INSTREAM
FLOW

INFORMATION
PAPER: NO. 23

Biological Report 86(9)
September 1986

A NEW PERSPECTIVE
IN INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS: THE
LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS MODEL
(LIAM)

INSTREAM FLOW
AND AQUATIC
SYSTEMS GROUP

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Biological Report 86(9)
September 1986

A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS:
THE LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL (LIAM)

Instream Flow Information Paper No. 23

by

Leah J. Wilds

Instream Flow and Aquatic Systems Group

National Ecology Center

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Fort Collins, Colorado 80526-2899

National Ecology Center

Division of Wildlife and Contaminant Research

Fish and Wildlife Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Washington, DC 20240

MBL/WHOI

D 0301 OOHOSflb b

This report should be cited as:

Wilds, L. J. 1986. A new perspective in institutional analysis: the Legal
Institutional Analysis Model (LIAM). Instream Flow Information Paper 23.
U.S. FishWildl. Serv. Biol. Rep. 86(9). 143 pp.

CONTENTS

FIGURES IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v

1 . 1 ^ITRODUCTION 1

2. NSTREAM FLOW: AN OVERVIEW 5

2.1. The West: Appropriation 7

2.2. The East: Riparian Rights 9

2.3. The Cedar River 11

3. LIAM: THE THEORY 17

3.1. Incremental i sm 17

3.2. Decision Arena 19

3.3. Organizational Process 20

3.4. Group Psychology 22

3.5. Bureaucratic Politics 24

3.6. Power 24

3.7. Summary 25

4. THE FOUR PHASES OF LIAM 29

4.1. Phase I: Survey of Authorities 29

4.2. Phase II: Role Analysis 32

4.3. Phase III: Power Analysi s 41

4.4. Phase IV: Behavior Analysis 42

5. LIAM: THE COMPUTER MODEL 46

5.1. The Computer Programs 46

5.2. Preliminary Steps Before Running Query 47

5.3. Phase I: Query: Survey of Authorities 50

5.4. Phase II: Query: Role Analysis 51

5.5. Phase III: Query: Power Analysis 53

5.6. Looky 55

5.7. Mapum 56

5. PHASE IV: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 62

6.1. Formi ng a Task Group 62

6.2. Context of the Issue 62

6.3. Coalitions 71

6.4. General Strategies 76

6.5. Defining Success 77

REFERENCES 78

APPENDICES 87

I. LIAM Subquadrant Descriptions 87

II. User's Manual for the Legal-Institutional Analysis Model 92

m

FIGURES

Number Page

1 The theoretical concepts used to develop the Legal-
Institutional Analysis Model 27

2 The four phases involved in conducting legal-institutional
analyses 30

3 The location of four organizations along the Broker-
Arbitrator continuum 34

4 An LIAM Role Map 36

5 The location of two typical organizations on an LIAM role

map 39

6 The sixteen subquadrants (A-P) of an LIAM role map 40

7 Flow chart of the theoretical concerns addressed in each of

the four phases of LIAM 43

8 The location of a Broker-Guardian organization on an LIAM role

map 54

9 The location and distribution of many typical organizations on

an LIAM rol e map 58

10 An example of three-sectioned power columns provided to users

of LIAM 60

11 An example of a perspective plot provided to users of LIAM ... 61

12 Likely scenario for competitive negotiations: a first cut ... 66

13 Likely scenario for competitive negotiations: a second cut .. 67

14 Likely scenario for cooperative negotiations: a first cut ... 69

15 Likely scenario for cooperative negotiations: a second cut .. 70

16 Likely scenario for integrative negotiations: a first cut ... 72

17 Likely scenario for integrative negotiations: a second cut .. 73

IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to Dr. Berton L. Lamb, Project Officer for this
effort, for his insightful criticisms and unrelenting support as this document
moved towards completion. In addition, this information paper has undergone
extensive internal and external review, which has resulted in a vastly improved
product. I would like to thank those individuals who took time from their
busy schedules to review this product:

Hanna J. Cortner, Pima County Board of Supervisors, Tucson, AZ .

Dennis L. Soden, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC.

Daniel McCool , Texas A&M University, College Station, TX.

John Nessler, Waterways Experiment Station, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Vicksburg, MS.

Michael Hamilton, University of Southern Maine, Portland, ME.

E. R. Mancini, Atlantic Richfield Company, Los Angeles, CA.

Jim Henricksen, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Ecology Center
(NEC), Fort Collins, CO.

James R. Hanchey, Institute for Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Fort Belvoir, VA.

Stephen Olson, Department of Water Resources, State of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ.

Zachary Smith, Ohio University, Athens, OH.

Gregg Cawley, University of Montana, Missoula, MT.

Rose Pfund, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI.

J. N. Clarke, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ.

Rich Johnson, NEC.

Robert Hays, NEC.

Kay Lindgren, NEC.

Helen Ingram, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ,

I'm also grateful to Ms. Jennifer Shoemaker, who was responsible for the
graphics; Mr. Jim Zuboy, who edited the manuscript several times; and our
wonderfully patient and experienced typists, Ms. Connie Spelling, Ms. Marlys
Updike, Ms. Elizabeth Barstow, Ms. Dora Ibarra, and Ms. Patricia Gillis. And
finally, I would like to express my thanks to my daughter, Victoria, and my
friends and coworkers for providing the friendship and emotional support this
writer could not have done without during the time it took to complete this
report.

VI

1. INTRODUCTION

Media commentators have long recognized that the United States moved into
the environmental decade of the 1970' s on a tide of optimism; there was a
general feeling that, once initiatives were begun and programs established,
over 100 years of pollution could be cleaned up quickly. Now, only 10 years
later, it is clear that such a monumental task will be neither "easy" nor
"cheap" (Rosenbaum 1985).

A number of steps have been taken. The legacy of the seventies is a
variety of Federal and State environmental laws [e.g., the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (1959); the Surface Mining and Control Reclamation Act
(1977); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972, 1977); the Endangered
Species Act (1973); the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (1958); the Toxic
Substances Control Act (1976); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(1976); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (1980)]. These laws reflect a desire not only to clean up and
manage America's natural resources, but also to develop protective programs
that would ensure future maintenance of those resources and allow industry and
development to proceed at a pace and in a manner compatible with — or at least
not detrimental to — natural ecological systems. Implementation of these
programs, however, has been extremely difficult, with costs high and
frustration the inevitable result. Moreover, technological advances have not
been able to meet the challenges presented in the implementation process.
Jurisdictional confusion and litigation have frequently been the result. The
trend towards litigation has stemmed in large part from the need to interpret
the various laws; resolve agency, organizational, and individual disputes; and
clarify the roles of economics and science in such complex areas as cost-
benefit analysis and risk assessment (Anderson 1973; Brown 1980; Lester and
Bowman 1983). The conflicts which arise in the course of resolving these
disputes are part of an overtly political struggle.

The struggle is over who gets what societal benefits and services

(Lasswell 1936) as these "values" are distributed in projects, permits,

licenses, and programs. Such policy determinations are made, implemented,

assessed, and adjusted in a complicated environment of technical analysis and

political trade-offs. Indeed:

No domain of public authority ... has expanded more rapidly,
nor has any embraced more ambitious goals, than has environmental
regulation in the last decade .... This expansion ... while most
visible at the Federal level, has ... permeated lower levels of
government until ecological issues are [now] routine agenda items
for [all levels of] government. [In essence], we are depending
primarily upon the Nation's governments, and the political structures

in which they are embedded, to assume leadership in environmental
management and responsibility for future environmental planning
(Rosenbaum 1985:25-26).

The above paragraph suggests a high degree of complexity not only in
major policy decisions, but also in small choices made at all levels of govern-
ment. Governments, whether Federal, State, or local, are involved in defining,
implementing, and adjusting policy; the bureaucratic activity that results is
confusing to observers and participants alike. Focusing on the decision-making
process on a project-by-project basis does little to relieve this complexity.
This is more true today, in the 1980' s, than ever, and it is as true regarding
instream flow protection as any other resource issue. In the instream flow
arena, of course, conflict develops over what users get the water that is
available — and for what purposes.

An "instream flow" can be defined as that amount of water that is left
flowing in a stream or river system. "Instream values" include the following:
navigation, water quality, recreation, fish and terrestrial wildlife
protection, and aesthetics. Instream flow decisionmaking is characterized by
the diversity of organizations that hope to benefit from the development and
implementation of policy. Many organizations, both public and private, attempt
to influence the outcome of instream flow program implementation efforts in
such a way that their respective concerns are addressed; these concerns may be
economic, technical, environmental, political, or social. These concerns are
frequently misunderstood, even by those directly involved. For example, many
applied scientists, involved in collecting and analyzing data, ignore the
context in which their recommendations will be considered. Project builders
focus on the purely economic costs and benefits involved. Politicians
frequently are not instructed by the confusing technical and scientific
elements of proposals. And each group has a hard time communicating with the
other, while all participate in determining the degree to which a particular
river system receives protection.

Three facts seem to stand out amid the confusion that results. First,
science or technology alone cannot be depended on to develop all of the
necessary solutions. Many di scipl ines need to become involved in a cooperative
effort to resolve the problems associated with instream flow protection.

Second, all environmental policy administration has both technical and
political aspects associated with it (Ingram 1984; Lamb 1984a, b). Indeed,
some observers suggest that policy implementation is more political than
technological (Mann 1982a; Yaffe 1982). Environmental policy implementation
occurs in an environment in which "...the medium of exchange. .. i s power and
the mode of interaction is negotiation" (Yaffe 1982:7). In spite of all
evidence to the contrary, many applied scientists and technicians still believe
policy implementation is a fairly simple technical matter (Mann 1982a; Lamb
1984a, b). They frequently do not recognize the political aspects of conflicts
in which they become involved. One must understand the political environment
in which programs are created and implemented. Technical issues, at this
level, are usually less complex than the political and institutional problems
involved. Implementation is ultimately a product of interorganizational
negotiation (Mann 1982a; Yaffe 1982; Lamb 1984a). This being the case, it is

important to develop an adequate understanding of the process of program
development and implementation, as well as the organizations that participate
in both.

le

Third, a number of recent research efforts have brought attention to th
crucial nature of preassessment techniques for resolving resource problems
One of these research efforts has focused directly on the need for institu
tional analysis as a first step towards defining and understanding a problem.
Institutional analysis is a general term that refers to attempts to understand
and explain "those legal, political, and administrative processes and
structures" through which public policy decisions are made (Ingram et al .
1982:323; Cortner and Marsh 1986:1-2). This includes rigorous definition of
the problem itself and the context in which it will be resolved. Since the
determination of water resource decisions and their subsequent implementation
involves the active participation of a wide range of organizations, profes-
sions, and interests (Bovee 1982), it is important to understand the context
in which these groups work, and to understand and plan for the ways in which
interactions will occur. Thus, the more rigorous the analysis, the more
likely that potential barriers and constraints to instream flow program imple-
mentation will be identified. Institutional analysis is most useful, however,
when it takes the analyst beyond traditional surveys of the relevant laws and
institutions to the assessment of alternative solutions and the development of
concrete strategies to achieve desirable results (Daneke and Priscoli 1979;
Ingram et al . 1984). Some sort of analytical framework is needed then, and
the Legal Institutional Analysis Model (LIAM) has been developed to meet this
need.

LIAM is a computerized analytical procedure designed to accomplish four
goals. First, it provides a systematic method to diagnose a conflict. The
analyst is able, by using LIAM, to answer such questions as: What type of
conflict is this likely to be? Will it be an ideological dispute — or a
procedural one? Who is likely to dominate the negotiation--and what type of
negotiation styles are likely to emerge? In whose favor is the outcome likely
to fall?

Second, the model allows an analyst to plan for participation in a
negotiation. Here, one could answer such questions as: Where can influence
best be exerted? What are the concerns of the various sides to this conflict?
What are the likely areas of agreement? Where are alliances likely to form?
What types of power does each organization have at its disposal — and to what
degree? What communication and negotiation strategies will be most suitable
in thi s context?

Third, the model predicts organizational behavior. Here the analyst can
answer such questions as: What is organization "x" likely to do? What is the
mix and distribution of organizational types? How likely is compromise among
them? Is litigation a possibility? How can compromise be facilitated? To
what types of information will organization "x" be most receptive? Given a
change in the environment, what will happen to organization "x"? How are the
other organizations likely to respond?

Finally, LIAM can be used as a conflict resolution tool. This can be
achieved by getting all of the parties to use the procedure to develop a
better understanding of the values and needs of other parties; to identify
commonalities among them; and to overcome misperceptions. LIAM, in this
latter sense, can lead to improved understanding and communication, and can
help to move the conflict from a competitive to a noncompetitive environment.
LIAM, in short, is presented as part of the answer to increased understanding
of the organizations involved in instream flow decisionmaking, and of the
nature of the decisionmaking process per se. An organization that develops
such an understanding will be in a better position to represent its own
interests and values in the process.

The following chapter examines instream flow decisions as they fit into
the overall water policy context, and an example is presented of the type of
problems usually encountered in instream flow issues. This chapter also
surveys the literature on institutional analysis, focusing on instream flow
protection. Chapter 3 introduces LIAM and its theoretical underpinnings.
Chapter 4 outlines the four phases involved in conducting legal-institutional
analyses. In Chapter 5, the computerized version of the model is described,
along with specific directions for conducting an LIAM analysis. The final
chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways in which LIAM can be used to
develop strategies for instream flow protection.

I

2. INSTREAM FLOW: AN OVERVIEW

Although water is clearly one of this country's most abundant and
versatile National resources, the "adequacy of our water resources has emerged
as [one of] the nation's principal resource concerns in the 1980' s" (Frederick
1982:216). Every geographic region in the United States faces serious water
problems, which fall roughly into two major categories: either there is too
much demand for too little water, or the quality is low. Instream flow needs
are related to both.

Historically, the value of maintaining flow in streams for instream uses
has been ignored in favor of development uses. This is especially true in the
West, where diversionary and beneficial use is often a prerequisite for obtain-
ing legal rights to the water. In the last decade, however, the environmental
movement and other factors led to the creation of a new kind of water use:
the use of a free-flowing stream for such purposes as recreation, water quality
maintenance, aesthetics, and the preservation of aquatic and terrestrial
wildlife (Doerksen and Lamb 1974; Tarlock 1978; Weatherford 1982).

The debate over instream flows centers on the crucial question: How much
water, in what condition, and for what uses, should be left in a particular
river or stream? Thus, instream flow allocation is integrally tied to the
issues of quantity and quality, as well as the legal and institutional frame-
works for managing and regulating each. As the demand for energy, irrigation,
and domestic and industrial consumption has increased, more and more streams
have been impounded or depleted to provide water for these interests. These
long-standing water uses have come into direct conflict with the newly
recognized instream values (Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Meshorer 1983).

Competition over what is viewed as an increasingly scarce resource,
especially in the West, is often fierce (Frederick 1982; Weatherford 1982).
Instream users not only have to compete among themselves for water to cover a
diverse set of activities (including fish and terrestrial wildlife protection,
recreation, flood control, hydroelectric power generation, navigation and
transportation purposes, and waste treatment and assimilation), but with
offstream users as well. Off stream users also compete with instream users and
each other to advance a variety of interests, many of which are incompatible.
These include water for agriculture and irrigation, livestock, manufacturing,
industry, mining, steam-generated electricity, and a host of commercial and
domestic activities (Frederick 1982).

Instream flow questions have no single answer that is suitable in all
conflicts. It is not simply a matter of instream flow versus diversionary
uses. Determination of instream flow needs is associated with a number of
water issues, including (but certainly not limited to): Section 404 dredge

and fin permits; hydroelectric licenses; operating schedules for Federal
projects, such as dams and diversionary works; waste assimilation capabilities
of rivers and streams; environmental impact assessments; mitigation efforts;
navigation facilities; recreation; land management planning; State programs
for setting initial instream flow standards; the design and implementation of
general State instream flow programs; initiating instream flow legislation;
and in denials of water rights based on instream flow studies.

Even where instream uses are designated as beneficial, and legal oppor-
tunities provided for their protection, the institutional processes involved
often present major obstacles to achieve adequate protection for instream
values. The problem seems to be more than just a question of which is the
more "beneficial" use. While it is true that instream uses are easier to
protect if they are legitimized by State law, when this is not the case, other
opportunities exist for their protection. Such opportunities are provided in
Federal project construction and operation; Federal water rights; endangered
species protection; wild and scenic rivers management; Federal Clean Water Act
planning; the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act; and various State laws and
protective programs.

Although one of the most basic elements of instream flow determinations
concerns the allocation of water among competing users, and hence "water
rights," the issue is much more complex than this implies. Solutions are far
from simple, no matter what system of water allocation is at work. Conflict
initially arises because a multitude of public agencies and private organiza-
tions strive to achieve a widely diverse set of goals (Doerksen and Lamb 1974;
Lamb and Meshorer 1983). Each instream flow problem tends to be defined,
then, by a number of factors, including: the various State and Federal laws
that are called into play by the nature of the problem; the interactions of
various groups attempting to achieve their own objectives; the particular set
of technological problems that need to be resolved; the type of field studies
and analyses to be conducted; and the political and institutional circumstances
involved.

Allocation of water supplies, both underground and surface, is achieved
through a complex arrangement of statutes, regulations, and permit systems
carried out by numerous organizations created at all three governmental levels.
To date, there has been little effort in developing and coordinating a single
regulatory system to control water distribution and use. At the National
level, the mechanisms for control are fragmented not only across the three
branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), but scattered within each
branch as well. For example, in Congress alone, 41 House committees and sub-
committees, along with 31 in the Senate, all have some authority over National
water policy planning. Furthermore, four different Federal agencies, each
located in different departments, have major responsibilities for water manage-
ment (Rosenbaum 1985). (These include the Bureau of Reclamation (Interior);
the Soil Conservation Service (Agriculture); the Army Corps of Engineers
(Defense); and the Tennessee Valley Authority.) Although such dispersion of
responsibility and authority obscures the interrelatedness of the various
policy areas and obstructs coordinated planning, new statutes are written and
existing statutes implemented in such a way that fragmentation and inconsis-
tency seem inevitable. The ambiguity that results is seen by some as

permitting a high degree of much-needed administrative discretion and flexi-
bility (White 1971). Ambiguity may even present opportunities, if correctly
handled; however, many individuals directly involved in the implementation of
different State instream flow programs are frequently frustrated by the
apparent lack of consistency.

The States have developed their own mechanisms for distribution, which
tend to reflect the wide variation among the States in water law, supply,
demand, public attitudes, and historical precedent (Mann 1982b). In the West,
the "appropriation doctrine" was originally adopted, while in the Eastern
States the "riparian doctrine" has dominated. Although modifications of both
doctrines have appeared in practice, these two doctrines still form the basic
foundations of Eastern and Western water law as we see them today (Gould 1977;
Meyers and Tarlock 1980; Davis 1983). A brief review of these doctrines then,
is necessary to fully appreciate the current state of affairs in instream flow
protection.

2.1. THE WEST: APPROPRIATION

The first major use to which water was put in the West was in mining,
followed soon after by irrigation. Both require the removal of water from the
streambed, with the return flow often far less than the amount diverted.
Since water is scarce in the arid West, not enough was available to meet the
demands of all those desiring to use it. These basic facts gave rise to the
three fundamental principles of the appropriation doctrine: the priority
rule, the diversionary requirement, and the beneficial use requirement (Dewsnup
and Jensen 1977b; Tarlock 1978; Mann 1982b).

The priority rule states that the first appropriator on a stream has the
prior right to use the water: "first in time, first in right" (Mann 1982b:24).
Thus, appropriati ve users are classified according to the dates on which each
began to use the water. In times of shortages, the most junior (i.e., latest
appropriation date) users may be required to cease operations, while the most
senior users continue to have the right to use the water.

The diversionary requirement that water physically be removed from the
stream results from the fact that the first major and competitive water needs
were associated with diversionary activities. Diversions were also viewed as
a practical means for determining priority, since diversionary structures
served as physical evidence of the priority of the water right. The diversion-
ary requirement presented a major obstacle in early attempts to keep the water
instream (Dewsnup and Jensen 1977b; Tarlock 1978).

Scarcity of water supplies also contributed to the development of the
third principle, that appropriated water be put to a "beneficial use." The
amount of water to which a user is entitled is no more than the amount that
can be put to a beneficial use. Failure to do so results in loss of the
appropriative right to the water by forfeiture or abandonment. "Beneficial"
uses, of course, were traditionally economic and developmental, as the mining
and irrigation customs became incorporated into common and statutory law
(Gould 1977; Tarlock 1978; Meyers and Tarlock 1980; Mann 1982b).

The appropriation doctrine in general reflects the struggle in the
American West to protect the "certainty" or dependability of water rights and
to "fix" the relative positions of users. The ultimate result of these forces
has been the development of a "consumptive ideology," which perpetuated the
notions that: (1) water not used is wasted or lost; (2) only economic, diver-
sionary uses are beneficial; and (3) individuals have the right, if all other
requirements are met, to use the alloted amount of water no matter what condi-
tions prevail (Lamb 1980b; Mann 1982b). Currently, the appropriation doctrine
requires meeting five standards: (1) intent to appropriate; (2) notice of
such intent; (3) adherence to State laws; (4) diversion or physical control of
the water; and (5) application to a beneficial use (Gould 1977; Huffman 1983).
The latter two requirements have long stood as historical road blocks to the
preservation of instream flows. The law has moved beyond the necessity of
capture as the basis of a Western water right, however, and now capture tends
to be justified only when it serves some clear resource allocation function
(Tarlock 1978). Indeed, most contemporary Western water law experts recognize
that the actual diversion requirement serves no real function today that
cannot be otherwise achieved through statutory procedures (such as permit
systems) (Tarlock 1978).

Western water law adopted the view that "inefficient" or cost-ineffective
water use could only be controlled or eliminated through the beneficial use
requirement. Since the economic benefits of instream values were difficult to
determine and document, instream uses were traditionally regarded as grossly
inefficient and thus denied in favor of other claimants, such as energy devel-
opers. In light of current widespread acceptance of instream values, however,
instream uses of water have increasingly come to be recognized in State
statutory schemes as "beneficial" (Tarlock 1978; Meyers and Tarlock 1980).

Since the early seventies. Western States have made rapid, creative
adjustments in water rights systems to accommodate changing needs (Mann 1982b).
While there continue to be conflicts, four major types of instream flow
programs have emerged among the Western States (Dewsnup and Jensen 1977b).
First, several Western States have adopted instream flow reservation systems,
wherein a basic flow level is set aside below which no new water rights can be
granted. These reservations have the date of enactment as the priority date.
Water rights senior in time to the reservation are not affected. Persons who
desire to obtain a water right after the date of reservation may use water
only when the reserved flow is satisfied. Additionally, all prior users get
to use the water before the reservation is satisfied. Enforcement provisions
vary among the States using this technique, but the basic idea is the same:
some percentage of a stream's flow is reserved from all subsequent out-of-
stream use (Dewsnup and Jensen 1977b; Lamb and Meshorer 1983).

Second, some Western States have developed, by statute, specific stream
flow appropriation systems. Instead of reserving water from future use as is
the case with reservations, the appropriation system grants an appropriati ve
water right for a given instream use. The States that employ this mechanism
provide that only a designated State agency may hold these water rights; there
have been, however, a few instances of individuals holding instream use water
rights (Tarlock 1978; Lamb and Meshorer 1983).

Third, many Western States allow for an administrative agency to
"condition" new water rights to protect flows on behalf of instream values or
the public interest. In most of these States, when an application is made for
a water right, the application is reviewed by concerned agencies. One
consideration is the maintenance of instream uses. To ensure proper flow
regimes, the conditions are often attached to a new permit for a water right
so that the water right holder may not use the water if (when) it drops below
a specified flow (Tarlock 1977; Lamb and Meshorer 1983).

Fourth, a number of States have instituted State-level protected rivers
programs, in which rivers are classified as wild and/or scenic. These designa-
tions typically specify that future withdrawals of water are either limited or
prohibited altogether (Tarlock 1978; Lamb and Meshorer 1983).

Various of other innovative methods for instream flow protection have
been devised and successfully implemented in the West; at the Federal level,
the opportunity exists for States to participate in the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers program (P.L. 94.486). Some of these include: conditions on
transfers and exchanges of water rights, or even the prohibition of both;
permits for a designated period of time only, not in perpetuity, which revert
back to the State at the end of that period; and the acquisition and realloca-
tion of existing water rights through purchase or condemnation. In addition,
a number of strategies have been developed in synchronization with the imple-
mentation of State and Federal water quality programs (Dewsnup and Jensen
1977a); the State police powers to protect the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens (Huffman 1983); and the gradual expansion of the definition of
navigability (Dewsnup and Jensen 1977a; Tarlock 1978).

2.2 THE EAST: RIPARIAN RIGHTS

Riparian rights are also rights associated with the use of the water —
rather than "ownership" of the water in question — but no diversion or actual
use of the water is required. This doctrine was adopted from 19th century
practices in England and seemed suitable for the eastern part of the United
States, given the abundant water supplies there. Under the riparian doctrine,
water rights are obtained by contiguous ownership of the land touching the
water (Cunningham 1973; Davis 1982). Each riparian landowner is entitled
equally to the water. Initially, this meant riparian users were absolutely
entitled to have the water flow along their property "undiminished in quantity
or quality" (Cunningham 1973:181; Davis 1982:47-80; Lamb and Meshorer 1983:
1-17), even if the water was not being used. This rule seemed quite
appropriate, since in the humid East, diversionary irrigation was unnecessary
and mining was not a major industry. Outside of domestic uses, moreover, the
primary need for water during the 19th century was to power mill wheels. With
the natural flow requirement mill owners were assured of enough continuous
flow to satisfy this need (Davis 1982). Only a few Eastern States, however,
currently adhere to this rule. In other areas, the rule has been modified to
provide that "reasonable" uses be made of the water in a stream system, a
principle that seeks to promote the fullest riparian use of the water.

The reasonableness of a use is determined by the character of the stream,
the present conditions, and the location of users relative to each other.
Thus, it is a comparative sort of reasonableness and tends to be determined by
the courts on a case-by-case basis (Davis 1982). The courts have thus come to
play an instrumental role in protecting instream values, although it has been
a long and cumulative process.

Four major court-created protection strategies have emerged. First,
there has been a trend towards recognition of private recreational uses as
"reasonable" under the riparian doctrine. Second, the courts have moved
towards protecting the waste assimilation capacities of streams under a variety
of State and Federal water quality control programs. Third, the courts have
been useful in protecting some element of natural flows on behalf of both mill
owners and metropolitan water supplies. Fourth, the courts have begun to
recognize the public interest right to protect streamflows on behalf of
recreation, aesthetics, and boating (Davis 1982).

Eastern States have also been successful in initiating programs of their
own, especially in the last decade. In some States, for example, flow
standards have been set that limit the ability of riparian users to take water
in times of short supply. Streams and rivers have also been assigned, either
by State statute or administrative ruling, a "protected" status, as has been
the case under the appropriation doctrine in the West. A number of Eastern
States have begun to implement permit systems or to condition the operation of
existing and future dams so as not to affect minimum flow standards set for
instream values. Other States have incorporated priority systems, either in
State laws or within an administrative permit system. In this latter instance,
uses are categorized according to types of use (e.g., domestic, industrial,
water supply) and ranked in priority of use rights. In times of shortages,
the lower categories are required to reduce the amount of water being used, or
to stop use altogether. Increasingly, instream uses are being included in
these categorization schemes (Aiken 1983; Ehrlich 1983; Ertl 1985).

In both the West and the East, then, opportunities do exist for protecting
instream flows; however, the degree of success encountered varies from State
to State and program to program. This is because, in practice, instream flow
protection efforts frequently involve controversy and lead to conflicts among
competing values and goals. The degree to which these conflicts are success-
fully resolved shapes the nature of the outcome. The key to successful
protection of instream uses is to negotiate permits and standards that give
adequate consideration to both viable economic interests in water resources
and instream values. This is a process that involves bargaining — and
compromise — among the interested parties to a conflict (Lamb 1980b).

Instream flow resource problems have many nontechnical aspects that are
not sufficiently understood. Indeed, the political, legal, and institutional
facets of instream flow issues are often more complex than the technical ones.
It is in this regard that a dynamic, flexible tool for evaluating these
elements can be highly useful. An example may help illustrate this point.

10

2.3 THE CEDAR RIVER

In 1972, steelhead anglers caught 278,927 steelhead in the State of
Washington rivers; 1,224 of these seagoing trout were caught in the Cedar
River. This does not seem like a lot of fish, however, to these fish add the
5,000 to 15,000 Chinook, 30,000 to 150,000 coho, and 50,000 to 200,000 sockeye
salmon that are produced in the Lake Washington system, of which the Cedar
River is a part. All of these fish depend on the Cedar River either for
spawning waters or for fresh water inflow to the lake during rearing. It is
estimated that the fishery in the Lake Washington-Cedar River system, with no
artificial propagation, could easily produce in excess of two million fish
annually (Beckett and Lamb 1975).

The importance of the fishery can be appreciated when one considers the
following facts. Lake Washington is surrounded by the City of Seattle and its
suburbs. Accessible portions of the Cedar River are within a few minutes'
drive of metropolitan Seattle. The lake is commercially fished and the Cedar
River receives heavy recreational use. In addition to supporting these values,
the waters of the Cedar River provide an important water supply; the City of
Seattle draws 70 percent of its water from the Cedar River. The city owns 81
percent of the Cedar River watershed; pipes from the point of diversion travel
only 30 miles to the city limits.

