all night to come into action, they had to march all the next night to get away from it; and it was with the most intense astonishment that the exhausted Bavarians discovered on the 10th that General d'Aurelles was not attempting to come after them. And this was not their only surprise. On the 11th the duke of Mecklenburg met Von der Tann at Toury; and the latter was proposing arrangements to unite their two armies, so as to make a stand against the victorious French and cover Paris, when to his bewilderment instructions were telegraphed from Versailles to abandon the direct line of defence, and to immediately march north-west to Dreux (leaving D'Aurelles to do what he liked), in order to stop another French army which was said to be marching straight on Versailles from Argentan and Laigle. Looking back at all this in the light of what subsequently transpired, it seems incredible that the clever Prussians should have been so utterly taken in by the fear of an army which really did not exist, that they left the road to Paris wide open before D'Aurelles; and, more incredible still, that the Tours government should have failed to profit by the prodigious opportunity which was offered to them by this mistake of General von Moltke. The altogether insignificant character of what the German commander imagined to be an army approaching from the west is explained in the following chapter, and the explanations of General Chanzy and M. de Freycinet afterwards enlightened the world as to why the opportunity of capturing the defeated Bavarian army and of raising the siege of Paris was not utilized.

It appears that, when the fight began on the morning of the 9th, General Reyan, with ten regiments of cavalry and some batteries of horse-artillery, was ordered to cover the French left wing and turn the German right. General Reyan had been at some distance from the scene of action, and on the morning of November 9, after a long and tiresome march of fourteen hours, he came within view of German batteries. Instead of hastening on to the battle-field and executing the manœuvre ordered, he opened fire on the batteries alluded to, and at two o'clock reported to D'Aurelles that his artillery had lost heavily in men and horses, and had no more ammunition, and that his cavalry had met with serious resistance everywhere. He added that he feared the enemy would outflank him, and he thought he should have to fall back. At five o'clock General Reyan again sent word that a column of infantry was now appearing before him at Villamblain, and he considered it indispensable to return to his encampment of the previous night. It was soon discovered that the column in question *was composed of French franc-tireurs;* but, unfortunately, the cavalry had already fallen back, night was coming on, and exhausted as they were with continuous marching, it was impossible to get the regiments forward again. The force, therefore, which was effectually to have cut off the retreat of the Bavarians, did not come into the engagement at all; and when the battle was won by the centre and right no cavalry was up to pursue the victory, or to ascertain the movements of the retiring Germans. The French slept on the field, but it began to rain and snow; the night was bad, there was no wood for fires, and the supplies of food and ammunition were got to the front with much difficulty. When day broke Admiral Jaureguiberry sent his own escort, forty-five men, in pursuit of the Bavarians, and they took two guns, 130 prisoners, and quantities of baggage and ammunition. If forty-five hussars could do this, what would General Reyan's ten regiments have effected? General d'Aurelles

does not seem, however, to have thought of following up his victory, though he must have had at least 80,000 men still in good fighting condition, against about half that number under Mecklenburg and Von der Tann, supposing, indeed, the two latter to have united and made a stand. The days following the 9th were occupied in organizing convoys, in completing the artillery, and in procuring clothes for the soldiers, arrangements which it seems a singular lack of foresight to have left till a time like this. Day followed day, and the French did not move; their outposts advanced, but the army remained inactive. Von der Tann left a few troops at Etampes, and marched away with the rest to join the Duke of Mecklenburg at Chartres; so that, by the 14th, there were not more than 3000 Germans between D'Aurelles and Paris.

With these facts before us, it is easy to understand the alarm which we have described in Chapter XXIV. as prevailing at Versailles at this time. General von Moltke knew that nothing would stop D'Aurelles if he marched resolutely on by Etampes to the Seine; he feared that Mecklenburg would not get into position between Chartres and Dreux in time to paralyze the other imaginary army, which was supposed to be driving on Versailles in that direction; so that on the 14th and 15th November the German headquarters expected to be attacked behind from Rambouillet and to be cut off from their line of communications eastward by D'Aurelles. It is not strange, therefore, that they should have packed up their boxes, as was actually the case; it seemed impossible to the energetic Prussians that their enemy should not rush at them instantly, and make a desperate attempt to break the line of investment south of Paris, before Prince Frederick Charles could reach it. But when they learnt, on the night of the 15th, that D'Aurelles had made no sign, that the Red Prince's outposts had reached the line of which Montargis is the centre, and that no French army had shown itself beyond Dreux, they took courage, stopped where they were, and so evaded the grave moral consequences which would have ensued on an evacuation of Versailles.

While the German headquarters were in this critical position, a conference had taken place, on November 12, between the French generals and M. Gambetta, who had come up from Tours to congratulate the troops on the victory of Coulmiers. General Borel, a very able officer, afterwards chief of the staff of Marshal MacMahon during the Communist siege of Paris, proposed to march straight to the Seine, but General D'Aurelles would not have that at all; not only did it seem to him impossible to continue the offensive, but he considered it was dangerous even to remain at Orleans. M. Thiers, who, as described in a previous chapter, had been endeavouring to arrange with the Prussians for an armistice, had just returned from Versailles, and reported that he had come through an army of 80,000 men; his imagination, in fact, having more than doubled the force, which was none other than that of the duke of Mecklenburg, now off to the west. To D'Aurelles, however, this was sufficient reason for not advancing. He said the enemy would be back on him directly; that an indisputable eye-witness had seen 80,000 Prussians marching down from Paris; that he was certain to be attacked in a day or two, and that his army was unfit to stand the shock. Finally, he proposed to immediately evacuate Orleans, and to return to his old position at Salbris. M. Gambetta, M. de Freycinet, and General Borel energetically opposed these arguments; but all they could obtain from D'Aurelles was, that instead of abandoning Orleans, the army should intrench itself round the town: no forward movement should be made, for the moment at least; but it was admitted that Paris should still be considered to be the destination of the army. A fortified camp was immediately formed round Orleans, new troops arrived, and in a few days the French had more than 200,000 men in position.

Leaving for the present the army of the Loire, we will glance at the events then transpiring in the north of France, which, next to those south of Paris, were the most important that occurred during the month of November.

Of the large force detached to operate in the north under General Manteuffel, a considerable portion was sent to assist in reducing several fortresses which had hitherto been rather invested than besieged, but whose fall, on the release of the immense siege *matériel* from around Metz, might now be counted on in a few days. The first place which followed the fate of the great Moselle stronghold was Verdun, a fortress of the second class, standing on the Meuse, where it begins to be navigable, about 150 miles east of Paris, 120 west of the Rhine, 30 north-west of Bar-le-Duc, and 40 from Metz. It has 13,000 inhabitants; and although

partly fortified by Vauban, its strength is not great against modern artillery, as it is commanded by the adjacent hills, and the river is fordable in several places near the works. Its fortifications consist of a citadel, separated from the town by an esplanade, and of an *enceinte* of ten bastioned fronts. The place had been the object of much attention ever since the German armies crossed the Moselle. In the attempt to gain it, the army of the Rhine had fought the great battles of Vionville and Gravelotte; an immense store of provisions having been accumulated here as soon as Bazaine's retreat was contemplated.

Verdun was first invested on September 25, but not so strictly as to prevent the garrison from being subsequently largely increased. Early in October the place was completely closed in, and the usual summons to surrender made. Baron Guerin de Waldersback, the commandant, replied by expressing to the Prussian envoy his resolution to hold out as long as one stone remained on another; adding, "We shall meet in the breach." The breach, however, was precisely the place where, in this war of sieges, no German and French officers ever did meet. The bombardment from the German artillery was terrific, and was effected from two strong batteries, the one situated due north, the other east, of the place. On the 13th and 14th of October a perfect hurricane of shells was poured upon the devoted town, but without shaking the determination of the garrison. The brave General Marnier, sub-commandant of Verdun, putting himself at the head of some 3000 men, made a sortie in a north-easterly direction on the 28th. Without firing a shot, at the point of the bayonet he drove back the German advanced posts. He then attacked the batteries, and carried them by assault, destroying the works, dismounting and spiking the guns, and returning safe to Verdun. The conduct of the civilians, like that of their fellow-countrymen at Strassburg, Toul, and elsewhere, was honourable and spirited. From the first they were anxious to make the best possible defence, irrespective of personal losses. During the furious bombardment they took refuge in the cellars, where some of the more timid remained during almost the whole of the siege, while their houses were burning over their heads. This state of things could not, of course, continue long. Disease—small-pox especially—was adding its ravages to those of the enemy's cannon, and the mortality increased rapidly from day to day. Prospect of relief there was none. So long as Metz stood, and there was a possibility of Bazaine's army, or any portion of it, forcing its way through Prince Frederick Charles' lines, and throwing itself upon Verdun, there might have been a propriety in continued resistance. But the fall of Metz changed the whole position of affairs, and it then became simply a question whether the barren honour of holding out to no purpose for a few days longer was worth the penalty that must be incurred in the demolition of the remains of the town, and the slaughter of a great portion, at all events, of the surviving garrison and inhabitants.

At this point, too, the severely-tried endurance of the townspeople began in some measure to fail them. So long as their sufferings were of any use to France they had borne them with exemplary patience, and had shown as little desire to yield as General Guerin himself. But they now felt that nothing was to be gained by prolonging the struggle. The devastation wrought was greater even than at Strassburg, as the German guns easily dominated the entire town. It was this almost complete destruction that led to the ultimate surrender of the place, which was coerced into submission without having had to endure any very serious want of food, the supplies of which would, at the time of the surrender, have enabled the inhabitants to hold out for a while longer. The 9th of November, which, as we have seen, brought the first and most considerable victory of the war to the French arms, witnessed the capitulation of Verdun, when two generals, 160 officers, and 4000 men were made prisoners, and 136 guns and 23,000 rifles, with a considerable store of material of war, were taken.

As soon as Metz had fallen, Thionville also was very soon vigorously bombarded, and set on fire. Until the surrender of Metz the position of Thionville gave it an importance in the war with which no other fortress of its size and strength, except Toul, could compare. At the end of July it supported the left wing of the French army of the Rhine. During the operations before Metz its proximity was a cause of extreme annoyance to Prince Frederick Charles, as its abundant supplies presented a constant temptation to the hungry garrison of the larger fortress to endeavour to establish a communication with it, in which they once nearly succeeded. The town has between 7000 and 8000 inhabitants. The fortress is built

almost entirely on the left or western bank of the Moselle; that part of it which stands on the right bank consisting of a fort of modern construction, containing magazines and fine cavalry barracks. It was formerly the residence of the Merovingian and Carlovingian kings, has been a fortified place since the thirteenth century, and has sustained numerous sieges, from that of 1643, when the prince of Condé took it, until 1814, when General Hugo, father of Victor Hugo, successfully defended it against the Prussians. When besieged by the allies in 1792, the citizens hung the figure of an ass over the wall with a bundle of hay at its mouth, and the inscription, "When the ass eats the hay you will take Thionville." The story illustrates the short range of artillery eighty years ago. Besiegers and besieged must have been very close together, or the placard could not have been legible. From 1815 Thionville was the advanced post of the north-east of France, between Metz and Luxemburg and Sarrelouis. Its fortifications belong to different epochs and systems of engineering. The *corps de la place* consists of an irregular heptagon, with demilunes, contregardes, and lunettes. The fort of the Double Crown is on the right bank. The full complement of the garrison of Thionville is 8000 men, but at the time of its investment there were not more than half this number. The fortress, however, held out until November 24, and was expected, from the boastful declaration of its commandant, to resist much longer. Less than three day's experience of the German artillery, however, was enough for him; and with a great part of the town in flames, a capitulation was signed, which gave the Prussians 4000 more prisoners and an additional 200 cannon.

In the course of General Manteuffel's progress towards Amiens, the only other fortified place which had not yet surrendered was that of La Fère, near the confluence of the Oise and the Serre, fourteen miles north-west of Laon, and on the road from that town to Amiens. It was invested about the middle of November, and on the 20th a courageous attempt to relieve it was made by a French force, which, however, was repulsed with heavy loss. On the 27th La Fère capitulated after two days' bombardment, yielding 2000 prisoners and 70 guns.

By a ministerial decision of November 18, General Bourbaki was summoned to take command of the newly-formed eighteenth French corps d'armée at Nevers; General Farre being intrusted provisionally with his charge in the north. It would seem from this that M. Gambetta, now the presiding genius of France outside Paris, had underrated the danger which menaced the wealthy and populous cities of the north from the advance of Manteuffel. So little, indeed, had been heard of the movements of this commander, that it was generally supposed he was hesitating to venture into a district where the brilliant fame of General Bourbaki had in a short time made him the rallying point for a French army of no mean pretensions. The fact was, that the advance of the first German army had been halted on the receipt of the news of the French movements about Orleans on the 9th, and its dispositions then seemed to indicate an intention to remove southward. This, however, was not the case. General Manteuffel left Rheims on November 17, and at this time his troops were reported as never having been in better case to meet an enemy, or to encounter the exigencies of a campaign. The artillery and cavalry horses were in splendid condition. Dysentery and other sickness, which prevailed around Metz, had gradually disappeared through change of air, exercise, and a good commissariat, and every thing was hopeful. Soissons was reached on the 19th, Compiégne—where the German commander occupied the emperor's chateau—on the 21st, and from this date little more was heard of Manteuffel's advance until the 24th, when a detachment forming his advanced guard was defeated in a smart skirmish with a large body of French, mostly mobiles. This occurred in the Santerre district, the eastern part of the Somme, and at the same time Prussian scouts were signalled in the neighbourhood of Amiens, plainly indicating an early advance upon the city.

Afraid to defend the slight intrenchments thrown up just outside the place, and reluctant to bring a battle so near their chief northern city, the French army moved out and took up positions extending from Boves to Villers-Bretonneux, about twelve miles east of Amiens. Here were constructed strong earthworks and batteries, which early on Sunday morning, November 27, were assailed by a vigorous fire from the German artillery. The division of General von Göben had come to the front, and a battle along the whole line shortly commenced. The French army of the north, numbering about 50,000 men, were divided into three corps—at

Villers Bretonneux, a large manufacturing village commanding the road to Fergnier, at the entrance of the plains of Santerre; at Boves, which commands the road to Paris; and at a little village called Dury, commanding that to Breteuil. The artillery force was largely composed of seamen, who came very prominently into notice during the later phases of the war, and on all occasions bore themselves with signal bravery. In the present instance they sustained the heaviest brunt of the fight, and were almost all killed or wounded, only three officers escaping with their lives. The mobiles also showed great steadiness and resolution, and were the last to leave the field when the fortunes of the day proved decisive against them. The battle was to a large extent an artillery contest. The most serious engagement took place in front of Villers. At Boves the chief event was a charge of the ninth Prussian hussars upon a battery of marine volunteers, who were completely cut to pieces, though with considerable loss to the Germans, including Prince Hatzfeld, who was killed. Later in the day the thirty-third regiment advanced to the ravine between St. Nicholas and Boves, to storm the village and the French position; whilst a battery of artillery stationed themselves at a distance of 2000 yards, about a quarter of a mile in front of the farm at Cambos. No sooner had the thirty-third deployed, and, covered by half a company of skirmishers, advanced to the attack, than the French opened the most determined fire. They, however, were weak in artillery, and after about half an hour were driven from their position, the thirty-third storming the village of Boves, and taking 300 prisoners.

The French right rested in Hebecourt, a village in front of Dury; and the sixteenth division was sent to oust them from their positions, and drive them back upon Amiens. This done, Dury was stormed. Both these hamlets lie on the Amiens and Dunkirk road. About three-quarters of a mile beyond Dury were the French works, with a battery of four heavy guns placed upon the road itself. Immediately in front of these works, at a distance of 300 yards to the left of the road, was a small graveyard, surrounded by a hedge. For upwards of two hours this graveyard was held by two companies of the seventieth regiment, in face of the French battery, and of the long line of rifle-pits lying right and left of it. The only cover the men had was the gravestones, of which there were very few, the greater portion of the monuments being iron crosses. A display of more determined courage the campaign did not present. The Prussian batteries at Dury took up a position at 1200 yards, and although they lost five officers and half their horses, nothing would induce the commandant to retire to 2000 yards. It was principally owing to their fire that the French were ultimately driven out of the works and retired into Amiens. The final storming of the village was witnessed from a neighbouring church tower by an English officer, who, fascinated by the splendid advance of the thirty-third regiment, and forgetful of the elevation on which he stood, enthusiastically threw up his hat into the air, and incurred the penalty of having afterwards to trudge a long distance bareheaded.

Around Villers-Bretonneux a fierce battle raged between the main portion of the two contending armies for several hours. Between Boves and Villers is a wood, under cover of which the Prussians advanced, debouching about noon, with eighteen guns, which immediately opened on the French, who were massed on the plateau of Villers. After awhile they showed signs of wavering, but at this critical juncture reinforcements, principally in artillery, came up from Amiens, and roused the sinking spirit of the French troops; at every point their enemies now seemed to be giving way, until, at half past four o'clock, they had been driven some three kilomètres from Villers-Bretonneux. The Germans, like history, seem fond of repeating themselves; as, indeed, is also the case with the French. In several engagements, the moment at which the invaders appeared ready to yield was precisely that when they were preparing a last great effort to advance. When, on the other hand, the French troops had gained a slight advantage, they—forgetting that the lull among the enemy foreboded a storm—fell too speedily into the mistake of congratulating themselves. At half past four o'clock the Prussians seemed defeated; but from that hour they made a determined advance, and swept the enemy before them. The firing having for a time ceased, the French assumed that they were masters of the field, and had begun to establish themselves, when a murderous fire was suddenly opened upon them from positions where no enemies were supposed to be. Altogether taken by surprise, they at

once fled. Fortunately for them, night came to their assistance; and before the sun of the next morning had arisen they were many miles away from the scene of conflict. Following up their advantage, the Prussians entered Villers, causing no small panic among the inhabitants. The women with children in arms shrieked and rushed wildly about. A number of them heedlessly ran in the line of fire, and were killed by shot and shell, and many more were drowned in the marshes about the city. Finding further resistance hopeless, General Farre ordered a retreat along the whole line; and great was the disappointment of the good citizens of Amiens to see approaching the disorderly remnants of that army of the north which it was expected should turn the fortunes of France, and drive back the Prussian veterans of Gravelotte in confusion.

On arriving at Amiens a council of war was hurriedly convened, at which it was resolved not to make any further stand behind the entrenchments around the city. The retreat was therefore continued, headed by General Farre and brought up in the rear by the prefect of the Somme. Before leaving the town, the following proclamation was addressed by the latter to the inhabitants:—

"Citizens,—The day of trial has come. In spite of the incessant efforts made by me for three months, to the feeble extent of my means of action, the chief town of the department falls, in its turn, into the hands of the enemy. The council of superior officers has just determined on the retreat of the army of the north and the disarmament of the national guard. I am absolutely obliged to leave you, but in the firmest hope of an early return. Calmness and confidence!—France will be saved. Vive la France! Vive la Republique!"

The mayor, left to his own devices, immediately followed with another:—"The generals intrusted with the defence of Amiens have suddenly departed with the troops, and, considering them too feeble, have abandoned us. The military committee has not been consulted. The prefect quitted Amiens to-night. As for me, I remain with my municipal council in despair, but without forces against the enemy: devoted to my fellow-citizens, and ready for all sacrifices in their behalf."

As it was well known to the German commanders that the forces opposed to them greatly outnumbered their own, it was deemed unwise to follow the pursuit too far, and orders were accordingly given to remain on the defensive. Very early on the morning of the 28th there was an unusual stillness, and no sentries were visible in front of the spot where the French were supposed to be. The commanding officer, therefore, sent forward a patrol the distance of some 300 yards to reconnoitre; and great was the surprise when, entering the works, they found nothing but the cannon and the dead bodies of those slain in the recent combat. Intelligence was immediately sent to General von Göben, who at once ordered an advance of the troops. Taking the road through Hebecourt and Dury, over a course thickly strewn with military accoutrements and the bodies of dead men and horses, the victorious army soon came upon an undulating plain, bounded by the town of Amiens. On the highest ridge of the plain the French had thrown up long lines of rifle pits; and the road was defended by a battery mounting two howitzers and two 16-pounder rifled guns, all of which remained in the hands of the victors. Right and left of the road the barracks of the troops came into view—plain wooden huts, on each side of which were raised platforms covered by straw mattresses. Half way between these lines and the town were two *emplacements* for guns, one to the right, the other to the left. The position was strong, and if resolutely defended would have been no easy matter to take. After some little delay Amiens was entered by three battalions of the 40th regiment, and two batteries of artillery, which filed past the general in the principal part of the town. The 45,000 Frenchmen that should have held it were in rapid retreat upon Arras, Doullens, and Rouen. The citadel had not, however, surrendered, and the commandant refused to give in upon any terms.

The mayor of Amiens took an early opportunity of waiting upon General von Göben, and with tears begged him to persuade Captain Fogel, the old line officer who commanded the citadel, to capitulate, and thus to set free 300 gentlemen belonging to the best families in the city, who were only increasing the general misery by a useless resistance. So far, however, from complying, the officer caused the citadel to open fire upon the town, the "gentlemen of the best families" thus doing all they could to destroy their own homes and kinsfolk. Two companies, therefore, of the 40th regiment took possession of the houses in the immediate

neighbourhood of the glacis, and opened a small-arm fire upon the place, which was returned by the garrison with artillery and Chassepot fire. All day long this sort of guerilla warfare continued. On the evening of the 29th it was determined to shell the earthwork, and eight batteries marched out at three in the morning, taking up their positions right and left of the citadel at 2000 yards. But, as day dawned, the white emblem of submission was seen waving from the ramparts; the commandant having been killed during the night.

The citadel was much stronger than had been supposed. The garrison was composed of 400 men and twelve officers, with thirty pieces of ordnance. The height of the *revètement* was 80 feet from the bottom of the ditch, so that to capture the place would have taken some little time, and occasioned no small loss; but the death of the commandant—killed while superintending the training of a gun—put an end to farther resistance. The loss of the defenders was four killed and thirteen wounded. Within the citadel were found one officer and sixteen men of the fourth Prussian regiment, who had been taken prisoners a day or two previously in the fight before the town, and who were agreeably surprised when their countrymen knocked in the door of the room in which they were confined.

In the end, the city of Amiens had to pay dearly for its resistance, and the possession of the citadel enabled the general to take far more troops with him in his farther progress than he could have otherwise done. Very speedily a German prefect and sub-prefect were appointed, under whose auspicious rule, much to the astonishment of the mayor, affairs soon assumed their ordinary aspect.

CHAPTER XXIII.

M. Gambetta the Real Governor of France early in November—The French Position after their Victory at Baccon—Mistake of General D'Aurelles in not advancing at once on Paris—Military Reasons for his remaining inactive—Determination of the French to march on Paris at all Costs—The worst time possible chosen by them for this purpose—What might have happened had they made their way to the German Lines—The new Disposition of the German Forces in consequence of Von der Tann's Defeat, and the celerity with which they were carried out—Difference of the French Prospects on November 10 and November 19—The Cause of the False Alarm at Versailles—General D'Aurelles made Commander-in-Chief of the whole of the French Armies South and East of Paris—His Dispositions of his Troops—The Duke of Mecklenburg withdrawn from Le Mans and other Reinforcements sent to Von der Tann—Positions of both Armies on November 26—The Advantage still on the Side of the French—Reluctance of General D'Aurelles to Advance—Battle of Beaune-la-Rollande on November 28—Incidents of the Fight—Critical Position of Affairs for the Germans—Great Bravery and Determination of the Hanoverians—Arrival of Prince Frederick Charles, who turns the Fortunes of the day—The French compelled to Retreat—Losses on both Sides—Another Fatal Delay on the part of D'Aurelles taken Advantage of by the Enemy—A Plan of Combined Action arranged between D'Aurelles and Trochu—Battle at Patay between the French, under General Chanzy, and the Bavarians, on December 1—Another hard-earned German Victory—Arrival of Balloon Despatches from Paris, and Great Excitement at Tours—Further Engagement on December 2 and Retreat of the French—The Germans assume the Offensive on December 3, bring on the Battle of Chevilly, and achieve another Victory—Scene on the Battle Field at Night—Resumption of the Engagement at Cercottes on December 4, and ultimate Recapture of Orleans by the Germans—Difference between D'Aurelles and Gambetta as to Defending the City—Narrow Escape of M. Gambetta—The Scene in Orleans on December 4—Complete defeat of the Loire Army and Loss of 15,000 Prisoners—General Review of the Operations on both Sides from November 28 to December 4—Superior Strategy of the Germans—Operations in the Eastern Departments of France—Fighting on the river Ognon—Bombardment and Capitulation of Dijon—The Proceedings of Garibaldi—His Animosity to the Clergy, and Desire to establish the "Universal Republic"—Victory of Ricciotti Garibaldi over the Germans at Châtillon—Garibaldi himself advances to the Relief of Dijon—Extraordinary Panic amongst his Troops, who are compelled to beat a hasty Retreat—Ill-feeling between Garibaldi and the French Generals and the Priesthood—The Composition of his Army—Capture of Neu Breisach by the Germans—Proceedings in Brittany—A Common Plan of Defence agreed on for the South of France—Unpopular Decree of the French Government annulling the Exemption of Married Men and Widowers from Military Service—Formation of Camps for the Instruction and Concentration of National Guards—The Bells of the Churches offered for Cannon—The Triduum, or Exposition of the Real Presence, celebrated throughout France—Exports of Guns and War *Matériel* from the United States to France—The Friendly Feeling between America and Prussia nevertheless continued—Contrast with the Feeling manifested towards England—Important Circular of the Russian Government repudiating part of the Treaty of Paris of 1856—Reply of Lord Granville—General Indignation in England and Expectation of War—Count von Bismarck's Proposal for a Conference adopted—The *Pros* and *Cons* on the side of Prussia—Change of Feeling in England with regard to Germany and much Sympathy shown for France—Celebrated Letter from Mr. Carlyle on the German side.

WE have shown in the preceding chapter that, early in November, the operations of the French on the south and south-west of Paris were no longer those of incoherent bodies of timid recruits, but those of a regular army under a general in whom it had confidence; and that they were conducted on a most extensive scale. M. Gambetta, too, had established himself as the temporary dictator of France. His efforts to revive the spirit and draw out the military resources of the country had been equally unremitting and successful. He made and unmade generals, and nothing was heard of his colleagues. The fiery, thorough Frenchman of the southern type, in fact, alone governed, and his government was recognized. In the east of France he appointed several new generals, and those deposed could only offer piteous protests against his misconstruction of their conduct. He ordered Bourbaki to give up the command of the army of the north, and Bourbaki obeyed. France, outside Paris, had a government once more; it had a large army; it kept the enemy in check. At Paris the Germans made apparently no progress in the direct operations of the siege. They seemed unable to take the forts; and had probably been led to abandon all thought of an assault as too dangerous and costly, by the immense preparations made against it since the investment of the city. The boast of General Trochu that Paris was impregnable, seemed so far justified; while the provinces were not merely doing their best, but doing a very great deal, to relieve it. The news of the French victory at Baccon had given new life and spirit to the city population. It appeared, as M. About put it, that after all there was such a thing as provincial France; and the Parisians, who thought themselves deserted, were now ready to co-operate with their deliverers as soon as they saw a fair chance. The successes of General d'Aurelles de Paladine on November 9 had, in fact, given to

France a new soul as well as a new army, which was designed for the relief of Paris; and in the opinion of every one except De Paladine himself, the auspicious day of hope and of triumph had at last dawned.

There are moments in almost every campaign when a single bold stroke, well aimed and delivered, will gain extraordinary results from fortune. Had General D'Aurelles, after his success at Baccon, pushed forward rapidly, either by the roads which lead straight from Toury to Paris or by the more circuitous route by Chartres, he could scarcely have failed to overwhelm the small force in his front, or at least to compel it to retreat with loss; in which case he would have found his way to the German lines open. When the news of the combats of the 9th and 10th arrived, the great general on whom devolved the direction of the German operations, alive to the extreme danger of a possible attack from without and within, had, as already stated, made preparations for removing his headquarters and raising the siege should it turn out that D'Aurelles was advancing on the French capital. But at this critical hour the latter was found wanting in genius and determination. He shrank from following up his success, and instead of making at once for Paris, he fell back on Arthenay and Orleans in order to obtain reinforcements and to form an entrenched camp under the screen of the forest, intended as a base for future operations. This was unquestionably a most unhappy resolve; but in justice to a veteran officer, who possessed no common organizing skill, it is fair to say that military reasons of a plausible kind may be assigned for it. There is no evidence to show that General Trochu, who communicated frequently with the provinces by balloons, pigeons, and other devices, expected relief at this moment; and if he had been unprepared to attack as soon as D'Aurelles appeared outside, the army of the Loire would perhaps have found itself in a dangerous position. In one respect General Paladine was, by what appeared a good authority, entirely misled as to the military obstacles in his path to Paris. M. Thiers had alarmed the French commander-in-chief by his report of having witnessed 80,000 Prussians on the way to Orleans; although this force, as explained in the previous chapter, was less than half the strength attributed to it by the veteran statesman. And whatever this army may have amounted to, it was quite diverted from the Orleans direction a day or two after M. Thiers had seen it, by being sent westward to Dreux, to cover the investing circle from the expected attack in that direction. The road from Orleans to Paris was thus left wholly undefended; for Prince Frederick Charles, although known to be coming, did not arrive from Metz till a fortnight later. It is true that the army of the Loire was as yet imperfectly trained, that its commissariat and ammunition service was but very indifferently organized, and that the depression caused by appalling reverses hung like a spell on the French commanders; and this may help us to understand why D'Aurelles hesitated to attempt the course which a bolder captain would have taken. The fact, however, remains, that this was the one golden opportunity of the war, and the responsibility of neglecting it must rest with the commander-in-chief, whose extreme caution led to his ultimate removal. When at last the patience of the minister of War was exhausted, and a letter by balloon from General Trochu, which unfortunately fell in Norway, informed Gambetta of the intended sortie by Ducrot, he allowed the generals near Orleans no further discretion in the matter. Accordingly, from November 28 to December 2, the operations of the army of the Loire took place which we shall presently describe; but unfortunately they were carried out by D'Aurelles at the most unfavourable moment that could have been chosen, whereas a fortnight earlier would have been the best. In the words of an anonymous, but very able military critic in the *Times*, to whom we have been greatly indebted, and whose impartial *resumé* of the events of the campaign has since been republished,* "It is useless, perhaps, to speculate on what would have been the probable result, had D'Aurelles made good his way to the German lines in the middle of November. We do not agree with those who think that the Germans, caught between two fires, would have suffered a terrible reverse; Von Moltke would have certainly drawn off in time, as Napoleon did before Mantua when he became aware of the approach of Wurmser; and it may be assumed that the army of the Loire would before long have been compelled to retreat. Nevertheless, the siege would have been raised; the armies of Paris, now in fair order, would have

* The Campaign of 1870–71. Republished by permission from the *Times*. London: Bentley and Son.

marched out and made the renewal of the investment in winter almost impossible; and it is difficult to imagine what the effect would have been on a brave and emotional race like the French. This indicates what a misfortune to France was the fall of Metz at the close of October; how, in the words of one in the German camp, the capitulation 'came in the nick of time.' Had the fortress held out ten days longer no additional corps could have been moved to Paris; in all probability the Grand-duke of Mecklenburg could not have been detached from the besieger's lines; no apparition of Prince Frederick Charles could have alarmed the chief of the army of the Loire—and, in these events, we can hardly doubt that D'Aurelles, who had already defeated, would have overwhelmed Von der Tann, and marched with his whole force to Paris."

General von Moltke, alive to the danger with which he had been threatened in consequence of Von der Tann's defeat, made a new disposition of the German forces without the delay of an instant. While the grand-duke of Mecklenburg and Von der Tanu were kept on the arc between Dreux and Toury, observing D'Aurelles and the French army of the west, the corps intended to march northwards were placed on an interior line from Laon in the direction of Rouen. Prince Frederick Charles received orders to suspend his movement towards the Upper Loire, to send a detachment to co-operate with the besiegers to the south of their lines, and to push "by forced marches" past the Upper Yonne, and take up positions in which he could communicate with Von der Tann and the grand-duke, and menace the right flank of the army of the Loire should it venture to make a move northwards. These movements were executed with the precision and celerity of well-commanded armies. Within a week after D'Aurelles had fallen back to his camp near Orleans, Manteuffel had formed a covering force against any incursion from the north; and the advanced guard of Prince Frederick Charles, reaching Fontainebleau, Nemours, and Pithiviers, and approaching the extreme left of Von der Tann, had almost closed the vast semicircle designed to oppose an iron barrier to the French armies of the Loire and west. Thus, the prospects of France, which on the 10th of November would have been really full of hope had a great commander wielded her forces, were overclouded by the 19th, and an opportunity equally favourable for repairing her disasters did not again occur.

Meanwhile great uneasiness had been caused at Versailles by the appearance of bodies of French troops on the roads leading to Paris from Rouen, Evreux, and Dreux. It was believed that the French armies of the north, and especially of Brittany, were about to make a convergent movement on Paris in combination with that of the Loire, and the French movements at Dreux seemed to confirm the belief. Detachments of the fifth and twelfth corps were therefore ordered from the neighbourhood of Versailles to support the grand-duke of Mecklenburg in meeting the anticipated attempt along the roads to Chartres and Dreux. This commotion proved, however, to have been caused chiefly by mere detachments of the forces of Brittany, which, upon the news of Von der Tann's retreat, had been pushed towards Paris. Dreux was held by about 6000 mobiles and marines, who, on the appearance of the duke of Mecklenburg, fought well; but as the opposing forces numbered more than 30,000 men, the French retired in great confusion towards Nonaucourt. Here they rested for the night, and were preparing the inevitable coffee early the following morning, when the alarm spread that the Prussians were coming. The headlong flight was resumed in the direction of Le Mans. For thirty leagues they were harassed by their pursuers, whose tread they could still hear while traversing with difficulty the woods under cover of a fog. It was this handful of Breton mobiles and of marines which had thus, perhaps unintentionally, given to their comrades of the Loire the immense opportunity to which we have alluded. General von Moltke had been completely deceived as to its numbers, and in order to disperse it he had left the road from Orleans to Paris entirely undefended, and sent westward an army beyond all proportion to the danger he had to fear.

After the victory of the 9th, M. Gambetta, who showed much of real greatness and capacity at this crisis, determined that at any rate divided counsels should be no impediment to vigour of action. General Reyan, who on the 9th had not been successful in outflanking Von der Tann, was civilly got rid of by an order removing all retired generals lately appointed to the staff; an order construed by Gambetta as applying to those only whom it was not considered desirable to retain, for General

D'Aurelles stood in the same list with the officer thus superseded. Longuerue, who had been under Reyan at the first, succeeded him, and D'Aurelles was promoted to the command-in-chief of the whole Loire army, having at the time of the battle had charge of only two corps, his own and the fifteenth. The former was handed over to General Pallières, one of the officers promoted by Gambetta after the battle, in recognition of the first success obtained by a French army in the war. Bourbaki was removed from his separate charge in the north to serve more immediately under D'Aurelles in the command of the eighteenth corps, and the independent command of General Fièreck and Count Keratry were also abolished. These arrangements were readily acquiesced in by all except Count Keratry, who hastily resigned his command, in a letter betraying a feeling of injured dignity.

Thus constituted generalissimo of the entire French forces south and east of Paris, General d'Aurelles de Paladine disposed of the army of the Loire as follows:—On the extreme left the seventeenth corps, under General Sonnis, was placed at Châteaudun, between which and Artenay, on the left also, was General Chanzy, with the sixteenth corps. The fifteenth corps, under General Martin des Pallières, was in the centre, with the headquarters behind Artenay; the twentieth, known hitherto as the army of the East, now under General Creuzot, was placed on the right about Ladon, nine miles due west from Montargis, and seven south-east from Beaune-la-Rollande; the extreme right, formed by the eighteenth corps under General Bourbaki, took up a position near Montargis. The united strength of the army thus brought into line amounted to 200,000 men, with about 14,000 cavalry, and between 500 and 600 guns.

After the false alarm at Versailles of a movement on Paris by Dreux was dissipated by the duke of Mecklenburg's successes over the petty levies which had created it, his triumphant progress towards Le Mans was suddenly checked by orders directing him to return and close in upon the right of Von der Tann, who lay isolated in front of the French camp. It had been discovered that D'Aurelles had not really moved; and it was either known or conjectured that behind his screen of wood he was receiving large reinforcements, to enable him to make a direct advance in overwhelming strength.

Whilst the duke of Mecklenburg drew in from the vicinity of Le Mans, and marched due eastward on Châteaudun, still more important reinforcements were on their way towards the other flank of Von der Tann. The march of Prince Frederick Charles with the three corps set free from Metz, was reported from day to day to be directed steadily on the passages of the Yonne, which crossed, he would be able to cover all the country between Fontainebleau and the Loire with the head of his columns. By November 24 these various corps had arrived, and the united armies of the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, Von der Tann, and Prince Frederick Charles now stretched away in a great arc of some 130 miles, trending nearly east and west, from Mamers by Chartres and Pithiviers to Montargis. The duke of Mecklenburg commanded on the western side of the arc, Von der Tann under him in the centre, and Prince Frederick Charles, whose headquarters were at Pithiviers, on the east. The principal forces of the Germans were on a line curving round from Senonches, eighteen miles south-west of Dreux on the left of Beaune-la-Rollande. Von der Tann's corps was between Bonneval, nine miles north from Châteaudun, and the Paris and Orleans road. The ninth Prussian corps was across that road in front of Toury; the third corps was in front of Pithiviers, and the tenth, forming the extreme left, was at Beaune-la-Rollande.

Such, about the 25th and 26th of November, were the positions of the armies intended to relieve and cover the siege of Paris. A glance at the map will show that, strategically, the French had a great advantage; from Marchenoir by Orleans to the road to Montargis, they had possession of the chord of the arc from Nogent-le-Rotrou, Chartres, Toury, to the left of Prince Frederick Charles, still somewhat to the east of Montargis; they held the principal roads to Paris, and could concentrate by shorter lines and more quickly than the enemy in front. United, they were in the proportion of nearly two to one to the Germans, for Prince Frederick Charles had not more than from 55,000 to 60,000 men, after the detachment he had made to the besieger's lines; Von der Tann and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg had probably not more than 45,000; and though the French troops, as a whole, were not to be compared with their foes, one half of them certainly were very fair soldiers. The arrangements did great credit to the military skill of D'Aurelles, and the zeal and patriotism of

the French people; they showed either that the German commanders underrated the strength of the army of the Loire, or were still exceedingly hard pressed; and though they did not present a prospect of success equal to that of the 9th and 10th November, a great commander would have known how to turn them to good account. In fact, with this difference, that his numerical strength was not half, but double, that of his foes, D'Aurelles was in a position similar to that of Napoleon when he invaded Belgium in 1815.

During all this time Prince Frederick Charles had been marching with extraordinary speed. His brigades advanced separately, by various roads, to their general rendezvous at Pithiviers; but D'Aurelles let them come without attempting to attack them, though General des Pallières asked to be allowed to march against them with his division, and though M. Gambetta wrote a despatch on the subject on the 13th November. General D'Aurelles, however, invoked the old arguments of bad weather, bad roads, and ill-clothed troops; and time passed uselessly until the 19th November, when M. Gambetta seems to have lost patience. On that day he wrote to the general as follows:—"We cannot stop eternally at Orleans. Paris is hungry, and calls for us. Prepare a plan which will enable us to reach Trochu, who will come out to meet us." General D'Aurelles declined, however, to prepare a plan, on the ground that he could not do so without knowing what General Trochu meant to do. It was not till about the 23rd November that orders were at last given to get ready to march, and to send forward a few divisions to open the road.

The first movement of D'Aurelles, judged by strategic principles, apart from its eventual failure, cannot be said to have been the wisest or most promising operation. He threw forward his right wing by Ladon, Maizières, and Montargis, without any similar advance of his centre and left; and on November 28 he attacked with two corps, more than 60,000 strong, the tenth Hanoverian corps of General Voigts-Rhetz, which held the left of the Prussian line, and lay in position between the towns of Corbeille and Beaune-la-Rollande, across the road to Fontainebleau and Melun. The attack was begun on the outposts, early in the morning, by the advanced guards of several French columns which debouched from the wooded country in front. They showed in such force that the Prussian pickets were obliged to retire hastily on their supports, which took up a position between Beaune and the Montargis Railway, covered in front by a small brook, and withdrew from Corbeille altogether. The French advanced rapidly, and soon after eleven a.m. drew up in a parallel line, their main columns being concealed in the hollows of the undulating ground. Swarms of their skirmishers opened a biting fire on the position of the Prussians, who replied as warmly, and obstinately held Beaune. The French artillery advanced at a gallop and crowned a high mound or hill which almost overlooks the town; while several heavy columns of infantry prepared to storm it under their fire. The artillery actually came within 500 yards of Beaune and seemed to riddle it, as well as the barricades at its entrance, with their shell splinters. Bullets came thick in return from these barricades and through the loopholed walls; but General Voigts-Rhetz could only hold his own. The French, who were in far superior numbers, began to extend their left, and enveloping the Prussian right, threatened to cut it off from Pithiviers, whence Prince Frederick Charles was bringing up supports in person. And sorely were they needed. The French left gradually closed round more and more. At one o'clock a mitrailleuse battery was established on the very road to Pithiviers. It opened on the rear of the hard-set Prussians, while the shell and mitrailleuse batteries on the hill referred to above tore their front; and on three sides they were assailed by a continuous fire of musketry from the infantry, which Hartmann's cavalry in vain tried to check by frequent demonstrations on the flanks. The position was most critical. It was only the courage and constancy of the men which rendered it tenable at all. General Voigts-Rhetz, seemingly with a presentiment of the desperate work the defence would involve, had issued orders for the corps to hold the village to the last man, and above all not to be made prisoners, even if surrounded. The corps was Hanoverian, and had never yet been beaten, even during the war of 1866, in the course of which, indeed, they had seen the backs of their Prussian foes. General Wedel, who commanded in Beaune, responded to the order of Voigts-Rhetz by expressing his determination to hold the place as long as he had a man left. The French General Creuzot had been bombarding the place for several hours, his troops throwing ball and shell into the

dwellings of their own countrymen, whose severe sufferings caused them to fly into the surrounding woods for shelter from the fire of their defenders. The town was on fire, but through smoke and flame the white jets of the musketry fire spurted out continuously with the roar of the artillery and the fitful grunts of the mitrailleuse. Meantime a sustained action was going on between the two other brigades of Voigts-Rhetz's corps and a French force which exceeded them in number; but for this the superiority of the Prussian artillery in open ground compensated.

The tenth corps, unsupported, had now held their position against overwhelming odds for nearly six hours. They were entirely surrounded by three French divisions, but refused to yield to a summons to surrender; on which the French suddenly pushed forward a great column to the assault of Beaune-la-Rollande, down the road to the main street. Men fell fast, but the column went on till it reached the barricade, where it was greeted with glistening bayonets, and soon melted away beneath a rolling fire. Long lines of dead and dying marked its path, thickest where the crossing of the brook caused a momentary delay and gave a steadier aim to their enemy. General Voigts-Rhetz, however, was very dangerously pressed, and his ammunition was expended almost to the last cartridge, when he received the welcome news that the "Red Prince" was close at hand, who, with his troops, began to show in the rear along the Pithiviers road. With steadiness and coolness, as if on parade, the columns drew up and formed in order of battle across the road, while thirty guns dashing forward covered a ridge north of Beaune, and opened fire on the French left. The arrival of these troops turned the day. Before they had formed up, the French began to withdraw their left, and D'Aurelles' took up a position in a line on the front of those troops who were fighting beyond the brook. But rapidly and skilfully as the French left retired, it could not avoid the attack directed against it by Stülpnagel, who drove straight at the heights over Beaune, and captured more than 1000 prisoners, who had held the various farmhouses. Voigts-Rhetz, thus relieved, at once assumed the offensive; but it was now dark, and pursuit was not possible, except in such charges as, by the light of the blazing town, Hartmann's cavalry could make on detached parties. The French artillery covered their retreat, and they drew off unmolested; but they left behind them their dead and wounded, and lost in all nearly 7000, including prisoners and missing; while the Prussians estimated their loss at only 1000 in that desperate fight.

At the time it was thought that this attack of the 28th was concerted with General Trochu in Paris, and that it threw a clear light on the object proposed by the latter in his sorties of the 29th, when Ducrot's attack on Villiers, postponed to the 30th on account of the rising of the Marne, was to have been made simultaneously with the demonstrations against Choisy and other points of the investing circle. It is now known, however, that the attack of the 28th was made in compliance with the urging of the Tours government, rather than as the result of any arrangement between D'Aurelles and Paris. A combined movement was certainly proposed by General Trochu, but, as we shall presently explain, it did not come to the knowledge of the commander of the Loire army until after the battle of Beaune la Rollande. Trochu's plan was limited to effecting a lodgment on the further side of the Marne, close to the besiegers' lines, and holding it until the arrival of a French army from the south, which he looked for on the 1st of December. As will be shown in the next chapter, he entirely performed his part of the plan; and it is obvious that, had an attack been made on the rear of the Würtemburgers by the troops coming from Beaune, at the same time that Ducrot assailed them in front, the Germans, obliged to concentrate their forces for a great battle, must have raised the investment. How nearly the only half-arranged plan succeeded is clear from the fact that, had the arrival of Prince Frederick Charles been delayed only one hour, he would in all likelihood have met the tenth corps in full retreat, and the two victorious French corps might then have marched to Paris by Fontainebleau. D'Aurelles, who in this operation had committed the grave strategical error of first striking at the strongest part of his enemy's line, now fell back towards his camp at Orleans, and remained inactive for two days, a delay which his adversaries turned to fatal account against him.

On the 13th November M. Gambetta had sent a pigeon-telegram to General Trochu, informing him of the victory of Coulmiers, and proposing joint action between the Loire and Paris armies. A balloon reply was received, agreeing to the

proposal, although Trochu himself had previously contemplated a great sortie in the direction of Rouen, and was rather disconcerted than otherwise at the success at Coulmiers. Another balloon left Paris on the 24th November, carrying word to D'Aurelles that a sortie on a large scale would be made on the 29th, in the hope of breaking the investing lines, and of effecting a junction with the army of the Loire. Most unfortunately, however, this balloon was carried into Norway, and it was not till the 30th that its intelligence reached Tours by telegraph. Such a definitive announcement from Paris was of course of the highest importance, and M. de Freycinet, M. Gambetta's delegate, was instantly sent up from Tours to General D'Aurelles, with instructions to send the whole army forward next morning towards Pithiviers, where the Red Prince's troops were supposed to be massed by this time. A council of war was called to meet M. de Freycinet, whose arrival was announced by telegraph; and though a march forward under such hasty circumstances was considered to be dangerous, and was objected to by the generals present, M. Gambetta's will prevailed. It was decided to attempt to form a junction with General Ducrot from Paris at Fontainebleau, and the details of the operation were discussed and settled. A large stock of food, representing eight days' rations for 300,000 men, had been prepared, and was to be sent after the army directly Pithiviers was taken.

These arrangements were made in the two days which followed the engagement of the 28th November. In the meantime, however, Prince Frederick Charles, warned by the affair of Beaune-la-Rollande, and having learnt, perhaps for the first time, the real strength of the French, perceived at a glance the disadvantageous position of the German forces, and issued orders for their concentration upon a narrower front, taking care, especially, to close the interval between Von der Tann and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg. Before this could be effected, however, the sixteenth and seventeenth French corps, under Chanzy and Sonnis, on December 1st attacked the Bavarians at Patay. Isolated as the Bavarians were, they were unable to withstand the impetuosity of a force nearly three times their strength; and for the greater part of a short winter's day a gleam of success warmed the hearts of the ill-fed and ill-supplied legions of General Paladine. Von der Tann's brigade was driven back with heavy loss; but it was almost immediately supported by two other brigades, and after a bloody fight the French were, by night-time, repulsed, though not until they had inflicted upon their adversaries losses amounting to above 400 in killed and wounded, of which the proportion of officers was unusually great. Had they been able to follow up their first advantage, and to push on somewhat further, the communication would have been severed between Von der Tann and the duke of Mecklenburg.

On the same day, December 1, another balloon reached Belle Isle, bringing news of the first day's sortie from Paris, announcing a victory, and stating that the battle would go on next day. Thereupon General D'Aurelles issued a proclamation to his men, saying, "Paris, by a sublime effort of courage and patriotism, has broken the Prussian lines. General Ducrot, at the head of his army, is marching toward us; let us march towards him with a vigour equal to that of the Paris army." Despatches were sent to Generals Briand at Rouen, and Faidherbe at Lille, begging them to support the movement by a concentric march on Paris, so as to occupy the Germans at all points. M. Gambetta telegraphed all over France that the hour of success had come at last, and in the course of a speech delivered at Tours the same day, said, "Thanks to the efforts of the entire country, victory returns to us, as if to make us forget the long series of our misfortunes. It favours us from every point. In effect, our army of the Loire has for three weeks disconcerted all the plans of the Prussians, and repulsed all their attacks. Their tactics have been powerless against the solidity of our troops, who have now vigorously launched themselves in advance. Our two great armies march to meet each other. In their ranks each officer and soldier knows that he holds in his hands the fate of the country itself. That alone renders them invincible. Who then would doubt henceforth the final issue of this gigantic struggle? The Prussians can appreciate to-day the difference between a despot who fights to satisfy his personal ambition, and an armed people which refuses to perish. It will be the everlasting honour of the republic to have given back to France the sentiment of herself, and, having found her in the depths of abasement, her armies betrayed, her soil occupied by the stranger, to have brought back to her military honour, the discipline of her armies, and victory.

The invader is now upon the route where he is awaited by the fire of our population raised in his rear. Behold, citizens, what can be done by a great nation which wishes to preserve intact the glory of its name, and to assert the triumph of right and of justice in the world! France and the universe will never forget that Paris first of all has given that example, has inculcated that policy, and has thus established her moral supremacy in remaining faithful to the heroic spirit of the Revolution."

Alas, that such fair prospects should be doomed to be so speedily extinguished! In the night following the battle of the 1st Von der Tann and the duke of Mecklenburg effected a junction with their respective forces, and on the morrow a more difficult task lay before the army of D'Aurelles. His troops, however, nothing daunted, resumed their attack on the 2nd, and a desperate conflict ensued, known afterwards as the battle of Bazoche-des-Hautes, which raged most fiercely round the chateau of Goury, a position which the French would certainly have captured but for the timely arrival of the Hanseatic brigade. Shortly afterwards, Prince Albrecht's cavalry also arrived, and the French retired to the village of Poupry, where for a time they made a gallant resistance. But though reinforced, they were unable to resist the steady wave of opposition which rolled upon them from nearly every side. The most they could hope to do was to retire as slowly as possible, and in this they succeeded, fighting well, and showing far more *élan*, the German officers said, than had been displayed by any of the troops they had already conquered. The village of Poupry was stormed soon after the middle of the day, and resulted in the capture of several coveted positions, sixteen guns, and about 2000 prisoners. The cost to the Germans was serious, but the result enabled them to interpose between the two French corps engaged (the sixteenth and seventeenth) and Pallières' fifteenth corps, which in consequence of the exposure of its left flank fell back before the enemy to Chevilly.

Prince Frederick Charles by this time had the whole German army nearly in hand, and resolved in turn to deal a decisive blow at the enemy now extended before him. Directing one of his corps to Beaumont, he restrained and paralyzed the whole French right wing, and struck rapidly at the comparatively scattered left and centre with the rest of his forces. On the 3rd he directed his ninth corps against Pallières' (fifteenth French corps) at Chevilly, and his third from Pithiviers, against Creuzot's twentieth corps at Chilleurs-aux-bois (due east from Artenay on the road from Orleans to Pithiviers). His tenth corps was advanced from Beaumont so as to interpose between the French eighteenth corps at Ladon and the twentieth at Chilleurs.

The engagements of December 3 were not of the sanguinary character of those of the two preceding days. The vast plain between Artenay and Orleans affords ample scope for the manœuvres of immense masses of troops, and as there could not have been fewer than 150,000 men visible at one time in battle array, the spectacle was unrivalled. Here large bodies of cavalry scoured the plain; there artillery dashed to the front, and opened suddenly on the enemy, as any fresh points were exposed in his retreat; while dense masses of troops steadily advanced to the attack of new positions. The main point of assault was Chevilly. The troops looked well in spite of the searching severity of the weather, and of their having, for the most part, bivouacked unprotected under wintry skies and on the cold ground. The landscape, of broken woodland, somewhat resembling the neighbourhood of Strathfieldsaye, was slightly covered with snow. Forage was difficult to get, for the country, thrice fought over in six weeks, had been eaten bare. But Prince Frederick Charles' commissariat had done its duty, and the men went into action with the full stomach that so remarkably ministers to courage. The snow was not deep enough as yet to muffle their tread, and the roads, hard as iron, gave out a ringing sound under every galloping hoof. Once in the day the French made a desperate attempt to turn the grand-duke's right flank, but the Bavarians gallantly baffled it, and got round south as far as Giday. For the most part, however, the tactics of the French were defensive; and assisted by the heavy batteries of position so well served by the marines, they made the work of the assailants arduous and costly. At one time a dexterous and bold charge was made by a regiment of hussars, who crept round a French battery, rapidly charged it from the rear, and simply escorted it off with every horse, gun, man, sponge, and stick belonging to it; a few hours afterwards the Germans had all, beautifully complete, exposed to view just behind the Great Louis' statue in front of the château

near Orleans. Night, however, which came so early at that season of the year, and which might well fall upon drawn battles, saw the French line abandoned. Five villages blazing in unison, the fair result of deadly and mutual fire, shed a lovely, if lurid, light over the snowy prospect; and by their assistant flames the victors read in deserted entrenchments and surrendered guns the measures of that day's success.

The troops bivouacked on the ground won, and the scene was as full of picturesque interest as that of the day. The night of the 3rd found at least 50,000 men of the German army sleeping "*unter freiem Himmel.*" Huge fires of unthrashed wheat straw added their quota of blaze to the burning villages, and the heavens were aglow with ruddy lights. Around these fires were grouped crowds of soldiers unable to do more than take brief naps on account of the cold, and constantly making short pilgrimages between the straw in which they tried to bury themselves when asleep, and that straw at which they warmed themselves when awake. It was melancholy to see the amount of food thus necessarily burnt. In the two miserable farmhouses which compose Beaugency, were quartered the grand-duke of Mecklenburg and his train, including more than one other royal personage, all of whom had to content themselves with straw to lie upon and short rations; for the column which contained the army provisions had not arrived, and the men had to put up with such as might happen to be in their pockets. But the morrow—after a darkness not too long for rest or respite—brought them face to face with another iron line. Chevilly had been won; but behind it stood Cercottes, and behind Cercottes were the lunettes and batteries of Montjoie If ever a hard day's work was set for an army flushed, yet fatigued, with victory, it would seem to be the work of that unsabbath-like Sabbath. Would Orleans be reached before the frosty stars once more glittered upon their weakened ranks? There were eighteen marine pieces in position at Cercottes, six to the right and twelve to the left; another twelve stood ready to defend Montjoie; whilst the intersection of four railways immediately north of Orleans itself was known to have been turned to very important account. Yet with all the excellence of their position and its adjuncts, the French fought but ill. Their guns were admirably served, but there was no heart in the infantry; and when an entire battery was triumphantly carried by a battalion of jagers at the point of the bayonet, there were no serried lines ambitious to retake it. The troops, once finding themselves hurrying to the rear, though they did not actually run away, were not sufficiently disciplined to obey their commanders blindly; and, like a horse who has taken the bit between his teeth, moved steadily backwards, fighting as they went, but refusing to wait anywhere long enough permanently to arrest the advance of the enemy. The latter, finding them in this mood, and feeling sure of their object, did not press them unduly, and hence, perhaps, the comparatively small loss on their part, and the order with which the retreat was conducted. It seemed almost as though it had been arranged that the one party should recede, and the other advance, at a given pace. There is no doubt that the Germans saved a great many lives by this policy; but it is not the less certain that, had they pressed the enemy as severely as they might have done, the enormous stores and materials of all sorts collected in Orleans for Paris would have fallen into their hands. These the French succeeded afterwards in carrying away in safety. Before twelve o'clock on the 4th Cercottes had been carried, and late in the afternoon, Montjoie ceased to resist. At five o'clock darkness descended upon victors and vanquished; the latter still keeping up a sullen fire as they retreated. The darkness, however, was not for long. At seven the moon rose, not quite full, but clear, and brightening the frosty air; and with it came the cry of "Forward."

The fifteenth French corps had fallen back, routed, on Orleans; the twentieth, prevented from gaining that city by the turning of its left, retreated across the Loire at Jargeau towards Vierzon. The eighteenth, thus isolated, retired to Sully on the Loire (about midway between Jargeau and Gien), and thence by Gien towards Bourges. These two corps then pursued their retreat separately, and were ultimately united at Bourges, with the fifteenth corps coming direct from Orleans, under Bourbaki. On the other flank, the sixteenth and seventeenth French corps, forming the right wing, had been cut off from all communication with the centre; and thus the fifteenth corps under Pallières was alone available for the defence of Orleans, which was supposed to be intrenched. In reality, a few earthen batteries had been thrown up, but unconnected with each other; while nothing effectual had




ILLIERS
BONNEVAL
CHATEAUDUN
CLOYES
Voves
Orgeres
Patay
Janville
Toury
Artenay
ORLEANS
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Marchenoir
MEUNG sur Loire
Cléry
Olivet
BEAUGENCY
MER
la Ferte St. Aubin
TOURS & PARIS RAILWAY
ORLEANS & TOURS RAILWAY
ORLEANS & PARIS RY.
ORLEANS & VIERZON RY.
LA LOIRE RIV.
FORET DE MARCHENOIR
Loir R.
le Cosson R.
Ardoux R.
Loiret R.
Moree
Drawn under the Superintendence of Captain H



AT STATIONERS HALL.
Engraved by Robert Walker
LONDON EDINBURGH & GLASGOW



been done towards clearing their line of fire in front, or for connecting them with each other, so that the position could be got through at almost any point by the enemy's skirmishers. With the large amount of labour available after the reoccupation of Orleans, there was apparently ample time to have constructed a really strong intrenched position, behind which D'Aurelles might have made an effective stand with the whole French army. As it was, these imperfect works were quite insufficient to reassure the young levies under his command, demoralized by defeat and hardship. If ever a lesson was to be learnt of the importance of the spade in war, it was here.

General D'Aurelles having sent word to Tours that he considered it impossible to defend Orleans successfully, Gambetta instantly replied by telegraph: "Your despatch of to-night causes the most painful stupefaction. I can see nothing in the facts it communicates to justify the desperate resolution with which it concludes. Thus far you have managed badly, and have got yourself beaten in detail; but you still have 200,000 men in a state to fight, provided their leaders set them the example of courage and patriotism. The evacuation you propose would be, irrespective of its military consequences, an immense disaster. It is not at the very moment when the heroic Ducrot is fighting his way to us that we can withdraw from him; the moment for such an extremity is not yet come. I see nothing to change for the present in the instructions which I sent you last evening. Operate a general movement of concentration, as I have ordered." The greater part of D'Aurelles' army had by this time been beaten and scattered; and to Gambetta's telegram he replied at eight on the morning of the 4th: "I am on the spot, and am more able than you are to judge the situation. It gives me as much grief as you to adopt this extreme resolution. Orleans is surrounded, and can no longer be defended by troops exhausted by three days of fatigue and battle, and demoralized by the heavy losses they have sustained. The enemy's forces exceed all my expectations, and all the estimates which you have given me. The city will fall into the enemy's hands to-night or to-morrow. That will be a great misfortune; but the only way to avoid a still greater catastrophe, is to have the courage to make a sacrifice while it is yet time. I therefore maintain the orders which I have given." This brought back, two hours later, another angry protest from Tours, leaving, however, to General d'Aurelles the power to retreat on his own responsibility. This despatch left Tours at 11 a.m. on the 4th, and at noon D'Aurelles wrote from Orleans as follows:—"I change my plans. I send to Orleans the sixteenth and seventeenth corps. I have summoned the eighteenth and twentieth corps. I am organizing the defence. I am at Orleans, at my post."

The Prussians, however, arrived near the city before either of these corps could be brought up, and from three p.m. till after dark the fifteenth corps sustained a severe onset, which resulted in their retreat on the town. M. Gambetta came up by special train from Tours in the afternoon, with the idea that his presence might produce some effect; but on getting within about ten miles of Orleans his train ran into a barricade, which had been hastily thrown across the line by the enemy. At the same time some uhlans lying in ambush fired upon him, and he escaped almost by a miracle. Severely shaken though he was by the shock of the collision, the minister got back on foot to Beaugency, where he took a carriage to Ecouis, in the hope of there getting some news from Orleans, but he could find none. He then made his way to Blois, where at nine in the evening he received, through Tours, from D'Aurelles the disheartening despatch:—"I had hoped up to the last moment not to evacuate Orleans; but all my efforts were useless. I shall evacuate to-night."

The general belief in the efficient state of the army of the Loire, the news about Ducrot, the success on the 1st of December, followed by the decoration of Chanzy with the grand cross of the Legion of Honour, and certain intimations of the archbishop while conducting a special divine service, had not prepared the people of Orleans to expect the reverse which had already occurred. But the vague rumours which began to circulate on the 3rd, and which were considerably strengthened by the arrival of fractions of the defeated regular regiments, had begun to excite fears among the inhabitants that they might once more fall into the hands of the Germans. Many wealthy families, therefore, who, since the reoccupation of Orleans by the French, had returned to their homes, again began to prepare for leaving. Saturday night (the 3rd) saw the beginning of the flow of emigration,

which was then ascribed mainly to timidity and exaggerated fears. Circumstances which occurred on the 4th, however, justified these apprehensions. A fearful noise of military carriages and waggons driving towards the bridge of the Loire had been heard through the whole night; all the stores of provisions intended to be carried into Paris as soon as an opportunity should occur, were sent to the southern bank of the river; and this, coupled with the further fact that in the morning, about seven o'clock, some ammunition carriages were observed taking the same direction, and blocking up the street by attempting to go three abreast—clearly indicative, not of precautionary measures, but of an intention to retreat—placed the unpleasant truth beyond further doubt.

In the afternoon and evening of the 4th the panic spread to the troops, who in retreating resembled more a flying mob than retiring columns. Men, horses, and waggons were jammed in the struggles to cross the bridge, as if the enemy had been at their heels. At a later hour quiet was restored, as it was generally supposed that the Germans would not enter the town until the following morning. The hotels were full of French officers carousing, as usual, and who were captured in great numbers, most of them in their beds. The reason of the midnight evacuation of the town was the sudden arrival of the duke of Mecklenburg's army, about nine o'clock, from the direction of Chartres, of the Bavarians by a road a little further to the west, while the third army corps was arriving from the east. Finding himself thus encompassed on all sides, General Pallières proposed to the grand-duke that his troops should be allowed three hours' grace to get across the bridge; threatening at the same time to blow it up and continue the defence of the town, should the proposal be rejected. As the Loire was then full of ice, and it would have been the work of some days to throw across a pontoon bridge, the grand-duke consented; thus probably saving much bloodshed. The retreat was then hurriedly effected, and when, at midnight, the Bavarians once more poured into the city, only a few isolated detachments remained to swell their already long roll of prisoners. The fifteenth corps, after crossing the river at Orleans, retreated on Vierzon.

The army of the Loire was thus broken to pieces, with a loss, including prisoners, of more than 15,000 men. All the heavy naval guns in the entrenched camp around the city fell into the hands of the enemy, with four gun boats, which had also been designed to assist in the defence. The attempt to relieve Paris had resulted in complete failure; but that the retreat was conducted with more than usual order, with the exception of the panic in getting away from Orleans, is proved by the fact that the loss of field artillery was comparatively small: eighty guns only were claimed, about forty-five of which were those of the entrenched camp. The French, during four days, disputed every available point, and retired as slowly as was practicable, consistently with their knowledge that two German corps d'armée were marching rapidly from opposite directions to get at their rear. "Talent in a general," said Napoleon, "is nothing without vigour and strength of character; and few men are able to direct an army 150,000 strong"—a remark which forms a fitting commentary on the conduct of D'Aurelles during these days. He had arranged his troops with much ability, but he failed in moving them so as to improve the advantage which his great superiority in numbers gave him. In his advance on Beaune-la-Rollande he had struck at his enemy at the strongest side, entirely neglecting that which was weak—the uncovered gap between Chartres and Toury; and though he was in the proportion of two to one, he had struck feebly and partially. He might have attacked with at least 20,000 more men, in which case he would probably have won, ill-planned as we may think his scheme to have been. If so, it would have been difficult to have intercepted him on the way to Paris, and what might the result have been if, in place of assailing Prince Frederick Charles, he had pushed in between Von der Tann and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg with a force which, on the 28th and 29th, the Germans certainly could not have withstood; or had he even thrown his whole line forward instead of advancing a single army? In truth, his movements on the 28th were vacillating, tentative, doubtful, and weak; and they not only led to defeat, but enabled his antagonists to form their plans. His hesitation, too, on the 1st of December, on which day his principal attack was not made till past noon, allowed Prince Frederick Charles to collect his comparatively small and ill-united army within menacing distance of the French, who were superior in numbers and better concentrated; and the feeble efforts

he then made, and the remissness with which he saw his enemy close upon his centre and crush it, between his disseminated wings, are proofs of incompetence for high command. Contrast with this his enemy's movements. The German army was dangerously divided at first; and the single corps of Prince Frederick Charles was seriously threatened on the 28th of November. But the peril once seen, with what clear insight he averted it, and plucked from it safety! How skilfully he took advantage of the slackness of his foe, and held one of the French wings in check with a force probably not a third its numbers, while he collected the mass which he rightly calculated would suffice to overwhelm D'Aurelles' centre, and render his own army irresistible at the decisive point! The more these operations of the combatants are studied, the more it will appear that the French were defeated rather by superior strategy than because of the bad quality of their troops. Events, indeed, were quickly to show how a fragment of the army of the Loire, under another commander, could contend with honour against a victorious enemy; but this we leave for the more detailed narrative of December events.

In the eastern departments the German army under General Werder, after investing Schlestadt, Neu Breisach, and Belfort, and clearing the southern Vosges, advanced to within ten miles of Besançon, a fortress of the first-class and the headquarters of the so-called French army of the east. Here detachments of troops were found in outpost on all the roads leading to the Ognon; behind which river they drew into position, apparently determined to dispute the passages which the Germans broke into several columns to make. The principal fighting was on October 22, at Cussey, where the stone bridge, though neither destroyed nor barricaded, was defended by a sharp fire from the village beyond, which the French occupied in force. General Degenfeld, the German commander, after letting his guns play for some time on the houses, suddenly ordered the leading battalion, formed in column, to storm at a double; and the order was so well carried out that the Prussians, crossing the bridge at a rush, carried the village beyond with the bayonet, taking more than 200 of the defenders prisoners, and driving the rest into a wood—a feat on the achievement of which General Werder, who witnessed it, personally congratulated the troops. The brigade, having lost only twenty-seven men in the assault, now ascended the hill beyond, which divides the valley of the Ognon from that of the Doubs, in which Besançon lies. The other columns crossed the Ognon at various passages, and closed in. They soon found the French posted in a strong position, flanked by heavy field guns, from which, however, the reserve artillery of the Germans, which Werder ordered to be brought into action, dislodged them without further fighting. The cavalry followed up the retreat, but were soon repulsed by the fire from skirmishers in woods on the flank; and on a support of infantry being sent to dislodge these, it was found that they had fallen back finally on a line of earthworks, constructed with some pains to cover the approaches to Besançon on this side. The flanking columns had lost about sixty killed and wounded. General Werder estimated the French now concentrated before him at about 12,000 strong; but he had no intention of attacking them further, having already accomplished his object, which was to clear his way thoroughly before turning westward to make the flank march on Dijon. On the 24th he began to file off by his right towards Gray, a change of direction which he effected without being disturbed. On the 27th two petty actions were fought during the advance beyond this place, where the columns, meeting separately, found the roads barricaded and preparations made for resistance. In each of these affairs the French stood just long enough to enable the column they encountered to turn one flank and take a number of prisoners, among them several armed peasants, who were tried next day by a court-martial and shot, in accordance with the severe policy which the German authorities had adopted with regard to persons of this class. On the 28th Gray was left by the headquarters, and in the evening advanced posts were in sight of Dijon: they had come up so rapidly as to capture the French mail on its way into the town.

The comparative inaction of the Germans, for the week or ten days prior to these events, had led to the belief amongst the French that the presence of Garibaldi and their army of the east had so scared General Werder as to deter him from any further advance in that quarter. Reports, indeed, ascribed several victories to the Garibaldians, who were popularly supposed to have captured many

This naturally produced considerable confusion in the ranks, which was not lessened by their clumsily repeating the infliction in rising. Some were wounded in the feet, others in the legs, others in the hands and arms, and others in the back. Once up, however, they brought their rifles to their shoulders and fired, although they had been expressly ordered to use their bayonets only. A large portion of the French troops, who were some distance ahead, of course received the volley, which caused amongst them indescribable confusion. The Italians and franc-tireurs, who up to the present had sustained the German fire with coolness, imagined that they were attacked by the enemy in the rear. Many thought that they were cut off from the other portion of the army, and did their best to reach it. The mobiles, seeing men coming towards them, turned and fled, and neither persuasion nor menace availed to bring them back. The retreat now became general, and Garibaldi and his staff were left almost alone, surrounded only by the seventh chasseurs d'Afrique and the Italians. Had 500 horsemen been sent at this moment in pursuit, half of the army would have been either made prisoners or cut to pieces. Fortunately for the Garibaldians, the Germans appeared contented with having driven them back, and did not seem to be aware of the advantage they had gained.

Save those under the immediate orders of Garibaldi and his sons, there were no large bands of franc-tireurs in the Vosges and eastern districts generally. This was principally owing to the unfavourable light in which the general was regarded, and was the more to be regretted by the French, as no other part of the country offered such opportunities for the tactics of well-organized free-shooters. The French generals of the regular army would neither serve under him nor give him any assistance, and they derided the orders of the government at Tours when it tried to compel them to do so. General Cambriels was superseded chiefly because he entirely ignored him, and would not even take the trouble to read his reports and orders. General Michel, Cambriels' successor, was at bottom of the same disposition, though he cloaked it with outward civility. Garibaldi, it was remembered, had fought against the French army in 1849 and 1868, and had so habitually abused them that sympathy with him from their superior officers was hardly to be expected. He had also a very dangerous enemy in the entire Catholic priesthood, whose influence with the people was unlimited. The French peasant, especially in the Vosges and in the Jura, can seldom read, and in all political matters follows blindly the leading of his priest. The village priests, with few exceptions, bitterly disliked Garibaldi as the pope's most dangerous enemy. Some, indeed, confessed that as Frenchmen they hated all Prussians intensely; but as good Catholics they hated Garibaldi still more, and refused absolution to any of their flock who dared to assist or serve under him. Thus the largest following which ever assembled under his command in the Vosges was about 8000 badly-armed and undisciplined men; 3000 of whom were Italians, 1500 Hungarians, Poles, Americans, &c., and scarcely 3000 Frenchmen. These last were chiefly youths from Lyons and other large towns, enthusiastic but undisciplined, and all expecting to be speedily made officers. They had only twelve guns and 300 cavalry, and the whole corps must have been scattered to the winds on the first encounter with a well-commanded Prussian division.

The various fortresses which were either regularly besieged or invested in this portion of France, became an easier prey to the enemy in consequence of the withdrawal in November of General Michel and his army of the east, to form part of the left wing of the great army of the Loire under D'Aurelles de Paladine, designed to advance on the besiegers of Paris. Early in October commenced the siege of Neu Breisach, a place constructed on the plan which Vauban almost uniformly followed in erecting his small fortresses. It is in the form of a regular octagon, the *enceinte* of which is pierced with four gates; it has also barracks and a tolerably spacious arsenal. Louis XIV., having been obliged to cede Alt Breisach to Austria by the treaty of Ryswick, built the new fortress two years afterwards on the left bank of the Rhine. Fort Mortier, an outwork at a distance of about a mile, was subjected to a severe bombardment, and captured after a gallant defence on November 9. For eleven days succeeding, Neu Breisach itself was fiercely and continuously bombarded. The engineer officer in command, Captain Marsal, was killed by a shell on the 19th, and his death had a very discouraging effect on the garrison. Most of the guns having been rendered totally useless, it was seen that further resistance would only occasion

unnecessary bloodshed. A council of war was therefore held, which assented to a proposition for capitulation. The garrison, numbering 5000 men, were conveyed as prisoners of war to Rastadt. This made the twelfth French fortress captured by the Germans, and there were at the same time six others in a state of siege or investment.

Brittany and most of the western departments had as yet escaped the raids of enterprising uhlans. It was rumoured that 60,000 Prussians had been told off after the siege of Metz to overrun the west, but the Bretons themselves were little alarmed. The natural defences of the province are stronger than in any part of France. The mountains, rivers, and bridges are very numerous; and all the land under cultivation is divided into small fields of from four to eight acres, each surrounded by a bank seven or eight feet high, and six feet thick. No detachment of the enemy could have marched through a region so protected without serious risk. Here, as in some other parts of the country, the call to arms was responded to with an alacrity and self-sacrifice unprecedented. The greater number of the garde mobile were already before the enemy; and the remainder, who were ready to start at an hour's notice, might be seen drilling every morning with the garde sedentaire, from seven o'clock till nine. The calling out of the latter class would appear to have been a great mistake; for there was not the least probability of their services ever being required. Many of the Breton peasants, also, complained bitterly of the decree which called out all men up to forty years of age. It was found to be particularly oppressive at a time when they were employed on their farms in sowing corn for the next year's consumption; and as the days at that season are short, three hours taken from them daily to military exercises, seriously diminished the time required for agricultural pursuits. The people justly argued that this and a few other favoured departments, not likely to be laid waste by the victorious armies of King William, would be the only ones that could grow corn for the next year's consumption, and that their time would therefore be better employed in raising bread for the survivors of their country, than in going to drill for the amusement of M. Gambetta.

In the more southern departments nothing of importance occurred beyond the desperate attempts of bands of socialists to establish in Marseilles and Lyons those communal institutions, which subsequently at Paris brought additional disaster and confusion upon the country, after the Franco-German war terminated.

The delegate government at Tours was not so profuse in its issue of decrees, during November, as in the previous month. Among the most important was one to the effect, that the departments situated in the valley of the Rhone, between Lyons and the sea, should, from their geographical position, have a common plan of defence. To organize such a plan a superior committee was appointed, composed of the general commanding the eighth military division, the director of fortifications and engineers at Lyons, Marseilles, Grenoble, and Nimes, two civilian managers of ironworks, two engineers of mines and bridges, and an inspector of telegraphs. They had power, in concert with the departmental committees of defence, to execute works, to find artillery, and to transport and place in position heavy guns. The fortified posts were to be united by a special line of telegraph wire.

An extremely unpopular decree, already incidentally alluded to, was issued early in November, that married men and widowers were no longer to be exempt from military service during the war. In many parts the decree was resented by the peasantry, who openly refused to obey it, saying that they would rather be shot for disobedience near home, than killed by the enemy at a distance. The decree was ill-advised, as France had already far more volunteers than she could find arms for, and it was certainly against her established law and custom that a married man or widower with children dependent on him should be forced to take service. The measure was one proof among others of M. Gambetta's determination to war to the death, and to provide that the defence should increase in strength and obstinacy with the onward march of the Prussians. The intense ill feeling, however, provoked throughout the country by this unpopular decree, led, shortly after, to its recall.

An order was also issued to the various departments to provide a battery of artillery for every 100,000 of their population, with 200 projectiles for every cannon. Had M. Gambetta's various decrees been carried out, France, by the end of December, would have been in possession of 2000 field pieces and 3,000,000 soldiers, irrespective of the army of the Loire.

This naturally produced considerable confusion in the ranks, which was not lessened by their clumsily repeating the infliction in rising. Some were wounded in the feet, others in the legs, others in the hands and arms, and others in the back. Once up, however, they brought their rifles to their shoulders and fired, although they had been expressly ordered to use their bayonets only. A large portion of the French troops, who were some distance ahead, of course received the volley, which caused amongst them indescribable confusion. The Italians and franc-tireurs, who up to the present had sustained the German fire with coolness, imagined that they were attacked by the enemy in the rear. Many thought that they were cut off from the other portion of the army, and did their best to reach it. The mobiles, seeing men coming towards them, turned and fled, and neither persuasion nor menace availed to bring them back. The retreat now became general, and Garibaldi and his staff were left almost alone, surrounded only by the seventh chasseurs d'Afrique and the Italians. Had 500 horsemen been sent at this moment in pursuit, half of the army would have been either made prisoners or cut to pieces. Fortunately for the Garibaldians, the Germans appeared contented with having driven them back, and did not seem to be aware of the advantage they had gained.

Save those under the immediate orders of Garibaldi and his sons, there were no large bands of franc-tireurs in the Vosges and eastern districts generally. This was principally owing to the unfavourable light in which the general was regarded, and was the more to be regretted by the French, as no other part of the country offered such opportunities for the tactics of well-organized free-shooters. The French generals of the regular army would neither serve under him nor give him any assistance, and they derided the orders of the government at Tours when it tried to compel them to do so. General Cambriels was superseded chiefly because he entirely ignored him, and would not even take the trouble to read his reports and orders. General Michel, Cambriels' successor, was at bottom of the same disposition, though he cloaked it with outward civility. Garibaldi, it was remembered, had fought against the French army in 1849 and 1868, and had so habitually abused them that sympathy with him from their superior officers was hardly to be expected. He had also a very dangerous enemy in the entire Catholic priesthood, whose influence with the people was unlimited. The French peasant, especially in the Vosges and in the Jura, can seldom read, and in all political matters follows blindly the leading of his priest. The village priests, with few exceptions, bitterly disliked Garibaldi as the pope's most dangerous enemy. Some, indeed, confessed that as Frenchmen they hated all Prussians intensely; but as good Catholics they hated Garibaldi still more, and refused absolution to any of their flock who dared to assist or serve under him. Thus the largest following which ever assembled under his command in the Vosges was about 8000 badly-armed and undisciplined men; 3000 of whom were Italians, 1500 Hungarians, Poles, Americans, &c., and scarcely 3000 Frenchmen. These last were chiefly youths from Lyons and other large towns, enthusiastic but undisciplined, and all expecting to be speedily made officers. They had only twelve guns and 300 cavalry, and the whole corps must have been scattered to the winds on the first encounter with a well-commanded Prussian division.

The various fortresses which were either regularly besieged or invested in this portion of France, became an easier prey to the enemy in consequence of the withdrawal in November of General Michel and his army of the east, to form part of the left wing of the great army of the Loire under D'Aurelles de Paladine, designed to advance on the besiegers of Paris. Early in October commenced the siege of Neu Breisach, a place constructed on the plan which Vauban almost uniformly followed in erecting his small fortresses. It is in the form of a regular octagon, the *enceinte* of which is pierced with four gates; it has also barracks and a tolerably spacious arsenal. Louis XIV., having been obliged to cede Alt Breisach to Austria by the treaty of Ryswick, built the new fortress two years afterwards on the left bank of the Rhine. Fort Mortier, an outwork at a distance of about a mile, was subjected to a severe bombardment, and captured after a gallant defence on November 9. For eleven days succeeding, Neu Breisach itself was fiercely and continuously bombarded. The engineer officer in command, Captain Marsal, was killed by a shell on the 19th, and his death had a very discouraging effect on the garrison. Most of the guns having been rendered totally useless, it was seen that further resistance would only occasion

unnecessary bloodshed. A council of war was therefore held, which assented to a proposition for capitulation. The garrison, numbering 5000 men, were conveyed as prisoners of war to Rastadt. This made the twelfth French fortress captured by the Germans, and there were at the same time six others in a state of siege or investment.

Brittany and most of the western departments had as yet escaped the raids of enterprising uhlans. It was rumoured that 60,000 Prussians had been told off after the siege of Metz to overrun the west, but the Bretons themselves were little alarmed. The natural defences of the province are stronger than in any part of France. The mountains, rivers, and bridges are very numerous; and all the land under cultivation is divided into small fields of from four to eight acres, each surrounded by a bank seven or eight feet high, and six feet thick. No detachment of the enemy could have marched through a region so protected without serious risk. Here, as in some other parts of the country, the call to arms was responded to with an alacrity and self-sacrifice unprecedented. The greater number of the garde mobile were already before the enemy; and the remainder, who were ready to start at an hour's notice, might be seen drilling every morning with the garde sedentaire, from seven o'clock till nine. The calling out of the latter class would appear to have been a great mistake; for there was not the least probability of their services ever being required. Many of the Breton peasants, also, complained bitterly of the decree which called out all men up to forty years of age. It was found to be particularly oppressive at a time when they were employed on their farms in sowing corn for the next year's consumption; and as the days at that season are short, three hours taken from them daily to military exercises, seriously diminished the time required for agricultural pursuits. The people justly argued that this and a few other favoured departments, not likely to be laid waste by the victorious armies of King William, would be the only ones that could grow corn for the next year's consumption, and that their time would therefore be better employed in raising bread for the survivors of their country, than in going to drill for the amusement of M. Gambetta.

In the more southern departments nothing of importance occurred beyond the desperate attempts of bands of socialists to establish in Marseilles and Lyons those communal institutions, which subsequently at Paris brought additional disaster and confusion upon the country, after the Franco-German war terminated.

The delegate government at Tours was not so profuse in its issue of decrees, during November, as in the previous month. Among the most important was one to the effect, that the departments situated in the valley of the Rhone, between Lyons and the sea, should, from their geographical position, have a common plan of defence. To organize such a plan a superior committee was appointed, composed of the general commanding the eighth military division, the director of fortifications and engineers at Lyons, Marseilles, Grenoble, and Nimes, two civilian managers of ironworks, two engineers of mines and bridges, and an inspector of telegraphs. They had power, in concert with the departmental committees of defence, to execute works, to find artillery, and to transport and place in position heavy guns. The fortified posts were to be united by a special line of telegraph wire.

An extremely unpopular decree, already incidentally alluded to, was issued early in November, that married men and widowers were no longer to be exempt from military service during the war. In many parts the decree was resented by the peasantry, who openly refused to obey it, saying that they would rather be shot for disobedience near home, than killed by the enemy at a distance. The decree was ill-advised, as France had already far more volunteers than she could find arms for, and it was certainly against her established law and custom that a married man or widower with children dependent on him should be forced to take service. The measure was one proof among others of M. Gambetta's determination to war to the death, and to provide that the defence should increase in strength and obstinacy with the onward march of the Prussians. The intense ill feeling, however, provoked throughout the country by this unpopular decree, led, shortly after, to its recall.

An order was also issued to the various departments to provide a battery of artillery for every 100,000 of their population, with 200 projectiles for every cannon. Had M. Gambetta's various decrees been carried out, France, by the end of December, would have been in possession of 2000 field pieces and 3,000,000 soldiers, irrespective of the army of the Loire.

Another decree, on the 26th November, ordered the immediate formation of camps for instructing and concentrating mobilized national guards called out by the decree of the 2nd. Mobile guards, free corps, and contingents of the regular army, were also to be admitted into these camps, which were to be formed at St. Omer, Cherbourg, Conlie, Nevers, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Pas des Lanciers, Bouches du Rhone, and Lyons. Those at St. Omer, Cherbourg, La Rochelle, and Pas des Lanciers, were specially intended for strategical purposes, and were to be put in a fit state to receive 250,000 men. The others were to be capable of containing 60,000 men, and to be only camps of instruction. The artillery demanded of the provinces was to be delivered at these camps.

The happy liberty insured by a republic was exemplified by the somewhat peremptory manner in which M. Gambetta's prefects carried out his instructions. He had ordered that the *Bulletin of the Republic* should be read at certain times to "educate" the people in republican principles. Some of the newly-appointed prefects, enthusiastic disciples of the creed, went the length of attaching to disobedience of the order all sorts of pains and penalties. One of them, the prefect of Vienne, fearing probably that the immoral stories in which the *Bulletin* abounds might be slurred over, issued instructions that the schoolmasters should read in a loud and solemn voice, that they should enter into explanations, and that those who showed any lack of zeal in this service should be dismissed from their offices. In many of the districts the prefects forbade all religious instruction whatever, and some teachers, male and female, resigned their posts rather than submit to such a prohibition.

Early in the month many of the clergy patriotically united in offering the bells of their churches to be cast into cannon, an offer which M. Gambetta, on behalf of the government, accepted. Some of the newspapers remarked at the time, that the next step would be to seize those which had not been offered, and in one or two places this anticipation was actually realized. The prefect of Perpignan asked the various parishes in his district for a return of the size and weight of their bells, which he stated, however, would be taken only as required. The country people, however, very strongly objected to part with them; nor was there the slightest occasion why they should. During the war of the old republic, when France was blockaded by sea, and had no means of obtaining copper, it was absolutely necessary to seize the church bells. But she could now get, without difficulty, as much of it from abroad as she pleased. Besides, she had in one arsenal alone 2,000,000 kilos. of it; and in case of urgent necessity, every household in France could, if asked, have contributed at least one copper utensil, all the cooking apparatus there being made of that metal.

The evening of November 23 witnessed in every church throughout France the closing ceremonial of the Triduum. The gravity of events and the continued suffering of the people led the bishops to summon a special general council, in which it was decreed that a Triduum, or, in other words, the exposition of the real presence—the most solemn act of devotion in the Catholic Church—should be celebrated for three consecutive days in every diocese and parish in the kingdom. Whatever the religion of a country, there is nothing more solemn or touching than the spectacle of an entire nation, and that nation in mourning, lifting up its voice in united supplication to Heaven for deliverance from a cruel and heavy scourge. The response furnished a striking proof that Frenchmen fully realized the unprecedented danger of their position, and that they would neglect no means, human or divine, to avert the awful calamity impending over them.

The collateral evils and dangers arising from the war must have convinced the most obstinate believers in a policy of isolation, how universally the security of Europe is affected by a conflict between two of its greatest powers. The general sympathy of England with a just cause failed to conciliate the goodwill of the Prussian government or of the German army and nation. During the Crimean struggle arms and munitions of war had been freely exported from Prussia to Russia; and in the present contest the following rifled cannon and ammunition were furnished to the French from the United States within a period of about two months:—*Pereire*, date of shipment, September 3, 2500 guns and carbines; *Lafayette*, September 20, 6000 guns and carbines, and 3,000,000 cartridges; *Ville de Paris*, October 8, 90,000 guns and carbines, and 8,000,000 cartridges; *St. Lawrence*, October 20, 60,000 guns and carbines, and 7,000,000 cartridges; *Pereire*, October 29, 50,000 guns and carbines, and 9,000,000 cartridges; *Avon*,

November 2, 80,000 guns and carbines, 11,000 boxes of cartridges, five Gatling batteries, and 2000 pistols; *Ontario*, November 7, 90,000 guns and carbines, 18,000,000 cartridges, and fifty-five cannon; total, 378,500 guns and carbines, 45,000,000 and 11,000 boxes cartridges, fifty-five cannon, five Gatling batteries, and 2000 pistols.

The North German government expressly forbade its consul at New York to interfere with the traffic in arms, and the relations of the confederation with the United States were friendly and even intimate; yet, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a comparatively insignificant exportation of arms from England to France served as a pretext for repeated protests. In his first complaint Count Bernstorff, conscious of the legal weakness of his case, invented a new doctrine of benevolent neutrality which ought, as he contended, to have been observed by England. Lord Granville, in a despatch equally courteous and conclusive, showed that, as benevolence to one belligerent could only be exercised at the expense of the other, Count Bernstorff's proposed rule for the conduct of neutrals involved a contradiction in terms. The new paradox was retracted, but the complaint was repeated in stronger language; and it was difficult at the time to avoid a suspicion that Count von Bismarck was actuated by political motives in displaying coldness to England. The suspicion seemed to be confirmed when, in the middle of November, the Russian government suddenly issued a circular repudiating a principal clause in the Paris treaty of 1856. Prince Gortschakoff stated that recent events affecting the balance of power had compelled the czar to reconsider the position of his empire, to which he found the neutralization of the Black Sea was injurious. Turkey could keep fleets in the Archipelago and the Straits. England and France could keep fleets in the Mediterranean; while the southern coasts of Russia were undefended. Written international law was no longer held in respect; the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had been united; the Black Sea had been entered by whole squadrons; in fact, the treaty had been violated in its essential provisions, and the emperor, therefore, "bids his envoys declare that he can no longer consider himself as being bound ('ne saurait se considerer plus longtemps comme liée') by the obligations of the treaty of 1856." He withdrew also from the convention with Turkey limiting the fleet of each power in the Black Sea, and permitted Turkey to do the same. Otherwise, he entirely adhered to the treaty, and did not wish to re-open the eastern question.

Lord Granville's reply was very firm, though courteous in tone. He pointed out that, though Russia did not profess to release herself at present from *all* the engagements of the treaty, "yet the assumption of a right to renounce any one of its terms involves the assumption of a right to renounce the whole." Prince Gortschakoff had indeed professed the intention of the Russian government to respect certain of these terms while it proposed to set aside others; but "however satisfactory this may be in itself, it is obviously an expression of the free-will of that power, which it might at any time alter or withdraw, and in this it is thus open to the same objections as the other portions of the communication, because it implies the right of Russia to annul the treaty on the ground of allegations of which she constitutes herself the only judge. Her Majesty's government have received this communication with deep regret, because it opens a discussion which might unsettle the cordial understanding it has been their earnest endeavour to maintain with the Russian government." Had Russia invited a congress to reconsider the provisions to which she now objected, her Majesty's government would not have refused to examine the question, in concert with the co-signataries to the treaty; and by that means "a risk of future complications and a very dangerous precedent as to the validity of international obligations would have been avoided." Lord Granville's language was felt to be very grave, perhaps not the less grave for its studious self-restraint and reserve. The great question now seemed to be whether the struggle in which it appeared almost certain that England must be involved, was to be with Russia alone, or with Russia and Prussia together, a secret understanding between these two powers being strongly suspected. Mr. Odo Russell was accordingly sent to the king of Prussia's headquarters at Versailles to ascertain, if possible, whether the North German government had been privy to the offensive menace of Russia. Prince Gortschakoff's circular had been issued when it might have been thought that the war was practically ended by the surrender of Metz, and its publication while the German armies still lay outside the walls of Paris

was inopportune and unwelcome. The envoy of England was received with profuse courtesy at Versailles; the German government repudiated the idea of any secret agreement with Russia, and the immediate risk of collision was staved off by the general adoption of Count von Bismarck's proposal of a conference.

The circular of Prince Gortschakoff excited in England universal indignation, all classes and nearly all journals contending that, unless Russia receded from her position, there must be a declaration of war. The effect on Change was nearly as great as that of the Duc de Gramont's declaration, all securities falling 2 per cent., and the weaker continental stocks from 2 to 5; while Turkish securities dropped 9 per cent. in two days. The panic in Frankfort was even greater, the tone of the Viennese press being most warlike, while that of Berlin affected to make light of the whole subject. The Turkish government at once commenced arming, and in the English War Office an unusual bustle and excitement prevailed. There seems little doubt that, but for the adoption of Count von Bismarck's amicable suggestion, Great Britain, Turkey, and Austria would have declared war against Russia, and proceeded to immediate operations.

The repudiation of the treaty was received throughout Russia with immense enthusiasm, and considerably smoothed the way for the execution of a decree, already issued, introducing the Prussian system of a compulsory three years' service binding on the whole population. The reply of Prince Gortschakoff, in which he accepted the proposal of a conference, was couched in extremely courteous and conciliatory terms; but still it was clearly the intention of Russia to insist, forcibly if necessary, on being relieved from the treaty. Studiously polite as Gortschakoff's despatch was, it said—"It was impossible that Russia should agree to remain the only power bound indefinitely by an arrangement which, onerous as it was at the time when it was concluded, became daily weaker in its guarantees. Our august master has too deep a sense of what he owes to his country, to force it to submit any longer to an obligation against which the national sentiment protests."

Opinions may very much differ as to the wisdom and policy of imposing. even after the most successful war, on a great power like Russia conditions at once humiliating to its dignity and very difficult to enforce. It was easy to see that Russia would tolerate these conditions only so long as she was compelled, and that she would seize the first opportunity to free herself from them. Indeed, the wonder is that she so long conscientiously kept, instead of eluding them, as she might easily have done. Had she been so inclined, she might have built a whole fleet of ironclads and monitors, without incurring any serious risk that the powers who signed the treaty of 1856 would undertake another war on that account. It was also said that the Russian government, by limiting its action to the one offensive point, and seeking a settlement of it in a way that would satisfy her people, proved that it had been unjustly accused of harbouring sinister designs against Turkey, and wishing to bring about complications in the East. It, on the contrary, wanted to avoid them. Had Russia wished for such complications, she had abundant means of bringing them about in an indirect way. She might, for instance, had her wish been to complicate matters, have asked back the territory which she had given up at the mouth of the Danube. But she merely withdrew from the limitation of her sovereign rights in the Black Sea, by which a feeling of humiliation and heartburning was kept awake amongst her people, that time would certainly increase instead of diminishing. Besides, Russia, as the note said, was quite ready to confirm anew all the other stipulations of the treaty, or to amend them, in concert with the other powers, as might be thought necessary.

The conference, which assembled in London in February, 1871, resulted in a decision favourable to Russia, the objectionable provision of the treaty being removed, and the Black Sea deneutralized.

A very great change had come over English opinion regarding the respective combatants in the war since the battle of Sedan and the capture of the emperor and his army. Many who up to that time had been against France, now warmly sympathized with her, believing the war to be continued by the Germans merely for territorial aggrandisement. Some, on the other hand, remained firm to the German side, the most notable amongst them being Thomas Carlyle, who, in a celebrated letter in the *Times* of November 18, energetically pleaded the German cause against the "cheap pity and newspaper lamentation over fallen and afflicted France." An amiable trait of human nature probably, but a very idle, dangerous, and misguided feeling as applied to the cession of Alsace

and Lorraine by France to her conquerors, Mr. Carlyle accounted that same pity and lamentation. The question for the Germans in this crisis was not one of "magnanimity," of "heroic pity and forgiveness to a fallen foe," but of prudence and consideration as to what the fallen foe would, in all likelihood, do when once again on his feet.

Germany had 400 years of dismal experience for her guidance in this matter, which Mr. Carlyle proceeded to summarize in his graphic way. First, there was Louis XI.'s behaviour to Kaiser Max, which was not unlike the behaviour of the younger Louis: "You accursed Head of Germany, you have been prospering in the world lately, and I not; have at you, then, with fire and sword!" The end was that opulent, noble Burgundy did not get reunited to her old Teutonic mother, but to France, her grasping stepmother, and remains French to this day. Max's grandson and successor, Charles V., suffered similarly from Francis I., whose life was spent in the violation of treaties and ever-recurring war and injury to Germany, against whom his most Christian Majesty did not scruple to commit the atrocity of covenanting with Sultan Soliman—"that is to say, letting loose the then quasi-infernal roaring-lion of a Turk, *then* in the height of his sanguinary fury and fanaticism, not sunk to *caput mortuum* and a torpid nuisance as now." Richelieu carried on the game of plundering, weakening, thwarting, and in every way tormenting the German empire. No French ruler, not even Napoleon I., was a feller or crueller enemy to Germany, or half so pernicious to it (to its very soul as well as to its body); and Germany had done him no injury, except that of existing beside him.

So, of Louis XIV.'s "four grand plunderings and incendiarisms of Europe;" of Louis XV.'s "fine scheme to cut Germany into four little kingdoms, and have them dance and fence to the piping of Versailles;" and of the treatment of Germany by the revolution and Napoleon I., Mr. Carlyle spoke by turns.

"No nation," said he, "ever had so bad a neighbour as Germany has had in France for the last 400 years; bad in all manner of ways; insolent, rapacious, insatiable, unappeasable, continually aggressive. And now, furthermore, in all history there is no insolent, unjust neighbour that ever got so complete, instantaneous, and ignominious a smashing down as France has now got from Germany. Germany, after 400 years of ill-usage, and generally ill-fortune, from that neighbour, has had at last the great happiness to see its enemy fairly down in this manner; and Germany, I do clearly believe, would be a foolish nation not to think of raising up some secure boundary-fence between herself and such a neighbour now that she has the chance.

"There is no law of nature that I know of, no Heaven's Act of Parliament, whereby France, alone of terrestrial beings, shall not restore any portion of her plundered goods when the owners they were wrenched from have an opportunity upon them. To nobody, except France herself for the moment, can it be credible that there is such a law of nature. Alsace and Lorraine were not got, either of them, in so divine a manner as to render that a probability. The cunning of Richelieu, the grandiose long-sword of Louis XIV., these are the only titles of France to those German countries. There was also a good deal of extortionate law practice, what we may fairly call violently sharp attorneyism, put in use. Nay, as to Strassburg, it was not even attorneyism, much less a long sword, that did the feat; it was a housebreaker's *jemmy* on the part of the *Grand Monarque*. Strassburg was got in time of profound peace by bribing of the magistrate to do treason, on his part, and admit his garrison one night. Nor as to Metz la Pucelle, nor any of these three bishoprics, was it force of war that brought them over to France; rather it was force of fraudulent pawnbroking. King Henry II. (year 1552) got these places—Protestants, applying to him in their extreme need—as we may say, in the way of pledge. Henri entered there with banners spread and drums beating, 'solely in defence of German liberty, as God shall witness;' did nothing for Protestantism or German liberty (German liberty managing rapidly to help itself in this instance); and then, like a brazen-faced, unjust pawnbroker, refused to give the places back—had ancient rights over them, extremely indubitable to him, and could not give them back."

As to the complaint by France of threatened "loss of honour," Mr. Carlyle asked whether it would save the honour of France to refuse paying for the glass she had voluntarily broken in her neighbour's windows? "The attack upon the windows was her dishonour. Signally disgraceful to any nation was her late assault on

Germany; equally signal has been the ignominy of its execution on the part of France. The honour of France can be saved only by the deep repentance of France, and by the serious determination never to do so again—to do the reverse of so for ever henceforth. In that way may the honour of France again gradually brighten to the height of its old splendour, far beyond the *First* Napoleonic, much more the *Third*, or any recent sort, and offer again to our voluntary love and grateful estimation all the fine and graceful qualities nature has implanted in the French. For the present, I must say France looks more and more delirious, miserable, blameable, pitiable, and even contemptible. She refuses to see the facts that are lying palpable before her face, and the penalties she has brought upon herself. A France scattered into anarchic ruin, without recognizable head; *head*, or chief, indistinguishable from *feet*, or rabble; ministers flying up in balloons ballasted with nothing but outrageous public lies, proclamations of victories that were creatures of the fancy; a government subsisting altogether on mendacity, willing that horrid bloodshed should continue and increase rather than that *they*, beautiful republican creatures, should cease to have the guidance of it: I know not when or where there was seen a nation so covering itself with *dis*honour."

True friendship, Mr. Carlyle considered, would counsel France to face the facts and recognize that they came by invitation of her own. "She —a mass of gilded, proudly varnished anarchy—has wilfully insulted and defied to mortal duel a neighbour not anarchic, but still in a quietly human, sober, and governed state, and has prospered accordingly—prospered as an array of sanguinary mountebanks *versus* a Macedonian phalanx must needs do—and now lies smitten down into hideous wreck and impotence, testifying to gods and men what extent of rottenness, anarchy, and hidden vileness lay in her." That Bismarck, and Germany along with him, should now at this propitious juncture demand Alsace and Lorraine was, Mr. Carlyle declared, no surprise to him. After such provocation, and after such a victory, the resolution was rational, just, and even modest. "I believe Bismarck will get his Alsace and what he wants of Lorraine; and likewise that it will do him and us, and all the world, and even France itself by-and-by, a great deal of good. Anarchic France gets her first stern lesson there (a terribly drastic dose of physic to sick France!); and well will it be for her if she can learn her lesson honestly. If she cannot, she will get another, and ever another; learnt the lesson must be."

Finally Mr. Carlyle asserted:—"Considerable misconception as to Herr von Bismarck is still prevalent in England. The English newspapers, nearly all of them, seem to me to be only getting towards a true knowledge of Bismarck, but not yet got to it. "Bismarck, as I read him, is not a person of Napoleonic ideas, but of ideas quite superior to Napoleonic; shows no invincible lust of territory, nor is tormented with vulgar ambition, &c.; but has aims very far beyond that sphere; and in fact seems to me to be striving with strong faculty, by patient, grand, and successful steps, towards an object beneficial to Germans and to all other men. That noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation and become queen of the Continent, instead of vapouring, vain-glorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and over-sensitive France, seems to me the hopefullest public fact that has occurred in my time."



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True friendship, Mr. Carlyle considered, would counsel France to face the facts and recognize that they came by invitation of her own. "She—a mass of gilded, proudly varnished anarchy—has wilfully insulted and defied to mortal duel a neighbour not anarchic, but still in a quietly human, sober, and governed state, and has prospered accordingly—prospered as an array of sanguinary mountebanks *versus* a Macedonian phalanx must needs do—and now lies smitten down into hideous wreck and impotence, testifying to gods and men what extent of rottenness, anarchy, and hidden vileness lay in her." That Bismarck, and Germany along with him, should now at this propitious juncture demand Alsace and Lorraine was, Mr. Carlyle declared, no surprise to him. After such provocation, and after such a victory, the resolution was rational, just, and even modest. "I believe Bismarck will get his Alsace and what he wants of Lorraine; and likewise that it will do him and us, and all the world, and even France itself by-and-by, a great deal of good. Anarchic France gets her first stern lesson there (a terribly drastic dose of physic to sick France!); and well will it be for her if she can learn her lesson honestly. If she cannot, she will get another, and ever another; learnt the lesson must be."

Finally Mr. Carlyle asserted:—"Considerable misconception as to Herr von Bismarck is still prevalent in England. The English newspapers, nearly all of them, seem to me to be only getting towards a true knowledge of Bismarck, but not yet got to it. "Bismarck, as I read him, is not a person of Napoleonic ideas, but of ideas quite superior to Napoleonic; shows no invincible lust of territory, nor is tormented with vulgar ambition, &c.; but has aims very far beyond that sphere; and in fact seems to me to be striving with strong faculty, by patient, grand, and successful steps, towards an object beneficial to Germans and to all other men. That noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation and become queen of the Continent, instead of vapouring, vain-glorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and over-sensitive France, seems to me the hopefullest public fact that has occurred in my time."


PARIS AND ITS ENVIRONS.
showing the
FORTIFICATIONS.
FRENCH BATTERIES
PRUSSIAN BATTERIES
French Kilometres
English Miles
Sannois
Montmagny
Villetaneuse
Pierrefitte
Garges
Stains
Villepinte
Dugny
le Blanc Menil
Epinay
ARGENTEUIL
Couronne de la Briche
Double Couronne du Nord
Aunay
Sevran
St DENIS
le Bourget
Genevilliers
Colombes
Houilles
Besons
St Ouen
la Courneuve
Gd Drancy
Ft d'Aubervilliers
Aubervilliers
Asnieres
Baubigny
Vaujours
Clichy
Carrieres
Montesson
Courbevoie
Bondy
Nanterre
Chatou
St GERMAIN EN LAYE
le Pec
Croissy
Rueil
Puteaux
Neuilly
Batignolles
Mont Martre
la Chapelle
la Villette
Pantin
Ft de Romainville
Noisy
Gagny
Montfermeil
Villemomble
Belleville
Forteresse du Mt Valerien
Suresnes
Chaillot
Passy
Auteuil
Menil Montant
Rosny
Avron
Ft de Rosny
Montreuil
Bougival
Louveciennes
Marly
Montretout
Garches
St CLOUD
Boulogne
Grenelle
VINCENNES
Charonne
Bercy
Billancourt
Issy
Vanves
Montrouge
Chatillon
Bagneux
Arcueil
Ft de Bicetre
Ft d'Ivry
Ivry
Vitry
Villejuif
Charenton
St Maur
Joinville le Pont
Creteil
Chennevieres
Meudon
Clamart
Fontenay aux Roses
Sceaux
Plessis Piquet
Bourg la Reine
Chevilly
Choisy
Thiais
Antony
Verrieres
Chatenay
Velizy
VERSAILLES
Viroflay
Petit Montreuil
Glatigny
Rocquencourt
le Chenay
Marne
Sevres
Bonneuil
Valenton
Brie
Villiers
Noisy le Grand
Champigny
Nogent
SEINE RIV.
Canal de l'Ourcq
SOISSONS RAILWAY
STRASBOURG RAILWAY
ORLEANS RAILWAY
NORTHERN RAILWAY
VERSAILLES RAILWAY



CHAPTER XXIV.

Feeling in Paris at the Commencement of November—Several Newspapers suggest a Capitulation, but the Government determine to continue the Defence—Measures adopted with that Object in View—The Last Foreigners leave the Capital on November 7—Circular of the French Government as to the Position of Affairs, and blaming Prussia for the Continuance of the War—Critical Position of Affairs at the German Headquarters after the French Victory at Coulmiers, on November 10—Excitement at Versailles at the expected Departure of the Germans—Despondency in Paris prior to the Reception of the News of the Victory—Important Proclamation of General Trochu—New Life infused into the City on the Receipt of the News of the recapture of Orleans by the French—The General Rejoicing not *shared* by General Trochu—Suspension of the Siege Operations—Amenities between the Combatants at the Outposts—Order of the Day by General Trochu on the Subject—Troubles in the Turbulent Quarters of Paris—The Condition of the Forts—Gallantry and Ability of the Sailors—The French advance their Works towards the Prussian Lines—The Skill displayed by the Germans in erecting New Works—Stores of Food collected in Anticipation of the Expected Surrender of the City—Preparations for a Great Sortie—General Trochu's Original Plan obliged to be set aside—Communications between him and M. Gambetta—The New Plan of Operations—Inspiring Address of General Ducrot to his Troops—He resolves not to re-enter Paris unless "Dead or Victorious"—Successful Feint of the French at L'Hay and Choisy—The Bridges on the Marne having been carried away delays the Serious Operations in that Direction for a Day—Pontoon Bridges thrown across and the Attack commenced in earnest on November 30—The Peculiar Course of the Marne and the Scene of the Battle—Bravery of the Saxons and the Würtemburgers—The French, greatly assisted by the Forts, succeed in capturing Champigny, Brie, and Villiers—Serious Position of Affairs for the Germans—Dreadful Struggle to drive the French out of the Village of Villiers—General Results of the Day's Fighting—The French again remain inactive at the Critical Moment—Preparations on the German Side for a renewal of the Engagement—A Council of War decides that Champigny and Brie must be retaken—The Dispositions of the Troops on both Sides on the morning of December 2—The French again taken by Surprise and Brie easily recaptured—The Outposts at Champigny also retaken—Panic amongst the French—Fearful and Destructive Fire from the French Forts—The Saxons fairly shelled out of Brie—Their Great Losses in attempting to secure the Bridges over the Marne—The French again occupy Brie and part of Champigny—Despatch from General Trochu to the Governor of Paris during the Battle—Review of the General Result of the Sortie—The French retreat across the Marne—Order of the Day by General Ducrot—The *Journal Officiel's* Explanation of the French retreat—Letter from the Provisional Government to General Trochu—The Losses on both Sides—An Impartial Critic's estimate of General Trochu's Operations—Ought he not to have resumed the Struggle on December 3, and have forced a Passage through the German Lines at any Cost?

After the result of the plebiscite of November had been made known in Paris, and the negotiations for an armistice had failed, the capital assumed an attitude of calm preparation for future eventualities. The military operations were confined to mere outpost encounters, and the persevering bombardment of the German positions by the various forts and redoubts; but the less sanguine among the Parisians, and the higher class of journalists, looking at the facts, were beginning to question the possibility of breaking through the living wall which encompassed them, and the wisdom of the government in further exposing the defenceless millions of the city to the horrors of a prolonged siege. "It is time," said the *Journal des Debats*, "for illusions to cease; now or never is the hour boldly to look the reality in the face. We are vanquished. We are expiating the blunders of that government which, falling to pieces, has involved us in its fate. The surrender of Metz is the unhappy counterpart of Sedan. In this terrible duel between two nations, fought out under the eyes of all the European powers, France lies prostrate, beaten, and wounded. Can it, while its wounds are still open, prescribe absolute conditions? Can it speak as if it were the victorious party? No, that is impossible. Paris has resolutely equipped itself for its defence; it has become impregnable; it may be so. Our enemies will not coerce us with arms; but, alas! they will overpower us by famine. . . . We must not delude ourselves; the provinces are but little in a position to help us; they are themselves a prey to the invasion, and the enemy's requisitions bring upon them ruin and desolation. What will happen, then, if Paris, the beleaguered city, is confined to its own resources? It will succumb. Prussia in 1806 was in a still more desperate position than ours; it knew how to resign itself to it, and afterwards to raise itself up again. Let us then act as reasonable people; let us make a painful but temporary sacrifice; and when by peace we regain our freedom of action, let us, with energy and patriotism, set to work to redeem our lost dignity." Other Parisian journals followed in a similar strain; but the government considered that a continuance of the defence of the city was the only way of escaping honourably from the acknowledged dangers of the situation. The measures for the defence of the capital were therefore pushed on with increased

activity. Fresh earthworks, redoubts, and rifle-pits were formed. Trees were cut down for construction and for fuel. The space between the ramparts and the forts became a zone of desolation. Destruction was a work congenial to the spirit of the young mobiles, some of them mischief-loving Parisians, some hardy striplings from the provinces, and they were not slack in performing this part of their duty.

The government, too, continued its exertions in organizing the army, and in forming, equipping, and drilling the war battalions of the national guard. From each of the 250 battalions of which it was composed, General Trochu had, in the first instance, called for 150 men as volunteers; but only some 12,000 had responded; and subsequently a draft was ordered, which legally mobilized the battalions, taking from the ranks, first, the volunteers, who had inscribed their names in the "offices of glory," and been honoured with a roll of the drum; then the unmarried men, or widowers without children, from twenty to thirty-five years of age; next, unmarried men or widowers from thirty-five to forty-five; fourth, fathers from twenty to thirty-five; fifth, fathers from thirty-five to forty. This law fell much more heavily on the old, respectable regiments of the quiet and wealthy quarters of Paris, in which nearly all the men were married, than on the newly-formed battalions raised in the turbulent districts of Belleville, where the unmarried were in a large majority, and from which the minimum of volunteers had been forthcoming.

On the 7th of November permission was given to a considerable number of foreigners to pass the French and Prussian lines; but an order was immediately afterwards issued that no one should be allowed either to enter or quit Paris. Among those who availed themselves of the permission to leave on the above day, were many English residents, who left by the gate of Charenton *en route* for Versailles, accompanied by Mr. Woodhouse, of the British embassy. Colonel Claremont, the military, and Captain Hore, the naval attaché to the embassy, still remained for the protection of the few British subjects who held by the besieged city.

A further disclosure of the plans of the government was made in a circular of the foreign minister, issued at this period to the French diplomatic agents abroad, regarding the nature of the negotiations for an armistice. This document set forth that the war was continued solely to gratify the ambition of the men at the head of affairs in Prussia; that, although the enemy's forces had been besieging Paris for fifty days, its inhabitants showed no signs of weakness; and that, in spite of some seditious attempts, the powers of the government of National Defence had been confirmed by the votes of an overwhelming majority of the population. After insisting that the revictualling of the capital was necessarily assumed as a consequence in any suspension of hostilities, M. Jules Favre concluded—"By refusing our demand to be allowed to revictual Paris, Prussia rejected the armistice. It is not only the French army, but the French nation, that she seeks to annihilate, when she proposes to reduce Paris by the horrors of famine. Let it be well understood that up to the last moment the government of National Defence, absorbed by the immense interests confided to it, will do everything in its power to render an honourable peace possible. The means of consulting France were refused to it, and it thereupon interrogated Paris. All Paris, in reply, rises to arms to show France and the world what a great people can do when it defends its honour, its homes, and the independence of its country."

While the government were thus engaged, the events to the south of Paris, as we have already seen in Chapter XXII., caused the Germans considerable uneasiness. On the 9th and 10th of November General D'Aurelles de Paladine, with the army of the Loire, obtained a victory over General von der Tann, which resulted in the recapture of Orleans by the French, and rendered the position of the besieging force around Paris very precarious. On the morning of the 14th a wild rumour spread through Versailles to the effect that "the Prussians were going away." By mid-day a crowd had assembled near the Prefecture, waiting eagerly for the announcement that the conqueror had departed. The enthusiasm of the city grew from hour to hour, as details of the royal preparations began to be generally known. The mayor informed his friends that the king of Prussia's boxes were loaded in the *fourgons;* spies came in haste from the Ombrages, with the news that the baggage of the Crown Prince was being brought out to the carriage drive; while inhabitants of the Rue de Provence and the Rue Neuve hurried up with the intelligence that they had seen Count von Bismarck and Generals von Moltke and Von Roon clearing

out their papers. And these statements were facts. It had been determined that the German headquarters should be removed to a safer place —to Ferrières or Lagny. The besiegers, not pleased with the situation westward, though they kept the reason a profound secret, had decided to evacuate Versailles. The day wore on, however, and they did not go. The mob which had lined the pavement of the Rue des Chantiers, waiting to see the royal staff disappear, went home. Night came, and the next day, but the black and white flag still waved over the Prefecture. The 15th was also an anxious day; the Prussians themselves did not know what was going to happen, beyond the fact that all the staffs were ordered to be in readiness to leave, and that the baggage was loaded in the vans. No officer could give one word of information, but observed gloomily, "There must be something wrong with Von der Tann." By the 16th, however, the crisis had passed; joy filled the hearts of the Germans, and dismay those of the French. Orders were given to unpack; boxes were returned to their quarters; and once more the besiegers settled down to their work.

It will be thus seen that for a moment the possibility of failure was contemplated at the German headquarters, and that they practically acknowledged the danger of their situation in the event of a powerful and victorious force marching to the rescue of the capital. They had evidently underrated the capabilities of Paris and the power of France to reappear in the field after the destruction of her regular armies. As a rule they professed to make light of the attempts of General Trochu's ill-disciplined levies to break through their lines of investment; but they well knew the inspiriting influence that a fair prospect of relief would have upon the besieged, and dreaded a sortie *en masse* while assaulted in the rear. When, however, it was ascertained that General D'Aurelles de Paladine was resting on his laurels, and in no condition to take the field in the direction of Versailles, the Germans proceeded to the disposition of their immense forces described in a previous chapter, in order to secure the protection of their investing lines.

For some days before the news of the recapture of Orleans reached Paris, the tone of the press and the spirit of the people was despondent, and by some peace was earnestly desired. Communication with the provinces had become exceedingly difficult; and as no carrier pigeon, almost the only means of information, had arrived for several days, the Parisians began to feel that they were likely to be thrown upon their own resources. One military writer frankly gave it as his opinion that to break the Prussian lines was impossible. "No man," said he, "who is thoroughly acquainted with the position of affairs, and possesses any knowledge of the progress of contemporary strategical science, will entertain such an idea. If the three corps d'armée, the cadres of which were set forth the other day in the *Journal Officiel* (even supposing them five times as numerous, and had they at their disposal an artillery ten-fold more powerful), were to make any offensive movement against the enemy, it would be a most unpardonable fault." A day or two later this document was copied into the Prussian *Moniteur Officiel* published at Versailles. The *Journal de Paris* followed in the same strain, treating the relieving army as a myth, and ridiculing the idea that a force consisting of the raw material of Paris would succeed in doing what Bazaine was unable to accomplish with the flower of the French troops—beating an enemy invigorated by his victories.

Several journals also reproached the government with imitating the example of their predecessors, in concealing from the public the disagreeable intelligence they received. The answer in the *Official Journal* was unfortunately too easy. In common with the rest of Paris, the government had to bear the consequences of an investment, which, notwithstanding repeated efforts, it had not yet been able to break through. It regularly sent off its despatches. During the first few weeks of the siege it had received some replies, which it immediately published. Since the 26th of October no information had reached it—a fact which it was unable to explain. But the ignorance which was an unavoidable result of the siege, could not justly be imputed to it as a crime. During this period, too, General Trochu prepared a proclamation, calm, truthful, and manly, but which, though intended to encourage, gave little indication of confidence in the ultimate result of the defence, as may be seen from the following sentence at its close:—"We have not done all we desired; we have done what we could in a series of extemporizations, the object of which

had enormous proportions, amid the most grievous impression which can afflict the patriotism of a great nation. Well, the future still demands of us a greater effort, for time presses. But time presses the enemy also, and his interests, the public feeling of Germany, and the European public conscience, press him still more. It would be unworthy of France, and the world would not understand it, if the people and army of Paris, after having so energetically prepared themselves for all sacrifices, did not know how to go further, viz., to suffer and fight until they can no longer suffer and fight. Let us, then, close our ranks around the republic and lift up our hearts. I have told you the truth, such as I see it. I wished to show that our duty was to look our difficulties and perils in the face, to approach them without alarm, to cling to every form of resistance and struggle. If we triumph, we shall have deserved well of our country by giving it a great example; if we succumb, we shall have bequeathed to Prussia, which will have succeeded the first empire in the sanguinary annals of conquest and violence, a work impossible to realize, a heritage of malediction and hatreds, under which it will succumb in its turn."

What might have been the effect of this proclamation under the ordinary aspect of affairs it is impossible to tell; but a day or two before, a rumour had obtained currency in the *Journal des Debats* of the victory of the army of the Loire and the defeat of Von der Tann. The rumour was not generally believed, but immediately after the proclamation had been issued, the governor received a despatch from M. Gambetta, reporting the recapture of Orleans, and detailing the success of the French troops. New life ran through the city, the hopes of the populace revived under the influence of the reassuring message; and on the following morning M. Favre reproduced the news in the *Official Journal* "with inexpressible joy." The press followed suit; newspapers which with bated breath were whispering peace a few days before, enlarged in glowing terms upon the victory gained by the army of the Loire, and declared that all ideas of an armistice must be abandoned, in presence of this happy augury. Was it not at Orleans, said they, that four centuries and a half before, Jeanne d'Arc gained a victory which gave the first blow to the English dominion in France? and might not the same city again begin the movement which should rid France of the hated presence of the Prussians? Groups of people assembled to rejoice over the victory, almost all of whom drew sanguine parallels between the deliverance of France by Jeanne d'Arc and this new turn in the fortune of war, which came from the same propitious quarter. By some, D'Aurelles was honoured with the *nom de plume* of "Jean d'Arc," or "le Garçon d'Orleans." It was also thought by wiser observers than the volatile Parisians, that a change for the better had indeed taken place in the disastrous fortunes of France.

The effect of the news was to prolong the resistance of Paris, although, as we shall see afterwards, it was bitterly repented by General Trochu, whose celebrated "plan" it disconcerted by turning attention to the army of the Loire, and seriously shifting the scene of his intended operations.

For some days following, the operations of the siege were suspended both inside and outside the French capital; and during this pause a scene occurred at the outposts of the combatants, which was at utter variance with military discipline, but illustrated the triumph of humanity over national animosity. At some points of the line of investment the French and Germans approached so closely, that to the north-east of the city a degree of intimacy sprang up between them, and exchanges of tobacco and spirits were effected. On one occasion, indeed, several officers of a mobile regiment accepted an invitation by German officers to breakfast in the château of Stains. The festivities were somewhat prolonged, and the absence of the Frenchmen was reported to their superiors. These military escapades had in fact now become matter of public scandal, and General Trochu issued an order of the day intimating that they could not be tolerated in the presence of the enemy. "Such a state of things," he said, "very seriously compromises the reputation and dignity of the troops, and has been a source of danger to the cause of the defence. The enemy fails not to take advantage of disorders which occur before their eyes; and the government has learnt, with equal indignation and surprise, that an intercourse, the effect of which cannot be comprehended either by the troops or their officers, is occasionally established between our advanced posts and those of the Prussians. My severity will be exercised to its fullest extent to

recall to a sense of duty those who may fail to observe its dictates."

This caution of General Trochu had the desired effect; but another source of anxiety to the governor arose from marauders, who scoured the country within the circle of investment, plundering houses and estates outside Paris, and for whose suppression bodies of national guards had to be organized. Some trouble was also occasioned by large parties of peasants, including women and children, who, in search of potatoes and other vegetables, sometimes came close to the German outposts, which led to their being fired upon by the besiegers. Many of these people were killed, and more wounded, by the Prussian bullets. General Trochu therefore issued warnings against these explorations, unless the parties were defended by bodies of troops, which were accordingly detailed for the purpose.

Reverting to the internal life of the city at this time, we catch a glimpse of a social and political undercurrent which had eventually a most disastrous issue. The turbulent quarters of the city swarmed with democratic clubs, in which indignant citizens denounced the incompetency of the authorities, and vented their spleen against the king of Prussia and his retainers. Bombs, too, of a violently explosive kind were manufactured, and stored away in the city, evidently intended for use in other directions than against the besieging army. Attempts were also made by these democrats to organize bodies of "Amazons," which, although at the time they tended to excite only laughter and ridicule, undoubtedly formed the basis of subsequent outbursts of feminine fury. It was, besides, most difficult to bring the national guards of these quarters to face the common enemy. General Trochu's decree to form war companies proved almost a nullity; and while the required quota for active operations in the field could not be got, a disposition was shown to secrete arms and ammunition for a possible opportunity of internecine warfare and of plunder.

But amidst all these difficulties and discouragements, the governor and his generals were unceasing in their activity, and the general spirit both of troops and people was a steady source of strength. The conduct of the artillerists of the forts especially was truly admirable; nor was that of the French sailors who took part in the operations of the siege less deserving of praise. The only section of their country's defenders undaunted by defeat, they maintained a manly, cheerful bearing, the moral effect of which was highly valuable. The condition of the forts displayed the most systematic order and cleanliness, and the splendid and almost unceasing practice of these marine *pointeurs* won the admiration of beholders, and served effectually to check the operations of the most skilful engineers and strategists which have arisen in Europe since the days of the First Napoleon. "The marine," observed an able French writer, "has given all for the defence of Paris—admirals, officers, and sailors, an admirable system of signals, and an incomparable artillery. Six of the forts are commanded by naval officers. All the semaphores at Montmartre, Mont Valérien, Passy, Issy, and the Opera have been intrusted to them. These gunners have become famous for the accuracy of their fire, and after the siege people will speak of them as, after Sebastopol and Solferino, they spoke of the zouaves."

Not content with strengthening their defences inside the forts and ramparts, the Paris garrison, as the siege went on, also pushed out fresh works towards the Prussian outposts, and in a manner besieged the lines of the besiegers, as the Russians had done at Sebastopol in 1855.

These facts were taken into due consideration by the besiegers in the careful arrangement of their investing lines. The Germans worked unceasingly in strengthening their hold upon the capital, but their advanced lines were meant simply to guard them against surprises, and were most skilfully concealed; for many weeks their really dangerous works did not make a near approach, and their true positions were established beyond the reach of the guns of the forts. Their works were admirably constructed for defence; but up to the period of which we are writing it was only from the fire of the guns of the redoubts originally erected at Châtillon, Montretout, and other points, and which had fallen into the hands of the enemy at the beginning of the siege, that danger was really to be apprehended.

In anticipation of the surrender, stores of food were already being collected by the investing forces, to allay the agonies of hunger, which it was believed the inhabitants would suffer before that crowning humiliation should take place; but, as we shall see, the provisions proved to be more

abundant than was anticipated by those who formed their conclusions outside the walls of the blockaded city.

THE GREAT SORTIE FROM PARIS.

Towards the latter end of November indications were not wanting that the brief pause in the actual warfare of the siege was about to end. On the 24th there was fighting at Pierrefitte; and on the 29th, while the important events narrated in the preceding chapter were occurring north and south of Orleans, the army of Paris began its mightiest effort to break through the German troops which hemmed it in on every side, in the hope of effecting a junction with the army of the Loire at Fontainebleau, and so compelling their enemies to raise the siege. To insure this result, it was of course necessary that each should succeed in its separate enterprize; but we have already shown how D'Aurelles de Paladine was prevented from carrying out his part of the arrangement, and we shall now see that, notwithstanding some important temporary successes, the great sortie from Paris also utterly failed to accomplish the purpose intended by it.

General Trochu, the "patient governor," had brought the armies within the walls of the city to as high a state of efficiency and discipline as he could, but only about 150,000 of them could fairly be classed as even tolerable soldiers. His purpose originally was to make his way through the peninsula of Gennevilliers to Corneille, and so on to Rouen and Havre; but, as he afterwards asserted in his celebrated defence speech before the National Assembly at Versailles, "when the news of the unfortunate, because delusive, success at Coulmiers became known in Paris, his plan was defeated. The works had been constructed for an attempt by way of Rouen; but the press and the government immediately demanded that a sortie should be made to meet the army which (they said) was coming from the Loire, a demand so impetuously urged by the public that it could not be resisted." He accordingly had to renounce all his preparations for a movement towards Rouen, and to prepare for a sortie in the direction of Orleans, although he confesses he had no hope of success when he undertook the task. However, being "summoned" in peremptory terms by his colleagues and by Gambetta (who had previously reproached him for his "persistent inaction") to join the combined movement, he concealed his misgivings and gave directions to mass the troops on the eastern fortresses and ramparts.

From official documents which have since been published, it appears that in November M. Gambetta had sent a pigeon-telegram to General Trochu, informing him of the victory of Coulmiers, and proposing joint action between the Loire and Paris armies. General Trochu replied on the 18th, by balloon: "Your telegram excites my interest and my zeal to the utmost; but it has been five days coming, and we shall want a week to get ready. I will not lose one instant. We have ample food till the end of the year, but perhaps the population will not wait till then, and we must solve the problem long before that." On the 24th another balloon was sent out with the news that a great sortie would be made on the 29th, in the hope of breaking the investing lines and effecting a junction with D'Aurelles. But, most unluckily, this balloon was carried into Norway, and it was not till the 30th that its intelligence reached Tours by telegraph. Of course it created an immense sensation; for though it was expected, the definitive announcement of a great sortie was an event of the gravest importance. The telegram was as follows: "The news received from the Loire army has decided me to go out on the southern side, and to march towards that army at any cost. On Monday, 28th November, my preparations will be finished. I am carrying them on day and night. On Tuesday, the 29th, an army commanded by General Ducrot, the most energetic of us all, will attack the enemy's positions, and if they are carried, will push onwards towards the Loire in the direction of Gien. I suppose that if your army is turned on its left flank" (an allusion to the duke of Mecklenburg, who, General Trochu thought, would move down from Chartres), "it will pass the Loire, and will withdraw on Bourges." It has just been stated that this important despatch, which announced the Paris sortie for the 29th, was not received at Tours till the 30th.

The first sign to the Parisians that the long inaction was to be broken was given on the night of Friday, the 25th of November, when it was announced by posters all over the city that from the evening of the next day all the gates would be rigorously closed, and no one would be allowed to pass in or out, except troops and such as had a

special order from headquarters. On Monday, the 28th, an order was issued requiring tradesmen to surrender to the government bacon, hams, sausages, and provisions of all kinds—the stores of fresh meat having been entirely consumed in supplying rations for the army. Each man was provided with a loaf of bread, a bottle of wine, and two lbs. of bacon or meat, as they might be out of the way of obtaining supplies for a day or two. The same day it was announced that on the morrow the great effort for the deliverance of Paris would commence. All the ambulances had orders to get ready, and to send their waggons and appliances to certain places at certain hours. During the whole of the 28th the streets were filled with armed men marching towards the south and south-eastern quarters of the city. The plan of operations was to make a real attack by the second army, under General Ducrot, against the position held by the Würtembergers and Saxons, between Bonneuil and Noisy-le-Grand; at the same time demonstrations, more or less serious, were to be made on the south side by General Vinoy against L'Hay and Choisy; on the west from Valérien, against Bougival, and on the north from St. Denis.

General Ducrot prepared his troops for the "supreme effort" by the following stirring address:—" Soldiers of the Second Army of Paris,—The moment has arrived to break the iron circle which has too long inclosed you, and threatened to stifle you by a slow and dreadful agony. Upon you has devolved the honour of attempting this great undertaking. That you will prove yourselves worthy of it I am convinced. Doubtless, at first, our task will be difficult, and we shall have to overcome serious obstacles. We must face them with calmness and resolution, without exaggeration, as well as without weakness. Here is the truth. At the outset, touching our advanced posts, we shall find implacable enemies, rendered confident and audacious by too frequent success. A vigorous effort will, therefore, be required, but it will not be beyond your powers. In order to prepare for your action, the foresight of him who holds the chief command over us has accumulated more than 400 pieces of artillery, of which at least two-thirds are of the largest calibre. No material obstacle can resist it, and in order to enable you to cut a way out, you will be more than 150,000 men, well armed and well equipped, abundantly provided with ammunition, and, I venture to hope, all animated by an irresistible ardour. Victorious in the first period of the struggle, your success is assured, for the enemy has directed to the banks of the Loire the greater number and the best of his soldiers. The heroic and successful efforts of your brothers detain them there. Courage, then, and confidence! Remember that in this supreme struggle we fight for our honour, for our liberty, for the salvation of our dear and unhappy country; and if this motive suffice not to inflame your hearts, think of your fields, which are devastated; of your families, which are ruined; of your sisters, your wives, and your mothers, who are desolate. May these thoughts lead you to share in the thirst for vengeance, the intense rage which fills my soul, and may it inspire you to contempt of danger. For me, I have fully resolved—and I swear it before you, before the whole nation—I will not re-enter Paris unless dead or victorious. You may see me fall, but you shall not see me recoil. Then halt not, but avenge me! Forward! forward! and may God be your shield!

" The General-in-chief of the Second Army of Paris,

" A. DUCROT.

" PARIS, *November* 28."

It is difficult to imagine an English general addressing his army in such terms, but it is stated that this language was exactly suited to the occasion, and that, " going straight to the heart of the discouraged French soldier, it had a tremendous effect on the army and the people of Paris."

At eleven o'clock on the night of the 28th a fearful fire, opened by forts Charenton and Ivry, was caught up by Bicêtre, Montrouge, Vanves, and Issy, aided by gunboats, which, from a position above Pont à l'Anglais on the Seine, joined in the infernal concert. At the appointed hour on the following morning (November 29) a strong force, sallying from Valérien, threatened the German position west of that fortress; while two columns, issuing from behind Bicêtre and Ivry, under General Vinoy, made a vigorous attack on L'Hay and Choisy. This operation was a mere feint, intended to distract the attention of the Germans, and was effected with comparative ease, as the whole road between Sceaux and Choisy, passing by L'Hay and Chevilly, was untenable by the besiegers, on account of the fire from two formidable redoubts constructed by the French at Hautes Bruyères and Moulin-Saquet. The attacking force succeeded in driving the Germans from L'Hay and Choisy; but just as fresh

troops were coming up to retake these positions, the French retired to the forts in obedience, to an order from General Ducrot, who, as we shall see below, had found it impossible to execute the more difficult part of the plan. The Prussian reserves, on approaching L'Hay and Choisy, suffered great loss from the two redoubts already mentioned, as well as from the gunboats on the Seine, and from a new kind of battery, consisting of guns mounted on iron-clad carriages, run out on the Orleans railroad towards Choisy.

To reach the points destined for the most serious attack the French had to cross the Marne, and march through the loop formed by that river just before its fall into the Seine; but on reaching their allotted posts early on the morning of the 29th, they found that a sudden rise of the waters had carried away the bridges over which they had intended to pass, so that they were compelled to remain idle for that day at least. The Marne doubles on itself several times in the neighbourhood of Paris; and its waters, together with those of the canal, have to be carefully managed by sluices, which had been neglected by the persons whose duty it was to attend to them for the previous two months, from fear of the German army. In consequence of the recent heavy rains, the water flowed over the gates, so that the river suddenly rose to nearly four feet above its ordinary level, forming, of course, an impassable barrier. During the night eight pontoon bridges were thrown across the Marne at Joinville—close under the guns of the double redoubt of Gravelle and La Faisanderie—and at Nogent; and the water having somewhat subsided, the attack was begun in earnest on the following morning, Wednesday, November 30. A second sortie, in which he succeeded, was also made on this morning by General Vinoy against L'Hay and Choisy, for the purpose of alarming the Prussians in that quarter. At the same time the French, sallying forth from St. Denis on the north, gained possession of the villages of Le Bourget, Stains, and Epinay, in the attack on which they were aided by gunboats on the Seine. Reserve troops of the fourth Prussian corps were soon brought up; and the French retired, having effected their object of preventing the Germans from weakening that part of their lines by the detachment of forces to the other side of the city.

Meanwhile the extremely formidable attack was being made by General Ducrot upon the German intrenchments on the east of Paris. Before joining the Seine the course of the Marne forms an immense S, the upper or northern bend approaching Paris, and the lower receding from it. Both are commanded by the fire from the forts; but while the upper or advancing bend favours a sortie by its configuration, the lower or receding one is completely commanded by the ground on the left bank as well as by the forts; and here the river, also, both from the line it takes and from its many branches, is unfavourable to the construction of bridges under fire. Hence the greater part of this bend remained a kind of neutral ground, on each side of which the real fighting took place. The line of battle extended for about four English miles, from Noisy to Bonneuil; but the severity of the conflict was confined almost entirely to the end of the horse-shoe formed by the Marne, between Brie and Champigny, about a mile and a quarter in length. It was a cold but brilliant winter's day; and as early as half-past seven o'clock in the morning—indeed as soon as it was light—bodies of French troops, infantry, cavalry, aud artillery, were seen descending the sloping ground from Fort Nogent, while others were advancing on Champigny from Chennevières, where they had crossed the Marne during the night. The main body of Ducrot's troops, with their artillery, passed over the river on the pontoon bridges at Joinville and Nogent, Rénault's second corps being in front; and soon there were three corps, numbering from 50,000 to 60,000 men, below the fortifications. As they descended into the plateau, forts Charenton, Nogent, Rosny, and the formidable batteries recently erected in front of Mont Avron, directed a constant fire on the outposts of the Würtemburgers and Saxons at Champigny, Villiers, Brie, and Noisy. The points thus selected for attack were the weakest in all the investing circle, and the sortie was made at the very moment when they were even weaker than ordinary; for Moltke, perceiving indications of the intention of the French to advance down the triangle, had given instructions for the line to be strengthened. The Würtemburgers were accordingly ordered to fall back from the front of their position to its second line; and the ground thus left vacant by them was to be occupied by the sixth (Saxon) corps. Thus it happened that the

Germans were caught in a transition state: for the Würtemburgers retired rather early, and the troops intended for their relief came rather late; and it was precisely at this moment—when the ground that had been left empty by one had not been filled by another portion of the investing forces—that the French made their attack. At first the German outposts had to bear the brunt of the fighting, but before mid-day there were three regiments of Saxons on the field (104th, 106th, and 107th), all under the command of General de Nehrhof, and a brigade of Würtemburgers, commanded by Brigadier-general Reitzenstein. The Saxons had two regiments of cavalry and six of artillery, their entire force amounting to about 11,000 men. The Würtemburg brigade was about 7000, so that the whole of the German force in position to resist the sortie was only 18,000 men. The French advanced in excellent order under the guns of their forts, and it soon became evident that they intended to make a most serious attempt to break through the German intrenchments. The troops on that side accordingly sallied forth into the plateau, in order to meet their attack; and now came a murderous cross-fire from Nogent and Mont Avron. High into the air rose shells, that were literally vomited forth from both the fort and the batteries. They shot through the atmosphere like blazing comets, and fell in showers among the German soldiers, causing death and destruction all around the places where they exploded. The Saxons and Würtemburgers fought gallantly, but they were overwhelmed by superior numbers; and after a brief, though murderous struggle, they were compelled to retreat, and the French at once seized upon Champigny and Brie, the fire from the forts being discontinued the moment they got close to those places. A third French column had in the meantime marched up the Marne as far as Neuilly, there crossed the river, and now proceeded to cooperate with their comrades from Brie in an attack on Villiers, an important post in the investing circle, which was also captured after a fierce contest. Noisy-le-Grand, too, was seriously threatened; and indeed the assailants had a decided advantage along the whole battle-field for several hours, their force being too great to resist, although, owing to the nature of the ground, it was impossible fully to deploy their columns, and to make the whole power of their fire felt. Matters were now looking extremely serious for the German troops, but operations were suspended for a short time. The Würtemburgers were reinforced by detachments from the Saxon, Pomeranian, and Silesian corps; and then a change in the situation of affairs was made by Colonel Abendorth, who acted as brigadier-general in the room of General Schultz, wounded at Sedan. Placing himself at the head of a body of Saxons, he called on them to follow him into the village of Villiers. They responded with a loud "Hurrah," and rushed upon the French who held it. A dreadful struggle ensued. It was then that the only firing at very close quarters took place, because on the plateau the French, while using the Chassepot, kept at a long distance from the enemy, to avoid coming under the fire of their own forts. In the village it was necessarily otherwise; but neither during this fight, nor at any other time in the day, was there a bayonet charge. After an obstinate resistance the French were driven out of Villiers: many of them were made prisoners, and the rest had now to defend themselves in the open field. While Colonel Abendorth was leading an attack on them in the plateau, a battery of mitrailleuses placed right opposite Villiers was worked with great rapidity. Four mitrailleuse balls entered the chest of the colonel's horse, which dropped dead. An officer galloped up to him with another; and again he was in the saddle, and leading his men, who followed him impetuously with another loud "Hurrah." This was a most exciting moment. They had only proceeded a hundred yards when the second horse was killed by a rifle shot, and, with its rider, came to the ground. Though hurt by the fall, the colonel got to his feet and called on his men to continue the charge. They did so, and actually took some prisoners on the plateau. There was now a fierce cannonading on both sides, and the artillery did terrific execution. Some of the German troops stationed themselves behind a wall to fire upon the French with the advantage of that cover; but the shells smashed the wall, and annihilated several of the men behind. The Germans captured two field-guns, but such a shower of shot, shell, and grenades was poured upon the troops who attempted to remove them, that they were obliged to leave them on the field. The fighting gradually ceased, and soon after four o'clock the French retired, leaving strong garrisons in Champigny and Brie; but it was

nearly five, and quite dark, before the guns of the forts were entirely silent.

While the contest was raging in this quarter, a column of French troops was directed eastwards towards Chelles, along the right bank of the Marne, in order to keep off the twelfth (Saxon) corps; and another army, debouching by Fort Charenton, advanced in the direction of Mesly and Bonneuil, in front of Creteil. They succeeded in obtaining possession of Mont Mesly, and with it the villages at its foot, about noon; and could they have held and entrenched it, a very important point would have been gained; but the Germans having been reinforced in the after part of the day by the seventh brigade of the second corps, the lost positions were reconquered, and the French driven back under the shelter of Fort Charenton.

At the close of the day the Saxons stood fast in Villiers, in spite of all that the French troops and forts could do to dislodge them; while the army of Ducrot solidly held the villages of Champigny and Brie, which in the morning had been German posts; and which, in the possession of the French, were a standing menace to the safety of the main line of investment, only 2000 yards distant. Their success was therefore real, though incomplete, for they had won positions which might prove of much value for ulterior operations. The French brought fourteen batteries across the Marne; but owing to the nature of the ground they could not get their guns on a height, at a fair range from the enemy's infantry, so that they did not make much use of them. The cavalry on either side took no part in the battle. Though the French had displayed unquestionable bravery and steadiness in these engagements, and though they had fought well and manœuvred fairly, showing that the governor of Paris had created out of rude masses a disciplined and tolerably efficient army, yet they were unequal to their German foes, who were strung to the height of daring by continual success. The French had not as yet reached the besieger's lines: they had only won advanced posts from which they could gather and attack in force; still these made their position very threatening, and it is hard to say what the result might have been if Ducrot, sacrificing every consideration to the primary object of breaking out, had called in his reserves during the night, and, advancing from Brie and Champigny, had endeavoured to storm the German intrenchments the next day. He would certainly have had the superiority of numbers, and would have begun with some advantages of ground; and even those who can fully appreciate the obstacles he would have had to overcome will, at least, doubt whether he might not have triumphed. The French, however, as on so many previous occasions in the war, remained inactive at the critical moment, and their opportunity was lost for ever.

Instead of resuming the attack, the French army remained perfectly quiet during the whole of the next day, December 1, repairing losses and collecting supplies; and though it still held its ground beyond the Marne, it was not reinforced to any great extent; neither was much advantage taken of the day's rest to fortify the captured positions. On the German side, artillery and ammunition were brought up by various roads, followed by regiment after regiment of infantry. The second army corps was ordered to assist in the operations, for it was expected that the French, from Champigny and Brie, with reinforcements from Paris, would attack the German lines, and a second day's fighting was regarded as certain. Not a moment was lost, for by halfpast seven o'clock in the morning the infantry and artillery had taken up their positions for resisting any movement either from Brie or against Villiers. It was bitterly cold all day, and it was consequently a severe duty for officers and men to rest there inactively, while exposed to the shot and shell from Fort Nogent and the battery at Avron; from both of which there was firing, though only now and then was it very frequent, and it did no damage. During the day a truce was agreed upon for some hours, at the request of the French, to enable them to bury their dead and collect the wounded; unfortunately not an easy task, for owing to the severity of the conflict the losses on both sides had been fearfully heavy. Late in the evening the German leaders held a council of war at the Prefecture at Versailles, at which it was decided that Champigny and Brie must be retaken. General von Moltke held that it was essential; though the other generals expressed great doubts as to the advantage of an attack in which the lives of their soldiers must be so freely sacrificed. However, orders were given to regain possession of these two villages "at any cost," and to drive the French behind the Marne. For this purpose as many men as could be spared were to be massed together;

and all night troops were marching in the direction of Brie and Villiers. It was arranged that the Saxons should attack Brie, and the Würtemburgers Champigny. The troops engaged consisted of the second division of the royal Saxon army (the twenty-fourth division of the German host), under General von Nehroff, and comprising the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th regiments. Taking each regiment at its full strength of three battalions, these would represent fifteen battalions, or about 12,000 men; but as more than one battalion was naturally employed elsewhere on outpost duty, it may be outside the exact number to put down the Saxon force at 10,000 men. Before the commencement of operations these splendid troops occupied positions in Cournay, Champs, Noisy, Villiers, and the vicinity. The division of the Würtemburgers was commanded by General von Obernitz, a Prussian officer, and they were posted at La Queue Noiseau, Ormesson, Chennevières, and the surrounding country. A contingent made up of contributions from various portions of the second army corps, supported and co-operated with the Würtemburgers; so that altogether the Germans engaged, or immediately supporting, must not have been less than 25,000. The troops belonging to the second army corps were commanded by General von Fransecki, who in virtue of his seniority had the nominal direction of all the operations, which were, however, supervised generally as regarded the Saxons by Prince George of Saxony in person. To oppose these veterans the entire second army of Paris had been assembled on the plateau between Brie and Champigny. The first and second corps (of three divisions each) commanded respectively by Generals Blanchard and Rénault, occupied the centre and right; while the third corps (D'Exea's) was *à cheval* on the Marne, opposite Nogent—the first division (Bellemare's) holding Brie, and the second, or reserve (Mattat's), lying on the rising ground forming the watershed at the other side. In all there were over 100,000 French bayonets in the elbow of the Marne, though probably not quite half that number were actively engaged at any time. The third army (seven divisions, or about 110,000 rank and file), under General Vinoy, were stationed right and left of General Ducrot, all round the city; but their orders were merely to harass the enemy as much as possible, without making a serious attack at any point.

Friday morning (December 2), was again bitterly cold and frosty; and the German soldiers who had bivouacked in the fields lay crouched around huge fires of green wood, which they had cut from the trees. Soon after seven o'clock the 107th Saxon regiment marched directly on Brie, a portion of them advancing from the direction of Noisy, and the rest coming up from Villiers. It is a notable fact that, although the French had every reason to expect an attack, they were taken completely by surprise; there were only about 100 of them in front of the village—the greater number being in the houses, some asleep, others composedly drinking their coffee. The Saxons rushed on the outposts, who commenced rifle-firing, and a fight, carried on from one end of the village to the other, at once ensued, in which some French reinforcements, who had already crossed the Marne with the intention of marching on Villiers and Noisy, took part. The attack was so sudden and impetuous that—unaided by the artillery of their forts, which could not be brought to bear on the position without destroying their own men—the French were unable to withstand it. Amid wild "hurrahs!" from the Saxons Brie was retaken, and about 300 prisoners were captured, including eight officers.

Just before eight o'clock the Würtemburgers, coming up from their posts on the south, assaulted Champigny with rapid discharges from their needle-guns: the French replied; but after a struggle, vigorously maintained on both sides, the Würtemburgers repossessed themselves of the outposts they lost on the 30th. This proved a critical moment for the French troops. In the plain below Champigny some hundreds of panic-stricken men were flying from the front, and the German shells began to fall among them, hastening their flight and increasing their confusion. The promptitude of the French commanders, however, prevented a terrible disaster. The bridges across the Marne were burned; gendarmes galloped to and fro, and belaboured the fugitives with the flat of their swords; batteries of artillery trotted into the plain and wheeled into position, and the heavy guns posted in the redoubt of St. Maur poured a murderous fire into the opposing German batteries, and in half-an-hour had silenced them. The heavy artillery of the French forts also continued to fire on Noisy; and about nine o'clock Nogent, Rosny, and Avron commenced shelling Brie, which had the

effect of changing the whole aspect of affairs. During the preceding day the neighbouring forts and batteries had received many additional guns, and the rain of shot and shell which they now began to pour into the devoted German ranks, has been described by experienced soldiers as more tremendous than they had ever before witnessed. The French troops now rallied and reformed, and were moved to the front again, where they resisted and finally repulsed the German attack. The correspondent of the *Times*, who was present, gave the following graphic description of the scene:—" There was the direct and the vertical fire. Avron and Rosny fired their shells right across. One of the batteries on Nogent fired in that way, while the other threw its shells high up in the air, and they descended from a point directly over the place in which they were intended to explode. No shelter could be found from Noisy down to the near end of Champigny. Houses were battered into ruins, trees were smashed into fragments, and men fell dead and wounded everywhere. It was simply impossible for any troops to live under such a fire as was then descending on Brie, and the Saxons were fairly shelled out of it. After an immense loss of men and officers, they evacuated it at ten o'clock. While this terrible and persistent discharge of shot and shell was going on, some of the Saxon regiments attempted to make their way to the bridges by which the French had crossed the Marne, while the latter were coming out by thousands in column after column from under Rosny and Nogent. I saw, I should think, not fewer than 20,000 of them in one long column on the sloping ground between those two forts. The attempts to get at the bridges were repeated over and over again, not only under the shelling from the forts, but in face of two batteries of mitrailleuses, the fire from which was scarcely less dreadful. In the distance were French infantry, scattered here and there, who kept up a continuous fusillade from their Chassepots. The *Schutzen* or chasseur regiment of Saxons replied to them. One line of this regiment was on a slope, and was so completely exposed to a combined fire, that an aide-de-camp was sent to tell it to retire. As he was approaching it, a ball struck him in the breast, and he fell dead. Colonel Hausen, of the *Schutzen* regiment, and thirty-four of its other officers were also killed, and the men were shot down like deer in a *battue*. Attempts were made by the Germans to bring their artillery into play, but such was the unfavourable nature of the ground that the guns could only be placed in positions where the shells from the forts would have knocked them to pieces in five minutes. Only one or two batteries fired, and that under circumstances which prevented their being of much service. There was cavalry on both sides, but they again took no part in the engagement. The Germans had to depend entirely on their infantry, which behaved admirably, and inflicted very great loss on the enemy. The lines of French were constantly thinned, but they were replaced by others, who kept up the Chassepot practice at just such a distance as enabled them to be safe from the fire of their own forts. There was a lull now and then in the rifle slaughter as the Germans retreated from the near approaches to the bridges over the Marne, but the shelling never for a moment ceased; and the mitrailleuses and Chassepots again performed their work of destruction, and again lines of Frenchmen fell dead and wounded from the fire of the needle-gun, as often as the Germans renewed the attempt to get at and destroy the bridges. All this time the wounded were being carried off the field by both parties; while some unfortunate soldiers, who though maimed were able to rise, fell dead from another ball, or the fragment of a shell, as they endeavoured to hobble off the ground. For miles round the whole earth seemed to shake from the thunder of the forts, while shells were passing over the battlefield and exploding in the woods and highways. Some of the projectiles reached a distance of 7000 yards from the batteries whence they were discharged. Ultimately the Germans were obliged to desist from the attempt on the bridges, though it was nearly three o'clock in the afternoon when they did so." Another eye-witness said:—" As the Germans advanced and the French retired, a most tremendous fire burst on the attacking columns. In vain, exulting in the pride of success, did the Germans press forward with shouts of defiance; in vain did officers break from their ranks and cheer them on against the receding enemy: whole files were literally swept away, until, at last, after a heroic effort, the retreat was sounded, and the German front fell back." Then the tide of battle turned again; the French pressed forward in dense masses, and the tricolor was once more seen in Brie and Champigny, although the

Würtemburgers still continued to hold several outposts at their extreme end of the latter village. That portion of the French army who had not crossed the Marne then retired, and after a few parting shots the forts became silent. So ended this second engagement.

While the battle was still raging, General Trochu forwarded the following despatch to the chief of the general staff in Paris:—

"*The Governor of Paris to General Schmitz.*

"*December* 2.

"PLATEAU BETWEEN CHAMPIGNY AND VILLIERS, 1.15 p.m.

"Attacked this morning by enormous forces at break of day. We have been fighting for nearly seven hours. At the moment I write to you the enemy is retiring along the whole line, giving up the heights to us once more. Traversing the lines of riflemen from Champigny to Brie, I received the honour and the unspeakable pleasure of being cheered by the troops, exposed to the most violent fire. We shall doubtless have dreadful returns, and this second battle, like the first, will last the whole day. I do not know what future is reserved for these generous efforts of the troops of the republic; but I owe this justice to them, that in the midst of trials of all kinds they have deserved well of the country. I must add that to General Ducrot belongs the honour of these two days.

"GENERAL TROCHU."

The actual result of these two days of slaughter bore no proportion to the fearful loss of life; for while nothing had been gained by either party, both had lost much. The desperate action on Friday pretty clearly showed that, notwithstanding their overwhelming superiority of numbers, and the bravery of the greater portion of the French troops, they could not defeat their enemies in the open field. It will be noticed that on the second day the Germans acted on the offensive; and it was only by the aid of the heavy guns of the forts that the French were able to maintain the positions they carried on Wednesday. Giving them full credit for the bravery and heroism displayed by those of them who fought, it must still be said that, with all their valour, they were not equal to the task before them; for they could gain no ground against enemies over whom they had the advantage of numbers, of position, and of weapons. Considering the intention with which the sortie was made, it had proved a grievous failure. Its object, on the part of the French, was not merely a trial of strength between the two armies, or even to gain certain positions (in which case they might have had reason to congratulate themselves); but they wished to force a passage through the Prussian lines, and as they were no nearer the attainment of this end than they had been a week before, they could not be said to have gained anything. On the other hand, they had lost nothing, for the troops were encouraged by finding they could cope on equal terms with the Prussians in a protracted engagement on a large scale, rather than dispirited by the failure of their object.

The Germans made every preparation for a renewal of the murderous conflict on the following morning, and before daybreak troops to reinforce their army were pouring from all sides into Champs (the headquarters of the Saxon corps): the Bavarians were marched up from Lagny, and the roads bristled with bayonets. These precautions, however, proved unnecessary; for on the afternoon of December 3 the mass of the French retired across the Marne, unmolested, to the shelter of Vincennes, leaving garrisons in the villages which had been the occasion of so much slaughter. These garrisons also were finally withdrawn on the evening of the 4th, after which General Ducrot issued the following order of the day:—"Soldiers! After two days' glorious battles I have made you recross the Marne, because I was convinced that further efforts would be fruitless in the direction in which the enemy had time to concentrate his forces, and to prepare means of action. Had we persisted in that way, I should have uselessly sacrificed thousands of brave men. Far from aiding the work of deliverance I should have seriously compromised it, and at the same time have led you to an irreparable disaster. But the conflict has only ceased for a moment; let us resume it with courage. Be ready! Complete with speed your ammunition and your provisions. Above all, raise your hearts to the height of the sacrifice which is demanded by the holy cause for which we must not hesitate to lay down our lives."

True to the French characteristic of never admitting a defeat, the *Journal Officiel* of December 5, after announcing that the troops had

recrossed the Marne and were encamped in the wood of Vincennes, gave to the Parisians the following elaborate explanation of this backward "strategical movement:"—"The plan, the execution of which has been for the last four days so vigorously carried out, now enters upon a new phase. In broad daylight our troops came down again in excellent order towards the Marne, while the enemy did not dare to molest them. The forts kept good watch. The fatigues so courageously endured by the young army of Paris required a short rest. The cold is much more severe and piercing on the hills than in the open country or inside Paris. The fight had lasted the whole day, and strict vigilance was necessary to avoid an unexpected attack, as was the case on the morning of the 2nd. Therefore no sleep was possible; added to which any one indulging in sleep on the hard ground in such a temperature would have risked being frozen to death. These, and strategical reasons, caused the movement, which will lead to fresh engagements, as announced in the order of the day of General Ducrot, the true meaning and import of which has been perfectly understood by the Parisian population. Some papers suppose that we have abandoned Champigny. This is not the case; on the contrary, we are assured that our troops remain strongly established in those positions. The number of German prisoners taken from the battle-field now amounts to more than 800; many of them are detained in the forts. No serious affair has occurred since the 2nd, but that does not prevent our generals preparing for the new stage of the struggle upon which we are now about to enter. The Prussian staff is reported to show uneasiness at the prospect. The enemy, who has in all directions to go over enormous distances before facing us, begins indeed to feel that he will soon be exhausted by marches and countermarches if we continue ever so little successively to attack him on several opposite points. The immense circle round which he has to manœuvre grows daily more extended, in consequence of our conquering advanced positions after each engagement, and therefore the increasing difficulties of quickly concentrating troops which threaten General von Moltke's plans, must be contemplated at Versailles with some legitimate fear. Paris, on the contrary, perfectly understanding what is going on, co-operates by all the means at her disposal with the views of her skilful and gallant governor The business of general organization, equipment, and the artillery works, is pushed on with fresh efficiency and vigour. The military resources placed at the disposal of battalions armed by private industry are, so to say, inexhaustible."

In order to show the intense delight inspired by the French successes, (?) the following letter was addressed by the members of the Provisional Government to their president, General Trochu:—

"General and Dear President,—For three days we have been with you in mind upon the field of battle, where the destinies of the country are being decided. We would wish to share that danger while leaving you that glory which so justly belongs to you, of having prepared and assured by your noble devotion the success of our valiant army. No one has a greater right to be proud of it than you. No one can more worthily pronounce its eulogium. You are only unmindful of yourself, but you withdraw yourself from the acclamations of your companions in arms, electrified by your example. It would have been agreeable to us to add our own, but permit us at least to express to you our hearty sentiments of gratitude and affection. Say to the brave General Ducrot and his gallant soldiers that we admire them. Republican France recognizes in them the noble and pure heroism which already has saved it. France now knows that she rests her hopes of safety on them and on you. We, your colleagues, acquainted with your ideas, hail with joy those grand and noble days in which you completely revealed yourself, and which we are convinced are the commencement of our deliverance." Neither then, nor at any subsequent period, did the true state of affairs justify the use of this highly inflated language.

As may be supposed, the list of casualties for the two days was on both sides frightfully heavy. On the 30th of November the French suffered equally with their enemies, for then they were the assailants, and it was only the fire from their forts which restored the balance of loss that must otherwise have been against them. But on the 2nd of December the German casualties far exceeded those of the French. The *Schutzen* and the 108th regiments, especially, were dreadfully cut up. The latter, after going into action, returned at the end of twenty minutes with the loss of thirty-five out of forty-five officers. The former covered

themselves with immortal honour, but at a terrible sacrifice. They went into action about 2000 strong, and lost 760 men and 36 officers—more than a third of their entire strength. One company which began the fight with 170 men, came out with 70, and in another every one of the lieutenants was killed. The total loss on the French side was officially stated to be 1008 killed and 5082 wounded, who strewed the plateau in front of the villages of Champigny, Brie, and Villiers; and there is reason to fear that a great many of the deaths were owing to the want of attention during the severe weather. On one night the thermometer was twelve degrees, and the next nine degrees, below zero (Fahr.)—the cold being intensified by a cutting wind which pierced through the very bones, and transferred many of the poor fellows from the list of the wounded to that of the dead. The French superior officers also were very unfortunate: General de la Charriere was killed; General Renaud had to undergo amputation of the leg, and General Falherbe of the arm; and Colonel de Talhouet was also severely wounded: On the German side nearly 8000 officers and men were placed *hors de combat* by the two days' hostilities—a heavy total, which was chiefly due to the gallantry of the regiments engaged, "for they fought like lions." Perhaps no men were ever called upon to oppose by rifles alone such a cannonade and rifle fire as the Saxons, in particular, were subjected to; and they well deserved the congratulations and thanks which the king of Saxony sent them. It has been stated that the French army was principally composed of raw recruits: no doubt thousands of them were new to the service; but there were present zouaves brought from Algeria after the battle of Sedan, and the great majority of the men who fought on the two days had the bearing of seasoned soldiers. As an instance of the privations caused by the siege, some of them cut up the dead horses with their swords, and proceeded to cook and eat portions on the battlefield.

In his general review of this sortie, and of the last engagement in particular, the able writer of the "Campaign of 1870-71," in the *Times* (since collected and republished), says:—The governor of Paris had witnessed the vicissitudes of this memorable day, and he had seen his enemy, frightfully thinned, recoil baffled, if not routed. Nevertheless, rigidly adhering to his plan, he did not attempt to improve his advantage, and contented himself with maintaining his hold on the valuable outposts he had regained. That these tactics were in accordance with the general rules of the art of war, which almost assume that the garrison of a fortress cannot, when once invested, escape unless aided by a relieving army, will be hardly denied by competent critics. Still, Trochu may have considered the question from too narrow a point of view; and possibly he had then an opportunity of severing the circle around Paris, even without any external assistance. The whole German force on the French front on the 2nd of December was 25,000 men; this had been reduced at least a fifth; and though it had retired in good order, the extraordinary losses of its officers induce us to think that it had suffered some abatement from its high martial courage. On the other hand, the French were not less, certainly, than 55,000 strong; these could have been raised to 100,000 by immediate reinforcements from Paris; they were full of confidence, and the terrible execution done by the forts had inspired them with exulting hope. It may be, therefore, that had Trochu combined the troops he could have made available for a great effort on the 3rd of December, he might possibly have cleared a passage. Such was the opinion of eye-witnesses writing from the German camp after the war had ended; and, had he done so, and marched boldly on the great German depôt of Lagny, on the main line of the hostile communications, he might have caused the siege to have been raised, and have practically gained a base for his army. Such an attempt certainly would have been perilous, but there were strong arguments, we think, in its favour. The force inside Paris was not a mere garrison; a large and far from despicable army had been formed for active operations; and as Trochu ought to have been aware that, in the actual circumstances of the war, the arrival of a relieving army was an event he could not fully rely on, he ought, perhaps, to have made up his mind to act decisively with the means in his hands; and had he done so, he certainly had a favourable opportunity at this moment. Instead, however, of making the effort, the governor of Paris remained immovable. Without seeking to blame Trochu, we shall only remark that he never found so good an opportunity again, and that possibly genius and daring might at this moment have led to fortune.

CHAPTER XXV.

Scenes on the re-occupation of Orleans by the Germans—Difficulty of disposing of the large number of Prisoners—Important Proclamation of the King of Prussia, stating that another Crisis of the War had been reached—The French Seat of Government transferred from Tours to Bordeaux—Panic in the former City on the decision of the Government being made known—Visit of M. Gambetta to the French Army, and issue of a Stirring and Hopeful Manifesto by him—Results of the Capture of Orleans to the French—New Arrangements made by them—General D'Aurelles removed from the Chief Command, and General Chanzy appointed in his stead—Good Reasons for the Step—Chanzy's Skill and Energy—Position occupied by his Army on the right bank of the Loire—Battle of Beaugency on December 7—Timely Arrival of the Bavarians, and the French driven back after a very Gallant Resistance—Resumption of the Engagement by them on the following morning, and continued Obstinate Fighting on both Sides during the day—The Germans finally again Victorious—Capture of 400 Prisoners by them at Midnight without firing a shot or losing a Man—Fearful Scenes in Beaugency—Another Battle on the 9th, in which the Germans are again Successful—The French, however, commence another Engagement on the 10th, and are again defeated after a Severe Struggle—The Scenes in the Villages around in consequence of there having been no time to attend to the Dead and Wounded—Skilful Movement of General Chanzy, who takes up a very Strong Position near Fréteval, on the road to Paris—Timely Arrival of Reinforcements to the Grand-duke of Mecklenburg, and the French ultimately compelled to retreat to Le Mans—General Review of the Strategy on both Sides during this period—The Fearful Losses amongst the Bavarians—Letter from the King of Prussia specially thanking them—Attack on Tours by the Germans—Capture of Rouen after an unavailing attempt at Defence—Panic amongst the French Troops and Inhabitants of the City—The Germans actually invited to enter to protect the Citizens from the Mob—The Strategical Importance of the City to the Germans—Visit of the Germans to Dieppe, they having thus crossed France from the Rhine to the British Channel—Scenes in the Town—Blockade of their own Seaports by the French—Second Occupation of Dieppe—The Prussian Garrison at Ham surprised and taken Prisoners—Surrender of Phalsbourg and Montmédy by the French—Contrast between Châteaudun and Chartres—New Levy of Germans Troops, and unabated Enthusiasm throughout the Country—Severe Decree of the French Government as to Desertion—Abolition of the General Councils of Departments by M. Gambetta—Great Dissatisfaction throughout the Country at the Measure—Repudiation of the Treaty of 1867 for the Neutrality of Luxemburg by the Germans—Reasons for such a Step, and Reply of the Luxemburg Government—Sinking of English Vessels by the Germans on the Seine—Remonstrance of the British Government, and Prompt Reply by Count von Bismarck, guaranteeing Compensation to the Owners and Crews.

Our last review of the events upon the Loire closed with the fall, for the second time, of Orleans before the victorious enemy. The entry of the Germans into the city, on the morning of Sunday, December 5, was a scene fitted to impress deeply both the victors and the vanquished. The rattle of the artillery trains, the roll of drums, the jingle of the trotting cavalry, the shouts of officers, the tramp of battalions, the hopeless "jams" of the baggage trains, the squads of prisoners arriving from different directions, the cowering, stray civilians, crushed by this din of war, and the weeping women—all combined to form a picture full of strong and striking contrast. If nations, like individuals, must pass through humiliation and suffering to rise to a higher and purer standard of virtue, the French were at this time draining the bitter cup to the dregs; while their opponents had the difficult lesson to learn of triumphing in a spirit of gentleness and moderation. The fact that the Germans had already once bombarded the town and driven out the enemy; and that, after occupying it for four weeks and being driven out in turn, they were now once more victorious over an army, the raising of which for her own defence had taxed the energies of Republican France to the utmost, naturally caused a high degree of exultation, and invested the second capture of Orleans with an interest peculiar to itself. The intensity of feeling arising out of these special circumstances was observable on both sides, and the proud elated air of the regiments which, with colours flying and bands playing, followed each other along the street, finally leading into the centre of the town, was in striking contrast with the dejected appearance of the inhabitants. At one point had been a barricade which raked the whole length of the street by which the city was entered, and along which the French had, during the night, kept up a storm of rifle bullets which, for a time, held their enemies at bay. Passing along this street the German troops finally debouched upon the Place du Martroy, in the centre of which, upon her bronze charger, and waving her sword, rode "The Maid," surrounded now by a dense throng of French prisoners captured in course of the night. As the whole army came pouring into the city, street after street began to resound with the strains of martial music and the tramp of armed men; and at every lattice, over which the blinds were kept closed for the most part, excepting some little chink left as a peep-hole,

inquisitive and anxious eyes looked out. There must have been something appalling to the inhabitants in the numbers of the hostile army, as, in seemingly never-ending columns, regiment after regiment marched to the position assigned to it. On the balcony of the Hotel d'Orleans stood the grand-duke of Mecklenburg returning the salute of his men, who looked for the most part as fresh and clean as if they had just turned out for parade, instead of having had three days of hard fighting in mid-winter. The jäger battalions, each man with a sprig of pine in his shako, were especially gallant-looking; and when the inhabitants came to compare the numbers and aspect of the conquerors, with their own troops huddled together and shivering in the middle of the square, they must have ceased to wonder at the result.

As usual, the number of prisoners was enormous, and considerable difficulty was felt by their captors in disposing of them. As many thousands as could possibly be crammed into it passed the night in the magnificent cathedral, which presented a very remarkable scene.

Considering all the circumstances under which Orleans was captured, and that for several hours its streets were actually defended by riflemen, it must in justice be said that the German troops displayed considerable moderation at a moment when, according to the rules of war, a certain amount of licence is supposed to be permitted to soldiers who may almost be said to have taken by storm a besieged town. This might possibly be owing to the fact that the Bavarians, who were among the first to enter, had during their former month's stay in the place made many friends, who now from motives of policy, if from no other sentiment, received them warmly as old acquaintances. No additional contributions were exacted from the city until, a few days after its occupation, the driver of a Prussian provision column was killed. He had asked a Frenchman in a blouse the way to the bivouac outside the town, where his waggon was standing. The Frenchman pointed in the direction he was to take; but the unfortunate waggoner, thanking him, had hardly turned away when a bullet passed through his back and entered his lungs. As the offender could not be discovered, a fine of £24,000 was imposed. Half the money was paid down in cash, and plate and other articles were offered in liquidation of the second moiety. The Bavarian officer, however, replied that he was commandant, and not a storekeeper; and that the amount would be increased by £4000 a day until the fine was paid. On the same or following day the money was forthcoming.

Numerous events following each other closely up to the present time, point to the early days of December as marking an important stage in the operations of the war. Not only had the army of the Loire been a second time defeated and Orleans reoccupied, but in the east Dijon had been captured; in the north the French army raised there had been shattered and dispersed, the large cities of Amiens and Rouen had been taken; and at Paris sorties on a great scale had been victoriously repulsed. The king of Prussia therefore issued the following important proclamation:—

"Soldiers of the Confederate German Armies!—We have again arrived at a crisis of the war. When I last addressed you the last of the hostile armies which at the commencement of the campaign confronted us had, by the capitulation of Metz, been destroyed. The enemy has since, by extraordinary exertions, opposed to us newly-formed troops, and a large portion of the inhabitants of France have forsaken their peaceful, and by us unhindered, vocations in order to take up arms. The enemy was frequently superior to us in numbers, but you have nevertheless again defeated him, for valour and discipline and confidence in a righteous cause are worth more than numerical preponderance. All attempts of the enemy to break through the investment lines of Paris have been firmly repulsed, often, indeed, with many bloody sacrifices, as at Champigny and at Le Bourget, but with a heroism such as you have everywhere displayed towards him. The armies of the enemy, which were advancing in every direction to the relief of Paris, have all been defeated. Our troops, some of whom only a few weeks ago stood before Metz and Strassburg, have to-day advanced as far as Rouen, Orleans, and Dijon, and among many smaller victorious engagements, two new important battles—those of Amiens and the several days' fight at Orleans—have been added to our former triumphs. Several fortresses have been conquered, and much war material has been taken. I have reason, therefore, for the greatest satisfaction, and it is to me a gratification and a duty to express this to you. I thank you all, from the general to the common soldier. Should the enemy

persist in a further prosecution of the war, I know you will continue to show that exertion of all your powers to which we owe our great success hitherto, until we wring from him an honourable peace, worthy of the great sacrifices of blood and life which have been offered up. "WILLIAM.

"HEADQUARTERS, VERSAILLES, *Dec.* 6, 1870."

With the defeat of the Loire army a general impression prevailed that the entry of the enemy into Tours was simply a question of time. Whether this feeling was or was not shared by M. Gambetta and his colleagues, they doubtless judged that the victorious Prussians would at once make for the city which, since the investment of Paris, had been the second capital of France. A proclamation was therefore issued by the ministers, in which they announced the abandonment of Tours as the seat of the delegate government, as under the circumstances of the hour it was of the utmost importance to prevent the freedom of the army from being impeded in any way by political or administrative considerations. As, therefore, the proximity of the seat of government at Tours might hinder the military operations, it had been decided that the whole of the government offices should be transferred to Bordeaux; which, owing to the facilities of communication which it offered both by land and sea with the rest of France, afforded peculiar advantages for the organization of the army and the continuance of the work of the national defence. Often during the campaign there might have been witnessed the sudden flight of a whole population before the dreaded Germans, but never was there seen a spectacle of the kind so general, or a terror so universal, as that which reigned in Tours when the decision of the government became known. The city has a population of 41,000 inhabitants; and after the government had made it their headquarters, at least 20,000 persons who had nothing to do with the place itself had taken up their residence there. All these had to move, or felt themselves bound to move in accordance with their own interests, when the authorities had decided on flying southwards. Many of course were obliged, by considerations other than selfish, to follow the fortunes of the emigrating ministers. Besides the different embassies, various official and semi-official newspaper establishments, a large body who had obtained, and who were trying to obtain, contracts for every conceivable article which the soldier could eat, drink, wear, or use in fighting, there were a vast number of persons who, living more or less on their own means, had fled from Paris, and were now anxious to escape again from the Germans, supposed to be in full march on Tours. It may therefore be easily understood how huge the exodus became when it was known the government had positively decided upon going south. The inhabitants of the place, French as well as foreigners, had been one and all so greatly deceived by the falsehoods told, and the greater falsehoods insinuated, regarding the doings and prospects of the army of the Loire, that in spite of themselves they read every official document in a sense almost exactly contrary to that which it bore. That the military situation was good, and that the government was departing merely to leave greater freedom of action to the army of the Loire, might have been credited after the battle of Coulmiers and the re-occupation of Orleans by the French; but it would not go down after the disastrous fight at Patay, the return of the Prussians to Orleans, the removal of D'Aurelles from the command, and the arrival in Tours of a host of wounded and of fugitives, both officers and men, from the beaten forces which had struggled with more or less valour, but with very little success, to stem the ever-advancing Prussian tide. The persistent misrepresentations of the French government had demoralized the public, and no good news was now credited until actually proved to be true. So everybody believed the worst to have happened, when it was known that the government was going. Meanwhile the railway terminus was besieged by multitudes of fugitives, waiting all day and all night for opportunities of departure.

But although the delegate government was supposed to have removed to Bordeaux, the course of events led its chief member to take an opposite direction, and proceed to the right bank of the Loire, between Meaux and Beaugency. Ever anxious to be where his personal presence might inspire new life and lead to renewed efforts for his country, M. Gambetta had, as already stated, narrowly escaped falling into German hands in his endeavour to reach Orleans on the 4th; and leaving his colleagues to manage the details of government at Bordeaux, he now, regardless of danger, hastened to where a portion of the lately-beaten army was fighting

so as to deserve his commendation, and to justify the hope that, under favourable circumstances, they would be able once more to resume their forward march. The events of the first few days of December had, indeed, sorely tried the faith of those who were still sanguine as to the ultimate prospects of France; but whoever else might, Gambetta certainly was not disposed to give way to despair. His most cherished and loudly proclaimed anticipations had been rudely thwarted; the army which at such infinite pains he had collected, and which was to provide a grave for the enemies of France, had been defeated and dispersed: but all this failed to damp his ardent enthusiasm. In a manifesto, issued only a day or two after the proclamation of King William, he wrote—"Have no apprehensions. . . . The military situation, notwithstanding the evacuation of Orleans, is good. . . . Our enemies regard their situation as critical; I have proof of that. Patience and courage! We shall get through the work. Show energy, guard against panic, distrust all false rumours, and believe in the good star of France!" The succeeding narrative of events upon the Loire will show the grounds upon which M. Gambetta's renewed hopes were founded.

By the capture of Orleans the army of the Loire had been cut in two. General Chanzy, with the sixteenth and seventeenth corps, composing the left wing, had been cut off from Orleans on the 2nd, and fell back along the north side of the river, towards Meung, on the road to Blois. The right wing, consisting of Bourbaki's eighteenth and Crouzat's twentieth corps, crossing the river at Jargeau, retreated up its left or southern bank towards Gien; and the centre, comprising the fifteenth and nineteenth corps, which had been driven back through Orleans, subsequently separated, the former making its way for Blois in concert with General Chanzy, and the latter moving eastward to effect a junction with Bourbaki. The involuntary situation was accepted by M. Gambetta with characteristic promptitude. A decree was issued on the 6th, announcing that, in consequence of the recent military events on the Loire and the evacuation of Orleans, the government had decided on the formation of two distinct armies, to operate in the two regions separated by the course of the river, "thus preserving means of effecting a junction with Paris, which was the immediate and supreme object in view." The decree further announced the appointment of D'Aurelles de Paladine to the command of the camp of instruction at Cherbourg, and of Generals Bourbaki and Chanzy to the command of the first and second armies respectively. The new appointment of D'Aurelles was, of course, equivalent to dismissal from his position as commander-in-chief of the Loire forces. We have shown in Chapters XXII. and XXIII. that the generalissimo of the Loire army was vacillating throughout between the offensive operations for which M. Gambetta was urgent, and the more Fabian policy to which he was himself inclined; and it is certain that discouragement caused by his vacillation spread rapidly among the troops. What might have been expected from the whole Loire army had he been inspired with some of the boldness and intrepidity of M. Gambetta himself, was shown by the splendid rally of the left under General Chanzy, as contrasted with the wretched behaviour of the French centre when driven within the defensive works around Orleans. An impartial view of the events of the first few days of December, forces on us the conviction that Gambetta was justified, not in interfering from a distance with the details of the operations of D'Aurelles, but in removing him after it became clear that he had not the requisite power over his men for holding them together, and that he had suffered his army, in its chosen position, to be dissevered by the attack of a force not more than half its numerical strength. It would have been more prudent to have drawn in the French corps, spread out like the circumference of an open fan across the different roads centering on Orleans, so as to cover that city on a shorter line, and thus bring the several corps into closer communication, and prevent that separation which proved fatal to the defence of Orleans. The fact that the eighteenth corps on the right was obliged to retire eccentrically across the Loire without striking a blow, seems an instance of bad generalship on the part of D'Aurelles, which from his antecedents could not have been looked for. He had, too, managed to lose much influence with his generally republican and free-thinking soldiers, by having gone to venerate some relics in the Orleans cathedral, on an altar before which Joan of Arc had seen a vision of the Virgin Mary. The gratitude of France was, however, due to him for having formed, from an undisciplined mob, the first army which withstood the Germans in the field; and although M.

Gambetta exercised a wise discretion in assigning the Loire army to younger and bolder men, he only paid a just tribute to his merits in offering him the command (declined on the ground of ill-health) of the new camp of instruction at Cherbourg.

When it was decided to remove General d'Aurelles from the charge of the army, it was generally acknowledged that M. Gambetta made a good choice of a successor, for there was no doubt that Chanzy had shown more military capacity than any general as yet tried on the Loire. It was he who really won the battle of Coulmiers on the 9th of November; it was the left wing, under his command, which had fought—at Patay, on the 1st December—the only creditable engagement of the Loire army in the several days previous to its retreat from before Orleans; and of all the undistinguished crowd of worn-out veterans, naval officers, and hastily-promoted colonels under whom that army was first brought together from its scattered depots, Chanzy was the only general who had shone out conspicuously for vigour and military capacity in the field.

Even before the Bordeaux government had settled itself in its new home, General Chanzy had thoroughly justified his title to the most important military command M. Gambetta had to confer. We have seen how he was cut off from Orleans on the 2nd and 3rd of December, with his own (sixteenth) corps and the seventeenth. These, reinforced on the following week by the twenty-first corps, sent to him from Tours, constituted the new active army of the Loire, with which he was to endeavour to fulfil the hopes which General D'Aurelles had failed to realize. M. Gambetta had pledged himself to support the new commander with all the forces of the west; but as yet these were only in a rudimentary condition, and weeks must elapse before they could with any certainty be drawn upon. Meanwhile, it was most important to present the best possible face to the enemy.

The sixteenth corps, after the defeats of the 3rd and 4th of December, had retreated down the river as far as Mer, within fourteen miles of Blois. General Chanzy ordered its columns to re-form at Beaugency, seven miles nearer to Orleans. With marvellous rapidity he established a new system of defence, presented himself, much to the astonishment of his enemy, at the head of at least 100,000 men, and offered a resistance which forms one of the most interesting episodes of the war. The newly-organized army was posted between the two railway lines, one coming from Paris and Orleans, along the banks of the Loire, to Blois and Tours, the other from Paris direct to Tours by Châteaudun and Vendôme. Between Beaugency, on the first line, and Fréteval, a few miles north of Vendôme, on the second, extends the forest of Marchenoir—a region chosen by the French at an early period in the campaign as well adapted for defensive operations.

Up to the evening of the 8th, Prince Frederick Charles, with the tenth corps, remained at Orleans, while the rest of the German forces spread themselves out like a fan, along the roads which the retreating enemy had taken. Not at all expecting to meet with any serious opposition, the prince sent the duke of Mecklenburg, with about 40,000 troops, comprising the seventeenth division, and the remnant of Von der Tann's Bavarians, to follow up those who had taken the right bank of the river. It did not seem probable that the advance upon Tours would be impeded by only a portion of that French army which, as a whole, had already been beaten and dispersed. On the 6th of December the cavalry, who were sent to clear the way to Blois, were, on entering the town of Meung, fired upon by a body of 1200 foot gendarmes, who after a short resistance disappeared, and the road was reported clear for the advance of the army. Accordingly the leading columns passed through the town, unmolested and without suspicion, about ten o'clock on the morning of the 7th; but no sooner did they debouch upon the plain covered with vineyards, on the side towards Beaugency, than they were received with a hot artillery and Chassepot fire, which compelled them to fall back behind the extreme houses of Meung, which they rapidly loopholed and defended. After a short delay the artillery came to the front, the Mecklenburgers again advanced, and the battle became general. The French army was in position along the road which runs at right angles to the Loire by Ouzouer-le-Marché. Some brigades had been pushed along in echelon towards Meung, but the main body extended from Villorceau on the right to Cravant on the left, the village of Beaumont forming the centre of the position. A slightly undulating plain separated the two armies, and owing to the hard frost, the country was in admirable condition for the passage of artillery and cavalry. But the

...ure from a Photograph

precaution taken by the French commander of causing the vine stakes to be left in the ground, paralyzed to a great extent the latter arm, in which the Germans were exceedingly strong. The seventeenth division, which found itself thus suddenly engaged with an enemy in very superior force, was for a time obliged to bear alone the whole brunt of the attack, and the seventy-sixth and ninetieth regiments of Mecklenburgers suffered severely both in men and officers. Cavalry operations, as we have said, were impracticable; but the country was very favourable for riflemen and skirmishers. The German artillery, however, by their excellent range and practice, prevented anything like a forward movement on the part of the French, until the Bavarians, who were at some distance in the rear when the fight began, by an extraordinary feat in marching came up on the right of the Mecklenburgers late in the afternoon, and by their dash and impetuosity carried all before them. At dark the French, who had made a gallant fight throughout the day, found themselves driven back at all points, and the German army camped upon their hardly-won field.

During the night the duke of Mecklenburg was strengthened by the arrival of the twenty-second Prussian division. General Chanzy also received reinforcements, and early on the morning of the 8th commenced a vigorous attack, which might have seriously altered the German position but for the timely arrival mentioned. At first the form of the battle-field was very nearly that of a horse-shoe halved into pieces, separated at some distance from each other. One end of the shoe rested upon the village of Baulle, about half way between Meung and Beaugency, and the other upon Tavers, a village beyond Beaugency, on a ridge at the bottom of which a small stream flows into the Loire. On this ridge the French were posted; their position extending in a curve as if to complete the horse-shoe, which it was prevented from doing by the German position occupying the corresponding curve. The strength of the French position was on the ridge near the end of the straight part of the shoe; that of the Germans at the curve. In other words, the force of the attack of both armies was from their respective right wings. Between Baulle and Beaugency, a little to the right of the main road, was the village of Messas; in the same direction, and a little in rear of it, lay Villeneuve. Yet further back, and more to the right, was Langclochere, the centre of the battle-field of the 7th. Still further round the curve, but far more to the front, was Beaumont, and beyond that, at the broken end of the German part of the horse-shoe, Cravant. These villages were generally from a mile to a mile and a half distant from each other. The twenty-second Prussian division, which formed the German right wing, was to have commenced the attack, but was anticipated by the French. The Bavarians, who as usual had to sustain the brunt of the action, occupied the centre; and the seventeenth division, forming the left wing, held the high road leading to Beaugency at Baulle, a little in rear of Messas, which with Cravant had not yet been taken. For a long time the battle lay with the artillery of the respective armies, and this arm of the French force did much to retrieve its character. About one o'clock the Germans endeavoured to storm several of the villages in their front, but found the work by no means easy; mobiles as well as the more seasoned troops contesting gallantly every inch of ground. Messas, Cravant, and Beaumont were, however, ultimately taken, though after severe loss. Batteries on the left bank of the Loire commenced bombarding Beaugency in the afternoon, and painful havoc was committed among the wounded soldiers, with whom many of the houses and public buildings were crowded.

Towards evening a storming party pushed forward, and after severe fighting managed to occupy the town and capture a battery of six guns and 1100 prisoners. The day thus closed favourably on the whole for the Germans, who had slowly gained ground. The resistance of the enemy, however, had been as obstinate as it was unexpected, and throughout the camp an unpleasant sense of disappointment prevailed. It was, therefore, resolved that something further should be done to augment the acquisitions of the day; and about midnight two Hanseatic regiments who were occupying Messas, finding that the village of Vernon, immediately in front of them, was still occupied by the French, determined on surprising it; and rushing suddenly in, captured 400 prisoners without firing a shot or losing a man. The Bavarians were equally successful in a night sortie from Beaumont upon the neighbouring village of La Mee, which they also took by surprise and without loss.

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The scenes in Beaugency, immediately after its

capture, were painfully memorable. The night was very starry, and the rattle of the musketry never quite ceased. There was also a good deal of desultory firing about the streets by Prussian patrols, who sometimes caught sight of the uniforms of French soldiers who had brought in wounded comrades, and were endeavouring to rejoin their corps. The whole town was a vast hospital, and there was only one doctor capable of performing amputations! In the theatre alone were upwards of 200 desperately wounded men, forming a scene which those who speak lightly of war, or who hold in their hands the power of making it, should have witnessed. For many hours there was no medical man in the place. The cold was intense, and many a man's life slipped away because there was no one sufficiently skilled to bind up his wounds. The dead lay thick among the dying; and as the former were dragged out their places were instantly filled. Miserable objects, with broken jaws or faces half shot away, wandered about, pointing to their wounds, and making piteous signals for water which they could not swallow. Officers and men, veterans and boys, all lay in one indistinguisable mass of misery, from which the cries of "Water! For the love of God, water! A doctor! A doctor!" never ceased to come. It was indeed a relief when the surgeon arrived from other similar scenes, and calling out loudly, "Voyons, où sont les gravement blessés? où sont les amputations?" set to work with determined but kindly energy. It will always be a satisfaction to the subscribers to the great English fund for the sick and wounded to know, that numbers of the French were spared unutterable torture, and owed their lives to the supply of English chloroform, blankets, bandages, and wine which was fortunately forthcoming on that fearful night, and called forth many blessings on our nation.

On the 9th cannonading began at daybreak, and both sides were soon engaged along their whole lines. The German position had been improved, the grand-duke's army occupying almost the exact front of the French on the previous day. The shape of the half horse-shoe was still preserved, but the French half was now occupied by the Germans, who were slowly pushing their enemy back in every direction, though the latter still pertinaciously strove to hold their ground, and replied furiously to the German batteries. The village of Villorceau was taken by the Bavarians early in the day, and Cernay about the same time by some regiments of the twenty-second division. Both villages were the scene of desperate engagements; and at the close of the day the dead Bavarians and French around Villorceau lay thicker than pheasants after the hottest *battue* in England. It was noticed towards the afternoon that General Chanzy was concentrating strongly on the German right: he was in reality falling back on the forest of Marchenoir. About three o'clock the order was given for a general advance; and as the artillery went to the front, and the sharpshooters began to feel the enemy along the whole line, the firing became terrific. The rifles seemed endeavouring to rival the mitrailleuse in loudness and rapidity, and the two, combined with the bursting of the shells and the fire of some heavy naval guns which the French had in position, made four distinct sounds, which between four and five o'clock blended in a roar fierce beyond description. At this time, immediately under the blaze of the setting sun, might be seen long lines of French troops apparently retreating rapidly northwards, and their opponents had clearly the best of the fight. The day before it might have been considered a drawn game, but it could not be doubted who were the victors this evening; and the shade of anxiety which clouded all countenances the previous night and this morning, at the unexpected check which the German armies received, had now disappeared. Still the French were spoken of in far higher terms than at any time since the commencement of the war, and general admiration was expressed for the commander who, out of a beaten and flying army, could have got together material to present so bold and determined a front. In the course of the day the grand-duke was strengthened by the arrival of the tenth corps from Orleans, and the army once more camped among the frozen bodies of friends and foes, the interment of which had been prevented by long-continued fighting on almost the same area of operations. The duke of Mecklenburg, in imitation of his illustrious master, telegraphed to his wife with reference to this engagement of the 9th: "The enemy attacked us violently, but was victoriously repulsed by the advance of the seventeenth and twenty-second divisions. God was with us. Our losses were smaller than yesterday."

As if by signal the firing ceased at dusk on the 9th, and it might have been inferred that both

sides were utterly exhausted by the three days' carnage. Quiet was therefore expected on the 10th, and by a few hours of much needed repose the grand-duke of Mecklenburg hoped to prepare his troops for the decisive battle, which it was thought might be looked for on the 11th. There were two parties, however, to this arrangement, and the irrepressible French seemed little disposed to enjoy the luxury of rest. On the 10th they hastened to commence an attack upon the twenty-second division, which was holding Cernay and Cravant, and bombarded those villages furiously for two hours. The Germans quickly brought their artillery into position, and an engagement became general along a line extending from Villorceau to L'Hay, a little eastward of Cravant. The two armies were now in almost parallel lines, from north-west to south-east, the French right resting on Josnes and the left on Villermain and Montigny. The attack made by the French in the early part of the day ceased, after having been replied to for a while; and the German army was too much in need of rest to court a struggle which would in all probability have to be renewed on the morrow. Only one incident of special note occurred during the day. The Prussians had taken the village of Villejouan, but the French in considerable force attacked and retook it, making more than 100 prisoners. A couple of German regiments came to the rescue, and, after losing very severely, again took the village; but their comrades had been passed to the rear in time to prevent their liberation. The French still swarmed around the village, and the Germans found themselves without ammunition. A number of the enemy, however, were made prisoners, whose cartouche boxes were still well supplied; and the Germans, seizing their Chassepots, returned the French fire with their own weapons. While still hotly engaged, the ammunition waggon on its way to their relief was suddenly brought to a standstill by three of its horses being shot, on which a party ran out under a heavy fire, brought in the waggon in safety, and finally succeeded in repelling the French attempt to retake the village. As all the superior officers had been previously killed, the battalion was commanded by a captain, who for this brilliant feat of arms received thanks from the grand-duke in person, and a promise of the iron cross. Along the whole of the now very extended line, however, the chief characteristic of the day was caution. With this one exception there were no brilliant dashes, no furious fusillades of small arms, and after a time even the artillery fire languished; but the day being remarkably clear, the scene, as a military spectacle, was perfect.