In the State of Washington, the Department of Ecology (DOE) is authorized
by statute to establish minimum or base flows by administrative procedure
after public hearing. In such a situation, the Department of Ecology becomes
the arbitrator among the agencies representing various uses of the stream.
Under Chapter 90.22 of the Revised Code of Washington, the State Fisheries or
Game Department, among others, can initiate administrative action by requesting
certain minimum flows for a stream system (Beckett and Lamb 1976).

The procedure to establish administrative policy regarding the Cedar
River was initiated by the State Department of Fisheries on August 5, 1959.
The department requested that the Department of Ecology set minimum flows to
protect fisheries resources. The Department of Fisheries recommended certain
minimum flows in a chronological regime — that is, minimum flow requirements
were recommended for different conditions and times of the year — and indicated
that the Department of Game and the Water Pollution Control Commission (now
part of the Department of Ecology) concurred in these recommendations.

Between August 5, 1959, and February 5, 1970, both the Department of
Fisheries and the Department of Game revised their requests on the basis of
further analysis. At a hearing on May 22, 1970, the Department of Game
requested an additional modification of its recommendation. Several agency
representatives testified at the hearing, including the Department of Fish-
eries, the Department of Game, the Department of Water Resources, the City of
Seattle, the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (METRO), the Puget Sound
Gillnet Association, and the Puget Sound Governmental Conference (now known as
the Puget Sound Council of Governments). Additional statements were received
from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Corps of Engineers.

11

Several salient facts emerged. First, the Department of Fisheries and
the Department of Game had submitted flow recommendations that varied only
marginally. Second, the Department of Water Resources recommendation was less
specific but generally paralleled those of the other State departments.
Third, the City of Seattle recommended a substantially lower flow regime. The
city's proposals were consistently about a third lower than those of the
Department of Fisheries, e.g., from October 11 to May 1, Fisheries requested
435 cubic feet per second, while the city recommended 290 cubic feet per
second from November 1 to May 1. The administrative regulation subsequently
promulgated by the Department of Ecology followed rather closely the Department
of Fisheries' recommendation.

The city later argued that 435 cubic feet per second exceeded the natural
flow of the Cedar River for that portion of the year. Further, the city
claimed that even though it was willing to provide some sort of flow, the
authorized flow regime exceeded optimum fish needs. The city commissioned a
series of studies, the results of which tended to confirm its position. In
addition, the city had always maintained that it had a perfected water right
and that the State should be required to purchase storage in the city reservoir
to maintain desired flows. This water right claim was based on five facts:
(1) in the 1890' s, the city installed and maintained a measuring weir on the
river above Cedar Falls; (2) in 1895, a city ordinance proposed an election to
authorize the city to proceed with development of the river as a water supply;
(3) in 1902, the first water was delivered to the city; (4) in 1914, a masonry
dam was constructed on the river; and (5) in 1916, over 47 percent of the
entire watershed above Landsburg Dam was purchased by the city. Undoubtedly,
the city does have a water right, but by 1959 it had not filed with the State
for the right, which it was required to do by State law. This left the extent
of the city's right in question (Beckett and Lamb 1976).

The call for the hearing in 1970 caught the City of Seattle by surprise.
The city first heard about the hearing and the proposed flow regime through a
public announcement. There was no advance notification or negotiation.
Furthermore, the Department of Fisheries seems to have viewed this as a test
of the strength of the law and the willingness of the Department of Ecology to
carry through once the process was initiated. Two representatives of the
Department of Fisheries indicated that they picked the Cedar River case because
it posed a difficult problem. If this problem could be resolved in a manner
beneficial to their objectives, it seemed to them that other such scenarios
would eventually follow.

The flow regulation ultimately recommended by the Department of Fisheries
was promulgated as Washington Administrative Code Chapter 17330. According to
several respondents, the standards of the regulation have not been met
consistently. The Department of Ecology has been unwilling to strictly enforce
the ruling. Since establishment of the flow regime, only one critically short
water year has occurred. During that period, representatives of the concerned
agencies met regularly to review the data provided by the City of Seattle and
to negotiate the actual flow level to be maintained. Subsequently, such a
renegotiation process became the standard practice, even in normal water
years, since the interested parties got together during each summer to negoti-
ate their di fferences. At these "low flow" meetings, information on historical

12

flows in the river was provided by the City of Seattle. Even though other
agencies had data on stream flow, the city maintained the most comprehensive
record of historic flows and current conditions. It was thus the city to whom
agencies had to turn for reliable information on which to base their individual
negotiating positions. The flow regime established by the Department of
Ecology has not been maintained for a number of reasons. Primarily, the city
adjusted outflow from its impoundments on the basis of natural inflow, water
quality, and consumptive demands on the water. The city was unwilling to
release more than the natural inflow and reluctant to retain turbid water.

These conditions led to confrontation at the semiregular low-flow-period
meetings. Representatives from both the city and the Department of Fisheries
indicated that the Department of Fisheries is frustrated by the inability of
the city to meet the flow regime and the unwillingness of the Department of
Ecology to enforce compliance. The city's position is that the Departments of
Ecology and Fisheries could purchase water to meet their flow needs. The two
departments, on the other hand, insist that the city must provide the flows.
There appears to be no practical way to reconcile these demands. The results
of these negotiations are that the city usually releases water in a pattern
that is generally parallel to, but less than, the flows specified in the DOE
flow standards. At the bargaining sessions, the problem tends to be dealt
with by continually settling for a flow somewhere between the city's offer and
the legal requirement (Beckett and Lamb 1976).

It would seem that passing a State law designating a single State agency
to establish flow standards may not always provide the solution necessary for
instream flow protection, especially if that agency is subject to political or
other pressures. Even though the agency may initially set flows, confrontation
frequently continues between interested organizations, as the parties negotiate
on the specific releases. In the present case, the parties have formally kept
the controversy open. The city, for example, still threatens a lawsuit to
establish its rights and commissions studies to refute the findings of the
State departments.

The Department of Ecology was placed in a difficult position from the
outset. On the one hand, it was charged with establishing and enforcing flow
regimes but, on the other hand, its only attempt to do so has led to continued
controversy. The Department of Fisheries has requested that flow regimes be
established on 14 other streams under RCW 90.22, but the Department of Ecology
has failed to act on a single one of these requests. It was only much later,
under a different statute, that the Department of Ecology sought to set flows
on other streams.

In this case study, two agencies, the City of Seattle and the State
Department of Ecology, seem to have the most potential influence. Seattle
owns the impoundments that control the water and, more importantly, owns a
majority of the watershed. Seattle could demonstrate the economic benefits to
be derived from continuation of past practice and it has staff and research
support adequate to support its claims. The Department of Ecology, on the
other hand, has control of issuance of water rights in Washington and the
statutory responsibility for establishing flow regimes. Neither has been able
to force the other to accept a flow policy, yet they must reach agreement on a

13

flow program. The Department of Fisheries has little money and only indirect
authority. For leverage it must rely on the general public interest in
protecting the environment and the State's fisheries. It is, however, able to
use the expertise of its fishery biologists to good advantage. The department
can specify the minimum needs for aquatic life and support its recommendations
with extensive field data. The city counters this advantage, however, by
hiring its own field researchers. Two different sets of recommendations
result, each supported by biological and other relevant data. Thus, the
struggle over policy is carried on through the bargaining process.

The point here is that the ultimate flow regimes achieved are not those
promulgated by the Department of Ecology. Each agency recommends a flow
pattern for the period in question — the low flow period each year — based on
its individual perceptions of instream needs. The city uses an amended version
of its original estimates, adjusted on the basis of the precipitation
conditions peculiar to the period in question. The State departments use the
Department of Ecology standards, adjusted on the basis of local conditions.
The result is a negotiated settlement for the week, month, or season in
question.

Commentary

Although the Cedar River case is but one example, it is typical in many
respects. A number of observations can be drawn from Cedar River that apply
to other types of instream flow conflicts.

Generally, the outer boundaries of a conflict such as this are set by
statute. In some cases, several potentially conflicting statutes are involved.
Here, the State legislature passed a law setting the stage for agencies to
apply for designation of minimum flows to protect an instream use of the
water. The State Department of Fisheries then chose to initiate the process
on behalf of the Cedar River fishery resource. Other State agencies supported
this move, and indeed it seems this particular case was viewed by the Depart-
ment of Fisheries and others as not only a test of the strength of the law,
but one that, if successful, would set a valuable precedent for similar
designations on other Washington streams and rivers. Furthermore, the hydro-
logic data were available regarding historical flows. It seemed the Department
of Fisheries simply needed to initiate the process, backing up its recommenda-
tion with technical information and field studies on the available habitat and
water requirements for maintaining the fishery. It seemed also that all that
was needed beyond this was to persuade the Department of Ecology to accept the
recommendations, in which two other State agencies concurred, and promulgate
them according to the specifications of the law.

On the surface, success seemed clear — and the Department of Ecology did
"promulgate" an administrative rule setting the requested flow standards.
Other organizations, of course, were allowed to give testimony at the hearing
and to submit counter-recommendations, which the City of Seattle did not
hesitate to do. Given its interest in protecting the consumptive water rights
of the city, it was not surprising that the city's recommendation was substan-
tially lower than that proposed by the Department of Fisheries. What resulted
was a struggle between organizations with apparently conflicting interests, in

U

which a choice between competing in- and out-of-stream values needed to be
made. The Department of Ecology was caught in the middle. This happens
frequently in water use conflicts (Lord 1984). Nonetheless, an official
standard was set, based on the Department of Fisheries' final recommendation.
Many, if not all, of these facts would have been revealed in a traditional
assessment of the conflict by any of the organizations involved.

This is because traditional assessments of instream flow issues tend to
focus upon surveys of: (1) the statutory environment in which use decisions
are to be made, (2) the policies that have developed within -that context,
(3) the principal actors, and (4) the institutional framework involved.
Typical questions addressed include: What statutes apply? Which organizations
have what degree and type of authority to participate? Who makes the final
decision — and on what basis? What policies have been developed? What organi-
zational structure is in place, if any, for implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement? What sanctions apply? The traditional approach has frequently
been used to examine water issues, either before or after the fact, and is a
crucial first step toward understanding the boundaries within which those
seeking to protect instream flows must operate. Many traditional analyses
have been undertaken because of the obvious need to document the existing
legal and institutional arrangements within a given State or region of the
country. Case studies have also been conducted that attempt to assess the
degree to which laws have been effective. These case studies tend to be of a
critical nature and more often than not suggest ways in which improvements can
be made.

In a case like the Cedar River, a formal analysis of this type would have
been useful in discovering and explicitly recognizing the basic legal facts
and organizations involved. Such analyses are frequently recommended (Minton
et al. 1980; Ingram et al . 1984; Cortner and Marsh 1985). Traditional
institutional analysis, however, would not have predicted the end result, non-
compliance and a never-ending series of negotiations. Nor would it have moved
the analyst towards developing strategies useful in avoiding such a scenario.

The Cedar River case demonstrates the type of problems that can arise
when a single State agency, without adequately consulting the other impacted
organizations (in this case, the City of Seattle), attempts to establish and
enforce flows through the promulgation of regulations. Each organization
typically pursues its own interest, without consideration of the other
interests involved. The ultimate decision reflects either the mutual accommo-
dation of competing positions or the inability, as in this example, of the
parties to reach a satisfactory agreement. One of the tests of a successful
agreement is the degree of compliance that follows. A high degree of compli-
ance is much more likely to occur when all parties are at least partially
satisfied with the agreement (Lee 1982; Wilds 1985).

Traditional assessments, then, tend to reveal only the tip of the iceberg
(Ingram et al . 1984). Other questions might have been considered prior to
initiating the administrative process for setting a flow regime for the river.
It would have been helpful, for example, for the Department of Fisheries to
generate information about the ways in which the other organizations,
especially the Department of Ecology and the City of Seattle, had interacted

15

in the past. How had they behaved in similar situations? What powers did
each have, aside from those legal ones spe^. -Tied in the statute? What were
some of the likely outcomes? The answers to these quer .ions may well have led
the Department of Fisheries to choose a different str tegy than it did. Had
the interaction been scoped and defined differently, the Department of
Fisheries could have developed tactics to cope with a number of possibilities.
If the Department of Ecology had a history of backing down in direct conflicts
with the City of Seattle, perhaps a better move would have been to begin
communicating with the interested parties well before the public hearing. As
it was, the hearing came as a surprise to the City of Seattle.. From that
point forward, it seemed the City was out to defend itself vigorously from
what it viewed as an unprecedented attack on its water rights.

And what about the original objective of the Department of Fisheries, to
"test the strength of the law" (Beckett and Lamb 1976)? It seems that this
objective was not wholly compatible with that agency's ultimate goal — long-term
protection of the fishery resources in the Cedar River system. Had the Depart-
ment of Fisheries defined the issue in less threatening terms (rather than
depicting it from the outset as the first of a long series of struggles with
consumptive users such as the City of Seattle), perhaps communication could
have been enhanced (Wilds and Lamb 1985).

Inadequate preparation prior to participating in resource conflicts (such
as evidenced in this case study) has become a major obstacle to those working
on behalf of instream flow values today (White et al . 1980; Ingram et al .
1984). Indeed, in many cases, no attempt is made at all to examine and define
the dynamics of a resource problem prior to becoming involved in its resolu-
tion, in spite of an increased emphasis in the literature on the importance of
such a task (Ingram et al . 1984).

Recent trends in resource policy literature suggest a number of ways in
which preparation for and participation in resource conflicts can be improved.
Some of these trends have included calls for more directly applicable policy
research (Schlesinger 1968; Rothman 1980; Cortner and Marsh 1986); more
politically astute actors on all fronts (Behn 1981; Alston 1983); increased
understanding and communication among the professions and disciplines involved
in instream flow and other resource conflicts (Alston 1983; Callaham 1984;
Haimes 1984); analyses that go beyond an examination of the economic factors
involved (Daneke and Priscoli 1979) and that recognize the political nature of
most policy issues (Schlesinger 1958; Hipel, Ragade, and Uny 1976; Ingram
et al . 1984); and improved methods for analyzing a problem, which go beyond
the traditional focus on formal laws and institutional arrangements (Ingram et
al . 1984). There is a general lack of guiding theory — ideas that apply no
matter what the instream flow issue at hand — in spite of the increased emphasis
on the need for specific guidelines. Although commonalties do exist, each
instream flow conflict is, because of the differences in participants and type
of decision process involved, somewhat unique. What is needed is a systematic
method that allows the user to discover the nature of a particular problem; to
understand the different perspectives of the organizations involved; to deter-
mine the power relationships involved; to predict probable outcomes; and to
develop strategies based on those discoveries. The purpose of this paper is
to present such a tool. The following chapter discusses the theoretical
foundation upon which this tool is built.

16

LIAM: THE THEORY

In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of LIAM are examined.
These theories represent a long-term attempt by social scientists to document
and understand the American policy process and center around five major
concepts: incremental i sm, decisionmaking arenas, organizational process,
group psychology, and bureaucratic politics.

3.1 INCREMENTALISM

Incremental i sm as an explanatory decisionmaking model is the result of
work by Herbert Simon, Charles Lindblom, and others, which attempts to explain
the fundamental nature of policymaking in America (Simon 1957a; Lindblom 1959,
1968; Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963). The incremental view holds that deci sions
are made serially and are pragmatic efforts to deal with problems, based on
past experience, as they arise within the broader decision context defined by
statute. Policies developed under general legal guidelines are adjusted bit
by bit as those involved become aware of new information, technology, or
preferences, or as decisionmakers are faced with new but related dilemmas.

Simon pointed out that, given the uncertainty involved in planning and
policy implementation, decisionmakers tend to merely "satisfice." This term
refers to attempts to reach decisions that both "satisfy" the participants
involved (at least temporarily) and "suffice" to solve the problem for the
present time and under the particular situational constraints (Simon 1957a).
This notion was further developed by others (Lindblom 1959, 1965, 1968;
Wildavsky 1974, 1975). The basic idea is that given the context of an issue,
the legal and policy framework currently in place, and the limitations imposed
on decisionmakers by time, resources, and information, they generally try to
do the best that they can in each instance. Satisficing is contrasted to
another decisionmaking model, rational-comprehensive decisionmaking, which
Simon and others felt was the most appropriate method for making policy
decisions. In this second model, the ideal method for making decision choices
involves the following:

(1) clarification of values and objectives prior to and distinct from
the scientific analysis of alternative choices;

(2) a means-end analysis, in which the ends are isolated and the means
to achieve them are sought;

(3) the best measure of a "good" policy is that it can be shown to be
the most appropriate means to the chosen ends;

17

(4) all analyses are comprehensive — that is, every important factor is
taken into account; and

(5) theory is frequently utilized (Lindblom 1959).

Although the above model may be the ideal method for making decision choices,
Lindblom asserted that it is not always feasible to follow. This is t^ue for
several reasons. First, rational-comprehensive decisionmaking is extremely
difficult to achieve in reality because:

...it assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information
that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as
an approach to policy when the time and money that can be
allocated to [resolve] a problem is [sic] limited, as is always
the case (Lindblom 1959:80).

Indeed, Simon asserts that:

In actual organization practice, no one attempts to find an
optimal solution for the whole problem. Instead, various
particular decisions ... are made by specialized units ... In
making these particular decisions, [they] do not solve the
whole problem, but find a "satisfactory" solution ... (Simon
1964:16).

Incremental decisions are usually arrived at by setting a general
objective. Then a comparison is made of the obvious and most feasible alter-
natives to reach that objective. There is heavy reliance on the record of
past experience rather than on theory; incremental alterations of present
policy are projected into the future, to judge the possible consequences of
each. The most feasible means-end combination open to the decisionmakers is
ultimately chosen. Typically, goals are only partially achieved; thus, one
would expect to repeat the above sequence as conditions, preferences, and
information changes or improves (Lindblom 1959). Incremental approaches to
policymaking are also less likely to disturb the status-quo, and thus are very
conservative. Further, small adjustments to existing policy are politically
easier to achieve than are sweeping changes.

Instream flow decisionmaking is typically incremental in a number of
ways. State laws and programs developed for the protection of instream values
are themselves incremental efforts, within the wider body of water law, to
resolve the conflict that exists over who uses what water, in what amounts,
and for what purposes. Second, within organizations, decisions are also made
incrementally, i.e., internal organizational choices regarding what policies
to pursue and recommendations to make in a particular conflict are based in
large part on that organization's past experience, and new decisions tend to
differ only marginally from 'past policy stands. Finally, as organizations
negotiate among themselves while trying to protect their respective interests,

18

the adjustments each organization has to make to accomodate the other partici-
pants tend to be achieved in an incremental manner.

In the Cedar River case, for example, the Washington law that allowed a
State agency to apply for minimum stream flows, and then authorized the
Washington Department of Ecology to promulgate an appropriate flow regime, can
be seen as an incremental effort on the part of the State legislature to
adjust Washington water law so that instream values could be protected. This
statute, then, is incremental in the first sense. Secondly, the way in which
the State Department of Fisheries developed its flow recommendations, based on
past experience and field studies, on the one hand, and then adjusted that
recommendation as it consulted with other agencies, on the other, can also be
seen as incremental. Finally, the annual summer negotiation sessions among
the parties in the Cedar River case are incremental. Each organization comes
to the negotiation with its position only slightly altered from the last
encounter, and each organization then adjusts its position incrementally as
bargaining and compromise ensues.

The way in which organizations tend to bargain and compromise in this
latter sense, however, is also influenced by the general context of the
instream flow issue; this relates to the second major theoretical thrust of
LIAM, which is explained in the following paragraphs.

3.2 DECISION ARENA

A "decision arena" can be thought of as a bounded area in which action of
one type or another occurs. According to Lowi (1972), most policy decisions
are typically made in one of four major arenas: (1) distributive, (2) regula-
tory, (3) redistributive, or (4) constituent. The first two, distributive and
regulatory, are the primary arenas in which instream flow decisions are made.
This is because the other two policy areas identified by Lowi have only an
indirect bearing on instream flows. Redistributive policies concern such
issues as taxation, and the Federal Reserve's credit controls, for example,
while constituent policies are the result of direct actions by groups in
society to shape the nature of politics itself, as in the case of reappor-
tionment or the creation of a new government agency.

Distributive policies divide benefits and services throughout society and
have tended to be in the form of such things as subsidies and construction
grants, project authorizations, and sales of Federal lands. In this arena,
the Government acts as a policy "broker," and groups compete with one another
to obtain these benefits and services (Lowi 1972; Mann 1982a; Ripley and
Franklin 1984). Mann (1982a) asserts that distributive politics at the
National level has been one of the "hardiest flowers in the policy-making
garden, withstanding the assaults of fiscal freezes, economic/analytical
pruning, and the best of environmental pollution control." At the interorgani-
zational level, it is a highly political arena in which politicians base their
ultimate decisions regarding who gets what upon such factors as perceptions of
current power relationships among the groups, public support for one proposal
over another, or favors owed by the political entity to the groups involved
(Lowi 1972; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

19

This process emphasizes bargaining strategies and negotiation as a way to
"cut a deal" among the parties so that, at least in the long run, each relevant
and "legitimate" organizational actor obtains something it desired. The
legitimacy of a participant is determined primarily by law and custom. Coali-
tions among organizations are formed to influence the outcome, but these
interests may have little in common except for the support of a particular
distributive action. With regard to instream flows, for example, this type
activity occurs in lobbying efforts by various groups to, first of all, build
a reservoir to hold water for release in dry periods, and then to influence
the way in which that water is ultimately distributed (Lowi 1972; Doerksen and
Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1985).

In the regulatory arena however, the decision procedure is quite
different. Typically, regulatory decisions are made in a quasi-judicial
setting by a decisionmaker authorized to make the decision (Lowi 1972; Ripley
and Franklin 1984), referred to here as the arbitrator. The type of arbitrator
authorized to make the decision is determined by the laws and issues involved,
as well as by the types of groups participating. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), for example, often serves this function in hydroelectric
licensing applications. The objective of an arbitrator is to choose from
among the proposed alternatives the best solution to the problem at hand. In
the regulatory arena also, groups coalesce and compete to have their interests
incorporated into the policy process, and they tend to do so on the basis of
shared interests and mutual goals. Standards, in the form of pel icy deci sions,
result in both decisionmaking arenas, but the procedures and bases for making
those decisions differ dramatically in each (Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and
Lovrich 1986).

The assumption in this paper is that the various organizations involved
in instream flow issues tend to have preferences for one arena over the other,
depending on the organizational strengths and weaknesses of the organization.
The dimension in which these preferences are expressed, however, is one of
process rather than substance. These preferences result in specific behavioral
patterns that lead to the development of organizational roles. These roles
are reinforced by a phenomenon known as organizational process.

3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

Just as individuals tend to develop personal styles, so do organizations.
This is true in part because each organization develops its own unique set of
internal processes, upon which it eventually comes to depend. This is referred
to as "organizational process." The essence of this view is that it postulates
the existence of organizational routines and programs that shape internal
decisionmaking processes (Cyert and Marsh 1963; Allison 1969, 1971; Mosher and
Harr 1970; Sharkansky 1970). The idea is that since organizations have goals,
which require planning and coordination, standard operating procedures (SOP's)
develop within the organization to help it systematically achieve its goals.
SOP's are typical methods for dealing with organizational goals and programs
that an organization creates early on and that become entrenched over time
(Allison 1969, 1971).

20

The end result is an organizational program that affects such things as
personnel recruitment; the type and distribution of rewards and punishments
within an organization; job tenure; and the internal decisionmaking apparatus
of the organization itself. Those individuals and processes that do not fit
organizational rules of thumb are weeded out, and the programs developed for
goal attainment become even more entrenched. Programs are complex clusters of
organizational routines arranged to deal efficiently with day-to-day problems.
Thus, internal decisions tend to be based on the very selective collection,
generation, and distribution of information relevant more to the organization's
routine than to the issue itself. Each organization winds up with a set of
relatively parochial priorities and perceptions. Flexibility, however, is the
price paid for more certainty in decisions; organizational options are limited
in both number and character, and trade-off possibilities are usually ignored.
Many SOPs are not very useful, moreover, in new decision situations (Allison
1969, 1971).

The context of the problem affects the type of information to which
decisionmakers are likely to be receptive (Ingram 1973). An organization
tends to develop, through its organizational processes, a particular "fix"
regarding the dimensions of the issues involved. Information is then select-
ively sorted out based on that conception, and information related to other
perspectives or new ways of viewing the problem is not really considered.
Indeed, Downs points out that decisionmakers tend to "... think in terms of
traditional or habitual categories which are often unduly narrow in relation
to their [real] needs," a bias that leads to the "one best way" approach to
problems. Alternative approaches or solutions are thus frequently not even
considered (Downs 1965). For example, water development projects, such as
dams, levees, or irrigation works were seen for so long as a means to stimulate
local economies that it was difficult to convince project developers of the
need to examine the environmental implications of these projects. The
"relevant" information included — and tended to be limited to — data on project
feasibility, benefits and costs, and the strength and unity of local support
(Ingram 1972). Environmental impact data, given this perception and context,
were "irrelevant." Furthermore, once an organization becomes committed to an
initial decision or approach, no matter how inappropriate it may be the organi-
zation will actually reject information that suggests alternatives (Rosenthal
and Weiss 1966).

Thus, because of unflagging dependence on SOP's to define the range of
"acceptable" behavior and "relevant" information, an organization tends to
collect and evaluate the same type of data regardless of its ultimate utility
in persuading the other decision participants. SOP's provide stability in
organizations to be sure, and stand as decision rules that individuals and
organizations alike can rely on from one problem to the next, lending
continuity and certainty to the overall process (Mosher and Harr 1970). Many
internal organizational decisions are thus predictable. Knowledge of the ways
in which organizations typically make internal decisions — such as flow
recommendations — and the ways in which organizations tend to pursue goals,
provides a basis for making preliminary predictions about interactions and
outcome.

21

Organizational routines are difficult to change- (Mosher and Harr 1970).
There are instances, however, in which organizations deviate from established
routines, and become more innovative and accepting of atypical perspectives
and solutions. Sharkansky (1970) suggests that these instances are brought
about over time by a number of factors, including National traumas, decisions
taken at one level of government that affect another level, and changes in the
level of economic resources available. Such happenings can lead to a situation
becoming ripe for change. Indeed, all of these factors can be seen as having
had some causal impact on the changes that have occurred in the last decade in
the recognition of instream values and the development of a variety of
mechanisms for their positive inclusion in water policy decisions. Typically,
change is difficult to achieve, however. LIAM assumes that an organization's
internal decisions are shaped by organizational processes. These, in turn,
are reinforced by the group "cultures" that tend to develop within organiza-
tions, which also reinforce organizational roles (Simon 1964; Schlesinger
1968; Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 1979; White 1986).

3.4 GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

"Group psychologies" tend to develop within organizations, especially in
subunits, along with organizational processes. Janis (1972) refers to this as
"groupthink. " Groupthink is a "mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive group" (Janis 1972:9), and which evolves
into an espirit de corps — or a "we" feeling of sol idarity--among group members.
Group solidarity is reinforced by a number of factors, including group norms
or rules of the game, a group vocabulary, and a group perspective or view of
the world. Often, these phenomena are reinforced by such things as "... honest
conviction, bias, recruitment, limited information and the structure of power
... [and] these mutually reinforcing tendencies provide for the preservation
of their own kind ..." (Schlesinger 1968:284). Subtle constraints exist,
moreover, which strengthen group consensus. New members are socialized into
acceptance and support of group norms. Deviant members are punished, either
by exclusion from intra-group belonging or expulsion from the group altogether
(Janis 1972; Mumme and Ingram 1984).

A number of studies have provided evidence for the existence of groupthink
within many types of groups and organizations. Fenno (1970), for example,
discovered four major norms operant in the House Appropriations Committee.
Newcomers were found to undergo an "initiation rite" in which they learned to
adhere to these norms. Kornberg (1970) examined the degree to which formal
and informal rules and sanctions are utilized to reinforce group norms in the
Canadian legislature. Mumme and Ingram (1984) studied the Papago Indian
tribes in southern Arizona, and found a very anti-individualistic group culture
that emphasized such values as cooperation, communal ity, and social harmony.
For this group, consensus is highly valued in political decisions, especially
with regard to the management of water resources.

Beckett and Lamb (1976) identified another factor that increases group
cohesiveness, at least within organizations involved in the resolution of
instream flow issues: professional alliance. Professional alliance refers to
the high degree of understanding and cooperation that develops among

22

individuals of the same profession — others have also found evidence of this
phenomenon in other professions and among professionals in general (Goleman
1954; Lipset and Schwartz 1966; Twight and Catton 1975; Alston 1983). It
seems that similarity in education and professional background among group
members in an organization decreases antagonism and leads to more interaction,
not only within organizations, but among them.

Groupthink, however, often contributes to organizational inability to
solve problems. Janis (1972) identified six tendencies that result from
groupthink within organizations.

1. Discussions are limited to a few alternative courses of action,
without a survey of the full range of options.

2. The group fails to reexamine later the initial preferences expressed
by the majority of members, from the standpoint of nonobvious risks
and drawbacks that had not been considered originally.

3. Group members neglect courses of action initially evaluated as
unsatisfactory and spend little or no time discussing whether there
are ways, for example, to reduce the seemingly prohibitive costs
that had made the alternatives seem undesirable to begin with.

4. Group members make little or no attempt to obtain information from
experts who can supply sound estimates of losses and gains to be
expected from alternative courses of action.

5. Selective bias is shown in the way the group reacts to factual
information and relevant judgements from experts, the media and
outside critics, and instead the group shows interest in facts or
opinions that support their initially preferred policies.

6. Groups spend little time deliberating about how the chosen policy or
course of action might be hindered by bureaucratic inertia or
sabotaged by political opponents.

Indeed, a dominant characteristic of groups is that members tend to
remain loyal to the organization by sticking to the norms and decisions to
which the organization has committed itself, even when the policy is working
badly or has unintended consequences that are disturbing (Janis 1972; Janis
and Mann 1979; Cialdini 1984; Goleman 1985).

The tendency of individuals and groups to stick to decisions and/or
attitudinal commitments is well documented (Festinger 1957, 1964; Cohen et al .
1963; Ingram 1973; Cialdini 1984; Goleman 1985). As with organizational
process, all aspects of group psychology are not negative. An organization
with properly defined internal roles, with traditions and routines to which it
consistently adheres, may well make good decisions. The key difference,
though, is that these norms and SOP's must facilitate critical thinking and
not block it. Further, organizational culture, and the values and loyalties
that are a part of that culture, serve to "knit together the institutional
fabric" of an organization, and represent the intangibles that make for

23

organizational pride and morale. Without them, organizational functions could
not be decentralized and delegated with any confidence in consistency.
Organizational behavior is thus highly predictable, particularly in response
to new values that pose a potential threat to organizational goals, power, or
survival (Seidman 1970). Using the context of "roles" developed within LIAM,
organizational behavior patterns peculiar to instream flow issues thus can be
identified, and predictions made about both the interactions that occur among
the organizations and organizational influence on outcome.

3.5 BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Most natural resource decisions are the result of conflict, competition,
and compromise between officials and organizations with diverse interests and
unequal abilities to influence the outcome. Variously labeled "partisan
mutual adjustment" (Lindblom 1965) and "bureaucratic politics" (Allison 1969,
1971; Allison and Halperin 1971), in this process, adversary bargaining is the
rule (Ingram 1972, 1984).

Whenever a decision is the result of compromise, the chosen alternative
will tend to benefit many goals somewhat, but maximize none totally. The way
to understand a decision, in this view, is to discover the elements that are
involved in the bargaining that precedes it; or if the desire is to maximize
the amount of influence one has, the objective is to be able to predict the
ways in which intergroup bargaining will occur. If bargaining power is
concentrated in one group or set of groups, for example, the decision that
emerges will reflect those organizations' separate and mutual goals to a
higher degree than those of other organizations involved. The more influential
organizations, in short, have a proportionately greater impact on policy
outcomes (Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

In a study by Beckett and Lamb (1976), evidence was found for the opera-
tion of this process in instream flow decisions. These authors observed the
prevalence of bargaining among organizations as a means to achieve policy.
The art of instream flow politics, then, is the ability to get things done in
such a context — and to predict the moves of the other players. In the process
of mutual adjustment that usually occurs, the outcome is heavily dependent on
the relative abilities of participants to operate effectively and influence
the outcome. This involves power.

3.6 POWER

Power has long been a topic of interest to those researching administra-
tive behavior and influence (Long 1949; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Simon 1957b;
Wildavsky 1979). According to Bachrach and Lawler (1981), power is the
"essence of bargaining" and the key to understanding policy decisions made in
a climate of mutual accommodation.

Some researchers have examined power as a function of hierarchical
bargaining ability, i.e., as a function of the position of an organization in
the institutional hierarchy in which it is located (Dahl and indblom 1953;

24

Simon 1957b; Seidman 1970); the actual resources an organization has at its
disposal (such as personnel and money) (Fenno 1966; Lamb and Doerksen 1978;
Rourke 1976; Clarke and McCool 1985); and the expertise the organization has
or the information it can control in given policy areas (Benveniste 1977;
Rourke 1976; Clarke and McCool 1985). In this latter regard, the power to
control the flow and type of information that reaches decisionmakers leads to
the ability to define the range of feasible or acceptable alternatives, and
thus can have a direct and substantial impact on ultimate policy choices.
Power has also been examined from a political perspective; power, in this
view, derives (at least in part) from the extra-organizational support (e.g.,
public, political, constituency, clientele) an organization is able to build
for itself and the goals it represents (Rourke 1976; Lamb and Doerksen 1978;
Clarke and McCool 1985).

Power, moreover, is dynamic and fluid rather than static; it consists not
only of the actual resources an organization has at its disposal to pursue a
particular outcome, but its willingness to use those resources in a given
situation; the type of tactics it chooses; and the successes and failures it
has accumulated in the past in similar issues (Bachrach and Lawler 1981).
Keeping these facts in mind allows one to better predict the outcome from an
analysis of the power relationships involved, and has within it elements of
reputational or historical power that can be converted into influence. The
power to persuade is the key ingredient to influencing policy outcomes (Lamb
and Doerksen 1978; Neustadt 1980; Bachrach and Lawler 1981). All of these
notions of power have been incorporated into LIAM.

3.7 SUMMARY

The four assumptions that underlie LIAM have been examined and explained;
the first three of these contribute to the development of organizational
roles, while the fourth specifies the way in which these roles are assumed to
be played out in instream flow decisionmaking issues. In brief, they are as
fol lows:

1. At the organizational level, decisions are made incrementally; that
is, internal organizational decisions are based in large part on
past experience, and new choices differ only marginally from past
policy stands;

2. At the organizational level, decisions are also shaped by organiza-
tional process — standard operating procedures that have developed
over time and that determine the nature and functioning of the
organization's internal decisionmaking structure;

3. Both incremental i sm and organizational process are reinforced by the
existence of organizational "psychologies" — intergroup solidarity
and cohesiveness — which also helps explain the persistent reliance
on incremental i sm and organizational process;

4. At the system or intergroup level, decisionmaking between or among
is characterized by competition, bargaining, and compromise; the

25

degree to which any one group has to adjust its position, moreover,
is directly related to the power differentials involved, and the
relative position of that organization vis-a-vis the others.

The first three facets of decisionmaking listed above ( incremental i sm, organi-
zational process, and group psychology or culture) also represent the factors
that lead to the development and persistence of the organizational roles
outlined in this chapter. Within the general boundaries established by the
laws, and the set of policies that develops under those laws, interested
parties come together and determine the ultimate policy outcomes. This process
is a highly competitive and interactive one, and the driving force that moves
the issues toward resolution is power. Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical
concepts outlined above, as they are assumed to operate in the model. The
major idea here is that there are three factors that lead to the development
and persistence of organizational roles in instream flow conflicts.

The first of these in Figure 1, incremental i sm, refers to the fact that
organizations decide what specific objectives to pursue in a given conflict
based on similar experiences in past conflicts and from having interacted with
the other organizations involved. Changes in past policies are pursued then,
in an incremental fashion, with each alteration differing only marginally from
past objectives.

The way in which organizations, once having decided on objectives, then
go about pursuing those goals, is also based on past experience, and defined,
in large part, by internal organizational processes that develop over time as
the means to achieve specific ends. And, finally, the internal group "culture"
that an organization develops over time, and into which it socializes new
members, reinforces reliance and adherence to incremental decisionmaking, in
general, and organization process, in particular. Group psychology comes, in
short, to determine the "why" of an organization's goals and the ways in which
it pursues those goals. All of these factors occur within organizations — and
hence analysis of these facets is conducted at the group level of analysis.

These factors are postulated to exist and to lead to organizational
roles — and organizational behavior associated with roles--apart from, although
certainly connected to, any interactive behavior that occurs between the
organizations involved in a resource conflict. Organizational role is the
link between group and intergroup behavior and, as can be seen in Figure 1, is
played out in two distinct dimensions. The first has to do with preference to
operate in a particular type of decision arena, and includes brokers and
arbitrators. The second is related to preferences for outcome, and includes
advocates and guardians.

The ways in which organizations adjust their positions in the course of
interaction and negotiation — the degree to which each is forced to compromise
to obtain at least part of its original objective — is largely a function of
the power that the organization brings with it to the conflict. As can be
seen in Figure 1, power in instream flow issues derives from the resources,
expertise, and outside support that an organization has at its disposal, as
well as the degree to which it is willing to use these elements of power to

26

LIAM: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Factors which
build role

Incrementalism
(What?)

Organizational
Process
(How?)

Group

Psychology

(Why?)

<^

Role types

Process Preference Goal Preference

Arbitrator Advocate

Broker Guardian

Decision arena

POWER

Partisan mutual
adjustment or
Bureaucratic
Politics

Resources Expertise Support

Bargaining
Behavior

Figure 1. The theoretical concepts used to develop
the Legal Institutional Analysis Model.

27

force an outcome that is favorable to its own position. Power and roles come
together in a climate of bureaucratic politics, and lead to the bargaining
behavior that is ultimately displayed by the organizations involved in an
instream flow conflict. Analysis of these concepts as they affect instream
flow issues occurs in four distinct phases. These phases are examined in the
fol lowing chapter.

28

4. THE FOUR PHASES OF LIAM

The Legal Institutional Analysis Model (LIAM) provides a step-by-step
process for understanding a particular instream flow issue and building
effective strategies for participation in its resolution. This process is
divided into four steps or phases, all of which operate on the assumption that
individuals can accurately describe the factors that will influence the outcome
of an instream flow conflict, and then determine the ways in which organiza-
tiona influence can best be brought to bear on the process. These phases
include: (1) traditional surveys of the organizations and laws involved;
(2) a description of organizational roles; (3) an analysis of the power
relationships; and (4) an assessment and prediction of likely organizational
behavior (Figure 2) .

Phase I analysis is similar to the traditional assessment recommended and
discussed in the literature, which has long been an important ingredient of
policy analysis. In Phase I, an analyst attempts to answer the question: Who
will participate in this conf 1 ict--and upon what statutory basis, if any?

4.1 PHASE I: SURVEY OF AUTHORITIES

Understanding the general context in which a decision will be made is
necessary to properly scope a problem prior to participation in its resolution
(Ingram et al . 1984). Many factors operate to define a resource issue. The
steps in Phase I help the analyst to identify two of these factors and to
organize them for further analysis. In the case of instream flows, as with
other resource issues, understanding begins with the identification of the
specific organizations and laws involved. The laws determine the number and
types of organizations to be involved as well as set the general boundaries
within which interaction among those organizations will occur. Thus, Phase I
analyses are conducted in two separate steps: the organizational survey and
the legal survey. In this manner, the analyst can identify the relevant
organizational participants that need to be included in the overall analysis,
and then determine the legal authority that each will bring into the decision
process.

Organizational Survey

Relevant organizational participants need to be identified for three
important reasons. First, the number and type of organizational actors must
be considered preparatory to determining the role types involved. Second, the
"mix" of organizations involved determines, in large part, the type of arena
in which interaction will occur, which in turn shapes the nature of that
interaction and gives the analyst some basis for preliminary predictions about

29

Phase I: Survey of Authorities

List the organizational entities (i.e., agencies,
interest groups, private organizations) that are
involved; then describe the legal authorities (statutory
and case law) that condition the actions of these
organizations.

Phase II: Role Analysis

Describe the roles expected to be played by each
organization that is a party to the problem.

Phase III: Power Analysis

Describe the elements that make up each organization's
base of power, and evaluate the relative power of each
entity that is party to the problem.

Phase IV: Behavior Analysis

Based on knowledge of roles and power, predict the
behavior (concerns, needs, and tactics) of each
organization and prepare a plan of action.

Figure 2. The four phases involved in
conducting legal institutional analyses.

30

outcome. Recalling the previous discussion about the two decision arenas in
which instream flow problems are typically resolved, if many organizations
that prefer to operate in the distributive arena are involved, the likelihood
exists that these organizations will take some sort of mutual or independent
action to see to it that the issue is resolved in that arena, as opposed to
the regulatory arena. Finally, identification of the organizations involved
is necessary so that this information can be tied to the legal survey, which
is the second step of Phase I.

Legal Survey

The laws involved in a particular instream flow decision represent the
"decision foundation" of the past, onto which the new decision will be grafted,
in an incremental sense. "Laws," in this context, refer not only to the
specific State or Federal statutes that set the legal boundaries for a
particular project or program, but also to administrative policies developed
therefrom, administrative requirements for implementation, applicable judicial
precedents, and the like. In instream flow and other resource issues, small
decisions are grafted onto the foundation of existing policies, as adjustments
are made for time, place, and context. At this level, incremental changes in
past policies are made as groups come together and interactively determine
each instream flow outcome. Typically, no attempt is made to recreate the
basis upon which new flows are determined and promulgated. Instream flow
protection programs are typically initiated in this manner at the State level.
That is, a general statute is passed, often with vague or indefinite goals,
which, in turn, sets the boundaries within which policies are ultimately
developed to achieve those goals.

The point is that neither laws nor policies are made once and for all
time; they are adjusted incrementally, and the sum total of these alterations
represents the legal framework that is relevant for the resolution of an
instream flow issue. By knowing the content of the legal foundation, and the
changes that have been made in the past, one is in a better position to
anticipate problems and to positively contribute to the process that shapes
the outcome. Thus, in Phase I, after identification of the organizational
participants has been completed, the analyst moves on to determine the relevant
statutes (and the policies and rules developed from those laws), both State
and Federal, that set the legal boundaries for resolution of the issue. And,
finally, an effort is made to determine the type and degree of statutory
authority that each organization has to participate in the negotiation.

The identification of the organizations and laws involved in a resource
issue is an important step in understanding that issue and participating in
its resolution; indeed, such an analysis is typically conducted (Ingram et al .
1984). In this sense, the steps in Phase I are "traditional" but important
ones. Once such a "traditional survey" has been completed, the analyst is
ready to move to the behavioral aspects of the analysis, dealing with roles.

31

4.2 PHASE II: ROLE ANALYSIS

Because of their planned nature and drive for calculable behavior and
interaction, organizations are particularly amenable to analysis using the
concept of role (Yarwood and Nimmo 1976). Roles can be thought of as guides
for understanding, characterizing, and predicting organizational behavior
(Lamb 1980). Organizations tend to play certain roles, moreover, with remark-
able consistency (Golembiewski 1976).

The concept of roles has been used in explaining the budgetary process
(Fenno 1970; Wildavsky 1974, 1975; Hrebrenar 1976). These works suggest that:
(1) roles are strongly associated with expectations of behavior attached to an
institutional position; (2) the various roles seem to fit in with one another
to form a stable pattern of mutual expectations; (3) frequent contact increases
understanding among the participants of the roles being played; and (4) the
more homogeneous the membership of a group, the more consensus it is likely to
have regarding its own organizational role (Wildavsky 1975; Hrebenar 1976).
Hrebrenar (1976) found that (contrary to his expectations) the best predictor
of budgetary decisionmaking behavior is past behavior patterns in similar
types of decisions. LIAM incorporates a view of organizational roles that is
consistent with these findings.

Because there are identifiable actors, issues, and activities that are
peculiar to the establishment and maintenance of instream flows, and that
occur within the boundaries set by statute, legal precedent, and tradition,
decisionmaking here is characterized by heavy reliance on roles, and is shaped
by the interactions that occur between organizations. These interactions,
moreover, are themselves characterized by traditional patterns that have
emerged over time and that condition the outcome (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Lamb
1980a; Olive 1981a, b; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). Thus, organizations enter a
conflict with knowledge of their own position and the positions of others,
particularly when they have interacted with these organizations in the past.
Behavior thus tends to fall into standard and recognizable types, and the
policy outcome often depends on how skillfully the collective actors can use
this knowledge in dealing with other participants (Doerksen and Lamb 1979;
Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

The role types that have been developed and included in LIAM are the
result of three processes that occur within organizations and that have been
documented in social science research. These processes were described under
the theoretical section of this chapter and include: incremental i sm, organiza-
tional process, and group psychology. First, organizations tend to make
internal decisions based on past decisionmaking efforts, and rely heavily on
the record of their own past experience to do so. Each organization, moreover,
enters the bargaining process with its own position little altered from its
past proposals or recommendations and, as negotiation progresses, these
recommendations are again adjusted incrementally as a result of compromise.
Incremental ism, then, can be viewed as shaping the "what" of organizational
behavior. Second, the ways in which organizations pursue their organizational
goals also tend to remain constant over time. Organizational processes, then,
can be said to shape the "how" of organizational behavior. Third, the group
psychology that develops within an organization also affects organizational

32

behavior and contributes to the development and persistence of organizational
roles.

Four role types are postulated to characterize behavior in natural
resource management issues: broker, arbitrator, advocate, and guardian
(Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb and Lovrich 1985). These
are represented as opposite extremes of two different behavioral dimensions.
That is, organizational behavior is predicted to occur in two distinct
dimensions, each of which results from a set of organizational preferences.
The first dimension concerns the procedural preferences that shape organiza-
tional behavior, and stems from the preferences that organizations have for
the arena in which an issue is to be decided. Thus, organizational behavior
in this dimension can be viewed as occurring along a continuum, with two
opposite role types located at each end. The two roles associated with this
preference are labeled in LIAM as "broker" and "arbitrator" (Figure 3).

Broker Role Type

Generally speaking, a broker is an organization that combines two
characteristics. First, it has some sort of physical control over natural
resource systems, allowing it to physically control the allocation of water;
and second, it possesses a highly political nature. A broker prefers solutions
that spread the benefits to be derived from a decision around so as to satisfy
as many interests as possible, or in a way that maintains its own power base.
An extreme broker prefers to make the decision itself by compromise, bargain-
ing, and coalition building. Less extreme players located along this continuum
may not actually broker the decision, but prefer a bargained solution nonethe-
less. A broker is thus in a position to support either environmental or
developmental interests. It is heavily influenced by political facts or
expressions of support from higher authorities and cost-benefit information
that demonstrates how the benefits to be derived from a proposed course of
action can be divided among the parties. Brokers tend to push for negotiated
solutions as a means to achieve results and to satisfy as many of the players
as possible. Consensus is preferred. Examples of organizations of this type
include the offices of State governors. State legislatures, some planning
divisions within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, many politically created
citizens boards and some State water allocation agencies (Beckett and Lamb
1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

Of course, not all organizations that prefer the brokered or distributive
decisionmaking arena are brokers themselves, but may be closely tied to broker
organizations or just prefer "brokered" decisions. For example, the group may
have had a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with the broker in
charge of a particular decision outcome. Or the group may simply prefer a
brokered decision in one instance because of political favors owed to it by
other players or because of the type of power that it has. Organizations do
prefer a certain type of procedure for decisionmaking, however, even if the
organization is unable to make the decision itself.

33

Distributive Politics
BROKER

state Legislature

Water

Conservancy

District

CO

c

0

Department of Game

FERC O

o

CO

o
o
Q

ARBITRATOR
Regulatory Politics

Figure 3. The location of four organizations
along the Broker-Arbitrator continuum.

34

Arbitrator Role Type

Arbitrators prefer an entirely different type of decisionmaking process.
An arbitrator usually has statutory authority to promulgate flow regimes or
the ability to legally control the allocation of water. Thus, it generally
presides over a judicial or quasi-judicial process and determines the ultimate
policy outcome itself, based on the adversarial presentation of technical or
scientific information. This information is presented by the opposing sides
of a conflict to persuade the arbitrator to accept their respective positions.
Arbitrators tend to solicit such information from all sides of a conflict, in
an effort to reach an "objective" decision. Examples of organizations of this
type include: State and Federal courts, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), some State engineers, and some permitting elements of the
Environmental Protection Agency (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb
1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

As was the case with brokers, not all organizations actually "arbitrate"
an outcome. But some organizations tend to prefer this process over the
other, and organizational behavior results from this preference. Figure 3
illustrates how these preferences might be characterized in an instream flow
conflict when preference for decision arena alone is considered. As can be
seen, four organizations are arrayed along the Broker-Arbitrator continuum.
Both a State legislature and a water conservancy district are located in the
upper half of the diagram; however, the State legislature is farther out on
the continuum, indicating a more extreme preference for a brokered decision,
perhaps because the State legislature in this instance is the decisionmaker.
The water conservancy district also prefers a brokered result, although to a
less extreme degree. Once again, perhaps this is because of its political
ties to the State legislature or its ability to influence election outcomes
within that body. In the lower half of the diagram, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission lies at the more extreme end of the continuum. Being a
classic arbitrator, FERC strongly prefers to have the decision made within its
own domain. A State department of game, however, is rarely in a position to
actually arbitrate a decision. Yet, because of its data-collection routines,
it prefers to operate in a situation where an arbitrator, such as FERC, is in
charge, and where it is likely to have the most influence.

The second behavioral dimension is also one of preference, but, in this
case, the preference is for the actual outcome, and thus is closely related to
an organization's traditional values or mission. The two roles associated
with this dimension, "advocate" and "guardian," are located at opposite ends
of the horizontal axis in Figure 4 (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb
1979; Lamb 1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986). The same element of degree comes
into play along this continuum, i.e., the farther out on the continuum an
organization is located, the more extreme is the indicated role.

Advocate Role Type

An advocate is an intensely ideological, prochange, and usually environ-
mentalist organization. It actively seeks to alter the traditional (typically
prodevelopment) ways in which National resources have been used and managed.
It may be prepared to operate and exert influence in either the distributive

35

ADVOCATE

Distributive Politics
BROKER

Goal

CO

C

Preference

GUARDIAN

c
o

O

0

Q

ARBITRATOR
Regulatory Politics

Figure 4. An LIAM role map,

36

or regulatory arena, but will urge that resources be conserved or protected
and that projects and developers be strictly regulated. An advocate is
typically quite vocal on behalf of the values it represents and is unwilling
to compromise. Usually without statutory authority to prevent by caveat what
it views as environmentally harmful projects, it instead reacts to proposals
and projects initiated by others. It tends to be well prepared to demonstrate
the "correctness" of its viewpoint through its well-developed data gathering
and analytical capabilities. It will not hesitate, however, to back up
scientific or technical facts with crusading campaigns initiated on behalf of
its values. Thus, it attempts to cultivate media and public opinion on behalf
of the environment, and typically is associated with environmental
"associations" or "clubs." Examples of advocate organizations include the
Division of Ecological Services within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
State fish and game departments, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
and environmental interest groups, as well as some consumer and health and
safety organizations (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb
1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

Guardian Role Type

At the other end of the goal continuum, guardians attempt to protect the
productivity or market utility of resources. They safeguard the traditional
ways in which natural resources have been used and managed. A guardian will
therefore resist attempts at change that might be urged by advocates or others.
Since it is usually possessed of established and influential constituencies,
whose interests it must protect, a guardian prefers political strategies to
persuade others of the correctness of its view. These political strategies
are usually "traditional" logrolling and influence-based processes. Like the
advocate, the guardian is also extremely ideological, but in this case,
ideology centers around such values as "economic progress" and "developmental
benefits." Examples of organizations of this type include the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation; U.S. Forest Service; water conservancy districts; special
districts, cities, and counties; the Division of Refuges within the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service; State departments of parks and recreation; bankers; and
various land interests (Beckett and Lamb 1976; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Lamb
1980a; Lamb and Lovrich 1986).

Role Patterns

In any instream flow conflict, a variety of organizations become involved;
each of these organizations brings with it preferences, both for the outcome
and for the arena in which that outcome is to be generated. An organization's
preference for outcome is linked to its goals or mission, whereas the
procedural preference is related to the resources it has at its disposal to
influence the outcome.

Not every organization holds these preferences to the same degree or in
the same order, however. For example, a State department of fish and game
may, in any given conflict, prefer to have the decision arbitrated, but it
will also prefer a certain type of outcome, presumably one which protects a
threatened fishery or establishes a flow regime that meets the ecological
requirements of a particular ecosystem. Its behavior, though, will be

37

dominated by the stronger preference. If it turns out to be for a particular
type of outcome, then the preference for an arbitrated solution will be
secondary. An organization exhibits behavior associated with two role types
simultaneously in each issue in which it is involved. The degree to which
each role type is exhibited may vary from issue to issue; however, one role
typically dominates.

Advocates and guardians also tend to design their behavior to accomodate
the presence of an arbitrator or broker, and will attempt to push the decision
toward resolution in whichever arena they feel will support their values
(Olive 1981a, b, 1982). Different strategies are pursued by these organiza-
tional types, depending on the issue. Advocate organizations, for example,
often develop data gathering and analytical capacities, which are most
influential in the regulatory arena, and are often highly familiar with
procedures used by arbitrators to make decisions. Arbitrators tend to rely on
them for information and the opportunity to act. Guardians are more familiar
and comfortable with political strategies and often seek to use their
constituencies to show injury from an advocate's initiatives.

LIAM allows the analyst to discern the dominant role type expected for
each organization, as well as its secondary role type, and the degree to which
organizations can be expected to exhibit both types of behavior. Each organi-
zation is evaluated in terms of all four role types; expected behavior is
calculated within each dimension; and the role type that appears to most
accurately describe an organization's behavior is the dominant role. Each
organization is located in a particular behaviorial space that is defined by
its location in both dimensions at once.

Figure 5 illustrates the relative positions of two hypothetical organiza-
tions. The circular line within a quadrant represents the midpoint in that
quadrant. Organizations located within the circle, closer to the point of
origin, are moderate role players, whereas those outside it are more extreme.
The diagonal dotted lines divide each quadrant in half, so that an analyst can
determine the dominant role type for an organization. In this example, the
State legislature is located in the upper right-hand quadrant on the left-hand
side of the dotted line in that quadrant, closest to the broker continuum.
Its dominant role type is that of broker. Thus, this particular State legisla-
ture is predicted to strongly prefer the decision to be a brokered one, and
its behavior in this regard will be extreme. It will actively seek to pull
the issue into this arena. At the same time, though, it will tend to lean
toward the type of outcome usually promoted by guardians. If it has the
opportunity to broker the decision itself — as is probable — it is likely to be
highly receptive to information supporting guardian values. The FWS-ES is
located in the lower left-hand quadrant, beyond the circle; thus, its behavior
as an advocate will be extreme. It prefers an arbitrated solution, though not
to an extreme degree.

Each of the 16 subquadrants (A - P) in Figure 6 has associated with it
different types and degrees of role playing. These 16 behavior patterns are
described in Appendix I. By examining the number, types, and relative
positions of all the players in a given conflict, an organization preparing
for involvement in an instream flow conflict can develop strategies that will

38

BROKER T

State
Legislature /

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

I I

-^ ARBITRATOR

Figure 5. The location of two typical organizations on an LIAM role map.

39

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

^ 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 6. The sixteen subquadrants (A - P) of an LIAM role map.

40

be most appropriate to the problem at hand. These strategies, moreover, will
necessarily be of a bargaining nature, since natural resources issues are
resolved in a climate of bargaining (Ingram 1972).

4.3 PHASE III: POWER ANALYSIS

In any instream flow problem, there Are inevitable and conflicting
preferences among actors with unequal levels of power and influence. Each
organization, in the process of interacting with other participants in a
bargaining situation, modifies its original objectives to achieve a mutually
acceptable decision that at least partially benefits its original goal.
Neither side, as was the case with the Cedar River problem, typically has
enough support to achieve its goals totally or by simple caveat.

Organizational power in instream flow issues is postulated to exist in
three major categories: resources, expertise, and support. In the first
category. Lamb and Doerksen have identified a number of important sources of
power, all of which relate to the actual resources an organization has to
expend in the resolution of a conflict at any given point in time. These
include: statutory authority; the ability to physically control stream flow;
designation as the implementing agency; legal ownership or management of the
land or water in question; political support; public support; money; personnel;
and the frequency and intensity of past involvement in such issues (Lamb and
Doerksen 1978). These last two elements of power — frequency and intensity of
past involvement — are indicative of the degree to which an organization is
willing to commit itself to use its resources on behalf of a particular out-
come; commitment is thus an important ingredient of power (Lamb and Doerksen
1978; Bachrach and Lawler 1981).

The second category of organizational power has to do with differentials
in organizational expertise. The resolution of instream flow issues tends to
be highly dependent on the availability of technical and scientific informa-
tion; the nature of organizational expertise in relation to the technical
issues involved, then, is also a crucial component of organizational power
(Lamb and Doerksen 1978; Rourke 1976; Clark and McCool 1985). Methodological
sophistication for data acquisition and analysis, for example, directly affects
an organization's ability to support its recommendations (Lamb and Doerksen
1978). Important considerations in this regard include: What type of informa-
tion is an organization involved in collecting and disseminating — and to what
degree? What organizational routines are currently in place that facilitate
the flow of information? Does the organization typically produce information
that is easily understood by the other participants — both in terms of method-
ologies and results? Is an organization dependent on other groups for the
information it needs — or is it in the business of supplying such information
to others? What is the reputational quality of an organizations' s expertise?
Does it tend to generate a high level of respect in its field? The answers to
these questions enable an analyst to better predict the tactics that will be
chosen by the groups involved to pursue a particular outcome, as well as the
nature of the outcome itself (Rourke 1976; Bachrach and Lawler 1981).

41

The last category of factors that influence organizational power in the
instream flow context has to do with the degree and type of clientele or
interest group support an organization has, either in terms of its general
goals or with regard to one specific issue or set of issues (Lamb and Doerksen
1978; Rourke 1976; Clarke and McCool 1985). Relevant considerations here
include: How many groups are willing and able to offer support — and to what
degree? How cohesive or organized are these groups? How aware are they of
the issues involved? How much does the general public tend to support the
kinds of goals represented by these groups? And, finally, how politically
astute do they tend to be?

The potential power inherent in these factors determines the type and
nature of strategies that will be chosen by the organizations involved, and
sets the stage for the intergroup bargaining that will occur. The tactical
choices made by the various participants, however, can in turn alter the power
relationships and lead to the selection of other tactics. That is, the inter-
play between potential bargaining power and tactical action can transform the
bargaining outcome, as the groups compete, coalesce, and mutually adjust their
various positions (Bachrach and Lawler 1981). Because of the give and take
nature of this process, bargaining outcomes on one issue can affect a party's
power with regard to another issue — and the overall settlement at one point in
time can affect future bargaining outcomes. The process of mutual adjustment,
then, has an extremely fluid quality (Rourke 1976; Bachrach and Lawler 1981).