The incessant fighting of the last four days over almost the same few acres, rendered it extremely difficult to administer the usual alleviations to the sufferings of the wounded and dying. The scenes occurring in Villorceau might have been witnessed in almost every one of the numerous hamlets in and about which the work of slaughter had been done. The chief house in the place was a Pension de Jeunes Filles, and it is doubtful if any of the horrors of war depicted by the truthful pens of Erckmann-Chatrian equal those which that house exhibited. Every room (and there were many), from the cellar to the roof, was crowded with dead and starving men, lying so thick that it was impossible to move among them. Some had been there since Tuesday evening, many of them since Wednesday. It was now Saturday, and not one drop of water, not one atom of food, had yet passed their lips. Many were desperately wounded, although still alive. Among them were several officers. The house contained no furniture; the windows had been broken; and all these days and nights of almost arctic cold had the men been lying on the bare floor with their wounds undressed. The stench was fearful. Every house in the village was in the same state. In some rooms were twelve or fourteen men—many of them corpses! That night a kind uhlan doctor volunteered to bind up a few of the worst wounds, to enable the men to be transported, but he had nothing with him but a pair of scissors and some pins. Fortunately the resources of the English society did not fail, and most of the sufferers were removed during the night of the 10th or on the following day to the Couvent des Ursulines at Beaugency. Many were too near their end to bear being moved, and an excellent French abbé—himself a martyr to consumption—spent the night with them in prayer, and in dispensing, with the assistance of an English Protestant soldier, the last sacraments of the church.

On December 11 the two armies remained inactive, and on the 12th it was found that the French had mysteriously disappeared. It was

evident that the attack of the 10th was designed to mask a movement of retreat, for General Chanzy had retired in perfect order, leaving not the slightest trace behind. The army of the grand-duke of Mecklenburg immediately set out by cross-roads, in full pursuit. Chanzy, however, eluded his pursuers, and while they were thinking of driving him upon Tours, he moved to take up a position, stronger than that which he had abandoned, on the direct road to Paris, and where he could receive reinforcements from the west.

Running almost parallel with the Loire is the Loir, upon which are the towns of Châteaudun and Vendôme, about midway between which the river traverses a range of hills—winding round the spur of one, and passing through a narrow valley, scarcely abrupt enough to be called a gorge, in the hollow of which lies the little town of Fréteval. From the left bank of the Loir the extensive forest of Marchenoir runs back in the direction of Beaugency, for a distance of twenty miles or more; while on the right bank the forest of Fréteval extends westward to almost an equal distance. The French had taken up a position on the spur on the right bank of the river, with the wood of Fréteval on the left and in rear, the wood of Marchenoir on the right, and the river Loir, which there makes a bend, in front. To strengthen the immense natural facilities for defence offered by his new position, General Chanzy planted batteries wherever any advantage of ground was to be had, and filled the wooded slopes with sharpshooters. The village of Fréteval was taken by the Germans at the point of the bayonet after some fighting on the 14th, but could not be held on account of its exposed position; and on the morning of the 15th the state of affairs was critical for them, and singularly creditable to the tactics of General Chanzy. The duke of Mecklenburg had been sent to drive farther away from Paris the army of the Loire, and now by a skilful movement it had not only placed itself on the road to the capital, but had got the start and left its pursuers in the rear. It will be remembered that on the 9th of the previous month the small Bavarian force under the command of General von der Tann, after making a gallant stand at Coulmiers, was obliged to retreat before the French army of the Loire. Now, after the lapse of five weeks, after marching incessantly and fighting eight battles, the Germans found themselves in sight of the wood on the other side of which the battle of the 9th was fought, with the same army before them, and in a stronger position than it had ever previously occupied! No German army was now between General Chanzy's and that which was investing the capital, and only an inferior force was behind. As Chanzy was in communication with Le Mans and the west, he might at any time become strong enough to advance, and might then, indeed, be advancing upon Paris by Châteaudun. The position of the French at Fréteval was too strong to be stormed with the force at the grand-duke's disposal; but, fortunately for him, a direct attack became unnecessary.

Prince Frederick Charles had sent the ninth corps down the Loire (a different river, it must be remembered, from the Loir), which had appeared in the rear of Blois, on the east bank of the river, on the 12th; but as the bridge was broken the corps could not enter Blois until the tenth corps, marching to that city, held out a hand to it by throwing up hastily a bridge of boats, by which it passed over. The tenth corps was sent to Vendôme, and by threatening the right of General Chanzy, succeeded in compelling the French to abandon their strong position at Fréteval, higher up the river. The French were posted in front of Vendôme, which they held on the 14th and 15th; but having been beaten in an artillery duel, they, on the evening of the latter day, evacuated the town, which the Germans entered on the 16th. The German line was now formed, the duke of Mecklenburg occupying Cloyes and Morée, the tenth army corps being at Vendôme, and the ninth at Blois. On the 17th Chanzy had another rear-guard action with Von der Tann at Epuisay, where the roads from Vendôme and Morée to St. Calais meet, and then withdrew to Le Mans, which he entered on the 21st.

The French had throughout been fighting a losing battle, but their commander felt that anything was better than the continued retreats by which the soldiers had been disheartened. A peculiar character was given to these daily encounters by the stern determination with which the French renewed the struggle, day after day, refusing to consider themselves as beaten, even after a series of undeniable defeats. Again and again the Germans in the morning found themselves occupying the positions held by their opponents in the evening; but the French held others in the

immediate neighbourhood—every village serving as a fortress. When dislodged from one, they took up their stand in another, and so on from sunrise to sunset. Each battle was a mere series of skirmishes, in which, though the Germans were victorious, both armies left a vast tract of country strewed with their dead, who lay unheeded day after day.

Had the movements of General Chanzy since the evacuation of Orleans been dictated by the most profound strategy, instead of by necessity or accident, they could not have been executed more skilfully, or in a manner more harassing to his foes. The vast quantity of stores which had been accumulated in Orleans were sent across to the left bank of the Loire, with a comparatively small force to protect them, and to deceive the Germans as to the position of the main body of the army, which waited on the right bank, and fell upon the flank of the inferior German force at Meung. Here, for four successive days, Chanzy fought so hard that the Germans gained very little ground, and had to send for heavy reinforcements; when they expected him to rest he attacked them; and when they expected him to attack, he was gone, no one at first knew whither. He thus forced the duke of Mecklenburg to change his front and follow the retreating enemy to the almost impregnable position he had taken up at Fréteval, and in the vast forests upon the right and left banks of the Loir; where there seemed to be nothing to prevent his keeping the Germans at bay, while the bulk of his army might by forced marches have moved in four days, by Châteaudun and Chartres, upon Versailles. As it was, the French held their opponents in front of Fréteval for four days, till their position being turned by the tenth and third army corps, directed by Prince Frederick Charles upon Vendôme, Chanzy was forced to choose between retreating upon Le Mans or upon Paris. The former town, with the great naval fortresses in its rear, offered important advantages to a retiring army wearied with constant fighting; and once reached, a junction with the French army of the west would be effected, and large reinforcements obtained. Chanzy, therefore, directed his march thither, making admirable use of many defensive positions, and on the 21st of December reached Le Mans, having saved his army and joined his supports. Although his troops had suffered terribly, he had lost only seven or eight guns.

These operations reflected high credit from every point of view on the French commander, and proved what a part, at least, of the army of the Loire could do in untoward circumstances. Prince Frederick Charles apparently calculated that Von der Tann and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg were in sufficient force to destroy Chanzy; but he baffled these expectations, and his vigorous stand at Beaugency and Marchenoir not only weakened his foes, but by drawing a detachment against his right perhaps saved the rest of the army of the Loire. In falling back on Le Mans, and retreating upon his reinforcements when his wing was menaced, eye-witnesses told with what foresight he availed himself of natural obstacles to baffle and impede his pursuers.

Though the retreat had been trying in the extreme, and many hundreds had disbanded, the great majority of the French troops had contended not without honour against their veteran and well-seasoned foes. That they should have been fighting in the open field at all, considering the helpless condition of France after Sedan, is not a little surprising. But that they should have fought, within thirteen days, ten such battles as Beaune-la-Rollande, Patay, Bazoches, Chevilly, Chilleure, Orleans, and the four about Beaugency, on terms so nearly equal, sometimes superior, against the best German troops, effecting their retreat on almost all occasions without any disastrous loss or confusion—is an achievement which reflects the highest honour on the generals who organized and commanded the army of the Loire. The weather had throughout been dreadful. As described by General Chanzy himself at one place in his valuable and concise work, "La Deuxieme Armée de la Loire," "A torrent of rain since the morning had melted the snow and produced a thaw. The roads were everywhere exceedingly slippery, and the fields were too muddy for the passage of horses and carriages. In point of fatigue to men and cattle, this day (12th December) was one of the most distressing of the campaign. Nevertheless, the march was effected with a reasonable degree of regularity, and by night all the corps were established precisely in the positions assigned to them."

In fact, the sufferings of the troops can have been but little less severe while they lasted than what was endured in the retreat from Russia. To fight all through a short winter's day, the fingers

almost too cold to handle a rifle, and to find oneself at nightfall on a bare frozen plain, or, even worse, a muddy field, with no supplies at hand, and often even no fuel, shivering the long night through in a furrow, or wandering about in a vain search for food—a night of this sort, followed by another day of hopeless fighting, was, during the first fortnight of this dreary December, the condition of the soldiers of the French army, in which the sufferings of the sound were only surpassed by those of the miserable wounded, who crawled unaided into the nearest ditch to die. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, the methodical way in which the business of the headquarters was conducted during this time was most admirable. Night after night, when the troops were getting such fragments of rest as their condition made possible, was passed by Chanzy in writing long despatches to the provisional government, and dictating orders for the following day. Promotions were made, casualties filled up, and the business of the army generally carried on with the greatest detail and precision. To read General Chanzy's orders of the day at this time, one might suppose that they were issued by the commander of a confident, well-conditioned army, making war in ordinary fashion, in regular campaigning weather. The whole episode is a remarkable instance of the effect of character in war. With a less determined and obstinate commander, it is hardly doubtful that this army would have gone to pieces. As it was, Chanzy's determined attitude, and the spirit he succeeded in infusing into those around him, had the effect of keeping the Germans, who were also of course suffering very much from the weather, on very respectful terms. Altogether, the retreat from Orleans to the Loire during the first half of December was perhaps as creditable to French arms as anything that occurred during the whole war.

It must in justice be remarked, however, that if the French had thus fought with heroic steadiness and courage, the Germans also bore up against their great hardships and heavy losses with their wonted fortitude; not excepting the Bavarians, about whose demoralization idle tales had been in circulation ever since their first mishap at Coulmiers. These troops had, indeed, suffered so severely, that they were reduced to about one-fifth of their original force; yet to the last they exhibited the utmost gallantry. Each corps d'armée left Germany 30,000 strong; before any of the fighting round Beaugency, the first was in sixteen battles, without reinforcements, and General von der Tann could not number more than 5000 effective bayonets. Some reserves arrived from Germany on the 7th December, and the active part they took in the engagements of that and the two following days may be judged by the fact that the corps sustained an additional loss of 1200 men and forty-eight officers. On the 12th the corps was ordered back to Orleans to enjoy a season of well-merited repose, and a very complimentary letter was addressed by the king of Prussia to General von der Tann.

Not deeming it prudent to pursue their enemy further for the present, the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and the duke of Mecklenburg remained in the country between Orleans, Vendôme, and Blois; and with the exception of an expedition to Tours by Voigts-Rhetz and part of the tenth corps, no further encounter took place between the combatants until the winter campaign in January, the events of which will be related in a future chapter. When the Germans reached Blois and Vendôme they were at less than two day's march from Tours, on the two railways converging on that town, the one from Orleans, and the other from Châteaudun. After the government delegation left for Bordeaux, General Sol, who had the command of the Tours military division, seeing himself exposed to attack from these two lines, and also from Vierzon, immediately retreated. M. Gambetta, deeming the evacuation of Tours precipitate, removed him from active service, and appointed General Pisani in his place. The force of Voigts-Rhetz having been signalled in the immediate neighbourhood, General Chanzy sent a despatch to Pisani ordering him, with the 6000 troops under his command, to harass the enemy as much as possible, but by no means to risk a defeat. Accordingly, on December 20, he, with his little army, attacked the Prussians at Monnaie, and after inflicting on them no little damage and taking sixty prisoners, retreated with considerable loss. Pisani, watching the course of events, lingered for some time about the vicinity of Tours, before which the Prussians appeared the next morning. Thinking that, as the garrison had left, the town would make no resistance, they sent forward a squadron of cavalry to take possession. The towns-people, however, had made up their minds to attempt a defence, and when the hostile

cuirassiers came within easy range, the Tours national guards fired on them, and forced them to retreat at full gallop. The Prussians then determined to try the effect of a bombardment, unlimbered a battery of artillery on the edge of the lofty plateau rising at only a few hundred yards to the north, and began shelling the town. As Tours was perfectly open and totally unprovided with the means of defence, this mode of attack soon began to tell. Several were killed by the shells, and amongst them M. Beurtheret, the editor of the *Union Liberale*. Fearing that the town might be totally destroyed, M. Eugène Gouiz, the mayor, accompanied by his adjuncts and an interpreter, went to the Prussian commander with a flag of truce, and asked for a cessation of the bombardment, which was at once and unconditionally accorded. The Prussians did not occupy the town, but, probably supposing that considerable French forces were in the neighbourhood, retired soon afterwards to Blois. Tours was thus again left in peace, and was re-occupied by General Pisani and his troops as soon as the enemy disappeared.

Dropping for the present the subject of the operations of the armies on the several zones around Paris, we will glance briefly at the principal towns and fortresses captured by the Germans during December, taking them in chronological order.

After the first battle of Amiens, which took place on the 26th and 27th November, and which resulted in the destruction of what was then called the French army of the north, some remnants of that force were said to have fled in the direction of Caen. General von Göben, with the first corps, was despatched to pursue these, with instructions also to make a reconnaissance upon the Rouen road, but not to attack the enemy there if in positions behind earthworks. At a meeting of the principal inhabitants and the military and civil authorities, it was determined not to defend Rouen, as in consequence of the incomplete state of the lines of defence any attempt at resistance would be useless. But changing their minds, an address was issued by the municipal council, intimating that the enemy was approaching nearer and nearer, that the military were concentrating for defence, and exciting the citizens to make an effort equal to the sacrifices the country required of them. The available forces of the town were accordingly sent to Buchy to arrest the course of the enemy, and the result closely resembled the memorable battle of Bull's Run.

Buchy is a village, very insignificant in itself, but strategically of no small importance, as there the road and railway from Amiens to Rouen bifurcates, the northern branch going on to Clères and St. Victor (on the way from Rouen to Dieppe), thus forming the apex of a triangle, of which the lines to Rouen and to Clères form the sides, and the railway from Rouen to the Clères station of the Dieppe Railway, the base. The French force consisted of undisciplined mobiles and mobilized national guards, from several departments, of a corps of franc-tireurs, a provisional regiment of the line (*regiment de marche*), and a small detachment of cavalry. The Prussians advanced on Buchy from St. Saens, and about five o'clock on the morning of 3rd December sent some shells into the French positions. The first discharge dismounted one of the *three* guns with which the French attempted to open fire against a Prussian battery of from thirty to forty. The mobiles, who were drawn up to protect them, no sooner heard a shell bursting than they fled across country, and paused not until they reached Rouen in the evening. There they scattered all over the place, filled every *café* and wine shop, drank very freely, confessed that they had retired, but boasted loudly of what they would have done in other circumstances, and gave exaggerated accounts of the enemy's numbers. A panic spread throughout the city. The treasure and notes in the Bank of France and in the receveur-général's hands were embarked on board the *Protectrice*, a powerful iron-clad floating battery, supposed to have been moved to Rouen for the defence of the city; but she now got up steam and was soon out of sight. The various French merchantmen in the river also dropped down with the tide. Early next morning, which was very cold, the *rappel* was sounded for the muster of the national guard, who turned out with readiness. They were kept waiting for nearly six hours in the cold, and were then marched to the railway station for conveyance to Clères. Ultimately, however, the authorities again changed their minds, and the guards remained, to be disarmed and disbanded by the Prussians. A number of siege guns, which had been landed on the quay only two days before, were spiked and thrown into the river. The town, meanwhile, was seemingly emptied of its male population, and the sad,

anxious faces of the women expressed the fears by which they were agitated.

In the meantime, the strange manner in which the French troops, evidently strong in numbers, had abandoned position after position from Gaillefontaine along the road to Rouen, induced General von Göben to make one of those rapid advances which had so often led to triumph. The forces under his command received with their usual enthusiasm the order to advance upon the road to Rouen; and notwithstanding the severe marching and fighting of the last few days, all strode along seemingly as fresh as when they left the banks of the Rhine. They anticipated a battle before Rouen; believing that the French were strong in numbers, well armed, and provided with artillery, with the advantage of occupying a fortified position.

A halt was made at Buchy, where the precipitate retreat of the French took place to which we have already alluded. Little knowing the terror they had caused, the Prussians concluded the force they had dispersed was but the outpost of a more formidable body. But on their arrival at Quincampoix, on the morning of December 5, the advanced guard brought in an elderly gentleman, taken prisoner as he drove from Rouen in his gig, and who turned out to be the mayor of Quincampoix. From him the Prussians learned that 35,000 troops had camped at Quincampoix the previous night, but had only remained for an hour, and then continued their retreat upon Rouen, which intended to make no resistance. The intelligence was so astounding, that it was at first believed to be a *ruse* to induce the somewhat wearied Germans to advance upon a strong position defended by fresh troops. But after a short consultation with Colonel von Witzendorff, the chief of his staff, and Major Bomki, General von Göben ordered the troops to advance. Just at this moment the omnibus from Rouen arrived, with intelligence to the general which seemed almost incredible. In the morning the French troops had all retreated upon Havre. The town had subscribed 10,000,000 francs as a contribution, which General von Göben was invited to come and take. Everything was now boot and saddle; the fortieth and seventieth regiments, forming the thirty-first brigade, with the ninth hussars and two batteries of artillery, pushed along the road to Isneauville, and the staff waited in Quincampoix, to let the infantry advance.

Arrived at Isneauville, the Germans came upon the first lines of the French works. In the middle of the road lay two heavy ship guns, 24-pounders, which it was clear that the French had not had time to put into position. Everything betokened a hasty retreat. The batteries were unfinished; while, on either side of the road, the Prussian troops actually marched among the still burning camp-fires of their opponents. The question naturally arose, what had the French general at Rouen been doing for the last two months? He had more than ample time, money, and material, to say nothing of his close proximity to Havre, Dieppe, and Boulogne, to establish a line of defence before the city that might have very greatly altered the face of matters. He had done nothing but abandon every position which, with immense labour, his troops had constructed between Isneauville and Gaillefontaine, where every village might have been made a fortress; all the more easily because his army, instead of being made up entirely of mobiles, included several line regiments, and the fifth hussars, with thirty-five guns.

Rouen lies in a basin, surrounded by high hills, from which Von Göben's army quickly had a view of the famous city. A patrol of hussars was sent forward to arrange for the entry of the troops; but in the meantime a magistrate appeared, a thin old man, with the ribbon of the Legion of Honour on his coat, asking the general to send some troops into the town as quickly as possible? The square of the Hôtel de Ville was in the hands of the *gamins*, who, armed with the weapons thrown away by the national guard, were trying their best to shoot the mayor. In that drunken, reckless style in which a French mob delights, they were firing upon the Hotel de Ville, the façade of which was pitted with bullets, the windows broken, and the members of the commune, huddled together in a back room, in despair. Fortunately for the mayor and the town, the German troops were soon upon the spot, when one battalion of the fortieth, with two guns, took up its position in the Place Cauchoise; while the other two battalions, with the seventieth regiment, filed in different directions through the town. The general then rode to the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, where, beside the statue of Napoleon I., he saw the sixteenth division, with bands playing and colours flying, march past.

Great indignation was expressed in other parts of France at the capitulation of Rouen without

resistance; but it was only one of a large number of instances in the course of the war, in which every one cried "forward" to his neighbour without moving a foot in advance himself. Nancy and Rheims were pronounced cowards because they offered no resistance to the enemy, having indeed neither arms nor men. Châteaudun was, in fact, the single open town which defended itself; for with this exception every other in France, so defiant when the enemy was distant, learned prudence at its near approach.

A " mild invasion " is almost a contradiction in terms; yet if ever a city was mildly invaded it was Rouen. Not one shop was closed, nor, as far as an ordinary observer could judge, was the petty commerce of the place interfered with. But capital was too sensitive not to take the alarm. Nearly all the great factories and printworks, on whose operations Rouen depended, were closed, and the distress of the workpeople was soon obviously very great. Some ingenious speculators in the locality had formed a special insurance company for guaranteeing subscribers against the various evils of war; but among these evils the occupation of Rouen by the enemy had not been foreseen, and the company, too severely tested at the very outset of its enterprise, collapsed.

In Rouen the German army of the north found many of its wants abundantly met. Among other things obtained was a supply of fresh horses, 40,000 pairs of boots, 10,000 blankets, 2000 shirts, 20,000 pairs of socks, and 100,000 cigars, and the city could, if needful, have furnished a considerable amount of specie. Here the army was in secure and comfortable winter quarters, in direct communication with the Crown Prince of Saxony and the army of Paris; and from this point, unless the communication by way of Amiens should be disturbed, a great military movement might be organized. The cost of all these advantages to the army of the north was eleven men killed and fifty wounded, without the loss of a single officer. The French had lost five officers killed and eighteen wounded, forty-five rank and file killed, 100 wounded, 600 prisoners, and twenty-seven pieces of heavy marine artillery, together with the wealthiest city of Western France.

Apparently from a desire to reach the sea, and thus be able to say that the Prussians had crossed France from the Rhine to the British Channel, a detachment of Manteuffel's army visited Dieppe from Amiens. The much-dreaded occupation had been for weeks past the nightmare of the worthy Dieppois, who had spent much time in making defensive preparations. In spite, however, of wooden barricades and innumerable drillings of the national guards, when the inhabitants heard of the near approach of the enemy, the guns were spiked, the arms and ammunition were shipped to Havre, the brave nationales and *douaniers* doffed their uniforms, and all prepared to receive the invader as amicably and cordially as dignity would permit. On the morning of December 9 the usual advanced guard of uhlans gave the customary warning of a large body of troops being behind them, who would require unlimited food, board, and lodging. Accordingly, a few hours afterwards, in marched the main body, with bands playing and colours flying, as if they were returning from a victory into one of their own towns. Many of the houses had been dressed out with flags of various nationalities, the English strongly predominating; hung out to show that the occupants were not French, and therefore not liable to the obligation of billeting the enemy. Every house, however, on which the lot fell had to receive its soldier guests; and the English residences were apparently at a premium—perhaps a delicate though unwelcome compliment to proverbial British hospitality. The troops behaved with great moderation, and all passed off quietly. As no resistance was offered, the Prussians levied no contribution. There were even less than the usual requisitions, though 25,000 cigars were demanded at the manufactory, and the authorities had to supply large quantities of provisions, wine, and brandy. Shortly after their entry into the town the uhlans rode to the Plage, where many of them for the first time saw with admiration the broad expanse of the ocean, and gave three hurrahs for the king and Vaterland. Orders were issued towards nightfall that no lights should be exhibited at the entrance of the port. Frenchmen were stationed at the pierhead to warn off every vessel that should attempt to force an entrance, under the penalty of being fired upon by the enemy. This measure seemed hard; but a man-of-war had been seen cruising in the offing in the latter part of the afternoon, and measures had to be adopted to thwart a night attack from the seaboard, should such be attempted. The departure of the troops, which took place the day after their arrival, was regretted

by those of the inhabitants who were engaged in commerce, and who had realized no small harvest. As the Prussians seemed to intend making Dieppe a provision depot for themselves, both this port, and Fécamp and Havre, were shortly afterwards declared by the French government in a state of blockade, and men-of-war were stationed near to enforce its observance.

On December 19 Dieppe was occupied a second time by the Prussians, and as the little army quartered there were in want of boots and horses, all residents and visitors, not being foreigners, were called upon to send their horses to the market-place, where a Prussian officer selected a certain number, and, according to the custom in such cases, bought them at his own valuation, paying for them in paper redeemable at the end of the war. As nearly all the good horses at Dieppe belonged to Englishmen, the Prussians, out of many hundreds brought forward, found very few worth taking —altogether, not more than a dozen. In the matter of boots they were more successful; the dealers in these articles having been required to send to an appointed place all the ready made goods they had on hand, on assurance that whatever was taken from them would be paid for at its full value.

Of course, too, there was a little money transaction. No contribution was levied. But Dieppe possessed a tobacco manufactory, which, like all such establishments in France, belonged to the state; and General von Göben explained to the municipality that, as state property, the tobacco manufactory passed from the hands of the French to those of the Prussian government. As the representative of that government he could not work the manufactory, neither could he carry it away with him, and he had no wish to burn it. He therefore proposed to sell it, and (making a good guess) fixed the value at the round sum of 100,000 francs. The muncipality protested against the exorbitancy of the demand, which was ultimately reduced to 75,000 francs. Part of the money was paid down at once, and the rest in a day or two after.

On the 9th of December, the same day on which Dieppe was occupied the first time by the Prussians, a somewhat compensating advantage was achieved by a band of active and daring Lille mobiles, who surprised the Prussian garrison at Ham, the fortress where Napoleon III. was once imprisoned. At six o'clock in the evening the detachment of French arriving before the town, which is protected by a strong castle, first fell on the sentries, and then sounded the Prussian signal for a general march. About 200 of the garrison, mostly belonging to the field railway detachment, hastily collected, and were caught as in a trap. Others fled to the fort, pursued by the French with levelled bayonets. At midnight a *parlementaire*, accompanied by a lieutenant, appeared before the fort; but they were fired upon, when the flag-bearer was killed and the lieutenant wounded. At one o'clock in the morning the French captain, accompanied by a Prussian officer who had been made prisoner, presented himself as a *parlementaire*, when in an interview with the commandant it was agreed that the place should be surrendered at six o'clock, and that officers who were prisoners on either side should be exchanged. At the appointed hour the French entered the fortress and found the Prussians, seventy-six in number, drawn up in line and disarmed.

Of all the towns besieged by the Prussians during the war, none held out more gallantly than Vauban's virgin fortress of Phalsbourg, a description of which is given in Chapter X.

Phalsbourg was closely invested on the 9th of August, and on the evening of the 10th it was bombarded for an hour and a half by two batteries, under the command of General Gersdorff, with four and six pounder shell guns. In that brief space 3000 projectiles are computed to have been thrown into the fortress; but only one house was seriously injured. On the 14th, at seven in the morning, the bombardment was renewed, and raged until four in the afternoon, along the side of Phalsbourg which runs parallel with the Port de France. In the conflagration which it occasioned, few of the houses of the town escaped without more or less injury, while forty, including the church, were burnt. Towards the close of the day a summons to surrender was sent to the governor, General Talhouet, who returned a firm refusal. The siege was soon after changed into a blockade. The beleaguering troops were relieved from time to time on their march westward, no week passing without *parlementaires* knocking at the gates. The garrison consisted of about 1000 regular troops and 800 gardes mobiles. The investing force varied; at the close it numbered 5000 infantry, with artillery, and a squadron of Bavarian cavalry. On November 24 there was another

smart bombardment, but famine at the last compelled the garrison to open the gates. The fortress was not well provisioned. Very early in October they began to eat horse flesh. Salt, tobacco, coffee, and sugar rapidly failed, and latterly wine. Towards the close, every other day, the rations of the garrison consisted of a water soup, whose only nutritive properties were derived from the fat of cattle and horses. The population of Phalsbourg is set down in gazetteers at 4000, but nearly half that number had quitted the town, or been turned out of it at the commencement of the siege. Those who remained suffered the same privations as the garrison, and to scarcity of food was added want of water, a Prussian spy having cut the conduit which supplied it. After the rout of Woerth the wreck of MacMahon's army was rallied upon Phalsbourg, when 35,000 kilogrammes of its provisions were drawn upon, and there was not sufficient time to revictual. The earlier sorties of the garrison, for collecting supplies, were often successful; but in the later the villages were found cleared bare by the besiegers.

An enormous quantity of powder had been stored at Phalsbourg, at the beginning of the war, for the use of the army of the Rhine. For some days previous to the surrender volumes of smoke ascending from the place told that these stores were being gradually burnt, that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. Before the gates were thrown open to the besiegers, 12,000 rifles, with 9,600,000 rounds of cartridge, were destroyed, and 12,000,000 lbs. of powder were flung into the moat, all the cannon spiked, and their wheels and carriages broken. On December 12, after sustaining a siege of five months, the fortress capitulated unconditionally; and fifty-two officers, 1839 men, and sixty-five guns, fell into the hands of the captors.

The only fortress in German Lorraine which now remained in French hands was Bitsche. This place also had been besieged since August; but its natural position was so strong that it was unlikely to yield except to famine, and there had for some time been a tacit understanding on both sides to suspend firing, and thus avoid useless bloodshed.

On the 14th December Montmèdy capitulated, yielding to the Germans an additional sixty-five guns and 3000 prisoners. The fortress had been bombarded by about seventy heavy guns, throwing balls of the average weight of 150 lbs., which did frightful execution. The upper town was almost destroyed, while the lower suffered but little. The iron roof of the powder magazine had been struck, and the commandant, seeing that the fortress and both the towns were likely to be blown up, called a council of war, which unanimously decided on capitulation. Thirty or forty persons were killed during the siege, and sixty wounded. The Germans lost only a few, as their guns were beyond the range of those in the fortress. The surrender released nearly 400 German soldiers, principally landwehr, who had been imprisoned here for several months. Negotiations for an exchange failed on account of the commandant demanding two Frenchmen for one German, a demand which provoked the retòrt that one German soldier was worth much more than two Frenchmen.

Montmèdy did not possess much strategic importance for the Germans, as it was too remote from the real scene of operations; but it had long been a favourite rendezvous for the franc-tireurs of the Ardennes, and its possession was necessary to prevent the communications of detachments operating along the Belgian frontier against Mézières, Longwy, &c., with Metz and Thionville, being exposed to the chances of a guerilla war.

We have spoken of Châteaudun as affording the only instance of an open town which in the whole course of the war made a vigorous stand against the enemy. A visit to that and the neighbouring town of Chartres afforded reflection for the moralist, and ample explanation of the non-resistance of open towns. Châteaudun, with the hand of war resting heavily upon it, was continually experiencing a change of garrison, and every change brought a pang of some sort. One day came the Germans, and left after staying a week; then came the French, taking what the Germans had left, scolding the inhabitants for giving these Germans anything, and going; back came the Germans the same evening, squeezed the sponge for the last drop, lived upon the inhabitants until it was a mystery how anybody in the wretched place lived at all, only to make way once more for the French, and so on. For weeks after the memorable fight, for which Châteaudun was voted to have "deserved well of its country," there might have been seen groups of men and women gloomily huddled together among the ruins of their burnt houses, the picture of

misery and woe, and who seemed to pass their existence in brooding over their misfortunes, or in watching the ingress and egress of the various troops. It was a pleasing contrast to leave such a scene, and arrive in the sleek, well-preserved town where the mayor had made friends with the enemy the moment he presented himself at his gates, so that Chartres scarcely suffered perceptibly from the war. The Châteaudun church was riddled with shot and shell, and showed great gaps in its walls and roof. The gigantic Chartres cathedral, towering above every surrounding object, and visible for leagues from every quarter of the landscape, stood intact. The narrow winding streets of the picturesque and historic old town were always alive and animated; all the shops open and well stocked, and even the market-place well supplied with provisions. No sign of plunder or pillage here; people received payment for everything, and in consequence of their good behaviour escaped heavy requisitions. Certainly, a lack of patriotism was attended with great advantages both to conquerors and conquered; and it was astonishing how well all seemed to get on together, and how few bitter recollections the Germans left behind them in places where from the beginning they had been humbly received and systematically well treated.

We have pointed out in a previous chapter that the desperate attempt of D'Aurelles on December 1 to push his army towards Paris, was part of a scheme arranged with General Trochu to break up the besieging forces. The defeat of the army of the Loire, therefore, and the retirement of Ducrot from across the Marne, marked the failure of the first combined attempt on a great scale to raise the siege of Paris. The Germans were on all points triumphant; and yet their able and experienced chiefs did not share in the exultation of the camp. No one knew better than the great strategist who directed the movements of the invading host, how perilous is a miscalculation in war, how insecure the German position had been made, and how success was even yet possible, if not prevented by mighty exertions. Victorious, too, as the Germans had been, their losses round Paris, and especially in the protracted struggle with Chanzy's army, had been severe; and as Paris still held out resolutely, and the winter was extremely rigorous, it was obvious that new and immense demands on the German resources were required. It had become necessary to strengthen considerably the barrier to the armies intended to relieve the capital, to fill up the gaps caused by the prolonged contest, and to increase the efficiency of the means employed to reduce the besieged city. For this purpose reinforcements, numbering not less than 200,000 men, were in the course of December marched into France. The new levy consisted partly of a portion of the supplementary (*ersatz*) reserve; men who had been passed over year by year, from the practice in Prussia of absorbing into the line less than one-half of the young men qualified and legally bound to serve. Citizens of all classes and occupations, who never dreamed of being again called upon for military service, received a peremptory summons to start, after a short drill, for the seat of war. There was, however, no grumbling, for the persistency with which it was believed the French had for many years contemplated the invasion of Germany, and the recklessness with which they entered upon it at what appeared to them a favourable moment, created and sustained a degree of indignation which nothing hitherto had been able to allay. This feeling was not confined to the towns and centres of culture, but penetrated even to the remotest villages, and promised a supply of willing and ardent reserves quite as long as the patriotic zeal of the French was likely to fill the ranks of M. Gambetta. The new comers occupied the captured towns and the extensive line of communication, while the more seasoned troops whom they relieved were sent to the front. With them the shrunken battalions of Prince Frederick Charles and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg were replenished, the armies of Manteuffel in the north, and Werder in the east, were augmented, and the sphere of their operations extended; the hold on the communications was tightened, the siege of new fortresses undertaken, whilst at Paris every nerve was strained to accelerate the attack, and lessen the difficulties of a mere investment.

Two decrees of special importance were issued by the French during the month, the first referring to the numerous desertions from the army, which were now of daily occurrence. It was notorious that by far the greater part of the prisoners "captured" in the fighting at and around Orleans, were men who delivered themselves up to the enemy, preferring a temporary sojourn in Germany

to the chances of Prussian steel or bullets. The ill-success of the armies, also, was largely ascribed to panics raised by troops who, terrified at the approach of danger, fled from the enemy. To prevent these scandals, M. Gambetta decreed that to all the armies of the republic should be attached a regiment of mounted *gendarmes*, the officer in command of which was to preside over a permanent court-martial, to be established in the rear of each army, with the following instructions:—"To follow the army, and to dispose his men in such a manner as to watch and close all the issues from it. To arrest fugitives, and hand them over to a troop in due formation. They will regard as fugitives every soldier, every officer, or group of soldiers, found retreating without a written order, or without being placed under the command of a superior officer. Every soldier, not being wounded, found in the rear of the army without arms or equipment, will immediately be brought before the court-martial. Any one who shall raise a cry of '*Sauve qui peut*,' or of 'We are pursued,' will be taken before the court-martial. Exercise the greatest rigour and the greatest vigilance in the performance of these duties"

On the 25th of December a far more unpopular, and in every way unjustifiable, decree was issued, abolishing the councils general of departments, as well as the councils of arrondissements; and it proved that the "government of the three lawyers," as it was frequently called, or to speak more correctly, the Gambetta dictatorship, was every whit as absolute, and when occasion arose much more tyrannical, than was ever that of the much-reviled "man of Sedan." The act can only be compared to a ministerial warrant of the Home office in this country, which should abolish all boards of magistrates and municipal councils, and hand over the county property and the control of county rates to a band of hungry adventurers and government adherents. The councils general sat regularly in the month of August, and for many years their meetings had been looked forward to with strong interest, as presenting one of the few opportunities that remained for the expression of public opinion. They had the almost absolute control of financial contributions, expenditure, receipts, and local taxes; they created resources, and contracted loans.

Such a provincial representation was peculiarly dear to the nation, and there were not wanting loud and vigorous protests against the decree. The patriotic portion of the country, however, saw that the time would be equally ill-chosen on their part for domestic discords; and after the first feeling of indignation the decree was admitted, and agitation left over for the future. It may be here remarked that not long after the conclusion of peace it was deemed advisable to rescind the decree of M. Gambetta and his co-delegates, and the councils general were re-established.

As in November, when Russia repudiated the treaty of 1855, so in December another danger burst upon Europe, in consequence of Count von Bismarck repudiating the treaty of 1867 for maintaining the neutrality of Luxemburg, on the alleged ground that she had not preserved her neutrality during the war. In his note to the government of the grand-duchy he declared, that "the hostile sentiments of the population have manifested themselves in the maltreatment of German officials in the duchy; but Prussia does not hold the government of Luxemburg responsible for the bad conduct of individuals, although more might have been done to repress it. The provisioning of Thionville, however, by trains run from Luxemburg, was a flagrant breach of the laws of neutrality, which could not have taken place without the connivance of the officials. The Prussian government at the time lodged a complaint with the government of the grand-duchy, and pointed out the consequences to which proceedings of the kind must inevitably lead. The warning was disregarded. After the fall of Metz numbers of French officers and soldiers, escaping from the captured fortress, passed through the territory of Luxemburg to evade the German troops, and to rejoin the French army of the north. In the city of Luxemburg itself the resident French vice-consul had an office at the railway station, designed to assist the French fugitives in reaching their own country; and at least 2000 soldiers had in this manner reinforced the French army. The government of Luxemburg did nothing to prevent these acts; and the fact undoubtedly constitutes a gross violation of neutrality. The conditions upon which Prussia had based her neutrality have, therefore, ceased to exist; and, consequently, Prussia declares that on her part she no longer considers herself, in the conduct of her military operations, bound by any regard for the neutrality of Luxemburg, and reserves to herself the right of claiming compensation from the grand-ducal government for the German losses

arising through the non-observance of neutrality, and of taking the necessary steps to secure herself against the repetition of similar proceedings."

The note was answered by M. Servais, minister of State and president of the Luxemburg government, in a long and elaborate document, disputing the truth of some of the Prussian chancellor's statements, and diminishing the significance of others. The Luxemburg government had evidently not been sufficiently vigilant in preventing breaches of neutrality; but it was equally clear that Count von Bismarck had been to some extent misled by the exaggerations of persons who, as M. Servais remarked, "never tired of lightly reporting things calculated to endanger and cast suspicion on the grand-duchy, while keeping themselves out of all responsibility." Fearing absorption into Germany by the Prussian chancellor, the inhabitants hastened to testify their attachment to their legitimate rulers by numerous addresses; but the matter was at length amicably settled by a special Prussian officer being sent to Luxemburg to confer with the grand-ducal government with a view to the prevention of any similar ground of complaint.

It was impossible that, when our nearest neighbours were fighting, we should not in a vast variety of ways be inconvenienced, and run the risk of being involved in the broil—an illustration of which occurred on the 21st December. Six English colliers, returning from Rouen, were stopped at Duclair, twelve miles lower down the Seine; some shots were fired, and the vessels themselves were sunk to bar the navigation. The incident was readily seized on by that numerous section of Englishmen who, without any real intention of forcing the country into a war with Germany, caught at an opportunity of showing sympathy with France by a paper quarrel with Count von Bismarck.

The facts were that six small sailing colliers had been discharging coals at Rouen, by permission of the Prussian authorities; and after unloading had received, through the British consul there, a permit to return to England. Following the usual course, they dropped down the river to a village called Duclair, about twenty-eight miles below Rouen, where ballast is taken in for the homeward run. When the crews had finished ballasting, the ships were seized by the Prussians, towed into position across the fair-way channel, scuttled, and sunk. The British consul, informed of what was going on, started from Rouen by land, reached Duclair at the moment the soldiers were about to sink the vessels, and entered a vigorous protest, of course without effect. He then undertook the negotiations for the bonds of indemnity, which the officer in command of the Prussians was willing enough to furnish.

In considering the question involved in this attack upon neutral property, it must be borne in mind that it occurred in time of war, and in waters which, after the expulsion of the French, were subject to the German military authorities. Trading vessels have not, like men-of-war, the exceptional property of being extra-territorial; and there is, therefore, a great difference between the confiscation of an English man-of-war and that of an English collier. In this case the act was a kind of military necessity. French men-of-war had frequently steamed up the river, landed troops, and caused loss to the German forces by firing upon them. Hence the determination of the Prussians to have the Seine blocked up; and as this could not immediately be done by means of batteries or torpedoes, they seized and sunk, off Duclair, eleven vessels, of which six were English.

Lord Granville, on hearing of the seizure, sent a remonstrance to the Prussian authorities, and Count von Bismarck at once wrote as follows to the representative of Germany in London:—

"VERSAILLES, *Jan.* 8, 1871.

"The report of the commander of that part of our army by which the English collier-ships were sunk in the Seine has not yet arrived; but as far as our intelligence goes, the general outline of the facts is known.

"You are authorized, in consequence, to say to Lord Granville, that we sincerely regret that our troops, in order to avert immediate danger, were obliged to seize ships which belonged to British subjects.

"We admit their claim to indemnification, and shall pay to the owners the value of the ships, according to equitable estimation, without keeping them waiting for the decision of the question who is finally to indemnify them. Should it be proved that excesses have been committed which were not justified by the necessity of defence, we should regret it still more, and call the guilty persons to account."

The reply of the Prussian chancellor was considered satisfactory, and the fullest compensation was shortly after made to the owners and crews of the vessels.


MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE
GENERAL FAIDHERBE'S CAMPAIGN.
1870—71.
French Kilometres
English Miles
Beaumetz
Boisleux
Boyelles
Bienvillers
St Amand
Ablainzeville
Ervillers
Gomiecourt
Bucquoy
Achiet le Gd
Bihucourt
Biefvillers
Sailly en Bois
Grevillers
BAPAUME
Mailly
Acheux
Domart-les Ponthieu
la Vicogne
Talmas
Courcelette
Contay
Vadencourt
ALBERT
Mamet
Combles
Flesselles
Villers Bocage
Bavelincourt
Behancourt
Frechencourt
Hailly
Vaux
Coisy
la Houssoye
BRAY-sur Somme
Pont Noyelles
Querrieux
Sailly le Sec
Sailly Lorette
Picquigny
Somme R.
Canal de la Somme
Cappy
Bussy
Daours
CORBIE
Fouilloy
Aubigny
Vecquemont
Ferrieres
Carnon
Froyart
AMIENS
Blangy
Villers Bretonneux
Floxicourt
Longueau
Avre R.
Cachy
Harbonnieres
Thury
Boves
Gentelles
St Fuscien
Chaulnes
Sains
Luce R.
Rozieres
Taisnil
la Celle R.
Villers aux Erables
Mezieres
Warvillers
Moreuil
Noye R.
Oresmaux
Ailly sur Noye
Bouchoir
Liancourt
Conty
Flers
Sourdon
Guerbigny
ROYE
Colleville
MONTDIDIER
Tilloloy
Tartigny
BRETEUIL
Grevecœur le Grand
le Plairon
Lassigny
under the Superintendence of Captain Hozier
ENTERED AT ST



LE QUESNOY
Epinoy
Marquron
Croisilles
Solesmes
CAMBRAI
Carnieres
Boursies
Marcoing
Masnieres
Cattenieres
Caudry
LE CATEAU
Bertry
Bertincourt
Clary
Escaut R.
Fins
Honnecourt
Busigny
Wassigny
Nurlu
Rancourt
Epehy
le Catelet
Ft de Bohain
Ftd Andigny
Bohain
Moislains
Bouchavesnes
Allaines
Bellecourt
Montbrehain
Templeux le Guerard
Canal de St Quentin
Bussus
Roisel
Fresnoy le Gd
PERONNE
Tincourt
Buire
Bellenglise
Bernes
Vaudelles
Cartigny
Hancourt
Essigny le Pt
GUISE
Vermand
Fayet
Brie
Caulincourt
Holnon
Tertry
Villeveque
Seleney
Athies
Trefcon
Marcy
ST QUENTIN
Oise R.
Somme R.
Mesnil
Origny-St Benoite
Bocourt
Beauvois
Etreillers
Neuville
Savy
Cauchy
Grugis
Roupy
Castres
Itancourt
Contescourt
Potte
Urvillers
Ribemont
Parpeville
Gd Seraucourt
Monceaux
NESLE
HAM
St Simon
Moy
Brissy
Jussy
Vendeuil
Crecy
Serre R.
Ognolles
Libermont
LA FERE
Guiscard
Ugny
Tergnier
CHAUNY
CREPY
FORET DE ST GOBAIN
St Gobain
Oise R.
NOYON
LAON

CHAPTER XXVI.

The German Plan of Campaign in the North of France—Alarm in the town of Havre—Singular Treatment of a Government Order—Appointment of General Faidherbe to the Command of the French Army of the North—The Germans lose an Opportunity—Advance of Faidherbe on Amiens—Von Göben despatched to accept the Challenge—The Positions of the respective Armies—Battle of Pont Noyelles—The Struggle around Querrieux—Gallant Conduct of the French—Ingenious Device of General Faidherbe to secure an Unmolested Retreat—By an Incautious Advance Von Göben provokes another Attack from the French—The Battle of Bapaume—Positions of the Armies—Excellence of the French Artillery—The Prussians forced back into Bapaume—Critical Position of Von Göben's Troops—General Faidherbe claims the Victory, but omits to follow up the Advantages—Incident of the Pursuit—Von Göben retires from Bapaume—Fall of Péronne—Sharp Engagement near Havre—Siege and Capitulation of Mézières—France in very Serious Circumstances—M. Gambetta conceives a last desperate Effort against the Invader—Prompt Consent of General Faidherbe for the Army of the North to do its Share—The French descend in force upon St. Quentin—Characteristics of Von Göben—The Battle of St. Quentin—Position of the Town and of the respective Combatants—Fatal Separation of the French Army—Fearful Charge of Prussian Cavalry—The French obliged to give way, and finally retreat in disorder—Imposing Advance of the German Army—Storming of St. Quentin—An Opportune Railway Trip—The Siege and Fall of the Fortress of Longwy.

THE plan of campaign adopted by the Germans in the north, after the capture of Amiens on November 27, was considered as pointing to immediate operations against Havre. The greatest excitement, therefore, prevailed there on news being brought that Rouen had been occupied; and the excitement was by no means allayed by the further intelligence that on the same day the Prussians had succeeded in recapturing Orleans. The commandant-in-chief of Havre and the mayor at once issued the following proclamation to the inhabitants:—"By a rapid march the enemy has arrived at the gates of Rouen. Havre, more menaced than ever, but long prepared, is determined to offer the most energetic defence. At the approach of danger we make a new appeal to the patriotism of the population. No sacrifice will be too great to repulse the enemy, and preserve our rich and valiant city from pillage and the inroads of the foreigner. Supported by its energetic co-operation, we answer for the safety of Havre." The inhabitants of the neighbouring communes were invited to take refuge within the town, large stores of cattle and fodder were collected, and such things as could not be received, but which might have been serviceable to the enemy, were destroyed. The situation of Havre was especially favourable for defence. There was no lack of men, arms, and ammunition. The fortified works around the town were formidable; and as it could not be entirely surrounded by the Germans, it could evidently stand a very protracted siege. General Briand, with the forces which had evacuated Rouen, shortly came in, together with a large number of franc-tireurs and moblots. Almost simultaneously came an order from the Tours government for 4000 of the troops, and a proper complement of guns, to be embarked for Cherbourg. This created a furious scene of riot and disorder. Vast crowds paraded the town, protesting against the order, which the authorities were about to carry into effect. The guns had been shipped, but the mob proceeded to the harbour and compelled the commander of the transport vessel to unship them. Finding that no other course would appease the populace, both the civil and military authorities resolved to disobey M. Gambetta's order, and issued all over the town a proclamation to the effect, that in their opinion he was not in so good a position as themselves to judge of the local necessities of the defence. "In presence, therefore, of circumstances the gravity of which hourly increases, and the legitimate emotion of the population, the superior commandant and the sub-prefect have replied to the government that the departure of troops from Havre was inexpedient just now." The proclamation afforded a curious illustration of the state of discipline prevailing in the country at this time. There have been instances of disobedience of orders in all countries; but the conduct of the authorities of an unruly town in informing the mob, under whose pressure they acted, that they had disobeyed because they knew better, was unprecedented even in the history of France.

After the battle of Villers-Bretonneux and the capture of Amiens, the remnants of the French army of the north fell back behind the formidable network of fortresses by which France is defended on her Flemish frontier.

The three northernmost departments, from the

Somme to the Belgian frontier, hold about twenty fortresses of various sizes, which, though wholly useless nowadays against a large invasion from Belgium, formed a most welcome and almost unattackable basis of operations in this case. When Vauban planned them nearly 200 years before, he could not have foreseen that they would serve as a great entrenched camp, a sort of multiplied quadrilateral, to a French army against an enemy advancing from the heart of France! But so it was; and small as this piece of territory is, it was for the nonce impregnable, as well as important on account of its manufacturing resources, and its dense, hardy, and patriotic population.

The army of the north first assembled under the command of General Bourbaki; and when the ex-commander of the imperial guard was summoned to take charge of part of the Loire army, the northern forces were left for a time under the direction of General Farre. It was during this interval that the battle of Villers-Bretonneux was fought and Amiens captured. On the 3rd December M. Gambetta replaced General Farre by the appointment of General Faidherbe, one of the most competent commanders the war produced. He was a native of the provinces he was called to defend, having been born at Lille on June 3, 1818, and had greatly distinguished himself in Algeria and Senegal.

Opposed to Faidherbe was probably the least dangerous of the German military leaders, as was evidenced by the fact that, had the advantages secured by the battles before Amiens on the 26th and 27th November been promptly followed up, the greater part of the beaten French army would undoubtedly have been captured. So great was the panic that whole regiments of the French lay concealed for days in the woods adjoining Amiens, not daring, in the presence of the dreaded German troops, to retire on the open field. But when, much to their surprise, they found they were not pursued, they collected their scattered forces and retired behind their northern fortresses, while the main body of the Germans went off towards Rouen. Had General Manteuffel, instead of taking this course, made a bold effort to cut off the retreat, it seems certain that French operations in the north would have been permanently paralyzed. As it was, the number who escaped to the triangle protected by Arras, Cambrai, and Lille was so large that, with the addition of some mobiles and drafts from various neighbouring garrisons, they formed for General Faidherbe an army of about 50,000 men and 70 guns.

The 20th of December was fast approaching when Manteuffel, while engaged in the comparatively sentimental work of capturing open towns and taking seaside trips to Dieppe, received intelligence that a new French army of the north was descending upon Amiens, and Von Göben was hastily despatched back to the scene of his encounters of November 27. General Faidherbe had advanced much sooner than was originally intended, in consequence of a rumour that the Germans were preparing an attack upon Havre. He had gathered together a large number of men, and in his safe northern retreat would gladly have had a little longer time for reorganizing them. The fact, however, that the second seaport of the country was threatened hastened his movements, and he advanced on St. Quentin, a detachment capturing Ham in passing; reconnoitred La Fère; and on the 14th December commenced demonstrations in the direction of Amiens. The German commander had been too well aware of the strength of Havre to lightly attempt an attack upon it; and the fears of the inhabitants, for which, indeed, there had been no real cause, were dispelled by the manœuvres of General Faidherbe; in consequence of which large detachments of Manteuffel's army were at once recalled, and a series of closely-contested engagements ensued, the most serious commencing on December 23 and ending on January 3.

At a little distance from Amiens General Faidherbe found that nature had supplied him with defences much superior to those of the best engineer. From Querrieux to Bussy, on the summit of a hill, or kind of elevated plateau, about three miles in length, the French army was posted, with its artillery, ready for action. Near the foot of this hill ran a small river, the L'Hallu, skirted by a long narrow line of wood, beyond which were numerous small villages—Daours, Pont Noyelles, Querrieux, Bavelincourt, &c. The French right wing rested on a wood on the brow of the hill overlooking Contay and Vadencourt; the centre was at Pont Noyelles and Querrieux, and the left at Daours.

The great festive season of the year had come, and throughout England bright faces, blazing fires, groaning tables, mirth and laughter were to be seen on every side. It was far different, however, with

Engraved by [illegible] Stodart from a Photograph.

our nearest neighbours, who, especially here in the north, were busily preparing again to defy their enemies to mortal combat. The morning of December 23 was bitterly cold and the frost most intense, as the army of General von Göben assembled on a vast plain near Querrieux, before marching to accept the challenge of the French. The fifteenth division, under General Kummer, crossed the Somme by some pontoon bridges near Carnon, and, leaving Rivery to the left, formed on the plateau in front of Allonville, with the cavalry of General Count Groben on the right. The sixteenth division, under General Barnakow, marched up the road to Rainneville and Pierregôt to the north of Amiens, whilst a brigade proceeded along the Somme from La Motte upon Vecquemont. General von Göben's plan was to advance upon the French position of Allonville and Querrieux, and to make a strong demonstration on their centre and left flank; whilst General Barnakow, with the sixteenth division, after arriving at Rubemprè, was to wheel round, and, having first taken the villages along the extreme right, to advance upon the French position, and endeavour to turn their right flank, thus encircling them so as to shut them up to a retreat on the Somne, which it was thought would be fatal.

Having ridden some distance out upon the Albert road, the general and his staff dismounted, and, sending their horses to the rear, awaited the advance of the troops upon Allonville. This little village is situated upon one of those ridges of hills that lie along the east side of the valley which stretches from Frèchencourt past Querrieux to Corbie. A magnificent sight was presented by the advance of the troops. The twenty-ninth brigade, commanded by Colonel von Bock, and composed of the thirty-third and sixty-fifth regiments, with artillery, and one squadron of the king's hussars, marched forward to the right of the farm of Les-Alençons; the thirtieth brigade, with the seventieth and twenty-eighth regiments, and two batteries of artillery, advanced upon the left of Allonville, covered by a regiment of lancers; whilst Count Groben's dragoons rode along the crest of the hill, looking across to the heights on the other side, above Corbie. Steadily, as if on parade, marched the compact masses of infantry; the skirmishers in front, with their supports to the right and left of the Albert road. They took possession of the woods beside Allonville, and in a moment the village was occupied, while as yet not a French soldier was to be seen. But an orderly galloped up to say that the village of Querrieux in the front was strongly held by French troops. At Les-Alençons a road leads off to the left through the village of Cardonette, and on to the Pierregôt road. Along this galloped Captain Allborn with orders from General von Göben to the sixteenth division to change front to their right flank, and, marching across between Molliens-aux-Bois and Mirvaux, to storm the French positions in the villages of Bavelincourt, Behencourt, and Frèchencourt. From the château of Bengerie the French tirailleurs were seen retiring upon Querrieux. The twenty-ninth brigade then brought their left shoulders forward, and two batteries of artillery took up position on the right. At ten minutes past eleven the first shot was fired by the French infantry from a windmill to the right of Querrieux, and the batttle of Querrieux—or of Pont Noyelles, as it was called by the French—commenced. By twelve (noon) the village was stormed, and the French had retreated upon the well-nigh impregnable position already referred to. The considerable village forming the centre of their line of battle was thus taken; but the position of the Germans was anything but pleasant, as the ridge and village they occupied were easily commanded by Faidherbe's artillery from the elevated plateau opposite; and the French batteries all along the height, especially that to the right of the villages of La Houssoye, kept up a determined and well-directed fire upon it. Meantime, to the right the Prussians had taken the villages of Daours, Vecquemont, and Bussy, the French retiring upon their intrenched position in front of Corbie. Here both sides fought hard, appealing to the bayonet to settle the disputed possession of the villages, whose capture in fact formed one of the most remarkable incidents of the battle, as it was accomplished by the Rhenish rifle battalion against a whole division of the French army. With only about 800 men, Major Bronikowski waited till the heavy columns of the enemy who came to attack him were within ninety paces. The Germans had every one been waiting at this point with the eye on their enemy and the finger on the trigger; and when their commander gave the word, "Nun! Kinder, schnell Feuer!" they sent such a volley into the ranks of the French as to leave upwards of forty dead in one place. The Germans had in the meantime been

reinforced, but they had not more than 2500 men in all at this point; and with this inferior number the French left was forced back upon Corbie, the villages of Bussy, Daours, and Vecquemont were taken, and, still more surprising, held against repeated assaults.

At two p.m. the French, under a heavy fire of artillery, endeavoured to retake the village of Querrieux. Hard, indeed, was the struggle between the combatants here. For nearly twenty minutes they fought, actually looking into each other's eyes. But the French again retired, and again their five batteries of thirty guns opened a crushing fire upon the Prussian line. Every eye was now anxiously turned to the left flank, but as yet there were no signs of Barnakow's division. The Prussians were very weak before Querrieux, and the reserve was ordered to move up to the left of that village. The thirtieth brigade deployed in the valley and took a small village, into which the French poured a shower of shell and shrapnel from their batteries to the right of the Albert Road. And now the space between Querrieux and Bengerie began to be filled with those tell-tales of an action—carts and carriages of all descriptions, bearing ghastly burdens to the rear. Fortunate it was that the waggons of the British Society were there, for they supplied blankets to cover the poor suffering soldiers, the pain of whose wounds was increased by the biting frost and intensely cold winds. About this time—half-past two p.m.—the French made a strong demonstration between La-Neuville and Daours. With their guns planted to the left of La Houssoye they opened a heavy fire upon the Prussian right flank, a considerable body of troops at the same time advancing as if to retake Bussy. But Captain Fuchius' battery of horse artillery galloped to the right, unlimbered, and opened such a hot fire upon them that first of all the infantry halted, then faced to the right about, and eventually doubled to the rear in a most orderly manner, the artillery quickly following their example.

About three o'clock the welcome sound of General Barnakow's artillery was heard, and his troops were shortly seen advancing on Frèchencourt from the Contay road. At four p.m. the sixteenth division had stormed the villages of Bavelincourt, Behencourt, and Frèchencourt; but their further advance was stopped by the same formidable position which had brought the fifteenth division to a halt. Now, however, the Germans held the line of villages in the valley through which the small river L'Hallu flows, and which now formed the line of demarcation between the two armies. On the other side of this stream a natural glacis extended to the summit of the ridge of hills occupied by the French. Up this glacis, with 50,000 troops at the top, and fifty or sixty guns, it was both too late and too dangerous to advance; but the artillery on both sides continued firing, as did also the skirmishers, some of whom were at a distance of but 300 yards apart.

Meantime the village of Querrieux was held by two battalions of the thirty-third and the sixty-fifth regiment. Again and again had the French unsuccessfully tried to retake it. Thus far all had gone well for the Germans throughout the day, and as darkness set in it was hoped the French would give up the contest. Suddenly, however, a fire was opened from the hill, far exceeding in intensity and deadliness the artillery play at Gravelotte. It was dusk, and the spectacle was indescribably grand. To this fire the Germans responded but feebly, as the men had expended their ammunition, which encouraged the French to come down the hill and renew their attack on Querrieux. The sixty-fifth were obliged to fall back, and as they did so the dark uniforms of the French chasseurs were seen advancing at the other end of the principal thoroughfare. They had not proceeded far, however, before they were received by a murderous fire from the thirty-third, who advanced upon them from the cross streets with the bayonet, and once more drove them back pell-mell out of the village. The thirty-third and sixty-fifth were now nearly without ammunition, but the gallant fellows would not give up the position so dearly bought; and there they stood, each man in his place, determined to make cold steel do the work of ball-cartridge. It was now dark. The Prussian artillery had ceased firing, and the village of Querrieux was burning in four places, the flames throwing their light far and wide over the surrounding country. Six companies of the thirty-third regiment determined to avenge the last attack of the French. In the dark they stole out of the village, formed line, and at the point of the bayonet charged up to the French battery on the right of the Albert Road. They had spiked two guns and taken the horses when they were attacked by five French bat-

talions, before whom they were forced to retire into Querrieux, followed so closely that at one moment it was thought the village was lost. By this time, however, the sixty-fifth had received ammunition, and drove the French back with a withering fire. It was now nearly six o'clock, and the battle of Pont Noyelles was over, in which the Germans had taken seven villages, 900 prisoners, a lieutenant-colonel, and a post-captain in the navy, who was jocosely asked why he had not brought his ship with him. The day had witnessed one of the severest actions of the campaign, but had resulted in no real gain to either party. The Germans had captured the villages and numerous prisoners, but the French still held the formidable position just beyond them, across the little stream. For that reason General Faidherbe claimed the victory, and in support of his claim made his men bivouac on the ground, with the thermometer marking 8° below zero, impressing on them, with the susceptibility of a French general, that the hardship was absolutely necessary to show that the day was theirs. That they fought stoutly there is not the least question, and great credit was due to their artillery, which was well served; but from the course their general felt compelled to take almost directly afterwards, it is difficult to see how he could fairly claim to have obtained any advantage.

As night closed in each army could observe the position of the other, clearly marked by the lines of bivouac fires, which burnt brightly in the intensely frosty atmosphere at intervals of 1500 to 2000 yards. Early next morning Generals von Göben and Manteuffel visited the field of battle, and witnessed the curious sight of nearly 60,000 French troops, with at least seventy cannon, looking down upon 24,000 Prussians with forty guns. There stood the heavy masses of the French infantry, drawn up along the brow of the hill, with their batteries right and left of the brigades, covered by cavalry ; there stretched a long line of tirailleurs covering the whole front, keeping up a constant fire, wherever there was a chance, upon the valley below. On the German side all was still. The troops stood to their arms, the artillery was unlimbered, the cavalry kept their bridles over their arms; but not a shot was fired. They felt that they were too weak to attack the powerful force opposed to them, by which every moment they expected to be assailed. The day, however, wore on; General Faidherbe declined to follow up his "victory;" and the two armies stood still, silently confronting each other. Their weakness in numbers had been apparent to the German commanders early on the 23rd, and Manteuffel had telegraphed for reinforcements. About midday on the 24th, intelligence was received that Prince Albrecht was coming from Paris with a cavalry division of the guard, and that General Schüler von Senden, with a division, was advancing in the direction of Corbie from St. Quentin. Meanwhile, General Barnakow had been detached to the French right, in order, if possible, to turn their position; and the Germans now commenced such dispositions of their troops as would enable them to avoid making an assault on the Franvillers heights. Towards the afternoon a heavy cannonade, intermingled with the discharge of rifles, was opened from the hill, the reason of which was soon after apparent. The French, witnessing the movements of their enemies, had seen at once the great peril they would be in should the Germans succeed in completing their tactics, which must have led to a repetition of the manœuvre at Sedan. They peopled, therefore, the top of the hill with soldiers, and feigned an intention to continue the battle. For that purpose they discharged cannons and rifles, galloped to and fro along the line, and showed themselves exceedingly busy But in the rear, behind the hill, was going on the very different movement of conveying men, horses, and cannon to the railway train. This completed, the dummies on the summit suddenly disappeared, and when the sixteenth German division had completed their arrangements for attack, they found that the French had abandoned the most magnificent position nature could give them, and were in full retreat upon Arras and Lille. General Faidherbe admitted the loss of 1400 in killed and wounded, while that of the Germans was officially returned as 800, including twenty-six officers. The brunt of the day's action was borne, on the German side, by the forces under Von Göben, who from this time became general of the army of the Somne, while Bentheim, at the same time, took command of the army of the Seine, with headquarters at Rouen, General Manteuffel still holding the command-in-chief.

With only one of his divisions—the fifteenth, with which he had fought at Pont Noyelles—and with the younger Prince Albrecht's flying column,

of about the strength of a brigade, Von Göben followed Faidherbe to Bapaume, sending the sixteenth division to invest Péronne, and keep the communications; a disposition of his army which could only be justified by the event, and which could not fail to tempt the French commander to attack him before he could concentrate his forces. He very speedily had reason to recall the sixteenth division, and to leave the besieging of Péronne to General von Senden, with what forces and material he could collect from St. Quentin and Amiens, which the result proved to be sufficient.

Faidherbe gave as an excuse for his retreat on the 24th the failure of his commissariat and train: experience, apparently, not having yet taught the French the value of these services, to the shortcomings of which their earliest disasters of the campaign were to a great extent due. This, however, was doubtless only part of his reason for retreating behind his fortresses. Here he received intelligence of the somewhat incautious advance of Von Göben to Bapaume, and perceiving his chances, determined at once to resume the offensive. On Friday, the 30th December, the country round Arras was swept by the division Lecointe, which on the following day proceeded to advance, with its left wing resting on La Scarpe, and its right on the heights of Beaumont-les-Loges. The front of the army, slightly convex in shape, extended for about a league before Arras. On the 2nd January the advanced guard attacked the Prussian post before Bapaume, but, owing to the failure of a subordinate general, without serious effect. Some detachments made a reconnaissance on the Arras and Douai roads, and came so near to a battery of artillery that, had it not been for Count Portalais and his squadron of king's hussars, the French might have recorded the capture of some Prussian guns. When, however, they were within 200 yards of the battery, it was saved by the hussars, who rushed upon them, cutting them down where they stood, and making 200 prisoners. Having thoroughly felt his way on the German left flank, General Faidherbe determined to attack at Bapaume the next morning. Accordingly, at nine a.m. on the 3rd January, just as General von Göben with his staff arrived at Le Transloy, half way on the Péronne road between Combles and Bapaume, the French commenced the action.

Bapaume, with the villages of Avesnes-les-Bapaume, Ligny-Tilloy, and Grevillers, were held by the fifteenth division, under General Kummer. The twenty-ninth brigade consisted of the battalions of the thirty-third and the sixty-fifth regiment. Two battalions of the thirty-third held the villages of Avesnes and Grevillers; the sixty-fifth regiment the suburb of Bapaume, called the Faubourg d'Arras. The thirtieth brigade, consisting of the twenty-eighth regiment and the second battalion of the sixty-eighth, made ground towards the Arras road and the wooded heights of Sapignies. Bapaume and its environs were consequently held by about eight battalions, with six batteries of artillery. As at this moment, with the exception of those of the nineteenth regiment, no battalion could bring more than 600 men into action, the Prussian force at Bapaume may be put down at 5000 infantry, with thirty-six guns. To their left was the brigade of General Count Groben, who lay at Miraumont, on the Arras and Amiens Railway. The Prussian right was commanded by Prince Albrecht, the younger, with the fortieth regiment, three batteries of horse artillery, and the division of the cavalry of the guard, whose headquarters were in Equancourt, at the juncture of the Cambrai, Bapaume, and Péronne roads. The reserve consisted of the eighth jäger battalion, one battalion of the thirty-third regiment, one battalion of the sixty-eighth, and the artillery reserve. These lay upon the Bapaume and Péronne road, between the villages of Beaulincourt and Le Transloy. The position of the Prussian troops was, therefore, with their left at Miraumont, centre at Bapaume, and right at Equancourt. The French right extended beyond Achiet-le-Petit, and lay in the villages of Bihucourt, Achiet-le-Grand, and Gomiecourt; their centre was in Behagnies and Sapignies; whilst their left rested upon Vaulx and Lagnicourt.

The French began with an attack upon the Faubourg d'Arras, and by an attempt to drive the thirty-third regiment out of the village of Grevillers. In this they failed, being driven back and pursued by the thirty-third into the village of Biefvillers, which the Prussians stormed and took possession of, but were soon obliged to evacuate. Heavy masses of infantry came on to attack the gallant little band, amongst whom the French artillery was making sad havoc. Slowly, and with their faces to the enemy, they retreated upon the suburb of Bapaume, where they found the sixty-fifth regiment at their backs, and whence a quick

and uninterrupted fire was soon opened upon the French troops. Meantime the Prussian artillery posted on the Arras road swept the plateau beneath, and poured a plunging fire of shell into the heavy French masses as they struggled across to gain the Faubourg d'Arras. The French artillery was never better served than on this occasion, both for rapidity and precision. Besides having excellent cannon, and knowing how to use them, the soldiers of the army of the north behaved most admirably under fire, although composed mainly of recruits, and without skilled leaders. Numerous bayonet charges were executed with creditable courage and gallantry against old and well-trained Prussian warriors. During one of those charges one battalion had to pass battalions of Prussians hidden at about five yards' distance. A full charge was given from the needle-guns with such terrible effect, that it seemed as if little more than fifty men of that battalion remained alive or unwounded.

In the course of the morning the thirty-third regiment, now fearfully reduced, was obliged to retire from the suburb it had held so bravely, and took possession of the old citadel of Bapaume, situated on the Albert road, and of the windmill to the left. The sixty-fifth still held a part of the Faubourg d'Arras, while two horse-artillery batteries were sent forward to the left, and, taking up a position at Ligny, opened fire upon the French right.

The action now became general and Bapaume was in a circle of fire and smoke. The Prussian centre, overwhelmed by the numbers of the enemy and the hot artillery fire, was beginning slowly to give ground, when the Rhenish jägers, with two fresh batteries, deployed to their left and went into action. Meantime Prince Albrecht had marched upon Baucourt from Equancourt, and had detached two batteries with some cavalry in the direction of Beugny-le-Château, whilst he himself, with the fortieth regiment and the remainder of his command, excepting the hussars of the guard, engaged the French left from Fremicourt. The hussars of the guard were sent along the road to Cambrai, to make sure that no troops were advancing on the Prussian right from that place. At the village of Boursies two regiments of French infantry, with a squadron of cavalry, were reported as advancing on the Cambrai road upon the German right flank. The officer in command was equal to the emergency. A squadron was dismounted, and took possession of the buildings and outhouses of the village. The hussars with their carabines opened a heavy fire upon the French as soon as they were within range; who, thinking that the village was held by infantry, made a hasty retreat. While matters were going on thus on the centre and right of the Prussian army, General Count Groben marched from Miraumout against the French right. Making a slight *détour* to his left flank, he suddenly appeared on the enemy's rear, and, opening fire from his artillery, made them imagine he was about to attack them in reverse, which speedily had the effect of compelling the French centre to draw off some of their forces, and gave a little breathing time to the gallant defenders of Bapaume.

There, in the meantime, confusion reigned supreme. The inhabitants were rushing off pell-mell in all directions. Shells went hurtling into the houses, bullets smashed the windows, and the town was set on fire in several places. On the road outside Bapaume, leading towards Beaulincourt, could be heard the sound of the heavy guns playing upon Péronne; and anxious must have been the commander of that fortress for news of those who were trying to relieve him, and whose fire he could distinctly recognize. Towards half-past one things had a serious aspect for the Germans. The heavy fire and superior numbers of the French had told so effectually, that the whole of the suburb of Arras was relinquished, and the twenty-ninth brigade, under Colonel von Bock, retired into Bapaume. The thirtieth brigade formed up in rear of the town on the Péronne road, and for a brief period the French suspended operations, except on the right flank, where Prince Albrecht was hotly engaged, but where neither side gained any advantage for a time. By sunset, however, the French had not only entered the suburb of Arras, where they at once erected strong barricades, but, after desperate fighting, had taken most of the villages around Bapaume, and even had their posts in some of the streets of the town itself, at only about thirty yards from the German outposts. The sixty-fifth regiment accordingly began to prepare for a fight in the streets by building barricades at every corner, and turning every window into a loop-hole. The terrified inhabitants fled into the cellars, and even the soldiers were not without apprehension, in consequence

of the very superior strength of the French. Fortunately for them, the battle did not extend into Bapaume, and the day closed upon a sanguinary fight, which again produced little or no real advantage to either party.

General Faidherbe subsequently issued a proclamation, expressing the greatest indignation at the pretensions put forward by the Prussians of having had the advantage in the action, and claimed to have won a "complete victory;" which, he asserted, was proved by the fact that his army slept in the villages it had taken. He had not, he said, followed up his victory, because of the failure of his commissariat, and his fear that an advance would involve the destruction of Bapaume. The battle may, indeed, be fairly said to have been won by the French, but a fatality seemed to attend their movements even when they were successful. Faidherbe's army had behaved with the greatest gallantry, and their repeated attacks so exhausted the Germans—the thirty-third regiment, for ininstance, having less than half its strength and only three officers left—that at six p.m. General von Göben gave the order to retreat across the Somme. The heavy baggage trains were already in motion when it was discovered that the French commander, whether unaware of his victory, or dismayed by his own losses, or alarmed by the prospect of wanting food, retreated, and the German movement was stayed. Had he only advanced, or even maintained his position till morning, he would have secured an unmistakable victory, which might possibly have given new life to France. It would, at the least, have enabled him to relieve Péronne, and to partially clear the left bank of the Somme; and this would have had much more effect in inspiring his troops with ardour and energy than a paper assertion of victory while in full retreat before the enemy. It was this want of vigour, rather than of capacity or courage, in the French generals, which on more than one occasion made their greatest efforts of so little avail.

The real fruits of the victory remained, of course, with the Germans, though dearly purchased by the loss of nearly 1000 killed and wounded. If the French slept in the captured positions, their nap must have been brief indeed, for by midnight a movement of retreat was commenced along their whole line. The proof of a victory is in its results: and General Faidherbe would have furnished the best evidence of having gained it if, instead of wasting time in undignified discussions with General Manteuffel, he had by advancing made the most of it: for he must have known that every day which passed added to the difficulties, the dangers, the agony of Paris. The allegation that the object of the fighting at Bapaume was frustrated by the shortcomings of the French commissariat, acquitted the soldiers at the expense of their commander, who had full time for the organization of the service in the north, and should therefore have seen that his army was in a condition to keep the field. As to his other reason for stopping short before Bapaume, "lest an attack upon that place might involve its destruction," he ought to have considered that between him and Paris there were many such places, within which the Germans might have chosen to await his onset, and that if he were equally scrupulous about the safety of all of them, he would never achieve the deliverance of the capital. Pursued to within about four miles of Arras by the Prussian cavalry—who, however, captured no guns and but few prisoners—the army of the north again found itself under the friendly shelter of their fortresses.

The principal cavalry intrusted with the pursuit were the eighth Rheinischer cuirassiers, commanded by Captain von Marées, who, just beyond the village of Sapignies—between it and Mory—came upon two retreating battalions of French infantry, one a chasseur regiment, the other consisting of gardes mobiles. At the moment he discovered them he was riding exactly parallel to them, the undulating country having hitherto hidden them from his view. He at once determined upon attacking them. The greater part of the country in the neighbourhood of Bapaume is arable land, most of which had been ploughed, and the furrows, from the severe frost of the previous ten days, were frozen as hard as bars of iron. Every one can see how serious were the difficulties which a heavy cavalry regiment would have to encounter in an attack over such ground. After some deliberation a spot was, however, chosen upon which to attack.

No sooner did the French infantry perceive the approach of the Prussian cuirassiers than they formed two squares. The foremost square, which was first attacked, waited until the cavalry came within 300 yards before it opened fire. Then, however, a perfect shower of bullets rang against and pierced the cuirasses of the advancing horsemen.

The captain was shot through the knee, and his charger through the head; the lieutenant was unhorsed, and suffered a severe concussion; and the squadron sergeant-major received a bullet through the heart. Undaunted by the fall of their officers and sergeant-major, the men rode boldly at and right through the square, scattering their foes on all sides, and sabring and trampling down many. Having thus pierced their way to the other side of the French, they immediately spread to avoid any concentrated fire. Had they been supported, which unfortunately for them they were not, in all probability the regiment of infantry would have been cut to pieces; but a ravine of great depth separated them from their comrades, who were unable to cross in time to take part in this gallant action. The remains of the shattered French square were thus able to gain the shelter of a village, against which it was of course impossible to advance with cavalry.

Von Göben did not consider it wise to hold Bapaume, and soon after the battle of the 3rd retired to Domprere. The retrograde movement was carried out along the whole German line; General Kummer, who with the fifteenth division was at Albert, withdrawing upon Bray-sur-Somme, and Prince Albrecht retiring upon Combles. Considerable detachments of men and siege material were despatched to Péronne, which, under the fearful artillery fire poured upon it, speedily became a mass of ruins, and on January 10 capitulated unconditionally, with its garrison of 2000 men, to General von Senden.

The same day on which the severe action at Bapaume was fought General von Bentheim, on the Seine, had a somewhat sharp engagement with the French troops from Havre; to which place a new commander had been recently appointed, who had won considerable popularity by encouraging and organizing a scheme for attacking the Prussian forces in the neighbourhood. For several days the Prussian commander had heard that large numbers of French were massing upon the left bank of the Seine, threatening Rouen. To prevent the completion of these movements Von Bentheim, with a strong division, on the 3rd of January, at five a.m., surprised the French army in their quarters. The attack was short, sharp, and decisive; four standards, 500 prisoners, and two rifled guns falling into the hands of the Prussians. Not satisfied with the result, a company of infantry were immediately placed upon waggons, and, with two horse-artillery guns and two squadrons of cavalry, under the command of Major Preinezer, of the artillery, went in pursuit of the flying enemy, and captured two more guns and many additional prisoners, before they could ensconce themselves behind the earthworks of Havre.

Besides Péronne, two other fortresses fell early in the new year; namely, Mézières on January 2, and Rocroi on January 4. The former had undergone a tedious process of investment, almost since the capitulation of Sedan; for as it could give little annoyance to the Germans, its reduction by siege guns was deferred. Like almost all the other fortresses besieged, it speedily yielded to powerful artillery, which in a bombardment of about three days caused a vast amount of damage to life and property. The wreck, indeed, baffles description; terrible as was the scene presented by Bazeilles after being fired by the Bavarians, it was not so fearful as that which met the eye in some parts of Mézières. At Bazeilles the walls of most of the houses were left standing, and the streets were free of *débris;* but at Mézières, in many places, the houses were a mere waste, and not a stone of the front walls was left standing. The narrow streets were so choked up with fallen stones, that it was often difficult to get along. The church was also much injured. The 2nd of January witnessed the capitulation of the fortress and the surrender of the garrison, numbering 2000 men.

Part of the force which had reduced Mézières at once marched north-west to Rocroi, on the Belgian frontier. Early on the morning of January 4 some cavalry appeared suddenly at the gate, and demanded an immediate surrender, threatening bombardment in case of refusal. The commandant, believing that the enemy were unprovided with siege guns, returned a firm reply in the negative. The effective garrison consisted of 150 mobiles and 120 artillerymen and engineers. The guns were old-fashioned pieces, and the fortifications antique. A dense fog prevailed, when at noon the sound of a cannon was heard and a hissing shell fell within the fort. It appears that about thirty-six German guns were ranged in batteries against the town, and a fierce fire was at once opened from them. A number of long-range guns were placed further in the rear, and the whole were supported by a force of

several thousand men. On the other hand, the fort of Rocroi possessed only four guns of serviceable range. When the first shell fell the mobiles rushed towards the ramparts on the side away from the fire, climbed over them, and fled in all directions. The 120 men who kept their ground, for five and a half hours bore an unrelenting bombardment, of which every shot told, and which crushed the town by the weight of 2000 projectiles. Fires broke out in several places, and a dozen houses were in flames. The four French pieces which were available fired as rapidly as possible against an enemy who could not be seen, and their balls fell at random. The powder magazine was so much damaged that there was imminent danger of its explosion. At half-past five another *parlementaire* appeared, stating that it was useless to prolong the resistance, and that only from respect to the valour displayed had the Germans been induced to take the unusual course of sending a second summons. The town continued to burn, and no assistance was to be looked for. The commandant, therefore, consented to capitulate, and the Germans entered and extinguished the fires, which, owing to a violent wind, threatened to destroy the whole place. Of the 120 men, nearly one-half managed to escape after the capitulation; the remainder, together with the officers, were sent to Germany.

While General Faidherbe was, as we have seen, availing himself of all opportunities of annoying and injuring his enemies in the north, things in other parts of the country were beginning to look extremely serious for France. Paris, patient and resolute, still kept at bay the hosts encompassing it, but only by submitting to privations so severe that it was easily seen they must soon issue in starvation or submission. The army of the Loire, at one time so full of promise to the nation, had been obliged to retire, defeated and scattered, upon Le Mans; and already the Germans were concentrating to deal it the last crushing blow. Seeing that his chances depended upon the hazard of one last desperate throw, M. Gambetta conceived the idea of a simultaneous offensive movement throughout the country. Paris was to make a formidable sortie in force, Faidherbe was to advance from the north, and Chanzy from the south, while Bourbaki was to put forth all his strength to cut the Prussian communications, and even push his way into Germany. M. Gambetta accordingly telegraphed to General Faidherbe that the moment for the supreme effort had come, and directed him to draw upon himself as many of the Germans as could be diverted from Paris. Promptly obeying, he eluded the troops who were watching him, and by forced marches arrived on the south of St. Quentin, threatening his enemy's lines of communication. It was thought advisable, however, to conceal if possible the extent and object of this movement. In a despatch to Bordeaux published on the 18th January, General Faidherbe therefore stated that, "having learnt that the Prussians at St. Quentin demanded of the inhabitants a sum of 548,000 francs, he had resolved to put an end to their exactions, and sent a flying column for that purpose under the orders of Colonel Isnard. That officer encountered the enemy at Catelet Bellicourt, and pursued him, killing and wounding thirty men. Colonel Isnard subsequently entered St. Quentin on the 16th, the enemy flying in great disorder, and abandoning 130 prisoners, as well as a considerable store of provisions. The inhabitants of the town received the troops with great enthusiasm."

Though somewhat coloured as to the "great disorder," &c., the despatch was correct in stating that St. Quentin was evacuated by the Germans. No artifice, however, could conceal from the well-informed Von Göben that the French had really advanced in great force; and promptly gathering together his little army, he gave orders for an immediate attack. The remarkable feature in the conduct of this commander was the great exactness with which he carried out his plans, and the care taken by him of all parts: none were neglected by him, even while each was working for itself for a certain time, and scarcely knowing it was connected with another until the moment came when all acted together as a whole. He cared comparatively little how many perished on the march, provided it was completed in the given time; and in the operations around St. Quentin on the 19th were seen the results of his exact method. Every one was in his right place at the right time. The officers of the Prussian army attributed to Manteuffel's slowness the fact that Faidherbe had not been more decisively beaten on previous occasions, while the confidence of the common soldiers in Von Göben's talent was great. On the fatiguing march through snow and mud, from morning till evening, they might often be heard

saying, "Well, Göben knows that all this is necessary," and they held on as merrily as ever.

The fighting commenced by some skirmishes on Wednesday, the 18th of January. On the previous day General Faidherbe had established his quartier-general at St. Quentin, and early the following morning despatched a brigade of the twenty-second corps in advance of the main army, which shortly after followed, in a southerly direction towards Mézières on the Oise. The French being very deficient in cavalry, his reconnaisances were too limited to enable him to know for certain the direction occupied by the enemy, and in consequence a portion of General Faidherbe's men came unexpectedly upon advanced posts near the village of Roupy. They were suddenly attacked by a Prussian battery, and compelled to fly with severe loss. Several other skirmishes of a similar nature and with like result occurred in the course of the 18th, showing clearly the proximity of very numerous hostile forces, and giving some indication of the severity of the battle next day.

About nine o'clock on the morning of the 19th the principal engagement commenced by an attack of the Prussians, from some heights overlooking the villages of Grugis and Castres, upon the twenty-third French corps, commanded by General Gislin. The unceasing fire of the Chassepots was not to be mistaken, and served to point out distinctly the French position. To understand this fully the reader must picture St. Quentin situated in a hollow, inclosed by hills, the hilly circle being separated by a valley from a second similar circumvallation. Eastward of this natural fortress, about 5000 paces from the second height, between St. Quentin and Savy, a small village to the south of it, is a thick forest of considerable length, separated by a plain of about 500 paces from a second forest, less extensive than the former, still more westward, towards the road to Péronne, near Vermand. The French army was so posted on the second height as to have its left wing eastward of St. Quentin, the right beyond the second forest, and the bulk behind both forests, which were lined with soldiers. Two batteries were, in a masterly fashion, placed behind the height separating the two forests, and so concealed that their existence became known only by the smoke after the discharge. On the Prussian side the sixteenth division was on the right, the third cavalry division on the left wing, and the fifteenth division in the centre. The respective batteries were with their divisions, and the artillery corps kept in reserve.

At Savy orders were given to the Prussian infantry to take the forests; and to help them, three batteries were mounted near a windmill behind the village, which threw their shells partly into the forests, and partly amidst those troops who were posted on the height connecting them. The French batteries, likewise, began to roar from behind the hill, and aimed well. So long was the range of the Chassepots, that at a distance of 1000 yards the advancing infantry had already several wounded.

So early as ten o'clock the French had to abandon several of their positions, and a powerful attack was then made upon their lines by the Prussians with a large artillery force. The twenty-second French corps, however, held its ground well for a time, but the twenty-third soon began to give way. The two corps had unfortunately become separated by the Canal Crozat, too broad and deep to be crossed but by bridges, and consequently could not aid each other. The twenty-third corps, therefore, soon began to yield, and by three o'clock made a disorderly retreat—in fact, "ran away" would more correctly describe the conduct of those who had not become prisoners. General Faidherbe endeavoured to restore confidence by directing some battalions of the twenty-second corps to go to their aid; but before this movement could be accomplished the panic was too great.

The cavalry fared no better. Immediately behind Savy several squadrons of French dragoons were drawn up in line against about an equal number of the king's hussars. The former were extremely nice and clean; their horses well tended; saddles and bridles apparently a few days only in use; their white cloaks as if put on for the occasion. The hussars, on the other hand, as well as their horses, were covered with mud; their uniforms, usually so neat and shiny, were all soiled from the long and toilsome marches of the last few days. Suddenly, and without a moment's warning, the hussars dashed forward like lightning against the enemy, and fairly overrode him. The first shock dismounted half of the French dragoons; their white cloaks covered the ground, or were trodden into the earth; while the other half fell under the strokes

of the hussars' sharp sabres, or were made prisoners. When brought in it transpired that they had entered the army only three weeks before, and had never previously been on horseback.

At noon the Prussian artillery, having no means of estimating the effect of their shells on the concealed batteries of the enemy, left off firing. They resumed it only when the French batteries, pressed hard by the German cavalry division, had changed their front towards their right flank, and continued it until they had compelled General Faidherbe to give up his excellent position. The twenty-third French corps having given way, the forests were already in possession of the Prussian infantry. About three o'clock two light and one heavy battery advanced in columns in the direction of St. Quentin, leaving the first forest to their left. Before that forest they were drawn up in line against the artillery of the French, who, being in retreat, had taken position on the first height around St. Quentin. Nearly at the same time four batteries of the corps artillery were summoned to the battle-field, and placed themselves at the right of the former three. Thus, on the west side of St. Quentin, seven batteries came into action, and the grandeur of their roaring, and the whistling of their shells, were indescribable. The cavalry division continued to exercise the utmost pressure on the French right, as the sixteenth division did on the left, and General Faidherbe had no other course but to abandon the last heights, and to fall back into the town.

From the time the twenty-third French corps had commenced their early retreat, the twenty-second, under Generals Deroja and Paulze d'Ivoy, sustained the brunt of the fight. Even among them some mobiles gave way, but were again rallied and placed in front of the regiment of zouaves of the north. These latter were as fine and daring a body of troops as the French had; but by four o'clock General Paulze d'Ivoy, being unable any longer to continue the defence, the retreat was sounded; and under a tremendous fire from the augmented Prussian batteries, the disheartened French set out for St. Quentin, but only *en route* for a farther distance still; for, determined to repossess the town they had evacuated three days before, the Germans were gathering fast for the pursuit. Thus, when evening was falling, the weary men—almost dead with several days' marching to and fro, first upon Albert, next tacking westward upon Fins—were trudging several kilomètres to Cambrai, in the dreary darkness, knowing they had lost an important day, and that their conquerors were pressing forward to occupy the town they held the night before.

One of the grandest war pictures ever witnessed was now displayed. The full light of day had already disappeared; the wide plain on which a fierce battle had raged was silent; but on the right and left wing were heard the cries of victorious troops. When the enemy was driven from his last position, the whole long line of German infantry and cavalry, followed by the artillery, began to march on St. Quentin, with drums beating and banners fluttering in the air; and amidst the shouts of "Hurrah!" advanced until they reached the heights just abandoned by the French. The batteries were then mounted in a semicircle around the town, which the fifteenth division now took by storm, assisted by the sixteenth, which attacked it on the east. To defend the place successfully was impossible; to remain within it was either to become victims to the pitiless rain of Prussian shells, or be taken prisoners. The majority of the French, therefore, after some slight show of resistance, fled in utter confusion, some to Guise, but most to Cambrai, the Prussian cavalry making about 4000 prisoners at St. Quentin alone. They had previously taken an equal number, and, in all, the battle finally resulted in the capture of more than 12,000. Had not night retarded the pursuit, it is probable that few, indeed, would have been left to France of its army of the north.

Thus, within ten days, a second French army, upon which high hopes had been built, was shattered and dispersed beyond recovery. In a report to the minister of War, General Faidherbe stated that at this battle his troops amounted to only 25,000, his four divisions having been reduced during six weeks' operations to 6000 or 7000 men each; and that, resolved to sacrifice his own army in order to assist the sortie from Paris, he had gone forward certain of meeting an overwhelming force. If the army of the north was indeed reduced to a strength of 25,000 men, France and Paris, which had been led to believe that it had at least three times that number, had been shamefully deceived.

In a pamphlet published by him at the close of the war, General Faidherbe also remarked somewhat complainingly respecting this battle, "How could we withstand indefinitely the fresh troops

brought continuously by rail on the field of battle, even from Paris?" That no very great force was despatched from among the besiegers of Paris might be inferred from the fact that they themselves had serious work on hand just at this time, the sortie on Montretout having taken place on the same day as the battle of St. Quentin. It is doubtful, however, if the whole war affords a more striking example of the military genius of Von Moltke than an opportune railway trip he ordered for the sixteenth brigade, forming part of the beleaguering army. As the result of calculation he had found that Von Göben would make his mark at St. Quentin all the deeper if he were strengthened with 4000 or 5000 men and a few guns; by calculation and good information together, he had even learnt the hour at which this help would be most useful. The brigade quietly went away for the fight, just as a lawyer goes down to a provincial town for the circuit; and, the work done, it returned immediately to its quarters before Paris, just as the lawyer returns to his cases in the Queen's Bench. The device had simply for the time converted 5000 men into 10,000. Of all Von Moltke's predecessors, Napoleon I. perhaps most effectively utilized his soldiery by means of rapid movements; but he had not the locomotive and the *militär-zug*. General Faidherbe had carried out M. Gambetta's instructions to the letter; he had drawn upon himself as many of the Prussians from around Paris as could be spared, but by doing so he had effectually insured his own irremediable defeat. The victory had cost the Germans 94 officers and 3000 men.

The only other matter of any importance which occurred during the war in the north of France, was the siege and fall of the fortress of Longwy, the strict investment of which was not undertaken by the Germans until after the fall of Mézières. It is situated on the Belgian frontier, thirty-three miles north-north-west of Metz. Its citadel stands on a steep rock, below which extends the town, hospital, military prison, &c. Longwy, which has been termed the "Iron Gate of France," was taken by the Prussians in 1792, and again by the allies in 1815. The details of the siege of 1871 prove that the defence of the place was in no way exceptional as compared with that of similar crowded fortresses in north-eastern France, and that it was given up owing to the same causes which led to the surrender of Thionville, Mézières, and Péronn. The working parties, with the siege train, were brought into the vicinity on the 18th of January, concealed in distant villages during the daytime, and in the evening advanced to begin the work of throwing up the usual concentric batteries which the Germans had found so effectual in like cases, and which were placed at points averaging 1500 yards from the town. Their construction was attended with unusual difficulties, owing to the severe frost which prevailed, and in consequence they were not completed until the night of January 21. There were nine of them in all; eight armed each with four rifled German 12-pounders or 24-pounders, and one with four French mortars, the same as at Thionville. Fire was opened at seven a.m. on the 22nd, and was hotly replied to by the fortress at first, the French causing a good many casualties, and dismounting three of the guns in one Prussian battery (No. 6), on which they directed their chief fire. This, however, soon slackened, from the effects of the constant shower of missiles thrown into the bastions, and then the German artillery began to direct their shots against the public buildings and barracks. Their fire was kept up at the usual measured intervals during the night, and resumed continuously next morning. At ten a.m. of the 24th the church tower fell with a mighty crash, audible above the din of the firing; and at four p.m., after thirty-three hours' bombardment, Colonel Massaroli hoisted the white flag and sent out a *parlementaire* to treat for terms, which Von Krenski readily granted. Nearly all the houses in the town were more or less damaged, some, however, very slightly; but the public buildings had been set on fire by the shells, and were wholly destroyed. It needed not this fresh proof to show how untenable the second-rate Vauban fortresses of France had become in the face of modern artillery, before which they inevitably fell without even causing the besiegers the trouble of opening approaches, unless the inhabitants had consented to be wholly sacrificed to the defence.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The State of France at the Close of 1870—The Accumulated Misfortunes of the Country—German Strategy and its Object—Activity of Chanzy—An Expedition to St. Calais and its Results—A Warm Protest—German Preparation for the Winter Campaign—The Progress towards Le Mans—"Beating up" the Enemy in a Fog—"Only an Incident"—Closing in upon General Chanzy—Great Strength of Le Mans—The Utility of a Map in War—The Battle of Changé—Audacity serving the Purpose of Numbers—The Wisdom of Secrecy in War—Gallant Behaviour of the Third Corps—Carrying the Heights of Champigné—A Brave Officer not to be Deserted—The Beginning of the End—The Army of General Chanzy in Full Retreat—Capture of Le Mans—The Takings of the Victors—The German Losses.

How many years must pass before a Frenchman shall have forgotten the closing scenes of 1870? Christmas and the new year was fast approaching, but men's minds were oppressed from day to day with thoughts contrasting sadly with the associations of the season. Not a single rift could be seen in the clouds which hung over the fairest part of Europe. From every quarter came distressing reports of the misery already inflicted by the war, and gloomy anticipations of the future. The bitter severity of the weather intensified the agonies of the wounded, whose sufferings were too horrible to relate; while in rural parts a distressing solitude, only broken by the occasional appearance of women or old men, reigned along the roads and around farm-houses and hamlets. Ploughs rusted in untilled fields, and the only sign of life in connection with farming affairs, was the sight now and then of a woman tending sheep or goats, as in some barren mountain district. The young and middle-aged men had been drained away to such fields as now surrounded Beaugency. Thousands of wounded constantly passed southwards, until there was scarcely a town in France without a military hospital; and yet the prospect of a decisive issue to the war seemed as faint as ever. Throughout the United Kingdom there prevailed a strong feeling of sympathy with France in her misfortunes, and an impression that Germany could now well afford to show a generosity which would encourage the French to entertain the idea of concession and peace. It could not be denied that the Germans had been driven into a war of defence, and that the disasters they had inflicted on the French were justly merited; but the punishment had already been exemplary beyond any recorded in history. They had taken prisoner the emperor who menaced them and the statesmen who joined with him in his schemes were driven into exile. They had destroyed or led into captivity his whole army, with nearly all its marshals and most renowned commanders. They had taken Strassburg and Metz, with a number of minor fortresses; they had overrun France and laid her provinces under contribution from the Rhine to the Channel; they threatened her beautiful capital with fire and famine; the ruler of Germany had occupied for three months the palace of the man who was his greatest enemy, and "all the glories of France" were humbled under his flag. Was not such a punishment enough for justice? Would it not be a cruelty akin to that practised by the Roman on the Gaul if Germany, with her veteran army and her incomparable organization, continued to crush the gallant but undisciplined bands who were now fighting in desperation to save some shreds of the honour of France?

To such reasoning the impassive Bismarck still had but one answer. His royal, and soon to become imperial, master was quite willing to listen to overtures from France, but would not surrender his claim to a solid security for the future, and a substantial compensation for the thousands of precious lives he had been compelled to sacrifice. On the other hand, M. Gambetta's answer to this demand for a "solid security" was the organization of new armies and defences on every side.

We have shown in previous chapters that the great object of the German commander was to cover the army investing Paris. Every movement was necessarily subordinate to the siege of the capital. D'Aurelles de Paladine, strongly posted at Orleans, constituted a danger which it was requisite to remove. But that object attained, it was questionable whether success in that direction need be much further pursued. The one essential point was, that no French army in the provinces should be suffered to acquire sufficient consistency to threaten the rear of the Germans before Paris. To secure this object General von

Moltke required as much caution as boldness. It was necessary that his base of operations should not be so widened as to weaken it. His armies away from Paris must be like an outer suit of armour to his army around it: they must stop every gap, and make fast every link and joint in defence of the inner panoply. At first the German flying columns merely threatened Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Nantes, Beauvais, and Soissons; but after subduing this first zone, their excursions extended towards Bourges and Tours, Evreux and Rouen, Amiens and St. Quentin. The advancing tide had been here and there momentarily stemmed, but hardly ever forced permanently backwards. It mattered very little whether or not Prince Frederick Charles entered Bourges, or the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, Tours, or Manteuffel, Havre. The important point was that neither Chanzy from Vendôme, nor Bourbaki from Gien, nor Faidherbe from St. Quentin, should have a chance of marching to the relief of Paris.

Bearing these strategical motives in mind, it will be readily seen why, after General Chanzy's brilliant and gallantly defended retreat to Le Mans, fully described in Chapter XXV., the German commanders stopped short in the pursuit at Vendôme. They were undoubtedly weary of the continual strife; but apart from this, further sacrifice in following Chanzy was needless, as the besiegers of Paris were relieved from present anxiety, and it was hoped that the speedy fall of the capital would be the signal for a cessation of hostilities. Such, however, was not Chanzy's opinion. Once behind the fortifications of Le Mans, he, though almost under his enemy's eye, set to work with immense energy to reorganize his shattered forces. The camp of Conlie was broken up; the best of its recruits were drafted to Le Mans; and with these and other reinforcements he soon found himself again at the head of about 150,000 men, thoroughly armed with Remington or Chassepot rifles, and provided with a field train of at least 300 guns. But the result of all these preparations will abundantly prove that armed men do not, strictly speaking, constitute armies.*

From the 15th of December, the day on which the last serious fighting occurred, to the first few days of January, the army of Prince Frederick Charles was comparatively inactive; the men, save in a few reconnoitring expeditions, enjoying a period of well-earned rest. One of these expeditions threw a little light upon the question, often suggested, but never fully tried, as to how the invariably victorious Germans would behave in a retreat. In retaliation for the doings of some franc-tireurs, a small column of troops was ordered to sweep the country from Vendôme as far as Sougé, on the bank of the Braye, and levy requisitions. The orders were to advance as far as Montoire on December 26, to push on through Les Roches on the 27th, remain the unbidden guests of the villagers at Sougé, and return on the 28th. The advanced guard reached Troo on the 27th, and here met with determined opposition from the French, who, from the shelter of houses and walled gardens, poured forth such a fire as checked the advance. After a two hours' conflict the French were thrust out, and leaving a company to hold the village the column pushed on to Sougé. This was found filled with troops, and another fight ensued, during which it was observed that the heights in the rear were being crowded with Frenchmen bent on cutting off the retreat of their diminutive enemies. It was seen that the only chance was at once to fight their way back to Vendôme; and relinquishing the idea of passing the night at Sougé, Colonel Boltenstern ordered a hasty retreat, the thundering of artillery and Chassepots on all sides now telling him only too plainly into what a hornet's nest he had fallen. The men marched rapidly, and had well nigh gained the shelter of Montoire, when a row of armed men appeared in their front, blocking up the entire retreat. Shells fell fast among the little band from the sides and behind; rifle bullets whistled through the air from the foe in front; and many a spiked helmet sank from its place. Still before them rolled the icy waters of the Loir, bridgeless until that line in front could be passed. Scattering four companies into skirmishing order, the colonel took the rest of his men in hand, and sent them full at the French. The line barring the passage hesitated, wavered, and broke; too soon for success, too late for safety. There was no time to count the killed and wounded, nor the prisoners whom the Germans took and drove before them as they went, for the increasing fire told of an enemy gathering in strength for pursuit. Steadily the little column

* For much useful information in this Chapter, we here, with pleasure, acknowledge our indebtedness to Captain Brackenbury, the very able military correspondent of the *Times*, who at this time accompanied the German armies.

trimmed their ranks and crossed to the left bank of the river, carrying their prisoners, uncounted as yet, with them. For some time hostile infantry pursued along the road; then all was quiet, and on the Germans marched in the twilight and the darkness, driving their herd of prisoners, until, having accomplished his orders, the colonel reported himself at Vendôme about an hour before midnight. He had lost in round numbers 100 men; but when the unwounded prisoners came to be counted, it was found there were ten officers and 230 men.

Another expedition was followed by such important events that a brief mention of it cannot be omitted. At St. Calais, a little town of 4000 inhabitants, lying between Le Mans and Blois, some franc-tireurs and French dragoons lodging there saw a small Prussian force approaching on the morning of December 25, and took the opportunity of firing upon it from some houses. The Germans vigorously replied; the franc-tireurs retired; and the mayor went out and endeavoured to explain to the Prussians that the inhabitants were not responsible for the resistance offered. He was, however, rather rudely repulsed, and the unfortunate town ordered to pay 20,000 francs immediately. The sum was afterwards reduced to 15,000 francs, and the town was asserted to have been given over to pillage for an hour. This, however, has been as loudly denied; but the report exasperated General Chanzy, and induced him to write a warm protest to the Prussian commandant at Vendôme. The protest was embodied in an order of the day, and read three times to the French troops on parade; General Chanzy expressing confidence that every one would share his indignation, and his desire to take revenge for the insults heaped upon the French nation. The following is the text of the protest:—

"To the Prussian Commandant at Vendôme,—I am informed that violence, for which I can find no language suitable to express my indignation, has been resorted to by the troops under your command against an innocent population at St. Calais, notwithstanding their good treatment of your sick and wounded. Your officers have extorted money and authorized pillage. This is an abuse of power which will weigh upon your conscience, though patriotism may enable our countrymen to bear it. But it cannot be permitted that you should add to this injury a gratuitous insult. You have alleged that we are defeated. This is false. We have fought and held you in check since the 4th of December. You have dared to treat as cowards men who could not answer you, pretending that they submitted to the will of the government of National Defence in resisting when they really wished for peace. I am justified in protesting against this statement by the resistance of the army, which up to the present time you have not been able to conquer. We reassert what our struggle has already taught you; we shall struggle on, conscious of our good right, and determined to triumph at any cost. We shall struggle on *à outrance*, without truce or mercy. It is no longer a question of fighting against a loyal enemy, but against devastating hordes, whose sole object is the ruin and humiliation of a nation fighting for the preservation of its honour, its independence, and the maintenance of its rank. You reply to the generosity with which we treat your prisoners and wounded by insolence, by arson, and by pillage. I protest with indignation, in the name of humanity and the law of nations, which you trample under foot."

General Voigts-Rhetz sent the letter to his chief at Orleans, saying that he knew not what answer to give to such a document, which differed strangely from all that he had read in the history of warfare. Meantime he bid his men hold fast to their posts, and guard patiently the line of the Loir. At Orleans the letter was regarded as a challenge to a renewal of fighting, and confirmed the suspicion as to the mischief which had been brewing around Le Mans. General Chanzy was doubtless about to commence some new movement for the relief of Paris, and severe as the weather was, Prince Frederick Charles resolved to take the initiative, and march out to meet him. Two main circumstances contributed to this resolution. In the first place, by his eccentric movement eastward (described in the succeeding chapter), General Bourbaki had removed all apprehension the prince might have entertained on his account, and enabled him to take with him the bulk of his force to the west without any uneasiness as to the safety of his position on the Loire at Orleans. In the second place, Von Moltke had determined on resorting to extreme measures against Paris; and as he was about to use his heavy guns, he was able to spare bayonets and sabres for the armies in the provinces. Accordingly, dispositions were made for a gradual concentration towards Vendôme, and for the first three days of the new

year the roads from Orleans leading in that direction were covered, as far as the eye could reach, with infantry, cavalry, and train, all advancing with the regularity of a well-directed machine to their respective starting points. The tenth German corps (Hanoverians) guarded the advanced positions on the Loir, occupying Blois and Vendôme, and the country between. Von der Tann's Bavarians were resting near Orleans. The ninth corps (Schleswig-Holsteiners and Hessians) held Orleans, with detachments before it and higher up the Loire. The third corps (Brandenburgers) were higher up the river towards Gien. It was intended that these various corps should advance by different roads towards the line of the Loir, drive back the French before Vendôme, find out and overthrow the army of Chanzy, and by taking Le Mans relieve the investing army before Paris of all fear for its safety. The eighteenth division (ninth corps) was to reach the Loir at Morée, and having cleared the way, prepare to act as a reserve. The third corps were to cross the river near Vendôme, while the tenth were to march to La Chartre, and be ready to turn Chanzy's right, and then join the other corps in the battle before Le Mans. The duke of Mecklenburg, who was at Chartres, was to advance and drive in Chanzy's left. Duke William of Mecklenburg, with the sixth cavalry division, was to keep on the left of the prince's forces; the second cavalry division was to maintain the communication between the ninth corps, which formed the prince's right, and the left of the duke of Mecklenburg's army. The fourth cavalry division was to protect the grand-duke's right, and the fifth was sent to keep watch in the country north of his line of march.

For the success which eventually resulted from these movements the Germans were indebted in no small degree to the masterly strategy of their commander. Prince Frederick Charles, as will be seen from the various movements we are about to relate, put in practice against Chanzy the principles which had succeeded so well against Benedek in the Bohemian campaign—a double attack was made upon his opponent, the one line at right angles to the other. The grand-duke of Mecklenburg's corps were not moved up directly against Le Mans from Chartres, but were required to make a detour, so as to descend in a northerly direction, and compel Chanzy's army to present two fronts—a mode of operation implying a certain contempt for the enemy, inasmuch as it offends against the rule of attacking with superior numbers. But the capacity of a commander is shown by his knowing when a rule must be observed, and when it may safely be set aside.

On the 4th of January Prince Frederick Charles moved his headquarters to Beaugency, the grand-duke of Mecklenburg being still at Chartres. The third corps was by that time concentrated in and around Marchenoir, the eighteenth division was near Orleans, the nineteenth at Blois, and the twentieth at Vendôme.

On the 5th the prince moved to Oucques, where the third corps had their headquarters. The eighteenth division moved up from Orleans to Ouzouer-le-Marché, and took its place on the right of the force, under the immediate command of the prince. The twentieth was still before Vendôme, skirmishing with General Chanzy's advanced posts, and the nineteenth moved up from Blois towards St. Amand. The grand-duke advanced from Chartres southwards to Illiers.

On the 6th Prince Frederick Charles marched from Oucques to Vendôme, close on the other side of which the tenth corps was seriously engaged with the French before the forest of Vendôme, supported by the third corps, which had advanced that day from Marchenoir. The opposition was greater than the Germans had expected, as the French fought better than usual. The fire of musketry was hot in the front, but the Hanoverians and Brandenburgers pressed on until their artillery and needle guns had borne down all opposition, and their leading division, the fifth, had reached a rivulet between Azay and Villiers. It subsequently transpired that General Chanzy had determined upon forcing his way towards Paris at whatever cost, and with this view had arranged for his army to move in several columns, every man being furnished with four or five days' provisions. It was one of these columns, on its way to attack Vendôme on the 6th, which came in contact with the fifth division (third corps), and for a time resisted all the efforts of the Germans to continue their advance. Night, however, found the French forced back beyond the Azay-Villiers line, where the Prussians halted, after taking 500 prisoners. On the right the eighteenth division reached Morée, on the Loire, north of Vendôme. While this engagement was going on, Duke William of Mecklenburg fell in with considerable forces of

the French on the left, near Villerporcher, and was unable to proceed. General Hartmann was therefore sent with a cavalry division and a brigade of infantry from the tenth corps, in the direction of St. Amand, which caused the French troops in that quarter to fall back towards Tours, whence they were transported by railway to Le Mans. On the same day the grand-duke marched with the seventeenth division to Brou, and the twenty-second advanced to La Loupe and La Fourche.

All the marches from Orleans had been made in bitter weather. Three or four inches of snow lay upon the hard frozen ground, and a piercing wind blew. The moisture exhaled from the lungs or skin froze instantly, and covered hair, beards, and greatcoats with rime. Icicles hung from moustaches and formed curious frames for the indispensable pipes or cigars which protruded from all mouths.

On the 7th a thaw set in; the roads were covered with melting snow, the ditches were fast turning to running streams, and the rivers were more impassable than usual. A dark fog, sometimes concealing all objects at a distance of 100 yards, obliged the Germans to advance with caution. The tenth corps was delayed by the attack on Duke William, and not till next day, when the French had retreated towards Tours, was its march resumed. The fifth, sixth, and eighteenth divisions, however, advanced steadily, occasionally coming in contact with the rear-guards of the French columns. By night-fall the first two of the three divisions had reached the line of the Braye, at Savigny and Sargé, and the last was at Epinay. The grand-duke of Mecklenburg moved his headquarters to Beaumont-les-Autels; the seventeenth division being at Authon and the twenty-second at Nogent-le-Rotrou.

The doings of the Prussian army during these first few days of January thus consisted principally in a well-devised concentration; and no part of the strategy of the war better showed how thoroughly both officers and men had been trained by a system of peace manœuvres to act together in war with the greatest intelligence. The sagacity displayed by the Prussian soldiers, indeed, is worthy of admiration. A description of the advance of one of the columns on the seventh will give a fair idea of the progress of the army generally. Imagine a straight road leading over a succession of round hills; on either side of it a rich country, dotted with farm-houses, cottages, orchards and walled gardens, hedges, (exactly like those of England), and occasional woods. In fact, Kent and Surrey combined, with vineyards instead of hop-gardens, would be an exact picture of the country through which the Germans were pushing on, under all the disadvantage of the fog, in a land never seen before.

The column was led by a small detachment of cuirassiers. After these came three infantry soldiers, two of them about 150 yards in front of the column, and one behind to connect these foremost men with the detachment of infantry which followed. The three foremost soldiers of the German army in face of the enemy were accompanied by four pet dogs, trotting quickly along beside them. After the infantry detachment came a squadron of cuirassiers, then more infantry, all of the same regiment, and followed by the light battery of the advanced guard. Owing to the thick mist the troops moved cautiously, for they knew that the enemy might appear at any moment. The pace was a moderate walk, about three miles an hour, with occasional halts, to examine a farm or a group of cottages near the road. Right and left of the road were cavalry and infantry marching in pairs, searching like dogs for game. They were generally concealed by the fog, but now and then a small party would peep out from a lane or cottage garden, and vanish again into the mist, when they saw that all was going smoothly, and that they had not lost their place beside the column. The troops marching along the undulating road had no reason to take thought for anything, save in front, as they had perfect confidence in the sagacity of their comrades, who, sometimes walking quickly, sometimes with rifle at the charge, were pushing on as well as they could over vineyards and gardens, ploughed fields and stubble, walls and fences, peering into every tree and bush for any enemy who might possibly be concealed by a copse, a garden wall, or a cottage. Occasionally one would run to the road and report something that had a suspicious look, when instantly some of his comrades were sent in the direction named to see whether any Frenchmen might be concealed there. All this was done so quickly as scarcely to interrupt the march of the column.

After a time there was a halt. The red trowsers had been seen to the right for a moment, and had immediately disappeared in the fog. Quest was made with increased numbers and redoubled

caution among the small fields and hedges, but no sign of the enemy. The march was resumed, and continued until the few horsemen in front rode back to the head of the column, reporting something like men on the road. Slowly the infantry advanced, straining their eyes to ascertain the nature of the obstacle. The fog became thicker, and closed in the view to within a few paces. The foot soldiers, with outstretched necks, felt their way onwards. The fog became gradually lighter, when dim figures assembled together, and above the group an appearance like the erect quills of a porcupine—soldiers, probably, with bayonets. Instantly there is a murmur, "Are they ours?" Has one of the searching parties gone a little too much to the front? Nay. The figures remain still, and seem to block the way. "Cuirassiers to the front!" In a sort of good-humoured growl, some one says, "Yes, it is always cuirassiers here, cuirassiers there." But the order has been given, and the cuirassiers know no other obligation but the call to duty. The men, who had been brought in behind the infantry detachment, draw their swords, set their helmets firmly on their brows, press their knees firmly to their horses, and file past the infantry once more to the front. "Trot!" The fog comes down again, and the dim figures with the spikes become once more invisible, but not unheard. The horses have not gone more than half the 400 or 500 yards uphill in the direction given to the riders, when the air is filled with a crackling, whizzing sound, as of innumerable heavy insects flying faster than insects ever flew before. Every horseman bends to his saddle-bow. The officer who leads them waves his sword, and gives a word of command. The cuirassiers who went at a trot return at a gallop, but always steadily and in order, followed by those swift hornets with the fierce stings. Like magic the foremost infantry soldiers dissolve, but not to retreat. They spring to the sides of the road into the ditch, full of half-melted ice, into the fields, and begin in their turn to creep forward. The enemy is still in the mist, though near: and as the hornets come thickly and fast, the squadron of cavalry now occupying the front seems inclined to follow the example of the infantry, and dive for shelter. But such is not their part in battle, and one simple "No," in an expostulatory tone, from their commander, recalls them to their steady attitude. One of them, and not the least steady, remarked quietly, "These French Chassepots shoot so far that one gets killed without seeing them. A comrade of mine was shot yesterday through his heart, and I don't think he even heard the rifle."

Cavalry are of no use where these men stand, so their officer soon draws them off into a field at the side. On the left, behind a house a little removed from the road, cavalry patrols are calmly waiting under shelter. Along the strait road for miles is a column of infantry, artillery, and train. Now for the mitrailleuse at work in its proper place. Its horrible growl must have been expected by many, but it came not. The French always seem to do the wrong thing. Their shells burst high in the air, and they pit their mitrailleuses against field artillery at long ranges.

Meanwhile, the infantry soldiers work steadily forward, firing at the flashes of the enemy's rifles, and helping to create a denser cloud than ever. though the sun at that moment, half-past twelve o'clock, seemed striving to break through the fog. The fight is partly transferred to the fields, for the bullets fly more at the sides of the road, and strike the trees with a sound like the chopping of an axe. Several minutes go by, long minutes, when the hornets are whizzing past with their sharp stings. The firing increases in intensity, but there are several shots now for every bullet that comes down the road or at the sides. The report of the needle-gun, too, sounds farther off. It increases to a heavy fire as more men come up. Still the French hold their ground. Guns begin to press forward, but as they cannot be made to tell, they do not fire a single shell. The sounds grow faster and fiercer. The combatants approach each other. A loud hurrah makes the mist quiver again. The Prussians have skirmished enough; they bound forward, reckless of consequences, and carry the position by storm.

It was only an incident which checked the march for a few minutes. It is past, and the Prussians move on, looking sadly on the stretcher with its straw, and the fine young fellow with the pale face trying to support his broken arm and save it from the swing of the bearers; looking yet more seriously at those forms lying quietly by the side of the road, their faces covered decently from the light, which they will never see more.

On the 8th the ground was again frozen, and the prince moved his headquarters to St. Calais,

where he had the fifth and sixth divisions not far in front of him, on each side of the high road; the eighteenth division being just behind Illiers. The tenth corps, in spite of the obstacles to its advance, was at La Chartre on the Loir, on its way to Le Mans. To connect La Chartre with St. Calais, a detachment of six squadrons of cavalry, one battalion of infantry, and six guns, was formed, and placed under the command of General Schmidt. On the same day (the 8th) the grand-duke of Mecklenburg reached La Ferté St. Bernard with his entire infantry corps; the fourth cavalry division marched down the Huisne to Bellême; the second kept up the communication between the grand-duke's and the prince's corps; and the fifth was on the grand-duke's right.

On the 9th the roads were once more hard as iron with frost, and covered with ice, which remained for days, and made the cavalry all but useless in the actions which were to result in the capture of Le Mans. A strange sight was presented by the army, as it struggled on over the icy roads. Even the prince had to dismount and walk; most of the staff and cavalry escort were also dismounted; others, mounted, forced their horses to stumble on in the ditch by the side of the road. The horses of the artillery and train were falling every instant, and ice nails became worth nearly their weight in gold. Still, however, the army pressed on, slipping and falling, but never halting, driving before it the French, who had hesitated too long to descend on Vendôme, and were now recoiling from the first shock of contact with the burly Brandenburgers on the hills above the Loir. The prince's headquarters were this day moved to Bouloire. Both divisions of the third corps were at Ardenay and along the line of the Narrais. The eighteenth division was with the prince; the nineteenth about Vancé; the twentieth at Grand Lucé. The grand-duke moved with the seventeenth division to Le Luard, near Connerré, the twenty-second occupying Sceaux, on the main road six miles in advance of La Ferté The German army was now within fighting distance of Le Mans. The prince had in front of him an army numbering, according to telegrams from Bordeaux a week before, 200,000 men, but rated by the Germans at the time at 160,000, and afterwards said by English correspondents at General Chanzy's headquarters to have been 118,000. The armies of Prince Frederick Charles and the duke of Mecklenburg numbered only 85,000, although in telegrams sent to Bordeaux from Le Mans they were reported to reach a strength of 180,000. But both men and horses were in the finest condition, and the supply departments were admirably served. The ninth corps had very recently shown its marching powers by having advanced, on the 16th and 17th of December, more than fifty English miles in twenty-four hours! The men were much attached to the prince, their commander, who on the 9th marched with them for twelve miles with the greatest ease.

Le Mans, towards which the Germans were now hastening, is naturally a place of considerable strength, being situated just above the confluence of the two rivers, the Sarthe and the Huisne, the former flowing from north to south parallel to the railway line which, from Cherbourg and Caen, goes by Alençon and Le Mans to Tours; the latter following a north-westerly course parallel to the other line which, from Paris by Chartres, Nogent-le-Rotrou, and Le Mans, proceeds to Angers. The town lies on both banks of the Sarthe, and the Huisne winds round the hills which dominate the place on the east and south. To these natural advantages the French had for several weeks been adding earthworks of some magnitude, rendering the position one of extraordinary strength and security. In addition to these points in their favour General Chanzy's men were armed with breech-loading rifles from the United States, of a pattern far surpassing the needle-gun; and he was also well supplied with the Gatling gun—a mitrailleuse firing a heavier projectile than that used in the imperial army early in the campaign.

On the 10th Prince Frederick Charles had drawn so near the French position, that the question seemed to be how to get into Le Mans. This, however, was a problem, for the grand-duke was not coming up so quickly as had been expected. The tenth corps, delayed by the state of the roads, was still behind, though the brave Hanoverians were toiling and sliding along as best they could. Using the only force immediately at his disposal, the prince ordered General Alvensleben to lead the third corps (his Brandenburgers) from Ardenay, and clear the principal roads to Le Mans, nearly up to the Huisne, behind which the French had taken up their position. He accordingly ordered


BATTLE OF LE MANS.
January 11th 1871.
FRENCH
PRUSSIANS
French Kilometres
Metres 1000 500 0 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometres
English Miles
Chains 80 40 0 1 2 3 Miles
Bois de Joue
Malessard
la Chanaie
la Maholiere
la Truyilles
Chaire Chau
SAVIGNE l'Eveque
le Rocher Chau
la Morterie Chau
Coindon
Courdour
les Morlettes
le Chatelet
la Chapelle St Aubin
Gnd Champ
la Croix
le Gruchet
Bois de Paneciere
le Cadran
la Fosse
Yeaurouse
la Sarthe R
Coulaines
la Sougis
Sarge
Parance
le Chene
la Sonnerie
LE MANS
Yvre l'Eveque
Vallee d'Ivree
St Pavin de Champs
la Busson Chau
Rouillon
Chau de Rouillon
Pipeche
l'Arche
les Aloes
Chau les Arches
RAILWAY
St Croix
Chau les Noyers
Huisne R
l Epau
les Barres
Sable
Gue de Mauny
St Georges-le Petit
Pt Chene
PONTLIEUE
Change
les Fondus
la Dubonsiere
la Pelou
Allonnes
le Port Beleau
la Vallee des Paules
Chef Raison Chau
les Boulaies
la Foreterie Chau
Chau de la Paillerie
la Vacherie
le Broussil
les Mortes Aures
Sauvre
la Riviere
Tevaigne
la Fonderie
la Sarthe Riv
Ruaudin
Ronquibert
les Guerilets
les Hunaudieres Chau
Lumay
le Enor
Plessise
Arnage
les Vigneux
Spay



la Chapelle
Parance R.
Gaigner
la Land
les Luceaux
le Tertre
la Chevrie
Lombron
Pts Vaux
les Pelinieres
Laresse Chau
la Perrine
les Bois d'Angers
les Frogeries
les Cahernieres
St Corneille
Hyre Chau
Saussay
les Jouazieres
Merdereau R.
la Commune
Bois de Montdoublerain
Pouillé
CONNERRE
le Gué R.
RAILWAY
les Mossibotieres
la Grenouillere
Fatines
la Chenaie
MONTFORT
Pont de Gesnes
l'Huisne R.
Montbellin
Bois les Croix
les Croix
Champigne
St Mars la Bruyre
les Brandieres
St Denis du Tertre
Nuillé
le Ht Tertre
Soulitre
St Hubert des Rochers
le Breil
la Buttes
Ardenay
Rossay
Bugent
la Buzardiere Chau
BOIS DE LOUDON
Etangs de Loudon
Surfond
les Vernelles
Mont Morillon
les Bouveries
la Heraudiere
les Brosses
la Mon Neuve
PARIGNE l'Eveque
les Laires
Volnay
Challes
St Mars de Locquenay
Ragoltieres

three of his brigades to advance by different forest tracks and meet at night at Changé, while the fourth was to push on and clear the woods to the right as far as Champigné. One of the three brigades, the ninth, met a French corps in the woods near Challes, and succeeded in driving them back towards Parigné, where a stand was made. The commander of the tenth brigade, General Schwerin, hearing the sound of firing at Challes, took at once a decided step, accepting the responsibility without hesitation. He saw by his map that there was a road leading behind the battle, where he might take the French in rear. He marched his men quickly towards the place, which he had never seen, but knew to be there, because a military map was as familiar to him and as easily read as a book, and the careful Prussian war office had supplied him with the means of knowing France better than Frenchmen themselves knew it. When the enemy began to retreat, therefore, they found the Germans barring the way beyond Parigné. Defeated, broken down, and bewildered, they surrendered themselves and two mitrailleuses, because General Schwerin had a map, could read it, and knew how to take on himself responsibility.

Parigné, behind Challes, the place thus taken by General Schwerin, did not surrender without a fight. It was strongly occupied by the French, and so built that several streets, slightly divergent, ran from the centre of the town in the direction of the German advance. It would have been hard to carry the place had it only been attacked in front; but the turning movement was irresistible, and Parigné soon fell into the hands of the Prussians.

The eleventh brigade, keeping more to the right, pressed on until it found itself close to Changé about four o'clock in the afternoon. Then the men were halted to take five minutes' rest, while the church bell rung out an alarm in their ears. The sound of the bell was soon drowned by the rolling fire of rifles and the explosion of bursting shrapnels. The men sang, mocked the hideous crash of the iron missiles, and speedily threw themselves into their work, like well-trained fox hounds in a cover. The French had no need of intrenchments, for every field had its banks aud hedges. Along these the thirty-fifth regiment (Berliners), scattered into skirmishing order, crept or ran suddenly from bank to bank, across the fields, always driving back the French, but leaving many dead and wounded. At last they gathered together in groups, and dashing forward with a vociferous cheer, carried the hamlet Gué la Har, about 1000 yards short of Changé. Supposing their work to be over for the day, they must have felt disappointed in finding that there were many banks yet to be carried, and a natural wet ditch, now covered with ice, to be passed before their quarters for the night could be won. The evening closed in; the fight raged in the twilight and in the darkness, under the gloom of which it was hard to tell friends from foes. The Berliners doubted sometimes whether they should fire against some dark group visible against the snow, until, in measured accents, broke forth the war cry, "Brand-en-burg! hur-rah!" quickly answered in like fashion. The dead lay thickly, and the wounded must surely perish that bitter night unless room should be won for them in Changé. Still the Chassepot bullets, fired at random by Frenchmen who were comparatively safe behind banks or in houses, whizzed through the air in a fearful leaden storm. The Prussians were discouraged, but still constant, when they heard sudden firing in advance of them, and to the left of the village much crackling of Chassepots, and the well-known sound of the needle-gun, speedily followed by a "Hurrah," and they knew that Changé was theirs. The timely friend was again General Schwerin with the tenth brigade, who, by bringing his troops round in rear of Parigné, which they had taken, had now outflanked and turned the position of Changé. Still the ill-fed, thinly-clad soldiers of France, though startled, behaved well, maintaining a gallant defence in the streets for some time after the place was entered. All, however, was in vain; for when man met man at close quarters, the terrible Chassepot was no longer of advantage; and finding further resistance useless, the Frenchmen took refuge in the houses, only to be made prisoners. Eight hundred of them soon lay huddled together in heaps for warmth within the walls of the church, whence the tocsin had sounded that afternoon. The orders of General Alvensleben had been faithfully carried out, and the three brigades made their hardly-won quarters that night in the village. This action of the 10th was distinguished by the Germans as the Battle of Changé; those of the 11th and 12th being called the Battles of Le Mans.

On the morning of the 11th the French watched the enemy from a position which might well be deemed impregnable. A curving range of hills

forms a vast natural parapet before Le Mans, the river Huisne forming its wet ditch. On this parapet guns and mitrailleuses, side by side, were more thickly planted than the Germans had ever seen before in the campaign. All the bridges over the river were also in the hands of the French. The grand chaussée from St. Calais and Vendôme was that by which the prince's eighteenth division was advancing; but the river is fenced off from the road by a range of hills which, running from the north-east towards Le Mans, meets the Huisne at Yvré. The prince had only three divisions with him—the fifth and sixth of the third corps, and the eighteenth of the ninth corps; for the grand-duke was still at some distance, and the tenth corps, detained at Montoire, had got no farther than Mulsanne and Ruaudin, on the south-westerly road from Le Mans. Across the Huisne the prince's three divisions had in front of them, at one time or another, almost the whole of the French army, and all the while the whole passages of the river were in their hands. Cautious and timid commanders would have hesitated, perhaps retired, before a danger so imminent. But neither Prince Frederick Charles nor Alvensleben of Mars-la-Tour were timid commanders. "The whole country is full of woods, right down to the Huisne," they said. "Let us attack, and the French will never know how weak we are." The wisdom of secrecy in war was, in fact, never more manifest than in the operations of this day; for had the French known the real number of the force opposed to them, they would certainly never have permitted their position to be taken. Their ignorance, or at least the possibility of deceiving them by an audacious movement, was one of the elements in the calculations of the German commander, who might have been attacked with a fair chance of success if the French had been well served by spies. The prince ordered the eighteeenth division to carry the hills above Champigné, and sent the fifth and sixth divisions, forming the third corps, against the Huisne. The third received the order to advance on the 11th, in the middle of the day. Their numbers could not have exceeded 18,000 men, for they left Orleans only 22,000 strong, and had been fighting ever since. They advanced, however, against the great natural rampart held by 50,000 men, over ground covered with woods, and intersected by lanes separated from them by ditches and banks. The woods were filled by French riflemen, and beyond the river, in front, were their artillery and mitrailleuses. Alvensleben's brigades advanced, the tenth going northward to try and gain the road to Le Mans by Savigné; the eleventh marched upon Château-les-Noyers, about 500 yards from the Huisne; the twelfth was sent to attack Yvré; and the ninth was held in reserve. The eleventh, in executing its orders, soon found itself enveloped in a furious tempest of fire from the French batteries on the hill opposite Château-les-Arches. After the battle not a tree could be found that was not marked with balls. The eleventh was compelled to give way, and the twelfth, recalled from Yvré, was sent to its aid. The latter attacked Les Arches and drove the French out; but when the divisional artillery was brought up, it could not hold the position in face of the French fire. Towards evening the eighth regiment was sent forward from the reserves to its assistance, as a French force of 25,000 was pushing forward to secure, as was afterwards found, the road by which another French force, retreating from before the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, might enter Le Mans. This, however, was not known at the time; and had the French at this moment advanced boldly, they might very likely have swept away the small number of Germans opposed to them. But they were contented with simply holding the position, which the third corps was not strong enough to carry. Help had been hoped for from the tenth corps, but these were still toiling painfully along the slippery road from La Chartre; so on this, as on other occasions, the Germans had to multiply their numbers by audacity and quickness. They ran from hedge to hedge and from tree to tree, never exposing themselves unnecessarily, yet always ready for a charge and hurrah when a chance presented itself. But Chassepots innumerable crackled in front, the mitrailleuse snarled from its cover, and the perpetually recurring thump of the Gatling was met on every path. The third corps could do wonders, and on this fatal 11th it fought gallantly all day, and held its own against fearful odds; but it failed to accomplish the task assigned to it, and the face of General Alvensleben wore an anxious and unsatisfied expression, as he saw his men struggling in vain against superior numbers, and falling wounded or dying iu the snow, while the mournful wind sang dirges over them through the pine trees.

Meanwhile the action on the main road was progressing. The twelfth brigade, which had occupied Château-les-Arches, hard by the road, in the morning, then joined the rest of the third corps, and it came to the turn of the eighteenth division to carry the heights of Champigné, which tower above the road, not parallel to it, but converging from about a mile to the right of St. Hubert, and coming close to the highway not far from the river Huisne in the direction of Le Mans. The hills are steep, and the end nearest St. Hubert is broken by three ravines. The prince, who was at St. Hubert, ordered the attack to be made, and moved near to watch it. A road from St. Hubert leads towards the right to Champigné, at the foot of the heights nearest to where the Prussians were advancing. One brigade remained at St. Hubert. About four battalions marched along the main road towards Yvré, which lies in the rear of the heights and the river; nearly an equal force took a path through the woods leading to the village of Champigné. The former force, spreading out into company columns, covered by skirmishers, went at the heights in front, with its left towards the river, and took the hills before it in gallant style. The other four battalions, or three with some jägers, pushed through Champigné, and moved steadily at the flank of the hill. One battalion remained below in reserve; one company mounted the hill, upwards, onwards, driving the enemy before them, over one elevation, down into the ravine, up and down again, striving to gain the flank of the French, and assist their struggling friends who were attacking the hills in front. But on the last crest stood three mitrailleuses snarling defiance, and causing even the Germans to recoil. The fire was terrible, especially when artillery could not fire at it from long range. The small force lay down to save themselves as well as they could, and when the company rose afterwards it was short of thirteen men. The rest of the brigade cleared the back of the heights.

Then Captain Mauntz, of the eleventh infantry, chose a small body of picked men, determined that the prince's commands should not remain unfulfilled. Quietly they stole through the ravine, quietly gained the crest where stood the many-barrelled pieces belching forth volleys of bullets. The hill was so steep that the muzzles of the mitrailleuses could not be pointed low enough to meet them until the band of brave men had reached the summit. One moment's breath, and then with a wild hurrah they sprang forward, and carried everything before them. The road was cleared, the men on the other bank rose to their feet—all except the thirteen who never rose more—and the heights commanding the Huisne were in the hands of the Prussians, though not completely until the next day. While Captain Mauntz and his chosen comrades stood beside the pieces they had taken, a Prussian battery opened upon them, not knowing of the gallant deed they had accomplished; and either here, or a little later from the French, he received a wound, "light" in the vocabulary of soldiers, but heavy enough to prevent him from advancing further that day. He was reposing quietly in a little hamlet on the heights, when it was reoccupied by the French, who held it through the night. They would have carried him off as a prisoner, but a woman who had seen his gentleness to her wounded countrymen caused him to lie on her bed, and represented to the French that his wound was dangerous, so that they also pitied him and left him there. Night came, and the faithful few whom he had led so well, consulting how they might rescue him, moved silently out in the darkness and crept into the village, where the French were taking their rest after the battle. The Prussian *kinder*, who knew where their captain lay, stole quietly into the house with a stretcher, and saluting him with "Here, captain, now is your time," they set him on the canvas, and slipped out as they had come, unperceived.

By this time it must have been perceived by the gallant General Chanzy that his army was in sore peril. Before him were the advancing troops of Germany; on his left the duke of Mecklenburg was ceaselessly pressing, driving his outstretched wing so closely to the body as to cripple his powers of motion; behind him was the Sarthe. Another day and his army would be taken as in a net. There was only one chance for him. He had his railways, while the roads were in such a state that the Prussians could hardly move on them. Not unwisely, he began at once to retreat. The German cavalry saw with bitter disappointment trains moving towards Sillé, Le Guillaume, Sable, and La Flèche, while they were prevented from cutting the iron way by the ice on the roads and the closeness of the country, everywhere intersected by numerous small hedges, gardens, and farm inclosures. So the French lines became

weaker, while the Germans were strengthened by the arrival at last of the tenth corps.

The night of the 11th was passed in some anxiety by General Alvensleben. When complimented in the evening on the behaviour of his men he remarked, "Yes, but I am not quite satisfied with what the third corps has done." Not satisfied, when he had shown so bold a front that the French must have believed they had a whole army before them! The Germans, indeed, disappointed as they were with their tactical achievements, did not know what advantages they had really gained this day. While Alvensleben was vexing himself in his quarters, General Chanzy was writing a despatch announcing his own defeat. In the course of the night he telegraphed from Le Mans to Bordeaux the following message to M. Gambetta:—"Our positions were good last night excepting at La Tuillerie, where the mobiles of Brittany disbanded themselves, thereby causing the abandonment of the positions we occupied on the right bank of the Huisne. Vice-admiral Jauréguiberry and the other generals think a retreat is necessary under these circumstances. I resign myself to it unwillingly." La Tuillerie was an important link of the positions stretching from Changé to Savigné l'Evêque, and upon its maintenance Chanzy calculated as the key to his whole plan of resistance. The Brittany mobiles who held it had been warmly praised for their behaviour under fire hitherto; but an attack of artillery opened upon them on the evening of the 11th completely disconcerted both officers and men. The officers were too astounded to give orders, and the men, thus left to themselves, in an evil moment determined upon instant flight. Horses were precipitately harnessed to the guns, and the column commenced a retreat which never paused till they reached Le Mans. A movement of retreat had been previously commenced by other parts of the army, but it was not until the abandonment of this essentially important position that General Chanzy became convinced of the utter hopelessness of further resistance. The possession of La Tuillerie would have enabled the Germans effectually to turn the French position and attack them in the rear, a manœuvre which might have resulted in a worse misfortune than a retreat. Had La Tuillerie been held by such men as held the left bank of the Lisane—as in the next chapter we shall have occasion to show—the chances of Prince Frederick Charles entering Le Mans would have been exceedingly small.

On the 12th the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who had fought a successful action at Connerré, was able to move his own headquarters to Montfort, his seventeenth division being at Corneille, and the twenty-second at La Croix. The French, as we have seen, were already in full retreat, and their guns had almost all disappeared from the hills; nevertheless, as a matter of prudence, General Chanzy ordered an attack on Les Noyers, which, in the prevailing uncertainty, and after the heavy loss of life on the previous day, caused some anxiety to the Germans. The attack, however, was repulsed; the sixth division took Yvré; while the tenth corps and General Schmidt's detachment, after some fighting at Château de la Paillerie, reached the heights above Le Mans, and threw some shells into the town on the retreating columns of the French. The fifth division followed in the same direction, and the Germans passed into Le Mans, not, however, without some opposition from the French, who fired upon them from houses, and maintained an obstinate contest in the streets and squares. It was not until the following day, January 13, that Prince Frederick Charles thought it prudent to remove his headquarters to the préfecture of the captured town. The grand-duke of Mecklenburg was sent towards Alençon, which in a few days experienced the fate of Le Mans. The eighteenth division pushed on, and occupied the entrenched camp at Conlie. The tenth corps was sent on towards Laval, but found the bridges broken up, and was not sufficiently strong to overcome such opposition as Chanzy's troops were still able to offer. At Le Mans and Conlie an enormous quantity of arms, ammunition, food, and what was even of more consequence, railway materials and rolling stock, fell into the hands of the Germans. On the 16th Prince Frederick Charles reported that, in the engagements from the 6th of January to that date, he and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg had taken from the enemy more than 22,000 unwounded prisoners, two colours, nineteen guns, and more than a thousand loaded ammunition conveyances, besides a large quantity of arms and other war material. The army of the Loire was in fact broken up, and with it Paris had lost its best hope of relief. The losses of the Germans in the fighting about Le Mans amounted, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to 177 officers and 3203 men.



MAP TO
ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS IN THE
EAST OF FRANCE
1870-71.
LANGRES
Longeau
Prauthoy
CHAMPLITTE
Selongey
Is-sur Tille
Fontaine Française
Dampierre sur Salon
GRAY
St Seine
Beze
DIJON
AUXONNE
Pontailler
Pesmes
St Jean-de Losne
DOLE
FORET DE CHAUX
Nuits
la Saone R
la Loue R
Doubs R
Oignon R
Arbois
POLIGNY
Recey-sur Ource
Gy



ST LOUP
les Luxeil
Fourgerolles
Faucogney
Luxeuil
VOSGES
MASSEVAUX
Faverney
Giromomagny
Combeaufontaine
PORT
sur Saône
Saulx
LURE
Champagny
Ronchamp
BELFORT
VESOUL
Noroy le Bourg
Hericourt
VILLERSEXEL
MONTBELIARD
DELLE
Rougemont
ISLE
sur le Doub
Rioz
Clerval
Blamont
Pont de Roide
BAUME
les Dames
ST HIPPOLYTE
sur le Doubs
BESANCON
ORNANS
QUINGEY
MORTEAU
la Chaux de Fonds
NEUCHATEL
SALINS
PONTARLIER
LAC DE NEUCHATEL
SWITZERLAND
Estavayer
Doubs R.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

The War protracted in the East—The Germans at Dijon—The Battle of Nuits—Evacuation of Dijon—The last Great Effort of France—Composition of the Loire Army—The Portion under the Command of Bourbaki—The Scheme of Colonel de Bigot—Vital Importance of the German Communications—*Pro* and *Con* of the proposed Eastern Expedition—Result of it as concerned Chanzy's Army—Errors in Bourbaki's Arrangements for marching—The confusion resulting—Arrival of General Werder at Vesoul—Battle of Villersexel—The German Position for covering the Besiegers of Belfort—Battle of Hericourt—Piteous Sufferings of the French from Defective Supplies—The attack on General Werder resumed—Temporary Success of General Cremer's Division—Repulse of the Second Attack—Deadly Precision of German fire—Third Day of the Battle, and Retreat of Bourbaki's Army—Criticism upon the Engagements—Von Moltke's Master-stroke—The Expedition of Manteuffel—Garibaldi hoodwinked—Fatal irresolution of Bourbaki—Exclusion of the East from the Armistice—The Horrors of the Moscow retreat renewed—The French Army driven into Switzerland—Gratitude of the Emperor to General Werder—An Extraordinary Feat of Marching—Exit Garibaldi—Siege of Belfort—Failure of the German Assault—Capitulation, with Honourable Terms.

We now resume our narrative of the events which transpired in the east of France, and which will conclude our history of the war, apart from Paris. The struggle was practically closed in the south and west by the capture of Le Mans and the dispersion of Chanzy's army, just described; in the north by the defeat of Faidherbe at St. Quentin on January 19; and at Paris, by the capitulation, on January 28: but for several days a portion of eastern France was unfortunately excluded from the operation of the armistice concluded at Versailles, and the war was consequently prolonged there to a later date than in any other quarter.

Our last notice of affairs in the east was on the occasion of the expedition of Garibaldi for the relief of Dijon, an enterprise which resulted in almost disastrous, certainly ridiculous, failure. The motley assemblage of troops of all nations, generally known as "Garibaldini," was pursued by a Prussian detachment as far as Autun, where a smart fight took place, after which the Germans deemed it prudent to retire back to Dijon, being considerably harassed by the French on the way. At that town General Werder, with the Baden corps, remained, as it served as an advanced post of observation in case any serious movements were made by the French to interrupt the lines of German supply and communication from Strassburg, *via* Nancy, &c., to Paris. The great and important fortress of Belfort, which formed the key to central and southern France, had been for some time besieged by a force under General von Tresckow; and in addition to its other uses General Werder's position at Dijon afforded a safeguard against the approach of any relieving corps to this stronghold.

The position was held without any incident worthy of notice until the middle of December, when General Werder became unpleasantly aware of a concentration of French in his front, and he determined to ascertain, if possible, its proportions. Accordingly, on the 18th of December, the first and second Baden brigades, under General Glumer and Prince William of Baden, proceeded towards Beaune, and at Nuits, a small town about eight miles north-east of the former place, encountered a strong French force under General Cremer. A most desperate engagement ensued, which lasted for five hours, and issued in the Germans storming, with severe loss, the defensive position of the French. General Glumer and Prince William were both put *hors de combat;* and Colonel von Reutz, the officer upon whom the command then devolved, was himself soon after mortally wounded. Of the Germans fifty-four officers and 880 men, killed and wounded, covered the field, while the loss of the French was not less than 1000, besides sixteen officers and 700 men taken prisoners, and the capture of four gun-carriages, three ammunition waggons, and a large quantity of arms. But as the position thus won was considered too advanced and exposed to be held with any advantage, it was evacuated on the 20th by its conquerors, and at once reoccupied by the French.

The evacuation of Dijon by the Germans followed soon after the battle at Nuits. This step was taken in consequence of the very large concentration of French troops discovered not only at Beaune but at Besançon, the entire suspension of civilian traffic on the Lyons and Besançon Railway, the possibility of portions of the Loire army being despatched to the east, and the probability of those forces attempting the relief of Belfort

or a movement on his flank. General Werder was accordingly directed to concentrate the Baden division on the line of Vesoul, Lure, and Montbéliard, to give up the advanced positions of Dijon and Langres, and to repel any attempt to relieve Belfort. The French ships of war had about this time captured several German merchant vessels, and detained the captains as prisoners of war. In retaliation the Prussians, a few days before leaving Dijon, summoned thirty of the "notables" of the place, and explained to them that they required forty hostages, who would be sent off to Germany, where, however, they were assured they would be well treated. Twenty were taken from Dijon, ten from Vesoul, and ten from Gray, and in spite of some strong protestations were at once despatched to Prussia. Dijon had been required, on the entry of the Germans, to deposit £20,000 as security for the good behaviour of its townsfolk; but at the entreaty of the mayor, who gave a touching description of the distressed condition of the working classes, the amount was reduced to £12,000. This was returned to the mayor by General Werder on his departure, with a letter complimenting the inhabitants on their exemplary conduct.

We now approach the last effort that could at all be regarded as formidable, made by the provincial armies to retrieve the disasters of France and checkmate the enemy, whose hitherto triumphant progress had been without a parallel. Our readers will remember that after the army of the Loire had been dispersed from Orleans on December 4, it was divided involuntarily into two main portions, and that M. Gambetta, accepting the situation, constituted the two halves respectively as the first and second armies. That which had fallen back along the upper, or left bank of the Loire, towards Bourges, now called the first army, was placed under the command of Bourbaki, the late chief of the imperial guard; while the other division, or second army, was confided to General Chanzy. The "great and paramount object" of the forces of both generals, as announced by M. Gambetta at the time, was the relief of Paris; and in order to effect this the two armies were each reinforced, reorganized, and thoroughly equipped, as far as was possible whilst under the surveillance of a vigilant enemy. In all, including the forces operating in the east and north, there could not at this time (about the end of December) have been less than 450,000 Frenchmen, with from 700 to 800 guns, under arms, exclusive of the garrison and army of Paris—a marvellous spectacle, considering the circumstances; but unfortunately, as Napoleon has observed, there is a wide difference between men and soldiers. The great bulk of these troops were unformed levies; and as most of what was best in the force originally under D'Aurelles had fallen in the terrible struggle of the previous two months, it may be affirmed that the real strength of the principal armies in the field, under Chanzy and Bourbaki, was not nearly equal, even if united, to that of the first army of the Loire. The organization of the new corps was pitiable, and there was such a lamentable want of officers, that their proportion to the men was wholly inadequate. Thus, while the victorious armies of Germany, as we have seen in the previous chapter, had been largely and formidably strengthened, there was nothing like a corresponding increase in the forces of France.

So far, however, as comparative numbers could constitute strength, the forces of Bourbaki and Chanzy were strong indeed, considerably outnumbering the united forces of Prince Frederick Charles and the duke of Mecklenburg, who were thus exposed to an overwhelming onset, had both branches of the Loire army resolved upon closing in upon them. Though Bourbaki had remained inactive for several weeks, he with such good effect held in check the German army occupying the line of the Loire, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, that, enterprising and adventurous as the prince was known to be, he seemed reluctant either to attack Bourbaki or to withdraw from his position in front of him. The prince's duty was to cover Paris on the southern side; and he co-operated with the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who, with his army at Chartres, was almost daily awaiting Chanzy's attack from Le Mans. If at this juncture any important event of the war could have been confidently anticipated, it was a combined movement by the two French generals against the prince and the grand-duke. The courage and firmness with which Chanzy held every position from Vendôme to Le Mans, although he fought single-handed and stood on the defensive, may be taken as an earnest of what he might have achieved had he been seconded by Bourbaki and acted on the offensive, as best suits French soldiers. That he had by far the best disciplined half of the Loire army may be inferred from the

fact that, while his troops performed prodigies of valour at Beaugency, and stubbornly contested every inch of their retreat, those under Bourbaki had fallen back along the Upper Loire without firing a shot. Bourbaki's soldiers, however, if properly provisioned, were by no means unfit to take the field; and, such as it was, his army was sufficient to paralyze all German movements. To withdraw it, therefore, from Bourges, till it was demonstrated either that Chanzy could raise the siege of Paris without Bourbaki's help, or that he could not raise it even with his help, would appear to be the height of folly.

Not so, however, thought Lieutenant-colonel de Bigot, a staff officer of the regular army, and attached to the seventh division at Besançon. It was natural that the mind of this intelligent officer should dwell especially on the best means of striking an effective blow in the part of his country in which he was, or had been, more immediately interested. He saw that Belfort was invested by some divisions of Werder's army, while Werder himself was operating generally in Franche Comté. His forces, however, were inconsiderable, numbering perhaps 40,000 or 50,000 in the field. They were, withal, occupied in reducing or holding the northern towns of the province, and in guarding the railway lines that from Dijon and Vesoul converged on Paris; they were already kept somewhat in check by Garibaldi and the French army of the east, and had even suffered some slight reverses. Bourbaki, however, and his numerous army were in force at Bourges and Nevers—that is, at no great distance to the west; and Colonel Bigot thought an opportunity was thus presented to strike a sudden and decisive blow which, if successful, would completely change the position of France in the east, and might lead to the relief of Paris. If Bourbaki, with 90,000 out of his 120,000 troops, were to unite with a part of the army of the east, he might, by a rapid attack, isolate and overwhelm Werder, and cause the siege of Belfort to be raised. This done, he could not only master the German communications by Dijon and Vesoul, but a few marches would place him upon the leading railway line which, from Strassburg to Paris, *viâ* the great depôts at Nancy, was the mainstay of the besieging army, and essential to its safe existence. A move of this kind, vigorously executed, might compel the invaders to relax their gripe on the invested capital; nor was it necessarily attended with peril to the operations of the French as a whole. True, the withdrawal of Bourbaki might subject Chanzy to the necessity of fighting single-handed with Prince Frederick Charles and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, who were now extended from Chartres to Orleans, with detachments pointing towards Le Mans; but having been largely reinforced, he could, it might be expected, hold his own; nor was it likely that a combined movement of this kind would be made against him. On the contrary, it was reasonable to suppose that, when informed of Bourbaki's march, Prince Frederick Charles would detach against him the whole or a large part of his troops, or would pause, hesitate, and delay at Orleans. In either case Chanzy would be safe, and might perhaps be able, by a bold advance, to defeat the enemies in his front in detail, and so open a way to Paris. Nor would the operations of Bourbaki be marred even were he followed by Prince Frederick Charles; for he would have greatly the start of him; and a French corps could be left in his rear to observe and retard the prince's movements.

Such was the scheme for the last effort of the provincial armies in behalf of Paris; and although it is unfair to judge of strategy by the event, yet looking at the relative condition and strength of the belligerents, the project from the first might have been pronounced desperate. No doubt the communications of the Germans formed their most vulnerable point, and a few facts will suffice to show their vital importance. Experience had shown that "requisitioning" was of but trifling use in providing for the wants of an army. Only upon the first occupation of a district did it supply any considerable amount of food. If the enemy remained for any length of time the provisions of the inhabitants were either exhausted or concealed, and were not to be had for love or money. Throughout the siege of Metz the troops engaged in that undertaking had to be fed by Germany; and although the army besieging Paris, and those in the several zones around, resorted at first to extensive requisitions, the supplies from this source ultimately proved so precarious as hardly to be worth the danger incurred by the detachments told off to gather them in. Throughout the war, therefore, Germany was the main base of supplies for her armies, whose enormous requirements may be conceived when we remember that, in the

course of twenty-four hours, each corps d'armée consumed 1800 loaves of 3 lbs. each; 120 cwts. of rice or pearl barley; either 70 oxen, 120 cwts. of bacon, or a proportionate amount of prepared sausage; 18 cwts. of salt; 30 cwts. of coffee; 12 cwts. of oats; 3 cwts. of hay; 35,000 quarts of spirits and 3500 ounces of orange essence, or some other bitter tincture, to mix with the spirits. To this gigantic repast must be added 60 cwts. of tobacco, 1,100,000 ordinary cigars, and 50,000 officers' cigars for each ten days. Multiply these figures by twenty-five, and we have the sum total of the consumption in one day, or as regards tobacco in ten days, of the German troops in France. The difficulties of bringing up such gigantic stores were often aggravated by the usual disasters incidental to warfare. Sometimes a large number of the oxen, having become infected with the cattle plague, had to be destroyed; and frequently stores would arrive in such a condition that they had to be thrown away and replaced by fresh cargoes. The wear and tear of the war in a rainy autumn and an unusually cold winter, moreover, required the continuous forwarding of an incalculably large stock of every article of clothing. Several times during the campaign each corps had distributed among them woollen shirts, flannel bandages, woollen comforters, woollen plaids, woollen stockings, boots, &c. The field-post, too, in an army where everybody could read and write, took up no inconsiderable amount of rolling stock. From the 16th of July to the 31st of December, 1870, no fewer than 67,600,000 letters and 1,536,000 newspapers—in other words, about 400,000 letters and 9090 papers per day—were despatched from and to the army. In the same period 41,000,000 thalers and 58,000 parcels of all sizes and weights were sent by the War Office to the German military authorities in France. The soldiers received from or sent to their friends and relatives at home 13,000,000 thalers and 1,219,533 parcels, or 22,173 of the latter per day. A large number of sick and wounded were constantly being conveyed back to Germany, besides prisoners, the number of whom was unprecedentedly large. Add to all this that, towards the close of 1870, from 180,000 to 200,000 new troops were brought up to the seat of war, and that the transport of guns, shell, and every variety of ammunition never ceased for one day until peace was declared, and we can then form some idea of the extreme importance of having secure command of the various roads and railways of German communications. Colonel de Bigot rightly judged, therefore, that if the transport of such vast and necessary supplies could be effectually stopped, German armies in France must soon cease to exist, and they would fall an easy prey to levies of men who, however raw, were well armed, and operating in their own country.

The scheme of isolating the Germans from their base of supplies, after defeating them in Franche Comté, would have been feasible, and even promising, had Bourbaki had a trained and well-organized army of 150,000 men, and could the forces of Chanzy have been counted on to cope successfully with Prince Frederick Charles and the grand-duke of Mecklenburg, on the supposition of their acting together. But even on these hypotheses it is doubtful whether it would not have been more prudent to attack the communications of the Germans at points considerably nearer Paris than a few marches to the west of Belfort; and in the actual state of the combatants the whole project was, we think, desperate. Bourbaki's army, even if reinforced to 150,000 men, was known to be raw and ill provided; its movements would have to be conducted in an exceedingly intricate and mountainous country, in the depths of a severe winter; it was, therefore, by no means certain that it would overpower Werder and raise the siege of Belfort, and far from probable that it could master, at least for a sufficiently long time, the great line of the German communications, already not without protection, and which reinforcements could easily reach. Success, therefore was far from assured, even where it appeared most promising; and even success, unless extraordinary, would leave the rest of the forces of France exposed to defeat and disaster. The march of Bourbaki from Bourges and Nevers would obviously set Prince Frederick Charles, in conjunction with the grand-duke, free to move against and attack Chanzy; and how could he, with an unorganized and inefficient army, contend against masses of veteran troops, who could, moreover, speedily receive additions? The notion that Prince Frederick Charles would follow Bourbaki, and leave Chanzy to deal separately with the grand-duke, was a mere assumption; and it was absurd to imagine that the prince, a really great commander, would halt, irresolute where to strike, and allow his enemies to elude him. Thus, while the operations of





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

IONERS HALL.

Engraved by Robert Walker

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Bourbaki were not very promising in themselves, and would expose Chanzy to defeat and ruin, their failure would not only mar the prospect of raising the siege of Paris, but bring down disaster on his own army.

Properly considered, the project, in truth, was simply a series of eccentric movements, to be executed by inadequate forces, against an enemy vastly superior and in a formidable central position; and those who admire it overlook the decisive fact of the immense disparity between the combatants. There seems very little doubt that at this conjuncture it had become impossible to relieve Paris; the German commanders had rectified the miscalculation they had made, and the barrier of the covering armies, which in consequence of the bombardment could now be reinforced from within, had become too formidable to be broken. Nevertheless, one chance there perhaps was; and had it been seized by the French generals, they would at least have averted a frightful catastrophe. Had Bourbaki vigorously attacked Prince Frederick Charles, instead of going off to the east, he would certainly have detained a very large part of the prince's forces. By that means, although the operation might not have succeeded, Chanzy might have defeated the grand-duke and any other divisions in his front, and at least have endeavoured to reach Paris. In any case the French armies would have had their lines of retreat open, and would have followed the rules of prudent strategy. The contrary course, however, was adopted. A scheme which *might* be attended with results so dazzling seized on the imagination of the ardent Gambetta; and in the last days of December Bourbaki, leaving one corps under Le Comte at Bourges, to observe the movements of Prince Frederick Charles, set off with three corps from his headquarters to effect a junction with the army of the east, a portion of which was to co-operate with him.

The result was what might have been expected by those familiar with the German strategy. Prince Frederick Charles no sooner saw that the enemy, who at Bourges and Nevers had compelled him to remain in force at Orleans, had gone away, than he instantly prepared to turn upon Chanzy, his nearest antagonist, and if possible to overwhelm him. For this purpose he directed a general movement of his whole troops, in concert with those of the grand-duke, against Le Mans; and as he had three well-recruited corps, with more than 300 guns, and the grand-duke had perhaps 60,000 men, with probably detachments from the besiegers' lines, it was certain that this splendid force would suffice to crush a French army composed chiefly of raw levies, and hardly, if at all, superior in numbers. By the first days of January the broad German line, extending from Chartres to Beaugency, was in full march on the positions of the enemy; and in the preceding chapter we have traced the disastrous fate of the best half of one of the largest and most patriotic French armies the campaign produced.

The command of the proposed expedition to the east was, in the first instance, offered by M. Gambetta to the staff officer who had devised it. The reason why he declined it, and the manner in which it was ultimately carried out, reveals with fearful significance the concurrence of causes which contributed to the misfortunes of France. Colonel de Bigot refused to accept the command, "because he would not serve under a revolutionary government!" and the choice of M. Gambetta then naturally enough, but unfortunately, fell on Bourbaki, who did not thoroughly apprehend the plan he was commissioned to execute. Rightly appreciating the necessity of rapid movements and good lines of retreat, Colonel Bigot had proposed that the French army should advance in four or five columns at least, and should especially hold in force the passages along the Swiss frontier. For this purpose he had insisted that the march to Belfort should be made by a number of converging routes, and that the roads by Montbéliard and Pontarlier should be occupied by several divisions. Instead of this, Bourbaki chose to move with the great mass of his men in a single column through the rugged defiles in the valley between the Ognon and the Doubs, throwing out only very feeble wings. The result was, of course, to retard his progress, and to confine him almost to one line of operations. His force consisted of four corps of three divisions each and a reserve division, and numbered altogether 133,000 men and 332 guns and mitrailleuses. The cavalry were hardly worth taking into account, being composed of the *débris* of all sorts of regiments, and, as a rule, badly mounted. The infantry, on the other hand, taken altogether, were good: the mobiles especially were strong and young; the regiments *de marche* were indifferent,

but they were blest with officers worthy to command, whereas eighty per cent. of the officers of mobiles were not fit to be corporals. Though the greater number were supposed to have had four months' training, they were incapable of carrying out the orders issued, and in many instances, under the fire of the enemy, had to be shown how to execute the simplest movements. In general, however, they were not wanting in courage. It is due to General Bourbaki to say, that the expedition was undertaken in spite of his protest that his troops were not equipped and supplied for an arduous campaign; though, had the original plan of different routes been adhered to, much of the misery that ensued would doubtless have been avoided. As it was, the march was heart-rending; the troops were half famished for want of food, without shoes, and starved by the cold; the few staff officers, knowing nothing, were continually giving wrong orders, and the artillery and trains were in hopeless confusion. One instance will suffice. On the very day of the first attack on Von Werder, when it might be supposed moments were of priceless importance, the division of General Cremer, while marching to take the Germans in rear at Frahier, were actually cut in two by the eighteenth corps of 30,000 men and seventy-two guns marching on Chagey. A delay of three hours took place before the two corps got disentangled, and the contemplated rear attack on the enemy never took place.

As already mentioned, General Werder retired from Dijon on December 27, to Vesoul, where he arrived on the 30th. Several strategic movements were made from the town, with the intention of deceiving the French, and gaining time for reinforcements to arrive. Twice the whole army left Vesoul, bag and baggage, but returned the same evening, after a promenade of four or five hours. This lured the French general to approach within a couple of leagues of Vesoul; but as it was a strong position, he retreated without hazarding an attack. Finding this, on the 9th of January General von Werder quitted Vesoul to take up a strong position before Belfort, at Brevilliers. On his way he met a part of Bourbaki's army at Villersexel, and a desperate struggle ensued for the place, from which an active general might easily have outflanked the Germans. Werder won the position, capturing some 1000 prisoners, but gave the enemy an apparent claim to victory by immediately evacuating it. The truth was that a part of his forces had fought the action to detain the French and give time to the main body to fall back to strong positions before Belfort, along the east side of the little river Lisane, a tributary of the Doubs, from Montbéliard by Hericourt to Chenebier. On the 12th January Werder reached his goal, his army was completely concentrated and strongly entrenched; and with reinforcements of heavy guns from the lines around Belfort, he confidently awaited the arrival of the French. Villersexel was only about twenty miles from the Prussian position at Hericourt, and it took Bourbaki five days—from the 9th to the 14th—to bring his troops up in front of that position, so as to be able to attack it next morning! To meet the 133,000 Frenchmen now before him General Werder had less than 40,000 men, of whom 4000 were cavalry, so that in round numbers the French were nearly four to one. The original plan of Colonel de Bigot embraced a simultaneous attack upon the front and rear of the Germans, which, with the immense preponderance of men, might easily have been effected. But the time lost by the French was an important gain to their enemy, whose dispositions now rendered such a movement extremely difficult, and the attack was mainly confined to the front at Hericourt.

At eight o'clock a.m. on the morning of Sunday, January 15, General Bourbaki commenced the attack with artillery, which kept up a continual fire until dusk. The small-arms, which did not come into play until a couple of hours later in the morning, never ceased throughout the day, and at about four o'clock the roar of all arms was fearful. The Germans kept steadily the position they had taken, and when night put an end to the conflict they bivouacked, along the whole line, on the same spot on which they were attacked in the morning. The frost was about twenty-five degrees below the freezing point, and no adequate idea can be formed of the horrible sufferings which resulted on this night from the defectiveness of the French arrangements. To General Cremer's corps was intrusted the operations against the extreme right of the Prussian position, near Chenebier, and of all Bourbaki's army no portion had made such energetic efforts in getting to the scene of action. It had been detained at Dijon till January 9 by a piteous call from Garibaldi, who mistook the appearance

of a few uhlans at Flavigny and Semur for an advance of the whole Prussian army on the capital of Côte d'Or. By forced marches the corps reached Lure on the 14th, cold and hungry, and wearied with a march of twenty-five miles in the snow. Wearied, as may be imagined when it is remembered that the French soldier carried sixty pounds; and cold, because shoe leather had failed, and in many instances the men were barefooted. Pushing rapidly on, the gallant corps reached Etoban at half-past three on the 15th, and did excellent service with their artillery on the Prussian position at Chenebier. Neither officers nor men had anything to eat from seven a.m. on the 14th till six p.m. on the 15th, although during that time they had marched over forty miles, and been for several hours under fire of the enemy. Night closed in, the hardest the French had yet known, and the Prussians were but 800 yards distant from the main body. The only thought, however, was how to fight against the cold, and contrary to all military rule fires were lit, round which there huddled, without distinction of rank, generals, officers, and men, ay, and even horses, to avoid being frozen to death. A strong cutting wind swept across the plâteau, carrying before it blinding clouds of snow, and drifting into small mounds that buried the men up to the knee. Sitting on their knapsacks they passed the night with their feet almost in the fires, in the hope of retaining the vital heat. Their craving for food was forgotten in the torpor that gradually stole over the camp, and the rest so anxiously looked forward to was found by many in that "sleep which knows no waking."

Next morning, the 16th, General Bourbaki renewed the attack, principally on the right wing, against which immense masses of troops were thrown in a vain endeavour to break the German line. Had that object been accomplished at this point, and the advantage actively pursued, the French would have obtained the considerable siege material before Belfort; the investment of that place would have been raised; fresh troops would have been thrown into the garrison, and a further supply of victuals into the town; the army of General von Werder, if not beaten, must have retired, and it would then have been possible at once to cross the Rhine and carry the war into German territory at Baden. On the second day, as on the first, however, along the whole line the inflexible German troops remained almost unshaken in their position: almost, for the divisions under General Cremer, by far the best of Bourbaki's force, succeeded in an attack on Chenebier, and a bold, well-supported flank movement at this crisis would have enabled the assailants to reach Belfort. As, however, on so many other occasions during the war, the French success was not followed up, and the Germans were allowed to take up a still stronger position at Frahier. In the attack the French sustained a very heavy loss, and that of the Germans was much greater than on the first day, when it was only from 200 to 300. On the second it was nearly 1200, principally at Chenebier and Champney. In killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, the French lost a far greater number; while the waste of ammunition may be conceived from the fact that on one acre of ground, where there was not a single man, about a thousand shells were thrown. The mitrailleuses made a fearful uproar, but either they were difficult to manage or were ill served, for they did comparatively little damage. When they did strike, however, the result was murderous; twenty-one men were killed and wounded by one volley. The fire of the Germans on this occasion was marked by a precision perhaps never before equalled. Near Bussurel an attack was made on a battalion of landwehr by 600 French, who were allowed to come within 150 paces, when the Germans fired and killed or wounded the whole 600, with the exception of forty-two, who, panic-stricken, were made prisoners. Again, the second day, the German army bivouacked on the ground they had taken up in the morning.

The third day, January 17, the attack was renewed, but faintly. Bourbaki's orders clearly showed that he had lost all confidence, not only in his men but in himself; and in the afternoon he directed a retreat along his whole line, having failed to attain even his first object, much more to reach the German communications. The luckless commander retreated by the narrow valley through which he had advanced, and it was not until the 22nd that his army, a beaten and disbanded mass, found a temporary shelter under the guns of Besançon.

In this three days' battle 133,000 Frenchmen fought against 35,000 to 40,000 Germans, and could not force their entrenched position. With such a numerical superiority, the boldest flank

movements were possible. Fifty thousand men resolutely thrown upon the rear of the Germans, while the rest occupied them in front, could scarcely have failed to force them from their position. But merely its entrenched front was attacked, with immense loss as the result. The flank attacks were carried out so weakly that a single brigade (Keller's) not only sufficed to counteract that on the German right, but to hold Frahier, and ultimately Chenebier, so as in turn to outflank the French. Bourbaki's young troops were thus put to the severest task which can be found for a soldier in battle; while their superior numbers would have rendered it easier to carry the position by manœuvring.

Though successful, the troops of Von Werder were sorely tried in the engagements; and not until the 20th, two days after Bourbaki's retreat, were they able to commence the pursuit. For three nights in severe frost, and a fourth under a complete thaw, the Germans had bivouacked on the field, and had made efforts which perhaps have never been surpassed, if equalled, in the long roll of battles. When it is considered that this defence was made between two hostile fortresses (Belfort on the north, not four miles distant, and Besançon, from two to three days' march to the south-west), against an enemy very nearly four times as numerous, who never once shook the German position, the brilliancy of such a defence and the heroism of the troops will remain one of the greatest achievements of the war.

On the 20th General Werder began his southward march, and found everywhere traces of au army not only demoralized but starving. The road as far as Rougemont was strewn with knapsacks, broken Chassepots and swords, cartouche pouches, caps, cooking utensils, and indescribable refuse. Dead horses abounded, from which the flesh had been hacked as they lay. By the 23rd 12,000 prisoners had been taken. The French army, in fact, was in a state of dissolution, when a new enemy descended on its path.

The French operations had been arranged with the greatest possible secrecy; but Von Moltke seems from the first to have divined Bourbaki's mission, and set himself to baffle, and, if fortune favoured, to defeat and crush him. The stage which the siege of Paris had reached enabled the great strategist to diminish the force of the investing army, and a whole corps (the second) was directed from the capital to watch from Troyes and Châtillon-sur-Seine the operations of Bourbaki's army. This corps, supported by some divisions from Metz and the German army of the north, was placed under the command of Manteuffel, with orders to push forward rapidly, as soon as Bourbaki had begun his march to Belfort, and fall on his flank and rear. Disregarding all obstacles, the Germans, not more than 50,000 strong, but well provided, in perfect order, and in the highest state of efficiency for war, were soon, therefore, closing in upon him. The four divisions comprising the expedition were concentrated about Châtillon on the 12th of January, when Manteuffel arrived from Versailles to take personal command. To move rapidly to Werder's aid it was necessary to cross the hills as directly as possible, and the chief routes were closed by the French holding Dijon and Langres. The march was, however, commenced without delay on the three cross-roads between those places which debouched at Selongey, Pranthoy, and Longueau, into the great valley which runs north and south between the Côte d'Or and the Vosges and Jura ranges. The second corps, being to the right or south on the march, detached Kettler's brigade on Dijon to keep Garibaldi occupied. The roads, naturally bad, were rendered almost impassable for artillery by the frost; but large working parties dragged the guns up the slippery inclines; and through the untiring exertions of men and officers the main body of the army was debouching from the hills by the 18th, undiscovered by the French on either side. On the 19th the advance reached the valley of the Saône. At this time it was intended to continue the movement eastward on Belfort; but news of Werder's successes before that place, and of the retreat of Bourbaki, now reached Manteuffel, who swung round to his right, and turned southwards to intercept the French.

For several days the detachment left at Dijon furnished ample employment for Garibaldi, who imagined himself and his troops to be hemmed in by a besieging host. To sustain this idea some attacks were made by his opponents, and as they were "victoriously repulsed," the old general published flaming proclamations, congratulating his men upon having "conquered the most experienced troops in the world." "In an obstinate two days' struggle," he added, "you have written a glorious page in the annals of the republic, and the oppressors of the great human family will once

Engraved by H Crickmore, from a Photograph.

more recognize in you the noble champions of right and justice." In a defence of his military conduct afterwards published in the Italian papers, it transpired that General Garibaldi was all this time utterly ignorant of the manœuvres of the Germans which were going on around him. The detachment from Manteuffel's force thus effectually hoodwinked him, while the main body of the army moved past his position to accumulate upon Bourbaki's rear. Manteuffel reached Dôle on the 24th, and here captured 230 railway waggons loaded with provisions, forage, and clothing—an irreparable disaster under the circumstances to the now hardly-pressed French. From Dôle the Germans crossed the Doubs, and rapidly marched to seize the defiles along the Swiss frontier, and thus hem in their intended victim.

Bourbaki reached Besançon on the 22nd, where with fatal irresolution he halted until the 26th, issuing orders, meanwhile, which can only be explained on the supposition of his utter bewilderment. The ex-commander of the imperial guard may have been a dashing officer at the head of a division; but the nerve required to brace oneself up to a bold resolution in a decisive moment is very different from that which enables one to command a division with *éclat* under fire; and like many men of undoubted personal bravery, Bourbaki seemed deficient in the moral courage so necessary to decision of character and promptitude in action. From the moment when he saw that he could not pierce Werder's lines, his mind ought to have been made up as to the course he should take. He must have known that Prussian reinforcements were approaching his line of retreat from the north-west; that his position, with a victorious enemy in his front and a long line of retreat, close to a neutral frontier, in his rear, was extremely dangerous; that in regard to its object this expedition had irretrievably failed; and that his most pressing, nay, his only duty, under the circumstances, was to save his army by retiring as hastily as he could. But the resolution to retire, involving as it did a practical confession that he had failed in his expedition, appears to have been too much for him. He dallied about as if loath to quit the scene of his last battles, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and thus gave Manteuffel the time to cut off his retreat. After four days of inactivity a reckless order for a retreat southwards towards Lons-le-Saulnier was given; but at that very time the Germans at Mouchard and Salins were nearer the Swiss frontier than the fugitives, and their retreat was virtually cut off. It was no longer a race; for the Germans could occupy leisurely the outlets of all the valleys by which escape was possible, while Von Werder pressed on the French rear. The unhappy Bourbaki, frenzied by finding his enemies thus closing in upon him, madly shot himself, and his ruined army rushed forth from Besançon almost literally without a commander. The horrors of that flight were like those of the retreat from Moscow; cold, hunger, and terror soon breaking up the mass into a horde of pitiful fugitives.

Such was the situation of military affairs in the east of France when Paris capitulated and M. Jules Favre negotiated the armistice. Count von Bismarck, desirous that Belfort should be in German hands when terms of peace were discussed, demanded that the fortress should be surrendered. As he must have expected, this demand was refused, and he therefore declared that the siege operations must go on. M. Jules Favre had been for months past shut up in the besieged capital, and if he knew aught of the operations in the east, it was only through the medium of a sanguine despatch from M. Gambetta, conveyed through the precarious pigeon post. Having, therefore, no definite idea of the real state of matters, he actually stipulated that if Werder were left at liberty to besiege Belfort, Bourbaki should be free to endeavour to raise the siege. The stipulation was acceded to, and the consequence of M. Favre's ignorance was that the army of the east, of which, since the incapacity of Bourbaki, General Clinchamp had taken the command, was given over to the last horrors of defeat. Driven like a flock of sheep into a mountainous country, where skilful leading alone could have saved even well-formed and well-disciplined troops; hemmed in upon the Swiss frontier without hope of escape; pressed closer and ever closer by a relentless enemy—the army lost provision waggons by the hundred, and the men walked they hardly knew whither, over icy roads or through the deep snow, day after day. General Clinchamp made a last effort to escape by the only route which he could now hope might be open; but in anticipation of this the narrow strip of country along the Neufchâtel frontier was already blocked by the columns of Manteuffel. A series of running fights ensued

near Pontarlier, which ended in the French being fairly driven over the frontier. A convention was signed between General Clinchamp and the Swiss General Herzog, who with a large force had been guarding the neutral line; and on the 1st of February the relics of what had once been an army of 133,000 men crossed that line and laid down their arms. The Germans had captured about 15,000 men, with 19 guns, before their escape to neutral territory could be effected; while 84,000 surrendered to the Swiss. Most of these unfortunate men—surely the most to be pitied of any of the victims of the war—arrived in Switzerland in a state which defies description. Their clothes were rent, and dropping off them in tatters; their feet and hands were frost-bitten. While the shrunk features and crouching gait told of gnawing hunger, the deep cough and hoarse voice bore witness to long nights spent on snow and frozen ground. Some had bits of wood under their bare feet to protect them from the stones; others wore wooden sabots; hundreds had merely thin cotton socks, and many none at all; others who appeared well shod would show a boot without sole or heel—the exposed part of the foot, once frozen, now presenting a wound crusted with dirt. For weeks none had washed or changed their clothes, or put off their boots. Their hands were blacker than any African's. Some had lost their toes; the limbs of others were so frozen that every movement was agony. The men stated that for three days they had neither food nor fodder served out to them, and that even prior to that period of absolute famine one loaf was often shared between eight of them. One corps, the twenty-fourth, escaped, and regained Lyons; but with this exception, such was the melancholy fate of the army led by the brave and brilliant Bourbaki. It was ill organized, ill formed, and execrably led; for the officers of the general's staff proved themselves ignorant of the very roads of their own country, and continually compromised the safety of the corps by their mistakes. Yet such as it was, its capabilities, or what were deemed such, caused for the first fortnight of the year much anxiety at Versailles; and the German emperor celebrated its defeat in the battles of January 15, 16, and 17, by the bestowal of preeminent honours and rewards upon General Werder, the commander. On the 18th of January the emperor sent the oak-leaf for the Order of Merit, which General Werder had already received. On the 20th he issued 150 Orders of the Iron Cross for distribution among the army, accompanied with the following telegram:—

"VERSAILLES, *January* 20.

"General von Werder,—Your heroic three days' victorious defence of your position, in the rear of a besieged fortress, is one of the greatest feats of arms in all history.

"I express my royal thanks, my deepest acknowledgments, and bestow upon you the Grand Cross of the Red Eagle, with the Sword, as a proof of this acknowledgment.

"Your grateful king,

"WILLIAM."

The catastrophe of Bourbaki's army was the Sedan of the war in its second phase. In a purely military point of view it was as heavy a blow as the fall of Paris, for it deprived France of the only force available to defend the east and centre. Though not necessarily the result of the false strategy we have described, it must, in a good measure, be ascribed to it; though doubtless the main causes were the disorganized state of Bourbaki's troops, his own incapacity, and the great ability with which Manteuffel's movements against him were directed. If Von Moltke had never done anything else, this single operation would mark him out as one of the master spirits of war; nor less admirable were the precision, the intelligence, and the promptitude with which the Germans went down on their foe. The march of Manteuffel has, perhaps, not a parallel in modern war, and formed a most striking proof of the perfection of the Prussian administration of supplies upon the march. In sixteen days his force, with all its trains of necessaries and other impediments, crossed two ranges of mountains over byroads; and, leaving enemies on each flank, and passing through the heart of one poor and hostile district, plunged directly into another equally poor and hostile, to intercept and finally destroy an army numerically twice as large. On the other hand, the uselessness of attempting great combinations with undisciplined troops and an inefficient commissariat, was shown at every stage of the miserable failure in which Bourbaki's career well-nigh ended.

As soon as possible after the news of Bourbaki's reverses reached him, Garibaldi withdrew, comparatively unmolested, into a department protected by the armistice, and Dijon was immediately

reoccupied by the Germans. The part which he played in the war, although doubtless well-meant, will always form one of the most singular and humiliating features of the struggle. To the dire necessities of the nation alone he owed his position in France. The fanciful garb and swaggering mien of the foreign adventurers who followed him, caused them to be sneered at as "Franconi's circus;" but in the anguish of her defeat France was loath to part with even the least chance of deliverance, and Ricciotti's success at Châtillon, and the capture of the one Prussian flag at Dijon on January 23, reconciled many Frenchmen to the presence of the Garibaldini. But unfortunately for himself, the general was loudly blowing his own trumpet at Dijon, and claiming a great victory, at the very time when he was duped by Manteuffel and prevented from rendering any aid to Bourbaki. Scarcely troubling himself to inquire how it was that, in the midst of his fancied triumph, he found himself in full retreat, Garibaldi heard of his return as a member of the National Assembly, and leaving his disorderly army to take care of itself, he made his way to Bordeaux. He had on his arrival his programme all ready; he would vote for a republic, and for a peace on the conditions of the *status quo ante bellum*, allowing the Germans only a pecuniary indemnity, *to be paid by the partisans of the empire and by the priests*. On the following day he resigned both his seat in the Chamber and his command in the army; and asserting that his duty was at an end and his mission concluded, he retired to Caprera.

Of all sieges during the war that of Belfort was the most prolonged, and the most trying equally to victors and vanquished. The fortress was invested on the 3rd of November, but not until the 3rd of December was a formal bombardment opened, which down to the 18th of February was kept up almost continuously night and day, For seventy-three days without interruption the civil population lived in the vaults and cellars of the town. At the moment of investment the population, usually 8000, numbered about 6000. There was a garrison of 16,000 troops, composed of gardes mobiles, with a fair proportion of line, artillery, and 457 officers. These at the close were reduced, by wounds, disease, and some slight desertions, to 13,500, and 400 of the population perished during the siege.

The besieging force seized early upon the position occupied by the Prussians in 1814—that is, the villages of Danjoutin and Bauvilliers—the south or Swiss side raking the town and forts in profile, and intercepting the approach of a relieving army from the east; but the heights to the right and left, those of the two Perches and of Bellevue, from which in 1814 the town was bombarded, were crowned with recently constructed forts, with which an incessant contest had to be maintained. The most noticeable incident of the siege occurred on the night of January 26, by which time the besiegers' parallels were within thirty yards of the two forts. Then the assault was delivered. Through the Bois des Perches, the trees of which had been cut to spikes, pressed the heavy German columns, to be received by a murderous fire. That night, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, they lost nearly 1000 men. The assault failed, but the next day the French vacated the two forts. The tidings of their abandonment were communicated by some deserters, and the besiegers lost no time in occupying them and placing guns in position. From this moment the fate of Belfort was decided. The fort of Bellevue opposite, at a lower altitude, was speedily silenced. The population were notified by M. Denfert Rocherau, the commandant, that beyond a certain point no fortress was defensible; and its condition having been communicated to the Paris government, their despatch authorizing surrender relieved the garrison from hopeless resistance, and the town from imminent destruction. Belfort passed through a somewhat similar ordeal in 1814, when it was bombarded by the Allies, and from the very heights which now were French forts; but the power of the artillery, though at a longer distance, was so much greater now than then that it did much more injury. Then, as on the present occasion, the town surrendered only in consequence of negotiations preliminary to peace. The troops were allowed to quit with the honours of war the place they had so well defended, and the garrison marched out with arms and baggage, taking with them also their papers and archives. The town was originally included in the territory demanded by the Prussians preliminary to peace; but Count von Bismarck ultimately offered to yield it on condition of the German occupation of Paris; and to save a position of such importance, M. Thiers consented to this last act of humiliation for the capital.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Feeling in Paris after the Sortie on November 30 and December 2—Communications between Count von Moltke and General Trochu as to the Fall of Orleans—Paris Determines to Resist to the Last—Disbandment of some of the Republican National Guards—Difficulties of the Government with the Democratic Clubs, which advocate most Extreme Measures—Irritation amongst the Germans at the Long Continuance of the Struggle, and Preparations for the Bombardment of the City—Presentation of an Address to the King of Prussia on the Unification of Germany, and His Majesty's Reply—Proclamation of General Trochu to the Army, and Reception of Encouraging News from M. Gambetta—Great Sortie at Three Different Points on December 21—Description of the Engagements and their Results—Severity of the Cold, and Sufferings of the French in Consequence—Christmas Inside and Outside the City—Commencement of Active Siege Operations, and Capture of Fort Avron by the Germans—The Last Days of 1870 in Paris—Want of Food and Fuel—Bombardment of the City—Renewed Determination to resist on the part of the Inhabitants—Results of the German Fire—Remonstrances of M. Jules Favre and the Diplomatic Agents against the Destruction of Hospitals, Churches, and Schools, and Count von Moltke's Reply—Installation of the King of Prussia as Emperor of Germany at Versailles—Description of the Ceremony, and Address of the King—Bloody Sortie on January 21—The Germans at first surprised, and Desperate Fighting on both Sides—The French unable to maintain their First Successes—Excited State of Public Feeling in the City during the Fight, and Despair when the Soldiers returned—Military Reflections on the Engagement.

ALTHOUGH the result of the great sortie on November 30 and December 2, described at the close of Chapter XXIV., failed to secure any advantage to the besieged, the Parisians were fain to believe that the retrograde movement of their troops on that occasion had only been undertaken with a view to future and more effective operations. In fact, the prevailing opinion was that the retreat was purely strategical, and that the army encamped in the Bois de Vincennes was yet destined to retrieve the fortunes of the capital. It was even currently reported in the city that the Prussians had evacuated Versailles, and crowds assembled in the public places, hoping to find the information officially confirmed. These illusions, however, were rapidly dispelled. The German successes at Orleans on December 4 were immediately communicated to General Trochu by General von Moltke; with an offer that, if he deemed it expedient to receive confirmation of the fact through one of his own officers, a safe conduct to come and return should be provided for him. This intelligence was, of course, forwarded in the hope that the government of Defence would see from it the desperate character of their position, and be induced to capitulate; and when the document was discussed at a council of ministers, the minister of Finance, M. Ernest Picard, seemed disposed to embrace the opportunity of considering whether a cessation of hostilities were possible. Whatever impression his counsels might have made upon his colleagues, was speedily nullified by the determined course of the governor of Paris, whose conduct on this occasion was certainly not that of a man who thought himself engaged in a hopeless cause. General Trochu contended that the overtures of the enemy went to prove their critical position in the heart of a hostile country in mid-winter; that the victory at Orleans might not be so conclusive as was represented; and that everything was to be gained by continuing the struggle until help came from the provinces, as Paris could still hold out, and victories might follow reverses. Accordingly, yielding to his eloquence and enthusiasm, the council decided unanimously on the continuance of the war, and the German *parlementaire* was despatched with a reply declining Count von Moltke's offer.

The Parisians were immediately informed of this interchange of correspondence by a note sent to the press, in which the members of the government again expressed their determination to prosecute the defence with vigour. "This news," said they, "which reaches us through the enemy, supposing it to be accurate, does not deprive us of our right to rely on the great movement of France rushing to our relief. It changes nothing either in our resolutions or our duties. A single word sums them up—to fight! Long live France! Long live the Republic!"

A profound impression was, however, produced in the city by the intelligence. The question as to the truth and importance of General von Moltke's communication was freely discussed, and led to the expression of very conflicting opinions; but at best the tidings were unwelcome, and confirmed the misgiving which now prevailed respecting the possibility of averting the fall of the capital.

On December 8 a decree was published disbanding the tirailleurs of Belleville, consisting

chiefly of red republicans. They had repeatedly demanded to be led against the enemy, but on the only occasion on which they were called to encounter the least danger they had behaved in the most cowardly and disgraceful manner; many of them afterwards deserted, and it was next to impossible to maintain even the appearance of discipline amongst the remainder, either officers or men. In fact, they were useless for service, and were, moreover, on such bad terms with the battalion of La Villette, that a barricade had been erected in the trenches to separate them, and prevent collision! A day or two later another order of the day was published, dissolving the battalion known as the volunteers of the 147th. It had received orders to proceed to Rosny, but mustered only 100 men, half of whom presented themselves without arms. The battalion refused to march, on the plea that their wives had not been paid the allowance which, by order of the government, they were to receive while their husbands were in the field.

While these extreme military measures were required to preserve discipline in the ranks of the disaffected national guards, the government experienced no small difficulty through democratic clubs inside the city. At most of these gatherings the authorities were loudly denounced as betrayers of the republic; and at one of them a motion was proposed, signed by M. Ledru-Rollin, calling on them to renounce the idea of capitulation, and to make a sortie *en masse*, so as to force the Prussian lines and deliver Paris with the least possible delay! It was urged, with somewhat more reason than was displayed in the discussion of other matters, that battle should be given to the enemy before famine had weakened the bodies and damped the courage of the people. Eight days—a space which was considerably reduced by the more enthusiastic—were allowed the government to raise the siege. If they failed to do anything within that period, they were threatened with another demonstration at the Hôtel de Ville and the proclamation of the Commune.

On the other hand, the prolongation of the struggle was causing irritation, not only in the besieging camp but throughout Germany, and in some quarters a change of tactics was warmly urged, to bring about the capitulation of the city. Preparations for bombardment were therefore carried on, but the plan of "waiting and watching" was still continued. The weak points of the German investment were also strengthened, although the general feeling was that the delay in striking a successful blow from inside the city had rendered General Trochu's operations comparatively hopeless. The promised relief had failed; the army by which it was to be achieved had been hurled back beyond the Loire; and although the besieged garrison might make a gallant effort, the Germans entertained little apprehension of their succeeding in breaking through the lines of investment.

On the afternoon of December 16 a deputation of thirty members from the North German Reichstag, headed by the president, Herr Simson, arrived at Versailles with an address from the legislature to King William, and to congratulate him on the decision of the South German princes to offer him the imperial crown of Germany. On the 18th the deputation was received at the headquarters in the préfecture of Versailles. Herr Simson read the address, setting forth that, by means of treaties with the South German states and by making two alterations in the constitution, titles were secured to the future (German) state and to its most exalted head, which had been revered for long centuries, and to the restoration of which the yearning of the German people had never ceased to be directed. The address then continued:—"Your Majesty receives the deputies of the Reichstag in a city in which more than one destructive armed incursion against our country has been considered and put into execution. Near it, under the pressure of foreign force, were concluded the treaties in immediate consequence of which the German empire collapsed. To-day, however, the nation may from this very spot console itself with the assurance that emperor and empire are again erected in the spirit of a new and living present, and that, with the further assistance and the blessing of God, it will secure in both the certainty of unity and might, of right and law, of freedom and peace." In his reply, after referring to the wonderful dispensations of Providence which had brought them together in that "old French royal residence," and to the support he had received from the German provinces, the king said:—"The victorious German armies, among which you have sought me, have found in the self-sacrificing spirit of the country, in the loyal sympathy and ministering care of the people at home, and in its unanimity with the army, that

encouragement which has supported them in the midst of battles and privations. The grant of the means for the continuation of the war which the governments of the North German Confederation have asked for in the session of the Diet that is just concluded, has given me a new proof that the nation is determined to exert all its energies to secure that the great and painful sacrifices, which touch my heart as they do yours, shall not have been made in vain, and not to lay aside its arms until German frontier shall have been secured against future attacks. The North German Diet, whose greetings and congratulations you bring me, has been called upon before its close to co-operate by its decision in the work of the unification of Germany. I feel grateful to it for the readiness with which it has almost unanimously pronounced its assent to the treaties which will give an organic expression to the unity of the nation. The Diet, like the allied governments, has assented to these treaties in the conviction that the common political life of the Germans will develop itself with the more beneficial results, inasmuch as the basis which has been obtained for it has been measured and offered by our South German allies of their own free choice, and in agreement with their own estimate of the national requirements."

In the evening the deputies dined with the king, and the following morning (Sunday) were taken to the front to obtain a glimpse of the beleaguered city. They then attended divine service at the chapel of Louis XIV. in the palace of Versailles, where King William was attended by a large number of illustrious personages.

Returning to Paris at this period, there were evident indications that another sortie was in active preparation. On the 17th of December General Trochu issued an address to the army, in which, after giving them credit for having made efforts on behalf of the country which had been of good service to their sacred cause, he proceeded:—"Our companions in arms of the army of the Loire—improvized by the patriotism of the departments, as the patriotism of Paris has improvized the army of Paris—set us an admirable example. They recruit themselves under fire, as we do, at the price of heroic sacrifices, in a combat which astonishes the enemy, who staggers under the magnitude of his losses and the indomitable energy of our defence. May these noble examples strengthen you; may the touching spectacle of the citizens of Paris become soldiers like yourselves, and fighting with you in the close bonds of duty and peril, raise you to the high level of all duties and dangers; and may your commander succeed in instilling into your souls the sentiments, the hopes, and the firm resolutions which animate him."

On the following morning the *Official Journal* contained a despatch from M. Gambetta, to the effect that the army of the Loire, far from being annihilated, "according to the lies of the Prussians," had been divided, and that now two armies, instead of one, were marching upon Paris from the south. A hopeful view was likewise taken of General Faidherbe's operations in the north. "The Prussian retreat," continued M. Gambetta, "is a movement concerning which there can be no mistake. If we can only hold out, and we can if we have only the will, we shall beat them. They have suffered enormous losses, and experience the greatest difficulty in obtaining supplies of food. But to triumph we must resign ourselves to supreme sacrifices without murmuring, and fight even unto death." Most of the Parisian journals received the announcement with exultation, and began to speculate upon the German retreat.

In preparing for the approaching sortie orders were given that the gates of the city should be closed; the marching companies of the national guard, provided with 120 rounds of ammunition per man, had their posts assigned them; battalions of sappers and miners were despatched to the front with materials for the construction of bridges; and trains of artillery waggons proceeded to the scene of the proposed operations.

The action commenced about eight o'clock on the morning of the 21st, and extended over an area reaching from Mont Valérien to Nogent-sur-Marne, or half round the city. On their right the French, commanded by Generals Malroy and Blaise, acting under the orders of General Vinoy, attacked the village of Neuilly-sur-Marne, the Villa Evrard, a lunatic asylum in advance of Neuilly, and the Maison Blanche, a farmhouse near the Strassburg railway. The attack was opened and maintained with great vigour, but the fighting was carried on almost exclusively by artillery. The French soon gained a decided advantage, the superiority of their new heavy guns being speedily established. The Prussian batteries at Noisy-le-Grand maintained a

stubborn ordnance duel with theirs on the plateau of Avron, and somewhat checked the advance for a time; but although in one redoubt alone they had placed a battery of twenty pieces of artillery, the guns of Avron, assisted by the Fort de Nogent, dismounted every one of them and destroyed the work. After this the French succeeded, in spite of a vigorous defence by the Prussians, in successively taking and occupying Neuilly-sur-Marne, La Maison Blanche, and Villa Evrard, which had been occupied as the headquarters of the Prince-royal of Saxony. Meanwhile Fort Nogent kept silent the Prussian batteries of Noisy-le-Grand and Villiers.

The centre of the movement, and that which sustained the heaviest of the fighting, was commanded by Admiral la Roncière, under General Ducrot, whose troops consisted of soldiers of the line, a brigade of sailors, and the mobiles of the Seine. Preliminary to the attack on Le Bourget, which was the centre of the action, the Forts Aubervilliers and L'Est directed a vigorous fire on the village, as did also a couple of batteries stationed at Courneuve. Pieces of flying artillery were likewise moved up, and on the Soissons Railway a novel mode of attack was made by a couple of cuirassed locomotives, which were used to considerable advantage. Steaming forward to the most favourable point with comparative impunity, these formidable batteries of cannon and mitrailleuses poured a destructive fire into the German positions. At eight o'clock there was a lull in the fire from the forts, and the infantry were thrown forward to the attack. An attempt to take the village by storm was made by a battalion of marines, commanded by M. Lamothe Heuet, and the 138th regiment of the line, supported by the tenth and twelfth battalions of the mobiles of the Seine. The marines, at the head of the column, went into action hatchets in hand, and rifles slung at their backs, and had a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the men of the Prussian royal guard at the entrance of the village. The marines, however, succeeded in getting into some houses, and took ninety-seven prisoners, who were immediately sent to the rear. The northern part of Le Bourget was held for three hours, but the fierce and stubborn resistance made by the Prussian guard caused it to be abandoned. The French had lost very heavily. Of 600 who went forward to the assault, 279 were wanting at its close. Of fourteen marine officers engaged, four were killed, and four others seriously wounded. The tenth mobiles had its lieutenant-colonel, the commandant, the captain-adjutant-major, a captain, and a lieutenant, put *hors de combat* almost at the first fire.

While this column was engaged on the left of the village, another attack was directed on it from the south by a second column, composed of the franc-tireurs of the press (300 strong), and the 134th regiment of the line, under the leadership of General la Voignet. The first and second companies of franc-tireurs extended in skirmishing order and advanced at the *pas gymnastique*, with the intention of entering the village by the left; the third company entered by the right; and the fourth advanced on the full front. The Prussians were admirably protected by barricades and breastworks; every house was a small fortress, and from every window, roof, and cellar a formidable fusillade kept the assailants at bay. The French, however, showed great coolness and courage; but the attack failed. At two o'clock the fire of the small arms ceased; the baffled columns retired, carrying some of their wounded with them; and the forts renewed their cannonade. Generals Trochu and Ducrot were on this part of the field, and ordered up three batteries of field-guns, which opened on the enemy's position. His guns at the Pont Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil were silenced, and a portion of Ducrot's army was enabled to advance on the farm of Groslay and Drancy, to the south of Bourget. A diversion was also made during the attack on this quarter, on the village of Epinay, by mobiles of the Seine and national guards of St. Denis.

On the west, and simultaneously with the attack upon Le Bourget, General Noel also made a demonstration against Montretout on the left, Busanval and Longboyau in the centre, and on the right against L'Ile du Chiard; the latter under the direction of the *chef de bataillon* Faure, commandant of the engineers at Mont Valérien, who was grievously wounded at the head of a company of the Paris freeshooters. The only purpose of this movement was to distract the attention of the besiegers.

During the general attack the weather was intensely cold, and although a large number of Frenchmen had been provided with pickaxes and spades to intrench the troops as soon as an advantage had been gained, the ground was frozen so hard that they could not carry out their purpose. To this excessive cold the French attributed their

want of success, and certainly it told very much against their movements.

At the close of the day the French right still held the positions they had gained, but the main body of the troops was withdrawn to the trenches, a sufficient force being left to hold Neuilly, Villa Evrard, and Maison Blanche. At Villa Evrard a somewhat remarkable incident occurred. When the action was over the French prepared to encamp, and lighted their bivouac fires. General Blaise and some officers of his staff were warming themselves round one of these, and discussing the incidents of the day, when suddenly a Prussian bugle was heard, followed in an instant by a discharge of musketry. General Blaise was killed on the spot, and several of his staff were severely wounded. The enemy who had done this turned out to be some Saxons who had remained in the cellars of Villa Evrard, and had crept out of their place of concealment when all was quiet. Few of them, however, escaped.

In this sortie it will be seen that the French had obtained considerable advantages, and occupied several positions which they had taken from the Prussians; but contrary to expectation the movement was not followed up, avowedly owing to the cold, which, as already stated, was exceptionally severe for the French climate. In one of the outposts on the night of the 23rd, 125 men were frost-bitten, and several instances occurred of others who were frozen to death.

This state of affairs continued until the morning of the 25th ushered in Christmas, which found the besieged capital undergoing fearful hardships, but still determined to hold out against the invader. Hardly a cannon shot, however, disturbed the hours of the Christmas festival, such as it was. Rations of beef, with a small portion of butter per head, were served out instead of horseflesh. On the German side it was made as comfortable as circumstances would permit, and although the fear of renewed sorties required the strictest watch to be kept, there were many very successful merrymakings and much joviality.

Almost immediately after Christmas active siege operations were commenced by the German commanders. The French position on the plateau of Avron was first selected as the object of attack. One of the results of the sortie of November 30 was the occupation by the French of a broad spur of land lying along the front of Fort Rosny, and reaching from Drancy to Neuilly-sur-Marne. On this ground, which included the plateau of Avron, the besieged had established batteries, amounting in the aggregate to 100 guns, some of which were powerful marine artillery, supported by a large infantry force. From this *point d'appui*, which bulged out into the lines of the besiegers, much trouble and annoyance had been caused to them.

On the 21st December, when the French advanced to the capture of Villa Evrard and Maison Blanche, they made this excellent position their starting point, and were materially supported by the fire of the guus from the redoubt. This finally determined the Germans to destroy it, although their engineers had been for some time previous selecting their points of attack, and working parties had been engaged during the nights in making preparations. The works were completed with great rapidity after the sortie, and on December 26 the Germans had established twelve batteries of heavy guns brought from Strassburg, Toul, La Ferté, and Soissons—three at Raincy, three at Gagny, three at Noisy-le-Grand, and three at the bridge of Gournay. Lieutenant-general von Kameke was appointed chief engineer, and Major-general Prince Hohenloe commanded the batteries, with Colonels Reeff and Bartsch as chief assistants.

The positions, which were admirably chosen, completely enfiladed the plateau of Avron, and also covered the Forts Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent. During the night of the 26th the German pioneers were busy cutting down the trees which had masked their works, and met with considerable attention from the French forts, which had awakened to the dangers of the situation. On the following morning the weather was intensely cold, and the snow was falling quickly, but the German guns opened a tremendous fire upon the plateau, which was continued with systematic steadiness throughout the day, and was only partially suspended when far into the night. Some of the shells from the batteries of Raincy actually fell within the district of Belleville. The besiegers made a vigorous reply, although their discharge was less regular and their aim less accurate. The troops, however, stood firm, and although some 3000 shells were thrown from the German batteries the entire casualties were less than sixty. On the morning of the 28th the cannonade recommenced, and continued during the day at the rate of about five to eight shots per minute.

General Trochu rode out early to the plateau, and visited the trenches, addressing some words of encouragement to the troops. During the afternoon the Prussians brought up some field batteries, and pelted most furiously at the French positions on the plateau, which was completely furrowed by the fire of eight converging batteries. During this fierce cannonade, the French troops sought concealment in the trenches, but the ground, hard as granite through the frost, opposed a resistance which caused almost every shell to burst. The French batteries, the parapets of which were almost as brittle as glass, were also struck full in front by shots from Chelles, right and left by the enfilading fire of Raincy and Gagny, and pounded at in the rear from Noisy. The powerful artillery of the French was unable to cope with the Krupp cannon; the plateau became untenable; and orders were consequently given to the troops occupying it to retire. The retreat commenced at six o'clock in the evening; but as there were about 100 guns, many of them of large calibre, to carry off along the slippery roads and in darkness—for the camp fires were extinguished, so that they might not attract the enemy's fire—it was three o'clock on the following morning before the mitrailleuses which had remained behind to protect the retreat were enabled to quit the plateau. The gardes mobiles, exposed in the trenches for six and thirty hours to the Prussian cannonade, lost about 300 in killed and wounded. One shell alone laid six low out of a party of nine gathered round the breakfast table of a commander of mobiles, who, together with his wife, was wounded, while only a single one of his guests escaped scathless.

The Germans, however, were surprised at their own success, and not until the afternoon of the 29th did their patrols, who groped their way up the sides of the plateau, discover that the position had been evacuated. The same evening the villages of Bondy and Villemonble were found deserted, and at midnight the German advance came upon the late French positions on the crest of Avron, amidst an awful scene of devastation.

The military bulletin announcing the abandonment of the plateau had a most depressing effect upon the Parisians, whom no consoling news now reached from outside, and who were without fuel and almost without food. The document intimated that the conditions of the defence would have to be changed, although its means and its energy would not be affected by the bombardment. During the whole of the 29th the Germans continued to bombard Forts Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent. In the course of five hours 155 shells fell on the barracks in Fort Rosny; casemates believed to be impenetrable to every kind of missile were rent and torn away; and from eight o'clock in the morning till six in the evening nearly 2000 shells fell within the enceinte and on the scarp and counterscarp of Fort Rosny alone; yet very few of the naval gunners were injured, and "the men stood to their pieces firm, resolute, vigilant, and undauntable." In the adjacent village only a few houses were damaged, and yet the road between Rosny and Avron was so ploughed up by the number of projectiles which had struck it, as to be impassable. The military report stated that altogether between 5000 and 6000 shells were thrown against the three forts in the course of the 29th. The closing days of the year 1870 proved a trying time indeed to the beleaguered city. While the German guns were pounding away at the eastern forts, the inhabitants were suffering not only from the want of food but also from the bitter cold. The price of fuel in consequence rose immensely, and the government had been unable to obtain a supply for the wants of the people. They therefore resolved to cut down the woods of Vincennes and Boulogne, and the trees on the boulevards; but the necessary preparations consumed time, in which the poorer classes were perishing. An indiscriminate onslaught was consequently made upon trees, palings, and trellis-work, without distinction of public or private property. These proceedings led the authorities to speedily accumulate a sufficient supply.

Thus closed the year 1870 in and around the capital of France. Provisions were getting dearer and dearer. The death rate had doubled. The "Red" party were showing signs of uneasiness. The popular voice bespoke impatience with the feebleness of the government operations; and the Prussians were thundering at their very doors. But no one dared to whisper the word "surrender!"

The new year was ushered in by the booming of the guns from the Paris forts, while the German sentinels stood to their posts in the biting cold which prevailed. The besiegers, strengthened by their easy success at Mont Avron, had the fullest confidence in their ultimate triumph;

and the besieged, amidst hardship, disease, and death, appeared equally determined to prolong the struggle. The gloom of the city, as on the emperor's fête day, when the army of the Rhine was grappling with the invader, was increased by its contrast with the usual festivities of the season, and by a growing apprehension that the energies of the provisional government were not equal to the duties which the emergency imposed on them.

The morning of the 5th of January commenced a fresh era in the history of the siege, for on that day the bombardment of the city itself really commenced. The months spent in watching an enemy who contented himself with remaining passive, not even answering the fire of the forts, combined with the growing scarcity of food, had told heavily on the Parisians, whose martial ardour was fading fast under the ever-present shadow of the Germans. The bombardment came like a ray of light to restore energy and give the required excitement.

The Germans directed their shells on the city from the south, and continued their fire from day to day with great severity. Their projectiles fell in the quarters of Grenelle, Vaugirard, and Montrouge, reaching even to the gardens of the Luxembourg, killing and wounding men, women, and children, and striking alike public buildings, private dwellings, and military hospitals. Some 40,000 deadly missiles were hurled upon the forts alone before the general bombardment commenced; but after the 5th of January 10,000 shells on the average were daily fired from the German batteries, of which 500 fell within the city proper. The French, however, replied with considerable effect, and caused much damage to the enemy's batteries; many of their naval guns being superior in weight to any that the Germans could bring against them.

The bombardment has been described as "the one mistake made by the Germans during the war," and very probably it prolonged the defence of the city. That it was commenced without the previous warning usually given by civilized nations where the fate of non-combatants is at stake, excited the just indignation of the French government, as well as of the various diplomatic agents within the city; and this bitter feeling was intensified by the presumed peculiar direction given to the Prussian fire. In one night five shells struck the Hospital of the Infant Jesus, where 600 sick children were domiciled. On the night of the 8th, a poor woman was slain in the Hospital de la Pitie; men were killed and wounded in the Military Hospital of Val de Grace; and five little children asleep in their beds at the school of St. Nicholas fell victims to a shell, which also wounded many others. Nor was any respect shown by the besiegers to associations connected with scientific research. The garden of Medical Botany, founded in 1626 by Louis XIII., and associated with the greatest names among the *savants* of the nation, was vigorously assailed, and a greenhouse filled with rare tropical plants was totally destroyed. These occurrences roused the faltering spirits of the people; and the government issued an indignant protest, in which they deprecated the fact that "Prussian shells had been wantonly launched against hospitals, ambulances, churches, schools, and prisons, and that the exigencies of war could never be an excuse for the shelling of private buildings, the massacre of peaceful citizens, and the destruction of hospitals and asylums. The government of National Defence, therefore," continued the document, "protest loudly, in the face of the whole world, against this useless act of barbarism." Notwithstanding protests of this nature, however, the bombardment continued with great violence, and spread death and dismay throughout the more exposed quarters of Paris. Count von Moltke, in reply to the French complaints, said that the striking of hospitals and ambulances was purely accidental, owing chiefly to the long range and the fog. "When the batteries are approached nearer the city," said the general, "the gunners will be able to take better aim."

During this time also, much internal uneasiness prevailed in the capital. Rumours of treachery and espionage were rife, and suspicion was openly expressed against the households of those high in position. The members of the government of Defence had hitherto worked harmoniously; and although the confidence of the populace in General Trochu had at times wavered, it was not till late in the history of the siege that there appeared reason to believe the other members of the cabinet doubted his ability to offer effective resistance to the German army.

Beyond the bombardment, almost the only movement among the opposing armies consisted

in casual engagements between outposts and patrols. In some of these skirmishes, which were secretly planned, the French obtained slight advantages, taking and killing some of the enemy. The range of the French operations embraced demonstrations against the bloody ground around Le Bourget and Mont Avron; and the Saxons put out a feeler to test the capacities of Fort Noisy, but only to discover the impossibility of a successful assault. Thus while cold, hunger, and death prevailed in the French capital, the besiegers also were subjected to a heavy penalty, and had to encounter much hardship and danger as they closed their grip upon the city.

But there is perhaps nothing more remarkable in the history of the war than the scene which was witnessed in the palace of Versailles on the 18th of January. After having long lain in abeyance, the title of Emperor of Germany was to be restored to the Prussian king in the midst of an enemy's country! Could any event more forcibly illustrate the astounding victories of the German arms and the humiliation of their opponents? The previous day witnessed a great "gathering of the clans," and the ceremony of formally proclaiming William Emperor was made the occasion of a grand military display. The Galerie des Glaces had been prepared, delegates from all the regiments of the third army with their colours had been summoned, the Bavarian regiments also sending their colours. The flags were arranged in a semicircle in the order in which their regiments lay before Paris, the place of honour being given to those of the landwehr guard, which, placed in the centre on a raised platform, were protected by the gardes du corps. An altar had been erected on the side of the gallery facing the park, and here stood the army chaplains, conspicuous among whom was the king's favourite preacher, Chaplain Rügger. On the right of the altar were ranged the military choristers and musicians, to the left the delegates from the various regiments, decorated with the Iron Cross. At twelve o'clock the king arrived, followed by a host of grand-dukes, princes, counts, and generals. After prayers and a consecration sermon by Rügger, the king from the steps of the altar made a short speech, and commanded the chancellor to read aloud his address to the German people, as follows:—

We, William, by God's grace king of Prussia, hereby announce that, the German princes and free towns having addressed to us a unanimous call to renew and undertake with the re-establishment of the German empire the dignity of emperor, which now for sixty years has been in abeyance, and the requisite provisions having been inserted in the constitution of the German Confederation, we regard it as a duty we owe to the entire Fatherland to comply with this call of the united German princes and free towns, and to accept the dignity of emperor. Accordingly, we and our successors to the crown of Prussia henceforth shall use the imperial title in all our relations and affairs of the German empire, and we hope to God that it may be vouchsafed to the German nation to lead the Fatherland on to a blessed future under the auspices of its ancient splendour. We undertake the imperial dignity, conscious of the duty to protect with German loyalty the rights of the empire and its members, to preserve peace, to maintain the independence of Germany, and to strengthen the power of the people. We accept it in the hope that it will be granted to the German people to enjoy in lasting peace the reward of its arduous and heroic struggles, within boundaries which will give to the Fatherland that security against renewed French attacks which it has lacked for centuries. May God grant to us and our successors to the imperial crown that we may be the defenders of the German empire at all times, not in martial conquests, but in works of peace, in the sphere of national prosperity, freedom, and civilisation."

Count von Bismarck read the proclamation, and the grand-duke of Baden advancing, cried, "Es lebe Seine Majestat der Deutsche Kaiser Wilhelm, hoch!" The assembly cheered, and the German princes did homage to their new suzerain. In the evening a dinner was given to the emperor, to which all the German princes were invited, and at which Mr. Odo Russell represented England.

On the same day, at home in Prussia, Count Itzenplitz had read the proclamation of the king relative to the imperial dignity in both houses of the Prussian Diet, when a call for cheers for Germany's emperor, King William, was responded to amidst great enthusiasm.

While these important historical events were taking place at the German headquarters, the interior of Paris was busied with preparations for a great military movement—the last and most bloody

which took place under the walls of the capital. It was felt that the time for the final great effort had arrived. All promises of help from the provinces had collapsed, and there was nothing for it but that General Trochu should silence his detractors, and play his last card by making a great sortie on the besiegers' lines. All through the day troops marched merrily along towards the western gates of the city, singing the "Marseillaise" and the "Chant du Départ." The populace assembled in the principal thoroughfares to see them pass, and great anxiety was shown by many of their relatives. The troops consisted of regulars, mobile guards, and mobilized national guards; and on the night of the 18th they encamped without the walls, behind Mont Valérien and in the Bois de Boulogne, so that they were ready for action early on the following morning. The plan of the sortie had been carefully prepared by a council of war under the presidency of the governor of Paris, the base of operations being Mont Valérien. The army of operation was composed of 100,000 men, formed in three main columns, and supported by 300 guns. The movement was directed by General Trochu in person, who had left General le Flô in Paris as governor *ad interim*.

The column of the left, under the command of General Vinoy, was ordered to carry the redoubt at Montretout and the villas of Bearn, Pozzo di Borgo, Armagand, and Ermenonneuve; the centre, under General Bellemare, was to proceed to the east of the Bergerie. The column of the right, commanded by General Ducrot, was to operate against the west of the park of Busanval.

The line of front from Montretout to Ruel extended, as will be seen by reference to the map, about three English miles across. The task of bringing together and handling a force so large, and most of them novices, in such a narrow compass, was difficult and delicate; and their concentration was not effected without immense trouble. The night was dark, and the morning of the 19th enveloped in a curtain of thick fog.

The preparations, however, had been carried out with great secrecy, and in the earlier period of the action the Germans were taken completely by surprise. But the positions attacked had been selected by the besiegers from the natural difficulties which they presented to the enemy, and every accident of the ground had been turned to profitable account. There were a series of intrenchments and crenelated walls and barricades, in addition to a most formidable abattis created by the felling of the woods. The trees had been all made to fall with their branches towards Paris, and the base of each trunk served as a cover for a marksman to fire over as his opponent was struggling to get at him.

Daybreak found each division of the French troops under arms, but considerable delay occurred through difficulties encountered by the right, under General Ducrot. About ten a.m. General Vinoy advanced against Montretout, defended by a single company, before any general alarm had been raised in the German camp. This division pushed on from behind Mont Valérien by the road parallel to the Seine, hidden for a space by the hillock of La Fouilleuse. The column of assault consisted of the zouaves, the 106th of the line, and several battalions of the national guard. The French rapidly swept into the village, and thence enveloping the earthwork rushed upon the little garrison. The Germans fought stubbornly, and a bloody hand-to-hand struggle ensued; but they were speedily overpowered by numbers. Those who were not killed were taken prisoners. Following up their success, Vinoy's army descended upon the village of St. Cloud, which they quickly took, together with many prisoners. The Germans then began to fall back upon the woods, followed by a host of skirmishers, who kept up a brisk fire, which made much noise but did little damage, as the Prussians took advantage of every object that offered cover.

Meantime General Bellemare, who commanded the French centre, attacked the château of Busanval and the height of La Bergerie. These positions were held by a force far superior to that with which the French left had to contend. The first obstacle met with was the farm of La Fouilleuse, whence a withering fire of small-arms was poured in upon the French advance. Twice were they driven back, but still persisting and trusting to a rapid advance, they, at a third effort, carried the farm with a rush and cheer. Still pressing onwards with undaunted courage, another spirited charge rendered them masters of that portion of the German position which lies between La Fouilleuse and St. Cloud. Having thus effected a junction with the right of Vinoy's corps, and the right of Bellemare's corps having captured the château of Busanval and the heights of La Bergerie, they were insensibly broken up into detached masses, and the fight subsided into a number of isolated

combats, in which the French wasted much ammunition, and in return were shot down by the Germans, who fired steadily and securely from the cover of trenches and stone walls. The heavy force thrown into the park of Busanval was permitted by the Prussians to approach within less than 200 yards of a loopholed wall which they held at the top of a slope, when presently a terrible discharge of musketry from their infantry within an incredibly short space of time covered the ground with dead and wounded Frenchmen. As the French troops were struggling in the forest, General Vinoy had massed some regiments of mobilized national guards to act as reserves, and to support the attacking forces. The only Prussian shells thrown at this point during the day fell among these guards; and although some of them had fought splendidly in the earlier part of the engagement, these terrible missiles so scared them that they broke and ran amidst the wildest confusion. In the garrison at La Bergerie were two companies of the garde landwehr, who, when the French advanced, lined the park walls of that place, and held the whole column in check by a murderous fire, which piled the front with dead. Again and again the French tried to carry the position, but failed. The Prussians fought till mid-day, when a detachment of the fifth corps came to their help, at the sight of whom the men who were left gave a tremendous cheer; but at eleven o'clock the French, coming on in force against Garches, once more occupied the heights and carried the village.

The weak point of the attack, however, was the French right under General Ducrot. This division had received orders to march from St. Denis, a distance of ten miles, during the night. The route lay along a defective line of rail, and on a road encumbered by a column of artillery which had lost its way in the dark. The district, besides, was swept by a Prussian battery at the Carriéres de St. Denis, which took the advancing troops in flank. From these causes the march of the French was greatly delayed, and their passage secured only by a cuirassed locomotive mounting a couple of guns, which General Trochu sent along the St. Germains Railway to their assistance. Eventually the troops under General Ducrot formed into line of battle; but at the very outset his right, established at Rueil, was fiercely cannonaded by formidable German batteries from the other side of the Seine. His late arrival proved disastrous. The Germans had taken the alarm; and although the right rushed bravely on and stormed and took Busanval, when they reached La Jonchere and the Porte de Longboyau they encountered, equally with the left and centre, a deadly fire from behind loopholed walls and crenellated houses, so that here too the bodies of the slain were literally piled in heaps. Again and again General Ducrot led his troops to the attack, and at a fearful cost succeeded in taking La Jonchere; but their utmost efforts failed to obtain the desired object of forcing a way to Celle St. Cloud and joining hands with General Bellemare to the south of La Bergerie.

The tactics of the besiegers on the 19th January were identical with those previously pursued; and although, as has been stated, the Germans were taken by surprise, the probability of attack had been foreseen. A rumour to that effect, indeed, had nearly a fortnight before reached General von Blumenthal, who then made dispositions which were nearly identical with those of the 19th. When the sortie was developed General Kirchbach sent word to the emperor "not to be uneasy; he could promise his Majesty the enemy should never pass his lines." He kept his word; but it proved a hard task. A hotter fire was never perhaps maintained than during part of the day.

The rush of the French at first carried the foremost positions of the Germans; but the supports were coming quickly from every quarter, and the artillery poured in a fire of great precision, which caused much havoc. The seventh grenadiers and the forty-seventh battalion marched to Vaucresson, formed for attack, and at twelve o'clock came down on Garches with great impetuosity, driving out the French, who still, however, hung about the position till two o'clock. The fusilier battalion of the seventh being ordered to attack and take the place, made a grand advance, sustained by the jägers and the rest of the fifty-ninth. Reserving their fire till they were within 200 feet of the French, they then literally destroyed them.

When the full force of the Prussian attack was brought to bear, the effect was deadly. The Germans made a fierce onslaught on the centre and left of the French position, which caused them to fall back; but a little later they moved forward again, and the summit of the plâteau was once more recaptured. As night set in, however, it was impossible

to bring up artillery to secure the position; and the French troops, fatigued by twelve hours' fighting, and by the marching on the preceding nights, were ordered to retreat. Montretout, however, the first position captured in the morning, was the last to be retaken by the Germans, who at half-past ten p.m. drove out the enemy by a splendid dash; but a French regiment of mobiles, notwithstanding, actually held out in St. Cloud until the following day. Even then they persistently refused to surrender; but at length such a force of artillery was brought to bear on the village from the heights above, that further resistance was seen to be useless. Of this regiment only 300 remained to lay down their arms. The Germans, profiting by this incident, at once completed the destruction of the village of St. Cloud, so that it could offer no further shelter to the troops of the besieged.

During the progress of the sortie great anxiety was felt in the French capital. Every available point of observation was eagerly seized, and the people waited in hope of favourable news. About six o'clock in the evening a cheering bulletin was issued by General Trochu. But the arrival of ambulances filled with wounded men told of terrible slaughter at the front; and the truth became partially known at half-past nine, when another bulletin from General Trochu was issued, stating that the enterprise so happily commenced had not resulted so favourably as might have been hoped, as the enemy, who had been surprised in the morning, brought up towards the latter part of the day immense masses of artillery, with infantry of reserve.

On the morning of the 20th the presentiment of coming evil was fully verified. The army had retired within the line of forts, every house in Neuilly and Courbevoie was full of troops, and regiments were camping out in the fields, where they had passed the night without tents. Many of the men were so tired that they threw themselves down with their muskets at their sides, and fell asleep in the mud, which was almost knee-deep. Bitter were the complaints of the commissariat. Bread and *eau de vie* were at a high premium. During the fight many of the men had thrown away their knapsacks, with their loaves strapped to them, which now became the property of the Prussians. Some of the regiments, chiefly those which had not been in the action, kept well together; but a vast number of stragglers were wandering about looking for their battalions and their companies. About twelve o'clock it became known that the troops were to re-enter Paris, and that the battle was not to be renewed. About one the march through the gate of Neuilly commenced. Most of the onlookers appeared to be in blank despair, so fully had they been impressed with the conviction that the great sortie must end in a decisive victory. Their loss was estimated at between 6000 and 7000 in killed and wounded. General Trochu requested of the German commanders an armistice of a couple of days, in which to collect the wounded and bury the dead. The request was refused; but an interval of a couple of hours was granted, during which the artillery ceased, and the work of mercy was heartily engaged in, while a large portion of the dead which had been left within the Prussian lines were buried by the German *krankentragers*.

On reviewing the results of the sortie, it would seem that the concentration of a large army between the forts and the *enceinte* of Paris demanded too much time; that the French troops were not sufficiently organized for extensive manœuvres; and that the object of the action was not sufficiently important to warrant the sacrifices made. The details of the affair and of the minor sallies that preceded it show beyond doubt, that Trochu's troops had attained just so much discipline as enabled him to bring them out from cover under fire, but that neither he nor his lieutenants could get them to advance when the fire was fairly opened on them. The strength of the German intrenchments and the excellence of the German batteries was indeed great; but no one can suppose that, had the besiegers and besieged been compelled to change places for forty-eight hours, the former, with their accumulated moral fighting power to back them, would not have found a way through the miles of circuit round their army. Nor can it fail to be observed that on this occasion the energy shown for a brief space, in the attempts of General Ducrot to seize the loops of the Marne seven weeks before, was almost wholly absent. The causes of this depression were the ruin of the French. General Trochu, though obeyed, did not lead to victory; and as he thus failed to inspire his troops with confidence in his generalship, Paris was doomed to the heavy fate before her.

CHAPTER XXX.

Irritation against General Trochu—He is compelled to retire and is succeeded by General Vinoy—Bad News from the Provinces—The Government compelled to ration Bread—Revolutionary Rising on January 21—Liberation of Gustave Flourens from Prison—An Attack on the Hotel de Ville completely frustrated, and several Insurgents killed and wounded in the Streets—Opening of new Siege Batteries and Continuation of the Bombardment—Error as to the Amount of Food in the City—Interview between M. Jules Favre and Count von Bismarck—Feeling in the City—The Capitulation and its Terms—Occupation of the Forts by the Germans—The Return of the French Soldiers and Sailors into the City—Revictualling of Paris—Munificence of England—The Effect of the Capitulation at Bordeaux—Magnificent Proclamation of M. Gambetta—He forbids the Election of Adherents of the Empire—Despatch from Count von Bismarck on the Matter, and Reply of M. Gambetta—Action of the Paris Government and Resignation of M. Gambetta—Election of the National Assembly and its Meeting at Bordeaux—Resignation of their Powers by the Government of National Defence—M. Thiers chosen as Chief of the Executive Power—Declaration from the Departments to be annexed to Germany declaring their Unalterable Attachment to France—Action of the Assembly thereupon—Negotiations for Peace at Versailles—The Great Struggle with regard to the Cession of Metz—Peace at Last—Important Telegram to the Emperor of Russia announcing the Fact—The German Plan of Operations in case Peace had not been concluded—Scenes in the National Assembly when the Terms were discussed—Large Majority in Favour of their Adoption—Action of England with regard to the Reduction of the Indemnity—Letter from the King of Italy against the Hard Terms imposed on the French—Occupation of Paris by the Germans—Last Telegram from the Emperor King—Reception of the News of the Conclusion of Peace at Berlin.

The failure of the sortie of the 19th January produced a greater effect on Paris than any other incident had caused since the beginning of the siege, and excited violent public irritation against General Trochu. Several members of the government resolved on appointing another military commander, and the mayors of Paris also called on him to give in his resignation. His position had, in fact, become untenable; but, according to his own statement in his "Defence Speech" before the National Assembly at Versailles, he determined not to resign, believing that to do so would be an act of cowardice; and not until he was actually compelled to do so by the government did he retire. He, however, retained his post as president. His successor as commander-in-chief was the old comrade of Lord Clyde, General Vinoy, who had specially distinguished himself in the Crimean War. He was very popular in the city for having saved his division from the catastrophe of Sedan, and brought it back to Paris.

But Paris had by this time two other great causes of alarm. The utter defeat of Chanzy had become known, and although fabulous reports of the success of Bourbaki were current, he was a very long way off; and then bread was getting short. Some time previously the government promised that it should not be rationed; but it had been rationed, and the ration consisted of a piece the size of a penny roll, made of rye, bran, hay, and a very little wheat. Even this miserable pittance was not always to be had, so that many who went for rations had to return without any. The thoughts of the Parisian populace, however, pointed not to capitulation, but to revolution. The wild spirits of Belleville thought the sure way to save the capital was to turn out the government, instal the Commune, and place all the forces under some unknown young officer, whose military aptitude might be doubtful, but who could be trusted to show himself the reddest of red republicans. Accordingly on Saturday, January 21, a number of these agitators combining went to the prison of Mazas, where M. Gustave Flourens, a leader of the ultra-democratic faction, had been confined since the former attempt, early in November, to upset the government at the Hotel de Ville. Five or six hundred men, armed with Chassepots, among whom were many of the mutinous battalion of national guards that M. Flourens had commanded, arrived at the prison about midnight, and, through the vacillation of the superintendent, they were enabled to rush in and liberate M. Flourens and five of his political friends, whom they at once conducted in triumph, with drums beating, to Belleville. Next day a party of 200 or 300 insurgents, mostly wearing the uniform of the national guard, proceeded to the Hotel de Ville, shouting "Vive la Commune!" and in the true spirit of cowards shot at two officers who came out to speak to them. Upon this the gardes mobiles in the building fired steadily and deliberately from the windows at the most active and forward of the assailants, who,

returning the fire as they fled, made off, some taking refuge behind the lamp-posts, some crouching or lying down behind the heaps of earth in the Place de l'Hotel de Ville, others entering the nearest houses and continuing to fire out of the windows, or from their roofs and balconies. The conflict lasted half an hour, when the insurgents, who had collected in the Avenue Victoria, hoisted a white handkerchief in token of submission. About thirty of them were overtaken and arrested. Nearly a hundred persons lay prostrate on the ground; but when the firing ceased, many of them who had escaped scatheless at once got up and sneaked away. A dozen were severely wounded, and five or six killed. On the following day the clubs were extinguished in which certain ranters had nightly spouted sedition; and the *Combat* and the *Reveil*, the two newspapers which—the one in the morning, the other in the evening—had daily stirred up the people to rebellion, were suppressed.

While these lamentable occurrences were taking place inside the city, and Frenchmen were shedding the blood of their brethren, the bombardment was vigorously pressed by the Germans outside. The siege batteries on the north, in the construction of which little opposition had been encountered, and which were armed with the heavy artillery which had reduced Mézières, opened fire on Saturday the 21st, after a summons to St. Denis to surrender had been refused. They continued to ply as vigorously as their companions on the east, during the few remaining days of the siege. The forts of La Briche, La Double Couronne, and De l'Est were, however, very strong, and responded vigorously to the German attack. The bombardment of the capital during the last week of the siege presented, however, few points of interest. The shells which fell within the *enceinte* caused little loss of life, and still less alarm. The citizens made up parties to watch their descent on Auteuil and Vaugirard, and the gamins applauded when an "obus" ever and anon splashed in the ice of the still half-frozen Seine.

General Vinoy's appointment as commander-in-chief had been hailed as giving promise of renewed efforts; but on Tuesday, January 24, it began to be whispered about that an error of several days had been made in the calculation of the period that provisions would last, and that, between Paris and actual starvation, there remained barely sufficient time to collect and bring in supplies of food. That the government must therefore, and at once, treat for terms of capitulation, was evident to all who knew the facts of the case. The newspapers had up to this time been silent on the subject, but by degrees the truth percolated through the well informed, and by the evening half Paris knew that Jules Favre had actually left that morning for Versailles to ask for terms. The news came first as a great surprise, then as a great disappointment, and lastly, as a considerable relief—except in the tumultuous district of Belleville, where some serious signs of insubordination were shown, which were, however, instantly suppressed; General Vinoy having guaranteed to maintain order there at all costs during the negotiations. Not only had Chanzy's collapse become generally known in the city, but also that Bourbaki had been defeated; and as the last chances of Paris were thus exhausted, there was no reason for any longer holding out. The government was, indeed, very much blamed for allowing itself to be driven into a corner by not having discovered sooner the actual state of the provisions, and above all, for not having replaced Trochu by Vinoy three months earlier. But these censures apart, the idea of capitulation was accepted as a melancholy necessity, relieved greatly by the reflection that Paris had, at least, made a splendid defence, and that it had yielded, not to arms, but to hunger.

The negotiations between M. Favre and Count von Bismarck were continued daily till the 28th, when a general armistice for twenty-one days was agreed on, and the bombardment of the city ceased and was not afterwards renewed. The war may thus be said to have lasted exactly half a year; for on the very day six months that the Emperor Napoleon left St. Cloud for Metz, the capitulation was signed. With one exception, the terms of the capitulation were comparatively light. The exception was a fine of £8,000,000, which was levied on the Parisians. The city itself was not to be occupied, and even its name did not occur in the articles of capitulation, which professed to treat only of the surrender of the forts. The troops in these were to be disarmed and confined in Paris; but the national guard and one division of the line, deputed to keep order in the city, were to receive *tabatières* and muzzle-loaders in exchange for Chassepots. No public property was to be removed, but all munitions of war were to come

into the possession of the captors. The general armistice included the revictualling of the city, and the convocation of a freely-elected Assembly which should authorize either the conditions of peace or the continuance of the war.

Thus the prize for which the German army had watched and waited for more than four weary months (the siege having lasted 131 days and the bombardment twenty-three), was at length within their grasp, and, as may be naturally supposed, they lost no time in entering upon the possession of the forts they had so hardly won. That of Valérien was the first occupied, and was visited by the king of Prussia—now emperor of Germany—on January 29. Altogether 602 field-pieces belonging to the army of Paris were handed over to the Germans, and 1357 guns in perfect condition were found in the forts.

In striking contrast to the exultation of the Germans was the state of affairs in the city. On the same day that Valérien was occupied, the French troops who had been camped outside during the siege—mobiles, sailors, linesmen, and franc-tireurs—came within the walls. They were without their arms, dirty, tired, many of them so ill that they could scarcely walk, and with that dead, despairing look which the beaten soldier always wears.

The most pressing matter after the capitulation was, of course, the revictualling of the city, which was indeed within not many hours of actual famine when the armistice was agreed to, and neither any government nor any charitable societies could, by the most strenuous efforts, have prevented thousands of human beings dying of hunger, had the siege continued another week.

On February 4 the supplies included a very large quantity of provisions from England, under the care of Colonel Stuart Wortley and Mr. George Moore, which had been purchased with subscriptions received by the Mansion House Committee, and consisted chiefly of concentrated milk, cheese, bacon, biscuits, flour, Liebig's extract of meat, and preserved soup. These supplies were distributed among the twenty arrondissements of the city, according to their respective population. On the arrival of Colonel Stuart Wortley and Mr. Moore, they were received by M. Jules Favre, who, in the name of the people of Paris, expressed his heartfelt thanks to them for the efforts made in England to relieve the distress in the capital. The English cabinet, on February 1, had also placed all the stores of the administration at the joint service of the French and German governments for the purpose of revictualling the city; and when the fact was announced in the House of Commons, the general cheering which it elicited showed the warm and universal approbation with which it was received by the representatives of the people. Food to the value of £50,000 was forwarded in the first government despatch. The energy and zeal thus shown on all hands prevented any deaths occurring from actual starvation, and in a few days there were supplies of everything in abundance.

The intelligence of the capitulation of Paris fell upon Bordeaux like a peal of thunder. Tidings of the negotiations arrived in the city from England, before M. Jules Favre's despatch could reach the Delegate Government. M. Gambetta at first refused to credit the report; and when the official news was received, he published a magnificent proclamation, which was really worthy of the occasion. He assumed, indeed, with more of French vanity than truth, that though, overpowered by famine, she had been compelled to surrender her forts, "Paris remained still intact, as a last homage which had been wrested by the power of moral grandeur from the barbarians." To the determination of Paris, and the value of the delay her resistance had caused, he did ample justice, but insisted eloquently on the misfortune entailed on the eastern armies by the armistice which M. Favre had negotiated without taking counsel of the Bordeaux government, and without really understanding its drift. He, however, accepted the armistice, and urged the duty of turning it to account as a war measure. "Instead of a reactionary and cowardly Assembly, of which the foreigner dreams, let us summon a really national and republican one, which desires peace, if peace secures honour, rank, and integrity to our country, but would also be determined to wage war and be ready for everything rather than assist at the assassination of France. Frenchmen! let us think of our fathers who bequeathed to us France, compact and indivisible. Let us not alienate our inheritance into the hands of barbarians. Who would sign it? Not you, Legitimists, who have so boldly fought beneath the banners of the republic to defend the territory of the ancient kingdom of France. Nor you,

descendants of the citizens of 1789, whose masterpiece it was to seal the old provinces into an indissoluble union; and it is not we, the working men of the towns, whose intelligence and generous patriotism have always been the representatives of France in her strength and unity, as a people initiating modern liberties; nor you, labouring men of the country, who have never withheld your blood in defence of the revolution to which you owe your property in land and the dignity of citizens. No! not one Frenchman will be found to sign this infamous pact. The foreigner will be deceived. He will be compelled to relinquish the idea of mutilating France, because we are all inspired by the same love for our mother country, and we are unmoved by defeats. We shall again become strong, and we shall expel the foreigner. To achieve this sacred object we must devote our hearts, our wills, and our lives. We must all rally round the republic, and above all prove our calmness and firmness of soul. Let us have neither passions nor weaknesses. Let us simply swear, as free men, to defend before and against everybody, France and the republic. To arms! To arms! Long live France! Long live the republic, one and indivisible!

"LEON GAMBETTA."

On the same day M. Gambetta issued a decree forbidding the election to the Constituent Assembly of any who had been councillors of state, ministers, senators, members of departmental councils-general, or government candidates for the Corps Législatif under the empire.

A great meeting of the republican party was held at Bordeaux in the evening, when resolutions were passed declaring that the capitulation of Paris was not binding on the provinces, and requesting M. Gambetta to become president of a committee of public safety, to act independently of the Paris government. This step he hesitated to take; having received from the diplomatic representatives of Austria, Spain, and Italy, who were sojourning at Bordeaux, a communication stating that they were accredited to the Paris government, and that if he separated himself from it they would leave. But fresh cause of irritation was furnished by a telegraphic despatch to him from Count von Bismarck, protesting against his decree concerning the elections, as irreconcilable with the freedom of choice stipulated by the armistice. The decree was stigmatized as an "arbitrary and oppressive" act of M. Gambetta himself. This despatch he immediately published, with an indignant comment, exposing the "insolent pretension" of Prussia to interfere with the constitution of a French Assembly; and declaring that its object was to obtain the support of "accomplices and flatterers of the fallen dynasty and allies of Count von Bismarck." The Paris government, however, met the remonstrance in a very different spirit. M. Jules Favre, in replying to it, assured Count von Bismarck that, as the country wished free election, there should be no restriction upon the right of voting, and promised that the decree of M. Gambetta should be rescinded; though, with the ingrained intolerance of French politicians, this was afterwards qualified by withholding from members of the families who had reigned over France the right to a seat in the Assembly. To prevent any confusion which might arise from M. Gambetta's decree, the elections were adjourned from Sunday to Wednesday; and M. Jules Simon, a member of the Paris government, was sent to Bordeaux with instructions for their management. These were rejected by M. Gambetta and his colleagues, who published a note in the *Moniteur*, stating that they felt it their duty to maintain their own decree, for the sake of the national interest and honour, despite "the interference of Bismarck in the internal affairs of France." The Paris government then resolved to put an end to the authority of the delegation government in the provinces; but to avoid further complication M. Gambetta resigned on the 8th of February, and along with his resignation sent to the prefects a despatch characterized by extreme moderation and good sense, recommending them not to resign, but to carry out the elections of February 8, a course by which they would "render to the republic a supreme service."

The elections, considering the state of the country, were conducted with facility and good order not a little remarkable, and an Assembly was returned which was Conservative, Orleanist, Legitimist, Republican, or anything but Imperialist. In Paris the extreme Radicals, to the surprise of every one, gained the day; but this was partly explained by the fact that the more moderate Parisians had abstained from voting, and by the exodus of 140,000 whose means had allowed them to quit the city. The candidate chosen

by the largest number of constituencies was M. Thiers, who was elected in no fewer than eighteen departments.

The National Assembly met at Bordeaux for a preliminary sitting on the 12th of February, and immediately constituted itself, although its members were not nearly all present. On the following day it held its first public sitting, when M. Jules Favre, in the name of his colleagues both at Bordeaux and Paris, resigned their powers as the government for National Defence into the hands of the representatives. He said—"We have borne the burden of government, but we have no other desire, under existing circumstances, than to be able to place our temporary plans in the hands of the National Assembly. Thanks to your patriotism and reunion, we hope that the country, having been taught by misfortune, will know how to heal her wounds and to reconstitute the national existence. We no longer hold any power. We depend entirely upon your decision. We confidently expect the constitution of the new and legitimate powers." M. Favre then announced that he and his colleagues would remain at their post, to maintain respect for the laws, until the establishment of the new government.

On the 16th the Assembly, by an immense majority, elected as its president M. Grèvy, a moderate republican of long experience in public life. Next day it proceeded to the most important duty which it had to perform prior to the negotiations for peace, and chose M. Thiers chief of the executive power, who the same evening received the congratulations of the ministers of England, Austria, and Italy, and was immediately called to enter upon the duties of his office. At the sitting of the Assembly the next day (February 18), M. Keller, a deputy, laid on the table a declaration, signed by the deputies of the Lower and Upper Rhine, Meurthe, and Moselle departments, in which lay the territories understood to be required by Germany. The declaration expressed in the strongest terms the unalterable attachment of these departments to France, and earnestly entreated the Assembly not to abandon them to the enemy. The document was very well framed, and the pathetic spirit which it breathed must have gone to the hearts of many who heard it. In reality, however, it virtually called on the Assembly to abide by the famous declaration that "France would never cede an inch of her soil or a stone of her fortresses;" and that, of course, was now impossible. There was immense republican applause when the declaration was read, and M. Rochefort demanded that it should be immediately referred to the bureaux, so that the Assembly might give to the negotiators of peace either imperative orders not to agree to the cession, or full freedom. M. Thiers, instead of proposing delay, boldly and unexpectedly supported the motion, as he evidently saw that its presentation furnished an opportunity of making the Assembly itself a party to the retraction of the vow that no territory should be ceded. He said, from the bottom of his heart he fully shared M. Keller's feelings, and urged that, after so affecting and grave a document had been read, the Assembly, without loss of a moment, must in honour deal with it, and order its bureaux to report instantly on the proper answer to give to it. In two hours the Assembly received and adopted a report to the effect, that the petition of Alsace and Lorraine must be referred to the negotiators to deal with as they thought best. Thus quietly and unmistakably, though indirectly, the negotiators were empowered to make a cession of territory the basis of negotiation. In times of sudden and rapid change a whole line of policy is often abandoned, simply because at a particular moment it ceases to be insisted on. The policy of carrying on the war *à outrance* was tested and abandoned, without one word being said about it when the report of the bureaux was received by the Assembly. No voice was lifted up to propose that Alsace and Lorraine must remain French at all hazards.

At the same sitting M. Jules Favre astutely proposed that the government should be supported in its negotiation by a committee of fifteen members of the Assembly, who should be in constant communication with the actual negotiators, and would, of course, be pledged to support the treaty of peace when finally referred to the Assembly for ratification. The precaution was not unnecessary, as it was possible that very severe terms of peace might cause in the Bordeaux Assembly some sudden revulsion of feeling against the negotiators. But twenty men of great influence, all supporting each other, would be more than likely to prevent such a turn of the tide.

M. Thiers arrived at Versailles early on Tuesday, February 21, and spent the whole day in conference

with Count von Bismarck. He fought gallantly to the last, but could not, of course, either by argument or entreaty shake the fixed resolution of the Germans, which imposed conditions more onerous than France had been prepared to expect. The indemnity which the Germans demanded was resisted as one without precedent in history, the very attempt to comply with which would derange the finances of the entire world. France had been weighed down with German requisitions for seven months; Paris had just paid a war contribution of £8,000,000 sterling, and had, besides, her own war debt to provide for. The interest of the loan that would be necessary to provide such an indemnity as that demanded would utterly crush the great body of the tax-payers of the country, make their position intolerable, and lead them to prefer war at any risk to life under such burdens. The imperial chancellor was, however, inexorable. France had caused the expenditure incurred by the Germans, and she must defray it. In the end, M. Thiers consented that France should bind herself to furnish the sum named.

The territorial surrender gave more trouble. It was known that Alsace, with Strassburg, must be sacrificed, but it was hoped, even against hope, that Metz might be saved to France; and M. Thiers exerted his utmost efforts to retain it, even though it should be without fortifications if necessary. Count von Bismarck urged that the Germans must have Metz as a security against invasion. M. Thiers pleaded the nationality of the inhabitants; but he was reminded that those among them who did not like to become Germans had been promised ample time in which to wind up their affairs, sell their property, and retire to France. So strongly did M. Thiers feel on this point, that at one time he seemed determined to withdraw rather than incur the responsibility of ceding it; and he personally waited on the emperor and the imperial prince of Germany to lay his appeal with regard to it before them. Those august personages received him with politeness, but finally remitted him again to Count von Bismarck. At last, after eight hours and a half of discussion on Friday, five hours and a half on Saturday, and five hours on Sunday, the name of M. Thiers was affixed to the treaty of peace on February 26. All that time had to be added to the hours spent in previous conversation, negotiation, and exposition, which, as we have said, M. Thiers managed with consummate ability and address, but without material result. At the close of the last day's interview there was a stormy scene. Count von Bismarck, who was not very well at this time, became impatient of delay, and insisted on the signature of the treaty on the close of the discussion, which would be the signal for the German troops recommencing the war. M. Thiers was consequently obliged to sign. When all was over the emperor sent for the Crown Prince, and the father and son, tenderly embracing, wept for joy and thankfulness. The gratifying news was immediately telegraphed to the empress, at Berlin; to the emperor of Russia, and to the king of Bavaria. The telegram to the emperor of Russia concluded as follows, and excited considerable interest at the time:—"We have thus arrived at the end of the glorious and bloody war which has been forced upon us by the frivolity of the French. Prussia will never forget that she owes it to you that the war did not enter upon extreme dimensions. May God bless you for it!—Yours till death,

"WILLIAM."

The threat of Count von Bismarck, that the German armies would immediately resume offensive operations in case the treaty was not agreed to, was not a mere formal one, for during the whole period of the armistice the Germans were as active as if war was inevitable; and those military men who were in the secret spoke with the utmost enthusiasm of the grand plan of attack on all the French positions which General von Moltke had prepared for the opening of hostilities, if necessary. In two days the Germans would have been engaged in sweeping away the levies which had been collected to oppose them at every point where they stood in force; and an advance on five great fronts, converging at certain points, would have led to the most complete discomfiture yet seen of the armies of France. The country would, in fact, have been overrun from the Mediterranean to the Pyrenees, and the disasters of January repeated on a larger scale.

M. Thiers arrived at Bordeaux on February 28, when a sitting of the Assembly was at once held, at which, in the midst of the most profound silence, he rose and said: "We have accepted a painful mission; and after having used all possible endeavours we come with regret to submit for your approval a bill for which we ask urgency. 'Art. 1. The National Assembly, forced by necessity,

and not being therefore responsible, adopts the preliminaries of peace signed at Versailles on the 26th February.'"

At this point M. Thiers, overpowered by his feelings, was obliged to leave the hall. His old friend, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, therefore continued to read the preliminaries:—

"1. France renounces in favour of the German empire the following rights:—The fifth part of Lorraine, including Metz and Thionville; and Alsace, less Belfort.

"2. France will pay the sum of five milliards of francs, of which one milliard is to be paid in 1871, and the remaining four milliards by instalments extending over three years.

"3. The German troops will begin to evacuate the French territory so soon as the treaty is ratified. They will then evacuate the interior of Paris, and some departments lying in the western region. The evacuation of the other departments will take place gradually, after payment of the first milliard, and proportionally to the payment of the other four milliards. Interest at the rate of 5 per cent. will be paid on the amount remaining due from the date of the ratification of the treaty.

"4. The German troops will not levy any requisitions in the departments occupied by them, but will be maintained at the cost of France.

"5. A delay will be granted to the inhabitants of the territories annexed to choose between the two nationalities.

"6. Prisoners of war will be immediately set at liberty.

"7. Negotiations for a definitive treaty of peace will be opened at Brussels after the ratification of the treaty.

"8. The administration of the departments occupied by the German troops will be intrusted to French officials, but under the control of the chiefs of the German corps of occupation.

"9. The present treaty confers upon the Germans no rights whatever in the portion of territory not occupied.

"10. The treaty will have to be ratified by the National Assembly of France."

The government asked the Assembly to declare the urgency of the discussion of the treaty, and M. Thiers made a touching and passionate appeal to its patriotism, in the painful situation in which the country was placed.

Several deputies for Paris, supported by M. Gambetta, proposed motions in favour of delay, on which M. Thiers said: "We, like you, are the victims of a state of things which we have not created, but must submit to. We entreat you not to lose a moment. I implore you to lose no time. In doing so you may perhaps spare Paris a great grief. I have engaged my responsibility, my colleagues have engaged theirs, you must engage yours. There must be no abstention from voting. We must all take our share in the responsibility." M. Thiers concluded by expressing the wish that the committee would meet that evening at nine o'clock, and that a public sitting of the Assembly would be held next day at noon, which accordingly took place. At this sitting M. Victor Lefranc read the report of the committee on the preliminaries of peace, which recommended their immediate acceptance by the Assembly, as their refusal would involve the occupation of Paris, the invasion of the whole of France, and occasion terrible calamities. The committee earnestly urged the meeting not to take a step fraught with such consequences, and expressed confidence that no member would, in the circumstances, fail of his duty. The Assembly was much agitated. M. Edgar Quinet protested strongly against the acceptance of the preliminaries, which would, he said, destroy the present and future of France. M. Bamberger, a deputy from the department of the Moselle, followed in the same course; and concluded by condemning Napoleon III., saying he was the person who ought to be compelled to sign the treaty. When M. Conti, the late chief of the emperor's cabinet, rose and attempted to justify the empire, the Assembly almost unanimously (there being only five dissentients) voted by acclamation a resolution confirming the fall of the empire, and stigmatizing Napoleon III. as responsible for the heavy misfortunes of France. M. Louis Blanc spoke against ratifying the preliminaries of peace, believing it possible to continue the struggle by substituting partizan warfare for hostilities on a large scale. He also made an appeal to Europe, declaring that if she did not arrest the arms of Prussia, she would sign her own death-warrant. M. Victor Hugo made a most impressive speech on the same side; but the bill for ratifying the preliminaries was carried by 546 against 107—a majority of fully five to one.

After the vote, M. Keller, in name of the deputies for Alsace, the Meuse, and the Moselle,

renewed the protest proclaiming the cession of territory to be null and void, and declaring that, one and all, they reserved to themselves the right of claiming to be united with France, which would always keep a place in their hearts. M. Keller further stated that, in the circumstances created by the vote, they could no longer retain their seats in the Assembly, as they could not represent a country ceded to the enemy.

Thus peace came at last, and France, burning with shame and heartbroken by sufferings, showed by the votes of her representatives that she was glad to have got it on any terms. In fact, her only choice lay between the acceptance of peace on the terms offered and ruin. However dearly the purchase had been made, it would buy the invaders out of the country. To Frenchmen the terms must, of course, have seemed oppressive, and what a pang must have shot through the hearts of all the deputies when, after the vote of ratification, the representatives of Alsace and German Lorraine bade their brethren farewell, on the ground that, the departments from which they came having ceased to be French, they could no longer sit in the Assembly!

The negotiations for peace were throughout carried on entirely between the principals, and the intervention of neutrals was avowedly discarded. The only approach to it was on the part of England. M. Thiers had seen fit to communicate the most important article of the conditions, that relating to the cession of territory, to no one, not even to M. Jules Favre. He took the entire responsibility of dealing with Count von Bismarck on that head, and England had therefore no room to say a word in the matter. But M. Thiers having informed the new French ambassador to England (the duke of Broglie) that the indemnity was fixed at six milliards, and that this was more than France could pay, he called on Lord Granville on the morning of February 24, and asked him to interfere in order to obtain a reduction. Lord Granville immediately presented him to the queen, a cabinet council was held, and in the evening his lordship telegraphed to Mr. Odo Russell, stating that England advocated a reduction of the amount demanded. By the time that Mr. Russell received the telegram the demand had been reduced by £40,000,000 sterling, and to this final arrangement M. Thiers agreed. Lord Granville had, however, sent early in the day through Count Bernstorff to Count von Bismarck a telegram of the same import as that which had been forwarded to Mr. Odo Russell; and Mr. Russell, in his reply, expressed a hope that this telegram might have had something to do with the reduction in the amount of the indemnity. Lord Granville stated to the French ambassador, that he thought the confining of the negotiation to the representatives of the belligerents was the wisest and best course, and the most likely to be beneficial to France; and the French ambassador had nothing to do but to assent to it, as it had been adopted by the head of his government. The king of Italy wrote to the German emperor, expressing his surprise and disappointment at the hard terms exacted from the French, especially with regard to the cession of territory; but hard as they were, there is no reason to suppose that the active intervention of neutrals would have led to their modification, while it would almost certainly have issued in a rupture of the negotiations, and in a renewal of the war.

One of the conditions on which the armistice was renewed at Versailles was, that 30,000 German troops should enter Paris and occupy the Champs Elysées and the Place de la Concorde. Such triumphs have been the reward of victory ever since war began, and will probably be claimed so long as it exists. In the present instance the feeling amongst the Germans on the subject, officers as well as men, was so strong, that even Count von Bismarck would scarcely have dared to refuse them the gratification, and such a refusal on the part of the new emperor would have made him unpopular where he most desired to be venerated. The feeling was also unquestionably strengthened by the arrogant tone in which the Parisian press spoke of the victorious army while under the walls of the city. "The German hordes," they said, "had not ventured to pollute Paris with their presence, so imposing was the Holy City even in her great distress." Such sayings were pleasing to the Parisian public, and, not without success, they tried to believe them. It was pleasant to think that the "barbarians," like that awe-stricken slave who dared not slay Caius Marius, seized with respect on the threshold of Paris, would not presume to enter. It was pleasant to read and to write to that effect, but certainly not very prudent as regarded the conquerors, by whom it was felt that the actual occupation of the

city would be the most effectual means of putting an end to these vain and boastful exaggerations. It was a curious proof of the ascendancy which Paris exercised over French feeling, as well as imagination, that all Frenchmen seemed to regard this occupation in the light of an inexpiable insult —though they have entered every capital in Europe except London. The Prussian *Moniteur Officiel* at Versailles sarcastically published the description of Napoleon's triumphal entry into Berlin in 1806, after the battle of Jena, from the "History of the Consulate and the Empire," by M. Thiers. Yet M. Thiers himself was on the present occasion very much affected by the occupation; and General Trochu, a moderate man if ever one existed, was driven by grief and irritation into writing a silly letter, advising the Parisians to close their gates and let them be blown open by German cannon—in other words, to risk an absolutely purposeless massacre.

When the determination of the Germans became positively known on Monday, February 27, the agitation in the city was indescribable. Groups of excited civilians assembled on the boulevards, vociferating for *guerre à outrance*, and several companies of the national guard declared their intention of opposing the Prussian entrance. A proclamation issued by MM. Thiers, Favre, and Picard, stating that they had done all in their power to secure good terms, somewhat calmed the excitement, and the more moderate admitted that it was absolutely necessary to conclude peace. Even the temperate *Journal des Debats*, however, said, "Our conquerors have used their victory cruelly; their demands, financial and territorial, have been such that in the conferences with M. Bismarck our negotiators, M. Thiers and M. Jules Favre, have several times been on the point of breaking off, even at the risk of seeing the war recommence. The commission of the National Assembly partook of the emotion of the negotiators when the conditions were communicated to them. It is death at heart and the having nothing more to hope, except in the justice of God, that have forced them to submit to the frightful yoke of necessity." Patience and abstention from all attempt at disorder were, however, advocated on all hands, and even the radical journals exhorted the people to be calm. On Tuesday, General Vinoy issued an order of the day condemning the disorderly conduct of the national guard, who had beaten the *rappel* the previous evening. M. Picard also published a manifesto declaring that Belfort had been saved by giving way to the entry, reminding the population that the safety of Paris, and indeed the whole of France, was now in their hands, and imploring them to remain calm, united, and dignified in their misfortune. Still considerable agitation prevailed. Many of the Belleville and La Villette Reds loudly proclaimed their dissatisfaction at the treaty, and vented their indignation by tearing down the ministerial proclamations. A large meeting of national guards was also held, at which it was decided that the entry of the Germans should be energetically resisted, and that the Hotel de Ville should be attacked. Accordingly, on Tuesday morning an attempt was made to seize that building; but the government was prepared, and the rioters had to beat a retreat. They then went to the Place de la Bastille, and established a formidable park of artillery. The *enceinte* at Belleville and Montmartre had also been refortified, and sentries were placed on the ramparts. The *Vengeur*, however, a journal of the most ultra opinions, published an article strongly protesting against any resistance being offered to the entrance of the enemy.

The "occupation" commenced on Wednesday, March 1, when the German legions made their entry along the broad Avenue de la Grande Armée; and skirted or passed beneath the lofty Arc de Triomphe, inscribed from summit to base with the names of victories gained by the French over their present conquerors and others. For two days the Champs Elysées and the Place de la Concorde were German military parade-grounds and camps. Martial music resounded from morn till night, generals caroused in the palaces of the Elysée and of Queen Christine of Spain, hussars stalled their horses in the Palais de l'Industrie, artillery kindled their bivouac fires around the Arc de l'Etoile, cavalry paraded the Cours la Reine, infantry manœuvred in the side walks of the Champs Elysées, and uhlans slept by moonlight beside their horses under the trees. On Wednesday, when the troops entered, the Parisians looked angry and reserved, and the Prussian quarter, as it was styled, was far from thronged; but by the afternoon of the following day the Champs Elysées presented the aspect of a fair. The assemblage, of course, consisted chiefly of the lowest classes, but amongst them were also some

well dressed persons, who had come out to listen to the music and to take a look at those "Goths and Vandals" of whom they had heard so much.

Owing to the quarter where the German troops were installed being inclosed by barricades at all its principal entrances, and to the subordinate thoroughfares being strictly guarded by both French and German sentinels, the most complete order was observed. Neither French soldier nor national guard was permitted there in uniform; sections of the mob were at times unruly and more or less insulting towards their conquerors, whose admirable forbearance, however, prevented any outbreak. The greatest humiliation they inflicted on the Parisians was performing martial airs, long after sunset on the Thursday, under the Arc de Triomphe, that cherished souvenir of French military renown. All the shops in the city were closed, as were all the cafés and restaurants; no papers were published; every blind was drawn down; the city was sad and solemn, even in those remote districts where no Prussians were; so that this seclusion was no parade of tribulation before the enemy, but was the real expression of the national sorrow. Nothing, in fact, could be more dignified or becoming than the bearing of the people in general. There can, however, be no doubt that the main reason why the occupation passed off so quietly was, that two days had been allowed to elapse between the time when it was known that it was to take place, and that of its actual occurrence. In those two days the excited population had time to calm down, and to calculate all the consequences of offering violence to an enemy within the gates, and while every gun of the forts pointed towards the city.

Throughout the whole of the occupation the Germans behaved in a manner worthy of themselves and of their country. The Bavarians, who had suffered so severely and fought so gallantly in the war, were assigned a place of especial honour; and portions of the Prussian corps who had done most hard work were allowed the honour of entering the city. But there was no air of triumph or parade. It was looked on as a mere military operation which had to be got through in a business-like, unpretending way. Neither the Emperor William nor his son entered the city. Count von Bismarck rode up to witness the scene as the Prussian regiments passed in; but he turned his horse's head and did not enter. The soldiers were good-humoured and grave, and impassive to the petty insults of the mob that stared at them; and nowhere did the army of occupation or its leaders exhibit any of that flaunting arrogance with which the first Napoleon and his marshals and soldiers used to ride through the cities they had captured.

As early as six o'clock on Thursday morning M. Jules Favre went to Versailles with the news of the vote at Bordeaux, ratifying the treaty of peace, and demanding the immediate evacuation of Paris. This was refused until the French foreign minister could show official documents. This difficulty, however, had been foreseen, and a special messenger was despatched from Bordeaux with an official account of the sitting in the chamber as soon as the vote had taken place. At eleven a.m. the courier reached Paris, and at once started for Versailles. Arrangements were then entered into between the French and Prussian generals for the immediate evacuation of the city, which was commenced on Friday at an early hour, and terminated about noon. The exit of the Germans was even more imposing than their entry. The road under the Arc de Triomphe, which had been purposely blocked up by the Parisians before the entry, was carefully levelled, and regiment after regiment passed through, cheering as they marked the names of the various German towns once conquered by that great enemy of their ancestors, Napoleon I.

On the previous day (Thursday, March 2), the emperor king sent the following characteristic telegram to his queen at Berlin:—"I have just ratified the conclusion of peace, it having been accepted yesterday by the National Assembly in Bordeaux. Thus far is the great work complete, which through seven months' victorious battles has been achieved, thanks to the valour, devotion, and endurance of our incomparable army in all its parts, and the willing sacrifices of the whole Fatherland. The Lord of Hosts has everywhere visibly blessed our enterprizes, and therefore, by his mercy, has permitted this honourable peace to be achieved. To him be the honour; to the army and the Fatherland I render thanks from a heart deeply moved."

This telegram was publicly read at Berlin on Friday amid salvos of artillery and peals from the church bells, and the city was brilliantly illuminated at night in honour of the peace.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Naval Operations—Projected Sea and Land Attack on Germany—Danish Feeling in favour of France—Total want of Preparation in the French Navy as well as in the Army—Part of the intended Fleet only despatched—Conflicting and Absurd Orders to the Admiral—Precautions taken by the Germans to prevent a Landing on their Coast—The Blockade of their Ports more Nominal than Real—Discouragement in the French Fleet and Return Home—Final Resumé of the Events of the War—Contrast in the Preparation for War in France and Germany—The Reports of Baron Stoffel to the French Government on the German Military System—The hopelessness of the Struggle in France after the Collapse of her Regular Army—Military Opinion of the Siege of Paris and its Bombardment—Conduct of the Germans in France—Chronological List of the German Victories—The Spoils of the War and the Extraordinary Number of French Prisoners—Total Losses on both Sides—Territorial Alterations made by the War—Prince Bismarck's Reasons for Annexation—The Military Positions of France and Germany entirely reversed—Official Publications issued after the War—The True History of the Secret Treaty contemplating the Annexation of Belgium by France—The Mission of M. Thiers and the Influence of M. Gambetta—English Benevolent Operations during the War.

NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE WAR.

From a statement on the subject in Chapters IV. and V., it will be seen that the naval strength of Prussia was in power and extent only about one-third of that of France, which had, in fact, a maritime armament only second to that of England. With such a preponderance of ships and guns, it was natural that France should at the outset count upon achievements at sea even more completely triumphant than the victories anticipated with such certainty on land. Unfortunately for her, whatever has been said of want of preparation and of blundering with respect to the army, applies equally to the navy, though in the case of the latter it was not attended with such disastrous results. The plan of attack meditated by France when war was declared included a joint advance by the army into Germany, by both its western and northern frontier. The main advance was of course entirely by land; but a large force was at the same time to be conveyed by ships of war to the Baltic coasts, and by an invasion of Hanover and Holstein to embarrass the Germans with an attack in rear. An air of feasibility was given to the scheme by the popular feeling in Denmark, which was at first so extremely warlike and anti-German, that it was thought probable the Danes would seize the opportunity of rising, and, by joining the French side, endeavour to pay off the scores of 1864. A subscription for the French wounded was set on foot in Denmark, and speedily reached the sum of 80,000 francs, while one opened for the Germans only amounted to 1800 francs in the same time. The Danish press vehemently advocated war and revenge on the Germans, and stated that the appearance of a French fleet in the Baltic would command a ready ally. As Denmark could have at once assembled 40,000 men, to co-operate with the proposed 30,000 from France, Prussia would have been menaced in the north by an army of 70,000, which would have compelled her to concentrate 200,000 men in that part alone, besides the garrisons of the different towns, which could not be withdrawn with an enemy threatening her coasts.

After war was declared several days of uncertainty passed respecting the appointment to the command of the important Baltic expedition, when on the 22nd of July Vice-admiral Count Bouet-Villaumez was suddenly informed of his nomination to this duty by the emperor. The fleet was to consist of fourteen ironclads, a large number of corvettes, and other vessels necessary for the expedition. A second fleet, commanded by Vice-admiral La Roncière le Noury, was to follow shortly, made up of gunboats, floating batteries, and large transport steamers, with the 30,000 troops on board, under General Bourbaki. Cherbourg, however, had been stripped to foster Brest and Toulon, till there were neither fire-arms, victuals, nor sailors, and the fleet at last consisted of only seven ironclads and one corvette. Especially was it without the American ram the *Rochambeau*, the only vessel capable of encountering the *King William*, but so disliked by the French builders as an American vessel, that they had hidden her up under pretence of repairs. The admiral, however, considered he could at least neutralize the great Prussian ship, by smashing in its iron sides with the ram of his flagship the *Surveillante;* and thus elate with hope, and determined to make the best of the first instalment of his promised fleet, Villaumez set sail on the 24th July, all his fears allayed by a

ministerial despatch promising that more vessels should speedily follow in his wake.

The admiral's orders were to direct his first operations against Jahde, near which he hoped to surprise the Prussian admiral, Prince Adalbert, in the open sea and compel him to fight. The prince, however, was not to be found; and finding his fleet was insufficiently supplied with coal, Villaumez was obliged to make for a port in Denmark. Here he received a verbal order from the French minister to sail for the Baltic. As this, however, was at variance with his first and more definite instructions, a telegram was sent for fresh orders, which had scarcely gone when a despatch from Paris arrived advising him to choose "some point of observation," whence, while respecting Danish neutrality, he could still watch the enemy's shores and supply his ships with everything they needed. The necessity was at the same time impressed strongly upon him, of leaving a powerful force at Jahde to take note of the enemy's movements.

Here was a fair specimen of orders, counter orders, and messages without aim or purpose. Where should this point of observation be? In the North Sea or the Baltic? But how was it possible to watch the Hanoverian coast from the Baltic, or to exert any influence at the North Sea upon what was going on along the Pomeranian shores? Could this double task be accomplished with seven ships? A German philosopher long since reproached the French with total ignorance of geography; and whether the taunt was just or not, it is certain that a more insane contempt was never shown for it than when Admiral Villaumez' fleet was sent, *entirely unprovided with maps*, to cruise about the Danish coast. The intricate straits through which the Baltic is reached are difficult enough to navigate in fair weather; but for ships of the heavy draught of French ironclads, with stormy seas, and no maps, it would be a miracle if they escaped the fate of the armada. It would seem as if the ministry of Marine at Paris had been equally ignorant of geography, for on no other supposition can the despatches to the admiral be explained. A glance at the map would have shown that from Jahde to Kiel was a distance of 900 miles, and as it was difficult to see how seven ships could prove an effectual patrol over this extent of coast, Admiral Bouet determined to wait for the answer to his telegram. An order to proceed to the Baltic soon arrived, and, indefinite as it was, the commander hesitated no longer. Skilful Danish pilots were procured, by whose help the Great Belt was passed, and after reconnoitring Kiel and Femern, the admiral pursued his route for the purpose of discovering a suitable landing-place for the promised and long-expected troops. This enterprise was one of no little difficulty, for all the lighthouse lights and beacons along the coast had been purposely extinguished, the buoys taken up, and an abundance of torpedoes laid near any place favourable for observation. If any spot or harbour was pitched upon as fit for attack and effecting a landing, it was generally the case as with Kiel. A large ship would be lying athwart the harbour mouth ready to be sunk at a moment's notice, with three rows of stakes, several rows of torpedoes, and a regular hedge of fishing nets ranged behind her. To commence operations against any such place gunboats, floating batteries, and troops to secure the ground gained were indispensable; and with all these the fleet was totally unprovided. The admiral sent off to apprise the minister of his difficulties, and on the same day received three despatches, the first dated 6th August, commanding his instant return to France; another, dated a day later, bade him remain where he was. Another, later still, but written on the same day, informed him that the army had suffered reverses, and reminded him that it was the duty of the fleet to strain every nerve and lose no opportunity to do the enemy an injury. Distracted with contradictory orders and bad news, the admiral determined to form a committee, consisting of the six principal officers of the squadron, who should report upon the most attackable part of the sea-board. The committee came to the conclusion that of all points on the Prussian coast Colberg and Dantzic alone could be attacked, but the slight impression likely to be made would only weaken the *prestige* of the French fleet. To do any good, ships of a peculiar construction would be required, and, above all, a respectable force for landing. Just as this rather despairing report was presented Admiral Villaumez heard that the Prussian fleet had left Jahde Bay, and was making for the Baltic. Delighted with the prospect of at least doing *something*, he hastily collected his ships and made for the Great Belt, there to dispute the passage of the enemy's vessels and offer battle. But the Prussian fleet had not left Jahde at all. On the contrary, it was closely

blockaded there by Admiral Fourichon. Finding little chance of accomplishing anything else, Admiral Bouet now declared the Prussian harbours of Kiel, Lubeck, Neustadt, Stettin, Stralsund, and Rugen, to be in a state of blockade, and caused official notices to be issued accordingly. Having only large ships, however, the blockade was more nominal than real; for the light German craft could always creep along the coast and elude the utmost vigilance of the French. More than this, whenever an opportunity offered, in thick weather or on dark nights, the small, fast-sailing Prussian corvettes would steal out, and gliding quietly along the coast, would take the huge French frigates by surprise, fire at them, thrust torpedoes under their keels, and make off, without the possibility of pursuing them. It is easy to imagine the discouragement of both officers and crews when they plainly perceived that, notwithstanding their patriotic efforts, they must give up all hope of being rewarded by victory. All the intelligence from France told only of fresh misfortune, while they themselves were condemned to a fatal and humiliating inactivity.

While Vice-admiral Bouet made the best of a bad matter in the Baltic, Vice-admiral Fourichon entered the North Sea upon an even more useless cruise along the shores of Schleswig and Hanover. An ordinary map will show the reader why cuirassed vessels can effect nothing in these waters. Having been ordered to watch the mouths of the Weser, Elbe, and Jahde, Admiral Fourichon found himself, about the middle of August, in a boisterous sea washing a shallow coast, without a harbour of refuge for many leagues around. The English island of Heligoland was closed against him, and all other harbours being distant, he had to take in coals and provisions when out on the high seas. With storms almost constantly blowing from the south-west—that is, away from the land—as is usual in those latitudes, he was expected to blockade one of the most dangerous and inaccessible coasts known to navigators. Thus circumstanced, the chief thing he had to guard against was injury to mast and engine. If seriously damaged in either of these particulars, any frigate would be hopelessly lost on the Hanoverian shores.

Unfortunately, the weather soon became extremely bad, and storm following storm, the provisioning on the high seas was very difficult. Though the frigates themselves might hold out against the weather, the ships that brought them coals and victuals had to tack about for days before they could come alongside. Not a few were lost. As the season advanced, the more dangerous became the equinoctial gales, and the fuel diminishing, the situation of the squadron began to be critical. In this extremity, on September 12, Admiral Fourichon determined to return to Cherbourg, where he was met by the yacht *Hirondelle*, which had been looking out for him for several days. The *Hirondelle* was charged with despatches informing him of the overthrow of the Imperial government and his appointment to the ministry of Marine. Leaving his squadron under the command of the rear-admirals, and informing Admiral Bouet that he had quitted the North Sea, Admiral Fourichon left for Paris, and for him and his second in command, Admiral Jauréguiberry, a more distinguished part in the war now remained. As minister of Marine, Fourichon was colleague and companion of M. Gambetta after his balloon exit from Paris, and was as conspicuous for his wisdom and moderation as was the minister of War for his impetuosity. Jauréguiberry was appointed to high command in the army of the Loire, and fought with extraordinary talent and bravery in the various engagements with which General Chanzy was connected, from December 2 to the final dispersion of the Loire army at Le Mans about the middle of January, 1871. The whole French fleet was subsequently ordered again to the Baltic, but returned to the North Sea, and ultimately to France. It had driven the Prussian fleet into harbour, where, if it gained nothing, it suffered as little. During a blockade of four months, maintained along 700 miles of coast, twenty small German merchant craft were captured; but beyond these trifling items the French navy achieved literally nothing.

At home a more remarkable use was found for the fleet, and a more curious phase of war is not to be found. The Germans had invaded France from the Rhine to the Channel, and fearing lest Dieppe, Rouen, and Havre should be made by them bases of operations or of supplies, the French government stationed several vessels of war off each of these places; and the singular spectacle was presented of a French fleet blockading its own ports, a task it performed far more effectually than it had been able to do with those of the enemy.

A large number of the sailors and men of the marine were drafted into land corps, and at Paris, Orleans, Le Mans, in the north under General Faidherbe, and in many other parts of France, did excellent service in manning the artillery, and not unfrequently bore a part in the thickest of the numerous sanguinary actions of the campaign.

FINAL RESUME OF THE EVENTS OF THE WAR, AND MILITARY OPINION OF THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

In Chapters IV. and V. of this work we described in detail the various features of the military systems of France and Germany respectively. A number of books and pamphlets published after the war threw additional light upon these characteristics, and their influence upon the singular course of the events of the campaign. Any one conversant with the systems of the two nations would naturally suppose, from the readiness with which Napoleon III. plunged into the struggle, either that he was ignorant of the immense superiority of the German organization, or that he believed the war would bring into relief in the French military machine decisive reforms, which Marshal Niel was supposed to have carried out into law. The reforms, however, proved to have been only upon paper, and the writings of the emperor himself show that he was quite familiar with the numerical and other disadvantages of his army as compared with that of Germany; but his dependence was upon a somewhat desperate and rapidly executed strategy, which proved to be utterly impracticable. What the war, even within a week or two from the time when it was declared, did bring into prominent and terrible relief, was a monstrous imperfection in the French organization, of which the War office was grossly and unpardonably ignorant; and this ignorance forms the key to the overwhelming misfortunes we have narrated.

Considerable indignation was at first vented against Colonel Stoffel, the French military attaché at Berlin, for not having more fully apprised his government of the immense resources and preparations for hostilities throughout Germany. Immediately after the war, however, Baron Stoffel published the reports on these subjects which he had made from 1866 to 1870, many of which it transpired *had never so much as been opened.* These reports not only described most fully the formidable nature of the German organization, but pointed out in contrast the feebleness and inefficiency of the French system; and had the Imperial government studied them, it would have been more fully alive to the madness of the enterprise entered upon on the dark and calamitous 15th July, 1870.

According to a calculation of Baron Stoffel made some months before hostilities broke out, and essentially corresponding with that of the Emperor Napoleon in January, 1871,* the standing army of France consisted of 372,558 men and 72,600 horses, whereas that of Northern and Southern Germany, when united, amounted to about 429,000 men, and from 80,000 to 90,000 horses. Thus, even in the single particular in which it was generally believed in Europe that she would possess a decided advantage—a regular army ready for the field—France was considerably overmatched; but this disproportion gives no idea of her immense inferiority in military power to her enemy. Apart from an unknown number of discharged soldiers and worn-out veterans, and from the practically worthless national guard, the whole reserves of France were composed of about 320,000 men, the residue of seven contingents of conscripts who had never actually joined the colours, and of the garde mobile, who on paper numbered rather more than half a million of men, but who had not yet been even embodied. The numerically imposing reserves of France, therefore, were simply a collection of "men with muskets;" and, good as might be their natural qualities, this circumstance was decisive against her in the contest in which she was engaged. On the other hand, the reserves of Germany, comprising the landwehr and the reserve proper, formed, in round numbers, about 800,000 men, all practised soldiers, in the flower of their age, and though separated for a time from their colours, all disciplined by long military service, and maintained in their martial bearing and spirit by frequent exercises even during peace.

After the events of the war, it would be useless to comment on the worth of this colossal force; but we may observe that, although its real qualities were never understood in France, Baron Stoffel had furnished the emperor with the fullest information respecting it. A report presented in 1869, after showing with remarkable clearness the homogeneous character of the German regular army and reserves, declared that a war even with Prussia

* Note sur l'Organization Militaire de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord. Wilhelmshöhe, January, 1871. By the Emperor Napoleon III.

alone could, humanly speaking, have no chance of success:—" Prussia, or more accurately, the North German Confederation, can dispose of a million of soldiers, well trained, well disciplined, and admirably organized, whereas France possesses only between 300,000 and 400,000."

Yet even these figures do not furnish anything like the real measure of the strength of the belligerent powers for military operations. The principle of local preparation for war was utterly disregarded in France; the elements required to form her armies were scattered over all parts of the country. In one place there was an immense material, in another a vast aggregation of soldiers; and a disunited regimental system was the most striking feature of her military organization. Moreover, even in her regimental units, local association was never the rule; each regiment was composed of men collected indifferently throughout the empire; and owing to a singular regulation, which required recruits under all circumstances to proceed to their depôts in the first instance, the increasing the force of any given regiment always consumed no little time. This system obviously threw great difficulties in the way of rapidly combining troops and forming them into well-appointed armies—a vital point in modern warfare. When the reserves of regiments were separated from each other by great and irregular distances, and when, in order to take the field, it was necessary to draw from remote points the materials of each corps d'armée and to fashion into organic masses men, horses, guns, and other *impedimenta*, delay and confusion were the inevitable result, and the arraying the armies of France was a tedious, uncertain, and cumbrous process. On the other hand, in Prussia and throughout Germany the principle of military organization was local; the empire was parcelled out into districts, each of which could furnish a separate army, complete in every appliance of war; and these distinct units of the mighty array which made up the collective national force were locally recruited, administered, and commanded. In a corrupt, an unwarlike, or a divided state, such a system might be very dangerous; but in the actual condition of Germany it enabled her to put forth her strength with extraordinary facility and despatch; it being obviously comparatively easy to combine troops collected from no great distances and already organized, and to expand them into even the largest armies. The result was that the "mobilization" of the forces of Germany, immense as they were, was swiftly, surely, and thoroughly accomplished, and under the conditions of modern warfare this feature of her military organization augmented her power in a wonderful degree, and largely multiplied the advantages she possessed already over her weaker antagonist.

Nor in this vital point of preparation for war did the difference end here. In France power over the military machine was centralized in the highest degree; the minister of War had complete control over every department of the service; hardly any arrangements could be made without his orders and supervision, and local subordinates were deprived of almost all direct authority. This system had its good side; but it threw an undue and intolerable burden at the outbreak of war on a single person. It thus caused responsibility to be ill divided, and tended to complication, to delay, and to irreparable mistakes. In Germany, on the contrary, power is localized in the army to the widest extent; the commanders of the different corps d'armée have an ample range of control, and the central authority seldom interferes. A system like this, in certain conceivable cases, might lead to great and dangerous abuses; but it worked well in the last campaign, and contributed to the precision and swiftness which characterized the German operations. The contrast between the two systems is thus presented in one of the numerous publications by actors in the war:—*

"It became necessary to form into brigades, divisions, and corps d'armée the scattered elements of our military power. This important duty, which requires calm reflection and a profound knowledge of the means within reach, devolved, owing to our vicious system of centralization, upon the minister of War and his office, and had to be accomplished in a few days. In Prussia, on the other hand, the central authority does not pretend to do everything; it imposes on the commander of each corps d'armée the task of completing all needful preparations."

These opposite modes of setting in motion the antagonist armies led to moral results not unimportant. The hastily-collected French corps had little of the unity or cohesion which long and intimate association had given to the arrays of Germany. We should not, of course, lay too much stress on a mere circumstance of organization,

* La Campagne de 1870. Par un Officier de l'Armée du Rhin Bruxelles, 1870.

but the "Officer of the Army of the Rhine" is probably correct in saying:—"Confusion and slowness in the earlier operations were not the only unfortunate results of this system of mobilization; it produced even more decisive effects throughout the entire campaign. By throwing together elements not previously united, by giving the troops commanders whom they did not know, and the commanders forces and means not familiar to them, the unity and mutual confidence which ought to connect the soldier with his superiors of every grade were seriously diminished in the French army."

The general result of the utter inferiority of France in force and military organization was that, though the first to draw the sword, she had not, probably, set in motion more than 220,000 men when the battles of Woerth and Forbach were fought, and that less than 120,000 were added during the crisis which ended in the capture of Sedan, when her fate may be said to have been virtually sealed. On the other hand, though the German commanders were taken somewhat by surprise—a point on which Baron Stoffel insisted in the preface to his reports—they were, nevertheless, able to bring into the field, within three weeks after war was declared, armies of which the aggregate numbers were over 500,000 men, and to add enormous reserves to these.

Independently, too, of inherent defects, the French army had felt the pernicious influence of the political and social state of the country. Too much is not to be made of this; for it must be remembered that French armies have marched to victory under an order of things essentially similar to that which existed in France in 1870. Nor can it be fairly asserted that the institutions of Germany must necessarily produce an excellent military instrument: one has only to read the remarkable preface to the "Military Memorial" of Prince Frederick Charles, and the observations of the gifted author of the "Prussian Infantry in 1869," to see that German officers of a high order of mind regard the autocratic system of Prussia as having a bad effect on the German soldier, and believe that the natural dash of the French is largely due to the usages of the country. But the evils at the root of society in France had in 1870 a peculiar tendency to injure and demoralize the army, whereas those which existed in Germany were not felt in her military service. The French generals were, in too many instances, the mere favourites of a sovereign who was, from the nature of his position, compelled to consider devotion to himself before merit. The venal corruption of an age of revolutions had found its way into the ranks of the French officers, and had made them dissolute, ambitious, and selfish; and the fortune which had long smiled on their arms had filled them with self-conceit and vanity. Above all, the constant agitation and changes of society in France had spread insubordination throughout the army and seriously impaired its discipline; and the dangers had been much aggravated which seem inseparable from its democratic organization. On the other hand, the energies of the Prussian government had been concentrated for years upon the creation of a formidable army; the discernment of the king and the skill and integrity of Von Moltke and Von Roon had neutralized the ordinary evils of an aristocratic military system, by making promotion depend upon merit; and the national movement which was stirring Germany had given her soldiers the energy and impulse which the institutions under which they live are not in themselves calculated to encourage. The subordination, the discipline, the order which naturally belong to the German army were seconded in 1870 by science, ability in command, and fervent patriotic enthusiasm, and this rare combination proved irresistible.

Such, then, or nearly so, were the forces of France and Germany at the beginning of the campaign. Overmatched in numbers, and very inferior in organization, in efficiency, and in military qualities, the French army was directed against an enemy in overwhelming strength and in a state of complete preparation for war. France, humanly speaking, could not have triumphed; but this is no reason why her army should have suffered disasters almost unparalleled, or why the country should have been overrun and conquered. Errors in command which have never been surpassed, and a fatal sacrifice of military considerations to the exigencies of a political situation, were the causes why the ruin was so overwhelming; for, notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary, the French army in this calamitous struggle was not devoid of the high qualities which had justly gained for it glory and renown.

Our brief retrospective remarks have thus far had special reference to the war as carried on between the regular armies of the two nations.

As to that great phase of the campaign subsequent to Sedan, which closed in the overthrow of Chanzy, Faidherbe, and Bourbaki, if the lesson is not to be taken home, that trained soldiers cannot be met with untrained levies, however gallant and patriotic, then are the lessons of history written to no purpose. Well would it have been if, in September, 1870, the French had consented to put an end to the war. The terms they would have had to accept then might have been onerous, but they were sure to be aggravated by the continuance of a struggle to which he must have been sanguine indeed who should have predicted a happy issue. Still, "France was bound to fight on for honour's sake," it was said. It is doubtful, however, if there is any honour to be reaped in enterprises absolutely hopeless; and suicide, in either nations or individuals, is a very questionable proof of courage. The struggle, as we have shown, was unequal from the outset, and subsequently, when the French army was so utterly prostrated in the field as no other within historical record had ever been, the condition of France became infinitely worse; because it was impossible that she should supply a second army equal in efficiency to that which had been lost, and no less impossible that, had the second even been as good, it would have proved itself equal to the exigency. For a better one the elements were nowhere to be found. The men, however, into whose hands power had fallen could not be made to see the true position of the case, or brought to acknowledge it. France in their hands apparently had ceased to be capable of acting rationally, and her measures were as those of a man in a dream or delirium. Orators appealing to frenzied mobs, and substituting for political facts the impressions of an assembly, a market place, and a single hour, collected crowds of men and boys, called them armies, gave them officers like themselves, and then dashed them in the face of a foe who was, in fact, what they could only pretend to be. On the one side it was history; on the other, a theatrical performance redeemed from ridicule only by the sacrifice of the miserable actors. The contrast was greatest where it was most dangerous. Men who could only talk of war as of a thousand other subjects waged it against those who lived for it alone, and who were warriors, if nothing else. On the one side were trading politicians, republican *préfets*, jealous of military command, and soldiers who had served, if at all, only against half savages; on the other side, men who lived, thought, and felt by act and rule of war, deeply imbued with its subtle skill, its hard sway, its cruel logic, and its fell liberties, enforcing its rights to the letter. The result was almost always and everywhere the same, and it is hard to say whether the incapacity of the commanders, the inadequacy of the preparations, or the unsoldierlike quality of the men, most contributed to it. The French troops, as might have been expected with raw and untrained levies, were invariably found incapable of holding positions, maintaining advances, supporting one another, or converting into a reality some momentary semblance of success. The enormous disasters with which the campaign opened were repeated, with variations of circumstances, over a third of France, and for half a year. Crowds of fighting men were surrounded and caught like shoals of fish. The only result of their courage was that after heaps fell under the fire of batteries never reached, and often not even seen, they surrendered or fled. The Great Napoleon long since told the French in the plainest terms, that it was one of their national delusions to believe that the revolutionary levies of 1793 saved France from the Allies; and the wisdom of his views has been recently even more strikingly illustrated. It is vain to think that collecting mobs of armed men in uniform, whether under the name of mobiles, sedentary guards, or volunteers, or county militia, will avail to defend a country that is seriously attacked. Massed together by the hundred thousand, as before Orleans, such a body becomes too unwieldy to move with effect, and a panic ruins it at once. Divided, as before Le Mans, it is simply exposed to be cut up in detail. Scattered out by a march over a long distance, as near Belfort, it is at the mercy of any small regular force that manœuvres boldly against it.

With regard to the siege of Paris, that a population so vast should have held out for such a lengthened period, and have willingly endured such hardships and privations, said much for the government arrangements, and did infinite credit to the patriotism of the people themselves; but, looked at from a purely military point of view, the general opinion amongst those best qualified to judge—and which was well expressed by a very able military critic in the *Saturday Review*—is, that the defence of the city was tame and passive; and that, had different weapons been adopted, the world could not have beheld the

singular spectacle of 500,000 men compelled to lay down their arms and surrender their scarcely injured forts to an army less than half their number, which had, in the open field, hemmed them in till their resources failed. Had General Trochu had as much constructive power as he undoubtedly had critical genius, the result might have been very different. From the first he seemed to have overlooked those engineering resources at his command, which might have sufficed to render the siege impracticable to the moderate number of Germans which finally triumphed over him.

Supposing there really was not sufficient time, before the Prussians came up from Sedan, to destroy thoroughly the huge belt of shelter which afterwards saved their army from being paralyzed by the frost, it would certainly have been quite possible to remove wholly the timber which they used so freely during the siege. As to the villages and detached buildings, there will probably be different opinions, and many will think that the cheapest and safest defence in the end would have been such wholesale demolition as would have deprived the Prussian corps allotted to the investment, of any ready made means of covering the continuous lines which they held throughout it in comfort. But the difficulties in the way of adopting this course were no doubt appalling; and we therefore pass from this part of the question to look at the investment completed, as it was in September, with but trifling opposition, and the outlying villages in the enemy's hands. Let us then suppose that Trochu's plans had been guided by a general of such constructive genius as Todleben, who, in view of the manifest uncertainty of relief, was prepared from the first to use all the resources at his command in an active and vigorous defence, instead of maintaining the passive attitude which was actually assumed.

Early in the siege there was at the governor's command such a supply of labour as no commander had ever before collected on one spot; nor were the other means wanting, both for strengthening the existing defences and for carrying on outside them a system of intrenchments, which would have mightily enhanced the difficulties of the problem placed before the German staff. Tools there must have been in abundance, since the resources of that vast metropolis were at the command of a firm and decided governor. There was a good supply of brushwood for fascine works in the Bois de Boulogne, and the stocks might have been largely supplemented by rough and ready expedients. Timber was plentiful, stacked in the builders' yards; and, above all, the sandbags, for rapid construction of shelter the handiest of all means, might have been made to any extent required. In short, it would have been easier to organize vast bodies of improvized pioneers with their tools, than to create out of the chaos inclosed that active army which promised so much and did so little. And in methodically fighting from the first under cover, the most irregular troops that Ducrot or Vinoy could put in line would have been almost as formidable—in a finished work certainly—as the best soldiers France had sent into the field to be slaughtered under MacMahon or entrapped with Bazaine. Such a system would have gone far to put the ill-matched forces upon an equality, even if it had not restored to the defenders the natural advantage of superior numbers.

If it be asked how the hundred thousand armed workmen, that might have been at once organized, could have been employed more profitably than the large parties which actually laboured in the later stages of the siege, we turn to the facts recorded, and point, as a single example, to what happened with regard to Mont Avron. The work thrown up on this hill was the only serious attempt made, from first to last, to extend the limits of the defence. Its mere occupation caused the Germans to erect against it a dozen batteries in a semicircle five miles long, protected by a parallel, covered by strong guards, and giving work to a whole corps. But Mont Avron was occupied by a redoubt quite detached, left destitute of bombproof shelter, and, above all, placed there nearly three months too late, when the enemy's siege train had arrived. Had Trochu been fortunate enough to have had for chief engineer an officer of such intelligence and energy as Todleben, or he to whom Belgium owes the strength of Antwerp, what could have hindered a number of such redoubts appearing early in the siege, their works pushed gradually forward, connected by cover with the place, supplied with rough bombproofs that would have made them safe from distant bombardment, and well manned by guards regularly relieved every twenty-four hours? Of course the Germans would have attacked them; the nature of the circumstances would have impelled them to do so, since otherwise

their lines would have had to recede bit by bit, and must have grown longer and weaker in receding. Let any one who wishes to understand the necessities of the supposed case remember what anxieties the first occupation of Le Bourget gave Count von Moltke, the hasty order which came to Prince Augustus, that the guards must retake it at all costs, and the heavy lists of killed and wounded to which the execution of the order led. Yet Le Bourget was merely an ordinary walled village, taken by a young brigadier, and occupied without even the care to loophole it properly before it was re-attacked. A strong work thrown out there early in the siege would have cost the Germans ten times as many men to take it as the village did at the end of October; and as their heavy guns were not then up, a similar front of offence might have been pushed forward in half-a-dozen different places simultaneously. To erect such works would have been slow and toilsome; but to prevent their advance altogether would have overtaxed the siege materials of the Germans, and by forcing them to assault would have caused a constant drain on their limited supplies of men, even in case of success; whilst one or two serious failures would have stimulated the zeal and energy of the defenders to put forth redoubled exertions, to the proportional cost of the enemy.

Had a Todleben or a Brialmont been present to advise Trochu, such a series of defences could, no doubt, have been started before the end of September; and if conducted with the vigour and skill which either of those renowned engineers would have infused, would soon have driven the Germans so far off, at more than one point, as practically to cut their circle into isolated segments; or, had the Germans effectually restrained them, it must have been at such an expense of life as of itself would have raised the siege, or at the least drawn in their detachments from all other quarters, and left their rear and communications dangerously weak. Their headquarters at Versailles might have been threatened, their depots on the railroad driven further off, and, above all, the first decided advantage gained in this manner would have given that moral impulse to the defenders which from first to last no step taken by their chiefs ever evoked among them. The effect of the most rousing proclamation, or of the most carefully coloured intelligence, is but transient; but to have held a mile or two of ground fairly won from their foes would have stimulated every soldier in the garrison to new efforts by a definite and tangible object. The battalions that wasted their time in purposeless drilling for a field they never entered would here have found useful scope for their services; and their officers, raw to their duties at first, would with practice have come to display the well-known ingenuity of their nation, so often exhibited in defences on a smaller scale.

In consequence of the tactics adopted by the French, the Germans had time to so strongly entrench their positions, and so dispose their numerous field artillery, as to enable them to hold securely any point suddenly attacked, even against very superior numbers. Yet their own forces at any given point were of necessity comparatively weak. The extent of their inner line of investment was fifty miles; that of the outer circle, occupied by the headquarters of the two besieging armies, was at least sixty-six miles. Taking fifty miles as the basis, and estimating the German force at 200,000, the average strength at any given point was only in the proportion of 4000 men to one mile. Under these circumstances, good soldiers, led by well-instructed officers, could not have been held in so long; but Trochu's army did not consist of good soldiers, and it may reasonably be doubted whether he would at any time have been justified in attempting to break clean through the German lines of investment, having no promise of assistance from without. To have done so for the mere purpose of carrying into the field beyond an army of raw soldiers of the strength just mentioned, short of provisions, short of horses, would have been to weaken the defence without gaining any corresponding advantage, save that of diminishing the number of mouths which remained inclosed. Without the requisite accessories such an army could not have sustained a campaign; and in order to subsist it would have had, even if not pressed by the Germans, to break up into separate fragments and hasten from the district near the capital. A number of recruits might possibly thus have been gained for Bourbaki and D'Aurelles; but they could have no effect upon the investment, unless the Germans had given it up for a time, and changed it into such an unremitting pursuit of their new enemy as, under the conditions supposed, would have insured his destruction. No

real attempt was, in fact, ever made to carry the army through the lines, except on the one occasion when Trochu's information led him to suppose that D'Aurelles was approaching Fontainebleau in November, with the vast train of supplies known to have been gathered behind his intrenched camp at Orleans. A junction with him thus provided would have put matters on altogether a different footing from the mere escape of 100,000 or 150,000 men out of the lines with three days' rations in their haversacks; and the position assigned for the meeting would have planted the French so threateningly on the flank of the German communications, as to have caused the instant and complete abandonment of the investment. This was the only practical attempt at strategic combination shown during the four months' siege; but it was foiled doubly in its execution, by the superiority in tactical power of Prince Frederick Charles' army to that of the army of the Loire, and by the failure of Ducrot to win sufficient ground beyond the loops of the Marne to enable him to develop his masses of men on a broad front, and so make some decisive use of his superiority of numbers.

Yet admitting that Trochu was probably right in determining not to risk bodies of his troops in the open field without supplies and unsupported, even supposing they could force a passage by surprise, his plan of waiting for relief from without, and holding his defences passively until it came, stands self-condemned by the results. The intermediate course of an active and vigorous resistance, so active and vigorous as to have placed the besiegers, with their inferior numbers, practically on the defensive, was, as we have said, hardly thought of, and rejected as too difficult and laborious. At least, no systematic effort was made to carry it out.

With regard to the bombardment of the city by the Germans, that is also now admitted to have been a mistake and failure. In the words of the able and very impartial military correspondent of the *Times*, "There was nothing gained by it; not a single day sooner did Paris yield. No practicable breach was formed except one, very small, in the rear of Fort Montrouge. There was, in fact, no military effect whatever from the bombardment of Paris."

The final German triumph at Paris was undoubtedly somewhat marred by the thought, that another month of the same patience which they had shown till the new year opened would have given them uninjured the prize they sought. The very works surrendered into their hands to save the lives of the starving multitude within, must have seemed to reproach silently the hasty counsels of those who led the emperor-king from his original plan to adopt sharper measures, which proved abortive and fruitless. The conquest so won was stained by what was then plainly seen to have been a superfluous use of the resources of war. For more than three months the German staff held to the resolve to reduce Paris by starvation, and there is no reason to doubt that they could have maintained their lines throughout intact for that purpose. After suddenly changing their minds and beginning a direct double attack by bombardment and approach, the capital fell, before either of these methods had in any way affected its powers of resistance, under the inevitable pressure of coming famine. In using the other modes the Germans were not, of course, going beyond their rights. A capital which, for strategic ends, has been deliberately turned into a fortress, is beyond dispute liable to be treated as a fortress.

A great deal of angry recrimination passed between Count von Bismarck and M. de Chandordy, delegate of the French Foreign minister, respecting the general conduct of the war by the respective belligerents. The Frenchman accused the Germans of committing needless and unjustifiable atrocities while overrunning his country; and the Count retorted by counter-charges of using explosive bullets, barbarities committed by Turcos, burning and scuttling of German merchantmen, and systematic disregard of the Geneva convention. None of the despatches, however, drawn up under the influence inspired by war, can be looked upon as impartial or altogether reliable. They all naturally took their tone from exaggerated statements, and from reports and testimony distorted by passion or by suffering.

The concurrent testimony of all observers was that, at the opening of the campaign, the conduct of the German troops was excellent; they were not more remarkable for courage and discipline than for honourable treatment of the invaded country. The picture was subsequently darkened; complaints were made that the German leaders acted like Tilly and Wallenstein; and dreadful stories were told of murdered free-shooters, of villages burnt by way of reprisals, of barbarous executions, of innocent citizens made hostages, of devastation carried out

on system, as if by the savage hordes of Attila. According to the remark of the old Greek, that human nature in the same circumstances is usually pretty nearly the same, we can easily account for these things, without imputing any peculiar guilt, or even ferocity, to the German armies. In the first place—and this unhappily is attested throughout the history of our race—prolonged war makes men indifferent to the sight of suffering; the soldier who knows he may die to-morrow becomes reckless of the miseries of others; and we cannot doubt that a change like this passed over the character of the invaders of France as the contest went on and deepened. In the second place, the system of requisitions pursued by the German commanders—a system, it must be said with regret, perhaps necessary in a campaign conducted on such an enormous scale—has invariably been attended with the consequences before mentioned. Forced contributions generate resistance among the non-combatant population; this leads to a guerilla warfare, which compels the generals of the invading army to exercise severities of all kinds, unhappily often without discrimination; for no officer will allow his men to be destroyed, and his army perhaps endangered, by irregular bands of armed peasants.

In the course of a letter addressed to his daughter by an officer of high rank at the German head-quarters, the following passages occurred:—"I have now been for four months in the thick of the war. You know that I am just to friend and foe, and have a feeling heart for any suffering on whatever side. This much premised, I can assert with a good conscience that so great and sanguinary a war has never been conducted with so little suffering or hardship. That in isolated cases things happen on both sides which, without exact information and inquiry, might be denounced as barbarities, is quite conceivable in a struggle in which unchained passions are so powerfully excited. Never before, however, have three-fourths of all wanted by the troops been supplied from the victor's country, or bought for ready money from the enemy, in order to spare the country visited by the war. *It has never come to my ears or those of my many acquaintances that a German soldier has ill-treated a French woman.* The entire contributions hitherto (December, 1870) levied by our armies, do not reach the sum exacted by the French under Napoleon from many a large town in Germany, although money was worth much more then than now. As evidence of the discipline of our troops, I may mention that while in France, with the exception of a single case at Nancy, I have not seen a drunken German soldier. In numberless cases our troops have, at the request of officials or communities, protected private property against attacks by Frenchmen—*e.g.*, the champagne vineyards."

We give these extracts as only fair statements, especially in regard to the treatment of French women; and we may remark that many alleged atrocities, the subject of comment all over Europe at the time—such, for instance, as the reported roasting alive of a franc-tireur near Dijon—appeared in quite a different light upon closer inquiry. Whatever wrongs may have been committed under the excitement of the war, the authorities of both sides willingly rendered homage to the leading international principles of civilization, and in their despatches earnestly endeavoured to justify themselves in the eyes of Europe for any violation of the sacred duties of humanity.

LIST OF THE GERMAN VICTORIES; THE TOTAL LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES; AND THE TERRITORIAL ALTERATIONS MADE BY THE WAR.

In a previous part of this chapter we have pointed out the disastrous consequences to France of her unpreparedness for the war, and we will here present a summary of the results accruing to Germany through her superior mobility, organization, and numbers. War was declared on July 15, 1870, and terminated February 16, 1871, after lasting 210 days. In the first week after the declaration of war the German troops were mobilized, their despatch to the west and disposition along the Trèves-Landau line requiring nearly a fortnight. The troops sent to the frontier amounted to over 500,000 men, and to bring the whole mass up in a fortnight about 42,000 had to be conveyed by rail per day. The transport was effected on five lines, two of which, however, were but little used. Besides the men, there were horses, guns, carriages, ammunition, and provisions to be sent. Four Prussian corps d'armée, to get to the French frontier, had to travel a distance of from 400 to 600 miles, and had to be fed on the way. As in the first few days of the campaign, and during the last period, there were no engagements, the war

was practically reduced to 180 days. In the course of these there were considerably more than 100 engagements, besides twenty-one great battles, the chronological order of the latter being—Wissembourg, Woerth, Spicheren, Courcelles, Vionville, Gravelotte, Beaumont, Sedan, Noisseville (before Metz), Beaune-la-Rollande, the three battles round Orleans, Amiens, Champigny and Brie (before Paris), Beaugency, Bapaume, Vendôme, Le Mans, Belfort, St. Quentin, and the great sortie against St. Cloud. Twenty-six fortresses were taken, namely, Lutzelstein, Lichtenberg, Marsal, Vitry, Sedan, Laon, Toul, Strassburg, Soissons, Schlestadt, Metz, Verdun, Montbeliard, Neu-Breisach, Ham, Thionville, La Fére, the citadel of Amiens, Phalsbourg, Montmèdy, Mézières, Rocroi, Péronne, Longwy, Paris, and Belfort. Reckoning only those actually transported to German fortresses and towns, 11,650 officers and 363,000 rank and file were made prisoners. The prisoners at the capitulation of Paris amounted to nearly 500,000, that being the number actually engaged in the defence of the city. Had not the war closed with the fall of the capital, these also would most likely have been transferred to Germany. Of the ill-fated army under Bourbaki 84,900 were driven across the frontier and compelled to lay down their arms in Switzerland, and fully 20,000 fled into Belgium after the battles of Metz and Sedan. The total number of prisoners and of fugitives interned in neighbouring states thus amounts to the extraordinary total of nearly one million. The quantity of arms and other warlike material captured was equally remarkable, and altogether unprecedented in any former war. Thus at the Alma the Allies took two colours and two guns, at Inkermann they lost three guns, and at the storming of the Malakoff one standard and thirty-one guns were captured. The number of prisoners in the campaign did not exceed 6000. The entire spoils of the French in 1859 consisted of three colours, twenty-six guns, and 16,000 prisoners. The Prussians, on the other hand, took at Düppel nineteen colours, 119 guns, and 3400 prisoners; at Alsen, thirteen colours, ninety-nine guns, and 2494 prisoners; at Königgratz, seven colours, 161 guns, and 19,800 prisoners; altogether in 1866, thirteen colours, 208 guns, and 49,000 prisoners. The more formidable total of 1870-71 consisted of 6700 guns (including mitrailleuses), 120 eagles and colours, and sufficient chassepots to equip the entire German army. Such large stores of cloth were captured at Metz and Le Mans as sufficed to renew the whole of the uniforms required; and notwithstanding the great number of horses which perished, the end of the war found Germany richer than before in this description of live stock—Sedan and other battlefields having yielded far more than the number lost.

The losses of both combatants were in proportion to the magnitude and fierceness of the operations of the campaign. Considering the hasty and confused manner in which the French forces were collected after Sedan, it is doubtful if accurate returns of their loss can ever be forthcoming. Some months after the campaign closed the numbers were returned as 89,000 "killed;" and if this is to be taken as including wounded and missing, the German loss far exceeded it, for the entire loss of Germany has been ascertained to have been about 180,000—rather more than half of whom are invalided.

The most costly fight to the Germans was that of Vionville, on August 16, 1870, when, in order to prevent the escape of Marshal Bazaine's army, more than 17,000 men were sacrificed. There was a great disparity of numbers in the battle, as 45,000 Prussians fought from 8 a.m. till 4 p.m., at first against 160,000 and by noon against nearly 200,000 French. Another instance of similar disparity was at Belfort, where about 36,000 Prussians and Badeners maintained a three days' battle against Bourbaki's army of nearly 130,000. There were instances, on the other hand, in which the disparity was reversed—notably at Wissembourg and Woerth, where, although the fortune of the day was in the end against them, the French undoubtedly made a most gallant and heroic stand. Gravelotte, also, was a most costly and hardly-won victory, although full 270,000 Germans confronted less than 210,000 French—including, however, the *élite* of the army.

Losses in men and warlike material to a certain extent were what France must have laid her account with in entering upon the campaign. That the loss should have been far beyond all precedent was what she might in time have become reconciled to, had even a small measure of success attended her arms. Unfortunately, the terms of peace which she was eventually obliged to accept involved sacrifices inflicting a rankling wound, which it is to be feared time alone will never

heal. Alison observes that, "The policy of the Allies, when dictating terms to France in 1814, was founded on a noble spirit—it rested on the principle of eradicating hostility by generosity, and avenging injury by forgiveness. The result proved that, in doing so, they proceeded on too exalted an estimate of human nature." The Germans of 1871 comfort themselves by reflecting, that they profited by the teachings of history and avoided the errors of their forefathers. Without seeking to eradicate hostility by generosity, they calculated on France nursing the spirit of vengeance and retaliation; and their one aim in dictating the terms of peace was to make her enter on any future war with Germany with the odds heavily against her. The population of Alsace and Lorraine had so conclusively shown their wish to be united to France, as to satisfy their conquerors that, in spite of their common language, they would have to treat them as vanquished aliens. There was therefore no pretence of moderation, nor any further talk of uniting to Germany the lands torn from her in past ages. By a turn of events as surprising to the conquerors as to the rest of the world, France had in a few months been so utterly crushed that Germany could ask of her what she liked. That which she asked was safety, as absolute and complete as possible. She might perhaps have had more, but she obtained all she wanted; and the maximum of military defence with the minimum of disaffected population, sufficiently explains why the demand was made for only a fifth of Lorraine with Metz, and the other four-fifths were allowed to remain French.

Had no loss of territory been involved, peace might doubtless have been arranged after the collapse of the empire and army at Sedan; and many deeply sympathized with France in the agony of dismemberment she had struggled so heroically but vainly to resist. The Germans, however, listened neither to the counsels of neutrals in the matter, nor to pleadings urged in the name of the civilization of the nineteenth century. One idea filled their minds, that France would seize the earliest opportunity of making war upon them again. The Allies, they said, in 1814 were very moderate towards France, and Prussia especially failed in her desire to obtain a good military frontier on the French side, because, it was said, the way to keep France quiet was to treat her generously. Since then one generation of her people after another, almost every statesman, and every political chief, had been hungering for the Rhenish provinces and threatening Germany with war. Government after government had arisen in the country, some of them upholding social order, some singing the pæans of humanity and rushing into the arms of universal brotherhood; but all alike, royalist, imperial, or republican, good or bad, liberal or illiberal, thirsting for the left bank of the Rhine. In a moment of profound peace war had been made upon Germany, on a pretext so frivolous that the warmest partizans of France were scandalized. There was now a chance of making the French see that war with Germany would henceforth be a very serious thing, and the opportunity was used to the full. The Germans were told that to cripple and humiliate France unduly could not be for the good of Europe. They replied that they had first to think of themselves; and that in July, 1870, a strong military frontier would have been of much more use to them than any preservation of the balance of power. They were taunted with forcing men into citizenship with them by tearing them from France, and with thus violating the unwritten laws of advancing civilization. But they closed their ears, like deaf adders, to all this, and listened only to the voice that bade them think of their own safety. Of course there were many who thought that the policy of Germany was due simply to a greedy and relentless extortion, which had always been one of her principal characteristics—a view on which we here pronounce no judgment. We have merely endeavoured to give as faithfully as possible the reasons in support of the territorial claim advanced by the government and by the principal organs of public opinion throughout Germany.

Were the terms of peace to be judged apart from any political or national aspect, and solely in the highest interests of mankind, it could perhaps be wished that Germany had displayed a magnanimity unparalleled in history, by declining to take any French territory, and resolving to abide the consequences. She might have suffered for her magnanimity, but a magnanimity that counts the risk it runs is the highest and most ennobling of virtues. The world would have been a better world had Germany, relying on her own strength, refused additional guarantees for her security. The Germans, however, in their intense horror of the miseries of war, and under the irritation caused

by the constant restlessness and aggressiveness of France, could not bring themselves to set before mankind so elevating a spectacle. They were bent upon security; and so far as that is possible, to all human views they attained their object.

The territory conceded is 5580 square miles in area, or about equal in extent to that of the three departments of the Haut Rhin, Bas Rhin, and Moselle. It is inhabited by 1,597,219 people, 200,000 of whom are French, the rest German, or mixed, in race and language, but all strongly French in feeling. The new frontier line begins at Cattenom, near Longwy, on the borders of the duchy of Luxemburg, and takes a southern course, having Thionville, Metz, Château-Salins, on the east (all of which therefore now belong to Germany); and Verdun, Toul, Nancy, and Luneville, on the west. After cutting a corner off the department of the Vosges, the line then coincides with the western boundary of the department of the Haut Rhin as far as the canton of Belfort, which it leaves to France by striking off to the canton of Delle, between which town and Joncherey it terminates on the Swiss frontier. Germany is thus advanced about 100 miles nearer Paris, and comes into possession of a long line of forts invaluable for defensive purposes. The principal are Metz la Pucelle, Thionville, Strassburg, Schlestadt, Bitsche, Marsal, Neu Breisach, Phalsbourg, and Hagenau; while amongst the towns are Colmar, Mulhausen, Guebwiller, Molsheim, Saverne, Château-Salins, Sarreguemines, and Forbach. Thus the whole department of the Bas Rhin, the greater portion of the Moselle, the Meurthe, and the Haut Rhin, and a small corner of the Vosges, are comprised in the concession, which may be more briefly described as the whole of Alsace (minus Belfort) and about a fifth of Lorraine.

The annexation of this strip of land, narrow as it looks upon the map, entirely reverses the relative military positions of France and Germany. Up to July, 1870, France had the aggressive position. Metz, with its recently built forts, was her sally-port towards the German left bank of the Rhine, as Strassburg was towards South Germany. Either of these places was important enough to serve as a base of operations for a large field army; while on the German side the nearest base opposed to Metz was Mayence, opposed to Strassburg, Ulm—both places a long way to the rear. By its geographical configuration, the ground on the German side does not furnish any nearer positions of sufficient strategical importance to make it worth while turning them into large fortresses, and thus the whole of the German left bank of the Rhine, and a large portion of Southern Germany, including all Baden and Würtemburg, were always open to French invasion. There was only one way to meet this danger—the way made use of in this war—that the Germans, ready before the French, should concentrate the whole of their force on the border line between the Moselle and the Rhine, and invade France in their turn. In that case, however, a lost battle would have driven them back to Mayence and across the Rhine, and laid open all Baden and Würtemburg.

Thus the German Rhine fortresses, Germersheim, Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, though forming a strong line in themselves, were a protection only to the country behind them—that is to say, to the country east of the Rhine and north of the Main. The fortresses situated in advance of the Rhine, Landau, Saarlouis, and even Luxemburg, were of no great importance; at most, they closed lines of railway, but none of them could arrest the march of an army.

In his speech on the government of the newly-acquired territory in the German Parliament in May, 1872, Prince Bismarck said that Germany could not permit the state of things we have described to continue, and it would have been suicidal on her part not to have availed herself of the opportunity offered by the war to amend it. He regretted to say that some other powers had not been of that opinion. These powers had not been particularly gratified by the determination of Germany to recover her lost provinces; and when they found her firm had proposed that the affair should be compromised either by a dismantling of the Alsace and Lorraine fortresses, or by the formation of Alsace and Lorraine into an independent and neutralized state, protected by a European guarantee. For Germany it had been quite impossible to entertain either of these suggestions. A joint guarantee might be valuable enough, had not some states been latterly in the habit of explaining it away the moment after acceding to it. Besides, even if honestly enforced, no guarantee could have prevented France from attacking the German shores, while Germany, with a small fleet and cut off from France by an

intermediate barrier of neutralized states, would have been powerless to reciprocate. As to the idea of razing the fortresses, this would have inflicted upon France a more severe humiliation than the mere loss of territory. It would have deprived France of the right to exercise her sovereignty in a portion of her own territory—a penalty which no great state is likely to submit to long. Add to this that the Alsatians would not have been very good neutrals, and it was clear that there remained nothing but to solve the difficulty by downright annexation.

The treaty of peace completely reversed the military position of the two countries. By the possession of Strassburg and all Alsace, the whole line of the Rhine, up to Basel, became German property; and Strassburg, flanked to the south by Schlestadt and Neu Breisach, from a sallyport against South Germany, becomes its chief and central bulwark, the Vosges range forming the first line of defence. North of Strassburg, even the western slopes of these hills belong to Germany, and with them the small places of Phalsbourg, Petite Pierre, Lichtenberg, and Bitsche, which more or less effectively command the passes. Thus South Germany received not only a powerful barrier against French aggression, but also a strong basis of operation, with the roads prepared and secured, for attack against France.

But this is only the least important point. The transfer of Metz gave the Germans a power of attacking France such as she would obtain against Germany by the possession of the whole left bank of the Rhine, with all its fortresses and their bridge-heads on the right bank. If the French had Coblenz with Ehrenbreitstein and Mayence with Castel, then Germany would be in the same weak strategical position relatively to France that she is now in with regard to Germany. The possession of Metz advanced the German base of attack against France by fully 120 miles. It gave them a stronghold superior in natural position, engineering strength, and extent, to any one they had before, situated exactly where they must wish such a powerful outpost of their Rhenish system of fortification to be—flanked, moreover, to the north by Thionville and by Luxemburg. And, just as beyond the Rhine, in the interior of Germany, there are scarcely any points naturally adapted for large fortresses to bar the road to Berlin, so there is, west of the Moselle, the same dearth of strategical positions capable of being turned to account in keeping the enemy at a distance from Paris. With the Germans in Metz, the road to Paris is open to them, as soon as the French army in the field shall have lost one great battle. Verdun and Toul, with Frouard or Nancy, might hereafter be formed into a system of fortifications, but they could never counterbalance or replace Metz; and between the Meuse and Paris there appears to be no position, were it ever so much fortified, where a defeated army could arrest the conquerors.

On the other hand, were the German army to be beaten before Metz, the garrison of that fortress (unless the whole army blundered into it, as was done in August, 1870) would hold in check more than twice its numbers, and the whole territory between the Moselle and the Rhine would remain disputed ground until Metz were again reduced by the French. No army will like to undertake the reduction of two such places as Metz and Mayence at one and the same time, unless the enemy repeat the Bonapartist campaign of 1870, which is not to be expected. Thus the possession of Metz enables the Germans, in case of defeat, to carry on the campaign for at least a couple of months on the left bank of the Rhine, and to weaken a successful enemy to a serious extent before he arrives on that river, their main line of defence.

In the same spirit in which the Germans claimed Metz and the line of the Vosges, they further insisted on making France pay the largest indemnity it could afford. The terms as to money, no less than as to territory, appeared merciless. Eminent financiers were solemnly summoned to consider how much could be squeezed out of France; and the sum of two hundred millions was by them scientifically ascertained to be the extremest burden the camel could bear without breaking its back. The Germans, of course, liked the money for its own sake, and no nation on earth was more likely to prize a windfall of £200,000,000 sterling. But perhaps their main idea was not the mere pocketing of this magnificent prize, but to obtain a guarantee of safety. A very heavily taxed nation shrinks from war, and France for the next quarter of a century will be most severely taxed in proportion to her resources and population. Altogether she will be fortunate if, in 1874, when the indemnity is paid, she has a debt of less than £1,200,000,000 sterling, and a mortgage of less than £40,000,000 a year upon her industry. For many years she

will thus be exposed to all the disorders which heavy taxes, constant deficits, and revolutionary finance experiments bring in their train. It is true that in course of time peace and industry may make the augmented debt felt as little as that of 1870. This, however, must be a slow process, and meanwhile France, under the penalty of risking national bankruptcy, will be bound over to keep the peace towards Germany; while the latter, with £200,000,000 to make good its losses, and enriched by the industry and commerce of Alsace, may count on keeping ahead in the race, and entering on a future war with a sounder financial system and a more solid credit than France can hope for.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS ISSUED AFTER THE WAR.

After the conclusion of the war most of the leading actors on the French side published defences or explanations of the various parts they had taken in it. In fact, so great was the flood of publications on the subject, that such a profusion of information, instead of enlightening the reader, only bewildered him. It seems necessary, however, in dealing with the consequences and results of the war, to notice a few of the works which bear very specially on some of the chief events narrated, and which, in one or two instances, throw a little additional light upon them, without, however, on any material point affecting the truth of our original statements with regard to them.

Perhaps the most historically important and remarkable work of all was that of Count Benedetti, explaining the relations between France and Prussia from 1864 to 1871, and especially with regard to the celebrated secret treaty, as to the annexation of Belgium by France, which caused so much consternation in England, and which is fully described in Chapter III. Soon after the secret treaty was divulged, Count Benedetti took occasion to publish a letter to the effect that, although the treaty was in his handwriting, it was written by him *purely at the suggestion and dictation* of Prince Bismarck. This statement might possibly have been allowed to stand unchallenged, had not Count Benedetti, at the close of the war, become infected with the prevailing mania of rushing into print in further justification of his conduct. In his work, "Ma Mission en Prusse," he stated that when the negotiation as to Belgium was going on, he communicated solely with M. Rouher, and as his correspondence was not official, he could not refer his readers to any official record of it; but so extremely scrupulous was he, that he *would not write a line the accuracy of which could not be verified.* Thus all that passed between him and the French government, while the negotiations were in progress, was necessarily buried in darkness. Still he could give his readers the general tenor of this buried correspondence, and he particularly requested them to treasure in their minds two great truths—that the proposal for the annexation of Belgium to France was, in his words, a purely Prussian conception, as he merely embodied in the famous draught treaty the suggestions of Count von Bismarck ; and secondly, *that the emperor would have nothing to do with the annexation of Belgium, and would only take Luxemburg*, whereas Count von Bismarck offered, in return for Prussia being allowed to consolidate its power from the Baltic to the Alps, that France should first get Luxemburg and then Belgium.

The luckless diplomatist was not aware that the French government, to aggravate the humiliation they had brought upon themselves, had left the most important state papers to be seized by the invader at St. Cloud. The fact, however, was that while, in honour of himself and the imperial government, M. Benedetti was printing the above version of what had happened, his enemies were in possession of the documents which he supposed were for ever safe in the custody of M. Rouher, and of which they availed themselves as soon as M. Benedetti's work appeared. According to these documents, what really happened in the latter half of August, 1866, with regard to Belgium, seems to have been as follows:—On the 12th the emperor wrote to M. Benedetti to say that he finally abandoned all claim to Mayence and to the left bank of the Rhine. It is acknowledged by both parties, that the emperor's reasons for doing so were, that Count von Bismarck had plainly told M. Benedetti a week before that to persist in such a demand meant instant war. On August 16 a diplomatic messenger was sent from Paris with a letter of instructions to M. Benedetti to make new demands; and these instructions Count von Bismarck used as the weapon to annihilate the pretensions of M. Benedetti after the publication of his volume. After a caution as to the strictly confidential character of the negotiations, the letter proceeded, "In proportion to the chance of

success our demands will have to be graduated as follows:—In the first place, you will have to combine into one proposition the recovery of the frontiers of 1814 and *the annexation of Belgium.* You have, therefore, to ask for the extradition, by formal treaty, of Landau, Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and the duchy of Luxemburg; and you have to aim at the annexation of Belgium, by the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty *which is to be kept secret.* Secondly, should this basis appear to promise no result, you will resign Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and even Landau, which, after all, is but a dilapidated nest of a place, the occupation of which might excite German national feeling against us. In this eventuality your public agreement will be confined to the duchy of Luxemburg, and your secret treaty to the reunion of Belgium with France. Thirdly, supposing a clear and unmistakable reference to the incorporation of Belgium is found unpalatable, you are authorized to assent to a clause in which, to obviate the intervention of England, Antwerp is declared a free city. In no case, however, are you to permit the reunion of Antwerp with Holland, or the incorporation of Maestricht with Prussia.

"Should Herr von Bismarck put the question, what advantage would accrue to him from such a treaty, the simple reply would be, that he would thereby secure a powerful ally; that he would consolidate his recent acquisitions; that he was only desired to consent to the cession of what does not belong to him; and that he makes no sacrifice at all to be compared to his gains. To sum up, the *minimum* we require is an ostensible treaty which gives us Luxemburg, and a secret treaty, which, stipulating for an offensive and defensive alliance, *leaves us the chance of annexing Belgium at the right moment*, Prussia engaging to assist us, if necessary, by force of arms, in carrying out this purpose."

These instructions of August 16 were answered by Count Benedetti in a letter dated Berlin, August 23, and commenting upon it, in replying to his book, published in 1871, Prince Bismarck drily observed that "this letter, which is entirely in his own hand, like so many other interesting documents of the same kind, is at this moment in the possession of the German Foreign Office." In the letter Count Benedetti told his correspondent that he had received his communication, and would conform as closely as possible to the principles laid down in it. He inclosed a draught treaty, explaining that he preferred one treaty to two; that he found Landau and Saarbrück unattainable, and that he had accordingly kept to Luxemburg and Belgium. The Germans had also got hold of the reply to Count Benedetti's letter from the French government. A general approval was given to his draught; but whereas the fourth article contemplated the extension of Prussian supremacy south of the Main, and the fifth provided for the annexation of Belgium, the French government wished it to be made clear that the latter article was not to be regarded as only binding if the former had been carried out. "It is obvious that the extension of the supremacy of Prussia across the Main will, as a matter of course, compel us to seize Belgium. But the same necessity may be brought on by other events, on which subject we must reserve to ourselves exclusively the right to judge."

Amendments to carry out the views of the French government were added on the margin of M. Benedetti's draught treaty, and as thus amended, it also fell into the hands of the German government. On the receipt of his revised draught, Count Benedetti presented to Count von Bismarck a draught treaty incorporating the amendments with his original handiwork, and this was the treaty which Count von Bismarck published to the world in 1870. When, however, M. Benedetti came to discuss the project he was disappointed at the reception he met with; and he wrote home on the 29th of August, expressing for the first time a doubt whether France could count on the sincerity of Prussia, which, according to his belief, had succeeded in establishing an alliance with Russia, that might lead to the co-operation of France being refused. The whole matter, for the time at least, thus dropped, and secret negotiations were suspended for several months.

These documents entirely disposed of M. Benedetti's case, which was that the suggestion for the annexation of Belgium came solely from Count von Bismarck, at whose dictation the draught treaty had been written; and that the treaty was at once rejected by the French government, which would have nothing to do with the annexation of Belgium. In short, Count Benedetti's story was shown by the documents of his own government to be entirely untrue.

In so far as regards France, there is the clearest

evidence of her determined design upon Belgium, and the French government had actually condescended to calculate what it might be necessary to provide as a sop to appease England. It is more difficult to say what was the true history of the part played by Count von Bismarck and Prussia in the matter. A part of M. Benedetti's book is proved to have been utterly false, but other parts the Prussian minister by no means explained. All that is really proved by the emperor's instructions of August 16 to Count Benedetti is, that the French government was plotting to seize Belgium, while he—anxious to put his government forth as a paragon of virtue—endeavoured to make the world believe that France would not have Belgium, even if offered. Prince Bismarck's revelations would have us infer that the proposal to lay hands on Belgium originated with her, but this by no means follows. Louis Napoleon had manifested considerable uneasiness at the growing power of Prussia, and could not but see that it was quite possible for him to prevent the easy subjugation of Austria in the war of 1866. He thought it reasonable, therefore, to inquire of Count von Bismarck, what compensation he might expect in return for allowing Prussia unmolested to absorb German territory on all hands. The idea of French interference evidently caused great uneasiness in Prussia; and on the 6th of June (more than two months prior to the letter of instructions above quoted) M. Benedetti wrote to his government that Count von Bismarck had told him that the compensation France might require in consideration of any future territorial aggrandizement of Prussia must be sought in a French-speaking district. This, it appears to us, was the first intimation of the secret treaty business. Count von Bismarck wished to disarm the hostility of Napoleon III., and in order to this he chose to keep dangling before him the prospect of an accession of territory to France at no risk or cost to himself. By this device he was completely taken in, and confirmed in his intention of maintaining an absolute neutrality between Prussia and Austria. On the 16th of July M. Benedetti wrote that Count von Bismarck had pressed on him the advantages of an alliance between the two countries. On his objection that to take the compensation offered would involve a breach of international treaties, Bismarck replied that if France and Prussia were united they need not fear armed resistance either from Russia or England. On the 26th of July M. Benedetti wrote again, that he should be telling the French Foreign minister nothing new in saying that Count von Bismarck "is of opinion that we ought to seek compensation in Belgium, and has offered to come to an understanding with France on this head." All these letters, written from time to time by M. Benedetti, in the ordinary course of his business, for the exclusive and private information of his own government, were published in his book, and their accuracy was certainly not impugned by anything Prince Bismarck afterwards published.

Putting all the accounts together, therefore, we think it is not very difficult to guess what really happened. Prince Bismarck was, in June and July, 1866, very much afraid of France helping Austria, and thought it expedient to agree that the former should have some makeweight to counterpoise the increased power of Prussia. As he did not wish to give up German soil, he suggested that France should take Belgium. France did not at all approve of this. She did not wish to get into a great international quarrel, and held that, as it was Prussia that was winning, she it was that ought to pay. France demanded Mayence and the left bank of the Rhine. Count von Bismarck rejoined that, rather than agree, he would prefer war. France backed out of the demand, but immediately caught at his suggestion for the annexation of Belgium, with, however, a demand for Luxemburg and a slice of Germany. Count von Bismarck would consent to no infraction of German territory, but was quite open to discuss what compensation he was to receive for Luxemburg and Belgium. During all this time that he was keeping France and M. Benedetti in play, he was arranging a Russian alliance; and no sooner had that point been gained than he threw M. Benedetti and his draught treaty to the winds, and vowed that he could never have the heart to do anything distasteful to England.

Under the title of "A Ministry of War for Twenty-four Days," Count de Palikao endeavoured to shuffle all the responsibility of the march to Sedan off his shoulders, and to justify the other acts of his administration. He admitted having been the author of the plan which proved so disastrous to MacMahon, but endeavoured to show that it was founded upon military considerations suggested by a former well-known campaign of Dumouriez in the Argonne. Dumouriez marched

from Sedan southwards and won the decisive battle of Valmy; therefore Count de Palikao thought if MacMahon marched northward towards Sedan he too would win a great battle over the sons of those who were defeated at Valmy. "When I conceived the march of the army of Châlons on Metz, in order to operate its junction with that of Marshal Bazaine," says the War minister of twenty-four days, "I understood that Dumouriez's plan could be executed in an inverse sense, that is to say, by a rapid march from the valley of the Marne to the valley of the Meuse." In Chapter X. of this work we have expressed our opinion that the sending of MacMahon northwards in the attempt to relieve Bazaine was one of the most striking examples in all history in which military were sacrificed to political considerations; and notwithstanding Count Palikao's explanations, to that opinion we still adhere.

From M. J. Valfrey's "History of French Diplomacy since the 6th September," and the official documents published by M. Jules Favre, we obtain a clear insight into the extraordinary part played by M. Gambetta in the misfortunes of France, and some very interesting details respecting the mission of M. Thiers to this and other countries in September, 1871. The mission intrusted to M. Thiers was the opening of a series of illusions destined to be dispelled by a terribly painful experience; and the manœuvres of M. Gambetta to paralyze the small results of the mission inaugurated what may be called the "era of patriotic falsehoods." It was an understood thing that, with M. Gambetta, "country" was synonymous with "republic;" if no republic there was no country; to save the country, therefore, it was necessary to save the republic. But if the republic signed a disastrous peace it was lost. This was the reason why, after the 4th of September, M. Gambetta was ever found impeding all attempts at a peace, or even an armistice. Before leaving Paris by balloon he was hostile to the pacific projects of M. Jules Favre, and he found a powerful auxiliary in the famous "plan" of General Trochu; at the end of October he resisted in his despatches the attempts at an armistice made by M. Thiers; in February, at Bordeaux, he voted against peace. His conduct was consistent, and from his own point of view irreproachable.

M. Thiers had been charged by the government of the 4th September with a mission to all the great powers, the main object of which was, if possible, to draw them into alliances with France, so as to continue the war and expel the Germans from French territory. Where, however, the Emperor Napoleon in the fulness of his power, and his cousin Prince Napoleon, had, after a first disaster, been unsuccessful, there could be little chance for the representative of a country without an army and without a government. Besides, these projects of coalition "against the common enemy" were little likely to be favourably entertained by cabinets accustomed to look upon France as "the common enemy." In case of the failure of these projects M. Thiers was to induce the various powers to remonstrate strongly with Germany upon the exorbitancy of her demands. But to extort from Germany better terms than she deemed equitable was a task which would have required the combined efforts of Europe—a task, withal, in which it was doubtful whether Russia would, or Austria could, co-operate. It would be hard to say what England alone, or even England with Italy, could have done for France after Sedan; and M. Thiers should have considered how little influenced France herself would have been by the mere remonstrances of Europe, had the Prussian armies been overpowered in two pitched battles, Mayence and Coblenz besieged, and the French van-guard in sight of Berlin.

In spite of his quick intelligence, M. Thiers did not at once perceive how difficult it would be to turn the opinion of Europe in favour of France, or instead of listening to his fears, he obeyed only the promptings of his devotion to his country. He went to London, and there proved in lengthy conversations, to his own satisfaction at least, how necessary France was to the equilibrium of Europe and to the happiness of mankind. He was listened to, as he always had been, with deference, with sympathy, and even with pleasure; but Lord Granville answered that England "did not mean to go to war; that by interfering in behalf of the neutral powers she might run a risk of offending Prussia, who would not put up with her intervention; and that such an intervention might do more harm than good." He added, that England had already paid the penalty sure to fall on all neutrality; that she had given offence to both belligerents, and the Germans complained of her too great partiality to France. M. Thiers insisted that the course England had followed, and was

bent on following, would cause her to fall from her rank among nations, and that her inaction, under present circumstances, amounted to connivance with Prussia, as it would necessarily turn to her advantage.

The English minister had, however, made up his mind not to compromise his country on any account. Her Majesty's government were fully aware of the futility of offering mediation between two belligerents who could not agree upon a basis of negotiation. They had brought the two plenipotentiaries face to face at Ferrières, and there left them to do the best they could together.

M. Thiers next went to Vienna, charmed Count Beust, thought that he had won him over, and went on to St. Petersburg. There all was cordiality and goodwill; the Emperor Alexander was understood to renew his promise that the French territory should be spared; this was much. Returning to Vienna, M. Thiers was received with good words, but it was necessary to make sure of Italy. King Victor Emmanuel was frankness itself; he acceded to everything asked by him, provided that his cabinet consented, but the cabinet did not consent. These great armies, this general rising announced by M. Gambetta, were they indeed real? M. Thiers, speaking officially, had no doubt about them, but when he spoke in his own name he was full of anxieties. His sad pilgrimage over, he returned to the government of the Delegation, bringing with him, besides the fair words which he everywhere received, a telegram from the Emperor Alexander to the king of Prussia, the object of which was to arrange for the entrance of M. Thiers into Paris, and to facilitate overtures for an armistice. If the Delegation approved, the telegram would be sent. At Tours the proposal was met by a similar proposal from the British cabinet. The combination decided their acceptance; for fear of showing unreasonable stubbornness, M. Gambetta yielded. While apparently joining in the opinion of his colleagues, however, he drew up privately for the government of Defence a long despatch, intended to precede M. Thiers and to destroy beforehand the effect of his speeches and his advice. This despatch may be said to throw a full light upon the character of M. Gambetta, as well as upon this episode of a very dark story. Overpowered by the authority of M. Thiers, M. Gambetta gave his vote for peace, but by underhand means he endeavoured to make it impossible. He put the government of Paris on its guard against the very objectionable views of the negotiator; the country was not so exhausted as he thought, men abounded, the staff of officers was being reformed. There existed in reality an army of the Loire of 110,000 men, well armed and equipped. The general who commanded them was not a great captain, but he was fully competent for his task. Another army was forming in the east; the west was getting ready; the north would stand firm; the franc-tireurs were the terror of the enemy; with Keratry and Garibaldi to command them they formed important resources. In a word, the military position was excellent, and as Paris would hold out long enough for all these forces to come into action, the state of affairs, from being critical, would become favourable; the flight of time, the rigours of winter, were so many auxiliaries which might be counted on.

This picture was drawn with the view of rendering the government remaining in Paris more exacting with regard to the conditions and even the acceptance of the armistice. To give additional effect to the picture, M. Gambetta furnished a highly coloured description of the state of people's minds in France. According to him elections were demanded only by a minority in the country. All the towns were "passionately republican and warlike;" even the provinces began to show their teeth. The Legitimists and the Orleanists alone, enemies to the supremacy of the capital, demanded new elections. There were no disturbances in the large towns. Lyons and Marseilles recognized the authority of the central government; leagues had been formed, but a little firmness and plain dealing sufficed to disperse them. Besides the republican party, "with the exception of two or three ultra-moderate individuals, are unanimous in considering the elections as a perilous diversion from the necessities of the war." If an armistice was to be concluded, it must serve to reinforce the defence and not to weaken it. There must, therefore, be laid down as absolute conditions the revictualling of besieged places.

"Far from weakening the spirit of resistance," says he, "we ought to excite it still more; we ought only to accept the truce proposed to us if it is advantageous from a military point of view, and only to make use of it from a political point of view if we are resolved to hold really republican elections." The eloquence of Gambetta had the most disastrous

influence upon those who read his fatal despatch; it persuaded them that the armies from the outside were hastening towards them, that the enemy was about to raise the siege, was imploring quarter, and must be made to pay for it. The armistice, as we know, was rejected, because the Germans would not consent to the re-victualling of Paris, and ultimately France had to pay three milliards more than would probably then have satisfied her enemy, and to lose, besides Strassburg and Metz, the whole of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine.

A singular feature of the war publications was the complaisance with which all the French generals sang their own praises. General Faidherbe was always victorious, and General Chanzy would have ultimately triumphed had the war continued. In our account of the operations in the north of France we have already alluded to M. Faidherbe's work, "Campagne de l'Armée du Nord en 1870–71," and see no reason to modify the opinions then expressed. The object of successful war is not to fight battles, or win them, for their own sakes, but as means to certain desired ends; and the whole question of a general's alleged victories turns on the degree in which he approached to or attained his object. Now, if Faidherbe in December wished merely to fight a defensive action and then move off, or in January to fight a defensive action and then move off, he certainly succeeded. But if the battle of Pont-à-Noyelles came out of an attempt to recover Amiens, as is generally supposed, or that of Bapaume of the desire to save Péronne, as Faidherbe himself tells us, then it is certain that he failed on each occasion, and can claim no success merely because he was not re-attacked or pursued.

ENGLISH BENEVOLENT OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR.

We have more than once, in the course of this history, alluded to the difficult part which England, as a neutral nation, had to play during the war. We were regarded by the belligerents as cold-blooded and lukewarm, for not taking an active share in a contest which stirred up the fiercest passions of both countries, and which each worked itself up to consider could only be rightfully regarded from its own point of view. Many Frenchmen felt more disposed to forgive Germany the invasion of their country than to forgive England for "permitting" it; while on the other hand, many German newspapers demanded a "bloody reckoning" of us for allowing the export of arms; forgetful that Prussia supplied Russia with them in the Crimean war, and that her jurists maintained that it was *then* both legal and expedient.

There is, however, one field where the much-maligned neutral is allowed fair play—the hospital and the ambulance. Here, at least, the United Kingdom showed that its neutrality was owing to no indifference, and that it is possible for outsiders to feel that there is a certain amount of truth and right on both sides, which the eager combatants overlook in the heat of the fearful strife—

> "Where furious Frank and fiery Hun
> Charge 'neath their sulph'rous canopy."

In these days of close intercourse and free trade among nations, England must suffer by all the misfortunes of its neighbours; a truth which, it may be hoped, will in time bring about a more charitable spirit towards us. Commerce is a sensitive plant, which shrivels up immediately under any cold chill, and our commerce, as the greatest in the world, is the most quickly affected. Yet the British contributions on behalf of the sufferers by the war exceeded those for any former object, and were larger by far than for our own Patriotic Fund, in the Crimean distress, in the same time. Such aid by neutral nations is regarded by some as an indirect subsidy for the carrying on of war; but a little reflection as to the circumstances of the recent contest will show that such was not the case in 1870–71. Under ordinary circumstances it is an admitted fact that any provision which a government can maintain for the service of the sick and wounded in time of peace, is invariably inadequate to meet the enormously increased demands which instantly spring up at the commencement of war. While the French arrangements in this respect were found on almost every occasion to be very greatly defective, the abundant provision made by Germany often seemed equally shortcoming. For the reason of this we have not far to seek. The campaign was one of unprecedented mutilation and slaughter; but in addition to this, and as a natural result of the extraordinary success of the Germans, a battle invariably threw upon their hands the sick and wounded of both sides; and the enormous strain under which they laboured may be gathered from the fact that the three first battles, Wissembourg, Woerth, and Forbach, left with them no less than 20,000 wounded.

Vast as were the efforts made, the utmost that one side could do proved a very inadequate provision for such an excessive mass of suffering; and the object of the British National Society for aid to the sick and wounded in war was to supplement the overtaxed exertions of the military surgeons, and provide some few comforts for the sufferers beyond those allowed by the somewhat Spartan practice of military hospitals.

Subscriptions were opened in August, 1870. In six weeks a sum of £145,000 had been raised, vast stores of every description were being judiciously distributed, and fifty thoroughly qualified surgeons had been despatched to the scene of conflict. The total sum ultimately received by the society in voluntary, and even unsolicited, subscriptions was £296,928—sent by 899 auxiliary committees, 317 bankers, 30 masonic lodges, 139 managers of concerts, lectures, &c.; the employés of 100 firms, 65 servants' halls, 257 schools, 172 regiments, including militia and volunteers; 30 ships of war, 5824 congregations and parishes, and 11,832 individuals. The value of the stores, no less important than the money, contributed by the public was estimated at £45,000; and a classification of the donors showed that stores of various kinds had been received from 224 branch committees, 252 parochial, congregational, and other collections, 69 schools and asylums, and 4354 individual contributions, of whom 380 sent their gifts anonymously. The stores embraced every conceivable article of hospital utility—bedding, clothing, medicines and surgeons' stores, food, and surgical instruments. As the war progressed the supplies of the last-named were especially acceptable, none being procurable in either of the belligerent countries, as German makers were in the army, and Paris, the regular source of French supply, was besieged. Large supplies of chloroform were also sent, and in addition to its use in the ambulance hospitals, permission was given by the king of Prussia for its conveyance into Metz, Strassburg, and Phalsbourg, some time before their surrender—the first instance of such mitigation of the horrors of a siege. The final report of the society showed that £20,000 was given to the German military at Versailles, and £20,000 to General Trochu in Paris, under a promise in both cases that it should be used purely for extra comforts, additional to the usual hospital allowance of each army; that £27,472 was spent in food, wines, spirits, and medical comforts for the disabled soldiers; that £28,971 was devoted to the purchase of clothing and bedding, £8090 to the purchase of surgical instruments, and £7866 to that of medical stores, disinfectants, &c. Besides these amounts we find an entry of £2111 expended in buildings for hospitals and stores, £21,705 on the transport service, including the purchase and hire of horses, vehicles, and forage, stable expenses, repairs, and packing and carriage of stores; and £23,845 on staff allowances and expenses abroad, including the pay of surgeons, dressers, nurses, lay-agents, infirmiers, drivers, grooms, porters, messengers, &c. Different other aid societies and ambulances, whose members by their local knowledge proved the best almoners that the committee could employ, were subsidized by the British society to the extent of £89,898.

At the close of the war the large sum of about £70,000 was still in the hands of the bankers, and it was resolved to apply for a charter of incorporation for the society, so as to insure permanence to its operations; the money being invested in the joint names of Prince Arthur, Lord Shaftesbury, and Colonel Lloyd Lindsay, as trustees, in order to form the nucleus of a fund for future use should occasion arise. One of the greatest difficulties of the committee was to allay the jealousies of the different military and medical authorities of both armies, who, though the system of distribution was rigidly impartial,* were always complaining that they did not get their share of good things. In the course of their report the committee observed:—"We know that we have saved lives, mitigated the sufferings, and carried assistance and comfort, which could not otherwise have reached them, to thousands of sick and wounded in every stage and degree of their misery." "We simply administer the funds which the public intrusts to us, never having solicited subscriptions, remembering that our legitimate function is only to assist the government and people of Germany and France to do their own work, and is only of a supplementary nature."

Some agreeable proofs were received that, in spite of small misunderstandings, our efforts to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded on both

* "You are very impartial, indeed," said the king of Prussia, with a bow, when thanking the chairman of the committee for the large supplies sent from England.

sides were received by the two belligerents in the same spirit with which the help was offered. The Crown Prince of Germany, whose wife, *our* princess, conducted an admirable war hospital at Homburg, wrote to Colonel Lloyd Lindsay:—

"HEADQUARTERS, VERSAILLES,
"*November* 2, 1870.

"The noble contributions brought by Colonel Lloyd Lindsay, for the use of the sick and wounded, from the English society of which he is the director, deserves somewhat more than a simple acknowledgment.

"On this, as on other occasions of distress, the help of the English public has been poured out with a liberal and impartial hand.

"The gifts which have been offered, in a truly Christian spirit, have excited a feeling of heart-felt gratitude amongst those in whose name I speak. In doing so, I am repeating the feelings of the whole of my country people, in this instance represented by those for whose special benefit these gifts are destined."

"(Signed), FREDERICK WILLIAM."

The queen of Prussia also sent word to the committee, that she had observed with sincere admiration the generous manner in which the English nation endeavoured to alleviate the fearful sufferings of the present war, and to participate in the care of the numerous wounded, by supporting the existing societies and hospitals, by the erection of their own hospitals, establishment of depôts, and the distribution of gifts. "In my relations with the German societies, I feel it an urgent obligation to express this to the English committee for aid to wounded and sick soldiers which directs this benevolent activity, and in their name, as well as in the name of my countrymen far and near whom this assistance has benefited, to offer the most sincere and deep-felt thanks. By such proofs of true humanity the nation does honour to itself, and preserves its old reputation of maintaining the interests of humanity as everywhere the first consideration. It may likewise rest assured that with us in Germany what we owe to it in this respect is most warmly acknowledged and felt.

"AUGUSTA.

"Homburg, *Nov.* 8, 1870."

The minister of War in France, General Le Flô, in acknowledging the gift of half a million of francs (£20,000), said that he understood the wish of the English subscribers to be, that the sum should be specially devoted to procuring for our sick and wounded, such additions to the regular hospital allowances as may enable them to feel that a friendly hand has been extended for the relief of their sufferings. "Allow me to express, in the name of the army and of our whole country, the sentiment of profound gratitude with which this brilliant manifestation of the sympathy of your generous nation inspires me. In happier and still recent times, it was granted to the soldiers of our two countries to fight side by side for a common cause, and the deed which you this day perform is a proof of the esteem with which you still regard us. I am deeply touched by it, as the interpreter of the grateful feelings of my nation."

Large, however, as was the sum received by the British National Society, it by no means represented the whole amount subscribed for the same or similar objects in Great Britain and its colonies. The Society of Friends raised a sum of no less than £75,681, known as the "War Victims' Fund," which was disbursed by members of the worthy community, who at their own expense visited the scenes of the war, and distributed help in the most judicious manner among the French civilian population suffering from its consequences. A large portion of the money was devoted to providing seed corn and vegetables for the impoverished inhabitants, who were thus relieved from the fearful contingency of a severe famine in addition to the other horrors of the war.

To carry out more fully the view of the Society of Friends in providing seed corn, a special subscription was commenced among the farmers and agricultural interest generally of England and Scotland. The "French Peasant Farmers' Seed Fund" which was thus raised, amounted to £51,582, and was distributed, without almost any cost to the fund, by gentlemen whose practical experience insured the certainty of the money being expended to the greatest possible advantage.

The *Daily News'* Fund, a subscription received entirely through the office of the popular newspaper of that name, amounted to £21,679, and was gratuitously distributed by several gentlemen—principally by Mr. W. H. Bullock, who for six

months devoted the whole of his time, and not a little severe labour, to the task.

When the siege of Paris was evidently drawing to the only end to which it could come, it occurred to Mr. Knowles and some other gentlemen in London, that if the French capital stood out until the food within the city was exhausted, there would be the terrible likelihood of 2,000,000 of their fellow-creatures starving within twelve hours of our own shores. The sympathies of the great British capital for its sister city were aroused by such a prospect. A meeting was held at the Mansion House without delay, a committee was formed of representative men of all creeds and classes, and with the view of accumulating large supplies of food, to be sent into Paris as soon as the gates should be opened, the sum of £130,000 was subscribed in an incredibly short space of time. The British government also came handsomely to the help of the committee, and supplied it with the means of transport, and with large donations of provisions from the Admiralty victualling yards. The work of distribution was confided to Lieutenant-colonel Stuart Wortley and Mr. George Moore, two gentlemen enjoying universal esteem and confidence, and both well acquainted with Paris and with the means best suited to the pressing emergency. To food, fuel, garden seeds, and to setting free from pledge tools and implements, to enable the population of Paris to resume its industry, £70,000 was devoted by the committee; and the immediate relief of the city being effected, attention was turned to the suffering districts outside its walls. Large sums were distributed to relieve the distressed inhabitants of the circle of investment; and considerable grants were made to committees appointed to inquire into the cases of those who, in the various departments around Paris, had been entirely deprived of their homes and means of livelihood. To the Peasant Farmers' Seed Fund a sum of £13,000 was granted; and many of our fellow-countrymen in Paris, impoverished by the continuance of the siege, were assisted in leaving the city, or received temporary aid within it. During the siege the English residents had been supported mainly by the munificence of Richard Wallace, Esq., whose liberality was also amply extended to the poor of the city generally. Through Lord Granville, Mr. Wallace received the thanks of the British government, and he was shortly after created a baronet. The French authorities also showed their sense of his generosity by re-naming one of the Paris streets the Rue de Wallace.

Whatever form of government ultimately prevails in France, among all sober minds and honest hearts the memory of the proofs of generous friendship shown by England towards that country, and more particularly towards the city of Paris, will not be easily effaced. Those Frenchmen who, during the war, sought an asylum across the channel, the wives and daughters of those husbands and fathers in Paris who desired to save them from the dangers and severe privations of the siege, know what a kind, sometimes almost enthusiastic, reception was given them; they witnessed the wide sympathetic movement which sprang up on all sides; they saw the solicitude with which high and low in our great metropolis went to the succour of their besieged city, to save it from the horrors of famine. London was more concerned with the care of revictualling exhausted Paris than was the French government, and succeeded better. The report of a commission of inquiry upon markets, subsequently revealed the extent of the services rendered by the English to Paris; and judging by this, it is fearful to think what would have become of a population of two millions of souls had not the English waggons arrived almost as soon as the gates were opened, whilst the provisions bought by the French government were waited for in vain for weeks.

When, after the new disasters caused to Paris by the Commune, regular authority had resumed its sway, and a legal municipality had been established, one of the first acts of the authorities was to show to England that there still existed in Paris grateful spirits, and that the recollection of her bounty was not effaced. A medal was struck; a bronze model of the Hotel de Ville, the symbol of the town itself, was added to the medal; the insignia of the Legion of Honour were given by the government, and a Parisian deputation, composed of the prefect of the Seine, M. Léon Say, and the president of the Elective Municipal Council, M. Vautrain, was commissioned to carry to London these souvenirs, and to tell in that city what true Parisians had been thinking and saying for months. The mission was well fulfilled; the reception given to the French representatives was such as to enhance the value of the services already rendered; and a return visit by the lord mayor of London tended to strengthen the ties between the two nations.

PARIS

DURING THE SIEGE,

AND A

HISTORY OF THE

RISE AND FALL OF THE COMMUNE.

BY A RESIDENT.

Hozier, Sir Henry Montague?

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



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
PARIS
WESTERN DIVISION.
CHAMP DE MARS
CITE DES TERNES
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HOTEL ROYAL DES INVALIDES
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PARIS,

BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE SIEGE;

WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE

RISE AND FALL OF THE COMMUNE,

BY A RESIDENT.

CHAPTER I.

Convulsions of Nature and of States—Paris the Metropolis of Brilliancy—The Boulevards and their Cost—Rebuilding of Paris, and a Delusion caused thereby—The first Reverses of the War, and their Effect upon the Capital—The News of Sedan and approaching Imprisonment of the Parisians—Energy and Self-denial of the People aroused—Great Want of a Controlling Head at this Crisis—Difficulties arising in consequence—Paris previous to the War—The Contrast when the National Disasters began—The Boulevards invaded—Enormous Victualling Supplies, and the Hopes excited thereby—"Many a true word spoken in jest"—Failure of Dairy Produce—Vegetables at a Premium—The Dawn of Horse-beef—Exorbitant Prices of all Provisions—Hopes founded upon Delusions—"All Lost, except Honour"—Cats, Dogs, and Rats in the Market—"Ordinary" Prices for Delicacies—Elephant Steaks—Disappearance of Fish—Unpleasant Substitutes for Butter and Fat—Articles of Drink, Coffee, Chocolate, &c.—The Policy and Necessity of High Prices—Failure of Official Interference with Prices, except in the case of Meat—Conduct of Purveyors generally—Consternation respecting Bread—How Corn-mills were improvised—Bread rationed at last—The Quality of the Bread supplied, and its Composition—The Effect of the Interdict upon Flour—Siege Fare and Siege Flavour—Distressing Monotony—The Greatest Sufferers—Mendacious Newspaper Statements—Restaurant Customers notified to "bring their own Bread"—The Sufferings from the Scarcity of Fuel—Not so bad after all as things might have been—Water Supply—The Consumption of Wines, Spirits, Alcoholic Drinks, and Tobacco—General Effect of the Diet and other Circumstances—A Calamity which might have been a Catastrophe—Uncontrollable Yearning for Fresh Food when the Gates were opened—Arrival of Provisions from England, and Change of Feeling in the City towards Great Britain—Markets immediately established under German Supervision—The Return of the Sailors to the City—Distressing Incident at Mont Valérien—General Condition of Society under the Siege—Lights put out and Places of Amusement closed—The Theatres and Actors in Siege-time—Paris the Brilliant becomes Paris the Dull—Efforts to keep up Communication with the Outside World—Balloon Experiments—The Torture of Suspense—The Pigeon-post and Marvels of Photography—Deciphering Despatches—Sensation caused by the Arrival of the First Post—Escape from the City and its Difficulties.

Convulsions of all kinds naturally attract more attention than the phenomena, however grand and important, which are the fruit of nature and progress. The dismemberment of an old kingdom causes more surprise than the creation of a new one out of a desert, although the latter is the more important event; but this is the natural result of the progress of civilization, while the former is unexpected, violent, extraordinary. Again, great social convulsions appeal far more directly to the mind than mere material ones, however startling and horrible; the latter affect our senses and call forth our sympathies, but the former appeal to every feeling, and set in vibration every chord of our system. The world is deeply moved by the news of earthquakes that bury thousands of human beings beneath the ruins of their dwellings; it shudders at the progress of epidemics that fill the land with desolation, and at wars which devour the flower of the manhood of nations, break up kingdoms, and snap old associations, but the effects soon pass away; the alteration of the arbitrary or imaginary "Balance of Power," that ill-defined theorem of diplomacy, leaves society almost as little affected by it as is the rotation of the earth or the precession of the equinoxes. But when we see an old, and once great, nation utterly ruined, its government and institutions all swept away like chaff before the wind, and its whole social system, political, material, and intellectual, reduced to

chaos, surprise and sympathy give way to astonishment and dismay. We feel for the moment that all laws and principles are set aside, that human nature is suffering shipwreck, and that all our philosophy, all our learning, all our art and science, are built upon sand, and may be engulfed should the terrible storm extend to our own land. The situation is one of fearful interest, of sublime horror; and the wonder is, not that all the world should be so deeply moved as it is, but rather, that even the pressing necessities of life and the demands of duty should allow of its being for an instant absent from our minds. Great kingdoms and empires have been subverted, and will doubtless be so again; the sceptre has passed from one hand to another like a harlequin's wand; powers and landmarks have disappeared, after the world has been familiar with them for ages; great states have slipped down from their stations, or new ones have grown up and overtopped them: but the spectacle of a nation of forty millions of people reduced, in a few months, from a condition of apparent prosperity to the verge of bankruptcy, material and social, surpasses all that is recorded in history, or that the most imaginative mind could have conjured up in the way of convulsion. Such a saturnalia of bloodshed, revolution, famine, and ruin, such a subversion of powers, military, political, and social, has never before been presented to the bewildered senses of the civilized world, and the eye strains itself painfully and hopelessly to see the *finale* of the terrible drama.

The struggle between France and Germany, and the fortunes of the former especially, will supply future historians with an inexhaustible theme; and we hope to contribute a page or two of materials by recording our own impressions of Paris, after a residence of many years, received before, during, and after the siege.

Gay, beautiful, splendid, brilliant, all the adjectives of admiration have been lavished on Paris, and many of them were deserved. The atmosphere, the out-of-door life, art, fashion, and fancy, have always rendered Paris a kind of paradise to the visitor from gigantic, magnificent, but gloomy London; and during the last twenty years so much had been done to make Paris more attractive, more *coquet*, as our neighbours say, cleaner, more beautiful and brilliant, that it is not surprising that the great mass of foreigners should have accepted Paris, at the valuation of the Parisians, as the queen of cities, the great capital of the world. Visitors bent on pleasure, and even residents in search of elegance and ease, took no note of politics and economics; they did not calculate the cost, they had not to consider the future; and as this state of mind exactly suited the great majority of the natives also, Paris was declared, pretty generally, to be not only pleasant, but prosperous and glorious in the highest degree.

The skill of the engineer and gardener had done wonders for Paris. The Bois de Boulogne, the public promenades, the great new boulevards and avenues, the public squares or gardens, the profusion of fountains and flowers, even the sewers themselves, had been the subjects of fashionable gossip, and of enthusiastic admiration and laudation, not only from journalists and sketchers, but from practical men of the world, from ministers of state downwards; while those who counted the cost too carefully were set down as belonging to that unamiable class of individuals who would point out the incipient wrinkles on the brow of beauty, or search for flaws in a precious gem.

Beyond all question, the new boulevards and houses of Paris are stately, airy, and gay, the promenades and pleasure grounds are charmingly planted, and they are, or rather were, tended and garnished and watered and lighted in the most admirable manner, and, which deserves special notice, by highly scientific and economical means. Those who are curious on these subjects should read the "Parcs et Promenades de Paris," by M. Alphand, under whose management the Bois de Boulogne, the Bois de Vincennes, and all the pleasure grounds of Paris were laid out and kept in order. Side by side with the description of these extensive works will be found detailed accounts of the expenses, not only of the original operations, but also of the whole of their maintenance; and this portion supplies many most valuable hints for all who have to manage public places and municipal affairs. It would have been well for the city of Paris and for France, had the demolition and reconstruction in the capital and other towns been conducted with like economy.

The rebuilding of Paris, as the alterations of the city were called, was principally caused by the necessity which the government felt for protecting itself against revolutionary attacks; but it was warmly advocated, on the other hand, on the score of salubrity, which was a well-founded argument, and as making Paris the central attraction

and mart of luxury of continental Europe; and the swarm of visitors and customers which new Paris attracted warranted this argument also, in the opinion of those who only looked upon the surface of affairs. On the other hand, the discontent was great, as there was a strong feeling that all that was being done for the capital was done at the cost of the rest of the country; and this feeling, as we shall see, bore poisonous fruit in the jealousy and mistrust which split the nation into many parties, and threatened to replace centralization by isolation under the name of federalism.

The enormous expenditure of the government and of the municipality of Paris gave rise, naturally, to enormous extravagance and speculation; the monied aristocracy, and indeed all classes, vied with each other in luxury and show; the Bois was filled with carriages and horses of the most costly and elegant description, in rivalry of the wealthy aristocracy of England; balls and entertainments assumed a pretentious and costly character, out of keeping with the old habits of Paris; and thus a fictitious appearance of great wealth was produced, which deceived the general world. But the most marked effect of the governmental and civic extravagance was a system of ingenious yet heedless speculation, which enriched the few and ruined thousands; immense gambling was taken for great financial prosperity, and until the greater part of the brilliant bubbles burst, Paris claimed to have assumed the first place in the monetary as well as in the artistic and fashionable world. We know now how hollow was the claim, how complete the delusion! Before the late fatal war was declared the financial position of the government, as well as of the city of Paris, was disastrous, while extravagance, public and private, had rendered all the necessaries of life inordinately dear; visitors became less numerous, and natives as well as foreigners were compelled to fly from a city where rent, food, and fuel, in fact, all articles of common consumption, were ruinously dear.

It was just as the truth was breaking upon the most unthinking, when the means of public and private life were becoming almost impossible, that the declaration of war burst upon astonished Europe, and terrified the thinking portion of the French people. The cry, *à Berlin*, was naturally taken up by the army and by the least trustworthy portion of the population, and was certainly not discouraged by the government in its inconceivable blindness; and whilst the Marseillaise was being roared in the streets and theatres in the hope of coming victories, it fell upon the ears of thousands like the knell of the sad disasters which were so soon to arrive.

With the war itself we have nothing to do in this chapter, but only with its effects on Paris. At first, by means of shamefully deceitful information, Paris was led to believe that a new era of glory had actually set in; but this deception was of short duration, and the effect of the disasters that followed each other with such appalling force and rapidity is indescribable. Paris was stunned at first, then almost driven to madness; her usual life was suspended as if by catalepsy; the gay throng seemed to have melted into air; art, literature, science, even frivolity and glaring vice, were at once quenched; theatres and other places of amusement were closed; the detested police, which had swept the streets fortunately of thousands of vagabonds of both sexes, was, in its turn, swept away; and Paris, left to itself, ceased to be gay, and, instead of rushing into excesses, sank into lethargy.

The disgrace of Sedan fell like a thunderbolt upon the people of Paris. Deception, whether from without or within, could not gloze over that dreadful capitulation; it could not be converted even into a glorious failure; there was not a single extenuating circumstance surrounding it; all the glory and prestige of French arms seemed extinguished for ever, and the leaders were openly denounced as cowards and imbeciles. The only consolation was that he who proclaimed and directed the war had succumbed in the catastrophe. Democracy again raised its head, and calling upon the people to rise as one man and defend the fatherland, awoke them from the torpor that looked like death. For a time again hope revived, and the nation seemed roused to action; but promise after promise proved delusive, and at length, when it was known that the enemy was marching with calm but decided steps towards Paris, the agony of the people became almost insupportable. The apathy with which the great mass of the population waited for the moment when we were all to be made prisoners within the walls, can only be accounted for by the total absence of political life and individual action which had been imposed upon the population by an

absolute government, working on the weaknesses of the national character.

When General Trochu and others at the head of affairs commenced the preparations for the defences of the city, able assistance was offered on every side; engineers, architects, and scientific men of all classes, not only organized, but helped to carry out with great energy the necessary works; members of the Institute, with the weight of sixty and more years upon their shoulders, laboured side by side with the pupils of the schools, literary men, and *ouvriers*, and the amount of work that was done was prodigious. On every side and in every form individual devotion and self-negation were common, the absence of it in fact was quite exceptional; every one's powers and capabilities were freely placed at the disposition of the chiefs, or were employed in auxiliary work, amongst which the establishment of temporary hospitals and ambulances occupied a prominent place. This was work in which all could contribute, and it was executed generously and ardently; Sisters of Mercy and Sisters of Charity, high-born dames and famous actresses, doctors and priests, *frères* and nuns of all classes, in cloister, tent, theatre, saloon, and hotel, devoted themselves day and night, uncomplainingly, to their sad labour, while those who had the means filled the cellars with wines and cordials, the store-rooms with linen, and the wards with beds and bedding. Amongst the few bright points in the siege of Paris, the most prominent are the devotion and the sacrifices that were made in aid of the wounded and the suffering. Many strangers aided greatly in the work, but none to the same extent as our own countryman, Mr. Richard Wallace, whose name has in consequence been given to the street formerly known as the Rue de Berlin.

In the midst of all this individual activity and devotion there was one great want—peculiarly patent to the eye of an Englishman, and characteristic of Paris—the city was a great agglomeration of individuals without a head; there was no general action, no public life. It is true that a number of clubs were opened, and that speech was free, but, with one or two memorable exceptions, the discussions there exhibited nothing but ignorance and violence. Population, like children, cannot be expected to perform at a moment's notice acts for which they have not been trained. Accustomed to look to government for everything; shut out from all the rights, though not from the duties and obligations of citizens; accustomed to be led or driven, as the case might be, by the agents of authority, just as flocks of sheep are conducted by the shepherds and their dogs—the disappearance of the directing powers reduced the population of Paris to a helpless, excited, and sometimes a mischievous crowd. Here and there men of commanding talent, such as Professor Wolowski, M. Desmarest, one of the ornaments of the Parisian bar, and the Protestant ministers, Coquerel and Pressensé, produced considerable effect on crowded audiences; but, speaking generally, nearly all who should have been the leaders and directors of the people were dumb, or wasted their words. The silence of the clergy of France, almost absolute, was one of the most marked and extraordinary facts during the whole period of which we are speaking. The archbishop of Paris issued one admirable address, touching the duty of the people under the circumstances, calling upon the clergy and the laity to lay aside all animosity, and be charitable and considerate towards each other, to respect the powers that were, and thus to aid in the re-establishment of order; but this and one or two other rare examples were more than counterbalanced by the violence of a well-known religious journal, which even surpassed the lowest club in the virulence of its personal abuse. Generally, the clergy felt it could not safely interfere; it knew it had not the slightest hold on the masses in Paris; and the editor of the journal in question had the incredible folly and wickedness to seize on the fact of a shot being fired on a flag of truce, to declare that "it was probably aimed at a priest who was present, as the democrats would rather kill a French priest or *frère* than a Prussian."

The government of the national defence suffered seriously from this state of things. While the work of preparation was new the people generally supported and individually helped it, and, with few exceptions, the press showed a most friendly spirit; but the new government, like that which had preceded, was utterly isolated from the people; it had neither the aid of aristocracy, middle class, or the masses; it could not call around it, or obtain the opinion of any one class or party; it could gain no moral support anywhere, and consequently, having been

compelled to act unaided during the early and more hopeful days of the siege, it had the whole of Paris against it when faint hope was converted into blank despair. Nor was it in a political sense only that it was isolated. The founders, the engineers, the railway companies, and others, gave most valuable aid in the armament of the city; but the mercantile and shopkeeping classes seemed to have been paralyzed in all their members by the loss of their old directing heads. The consequence was, that the management of the food and other supplies, and nearly all the ordinary business of a city that then contained more than 2,000,000 of souls, was left to advocates and others, as ignorant of trade and its thousand requirements as grocers and others of the law of evidence. The result was a violent breach between the government and nearly all the wholesale and retail tradesmen of the city, the complete disorganization of the whole of the ordinary modes of supply, a frightful waste of provisions, an amount of suffering and a mortality which are frightful to look back upon. It is only when such facts as these are laid before us, and their effects are considered, that the causes of the difficulties of France in general can be traced. Louis XIV. and XV. broke down the influence and ruined the character of the old aristocracy, the first Empire reduced the whole nation politically to the condition of slaves, the second Empire completed the work of destruction, first by its overweening pretension and extravagance, and finally by the utter incompetency of its chief and instruments. Where is the man, or where are the men, the assemblies, the representatives, to lay the foundations of a new France, able and worthy to hold its own? Who will make the French understand that the time for domination, false glory, and pretension is past, and that France must be content to take her own proper place amongst the nations and keep it, or follow the fate of the fallen empires of the ancient world? Time alone can show.

The grand characteristic of new Paris when the word for war was given at the Tuileries was spruceness. If the greater part of the new structures had too much the air of barracks, if the new boulevards were fatiguing on account of their length and monotony, if the Bois de Boulogne had somewhat of a cockney, theatrical, over-wrought appearance, if the banishment of every natural element in favour of an artificial one, wherever possible, produced something of a vulgar, *parvenu* air, still the exquisite cleanliness of the streets in the better parts of the city—not the inferior portions—the care with which the capital was swept and garnished, planted and watered, and decorated in every way, made it an attractive place; and especially so for those who were satisfied while they themselves were comfortable, cared nothing about principles of government, the rights of humanity, or the progress of civilization.

With the destruction at once of the army and the empire the aspect of Paris underwent an extraordinary change; the police and nearly all the other agents of the late government disappeared, the whole municipal organization fell at one blow, and dirt and disorder assumed universal sway. It would be difficult to conceive the rapidity and completeness of the change that took place; smiling frivolous Paris became at once a dirty camp. In the first place lodgings had to be found for 80,000 *mobiles*, besides the national guards from the districts just outside of Paris; they were billeted on the inhabitants while huts were being provided for them. These were erected in the centre of what used to be the outer boulevards of the city, following the line of the old *octroi* wall, demolished when the city was extended to the fortifications, and on the unoccupied ground in the new districts. During the day the new and least frequented boulevards were continually occupied by troops drilling, marching, skirmishing, cooking, or eating. Quiet, "genteel" squares and *places* in the new districts were converted into *places d'armes*, and a large portion of the Avenue Wagram was converted into a park for the artillery of the national guard, the staff of the corps being established in the very house in which about ten years since the emperor was entertained at a collation upon the occasion of the opening of the magnificent Boulevard Malesherbes. All the unoccupied apartments in the handsome *hôtels*, or private residences, whether furnished or not, were taken possession of and converted into staff quarters, stations, and ambulances; and from break of day. and even earlier, all the prominent corners were occupied by coffee and other stalls, superintended by neat, coquettish, or brazen, slatternly *vivandières*, or, as they are commonly called in France, *cantinières*. Every scrap of waste ground in the neighbourhood of the huts and *places* referred to was seized upon as sites for refreshment booths

and shanties, which were generally constructed of old boards and window frames brought in by the suburban population on the approach of the German army. *Bifteks* and *côtelettes,* soup and bouilli, coffee, wine, and brandy were offered, and very freely accepted, at prices alarmingly low. Some of these establishments were of a curious character: near the *Parc Monceaux* an adventurous caterer for the thousands of mouths set up a *café-restaurant* in two old omnibuses, and seemed to have plenty of customers. The *mobiles* received their rations in the streets and boulevards, set up their soup kettles, and fried their potatoes on the side walks, and ate, drank, smoked, sang, and talked, when off duty, as if they were perfectly at home; the *patois* of Alsace, Normandy, Brittany, and Provence mingling curiously with the Parisian tongue. In very bad weather the shops and ground floors of untenanted houses served as refuges to those who could not afford to frequent *cafés* and wine shops; but, generally speaking, from the first streak of daylight to late in the evening, the whole of the boulevards and broad streets were thronged with soldiers and recruits in the most varied costumes, from the common *blouse* of the workman to the gay uniform of the citizen soldier. The national guard included men nearly of all ages and of all classes of society; and it was a curious sight to see highly respectable citizens, often "with fair round belly with good capon lined," fling themselves flat on the ground, in dust or mud, at the word of command of the drill serjeant who was busy converting them into sharpshooters.

The military were not the only invaders of the boulevards; the great mass of the washing of the city is usually carried on in the outskirts of Paris, and when the *blanchisseurs* and *blanchisseuses* were compelled to retreat within the walls, they also seized upon the boulevards as their ground; and the trees which the other day were watched with such sharp eyes by the police that scarcely any one dared touch them with his finger, now served as supports for clothes' lines, and in many parts these were covered continually with masses of linen that would have made Falstaff's army mad with delight. Still another class took advantage of the occasion; those who could manage to bring in from their own or somebody else's garden outside, any kind of vegetable or green meat, from a few cabbages and cauliflowers to a bag of potatoes, a few handfuls of onions, leeks, garlic, or salad, planted themselves where they thought best; and the corners of many of the boulevards were converted into regular, or rather, irregular markets, for the sale of every conceivable article of consumption, except those of a superior kind. To complete the picture, the *chiffoniers* and *chiffonières*, male and female rag and bone collectors, had disappeared, and the refuse from the houses lay continually before the doors till dissipated by the traffic or the wind; and when the gates of the city were finally closed, the dung and litter from all the stables in Paris was collected here and there on vacant bits of ground, and added greatly to the general metamorphosis. At first this threatened to be the source of serious mischief, for the weather was extremely hot, and the number of flies was incredible; in houses near the stations of the omnibus company they hung in great black clusters in every corner and attractive spot, and pestered us in the house abominably. At length the frost fell upon us, which banished the flies and subdued the effluvia, but which brought terrible evils of other kinds in its train.

It was a curious sight for the Parisians, usually so regularly and systematically supplied with the necessaries of life, to have the whole system of supply laid open before their eyes. In ordinary times no cattle are seen in the streets of Paris, few heavy waggons laden with hay and straw; and the supplies of wheat, vegetables, fish, &c., come to the markets in the small hours, when Paris generally is asleep. The *abattoirs*, where the cattle are slaughtered, are on the outskirts of the city, and the meat is brought to the butchers in great covered carts; the sides of beef, &c., being curtained over generally by means of white cloths. Now all was changed! Every railway station was choked up with corn, hay, straw, cattle, sheep, pigs, and provisions; the streets were blocked up by huge carts, military waggons, trucks, and vehicles of all kinds; the wine merchants were bringing in thousands and thousands of barrels of wine and pieces of spirits from their cellars beyond the *octroi* circle; droves of bullocks, sheep, and pigs crowded every boulevard; the little farmers and dairymen brought in their cows and poultry with their children and household goods; here a poor woman had several cocks and hens in each hand; now a man brought in a barrow with half a dozen white geese sitting with all gravity and grace, their necks erect, their eyes wide open

and gazing curious on the novel scene, with nothing to indicate the fact of their feet being imprisoned beneath them. Pigs, goats, and rabbits came in at every gate, and had to take up their abode in empty shop, cellar, or elsewhere. One landlord who had given shelter to a farmer and his family, was not a little astonished a month afterwards to find a magnificent suite of rooms converted into a menagerie; a litter of pigs grunted around Mama Sow in one room, flocks of pigeons flitted and cooed in a second, while a third was occupied by a large family of ducks, who were revelling in the delights of a bath standing in the centre of the drawing-room floor.

The cattle and sheep were collected together in the Champ de Mars and other open spaces, on the green slopes of the fortifications and all around between the ramparts and the forts, under the protection of the latter. The flour market, the military storehouses, the cellars of the great central *Halles*, or market of Paris, and many buildings, including amongst others the new opera house, which it was little supposed would ever be turned to such use, were crammed with flour, corn, hay and straw, biscuits, salt beef, pork, and fish, preserved meats, cheese, butter, potatoes, and provisions of all kinds. Paris was amply victualled; the siege could not last more than a few weeks, the forts were impregnable, the enemy would soon find himself between two fires, and in the meantime there was no fear of famine, or even scarcity, except of green vegetables! Such was the tenor of nearly all that was said and printed in Paris in September, 1870; those who had laid in stocks of provisions on their own account kept the fact secret for fear of being laughed at, and in some cases, perhaps, as a precaution against exciting envy in their neighbours' bosoms. The government assured the people that the provisions were ample, that the stock of meat was good, and that of breadstuffs inexhaustible; and this we are assured was said in all good faith. Some doubters joked upon the subject, said that horse was capital eating, and that the omnibus *cavalerie* would feed all the population of Paris for weeks, that when the horses were gone we should relish cats and rats; the dubbing of a rat by the name of the "future partridge" was pronounced a capital joke. We little dreamed of the grim reality that was to come upon us before the waning year should have finished its course!

We very soon found to our cost what a serious matter was the feeding of 2,000,000 of people, and how miserably helpless was a great city cut off from the rest of the world; the thousands of sheep and hundreds of other animals required for such a carnivorous monster as Paris were reckoned up, and various calculations made as to how long our meat would last at the rate of the fifth of a pound per head *per diem*, the quantity fixed by the first rationment of the authorities. We had not to trust long to guesses or calculations, for we soon learnt that the "salutary precaution of rationing the amount of food" was nothing more than a euphonistic phrase for scarcity and approaching famine.

No sooner was Paris invested than we began to feel our helplessness. Dairy produce was the first to fail us; a large number of cows had been brought into the city, but the supply of milk was far below the average; even during the first month it was allowed by law to be mixed with water to the amount of forty per cent.: a great error, not only on account of its deterioration, but also it was found impossible to prevent the dose of water being increased, and the consequence was, that while we paid more than double the usual price, the milk was almost worthless. Before long the fodder began to fail, numbers of the cows were killed and eaten, no one being allowed to retain them unless he could show that he had plenty of food to give them. Concentrated milk was largely used, but the stock was soon exhausted, and the small tins that sold usually for tenpence became worth five or six francs, and even more. The value of asses' milk is rated very high in Paris, and previous to the siege many of those animals might be seen, or heard, for they wore bells round their necks, trotting into the city in the morning to the various markets; one person living in the neighbourhood of Paris kept some hundreds of asses, and we saw them come in just before the actual closing of the city. The proprietor generously placed the whole of the milk gratuitously at the disposition of the medical profession for the use of the sick and infirm; but like the cows, the poor asses also disappeared, and it is more than probable that not one of them ever saw their fields and stables again. Goats helped our supply for some time, for these creatures are always numerous in and around Paris, and as they live and thrive where

almost any other animal would starve, they held out till fresh meat of any kind became worth almost its weight in gold. Eggs were of course scarce at the very commencement of the siege, and when a fowl, young or old, became worth forty or even fifty shillings, and corn of all kinds was wanted for bread, eggs were almost unattainable, and fetched one, two, and finally three francs each!

The disappearance of butter was a terrible deprivation to the Parisians, who consume immense quantities of it in all forms, but especially in cookery; the commonest salt butter soon became worth ten francs a pound, and finally even four times that price, while the small quantity of fresh butter made in Paris rose gradually to forty, fifty, and even sixty francs; the first pastry cooks and provision shops in the city sold little pats of it at a franc or more each, and ladies carried these precious morsels away with more delight than at another time they would have exhibited over a brilliant ring or bracelet. Cheese disappeared at a very early period; Gruyère, which generally sells for tenpence or a shilling a pound, was worth at least five-and-twenty shillings. On the first day of the new year, when every gentleman calls and presents each of his lady friends with a bouquet, sweetmeats, costly jewels or trinkets, a pound of fresh butter or cheese or half-a-dozen new-laid eggs formed a princely offering, far above rubies. Those who spent the New-year's Day of 1871 in Paris are not likely to forget it as long as they live; rich as well as poor, with few exceptions, learnt then, if they never knew before, what cold and hunger, or at any rate the craving for wholesome food, were like!

Vegetables were of course dear, and very soon excessively scarce; cauliflowers and cabbages rose in price rapidly, from one to fifteen francs a-piece; carrots, turnips, and wretched heads of green celery fetched two and three francs each; beetroot reached eight francs a pound; a clove of garlic or a leek was worth a franc, and at last even double that sum; and onions, without which cooks are badly off indeed, were amongst the rarest of provisions, and rose in price from one to seven francs the *litre*, which holds a pint and three-quarters. All this was bad enough, but worse still was the failure of potatoes. The season had been bad for them; they were dug up before they were thoroughly ripe, and stored anywhere; the consequence was the price soon rose from sixpence and eightpence the *boisseau*, a measure containing less than a peck, to three, four, and five francs, and finally they were quoted at the market at *fifty francs*, or two pounds! The deprivation was felt severely, and some time before the end of the siege placards appeared in various parts of the town offering thirty-five francs the *boisseau*, but without producing any results. Nor were there any substitutes to be found, when the haricot beans and lentils, of which there is an enormous consumption in France, had been all eaten up; rice, dried peas, and even dried Windsor beans, were sought after with avidity, and each in its turn became exhausted, as macaroni, vermicelli, and the other *pâtes d'Italie* had previously. The prices which some of these articles had attained in the month of January will show at once how rare they had become:—Rice, two francs a pound; small tins of preserved peas, ordinarily sold for one or two francs, became worth seven and eight francs, and then disappeared altogether; tins of preserved haricot beans were equally dear and scarce; and at the last period of the siege we were asked eight francs a pound for the remainder of a jar of the commonest dried peas!

When the quantity of meat to be sold to each family was fixed by the municipal authorities, that is to say, when the *rationnement* commenced, and horse and other meat took their places beside that of beeves, we came to understand fully what a state of real siege meant. At first the allowance was the fifth of a pound per head per diem; this was soon reduced to two ounces, and finally and for many weeks the quantity to be obtained did not equal one ounce of raw meat per head daily. The prices of beef and horse flesh were fixed, and not high; but pork, veal, and mutton had almost entirely disappeared when the first *rationnement* took place. Very soon there remained nothing but horse flesh, the small supply of beef being reserved for the sick and the aged. It is needless to dwell on the condition of the population, reduced to an ounce of horse flesh a day, without fish or poultry, except at enormous prices, butter, eggs, potatoes, or other vegetables. But the smallness of the amount of animal food was not the only cause of suffering; the moment the *rationnement* commenced the whole system of supply was deranged, the butchers declared they could not keep their shops open with the prices fixed by the authorities;

most of them were closed, and special places were opened for the sale of meat in each of the *arrondissements*, or sections of the city; the *maires* and other officials, with few exceptions, were utterly incapable of the management of the business, and the greatest possible confusion and suffering were the consequence. The poor women and the cooks in every family were compelled to stand for hours at the doors of the *boucheries*, waiting to purchase their morsels of meat; in many cases they took their places over night in order to reach the counter before the meat had all disappeared, and thus during the coldest weeks of one of the severest winters known, and frequently with masses of half-melted snow beneath their feet, five, six, and even eight hours did these poor women wait, and then often found the stock of meat exhausted; and as the distribution only took place once in three days, sometimes extended to four, the supply of meat really became insignificant. At first only beef was placed under requisition, and other kinds of meat were left free; then horse flesh was taxed, and the price fixed, and each person might purchase two ounces of that in place of one ounce of beef; mule and asses' meat was still free, and in great demand, especially the latter, at high prices; but it was found that horse was sold as mule flesh, and finally all kinds of meat were placed under the same regulations. By this time, however, very little but horse flesh remained, and much of that was execrable.

During the last three months of the siege small quantities of mutton, veal, cow-beef, mule and asses' flesh, that came few know from where, were sold at rates varying from six to twelve francs a pound, and purchasers almost fought for it. Coarse sausage, of horse flesh, fetched eight francs a pound, and that made from mule and asses' meat nearly twice as much; black-pudding composed of horse blood sold readily at six and eight francs a pound, and was pronounced capital eating, although there was little or no bacon or fat of any kind in it. For a time we were led to believe that there were large supplies of salt meat in store, but this ended in nothing but disappointment; once we obtained some wretched salt beef or horse, but only once, and we did not desire a repetition. It was said, we believe with some truth, that by the negligence or inexperience of the authorities, or by the unprincipled conduct of speculators, large quantities of meat salted down were quite uneatable; at any rate, the promised salt beef never reached our mouths.

Under such circumstances, it seems incredible that the population of Paris should have existed at all, or that the authorities were not forced to capitulate by popular clamour. In the first place, the feeling of honour was very lively; to propose capitulation at one of the clubs, or in any public place, would have been an act of the greatest temerity, and might have cost the author of it his life; secondly, the mass of the people and, we believe, the government also, deceived by the reports sent from Tours and Bordeaux, fully expected that, although detained, the new armies levied in the provinces would arrive to the rescue of the capital. We know now how utterly fallacious was that hope, but it was impossible for Paris to know the truth at the time. We heard of the victories of Chanzy and other generals, and the account came all dressed in glowing colours for our special ears; and we could not conceive that the whole organized power of a great country like France was at an end, or so near it as scarcely to form an element in the question between her and the enemy. We were starved, or nearly so, materially, but we were fed with false hopes, so that capitulation looked like the grossest cowardice; and France will be intensely thankful hereafter to the people of Paris, who in thus suffering, and still upholding the honour of the city, did so much to save the national pride. The people of Paris deserve to rank with the Old Guard at Waterloo; their leaders were incapable, their force was broken down by that of the enemy, everything around them was chaos, but they stood their ground as long as human nature was capable of enduring; and they may honestly adopt the words of the brave Francis I., "All is lost, except honour!" But when honour is saved, all is saved for the future; a nation whose honour is intact is only scotched, not killed. When France shall find worthy rulers, and cease to be the plaything of adventurers and revolutionists, she will, let us hope, again take a high place amongst nations, and commence another, brighter, and purer career than that already written against her name in the book of European civilization.

But even honour cannot exist upon air! How then were the people kept alive? At the time when an ounce of horse flesh a day first became the ordinary allowance, the quantity and quality

of the bread were excellent and unlimited; there was an immense supply of biscuit, plenty of sugar, coffee, chocolate, and wine; the elements of life-sustaining diet were still present though unequal; the destitute were well supplied with soup, made from refuse meat, bones, and animal greases; as for the mass, they took kindly enough to horse-flesh, and eked out the supply of meat from all sources. For a time, the accounts of the consumption of the flesh of cats and dogs were regarded as jokes, but they soon proved their veracity; dogs and cats were not only eaten, but declared by many to supply excellent food; and finally they appeared regularly in the markets, and ended by being actually in great demand, at prices ranging from four to six shillings a pound. Rats were strongly eulogized by the members of a somewhat fantastic club of naturalists, and were certainly eaten at last in large numbers, selling for two and three francs each; it was said that Paris was thereby cleared of rats. This is probably an exaggeration, but it was absolutely true that cats and dogs had almost entirely disappeared. The beautiful half-angoras, which used to be so common, were only to be found in houses where they were protected with the greatest possible care. When a cat came to be worth ten and even twenty francs, the pussy that ventured out alone was a "gone coon."