4.4 PHASE IV: BEHAVIOR ANALYSES

As indicated in Figure 7, it is in this final phase (Phase IV) that the
information gathered in the previous steps is combined and analyzed. It is
here that the analyst examines the information as a whole, and attempts to
answer the question: What does all of this mean? Rather than looking simply
at the authority, role type, and power associated with each individual
organization, the analyst looks at the combination of statutory authorities,
role types, and power involved.

There are three general types of questions that must be answered in this
part of the analysis. The first of these has to do with the arena in which
the decision is likely to be made. In this regard, the analyst surveys the
organizations that have been previously identified and examined in the first
three phases of the analysis and attempts to determine how many of these will
prefer an arbitrated outcome rather than a brokered outcome — or vice versa.
It is important to determine the degree of these preferences as well. For
example, four organizations may exhibit a preference for a brokered decision,
and only two desire an arbitrated solution; these latter two organizations,
however, may be more successful in pushing the conflict into the regulatory
arena, if their desire to do so is extreme.

The converse, of course, may also be true. Moreover, those organizations
strongly desiring a brokered solution, made in the distributive arena, are
much more likely to exhibit behavior that attempts to force participants into
that arena. The major considerations here are: (1) the statutory environment
surrounding the conflict and (2) the authority each organization has to
participate.

42

LIAM: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

PHASE I

Factors which
build role

PHASE II

Role types

PHASE

Incrementalism
(What?)

Organizational
Process
(How?)

Group

Psychology

(Why?)

X>

Process Preference Goal Preference

Arbitrator Advocate

Broker Guardian

Decision arena

POWER

Partisan mutual
adjustment or
Bureaucratic
Politics

PHASE IV

Resources Expertise Support

Bargaining
Behavior

Figure 7. Flow chart of the theoretical concerns
addressed in each of the four phases of LIAM.

43

Key questions for the organizations identified as preferring to operate
in the distributive arena include: Is there any one organization among them
with the legal authority or political clout to broker the decision itself? Do
the organizations that prefer a brokered process have ties with one another or
with the potential broker? Have they worked together frequently in the past--
or formed coalitions among themselves to influence the outcome? This
information then must be compared to information regarding the regulatory
arena. How many organizations prefer to operate in the regulatory arena? Is
there one among them with the authority to arbitrate? Is litigation likely if
the decision is not arbitrated? Based on the answers to these and similar
questions, the analyst can develop strategies for participation in the
conf 1 ict.

A second set of questions has to do with the organizational values
associated with the conflict. Each organization has a preference for a
particular type of outcome, no matter what its preferences for arena, and the
various organizations involved will pursue their preferred outcomes with
varying degrees of intensity. It is important, then, to determine not only
number of organizations preferring guardian-type outcomes over advocate ones,
but the intensity of these preferences as well. For example, is protection of
the particular resource involved a major mission of any of the organizations?
If so, how many? What is the likelihood of two or more of these organizations
forming a coalition on behalf of these resources? How actively will they
pursue change? What type of change? Conversely, how many organizations are
there that strongly desire to see this particular project or developmental
initiative undertaken? What stakes are involved for these organizations?
What types of information and tactics will the groups likely pursue, given the
nature of their commitment and interest in the outcome? Is compromise likely?
If so, by whom? What trade-offs might develop? Answering these questions
puts an analyst in a better position to determine the most effective strategies
to pursue on behalf of a particular set of values. If it appears, for example,
that intensely committed guardians outnumber the advocates, and that the
decision will likely be a brokered one, an advocate organization can choose
from among alternative strategies those that are most likely to advance its
own position and enhance its ability not only to communicate with the guardians
involved, but to influence the outcome so that its own objectives are at least
partially achieved.

44

A final set of questions, which need to be answered prior to developing
these strategies, has to do with the types and distribution of power among the
participants. It is here that the analyst attempts to answer the questions:
Given the distribution of preferences for both process and outcome among the
participants, and differing levels of intensity with which these preferences
are likely to be pursued, how much power will these organizations have at
their disposal to do so? What types of power will come into play? What
relationships (especially in terms of power coalitions that are in agreement
regarding preferences for process or outcome) are likely to develop among
these organizations? If an organization, for example, is confronted with a
powerful coalition that is intensely interested in the conflict (whatever the
nature of that coalition), the strategies it chooses are very likely to be
quite different than if no coalition existed. That is, if the organization
expects to have any degree of successful participation at all.

The following chapter introduces the computerized model developed for
gathering information about a conflict and the organizations involved.

45

5. LIAM: THE COMPUTER MODEL

Preparing for involvement in an instream flow issue is no easy task. At
a minimum, it involves an examination of laws and institutions as well as
development of strategies for pursuing organizational goals based on that
information. Preparation of the scope and depth envisioned here may seem
overwhelming. The computerized version of LIAM has been developed to provide
a systematic, efficient, and theoretically sound method of analysis to simplify
the task.

Conducting institutional analyses using the computerized version of LIAM
begins with logging on to the computer terminal and creating a file to store
information about the instream flow issue. The User's Manual contained in
Appendix II gives complete instructions for using LIAM. There are three major
computer programs in LIAM — Query, Looky, and Mapum — each of which is discussed
briefly in the following paragraphs.

5.1 THE COMPUTER PROGRAMS

"Query" is an interactive program that runs the questionnaire that is the
information-gathering element of LIAM. The questions contained in this program
were developed based on the theoretical assumptions discussed in Chapter 3.
The questions in Query are divided into three major sets, and each of^ these
relates to one of the first three phases discussed in Chapter 4: survey of
authority, role analysis, and power analysis.

Organizations tend to develop consistent behavioral patterns, and these
behavioral patterns have been categorized in LIAM; 16 distinct role types that
are associated with organizations typically involved in instream f low conf 1 icts
have been specified (see Appendix I). The questions in Query help the analyst
identify role types for each of the organizations being analyzed. And, since
most resource decisions are ultimately made through a bargaining process, the
questionnaire also allows the analyst to examine the relative amount and types
of power each organization has at its disposal and may be willing to bring
into the bargaining process. By answering the questions contained in this
program, the analyst can approximate the legal setting and key organizations
in a particular dispute, as well as the legal authority assigned to those
participating organizations, the behavior patterns associated with each, and
the power relationships involved. The analyst then uses the other two programs
of LIAM, Looky and Mapum, to examine and analyze the conflict.

46

5.2 PRELIMINARY STEPS BEFORE RUNNING QUERY

Prior to actually running Query, the analyst must take several preliminary
steps. First, organizational participants to be included in the analyses must
be identified. The goal is to identify all organizations, both private and
public, that will actively and directly participate in the decisionmaking
process. In selecting organizations for inclusion in the analysis, the analyst
should consider those organizations that typically participate in similar
issues (e.g.. State and Federal agencies) as well as those having a direct
stake in the outcome (e.g., project developers, resource consumers). In
addition, organizations with a political stake in the issue should be included;
that is, even though an organization may not have a direct interest in one
specific outcome over another, it may have a real interest in seeing to it
that the issue is decided in a particular manner, and will become involved as
a result of that interest.

The idea is to identify and include all groups that will participate,
interact, and have some sort of influence on the outcome. Comprehensiveness
is desirable, since the overall analysis will be flawed if significant groups
are omitted. This is because groups interact in a negotiation; that is, each
group not only behaves in a certain fashion, but also responds to the behavior
of other groups as the negotiations proceed. Omitting one significant group
may lead an analyst to ignore an important set of stimuli to the intergroup
interactions. The set of groups included in the analysis should be all-
inclusive — but real i stical ly so. If too many groups are included that do not
interact or affect the ultimate outcome, the analytical effort may become too
tedious, the information collected overwhelming, and the tactics developed
therefrom vague and difficult to pursue.

Identifying organizational participants can be accomplished in a number
of ways. First, a review of the laws surrounding an issue will generally
indicate which organizations will enter the conflict, as well as the stage of
the process at which they will do so, and in what capacity. Typically, the
laws will also reveal which organizations must act — and which ones merely have
the opportunity to act. Another way to accomplish this task is through the
collective judgement of experts in the field. This technique has been success-
fully utilized by other disciplines (Linestone and Turoff 1975; Zuboy 1981).

The most informal of the "professional committee" approaches is a round-
table discussion; these discussions are typically facilitated by a moderator,
and although consensus may be difficult to achieve, it is recommended. Scheele
(1975) suggests that at least three types of individuals be represented on the
committee. Although Scheele was referring to a situation in which diverse
groups with differing goals are selected for the purpose of developing habitat
suitability criteria, the same principles seem applicable here.

The first of these types of individuals are those directly involved in
the conflict and who have a "stake" in the outcome. The stake may be of a
professional or an ideological nature. For example, the supervisor in charge
of an organization's technical or field studies may have a professional
interest in seeing to it that the group's recommendations are accepted — or at
least considered — while another person within the organization may have an

47

intense ideological interest in seeing to it that a particular objective is
obtained. The second type of individual is .lie "expert." These are indivi-
duals (from within or outside the organization conduc ing the analysis) who
specialize in the technical or legal aspects of the ty le of issue or who have
had experience in the issue area. Experts, in Scheele's sense, are typically
further removed from the operational aspects of the organization and can bring
a measure of objectivity to the process. The third type of individual is the
"facilitator." These are people who have keen organizational skills and who
are good at moving the discussion forward in a smooth and timely manner. They
are also able to clarify facts and synthesize information for the group.

In selecting a committee such as this, it is important to remember that
the idea is to include diverse points of view. It is also important that the
individuals chosen for membership on committees of this type are either
interested enough to take the job seriously — or can be provided with enough
incentive to do so (for example, monetary awards or certificates of apprecia-
tion for participating). Once the panel is selected, the moderator leads it
through a series of brainstorming sessions in which: (1) criteria are generated
for including organizations in the analysis; (2) all participants are
encouraged to identify the organizations each feels are relevant; (3) a list
of potential organizations is drawn up by the committee; and (4) the list is
discussed and a final number is chosen by the members of the committee. All
organizations obtaining an agreed-upon (e.g., 51% to 100% agreement) amount of
consensus are included in the LIAM analysis.

A more formal approach, which does not have the disadvantages of
committees, is the Delphi method. Delphi was first employed in military
planning efforts, and has since been used in such diverse areas as health
care, the environment, local planning, transportation, and fisheries manage-
ment (Zuboy 1981). The most common Delphi exercise is in questionnaire format.
In this case, a questionnaire is developed that details the specifics of the
conflict and outlines criteria for selecting organizations. This form is then
sent to a set of experts (or experienced individuals) who are asked to identify
all of the organizations that meet those criteria. The results of the question-
naires are combined to produce two short lists. One of these includes all of
the organizations identified by an agreed upon majority of the respondents as
directly relevant to the issue, while the second includes all those upon which
majority opinion could not be reached. The respondents then review this
second list and identify those groups that they strongly feel should be
included, along with reasons for doing so. The results of the second round are
sent back to the respondents, and this process is repeated until the desired
amount of consensus is achieved (Linstone and Turoff 1975; Zuboy 1981).

Once this has been accomplished, each organization identified should be
analyzed by at least three different individuals. These can be individuals
either internal or external to the organization conducting the analysis. Each
of these individuals — referred to within LIAM as respondents--then answers the
questions presented in Query in relation to that organization. It is crucial
to have each organization analyzed by three different individuals to obtain an
"averaged" set of responses. This is desirable for two reasons. First,
individual perceptions of the same organization differ from one another, and
while neither perception may be more "right" in an absolute sense than the

48

other, some method for reconciling the different perspectives must be incorpo-
rated into the analysis. Second, some people are naturally inclined to lean
in one direction or the other, in terms of degree, when responding to questions
of the type presented in Query. For example, a series of questions or
descriptive statements is presented, and the respondent is asked to indicate
the degree to which each statement can be applied to the organization he is
analyzing. The following question is typical of those presented in Query:

This organization typically focuses on the need to
preserve the natural environment in conflicts such as
this:

(A) Almost always

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E) Almost never

The respondent selects the response that he thinks most accurately describes
that organization. The middle responses are degrees of agreement that are
left to the respondent's imagination, since confusion may result if no response
choice absolutely "fits" the description of behavior the respondent has in
mind. Some individuals tend, however, to systematically select responses that
exaggerate the degree to which an organization exhibits the described behavior
or has the indicated attribute, while others tend to consistently under-
estimate. LIAM allows the analyst to combine the three sets of responses for
each of the questions for an organization. The individuals responses are
'assigned numerical scores within LIAM and the computer produces an average
score for each question. The three response sets for each organization are
combined by the analyst (using Mapum) after all of the relevant organizations
have been identified and examined using Query.

Individuals should be chosen to analyze the organization(s) with which
they are most familiar. Care should be taken, however, that the individual
does not have such a close working relationship with the organization he is
analyzing that some element of objectivity is not possible, and that he is not
antagonistic towards the group in question.

Individual respondents can also be assigned organizations to examine on a
self-selecting basis, where each chooses the organization he feels best able
to analyze. One respondent, moreover, can analyze several of the organizations
identified as relevant to the conflict, provided he has dealt with those
organizations in the past, and is familiar with the different aspects of
organizational authority, roles, and power that are the subject of Query.

If a subunit of an organization typically handles one type of instream
flow conflict — such as dams or reclamation projects — that group of individuals
should be involved in the analysis whenever that type of conflict arises.
This is because these people are likely to be most familiar with the issues
and organizations involved. (They are also in a better position to be able to
identify those organizations which, though not yet directly involved in the

49

conflict, are likely to participate at some future point in time, as the
negotiations progress or the conflict expands.)

The choice of individual respondents is as important as the identification
of relevant organizations because the questions contained in Query are designed
to tap the knowledge individuals have about issues and organizations based on
the past experiences.

Once the organizations have been identified and three different
respondents assigned to each, the respondents individually analyze the organi-
zation(s) assigned to them using the questionnaire contained in Query.

5.3 PHASE I: QUERY: SURVEY OF AUTHORITIES

Query begins by asking the respondent several preliminary questions
including: the analyst's identity, a list of the various organizations to be
included in the overall analysis, and the time and date of the analysis. The
analyst is then asked to identify the specific organization being analyzed and
to describe two major aspects of that organization's behavior: (1) the legal
authority that organization has to participate in the conflict; and (2) the
major issues and goals involved, from that organization's point of view. The
answers to these serve two purposes in LIAM. First, having to describe a
conflict in this manner helps a respondent to clarify facts and ideas regarding
the issues, and to begin to look at the conflict from a different perspective.
Second, as this is done for each of the organizations involved, the respondents
(together) begin to build a foundation of legal information that will prove
useful in later analyses and in developing an overall understanding of the
conf 1 ict .

It is here, also, that the respondent is asked to indicate the type and
degree of statutory authority the organization has to participate in the
conflict. Although the information for these questions may be generated prior
to running Query (ideally, it should be gathered beforehand), each respondent
needs to complete this answer for the organization he is analyzing. Thus, a
survey needs to be made of the State and Federal laws surrounding the conflict.
This may be done by one of the respondents, all of them individually, or at a
group meeting prior to running Query.

Since each organization will have its own view of the issues involved, it
is important to discover and describe these in this section. This is because
the respondents need to begin to perceive the conflict from other points of
view, so that relevant and persuasive communication strategies can be develop-
ed. Once these facets of the problem are described, the traditional section
of the model is complete and the program automatically moves on to the
behavioral elements of LIAM. The first of these helps the respondent determine
the role types that will come into play. The computer stores the answers
given in this first section, however, so the analyst can utilize the informa-
tion in developing strategies for participating in the bargaining that will
ensue. In addition, the responses taken in this first section, especially
those relating to the legal context of the issue, may be useful in answering
questions contained in other sections of Query. For example, some questions

50

ask. the respondent to indicate the degree of authority (as an element of
power) an organization will bring into the conflict. Since the analyst has
already determined this, the answer will likely come readily to mind; if it
does not, the information is available for review using Looky.

5.4 PHASE II: QUERY: ROLE ANALYSIS

The second set of questions in Query permits the respondent to describe
the behavior patterns that are expected to emerge for each organization
involved. A series of behavioral statements is presented, and the respondent
is asked to identify the degree to which that statement applies to the organi-
zation. These statements were developed from the four role types typically
associated with organizations involved in resource issues (broker, arbitrator,
advocate, and guardian). Each question attempts to measure the degree to
which organizations are expected to exhibit each type of behavior. The answers
are coded on a scale from one to five. The most extreme response choice is
coded five, while the least extreme is coded one. No response choice was
coded zero, however, since it is reasonable to assume that, by virtue of
participating in the conflict, each organization will interact with the other
organizations involved, at least minimally. Thus, some type of behavior
pattern is expected for each. If no individual can be found having enough
experience with an organization to comfortably attempt analysis, individuals
outside the group conducting the analysis can be found to provide the necessary
information.

Each of the four role types has several "behaviors" associated with it,
which together make up a distinct pattern. These expected behaviors were used
as the basis for developing the question set for each of these roles. The
role type "arbitrator" has been identified as having four behaviors:
(1) preference for objectivity in decisionmaking; (2) whether or not it will
preside over a formal decision process (as does a court); (3) the degree to
which it is expected to solicit information from all sides to a dispute; and
(4) whether or not it tends to have the authority to establish rules or promul-
gate regulations in conflicts of the type being analyzed, or to determine the
ultimate decision outcome. The broker has a different set of behaviors:

(1) the degree to which it promotes a negotiated or consensual outcome;

(2) whether or not it has physical or legal control of the resources involved;

(3) the degree to which it prefers to consider or use economic, constituency,
or political information in resource decisionmaking; and (4) whether or not it
will attempt to see to it that all parties to a dispute are somewhat satisfied
with the outcome. All of these elements of behavior, it should be noted, are
related to preferences foi — and behavior associated with those preferences — one
decision arena or the other (regulatory/distributive). Thus, these behavioral
patterns stem from organizational preferences for procedure, rather than
specific outcome.

The other two roles, advocate and guardian, relate to goal preferences.
An advocate organization prefers environmentally protective outcomes, and its
behavior reflects this preference. Thus, the questions in Query attempt to
measure the degree to which an advocate is expected to: (1) attempt to change
traditional patterns of resource use and management, which considers economic

51

and political factors to be more salient than environmental ones; (2) show a
preference for and use of scientific and technical information over economic
or political facts; (3) promote environmental values; (4) demonstrate an
ideological adherence to the mission of "environmental protection;" and
(5) react to projects and proposals initiated by others. A guardian exhibits
behaviors that are the mirror image of those of an advocate, and the questions
in Query measure the degree to which this is the case.

All of these role-related questions are presented to the respondent in
random order by the Query program. This is done so that the respondent will
be unable to anticipate questions and will have to think out the answer to
each question prior to responding. Furthermore, each type of question has
been phrased in three different ways; the computer randomly selects one of the
three to measure each of the particular behavioral components. Thus, no two
questionnaires will ever be exactly alike. The point is to force the respon-
dent to carefully analyze each organization for each resource conflict, not
just respond in a rote manner, based on familiarity with the questionnaire.

The computer retains the answer for each role question, assigns it a
numerical score, and combines the scores given for all of the questions
associated with each role type. In this manner, a score for each role type is
generated for each organization examined. The combined score for each role
type is called an index, and these indices determine the specific behavioral
patterns that organization is expected to exhibit, along with the degree to
which it is expected to do so. This is done by separating the index scores
(one for each role type) into two sets; one set of indices represents behaviors
associated with preference for procedure (broker/arbitrator), while the other
represents behaviors associated with preference for outcome (advocate/
guardian) .

For each set of indices, the smaller index score is subtracted from the
larger one along each of the two dimensions (broker from arbitrator, or vice
versa; advocate from guardian, or vice versa). This is done to get closer to
the element of degree. Since "ideal" role types are extremely rare — if not
nonexistent — an organization that scores high on all measures of the broker
role type is likely to also exhibit behavior commonly associated with arbi-
trators, even if only to a minimal degree. Since an arbitrator is located at
the opposite end of the broker-arbitrator continuum, however, this score must
be subtracted from the score obtained on the broker index in order to determine
just how extreme that organization's brokering behavior is apt to be. The
difference between the two indices indicates that organization's location on a
particular behavioral continuum — or, the degree to which that organization can
be expected to exhibit that type of behavior. For example, if an organization
scores 4, 3, 4, and 4 on the questions related to broker, these numbers are
added by the computer and an average "broker" score is calculated by dividing
that sum (15) by four. Thus the broker score for this organization is 3.7.
Further, if the same organization receives 2.0 as its arbitrator score
(calculated in the same fashion), then the computer subtracts 2.0 from 3.7, to
arrive at a final broker index of 1.7.

The same process is used to locate that organization on the second con-
tinuum, associated with goal preferences. If the hypothetical organization in

52

the above example receives an advocate score of 1.0 and a guardian score of
3.0, the final score on this continuum would be 2.0, in the direction of
guardian. Both indices, then, are used to define an organization's expected
behavior pattern. An organization with these scores can be said to be 1.7
points toward the broker role type, and 2.0 points toward the guardian role
type--or to be a "Broker-Guardian." The larger score (between the one behav-
ioral dimension and the other), moreover, is that organization's dominant role
type; in the above example, the dominant role type is that of broker. Figure 8
illustrates the location of this hypothetical organization on a "behavioral
map." This map gives an analyst, once all the relevant organizations have
been located on it, a pictorial representation of the distribution of the four
role types for a given conflict.

As previously mentioned, roles are not the only important predictive
factors within LIAM. Power must also be examined.

5.5 PHASE III: QUERY: POWER ANALYSIS

As was the case with roles, a series of power statements is presented,
and the respondent is asked to indicate the degree to which the statement is
applicable to that organization. These responses are also scored and stored
in the computer's memory, in the same manner as the scores obtained for the
various roles. The questions relating to power were created to tap all three
elements of power that an organization may bring to bear in a conflict:
resources, information or expertise, and support (Rourke 1976; Benveniste
1977; Clarke and McCool 1985).

The first type of question asks the respondent to identify the degree to
which an organization has at its disposal such typical organizational resources
as: statutory authority to act or decide, physical or managerial control over
resource systems, public support, personnel, fiscal resources, political
support, and frequency and intensity of involvement in such issues.

The first six factors give one an idea of the potential power an organiza-
tion may have to influence the outcome, while the latter two indicate the
likelihood that it will go all out to do so. The more often an organization
has been involved in similar conflicts, the more experience it will have
behind it; and the more intensely it feels about the outcome, the more
aggressive will be its behavior in that regard (Rourke 1976; Clarke and McCool
1985).

The second category of power-related questions concerns the type and
quality of expertise with which an organization is typically identified;
whether or not the organization is dependent on other groups for relevant
scientific and technical information; as well as the respect the professionals
within that group--and the group as a whole — have earned for themselves in a
scientific field or academic discipline. Other factors measured here include
the clarity of methods used and the degree to which the results obtained using
those methods are understood by other participants and decisionmakers. Given
the highly technical nature of instream flow issues, an organization in the
business of generating information relevant to a particular issue or type of

53

ADVOCATE

Distributive Politics
BROKER

1.7

-I H

f (Brol<er-Guardian)

H h

2.0

1

ARBITRATOR
Regulatory Politics

GUARDIAN

Figure 8. The location of a Broker-Guardian on an LIAM role map.

54

issue may often find itself in an influential position because of that fact.
The power to persuade is directly related to the the ability to convince
others--and in resource issues, this necessarily involves data collection,
interpretation, and dissemination. The more capable an organization is in
this regard, the more likely it will be able to persuade others (Benveniste
1977).

The third category of power-related questions concerns the amount and
type of clientele or interest group support (referred to within LIAM as
"constituency support") an organization has behind it in general, but
especially with regard to the conflict at issue. This part of the question-
naire is separated from the previous two, and begins by asking the user to
identify the support groups associated with the organization. These can be
groups that are already tangential ly involved in the conflict and that may
support the organization because of similarity of goals, or groups may become
involved at some point in the future on behalf of the organization and its
goals. The respondent should attempt to identify and list both types of
support groups that are associated with the organization he is analyzing. If
none are identified, the computer assumes a zero score for power in this
category.

Once again, a series of questions or statements is presented to the
respondent, asking the degree to which each applies to the relationship between
the organization being analyzed and its support groups. These questions
concern the type and number of support groups; the degree of involvement these
groups typically have in issues such as this, in terms of both frequency and
intensity of that involvement; group cohesiveness and organization; the level
of public support the groups have or are likely to be able to generate; and
the amount of political skill and prestige the groups generally have (Rourke
1976; Clarke and McCool 1985; Smith 198B). As each question is presented to
the respondent, he selects from the response choices offered the one that best
describes these groups in relation to the organization being analyzed. As was
the case with roles, an index score is constructed for each type of power
associated with an organization (resources, expertise, and constituency
support) .

This process is repeated three times for each organization involved in
the dispute. Once this has been accomplished, the analyst has a complete file
on the conflict that contains all the necessary information to analyze the
conflict using Mapum. Prior to this, however, a user should examine the
information using the second major program, Looky.

5 . 6 LOOKY

"Looky" allows the analyst to "look" at the responses recorded in Query
prior to analysis — for purposes of review, rearrangement, or revision. A
number of options exist in this program.

First, the list of organizations examined and the list of individual
respondents who answered the questions can be reviewed. This should be done
to ensure that each organization identified as important is contained in the
file and that each was examined (using Query) the requisite three times.

55

Second, answers can be altered as new information becomes available,
factual circumstances change, or new organizations enter the conflict. Looky
offers the respondent the option of changing the answer previously given, for
example, just in case erroneous information was included for an organization.
If other organizations become involved in the issue, the analyst can simply
run Query on these groups, and the new information will be automatically added
to the file.

Finally, an analyst may examine the index scores calculated for a given
organization, as opposed to answers given for particular questions although
the latter can also be accomplished by Looky. Indices are reported in the
program for all role types (broker, arbitrator, advocate, guardian), as well
as for the three power components (resources, expertise, constituency support).
All indices are calculated on a scale from one to five. The less an organiza-
tion is identified with a particular role type or has of a particular power
component, the smaller the index score reported for that element. If the
respondent desires, he can calculate (by hand) the dominant role type, as well
as the degree of behavior, for any or all of the organizations. The index-
reporting option is provided so that scores that seem unreasonable or data
gaps can be identified and examined. Once it is determined that the informa-
tion is complete and accurate, the analyst may go on to "Mapum," which contains
the analytical part of the model.

5.7 MAPUM

Six types of information are produced by Mapum. First, there is a
numerical score (index) for each of the four role types and the three types of
power.

Second, these scores are used by the computer to plot the location of the
organizations on a "role map" (Figure 8). Each organization is assigned a
location on the two behavioral continuua discussed earlier. The resulting map
gives the analyst a pictorial representation of the distribution of organiza-
tions among the four major role types. This information can be used by the
analyst to develop strategies for participating effectively in the conflict.

Figure 9 is an example of a role map containing various hypothetical
organizations, which can be interpreted as follows. The arcs dividing the
four major quadrants have been calculated as a function of the average distance
from the point of origin of the organizations located in that quadrant. That
is, for all organizations located in a particular quadrant, the numerical
distance for each organization from the point of origin (or zero) is calculat-
ed; these scores are then added and averaged. The mid-point arc is then drawn
in that quadrant as a function of the averaged score. This is done so that
the intensity of each organization's expected behavior is reflected as a
relative function of the other organizations in that quadrant. Six organiza-
tions appear in the upper left-hand quadrant. Two of these are located very
close to the point of origin (in subquadrants A and B); relative to the other
organizations appearing in this quadrant, these two groups can be expected to
be moderate players. The most extreme players are located in subquadrants I
and M, which are also the subquadrants in which the most p'ayers appear.

56

Thus, just by examining the distribution of players on the map, one can begin
to develop a sense of the degree of polarization that is likely to evolve in
this case, especially since the polarization will be in terms of preferences
for outcome. Advocates and guardians are both, after all, driven by ideolog-
ical values that are opposite. The further out on the continuum an
organization is located, in either direction, the more extreme the behavior is
likely to be. The other most intense player is located in subquadrant J;
thus, it appears a broker will try to take charge. This particular broker
seems to lean slightly toward the advocate organizations in terms of goal
preferences.

The third type of information generated by Mapum has to do with the
predicted roles associated with each organization. For each organization that
appears on the role map, a behavioral description is given according to the
subquadrant into which it falls. In the example above, the program would
provide the descriptions of expected behavioral patterns, taken from those
that appear in Appendix I and associated with a particular subquadrant. For
example, for an organization appearing in subquadrant A, the following would
be reported:

A. MODERATE ADVOCATE-BROKER: Is protective of environmental and non-
economic values and will join forces with others to resist proposals
or projects that threaten those values. Will cooperate in efforts
to change the ways in which resources have been used and managed in
the past, and will contribute to crusading efforts initiated by
others on behalf of the environment. Will use scientific and tech-
nical data to support its position. Also prefers a negotiated
outcome, in which decisions are a result of bargaining among players.
Thus, it will not resist efforts to keep or push the conflict into
the distributive arena. Will be somewhat open to compromise.

To fully understand a resource conflict, the analyst would examine all of the
behavioral descriptions reported, as well as the distribution of power among
the organizations .