The affluent classes, and indeed all who had money at command, whether they could afford it or not, added to the common fare delicacies, which in the end rose to almost fabulous prices; a few of these, the result of personal experience and observation, will be interesting by way of record:—

Fowls,	40*s.* to 50*s.*
Turkeys and geese,	5*l.* to 6*l.*
A fine turkey stuffed with truffles,	8*l.*
Ducks,	30*s.*
Pigeons,	8*s.* to 15*s.*
Rooks,	5*s.*
Sparrows, or any other small birds,	1*s.* to 2*s.*
Hares,	2*l.* to 3*l.*
Rabbits,	30*s.* to 40*s.*
Ham,	40*s.* per lb.
Preserved beef,	15*s.* per lb.

The above were ordinary prices which ruled for weeks; special instances of still higher rates might be adduced.

The papers amused their readers considerably with accounts of the immense success of elephant and other meats which were sold at great prices; but these belong simply to the curiosities of the siege. The elephants killed were but two very small ones, and the whole of the rare animals and large birds killed for food were the property of the Acclimatization Society, which had not fodder enough to maintain them; none of the animals belonging to the Jardin des Plantes were slaughtered. A well-known butcher made a great show of these rare meats, and of *pâtés* and preparations made from them; and those who could find nothing better to do with their money paid exorbitant prices for elephant steaks, elan beef, roasted cassowary, and other delicacies, from which under ordinary circumstances they would have turned away with disgust.

Fish, of course, was almost unattainable; the appearance of a fine fresh salmon caused a positive sensation in the city; a small plate of Seine gudgeons was worth five shillings; and the few pike, carp, tench, eels, and other fish that appeared in the markets, sold almost for their weight in gold. It will give an idea of the absolute dearth of anything like fish to mention that the ordinary shilling box of sardines in oil became towards the end of the siege worth at least a dozen shillings.

Few articles attained such high prices relatively as oils and greases; the absence of butter and the want of fat was not only felt in cookery, but began to tell most seriously upon the health of the people; olive oil was almost exhausted, and was worth from ten to twenty shillings a pint, and rapeseed oil, which was used as a substitute, was not to be had under three or four shillings. The whole of the suet, and all the other fat, was melted and purified at the *abattoirs*, and sold for four to five shillings a pound; the very commonest grease, even cocoa butter, generally used only by the fine soapmakers, although declared detestable in flavour, was not to be had under eighteenpence a pound.

It may be remarked, that while almost every kind of meat was accepted and eaten with very little complaint, the substitution of grease for butter created general disgust. The Academy of Sciences tried to persuade the people that any kind of oil or grease, even tallow, might be easily purified and rendered tasteless; but the universal verdict was that none of the substitutes for oil and butter were fit for human consumption. The one article which supplied the place of fat in the food was chocolate, and its consumption was enormous;

fortunately the supply was large, and although it at last became scarce, the price did not rise very high. Honey was also a useful auxiliary, but the stock was not great, and before the armistice was agreed to it was worth eight or ten francs a pound. Chocolate and sugar were used in enormous quantities, and although the raw material began to run low, and the refiners and manufacturers had great difficulty in obtaining fuel, and had to pay enormous prices for it, the supply held out to the end. At one moment the prices of these important articles threatened to increase seriously, and the authorities made an attempt to fix the price of sugar; but this attempt at controlling trade, like most others of the same kind, failed utterly: refiners refused, in fact were generally speaking unable, to sell large quantities at a loss, and retailers who had made heavy contracts refused to sell at less rates than they paid for the goods wholesale. At one moment we feared that chocolate and sugar were both all but exhausted, for the grocers almost universally refused to sell to one person more than half a pound of the former or a pound of the latter, so that the members of a family had to visit different shops in order to obtain sufficient quantities of these always useful, and now almost indispensable, articles of consumption. It seems extraordinary to lay so much stress upon an article like chocolate, which many persons, and the writer amongst the number, scarcely ever touch; but for a long time the only substantial aliment within common reach was chocolate, made without milk, or with an exceedingly small quantity, with dry bread; chocolate was used also largely with rice, while the latter held out, and a small quantity of rum. Coffee was plentiful, but the absence of milk made it of little use; a thimbleful of black coffee, made as strong as brandy, is much relished after a good dinner, but a large cup of black coffee fasting is anything but an agreeable beverage, and if persisted in would soon tell upon the health of the consumer. Had the siege occurred in hot weather coffee would have been invaluable, as it forms one of the most wholesome drinks possible for the summer, and is specially recommended to the army. This beverage is called *mazagrin*, and is made by pouring iced-water on strong cold coffee, and adding sugar and a small glass of brandy, according to taste; it never disorders the stomach, and therefore is invaluable in the dog-days. But although we led a dog's life of it during the latter portion of the siege, it was not the heat that troubled us; and our ounce of horse-flesh did not produce that amount of oppression which demands large libations of any kind, except those which supplied warmth and comfort, and a feeling, if not the reality, of support.

The exorbitant prices of many articles of consumption have been referred to more than once, and there is no doubt that a number of persons traded largely on the scarcity of provisions, and demanded and obtained outrageous prices, but these did not in all cases represent great profits. The poulterers, for instance, who sold miserable fowls or small rabbits for thirty and forty shillings each, had immense trouble to obtain a supply, which, after all, was extremely limited; and the poor man or woman who sold the few fowls or rabbits that they possessed, could not certainly be blamed for selling them at high prices, when they themselves often wanted the means to obtain a dinner except by charity; moreover, had the prices been maintained at the usual rates all the poultry, and many other articles, would have been consumed long before they were, and even the sick and invalided would have been unable to obtain the slightest delicacy, or even change of diet. Some grocers and other tradesmen undoubtedly kept back provisions until almost famine prices were reached; but nothing proved that this was done on a large scale, and many respectable shops refused to buy of wholesale dealers who thus traded on the sufferings of others, and announced the fact by placards in their windows, somewhat in the following form:—

"We beg to inform our customers that our stock of —— is exhausted, and that we refuse to purchase more of those wholesale dealers who have kept back their stocks until they could obtain exorbitant prices for it."

The great mass of retail dealers did not take undue advantage of the state of affairs, and we believe that the number of wholesale dealers who did so was very small. In many cases within our own experience respectable shopkeepers made no advance at all. They said, so long as our stock lasts we shall sell at the usual rates; and they kept their word. On the whole, the usual course of trade was not interfered with, and wherever an attempt was made to fix prices by authority utter failure was the result, the article generally disappearing at once from the public view. Official

interference simply caused secret instead of open dealing. The case of meat was different; the supply was precisely known, and as all the animals are sold and killed in one place in Paris, under the eye of the municipal authorities, the requisition and rationing which were necessary, first, to limit the consumption, and, secondly, to keep down the prices, only interfered with the butchers' trade, and was fully justifiable on the score of necessity.

Manufacturers, dealers, shopkeepers, the mass of purveyors generally, acted, on the whole, admirably. Thousands of them were utterly ruined, and many of them met their ruin with truly noble courage, giving liberally, putting all considerations for the future out of sight, and turning all their attention to the defence of the city or the succour of the sick and wounded. The members of the literary professions also exhibited the most praiseworthy devotion.

We have not yet reached the culminating point in the alimentary view of the siege of Paris; meat we knew must very soon run short if the siege were prolonged, vegetables we knew we must be content to do without; many other articles of food we were aware would either vanish altogether or become very scarce, but up to a late period of the investment we were positively assured that there was no lack of flour or corn, and that there could be no necessity for restricting the consumption of bread. We believed this, as we believed the approach of the provincial armies to our relief, because we believed the members of the government to be honourable men; we came to know how utterly unfounded were both beliefs, yet the government could hardly be charged with deception; the sufficiency of bread depended on the length of the siege, that again on the arrival of the armies of the departments, while the knowledge that the government possessed respecting those armies reached it from sources in which it certainly had a full right to trust. It deceived the people because it was itself deceived, and bread only failed us because the hoped-for aid from the provinces turned out to be a mere will-o'-the-wisp. When it was whispered that bread was about to be rationed the dismay was extreme, but assurances were given that the measure was one of precaution only, that the supply of wheat was immense, only there was some difficulty in grinding it into flour. The task, in fact, was one of great difficulty; Paris possessed at the time of the investment no flour mills worth speaking of, with the exception of those belonging to the army; all had to be created. Fortunately large numbers of fine millstones had been brought in for safety, and numbers of millers had come in from the surrounding country; these, with the aid of engineers and others, set to work manfully; mills were established at railway stations, locomotives being used to supply power; numbers of small iron mills of improved construction were made and set to work at the large engineering establishment of MM. Cail & Co., and finally, nearly four hundred mills of different kinds were in operation. Unfortunately, just as the means for converting corn into flour were complete, it was discovered that the wheat was nearly all gone!

In spite of all the assurances that were put forth, the appearance of the decree fixing the quantity of bread to be purchased daily at 300 *grammes*, or little more than ten ounces per head per diem, caused universal consternation; and as the official arrangements—as a matter of course—broke down, certain quarters of the town were short of flour, no bread was to be had, and numbers of men paraded the streets declaring that the government was starving them; in other districts many persons, on the day before the decree appeared, bought up all the bread they could find, cut it up and dried it in ovens, storing it away for the last emergency. This gave rise, of course, also to general insufficiency, and increased the dismay of the people. Assurances were put forth that all these errors and accidents would be immediately corrected or avoided for the future, and that the population would be supplied with pure wheaten bread, not so white as usual, but more wholesome and economical; in other words, the flour was only sifted once, and consequently only the coarse bran was removed. The promised bread appeared and quite fulfilled the promise which had been given for it, and Paris was satisfied; when one morning the supply nearly failed altogether, thousands of families could not obtain a single crust of bread on that day, and stale pieces were worth almost their weight in gold. This state of things went on for a week or two, the supply always being below the amount fixed, and consequently people were turned away every day with empty hands from the bakers' doors, and women carrying

loaves home were positively afraid to meet the gaze of their disappointed neighbours. Not only women and children, but soldiers and men in the vigour of life, would stop a person in the street and beg with tears in their eyes to be allowed to buy even a slice of the loaf he or she was carrying home—and who could refuse such a request, although he knew that at home every slice missed was a calamity? The condition and feelings of those unfortunate creatures who waited, frequently all night and always for hours, in the bitter frosty air, standing with aching feet in half-melted snow, and were told when they were in sight of the baker's shop that there was no more bread, may be imagined but cannot be described; this happened several times in the district where we lived. Still the bread, though short in quantity, was excellent in quality, appetizing and satisfactory; but it did not long remain so. It was announced that in order to economize the wheaten flour a certain quantity of rice would be mixed with it, and we were curious rather than anxious to know what would be the effect of such mixture; our consternation was extreme when the first sample of the new kind of bread appeared. It was a dark mass of heavy indigestible stuff, that not a single individual in Paris would have touched under ordinary circumstances. The bakers did not know how to manage the rice, said the *savans* of the *Académie des Sciences;* a day or two would suffice to teach them this, and then the bread would be good again! The day or two fled, and a week or two after them; the bread was certainly better made, but its composition became a subject of general curiosity. The fact was, that wheat flour formed a very minute portion of the whole; rice of the poorest quality, ground oats, haricot beans and lentils, bran, and as some declared, cut straw, were all called into requisition, and the result defies description, as it defied digestion. A hale, active man could manage with the aid of stimulants and exercise to turn the gritty, leaden mass into chyle, but for the sedentary, the sick, the delicate, such bread was almost entirely valueless; small as the quantity eaten was, the result was long sleepless nights and a continuous feeling of uneasiness, if not actual pain. A sort of specific disease was created, for which the prescribed remedies were ether, ginger, and peppermint, separate or mixed.

It is difficult to imagine the effect of scarcity of flour without having witnessed it; the decree, calling up all corn, flour, biscuit, and other breadstuffs, interdicted the application of flour to anything but breadmaking; none was to be obtained for culinary purposes, and no baker or confectioner was permitted to rebolt or sift the flour he received from the government mills. The consequence was, that the pastrycooks' shops, generally so well supplied in Paris, gradually became almost empty, and were finally closed one after the other. A very few, in the most conspicuous situations, managed to supply a certain number of *pâtés* to the end of the siege by the use of rice flour, or by some clever evasion of the law; these were excellent, the ability of the cooks, with the aid of mushrooms, converting horseflesh into a delicious compound—at least, it seemed delicious to us then. Those *pâtés* were of course very dear, but they were almost scrambled for, and ladies and gentlemen bore them off in triumph, dropping *sous* right and left into the hands of the half-famished creatures, or the cunning beggars that crowded around the doors and stared longingly at the tempting wares in the windows. A person endowed with any natural sensibility, although knowing that much of the appearance of starvation was assumed, felt almost ashamed to pass through the eager, watching groups, buy a *pâté*, which the very children amongst them knew cost enough to keep a poor family for two or three days in ordinary times, and pass out again with the dainty morsel in his hand in presence of a hundred beseeching or envious eyes.

The stock of dry confectionery did not hold out long, and finally the commonest ship biscuit was worth several pence; the pieces of broken ones were laid carefully together on paper, and exhibited and sold at the best shops. Eating became so absorbing a matter, that jewellers, goldsmiths, shopkeepers of all kinds in the very best and most fashionable streets of Paris, became dealers in chocolate, or in poultry or other rarity attainable, including butter and eggs.

The above is an accurate account of the general state of food supplies, and those who had no reserves and who could not afford, that is to say, who positively had not the cash to purchase expensive additions to their ordinary fare, came fully to understand the true meaning of the words siege

fare. Even those who were most fortunate could not escape altogether; they could not obtain good bread by any outlay whatever, and scarcely a morsel of fresh meat, except the diurnal ounce of horse flesh; while even the most extravagant comestibles were frequently more or less musty, and everything almost had an antiquated taste, which we designated amongst us as the "siege flavour." The positive physical deprivation was galling, but the greatest punishment of all was the dreadful monotony; the mind could never entirely free itself from considerations of the immediate wants of the day, and fears respecting the morrow; servants were almost always out seeking bread, meat, or some other necessary, the tradesmen ceased their calls, every one had to go to shop or market cash in hand and bring home his or her purchases; there were no errand boys, no vehicles, every one was at once his own purveyor and his own porter. Soldiers and single men who lived out were relatively better off; the latter got their rations like other people through the *restaurateurs*, to whom they transferred their meat tickets, and the soldiers cooked theirs with their comrades in the barracks, huts, or on the sides of the boulevards, or they ate it at the cheap canteens which were established in all quarters of the town. As to the very poorest of all, they were fed at the public soup kitchens, and were relatively as well, if not better off, than any one. The classes that suffered most were those which always suffer most, the lower ranks of the middle class, those who had scarcely anything to spend, and yet who were too independent to appeal to public charity. It was in those classes that the mortality was greatest; poor seamstresses, shop-girls thrown out of work, men too old for service, singers, dancers, actors and actresses, starved or fell into ill health in their garrets, with few to heed them or lend them a helping hand. Many a poor actress accustomed to lively society, played constantly for charitable objects, receiving nothing but a franc or two for the necessary gloves or other trifles, and returned home weary and famished, ready to fall a victim to the small-pox or other disease that predominated. The secret history of these poor creatures can never be written, or it would present one of the saddest records that a civilized society ever presented.

Certain newspaper correspondents and others have made light of the sufferings of the population during the siege, and some have declared that they dined at their restaurants as usual, only paying a somewhat higher rate for what they ate: such assertions are reckless and untruthful. It is true that a few of the best restaurants had wonderful supplies of preserved meat, and could obtain poultry and other things at exorbitant prices; but fresh meat was only to be found here and there, and a good wholesome dinner could only be obtained by the expenditure of three or four times the usual amount, and frequently much more. Speaking generally, the restaurants were closed, many houses famous for their *cuisine* put up their shutters at the very commencement of the scarcity; the best and most popular of the fixed price dining houses struggled manfully for a time, diminished their portions, doubled their prices, yet were compelled finally to shut up. The cheap restaurants, or *établissements de bouillon*, as they are called, were kept open by some arrangement of the authorities, as it would have been absolutely dangerous to have left thousands of single men and women without some such resource. We visited some of these more than once, and found them crowded, but the fare was limited to a few dishes of horse, dog, cat, or what not, while in the absence of butter and oil everything had a nasty tallowy taste, that disgusted all but the heartiest; omelettes and eggs in any form were out of the question; there were no vegetables but the commonest haricots and lentils, and these were very dear; few sweets and very rarely any cheese; when a morsel of the last-named article was to be had, it was worth almost any price, and we remember one instance amongst others when we were charged about seven pence for a morsel of bad Dutch cheese that certainly did not weigh half an ounce. Those who found the restaurants "the same as ever" must have been peculiarly lucky during the siege, or very unfortunate previously. To give another instance of the price of ordinary provisions, it may be mentioned that several shops made a special trade of providing little luncheons for men on duty; these consisted of a small round tin box about an inch high and two inches in diameter, containing a rough kind of potted horse flesh, and were purchased eagerly at a franc each.

The positive scarcity of bread, or rather the impossibility of obtaining an extra morsel of that which is eaten so lavishly in Paris by all classes in

ordinary times, may be illustrated by the fact that all the restaurants and *cafés* were compelled to ask their customers to bring their own bread, and this was not a mere request, but an actual necessity, as we found on one occasion when entering a well-known restaurant on the boulevards without our slab of baked bran; we were compelled to consume what we could get without bread, potatoes, or other vegetables, except haricots. Even the clubs were compelled to act in the same manner; a rich man of title, on one occasion, talking to some ladies of our acquaintance on whom he had called, said, "I am going to dine at my club, and here is my bread," taking a slice out of his pocket. He did not find dining out "as usual!"

The excessive rigour of the weather was a fearful addition to the sufferings of the people; fuel is always a dear thing in Paris, coals twice the price they are in London, wood very expensive to burn, charcoal also dear; coke alone, which is coming much into use, is the only fuel to be had at a moderate rate. The coal was all requisitioned at an early part of the siege, the gasworks were soon stopped, and then there was no more coke to be had; charcoal was sold, when it could be found, at four times, and even more, the ordinary rates, and, finally, wood was requisitioned for baking and other purposes, and then we understood that it also was nearly exhausted. The authorities had already cut down a quantity of timber in the Bois de Boulogne, to prevent its forming a cover for the enemy; the axe was now called into requisition, not only there but in the Bois de Vincennes and in the outlying boulevards, and this green wood was the only fuel which the people had to depend upon for weeks; moreover, the quantity which each family could purchase was limited to half a hundredweight for five days, or about ten pounds in weight of green wood, which was half water, per diem! No matter how large was the family, unless it possessed a store of wood of its own, it was impossible to maintain more than one fire for all the purposes of cooking and warming; and this at a time when two coats, a railway rug, and thick woollen mittens scarcely kept the body warm enough for the fingers to manage a pen. Moreover, as in the case of the meat and the bread, this miserable modicum of wet wood that spluttered and smouldered, and finally shrunk up into something like a black sponge, was only to be obtained at a high price, and after spending hours with hundreds of others, exposed to cutting winds, or the feet buried in half-melted snow; and when obtained, the means of carrying it home rested with each purchaser. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that everything wooden began to disappear; small trees on the boulevards were cut down and made off with, every atom of wooden railing disappeared bit by bit, unoccupied huts were robbed of their doors and planks, gardens were invaded and were denuded of their trees; there were no guardians but the national guards, and the national guards wanted firewood. At last the suffering from the want of fuel rendered people desperate, and depredations began to be effected in open daylight; in one case, close to our house, the remains of a fine old property, on which there was a grove and clumps of fine walnuts, elms, and other trees, was invaded by a number of men with axes and saws; in an incredibly short space of time every tree was brought to the ground, and all were soon reduced to logs, which were carried off by the men, while troops of women and children collected and carried off every twig that they could find. The authorities were utterly powerless, so they contented themselves by causing the roots to be grubbed up and sent to the public kitchens. The proprietor must have stared when he visited his land again, and would find some difficulty in getting any compensation for his lost timber.

So great was the want of fuel at last that all kinds of wood, whether for building or cabinet making, was put in requisition; little builders sold their scaffold poles, and almost everything they possessed that would burn, at exorbitant rates, and the flooring of a vast number of rooms doubtless met a similar fate to that of the furniture of the enthusiastic Palissy the Potter. A few more days of such paucity of fuel would have caused the furniture of Paris houses to begin to find its way into the stoves and grates.

Paris, however, escaped some of the worst features of a siege; water never ran short, although the enemy, according to the military custom of civilized nations, cut off one of the sources of supply, and salt, although dear, can hardly be said to have become scarce; on the other hand, the evils that commonly arise from the use of too much salt meat were happily escaped by the fact, that nearly all the provisions salted down at a great cost by the authorities and their contractors and agents turned out totally unfit for use. This was only one

instance of fearful waste caused by the inexperience or carelessness of those who had the management of the provisions; tons of cheese, potatoes, and other commodities were forgotten or left to rot in cellars at the markets and elsewhere, while the population would have eagerly purchased them at exorbitant prices.

Wine and spirits, those highly-lauded and much-deprecated aids to diet, became of immense importance during the siege; their consumption was enormous, and doubtless their use ran frequently into abuse. Soldiers exposed for hours in the most inclement weather were not, as it may well be supposed, scrupulous about the number of *cannons*, or *petits verres*—the common name for the wine glass of the shops and the dram glass, intoxication was prevalent, and gave rise to constant complaints on the part of the military commanders, some of whom were themselves accused of going drunk upon duty; these were, however, officers of the national guard, to whom the duties of the camp were new, and whose habits were utterly subverted. With less sustaining food than usual at their command, and having much time on their hands, they flew to the *diva bouteille* as a resource against *ennui*. Every little *café* and coffee stall sold wine as well as brandy; and although this seems in ordinary times to produce no bad result, under the peculiar circumstances of the siege it doubtless held out unusual temptations to the young and the thoughtless. But wine and spirits in other ways were of immense service; in the absence of butter, fat, and oily substances they supplied the carbon which is so necessary a portion of diet that without it otherwise good food becomes unsatisfactory and unsustaining. Brandy, but more especially rum, was largely used in cookery; rice and rum was a common sweet dish while the rice held out; wine was employed in the stewing of horse flesh, and hot wine was strongly recommended by doctors even for females and young persons. The method of preparing it was similar to that adopted in France and elsewhere for punch; a considerable portion of the spirit was got rid of by setting the wine for some time over the fire, and then the latter was poured upon toast, and all eaten together like soup; the dish was, in fact, called *soup au vin*. Rum was also drunk in small quantities, burned, just as the Chinese drink thimbles' full of their rice spirit at meals; and ladies, who scarcely ever before drank a drop of spirit in their lives, found great benefit from it. They were not likely to have acquired a taste for it from their siege practice; on the contrary, the very smell of rum was afterwards, as far as our experience taught us, peculiarly repugnant in consequence.

Bread, haricot beans, soup, and wine, form the staple diet of the French *ouvriers*, and indeed of all classes except the wealthy; and there being no beans or potatoes, and but little bad bread to be had, the consumption of wine must have increased at least threefold. The consequence was, all the common wine was consumed, and the poor soldiers and others, instead of getting a *litre*, nearly a quart, for sixpence or sevenpence, had to pay tenpence or more for an ordinary bottle, which does not hold two-thirds of a *litre*.

The English residents in Paris, and many of the French, soon found out the value of good English porter, stout, and ale; and the stocks of the agents of the Burton and other brewers were soon exhausted, for unfortunately the siege happened just previously to the period for the importation of the new beer; and long before the gates of Paris were opened again, there was not a bottle of ale or stout to be obtained, except out of a private cellar. French beer, bad at all times, was almost undrinkable during the siege, and the Austrian and other foreign beer establishments were all quickly closed in consequence of the exhaustion of their stocks.

Tobacco, too, was a precious auxiliary; and when a report went abroad that it was likely to be rationed, the consternation was extreme. This dreaded necessity, however, never arose; and if the ordinary tobacco became a little worse than usual, the supply held out without stint.

The effect of the diet and other circumstances of the siege may be pictured in a few words. The mortality increased from less than 3000 to more than 5000 deaths per week, exclusive of those in the military hospitals and ambulances; in other words, the number increased to nearly the extent of 500 a day; add to this, first, the effect on the constitutions of thousands of survivors and upon their offspring, the deaths and sufferings of the army, to say nothing of property wasted, debts incurred, and consequent taxation, and we obtain a glimpse of the effects produced by the royal game of war.

The calamity which fell upon Paris was serious enough, but it narrowly escaped taking the form of a frightful catastrophe. The feeling of the people was so intensely opposed to capitulation,

the hope of succour arriving was clung to naturally with so much tenacity, that the government put off to the last moment the hateful act of succumbing to the enemy; while the forts around the town were almost entirely uninjured, while men and arms and ammunition held out, while there was food enough to keep the population from starving, every man who had a spark of the hero within him naturally shuddered at the very idea of capitulation. But the time came when valour would have become crime; and had the armistice been deferred three days longer there is no saying what might have been the consequences. The moment the gates were opened the people were seized with an uncontrollable yearning for fresh food. The first who brought loaves of white bread, joints of fresh mutton, and vegetables into Paris, were regarded with as much curiosity as artists who had produced new forms of beauty, or searchers who had discovered hidden treasures. To obtain something different from siege fare seemed the sole object of the whole world. The arrival of quantities of provisions from England caused profound sensation, and Paris would certainly not have refused a vote of thanks, as the Bordeaux Assembly did; on the contrary, the papers the least friendly to Great Britain were loud in their praise, not only of the munificence of the British nation, but of the determination and rapidity with which the succour was brought to the doors of those who wanted it so visibly. There was sad delay in the distribution, but this was not the fault of the English committee, as the Parisians knew well enough. The people of Paris, always either kept in the dark or fed with falsehood, were ignorant of the motives and acts of the English government, and the press, unfortunately, was either ignorant or malicious, and led the people, who were foolish enough to believe it, to think that the English nation rejoiced in the sufferings of its neighbour; but the gates once open, the falsehood was soon exposed, and the gratitude felt for the munificent aid sent to Paris and other parts of France was spontaneous and general.

The moment the gates were open the people flocked to the outposts of the enemy for provisions; regular markets were held at a dozen points around Paris, at the outposts of St. Denis, the bridge of Courbevoie, and elsewhere; it was an extraordinary sight to see, as we did, hundreds of Parisians around the barriers, which were kept by German soldiers and French gendarmes acting in concert, eagerly pressing for the chance of purchasing what the country people had brought in; the contents of waggons, carts, and trucks were swept away almost in the twinkling of an eye, the Germans keeping watch over the transactions, and suppressing any attempt at unusual extortion. In some cases, where exorbitant prices were demanded, the German officials fixed the prices and superintended the sales. Here and there there were some unfortunate scenes, some very rough justice; but on the whole the management was better and the disorder less than could fairly be expected.

It took some time, of course, to revictual Paris; supplies came in fast, but not fast enough; prices fell, but not rapidly, on account of the eagerness of the purchasers; twice and three times the ordinary prices were cheerfully paid by those who had money for butter and many other articles; white bread reappeared almost immediately, but for some days a leg of mutton was worth twenty or more francs. It was no easy matter to stock the market of a city which required 400 to 500 head of cattle and 3000 sheep a day. Fuel, too, presented a great difficulty; the railways were encumbered, the river traffic interrupted by the breaking down of bridges and the removal of dams, but thanks to the re-establishment of the natural modes of trade, to the energy of philanthropists as well as of men of business, a few days sufficed to fill our cupboards, Paris became a civilized city once again, and its inhabitants were no longer reduced to the grovelling necessity of giving nearly their whole time and thought to the supply of merely animal wants. One must pass through a siege before he can estimate the value of a bit of wholesome mutton, a potato, and a slice of good bread, and understand the real difference between civilized society and that state of things which poets have often dwelt upon with much misplaced rapture, anent the noble savage and free life in forest or prairie.

There was one terrible drawback to the sensation of relief which, in spite of the hard conditions, followed the armistice; the enemy was to occupy Paris, not in the ordinary fashion of conquerors, it is true, but almost by way of form. The whole of the Champs Elysées, from the Arc de Triomphe to the Tuileries, and thence to the river, was to be occupied by the Germans; all the side streets leading to the Champs Elysées were closed at the further end by French picquets, and the space

marked out left entirely to the conquering army. The press and the clubs called upon the people to treat the days of occupation as days of mourning, and the appeal had its effect; the figures of the towns of France on the Place de la Concorde had their faces covered with crape, a puerile act, perhaps, but not without significance. With one solitary exception, every shop, *café*, restaurant, and garden was closed in the Champs Elysées; the same was the case in all the side streets, all along the parallel Faubourg Saint Honoré, the great boulevards, and in all the principal streets at the western part of the city. There were few but soldiers visible, and these parts of Paris seemed almost to belong to a city of the dead; at the ends of the Rue Rivoli and the Rue Royale, where they touch the Place de la Concorde, were lines of artillery waggons, drawn up under the charge of a few unarmed artillerymen.

In the Champs Elysées itself a certain number of persons went about amongst the German troops; these included a fair proportion of well-dressed people, some military men, inhabitants of the quarter, newspaper correspondents on duty, a sprinkling of ladies, and a number, not very large, of the lowest orders, principally boys. There were three or four slight disturbances during the two days of occupation; the people of the single *café* the door of which was open, and frequented by the Germans, were hooted, and finally the tables and contents destroyed; and if, as asserted, the Germans compelled the proprietor to serve them, this was against the stipulations of the convention, and very hard upon the *café* keeper. The *gamins* of Paris, the most insolent street boys in Europe, jeered and hooted a few German officers, and caused some little difficulty, and one or two women who gave offence were very roughly handled; but on the whole, the conduct of both the French and Germans was excellent, and it is difficult to imagine such a painful occurrence as the occupation of a portion of a city by a triumphant enemy giving rise to less disturbance. Fortunately, too, that occupation was suddenly shortened by the early payment of an instalment of the indemnity, and the Champs Elysées was cleared of the Germans.

Another painfully exciting scene was the return of the sailors into Paris from the forts, after these had been given up to the enemy. The sailors, or infantry and artillery of the marine, as they are called in France, behaved splendidly in the various sorties and in the manning of the forts; and the armistice was a bitter disappointment to them. The excitement of the men was so great that it was considered dangerous to attempt to disarm them, so they all came into Paris with their guns slung over their shoulders. Their appearance as they issued from the Paris terminus of the Western Railway will not easily be forgotten by those who witnessed it; the officers marched along calmly with compressed lips, the blue-jackets swarmed along the streets as if they were going to charge a redoubt; he would have been a bold man who should have dared to say a word to displease them; their step was far from steady, for it was evident enough that they had been allowed to seek solace for their injured feelings in the bottle. A terrible incident will show how the sailors fought and felt; when the armistice was made, five lieutenants had fallen as seconds in command at Mont Valérien, and when the sixth, who was then acting, heard of the capitulation, he cried:—“It shall never be said that the fort was delivered up while I was alive,” and deliberately blew out his brains in the presence of the man. No wonder his brother officers and the brave fellows under them came into the city with knitted brows and flashing eyes. If the army of France had been made of the same stuff as these noble sailors, the history of the fearful struggle might have been strangely different. Officers and men, although somewhat slighter, looked so like English salts that it was difficult to imagine them belonging to another country. The sons of the ocean have a strong family likeness.

It must be difficult for any one who was not in Paris at the time of the siege to realize the condition of society at that time. It is almost needless to say that commerce was utterly at an end, for that was a natural result of communications interrupted, but nearly all business was at a stand-still, with the exception of that which had to do with the necessaries of life or the material of war; and even for the latter the supply of workmen was frequently very inadequate. Once taken away from the foundry or workshop, numbers of men preferred idleness and fifteen pence a day to hard work with three times that amount of pay; it was with great difficulty that hands enough were found for the casting of cannon, the transformation of muskets, the repair of arms, and the manufacture

of ammunition of various kinds. As to money matters, few landlords, except the poor proprietors of single houses or grasping misers, asked their tenants for rent, and fewer still obtained it when they asked; and Paris, at the conclusion of the siege, presented the extraordinary condition of a city that owed three quarters' rent! All other payments were suspended, bills stood over by law, houses of undoubted stability declined to pay accounts until after the war, and, generally speaking, no one asked for what was due to him, and no one tendered what he owed. Pay as you go now, was the general cry; we must leave outstanding affairs till we have got rid of the Prussians. Many persons, doubtless, took care to place all the money and property they could in safety when the first news of the reverses arrived, but the great mass of the manufacturing and shopkeeping class, and many other classes, were utterly ruined.

The aspect of the Bois de Boulogne, the Champs Elysées, and the boulevards, was most extraordinary. In the busy central portions of the town the streets presented much the same aspect as usual, but in the fashionable and main streets the change was very remarkable. There were no carriages in the Bois, for most of the owners had fled the city and most of the horses were eaten. The splendid half-bred pair, purchased for hundreds of pounds a few months previously, and the poor cab hack, alike were requisitioned, paid for by the government at a fixed rate per pound, live weight, sent to the *abattoir*, and converted into "beef." Valuable horses thus fetched a tenth part of their value, while a good fat cab or omnibus horse fetched more than usual. Thirty to forty thousand horses were eaten. The reader may imagine the void that their absence created. There were no parties, few ladies were left in the city, people wanted all their cash for the supply of the cupboard; those who rode at all used the omnibuses, and the few cabs to be seen were only in demand by officers on duty, or luxurious national guards riding to their posts of duty. There were no carriages at the door of the jockey club, no crowd of *voitures* at the Grand Hotel; all were reduced to the democratic omnibus, or the still more democratic Shanks' mare, or, as the Cockneys call it, the Marrowbone stage. The roads thus were left free to the national guards, who inhabited many of the boulevards almost in permanence, and the pavements were nearly as vacant as the carriage ways; many of the great *cafés* were closed, and, with very few exceptions, those which remained open were nearly deserted; even in the very heart of the town, where at midday, just before dinnertime, and all the evening, there used to be a continual throng of visitors and a flying crowd of waiters, was exhibited the spectacle of a superannuated attendant hovering over one or two equally superannuated customers. In one of the best *cafés* in Paris the chain of one of the three great iron shutters was broken by accident. The shutter remained closed for weeks. The waiter shrugged his shoulders, and said it didn't matter; half the room was three times as much as was required then—and it was perfectly true.

Paris the brilliant was not only dirty, but dull. All the theatres were closed by order of the prefect of police at the commencement of the siege; and the scenery and properties packed away in secure places against the danger of fire. The *cafés chantants*, *casinos*, and all other places of amusement, were also closed, and, with the exception of performances in aid of the funds for the ambulances and other charitable purposes, there were scarcely any means of relaxation in the city for the 80,000 provincial mobiles far away from family and home, and the thousands of national guards; and the poor fellows had no resource but drinking at the wine shops and *cafés*, or going to bed with the fowls. The streets were miserably dull; in place of two or three gaslights they were lighted with one small petroleum lamp, that looked more like a taper burning before a statue of the Virgin than a street light; and in the bitter, cold, dark nights of January few who had a home of their own troubled the pavements of Paris with their presence.

When performances took place at the theatres the scene was a curious one; whatever the play, it was acted without scenery or costumes. The actors of the Théâtre Français performed a classical play, some of them dressed in the uniform of the national guard, while the others wore evening dress and white gloves, and carried a crush hat; and a well-known actress of the same theatre played the mischievous page Cherubino in a black silk dress. The saloon of the theatre was converted into an ambulance, and sick and wounded men lay around the statues and busts of Voltaire, Molière, Corneille, Racine, and all the stars of past days, and the actresses superintended the ambulance with

great assiduity and kindliness. On the evening in question Mlle. ——, who had just left the stage after an admirable performance of the page, and being the only one of the lady attendants present in the theatre, was summoned, all panting with excitement, to receive a patient who had been injured in the street. A few weeks later still M. Seveste, a clever young actor of the theatre, was brought to the ambulance there mortally wounded, and died in the arms of his sister artistes. Such were a few of the effects of the siege on the theatres and on the actors and actresses, a body often shamefully maligned, but which did its duty in every way during the siege with great devotion and gallantry, as did the artists of every class, writers, painters, sculptors, and others.

It was a melancholy sight to see the Théâtre Français filled almost exclusively with dark-blue uniforms and black dresses, and lighted with a few lamps in place of chandeliers, lustres, and float-lights. The opera house, when it opened, resorted to the old method, and lighted up with wax candles, but at all the other theatres petroleum reigned alone, but shone with no imperial lustre.

At home the like dulness pressed upon all; scarcely a visitor rang the bell from one week's end to the other; the news that reached us was often disastrous, generally unsatisfactory; sickness and death, ruin and hopelessness, pressed upon all, and when common daily wants left the mind a few moments of repose, it was difficult to find any intellectual solace. As may be supposed, the publishers produced few works; in fact, the appearance of a single volume was an extraordinary event, a few pamphlets relative to passing events forming nearly the whole literature of the period. Nearly the whole of the scientific and literary periodicals ceased to appear; almost all engaged in them, writers, artists, publishers, and printers, were enrolled in the mobiles or the national guard; old men, women, and children were alone left to carry on most of the business of the city. At first the newspapers brought us daily budgets of most exciting news, and the accounts of the vast preparations which were being made for the defence of the city filled our minds; but the seal of secrecy was naturally affixed on many operations lest the enemy should benefit thereby. The result was, however, just what it always is in France, where publicity is never in favour with the authorities, the enemy knew everything, while the besieged population was only supplied with incomplete or false information. When the English and German papers were completely shut out, we in Paris scarcely knew more about what was going on within a mile or two of us than we did of the events in Timbuctoo.

The scarcity of paper, too, added to the difficulties of publishers; the numberless little political papers which made their appearance and sold for one or two *sous*, were printed on the most wretched paper that ever passed through the press, and were scarcely legible, and the established journals of large circulation were put to the greatest straits; large-sized paper was almost entirely exhausted, and the *Gaulois* and others, in order to print two copies at once, were compelled to paste two small sheets together and then cut them apart after they were printed. Towards the end of the siege the scarcity increased to such an extent, that four half sheets had to be pasted together to produce the double sheet.

When, on Sunday the 18th of September, we learnt that the railways were all cut, and that no more letters could be sent out or received, we began to understand what a state of real siege meant; we groaned over the prospect of being shut out from communication with the rest of the world for weeks. What would have been our feelings, had we known that our isolation was to last for more than five long miserable months!

The greatest efforts were made to maintain correspondence. Of course, the telegraph wires were cut at once by the enemy, and it is said that a cable laid in the bed of the Seine was fonnd and severed; the director-general of the post and telegraphs, one of the few really capable men that the war brought forward, had light copper balls made in which letters were sent down the river, but the enemy soon discovered them, and by the simple expedient of a net across a bridge fished them all up. Numbers of men attached to the post office, tempted by large offers of reward, tried to make their way across the enemy's lines; a few succeeded, one or two even went out and returned more than once, but the majority were never heard of. These brave fellows underwent great hardships; one of them remained hidden for nearly a day in the icy waters of the Seine, and others were several days without food while exposed to the cold of an almost arctic winter, or struggling against snow drifts, in which some doubtless perished.

It remained to try the worth of balloons, and these turned out of the greatest value to us; an extensive manufactory was established at one of the railway termini, which eventually had to be moved to another on the arrival of German shells; all the gas that could be produced was reserved for the inflation, all the aeronauts were called into requisition, and a number of intelligent young sailors instructed in the art of aerial navigation. The departure of the first balloon, with half a ton of letters, was an event which created immense interest, which went on increasing with every successive departure; the balloons were named after the heroes of the day or the towns which had held out courageously against the enemy, and the privilege of being present at the departure of a balloon was sought for most eagerly. More than forty balloons were despatched, but not one came into Paris; several attempts at directing their course were made, but they were all fruitless. The fate of some of the aeronauts became known to us; one poor fellow perished in the ocean, but a portion of the letters in his charge were recovered; one or two fell into the hands of the enemy, and one reached his destination after having been carried to Christiania, in Sweden. For the rest, we hoped that they had arrived safely beyond the reach of the enemy, who fired upon them whenever they appeared, but only in one instance succeeded in bringing the balloon down; but when the siege was raised we were astonished at the success of the balloon post, and of the small number of mails that had been lost.

But the anxiety of the population for news from without soon arose to positive torture. Government and other messengers came in now and then, and spies and agents brought us small supplies of news and newspapers; but thousands of persons, separated from all whom they loved, were weeks and months without knowing where wives, children, and friends were, or whether they were alive or dead. The agony suffered may be conceived, but defies description. A single case, which came to our personal knowledge, will supply a striking instance. A lady whose husband was in Algeria received news of his dangerous illness; she started from Paris, but was soon met by the news of his death; she had left her daughter, a young wife, in Paris in a critical condition, but was unable to get back within the city, and after weeks of torture, heard of the confinement and death of her beloved child! Multiply such cases mentally by thousands, and you may attain to something like a conception of the sufferings entailed on millions of men, women, and children, utterly innocent of any share in the cause of this frightful war.

The employment of pigeons to bring us in news was naturally thought of at the first moment of the siege, and fortunately the supply of birds for the purpose was considerable, amounting, in fact, to more than four thousand. They were carried in cages attached to the balloon cars, and being taken to Tours, Orleans, and other places, were sent in with governmental and private despatches. The arrival of these winged postmen created the greatest excitement, but unfortunately they were few and rare; but they brought us more consolation than anything else did during the siege, and every one who was shut up in Paris will regard a carrier pigeon with affection, or at least with gratitude, as long as he lives, or his nature must be very hard and prosaic.

The poetic notion of a pigeon messenger, a beautiful bird with a *billet doux* suspended to its neck or tied beneath the wing, did not meet the requirements of Paris. Our wants were sentimental as the gentlest love passage, but large, pressing, absorbing as hunger or thirst; we yearned for news with the most intense longing; no traveller in the Arabian desert ever looked forward to the next oasis with more eagerness than we for the arrival of the next pigeon. An admirable system of despatches was conceived, and by successive improvements was carried to great perfection. This plan has been explained and illustrated in articles and lectures—the most complete account, perhaps, will be found in the London *Engineer* newspaper of the 7th of April, 1871; but an outline of the mode adopted and of the results will be interesting to all and sufficient for most readers.

The first despatches sent were written on the thinnest paper manufactured, in ordinary writing or cypher; secondly, photography was called in aid, and the manuscript despatches were reduced to a very small compass, so that one pigeon could carry an immense number of messages; next, the despatches were set up in type and printed, so that they could be still further reduced by photography, and yet be more legible than the former; and lastly, these microscopic photographs were sent on films of collodion, which were ten times lighter

and thinner than the thinnest foreign post paper made. The despatches were placed in quills and attached in the usual manner to one of the central tail feathers of the pigeon. The photographic part of the operation was first executed in the ordinary way by means of apparatus existing at Tours, but superior instruments were afterwards sent off by balloon from Paris, part of which, after incurring great danger, reached its destination, and did valuable service. The fact of these instruments being made available seems almost miraculous, for the balloon in which they were, like another which left Paris at the same time, was fired at by platoons of infantry for an hour, and pierced by the enemy's balls. The latter was captured immediately, and the former also, after a portion of the instruments had been placed in safety.

The first photographic reductions on paper measured $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches by $1\frac{1}{2}$, and contained 240 ordinary despatches; the collodion films carried much more, each small page of print, containing 15,000 characters or about 200 despatches, being reduced to a mere speck, in fact, a parallelogram measuring superficially about *one twenty-fifth of a square inch;* on an average, a collodion film measuring $2\frac{1}{5}$ by $1\frac{1}{5}$ inches, and weighing the six-hundredth part of an ounce, carried sixteen of the small printed pages or 3200 despatches. Finally, 15,000 ordinary messages and 500 pages of official despatches were contained in a small quill attached to the tail feather of the pigeon; some carrying as many as twenty-three films of collodion. Numerous copies, sometimes as many as fifty, were sent by different birds. In all, nearly 100,000 despatches were sent to Paris, but the proportion received was very small; many of the birds had a long way to fly, and a great number were doubtless shot or killed by birds of prey.

The deciphering of the despatches when received in Paris was a matter of great difficulty, but after several improvements it was accomplished perfectly. The quill having been split open with a pen knife, the collodion films were placed in water containing a little ammonia, which caused them to unroll almost immediately; they were then dried, placed between sheets of glass, and the despatches transcribed by clerks, with the aid of powerful microscopes; the next step was to magnify the collodion despatch by means of the megaroscope, or microscope with the electric light, throwing the characters on a screen, and so large as to be read off with ease by half a dozen transcribers at the same time; the last improvement was to reproduce the despatches of the original size on collodion, to separate the messages one from the other by scissors, and to send to each of the persons to whom they were addressed a perfect reproduction on collodion, stuck on a piece of gummed paper, of the original photographed despatch, thus avoiding all copying and transcription, and saving an immense amount of time.

The sensation caused by the arrival of the first parcel of letters and the first telegraphic despatches, after the armistice had been signed, was indescribable. In spite of pigeon posts there were thousands of families who had not received a scrap of news from without for more than five months; great was the excitement also of those who wished to fly to their wives, children, and friends, while the means of communication were limited on account of the necessity for the transport of provisions, the destruction of bridges, the want of horses, and the regulations of the German authorities.

People shuddered at the idea of encountering the victorious enemy, now masters of the whole district around Paris, with headquarters amid the ruins of Saint Denis and the cathedral, or rather abbey church (which is a prominent object from the western outskirt of Paris), and in complete command of the railways and of the whole country around; they dreaded the great cost of a journey which was sure to be extended to two or three times its usual length; they feared to face the dangers of the road, partly on account of the swarms of German soldiers, but still more on account of the numerous bands of marauders which it was known infested the country, laid every one under contribution, and feasted, like the horrible vulture, on what the war had left behind it. But the yearnings of affection, the cruel anxiety, the thirst for freedom from the unhappy city, so long a sad prison to its inhabitants, overcame in most cases all other feelings, and many thousands had but one thought—how they were to get out of Paris.

In the first place permission was necessary, and the prefecture of police was densely crowded from morning to night by applicants for passes to enable them to leave the city; and when, after many visits and tedious waitings, these had been obtained, the

difficulties were far from overcome. The railway offices and stations were as densely thronged as the prefecture of police, but the officials could give little or no information about the trains; the German authorities had their own necessities to supply, and when the rails were left free by them the convoys of provisions and fuel blocked all the lines.

Young active men, and many women, trusting to their own physical powers, set out on foot, and walked till they could find some kind of conveyance; others who possessed, or could buy or hire vehicles at exorbitant rates, fared perhaps the best; but in several instances the travellers were stopped and robbed of all they possessed. When trains first began to leave Paris, passengers were only carried short distances, and then were dependent on the Germans for their further progress, which became inexpressibly tedious, and often extremely expensive, for the railways were destroyed in many places, and vehicles of any description very scarce. When the direct lines of railway were nominally open, travelling was far from being agreeable; and those who quitted Paris were compelled to carry nothing more with them than they could hold conveniently in their hands; for noble bridges over broad rivers were broken down, and at certain places the whole of the passengers had to descend from the carriages, shoulder their luggage, trudge a considerable distance on foot, cross the river by a temporary bridge of boats, and remount a long hill on the other side to regain the railway. No matter what was the weather, there was not the slightest shelter, not the faintest hope of assistance; all were compelled to tramp along amid masses of German soldiery, rough navvies, and peasants, with the fear haunting every one that the train on the other side would be chock-full before he reached it. Many, women especially, were unable to keep up with the throng, and were left behind to pass a miserable twenty-four hours before another train should appear. This state of things continued till the middle of the month of March, or later, by which time the greater portion of those who had connections abroad, or the means of escaping from the long-beleaguered city, had quitted the capital, little dreaming what would happen there ere they saw it again.

CHAPTER II.

PARIS UNDER THE COMMUNE.

The State of Affairs in Paris after the Departure of the Germans—Origin and Real Meaning of the Term Commune—Ultimate Aims of the Communists—M. Jules Favre unfairly blamed for having agreed at the Capitulation that the National Guards should retain their Arms—Universal Delusion as to the Insignificance of the Communist Rebellion—The Mistake of not removing the Seat of Government to Paris Immediately after Peace had been agreed to—Sympathy of the Troops with the Rebels—The Government reduced to a State of Inactivity or compelled to besiege the City—Suppression of Revolutionary Newspapers in reality proves a Source of Strength to the Insurgents—Complete Absence of Agitation on March 16—Proclamation of the Government on the Following Day—The Attempt to put down the Rising on March 18 completely frustrated, and Two Generals brutally murdered by the Communists—Proclamation of the Communist Leaders and seizure of the *Official Journal* for their Purposes—Decree for a Municipal Election—Honourable Attitude assumed by the Parisian Press against the Assumptions of the Communists—Election of the most Violent Republicans as Mayors—An Attempt to stem the Torrent of Rebellion leads to a Massacre in the Streets—Terrible State of Affairs under the Communal Régime—Great Want of Money—Assassination openly advocated in the *Official Journal*—Seizure of some of the Forts by the Communists, and Preparations for Action against the Government at Versailles—Paris again cut off from the Outside World—Extraordinary Decrees of the Commune—The "Pales" and the "Reds"—Engagement between the Communists and the Versailles Troops—An Attempt on Versailles defeated and Flourens killed—Decrees of the Commune abolishing the Payment of Rent and other Interferences with Private Affairs—The Difficulties of Living in the City—Effects of the Commune on Trade—Formation of New Barricades and Mines within the City—Decrees handing over Workshops to the Workmen—The Artists and the Commune—The Commune and the Press—Suppression of Opposition Journals—Dissensions in the Commune—Seizure of the Archbishop of Paris and other Dignitaries of the Church—Letter from M. Thiers to the Archbishop denying that the Communists Prisoners were shot or ill treated, and offering a Pardon to all who would lay down their Arms—The Students at the Medical School decline to join the Commune—Important Letter of M. Louis Blanc—Marshal MacMahon placed in Command of the Versailles Troops—Continual Fighting—Curious Combination Outside Paris—Fearful Scenes at Les Ternes and Neuilly—Truce in order to allow the Inhabitants to leave.

The occupation of a portion of Paris by the Germans—fortunately shortened by the activity of the government in making the first payment of the indemnity—had happily given rise to no disturbances of the slightest importance. The appeals of the press and of other bodies had a good effect; the great mass of the people had closed their shops, and regarded the day as one of mourning; but the public had been disturbed by rumours of the intention of some of the national guards to fire upon the Germans, and some fear was entertained that they would keep their word. This fear was increased by an act that occurred on the 27th of February. A portion of the Avenue Wagram, in which no houses have yet been built, although the avenue itself has been formed for nine or ten years, had been converted into an artillery park for the national guard; and at the conclusion of the armistice a large number of the new bronze pieces of eight had been placed there under the care of the artillery of the guard, whose quarters were in the wooden huts erected on a large space of ground close at hand. On the day mentioned, the inhabitants of the Place Wagram adjoining, of whom the writer was one, saw that the guns were being removed; at first four horses mounted by artillerymen of the national guard were brought for each gun, and the work went on in the most quiet and regular manner possible; presently no more horses appeared, but men and boys, and even women, attached themselves to the guns and trotted off with them. Still no suspicion was entertained that a rebellious act was being performed in broad daylight under our eyes, till, after seventy or more of the guns had been abstracted, we saw a squadron of cavalry enter the park and take charge of the remainder. Soon we found that the guards favourable to the Commune had arrived in considerable numbers at the park, and acting in spite of the artillerymen, who, however, offered very little resistance, had taken first the horses from the pickets in the rear, and finally the guns themselves from the park. The reason given out for the act was, that in spite of the assertions of the government the artillery of the national guard was to be given up at night to the enemy. Few people believed in such an act of deception; but it was not difficult to imagine, in the excited state of the popular mind, that the leaders of the Communist guards might truly believe what they asserted.

The principal fear which seized upon the authorities—who were totally unable by threats or otherwise to get the men to give up the guns—seems

to have been that they would be used against the Germans entering Paris, and consequently the national guards that were still loyal were called out; cartridges were served out for the mitrailleuses belonging to those troops; and these and other guns were placed at many points commanding the great boulevards, and other places where *émeutes* were feared. The guards in opposition to the government made a demonstration against this movement, but happily no collision occurred. Squadrons of cavalry, principally gendarmerie, patrolled the streets in all directions at a trot. Fortunately the temporary occupation by the Germans did not give rise to any offensive act against them; in fact, the city was remarkably calm during the two days of the occupation. It was said that the conduct of General Vinoy had inspired confidence, and that the national guard had no intention of opposing the government.

When the conditions of peace, which had been agreed to at Bordeaux by the overwhelming majority of 546 against 107 votes of the Assembly, were known in Paris, the consternation was terrible. The war, which had commenced with the view to wrest the Rhenish provinces from the Germans, and throw a new halo of military glory around the dictature of the Napoleons, had ended in the loss of most important provinces, with an immense indemnity in addition to be paid to the conqueror; the cry of *à Berlin* had been converted into the dreadful reality of *à Paris.* The effect of the publication of the conditions in the *Official Journal* cannot be described; it was felt throughout Europe, though not of course in the same intensity. The terms seemed to the unfortunate people of Paris to include the utter ruin and prostration of the country; and the outcry against those who had negotiated such a contract of peace was general, except with the few who saw clearly enough that they had only done so in the utter impossibility of obtaining any better conditions. One effect of the action of the Assembly was the sudden termination of the German occupation, and this had naturally a tranquillizing effect, and the danger of an insurrection seemed to be passing away. The gendarmerie still paraded the streets, the abstracted guns were still in the hands of the recalcitrant national guards, who persistently declared that they held them to prevent their being given up to the enemy; yet when the Germans evacuated Paris in the morning of the 3rd of March, we fondly hoped that the poor city would return to something like its ordinary life. The weather became splendid, and people said that the sun of Paris was rising anew; the gas was lighted again in the streets on the departure of the enemy, and it was taken as a promising token of the return of industry and all the occupations of peace. These pleasant hopes were strengthened by the complete re-establishment of the postal service; letters began to reach us in due course from London, with many dated previously to the investment; even newspapers, which had been accumulating at the various ports and provincial towns, came in upon us in floods of twenties and thirties. It would be difficult to imagine what we, who had been shut up for nearly half a year, felt when the doors of our prison were fairly thrown open; we came back as it were to life, we believed at last that we were still of this world. Letters, old as well as new, were devoured with painful eagerness or tearful delight, and old newspapers were opened and arranged, and smoothed out, and cut with infinite care, and finally read as if they had been Sibylline leaves or Cupid's delightful literature. No wonder that we disbelieved in rumours of coming danger, or even difficulties; no wonder that we refused to believe that after all we were not at peace: and when at last the truth was forced upon our minds, when it became known that the rebellious national guards had established batteries on the heights of Montmartre and Belleville, and had taken and kept possession of many other important positions, we rather laughed at the folly and hopelessness of the insurrection than feared for the result. Barricades, it is true, were beginning to make their appearance, but 40,000 more soldiers had been sent for; the brave and experienced General Aurelles de Paladine was announced to take command of the national guard of Paris; the mounted gendarmerie kept order in the main streets and boulevards of the city; and it was almost universally felt by those not in the secrets of the Communists, that if the insurrectionists did not lay down their arms immediately, they would be quickly dispersed by the shells of Mont Valérien or the forces from Versailles. How we waked from our pleasing delusion is but too well known, and how Paris was a second time fortified, and a second time besieged within six months, is now matter of history.

Before entering upon the account of Paris under the Commune, it is necessary to say a few words about the term itself. When first it was uttered at the Hôtel de Ville, while the enemy was at the gates, very few had any notion of what it meant. "Cry *Vive la Commune!*" said a fellow to a passer by. "What is the Commune?" said the other. "Oh! I don't know!" was the rejoinder; "but I was told to cry, *Vive la Commune!* and to tell every one else to do the same."

The word communism would naturally, at first sight, be taken in its old meaning of property divided in common, but this would be an error; the word is derived from the French word *commune*, a district or subdivision of a department which has a municipal council of its own. Each commune is supposed to elect its own council, and, with certain precautions, such is generally the case; but during the whole of the period of the reign of Louis Napoleon, Paris, Marseilles, and Lyons were utterly deprived of all municipal rights whatever; the government not only appointed the prefects and sub-prefects, but the municipal councillors, and even the *maires*, of whom there are twenty in Paris, their *adjoints*, or assistants, down to the lowest official. Thus these three great cities were deprived of all municipal freedom, and the inhabitants had no voice in the management of their local affairs. Such a state of things was anomalous in the nineteenth century, and the fact of its existence was proof positive that the government felt that it was opposed to the opinions and the desires of the most populous cities in the country. Unfortunately, M. Thiers and, perhaps, the Assembly were no more favourable to municipal liberty than former governments; and therefore the adoption of the *Commune*, and the term *Communist*, afterwards changed to *Communalist*, was a happy one; and had the object of the Communalists been merely to obtain for Paris—and consequently other great towns—municipal self-government, they would have deserved, and would have obtained, the support of all true liberals.

The Communalists had adopted a clever cry, and thus drew around them sufficient adherents to enable them to carry out their designs; but when once in power it was soon manifest that the commune, or municipal rights, was not their ultimate aim, but the complete destruction of all general government, and the establishment in its place of a federation of free communes somewhat after the model of the Swiss republic. It is impossible to say what may occur in the progress of political science and the growth of civilization; but in the present state of Europe such a splitting up of France into a mass of little independent states, which would be eternally jealous of and pulling against each other, would be nothing less than the annihilation of the nation proper, and the reduction of France to a third-rate power.

Another object of the Commune was the extinction of the church. The hatred of the people of Paris and other great towns in France for the clergy proves that the church has not been more fortunate than the government in acquiring the love, or even the respect, of the nation at large; and the Communalists aimed at overthrowing all religion as well as all general government.

It is but just, however, to say that the leaders of the Commune declared that had the Assembly listened to their appeals, and granted municipal liberty to Paris, the insurrection would have been put an end to on the instant.

Lamentable as such a programme as that of the Communalists was, extraordinary as it appears to Englishmen, accustomed to representative government and political as well as religious discussion, is it very surprising that ignorant men should be led by demagogues who preach such doctrines, when we consider how long the great cities of France have been completely deprived of municipal freedom, and that a well-known member of the present French Assembly did not hesitate to make in his place the ludicrously illogical assertion, that the "republic was above universal suffrage?" When would-be teachers of the people and sharp critics of others descend to clap-trap expressions like the above, which was equivalent to declaring that the tree was above its roots, or that the effect was totally independent of its cause, can we wonder at the madness, the folly, the criminality of the ignorant masses, or at the conduct of those who fancied they could reconstruct the government of a country according to their own childish notions?

The Communal insurrection was rendered possible by the fact of the national guards having been allowed, by the terms of the convention with the Prussian authorities, to retain their arms; and M. Jules Favre was blamed for not having taken the opportunity of getting the arms out of such dangerous hands, just as he was blamed for not

having concluded a peace immediately after the disaster of Sedan. The conduct of those who so calmly utter their prophecies after the fact, calls to mind the stinging expression of the poet—

> "The juggling fiend, who never spoke before,
> But cries, 'I warned you,' when the mischief 's o'er."

It is impossible to deny, we think, that if Jules Favre or any one else had accepted Count von Bismarck's conditions at that time, and thus put an end to the war, there would have been an indignant scream from one end of the nation to the other, and especially from the capital, that France had been sold, betrayed, disgraced; and that the miserable traitor must have known that the *grande nation* only required a few weeks to rally its forces, to place arms in the hands of every man and boy, and drive the enemy at the bayonet's point to the Rhine, and perhaps beyond it. Such language was in fact used, such hopes were nursed, and to those shut up in Paris, as well as to some other people, they did not seem absurd. It is equally impossible, we think, to deny that the condition that the national guard should retain not only their small arms, but also their artillery, was one for which M. Jules Favre deserves gratitude, and has been loaded with abuse. The national guard was greatly pleased at the time; its self-esteem was thus spared a deep wound; and to convert this into a reproach against the minister is surely an act that comes under the poet's lash.

France appears to have been the victim of every form of deception; every act seemed to turn against her. Her, or perhaps we should say, her late ruler's ambitious schemes, have turned to the glory of Germany; the snatch at the Rhenish Provinces has ended with the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, just as the dog in the fable lost his meat by snatching at its shadow; the honourable preservation of the arms of the national guard enabled the Commune to rebel against the government, which had prevented their being delivered to the enemy; and the government was kept at bay for six weeks by the very ramparts and forts which its chief, M. Thiers, erected at enormous expense against foreign enemies thirty years before.

When in March the heights of Montmartre and Belleville were crowned with revolutionary batteries, when numbers of the national guards were in arms against the government, even those who knew well the seething mass of discontent in Paris, made light of the fact; they were wrong, but they erred in good company; all the world, or nearly so, was of the same opinion. It was almost universally believed that the first shot from Mont Valérien would put to flight the rebellious artillery of Montmartre and Belleville; and that the only reason why that shot was not fired, was that the government knew perfectly well that it could put an end to the *émeute* whenever it pleased, and only held its hand because it felt confident in the good sense of the better portion of the population, and desired to spare bloodshed. As in every case from July, 1870, to the moment to which we refer, these views, though shared by nearly all who expressed any opinion, turned out erroneous.

The total absence of anything deserving the name of public opinion, of political life, left Paris, as usual, a prey to ignorance and mad fury. The press, occupied almost solely with the advocacy of party views or the vilification of opponents, took, as usual, no care to ascertain what was actually going on close around it; second-rate writers filled what are called newspapers, but which are really little more than satirical squibs in a daily form, with long frothy articles pretending to be political, but intended to be comic while they were simply weak and ridiculous, and the Commune was thus enabled to carry on its manœuvres without the great mass of the people knowing anything about them. Rochefort, Pyat, and others put forth revolutionary arguments of the most atrocious character in their journals, managed to persuade the ignorant that the views of the Commune were full of wisdom and justice, and that the political millennium was really at hand, while the better informed passed over their lucubrations with confident contempt. The mistake was a serious one for Paris; it consisted in this, that no one understood how completely all classes were demoralized, high as well as low, civilians as well as soldiers. The proofs came with fearful rapidity, bearing upon their faces the unquestionable mark of authenticity.

Another mistake, in which nearly all the world participated, was brought to light at the same time: this was the removal of the seat of government from Paris. When the Assembly met at Bordeaux the expression of approval seemed all but universal, and when it was removed to Versailles there was scarcely a dissentient voice raised against it. Some deputies recommended Fontainebleau; but it is clear that that would have been no

improvement. The absence of the government and of the army gave the Communalists the very opportunity they required; the effect of thus abandoning Paris was to frighten the timid out of it, and to give up the city to the revolutionists, who soon took advantage of the occasion thus offered to them.

This fact allowed the disorganization of society to appear in all its horrible nakedness. The Commune determined to have recourse to universal suffrage; it was far wiser than M. Louis Blanc, who had declared in public that the republic was above that and everything else; it knew, though he ignored the fact, that popular government must have a popular vote, or the appearance of it, for its base, and accordingly it determined to elect the *maires* of the twenty arrondissements, or districts, of Paris. Some few of the newspapers denounced the proposed election in bold terms, and at first nearly all the press declared the claims and the doings of the Communalists to be ridiculous and mischievous; and if at that moment there had been a spark of political life in Paris, it would have been easy to blow it into a flame and destroy the nascent revolutionary government. But the mass of the middle classes, the men of education and the men of substance, who might have stemmed the growing torrent, had either fled at its approach or cowered in helpless silence. The elections took place; no one had the courage of opposition: abstention, the proof of weakness, was the only weapon used, and of course it was utterly ineffectual. Two men, M. Desmarest and M. Albert Leroy, well-known liberals, but utterly opposed to Communalism of the Pyat-Blanqui pattern, had the courage to refuse to accept the mandate which the voters had attempted to force upon them, and we never heard that they suffered for their patriotism. Had other liberals taken a manly course, the shame of the Communist domination would have been spared to Paris. As it was, the Communalists were left to vote alone, and the result was the installation, as members of the government, of the most violent demagogues, men who were avowed opponents of all that was decent and holy. Such was the effect of the absence or the cowardice of the middle classes of the Parisian population. When the elections had been accomplished, some of the respectable journals still wrote in opposition, and the Commune used against them the old means of punishment, suppression or suspension. Others, the *Siècle* amongst the number, turned towards the rising sun that was so soon to set in blood, and supported the Commune in equivocal though effective terms. These, like the men of the middle classes, bowed down before the demagogues.

This absence or disorganization of the middle classes left the ground clear to the Commune; there was neither government nor popular opinion to restrain it; there remained nothing to depend upon for its suppression but force of arms. The first attempt showed that the demoralization of the army, or of a portion of it, was more complete than even the experience of the previous months had led the world to suspect. Led against the rebels at Montmartre, one or more regiments, either sympathizing with the insurgents or cowed by their determination, threw up the butt end of their muskets in the air and shouted for the Commune. What was the government to do under such circumstances? To repeat the attempt was to run the risk of another disgraceful scene of the same kind, and to expose such of the regiments as might remain true to their colours to almost certain death. The consequence of this was that the government, forced to retire and reorganize its forces, to wait for reinforcements of soldiers upon whom they could depend, was shut out from Paris, and M. Thiers was placed in the predicament of doing nothing, or of besieging the forts and ramparts which he himself, nearly thirty years before, had erected against possible, but then not probable, enemies from abroad. He may probably infer from the difficulties which they gave him, that these fortifications deserve the admiration of the world. Although, in a previous chapter, the belief has been stated that they were of inestimable advantage to France, many think that much of her sufferings, and especially those of Paris, were caused by these very forts and walls; that but for them peace might have been made earlier and upon better terms; but for them the population of Paris could not have been starved into submission, its people decimated and its rising generation impoverished by disease and suffering; that the flight within the walls and the closing of the gates took the place of bold attempts at reorganization in the field, which might possibly have changed the course of events; and we know now from General Trochu's own admission, that not a hope existed of the garrison of the city triumphing over the enemy. During the existence of the

Commune, the walls of Paris might have enabled the Versailles government to starve out the insurrection, as the Prussians had starved down the resistance (it is to the credit of M. Thiers that he did not resort to this atrocious expedient); but they certainly caused that same government to bombard the city, to rouse all the ferocity of the Communalists, to give them time to exhaust the resources of the place, to inflict enormous suffering upon the quiet portion of the population, and finally, cause the destruction of many of the finest monuments of the city, and of an immense amount of private property. To a population that has not the force to defend its country in the field, fortifications, with the present system of warfare, simply offer the chance of being starved into submission at enormous cost, which, eventually, the survivors have to defray. The fortifications that make a people strong against enemies from within, as well as from without, are freedom and self-dependence—forts of which M. Thiers, and all the emperors, kings, and presidents in France to the present time, have never been able to learn the value. The doings of the Commune were so atrocious, that most men looked upon the leaders as wild beasts; but had they simply demanded free municipal government they would have deserved and obtained the support of all liberal-minded men; for in that case they would simply have been asking for that which was their birthright, and of which they had been deprived for years by rulers for their own ends. The final acts of the Commune or of the mob were infamous, and infamously carried out; but the leaders of the Commune were not a set of thieves and bandits, any more than were the concocters and agents of the atrocious massacres of the *coup d'état* in 1852. The Commune was the natural child of governmental incapacity, and the selfishness of vulgar speculators, just as the crowd of vagabonds that fill our jails, infest our streets, and from time to time endanger the peace of our community, are the result of the culpable neglect of government, the indolence of wealth, and the selfish and vain squabbling of parties and sects. Perhaps now that such a fearful drama has been played before the world, we may pay more attention to the means of education and the demands of morality.

The course of events from the beginning of March to the end of May is extremely difficult to explain. We have already said something of the commencement of the insurrection. The following, taken from a journal published on the 9th of March, will give an idea of the small impression events had then made on the public mind:—

"Tranquillity is likely soon to be restored; sleep quietly, people of Paris.

"General d'Aurelles de Paladine (commandant of the national guard) met the officers, and the *maire* of Montmartre, at a private audience.

"The meeting was a long one, and the negotiations were well advanced by the discussion.

"M. Clémenceau especially exhibited great moderation, and we are happy to record the fact.

"The men of Montmartre admitted that they began to weary of their watch over the cannon in their possession.

"One more good movement to counteract a bad one, and all will go well."

The red flag of the insurrection had been placed in the hand of the figure at the top of the column of July. Admiral Pothueu went to the Place de la Bastille, and sent a young sailor up, who, after some hesitation, took down the hateful flag and replaced it by the tricolor.

An incident of a different kind occurred on the boulevards. A paper signed Blanqui had been stuck upon a column calling the people to rise, and attracted a crowd of idlers, when a man, one who truly deserved the name of *Citizen*, advanced and said—"Messieurs, I have too much respect for universal suffrage to stand by quietly, and see appeals made to violence in a country in which it is not legally permitted to appeal by any other means but the voting paper." Then quickly tearing down the placard, he went his way amid the surprise of all, and the acclamations of a portion of the bystanders. Had that man been a fair example, instead of an exception, of the people of Paris, the Commune might have been strangled in its birth. Unfortunately, the great mass of the writers and talkers were far too much occupied with abuse and ridicule of the existing government—which certainly deserved neither—to bestir themselves and stop the operations of the Commune, which at the outset had not the sympathy of the people.

At this very time M. Louis Blanc, in his place in the Assembly at Bordeaux, presented a proposition, signed by Victor Hugo and others, for the impeachment of the government of the National Defence. In this precious document the

provisional government was charged with having brought about the capitulation of Paris, "which the heroism of the people, if left to their own inspirations, would, according to all probability, have saved." It is due to the Assembly to add that, while a few members applauded this nonsense, the great majority received it as it deserved to be received.

While the commander of the national guard was doing his best, by constant interviews with the officers under his command, to assure them that the government was true to the republic, and that he would never destroy it; while every one seemed convinced that an amicable arrangement would soon be brought about, the attention and time of the Assembly was diverted by the complaints of the extreme Left; while M. Victor Hugo found time to vilify all Europe as cowardly (*lâche*) in not rendering assistance to France during the war, and finding himself impatiently listened to gave in his resignation; while the Assembly itself was pre-occupied with the question of its removal from Bordeaux to Versailles—the government had the unhappy idea, which generally crowns all difficulties in France, of suppressing half a dozen of the revolutionary papers. It could not have easily taken any step more calculated to aid the leaders of the insurrection, and to strengthen their cause with the masses. Prevented from acting in broad daylight through the press, the secret action became at once more energetic and more deadly. There was a review on the same day at the Champ de Mars—it was some time before another review took place there—and between the two reviews Paris had been besieged a second time, her palaces ruined, and her streets again sullied with the blood of Frenchmen.

On the 16th of March Paris was remarkably quiet; the government was praised for having met the difficulty with firmness, and the best writers in the journals were hopeful. The guns on Montmartre were only guarded by four national guards, and Belleville, the other stronghold of the insurrection, was almost as quiet. The crowd that had surrounded the column of July had dwindled down to forty or fifty idlers and hucksters, who were selling, or trying to sell, medals and biographies of Garibaldi; the cold was severe, snow was falling, and almost everybody kept within doors.

A simple incident will illustrate the condition, or rather, it should be said, the apparent condition, of Paris on the day in question. A small body of marines, about to quit Paris for the coast, marched up the Rue Rivoli to lay an offering at the base of the July column in the Place de la Bastille; they made no demonstration whatever, except placing a small flag and a wreath at the foot of the republican monument. No one took any notice of the act, there was no crowd; and when they had accomplished their patriotic act they marched straight to the railway station and set off on their journey.

This same week several of the rooms of the Museum of the Louvre were opened. The great mass of the works of the old masters were still absent, but those of the French school, the drawings and several other collections, were open as usual to the public; and this fact gave a feeling of security which can only be understood by those who know what an important position art occupies in Paris, and how completely the Louvre stands as its representative. To complete the picture, it may be mentioned that the opening of the school of the Beaux Arts was officially announced for the 20th of March, and the dates fixed for the competitions for the annual prizes.

By this time the Assembly had quitted Bordeaux; and the theatre in the Château of Versailles, where the brilliant throng of courtiers were accustomed, during the reigns of Louis XIV. and XV., to flutter round the sovereign, gay and buzzing as the insects that swarm about the rose, though far less innocent in their occupations, was being fitted to receive the deputies of the third French republic on the 20th of the month. The ministers had already arrived, and on the 17th M. Thiers had a formal reception of all the officers of state, civil and military. After the reception there was a council of ministers, and the report afterwards was that—"Decisions had finally been arrived at to put an end to the irregular state of things which existed at Montmartre and Belleville." Such was the aspect of affairs on the 17th of March. On the following morning appeared a proclamation, signed by all the members of the government, calling upon the population to support the authorities, and put an end to the state of anarchy caused by a handful of men who had coerced others and threatened to bring about a civil war; the government informed the people that it had taken means to put an end to the insurrection, and trusted that it would have the support of all well-disposed citi-

zens. True to its promise, two forces were directed on that same morning, one against Montmartre, the other against Belleville. The exact truth respecting what took place there is known to few, and will never be known to the world at large; but we all know, and in Paris it was known in an hour or two, that the government had utterly failed, and that the Commune was master of the position. It would be impossible to describe the disappointment, the disgust, the terror, that seized upon the well-inclined portion of the people of Paris when the deplorable truth became known. The accounts were at first most contradictory, but all agreed as to the main point, namely, that the government had met with a very serious defeat. The most terrible facts that came to light at the very outset, were the refusal of more than one regiment to act against the insurgents, and the fraternization of a considerable number of the regulars with the rioters. One regiment seems positively to have refused to act; another gave way at the first attack of the rebels, who effectually prevented the guns which were in the possession of the soldiers from being carried off; while a third is said, apparently with truth, to have openly declared against the government, and to have gone over at once to the Commune.

An atrocious act, perpetrated at Montmartre, completed the horrors of the day. General Lecomte, who commanded the attack, was made prisoner, and taken, it is said, before a band of men called the central committee; at this moment General Thomas, a soldier of high reputation, who commanded the national guard during the siege, appeared in plain clothes, and was also made prisoner. What actually occurred is involved in some mystery, but the horrible truth remains, that about a hundred ruffians seized the generals, dragged them into a garden, and then having pinioned them, shot them, and afterwards mutilated their bodies with bayonet wounds. One of the unfortunate officers, at the moment the rifles were levelled at them, looked full in the faces of their murderers, and with his last breath, and throwing all his force into the expression, flung the word *lâches* (cowards) at the teeth of the miserable assassins. The two aides-de-camp of General Lecomte, very young men, were also about to be shot, but were saved by a brave young fellow of seventeen, who threw himself between the officers and the wretches who were prepared to murder them, declaring that what had already been done was infamous, and that nobody knew the men who had given orders for the execution of the generals. The central committee of the Commune declared afterwards that it had nothing whatever to do with the assassination of the generals, who were killed by an enraged group, headed by a serjeant. The rebels at the same time made prisoners of several officers and 130 gendarmes and gardiens de Paris enrolled as soldiers.

Complete was the victory of the Commune. Before the day had ended the whole of Paris was in its possession; the Hôtel de Ville, the Luxembourg, and all the barracks in its hands; barricades thrown up in all the principal streets; and the members of the government, the soldiery, and all the officials in flight. The defection of a portion of the army, the want of determination of the rest, the connivance of one part of the national guards, the indifference of the others, and the unaccountable absence of anything like public spirit, made the Communalists masters of the capital of France almost without a struggle. Paris has seen other revolutions; government has before now been overthrown in France: but never in the history of the world did a handful of men, scarcely three of whom were known to the Parisian public, vanquish the whole force that a government could bring against it in a few hours, and remain masters of the field.

On the day after their victory the leaders placarded Paris to the following effect:—

"Citizens,—The people of Paris have thrown off the yoke which it was attempted to fasten upon their necks.

"Calm and immovable in its strength, Paris awaited without fear as without provocation, the insolent fools who would have dared to touch the republic.

"This time our brothers of the army would not lay hands on the holy ark of our liberties. Our thanks to all! and may Paris and France together lay the foundation of a republic proclaimed with all its consequences, the only government which can for ever close the era of civil wars.

"The state of siege is raised.

"The people of Paris are convoked to elect communal representatives in the several sections.

"The safety of all citizens is assured by the co-operation of the national guard.

"The central committee of the national guard.

"(Signed), Assi, Billioray, Ferrat, Babick, E. Moreau, C. Dupont, Varlin, Boursier, Mortier, Gouhier, Lavallette, Fr. Jourde, Rousseau, Ch. Lullier, Blanchet, J. Grollard, Barroud; H. Geresme, Fabre, Pougeret.

"Hôtel de Ville, Paris, 19*th March*, 1871."

Another proclamation, signed by the same persons and issued on the same day, ran thus:—

"*To the National Guards of Paris.*

"You have intrusted us with the defence of Paris and of your rights.

"We feel that we have fulfilled that mission; aided by your generous assistance and admirable *sang froid*, we have driven out the government which betrayed us.

"We have fulfilled your mandate and we return it to you, for we have no pretension to take the place of those whom the popular breath has driven away.

"Prepare then your communal elections without delay, and make us the only recompense we have ever hoped for, that of seeing you establish a veritable republic.

"In the meantime, we retain the Hôtel de Ville in the name of the people."

It will be perceived that not a single fact is here stated proving, or even intended to prove, that the government and the Assembly had betrayed the republic; the proclamations of the Commune were not peculiar in their style; each reader was left to construe the meaning for himself. The arguments of the Commune were such as we have heard before: it had the power, and invented the offence to be punished.

On the 17th of March the Communalists had taken possession of a number of guns in the old Place Royal and other places, and carried them off to Belleville. It was stated that they had in their possession in all 448 cannons, mortars, and mitrailleuses; this formidable artillery consisted principally of breech-loading brass guns throwing a sixteen pound shell, subscribed for during the siege, and for the production of which all the skill, science, and energy of the military and civil engineers, the founders and machine-makers of Paris, had been called into play. A very small number of these pieces had ever been fired against the invading Germans.

In vain did the government make appeals by proclamations and in the *Official Journal*, to arouse the population against the rebels. Paris was fairly cowed, had no faith in itself or any body else, and the communal leaders had everything in their own hands. The central committee at once seized upon the *Official Journal*, appointed a delegate to superintend its publication, and thus communicated with the people.

On the 20th of March an announcement appeared in that *Journal*, to the effect that the election of the municipal and communal council of Paris would take place on the 22nd of that month; one representative was to be elected for every 20,000 inhabitants. The "new government of the republic" took possession of all the ministerial and other public offices; all political prisoners were released, and full amnesty granted for political offences. The Assembly, on the other hand, had removed all its ministries to Versailles, which was declared to be, *pro tem.*, the seat of government. The army had been withdrawn by General Vinoy; its force was announced, in a letter to the *maire* of Rouen by M. Thiers, to number 40,000 men, and to have arrived in good order at Versailles. The Commune put forth a proclamation, in which the demands of the people of Paris were thus set forth. Starting with the assertion that "Paris, since the 18th of March, had no other government but that of the people, the best of all," the document went on to declare Paris "a free city, in which every one had the right of freedom of speech," and to state that her demands were "the election of the *maires* and their assistants, as well as the municipal council," and "the election of all the chiefs of the national guard, without exception." "Paris," said this document, "has no intention to separate itself from the rest of France; far from it. It has borne for her the empire, the government of the National Defence, all kinds of treason and rascalities. It has no intention to abandon her now, but only to say, in the character of an elder sister, 'Support yourself, as I support myself; put down oppression, as I have put it down.'"

The former portion of this document, that which referred to the elections of the *maire* and municipal council, as well as of all the officers of the national guard, was echoed by the deputies representing the department of the Seine. A placard to that effect, signed by MM. Louis Blanc,

Schœlcher, and ten other deputies, was posted in Paris, and some few days later a motion with the same object was made, without success, in the Assembly at Versailles.

The press at last assumed a very honourable attitude. A declaration, signed on behalf of thirty-four political journals, including nearly all the well-established journals and several new ones —the *Siècle* being one of the few exceptions— declared that the pseudo-government installed at the Hôtel de Ville had no right whatever to call upon the electors to vote for representatives; that the attempt to dominate was the act of a minority against universal suffrage; that it was not Paris acting against France, for the chiefs of the insurrection did not represent the capital any more than they did the nation; and called upon the population not to give any countenance to an anti-social usurpation. The *maires* of Paris also met and passed an address to the Assembly, urging that body to decide on the question of the municipal elections. At length, therefore, something like public spirit was evoked, but the act was all too late; the capital was in the hands of the Commune, which had no intention to listen to reason. If the press, the *maires*, and the majority of the people of Paris had always acted as they now did, unfortunately at too late a moment, no body of men, however powerful, reckless, and unscrupulous, no party, however violent, could have succeeded in trampling upon the rights of the people.

All protests and arguments were ineffective now; the ball had been fired from the gun, and neither voice nor declaration could arrest its progress. The Commune declared that, not being able to make a satisfactory arrangement for the elections with the *maires*—the only power left but itself—it had determined to proceed without, or in spite of them; and the elections accordingly took place on the 26th of March, nearly all the *maires* in the end aiding in the work. The warning of the press was effective in some parts of the city, but not in others. In some districts nearly two-thirds of the voters on the list went to the poll; in others not a quarter of the whole; the average was about half. But it must be remembered that a large number of the voters had left Paris by this time. The result is well known; men such as Pyat, Blanqui, Assi, Flourens, and Delescluze were carried with overwhelming majorities. Only two men belonging to the true liberal party were elected, without their cognizance, and they lost no time in sending in their resignations. What did that matter to the Commune? It had between eighty and ninety men returned by universal suffrage; and the new government was declared to be firmly established.

The efforts of the Left in the Assembly produced little effect. M. Thiers energetically opposed the project of allowing the people of Paris to elect their *maires* and the national guards their officers. The only concession made was that they should elect the municipal council. Had this been conceded a month earlier, the insurrection might have been prevented; for every one who has lived long in Paris knows that the appointment of the municipal council by the government was an arbitrary act of absolutism, which rankled most deeply in the breast of every one deserving the name of a politician. Now, the resolution of the Assembly, like nearly all its acts, was fatally too late! The condition of affairs at this moment was well expressed by a writer in the *Temps* of the 23rd March:—"With pain and discouragement in the soul we take up the pen. To the last moment we hoped that the conciliatory disposition of the government and the Assembly, and the courageous firmness of the *maires* of Paris, would have helped us to avoid the catastrophe. It seemed impossible that criminal hands could hurl the country into the abyss, upon the edge of which she was already struggling. We were mistaken: blood has flowed, and we dare not measure the extent of the misfortunes which overwhelm or which threaten us."

On the 21st March a number of private individuals, headed by a Russian gentleman long resident in Paris, made a most praiseworthy attempt to stem the torrent of rebellion. They met in front of the new opera house; one of their number, a soldier of the line, carrying a flag with the inscription, *Réunion des Amis d'Ordre.* Numbering not more than twenty persons at starting, the procession swelled as it passed along the main boulevards to a thousand or more. It was received by the people with acclamation, and no attempt was made to interrupt its course, except by a captain of the national guard at the head of his company at the Place de la Bourse; but the men saluted the flag of the friends of order, and the drummers beat the *rataplan.* In the Rue Drouot was stationed a battalion of the national guard

attached to the Commune; there was some fear of collision, but none occurred; the men of the guard thronged to the doors and windows of the *mairie* and saluted the flag. Some one suggested that there was danger of the manifestation being looked upon as reactionary, so the words *Vive la République* were written with chalk beneath the inscription on the flag. The procession set out again on its way amid the acclamations of men, women, and children, and cries of Down with the Commune! *Vive l'Ordre! Vive l'Assemblée Nationale! Vive la République!* The procession entered the Place Vendôme, where the insurgent national guards had established their headquarters. A deputy of the Commune addressed it from the balcony; but when he pronounced the words "In the name of the central committee," the crowd hissed furiously and he disappeared, while the friends of order marched without opposition around the column—afterwards thrown down—and proceeding on its course, crossed the Seine into the revolutionary quarter of the schools, and returned to the Place de l'Opera still amid the cheers and friendly cries of the population. On the following day the friends met again at the same place, again paraded the boulevards, swelling in numbers as they went, and finally proceeded up the Rue de la Paix towards the Place Vendôme. Why it selected that place again for a visit is incomprehensible, and what happened to lead to the catastrophe that followed is not, and probably never will be, known; but suddenly firing was heard, the crowd rushed madly down the street, men and women fell killed or wounded, and the friends of order were dispersed never to reappear again.

The leaders declared that they were fired upon without notice or provocation; while the Communists asserted that the foremost men were armed with revolvers, and fired first. On the face of it this assertion is false; it is inconceivable that the leaders of such a movement could have committed the atrocious folly of attacking a mass of insurgent guards with a few revolvers. The probability is that some scoundrels fired a shot or two from the side of the procession, simply as a means of bringing about the conflict.

Like the government, the Assembly, and the *maires*, the friends of order were too late. Their success in the streets and boulevards was great, and had they pursued their object with judgment as well as energy, there is no telling what may have been the happy result. Had the respectable people of Paris acted as some of the national guards and the Breton mobile acted against the Communists on the 31st of October, and made a strong manifestation in the interest of order before the government had been driven out of Paris, there is little doubt about the result; but the population had been for nineteen years told, nay forced, to leave everything to the government; it had been terrified by imprisonment, persecution, and hosts of police spies; it had been constrained to act the part of the humble bee, and that only; and it felt perhaps that the fighting bees might be left to battle alone with the hornets that had come upon the scene. Besides, it is difficult for a population purposely retained in political ignorance to act like men accustomed to think and speak their thoughts, to take care of and to act for themselves; so the people stood by and looked on while the conflict was proceeding, and the friends of order did not make their appearance till all order, and all hope of it for the moment, had disappeared. The impression, that with a little more energy even at the last moment order might have been restored, is strengthened by the fact, that as the friends of order were marching along the boulevards, another procession, with a flag which bore the inscription "*Vive l'Assemblée Nationale*, met and joined it. If ten good stalwart standard-bearers had appeared in ten different parts of the city, and roused the sluggard population by a few energetic appeals, surely the organization of the Communal forces might have been nipped in its bud, and Paris spared the infliction and the disgrace of the second siege.

The discomfiture of the friends of order was final. No more attempts were made to arrest the Commune, which was now undisputed master of the field. The new terror had set in: a man dare scarcely speak to his neighbour for fear of being denounced as an enemy of the "new government." All the members of the national guard were summoned to join the ranks, and those who did not obey had to hide themselves with the utmost care: any one discovered in hiding was a lost man. The officials in their retreat to Versailles had carried off all the money and documents they could. The able director of the post office had cleverly sent away all the carts and vans belonging to the establishment, with the clerks and postmen.

All the public services were thus abruptly put an end to, and the Commune had to reorganize everything, which, it must be admitted, it accomplished with much ability. But the re-establishment of the post office outside the walls was beyond its power; for fifteen or sixteen days no letters, or scarcely any, came in or went out of Paris, and for some days before, the only means of communication was by sending to Saint Denis, Versailles, or elsewhere. Milkwomen, washerwomen, and special messengers were employed to carry out and bring in letters, but for the great mass of the population the post was suppressed. Those who passed in and out did so at the risk of their lives, and had it not been for the fact that the Northern Railway was worked under the Prussian flag, ingress and egress would have been nearly impossible. The city was again almost a prison, and had not the Versailles government and the Germans allowed provisions to pass in, the famine of the siege might have been repeated; as it was, the supply of provisions was irregular, and sometimes these were dear and bad, but there was no actual scarcity; the Commune, fortunately, did not reduce Paris to sawdust bread and ounces of horse flesh.

The grand difficulty of the Commune was the want of money; in one or two instances it had not the means of paying the national guards their daily stipend of fifteen pence a head, and serious trouble seemed imminent. The Bank of France was in great danger; reports were set afloat that not a penny was left in the bank-cellars, and that all the notes had been destroyed. This was not the case; the bank was saved by the good generalship of one of the members of the Commune, M. Ch. Beslay, who, after the suppression of the revolt, was allowed to go free in consideration of the great services he thus rendered. The chiefs found a quantity of unissued bonds at the Hôtel de Ville; these they naturally put in circulation. They obtained two or more large sums from the bank and from the private bankers of Paris; they made large draughts on the railway companies; they forced the chests of the insurance and other offices, and of some notaries and private persons; and they were in consequence denounced as thieves and bandits—which they were not. Some of them were brutal and ferocious enough, but that was not their general character. Anything more deplorably wicked and foolish than the conduct of the Commune it is not easy to conceive; but there is no reason to believe that the leaders were actuated by any worse spirit than wild political fanaticism, the kind of madness that at various epochs of the world has seized upon the best, as well as the worst, of men, and that self-esteem which stands for patriotism, and in presence of which all considerations of danger and disgrace seem to be utterly set aside. And there was this excuse for the conduct of the leaders of the Commune, that other leaders, better known to the world, preached doctrines which almost naturally led to Communism, while very many more exhibited very moderate admiration indeed for true liberalism in government.

The tardy act of the Assembly in according the people of Paris the right of electing its municipal council, was a tacit admission that it had done wrong in not granting it before; and surely the claim to elect the *maires* cannot be considered very unreasonable. If the appointment of municipal officers cannot be accorded to the great towns, such as Paris, Marseilles, and Lyons, it is a proof, as we have before said, that the government that withholds the right has not the sympathy of the people of those cities.

If the Commune did not seize upon private property for its own purposes, it certainly made improper requisitions in other ways. Men in power rarely pay much attention to the rights of individuals, when their own necessities are pressing; and the men of the Commune being often hard up, did as most men under the circumstances would have done, they helped themselves; in other words, they visited the restaurants and shops, took what they wanted, and paid in paper that certainly was not a legal tender, and would not be rated A 1 in any money market in the world.

In the *Official Journal* of the 28th of March there appeared a letter written by M. Ad. Vaillant, in which assassination was openly advocated. It was written in reference to the asserted appearance of the Duke d'Aumale at Versailles. "If this be true," says the writer, "the duke did not meet a *citizen* between Bordeaux and Versailles. We see by such facts how much the moral and civic sense is weakened with us. In the ancient republics tyrannicide was the law. Here pseudo-morality calls this act of justice and necessity assassination. To the corrupt who are happy in monarchical rottenness, and the intriguants who live by them, is added the group of sentimental

fools." The letter concludes with the following paragraph:—"Society has only one duty towards princes—Death. There is but one formality to be observed—Identification. The Orleanists are in France; the Bonapartists want to return: let good citizens be on the alert." The delegate of the Commune in command of the *Official Journal* says, in introducing the letter, that "it appears to meet satisfactorily the difficulties of the movement!"

It is true that acknowledged patriots, as well as many others, more or less honest, have joined and taken the horrible oaths of secret societies of assassins, and have afterwards moved in the world, and been accepted by honest, respectable men; but the crime of assassination, whether by plain "citizen" or prince, and whether of a single individual or of a thousand, or the incitement to it, should never be allowed to pass without the author being branded as he deserves. The Commune made a lame attempt to disown the act of one of its members in this case some days later.

Having secured the command of the city, the Communalists closed the gates of the fortifications, took possession of the forts on the south side of the town, and prepared for action against the government at Versailles; they also seized upon Vincennes, or rather it was given up to them by the disgraceful treachery of the artillerymen, who sawed through the bars of the windows and let down the drawbridge. The governor himself was made prisoner, and it was several days before he could escape and inform the government of what had happened. The insurgents of the southern forts now began to move to Clamart, Bagneux, and Châtillon, the site of so much bloodshed during the Prussian siege. Regular military establishments were formed, with tents and canteens, provisions being furnished from the stores of preserved meats, &c., found in the building of the new opera house. Every night reconnoitring parties were sent out in various directions, and on that of the 26th March one of these parties met an unpleasant surprise. General Ducrot, who was said to have been killed, appeared with the Marquis de Gallifet and a body of cavalry at Châtillon. This appearance of the forces of the government so near the city cooled terribly the ardour of the Federals; and there was a report all over Paris that a conciliation was on the point of being effected. Admiral Saisset had put forth a proclamation which caused much satisfaction in the quarters of the insurgents; and even the women, who had exhibited the utmost rancour against the Assembly, and had done as much, if not more, than the men in maintaining the insurrectionary movement, appeared satisfied. It was said that the admiral had promised a complete amnesty, and that order would soon be restored. This, however, was evidently not the object of the ringleaders of the rebellion; and it was soon discovered that, while they had the power to influence a large portion of the national guards, and money and ammunition lasted, they had no intention of yielding; unless, indeed, they obtained their own terms, which it was not in the power, if it had the will, of the Assembly to accord. To adopt the absolute unity of Paris would have been to strike France out of the list of nations.

The result of the late elections gave the Commune new force; the leaders redoubled their activity, and those able to bear arms had the greatest difficulty to keep themselves out of the insurgent ranks; reconnoitring parties were multiplied day and night on all sides of the town, and particularly between Paris and Versailles; and it was evident that each party expected some important movement to take place on the part of the other. The appearance of the city itself was extraordinary: the Hôtel de Ville was completely encircled by barricades and artillery; the air of the Place Vendôme became more ferocious than ever; small reviews took place at Montmartre; the barricades were reconstructed and extended in the great quarter of the Batignolles; the Faubourg Saint Antoine was all up in arms; every gate of the city, or nearly so, was guarded by guns against the approach of the enemy; the railway stations were all in the power of the insurgents, who were enabled to overhaul every train, and arrest all whom they suspected. The obedience of the great mass to the Commune seemed all but absolute, and the few who attempted to escape from the disagreeable duty imposed upon them found themselves treated with small consideration.

On the 29th of March, after the election, the Commune put forth a characteristic proclamation, of which the following are the most remarkable passages:—"A cowardly aggressive power has seized you by the throat; you, in your legitimate defence, have repulsed this government, which would have dishonoured you by imposing a king upon you. Now the criminals, whom you dis-

dained even to pursue, abusing your magnanimity, are organizing a monarchical conspiracy at the very gates of the city. They invoke civil war; they make use of all kinds of corruptions; they accept all the accomplices who offer their aid; they have even dared to make an appeal to the foreigner."

The impudent falsehood of the assertions in this precious proclamation is glaring; but the mass must be treated to some kind of reasoning, and the exhibition of the spectre of a king was sure to have its effect.

A string of decrees followed the above proclamation. The conscription was abolished; no military force but the national guard was ever again to enter Paris, and every hale citizen was to be enrolled in the civic corps; no rent was to be paid for the nine months ending with April; all sums paid within that period were to go to the future account; everybody was free to throw up his lease during the coming six months; and all notices to quit were to be void for three months. Finally, all the employés of the government who did not immediately adhere to the Commune were to be dismissed forthwith; fortunately for them, they had already dismissed themselves to Versailles.

The red flag waved over the palaces and public offices; the Commune was master of the situation, caused Paris to be effectually shut off from the rest of France, and seemed to be assured that all the other great towns would follow the example of the capital, and thus bring about the Communal dream of federation without a central government. The horror of the word government amongst the French republicans is almost ludicrous. A story is current of a hot-headed ultra in 1848, who, having visited the Hôtel de Ville and seen the new ministry at work, said to his friends afterwards —"Republic! why, that is not a republic; it is a *government!*" It must be admitted, on behalf of the republicans, that the governments which have successively ruled over France have done all in their power to give the word a bad name, and to produce the catastrophe that happens, proverbially, to the dog who is so treated. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Commune was amazingly like a government.

On the 1st of April Paris found herself fooled into the position of a beleaguered city; all communication, except what was winked at by the Versailles authorities, was cut off, and for sixteen days from that period the post did not bring in or take out any mails; the interruption was as complete as during the Prussian siege. "Why does not the army at Versailles put an end to such a state of things?" was now the indignant cry of those lukewarm friends of order who had stood with their hands in their pockets and lips sealed during the whole time that the Communalists were completing their work, trusting in Providence to deliver them; or rather, we should say, considering what must have been the quality of their minds, waiting like Mr. Micawber, in the hope that "something would turn up."

During the night of the 31st of March the following proclamation was posted all over Paris:—

"Ex-prefecture of Police.

"The greater part of the public services having been disorganized in consequence of the manœuvres of the government of Versailles, the national guards are invited to send any information which may interest the committee of public safety, in writing, to the municipal police.

"(Signed) A. DUPONT,
"Chief of the Municipal Police."

The imperial government itself could not have penned a more diplomatic document—the allusion to the "manœuvres of the Versailles government" is superb in its way!

On the morning of the 2nd of April the guns of Mont Valérien, the only one of the forts in the hands of the Versailles government, were thundering away for hours, and a report was spread that the Prussians were aiding the government, and that there would soon be an end of the Commune; the middle classes, who, however, scarce dared speak above a whisper, were in a state of great delight. Within the city the *rappel* was beaten everywhere; whole battalions in full marching order passed and repassed in all directions; while, on the other hand, numbers of *fuyards*, dirty and footsore, came in, and a report was current that a serious engagement had taken place near Montretout. The omnibuses were crowded with national guards hurrying to or from the *enceinte*, and as there were scarcely any cabs in the streets and no carriages to be hired, he who had not a horse of his own had great difficulty in getting from one part of the city to another, to say nothing of the fact that every man and boy between the age of

sixteen and fifty was liable to be arrested as a traitor unless he wore the uniform of the national guard.

One of the most disgraceful sights was that of the appearance of a considerable number of men of the regular infantry of the line marching in the ranks of the Communists—marching under the red flag with music at their head. This is another and a striking instance of the utter demoralization of the mass of the people.

The reports of a conflict turned out to be correct, and the Communist accounts appeared in the *Official Journal*. The executive committee informed the national guards by proclamation, that "the royalist conspirators had commenced the attack. Yes! in spite of the moderation of our attitude they have attacked us! Not being able to count on the army of France, they have attacked us with pontifical zouaves and the imperial police" (incorporated in the army by the government of the National Defence). "Not content to cut off correspondence with the provinces, and with making vain efforts to reduce us to famine, these furies have dared to imitate the Prussians and bombard the capital. This morning the *chouans* of Charette, the Vendeans of Cathelineau . . . covered the inoffensive village of Neuilly with shot and shell, and commenced the civil war with our national guards. There were killed and wounded."

A little later we were told that Bergeret was at Neuilly; that the fire of the enemy had been silenced; that the spirits of the Communists were excellent; that soldiers of the line who had come in from the enemy declared that, with the exception of the superior officers, no one would fight. This was followed by another sensational paragraph, in which it was asserted that "a school of young girls, coming out of the church of Neuilly, had been literally cut to pieces by the bullets of the soldiers of Favre and Thiers."

It was soon found out that this cry of triumph covered the rage of defeat; and as to the destruction of the school, that was shown to be a deliberate and infamous invention. But the people must be kept in heart, the national guards must be kept in good spirits. The above announcements were followed by a string of decrees. The first of these declared that the crime of civil war had been committed, and soldiers, women, and children killed, with premeditation and snares, against all right and without provocation. MM. Thiers, Favre, Picard, Dufaure, Simon, and Pothuau were charged to appear before the justice of the people, and their property would be immediately seized and placed under sequestration, &c.

The Commune announced that it adopted the families of all citizens who should succumb in repulsing the "criminal aggression of the royalists," &c.

Following these came a series of decrees of another character, which are so characteristic that it is proper to give them in full, with the preamble which introduced them to public attention:—

"Considering that the first principle of the French republic is liberty; considering that liberty of conscience is the first of liberties; considering that the budget for the religious establishments is contrary to principle, because it lays a charge on the citizens against their faith; considering, in fact, that the clergy have been the accomplices of the crimes of monarchy against liberty—It is decreed,

"1. That the church is separated from the state.

"2. That the *budget des cultes* is suppressed.

"3. The property called *mortmain* belonging to religious congregations, whether real or personal, is declared to belong to the nation.

"4. An inquiry will be immediately made respecting this property, in order to ascertain its nature and place it at the disposition of the nation.

"(Signed) THE COMMUNE OF PARIS."

Long and passionate appeals were made to the people in Communal journals, intended to show how calm was the attitude of the Commune, and that the sole object of the "people at Versailles," was the defeat of the republic and the re-erection of some new and odious tyranny. These appeals were constant, and their object was to draw away the attention of the population from what was going on without the walls. They failed in that object; the unfortunate middle and decent classes, many of whom had been silly enough to believe in the Commune, and all of whom had been almost criminally neglectful of their duties, in remaining inactive and leaving the coast clear for demagogues and fanatics, now saw their error, but as usual, they saw it too late. The die was cast, they were again prisoners, and might again be brought to the verge of starvation as in January.

"Les Français peints par eux mêmes" was the title of a famous satirical book of sketches; the

"Commune painted by itself" would make another curious work. A writer in the *Official Journal*, M. J. B. Clément, treated us with a long sketch of "Les Rouges et les Pales," which, of its kind, is a gem. M. Clément says, "The *Reds* are men of quiet and peaceful manners, who place themselves at the service of humanity when the affairs of the world are embroiled, and who return and take up the hammer, the pen, or the plough, without pride and without ambition. . . . " Veritable patriots every one! "The *Pale* are men of frivolous and noisy habits, who intrigue, accumulate offices, and embroil the affairs of the world. Inflated with pride and ambition, they wrap themselves in their infamy, and roll along on the soft cushions of emblazoned carriages, which transport them from the court of assize to the gaming house. They do not dress themselves because the weather and decency require them to do so; they *costume* themselves in order to dazzle you, and to make you believe that they are not flesh and bone like yourselves; their life is an eternal masquerade; they have knee-breeches for such and such a ball, pantaloons with gold bands for another; they have coats of apple-green cloth embroidered on all the seams, and cocked hats with plumes. I ask you whether all this is not pure comedy? . . . "

"They do not reside, they stay in hotels in which all is gold, marble, and velvet; all is gilt-edged. . . . Their horses are better dressed than you" (the *Reds*, whom M. Clément addresses in an affectionate way as *Misérables!* after Victor Hugo); "their dogs are better fed and taken more care of than your children" (not complimentary this to the *Reds*). "There are 100,000 poor in France, who would be happy to live in their stables and dog kennels. . . . The *Pale* do not eat to live; no! They are the gourmets for whom exist the Chabots, who are decorated for having found out the art of seasoning a truffle, and the Vatels, who blow out their brains because the sauce is not quite of the right golden colour." Poor Vatel, who fell like Cato on his own sword, to be accused of such a coarse conduct as blowing out his brains! But M. Clément knew his readers. What was fact to him in comparison with brutal sensation?

"The *Reds* will not have to pay taxes any longer to support others; they will have no more barracks full of soldiers, because not being the enemies of the people they have no fear of them; they know that the people will arm themselves when our frontiers are menaced." Then we have the fraternity and equality of Tom Paine tossed up afresh with Clément sauce, which is not too piquant.

"The *Pale* want their infants to come into the world with the look of a drop of milk fallen from the lips of the virgin, while yours should be but vulgar bales of flesh.

"They will not have equality, because of their little white hands and little rosy feet, which are not adapted for working and walking. I am astonished that these gentry do not place themselves in niches, and call upon us to fall down and adore them three or four times a day. . . .

"They oppose equality because they are the apostles of war, of despotism, of discord; because it is amidst our troubles and our calamities that they collect their parchments, cover their seams with gold, fabricate coronets, and cut out mantles of purple and ermine—colour of the blood and the innocence of their victims. . . . " Such is the kind of writing by means of which the silly people are led out to seek equality, and find misery and death. What is the exact nature of the crime an educated man commits who thus, as it were, flirts petroleum on the flames of revolution from his pen? Does it differ in kind from assassination and incendiarism?

Up to the last moment it was hoped that attempts would be made by prudent men within and without Paris to prevent actual civil war; but the hope proved delusive, blood had already flowed, and all Paris seemed up in arms; battalions tramped along the Champs Elysées and the Boulevards unceasingly; 50,000 men were reviewed in the Champ de Mars before going out to meet the hated Versaillais. The news that a conflict had taken place soon reached us, and was found to be only too true; but with it came that of the success of the Commune, which turned out to be utterly false. When the truth began to ooze out the fury of the insurgents was excessive; their leaders had lied to them and they would not be undeceived. Two youths arriving near the Place Vendôme were telling the people of the rout of the Communal guard, when they were pulled out of their chaise and in danger of their lives, which were saved by a vivandière, who at the same time expressed her indignation by spitting in their faces!

The fact of the failure of the first attempt of

the Communal forces being known, there was a furious scene at the headquarters of the national guards; but the leaders acted with great energy, made light of the defeat, called all their forces to arms, and were answered with an amount of promptitude and determination that certainly were rarely exhibited by the national guards during the German siege. The sight struck terror into the souls of the friends of order, who saw in this obstinate determination nothing but the promise of enormous bloodshed and savage recrimination. When amid the din that arose just without the city, shells were seen to burst, at first at some distance, then nearer, and at last actually within Paris, till the great avenue leading from the Arc de Triomphe was rendered untenable, then the sad truth broke upon the unfortunate people of Paris that the capital was being bombarded for the second time within a few weeks—bombarded by Frenchmen fighting against Frenchmen!

But even danger did not inspire resolution. The friends of peace, all but the Communists, disappeared utterly from public view; thousands fled at the first report of the insurgent arms, and every day added to their number. As the respectable classes had abstained from voting at the municipal elections, and so left the government of Paris in the hands of the Communists, so afterwards they abstained from all the rest of their duties by carrying themselves off. Never was an unfortunate nation left so utterly a prey to demagogues and fanatics. A passage in Sir Henry Bulwer's "Life of Lord Palmerston" may perhaps throw light upon this national annihilation. In his journals dated 1829, Lord Palmerston says:* "The difficulties are great from the dearth of eminent public men. Bonaparte crushed everybody both in politics and war; he allowed no one to think and act but himself, and has left, therefore, nothing but generals of division and heads of departments, no man fit to command an army and govern a country." Twenty years more of imperialism completed the work, and resulted in the state of things lately seen in France.

Mont Valérien astonished the Communists by a very warm cannonade, and killed and dispersed a large body of men. The Communist leaders had bought over, or thought they had bought over, the commandant; and when they found they had been out-tricked by the Versaillais their rage was terrible, and cries of "treason" arose as usual amongst them. This every-day charge of treason is very lamentable, and was lampooned most cleverly in a piece that was played some three or four years since at the Gymnase. A gambler being seen to secrete a pack of cards in his hat, the cards were adroitly exchanged for others, and the party sat down to play. In a few minutes the face of the would-be trickster began to exhibit the most lugubrious expression; in a few minutes more he had lost what little money he had, when, quitting the table and coming close to the foot-lights, he said to the house, "I am robbed!" The hit was palpable and most effective; but still, after the failure of every manœuvre our friends here persist in exclaiming, "We are betrayed!"

The Communalist leaders were determined not to let the grass grow under their feet; they planned a regular attack on Versailles. The army was divided into two divisions, one commanded by Bergeret, a printer, the other by Flourens, the maddest Communalist of them all. They marched off with flying colours, persuaded that the men of the line would join them on the road, and that Mont Valérien would not fire upon them. They were "betrayed" as usual! Mont Valérien cut one of the corps up sadly; the men from Versailles did not join them: on the contrary, the two forces were allowed to advance, completely entrapped, Flourens killed, an immense number taken prisoners, the rest flying back to Paris, to find the gates shut against them by their own enraged comrades.

The news of this defeat brought joy to the hearts of the friends of order; but the joy was soon overcast, the hope which it raised sadly deferred. The sad drama was not nearly played out yet.

War was not the only difficulty with the Commune. It had, in the first place, the terribly onerous task of finding money to pay its 200,000 guards, and to keep up some necessary public services; it had, moreover, to meet the demands of its own supporters. It performed the last-named duty in a very trenchant manner. It declared all arrears of rent to be sponged out, and any sums paid on the old to go to the new account; it declared all leases void, if the tenant should desire it, and all landlords' notices to quit, null; and these decrees were acted upon. Instances came within our own knowledge of persons who moved out

* Bulwer's Life of Palmerston, vol. i. p. 316.

their goods in defiance of their landlords, and under the protection of Communist bayonets. Of course the proprietors of houses were placed in the greatest straits; they were compelled to pay taxes and cut off from their rents. One of these unfortunate small proprietors, a man who lived upon the rent of a small house in a poor neighbourhood, about £36 a year—there are lots of such *petits rentiers* in Paris—hit upon the happy idea of taking a stool and an accordion, seating himself on the bridge called the Pont des Arts, and soliciting alms as a man ruined by the Commune. The dodge told well, and the man became a public character; and capital tales were invented about him, of which the following is the most amusing:—"Fortunately one of the, now, beggar's tenants was a man well off, and possessed a grand and noble soul. He visited his landlord and said to him, I will not pay you your rent because Saint Commune has forbidden it, but I will pension you. He kept his word, and the following morning, on passing over the bridge, he paid the first instalment of the pension—one penny!"

The position now began to be extremely uncomfortable. Provisions, though not absolutely scarce, were often dear and generally bad; the streets and all waste ground were filthy in the extreme, and the danger of epidemics breaking out was considerable; and added to all this, the difficulty of escaping from the toils of the Commune were great, in the case of any one capable of bearing arms. The railways had been closed for a day or two, when the Prussians sent a message to the managers of the Eastern line to say, that if the service were not recommenced they would take possession of it; this was awkward, and the Commune was compelled to yield. A picket of guards was, however, placed at the terminus, and the "new government" revenged itself, not only by seizing any arms or provisions, but also by making itself very disagreeable to all who wanted to leave Paris. This was not, however, general, for there was scarcely any interruption of the Northern and Western lines, but great difficulty in procuring French passports. As to the chance of a man in the prime of life being allowed to pass the gates of the city, that was all but hopeless; hundreds tried it, but were turned back. Some of them at last hit upon the happy expedient of entering the service, going out with the battalions, and deserting on the first opportunity. There is no doubt that this course was adopted in many cases, and such conduct may account for some of the noisy enthusiasm evinced on marching out of the city, and for the routs that followed.

As to correspondence, the only letters that got out of Paris for many days were taken, as already stated, by the milkwomen or other "special couriers," but none came in that we heard of; that business might have been regarded by the robust *laitières* as rather too dangerous.

It will give some idea of the effect of events on ordinary trade to state the following facts respecting one of the great ladies' shops in Paris. In the spring of 1870, 260 young men and women were employed there, and the receipts amounted to 40,000 francs, or £1600, a day; now there were but fifty persons to serve, and the takings had dwindled down to £60 a day. And yet this amount under the circumstances seems large, for nobody bought anything he could do without, and dress, instead of being sedulously cultivated, as usual, was as carefully avoided; the worst-dressed person was most secure against annoyance.

By the middle of April, when Marshal MacMahon had assumed the command, Paris began to hope that the reign of the Commune was nearly at an end, and the operations around gave fair ground for such hope; the roar of cannon and the crash of mitrailleuses were continuous, and being closer home, the noise was much louder than at any time during the siege. Every day engagements took place so near the city that the smoke and flash of musketry were distinctly seen from houses considerably within the circle of the fortifications; the constant shower of shot and shell came nearer and nearer, till the few inhabitants who resided on the outskirts of the city either fled into their cellars or to some less dangerous roof. Many people who had left Paris had placed their apartments at the disposal of their friends, who gladly availed themselves of them, and fled into the interior of the city. In many places the cellars were the only resort, and cases occurred in which whole families were confined to them for weeks, while the shells were flying almost without cessation over their heads.

The conflict went on perpetually; and the struggle was maintained with bravery by both sides. May-day came, and still there was little change in the aspect of affairs, although the end was evidently approaching.

One of the most curious combination of circumstances that could well be imagined was to be seen, just outside Paris, at this period. The Germans were in possession of St. Denis, as they had been long before; the Communists were in possession of Asnières and Bois-Colombes, and the Versailles troops of the little town of Colombes close at hand. Constant conflicts were going on between the Versailles and the federal forces, under the eyes of the Germans, who had adopted the island of St. Ouen, near St. Denis, as their observatory; and the bridge being broken down they had established a ferry boat, which carried them backwards and forwards for a few *sous*. From this spot they watched with their glasses the conflicts going on amongst their late opponents. To complete the picture, St. Denis, almost utterly ruined, and in possession of the enemy, is only seven miles from Paris, and many Parisians passed the day in Paris and went to St. Denis for safety for the night; here they were under the military police regulations of the German authorities, and were compelled to be within doors at ten o'clock; and if found infringing any of the regulations were clapped in the guard-house, and let out the next morning on paying ten francs for the smallest offence.

The destruction at St. Denis was terrible, and the isle of St. Ouen was cleared of everything that was on it, and now Asnières, Neuilly, and all the villages and hamlets around seemed doomed to destruction. There is but one consoling fact, namely, that, with the exception of Neuilly, they were amongst the ugliest and most uninteresting suburbs that ever lay around a chief city. While the poorest hamlet in England has its flower-gardens, and even the commonest inn has something of a rural and ornamental character, nearly all the French suburban villages consist of hideously ugly houses without an atom of forecourt, much less garden, and the rural inn is replaced by a miserable wineshop, and a *café* which can only be described as a dirty barn reeking with stale tobacco. St. Denis was a place of large business, and possessed one or two pretentious restaurants, but not one decent inn or *café*. The contrast between Paris and its immediate surroundings is one of the most curious that can be imagined.

In the winter we had watched the growth of the barricades within Paris; we had seen every open place and salient corner converted into a redoubt, and the railway within the walls fortified and crenelated throughout its entire length; we had seen some of these fortifications removed, wondering, as we watched them, what effect this grand lesson in barricade-making might have upon the population at some future period of difficulty. We little thought how soon our speculations were to be carried into practice. The feelings of peaceful people in Paris may be imagined when a long official document appeared, of which the following is a very condensed analysis:—

"The barricade commission" (of which many have since obtained unenviable notoriety, and not a few have gone to their account) "met under the presidency of Citizen Rossel, delegate of war.

"The president laid the existing system of barricades before the meeting, and these, as well as the new plans, having been discussed at length, it was resolved that two lines of barricades should be formed along the whole line open to the attacks of the troops of Versailles, and that those lines should be continued around the whole town.

"Citizen Gaillard, senior, proposed that the sewers should be cut in the fosses of the fortifications, and mined in front of the barricades. He pointed out that the principal object of the latter was to show, both to the enemy and the population of Paris, that to take the city it must be destroyed house by house. It was necessary, therefore, to collect behind the barricades all the means of defence most likely to act on the *moral* of the enemy. It is not probable that they will require to be used, for the attack will not be energetic enough to reach so far; but with such an organization Paris may defy treason and surprises.

"The commission decided that the gas and water pipes should be preserved intact until the moment of attack, and also such sewers as were necessarily opened for mines.

"It resolved to abandon the construction of subterranean mines as too slow an undertaking, but decided that mines should be formed below and at the sides of sewers, and laid down the following rules on the subject:—The first series of mines to be twenty yards in advance of the fosses, and to be charged with 100 pounds of powder; the second series to be twelve yards beyond, and to contain 200 pounds of powder; the third series to be at the same distance further

in advance, and to contain the same quantity of powder as the second; and so on, in addition where necessary. Each mine to have a separate train to fire it.

"The general plan to be made known to the public by placards and lithographic sketches.

"Lastly, every one of the gates of the *enceinte* was ordered to be barricaded on each side, and that all the roads leading thereto, and every corner house near a gate, should be barricaded and occupied by soldiers."

Such was the prospect laid open to us. As regards the barricades, they were immediately commenced and carried out with great rapidity and ingenuity; every one was forced to aid in the work, and two formidable rings of barricades were erected around the city. In important positions these barricades assumed the character of veritable redoubts, and were armed with the excellent new bronze breech-loaders in the possession of the Commune; never was an insurrection mounted on such a scale or provided with such means.

We know less about what was done with respect to the mines, but there is every reason to believe that the work was pretty thoroughly carried out; certainly wires were discovered in many places, and cut by the Versailles troops on entering Paris. Bands of men were told off for this dangerous duty, the men wearing bands round one arm to assure the inhabitants of their peaceful intentions. Some of these men fell by accidents in thus foiling the plans of the Federals; but no clear or trustworthy account of the whole expedients that were prepared for the last struggle has appeared.

Other matters also engaged the leaders of the Commune at this period, especially the means of carrying on necessary works, and a document to the following effect was issued:—

"COMMUNE OF PARIS.

"Seeing that many workshops have been abandoned by those who directed them, who have escaped from their civic obligations without any consideration for the interest of the working classes; seeing that in consequence of this cowardly flight, many works essential to the ordinary life of the masses have been abandoned, and the existence of the workmen compromised—It is decreed:—

"That the synodical chambers of the workmen be convoked, in order to establish a commission of inquiry with the following objects:—

"1. To draw up a list of the works abandoned, with an account of the exact state of the machinery, tools, and plant which they contain.

"2. To present a report on the practical means of placing these workshops in condition for working, not by the deserters who have abandoned them, but by the co-operative association of the workmen who were employed there.

"3. To draw up a plan for the constitution of such co-operative associations.

"4. To form an arbitration jury, which shall, on the return of the employers, settle the conditions on which the workshops shall be definitely ceded to the workmen's associations, and upon the quotas of indemnity to be paid to such employers."

Doubtless some of the workshops referred to were taken possession of by the Communal authorities; but this wonderful decree can scarcely have come into anything like general operation. Arms and food were the principal requisites in demand; the former were found in large quantities, and the workshops in the Louvre established by the government of September supplied all the necessary means of repair; as to food, that existed, and when not to be had in the ordinary way, was simply requisitioned, and sometimes paid for in paper money of the Commune—I O Us of which the current value was about the same as that of a button top.

A commission of artists was formed, the objects of which were that artists should have the management of everything in the world of art; namely, the preservation of the works of the past, the bringing before the attention of the world the works of the present day, and the regeneration of the future by education: in short, the care of the public galleries of art, the management of the exhibitions of modern art, and the education of future artists—free trade in art, in its fullest acceptation. The publication, under the commission, of an official journal of art, formed one of the special objects mentioned.

Liberty of the press seems to be a plant that can not flourish in French soil. The Bourbons would not have it; the Orleanists liked it not, and gave it little chance. Imperialism detested it, fought against it in every way by repression, suspension, fine, and imprisonments without end; half the journalists were inmates of prisons during the reign of Napoleon III. Latterly the imperial government set

to work stealthily and steadily to circumvent what it could not absolutely eradicate, by starting at its own cost false liberal and opposition journals, and trying to corrupt existing ones; in which it succeeded to a certain extent, but with no practical result but the loss of its money and the ruin of the credit of the papers which listened to the charmer. The government of September could not bear such a power as the press near the democratic throne; it also tried its hand at suppression and coercion, and fairly burnt its fingers. The Commune adopted much the same course as most of its predecessors, and although it did not arrive at the slaughter of imperial times, it made its arm felt in like manner. It suspended and suppressed half a dozen or more journals; the *Bien Public* was absolutely suppressed on the 21st of April. M. Dubisson, who printed the *Figaro* and many other papers, was forbidden to use his type and presses, and an attempt was made by the Commune to take possession of them; but M. Dubisson's printers stood by their master, and although almost starved out, they refused to submit to the tyrannical demand. The printing office of the *Opinion Nationale*, an old liberal paper, the editors of which declined to accept the Commune, was forcibly taken possession of. All this was disgraceful, especially so in a government pretending to be founded on liberty, equality, and fraternity.

M. Rochefort cannot be quoted as having done much for his country, except adding fuel to the flames and aiding civil war by puerile violence; but in this case of the interference of the authorities with the press he behaved well, and deserves credit for it. In his paper, the *Mot d'Ordre*, he addressed stinging articles against a liberal government interfering with a liberal press; he said, the members of the Commune were editors of papers, and insulted honest republicans who could not use reprisals and suppress the Communal journals in their turn.

The *Affranchi*, which was edited by Paschal Grousset, caused bitter smiles by announcing that the Commune was well off for cash, and that the financial committee was in a position to pay a thousand millions of francs, or forty millions sterling, as the share of Paris in the Prussian indemnity, and to spread that sum over ten years, and still be able to diminish the octroi dues; these, adds the writer, are acts to which neither the empire nor the government of the 4th of September have habituated us.

This was all lamentably ridiculous; the Commune had money then, but how did it obtain it? By confiscating the bonds of the Hôtel de Ville and the cash of the bank to a certain extent, and by levying contributions on the railway companies, the insurance offices, the notaries, and others. After all, there remained the query: Was not the whole statement a mendacious tissue of absurdities? But the Commune's supporters must be kept in hope, and tickled and pleased; what mattered a few more falsehoods for such a purpose?

Amongst other decrees, the Commune issued one ordering all *cafés* to be closed at midnight; there was little cause for this, for there was scarcely any one in them long before that hour. Another decree caused some amusement; bakers were ordered not to work at night, because it was bad for the health of the men, and Paris can do very well, it said, with stale bread in the morning!

Reports were rife at this time, that the members of the Commune were all at sixes and sevens with one another. Cluseret was charged with all kinds of crimes and offences, and if his dear colleagues could have found any better, or worse, man to put in his place, he would soon have had a safe lodging. M. Cluseret demanded the arrest of M. Felix Pyat, which it is said was agreed to; and the latter attacked M. Vermorel violently in *Le Vengeur*, for having opposed him in the Communal councils. M. Pyat tendered his resignation, and this, like the rats quitting a ship, was looked upon as proof that the end was near. His resignation was based on an absurdity. He took his seat there at the end of March, when the law about the number of votes at an election was arbitrarily set aside; and now he would quit it on the ground that the same illegality was to be practised with respect to the election of supplementary members to fill vacancies. Logical M. Pyat! Three urgent appeals were, however, made to M. Pyat to withdraw his resignation; one from ladies, to whose decree the amiable Felix declared he must submit.

The court-martial established to judge all acts threatening the public safety, had been dissolved after a great row in the Communal council, by which General Cluseret was said to have been very rudely treated. M. Assi was arrested for the second time.

When the Commune was elected, the central committee of the national guard, the original revolutionary body, was to dissolve itself; but it

had done nothing of the kind. It had adopted M. Louis Blanc's dictum, and maintained itself above and in spite of universal suffrage, and in spite of its own declaration to the contrary before the elections took place. What power it exercised actually, no one exactly knew; but it represented the 200,000 bayonets, and that was enough for a power to place itself "above universal suffrage." As might have been expected, these two conflicting bodies did not pull well together; like the Siamese twins, they were united, yet not of one mind. The schism between the two was becoming wider every day; and there was an idea abroad, that the central committee was not unlikely to arrest the whole of the members of the Commune, and then try to make terms with Versailles. All this showed that the Commune felt itself hopelessly lost, which few regretted, although a week or two before one was almost inclined to believe that nearly the whole population of the capital was with it.

Proposals for an amicable settlement were put forth on all hands, especially by the *Temps*, which journal declared that nothing could be settled by the victory of either party over the other. The *Temps* is a sensible, well-written, really liberal journal, which had never bowed down before the Commune; but in this case its judgment was not accepted by any one that we knew; on the contrary, the general opinion was that, painful as was the necessity, the government had no other course but to force the Communists to submission, or fight it out; and such proved to be the case.

The most infamous act of which the Commune was guilty, was the seizure of the archbishop of Paris and more than a hundred priests and dignitaries of the church; the excuse given was that prisoners taken by the government forces had been barbarously murdered, and that the priests and prelates were merely seized as hostages in case any such conduct should be pursued in future.

The archbishop of Paris wrote from his prison to M. Thiers, probably at the instigation, or in consequence of the declarations, of the Commune. The authenticity of this letter was not believed in, but M. Thiers has shown that it was perfectly authentic by the following reply:—

"VERSAILLES, *April* 14.

Monseigneur,—I have received the letter from you brought by the curé of Montmartre, and hasten to reply with that sincerity from which I shall never depart. The facts to which you call my attention are absolutely false, and I am really surprised that so enlightened a prelate as you, Monseigneur, should for a single instant have imagined them true. The army never has committed, and never will commit, the odious crimes imputed to it by men who are either calumniators or are misled by the atmosphere of lies which surrounds them. Our soldiers have never shot their prisoners, or sought to dispatch the wounded. That in the heat of combat they may have used their arms against men who assassinate their generals, and do not hesitate to accumulate the horrors of civil upon those of foreign war, is possible; but once the fighting over, they act with the generosity of the national character; and the proof of this is patent to everybody here in Versailles. The hospitals contain very many insurgent wounded, who are treated in precisely the same way as the defenders of order. This is not all. We have made in all 1600 prisoners, who have been transported to Belle Isle and other maritime stations, where they are treated just like ordinary prisoners, and much better than any of our men would be who might fall into the hands of the insurrection. I therefore, Monseigneur, repudiate altogether the calumnies which have been repeated to you. I affirm that our soldiers have never shot any prisoners; that all the victims of this wretched civil war have fallen in the heat of battle; that our soldiers have never ceased to be guided by those humane principles which animate all of us, and which are alone worthy of the freely elected government that I have the honour to represent. I have already declared, and I declare again, that all the misguided individuals who may repent of their errors and lay down their arms, will have their lives spared, unless they be judicially convicted of participation in those abominable assassinations which all honest men deplore; that necessitous workmen shall receive for some time yet to come the subsidy which enabled them to live during the siege, and that once order re-established, all shall be forgotten. Such are the declarations I have already made, which I renew, and to which I shall remain faithful whatever happens; and I give the most positive denial to everything contrary to these declarations. Receive, Monseigneur, the expression of my respect, and of the pain I feel at finding you a victim of this frightful

system of hostages, borrowed from the reign of terror, and which we might have hoped would never re-appear amongst us.

"The President of the Council,

"A. THIERS."

The countless stories of the assassination of prisoners did much to inflame the minds of the Communistic national guards and the rabble against the government; but we were too much accustomed to deliberate falsehoods of this kind to be astonished at anything, and few doubted the sincerity of M. Thiers' express denial of any such atrocities having been committed. The letter produced a great impression, as it was calculated to do.

Of these unfortunate prisoners sixty were confined in the prison of the Conciergerie, and others at Mazas, La Roquette, and elsewhere. It is asserted that they were treated with the greatest rigour, fed on the commonest and scantiest prison diet, confined in cells which they were never allowed to quit; and as many of the prisoners were old men accustomed to every comfort, the punishment fell most severely upon them. But the torture of any one in a religious garb seemed to give intense pleasure to the Communists.

The "new government" commenced the manufacture of balloons; it formed a body of balloonists, with a captain and other officers. The object of the balloons was said to be, first, military observation, and secondly, correspondence with the departments. They also seized upon the arm-shop established at the Northern Railway Works, and finished a number of brass guns that were left in an imperfect state at the time of the armistice.

The want of money was, in spite of all the assertions to the contrary, pressing, and all means were tried to fill the exhausted coffers of the Commune. One day 600 national guards surrounded the offices of the great Paris gas company, and forcing the iron chest, took away 70,000 francs; the money was, however, afterwards returned with an apology.

An incident which told decidedly against the Commune occurred at the medical school. The students were convoked to appoint ten delegates to confer with the government on the reorganization of the medical schools; but by a majority of two-thirds they refused to go into the question with the Commune, and dispersed with cries of *Vive la République!* This incident was the more important, from the fact that the medical schools as a body are radical in the extreme. In September, when nearly all the world was content to write up "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the medical school added the words "or Death;" and within the walls on which this Robespierrean motto appeared, met one of the most violent clubs in Paris. The fact was, we believe, that many of the students hailed the Commune with great zeal at first, but that they had had enough of it. In our own country, the opinions of a school of young men and boys would not go for much; but in Paris, where almost every well-educated man seems to shrink from public life the moment he leaves college, it has decided importance. The Commune lost something by the defection of the radical medicals.

Another proof of the difficulties of the Commune was shown in the closing of a well-known *café* near the Bourse, on account of the too free conversation concerning the disastrous effects of the revolution.

M. Louis Blanc has filled an important place in the public mind, and in some respects deservedly so. We have felt obliged to say what we believe to be truth respecting the harm some of his acts and speeches have done, and we therefore think it right to let his own account of his views appear here, in the form of a letter addressed to M. Cernuschi, the editor of the *Siècle*.

"VERSAILLES, *April* 20, 1871.

"Sir,—You wish to know if I have remained a Socialist. Upon this point your curiosity must be very great, since this is the second time you have publicly asked me the question. Be assured, I have remained a Socialist. Permit me to add, that if you are ignorant of this it is not my fault, for in my letters to the *Temps* I have never missed an opportunity of declaring my political and social convictions; and again quite recently I explained, developed, and defended them in a book published in France under the title of 'The Revolution of February.' True, from the moment I returned from exile to shut myself up in besieged Paris, my thoughts and my mind were completely occupied by poignant anxiety for the misfortunes of my country. But what I was, I still am. At the present moment I feel myself drawn as powerfully as ever towards the study of the problem long since laid down in these terms: The moral, intellectual, and physical

amelioration of the condition of the class the most numerous and the poorest, by the co-operation of efforts instead of their antagonism, and by association instead of conflict. If with regard to the practical means to be employed for arriving *gradually* at the solution of this great problem, twenty years of observation and sincere study had led me to modify my ideas, so far from concealing this, I should consider myself bound in honour to declare it. I have not this duty. Perhaps the reason is that the wrong means have been taken to convince me, my opinions having been calumniated or burlesqued rather than discussed. As to the reproach you address to me, of belonging to a party which, to quote your words 'fears to injure the millennial edifice of royal unity, and dreads the apparition of a federal constitution, by which the chain of the past would be broken,' let us come to an understanding. To break the chain of the past I believe to be neither desirable nor possible, for the simple and very well-known reason that the past is the parent of the present, which in its turn is the parent of the future. And I should deem it deplorable, provided that the chain of the past could be broken, that it should be broken for the profit of the federalism which you appear to wish for. If the only thing at issue were to 'injure the millennial edifice of royal unity,' an old republican like me would not be terrified by such a result. But the principle for which I will fight as long as I can hold a pen, is that which the Revolution proclaimed; that from which it derived the strength to crush the coalition of the kings; that expressed by these words, which explain so many victories and recall so many grand deeds—'Republic, one and indivisible!' France advancing united and compact to the pacific conquest of its liberty and that of the world, with Paris—the immortal Paris—for capital, is a prospect which tempts me more, I admit, than France reverting, after being torn in pieces, to that Italian federalism of the middle ages, which was the cause of continual intestine contentions in Italy, and which delivered her, lacerated by herself, to the blows of every foreign invader. Not that I am for centralization carried to extremes. Far from it. I consider that the commune represents the idea of unity not less truly than the state, although under another aspect. The state corresponds with the principle of nationality, the commune corresponds with the principle of association; if the state is the edifice, the commune is the foundation. Now, upon the solidity of the foundation that of the edifice depends. Hence it follows that in recognizing the right of the commune to govern itself, to elect its magistrates, beginning with the mayor, to control their office, to provide, in a word, for everything which constitutes its own life, for everything which its autonomy realizes, the cause of national unity is really served. But just as it is necessary that the municipalities should be free in their movements—in everything which specially concerns each of them—so is it necessary that the bond which unites them one to the other, and attaches them to a common centre, should be vigorously fastened. Just as decentralization is necessary in everything affecting local interests, so would it be dangerous if extended to general interests. Suffocation, no; unity, yes. Assuredly no one will deny that it is in conformity with good sense to attribute what is personal to the individual, what is communal to the commune, what is national to the nation. The difficulty would be to trace a well-defined line of demarcation between these various classes of interests, were not the means of distinguishing one from the other almost always furnished by the very nature of things, and inherent in the laws of evidence. Under any circumstances, this is a matter for free investigation and free discussion. But, alas! how distant the day seems still in which that maxim which so much sophistry has obscured will be received as an axiom—'Force founds nothing because it settles nothing.' What, in fact, is taking place? The cannon roars; the abyss opens; we slay; we die; and such is the fatality of the situation, that those within the Assembly, and those without, who would give their lives to see this sanguinary problem solved in a pacific manner, are condemned to the torture of being unable to perform a single act, to utter a cry, to say a word, without running the risk of provoking manifestations contrary to the object they propose, or without rendering themselves liable in this manner to irritate the malady, to envenom the wound. Was ever misery to be compared with this? And when the return of civil peace depends, on the one hand, upon the formal recognition of the sovereignty of the people which abides in universal suffrage, that will express it in a more and more intelligent manner in proportion as the organization is improved; and on the other hand, upon the ungrudging consecration of everything which constitutes municipal

freedom, is it conceivable that, instead of seeking an issue from so many evils in a policy of pacification, of conciliation, and of forgetfulness, Frenchmen should continue to cut each other's throats under the eyes of the enemy, whom our discords strengthen, and of the world, which is scandalized? Oh, civil war, grafted so lamentably upon foreign war; frightful struggle pursued amid an intellectual night, that a single ray of thought ought of itself to dissipate, there is one thing which equals thy horrors, it is thy madness!

"LOUIS BLANC."

If the above letter does not show very clearly what M. Louis Blanc's exact opinions are—half the number of lines would have served that purpose, had he desired to have been explicit—it is quite clear that he repudiates the Communal notion of federation; but the blame, or rather the dissension, therein expressed is so mild, that it can scarcely be said to have shut the door in the face of the Commune, but rather to have kept it ajar, in case of possible eventualities.

With respect to the finance of the Commune, it was asserted that its daily expenses amounted to between 700,000 and 800,000 francs, or £28,000 to £32,000, while the receipts fell something like £8000 below that sum; the difficulty of making up such a deficit by means of loans, bills, &c., must have been great. It must be stated, however, that on other hands, such a deficit, or any deficit, was strenuously denied. One fact, however, is worth a hundred assertions, especially in Paris, and here is a striking one—the Commune demanded from the railway companies the payment of 2,000,000 francs, £80,000, within forty-eight hours. This was the sum of the arrears of taxes due by the companies to the government; they were also called upon to pay their dues regularly for the future.

The two adjoining quarters of Paris, Les Ternes and Neuilly, were reduced to a deplorable state. All the inhabitants not retained by force or a sense of duty had left; and the poor, who had nowhere else to go to, were living in the cellars, half starved, with shells from Valérien and Courbevoie falling incessantly. The stories that we heard were horrible; for example, a child's funeral was passing through a bye street, when a shell fell amongst the mournful party, all of whom fled but the father and mother of the deceased, who flung themselves on the ground: when they rose they found the coffin and remains cut to pieces. A poor woman in a cellar saw her husband dying of a wound and of starvation before her eyes; she begged for aid, for food, for a doctor, but all her appeals were useless; the poor man died. She implored the few passers-by to get the remains buried; but the shells threatened the living too seriously to allow them to think of the dead. The poor woman at length made a hole in the floor of the cellar and interred the body; but she could not bear the neighbourhood of the corpse, and becoming half frantic rushed out into the street, and declared that she would go out and meet her death at the hands of the enemy, rather than starve in a vault. The poor creature found at last some aid. This was only one of a hundred such cases, and the least miserable seem to be those whom a friendly shell or bullet snatched away from such fearful tortures.

At last a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon, in order that the miserable inhabitants of these districts might get away, and save their lives and what little else was left to them.

THE TRUCE.

The question of a truce with rebels was a difficult one for M. Thiers, but he agreed to it at the request of a masonic delegation which waited upon him under a flag of truce at Versailles. The delegates asked for an armistice for the poor inhabitants of Neuilly, to which M. Thiers agreed; but when they talked of conciliation with the Commune, and a recognition of the municipal franchise of Paris, the chief of the executive was adamant, and declared that for the present he adhered to the municipal law voted by the Assembly. No one can blame M. Thiers for not yielding to the demands of a tyrannical rebellion; but sooner or later Paris will have municipal liberty, or the whole life will be crushed out of her in the struggle. The position of two millions of people without power over their own affairs, is only possible in presence of a forest of bayonets. This is the only document of the kind that passed between the "governments" of Paris and Versailles, and we therefore quote it entire as a curiosity:—

"An armistice for the benefit of Neuilly, Tuesday, 25th April, from nine o'clock in the morning until five o'clock in the evening, has been agreed to, subject to the following conditions:—

"The troops of Versailles and Paris will maintain their respective positions.

"Sufficient notice will be given to the people of Neuilly, during which they can abandon the scene of mutual conflict.

"In no case must they pass the bridge of Neuilly or the lines of the Versailles troops.

"Persons residing within the said lines, who may not be permitted to enter Paris, will go towards St. Ouen and St. Denis.

"The road will be made practicable by the cessation of fire on both sides from Neuilly to St. Ouen.

"During the armistice no movement, either of the Paris or Versailles troops, is to take place.

"Citizens Loiseau-Pinson and Armand Adam, present within the limits occupied by the troops of Versailles and Paris, will remain there during the armistice, and if necessary, be warned that all emigration is suspended and hostilities about to recommence.

"Citizens Bonvalet and Hippolyte Stupuy, present within the same limits occupied by the troops of Paris and Versailles, will in turn be warned by Citizens Loiseau-Pinson and Armand Adam.

"These conditions are approved and accepted by the generals commanding the first corps d'armée, and by the Commune of Paris."

[Here follow the signatures.]

"A system for supplying the starving inhabitants of Neuilly with food has been organized by the delegates, who will remain on the bridge of Neuilly throughout the whole duration of the armistice."

The armistice was announced for the 24th of April, but by some inexplicable blundering this was an error. The consequence was that crowds of people went down to the gates as near as they could without coming within range of the fire, to bring away their friends and such of their own property as was still undestroyed the moment the hostilities were suspended; but to their surprise and rage, at noon, when the armistice was to commence, the fire increased instead of ceasing. Shells fell in great numbers in reply to the fire of the insurgents, and then it came out that the Commune had not yet agreed to the terms proposed; if this were true, as it appears to have been, the conduct of General Cluseret in announcing the armistice was, to say the least of it, culpable. No suspension of hostilities took place on that day, and the whole of the people who went to Neuilly, in expectation of the armistice, were greatly enraged. The whole of the ground from Neuilly to the Arc de Triomphe was covered with shells, and no one could cross that quarter without running great danger; several persons, in fact, were killed, and more wounded.

The armistice really took place on the 25th; an immense collection of cabs, carts, and vehicles of all kinds were collected at the Palais de l'Industrie, the headquarters of the association in aid of the wounded during the siege, provided by the delegation to assist the unfortunate inhabitants and refugees to clear out of Neuilly—a considerate act which deserves notice. In spite of all this, many of the inhabitants remained, having probably no other place to go to, for they are the poorest of the poor. Still, it was difficult to imagine any one remaining to face almost certain death by projectiles, or what is far worse, starvation. Half Paris flocked to the spot on the occasion, many in order to see the devastation which had been caused in and around the village, which was even greater than that created at St. Cloud during the siege.

The suspension of arms was completely respected on both sides during the armistice. No firing took place from either the Versailles or Paris lines, but both sides proceeded with their barricades and redoubts almost in sight of each other. General Okolowicz afterwards made a formal complaint on the part of the Federals, that the Versailles troops broke the terms of the truce by carrying on their works during the armistice; but the charge is mendacious in the extreme, for trustworthy witnesses saw barricades and ditches being proceeded with on the insurgent side, and were even compelled to lend a hand to the works. So much for General Okolowicz's complaint!

The armistice ceased at one in the morning, and at about three Mont Valérien opened fire with great vigour, and the Versailles troops were in full activity on all sides. The damage done to this quarter is immense. As to the Avenue de la Grande Armée, there is not a house that has not been hit, and most of these fine new mansions are seriously injured, while the shells fell like hail all the way to the Champs Elysées. The smaller buildings in the avenues and streets leading to the two gates of Porte Maillot and Ternes are utterly ruined; not merely chipped and pierced, but roofs, corners, and walls shot away. To give an idea of the devastation, and of the number of projectiles which have fallen in this quarter, it may be mentioned that scarcely a tree or a lamp-post escaped, the former being cut

to pieces, and the latter bent or snapt off. Add to this that the pavements or roads were ploughed up by the shells, or covered in many places with the rubbish of the fallen houses, and some idea may be formed of the condition of this quarter of the town, which a few months since was the favourite resort of the English residents and of many well-to-do Frenchmen, who were beginning to understand the benefit of the English arrangement, living away from the dusty, stifling, gas-polluted air of the city. The more remote parts of Neuilly are less injured, but it will be a long time before that favourite suburb can assume its tranquil umbrageous aspect, and its promenades become filled again with troops of laughing children under the charge of their white-capped French *bonnes*, or spruce English nursery governesses. The horrors of a foreign war are bad enough, but those of a fiendish conflict between members of the same nation surpass anything that misguided human nature brings upon its own head.

Some serious accidents happened through the eagerness of the poor people in trying to save their remaining goods; staircases and floors gave way under foot, and loss of life and serious injuries were the result; and amongst the very worst effects of this frightful conflict was the apathy with which such calamities were regarded. Death and suffering had become so common, that scarcely any one seemed to have any thought except for himself and those who were nearest and dearest to him. The French are noted for the transient effect produced upon them by disaster, but nothing more revolting can be imagined than the callousness with which the great mass regarded the scenes of havoc and the sufferings which were enacted hourly before their eyes. War may have, and assuredly has, at times a noble aspect and a worthy cause; but civil war is a crime against nature and a disgrace to mankind.

One had scarcely the heart to listen to anecdotes or trivial incidents at such a time, but they existed and formed the staple of much small talk. In this quarter of the town there was a man, an Englishman, famous for his breeds of dogs and other animals. Towards the end of the siege he had a litter of famous bull pups; a lady wanted one of the queer little balls of fat, and he asked her twenty pounds for it. Upon her exclamation at the price, he declared that in three months they would be worth double that sum each. Poor man, in much less than three months food and fuel had become almost worth their weight in gold; the half-mad starving people broke down his palings to warm themselves with, burst into his house, and all the dogs, including the little twenty pound puppies, were mercilessly gobbled up. The Commune finished what the siege marauders had commenced; his farm outside the walls, and his house just within them, were soon in ruins; his losses were so serious, that he may be excused for declaring that the French are the "stupidest, thickheadedest, and vain-gloriousest people as he ever knowed." Alas! that such should be said of a nation which calls, and believes itself, the most glorious, unselfish, and logical people on the face of the earth, and in a city which claims to be the very kernel of the universe, the admiration, the envy, and the despair of the civilized world!

CHAPTER III.

Advance of the Versailles Army—Severity of the Struggle in the Asnières Road—Destruction of the Villages of Meudon and Belleville—Life in the City and Suburbs during the Second Siege—Distress amongst the Market Gardeners—Case of Special Hardship—Dissensions within the Commune—Proclamation of M. Thiers strongly condemning the Proceedings of the Commune, but promising that the Lives of all who laid down their Arms should be spared, and asking for the Assistance of all Orderly Citizens—Small Effect produced by the Proclamation—Life in Paris towards the End of the Communal Régime—Absurd Legislation—Fruitless Acts of the Freemasons and others with the View of bringing about a Reconciliation—Violent Article of M. Rochefort against the Release of the Hostages—A Committee of Public Safety appointed—New Reign of Terror—Arrest of the Governor of the Invalides—Rumour of Prussian Intervention, and Feeling in the City on the Subject—State of the Provision Market and General Health of the City—Further Efforts to bring about a Truce—Grand Concert at the Tuileries—Horrible Scenes in Churches—Bombardment of the Forts and Western Part of the City—Extensive Conflagrations and Exciting Scenes—Appointment of Rossel as Communal Commander-in-Chief—Biographical Notice of him—Balance Sheet of the Commune and Ability of Jourde, the Finance Delegate—Construction of Inner Barricades—Summons to the Commander of Fort Issy to surrender, and Characteristic Reply of Rossel—Statement of the Communal Forces—Capture of Fort Issy and Attack on the Ramparts—Rossel's Indignation at the Acts of his Colleagues and Resignation—Appointment of a New Committee of Public Safety—Rossel proposed as Dictator by Rochefort—Counsel of Félix Pyat—Arrest of Rossel—Destruction of M. Thiers' Parisian Residence, by order of the Commune—State of the Press at this Period—Terror in the City—Desertions from the Communal Ranks—Financial Difficulties—Bombardment of the Gates, of the Fortifications, and the Barricades—Capture of Fort Vanves by the Government Troops—Wretched Appearance of the Garrison on their Return to Paris—Increasing Severity of the Attack on the City and Desperate Position of the Communists—Extraordinary Legislation by them—Determination to burn or blow up the City rather than Surrender—Demolition of the Vendome Column—Disgraceful Scene—Proclamation of Marshal MacMahon on the Subject—Cowardice of some of the Communist Leaders.

During the week previous to the truce of Neuilly the Versailles army had been gradually making advances against the Communists. On the 17th April the château of Bécon was taken by a regiment of the brigade Lefebvre; the park was immediately placed in a state of defence and batteries constructed. On the following day the Versailles troops continued to advance, dislodged the insurgents from all the houses in the Asnières road, took the railway station, and established themselves there. The condition of the houses around after the fight showed how sharp was the struggle here: many of them were reduced to mere heaps of ruins; others had only the back walls left standing, with the staircases in some instances hanging suspended to them, nothing else remaining but the fireplaces in their niches, a clock, a lamp, or a few ornaments on the mantelpieces, and the paper-hangings on the wall, torn and blackened, making together as terrible a picture of the material ravages of war as could well be imagined. All around was desolation and ruin; the houses that were not utterly destroyed had their walls pierced in every direction, piers knocked away from between the windows, roofs destroyed, the floors in most cases burnt, or fallen in. The railway station suffered almost as much as the houses around.

On the same day a regiment of the Grémelin brigade, with a battalion of the brigade Pradier, took the village of Bois-Colombes, an important position. The attack was then continued against the blocks of houses which were occupied by the insurgents at Neuilly. At the same time General Cissey advanced against Fort Issy by parallels between Clamart and Châtillon, the insurgents making constant but ineffective attempts to prevent the advance. Batteries were also established on the heights at Châtillon, Meudon, and Belleville; and Bagneux, where the conflicts between the French and Prussians had been so sharp, was wrested from the insurgents.

On the 23rd of April it was decreed that two new corps d'armée should be formed, principally of prisoners returning home from Germany; this was immediately carried out, and the command of the new corps given to Generals Douay and Clinchant.

On the 25th the batteries on the right opened fire; those at Breteuil, Brimborion, Meudon, and Moulin de Pierre, covered Fort Issy with their shells, while those of Bagneux and Châtillon attacked Fort Vanves; these two forts were, however, well armed and manned, and replied vigorously, and were aided by the guns on the fortifications of the city at the Point du Jour. A quarry near the cemetery of Issy was taken from the insurgents, and a trench was cut all along the road from Clamart to Moulineaux to command the last-named village. Preparations were now made

to carry out the approaches to the right and left of Fort Issy, and to isolate it as far as possible; for this purpose it was necessary to take Moulineaux, an advanced post of the insurgents, and this was effected in the evening of the 26th of April by General Vinoy. On the following day the village was fortified, and a second parallel established between Moulineaux and the road called the Voie-Verte to within 300 yards of the glacis of the fort, works being pushed forward at the same time in the direction of the railway station at Clamart. These operations enabled the government forces to debouch upon the positions which the Communists still held to the west of the fort, on the plateau, in the cemetery, on the slopes, and in the park, in advance of Issy; these positions were, however, strongly entrenched, and the insurgents maintained a vigorous and constant fusillade from redoubts, houses, and crenelated walls.

The taking of Issy was not such an easy matter as some people imagined; six hours was the time talked of by the governmental organs, but it really took twice that number of days, and the operations completed the destruction of the villages of Meudon and Belleville. All the slopes around these places were studded with little châteaux and cockney boxes, nestling in charming gardens and amongst noble trees, and commanding some of the most beautiful views around Paris; these were nearly all laid in ruins, and the appearance of the whole neighbourhood rendered desolate in the extreme. Within the fortifications on the city side of the river the destruction was equally or even more terrible. The Germans reduced the Point du Jour and parts of Auteuil to ruins; and as the insurgents were strongly entrenched there, the governmental batteries completed the work. Hundreds of houses were levelled with the ground, the railway station destroyed, and the beautiful compound bridge over the Seine, over which the railway passes on a viaduct, was seriously disfigured, although the structure was not materially injured.

It must be difficult for those who have not been within a besieged city to picture exactly to themselves the state of the case. So long as the conflict was confined to the outlying forts it was extremely difficult for one not engaged in the operations to see what was going on. Many persons, some from curiosity only, volunteered to aid the wounded within the forts, and they, of course, had good opportunities of seeing, and feeling, the effects of the Versailles artillery; but those who remained within the city, however near to the fortifications, or made their way to the outlying villages, saw nothing but smoke, with an occasional flash at night, and heard nothing but the thunder of the guns. From the plains lying between St. Denis and Versailles, however, all the scene of the conflict was visible, but of course at too great a distance to make out much more than rude outlines and smoke. In these plains the poor peasants continued their work in the fields, but all their labour brought them only a miserable pittance; their cottages had been destroyed; their cattle and horses, if they had any, eaten; their tools stolen, lost, or burnt; the usual means of conveyance being all cut off, it was always difficult and often impossible for them to get into the city, where their vegetables would have been most welcome. The people of the villages around were themselves too seriously impoverished to be good customers. They had no resource but to carry their products to Versailles, which compared to Paris was a very poor market for such a large tract of cultivated ground as that referred to. These difficulties, however, were not all with which they had to contend. The whole neighbourhood had become demoralized; the government was too much occupied to attend to police regulations; the gendarmes were all in the army: and consequently the unemployed workmen and labourers, together with vagabonds of all classes from the neighbouring villages, spent a part of the night generally in foraging on their own account. They went to gather wood in the forest of Saint Cloud, but on their road men, women, and children filled their pockets with whatever vegetables they could lay their hands on, and the unfortunate gardeners had no remedy. As to the pillagers, they were shameless; shouted loudly for the Commune or for the Republic, according as they were near the troops or the insurgents, and made the whole district which they infested unsafe for any one but themselves.

It was not only the little cultivators and labourers who were reduced to the verge of starvation, but men formerly of considerable means, and many of the instances were most distressing; one case may be mentioned by way of illustration. A market gardener and proprietor of some houses at Bagneux, a respectable, well-educated man, fled like the rest of the inhabitants

of that harassed village on the approach of the Germans, having been lucky enough to save some part of his property. His houses were destroyed during the siege, and a battery was erected on the site of his garden. He went with his family to Châteaudun, where his wife's family had some property and she herself possessed a few houses as her portion; these were completely destroyed when the Germans fired the town. Immediately after the armistice the person in question returned to Paris, and with the little money left them he and his brother-in-law settled at Neuilly, under the shadow and, as they supposed, the protection of Mont Valérien, and opened a shop. Here the house was half burnt, his stock in trade scattered by shells; some of his money had been taken by the Communists, and some had been stolen; his furniture was either destroyed or had to be abandoned; and he came into Paris with his wife and a troop of other fugitives, with all that was left to him, a bed, a few clothes, and a bag of valuable seed in a wheelbarrow. His case is doubtless but one amongst thousands equally lamentable.

Although Issy did not fall in six hours, or in six days, the government was making head, and the fact was evident in more ways than one. On the 29th April, in the evening, the cemetery, the trenches, and the park of Issy were taken by three columns of Versailles troops. The park was defended by barricades armed with mitrailleuses, but the conflict did not last long, and the loss on the side of government was not serious. A great many of the Communists, who fought bravely, were killed, and a number of prisoners were taken. At about the same time another small victory was gained near Fort Vanves.

The dissensions within the Commune itself, and the reluctance of the national guards to be killed for an idea, became now very evident. The central committee and the councils quarrelled amongst themselves and with each other; the decrees began to lose their importance, and were openly disobeyed. A court-martial was appointed to try prisoners or offenders. It tried one and passed sentence of death; the council first commuted the sentence, and then dissolved the court-martial. General Dombrowski on an important occasion asked for large reinforcements, and when the battalions were called upon for service, not a hundred men appeared in place of some thousands; whereupon a battalion was disbanded, and a number of men condemned to ignominious punishments. This proceeding created a very bad impression in Paris; yet it is difficult to see that a commander could have acted more leniently with troops that had voluntarily joined the Commune and afterwards refused to fight. The truth was, the rats were quitting the sinking ship.

On the last day of April it was declared that Fort Issy was in the hands of the Versailles government, but the rumour turned out to be incorrect. It appeared that there had been some sign of capitulation, but on a flag of truce being sent to the insurgents they refused to lay down their arms; and on the following day General Eudes reached the fort with reinforcements, and having taken the command, refused to listen to any propositions; the siege operations, which had for a moment been suspended, were therefore recommenced with renewed vigour. For another week the conflict was maintained with determination, the batteries opposite to Issy and Vanves continually pouring shot and shell into the two forts from seventy guns, and destroying all the buildings around them.

On the 8th of May a proclamation, signed by M. Thiers, appeared in Paris; it was addressed to the Parisians, and opened with the declaration that "France, freely consulted by universal suffrage, had elected a government, which was the only legal one, the only one which could command obedience, unless universal suffrage were a vain expression." It then went on to say, this government had given to Paris the same rights which were enjoyed by Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, and that without offence to the principle of equality the Parisians could not ask for more rights than all the other towns of France possessed. This was a most unfortunate commencement; for all the world knew that the denial of municipal rights to Paris and the great towns was a breach of that very principle of equality, as such rights remained to all the smaller towns; a little concession on this head at that moment would have disarmed the Commune utterly, but that concession M. Thiers would not make. The document proceeded as follows:—

"In presence of this government, the Commune, that is to say, the minority which oppresses you, which dares to cover itself with the infamous red flag, has the pretension to impose its will upon France.

"By its acts you may judge of the *régime* it would impose upon you. It violates property, imprisons citizens as hostages, transforms your streets and public places, where the commerce of the world was installed, into deserts, suspends work in Paris, paralyzes it in the whole of France, arrests the prosperity which was ready to revive, retards the evacuation of the country by the Germans, and exposes you to a new attack on their part, which they declare themselves ready to effect without mercy, if we ourselves are unable to put down the insurrection. We have listened to all the delegations which have been sent to us, and not one of them has offered conditions which did not include the abasement of the national sovereignty before revolt, the sacrifice of all liberty and of all interests.

"We have repeated to these delegations that the lives of all who lay down their arms will be spared, and that we will continue the subsidies to distressed workmen. We have promised this, we promise it again; but the insurrection must cease, for France will perish if it be prolonged.

"The government which addresses you would have wished that you should have emancipated yourselves from a few tyrants who are playing with your liberties and lives. But as you cannot, it has collected an army before your walls, an army which comes, not to conquer, but to deliver you at the cost of its blood.

"Up to the present time it has confined its attack to the outer works; the moment is now arrived when, in order to abridge your sufferings, it must attack the *enceinte* itself. It will not bombard Paris, as the Commune and the Committee of Public Safety will not fail to assert.

"A bombardment menaces the whole city, renders it uninhabitable, and its object is to intimidate the citizens and force them to a capitulation.

"The government will not fire a cannon except to force one of your gates, and will do all in its power to limit to the point attacked the ravages of a war of which it is not the author.

"It knows, it would have known even if it had not heard so from all parts, that as soon as the soldiers have crossed the *enceinte* you will rally around the national flag, in order to aid our valiant army to destroy a sanguinary and cruel tyranny.

"It depends upon you to prevent the disasters which are inseparable from an assault. You are a hundred times more numerous than the supporters of the Commune. Be united; open for us the gates which are now closed against law and order, against your prosperity and that of France. Once the gates open the cannon's voice will cease to be heard; peace, order, and abundance will enter within your walls; the Germans will evacuate our territory, and the traces of your misfortunes will be rapidly effaced; but if you do not act, the government will be compelled to take the most prompt and surest methods for your deliverance. It is due to you, but it is above all due to France, on account of the evils which beset her, because the enforced idleness which is ruining you extends to her, and is ruining her also; because she has the right to save herself, if you do not know how to save yourselves.

"Parisians, reflect seriously that in a few days we shall be in Paris. France is determined to put an end to this civil war; she will, she ought, she can; she is marching to deliver you. You can contribute to your own deliverance by rendering assault unnecessary, and by taking your place, from the present moment, amongst your fellow-citizens and your brothers."

This proclamation did but little good, as far as appeared; the peaceably inclined citizens seemed to have been struck with apathy, to have no bond of union, no capacity for action; but it must be remembered that the Commune took all possible means to prevent the circulation of the document; that even those who were against the Commune were very lukewarm friends indeed of M. Thiers and the Assembly; and, lastly, that the press, with few exceptions, had not the courage to speak out boldly.

At the period at which we are now arrived it was evident to all the world, and, doubtless, recognized by the Commune itself, that its fall must occur shortly; and it is somewhat surprising that the quarrels which now were constant amongst the leaders did not lead in one way or other to capitulation. The mass was evidently only kept from declaring against further struggle by the severe measures which were put in force against offenders. People were seized in the streets, forced to enter the ranks, and in some cases sent off at once to the forts; an instance occurred in which a young man was sent to Fort Issy, although, or perhaps because, he had a brother in the Versailles army. Atrocious as was the conduct of many of the leaders, they exhibited wonderful personal

courage and devotion to the cause they had espoused; and had all been like the leaders, the task of the government in putting down the Commune would have been far more difficult than it proved to be. In its administration the Commune often committed great absurdities, passing laws which were either ridiculous in themselves or impracticable for the time, and consequently were disregarded. One day a decree was issued that the *Official Journal*, which is private property, should be sold for one *sou* instead of three; but of course it continued to be sold at the old price. The most absurd decree of all, perhaps, was that in future no workman should be fined for arriving late at his work. In the first place, when this decree was issued there were scarcely any artizans at work anywhere; and, secondly, the whole nation is so wanting in punctuality, that business would be impossible but for fines and positive regulations. The idea of manufacturers and companies not being able to enforce the attendance of their workmen and assistants is absurd enough, in a general way, but amongst the Parisians half an hour would soon grow to an hour, and the hour perhaps to two; and the acme might at last be reached by the workmen merely looking in once a week for their wages, unless, indeed, they should insist on having the money sent home to them.

It was at this time that the proposal first appeared for destroying the front portion of the Tuileries, so as to throw the inner court, known as the Place de Carrousel, open to the Place de la Concorde and the Champs Elysées. The effect of such an arrangement would be excellent; but it is very questionable whether the destruction of the old portion of the Tuileries was not desired more on account of its royal history than with a picturesque view. The destruction, as is well known, afterwards took place, but the fire effected more than was contemplated in the above proposal; not only the front, but one side of the building being completely burnt out. It should be noted, however, that the portions burnt did not include any of the art galleries; the whole of the destroyed portion being devoted to government offices and official residences, with the exception of the library of the Louvre, which was rich in works on art.

The freemasons of Paris made an attempt to bring about a reconciliation, but they set about it in a very odd way. About 120 masons went outside with flags and ensigns, in spite of the fire from the guns of the batteries; they then proceeded in a body towards Versailles. Five of the number were killed, and nearly the whole of the rest turned back, only three being allowed to proceed to Versailles and see M. Thiers. It appeared that the proposed plan of conciliation included the dismissal of all the ministers who formed part of the government during the siege of Paris; that Paris should elect not only its municipal council, but also its twenty maires; and that the police should be entirely under the orders of the municipal government. Of course such a proposal was not accepted. It is said that many of the venerables of the masons protested against this step, admitting that it was the duty of masons to strive for peace and goodwill, but that they had no right to join a political party. It never seems to have struck these freemasons, that their work should have begun earlier and at home; had they in March thrown all the influence they possessed into the scale of law and order, they might have done some good; but the notion that their banners and protests would stop the action of the government when the rebellion which they supported was in full force was certainly rather puerile. It appears that, as soon as the nature of the deputation was understood, the government batteries ceased firing; and, as already stated, the deputation was received by M. Thiers, so that there was no disinclination to receive proposals for terminating the conflict.

Other attempts were made with the same view. The republican union of Havre had the curious idea of sending a delegation, inviting M. Thiers and the Assembly to put an end to civil war by the recognition of the Commune! It is needless to say what was the reply in this case. Petitions were sent in from many other places with similar proposals, but they were unceremoniously shelved by the Assembly; and upon one occasion a tremendous sensation was produced by a deputy, who rose in his place and declared that, sooner or later, the Assembly would be forced to accept a compromise; and, strange to say, many journals and well-informed persons took the same view, even at this time, when the back of the Commune was nearly broken. This mistaken view of the case arose, as did most of the errors during the siege, and as, indeed, the majority of the popular errors in France and elsewhere do arise, namely, from

false news and imperfect information. The Communists believed that all France would eventually rise and declare for the Commune; the freemasons of Paris believed that all the lodges in France would respond to their appeal; while, in truth, with few exceptions, France was waiting with much coolness to see whether Paris would succeed or not, and to act accordingly afterwards.

In spite of the critical situation of the Commune at this time, in spite of the financial difficulties with which they had to contend, which crippled their action and did not allow them to buy friends, it must not be supposed that the leaders maintained the rebellion by the force of their own talents and energy alone; they had the support of a large number of the Parisians then present in Paris. A monster meeting was held in the great court of the Louvre, when the unusual spectacle of public speaking in the open air was exhibited. A resolution was passed, without any dissentient voices, approving of the programme of the Commune. There is no doubt that the Communal party was kept together principally by the false statements and atrocious arguments of the Communal press; and to give an idea of these it may be mentioned that the moderate journals, having protested against the arrest of the archbishop of Paris and the other unfortunate hostages, Rochefort, in the *Mot d'Ordre*, wrote a violent article protesting against the proposed release of the prelate. There had been many reports current of the release of the hostages, which proved false; and this article in the *Mot d'Ordre* made the blood run cold in honest men's veins, though few believed that the threatened assassinations would ever be carried into effect.

It must also, in justice, not be forgotten that the friends of order were seriously menaced, and had little chance of expressing their opinions. In one day, at this period, the Commune suppressed one journal, the *Pays*, tried to arrest the editor, caused the disappearance of a second paper, the *Messager*, and attacked a third. On the next day the last-named paper, the *Soir*, and *La Paix*, were also suppressed. This was the work of Raoul Rigault, the procureur-général, one of the most violent of the Communists.

The difficulties of the Commune had now reached a climax, and the natural effect in such cases—internal quarrels—occurred constantly. When severe reverses are suffered generals are often charged with treason, and General Cluseret was no more fortunate than his colleagues. He was arrested, charged with being a Bonapartist, and with designs of making himself dictator. But the Commune did not stop there. It dismissed the whole cabinet, or rather the executive commission, which consisted of one delegate from each of the ministries, and handed the power over to a Committee of Public Safety, consisting of five members—Antoine Arnaud, Léo Meillet, Rauvier, Jules Girardin, and Félix Pyat.

The title of this new authority was alone enough to make people shudder. Committees of public safety have always characterized the most lawless and dangerous periods of revolution and tyranny. People felt and said that a new reign of terror had been inaugurated, and unfortunately the ill-sounding epithet turned out to be only too appropriate. The following sketch by an English correspondent who had an interview with Reynard, the second in power at the préfecture of police, supplies an illustration:—"He seemed to me the very embodiment of the legendary revolutionist—a tall, handsome man, with a pale face, long flowing hair, almost hanging over his shoulders, a menacing moustache, a determined frown, and hands which grasped nervously at any document or paper likely to assist the cause he loves. Round his waist he wore a broad band of blue silk, surmounted by a narrow scarf of red. The blue tunic of the national guard, and a collar embroidered with gold lace, completed the costume, which impressed me with the idea that the days of 1793 had returned."

The appointment of this Committee of Public Safety was not made without a violent conflict within the Commune, and twenty-three of its members voted against the proposal, so that the former commenced its career with a most dangerous body of enemies close at its elbow.

That a reign of terror had already set in was scarcely an exaggeration; the arrest and imprisonment of General Martimprey helped to prove it. The general was governor of the Invalides, and a man of ninety years of age, paralytic, and for some time almost bedridden; this poor man was brutally arrested and confined in a cell in the Conciergerie ("in a cold, damp cell," say the accounts, but that is doubtless a mere bit of newspaper phraseology), for the simple reason that he was the brother of General Martimprey who took an active part in the massacre of 2nd December, 1851. The destruction

of a chapel erected to the memory of General Bréa, who was basely shot in 1848 when entreating a body of revolutionists already surrounded by the troops to lay down their arms, and whose fall created a great sensation at the time, is another instance of the violent spirit of the Commune. This chapel was declared to be a "permanent insult to the conquered of June, 1848, and to the men who fell for the cause of the people." The man who killed the general, a fellow named Nourri, who should have been shot, was sent to Cayenne, and the Commune said, "He has been kept there twenty-two years for the execution of the traitor Bréa," and ordered with characteristic swagger that he should be set at liberty as soon as possible. It was remarked at the time that some of the Commune were far more likely to join Nourri at Cayenne than to welcome him to Paris.

The relations of the Communist leaders are not badly illustrated by what is probably a mere newspaper story, namely, that when Cluseret arrived in his cell at Mazas he found the following inscription on the wall:—"Citizen Cluseret, you have confined me here; I expect you will follow me in a week.—General Bergeret." Another member of the Commune, Colonel Boursier, was also arrested. Amidst all the violence and recrimination it is pleasant to find one example of conscientiousness and liberality; all kinds of charges had been made against Cluseret, but his successor Colonel Rossel wrote to one of the papers clearing Cluseret of the imputation of having tried to provoke a rebellion against the Commune when he found he had lost popularity. This trait adds to the pain that one feels that such a man as Rossel should have thrown away his life in such a cause.

One of the most absurd, painfully comic announcements appeared about this time, to the effect that as soon as a convenient place of meeting could be found the sittings of the Commune would take place in public.

A rumour was afloat at this period that the Prussian General Fabrice had declared to M. Jules Favre that the prolonged occupation would add seriously to the German costs; and that Prussia would be compelled to enter Paris and put an end to the existing state of things, either with or without the concurrence of the French government. It does not appear that there was any truth in this rumour, but it was widely credited, and, strange to say, the great mass of respectable people seemed to regard the possibility of such an event with satisfaction rather than the reverse, so much had the feeling altered within a few weeks; so much worse than foreign occupation is intestine war! It must be remembered, however, that the peaceful portion of the population was worn out, impoverished, subdued; and no wonder, considering that it had been shut in, almost constantly, for seven months. It would have subdued, or maddened, almost any nation, and it was torture to the impatient Parisians; they had been half starved for months, and now, though provisions were not actually wanting, their means of life had been terribly diminished; there was little trade going on, no foreign or provincial money coming in, no gaiety, and no repose. No wonder if the entering Germans had even been hailed by all but the "reds" with gratitude, concealed, if not expressed.

Provisions were running rather scarce, and fears were at one time entertained that the supplies would be cut off altogether; the number of head of cattle at the market was not half the usual amount, and the entrance of 600 bullocks by the German lines created quite a sensation. There never was any actual scarcity during the Commune as during the siege, but vegetables and many other things were dear and sometimes scarce; milk failed early, the cows being few and fodder rare; the condensed milk was eagerly bought up, and the stock as quickly exhausted; it all went, Anglo-Swiss, Irish, and Aylesbury. It was the same in the case of preserved meats, *extractum carnis*, and all the preserved, potted, pickled meats and vegetables from all quarters of the world; and the siege and the Commune will have made more people acquainted with English, Scotch, and Irish stores than twenty years of free trade, free intercourse, and the freest puffing would have done: so true is it that the nearest way to a man's heart is through his stomach. Sheridan, or some other wit, said, "Give us our luxuries, and we will take care of the necessaries of life;" but in Paris the necessaries had become luxuries, and doubled the force of the demand. When the Commune was at an end, and we once more met at well-furnished tables, and could command any delicacy within our means, the sensation was quite curious. We had had a lesson in social science, which, let us hope, we may not soon forget. While on this phase of the subject, it may be remarked how little illness there was in Paris and Versailles, except in the military hospitals;

we had been terrified by prophecies of pestilence after famine, but there was nothing of the kind; the health of the city was peculiarly good. There was, however, one painful explanation of the fact, namely, that the aged, the ailing, the weak, and the young had fallen during the last months of the siege at a frightful rate; disease had tougher materials to deal with than usual, and, moreover, when the incubus disappeared men were compelled to exert themselves, and exertion was positive recreation after the dull monotony of the past months.

We have spoken above of some of the absurd decrees of the Commune; let us in fairness note one of the follies of the government and the Assembly. M. Dufaure, the minister of Justice, introduced a bill for punishing as receivers of stolen goods any person who should purchase property confiscated by the Commune. Some few only of the deputies protested against what is equivalent to setting aside the orders of the House of Commons on the score of "urgency," on the ground that laws of exception passed on the spur of the moment were generally unjust; but the mass adopted the useless project almost unanimously. While the Assembly was passing the above law, the Commune on its part decreed the entire abolition of all political oaths.

About the same period General Rossel published an order that no horses should be allowed to leave Paris, except for military duty. The preceding acts of authority troubled few people, but Rossel's order produced a panic. "Are we to be rationed on horse flesh again?" was the universal inquiry.

Numerous appeals were now made both to the Assembly and the Commune for an armistice or truce. The Union Republican League sent addresses to both parties, imploring them to agree to a truce for twenty days, during which time arrangements might be made to put an end to the fratricidal struggle. The women of Paris placarded the streets to the same effect, and the freemasons of Havre and Fécamp drew up addresses to M. Thiers and the Commune, imploring them in the name of humanity to suspend hostilities and open negotiations. These appeals were supported by the most respectable journals in Paris, and even M. Félix Pyat wrote to M. Thiers, stating that he was ready for conciliatory steps. The only effect all this produced was a violent article in the *Official* (Communal) *Journal*, and a declaration of Paschal Grousset that it was high time for the Commune to have done with conciliation and conciliators, that it had had enough of both. As the temper of the government and the Assembly was much the same as that of the Commune and M. Grousset, the advocates of conciliation were silenced. This was effected in part by the suppression of more journals; the whole number put down by the Commune were said at this period to approach twenty.

It seems very curious to talk of a grand concert at the Tuileries amid such scenes as were going on around, yet such an entertainment really took place on Sunday, the 17th of May; and the state apartments, the court, and the gardens were thronged with a dense mass of people. The concert was not classical, far from it; but the music was lively, and the Parisians made a *fête* of the affair, which was for the benefit of the sufferers in the war. The proceeds amounted to nearly £500, which, under the circumstances, must be regarded as a grand success. It was a great thing for the Commune to find amusement for the people. The music was heard well in what used to be the emperor's private garden, and the thousands outside the building thus had their part in the concert. With the same view, the leaders of the Commune patronized the theatres, sat in the late imperial box, some dressed in irreproachable evening costume, others in republican finery, and others again in glaringly vulgar clothes, perhaps assumed for the sake of popularity. The Park of Monceaux and some other gardens, long closed, were also reopened, to the great delight of nurses, children, and old people. These were not all the amusements offered to the people; the churches of Saint Eustache and Saint Germain l'Auxerrois were devoted to public meetings, and from the pulpits of these two fine old edifices were uttered some of the most horribly blasphemous discourses that ever escaped from human lips, while amongst the most violent of the speakers, and the most turbulent in the audiences, were troops of women. The scenes in these churches surpassed description; hundreds of filthy, dissipated wretches of both sexes, smoking, singing, swearing, drinking, and sometimes dancing together, presenting orgies that could scarcely be surpassed by any of the descriptions of Eugène Sue, or other able

delineator of the foulest assemblages of bygone times.

In order further to please the million, the Commune ordered that all pledges at the Mont de Piété—the governmental and only pawnshop in Paris—not exceeding twenty francs in amount, should be restored to the owners upon their proving their identity.

A very ominous announcement appeared in the *Official Journal* over the signature of the préfect of police, to the effect that no anonymous denunciations would be attended to. This went far to show that the infamous system of secret accusation had been resorted to, and it was well known that the prisons were crowded with "hostages" and "suspects," or, in other words, political opponents; but the announcement was read in the worst sense, as all official notices are in Paris, whether under Dictator, King, or Commune, and was construed into an invitation of signed accusations. Such a hint gave to the Committee of Public Safety a hideous resemblance to its predecessors, which were as inquisitorial as the secret council of Venice or the dreadful Spanish tribunal. It was asserted that General Cluseret had succeeded in obtaining the liberation of the unhappy archbishop of Paris; but this was found to be incorrect, and it was known that the number of so-called hostages had been increased, so that the significance of this notice assumed a very terrible character. In connection with the persecution of political opponents, it may be mentioned that at this period it was declared and pretty generally believed that the Commune had the intention of suppressing all the political journals except the *Official*, which was in their hands. Such an act might be excusable under certain circumstances, and would be far less unjust than the suppression of opposition journals only; but the Commune, like all French governments, kept to the latter system to the end.

During the beginning of the month of May the Versailles generals gradually perfected their plans, and drew the line around the city tighter and closer. Failing to silence the forts of Issy and Vanves, and repulsed in an assault on the former, powerful batteries were formed on the heights commanding the forts, generally on the very spots selected by the Germans, and often partly constructed with the fascines and gabions, of which they had left an immense stock unused. Some of these batteries contained seventy and even eighty guns, many being ship guns of great calibre. As many as ten of these batteries poured their converging fires into the fort of Issy. In addition to this, several gun-boats made their appearance on the Seine. The Commune had also a few gun-boats on the river, and one of these was sunk by shells from a battery. The positions of the insurgents around Issy, as already stated, were taken at the end of April, and subsequently several other redoubts and positions were wrested from them, either by force or stratagem. In some cases considerable numbers of prisoners were secured, and it was declared on the part of the Commune that they were shot without mercy. Some cases of summary execution undoubtedly happened; but there is no reason to doubt the assertion officially made afterwards, that with the exception of acts committed in the heat of the moment, no prisoners were executed otherwise than by the order of properly constituted courts-martial. It is notorious, however, that masses of prisoners were marched to Versailles in the most lamentable condition, wounded, footsore, and without food, and that they were grossly insulted by ferocious crowds, who heaped all kinds of indignities upon them: but civil war is always the most horrible, and the exasperation of the people, although to be regretted, can scarcely be blamed severely. On the 1st of May the Versailles troops had advanced to within 200 yards of the entrenchments of Fort Issy, although at the same time they had suffered repulses at other points. Fort Issy was in a very dilapidated condition, the casemates and nearly all the constructions around destroyed, and half the guns, originally sixty in number, dismounted. The case, in fact, was so bad that the garrison, which numbered 300, was seized with panic, declared that it could no longer hold the fort, refused to obey the orders of the Commandant Mégy, spiked some of the guns, and quitted the place. Had this state of things been known to the government generals, they might at once have marched in and taken possession, but this was not to be. Mégy proceeded to Paris, and surrendered himself a prisoner. General Cluseret, advised of this state of things, sent fresh troops into the fort, and the firing recommenced. Strange to say, immediately after this occurrence Cluseret himself was arrested, as already stated, and the afterwards famous Rossel was appointed delegate for war, with

La Cécilia as commandant of Fort Issy. One way of accounting for the fort not being assaulted as soon as the firing ceased was, that the Versaillais believed the place had been mined, and that the retreat of the Communists was only a trap; but this could hardly have been the case.

As Colonel Rossel from this time was the most prominent figure in the Commune, and in fact the only man of real mark that the insurrection produced, it will be well to give a few particulars respecting him. He was born at Saint Brieue in Brittany in 1844, and was consequently only twenty-seven years of age; his mother's maiden name was Campbell, so that he was half Scotch in blood. Rossel was a slight man of middle height, with fair hair and small beard, wore glasses, had a very deliberate, reserved, yet self-confident air, and had altogether far more the air of an English, Scotch, or Prussian officer than a French one; in fact, he was as unlike the common type of the last as possible. He had a hatred of show and ceremony, dressed in the simplest manner, and was altogether a man of decided mark. He spoke English perfectly, and was well acquainted with British history, habits, and opinions. About twelve years ago he graduated at the Ecole Polytechnique, being second in a long list of candidates for commissions, and on leaving that establishment joined the engineers, in which he obtained the rank of captain. When Gambetta became the virtual dictator of France, Rossel went to Tours and asked for a command. The delegate minister of War was pleased with Rossel's republican notions, and at once promoted him to the rank of colonel, intrusting him with an important and delicate mission on the Loire. When peace was proclaimed Rossel sought an interview with M. Thiers, and asked him for employment, offering to resign the rank he held as colonel if the new government would promote him to be *chef de bataillon*, or major, in his own corps. But those who had been favoured by Gambetta were not looked upon with much love by M. Thiers, and Rossel's request was refused. His pride was wounded at the idea of having to go back to the rank o. captain, so he resigned the service, and, happening to be in Paris on the 18th March, offered his sword to the Commune. He was accepted, and at once promoted to the rank of colonel.

The young Bonaparte once offered his sword to Great Britain; had it been accepted, what a change might have been produced in the history of Europe! Had M. Thiers accepted young Rossel's services the Commune would have lost, and the government gained, a well instructed and clever officer, and poor Rossel himself, perhaps, would have risen to an eminent position.

Had the Commune ever a chance of success this Committee of Public Safety would have ruined it. One of its acts was the appointment of one Moreau civil commissioner to the delegate of war, or, in other words, a person of their selection to look after Rossel, who, however, does not seem to have troubled himself about him.

Another member of the Commune who showed much ability was the delegate of finance, Jourde, whose balance sheet to the end of April showed that in forty days the expenditure had amounted to rather more than £1,000,000 sterling, or £28,000 a day. The revenue from octroi duties, tobacco, stamps, and other sources, was more than £300,000 less than the expenditure, and this deficiency was made up by loans from the Bank of France. The balance sheet only shows about £357 for seizures, all of which was taken from priests and religious bodies. After the 1st of May Jourde obtained more than £40,000 from the railway companies. The balance sheet surprised everybody, and certainly showed great ability on the part of the delegate Jourde. He showed his force of character by resigning his position on the appointment of the Committee of Public Safety, declaring that he would not consent to be the servant of that committee, as the finance minister was a member of, and only responsible to, the executive committee. The consequence was that his resignation was accepted, but he was immediately re-elected, almost unanimously, and assured that the new committee would have nothing to do with finance.

About this time batteries opened at Montmartre, and the cannonading became more terrible and continued than had before been witnessed. The thundering of the guns was constant night and day. The government, on its side, attacked the western portion of the city with great determination; half Neuilly was burnt, and all that part of Paris within reach of the Versailles batteries pelted with shot and shell without cessation; M. Thiers' promise not to bombard the city had been forgotten!

One of the terrible features of the second siege of Paris was the frequency of the fires caused by

the shells from Versailles batteries. In the midst of the horrid monotony of the cannonading, suddenly the people would be startled by a noise of a different kind, or by the sky becoming vividly illuminated. The general impression was—that which was generally hoped for—namely, that the assault had taken place at last, and that delivery was at hand. Frequently these explosions and fires were the result of a shell having entered a powder magazine, but more often the lurid glare was caused by some large factory or other establishment being in a blaze. It was not uncommon to see two or more fires raging at once; in one case, at least, there were three large conflagrations going on at the same moment. When these occurrences took place the scene was terrible. As the flames mounted in the air dense masses of smoke would hang over the city, the smoke of one being lighted up most fantastically by the flames of another. Drums and bugles were heard to sound, the bells of the churches rang out the tocsin in discordant notes, masses of soldiers and firemen tramped past for the scene of the disaster; and amid all this, regardless of the accident, regardless of the danger to human life, as of day or night, week-day or Sunday, the cannon continued to roar, and the balls and shells to rain upon the devoted city. Horrible comment on the civilization of the nineteenth century of the Christian era! The month of May rose brightly on Paris, and such were the scenes with which the coming spring was welcomed!

The government forces having obtained possession of all the positions around Issy, set to work systematically to cut it off from Paris by means of a trench, while a second trench was formed for the assault. On one occasion the Communist soldiers surprised eighty of the sappers and miners, and made prisoners of them. Their fate was never known, but it is scarcely doubtful. It must be remembered with regard to the defence of Fort Issy, that the insurgents still possessed the next fort, that of Vanves, which constantly shelled the men employed in the trenches.

When Rossel assumed the chief military command, a decree was issued which divided the national guards into two armies, one commanded by General Dombrowski, the other by General Wroblowski, both Poles. From this moment a great change took place. Dombrowski ordered the rest of the inhabitants to quit Neuilly, and took up a strong position there; and Rossel immediately commenced the formation of the last lines of defence, inner barricades, which were constructed with singular ability and rapidity.

The following summons, with Rossel's reply, will serve to give a fair idea of the character of the man:—

"In the name and by order of the field-marshal commanding-in-chief, we summon the commandant of the insurgent forces at present in Fort Issy to surrender himself and all his troops in the fort. A delay of a quarter of an hour will be granted to answer the summons. If the commandant of the insurgent forces declares in writing for himself, and in the name of the entire garrison of Fort Issy, that he obeys the present summons, without other conditions than that of saving their lives and liberties on condition of not residing in Paris, this favour will be granted. If the commandant fails to reply in the space of time indicated, the whole garrison will be shot."

To which Rossel replied:—

"My Dear Comrade,—Next time you permit yourself to send us a summons so insolent as that in your handwriting yesterday, I will have your parlementaire shot, in accordance with the usages of war.—Your devoted comrade,

"ROSSEL."

As an element in the history of the Commune, it will be well to state what was the force at its command at this period; the muster roll was published in the *Official Journal*, and included twenty-four marching and twenty-five sedentary legions; the real fact, however, was stated by a well-informed person to be that there were, except on paper, no more than twenty legions of each class. The marching legions consisted of 3655 commissioned officers, of whom only 3413 answered to the call; and 96,325 non-commissioned officers and privates, of whom only 84,986 answered the call at this time. The real force for duty outside the walls of Paris was therefore at this period, in round numbers, not much more than 88,000 in all. The total number of available sedentary guards was about 77,600. The value of these forces, except for service behind walls, was admitted by the Communists themselves to be very various; many of the corps were unsteady, while some who behaved

well one day would exhibit great want of discipline on another; it was, however, recognized on all hands that the new commandant, Colonel Rossel, thoroughly understood the nature of the troops with which he had to deal, and was reorganizing the whole with extraordinary ability.

Issy fell at last into the hands of the government troops on the 9th of May, and on that same evening M. Thiers issued a circular on the subject, the purport of which was as follows:—The able direction of the army and bravery of the troops have obtained a brilliant result. After only eight days' attack Fort Issy was occupied by us. We found a quantity of ammunition and artillery. Fort Vanves cannot resist much longer; and, moreover, the conquest of Fort Issy is alone sufficient to assure the plan of attack laid down. Fort Vanves did, however, hold out for nearly another week.

In the same circular we have an account of the commencement of the actual attack of the fortifications. It appears that General Douay on the same night, under cover of the batteries of Montretout and the darkness, crossed the Seine and established himself in front of Boulogne, opposite the fortifications: 1400 men from several corps commenced a trench at ten o'clock and worked all night till daylight. At four in the morning they were covered from the fire of the enemy, and at a distance of only 300 yards from the fortifications, where, if necessary, a breaching battery could be established. M. Thiers completed his circular in the following terms, intended as a warning to the departments to which it was addressed:—

"Everything makes us hope that the cruel sufferings of the honest population of Paris are drawing to their close, and that the odious reign of the infamous faction which has taken the red flag for its emblem, will very soon cease to oppress and dishonour the capital of France.

"It is to be hoped that passing events will serve as a lesson to the miserable imitators of the Commune of Paris, and will prevent their exposing themselves to the legal severities which await them if they dare to push further their criminal and ridiculous enterprises."

When the attack on the ramparts commenced the guns of Mont Valérien and Montretout opened a tremendous bombardment on the Point du Jour and Auteuil; the guns on the ramparts answered sharply, until they were silenced by the superior weight of metal on the other side. The most fearful excitement now occurred; the inhabitants of Auteuil fled into Paris in the utmost consternation, with what little of their property they could carry, feeling convinced that the district would very shortly be in the hands of the government troops; at the same time many battalions of Communist guards were marched to the support of those on the ramparts. The scene was one of the direst confusion and terror, and everyone was surprised when the bombardment suddenly ceased; it was explained afterwards that the Versailles authorities caused the firing to be stopped, in order to see the effect on the Parisians of the proclamation addressed to them by M. Thiers on May 9, and which is given above. But there was no organization of the friends of peace and order; no one dared to bell the cat, and so the work of destruction recommenced and was carried on to its bitter end. It must be repeated also, in addition, that there were few in Paris who had any love for M. Thiers' government; the chief did not profess to be republican, and the acts of the Versailles authorities were generally regarded as neither liberal nor energetic, and as usual, party feeling shut out political common sense.

The Commune had apparently no fear of the effect of M. Thiers' address, for it published it in the *Official Journal*, and although copied into all the other papers, and backed by the fact of the taking of Fort Issy, it produced no impression but that of its own weakness and glaring misrepresentations.

When Issy fell the committee tried to deny the fact for a day or two; but Rossel wrote a letter to the Commune in which he denounced with the utmost bitterness the mischievous interference of different authorities, and tendered his resignation. He commenced by stating that he could not any longer endure the responsibility of commanding where every one discussed, but no one obeyed. Nothing was yet organized in the military services, and the management of the guns rested upon a few volunteers, the number of whom was insufficient. The central committee forced upon him its co-operation in the organization of the guards, which he accepted, but nothing had been done by it. He said he would have punished the enemy for his adventurous attacks upon Issy, had he had

even the smallest force at his disposal. The garrison were bad and badly commanded, and the officers drove away Captain Dumont, an energetic man who had come to command them. He continued as follows:—"Yesterday, when every one ought to have been working or under fire, the chiefs of the legions were discussing the substitution of a new system of organization for mine. My indignation brought them to their senses, and they promised me that they would not again take a similar course. An organized force of 12,000 men with which I engaged to march against the enemy was to have been summoned at 11 a.m., and now 1.30 p.m. has come, and there are only about 1000 men ready. Thus, the incapacity of the committee has hindered the organization of artillery, the vacillation of the central committee stops the organization of men, and the petty preoccupations of the chiefs of the legions paralyze mobilization. I am not a man to recoil before repression; and yesterday, while the chiefs were discussing, an execution party awaited them in the yard. I have two lines to choose—to break through the obstacles impeding my course of action, or to retire. I cannot break through the obstacles, because the obstacles are your weakness. Nor will I attack the sovereignty of the people. I retire, and I have the honour to demand of you a cell in Mazas."

This is the language of a man; and every one applauded, except M. Félix Pyat, who declared in his paper, that if Rossel had not sufficient power to confine, nor intelligence to keep the central committee to its purely administrative functions, it was not the fault of the Committee of Public Safety. But M. Pyat was one of that very committee! All that can be deduced from the above is, that the whole of the affairs of the Commune, military and civil, were in a hopeless condition. One result of Rossel's letter was that the Committee of Public Safety was requested to resign, which it did, and a new one was elected, consisting of Jauvier, Antoine, Arnaud, Gambon, Eudes, and Delescluse.

On the other hand, Rochefort and others openly advocated the appointment of Rossel, or some other person, as dictator. The salvation of the Commune depended on it, they said, and there was not a day to lose. True enough : but what difference would the appointment of a dictator have made? Rochefort was one who was clever at destruction, but his advice and attempts at construction were always utterly worthless.