Fourth, are the numerical scores used to place the quadrant arcs on the
role map. These arcs (see Figure 9) serve to differentiate among role
intensities within the same quadrant. Intensity of role is a relative concept
within LIAM, rather than an absolute one, and depends on the location of the
players in the four quadrants vis-a-vis each other and the point of origin on
the map. If only one organization falls within a quadrant, for example, the
arc is drawn in an absolute sense, and is placed exactly in the middle of the
quadrant by the computer. This information is reported primarily for those
who are interested in calculating the arc locations by hand, for purposes of
comparison with the computer's output; these numbers also allow the analyst to
get a better sense of the manner in which the arcs are calculated and drawn on
the behavioral map. For example, in Figure 9, seven organizations appear in
the lower right hand quadrant. The arc for that quadrant was calculated as a
numerical function of the distance of each of the seven organizations from the
center of the diagram. The seven distances were added, and the sum divided by
seven. The arc was plotted at that point by the computer. Three of these

57

BROKER

4 T

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

^ ^ ARBITRATOR

Figure 9. The location and distribution of many
typical organizations on an LIAM role map.

58

organizations are located on or within the arc — and are expected to be moderate
players. The behavior of the other four groups will be extreme, relative to
the other three.

All of this information and output from Mapum is then utilized to develop
an understanding of the conflict, and to develop strategies for participation
in its resolution. This is accomplished in the final phase of LIAM.

Fifth, a graph (Figure 10) of the powers of each organization is provided,
for all three categories. Three-section power columns, each section repre-
senting one of the major types of power examined within LIAM, are created for
each organization. Each column is divided into three sections, and each
section represents one of the elements of power previously discussed. The
sections themselves are drawn as a function of the power indices created by
the analysts for each organization, and reported (as a numerical figure) in
Mapum. These columns also give the analyst a pictorial representation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the organizations examined, and the distribution
of power among them. For example, group 2 in Figure 10 is the most powerful
of the three organizations here, and the resource power it appears to have is
its greatest source of strength.

Sixth, is the "perspective plot." This plot (Figure 11) indicates the
positions of all the other players from the viewpoint of and relative to
whatever organization the user chooses to select. Generally, the point of
view of interest is that of the organization conducting the analysis; however,
perspective plots can be drawn from the point of view of whatever organization
the analyst selects. This plot gives the analyst an idea of the distance of
the other organizations from his own group's perspective (vertical axis) as
well as the power differences involved (horizonal axis). The location of the
organizations along the vertical axis is determined as a function of the
distance between the various organizations on the LIAM role map, and reflects
the role differences between them. The location of the organizations along
the horizontal axis reflects the power differences among these groups. This
plot sheds a somewhat different light on the conflict than does the role map,
however, since it indicates the relative positions of the other organizations
from one particular organizational point of view. For example, in Figure 11,
while all three groups appear powerful vis-a-vis one another, groups 2 and 3
are located quite a distance from group 1 — yet close to one another. Perhaps
these groups, if they combined resources, may be able to push the conflict in
a direction to which group 1 would be strongly opposed. At any rate, it is a
potential development that group 1 might want to examine further, and to
consider when developing strategies.

59

K'. '■'■'. '.'.'.'.'n

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

tkuIkLkkkil

Legend
Resource power

Information power

^$$::^^ - Constituency support

Figure 10. An example of three-sectioned
power columns provided to users of LIAM.

60

ROLE
DIFFERENCES

Group 1 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

Group 2

Group 3

CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

POWER

Figure 11. An example of a perspective plot provided
to users of LIAM (see text for explanation).

61

6. PHASE IV: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

It should be clear at this point that behavioral analysis and strategy
development are the elements of LIAM that depend most heavily on the experience
and sensitivity of the user. No magic formula exists that will provide
clear-cut answers to the question: What now? The answer, if there is one, is
simply: it depends. There are some concrete steps one can take, however,
towards strategy development. First, a task group must be formed to analyze
the results of LIAM and select the most appropriate strategies.

6.1 FORMING A TASK GROUP

A subset of the respondents who previously participated in the LIAM
process should be selected for the task of developing participatory strategies.
This is because these individuals will be familiar with the model and, by
virtue of having analyzed one or more organizations themselves, will be aware
of the type of results obtained. These individuals should be from the
organization sponsoring the analyses, since the strategies they develop will
be on behalf of that organization. Members of that organization are also more
likely to have the necessary amount of interest in the final stage of LIAM to
motivate them to pursue the assignment with energy.

This subgroup should be large enough so that more than one viewpoint is
considered, but not so large that management of the group's activities becomes
impossible. Three individuals of the types suggested by Scheele (1975) are
recommended, so that a balance can be struck between intensity, objectivity,
and organization. A moderator is also recommended to facilitate the proceed-
ings and record the outcome.

In a series of meetings, this group brainstorms together, led by the
moderator and informed by the results of LIAM, to identify a list of possible
strategies and tactics. The items on this list could then either be voted
upon within the subgroup itself — roundtable fashion — or distributed to all
members of the organization or the original analytical group using the Delphi
technique. A number of factors must be considered by the group, however,
prior to making final decisions. Each of these is treated separately in the
following paragraphs.

6.2 CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE

Gifford (1985) has identified three negotiation strategies that relate to
the context in which a conflict occurs: competitive, cooperative, and
integrative. Understanding the context in which one has to negotiate is

62

crucial to selecting appropriate negotiation strategies (Ingram et al . 1984;
Harter and Eads 1985).

The competitive strategy is the one most frequently written about in the
literature on negotiation (Nirenberg 1977; Cohen 1980; Gifford 1985). This
approach assumes a zero-sum game in which one party's gain is necessarily
another's loss. It also assumes that the resources at stake are limited and
that all parties value the same elements of the disputed resources. This
approach is an adversarial one, in which the tactics are designed to maximize
one's own gain by convincing the other participants to settle for less. These
tactics include: making a high initital demand, partial and reluctant dis-
closure of information, few and small concessions, inflexibility, the use of
arguments and threats, and the taking of strong positional stands. There is a
fear of image or positional loss, and the concessions of the other side are
often taken as a sign of weakness (Menkel-Meadows 1984; Gifford 1985).

The cooperative strategy emphasizes compromise as a legitimate means to a
fair and equitable result — even when the parties are deciding how to divide a
limited resource. The idea is to build and maintain organizational relation-
ships based on trust. Thus, a negotiator using this approach makes a fair
opening bid, values concessions, initiates concessions to create the obligation
to reciprocate, expects reciprocity, is accommodating of the needs of the
other parties, and attempts to maintain or even enhance the interorganiza-
tional/interpersonal relationships involved (Lowenthal 1982; Gifford 1985).

While both the cooperative and competitive strategies focus on the
opposing positions involved, and each tries to obtain as many concessions as
possible from the other side, an attempt is made with the third approach to
reconcile the parties' interests. The integrative strategy is most successful
where the parties' interests are not directly opposed, and where the issues at
stake are numerous and diverse. Here, the negotiators seek to: identify
complementary interests, invent solutions, promote positive-sum results in
which one party's gain is not necessarily another's loss, separate the people
from the problem, focus on underlying interests and needs — not positions,
develop objective standards by which to judge options, and exchange information
freely (Gifford 1985).

Several factors should be considered prior to selecting the optimal
negotiation strategy for a particular conflict. The most important of these
is the negotiating style of the other parties. This is because the competitive
strategy can be used to exploit organizations using a noncompetitive approach.
If a negotiation process is dominated by an organization using the competitive
strategy, the other organizations may be forced to adopt this strategy
themselves — or risk exploitation. Two key elements in making this deter-
mination are strategies adopted by the other organizations in the past and the
negotiation styles exhibited at the beginning of the negotiation process. An
organization that generally or initially adopts the competitive approach is
likely to continue to do so, unless it can be convinced otherwise (Gifford
1985).

The second factor is organizational power: How powerful a player is a
particular organization likely to be? An extremely powerful organization can

63

use the competitive strategy with minimal risk to itself. Threats, for
example, work better — and lead to more concessions from the other side--when
made by powerful players. Noncompetitive strategies, of course, are best for
low-power players. Less powerful organizations have three options in this
situation: increase their own power, decrease the power on the other side, or
convince powerful competitive organizations to adopt a noncompetitive approach
(Gifford 1985). When an organization is confronted with an extremely powerful
opponent, it may have no choice but to play a competitive game.

A third factor is dead! ines--real or artificial. When an organization is
under the pressure of a deadline, the competitive strategy should be avoided.
This is because competitive negotiations are the most likely to break down.
If an agreement is mandated by law, cooperation is most likely to come from
those organizations standing to lose the most if an impasse occurs. Indeed,
the threat of litigation often provides a powerful incentive for compromise
(Clyde 1985). Delay tactics, then, may convince even powerful, normally
competitive organizations to consider an alternative approach (Gifford 1985).

Finally, if an organization is interested in maintaining trusting and
long-term relationships with the other parties, a noncompetitive approach is
best (Gifford 1985). Since many of the organizations are repeat players in
the resolution of instream flow issues, interorganizational relationships are
highly val ued.

Once a competitive strategy has been ruled out, a choice must be made
between the two noncompetitive approaches. In general, the cooperative
approach is most suitable in a zero-sum ganie, in which a limited amount of
resources are to be divided among the players. Conversely, if the conflict
is — or can be converted into — a positive-sum game, the integrative approach is
best. In positive sum games, the gain of one party does not necessarily have
to result in losses for the other side. The potential exists for all sides to
a conflict to benefit. Further, the more issues there are, and the more
diverse, the greater the potential for identifying trade-offs, a crucial
ingredient of the integrative approach. Last, the greater the need for a
timely resolution of the conflict, the more appropriate the cooperative
approach — rather than the integrative one. This is because, of the three
approaches examined here, the integrative is the most time-consuming (Gifford
1985).

In determining the most appropriate approach to a particular negotiation,
the output from the computerized version of LIAM is worth examining closely.
First, the role map provides an analyst with a pictorial representation of the
organizations participating in the conflict as they are distributed among the
16 subquadrants on the map. The analyst is also provided with the numerical
scores — indices — for each organization analyzed, for each of the four major
role types. Indices for each of the three power variables — resources,
expertise, and support — are also provided, along with a pictorial representa-
tion of these scores in the form of power columns for each organization.
Finally, the analyst is provided with a description of the behavior that is
predicted for each of the organizations analyzed, based on its location on the
role map (see Appendix I for all of these descriptions). The role map, more-
over, can be directly related to one of the three strategies outlined above.

64

Figures 12 and 13 illustrate two different role maps that are similar in
one major aspect: each depicts a conflict with few — yet highly polarized —
players. All organizations in these examples are extreme in their respective
preferences. In this situation — or one like it — an analyst should examine the
power of the other player carefully, as well as the behavioral description
associated with the subquadrant in which the opponent is located: Powerful
players are advantaged in a highly competitive negotiation, and past behavior
is frequently a good indication of what is to come. If the other organization
is extremely ideological in terms of the type of outcome it seeks to promote,
compromise may be difficult, especially when the issues — as may be the case
with so few players — are major and limited. Two other facets of the conflict
may also be important: the presence/absence of deadlines and the desire of
both parties to maintain or enhance their working relationship. An extremely
ideological, powerful organization that frequently engages in competitive
bargaining can make a powerful opponent, especially in the absence of an
urgent need to reach an agreement. An organization preparing to enter a
highly competitive negotiation such as this needs to cover a number of bases.
This includes developing a set of initial (and high) demands, from which it
will be possible to retreat incrementally, as well as a bottomline position
beyond which further concessions cannot be made. "Throw-away" items need to
be identified — points that can be conceded easily, without damaging important
interests. Timely concessions may facilitate reciprocity from the other
parties, provided not too much is offered too soon. One can typically expect
arguments or threats from the other side, and should be prepared to identify
and call the bluffs from the other side.

It may be preferable, however, to encourage more cooperation. For
example, it may be helpful to emphasize the importance of a fair and equitable
result, or the need to develop and maintain trusting interorganizational
relationships (Eavey and Miller 1984; Gifford 1985). One can also identify
the most likely and powerful competitive players, and seek to build a coalition
among the other organizations to balance the distribution of power. Coopera-
tion is more likely among relatively equal players.

When the conflict is essentially bipolar, as is the case in Figures 12
and 13, and it is difficult to anticipate the outcome, it may be possible to
use the "uncertainty" element to persuade the other side to cooperate, rather
than risk losing altogether (Hoffman 1958; Mulford and Rogers 1982). Players
adopting this tactic, however, need to preserve the perception that a wider,
more costly conflict is possible (Hoffman 1968). Another highly persuasive
tactic in a bipolar conflict is one of "irreversible commitment." In this
case, an organization makes a statement of absolute commitment to a particular
policy outcome in such a way that it is clearly understood: either the desired
outcome is achieved or all parties lose — through the time and expense of
litigation, for example, or from an expansion of the conflict. The threat must
be credible, of course, for this tactic to work. The organization extending
it must be willing to follow through, or be able to convince the others that
it will do so. Ideological extremists and/or very powerful players are most
likely to adopt this tactic. It is more likely to work, however, when the
decisionmaker is not actively involved in resolving the dispute, or when there
is no decisionmaker. In this latter case, agreement among the parties may be
mandated by statute.

65

BROKER

ADVOCATE

ARBITRATOR

Figure 12. Likely scenario for competitive negotiations: a first cut.

66

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

< 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 13. Likely scenario in competitive negotiations: a second cut.

67

Figures 14 and 15 illustrate two configurations of organizations likely
to engage in cooperative bargaining. In both cases, agreement on process
seems certain, and all players are located in moderate positions with respect
to the goals preferred by each.

In Figure 14 the organizations are all located in the upper half of the
diagram, indicating a preference for operating in the distributive arena. The
essence of distributive policy is the distribution of policy benefits accruing
from a policy decision; conflicts typically are resolved in face-to-face
negotiations; and compromise between initial positions generally results
(Ripley and Franklin 1984). This is especially true, of course, if the groups
are ideologically connected in some way (Axelrod 1970; Browne 1973). Since
the basis for making a distributive decision differs dramatically from that
used in the regulatory arena, however, the analyst should further investigate
the types of power each organization has at its disposal. For example, public
and constituency support are frequently valued more than data when a decision
is to be brokered (Beckett and Lamb 1975; Lamb and Doerksen 1979). Interest
groups also play an important role in brokered decisions (Rourke 1976; Smith
1985). And finally, an analyst facing this situation must consider the number
and types of issues involved, the need for a timely resolution of the conflict,
and the ideological preferences of the organizations involved. The more
numerous and diverse the issues, and the greater the need for immediate
resolution, the more appropriate will be the cooperative strategy. Further-
more, organizations that are predicted to exhibit a moderate preference for a
particular set of goals are more likely to offer the necessary concessions to
make a cooperative negotiation successful .

In Figure 15, the decision is likely to be arbitrated. In the regulatory
arena, information is presented by all parties to a conflict, and the arbitra-
tor objectively selects the proposal that appears to offer the "best" solution
to the problem (Beckett and Lamb 1975; Doerksen and Lamb 1979; Ripley and
Franklin 1984). Data carries more weight here than do the political facts
preferred in distributive arenas. Thus, the analyst should examine the power
differentials among the organizations. Resource power is reflected by the
degree to which an organization is able to fund studies to support its
position, its expertise index, and its backing by interest groups.

One tactic that is useful in a cooperative negotiation is to identify the
general boundaries within which all groups agree to work. Flexibility is
maintained within these boundaries, however. Those adopting this approach
work together to identify those general areas — either procedural or sub-
stantive— on which agreement can be reached, and then iron out the specifics,
in terms of outcome, as the negotiation proceeds. Two examples are: (1) tacit
agreement on the rules of the negotiation process itself, such as "no political
appeals to the media, politicians, or currently uninvolved interest groups,"
"no giving of false or manipulative information," or "no personal attacks;"
and (2) tacit agreement on substantive issues, i.e., appropriate methodology
or the number and type of alternatives. In this case, however, the opponents
must perceive a need to coordinate, but be so ideologically or geographically
separate that they are unable to communicate openly with one another (Hoffman
1968).

68

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

H 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 14. Likely scenario for cooperative negotiations: a first cut.

59

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

^ 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 15. Likely scenario for cooperative negotiations: a second cut.

70

The third approach — integrative bargaining — is demonstrated in Figures 16
and 17. In both cases, while there appears to be little or no agreement
regarding procedure, all are in agreement on type of outcome. Typically, each
side will attempt to pull the conflict into the arena in which it operates
most comfortably, and from which it expects to benefit the most. If an inte-
grative approach is successful here, however, polarization can be avoided.
The probability of success is enhanced in this regard if information is freely
exchanged among the parties. The integrative approach works best when there
are many and diverse issues and when time is not an important constraint.
There must be some possibilities for expanding or creatively manipulating the
tradeoff potential; that is, the game must be positive-sum. For example, in a
conflict between an endangered fish species' need for additional habitat and
the existence of limited opportunities (during spring runoff) for white-water
rafting, the rafting opportunities may be relocated to a different river
system where rapids are more plentiful, in exchange for the habitat. Since
all players in these two cases are in ideological agreement, the opportunities
for log rolling and trade-offs across specific issues can be increased in a
positive-sum game.

Three tactics are most helpful in an integrative negotiation, or in a
situation where the parties are attempting to engender such a climate. First,
the parties brainstorm together to develop objective standards upon which to
base the deci sion--and to which all parties agree (Fisher and Dry 1981; Gifford
1985). Second, the issues where agreement is most likely are selected and
dealt with first. This frequently sets the stage for compromise among the
parties and creates an atmosphere of trust. And, finally, before opposing
views on the issues solidify, it is important to anticipate major problems
before they arise. Here, the parties identify the potential problem areas,
where agreement seems most difficult. The groups then work together — perhaps
with the help of a neutral third party — to generate a wide range of options
for solving the potential problems (Clark and Emrich 1980; Fisher and Ury
1981; Gifford 1985). When the issues are many and diverse, moreover, it is a
good idea to break them into smaller and more manageable units, and then to
work with several issues simultaneously. This increases opportunities for
trade-offs among the parties and leads to fairer results than working with one
issue at a time. Indeed, working with one issue at a time may not only be
inefficient but also tends to increase the potential for conflict among the
parties (White et al . 1980).

These examples are offered to give an analyst an idea of the
lizational configurations that may occur in any given conflict,
:ypes of negotiations that are likely to result.

Another possibility that must be considered has to do with the formation
of coalitions among the players, not only among the direct participants, but
between these organizations and their real and potential interest group allies.

6.3 COALITIONS

A coalition is defined here as a set of organizations that pools resources
or coordinates activities to pursue common and independent goals. Two related

71

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

\ 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 16. Likely scenario for integrative negotiations: a first cut.

72

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

^ 1

ARBITRATOR

Figure 17. Likely scenario for integrative negotiations: a second cut,

73

elements of a resource conflict are worth examining with regard to coalitions.
The first has to do with the goals that the various organizations hope to
achieve in the conflict. The second has to do with power.

Although numerous researchers have attempted to identify the factors that
increase the likelihood of coalitions forming, the one that appears to have
the most empirical validity — and which also seems most relevant to the types
of conflicts addressed here — is Axlerod's notion of "minimal connectedness"
(Axlerod 1970; Browne 1973).

Axlerod suggests that coalitions are most likely to form where there is
the least amount of conflict of interest among the members. Those organiza-
tions having similar values — and goals stemming from those values — have the
least amount of conflict of interest among them. Thus, groups (or indivi-
duals) tend to coalesce when they are located close to one another along some
relevant ideological continuum. This set also tends, however, to be of minimal
size; the smaller a successful coalition, after all, the greater is each
member's share of the goods obtained and the fewer are the concessions they
have to make among themselves (Axlerod 1970). Coalitions do develop that
contain numerically unnecessary members. Axlerod indicates that this tends to
occur when the unnecessary members are ideologically close to the others.
Eavey and Miller (1984) explain in different terms why coalitions arise that
contain more members than are absolutely necessary to achieve mutual goals.
For these authors, a norm of fairness exists that can move players toward
consensus or to include nonessential members in an alliance. It may be helpful
to stress this norm where it appears to be operating — or to create it when
none exists. Satisfaction with the results is enhanced when all legitimate
parties are allowed to participate. This, in turn, increases the likelihood
of compliance with the terms of the agreement and decreases the potential for
new but related conflicts at a later point in time (Olive and Lamb 1984; Wilds
and Lamb 1985). This may be especially true in cooperative and integrative
style negotiations, where both fair results and the maintenance of inter-
personal and intergroup relationships are highly valued (Gifford 1985).
Complementary sources of power also seem to be an important determinant of
group inclinations to form or join coalitions (Smith 1985).

Potential coalitions can be identified from an examination of the role
map, subquadrant descriptions, and role indices provided by the model. For
example, those organizations located in clusters within the same quadrant are
likely to have enough in common to at least consider becoming members of the
same coalition. The key factor to examine here, however, is the intensity of
organizational preference for one type of outcome over another. Thus, all
organizations having either "advocate" or "guardian" as their dominant role
type are likely to coalesce with organizations of a similar perspective.
Indeed, the stronger the preference for one type of outcome over another, the
more extreme will be the behavior of the organization in pursuit of that
outcome. Extreme ideological players are deeply committed to the values they
represent. These organizations are also most likely to expand the conflict or
litigate should the outcome not be in their favor. Thus, the analyst needs to
examine the number, type, and distribution of extreme advocate and guardian
organizations. Strategies should be developed for dealing with a number of
possible scenarios. Three questions that should be answered regarding poten-
tial coalitions are outlined below.

74

First, which organizations represent potential coalition partners for
one's own organization? These groups need to be identified so that they can
begin to communicate among themselves, identify common goals, develop
strategies for the pursuit of those goals, and formulate compromises where
differences do exist. Those organizations located closest to one's own group
on the role map should be examined individually to determine what common
interests exist among them. The information contained in the Phase I analyses
lists the goals identified by the analysts for the various organizations. The
behavioral descriptions associated with each of these organizations can provide
additional information in this regard.

Once mutual goals have been identified and categorized, it is important
to examine the types of power these groups have to pursue those goals. Groups
that have complementary bases of power are not only more likely to join the
same coalition to begin with (Smith 1985), but are able to achieve more
together than alone, at less overall cost to the coalition as a whole. Another
reason it is important to examine the power columns and indices of potential
coalitions members is to identify those areas in which the coalition is weak.
If, for example, a coalition has adequate funding and personnel, but little
public, political, or interest group support, attempts can be made to
strengthen the coalition's power in this latter category. Other players may
be willing to provide the necessary element of power, in exchange for
concessions later in the negotiation process. A campaign could be initiated
to increase public awareness and sympathy for the values represented by the
coalition, thereby expanding the conflict (Cobb and Elder 1983). Resources
from one power source can be converted into another type of power. For
example, money can be used to purchase outside expertise or information if the
coalition has plenty of the former, and very little of the latter.

Second, what is the probability of an opposing coalition forming among
the other participants in the conflict? The most likely candidates are those
organizations located in the quadrant opposite the one in which one's own
organization is located. These groups should be examined in a similar manner
to that outlined above. In spite of the fact that the two sides represent
seemingly polarized viewpoints, an attempt should be made to identify areas in
which agreement may be reached. Potential tradeoffs can be identified early-
on, which could help set the stage for compromise between the two sides of the
conflict. More difficult issues can be postponed until later in the negotia-
tion process, after communication has begun between the parties, some degree
of trust has been established, and a climate of cooperation engendered.
Moderate players, located inside the arcs on the role map, can also be
encouraged to work together to pull the more extreme players closer to the
middle — and towards compromise.

Third, are there potential coalitions between the organizational partici-
pants and their interest group allies? The importance of interest groups in
policymaking should not be underestimated (Greenwald 1977; Cummings and Wise
1985; Smith 1985). A careful examination should be made of this element of
organizational power to determine not only which interest groups are already
allied with various organizational participants in the conflict, but to
ascertain the likelihood of currently noninvolved interest groups being pulled
into the conflict. Interest groups are likely to be the most politically

75

powerful players in a conflict. Indeed, one study concluded that the key
element in many interest group decisions to coalesce with one another was the
degree to which one element of political power complemented another; that is,
political power — rather than resources or expertise — was the major element of
power interest groups involved in water policy formulation in the Southwest
considered in making a decision to coalesce with other interest groups involved
in the same policy area (Smith 1985).

Power is the driving force that moves most resource conflicts to resolu-
tion. It is the crucial component of organizational ability to either pursue
a particular type of outcome or to render a particular kind of decision. Power
relationships must be carefully examined throughout the process of analysis
and strategy development recommended here. Individual elements of organiza-
tional power, however, should also be examined in their own right. Power in
instream flow conflicts is postulated to exist in three different categories.
For each organization participating in a conflict, the analyst should examine
all three categories and attempt to identify the most powerful organizations
and likely coalitions in a conflict. When potential brokers or arbitrators
appear on the role map, an examination of the statutory and political power
they have to decide the outcome is in order; the desire to broker or arbitrate
a particular conf 1 ict--alone--i s not enough. As coalitions form or separate,
the types and distribution of power among them should be tracked also. Careful
analysis of power will not only provide clues regarding which strategies may
prove most effective, but will enable an analyst to identify his own organiza-
tion's strengths and weaknesses, and provide information about which coalitions
to join or avoid. Organizations and coalitions that have a strong and well
balanced power structure have a decided advantage in influencing the outcome
of a conf 1 ict.

Many other coalition scenarios are possible. These are just three
examples of the types of concerns that an analyst needs to address. The point
here is that both the intensity of preference for a particular type of
outcome — typically associated with organizational mission or ideology — and
power are important elements of coalition formation decisions. An analyst
should examine each carefully. This may be done to develop strategies for
forming coalitions of one's own — or for bargaining more successfully with the
opposing coalitions that emerge.

6.4 GENERAL STRATEGIES

Bingham (1985) identified several factors that affect success in mediated
environmental negotiations. First, the parties must have some incentive to
negotiate and reach an agreement. Two such incentives have already been
discussed: the desire to maintain positive working relationships and presence
of a deadline. Other possibilities include the need to appease public opinion,
avoid the cost accompanying delay or litigation, and the desire to avoid
uncertainty. If no such incentives are readily identifiable, it may be
necessary to define one and make the participants aware of its existence. Use
of the media to promote a particular set of values may be helpful in this
regard (Cobb and Elder 1983).

76

Second, negotiators should attempt to identify the real needs and
interests that often underlie stated positions (Fisher and Ury 1981; Bingham
1985). This is often more difficult than it sounds, especially in highly
competitive negotiations, where the parties tend to take absolute stands and
withhold information from one another. Communication is essential for parties
desiring to foster cooperative or integrative negotiation settings. The
negotiators must often search carefully to identify mutual or complementary
interests among the parties, and then communicate a sense of understanding
what those needs actually are. Demonstrating a willingness to compromise will
also facilitate movement from competitive to noncompetitive bargaining.

Third, it is extremely important to make certain that the organization in
charge of implementing the agreement participates in the process, as well as
all of the organizations that will be affected by the outcome (Bingham 1985).
Participation produces a feeling of commitment among the parties, and commit-
ment, in turn, increases the likelihood of implementation.

Finally, the use of an objective mediator is strongly recommended.
Mediators can facilitate communication among the parties to a conflict and
help identify needs and avoid impasse (Bingham 1985; Wilds and Lamb 1985).
Although an arbitrating organization--such as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission — may play this role in some conflicts (Olive and Lamb 1984; Wilds
and Lamb 1985), it is usually reluctant to do so in most cases. An objective
professional is generally more desirable in this role. Mediation is
increasingly recommended as a viable method of conflict resolution in environ-
mental disputes (Strauss 1979; Clark and Emrich 1980; Lake 1980; Abrams and
Stephen 1986).

6.5 DEFINING SUCCESS

The major criterion for evaluating the success of a negotiation is the
quality of the solution produced. Does it reflect the real needs and goals of
your own organization, both over the short and long term? Does it reflect the
needs of the other parties? Have the parties explored all possibi 1 ities--and
attempted to generate a win-win solution, in which all parties are satisfied?
Was the solution achieved at the lowest possible costs compared to the desir-
ability of the outcome? Is it achievable? Are those who participated
satisfied with the process used to generate the outcome? And finally, is the
solution fair or just? By satisfying these criteria, a negotiation may produce
results that are acceptable to all concerned, which, in turn, should lead to a
greater sense of commitment to the agreement (Menkel-Meadows 1984).

The Legal-Institutional Analysis model can help individuals and groups
involved in instream flow disputes to move toward an agreement that meets
these criteria. This is because it enables users to develop an understanding
of the environment in which the conflict will occur, and of the organizations
that are to participate. The needs and interests of the parties can thus be
identified and predictions about organizational behavior and interaction made.
Strategies and tactics are then selected based on this information; potential
problems can be identified before they become an entrenched part of the
negotiation process, and communication enhanced among the participants.

77

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86

APPENDIX I
LIAM SUBQUADRANT DESCRIPTIONS

A: MODERATE ADVOCATE-BROKER:

Is protective of environmental and noneconomic values, and will join
forces with others to resist proposals or projects that threaten those
values. Will cooperate in efforts to change the ways in which resources
have been used and managed in the past, and will contribute to crusading
efforts initiated by others on behalf of the environment. Will use
scientific and technical data to support its position. Prefers a
negotiated outcome in which decisions are a result of bargaining among
players. Thus, it will not resist efforts to keep or push the conflict
into the distributive arena. Will be somewhat open to compromise.

B: MODERATE BROKER-ADVOCATE:

Will cooperate in efforts to keep or push the decision into the distri-
butive arena, where the outcome is a negotiated or brokered one. Will
not resist efforts to change the traditional ways in which resources have
been used and managed in the past, but will prefer to build a political
coalition to bring about such changes and to protect environmental and
nontraditional values. Thus, will use technical and scientific data in
combination with political and economic information to support its
position. Will avoid taking absolute positions in bargaining situations
and will readily compromise.