The League of the Republican Union still tried to bring about reconciliation. It asked the Commune to recognize the republic, and it implored the government to grant Paris full municipal rights. It was evident that the appeal was now too late, yet every approach towards, or exhibition of a desire for reconciliation, tended to appease the violence of party feeling and helped to break the fall; but M. Pyat, again, was of a different opinion, and in his paper denounced every attempt of the kind. Next to Rochefort, Pyat has perhaps contributed more than any other man to render liberal government almost impossible in France; but he exceeded even him, in the mischievous folly which he exhibited during the last days of the Commune, when nothing was to be gained, and much injury could be and was done by such journals as that of Pyat's. They helped to blind the leaders as well as the Communists in general, and led them on to absolute destruction.

Rossel's resignation led to his arrest; he was accused of treachery to the Commune, in having publicly announced the capture of Fort Issy without the permission of the Committee of Public Safety. He was given in charge to Girardin, one of that very body; but strange to say, prisoner and keeper escaped together from the Hôtel de Ville. Bergeret was ordered to arrest them. Here we have an example of the extraordinary doings of the Commune. Bergeret, Cluseret, and Rossel, follow each other in command of the forces, and as prisoners; and the first is set to catch the last, who has run off with his keeper, who was formerly one of the very body against which he specially complained.

Rigault furnished his enemies with another proof, or at least good reason for believing, that the prisons had been filled in a very irregular manner, by the publication of an order to the effect that no one was to be confined unless an official report detailing the alleged offences of the accused, with the names and addresses of the witnesses, were lodged at the clerk's office of the prison by the citizen making the arrest. Such documents gave point to epigrams like the following: "The Commune consists of a number of violent persons who are always arresting one another."

The Committee of Public Safety was the body

that ordered M. Thiers' house to be destroyed, and this act was drawn up in a perfectly regular manner. The precious document ran as follows: "The Committee of Public Safety, considering that the proclamation of M. Thiers declares that the army will not bombard Paris, while every day women and children fall victims to the fratricidal projectiles of Versailles, and that it makes an appeal to treason in order to enter Paris, feeling it to be impossible to vanquish its heroic population by force of arms, orders that the goods and property of M. Thiers be seized by the administration of the Domains, and his house in the Place St. Georges be razed to the ground. Citizens Fontaine, delegate of the Domains, and Andrieux, delegate of the Public Service, are charged with the immediate execution of the present decree." This order, as it is well known, was duly carried out. The property within the house was not destroyed. The books were conveyed to one of the public libraries; the collection of works of art, which was of considerable value, was housed at the Tuileries; the linen was handed over to the army surgeons to be used in the hospitals, and the furniture was ordered to be sold. As to the house itself, it was proposed to set fire to it; but as it did not stand alone the commissaire of the police of the quarter pointed out the danger of such a project in a rather dense part of the city, and accordingly it was systematically pulled down. Rochefort was one who saw the folly of this proceeding, and he said in his journal that the Assembly would of course compensate M. Thiers for the loss. But the Communists knew that the latter set great store by his collections—who at the age of seventy does not worship his *lares et penates?*—and that the destruction would give him and his wife, and her sister, who lived under the same roof, great pain; so the well-known modest hôtel was destroyed. As to the treasures, they were, as we have said, deposited in the Tuileries, which fact would go towards proving that M. Courbet, the artist who had the charge of the artistic property, did not intend, although he had advocated it, to destroy the palace. When the fire happened there, these treasures were destroyed with the rest. Only one single object is known to be saved, and to that a curious interest attaches. It is a small Etruscan urn of terra-cotta, which in spite of its brittleness remains intact, and the surface of which has become glazed by the lead or other substance melted upon it during the conflagration. A curious relique of M. Thiers' collection of objects of art!

The condition of the press in Paris at this period was very curious. Only two or three of the old established journals continued to appear in their ordinary form, and some of these exhibited curious internal changes; but in spite of all the suppressions, in spite of the danger of saying a word against the grand philosophic government of the people, the Commune, the number of newspapers was not decreased; on the contrary, they seemed to multiply. Suppression became a farce in most cases. If you asked for one paper the newswoman presented you with a similar one, kindly informing you that the *Bien Public*, or some other paper, was suppressed, and that the one she offered you came from the same office; it was, in fact, the same paper with the title changed, and this went on for some time, the Commune having far too much else to attend to, to look sharply after the slippery journalists. It is always remarkable with what apparent ease new journals are started in Paris, and it was more than usually so during the siege and the Commune. It was simply a question of supply and demand. People had very little to do, were thirsty for news, and had little money to spend; so dozens of halfpenny journals sprang up and found tens of thousands of readers. These literary mushrooms will certainly form one of the most curious collections of materials for the history of France, such as they are, for future students. They will not add much to the reputation of the Paris press; but they will supply a collection of the most vituperative and scandalous libels and atrocious calumnies that have appeared in the present century.

It would be interesting to give a few extracts from these ephemeral journals, but they would lose half their character in an English dress, and many of the most characteristic are totally unfit for reproduction. The proposals of some of the writers would seem to have emanated from the brain of fiends rather than men. The *Père Duchesne*, a paper named after one of the most sanguinary of the old revolutionary prints, was foremost of its class. Its gods seem to have been Robespierre and Marat, the hideous wretch who fell by the hand of Charlotte Corday; and it recommended strongly the guillotine and reign

of terror as the best means of bringing about liberty, equality, and fraternity! These incendiary writers took great care of their own carcases when the crash, or rather before the actual crash arrived, and many of them are now haunting the neighbourhood of Leicester Square and Soho, and vainly striving to earn bread and cheese, and at the same time to revolutionize England with their disgusting journals, in which honourable men, because they are of a different way of thinking to the writers, are stigmatized by the most filthy epithets in every article. These dirty little sheets will meet the fate they deserve, but they will do good during their short lives. They will make known the wretched *animus* of the scribes who hounded thousands on to their death or destruction, and were the first to fly from the dangers they had helped to create. To repress these wretched prints would indeed be a mistake, for they are of real value as mirrors to show people what class of men these would-be Marats of the nineteenth century are, and how they would construe liberty, equality, and fraternity.

The terror which is recommended by the writers above mentioned had actually begun to hover over Paris. The arrests had become numerous and constant, the search for members of the national guard who declined to serve the Commune was now pursued with energy, and every unfortunate man who was caught was immediately sent off to one of the forts or other dangerous position. Of course, all who could manage it deserted immediately, and thus the numbers of the Communal forces were constantly dwindling, in spite of the impressment. The deserters were not, however, confined to the pressed men; many others also went over to Versailles. One instance may be specially mentioned. A young officer was sent by Rossel with a flag of truce and a despatch. On delivering it he declared that he had no knowledge of the contents, and that he preferred being kept as a prisoner to being sent back to Paris. All this shows how near the cause of the Commune was to its end. In the meantime the terror was increased. Cournet, who had been at the head of the police, was found too easy, and therefore Ferré was appointed in his place. The ferocious character of this man is well known, and he has paid the penalty of his crimes. His great friend, the fierce Raoul Rigault, once gave proof of a less sanguinary nature than has been attributed to him. Schœlcher, one of the deputies of Paris, had been arrested, but was set free after two days' confinement; Rigault announcing to him in a letter that he was free, and adding that he had thought of detaining him as hostage against Edward Lockroy, who was in the hands of the Versailles authorities, but on second thoughts did not see that one absurdity could be properly answered by another. The unfortunate archbishop of Paris and the other hostages found no pity in the eyes of the Ferrés and the Rigaults.

Another act of the Commune was the establishment of a police. It was one of their grand principles that "the safety of the city was to be left for evermore in the hands of the national guards;" now they found out that a police was necessary, and a decree was issued in which it was stated that the Jews, the Athenians, the Spartans, and the Romans all found police necessary, and so the great French Federal Communal government must also have its police! In connection with police regulations, it may be mentioned that all citizens were obliged to provide themselves with cards, in imitation of the *cartes civiques* of 1790, on which was to be inscribed the name and address of the bearer, with full particulars, attested by the municipal authorities. Any national guard, or apparently, any one else, had the right to demand to see any one's card on any occasion. All this was said to be in consequence of a great secret conspiracy; but more probably it was simply the result of the terror of the Communists themselves, who felt that every honest man must be their enemy, and thoroughly mistrusted each other. Arrests were made in all directions. Colonel Masson, lately appointed chief of the staff of the war office, and dozens of other officials, were thrown into prison.

The financial question also began to press most seriously upon the Commune. The offices of more than one of the financial societies were invaded, and the seal of the Commune affixed to the safes in which the cash was deposited. It did not appear that any of the property was removed. Next the Bank of France was invaded by the national guards, in spite of all the efforts of M. Beslay, who was the Communist delegate to the bank, and who had very cleverly managed to prevent its treasuries being ransacked. No money was taken, but M. Beslay immediately gave in his resignation as a member of the Commune.

The bank at this time contained three milliards (£120,000,000) in securities, a milliard in metal belonging to the state, a milliard composing the fortune of ninety families, and a milliard in bank-notes. M. Jourde, the Communist Finance Minister, also exercised the full weight of his influence to prevent the bank from being pillaged.

As soon as the government had got possession of Fort Issy, in which were a hundred guns and loads of ammunition, the guns were turned against its neighbour, Fort Vanves, which suffered greatly; rockets were also thrown into it and set the buildings on fire; the barracks were thus destroyed. A vigorous bombardment was then maintained all along the lines; not only were all the gates of the fortification shelled, but also the barricade in advance of the Arc de Triomphe. This and other barricades, such as one by the arch itself, and others in the Place Vendôme, the Rue de la Paix, by the Tuileries, &c., were constructed with uncommon care in the manner adopted by the engineers during the siege of Paris. They were composed of fascines and small sacks filled with sand, and everything was finished off in the most elaborate manner, giving the barricades almost a theatrical air. It must not, however, be understood from this that they were toy-works; it was only the outward appearance that was toy-like. On the contrary, they were admirable earthworks, designed and executed in the best manner; and armed as they were with beautiful breach-loading bronze guns and mitrailleuses, might have given the troops immense difficulty. But in a large city like Paris, at least on the outer circle, the number of such barricades, to be of any service, must be immense; the line must be almost continuous, or they are easily turned. When this is not the case the enemy can choose his mode of attack, and circumvent obstacles.

On the night of the 13th of May Fort Vanves was in the hands of the government troops. In the case of Fort Issy the insurgents had abandoned the place so secretly, that the Versailles generals were not aware of the fact until they approached and found it empty. The garrison of Vanves found its way back into Paris through subterranean passages leading to the Catacombs. A miserable spectacle they presented, worn-out with long service in the fort, having spent the night in their subterranean retreat, without arms or caps, their clothes torn, their hands and faces begrimed with dirt, frequently mixed with blood, foot-sore and famished, they were indeed objects of pity, and all the more so, from the fact that their escape was not to freedom, but into a trap; they merely dragged their wearied bodies from a lost fort into a barred city, with no prospect but death or imprisonment. As an instance of the tactics of the Commune, it may be mentioned that for two days the *Official Journal* tried to hide the fact of the fall of Vanves, and declared that the Versailles troops had made an attack and been repulsed with great loss, on the night after that in which it had been abandoned by the Communists! However, the Communists were not the inventors of false reports. Fort Vanves was boldly defended, but the shelling and burning of the buildings created a terrible panic, and it was said that all the garrison except 150 men abandoned the place; these fought gallantly for a long time, but were at last compelled to retire. When the Versailles troops succeeded in establishing themselves there, on the 14th of May, they found only a few insurgents and thirty corpses. There were in the fort fifty guns and eight mortars, some provisions, and an electric wire by which the fort was to have been blown up. A place called the Seminary, near Issy, was taken on the previous day, when a hundred of the insurgents were killed and several hundreds more taken prisoners.

As already stated, the shelling of the ramparts began as soon as Fort Issy was taken, and after Vanves fell and the trenches were opened around the Bois de Boulogne the effects soon became serious, and could no longer be concealed. The bastions at the Point du Jour and Auteuil had become untenable; the casemates were destroyed by shells, which also began to fall a mile within the fortifications, so that the neighbourhood was soon deserted by the Communists, as well as by the unfortunate inhabitants. The attack was carried on simultaneously on two sides of the city, by Auteuil and Passy, and by Clichy, where a pontoon bridge was thrown across the river; several of the barricades just outside Paris were also taken. Squadrons of cavalry had been stationed all round the city. and fighting was going on at a dozen points near the walls.

In order to meet this state of things the Communists formed more barricades. One behind the Arc de Triomphe was guarded by six cannons and four mortars; a large number of guns and

mitrailleuses—more than sixty, it is said—were placed in battery on Montmartre. The most feverish excitement was evident everywhere. Detachments of guards paraded all the streets of Paris; and such was the distrust of the sedentary national guards, that the battalions were ordered to do duty at a point far away from the quarter of the city to which they belonged, lest they should desert, which they had commenced doing to a large extent. The quarters which were mistrusted were watched by franc-tireurs; every person was suspected; no one could pass into or out of Paris without being examined; and even omnibuses and cabs were stopped in the streets and their occupants interrogated. Never were distrust and anxiety more plainly evidenced. Numerous arrests took place every day; and although many of the prisoners were released on examination, the prisons were filled to overflowing. The Commune itself was torn by intestine quarrels, and threatened to fly to pieces like one of its own bombs; the *prudent* were disappearing, the desperate were quarrelling, and men of a lower cast than most of the old members made their way to power, so sweet it seems to be, although on the verge of a precipice. Twenty of the most moderate and able men in the Commune protested against the existence of the Committee of Public Safety; but it was maintained that it was necessary that there should be some body above the ministers, in fact, an imperialism, so strangely do all extremes, all non-constitutional governments, resemble each other in their modes of thought and action!

The Central Committee, which still existed in spite of the appointment of the Committee of Public Safety, and which seemed indeed to have set aside the general government of the Commune, now openly advocated and put in practice the plan of the old republic and the consulate, and appointed a civil commissary to watch over each military commander. A man named Dereure was appointed to be by the side of Dombrowski, one Johannan by that of La Cécilia, and one Milist by that of Wroblowski. Cluseret, who had escaped his persecutors, wrote a letter to Rochefort, in which he dwelt bitterly on the faults committed, and declared that nothing remained to be done but to make good their position by barricades. Newspapers that had supported the Commune all along now gave it up as a delusion, and wrote against it, showing the conviction of the writers that the hour of deliverance was very near.

Misfortunes are said never to come alone; in truth, they have fallen on Paris in crowds. Just at this moment a cartridge factory, in which 500 women were employed, near the Champ de Mars, exploded, and caused the destruction of a post of national guards close at hand. At least 200 of the poor women were killed, and a number of the guards. Of course, in the state of affairs at the period, no exact account could be obtained.

A movement having occurred at this time amongst the German troops, it was given out that they were about to join the French outside, storm the city, and massacre the people. It was evidently only a Communist trick, to arouse the spirit of the people and throw odium on the Assembly; but instead of producing the intended effect it simply terrified the timid nearly out of their senses, and did not certainly strengthen the Commune's hands. This rumour was made the occasion for the declaration that, in presence of such infamous conduct on the part of the Assembly, they would burn and destroy every public building in Paris. One man, who must have had a good deal more money than wit, offered a sum equal to £8000 to any man who should succeed in bringing M. Thiers into Paris. Certainly the chance of his having to pay the reward was a small one, so he obtained a day or two's cheap notoriety.

So desperate had the position become that the Committee of Public Safety having been blamed in a manifesto, threatened to imprison the minority, and carried out the threat in the case of one member named Clément. It also ordered that no one in prison should be released except by the express order of the committee itself. In spite of all the difficulties which surrounded the Commune, however, it could not refrain from playing at legislation; the love of power was so sweet, that even when all was crumbling beneath its feet, it devoted itself to reform the code for future generations; and as the time was evidently short, a vast deal of work was done on paper in the smallest possible time. Amongst the rest of the propositions, that of suppression of a part of the city *octroi* dues was sure to be most popular, and was made prominent. More than a hundred millions of francs were to be presented to the people under this head, to be made up by—1st, Saving thirty millions on police and

religion, which was declared to be only another name for espionage; 2nd, By a tax amounting to fifteen millions on railways; 3rd, By the profits on assurance, which the city was to undertake on its own account. In addition to this, there was a proposition to declare at once all titles, arms, liveries, and privileges of nobility illegal, and consequently abolished; the Legion of Honour was to be suppressed; all children were to be considered legitimate; and every man and woman after the age of eighteen (a royal majority) were to be married by simply declaring the fact before the proper authority, without any parental or other consent being required. The Commune, however, could not agree on these and similar points; there was a tremendous scene in the council, and the minority seceded, and were not imprisoned. The Committee of Public Safety proceeded alone with its work, and issued its *decrees* in the *Official Journal*. One of these suppressed at a single blow ten journals, including the *Patrie*, the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and, singularly enough, the *Commune*. Ominous fact! Another ordered that no new journal or review should be allowed to appear until after the war was ended; that all articles must be signed by the writers (the imperialist condition); that offences against the Commune should be submitted to a court-martial, and that printers contravening this decree should be tried, with their accomplices, and their presses seized! Such are the kindly and considerate feelings towards the press and its liberties left on record by the Committee of Public Safety of 1871.

The Commune seemed, in fact, as its last hour approached, to be endowed with supernatural powers of legislation and diabolical work, and amongst other matters it discussed the mode of dealing with the unfortunate hostages. Some proposed that the victims should be drawn by lots, others that the most culpable only should at first be shot, and the rest reserved for a later period. A well-known man named Wolff, formerly secretary to Mazzini and president of the Universal Republican Alliance of London, was accused of being a secret agent of M. Piétri, prefect of police under the empire, of receiving from him a salary of £20 a month, and of furnishing him with reports of the doings of the Commune; silver candelabra and other plate and ornaments in the churches were seized; and it was announced in many journals, and notably in the *Cri du Peuple*, that rather than capitulate the committee had resolved to blow up and burn the city. This fact is important, as it has been strenuously denied that the Commune caused the destruction that afterwards occurred; at any rate, they had recommended it in one of their favourite journals. As to the destruction itself, that commenced some days before the government troops had made their way into Paris. The demolition of the expiatory chapel, erected in memory of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, was commenced though not accomplished; and every one knows of the demolition of the Column Vendôme, which was accomplished in a very systematic manner by a builder who undertook the job at a given sum. In the first place the column was sawn through just above the square base upon which it stood; an immense bed of dung covered with faggots was prepared in the place, so as to deaden the shock of the fall of such a huge mass; a mast had been erected to which were attached pulleys, through which ropes, fastened to the statue on the top of the column, passed and were tightened by a windlass, while other ropes were pulled by hundreds of shouting fiends until the proud memorial of Napoleon's victories tottered, fell, and broke into fragments, amid the shouts and mad rejoicings of all the scum of Paris, who crowded in thousands round the spot, and it is marvellous that no accident happened. In consequence of the preparations that had been made, the crowning statue was uninjured; but the bronze plates which surrounded the column and which were covered with bas reliefs commemorating Napoleon's greatest victories, were parted and some of them broken.

Marshal MacMahon made good use of the occasion in an address to the army, in which he said:—"The foreigner respected it—the Commune of Paris has overthrown it. Men calling themselves Frenchmen have dared to destroy, under the eyes of the Germans who saw the deed, this witness of the victories of our fathers against Europe in coalition. The Commune hoped thus to efface the memory of the military virtues of which the column was the glorious symbol. Soldiers! if the recollections which the column commemorated are no longer graven upon brass, they will remain in our hearts. Inspired by them, we know how to give France another proof of bravery, devotion, and patriotism."

By this time a large number of the Commune

became terrified at their position, and twenty or more are said to have suddenly ceased to attend the meetings. We know now that these fierce leaders were, many of them, intent on their own safety only; and that having led thousands to destruction and shown the example of demolition, they exhibited their heroism by running away from their victims, and some of them succeeding are now exiles, trying to make the world believe that they are victims of their patriotism. The most honourable and brave of the Communists fell fighting in a hopeless cause or by the bullets of the victorious army.

While these latter events were passing in Paris, the bombardment of the city was proceeding with terrible intensity. The Versailles and Auteuil gates were the first that were demolished, and the bastions around, as well as the Point du Jour, were soon untenable: the bombardment of Porte Maillot and the Champs Elysées to the arch, and farther, was continuous and most violent; and the destruction of the houses from the gate in question to the arch was frightful. Few parts of Paris have suffered more. The Auteuil Railway passed across beneath the road, close to the Porte Maillot; not only was the station there utterly destroyed, but the tunnel was blown up, and the railway traffic stopped for a considerable time afterwards. Not a vestige remained of gate or station. Trees and lamp-posts had disappeared; and the whole quarter presented a scene of desolation which it is impossible to exaggerate. A severe struggle took place at Clichy, not far from Saint Denis, on the Seine: it was taken by the Versailles troops on the 17th of May. It was a very important point, as it covered the road to Neuilly; in fact, there was constant fighting and cannonading along the whole line, not only at the ramparts, but at many points outside, the Federals answering the Versailles batteries from Montmartre, the Trocadéro, the fort of Montrouge, and many sections of the ramparts. The fire was not, however, well sustained. On the 18th or 19th a breaching battery was opened in front of the village of Boulogne, which fired rapidly and continuously, and was replied to vigorously by the guns on the ramparts at Vaugirard; but on the latter day the gates of Auteuil and Point du Jour were completely destroyed, and this was the beginning of the end. At this time the Communists established a powder magazine in the palace of the Legion of Honour, and considering the short distance that this building is from the Louvre, and the fearful fires that raged in that quarter of the city afterwards, it is surprising that a greater catastrophe than any that occurred, namely, the burning of the Louvre, with all its precious treasures in pictures, sculpture, engravings, and antiquities, did not crown the work of the Commune.

CHAPTER IV.

The Beginning of the End—False Communal Announcements—The Communists at bay—M. Rochefort attempts to escape, but is captured and taken to Versailles—Abominable Threat of the Communists—All Communication with Paris cut off—Condition of the Interior of the City—Perpetual Arrests, Domiciliary Visits, and Robberies—Entrance of the Versailles Troops—An Army of Amazons—Speech of M. Thiers in the Assembly on May 22—Fighting behind the Barricades—Description of the Barricades—The Communists set fire to the City—Continued and Severe Fighting—Use of Petroleum Bombs—Convoys of Prisoners to Versailles—Merciless Treatment of them—Circular of M. Thiers—Massacre of the Archbishop of Paris and other Hostages by the Communists—Reasons assigned by the Communists for arresting them—End of the Struggle—Severe Lesson for the Middle Classes—The Buildings partially or totally burnt—Were there any *Pétroleuses?*—Retribution—Fearful Scenes in the City and at the Camp of Satory, near Versailles—The Women of the Commune—Trials of the Prisoners—Sketches of the most Notorious and their Sentences—Rochefort and his Sentence—Trial of the Alleged *Pétroleuses*—Groundless Accusation as to the Number of Englishmen in the Communal Ranks—Ducatel the "Saviour of Paris," and his Reward—Estimates of Value of Buildings Destroyed—All the Registers of Births, Deaths, and Marriages Burnt—Proceedings of the Assembly after the Suppression of the Commune—Present Position of France, and her Prospects for the Future.

Notwithstanding its desperate position the Commune worked hard to keep up appearances. It declared in the *Official Journal* on the 20th of May that the position was in every respect good and strong; that their organization was much improved, and confidence was strengthened! At this very time crowds of Communists were flying into Paris in the most disorderly manner. It condemned to death four individuals found guilty of being concerned in the firing of the great cartridge factory in the Champs de Mars. General Cluseret was to be tried on the 22nd. On the 21st a decree appeared abolishing all the grants made to the theatres by the government, and all monopolies connected with the theatres, which were to be placed under the management of associations. On the same day the *Official Journal* contained accounts of successes of the Commune nearly all round Paris, repulses of the Versailles troops at half a dozen spots, successful reconnaissances here and there on the part of the Communists, "defeat of Versailles troops by Garibaldians at Petit Vanves," "everything going on well at Neuilly." The previous day's results had been "very satisfactory to the Commune; the battery at Montmartre had dismounted its opponent at Gennevilliers." The reports of Generals Dombrowski and Wroblewski confirmed all the pleasing reports of the Commune, and declared their belief that the approaches of the Versailles troops had been destroyed. La Cécilia had 12,000 men with him at Petit Vanves; the Central Committee had sent forward large reinforcements of troops, with *matériel*, to all the threatened points; seven times were the Versailles forces repulsed in attempting to storm the ramparts, and were compelled to give up the attempt; several members of the Commune had gone to the advanced posts among the troops—they must have taken the wrong way, for some of them were found a good way off, and some found themselves in London not long afterwards—all the members who left the Commune had been replaced, &c., &c. Such were the announcements put forth to amuse the deluded followers of the Commune. It is true that the notices in the *Official Journal* were without date, vague, and to a careful reader significant. But the mask was cunningly worn to the end; it was often awry, to be sure, and the audience should have observed this, but did not. Thousands still allowed themselves to be led out to slaughter, and false reports of success laid the way for more bloodshed.

An order of the barricade commission put the true complexion on the state of things, by ordering the inhabitants of all the houses at the corners of the streets, in the neighbourhood of the ramparts on the south side of the city, to leave their houses, which would be occupied by the national guards, and the walls loopholed for defence. The Communists were at bay; and it is but just to say that some of the leaders behaved heroically, though the sacrifice of their own lives was but a poor recompense for the lives of thousands upon thousands that lay at their door.

The legislative farce was still being played with wondrous face. On the 19th or 20th of May the Commune decreed that a superior commission of accounts should be appointed, to consist of four members, who should report monthly; that all contractors and accountants guilty of theft or malversation should be punished with death; that

all pluralities of salaries should be prohibited. Then, amongst a dozen other matters, we have a resolution to the effect that the corps of marines is to be dissolved! A report was ordered to be made on the reform of the prison system. One member of the Commune proposed the abolition of religious worship in all churches, which, he further proposed, should be devoted in future to lectures on atheism, the absurdity of old prejudices, &c. M. Pyat, in the *Vengeur*, said, in an article that bore his signature, that if the minority of the Commune should persist in abstaining, new elections should be ordered to replace them. About the same time M. Pyat disappeared! At almost the same moment as the above remarkable coincidence occurred, M. Henri Rochefort announced in the *Mot d'Ordre*, his journal, that in consequence of the measures taken by the Commune against the press the *Mot d'Ordre* would cease to appear. Curiously enough, on the same day or the day previously, M. Rochefort did not appear in Paris, but was found at Meaux, and conducted to Versailles in an omnibus guarded by chasseurs. Rochefort had tried to disguise himself by having his hair cut short and his beard shaved off, but his peculiar and well-known physiognomy gave him little chance of escape.

One by one the leaders of the rebellion disappeared from the scene. Several were lucky enough to escape into Belgium; others secreted themselves in Paris and were afterwards taken. But we must not forestall events, but confine ourselves at present to what was actually going on in Paris. The two following documents, the former issued on the night of the 20th and the latter published on the 21st of May, present a curious contrast. M. Thiers addressed a circular to the prefects of the departments, in which he says: "Those who have misgivings are wrong. Our troops are working at the approaches; we are breaking the walls with our batteries. At the moment I am writing never have we been nearer the end. The members of the Commune are occupied in saving themselves by flight. Henri Rochefort has been arrested at Meaux." The proclamation of the Commune says: "All inhabitants of Paris who are absent from the city must return to their houses within forty-eight hours, otherwise their stock, bonds, shares, and ledgers will be burnt." This abominable threat was all the more infamous from the fact that no one could at that time enter Paris, the Versailles troops having complete command of the gates, and having already stopped a number of persons, including English and Americans. It was said afterwards that the order was a mistake, and would be cancelled; but it formed a part of the system which we now know was attempted to be carried out, if not by the Commune, by individuals, of burning all the documents, public and private, that were deposited in the Hôtel de Ville and other edifices.

The preparations for what afterwards happened were now being made. The well-known bronze bas-relief of Henri IV., which was over the central door of the Hôtel de Ville, was taken down, and it was asserted, had been cut up into pieces and distributed. The truth was, however, that the bas-relief was taken down and stowed away, and afterwards found intact, that it might not be destroyed with the beautiful Hôtel de Ville, which it had so long decorated. This bas-relief was not, however, the original; that was destroyed at the first Revolution and replaced by a new one. When its place was laid bare there appeared a square hole in the wall, in which originally, it is supposed, were deposited the coins and other things placed there at the time of the building; but the hole was empty, and may now be seen in the vacant space of calcined stones.

On the 22nd of May all communication whatever with Paris was systematically cut off; on the north, the trains were stopped at St. Denis and none allowed to leave Paris; numberless arrests were made, Assi being amongst the number of prisoners. The Germans, who had remained completely neutral, except when the conditions of the peace seemed in danger, now prevented the fugitives from quitting the city. The advanced corps were doubled and exercised the greatest vigilance; every one was driven back, no matter what was his condition; wounded officers and men, including one general, were forced to retrace their steps and return to the desolation they had helped to create.

The condition of the interior of Paris at this moment was wretched in the extreme; as usual, the cry of treason was up, and every one suspected his neighbour of being an agent of Versailles or of Louis Napoleon. Men, and women too, were arrested on the slightest pretence; *cafés* which exhibited more animation than the majority were constantly visited; cordons of soldiers would suddenly be drawn across a street or boulevard;

a commissary of police would appear in the doorway of the establishment, and order every one within to remain there on pain of death. The visitors would be severely scrutinized, and generally a few suspected individuals would be arrested, and the rest dismissed. But on more than one occasion hundreds of men and women, old and young, respectable or otherwise, were thus entrapped in a mass, marched off to the Hôtel de Ville, and examined by police or other communal authorities. Most of them were released in a few hours, but the arrests were sufficient to fill all the prisons to overflowing.

Another cause of intense terror and suffering was the domiciliary visits of the national guards; these had a double object, the finding of arms, and also of national guards, or of any young able-bodied men, in hiding. Woe to any who were found, especially in uniform; they were immediately marched off to the forts or the advanced posts, and their chance of escape was small. Every kind of arm that was found was taken away; and when the house or apartment belonged to a late senator, or other marked Bonapartist, all the valuables were seized, and frequently the furniture and other things destroyed. In other instances there was not much mischief done, though of course, as in all such cases, there was a number of black sheep who took advantage of the state of things, and helped themselves to whatever came within their reach. When the Commune had fallen some curious scenes occurred; those who had helped themselves to their neighbours' goods began to feel uneasy, knowing that if discovered the retribution would be swift and heavy, and the conduct of every man in Paris would be known to his neighbours through the concierges. A single instance, which will serve as an example, came within our knowledge; a very handsomely furnished suite of rooms in the Place Wagram had been divested of every portable valuable, but it seemed that the possessors of some of the goods got uneasy; for one evening at a late hour a ring came at the gate, and a man called out, "Here are your clocks," and ran off. At the gate were found, not only six time-pieces, which had been stolen from the apartments referred to, but another which had doubtless been taken from some neighbouring house. A quantity of money and jewellery, stolen at the same time, was not returned with the clocks.

On the night of the 20th the siege batteries maintained an incessant fire for eight hours against Porte Maillot and Auteuil, and on the following day, Sunday—nearly all important military engagements seem to take place on Sunday—General Douay with his corps d'armée entered Paris by a breach in the walls, and occupied positions near Auteuil, whereupon a flag of truce was hoisted at the Saint Cloud gate, and the Versailles batteries immediately ceased, by signal, to fire on that part of the city. At the same time another corps d'armée, under General Dubarrail, had occupied Choisy-le-Roi, and a third had entered at Porte d'Issy; the first and third here joined, and the whole prepared to march against the Communist forces, who still held their ground with obstinacy. To meet the attack, one of the largest guns in Paris, a huge naval breech-loader, had been remounted on the ramparts, and on one day destroyed the roof of the barracks of Mont Valérien, and on another did great damage to the Château de Bécon. This gun, called Joséphine, was the same which during the siege sent a shell from the fortifications to Saint Germain, and caused the Germans to shift the position of their hospital. The insurgents placed twelve heavy guns on the bastions at Clichy and Gennevilliers, to prevent the troops crossing the Seine at that part. They also set up some large guns on the Arc de Triomphe, which caused the Versailles gunners to fire at that, the most beautiful of all the architectural monuments in Paris. Fortunately they did it but little harm; but the houses around were considerably injured, and many men and horses were killed in and around the Place de l'Etoile. This caused the shells to come further than ever into Paris. The Pont de Jéna was struck several times, and on one occasion a carriage close by the bridge was cut to pieces by two shells, which struck it at once, and three passengers were badly wounded.

The success of the government troops was not uniform; in the neighbourhood of Issy and Vanves, the insurgents were driven in, but at the Dauphine gate the attacking force was kept back by the steady fire of the mitrailleuses. In the evening of the same day, however, the Versailles troops, as already stated, entered Paris by the gates of Saint Cloud and Montrouge, the insurgents quitting the ramparts. The corps of fusiliers and marines, headed by a captain in the navy named Trèves, had the honour of first entering the city.

They immediately cut the telegraph wires and stopped the communications of the Commune. The resistance on the road by Auteuil to Paris was not great. The Federalists fled into the city, generally in the wildest disorder—as most beaten armies do; and the shells from the Versailles batteries now falling well within the ramparts added to the confusion. The inhabitants were stricken with terror, and a large number of lives were lost amongst the civilians.

Even at this eleventh hour the Commune continued to arrest all the men capable of bearing arms, and on the very day before the entry of the government troops it was said that 2000 were impressed.

A sad smile was brought up on the face of those who were on the boulevards on the 20th of May, when a regiment, or rather a mass, of women, all armed and wearing something more or less military about them, and commanded by several grey-headed old men, appeared and marched along. This army of amazons never faced the enemy. Many women, however, exhibited the utmost courage, not to say ferocity; for instance, on the last day of the defence of the *enceinte* a vivandiére of one of the battalions, who had just joined, and was not even equipped in the usual short skirt, trousers, and military cap, but who carried a Chassepot, sat down behind the ramparts by the Bois de Boulogne and deliberately fired twenty rounds at the enemy; preparing to fire her twenty-first cartridge, she was struck by a piece of a shell and her head shattered in the most frightful manner.

On the 21st and 22nd May two very short but important proclamations appeared with M. Thiers' signature; the first merely stated that "the Saint Cloud gate had been destroyed, that General Douay was entering with his troops, and that two other generals were hastening after him." The second was still more curt:—"Half the army is already in Paris. We have possession of the gates of Saint Cloud, Passy, and Auteuil, and we are masters of the Trocadéro."

The work went on fiercely on both sides; on the 22nd thousands of prisoners were taken, men, women, and children, and sent off to Versailles; the troops were pouring into Paris through the crushed gates and walls; the Saint Germain quarter was occupied by General Cissey with 20,000 men, and other corps reached the entrance of the Champs Elysées, and the barricades at the Place de la Concorde were now brought into play against them. In a few hours more there were 80,000 Versailles troops in Paris, and the barricades were being shelled by the forts and batteries. The army advanced towards the centre of Paris; they occupied on the 22nd, amongst other places, the Champ de Mars, the place in front of the new opera house, and the esplanade of the Invalides; but the insurgents had placed guns on the terrace of the Tuileries, and swept the whole of the Champs Elysées. The fighting was serious round about the terminus of the Western Railway, which is not very far from the Madeleine; conflagrations and explosions took place in a dozen places at once, and a funereal pall of smoke seemed to hang over the city. Few imagined how much more sombre and lurid that pall was to become before the Commune was entirely subdued!

On the 22nd of May M. Thiers made a statement in the Assembly, of which the following were the most important passages:—"The cause of justice, order, and civilization has triumphed, thanks to our brave army. The generals, officers, and soldiers, especially the latter, have all done their duty. I congratulate the army for having generously shed its blood to accomplish its duty." M. Thiers then alluded to the powerful effect of the Versailles artillery, which had enabled the engineers to advance rapidly with the works against the forts of Issy and Vanves, and subsequently against the *enceinte*. He then added: "We did not expect to enter Paris for two or three days, and then only at the cost of painful efforts and sacrifices. We have been spared this cruel task. Yesterday General Douay perceived that the gate of St. Cloud was approachable. His army soon penetrated into the interior of the city, and advanced as far as the Arc de Triomphe. General L'Admirault entered simultaneously on the left, and occupied the avenue of the Grand Army and the Arc de Triomphe; while General Vinoy communicates with General Cissey, who rests his left wing upon Mont Parnasse, and his right upon the Invalides. General Clinchant for his part has entered by the Faubourg St. Honoré, and reached the Opera House. Such was the position of affairs at two o'clock yesterday afternoon. We are disposed to believe that Paris will soon be restored to her rightful sovereign, namely France."

The Assembly at once voted thanks to M. Thiers and the army; and M. Jules Simon brought in a

vote for the reconstruction of the Column Vendôme and the restoration of other public monuments. Alas! they little thought what a much longer list of restorations and reconstructions the morrow would give rise to!

During the course of the following day, the 23rd of May, the army made great progress; there were nearly 100,000 men in Paris; Generals Douay and Vinoy surrounded the Place Vendôme, the staff quarters of the Communists, Neuilly, the Northern Railway station, and Montmartre. The last-named hill had been armed with a large number of guns, and great fear was entertained of the mischief that they would do to the interior of the city; but they were silenced with comparatively little trouble, and by a sort of retributive justice, by batteries placed close to the spot where the artillery was seized and carried off by the Communists in March. The government troops arranged a number of guns on the Place Wagram, and those of Montmartre facing the other way, the batteries were taken in flank and rear and immediately silenced. Many thousands of the insurgents were taken prisoners and a large number killed, but the rest still fought behind the barricades with great energy, and kept the entering army at bay for a time; but it was soon found that barricades could be turned, as Montmartre had been, and thus the army took the Place de l'Etoile and obtained possession of the Elysées and all that neighbourhood. Thus one by one all these barricades fell, and the conflict was confined to the centre and the north-east side of the city. Here, however, the insurgents made a desperate stand, and held the army at bay for two days longer; the barricades were guarded with numerous guns and mitrailleuses, and in the streets of the centre of the city they could not be turned.

Of these barricades, those who have never seen a siege or a revolution can scarcely form an idea. They were not heterogeneous heaps formed of omnibuses, cabs, carts, furniture, and paving stones, but were very carefully constructed on military principles. The first of them was in fact a wall all round the city, at a very short distance from the fortifications, constructed of earth, about three feet thick and six feet high, and crowned with sand-bags. Behind this rampart was a ledge, also of earth, on which the men stood and fired over or between the sand-bags, so that those not actually engaged in firing, stepping down, were well covered. In forming this outer ring of barricades good advantage was taken of the circular railway which runs round just within the walls. In those parts where the railway is in a cutting, as it is during the greater portion of its length, the barricade was raised against the inner railings, which thus became themselves a portion of the work. Every station on the line in these parts was converted into a small fortress, the windows being built up with stones and mortar, or filled with sand-bags, and pierced everywhere. At the foot of the stairs at each station there was a second work of the same kind, in case of the former proving untenable. On the line itself, here and there, were strong oak gates, with numerous holes for riflemen, which could be shut and firmly fastened on the approach of the enemy; and lastly, the whole of the shrubs on the slopes of the cuttings, and they were thick and fine, were cut off at a foot or so from the ground, and every stump cut to a sharp point. In places where the railway cutting was interrupted by a tunnel, the street, boulevard, or place above was converted into a strong bastion, arranged for artillery as well as riflemen. Some of these were truly formidable works. In addition to all this, the road which skirts the railway along the entire length was protected by loopholed walls, built half across the road, and each alternately covering the space left open by the side of the preceding one. Thus an advancing army would at every point meet with a strong wall, behind which were dozens of riflemen. Where the railway dipped below the surface the same principle was followed; only, in the absence of the cutting and rails, the barricade being self-sustaining, had to be much more substantially constructed. The second ring of barricades being much nearer the centre of the city (the Arc de Triomphe was one of its links), was necessarily not continuous, but consisted of isolated barricades and redoubts across the streets and boulevards. Against infantry only they would have been extremely formidable, but the shells which fell upon and within them soon rendered the inner ring also untenable. When the army under the Versailles generals got within this inner ring, the strategic value of the great new boulevards was well demonstrated. Cannon and mitrailleuses were brought to the intersections of these broad

thoroughfares, including the Champs Elysées (which were thus swept down their whole length, and the road cleared of the insurgents down to the very heart of Paris), the Rue Royale, the place in which the new opera house stands, and, finally, the Place Vendôme, the Place de la Concorde, the Place de la Bastille, and many other important positions. The artillery thus placed poured a crushing fire of time fuse shells on the barricades around the Tuileries, the Bourse, the Palais Royal, and the Hôtel de Ville, and on the boulevards, to which was added a murderous cannonading from batteries placed on the Trocadéro, a most commanding situation.

It was impossible for the insurgents to maintain their position after this. The men were demoralized, no generals were to be found; half-drunk and half-mad, their companions falling around at every instant, they raised the usual cries of "Treason!" "We are betrayed!" &c.; and then came the common street fighting, without order or hope. Barricades were now formed, or tried to be formed, of whatever could be seized upon—the military bedsteads and bedding of the barracks in the Louvre, goods out of private houses, vehicles, and whatever came to hand. The courage of many of the insurgents was beyond all question, but the carnage was frightful and the end was inevitable. The last stand in this central part of Paris was made whilst the public buildings around were blazing in the midst of, perhaps, the most fearful combat that even the streets of Paris have ever witnessed; for the Communists, now in utter despair, had carried out their threat as far as lay in their power, and had set fire to some of the most valuable public edifices.

At first it was impossible to ascertain the extent of the mischief. When the Tuileries were set on fire the Communist guards were in possession of the site, and kept off all who would have attempted to stop the conflagration, and it was believed, and the supposed fact telegraphed all over Europe, that the Louvre was destroyed. This fortunately proved not to be the case. The army obtained possession of the spot before the ruin was consummated, and managed to stop the fire by isolating the buildings on both sides. The grand collections of pictures, sculpture, antiquities, and objects of art of all kinds, were saved. The truth, when known, was, however, sad enough.

The effect of the fire can never be described; the whole mass of the Tuileries, front and side, was in flames, as were the Palais Royal and the great building occupied by the ministry of Finance just opposite. On the island close at hand the fire was darting up from amidst the quaint old towers of the remains of the Palace of Charlemagne; the Palace of Justice, the Prefecture of Police, and the Sainte Chapelle, were all supposed to by doomed. On the opposite quay, the great buildings occupied by the Council of State and the Court of Accounts were blazing furiously; and somewhat later the fire appeared further east; the Hôtel de Ville was also in flames. Add to this that dozens of private houses and other buildings around these edifices were included in the conflagration, while fires, caused no one can say how, occurred in all parts of the city, and imagination may draw something like a picture of the scene. Over the city hung a huge canopy of smoke, almost shutting out the light of heaven; and this was illuminated in the most extraordinary manner by the flames, the pyramids of fire, which sprung up from the petroleum-saturated floors. Further on we shall speak of the actual damage done; for the present our object is to sketch as clearly as we can the progress of the Versailles army and the extinction of the Commune.

While this tremendous fire was raging, the fighting was furious around the Tuileries and the Hôtel de Ville, at Montmartre and Belleville: the Versailles batteries cannonaded the parts of the city still in the hands of the insurgents without cessation; while the Communists on their side bombarded the city from the southern forts, and threw petroleum bombs from batteries on the heights around. During the last struggle this was continued during the whole night, and it was in vain that firemen and others attempted to make their way through the serried masses of now infuriated Communists, who guarded every avenue. It is admitted that the insurgents fought in the streets with great bravery; while independent observers mostly agreed that the Versailles troops were remarkably cautious. The generals, or the soldiers, may have taken a lesson from the Germans, and have found out at last that rashness is far more likely to lead to reverses and panic than to success. In this terrible case of street fighting especially, discretion was the better part of valour, as the unfortunate population had to be considered. At every important point, by the Madeleine, the

Bourse, the New Opera, the Rue Royale, and the Rue St. Honoré, the struggle was desperate; and as the Communists are proved to have fought like wild beasts at bay, the soldiers who conquered them must have had valour as well as discretion. Thousands of the insurgents fell, and many more escaped to hiding.

From the moment that the army made its way fairly into Paris, commenced one of the most painful phases of the insurrection, namely, the convoy of prisoners to Versailles. The resistance of the Commune and the burning of Paris seemed to have almost extirpated the sentiment of pity from the mind. The miserable prisoners (men, women, and children), sore-footed, half-starved, and often wounded, were driven like wild beasts. Their guards were, as a rule, utterly merciless, and only laughed at their sufferings; while the populace, even educated men and women, insulted the fallen wretches in the coarsest manner. Certainly one of the worst points in the French character is the savage bitterness exhibited towards an enemy, whether victorious or prostrate.

To give an idea of the treatment of the prisoners, it was said that Rochefort, although guarded by three detachments of gendarmes and chasseurs, was handcuffed, and in such a manner that one of his wrists was hurt. If a man fell out of the ranks from fatigue, he stood a good chance of being shot. Many instances are recorded of summary execution on the road. The following was related by an English correspondent:—" The whole way to Sèvres the road was crowded with trains of waggons, ambulance vans, policemen, and cavalry escorting prisoners. To show the bitterness of feeling among military men at Versailles, I may mention that when one of four field-officers in conversation expressed a wish to see the prisoners handed over for the benefit of science to the professors of vivisection, the other three applauded the idea. While talking, a young captain entered the *café* to refresh himself with a glass of beer. He was in command of a convoy of prisoners going to Satory, and said he had ridded his country of some of the scoundrels. One from fatigue, one from weakness, and two who were sulky, had sat on a bank. He ordered them to get up directly if they did not want to be shot. 'Shoot us,' replied one of the prisoners. 'I will take you at your word, my good fellow,' the captain answered, 'and I shall consider those who do not get up directly to be of the same mind as you.' No one moved. The firing party was quickly told off, and the four men were corpses in another instant. The captain was highly commended by his brother officers for his firmness, and when he had gone all fell to praising him."

Amongst the prisoners were many women, " Amazons of the Seine," vivandiéres, and others. Many of these were wounded, some had children in place of knapsacks, nearly all were fatigued, famished, miserable; but they were compelled to march at a good quick pace by mounted gendarmes, who were evidently quite prepared to enforce obedience to their orders; and in their condition, and under a hot sun, they must have suffered horribly. When they arrived at Versailles the jokes and ribaldry of the spectators was enough to madden them; but generally they kept a firm and defiant countenance, and in some cases answered insult with its own coin. The women and the boys bore themselves far more bravely than the men; but then, they had not suffered so severely, and they had less to dread. As to the boys, many of them little imps of ten or eleven years of age, who were in some cases attached to battalions of national guards, and in others belonged to special corps, " Infants of the Commune," or something of the kind, but all either dressed in the uniform of the guard or wearing a scarf or belt over their blouse, they strutted along with their noses in the air, as if, to use the stereotyped phrase of French politicians, the " eyes of all Europe were upon them." To be a revolutionist is, as it were, a profession with numbers of Frenchmen. The number of old men amongst the prisoners was surprising. These were the patriarchs of Saint Antoine, the men of the Faubourgs, who had taken part in every revolution and *émeute* since they were children, who hailed a struggle against any authority as the highest treat in their lives; these men appeared under the Commune, as usual, in order to give courage to the younger, and threw the weight of their experience into the Federal scale. When there was an inclination towards panic it was they who stemmed it; and when the Commune was on its last legs they came out by hundreds, perhaps by thousands, and steadily blew the embers again into a fierce flame. These men marched like martyrs to their fate, and had they fought in a better cause they would have been true heroes. They are the rank and file of

the army of which Blanqui and Pyat, and others, are the chiefs; but unlike these men they dared to fight, disdained to fly, and were ready for death; and many of them met the grim monster unflinchingly. It was principally due to the steadiness of these men, no doubt, that the last struggle was so severe; all hope had vanished, but the old revolutionary blood was at boiling point, and hundreds faced certain death with unflinching countenances.

On the 25th of May M. Thiers issued the following circular:—

"We are masters of Paris, with the exception of a very small portion, which will be occupied this evening. The Tuileries are in ashes, the Louvre is saved. That part of the Ministry of Finance which skirts the Rue de Rivoli is burnt, the Palais d'Orsay, where the Council of State and Cour des Comptes were lodged, is also burnt. Such is the state in which Paris is delivered to us by the wretches who oppressed and dishonoured it. They have left 12,000 prisoners in our hands, and we shall have 18,000 to 20,000; the ground is strewed with their dead. The fearful spectacle will serve as a lesson to those madmen who dared to declare themselves partizans of the Commune; justice will soon satisfy the outraged human conscience for the monstrous acts of which France and the whole world have been witnesses. The army has been admirable. We are happy in the midst of our misery to be able to state that, thanks to the wisdom of our generals, it has suffered but small loss."

When that circular was despatched the whole extent of the evil was not consummated; on the same day the Hôtel de Ville, with an immense building connected with it, but on the opposite side of the way, the Lyrique Theatre, and all their contents were destroyed, and the crowning horror of the Communists' crimes, the massacre of the hostages, was perpetrated.

The unfortunate men who were incarcerated as hostages consisted almost entirely of priests, monks, gendarmes, and municipal guards who had been *gardiens de ville* under the empire. The pretext for arresting them was, in the first place, that the Versailles authorities had put many Communists to death in cold blood, and that these hostages were seized in order to prevent, by the fear of retaliation, such summary executions in future. The precise truth of the accusation against the government will never be known. M. Thiers, or another influential member, declared in the National Assembly that no such executions had taken place; and that except those who had been sacrificed by the enraged soldiery on the field, no man had been executed except after a fair trial by court martial. This denial leaves the question much where it was; some very gross cases have undoubtedly been proved against officers, to say nothing of the soldiery, but whether the Commune had good ground for retaliation of the kind threatened, it is impossible to say. As stated in a previous chapter, the unfortunate archbishop wrote to M. Thiers from prison on the subject, and the latter denied the accusation.

Why so many ecclesiastics had been arrested was explained by a member of the Commune in this way, that all Catholic priests must be enemies of the Communal movement by profession; that they had kept up communication with the government at Versailles, and had done all they could against the Commune by their preaching and arguing; and that in time of war it was absolutely necessary to put down such intrigues. But another ground was alleged, namely, that it had been discovered that the priesthood had secreted large numbers of arms; 2000 it was declared had been found at Notre Dame, and a great many also in a Jesuit establishment; that it was evident that these, and many other arms, had been secreted in order to furnish their disciples with the most approved weapons against the Commune. These arms had come into their hands in the various ambulances under their charge, and should have been returned into the government stores, instead of being hidden away for future use. It was further declared that only in case of the Communal prisoners being shot would any harm be done to the hostages; and, lastly, that instead of being treated with severity, the archbishop received the greatest consideration. These statements cannot be accepted as of much value. The Communists may have had cause, or believed they had cause, for reprisals, and they seized as hostages the men whom they most hated, namely, ecclesiastics and policemen—the agents of the church and empire, which they detested.

The unfortunate hostages, 232 in number, were confined at Mazas; not like prisoners of war, but like felons in separate cells. About this there is no question. They were first taken to the Con-

ciergerie, thence to Mazas, and finally to the criminal prison of La Roquette.

On the entrance of the Versailles troops into Paris the unfortunate hostages were ordered for execution; and on the 24th of May the unhappy archbishop, with the Abbé Deguerry, of the Madeleine, the apostolic protonotary, and other priests, two Jesuit fathers, M. Bonjean, the president of the Cours des Comptes, and senator under the empire; M. Jecker, the banker who was the agent for the Mexican loan, which was one of the causes of the war against that country; and some other victims not named—were butchered in the most cruel and insulting manner in the outer court of the prison, under the eye of a delegate of the Commune. Two days later thirty-eight gendarmes and sixteen priests were murdered at the cemetery of Père la Chaise. The unfortunate gendarmes, gardes de Paris, and gardiens de la paix left behind them a large number of widows and children without provision, and a public subscription in their favour was afterwards raised, and produced more than £10,000.

When the government troops reached La Roquette they found there and saved 169, according to one account, and according to another, 132 other hostages, all of whom had been ordered for execution.

The archbishop of Paris is the third who, within a few years, has met a violent death. Archbishop Affre fell in 1848, when making an appeal to the insurgents; and Archbishop Sibour was assassinated in church by an unfrocked priest named Verger. The victim of the Commune, George Darboy, was a man of high attainments, and had held several professorships. In 1850 he was appointed bishop of Nancy; he attached himself to the empire, and in 1863 was made archbishop of Paris and grand chaplain to the empire, and senator, and thus was an object of popular hatred. It should be recorded of him, that during the siege he was one of the very few ecclesiastics who made any public appeal to the people in favour of order and toleration. He published an admirable letter, in which he implored the more violent polemical writers to set aside their discussions and party quarrels, and give all the assistance they could to the then government. His appeal was totally ineffectual, but the act should not be forgotten. M. Darboy had the misfortune of being too imperialist for the people, and too liberal in his views for the ultramontanes and the pope, with whom he was not in favour.

Unhappily, these were not the only victims of the Commune. It was reported that many of the gendarmes taken were shot on the instant; but there is no proof of this. One case, however, is beyond all question, that of a well-known liberal and republican journalist, named Chaudey, who was charged with intriguing with the Versailles authorities. He was shot in the prison yard without, as is asserted, any form of trial. M. Chaudey was a man much esteemed, and his execution—assassination we should rather say—created a deep sensation against the Commune.

After the army had possession of the central portion of the town, the eastern and other quarters, and several of the forts, were still in the hands of the Communists, and desperately though hopelessly they fought. A circular, signed by M. Thiers and issued on the evening of the 27th of May, tells how sharp was the conflict. After speaking of preceding events, and stating that the prisoners taken amounted at the above date to 25,000, the document narrates the proceedings outside the city, the taking of three of the forts, one, curiously enough, by cavalry, the attack and taking of the barricades on the left side of the Seine, and then proceeds:—"General Vinoy, following the course of the Seine, made his way towards the Place de la Bastille, which was defended by formidable intrenchments; took the position with the divisions Bruat and Faron, and made himself master of the Faubourg Saint Antoine to the Place du Trône. The efficacious and brilliant aid given to the troops by the flotilla of gunboats must not be forgotten. The troops have this day taken a strong barricade at the corner of the Avenue Philippe-Auguste and the Rue Montreuil. This has brought them to the foot of the heights of Belleville, the last asylum of this insurrection, which in its fall has committed its last act of monstrous vengeance in incendiarism.

"From the centre towards the east the corps of General Douay followed the line of the boulevards, resting its right on the Place de la Bastille, and its left on the Cirque Napoléon. The corps of General Clinchant, in joining that of General L'Admirault, met with violent resistance at the Magazins-Réunis, which it gallantly overcame; finally, the last-named corps, after having seized with great vigour the stations of the Northern

and Eastern railways, proceeded to Villette, and took up a position at the foot of the Buttes-Chaumont.

"Thus two-thirds of the army, after having successfully conquered all the right bank of the Seine, are now stationed at the foot of Belleville, which they will attack to-morrow morning."

The circular concluded with a high eulogium on the army, and with regrets for the fall of General Leroy, and "the Commandant Seboyer of the chasseurs-aux-pied, who, having advanced too far, was taken by the scoundrels who defended the Bastille, and was shot against all the laws of war. This act was indeed in accordance with the conduct of those who burnt our cities and our monuments, and mixed liquids to poison our soldiers almost instantaneously."

This last passage seems to allude to an asserted fact, that in some of the forts poisoned wine or spirits were found.

Another circular, published on the following day, records the actual conclusion of the struggle. It states that during the night all difficulties were overcome. A young officer named Davoust took the barricades, and the corps of General L'Admirault occupied the heights of Belleville. At the same time General Vinoy took the cemetery of Père la Chaise, the *mairie* of the twentieth arrondissement, the headquarters of the insurgents of Belleville, and the prison of La Roquette, where, as already stated, the 169 hostages were found and set at liberty. The following passage concludes this, the last of the Versailles circulars relating to the insurrection:—"The remaining insurgents, now driven to the extremity of the city, between the French army and the Prussians, who have refused to let them pass, will expiate their crimes, having no choice but to surrender or die. The too guilty Delescluze was found dead; Millière, not less guilty, was shot for firing a revolver three times at a corporal who was ordered to arrest him. . . . The insurrection, confined to a space of a few hundred mètres, is now definitely crushed. Peace is established, but it cannot drive from honest breasts the grief which has so deeply penetrated them."

The last place in the hands of the insurgents was the fort of Vincennes, and the garrison surrendered on the morning of the 29th of May. "The army collected at Versailles," said an official summary, "has in six weeks vanquished the most formidable insurrection that France ever witnessed. The military works amounted to more than twenty miles of trenches, and eighty batteries armed with 350 guns. It had to take five forts, with formidable armaments and obstinately defended, besides numerous earthworks. The *enceinte* of the city was forced, and the army advanced to the heart of Paris, in spite of all obstacles, and after eight days' of incessant fighting the whole of the fortresses, redoubts, and barricades of the Commune fell into its hands. It took 25,000 prisoners, 1500 guns, and 400,000 Chassepots. Street fighting is generally excessively murderous for the assailants, but all the positions and barricades were turned, and the losses of the army were comparatively small." The following are the official numbers given:—Killed, 5 general and staff and 78 other officers; and wounded, 10 of the former and 420 of the latter. Privates: killed, 794; wounded, 6024; missing, 183. The casualties of the army amounted then, in all, to more than 7500, and the losses on the side of the insurgents must have been three or four times as numerous. This statement is from the report of Marshal MacMahon, commander-in-chief of the army.

The final struggle had brought the cannon into the heart of Paris, and taught the middle classes, and especially the proprietors of houses and shopkeepers, a fearful lesson, which it is to be hoped will not be lost upon them. During the siege they gave little encouragement to the government of the National Defence, but, on the contrary, criticized its every act, as though the position were not one of the greatest possible difficulty, with an enemy surrounding the city and famine within. When the Commune seized upon the Hôtel de Ville and installed itself master of Paris the population scarcely raised voice or hand against it; and when for a time there seemed to many a chance of success for the so-called Federal government, the conduct of the great mass was such as to give the idea that such a prospect was not disagreeable. After a few weeks of imprisonment, when private houses were searched for men and arms, when perquisitions were made in all directions, when goods were demanded and paid for with worthless scraps of paper, then they found out, too late as usual, the mistake they had made; and when the cannon and mitrailleuses began to roar and hiss in the fine new boulevards, the

punishment fell directly upon their unthinking, irresolute heads. The Versailles gunners did not intentionally fire upon the houses, but barricades had to be demolished and streets cleared of the enemy; and when the shells and bullets were once let loose many of them took vagrant directions, and much destruction and suffering were the consequence.

Even now the marks are not obliterated; the front of the church of the Madeleine, although not materially injured, is one mass of blotches and spots, which mark the ravages by shot and shell; in the Rue Royale, which extends from the church to the Champs Elysées, several large houses were utterly destroyed, and the gaps are only now being gradually filled up. On the boulevards, especially near the new Grand Opera, hundreds of houses were struck by shell, and dozens of huge plate-glass windows, for some time after patched all over with paper, showed how freely the bullets flew about in that neighbourhood. Nor was the destruction of property the worst that occurred; in some of the streets strewed with corpses, the gutters actually ran blood. Death entered the houses in its most fearful aspect; a poor woman was sitting at the counter in her own shop, near the Porte Maillot, when a shell entered and severed her head from her body; an English publican was putting up his shutters in the Champs Elysées, when a soldier deliberately took aim at the man, whose little boy gave him warning when too late; he fell a corpse at his own door. These are but instances from hundreds of similar cases. There was scarcely a house or a shop in any part of Paris in which, at one moment or other, life was not in danger. Cases of extraordinary escapes were numerous. In one case the *dame de comptoir* of a *café* not far from the Arc de Triomphe had just quitted her seat at the marble table, where she superintended the service and took money, when a huge shell pierced the wall behind her chair and went crushing into the marble slab of the counter; in a private house in one of the new boulevards another shell entered through the front wall, passed across the first room, through a second wall, reducing the whole contents of a bookcase nearly to powder, and without exploding, half buried itself in the seat of an arm chair which the lady of the house occupied almost constantly. This will give some slight idea of the state of Paris during the last days of the Commune.

In the consternation which came over all at the outbreak of the fires, the exaggeration of the mischief was naturally great. It was supposed that the Louvre, with all its contents, was lost; this was happily not the case. The galleries of the Louvre, the beautiful water-side front built by Henri III., the old and the new squares, and even that part of the great gallery recently rebuilt, which connects the Louvre on that side with the Tuileries, are completely untouched; the only portion of the Louvre collections destroyed was the library, which contained some very rare manuscripts and books, and a valuable general collection of works relating to art (about 90,000 in number), the large majority of which may be replaced. The ruin of the Tuileries was, however, almost total; the old central portion, built by Catherine de' Médicis, with the wings and one of the corner pavilions, which completed the front towards the Champs Elysées, were utterly destroyed, the roofs and floors annihilated, and the bare walls calcined, and ready to crumble at the first shock. Never was devastation more complete. The pavilion at the corner by the river, which had lately been rebuilt, was scarcely injured. The side of the palace in the Rue Rivoli was in almost as bad a state as the front, the walls alone standing.

The injury done to the Palais Royal was far less than was at first supposed. This famous building, originally the palace of Cardinal Richelieu, afterwards the scene of the fearful orgies of the Regency and of the wild financial schemes of John Law, was composed of a palace, the front, and a square of houses in the rear, with a garden in the midst; the restaurants, jewellers' and other shops of the Palais Royal are known to all who have visited Paris. The palace alone was burnt, and principally that portion of it which was occupied by Prince Napoleon, who, seeming to have had a pretty clear presentiment of what was to happen, had removed his pictures and other valuables; he had, in fact, disposed of a portion of them by public auction some time previously.

The other public buildings destroyed in this portion of the city were the immense range of offices which belonged to the ministry of Finance, the front of which is in the Rue de Rivoli, and one side in the Rue Castellane. It was one of the largest public offices in Paris. Nothing remained of it but the walls, and not all of them. A larger and more stately building was, however, destroyed

on the opposite side of the river. This was generally known as the Palais d'Orsay, being on the quay of that name. This building was the result of one of the whims of the Emperor Napoleon. It was constructed for the residence of all the foreign ambassadors in Paris, who the emperor was vain enough to suppose would live, as it were, in a kind of diplomatic barrack at his invitation. In the time of Louis Philippe the building was used for industrial exhibitions. Lately it was tenanted by the Council of State and the Cour des Comptes, or Board of Audit. Near this is a pretty little classic building, the Palace of the Legion of Honour, with a semicircular Corinthian front; this was only partially burnt.

The Prefecture of Police, which was burnt, was a handsome new building at the back of the Palais de Justice: the latter was but little injured. Immediately adjoining these buildings is one of the most elegant and curious edifices in France, the Sainte Chapelle, erected by Saint Louis to contain a mass of relics brought from Jerusalem. One or two shells would have reduced this architectural gem to a heap of ruins: but fortunately it escaped both bombardment and fire. The famous Gobelins manufactory, with its historic collection of tapestry, one of the great sights of Paris, was, however, completely destroyed.

But the crowning misfortune of all was the destruction of the Hôtel de Ville. This was one of the most beautiful examples of French Renaissance, and its historical reputation was even greater than its architectural beauty. From the time of the bold Henri Quatre it had been the scene of the most stirring incidents in French history; and lastly, it was the theatre of the civic festivities on every joyful occasion. A few statues and busts, a few battered pieces of plate, and a few mural paintings, were all that remained of this noble old edifice. Opposite to it was a very large auxiliary building, in which were other offices belonging to the city; this also was a complete ruin, together with a mass of houses around it.

The churches fared better. An attempt to burn Notre Dame was frustrated by the Versailles soldiery, who entered just in time to save this fine structure. The chairs, benches, and wood work had all been heaped around the high altar, and fire actually applied; but in this case the design of the destroyers was frustrated. Several other fine churches were injured by shot and shell, but none of them were destroyed. Two theatres, the Porte Saint Martin and the Théâtre Lyrique, were completely burnt, and some damage was done to two others. As to private buildings, the number destroyed was enormous. Some streets in the very heart of the town had huge gaps, which are now being filled up slowly; but in the distant quarters, where the shells from the Versailles batteries took most effect, and in those parts where the Communists made their last stand, the havoc was fearful. When forced to quit a position they generally tried to fire the houses, and in too many cases they succeeded. Much has been said about the use of petroleum, and there is no doubt that it was used in the case of the Tuileries and other large buildings. The smoke was of a most peculiarly suffocating description, and the burnt stone of the walls is of a red colour; but the stories relative to the women called *pétroleuses*, who were said to be employed by the Commune to throw the villainous stuff into the cellars of private houses, with lucifers or lighted rags, were probably pure invention—the French press being, unfortunately, far more celebrated for originality than accuracy. This petroleum pouring has not, we believe, been proved in any one case, and therefore it is but just to give the Commune the benefit of the doubt that hangs around the subject. The destruction of the public buildings was bad enough, but a systematic and general plan of destroying the whole city is too fiendish to be attributed to any one without far clearer evidence than we have in this case. Several women have been condemned to death, (though none executed), three of them for having used petroleum; but there was nothing in the evidence as printed to bear out the accusation.

A very prompt offer of assistance in extinguishing the fires was received from the chief officer of the London Fire Brigade. A force of 100 men and 12 engines—towards the expense of which the British government voted £1000—was on the point of starting from Dover, when a telegram was received from Jules Favre, thanking the brigade, but stating that, owing to the exertions of the Paris pompiers, further help was not urgently needed.

During the previous twenty years the demolitions and constructions in Paris had formed a new wonder of the world—street after street and boulevard after boulevard of palaces had sprung up. Various were the views expressed concerning the

policy of many of the changes made; but all expressed their astonishment at the amount of work done and the grandeur of some of the edifices; yet in three days more public buildings were destroyed by the Commune, and through its acts, than all those twenty years produced. So much more easy is it to destroy than to build up! As all the so-called glories of the empire ended in the loss of provinces wrested 200 years before from a neighbour, so the epoch of what was called the "rebuilding of Paris" closed with the destruction of the Tuileries and the Hôtel de Ville, its two most famous palaces and most renowned monuments.

We have already spoken of the fortunate accident by which the Sainte Chapelle escaped destruction. We may here mention another which is equally remarkable, although the building is far less important. Visitors to Paris will not have forgotten the expiatory chapel of St. Ferdinand, erected by order of Louis Philippe to the memory of his eldest son, the duke of Orleans, who was killed by a carriage accident. When the Germans drew their iron belt around Paris, the houses in the immediate vicinity of and outside the fortifications were demolished by thousands, lest they should afford cover for the enemy. It was proposed to take down the little chapel and mark the stones, so that it could be readily reconstructed. Other and more pressing matters caused this project to be set aside, and the chapel stood alone in a plain strewed with ruins. Towards the close of the Commune it was ordered to be destroyed, but it still stands, apparently untouched; and near it is a tree, the only one left amidst the desolation. This is a cypress which marks the spot where the prince met his death. In a country where fatalism is entertained by many minds, it would not be surprising were the Orleanists to look upon this lonely chapel and tree as omens of the future fortunes of the family.

The Commune was no more. It was estimated that more that 40,000 had been killed (of whom about 10,000 fell in Paris, after the Versailles troops had made their way into the city), and about 35,000 were made prisoners. The total number of insurgents in arms had been reckoned at about 165,000; but it is very questionable if so many actually took part in the conflict: but supposing the total to have been smaller, the carnage was almost, if not absolutely, unprecedented. Dombrowski, Delescluze, Gambon, and some other leaders, fell the heroes of a hopeless cause; but the great mass of them took to flight, or lay in hiding, hoping to escape the doom that hung over them. For those in power two balloons were provided, and although it was never known who went away in them, or where they fell, it is believed that they escaped capture. Rossel was discovered in the disguise of a railway engineer; Okolowitch was found in an ambulance, and shot in the Parc Monceaux; Pilotell, Napias Piquet, Brunel, Millière, and some others, met with summary execution by the troops. Piquet was shot in the presence of his daughter. Millière, it is said, had the day before his death caused thirty refractory Communists to be shot. The fate of many is unknown, and will probably never be discovered.*

While some of the leaders—who, when real danger came had proved arrant cowards, and thought of nothing but their own safety—were doubtless laughing at their cleverness and luck, their poor deluded victims were being slaughtered in the streets of Paris, or driven like wild beasts into the prisons of Versailles; men, many of them probably innocent, were dragged out of shops and houses and shot like dogs. Several hundreds, it is declared on good authority, who had sought refuge in the church of the Madeleine, were bayoneted in sight of the altar. Not one came out alive! Men and women accused of pouring petroleum on the floors of public buildings, and of throwing petroleum bombs, were dragged into the streets and shot; or in some cases battered to death with the butt ends of guns. Human beings seemed to be turned to fiends, taking pleasure in denouncing each other. No one was safe, and it is dreadful to think how many innocent lives were thus sacrificed.

The stream of prisoners on the road to Versailles was continuous; men, women, and children driven by the swords of the cavalry or the bayonets of the infantry. A party of 1500 deserters from the army, about whose fate there could be no question, were greeted by the mob with fiendish derision. If a man stumbled or fell out of the ranks a bullet was the only argument. A woman tried to slip out of the ranks, when an officer drew his sword and inflicted a deep wound on her

* The Prince de Bagratian, a Russian, a Federal commandant, was executed at Vincennes.

face and shoulder. At Satory, the camp near Versailles, the executions were incessant; the number was so great that after a day or two they attracted no attention. The name of Dereure, a leading member of the Commune, was one of the very few that transpired. The condition of the prisoners was frightful; the numbers were so great that the government scarcely knew what to do with them, half starved, many of them wounded, all worn out with fatigue. Men and women were huddled together like cattle in pens, with nothing but a little filthy straw, and at first not even that, to lie upon; and nothing but hunches of bread to sustain them. And hundreds of these were dismissed as soon as the first examination took place, as having been arrested by mistake!

The number of prisoners was at first far larger than that of their guards, and fears were entertained of an insurrection; so large numbers of the former were drafted off to Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon, where the hulks are still crowded. The number of deaths was naturally large; the two principal causes being the effects of previous intoxication and want of proper food.

As in the first revolution, the women played a hideous part in the insurrection; their leader was said to be a Russian, Olga Demitrieff, who, with a central committee, was installed at the *mairie* of the tenth arrondissement. Natalie Duval, of whom we shall have to speak presently, was one of the most active of the lieutenants. These women were enrolled in what was called a mystical warlike association; and on the 23rd of May fifty of them went to defend barricades which they themselves had erected in various parts. Several of these viragoes were killed and many more taken. It appears that they were exercised in the use of arms every day in the court yard of the *mairie*. It is said that there were originally in all 400 of these Amazons, most of whom were employed in hunting up and denouncing national guards in hiding to the prefects of police, a work which they performed with fiendish pleasure.

Amongst the women arrested were the sister of Delescluze, described as a most dangerous woman; Madame Colleuil, a hideous virago, who made herself conspicuous by her insane violence at certain clubs; Madame Jaclard and Madame André Leo, of the same class.

A pamphlet, published concerning the doings of *General* Eudes, a druggist's assistant who reigned for a time at the Palace of the Legion of Honour, brings a number of women forward. Eudes' wife, aged twenty-three, is accused of having carried off a number of clocks and a large quantity of linen. She had a carriage at her disposal, and constantly took away linen and other articles. The wife of Captain Hugo, an old soldier, is also accused of helping herself in like manner. Captain Mégy, long notorious, was one of Eudes' companions here. On the 22nd of May he caused a concierge to be assassinated, broke the mirrors with his revolver, and ordered the building to be set on fire, which was done. Colonel Collet and his wife were of the same party. He acted as judge of the court-martial, having formerly been a huckster. This fellow gloried in his crimes. He boasted of having had two gendarmes and a gardien shot in a convent at Vaugirard, having had them stripped naked first. He brought the horses of the gendarmes to the palace for his own use. Madame Collet acted as second in command of the household to Madame Eudes, had charge of the stables and of the kitchen, and rode out in her carriage every morning and evening. This precious family sent all the silver in the palace to the mint to be melted, while the crosses and medals they wore in derision. There were eighteen horses in the stables. The horses were named Thiers, Favre, Trochu, and so on; and over each stall there was a placard bearing the name of the horse and of his master. All the pictures, porcelain, and glass were destroyed.

Much has been said about the time allowed to elapse before the prisoners were brought to trial; but it is forgotten, in the first place, that this is quite the rule in France, where six or more weeks often elapse before a prisoner is brought before any tribunal, being interrogated in secret by a *juge d'instruction*—a custom which is the great blot in French jurisdiction; and in the second place, it is forgotten that the government had to deal with an unexpected mass of prisoners, while the duty of magistrates had to be performed by soldiers, who were new to the work. It was not till the 7th of August that the first trials commenced, under the presidency of Colonel Merlin, an engineer officer. The first list included Ferré, a clerk; Assi, working engineer; Urbain and Verdure, schoolmasters; Billioray and Courbet, artists; Rastoul, doctor, and Jourde, medical student; Trinquet, shoemaker; Champy, cutler;

Régère, veterinary surgeon; Grousset and Lisbonne, writers; Lullier, formerly a naval officer; Clément, dyer; Parent, designer; and Deschamp, bronze worker. Of these Ferré, Assi, and Urbain were the most notorious.

Ferré, as the coadjutor of the infamous Raoul Rigault, was the instrument of the assassination of the archbishop and his unfortunate fellow-prisoners at La Roquette. He was a known man in 1868. At the funeral of Baudin he had tried to bring about an *émeute* by an address which commenced with the following expressions:—"*Vive la République!* The convention at the Tuileries! The goddess of reason at Notre Dame!" At the clubs he invariably called for the resuscitation of the revolution of 1793. He was included in the charges tried at Blois in connection with the death of Victor Noir at the hand of Pierre Bonaparte, but was acquitted, and he insulted the president in the grossest manner. On the present occasion he refused to answer any questions, or to have an advocate to defend him. He was accused of having caused the assassination of the two generals at Montmartre. As delegate of police he suppressed newspapers at his will. He was accused of superintending the execution of numbers of prisoners, and even of having himself fired the first shot from a revolver. A female witness declared that she heard him address his men in the following terms:—"All the sergents de ville, all the gendarmes, all the Bonapartist agents, will be shot immediately;" and we know that the threat was partially carried out. He seems to have been one of the principal instigators of the burning of the public buildings, and orders to that effect in his handwriting were produced. One of these related to the offices of the ministry of Finance. It was at the capture of six men of the Communist battalions that Ferré appeared at La Roquette and said: "Citizens, you know how many of ours have been taken. They have taken six. We have six to execute." And the archbishop of Paris, two abbés, two monks, and the Judge Bonjean were shot! This act was followed by other assassinations, especially those of the gendarmes, already alluded to in the letter of the curé of the Madeleine. Ferré denied none of the charges against him, and declared that the execution of the hostages and the burning of the public buildings were perfectly legitimate acts. He concluded a violent and characteristic address as follows:—"I was a member of the Commune of Paris, and I am now in the hands of my conquerors. They demand my head; let them take it. Free I have lived, and free I will die. I add but one word. Fortune is capricious. I confide to the future my memory and my vengeance." Ferré and Rigault were rather wild beasts than men. The latter met his death in the last struggle; the former was condemned and shot at Satory, and it must be admitted that his fate created little sympathy. If, however, the conduct of Ferré had alienated almost all feeling from him, who can read without a pang the following painful letter written by one of his brothers or sisters to the president of the court:—

"Sir,—My father, Laurent Ferré, is at present a prisoner in the citadel of Fouras; my brother, Théophile Ferré, is lying under sentence of death at the prison of Versailles; my mother, driven out of her mind by the efforts of the police to wring from her the address of my other brothers, now in exile, died a lunatic at the Hôpital Ste. Anne on the 14th of July last; I myself was arrested and kept a prisoner for eight days. A fresh misfortune has overtaken me. My second brother, Hippolyte, was transported on Thursday to the military hospital at Versailles suffering from brain fever, caused by cellular confinement for three months at Mazas, and afterwards at Versailles. My brother Hippolyte has never been tried. He is accused, but nothing more. I was denied access to the military hospital, but they told me my brother was in a cell. I ask your permission to see my brother, and next his release on bail. He is only twenty-four, and had no official employment under the Commune. Military justice will be only just by not showing itself merciless.—I am, &c.,

"A. FERRE."

What a fearful picture! Yet hundreds of families must have such sad stories to tell. One came within our own knowledge: a clever and respectable watchmaker's shop being closed after the fall of the Commune, we were told on inquiry that the man had been shot by the troops, that his three sons were prisoners, and that their mother was somewhere in a madhouse!

Urbain was one of the *maires* of Paris during

the Commune; and, with a woman named Leroy, was accused of spending the public money and stealing jewellery. He was proved, moreover, to be one of the most urgent advocates of violence, and he completed his guilt by a demand, which appeared in the *Official Journal*, for the execution of the archbishop and the other hostages.

Assi's name is well known as the member of the *Internationale* who was the principal mover of the strikes at Creusot. After these events, not being able to find employment, he set up for himself as a maker of military equipments. During the siege he became lieutenant in a marching regiment of national guards; and finally, he was one of the central committee of the Commune. He was afterwards governor of the Hôtel de Ville, colonel of the national guard, and exhibited the greatest activity and much talent in organization; his ambition created enemies, and he was arrested, and passed some time in prison. He was soon, however, released, and became the director of the ammunition manufacture, in which he showed great ability. The petroleum bombs are attributed to his ingenuity; but he produced an immense sensation in court when he declared that these were made after a model which had been prepared to be used by the government against the Prussians.

Jourde, who acted as Finance minister, was admitted to have shown great ability. It appeared that he had received in all from the Bank of France more than £640,000; the rest of the treasure, which amounted to £120,000,000 sterling, was saved by the energy of the deputy-governor of the bank and the Communist Beslay, of whom we have already spoken. An attempt was made to show that Jourde helped himself largely, but it failed; and the general impression is that this man was an honest as he certainly was a capable minister of Finance: and yet he is a mere youth, and looked extremely weak. He very nearly effected his escape with a false passport, but was tripped up by a clever agent. Captain Ossud, who first examined Jourde, declared that he was the most truthful of all the prisoners, and that he believed he had spoken the whole truth.

Lullier, who was formerly in the navy, but was dismissed for striking his superior officer, and who was afterwards involved in several broils, must be set down as a madman. He belongs to a respectable family, but with the exception of Ferré, was the most forbidding and vulgar-looking man amongst the accused. He behaved in the most theatrical manner in court, declared that he had nothing to do with the fires or the assassinations, but explained how, "as a general," he had taken Paris, but that not agreeing with the Commune he had planned to make himself dictator. He admitted that he had placed himself in communication with Thiers, but that he did not mean to betray the Commune; only he meant to be dictator, and *in extremis* to negotiate with Versailles. He spoke for an hour and a half, drew a bacchanalian picture of the life of the Commune at the Hôtel de Ville, "where beautiful *vivandières* filled high in their glasses the wine of triumph," which another prisoner declared was an infamous falsehood, as they never even got a glass of wine and water there. Like Ferré, Lullier was condemned to death, but the sentence was afterwards commuted.

Clément, the dyer, received an excellent character from his employer, to whom he had been foreman for years. He had aided him greatly during the siege, had bought wine for the hospitals out of his own money, and when elected *maire* under the Commune he dined with his former employer, and said that he feared the Commune were a bad lot, a set of jacobins, and would do no good; and wished he were back in his wooden shoes again. Several witnesses proved that he had protected priests, nuns, and churches with extraordinary courage, and some priests spoke eloquently in his favour. When the Commune was overthrown he deposited the balance of the funds for the poor in his late master's hands, saying:—"Heaven knows what will become of me, but I know I can trust you to place the money in the hands of the proper authorities." The employer could only account for Clément's joining the Commune by supposing that his head had been turned by the socialist theories of Proudhon. Sad that such a man should be placed in a dock by his own imprudence!

Urbain and Trinquet were condemned to imprisonment for life, with hard labour; Assi and another to imprisonment in a fortress; Jourde, Grousset, and five others, to transportation for undefined periods, during pleasure; Clément escaped with three months' imprisonment; and Descamps and Parent were acquitted. Courbet was let off with six months' imprisonment and a fine of £20. This leniency is attributable to two causes; first, to the fact that Courbet acted

as minister of the Beaux Arts, and did all he could to save the art treasures of the nation; and secondly, to the daring defence of his advocate, M. Lachaud, who, in his own impassioned manner, raised his client to the very pinnacle of greatness as an artist, and called him almost an idiot in politics. With indomitable visage he declared that Courbet's published letter, in which he recommended the taking to pieces of the Column Vendôme, meant its preservation, and not its destruction!

Two curious facts were brought out on the occasion of these trials, which will doubtless be new to English readers; first, that the costs are fixed by law, and did not exceed one pound for each prisoner; and secondly, that advocates receive no fees in political cases. What would British judges and barristers say to such regulations!

The prisoner who attracted the largest amount of sympathy was the unfortunate Rossel, whose conduct and talents have made him almost a martyr in the opinion of the world. Rossel was half a Scotchman, his mother being a Campbell. He was a highly-educated soldier, and had already made his name known as a military writer before the war between France and Germany. Of his bearing while acting as War delegate under the Commune we have already spoken; of his talents, his determination, his courtesy, and his dignity as president of the courts-martial, all who came across him spoke in the highest praise. Rossel was tried twice, and in each case condemned to death and military degradation, the first judgment having been quashed on a point of law. The second trial took place before a court martial, presided over by Colonel Boisdénemetz, whom the French reporters nicknamed "Lucifer box;" and who seemed determined to put the worst construction possible on all the prisoner's acts. Rossel's defence was that he only joined the Commune, in the hope that the Parisians intended to renew the struggle against the Prussians. It was true that he very soon learned that the Commune had no intention of fighting the Germans, but he did not make the discovery until it was too late. "How could you hope," asked the President, "to defend Paris against the Prussians when they held the northern and eastern forts, and the Parisians had nothing to defend them but the dismantled *enceinte* of the city?" "The same *enceinte*," replied Colonel Rossel, "kept out the army of Versailles for two months; why should it not have repulsed the Prussians?" "But you know that the army of Versailles did not have recourse to radical measures" (*les grands moyens*). Those among us who had remained in Paris during the reign of the Commune, and who had witnessed the daily storm of shells in the Champs Elysées, to say nothing of the tremendous bombardment of Auteuil and Passy, could not help wondering what were the means which Colonel Boisdénemetz would have had the Versailles army employ against Paris. The president next asked Rossel how he could believe that it was possible to carry on the war against Prussia after the fall of Paris, and he called on the prisoner to point out the plan of campaign which he would have pursued. Rossel answered, modestly enough, that the time had not yet come to judge of the expediency of making peace with the Germans last February, but that he, as a matter of opinion, still held that French resistance might have been prolonged after the capitulation of Paris.

The result of the trial, as had been foreseen from the first, was a sentence of death; but so strong was the feeling in favour of Rossel that few thought it would be carried into effect. It did take place, however, on November 28, and was certainly one of the most unwise or unfortunate acts, as it greatly intensified the hatred of the existing Communists for the government; but it is admitted by most people, that neither by military nor civil law could he have been acquitted or sentenced differently. And M. Thiers, we presume, shrunk from the responsibility of commuting a sentence which had been confirmed by a second trial and a Commission of Pardons.

The following extracts from the unhappy Rossel's posthumous writings will have a melancholy interest, and should inculcate more than one useful lesson:—"There is one point on which I consider the Commune as a complete experiment; that is, the incompetence of the working classes for government. It is necessary, it is *necessary* that, until things are changed, the exercise of the functions of government should remain in the hands of the instructed classes; or rather it is necessary that the government should remain in the hands of the bourgeoisie, until the working classes are possessed of sufficient instruction. Let the people then acquire instruction, if they wish to have their legitimate share in the conduct of business and the distribution of fortunes. But, for the present,

I will speak the word without mincing it—the people are too stupid to govern us. They have not sufficient sound ideas, and they have too many false ideas."

"The greater part of my time, when I was chief of Cluseret's staff, was certainly taken up by importunate and useless individuals, delegates of every origin, inquirers after information, inventors, and above all officers and guards, who left their posts to come and complain of their chiefs, or their weapons, or of the want of provisions and ammunition. There were also almost everywhere independent chiefs, who did not accept, or did not carry out, orders. Each district had a committee as useless, as quarrelsome, and as jealous as that of the 17th. The artillery was sequestered by an analogous committee, also dependent upon the federation, and who formed a rare collection of incapables. Every monument, every barrack, every guard-house, had a military commandant; that military commandant had his staff, and often his permanent guard. All those spontaneous productions of the revolution had no other title or rule than that of their own pleasure, the right of the first comer, and the pretension to retain the place without doing anything. You might see doctors promenading with a general's gold lace and escort; barrack door-keepers equipped like superior officers; and all those fellows had horses, rations, and money."

"There were in Paris, on the 18th of March, [this is an account for the accuracy of which I can vouch] sixty revolutionary battalions. The remainder were divided, and incapable of escorting a decisive action. The ninety conservative battalions were of older standing, better equipped, and better armed than the revolutionists; they were equally numerous, better commanded, and better disciplined. But those unworthy citizens are accustomed to trust entirely to the army and to the police, whose duty it is to get killed for the cause of order. But there are moments when the police is worn out, and when the army does not clearly understand on which side its duty lies, or whether it be not its duty to remain quiet. At those moments the streets of Paris are at the mercy of the first comer."

The trial of Henri Rochefort (Count Henri de Rochefort de Sercay is his full title) excited great interest; but he was ill, broken down, and said not a word in his own defence, so that the curiosity of the public was disappointed. The original charge made against him, of complicity in the assassination of the hostages, could not be supported, and was withdrawn; and it was clearly shown that he had protested against the execution of prisoners and incendiarism, in his paper, when it was very dangerous to do so. His attacks against the existing government were, however, violent in the extreme; and the judge advocate said it was necessary to enforce the utmost rigour of the law against Rochefort and his satellites, whom he designated as a pestilential race of young journalists, who made a trade of sedition. Rochefort was defended with great talent by the same advocate, M. Albert Joly, whose reputation was made by this and Rossel's trials; but the court had fully made up its mind, and sentenced the prisoner to transportation to a fortress. It should be remembered that Rochefort, violent as his writings were, was not a member of the Commune, and was not even charged with any overt act of sedition.

The trial of the *pétroleuses* was looked forward to as promising great excitement; but it only produced disgust in some minds and disappointment in others. The prisoners were five very common-looking women, who had been *vivandières*. Not a single case of the use of petroleum could be proved against them, and these miserable women were condemned to death for taking part in the Communal army, and "attempting to change the form of government." The sentence created a positive feeling of shame in the minds of honest Frenchmen; but happily it was not carried into execution.

The trial of Madame Leroy, a pretty young woman of light character, who had lived with Urbain, whose trial and conviction has been already mentioned, caused some interest. She had a clever counsel, and acted her part with much skill, escaping with a sentence of simple transportation.

The heroine of the Commune, however, was Mademoiselle Louise Michel, a schoolmistress of high attainments and position, thirty-five years old, and very handsome; who, when the insurrection commenced, had sixty pupils belonging to good families under her charge. She was tried as an accomplice in the acts of the Commune, as having fought in uniform, and as having written articles in the *Cri du Peuple* inciting to the assassination of the two generals.

Her manner was calm, modest, and unassum-

ing; but she defied her judges, saying that she gloried in the social revolution; she respected the court more than the Committee of Pardons, which judged in secret. She stood face to face, she said, with avowed enemies, who she knew must condemn her. She admitted that she attended and took part in almost every council of the Commune, which she declared was honest and innocent, and had no thought of murder or arson. She would have shot the two generals, Clément Thomas and Lécomte, with her own hand had she seen them on the scene of action, but she repudiated as a dastardly deed their execution when they were prisoners. She had proposed fire as a strategical means of opposing the advance of the Versaillists. She had exhorted Ferré to invade the Assembly, and regretted that he had not done so. *She meant two lives to be sacrificed at Versailles, that of M. Thiers and her own.*

M. Marchand, the counsel assigned to her, declined, by express order of the prisoner, to speak for the defence. She said, "All I ask of you is to send me to Satory. Shoot me there, and let me sleep by the side of my beloved Ferré. The public prosecutor is right; I have no place in this world, at a time when an ounce of lead is the portion of the lovers of liberty and right."

The president, Colonel Delaporte, stopped her harangue, and after a few minutes' deliberation the court sentenced her to transportation for life in a fortress.

The trial of a man who acted as jailor under the Commune, with others charged with the murder of the hostages, did not take place till January, 1872: one prisoner only was condemned to death.

On the 18th of February commenced the trial of the prisoners charged with the massacre of the Dominican monks at Arcueil. This act was marked by unusual atrocities; the unfortunate monks and some of the attendants having been tortured with such refined cruelty that the Father Guerny, a missionary, declared that no savages had ever treated missionary martyrs with greater cruelty than the Commune had treated its victims. The Dominicans had no fear from the Communists, for they had converted their house into an hospital, and had collected the wounded and dying even on the battlefield. But the 13th Communist legion was commanded by a man named Seresier, who been noted during the siege, when he commanded the 101st battalion, for his implacable hatred against the clergy, and for having profaned several churches. On the 17th May a fire broke out near the monastery at Arcueil, and the monks were accused of having set fire to the place by order of the Versailles government; and two days later the house of the Dominicans was surrounded by two companies of the national guards, under the command of Léo Meillet, who was then governor of the fort of Bicêtre. This man had escaped, but his accomplice Lucipia, who had given Seresier his orders, was one of the accused. After the pillage of the house the monks and their servitors, with a few pupils, were transferred to Fort Bicêtre, and afterwards taken to the *mairie* of the 13th arrondissement near the Port d'Italie, which was used as a military prison. A Communist captain demanded that the monks should be given up to them, and said that they should have their turn at the barricades. The Dominicans refused to bear arms, declaring that their duty was to succour the wounded and dying, and not to fight. "You promise to take care of the wounded," cried the captain. "Very well! then go away; you are free, but go out one at a time." The unfortunate Dominicans did as they were told, and the men under Seresier's orders shot down thirteen of the victims. This atrocious deed was committed at the moment of the entrance of the Versailles troops into Paris, and more lives would have been taken, had the insurgents not been forced to fly.

The council of war was presided over by Colonel Delaporte, and there were fourteen prisoners placed at the bar. The first on the list was the commandant Seresier, already mentioned, a currier by trade; the second, whose name was Boin, was also a currier; the third, Lucipia, a law student; the others were Quesnot, a mechanic; Gironée, an architectural draughtsman; Pascal, a miscellaneous dealer; Annat, a bookseller's assistant; Bouillac, a labourer; Grapin and Busquant, cobblers; Gambette, a labourer; Boudaille, a corporal in the line; Buffo, a stone mason, and wife. Seresier, the commander of the corps who assassinated the Dominicans, and Boin, who had been appointed by the former keeper of the prison, declared that they had nothing whatever to do with the massacre. The other prisoners declared that they had nothing to do with the assassination, and some laid the whole to the account of Meillet, who had escaped, and Seresier, who, they de-

clared, was drunk and furious, threatening everyone around him with his revolver.

The evidence of one of the Dominicans, Father Rousseln, who had escaped the fate of his brethren, created a deep sensation. He is a fine energetic man, and dressed in the long white robe of the order, presented a commanding appearance. It appeared that he had exhibited great calmness and courage during his imprisonment. He recognized Seresier and several others amongst the prisoners, and said that the insurgents behaved well until the arrival of the 101st battalion, when the Dominicans were accused of showing lights and ringing bells as signals to the Versailles troops. Meillet took possession of the college. Seresier was also there, and said to the witness, "As to me, I believe in neither God nor devil; not even in confession." When taken to Bicêtre, the situation of the monks was described as horrible. There was a crowd of the lowest rabble, who insulted the prisoners in the grossest manner, and stripped them of everything of any value, as well as of all their clothing. The witness then described the manner in which the monks were told to leave one by one, and how they were shot down amid the grossest insults; the witness, who had been separated from the rest by accident, making his escape. A day or so later he saw the remains of his unfortunate brethren, and declared that the corpses were horribly mutilated. Another monk, who also had the good fortune to escape, gave similar evidence, and declared that he and another man were found by Seresier in a cellar, and were actually about to be executed, the pieces being pointed towards them, when they were saved by the arrival of the Versailles troops.

One of the most disgusting features of this and other acts of the Commune was that to which all the witnesses deposed; namely, that the women were the most violent, and constantly urged the men to greater atrocities, and heaped the grossest insults upon the prisoners.

Seresier, Boin, Lucipia, Boudaille, and Pascal were condemned to death; Léo Meillet, Chaler, and Moreau were also condemned to death in their absence. The rest of the prisoners were sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for life, with the exception of the old man Gambette, who escaped with two years' imprisonment, and the woman Buffo, who was acquitted. Gambette said as he left the court, "Is it possible? Two years' imprisonment for doing nothing but beating my drum!"

The trial of Blanqui, "the Nestor of revolution," as his friends delight to call him, caused great interest. The charge against him was in connection with the *émeutes* of the 31st October, 1870, and the 22nd of January, 1871. A number of persons had been tried and acquitted, a year before, when the responsibility seemed to be thrown on Blanqui, who was condemned to death in his absence. Ill luck had thrown him into the hands of the authorities.

Blanqui is a little spare man, sixty-seven years of age, with hair and beard white as snow, and a pair of small bead-like eyes, sunk deep in their orbits, but full of feverish energy. He has spent three-fourths of his life in Cayenne and other places of imprisonment, and has been four times condemned to death. He had refused to answer the *Juge d'Instruction*—that is to say, the interrogatories put to him in prison; and when the president of the court-martial, Colonel Robillard, called upon him to give explanations of his conduct with respect to the affair of La Villette, he replied politely but triumphantly, "*Pardon*, but I am not accused with respect to the affair of La Villette." The colonel admitted the awkward plea, but added, "That is true; but in virtue of our authority *(pouvoir)* we ask you for information respecting other facts than those which are included in the accusation." To this extraordinary ruling Blanqui answered coolly, "You have only to read my journal, *La Patrie en Danger*. You will find the affair in detail there, and much more complete than I can give it you." The colonel was not, however, to be turned from his course, and the following colloquy took place:—

"President—Nevertheless, speak about it yourself!

"Blanqui—Very well! The La Villette affair was the 4th of September, three weeks too early. It was an attempt to overturn the government. It was a 4th of September spoiled.

"President—But who gave you the right thus to change the form of government?

"Blanqui—It was in the name of the country in danger that we took it upon ourselves. You talk of right! Who gave any right to those of the 4th of September?

"President—At any rate they were the elected of the nation. . . ." But the colonel had had

enough of La Villette, and, after some awkward hesitation, added, "Well, let us go to the affair of the 31st of October," (when the Hôtel de Ville was invaded). The colonel had better have stuck to the record, and commenced there.

Blanqui then went at length into the last-named affair. MM. Jules Ferry, Jules Simon, and other members of the September government were examined; but this portion of the inquiry is not in place here, and besides, the facts have already been given at sufficient length. Blanqui maintained that the affair ended with an understanding that there should be no prosecution, and this was certainly the understanding in Paris at the time; the fact of M. Jules Favre leaving the Hôtel de Ville, arm-in-arm with Blanqui, being universally asserted. The witnesses were not at all unanimous or clear upon this subject, and Blanqui certainly had the benefit of the doubt in the opinion of the public. M. Dorian, member of the Assembly, did not hesitate to declare that Blanqui was perfectly right upon this point.

The prisoner exhibited the most perfect coolness and presence of mind, and gave the court some sharp retorts. Amongst others, "I have noted," he said, "that the commissary of the government [who read in court a decree of M. Thiers, authorizing M. Jules Simon, as a minister, to give evidence], evoked against me principles which existed before our first revolution. For him the revolutions of 1789, of 1830, and of 1848, are so many crimes. Well! I retain this fact in my memory from to-day, that, under a government called republican, I have been prosecuted in the name of monarchial principles." And having no more to say, he calmly took up his cloak, threw it over his shoulders, and followed his guards out of the court, with more apparent unconcern than was shown by any one there.

The court only deliberated for half an hour, and sentenced Blanqui to transportation in a fortified place. When re-introduced, the prisoner heard his sentence read without exhibiting the slightest emotion; and it is said that, since he has been in prison, he has devoted himself principally to astronomy and mathematics.

There must surely be something rotten in our boasted civilization, when a man of such intelligence and self-reliant power can find no better occupation for his admitted talents than that of permanent conspiracy; or are we to attribute his extraordinary career to insanity, monomania, or mere idiosyncrasy?

The trial of a well-known young physician, named Goupil, created some sensation from the intelligence and respectability of his appearance, and in some measure also, from the fact that his young wife and two children appeared in court. There were two charges against Dr. Goupil; the first being that he had, on the 31st October, the day of the first communalist *émeute*, sequestrated a captain of the national guard, who was the bearer of an order from the government. The charge was proved to a certain extent, and the captain had been detained for about half an hour, but solely, as the prisoner said, because the order was believed to be a forgery. Strange to say, the accused was charged by the court with having had to do with a certain printed document, of which no mention was made in the charge against him; it appeared that this paper, an appeal to the people on the part of the *maire*, was very violently worded. Goupil made some alterations in the draft for the printer, and declared that he was thanked at the *mairie*, for having done so, and afterwards charged with the fact as a crime. Goupil was condemned to two years' imprisonment and costs. The second charge on which he was tried was far more serious; he was a member of the Commune, delegate to the minister of Public Instruction, and was charged with the arrest of a M. Magnabal, and the sequestration of two Lazarist monks. It was clearly proved that Goupil had always tried to protect the clergy, and had protested energetically against acts of brutality unworthy of intelligent men, and had declared that the clergy had done nothing to excuse the absurd and cowardly persecutions of the Commune. These declarations had made him suspected, and nearly caused his arrest, and when ordered to search religious houses for concealed arms, he was accompanied by agents of the police, to force him to act as ordered. He was so disgusted with the conduct of the Commune, that he gave in his resignation, and on the 6th of April managed to escape from Paris. The principal of the Lazarists, and others, bore testimony to the truth of Goupil's statement, and said that when Lagrange, the special agent of Goupil, searched the house, nothing was destroyed, broken, or damaged, and no one put to inconvenience. All the witnesses gave similar testimony; but Goupil was condemned to five years' imprison-

ment, by a majority of five against two in the council. The sympathy in favour of Dr. Goupil and his unfortunate family is very general, and it is not likely that such a severe sentence will be carried out to the full extent.

The French law allows of appeal in case of condemnation to death, and nearly all the prisoners sentenced have availed themselves of the privilege. Many cases stood over for weeks, and even months, in consequence, and because the sentences are finally deliberated upon by a council of mercy, and a long time generally elapses between sentence and execution.

On the 22nd of February the execution of Verdaguer, Herpin-Lacroix, and Lagrange—condemned for the assassination, or for complicity in the assassination, of Generals Lécomte and Clement Thomas at Montmartre—took place. The culprits were not informed of the decision until three o'clock of the morning of the execution. Verdaguer had been ill, and subject to violent convulsions, and was at first terribly affected at the idea of leaving his wife and children; but he soon rallied. This man and Lagrange were both deserters from the army, so that their case was doubly bad. The three men exhibited great calmness and resignation, declared their respect for the law and for their judges and all with whom they had come in contact in prison, and embraced the director and all the attendants, as well as each other, with emotion.

The execution took place in presence of a mass of troops, composed of detachments from all the corps in the army. At half-past six all was over, and the troops left the ground, according to custom in such cases, the band in advance playing gay music! The custom of quitting the grave of a hero with lively music, although it grates upon the feelings, is comprehensible from a military point of view: the deceased has died the death which, to a soldier, is glory; but music after such a scene as the above is horrible to think of!

On the 14th of March commenced the trial of twenty-three prisoners implicated in the "affair of the Rue Haxo," which was the most considerable massacre under the Commune, no less than forty-seven hostages having been shot in that street on May 26. Some of the prisoners were old acquaintances of the frequenters of the Versailles Riding School since it became the theatre of bloody assizes. François, the Communal gaoler of La Roquette prison, already under sentence to hard labour for life for participation in the murder of the archbishop of Paris, again appeared in his old place. Next to him was Ramain, the turnkey, let off before with ten years' penal servitude, but now once more put upon trial for his life. Several of the other prisoners, officers of the Communal army, were respectable-looking men. One, describing himself as M. de Saint Omer, a lieutenant of the 74th federal battalion, says that he was a merchant in Cuba; another, named Benot, a journeyman butcher, who was one of General Bergeret's colonels, was accused of having insisted upon the execution of the prisoners, although he had received orders to the contrary from the then Communal delegate for war, M. Parent. The indictment, like many of its foregoers, lamented that justice had not laid hands upon the principal criminals. It accused François and Ramain only of having given up the forty-seven hostages, knowing that they were going to be executed, but anticipated that the defence to be made by these prisoners would be, that they obeyed the order of an officer who represented that for strategical reasons it was necessary to evacuate the prison. François knew the name and rank of this officer, but would not mention them. More than half of the indictment laboured to show that François must have known for what purpose the prisoners were taken away from La Roquette. Whatever may or may not have been the complicity of François, the facts were that forty-seven hostages, consisting of thirty-five gendarmes, ten priests, and two laymen, were marched in custody from the prison to the portals of the Père La Chaise cemetery, and then along the Boulevards Menilmontant and Belleville, and the Rue Puebla, to the mayoralty of the Rue Haxo, which was the headquarters of M. Ranvier, a member of the Commune. The officer (name still unknown) who was in command called upon a Major Devarennes, commandant of a battalion at a barricade, for a reinforcement of eight men; and then one of his captains, named Dalivon, and his lieutenant, St. Omer (both prisoners at the bar), came forward "with alacrity," and brought many more men with them than were asked for. The crowd which followed the cortége was at first only "curious" to see men "who, it was boasted, were prisoners taken from the Versailles army;" but gradually they became bloodthirsty, and cried, "Down with the priests!" Their "hideous

ferocity" went on increasing till they got to the Rue Haxo. Here the war delegate, Parent, ironically (as the indictment alleged) harangued the members of the Central Committee, saying, "Now, gentlemen, is the time to show your influence, and prevent the Commune from being dishonoured." A federal officer got upon the top of a cab and made a speech. Then the hostages were brought out, one by one, upon a bit of waste land appointed for their execution, and shot down with the muzzles of the muskets almost close to them. The trial lasted several days, and ended with the following judgments:—Seven of the accused condemned to death; seven to forced labour for life; two to the same punishment for twenty years; three to transportation for life; and four others to slighter punishments.

On the 21st March a man named Rouilhac was condemned to death, another, named Roussion, to hard labour for life, and ten others to various degrees of punishment, for an infamous murder which was perpetrated on the 24th of May. A chemist named Dubois, who lived at the Buttes-aux-Cailles, had the hardihood to declare against the Commune, and when his house was about to be turned into a fortress against the troops he barricaded the door. A large body of the federals fired cannon at the house, then forced open the door, and finding the unfortunate Dubois in the garden, shot him, and exhibited the body for a whole day in the front balcony. The house was then sacked, 2000 francs stolen, the wine drunk, and the servant thrown into prison.

Captain Matusewitchz, who was formerly in the 134th regiment of the line, was condemned to death. He was colonel of a regiment of federals, but made his escape from Paris. He was found guilty of participation in the insurrection, and also of having stolen the money intended for his own men.

One ecclesiastic only was charged with Communism, the Abbé Perrin, found guilty by a Versailles court-martial of exciting to civil war, &c., and arresting some of his fellow-priests, was sentenced (extenuating circumstances being admitted) to two years' imprisonment. The prisoner, who was vicar of St. Eloi, in Paris, exclaimed in the course of the trial, "And only think that I once refused a bishopric!"

The military secretary of the unfortunate Rossel, an intelligent young man named Jules Renard, was tried by court-martial. He took honours a few years ago at the normal school, and afterwards became mathematical professor in a large school at Lagny. When the war broke out he enlisted as a private in the 17th chasseurs and, after the 18th March, came to Paris to take service with the Commune. Rossel made him a staff colonel. He escaped to Belgium after the entry of the Versailles troops into Paris, passed some time in England, where he was almost starving, and in September, 1871, returned to Paris, where he obtained a place in a school, and lived quite unsuspected by the police. But the news of Rossel's execution excited him so much, that he went to Versailles and gave himself up. The court-martial sentenced him to transportation for life in a fortified place.

An extraordinary scandal occurred at Versailles, before the sixth court-martial. An obscure Communist, named Michel, was tried for bearing arms under the Commune. He was too poor to pay an advocate, and at the last moment he wrote to M. Bigot, who acquired a certain celebrity as counsel for Assi, to defend him. M. Bigot came into court, knowing nothing whatever of the matter; and he asked the president to be good enough to hand him down the *dossier*, or brief of the case, to enable him to see what the charges against his client were. To his great astonishment he saw on a margin of one of the pages a minute, in the handwriting of the president, of the verdict which had been agreed upon before the defence was heard. Against every charge was written the words, "Guilty by a majority." M. Bigot said nothing of this in his speech, merely pleading that his client, who had been in charge of the powder magazine at the fort of Vanves, was not proved to have borne arms. But after Michel had been found guilty and sentenced, by a majority of five to two, to two years' imprisonment, M. Bigot rose and moved that the president should put upon record that the conviction and sentence had been agreed upon by the court-martial before the trial was over. The president, in an angry tone, refused to take official notice of the objection, and accused M. Bigot of an "abuse of confidence" in making it. The defence would doubtless be, that the sketch of the probable judgment made by the president was merely for his own guidance, and did not exclude revision if, subsequently to his memoranda, new light should be thrown upon the affair.

But, making the best of it, the business was an extremely awkward one. It is impossible to deny that the judges ought to have been listening to the defence, instead of drawing up their judgment before the case was concluded.

M. Elisée Reclus was a lucky man; his scientific friends in England saved him. He writes:—"I am able at last to tell you that I am free. After having been kept for a long time in prisons, and sent from one prison to another, I left Paris for Pontarlier, escorted by two police agents, who left me on the free soil of Switzerland. While breathing and enjoying the pure air of liberty, I do not forget those to whom I am indebted for my freedom. Having been claimed by so many Englishmen as a student of science, I shall work on more than ever to show them my gratitude by my works and deeds."

A prominent member of the Commune, M. Grelier, who for a time filled the office of minister of the Interior, was arrested in a peculiar way. He succeeded for many months in eluding the search of the police, and was all the time a cook in the house of the Jesuit Fathers at Meudon. What an unlikely place for a Communist to have found a refuge in! The police had long had their eye upon a major of the Commune, who, disguised in rags as a beggar, made frequent visits to the Meudon monastery. The ostensible object of his appearance there was to get a share of the kitchen scraps, which the monks are in the habit of daily giving away; but in reality he went to talk politics with Grelier. The false beggar, when arrested, did not perhaps exactly betray Grelier, but gave the police information which led to his arrest. It appears that when it was all over with the Commune, Grelier bethought him of a cousin who was a servant in the house of the Jesuit Fathers. This relation recommended him successfully for a cook's place, which he took under a false name, and which he might in all probability have filled for a long while to come unmolested, had he not yielded to the temptation of keeping up political intercourse with old friends.

The council of war condemned to death Colonel Henry, who made a considerable figure at the commencement of the Commune till he was made prisoner, so that he was more than a year in prison. The prisoner was deeply moved at the trial, and pleaded hard for mercy. Five other prisoners, Girin, Felix, Leprince, Badinier and Lemare, were sentenced at the same time to various terms of imprisonment, and of hard labour for life.

The *Official Journal* says that during the week ending the 10th of February the councils of war tried 305 prisoners, while 598 others were set free for want of evidence against them ; and also, that the total number tried to that date was 4242, and of those dismissed on the preliminary examination 20,704.

Of those found guilty, 36 were condemned to death ; 86 to imprisonment with hard labour ; 341 to transportation within a fortified place—which means Cayenne or New Caledonia ; 1002 to simple transportation ; 470 to imprisonment, and 21 to confinement in penitentiaries. All the above sentences of transportation and imprisonment are for life, or during pleasure. In addition, 184 were sentenced to imprisonment for three months or less, 584 to periods exceeding three months, and 425 for one year or more ; 80 were condemned to banishment, and 1 to labour in public works—an unexplained singularity. Of those tried, 1012, or nearly one-fourth, were acquitted.

Of the whole mass tried, twenty-five per cent. are reported as having undergone previous punishment for some crime or other ; and three to four per cent. are foreigners. This last phrase completely nullifies the assertion that the Commune was the work of foreigners, rather than Frenchmen. Eleven prisoners, one of whom had been condemned, are reported as having escaped from the prisons of Versailles, and three from hospitals; while 213 died in prison. The report concluded with the statement that all the prisoners' cases had undergone preliminary examination, and 6000 then awaited trial before the councils of war! These facts exhibit in a terrible light the frightful evils brought upon society by the acts of the Commune: 25,000 persons confined for periods varying from one to ten months ; of whom more than 20,000 were discharged because nothing could be proved against them, 3230 sentenced to death and various degrees of punishment, and then, more than ten months after the end of the Commune, above 6000 remained to be tried. A later return, to the 30th of March, gave the following figures:—21,092 discharged, 6887 condemnations, and 4265 remaining to be tried. Add to the above the tens of thousands killed and

wounded, the thousands widowed, rendered orphans, driven insane, and ruined, and you have before you one of the most frightful pictures of human folly and human suffering ever presented to the imagination.

The great majority of the female prisoners were at the outset transferred to the prisons of Amiens, Arras, and Rouen, and few of them had been tried by the middle of the month of February, when two captains were charged with what is called in France the instruction; that is to say, the preliminary examination in private, which stands in the place of the inquiry before a police magistrate in England. The result of this examination was the dismissal of the great majority, about 130 only being retained for trial.

The large number of prisoners who have been set at liberty from time to time create much uneasiness in the minds of many Parisians, and furnish others with arguments, honest or otherwise, in favour of severe measures; for it is urged that the spirit of the Commune is as lively as ever. It is asserted that, since the return of the discharged prisoners commenced, there have been many signs of projected revenge, which naturally terrify the peaceful portion of the population. At the commencement of February there were accounts afloat of bombs having been thrown and exploded in the Boulevard Malesherbes, and in some of the public squares. The only acts of the Communists that are beyond question are the posting of a few inflammatory placards here and there; and even this may have been the work of one or two fanatics, or, which would be perfectly consistent with the Parisian character, of mischievous *farceurs*, on whom a horse whip might have a salutary effect. Whatever truth there may be in the statements and views referred to, there is no question as to the effect which the violence of the Commune has had upon liberalism. The journals, remarkable formerly for their true liberalism and moderation, have lost all hope and confidence. The following short extract from such a journal now before us is a case in point:—" For our part, after the experience of 1871, we ardently hope that the political and moral sense of the nation will remount the revolutionary stream, The current destroys everything and reconstructs nothing; in the place of ideas and principles it produces baseness and cupidity. Never, then, was firmness, determination, more necessary on the part of the Assembly and the Government."

When the Commune broke down it was declared that there were masses of Englishmen in the ranks. Prince Bismarck asserted in public that they numbered 4000. Some of the Paris papers cleverly seized upon this fact, and on the names of three Polish generals, upon which to found an argument that the Commune was not French, but cosmopolitan. This was smart, but like many such arguments, too smart by half. The Commune was thoroughly Parisian, and the foreign element a mere item in it. As to the 4000 Englishmen, where Prince Bismarck got his information from is a curiosity. Lord Lyons tells us that only thirteen were arrested after the army had entered Paris; and all but one were discharged. This exceptional Englishman has the un-English name of Fabre de Lagrange; but he is a British subject, a native of Jersey. He was well known as an expert electrician, and was charged with having managed the lighthouse at Montmartre, and of drawing up an excellent plan of destroying or paralyzing the action of the army, by means of mines fired by electricity. He asserted that he merely obtained employment as he was without means, and only amused the Commune with plans that could not have been carried out.

The army entered Paris on the information of Ducatel, one of the keepers of the Bois de Boulogne, who at the risk of his life jumped down from the ramparts, and told Captain Trèves, a naval officer, that the ramparts were deserted. There is no doubt about the value of his services, for M. Thiers gave him the cross of the legion, and presented him with 30,000 francs, equal to £1200. Ducatel was taken up by the Opposition, and a good subscription raised for him, so that he was provided with a capital of about £4000. The secret of this was, that his name was peculiarly unpleasing to the army, which desired people to believe that it forced the ramparts and rushed into the city with irresistible impetuosity; and the royalists and others took up Ducatel simply to annoy the government. A lucky man is Ducatel! But what shall be said of party tricks like these, at a time when France wanted the aid of all her sons to bind up her wounds and restore her vigour. If half the energy wasted in such unworthy manœuvres as this had been employed in an honest direction, the case of

France would never have been as bad as it is at present.

The debts, old and new, of the city of Paris, are fearfully heavy, and must for a long period remain a sad burden on the people; but the new prefect and municipal council do not exhibit a desponding feeling, and propose to devote a sum equal to nearly £1,000,000 sterling for urgent public works, including £120,000 towards the rebuilding of the Hôtel de Ville.

In addition to the immense debt which weighs upon the city, there are the results of the conflagration to be added. The destruction of buildings alone has been estimated at £5,250,000 sterling. The following are the chief items of this estimate:

Palace of the Tuileries,	£1,080,000
Hôtel de Ville,	1,200,000
Treasury,	480,000
Palais Royal,	120,000
Palais de Justice,	120,000
Prefecture of Police,	80,000
Conciergerie,	20,000
Public Granaries,	200,000
Arsenal,	60,000
The Gobelins,	40,000
Palace of the Legion of Honour,	40,000
Assistance Public,	80,000
Council of State, &c.,	356,000
Entrepôt at La Villette,	120,000
Two Public Tax Offices,	260,000
Barracks,	20,000

besides ninety-two houses in Paris proper, and many hundreds in the outlying districts. When in addition to the above we consider the enormous quantity of grain, wine, and spirits burnt in the public warehouses; the destruction caused by shot and shell; the works of art, furniture, plate glass, and merchandise burnt or otherwise destroyed, an estimate which places the total material losses caused by the insurrection at more than £10,000,000 sterling, is probably not exaggerated.

A commission has reported on the burning of the docks at La Villette; the total loss is set down at £1,200,000, of which sum rather less than half represents wine, brandy, and articles of food. The destruction of the great government corn stores, called the Grenier d'Abondance, has not been reported upon officially; but the loss in this case is estimated approximatively at nearly one million sterling.

The destruction of the entire registers of births, marriages, and deaths of any city, must cause immense inconvenience; but especially so in Paris, where the formalities respecting births, deaths, and marriages are so multitudinous and minute that it is a wonder any one ventures either to be born, to be married, or to die. No boy can enter any of the public schools, no man enter any public office, without producing the certificate of his birth; then every year all the youths of the age of twenty have to appear and draw lots for military service, when, of course, certificates of birth are required. This conscription gives rise sometimes to curious scenes; not to present yourself at the proper age for the conscription is a very serious offence, and the municipal officers take care to hunt up defaulters very sharply. A few years since an inhabitant of Paris received a peremptory summons to bring up his son to draw for the conscription. The reply was he had no son, but a daughter of that age was produced. The parents protested that they had nothing to do with the blundering of an official clerk (a blunder easily made, as the French words for son and daughter, *fils* and *fille*, are very like in writing and sound). The managers of the conscription declared, that as the child was described as a boy on the register *he* must draw a number out of the urn; therefore *she* did so, and fortunately drew a high one, which gave her exemption. Had it occurred otherwise, she would have been enrolled for a time amongst the recruits, and it is terrible to think of the formalities that would have been to go through to release the young lady from military service. Perhaps it would have ended in a compromise, and she would have been enrolled as a vivandière!

Now all these registers are burnt, any one who does not happen to have the certificates of his birth, &c., in his possession, is placed in a great difficulty. The authorities have appointed a commission to act in the matter, and every one is called upon to deposit all the certificates in his possession relating to himself or his relations, and all these certificates will become the property of the state. It is naturally objected to this arrangement that many people regard such documents with almost superstitious affection, and that therefore the authorities ought not to appropriate, but merely copy and return them. However the affair may be worked out, it is quite certain that out of the million and three quarters of inhabitants of Paris a very large proportion will never be able to prove, legally, that they were ever born at all; and how they are to get through life under such circumstances is a puzzle. It is proposed that in

future duplicates of such registers shall always be deposited in other towns, so as to prevent such another accident. This suggestion is certainly applicable to other cases besides the registers of Paris.

This loss of documentary evidence had very nearly been accompanied by another, namely, the destruction of the *Grand Livre* of France, which like our national debt books consists of thousands of folio volumes. This, however, was in duplicate, and one if not both copies were saved, so that the holders of government stock are spared the inconvenience which might have fallen upon them.

Some of the acts of the Commune also are causing similar complications; thus all the marriages which took place between the 18th of March and the 22nd May are declared void, as having been solemnized in the presence of revolutionary functionaries. An inquiry has been made into the subject, and in cases where both parties are living, and act in good faith, there will be little difficulty; but an unprincipled man or woman may seize upon the opportunity to set aside the contract, and the other party would have no remedy.

But this is only one, though a very serious one, of a series of difficulties. When we reflect that from September, 1870, to the end of May, 1871, the entire life of the nation, and particularly of Paris, was as it were suspended, that trade and commerce were laid aside, engagements deferred, in too many cases *sine die*, and that everything had to be taken up and set going again, with obstacles of all kinds in the way, dearness of money, loss of machinery, plant, and stock, and what is still worse, a diminution by thousands and tens of thousands of workmen, who will never more labour or suffer, the prospect is indeed a sad one; and from it we obtain something like a notion of the miseries which ambition, war, and revolution are capable of inflicting on an unhappy nation.

It is well that history is imperfect; for a true summary of all the crimes and sufferings, the mental and bodily torture, the destruction and devastation which were crowded into that short space of time, would form one of the most dreadful accounts that was ever exhibited against poor human nature. May the events of 1870 and 1871 close the era of war and revolutions, and may Paris grow more prosperous and more glorious; richer and richer in art, literature, and industry; gayer, brighter, more beautiful than ever!

CHAPTER V.

Parliamentary Inquiry into the Facts of the Communist Insurrection—Evidence of M. Thiers with regard to it and Subsequent Events—Evidence of M. Cresson and the Communists of October, 1870—Extraordinary Leniency to Prisoners—Unpatriotic Conduct of a Paris Mayor—Evidence of General Trochu—Strange Opinions and Statements—M. Jules Favre's Views—Evidence and Opinions of Jules Ferry, Picard, General Aurelles des Paladine, Adam, General Le Flô, General Vinoy, Admiral Saisset, Marshal MacMahon, Marquis de Plœuc, Corbon, General Cremer, and others.

A LONG report, occupying two volumes, and containing the evidence of a large number of important witnesses upon the events of the disastrous year 1871, furnishes the world with a mass of very important facts, and throws light upon many points in its history.

The testimony of M. Thiers occupies the first place. He said the government had no confidence in the success of the steps to retake the guns from Montmartre, but it was impossible to refrain from making the attempt. After the failure of this undertaking, M. Thiers says he did not for a moment hesitate about withdrawing the army from contact with the revolution. "On the 24th of February," he adds, "when matters had already taken a bad turn, the king of Prussia asked him what was to be done, and I answered that we must leave Paris, and return there with Marshal Bugeaud and 50,000 men." Attempts were made to get together such of the national guards as were still to be depended on, but all the drum-beating and exhortations only produced from 500 to 600.

All the forts except Mont Valérien had to be evacuated, because they would have required 8000 men, which the government could not furnish. M. Thiers went on to say that, during the first fortnight that he was at Versailles, he was anything but easy in his mind; for "had we been attacked by 70,000 to 80,000 men, I would not have answered for the stanchness of the army." The Communist leaders told the people of Paris something like this over and over again, but they were not believed; and they, by the accounts of their own generals, never could get together anything like that number of trustworthy troops.

The president of the republic naturally concluded with a few sentences relating to the subsequent state of affairs, and thus excused, or rather justified, the facts of the Assembly remaining at Versailles, and Paris being kept in a state of siege. "I continue to believe," he says, "that while standing upon our guard, and being always prepared for resistance, there should be constant moderation in the general conduct of the government, which, however, does not exclude either assiduous vigilance or invincible firmness."

One of the most important witnesses examined was M. Cresson, who was prefect of police from November, 1870; and having collected 1200 sergents de ville, or gardiens de la paix publique, as they were called, and having selected twenty-two commissaries, proceeded to arrest the Communists who had created the insurrection of the 31st October. A man named Châtelain, known as an agent of the *Internationale*, in whose possession were found some very important documents, was arrested in his own apartments; but M. Jules Ferry, a member of the Government, denied the political power of the *Internationale*, said that it was composed of very honest men, that he knew them, and that he had pleaded for them as advocate. Châtelain was therefore released. About the same time a man named Ranvier, a fanatic capable of anything, was also arrested. He had two interesting daughters, and begged the favour of going to see them. The *juge d'instruction* and the *procureur de la republic* gave him forty-eight hours' leave, but without informing the prefect of police of the fact. Ranvier departed, and appeared that very night at the Belleville clubs, at one of which he said: "They had not the courage to shoot me. We will have that courage, and shoot them." Of course he did not return to prison.

The history of Felix Pyat, as told by M. Cresson, is still more strange. He was taken prisoner, and immediately wrote to M. E. Arago, then minister of Justice, "What a misfortune I am your prisoner. You ought to be my advocate." M. Arago immediately called on M. Cresson, and demanded the liberation of Pyat as

"one of the veterans of the democracy." M. Cresson refused to comply, but three days later the prisoner was released by an order, on the ground that there was no case against him.

M. Cresson gave it as his opinion that if, after the 31st October, the Communists had been taken before a court-martial, it would have been an act of justice, and would have given immense confidence to the majority of half a million who, on the 2nd of November, had voted the act of confidence in the government, and would have imposed silence on the 50,000 or 60,000 bandits—this is M. Cresson's exact expression—who were in opposition, and whom it was necessary to put down. Of the mayors of Paris, M. Cresson says some of these were good men, but a great many of them were animated by the most detestable spirit. It must be remembered that there are twenty mayors in the city, each powerful in his arrondissement, or district, so that their influence is considerable for good or evil. Bombs, he adds, were being manufactured at Montmartre, and the individual who specially interested himself in their fabrication was the mayor of Montmartre, M. Clémenceau! When this was discovered he at once gave up 600, but a still larger number was afterwards found in his possession!

M. Cresson demanded the closing of the clubs, but this measure was not carried out till after the 22nd of January, and they were soon opened again after the capitulation on account of the elections; during which time public meetings are legal. M. Cresson thinks the principal cause of the insurrection was the revolutionary spirit which had been engendered during the siege, by permitting "mayors and assistant mayors to be elected in Paris who did not recognize the government." Many people, on the contrary, think that the cause of the success, for a time, of a Commune, was the refusal of the government to give the Parisians the use of their municipal rights! Who shall judge between the advocates of arbitrary government and of free institutions?

General Trochu, the ex-governor of Paris, was re-examined before the commission, and his views of the causes of the insurrection were read with astonishment. He considered that one of the first causes of this insurrection was the relations of the empire with the demagogues. "For myself," he says, "politically speaking, the empire and the demagogy were *Siamese twin brothers*, although in reality enemies." The general is also convinced that the hand of Prussia was in all the difficulties that the government had to contend with in Paris, and that M. Bismarck had his allies and his accomplices in the clubs and the radical press. "The demagogues," he says, "organized themselves during the siege to the cry of *guerre à outrance*—war to the knife, as we should say; but once masters of Paris, in possession of 2000 pieces of artillery, with considerable provisions of all kinds, they hastened to come to an understanding with the Prussians, and were full of politeness and complaisance to them." The general further declared his belief that "Dombrowski was an agent in the pay of the enemy." The ex-governor added a good deal more in the same strain, but nothing sufficiently circumstantial to demand quotation.

General Trochu agreed with all the witnesses that to have disarmed the national guards at the time of, or after the capitulation, would have been impossible; and he added that had the army retained their arms Paris might have been kept quiet, but "in spite of all the arguments and pleadings of himself (the general) and M. Jules Favre, M. Bismarck persisted in disarming it. He only exhibited any consideration for the national guard."

When we remember the congratulations of the then government respecting the retention of the arms of the national guard, these revelations and assertions from the mouth of a member of that government fall strangely on the ear.

M. Jules Favre was the next witness, and said, that the government of September found itself in presence of a vast political conspiracy, better organized than could have been imagined; but he did not regard the members of the *Internationale* as the leaders in the insurrection of the Commune of the 18th of March. He believed the causes to be various; first, there were the fortifications, which rendered the resistance possible for a time; next to that, the moral condition of the city. During the siege the upper and intelligent classes behaved admirably, but towards the end of January their generous patriotism ran into extravagance. As to the intermediate classes, M. Jules Favre declared them to have been most ignorant and dangerous; and the working-classes, with some admirable exceptions, lost during the siege all ideas of morality and economy, and were prepared for

anything that should change the face of society and satisfy their political and social passions. The monster that the government had to contend with was sketched with much vigour :—

"Every day new legions were organized in order to obtain the pay; the expense amounted to 600,000 or 700,000 francs (£24,000 to £28,000) per day; the situation was horrible! I felt sure that if we should succeed in passing the crisis without, we should have to contend with the crisis within; you cannot place arms in the hands of so many vagabonds (*mauvais sujets*) without having to think some day how you are to get them out of them again."

M. Favre struck a right chord when he enumerated amongst the probable occasions of the insurrection the absence of the best men in the national guard. Fatigued with their five months' imprisonment and poor fare, eager to clasp again in their arms their loved ones, who had been sent all over Europe out of harm's way, those who had the means rushed out of Paris at the opening of the gates, little suspecting what would spring up and occupy the vacuum they had left behind them. Again, the entry of the Prussians exasperated people's minds; and here M. Jules Favre read his countrymen a lesson which they would do well to study carefully. He said, "A proclamation" (a placard would have been the proper word), "with the following sentence, 'the barbarians halt at the gates of the holy city,' furnished M. Bismarck with the last pretext for insisting on the occupation." It would be well to remember for the future that no one likes to be insulted, and that probably the Prussians argued, that if they did not enter Paris the French would at once have proclaimed that they were afraid to do so.

M. Jules Favre thought that "the *Internationale* was not first in the breach on the 18th of March, but that it organized the victory," and he did not agree with General Trochu with respect to the relations between the Prussians and the demagogues during the siege.

M. Jules Ferry, ex-mayor of Paris, whose correspondence has been published, proving that he was a good deal more clear-sighted than some of his colleagues, gave an extraordinary account of the Belleville men.

"At the end of September, or the commencement of October," he says, "we were much surprised to find superior arms in the hands of the Belleville battalion. We inquired into the matter, and learnt that it was Flourens who had purchased and paid for these arms, amongst which were some Chassepots." These arms, it is said, were purchased before the 4th of September—the end of the Empire.

M. Jules Ferry gave an account of his visit to Belleville with a flag; it appears that the flag had been asked for some time before, and evidently not given. Now, some one on the staff fancied that if it were sent it would be a mark of confidence and esteem to the tirailleurs of Flourens—for whom, it is added strangely enough, General Trochu had sympathy—and the government might thence draw some good soldiers for the defence; and so M. Ferry was deputed to deliver the flag into the hands of the *legionnaires* of Belleville. "But," says M. Ferry, "I was very ill received, I was mistrusted by this population. I saw there men who only thought of one thing, namely, to explain to me why they would not go out? One of them said to me, 'I cannot quit the city, for the reactionary party has become master of it,' and he went into his house. Do you know," said M. Ferry, "what was done with that flag? The guards tore it in pieces before reaching the trenches, saying, 'This flag which they have brought to us is intended to denounce us to the Prussians; they have given us a special flag to show where the Belleville men are, so that Bismarck may massacre us!'"

M. Picard exculpated the Communists from the crime of assassinating Generals Lécomte and Clément Thomas. "Bonapartist agents played a great part in the insurrection of Montmartre. The day Generals Lécomte and Clément Thomas were killed, a young naval officer whom I know intimately, and who had a narrow escape of being shot with them, came to tell me how they were assassinated. It was the regular soldiers who were the assassins. A person wearing the uniform of an officer of marines commanded the firing party. Had it not been for him, the generals would have been released. Nobody knows what has become of this officer. The naval officer of whom I speak remained in Paris, and sought in all directions to find out where the murderer was, but without success."

This is very horrible, but the following is not less so. It was admitted in the evidence before this commission, that the government was very

anxious to prepare for a capitulation and guard against a civil war by getting the Bellevillites slaughtered. The ill-starred Clément Thomas entered into this patriotic scheme, which Ducrot discountenanced. This warrior told Trochu and his colleagues, when they asked his opinion, that they would find it harder than they supposed to get 10,000 Nationals slaughtered in battle.

General Aurelles des Paladine, a severe soldier, very accurate as to fact, and having a rare memory, made an excellent witness. He gave a sketch of the councils of the government of the National Defence, which will not easily be forgiven by those who are there shown up. He says:—"M. Thiers was at Bordeaux, where he arrived on the 15th March. M. Jules Favre, who remained in Paris, had the direction of the branch of government installed there. His colleagues were M. Picard, minister of the Interior, and M. Pouyer-Quertier, minister of Finance. All the other ministers were replaced by their first secretaries, or heads of sections. M. Jules Favre informed me that the cabinet council met every evening towards nine o'clock, and requested me to be present at its sittings. I went every evening on his invitation. The opinion that I formed from what I saw at the council-board was, that in the grave and difficult situation in which the country found itself little was to be hoped from the efforts of the ministers. Their meetings generally began at half-past nine. Sometimes the council only opened at eleven at night, because the members did not arrive sooner. The proceedings commenced by a few words about public business, or state affairs. The rest of the time was passed in gay conversation, M. Picard laying himself out to crack jokes and tell good stories. M. Jules Favre did not talk much, but his colleague of the Interior was hardly ever silent. If he could not keep up an amusing conversation with his neighbour on the right, he tried what he could do with the one on the left. I admit this was not business-like; but what I say is literally true. The talk and fun went on till one o'clock in the morning. Occasionally a despatch was brought from the prefecture of the police, from a ministry, or from the staff, to keep us informed of the situation. General Vinoy often lost patience. He sat next me, and we used to say that it was pure loss of time for us to attend those ministerial councils. As commander of the national guard, I chiefly corresponded with M. Picard. I gave him a daily report of what was going on. His answer generally was, 'Oh, it's nothing. We're used to that sort of thing. You know of what curious stuff the population of Paris is made.' M. Picard was incredibly careless in business matters. Here is an instance. The officers of the national guard who were mobilized had been promised a rise of salary, and the same pecuniary advantages as the officers of the Line; that is to say, an indemnity for their outfit. These advantages were formally promised. But as the siege dragged on, the government began to repent of saddling the state with such a heavy expense. It was then decided that no allowance for outfits was to be made. However, a compensation of some sort was necessary, and it was finally arranged that two months' extra pay was to be given as a remuneration for the cost of uniforms, &c. The first month was paid in February, but not the second. When I took the command of the national guard, I was overwhelmed with demands and complaints. I understood nothing of the matter, and asked an explanation from a member of my staff, who gave me a very clear one. In consequence of what he told me I at once waited on M. Picard, to demand the entire fulfilment of the engagement made by the government. He received me in his gay, jaunty way, and when I told him on what errand I had come, he said, 'Make your mind easy, and pay them the other month.' 'But I must have the order.' 'Nothing easier, I shall give you one. Yes, I shall see that you are given one.' 'But,' I interrupted, 'it must be a written order.' 'You shall have one; go and tell those officers that the matter is all settled.' I went, as I was authorized, and thought the affair was arranged; but the complaints and demands, I found, went on. Numbers of officers came to claim what was due to them, and I put them off with quotations from M. Picard. At length I summoned my principal staff officer, Roger du Nord, and instructed him to prove to the duns that what was due to them would most certainly be paid. He objected, telling me that the shortest way was to pay the debt at once. I positively refused to do this, unless furnished with M. Picard's written order, for the sum total amounted to 900,000 francs. M. Roger du Nord then went to expostulate with the minister of the Interior, and to inform him of my determination. Pressed in this way, M. Picard turned round and

refused plump to give any order. 'Since the money is not paid,' he said 'let them wait some time longer for their indemnity." The 18th of March came round a few days later, and from that day to this not a centime of the indemnity has been paid."

Mr. Adam, prefect of police under the government of the National Defence, together with MM. Favre, Ferry, and Arago, denied that there was any connection between the Communists and the enemy; but he gave the following sketch of the Bonapartist machinations:—"Before the 31st October my attention was called to the proceedings of the Bonapartists. I quietly attended to this matter, and did my best to follow the conspirators secretly. It was difficult to track them, owing to the Bonapartist composition of the police. The presence of General Fleury was reported to me. I am unable to prove it; but this much I know, that a very important member of the imperialist party entered Paris in October. It was only at a later period that I understood why he came. Towards the end of October the Bonapartists plucked up courage, and managed to send emissaries backwards and forwards through the Prussian lines in the direction of Reims. I cannot affirm in how far these movements were connected with the insurrection of the 31st October. Subsequent to this date, the Bonapartist agents who were introduced into Paris disappeared as if by enchantment. I quitted the prefecture shortly after, and it was only when I heard of the capitulation of Metz that I understood the gravity of the intrigues which had been signalized to me."

A very important witness, General Le Flô, minister of War during the siege, went to Bordeaux in February, and only entered Paris on the 17th of March, the day before the insurrection broke out openly. He found the government occupied with the plans of the attack on Belleville and Montmartre. The army then numbered about 40,000. After the failure of the above attack General Le Flô went to M. Thiers, and they together went to see General Vinoy. From that time the president of the council thought that if the situation did not improve in the afternoon, there was nothing to be done but to evacuate Paris. At six in the evening the minister of War and General Vinoy were of opinion that it was necessary to quit the Hôtel de Ville, the prefecture of police, the Luxembourg palace, and the Palais de l'Industrie in the Champs Elysées. The government was much opposed to such a course. A discussion then took place respecting the holding of the Ecole Militaire and the Trocadéro; but General Le Flô maintained that there must be no half measures, and that to remain twelve hours longer in Paris was running the risk of not taking one single regiment back to Versailles entire. Such, though General Le Flô did not say so in as many words, was the small confidence which the generals entertained towards the army. Finally, General Le Flô gave an order in writing to General Vinoy, to abandon all the points which the army then occupied in the interior of Paris. "It was I," says the general, "who gave this order; it is I who am responsible for it; I am glad of the opportunity of asserting the fact. . . Consequently, if there be any merit in the act, I am glad to claim it." It is added that M. Thiers had, at the time in question, already left Paris for Versailles.

With respect to leaving the arms in the hands of the national guards, General Le Flô was decidedly of opinion that it would have been impossible to have taken them from them:—"If we had attempted to disarm them at the moment of the capitulation, we should certainly have failed. We should have had to fight a battle in Paris which would have lasted, perhaps, three days, and we had but three days' provisions; the consequence would have been famine at the end of that period, with 250,000 Prussians encircling us." The general is, however, of opinion that while it would have been impossible to disarm the national guards, a great fault was committed in allowing the disarmed troops to re-enter Paris during the armistice; they became perverted, and thus aided the demagogues in arms to carry out their schemes. This supposed effect of an enraged and demoralized army sounds like truth.

The commission of inquiry then interrogated General Le Flô concerning the evacuation of the forts, and if he assumed the responsibility of it. The general replied:—"The forts were evacuated without my knowledge, and it was not until five or six days after the fact that I was informed of it. It had never entered my brain that such an act could have been committed." The fact of such a proceeding remaining unknown to the minister of War for nearly a week, shows what a state of disorganization must have existed everywhere.

In conclusion, General Le Flô attributed the insurrection of the 18th March principally to the discontent of the national guards. He considered "it was a grand mistake not to have employed them more, for they would have fought very well. I told General Trochu twenty times that he was wrong in making no use of them; that he would be forced to do so some day, and then he would not have the credit of the initiative. General Trochu was not disinclined to employ them; and I must add that the man who was absolutely opposed to it was General Ducrot."

General Vinoy who was commander-in-chief of the army of Paris at the time the insurrection broke out, was the next witness, and a very important one. M. Thiers, it appears, before quitting Paris for Versailles, had given a written order to the effect that all the troops then in the south forts should be collected at Versailles. The general said he was opposed to the attempt to take the cannon from Montmartre; he recommended instead that the payment of those who had them in their possession, the allowance of fifteen pence a day, should be stopped; but he could not get the government to agree to this, nor could he get the leaders Henry, Duval, Razoua, and others, arrested as he wished. The government declared that it had not the means, and suggested that the troops under him, the commander-in-chief, should do it; but he replied that with 12,000 in a city in which the national guards had 300,000 muskets in their hands, it was impossible. The commission asked the general whether the attempt to retake the guns was not compromised by the unfortunate delay in bringing up the necessary horses to take away the cannons; he admitted the delay, but said that there were 600 guns to be taken away, and that each required from four to eight horses. Seventy pieces were got away; but it would have taken three days to have removed them all, and the insurrectionists might have taken others from the ramparts during the time.

In connection with this question of removing the guns, it may be mentioned that the Communists took them away, and got them to the top of Montmartre with much less than eight, or even four, horses to each. We saw many of them taken from the Artillery Park in the Avenue Wagram, first by two or four horses, but afterwards by troops of men, women, and children, who made quite an amusement of the affair. It would seem almost as though General Vinoy desired to shield the ill will of the regulars as much as possible, which was not unnatural; for had there been the will, it does not appear that the way to get the guns down could not have been found.

Another important point mentioned by the general was the temporary vacation of Mont Valérien; he was aghast when he found that the order to withdraw the troops from the southern forts had been applied to Valérien, and he immediately went to see M. Thiers on the subject. This was in the morning of the 20th of March. The account of the interview is quite dramatic; the general says:—"I went at one o'clock in the morning to see M. Thiers. He was in bed, and I had an explanation with him. He said, 'But what troops will you put in Mont Valérien?' I answered: 'You know that I sent you the 119th of the Line to Versailles, to clean and take possession of the town; this regiment is well commanded, and it is that which should be sent to Mont Valérien, and that immediately.' M. Thiers agreed to sign the order which I asked for; I then went in search of the colonel of the 119th, and asked him where his men were. The answer was that they were distributed here and there all over the town." Three hundred men were soon got together and sent off with an escort of cavalry to Mont Valérien, which otherwise would doubtless have been occupied by the Communists, thus rendering the position of the government infinitely worse even than it was. It will not be forgotten that it was this fortress which afterwards destroyed the Communist forces marching towards Versailles under Flourens (who fell on the occasion) and other leaders; and that no second attempt was ever made in that direction.

With respect to the other forts, General Vinoy was of opinion that it was absolutely necessary to abandon them on account of the disorganized state of the army. Besides, it was impossible to revictual them without the means of transport; and, moreover, they were within reach of the fire from the cannon on the ramparts of the city.

The above evidence shows what a condition the army was reduced to! As to the condition at headquarters, it is shown by the evidence of Generals Le Flô and Vinoy, that the order to evacuate Paris emanated from the minister of War, and that for the evacuation of the forts from M. Thiers; but neither thought it worth while to consult the council of ministers on the subject, nor was the commander-

in-chief informed of what M. Thiers had done; he left him and the minister of War to find it out for themselves!

Admiral de Saisset, who is known to be a brave old sailor, was one of the worst witnesses possible; his thoughts were confused, and his assertions loose and careless in the extreme; he contradicted those with whom he had acted, and was contradicted by them. He said that Dombrowski, Engel, and Veysset, all dead, were traitors in the Communist camp. He admitted against himself, that he was sent from Versailles to amuse the Parisians by promises, which he knew the government did not intend to keep; M. Thiers, said the Admiral, never had the slightest intention of making any compromise with the Commune. How the government could have chosen such an agent for such an employment is beyond understanding; and how it could venture to send him before the commission to be examined, is equally extraordinary.

Marshal MacMahon's evidence was, of course, almost entirely military; he had nothing to do with the conduct of matters in Paris previous to the Commune, as he only returned from Germany on the 17th of March, the very day before the outbreak. He was immediately offered the command of the government troops; he only accepted it on the 6th of April. The marshal's description of the second line of defence within the fortifications at Auteuil and Passy, to some extent confirms the charges of treachery made by others against Dombrowski. The insurgents had made themselves, he says, a position of immense strength, by crenelating the railway viaduct near Point du Jour, and loopholding all the houses and garden walls around; they, together, formed a kind of fortress extending from the Bois de Boulogne to the Seine. The evidence of the marshal seems to prove that the insurgent troops had been drawn by their leaders from this strong position, so that the marshal obtained easy access, through Auteuil and Passy, to the central portions of the city. But turning and carrying barricades afterwards, he lost 600 men, killed, and had 7000 wounded. He describes the struggle as far more serious than generally represented. The insurgents profited by all the defences thrown up against the Germans, to oppose the government troops, and cause the victory to be sanguinary. In the early part of the struggle, says the marshal, the insurgents were intensely excited, and numbers of them fought with great energy. The red bags on the barricades were, in some cases, defended to the last man. They appeared convinced that they were fighting in a sacred cause, and for the independence of Paris. Their enthusiasm the marshal believed to be genuine. Eight days after the commencement of the struggle, the case was altered, a moral collapse had occurred; the prisoners declared that they only took up arms because they could not help it, that they served the Commune in order to obtain bread, &c.

When Rossel was arrested, he was taken before Marshal MacMahon, who says that he denied he was Rossel; he seemed confused, broken, bewildered. After being questioned he became confused, and at length said—"Well, I am Col. Rossel, I am tired of concealing my name; I am at length delivered from the miserable life I have long been leading." From that moment he was himself again, and recovered his natural ease of manner and self-possession. He was under the impression that he would be shot on the instant, and said to the commissary of police charged to interrogate him, "All I ask is, that they will allow twenty-four hours to elapse before my execution."

The president asked, "Did the women participate in the wild excitement of the men?"

"Yes, near Montmartre especially, they insulted and reviled the soldiers."

"After the taking of Paris, were there many cases of assassination?"

"Very few. All the time I was in Paris, only four soldiers and an officer were fired at."

"Is it true that there were many cases of poisoning?"

"I only heard of one. I was told that a man was taken to the ambulance in the Champs Elysées, directed by Dr. Chenu. He had violent colics; and there was an idea that he had been poisoned. Doctors Chenu and Larrey, who examined him, were of this opinion. I heard that the man ultimately died, and that he had been poisoned by a woman, who offered him a drink. No other case of the kind ever came to my knowledge."

"Can you tell us the number of insurgents shot in Paris?"

"When men surrender their arms it is admitted that they should not be shot. Unhappily, in different places my instructions to this effect were forgotten. I believe, however, the number of

executions in cold blood has been greatly exaggerated."

"How many were killed fighting?"

"It is impossible for me to say. I don't know."

"A general tells me that 17,000 were killed fighting in the streets and on the barricades?"

"I don't know what data he has to go upon. But it appears to me that his estimate is exaggerated. All I can say is, that the insurgents lost a great many more than we did."

There are ample proofs on record that MacMahon's orders were disregarded. Major Garcia, on his own showing, was one of those who forgot MacMahon's orders not to shoot prisoners in cold blood. He gave a dramatic account of Millière's execution, at which he presided, on the steps of the Pantheon. "He (Millière) was brought to us while we were breakfasting in a restaurant in the Rue Tournon. He was surrounded by an infuriated crowd, which threatened to tear him in pieces. I said to him, 'You are Millière?' 'Yes,' he answered, 'but you are aware that I am a deputy.' 'Possibly. And it also happens that there is a deputy here to identify you. M. de Quinsonas cannot fail to recognize you.' I then told him that the general's orders were to shoot him. 'Why?' 'I don't know you personally, but I have read your articles with indignant loathing. You are a viper on whose head one likes to tread. You detest society.' He cut me short, saying, with a significant expression, 'Yes, I detest this society.' 'Very good. Society in her turn will cast you from her bosom. I am going to have you shot.' 'Your summary justice is barbarous and cruel.' 'And all your cruelties! Have you thought of them? At all events, you say you're Millière, and that's enough for us.' Orders were then given for him to be taken to the steps of the Pantheon (a church!), and there executed. He was commanded to go on his knees, and demand pardon of society for the evil he had done; but he refused to be shot kneeling. I then said to him, 'It's the order; you mustn't be shot in any other posture.' He attempted to go through the farce of opening his shirt and presenting his bare breast to the firing party, on which I called out, 'You want to show off. I suppose you wish it to be said in what way you met death. Die tranquilly, and it will be better for you.' 'I have a right in my own interest, and in the interest of my cause, to die as I have a mind.' 'With all my heart; but kneel, I command you.' 'Not unless I am forced by two men.' Two men were told off to put him on his knees. The firing party was drawn out; Millière cried out, *Vive l'humanité.* He was going to cry out something else when he fell."

The next witness examined by the commission was the marquis de Plœuc, the under governor of the bank of France, who gave an interesting account of the difficulties of his position under the Commune. When the army left Paris on the 18th of March the bank had in its possession, in bullion, notes, deeds, shares, plate, and jewels, an amount equal to very nearly £97,000,000 sterling! The bank at this moment represented, more completely than it had ever done, the credit of the country; for had it been invaded and pillaged by the Commune, it is difficult to say what might not have happened, with one-third of France in the occupation of foreigners, and an enormous debt to be paid almost immediately. M. Rouland, the governor of the bank, went immediately to Versailles, and from the 23rd March M. de Plœuc acted as governor. On the evening before the bank had paid 1,000,000 francs (£40,000) to Jourde, Varlin, and Billioray, to enable them to pay the national guard, and to assist their wives and children. It was impossible for the bank to transfer itself to Versailles, and it was determined to accede to all demands actually necessary, to prevent its being invaded by the Communists. But already a second 1,000,000 francs had been demanded by Jourde and Varlin, who talked about taking radical measures if their demands were not promptly complied with. The second million was paid. After the proclamation of the Commune, M. Beslay, who had first been named governor of the bank, but who finally declined that title, was named delegate of the Commune at the bank, and entered into possession. M. Beslay then rendered such services to the bank as obtained for him the means of passing into Switzerland without hinderance. The truth, says M. de Plœuc, demands that it should be known that it was by the influence, energy, and acuteness of M. Beslay that the bank was enabled to maintain its battalion of guards, formed of its own officers and servants, for its defence. From the 6th of April there were fears that M. de Plœuc would be arrested, so that he was compelled to abstain from regular attendance at the bank, and the council met at the house of one of the regents.

The situation grew worse and worse. A paper fell into the hands of the Communal leaders which led them to suppose that the crown diamonds were deposited in the bank, and it required great determination and patience to prove to them that this was not the case. By about the 12th of May the difficulties became terrible. Jourde pretended that the bank was accused of being used as the resort of Versailles conspirators, and as a magazine for arms. It was with the greatest difficulty that the occupation of the establishment was prevented; but at last it was agreed that previous notice should be given to M. Beslay, the delegate. Had the Commune got possession, it is impossible to say at what cost they could have been satisfied. The dangers had risen to the highest pitch on the 23rd of May. The troops had been in Paris for forty-eight hours, but the bank was not protected, and the fires which sprang up on all sides approached nearer and nearer to the building. It was not till the morning of the 24th that General l'Hériller made his way to the bank, and there established his head-quarters.

The finale of this story is that the Bank of France managed to escape by paying over to the Communal leaders, in all, the amount of 7,290,000 francs or £291,600, not more than a three-hundredth part of its stores.

M. Corbon, another witness, gave an insight into a new matter; he was formerly one of the maires of Paris, and during the Commune period he was one of the principal members of the Republican Union League, which is mentioned in the early portion of our notice of the Commune, but about which it was next to impossible to get further information.

The republican league must be regarded as representing the real grievances out of which the Commune sprang, but as opposed to the Communistic leaders; in other words, the league, according to M. Corbon, represented the ardent desire of the Parisian population for municipal franchise, and formed a sort of moral shelter for those citizens, who, although very ill pleased with the Versailles government, would not act with the Commune.

The first idea of the league was to act as intermediary between Paris and Versailles; a deputation from amongst its members placed itself in communication with M. Thiers to ascertain on what conditions he would consent to treat. These conditions were stated, and M. Corbon does not seem to consider that they were exaggerated. The next thing was to ascertain those of the Commune; the league therefore sent delegates to the Hôtel de Ville, but they were very ill received, the Committee of Public Safety declaring the members of the league to be its worst enemies, and that they were undermining the defence to the profit of Versailles. Some members of the Commune, however, Vermorel and others, took a different view of the matter, exhorted the League not to lose courage—"Continue your work," said Vermorel; "the league may yet save all, may save Paris, and may save us from ourselves and from this frightful war."

The last attempt of the league was on the 23rd of May, when the Commune was in dissolution, but the Central Committee still sitting at the Hôtel de Ville. The result of this appeal places the committee in the most ludicrously painful light. The *ultimatum* of these men, who must have known by this time that they were utterly defeated, was to the effect that the committee would consent to abdicate and resign its powers on the condition that the army should immediately retire far from Paris, that the assembly should be dissolved on the same day as the Communal government, and that until a constituent assembly could be formed the government should be carried on by the delegates (of whom is not stated) of the great towns. This ridiculous ultimatum was, of course, waste paper.

The last act of the league, if M. Corbon is to be credited, and we know no reason why he should not be, had, however, a most important effect. Three of the Committee of Public Safety, terrified at the state of affairs and at the ruin already caused, revoked the order that had been given to set on fire the Imperial Printing Establishment, the Archives, and the Library of the Arsenal; and these three public edifices were saved, with the mass of public records of the history of France, the valuable books, and the splendid founts of Oriental and other type for which the Imprimerie is famous all over the world.

This short account of the acts of the Republican Union proves the truth of the opinion advanced in a chapter on the Commune; namely, that had the mass of the well-disposed Parisians exhibited any kind of cohesive action, the Commune could never have gained its mischievous power. We have seen that the league in March bearded the

Commune and exhibited considerable energy, finding favour with the people; that it was able to maintain itself and attempt to bring about a conciliation; and that at the last it was still in existence, and seems to have done some service. That it did not do more must be attributed to the absence of many of the most influential citizens after the siege, and to the culpable apathy of the remainder.

General Cremer, who obtained the liberation of General Chanzy, had an opportunity of seeing the famous central committee and the most conspicuous members of the Commune at their work, and gave a graphic description of them before the commission of inquiry. He found that there was no regular president; one member being in the chair one day, and another on another day. "It was a deplorable sight," he says, "to see the *salons* of the Hôtel de Ville full of drunken national guards. In the great hall there was a disgusting orgie of drunken men and women; the committee met in a room at the corner of the building by the quay, and here there was more order and decency. The attendance of the members of the committee was very irregular, and when a meeting was called all the cabarets had to be ransacked." General Cremer's account of the *deliberations* of the committee is singular; he says, "They quarrelled" (literally, 'took each other by the hair') "during the first five minutes of their sitting; no pot-house exhibits such scenes as did the meetings of the committee; all the eccentric doings of the minor theatres of our days were unsurpassed by what I saw in the committee. Had they not been horrible, they would have been irresistibly comic. There were never more than six or seven members present at once; some were constantly going out and others coming in; some were always intoxicated, and these were the most assiduous, because as they were it was not easy for them to leave the room. There was one of middle height, well built, with long greyish hair, ill-kept beard, who invariably had his Chassepot in hand; when he addressed you he pointed it at you, and when he had finished he shouldered it again."

The publication of the evidence taken before this commission caused considerable sensation, and one violent quarrel. It is understood that the various witnesses, or some of them at least, believed they were merely supplying private information for the use of the government, and were thunderstruck at seeing their revelations appear in print. This belief is in part supported by the very free and easy manner in which some of the witnesses spoke of acts and communications which were certainly and necessarily of a secret nature. The extraordinary part of the affair is that the book is supposed only to be distributed to members of the Assembly, and not to be sold by the booksellers; but any one can obtain it for about fifteen shillings, and it has sold largely. It is said that some one acting for the Count de Chambord has spent hundreds of pounds in distributing it in the large towns; the revelations contained in it, both as regards the imperialists and the republicans, being of course immensely interesting to the royalists.

Among the contradictions to the evidence that have appeared in print is a letter from the Communist General Cluseret, who denied the truth of Admiral Saisset's assertion that the former was an agent of Prussia. Admiral Saisset was, as we have said before, one of the most unhappy of witnesses; he gave evidence which did himself little credit, and his assertions respecting others have been strenuously denied, and in some cases disproved; all admit that his mind is of a curiously illogical mould. In reply to General Cluseret's letter, it is declared that, in 1870 at any rate, he was in relation with the German legation at Berne. This, however, is evidence as loose as that of the brave but blundering admiral, who was challenged by the ex-General Cremer for stating that the latter was paid heavily for securing the release of General Chanzy from the Communists. He was compelled to retract this, and General Cremer cleared himself of any such imputation.

CHAPTER VII.

GERMANY AFTER THE WAR.

Return of the Emperor to Berlin—Contrast with the Arrival of the Emperor Napoleon as an Exile in England—Rewards and Honours to Counts von Moltke and Bismarck—Meeting of the First Reichstag of the New German Empire—History of the Union of Germany, and Full Description of the Constitution of the Empire, with its similarities to, and differences from, those of other States—The Ceremony at the Opening of the First Imperial Parliament—Speech of the Emperor and Address in Reply—Delay on the part of the French in concluding the definite Treaty of Peace—Sharp Speech of Prince Bismarck, and its Effect in France—Differences as to the Meaning of some of the Points Agreed to in the Preliminary Treaty—Feeling of Exasperation in Germany—Meeting of MM. Jules Favre and Rouyer-Quertier and Prince Bismarck at Frankfort, and Settlement of the Treaty—Its Terms, and the Slight Alterations made by it in the Original Draft—Reception of the News in Germany and France—Grand Military Festival at Berlin—Full Description of the Proceedings—Legislation of the New German Parliament—Special Act for the Government of Alsace and Lorraine—Resistance of the Population to the new order of things—Seditious Language Forbidden in the Pulpit—Severity of the German Regulations as to Nationality and the Conscription for the Army—Payment of part of the Indemnity anticipated by the French with Beneficial Results to both Countries—Arrangement as to the Customs' Duties of Alsace and Lorraine—Application of the War Indemnity in Germany—Increase of Pay to Disabled Soldiers—Burying of 40,000,000 thalers as a "War Treasury"—Military and Naval Preparations to provide against the Contingency of another War.

WHILST the terrible drama described in the previous pages was being enacted in Paris, very different had been the course of events in Germany.

His Majesty the emperor returned to Berlin on March 17, and met with a very hearty reception; but the demonstration from beginning to end bore a civilian impress, and in the most military capital of Europe there was no military show. It might almost be said, indeed, that there was little actual rejoicing, or rather that the joy of the people was dashed with the recollection of what the struggle had cost them. Many thousand German soldiers were still in France; many thousands more lay in French graves. The recollection of these losses, and the absence of so many countrymen and friends weighed upon the minds of the Prussians, and saddened even their looks of thanksgiving. Nevertheless they illuminated their capital, and received their sovereign with the grateful loyalty due to his achievements. They felt the magnitude of their success, and testified, though in a comparatively quiet way, the depth and sincerity of their emotions. The emperor-king met his wife and children once more after a separation of eight perilous months; and on re-entering his palace, with a peaceful promenade of the population under the lamps of welcome, the eventful day concluded.

Three days after the German sovereign re-entered his capital as a conqueror, the ex-emperor of the French landed as a refugee at Dover. Since the previous 10th of July the one sovereign had gained a new title and an exalted position in Europe; the other had lost his throne, and, after being for six months a prisoner of war, was now an exile in a foreign land.

The emperor of Germany took the earliest opportunity of showing his sense of obligation to his two invaluable servants—Counts von Moltke and Bismarck. The former was created a field-marshal, and received the grand cross of the Order of the Iron Cross; the latter was raised to the rank of a prince. Subsequently the estate of Schwarzenbeck, in Lauenburg, was conferred upon him by the emperor, in acknowledgment of his services to the country. It had a rent-roll of 40,000 thalers; the capital value, according to German calculations, being equal to 1,000,000 thalers—the very sum the emperor intended as a gift. That sum, however, by no means expressed the full extent of his Majesty's generosity. The lands had been crown lands; the rents, even at the time of their assessment many years before, had been fixed very low; the above sum therefore represented not more than about the third part of the real value; and it was considered that, on the expiry of the leases in a few years, the rents would easily bear to be tripled. The German chancellor thus practically received a gift of 3,000,000 thalers.

On March 21 the dream of generations was fulfilled, when the emperor opened the first Reichstag of the new German empire. For the first time since the beginning of the century, a parliament met representing all the states of Germany. It was no

mere Constituent Assembly, like the one wrecked on revolutionary breakers twenty-two years before; nor was it restricted to the treatment of financial affairs, as was the Customs' Parliament, the makeshift devised in 1866. It was a recognized body established on the basis of a new constitution, ratified by all the local sovereigns and parliaments of the land; a supreme legislative corporation, whose jurisdiction included a large portion of the ordinary political business, and was sure in the natural course of things to extend.

And here, as we have hitherto only incidentally alluded to the growth of the "United States of Germany," it may be well to state briefly the circumstances under which the union was effected, and to glance at the leading features of the new constitution.

The original constitution of the North German Confederation, comprehending the Prussian monarchy and the small northern and central states, came into general operation on the 1st of July, 1867. It instituted a Federal Council of forty-three members, and an Imperial Parliament of 297, which bodies were to form the Legislature in all matters affecting the common interests of the united states—such as the civil rights of German subjects, the army and navy, matters of trade and finance, railways, posts, and telegraphs, and the administration of justice. The presidency was assigned to the king of Prussia, with power to declare war and make peace, to conclude treaties with foreign powers, and to send and receive diplomatic agents. Where such treaties affected matters reserved to the Legislature, they required the sanction of the Federal Council and of the Imperial Parliament.

The victorious progress of King William in the war with France could hardly fail to determine the waverers of the south to accede to the union. First came Baden and the southern portion of Hesse-Darmstadt, by a convention signed on the 15th of November, 1870. The treaty with Würtemburg was concluded on the 25th, that with Bavaria on the 23rd, of the same month; and they severally took effect on the 31st of December, just before the assumption of the imperial crown by the Prussian king.

Baden and Hesse adopted the federal constitution with very few alterations—Baden reserving to herself the taxes to be raised on brandy and beer. By the treaty Würtemburg reserved the same taxes, and also, for the present, the regulation of her own posts and telegraphs. Her military relations to the Confederation were settled by a separate convention bearing the same date, so that her army corps should form part of the federal army, under the supreme direction of the president of the Confederation.

The accession of Bavaria was not so easily effected. The Bavarian government reserved to itself the right of separate legislation in domestic matters, the settlement of political rights and of marriage, and the regulation of the laws of assurance and mortgage, as affecting landed property. It further reserved the administration of its own railways, posts, and telegraphs, subject to the control of the Confederation in so far as the general interests might be concerned, and to the normal principles which the Confederation might prescribe for railways to be used in the federal defences. A committee of the Federal Council was to be appointed for foreign affairs, consisting of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemburg, with Bavaria as president. At those foreign courts where there were Bavarian envoys, they were to represent the federal body in case of the absence of its envoy, and at the courts where Bavaria might keep envoys the federal envoy should not be charged with affairs exclusively Bavarian; Bavaria, in the absence of Prussia, to have the presidency in the Federal Council. The taxation of Bavarian brandy and beer was reserved. Bavaria was to bear the costs of her army, as a corps belonging to the federal army, such corps to be regulated in time of peace by her own government. Her fortresses were to continue her own, subject, however, to federal supervision; and the important stipulation was made, that in the Federal Council fourteen adverse votes should suffice for the rejection of any measure affecting the constitution.

After the meeting of the Reichstag some trifling amendments were made, and, as finally agreed upon, the constitution of the German empire bears date April 16, 1871. By its terms all the states of Germany "form an eternal union, for the protection of the Confederation and the care and the welfare of the German people." The supreme direction of the military and political affairs of the empire is vested in the king of Prussia, who, as such, bears the title of Deutscher Kaiser (German Emperor). According to article two of the con-

stitution, the Kaiser represents the empire internationally, and can declare war, if defensive, and make peace, as well as enter into treaties with other nations, and appoint and receive ambassadors. To declare war, if not merely defensive, the Kaiser must have the consent of the Bundesrath, or Federal Council, in which, together with the Reichstag, or Diet of the Realm, are vested the legislative functions of the empire. The Bundesrath represents the individual states of Germany, and the Reichstag the nation. The members of the Bundesrath, fifty-eight in number, are appointed by the governments of the individual states for each session, while the members of the Reichstag, 382 in number, are elected by universal suffrage and ballot for the term of three years.

The Bundesrath and Reichstag meet in annual session convoked by the Kaiser, and all laws for the empire must receive the votes of an absolute majority of both Chambers. The Bundesrath is presided over by the Reichskanzler, or Chancellor of the empire, appointed by the Kaiser, but the president of the Reichstag is elected by the deputies. The payment of any salary or compensation for expenses to the deputies is forbidden by article thirty-two of the constitution.

The Bundesrath, in addition to its legislative functions, forms a supreme administrative and consultative board. It prepares bills and issues such supplementary provisions as may be required to insure the enforcement of the federal laws. The better to superintend the administrative business of the empire, the Bundesrath is subdivided into eight standing committees, respectively for army and naval matters; tariff, excise, and taxes; trade and commerce; railways, posts, and telegraphs; civil and criminal law; and financial accounts and foreign affairs. Each committee consists of representatives of at least four states of the empire.

The common expenditure of the empire is defrayed from the revenues arising from customs, certain branches of excise, the profits of the post and telegraphs. Should the receipts from these various sources not be sufficient to cover the expenditure, the individual states of Germany may be assessed to make up the deficiency; each state to contribute in proportion to its population.

Viewed in connection with history, the new German Confederation is a curiosity. Though a confederation, it is not republican, but monarchic. Its chief is a hereditary king, who, by its constitution, is clothed with the rank of emperor; and its other members are mainly monarchies ruled by kings, dukes, or other princes: three only are free cities, whose constitutions are, of course, republican. Now for ages past the chief federal systems of the world, Achaia, Switzerland, and America, and a crowd of others of less fame, have all been republican. For a union of princes worthy to be called federal we shall look in vain in the pages of history, unless it be said that something of the kind is to be found in the days of the twelve kings of Egypt, the seven lords of the Philistines, or among the tetrarchs of Galilee. No doubt under the old German Bund the presidency was vested in Austria; but at that time the league was so much laxer, the powers which it gave to the federal president so much smaller, that the likeness it bears to the present is not great. The rank of German emperor, with the federal authority vested in that office, is attached by the constitution to the crown of Prussia; and the really novel and important point is that the hereditary chief of the empire is also the hereditary chief of one, and incomparably the greatest, of its states. It is as if the governor of the state of New York should be *ex officio* president of the United States. The absurdity of this arrangement would be apparent. Instead of seeking the good of the Union, the president so chosen would be almost sure to consult the interests of his own particular state, and would almost certainly be appointed for that express purpose, which would not the less consciously be followed that New York, though the greatest state in the Union, is by no means so much the greatest as Prussia is greatest among the German states. But hereditary succession, whatever may be said against it, is likely to do much to lessen evils of this kind. Succeeding by right of birth to the imperial crown, as well as to the crown of Prussia; brought up, it may be hoped, with a view to the greater post as well as to the smaller—a German emperor may easily learn to feel not merely as a Prussian, but as a German, and learn to make the interests of the lower office, should the two ever clash, yield to those of the higher; the interests of his kingdom to those of his empire.

The monarchic nature of the Confederation is again very apparent in the construction of the Bundesrath, or Federal Council. This body does

not answer to the Swiss Bundesrath, which is the executive of the league, but to the Swiss Ständerath or the American Senate. All these bodies represent the states as states, while the other house of the Legislature in each case represents the Confederation as a nation. But the constitution of the German Bundesrath differs in two important points from that of the Ständerath and the Senate. In both the Swiss and the American systems the true federal idea is carried out; each state, great and small, has the same number of votes in the Upper House of the Federal Assembly. The American states and the Swiss cantons differ widely among themselves in extent and population. In one house of the Legislature, therefore, each has a number of representatives in proportion to its population; but in the other house, as independent and sovereign states united by a voluntary tie, they have all equal rights, powers, and dignity, the smallest state having the same number of representatives as the greatest. The Swiss and American confederations, however, were in their origin voluntary unions of independent states, which have since admitted others to the same rights as themselves. In Switzerland, indeed, the original cantons which formed the kernel of the League are now among the smallest of them all. The political equality of Berne and Uri, of New York and Rhode Island, is therefore among the first principles of the two confederations. It would be childish to expect the same sort of equality to be established between Prussia and the conquered enemies or dependent allies, out of which she formed a nominal confederation after her victories in 1866. The confederate nation, as a nation, might, just as much as Switzerland and America, have equality of representation throughout its extent; but it could not be expected that the states, as states, should have the same privilege, or that Prussia should have no greater voice in the federal body than Schaumburg-Lippe and Schwarzburg Sondershausen. Each state, therefore, of the North German League kept in the new Bundesrath the number of votes which it had held in the Plenum of the old German League, Prussia adding to its own number those of Hanover and the other states which it absolutely incorporated. As these did not amount to more than seventeen votes out of forty-three, the proportion could hardly be called unfair; and by the accession of the southern states it has been so reduced, that Prussia has now only seventeen votes out of fifty-eight.

Compared with the senates of the Swiss and the American confederations, there is another obvious difference in the Senate of the new Confederation, directly and necessarily arising out of the monarchic character of the German League. The Swiss constitution provides that the members of the Ständerath shall be chosen by the cantons; the American, that the senators shall be chosen by the legislatures of the several states. No one would have thought of making the Ständerath consist of the chief magistrates of the several cantons or their representatives. But in a confederation whose states are monarchies, it would hardly be possible to shut out entirely the executive governments of the several kingdoms or duchies from a direct place in the federal body. The German constitution, therefore, makes the Bundesrath consist of representatives of the several states, who may be either the princes themselves or their ambassadors. Each state may send as many representatives as it has votes, but these votes must be given as a whole. Bavaria, for instance, may send six representatives; it has in any case six votes, but these must all be given in the same way. This is going back to the arrangements of the ancient league of Lykia, and is unlike the system of America and Switzerland, where each member of the Senate or the Ständerath has an independent vote.

Yet another peculiarity of the new Confederation is an important provision in the constitution of the empire, which did not appear in that of the former North German League. In the latter the president—that is, the king of Prussia—had the absolute power of making war or peace. He had to obtain the consent of the Legislature only when the articles of a treaty concerned matters with which that body had to deal. By the new constitution, the emperor cannot declare war without the consent of the Bundesrath, except in cases of sudden invasion. His power with regard to war is thus much the same as that of the president of the United States with regard to peace; but the powers of the executive with regard to war and peace are quite different in the three confederations. In Switzerland these powers are vested wholly in the Federal Assembly. In America the Congress declares war, but peace is made by the president, with the assent of the Senate. In

Germany the emperor makes peace, with the limitations above mentioned; but he can declare war only with the consent of the Bundesrath.

The constitution of the new German empire, with its elected but not elective emperor, its Upper House of princes reigning by divine right, and its Lower House of members chosen on principles the most democratic, thus appears one of the most remarkable ever accepted by a great people. The new Kaiser has kings among his subjects, and his prerogative is curiously limited by theirs; but still he is in a sense monarch of Germany, a centre round which all Germans may legally rally if they please. Although compelled to explain his foreign policy to the council of kings, as the president of the United States explains his to the Senate, the emperor still dictates that policy, appoints and receives all diplomatists, and is apparently in no way obliged to alter his course should his council disapprove. He cannot, indeed, declare a war without their consent, unless Germany is attacked; but then almost any war may be described as one of self-defence, and in extreme cases the Kaiser can exert a mighty pressure upon the councillors. He has, it is true, on behalf of his hereditary territories, only seventeen votes, while his prince vassals have forty-one; but half of these princes are independent only in name, and of the remainder the king of Bavaria alone retains anything like a solid or defensible position. Even he could not resist unless encouraged by foreign aid, which his people would in no case endure. Of the twenty-four sovereigns and free towns in council, sixteen have only one vote each, and are in a military sense powerless, mere nobles or towns of Prussia; while the chance that Bavaria with her six votes, Saxony with her four, Würtemburg with her four, Baden and Hesse with their three, and Brunswick and Mecklenburg with their two each, should all unite and carry, moreover, half of the powerless princes with them, is so small as to be not worth taking into account. Besides, in the extreme and most improbable case of a vote on war being carried against the emperor, he could, as king of Prussia, declare war for himself—a separate right which he alone has as head of a great power—and thus compel his allies either to rise against him, which would be impossible, or to remain neutral and see the representative of German military honour defeated in battle with the foreigner. Except in Bavaria the emperor is commander-in-chief throughout Germany; appoints all general officers; is, in fact, military service being universal, master of all men from the princes downwards. Bavaria, it is true, retains her separate army, and may appoint diplomatists if she pleases; but that state excepted, the empire is for all military and diplomatic purposes one and indivisible.

Had the unionists secured only this much, they would have been very successful; but they secured a great deal more, and framed a Legislative Chamber, whose powers will very likely prove far more potent throughout the fatherland than any ardent patriot ever contemplated. The local parliaments of the separate kingdoms and states still exist, but they have absolutely no control, either in theory or fact, over external politics or military organization, and are sunk into mere provincial legislatures, with less power than belongs to each of the separate states of America. On the contrary, the Reichstag, elected by universal suffrage, and completely dominated by Prussia, which returns almost two-thirds of its members, has, when in harmony with the council, entire power over criminal legislation, tariffs, excise, coinage and paper issues, commercial and banking laws, copyright laws, navigation laws, laws of judicial procedure, hygienic laws, press laws, trades-union laws, and laws affecting intercommunication; with the two small exceptions, before-mentioned, that Bavaria and Würtemburg fix the taxes on their own beer and brandy, and Bavaria can still compel strangers from other provinces to sue for a permit of residence. It is scarcely conceivable that a Parliament, of which one house is so democratic in its mode of election, so closely bound up with the dominant member of the federation, and invested with such extensive powers, should not go beyond the paper limits of its authority, especially when its legal rivals anxiously wish that it should not remain within them. The Prussian Liberals would most gladly merge their Parliament in the central one, thus getting rid at once and for ever of their tiresome and conservative house of squires; and Hesse and Würtemburg are equally desirous of being freed from the pressure exercised by their courts. In fact, except in Bavaria, where the Ultramontanes are powerful, there is scarcely a party in the empire disposed to stand up for state rights. The drift of opinion, of events, and of material interests, is towards a sovereign Parliament seated in Berlin—towards a legislative unity

which would in a year or two reduce the states to provinces with hereditary lord-lieutenants at their head, and municipal councils to manage local affairs, including, it may be, education and the control of religious establishments. Prussia alone can resist this tendency, and her interest is to profit to the uttermost by her numerical preponderance—to widen in every direction the attributes of the Legislature in which her children are supreme.

There are, however, weak points in the new constitution, which in course of time may possibly involve the empire in serious difficulties. In the first place, absolute power is not lodged anywhere, either in the Kaiser, or the Parliament, or the subordinate legislatures, or the mass of the people, while the necessity for such power is perpetually recurring. Had it existed anywhere in the American constitution, the civil war might very likely have been averted, or at all events the obvious illegality of the insurrection must have cost the seceders hosts of supporters. It may be needful yet, in unforeseen contingencies, to override the Kaiser, or a state, or a combination of states, even while acting on their legal rights; but nowhere within the constitution is it to be found. Nor is there any provision for the reception of new states which may yet come in, and may fatally derange a system carefully framed to give its natural ascendancy to the state which has made Germany.

Again, with respect to the Bundesrath, or Federal Council, it is to be observed that no House of Lords so powerful was ever yet constructed. It is a co-ordinate branch of the central legislature, and is filled by men who must be conservative, who cannot be without followings, who are all in high military command, who have prestige such as can never belong to mere nobles, who debate in secret, and whose number cannot be increased. Each member is protected by immunities such as no noble ever possessed—is, in fact, beyond the law, whether local or imperial, cannot be menaced without treason, or severely criticised without danger of incurring the penalty attached to insulting German sovereigns. The immense strength of the United States Senate, when opposed to the House of Representatives, is the most striking feature in American politics, and its power is derived from the fact that its members represent states instead of districts. So will the imperial councillors, while they will have the further advantages of their royal rank, and their influence, necessarily great, over local elections. Should they rally round their chief, instead of quarreling with him, as they are very likely to do, they will form a conservative power against which the tide of popular feeling may break for years in vain.

Considerable interest of course attached to the opening of the first imperial German Parliament; but though distinguished by somewhat more pomp and circumstance than previous openings of the Reichstag had been, the ceremony was, on the whole, imposing rather from its simplicity than its magnificence. The aristocracy of Prussia and the North, who in other circumstances would have flocked to Berlin on such an occasion, kept quiet in their country houses and provincial towns, as there were few who had not cause to mourn the loss of relatives in the war. The "Weisse Saal," or White Hall, in which the ceremony took place, is a magnificent apartment of white marble attached to the Schloss Chapel, and worthy of the great historical spectacle of March 21. The architecture and decoration display a blending of strength, austerity, wealth, and grace. Lighted from a row of deep-set windows on one side, the walls between and below these are merely whitewashed, and are plain almost to meanness. There is an utter absence of drapery; but the ceilings are richly chased and gilt, and the compartments of the roof and side panels filled with frescoes worthy of a city where poetry and high art conspire to adorn the very beer cellars. A more fitting apartment could not have been chosen to witness the culminating glory of the House of Hohenzollern, and the triumph of the Prussian ascendancy. Twelve electors of the line of Brandenburg look down in marble from the walls, and there are eight noble figures representing the older provinces of the Prussian state. The vast hall below was bare of all furniture, except for the canopy on the dais, and a few chairs arranged on either side of it for the ladies of the blood and the representatives of the foreign powers. One door opposite was kept by the dismounted cavalry of the guard—with the eagle fluttering open-winged, in old Norse fashion, over the golden helmet, the white tunic with the crimson back and front pieces, embroidered in enormous stars of black and white and crossed with broad silver bandoliers. At the other entrance were posted the foot guards of the palace, in the

quaint costume they had worn on high parade ever since the days of the great Frederick—a long blue frock coat laced with cross bars of white, and the lofty triangular shield-like shako, faced with polished steel and backed with scarlet cloth. Gradually officers in multifarious uniforms, land and sea, horse and foot, foreign and native, came straggling in, slipped nervously on the polished floor, or withdrew modestly into the deep bay windows.

About the time the emperor was expected no little sensation was caused, amidst all this blaze of gold and colour, by the entrance of several working men in cloth caps and coarse fustian jackets. As the more respectable-looking mechanic of the number advanced to the imperial dais, he might have been taken for a Cromwell of the Prussian type, determined on outdoing "Old Noll" by ordering his satellites to "take away that throne." They at all events did take it away, and proceeded to open certain dingy bundles, when panels of rusty marble, somewhat like the compartments of an iron garden seat long exposed to the weather, fell out on the crimson velvet of the dais. Out of these materials they erected a very ancient-looking but substantial structure, supported by four cannon balls; and it afterwards transpired that this was the imperial throne of the Saxon emperors, just arrived by special train from Goslar.

Then the hall began to fill, first with uniforms, thickly sprinkled with the sombre black and white of the civilian members of the Reichsrath. But the impression which, though doubtless erroneous, might have been produced upon a stranger, was that this constitutional ceremony was a military pageant, in which arms, once in a way, condescended ostentatiously to the gown. It was natural, however, for the moment, that the martial element should be in the ascendant. Peace, with her attendant blessings, had just been obtained by the sword, and she had to bow in gratitude to the prestige of war.

A burst of distant music excited general expectation; and very soon the grand entrance was thrown open. As the guards presented arms the Emperor William and Empress Augusta entered, and moved slowly down the hall, bowing to the crowd in acknowledgment of the loyal shouts and waving of hats and handkerchiefs. The old monarch, in his stately yet homely dignity, looked every inch the soldier—a man of firm mind and fixed ideas, inheriting the force of character and arbitrary will of his ancestors, and bent on being father of his people in his own way. The various great officers of the empire now took their places, according to rank, around the Kaiser. The Crown Prince, Prince Frederick Charles, Bismarck, Moltke, Von Roon, and others with whose names the events of the past few months had rendered the whole world familiar, occupied places immediately adjacent to the throne, and were each objects of special interest. The white banner of the empire was carried by Field-marshal Von Wrangel, who, though over ninety years of age, stayed at home from the war sorely against his the will. Three vociferous cheers were given for German emperor, after which Prince Bismarck stept out, and bowing profoundly, handed the speech, printed in large letters in a bound volume, to his august master, who proceeded to read it. Repeatedly he faltered; once his voice broke altogether from emotion as the cheers rang out around him; but recovering himself he finished amid a tempest of cheering, and handed the book to an aide-de-camp. Taking his helmet, he bowed low to the assembly, and retired greeted by another chorus of cheering, called for by the Bavarian representatives in the Bund.

The speech congratulated the Reichstag upon the victorious termination of the glorious but trying struggle from which the nation had just emerged—a struggle which had resulted in that unity which, although veiled for a time, had always been present to the mind of Germans, who had now in indelible characters, on the battle-fields of France, marked their determination to be and to remain one united people. Against the abuse of the power thus obtained Germany would be guarded by that amicable spirit which pervaded the culture and morals of the people; and the emperor regarded with special satisfaction the fact that, in the midst of a terrible war, the voice of Germany had been raised in the interests of peace, and a London Conference for settling international questions had been brought about through the mediatory endeavours of the Germau Foreign office. The first task of the Reichstag would be to heal as far as possible the wounds inflicted by the war, and to mark the gratitude of the fatherland to those who had paid for the victory with their blood and their life. The war indemnity to be paid by France would, with the approval of

the Reichstag, be disposed of in conformity with the requirements of the empire, and with the just claims of the confederate members. The speech indicated the leading measures which would have to be considered in the current session, the legislation required for the territories recovered by Germany, &c.; and concluded by expressing a hope that the German imperial war would be followed by an equally glorious and fruitful peace for the empire.

An address in reply to the speech was drawn up by members of all the various political parties in the Assembly, and one or two of its most remarkable passages we must present entire. After reciprocating the emperor's congratulations on the attainment of the goal so long desired by their ancestors, and so ardently hoped for by the present generation, the address proceeded:—"We beg your Majesty to accept the thanks due to the illustrious commander-in-chief of the German army, due to the bravery and devotion of our troops. We are fully sensible of the benefits conferred upon us by deeds which have not only averted present danger, but protected us from the recurrence of similar troubles in the future. Defeat, and still more the strength added to our frontiers, will henceforth restrain our neighbour.

"The dire misfortune France is suffering now, in addition to the calamities of the war, confirms a truth which, though often ignored, is never neglected with impunity. In the family of civilized nations, even the most powerful can remain happy only by prudently confining their action to the improvement of their own domestic affairs.

"In times past, when her rulers were governed by a doctrine imported from abroad, Germany, too, chose to meddle with the concerns of other nations, and by doing so undermined her own existence. The new empire is based upon our own views of national and political life, and, armed for defence, will be entirely devoted to works of peace. In her intercourse with foreign nations Germany claims no more for her citizens than that respect which right and international usage accord. Unmoved by hostility or friendship, she is well content to leave other nations to themselves, and will be happy to see them regulate their own affairs as they think fit. Interference with the internal arrangements of other nations will, we hope, never be resorted to again under any pretext or in any form. . . . . .

"The German people cherish the warmest feelings of brotherly sympathy for the inhabitants of the recovered territories. Alsace and Lorraine are studded with monuments commemorating the most glorious phases of German culture and national life. Although the vestiges of the past may in some cases have been obliterated by long estrangement, Alsace and Lorraine have been our own for a thousand years, and the majority of their inhabitants to this day retain our language and national characteristics. We hope that legislation and administration will unite in reviving the German nationality in those splendid provinces, and in strengthening the ties which bind them to us, by conciliating their feelings. In this spirit we shall undertake the work of ordering the rearrangements to be introduced in Alsace and Lorraine.

"Your imperial Majesty,—Germany, to be satisfied, and Europe, to be safe, required the establishment of the German Empire. Our national longings for unity have been fulfilled at last, and we have an empire protected by an emperor, and placed under the safeguard of its charter and its laws. After this, Germany has no more ardent wish than to achieve victory in the noble strife for peace and liberty and their attendant blessings.

"We are, the most faithfully devoted subjects of your imperial Majesty,

"DER DEUTSCHE REICHSTAG."

When, soon after the capitulation of Paris, the required preliminaries of peace were agreed to, it was expected that a definite treaty to the same effect would be arranged and signed with little delay. France, however, was plunged into fresh troubles by the Paris Commune; weeks, in fact, months, passed by, and up to the beginning of May there appeared no indication of a desire on the part of the French government to conclude the treaty. The inference which Prince Bismarck drew from this delay may be gathered from a speech made by him in the German Parliament. "I confess," said he, "I am compelled to assume that the French government are determined to gain time by unnecessary delays, and that they hope they will be able to obtain more favourable conditions some future day, when their power and authority have been re-established." The chancellor went on to say that the imperial government were determined not to entertain any

proposals springing from such a motive. Consent had been given for the return of all the prisoners to France, but under these circumstances the transfer was at once stayed, and about 250,000 men were retained. The cost of this measure to Germany was all the larger, that the French government had not as yet been in a condition to defray the expense of provisioning the army of occupation, as stipulated in the preliminaries, and which alone amounted to 36,000,000 francs per month, besides a large sum due as interest upon the stipulated indemnity. Prince Bismarck expressed considerable surprise at the remissness of the French government; and said that, as the Germans could not be expected to go on advancing money in this way to the French exchequer, authority would be given to return to the practice of requisitioning, unless the amount over due were shortly forthcoming.

Respecting the policy of non-intervention which the Germans so strictly observed during the troubles of the Commune, Prince Bismarck made some remarks which will serve to show the chaotic condition into which France had by this time been plunged. "It has been observed," he said, "that if we had interfered promptly we might have prevented France from lapsing into her present lamentable condition. But, gentlemen, I shrank from the responsibility of advising his Majesty to meddle with the domestic concerns of our excitable neighbours. Had we offered to intercede, the contending parties would have probably shaken hands, and, turning round upon us in the French emotional fashion, embraced each other with the enthusiastic cry, '*Nous sommes Français; gare aux étrangers!*' Besides, we have no wish to deviate from the programme solemnly announced by his Majesty, which renders non-intervention in the domestic concerns of other nations a principle of our policy. I admit that the interest we have in securing the payment of the indemnity, was a strong temptation to take an active part in the establishment of a solid government in France. I also allow that we might have succeeded in instituting some such government. But just consider what the position of such a government would have been. A government virtually appointed by the foreigner might have found it difficult to hold its own, the moment we withdrew our protection; even if strong enough to assert its authority, it might have thought its position so disagreeable as to resign incontinently, and leave the responsibility of settling with us to its successors. But is there any one in this Assembly who could tell me who their successors would be? Things might actually have come to such a pass that *we* should have had to look out for a successor to M. Thiers. With the like unpleasant prospect before us, I think I may hope for the approval of this Assembly and the nation at large, if I think it as well to abstain from all interference whatever. At the same time, I am not at liberty to give a promise to France to this effect. We must reserve to ourselves the right of protecting our interests, and while leaving the French to themselves, we must guard against guaranteeing them impunity should our just demands be ignored."

This speech had an immediate effect. Within a very short time France, having concluded a temporary loan, at seven and a half per cent. interest, with certain London and Frankfort bankers, paid the whole of the instalments for the provisioning of the troops due up to the 1st of May. Communications were also resumed with a view to the definite settling of the treaty, when it was found that the French put a very different construction from the German government upon certain important points in the preliminaries signed at Versailles. First, the French government contemplated paying the greater part of the indemnity in stock; secondly, they insisted upon charging Alsace and Lorraine with a portion of their national debt; thirdly, they raised certain pecuniary demands connected with the cession of railways in Alsace and Lorraine; and they claimed a larger strip of territory round Belfort than the Germans were disposed to concede.

Concerning the first of these disputed points, it will be remembered that France, in the preliminaries of peace, engaged to pay one milliard of francs in 1871, and the four remaining milliards within three years of the date of the ratification of the preliminaries. But no sooner were negotiations for the definite treaty opened at Brussels, than her representatives declared that it would be impossible to pay such an enormous amount in silver. The coin, they asserted, could not be collected in all Europe, at least not for this purpose, nor by them; and therefore they argued that the preliminaries must be understood to imply payment in stock. The German negotiators replied

that there was a great difference between paper and bullion, and that as no paper had been allowed in the preliminaries, the natural inference was that cash was meant. Upon this the French negotiators somewhat modified their position, and submitted to their German colleagues a proposal to pay one milliard in cash and four milliards in stock. The cash would be handed over within three years from July 1, 1871; the date of the delivery of the stock—French Five per Cents.—being left to special agreement. The German plenipotentiaries, however, did not conceal that they looked upon this proposal as an attempt to violate the preliminaries ratified by the French government and National Assembly, and it was plainly intimated that Germany would insist upon her rights. She had just been compelled to raise another loan in consequence of the prolonged maintenance of her forces on the war footing, caused by the insurrectionary difficulties in France, and to meet the unforeseen necessity of retaining the prisoners of war in Germany. That under these circumstances the French should throw obstacles in the way of the final settlement, with the view, as was considered, of gaining time and strength to make better terms, excited in Germany a feeling approaching to exasperation; and to prevent the unpleasant complications which seemed impending the French ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, M. Pouyer-Quertier and M. Favre, were despatched to Frankfort, where they were shortly joined by Prince Bismarck.

Before going thither the imperial chancellor had determined that, if the result of his interview was not satisfactory, the German army should at once occupy Paris either by an arrangement with the Commune or by force; and that the French government should be required to withdraw its troops behind the Loire, and then resume negotiations. Perhaps there was some foreboding, in the minds of the two French ministers, that this was the alternative awaiting them if they adhered to the views they had formed. At all events, Prince Bismarck found little difficulty in inducing them to abandon their proposal respecting payment in French stock, or the handing over of French debts with the ceded territory. A perfect understanding having been arrived at with regard to these matters, it was further agreed to settle at once the terms of the treaty. With regard to the indemnity of five milliards, it was decided that the payment should be made either wholly in specie, or in notes of English, Dutch, Prussian, or Belgian banks, or in first-class bills. The first half milliard was to be paid within thirty days of the occupation of Paris by the Versailles army; a second payment of one milliard was to be made by the end of 1871, and the fourth half milliard by May 1, 1872. The French negotiators demanded 800,000,000 francs for the Alsatian and Lorraine railroads, which however, was reduced to 325,000,000 francs, and even that sum was allowed only on condition of the German government obtaining possession of the line from Thionville to Luxemburg. The purchase-money of the railways was to count as part payment of the first two milliards of the indemnity, and it was stipulated that the whole of the last three milliards should be paid by the 1st of March, 1874. Interest at the rate of five per cent. was to be paid upon the indemnity until its entire liquidation, and in the meantime the German army of occupation in eastern France, consisting of at least 50,000 men, was to be maintained at the cost of the French government. The East of France Railway Company received 2,000,000 francs for the portion of St. Louis and Basle line on Swiss territory.

With regard to the extended area demanded by the French round Belfort, Prince Bismarck offered to give up the whole arrondissement of Belfort on condition of his acquiring for Germany a strip of territory along the Luxemburg frontier, comprising the communes of Redingen and Moyeuvre, where German was almost entirely spoken; and this proposal was ultimately agreed to by the Assembly. Respecting commercial relations, it was agreed that Germany should be treated on the same footing as the most favoured nations—namely, England, Belgium, &c.; and further, that the Germans who had been expelled from France should be restored to the possession of their property and to their rights of domicile on French territory. Permission was granted that the prisoners might return, and the garrison towns be again occupied; the force before Paris, however, was not to exceed 80,000, and the remainder of the army was to remain behind the Loire.

In Germany the news of the peace of Frankfort was received with enthusiasm, and was justly regarded as a new and brilliant jewel in the princely coronet with which the emperor had rewarded the services of his chancellor. The

success of Prince Bismarck surpassed, in fact, the most sanguine expectations. While thousands of his countrymen were prepared to hear that he had made financial concessions in order to obtain guarantees for the punctual payment of the rest of the sum, and no one ventured to hope that the amount stipulated in the preliminaries would be exceeded—all were surprised by the news that a definite peace had been concluded, without any reduction having been made in the sum demanded; that the interval between the dates fixed for the payment of the instalments had been shortened; and that far better security had been obtained by Germany.

The reading of the treaty in the French Assembly at Versailles naturally caused very great emotion. It was proposed to receive and ratify it in silence, as a lamentable but inexorable necessity. To this the single dissentient was General Chanzy, who could not resist the temptation of pointing out the strategical advantages Germany obtained by the cession of the strip of Luxemburg frontier; and also of blaming the French negotiators for submitting to burdensome and humiliating conditions *while the Prussians might have been conquered, had it been wished.* Such language might have been understood had it come from a Communist, who, ready enough to fight his own government, could never be induced to face a Prussian; but it is rather surprising as coming from one who, having failed in spite of his preeminent courage and skill, had thus clearly exemplified the utter inutility of resistance. In announcing the signature of the treaty, M. Thiers dwelt mournfully upon the onerous conditions involved, but found comfort in the thought that "all Frenchmen will be restored to their country, and we shall be able to fill up the ranks of our glorious and brave army in far greater numbers than we were at first permitted to do by the preliminaries of peace. Our army, besides, has again raised the high fame of the French name and the power of France in the eyes of Europe, and the world once more renders it justice." These observations were received with great applause by the Assembly; though, looking at the events of the previous twelve months, it is not easy to see on what grounds.

On May 20 the treaty was ratified at Frankfort amidst great public rejoicing, and immediate arrangements were made for disbanding the huge assemblage with which the conquest of France had been achieved. The celerity with which this was carried out was little less remarkable than the extraordinary rapidity with which the German armies were brought together at the commencement of the war. At that time a fortnight sufficed to place upon the war footing a force sufficient to take the initiative and carry the hostilities into French territory; and only about the same time was required to send back to their quiet dwellings army and corps' commanders whose names had become famous in history, and to restore to the peaceful avocations of the spade and mattock vast hosts who had proved themselves such adepts in the use of the sword and field-gun.

Previous, however, to the final disbandment of the troops, it was arranged that their return home and entry into Berlin should be the occasion of a grand war festival, a fitting celebration of the great achievements of the past few months. The triumphal entry was the seventh recorded in the history of the city, and those which preceded it mark well the gradual rise of the successful state. On the first occasion of the kind Berlin was only the capital of Brandenburg, the duchy of Prussia not having reverted to this dynasty. The Austro-German Emperor Ferdinand had summoned the Brandenburg Elector, Joachim I., to assist him against the Turks. The elector sent his son with a force of 6000 men from various parts of northern Germany, or Saxony, as it was then called. With these the prince defeated an army of 15,000 Turks, and was triumphantly received by his father on his return in May, 1532. Between this and the second entry there was an interval of nearly 150 years. In December, 1678, the great Elector, Frederick William, chased the Swedes from the island of Rugen, having effected a landing in 350 small vessels, only eleven of which belonged to the government. To commemorate this the Berliners erected triumphal arches, and placed two clumsy imitations of men-of-war on either side of the *via triumphalis*. The most extraordinary entry of all was that of Frederick the Great, after defeating Austria, in 1763. Though victorious in the end, the hero-king was so distressed by the terrible losses sustained in a seven years' war, that he slunk into the capital unseen by his citizens, who were awaiting his appearance with all due pomp and circumstance. The year 1814 witnessed the entry of King Frederick William III., the father

of his reigning Majesty. So conscious was the king of having had no immediate share in the war which led to the fall of Napoleon I., and so strictly honest was he in word and deed, that when his subjects received him at the Brandenburg Gate he uttered these memorable words;—"Personally I have no right to accept your thanks. But if this honour is offered to Field-marshal Blücher, and to the guards and my sons, who alone deserve it, I shall be most happy to join them, and enter Berlin in their company." This was the first time that the procession passed along the Linden, and the culminating point of the day was the performance of divine service in the open square before the Old Palace. During the offering up of the Thanksgiving Prayer the king, the princes, and the entire army there assembled, knelt, and remained in this devout posture for nearly ten minutes. To his son, the Emperor William I., two triumphs were vouchsafed before the late crowning event. His first entry was made in December, 1864, after the defeat of the Danes; the second in September, 1866, when Austria had succumbed to his arms.

The troops detailed to take part in the triumphal procession in 1871 numbered more than 45,000 men, consisting of the Prussian guards, some southern detachments, a certain number out of every regiment that had taken part in the campaign, a "combined" artillery battery, and the second West Prussian regiment. The latter formed part of the corps which carried the heights of Weissenburg, captured the first French colour, and also specially distinguished itself at Woerth. It was, however, selected to accompany the procession, particularly as the regiment in which the emperor served his term before promotion to the rank of officer. Previous to their first appearance in Berlin the troops were quartered in various neighbouring towns and villages, each of which celebrated a triumphal entry of its own on a small scale, and treated the gallant warriors with profuse hospitality.

By the municipal authorities no expense or trouble was spared to render the capital itself, and the approaches by which the troops were to enter, worthy of the magnificent historical spectacle it was to witness. From the Halle Gate to the Schloss—about five miles—two rows of ornamental flagstaffs were placed, fifteen paces apart, on the top of each of which was fixed a Prussian standard, with two German flags suspended halfway up over the escutcheon of one or other Federal state. Occasionally amidst this armorial exhibition might be seen the quartering of the Austrian two-headed eagle—a graceful remembrance of former alliance, and of the many eventful years in which the two countries went hand in hand. All the flagstaffs were connected by a continuous garland of fir, the symbolical tree of Brandenburg, which furnished many miles of festoons for the occasion. Amidst these, at various intervals, were more imposing decorations, consisting of gigantic pictures (some allegorical, others representing different scenes in the war), and of immense trophies commemorative of the leading battles, generally surrounded by the artillery and other spoil captured in the engagements. The way on both sides from the Tempelhof Field to the Palace were also lined with captured cannon and mitrailleuses, each having inscribed upon it the name of the place at which it was taken. The mitrailleuses particularly were a source of endless curiosity to the youth of Berlin, who, by grinding their handles, extracted a faint echo of the reality of their grunting; rode on the top of them as if they had been ponies; or examined with wonderment the intricacies of the spirals.

The Unter den Linden of Berlin, with the magnificent squares touching it at each end, is a justly famous locality. Running from east to west, a fine avenue extends 3000 feet long and 70 feet wide. On each side is a paved way for horsemen, flanked by a broad carriage road with adjoining foot pavement. The houses on both sides are amongst the finest in the capital, and contain a brilliant row of shops. To do honour to the occasion the centre avenue was lined with French cannon, and pillars exhibiting the official war telegrams, connected by festoons and garlands of fresh flowers. At five points the line of captured artillery was broken by triumphal arches, equally simple and tasteful in style. Between two columns placed on each side of the avenue, was suspended a gigantic display of canvas, like an ornamental carpet, covered with choice paintings in wax colours. These exquisite hangings were twenty feet by fifteen; and on one of them, Germania, in the attitude of an exalted priestess leaning against the national oak, sword in hand, while lightning flashed from the lurid sky, called her people to arms. Bavariaus, Prussians, and Saxons, were all thronging forward to obey the summons. On the painting were words taken from the em-

peror's first proclamation on the outbreak of the war; and lines from Becker's "Rhein-Lied," composed in 1840, when M. Thiers seemed inclined to do as Napoleon did in 1870, were inscribed upon the back of the canvas, which formed a splendid purple silk standard, vandyked at the bottom. A couple of hundred feet further on, the next painting, whose subject was again explained by extracts from the emperor's proclamations during the war, exhibited genii bridging over the Main, on the banks of which the Bavarian and Prussian at length united shaking hands. On the third picture, Germania, a blue-eyed virgin of mild maidenly type, standing erect in a gold chariot, rushed into battle, with her fierce stalwart sons crowding around her. While they were cutting their way through death and flame, the German eagle in the sky swooped down on her Napoleonic colleague. In the fourth and fifth pictures, devoted to the apotheosis of Peace, Germania was represented as advancing liberty, industry, and science, under the shadow of the Imperial crown. As another little by-play, the genii of Concord, at a vast elevation in the sky, were performing celestial music, and urging by their harmony, the scholar, the manufacturer, and the merchant to fresh efforts. The unfortunate sufferers through the war were not forgotten amid all the rejoicing. The roads on each side of the avenue were appropriated to the wounded and their attendants, and some thousands were here seated on the "tribunes" prepared for them.

At the western extremity of the Linden is the Paris Square, an open area nearly as large as Trafalgar Square, London, and surrounded by palatial mansions. The opposite end, in the direction of the Park, is closed by the Brandenburg Gate, that celebrated pile, so often called the Prussian Propylæa. It consists of six double columns connected by a flat ceiling, on the raised centre of which stands the celebrated Victory in her iron car. On this auspicious day Victory had her attendants; for hundreds of bold Prussians clambered to her aërial heights to see the entry under the auspices of the protecting divinity of their land. The colossal proportions of the gate were enlivened by a profusion of green garlands of fir and oak.

Where the Linden abuts on the monument of Frederick the Great the Opera Square begins. It is 2500 feet long, about 1500 feet wide, and one of the handsomest places in the world. The king's palace, the Crown Prince's palace, the university, the opera, the arsenal, and in the background the ancient castle, with the town-hall tower overlooking the whole, form a cluster of monumental buildings such as are rarely seen together anywhere. The way of the troops into the interior of the city lay through the Brandenburg Gate, along the central avenue of the Linden, and down the Opera Platz, where in front of Blücher's statue was held the concluding parade.

Most of the public buildings were decorated with festoons, flags, and pictures commemorative of events of the war, or with well-executed statuary designs; and every open space contained memorials, trophies, or allegorical representations in many forms. Perhaps the best and most significant of these were in the Opera Square and Potsdamer Platz. In the latter, on a lofty pedestal surrounded by a circular platform, a colossal statue of Victory—a jubilant angel in a short tunic—soared into the air to a height of seventy feet. The platform at the base was graced by about thirty French cannon, the substantial harvest of the conqueror; and the significant word "Sedan" shone forth in golden letters from the supporting pillar, itself a model of beauty and taste. In front of Cannon-hill, as this exhibition was jocularly termed, were seated two immense and rather morose-looking Amazons, the one on the right side representing Metz, the other on the left, Strassburg. Strassburg, lugubrious in mien, sank the torch with which she so long combated her countrymen; Metz, like a pert vixen, had one arm combatively akimbo, and seemed to look down defiantly upon her captors. That Herr Begus, the renowned artist to whom the city was indebted for these remarkable ornaments of the *via triumphalis*, should have modelled the two cities so true to things as they were, was one proof among others that the Germans had no wish to deceive themselves or others as to the nature of their position in the new provinces.

In the Opera Platz, close to the castle, was a gigantic group representing Germania with Alsace and Lorraine. On the circular base, sixty feet in circumference, appeared in alto-relievo no less than thirty figures the size of life, representing German soldiers hurrying to the strife. Bavarians mingled with Prussians, and the Würtemburg forage cap was conspicuous beside the landwehr

shako of the north. Girls were taking leave of their sweethearts, and as the strong and the fair clung in mute embrace, boys threw up their caps, each contending who should carry his father's gun. A lower frieze allegorized the German rivers, and the whole, as a work of art, deserved to be executed in a more permanent substance than plaster of Paris. Between this group and the Museum, in the large area known as the Lustgarten, stood the statue of King Frederick William III., father of the emperor, the unveiling of which was to form the grand closing feature of the day's festivities.

To witness the spectacle Germans and representatives of nearly every other nationality crowded in immense numbers to Berlin, the population of which was for the time almost doubled. The aspect of the city, from an early hour on the morning of the 16th, may be compared to Fleet-street and Holborn in London on the well-remembered Thanksgiving Day in February, 1872; and large as were the sums paid on that occasion for eligible windows from which to view the procession, it is doubtful if they exceeded those offered in Berlin on June 16, 1871, for sites commanding favourable views of the military triumph. Very early in the day the burgomaster received telegrams from the German societies at Vienna, Marburg, Graatz, and other Austrian towns, congratulating Berlin on her successes, and dwelling with significant emphasis upon the fact that the senders belonged to the nation of the fatherland, and regarded its victories as their own—a fact the more significant that, only a week or two before, a thousand Germans from Hungary had asked permission to take part in the entry and march behind the troops. From regard to their sovereign's feelings the request was refused, but many nevertheless came, and joined the gratified Berliners in drinking to fatherland.

The auspicious morning dawned with beautiful weather. Business was, of course, entirely suspended, and from the early hour of five o'clock the streets streamed with people, who, in a continuous line, crowded the road the troops were to take. Gradually rising from the level streets, and often reaching to a considerable height, they formed so many artificial slopes, gorgeously decked out with scarlet cloth and overtopped by banners and standards, like trees shooting up from a hill side. By eight o'clock the roads were crowded with a vast array of civilians awaiting the army of soldiers, who after many dangers and vicissitudes enjoyed the supreme blessing of seeing home once more. The citizens who had not the privilege of a tribune ticket, took time by the forelock in such portions of the thoroughfares as were open to them. The numerous city guilds paraded the streets in their quaint semi-military insignia and ensigns, each accompanied by its band; and had there been an individual in all the city not conversant with the "Watch on the Rhine," he would on that day have had the opportunity of thoroughly making its acquaintance.

The arrival of a long and melancholy file of wounded, who seated themselves on the tribunes along the Linden avenues, was the signal for the first grand outburst of cheering, while the guild bands struck up with renewed vigour. At length there were indications that the great event was about to take place. Like a herald announcing his master's approach, a vehement hurrah arose along the procession. There was reason for joy For the first time in history it was not a Prussian, but a Pan-Germanic army, that entered Berlin in triumph. For the first time for centuries, the nation had grounded its political unity upon the rock of a united army. To accomplish this end, many a disaster had to be endured, many a bitter draught swallowed; but the full time was now come, and victory and comparative safety were, to the great joy of the people, the reward of prejudices conquered and interests more firmly secured.

The first glimpse the townspeople caught of the procession was as it swept down Belle-Alliance Street, and through Koniggratz Street, towards the Halle Gate. "Belle Alliance" is the Prussian designation for Waterloo, and "Koniggratz" for Sadowa. The army which was now returning after accomplishing the crowning achievement of Sedan, were thus significantly reminded, by the route they followed, of the two other most important battles of the century, which had paved the way for German unity. At the Halle Gate a noble and gigantic statue of Berlin extended a cordial hand to the victors; and here the civic dignitaries stood to welcome them on their entrance into the capital. To remind them of Paris incidents a flight of diminutive balloons was let loose by an adept of the aëronautic art. Marching on to the Anhalt Gate the soldiers found themselves saluted by the lusty hurrahs of 3000 boys placed on a

large platform, flanked by trophies. Proceeding between the flagstaffs marking its course, the gallant array reached the Potsdam Gate with its imposing embellishments. Here the statue of Victory looked down upon them from her terrace bristling with cannon. The two captured ladies, Strassburg and Metz, were seated at her feet. The king stopped his charger, and looked up admiringly at the beautiful group. Many a soldier as he passed along sadly remembered the sacrifices by which the two western fortresses of the enemy had been won, and how much more easy it was for the sculptor to represent them as they now were, than it proved for the army to reduce them to this position.

An expectant flutter pervaded the multitudes crowding Unter den Linden as the thunder of drums and clashing of brass bands, mingled with the lusty cheers, told that the brilliant cavalcade was drawing near the Brandenburg Gate. The national anthem was suddenly drowned by the deafening huzza which resounded from the square inside the portico, and told that the head of the army had entered the city. The gallant Marshal Wrangel led the van; and the veteran warrior, who won his spurs against Napoleon I., was in his place at the head of a generation whom he had taught the way to victory. Alone the old man rode, and was lustily cheered by the people. Behind him were his staff, composed of generals like himself superannuated from active work, or who from other causes were not in the war. Then came the officers of the central staff, and of the staffs of the various armies in the field—an intellectual *élite*, with many a famous name among them. Lieutenant-colonel Verdy, Moltke's assistant and another Prussian Clausewitz, rode close by Colonel Leszczynski, Werder's chief of the staff, and the hero of the three days' battle before Belfort; Blumenthal, who served under the Crown Prince at Woerth; Stosch, who assisted the grand-duke of Mecklenburg at Orleans and Le Mans: and Stiehle, who advised Prince Frederick Charles. These were followed by the leaders who had served as civil governors during the war—Bettenfeld, Falkenstein, Bonin, and Fabrice. Behind them rode the great generals of the campaign—the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Prince George of Saxony, Field-marshal Steinmetz, and Manteuffel, Werder, Von der Tann, Göben, Fransecki, Kamecke, &c.

After a slight interval there followed the illustrious trio who, under the emperor, had the direction of the war—Moltke, Roon, and Bismarck. As the three became visible the cheering rose to a tempest, and the shower of laurel wreaths, which had been pouring down all the while from the grand stand and the windows, became all but overpowering. They looked as characteristic as ever. Moltke was the abstracted sage, caring little for anything under his immediate observation, unless it happened to be a hostile army or two, and seemingly fighting out some imaginary battle in his own mind. Bismarck in his cuirass, taller than tall Moltke, and twice as stout, appeared the stern representative of sovereign common sense he had proved in his rare career. Neither he nor Roon, in whose grim warrior face every ploughed furrow pointed to administrative precision and energy, appeared to care much for the jubilant shouts.

Behind them, the solitary centre of the splendid picture, on his dark bay war-horse, rode the emperor and king—of truly royal aspect, beaming with dignity and good-nature. No welcome could be heartier than that given him; no acknowledgment more gracious. Behind him rode the field-marshals of the royal house—the Crown Prince of Germany, looking every inch a prince and a soldier, on a chestnut horse; and Prince Frederick Charles, heavy-browed, stalwart, and square, with his firm, strong seat on the bright bay charger. Following these came a great company of German sovereigns and princes, who had come to rally round their emperor as in days of yore. Immediately behind came nearly a hundred non-commissioned officers of varied German nationalities bearing the spoils of war—the eagles and the colours. As he wheeled under the gate Kaiser Wilhelm looked back significantly at these prizes, about to pass under a structure once despoiled by the armies of the nation from which they had been taken. Having bowed repeatedly to the stands encircling the square, his Majesty advanced towards a platform on which stood sixty young ladies, who had been selected to greet him by a poetical recitation, and the presentation of a laurel wreath—a time-honoured usage imperatively required by German custom on such occasions. As was the ceremony, so was the costume traditional. The fair band were clad in white, trimmed with blue—the colours of Innocence and Faith—with bare heads and beautiful bouquets. Two matrons

chaperoned the girls, and Fraulein Blaser, the sculptor's daughter, advancing with six of her companions, had the honour of addressing an appropriate poem to the emperor—all about the war which had been so terrible, and the peace which was so soothing. Having received the laurel wreath, he placed it on the hilt of his sword, kissed the speaker, and thanked the blushing donors in fatherly terms. "It is very kind of you," he said, "to come and welcome me. But do not forget those who are coming behind me. I can assure you, they are more worthy of your notice than I am. Receive my reiterated thanks." The Crown Prince likewise accepted a wreath, which he kept in his right hand during the rest of the march. At the head of the Linden the emperor was received by the burgomaster and town council, who presented to him a municipal address, which having been duly responded to, the procession moved on.

And now for the troops. Horse, foot, and artillery, they came on—a glorious sight as they poured through the historical gate. With the brilliant sun reflected on their arms, and the air filled with martial music, eye and ear were alike gratified. With steady tramp came the laurel-crowned stalwart infantry men of the Prussian guard, followed by deputations from all other regiments of the united army—picked men, well fitted to be the representatives of a renowned force. Strong in limb, tall in stature, and manly in countenance, they were uncommonly fine and soldierly-looking troops. There was no very marked difference in type between Northerners and Southerners, only the Bavarians looked a little more elastic and had a rollicking dash in their gait, while the Prussians were somewhat more solid and precise. Heavy grenadiers and light fusiliers alternated in dark-blue columns. In the moving panorama brisk hussars in red tunics succeeded to gigantic cuirassiers in white uniforms. Of course the lancers were not absent, and the multitude of sight-seers had the pleasure of passing in review many a squadron of those ubiquitous uhlans whose swiftness and daring struck terror into the enemy. Every now and then the rumble of artillery was heard; and gunners, who, in keeping with their sombre work, wore the darkest blue of the service, passed in through the gate. The seemingly interminable current swept continuously along, in undiminished strength and rapidity.

The spectators shouted, and the soldiers reciprocated the greeting with hand and sword. If popular sympathy was more warmly expressed towards one part of the army than another, perhaps the Würtemburgers and Bavarians received a heartier welcome from their northern countrymen. Along the whole route the people studiously evinced their joy at the re-union at last effected between themselves and their brethren of the south. As may be imagined, the French colours, or rather their German bearers, likewise elicited a tribute of applause; and it was remarked that many of them were new, and had evidently seen little service. Artillery and commissariat waggons closed the warlike train, which included all branches of the service, the military clergy and *vivandières* not excepted. They were about 45,000 strong, and took three hours and a half to defile.

Having reached the Opera Platz, the emperor, with the princes, the royal guests, and generals, took up their station before the Blücher statue, the Reichstag rising in a bank behind. It is the point from which the kings of Prussia have witnessed festive reviews for the last fifty years. The troops formed in broad fronts as they arrived, and executed the ceremonial march of the Prussian service. As an exhibition of the precision and regularity attained by the first military nation in the world, this part of the day's proceedings, which occupied about two hours, was perhaps the most remarkable and interesting. Like a moving wall, the broad front stepped forward. Though extending over nearly the whole width of the wide square, there was a cohesive force in the ranks which made the living unit disappear in the one animated whole.

All being ready for the occasion, the emperor, with his suite of sovereigns and princes, entered the square, and took up a position under an awning between the two fountains. As the Kaiser advanced the troops presented arms, and the bearers of the trophies laid them down at the feet of the statue. As a loud and sustained roll of drums died away, the cathedral choir burst out into a hymn, after which the chaplain-general, standing on the steps of the monument, offered up a short prayer. Von Bismarck then approaching the emperor, asked and obtained his permission to unveil the statue. As the canvas fell from it, the drums rolled, the trumpets blared, the standards of the guards were lowered, the troops presented arms

and cheered, a salute of 101 cannon was fired, and the church bells rang all over the town. The national air was performed, while the emperor, helmet in hand, approached his father's statue, walked slowly round it, and not without emotion addressed those around him as follows:—"What we projected amid the most profound peace is completed; what we had hoped to unveil in the profoundest peace—this statue—has now become a memorial of the close of one of the most glorious, though one of the most sanguinary, wars of modern times. If the king to whom we erect this statue could see us now, he would be well satisfied with his people and his army. May the peace which we have achieved by so many sacrifices be lasting. We must all do our part that it may be so. God grant it!" "Unn danket alle Got" was then played from the museum, the troops joining in the grand Te Deum of Germany; and the pageant of the day closed.

In the evening, beneath a sky of Italian clearness, a magnificent illumination took place. Everywhere a profusion of coloured lamps was ranged in symmetrical figures over the house fronts. Strings of Chinese balloons lined the Linden and other streets, shedding a soft lustre on the green boughs and leaves, and contrasting finely with the flaring torches above them. Crowns and eagles, adorning the exchange and many other buildings by coloured *lampions* placed inside a surrounding of gas, added to the general splendour. No jewel ever possessed a softer radiance than the variegated glass representing ruby and sapphire in these mimic crowns; while at intervals the warm effulgence of electric light burst forth at various points along the *via triumphalis*.

During the illuminations merrymaking in the old German style was carried on, and an *al fresco* entertainment was given to the soldiers in a square in the centre of the town. A portion of the Domhofs Platz, opposite the House of Parliament, had been inclosed and converted into an impromptu saloon, in which dancing was kept up until the dawn. All round the square refreshment tents were erected, and the wearing of a military cap gave a claim to unlimited beer and sausage. In nearly every other district of the city the inhabitants clubbed together to provide feasts for certain numbers of soldiers, and at most of these entertainments the various dishes were prepared and served up, not by hired attendants, but by young ladies of the middle class—an arrangement natural in a country where all classes indiscriminately are represented in the rank and file. For days and nights together were these entertainments and rejoicings kept up; the extraordinary nature of the occasion having roused the usually sober and impassive nature of German townspeople to such a festive pitch that it seemed difficult to reduce it to the work-a-day level. Amidst all the merrymaking, however, there was no drunkenness, no oaths, no indecorum of any kind. The general behaviour of the men indicated that they felt they had a real stake in their country; that the success which was being celebrated, and the results it had produced, could be maintained only by hard work, both of body and mind; and that the exciting influence of these festive days should not be allowed to vitiate the moral resources of the nation. However mighty Germany may become, geographically placed as she is between three military powers, she will need all her energy to protect house and home; and this fact of her political life was felt, and served to modify many a triumphant speech and writing during the Berlin rejoicings.

As in the chief city of Prussia, but of course on a smaller scale, Bremen, Hamburg, Munich, Dresden, and other towns, in their turn had a public holiday and festivities on the return of the soldiers of their respective states.

The legislation of the Parliament, the opening of which in March, 1871, we have already described, was devoted principally to questions directly raised by the new organization of Germany, to the disposal of claims upon the indemnity levied from France, and to the settlement of the new Alsace-Lorraine province. It is tolerably certain that immediately after Sedan the acquisition of Strassburg would have satisfied the territorial demands of the Germans; but when it was seen that the united armies could hold Paris with such a grasp that its fall was a mere question of time, the claims of the fatherland were, as a matter of course, extended to the restoration to Germany of the territory which by force or fraud had been wrested from her by Henry II., Louis XIV., and Louis XV. The only matter of doubt was as to the party to whom the new province should revert, and the investment of Paris had not long been complete before Bavaria expressed a desire to appropriate a good share of the conquered territory. To her it seemed just that she should receive a special reward for

supporting the North at a crisis when the defalcation of the South might have been fatal to all the fatherland. So strongly, indeed, was the desire of the Bavarian government expressed, that the Prussian cabinet deemed it injudicious to resist the demand of so important and faithful an ally. It was obvious, however, that if Bavaria had a right to claim a gratuity of this kind for adhering to treaty obligations, so had the other states; and it was equally certain that if unity was to be established on a firm basis, territorial acquisitions must not be portioned out amongst the allied states as in former centuries, but kept together and placed as a whole under the central government of the land. Public opinion, anxiously wishing to promote unity, at once pronounced against the scheme of the Munich ministry, and the Bavarian press rejected it even more decidedly than the Prussian. A considerable party in Prussia claimed the territory for themselves, on the plea of not further multiplying the divisions of Germany; but the voice of the nation pronounced unmistakably in favour of retaining the new province as a "monument of the common victory." Accordingly the Alsace bill, framed by the Federal Council, entirely ignored the claim of Bavaria and all other individual states, and made the central government paramount in the recovered lands. The bill provided that Alsace and Lorraine should become the common property of the various states forming the German empire, and should, until January 1, 1874, be governed by the emperor and minor sovereigns assembled in Federal Council; but their prerogative after that date was to be restricted by the German Parliament, which in addition to its other functions was to act as Legislative Assembly for Alsace and Lorraine. To reconcile the Alsatians to this plan and to the want of a local Parliament, they were to have the right to send deputies to the German Parliament as soon as it began to legislate for them.

For some time after the incorporation of the province, two classes of its population offered active resistance to the new state of things—the lower orders and the priests. The former frequently attacked the sentinels and soldiers sauntering about in the by-streets and public promenades of the larger towns; while the priests lost no opportunity of instilling French feeling into the minds of the country people. These manifestations of dissatisfaction were met by characteristic discretion. The civil and military authorities in Alsace were ordered to treat the people with the greatest leniency, and to take no notice of the petty provocations so frequently offered. In case, however, of open resistance or serious attack, the culprits were to undergo the full rigour of the law. Boys and mill-hands, for instance, might, without being called to account, indulge in the harmless diversion of saluting policemen with the favourite cry of *Vive la France, à bas la Prusse;* but if a blow was dealt, or even aimed at the representative of the law, prompt punishment was to follow. At the same time the people were given to understand, that any one opposing the rulers would not improve the chance of having his losses in the war made up to him—an announcement strictly in accordance with the law, which, while it empowered, did not oblige the government to accord damages to the new citizens of Alsace and Lorraine. With the priests there appeared great reluctance to interfere, and only the strongest reasons of expediency ultimately induced the government of Berlin to depart from its established policy of religious toleration. It was found, however, that the Ultramontane clergy were endeavouring to excite the utmost hostility to German unity as established under the supremacy of Prussia—a leading Protestant power. The Diet therefore passed a bill for the repression of seditious language in the pulpit, and the law was of course operative in Alsace, as well as throughout the other portions of Germany.

It was stipulated by the Treaty of Peace that an "option" should be accorded to the Alsace-Lorrainers as to their future nationality, and it has been charged against the German government that the rules which affect those who declined to become Germans were made tyrannically narrow and severe. Every Alsatian was compelled to make up his mind to accept German citizenship, with all its consequences, or part with the property and the civil rights which had been his inheritance. It was argued that, were concession made on this point, there would be nothing to prevent the whole population from remaining on the soil as aliens, and sheltering itself under its French nationality. This argument is no doubt logical, but to an impartial observer it would seem that German statesmen would have acted wisely in interpreting the "option" in the widest sense;

that there should have been no attempt to force the people of Alsace and Lorraine into compulsory exile; that they should have been permitted to call themselves French subjects, and to have a French domicile, whilst quietly carrying on their usual business, and not urged—at all events till the breaking out of a fresh war—to strike their tents and go. But the German government not only refused to allow this intermediate state of affairs, and compelled all born Alsatians and Lorrainers to reside in whichever country they chose to abide by, but it added to the pain of this choice by making all who did not decide on going into France before the 30th of September, 1872, liable to the German law of conscription, unless they had already served in the French army and navy. In other words, before that date all inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine had to choose either exile from their homes, or to see their sons and brothers incur the liability to be drafted into an army which will, in all probability, have to fight against the country of their birth and of all their traditions. These terms made the "option" a choice, on the one hand, between exile, and the sacrifice of all indemnity for the heavy private losses caused by the war (which the Germans promised to those who remained); and on the other, not merely alienation of nationality, but the bitterness of seeing sons and brothers pouring out their blood for what they regard as the wicked cause of the conqueror of their land. To many, of course, the choice was merely nominal, for they could not leave the little they possessed and go forth as outcasts; and in their case the acceptance of German nationality was, therefore, a necessity. The decree, however, resulted in a great and steady stream of middle-class emigration from the conquered provinces into France, including many war propagandists, who had the great advantage of pointing to their own sacrifices as guarantees of their sincerity. This rigour, as it seems to us, can scarcely fail to create even more bitterness in the hearts of those who stay than of those who go, for it will mingle with their grief the poison of a certain amount of humiliation and self-condemnation. If Prince Bismarck were bent on interpreting the "option" in this severe sense, we think he should have exempted Alsace-Lorraine for another five years from all military conscription. To impose on the inhabitants that liability as the immediate corollary of the option to stay in the province of their birth, was hard indeed; and the regulation by which minors were denied any choice, and were compelled to follow the decision of their parents, seems certain to produce much stubborn resistance on one side, and to necessitate a harsh discipline on the other. Conquest must always be hard and stern work; but there is such a thing as superfluous rigour. The French already abound in legends of German atrocities in Alsace, notable examples of which are to be found in MM. Erckmann-Chatrian's fiction "Le Plébiscite." Why lend colour to such stories, by pursuing a policy which will certainly furnish numbers of unoffending citizens with a far more reasonable ground for vindictiveness than the plunder of their cellars or the seizure of their cattle?

In the Treaty of Peace a passage had been introduced relative to the eventual substitution of financial guarantees for the right conceded to German troops to occupy a portion of French territory, as it had been anticipated that, under certain circumstances, such an arrangement might be for the advantage of both parties. The German army of occupation found it a most wearisome task to keep guard over a country in which they were universally hated, and had to protect their lives by stern measures, which in turn provoked new complaints and new plots of vengeance. In a short time the relations between the conquerors and conquered in the occupied provinces became very unpleasant; industry was greatly fettered by restrictions which the occupying force imposed on communication and exchange; and the dissatisfaction and irritation thus kept alive shook public confidence so profoundly, that M. Thiers, taking advantage of the financial provision in the treaty to which we have referred, conceived the idea of buying the Germans out of at least six departments. According to the treaty of Frankfort the departments of the Aisne, Aube, Côte d'Or, Haute Saone, Doubs, and Jura would in any case have been evacuated on the 1st of May, 1872, on payment of the half milliard then due; and had the payment been made at once, the evacuation might have been demanded directly. But France was at this time unable to meet such a draught on her resources. It was not that she was not rich enough to get credit for twenty millions more in the markets of the world, but she could not procure the specie requisite for so large and

sudden a payment without producing a ruinous crisis in the money market. Trusting that a promise to pay in the May following, if backed by the guarantee of a number of great mercantile houses, might be satisfactory to the Germans, the French government made the proposal. Prince Bismarck agreed to it, but at the same time would not pledge himself not to discount the bills given him as guarantee; and as, by retaining the power of discounting bills of twenty millions sterling whenever he pleased, he would have been the financial master of Europe, the bankers to whom an appeal had been made refused to run the risk. The proposed arrangements thus appeared to have failed; but M. Thiers, persuaded that some other basis of negotiation might be devised, despatched M. Pouyer-Quertier on a tentative mission to Berlin.

Finding the French government thus anxious to come to a financial arrangement so as to release the six departments, Prince Bismarck speedily devised one. The bankers who had undertaken to guarantee the payments in May, were to have received a commission of 10,000,000 francs; and it occurred to the astute minister that if France was willing to pay such a commission, it were better it should go into the pocket of his imperial master. He accordingly agreed to accept the word of M. Pouyer-Quertier and M. Thiers on behalf of the French government, without any further guarantee. But as by the Frankfort treaty the twenty millions, or half milliard, was not due until May, nor the six millions interest on the unpaid portion of the indemnity until March, he proposed that the twenty-six millions should be paid by nine equal fortnightly instalments, beginning 15th January, 1872. On M. Pouyer-Quertier acceding to this arrangement, Prince Bismarck undertook that the German troops should at once evacuate the six departments; on the distinct stipulation, however, that they should not be occupied by the French, but should for the time be declared neutral ground, in which no French soldiery should appear, except such as might be necessary for police purposes. In other words, the departments, though evacuated, were really to be held in pawn by Germany, in case France failed in any of the money payments, when the Germans were immediately to re-enter—a course which their strong position on the borders of the departments would render extremely easy. Germany was clearly the gainer in every way by the transaction, as it was freed from the burden of providing an occupying force, and as considerable pecuniary advantage was secured by obtaining payment in advance. France, on the other hand, paid less money for the evacuation than she would have had to give the bankers in purchasing their good offices. That her own soldiers might not go into six French departments until a certain sum of money had been paid, was no doubt humiliating; but the only alternative was the presence of German troops. In another way the arrangement was beneficial to France. Stability to the government in the then unsettled state of the country, was of inestimable value; and there is no doubt that the very frank and respectful manner in which the Germans recognized in the cabinet of M. Thiers the centre of real power in France, tended largely to consolidate its authority. On the whole, therefore, the treaty of evacuation was not purchased at more than it was worth; but the Germans, as usual, took remarkably good care of themselves in the negotiations. Prince Bismarck saw, with his usual perspicacity, that provided he got all he really wanted, the more he strengthened the hands of the government of France, the greater would be the security that Germany would receive in due time, and that she would be paid even with some acceleration, the enormous sums to which she had become entitled by the fortunes of war.

When the time for payment of the first instalments of the half milliard arrived, the French minister of Finance declared himself ready to pay the whole amount at once, which, by an arrangement between him and the German ambassador, Count Arnim, was accordingly done. By this arrangement France obtained a discount of five per cent. on the amount, effected a saving of £800,000, and was relieved from any further payment till March 1, 1873. Whatever fault, indeed, may be found with the government of M. Thiers in other respects, it certainly set about the liquidation of the German indemnity with a singleness of purpose, a zeal and ability, above all praise.

In negotiating the terms of evacuation Prince Bismarck contended, that as France wanted something from Germany she must give something in return; and Germany required such a temporary arrangement as to Customs duties as would mitigate to Alsace and Lorraine the immediate evils of their

separation from the French commercial system. It was therefore agreed that for eighteen months specific manufactures of Alsatian produce should be admitted into France at a very reduced duty. The National Assembly, not comprehending the nature of the agreement, voted as an amendment which seemed only fair, that the arrangement should be reciprocal, and that France should be permitted to export into Alsace and Lorraine on the same advantageous terms as these provinces might be allowed to export into France. The National Assembly failed to see that, while the beneficial concession claimed by Bismarck applied only to purely Alsatian produce, to throw Alsace open to the admission on similar terms of all French goods, would have been equivalent to the throwing open of all Germany, of which Alsace was now become a portion. As the only alternative, the Germans would have had to re-establish Custom-houses on the eastern frontier of the new province; but as this would clearly have constituted it a separate country which, commercially at least, would have belonged to France rather than to Germany, Prince Bismarck refused to admit the amendment of the French Assembly. At the instance of M. Thiers, M. Pouyer-Quertier agreed to set aside the vote if, to justify this course at home, Prince Bismarck would consent to the restoration of two or three small communes adjoining Luxemburg, which had been included in the recent transfer of territory, and to the reduction, from eighteen to twelve months, of the exceptional privileges allowed to Alsace. The concessions were granted, and some paltry slices of territory again reverted to France; but the minute care exercised by Prince Bismarck on behalf of his country did not fail him even here. The smallest details did not escape him, for like the Jew of story-books, he was equally at home whether selling seven oranges for sixpence, or arranging for a loan of millions sterling. He subsequently explained to the Reichstag that he gave up two parishes because, lying on the western slope of the Douron hills they were only accessible from the French side; the one thing valuable in them, the only one thing, was a forest, crown property: so he excepted the forest from the cession; the parishes were to belong to France, but the woods to Germany. In the other instance, the frontier line had been so drawn as to oblige the inhabitants of a petty place, in order to reach the quarter with which all their dealings were connected, to go from Germany into France. By conceding their small strip of land, Prince Bismarck allowed the inhabitants to remain French; but he made the French government undertake to build a new station at the point where the railway became German—an obligation which, imposed on a great power like France, furnishes a curious example of what the tempers of her statesmen had in this crisis to endure, and of the class of minute affairs to which Prince Bismarck found time to give his mind. It may be observed, however, that this matter was conceived exactly in the vein of German commerce, which seems destined to push its way over the world by attending to sixteenths, where other nations concern themselves with eighths per cent., and it was certain therefore to be highly relished and approved by the chancellor's audience.

M. Pouyer-Quertier, throughout his stay at Berlin, was treated in the most friendly manner by the emperor, and as the result of his negotiations there were signed on the 12th of October—first, a territorial convention, relating to certain ratifications of frontier; secondly, a financial convention, involving the evacuation of six departments in the east; and, thirdly, a convention bearing upon the temporary Customs system in Alsace and Lorraine.

A considerable portion of the war indemnity, 1,500,000,000 francs, having been paid by France, measures were taken by the Reichstag for the allotment of it. The total disposable sum was, however, less than a milliard and a half by 325,000,000 francs, the amount allowed for the purchase of the Alsatian railways. This left 1,175,000,000 francs, or 313,000,000 thalers, of which sum 4,000,000 thalers were reserved to endow the generals, and another 4,000,000 to assist those members of the landwehr and reserve who had suffered in their pecuniary circumstances by the war. Towards indemnifying the Germans expelled from France 2,000,000 thalers were allotted; but it may be mentioned that these amounts mostly represented only the first instalments of what was intended to be devoted to the various objects, the full sums being made up as the indemnity flowed in. To indemnify expelled German subjects, for instance required, at least 15,000,000 thalers, to be made up by 8,000,000 out of the war indemnity, of which the 2,000,000 was the first allotment, and by 7,000,000 thalers

previously levied in France. To shipowners whose vessels were seized or detained in harbour by the blockade 7,000,000 thalers were voted, and about 20,000,000 were set apart for the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, for damages sustained and provisions supplied both to French and Germans in the course of the campaign. Add to this 5,000,000 thalers required for repairs and rolling stock of the Alsace-Lorraine railways, and there was a total of 42,000,000 thalers laid out in compensating some of the evils inflicted by the war, on parties who, according to old-world usages, would very generally have been left without any redress.

The very flourishing condition of the finances also enabled the government to pass a Military Pensions Bill, which rendered disabled German soldiers the best paid in Europe. Thus, whereas invalids who leave the service in consequence of their wounds, without being actually disabled for work, receive in Austria a monthly pay of $1\frac{1}{2}$ thaler, in Italy 7 thalers, in France $7\frac{1}{2}$, and in the United States $11\frac{1}{2}$, they were by this bill henceforth to receive 12 thalers in Germany. Invalids partially disabled receive in Austria $4\frac{2}{3}$, in France $10\frac{1}{3}$, in Italy 12, in England 15, in the United States 21, and in Germany from 15 to 18 thalers per month. Totally disabled men are paid $7\frac{1}{2}$ thalers per month in Austria, $13\frac{1}{2}$ in France, 15 in Italy, 15 to 25 in England, 28 to 35 in the United States, and 24 in Germany. The payment between 1866 and 1871 was rather below this standard, but still very liberal; and it must be remembered that a thaler goes much further in Germany than its equivalent does in England. To the provision made for invalids and compensation to widows and orphans, the Prussian authorities ascribed much of that readiness to brave the dangers of battle displayed by their reserves and landwehrmer in the late war.

This liberal measure of the government absorbed 31,000,000 of the 271,000,000 thalers remaining. They had the power to devote 240,000,000 thalers for the purpose; but as the whole sum was not required at once, and as the individual states desired to have a portion of their war expenditure reimbursed, only the above instalment was then set aside for the pension list, leaving exactly 240,000,000 thalers, which were divided according to the number of men supplied by each state. In other words, Prussia, or rather the late North German Confederacy, received five-sixths of the whole, the remaining sixth being portioned out between Bavaria, Würtemburg, Baden, and the southern half of Hesse, which before the war had a separate contingent. The 200,000,000 thalers thus accruing to North Germany were employed in replenishing the war treasury, and canceling a portion of the war debt.

The war treasury is one of the "peculiar institutions" of Prussia, and consists of a certain sum which is deposited in gold and silver in the cellars of a citadel, where it remains, without yielding interest, till the sound of the war trumpet again calls it into use. Previous to the war with France it consisted of 30,000,000 thalers; but when Southern Germany was included in the empire, it was proposed to augment the sum to 40,000,000. Some few members remonstrated against the burying alive, as it were, of such an enormous sum, and the Finance minister, Herr Camphausen did not deny that 40,000,000 thalers was a large sum to lock up, and a small one with which to carry on a war; but he insisted that in these times it was of the last importance not to be taken by surprise, and to be able to complete the national armaments with the least possible delay. "It was for the purpose of making these prelimirnary armaments with the greatest despatch that the government required the sum demanded; it was to prevent a fall in the price of public securities, which must result from large sales on the eve of war, that government wanted cash, not stock;" and he observed that if the rate of exchange on London sank only $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ after the declaration of war in 1870, it was owing mainly to the fact that Prussia was in possession of a war fund. The proposal was, of course, ultimately carried, and the 40,000,000 thalers were duly consigned to that dormancy in which we wish there were any good grounds for hoping they may lie, until the world becomes wise enough to justify their being brought forth to the light for a more beneficent purpose than that contemplated in their burial. We fear, however, that for the present such a hope is vain. Already the warlike preparations in France, described in the next Chapter, have produced a settled conviction in Germany that a "war of revenge" will be undertaken at the earliest favourable opportunity.

CHAPTER VIII.

FRANCE AFTER THE COMMUNE.

The Question of the Future Constitution for France—Repeal of the Law exiling the Bourbons, in spite of the Opposition of M. Thiers—Failure of an Attempt to form a Coalition between the Monarchists in consequence of an Extraordinary Manifesto of the Comte de Chambord—Prolongation of the Executive Powers vested in M. Thiers for three years, and the Title of "President of the French Republic" conferred on him—The Duc d'Aumale takes his seat in the Assembly—The Financial Position of France and the Total Cost of the War—Peremptory Refusal of M. Thiers to impose an Income Tax—Wonderful Success of a Loan for £100,000,000—The Budget for 1872–73 and the Future Expenditure of the Country—Return to Protection in France and withdrawal from the Treaty of Commerce with England—Abolition of the Passport System—Reorganization of the French Army—Adoption of the Principle of Universal Military Service and Abolition of Substitutes—Full Explanation of the New System and Comparison of it with that of Germany.

As soon as the Communist insurrection of Paris had been suppressed, and the first stern outcry for the punishment of its guilty authors had been appeased by reprisals of extreme severity, the question of the future constitution most suitable for the country excluded consideration of all others. The Assembly elected in February contained a large majority of members pledged to monarchical principles; and their first act would probably have been the proclamation of a monarchy, had not M. Thiers advised them to suspend all questions of internal reorganization until peace should be concluded. During the reign of the Commune, with the capital of the country in their hands, no steps could be taken in favour of monarchy. When the revolt was put down, M. Thiers, who had hitherto been regarded as the champion of constitutional monarchy, and who on May 11 demanded a vote of confidence from the Assembly, which was granted by 495 to 10, seemed ready to exert all his influence as head of the administration to secure the indefinite prolongation of the Republic, with himself as president.

The monarchists, on their part, were determined to bring the matter to an issue. On June 8 the Assembly, by 484 votes to 103, passed a resolution repealing the laws under which the House of Bourbon had been exiled, and another declaring valid the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville, who had both been returned to the Assembly in the previous February. Knowing that resistance was vain, M. Thiers assented to the resolutions. But he professed no sympathy with the party by which they had been carried. On the contrary, he plainly told his audience that the act was not one of clemency to individuals, but of political intrigue. He insisted that a state had the right to exclude royal pretenders from its territory, and that there could be no injustice in maintaining a decree of exile against those who would return, not as French citizens, but with the avowed intention of conspiring against the government and subverting the commonwealth. "You think," he said to the Assembly, "that you are doing a great act of generosity. You are doing something quite different. The laws it is proposed to abrogate are not laws of proscription, but laws of precaution." He referred as an illustration to what he still deemed, as formerly, the mistaken clemency of the republicans of 1848, in allowing the Bonapartes to enter France. Louis Napoleon came, and the Republic was overthrown. M. Thiers thus cleared himself from the suspicion of complicity with the purposes of the Assembly, by avowing that, though he did not oppose, he yet did not approve, the act on which the majority had determined. He was, no doubt, sincerely of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the time was inopportune for changing the form of government and plunging the country into political controversy. He did not pretend to be a republican in principle, an opponent of every government which had an hereditary chief; he had striven, he said, for forty years to procure for France a constitutional monarchy after the English pattern, and he expressed a preference for English institutions over those of the United States. But this, he argued, was not the present question. The Republic existed, and could not be overthrown but by a revolution, and at the cost of political struggles which would inflict new calamity on France. He reminded the Assembly that it had been agreed

at Bordeaux to set aside all questions which could divide the country. "I have," he said, "accepted the Republic as a deposit, and I will not betray the trust. The future does not concern me; I merely look at the present."

He also told his audience of the suspicions which the royalist tendencies of the Assembly had excited in the great towns. All the cities of France had sent deputations to complain that the Assembly wished to get rid of the Republic. He had presumed to deny the allegation, and to declare that though there were members who favoured monarchical principles, they had the wisdom to waive their preferences. But a royalist movement would convert these suspicions into certainty. The public mind was still excited; the insurrection was put down, but not extinguished. One of the great weapons of the Commune was the cry that the Republic was in danger. Could there be a worse time for changing the government? "I do not desire," said M. Thiers, "to discuss the possibility of a monarchy at some future time; but in order that it may be durable, it is necessary that it should not be said that the Republic had not had a fair trial." He further argued in favour of the political *status quo* from the necessity of dealing at once with the German occupation. "We have 500,000 Germans to feed. We have a deficiency of 400,000,000 francs in the revenue derived from taxation. We must have recourse to credit, and in order to this we require the confidence of Europe. No one doubts the resources of France, but it is feared that our union will be broken up." Speaking of the House of Orleans, he said he had been the minister of that House; he had been attached to it in exile, and he felt a warm friendship for it. But his friendship for his country was stronger still.

These powerful arguments might have been thought to have had considerable influence on the Assembly, and that the royalists would, at all events, have reckoned the cost before they attempted to carry into effect the plans which they had projected. Such, however, was not the case, for the different sections of the monarchical party — the Legitimists and Orleanists — agreed to support the candidature of Henri V. (the Comte de Chambord, grandson of Charles X.); and as he is childless, and upwards of fifty years of age, they also fixed upon his cousin, the Comte de Paris (grandson of Louis Philippe), as his natural successor. The Comte de Chambord returned to France for the first time since his boyhood; but the hopes of the coalition which had been agreed upon with the view of placing him upon the throne were dispelled by a manifesto, in which he avowed that he could only consent to be made king upon principles at variance with the ideas, associations, and prejudices of modern France. This document has such an historical importance, as it seems to have settled for ever the question of any future legitimist government in France, that we give it entire:—"Frenchmen! I am in the midst of you. You have opened the gates of France to me, and I could not renounce the happiness of again seeing my country. But I do not wish by a prolonged sojourn to give new pretexts to stir up men's minds, already so disturbed at this moment. I therefore leave this Chambord, which you gave me, and of which I have with pride borne the title for these last forty years in the land of exile. As I depart, I am anxious to tell you that I do not separate myself from you. France is aware that I belong to her. I cannot forget that the monarchical right is the patrimony of the nation, nor can I forget the duties which it lays upon me with respect to it. I will fulfil these duties, you may take my word as an honest man and as a king for it. By God's help we shall establish together, whenever you may wish it, on the broad basis of administrative decentralization and of local franchise, a government in harmony with the real wants of the country. We shall give, as a security for those public liberties to which every Christian people is entitled, universal suffrage, honestly exercised, and the control of the two Chambers, and we shall resume the national movement of the latter end of the eighteenth century, restoring to it its true character.

"A minority rebellious against the wishes of the country has taken that movement as the starting-point of a period of demoralization by falsehood, and of disorganization by violence. Its criminal excesses have forced a revolution on a nation which only asked for reforms, and have driven it towards the abyss in which it would lately have perished, had it not been for the heroic efforts of our army. And it is upon the labouring classes, upon the workmen in the fields and in the large cities, whose condition has been the subject of my most earnest solicitudes and of my dearest studies, that the evils of this social

disorder have fallen most heavily. But France, cruelly disenchanted by unexampled disasters, will perceive that it is not by going from error to error that one can reach truth, that it is not by shifts that one can escape eternal necessities. She will call me, and I will come to her *tout entier* with my devotion, my principles, and my flag.

"With respect to this flag, conditions have been put forward to which I must not submit.

"Frenchmen! I am ready to do all in my power to lift up my country from its ruins, and to restore it to its proper rank in the world. The only sacrifice that cannot be expected from me is that of my honour. I am and wish to be the man of my own age. I sincerely do homage to all its greatness, and under whatever colours our soldiers marched I have admired their heroism, and given thanks to Heaven for all that their valour has added to the treasure of the glories of France. There must be no misunderstanding, no concealment or reticence, between us. Whatever charges about privileges, absolutism, and intolerance—or, what do I know?—about tithes, about feudal rights, the most audacious bad faith may lay against me, whatever phantoms it may conjure up to prejudice you against me, I shall not suffer the standard of Henry IV., of Francis I., and of Joan of Arc to be torn from my hands. It is by that flag that national unity was established, it is by it that your fathers, led by mine, have conquered that Alsace and that Lorraine whose fidelity will be the consolation of our misfortunes. It is that flag which conquered barbarism in that land of Africa which saw the earliest deeds of arms of the princes of my House: it is that flag which will overcome the new barbarism by which the world is threatened. I will intrust this flag with confidence to the bravery of our army. The army well knows that the white flag has never followed any other path than that which leads to honour. I received it as a sacred deposit from the old king, my grandfather, who died in exile. It has always been inseparably associated in my mind with the remembrance of my distant country. It has waved over my cradle, it will overshadow my grave. In the glorious folds of this stainless flag I will bring you order and freedom.

Frenchmen! Henry V. cannot forsake the white flag of Henry IV.

"HENRY.

"CHAMBORD, *July* 5, 1871."

The proclamation took the country completely by surprise, and, especially in the Chamber, did more to extinguish the aims of the legitimist party than could have been done by months of political indiscretion on their part. It is, however, due to the Comte de Chambord to say, that if he threw away his chances as a king, he stood higher, if possible, in the estimation of his countrymen as an honourable man; and with all the sharp criticism to which the proclamation gave rise in the newspapers, there was mingled a feeling of kindliness for him, and appreciation of the honesty and nobility of his character, which at the moment, when the cause which he represented was at such a discount, reflected credit on all.

Disappointed in the Comte de Chambord, the Assembly could not agree upon the choice of a monarch, and on August 12 a motion was made to prolong for three years the executive powers vested in M. Thiers. In the event of the National Assembly breaking up before that period, it was proposed that his powers should continue during the time necessary for constituting a new Assembly, which would then have to decide upon the question of the executive power.

M. Thiers, in reply, said he was deeply moved by the confidence reposed in him by the Assembly. The task laid upon him was heavy, but he was ready to submit to the will of the country. He believed all must acknowledge that the proposals had been made without any participation on his part, but since they had been brought forward, he must call upon the Chamber to decide upon them both with the briefest possible delay.

The matter was accordingly at once taken into consideration, and on August 31 the Assembly, with assent of the government and by a majority of 480 to 93, agreed to the following bill, by which it will be seen that M. Thiers exchanged the title of chief of the Executive Power for that of "President of the French Republic:"—"The Assembly, considering the necessity of acquiring for the government of France a degree of stability adapted to the present state of affairs, and strongly to unite together the public authorities by a fresh proof of confidence accorded to the chief of the Executive Power for the eminent services which he has rendered to the country, and for those which he may still render, decrees:—

"Art. 1. M. Thiers shall continue, under the title of President of the Republic, to exercise those

functions which were conferred upon him by the decree of the 17th of February, 1871.

"Art. II. The powers conferred upon M. Thiers shall have the same duration as those of the Assembly.

"Art. III. The President of the Republic shall be responsible for all his decrees, which are to be countersigned by a minister; and the president has the right to speak in the Assembly whenever he shall deem it expedient.

"The ministers will likewise be responsible, and render account of all their acts to the Assembly."

Notwithstanding the vote of the Assembly, already noticed, repealing the laws of proscription against the Bourbons, the Duc d'Aumale was warned that his appearance would embarrass the progress of public business, then in a most critical condition, and pledged himself to M. Thiers and a committee of the Assembly not to take his seat. This pledge he religiously observed until December, when, deeming circumstances much changed by the elevation of M. Thiers to the presidency, and hearing his own inaction ascribed to irresolution, he in a personal interview desired the president to release him from his engagement. M. Thiers, thinking that the moment the duke entered the Chamber the majority would regard him as the alternative man, but embarrassed perhaps by his old relation to the House, at first refused, then hesitated, and finally declared that the decision of such a matter rested with "a power above himself"—the "sovereign" Assembly. On this the duke, through one of his followers, requested an opinion from that body, and on December 18 the Chamber after a fierce debate decided, though in a very singular and hesitating manner, in his favour. The original mover, M. Desjardins, proposed that the Assembly should "invest the deputies for the Oise and Haute Marne—Prince de Joinville and the Duc d'Aumale—with the plenitude of their rights," and the government suggested, as a counter proposal, that it should pass on to the order of the day. This suggestion was rejected by 358 to 273, but the motion of M. Desjardins was also lost by 360 to 294; the majority shrinking, apparently, from a vote which would be interpreted in the country as distinctly monarchical. Before the vote was taken, M. Fresneau, moderate Orleanist, introduced another motion, that "the Assembly, considering that it has no responsibility to assume nor advice to offer on engagements in which it had no part, and of which it cannot be a judge, passes to the order of the day." As the words "of which it cannot be a judge" were distasteful to the personal supporters of the Duc d'Aumale, as implying a reproof, they were withdrawn by the mover; and the revised motion was then put and almost unanimously accepted by the Assembly, only two members, in a house of 648, opposing. The effect clearly was, that as the government claimed no pledge (a point strongly reaffirmed in debate by the minister of the interior, M. Casimir Perier), nor was any claimed by the Assembly, which even declined to consider whether there was one, the duke stood released from pledges and accordingly took his seat on December 19. The members in the train from Paris, by which he reached Versailles, fell back respectfully to allow him and his brother to walk on alone; in the Assembly he was received with considerable agitation.

The two other matters which have chiefly engrossed the attention of France since the war, are the state of her finances and the reorganization of her army.

On June 20, M. Thiers fully explained the financial position to his fellow-countrymen. He calculated that the war had cost France £340,000,000 in actual money, including the German indemnity, but excluding the loss sustained by the inhabitants of the departments ravaged by the enemy. Taking the most moderate estimate of the damage inflicted by requisitions and the destruction of property, the cost to France was about two millions sterling a day as long as the war lasted! a pecuniary expense unprecedented in history, besides the loss of two great provinces. M. Thiers severely condemned the dethroned emperor for having permitted Sadowa, and for having subsequently attempted to redress that error under circumstances which made success impossible; but foreign observers, anticipating as we may believe the judgment of posterity, cannot lay exclusively upon Napoleon III. the guilt of a war for which M. Thiers himself was, perhaps, more than any other man primarily responsible. He it was who revived the Napoleonic legend, who excited the people to demand the Rhine frontier, and who never ceased to heap reproaches upon the emperor for having assisted in the unification of Italy, and kept the peace while Prussia was engaged with Austria in 1866. M. Thiers was, unquestionably, the foremost apostle

of that selfish policy which demanded that all the rest of Europe should be weak, in order that France might be the mistress of the Continent.

The actual expenditure of France itself in 1870 M. Thiers estimated at £132,000,000, of which about £47,000,000 was spent by the successive governments of the country in prosecuting the war up to the end of December. The balance of £85,000,000 represented the normal expenditure of France under the later years of the empire. The actual income from taxation was not above £70,000,000; but the loans authorised by the Corps Législatif before the revolution of the 4th of September, and the loan subsequently raised in England by M. Gambetta, added to the receipts from taxes, produced a total income of £106,240,000. This, compared with an expenditure of £132,000,000, left an uncovered balance of £25,760,000. The deficiency for 1871 was as great as that of 1870, for not only had the cost of the war to be met, but the receipts from taxes and the other sources of national income had very much declined. The excess of expenditure over income, independently of the German indemnity, was £39,440,000; and this, added to the uncovered balance of the previous year, made a total of £65,200,000 against the treasury.

In order to meet this deficiency and the payment of the portion of the indemnity due to Germany in 1871, a loan of £100,000,000 at five per cent. was proposed to be issued at eighty-three, which would give investors interest at the rate of six per cent. M. Thiers said, that after studying the subject he was fully persuaded that France was well able to meet the additional taxation which must be demanded of her; no country in the world possessed such recuperative power. No new loan would be required for three years, within which time France, if she acted wisely, might reorganize herself, and lay the foundation for future prosperity and glory. Referring to the new taxes proposed, he said he had been much pressed not to impose any on raw materials used by textile manufacturers. "But I," he added, amidst the laughter of the Assembly, "am an old protectionist, and with me anything old is not likely to change." He hoped that all classes would cheerfully submit to necessary sacrifices, and disclaimed any intention of levying fiscal duties to the extent of prohibition.

At the conclusion of M. Thiers' speech, M. Germain created much excitement by suggesting an income tax as the proper remedy in the present crisis. From the Left the proposal called forth applause; but it had a very different effect on the wealthy country gentlemen on the Right. The speaker in vain quoted the example of England, and urged with great vehemence that the best way to oppose Communism was voluntarily to tax themselves for their country's good.

M. Thiers replied with much warmth and energy, describing the income tax as a "disorderly tax." He had never in his life flattered popular passions, and would not now. The income tax was utterly unsuited to Frenchmen, who would never bear its inquisitorial nature. The attempt to impose it would set class against class and produce horrible disasters. He begged all who had any confidence in him to understand, once for all, that he would never consent to it. Now the Right in their turn vehemently applauded; the Left were silent.

The subscriptions for the loan were received on June 27, and in less than six hours amounted to more than double the sum required—a fact without parallel in history. A people crushed by a foreign invasion, with the enemy still on its territory, without settled institutions, torn by recent civil war, and still in dread of future disturbance, subscribed within a few hours for the largest sum ever borrowed by any government. The total amount raised in France was three and a half milliards—two and a half in Paris, and a milliard in the provinces. The hoarded bullion of the country was poured into the public treasury when the gates were opened, with a force like that of water seeking its level. There was as much eagerness to lend money to the government as there had been to obtain bread during the famine. Public loan offices were thronged like bakers' shops, and the clamorous multitude of capitalists swayed to and fro at the doors for the turn of each subscriber.

The success of the loan proved that, though industry was for the time disorganized, the actual savings of the country were sufficient to carry it through its most pressing difficulties. It is interesting to know from what class these immense sums of money were drawn, and in what form they were previously held. They came chiefly from those possessed of moderate fortunes, including numbers of subscribers from the country districts. This stratum of French society is

essentially penurious. In the provinces economy degenerates into parsimony, and in the north especially the people are hard and griping. But niggardliness, though in itself an unamiable quality, is useful in a state; and it may be doubted whether among the more active and adventurous people in England half as many of the lower middle class would be found able to invest in a loan. Notwithstanding the extravagant style of living which prevailed in Paris under the Empire, it is estimated that in the country savings to the amount of £100,000,000 a year were put by; for the great mass of the middle class retained their old habits of prudence, economy, and regular, though not hard work. Small families, small establishments, small expenditure in entertainments, and hardly anything spent on travelling and junketing—such were the features of citizen life in town and country. The consequence was that the most enormous sum ever demanded by a government was speedily forthcoming from thousands of modest hoards. The little purse was the mainstay of France in her calamity. From every quarter, from the districts still occupied by the Prussians, as well as from those which the enemy had never trodden, money in abundance was placed at the service of the state. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of the transaction was not the amount of money contributed, but the promptitude with which it was given. The French people had evidently an absolute belief in the security of the state—a belief so manifestly universal as to expose the real numerical insignificance of those desperate factions which pretend to revolutionize society. The socialist members of the International were certainly not among the subscribers to the government loan, for one of their absurd doctrines is that there should be no public creditors; but we may be equally sure that the millions who came forward with their money had not the smallest fear of these fanatical conspirators. Confiding in the good faith and the permanence of society, they eagerly embraced the opportunity of lending their money on the security of the nation, especially on terms a little more favourable than before. The French really borrowed, all things considered, on very easy conditions. They did, for instance, materially better in the money market than the Americans, notwithstanding the superior resources of the United States. The Americans were unwise enough, not indeed to propose repudiation, but to talk about and discuss it as a political "question," whereas the public credit of France has never been suspected. That was the secret of her success, and when she offered to pay six per cent. for money, her own people were ready with it to any amount. A love of hoarding truly Asiatic was found compatible with an astonishing readiness to lend. One word from government unlocked all the little repositories of money in the country, turned every available franc into the coffers of the state, made the terrible spectre of finance disappear as M. Thiers approached it, and enabled him to proceed in all confidence to buy the Germans out, and to stop the drains caused by their protracted presence on French soil.

The manner in which this was done is described in the previous chapter, and in order to complete the picture of the financial condition of the country, it will here only be necessary to give some particulars of the budget proposed for 1872–73, which was submitted in December, 1871.

Of the £340,000,000 which the war cost, £213,649,000 had then been provided from the following sources:—

The war loan of August, 1870,	£32,183,000
The loan raised in England,	8,356,000
The sale of the Rentes belonging to the dotation of the army, of surplus stores for the supply of Paris, &c.,	4,510,000
The advances made and to be made by the Bank of France,	61,200,000
The allowances made by Germany for the transfer of the part of the Eastern Railway which lies within the annexed territory,	13,000,000
The tax for the cost of the garde mobile,	5,400,000
The last loan,	89,000,000
Total,	£213,649,000

The balance remaining to provide was therefore £126,351,000.

The estimated receipts of 1872 amounted to £97,174,500, and the expenses to £96,613,400. The budget consequently showed an expected surplus of £561,100. The receipts consisted of the product of taxes which existed before the war, £72,620,500, and of new taxes, £24,554,000. This latter sum does not, however, correctly represent the increase of annual expenditure brought about by the war; that increase really amounts to nearly £29,000,000, but the actual addition to the budget was reduced to £22,529,000 by the savings effected on other items. Notwithstanding the dryness of a long

array of figures, it seems worth while, in a chapter dealing with the consequences of the war, to give the list of additions and diminutions, as otherwise the position could not be clearly understood.

The savings on the last budget of the Empire appear to have been as follows :—

Item	Amount
The suppression of the civil list of the emperor and his family and of the dotation of the Senate,	£1,385,000
Ministry of Justice: reductions in the Council of State and suppression of several law courts,	100,600
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: suppression of legations and consulates and diminution of salaries,	33,200
Ministry of the Interior: diminution of salaries, &c.,	110,500
Economies in Algeria,	31,400
Reductions in the cost of collecting taxes,	440,800
Reductions in the expenses of the Ministry of Finance,	24,400
Reductions in the cost of the Navy,	1,253,000
Reductions in subventions to theatres and various works dependent on the Ministry of Fine Arts,	79,800
Reductions in subventions to various institutions dependent on the Ministry of Commerce, including race prizes,	50,800
Public works,	2,809,800
Total of reductions,	£6,328,300

The augmentations were as follows :—

Item	Amount
Interest on the loan of £30,000,000 issued in August, 1870,	£1,584,000
Interest on the English loan of £10,000,000,	600,000
Interest on the last loan of £80,000,000,	5,555,800
Interest on the £120,000,000 still due to Germany,	6,000,000
Interest on the £13,000,000 credited by Germany for the annexed portions of the Eastern Railway (the French government keeps the money and pays interest on it to the railway company),	650,000
Interest on the advances made by the Bank of France,	367,200
Repayment on account of the advances made by the Bank of France,	8,000,000
Increase on the budget of the Ministry of War, which stands for 1872 at £18,000,000,	3,025,100
Increase of soldiers' pensions,	148,000
Increase of civil pensions,	66,200
Increase of pensions to aged persons,	24,000
Dotation of the president of the Republic,	30,500
Cost of the present Assembly over and above that of the former Chamber,	127,200
Extra dotation of the Legion of Honour, in consequence of the large number of crosses distributed during the war,	106,900
Cost of naval pensioners, in consequence of the absorption of the special resources hitherto employed to pay them,	280,000
Sundries,	8,000
Augmentations in various Ministries, including repairs of damages, cost of collecting the new taxes, new telegraphs, rebuilding bridges, &c.,	756,500
Payment on account of the repayment to the Departments and Communes of the cost of the garde mobile,	1,288,000
War expenses incurred by the Ministry of the Interior,	240,000
Total of augmentations,	£28,857,400

In addition to the £96,613,400 of state expenditure, the budget showed a further sum of £12,825,000 for departmental outlay; the general total therefore amounted to £109,438,000, which was to be employed as follows :—

Item	Amount
Interest and dotations,	£44,393,500
Ministry of War,	18,002,000
Ministry of Marine,	5,906,700
Ministry of Justice,	1,343,000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,	499,400
Ministry of Interior,	5,975,300
Ministry of Finance,	811,600
Ministry of Public Instruction, Worship, and Fine Arts,	3,815,500
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce,	642,400
Ministry of Public Works,	5,225,000
Cost of collecting taxes,	9,533,500
Deductions and repayments of taxes,	465,100
Departmental expenditure,	12,825,000
Total,	£109,438,000

This enormous budget, it must be admitted, represented the worst; there was nothing more behind. It included interest not only on the loans then brought out, but also on those to be afterwards raised; for £6,000,000 shown as interest at five per cent. on the £120,000,000 then due to Germany, will probably suffice to cover the cost of further issue of Rentes to the same amount. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any probability of reductions; the £8,000,000 payable annually to the bank of France will have to be maintained during nearly eight years; with the exception of the cost of the army, all the items of current expenditure were apparently cut down to the lowest point; the sum allotted to public works was insufficient; and even if any margin should arise, either from an increase of receipts above the estimates, or from diminutions of outlay on certain heads, there will be urgent employment for it. France must, therefore, look forward to a lasting annual taxation of £110,000,000, or £40,000,000 more than England!

In order to provide for this enormous expenditure many of the old imposts which correspond with the English excise duties, as well as the house, land, and other taxes, were increased, and the government proposed to obtain the balance by the augmentation of the existing import duties, and by imposing a tax on certain raw materials. A great number of French economists desired that for the latter proposal—which was truly regarded as a return to the old protective system—an income tax should be substituted; but the suggestion was again strongly opposed by M. Thiers, and rejected in the Assembly by a large majority.

Before any material alteration could be made in the import duties it was necessary to set aside the celebrated treaty of commerce, which was negotiated in 1860 by the late Mr. Cobden, M.P., and the Emperor Napoleon. By it the duties on silks and velvets and kid gloves imported into

England were entirely repealed, and those on wines very much reduced; whilst, on their side, the French agreed to admit English manufactures at much lower rates than before, although still very high according to free-trade principles. In fact, the treaty was objected to by some in England on the ground that its advantages were chiefly on the side of France. In ten years it increased French exports to England by 175 per cent., and English exports to France by only 139 per cent. The so-called "balance of trade" was largely and constantly against England. Though the trade with England forms about one-fourth of the whole foreign trade of France, while English trade with France forms only about one-tenth of the whole foreign trade of England, no considerable agitation against the treaty ever prevailed in this country. But in France it was more than once "denounced," by M. Thiers and others, in the interests of those who were supposed to have been injured by it. When the treaty was negotiated it was hoped, that through the introduction of the leaven of free trade into the minds of the French people, they would ultimately be converted to the principle altogether. Every year, it was supposed, would show them more plainly the wisdom of the policy into which they had been forced by a ruler more clear-sighted in this respect than his subjects, and that complete and unconditional abolition of all remaining restrictions on commercial intercourse would follow. The treaty was, in fact, concluded at the desire of the emperor, in order that principles which he knew to be salutary might be recommended to his subjects by the example of foreign concessions.

The treaty might have had to sustain a very formidable attack, even had the imperial power not been overthrown. It was initiated when the authority of the emperor was at its height, within a few months after his splendid victories in Italy, and when the idea of uniting what are called the Latin nations under French leadership, maintaining a beneficial alliance with England, and thus constituting something like a confederation of Western Europe, opened the minds of Frenchmen for the time to larger political theories. But the chief movers in the treaty were, undoubtedly, the Emperor Napoleon himself, who had formed clear views in adversity and exile, and his personal followers, who entered readily into the ideas of their master. The treaty was negotiated and put in operation without resistance from the protectionists, but not without many murmurs, and a resolution on the part of that numerous and powerful class to fall back upon the old system as far as possible, whenever an opportunity should offer. That opportunity might have occurred, even if the Empire had lasted. As the emperor's energies declined, as the old companions who had stood by him in support of an English alliance and a free-trade system passed away, it is probable that the interests which were aggrieved in 1860 would have regained sufficient power to modify legislation. The argument that France could abrogate the treaty without losing the English trade which had grown up under it, dates from before the war. It was said, with some plausibility, that England would not retaliate by imposing high duties; that she wanted the wines and the silks and fancy goods of France, and must have them whether France took, or did not take, anything from her; in short, that these productions, by their special and unique character, were indispensable to England, as to all foreign nations, while France might be independent if she wished it, and had the greatest interest in becoming so.

The five milliards of indemnity hastened the consummation. No free-trader has ever disputed that duties may be imposed for the purpose of revenue; for though direct taxes may be theoretically preferable, it must also be admitted that they cause much irritation, are largely evaded, and cannot practically be increased beyond certain limits. If France be condemned for many years to raise a sum immensely larger than sufficed for her necessities in 1860, and if those acquainted with the feelings and habits of the people agree that direct taxes cannot be safely increased, it is not for us to blame the French government for desiring to regain absolute freedom in dealing with the national finance. It may indeed seem strange that a nation so acute and logical as the French should reject principles which in England are held proved to demonstration. Many will hardly believe that amongst a people who have produced some of the best and clearest expositors of free trade, and in whose literature its doctrines are even more popularly set forth than in our own, should still cling to the high duties, and even the prohibitions, which were in favour thirty years ago. The most eloquent speakers, and the writers most influential in their manner and style, are, as a rule, free

traders; the notice to terminate the English treaty was almost universally condemned by the best part of the French press as a retrograde step; while the protectionists say little, and say it very indifferently. But late events have clearly proved that, after a quarter of a century of controversy —for the free-trade contest has been going on in France ever since the repeal of the English corn laws—the principles on which English legislation is based have not been cordially accepted in France.

There can be no doubt that, under any financial system, the country is in every way able enough to supply the wants of its government; but a wise policy may make all the difference between an easy and an oppressive taxation.

As early as August, 1871, M. Thiers told Lord Lyons that the treaty of commerce had always been regarded by his present colleagues and himself as disadvantageous, not to say disastrous, to France. He should prefer getting rid of the treaty altogether, as commercially it had been advantageous to England only. From her, as the most formidable competitor in commerce, concessions which might safely be made to other countries ought to be withheld. Nevertheless, apparently for political reasons, he did not wish to abrogate the treaty altogether, and should England consent to the modifications he desired the convention might be maintained. Giving in to these would not, he contended, be a retrograde step, or a departure from the principles of free trade; the really retrograde policy would be to reject them, thus abandoning the principle of the treaty and sacrificing the numerous liberal commercial arrangements which would remain. Lord Lyons told him that it would be a painful task to communicate these views to her Majesty's government; and it must have been painful to listen to them.

A long correspondence on the subject ensued between the two governments, and M. Thiers referred to it very pointedly in his message to the Assembly in December. The treaty, he complained, had been concluded without consulting the nation, and absolute free trade had been introduced without any preparation, causing deep injury to the trade in iron, woven fabrics, agricultural products, and the mercantile marine. He reported that the government proposed, as a basis of negotiation with England, an increase of from three to five per cent. in the duties on woven fabrics, with twelve or eighteen per cent. on mixed wool; that these overtures met with an unfavourable and dilatory response; that England objected to the change as a retrocession from free trade principles; and that the government therefore intended to give notice to terminate the treaty, continuing the negotiations during the twelve months which it had then to run. In any case, the existing friendly relations with England would remain unaffected, and the tariffs would be altered only on the points specified.

Official notice to terminate the treaty was given on March 15, 1872. The French government asserted to the last that it had no desire to effect an economic revolution of a nature tending to disturb the commercial relations of the two countries, but that it only wished to provide in the best manner for the pressing wants of French finance and industry. It recognized with satisfaction not only the courtesy manifested by Lord Granville in his communications on the subject, but also his acknowledgment of the difficulties against which France was struggling, as encouraging the hope that a resumption of negotiations might yet lead to a satisfactory compromise. Finally, it heartily reciprocated the declaration of her Majesty's government that, whatever might be the issue of the discussion, England would not regard it as a proof of hostility, or as affecting the *entente cordiale* which the commercial treaty was designed to strengthen.

The negotiations published in the Blue Book on the subject prove that the French government never exactly understood the English. Up to the last, M. Thiers did not believe we should go the length of accepting a "denunciation" of the treaty, but persuaded himself that it would be modified in the sense he desired. It was in vain Lord Granville again and again declared, that we could be party to no treaty involving an increase of protection, especially when it was stated on the other side that our consent was most earnestly sought for the purpose of inducing other nations to follow our example. M. Thiers was so convinced that, if he only held out long enough, he must lure us back, that at one time he proposed to send over M. Pouyer-Quertier to remove the slight difficulties in the way of a settlement; and he could hardly be persuaded that, without some preliminary agreement on principles, the visit of the finance minister would end in nothing but disappointment and

vexation. M. de Rémusat, the foreign minister, appears to have seen a little more clearly than his chief the bearing of Lord Granville's notes and the conversations of Lord Lyons; but even he could not be made to perceive that an import duty on wool or raw silk would be a protection to French producers of these articles, even though it were accompanied by import duties on cloths and manufactured silk. All that could be got from him when driven hard was, that if it were a protection it was very small; that Frenchmen were now heavily taxed; and, lastly, that small protective duties were not at variance with the spirit of the treaty. Correspondence thus conducted could end only in the "denunciation" of the treaty, and it is to be hoped that in future nothing will be done to enable him or any successor of his to allege afterwards that we have made a gain, and that France has suffered a loss, through a bargain between us.

With regard to another matter in which Englishmen took a special interest, M. Thiers adopted a much more satisfactory course. For many years Englishmen had been allowed to travel in France without any restriction whatever; but during the war the old system of passports was revived, and it was ultimately made more stringent than ever. Remonstrance from the English government was for some time useless, although it was clearly shown that the revival of the wanton and tyrannical restriction was quite inoperative for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime, and acted merely as an impediment to honest travellers. At last, however, M. Thiers, somewhat unexpectedly, gave way on the subject, and the intercourse of the two countries was practically restored to the freedom which existed, to their common advantage, in the days of the Empire. It is not often that a veteran statesman, arrived at the height of power, and fixed in his own opinions by the deference he receives, is willing to abandon anything on which he has set his mind; but in the present instance M. Thiers wisely gave in to the views which he found to prevail among men younger and holding inferior places, and in so doing he gave a better proof of capacity to govern than would have been afforded by any display of successful obstinacy.

The other subject to which M. Thiers chiefly directed his energies after the suppression of the Communist insurrection, and to which he seemed to pay, if possible, even more attention than to the financial condition of the country, was the reorganization of the French army.

The war had been so disastrous to France that it had destroyed her military power, materially as well as morally. It emptied the arsenals, exhausted the stock of the arm manufactories, left vast stores in the enemy's hands, and shattered or dismantled such of the strongholds as were not irreparably lost. The first steps to be taken were, of course, with the men. It became necessary not only to reunite scattered fragments of regiments, to provide *cadres* for them, to re-arm, clothe, equip, and train them, and to re-establish the health of the returned prisoners, but to collect in the centre of the country a force strong in numbers and quality, capable of overawing disorder, and of exhibiting to Europe visible proof of the reconstitution of the French army with all its old merits. In his speech to the Assembly, in December, 1871, M. Thiers was able to state that this project had been almost completed, permitting the incorporation of 600,000 infantry into 150 regiments of 3000 in the field, and 1000 at the depôt, and securing the constant "feeding" of the acting army, whatever the ravages of battles, marches, and diseases. Under the Empire, there were only 128 or 129 regiments, including the guards and zouaves; but with 150 regiments thirty-seven to thirty-eight divisions could always be organized, dispensing with the appointment of new *cadres* at the moment of taking the field, when every one so made was worthless. The increase of pieces of artillery from scarcely two and a half to four per thousand men, would also remedy one of the principal causes of the recent disasters. The threatened feud between the old officers, owing their advancement to length or distinction of service, and the new, owing it in part to the course of events, had been prevented by a spirit of moderation and good sense, and the deference of the juniors, so that the reconciliation was complete in most of the regiments; experience and the spectacle of a rigorous obedience in Germany having shown, both to soldiers and officers, that discipline was the life of armies. Hence order and respect for superiors prevailed. Destroyed or dispersed *cadres*, owing to the return of a large number of prisoners, would soon be reorganized, the troops were well armed, but their equipment and clothing were less advanced. As to recruiting, too much stress had

been laid on the numbers, instead of on the quality of soldiers, and the Prussian victories had been attributed to compulsory service. On this point M. Thiers said: "If by compulsory service it is meant that the French should be imbued with the patriotic thought that amid great perils they all owe their lives to the country, it is right, and we applaud it; but if it is meant that in peace, as in war, all Frenchmen should belong to the active army, this is pursuing the impossible, threatening the disorganization of civil society by the absolute ruin of the finances, and preparing an army, numerous without doubt, but incapable of really making war. There is, moreover, an impossibility of fact which you will at once appreciate. The class which every year attains, at twenty-one years, the age of service consists of 300,000 men. If these were enrolled there would be, with three years of service, three contingents, making about 900,000 men, which would constitute, doubtless, a very imposing force; but the budget, pushed to the utmost, could not pay more than 450,000, so that half would successively have to be relegated to their homes in the middle of their time of service, to give place to the new comers."

Urging that in eighteen months soldiers could not be formed, much less sub-officers, and that Prussia owed its success to the persistent struggle of the king and his principal minister for the prolongation of the period of training, the president proposed, as adequate to every necessity, to make service compulsory on all in time of war, but to enrol annually by lot during peace 90,000 men, clear of all deduction. The term of service would be eight years—five under the colours, and three in renewable furloughs; thus furnishing eight contingents of 90,000 each, which, added to the 120,000 otherwise recruited, would give a total of 840,000, or 800,000, making allowance for deaths, and the annual draught for the marine. A force would thus be secured which, in 1870, would certainly have won or disputed the victory, and saved provinces and milliards. Five years' active service would not be too heavy for the population, and the power of substituting one man for another would tend to mitigate it; while those not drawn could be intrusted with the protection of the towns, and in war with that of fortresses and frontiers.

This proposal of M. Thiers, which showed that, as in some other respects, he was yet untaught by the lessons of the past, and failed to see that the chief cause of the demoralization of the French army was the combination of conscription with paid substitutes—met with a firm and steady resistance from the National Assembly. The difference between him and them was fundamental. M. Thiers wanted an army formed on the same basis as that which capitulated at Sedan. He argued that the disasters which overtook the imperial troops reflected no discredit on the principles on which they were recruited and trained, but were due to the systematic neglect of those principles. Had the army been in fact what it was on paper, all might have gone well. What other motives M. Thiers might have had for wishing the principle maintained, or why he pronounced so decidedly against universal service, and in favour of a limited conscription, it is perhaps scarcely fair to surmise. But a general impression certainly existed that he was eager to hurry forward the day when France should be once more in a position to play an independent part in the affairs of Europe, and saw that a shorter time would suffice to put an existing system into thorough repair than to organize one entirely new. But his reasons, whether expressed or unexpressed, had no weight with the Assembly. They referred the matter to a well-selected committee, by whom it was most closely investigated, and through whose influence the government proposal was completely recast; while the shape in which it was presented showed how deep was the impression left by the war on the minds of Frenchmen. Both the Right and the Left in the Assembly would naturally be opposed to a large military establishment; but the desire to give France the power to measure herself again with Germany was stronger than any dread of domestic tyranny, and without a single dissentient vote the committee recommended as the basis of their scheme, that every Frenchman between the ages of twenty and forty should be not only liable to military service, but, with a few exceptions, should actually serve in the army or navy. The proposals of the committee were adopted by the Assembly, with very few alterations, June, 1872, and the new system will come into operation on the 1st of January, 1873. France will be divided into twelve military regions, each with a corps d'armée to which will be attached all soldiers found in the region, whether they have been liberated by anticipation, not having completed their period of active service,

or belong to the reserve, or have been allowed to return home, on no matter what pretext.

A corps d'armée will comprise two divisions of infantry of three brigades, one brigade of cavalry of three regiments, two regiments of artillery of fourteen batteries, a battalion of engineers with military train, &c. Each brigade of infantry will be uniformly composed of two regiments; the battalions of chasseurs à pied will be abolished as a constituted body, and will reappear as companies d'élite; and the battalion of infantry will be composed of five companies, including one of chasseurs, recruited from among the best shots in the corps. One of the three regiments of the cavalry brigade will be parcelled out between the two divisions for divisional service, for furnishing escorts, estafettes, &c., and the commander of the corps d'armée will have only two regiments of cavalry at his disposal for reconnoitring. This is hardly considered sufficient, but in addition to these two regiments there will be the cavalry of the reserve.

Each of the regiments of artillery will comprise fourteen batteries—ten field batteries, two foot, and two in the depôt. Out of the ten field batteries there will be eight mounted, and two of horse artillery. The artillery o. a corps d'armée will thus be composed of twenty batteries — eight attached to each division, two to the cavalry brigade, and two in reserve.

Each corps d'armée will detach a brigade for service in Paris or Lyons, and the twelve brigades thus obtained will form two corps d'armée for Paris and one for Lyons. By this combination a garrison easily moved and renewed will be kept up in these two troublesome centres of France, without the normal condition of the corps d'armée in the interior being greatly affected. The brigades thus detached, though forming a variable corps as far as regards the source from which they are drawn, will be under the command of a permanent staff and permanent generals, and so be ready to march at once in the event of war. This combination has been rendered necessary by the impossibility of garrisoning Paris with Parisians and Lyons with Lyonese, on the principle of territorial recruitment. The normal force of a corps d'armée upon a war footing will therefore consist of only five brigades, as the sixth brigade will be detached for service in Paris and Lyons.

In Algeria a permanent corps d'armée will always remain, composed of three divisions, one for each province. In the event of war, there will therefore be ready for service the twelve regional corps d'armée, the three of Paris and Lyons, and, in addition, a division of marines and three brigades borrowed from Algeria; in all, sixteen corps d'armée.

Independently of the twenty-four regiments of regional artillery, there will be ten others for supplying Paris, Lyons, and Algeria, as well as the general reserves of the army.

Such is a brief sketch of the plans adopted by the Assembly for the distribution of the force of 1,200,000 men now considered requisite for the defence of the country, and which will be divided into an active army, reserve of the active army, a territorial army, and territorial reserve.

The new military law, as regards recruitment, is based on the following general dispositions. As before stated, it lays down the principle of personal military service, not allowing substitutes; and consequently every Frenchman from twenty to forty years of age will be forced to serve. It also modifies the provision by which certain citizens, such as eldest sons of widows, &c., used to be entirely exonerated.

Although the contingents will in future comprise all the young men capable of military service, the old *tirage au sort*, or drawing of lots, will be maintained; but the men who draw good numbers, instead of being exonerated as heretofore, will only escape service in the marines, and be placed in the second instead of the first part of the contingent of the active army.

Definite exemption will in future be accorded only to young men whose infirmities render them unfit for all active or auxiliary service. The exemption for insufficient height is done away with, and the lads below the standard will be employed as auxiliary troops. The same law will be applied to youths of feeble constitution, who will have to present themselves three successive years before the Council of Revision before being told off to any special duty in hospitals, &c. The other cases of exemption specified in the law of 1832 will also be modified; in future the eldest son of a widow, the eldest lad of a family of orphans, and the young men who have brothers on active service, will not be exempted, but will receive a temporary dispensation, and be called upon to serve only in case of absolute necessity. In

regard to youths destined for holy orders and for public instruction, the law of 1832 is very slightly changed, but the new law accords no special favour to young men carrying off the first prizes at the Institute and the University. In the case of young men studying for a profession at the time of being drawn, the authorities may allow them to postpone serving until their studies are completed. In all cases the ecclesiastical student must take orders before he is twenty-six years of age. The exemption of priests was one of the great grudges which the Communists had against the whole body of the ecclesiastics; and during the siege of Paris several attempts were made to force the government to call on the seminarists to fall into the ranks of the national guard. In the early days of French history the clergy were obliged to serve like other vassals. When a bishop or an abbot renounced the profession of arms, he was forced to place himself under the protection of an *advocate* or *vidame*, to whom he paid so much a year, and it was probably this mediæval custom which the Communists wished to revive.

A certain number of men, deemed indispensable for the support of their families, will get temporary and renewable dispensations; but, as in most other cases, they will be called upon to serve in the event of danger.

The most important regulation in the new military law is, without doubt, the rendering it imperative that every Frenchman capable of bearing arms must form part of the active army for a period of five, and of the reserve of the active army for four years. On the expiration of these nine years' service the soldier will pass five years in the territorial army and six in the reserve of that army. In the marines, where the service is considered harder, its duration will not be so long, and exchanges will be permitted.

All the youth of the class called out, who are found fit for service, will be at once incorporated into one of the corps of the active army, but they will not all have to serve the same length of time in the effective. The minister of War will make known each year the number of men he requires, and those drafted into the active army to fill up its ranks will constitute the first portion of the contingent. The young men not comprised in that portion will only pass six months under the flag. It will be thus seen that when once the system comes into complete operation the reserve forces of France will be continually in process of recruitment through two distinct channels. Every year a certain number of troops who have served their full time with the colours will pass back into the civil population, and every year a certain percentage of the civil population will learn as much soldiering as six months in camp can teach them. When this system has been completely carried out, the active army can be reinforced in case of need by all the trained soldiers who have already served their full time, and by as many of the civil population who have served for six months as it proves necessary to call up.

The soldiers of the second portion of the contingent, though allowed to return home at the time stated, will be subjected to reviews and exercises; and so with the men of the reserve, who will be liable to be called out twice in the year, for four weeks at a time. Those belonging to these categories will be allowed to marry without authorization, and any man becoming the father of four living children will pass by right into the territorial army.

As regards volunteers, it is laid down that they must be able to read and write, and that in the event of hostilities any Frenchman, having completed his time in the active army and the reserve, will be allowed to volunteer for the duration of the war. Soldiers in the second portion of the contingent will be permitted to volunteer to complete their five years' service in the active army, and will have the right of objecting to being sent home before serving out their time.

On the subject of engagement and re-engagements, a large portion of the law of 1832 is unaltered; but one clause in the present law is an entire novelty in France (although a somewhat similar plan has been long in operation in Prussia), and will allow young men who have taken out diplomas—who are bachelors of letters, arts, or sciences, or who are following one of the faculties of the University, the Central School of Industry and Commerce, the School of Arts and Trades, the Conservatory of Music, the veterinary or agricultural schools, &c.—to contract a conditional engagement for one year. They will be required to pass a certain examination before the War minister, and will then be permitted to join the army for the short period stated, provided they equip and keep themselves. If at the expiration of a year they pass a military examination, they

will be freed from service and allowed to retire with the grade of sous-officier. Should a young man of this class desire to finish his studies before serving, he will be allowed to remain free until he is twenty-three years old, when he must pass his year in the ranks.

An important clause in the new law sets forth that any soldier who has passed twelve years under the flag, and has served as sous-officier for four years, will be entitled to a certificate giving him the right of claiming a civil or military employment, in accordance with his capacity. A special law is to settle the status of these employés in the public service.

As soon as the recommendations of the committee were made known, M. Thiers withdrew the opposition which he originally offered to the principle of universal service, and agreed to accept the increased strength of the army in the future as compensation for the greater delay in attaining it. The only point upon which any serious difference of opinion then existed was the question of substitutes. M. Thiers pleaded that, without allowing these, it would be impossible to satisfy the requirements of a civil career; but the committee replied that these were provided for by the clauses introduced into the bill to meet the case of students and young men preparing for professions. It is clear that the prohibition of substitutes is essential to the success of a system of compulsory service. So long as they are allowed, the army is not a really national force, but one composed of men who serve because they cannot help it, or who have been bribed by those who wish to avoid the duty which has devolved on them. The particular difficulty started by M. Thiers is disposed of as soon as service becomes really universal. It cannot be maintained that a year of camp life interposed between the preparatory study and the practice of a profession would be any real injury to a young man, unless it were exacted from him and not from his rivals. When it is imposed upon all alike, it simply interferes with the preparation for civil life by one year. M. Thiers would create a real, on the plea of doing away with an imaginary, hardship. Nothing could make military service more unpopular, or bring the government into greater discredit, than a provision allowing a student of law or medicine who could afford to buy a substitute, to set up as a barrister or a physician a year earlier than one of equal capacity and education, but by whom, from his limited circumstances, a substitute was unattainable.

Having thus given an outline of the French scheme, it may be interesting to compare it briefly with the military organization of Germany. The French Assembly has so fully adopted the principle of universal liability to military service without substitutes, that their system is even more thorough than that of Prussia, where anything beyond slight bodily defects disqualifies a man for enrolment, or even the Ersatz reserve.

It will be observed that in France the period of service extends from the age of twenty to forty, while in Prussia a man is free after he has attained the age of thirty-two, or has served twelve years. It is evident, therefore, that in France the service will press nearly twice as hard upon the nation as it does in Prussia. In Prussia also, in the case of the educated classes, the burden is much lightened by allowing young men to enter the army at seventeen, and to commute their three years' service with the colours and four years in the reserve, for one year with the colours and six years in the reserve, provided they give proof of their education, and consent to provide their own clothing, equipment, and subsistence. In France neither the educated nor the uneducated man can enter before he is twenty.

With regard to organization, the first point observable is, that the picked shots, instead of forming a third sub-division to each company, as in Prussia, are formed into a fifth company. There is something to be said for each arrangement, but on the whole the Prussian system seems preferable, as it renders each company an independent tactical sub-unit. In the English army the marksmen are mixed up with the worst shots, and of their superior skill no advantage whatever is taken. The abolition of the battalions of chasseurs is a measure the wisdom of which is not very clear, for it is always convenient to possess in each division or corps d'armée battalions trained for the special duties of the advanced guard. The distribution of the cavalry in the French system seems open to serious objections. In reconnoitring, a brigade of two regiments will not suffice to perform the duties of so large a body as a corps d'armée. Moreover, the employment of cavalry *en masse* is obsolete, and to withdraw them from the corps d'armée for the purpose of forming a grand reserve,

is to ignore the progress of the science of war. In future, we conceive that on the battle-field cavalry will only be able to act in comparatively small bodies, such as a regiment, or, at most, a brigade of two regiments. To form a corps of two or three, or even of one division, would therefore seem to deny that arm all opportunity of combining effectually its action with that of infantry and artillery. Cavalry ought to be chiefly attached, but not chained, to the divisions of infantry, in order to be able to take prompt advantage of the quickly passing opportunities which offer themselves.

The completeness of the localization in the French scheme, and the principle of keeping every corps d'armée in a state of continual readiness for active service, cannot be too much praised. The great distinction between the two systems here compared is, that service with the colours is in France to be five years, while in Prussia it is only three. The French, from natural insubordination and want of education and intelligence, probably require longer military training than the Prussians. But even the Prussian authorities would prefer a longer period of service, did circumstances admit of its being introduced. We are not, therefore, disposed to find fault with that portion of the French plan. We do, however, think that two trainings yearly, each of four weeks, to which the French reserve man is to be subjected, will impose an unnecessary hardship on the nation What master will care to employ a workman liable to be called away so often, and for so long a time? Further, a person once thoroughly trained could well keep up his military proficiency by means of a much less time. In Prussia the men on furlough, corresponding to the army reserve of the French, are only liable in four years to take part in two manœuvres, neither of them exceeding eight weeks. Practically they are not kept out for half that time.

As a whole, the French may be pronounced an exaggerated copy of the Prussian system, but it wants its practical character and its completeness. Imperfect, however, though it be in some respects, it is a great improvement on the old organization. It raises the status of the army, and adds enormously to the material strength of the country, while at the same time it promises to contribute largely to its moral regeneration.

Under the new system it is intended that France shall be able to bring into the field an army of 1,185,000, armed with the best weapons that science can invent and money procure. It is further designed that the fortifications of Paris shall be so extended as to embrace the heights which the Germans occupied in the late siege, and that the eastern frontier shall be covered with a line of fortresses.

The reform of the military schools also formed a part of the programme of the government and of the Assembly. The war brought out clearly the inadequacy and vices of the instruction given in them. The pupils of the Polytechnic were too often theorists, who retained in the colleges to which they were afterwards sent—the military engineer college, the artillery and staff colleges—the faults of their training. Over-instructed in some branches, ignorant in others which are indispensable, they showed themselves especially incompetent on the staff. Under the most favourable circumstances, however, it must take a considerable time and no little effort of administrative ingenuity, before the armed power of France can be considered materially a match for that of Germany.

On June 29 a new treaty was concluded between Germany and France, which was, on the whole, beneficial to the latter Under previous arrangements no more money was to have been paid until March 1, 1874, and the six departments were all to continue to be occupied till that time; £120,000,000, with interest, were then to be paid, and the Germans were forthwith to evacuate France Under the new arrangement £20,000,000 were to be paid within two months o the ratification o the treaty, and two departments, comprising the finest parts of Champagne, were to be evacuated It was also agreed that £20,000,000 more should be paid on February 1, 1873, and £40,000,000 more on 1st March, 1874; and on these £80,000,000, or two milliards, being paid, two more departments, those of Ardennes and the Vosges, are to be evacuated. The last £40,000,000 are to be paid, with all interest then due, on March 1, 1875, and then the last of the six occupied departments, those of Meuse and Meurthe, are to be evacuated, and Belfort is to be handed over to France. The main features of this new treaty were, therefore, that by an immediate payment of £20,000,000 France purchased the liberation of two departments, and she had a

year more given her before she made a final settlement with Germany. The French government tried hard to obtain the further concession, that in proportion as the area of occupation was diminished the numbers of the occupying army should be diminished also. But the Germans, for military reasons, would not agree to this. They insisted on being at liberty to keep 50,000 men in France, so long as they were there at all.

Immediately after this treaty had been ratified by the Assembly, preparations were made for contracting a new loan in order to carry its provisions into effect. The amount asked for was three and a half milliards, or £140,000.000, at five per cent., and as it was issued at eighty-three it promised investors about six per cent. interest. The success of this loan was almost beyond the power of imagination. More than twelve times the amount required was offered! Of this enormous sum France of course subscribed the greater part. The eagerness of the people there transcended everything which had been observed in connection with the imperial loans. Not fewer than 250 places for subscription were opened in Paris alone, and at all of them the tradesmen and workmen pressed to make their demands (in many cases they waited all night in order to obtain a good place), and to hand in the deposit which should entitle them to their allotment. Abroad the loan was hardly less attractive, and Germany alone more than covered the whole amount required. In England, too, the subscriptions were very large—far exceeding any which had ever been offered to any foreign country, or even to our own. Of course the offer was to some extent unreal, as many subscribers, anticipating that they would only be alloted a portion of the amount asked for, sent in requests for much larger sums than they would have been prepared to take. But the deposit required to guarantee good faith, the fourteen per cent. actually sent in to the Mairies and the Treasury in gold, silver, bank-notes, and immediately available securities, was £240,000,000, or £100,000,000 more than the amount required—an amount nearly four times the sum ever asked for in a single loan in the whole history of finance.

The great moral lesson of this marvellous success was, as it seems to us, that it clearly proved that the people of France—the six or seven million male adults who plant and plough, and build and trade within her borders—are not disenchanted by her reverses, are not distrustful of her future, and are not fearful lest she should be eaten up by Communists, or should cease to be a state. All accounts testify alike that subscriptions came from the very lowest, that the *queue* of persons waiting to subscribe in Belleville, the Communist stronghold, was one of the longest in the capital. The conservative power of confidence such as this could scarcely be overrated, even were the possession of means to subscribe in itself not so conservative an influence; but as it is, the subscription was of itself, in our opinion, almost a guarantee for France. A nation in which industry, patience, self denial, and habits of saving are so conspicuous as in France, and in which the masses so trust the state, cannot be dead or dying, or even weak. There must be vitality in it, even if misdirected; force, even if the force has not yet accumulated itself in the hand most competent to guide it. What nation, at any height of prosperity, could give a more decisive and unanswerable proof of its belief in itself, of its own intention to live, of that confidence in its own continuance which is, after all, the best security that it will continue, and continue great? Money is not all, either in war or peace, though both have been made so expensive; but the nation which, with the victorious foreigner camped on her soil, with an openly expressed determination to "revindicate" two of her provinces at the earliest opportunity, and with all her institutions to re-arrange, can, at a word, command £120,000,000 to be paid away in tribute to an invader, is and must remain, both for war and peace, one of the greatest of nations.

THE END.

WILLIAM MACKENZIE, LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND GLASGOW.

PART III.

THE RHINE VALLEY.

Adams, W. H. Davenport

A thousand battles have assailed thy banks,
But these and half their fame have passed away,
And slaughter heaped on high his slaughtering ranks;
Their very graves are gone, and what are they?
Thy tide washed down the blood of yesterday,
And all was stainless; and on thy clear stream
Glanced with its dancing light the sunny ray;
But o'er the blackened memory's blighting dream,
Thy waves would vainly roll, all sweeping as they seem.

Adieu to thee, fair Rhine. . . .
The negligently grand, the fruitful bloom
Of coming ripeness, the white city's sheen,
The rolling stream, the precipice's gloom,
The forest's growth, and Gothic walls between
The wild rocks shaped as they had turrets been.
In mockery of man's art; and these withal,
A race of faces happy as the scene,
Whose fertile bounties here extend to all,
Still springing o'er thy banks, though empires near them fall.

Byron's *Childe Harold.*

CHAPTER I.—Introductory.

FROM THE SOURCES OF THE RHINE TO STRASBURG.

With the exception of the Nile and the Jordan, there is no river in the world which has exercised so great an influence on the fortunes of nations, or produced so powerful an impression on the minds of men, as the Rhine. We know all that can be said in favour of the mighty Mississippi, and its turbid roll of waters; of the Amazon, and its forest-clad banks; of the "sacred Ganges," and its traditions dating far back into the twilight of human history; of the Indus, which marked at one time the frontiers of Western civilization; of the Thames, which, comparatively insignificant in its course and volume, has nevertheless gathered to its ample bosom the commercial navies of the world: but of none of them can so much be advanced to interest and astonish and attract the thinker, as of the "exultant and abounding" Rhine. The great German river possesses every charm which can fix our attention; it is rich in the graces of scenery, in historical associations, in those songs and legends which naturally spring from the fertility of the popular imagination. It flows through a succession of landscapes which vary from grave to gay, from the sublime to the beautiful; it is haunted by memories of heroes, of warriors, princes, and poets; by the shadows of terrible battles which have been fought upon its banks; by the immortal music of the Lorelei, who, as old poets tell us, frequents its liquid depths, and incessantly raises her sweet but melancholy strains. It is the river of the grand epic of the Nibelungen-lied; it is the river of the faithful Roland, of the two brothers of Liebenstein, of the white-bearded and imperial Charlemagne, of the mighty Barbarossa. From the earliest ages it has borne that singularly impressive character which is still its dower. Long before the Teuton settled on the slopes of its fertile hills it was called, as it is still called, the Rhine (*hren*, *rhenus*); and the word thrilled in the ears of the Celts of old, as it now thrills in the ears of Frank and German. Two thousand years ago, as now, it was "the river," the river of rivers, the king of rivers, for the great German race; and mailed warriors sang, as well-armed veterans sing to-day:—

"Am Rhein, am Rhein, da wachsen unsere Reben,
Gesegnet sie der Rhein!"

The people prayed on its banks—for it was as sacred to them as the Ganges to the Hindu—and lighted their tapers, and offered their offerings in honour of the noble river. And through the course of succeeding generations, the popular devotion has never failed, and you can stimulate

the dullest brain and coldest heart into enthusiasm by whispering—the Rhine.

There are rivers, says a German writer, whose course is longer; there are rivers whose volume of water is greater: but no other unites in the same degree almost everything that can render an earthly object magnificent and attractive. As it descends from the remote ridges of the Alps, through fertile regions into the open sea, so it comes down from remote antiquity, associated in every age with momentous events in the history of the neighbouring nations. A river which presents so many historical recollections of Roman conquests and defeats, of the chivalrous exploits of the feudal age, of the wars and negotiations of modern times, of the coronations of emperors, whose bones repose by its side; on whose borders stand the two grandest monuments of the noble architecture of the mediæval days;* whose banks exhibit every variety of wild romantic rocks, dense forests, smiling plains, vineyards, sometimes gently sloping, sometimes perched among lofty crags, where industry has won a domain among the fortresses of nature; whose banks are ornamented with populous cities, flourishing towns and villages, castles and ruins, with which a thousand legends are connected, with beautiful and picturesque highways, and salutary mineral springs; a river whose waters offer choice fish, as its banks produce the choicest wines; which, in its course of 900 miles, affords 630 of uninterrupted navigation, from Bâle to the sea, and enables the inhabitants of either side of its fertile valley to exchange its rich and luxurious products; whose cities, famous for commercial enterprise, science, and military strongholds which furnish protection to Germany, are also famous as the seats of Roman colonies and of ecclesiastical councils, and are associated with many of the most important events recorded in the history of mankind;—such a river, says our authority, it is not surprising that the Germans should regard with a kind of reverence, and frequently call it in poetry *Father*, or *King Rhine.*

GENERAL STATISTICS.

The Rhine, in its earliest stage, consists of three branches, the Front, the Middle, and the Back Rhine, and in these branches absorbs nearly all the drainage of the northern basin of the Alps.

* The cathedrals of Strasburg and Cologne.

Each branch has, of course, its own fountain-head.

The Front Rhine (*Vorder Rhein*) rises from the Toma Lake, which is 7460 feet above the sea level, and coated with ice for the greater part of the year, in a region of dreary rocks and steel-blue glaciers.

The Middle Rhine (*Mittel Rhein*) springs from the Cadelrhin glacier, and descends abruptly into the Medelsee valley.

The Back Rhine (*Hinter Rhein*) issues from the icy solitudes of the Rheinwald valley, at the base of the Moschelhorn, Adula, and Piz Vol Rhein, about six miles above the little village of Hinter Rhein (4800 feet above the sea), where it is crossed by a stone bridge with three arches; and thence traversing the Via Mala and Trou Perdu, swollen by thirty torrents, it winds through the fair valley of Domleschg, where it receives the Nolla, the Albula, the Davos, and the Rhine of Oberhalbstein.

The Front Rhine, near the pastoral hamlet of Chiamont, is augmented by two streams, one coming down from Crispalt and the other from the Corvera Valley. At Dissentis, where the traveller may see the remains of a fine old Benedictine abbey, it receives the Middle Rhine, and the united stream then proceeds to join the more important current of the Back Rhine at Reichenau.

Such is the origin of the great German river. Fed by the snows of the Swiss mountain glaciers, it strikes eastward from Reichenau to Coire. Then it takes a northerly direction, and flows through the beautiful valley which bears its name, as far as the Lake of Constanz. At Constanz it issues from the lake, and proceeding westward traverses a second lake, which it quits at Stein; then it runs to Schaffhausen, to form the magnificent cataract known as the Falls of the Rhine. From Schaffhausen to Bâle it keeps a westerly course. Near Waldshut it receives the Aar, which, with the Limmat and the Reuss, brings to it the waters of the Swiss cantons of Friburg, Lucerne, Unterwalden, Uri, Schwyz, Zug, and Glarus, and no inconsiderable portion of those of Vaud, Neuchâtel, Berne, Soleure, Argovie, Zurich, and Saint-Gall; for its basin extends, west to east, from the Lake des Rousses to the frontier of the Grisons; and south to north, from the massive ridge of St. Gothard to its own borders.

Beyond Bâle, the Rhine, receding from rugged

Helvetia, takes a northerly direction, and forms as far as Strasburg, one of the great fortresses in the French outer line of defence, the boundary line between the grand duchy of Baden (right bank) and the empire of France (left bank).

From Strasburg our river flows northward, or more correctly speaking north-eastward, to Mannheim, where it receives the Neckar. At Mainz it turns to the west, then to the north-west, and flows past Coblenz (where it is augmented by the Moselle), Bonn, Köln, and Dusseldorf, to Arnhem, where it strikes westward to Utrecht, and dividing into two channels, the Waal and the Lek, which again unite near Arnhem, sluggishly meanders through a flat and deltoid country, to empty its waters, amid shallows and mud banks, into the German Ocean at Catwyck, below Leyden.

Its length of course may be thus estimated: From its extreme source to the city of Constanz, 135 miles; from Constanz to Basel (Bâle), 80 miles; from Basel to Lauterberg, 110 miles; from Lauterberg to Bingen, 90 miles; from Bingen to its mouth, 270 miles: total, 685 miles. Its average velocity is ninety-one mètres, or 99·5 yards, per minute. Its basin includes an area of 82,000 square miles, inhabited probably by 18,000,000 inhabitants. Of this area a ninth part belongs to Switzerland, an eighth to France, a seventh to Belgium and Holland, and the remainder, with the exception of a small Austrian territory, to Germany, as represented by Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemburg.

The breadth of the Rhine at the principal points on its banks is as follows:—

	English Feet.
Near Reichenau,	250
At Stein,	280 to 330
Schaffhausen,	380
The Falls of the Rhine,	330
Rheinfelden,	660
Basel,	750
Near Strasburg,	1090
Mannheim,	1350
Mainz,	1350
Biberich,	1650
Eltville,	1950
Near Bingen,	1020
Near Coblenz,	1380
Near Neuwied,	1530
Bonn,	1360
Cologne (Köln),	1400
Hittorf,	1750
Dusseldorf,	1350
Kaiserswerth,	1510
Wesel,	1650
Below Wesel,	1950
Near Emmerich,	2350

The Rhine is navigable from its mouth to Schaffhausen, a distance of 500 miles. Its average depth, from the sea to Köln (160 miles), is ten to twelve feet; from Köln to Mainz, five to six feet; but the depth is affected by the character of the seasons, being greatest when a very warm and genial spring has largely melted the mountain snows.

The Rhine, says Victor Hugo, combines the characters of all other rivers. It is swift as the Rhone, broad as the Loire, shut in like the Meuse, tortuous as the Seine, green and lucent as the Somme, historic as the Tiber, regal as the Danube, mysterious as the Nile, gold-spangled as a river of America, haunted with fables and phantoms as a river of Asia.

TO REICHENAU.

Having furnished the reader with these general particulars—with an itinerary, as it were, of the district he has to traverse—we now proceed to a detailed description of the course of the great German river.

The fountains of the Back Rhine are romantically situated. They issue from the bosom of the Rheinwald glacier—a torrent of ice fully four and twenty miles in height—thirteen or fourteen in number, and fall over the ridge of the Moschelhorn into a dark blue pool at the base of the glacier, which is fed by inexhaustible but concealed streams. This pool is about four feet broad by one and a half deep. Receiving tributes of melted snow and ice on either hand, the infant river pours through a chasm or crevasse, called the Gulf of Hell; passing the spot where a "Temple of the Nymphs" once consecrated the silent mountain solitudes; and hurries onward to Reichenau, to receive, as we have already said, the united stream of the Front and Middle Rhine. The distance is about forty-five miles, and in this distance the river has a fall of nearly 4000 feet, a fact which attests the impetuosity of its current, and the steep rugged character of the valley, or succession of valleys, through which its hurrying waters swirl and foam.

The chief town in this wild and picturesque region is Splügen, lying in the shadow of the densely wooded mountain of that name. It boasts of a quaint little church and a grey old timber bridge, of a decent inn, and of several houses of such fantastic design, that they would delight the soul of an artist. Its chief importance lies in its position

at the commencement of the great Splügen Pass, one of the main channels of communication between Switzerland and Lombardy.

We are now in the territory of the Grisons; a territory which comprehends within its limits the elements both of the grand and beautiful, the sublime and terrible. The Rhine traverses it from end to end, and in so doing traverses a series of landscapes wholly unequalled in Europe; landscapes which combine the rock and the torrent, the forest and the ravine, the pastoral meadow and the sylvan glen. We can well believe that they kindle an almost divine enthusiasm in the soul of the poet. Certain we are that not even the dullest can look upon them without an emotion of sympathy.

The territory of the Grisons, anciently forming the Republic of the Three Leagues in Rhætia Superior, consists, in the main, of the upper valley of the Rhine, and occupies an area of 130 German square miles. It is the largest canton included in the Swiss Confederacy; but in point of population only the eighth, its inhabitants not exceeding 100,000 in number. These are divided between the Lutheran and Roman Catholic creeds in the proportion of 60,000 to 40,000, and are of German, Romansh, and Italian origin. The chief town is Chur, or Coire.

The character of the country, and especially of the Engadine, which is its most beautiful and pastoral portion, has been described with singular force and effect by Michelet, in his book on "The Mountain." But on its icy plains and snowy wastes, its broken masses of rock, its precipices, its wild awful ravines, its foaming torrents, its deep shadowy forests of murmurous pine, its bold mountain terraces, and its occasional bursts of Arcadian loveliness—where some crystal stream winds through a quiet and leafy vale, sheltered, tranquil, and genial, and enhanced in its still beauty by the mystic horror of the frowning heights beyond—we are forbidden to dwell. Nor can we speak of the 180 ruined castles, which, planted on their rocky eminences, form so curious an object in the most attractive landscapes, and of each of which some legend might be told, or some historical fact narrated.

After leaving Splügen, the Rhine increases in width, and its waters assume a blue-green tint, as they enter upon the dark and desolate ravine of the Rofla—*die Felsengallerie* (or tunnel gallery), *durch die Roffler*—and plunge under arching crags, and down steep descents, with a deafening din and a ceaseless whirl and eddy. The rocks on either hand are gaunt and precipitous, relieved only by the brushwood growing from their fissures, or the rows of tall spectral firs which stand like wardens on their summits. The Rofla defile is about half a league in length, and a road was first formed through it in 1470, at the same time that the Via Mala was constructed.

Into the dark deep gulf the Rhine plunges with a mighty bound. It is spanned by the Rofla bridge, 4140 feet above the level of the sea. Here it is joined from the south by the Averse water, or the Avner Rhine, the two streams meeting together with a wild clash and tumult, like two warrior-foes, and hurtling from rock to rock, and dashing from side to side, as if in the throes of a mortal combat, while the echoes resound with the din, and the living spray flashes far up the rugged precipices which confine and limit their struggles. He who gazes on the scene may understand the full force of Byron's powerful expression, "a hell of waters;" for the deep shadows, and the boiling currents, and the roar and crash that cease not day nor night, seem, in very truth, infernal!

But swift as the change in a child's heart from agony to joy, is the change which operates in the character of our river as it passes from the Rofla into the gentle valley of Schams, or Schons; so named, it is said, from the six mountain streams which here descend into the all-absorbing Rhine. It is the central of the three terraced basins through which the Back Rhine traces its course, and forms the natural transition between the snow-clad Rheinwald and the sunny Domleschg. The transformation, says one authority, is magical; all at once we find ourselves in quite a different world. The blue sky is no longer hidden by lofty menacing rocks; the mountains on either side stretch down into the lowlands with a more gradual slope; the Rhine winds more tranquilly and deliberately through green meadows, studded with farm-house and cottage; while, on the wooded heights, the ancient ruins of many a deserted stronghold stand like the monuments of a bygone age.

The valley of Schams is nearly fourteen miles in length, from Thusis to the borders of the Rheinwald, that is, from north to south; but its central and inhabited portion, the vale within the valley, does not exceed a couple of leagues in

length. Its form is oval, and there are geological indications that it was once, like the other valleys of this romantic district, the bed of a lake.

The principal village in the valley is Andur, situated 3000 feet above the sea. Its inhabitants speak the Romansh language, and profess the Lutheran religion. They are chiefly employed in the iron furnaces and smelting-houses which fill this countryside at night with a score of blazing fires.

We next come to the bridge of Pigneu, (Pigné, or Pignel), a place whose chief reputation is founded on its thermal springs, which have a temperature of 50° R., and are described as alkaline chalybeate waters.

The next village is Zillis or Ciraun, where there stands a large church, the oldest in the valley. In 540 it was bestowed by Otto I. on Bishop Waldo of Chur, to compensate for the injury the see had sustained by the invasion of the Saracens.

Two bridges are here thrown across the river, and lead up a gentle and pleasant ascent to the picturesquely situated villages of Donat, Pazen, Fardün, Casti, and Clugien. On the high ground above Donat, to the right, moulder the ruins of Fardün.

The rocky strongholds of the barons, says a judicious writer, were nearly all on the left bank of the Rhine, near the old high road which wound over the heights towards the Heinzenberg, before the defile of the Via Mala was opened, and that highway rendered available. Near the hamlet of Casti, and almost opposite Andur, is the castle of Castellatsch, from whose hoary height you can enjoy a superb panorama of the entire landscape. Both names indicate their derivation from the Roman Castellum, or from Castel.

Not far from the hamlet of Mathon, which is built on the table-land above Donat, one weather-beaten ruinous tower of the old castle of Oberstein overlooks the valley. Near the adjoining village of Bergenstein also stood a stronghold bearing the same name. And thus, as the eagles build their eyries among the rocks, so did the old feudal barons erect their towers on the difficult heights, prepared to swoop down on wealthy burgher or opulent priest as he passed unwarily beneath.

At Zillis a bold mountain-ridge, extending from the Piz Beverin to the Mutnerhorn, cuts across the fair meadow-valley of Schams, and separates it from the luxuriant Domleschg. Ages ago it undoubtedly blocked up the waters of the Rhine, and confined them within the hollow, which they converted into a silent lake; but in the course of generations these waters have broken through the barrier, assisted, perhaps, by some violent subterranean convulsion, and excavated the grand majestic defile of the *Via Mala*, or Evil Way.

The cliffs on either side of this defile rise from 400 to 500 feet in height, but approach so closely together that, in several places, the distance between them does not exceed thirty feet.

The lower part of the Via Mala is called the "Lost Hole." Here the road skirts the margin of an awful, brain-dizzying chasm, and enters a gallery 216 feet long, ten to fourteen feet high, and fifteen to eighteen wide, which it was found necessary to cut through the projecting mass of perpendicular rock.

The two banks of the river are here connected by bridges of bold and airy span. The first at which we arrive, 2622 feet above the sea, was erected in 1731. The second, built in 1739, lies 300 yards farther south. It is between the two that the traveller gazes, with mingled awe and admiration, on the most romantic and impressive portion of the great Via Mala. Grandly wild is the dark abyss, lying 400 feet deep in shadow, where, at the second bridge, the mad torrent foams, and boils, and rushes over crag and boulder. The rocky declivities start up so abrupt and sheer, that the width of the cleft at the top scarcely exceeds that at the bottom. So narrow is the gap, that huge fragments of rock, or trunks of venerable pines, hurled over the parapet of the bridge, never reach the water, but lie wedged between the sides. The mighty roar of the torrent; the ghastly white spray which mantles its darkling waves; and the rugged black acclivities, with their numerous projections and pinnacles rising far above the mist of the abyss, cannot but produce a strong impression on the mind which rightly appreciates the various features of the scene.

Close to the mouth of the Via Mala stands the gray old castle of Realt, on a precipitous rock 960 feet in height, and guarding the defile like some veteran knight of the "brave days of old." It occupies the site of the ancient Hohenrhaetien—the Hoch-Royalt, or Rhaetia alta—whose erection belongs to so remote an antiquity that the peasants

are fain to connect it with one Rhaetus, the leader of the Etruscans in their war against the Gauls, 587 B.C.

From the early days of the Frank supremacy to the close of the eighth century, Realt belonged to a powerful Rhaetian family, the counts of Victorinz or Realt, who encouraged the diffusion of Christianity in their territory, and founded the convent of Katzis.

In the eleventh century the knights of Hoch-realt again figure upon the scene, and one of them, Sir Heinrich, received the episcopal mitre in 1213. The castle continued to be inhabited down to the middle of the fifteenth century.

It must once have been of considerable size, to judge from the extent of its ruins; and of great strength, owing to its formidable and almost inaccessible position. The only pathway to the summit climbs the northern side; elsewhere, the cliff descends straight into the narrow gulf watered by the Rhine.

Here, according to an old legend, the last governor of Hohen-realt precipitated himself on horseback into the chasm. The fort was surrounded by a large body of malcontent peasantry; the servants and men-at-arms of its captain had been slain or put to death. Instead of surrendering, he set fire to the castle, mounted his steed, rode to the loftiest peak, and spurred the animal with a swift bound into air—and destruction; exclaiming, "Death, rather than the people's tyranny!"

The chivalrous spirit of the knight, mounted on a phantom white horse, is believed still to gallop to and fro among the mouldering ruins at "dark midnight."

After passing Hohen-realt, we enter the valley of the Domleschg, where the Rhine receives a turbid rivulet called the Nolla. The valley (*vallis domestica*) is a broad and fertile district, lying at an elevation of 2250 to 1870 feet above the sea, and running due north and south for about ten miles. The mountains on either side are from 7000 to 8000 feet high, and with their glittering crests of snow, and bare sides and bold rugged forms, present a striking contrast to the smiling scene through which the Back Rhine carries its emerald waters; a panorama of meadow, orchard, and vineyard, of green hills and rich deep forests, of gray old castles and church-spires, with villa, castle, and farm enlivening the whole. The vine is here met with for the first time on the banks of the Rhine, and the chestnut and mulberry thrive in the open air.

The mountains on the east are of a very rugged character, especially the Three League and the Malix. Not less formidable are the Mutterhorn and Piz Beverin to the south. But the terraced range of the Heinzenberg on the west bears a more genial aspect, and its amphitheatre is studded with numerous smiling villages.

The principal town in the Domleschg is Tosana, or Thusis, which lies sequestered in a kind of rocky hollow, overshadowed with walnut trees, chestnuts, and fruit trees, and pleasantly distinguished in the distance by its white church-steeple. Wolfgang Musculus, a scholar of the sixteenth century, was born here.

After crossing the limpid Albula, which empties itself into the Rhine near a toll-bridge, at an elevation of 2240 feet above the sea level, we come to Katzis, a small Romansh and Roman Catholic town, literally embowered in orchards. Its Dominican nunnery was founded in the seventh century by Paschalis, bishop of Chur.

On the opposite bank stands Fürstenau, and its Episcopal castle, built in 1270 by the bishop, Henry of Chur, to protect the surrounding country from the inroads of the robber knights. It is by no inharmonious consequence that it is now used as a prison.

The castles of the Domleschg are numerous. Near that of Fürstenau stands the fastness of the barons Von Planta. Close at hand may be seen the ruins of Husensprung; those of Campi remind the spectator of the gallant race of Campobello, or Campbell, to which belonged the historian and reformer Ulrich Campbell. On the opposite side of the valley is Baldenstein; Jagstein and Schauenstein may also be mentioned; and along the right bank of the river we arrive, in due succession, at the mouldering battlements of Paspelo, Alt-Sins, and Neu-Zinsenberg, which were once associated with many a hope and fear, many a proud ambition and dark despair and tender love, but are now desolate and silent, save for hooting owl and whirring bat. The reflections which yonder gray old walls awaken are necessarily trite, for what is more commonplace than the mutability of worldly things? Yet in such scenes as these they naturally rise to the mind, and demand expression; and, at all events, the traveller will do no harm if, sparing himself elaborate apostrophes and pro-

found meditations, he chants the well-known lines of Coleridge—

> "The old knights are dust,
> Their swords are rust,
> Their souls are with the saints, I trust."

They had God's work to do in their time, and nobly and loyally some of them did it.

The castle of Ortenstein is spoken of as in excellent preservation. Its position is so picturesque that whoever sees it once will remember it always; but it has no historical associations to seize upon the memory, and endow it with a vital interest. It is still inhabited by the descendants of its old lords, the Travers, who formerly played a considerable part in the affairs of the Grisons, though in no wise connected with European history. John Travers was one of the earliest of the Lutherans.

The castle of Rhäzüns, near the village of the same name, is the finest in the Domleschg, perhaps in the whole countryside of the Grisons. It lies romantically in the turbulent stream, says Gaspey, enthroned on a high rock, with its weather-beaten towers, still firm and strong, overlooking the valley whose entrance it commanded. According to a local tradition, it was formerly a Roman fort. In the earliest times a powerful family dwelt at Rhäzüns; when, in the fourteenth century, it became extinct, the castle and lordship passed to the Baron of Brun, who was one of the earliest members of the Upper League.

In the year 1459 died Ulrich von Brun, the last of his race. The castle and lordship were inherited by the counts of Zollern, who sold them to the archducal house of Austria. The Hapsburgs bestowed them as a fief on the Von Marmels; next on the Von Plantas; and finally, on the Travers. Early in the eighteenth century it was the residence of the Austrian ambassadors in the Grisons, and of the stewards of the estate, who were entitled to a seat and vote in the conferences of the Upper League. By the peace of Vienna, in 1805, it was given to Bavaria; by that of Presburg, in 1805, to France; and in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Austria relinquished her claim on the castle in favour of the Grisons, though she took care to retain all the lands included in its seignory.

Traversing the rich corn-fields of Bonnaduz (Ponnad'oz = Pan-a-töto, or "Bread for all"), a Romansh village, built of stone, we reach at last the confluence of the two arms of our great river at Reichenau.

At the point of junction stood, six centuries ago, a watch-tower, like the border peels of south-eastern Scotland, called La Punt; which was afterwards converted into a castle by one of the bishop of Chur, and re-named Reichenau—in compliment to the abbot of the island of Reichenau, in the Lake of Constanz, with whom the good bishop had frequently "crushed a cup of wine." It suffered terribly at successive epochs, and losing its castellated character, figured towards the close of the last century as a school, where no less a man than Heinrich Zschokke, the moralist, was tutor, and Benjamin Constant, afterwards so eminent a French savant, pupil.

With this educational establishment a curious incident is connected, not without interest at a time when the crown of imperial France has suddenly fallen from the astute brow which for so many years had worn it. We shall tell it nearly in the language employed by the author of "The Upper Rhine."

It was growing dark one afternoon in October, 1793—an epoch like the present, when Europe shook with the tread of armed men, and the spirit of Revolutionary France was all aflame—it was nearly dark when a young man, carrying a bundle over his shoulder at the end of a stick, and who, from his wayworn appearance, had evidently travelled far on foot, knocked at the door of the house. In indifferent German he inquired for the director, Herr von Jost, and on being ushered into his presence handed him a letter of introduction from General Montesquiou, which ran as follows:—

"Sir,—In the bearer of this note I bring you acquainted with a young man who, pursued by the French assassins, is anxious to obtain a secure asylum in your quiet Reichenau. He resided for awhile in Zug; afterwards with me in Bremgarten; and hopes now to meet with shelter for a longer period in the highlands of Rhætia. His great acquirements in mathematics and in French render him eligible for the situation as teacher, which, as I perceive from the newspapers, is now vacant in your establishment.

"Receive him, brave fellow-soldier, who have valiantly fought in the Swiss guard, and in my army in Savoy. You will do so with the greatest satisfaction when I communicate the secret of his rank. He is the young duke of Chartres, the son of the duke of Orléans. As you are aware, he served honourably in the army of the Republic,

under the name of the younger Egalité, but was forced to fly from the blood-thirsty Committee of Public Safety, and now seeks shelter in neutral Switzerland. I trust you will be able to afford it to him.

"MONTESQUIOU."

After consulting his partner, Herr von Tscharner, and his head-master, Professor Vesemann, the director willingly complied with General Montesquiou's request, and under the assumed name of Chabaud* the young duke of Chartres entered the establishment as an usher. For eight months he taught mathematics with patience and success, boarding at the common table with the pupils and other teachers, none of whom suspected that a Bourbon was among them.

Here the duke learned of the execution of his father, who, instead of swimming with the fierce current of the revolution, as he had hoped, was overwhelmed by its violence. Here, too, he heard of his mother's exile to Madagascar. At length he ventured from his concealment to make a tour in the north of Europe, and finally, in 1796, to sail to America.

Years passed away. The star of the first Napoleon rose above the horizon like a terrible meteor, portending ruin to nations, and sunk in blood and ruin on the well-remembered field of Waterloo. The Bourbons regained the throne of their ancestors, to prove that they had forgotten everything, and learned nothing. Charles X., in 1830, was driven into exile, and the former teacher of mathematics at Reichenau became Louis Philippe, king of the French.

In his prosperity he was not unmindful of his days of adversity, and he caused a painting to be executed in which he was represented, surrounded by his pupils.

In 1847 it was announced that the grandson of his old director, Herr von Jost, who through political troubles had been driven from Switzerland, had been appointed to a lieutenancy in the French army, and presented with a handsome outfit by King Louis Philippe. A twelvemonth later, and under the assumed name of Mr. Smith the monarch was hurrying to a safe retreat in England; leaving his throne to be occupied, after a brief interval, by the third Napoleon, who, after twenty years of rule, has been compelled to surrender himself to a Prussian king. Such are the vagaries of Fortune! May we not learn a lesson from them?

There are two timber bridges at Reichenau: one over the Front Rhine, of comparatively small dimensions; the other below the junction of the stream, 237 feet long, and 80 feet above the surface of the water. It was constructed by a self-taught architect.

The valley of the Front Rhine is usually called the Oberland, and is deservedly famous for the bold and romantic character of its scenery. It is forty-eight miles in length, and the descent from Chiamict to Reichenau is 3420 feet. Besides the Middle or Medelser Rhine, the Front Rhine receives about sixty brooks and mountain torrents, of which the Somvix, the Glenner, and the Savien are the chief. It therefore contributes no inconsiderable augmentation to the volume of the Back Rhine. The principal points of interest are:—

Ilanz, or Ylim, 2240 feet above the sea; a picturesque but decayed little town, embosomed among the mountains. It seems shut out from the world, and wholly unconnected with the living present; but the artist would find in its vicinity many of those things of beauty which, from the thoughts they inspire and the emotions they awaken, are so much more precious than the most coveted idols of society.

Dissentis is scarcely less remarkable for the infinite romance of its isolated position. Its Benedictine abbey was formerly one of great influence, as well as of high antiquity. It is said to have been erected about 614 by the devout and enthusiastic St. Sigisbert, a disciple of the Irish apostle, St. Columbanus. Here was buried the body of the martyr Placidus.

The Devil's Bridge (*die Teufelsbrucke*) lies away from the beaten route, but is worth a visit. It spans the mountain torrent of the Reuss, which roars and welters in a rugged defile, 100 feet beneath its mossy arches.

Another place to which the traveller may make a détour, on his way to Reichenau, is the beautiful little village of Andermatt. It is situated 4446 feet above the sea, at the mouth of the fair valley of Unsem, and at the foot of the St. Anna mountain, whose piny slopes are rich in living verdure, while its crest is crowned with a diadem of snow and ice.

* Carlyle, in his "History of the French Revolution," sends the young Egalité to *Coire*, and calls him *Corby*, a double error.

FROM REICHENAU TO CHUR.

We shall henceforth follow the united stream of the Rhine, and as we trace its winding course, shall traverse a country widely differing in the character of its scenery from that which has hitherto engaged us.

But it cannot be said that any great change occurs in the six miles between Reichenau and Chur: Chur, or Coire, the time-honoured capital of the Grisons. On either side the mountains rear their black wooded acclivities, whose summits, for several months in the year, are covered with glittering snow. The valley between is sufficiently fertile, and romantic little glens descend to the green bank of the Rhine, which now sweeps onward with a moderately rapid current, now dashes, hurries, foams, and thunders over a bed of rugged rock.

On the left runs the long bold ridge of the Kalanda, with the quaintly shaped and quaintly named peaks of the Men's Saddle and the Women's Saddle towering in its rear. On the right, the mountain of the Three Leagues, and the Spontisköpfen, present an admirable diversity both of form and colour.

This part of the Rhine Valley, that is, from Reichenau to Chur, varies in elevation above the sea level from 1550 to 1850 feet. Its fertility is considerable; and agriculture on the Swiss method, which possesses a certain undeniable simplicity, is carried on with some success. It contains two towns and eleven villages, and the population exceeds 20,000.

Of the villages Ems is, perhaps, the largest and wealthiest; the inhabitants are Catholics. The appearance of Ems is squalid-looking and dirty. This, indeed, is the character of many of the villages of the Grisons; while, on the other hand, the traveller is not less struck with the cleanliness and orderliness by which others of them are distinguished.

Felsberg is situated on the lower bank of the Rhine, nearly two miles lower down, and at the foot of the Kalanda, which hangs above the village a stupendous piece of overhanging rock, threatening at some not far distant time to crush into shapeless ruin the houses and church below. It is an awful "sword of Damocles," which no stranger can regard without an emotion of terror. Its downfall, says a German writer, will occur sooner or later, for the water flowing in the gaping clefts undermines the foundation, and must inevitably provoke the destruction of the entire mass. Aware of this fact, the Felsenbergers have of late years founded a new settlement near the margin of the Rhine; where, indeed, they are not liable to be crushed, but run the hazard of being drowned in the frequent inundations of the river.

It is possible from Felsberg to ascend the Kalanda; but as its summit is only 7877 feet above the sea, and its sides are not broken up with any fathomless chasms or frightful precipices, it would certainly be despised by the most timorous member of the Alpine Club. The view from its white crest, however, is very beautiful and extensive; one of those views which make the joy of the spectator's later life. Who can conceive of aught more beautiful than a fairy ring of snowy peaks, whose sides are richly diversified with masses of forest, and at whose base the green pastures smile with an inexhaustible verdure?

CHUR, OR COIRE.

Chur, the ancient capital of the Grisons, is the Curia Rhætorum of the Romans. It is situated at an angle of the Rhine, where the river abruptly strikes to the northward, and the plateau on which its high-gabled houses, and grotesque spires and steeples cluster, is hemmed in on three sides by the ranges of the Three League Mountains, the Parpfran Highlands, and the Hochwang. At the foot of the heights, and at the mouth of a ravine from which the Plessaur brings down its glacier waters, it takes its stand, like a venerable monument of ancient civilization; and far across the valley it seems to cast its gaze, until bounded in the blue distance by the "silver-glancing ice peaks" of the Oberland.

Chur is fully 1800 feet above the sea. It is distant ninety-seven miles east from Bern, and fifty-eight miles east-south-east from Luzern. As it lies on the high road to the great Alpine passes of the Splügen and Bernardin, it still retains a considerable trade. Surrounded by lofty walls, which are strengthened with massive towers, and divided into close narrow alleys and streets, whose houses bear the venerable impress of antiquity, Chur presents peculiar attractions for the traveller. It is divided into an Upper and a Lower Town. The former contains the Episcopal palace and its appendages, a canonry, a Capuchin monastery, the ancient convent of St. Lucius, and

the cathedral, a Byzantine edifice of the seventh century. In the Lower are to be found the government house, the Schwarz house, St. Margaret's castle, and St. Martin's church.

The population of Chur numbers about 5500, who are nearly all Calvinists. The doctrines of the Reformation were early and enthusiastically embraced here, and have been maintained with steadfastness. They were first preached by John Comander, from the old wooden pulpit of St. Martin's.

Chur can boast of one artistic celebrity, Angelica Kaufmann, born on the 30th of October, 1741. She once enjoyed some reputation as a portrait painter, but her works have long passed into comparative oblivion.

Having thus briefly specified the general character of the town, we may proceed to notice some of its more interesting details. Let us pass, then, into the Bishop's Quarter.

The Emperor Maximilian was accustomed to describe the bishoprics which formerly ruled all-powerful over the valley of the Rhine in some such epigrammatic terms as these: Constanz was the largest, Basel the blithest, Strasburg the noblest, Speyer the devoutest, Mainz the most dignified, Worms the poorest, and Köln the richest. He might have added that Chur was the oldest. It is certain that the see was in existence as early as 452, and ecclesiastical tradition asserts that St. Asimo was its first occupant. However small its beginnings, it soon rose into importance, and waxed fat and wealthy. Its territories were enlarged by the gifts of the pious, no less than by judicious exchanges; and the bishop of Chur became a power in the Grisons, helping to make the history of that remarkable province. Though shorn of his ancient privileges, he is still a considerable prelate, and since 1824 has been the clerical administrator of the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. He is elected by a chapter, consisting of twelve prebendaries, six of whom live at Chur. His country seat, Molinära, is situated near Zizers, where there is a railway station.

The bishop's palace, or hof, is an ancient edifice, crowning a steep hill in the Roman Catholic quarter of the town. Its staircase and halls are quaintly decorated with devices in stucco. The private chapel is located in an old Roman tower called Marsöl (corrupted, it is said, from *Mars in oculis*), attached to the north-east side of the palace. In this tower St. Lucius suffered martyrdom. In another wing is a much mutilated fresco of a "Dance of Death." A second Roman tower, Spinöl (*Spina in oculis*), strengthens the south-western angle of the walls.

In the rear of the palace runs an abrupt hollow, planted with vineyards, and leading by a picturesque winding path to the Roman Catholic seminary. From this point a fine view of the town, the Rhine, and the Schalfik-thal, may be obtained.

The church of St. Lucius, or the Dom, is a noteworthy example of the early Gothic, including some fragments of an earlier building, erected by Bishop Tello in the eighth century. The outer gate is flanked by the statues of the four evangelists, resting upon lions. Their position at the outer gate, according to Beda, indicates that they point the way to our Saviour, while the principal gate is the symbol of Christ himself, who leads the devout worshipper to the Father and the communion of saints.

The choir is raised upon steps, leaving open to the nave the crypt beneath, whose roof rests upon a single pillar. The high altar is enriched with quaint old timber carving, supposed to have been executed by Holbein the elder. In the sacristy are preserved the bones of St. Lucius, a British king, and the supposed founder of St. Peter's church, Cornhill. There are also an episcopal crozier, a chasuble with raised work, a fourteenth century pyx, and several other curiosities and relics.

The paintings are numerous and interesting. The names of their artists being unknown, they are freely attributed to Holbein or Albert Dürer, Nor are old monuments wanting. A sarcophagus of red marble is that of the Bishop Ortlieb of Brandis; and in an adjacent vault lies the dust of many of the bishops of Chur.

On entering the nave you will do well to look attentively at the first pillar on the left, in which, according to an old tradition, some huge bones are built up; reputed to be those of a certain gigantic robber, named Long Kuhn, or Long Conrad of Schwyz, who, after plundering the Grisons in 1251, was overtaken and slain by the inhabitants near Tavanusa on the Upper Rhine.

"I know not if the tale be true,
As told to me I tell it you."

Chur, or Coire, is the terminus of the United Swiss Railway, which leads to Rorschach on the Lake of Constanz, with branches to Glarus, St.

Gall, Winterthur, Rapperschwyl, and Zurich. The distance to Rorschach is sixty-two miles.

From Coire the traveller may visit Samaden, and the grand and romantic Julier Pass, opening up the finest scenery of the Engadine. Or he may proceed to Splügen by the Via Mala, or to Chiavenna by the Splügen. Klosters, in one direction, and Süs in another, are also accessible from this point. The traveller will find Michelet's "La Montagne" an excellent guide to this part of Switzerland. He has described the Engadine with remarkable fervour and brilliancy.

FROM COIRE TO RAGATZ.

After quitting Coire, we continue to traverse a rich and ample valley, inclosed between the Kalanda, or Galanda-berg, on the west, and the Falkniss, on the north-east. Almost every ridge and projecting crag are crowned by the ruins of "chiefless castles," so gray and weather-worn that they can scarcely be distinguished from the rock on which they stand; while the sides of the mountains are marked with the deep furrows of the winter torrents.

Of one of these ruined fortalices, that of Ober-Ruchenberg, the following legend is told. It is all that men seem to know or imagine about it:—

When the fairy queen, who dwelt in the silent heart of the great mountains, was giving birth to one of her elfin progeny, she was generously assisted by the then lady of Ruchenberg. As a reward, the dame received a set of golden ninepins, with which she could at all times obtain the faithful service of the mountain sprites. They were handed down as precious heirlooms to her descendants; one of whom, a great grandson, and a turbulent dissolute rake, abused the fairy gift by lavishing on unworthy objects the treasures it placed at his disposal. At last his summons was answered by nine living giants, who suddenly rose from the earth with a sound as of thunder, and as they rose the castle crumbled into ruin, and its profligate lord was carried off from the eyes of men. This evil man, however, had a daughter who was as devout as he was blasphemous. The fairies saved her from the general desolation, and thenceforth she spent her life in the haunted caverns of the mountains. Once every hundred years she is permitted to revisit the glimpses of the moon, and standing on the shattered ramparts of the old baronial stronghold, she waits the coming of the fortunate knight who is to restore her to her kind, and, at the same time, to win from the fairy queen the dangerous but valuable gift of the golden ninepins.

Nearly opposite Coire stands the castle of Haldenstein, with a village of the same name. The castle, sumptuously rebuilt by the French ambassador to the Grisons, in 1548, suffered severely from fire on several occasions, but was restored in the last century by the family Von Salis, to whose posterity it still belongs. The ruins of the ancient fortress are situated on a rocky height at some distance from the more modern erection.

To the north of the village some shattered walls mark the site of the ancient castle of Lichtenstein.

After passing the point where the Landgnart, or Langaurs, rolling down from the valley of Prättigau, pours its noisy waters into the Rhine, we diverge a little from the right bank of the river to visit the old and tranquil town of Mayenfeld, said to be the Roman Lupinum. Its modern name is probably derived from the "May-fields," or May courts of jurisdiction, held here under the spreading boughs of a lime tree during the Carlovingian era. It boasts of a Roman tower, erected by the Emperor Constantius about 340; and of an excellent wine made from prolific vineyards of modern growth. The valley of the Rhine from this point presents a noble prospect, in which the peak of the Falkniss, rising on the north-east to an elevation of 7824 feet, is necessarily a conspicuous and impressive object. The view also comprehends the summits of "the Seven Electors," and the villages of Malans, Jenins, and Sargans.

From Mayenfeld we may visit the fortified Lucian pass, named after the martyr, St. Lucius, and 2180 feet high, which commands the road from Germany to Italy. Territorially it is included in the old principality of Lichtenstein-Vaduz.

Continuing our route along the valley, we call at the romantic town of Malans, lying at the foot of the Augustenberg (7356 feet.) Here, at Castle Bodmer, was born the poet Von Salis, whose lyrics breathe so tender and melancholy a spirit. "The Silent Land," one of his most pathetic strains, is well known in England by Professor Longfellow's admirable translation of it.

At fourteen miles from Coire the traveller reaches Ragatz,* a village of between 600 and 700

* Principal inns:—Hof Ragatz, formerly the summer residence of the abbots of Pfeffers; Hôtel de la Tamina; and the Krone.

inhabitants, situated at the mouth of the gorge (*tobel*) through which the foaming waters of the Tamina rush down to join the Rhine. It depends for its prosperity on its vicinity to the hot mineral springs of Pfeffers, and its position at the junction of the great roads from Zürich, St. Gall, Feldkirch, Coire, and Milan. It contains a small English chapel.

At Ragatz a victory was gained by the Swiss confederates, under Itel von Reding and Fortunatus Tschudi, over the partizans of Hans von Rechberg (March 6, 1446).

A road tunnelled through the rugged defile of the Tamina, for about two miles and a half, leads to the old baths of Pfeffers (or Pfäffers), one of the most remarkable and wildly romantic spots in Switzerland. The walk thither is undoubtedly picturesque and impressive. "At the edge of the narrow path, which ascends gradually and not too abruptly, and which occasionally passes under the tunnelled rocks, the foaming torrent rushes onward, bounding impetuously over every impediment, and scarcely deigning to greet the melancholy rocks in its rapid course. After a walk of three miles, a narrow slope, clothed with pine trees, is seen wedged in under the face of the rock, only a few feet above the raging Tamina, on which is built a tolerably large and straggling massive edifice. Nothing more dreary can be conceived than its situation in the cool dark glen, almost buried beneath the rocks that tower above it to the height of six or seven hundred feet; in the height of summer, in the months of July and August, the sun manages to find his way into this singular retreat from about ten o'clock in the morning till four in the afternoon. This is 'Bad Pfäffers.'"

The hot springs of Pfeffers were not known to the Romans. The story runs that they were discovered by a hunter, Karl von Hofenhausen, who, having penetrated into the gorge of the Tamina in the pursuit of game, was attracted by the columns of vapour rising from them. In authentic documents they are first mentioned in 1050, when they were conferred by the Emperor Henry III. on the monks of Pfeffers. Centuries passed, however, and nothing was done to facilitate access to their wonder-working waters. Patients who had faith in their curative properties were let down to the spring from the cliffs above by ropes; and with an admirable desire to benefit by them as much as possible, were wont to spend a week together, both day and night; not only eating and drinking, but sleeping, "under hot water instead of blankets." In 1629, however, the ravine was enlarged, and a bathing-house, on the site now occupied by the present establishment, was erected by the Abbot Jodvens. The healing waters were conveyed from the spring in wooden conduits, and the work duly celebrated at Whitsuntide, in 1630, by a service of thanksgiving. The present baths were completed in 1716, but are now very scantily patronized; most visitors preferring the conveniences and liveliness of Ragatz.

An excursion to the source of the waters (whose temperature is 97° to 98°), has a perilous air about it, well calculated to terrify weak nerves.

Proceeding through the bath-house, you cross the Tamina on a bridge of planks, which, in the shape of a scaffolding, is prolonged into the dark dim gorge above the contracted but noisy torrent. It is carried all along the abyss as far as the hot spring, and furnishes the only means of access to it, as the sides of the gorge are vertical, and there is not an inch of space between them and the Tamina for the sole of the foot to rest. A few yards from the entrance the air is darkened by an overhanging mass of rock. "The sudden chill," says a writer, "of an atmosphere never visited by the sun's rays, the rushing and roaring of the torrent thirty or forty feet below, the threatening position of the rocks above, have a grand and striking effect; but this has been diminished by modern improvements, which have deprived the visit to the gorge of even the semblance of danger. In parts it is almost dark, where the sides of the ravine overlap one another, and actually meet overhead, so as to form a natural arch. The rocks in many places show evident marks of having been ground away, and scooped out by the rushing river, and by the stones brought down with it. For several hundred yards the river pursues an almost subterranean course, the roof of the chasm being the floor, as it were, of the valley. In some places the roots of the trees are seen dangling through the crevice above your head, and at one particular spot you find yourself under the arch of the natural bridge leading to the staircase mentioned further on. Had Virgil or Dante been aware of this spot, they would certainly have conducted their heroes through it to the jaws of the infernal regions.

B Foster | A Willmore

[illegible]

AND THE [illegible] MAINA[illegible] AND REICHENA[illegible]

WILLIAM MACKEN[illegible] LONDON EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

"After emerging from the gorge at the bath-house, the traveller may ascend the valley above it by a well-marked track; ascending the steep left bank, and then keeping to the left, and descending a little, he will in about half a mile cross by a natural bridge of rock, beneath which the Tamina, out of sight, and heaving from above, forces its way into the gorge of the hot springs. A steep path or staircase (*steige*), formed of trunks or roots of trees, on the right bank, is then met with, ascending which you reach an upper stage of the valley, formed of gentle slopes, and covered with verdant pasture on one side, and with thick woods on the other. The two sides are separated by the deep gash and narrow gorge along the bottom of which the Tamina forces its way. This is, perhaps, the best point for obtaining a general view of the baths, and the singular spot in which they are sunken. On looking over the verge of the precipice you perceive, at the bottom of the ravine, at the depth of 300 feet below, the roofs of the two large buildings, like cotton factories in size and structure. The upper valley, also, with its carpet of bright green, its woods, and the bare limestone cliffs which border it on either hand, and above all, the huge peak of the Falkniss, rising on the opposite side of the Rhine, form a magnificent landscape."

The traveller's attention will next be directed to the convent of Pfeffers, an edifice of considerable extent, but by no means remarkable for architectural excellence. As in all Benedictine convents, a church occupies the centre of its enceinte. The position is admirable: from its lofty mountain-platform it looks out, in one direction, on the rich Rhine valley, backed by the lofty summit of the Falkniss; in another, it commands the lake of Wallenstadt, and the peaks of the Seven Electors (*Sieben Kurfurster.*)

The foundation of the convent dates from 713, when its erection was commenced by S. Pirminius, bishop of Meaux, on the left bank of the Landguart. While felling timber for the building a carpenter accidentally wounded himself. Some drops of blood fell on a chip, which was straitly picked up by a white dove, and carried across the Rhine to the forest on the opposite heights. On seeing the dove let fall the chip from the top of a larch tree, S. Pirminius exclaimed, "There the Lord wills that his house should be built." And thus the convent came to be raised on its present site, and to assume for its device a flying dove with a chip in its beak.

The convent lasted for ten centuries, but its financial affairs becoming hopelessly involved, a majority of the brethren requested the government of the canton (St. Gall) to suppress it, and it was therefore abolished in 1838. The building has since been converted into a lunatic asylum.

We continue our route to Rorschach by way of Sargans; Sevelen (where, on the left, across the Rhine, lies Vaduz, capital of the miniature principality of Lichtenstein); Werdenberg, formerly the seat of a patriotic line of nobles of the same name; Sennvald, a village at the foot of the Kamor; Altstetten, a town of 7000 inhabitants, in a fertile country; S. Margarethen, near the Austrian ferry, an English-like village surrounded by groves and orchards; and Rheineck, a hamlet at the foot of vine-clad hills.

Between Rorschach and Rheineck the Rhine enters the Boden See, or Lake of Constanz. The flat delta is covered with morass, and presents no beauty to attract the traveller's eye. Rorschach (*inns:* Hirsch, and Post) is a quiet town, the principal station of the lake steamers, and a large corn market. The grain required for the supply of the Alpine district of North Switzerland is imported from Suabia in boats across the lake, and temporarily stored in spacious warehouses. There are several thriving muslin manufactories.

The only noteworthy buildings are the ruined keep of the castle of St. Anne, and the dilapidated palace of the abbots of St. Gall, now known as the Statthalterz.

LAKE OF CONSTANZ, OR BODEN SEE.

Steamers navigate the lake between Constanz, Schaffhausen, Ueberlingen, Meersburg, Friedrichshafen, Rorschach, Ludwigshafen, Romanshorn, Lindau, and Bregentz. The voyage from Rorschach to Constanz occupies three hours, and from Constanz to Lindau about five hours. Printed bills of fares, hours, and places of starting will be found at all the principal inns in the above-named towns.

The Lake of Constanz, called by the Germans *Boden See*, and known to the Romans under the name *Lacus Brigantinus* (from Brigantia, the modern Bregentz), is bounded by the territories of five different states, Baden, Wurtemberg, Switzerland, Bavaria, and Austria. A portion of its

shores belong to each state. Its elevation above the sea is estimated at 1385 feet. Its length is about forty-four miles from Bregentz to Constanz, and thirty miles from Bregentz to Friedrichshafen. Its maximum width is nine miles; its maximum depth, 964 feet. It is full of fish, and as many as twenty-five species have been distinguished. Locally it is divided into four sections: the Lake of Bregentz, the Lake of Constanz, the Lake of Ueberlingen, and the Lower Lake. Its waters are clear, of a greenish tint, and an agreeable flavour. Their surface is never smooth; a ripple is always upon it, even when no breath of air is felt in the "blue serene;" this constant agitation is probably due to some under-currents.

Its main tributary is the Rhine, which enters at its eastern extremity; but it also receives upwards of fifty brooks and torrents. It is frequently visited by storms, when its billows roll with crested heads, like those of a tempest-stricken sea. Though its shores present no very attractive panorama of scenery, they are exuberantly fertile; and on the south the landscape assumes a certain picturesqueness of character from the numerous ruined forts which crown each conspicuous height.

On an average the waters of the lake are lowest in February, and highest in June and July, when the snows, melting on the distant mountains, swell every brook and torrent which flows into its basin.

The lower section of the lake is generally frozen every winter, but only a small part of the upper is ever "bound in chains of ice." The Swiss chroniclers, however, record several occasions when, if they may be credited, nearly the whole of the lake was frozen; as in 1277, 1435, 1560, 1573, 1587, 1695, 1785, 1788, and 1830. But the entire surface was not iced over in the three last-named years; navigation was still possible in the centre.

The following tradition is connected with the freezing of the lake in the sixteenth century (1587):—

During the winter, which was one of extraordinary severity, a horseman, bent on visiting the lake, descended from the rugged mountains and rode forth into the deep snowy plains. Wherever he gazed, the hard whiteness met his eye; not a tree, not a house, relieved the monotony before him. For leagues he pressed forward his weary horse, hearing no sounds but the screams of the wild water-fowl, or the shrieks of the wind across the echoing waste. At length, as the darkness of night spread over the sky, he descried in the distance the faint glimmer of a taper; trees sprang out of the low creeping mist; the welcome sound of dogs broke on his ear; and the wanderer stopped his horse before a farm-house. He saw a fair maiden at the window, and courteously inquired how far it might yet be to the lake.

"The lake is behind you," she answered in exceeding surprise.

"Nay, not so, for I have just ridden across yonder plain."

"Mary, Mary, save us! You have ridden across the lake, and the ice has not yielded under you!"

The villagers had by this time gathered round the stranger horseman, and uttering loud exclamations of surprise and wonder, they bade him be thankful for the great mercy Heaven had vouchsafed him. But they spoke to ears that could not hear. When he realized the full extent of the peril he had so narrowly escaped, both brain and heart gave way, and he fell from his horse lifeless.

CIRCUIT OF THE LAKE.

We now propose to notice briefly the interesting points on either shore of the Boden See.

On the west, two leagues from Rorschach, lies the ancient town of Arbon (the Arbor Felix of the Romans), a quiet little settlement of some 750 inhabitants. The Romans built a fort here, which, in the fifth century, they were compelled to abandon to the Allemanni. On its site, in 1510, were reared the present castle (except the tower, which is three or four centuries older) and the church, which dates from the same epoch. Its belfry is detached, and boarded, not walled, on the side nearest the castle, in order that no besiegers might be able to use it as a point of vantage.

From Arbon to Constanz the south shore of the lake is occupied by the canton of Thurgovia, one of the most fruitful districts in Switzerland. Gardens, orchards, and villages remind the traveller of some of the midland scenery of England.

Following the sweep of a noble bay for eight or nine miles we arrive at Romanshorn or Romishorn, which clusters somewhat irregularly on the low peninsula forming the northern boundary of the bay. The peninsula curves like a horn; hence the name of the village, which is populous and thriving, and stands in a land of vines. A fine

B. Foster E. I. Roberts

AS SEEN FROM THE HARBOUR

WILLIAM MACKENZIE, LONDON, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW



[illegible]HAFEN

view of the lake, and of the white peaks of the distant Alps, may be obtained from this point.

At Romanshorn is the terminus of the North-Eastern Railway. It is fifty-one miles distant from Zurich. The steamers from Bregentz, Lindau, and Friedrichshafen call here.

Of the valleys of Utwyl and Kuswyl we have nothing to record, nor of Güttingen, except that it possesses an ancient castle, pleasantly situated on a little promontory. Soon after passing the latter, the industrious traveller reaches the Benedictine nunnery of Münsterlingen, founded, it is said, by Angela, the daughter of Edward I. of England, in commemoration of her escape from a great storm on the Lake of Constanz. Whether this be true or not, it is certain that the convent was largely endowed by Queen Agnes of Hungary, and that the Emperor Sigismund and the outlawed duke of Austria were reconciled here in 1418. A new building was erected for the nuns in 1715, but in 1838 the nunnery was converted into an hospital.

Just before entering Constanz we reach the Augustinian abbey of Kreuzlingen, now suppressed, like the nunnery, and adapted to the purposes of an agricultural school, with between ninety and one hundred pupils. The foundation dates from 1120, when it was established by Bishop Ulrich I.; but the ancient monastery, standing near the city gate, was frequently exposed to the hazards of war, as in 1450, when it was set on fire, and during the Thirty Years' War, when the Swedes plundered and destroyed it. A new convent was therefore erected on its present site, at a greater distance from the city. When the famous Council of Constanz was held in 1414, Pope John XXIII., on his way thither, spent the night at the abbey of Kreuzlingen, and was so well pleased with his reception that he presented the abbot with a superb vest richly set with pearls. The papal donation is still preserved at the abbey, along with a curious piece of wood carving, by a Tyrolese artist, which represents our Saviour's Passion, and consists of several hundreds of well-executed figures.

Our survey of the lake has thus conducted us to the old, decayed, but historical city of

CONSTANZ,

Nine miles from Schaffhausen, twenty-six miles from Rorschach. Population, 4500. Inns: Brochet, Post, and Hôtel Delisle.

The most interesting associations connected with Constanz are those of its great council, held in 1414–18, and the martyrdom of the Bohemian reformers, John Huss and Jerome of Prague, the apostles and heirs of Wycliffism; and who, in spite of the safe-conduct granted to the former by the Emperor Sigismund as president of the assembly, were seized, accused of heresy, tried, condemned, and executed.

The avowed object of the Council of Constanz was the reformation of the church; but the question which secretly agitated the minds of its members was, the supremacy of a general council over the pope, or of the pope over a general council. It was the first council which had represented Latin Christianity; and it was called, not by the papal volition, but at the instigation, or rather by the command, of the Emperor Sigismund. The pope, John XXIII., had made it a condition that it should not be held within the dominions of the emperor; but when the latter named Constanz as the place of meeting, he was compelled to yield. And in truth no city could have been better suited for such a purpose. It was pleasantly and healthily situated at the foot of the Alps; accessible from Italy and from all parts of Christendom; on the fertile shores of a spacious lake, so that an abundant supply of provisions might be readily obtained; and inhabited by an orderly and peaceful population.

To Constanz, therefore, in the summer of 1414, bishops and princes, patriarchs and professors, abbots and priors, laymen and clerics, began to make their way from every country in Europe; and with these were mingled merchants and traders of every kind and degree, and every sort of wild and strange vehicle.* It was to be, apparently, not only a solemn Christian council, but an European congress; a vast central fair, where every kind of commerce was to be conducted on the largest scale, and where chivalrous, histrionic, or other common amusements, were provided for the idle hours of idle people. In its conception it was a grand concentrated outburst of mediæval devotion, mediæval splendour, mediæval diversions: all ranks, all orders, all pursuits, all professions, all trades, all artizans, with their various attire, habits, manners, language, crowded to one single city.

* The following account is condensed from Dean Milman's History of Latin Christianity, b. viii. c. 8.

Down the steep slope of the Alps wound the rich cavalcades of the cardinals, the prelates, the princes of Italy, each with their martial guard or their ecclesiastical retinue. The blue waters of the ample lake were studded with boats and barks, conveying the bishops and abbots, the knights and burghers of the Tyrol, of eastern and northern Germany, Hungary, and from the Black Forest and Thuringia. Along the whole course of the Rhine, from Köln, even from Brabant, Flanders, or the furthest north, from England and from France, marched prelates, abbots, doctors of law, celebrated schoolmen, following the upward course of the stream, and gathering as they advanced new hosts from the provinces and cities to the east or west. Day after day the air was alive with the standards of princes, and the banners emblazoned with the armorial bearings of sovereigns, nobles, knights, imperial cities; or glittered with the silver crosier borne before some magnificent bishop or mitred abbot. Night after night the silence was broken by the pursuivants and trumpeters announcing the arrival of each high and mighty count or duke, or the tinkling mule-bells of some lowlier caravan. The streets were crowded with curious spectators, eager to behold some splendid prince or ambassador, some churchman famous in the pulpit, in the school, in the council, it might be in the battle-field, or even some renowned minnesinger or popular jongleur. Yet with all these multitudes perfect order was maintained, so admirable had been the arrangements of the magistrates. Constanz worthily supported her dignity, as for a time the chosen capital of Christendom.

And the pope, who had some cause to fear the council, was received with every outward sign of respect and spiritual loyalty. The magistrates and clergy attended him through the streets, and to the venerable Minster (October 28). Nine cardinals and about six hundred followers formed his retinue. But on the 3rd of December another arrival caused still greater excitement. There entered the city a pale thin man, in mean attire, yet escorted by three nobles of his country, with a great troop of other followers from attachment or curiosity. He came under a special safe-conduct from the emperor, which guaranteed in the fullest terms his safe entrance into and safe departure from the imperial city. This was the famous Bohemian "heretic," John Huss.

In these pages any chronicle of the proceedings of the great council would be out of place. But we must briefly trace its dealings with the Bohemian reformer, from the imperishable association of his name with the city whose history we are sketching. He appeared before the council not so much as a preacher of dogmas as a reformer of abuses. He was provided with the imperial safe-conduct, with testimonials to his orthodoxy from the highest authorities; yet he did not enter Constanz without dark misgivings. In a farewell address to his followers he said, "I expect to meet as many enemies at Constanz as our Lord at Jerusalem; the wicked clergy, and even some secular princes, and those Pharisees the monks."

His misgivings were speedily justified. A charge of heresy was brought against him. The emperor abandoned him, and basely consented to violate his royal word. It was soon understood that he was to be tried by the council, condemned by the council, and that whatever might be the sentence of the council it would be carried into execution by the secular arm. Huss was thrown, a prisoner, into the castle of Gottlieben, outside the city walls. He was called upon to retract his errors. "I will retract," he answered, "when convinced of them." On the 5th of June, 1416, he was brought before the council; again on the 7th and the 9th; but in the presence of his many accusers he maintained a calm and unmoved composure, and the serenity of a mind at ease. On the 9th, after he had been carried back to prison, the emperor rose, and addressed the council:—"You have heard the charges against Huss proved by trustworthy witnesses, some confessed by himself. In my judgment each of these crimes is deserving of death. If he does not forswear all his errors, he must be burned. If he submits, he must be stripped of his preacher's office, and banished from Bohemia; there he would only disseminate more dangerous errors. The evil must be extirpated, root and branch. If any of his followers are in Constanz, they must be proceeded against with the utmost severity, especially his disciple, Jerome of Prague."

Huss calmly refused the recantation demanded from him; and on the 1st of July was led forth from his prison to undergo the sentence which had been passed upon him as having swerved from the true Catholic faith. Having been degraded from the priesthood in the sacred shades of the cathedral, he was delivered over to the secular arm.

The emperor gave him up to Louis, Elector Palatine, the imperial vicar; the elector to the magistrates of Constanz; the magistrates to the executioners.

With two of the headsman's servants before him, and two behind, he went forth to the place of execution. Eight hundred horsemen followed, and the city poured out its whole population. The bridge was narrow and frail; so they went in single file, lest it should break beneath their weight. They paused before the episcopal palace, that Huss might see the pile on which his books lay burning. He only smiled, for he knew that the right or wrong in matters of belief cannot be determined by brute force. As he went along he addressed the people in German, protesting against the injustice of his sentence; his enemies, he said, had failed to convince him of error.

The place of execution was a meadow outside the city walls. Here he knelt, and, kneeling, recited several psalms, with the perpetual burthen, "Lord Jesus, have mercy upon me. Into thy hands I commend my spirit." "We know not," exclaimed the people, "what this man may have done, but we do know that his prayers to God are excellent." His attendants demanded if he would have a confessor. A priest, mounted on a stately horse, and richly clad, declared that no confessor should be accorded to a heretic. But others were more charitable, and one Ulric Schorand, a man of piety and wisdom, was summoned from the crowd.

Ulric insisted first that Huss should acknowledge the errors for which he was condemned. Unawed by the prospect before him, he refused to confess. "I have no need of confession," he said; "I am guilty of no mortal sin." He turned round, and made an effort to address the people in German, but the elector caused him to be interrupted. Then he prayed aloud, "Lord Jesus, for thy sake I endure with patience this cruel death. I beseech thee to forgive mine enemies." As he spoke the paper mitre with which his head had been crowned in derision fell to the ground. The rude soldiery replaced it, saying, "He shall be burned with all his devils!" In reply he said gently, but firmly, "I trust that I shall reign with Christ, since I die for his holy gospel."

With an old rusty chain he was now bound to the fatal stake. The Elector Palatine and another again urged him to recant; but firm in faith and hope, Huss assured them that the testimony he had borne was true, and that he was willing to seal its truth with his blood. All he had taught and written was with the view of saving the souls of men from Satan's snares, and from the power of sin. The fire blazed up; an aged crone busied herself in piling up the wood: *O sancta simplicitas!*—"O holy simplicity!" cried Huss, in the spirit of tenderness and compassion. Then the flames crackled, and the smoke went up in thick wreathing clouds, while he, with his last gasping breath, continued to pray to the Saviour, and to commend his spirit into his hands. All the remains of his body were torn in pieces; even his clothes were flung upon the fire; the ashes were gathered and cast into the lake, lest his disciples should make reliques of them. But their loyalty defied this precaution; they scraped together the earth around the pile, and carried it to Bohemia.

Huss was born in 1369, or, according to other accounts, in 1373, at Husinec in Bohemia, and studied philosophy and theology at the university of Prague. He became bachelor of theology in 1394, and in 1396, master of arts. He commenced teaching in the university in 1398; and the year following he took part in a public academic disputation, in which he defended several of the tenets of Wickliffe, with whose writings he had, so early as 1391, become acquainted. Along with the office of teacher in the University, he had held that of preacher in the Bethlehem chapel at Prague.

A few months after the death of Huss, Jerome of Prague, his follower and companion, expiated his deviation from the doctrines or the spirit of the Catholic faith, by undergoing a similar fate. Like Cranmer, he at first recanted; but like Cranmer he grew ashamed of his recantation, and his soul rose to the fiery heights of martyrdom. In spite of the earnest protest of Robert Hallam, bishop Salisbury, that God willeth not the death of a sinner, but that he should be converted and live, Jerome was condemned to be burnt alive, and the sentence was carried into effect on the 1st of June, 1416.

It is said of him that at the place of execution his countenance was not only composed, but cheerful. When bound, and bound naked, to the stake,* he sang his hymns of thanksgiving, with a voice whose clear loud accents never trembled. The executioner offered to light the fire

* The stake was a wooden block, cut into a rough figure intended as a likeness of Huss.

behind him, that he might not see it. "Light it before my face," he exclaimed; "were I the least afraid, I should not be standing here."

Constanz is full of memorials of the two martyrs, but more especially of the elder and more famous one, John Huss. The house in which he lodged on first reaching the city stands in the Paul's Strasse, near the Schnetzthor, and is distinguished by a rude stone bust. He was afterwards confined in the Dominican convent (December 6, 1414, to March 24, 1415), which is now a cotton manufactory. Its church, a thirteenth century building, is in ruins, and these ruins are picturesque, while the adjacent cloisters will attract the visitor's attention from their singular character. The chapter-house is probably older than the church. The little island occupied by this interesting edifice was formerly fortified by the Romans, and a portion of the wall, towards the lake, still bears witness to the solidity of Roman masonry.

The council, to whose zeal for the Catholic faith Huss and Jerome fell victims, held its sittings in the Hall of the Kaufhaus, which was built in 1388 as a warehouse, but afterwards used as the town-hall. The council was composed of thirty cardinals, four patriarchs, twenty archbishops, two hundred professors of universities and doctors of theology, besides princes, ambassadors, ecclesiastical dignitaries, abbots, priors, and distinguished civilians. The place of meeting was a large room, divided by two rows of wooden pillars into three aisles.

In a small apartment at the north extremity of the building are shown some curious relics, more or less interesting according as they are more or less authentic. The principal are:—1st. The ancient fauteuil of Pope Martin V., whom the council elected in place of John XXIII., and the throne of the Emperor Sigismund. 2nd. On a platform in front of the throne, the three effigies of Huss, Jerome of Prague, and Father Celestine. 3rd. A model, and some original fragments, of the dungeon in which John Huss was imprisoned at the Dominican convent. 4th. The beautiful gilded casket, ornamented with bas-reliefs, in which were deposited, in 1417, the votes for the election of Pope Martin V. 5th. The Gothic altar, the gilded and illuminated parchment missal, and the cross of the same pope. 6th. A life-size statue of Abraham, which supported the cathedral pulpit, and being mistaken by the populace for a figure of Huss, was grievously defaced. 7th. An old Germanic urn, with a patera, and images of idols. 8th. A stone idol of great antiquity, worshipped, it may be, by one of the old Teutonic tribes. 9th. Small statues of stone and metal discovered in the neighbourhood. 10th. A collection of painted glass. 11th. A collection of various sculptured objects. 12th. A collection of indifferent oil paintings. 13th. A well-executed view upon the lake.

Another memorial of the martyrs is the field outside the town, in the suburb of Brühl, where they passed through their fiery trial. Rude images of Huss and Jerome, moulded in clay excavated from this very spot, are here offered for sale to the much-enduring stranger.

The ancient bishopric of Constanz, occupied in due succession by eighty-seven bishops, was abolished in 1802. Happily, the noble cathedral in which they played their part has survived the ravages of time, the storms of war, and the changes from the old order to the new, of which Constanz has witnessed so many. It is true that it has suffered from the "pestilent heresy" of "restoration;" but its main features remain unaltered.

It was begun in 1052; but the work of completion was very protracted, and occupied from early in the thirteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century. The ground plan is cruciform, with very beautiful open-work turrets at the west end. The tower, rebuilt in 1511, after the destruction of an earlier one by fire, was crowned (1850-1857) by an open spire of limestone, under the direction of Herbsch. The doors of the main portal are of oak, and quaintly carved with a representation of our Lord's passion, executed in 1470 by one Simon Baider. The workmanship is admirable for boldness and decision. The nave is supported by sixteen pillars, each of a single block, and dates from the thirteenth century. Here, at sixteen paces from the entrance, you may see the stone on which Huss stood, while undergoing the ceremonial of "degradation."

In front of the high altar stands the tomb of Robert Hallam, bishop of Salisbury, who died at Constanz on the 4th of September, 1417. He was a man of great ability and moderation, and as the head of the English deputation to the great council secured the confidence of the Emperor Sigismund. It further deserves to be remembered that he alone, or almost alone, protested

against the sentence of death delivered upon John Huss. His tomb, as the workmanship proves, is of English brass, and was probably sent over from England by his executors.

The organ dates from 1520, but was restored in 1680 in the style of the Renaissance.

In a chapel on the south side may be seen a carving of the Entombment of Christ, by the sculptor, Hans Morinz; in a chapel on the north, the tombs of the Weller family, and of Bishop Otto von Sonnenberg. In one to the left of the choir are some striking half-length figures, the size of life, grouped round a dying Virgin, sculptured in sand-stone, and painted; apparently the work of a fifteenth century sculptor. The elegant winding staircase, close at hand, is ornamented with sculptures and statues. In a chapel to the east may be seen the tomb of Bishop Otto III., margrave of Hochberg-Rœtaln, who died in 1432, and above it an altar picture on glass of six of the apostles. The tombs of bishops Burkhard and Henry von Höwen are situated in the transept.

The sacristy contains some curious relics; an old painting of The Crucifixion, date 1524, erroneously ascribed to Holbein; and the armorial shields of all the prelates who have occupied the episcopal throne of Constanz. In the vestry room above it is shown a range of curious cupboards, or presses of carved oak, none of a later date than the fifteenth century.

Two sides of the ancient cloisters, with their richly sculptured arches, are still standing. Attached to them is a chapter-room of the fourteenth century, in whose centre rests a thirteenth century work, in the Italian Gothic style, representing the Holy Sepulchre; it consists of an open rotunda, decorated by arches resting on small columns. Externally are placed, against the piedroits, certain finely executed statues, half human size, representing the Annunciation, the Birth of Christ, the Adoration of the Magi, and, underneath, the twelve Apostles. In the interior is quite a cluster of statues—an angel, and the three holy women visiting the tomb of our Lord; two groups of Roman soldiers sleeping, and a man attired in the dress of a physician, seated at a table, with two vessels before him, in one of which he is stirring some drug or potion; in his left hand he holds a large round spoon, on his head he wears a kind of square cap. Next comes a female pointing with her finger to two others, who carry a couple of vases. All these figures, like those on the outside of the structure, are half the size of nature.

There is little else to be seen in Constanz. St. Stephen's church, however, is not without interest. It was founded in the ninth century, rebuilt in the thirteenth, and completed in the fifteenth by Bishop Otto III. von Hochberg. It contains some good ancient coloured glass, and some new (in the choir) by Dr. Stanz, of Berne. The high altar-piece is by Memberger. The sculpture of the choir, of the door of the sacristy, and the tomb of his own wife, is by Hans Morinz (1560-1610), and well worthy of a careful examination. You can see that the artist wrought at his work with a conscientious devotion to his art; the execution is everywhere honest, careful, and vigorous.

Some portions of the old walls and towers are still extant. The bridge across the Rhine, which here flows from the Upper into the Lower Lake, is roofed over, and protected by some military defences dating from the fifteenth century. The moats may also be traced by the inquisitive stranger.

EXCURSIONS FROM CONSTANZ: REICHENAU.

The Isle of Reichenau is worth a visit. It lies in the broad part of the Rhine, where the river still retains something of a lacustrine character, and contains the church and treasury of a Benedictine abbey founded by Charlemagne.

The island is low but pleasing, and from its highest point, the Hochwacht, commands a fine view of the river, and of the upper and lower lakes. It measures one league and a quarter in length, and about half a league in breadth. The principal villages are Reichenau, or Mittelzell, Oberzell, Niederzell, and Unterzell. The population (1500) are chiefly occupied in the cultivation of the vine.

We have spoken of the abbey as founded by Charlemagne. More strictly speaking it originated in an ecclesiastical colony planted by St. Pirminius, which the great emperor of the Franks afterwards endowed with ten towns. It throve mightily, and met with numerous wealthy and liberal benefactors. Thus, Genla, duke of Suabia, conferred upon it Tuttlingen, Wangen, Stettin, and five and twenty villages. It obtained from King Carloman four towns on the lake of Como; from Charles III., Zurxach; from Louis the Pious, Altheim, Riedlingen, and five villages; and from

Duke Berthold of Suabia, thirty villages. It must be confessed that the monks, if at all grateful, had good reason to celebrate masses continually for the repose of the souls of men so generous and devout! The abbey had upwards of 300 noble vassals, 1600 dependent monks and priests, and of its superior it was proverbially said, that he could ride to Rome and yet dine and sleep every day on his own land. Hence came the present name of the island, Reichenau.

Rapid and astounding as was the rise of this celebrated foundation, not less rapid and astounding was its fall. In the tenth century it had already begun to decline. In 1175 its annual revenue had sunk from 60,000 to 1600 florins; in 1384 it had decreased to three silver marks; and the abbot was so poor that, instead of entertaining princes and nobles at his table like his predecessors, he was compelled to ride on his white pony, every morning and evening, to sit at the frugal board of the priest of Niederzell. It was the old story; profusion and ostentation and luxurious living had wasted the resources of the monastery, and as might have been anticipated, the result was, that those ecclesiastics who had kept a court equalling a king's in splendour, were succeeded by others, who lived upon the scanty alms of the charitable.

In the course of time the abbey was incorporated with the see of Constanz (1541), whose bishops assumed the title of abbots of Reichenau, and restored its former glories. Since 1799 the services of the church have been conducted by three secular priests.

Of the various conventual edifices, once so celebrated for their extent and magnificence, the church and the treasury, as already stated, are all that remain.

The church was built in 806 by Abbot Hatto, but was thrice destroyed. The tower is probably a portion of Abbot Hatto's work, and is Romanesque in style. Here was buried Charles the Fat, in 887, as an inscription, carved in 1728, duly records. His grave, however, can no longer be recognized. The treasury contains some remarkable relics, such as the silver-gilt shrine of St. Fortunatus, an ivory ciborium, a cope, a crozier, a missal of the tenth century; a so-called emerald, weighing twenty-eight pounds, which is, however, only coloured glass; and the waterpot used by our Lord in his miracle at the marriage of Cana—a marble urn of simple design, presented to the convent by Simon Wardo, the general of Leo the Byzantine emperor.

The valuable manuscripts which the convent formerly possessed have been removed to the libraries of Carlsruhe and Heidelberg.

At Niederzell the church has two small towers in the Byzantine style. It was built in the ninth century by Bishop Egino, of Verona, who lies buried here. Persons suffering from fever were accustomed, down to a very recent date, to offer up their prayers in this quaint old church, and then lie down on the grass which covers the good bishop's grave, in the hope or belief their devotion would be rewarded by a cure.

At Oberzell the Byzantine crypt of its little but ancient church is spoken of as a remarkable monument in an architectural point of view.

Near this village moulder the ivy-clad ruins of an ancient castle, that of Schoppeln, which formerly belonged to the abbots of Reichenau, but was destroyed in a popular insurrection in 1382. The abbot Mangold, who was also bishop of Constanz, had arrested some Constanz fishermen for casting their nets within the limits of his jurisdiction, and had deprived them of sight with his own hands. The fishermen then rose in open revolt, invaded the island, set fire to several farms, and demolished Schoppeln.

THE ISLAND OF MEINAU.

The island of Meinau, situated about four miles north of Constanz, is of a more attractive appearance than that of Reichenau, and with its terraces and vine-clad hills, its groves and gardens, might be held to realize a poet's dream of an enchanted isle, frequented by wood-nymphs, and haunted by celestial music. "Nature," says a topographical writer who does not ordinarily grow enthusiastic, "nature has lent it every charm (and lent them apparently *in perpetuo*), and all the sweet sunny visions of blest isles and floating gardens, of which the poets sing, are here realized. It rises from the smiling lake in the form of terraces. The gently sloping green banks are decked with fruit trees, gardens, vineyards, and meadows; old masonry looks picturesquely forth from the green foliage, and the summit is crowned with a stately castle, from whose terrace a most splendid view is afforded of the lake and the surrounding landscape. Its loveliness gave rise to the name of *Maien-aue*, or

'May-meadow.'" It is connected with the mainland by a wooden bridge, 630 paces long, and by the bridge belonging to the railway. Its circumference is estimated at forty-three miles.

Anciently the island belonged to the barons of Langenstein, and they erected a castle on it, which, with the island, was handed over to the Teutonic order, in 1282, by Arnold von Langenstein and his four sons, the five chivalrous knights having taken upon themselves the Teutonic vows. A commandery was then established here, and Herz von Langenstein, one of Arnold's sons, was the first of a series of sixty-five "commanders," who maintained the repute of the order in this beautiful island. He seems to have been the beau-ideal of a knight; not only a warrior but a poet, for a collection of his poems has been discovered—one of which, dated 1293, and devoted to a glorification of the life of St. Martina, consists of 30,000 verses. We may be permitted to hope he did not compel his knights to listen to their recital.

On the 11th of February, 1647, the Swedes, under their great general, Wrangel, landed in the island a detachment of 1000 musketeers, with four cannon, and drove out the imperialist garrison. It is said that they found a great booty here, valued at 5,000,000 florins. When the Swedish army, and the French under Turenne, retired from the shores of the lake, the imperialists made a bold attempt to recover Meinau; but the attack was defeated by the Swedes, who held possession of the island until September 30, 1648, when they evacuated it in compliance with the provisions of the treaty of Westphalia.

In 1805 the island was annexed to the grand duchy of Baden. Afterwards it was sold to a natural son of Prince Esterhazy, who in his turn sold it in 1839 to the Countess von Langenstein, the morganatic wife of the Grand Duke Louis of Baden. In 1854 it was purchased by Prince Frederick, regent of Baden. The castle is an eighteenth century building, and uninteresting.

PETERSHAUSEN.

Petershausen skirts the right bank of the Rhine, nearly opposite Meinau, and forms a village suburb of Constanz. It derives its name from the old Benedictine abbey, *Domus Petri*, or Peter's House, and is inhabited by about 250 to 300 Catholics, who depend for their support on the breeding of cattle and the cultivation of the vine.

The founder of the *Domus Petri* was Gebhard, bishop of Constanz, and the work was begun in 983. The following legend is connected with it:—The bishop, who himself superintended the erection of the abbey, happened on one occasion, while the interior was in course of decoration, to be absent. The knavish painters seized the opportunity to bury their best colours in the neighbouring forest, and on the bishop's return demanded a fresh supply of materials. But the holy prelate was fully equal to the task of coping with dishonest workmen. Endowed with the gift of second sight, or some faculty not less useful and wonderful, he conducted them to the wood, and said, "Let us see if the grace of the Lord will not furnish us with what we require!" Striking his staff in the ground he exclaimed, "Dig!" They dug, and the hidden treasures were revealed. "Now, my dear children," said the bishop, slily smiling, "let this miracle strengthen your energies, and I pray ye resume your work." On the following day, however, the deceitful painters suddenly fell to the ground as if they were dead. The bishop touched them with his pastoral staff and said, "I will not reward you by permitting you to lie here and take your rest. Up, up, and persevere in well-doing." The dead then arose, and by their redoubled industry showed the miraculous character of the episcopal exhortation.

So, at length, the abbey was completed. The church was dedicated to St. Gregory, whose bones were sent hither from Rome by the pontiff; and the new foundation was richly endowed by its founder, and afterwards by Otho III. and the Duchess Hadewig.

For some centuries it prospered exceedingly, but about 1489 a cloud came over its fortunes; it fell into a wretched poverty, and all its monks deserted it, except John Meck of Lindau, who in 1518 became abbot, and energetically laboured to effect its restoration. When the people of Constanz embraced the doctrines of Luther, its then ruler, Gebhard III., took to flight, and the abbey was destroyed. On the success of the Catholic league, however, the city was compelled to rebuild it, the monks returned, and it regained much of its ancient prosperity. In 1803 the convent was finally dissolved.

We must now return to Rorschach, in order to complete our circuit of the Lake of Constanz, by exploring its north-eastern shore.

LINDAU.

From Rorschach we may proceed by rail to Lindau, passing Bregentz.

Lindau, with the villages of Nonnenhorn and Wassenburg, constitutes nearly the whole of the Bavarian territory on the shore of the lake. It is the terminus of the Bavarian Railway, and distant about five hours' journey from Augsburg. Built on three islands, it has sometimes been called the "Bavarian Venice," but the points of resemblance are not visible to the unprejudiced eye of the stranger. It contains about 4000 inhabitants, has two good inns, is quiet and orderly, and wholly destitute of animation, except when the pilgrimages to Einsiedeln commence. It has a considerable transit trade and a good fishery, which might easily be made better if the Lindauers were less inclined to take things easily.

Lindau is agreeably situated: exactly opposite it may be seen the broad extensive valley through which the Rhine descending from the Rhaetian Alps, hurries to the lake. The rocky mountain chain of Switzerland runs along the whole of the right side of this valley as far as the lake, and then, extending along the same in a chain of fertile hills, forms its southern shore. The left side of the valley is bounded by the sterile summits of the Vorarlberg, which, continuing towards the east, terminate in a range of steep and lofty cliffs, washed by the dark-blue waters of the Boden See. All that portion of the latter which lies to the east of Lindau forms a fine large oval basin, two leagues wide, and nearly as long, at whose western extremity stands the little town of Bregentz. Towards the west and north the lake stretches out into a bright and magnificent expanse. From Lindau to Constanz, as the crow flies, measures thirty-three miles, and to the end of the Upper Lake, forty-eight miles. The western and northern shores, though much indented, preserve on the whole a straight line, and the eye is therefore enabled to range unobstructed over a sheet of water, whose area is not less than forty German square miles. When the atmosphere is not too transparent, the views are bounded only by the horizon, and it is easy to understand why the lake was once called the Suabian Sea.

The three islands on which our Bavarian Venice takes its stand boast of an area of 102 acres. The foremost is the largest, and communicates with the mainland by a timber bridge, 290 paces in length. The principal part of the town is erected on this island; the second, connected with it by drawbridges, is given over to fishermen and vine-growers. The third, called the *Burg*, is linked to Lindau by a stone bridge. It contains the old church of St. James, and some remains of ancient walls, supposed to be Roman. The town itself is strongly fortified.

In its earlier history the great enemy of Lindau seems to have been fire, and we read of conflagrations destroying it in 948, 1264, 1339, and 1347. Its position, however, was admirably adapted for defence in time of war, and commercial enterprise in time of peace. Thus, it rose again from its ashes with unabated vigour, and in 1496 had acquired so much importance that the Emperor Maximilian I. selected it as the seat of the Imperial Diet. It may further be mentioned, that it was one of the first towns which embraced the doctrines of Luther; with the cities of Constanz, Strasburg, and Memmingen, it was represented at Schmalkalden when the great Protestant League was formed, and subscribed to the famous Confession of Augsburg.

When, at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, a crusade was preached against the German Protestants, the gallant burghers of Lindau prepared to defend their principles with the sword. They fortified their town, under the superintendence of the count of Solms, but were unable to resist the overwhelming force sent against them by the emperor; and as a punishment for their disaffection a garrison was quartered upon them for twenty years.

In 1647 Lindau was unsuccessfully besieged by the Swedes under Wrangel. After the French Revolution it several times changed masters; but, by the Peace of Presburg in 1806, was finally given to Bavaria, to which it still belongs.

Its public buildings are unimportant. St. Mary's church formerly belonged to the nunnery of Lindau, which consisted of an abbess and twelve nuns, all of noble family. The abbess possessed a singular privilege; namely, she was allowed to rescue a criminal from the gallows by cutting the rope from his neck with her own hands. "This act of mercy took place at the corner of the so-called 'Kerwatzen;' the knife destined to sever the cord was borne after the abbess in solemn procession on a silver salver. The individual delivered from the executioner was then regaled in the convent, and the rope tied

about his middle, to remind him of his fortunate escape. Each abbess exercised the privilege *once* only; it was actually carried into effect in the years 1578, 1615, 1692, and as late as 1780."

In Trinity church, which once belonged to the Franciscans, but has been disused for many years, the town library is preserved. It contains two manuscript chronicles of the town, some black-letter bibles, block-books, and interesting ancient MSS. The Lutheran church is of great antiquity.

From Lindau we proceed to Friedrichshafen, the terminus of the Stuttgard and Ulm Railway. Langenargen and Friedrichshafen are in the lake territory of Würtemburg; the former a small market town, which formerly belonged to the Counts de Montfort, and contains the ruins of a strong castle, built on a jutting peninsula by Count William in 1332; the latter a busy and thriving port, with a harbour constructed by Frederick, king of Würtemburg. The imperial town of Buchhorn, to the north-west, and the convent of Hofen, now converted into a royal château, are situated within its boundaries, and are connected by a long street which skirts the shore of the lake. The views from the palace are very beautiful and extensive.

From 1632 to 1634 Buchhorn was occupied by the Swedes under General Horn, who successfully resisted an imperialist attack, delivered both by land and water.

MARSBURG.

Soon after entering the Baden territory we reach the ancient town of Marsburg, clustering on the slope of a considerable hill, under the protection of the castle which crowns the summit. It is surrounded by vineyards and orchards, and its inhabitants deal in wine, fruit, cider, corn, and fish. Its history is crowded with episodes of strife and turbulence, so that one would be tempted to believe its burghers lived in armour, and slept with sword and crossbow by their side. Its inhabitants evinced a disposition, at an early date, to embrace Lutheran opinions; and by way of warning the bishop of Constanz burnt an heretical priest here, on the 10th of May, 1527. John Hüyli, the victim, died with a courage which the fear of torture and death could not shake. Having arrived at the place of execution, he publicly thanked the bishop for the indulgence shown to him during his imprisonment. As the pile was lighted, he exclaimed, "Alas, my good people, may God forgive ye, for ye know not what ye do!" And while the flames wreathed around him, he continued to sing aloud, "Gloria in excelsis Deo! Te Deum laudamus!" His death did not arrest the spread of his opinions; the cause for which he died thenceforward progressed rapidly in Constanz and Lindau.

The old castle of Marsburg is an interesting specimen of mediæval military architecture. The main building, flanked by four circular turrets, was erected in 1508 by Hugo von Breitenlandenburg, bishop of Constanz. The outer wall is more ancient, and probably of Frankish architecture. A new castle, separated from the old by an artificial ravine, was built by Bishop Antony von Siggingen of Hohenburg, and continued to be occupied as a residence by the prelates of Constanz until their see was suppressed. It commands a magnificent prospect from its stately terrace.