C: MODERATE BROKER-GUARDIAN:

Will cooperate in efforts to keep or push the decision into the distri-
butive arena, where the outcome is a negotiated or brokered one. Will
not resist efforts to prevent change in the traditional use and management
of resources, but will prefer to build a political coalition to stop such
changes and to protect economic and developmental values. Thus, will use
economic, political, and constituency information to support its position.
Will avoid taking absolute positions in bargaining situations and will
readily compromise.

87

D: MODERATE GUARDIAN-BROKER:

Will cooperate in efforts to prevent change in the traditional use and
management of resources, but prefers to join a political coalition to
resist change and protect its own economic and constituency interests.
Thus, will use economic (such as cost-benefit analyses) and constituency
information to support its position. Will not resist efforts to keep or
push the conflict into the distributive arena, where the outcome is a
negotiated or brokered one. Will avoid taking positional stands in
bargaining situations and is somewhat open to compromise.

E: MODERATE GUARDIAN-ARBITRATOR:

Will cooperate in efforts to prevent change in the traditional use and
mangement of resources, and will contribute to campaigns seeking to
protect economic and constituency values. Prefers, however, to operate
in the regulatory arena, where decisions are objectively made by an
arbitrating organization based on evidence presented by all sides to the
dispute. Thus prefers and will use scientific and technical data to
support its position. Will tend to be somewhat demanding in bargaining
situations and not be very open to compromise.

F: MODERATE ARBITRATOR-GUARDIAN:

Will cooperate in efforts to keep or push the conflict into the regulatory
arena, where decisions are objectively made by an arbitrating organization
based on evidence presented by all sides to the dispute. Prefers and
will use economic information (such as cost-benefit analyses) to support
its position. Will not resist efforts to prevent change in the
traditional use and management of resources, and will not resist campaigns
initiated by others on behalf of economic and constituency values. Will
take positional stands in bargaining situations, however, and will not be
very open to compromise.

G: MODERATE ARBITRATOR-ADVOCATE:

Will cooperate in efforts to keep or push the decision into the regulatory
arena, where decisions are made by an arbitrating organization based on
evidence presented by all sides to the dispute. Prefers and will use
technical and scientific data to support its position. Will not resist
efforts to initiate changes in the ways in which resources have been used
and managed in the past, and will not resist campaigns to protect environ-
mental values. Will tend to be somewhat demanding in bargaining
situations and not be very open to compromise.

88

H: MODERATE ADVOCATE-ARBITRATOR:

Will cooperate in efforts to protect environmental and nontraditional
values, and will contribute to campaigns to protect such values and to
initiate changes in the ways in which resources have been traditionally
used and managed in the past. Will not resist efforts to keep or push
the conflict into the regulatory arena, where decisions are made by an
arbitrating organization authorized to make the decision based on evidence
presented by all sides to the dispute. Prefers and will use scientific
and technical data to document its position. Will be somewhat demanding
in bargaining situations and will not be very open to compromise.

I : EXTREME ADVOCATE-BROKER :

Will frequently speak out — in the media, at public meetings and the
like — on behalf of environmental values, and will strongly push for
changes in the traditional ways in which resources have been managed and
used in the past. Will employ crusading techniques to protect the
environment from the crises it feels are approaching, and will actively
solicit support from other groups in these values, however, will argue
for compromise, and willingly participate in negotiation. Will cooperate
in efforts to keep or push the conflict into the distributive arena,
where decisions are the result of bargaining. Is likely to have a close
relationship with the potential broker in a conflict. Exhibits a strong
belief in the correctness of its world view. Is apt to utilize political
and economic information and to take absolute positions in bargaining
situations.

J: EXTREME BROKER-ADVOCATE:

Will actively seek support for a negotiated solution, which is the result
of bargaining and compromise, and will lead attempts to keep or push the
conflict into the distributive arena. Is likely to be in the position to
actually broker the decision itself, because it tends to have physical or
legal control over the resources in question. Will solicit support from
the general public and controlling politicians for its position, and will
actively seek to build a political coalition on behalf of environmental
values and to initiate changes in the ways in which resources have been
traditionally used and managed. Jealous of its brokering role, this
organization will attempt to integrate the parties and positions in
bargaining situations. Will be keenly interested in all types of
information in a dispute, but will prefer information that demonstrates
the benefits to be derived for all parties from changes proposed by
advocates or recommendations that protect the environment. Will avoid
taking positional stands and will be open to compromise, at least where
some means for resource protection or regulation is included in the
outcome.

89

EXTREME BROKER-GUARDIAN:

Will actively seek support for a negotiated solution, which is the result
of bargaining and compromise, and will lead attempts to keep or push the
conflict into the distributive arena. Is likely to be in the position to
broker the decision itself, because it will tend to have physical or
legal control over the resources in question. Will solicit public,
political, and constituency support for its position, and will actively
seek to build a political coalition to resist changes in the ways in
which resources have been traditionally used and managed in the past, and
to protect its own economic interests and those of its substantial
constituency. Will be jealous of its brokering role and thus will attempt
to integrate the parties and positions in bargaining situations. Will be
interested in all types of information in a dispute, but prefers informa-
tion that is of an economic or political nature. Will avoid taking
absolute positions and will actively promote compromise in bargaining
situations.

EXTREME GUARDIAN-BROKER:

Will activively promote its own economic interests and the interests of
its substantial constituency, which it is obligated to protect. Thus, it
will strongly resist proposed changes in the ways in which resources have
been used and managed in the past, especially when these changes threaten
those interests. Strongly believes in a world view that promotes
"economic progress" over "environmental values" and will actively crusade
to have those values protected in the decision outcome. Will seek to put
together a political coalition on behalf of those values and cooperate in
efforts to keep or push the conflict into the distributive arena. Is
likely to have a close relationship with the potential broker, and will
use economic and political data to influence the outcome. Will take
absolute positions in bargaining situations, but will be willing to
compromise, at least where some of its economic interests and those of
its constituency are protected.

EXTREME GUARDIAN-ARBITRATOR:

Will actively promote its own economic interests and that of its
substantial constituency, which it feels obligated to protect. Thus,
will strongly resist changes that threaten those interests. Strongly
believes in a world view that promotes "economic progress" over "environ-
mental values" and will use economic and constituency information to
support its position. Will actively crusade on behalf of its world view.
Will cooperate in efforts to keep or push the conflict into the regulatory
arena, however, where decisions are made by an arbitrating organization
based on evidence presented by all sides to the dispute. Will take
absolute positions in bargaining situations and not be open to compromise.

90

EXTREME ARBITRATOR-GUARDIAN:

Will actively seek support to keep or push the conflict into the
regulatory arena, where the decision is made by an arbitrating
organization based on evidence presented by all sides to the dispute. Is
likely to be in a position to arbitrate the decision itself. Will thus
solicit information from all sides of the dispute, and will be more
interested in technical and scientific information than political facts,
especially when these data support its own economic interests and those
of its constituency. Will resist attempted changes in the traditional
ways in which resources have been used and managed in the past, and will
not obstruct crusading campaigns that promote "economic progress" over
"environmental protection." Will take strong positional stands in
bargaining situations and not be open to compromise. May threaten
litigation or actually "try" the case.

EXTREME ARBITRATOR-ADVOCATE:

Will actively seek support to keep or push the conflict into the
regulatory arena, where the decision is made by an arbitrating organiza-
tion based on evidence presented by all sides to the dispute. Is likely
to be in a position to arbitrate the decision itself. Will thus solicit
information from all sides of the dispute, and will be more interested in
technical and scientific information than political facts, especially
when these data support environmental protection efforts. Will attempt
to change the traditional ways in which resources have been used and
managed in the past, and cooperate in crusading campaigns promote
"environmental protection" over "economic progress." Will take strong
positional stands in bargaining situations and not be open to compromise.
May threaten litigation or actually "try" the case.

EXTREME ADVOCATE-ARBITRATOR:

Will frequently speak out — in the media, at public meetings and the
like — on behalf of environmental values and will lead efforts to change
the traditional ways in which resources have been used and managed in the
past. Will employ crusading techniques to protect the environment from
the crises it feels are approaching, and generate and use scientific and
technical data to support its position. Strongly believes in the correct-
ness of its environmentally protective world view, and will join efforts
to keep or push the conflict into the regulatory arena, where the decision
is made by an arbitrating organization based on evidence presented by all
sides to the dispute. Will take absolute positions in bargaining
situations and not be open to compromise.

91

APPENDIX II

USER'S MANUAL FOR THE LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS MODEL (LIAM)

92

WELUT-86/W04
December 1985

USER'S MANUAL FOR THE
LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL (LIAM)

by

Nancy Young
Instream Flow Group
Western Energy and Land Use Team
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Drake Creekside Building One
2627 Redwing Road
Fort Collins, CO 80526-2899

Western Energy and Land Use Team
Division of Biological Services
Research and Development
Fish and Wildlife Service
U.S. Department of the Interior
Washington, DC 20240

This report should be cited as:

Young, N. 1985. User's manual for the Legal Institutional Analysis Model
(LIAM). U.S. FishWildl. Serv. WELUT-86/W04. 48 pp.

CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i v

INTRODUCTION 1

A Word About the Software 2

A Word About the Hardware 2

Running the Programs 3

Logging On 4

Logging Off 5

Creating Your File 6

THE PROGRAMS 10

-Menu 10

-Query 11

-Looky, , 13

-Mapum, , 14

-Plotum, , 21

CLOSING REMARKS 22

APPENDICES 23

A. Examples 23

B. Glossary 39

C. Troubleshooting 46

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the creative impulses of Dr.
Berton Lamb and Ms. Leah Wilds for constructing the Legal Institutional
Analysis Model; the numerous helpful computer users who tested the manual for
content and the reviewers who revised it for clarity; Tom Corman and Kirk
Smith the gracious computer geniuses; Susan Strawn for her handy and clear
graphics; Patricia Gillis, Elizabeth Graf, and Dora Ibarra for competent and
speedy typing of the manuscript and revisions; and Kate Brandes for her
cheerful organizational attentions.

IV

INTRODUCTION

This manual is an antianxiety primer and companion to the Legal Institu-
tional Analysis Model (LIAM). This model is a process designed for agencies
and organizations involved in assessing the impacts of water resource projects.
It is used for the systematic analysis of those qualities that enable an
agency to achieve its goals in a project negotiation. Using LIAM, you will be
better equipped to develop the most appropriate strategies for goal achieve-
ment, conflict resolution, and effective negotiation.

The major thesis of LIAM is that the political and institutional dynamics
that operate in any decision-making process are as vital to the outcome as
the technical data and regulations involved. In fact, the institutional
dynamics often condition the technical studies. LIAM provides a systematic
and routine means to diagnose institutional dynamics before launching a tech-
nical study.

In the computer language of our day, computers are referred to as either
"user friendly" or "user scary." This manual attempts to set your mind at
ease as you try working with a friendly computer program to analyze the water
resource conflict you have in mind.

If you are totally new to this system, and computers in general, you
might benefit from a bit of advice. Take your time to read over this manual.
Pay particular attention to the "Troubleshooting" section. Refer to the -MENU
as often as you need for explanations of each program offering. It can be
difficult to be patient with a machine, but try to be calm; remember, you will
not ruin the programs or hurt future generations by experimenting and practic-
ing different commands. Think of the computer as your silent partner who can
add a new perspective to your information and intuitions and contribute
creative and helpful alternatives to your own decision-making process.

If you are an advanced computer user, the following description of LIAM
might be the basis of your conceptual understanding. The LIAM programs are
run by procedures that access various programs, data files, and test files.
The source code for the programs is written in Fortran IV. Binary versions of
the program are stored in a multirecord file, where they are retrieved by the
procedure for execution. Data files are created and named by the user, and
are updated each time -QUERY,, or -LOOKY,, is run. Text files include one
file containing all of the questions, and other files that contain large
textural blocks for use in the -MENU and for user instructions. As the
programs are run, subroutines are used extensively. All subroutines are
stored in a binary library, which is loaded before the program executes. Many
of these subroutines are used in more than one program (e.g., reviewing
respondents in a data set is executed by the same subroutine in each program).

Each program is written to be user friendly. Where possible, the programs
have been written so that errant answers will not cause a program failure.

A WORD ABOUT THE SOFTWARE

LIAM is a collection of programs that observe, articulate, and quantify
different positions taken during the course of decision-making. Each program
is involved with one of the following steps.

BASIC INFORMATION

DATA GATHERING

DATA DISPLAY

DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

DATA REARRANGEMENT, REVISION, AND REVIEW

LIAM helps you to analyze the present positions of all participants in
the decision-making process, and to learn to anticipate potential points of
conflict and agreement. No prior experience with computers or keyboards is
required. No procedural language must be learned before getting started.
Once a LIAM program is chosen, you will interact with the computer program to
chart your own course toward a particular decision-making goal. LIAM uses the
computer to quantify and graph different positions held by the various
decision-making organizations.

You will be asked a series of questions that help define the specific
roles, relative powers, information needs, and bargaining potentials of the
relevant agencies in the decision-making process. LIAM will then help you to
predict your organization's concerns and the likely concerns of others in a
specific negotiation — based on the information in your questionnaire file — so
that strategic assessments and choices can be prepared before the negotiations
begin.

A WORD ABOUT THE HARDWARE

The Computer System

The Cyber Series computers are produced by Control Data Corporation. Two
of the Cyber Series computers at Colorado State University (CSU) are referred
to as the Green System and the Gold System. You will always be operating in
the Gold System.

These computers are hooked up to another computer called MODCOMP II
Communications Processor, which has 512 communication lines into the computer
center. Another aspect of the Cyber Operating System, commonly called the
Network Operating System (NOS) controls the functions of the computer itself.
When you are using the Cyber, information concerning the NOS is available;
just type "help" and press the carriage return key (noted throughout this

manual as [CR]) while in batch mode (see Glossary). New users especially will
want to use the double space before and after "help".

A few items are essential to your working with the computer and LIAM:
(1) a terminal (the tv screen with typewriter keys); (2) a modem (the small
box that is your telephone link to the Cyber); (3) a printer, if you want hard
copies (i.e., paper copies of your results); and (4) a telephone.

Before you begin, you should be aware of one simple mistake that can
really slow you down: a computer, unlike children and dandelions, does exactly
what you tell it to do. It does not, however, tolerate ambiguity; it works
quickly, tirelessly, literally, but only deductively. This means that the
slashes and dashes you see in the instructions and commands will not stand
being overlooked. To the computer, they are as important as the letters you
enter. That goes for commas and equal marks too. For example, the dash (-)
symbol is equivalent to the word "begin" and the computer will not let you
begin without it.

RUNNING THE PROGRAMS

Acquiring Your Account (Username) and Password

In order to use the LIAM program on the Cyber computer at CSU, you must
acquire an account username from the Instream Flow Group, Western Energy and
Land Use Team (WELUT), 2627 Redwing Road, Fort Collins, CO 80526, (303) 226-
9331, or directly from CSU. You will be given a username, which you will
enter at the appropriate place, along with a personal password. This username
and password will give you access to the LIAM program after your telephone and
modem connect your terminal with the Cyber.

Procedural Constraints

The computer procedures described in this user's manual follow the formats
1 isted below:

UPPERCASE print will represent the computer's communications to you;

lowercase print will represent the necessary information you will enter
on the computer;

parentheses are used around suggestions and comments;

[CR] indicates that you should press the "carriage return," or "return"
key on your terminal;

to correct misspelled words, you have some choices: press the CTRL key
and the letter H key simultaneously and backspace the correct number of
spaces then type in the correct word;

or

press the DEL (delete) key;

or

press the arrowed backspace key;

or

check the user's manual for your particular terminal and follow its
suggested procedures.

LOGGING ON

Logging on means connecting the terminal to the computer via the modem
and telephone, and identifying yourself to the system with your username and
password. To log on, follow these steps.

1. Turn on your terminal and modem (hook up your printer to the terminal
if you want hard copies too). Now you are ready to make contact
with the computer.

2. To connect with the CSU Cyber machine, dial (303) 491-7395 (CSU
Computer Center, Accounts) to receive the number to dial directly to
the computer. You must inform them of the 'baud' rate of your
terminal and printer. See the Glossary regarding baud rates, and
your terminal's user's manual concerning the baud rate of your
hardware. After you have an account, dial the direct computer
number.

3. Wait for a continuous high-pitched tone.

4. Connect your telephone receiver with your modem making sure the
handset is correctly matched up with the modem. A light usually
indicates a connection has been made with the computer.

5. Press a [CR] and you will see something like this
ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

6. Type 1 on your keyboard. You should always select the Gold System
because that is where LIAM resides.

The computer responds:

WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.

COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

CURRENT DATE AND TIME, CSU GOLD MACHINE

FAMILY:

This is the computer's procedure for asking you to type in your
assigned username and password, which the computer calls your family
name. Typing it now is the process of logging on. Be certain to
type it precisely as it was given to you, complete with commas and
no spaces.

7. Type your username and password as it was given to you, for example:

.username, password and press a [CR]

(Note: your username and password will usually not be visible on
your terminal screen.)

If both username and password are correct, the computer will proceed.
If anything goes wrong, the computer will tell you to retype it; you
have two more tries. If you cannot get it right in three tries, you
will have to hang-up, redial , and start over. (Sometimes the
computer lines are busy and your line is accidentally disconnected.
If this happens, go through the log on procedure again. The computer
will ask you if you wish to recover your "previous job." It will
give you a series of letters and ask you to type them. Once done,
you will find yourself back in your previous place. You have 10
minutes to do this. After that, just log on and begin a new job.
See "recoverable job" in the Glossary.)

8. Now the computer responds in one of two ways:

READY,
or

/
Type:

batch and press a [CR]

(See the Glossary regarding "batch" modes.)

The computer responds:

$RFL,0.
/

(See page 6 for how to create a file at this point.)

LOGGING OFF

Logging off means disconnecting your terminal from the computer. It is
commonly done after a program is completed.

1. Type:

bye and press a [CR]

The bye command cuts the communication line permanently. If you
wish to regain a communication line, you must hang-up the telephone,

pick it up, and redial. Be sure that both the terminal and the
modem are on.

Always remember to turn off the terminal and the modem before you
leave. If you used a printer, make certain it is off too. (See
Example 1.)

CREATING YOUR FILE

It is necessary to create a file for each water resources problem you
wish to analyze. Innumerable questionnaire responses can be managed and
stored in each file. The only data in your file are those that you put in it.
Creating your file is equivalent to making computer space available for your
data. Remember, the word "data" here refers to the answers you give to the
questions in the questionnaire found in the beginning program named "-Query,,".

When choosing a name for your file, do not exceed seven letters. You
will want to give your file a logical name that represents your name or the
problem or geographic location you wish to address.

Now that you are logged on, you can create your file.

The computer is waiting:

$RFL,0.
/

1. Type:

xedit, your filename [CR]
Example:

xedit, Redlake [CR]

(Leave no spaces. )

The computer responds:

XEDIT 3.1.00

EMPTY FILE/CREATION MODE ASSUMED

??

2. Press a [CR]

The computer responds:
INPUT

7

3. Below is an example of something you might type. It is the first
datum for your file, and is your file's title:

Example:

This file will hold data concerning RedLake. [CR]

If you enter more than one line here, press the [CR] once and
continue to enter. You might want to input a narrative description
of the problem here, or perhaps just give it an identifying geo-
graphic location name. When you have nothing more to enter, press
CR twice and you will be out of the input mode.

The computer responds:

??EDIT

??

Type

End,

,fi lename

,H

Example:

End,

.Redlake,

rl

[CR]

[CR]

("Redlake" is the name given to the file just created, rl is the
command to replace the file in permanent and local filespace.
Remember, your filename must be no longer than seven letters.)

The computer responds:

REDLAKE IS REPLACED. (This means it is in permanent space.)
REDLAKE IS A LOCAL FILE. (This keeps it in local space so you
can work with i t. )

You have now instructed the computer to store your file in both
permanent and local filespace. If it were kept only in local space,
it would "disappear" when you logged off. (See Example 2.)

The computer responds:

READY or

/ (this is your cue that the computer is waiting for you again)

Now, you can do a number of things:

a. You can see the catalog of permanent files to assure yourself
that your file has indeed been created by typing:

catlist [CR]

(It may take a few seconds, see Example 3.)

b. You can see the Menu by typing:

-MENU [CR]
(Wait for it a few seconds, see Example 4.)

c. You can log off (your file will be saved).

d. You can begin answering the LIAM questionnaire to analyze any
organization you choose by typing:

-QUERY,, your filename [CR]

e. If you have previously created your file and you or others have
completed the -QUERY questionnaire, you can now review or
change your responses by typing:

-LOOKY,, your filename [CR]

or you can :

graph your data with the -MAPUM,, program (this is appropriate
if you have more than three responses for at least two organi-
zations) by typing:

-MAPUM,, your filename [CR]

or you can :

graph your data with the -PLOTUM, , program onto a Versatec
plotter (if you have made prior arrangements with CSU's Computer
Center) by typing:

-PLOTUM,, your filename [CR]

f. You can receive a short computer lesson by typing:

help [CR]

The glossary of computer terms that begins on page 39 will assist you
with your further computer adventures.

Detailed descriptions of the separate LIAM programs are provided in the
following pages. Each program has its place in a larger context, which is
explained by the LIAM flow chart (Figure 1).

8

Correct
or review
question-
naire:
LOOKY

Rule:

• 3 respondents each agency

• At least 2 agencies

• Up to 15 agencies

Create
line printer
output:
MAPUM

Create

Versatec

output:

PLOTUM

Compare

individual

responses -

reselect

comparisons:

CONTRAZ

Create
PS 3000
output:
PSCOLOR

Figure 1. Flow chart for LIAM.

THE PROGRAMS "

-MENU

-MENU is an informative listing of programs and capabilities that are
available to you in the LIAM package. To read the LIAM MENU, after any
computer response of:

READY or /

type:

-MENU [CR]

(See Example 4. )

10

-QUERY,,

-QUERY,, is the program name for the LIAM questionnaire. After you
create and name your file, you can fill out the questionnaire in -QUERY,,.
After a computer response of:

READY or /
type:

-QUERY,, your filename [CR]

(See Example 5. )

-QUERY,, is composed of 117 questions designed to ascertain particular
information regarding a water resource situation. Thirty of the possible 117
questions will be chosen at random for you to answer. Initially, you will be
asked to answer four open-ended questions. The remaining questions ask you to
select one answer from several choices. You should answer from your knowledge
of that organization or agency, i.e., the way you believe that the organization
or agency would behave. First, you are asked to enter your project name.
This is the name of the specific water resources issue to which LIAM will be
applied. Second, you are asked to name the organization or agency you are
planning to evaluate. This can be your own organization or another one related
to the specific project under assessment. Third, you are asked to list the
other participating organizations involved in the project. Fourth, you are
asked to define the project or problem in your own words, including the issues,
long- and short-term goals, and various levels of involvement for the organiza-
tion you are evaluating. If you choose to answer these open-ended questions,
your responses will be saved in a local file called "Tape 12." When you
complete both the open-ended questions and the multiple choice questions, you
can see your open-ended answers by typing:

LIST,f=Tapel2 [CR]

The 30 multiple choice questions offer choices ranging from A to E from
which you are to select one answer, enter its letter on your keyboard, and
press a [CR] .

When you have completed the multiple choice questions, you will be given
the opportunity to review your answers and make any changes you wish. Simply
enter the question number when you are prompted by the program. In order to
do this, you will have to keep a list of questions which you might wish to
review. If you have no changes, press [CR] twice and the program will continue
on to its end. Be sure to answer al 1 the questions in the questionnaire.

When you finish the questionnaire, you will see on your screen:

REVERT. THIS PROGRAM IS COMPLETE.

11

You can choose from a number of options.

1. You can log off; just type: bye [CR]

2. You can see the answers of all the completed questionnaires that are
stored in your file. These responses can be shown in graph form by
running the -MAPUM,, program (if you have at least two organizations
and three responses for each organization); type:

-MAPUM,, your filename [CR]

3. You can review the answers to any questionnaire if you enter the
-LOOKY,, program; type:

-LOOKY,, your filename [CR]

4. You can see the -MENU; type:

-MENU

5. You can see your textual open-ended responses; type:

LIST,F=TAPE12 [CR]

12

-LOOKY,,

The -LOOKY,, program allows you to choose a number of options for working
with your data. In -LOOKY,, you can examine one respondent's answers at a
time. This can help you to:

* see how an individual answered particular questions;

* change answers on a particular questionnaire;

* return to any unanswered questions you might have left when you
first took the questionnaire;

* replace your files and store the changes;

* replace your files & not store any changes; or

* look up the indices created by a particular respondent.

To activate the -LOOKY,, program, after a computer response of:

READY or / or $RFL,0.,
type:

-LOOKY, , your filename [CR]
(See Example 6.)

13

-MAPUM,,

Agencies and individuals dealing with water resources issues often have
requested a systematic procedure for preparing decision-making strategies and
for anticipating the concerns of the participating organizations in a negoti-
ation. They have suggested that institutional analysis techniques be used for
this, and LIAM is one such tool.

With the information gained from the questionnaire in the -QUERY,, program
and arranged in the -MAPUM,, program, you are in a position to view your
agency and other participating groups from a creative and problem-solving
perspective.

The -MAPUM,, program is the main source of output from the LIAM question-
naires. In order to benefit from -MAPUM,, you must be describing at least two
organizations with the data from at least three completed questionnaires for
each organization. The more data, i.e., more questionnaire respondents, the
better your results. The -MAPUM,, program uses the data from the question-
naires to produce a plot that can be routed to your line printer. The -MAPUM,,
program:

* combines and summarizes all the questionnaire responses for a given
agency;

* identifies the roles of each agency, describing expected concerns and
behaviors;

* quantifies power scores for each agency according to resources, informa-
tion, and support; and

* compares each agency's scores by creating a graph of the data.

All of these products are stored in the MAPO local file that is automati-
cally created by the -MAPUM,, program.

For a more complete explanation of -MAPUM,, and LIAM capabilities, you
are encouraged to participate in course IFG 310 offered by the Instream Flow
Group. We also suggest that you refer to Instream Flow Information Paper #23
for a detailed exposition of the multidimensional possibilities and uses of
LIAM.

To begin the -MAPUM,, program, after a computer response of:

READY or /
type:

-MAPUM,, your filename [CR]

(See Example 7. )

The first information you will see on your screen is a list of names,
dates, times, and abbreviations for organizations or groups that you have

14

stored in your file. These responses are your data for the analysis and
graphics created in the -MAPUM,, program. The program offers options to
select and/or reselect specific respondents from your master list to create
"input groups." The individual questionnaire responses are then averaged to
create a single unified perspective for each group.

Your first task is to choose a number to represent each name you want to
include in one "input" group. When combining names to form a group (each
group should contain at least three names.), type the number that represents
the name followed by a space and then the next number and space, etc. When
all the selected numbers to combine for one group are listed, press a [CR] .
If you need to review the respondents list again, type R and press a [CR] .

Each time you form a group, the computer will list the names you choose
so that you can double check, them and assign a title to the group. Now you
have a few options. Your terminal will prompt:

1. REMOVE THIS GROUP AND RESELECT ITS MEMBERS

This option allows you to change your mind and recombine numbers of
respondents. To make these changes, type:

1 [CR]

Combine the correct numbers (separating them by spaces) and end with
a [CR].

2. ADD ADDITIONAL RESPONDENTS TO THIS GROUP
Type:

2 [CR]

Then proceed to enter the number representing the name you wish to
include in the group you just made.

3. REVIEW THE MASTER RESPONDENTS LIST
Type:

3 [CR]

Choose 3 to see the list of all respondents.

4. COMBINE THESE RESPONDENTS INTO A SINGLE GROUP AND BEGIN SPECIFIYING
OTHER GROUPS

Type:

4 [CR]

When you have chosen the respondents for the second group, press a
[CR].

15

5. CONSIDER THESE A GROUP AND BEGIN PLOTTING WITH IT AND OTHER COMBINED
GROUPS (CHOOSE 5 ONLY AFTER YOU HAVE CREATED AT LEAST TWO GROUPS)

Type:

5 [CR]

When you have combined all the groups you have intended, chose option 5
and press [CR]. The terminal will prompt:

BEGIN PLOTTING

The program is now working with the groups that you have selected and is
drawing what is called a "role map" that will characterize each group's
position relative to the others'.

You are now asked to select one of two output sizes.

Choice 1 is 80 columns, approximately 8h x 11" in size. This size will
fit completely on your screen and on 8H x 11" computer print-out paper.

Choice 2 is 132 columns and is the large computer page size. If you
choose 2, be prepared to see only part of it on your screen, from which it
will not be possible to make any reasonable sense. The print-out will be
coherent if it is printed out on large computer paper.

Next you are asked:

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE LINES PRINTED ON THE PLOT? Y/N

YES: The degree of accuracy is much higher when the lines are printed,
but you should choose YES (Y) only when you are using the 132 column
output.

NO: Choose NO (N) when you are using the 80 column output.

The computer then responds with:

THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE INPUT GROUPS.

Here will be listed all the groups you have chosen. Each will be assigned an
identifying letter that will correspond to the letters located on the role map
and the perspective plot option.

Next you are asked:

PLEASE SELECT THE NUMBER OF THE GROUP FROM WHOSE PERSPECTIVE YOU WISH TO
EXAMINE THE OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Type:

the number that corresponds to that group, [CR]

16

In a few moments, the computer will respond:

THE PERSPECTIVE PLOT HAS BEEN DRAWN

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE PLOT FROM ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE? Y/N

Yes, type: Y [CR]

You will be asked to enter the number of the group you wish the second plot to
be created from.

No, type: N [CR]

The computer will proceed to create the first plot as requested.