In the cemetery chapel of Marsburg lies the dust of that extraordinary man, half-enthusiast, half-impostor—Antony von Mesmer, the inventor of Mesmerism. He was born in 1734 at Itznang, on the Lower Lake, and died at Marsburg in 1815. His monument was erected at the cost of the Society of Naturalists of Berlin.

UEBERLINGEN.

Passing New Bernau and its picturesque chapel, which lies embowered in vineyards, and the château of Maurach, we arrive at the ancient imperial town of Ueberlingen, situated on a creek or narrow bay of the lake, which is named after it the Ueberlingen See, or Lake of Ueberlingen. "The place has a venerable appearance, looking precisely as it did after its recovery from the ravages of the Thirty Years' War in the middle of the seventeenth century. It is situated close to the lake, which is here very deep, on a rocky soil, surrounded by vineyards and corn-fields; it still boasts of walls and moats, has eight gates, sixteen towers, an old minster, and four other churches. It is particularly animated in the suburb, where there are many fishermen's cottages. A considerable corn market is held here every week."

The following summary of events is borrowed from Dr. Gaspey:—

As early as the commencement of the seventh century the place (then called Ibriungae, not being mentioned as Ueberlingen till 1257) was a central point of the Frankish dominion, and a nursery of

Christianity. Gunzo, a Christian Frankish duke of Allemannia, had his seat here. Frideburg, the beautiful and only daughter of the duke, was the betrothed of the Frankish king Sigebert, Theodoric's son; she was smitten, however, with severe illness, so that her father and all the people believed her possessed of an evil spirit. She was restored by the prayers of St. Gallus, who, at her desire, was fetched from the wilderness, but had at first refused to obey the mandate of the prince, and had fled into the valley of the Rhine. According to an old tradition, the evil spirit departed from Frideburg in the form of a black raven, which flew out of her mouth. The duke, grateful for his assistance, was desirous of conferring on him the episcopal dignity, the see of Constanz being just then vacant; St. Gallus, however, declined the proffered favour, and desired it might be awarded to the dean of Juaradaves, named John, who had been instructed by him in the word of God.

In the middle of the fourteenth century, when the country was devastated by the great plague of the so-called "Black Death," and certain zealots wandered from place to place, pursuing the Jews with fire and sword, many of the Hebrew persuasion were also sacrificed here. The mutilated corpse of a boy who had been missed by his parents was found in a brook; as the body was borne past the houses of the Jews the wounds broke out afresh. In accordance with the old superstition that the wounds of a murdered man bled in the presence of his murderer, this circumstance was held to be a satisfactory proof of their guilt. Under the pretence of rescuing them, the terrified Jews were removed to a tall stone house, in the lower story of which a quantity of faggots had been collected. As soon as the victims, over 300 in number, had been enticed into this supposed retreat, the faggots were lighted. The hapless Jews were driven by the flames from story to story, and, at last, got out upon the roof. But there was no chance of escape. The whole house was consumed, and with it every living creature. In their desperation, the Jews hurled down knives and stones and burning rafters on the crowd of persecutors who stood below and mocked at their agonies; some precipitated themselves from the windows, but were quickly seized and massacred.

As a reward for its heroic conduct in the Peasants' War, Charles V. bestowed upon it many privileges. It suffered greatly during the Thirty Years' War; was besieged by the Swedes in 1634, but forced them to retire. Five years later it was attacked by the Bavarians, and after an obstinate resistance compelled to capitulate. In 1802 Ueberlingen was attached to the grand duchy of Baden.

The only public edifice in the town worthy of notice is the Minster, or Cathedral, which presents some Gothic features, and whose interior is both spacious and majestic. The tower is upwards of 200 feet in height.

The mineral springs of Ueberlingen seem, of late years, to have risen in repute.

The northern section of the Lake of Constanz is divided into two basins, as a glance at a map will show the reader, by a long narrow peninsula jutting out from the mainland in a south-westerly direction, and terminating opposite Constanz. Here, at its extremity, is situated the suburb-village of Petershausen, connected with Constanz and the left shore of the lake by the bridge of the Strasburg Railway. The island of Meinau, already described, lies between this peninsula and the right shore of the lake; that of Reichenau, between the peninsula and the left shore of the lake, in the north-western basin (or *Unter See*), which strikes inland as far as Rudolfzell.

In our preceding descriptions we have been as brief as was consistent with our duty to the reader, because the upper course of the Rhine, however beautiful may be its scenery, is not much visited by the British tourist; nor has it proved of any great strategic importance in the principal European wars. Moreover, with the exception of Constanz, we have met with no city of eminent historical importance, nor with any of those exquisite landscapes which song and fable have endowed with undying attractions. But now we enter upon "hallowed ground." The river whose descending wave we accompany will carry us past cities and towns indissolubly associated with the great men and deeds of bygone times, and with the stirring events of the present epoch; as well as through scenes of the highest interest and the most admirable beauty. We must proceed, therefore, at a slower pace; but not, we trust, to the dissatisfaction of the reader, who will find food for meditation and objects of curiosity abundantly supplied in every page.

CHAPTER II.

THE RHINE, FROM CONSTANZ TO STRASBURG.

Backward, in rapid evanescence, wheels
The venerable pageantry of Time,
Each beetling rampart, and each town sublime,
And what the dell unwillingly reveals
Of lurking cloistral arch, through trees espied
Near the bright river's edge.—*Wordsworth.*

RIGHT BANK OF THE RIVER TO SCHAFFHAUSEN.

THE Rhine issues from the Boden See in a westerly direction, between the towns of Stein, on the right bank, and Steckhorn, on the left.

Stein, on the right bank, is in German territory, and picturesquely situated among vine-clad hills. A wooden bridge, forty-four mètres in length, connects it with a suburb on the left bank. It contains a population of 1500.

In the eighth century it was already a considerable village. In 945 it was raised to the rank and privileges of a town by Duke Burckhardt II., of Suabia; and in 1005 a further impetus was given to its prosperity by the removal hither of the Benedictine abbey of St. George, from Hohentwiel. The barons of Klingen, lords of the abbey, gradually crept into possession of the town; one moiety of which, in 1359, they sold to the duke of Austria, and receiving it again as a fief in 1415, sold it a second time, with the other moiety, to the barons of Klingenberg. From the latter the town succeeded in purchasing its freedom, in 1459, for 1500 florins, and it then entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with the towns of Zurich and Schaffhausen. In 1484 its heavy debts, and the exactions of the abbot of St. George, compelled it to place itself under the protection of Zurich, then a powerful and influential city; and so it remained until 1798, when it was formally incorporated with the canton of Schaffhausen. The abbey of St. George had previously been suppressed, having fallen before the sweeping whirlwind of the Reformation.

The artist will find in the town many old houses well worth a place in his sketch-book, such as the Red Ox and the White Eagle. Near the bridge is a mansion of venerable antiquity, bearing the sign "Zum Klu," and reputed to have been formerly the house of assembly for the nobles. It is enriched with some very fine specimens of the best painted glass, perfectly wonderful in their depth and glow of colour. In the town hall hangs the portrait of a citizen of Stein, Rudolph Schydt, Baron von Schwarzenhorn, born in 1590, who after having been carried into slavery by the Turks, was, by a strange revolution of the wheel of fortune, to become Austrian ambassador at the Turkish court. The large and profusely ornamented silver goblet is shown which he presented to his native town, and which, on the occasion of a wedding, figures always among the decorations of the feast.

In the old abbey of St. George the visitor will find a really noble hall, profusely ornamented with quaint frescoes and some good wood-carving.

On the rocky height above the town stands what time has left of the ancient castle of Hohenklingen, or the Steiner Klinge. To the family which formerly occupied this fortress belonged Walter von Klingen, a minnesinger of great celebrity, and the friend of Rudolph of Hapsburg, whose future greatness he predicted. He lies interred, with his three daughters, near Bâle, in the convent of Klingenthal, which was founded by his pious generosity. From the topmost roof of Hohenklingen was precipitated the burgomaster Ezweiler, in 1758, for having treacherously plotted to deliver up the town to the Austrians.

About three miles to the east, at an elevation of 650 feet above the Rhine, and on the southern slope of the Schienenberg, are situated the quarries of Œhningen, remarkable for their abundant store of fossil remains of terrestrial and fresh-water ani-

mals, as well as plants, discovered in their marl and limestone rocks. The most curious discovery was that of a fossil fox, made by Sir Roderick Murchison. The strata lie immediately above the formation called Molasse, and in their organic contents differ from all fresh-water beds previously discovered.

Continuing our course along the left bank* of the river we next reach Hemmishofen, lying in a pleasant gap or hollow between the hills. Then we come to the mouth of the little river Biber, which winds past the château of Ramson, and in the shadow of luxuriant "beechen groves" make our way to Gailingen, a hamlet embowered among vines, and chiefly inhabited by Jews. Near this point the French army, on the 1st of May, 1800, effected that passage of the Rhine which enabled Moreau to gain his great victory of Hohenlinden.

Passing through the glades of the Schæchenwald we next arrive at Büsingen; and soon afterwards, at Paradies, a nunnery of the order of St. Clara (*Clarisses*), founded in 1214 at Constanz, and thence transferred to its present site. In the neighbouring marshes many rare plants are found.

The imperial army, under the archduke Charles, crossed the Rhine at Paradies in 1799.

LEFT BANK OF THE RIVER TO SCHAFFHAUSEN.

On the left bank of the river, after leaving Constanz, the first point of interest at which the traveller arrives is Gottlieben, and here he will regard the hoary castle with curious eyes, from its imperishable associations. It was the temporary prison in 1414 of John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who were confined in its dungeons, in gross violation of the imperial safe-conduct, at the instigation of Pope John XXII. By a strange turn of fortune, the latter, a few months later, was himself a prisoner at Gottlieben, by order of the Council of Constanz, and was here compelled to sign the bull by which he virtually abdicated the papal throne. In 1454 Felix Hämmerlin, the canon of Zurich, better known by his Latinized name of Malleolus, the most learned scholar and generous philanthropist which Switzerland in the fifteenth century could boast of, was also imprisoned here. He was afterwards removed to the convent of Luzern, where he was buried alive.

* The tourist may proceed from Constanz to Schaffhausen by the Baden Railway, in which case he loses sight of a considerable portion of the Rhine; or he may descend the river by steamboat (three hours). The railway station for the Falls of the Rhine is Neuhausen.

During the siege of Constanz, in 1633, the Swedish general, Horn, established here his headquarters. The castle was purchased in 1837 by Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte—now Napoleon III.—who demolished a part of it, and reconstructed it on a more extensive scale.

The Rhine now broadens into the north-western section of Lake Constanz—an ample basin, known as the Zeller See north of Reichenau, and the Unter See south of that island. The shores of the Zeller See are studded with several picturesquely situated villages—Heyne, Allensbach, Markelfingen, Rudolfzell (already mentioned), Moos, Itznang, Weiler, Horn, and Gaienhofen. The Baden Railway skirts its north-western shore from Rudolfzell to Petershausen, where, as before stated, it crosses the Rhine and enters Constanz.

On the left or southern shore, our exploration brings us to Ermatingen, a small town of 1500 inhabitants—agriculturists, traders, and fishermen—dominated by the castles of Hind and Wolfsberg, the latter belonging to an English family.

The château of Arenenberg (formery Narrenberg) we regard with peculiar interest as the residence and death-place of the duchess of St. Leu, ex-queen of Holland—Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of Josephine, and the mother of Napoleon III., who purchased and restored the château in 1855. The emperor resided here previous to his mock-heroic descent upon Strasburg.

In this neighbourhood, to the south of the village of Maunenbach, are situated the château of Solmstein, built in the twelfth and rebuilt in the fourteenth centuries; and nearer the village, that of Eugensberg, which was inhabited for a time by Queen Hortense.

The castle of Sandegg, which belonged to Count Eugene de Leuchtenberg, was destroyed by fire in 1834.

Passing Berlingen, we next arrive at Steckhorn, an ancient town of about 1500 inhabitants, situated at the point where the Rhine issues from the lake-like expanse of the Zeller Zee. The old castle has been converted into a manufactory.

On a promontory covered with fruit trees stands the Cistercian monastery of Feldbach, founded in 1252. Its chapel contains a statue of Walter von Klingen, the feudal superior of the lords of Feldbach, and a bounteous benefactor to the abbey.

The château of Clansegg is comparatively uninteresting. Through a broken and picturesque

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country, and passing the château of Neuburg, we proceed to the village of Mammern, occupying a tongue of land which juts boldly into the river. On the opposite bank are Wangen and Oehringen.

The château of Oberstad has undergone that process of transformation which so signally marks the rise of a "new order" of things upon the ruins of the old. It has been converted, like that of Steckhorn, into a factory. Strigen and Kattenhorn are still famous for their vines.

At Eschenz the tourist, if he have time, may reasonably spend a few hours in examining the Roman and Germanic antiquities which render its neighbourhood so full of interest. On the hills above are planted the châteaux of Frendenfels and Liebenfels, the latter recently restored.

The channel of the Rhine has considerably narrowed at Burg, where it is divided into two contracted branches by the small island of Woerd. The chapel so conspicuous on this little islet—which was anciently connected with Burg by a Roman bridge, whose piles were visible as late as 1766—was erected in memory of Sidonius, bishop of St. Gall. He was for some time confined here a prisoner, and perished, in 759, the victim of a false accusation.

The small hamlet of Rheinklingen need not delay our progress. Diessenhofen is a town of 1650 inhabitants. From 1640, when it was conquered by the Leaguers, until 1798, it formed a small republic under the protection of Schaffhausen and the eight ancient cantons of Switzerland. The Rhine is here spanned by a substantial bridge. The town has some large tanneries, and a considerable fair, especially for cattle.

St. Katharinenthal is a Dominican convent, founded in the thirteenth century, and still inhabited by a prioress and four nuns.

We now enter the town of

SCHAFFHAUSEN.

Population, 8711. Sixty-four miles from Bâle; twenty-nine miles from Constanz. Hotels in the town, Falke, Krone, Lœwe; and at the Falls, Schweizerhof and Bellevue. On the left bank, Schloss-hauffen, Witzig, and Schiff.

Schaffhausen, the chief town of a canton of the same name, has a population of 8711 inhabitants, and stands on the right bank of the Rhine, at an elevation of 1270 feet above the sea, in the valley of Durach or Taunerbach. It is situated just above the commencement of the falls or rapids which render the Rhine unnavigable as far as Basel. Anciently it was a landing-place and customs-town, where all goods brought from the south or north had to be embarked for conveyance up the river; and it owes its name to the *boat* or *skiff-houses* erected for this purpose. But the introduction of railways has year by year diminished its importance, and it chiefly depends at present on its limited manufactures of soap, candles, silk, cotton, iron; its tanneries, potteries, and breweries; and the influx of tourists attracted by its vicinity to the celebrated Falls.

Though it does not merit a long visit, yet it possesses many features of interest for the cultivated traveller. No other town in Switzerland—perhaps none in Germany, with the single exception of Nuremberg—has so faithfully preserved a mediæval character and physiognomy. If, like Pompeii, it had been buried under the ashes of a volcanic eruption, and only recently exhumed, it could not more thoroughly have retained the sentiment and aspect of antiquity. It is an old-world place, and in passing through its streets you feel suddenly transported back to the sixteenth century, when it was a city of influence, wealth, and power. Many of its houses are remarkable for their antique architecture, for the turrets and projecting oriel windows which relieve their façades, and for the quaint carvings and mouldings in wood and stucco with which they are embellished. It is unfortunate that few of them now exhibit any traces of the fresco paintings with which they were originally covered; and the antiquary will regret, though the sanitary reformer will rejoice, that the muncipality have of late years been inspired with a spirit of improvement, and have begun to widen the ancient streets and to substitute blooming gardens for grim but useless fortifications. The wall and six turreted gateways of the town are, however, as yet extant, and will furnish the artist with many picturesque subjects for his pencil. The house called Zum Ritter, opposite the Krone Hotel, is a "bit" worthy of Prout.

The celebrated wooden bridge, which was formerly the glory of Schaffhausen, and the most perfect specimen of that species of architecture in the world, was burned by the French, under Oudinot, in 1799, after their defeat by the Austrians at Stockach. It consisted of a single arch, 365 feet in span, and was built by a carpenter

from Appenzell, named Grubenmann. A model of it is preserved in the town library (20,000 vols.), which also contains the collection of books made by the great Swiss historian, Johannes Müller, a native of Schaffhausen (1752-1809).

"At Schaffhausen," wrote Montaigne, on passing through the town in 1580, "we saw nothing rare;" and nothing rare is to be seen there to-day. On the hill above it, the Emmersberg, however, is planted the singular fort or castle called Annoth (that is, *ohne Noth*, or "the Needless"), because it was erected in order to provide the poor of the town with food. It was built in 1560. The walls are upwards of eighteen feet thick, and its vaults are bomb-proof. There are subterranean passages under it. From the summit of the tower may be enjoyed a prospect of singular beauty and variety.

Frederick duke of Austria, in 1415, having assisted Pope John XXIII. in his escape from Constanz, provided him with an asylum in the castle of Schaffhausen. To effect his purpose, he had proclaimed a splendid tournament without the gates of Constanz. All the city poured forth to the spectacle; the streets were wholly deserted. Pope John, in the dress of a groom, with a gray cloak, and a kerchief wrapped closely over his face, then mounted a sorry and ill-accoutred steed, with a cross-bow on the pommel of his saddle (March 20). Unperceived and unchallenged he passed the gates, and in about two hours reached Ermatingen. A boat was ready, he glided down the rapid stream to Schaffhausen, and took refuge in the ducal castle.

The emperor and the Council of Constanz were quick in their punishment of the pope's abettor and assistant. The ban of the empire, and the excommunication of the council, were both launched against him on the 7th of April. "All his vassals," says Milman, "were released from their sworn fealty; all treaties, contracts, oaths, vows, concerning the man excommunicated alike by the church and the empire, were declared null and void. Whoever could conquer, might possess the territory, the towns, the castles of the outlaw. The Swabian princes fell on his possessions in Alsace; the Swiss Cantons (they only with some reluctance to violate solemn treaties) seized his hereditary dominions, even Hapsburg itself. Before the month had expired this powerful duke was hardly permitted to humble himself in person before the emperor, whose insatiate revenge spared nothing that could abase his ancient foe. It was a suppliant entreating pardon in the most abject terms, a sovereign granting it with the most hard and haughty condescension. Frederick surrendered all his lands and possessions to be held at the will of the empire, until he should deign to reinvest the duke with them under the most degrading tenure of allegiance and fealty. The pope then fled from Schaffhausen to Fribourg, and thence to Brisach; but he was quickly pursued, overtaken, and thrown into prison in the strong castle of Gottlieben."

The Minster, anciently the abbey of All Saints (Allerheiligen), was founded in 1052, and completed in 1101. In 1753 it was restored, but with a pitiful want of taste. It retains, however, the principal features of its ancient style, the Romanesque, and its round arches and massive construction will interest the stranger. The arches of the nave rest upon single circular pillars; those of the central transept on square columns of such solidity that they seem intended to outlast the world. Prior to the Reformation, the great boast of the minster was a colossal figure, called the "Great Good God," which attracted numerous pilgrims. It was a figure of Christ twenty-two feet in height, and occupied the site of the present pulpit. The story runs that an irreverent jester, boasting that he was the brother of the Madonna of Einsiedeln, was cast into prison for blasphemy. On being brought next day before the magistrate, he said, "Yes, the Madonna at Einsiedeln is my sister, and what is more, the Devil at Constanz and the Great God at Schaffhausen are my brothers; for my father, who is a sculptor, made them all three, and therefore we must be akin."

The great bell of the cathedral, founded in 1486, bears the celebrated inscription which suggested to Schiller his "Song of the Bell:"

"Vivos voco, mortuos plango, fulgura frango."

The Gothic cloister contains numerous white-washed and plaster-daubed monuments of the magistrates and principal families of Schaffhausen.

The church of St. John is the largest in Switzerland; but its spaciousness is its sole distinction. It was built in 1120.

On the public promenade near the casino garden, a well-executed marble bust on a pedestal of gray marble, which is enriched with some bas-reliefs in bronze, perpetuates the memory of Schaffhausen's

most famous citizen. The inscription on it runs as follows:—

"JOHANNES VON MULLER,
Von Schaffhausen,
Geb. 8 Jan. 1752. Gest. 29 May, 1809.
Nie war ich von Einer Partie,
Sondern für Wahrheit und Recht
Wo ich's erkannte."

That is, "I was never of any particular party, but for Truth and Light, wherever I recognized them."

Schaffhausen is a place of great antiquity. Annual fairs were held in the village, which then belonged to Count Ebenhard III., of Nellenburg, as early as the eleventh century. It increased so rapidly, that in the next century it claimed the rank and enjoyed the privileges of a town, and was taken by the Emperor Henry VI. under his protection and that of the Empire. The neighbouring nobility thought it an honour to obtain its freedom, and Schaffhausen having thrown off the supremacy of its abbot was received, in 1246, among the number of free cities. Its burghers having been greatly favoured by the house of Hapsburg, always loyally supported it, and at the battle of Morgarten fought bravely in the Austrian ranks. It attained the climax of its prosperity early in the fifteenth century, when it had a population of 12,000, and was the great commercial dépôt of Upper Swabia. Its administration was then in the hands of an elective burgomaster, and its citizens were mustered in twelve guilds, one of which was restricted exclusively to persons of noble birth.

When Duke Frederick the Penniless was placed under the Imperial ban in 1415, for his share in the escape of Pope John XXIII., Schaffhausen found itself in a position of extreme peril, and only escaped the vengeance of the emperor by payment of a fine of 30,000 ducats. The duke, who had deserted it in its difficulties, then attempted to recover possession of it; but the burghers gallantly maintained the independence they had so dearly purchased. For this purpose they concluded an alliance with the Swiss, who nobly came to their aid when, in 1451, the Austrian forces under Von Hendorf had nearly succeeded in their investment of the town. In return for such loyal service, Schaffhausen supported the League, of which it became a member in 1501, in its wars with Burgundy and Swabia. Meantime, it continued to increase its territory by buying up the lands of the neighbouring nobles, whose profligacy forced them to raise money at any cost.

In 1529 Schaffhausen declared itself Protestant. It was afterwards somewhat disturbed by the outbreaks of the Anabaptists; but the course of its history ran with tolerable smoothness until the European convulsions caused by the French Revolution. In the great struggle between revolutionary France and Austria it was ultimately occupied by both armies; and from the 7th to the 10th of October by the Russians.

The canton of which it is the capital lies on the right bank of the Rhine, occupies a superficial area of 117 square miles, and has a population of 37,000, of whom 34,000 are Protestants and 3000 Roman Catholics. The surface is hilly and irregular, with many picturesque valleys, one of which, the Klettgau, is famous for its vineyards. The principal products are grain, flax, hemp, and fruits. The canton contains the two small towns of Neunkirch and Stein, the latter, in reality, a suburb of Schaffhausen; the five market towns of Unter-Hallau, Schleitheim, Wilchingen, Thüingen, and Ramsen; twenty-eight to thirty villages; and about forty castles and farms.

THE FALLS OF SCHAFFHAUSEN.

The course of the Rhine from the suburb of Stein to the little village of Obernid, where it quits the canton of Schaffhausen, measures about nine Swiss leagues. In this distance it descends 210 feet; and such is the rapidity of its current that in the severest winter it never freezes. Nowhere, in the whole extent of its manifold windings, is the river brighter or more transparent; its deep blue waters, with their emerald gleam, flow onward with many a crest of pearly foam, but are never unclean or turbid. The depth varies, but between Stein and the Falls attains a maximum of thirty feet.

About a mile and a half below Schaffhausen the river, for a distance of 1000 feet, whirls and foams and eddies over a succession of broken calcareous rocks. It is here called the "Lächen," or "Pools," from the countless basins into which the waters are pent up. On the left, just below these pools, a huge crag juts forward like a promontory, and contracts the channel of the river into a space of one hundred and twenty feet. With a fall of eight or ten feet, the current dashes headlong through this narrow throat, and then

suddenly expands to a breadth of 560 feet, darts off at a right angle towards the south, and for half a league is content to mitigate its fury, and flow with some degree of moderation through sloping banks covered with luxuriant vineyards. But the shores gradually grow steeper, and draw nearer together; and the river, confined between the heights of Bohnenberg on the one hand, and of Kohlfurt on the other, and broken up into three channels by two isolated masses of projecting rock, leaps a descent of forty-five to sixty feet with indescribable violence and boundless fury.

In *front* of the Falls, on the right bank, stands the castle of Wöerth, and nearly opposite it, on the left, the château of Lauffen (*i.e.*, the "rapids"), from either of which a fine view of the "hell of waters" may be obtained. Immediately *above* the Falls the river is spanned by the stone bridge of the Schaffhausen and Zurich Railway, and the rocks on the right bank are occupied by some iron-works, whose hammers are worked by the waters, but whose dingy buildings considerably detract from the beauty of the scene.

Perhaps, after all, the best point of view is from the château of Lauffen. Here a wooden gallery projects to the very edge of the rapids, so that you can touch the water with your hand. You see the emerald-tinted, azure-shining mass swirling impetuously downward, almost over your head, with a roar like the thunder of battle. Hurled against the rocks, like a stone from a catapult, part rises in a cloud of dense and flashing spray, part sweeps onward in a boiling rush of foam, while the main volume of water, descending into the semi circular basin beneath, again is partly dissipated into foam and spray. But the great charm of the picture is its variety. At times it is dark and dim, and then the heart of the spectator is troubled with its infinite suggestions of terror; but when the sun shines it is lit up with a myriad shifting hues, and brightened into beauty by an endless succession of rainbows.

No ancient or classical writer mentions these rapids. The first author who refers to them is the Florentine Poggio:—"The river," he says, "precipitates itself among the rocks with so much fury and so terrible a roar, that one might almost say it bewailed its fall."

They are thus described by Montaigne:—"Beneath Schaffhausen the Rhine encounters a hollow full of great rocks, where it breaks up into many streams, and further on, among these same rocks, it meets with a declivity about two pike-staves in height, where it makes a huge leap, foaming and roaring wildly. This arrests the progress of the boats, and interrupts the navigation of the river." In such cold and passionless language does the great essayist describe one of the most beautiful scenes in Europe!

Madame Roland is more enthusiastic:—"Figure to yourself," she says, "the river in all its majesty sweeping headlong like a sea of leaping foam; until the rocks, crowned with verdure, interrupt the course of its vast sheet of water, of this torrent of snow. The irritated river lashes its inclosing banks in furious wrath, undermines them, encroaches upon them, and multiplies its falls by the gaps it cleaves in them; it crashes down with a turmoil which spreads horror on every side, with which the whole valley re-echoes, and the shattered billows soar aloft in vapours richly adorned by shining rainbows."

Dr. Forbes speaks of the scene as being singularly impressive by moonlight. No sound is then heard but the one continuous roar of the water, softened by the distance, and seeming to fill the whole air, like the moonshine itself. There is something both wild and delightful in the hour and its accompaniments. The mind yields passively to the impressions made on the senses. A host of half-formed, vague, and visionary thoughts crowd into it at the same time, giving rise to feelings at once tender and pathetic, accompanied with a sort of objectless sympathy or yearning after something unknown. The ideas and emotions most definite and constant are those of Power and Perpetuity, Wonder and Awe.

But we must be careful to avoid exaggeration in our pictures of natural phenomena. The language in which some writers speak of the Falls of the Rhine is grotesque in its extravagance. Dr. Forbes honestly confesses that, after all, they impress the intellect much less than the feelings. The first view, in truth, is somewhat disappointing, particularly as to the dimensions of the Falls, both in breadth and height; and as you gaze, you feel a sort of critical calculating spirit rising within you; but this is speedily subdued by something in the inner mind *above* reasoning, and you are overpowered by a rush of conflicting emotions. Milton makes his Adam and Eve tell us that they "feel they are

happier than they know:" the spectator of the Rhine Falls feels they are grander than he thinks.

For the convenience of the tourist we may add that the distance between Constanz and Schaffhausen is three posts and a quarter, or twenty-nine one-fourth English miles.

	Posts.	Eng. Miles.
Constanz, ...		
Steckhorn, ...	1	9
Diessenhofen, ...	$1\frac{3}{8}$	$12\frac{1}{2}$
Schaffhausen, ...	$\frac{7}{8}$	$7\frac{3}{4}$

From Constanz to Lauffen is three miles. The tourist can take the railway if he pleases, stopping at Dachsen station; or he may go down by boat, or travel by road.

DESCENT OF THE RHINE CONTINUED: SCHAFFHAUSEN TO BASEL.

(Railway from Schaffhausen.)

Schaffhausen to Waldshut, . . .	29 miles.
Waldshut to Lauffenburg, ...	9 "
Lauffenburg to Sackingen, ...	6 "
Sackingen to Rheinfelden, ...	10 "
Rheinfelden to Basel, ...	10 "
Total distance, ...	64 miles.

We shall first pursue the right bank of the Rhine from Schaffhausen to Basel, and then, returning to Schaffhausen, follow up the left bank.

Below the Falls, the Rhine "nobly foams and flows" through a fertile and attractive country. At first it takes a southerly direction; then it strikes towards the west and north; and, after awhile, bends round with a southerly inclination. Here two narrow tongues of land confine the channel of the river, which is further impeded by a little islet. On one of these tongues, or peninsulas, stands the small town of Rheinau, belonging to the canton of Zürich; and on the island, connected with the mainland by a substantial stone bridge, stands the Benedictine abbey of the same name, conspicuous with its towers. It was founded in 778, and contains the marble tomb of its supposed founder, an Allemannic prince, named Wolfhard.

Just above Rheinau our river receives the Thur, and just below it the Töss. Neither rivulet contributes any great augmentation of volume. A more considerable tribute is furnished by the Aar, which flows into the Rhine opposite Waldshut, and near the little village of Coblence (Confluentia). The Aar rises in the two huge glaciers of the Ober and Unter-Aar Gletscher, near the Hospice of the Grimsel. The Unter-Aar glacier divides into two branches, the Lauter Aar and the Finster Aar; and from these the river draws its ice-cold emerald waters, which, swollen by their transit through various Swiss lakes, and by the junction of the Reuss and the Limmat, wind through valley and glen to feed the great German river.

It was near this point of junction, and on the deltoid tongue of land between the Aar and the Reuss, that the Romans raised their mighty fortress of Vindomissa, the most important settlement they had in Helvetia. Its name is preserved in the little modern village of Windisch, but notwithstanding the immense extent of the Roman settlement, which stretched twelve miles from north to south, its remains are inconsiderable. In the Bärlisgrube vestiges of an amphitheatre have been discovered, and on the road from Brauneck-berg to Königsfelden the ruins of an aqueduct.

When Christianity was introduced into Helvetia, Vindomissa became the seat of the first bishopric, which was afterwards removed to Constanz. In the third and fourth centuries the town was ravaged by the Vandals and Allemanni, and in the sixth it was destroyed by Childebert, king of the Franks.

Near its ancient site was erected the monastery of Königsfeld, and about two miles westward, on a wooded height, moulder the ruins of the castle of Habsburg or Habrichtsburg (Hawk's Castle), the cradle of the imperial house of Austria. The town of Bruegg, or Bruck, lies further to the south.

"Thus," as Gibbon says, "within the ancient walls of Vindomissa, the castle of Habsburg, the abbey of Königsfeld, and the town of Bruck have successively arisen." The philosophic traveller may compare the monuments of Roman conquests, of feudal or Austrian tyranny, of mediæval monasticism, and of industrious freedom. "If he be truly a philosopher," says Gibbon, "he will applaud the merit and happiness of his own time."

If he be truly a philosopher, we may add, he will certainly contemplate with interest the ruined castle which witnessed the dawn of the fortunes of the Hapsburgs; of the great family—often defeated but never wholly crushed—who wore so long the imperial crown of Germany, the inheritance of Roman empire, and maintained for centuries so bitter a struggle with the rising Hohenzollerns for the retention of the imperial power. At last they seem to have been worsted in the fight, and the fatal field of Sadowa has handed over the supremacy of Germany to the Prussian dynasty.

The castle of Hapsburg was built by Werner, bishop of Strasburg, son of Kanzeline, count of Altenburg, early in the eleventh century. His successors increased their family inheritance by marriages, donations from the emperors, and by becoming prefects, advocates, or administrators of the neighbouring abbeys, towns, or districts. His great grandson, Albert III., was owner of ample territories in Suabia, Alsace, and that part of Switzerland which is now called the Aargau, and, moreover, held the landgraviate of Upper Alsace.

Albert's son, Rudolph, was the true founder of the family. The emperor bestowed upon him the town and district of Lauffenberg, and his astuteness and perseverance gained him great influence in Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden. Dying in 1232, his two sons, Albert and Rodolph, divided their inheritance. The former obtained Aargau and Alsace, with the castle of Hapsburg; the latter Cleggow, the Brisgau, and the counties of Rheinfelden and Lauffenberg. He fixed his residence in the latter city, and thus established the branch of Hapsburg-Lauffenberg.

Albert married Hedwige, daughter of Alice, countess of Baden, and by her had three sons, Rudolph, Albert, and Hartinau. The former, born in 1218, displayed a surprising sagacity and heroic prowess, and after a stirring career was elected emperor of Germany, and successor of the Cæsars, in 1273.

From this point, as Dr. Bryce remarks, a new era begins in European history. In A.D. 800 the Roman empire was revived by a prince whose vast dominions gave ground to his claim of universal monarchy; it was again erected, in A.D. 962, on the narrower but firmer basis of the German kingdom. During the three following centuries Otto the Great and his successors, a line of monarchs of unrivalled vigour and abilities, strained every nerve to make good the pretensions of their office against the rebels in Italy and the ecclesiastical power. Those efforts failed signally and hopelessly. Each successive emperor continued the strife with resources scantier than his predecessors; each was more decisively vanquished by the pope, the cities, and the princes. Still, in the house of Hapsburg the Roman empire lived on 600 years more; and the crown of the Cæsars and of Charlemagne and of Otto was transmitted from generation to generation of the descendants who sprang from the loins of Werner, the founder of the castle of Hapsburg.

That castle is now in ruins. The keep, tall, square, and built of rough stones, with walls eight feet in thickness, is the only portion entire. The view from its summit is justly described as both picturesque and interesting; picturesque from the variety it includes of wood, and savage glen, and mountain height, and rolling rivers; interesting, because it sweeps, as it were, over a wide historic field. Yonder lie the ruins of Vindomissa; yonder, those of Königsfelden: to the south rises the desolate keep of Braunegg, which formerly belonged to the sons of the tyrant Gessler; below it, in the quiet shades of Beir, Pestalozzi, the educational reformer, died and lies buried. But more; at a glance you take in the entire Swiss patrimony of the Hapsburgs—an estate inferior in size to that of many an English peer—from which Rudolph was called to wield the sceptre of Charlemagne. The house of Austria, 130 years later, were deprived by Papal ban of their ancient Swiss domains; but the ruined castle, the cradle of that house, was purchased not long ago by the present occupant of the Austrian throne.

The abbey of Königsfelden (" King's-field") was founded in 1310 by the Empress Elizabeth and Agnes queen of Hungary, in memory of the murder of the husband of the one and the father of the other, the Emperor Albert, just two years previously. The convent, " a group of gloomy piles," was suppressed in 1528. Parts of it have been occupied successively as a farm-house, an hospital, and a lunatic asylum; a portion now serves as a magazine, but divine service is still celebrated in the choir. Other parts are falling rapidly into a decay which threatens to be irretrievable. There is much excellent painted glass in the church; and the visitor will not fail to gaze with compassionate interest on the sculptured stones which mark the last resting-places of a long train of knights and nobles slain in the fatal field of Sempach (1386) —Austria's " Sadowa" of the fourteenth century.

The high altar, it is said, indicates the spot where the Emperor Albert fell beneath the swords of his murderers.

The emperor at the time was preparing to lead a formidable army into Switzerland, with the view of suppressing the revolt which had broken out in the cantons of Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden. His nephew John, having attained his nineteenth year, had demanded the possession of his inheritance, which the emperor had seized during his

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minority. Angered by repeated denials, and instigated by some discontented nobles of Aargau and Kyburg, he entered into a conspiracy against his uncle with four confidential adherents of illustrious birth, namely, his governor, Walter von Eschenbach, Rudolph von Wart, Rudolph von Balne, and Conrad von Tegelfeldt.

The emperor, accompanied by his family and a numerous train, among whom were the conspirators, set out on the road to Rheinfelden, where his consort, Elizabeth, had gathered a considerable force. As he rested at Baden for the purpose of refreshment, the young prince once more demanded to be installed in his estates and dignities; but Albert flung to him a wreath of flowers, observing that it better became his youthful years than the cares of government. Stung by the insulting jest, John burst into tears, threw the chaplet on the ground, and retired to concoct a scheme of immediate vengeance.

Arriving on the banks of the Reuss, opposite Windisch, the conspirators were the first to pass the ferry, and were followed by the emperor with a single attendant, his son Leopold and the remainder of the suite waiting on the other side of the river. As he rode slowly through the meadows which lay at the foot of the bold rock crowned by the frowning towers of Hapsburg, conversing familiarly with his nephew, he was suddenly attacked by the conspirators, one of whom seized the bridle of his horse. His nephew, exclaiming, "Will you now restore my inheritance?" wounded him in the neck with his lance. Balne ran him through with his sword, and Walter von Eschenbach clove his head at one tremendous blow. Wart, the other conspirator, stood aghast, unwilling at the last to share, yet afraid to prevent the terrible crime; the attendant fled, and the emperor, falling from his horse, lay weltering in his blood.

The atrocious deed was witnessed by his son Leopold and all his suite, but they were unable to cross the river in time to arrest the murderers. Their conduct, in truth, is inexplicable, for they left their dying master to breathe his last in the arms of a compassionate peasant woman, who chanced to appear on the scene.

"A peasant-girl that royal head upon her bosom laid,
And, shrinking not for woman's dread, the face of death survey'd:
Alone she sate. From hill and wood low sunk the mournful sun;
Fast gushed the fount of noble blood, Treason his worst had done.
With her long hair she vainly pressed the wounds to staunch their tide,
Unknown, on that meek humble breast, imperial Albert died."

—*Mrs. Hemans.*

Near the mouth of the Aar occur the rapids of the Rhine known as the "Little Lauffen."* A ridge of rocks is thrown across like a weir; but a gap in the centre, eighteen feet wide, admits of the passage of small vessels. When the waters are high they overflow the ridge, and produce a miniature fall; when low, the rocks lie bare and exposed, and with the help of a plank you might cross the river dryshod from the Swiss bank to the Baden.

Swollen by the accession of the glacier-born Aar, onward flows the Rhine with a bold and impetuous current, passing Waldshut on the left, and near Lauffenberg executing another abrupt descent of about twenty feet. Here a bridge, 306 feet in length, connects Lauffenberg with Klein Lauffenberg; the two containing, perhaps, a population of 1000. On the hill above the former town are the ruins of the stronghold of the Lauffenberg branch of the Hapsburgs.

We pass onward to Rheinfelden, a picturesque place, with a pleasant, suggestive name. It has high hills at its back, and open meadows on either side, and a foaming river in its front; so that an artist will be glad to enshrine its principal features in the amber of his memory. And the archæologist will be pleased to know that it occupies the site of the Roman station *Augusta Rauracorum*, which was founded by Munatius Plancus in the reign of Augustus, and destroyed by the Huns in 450; while the historian will recollect that Rheinfelden itself has many associations of storm and strife. Did it not stand on the debatable frontier-line of the Holy Roman empire, and was it not frequently fought for by contending armies? Especially was this the case in the Thirty Years' War, when the celebrated Lutheran leader, good Duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar, sheltered his battalions under its massive battlements and defeated Johann von Werth and the Catholic army. In 1744 it was captured and razed to the ground by the French, under Marshal Belleisle; but it contrived to raise its head again from the ashes, and its future safety was secured in 1801 by its annexation to neutralized Switzerland.

Its prosperity now depends upon its extensive salt-works, and on the visitors who seek relief in its saline baths from some of the many ills which "flesh is heir to."

* It was in descending these rapids in a small boat that Lord Montague, the last of his line, was drowned. On the same day his family mansion, Cowdray, in Sussex, was burned to the ground.

Here, almost in the centre of the river, lies a large mass of rock, precipitous on either side, but with a sufficiently level area on its summit for the erection of a strong fortress. This, we are told, is the celebrated "Stone of Rheinfelden;" anciently occupied by a formidable castle, but now by nothing more terrific than the house of a customs officer.

At this point occur the *Hollenhallen* rapids, where the seething and swirling river, and the rugged rocks, form a spectacle of singular and romantic interest.

Between Rheinfelden and Basel (Basle, or Bâle), only two villages remain to be noticed, on the right bank of the Rhine, those of Basel-Augst and Kaiser-Augst. The Roman ruins in their vicinity mark the westward limits of the once wealthy and powerful Augusta Rauracorum. An encampment at Kaiser-Augst, of which some remains exist, was probably the outwork or advanced post, designed to protect the city from any sudden incursion of the turbulent Germans.

RIGHT BANK OF THE RHINE.

Returning to Schaffhausen, we cross to the right bank of the river, which is traversed by the Baden Railway, and proceed to indicate its points of interest as far as Basel.

The first town of importance is Eglisau, where the river is crossed by a timber bridge. The valley here is narrow but fertile, and blossoms with orchards and vineyards.

Opposite Eglisau the Glatt, which rises at the foot of the Almann, pays its tribute to the Rhine.

A broad rock, just below Kaiserstuhl (the ancient *Tribunal Cæsaris*), is crowned by a graceful château, fancifully named Schwarz-Wassertels ("Black Water-Wagtail"). Weiss-Wassertels, on the Baden bank, is in ruins.

Waldshut, situated on the slope of the Black Forest, is a walled town, small but pleasant, with a population of 1200. It lies at a considerable elevation above the river, and commands some magnificent prospects, bright, varied, and romantic. It owes its foundation to Rudolph of Hapsburg; was unsuccesfully besieged by the Swiss in 1462; at the epoch of the Reformation became the headquarters of the Anabaptist leader, Balthasar Hubmeier; and on his flight was captured by the Austrians.

About two miles to the north is situated Höchenschward, 3314 feet above the sea-level, and the highest village in the Black Forest. It is unnecessary to say, that the tourist who climbs to this natural watch-tower will be able to satisfy himself with some of the finest pictures in all this romantic region. How grand they are may be inferred from the fact that a great part of the snow-covered chain of the Alps, with their bold peaks, like a combination of colossal spires, towers, and pyramids, sharply defined against the azure sky, may be seen from this point. For an Alpine panorama it can hardly be surpassed.

Passing the mouth of the Meng we arrive at Säckingen, a considerable town, traditionally celebrated as "the first seat of Christianity on the Upper Rhine." Here a chapel, monastery, and nunnery were founded by St. Fridolin in the seventh century. The bones of the saint are preserved in the ancient abbey-church, a quaint edifice distinguished by two towers.

Between Säckingen and Basel there is nothing to interest; but if we travel by rail we pass through a fertile country, and pause at the stations of Breunet, Rheinfelden, Wyhlen, and Grenzach. The Rhine here flows through a narrow but deep valley.

BASEL, BASLE, OR BALE.

Population, 45,000 (of whom 19,697 are Roman Catholics). Hôtels: Three Kings, Schweizerhof, Cigogne, Sauvage, Couronne, Kopf, and Hôtel de la Poste. The Central Railway station is on the south side of the town; the Baden station in Klein (or Little) Basel, on the right bank of the river. Post and Telegraph offices in the Freien Strasse. English Church service in the church of St. Martin.

Basel is happily situated on the left bank of the Rhine, at an elevation above the sea of 730 feet, in an open and sunny plain, surrounded at a sufficient distance by verdurous hills and wooded mountain slopes. It is the point of junction of three very different countries—France, Germany, and Switzerland—a circumstance to which its proverbial wealth and prosperity are undoubtedly due; and of each it seems to exhibit some characteristic feature. It is connected with its suburb, Klein Basel, on the right bank of the river, by a wooden bridge 840 feet in length, which was originally constructed in 1285. Basel is the chief town of the old canton of the same name, and of the new canton of Bâle-Ville.

"The first thing which strikes the stranger on entering Basel," says Emile Souvestre, "is the expression of melancholy and solitude which everywhere encounters his eye. At the sound of carriage-wheels the shutters fly forward, the doors are closed, and the women hide themselves. All is dead and desolate. It looks like a town to let. You must not think, however, that the voluntary imprisonment of the good people of Basel denotes any want of curiosity; for they have found a means of satisfying both that and their primitive savageness. Mirrors fixed to hinges of iron, and skilfully arranged at the windows, enable them to descry, from the shades of their apartment, everything which transpires without, while sparing themselves the annoyance of being scrutinized in their turn.

"But if there is a certain gloom in the appearance of the streets of Basel, we must own that their cleanliness is exquisite. Every house looks as if it had been finished off last evening, and was waiting for its first tenant. Not a cranny, not a scratch, not a spot on all those oil-painted walls; not a crack in all those marvellously wrought railings which protect the lower windows. The summer benches, placed near the threshold, are carefully raised, and let into the wall, to shelter them from the sun and rain. If the street be on too abrupt a descent, hand-ropes, fixed to the walls, arrest the tottering steps of old age, or of the peasant, bowed beneath his heavy burden. Everywhere you meet with this minute thoughtfulness, this anxiety, this attention, which is that of the proprietor, and, at the same time, of the head of a family."

It is some years ago since this graceful sketch was written, and Basel, while retaining its cleanliness, has lost much of its sadness. Its hotels are conducted with as much vivacity and politeness as the best in France; its inhabitants are as frank and honourable as those of an unadulterated German town. There are few cities on the Rhine where an English tourist can more pleasantly spend a summer holiday.

Basel is the ancient Basilia, which is first mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus in a passage of much perplexity to antiquaries. He speaks of a fortress, Robur, as erected near Basilia by the Emperor Valentinian I. The exact site of this ancient fortress is an archæological puzzle which has had a strong attraction for many inquisitive Dryasdusts, but scarcely seems worth our formal discussion. When Robur disappeared we know not, but it is certain that Basilia, though not mentioned in any of the Itineraries, became a town of considerable importance; and after the ruin of Augusta Rauracorum it would seem to have been the chief town in this part of Switzerland (Rauracia). The episcopal seat was removed to it; an episcopal palace was erected; and houses rapidly sprang up in the shelter of the ecclesiastical power.

Though plundered by the Barbarians in the fourth and fifth centuries, and by the Huns in the tenth (A.D. 917), it rose on each occasion with renewed vigour. In 1032 it was transferred from the kingdom of Burgundy to the sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire; but it still continued under the immediate control of its bishops, whom Charlemagne had elevated to the rank of *princeps aulæ nostræ*. For this reason it ranked as a free town, like Ratisbon or Worms, and never laboured under the incubus of a provincial governor. But as it waxed strong and wealthy it grew impatient even of episcopal jurisdiction, and from 1200 the efforts of its citizens to throw off the yoke were resolute and unceasing.

Meanwhile, churches, palaces, and convents had multiplied in the prosperous town. A cathedral was built, and richly endowed, by the Emperor Henry II. in 1010–1019. In 1061 it was the seat of a general council, where the anti-pope, Honorius II., was elected, and Henry IV. crowned by Roman ambassadors. To protect it from Rudolph of Suabia it was fortified with walls and ditches in 1080. In 1247, relying on its virtual independence, it joined the League of the Rhenish Towns.

In the thirteenth century its tranquillity was greatly disturbed by the quarrels of its patrician families, as was Florence by the feuds of Guelph and Ghibelline, and Rome by those of the Colonnas and Orsinis. The two great families of Schaler and Mönche were accustomed to meet and carouse at the hostelry of the "Sigh," and as they carried a banner emblazoned with the figure of a parrot ("Psittich"), they were known as the Psitticher. Another company of knights and burghers held their revels at the "Fly," and bore a star as their emblem. All the town in due time was divided into two houses, like ancient Verona; and every inhabitant belonged to either the Stars

or the Psitticher. The two factions were constantly engaged in open warfare, which became more serious still when Count Rudolph of Hapsburg and the bishops intervened in it; the former siding with the Stars, the latter with the Psitticher. Count Rudolph, assisted by the Stars, was laying siege to the town, when he received the news of his election as king of Rome. The siege was immediately raised; and the bishop threw open the gates of Basel without demur to the successor of Charlemagne. This prompt obedience led to the entire reconciliation of the two parties. The emperor frequently visited the faithful town, and both he and his successors endowed it with many privileges. The wife and two of the sons of Rudolph were interred in the cathedral.

The history of Basel is curious in many respects, and especially in the illustrations it affords of the surprising vitality of a great town. Its tenacity of life was truly wonderful. In 1312 it was literally desolated by the "Black Death," which carried off on this one occasion 14,000 persons; and each time that it visited Basel, which it too frequently did during the next three centuries, it was not satisfied except it counted its victims by tens of hundreds. In 1356, on the 18th of October, the town was overwhelmed in ruins by a terrible shock of earthquake. Not a tower or spire escaped, and scarcely one hundred houses, while upwards of 300 lives were lost, and the whole neighbourhood, for miles around, was fearfully ravaged. Yet it survived these disasters. In a few years it was populous and prosperons again. It rebuilt its cathedral, reared anew its churches and public edifices, purchased the village of Klein Basel, on the opposite bank of the river, and the lordships of Liestal, Waldenburg, and Homburg.

Meantime its burghers grew more and more sensible of their power. They defied Austria, and they defied the church. The patricians retaining some privileges dangerous to the commonwealth, they were summarily deprived of them; and the clergy launching the bolts of excommunication, were bidden to sing and pray, or remove themselves from the town. They entered into a confederacy with other cities, and surrounded their own with new walls. They were active in trade and commerce, encouraged mechanics, and established the first paper mills of Germany.

The great Œcumenical Council of Basel was held from 1431 to 1438. It commenced on the 14th of December, 1431, and consisted of eleven cardinals, three patriarchs, twelve archbishops, one hundred and ten bishops, six temporal princes, and a large number of doctors, besides ambassadors from England, Scotland, France, Arragon, Portugal, Sicily, and Denmark, from the princes, cities, and universities of Germany. It was presided over by the emperor, who submitted for the consideration of the Fathers the all-important question of the marriage of the clergy. John of Lubeck, says Milman, was authorized to demand in the emperor's name, the abrogation of celibacy. John of Lubeck is described as a man of wit, who jested on every occasion. But on this subject jesting was impossible; it was of a nature so grave and important that a serious treatment of it was imperative. The celibacy of the clergy is practically so interwoven with the framework of Catholicism, that the question of abandoning the system could not be expected even by its advocates to obtain from the council a unanimous response to it. It furnished, indeed, the subject of no small debate, and facts and reasons, for and against it, were urged and rebutted by the spokesmen in the council, in accordance with the views which reflection and observation had led them to espouse. The Greek Church, it was urged, admitted marriage. The priests of the Old and New Testaments were married. It is said that the greater part of the council were favourable to the change; but the question, as unsuited to the time, was "eluded, postponed, and dropped."

The most important act of the council was the deposition of Pope Eugenius IV., and the election of Duke Amadeus of Savoy, under the title of Felix V. (1440). In the interval Basel was again visited by the Black Death. The mortality was terrible. The ordinary cemeteries were wholly insufficient; huge charnel-pits were dug to receive the dead. The Fathers, however, stood nobly to their post, and refused to quit the blighted and sorrowing city. When the plague passed the pope was solemnly crowned at Basel, his two sons, the duke of Savoy and the count of Geneva (an unusual spectacle at a papal inauguration), standing by his side; 50,000 persons were witnesses of the magnificent ceremony. The train worn by the new duke-pope was of surpassing splendour, and worth, it is said, 30,000 crowns.

After this event the influence of the council

gradually declined, and they had the good sense to consummate their own dissolution, at the instigation of Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, afterwards Pius II. He officiated as secretary to the council, and has left on record a graphic description of the coronation of Felix V. He speaks in enthusiastic terms of the pope's gravity, majesty, and ecclesiastical demeanour; "the demeanour of him who had been called of God to the rule of his universal church." Of the 50,000 spectators many, he says, wept for joy; all were excited. Nor does Æneas forget his own part in the ceremonial. "The cardinal of Santa Susanna chanted the service; the responses were given by the advocates and notaries in such a dissonant bray that the congregation burst into roars of laughter. They were heartily ashamed of themselves. But the next day, when the preachers were to make the responses, Æneas, though quite ignorant of music (which requires long study), sung out his part with unblushing courage (*cantilare meum carmen non erubui*). Æneas does not forget the tiara with 30,000 pieces of gold, the processions, the supper or dinner to 1000 guests. He is as full and minute as a herald, manifestly triumphing in the ceremonial as equalling the magnificence, as well as imitating to the smallest point, that of Rome."

In 1444, on the 26th of August, the battle of St. Jacob was fought beneath the walls of Basel; and 1400 Swiss, who had hastened to protect the city from the Armagnacs, were slain after a desperate defence of ten hours against 30,000 enemies.

In 1460 Pope Pius II. granted Basel a bull for the foundation of an university, which was solemnly opened in the same year, and rapidly rose into high repute. In 1501 the thriving, busy, opulent, learned city, was received as a member into the Swiss confederacy. No sooner was the treaty of alliance signed than the good burghers of Basel immediately threw open their gates. Hitherto, the dangers to which they had been incessantly exposed from the neighbouring nobility, had not only compelled the citizens to guard them day and night, but also to keep them constantly closed. From this date, instead of an armed guard, they stationed there a single woman with a distaff to levy the toll.

In the early part of the sixteenth century Basel reached the climax of its prosperity, and its fame as a centre of learning spread over all Europe. It was the rendezvous of men of science and letters, the gathering place of a host of scholars, empirics, professors, physicians, philosophers. and fools. Not one of the least famous was that singular character, half-impostor, half-philosopher, Aureolus Philippus Theophrastus Paracelsus. He was not a native of Basel, he had not studied at its university, but on his arrival there was warmly welcomed. For the learned of that age formed a compact, freemason-like guild, whose sympathies were not with the world, and whom the world hated as well as feared. At first, therefore, the much-travelled philosopher, who shook off the dust of Italy and Denmark, Hungary and Muscovy, at the gates of Basel; who had visited the rose gardens of Persia, fallen a prisoner to the Tartars, and been despatched by their Cham on a mission to Constantinople, was well received by the Illuminati of Basel. But Paracelsus was a man of original intellect and aggressive character. Almost immediately on his arrival he provoked the jealousy of his brothers in science by a bold stroke of medical practice. The celebrated printer of Basel, Jacob Froben, had long suffered from an intense pain in the right foot, which not all the doctors of Basel could relieve, and which permitted its victim neither to eat nor sleep. He summoned to his aid this new physician as a last desperate chance; for as Paracelsus boasted that he had turned over the leaves of Europe, Asia, and Africa, it might reasonably be supposed that he had gathered some useful hints out of so vast a volume.

Paracelsus obeyed the summons, prescribed fomentations, and administered a specific which he had brought back from the East in the shape of three black pills (*tres pilulas nigras*); the said specific being opium, previously unknown in Europe. The printer quickly tasted that luxury of repose which had so long been denied to him. Sleep restored strength and energy to worn-out nature. He speedily recovered, and everywhere sounded the praises of his able physician, who was soon afterwards unanimously elected to the chair of medicine at the Basel University (A.D. 1526).

As a professor, Paracelsus attained the very summit of popularity, and from all parts of Christendom students flocked to attend his lectures. They were characterized by much originality, no little talent, an unconscionable amount of self-praise, and an uncompromising denunciation of all other teachers but himself. "There is more knowledge," he would say, "in my shoe-strings than in

the writings of all the physicians who have preceded me! I am the great reformer of medical science. You must all adopt my new and original system—you, Avicenna, Galen, Rhazes, Montagnana, Miseri; you must and shall follow me, gentlemen of Paris, of Montpelier, of Vienna, and Köln! All you who dwell on the banks of the Rhine or the Danube, who inhabit the islands of the seas—you, too, Italians, Turks, Sarmatians, Greeks, Arabs, Jews—you shall follow me! If you do not freely enlist under my banner, it is because you are but as the stones which the very dogs defile! Rally, then, to me as your leader; for the kingdom shall be mine, and sooner or later you must swallow the bitter draught of obedience!"

Then the splendid charlatan brought forward a vase of fire, upon which he flung handfuls of nitre and sulphur. And as the lurid flames shot upwards, he flung into them the ponderous tomes of Galen and Avicenna, and while his audience gazed in astonishment at this novel act of incremation, he exclaimed:—"Thus, O ye doctors, shall ye burn in everlasting fire! Get thee behind me, Sathanas! Get ye behind me, Greek, Latin, Arab! ye have taught nothing but absurdities; the secret of nature is known only to myself!"

It is no wonder that the cordiality with which Paracelsus had been received by the learned of Basel, was soon replaced by jealousy, suspicion, and dislike. It may be that his ability and success, quite as much as his ostentatious vanity, worked his downfall; but it must be owned that his mode of life, intemperate and licentious, was calculated to disgust his friends and embolden his enemies. His pupil, Oporinus, says of him, that he never put off his clothes at night for the two years he was with him, but with his sword hanging by his side, would fling himself on his bed, filled with wine, towards the hour of dawn. And in the darkness of night he would start up suddenly, and deal blows all around him with his naked sword; now striking the floor, the bed, the doorposts, and striking so furiously that Oporinus often trembled lest he should be unwittingly decapitated.

Meanwhile he effected numerous cures, and, at length, one of so brilliant a description that it ought to have consummated his fortune. Unhappily, it cut short his career at Basel.

One of the canons residentiary lay, as was supposed, at the point of death. In his extremity he had recourse to Paracelsus, promising him a splendid recompense if his treatment should be successful. Paracelsus, like Cæsar, *venit, vidit, vicit.* He administered his favourite specific, and the canon recovered. But with a shameful ingratitude he then refused to fulfil his contract, asserting that his illness could not have been serious if it could be so easily cured. Paracelsus summoned him before the magistrates, but they decided that the patient could only be required to pay the usual fee. In a tempest of rage the discomfited philosopher poured out his indignation on the heads of the purveyors of the law, and the next morning secretly quitted Basel to avoid being thrown into prison.

A man of greater eminence, the celebrated Erasmus, whose work in promoting the Reformation was scarcely inferior to that of Luther himself, lodged with the printer Froben, in the house "Zum Luft," from 1521 to 1529, and again in 1536, in which year he expired at Basel. It was here he undertook and carried out his "enormous labour" of editing and translating selections from the writings of the Fathers. While the art of printing was young, the New Testament was little known by the body of the people; all that they knew of the Gospels and the Epistles were the passages more immediately connected with the services of the church. Erasmus published the text, and with it a series of paraphrases containing bold innovations on the system of doctrine which had previously been maintained, and thus subjected himself to the censures of the ecclesiastical authorities. Erasmus, however, had little of the spirit of the martyr. He courted fame; but he held not his opinions with such earnestness as to prompt him to expose himself to suffering for their sake, and, indeed, was not fully trusted by either Catholics or Lutherans.

It should be noted that this was the earliest published New Testament, and the printing press of Basel had the honour of giving it to the world.

Here, too, appeared, in 1524, his "Colloquies," a book of keen and lively satire, in which he ridiculed many of the tenets and observances of the Romish Church. Here he made his attack on Luther, in his treatise "De Libero Arbitrio" (on Free Will), which led to a controversy between them; indeed, he went so far as to write to the elector of Saxony, urging him to punish Luther for his opinions. In 1529 he left Basel and retired to Freiberg in the Brisgau; but

the quiet and learned city on the Rhine, with its literary circle and university and printing-office, had an overmastering attraction for him, and he returned to it in August, 1535.

His edition of "Ecclesiastes" was printed at Basel, and here he commenced his edition of Origen. Confined to his house by an attack of gout, he employed his leisure in writing a commentary on the 15th Psalm, "De Puritate Tabernaculi." It was the last effort of his clear and vigorous intellect. An attack of dysentery brought him to the verge of the grave, and he prepared to meet his end with firmness. Without absolution or extreme unction, or any sacerdotal ceremonies, but with the words "Lieber Gott" on his lips, he died, on the 12th of July, 1636, at the age of seventy. He was buried with great pomp in the cathedral, where his tomb is as a sacred shrine to every lover of learning.

A contemporary of Erasmus, and a man whose fame is inseparably associated with Basel, Hans Holbein the younger, deserves a longer notice than our limited space permits us to dedicate to his memory. Whether he was born at Basel is uncertain; most probably his birth-place was Augsburg; but he must have come to this city at a very early age, as his father was engaged in decorating its town-house in 1499, and the year of Hans' birth is invariably stated to have been 1498. His great artistic capacity showed itself in his youth, and at fourteen he painted two admirable portraits of his father and himself. About 1523 he became acquainted with Erasmus, whose portrait he painted, and for whose works he executed many splendid wood-engravings. The scholar recommended him to visit England, and thither the artist repaired in 1526, with a letter of introduction to Sir Thomas More, who welcomed him with the most delicate and generous kindness. The chancellor having embellished his apartments with Holbein's pictures, became anxious to introduce him to Henry VIII. in the manner best adapted to secure the royal favour and protection. Accordingly, he arranged his pictures in the most advantageous order in the great hall, and invited the king to an entertainment. When the latter entered, he was delighted with the excellence of the artist's works, and so warmly expressed his admiration that Sir Thomas begged him to accept of the one he most affected. But the king inquired anxiously after the artist, and when the latter was introduced, received him graciously, observing, "that now he had got the painter, Sir Thomas might keep his pictures." Holbein died in England in 1554, of the plague.

Some of the houses were formerly adorned with his frescoes, but these were unhappily destroyed when the edifices were rebuilt. A well-known anecdote is related in connection with a painting which formerly "glorified" the house of an apothecary in the Fishmarket. When Holbein was employed upon this task it was summer time, and the days were so hot that he found himself compelled to resort very frequently to the "Flower" inn. A merry company of roysterers was wont to assemble there, and a shady room with a bottle of sparkling wine, to say nothing of lively jest and joyous song, proved so much more attractive than a hot scaffolding, that Master Hans spent almost the whole day at the hostelry. His employer remonstrated with him for his idleness:—"I do not pay you to drink," he said, "but to paint my house. You must leave off revelling and drinking, or I will have none of you." The artist promised amendment, and thenceforth, whenever the owner of the house took up his watch, he found Hans Holbein at work. But alas, on one occasion after convincing himself of the painter's diligence, he chanced to cross over to the tavern. What was his surprise to find him seated at the table with his glass and his long pipe! Hastily returning home and ascending the scaffold, he found that what he had supposed to be Holbein was only *a pair of legs* which he had painted with the most wonderful exactness to imitate the real limbs.

It is said that Holbein's wife was a shrew, and that he went to England, not so much to please his friend Erasmus, as to escape her vixenish tongue. But as Mrs. Jameson remarks, those who look upon the portraits of Holbein and his wife at Hampton Court, will reasonably doubt whether the former black-whiskered, bull-necked, resolute, almost fierce-looking personage could have had much to endure, or would have permitted much, from the poor broken-spirited and meek-visaged woman opposite to him, and will give the story a different interpretation.

Among the mediæval celebrities of the old city we may mention John Wessel; Sebastian Brunel; the scholar and reformer Reuchlin, who taught Latin and Greek at Basel from 1474 to 1478; and

Johannes Hussgen, or Œcolampadius, one of the supporters of the Reformation. The latter was born at Weinsburg in 1482. His father was a merchant in moderate circumstances, who destined him for his own vocation; but his mother, a woman of energy and talent, recognizing the abundant promise of her son's childhood, succeeded in obtaining for him the boon of a superior education. He learned Latin in the grammar-school of Heilbronn; studied law in the university of Bologna; but not liking the law, betook himself to Heidelburg in 1499, where he studied theology and the *literæ humaniores*, acquiring such a reputation for scholarship that the Elector Palatine Philip appointed him tutor to his son. His heart, however, was in his theological studies, and returning to Weinsburg, he entered zealously and perseveringly on the duties of a parish priest. His sermons on the "Seven Words of the Cross," published in 1512, are remarkable for their earnestness, and show that his energies were all enlisted in his Master's service.

To improve his knowledge of Greek he visited Tübingen and Stuttgard, availing himself of the lessons of Melanchthon at the one place, and of those of Reuchlin at the other, and imbibing from both a strong sympathy with the scheme of doctrine proclaimed by Luther. In 1519 we find him studying Hebrew at Heidelburg; and soon afterwards the bishop of Basel invited him to become a preacher in its cathedral. There he made the acquaintance of Erasmus—whom he assisted to prepare his edition of the "New Testament"—and of the other men of letters who, in the first half of the sixteenth century, shed so great a lustre upon the ancient Swiss city.

In 1519 he published some writings of a decided Lutheran tendency; but the doubts which possessed him were so strong, and the struggle between the traditions of his youth and the new sympathies which had risen in his mind became so violent, that he suddenly took refuge in a monastery near Augsburg in 1520. Carrying on his studies in tranquillity, his views gradually underwent such a change that he resolved to abandon the church with which he had hitherto been connected; and returning to Basel openly appeared as a teacher of the doctrines of the Reformation. Having been appointed by the municipality in 1523 to a lectureship in the university on biblical criticism, he chose the prophecies of Isaiah for his theme, and denounced the doctrines of Romanism with a degree of vehemence which had a stirring effect on the minds of the citizens. It is needless to trace any further his career; the work which he had set himself to do, he did uncompromisingly. In 1529 the Reformation was formally adopted in Basel, and two years later he closed in peace a life of unceasing labour.

Basel, however, was slow in the adoption of new ideas and new practices; and, as Mr Mayhew remarks, it stoutly resisted, throughout the Middle Ages, every attempted innovation in the manners and customs of its citizens. It was called in these days "the reverend city of Basel," and its councillors were honoured with the title of "the noble, dread, pious, resolute, prudent, wise, and honourable lords." Whether they always deserved these epithets may reasonably be doubted; assuredly they could not often be applied to the members of municipalities nearer home! They were so "resolute" in the maintenance of their dignities, that in 1501 the council issued a decree, declaring, that if it so happened that, either through scorn or through envy, any person should curtail their civic title in any manner whatsoever, and neglect to address them as their ancestors had been always addressed, every letter and message would be incontinently dismissed without receiving the slightest notice.

Even as late as the end of the last century, it was the custom in the city of Basel for the clocks to be set one hour in advance of all others in Europe. Tradition explains this practice by ascribing the deliverance of the town from a conspiracy to surrender it to the enemy at midnight, to the circumstance that the minster clock struck one instead of twelve. We do not ask the reader to accept this tradition as authentic; but to the practice, at all events, the citizens clung so pertinaciously, that when in 1778 the "noble, dread, pious, resolute, prudent, wise, and honourable lords" of the corporation issued an edict to the effect that all the clocks of Basel should, after the 1st day of January next ensuing, be regulated by solar time, the alteration was so unfavourably received, that the town council was compelled, a fortnight afterwards, to issue a second decree repealing the first. And the clocks of Basel were kept one hour before the sun until the present century began.

After the Reformation, a singular rigidity of spirit took possession of the town, which became as violently fanatical as the straitest of Scotch sects

during the most flourishing times of Calvinistic supremacy. The burgomasters regulated the dress and viands of their fellow-citizens by the severest sumptuary edicts, and enforced upon all a sober economy in table and wardrobe. They would not allow women to have their hair dressed by males, nor a dinner-party to take place whose bill of fare had not been revised by the civic authorities. All persons going to church were compelled to wear black; and no carriage was allowed to pass through the gates during Sunday morning service—a rule still enforced, or at all events enforced down to a very recent period.

This rigid devotion is too frequently unaccompanied by a spirit of Christian charity; and Mr. Mayhew points out that for years a violent feud prevailed between the two quarters of the town—Basel east and Basel west, Klein Basel and Grosse Basel. A curious memorial of this antipathy existed in the image called *Lallen König*, or the "Stuttering King." A tower on the left bank of the Rhine was so situated as to command the bridge which connects the two towns. Here, near the summit, was placed a clock, with a giant's head skilfully carved in wood projecting from the wall above. A long tongue was thrust from the open mouth of this monstrous figure at every beat of the pendulum, and made to roll about derisively in the face of the people of the *Klein Stadt* on the opposite bank. To avenge this insult, the people of Klein Basel also set up a wooden image at *their* end of the bridge: a huge carved dummy, which turned its back on the Lallen König in a manner more significant than graceful. This singular specimen of local humour was not removed until 1830.

The later history of Basel does not present many features of interest. Yet in 1795 the Lutheran city was associated with an event which the tragic drama that has recently passed before our eyes renders peculiarly significant. The coalition which had been formed against revolutionary France had been shaken to its foundation by the vast successes of her arms; and Prussia, deserting her allies, opened conferences at Basel with the representatives of the French government, and in January, 1795, concluded a peace. It was a fatal step on the part of Prussia, and opened the way to those changes in Europe which brought humiliation and disaster on her head. By signing the treaty of Basel, says Prince Hendenberg, the Prussian king abandoned the house of Orange, sacrificed Holland, and laid open the empire to French invasion. Accident alone prevented the treaty of Basel from being followed by a general revolution in Europe. Had Frederick William possessed the genius and resolution of Frederick the Great, he would have protected Holland against the arms of France, and included it in the line of military defence of Prussia. By the treaty of Basel he entered upon a policy of neutrality, which alienated from Prussia every European power, so that when she was compelled to descend into the arena to fight for her national existence she fought alone, and was prostrated on the field of Jena. Eighty years have passed away, and Jena is at length avenged. In 1795 Prussia concluded with a French Republic a peace which involved her in dishonour and disgrace; in 1871 she may again be called upon to sign a treaty with another French Republic, but on this occasion, under very different conditions, and with very different aims. The next treaty at Paris, under whatever form of government, will rest on other principles than those of the treaty of Basel in 1795.

In 1830 the democratic spirit of the second French Revolution made itself felt in Basel, and fierce and even sanguinary struggles took place between the peasantry who adhered to the old constitution, and the townsmen, who sought to establish a socialistic and communistic republic. The townsmen having been defeated near the village of Prattelen, on the 3rd of August, 1833, Basel was occupied by Federal troops for eleven weeks, and until the peace of the town was fully insured. The result was the division of the canton of Basel into two independent cantons, Basel-town and Basel-country; the former retaining only three communes, or rural districts, on the right bank of the Rhine. Each canton has its separate constitution.

In addition to the literary worthies already mentioned, Basel can boast of an ecclesiastical historian of great merit, Karl Rudolf Hagenbach, born in 1801, and of two illustrious mathematicians, Leonard Euler and John Bernoulli. It is worth noting that the latter came of a family which produced, in all, eight distinguished mathematicians. The first of the series was James Bernoulli, 1654–1705, professor of mathematics in the university of Basel. His brother was the celebrated John Bernoulli, born at Basel in 1667; he was the friend and correspondent of Leibnitz: died in 1748. Nicholas, the nephew of the two brothers,

was born at Basel in 1687, and died in 1759. Another Nicholas, the eldest son of John, born in 1695, was not only an eminent mathematician, but an able jurist and an expert linguist; he died in 1726. Daniel, the second son of John, and the most distinguished of the family, was born at Groningen, but he was educated at Basel, did the best of his work at Basel, and died at Basel in 1782.

John, the third and youngest son of John Bernoulli, succeeded his father as professor of mathematics at Basel, and held that position until his death, in his eighty-first year, in July, 1790. He was a foreign associate of the French Academy of Sciences; and it should be noted, that from the election of his father and uncle to that body in 1699, to his own death in 1790, the name of Bernoulli continued in the list of members for one and ninety years.

John, elder son of the foregoing, born in 1744, worthily maintained the reputation of this remarkable family. He obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy at the age of thirteen; and at nineteen was appointed astronomer-royal at Berlin. He died in 1807.

We close this extraordinary list, which affords so strong a proof of Mr. Galton's theory of hereditary genius, with James Bernoulli, brother of the preceding, who was born at Basel in 1759, and died at the premature age of thirty, in 1789.

Thus much have we thought it necessary to say of the historical associations and literary glories of Basel. Now,

> "Let us satisfy our eyes
> With the memorials and things of fame
> That do renown this city."

Foremost amongst these stands the Cathedral or Münster, the former cathedral-church of the bishopric of Basel. It is built of red sandstone, with two towers, one 200, the other 205 feet high; and though not magnificent in aspect, nor chaste in style, is eminently picturesque, and pleases, if it does not promptly attract, the spectator's eye. It was begun in 1010 by the Emperor Henry; consecrated in 1019; greatly injured by fire in 1185; almost destroyed by an earthquake in 1356; rebuilt immediately, and completed to the very top of the towers in 1500. Its architecture is a mixture of the Romanesque and Pointed styles, the latter prevailing. The interior was restored in 1859, and restored with much care; though the zealous archæologist will, perhaps, regret that the chisel was so freely used. Externally, the most striking features are the porch of St. Gallus, in the north transept (thirteenth century), with its curious, very curious, statues of Christ, John the Baptist, the Evangelists, and the Ten Virgins; and the western part, with its tower and carving, and its figures of the Virgin and Holy child; the emperor Henry I. (or Conrad II.?); the empress (Helena or Cunigunda?), and their two daughters; and the equestrian statues of St. Martin and St. George.

Within, the objects of interest are not very numerous, but the artist may find some entertainment in studying the fantastic masks which terminate the corbels. The stone pulpit, dating from the fifteenth century, is also worth examination; the font (1465) is curious; and he must not omit to notice the four columns of the choir, which are formed of groups of detached pillars. Observe, too, the tomb of the Empress Anne (1281), wife of Rudolph of Hapsburg, from whom the imperial house of Austria sprang; and that of Erasmus (dated 1536), in red marble. The stone carvings inserted in the wall are peculiarly mediæval in character.

The windows are filled with modern stained glass, which lacks depth and delicacy of colour.

A staircase leading out of the choir conducts us to the chapter-house, or Concilium's Saal, a small low Gothic chamber, with four windows, which remains in the same condition as when the Council of Basel held some of its seances here, between 1436 and 1444. Two clepsydræ, or water-clocks, which the princes and prelates will often have gazed upon during the tedious harangue of some merciless orator, are still suspended to the wall; and the room also contains several plaster casts, more or less interesting, the famous Lallen König (removed here in 1837), some pieces of mediæval furniture reported to have belonged to Erasmus, a few quaint old chests, and the six remaining fresco fragments of the original "Dance of Death" (Danse Macabre), which once enriched the walls of the Dominican church, and a set of coloured drawings of the whole series of figures.

From the researches made by certain archæologists it seems evident that the custom of painting on the walls of the cloisters and churches a succession of images illustrative of Death wheeling away in a mad wild dance persons of all "sorts and conditions," existed before the fourteenth century. Some authorities are of opinion that the idea of

these paintings was suggested by the puppet-shows; others, by the terrible depopulation of Europe through the frequent visitations of the plague. Fabricius asserts that they received the name of the "Danse Macabre" from the poet Macaber, who was the first to treat this fantastic subject in some German verses, translated into Latin by Desrey de Troyes, in 1460. The Latin version is still frequently reprinted, with the blocks of the ancient woodcuts, under the title of "La grande Danse Macabre des Hommes et des Femmes." The "Dance of the Dead" at Basel was painted, it is said, by order of the council, to commemorate the mortality occasioned by a pestilence in 1439.

As the elder D'Israeli observes, the prevailing character of all these works is unquestionably grotesque and ludicrous; not, indeed, that genius, however barbarous, could refrain in so large a picture of human life from inventing scenes often characterized by great delicacy of feeling and depth of pathos. Such, says D'Israeli, is the newly-married couple, whom Death is leading, beating a drum, and in the rapture of the hour the bride seems with a melancholy look not insensible of his presence; a Death is seen issuing from the cottage of the widow with her youngest child, who waves his hand sorrowfully, while the mother and the sister vainly answer; or the old man, to whom Death is playing on a psaltery, seems anxious that his withered fingers should once more touch the strings, while he is carried off in calm tranquillity.

The majority of the subjects, however, are purely ludicrous, and could only awaken risible emotions in the minds of their spectators. There is no question of teaching or impressing; they amuse, and nothing more. What was their object? To excite a contempt of death? We think not. Life was but little valued in the middle ages, for the conditions under which the millions lived were so harsh and rigid, that the grave must have appeared to them in the light of a place of blessed repose and felicity. We believe that these Dances of Death, like so many of the carved caricatures in church and cathedral, were a kind of protest on the part of the weak against the strong; the silent yet significant satire by which the oppressed avenged themselves on the oppressors. They seem to say, "You lord over us now; you are our masters and tyrants; but see you the Master and Tyrant in whose presence you will be as powerless as we are?" It is in the same spirit that the old French poet, Jacques Jacques of Ambrun, represents Death as proclaiming triumphantly the universality of his dominion:—

"Egalement je vay regneant,
Le counseiller et le sergeant,
Le gentilhomme et le berger,
Le bourgeois et le boulanger,
Et la maistresse et la servante,
Et la mère comme la tante;
Monsieur l'abbé, monsieur son moine,
Le petit clerc et le chanoine;
Sans choix je mets dans mon butin
Maistre Claude, maistre Martin,
Dame Luce, dame Perrette," &c., &c.

The cloisters, in whose sacred shades Erasmus probably may have often walked and meditated, were erected in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (1332, 1400, and 1487). They extend to the brow of the hill overlooking the river, and to those who are fond of "meditations among the tombs" offer a very agreeable retreat. The monuments of three of the Reformers deserve a passing notice: Œcolampadius, who died in 1531, Mayer, and Grynaeus, who also died in 1531.

Behind the cathedral extends the terrace called the Pfalz. It is seventy feet above the river, and planted with chestnut trees, which in the May month hang the entire walk with blossom. The view which it opens up is very picturesque and extensive, including the broad sweep of the Rhine, the roofs and towers of the city, and the green slopes of the hills of the Black Forest.

From the remains of ancient walls and other ruins discovered in 1786 and 1836, it has been conjectured that the Minster stands within the area of the old Roman fortress of Robur or Basilia. Here, in an open space, is erected a monument to the reformer Œcolampadius. In one corner of the square stands a building called "Zur Mücke," of which nothing more need be said than that it was the meeting place of the conclave which, in 1436, converted Duke Amadeus into Pope Felix V.

Before proceeding further, we may as well glance at the other churches of Basel, none of which are characterized by any remarkable architectural beauty. In that of St. Martin, Œcolampadius preached the doctrines of the Reformation, addressing his hearers in their native German. In St. Peter's, restored in 1851, are the tombs of many of the Basel worthies, Zeillenden, Offenburg, Seevogel, Fröben, and Bernoulli. St. Elizabeth's is a new and spacious edifice, erected within the last twenty years at the cost of an opulent citizen.

Passing into the streets, which are remarkable

for their tall, narrow, and vari-coloured houses, we direct our steps towards the *Spahlen Thor* (unless, indeed, the spirit of iconoclasm abroad in Basel shall have accomplished its destruction), a narrow square tower, with two turrets and a pointed roof. The exterior of the gateway is adorned with a good statue of the Holy Virgin, to which the Catholic peasantry of the neighbourhood ascribe a peculiar sanctity, and certain traditional wonder-working powers. When the reformers attempted to destroy it, she struck her assailants dead with her sceptre of stone.

Under the scalloped cornice of the barbican, which covers the entrance to the town, a row of quaint little figures demands and deserves examination. What a queer fancy must have been his who sculptured them! The Fischmarkt Brunnen, or "Fishmarket Fountain," which has been recently restored, is a graceful little structure, dating from the early part of the fifteenth century. We find a description of it done to our hand; it consists, says a recent writer, of a kind of telescopic prism-shaft, ornamented with fretted Gothic canopies for the statues which enrich its sides. The sculpture is excellent; the pinnacles canopying the figures are of the most delicate open tracery-work, and the little notched spire at the top of the column is crested with a miniature golden angel, so that the details are exquisitely varied, and the effect of the whole is as light and graceful as the lines formed by the glancing and shining water.

As we are not writing a guide-book, but simply endeavouring to seize the salient features of each place that interests us, we shall pass over unnoticed the new hospital, the new fountain, near the said hospital, the summer casino, customs-house and post-office, the missionary institute, and the botanical garden. With all these cannot the reader become acquainted in the pages of Baedeker, Murray, and Joanne?

But let us not be forgetful of the Spahlen Brunnen. Its sculptured figures are most felicitous. They were designed, it is said, by Albert Dürer, and represent the *Dudelsack-pfeiffer*, or bagpiper, playing to a group of dancing peasants.

In the house "Zum Seidenhof" lodged strong-handed Rudolph of Hapsburg when he first visited Basel as emperor; his statue is shown there. That of "Zum Luft" was the dwelling-place of Erasmus, and the printing-office of Fröben; let every lover of letters reverently doff his cap as he passes by it. In the Burkhard'sche (formerly Ochsische), the treaty of peace was signed in 1795 between Prussia and France. And in the house This'sche, near St. John's Gate, the duchess of Angoulême was exchanged, in 1795, for certain members of the National Convention. The "Hotel of the Three Kings" has been so called, it is said, since the year 1026, when the Emperor Conrad II., his son and chosen successor Henry III., and Rudolph of Burgundy, met under its ancient roof.

In the Arsenal is a small but not particularly valuable collection of arms and armour. The only thing of interest is the coat of mail worn by Charles the Bold at the battle of Burgundy.

We have dwelt at some length on the history and historical buildings of Basel, but we have yet to notice, before resuming our voyage, the New Museum, the Rathhaus, and the University.

The Museum, which contains all the art-treasures and science-treasures formerly scattered over various collections, is situated in the street of the Augustines. It contains at least seven different departments. As lovers of art we shall first visit the Museum, properly so called; that is, the Kunstammberg, which is under the direction of Herr Wackernagel.

The frescoes in the Entrance Hall are by Cornelius, designed for the church of St. Louis, at Merneil.

In the Vestibule are the paintings of Holbein, to which we have already alluded.

We next enter the Salle des Dessins, where, besides etchings and engravings by Brant and Jacques Callot, we may see some eighty-six pen and ink sketches by the immortal Holbein; the Death of the Virgin Mary, by Hans Grün, from sketches by Albert Dürer; and the Last Judgment, by Cornelius.

We count no fewer than thirty-six pictures in the Salle de Holbein, from the pencil of that indefatigable artist. Here are the Schoolmaster, portraits of Ammerbach and Erasmus, the Dead Christ (painted with ghastly fidelity), the Burgomaster Meyer, a Lais and a Venus, the printer Fröben, and the eight tableaux of our Lord's Passion, for which the Elector Maximilian had the magnificent good taste to offer 30,000 florins.

We have little admiration left for anything after dwelling so long on the masterpieces of a great and conscientious artist, but the Salle Allemande is not without attractions. The Eleven Thou-

sand Virgins of Lucas Cranach exhibits a certain amount of rough but genuine power; and there is much to study in Albert Dürer's Adoration of the Magi. Observe, too, Peter Breughel's St. John preaching in the Wilderness (how gaunt and laidly frowns the great Precursor!), and the fragments of the Dance of the Dead, removed from the Dominican convent, and restored by Klander.

We pass quickly through the Salle Suisse and Salle Baloise. In the Quatrième Salle are two specimens of Jean de Mabuse; one of Teniers' cabaret-interiors, coarse but vigorous; a Quintin Matsys, and an Annibale Caracci.

In the Cinquième Salle the pictures best worth notice are Nicolas Poussin's Landscapes; a Birth of Christ, by Annibale Caracci; an Adoration of the Magi, by Jean de Mabuse, which may be profitably compared with Albert Dürer's presentation of the same subject in the Salle Allemande; a Landscape, by Ruysdael; a jovial group of Smokers, by David Teniers; and two landscapes, with figures, by E. van Heimskerk.

The library is under the superintendence of Professor Gerlach; it contains 80,000 volumes and 4000 MSS. Among the latter the enthusiast will know how to estimate an unique manuscript of Velleius Paterculus; the Acts of the Council of Basel in three great volumes, with chains attached to their covers, so as to secure them from felonious hands; the original Greek Testament of Erasmus; and a copy of his "Encomium Moriæ," with marginal notes in his own writing, and charming pen and ink vignettes by Holbein.

To the attention of the archæologist we may commend the collection of Roman antiquities discovered at Augst, and the collection, scarcely less interesting, of Mexican and Egyptian antiquities.

The Cabinet of Medals contains about 12,000. The Museum of Natural History is abundantly rich in minerals, fossils, and in birds from the Guinea coast. There are also a cabinet of Natural and Physical History, and a gallery of portraits of the most celebrated professors of the university.

The university was founded on the 4th of April, 1460, by a bull of Pope Pius II. (the ingenious and astute Æneas Sylvius, who as secretary to the great council had worked out his manœuvres for his advancement with singular skill), and has always enjoyed a high and deserved reputation. It was re-organized in 1817, and again in 1835. Among its most eminent professors we may name Erasmus, Œcolampadius, Grynaeus, Ammerbach, Frobenius, Paracelsus, Plater, the two Bauhins, Daniel and John Bernoulli, and Euler.

The Rathhaus stands at the bottom of the Freie Strasse (the principal street), opposite the pinnacles of the Fischmarkt-brunnen. It was erected in 1508, and offers a pleasing example of the Burgundian or French Gothic. It was restored in 1825–27. The walls, of which the upper part is castellated, the lower part arched, are decorated with frescoes; and along the top runs a frieze, embellished with the arms of Basel, and of the cantons of Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden. The frescoes of the façade are descriptive of a hawking party, with groups of armed knights, and a characteristic figure of Justice carrying her sword. It is traditionally reported that they were designed by Holbein, and, at all events, their merit is such that their gradual decay cannot but be deplored. In the interior the artist cannot fail to admire some good old wood carvings, some painted glass, a picture of the Last Judgment, and a statue of Munatius Plancus, the traditional founder of Basel, and of the "colony" of Augusta Rauracorum.

The character of a city may be said to depend, in some measure, on the character of its immediate neighbourhood. For this reason we shall glance at some points in the environs of the towns we successively describe.

The village of St. Jacob by the Birs is situated about a quarter of a mile from Basel, on the Berne road. Here a Gothic column, thirty-six feet high, marks the last resting-place of the dead who fell in the great battle of St. Jacob, on the 26th of August, 1444, when a small Swiss force, not exceeding 1300 in number, heroically attacked the French army under the dauphin (afterwards Louis XI.), though the latter were 20,000 strong.

Again and again, says Zschokke, the Swiss threw themselves upon the countless battalions of their enemies. Their little force was broken and divided, yet still they fought: 500 maintained the unequal struggle in the open field; the remainder behind the garden wall of the Siechenhaus at St. Jacob. Fierce as lions they fought in the meadow, until man after man fell dead on the heaps of slaughtered foemen. The dauphin won the victory by sheer preponderance of numbers, but it taught him a lesson. "I will provoke this obstinate people no further," said he, and full of

admiration for such heroic courage, he met their representatives at Ensisheim, and concluded peace.

The young men enrolled in the various "Singing Unions" and "Federal Rifle Clubs" in this district, commemorate their Swiss Thermopylæ yearly with vocal and rifle festivals. And the vineyard of Wahlstadt, not far from the battlefield, yields a red wine, which the people delight to call Schweizerblut, or "Swiss blood."

A marble tablet in the church of St. Jacob (a plain and unpretending edifice) bears an inscription to the following effect:—

OUR SOULS TO GOD,
OUR BODIES TO THE ENEMY.

HERE DIED, UNCONQUERED,
BUT EXHAUSTED WITH VICTORY,
THIRTEEN HUNDRED CONFEDERATES AND ALLIES,
IN CONFLICT WITH FRENCH AND AUSTRIANS,
26TH AUGUST, 1444.

We now take our leave of Basel. A few paces and we enter upon the French province of Alsace, which has figured so conspicuously in the present war, and which, at the time we write, seems fated to become a portion of the spoil of the conquerors.

ALSACE, or ALSATIA (in German, Ellsass), is supposed to derive its name from the *Ell* or *Ill* (Alsa), which waters two-thirds of the country, and constitutes its principal artery, and the German *Sass*, or "settlers." It formerly belonged to Germany, but by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and as a result of the victories of Turenne, was annexed to France, of which it forms the easternmost province. To the west lies Lorraine, separated from Alsace by the mountain-range of the Vosges, through whose defiles the Prussian Crown Prince so successfully carried his numerous battalions at the outset of the war of 1870. Its southern boundary, dividing it from Switzerland, is the chain of the Jura; to the south-west it borders on Upper Burgundy; to the east the Rhine separates it from Baden; and to the north the Lauter from Rhenish Bavaria.

Its surface being broken up by lofty mountains and deep valleys, and watered by numerous rivers, it is necessarily rich in bright and romantic landscapes. The slopes of the Vosges are covered with the ruined strongholds of the feudal barons; and an old saying is still popular, that in Alsace three castles are to be found on every mountain, three churches in every churchyard, and three towns in every valley.

The rivers of Alsace are many and charming, and the glens or hollows through which they trail their dark waters, present a succession of pictures bold in outline and rich in colour. The Ill is the largest and longest; it traverses a great part of the province, which is further intersected by the Monsieur or Napoleon Canal, connecting the Rhine with the Rhone, and, consequently, the North Sea with the Mediterranean. From the "bosom infinite" of the Vosges descends many a rippling river and tumbling torrent. In the department of the Upper Rhine, the Leber, which flows into the Ill near Schlettstadt; the Weiss, issuing from the Black and White Lake, and emptying its tribute into the Fecht; the Fecht, winding through the Münster valley, and after a course of thirty miles, falling into the Ill; the Thur, which brightens and enriches the vale of St. Amarin; the Doller, or Tolder, rising in a lake above the village of Dobern, and flowing into the Ill below Mühlhausen. In the department of the Lower Rhine, the Lauter, a Bavarian affluent, falls into the Rhine at Neuburg; the Moder, the Zorn, the Morsig, the Zunts, the Scher, the Andlau, the Ischer, and the Mayet are comparatively unimportant streams.

Alsace contains the important cities of Strasburg, Colmar, and Mühlhausen. In Cæsar's time it was occupied by Celtic tribes; who, towards the decline of the Roman empire, were conquered by the Alemanni, and completely Germanized. For ceuturies it formed a part of the German empire. At the peace of Westphalia, some portions of it were ceded to Vienna, and the remainder was annexed by Louis XIV., whose seizure of Strasburg, in 1681, during a time of peace, was one of the most iniquitous acts of a reign in which the only recognized law was the law of might. By the peace of Ryswick in 1697, the cession of the whole to France was unwisely confirmed, and Germany had the misfortune to see one of its finest provinces yielded to an aggressive and powerful neighbour, at a time when her arms were crowned with victory. At the downfall of the first Napoleonic empire, in 1815, an opportunity arose for the restoration of Alsace to Germany; but the Treaty of Vienna did nothing to redress an undoubted wrong in all its over-ingenious attempts to establish the European balance of power. Mr. Matthew Arnold has keenly remarked that the great object of the statesmen who concluded that famous treaty

was to erect barriers against France. How did they proceed to carry out this object? "Instead of creating a strong Germany, they created the impotent German Confederation; placing on the frontiers of France the insignificant Duchy of Baden and an outlying province of Bavaria, and dividing the action of Germany so that her two chief powers, Prussia and Austria, must necessarily be inferior to France. They created the incoherent kingdom of Holland and the insufficient kingdom of Sardinia; they strengthened Austria against France, by adding to Austria provinces which have ever since been a source of weakness to her. They left to France Alsace and German Lorraine, which unity of race and language might with time have solidly re-attached to Germany. In compensation they took from France provinces which the same unity may one day enable her to re-absorb. The treaties of Vienna were eminently treaties of force, treaties which took no account of popular ideas; and they were unintelligent and capricious treaties of force."

Of late years, however, we have grown accustomed to see these treaties openly disregarded; and in spite of them Italy has become an united kingdom, and the isolated states of the Germanic Confederation have been welded "by blood and iron" into a compact and homogeneous empire. If at the close of the present war, victorious Germany puts forward a demand for the restoration of Alsace, it is difficult, say the pro-Prussian party, to see on what grounds the demand can be opposed by the neutral powers. Alsace, they tell us, is a German province, wrested from Germany by force and fraud; and the very principle of nationality to which so much prominence has been given since the war of 1856, would justify its annexation to the empire founded by Bismarck and Von Moltke. The German language is still spoken by many of its inhabitants, notwithstanding the efforts of the French to extirpate it, and in the smaller towns and villages German customs still prevail.

Alsace has given birth to some worthies who have attained an European reputation. Among these we may mention General Klèber, who distinguished himself in the French expedition to Egypt in 1798, and was left by Napoleon in command of the French army; Kellermann, and Rapp, two of Napoleon's favourite and most trusted lieutenants; Sebastian Brandt, of Strasburg, the author of the "Ship of Fools," well known in England through Barclay's vigorous but quaint translation of it; the poets Augustus and Adolphus Stöber, whose lyrics breathe a genuine German spirit; and the pious village pastor and enthusiastic philanthropist, Johannes Friedrich Oberlin (born at Strasburg in 1740, died in 1826). It is needless to say that in history it has played a conspicuous part, the thunder of battle having frequently resounded among its mountains, and the blood-red tide of war poured devastatingly over its fertile plains.

FROM BASEL TO STRASBURG.

On the Alsace bank of the Rhine.

A railway running parallel to the bank of the Rhine connects Basel with Strasburg. It was opened in 1841. The distance is 89 miles.

Soon after leaving Basel we perceive, on the right, the village of Grosse-Hüningen, so called to distinguish it from Klein-Hüningen, on the Baden bank of the river. In 1680, by command of Louis XIV., it was converted into a strong fortification by Vauban, the great military engineer; but the defences were razed in September, 1815, at the instance of the Swiss Confederation, and by the second treaty of Paris, France bound herself never to restore them.

We next arrive at the important and thriving town of Mühlhausen, situated on the Rhone and Rhine Canal, and famous for its extensive calico manufactories. The surrounding country is level but fertile, and its pastures are pleasantly refreshed by the windings of the Ill.

Mühlhausen, or, as the French call it, Mulhouse, owes its origin, as its name indicates, to a mill erected here on the bank of the Ill. We can easily imagine that in course of time other houses would spring up around the centre thus provided, until the hamlet grew into a village, and the village into a town. As early as the eighth century, this town was surrounded by walls. Having fallen into the hands of Rudolph of Hapsburg, it was elevated to the rank of an imperial free town in 1273. From succeeding emperors it received many privileges, and in 1293 Adolph of Nassau bestowed upon it a charter, in keeping, indeed, with the spirit of the times, though the superiority of its citizens over strangers or foreigners was pushed to the extent of waiving their responsibility for even the most criminal acts. Thus, no citizen could be summoned before a foreign magistrate.

No citizen was required to defend himself against the accusation of an alien, nor was he allowed to render assistance to a foreigner against a fellow-citizen. All goods of which a citizen could prove that they had been in his possession for a year, were thenceforth to be regarded as his own property. If a citizen killed a foreigner, and it could be proved that provocation had been offered him, he was not condemned even to pay a fine. And lastly, no citizen, of whatever crime accused, could be arrested in his own house; a privilege surpassing the Englishman's proud boast, that his house is his castle; for the Englishman's house has always been open to the ministers of the law.

It cannot be said that the existence of such extraordinary immunities was altogether favourable to the prosperity of the town. They certainly attracted to it a numerous population; but what a population! Mühlhausen became the "Alsatia" of the surrounding country; the asylum of robbers and thieves, who were admitted to the rights of citizenship on taking an oath that they had not *voluntarily* committed a crime. As might be expected, its population was not deficient in energy, and it always evinced a marked hostility towards the nobles. In 1338 it joined the league of Alsace against them. In 1437, after gallantly repulsing an attack of the Armagnacs, it drove the *seigneurs* from its walls. Thenceforth it flourished as a democratic republic, and with undaunted intrepidity maintained its liberties, even venturing, in 1474, to resist Charles the Bold, who had threatened it with annihilation.

In its endless feuds with the nobles it had frequently demanded and received the support of the Swiss, with whom it was allied. In 1515 it renewed its treaty of perpetual union, and undertook, as a guarantee of its fidelity to the confederation, that it would enter upon no war, nor accept any foreign succour, without their consent. From these close relations sprung the natural result of the adoption of the Lutheran doctrines by the people of Mühlhausen, and this adoption, towards the end of the sixteenth century, leading to the interference of the house of Austria, a Swiss garrison was stationed in the town to protect it from attack.

In 1648 the treaty of Westphalia handed over to France the Austrian possessions on the Rhine, and the towns in the government of Haguenau. Mühlhausen was at the same time declared independent, like the Swiss cantons, and having no longer to arm against external power, was free to cultivate the arts of peace. A century elapsed, however, before it came to the front in the ranks of material progress. In 1746 the first manufactory of printed calicoes was established here by three worthies, whose names are still held in honour at Mühlhausen, Samuel Kœchlin, J. J. Schmaltzer, and Johannes Heinrich Dollfus. Twenty-five years later, and eleven new factories had been planted on the ruins of the palaces of the old nobility.

The busy city now throve amazingly. But its wealth attracted the greedy eyes of France, and though for some years it gallantly defended its freedom, in 1798 it was compelled to vote for its own extinction as an independent city. Under the influence of French bayonets, it gave 666 votes against fifteen, in favour of its annexation to France. Whether the whirligig of fortune will once more wrest it from France, and with the rest of Alsace, hand it over to victorious Germany, it is at present too early to conjecture.

Mühlhausen is distinguished by its great industrial resources; it is also distinguished by its noble benevolent institutions. It presents almost the only example in Europe of a Workman's City, of an independent community of operatives. Nowhere else has trade unionism been developed under such favourable auspices, and with such satisfactory results. Between Mühlhausen and Dornach, says Jules Simon, extends an ample plain traversed by the canal which winds round the city. Here, in a singularly healthy situation, and on both banks of the canal, the *Société des Cités Ouvrières* has traced the plan of its new town. The ground is perfectly level; the streets, broad and spacious, are laid out at right angles. As each house stands in its own little garden-plot, the eye is everywhere greeted with trees and flowers, and the pure air circulates as freely as in the open country.

On the Place Napoleon, an open area in the very centre of this interesting town, and the point where the main thoroughfares terminate, are erected two houses of dimensions superior to the others; one of which is appropriated to the public baths and lavatory; the other to the restaurant, store-rooms, and library. On the opposite bank of the canal, in the square formed by the Rue Lavoisier and the Rue Napoleon, is located an asylum for the reception of 150 children; it is

excellently managed, clean, and comfortable. There is no private school, because the managers have rightly judged that it could not surpass, or even equal, the communal school, which is one of the most admirable institutions in Mühlhausen.

At the restaurant and bakery every article is sold at wholesale prices. The restaurant is conducted on a most admirable plan. The charges are moderate, and differ greatly from those of the ordinary establishments. The dishes, too, are of a better quality, and sufficiently varied.

The conditions on which the houses become the property of the workmen are thus plainly stated by M. Simon.

The society, he remarks, makes no mystery about them. It says—"You see my houses are wide open; enter, and inspect them from the garret to the cellar. The ground cost me one franc twenty centimes per mètre (about three yards three inches); including the architect's fees, purchase of materials, expense of erection, the houses cost 2400 to 3000 francs; I sell them to you at the same price. You are not in a position to pay me 3000 francs; but I, the society, can wait your convenience. You will deposit in my hands a sum of 300 or 400 francs to begin with; this will defray the legal and preliminary expenses. Afterwards, you will pay me eighteen francs (about 13*s.* 10*d.*) per month, for a house worth 2400 francs; or twenty-three francs (about 18*s.* 3*d.*) for a house worth 3000 francs. That is, you will pay about four or five francs more than you would for hired apartments. By continuing this payment for fourteen years you will have reimbursed the price of your house; it will be paid for, you will be its owner. Not only will you thenceforth live rent-free, but you will be able to leave it to your children or to sell it. By setting apart five francs monthly, which, if put in the savings bank, would not have realized 1400 francs, you will have acquired a house now worth 3000 francs, but which, in fourteen years, will probably be worth double that amount, and meanwhile, you will have been completely housed, without running any risk from a landlord's whims. You will have enjoyed the use of a garden, whose produce cannot be valued at less than thirty or forty francs per annum. We do not take into account the broad healthy streets, the tree-planted squares, the children's asylum—in a word, all the public and useful institutions which have been open to you, and which are not in any way included in your rent."

It must be admitted that such terms as these present no ordinary attraction for the intelligent operative, and we are not astonished to find that out of the 560 houses belonging to the Société des Cités Ouvrières in 1860, 403 had been sold. Something of the same kind has been accomplished in London, and some of the larger towns of England and Scotland, but not, as it seems to us, on so liberal a scale or so enlightened a plan; and we commend the example of Mühlhausen to our British philanthropists in their efforts to promote the well-being and advance the interests of the working-classes. Fourierism and Owenism appear the empty theories of credulous philosophers when compared with the practical work so nobly conceived, and so admirably carried out, at Mühlhausen.

This enlightened town boasts also of a Société Industrielle, which carefully examines into the merits or demerits of every project brought forward for the amelioration of the condition of the working-classes. Then there are—a Société d'Encouragement à l'Epargne (for the encouragement of economy), a Société Alimentaire, a Société de Saint Vincent de Paul, a Société des Amis des Pauvres, and a Société de Charité. In fact, Mühlhausen has become the arena where philanthropic designs are tested before the eyes of the public, and where those which possess intrinsic merit are immediately adopted, and energetically carried into execution.

Such a place will necessarily be provided with good schools. In addition to a college, a professional school, and an upper school, it possesses an admirable primary school, which the town supports by a yearly grant of 70,500 francs, and which has no equal in France, no superior on the Continent. The work of supervision and tuition is intrusted to a director, a sub-director, and forty-two masters, mistresses, and assistants, who take charge on an average of 3000 children of both sexes. The children of the operatives are admitted free. The educational course comprises French, German, English, Drawing, Geography, History, Arithmetic, and the Elements of Geometry.

France has a right to be proud of its radiant and intellectual Paris, of historic Tours, of regal Rheims, of sunny Bordeaux, and of many other towns and cities scattered over its fair and fertile land; but of none can it boast with greater justice than of industrious and philanthropic Mulhouse.

A few words will be sufficient to satisfy the reader's curiosity respecting its public edifices. Here, as in the preceding pages, we shall follow the guidance of Adolphe Joanne.

The new Catholic church, built in the ogival or pointed style of the thirteenth century, is a really graceful and yet majestic building, which we think would meet with the approval of the architectural purist, both in its general conception and principal details. It is above 270 feet in length by 110 in width at the transept, and seventy-five at the nave and aisles. Its height in the interior is seventy-five feet. The roof of the nave and transepts is of timber, and the general effect is very grand and impressive.

A new Protestant church, designed by the same architect, M. Schaere, has recently been erected. It measures 145 feet long, seventy-five feet wide, and sixty-five feet high.

M. Schaere is also the architect of the Jewish synagogue, which is built in the Oriental style, of red sandstone, and in the form of a parallelogram. The interior is divided into three aisles; in the central, which is of great width, sit the men; in the narrow lateral aisles, the women.

The town-hall is situated in the Place de la Réunion, in the oldest part of the town. It dates from 1551 to 1553. Its most original feature is its external double staircase. To the left of the entrance is a wall-painting, very striking and vigorous, of an old man in magisterial robes; on the right, a figure of a woman of the handsomest German type, crowned with roses, and bearing a crown of laurel in her hand. The great hall is adorned with three pictures representing the shields of the burgomasters or maires of Mulhouse. Above them is a row of the armorial bearings of the Swiss cantons. The glass windows are ancient and curious.

A lively and agreeable promenade is furnished by the long line of well-built quays which skirt the basin formed here by the Rhone and Rhine Canal. In most of the streets, however, the visitor will find much to amuse, and more to interest. The signs of rapid industrial progress are everywhere. To these, indeed, he may be accustomed in other towns; but in few towns will he find them accompanied by such abundant and satisfactory indications of moral advancement and artistic culture. Mühlhausen is French in aspect, German in character, English in spirit. In many respects it is a model of what a great manufacturing town ought to be.

The Industrial Museum is worth a visit. It is situated in the triangle of colonnaded mansions, which looks like a bit of Belgravia, erected in 1828.

Mühlhausen was entered by the Prussians in September, 1870.

The next station on our route is Dornach, a manufacturing town of about 4000 inhabitants. Here is the well-known establishment of Messrs. Dolfüs-Mieg and Company, whose printed calicoes are noted for their excellence.

At Dornach we cross the Ill, which formerly served as the boundary line between the Sundgau and Alsace, and the Rhone and Rhine Canal.

At Lutterbach the railway strikes further inland, and opens up some striking views of the rugged peaks and deep ravines of the Vosges. A branch line diverges from this point to Thann (the ancient *Pinetum*), another manufacturing town, with a population of about 5000, partly Catholics and partly Protestants, as is the case in most of the towns of Alsace. Its situation is eminently picturesque, for it lies at the mouth of the St. Amarin Valley, while huge summits dominate over the foreground, and far away spreads a seemingly endless stretch of fair and fruitful country. Its special pride is its minster, dedicated to St. Theobald; a structure in the finest style of the German architecture of the fifteenth century, and not unworthy of the genius of Master Erwin of Strasburg, who is reported to have furnished the design. The spire, however, was erected by the architect Rumiel Vatel. The whole work, begun in 1430, was completed in 1516. An old tradition runs that the latter was an excellent year for the vintage, and that the beauty of the spire is owing to the circumstance that the mortar was mixed with wine.

The western gateway is magnificent. It is enriched with statues in decorated niches, and with a variety of ornamentation, which is not less graceful in design than conscientious in execution.

From Thann, following the course of the Thur, we return to Ensisheim, situated at the confluence of the Thur and the Ill. The latter river, it should be observed, from Mühlhausen to a point below Strasburg, incloses, in conjunction with the Rhine, a long and narrow peninsular strip of land, which is low, level, fertile, and well-cultivated.

Ensisheim is a town of about 3000 inhabitants. Jacob Balde, a Latin poet, whose odes have been

translated by the German Herder, was born here in 1603. In its church is preserved a large aerolite, which fell in the neighbourhood on the 7th of November, 1492. It originally weighed 280 lbs., now only about 170 lbs.; portions having been gradually broken off by inquisitive curiosity-mongers.

Continuing our course at a distance of about ten miles from the Rhine, with the Vosges on our left hand, we reach, in succession, the town of Sultz, (3989), and Gebweiler (10,680), both inhabited by an industrial population. Near the latter, the Vosges culminate in the bold peak of the Belchen (4410 feet), or "balloon of Gebweiler."

We next arrive at Rouffach (the *Rubeacum* of the Romans), a busy and interesting town of a decidedly German aspect, with a population of 3917. Here was born Marshal Lefebvre, duke of Dantzig, one of Napoleon's safest and most skilful lieutenants, on the 25th of October, 1755. He was the son of a miller, who had formerly served in the army, and at the age of eighteen entered the Gardes Françaises, rising to the post of *premier sergent* in the year preceding the outbreak of the French revolution. In those stirring times every soldier carried a marshal's bâton in his knapsack. His rise was rapid. In 1793 he was a general of brigade. For some years he served under Hoche, was appointed general of division, distinguished himself at Lamberg and Giesberg, and more especially at Stockach, March 25, 1799, where he kept at bay a greatly superior Austrian force. Afterwards he offered his services to Napoleon, and when the latter established the first empire, Lefebvre was made a marshal. At Jena, in 1806, he earned the imperial praise by his splendid valour, and in the following year was appointed to the command of the army besieging Dantzig. The city capitulated, and Lefebvre was created a duke. In 1808 he served in Spain, in 1809 in Austria and the Tyrol. In the disastrous invasion of Russia he commanded the imperial guard, and during the terrible retreat from Moscow his intrepidity and wonderful powers of endurance were strikingly displayed. He fought with equal courage and skill in the brilliant but unsuccessful campaign of 1814. It proved the close of his military career. After the restoration his services were not required, but he accepted the Bourbon rule with honourable loyalty, and was permitted to retain his hard-won honours. He died in 1820. A bust of the marshal, by David of Angers, is the principal ornament of the town-hall of his native place.

Rouffach grew up round the old castle of Isenburg, one of the oldest in Alsace, where Dagobert II. frequently resided. At a later period it belonged to the bishops of Strasburg. It was seized by the Emperor Henry IV., whose men-at-arms, enjoying here an uncontrolled license, were guilty of the most abominable excesses. One day, the feast of the Passover, the governor of the castle carried off a young maiden of noble birth, while she was proceeding to church in her mother's company. The citizens heard with emotion the shrieks and exclamations of the distracted mother, but a craven dread of the imperial lances kept them silent. Their wives and daughters, however, more courageous, and more easily aroused to enthusiasm, hastened to the castle, broke through the gates, drove out the surprised garrison, and the emperor himself, who was at the time a resident within its walls. Terrified by the unexpected attack of the Alsatian heroines he fled, half-naked, to his harem at Colmar, leaving behind him his crown, his sceptre, and his imperial mantle, which his victorious assailants immediately offered up at the altar of the Virgin. In memory of this event, says Rouvrois, in his "Voyage Pittoresque en Alsace," the magistrates of the town conceded the right of precedence to the women in every public ceremony, and this proud prerogative they still enjoy.

Ashamed of his defeat, and furious at its disgrace, the emperor laid siege to the town with an army of 30,000 men, which he had collected for a campaign in Italy. It was now the turn of the men of Rouffach to come to the front, and they fought with so much resolution and intrepidity that the emperor was completely baffled. Unable to satisfy his vengeance by force, he had recourse to fraud. He demanded permission for his troops to pass through the town (1106), and when the citizens unsuspectingly opened their gates, he ordered it to be set on fire, and handed it over to the greed and lust of his mercenaries.

Towards the end of the thirteenth century, the men of Colmar seized upon Rouffach and plundered it. After this disaster, it was surrounded by strong walls, but the defence proved useless against the Armagnacs, who sacked it in 1444. Finally, in the seventeenth century, it was three times occupied by an enemy; on the first occasion by the Landgrave Otho; on the second by the Duc de

Rohan; and on the third by Marshal Turenne, after his victory at Turckheim.

One cannot but pity the fate of these frontier towns, so frequently exposed to the ravages of war; nor can one help feeling some surprise at the vitality they have exhibited in surviving so many and such deplorable misfortunes.

In the thirteenth century Rouffach became unhappily distinguished by its cruel persecution of the Jews, many of whom were burned at the stake in a meadow still called *Judenfeld*. And, even at this day, not a single Jew inhabits Rouffach, or owns any property within it.

The church of Rouffach, dedicated to St. Arbogast, is an interesting monument of twelfth century date.

Its design and its decorative work refer it, according to M. de Rouvrois, to the second period of the Gothic style. The choir, with its remarkable boldness of construction, appears much more ancient than the remainder of the edifice. One of the baptismal fonts in a side-chapel on the right, arrests special attention as a masterpiece of subtle and delicate sculpture, in which every line seems informed with genius. Persons afflicted with epileptic fits are in the habit of resorting to the chapel of St. Valentine.

We must take the reader to Pfaffenheim (1700 inhabitants), situated at the very foot of the Vosges, in a sheltered and sunny land of vineyards, famous for the excellence of their vintage. The church is ancient, with a remarkable spire. Above the town rises the striking hill of the Schaumburg (1780 feet), from whose summit a view of the valley of the Ill may be obtained, which presents some striking features.

Gueberschwir (1500 inhabitants) was formerly a walled town, with a castle, the Mittelburg, of some celebrity. Its church, in the so-called Roman style, is an edifice of more than ordinary pretensions.

A line may be given to Huttstadt (1000 inhabitants) to refer the visitor to the romantic ruins of the old castle of Barbenstein.

Crossing the Lauch, a small swift stream, clear as a mountain torrent, and sparkling with an azure gleam in a dell of luxuriantly leafy character, we observe the stately castle of Hurlisheim (1100 inhabitants), erected in the last century on the site of an old robber fastness. Then we come to the interesting town of Eynisheim (1953 inhabitants), the birthplace, in 1049, of Pope Leo IX.

Of the castle in which, according to tradition, the pope was born, and which was built by the Count Eberhard, son of Duke Athic, the only remains are a grey hexagonal tower, gaunt and weatherworn, and some trace of the fosses which supplied the castle with water. To the west, on the cone-shaped mountain above the town, rise the three shattered towers of an ancient fortalice, called Drei-Exon. Each tower was severally named: thus, on the south stood the Wahlenburg ; on the north, Dagsburg; in the middle, Weekmund. One of them is still some 125 feet in height; the others are in ruins.

This palace was erected by the first Count von Eynisheim, grandson to Duke Athic, and founder of several princely and royal dynasties, in whose successive generations our readers would take no interest. But, at least, it may be as well to note that among the number are included the princes of Teck, now, through the marriage of the Princess Mary of Cambridge, closely connected with our own royal house. Bruno of Eynisheim, son of Count Hugues IV., became bishop of Toul, and afterwards Pope Leo IX. His life has been written by his disciple and partisan, Archdeacon Wibert, with a credulity which leaves little to be desired. Whoever has a taste for the legendary and marvellous should turn to this narrative, as it appears in the valuable collection of Muratori. As a bishop, Bruno was notable for his fervent piety, his gentleness to those below him (he constantly washed the feet of the poor), his boundless charity, his eloquence as a preacher, and his knowledge of music. As pope, he showed a great talent for organization, an intense devotion, and an unwearied zeal for the interests of the church. Both as pope and bishop, however, he evinced a curious feature of character: he discovered reliques of saints wherever it was necessary to find them, he worked miracles, and he "saw visions." He died on the 13th of April, 1059, closing a saintly life with a sublime death. He ordered his coffin to be carried into St. Peter's; and laid himself down on a couch by its side. Then, having bestowed his last advice and admonitions on those around him, he received the last sacraments, and, rising with difficulty, looked stedfastly upon his future resting-place. "Behold," he said, "my brethren, the mutability of human things. The cell which I dwelt in as a monk expanded into yonder spacious palace; it shrinks again into this narrow coffin." The next morning he was dead.

Of his miracles we can but record a single example. A costly cup, presented to him by the archbishop of Köln, fell to the ground and was broken to pieces. At the bidding of Leo, these pieces came together, the cup was made whole, and the fracture was marked only by a thin thread *(capillo)*. But the most wonderful thing was, that all the while not a drop of the wine which it contained was spilled!

The following account of the destruction of the pope's birthplace we borrow from the "Voyage Pittoresque en Alsace:"—

"It was in 1466. The year before, the nobles, whose oppressions the towns did not bear so patiently as in the preceding century, had been expelled from the senate of Mühlhausen. Enraged at this bold act of rebellion, they waited only for a pretext to re-assert their ancient domination, and avenge themselves on the presumptuous burghers. A miller's boy of Mühlhausen furnished them with the excuse they needed. Driven out by his master, and pretending that he was in great distress for a paltry sum of six oboli, which the latter refused to pay him, he carried his complaint before the nobles; and one of them, Peter of Eynisheim, purchased from him his debt.

"Strong in his legal title, and putting himself forward as a redresser of wrongs, he seized upon several citizens, and flung them into the lowest dungeon of his castle.

"Mühlhausen appealed to its allies, and a war, known as the Plappert-Krieg, or 'War of the Six Oboli,' broke out on this insignificant cause. The nobles, summoning to their aid all their friends and kinsmen, retired to the castle of Eynisheim, which they strongly fortified, and appointed Hermann Kliv, the miller, who had been the original cause of strife, to the chief command.

"The allied towns resolved to attack the castle, and under the leadership of a certain Stützel, they carried it by assault on the day of the Fête-Dieu (1466), and burned it to the ground. Then they crowned their victory by hanging up the miller and three of the most tyrannical nobles.

"It would seem to be tolerably certain that these three fortresses were never rebuilt, or inhabited after this event; for in 1568 a pretended sorceress, accused of having married her daughter to the devil, and celebrated the nuptial-feast among the ruins of Eynisheim, was brought to trial. The details of the evidence brought against this unfortunate victim of superstitious ignorance are very curious, very extravagant, and, as persons knowing anything of the history of witchcraft will readily believe, are frequently disgusting. We may mention, however, that it was stated as a fact, before a properly constituted court of judicature, that the wedding-feast had consisted of bats—cooked, we suppose, in a variety of ways—and that the concluding dance had been performed by imps and devils!

> "What thronging, dashing, raging, rustling!
> What whispering, babbling, hissing, bustling!
> What glimmering, spirting, stinking, burning,
> As heaven and earth were overturning!"

It is needless to add that the poor sorceress was put to death.

We resume our route. The Hoh-Landsberg, which rises above the château of Plixburg—the latter a thirteenth century building, with a cylindrical keep—was formerly, as its remains very plainly indicate, a fortress of great strength, and almost impregnable in the days before rifled cannon and mitrailleuses. In the history of Alsace it played an important part, as early as the thirteenth century. In 1281 it was captured by an imperial army, and thenceforth it remained a fief of the house of Austria. The Swedes took possession of it in 1638. It was dismantled by order of Louis XIV.

Logelbach, on the left, is famous for its large cotton mills, weaving, and calico-printing establishments. Wintzenheim, another manufacturing town, has a population of 4000.

Almost opposite the railway station of Colmar lies Turckheim (2946 inhabitants), where Marshal Turenne, on the 5th of January, 1675, gained a great victory over the imperialists.

Colmar is the principal town in the department of the Upper Rhine, and was the seat of the imperial court for the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine.

This ancient and quaint old town is situated in the immediate shadow of the Vosges, on the small rivers Lauch and Fecht, and in a plain of great fertility, watered by innumerable rills which supply the motive power of many important mills and factories, and are carried through the busy streets of the town itself. In some they are reduced, however, to the modest dimensions of gutters. Its principal manufactures are cottons and printed goods.

Founded in the sixth century, it was called

Columbaria, or Colmaria, when the sons of Louis the Debonnair encountered in its vicinity their father, against whom they had rebelled, and forced him to surrender the crown he had received from Charlemagne (A.D. 833). The three brothers afterwards met in council at the royal vill of Colmar, and Lothair conveyed his father from thence to the monastery of Soissons, and treated him with the most shameful indignities. He was compelled to perform public penance in the church of St. Médard. There the father of three kings laid down upon the altar his armour and his imperial robes, and clothing himself in black, read the long and enforced confession of his crimes. Next, he laid the parchment on the altar, was stripped of his military belt, which was likewise placed there; and having put off his secular dress, and assumed the garb of a penitent, was thenceforth deemed incapacitated from all civil acts.

The field where the emperor had been deserted by his courtiers and army, was ever afterwards named Lügenfeld, *Campus Mentitus*, or "the field of falsehood."

In 1106 Colmar suffered severely from fire, but was soon rebuilt. In 1226 it was raised to the rank of a town by the Emperor Frederick II., and in 1282 declared an imperial town. In 1474 it was attacked by the French under Charles the Rash, but successfully repulsed its assailants. In 1552 it had grown so wealthy and prosperous, that it was thought advisable to fortify it with ramparts and towers. In 1632 it was taken by the Swedes; the majority of the citizens having embraced Lutheranism, compelled the imperialists to capitulate. Two years later it was annexed to France, and in 1673 Louis XIV. dismantled the fortifications, whose site is now occupied by pleasant boulevards, agreeably planted with trees, and surrounding the old, quaint, and obscure town with a belt of leafiness.

Colmar has given birth to three eminent men, Pfeffel, Rewbell, and General Rapp.

Gottlieb Conrad Pfeffel was born in 1736. He became blind at the early age of twenty-one, while pursuing his studies in the university of Halle. By dint of unwearied perseverance he conquered the numerous obstacles which loss of sight throws in the way of the man of letters, and as a writer of fables attained a great and deserved distinction. He died in 1809, having for several years conducted with success a Protestant military academy.

Rewbell was one of the many whom the surging waves of the French Revolution carried into power. Having attained an influential position in the National Assembly, he had the courage to denounce the sanguinary excesses of the Jacobins, and was appointed one of the five directors to whom the government of France was intrusted by the constitution of 1795.

His character is concisely sketched by Alison: —An Alsatian by birth, and a lawyer by profession, he was destitute of either genius or eloquence; but he owed his elevation to his habits of business, his knowledge of forms, and the pertinacity with which he represented the feelings of the multitude, often in the close of revolutionary convulsions envious of distinguished ability.

For ourselves, we think that Alison does not do him justice. He was a man of principle, and advocated moderation at a time when to do so required considerable intrepidity. He was at all events a sincere republican, and had the sagacity to fathom the designs of Napoleon, and the courage to oppose them as long as opposition was possible. In 1799 he retired from the Directory, and thenceforth made no sign.

Jean Rapp was born at Colmar on the 26th of April, 1772, of obscure parentage. He enlisted at the age of sixteen, served in the army of the Rhine, was four times wounded, promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and as aide-de-camp to Dessaix accompanied "General Bonaparte's" expedition to Egypt. Still following the fortunes of Dessaix, he stood by his side at the battle of Marengo, and supported him in his arms after he had received his mortal wound. It was probably his friendship with the one man whom Napoleon pre-eminently loved and trusted, that recommended him to the great conqueror's favour. At the battle of Austerlitz he led one of the most dashing and successful cavalry charges ever made, and was rewarded with promotion to the rank of general of division. Henceforward he was admitted to Napoleon's special confidence, and was employed on several difficult and delicate missions. After serving throughout the disastrous Russian campaign, he was appointed military governor of Dantzig, and gained great distinction by his brilliant defence of that city in 1813; not surrendering until two-thirds of the garrison had perished. Being made a prisoner of war, he did not return to France until the restoration of Louis XVIII., to whom he offered his

services. When Napoleon returned from Elba he could not refuse the claims of his old leader, and he took the command of the garrison at Strasburg, which city he held even after the crushing defeat of Waterloo. In spite of his tergiversation, he secured the forgiveness of the Bourbons, and was made a peer of France in 1818. He died in 1821, in his fiftieth year; leaving behind him the reputation of a gallant and trusty soldier, who was inferior to none in all the qualities which make an excellent lieutenant. He had no genius, but he had military talent; and he had a knack of doing whatever he had to do in a very sufficient and effective manner.

We can easily see all that is to be seen at Colmar in a few hours. A ramble along its streets will open up to us some quaint examples of domestic architecture; and if it be market day, we cannot but be amused by the no less quaint costumes of the peasants who stream into the town from the neighbouring villages.

The Minster, or St. Martin's church, is an admirable Gothic edifice, begun in 1265 and completed in 1360. Completed, that is, so far as the original design seems likely ever to be carried out; but of the two towers the southern one only has been commenced, and this rises but a little above the body of the building. A spire has been erected in the place of the ancient spire, destroyed by fire in 1572. The grotesque figures which decorate the portico and nave are worth examining; their carvers must have been men of a sly satiric humour! Not less notable is the altar-piece, by Martin Schön, or Schöngauer, a native of Colmar (died 1488), of the Virgin Mary with the Holy Child resting in a bower of roses, and attended by angels. The figures, larger than life, are set off by a background of gold.

Each window in the choir consists of three lancet lights with two mullions. They are filled with the remains of the superb painted glass which formerly adorned the ancient church of the Dominicans. It would be impossible to speak too highly of its depth and transparency of colouring.

The old Dominican convent (that of the Unterlinden) has undergone a deplorable transformation; the principal building being used as a corn-mart. The conventual church has been more fortunate; it contains the town museum and library, the latter numbering about 40,000 volumes. There are some interesting paintings in illustration of the life of Christ, by Martin Schöngauer; six subjects from the Passion, and an Annunciation and Adoration of the Magi, by the same artist; also various pictures attributed, with more or less foundation, to Albert Dürer and Grunewald. Here, too, are some fine specimens of mediæval carving, from the convent of Isenheim; the head of Peter of Hagenbach, embalmed, and preserved under glass; an aerolite which fell near Colmar in 1492; a Gallo-Roman mosaic from the choir of the minster; specimens of armour, and certain instruments of torture; besides many other things both rich and rare, and some which are neither rich nor rare.

The treasures of the library are, the first book printed in German, at Strasburg, by Eggenstein, in 1466; namely, a "Tractatus Rationis et Conscientiæ," either printed by Guttenberg himself, or by his successor, Nicolas Becklermunze; and collections of medals (10,000 in number), ethnography, and natural history.

A bronze statue, by Bertholdi, to General Rapp, was erected on the Champ de Mars in 1855; and one in stone, by Friederich, to the fabulist Pfeffel, was placed beside the museum in 1859.

From Colmar a visit may be paid to Freiburg, in the Brisgau, and Neuf-Brisach (3456 inhabitants), on the banks of the Rhine. The latter is one of Vauban's fortified towns. In its vicinity is planted the Fort Mortier, a constant menace to Alt-Brisach, which suffered greatly, as well as the fort, in the Franco-Prussian War.

At four miles from Colmar we reach Bennwihr (1000 inhabitants), whence we proceed, by way of Ostheim, on the Fecht, to the Kaiserberg, and Rappoltsweiler (8000).

Kaiserberg is situated in a pleasant little valley at the foot of the ruined mountain fortress of the same name. Both fortress and town sprung into existence during the first quarter of the thirteenth century, under the Emperor Frederick II.

A short distance from the railway, and at the mouth of a vine-clad valley, lies Rappoltsweiler, better known by its French name of Ribeauvillé (population, 6081, of whom about one-seventh are Protestants). This town was the cradle of the once powerful family of Rappoltstein, who, after the annexation of Alsace to France, changed their name to Ribeaupierre. It was one of this family who, on the summit of the mountain above the town, erected the castle, now in utter ruin, of Hoh-Rappolstein, besieged

in turn by Rudolph of Hapsburg and Adolph of Nassau. It is distinguished by its cylindrical tower. Lower down are the remains of two other castles, the Giersberg, and Niederberg, or St. Ulrich.

The parish church, dedicated to St. Germain, which contains the tombs of the lords of Ribeaupierre, and the town-hall, are the only two buildings of any particular interest or merit.

Along the crest of the foremost line of the Vosges runs the singular rampart, of unknown antiquity, called the Heidenmauer, or "Pagans' Wall." Its remains extend over an area of two leagues. It is composed of unhewn stones, uncemented, and about eight to ten feet high.

Philipp Jacob Spener, an eminent divine, who may justly be considered the founder of the Pietists, was born at Rappoltsweiler in 1635. He studied successively at Strasburg, Basel, and Geneva, imbibing the principles of the strictest Lutheranism, with, however, a strong attachment towards the Calvinistic ideal of church government and discipline. From 1666 to 1686 he laboured at Frankfort-on-the-Maine as senior pastor, with an enthusiasm and devotedness which revived in Germany the decaying spirit of evangelical piety. In 1675 he published his "Pia Desideria," which, according to Tholuck, is one of the most important productions in the whole theological literature of Germany. As a remedy for the religious lukewarmness then too prevalent, he urged that the laity should be taught to co-operate in the work of the Christian church, and that all the faithful, whether clerics or laics, should realize their spiritual priesthood by union in prayer, and by efforts for the well-being of their fellows. Hence arose the *collegia pietatis*, or private meetings for prayer and bible-reading, which originated the nickname of "pietists," bestowed on those who attended them.

From 1686 to 1691 Spener officiated as chaplain, or chief preacher, at the court of the Elector George III. of Saxony, but discharged his trust with a faithfulness which princely ears were unable to endure, and the connection was terminated abruptly, to the relief of both parties. Removing to Berlin, he filled the offices of provost of the church of St. Nicholas, and consistorial councillor, until his death in 1701. His influence extended over all Lutheran Germany, and he formed a school of zealous and able disciples, Breithaupt, Lange, Anton, Franck, and Freylinghausen, who took up and continued the movement which Spener had inaugurated, and infused a new life and inspiration into the German church.

According to Tholuck, and no man is better acquainted with the whole religious history of that age, Spener, of all who have attained to eminence in the Lutheran church, was the purest and most unblemished in personal character, and of all God's instruments in the seventeenth century the most signally blessed.

RAPPOLTSWEILER TO TUSENBACH.

A road lined with poplars conducts from Rappoltsweiler to a place of pilgrimage in much favour before the French Revolution, Tusenbach, so called from the noise (*tosen*) of a "brawling stream" which rushes past it. St. Mary of Tusenbach was the patroness of the musicians in all Alsace. These musicians formed a guild, which dated from the romantic era of the troubadours, when the singers and jongleurs wandered from castle to castle, and relieved the dull life of feudalism with flashes of poetry and song. The area over which the guild extended their operations lay between the Hauenstein and the Haguenau Forest, and from the extremity of the Wasgau to the Rhine. They placed themselves under the immediate protection of the lord of Rappoltstein, who assumed the title of King of the Jongleurs, constituting it a separate office, in subordination, at first to the Imperial, and afterwards to the French crown.

As late as the 10th of March, 1785, we find the royal council renewing the statutes which Eberhard von Rappoltstein had bestowed on his musical subjects in 1606.

Certain privileges, we had almost said prerogatives, belonged to the king of the jongleurs, and the jongleurs, in their turn, could claim certain rights. The former appointed a viceroy, or "piper king," who presided at the annual court. As the guild was very numerous, it was subdivided into three bodies, each of which had its separate rendezvous. Thus, the musicians from Hauenstein to Ottmensbühl assembled at Alt-Thann on the 8th of September; those from Ottmensbühl to Eppil came, with pipe and drum, to Rappoltsweiler on the same day; while those from Eppil to the Haguenau met at Bischweiler on the feast of Assumption.

On the 8th of September the musicians of the Rappoltsweiler district gathered together as early

as nine in the morning, and set out from the Sun tavern, in a radiant procession, with music and banners, and the piper king at their head, and each man carrying a silver medal in his button-hole, to hear mass at the parish church. Thence they marched to the castle, played a symphony in honour of their king, and drank his health in good red wine. Returning to the inn, a court of justice was held; complaints were heard, and in cases of the infraction of the brotherhood's statutes, suitable fines inflicted. The ceremonies of the day concluded with dances and songs.

TO HOH-KÖNIGSBURG.

After leaving Ribeauvillé, we pass Guémar (population, 1400) on the right, and Bergheim (population, 3100) on the left, and cross several streams, before arriving at St. Hippolyte (population, 2241), the point whence travellers frequently ascend the steep slopes of the Hoh-Königsburg.

On the summit are situated the extensive ruins of a castle of great antiquity. It was erected in 1469 by the Counts Oswald and Wilhelm von Thierstein. The view from the battlements is very fine. It is not often, even in the Rhine Valley, that so grand and striking a panorama, one so bold in its grand outlines and so rich in its details, is unfolded before the traveller.

At four miles from St. Hippolyte we reach Schlestadt; an important and prosperous town of 10,184 inhabitants.

Schlestadt was anciently a free town of the German empire, but did not receive its full civic privileges until the thirteenth century. The Frank kings, according to an old tradition, had a palace here, erected by Frederick II. In 775 Charlemagne spent his Christmas tide at Schlestadt. In the fourteenth century it was twice besieged by the warrior bishops of Strassburg. Alternately occupied by the Swedes and Imperialists during the Thirty Years' War, it fell, in 1634, into the hands of the French. At the peace of Westphalia it was again acknowledged as an imperial city; but in 1673 it was again captured by the French, and Louis XIV. ordered its walls to be razed, and new fortifications to be erected by Vauban. It is a place of considerable strength, and both in 1814 and 1815 successfully resisted the attacks of the allied armies. In the campaign of 1870 it was besieged and captured by a Prussian army.

Above the small town of Dambach rises, hoary and massive, the ruined castle of Bernstein, whose rapid decay Nature seeks to conceal with her freshest luxuriance. On the right is Ebersmünster, a village of 930 inhabitants, where Duke Athic founded, in 667, the *Apri Monasterium*, or Monastery of the Wild Boar, in place of a chapel built by King Dagobert.

And next, we arrive at Ebersheim (1900 inhabitants) the explanation of this *Apri Monasterium*. Here, according to tradition, Sigebert, the son of Dagobert, was mortally wounded by a wild boar (*eber*); but through the potency of the prayers of St. Arbogast, then bishop of Strassburg, was restored to life. In grateful acknowledgment of the miracle, Dagobert erected in the vicinity the Chapel of the Boar, or Ebersmünster.

Benfeld is eleven miles from Schlestadt. It has a population of 2745 inhabitants, and is situated on the Ill. It appears to have risen on the ruins of the ancient Elcebus, the *Hellkebos* of the geographer Ptolemy, which the Goths destroyed in the fifth century. Here were interred the remains of St. Materne, the apostle and evangelizer of Alsace. It was one of the most ancient demesnes of the bishops of Strassburg.

From Benfeld we proceed, by way of Matzenheim—leaving, on our right, the beautiful sixteenth century castle of Osthausen, belonging to the Zorn de Brulach family—to Erstein.

This quiet, old-world little town (population, 3705), pleasantly planted on the banks of the Ill, was anciently of some importance. The Frankish kings had a palace here, in which at a later date resided the two emperors, Otho I. and Otho II. It was at that time surrounded by walls, which, together with the castle, were destroyed by the stout citizens of Strassburg in 1333.

From Erstein the reader will permit us to diverge to Oberwin (population, 5150), an irregularly built but picturesque town, situated on the Ehn, with a fine background formed by the green acclivities of the Hohenburg. Formerly it was a royal demesne, belonging to the Merovingian kings; afterwards it became an imperial free town, of the sixth rank. It has four gates; but the only relics of its ancient importance are the remains of the strong towers that formerly flanked its walls. The town-hall, built in 1528, is rich in curious wood carving and ancient pictures.

From this point we proceed to ascend the Ottilienberg, or "Mountain of St. Odille;" the scene

every year, on Pentecost Monday, of a pilgrimage famous throughout the length and breadth of Alsace. The Ottilienberg, apart from its associations, is worthy of a visit; its scenery is more than ordinarily picturesque and varied, and the prospect from its summit might fill the heart of a poet with gladness! To the left rise the ruins of the Rathsamhausen, which formerly belonged to a powerful Alsatian family, and the Lützelburg, which was built in the twelfth century, and whose two shattered towers are surrounded by a girdle of dark-green forest. To the south lies the Landsburg, which was occupied by a family of the same name down to the great Revolution of 1789. Its remains consist of two noble, cylindrical, five-storied towers, at the angles of the western *enceinte;* a mass of ruins on the eastern side; and, in the centre, the old, square, sandstone keep, with its grim eyeless walls, looking blankly out on a changed world.

From Erstein a journey of two miles brings us to Limersheim, a village with 500 inhabitants, and another two miles to Fegersheim, which, with a population of 1800, is situated at the confluence of the Little Andlau with the Ill. It is said to possess a spring whose waters are beneficial in ophthalmic diseases. Almost opposite it, above the old town of Rosheim (population, 3910), where there is a remarkable Byzantine church dating from the eleventh or twelfth century, rise the ruins of the stately pile of Guirbaden, the ancient castle of the Rohans, destroyed in the seventeenth century.

As we draw close to Strassburg we see on our right, between the railway and the Rhine, which here flows with a broad and noble current, the agricultural settlement of Ostwald, founded in 1839 by the city of Strassburg; and on the left the town of Eutzheim (population, 1700), in whose vicinity, on the 4th of October, 1674, the Imperialists were defeated by the French under Turenne. The mountains of the Vosges, when seen from this point, assume a character of singular beauty, and the surrounding country is diversified by many rich and agreeable landscapes. In several villages the houses are decorated with double rows of tobacco-leaves drying in the sun; tobacco being cultivated here to a considerable extent.

THE BADEN BANK OF THE RHINE.

Basel to Kehl.

Having thus conducted the patient reader along the *left* bank of the Rhine, and the valley of the Ill, to the city of Strassburg, we now retrace our steps to Basel, cross the "exultant and abounding river," and proceed to carry him with us along its *right* or German bank, a route not inferior in interest or in beauty to the former.

The Rhine, in this part of its course, is frequently encroached upon by hills. It receives the Dreisam, the Elz, the Schutter, and the Kinzig. Its surface is literally strewn with islands, more or less wooded, of various outline, and frequently very charming in aspect.

About a mile and a half from Basel, on the so-called Leopoldshöhe, or Leopold's Height, stands the Basel custom-house, to indicate that we have quitted the territories of republican Switzerland. Passing Hattingen and Efringen, through very bright and beautiful scenery, and crossing the small stream of the Kander, where we obtain a glorious view of the islanded river and the mountainous landscapes of Alsace, with the snow-peaks of the Jura rising beyond Basel, we penetrate the limestone cliff of the Isteiner Klotz in a succession of tunnels, and drawing near the river arrive at Schliengen.

Continuing our course along the vine-clad slopes of the Black Forest, we arrive at Mühlheim (population, 3000), the seat of an "amstadt" or jurisdiction, and the nearest station for Badenweiler. Mühlheim is celebrated for the "Markgräfler" wine produced by the neighbouring vineyards. It is a town of great antiquity, the abbey of St. Gall having had possessions here as early as 758.

Badenweiler lies about three miles to the east. Its springs were known to the Romans, and the baths erected by them were discovered in 1748, in a state of excellent preservation. They consist of four large and eight smaller baths, including dressing and anointing rooms, a sudatorium, and other appurtenances. They are probably the most complete now in existence (out of Rome), and measure 324 feet in length by 100 feet in breadth. Badenweiler is now frequented by as many as 1500 visitors every season, and boasts of a handsome Cursaal. The water is impregnated to a large extent with common salt and gypsum, and reputed beneficial in cases of gout, consumption, rheumatism, hysteria, hypochondriasis, and intermittent fever. The temperature is 20° R.

About six miles from Badenweiler is the Belchen or Hochblewan peak, whose summit, 3597 feet above the sea, commands a fine view of the

course of the Rhine as far as Strassburg, and of the country inclosed by the mountain chains of the Black Forest on the east, of the Vosges on the west, and the Jura on the south. Beyond the latter, on a clear day, may be seen the white crests of the Bernese Alps.

To the west of Mühlheim, at a distance of one mile and a half, and close to the rocky bank of the Rhine, lies Neuenberg, besieged by the chivalrous Duke Bernhard von Weimar, in 1633 to 1634.

Near Heitersheim, once the seat of the master of the Maltese Knights, are the ruins of Staufenburg castle, which can also be reached from Krotzingen. It was formerly the seat of a race of powerful nobles, whose line became extinct in 1602. From this point we may carry the reader, for a moment, to a town already mentioned—Alt-Brisach. Here the isolated volcanic mountain of the Kaisersstuhl throws out, as it were, a buttress of basalt, rising almost perpendicularly from the waters of the rolling river to a height of 758 feet. On the highest point of this singular eminence is planted the Gothic minster of St. Stephen, a notable example of thirteenth century architecture. The town of Alt-Brisach lies on the sides of the hill and in the valley beneath it. A flying bridge connects it with the opposite bank. Though now a quiet, lifeless place, with less than 4000 inhabitants, it was once a most important frontier fortress, and the key of Germany on the west.

As late as the tenth century, the Rhine is said to have flowed round the town, and isolated the rock on which it stands. From 1331 it belonged to Austria; but in 1638 was captured by Duke Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, after a blockade of twelve months, which inflicted the most dreadful sufferings on the garrison and citizens. After his death it was held by the French, to whom it was formally made over by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. But it was impossible for Germany to rest contented with this important fortress in the hands of a hostile nation, and at the Peace of Ryswick, in 1700, it was recovered by the Austrians. In 1703 it was again taken by the French under Tallard and Vauban, nor was it restored until 1715. The Emperor Charles VI. greatly improved the defences, and erected a new fort. In 1743, when a new French invasion was apprehended, the Empress Maria Theresa ordered the Leopold and Charles forts to be destroyed, and the military stores removed to Freiburg. These steps were not taken too soon. In the following year the irrepressible banner of the fleur-de-lis once more crossed the Rhine, captured Alt-Brisach, and destroyed the remaining fortifications. Subsequently the bridge was removed. An Austrian garrison was not replaced in the town until 1768.

At the epoch of the French revolution the French once more attacked Brisach. On the bank of the river, opposite the unfortunate town, they had erected Fort Mortier, and from this position they bombarded the defenceless German town, on the 15th of September, 1793. A portion of the buildings having been restored, they again occupied it in 1796. In 1805 Napoleon resolved on converting it into a strong fortress, and the works were already in a forward condition when the treaty of Presburg gave Brisach to Baden.

About two leagues to the north of Brisach, on a spur of the Kaisersstuhl, which, projecting into the river, breaks up its regular flow into a swift and whirling current, are the ruins of Castle Sponeck. These owe more to their romantic position than to their extent or character, which is comparatively insignificant; but they command a fine view of the Rhine, the opposite bank, and the undulating sweep of the Vosges.

FREIBURG.

Freiburg, the ancient capital of the Breisgau, is situated about twelve miles from the Rhine, on the outskirts of the Black Forest, at the mouth of the romantic Höllenthal, or Valley of Hell, and upon the Dreisam, whose manifold ramifications extend into all the principal streets. It is elevated about 860 feet above the sea, so as to enjoy an unbounded view of the surrounding country, which is as bright, goodly, and diversified as eye can desire. The rich vale of the Dreisam, the boldly broken ground of the Black Forest, the fertile plain, which carries its stores of wealth and beauty up to the very foot of the vine-clad Kaisersstuhl, and the picturesque mountains, which raise their vapour-loaded crests against the horizon, form a picture of infinite light and loveliness.

Freiburg is the seat of a "jurisdiction" of the Imperial Court of the Upper Rhine Circle, of a university, and of the archbishop and chapter of the Upper Rhine ecclesiastical province. It has a population of 17,000, and is a busy and flourishing town; its prosperity being due in part to its position on the great German highways, and partly to

its forming the centre to which the commercial and manufacturing industry of the Black Forest converges.

The history of Freiburg extends over about eight centuries. As late as 1008, and probably fifty years later, the area now covered by its well-thronged streets was a dense luxuriant forest. Gradually a clearing was made, and a few hunters and fishermen planted their huts on the bank of the Dreisam. The neighbouring hill was speedily seized upon as a suitable site for a castle, and the infant settlement began to extend under its protection. Then came an auspicious patron in the person of Duke Berthold III., of Zaringia, who, having visited Köln, and learned to admire its splendour, desired to establish a rival on the Upper Rhine. Accordingly, he raised the village to the rank of a town. From his brother and successor, Conrad, the new town received a charter of rights and privileges. It was under the rule of this energetic prince that the minster was commenced, and so diligently was it prosecuted that within its walls, in 1146, St. Bernard was able to deliver an eloquent harangue in favour of the Crusades.

In 1218 the male line of the dukes of Zaringia, who had done so much for the prosperity of Freiburg, became extinct. The town was then claimed as an imperial fief, but soon afterwards surrendered to Egon I., count of Hohenberg, who had wedded Agnes, the sister of Duke Berthold V., of Zaringia. His son, Egon II., called himself von Freiburg, and for the defence of the town erected the strong castle of Burghalden.

About the middle of the fourteenth century Freiburg became involved in a life and death struggle with Count Egon IV. She conquered, but the tax on her resources was so heavy, that to avoid any similar disaster she voluntarily parted with her independence, and surrendered her rights and liberties to the imperial house of Hapsburg. Some of her bravest sons afterwards followed the Austrian standard to the field of Sempach, and perished in that murderous battle. In 1457 the line of the counts of Freiburg ceased to exist.

In 1468 the Archduke Sigismund, whose extravagance had had its natural result, mortgaged all his possessions in Alsace, Sundgau, Breisgau, and the Black Forest, to Charles the Bold of Burgundy, for the sum of 80,000 florins. Freiburg then did homage at Ensisheim, and Peter von Hagenbach, a man of unbridled lust and cruelty, was appointed its governor. He was soon guilty of the most abominable excesses. In vain the towns complained to Charles; he listened to them with indifference. They then collected a sum sufficient to defray the mortgage, and encouraged Duke Sigismund to take up arms against the Burgundian tyrant. Hagenbach retired to Brisach with a considerable force; but continuing his exactions, the citizens rose against him, expelled his mercenaries, seized him, tried him according to the law of the empire, and beheaded him at night by torchlight. The towns then made common cause against their oppressor, who invaded Switzerland with a powerful army, but was defeated at Granson and Morat, and killed under the walls of Nancy, on the 5th of January, 1477.

During the famous Peasants' War, Freiburg was surrounded with twenty thousand insurgents, who were bribed to retire by a gift of 3000 florins and several pieces of artillery. In the Thirty Years' War, the Swedish army appeared before the gates of Freiburg on the 19th December, 1632. They were at first repulsed, but on the 26th of the same month their compact battalions once more gathered in front of the town, and Colonel Bernhard Schaffalitzki demanded its surrender in the name of Field-marshal Horn. In this extremity the citizens displayed no ordinary resolution. Supported by the students and country people, they manned the walls. For forty-eight hours the unfortunate town was bombarded with redhot balls, effecting so terrible a desolation that the Freiburgers found themselves compelled to surrender. On the 29th, Field-marshal Horn made his public entry, and immediately proceeded to levy a requisition of 30,000 florins.

After a brief interval of peace, Duke Bernard of Weimar appeared before the town (March 20, 1638). Under Escher von Bühningen it made a gallant defence; but on the 11th of April Freiburg surrendered. The Swedish colonel, Kanoffsky von Langendorff, was appointed governor. He treated its citizens with the utmost moderation; but in 1644, on the approach of the imperial army, ordered two of the suburbs to be razed. The Imperialists, 15,000 strong, under Field-marshal Mercy, invested the place, while Turenne, with 10,000 men, hastened to its relief. Mercy, however, delivered his attacks so incessantly and so furiously, that on the 28th of July the garrison was forced to yield. In recognition of its gallant

defence, however, it was allowed to march out with all the honours of war, and retire to Brisach.

Turenne, reinforced by 10,000 men under the famous Condé, arrived on the scene soon after the capitulation had been concluded. On the 2nd of August he attacked the entrenchments which Mercy had raised along the neighbouring mountain, the Schinberg, but was repulsed with so severe a loss, that he retired upon Denzlingen during the night of the 5th of August. Mercy maintained himself in the town for several days, and then, leaving a strong garrison behind him, marched towards the Black Forest.

Freiburg now enjoyed a period of peace. By the treaty of Westphalia it was restored to Austria; but Louis XIV., in pursuance of his scheme of European supremacy, resolved to seize it. In the autumn of 1677, its garrison having been imprudently reduced, Marshal Créqui suddenly crossed the Rhine on the 10th, and made himself master of the place on the 16th, of November.

By the treaty of Nimeguen, in the following year, the city, so craftily won, was formally ceded to France. Louis XIV. proceeded to convert it into a fortress, after the plans of Vauban. In 1697 the treaty of Ryswick restored Freiburg to Austria; but in the condition of the town no improvement took place. On the 21st of September, 1713, Marshal Villars, with an army of 150,000 men, advanced against Freiburg, which was garrisoned by only 10,000 men under Field-marshal von Harsch. In little more than a week Von Harsch was forced to retire into the citadel, leaving the unfortunate inhabitants to take what steps they chose for their own protection. Villars had given orders to storm the town, bnt at the representations of the citizens he consented to accept terms of capitulation. An armistice was agreed upon until the garrison had communicated with Prince Eugene, and on the 17th of November the garrison marched out with all the honours of war, while the town paid a sum of 1,000,000 francs as an indemnity. Freiburg, however, quickly returned to its former allegiance, being restored to Austria by the treaty of Rastadt, in September, 1714. Harassed by these continual sieges, it declined more and more rapidly, until, with an expenditure exceeding its income by 5000 florins yearly, it owed a debt of 300,000 florins.

On the 17th of September, 1740, Marshal Coigny, with a French army of 56,000 men, crossed the Rhine, moved rapidly on Freiburg, and invested it. The town was at that time garrisoned by 8000 men under General von Damnitz, and its bombardment took place under the eye of Louis XV. The operations of the besiegers were pressed so vigorously, that on the 26th of October a breach had been effected, and on the 5th of November the garrison abandoned the town to the French, and withdrew into the castles. These, however, soon fell into the hands of the French, who captured 212 guns, besides eighty mortars and howitzers. They then razed the fortifications, and blew up the three castles.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle again restored Freiburg to Austria, when prosperity returned to the town, and it has since persevered annually in increasing its wealth and population. During the French Revolution it suffered comparatively little. By the peace of Presburg, in 1801, Freiburg was annexed to the grand-duchy of Baden, whose government used every exertion to promote its interests. In 1848 it was once more exposed to a partial bombardment. A body of revolutionists marched into the town during Passion week, proclaimed the republic, and barricaded the town gates. But on Easter Monday it was invested by the grand-ducal troops, by whom the insurgents were speedily put to flight.

Freiburg consists of the town, properly so called; of the Stephanie, formerly called the Schnecken (or Snail) suburb; and of a new district dating from 1826, which seems to be generally known as the Zaringian suburb. The cathedral, in boldness of design and perfectness of execution, in solemnity and grandeur of aspect, is inferior only to that of Strassburg. We are speaking, be it understood, of German cathedrals. Religious art has here produced a masterpiece, which seems to be informed, if we may venture on a somewhat fanciful expression, with the enthusiasm of a devout and lofty genius. It is surprising that an edifice, whose gradual erection spread over a couple of centuries, should everywhere exhibit so fine a harmony. It was begun between the years 1122 and 1152, in the reign of Conrad, duke of Zaringia. The nave, the west aisle, the tower, and the porch date from 1236–72. The new choir was begun in 1354, and not completed until 1513. In 1561 a portion of the spire was destroyed by lightning, but it was soon restored.

Built of red sandstone, which time and atmos-

pheric influences have toned down sufficiently, the cathedral of Freiburg is, unquestionably, a structure of surpassing beauty. Its ground plan is cruciform, and it occupies the centre of an open area, in the direction of west to east. Its tower, crowned by a pyramidal spire, is 340 feet in height. The first stage forms a square; the second, above the gallery, a dodecagon, which quickly passes into an octagon, the whole ending in an "octagonal pyramid" of the most exquisite open work. The western entrance, at the base of the tower, which is of the same width as the nave, is enriched with eight and twenty columns, each adorned with a statue of admirable design and execution. The gateway is divided into two by a solid column, ornamented with a fine statue of the Virgin, and covered with remarkable sculpture. Finally, a bas-relief, inserted above the gate, represents, in four tableaux, some Biblical incidents and scenes from the life of our Saviour. The interior of the minster, from end to end, is 460 feet in length. The nave is divided from the aisles by six pillars (each about six and a half feet in diameter) on either side; and against these are erected, on pedestals, statues of the Twelve Apostles. Nave and aisles, taken together, measure ninety-five feet across. These dimensions alone will enable the reader to form some dim notion of the magnificence of the *coup d'œil* which bursts upon the spectator as he passes through the entrance door; but to realize the scene he must fill the windows with richly painted glass, which sheds a "dim religious light" on pavement and statue and column, and embellishes each carved capital and the sculptured balustrade carried along the side-walls, with the rarest dyes, "gules and emerald and amethyst."

The exterior of the cathedral, especially on the south, is not less impressive than the interior. Its flying buttresses, its balustrades, its statues, its niches and their Gothic dais, its curious and very various spouts, its side doors, its atriums, its interminable rows of windows, its Gothic *rosaces*, its carved pedestals, its abounding wealth of strange, quaint, monstrous, and beautiful sculpture, all so completely original, and, if we may use the expression, individual, would furnish the stranger with material for a whole day's investigation.

Worth visiting also, as Mr. Mayhew tells us, is the Munster Platz, or Cathedral Square, for the peculiarity of the costumes one sees congregated at the spot. This, continues our authority, is the principal market-place, and the head-dresses of the peasants here are of the most peculiar character. Most of the women wear two huge black ribbon bows perched right on the crown of the head, each bow being spread out fan-shape, and the two together seeming like the enormous wings of a gigantic black butterfly that has settled on the top of the skull. This is the true Margravia, or Breisgau fashion; the Catholics wearing the bows embroidered with gold at the back, and the Protestants preferring them plain. Other women, again, have straw hats of a most masculine shape, poised as it were on the head, and bright red handkerchiefs tied over their ears, while long Swiss tails hang down the back in double Chinese fashion, and are tied with ribbon that reaches literally down to the heels.

After the Cathedral, there are few buildings in Freiburg which the visitor cares to see. The Minster dwarfs as it were, and humiliates them. Still the Ludwigs (Protestant) Church, built in 1827–38, is worth a visit. It occupies the summit of a gentle elevation at the north end of the town, in the Zaringian suburb.

Then, among the sights of the town are, the archiepiscopal palace, east of the Kaufhaus; the fifteenth century fountain, in the Kaiser-strasse; the fountain in the Fish Market, built in 1807, and adorned with a statue of the founder of Freiburg, Berthold III.; the university, erected in 1454, and containing a valuable library of upwards of 120,000 volumes; the blind asylum; and the palace of the grand duke. The university has been rendered illustrious by the names of Capiton, Erasmus, and Philip von Engen; and in our own day by those of Hug the orientalist, Rotteck the historian, Welker the jurisconsult, and Beck and Baumgarten the physicians. It has thirty-five professors, and 228 students.

By way of the Höllenthal the traveller may proceed from Freiburg to the Schauinsland or Erdkasten, whose summit, 4200 feet above the sea-level, commands the finest view in Baden; a view including not only the heights of the Black Forest, the Kandel, the Feldberg, and the Belchen, and the dim shadowy valleys which penetrate into their recesses, but the rich plain of the Rhine, fertile, sunny, and radiant, the Vosges, the mighty masses of the Jura and the Alps, from the Glœrnisch and the Tœdi to the Dent-du-Midi and the "monarch

of the mountains," Mont Blanc. The centre of this grand mountain chain is occupied by the white peaks of the Bernese Alps.

FREIBURG TO OFFENBURG.

We may now resume our journey along the Baden bank of the Rhine.

About three miles to the north lies the ruined castle of the dukes of Zaringia or Zähringen, the founders of the reigning family of Baden. It commands an attractive picture of the surrounding district of the Breisgau.

Passing Denzlingen, we soon come in sight of Emmendingen, a town of 2170 inhabitants. The only notable fact recorded in connection with it is that the astronomer Kepler, and the antiquary Schœpflin, were educated at its grammar-school.

From Emmendingen we make a detour to the Hochburg or Hochberg. The ruins are said to be the most extensive in Germany. The castle was founded by a family of the same name; sustained a siege during the Peasants' War; was occupied during the Thirty Years' War by the Margrave George Frederick, fortified after the peace of Westphalia by Frederick VI., and dismantled by order of the great French war-minister, Louvois, in 1689.

Continuing our route, we leave on the left the volcanic range of the Kaisersstuhl, and on the right the undulating ridges of the Black Forest, as we draw near to Riegel. From this station the Kaisersstuhl—so called because the Emperor Rudolph of Hapsburg, in his hunting expeditions, frequently rested on its summit—is usually visited. The highest point is indicated by nine lime trees (1950 feet). It lays bare to the eye the entire sweep of the Rhine, and of each side of its valley, from Basel to Strassburg.

Crossing the Elz, we reach Kurzingen (population, 2313), which formerly belonged to Austria; and crossing the Bleiche, we arrive at Herbolzheim (population, 2063). Leaving Ringsheim on the right, we come to Ettenheim (population, 2931), at the mouth of the valley of the Undiz; a place of interest as the scene of the forcible arrest of the young Duc d'Enghien, on the 15th of March, 1804.

The summit of the steep conical Hohengerold is crowned by the ruins of a castle, destroyed in 1697 by the French under the Marshal de Créqui. The view from it is very beautiful, and the Rhine valley is seen inclosed between the Vosges on the west, and the Black Forest on the east, prior to its escape into the fertile plains of Baden, Hesse Darmstadt, and Rhenish Prussia.

Offenburg (with a population of 4408), is situated at the mouth of the valley of the Kinzig, about three miles above the junction of that river with the Rhine. It was formerly a free imperial town, but by the treaty of Presburg was ceded to Baden. At the end of the principal street the English visitor will be surprised to see a statue of the bold, bluff, sturdy Elizabethan sea-king, Sir Francis Drake, erected in 1583, apparently to commemorate his introduction of the potato into Europe.

At the Appenweiler station, a mile beyond Offenburg, a branch line strikes off on the left for Kehl and Strassburg (we adopt the German orthography), while the main line descends the bank of the Rhine to Carlsruhe, Mannheim, and Frankfort.

Kehl (population, 1903) attained a melancholy celebrity in the late war, having been laid in ruins by the batteries of Strassburg, during the siege of the latter by the German army under General Werder. It is situated at the confluence of the Kinzig and the Schutter with the Rhine, and was formerly an imperial fortress of some distinction.

The Rhine at this point is divided into two branches by an island, on which stood the French custom-house, and still stands the monument to General Desaix. The island is connected with the mainland on either side by a bridge of boats, blown up in 1870. The railway is, or was, carried across the river from Kehl to Strassburg by an iron lattice bridge on four piers, erected in 1861.

This connecting line between the French and German railways was opened on the 6th of April, 1861. It describes an immense curve around the city, for it first proceeds towards Paris for three-quarters of a mile, then connects itself with the Baden Railway by a branch of 800 yards in length, and follows up that of Basel for 2200 yards, as far as Kœnigshofen. Beyond this village it assumes a "separate existence," crosses the Ill and the Rhone and Rhine Canal, and approaches the walls of Strassburg. Skirting the cemetery of St. Urbain, and passing the south side of the citadel, it reaches the Porte d'Austerlitz station. On a light girder bridge it traverses the Little Rhine, opening up a view of the monument of General Desaix on the Ile des Epis.

CHAPTER III.

THE CITY OF STRASSBURG, OR STRASBURG.

STRASSBURG, like most of the Rhenish cities, is of Roman origin; like Köln and Coblenz, Mainz, Bingen, and Speier. It was the old Romano-Celtic Argentoratum, and it is easy to understand that to the warriors of Rome its position would recommend itself as possessed of peculiar military advantages. It is situated at the confluence of the rivers Ill and Brieusch, about half a league from the Rhine; so as to hold the entrance to the valleys of both rivers. Hence, its possession has at all times been fiercely disputed by hostile armies endeavouring to obtain command of the Upper Rhine.

The strength of its fortifications, which were designed by Vauban, may readily be inferred from the resistance they offered, in 1870, to the Prussian arms. The siege was gallantly maintained; the defence was equally heroic; and the inhabitants suffered terribly before General Uhrich consented to relinquish the defence. The Prussian artillery had not only reduced the outworks to ruins, and effected a breach in the walls, but, at one time, had poured shot and shell into the doomed city, setting on fire the houses of inoffensive citizens, and slaying women and children, the old and young, the unarmed civilian as well as the soldier. For six weeks Strassburg held out bravely; but in the end, General Uhrich having done enough for his own fame, acted nobly in not prolonging a defence by which the unarmed and feeble must have been the principal sufferers. Happily, this terrible siege, in all its wide-spread devastation, has left comparatively uninjured the great pride, and boast, and ornament of Strassburg; its famous Minster has escaped the "storms of battle."

In outline as in details the cathedral of Strassburg deserves nearly all the praise that has been lavished upon it; and it is certain that no man of taste or fancy can look upon it without a very powerful emotion of reverent admiration. The spire rises 460 feet above the pavement; that is, one foot lower than the great Pyramid of Egypt, 104 feet higher than the cross of St. Paul's, 40 feet higher than the steeple of St. Etienne at Vienna, 28 feet higher than St. Peter's at Rome, and 258 feet higher than the monument of London. A doorway in the south side of the truncated tower leads to its summit. The next chief point of interest is the western façade, whose delicate and yet luxuriant beauty it would be difficult to overpraise; though we think it inferior to the corresponding parts of the cathedrals of York and Exeter. The effect has been compared to that of a netting of detached pillars and arches thrown—we had almost said spun—over the solid mass or body of the cathedral. And delicate as are the mouldings and sculptures, such is the hardness and excellent preservation of the stone, that they preserve all their original sharpness, and look "like a veil of the finest cast iron." The window is circular, and forty-eight feet in diameter.

After the spire and the west front, the principal object of interest to the traveller is the clock, whose origin dates as far back as 1352, in which year it was set up in its place in the south transept, under the auspices of Berthold de Buchek, then bishop of Strassburg. It was divided into three parts, of which the lowest exhibited a universal calendar. In the middle was an astrolabe, and in the upper section might be seen the figures of the Three Kings and the Virgin, carved in wood. When the hour struck the three kings bowed to the Virgin, while a carillon chimed a lively air, and a cock crowed and clapped his wings. In course of time, however, this ingenious mechanism got out of order, and in 1547 its repair was intrusted to Dr. Michael Herr, Chretei Herlin, and Nicholas Prugnor, three distinguished mathematicians. They died before the work was finished, but it was continued by Conrad Dasypodius, a pupil of Herlin, and completed in four years. Thenceforth the clock went merry as a marriage bell up to the year of the great French Revolution, when it struck for the last time, as if it felt it had been created in accordance with the "old order" of things, and was not in harmony with "the new."

Nearly fifty years passed away before any attempt was made to restore it to a working con-

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dition. During this time it fell into a state of pitiable dilapidation, and when the mechanicians came to examine it, they found that the works were eaten up with rust and verdigris, and that nothing could be done. At length, one Schwilgué, an artist and mathematician of Strassburg—who is still, or, at all events, was recently living—undertook to repair, modify, and reinstate the clock; which task, it is recorded, he commenced on June 24, 1836, and completed in 1840. The mechanism of the new clock was set up in the old framing, the number of the figures having been increased, and their appearance improved by jointed limbs. The quarter chimes are struck by figures representative of the Four Ages of Man, which move in a circle round the skeleton Time and his sweeping scythe. The hour bell is struck by a winged Genius, at the same moment that a figure of an angel turns an hour-glass, through whose narrow neck the sand continuously pours year after year. Daily, at noon, a procession of the Twelve Apostles wheels around a figure of the Saviour. Each one in passing bends towards him, and he, when the circuit is complete, extends his hands as if in the act of blessing. During the procession a cock claps his wings, opens his beak, and crows three times.

This singular and complex piece of mechanism exhibits the month and the day of the month, the sign of the zodiac, the Dominical letter, the sidereal time, the Copernican planetary system, and the precession of the Equinoxes; and the works are elaborated with so much ingenuity, that it also marks the 29th day of February in every leap year. Moreover, the various phases of the moon are shown, and the solar and lunar equations for the reduction of the mean movements of the sun and moon.

The façade of the cathedral is decorated by three porticoes. The central, ornamented with columns and with fourteen statues of the Hebrew prophets, is both the grandest and the most beautiful; though its gate of bronze, covered all over with the richest work, was melted down at the Revolution, converted into coin, and is now replaced by one of wood. The portico on the right hand is embellished with statues of the Ten Virgins, the Bridegroom, and Bride; that on the left, with figures of other virgins treading under their feet the capital sins. The tympana and pediments of all three portals are filled in with the most exquisite sculpture; and above, on the line where the second story commences, are set the spirited equestrian statues of Clovis, Dagobert, Rudolph of Hapsburg, and Louis XIV. The latter is of modern workmanship, and was not elevated to its present noble position until 1828. Also of modern workmanship and recent erection are the statues, on a somewhat higher level, of Pepin the Short, Charlemagne, Otho the Great, and Henry the Fowler, each in his turn a ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.

Above the central gateway shines the glorious marigold window, which measures forty-three feet in diameter, and is filled with glass restored by Messieurs Ritter and Muller.

The north and south towers are each pierced with a noble window, enriched by numerous *rosaces;* and rosaces likewise embellish and beautify the pediments of the side doors. Statues of the apostles occupy a gallery raised above the great central rose. Higher still stands the majestic figure of our Lord, holding a cross and banner. On each side of this same stage may be seen a lofty ogival window behind a cluster of slender shapely pillars.

The third stage is occupied, between the two towers, by a massive belfry of late construction, inclosing four bells, of which the heaviest, cast in 1427, weighs 9000 kilogrammes. This portion of the façade was decorated in 1849 with a colossal sculpture, representing the Last Judgment. The entire story, except so far as the noble tower is concerned, is surmounted by a platform, where a small hut is erected for the keepers charged with ringing the bells, and raising an alarm in case of fire. From the north tower springs the münster, as it is called, or spire; this is supported by an octagonal tower; octagonal, yet, from a distance, apparently square, because four of the sides are concealed by winding staircases.

The spire is an eight-sided obelisk of the most exquisite open work, consisting of six tiers of small turrets, raised one above another in pyramid-fashion. A miracle of art, from its surpassing delicacy and admirable boldness! On the sixth tier or story rests the lantern, to which eight open winding staircases lead up; and thence, by steps constructed on the outside, the adventurous climber reaches the crown. Higher still, above another opening, poetically called " the rose," shoots the graceful spire in the form of a cross, five and a half feet high; finally, this cross terminates in a *bouton*, 460 millimètres in diameter, surmounted by a lightning-conductor.

The south doorway consists of two semicircular doors, and is ornamented with bas-reliefs and statues. Two of these were carved by the firm hand of Sabina von Steinbach, Erwin's daughter. On the parvise in front stands a statue of Erwin, executed a few years ago by M. Grass, the statuary of the cathedral. The old north doorway is masked by a façade, built in 1492 by Jacques de Landshut. The nave, covered with a copper roof, which suffered much during the great siege, is lighted by great pointed windows, ornamented with rosaces. Scarcely, indeed, is there a foot of stone which does not exhibit some more or less conspicuous effort of the carver's skill in statues, and gargoyles, and shapely pinnacles.

We now enter the interior; and the imagination recoils overpowered by the awful impression of that lofty aisle, whose vaulted roof soars heavenward with all the elasticity and strength of a forest arcade, and scarcely seems to lean on the double row of clustered columns which supports it. Rich glories dye the pavement; streaming in through many-coloured windows, which immortalize the names of John of Kirchheim, John Markgraf, Jacques Vischer, and the brothers Link. How soft and sweet the light which shimmers through each painted pane, and weaves a fine phantasmagoria of colour over wall and column! The pulpit is a masterpiece: it was carved in stone by John Hammern in 1406. The once-famous organ, built by Andrew Silbermann in 1714, was destroyed in the siege of 1870.

One of the columns supporting the roof of the choir is composed of a sheaf or group of pillars. It is known as the Angel's Column, and being of comparatively recent date is popularly attributed to Erwin of Steinbach. In the south transept, opposite a statue of Bishop Werner, stands the great clock which we have already described so fully.

The apse, intended to serve as a sanctuary, is, perhaps, too shallow. It is ascended from the choir by a flight of steps. The crypt, restored about eleven years since, contains a nave, a choir, and two apses. At the entrance we pause to contemplate a very ancient sculpture, representing our Saviour seized by the Roman soldiers on the Mount of Olives. The form of the pillars, the cubic capitals, the semicircular arches of the crypt, may be accepted as proofs that it was erected early in the eleventh century.

The chapel of St. Andrew, in the south aisle of the choir, contains the tombs of several bishops. Its columns and ornaments are very ancient.

In the chapel of St. John the Baptist, behind the north aisle, is the superb Gothic monument erected in honour of Bishop Conrad II., of Lichtenberg, who died in 1299. Near the entrance to this chapel our attention will be arrested by the baptistery, in stone, of Josse Dotzinger, of Worms: died 1449.

The chapel of St. Catherine, in the right wing, contains the tomb of a chevalier of Strassburg, remarkable for the number and excellence of the figures which decorate it, and for the singular manner in which they are grouped.

The cathedral contains several paintings by Strassburg artists; among others, the Adoration of the Shepherds, by Guèrin; the Entombment of Christ, by Klein; and the Ascension, by Heim.

In a little court behind the chapel of St. John is the tomb of the sculptor Erwin, his wife, and son. In the north side of the cathedral, the St. Lawrence chapel is enriched with renovated sculptures, representing the martyrdom of the saints.

We now direct our steps to the Protestant church of St. Thomas, which occupies the site of a palace of the Frankish kings. After being twice burned, and twice reconstructed, it was completely rebuilt by Bishop Henry, in 1264. Externally, its characteristic features are its towers; the west is partly built in the Byzantine style; the east, in the Gothic. In the interior we shall find some admirable painted glass, and several curious monuments; among others, the celebrated monument of the Maréchal de Saxe, the masterpiece of the sculptor Pigalle, erected to the great soldier's memory by Louis XV., in 1777. A monument of very different character is the tomb of Bishop Adeloch, with its curious sculptures. It bears the date of DCCCXXX (830), but surely this is somewhat apocryphal.

The other churches are those of St. Peter the Elder (the most ancient in Strassburg, and easily distinguished by the graceful Gothic spire which crowns its dome); St. Peter the Younger (built in 1030, restored in 1290); St. William, so named in honour of William of Aquitaine, founder of the monastic order of the Guillelmites (here are the tombs of Counts Philip and Ulrich of Werden); the Madeleine (the choir is surpassingly beautiful); and St. Stephen, a Byzantine building of

the eighth century, which in its time has played many parts, having been a church, a storehouse, a theatre, a tobacco manufactory, and again a church.

The Académie Royale was founded in 1538 as a Protestant school. In 1621 it was raised to the rank of a university, but it was suppressed at the Revolution. It was here that Goethe completed his studies, and took his doctor's degree in 1771. Indeed, the residence of the great German poet and philosopher at Strassburg is one of the most interesting associations of the place.

The offices of the Prefecture are worth a word of notice, on account of their own stately architecture, and because they occupy the site of the funeral pile on which ten thousand Jews were burned, in 1349, because they refused baptism. The founder of these buildings was François Joseph Klinglin, and the date of their erection, the early part of the eighteenth century.

Between the Ill and the south side of the cathedral stands the Château Imperial, formerly the episcopal palace, and one of the stateliest piles in Strassburg. In the same neighbourhood we find a rich and striking Renaissance mansion, the Frauenhaus, built in 1581. The chief object in its interior is a staircase of singularly light and elegant construction. Here are preserved the ancient plans, on parchment, of the cathedral: the works of the old astronomical clock; fragments of the cathedral, secured during its various alterations and repairs; and a collection of plaster casts of the most remarkable sculptures.

Strassburg has long and deservedly been quoted as a brilliant example of what may be done by a liberal city for the education of its children. Before the war it contained, besides its Academy, an Imperial Lyceum,* a Protestant gymnasium, thirty-six primary schools, and twenty-four charities, supported by the town, and attended by 8000 pupils of both sexes; a normal primary school for schoolmasters; a normal primary school for Protestant mistresses; a municipal industrial school; a Jewish school; two institutions for the deaf and dumb; Catholic seminaries; a Protestant seminary; schools of design; a school of artillery; two schools to prepare young ladies for the work of tuition; four intermediate schools, into which, at a suitable time, the children passed from the charitable asylums; two evening schools for young artisans; a school of medicine; and a conservatory of music.

Our last journey conducts us to the Platz Kléber, where the convent of the Cordeliers, and a tower containing the archives and treasury of the city, gave way in 1767–68 to a vast public edifice of heavy design, formerly occupied by the governor's staff. In the centre of the open area, on a pedestal covered with inscriptions and vigorous bas-reliefs, stands a bronze statue of General Kléber, executed by Philippe Grass.

Besides Kléber, Strassburg gave Marshal Kellermann to the French army. François Christophe was born of an old and distinguished family, on the 30th of May, 1735. Entering the army in 1752, he served with good repute in the Seven Years' War, and in 1789, when the French revolution opened a career to men of talent, was a maréchal de camp. In 1790 he obtained the military command of the departments of the Haut and Bas Rhin, and early in 1792 attained the rank of lieutenant-general.

Dumouriez, at the head of the main body of the French army, was encamped at Grand Pré, in the forest of Argonne, and gravely threatened by the advancing Prussians. With a corps of twenty-two thousand men Kellermann hastened to his relief, and by a series of brilliant forced marches gained Valmy, a strong position on the right of Dumouriez. Here he was separated by a valley or ravine from the heights of La Lune, on which the Prussians were posted thrice as strong in numbers. About eleven o'clock on the 20th of September the latter assaulted in column, supported by artillery, Kellermann's position. A fierce struggle ensued, but the brilliant manœuvres of the French general compelled the enemy to retire with considerable loss. It is noticeable that this victory was won on the day that monarchy was abolished in France. Its importance was immense. It saved the young republic from annihilation, and strengthened the heart of the people in their resolution to defy the coalition of Europe.

* The Lyceum was built in 1756, and occupies the site of the hostelry of the Thiergarten, where Gutenberg made his first experiments in the art of printing.

CHAPTER IV.

STRASSBURG TO SPEIER.

LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE.

THERE are no steamers navigating this portion of the Rhine. The road from Strassburg is good, and very agreeable. The railway lies further inland, approaching very near the northern prolongation of the Vosges, and connecting Hagnenau and Weissenburg, in France, with Landau, in Rhenish Prussia. From Strassburg to Weissenburg the distance is about forty-one miles.

At Vendenheim (population, 1362) we branch off from the Paris Railway—which proceeds by way of Nancy, Bar-le-Duc, and Châlons-sur-Marne, to the "capital of civilization"—and strike in a northerly direction; passing Hærdt (population, 1700), and Bischwiller (population, 8780), on the Moder. The latter is a busy and animated town, with those tall shafts rising above its roofs which invariably tell of commercial prosperity.

Traversing the "leafy shades" of the forest of Haguenau, we arrive at Walburg, a village of 600 inhabitants, on the Eberbach. Here the church is of great architectural interest. It belonged to an ancient abbey of Benedictine monks, founded, it is said, in the fifth century, and destroyed in 1525.

By way of Hoffen (population, 650) and Stundsbach (population, 750) we proceed to Wissembourg, or Weissenburg, a town of 5000 inhabitants, on the right bank of the Lauter, and at the base of the last buttresses or spurs of the prolonged chain of the Vosges. It was anciently one of the ten imperial free towns of Elsass. Captured by Louis XIV. in 1673, its possession was formally confirmed to France by the peace of Ryswick. Here, in 1870, the Prussians gained one of their earliest victories over the French.

Beyond Weissenburg the railway crosses the Lauter, an affluent of the Rhine, the "clear" river which marks the boundary of Alsace, and enters Germany in the territory of the Bavarian Palatinate.

Winden is the station for Bergzabern, a town of 3000 inhabitants, and the junction point of the branch-railway to Carlsruhe, which crosses the Rhine at Maxau.

Passing Rohrbach, we quickly arrive at Landau (population, 7500), on the Queich, a fortified town and depot on the Germanic frontier. In the thirteenth century it was an insignificant village. In 1291 Rudolph of Hapsburg elevated it to the rank of a town, which was soon, much to its misfortune, surrounded by fortifications. Thereafter it became a military position of importance, and from the fifteenth century its history has been aptly described as a "succession of sieges, blockades, bombardments, captures, and surrenders." During the Thirty Years' War it was captured and pillaged eight times by the troops of Count Mansfeldt, the Spaniards, the Swedes, the Imperialists, and the French. By the treaty of Westphalia it was made over to France, who kept it for about three years. In 1678 it fell into the hands of the duke of Lorraine, but in the following year was recaptured by the French, to whom it was confirmed by the treaty of Ryswick. In the interval (1679–1691), its fortifications had been strengthened by the genius of Vauban, and the town nearly destroyed by fire (1689). During the profitless War of the Spanish Succession, its boasted impregnability was disproved, and it capitulated on four different occasions. In 1796 it was blockaded by the allies; but the victory of Weissenburg, won by Hoche and Pichegru, compelled them to raise the siege, and thence, until 1815, it remained in the hands of the French. By the treaties of Vienna it was given, first to Austria, and afterwards to Bavaria. Of late years its defences have been greatly neglected. The view from the church tower is extensive, and not deficient in the elements of the picturesque.

From Landau we proceed to Madenburg and Trifels, passing Arzheim, Ilbeseim, and Eschbach.

The Madenberg, or Madenburg, is the most perfect castle in the Rheinpfalz, and notwithstanding its ruined condition impresses the mind of the spectator by the singular dignity and magnificence of its aspect. The date of its foundation is unknown,

and it first appears in history in the thirteenth century as the seat of the count of Leiningen. It was besieged, taken, and plundered by the Emperor Frederick the Victorious in 1470. In 1516 Ulrich, duke of Würtemburg, sold it to the archbishop of Spires (or Speier), but its ecclesiastical sanctity did not protect it from the insurgent peasants in 1525. Though almost razed to the ground, it sprang again into a splendid existence; again to be given up to the flames in 1552, by the margrave of Brandenburg, surnamed Alcibiades. Thrice, in less than a century, was the Madenburg ruined and rebuilt. Next came the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, and we read of it as alternately in the possession of the troops of Mansfeldt (1622), the French (1634), the Imperialists (1636), and the French again (1644). By the peace of Westphalia it was restored to the archbishops of Speier. It was once more restored, and on a very extensive scale; but in 1680 the French attacked, captured, and dismantled it. A stately ruin, it occupies the crest of a considerable and well-wooded ascent, and speaks with silent eloquence of the vicissitudes it has undergone in the stormy past. From its shattered battlements the traveller obtains one of those wide, bright, varied, and historic pictures which are met with nowhere else in such number and splendour as along the banks of the German river; a picture including the grim mountains of the Odenwald, the peaks of the Haardt, the irregular summits of the Vosges, with all their changing lights and shadows; the meanderings of the Rhine, the cathedral spire of Strassburg, and the old historic cities of Mannheim, Speier, and Worms.

An extension of our journey as far as Trifels will not fail to be of interest. The castle is now a complete ruin; it occupies, as its name implies, the summits of three conical heights, the Hauptberg (which is northernmost), the Anebos (to the south), and Trifels (in the centre). The chief remains now extant are those of a massive tower on the Hauptberg, in whose subterranean dungeon, according to tradition, Richard Cœur de Lion was imprisoned by Duke Leopold of Austria. In 1330 the castle of Trifels passed into the hands of the Princes Palatine. It is situated about 1422 feet above the sea-level. Even in its decay it is gravely imposing, and it commands a prospect of the richest and rarest character. On the adjoining hill of Scharfenberg rises a tower of 100 feet in height.

After leaving Landau, and passing the stations of Kerdningen and Edesheim, we arrive at Edenkoben, an industrial town of 4500 inhabitants. It is surrounded by extensive vineyards, but the wine is of inferior quality. On an adjacent hill, in the heart of vines and chestnut-trees, is situated the modern royal villa of Ludwigshöhe, and above it, on a higher eminence, bold and precipitous, moulder the ruins of the old castle of Rippburg, destroyed in the thirteenth century. To the north of the town wells a mineral spring, the Kurbrunnen.

From Edenkoben the traveller may repair to the Kropsburg, the Maxburg, and the Kalmit; or may ascend, through the western valley of the Modenbacher-thal, to the Steigerkoff, popularly designated the Schænzel, whose summit, elevated some 2100 feet above the sea, commands what the guide-book calls a "magnificent panorama" of the valley-plain of the Rhine, and the heights which border on it.

The railway skirts the base of the Haardt Mountains, whose peaks and ravines offer many delightful vistas. On the opposite side, in clear and sunny weather, the long blue line of the summits of the Black Forest may be traced, like the undulating crest of a distant wave.

Maikammer is a town of 3000 inhabitants. On the right tower the massive and predominant bulks of the Maxburg, the Kalmit, and the Kropsburg. All the land seems burdened with their shadow, like a people lying under a great woe. But as their noble outlines rise more and more distinctly upon us, our heart seems to go forth towards the mountains, and we become sensible of their sublime associations of infinite silence and solitude, of purity, and majesty, and power.

From St. Martin, a village about two miles from Maikammer, the traveller most easily mounts to the Kropsburg, *i.e.*, the "fine view," a castle of thirteenth century foundation, whose annals may be summed up in a few pithy phrases; it was frequently embellished and enlarged; it escaped the scourge of war; it did *not* escape the scourge of fashion, for some caprice induced its ancient lords to abandon and sell it, early in the present century. Thereafter it was partly demolished to furnish materials for the fortifications of Germersheim, and now it is occupied as a workhouse or benevolent asylum.

Above Maikammer, where, let us note, the

church contains a good altar-piece by some German artist, rises the Kalmit (2300 feet), the culminating point of the mountains of the Palatinate, the Donnersberg alone excepted. An obelisk on the summit was erected by the people of Maikammer, in 1824, to King Maximilian Joseph.

The ascent of the wooded height of the Maxburg (1020 feet) may be made either from Oberhambach, from Mittelhambach, or by a path which skirts the southern acclivity.

The Maxburg, anciently known as the Hambacher Schloss, the Kæstelberg, and Kestenburg, is a stately, castellated pile, surmounted by a square turreted keep, which owes its present name to the circumstance that it was presented to King Maximilian by his subjects, on the occasion of his marriage to the Princess Mary of Prussia, October 12, 1842. It was then rebuilt on a magnificent scale by the architect Voit, of Munich, and a more splendid marriage-gift it would be difficult to imagine. It is not only a noble and majestic structure, with a richly-decorated interior, but it commands a wide and richly-coloured view of the mountains of the Haardt, and the beautiful valley-plain of the Rhine.

When the ancient castle of the Maxburg was founded, no German antiquary seems able to determine. From the Roman remains which have been discovered, it is allowable to suppose that the site was once occupied by a Roman camp. The castle afterwards erected on the same spot belonged, from the year 1100 down to the epoch of the French Revolution, to the cathedral-chapter of Speier; an instance of unbroken possession very unusual in Germany, whose castles generally changed hands once every half century. It was taken and pluudered by the peasants in 1525; taken, plundered, and burned by the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg in 1552. The bishop of Speier showed no inclination to rebuild it, but in the great war of the Spanish Succession the French did what they could to complete its destruction. At the date of the French Revolution it became national property; and in 1823 was sold, on condition that the purchaser should not attempt to remove the ruins of the ancient pile. Here, on the 25th of May, 1832, was held the great popular demonstration of the Hambacher Fest, when the enthusiasm of a crowd of German students was fired by wild, vague ideas of consolidating German unity; a task only to be successfully accomplished, as we have seen, by "blood and iron."

Returning to Maikammer, we continue our railway route to Neustadt, sometimes called Neustadt an der Haardt, to distinguish it from other towns of the same name. It is a busy commercial and agricultural town, pleasantly situated at the foot of the well-wooded and vine-clad slopes of the Haardt mountains, and on the Rehbach, a small affluent of the Rhine. It forms the key of a valley which the conical bulk of the Kœnigsberg apparently closes. On the height immediately above the town rise the ivy-shrouded ruins of the Castle Winzingen, or Haarsten Schloss, formerly the residence of the Electors Palatine, but reduced to decay in the Thirty Years' War and the War of Succession. The ruins are now attached to a handsome villa, and surrounded by blooming gardens, which command a view of the Rhine as far as Heidelberg.

The church of Neustadt is a stately Gothic structure, with massive towers, completed in the fourteenth century. It contains some interesting monuments of the Pfalzgraves, especially of Rudolph II. and Robert I., and some remains of ancient mural paintings in the fore-court, called the "Paradise."

In the neighbourhood of the town are the ruins of several castles, bearing mute and yet eloquent testimony to the desolation which a long series of wars effected in this fertile and beautiful region. The Wolfsburg was destroyed in the Peasants' War. Elmstein recalls the bitter memories of the Thirty Years' War. Some extensive quarries are here excavated in the Bunter sandstein and Muschelkalk; the latter, it is said, is rich in fossils.

LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE—LAUTERBURG TO SPEIER, BY RAIL.

The reader will remember that the route we have described in the preceding pages lies inland, at some miles from the Rhine, but forming the direct railway route from Strassburg to Neustadt. We now proceed to notice briefly a course that hugs more closely the bank of the great river.

From Strassburg the traveller makes his way to Lauterburg, by road, passing Germersheim, Fort Louis, Seltz, and Bernheim, and obtaining many glimpses of the broad and freely flowing Rhine, and of the picturesque wooded islands which occasionally diversify its channel. At Fort Louis,

twenty-seven miles from Strassburg, a fine view of the celebrated spire of the cathedral may be obtained in clear weather. At a place called Knielingen, the railway to Carlsruhe is carried across the Rhine on a bridge of boats.

Below Lauterburg, a small fortified town of no great importance, and of less interest, the Lauter enters the Rhine.

A little lower down the river is crossed by another bridge of boats, and we arrive at Germersheim, a town of even less interest than Lauterburg, squalid, mean, and dirty, but surrounded by fortifications of great strength, which have been erected since 1834. This town was founded by the Emperor Rudolph of Hapsburg, who died here in 1291.

The country between Germersheim and Speier calls for no remark.

RIGHT BANK OF THE RHINE.—KEHL TO SPEIER.

From Kehl it will be convenient for the reader to return with us to Offenburg, and thence to descend the right bank of the Rhine by railway, visiting Rastadt (and Baden-Baden), Carlsruhe, and Philipsburg.

Passing the Appenweiler Junction, and the station at Renchen, we cross the Knisbis, and arrive at Achern, where there is a statue of Leopold, grand-duke of Baden, in the market-place.

At Sarsbach, two miles distant on the left, an obelisk of granite was erected by the French in 1829, to mark the spot where Marshal Turenne was killed by a cannon-ball, while reconnoitring the imperial army, July 27, 1675. Three previous monuments erected to his memory had been successively destroyed.

M. Charles Lallemand, in his elaborate work, "Les Paysans Badois," says, the vast plain which extends from the Rhine to the Black Forest, from Kehl to Appenweiler, has preserved its traditional costume and ancient manners. The Badish Hanau, he adds, is a kind of preface to the Black Forest. On quitting Kehl, and speeding along the branch line which, at Appenweiler, joins the great Baden railway, have you not a score of times admired those fertile levels, covered with crops, and meadows, and woods, which stretch afar on either hand, some with pretty villages where the peasant inhabitants move to and fro in a garb so picturesque and so elegant, that they seem the actors in an immense comic opera given by nature on this charming stage? And on Sunday especially, oh, then, nothing is wanting! neither idylls, nor merry ballads, nor harmonious choruses. So well defined, so distinct, and so individual is this picturesque country, in the heart of the uniformity which has crept over the surrounding plain, that the Badish people and writers preserve to it its ancient name of Hanauer-Lændchen, though it has been formally incorporated into the Mittel-Rheinrcis, or "Middle Rhine-circle." Hanauer-Lændchen (Lændchen being the diminutive of Land) signifies, the "little country of Hanau." The word seems to breathe an atmosphere of purity, freshness, and tenderness; it testifies to a love of country which is worth its weight in gold to artists, authors, and tourists.

We now come to Ottersweier, a town of nearly 2000 inhabitants, to the right of the railway, and close to the mouth of the Neusatzerthal, a pleasant and picturesque valley, watered by the Ambach. At about two miles from Ottersweier is the Hubbad, erected in 1811, after the plans of Weinbrenner. The thermal spring here is said to be efficacious in certain diseases of the stomach and bowels, in gout and rheumatic affections. In the neighbourhood lies the ruined castle of Windeck.

At Bühl, our next resting place, the most interesting object is the venerable church, the patriarch of the Badish churches in this part of the plain. The town has a population of 3000, and seems busy and prosperous; its fertile environs have been poetically but not untruly designated, *das goldene Land*. A stream called the Bühlotbach here flows down from the romantic valley of Bühl, which, by way of Herrenweise, communicates with the not less romantic valleys of Geroldsau and the Murz, and is famous for its vineyards and the "brave red wine" known as the Affenthaler.

Behind Steinbach, the hill of Yburg is crowned by the ruins of an old castle.