After you complete the information in the -MAPUM,, program, your terminal
will display:

REVERT. *OUTPUT IN LOCAL FILE MAPO.

If you desire a paper copy of the forthcoming graph, connect the printer to
your terminal .

Type

■

xon

[CR]

The

computer

XON

/

responds:

After the slash, type:

list,f=MAPO (with no spaces) [CR]

You will see on your screen:

LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL (LIAM)
TABLE TO RESPONDENT POSITIONS AND POLICY POINT

The respondent positions are the positions assigned to the groups you have
created. The policy point is intended to identify a point for policy resolu-
tion, however, at present, the program does not make this prediction.

Before we continue, it is necessary to explain some details regarding
standard institutional analysis. Four kinds of roles are commonly identified
in an institutional analysis. They are the general categories of guardian,
advocate, broker, and arbitrator.

The "guardian" role characterizes agencies or organizations that attempt
to protect the productivity or market utility of water. These agencies prefer
such strategies as interest group consultation and public participation,
because they are backed by established and influential support groups.

17

The "advocate" role characterizes agencies or groups that call for a
change in the developmental approach to water allocation. These agencies are
often without enabling legislation or are reactive to the initiative held by
other agencies. These groups rely on "crusading" and data to advance their
positions.

The "broker" role characterizes agencies that allocate water through
their ability to physically control streams via impoundments. "Brokers" are
in a position to support either environmental or developmental interests.
They favor benefit-cost analyses, mechanisms for controlling flows, and
political considerations. Political considerations are possible due to the
nature of the groups either supporting or seeking favors from the "brokers."
"Brokers" prefer strategies that play activist agencies against each other to
obtain control of the balance of power.

The "arbitrator" role characterizes agencies that have the statutory
authority to establish instream flow regimes, as well as the ability to legally
allocate water. These are usually policy-making agencies that rely on data
collected by others and make authoriti tati ve allocations after hearing evidence
from all sides. "Arbitrators" avoid political or public participation
strategies by relying mostly on legal or quasi-legal proceedings and management
strategies.

After beginning the MAPO section of the program, LIAM will list the
groups that you created by name and assign quantified scores for each of the
designated categories of "broker," "arbitrator," "advocate," and "guardian."
These scores express the degree to which the groups are expected to follow
these designated roles. These scores are assigned a letter to represent the
groups that will appear on the graph we call the role-map (Figure 2). The
letters determine a position for each group within one of the 16 subquadrants
on the role-map. The further from the middle (or origin) on the continuum
that the agency is found, either right or left, is an indication of the degree
to which the agency being described exhibits that particular role type. The
closer to the origin, the more moderate its role intensity; proximity to the
edges suggests a more extreme role position. It is important to remember that
the role-map attempts to indicate the intensity of a particular role or combi-
nation of roles and does not suggest an agency's power.

The computer creates eight subquadrants by drawing an invisible diagonal
line from the corners of the graph through the origin. Each subquadrant is
assigned a letter, A-J . (See sample graph of role-map. Figure 2). The
computer also draws an arc in each quadrant, which functionally creates another
eight subquadrants (eight inside and eight outside of the arc). The arc is
drawn as a function of the average distance from the origin to all the players
in a given quadrant.

For the 132-column role-map, an arc can be accurately drawn as a function
of the average distance from the origin to the participating groups (also
called "players") in a given quadrant. The 80-column format is too small to
allow an accurate display of what the computer has calculated. In further
analyses, the role-map participants will be identified by their assigned
letter and the quadrant letter on your terminal screen.

18

BROKER

ADVOCATE

GUARDIAN

ARBITRATOR

Figure 2. Role-map graph.

19

You can double check the points assigned to each group yourself. Imagine
a 0-4 scale on the role-map, both vertically and horizontally from the origin.
The point of origin is equal to the 0 point. Determine the difference between
the broker and arbitrator score that the computer displays on your screen.
Symbolize it by placing a tentative dot in the direction of the positive score
on the vertical axis of the role-map. Do the same thing with the advocate-
guardian scores on the horizontal axis.

For example, if the broker score is 3.5, and the arbitrator score is 2.0,
place a tentative dot in the direction of the broker quadrants approximately
1.5 points from the origin. In order to find the final placement of the dot,
compute the advocate-guardian score and move tUe dot horizontally in the
direction of the positive score.

For example, with an advocate score of 2.0 and a guardian score of 3.0,
the difference is 1.0 in the horizontal direction of guardian. Locate the
final placement of the marker dot up; from the 1.0 horizontal plane to a point
of convergence with the broker-arbitrator tentative dot which is now extended
to the right by 1.0 (i.e., broker = 1.5: guardian = 1) .

The "AVERAGE QUADRANT ARCS" shown on the screen above the role-map show
the point at which the computer calculates the boundary for each quadrant to
intersect the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Additionally, resource
power, information power, and constituency-support power scores will be
determined.

Next, the screen will display in a bar graph the relative power of each
agency that you are describing. The asterisk (*) represents an agency's
resource powers, the number symbol (#) represents the information powers, and
the percentage symbol (%) represents the constituency support for each agency
1 i sted .

The predicted roles for each organization will then be listed. A brief
explanation of the broker-arbitrator, advocate-guardian tendencies is provided
for each organization that you list.

The letter assigned earlier to each group is used next in a final grid
that displays the distance between the varied powers (horizontal letter exten-
sion) and intensity of roles (vertical spaces) for all agencies in relation to
each other. The computer will list the name of the agency from whose perspec-
tive the grid views the other agencies' role intensities and perceived power
previously identified. Next, the computer shows the relative power and role
distances for each agency requested. This completes the analysis.

Your screen will then display:

ANALYSIS COMPLETE

(See a sample run of MAPO in Example 7.)

20

-PLOTUM,,

The -PLOTUM,, program differs from the -MAPUM, , program in that it creates
a grid of relative positions of the participants on a high resolution Versatec
plot located at CSU Computer Center. It gives none of the open-ended (textual)
information that is found in -MAPUM,,. Prior arrangements must be made to
have this fine-line plot constructed from your questionnaire data by contacting
the CSU Computer Center.

21

CLOSING REMARKS

The LIAM process helps you as a user and planner to explore the varied
dimensions of decision-making and to choose a strong and relevant position for
presentation during a negotiation. In addition to technical information, an
organization's internal resources and power capabilities are quantified and
graphed. Understanding one's own organizational perspective is a major step
in creating a unified position at the decision-making table. Other organiza-
tions' perceived roles, needs, and concerns can then be directly addressed;
alternatives can be proposed and explored.

The scope of the LIAM process is currently expanding. We project that
LIAM will be adapted for use on microcomputers in the foreseeable future. An
added program called -CONTRAZ,, is presently being developed, which would
allow the user to compare the responses and power scores of one respondent to
another respondent or to an existing data base and create a histogram or a
Versatec plot of the resulting data.

PSCOLOR is another LIAM program whose use is, at present, severely
limited. This program allows 35mm color slides to be photographed from a
PS300 computer's graphic color screen. The multi-dimensional relationships of
different organizations can be easily identified by the output of this program.
This program requires the user to work closely with the Western Energy and
Land Use Team and to acquire an account for the PS300 machine located at CSU.

Your suggestions and responses to the LIAM process and its accompanying
short courses, and ways that the LIAM can be adapted to your particular circum-
stances, are heartily welcome. Address your comments to: The Instream Flow
Group, Western Energy and Land Use Team, Drake Creekside Building One, 2627
Redwing Rd. , Fort Collins, CO 80526.

22

APPENDIX A

Example 1
Logging On and Off

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/15, 14.06.26CSU GOLD MACHINE,
NOS 2.3-617/617

FAMILY:

READY.

XXX: XXXX, XXX [CR]*

Logging on

batch [CR]

$RFL,0.

/

bye [CR]

UN=LFATZCK LOG OFF 14.07.25. Loqqinq off

JSN=KGCM SRU-S= 1.024

CHARACTERS= 0.493KCHS

'[CR] is the act of pressing the "carriage return" or "return" key.

23

Example 2
Creating Your File

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/15. 14.08.08.CSU GOLD MACHINE.
NOS 2.3-617/617

FAMILY:

READY.

XXX: XXXX, XXX

batch [CR]

$RFL,0.

/xedit.redlake [CR]

^

XEDIT 3.1.00

EMPTY FILE/ CREATION MODE ASSUMED.

?? [CR]

INPUT

? this is my file for the redlake project.

[CR'

? I could stop here or continue entering

[CR'

? information regarding the project. When

[CR'

? I have entered all that I wish, I must

[cr:

? press two (2) carriage returns to close

[CR'

? my file.
?

[CR

EDIT

?? end, redlake, rl [CR]

REDLAKE REPLACED

REDLAKE IS A LOCAL FILE
/

24

Example 3
Reviewing the Catalog of Your Filename

/ [CR]

catlist
CATALOG OF LFATZCK FM/GOLD 85/08/15. U. 11.39.

INDIRECT ACCESS FILES

DATAB GOSPEL KATE LIAMTX PROCFIL SUBLIB VPLT
DCOMP IFG200 LIAMLB LMTEXT REDLAKE TR WPF

16 INDIRECT ACCESS FILES, TOTAL PRUS = 1518.

25

Example 4
Running -Menu Program

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/15. 14.18.02.CSU GOLD MACHINE.
NOS 2.3-617/617

FAMILY:

READY.

XXX: XXXX, XXX [CR]

batch [CR]

$RFL,0.

/-menu [CR]

WELCOME TO LIAM (LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL). THIS
IS THE MENU WHICH DEMONSTRATES HOW ALL PROGRAMS IN THIS SIMU-
LATION PACKAGE OPERATE. BELOW IS A LIST OF ALL PROGRAMS
AND A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THEY DO. TO RUN ANY PROGRAM
YOU MUST SIMPLY TYPE THE SMALL PHRASE THAT APPEARS BEFORE EACH
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.

PROGRAMS IN THIS MENU MAY BE RUN AFTER A COMPUTER PROMPT (/),
USING COMMANDS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING: -plotum, ,(your filename).
TO RUN THIS PROGRAM (FOR EXAMPLE, IF suzy IS YOUR filename)
YOU WOULD TYPE -plotum, , suzy AND A CARRIAGE RETURN.

REMEMBER: TO THE COMPUTER, COMMAS AND MINUS SIGNS ARE AS
INFORMATIVE AS LETTERS AND NUMBERS. ADDING THEM UNNECESSARILY
CAUSES THE COMPUTER TO DENY KNOWING YOU. NEGLECTING TO ADD
THEM WHEN NECESSARY IS THE MOST COMMON CAUSE OF USER GRIEF AND
IT RESULTS IN YOUR COMMANDS BEING IGNORED AND THE PROGRAM ENDING.
SO GIVE THE MINUS SIGNS AND COMMAS YOUR UTMOST ATTENTION!

A CARRIAGE RETURN WILL CONTINUE

/-NEWQ,,(your filename) -THIS PROGRAM IS THE LONG VERSION OF
THE LIAM INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS QUESTIONNAIRE. IT CON-
TAINS A FULL LISTING OF ALL QUESTIONS IN THE MASTER LIST.
DON'T CHOOSE THIS PROGRAM UNLESS YOU WANT TO ANSWER ALL
OF THE QUESTIONS. NO NEW INSIGHT CAN BE GAINED FROM
THIS, AS TWO-THIRDS OF THE QUESTIONS ARE REDUNDANT. ALL
RESPONSES TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE
FILE SPECIFIED BY YOUR FILE NAME.

26

/-QUERY,, (your filename) -THIS PROGRAM IS THE SHORT VERSION OF THE
LIAM INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS QUESTIONNAIRE. ALL RESPONSES
TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE SAVED IN THE FILE WHICH YOU
NAME.

A CARRIAGE RETURN WILL CONTINUE.

/-LOOKY,,(your filename) -ONCE YOU HAVE TAKEN THE LIAM SIMULA-
TION QUESTIONNAIRE, THIS PROGRAM ALLOWS YOU TO PERFORM
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS ON YOUR RESPONSES:

1) REVIEW YOUR RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

2) ANSWER ALL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS.

3) PERFORM A RESOURCE/IDEOLOGY ANALYSIS ON

THE GROUP ANALYZED.

4) CHANGE YOUR RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTION IN THE

QUESTIONNAIRE.

/-MAPUM,,(your filename) -THIS PROGRAM ALLOWS YOU, THE USER, TO
PRODUCE LINE PRINTER QUALITY PLOTS WHICH CAN BE
ROUTED TO THE NEAREST LINE PRINTER. DATA FOR THIS
PROGRAM COMES FROM YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE DATA SET OR ANY
OTHER QUESTIONNAIRES DATA SET YOU SPECIFY.

A CARRIAGE RETURN WILL CONTINUE.

/-PLOTUM,,(your filename) -THIS IS THE PROGRAM THAT ALLOWS YOU
TO COMBINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES TO PRODUCE A
"VERSATEC" PLOT OF THE INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN A
SIMULATION. THIS PLOT IS OF MUCH FINER QUALITY
THAN -MAPUM'S LINE PRINTOUT. THE DATA USED FOR
THIS PLOTTING SEQUENCE COMES FROM YOUR FILE.

/-CONTRAZ,,(your filename) -THIS PROGRAM COMPARES AND CONTRASTS
TWO OPPOSING ORGANIZATIONS. THIS PROGRAM GIVES BOTH
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH ORGANIZATION.
OUTPUT IS TO THE SCREEN OR TO AN OUTPUT NAMED "OPOZ".

THIS IS THE CONCLUSION OF THE USER MENU FOR THE LIAM SIMULATION
PACKAGE. DON'T FORGET, IF YOU WANT TO SEE THIS MENU AGAIN AT ANY
TIME FOLLOWING A / SYMBOL MERELY TYPE -MENU AND THESE PROGRAM
DESCRIPTIONS WILL RETURN TO THE SCREEN. GOOD LUCK AND HAPPY
COMPUTING!

A CARRIAGE RETURN WILL END THE MENU.

?

REVERT

/ (The computer / indicates it is awaiting a command.)

27

Example 5
Beginning - Query,, Program

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/85 14.06.26CSU GOLD MACHINE
NOS 2.3-617/617

FAMILY:

READY.

XXX: XXXX, XXX [CR]

batch [CR]

$RFL,0.

/-query, .redlake [CR]

WELCOME TO THE LIAM SIMULATION PACKAGE

THIS IS THE QUESTIONNAIRE THAT HELPS YOU ANALYZE THE VARIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WHO INFLUENCE PUBLIC
POLICY DECISIONS. IF YOU HAVE NOT RUN THIS SIMULATION BEFORE
AND WOULD LIKE TO BETTER ACQUAINT YOURSELF WITH ITS OPERATION
TYPE 'HELP' NOW. FIRST TIME USERS CERTAINLY SHOULD TYPE 'help'.
THIS WILL PROVIDE SPECIAL EXPLANATIONS DURING THE QUESTION-
NAIRE THAT WILL HELP YOU UNDERSTAND HOW THE PROGRAM WORKS
AND EXPLAIN THE PROPER WAY TO RESPOND TO THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS
ASKED DURING THIS SIMULATION. IF YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE BEFORE AND ARE FAMILIAR WITH ITS OPERATION, A
CARRIAGE RETURN WILL CAUSE THESE MESSAGES TO BE SUPPRESSED THUS
SPEEDING UP THE QUESTIONING PROCESS.

(PLEASE ENTER A CARRIAGE RETURN OR TYPE 'HELP')

/ (program continues)

28

Example 6
Running -Looky,, Program

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/15, 14.06.26CSU GOLD MACHINE
NOS 2.3-617/617

FAMILY:

XXX: XXXX, XXX [CR]

REAE f' .

batch [CR]

$RFL,0.

/-looky, ,red1ake [CR]

(Program begins . . . )

29

Example 7
Running -Mapum,, Program

ENTER 0 FOR GREEN SYSTEM

ENTER 1 FOR GOLD SYSTEM
WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1983.

85/08/05. 14.47.22.CSU GOLD MACHINE.
NOS 2.3-517/517

FAMILY:

READY.

XXX: XXXX, XXX

batch

$RFL,0.

/-mapum, ,redlake

[CR]

[CR]
[CR]

WELCOME TO THE LIAM PLOTTING PROGRAM

THESE ARE ALL RESPONDENTS IN THE INPUT FILE:

Name

1)

Respondent #1

7/14/85

5:35

FOR-DEPT OF FISH

2)

Respondent #2

07/15/85

5:37

FOR-FISHERIES

3)

Respondent #3

07/15/85

17:42

FOR-DEPT FISH

4)

Respondent #4

7/15/85

5:59 PM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

5)

Respondent #5

07/15/85

05:55 PM

FOR-DOE

6)

Respondent #6

07/15/85

05:24 PM

FOR-DOE

7)

Respondent #7

25/85

:36 AM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

8)

Respondent #8

7725785

4:07 PM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

9)

Respondent #9

8/8/85

10:11 AM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

10)

Respondent #10

08/09/85

14:56 AM

FOR-DEPARTMENT OF GAME

11)

Respondent #11

8/15/85

9:32 AM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

12)

Respondent #12

8/14/85

10:10 AM

FOR-CITY OF SEATTLE

PLEASE SELECT THE RESPONDENTS THAT WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THIS PLOT. IF MORE THAN ONE
RESPONDENT IS TO BE COMBINED TO CREATE A GROUP
ENTER THEM ON ONE LINE WITH ONLY A SPACE BETWEEN
THEM (EX:3 4 6) AND THEN PRESS A CARRIAGE
RETURN. TO REVIEW THE RESPONDENTS ONCE AGAIN
TYPE: R [CR]

?

1 2 3

(program continues; choose appropriate responses)

30

YOU HAVE SELECTED THE FOLLOWING FILES TO BE
COMBINED AS ONE GROUP AND OUTPUT:

RESPONDENT #1

(7/14/85

5:35

)

FOR-DEPT OF FISH

RESPONDENT #2

(07/15/85

5:37

)

FOR-FISHERIES

RESPONDENT #3

(07/15/85

17:42

)

FOR-DEPT FISH

WHAT TITLE WOULD YOU LIKE FOR THIS COMBINED GROUP?
? fng (you can give it any title you desire)
YOU CAN NOW SELECT FROM A VARIETY OF OPTIONS:

1) REMOVE THIS GROUP AND RESELECT ITS MEMBERS

2) ADD ADDITIONAL RESPONDENTS TO THIS GROUP

3) REVIEW THE MASTER RESPONDENTS LIST

4) COMBINE THESE RESPONDENTS INTO A SINGLE

GROUP AND BEGIN SPECIFYING OTHER GROUPS

5) CONSIDER THESE A GROUP AND BEGIN PLOTTING WITH IT

AND OTHER COMBINED GROUPS (CHOOSE OPTION 5 ONLY AFTER
YOU HAVE CREATED AT LEAST 2 GROUPS)

PLEASE SELECT ONE OPTION AND TYPE A CARRIAGE RETURN.

? 4

PLEASE ENTER THE NUMBERS OF THOSE RESPONDENTS
TO BE COMBINED FOR THE NEXT GROUP.

(TO REVIEW ALL GROUPS TYPE: R [CR])

? 7 8 9

YOU HAVE SELECTED THE FOLLOWING FILES TO BE
COMBINED AS ONE (GROUP AND OUTPUT):

RESPONDENT #1

(25/85

:36 AM )

FOR-CITY

OF

SEATTLE

RESPONDENT #2

(7725785

4:07 PM )

FOR-CITY

OF

SEATTLE

RESPONDENT #3

(8/8/85

10:11 AM )

FOR-CITY

OF

SEATTLE

WHAT TITLE WOULD YOU LIKE FOR THIS COMBINED GROUP?
? city

YOU CAN NOW SELECT FROM A VARIETY OF OPTIONS:

1) REMOVE THIS GROUP AND RESELECT ITS MEMBERS

2) ADD ADDITIONAL RESPONDENTS TO THIS GROUP

3) REVIEW THE MASTER RESPONDENTS LIST

4) COMBINE THESE RESPONDENTS INTO A SINGLE

GROUP AND BEGIN SPECIFYING OTHER GROUPS

5) CONSIDER THESE A GROUP AND BEGIN PLOTTING WITH IT

AND OTHER COMBINED GROUPS (CHOOSE OPTION 5 ONLY AFTER
YOU HAVE CREATED AT LEAST 2 GROUPS)

31

PLEASE SELECT ONE OPTION AND TYPE A CARRIAGE RETURN.

PLEASE ENTER THE NUMBERS OF THOSE RESPONDENTS
TO BE COMBINED FOR THE NEXT GROUP.

(TO REVIEW ALL GROUPS TYPE: R [CR])

? 5 6

YOU HAVE SELECTED THE FOLLOWING FILES TO BE
COMBINED AS ONE GROUP AND OUTPUT:

RESPONDENT #5 ( 07/15/85 06:55 PM ) FOR-DOE
RESPONDENT #6 ( 07/15/85 06:24 PM ) FOR-DOE

WHAT TITLE WOULD YOU LIKE FOR THIS COMBINED GROUP?

? manager

YOU CAN NOW SELECT FROM A VARIETY OF OPTIONS:

1) REMOVE THIS GROUP AND RESELECT ITS MEMBERS

2) ADD ADDITIONAL RESPONDENTS TO THIS GROUP

3) REVIEW THE MASTER RESPONDENTS LIST

4) COMBINE THESE RESPONDENTS INTO A SINGLE

GROUP AND BEGIN SPECIFYING OTHER GROUPS

5) CONSIDER THESE A GROUP AND BEGIN PLOTTING WITH IT

AND OTHER COMBINED GROUPS (CHOOSE OPTION 5 ONLY
AFTER YOU HAVE CREATED AT LEAST 2 GROUPS)

PLEASE SELECT ONE OPTION AND TYPE A CARRIAGE RETURN.

IF YOU ARE CERTAIN THAT THESE ARE ALL THE GROUPS
YOU WISH TO ENTER HIT THE CARRIAGE RETURN AGAIN.
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE GROUPS A LAST TIME
TYPE: R [CR]

?

BEGIN PLOTTING

YOU MAY SELECT ONE OF TWO OUTPUT SIZES
(80 COLUMNS IS AN 8.5 BY 11 SIZE AND FITS
ON YOUR TERMINAL SCREEN; 132 COLUMNS IS A
LARGER COMPUTER PRINT OUT SIZE).

1) 80 COLUMN

2) 132 COLUMN

PLEASE CHOOSE 1) OR 2) AND PRESS A CARRIAGE RETURN,

1

32

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE LINES PRINTED ON
THE PLOT? Y/N

? y

SHOULD GROUP PERSPECTIVE PLOTS BE INCLUDED IN THE OUTPUT? Y/N

? y

THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE INPUT GROUPS:

1) PNG

2) CITY

3) MANAGER

PLEASE SELECT THE NUMBER OF THE GROUP FROM
WHOSE PERSPECTIVE YOU WISH TO EXAMINE THE
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

? 1

THE PERSPECTIVE PLOT HAS BEEN DRAWN.

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE PLOT FROM ANOTHER
PERSPECTIVE? Y/N

? y

THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE INPUT GROUPS:

1) FNG

2) CITY

3) MANAGER

PLEASE SELECT THE NUMBER OF THE GROUP FROM
WHOSE PERSPECTIVE YOU WISH TO EXAMINE THE
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

? 2

THE PERSPECTIVE PLOT HAS BEEN DRAWN.

WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE THE PLOT FROM ANOTHER
PERSPECTIVE? Y/N

ANALYSIS COMPLETE. *OUTPUT IN LOCAL FILE MAPO.
1 i st,f=mapo

LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL (LIAM)

TABLE OF RESPONDENT POSITIONS AND POLICY POINT

33

TABLE OF RESPONDENT POSITIONS AND POLICY POINT

FNG

BROKER SCORE -
ARBITRATOR SCORE -
ADVOCATE SCORE -
GUARDIAN SCORE -
RESOURCE POWER -
INFORMATION POWER -
CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT

3.3
3.1
4.5
1.6
3.3
3.5
3.6

CITY

BROKER SCORE -

3.6

ARBITRATOR SCORE -

3.0

ADVOCATE SCORE -

2.4

GUARDIAN SCORE -

4.0

RESOURCE POWER -

3.5

INFORMATION POWER -

3.9

CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT -

2.5

MANAGER

BROKER SCORE -

3.1

ARBITRATOR SCORE -

3.1

ADVOCATE SCORE -

4.1

GUARDIAN SCORE -

2.5

RESOURCE POWER -

2.4

INFORMATION POWER -

4.1

CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT -

1.9

AVERAGE QUADRANT ACRS

1ST
2ND
3RD
4TH

1.7
2.2
0.0
0.0

34

— EOR
*********************************************************

* * A-FNG

* * B-CITY

* B C-MANAGER

* R

* D *

* K *

* X E *

* X R X BB *

* AA CC * XBB *

* AA CC * X *

****** An\/QrATC*****************************QMADnT AM** ** **

* * *

* * *

* * *

* A *

* R *

* B *

* J *

* J *

* * *

* * *

*********************************************************

35

THIS IS HOW ALL GROUPS INVOLVED IN THIS SIMULATION APPEAR TO CITY:

V V

V V
V V
V

IBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

3CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

3AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA&

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &

& &
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

ANALYSIS COMPLETE

36

THIS IS HOW ALL GROUPS INVOLVED IN THIS SIMULATION APPEAR TO FNG:

V V

V V

V

1AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

3CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

3BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

CiCiCiQiQiCiCiCiiLCiCiQiiiitQliiQt&liiiiCiQtai^QtSiQiS^

37

LEGEND

*********

******** _ RESOURCE POWER
*********

*****************
******

****** - INFORMATION POWER
******************

0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/

/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o
0/0/0/0/0/

°% °% % °% % - CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT

0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/ 0/0/0/0/0/0/0/ 0/
/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o/o

THESE ARE THE PREDICTED ROLES FOR EACH ORGANIZATION:

FOR FNG

SUBQUADRANT: P

ROLE INTENSITY: EXTREME ADVOCATE-BROKER

TENDS TO BE QUITE ACTIVE AND VOCAL ON BEHALF OF CHANGING THE WAYS IN
WHICH BUSINESS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE PAST, BUT PREFERS TO OPERATE IN THE
POLITICAL ARENA, WHERE SOLUTIONS ARE THE RESULT OF BARGAINING AND COMPROMISE.
CONSIDERS FACTUAL ARGUMENTS, PROVIDED THEY DO NOT RUN OPPOSITE TO POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS. TENDS TO BE IDEOLOGICAL. WILL PUSH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

FOR CITY

SUBQUADRANT: E

ROLE INTENSITY: MODERATE GUARDIAN-BROKER

PREFERS TO OPERATE IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, ESPECIALLY TO PRESERVE THEIR
OWN INTERESTS AND WAYS IN WHICH THEIR BUSINESS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE PAST.
IS LIKELY TO BE INFLUENCED BY ARGUMENTS WHICH DEMONSTRATE THE CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN THE PROPOSED SOLUTION AND THEIR OWN INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY ON ECONOMIC
TERMS, AS WELL AS THE INTEREST OF THEIR CLIENTS. TENDS TO FAVOR BARGAINED
SOLUTIONS FACILITATED BY A POLITICAL ENTITY, RATHER THAN DECISIONS BASED ON
SCIENTIFIC AND/OR TECHNICAL INFORMATION DECIDED BY AN OBJECTIVE REGULATOR.
SPEAKS OF CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT.

FOR MANAGER

SUBQUADRANT: H

ROLE INTENSITY: MODERATE ADVOCATE-BROKER

PREFERS TO CHANGE THE WAYS IN WHICH DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST,
BUT ALSO TO DEVELOP BARGAINED SOLUTIONS FACILITATED BY A POLITICAL COALITION.
WILL USE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL INFORMATION, BUT WILL ALSO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE
CONSTITUENT SUPPORT ON BEHALF OF SUCH CHANGE. SPEAKS OF CONSERVATION AND THE
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.

38

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

abort - TO BE USED WITH THE -QUERY,, PROGRAM, YOU CAN TYPE abort AND YOU WILL
BE GIVEN THREE CHOICES: A. YOU CAN CONTINUE THE QUESTIONNAIRE, B. YOU
CAN STOP TAKING THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAVE THE RESPONSES UP TO THAT
POINT, OR C. YOU CAN STOP THE QUESTIONNAIRE PROCESS AND NOT SAVE THE
RESPONSES.

accuracy, speed and tirelessness - THREE REASONS YOU ARE USING A COMPUTER!

analog - AN ADJECTIVE FOR THE COMPUTERS THAT DO SOMETHING SPECIFIC RATHER THAN
TELL YOU SOMETHING.

backspace - A FEW WAYS TO ERASE: (1) PRESS CTRL (CONTROL) KEY AND THE H KEY
SIMULTANEOUSLY ON YOUR KEYBOARD AND, AS THE CURSOR MOVES BACKWARDS, YOUR
INCORRECTLY ENTERED LETTERS OR NUMBERS WILL BE DELETED; RESUME TYPING
WHEN YOU HAVE DISCARDED UNWANTED CHARACTERS; (2) PRESS DEL (DELETE) KEY
ONCE FOR EACH LETTER YOU WISH TO REMOVE; (3) PRESS BACKSPACE KEY (CHECK
YOUR TERMINAL'S USER'S MANUAL FOR THE CORRECT PROCEDURE.)

batch mode - A MODE OF PROCESSING DATA. IN THIS MODE, WHEN YOU RUN YOUR
COMPUTER PROGRAM, ALL THE INPUT DATA IS LOADED INTO THE SYSTEM IN A BIG
BATCH. THE PROGRAM, ALONG WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT HOW TO COMPUTE THE
DATA AND ALL THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, ARE RUN AT SOME LATER TIME, IN YOUR
CASE PROBABLY MILLI-SECONDS LATER. THIS MODE IS LESS EXPENSIVE THAN
OTHERS.

baud rate - THE SPEED AT WHICH THE COMPUTER ACKNOWLEDGES YOUR KEYBOARD ENTRIES.
300 IS A COMMON (AND SLOW) RATE; 1200 BAUD IS QUICK, ABOUT AS FAST AS THE
EYE CAN READ; AND 4800 BAUD IS DOWNRIGHT SPEEDY.

boot - THE PROCESS OF STARTING UP A PERSONAL OR MICRO-COMPUTER AND GETTING IT
TO DO SOMETHING. MOST COMPUTERS HAVE TO BE FED DIRECTIONS TO TURN ON THE
OPERATING SYSTEM BEFORE THEY CAN BE TOLD WHAT ELSE TO DO. GIVING THOSE
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMPUTER, USUALLY VIA A DISKETTE, IS CALLED 'BOOTING'
THE SYSTEM. THE LIAM PROCESS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR MICRO-COMPUTER USE IN
THE FUTURE.

break - THE BREAK KEY INTERRUPTS AND SUSPENDS THE PROGRAM YOU ARE CURRENTLY
RUNNING. TO RESUME OPERATIONS IN THE SAME PLACE, PRESS THE CARRIAGE
RETURN KEY. LIAM PROGRAMS ARE SHORT ENOUGH THAT YOU SHOULD NOT NEED TO
USE THIS KEY.

39

bug - A HOLE IN THE BASIC LOGIC OF THE PROGRAM THAT WILL CAUSE IT TO FAIL:
NAMED AFTER A REAL BUG THAT DIED AND MELTED ONTO A PIECE OF COMPUTER
EQUIPMENT IN THE 1950' s, AND IN SO DOING, BROUGHT THE WHOLE PROGRAM TO A
HALT.

bye - THIS IS A COMMAND TO THE COMPUTER THAT TERMINATES THE COMMUNICATION TO
YOUR TERMINAL. YOU USE THIS COMMAND WHEN YOU ARE LOGGING OFF.

catlist - THIS IS A COMMAND THAT CALLS TO YOUR ATTENTION A CATALOG LISTING OF
ALL THE FILES LOCATED IN THE PERMANENT FILE SPACE. YOU MIGHT CHECK HERE
AFTER YOU CREATED YOUR FILESPACE IN xedit BECAUSE YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE
RESPONSES WILL BE STORED THERE. ANOTHER TIME TO CHECK THE catlist MIGHT
BE AFTER YOU HAVE RUN -MAPUM,, WHEN THE FILE mapo HAS BEEN CREATED IN
YOUR LOCAL FILESPACE AND YOU DECIDE TO KEEP IT IN PERMANENT FILESPACE.
TO DO SO, JUST TYPE replace, mapo AND A CR.

computerphobia - AN UNREALISTIC FEAR OF COMPUTERS OVERCOME BY HANDS-ON PRACTICE
AND REMEMBERING THAT (1) MISTAKES ARE NATURAL AND (2) THE COMPUTER WON'T
BREAK OR REPLACE YOU.

computerphrenia - AN EXAGGERATED BELIEF IN THE CAPABILITIES OF COMPUTERS.

crash - A TOTAL COMPUTER MALFUNCTION; A SYSTEM DEATH. DON'T LOOSE HEART:
BEGIN AGAIN. 1) TYPE THE REWIND * COMMAND, AND, 2) TYPE:

-PROGRAMNAME, FILENAME [CR]

creation mode - THE CONTEXT WITHIN THE xedit PROGRAM THAT ALLOWS YOU TO CREATE
A FILE IN WHICH THE ANSWERS TO THE LIAM QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE STORED.

CTRL key - A KEY TO USE WITH THE "h" KEY TO BACKSPACE AND ERASE AN UNWANTED
WORD OR NUMBER. JUST PRESS THEM BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THE CURSOR WILL
GO BACKWARDS ONE SPACE AT A TIME UNTIL YOU RELEASE THE KEYS. WHEN xon
HAS BEEN ACTIVATED, PRESSING Ctrl AND s KEYS SIMULTANEOUSLY WILL STOP A
FILE FROM PRINTING, AND Ctrl AND q WILL RESUME THE PRINTING. (SEE xon IN
GLOSSARY).

cursor - THE FLASHING MARK ON YOUR TERMINAL SCREEN THAT TELLS YOU THE PLACE
YOUR KEYBOARD WILL RECORD YOUR ENTRIES. ALL ANSWERS, TEXT, ETC. IS
ENTERED OR DELETED AT THE POSITION OF THE cursor. A cursor IS NOT A
FRUSTRATED USER WHO SHOUTS AT THE COMPUTER.

cyber - THE COMPUTER SYSTEM AT COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY WHICH YOU ARE USING
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE LIAM PROCESS. CYBER SERIES COMPUTERS ARE PRODUCED
BY CONTROL DATA CORPORATION.

deductive reasoning - A FORM OF LOGIC THAT MOVES FROM A GENERAL RULE TO A
SPECIFIC CASE. THE COMPUTER IS FUNCTIONING DEDUCTIVELY WHEN IT LETS YOU
ADAPT THE LIAM THEORY TO YOUR SPECIAL SITUATION.

digital - AN ADJECTIVE WHICH DESCRIBES COMPUTERS THAT MANIPULATE NUMBERS AND
WORDS TO GIVE YOU INFORMATION. THIS IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO AN ANALOG
COMPUTER.

40

end,,rl - A GOOD COMMAND IN THE xedit PROGRAM WHEN YOU FINISH CREATING YOUR
FILE. TYPE THIS AND YOUR FILE IS REPLACED IN PERMANENT FILESPACE.

eoi encountered - THE COMPUTER'S NOTATION TELLING YOU THAT YOU HAVE COME TO
THE 'END OF INFORMATION' IN YOUR FILE. THIS IS NOT AN ERROR. A rewind,
filename COMMAND WILL REWIND THE FILE FOR YOU.

file, filename - IS A RECORD OF THE ENTRIES (QUESTIONNAIRES OR TEXTS) YOU
CREATE TO WORK WITH FOR THE LIAM PROCESS; filename IS THE NAME YOU GIVE
YOUR FILE.

filespace - TWO KINDS:

local filespace - TEMPORARY FILES THAT EXIST AS A RESULT OF A PROGRAM OR
COMMAND EXECUTION, LIKE mapo. IF THEY ARE NOT SAVED, THEY WILL
DISAPPEAR WHEN YOU log off. SAVE THEM IN xedit WITH A replace,
filename COMMAND.

permanent filespace - FILES STORED REMOTELY ON MASS STORAGE DEVICES WHICH
MUST BE RETRIEVED TO BE USED. LIAM IS LOCATED IN PERMANENT FILESPACE
FROM WHICH YOU CREATE YOUR LOCAL FILES.

glitch - AN ANNOYING AND NON-SUBSTANTIVE ERROR THAT CAN STOP YOU COLD BUT IS
EASILY FIXED BY A GLANCE AT THIS PRIMER PERHAPS OR AT THE 'TROUBLE-
SHOOTING' SECTION.

hardware - THE PHYSICAL COMPUTER; ALL THE PARTS OF THE COMPUTER THAT YOU CAN,
BUT SHOULD NOT, KICK WHEN THINGS GO AMUCK.

hello - A COMMAND THAT ALLOWS YOU TO log off YOUR PRESENT USAGE AND log on
AGAIN USING ANOTHER USER NUMBER WITHOUT HANGING UP AND REDIALING. JUST
TYPE hello AND YOU WILL BEGIN THE Logging on PROCESS OVER AGAIN BY ENTER-
ING YOUR USERNAME AND PASSWORD AS REQUESTED.

help - A COMMAND THAT WILL LIST ALL COMMANDS AND FUNCTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER THE
NETWORK OPERATING SYSTEM (NOS) AND A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THEM (EXCEPT IN
THE -QUERY,, PROGRAM) TO HELP YOU OPERATE YOUR PROGRAM.

idle - A COMPUTER RESPONSE TO YOU SAYING IT IS "ALIVE" AND WELL AND AWAITING
YOUR INPUT.

inductive reasoning - A FORM OF LOGIC THAT MOVES FROM SPECIFIC CASES TO GENERAL
THEORY; MORE CHARACTERISTIC OF HUMANS THAN COMPUTERS.

infinite loop - SEE loop.

interactive terminal - AN INPUT-OUTPUT DEVICE THAT ALLOWS YOU TO "TALK BACK"
TO THE COMPUTER. YOUR TERMINAL ALLOWS YOU TO ACCESS YOUR FILES AND RUN
YOUR PROGRAMS BY FOLLOWING THE COMPUTER'S QUESTIONS AND PROMPTS.

interrupt - IF YOU WISH TO STOP YOUR TERMINAL FROM LISTING YOUR FILE OR
PRINTING YOUR DATA, PRESS THE break KEY ON YOUR KEYBOARD. THIS ACTION
interrupts THE READOUT; A CARRIAGE RETURN WILL RESUME IT.

41

keyboard paralysis - ACUTE, UNEXPECTED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BEFORE A COMPUTER
TERMINAL WHICH DISAPPEARS AFTER AN HOUR OF GENTLE INTERACTION WITH A
FRIENDLY COMPUTER PROGRAM SUCH AS -QUERY,,.

list,f=mapo - THIS COMMAND IS USED WHEN YOU WISH TO LOOK AT YOUR MAPO FILE.
AFTER YOU HAVE RUN THE -MAPUM,, PROGRAM, AND THE COMPUTER SIGNALS:

REVERT. *OUTPUT IN LOCAL FILE MAPO.
TYPE:

list.f^mapo [CR]

AND YOU WILL BEGIN THE GRAPHIC RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM.

list,f=Tapel2 - THIS COMMAND IS USED WHEN YOU WISH TO LOOK AT YOUR OPEN ENDED
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN THE QUERY QUESTIONNAIRE. AFTER A COMPUTER
RESPONSE OF /,

TYPE:

list,F=Tapel2 [CR]

local files - INTERACTIVE AND TEMPORARY FILES THAT EXIST AS A RESULT OF YOUR
COMMAND EXECUTION. TO SAVE ANYTHING YOU SUSPECT IS A LOCAL FILE ONLY,
SIMPLY TYPE replace, your filename BEFORE YOU log off.

logging off - THE ACT OF DISCONNECTING YOUR TERMINAL FROM THE CSU CYBER
COMPUTER. AFTER REPLACING YOUR FILE, SIMPLY TYPE bye AND YOUR ELECTRIC
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPUTER WILL BE TERMINATED.

logging on - THE ACT OF TELLING THE COMPUTER THAT YOU, A NEW USER, ARE READY
TO BEGIN WORKING. HAVE YOUR ACCOUNT USERNAME AND PASSWORD READY TO GIVE
THE CYBER COMPUTER WITH YOUR TERMINAL AND MODEM TURNED ON.

loop - SEE infinite loop.

menu-drive - AN ADJECTIVE USED TO DESCRIBE A FRIENDLY PROGRAM - LIKE LIAM -
THAT GIVES YOU CHOICES OF WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO WITH THE COMPUTER.
THEN YOU JUST CHOOSE FROM THE -MENU. TO SEE IT, JUST TYPE: -MENU
(REMEMBER THE DASH).

modem - MOdulator-DEModulator , TO BE EXACT: A DEVICE THAT ALLOWS YOU TO
COMMUNICATE WITH THE COMPUTER BY PHONE. IT CONVERTS MACHINE LANGUAGE
SIGNALS INTO ELECTRONIC SIGNALS WHICH IT TRANSMITS OVER THE TELEPHONE.
ALWAYS CHECK TO ASSURE YOURSELF THE CORD END OF THE PHONE IS CORRECTLY
MATCHED UP TO THE TOP OF THE MODEM.

NOS - ABBREVIATION FOR THE "NETWORK OPERATING SYSTEM" — ALL BASIC
INSTRUCTIONS — FOR THE CYBER SERIES COMPUTER.

operating system - A SYSTEM (LIKE A LARGE PROGRAM) YOU USE TO OPERATE THE
COMPUTER — IT IS NOT hardware, BUT RATHER THE PROCEDURES, ASSUMPTIONS
AND COMMANDS ABOUT HOW THINGS WILL BE DONE ON THE COMPUTER.

42

password - YOUR INDIVIDUAL AND NECESSARY WORD-KEY TO BEGIN COMPUTER COMMUNICA-
TIONS TO YOUR TERMINAL. TO OBTAIN YOUR password, CONTACT THE INSTREAM
FLOW GROUP, 2627 REDWING ROAD, FORT COLLINS, CO 80526, (303) 225-9331 OR
CONTACT the CSU COMPUTER CENTER DIRECTLY (303) 491-7395. YOU WILL BE
GIVEN A USER NUMBER TOO.

permanent files - TWO KINDS:

indirect access - LIAM FILES ARE INDIRECT. WHEN YOU WORK ON YOUR FILE,
YOU ARE ACTUALLY WORKING ON A LOCAL COPY OF THE FILE WHICH IS ALWAYS
KEPT IN PERMANENT SPACE.

direct access - IN CONTRAST, WHEN YOU WORK ON A DIRECT FILE, YOU WORK ON
THE ONLY COPY OF THE FILE THAT EXISTS AND ANY CHANGES OR ERRORS ARE
PERMANENT.

printer - A COMPANION MACHINE TO YOUR TERMINAL THAT PRINTS PAPER (i.e., "HARD")
COPIES OF YOUR FILE AT YOUR REQUEST. IT MUST BE CONNECTED TO YOUR
TERMINAL TO PRINT.

program - A SET OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPUTER TO FOLLOW.

purge - AN IMPORTANT (AND POSSIBLY DANGEROUS) COMMAND THAT WILL DELETE A FILE
FROM PERMANENT STORAGE IN YOUR ACCOUNT. USE WITH CAUTION. EXAMPLE:
purge, fi lename.

recoverable job - WHEN YOU ARE UNWILLINGLY CUT OFF FROM THE COMPUTER, WITHOUT
BENEFIT OF logging off YOU CAN CONTINUE THAT JOB BY logging on AGAIN, AT
WHICH TIME, THE COMPUTER, EMBARRASSED THAT IT TERMINATED YOUR RELATION-
SHIP, WILL ASK YOU IF YOU WISH TO RECOVER YOUR PREVIOUS JOB. IT WILL
GIVE YOU THE JSN (JOB SEQUENCE NUMBER) OF THAT JOB, AND ASK YOU TO TYPE
IT (JSN) AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. ONCE DONE, YOU WILL FIND YOURSELF
PRECISELY WHERE YOU WERE SO RUDELY INTERRUPTED. YOU HAVE TEN MINUTES TO
RECOVER THAT JOB. IF YOU CANNOT RECOVER WITHIN TEN MINUTES, JUST START
THE PROGRAM FROM THE BEGINNING.

ready - A COMPUTER RESPONSE TELLING YOU IT IS WAITING FOR YOUR COMMAND.

replace - A COMMAND TO THE COMPUTER TO TRANSFER A DUPLICATE OF A LOCAL FILE
YOU ARE WORKING WITH INTO AN ALREADY-EXISTING PERMANENT FILE. THIS IS A
HANDY COMMAND TO SAVE YOUR FILES AFTER EACH USE; JUST TYPE replace, your
filename.

revert - A COMPUTER RESPONSE TELLING YOU THE PROGRAM YOU ARE WORKING ON IS
FINISHED. IT IS NOT REPORTING AN ERROR: THE COMPUTER IS 'BACK' INTO ITS
GENERAL OPERATING SYSTEM, WAITING FOR YOUR NEXT COMMAND.

rewind* - A COMMAND TELLING THE COMPUTER TO REWIND ALL OF YOUR FILES BACK TO
THE BEGINNING, OR 'TOP' OF EACH FILE. THE COMMAND rewind, fi lename WILL
REWIND A SPECIFIC FILE.

43

rollout, 7777 - A COMMAND THAT PUTS THE COMPUTER 'ON HOLD' FOR AS LONG AS 30

MINUTES AT YOUR EXPENSE WHILE YOU TEND TO OTHER MATTERS. YOU CAN TYPE

rollout, 7777 ANYTIME AFTER A / MARK EXCEPT IN THE -QUERY, , PROGRAM WHERE
IT IS NOT AN OPTION.

run - TO MAKE A PROGRAM PERFORM ACCORDING TO ITS INSTRUCTIONS.

rwf - A COMMAND TELLING THE COMPUTER TO REWIND ALL OF YOUR FILES BACK TO THE
BEGINNING, OR 'top' OF EACH FILE.

save - A COMMAND THAT ALLOWS YOU TO SAVE A FILE IN PERMANENT STORAGE. USE
ONLY ONCE FOR A FILE WHEN IT IS NOT PREVIOUSLY IN PERMANENT STORAGE.
REMEMBER THE replace COMMAND CAN BE USED REPEATEDLY TO SAVE YOUR FILE.

status, f - A HELPFUL COMMAND THAT INSTRUCTS THE COMPUTER TO LIST ALL THE FILES
CURRENTLY HELD IN LOCAL FILE SPACE. JUST TYPE status, f [CR]

software - THE PROGRAMS, IDEAS, LISTS, RESULTS AND PROCEDURES FOR WHICH THE
hardware IS CREATED.

T - A COMMAND ONLY USED IN xedit MODE THAT PUTS YOU AT THE START OR 'TOP' OF
YOUR FILE. TYPE T [CR]

terminal - AN INPUT OR DISPLAY DEVICE THAT LOOKS LIKE A CROSS BETWEEN A TELE-
VISION AND A TYPEWRITER AND CONNECTS TO A COMPUTER.

time out - TIRED? INTERRUPTED? THE COMPUTER WILL WAIT UP TO 30 MINUTES FOR
YOU. JUST TYPE rollout, 777, AND PUT THE COMPUTER ON HOLD. IF YOU ARE
DISCONNECTED, log on AGAIN AND ENTER THE recoverable job USERNAME YOU ARE
GIVEN BY THE COMPUTER WHEREUPON YOU WILL BE RETURNED TO YOUR PARTICULAR
PRE-TIMEOUT PLACE.

user friendly - AN ADJECTIVE USED TO DESCRIBE A COMPUTER AND PROGRAMS THAT
DIGEST YOUR INFORMATION AND DATA POLITELY AND AID YOU IN UNDERSTANDING
YOUR PARTICULAR PROBLEM.

username and password - YOUR PRIVATE ACCESS KEY TO THE CYBER SERIES COMPUTERS
AT CSU. OBTAIN YOURS BY CALLING THE OFFICE OF BERTON LAMB, INSTREAM FLOW
GROUP, 2728 REDWIND ROAD, FORT COLLINS, CO. (303) 226-9331 OR THE CSU
COMPUTER CENTER (303) 491-7395.

wait - A NOTICE TO YOU THAT THE COMPUTER LINE IS BEING CLEARED TO ACCEPT YOUR
COMMANDS AND INPUT. USUALLY, THIS MEANS WAITING A FEW MOMENTS.

xedit - AN INTERACTIVE TEXT EDITOR DESIGNED TO CREATE AND MODIFY FILES. WITH
THE LIAM PROCESS, YOU WILL USE xedit TO CREATE THE FILE TO STORE ALL YOUR
-QUERY,, RESPONSES IN, AS WELL AS THE RESULTING DATA. xedit HAS A
DIFFERENT SET OF COMMANDS FROM THE REGULAR batch MODE. THE TWO SIGNALS
YOU MUST BE MOST AWARE OF ARE:

"?" WHICH IS xedit' s WAY OF TELLING YOU IT IS WAITING FOR YOU TO TYPE
INFORMATION (INPUT) INTO YOUR FILE; EVERYTHING TYPED AFTER A ? ,
WILL BE RECORDED IN YOUR FILE; AND

44

"??" WHICH IS xedit's WAY OF TELLING YOU IT IS WAITING FOR YOU TO TYPE A
COMMAND. THIS SIGNAL IS ANALOGOUS TO THE / NOTATION IN batch.

xon - THIS IS A HANDY SYSTEM COMMAND THAT ENABLES YOU TO STOP AND RESUME
LENGTHY COMPUTER OUTPUT ON YOUR SCREEN. WHEN YOU ARE IN batch MODE, TYPE
xon AND A CR BEFORE RUNNING A LONG PROGRAM. TO STOP A FILE FROM
"SCROLLING" ENDLESS DATA, PRESS YOUR Ctrl AND s KEYS SIMULTANEOUSLY; TO
RESUME THE DISPLAY, PRESS Ctrl AND q KEYS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

/ THIS SLASH IS THE COMPUTER'S NOTATION TELLING YOU IT IS WAITING FOR YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS. REMEMBER TO ENTER A CARRIAGE RETURN [CR] AFTER YOUR
INSTRUCTIONS.

- THIS DASH IS THE COMPUTER CHARACTER FOR begin. IT NOTIFIES THE COMPUTER TO
PREPARE TO RUN A PARTICULAR LIAM PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE, -MAPUM,,YOUR
FILENAME.

45

APPENDIX C

TROUBLESHOOTING: Questions and Assorted Remedies

What if ...you are unsuccessful at logging on?

CHECK YOUR MODEM. MAKE CERTAIN IT IS ON AND ATTACHED PROPERLY TO YOUR
TERMINAL. CHECK YOUR USERNAME AND PASSWORD. WHEN YOU ENTER THEM AFTER THE
COMPUTER REQUEST family: , YOU WILL NOT SEE THEM ON YOUR SCREEN AS YOU TYPE
THEM, SO USE CARE IN ENTERING THEM PRECISELY. YOU HAVE THREE TRIES BEFORE THE
COMPUTER WILL DISCONNECT. CHECK YOUR USERNAME AND PASSWORD, MAKING SURE YOU
ARE NOT ADDING OR DELETING ANY COMMAS.

What if . . .the computer responds that it is busy when you attempt to log on?

FLIP THE MODEM SWITCH OFF AND ON. WAIT A FEW MOMENTS. REDIAL THE COMPUTER
TELEPHONE NUMBER.

What if ...the computer is printing gibberish (called computer noise) on your
screen while you attempt to enter information?

WHEN THE COMPUTER LINE IS WEAK OR OVERLOADED YOU HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO log
off AND TRY LATER OR YOU MAY CONTINUE DISREGARDING THE EXTRA LETTERS. SUCH
"NOISE" IS OFTEN MOMENTARY.

What if.. .you mi sspel 1 ed a word?

YOU HAVE A FEW OPTIONS DEPENDING ON YOUR COMPUTER HARDWARE:

1. PRESS THE [CTRL] KEY AND THE LETTER [H] KEY SIMULTANEOUSLY AND
MOVE THE CURSOR THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF SPACES BACKWARD, THEN
RE-ENTER THE CORRECT KEYS.

2. PRESS THE [DEL] (DELETE) KEY.

3. PRESS THE ARROWED BACKSPACE KEY.

4. CHECK THE USER'S MANUAL FOR YOUR PARTICULAR TERMINAL.
What if ...you wish to create a file?

SEE PAGE 6.

What if ...you wish to create a second file?

LOG ON WITH YOUR SAME USERNAME AND PASSWORD AND PROCEED AS THOUGH YOU ARE
CREATING YOUR FIRST FILE, PAGE 6.

/

46

What if . . .you have lost your data set?

TYPE catlist TO SEE WHETHER IT IS IN PERMANENT FILESPACE. RE-ENTER THE PROGRAM
YOU WITH TO RUN WITH YOUR FILENAME AND PRESS A [CR]. TYPE: rwf WHICH WILL
REWIND YOUR FILE. NOW TRY RUNNING IT BY TYPING: -PROGRAMNAME, FILENAME [CR]

What if . . .you must leave your terminal for a few minutes?

AFTER A / , YOU MAY TYPE rollout, 7777 AND THE COMPUTER WILL 'WAIT' FOR YOU
APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES AND THEN LOG YOU OFF AUTOMATICALLY. TYPE: stop [CR]
TO RESUME. rollout, 7777 IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE MIDST OF THE -QUERY,,
QUESTIONNAIRE. This procedure is expensive.

What if ...the computer stops?

"DOWN-TIME" IS TIME THE COMPUTER IS NOT FUNCTIONING. IF THE COMPUTER DISCON-
NECTS FROM YOUR TERMINAL WITHOUT WARNING, YOU HAVE LITTLE CHOICE THAN TO
ATTEMPT TO log on AGAIN. IF YOU SUCCESSFULLY log on WITHIN THE NEXT TEN
MINUTES, THE COMPUTER MIGHT ANNOUNCE recoverable job ON YOUR SCREEN. YOU CAN
RECOVER YOUR PREVIOUS WORK BY ENTERING THE LETTERS AND NUMBERS COMBINATION
THAT THE COMPUTER ASSIGNED YOUR INTERRUPTED JOB. IF YOU WOULD RATHER START A
NEW JOB, TYPE: go [CR]

What if ...your terminal screen reads: READY ?

"READY" IS ANALOGOUS TO THE / NOTATION AND MEANS THE COMPUTER AWAITS A
COMMAND. YOU MAY CHOOSE TO SEE THE -MENU, RUN A PROGRAM, OR CREATE A FILE.
It is less expensive to type BATCH and run in that mode.

What if ...your terminal screen reads: ?? ?

THE DOUBLE QUESTIONMARKS ARE FOUND ON IN xedit. THEY ARE ANALOGOUS TO /
NOTATION IN batch mode. THE COMPUTER IS WAITING FOR YOUR COMMAND, THE MOST
LIKELY OF WHICH WOULD BE input WHICH LETS YOU EITHER CREATE OR ADD TO A FILE.
TO GET OUT OF XEDIT WITHOUT SAVING ANYTHING TYPE: abort [CR]

What if ...your terminal screen reads: ? ?

YOU ARE NOW IN THE input MODE OF xedit WHEN YOU SEE A SINGLE ? . EVERYTHING
YOU TYPE AFTER IT WILL BE RECORDED VERBATIM IN YOUR FILE. WHEN YOU FINISH
ENTERING THE INFORMATION YOU WISH TO RECORD, PRESS CR TWICE.

What if... the pri nter i s not pri nti ng out your file?

CHECK THE COMMUNICATION LINES BETWEEN YOUR TERMINAL, PRINTER AND MODEL. CHECK
THE PRECISE PROCEDURES FOR TRANSFERING INPUT.

What if ...you must choose the size output for your printer when using
-Mapum, , program?

1) 80 column PRINTS ON 8 and 1/2 INCH PAPER;

47

2) 132 column PRINTS ON 16 INCH REGULAR COMPUTER SIZE PAPER.
What if ...you wish to see what is in your local filespace?
AFTER A / , TYPE: status, f [CR]

What if .. .you wish to see what is in your permanent f i le space?
AFTER A / , TYPE: catlist [CR]

48 * 'J-5- GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFI' 1986 673-174/45343

50273-101

REPORT DOCUMENTATION
PAGE

1. REPORT NO.

Rinlnair.fll Rppnrt 8fif9)

4. TItl* and Subtitle

.A New Perspective in Institutional Analysis:
} Institutional Analysis Model

The Legal-

3. Recipient's Accesilon No.

5. Report Date

September 1986

7. Authors)

Leah J. Wilds

8. Parformfng Organization Rept. No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address National ECOl Ogy Center

Division of Wildlife & Contaminant

Research
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Servcie
2627 Redwing' Rd.
Fort Collins, CO 80526-2899

10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.

11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No.

(C>

(G)

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address National ECOlOgy Center

Division of Wildlife & Contaminant

Research
Fish and Wildlife Service
U.S. Department of the Interior

13. Type of Report & Period Covered

14.

IS. Supplementary Notes

Washington, DC 20240

IS. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)

The Legal-Institutional Analysis Model (LIAM) helps an analyst to: (1) develop a better
understanding of the biases of the decisionmaking process through which resource decisions
are typically made; (2) predict the behavioral patterns which are likely to emerge among
organizations in a given conflict; (3) examine the power differentials among those
.organizations; and (4) develop more effective negotiation strategies for the resolution of
pinstream flow and other water resource conflicts. The model is based upon a synthesis of
various social science research concepts, which were themselves developed as part of the
continuing effort to understand and explain decisionmaking in the United States. The
combined result of the organizational phenomena depicted in these research efforts is that
organizational behavior is highly predictable. Prediction is incorporated into the LIAM
using the concept of roles. The model allows the user to systematically analyze the
political aspects of an agency's abiltiy to achieve its goals in a project negotiation.
LIAM is especially useful for assessing an organization's position vis a vis the other
agencies involved in a project. Using LIAM, a planner will then be better able to choose
the most appropriate strategies for goal achievement, conflict resolution, and
negotiation.

17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors

Computer simulation
Management methods
Negotiations
Organization theory

b. ldantlfisrs/Op«n-Ended Terms

Policy analysis

c COSATI Fleld/GiDup

ll. Availability Statement

Release unlimited

19. Security Class (This Report)

Unclassified

20. Security Class (This Page)

Unclassified

21. No. of Pages

143

22. Price

(SMANSI-Z39.18)

See Instructions on Reverse

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
(Formerly NTIS-35)
Department of Commerce

Take Pride in America

Use Natural Resources Wisely

' — r;: — \

KIKHAWII.DIIf'E
SF.RVICf-:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

As the Nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has respon-
sibility for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes
fostering the wisest use of our land and water resources, protecting our fish and wildlife,
preserving th»environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places,
and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The Department as-
sesses our energy and mineral resources and works to assure that their development is in
the best interests of all our people. The Department also has a major responsibility for
American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under
U.S. administration.

s