Leaving Sinzheim, a town of 2500 inhabitants, behind us, we cross the Oos rivulet, and speedily run into Oos junction, where we change carriages for one of the liveliest, gayest, and most beautiful of the German cities, the capital of the grand-duchy, Baden-Baden.

BADEN-BADEN.

The population of Baden-Baden is about 8000; that is, the permanent population; for the visitors in the season raise the total to 50,000.

Baden-Baden, the *Aurelia Aquensis* of the

Romans, the queen of continental watering-places, is situated in a fair and well-wooded valley, watered by the Oos, at a distance of about six miles from the Rhine. It lies, in the form of an amphitheatre, on the slope of a mountain, whose summit is crowned by the old castle of Baden. It may not be, as some enthusiastic travellers assert, the most beautiful spot in Europe; but, as a French writer remarks, it offers the greatest number of pleasant walks, especially for those who have eyes to see, and who love the bright long vista of fairy landscape and the deep shadows of wooded masses. If the forest were less luxuriant, and the waters more copious, the most enthusiastic of landscape amateurs would find nothing to displease them in this delectable region. And even as it is, there is such a freshness in the meadows, such a fulness and variety of vegetation, such a wealth of glowing colour in the picture, such a splendour and boldness of forms, that you can never weary of admiring them. Every day reveals to you a charm, a beauty previously unsuspected. In whatever direction you bend your steps, some secret surprise awaits and delights you.

And now for a glance at the history of Baden-Baden.

Note, as a preliminary, that the Oos or Oes (Oosbach), the comparatively insignificant stream which waters Baden, formerly separated the country of the Franks from that of the Allemanni. It still gives to this part of the grand-duchy—now a member of the North Germanic Confederation—the name of Oosgau or Usgau.

The origin of Baden, we are told by a learned authority, is referred to the most ancient times; and of all the towns on the right bank of the Rhine it has the oldest traditions, extending even as far back as the days of the Roman king, Tarquinius Priscus, when a Celtic colony *is said* to have settled here. At all events, it is certain that its sanative waters were soon discovered, and that they grew into repute among the Romans. According to an ancient monument which was discovered some years ago, its Latin designation was *Aurelia Aquensis;* or, more correctly speaking, it would seem to have been called *Civitas Aquensis* by its founder, Augustus, and *Aurelia* by a later benefactor, Caracalla. It was also visited by Trajan (who greatly improved it), Hadrian, and Antoninus. It was connected by a military road with *Argentoratum* (Strassburg), *Salatio* (Selz), and Pforzheim; and was the headquarters, in succession, of the third, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth legions. Wine was first grown here in the reign of the Emperor Probus.

Having been destroyed by the Allemanni, Baden disappears from the page of history for some centuries. When we again hear of it, it is in the reign of Dagobert I., king of the Franks. From the Franks it passed to the monks of Weissenburg, the duchy of Suabia, the house of Zæhringen, Henry the Lion (by marriage), and Frederick Barbarossa (by exchange). The red-bearded emperor bestowed it as a fief on the Margrave Hermann III. His successor, Hermann IV., was the first who resided in the ancient castle. The town now rose from its ruins, became the capital of the margraviate, and in 1243 possessed, as we read, a church. It was also surrounded by fortifications, which proved of sufficient strength, in 1330, to repulse the troops of Berthold, bishop of Strassburg. In 1453 the church was converted into a "collegiate foundation." The Margrave Christopher forsook the residence of his ancestors, and in 1475 erected the new castle on the height immediately above the town. By this time the mineral waters had attained so great a renown, that as many as three thousand bathers yearly visited them. It is recorded that during the prevalence of the plague in 1551, the waters were allowed to overflow and course through the streets; and owing, it was supposed, to the beneficial influence of their vapour, the pestilence never smote the town. It was less fortunate in its efforts to escape the plague of war. During the protracted struggle of the Thirty Years' War it suffered severely. In 1689 it was burned by the French under General Duras; its walls were dismantled, and the tombs of its margraves in the cloister church sacrilegiously broken open. After this event, the margraves retired to Rastadt, where they built a castle. In 1771 the branch of Baden-Baden became extinct in the person of the Margrave Augustus, and the line of Baden-Durlach inherited the ancestral territories.

The prosperity of Baden as a watering-place really dates from the epoch of the French Revolution, when numerous wealthy emigrés settled in its pleasant environs, and the fame of its baths spread among the higher classes of Europe. It was largely benefited by the Congress of Rastadt, for during the eighteen months its deliberations lasted,

the different ambassadors gladly quitted the grim fortress to take up their abode in this attractive town. To meet the ever-increasing demand, new edifices sprung "like exhalations" from the ground; bath-houses, palaces, theatres, hotels. In 1822 was built the new "Conversation-house." At this date rouge-et-noir began to flourish, and Chabert paid 25,000 florins a year for the privilege of keeping a gaming-table. Purafit, who succeeded him in 1838, found it profitable to increase this abominable tribute to 45,000 florins.

For the idler and the adventurer Baden will lose its principal attraction when the public gaming-tables are suppressed throughout the new German empire; but as it will still retain its delightful scenery and its baths, it is reasonable to expect that its prosperity will not be seriously affected.

The first visit of the "stranger in Baden" will be paid, we doubt not, to the Conversations-Haus and Trinkhalle. This splendid edifice is situated on the left bank of the Oosbach, at the foot of the Bentig, and the high hills of the Friesenberg, whose shady woods and verdant leas have been disposed in a kind of enchanted garden for the behoof of visitors. The building was erected in 1824 by Weinbrenner, but was considerably enlarged and embellished in 1854. It is now 350 feet in length, and has a portico of Corinthian columns. The interior is very richly, and yet elegantly, decorated. From the hall we pass into the assembly room, which is 150 feet long by 50 feet wide. Another magnificent chamber serves as the ball room (the "Salon des Fleurs"), and on either side are several smaller apartments, all decorated by Ciélli and Séchan, and splendidly fitted up. The two wings are occupied as follows; on the right, by the Restaurant; on the left, by several new and partly private salons, namely, a ball and concert room, a "gallery of flowers," a "Louis Quatorze" salon, and a boudoir à la Loreis. . . . At the end of the left wing are Marx's library and reading-rooms.

In front of the Conversations-Haus, beyond a wide and open area reserved for promenades, and furnished with seats, extends a beautiful verdurous lawn, on either side of which a "shady lane," bordered with noble trees, leads into the Lichtenthal road. The appearance of a fashionable bazaar, or fancy fair, is given to this agreeable promenade by the numerous shops, supplied with all kinds of *objets de luxe ou de nécessite*, which you encounter at every step. Of these *objets*, decidedly the most curious and the most artistic are the wood-carvings executed by the peasants of the Black Forest.

The Promenade, properly so called, stretches in front of the Conversations-Haus as far as the left bank of the Oosbach. At certain hours of the day all the fashionable world of Baden gathers at this rendezvous, where they can flirt and gossip to their hearts' content, while looking out upon one of the fairest prospects imaginable. The "season" begins on the 1st of May, and ends on the 31st of October, but even during the winter Baden is not wholly deserted.

North of the Conversations-Haus, and nearer the Oos, rises the new Trinkhalle or Pump-room, begun in 1839, from the plans of Hübsch, and completed in 1843, at a cost of 229,000 florins. It consists of a colonnade or portico, about 270 feet in length by 40 feet in width, and of a main building whose entrance is situated in the centre of the colonnade; this colonnade, we may add, being composed of sixteen Corinthian pillars of white sandstone. Fourteen commonplace frescoes, by Gœtzenberger, the director of the Pinacotheca of Munich, form the principal decorations. They represent certain Black Forest legends, but are mean in conception and indifferent in execution. Over the main entrance is a good sculpture, by Reich of Hüfingen, representing the nymph of the spring surrounded by a crowd of eager worshippers. Above the north and south doors, inside, the designs are intended to illustrate the subjugation of Germania by the Romans, the Romans at Baden, and their expulsion from the city; the triumphal entrance into Rastadt of the Margrave Louis, the conqueror of the Turks; and the original sketch of Carlsruhe. The adjoining apartment is the Pump-room properly so called; the mineral water is brought here in pipes from the natural springs.

The temperature varies from 37° to 54° R. The springs, thirteen in number, emerge from rocks at the foot of the castle terrace, called *Schneckengarten*, behind the parish church; this part of the town is known by the name of "Hell," and in the coldest weather snow never rests upon the ground. A building in the form of a temple covers the principal spring ("Ursprung"), one of the hottest as well as most copious sources. The vault of masonry inclosing it is of Roman construction, and in the temple are preserved several relics of ancient

sculpture, such as votive tablets and altars to Juno, Mercury, and Neptune (the patron-god of Baden). The Ursprung yields 7,345,440 cubic inches of water in twenty-four hours.

The other springs are:—The Hœllensprung, or Hell-spring, temperature, 52° R.; the Brühlquelle, or Scalding-spring, temperature, 50° 5′; the Jews' spring, temperature, 54°; the "Ungemach," temperature, 52° 3′; the Murrquelle, temperature, 50° 6′; the Fettquelle or "Fat Spring," temperature, 51°. There are also eight hot springs called the Bütte; ten springs called the "cool fountain," 37° 5′ and 43° 7′ R.; and a chalybeate spring.

The Baden waters are recommended as beneficial in rheumatic and neuralgic affections, diseases of the skin and stomach, and sores and old wounds. They are both diaphoretic and diuretic, laxative and tonic; and are taken both externally and internally.

Of late years a new attraction has been added to the many attractions of this attractive watering-place; and Baden has its Races. It cannot be said that the course is very good, that the horses are of the best blood, that the stakes are hotly contested, or that, in a word, the glories of Ascot and Newmarket are reproduced in this little German town; but the scenes accompanying or originating in them—the outward procession and the homeward progress—are singularly characteristic and entertaining, and may be regarded as full-coloured pictures of "Life in Baden."

The Grand-duchess Stephanie—that is, in the Scottish peerage, the dowager duchess of Hamilton—has a superb palace near the Leopolds-platz; it was erected in 1809 from the designs of the architect Weinbrenner. In the Leopolds-platz was raised, in 1861, the bronze statue of the late Grand-duke Leopold, by Xavier Reich; here commences a street called the Graben, ornamented with a central row of chestnut trees, and lined by splendid hotels and mansions. The Graben leads to what the French call *l'allee des Soupirs* (the *Seufzeraller*), and to the old Gernsbach road.

The parish church (*Pfarr-Kirche*, or *Stifts-Kirche*) was reconstructed in 1453, destroyed by the French in 1680, rebuilt in 1753, and restored in 1837 and 1861. Here are buried many of the margraves of Baden, and the choir contains their monuments; most of them in the rococo style, and covered with elaborate but unmeaning ornaments. They begin with Bernhard I., who died in 1631. To the left of the high altar are the tombs of Edward Fortunatus, died 1600; Bernhard III., died 1537: Friedrich, bishop of Utrecht, died 1515; Leopold William, died 1671, a great soldier in an age of great soldiers, and the comrade of Montecuculi and Stahremberg. Further off are those of Christopher I., died 1527, and his consort Ollibe; and of Jacob II., who died in 1511 as elector of Trèves, and whose corpse was removed hither from Coblenz in 1808. To the right of the altar stands the tomb of the Margrave Louis William, who died at Rastadt in 1707. He was a fellow-soldier of Prince Eugene, Marlborough's companion-in-arms, and commanded in twenty-seven campaigns without sustaining a single defeat. The monument is by Pigalle, the sculptor who executed the monument of Marshal Saxe we have mentioned at Strassburg. As a whole, it is heavy and tasteless.

In the rear of the Trinkhalle stands a Russo-Greek chapel, built by Prince Michel Stourdza as a mausoleum for his son. The interior is lavishly enriched with paintings. The building is rather quaint than graceful.

Between the Conversations-Haus and the Lichtenthal road is situated the massive and richly decorated pile of the theatre, designed by Conteau, a French architect, and opened in 1862. Among the ornaments of the interior, the best are the busts of Auber and Rossini, by Dantan, and of Beethoven and Mozart, by Perrault. The theatre fills an important place in Badish sociology. The representations are well attended; the company is good, the music excellent, and the plays are well mounted.

We have now exhausted all the sights of the town but one: the *Neue Schloss*, or New Castle, the summer residence of the grand-duke of Baden; and called "new" for the same reason that America is called the New World, to distinguish it from the Old. The more ancient pile, which was inhabited down to 1471, is situated on the very summit of the hill; the new castle occupies a lower, but still commanding level. It was burnt and ruined by the French in 1689, and it is to be regretted that the grand-duke considered it necessary to rebuild so hideous a structure.

We do not visit it, however, from any architectural or artistic propensities, or with any intention of enjoying the prospect it commands, but simply on account of the very curious and remarkable

dungeons beneath it. To these we slowly and painfully descend by a stair which winds under a tower on the right-hand corner of the inner court, through an ancient bath of Roman construction. This entrance has been broken through in modern times; originally, the dungeons were only accessible from above, by a perpendicular shaft running through the centre of the building, and still in existence. The visitor, in passing under it, can scarcely discern the daylight at the top. The old tradition asserts that prisoners, bound fast in a chair and blindfolded, were lowered by a windlass into these dim, chill, mysterious, and appalling vaults and corridors, which it is not improbable the Romans excavated out of the solid rock. Each cell closes with a massive slab of stone, nearly a foot thick, and twelve to twenty hundred pounds in weight, moving on a pivot, and ingeniously fitted.

In one chamber, loftier than the other, and called the Rack Chamber (*Fotter Kammer*), stood the dread instruments of torture; and a row of iron rings, still rusting in the wall, suggests most painful recollections of those dark and troublous times when the power of the oppressor was as yet unbroken. An adjoining passage contains the trap-door called the "Virgin's Kiss" (*baiser de la vierge*). The condemned was forced to kiss an image of the Virgin, when the trap-door giving way he fell headlong to a great depth below, on a machine armed with knives and spikes, which, slowly revolving, tore him to pieces. Not even the Oriental imagination, we think, could conceive of a punishment more diabolically cruel.

The last and largest of these vaults is the "Hall of Judgment," where, on stone benches, sat the members of the terrible *Vehmgericht*, or Secret Tribunal, and pronounced the terrible sentences from which there was no appeal. We have no space to dwell on the dark romantic story of this secret court; nor is it necessary, since the reader will find it dramatically related by Goethe in his "Goetz von Berlichingen," and Sir Walter Scott in his "Anne of Geierstein."

A road beginning behind the new castle winds up the richly wooded hill to the ruins of the more ancient pile (*das Alte Schloss*), the earliest residence of the margraves of Baden, where they sat secure, and looked down contemptuously on the toiling and moiling world below. It is a complete ruin, having been destroyed by the French during their ravages of the Palatinate. The view from the battlements of the square tower is simply a vista into fairy land: on one side rise the darkly wooded hills of the Black Forest, contrasting vividly with the bright fresh verdure of the valleys they inclose; while the foreground is filled up with innumerable villages, whitely-gleaming spires, convents, farms, and mills, clustering on the banks of winding streams; while, on the other side, the green declivities slope gently into the plain of the Rhine, and against the dark-blue sky breaks the sharp irregular outline of the Vosges.

Proceeding from the Alte Schloss, it is usual to visit the ruins of Ebersteinburg, near the village of the same name. These ruins are situated on a kind of rocky promontory, and seem to occupy the site of a Roman watch-tower, built, perhaps, in the third century. The masonry dates from the time of the Frankish emperors to the fourteenth century. From this castle a powerful family took their name, who afterwards, in the thirteenth century, removed to Neu Eberstein (or the "Boar Stone"). In a feud with Eberhard the Weeper, of Würtemburg, in 1337, the castle was burnt. Half a century later, the lands of the Ebersteins were sold to the margraves of Baden.

The castle was then rebuilt and enlarged, and for a century and upwards was the residence of one or other of the principal vassals of the margraves. But since 1573 it has been deserted, and nature has been left to embellish the ruined stronghold with her favourite growth of ivy and wild flowers.

The prospect from the ruins is bold, extensive, and animated; especially towards the rich and radiant valley of the lower Murz, and the pretty villages of Kuppenheim, Bischweier, Rothenfels, Gaggenau, and Ottenau.

To the east of Baden rise the Great and Little Staufenberg. The former, 2240 feet above the level of the sea, is also called the Mercury mountain; on its summit a Roman votive stone having been discovered, bearing a rude sculpture of Mercury with his *caduceus* and ram.

In 1837 a prospect tower, seventy-five feet high, was erected here by the Grand-duke Leopold.

From Baden some agreeable excursions may be made in or about the Rhine valley, to which we shall briefly refer.

It is usual for the stranger at Baden to wander as far as Stephanienbad, where there are mineral

waters and chalybeate waters, and to visit the monument to the poet Schiller, a mass of rock, surrounded by a pleasant shrubbery. He will find something to see at Lichtenthal. In the first place, its situation at the foot of the Klosterberg, and at the junction of the Oos with the Grobach, which comes sparkling and splashing down the pleasant vale of Geroldsau, is very pleasant. Next, there is an old convent, a very old convent, of Cistercian nuns, who renew their vows every three years. The vicissitudes which this convent has survived are remarkable. It was founded by Ermengarde, widow of Hermann V., in 1145; endowed by her sons and successors; and thus was raised into a position of repute and influence. In 1689 the French, under Duras, threatened to burn it, but it was saved at the intercession of one of the nuns. When the total suppression of monastic establishments took place, it lost all its fair estates; but a small annual pension was granted to its nuns, which is shared among about sixteen recipients.

There are two churches, and each has something to boast of: the larger, of the relics of the martyr-saints Pius and Benedict, with their skeletons attired in the most magnificent costume: the smaller (and more ancient), which was restored some fifteen years ago, and embellished with richly painted windows, of the tombs of several margraves of Baden-Durlach, and the quaint pictures of Hans Baldung Grün.

The Baden margraves descend to Rudolph VI., surnamed the Long, who lies on a stone bed of state, attired in full armour, in the middle of the chapel.

On the Rastadt road, about six miles from Baden, "in the green obscurity of a little park," is situated the grand-ducal summer palace, or lodge, called "the Favourite." Dr. Gaspey, in his volume on the "Upper Rhine," thus describes it:—It was built, he says, at a very considerable expense, in 1753, by the Margravine Sybilla Augusta, a princess of Lauenburg, and widow of Prince Ludwig, renowned for his successes against the Turks. In the evening of her days, when her eldest son had attained his majority, she withdrew from the pomp of a court life to this secluded residence. In the centre of the château a richly ornamented circular saloon, several stories high, is surrounded by a gallery, and receives its light from above; the design is not unlike that of the reading-room of the British Museum. The various apartments are cumbrously ornamented in the style of Louis Quatorze. In one of the side rooms the walls exhibit a crowd of the most curious fishes, flowers, and birds—you would suppose them to have sprung from the fancy of a Chinese artist!—and, in another, you may see the portraits of the margravine and her husband in seventy-two different dresses; while a third is more sensibly embellished with the miniatures of artists and men of letters of every country. A fourth apartment is wholly and truly in the Chinese style, with mimic pagodas and other incongruities; and a fifth bears witness, in its abundant embroideries, to the industry, if not the taste, of the margravine and her ladies. Most remarkable of all is the so-called "Show Kitchen," where a vast quantity of antiquated culinary apparatus, and a whole succession of dinner-services in Dutch porcelain, in the form of stags, birds, fishes, and garden fruits, never fail to interest the curious visitor.

Opposite the villa, in the densest shades of the park, stands a small quaint hermitage, and here, during Lent, the builder of the Favourite was wont to withdraw from her voluptuous life to undergo her self-imposed penances. She wore a horse-hair chemise and a prickly belt; and she slept on a straw-mat. The peasants, therefore, looked upon the margravine as a saint, though, in truth, she drank of the cup of pleasure to the dregs.

We shall now carry the reader to the south of Baden, and around the steep mountains of the Yburg (1767 feet), whose summit is crowned by the ruins of an old, old castle. Oh, what a glorious prospect do we enjoy from this lofty position! Yonder flows the noble river, winding through what is truly "enchanted ground"—through fields and groves, orchards, gardens, and vineyards, most pleasant to the eye, and dear to the memory from their legendary and historical associations. The ramparts of the castle overhang the very brink of the abrupt ascent; one of the towers, and a gateway, are also in excellent preservation. The story runs that the Margrave Edward Fortunatus coined bad money here, a most unprincely occupation; but, mayhap, the sole foundation for the story is the fact that his chemists, Pestalozzi and Muscaletta, had a laboratory in the castle, for the investigation, in all probability, of alchemical mysteries. Innumerable ghost stories, it is said, are connected with the

ruins; originating, most likely, in the circumstance that all the storms coming from the direction of Strassburg pour their fury in the neighbourhood of the Yburg.

Yonder densely-wooded mountain, to the north of the Yburg, is known as the Fremersberg, and is only twelve feet lower than its castle-crowned rival. Some years ago its summit was occupied by a convent; on the site of the convent now stands, or did lately stand, a small inn.

Many other places and buildings of interest, many picturesque villages, and beautiful landscapes, are to be found in the neighbourhood of Baden; but as they mostly lie beyond the valley of the Rhine, we shall not introduce them into our present description.

RASTADT.

We now proceed to Rastadt, one of the most celebrated fortresses on the German frontier. It is by no means a lively or picturesque town, and unless the traveller has military proclivities, he will find in it but few materials of interest. Its defensive works have been completed since 1840, under the direction of military engineers.

It is situated between Oos and Carlsruhe, at the confluence of the Oos and Murg, and on a kind of table-land which slopes gently towards the north-east. It is built with great regularity, most of its streets forming compact parallelograms, and has a population of about 7000 souls.

Rastadt was burned by the French in 1689, and rebuilt by Louis of Baden in 1701; it continued to be the residence of the margraves until the extinction of their line.

To the north of the town, and on a commanding height, rises the palace or castle founded in 1701 by the Margrave Louis William, the conqueror of the Turks, and the Margravine Sybilla Augusta, of whom we have already spoken. It was designed on the same plan as Versailles, but never completed; and a portion of it is now used as a barracks, while the park serves as a parade and exercise ground. It formerly contained a splendid collection of Turkish arms, housings, saddles, and standards, but this was pillaged and destroyed by insurgents in 1849. The apartments are decorated in the Louis Quatorze style. Above the main building rises a belvedere, or prospect tower, surmounted by a copper-gilt statue of Jupiter.

In this castle were held the two celebrated congresses of Rastadt; the first in 1713–14, and the second in 1797–99. The former brought to a close the great War of Succession, which had involved nearly all Europe in flames, and in which the military glory of England was raised to a prodigious height by the victories of Marlborough. The second congress met in 1797, again with the view of negotiating peace between France and the imperial house. It began on the 9th of December, and the conference was protracted all through 1798, and into the spring of 1799; but with the lapse of time the French demands increased to such an extent that the emperor found himself unable to satisfy them. At length, indeed, the two contracting parties waxed less and less inclined to an agreement, and the congress finally declared itself dissolved. The departure of the diplomatic body was fixed for the 28th of April; but the commander of the Austrian garrison gave them orders to set out on the 10th, as the town on the following day was to be occupied by the imperial troops. An escort was demanded, but refused on the ground that it was unnecessary. Consequently, on the evening of the 10th, the French plenipotentiaries, Jean Debry, Ponnier, and Roberjot, set out for Strassburg; but scarcely had they passed out of the Rheinau gate when they were attacked by some drunken hussars, who seized them, dragged them from their carriages, murdered Ponnier and Roberjot, in spite of the frantic efforts of the wife of the latter to save her husband, and flung Jean Debry, severely wounded, into a ditch, where he escaped destruction only by promptly feigning to be dead. The assassins carried off all the papers of the legation, but committed no other robbery; and satisfied with the work they had accomplished, disappeared in the obscurity of the night: whereupon Jean Debry, though suffering severely from his wounds, contrived to crawl into Rastadt, and present himself, bleeding and exhausted, at the hotel of Herr Goertz, the Prussian ambassador.

In 1849 Rastadt was again the scene of a very sanguinary event. Here, on the 11th of May, began the Baden insurrection, and when, in July, the outbreak had been in a great measure suppressed, the rebels still held possession of the fortress, which was surrounded by the Prussians. The outrages which had disgraced the town in May and June were worthy of a signal punishment; and when the fortress surrendered on the 23rd of July, the Prussians shot the leaders Tiedermann

and Micswoski, and a number of their principal followers.

Passing Muggensturm (population, 1770) and Malsch (population, 3261), we arrive at Ettlingen, a town of 5100 inhabitants, situated on the Alb, and famous for its paper manufacture. Near the bridge, in the wall of the town-hall, is inserted a Roman sculpture of Neptune, and other Roman remains have been discovered in the vicinity.

The railway here leaves the mountains, and approaches nearer to the Eider, which in this portion of its course is remarkable for its curves and angles, and is studded with numerous islands. We leave the little town of Ruppen on the right, and cross the Alb at Baluch, whose twin-towered church, built by Hübsch in 1837, is adorned in the interior with well-designed and well-executed frescoes by Dietrich of Stuttgard. A journey of nine to ten miles from Ettlingen, and of eighteen miles from Rastadt, brings us to Karlsruhe (Carlsruhe, or "Charles' Rest").

CARLSRUHE.

The population of Carlsruhe is about 28,000. The town itself is distant about five miles and a half from the bank of the Rhine, which is crossed by a branch line of rail, connecting the town with the railways to Paris, Strassburg, and the west of France.

There are few towns in South Germany, says Captain Spencer, which present a more cheerful appearance than Carlsruhe, the Liliputian capital of the grand-duchy of Baden. The streets are broad, airy, and cleanly-looking, and being here and there ornamented with public buildings of no slight architectural pretensions, it bears about it all the characteristics that usually distinguish a metropolis from a purely commercial town. It is the youngest capital in Germany, dating only from the beginning of the last century. In 1717 the site which it occupies was covered by the leafy masses of the Hartwald. In the depths of the woody solitude the Margrave William erected a hunting-lodge, or château, which he appropriately christened "Charles' Rest," or Karlsruhe. A town soon sprung up around it, and the forest annually dwindled in its proportions.

The present castle is a handsome pile of stone, raised by the Margrave Karl Friedrich in 1750. To this prince Carlsruhe owes its prosperity, if it owes its foundation to his grandfather. He encouraged by liberal concessions the erection of new houses; so that in 1793 his little capital numbered 630. In 1806 the margraviate became a grand-duchy, and received soon afterwards some accessions of territory, so that in 1814 it comprised a superficial area of 278 square miles, and a population of 1,000,000. Necessarily, its capital exhibited a corresponding increase in importance.

Carlsruhe is the very model of a quiet, sleepy, monotonous German capital. It is almost wholly dependent on the ducal court and its officials. Of lâte years it has essayed to become a manufacturing town, but with little success.

On arriving by the railway from Rastadt, we pass through the Ettlingen Gate, erected by Weinbrenner in 1803. It is supported by twelve Doric columns, and ornamented with sculptures illustrative of the union of Baden and the Palatinate. Following up the Carl-Friedrichs Strasse, we come to an open square, the "Rondel," in whose centre stands an obelisk, raised to the memory of the Margrave William. To the right rises the stately palace of the margraves, built by Weinbrenner; it has a Corinthian portico of six pillars, and is two stories high.

Entering the market, which forms a kind of oblong, and may be considered "the handsomest part of Carlsruhe," we may glance at the monument of Duke Louis, who died in 1830; a statue in sandstone, by Raumer. Beneath a small pyramid rests the remains of the founder of the city, the Margrave Charles William. It bears the following inscription:—"Here, where formerly the Margrave Charles sought repose in the shades of the Hardt Forest, and built the town which perpetuates his name; here, on the spot where he found his last resting-place, this monument, inclosing his ashes, was erected in grateful remembrance by Ludwig William Augustus."

In front of the castle stands the statue of the Grand-duke Charles Friedrich, who died in 1811, after a reign of sixty-five years in duration. It was executed in bronze by Schwanthaler, and each angle of the pedestal is enriched by a female figure, representing one of the four circles of the grand-duchy; viz., the Lake circle, the Upper, Middle, and Lower Rhine circles.

The Schloss, or castle, was erected about 1750, in the "old Frankish" style, and, externally, is more remarkable for size than architectural splendour. It consists of a main building of three

stories, with right and left wings of two, and is dominated over by the so-called "Lead Tower," which necessarily commands a broad and richly varied prospect. This tower, in the last century, was of scarcely less evil repute than the notorious Tour de Nesle of Paris in the fourteenth; being the seraglio of the Margrave Charles William. Internally, the Schloss is fitted up with a luxury and a richness not unworthy of the palace of a prince; but strangers wander "open-eyed," and with admiring looks, through a series of superb apartments. On these we shall refuse to dwell. There is matter more to our taste in the court library of 90,000 volumes, situated in the left wing; in the small but admirable cabinet of natural history; and in the theatre, in the right wing, erected by Hübsch in 1851–1853. The portico is embellished with well-executed busts of Mozart, Beethoven, and Gluck; of Goethe, Schiller, and Lessing; and an allegorical figure, the Genius of Dramatic Poetry.

Through an arcade in the right wing we pass into the gardens, where a graceful little monument commemorates the poet John Peter Hebel, born 1760, died 1826. He wrote some spirited and popular lyrics in the Allemannic dialect. The botanical garden is justly considered one of the most extensive in Germany; it owes its excellence to the unwearied care of the celebrated botanist, Charles Christian Gmelin.

Let us next conduct the reader to the Academy, or Kunsthalle, unquestionably the finest edifice in Carlsruhe. It is built of a cool gray sandstone, relieved by horizontal layers of red brick. The style is Byzantine, and the details have been well worked out by the architect Hübsch. The figures at the entrance, Painting and Sculpture, Raphael and Michael Angelo, Albert Dürer, Holbein, and Vischer, are from the chisel of a native Badish artist, Xavier Reich.

The apartments on the ground floor are crowded with statues and plaster casts, Etruscan vases, and Roman and German antiquities; among which the eye signals out, delightedly the exquisite Hebe of Canova, the very embodiment of grace, and mirth, and youth; a Nymph, by Schwanthaler; and a Victory, by Rauch.

The grand staircase is ornamented by the boldly designed frescoes of Schwind, representing the Inauguration of Freiburg Cathedral, by Duke Conrad of Zaringia, and deriving a considerable interest from the number and fidelity of the portraits.

Of the Finance Office, erected by Hübsch in 1828, enough to say that it contains 110 rooms, and has 292 windows. The Polytechnic School, also built by Hübsch, is of very considerable extent; the façade extending 157 feet in length, and measuring 55 feet in height. Over the entrance are two statues in sandstone, Kepler, as the representative of science, and Erwin von Steinbach, as the representative of art. They were executed by Remfer.

The school, which contains about 500 pupils, was enlarged in 1863. It is very efficiently and yet economically managed.

The only place of importance between Carlsruhe and Philipsburg is Bruchsal, which has a population of 9500 souls. Philipsburg is a strong fortress on the bank of the Rhine, situated at an abrupt angle of the river, in a line almost due south of Speier.

The railway from Bruchsal strikes northward to Heidelberg, where it joins the Mannheim and Frankfort line. But we have now, in our descent of the river, arrived at a point nearly opposite Speier, and before we continue our journey that famous historic city claims the attention.

CHAPTER V.

SPEIER AND HEIDELBERG.

Speier (the *Spire* of the French, and *Spires* of the English) is situated in a fertile plain, near the confluence of the Speierbach with the Rhine. "The tomb of the German Emperors," and formerly a free imperial city, it is one of the oldest, and, historically, one of the most remarkable towns on the great German river. True it is, that of its pristine magnificence few traces remain, but its associations are imperishable. It now contains a population of about 12,000, and it is still the capital of the Bavarian Palatinate, the seat of the provincial government, and of a cathedral chapter.

To the Romans it was known as *Spira*, and as *Augusta Nemetum* or *Noviomagus*. It remained under the sway of the Eagle until the breaking up of the Empire, when it was twice destroyed by the Northmen. The town soon sprung again into prosperity, and under the rule of the Franks abundantly flourished. At the partition of Verdun, in 843, it was awarded to Germany, "on account of the wine;" and passing under the supremacy of the Salic emperors, who resided at the castle of Limburg, within about eighteen miles of the city, it continued to wax strong and wealthy.

The German princes seem to have affected it greatly; and it was so adorned and aggrandized by the Emperor Conrad II., that he obtained the surname of *der Speierer*, the Speier-man. One of his successors, Henry IV., bestowed on its bishop, not only the title of count of the Speiergau, but the rank and power of a secular prince. At a later date Henry V. placed the administration of the town in the hands of a municipal council, composed of twelve burghers. This step encouraged the growth of a spirit of independence among the citizens, and led to a series of struggles for supremacy between them and their bishops, terminating in the discomfiture of the latter in 1192. The bishops retired to Bruchsal, and Speier became a free imperial city.

From this epoch until the close of the seventeenth century its prosperity knew no check. Its population, like that of some of the old Flemish towns, was scarcely less versed in the arts of peace than of war, and though not exceeding 30,000 in number, were able to set on foot and maintain a well-equipped force of 6000 men. Placed at the head of the Confederation of Free Rhenish Cities which was formed in 1247, in opposition to the feudal nobility, it destroyed a considerable number of the strongholds and mountain-fastnesses, whence mediæval knight and baron were accustomed to sally forth to pillage the defenceless merchant. So signal was its success, and so great its wealth, that its enmity was only less feared than its friendship was courted. The feudal princes, in 1315, in 1320, and again in 1422, armed against it, but their battalions were in each case repulsed with terrible slaughter. Protected by the martial spirit of its inhabitants, its commerce steadily increased; and of a rich, strong, and independent mediæval city it would be difficult to find a more felicitous example than Speier. When the Diet of Worms abolished, in 1530, the atrocious right of private war, which had so long desolated the fair valley of the Rhine, the Imperial Chamber, or *Reichskammergericht*, instituted to watch over the full execution of this edict, was established at Speier, where it held its sittings for two centuries. In 1689 it was transferred to Wetzlar.

This astonishing course of prosperity was scarcely checked by the Thirty Years' War; for though Speier was alternately occupied by Swede and Imperialist, both parties seem to have agreed in treating it gently. But a very different fate befell it in the War of the Succession. It was then completely devastated by an army of Frenchmen, in the name of Louis XIV., and under the immediate order of his minister, Louvois. For two years Speier remained a heap of ruins; France would not suffer it to be rebuilt. At the peace of Ryswick, however, some of its former inhabitants returned, and rebuilt their shattered houses; but it never recovered its former splendour. It was doomed, moreover, to new misfortunes. In 1716, at the instigation of Bishop Hartand of Rollingen, it was plundered by a body of armed peasants. In 1734

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it was stormed by a French army; and in 1794, another French army, commanded by the revolutionary general Custine, repeated the scenes of 1689. On this occasion the cathedral was again plundered, and the tombs of the Emperors Rudolph, Albert, and Adolph were desecrated.

By the peace of Lunéville Speier was annexed to France, and became a sub-prefecture in the department of Mont-Tonnerre. By the treaty of Paris it was restored to Germany.

The chief building, in truth the only building of interest in this ancient city, is the *Dom*, or cathedral, founded by the Emperor Conrad II. in 1030; continued by his son, Henry III.; and completed in 1061 by his grandson, Henry IV. It is a remarkable and magnificent example of the Byzantine style of the eleventh century, though it has suffered severely by successive fires, as in 1165, 1289, and 1450, and by the depredations of the French in 1689 and 1794. The principal entrance is through a porch called the *Kaisersaal*, or "Imperial Chamber," on account of the eight statues of the emperors which decorate it—the emperors buried under the roof of the ancient Dom. They are executed in white marble, of life size, and distinguished by an aspect of sovereign dignity. They represent Conrad II., Henry III., Henry IV., Henry V., Philip of Suabia, Adolph of Nassau, Albert of Austria, and Rudolph of Hapsburg.

The architecture of the interior is impressive, though somewhat overloaded with ornament. The broad and lofty nave is separated from the north and south aisles by twelve square pillars. Four stars of red marble, let into the pavement, indicate the place where St. Bernard preached a new crusade, in 1141, before the Emperor Conrad and his court.

At the entrance of the choir, to which we ascend by a flight of marble steps, two statues are kneeling on their tombs; Rudolph of Nassau and Rudolph of Hapsburg, sculptured in Carrara marble by Schwanthaler. The imperial mausoleum, which has been carefully restored, forms an immense crypt. With torch in hand the visitor gropes his way into the dim, cool shades; a score of columns, rudely and roughly hewn, seem almost bent to the ground by the low and heavy roof. A long series of arches intersect each other in the obscurity. Lamps of baked clay, of ancient form, hang suspended from hooks of iron. Stone slabs, serving the purpose of altars, are planted on a couple of pillars, which are scarcely cut out of the stone. The mind involuntarily recalls those gloomy catacombs in which the Early Christians worshipped during the bitter days of persecution. Every year, on Christmas night, the crypt grows alive; a hundred torches are kindled; and the bishop of Speier repairs hither with all his clergy to celebrate, according to the rites of the Romish Church, the Nativity of Christ.

Over the crypt is the *Kœnigschor*, or "King's Choir;" and to the south of it, the Baptismal Chapel, containing the coloured sketches and drawings of Schrandolph for the frescoes with which he has decorated the cupola, the choir, and the aisles. They illustrate biblical personages and biblical scenes, and are very literal, cold, and inexpressive.

The Dom measures 480 feet in length, and 136 feet in width.

On passing from the Dom by the southern gate, we enter a leafy, shady garden, the ancient cemetery, where the only conspicuous object is a pile of stones, called the *Oelberg*, or "Mountain of Olives." It dates from the sixteenth century, is covered with figures and sculptures, and owes its curious designation to the fact that it was formerly part of a chapel, whose interior represented the Garden of Gethsemane and the betrayal of our Saviour. It was partly destroyed by the French in 1689.

To the east of the cathedral rises the *Heidenthürmchen*, or "Pagans' Tower," which, with other Cyclopean ruins, tradition attributes to the Roman general, Drusus. It is most probable, however, that the tower was built by Bishop Rüdiger, about 1180, and was included in the fortifications of the city. It contains some antediluvian fossils, and various mediæval relics. A staircase leads to its summit, from which a very bright and varied prospect may be obtained.

North of the cathedral stands the Hall of Antiquities, containing a valuable collection of Celtic, Roman, and Germanic antiquities, discovered in the Palatinate. It is divided into three sections, of which the central is the larger. An iron grating reveals a number of *milliaria*, statues, altars, and votive tablets. In the others, which are closed, vases, urns, amphoræ, weapons, medals, and a legionary eagle, speak eloquently of the "brave old times" of Roman domination.

Opposite this treasure-house of curiosities is situated the chapel of St. Afra, the only one

extant of the ten chapels which formerly surrounded the cathedral. It is connected with one of the most pathetic episodes in the history of Speier. The Emperor Henry IV. having died in profound distress, and under the ban of excommunication, his remains were deprived of the last solemn rites. Of all the priests who had flourished through his bounty, not one durst bury him. The men of Speier, more loyal and more grateful, collected his bones, deposited them in this chapel, and assiduously watched over them until the pope was induced to recall the terrible sentence, and the unfortunate emperor was permitted to sleep with his fathers in the imperial crypt.

The modern edifices of Speier are deficient in architectural beauty, and necessarily possess no historical interest. The reader will, therefore, be content with a simple enumeration—the Protestant church, the Episcopal palace, the government house, the town-hall, the lyceum, and the cavalry barrack.

From Speier we cross to the right bank of the Rhine, and by way of Schwetzingen proceed to romantic Heidelberg.

Schwetzingen is a comparatively insignificant town of about 3500 inhabitants, two-thirds of whom are Protestants. No one would spend an hour here but for the superb gardens, constructed at an amazing cost by the Elector Charles Theodore, and still maintained on a very sufficient and satisfactory scale. They are embellished with fountains and statues, Roman ruins, an orangery, a lake, temples to Mercury, Apollo, and Minerva; and a seventeenth century château contains some richly furnished apartments. A mosque, a theatre, and a restaurant are among the very varied and somewhat incongruous attractions offered to visitors.

The celebrated university town of Heidelberg is situated on the left bank of the Neckar, at the entrance of the fair Neckar valley, and at a short distance above the confluence of the Neckar with the Rhine. From its ruined castle a fine view is obtained of a position almost unequalled in picturesqueness of effect; while the prospect extends westward, across a plain so fertile and so fair that it has been called the "Garden of Germany," to the blue line of the Haardt Mountains in Rhenish Bavaria.

The town is about one mile and a half in length (population, 18,000), but exceedingly narrow in proportion. It lies between two wooded eminences, "higher than hills, and not so rugged as mountains." On a northern spur of one of these acclivities, the Kœnigsstuhl, on the left bank, rise the grand but gloomy ruins of the old electoral castle. The Kœnigsstuhl is 1893 feet above the sea-level, but the elevation of the castle does not exceed 313 feet. On the left bank soars conspicuous the vine-clad, "castled height" of the Saint's Mountain, or the Heiligenberg, whose summit has been crowned by the eagle of the Roman legionaries. Some authorities assert that the Romans fortified both the Heiligenberg and the Kœnigstuhl. In the reign of Ludwig III. the Saint's Mountain was made over to the convent of Lorsch. Such Roman structures as were still extant were then destroyed, their materials being employed in the erection of religious edifices.

First, the chapel of St. Michael was built (about 863–870); and soon afterwards a Benedictine cloister was added to it. Next, a chapel dedicated to St. Stephen and St. Lawrence was built lower down the mountain. A second convent sprang up, whose rights and privileges were confirmed by Pope Alexander III. and by the Emperor Henry IV., in 1103. It was then the mountain acquired its present designation.

When the great irruption of the Germanic tribes swept away the Roman garrisons, their camp afforded an asylum and a stronghold to the barbarians. It is possible that some chieftain, weary of plunder and fighting, planted himself here with his followers, among whom he divided the surrounding lands. Then was heard the sound of the axe; the old patriarchal trees were felled, and golden harvests bloomed in the clearings effected by the industry of man. Want of water and of "free elbow-room" eventually brought them down to the banks of the Neckar, and Heidelberg was founded.

One day about the middle of the twelfth century (1155–1157), Conrad of Hohenstaufen, the count palatine, in the course of a journey through his dominions, arrived in this romantic neighbourhood, and resolved to build a castle here. Under his patronage the village of Heidelberg grew up into a town, which at the beginning of the thirteenth century had its guild of citizens, its magistrate, its governor, and its ramparts. Eventually it became the capital of the rich and beautiful Palatinate of the Rhine; and so continued until the last electors preferred to reside at Mannheim.

In the course of these five centuries, however, it passed through many vicissitudes. In 1248 it suffered from a dreadful famine: in 1278 it was devastated by an inundation of the Neckar, and so much as the gathering waters spared was soon afterwards swept away by a conflagration, until only one edifice remained extant, the church of the Blessed Virgin. In 1288, we are told, the town was visited by another conflagration; from which we must conclude that, in the ten years intervening between the two visitations, the town had been wholly or partially rebuilt. About the same date, the great Neckar bridge broke down while a procession was passing across it, and upwards of 300 persons were killed. About 1301, in the war with the Emperor Albert, and soon afterwards, in the war with the Emperor Ludwig, the country for many miles around was swept with fire and sword; and in 1313 or 1314 the unfortunate town was again blighted by plague and inundation.

It must have required all the tenacity and robustness of the German character to withstand such a series of misfortunes. Withstood they were; and in spite of all its sufferings, Heidelberg grew prosperous. In the fifteenth century, the Elector Robert III. commenced the erection of a feudal château on the very site of the ancient Roman walls, thus inaugurating that love of stately buildings which became a characteristic of the Palatinate family. It was the ambition of each elector to continue and surpass the work of his predecessor. Frederick the Victorious, Louis the Pacific, Otho, Henry, and Frederick V., were distinguished by their generosity and their love of dignified magnificence.

In 1414, on his way to the great Council of Constanz, the Emperor Sigismund was received at Heidelberg with a splendid welcome. In its castle the deposed pope, John XXIII., resided as a prisoner until 1418.

In 1461 the first mutterings were heard of the Palatine War. "Wicked Fritz," as his enemies called him, or Frederick the Victorious, as he was entitled by his partizans, when placed under the ban of the Empire, erected a stronghold on the height above the town, and boldly named it *Trutz-Kaiser*, or "Defiance to the Emperor." The surrounding country was ravaged by the troopers of Baden and Würtemburg. In preparation for the gathering storm the ramparts of Heidelberg were strengthened, and its garners filled; but the town was spared the horrors of a siege. Frederick met and completely defeated his enemies at Friedrichsfeld, between Seckenheim and Schwitzingen, on the 30th of June, 1462, making prisoners the Margrave Charles of Baden, Count Ulrich of Würtemburg, and Bishop George of Metz, whom he conveyed in triumph to the capital.

In 1613 the ill-fated marriage of the Elector Frederick V. (1610–1632), with Elizabeth, the daughter of James I. of England, the heroine of Wotton's beautiful lyric, and one of the most amiable and intellectual of the Stuart race, was celebrated with unusual magnificence. Nine years later the city was stormed by Tilly, whose fierce soldiers committed the most disgraceful excesses. For three days rapine was uncontrolled, while several of the public buildings and upwards of forty houses were sacked and burned. The university library was sent to Rome. In the following year victorious Bavaria attained the electorate, declared the Roman Catholic religion restored, and expelled the Lutherans from the country. Both town and castle remained in the hands of the Bavarian soldiers until 1633, when it was recaptured through an ably-conceived stratagem of the Swedish colonel, Abel Moda. Again the wheel of fortune revolved: in May, 1635, the Imperialists, under Count Clam Gallas, attacked and captured the town; and on the 27th of July the castle also surrendered, after an obstinate defence.

Few parts of Germany suffered more severely during the last five years of the Thirty Years' War than the Rhenish Palatinate, and on the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia the Elector Charles Ludwig (1632–1680) found his dominions in a condition the most deplorable; the towns half depopulated, the villages burned, the vineyards and corn-fields destroyed, commerce extinct, and industry almost at a standstill. The elector, however, was a man of more than ordinary capacity, and under his firm and enlightened rule the Palatinate was beginning to recover somewhat of its former prosperity, when it had to endure a heavier storm than ever, by Louis XIV. The French army was under the command of Mélac, who excelled Tilly in cruelty, and whose name for years was so hated in the country he ruthlessly ravaged, that the peasants gave it to their dogs.

On the 26th of October Heidelberg was captured, and occupied until the spring of 1689 by a French army. The arms of France had been

everywhere successful. They had overrun the entire Palatinate, and from Heidelberg spread even to the banks of the Danube. But an event more disastrous to the French fortunes than any repulse in the open field, occurred at a critical moment. To the throne of England succeeded William of Holland, the resolute and mortal enemy of France; and his ability and steadfastness united all Europe in a formidable league against its common aggressor. France found itself called upon to combat, not only on the Rhine, but in Holland, in Savoy, in Spain, wherever the coalition formed at Augsburg could put an armed force in the field.

The French government, confronted by so powerful a league, conceived, as a French writer says, the most terrible resolution ever dictated by the genius of war: namely, to destroy every town they were compelled to evacuate, and to harry with fire and sword the territory they were forced to restore to the elector. This atrocious conception is generally attributed to the Marshal de Duras, but it was sanctioned, to his eternal infamy, by Louis XIV., and carried out with savage fury by the able and unscrupulous Louvois. The French generals, Mélac, Montclar, Tessé, Boufflers, and a score of others, were the executants, the hands; but Louvois was brain and soul. It is to the credit of the former that they occasionally experienced sentiments of remorse and pity; that they sometimes halted in their dreary course, and refused to proceed except under new and stringent orders. Duras openly cursed the fatal counsel which he had been evilly inspired to give, and implored the king, in "the name of his glory," to revoke the doom he had pronounced, and refrain from inspiring all Christendom with "a terrible aversion." But Louvois would not suffer him; not for one minute did this implacable statesman relent.

Heidelberg, says M. Durand, was the first to experience the consequences of the retreat of the French. In the month of March of this fatal year, Montclar received orders to burn the town, and expel its inhabitants. He selected for this mission the Count de Tessé, one of the heroes of the notorious Dragonnades. But neither the soldiers nor the generals were yet sufficiently hardened for the proper performance of their barbarous duties. The fire was not half kindled; and Tessé hastened to quit the town before it was more than partially consumed. Its inhabitants immediately returned, extinguished the flames, and repaired their houses. They raised some palisades around the castle, which was spacious enough to accommodate 1000 imperial soldiers.

Four years later, and on the 22nd of May, Heidelberg, which had been hastily rebuilt and fortified, was stormed by the Marshal de Lorges, and this time it was utterly destroyed. The population were driven, foodless, without clothes, without shelter, to the other bank of the Neckar. The soldiery broke into the castle, plundered it of its treasures, desecrated the tombs of the electors, and scattered abroad their remains. Finally, several thousand pounds of gunpowder were deposited in the cellars, and all that remained of the magnificent work of four generations was blown to the winds of heaven.

Some years elapsed before any attempt was made to restore this unfortunate city. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the ruined buildings were rebuilt, and many new ones erected. In 1712 the first stone was laid of the new University; soon afterwards St. Anne's Chapel and the Citizens' Hospital were commenced.

In 1735 Prince Eugene established his head-quarters here; but the town and its neighbourhood escaped the usual ravages during the war of the Bavarian Succession, in consequence of the cautious neutrality observed by the Elector Palatine.

The Elector Charles Theodore (1742-1799), was desirous of returning to the seat of his ancestors. But an evil fortune pursued the château. On the 23rd of June, 1764, the walls being completed, and the following day fixed for the triumphant entrance of the prince, the tower was struck by lightning, and in a few hours three-fourths of the building were consumed. Thenceforth, the skill of man has turned aside from what seemed and seems to be "a house accurst;" and the ruined pile, standing erect on the desert slope of the mountain, reminds the traveller of those ancient imperial diadems which are preserved in our collections as the relics, not as the signs of royalty.

In the winter of 1784, that is, on the 18th of January, and again on the 26th and 27th of February, the town suffered greatly from an inundation: the bridge was carried away by the drifting ice; thirty-nine buildings were destroyed, and 290 greatly damaged.

During the long war of the French Revolution, this unfortunate city was frequently visited by

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hostile forces. The Austrian headquarters were established here, at frequent intervals, from 1794 to 1800. In September, 1799, it was occupied by the French, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, but they retired on the approach of the Imperialists. The French afterwards returned, under Nansouty and Sabbatier, and on the 16th October attempted to carry the bridge, but were beaten off, though the approach was commanded by only a single cannon.

In 1803 Heidelberg, with the Rhine Palatine, was annexed to Baden, and the grand-duke, Charles Frederick, immediately addressed himself to the task of resuscitating the university, which he endowed with new sources of revenue, and whose organization he remodelled in a liberal and enlightened spirit. Heidelberg is now one of the most prosperous, one of the brightest and most radiant, of the Badish towns; and to the cultivated mind its romantic beauty and historical associations will ever endow it with the gift of immortal youth.

Modern Heidelberg stretches along the left bank of the Neckar, and at the base of the final escarpments of the Kœnigsstuhl, for a mile and a half, from W. to E., or from the Mannheim to the Karl gate. It consists in the main of two parallel streets, the Haupt Strasse, or principal street, and the Plock Strasse; behind which are found the Anlagen. On this promenade, which is agreeably planted, and lined with charming houses, stands a statue of bronze (by Brugger, in 1860) to the Bavarian Field-marshal Wrede, who earned considerable distinction in the Napoleonic wars. He was born at Heidelberg in 1767, and died at Ellingen in 1838. The railway terminus is situated near the Mannheim gate. The Haupt Strasse, the Plock Strasse, and the promenade, all lead to the castle, which is the great object of attraction to all visitors.

As the reader will suppose from our historical sketch, Heidelberg is a completely modern city. Of its ancient houses man and the elements seem to have spared but one, situated in the market-place, opposite the church of the Holy Ghost. This was built by a Frenchman, Charles Belier, of Tournay, a Huguenot who had escaped from the massacre of St. Bartholomew's-day. It is now an inn, *Zum Ritter Sanct Georg.*

The church of the Holy Ghost, which we have spoken of as near this ancient mansion, is also of great antiquity. In truth, who built it, or when it was built, is not known; but it was certainly raised to the rank of a cathedral by Rupert III. in 1393, and completed under his son Ludwig early in the fifteenth century. Here were the tombs of numerous princes and electors palatine, unfortunately destroyed by the French in 1793. Divine service, after the Lutheran fashion, was first celebrated on the 3rd of January, 1546. Both Protestants and Catholics now worship under the same roof.

For nearly two centuries the university library was kept in the choir, and esteemed the finest in Germany. But when the town was captured by Tilly, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria despatched the books to Rome, where they were deposited in the Vatican.

The Jesuits' Church was erected from 1712 to 1751. It is a spacious and imposing edifice.

The oldest church in the town is St. Peter's, also called the University Church. It suffered no great injury in the wars, but in 1737 its tower was greatly destroyed by lightning. Architecturally the interior is not remarkable, but it contains some interesting tombs; especially those of Marsilius von Inghen, the first rector of the university, and the noble and learned lady, Olympia Fulvia Morata, of Ferrara, who was appointed professor of the Greek language at the university in 1554 and died soon afterwards, in her twenty-ninth year.

The university, the celebrated *Ruperta Carolina*, owes its reputation chiefly to its faculties of medicine and jurisprudence. Not a few of its professors have acquired a European reputation. The number of students, prior to the war, varied from 500 to 600. It is one of the oldest universities in Germany, its foundation dating from 1386. Its buildings, however, are but of moderate extent, and of no special architectural merit. The handsomest edifice is the new anatomy school, in a street leading to the river. The laboratory is situated in the Academy Street; the botanical garden, outside the Mannheim Gate. Near the hospital, that is, to the east of the university, stands the library, a three-storied building, which now contains 150,000 volumes, 50,000 dissertations, and 1880 MSS. Some invaluable MSS., which from Rome had been carried to Paris, were likewise restored after the conclusion of peace. Among the bibliographical curiosities we may enumerate:—a Greek Anthology; a fine MS. of the eleventh century; MSS. of Thucydides and Plutarch, of the tenth

and eleventh centuries; a translation of Isaiah, in the handwriting of Luther; his Exhortation against the Turks; an edition of the Catechism, annotated by the great Reformer; the Electress Elizabeth's Book of Prayers, ornamented with miniatures by Dentzel, of Ulm (1499).

Attached to the university is a mineralogical collection, containing more than 15,000 specimens.

We now proceed to the pride and glory of Heidelberg, its Castle, which from the distance appears a complete mosaic of ramparts and towers, and when seen more closely seems to deserve the title so frequently given to it, "the Alhambra of Germany." The story of its vicissitudes, reconstructions, and demolitions would fill a volume. We shall content ourselves with adding a description of the storm which destroyed the upper castle on the 25th of April, 1537. Its violence was so great that it tore up the trees in the neighbouring forests by the roots; and oaks which had braved the tempests of a hundred years, were dashed with surprising fury into the valley. The clouds from all points of the compass seemed whirling to a centre, with a wind which swept everything before it, and drew up the waters of the Neckar to such a height, that a fearful inundation was momentarily expected. Presently the most awful peals of thunder reverberated among the mountains, followed by heavy torrents of hail and rain, which completely deluged the earth. Suddenly, a vivid flash of lightning struck the tower of the castle, whose vaults were filled with many tons of gunpowder. Then it seemed as if the earth had been violently rent asunder, and the shock was like the simultaneous discharge of hundreds of cannons. The doors of the houses were lifted from their hinges; the windows dashed out into the streets; whilst the huge stones, the beams, and the entire roof of the venerable castle were precipitated into the town, destroying the houses, and crushing many of the wretched inhabitants. Even the valley was strewn with rubbish. The lower castle also was seriously damaged; and the Elector Louis V. narrowly escaped with his life. Of the venerable pile itself, only one or two insignificant walls were left standing.

We have already stated that the lower castle is first mentioned in the year 1329, in the treaty of Pavia. It was probably erected about the end of the thirteenth century, under the Palsgrave Ludwig the Severe, son-in-law of Rudolph of Hapsburg, who died in 1294. The palace was afterwards embellished and enlarged by successive electors, especially by the electors Otto Henry, Frederick IV., and Frederick V., the latter having erected the so-called "English Buildings," of which the remains are few. Then came the desolation of 1649, 1689, and 1692, and the splendour of Heidelberg vanished for ever. For ever, because when in 1764 the Elector Charles Theodore had resolved on restoring the ancient castle, it was struck by lightning, and the flames seized upon everything that would burn.

On entering through the principal gate—the Elizabeth Gate, built by the Elector Frederick V. in honour of his English bride—we pass into the Stückgarten, or Cannon-garden, so named because the Heidelberg artillerists were formerly drilled within its precincts. This, the westernmost part of the castle, commands an extensive and richly-coloured picture of the town, the Harst Mountains, and the valley of the Rhine. "Strictly speaking, it forms a large terrace, irregularly planted with tall lime trees."

Close adjoining the Cannon-garden is the so-called Theits Tower, of which only one-half is preserved. It was erected by the Elector Louis V., completed in 1533, and destroyed by General Mélas in 1685, notwithstanding the thickness of its walls (twenty-two feet). In the ivy-shrouded niches may still be seen the remains of the stone statues of Frederick V. and his brother, Ludwig V.

In this vicinage stood the "English Buildings," erected in 1612 by Frederick V., in honour of his consort, Elizabeth of England. It was noble and majestic externally, and internally most sumptuous; but in 1689 it was set on fire by the French, and reduced to a heap of ruins.

On the east side of the castle court rise the two lofty triangular pediments of the sombre palace of Frederick IV., with its boldly-projecting entablatures, on which are erected, between four rows of windows, the beautifully executed statues of nine electors, two kings, and five emperors. To the right stands the exquisite Italian structure of Otto Henry, finished by that elector in 1566, ruined by the French in 1659, restored in 1718, and destroyed by fire in 1764. The plan is said to have been furnished by Michel Angelo.

Above the entrance, which is decorated with four statues, are the name, bust, and armorial bearings of the architect. The entire façade is

adorned with niches, and these niches are filled with admirable statues. Thus, in the first stage we see Joshua, Sampson, Hercules, and David, a motley collection, with rhyming inscriptions; in the second, allegorical figures of Strength, Faith, Love, Hope, and Justice; and in the third, Saturn, Mars, Mercury, and Diana. The gable-ends are protected by Pluto and Jupiter, and near the pediments of the first tier of windows are the half-raised busts of Vitellius, Antoninus Pius, Tiberius, Nero, and four more Roman emperors.

The oldest part of the ruins is probably the Ruprechtsbau, or Rupert's Building, erected in the fifth century by the Palsgrave Rupert, restored by Ludwig V. in 1540, and embellished by Frederick II. Its hall contains a small collection of curiosities. In the rear rises a dilapidated structure, which is considered to be still older; and close beside it stands the Old Chapel, which Rupert I. erected in 1346, and amply endowed. Under Frederick I. it was restored; but the new castle chapel having been built by Frederick IV. in 1607, the former was converted into a throne room. More recently it has served as a cooper's shop.

Let us now proceed to the palace of Frederick IV., whose façade is overloaded with a profusion of heavy ornamental sculpture. It was commenced in 1603 by Frederick IV., and completed in 1607. On the inner façade, towards the court-yard, are sixteen statues, several of which bear the disfiguring traces of the Swedish bombardment in 1633. On the ground-floor stands the new chapel, already referred to.

The first-floor saloons are appropriated to the Graimberg Museum, containing, among other treasures, numerous specimens of the porcelain of the Palatinate; a picture, by Lucas Cranach; a manuscript diploma of Arnulph, grandson of Charlemagne, dated 896; a manuscript bull of Alexander IV., 1255; the plaster cast of the face of Kotzebue, taken immediately after he had fallen beneath the dagger of Sand; the portrait, and a lock of hair, of the murderer; portraits of Melanchthon, Luther, and Luther's wife; costly enamels; plans and drawings of the castle; a sword found in the Neckar; paintings by Wohlgemuth and his school; coins, seals, ornaments, arms, and household utensils. There is also an elaborate model of the castle in cork.

We now step into the broad balcony, raised by the same elector on the site of an old wall, and opening up a gorgeous view of the town of Heidelberg and the valley of the Neckar. A door in the west corner leads to the cellar containing the Great Tun, one of the most widely-celebrated of the curiosities of Heidelberg.

The first large tun seems to have been built about 1591. It contained 132 tuns, or nearly 133,000 quarts of wine, was an object of much popular wonder, and destroyed in the Thirty Years' War. In 1664 a new one was built, by order of Charles Ludwig, to hold 204 tuns, or upwards of 206,000 quarts.

In 1751 the present monster tun was constructed by the Elector Charles Theodore. It measures thirty feet five inches in length, and twenty-three feet in height, is kept together by eight massive iron and eighteen wooden hoops, and contains 236 tuns, or nearly 238,000 quarts. It was filled with wine on the 10th of November, 1752, which was subsequently repeated on three occasions, but since 1769 has remained empty. On either side a flight of steps leads up to it, while on the summit, and round the bung-hole, a flooring has been constructed, formerly reserved for the display of the light fantastic toe.

With a few brief words we must pass over the Octagonal or Bell Tower, completed in its present form by Frederick VI., about 1666; the Masted Tower, forming the Powder Magazine, erected by Frederick the Victorious about 1455, and blown up with gunpowder in 1689; and the four granite columns supporting a portico in the court-yard, which the pope gave to Charlemagne; which in the eighth century were removed from Ravenna to the banks of the Rhine, and in the fifteenth from the banks of the Rhine to those of the Neckar.

The castle gardens, at one time scarcely less famous for beauty than the castle itself for magnificence, were laid out in the formal French style by Solomon von Caux.

The finest views will be obtained from the Altau, or platform, constructed in 1346, beneath the château of Frederick IV.; from the Stückgarten; and from the great terrace in the gardens.

It is customary for every visitor to pass from the castle to the Wolfsbrünnen, passing on the right bank of the river the monastery of Newburg, and Zeigelhausen. In a little dell, under the shade of lofty trees, flows the Fountain of the Wolf: preserving the memory of a sorceress, named Jetta, who, it is said, was torn to pieces by a wolf while walking in this sequestered retreat.

CHAPTER VI.

MANNHEIM TO MAINZ, VIA WORMS.

BETWEEN Heidelberg and Mannheim there is a railway, which strikes to the north-west, following at an irregular distance the left bank of the Neckar. On the right bank, nearly half-way, lies the small town of Ladenburg, in a plain of great fertility. It is conspicuous from its lofty church tower, the venerable church of St. Julius.

The Romans formed a settlement here under the name of *Lupodunum*. Next, the Franks got possession of it, and their kings built for themselves a palace. In 636 both town and palace were conferred by King Dagobert on St. Peter's Abbey of Worms, and in 1011 the bishops also obtained the jurisdiction. In the twelfth century the bishops made Ladenburg their place of residence.

In the Thirty Years' War it suffered severely: in 1621 it was occupied by Tilly; in 1622, by Mansfeldt; then came the Bavarians and Spaniards; and in 1631, Gustavus Adolphus. In 1644 it was seized by the French, who levied a heavy requisition; and in 1693 it was despoiled and devastated by Mélac. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the bishops of Worms quarrelled with the Elector Palatine about Ladenburg. Eventually the former gave way, and Ladenburg was awarded to the Palatinate, with which it afterwards fell to Baden.

The town has a population of 3000 souls, who are principally engaged in agricultural pursuits, and in the timber and tobacco trade. It boasts of a venerable Catholic church, which, in its turn, boasts of numerous sepulchral memorials of the barons of Sickingen and Metternich. A charity founded by the barons of Sickingen exists here. It is said that a young maiden of this family had, on one occasion, lost her way, and must have perished, but that, in her extremity, she was guided to the town by the welcome chime of a bell. The barons determined, therefore, that the bell should be rung every evening, and bread baked every week, so far as a bushel of corn would go, and distributed among the poor.

Mannheim, the largest town of the grand-duchy of Baden, has a population of nearly 30,000 inhabitants, and is situated on the right bank of the Rhine, opposite Ludwigshafen, at the point of junction between the stately Rhine and the rapid Neckar. It is situated in a flat, fertile, but uninteresting country. It has a circuit of about three miles, and three gates—the Neckar, the Heidelberg, and the Rhine gates. Like Washington, it is laid out in regular blocks or parallelograms, of which there are about 110.

Mannheim was founded in 1606 by the elector, Frederick IV. Unhappily for the town, he had scarcely begun to build it before he began to fortify it, and by so doing made it an object of attack in the various wars which have desolated Germany. Partly destroyed in the Thirty Years' War, it had risen from its ruins when the War of the Succession broke out. In 1688, when the French again invaded the Palatinate, it was under the command of Baron von Seligenkron, and the Lieutenant-colonels Strupp and Schenck. The works were put in good condition, and a force for their defence collected of 900 regulars, with cavalry and artillery, and 1050 militia.

On the 1st of November the enemy appeared before Mannheim. In less than a fortnight Seligenkron found himself compelled to surrender. The French immediately commenced the work of destruction. The houses were set on fire, the churches were blown up, and nothing was left of the town or fortress but blackened ruins. Mannheim seemed to have been swept from the face of the earth; and an old inhabitant, returning to its former site after the departure of the French, could with difficulty recognize the former position of the streets.

At the close of the war the Elector John William endeavoured to restore the town, and caused the plan of the new fortifications to be drawn up by the engineer Coehorn. In 1700 a council-house was built; in 1701 the Capuchin Church; about 1715 the Lutheran. To the Elector Charles Philip, however, Mannheim is principally indebted for its restoration. Had he not moved thither the court from Heidelberg in 1721, it would never have risen out of its insignificance.

MANNHEIM

WILLIAM MACKENZIE, LONDON, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

Under Charles Theodore, on whose court enormous sums were lavished, Mannheim continued to improve in appearance. In 1746 the Kaufhaus, or Hall of Commerce, was completed; in 1754 the infantry barrack; in 1756 the Jesuits' Church; in 1772 the Citizens' Hospital and the Observatory; in 1777 the arsenal; in 1779 the theatre. Charles Theodore was no niggardly patron of the arts and sciences, but spent on their advancement not less than 35,000,000 florins. In 1754 was built the Anatomical Theatre; in 1756 a surgical hospital; in 1765 a maternity hospital. In the same year was commenced a cabinet of natural history, and in 1767 a botanical garden. In 1763 the Palatine Academy of Science had its beginnings; and in October, 1775, was founded the German Society for the Culture and Advancement of Literature, including among its members Lessing, Klopstock, Wieland, Schiller, Kästner. At this epoch, in truth, Mannheim was the Athens of Germany; it held among the German cities much the same position as Weimar afterwards held. It had its sculptor in Peter von Verschaffelt; its actors in Beck, Biel, and Iffland; its poet and dramatist in Schiller.

In 1777 Charles Theodore had succeeded to the throne of Bavaria, and his court and courtiers followed him to the Bavarian capital, Munich. The prosperity of the Badish city rapidly declined. In 1784 an inundation caused very considerable injury. Then, to complete its second overthrow, came the horrors of the French Revolutionary War. The Rhine entrenchments were captured by the French in December, 1794; and in September, 1795, a French army, under General Pichegru, appeared before the town. It was surrendered on the 20th, through the infamous treachery of the minister, Count Francis Albert von Oberndorf, and the governor, Baron von Belderbusch. A month later, and the Imperialists, under Clairfait, appeared before the city, after a series of successful actions along the Rhine, and in the vicinity of Coblenz and Mainz. Pichegru had left in Mannheim a garrison 10,000 strong, and taken up a position which enable him to communicate with the place by his right flank. So long as this communication was maintained, the Imperialists had little hope of reducing the city, and they resolved, therefore, to dislodge the French from their position. For this purpose Clairfait, having been reinforced with 12,000 men from the army of the Upper Rhine, attacked Pichegru's forces, and after a gallant action compelled them to retreat. He then proceeded to press the siege of Mannheim, covered by the main Austrian army under Wurmser. The French, under Jourdan, made an attempt to relieve it, but in vain, and the city capitulated on the 22nd of November.

By the peace of Lunéville, in 1803, it was given to the grand-duchy of Baden. Of late years it has grown into importance as a commercial town, and the Rhine harbour has assisted in developing its new-born energies.

The castle, or palace, formerly the largest in Germany, is more remarkable for its proportions than its architectural excellence. The façade was 1850 feet long, and the whole building contained 500 apartments, but the left or western wing was almost entirely destroyed during the bombardment of 1795. Strictly speaking, it consists of three courts or squares, of which the central and largest opens towards the town. The western portion was inhabited until her death by Napoleon's adopted daughter, the Dowager Grand-duchess Stephanie. The east wing is appropriated to the governor. Its picture gallery, since the removal of most of its treasures to Munich, does not present many valuable or interesting features.

The promenades of Mannheim are the terrace in the castle garden, which overlooks the excellent and abounding river; the Rhine jetty, or Rheindamm; the Neckarauer Wald; and the public garden of Mühlhausschlasschen, which forms a charming pleasure-resort on an island in the Rhine.

We cross the river at Mannheim to the small town of Ludwigshafen, whose advantageous position on the Rhine, and on the railways from Strassburg, Mainz, and Forbach, seems to insure it a prosperous future. Prior to the period of the French Revolution, it was a fortress called Rheinschanze, the *tête-du-pont* of Mannheim. In 1794, 1795, and 1798 it was the object of desperate struggles, as it commands the passage of the Rhine at an important point. In 1798 it was razed to the ground, but the French reconstructed it in 1813, to abandon it, on the 1st of January, 1814, to the advanced guard of the Russian army. Until 1823 it held rank only as a fortress; but since that date commercial establishments have been founded here, new lines of streets erected, and many handsome houses built. Its rise has

been carefully watched over by the Bavarian government, who made it a free port, and gave it the name of Ludwigshafen. Its fortifications have been demolished.

On the 15th of June, 1847, and for several days, it was cannonaded by the Badish insurgents, after they had made themselves masters of Mannheim, and several houses were set on fire.

From Ludwigshafen, or Mannheim, there are two ways of reaching Mainz; by the Rhine, and by railway.

In descending the river, the following are the principal points of interest on either bank:—On the right, Sandhofen, which possesses two churches, neither of any peculiar architectural interest. But the situation of the village is charming. On the left, Frankenthal, a town of 5000 inhabitants, to which we shall duly refer. On the right, Lampertheim, in Hesse Darmstadt, a small sleepy town of 3500 inhabitants, with vineyards and orchards all about it; a town where any German Rip van Winkle, returning after an absence of fifty years, would find nothing changed. On the left, Roxheim, a town of 1000 inhabitants, situated on the old and original channel of the Rhine, which here, while winding and doubling like a snake in pursuit of its prey, preserves the broad calm aspect of a lake. On the left, the old historic city of Worms, respecting which we shall have much to record. On the same bank, Hernsheim, about two miles from the river; an old and lifeless town, encircled by ramparts. The castle belongs to the Duc de Dalberg. On the right, Gernsheim, a town of nearly 4000 inhabitants, famous as the birthplace of Peter Schoeffer, one of the first three printers. He was the son-in-law of Faust, and in 1454 invented metallic types. A statue, by Scholl, was erected to his memory in 1836.

Below Gernsheim a canal has been excavated, to avoid one of the longest *détours* made by the Rhine. Here, in the middle of the elbow formed by the river, on the right bank, near Erfelden, Gustavus Adolphus, the "Lion of the North," raised a monument to commemorate his successful passage of the Rhine on the 7th of December, 1631.

The Rhine approaches the railway very closely. We have on the left Oppenheim and Nierstein; then, on the right, Trebur or Tribur, where the Carlovingian kings had a palace, of which no remains are extant; and after having passed (left bank) Nakenheim, Bodenheim, Laubenheim, and Weissenau, and (on the right bank) Giersheim, near which point the Schwarz empties itself into the Rhine, we have on the right the embouchure of the Main, and beneath a railway bridge of very handsome erection sweep into Mainz.

We have now to speak of the railway route to Mainz. The first town we meet with is—

Oggersheim, with a population of 1500 souls, destroyed in the War of the Palatinate. Here, in the inn Zum Viehhofe, Schiller wrote his "Verschwörung des Fiesco." At the time he was living in a condition of much distress, under the name of Schmidt; but soon afterwards he was invited to reside with the sons of Madame von Wollzogen, in her estate of Bauerbach, near Meinungen.

The chapel, or rather church of Loretto, at Oggersheim, is a centre of attraction to the surrounding country on Ascension Day. A convent of Minorites, endowed by the king of Bavaria, was founded here in 1845.

Our course now lies to the northward, across the Isenach, and brings us to Frankenthal (population, 4800), which is connected with the Rhine by a canal about three miles long. Both its origin and prosperity are due to sixty families of Flemish Protestants, who, expelled from the Low Countries by the tyranny of the Spaniards, established themselves here in 1562, in an Augustinian convent, founded in 1119.

When the Thirty Years' War broke out, the industrious little colony had increased to the number of 800 families, who introduced into this part of Germany industrial resources hitherto unknown, such as the manufacture of silk and cotton. It was then surrounded by walls, but its fortifications did not prevent it from being successively captured by the Spaniards, the Austrians, the Swedes, and the French. It was occupied for some months in 1622–23 by a small English force under Sir Horace Vere, despatched by James I. to sustain the failing cause of his son-in-law, the Elector Palatine. But the troops were too few in number, and their commander too deficient in military ability, to avail anything against the large Spanish army under Spinola, one of the first generals of his age, and accordingly they were compelled to surrender. When peace was re-established the electors rebuilt the town, which became in due time the great industrial depôt; but it has since fallen from its "pride of place."

On the site of the ancient convent, and after the



model of the church at Karlsruhe, was built the Protestant church in 1820–23. The town, burned down in 1844, has since been reconstructed. The portico of the ancient conventual church is still extant.

Beyond Bobenheim we cross the Leininger; then we take leave of the Bavarian Palatinate, and enter into the grand-duchy of Hesse; cross the Alt and the Eis, and pass near the cemetery of Worms, where we may distinguish the monument erected in 1848 to the memory of the old soldiers of the Grand Army of Napoleon.

WORMS.

The present population of Worms is about 11,000; it formerly numbered 40,000. The city is situated about a mile from the Rhine, which at one time washed its walls.

The one man with whom Worms is inseparably connected, and through whom it is something more than a decaying and dying city, is Martin Luther. The associations of Worms date from a venerable antiquity. A Roman fort was built here by Drusus. Here, too, in the Frankish era, were placed the scenes of the great German epic, the "Nibelungenlied." Christianity was introduced at a very early period, and Worms, in the fourth century, was a bishop's see. In the fifth century it was taken and plundered by Attila and his Huns; but it soon sprang erect from its ashes, and became a frequent residence of the Frankish kings. Dagobert I. built a palace, whose site is now occupied by the Trinity Church. Here Charlemagne declared war against the Saxons, and here, from 770 till 790, the famous May Assembly was held nearly every year. It was succeeded in due time by the Imperial Diet. At the Diet of Worms, in 1122, was concluded the treaty between the Emperor Henry V. and Pope Calixtus II., by which the bishops were thenceforth allowed to assume as episcopal insignia the sceptre, ring, and crozier. At the diet in 1495, under the Emperor Maximilian I., the right of private warfare was abolished, and public peace introduced into Germany. And it was the Diet of 1521 that summoned Martin Luther to answer the charges preferred against him by his opponents. The result of Luther's appearance before the Diet is too much a part of history to need description here.

FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAINE.

In ancient German history there is no city, perhaps, which figures more conspicuously than Frankfort. It was an imperial city, a free city, and a city opulent and grave. Its gravity in those days became it, and was worthy of the sober burghers, its inhabitants, who played the game of life so decorously. And while it has lost its ancient renown, it still retains this dull and decorous air. At least so it seems to us, in spite of the newness which reigns about us; a newness due to its rich hotels, its broad bright boulevards, its open squares. But ancient Frankfort is no more; the narrow streets through which Charles V. and his cavaliers took their way, and the peaked gabled roofs, and the timber fronts of the houses, with all their quaint and curious carving, have vanished before that demon which reigns in every European town, and does its work not wisely, but too well—the demon of improvement. Whoever enters Frankfort, fresh from the pages of the old chroniclers, will be astonished how completely its past has disappeared; how little is left of the grand old mediæval city.

Almost the only street which preserves what we may suppose to be its original characteristics is the Judengasse, or the Jews' Street. It has been well said that between it and its neighbours intervene 500 leagues and 500 years. The traveller, if he has wandered far, will be reminded of the muddy and miry Ghettos of Rome and Prague. It consists of two long rows of houses, black, gloomy, lofty, evil-looking, parallel, and almost alike. Between them runs a narrow, dim, and dirty causeway. On either side there is little to see but would-be doors, surmounted by an iron trellis-work fantastically wrought; and contiguous to these a grated *judas* partly opens on a gloomy alley. Wherever you turn you are greeted with dust, and ashes, and cobwebs, and worm-eaten crumbling timber, by a want and wretchedness more affected than real. But improvement has been in this street also—and, for once, let us own it was just necessary—and its ancient character will not be long in disappearing.

Here, on the right hand side, and in the house No. 118, was born the learned writer, Louis Boerne. Farther on, at No. 153, we come to the birthplace of the Rothschilds. As they grew wealthy they abandoned the old nest for more sumptuous residences; but their mother clung to it to the last, and died there in 1849.

The old synagogue of the Jews stands at the

southern entrance of the street; at the northern extremity, in the Schützenstrasse, a new one has been erected in the Oriental style, and on a most superb scale. It was inaugurated in 1853.

From the Judengasse we turn to the quay of the Maine, and open up quite a different picture of the past. There still stand erect the ancient towers which strengthened the city walls, reminding us of the days when every man's hand was against his neighbour. The two banks of the river are connected by a narrow and high-pitched bridge. What tales its stones might tell if they could speak! for they are very ancient; we trace them back from generation to generation. The view from this bridge, and from the whole extent of the quay, is exceedingly picturesque and animated.

From the Main-Kai we turn up Neue Mainzer Strasse, and diverging on the right into Grosse Gallen Gasse, we soon find ourselves in the Rossmarkt, the largest open area in the town. Here is placed the Gutenburg *denkmal*, or memorial: a group of colossal statues representing the three first inventors of printing—Gutenburg, Fust, and Schoeffer; the medallions along the frieze reproduce the heads of the thirteen most celebrated German printers; and underneath the frieze are carved the armorial bearings of Mainz, Frankfort, Strassburg, and Verney, the four cities which most actively devoted themselves to the improvement and propagation of the new art; and, finally, the pedestal of the fountain is surrounded by allegorical figures of Theology, Science, Poetry, and Industry. The memorial was erected in 1845, and designed by Launitz.

In the Grosse Hirschgraben, close at hand, the house, No. 74, is for ever memorable as the house of Goethe, the greatest genius which Germany has yet produced. There he was born on the 28th of August, 1749, as the clock sounded the hour of noon.

Frankfort might well be content with the glory of having given birth to Goethe; but she has had other sons and daughters not unworthy of being remembered; as, for instance, Goethe's correspondent, Bettina von Arnim, the illustrious dramatist Oehlenschlager, Vogt, the great harmonist, Schlosser, Buttmann, and Feuerbach.

The handsomest, broadest, and liveliest street in Frankfort is the Zeil, where are situated the post-office, the residence of the grand-duke of Hesse, the house of De Rothschild, and at its lower end a foundry for bells and cannons. From hence we can take any one of the many streets leading into the other quarters of the town, and to the Rœmer (or town-hall), and the Dôm (or cathedral).

The Rœmer is an edifice of much interest, though it is difficult to say how much antiquity it retains, so frequently has it been repaired, restored, and reconstructed. It is said to have been originally used (and hence its name) as a kind of mart, or bazaar, where the Lombard merchants from Italy displayed their merchandise during the great Frankfort fairs. Others say it was erected on the site of one of Charlemagne's palaces. At all events, the city purchased it in 1403, and transformed it into a guildhall. Its façade is very curious. From a vast but low hall of the fifteenth century we ascend a broad staircase with a balustrade of iron, *à la* Louis XIII., and a lining of old tapestries, which are unworthy of attention, to the Kaisersaal, or imperial chamber. This is an irregular rhomboidal apartment, in which the emperors banqueted, with kings and princes acting as their attendants. The walls are covered with their portraits, fifty-two in number, and in chronological order, from Conrad I. to Francis II. These have been recently painted by Lessing, Burdeman, Rethel, and others, and are agreeable substitutes for the caricatures which formerly aroused the indignation of the visitor. Under nearly every one is the motto which the emperor adopted at his coronation. At the end of the hall is the Judgment of Solomon, by Steinde. In the Wahlzimmer, or election chamber, the senate of Frankfort, instead of the electors of the Holy Roman Empire, now hold their sittings. Here is preserved the famous Golden Bull, promulgated partly at Frankfort in the month of January, 1356, partly at Metz on Christmas day in the same year, by the august Emperor Charles IV., king of Bohemia, assisted by all the elector-princes of the Holy Empire, in presence of the reverend father in God, Theodore, bishop of Alba, cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, and of Charles, eldest son of the king of France, the illustrious duke of Normandy, and dauphin of the Viennois.

This document, whose appearance caused in its time a vast amount of excitement, is, after all, of little real importance; regulating, much less from a political than from a ceremonial point of view, the reciprocal relations of the electors and the head

of the empire. In effect, it exalted the power of the seven electors, as they were called, at the cost of the imperial authority. It gave the king of Bohemia a place among the said seven; fixed Frankfort as the place of election; named the archbishop of Metz convener of the electoral college; gave to Bohemia the first, to the Count Palatine of the Rhine the second, place among the secular electors. In all cases a majority of votes was to be decisive.

"Peace and order," says Dr. Bryce, "appeared to be promoted by the institutions of Charles IV., which removed one fruitful cause of civil war. But these seven electoral princes acquired, with their new privileges, a marked and dangerous predominance in Germany. They were to enjoy full regalian rights in their territories; causes were not to be evoked from their courts, save when justice should have been denied; their consent was necessary to all public acts of consequence. Their persons were held to be sacred, and the seven mystic luminaries of the Holy Empire, typified by the seven luminaries of the Apocalypse, soon gained much of the emperor's hold on popular reverence, as well as that actual power which he lacked. To Charles, who viewed the German empire much as Rudolph had viewed the Roman, this result came not unforeseen. He saw in his office a means of serving personal ends; and to them, while exalting by endless ceremonies its ideal dignity, deliberately sacrificed what real strength was left. The object which he sought steadily through life was the prosperity of the Bohemian kingdom and the advancement of his own house. In the Golden Bull, whose seal bears the legend—

'Roma caput mundi regit orbis frena rotundi,' *

there is not a word of Rome or of Italy. To Germany he was indirectly a benefactor by the foundation of the University of Prague, the mother of all her schools; otherwise her bane. He legalized anarchy, and called it a constitution."

Since the days of Austerlitz Charlemagne's crown, until the present remarkable epoch, has rested on no imperial brow. Many of the losses which Austria had suffered at Napoleon's hands were repaired by the treaties of 1815; but the empire of Germany was not restored, and the Hapsburgs were forced to be content with the new imperial crown of Austria. In August, 1863, however, the present emperor made a bid, as it were, for the old leadership of Germany, which for some years had been divided between him and the king of Prussia; and in the ancient Germanic capital he convoked all the German kings and princes, to discuss with him the future interests of their fatherland, and the reforms required in her constitution. But the hostility of Prussia checked the move, and foiled the designs of the Austrian statesmen.

But at all events Frankfort could rejoice that for a moment the eyes of Europe were fixed upon her, as in the old historic days. And she had some reason to be proud with a civic pride when, before the princes assembled at the banquet, under the imperial roof of the Rœmer, the emperor of Austria pledged it in a cup of wine. The wealth of the old days once more poured into the treasuries of the Frankforters. Fifty thousand strangers were attracted from all parts of Europe by this gathering of kings, princes, grand-dukes, princelings, statesmen, soldiers, and courtiers. It was an imperial revival on a grand scale, but "for this occasion only." The emperor was lodged in the Rœmer, as was the custom with his ancestors; but he was not to wield the sceptre of the Holy Roman Empire. It was a glorious dream, a dazzling mirage. As for practical result, it had none, unless we look for it on the field of Sadowa!

Amongst the ecclesiastical buildings of Frankfort, the first and foremost is necessarily the Dôm, or cathedral, also called the church of St. Barthelemy. This is a cruciform edifice, which has been erected at different epochs—the nave about 1238, the choir between 1315 and 1338, and the aisles somewhat later. The effect of the whole is certainly quaint and picturesque, but the details do not harmonize thoroughly. The Dôm was restored in 1855. It measures about 310 feet in length, and 270 in width. On the right hand side of the principal entrance is conspicuous an enormous clock, with an astrolabe and a perpetual calendar, of the fifteenth century. The interior contains a number of objects more or less worthy of attention. The ancient tombs of the Holzhausen, with their remains of colouring, must not be overlooked. In the choir are some noteworthy frescoes of the sorrows of St. Bartholomew and the graces of St. Mary Magdalene, besides rude, bold wood-carving of fourteenth century date. In the chapel on the

* Rome, the head of the world, holds the reins of the circular sphere.

left, a fifteenth century sculpture, representing the Virgin on her death-bed, astonishes by its singularity of conception. The artist will find matter for criticism in a Christ on the Virgin's knees, attributed to Dürer; an Assumption (over the high altar), by Veit, in the style of Rubens; and a Holy Family, after Rubens. For the simply curious spectator the objects of interest are many and varied; the ancient armour hanging from the walls; the painting, on leather, of the interior of St. Cecilia's tomb; some fine copper lamps; and, among other tombs, that of Gunther von Schwarzburg, elected emperor at Frankfort in 1349, and shortly afterwards poisoned. The monument was erected in 1352. It stands close beside the door leading to the old chamber of election. Observe, that in the centre of the Dôm, and just at the entrance to the choir—that is, at the point where the nave intersects the transepts—the emperors have undergone the ceremony of coronation since the days of Maximilian II.

St. Leonhard's Church is memorable as occupying the site of the ancient palace of Charlemagne, who assembled, as the Chronicles tell us, the bishops and princes of the empire here at Frankensfurd, or the "Frank's ford." In the interior are some interesting objects. The altar-piece is by Stieler, a Bavarian artist.

The Sachsenhausen, founded by the Saxons about the epoch of Charlemagne, is chiefly inhabited by gardeners and vineyard-labourers. To the left, as we enter it, our eye rests on the Deutsche Haus, the residence of the knights of the old Teutonic order, but now degraded into a barrack.

The quay, which from the bridge runs along the right bank of the river, as far as the Obermainthor, is called the Schœne Aussicht, or "Beautiful Prospect." At its further end is placed the library, built in 1825. Among its bibliographical curiosities are a MS. Bible, purchased at Rome about 1350, and formerly in the possession of the Gutenberg family; the Mainz Bible of 1462, on parchment; and Gutenberg's Bible, the so-called Mazarin.

The Stadel Museum (of pictures) is situated in the Neue Mainzer Strasse, and named after its founder, a Frankfort burgher, who bequeathed all his paintings, drawings, and engravings to the city, besides a sum of £83,000 for the erection and maintenance of a public gallery. In the first room there is Moretto's admirable Virgin and Child, with the four Fathers of the Latin Church, purchased at an expense of 30,000 florins. In the second, the *chef d'œuvre* is Lessing's Huss before the Council of Constanz. In the third, we remember an ancient and curious altar-piece, and a tasteless but cleverly composed Triumph of Christianity in the Arts, by Overbeck. In the sixth room, Schnorr, Schadow, and Steinle are represented.

The Fresco-Saal contains an allegorical fresco by Veit, representing Christendom introducing the Arts into Germany; and a terra-cotta composition by Andrioli (1561) of the Virgin and Saints.

Sinkenberg's Museum of Natural History is near the fine old Eschenheim Gate, and contains a tolerably well-selected, but not very large, cabinet of natural history specimens.



CHAPTER VII.

FROM MAINZ TO COBLENZ.

MAINZ.

MAINZ (in French and English, Mayence), one of the principal towns of the German empire, is situated, at an elevation of ninety to ninety-five feet, on the right bank of the Rhine, almost opposite the mouth of the Main. Its population exceeds 40,000. With the left bank of the German river it is connected by a bridge of boats, and by a strong iron bridge at some slight distance from the city. This latter bridge was opened in December, 1862.

The circumference of Mainz, including its military outworks, may be computed at three leagues and a half. Three main gates, without including those of the quay, opening on the Rhine, provide a communication between the interior of the city and the country; namely, Neuthor, on the Oppenheim and Worms road; Gauthor, on the Paris road, *viâ* Algey and Kaiserslautern; and Münsterthor, on the road to Bingen, Coblenz, Trier, and Creuznach.

Now for a general description of the city.

A bird's eye view, could it be obtained—or an aerostatic voyage, which is equivalent to it—would show you Mainz in the form of a perfectly-defined arc of the circle, the chord being represented by the river, and the circle by the fortifications. These fortifications are founded on Vauban's system, but with many modifications, the fruit of modern engineering study. They are considered by the best judges to be of a very formidable character; and it will be observed that the river, on one side, acts as a deep, broad, and comparatively impassable fosse. In addition, a very powerful citadel, in front of the town, commands its passage, and threatens to overwhelm any assailant. Like a gigantic star, it projects in four angles, and its four bastions, bristling with artillery, bear these heroic or sinister names: Drusus, Germanicus, Tacitus, and Alarm. The latter, partly situated in the suburb of the city, is strengthened by a mine, and, from far or near, seems to say to the passer by, "Who goes there?"

Mainz is another example of the folly of converting populous cities into great military posts. It is literally choked within the strong grasp of its walls. Hence its streets are narrow and muddy, and its houses are carried to a great height to compensate for the want of superficial space. A busy and numerous population seem, in their marts and markets, to shoulder, to jostle one another.

The history of Mainz dates back to a period anterior to the Christian era. Whether the Germans had a settlement here, no antiquary seems able to determine; but thirty years before the birth of our Saviour, Martius Agrippa, one of the lieutenants of Augustus, constructed here an intrenched camp. This fortress, which was afterwards known as Moguntiacum, was rebuilt, twenty years later, by Agrippa's successor, Drusus Germanicus; who also raised, on the opposite bank of the river, a *castellum* (castle), and united the two by a massive stone bridge, some remains of which are visible to this day.

In A.D. 70 Moguntiacum was garrisoned by the twenty-second legion, which had conquered Judea and destroyed Jerusalem, under the orders of Titus. The ancient tradition affirms that St. Crescentius, who was one of the first to preach the religion of Christ on the banks of the Rhine, and who suffered martyrdom in 103, was a soldier in this legion before becoming a soldier of the church militant, and first bishop of Mainz.

In 235 Alexander Severus, while meditating a campaign against the Germans, was here waylaid by a small band of mutinous soldiery, incited, it is said, by his rival Maximinus, and murdered, along with his mother, in the thirtieth year of his age and the fourteenth of his reign.

After the crashing downfall of the Roman empire, Mainz successively fell into the hands of the Allemanns, the Vandals, and the Huns. Destruction had swept over it, and it was but a heap of ruins when its bishop, Sidonius, with the help and patronage of Dagobert II., king of the Franks, began to rebuild it, but on a site nearer the river bank. It was surrounded with walls in

712 by Bishop Sigebert. Soon afterwards, by a vicissitude of fortune common enough in those days, it was seized by the Burgundians. These were driven out in 720 by the hammering blows of Charles Martel. Then it seems to have flourished apace; and in 745 the two kings, Carloman and Pepin, in agreement with Pope Zacarias, elevated its bishop to archiepiscopal rank, and made him the ecclesiastical metropolitan of all Germany. This new archbishop was no other than the sainted Wilfrid, better known under the name of St. Boniface. Born at Crediton, in Devonshire, of a wealthy and distinguished race, he became a monk in the Benedictine abbey of Nutsall, near Winchester, but speedily quitted it with eleven companions, to preach the gospel to the barbarous nations of Germany. His mission, interrupted by three voyages to Rome, lasted thirty years, and its influence extended from the Elbe to the Rhine, and from the Alps to the ocean. It is said to have accomplished, as its glorious result, the conversion of upwards of 100,000 pagans.

Glancing at the mediæval history of Germany, we see two great facts standing out in conspicuous relief, both of importance, and one of them destined to exercise a social, moral, and intellectual influence over the whole civilized world. We refer, in the first place, to the League of the Rhine, founded by Arnold von Walboten in 1247, with the view of liberating commerce from the iron fetters imposed upon it by the tyranny of feudalism; the other, the invention of printing by Gutenburg in 1440. We know how the latter invention has affected every branch of our general life; how it has upset thrones and mitres and provoked revolutions, but, on the other hand, has encouraged reforms, and built up the fair structures of constitutional liberty and religious freedom.

We shall be right, perhaps, in considering that Mainz attained the climax of its prosperity in the fourteenth century. After the Reformation its history was one long course of vicissitude and disaster. It was captured and set on fire in 1552 by Albert, margrave of Brandeburg. In 1631 the "Lion of the North," Gustavus Adolphus, appeared before it with that remarkable army of his, the prototype of Cromwell's "Ironsides." On the 13th of December, 1631, the king made his entry into the conquered town, and fixed his quarters in the elector's palace. In 1635 the Imperialists once more gained possession of the city, to give way to the French in 1644. When these had retired, it enjoyed some years of peace and prosperity; was rebuilt, embellished, and aggrandized by the Elector John Philip the Wise, who threw a bridge of boats across the Rhine. But in 1688 the French once more captured it, committing, according to French authority, "abominable excesses;" and in 1689, they being driven out, the Imperialists resumed possession. The Elector Lothair Francis, and his successors, resumed the work of John Philip, which had thus rudely been interrupted, and succeeded in effacing every sign of war and its ravages.

Then broke out the French revolution, and Mainz, as one of the great advanced posts of Germany, was compelled to endure a succession of calamitous sieges. It was taken by the French under Custine, in 1792; but in the following year they were forced to surrender by an Austro-Prussian army, more through the effect of famine than through the military skill of the commander of the allies. It was again besieged by the French in 1794, who were defeated under its walls. In 1795 they were also repulsed. In 1797, however, it was ceded to the French, and it remained a French fortress until 1814. Afterwards, and down to the present time, it belonged to the German confederation, and was garrisoned by an equal number of Austrians and Prussians. Now it is included within the boundaries of North Germany, and is solely occupied by Prussian troops. Its fortifications have been greatly strengthened and enlarged.

At Mainz begins the Lower Rhine.

We shall pay our first visit to the *Platz Gutenberg*, where, opposite the theatre, was erected in 1837 a bronze statue to Gutenberg, the first printer, executed by Thorwaldsen, at the cost of the citizens of Europe. Gutenberg was born at Mainz, about 1397, of a noble family, named Sulgeloch zum Gutenberg. The house where he was born stands at the corners of the streets Pfundhausgasse and Emmeransgasse. About 1424, having discovered the principles of the new art with which his name was to be associated, he betook himself to Strassburg, where he carried theory into practice, and made his first typographical attempts with movable types cut out of wood. He did not return to Mainz until 1443, when, being in want of funds, he associated with himself Fust, a wealthy goldsmith, and Schoeffer,

a man of talent, and in the house *Hof zum Sungen*, which still exists, he printed his *Biblia Latina*.

The finest building in Mainz is its cathedral; a red sandstone pile of great extent, begun in the tenth, and completed in the eleventh century. It has gone through so many conflagrations, however, and suffered so much from the Prussian bombardment of 1793, and still more from having been used as a barrack and magazine by the French, that little is left of the ancient edifice except the eastern apse, which is flanked by two circular towers, one dating from 978, the other from 1137. The Pfarrthurm, at the east end, is an octagonal tower, surmounted by a cast-iron cupola, seventy feet high, designed by Moller. Like the cathedrals of Worms, Trier, and Speier, the church has a double choir, with high altars both at the east and west ends, and transepts.

The principal entrance is a low door in the side of the building. But the leaves of the door are eight centuries old, and on their bronze panels may still be read the characters of the charter granted to the city by Bishop Adalbert I., who ordered it to be here engraved.

Two domes, of different styles and proportions, crown the edifice. They might almost be called, in allusion to their form and ornaments, two papal tiaras. The older is the more severe and simple in construction, and the more imposing; the other, the more enriched, the more elaborate, and "perhaps" the more pleasing.

There are three naves in the interior, or rather a nave and side aisles, of which the central is remarkable for the boldness of its lofty arches. The great defect internally is the want of windows; they are few and narrow, and placed at too great an elevation. Hence the light is insufficient, and what there is falls in the wrong places, and injures the general effect. This has been not unjustly designated the capital vice of the Romanesque style. On the other hand, the Gothic architect delighted to open up windows wherever he could, and to flood his buildings with light, moderated and varied by the painted glass.

The cathedral was the place of sepulture of the electoral archbishops of Mainz, of the princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and of many other illustrious and distinguished personages. We cannot pretend to enumerate all these monuments. The most interesting are those which belong to the last years of the fifteenth and the earlier part of the sixteenth centuries. Among these we may point out Prince Albert of Saxony, 1484; the Canon Bernard of Brudenbach, 1497; Archbishop Berthold of Stenneberg, 1504; Archbishop Jacob of Liebenstein, 1508; and Albert of Brandeburg, 1545. In no case are the epitaphs more than pompous and verbose descriptions of the honours and dignities enjoyed by the deceased. A fragment of white marble, let into the wall, is all that remains of the tomb erected by Charlemagne to Fastrada, his third or fourth wife, who died in A.D. 794.

Another monument of historic interest is that of St. Boniface, raised to his memory in 1357. It consists of red sandstone, and is situated on the right side of the nave.

To the artist that of Frauenlob will also be attractive. Frauenlob (that is, "praise of women") was a canon of the cathedral, named Heinrich von Meissen, who lived towards the close of the thirteenth and in the early part of the fourteenth centuries. He was one of the first *Minnesingers*, or love-singers—the German troubadours; and he devoted his poetic genius to the laudation of women, and especially of the Virgin.

The church of Saint Stephen, in the Gauthor, is worth a visit. From the summit of its lofty tower, which is situated in the highest part of the city, the view is rich, extensive, diversified.

The old Electoral Palace, a stately red sandstone pile of the seventeenth century, was down to 1792 the residence of the electors. The throne room has been restored. Here are now collected, under a single roof, the library, the picture gallery, the museums of coins, antiquities, and natural history. The library possesses upwards of 100,000 volumes. Among these may be particularized, a bible, 1462; a catholicon, 1460; and a psalter, 1457. In the collection of antiquities, the most notable features are the Roman altars, the votive stone, and the inscriptions discovered in the town and its environs. But the gallery of pictures contains things of beauty, which appeal to the heart and fancy of the largest number of visitors. Among about 270 works of ancient and modern artists, there are good specimens of Jordaens, Titian, Giordano, Albert Dürer, Tintoretto, Guido, Domenichino, Rubens, Murillo, Snyders, and others.

About a mile beyond the Gauthor are the remains of a Roman aqueduct, nearly 3000 feet long, which conveyed water to the Roman garri-

son from a spring five miles distant. Sixty-two piers, still extant, are admirable specimens of Roman masonry.

From Mainz to Coblenz extends what may aptly be called the "steamboat navigation of the Rhine," and this portion of the river is certainly best explored "by water." We enter now on the fertile country of the Rheingau, whose general aspect has been very faithfully described by a recent French writer. "The Rheingau," says Professor Durand, "is a region, half plain and half mountain, sheltered from the rough north and biting east by the thick masses of the Taunus and the Niederwald, while facing the south with its Rhine-washed hills. It is the vineyard of Germany. Places more poetical we *may* see; but none more prosperous or more flourishing. The intervals between the various villages are exceedingly short; and in their site, their structures, and the gleam of their lime-washed façades, there is an air of gaiety which greatly pleases the spectator. Most of them are planted at the very edge of the river, and are separated from it simply by a pathway. Thus, in winter, the inhabitants are driven from their homes by the floods. But as these floods are of periodical occurrence, no one seems to be disturbed by them. Everybody seems to have made up his mind to live on good terms with their regular visitor; and rather than depart from his paternal river, is willing to yield up to him once a year his room and bed. In the first sixty years of the present century, no fewer than thirty-three inundations have taken place, some of them of a terrible character. A church of greater or less antiquity, and generally of a pleasant architectural aspect, forms the central point of each village, and around it gathers a group of brick-built houses, adorned with vines."

The Rheingau's surest source of wealth is in the bounty of the vine, and, consequently, its cultivation has spread over every rood of ground. Rocky precipices, declivities, and precipices where it is a task to hold oneself erect, have been dug, and turned over, and fertilized. In default of vegetable soil, the cultivators have pulverized the friable rock. Far out of sight the vines extend their regular ranks, and all the outlines of the mountain bristle with them. Out of this flood or sheet of verdure rise at intervals large, gleaming Italian villas, with flat roofs and square walls, or Neo-Gothic castles, with crenelated turrets. These are the pleasant summer resorts of the opulent wine merchants of Mainz or Frankfort, erected in the midst of the vineyards to which their proprietors owe their wealth. Flags bearing the national colours float from every summit, and, as in a royal palace, indicate that the master is at home. But round these splendid edifices blooms scarcely any garden ground; the ground is too limited, the product too precions, for the agreeable to take the place of the useful. An oak, or a larch, gives only a little shade; but here, each foot of the vineyard is covered in autumn with pieces of gold. At the bottom of the terrace an elegantly decorated skiff balances on the waves. To have an estate in the Rheingau, and a boat on the Rhine, are the two extreme points of human happiness in this country.

Of all the vineyards in this part of the Rhine valley the most celebrated is the Johannisberg. After having belonged for some centuries to the abbey and convent of St. John, the original passed, early in the present century, into the hands of the prince of Orange; but the all-dividing Napoleon presented it as a gift to Marshal Kellermann. At the close of the first empire, it was given by the emperor of Austria to Prince Metternich to be held as an imperial fief. "The ground around is too precious as a vineyard to be laid out in gardens: no trees are allowed, as they would deprive the vines of the sun's rays; but on the north side of the houses there is a sort of vineyard planted with trees. The best wine grows close under the château, and indeed partly over the cellars. The species of wine cultivated is the Riesling. The management of it at all seasons requires the most careful attention. The grapes are allowed to remain on the vines as long as they can hold together, and the vintage usually begins a fortnight later than anywhere else. The vine-grower is not satisfied with ripeness; the grape must verge on rottenness before it suits his purpose; and although much is lost in quantity by this delay in gathering, it is considered that the wine gains thereby in strength and body. So precious are the grapes, that those which fall are picked off the ground with a kind of fork made for the purpose. The extent of the vineyard is about seventy acres, and it is divided into small compartments, the produce of each of which is put into separate casks: even in the best years there is considerable difference in the value of different casks. Its produce amounts in good years to about forty butts (called *stücks*), and of

7½ ohms, and has been valued at 80,000 florins. The highest price ever paid was 18,000 florins for 1350 bottles, or upwards of thirteen florins a bottle."

THE RHEINGAU.

Generally speaking, the course of the Rhine, after leaving Mainz, is that of a river running in a deep mountain channel. On the right the Taunus, and on the left the Hundsrück, have neared each other as if they would absolutely arrest the progress of the waters. To the most superficial observer it is evident that, in ages long ago, the solid mountain mass must have been disrupted by some formidable convulsion; and in the chasm then created now flows the mighty stream—far mightier, it may be, in those days of earth's stir and turmoil. On either side it now washes a wall of rock, its narrow banks being covered with a scanty vegetation of firs and reeds, whose gloomy verdure communicates to the waters the colour of bronze. Here and there some persevering labourer has broken up the obdurate soil, and planted the fruitful vine. The live rock, wounded by the miner's pick, gnawed at by the waters, eaten by frost and rain, exhibits its marvellous strata of red and blue; and day and night, says a French writer, seem to encounter one another, without ever commingling, in the cavernous hollows of their declivities. At one point the eye is lost in a deep darkness; at another it rests on a surface flooded with light.

And mark how the river murmurs and plashes, as it eddies round a rock rising in the centre of its channel. Mark how it tumbles in a miniature cascade over the ledges which its waters have created. And now, behold, the mountains seem to hem it in, and the waters rest tranquilly in their sheltered basin, as in a far-off mountain tarn? We look in vain for its point of issue. When did it enter? whence will it escape? Is not this the termination of the Rhine? There is something attractive, and yet melancholy, in this deception. Were the heights loaded with snow, says Durand, you might think that the river had turned back towards its Swiss cradle, and had poured itself into one of the great lakes of the Alpine regions.

Thus, then, we have seen the Rhine in its wilder and gloomier beauty. There are no more villages after Bingen, few human habitations, scarcely any cultivation. An infinite grandeur is given to the picture by their silence and solitude; and as we gaze upon it our thoughts are raised to its own high standard. And the spectator, carrying his fancy back over the gulf of time, readily calls up the images of the primeval world, and traces through the ages the successive fortunes of the stream.

All Christian that it is, and though the spires and towers of a thousand churches are mirrored in its waves, the Rhine still gives birth to unnumbered pagan fables, unnumbered phantoms, of which it is both the cradle and the realm. Sylphs, and elves, and gnomes, loreleys, nixes, and ondines, spring into life along its banks, haunt its rocks, inhabit its crystal caverns, and contend with the priest for the empire of the river. The devil is on their side; the devil, who was ever-present to the mediæval imagination, figures in at least one-half of the legendary history of the Rhine. There is not a hermitage whose saint he has not tempted with his wiles; not a monastery to which he has not done some evil turn; not a cathedral but he has doomed it to remain unfinished for ever.

Simultaneously with the religious life, feudalism seized upon this fair countryside, to leave the indelible mark of its iron sway. The stir and conflict of the early centuries rendered necessary those innumerable burgs or fortresses which, from Bingen to Coblenz, form along the Rhine a belt of towers and battlements. Each summit, each rock, each mountain gorge, had its master. Entrenched behind walls six feet in thickness, separated from the commerce of men by draw-bridges, and bastions, and precipices, these warriors only quitted their falcons' nests to pounce upon a prey or to attack one another. It was an age of unrestrained violence. In no other country was mediæval history characterized by so much blood, and rapine, and disorder; by so much turbulence on the part of the chief, by so much misery on the part of the peasant. And nowhere else has the image of those times been preserved with so much fidelity. Yon keeps, yon platform, yon shattered and crumbling walls, which, enthroned upon the rock, have so valiantly endured the weight of centuries—all these are the past, are feudalism, are history. It is as if an ancient theatre had remained erect, with the scenery almost uninjured of the drama formerly enacted within it. But where are the actors? where the movement, the sounds, the accents of human speech? Everything

is alive in the past; everything is dead in the present.*

FROM MAINZ TO COBLENZ BY THE RIGHT BANK OF THE RHINE.

Passing the long narrow islands of Petersau and Jugelheimerau, we arrive at Biberich, a small but pleasantly situated town of 5000 inhabitants, whose single attraction is the château of the duke of Nassau, a handsome structure of red sandstone, built towards the early part of the last century in the Renaissance style. Its richly decorated front faces the Rhine, and forms a conspicuous feature in the landscape. It consists of two main buildings, terminated by a couple of wings, and connected by a kind of circular projection or rotunda, ornamented with a group of statues. The interior is furnished with much taste and splendour, and the windows open up a number of beautiful views of the Rhine scenery.

Elfeld, or Eltville, bears the distinction of being the only town in the Rheingau. Its name is a corruption of Alta Villa, and indicates its conspicuous and elevated position. From afar it may be recognized by the lofty, four-turreted watch-tower, which crowns the ridge of the acclivity, and is a part of the castle erected here in the fourteenth century by the archbishops of Mainz. These distinguished prelates were often glad of a safe refuge from their turbulent citizens. It was here that in 1349 Gunther of Schwarzburg, when beleaguered by his rival Charles IV., resigned his crown, and died, probably of poison. The castle was destroyed by the successive efforts of the Swedes and French. Of the town it may be noted that it possessed a printing press as early as 1465, and that its environs are unusually picturesque and attractive. There is a beautiful chapel of St. Michael in the Kedriel valley. It was built in 1440, and of the later Gothic is a valuable example.

The islands which here stud the expansive bosom of the river are named Rheinau, or Westphælau, Langwertherau, and Sandau. Charlemagne often resorted to them to fish, when he was residing at Jugelheim (of which hereafter). And upon one of them, probably Sandau, Louis the Debonnair, hunted to the death by his cruel sons, ended his wretched life in June, 840.

* Durand, Le Rhin Allemand. We apologize for our long quotation, but M. Durand's sketches are both lively and accurate, and are interesting to English readers as taken from a French point of view.

A little below Hattenheim the Rhine attains its maximum breadth, 2000 feet; and in the vicinity of this town, on the Strahlenberg, grows the celebrated Marcobrunnen wine, so named from the small fountain of Markbrunnen. Count Schönbom's château, Reichartshausen, is situated further down the river, in a pleasant but not very extensive park.

Through a country of vineyards, whose radiant smiling aspect it is impossible to describe, but of which one can never grow weary, we proceed to Geisenheim, distinguishable from a distance by the open Gothic towers recently added (1836) to its fifteenth-century church. Here lies the dust of John Philip, of Schoarbom, formerly elector of Mainz.

Of far greater interest than any of the vintage towns mentioned is Rüdesheim (sixteen and half miles by rail from Biberich), a place of great antiquity, of much importance, and picturesque situation. The neighbouring hills blush with the vines which produce the famous Rüdesheim liquor, the essence of the precious grape. Tradition ascribes the origin of these vineyards to Charlemagne, who, remarking from his palace at Jugelheim that the snow disappeared from the heights of Rüdesheim sooner than elsewhere, and detecting the advantageousness of the locality for vine-growing, ordered suitable plants to be conveyed thither from Burgundy and Orleans. And the grapes, we may add, are still called Orleans.

The great antiquity of Rüdesheim is the picturesque quadrangular keep, seated close to the bank of the Rhine, and known as the Brömserburg, which dates from 1100. It is also called the Neiderburg and the Oboeburg. It consists of three vaulted stories, and its walls are from eight to fourteen feet in thickness. It dates from the thirteenth century, and measures about 110 feet in length, ninety-five feet in width, and seventy-five feet in height—a formidable mass picturesquely adorned with ivy and shrubs. "What an admirable feudal castle!" cries Victor Hugo. "Romanesque caverns, Romanesque walls, a hall of knights illuminated by a lamp resembling that in Charlemagne's tent, Renaissance windows, iron lanterns of the thirteenth century suspended to the walls, narrow corkscrew staircases, frightfully gloomy cells or *oubliettes*, sepulchral urns ranged in a kind of ossuary—a complete accumulation of black and terrible things, at whose summit expands an

enormous crest of verdure and flowers, whence we may contemplate the magnificence of the Rhine."

At first, the Brömserburg belonged to the archbishops of Mainz; next, to the nobles of Rüdesheim-Brömser (a family which died out in 1688); and afterwards it passed through the hands of various owners into those of Prince Metternich, who sold it to the Count von Jugelheim.

From Rüdesheim we always strike inland to the beautiful Niederwald, or Lower Forest. Here are Lagdschloss, a small hunting box; the Bezaubertu Hæhle, or "Magic Grotto," affording three superb tableaux of the castle and church of Falkenburg, Rheinstein, and the Schweizerhaus. Thence we ascend to the artificial ruin of the Rossel, and "under the shade of melancholy boughs" to the Temple; which is situated on the very summit, 780 feet above the Rhine. Both from the Rossel and the Temple the views are grandly impressive; and though many others equal, few, if any, surpass them. They have a character of their own which prevents them from being forgotten, and once seen they are stamped upon the memory for ever.

Passing the conflnence of the Nahe with the Rhine, we mark the old quartz rock which rises in the middle of the narrowing river, where the latter seeks to force a passage between the Taunus and the Hundsrück. The rock is crowned with the ruins of an old tower, the Mæusethurm, or Mouse Tower, or Bishop Hatto's Tower. Associated with it is a romantic legend, of which Southey has given a version. The tower was built in the thirteenth century, by Archbishop Siegfried, for the accommodation of the guards who levied the tolls inflicted on passing vessels. Hence it was called the Mauth or Maus, that is, the Toll tower. It was restored in 1856.

Continuing along the right bank, we come to Ehrenfels, the romantic ruins of a castle built in 1210, and frequently occupied by the archbishops of Mainz, when they and their treasures were in danger from their turbulent subjects. It was captured by the Swedes in 1635, and destroyed by the French in 1689. The most delightful and luxuriant vineyards embower these picturesque ruins.

Below Ehrenfels we cross the Bingerloch, an artificial canal excavated in a rocky dyke which, at that point, obstructs the bed of the Rhine. It was constructed by the Prussian government between 1830 and 1832.

We arrive at Lorch, the *Laureacum* of the Romans, situated at the confluence of the Wisper with the Rhine. In mediæval times it was inhabited by numerous nobles, whose mansions are still extant. The church was founded in the twelfth century, but has undergone considerable reconstruction. It has a fine chime of bells, whose melody, gliding over the waters and echoing through the vineyard alleys, has a singularly impressive effect.

On the right bank of the Wisper rises, abrupt and precipitous, the terraced rock known as the Devil's Ladder — *Teufelsleiter*—crowned by the crumbling ruins of the castle of Nollicht or Nollingen. Even on this rude rock "the flower of a legend blows."

Below Lorch, a fair and well-cultivated little island breaks the waters of the Rhine. Below Bacharach, which will receive attention hereafter, the river plunges into a mass of rocks, with incessant clouds of spray and foam, and would be impassable for ships but for the canal excavated by the Prussian government in 1850. This *Wilde Gefæcht*, however, is one of the most picturesque points on the river.

At a bend of the stream, and on a rocky islet, stands the romantic castle of Pfalz or Pfalzgrabenstein, erected in the fourteenth century by the Emperor Louis the Bavarian. It completely commanded the passage of the Rhine, and levied a toll on all passing vessels. Here Louis le Debonnair died in 840, weary with the fatigues of empire, and longing only for a thatched lodge or leafy hut to shelter him in his last home. The "soothing music of the gurgling waters" lulled him to his rest. It was often used as a prison, and its dark and horrible dungeons lie below the level of the river. The castle is accessible by means of a ladder, and the solitary entrance is closed by a portcullis. The well which supplied its inmates with water is filled from a sonrce far deeper than the bed of the Rhine. According to an old belief, the princesses Palatine always came here for their accouchements, and the mother and babe took their first airing in a boat on the surrounding waters.

Opposite Pfalz on the right bank of the Rhine, which, let us remind the reader, is the bank we have been descending, is Caub, with its important slate quarries. It was here, on the 1st of January, 1814, that the Prussian army, under Blucher,

crossed the river, and commenced the invasion of France.

To the north of this little but remarkable town rises conspicuous the castle of Gutenfels. We hear of it as early as 1178, when the lords of Falkenstein sold it to the Palatinate, along with Caub, which, as was customary with the feudal towns, had grown up silently at its feet. It is said to owe its name—Guta's Rock—to the beautiful Beatrix Guta or Guda, the sister of Philip von Falkenstein, with whom our Richard of Cornwall, king of the Romans, became desperately enamoured, and whom he afterwards married. When the storm of the Thirty Years' War raged down the valley of the Rhine, Gustavus Adolphus attempted to dislodge a Spanish garrison which had previously been stationed in it; but the natural and artificial strength of the position foiled all his efforts.

As we descend the river grows narrower, and runs with pent-up waters in a rocky channel. A rock on the right bank, singularly shaped, arrests every eye. It looks as if giants had been constructing a staircase, and had failed in, or grown weary of, their task. The echo here is turned by the inhabitants to some account. It repeats every sound which strikes upon it seven times. As the steamboat passes, a man, standing on the left bank of the river, fires a few pistol shots, that the passengers may be amused with their repeated reverberations. It is a favourite jest with the German students to ask the hidden nymph, "Echo, what is the burgomaster of Oberwesel?" Echo answers, *Esel*, that is, "an ass."

Much of the poetry of the Rhine centres in this craggy rock. For *ley* means a rock, and *lore* is an old word for song, or music. Lurlei or Lorelei is, therefore, the "rock of song;" and the loreleys of the Rhine are singing maidens of great beauty, who, like the sirens of old, beguile the listener to his death. One legend relates that the boatmen sometimes descry on the summit of the rock a maiden of surpassing loveliness. She begins her enticing chant. In spite of themselves they are constrained to listen; and while they listen their boat dashes against the rocks, is shattered to pieces, and they are carried underneath the waves to the crystal halls of the Lurlei.

A Count Palatine was desirous of seeing this siren, whose charms so far excelled all ordinary human beauty. He, too, fell a victim to her arts. His father immediately ordered his soldiers to bring the young magician to him, alive or dead. But just as they thought themselves on the point of seizing her, she called upon the river to come to her rescue. Immediately it obeyed. From its foamy waves sprang two white horses, removed the stone on which she was seated, and dragged it down to the river-depth. On their return to the castle, they found that the siren had restored the young count to his home. Since this epoch, she has ceased to show herself; but her soft voice still awakens the murmurs of the evening breeze, and at times she will sport with the boatmen by mimicking their voices.

A small, and gradually decreasing fishery, is carried on in the neighbourhood of the Lurlei-bay.

We now pass by the fearful whirlpool of the Baik Bank, and the narrow and dangerous defile of the Gewirra—the Scylla and Charybdis of the Rhine. They prove no obstacle, however, to the progress of the Rhine steamers.

Our course now brings us to Sanct Goarshausen, opposite Sanct Goar. It is situated at the entrance of the beautiful and romantic Swiss valley, between the "Cat" and the "Mouse."

The "Cat" (die Katze) is an ancient castle, founded by the Counts von Katzenelnbogen ("cat's elbow") in 1392. It derived its name, perhaps, not from its lords, but because it watched the merchant vessels, in order to levy exactions upon them, as a cat watches a mouse. After this family died out, in 1470, it passed into the hands of various Hessian princes, until destroyed by the French in 1806. Its ruins command a view both rich and rare.

Opposite to it, but also in a ruined condition, stands the "Mouse" (die Maus), also called the Thurmberg or Kunoberg, built in 1363 by Kuno von Falkenstein, in order to keep the "Cat" under control. "Henceforth," said he, "I will be the mouse which frightens the cat!" And he was right, said Victor Hugo, for it is a formidable pile even to this day.

There is another of these eloquent memorials of feudalism far up the Swiss valley (which is by no means Swiss, though very picturesque in character). It is called the Reichenburg, and its history is easily summed up. As thus:—Built in 1280 by Count Wilhelm I. of Katzenelnbogen; destroyed in 1302; reconstructed by Baudoin of Trier in the Oriental style; destroyed

B. Foster S. Bradshaw

ST. GOARHAUSEN

WILLIAM MACKENZIE, LONDON, EDINBURGH & GLASGOW

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CASTLE OF MARKSBURG.

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



by the ferocious Tilly in the Thirty Years' War; inhabited until 1806; sold, for purposes of demolition, in 1818; and now in possession of Herr Habel von Schierstein. Such are the phases through which a feudal castle seems generally to pass.

On the right bank we pass the little Gothic church of Wilmich, at the foot of the steep and broken rock crowned by the ruined fortalice of the Mouse. Lower down is Ehrenthal, with its silver, its copper, and its lead mines; and a short journey brings us to one of the "hallowed spots" of the Rhine—to the Castles of the Brothers, Liebenstein and Sternfels, whose story has been several times told by the poets.

"The mountains that inclose the river," says Mr. Mayhew, "are finely rugged, and ribbed with the schistose rocks that in some places protrude through the green hill-sides, and that in others apparently stream down from the top like a cascade of crags.

"Then there are the grand old ruins cresting the summits, and lending a hoary historic life to the neighbouring mountains—and the little bits of vineyards, crammed in among the stones whereon the sun can fall, and tinting the green-gray crags with many a golden streak—and the lovely repose of the valley openings, looking soft and cool in the rich 'clear-obscure' of the shade that hangs over them like a veil of dusky air, and with the steamy cloud of smoke that rises, as if it were so much morning mist, from the valley-hollows, telling of the peaceful homesteads that lie cradled within them; and the white frothy brooks streaming under the little archways beside the Rhine, and whispering of the many mills they give life and motion to as they come tumbling down the steep rocky dingles behind, and pouring over the walls of crag there in such a mass of foam that the very water seems no longer liquid, but to be a torrent of powdery particles, like snow, showered down from one ledge to another."

At Filzen the Rhine bends abruptly eastward, and washes the town of Ostersperg, resting in the cool green shadow of the Liebeneck. Then the Rhine resumes its northerly direction at Denkhers, famous for its mineral spring; and flows past Braubach and the grand castle of Marxburg.

Several hundred feet above the town of Braubach, on a rugged and rocky mountain height, stands its noble castle, which has been described as bearing some degree of likeness to that of Dover, but seems to us more closely to resemble the Scoto-Gothic castles of northern Britain. At all events, it is one of the most complete examples of a feudal castle along the whole course of the Rhine. Seen from the river, or from the village street, it possesses an indescribably grand effect, and one may be forgiven for fancying it the work of some ancient Titan, who, after piling rock upon rock, erected a stronghold for himself on the wind-swept summit.

THE MARXBURG.

Through long, narrow, and climbing alleys we reach the foot of the castled mountain, and then by a zig-zag path undertake the laborious ascent. It is right to add that the labour is much sweetened by the delightful glimpses you catch ever and anon of the flowing river and its wooded banks.

The first object to which your attention is directed after you enter the castle is the gloomy vault, the prison of the German Emperor Henry IV. The walls are bare and ochred, and there is only a "rude, little, conical chimney-place sunk in one corner of the apartment," while opposite a loophole, rather than a window, is inserted in a very small recess. On one side of this aperture a small stone slab, projecting from the massive wall, serves as a rude uncomfortable seat. Here Henry II. was imprisoned, after the rebellion of the German princes in favour of Rudolph, duke of Suabia.

From the prison-chamber you wind your way through dim, dark, and mysterious corridors, and across various apartments, and up steep and half-broken steps, to the gloomy dungeon called the Hundloch, or "dog-hole." After your eyes grow accustomed to its semi-darkness, you make out a beam slanted up on end, like a rude crane projecting from the ground, with a windlass attached to its base. This is the apparatus by which prisoners doomed to perpetual captivity, or, more truly speaking, to a lingering and terrible death, were lowered into the actual dog-hole, the pit below. The guide lifts up a trap in the floor, and standing on the edge and looking over, you see, by the glimmer of light let in through a chink or slit in the wall, that the pit resembles a well about thirty feet in depth. Into this most miserable of dungeons the poor wretch was lowered by the crane which we have spoken of; lowered, perhaps, with a crash which happily saved him from further suffering. Otherwise, provisions were let down in the same

way, as long as the doomed man dragged on his wretched life.

From the dog-hole you ascend a narrow spiral staircase, hewn out of the massive masonry of the main tower, to the square platform which serves as roof; and from this elevated position you enjoy a picture of the Rhine, so bright, so beautiful, so rich in colour, that you forget at once the gloom of the scenes you have been looking upon. From this grand observatory we descend to the Fotter-kammer, or Rack-chamber, another dark and dismal apartment, from which, however, the instrument of torture to which it owes its name has been removed. Thence we pass into the Speis-kammer, or Dinner-chamber; and the Ritter-saal, or the Knight's Hall, now used as a prison. Adjoining these another strong room is situated, whose white walls are covered with rude frescoes, drawn by the prisoners who, in the last century, were inmates of the place. Some of these consist of figures of warriors and princes, while others possess more of a grotesque than chivalrous character: such as wooden-legged fiddlers, peasants dancing, innkeepers carrying frothy cups of beer. In among these are scattered numerous inscriptions in prose and verse.

It is said that a secret passage descends through the live rock, connecting the Marxburg with a tower on the borders of the river. The castle is (or was until very lately) garrisoned by a corps of invalids.

Continuing our survey, we come to a little chapel, embosomed among trees, and nearly opposite the Königsstuhl (on the left bank), which calls for our special attention as the place where, in 1400, the four electors of the Rhine declared the deposition of the Emperor Wenceslaus, and elected in his stead the Count Palatine, Rupert III. This incident is a signal proof of the decay into which the Holy Roman Empire had by this time fallen, and of the virtual usurpation by the electors of the imperial power. The chapel, then, is literally one of the landmarks of the history of the Holy Roman Empire.

We next pause at Oberlahnstein (Upper Lahnstein), situated on a long bank of silted-up deposit facing the Rhine, its shore sanguine with heaps of red iron ore from the Nassau mines. 'Tis a picturesque old town, with stone rampart walls and old towers and turreted gates, and at the further end the palace of the electors of Mainz, rebuilt or enlarged. On the hill above moulder the ruins of the Lahneckburg, a castle of great antiquity, which figures in history as destroyed by the French in 1688, and in poetry as sung of by Goethe.

On the other side of the Lahn, which here comes down a romantic valley to join its waters with those of the Rhine, is Niederlahnstein (or Nether Lahnstein), and close by stands the structure of Johannis-kirche (St. John's church), with the tall lonely tower looking like the keep of some ancient stronghold, and reflecting its gray hoary walls in the silver mirror of the Lahn. It was destroyed by the Swedes, and after remaining for many years in a ruinous condition, was restored in 1857. Stolzenfels, rising so grandly on the opposite bank of the Rhine, will hereafter engage our attention.

On the right bank we pass Storchheim, the island of Oberwerth (or Upper Island, lying in a sheltered bay), and the village of Pfaffendorf. Opposite Coblenz rises Ehrenbreitstein, the "Gibraltar of the Rhine," the "Broad Stone of Honour." The best view of the steep mountainous rock, and the tremendous fortress which crowns it, is obtained from the opposite bank, just below the bridge that unites Coblenz with the Petersberg.

We now proceed to describe the left bank of the river from Mainz to Coblenz.

TO COBLENZ. BY THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE.

During the early portion of our course from Mainz to Coblenz, the railway closely hugs the romantic bank of the river, which is here studded with numerous islands. On the opposite shore all the beauties of Bieberich and the Rheingau are successively opened up to our gaze. Beyond the small village of Bredonheim, the iron road starts away from the river, and through a wood of murmurous pines reaches Heidesheim; of which I know nothing more than that all about it cluster prolific vineyards and not less prolific orchards.

The left bank is neither so romantic nor so interesting as the right until we reach Nieder Ingelheim, which lies about two miles inland from the river, on the Seltz, one of its minor affluents. It is a town to look at with curious interest, if it be true, as most historians assert, that Charlemagne, the most imperial of emperors, was born here. He seems to have regarded it with the affection one generally feels for one's native town; and he erected within its walls, between 768 and 774, a

palace of more than usual splendour; a palace embellished, it is said, with one hundred columns of marble and porphyry which he had brought from Rome, and with the costliest mosaics, which Pope Hadrian had sent to him from Ravenna as a gift. Not a vestige of its ancient magnificence now remains.

It was here, on the 30th of December, 1105, occurred one of the most remarkable incidents in the history of the Holy Roman Empire. The bishops of Mainz, Köln, and Wurms pronounced the deposition of the Emperor Henry IV. Advancing towards him, they removed the "circle of sovereignty from his head," tore him from the throne on which he was seated, and stripped off his imperial robes.

To conclude our catalogue of the associations of this quiet little town, let us point to the small obelisk at its extremity, whereon two immortal names come into strange juxtaposition; both of them conquerors, and imperial founders, and great administrators, but how unlike in their fate, and in the fate of their work! This is the inscription on the obelisk:—

"Route de Charlemagne, terminée en l'an 1er du régne de Napoléon, empereur des Français." (The great road of Charlemagne, completed in the first year of the reign of Napoleon, emperor of the French.)

Through a beautiful country we make our way to Bingen, where the Nahe pours its waters into the Rhine. Confined on the left by the Nahe, on the right by the Rhine, it has developed itself in a triangular form around a Gothic church, set back to back against a Roman citadel. In the direction of Mainz sparkles the famous plain called Paradies, opening up the rich wine-garden of the Rheingau. On the side of Coblenz the sombre summits of Leyen rise against the horizon.

Bingen is the Roman *Bingium*, and its bridge across the Nahe is still called, as Tacitus called it, the "Bridge of Drusus." It was built by the Archbishop Wittigis in the eleventh century (1013), probably with the materials and on the site of the Roman bridge, which the Treviri had destroyed in A.D. 70. It was again rebuilt in the seventeenth century, and has been frequently repaired. The ruin called Klopp, on an eminence above the town, though of no greater antiquity than the days of feudalism, was probably raised on the site of one of the Roman forts built by Drusus. Bingen, commanding both the Nahe and the Rhine, was necessarily a military post of much importance before the invention of artillery. In the middle ages it belonged to the archbishops of Mainz and Trier. Its prosperity dates from its colonization by some Lombard merchants from Asti, in Piedmont—the Ottini, Pomario, Broglio, and others. In 1302 it was successfully defended against the Emperor Albert; but in the Thirty Years' War, and the War of the Succession, its position having ceased to prove formidable in defence, it passed from one of the belligerents to the other with admirable facility. It was included in the French territories from 1797 until 1813, and three years later was annexed to Hesse Darmstadt.

There is not much to be seen in Bingen, but around it the interesting features are very numerous. One of these is the Rochus Kapelle, or chapel of St. Roch, situated high up the hill—in truth, on its very crest, almost opposite Rüdesheim on the other bank. The ascent to it is neither very long nor very difficult; and were it both long and difficult, you would still be repaid for your labour by the magnificent prospect from the summit. The completeness of its beauty, its exquisite atmospheric radiance, its ever-changing effects of light and shade, its combinations or contrasts of colour, render the spectacle to the eye as if seen through a kaleidoscope. The Sunday following the 16th of August is St. Roch's day, when hundreds of pilgrims congregate from every quarter to pay their vows to the saint, who is famous as an averter of plague and pestilence.

There is a hill called the Scharlachkopf, which is easily accessible from Bingen or from St. Roch's chapel, and whose declivities are thickly planted with vines of good quality. From the terrace of this hill, too, the view is charming.

We resume our descent of the river, but do not halt again until we arrive at Bacharach, the mediæval *Ara Bacchi*, long celebrated for the superior excellence of its wines. The true *Bacchi ara* is a rock in the bed of the river, adjoining the island a little below the town. Usually it is covered with water, but in very dry seasons its bare surface rises above the river-level, much to the gratification of the lord of the vineyard, who hails it as a sign of an auspicious vintage. It is said that Bacharach wine was of so delicious a flavour that Pope Pius II. imported a tun of it to Rome every year, and that the freedom of the city of Nurem-

berg was purchased by the annual gift of a few casks of it to the Emperor Wenceslaus.

Victor Hugo's description of Bacharach is amusing. You would say, he remarks, that a giant, who dealt in *bric-à-brac*, wishing for a show-room on the Rhine, seized upon this mountain, cut it up into terraces, and piled upon these terraces, from top to bottom, and with all a giant's taste, a heap of enormous curiosities. In truth, he began under the very waters of the Rhine; for there, just beneath the surface, lies a volcanic rock, according to some authorities, a Celtic pulven, according to others, and a Roman altar, according to the few. There, on the bank of the river, moulder two or three old, worm-eaten hulls of ships, cut in two, and planted upright in the earth, so as to make decent cabins for fishermen. Next, behind these cabins, we come to a portion of the city wall, formerly crenellated, and supported by four square towers, the most ruinous and shot-battered that ever human eye beheld. After this, against the very *enceinte* itself, where the houses are all pierced with windows and galleries, and beyond, at the foot of the mountain, an indescribable pellmell of amusing edifices, fantastic turrets, preposterous façades, impossible *pignons*, whose double staircase carries a belfry pushed forward like a holy-water sprinkler on every stage, heavy timbers designing upon cottages most delicate arabesques, barns in volutes, balconies open to the day, chimneys fashioned like trains and crowns philosophically full of smoke, extravagant weather-cocks; but why need we continue the enumeration?

Amidst this most admired disorder there is an open area, a twisted space or place, made by blocks of mountains which have fallen from the sky haphazard, and which has more bays, islands, reefs, and promontories than a Norwegian gulf. On one side of this place stands a couple of polyhedrons, composed of Gothic constructions, overhanging, bent forward, grimacing, and impudently holding itself erect in defiance of all the laws of geometry and equilibrium. On the other side, observe the beautiful Byzantine Church of St. Peter, with its handsome gateway and lofty belfry, and the host of tombs in the Renaissance style which crowd its interior. It was formerly a Templar church, and is interesting as an early example of mixed Round and Gothic.

Above this church, and on the road to the old castle of Stahleck, lie the ruins of St. Werner's church — windowless, roofless, doorless — yet a magnificent specimen of later Gothic, built of hard red sandstone in 1428. "It was demolished by the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, but still shows in its east end a lantern, the highest and most elegant lancet style existing."

We come next to Schœnberg, the cradle of the family so named, whose most illustrious offshoot seems to have been the Marshal Schomberg who closed a long military career at the Battle of the Boyne, fighting for William III. Below Schœnberg is situated the picturesque town of Oberwesel, the *Vesalia* of the Romans, with its ivy-shaded, crenellated towers, its old, narrow, and quaint streets, and its two superb Gothic churches. The walls are in many places curiously romantic, and in the lower part of the town is the lofty round tower of the Ochsenthurm.

The church of Our Lady (Liebfrauenkirche), at the upper end of the town, is a simple but gracefully proportioned church, erected in 1331–38. Its roof is eighty feet in height, and rests upon plain square piers. Its porches are richly sculptured, and the vaulting of the cloisters is singular. In a side chapel are many monuments of the Schomberg family, bearing rudely carved effigies of knights in armour, ladies in ruffs and stomachers, and babies in swaddling clothes, like mummies or the larvæ of insects.

The church of Saint Martin is still older, and its architectural details are full of interest. The altar-piece represents the Lowering of Our Saviour's Body from the Cross, by Diepenbeck, one of the pupils of Rubens.

Sanct Goar is opposite Sanct Goarshausen. The Hinter Rhein-strasse, which is the High Street of St. Goar, and the principal one of the two making up the long narrow town, has so few shops in it, that you would almost believe the simple villagers dealt with one another according to the primitive mode of barter. The church here is not a very interesting edifice, but the Protestant church is a well-looking structure near the centre of the town. It was built in 1468, contains some monuments of the Hessian princes, and stands over the crypt of the ancient church of St. Goar. It was restored in 1482. In this crypt Saint Goar was buried.

Above Sanct Goar towers the lofty castled crag of the Rheinfels, 368 feet high, the most extensive ruin on the banks of the Rhine. The earliest stronghold was founded by a Count Diesher of

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Katzenelnbogen, in 1245, for the purpose of a residence, and as a toll-tower, where he could levy toll on passing vessels. The appetite grew by what it fed on, and the bandit's exactions grew so colossal, that the citizens of the neighbouring towns plucked up spirit to rebel against him, and finally, to besiege the robber in his lair. The struggle was prolonged over fifteen months. Then was formed, on a broader base, the great Confederation of the Rhine, which destroyed so many of these robber-fastnesses, and set free the navigation of the river. Among the castles which the confederated burghers captured was the Rheinfels; it afterwards came into the possession of the Landgrave of Hesse, who converted it into a modern fortress of such strength that, in 1692, it successfully resisted a French army of 25,000 men, commanded by Marshal Tallard, though the latter had promised it as a New Year's gift to his sovereign. In 1794, however, it surrendered, before a shot was fired, to the French revolutionary army, who, about three years later, blew up its formidable defences.

Passing Salzig and its cherry orchards, we come to Boppard, the Roman *Baudobriga*, which in mediæval times was an imperial free city. In 1312 the Emperor Henry VII. yielded it to his brother Baldwin, archbishop of Trier, who united it to the electorate. An attempt was made by some of its inhabitants to reconquer their liberties, but it failed. It now belongs to Prussia.

It is a pleasure to arrive at Rhense, for it is one of the most picturesque towns on the Rhine, and retains its mediæval character with delightful freedom from modern improvements. Few of its houses, as the guide-book tells us, are *newer* than the sixteenth, while many are as old as the fourteenth century; a statement which, in itself, is sufficient to stir any true archæologist's imagination. But Rhense has something more to boast of. Just outside of it is the Königsstuhl, or "King's Seat."

Here, says Victor Hugo, four men, coming from four different directions, assembled at intervals near a stone on the left bank of the Rhine, and at a few paces from a grove of trees between Rhense and Kapellen. These four men took their seats upon the stone, and there they made, or unmade, the emperors of Germany. The place selected by them, Rhense, is nearly in the centre of the Rhine Valley, and belonged to the elector of Köln. In an hour, each elector could repair from Rhense to his own territories.

While Napoleon held the mastery of the Rhenish provinces the Königsstuhl fell into decay. In 1807 it was destroyed, and some of its materials used in the construction of a new road. But happily it was rebuilt in 1843 on exactly the same plan as the original, and to a great extent the original materials were employed.

Still pursuing the left bank of the river, we arrive at Kapellen, splendidly dominated over by the castle of the Stolzenfels, or the "Proud Rock," as it is appropriately named. The rocky promontory on which its walls and towers are planted rises about 330 feet above the Rhine. Destroyed by the French in 1688, the Stolzenfels remained in decay until 1823, when the city of Coblenz, which had become its owner, presented it to the present emperor of Germany, then crown prince of Prussia. From 1836 to 1845 the emperor expended upwards of £50,000 in restoring it, from the designs of Herr Schenkil. Looking southward from the Stolzenfels, at our feet we see the ruined Marxburg and the red roofs of Braubach; near Oberlahnstein, the white gleaming chapel of Wenceslaus; directly opposite, by the side of the picturesque town of Rhense, the Königsstuhl is barely visible through its screen of trees. Like the outstretched wings of a bird of prey, the shattered battlements of Lahneck still dominate over the ancient town of Oberlahnstein, where the palace of the elector of Mainz naturally attracts the eye. Farther away, in the remote and lonely valley of the Lahn, rises the Mountain of All Saints—the Allerheiligenberg—whose chapel is visited by numerous pilgrims. Before Niederlahnstein, and near the mouth of the Nahe, stands conspicuous the church of St. John. Northward, the woody isle of Oberwerth stretches itself at full length on the bosom of the Rhine. To the right, in the green cool shadow of verdurous mountains, rise the rocks of Ehrenbreitstein, or the "broad stone of honour," facing the formidable walls of Fort Alexander. Between the rocks and the fort a bridge of boats serves as a communication between Coblenz and Ehrenbreitstein. Finally, against the remote horizon are outlined the heights of Vallendar, the town and the church of the same name.

CHAPTER VIII.

COBLENZ.

EHRENBREITSTEIN, a lofty rock, steep and abrupt on three sides, and on its fourth, or weakest, the north-western, protected by no less than three formidable lines of defence, is armed with upwards of 400 heavy guns. To the non-military observer it seems as if military science had here done its best and worst; and that no force could possibly advance in the face of the tremendous fire the garrison could pour upon them. The great platform on the summit of the rock is not only used as a parade ground, but artfully serves as a roof or cover for cisterns of immense capacity, which can hold a supply of water for three years, furnished by springs without the walls. Moreover, there is a well, sunk 400 feet deep in the rock, which communicates with the Rhine; but then, Rhine water is unwholesome, and would quickly lay low a garrison with disease.

We may conclude then, that Ehrenbreitstein could never be reduced by ordinary military operations, unless Coblenz was in the hands of an enemy; but that it might possibly surrender to a close and persistent blockade.

Ehrenbreitstein, the "broad stone of honour," seems to have been occupied for military purposes since a very remote period. In 1631 the Elector Philip Christopher, of Sœtern, gave it up to the French, who retained possession of it for five years. In 1688 it was unsuccessfully besieged by Marshal Boufflers; in 1795 and 1796 by General Marceau; but in 1799 it surrendered to the French after a long and rigorous blockade. By the treaty of Lunéville the French were compelled to restore it to Germany; but before abandoning it they blew it up, and converted it into the ruins so graphically commemorated by Byron.

Through the town of Thal-Ehrenbreitstein, and across the Rhine, we pass into Coblenz.

Coblenz owes its name to its position at the confluence of two great rivers—the Rhine and the Moselle. The Romans, who formed a camp here about 30 B.C., called it *Confluentia*, or *Confluentes*. Coblenz is situated on a triangular or wedge-shaped piece of land between the Moselle (north) and the Rhine (east). It may be divided into the Old Town and New Town. The former lies nearest to the Moselle; its streets are narrow and tortuous, and not unlike the wynds of Edinburgh. The New Town, or Clement's Town, lies behind the imperial château, built in 1778–86 by Clement Wenceslas, last bishop-elector of Trier; its streets are regularly laid out, its houses of good size and well built.

Here is a lively picture:—"The banks of the Moselle, opposite to Coblenz, are low, and a long plain stretches far away behind them towards Andernach, that has been, from Cæsar's time, the scene of many a fierce battle; while close in front of them the river is floored with the rafts, which are here to be pieced together into one 'float' before descending the broader part of the Rhine on their way to Holland: all along the shore, too, there are huge, square stacks of planks, and the air pants again, as it were, with the grating of the saws from the neighbouring timber yards.

"The Coblenz houses along the quay beside the Rhine are very different from those along the quay beside the Moselle; for the buildings facing the *Rhein-strom* are parts of the New Town, and consist chiefly of large white-fronted hotels, with their names painted all along them in gigantic letters; and the banks immediately under these are beset with many a landing-pier, beside which are grouped the steamers, with their piebald funnels; while beyond the dumpy round tower, with the Rhine crane, like a giant fishing-rod, projecting through its roof, and the square yellow-ochre turret of the Government House rising behind it, at the end of the quay, we can just catch sight of the tall red sandstone of the palace portico, as high as the building itself, and breaking, with a bold simplicity, the great length of the otherwise plain façade.

"The buildings, however, on the side of the city next the Moselle, are all of an antiquated character, and there the gables of the narrow houses are huddled together, one above another, till the roofs look like so many black billows; and beyond these, the odd, old Exchange is seen, with its

B. Foster — E. I. Roberts

EHRENBREITSTEIN.

battlement-like turrets projecting from the upper corners of its walls; while farther on still, at the end of the quay next the bridge, the eye rests upon the ancient palace of the archbishop of Trier, with the lighthouse-like towers at either angle of its ochre-coloured front, and seeming more like the gate to some fortress than the residence of a Christian prelate.

"Then the Rhine-stream is crossed by a bridge of boats no higher than a floating pier, and whose platform stretches along the line of barges like an enormous lengthy plank, reaching from one side of the river to the other, and linking the valley village with the city. This is now all in pieces, for we can see large slabs of the floating roadway standing out in the river, far away from the bridge itself, and with two or three white-hooded peasant women upon them, as if they had been carried adrift in the hurry of crossing. Then, at either end of the gap in the "*Schiff-brücke*," we can distinguish the crowd of passengers dammed up, the brass-tipped helmets of the cluster of soldiers looking as if on fire in the sun, the market-women, with their baskets poised upon their heads, together with the white awning of the tilted carts, all brought together into one pretty group; while between the glittering opening in the platform we perceive in the distance some heavy, lazy-looking barge, with the yellow load of planks stacked high above its deck, and without a sail set, drifting down with the stream slowly towards the bridge."

In the Old Town, very close to the actual junction of the two rivers, is the church of Saint Castor. The church is associated with some memorable events. Beneath its roof the three sons of Louis le Debonnair—Lothaire and Louis of Germany and Charles the Bold—met to divide amongst them the grand heritage of Charlemagne's empire. And here, in the *platz* in front of the building, Edward III. of England, in 1338, had an interview with the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria, who installed him Vicar of the Empire, to enable him to secure the assistance of the imperial vassals on the left bank of the Rhine in his campaign against France. As a pledge of his honour, Edward deposited his crown in the church, where it was guarded night and day by an equal number (fifty) of Teutonic and English knights. To few Englishmen, we imagine, is this romantic incident known, which links English history with a quaint old church in a quaint old fortress-city on the bank of the Rhine!

In the New Town may be visited the Palace of the Government; the Hauptsteueramt (or tax offices), and the Royal Palace (Königliche Schloss), erected in 1778–1786 by the last elector of Trier, Clement Wenceslas. The Prussian government undertook its restoration some thirty years ago; and since 1845 it has frequently been inhabited by the present emperor of Germany and his wife. It commands a fine view of the Rhine, and the interior contains some really precious works of art. The service of the Church of England is performed here twice every Sunday, by permission of the emperor of Germany.

It has been well said by a recent French traveller, and must be apparent to every visitor, that Coblenz plays in the world a double part. Happily situated at the junction point of two rivers—the central ring of the vast chain of which the two extremities are formed in Köln and Mainz—it necessarily serves as the focus of all the commercial industry and agricultural wealth for thirty leagues around.

On the other hand, it is equally destined to the rôle of a military city. Its position is not less valuable to the defenders of Germany than formidable to its enemies; it commands the valley of the Moselle, it overawes the passage of the Rhine. It is one of the keys of Germany, and its conquest would be one of the first tasks imposed on an enemy invading the Prusso-Rhenish provinces. Hence it is doomed to see itself confined and imprisoned within a threefold line of forts and bastions.

There are many pleasant spots in its vicinity. The Petersberg contains within its wall a plain marble slab, with four corner stones, indicating the grave of the French revolutionary general, Hoche. Near at hand is the monument, a stone pyramid, erected to the memory of Marceau, another of the heroes of the Revolution. Translated into English, the inscription runs thus:—

"Here rests Marceau, born at Chartres, in the department of Eure-et-Loir, a soldier at sixteen and a general at twenty-two. He died [at Altenkirchen] fighting for his country, on the last day of the fourth year of the French Republic [September 21, 1796]. Whoever thou art, friend or foe of this young hero, respect his ashes."

THE RIGHT BANK OF THE RHINE TO BONN.

Along this bank extends a range of "smiling

hills," never of any considerable elevation, but always of a very pleasant and picturesque aspect. Upon their slopes and at their feet are situated many little villages, which to the passer-by seem perfect Arcadias of peace, prosperity, and loveliness.

The first place, of any considerable importance in regard to population, at which we arrive, is Neuwied, a neat and cleanly town, with streets crossing each other at right angles; a town of 10,000 inhabitants, the capital of the principality of Wied, but now belonging to Prussia.

A writer speaks of it as "a pretty little town on the right bank of the Rhine, between Mainz and Bonn. The situation is agreeable, the air very healthy, and the country fertile. It lies in a plain of considerable dimensions, terminated by hills arranged in the fashion of an amphitheatre, and presenting to the eye a charming variety of fields, meadows, vineyards, and well-cultivated orchards." All the religions of Europe (Mohammedanism excepted) have found a meeting-place in this little town. In its factories, the Quaker and the Moravian work side by side, recognizable only by the different colour of their vestments.

The next place of interest is Andernach, the *Antenacum*—that is, the *statio ante Nacum*, or "advanced post of the Nette"—of the Romans. During the supremacy of Napoleon, Andernach was annexed to the French; it now belongs to Prussia. The neighbouring plain is one of the great historic battle-fields of Germany. Here Charles the Bold was defeated, in 876, by his nephew Louis the Younger. Here, after a bloody strife, the Franks prevailed over the Normans in 850. Here Otho the Great successfully withstood the freebooters of Duke Eberhard and Philip of Hohenstaufen. Here the Archbishop Frederick of Köln repulsed the soldiers of the Emperor Henry V. in 1114. And here, too, various battles were fought in the Thirty Years' War, the War of the Spanish Succession, and the French Revolutionary War. At present it is the scene, every three years, of the manœuvres of a portion of the Prussian army.

The streets of Andernach are narrow and dirty, but these demerits are of little importance, as they are almost unfrequented. The great ornament of the town is its parish church, the Pfarr Kirche. The two tall towers, at the end of the nave, are pierced all the way up with light Romanesque arches, while in other parts the arches are Byzantine. There are in all four towers, with Byzantine belfries, which from a great distance serve as conspicuous landmarks. Beautiful sculpture enriches the south entrance to the transept. A bas-relief of curious design, but exquisite workmanship, represents the Adoration of the Lamb; another, the death of "some lady in a painted green dress, amid a crowd of priests and choristers, with archbishop-angels looking down upon her from the clouds above."

The shore of the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of the Crane Tower—which is lower down the river than the Watch Tower, and was built in 1554—abounds with dark-gray millstones, made of hard porous lava, and looking not unlike "so many cheeses" piled one against another. These are obtained from the curious basaltic lava quarries of Nieder Mendig; were well known to the Romans; and are now exported in considerable quantities to England, Russia, the East and West Indies, and all parts of the world. Andernach also produces a volcanic cement, or *trass*, from the quarries of Brohl and Krup; and a species of pumice, called oven-stone, from the Bell quarries, about five miles west.

Our course next brings us to Linz, a busy little town of 3500 inhabitants, surrounded by walls of basalt, and lying in a fruitful vineyard region. Charles the Rash captured it in 1475, the Swedes in 1632, the French in 1688. The tower near its Rhine-gate was erected in 1365 by the archbishop of Köln, for the exaction of a toll from boats ascending or descending the river; and also to defend the town against the burghers of Andernach, who cherished a bitter hatred against the Linzites. Linz lies opposite the mouth of the Ahr, and commands a charming view of the Ahr valley.

Below Linz we may visit the singular basaltic quarries of the Drattenberg, and the still more remarkable ones of the Minderberg, by way of the copper mine of the Sternhüter. In the latter, the columnar arrangement of the basalt is scarcely less beautiful than in Fingal's Cave or at the Giant's Causeway. The summit of the Minderberg is 1200 feet above the Rhine, and the prospect which it commands is magnificent and extensive. The castle of Ockenfels, on the river side, is now a picturesque ruin.

The basalt again appears on a grand scale in the precipices called Erpeler Lei, which rise to an



elevation of 700 feet above the river. "The ingenuity of man has converted those barren rocks, which are almost inaccessible, into a productive vineyard. The vines are planted in baskets filled with mould, and inserted in crevices of the basalt. By this means alone can the earth be preserved from being washed away by every shower."

Carrying our gaze back to the bank of the Rhine which we are traversing, we find ample material for admiration and wonder. Here, at Königswinter, we obtain a fine view of the Drachenfels.

The Drachenfels (1056 feet) which, in conjunction with the island of Nonnenwerth and the Rolandseck, forms the most celebrated, and, perhaps the most perfectly beautiful of all the Rhine landscapes, is one of the volcanic group—remarkable not for height but for variety of outline—called the Siebengebirge, or Seven Mountains; the other six of which are, the Stromberg, 1053 feet; Niederstromberg, 1066 feet; Oelberg, 1453 feet; Wolkenberg, 1055 feet; Lowenberg, 1414 feet; and the Hemmerich, 1210 feet. There are several other, but less elevated and less conspicuous, summits. The general aspect of the whole group is singularly impressive; and seen from different points they break up into the wildest combinations, which fleeting lights and shadows invest with a mystical kind of air. Each peak is crowned with some old ruin, and commands a glorious prospect; but the view from the Drachenfels is considered the richest, as that of the Oelberg is the most extensive.

As you ascend the broken acclivities of the Drachenfels, your guide takes you aside to see, first, the quarry from which the blocks of trachyte were taken to build the cathedral of Köln, and hence called Dombruch; and, secondly, the "cave of the dragon" (whence the mountain is named), killed, according to the legend, by Siegfried, the hero of the national epic, the Niebelungen.

LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE. COBLENZ TO BONN.

After passing the "castled height" of Petersberg, and the pyramid marking the resting-place of Marceau, we traverse the plain of Andernach, and visit the château of Schönbomhist, which formerly belonged to the archbishop-elector of Trier. At the epoch of the great French Revolution it became the headquarters of the Bourbon princes and their partizans.

The village of Weissenthurm is so called from the square "white tower," erected by the archbishops of Trier to mark the boundary of their domains. Here the French forced the passage of the Rhine in 1797, in the face of an Austrian army. On an eminence behind it an obelisk has been raised to the memory of General Hoche, who accomplished the passage by throwing a bridge across to the island in the middle of the river.

The plain of Andernach is succeeded by a belt of undulating ground lying between the mountains and the river, which, from this point up to Bonn, forms a majestic lake, filling nearly the whole area of its valley.

Passing Oberbreisig and Niederbreisig we traverse the low, rich plain between the rail and the river, known as the "Golden Mile." We pause at Sinzig, an old walled town, about a mile and a quarter distant from the Rhine, in one direction, and the Ahr, in the other. It was the Roman *Sentiacum*, but Roman remains are scanty. Here, according to a more than doubtful tradition, Constantine the Great saw the luminous cross in the sky, and the legend, *In hoc signo vinces*, which indicated his coming victory over his rival Maxentius, and finally converted him to Christianity. A rough painting in the parish church, a curious semi-Byzantine, semi-Gothic building of the thirteenth century, commemorates the event.

Remagen is the *Regiomagum* of the Romans, and a valuable collection of Roman antiquities has been made here. The well-wooded hill which rises above this ancient Roman settlement is called the Apollinarisberg. Its summit is crowned with a modern church of very indifferent design, in which the head of the saint after whom the hill takes its name is duly preserved.

Below Remagen the Rhine makes a bold and abrupt curve. As we descend, and its course becomes less sinuous, we catch our first glimpse of the Rolandseck on the left, and the Drachenfels and its sister hills. On the right bank, Unkel forms the centre of a romantic landscape, which is matched on the left bank by the picturesque scenery of the Unkelstein, a mass of beautiful basaltic columns, which stretches far into the bed of the Rhine, and seriously obstructed its navigation, until a portion of the rock was blown up by the French. The current here flows with an almost dangerous rapidity.

Passing through Oberwinter, and by the sweet

wooded island of Nonnenwerth, we arrive at another of the legend-haunted spots which have given so enduring a celebrity to the Rhine: the basaltic rock of Rolandseck, 340 feet high, with its feudal stronghold securely planted on its rugged summit. The Rolandseck is an everlasting monument to the memory of the famous nephew of Charlemagne—the Roland of song and story, the Roland of many a tradition and many a myth. In the old Frank ballads he is gay, brilliant, dashing, chivalrous; Germany has surrounded him with her own sentiment and mysticism.

In battle, on the banks of the Rhine, Roland fell grievously wounded, and the rumour of his death spread far and wide over many lands. Hildegund, his betrothed, took the veil in a monastery, feeling that she could never love again, and that the sole consolation in her overwhelming grief would be the strict performance of her religious duties. Meanwhile, the knight, being healed of his wound, hastened to obtain the reward of his valour from the sweet lips of his betrothed. He found her dedicated to heaven, and out of grief or emulation turned hermit. With a robe of sage about him, and his loins girt with a rope, he ascended the Rolandseck; not that he might be nearer, so to speak, to heaven, but that he might gaze from thence on the convent walls which imprisoned his Hildegund. And so his life flowed on in contemplation and earnest prayer. . . .

But one day the convent walls are covered with black; the knell resounds; on the brink of a new-made grave a company of veiled women deposit a coffin, wherein the dead is lying, with face uncovered, according to usage. Roland recognizes the death-calm features of his beloved. Falling on his knees, he follows with tearful eye every detail of the mournful ceremony; he sees the holy water sprinkled on the corpse; hears the ropes creak with the weight of the bier; as each spadeful of mould is thrown upon it a groan issues from his bosom; and when the grave is finally filled, he himself falls prone upon the earth—dead!

Bonn is pleasantly situated on the side of a moderately steep hill, which slopes down to the very margin of the Rhine. Its houses are built in tiers, the lowest of which is washed by the waters, while the highest commands a magnificent perspective. The ascent from its base to the summit is, however, a difficult task for asthmatic visitors; and some of the streets are so steep that, if your foot slip, you must roll from top to bottom without hope of checking yourself in the *facilis descensus.* In this respect the town resembles Clovelly, in Devonshire, several times multiplied. Yet carriages ascend and descend, by some miracle of skill on the part of their Jehus. Bonn is a delightful place of residence. Not that this little city of 20,000 souls exhibits any extraordinary gaiety, or offers many objects of curiosity or interest. Its monuments scarcely rise above mediocrity. But its environs are "enchanting," and its walks are things of beauty. Life at Bonn is so smooth and easy; it glides along in such a transparent flowing stream. The good people of Bonn, moreover, are good-tempered and hospitable. Both mind and body are bewitched by an indefinable something in the air, the aspect, the habits of the country. Then, again, its university, the second in Germany in reputation, renders it a studious and "engaging" abode, from which you have no desire to tear yourself. We feel almost inclined to say, once at Bonn, always at Bonn.

One thing there is at Bonn which every Englishman will regard with pleasure; the care with which its inhabitants honour the memory of the celebrated men who have lived within its walls. In almost every street a marble tablet or an inscription calls upon us to do homage to the illustrious dead. Would so good an example were followed in London!

For example: in the Rheingasse, and close upon the quay, a tablet attached to the wall of an old house informs us that it was Beethoven's birthplace. Beethoven has sometimes been accused of having forgotten his country and his native city. It is true that three-fourths of his life were spent outside the walls of Bonn; but the following quotation will show that he was not wanting in patriotism:—"My country, my beautiful country, in which I first saw the light of day, is always present to my eyes, as full of life and beauty as when I quitted it. Happy will be the moment when I can see it again, and salute our father, the Rhine!" At all events, Bonn has not forgotten her wild, wayward, but Titanic genius. She has raised in his honour a statue of bronze.

We pass on to another house of interest to the English traveller, the house in which the late Prince Consort resided while a student at the university of Bonn.

It stands just within the university's gates, near one end of the Minster Kirche, and opposite a little grassy oval, called Martin's Platz. It is a homely-looking building, of a pale, green colour, set among tall fir-trees, and inclosed within a wall. The most noticeable thing about it is its steep slate roof.

You cannot help, says Mayhew, as you gaze at the humble dwelling, thinking of the wonderful change which occurred in the fortunes of the young student not long after he had drunk his "Bairioch Bier" (Bavarian beer) in the city of Bonn. Little, too, did he dream that a life of great usefulness to his adopted country, and a life of much domestic happiness, would be prematurely cut short at a moment when his queen-wife seemed most to need his counsel, and that the student of Bonn would die in the castle of our English kings.

Bonn is a clean and wholesome town. Its better streets and houses are all kept in excellent order. The present prosperity of Bonn is due to its healthiness, quietness, and agreeable situation, which draw thither a large number of English families, and, more particularly, to its university. The university buildings occupy an area of nearly a quarter of a mile in length. On the east they extend to the Coblenz-thor; on the south they occupy or include the palace of the electors of Köln, built in 1723 to 1761. They are situated at one end of a fine and well-wooded park, which originally belonged to the electoral palace, and where, according to tradition, Henry "the Fowler" was found bird-catching in the year 919, when the ambassadors arrived to announce his election to the imperial throne. The palace itself is now known as the University Museum of Natural History.

The various buildings comprise, according to the Guide-books:—A library of about 200,000 volumes, ornamented with a great number of busts; a Museum of Arts, or Plaster Casts, rich in about 500 copies of statues in plaster, bas reliefs, medals, and the like; a Gallery of Medals, remarkable for its fine Greek and Roman specimens; a grand Academical Hall, decorated with frescoes by Cornelius, and his pupils Harmann, Förster, and Götzenberger, which represent the four faculties—Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Medicine, and Theology; Anatomical Theatre; and, finally a Museum of National Antiquities, discovered on the banks of the Rhine or in Westphalia, and comprising numerous memorials of the past.

At no great distance from the University Park blooms the magnificent chestnut avenue called the Poppelsdorfer Allée, leading to the old Electoral Palace, Lustschloss Klemensruhe, which King Frederick William III. presented to the university, and which now holds the University Museum of Natural History.

Hither it was, we are told, that the archbishop-elector of Köln, Engelbert von Falkenberg, removed his electoral court when the Köln burghers rebelled against his rule in 1268; and here it was, three centuries later, that a very different prelate, Count Gebhard von Truchsess-Waldburg, celebrated his marriage with the beautiful nun, Agnes, Countess von Mansfeldt, whom he had carried off from the noble convent of Gerresheim, near Dusseldorff.

Passing the village of Poppelsdorf, we proceed to ascend the Kreuzberg, a finely wooded hill, 750 feet high, whose summit was formerly occupied by a convent of Servites, but is now surmounted by a church, erected in 1627 by the Elector Ferdinand. The pillared portico and commonplace façade are due, however, to the Elector Clement Augustus, who built it in 1725, as a screen or shelter for the *Scala Santa*, or Holy Steps, of Carrara marble, constructed about the same time. They were modelled after the *Scala Santa* at Rome—the sacred stairs (it is said) up which our Saviour was conducted into the presence of Pontius Pilate. Their ascent is permitted only on your knees.

Among the public edifices of Bonn, we do not feel called upon to direct the stranger's attention to any other than the Cathedral. Its foundation is attributed to the Empress Helena, mother of Constantine the Great; and it contains a bronze statue of the saint, characterized by no special beauty of workmanship. The present building was erected in 1270, and restored in 1845. The interior is very plain; but there are two bas-reliefs of more than ordinary merit; a Nativity and a Baptism of Christ by St John. Both are in white marble.

CHAPTER IX.

COLOGNE.

FROM Bonn to Cologne, as the French, or Köln, as the Germans call it, the banks of the Rhine are low, flat, and devoid of the picturesque. The traveller becomes aware of the fact that he is drawing close to the frontiers of Holland; the Rhine has entered upon a plain extending to the sea, which grows duller and drearier the further you advance, and finally terminates in an immense morass. It has been well said, or it may be said, that the mode in which the traveller hurries over the latter portion of his Rhine-journey is a striking indication of his temperament and disposition. If he be restless and impatient, he escapes the infliction of a monotonous navigation by taking to the train. If he be an enthusiast, he continues his protracted voyage. Well: of whatever fatigue he may be sensible on the way, he feels himself amply repaid when he arrives in the magnificent port of Köln. The "city of the Eternal Cathedral," as a poet has called it, is accumulated, so to speak, on the river bank, and reflects itself in the broad mirror of the Rhine, which curves at its feet in a noble basin, incessantly furrowed with the tracks of busy keels.

The destiny of cities, says Durand, is singular. A colony of Ubians, situated on the right bank of the Rhine, being unable to oppose successfully the incursions of their predatory neighbours, sought the assistance of Rome—an assistance always readily given, but dearly purchased. Marcus Agrippa invited them to cross the river, and threw open to them the fortified asylum of the Roman camp. The change decided for awhile the course of history. The right bank fell into the occupation of barbarous peoples, and possessed neither towns, nor commerce, nor established societies: the left touched at every vantage point the Romanized Gaul, then in the full flush of civilization—a position admirably adapted to the necessities of commerce, and the interchange of so much as was then known of economical relations. Glance at the map, and you will see that nearly all the great cities of the Rhine are seated on its left bank.

A few years afterwards a daughter of Germanicus, the imperial and shameless Agrippina, who lived to become the mother and victim of Nero, was born within the walls of the Ubians. Their city then assumed, as a politic compliment, the name of the Roman commander's daughter; it called itself *Colonia Agrippina*, a name which is better preserved in the French Cologne than in the German Köln.

Köln preserved for several generations the traditions of its infancy; they were effaced neither by the fall of the empire, nor the great flood of barbarian invasion, nor the genial influences of Christianity, nor the complicated system of feudalism. For many centuries it called its nobles, patricians; its magistrates, senators; its burgomasters, consuls; its *huissiers*, lictors. It had even its capitol. Its inhabitants preserved the Roman costume as well as the Roman manners, and on its municipal banners were long inscribed, after the Roman usage, S.P.Q.C., *Senatus Populusque Coloniensis.*

Early in the fourth century Köln was captured and plundered by the Franks. Julian the Apostate (how history delights in nick-names!), recovered it, but they again made themselves its masters, and took care to keep it. Here the illustrious Clovis, the son and successor of Childeric, was crowned king. When at his death the empire he had laboriously built up was partitioned among his children, Köln remained one of the principal cities of Austrasia, a kingdom of which Metz was the capital. When, in their turn, the sons of Louis le Debonnaire divided the mighty realm of Charlemagne, it was comprised within Lotharingia, or the territory of Lothair, whence comes the well-known word Lorraine. Passing rapidly down the stream of Time, we find it ravaged by the Normans in 881 and 882. But escaping, without any serious injury, from all the turmoil of these early centuries, it was reannexed to the German Empire by Otho the Great, was endowed with extraordinary privileges, and placed under the special protection of his brother Bruno, duke of Lorraine, archbishop and elector of Köln.

Thenceforth it grew rapidly in importance, and increased wonderfully in population. Its safety became the peculiar object of the German emperors, and when it was threatened by Frederick Barbarossa, its ruler, the Archbishop Philip of Heimsberg, who had already enlarged it considerably by connecting it with its suburbs, surrounded it with solid walls, and with moats filled by the water of the Rhine. Its present fortifications are of a later date; belonging to the fourteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries.

In 1212 Köln was declared a free imperial city. At this time it was one of the largest, most populous, and most opulent cities in Northern Europe and the Hanseatic League. She could put into the field, and maintain, an army of 30,000 soldiers.

In 1259 it obtained permission to levy a most extraordinary impost. Every ship entering its waters could only disembark its cargoes through the agency of boats or barges belonging to its merchants. These same crafty, wealth-amassing burghers enjoyed very great privileges in England. Its relations were scarcely less advantageous with France, Spain, Portugal, the North of Germany, and especially with Italy, which exported thither, not only its architecture and arts, but some of its characteristic customs, such as its wild gay Carnival, and its puppet theatres. Hence it acquired the distinctive name of the "Rome of the North" and "Holy Köln;" and hence it was induced to form in its own bosom a school of painting, the first with which Germany was enriched.

A traveller, whose Italian birth and culture were unlikely to dispose him to deal too favourably with the Germans, was astonished at the splendour of Köln, when he visited it in 1333. "I arrived there," he writes, "at sunset, on the eve of the Feast of St. John Baptist, and immediately betook myself, in obedience to the advice of my friends, to the bank of the Rhine, where a curious spectacle awaited me. A crowd of ladies had assembled; oh, such a gathering of beauties! How could one have avoided falling in love, if one's heart had not been already captured? I placed myself on an eminence to obtain a better view. Their heads were garlanded with fragrant branches; their sleeves were tied back to the elbow; in turn they dipped their white arms in the waters, uttering some words which had a singular charm. I asked, as in Virgil:—

'Quid vult concursus ad amnem?

(What means this concourse on the bank of the stream!) I was told it was an old national custom; that the populace, and especially the women, were persuaded, that by washing themselves in the river on this particular day, they turned aside, they warded off, all the evils which threatened them, and secured a year of good fortune. The answer made me smile. 'Happy people of the Rhine!' I cried, 'if the river carries away all your sorrows; oh, that the Tiber and the Po would do as much for us!'"

Köln had now attained the climax of her greatness, and thenceforth her wealth and power began to wane. The discovery of America opened up a new channel to the commerce of the East; but, perhaps, the chief cause of its decay was its incessant civil commotions. The Jews of Köln, who had done so much for its opulence, were cruelly massacred; the industrious and ingenious Protestants were banished; and a riot breaking out among the weavers, they were hung by the score, and 1700 looms were burned in the public place. The survivors carried elsewhere, to more tolerant and equitable countries, the precious secrets of their industry; and so the harbour was no longer filled with ships, nor did the hammers ring in the deserted workshops. Workmen, without employment, wandered begging through the streets, and finding the trade of mendicancy productive, never again abandoned it. It became a scourge; one half the city lived on the alms of the other half, and thus they preyed upon the beautiful city which Petrarch had admired, until it became a wreck of what it was. And finally, to complete its ruin, the Dutch, in the sixteenth century, closed up the navigation of the Rhine, which was not again thrown open until 1837.

In 1794, when Köln was captured by the French, it still held the rank of a free imperial city, but its population did not exceed 40,000 souls. At that time a third of its population still lived by mendicancy. The French government, it must be owned, took prompt measures to repress this abuse; it secularized the convents, suppressed a great number of churches, and opened workshops and factories for the employment of the poor.

France held Köln until 1814. For twenty years it was the chief town of one of the arrondissements of the department of the Röer, of which Aix-la-Chapelle was the capital. The Russians occupied it militarily for a few months,

after which the Treaty of Paris handed it over to Prussia. Let us admit that if the rule of Prussia be somewhat rigorous, it is also healthy and sagacious; and Köln, since 1815, has thriven greatly. The establishment of a steam-boat service on the Rhine, the reopening of the navigation of that river, and the construction of numerous important lines of railway which all find a terminus at Köln, have given a new impetus to its industry and commerce.

Köln is famous as the birthplace of Agrippina and St. Bruno.

The electorate of Köln, formerly one of the states of the German empire, and one of the three ecclesiastical electorates, was included in the circle of the Lower Rhine, and comprised numerous provinces and territories now belonging to Prussia. It was suppressed in 1794.

We shall borrow a general description of the city from the animated pages of M. Durand.

He will not allow that it is a beautiful city, at least in its present condition. It has all the inconveniences of the Middle Ages, but none of their picturesqueness. It is muddy, irregular, dull, badly laid out, and insufficiently paved. The best view of it is obtained from the river. There, indeed, its aspect is fair and pleasant; but both the fairness and pleasantness vanish when you plunge into its labyrinthine streets.

The truth is, everybody visits it for the sake of its cathedral, that immortal, that priceless, relic of the loftiest art.

The present edifice was preceded by two other cathedrals; one erected by St. Matema, the other founded in 784 by Hildebold, the first archbishop of the city, consecrated in 876, and set on fire in 1248. On the 14th of August in the latter year, Archbishop Conrad of Hochstetten laid the first stone of the present glorious building at a depth of 55 feet. Even before this event, the Archbishop Engelbert, count of Altona and of Berg, assassinated in 1225, had formed the idea of constructing a cathedral of unsurpassed grandeur. This idea was now realized, but strange to say, the name of the architect who designed the building and who laid down the plans which the labour of six centuries has failed to carry out, is wholly unknown.

This labour, however, was greatly impeded and delayed by the constant feuds in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between the city and its archbishops. A certain degree of progress was, nevertheless, accomplished, and on the 27th of September, 1322, the choir was consecrated by the Archbishop Henry II., count of Birnenburg. In 1437 the south tower had already been raised to the elevation which it now attains. But the work, so frequently impeded and interrupted for two centuries and a half, ceased completely in the year 1509.

Long forgotten and neglected, the cathedral of Köln was shamefully mutilated in the eighteenth century by the unintelligent and inartistic canons who then composed the chapter. For its beautiful altar a kind of Greek pavilion was substituted; its four bronze angels were transformed into rococo candelabra; heavy fauteuils replaced its beautiful stalls of sculptured stone; the stone chancel was demolished, that the choir might be surrounded with an iron railing; common glass was substituted for exquisite painted windows, which the canons pronounced too dark; and finally, the tabernacle, a masterpiece of sculpture, was destroyed and cast into the Rhine.

The French Revolution inflicted further injuries on this magnificent building. At last, the ravages of time which were added to those of man, not having been repaired for centuries, the general decay and dilapidation began to inspire serious fears for the solidity of the finished portions. The roof sunk in. A sum of 40,000 francs asked for the restoration of the edifice was refused by Napoleon. The French bishop of Aix-la-Chapelle, Berthollet, actually on one occasion congratulated the citizens that they possessed so fine a Gothic ruin, and advised them to plant it round with poplars to increase the effect. When, after the events of 1814, Köln was annexed to Prussia, a voice was raised on behalf of its cathedral in the *Mercure du Rhin*; no one listened to it. At last it happened that the old crane which from the summit of the incomplete tower had called fruitlessly on generation after generation to complete the work of their forefathers, fell to the ground through sheer decay. The incident awoke a tender interest in the heart of the citizens, who had not even been mindful of Berthollet's suggestion of a grove of poplar trees. They had been accustomed to see this crane every day; they could not dispense with it; and the municipal council, in 1819, voted the necessary funds for its re-establishment.

Meantime, the then Crown Prince of Prussia, afterwards Frederick William IV., visiting Köln,

was powerfully impressed by the spectacle of the ruined cathedral. At his request the Prussian monarch resolved to undertake the most urgent restorations, which between 1820 and 1840 absorbed no less a sum than 300,000 thalers. And after Frederick William IV. came to the throne, a society named the *Dombauverein* was formed under his royal patronage, not merely for the maintenance, but for the completion of the cathedral. Donations for an object so laudable flowed in from every quarter. The king promised an annual subscription of 50,000 thalers; and on the 4th of September, 1842, the second foundation of the cathedral was celebrated with the most imposing ceremonies. From that date to the present time, the works have been carried on under the direction of Herr Guirna and his successors, in strict harmony with the original plan, at an outlay already exceeding a million and a half of thalers. To sum up: the choir is completed; so are the transepts; the inner pillars of the nave, consecrated in 1648, have been raised to their full elevation; and strenuous exertions are being made to finish the vaulted roof and lofty towers, each of which will be about 500 feet from base to capital.

The cathedral is built on a cruciform plan, and rises about 60 feet above the Rhine, on an eminence, which, since the days of German supremacy, has formed the north-eastern angle of the fortifications. Its total length is 511 feet, its breadth at the entrance 231 feet; the former corresponding with the height of the tower when finished; the latter, with the height of the western gable.

The choir consists of five aisles, is 161 feet in height, and, internally, from its size, height, and disposition of pillars, arches, chapels, and beautifully coloured windows, resembles a poet's dream. Externally, its two-fold range of massive flying buttresses and intermediate piers, bristling with airy pinnacles, strikes the spectator with awe and astonishment. The windows are filled with fine old stained glass of the fourteenth century; the pictures on the walls are modern. Round the choir, against the columns, are planted fourteen colossal statues: namely, the Saviour, the Virgin, and the Apostles, coloured and gilt; they belong, like the richly carved stalls and seats, to the early part of the fourteenth century.

The fine painted windows in the south aisle of the nave were the gift of King Louis of Bavaria; those in the north aisle were executed in 1508. The reredos of the altar of St. Agilolphus, a quaint old combination of wooden carving and Flemish painting, is worth examination.

The apsidal east end is surrounded by some chapels. In the chapel immediately behind the high altar is placed the celebrated Shrine of the three kings of Cologne, or the Magi who were led by the star, loaded with Oriental gifts, to worship the infant Saviour. Their supposed bones were carried off from San Eustorjis, at Milan, by Frederick Barbarossa in 1162, and were presented by him to his companion and counsellor, Rainaldo, archbishop of Köln. We read in the invaluable Murray: "The case in which they are deposited is of plates of silver gilt, and curiously wrought, surrounded by small arcades, supported on pillars, inclosing figures of the Apostles and Prophets. The priceless treasures which once decorated it were much diminished at the time of the French Revolution, when the shrine and its contents were transported for safety by the chapter to Amsberg, in Westphalia. Many of the jewels were sold to maintain the persons who accompanied it, and have been replaced by paste or glass imitations; but the precious stones, the gems, cameos, and rich enamels which still remain, will give a fair notion of its riches and magnificence in its original state. The skulls of the three kings, inscribed with their names, Gaspar, Melchior, and Balthazar, written in rubies, are exhibited to view through an opening in the shrine, crowned with diadems (a ghastly contrast), which were of gold, and studded with real jewels, but are now only silver gilt. Among the antiques still remaining are two of Leda, and Cupid and Psyche, very beautiful."

Durand describes the choir as the consummate ideal of the Christian tabernacle. Columns slender as lances spring aloft to the very roof, where their capitals expand in flowers. All the rest is a splendid mass of glass-work (*verrière*), whose lancets are tinted over their whole surface with a rich colouring of azure, gold, and purple. The artist who constructed this magic wall must have remembered the words of the Psalmist, "My God, Thou art clothed with light," and has made for the Holy of Holies a dwelling-place not less resplendent than Himself.

There are numerous archiepiscopal tombs in the lateral naves. Like those of Mainz, they are overloaded with cumbrous epitaphs. The tomb of Conrad of Hochstetten, the founder of the

cathedral, is regarded with special veneration. "In the year of our Lord 1248, Bishop Conrad finding himself superabundantly rich in gold, in silver, and precious stones, and deeming his treasnre inexhaustible, undertook the construction of the cathedral of this immense and costly edifice, on which we are labouring at the present moment." I take this extract from the "Chronicle of Cologne" for the year 1499.

Another bishop lies in a tomb fashioned like a fortalice, with a laurel at each angle. He reposes at their base in a semi-military, semi-ecclesiastic costume. Each archbishop of Köln kept his grave open throughout his archiepiscopate, to receive his dust, when needed. A fantastic custom, more honoured in the breach than the observance, demanded that every year of his rule should be marked by means of a small staff of white wood suspended to an iron hold-fast.

We follow M. Durand from the cathedral into the ancient Romanesque church of Saint-Martin; a church to be visited upon market-day, at the hour when the peasants of the neighbourhood abandon their fruits and vegetables to hear mass. In their temporary seclusion from worldly affairs, these rude and angular figures, with their fixed serious gaze, and solemn, stiff, and almost awkward air, seem to have stepped out of some old woodwork, or ancient German engraving, like those of Martin Schœn.

Verily, Köln, metropolis as it is of the banks of the Rhine, is still the city of the apostles and the princes of the Church, and even in these days of German Rationalism, the capital of Roman Catholic Germany.

What shall I say of its town-hall, which is situated between the Gürzenich (custom-houses) and the cathedral? I cannot do better than imitate my predecessors, and quote from Victor Hugo:—It is one of those enchanting harlequin-like edifices, he says, built up of portions belonging to all ages, and of fragments of all styles, which we meet with in the ancient *communes*, the said *communes* being themselves constructed, laws, manners, and customs, in the same manner. The mode of formation of these edifices and of their customs is curious to study. It is an agglomeration rather than a construction, a successive development, a fantastic aggrandizement, or encroachment upon things previously existing. Nothing has been laid out on a regular plan, or digested beforehand; the whole has been produced *au fur et à mesure*, according to the necessity of the times.

The general effect of this ancient structure is, however, very imposing. It was begun in 1250, and terminated in 1571, and is therefore a record of three centuries of architectural progress. Its portico is in the Renaissance style, and the second story is embellished with small triumphal arches made to serve as arcades, and dedicated by quaint inscriptions to Cæsar, Augustus, Agrippa, Constantine, Justinian, and Maximilian. Among the sculptured bas-reliefs, you may remark a man worrying a lion. This man, named Gryn, was a mayor of Köln. The archbishop Engelbert III. had, to rid himself of a troublesome opponent, exposed him to combat with a lion. His courage brought him safely through the perilous experience. The inhabitants, rendered furious by his perfidy, avenged their mayor by hanging to a gate, which at this very day is called *Pfaffarthor*, or the Priest-gate, the first priest who fell into their hands.

The large and splendid hall in the interior, where the Hanseatic League formerly held its sittings, is adorned with nine large statues of knights.

Beside the town-hall stands the "Chapel of the Council," which formerly enshrined the Dombild, now preserved in the St. Agnes chapel of the cathedral. The Dombild, I may remark, represents, when thrown open, the adoration of the three kings, in the middle, and on the flaps (*volets*) St. Geryon with his companions, and St. Ursula with her virgins; when shut up, the Annunciation; it bears the date of 1410. The author of this remarkable picture is unknown; but it is generally attributed to Master Stephen Lotheren, of Köln, the pupil of Master William.

The "Chapel of the Council" contains a fine Roman mosaic, discovered when digging the foundation of the new hospital; and, also, a small collection of ancient pictures. In its fine tower, ornamented with many statues, and constructed in 1407, the municipal council was wont to assemble; at present it meets in the adjacent building, erected in 1850.

Near the Jesuits' church and not far from the quays of the Rhine, stands the church of Saint Cunibert, commenced, and consecrated in 1248, by the Archbishop Conrad. It stands on the site of an older church, built in 633 by the prelate whose name it bears. In its architectural character it is

Romanesque; two portions only belong to the ogival style. Its small side-door presents a most remarkable combination of Oriental art and Gothic form. The front has been restored. The two Romanesque towers in the rear were formerly of a much greater height. The principal tower, having fallen into ruins, was rebuilt in 1850 in the ogival style; it has no other merit than that of magnitude. The most noticeable feature of the church is the thirteenth century stained glass in the apex; this is very rich and beautiful. There are also several small pictures on wood, by artists of the early German school.

Of course, no visitor to Köln fails to make a pilgrimage to that legendary edifice, the church of St. Ursula. From an artistic point of view it presents very little that is interesting or remarkable; except in the choir, the tomb of St. Ursula (dating from 1668), and her statue in alabaster on a pedestal of black marble, with a dove at her feet.

The legend runs that St. Ursula, daughter of a British king, set sail with a train of 11,000 virgins, to wed the warriors of an army which had migrated, under Maximus, to conquer Armorica from the Emperor Gratian. The ladies, however, losing their way, were captured at Köln by the barbarous Huns, who slew every one of them because they refused to break their vows of chastity.

This story is told in a series of most indifferent pictures, to the right of the visitor as he enters the church.

The reliques of the virgins cover the whole interior of the building; they are interred under the pavement, let into the walls, and displayed in glass cases about the choir.

As in St. Ursula's, so in St. Gereon's church, the principal ornaments are bones; its walls being lined with the remains of the 6000 martyrs of the Theban legion, who, with their leader Gereon, perished in the persecution under Diocletian, because they refused to renounce the Christian faith.

The church itself is one of the finest in Köln. The nave dates from 1262; the other portions, including the choir and crypt, are as early as 1066–69. Mr. Hope thus describes the decagonal nave:—"By a singular and theatrical arrangement, arising out of these various increments, its body presents a vast decagonal shell and cupola, the pillars of whose internal angles are prolonged in ribs, which, centering in a summit, meet in one point, and lead by a high and wide flight of steps, rising opposite the entrance, to an altar and oblong choir behind it; whence other steps again ascend to the area between the two high square towers, and to the semi-circular east end, belted, as well as the cupola, by galleries with small arches and pillars, on a panelled balustrade. The entrance door, with square lintel, low pediment, and pointed arch, is elegant; and the crypts show some remains of handsome mosaics."

The baptistery, an elegant structure of the same date as the nave, contains a font of porphyry, said to be a gift of Charlemagne.

In the late Gothic choir of the semi-Romanesque church of St. Andrew are preserved the relics of the great chemist and necromancer, Albertus Magnus. The church of the Jesuits (1636) contains the crosier of St. Francis Xavier, and the rosary of St. Ignatius Loyola.

Our space forbids us to dwell at any length on the numerous and interesting churches of this thrice-holy (and most odoriferous) city. But one of the most ancient—nay, I believe it wears the palm of unsurpassed old age—is that of Santa Maria di Capitolio. It is reputed to have been founded in 700, by Plectruda, wife of Pepin d'Héristal, and mother of Charles Martel, who erected a chanonry beside it. It is very clear that Plectruda's tomb belongs to an earlier date than the edifice which now enshrines it; and which, judging from its Romanesque style, was erected about the beginning of the eleventh century. It was restored in 1818 (the porch and choir in 1850), and enriched with stained glass windows. In addition to the curious tomb of its foundress, this church possesses an object of interest in an altar-piece attributed to Albert Dürer. Painted in 1521, and placed in a side chapel, left of the choir, it represents in one compartment the Death of the Virgin, and, in the other, the Dispersion of the Apostles. In the Hardenrath Chapel will be found some interesting mural paintings, portraits, and a Miracle of St. Martin, by Lebrun. The Schwarz Chapel contains the brass font (1594), surmounted by a figure of St. Martin on horseback.

The Church of St. Peter should be visited for the sake of the great picture of Rubens, forming its altar-piece, of the Crucifixion of the Apostle, with his head downwards. It was painted shortly before the master's death. Wilkie and Sir Joshua Reynolds both criticise it adversely; but the visitor who contemplates it, however, without

any foregone conclusion, will be powerfully impressed by it, and will pronounce it, we think, not unworthy of Rubens.

The artist was baptized in this church, and the brazon font used on this occasion is still preserved.

Until he was ten years old (1587), he lived in the house, No. 10 Sternengasse where Maria de' Medicis died in 1642.

The church of the Minorites, that of St. Mauritus, those of St. Pantaleon and St. Andrew, are well worth visiting. The same may be said—I wish that I had space to say more—of the double iron bridge (1352 feet long), across the Rhine; the noble quays; the house of the Templars, No. 8 Rheingasse; the new Rathhause, and the Wallraff-Richartz Museum of pictures, founded and enriched by the two citizens whose name it bears.

So much for Köln. But stay, how can we leave the city without an allusion to its Eau de Cologne? To that celebrated perfume, which is nowhere more necessary than in Köln itself, though its evil odours are not quite so overpowering as they were in the days of Coleridge:—

> "Ye nymphs, who reign o'er sewers and sinks,
> The river Rhine, it is well known,
> Doth wash your city of Cologne:
> But tell me, nymphs, what power divine
> Shall henceforth wash the river Rhine?"

"My eyes," says a traveller, "are still dazzled by the placards announcing in gigantic letters the sale of this precious perfume. Its distillation is the most important industry of the city. There are twenty-four manufacturers of it, and upwards of a hundred vendors. The annual production is estimated at from eight to nine million litres, worth about £6,000,000. But what a display of charlatanism for such a sum! The ancient Colonia Agrippina has no longer its consuls, its patricians, its princes, electors of the Holy Empire. It is swayed by the dynasty of the Jean Marie Farinas, an encroaching dynasty, swollen by usurpers and pretenders, who flood the streets with their products, their ensigns, their agents. Every wall is plastered over with provoking bills, which would be amusing enough if we were not weary with the 'posters' of other cities. All the crossways are guarded by bill-distributors and touters, who almost take you by the collar and force you to receive, at a moderate price, a flask coquettishly invested in an outer garb of white straw. There are upwards of thirty rivals, more or less legitimate heirs of the same name, sons and grandsons, nephews and great-nephews, disciples and successors of the illustrious Jean Marie Farina, inventor, in 1672, of *the* Eau de Cologne, sole possessors of his secret, sole manufacturers of the *true* 'water,' sole inheritors of his genius. Their lives are spent in decrying one another, *vivâ voce* or in writing. In fact, the question of *whose* or *which* is the genuine Eau de Cologne has quite a literature of its own, into which neither reader nor writer will be desirous of plunging."

We have now brought our readers to the point where the valley of the Rhine terminates, and the once grand and rolling river enters upon the low plains of Holland to creep sluggishly through winding channels, and finally mingle with the sea in two dreary estuaries. Soon after entering the Netherlands, the great river bifurcates into two arms—the left, called the Waal, and the right, the true Rhine. The Waal, near Fort Louvestein, is joined by the Maas, and forms the Merve or Mervede, which, below Dordrecht, takes the name of the Old Maas. The Rhine proper, a short distance above Arnheim, throws off the New Yssel, which was anciently a canal, cut by the Roman Drusus to connect the Rhine with the Old Yssel. At Wÿk bÿ Duerstede the Rhine again divides; one branch, the Lek, uniting with the New Maas near Ysselmonde; the other, the Kromme Rhine, separating at Leyden into the Vecht and the Old Rhine, the latter eventually reaching the North Sea to the north-west of Leyden. The delta of the Rhine is a low semi-inundated level, extending from lat. N. 51° 35′ to 52° 20′, and occupying nearly 50,000 square miles. It is protected from the ocean-floods by artfully disposed and solidly constructed dykes or embankments, varying from twenty to thirty feet above the river-level.

Here, then, as it is only with the German Rhine we had to deal—with that romantic and beautiful Rhine valley, which so abounds in old associations and chivalrous memories, and which has been so frequently the cause, the scene, and the prize of sanguinary wars—our task is done.