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DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY.

Selected, Prepared and Published

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BALTIMORE: JOHN P. DES FORGES.

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DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY.

It is scarcely possible to conceive a man capable of reflection, who has not, at times, proposed to himself the following questions : Whence am I? and whence the innumerable tribes of plants and of animals which I see, in constant succession, rising into existence? Whence the beautiful fabric of this universe ? and by what wise and powerful Being were the principles of my constitution so wonderfully adapted to the various objects around me ? To whom am I indebted for the distinguished rank which I hold in the creation, and for the num- berless blessings which have fallen to my lot ? And what return shall I make for this profu- sion of goodness? The only return I can make is by accommodating my conduct to the

will of my Creator, and by fulfilling, as far as I am able, the purposes of my being. But how are these purposes to be discovered ? Every individual chooses for himself the ends of his pursuit, and chooses the means which he is to employ for attaining them. Are all these elec- tions equally good ? and there is no law pre- scribed to man ? I feel the reverse. I am able to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, what is honorable and becoming from what is unworthy, base ; what is laudable and meritorious from what is shameful and criminal. Here, then, are plain indications of the conduct I ought to pursue. There is a law prescribed to man as well as to the brutes. The only dif- ference is, that it depends on my own will whether I obey or disobey it. And shall I alone counteract the intentions of my Maker, by abusing that freedom of choice which he has been pleased to bestow on me by raising me to the rank of a rational and moral being ?

This is surely the language of nature ; and which could not fail to occur to every man capable of serious thought, were not the under- standing and the moral feelings in some in- stances miserably perverted by religious and political prejudices.

How callous must be that heart which does

not echo back the reflections which Milton puts into the mouth of our first parent !

11 Thou sun — said I — fair light, And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay, And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, Tell, if you saw, how came I thus, how here ; Not of myself ; by some Great Maker then, In goodness, as in power pre-eminent ; Tell me how I may know him, how adore, From whom I have, that thus I move and live, And feel that I am happier than I know.''

In this manner a consideration of the rela- tion in which we stand to God must satisfy us that it is our duty, or that it is morally right we should obey his will, as manifested by that inward monitor established by himself as his vicegerent in our breast. Our moral powers give rise to religious sentiments, and these be- come in their turn the most powerful induce- ments to the practice of morality.

When once we have established the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause from the works of creation, we are unavoidably led to apply to him our conceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive him as filling the in- finite extent of both with his presence and his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those awful impressions which are natu-

rally produced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still more by the idea of endless duration. When we speak,, therefore, of in- finite power, wisdom, and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from space and time, are at least wonderfully aided by this analogy ; so that the conceptions of immensity and eter- nity necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes.

Important use may also be made of these conceptions of immensity and eternity in stat- ing the argument for the future existence of the soul. For why was the mind of man rendered capable of extending its views in point of time beyond the limits of human transactions, and in point of space beyond the limits of the vis- ible universe, if all our prospects are to ter- minate here ? — or why was a glimpse of so magnificent a scene disclosed to a being the period of whose animal existence bears so small a proportion to the vastness of his desires ? Surely this conception of the necessary exist- ence of space and time, of immensity and eter- nity, was not forced continually upon the thoughts of man for no purpose whatever. And to what purpose can we suppose it to be sub- servient, but to remind those who make a pro- per use of their reason, of the trifling value of

some of those objects we at present pursue, when compared with the scenes on which we may afterwards enter ; and to animate us in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, by affording us the prospect of an indefinite progression ?

OF THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

In entering on this subject, we may lay it down as a fundamental principle that our ideas of the moral attributes of God must be derived from our own moral perceptions. It is only by attending to these that we can form a concep- tion of what his attributes are ; and it is in this way we are furnished with the strongest proofs that they really belong to him. The power of distinguishing right from wrong is one of the most remarkable circumstances which raise man above the brutes ; to act in conformity to this sense of rectitude is the highest excellence which man is -capable of attaining ; insomuch that, in comparison of moral worth, the most splendid intellectual endowments appear insig- nificant. The constitution of our nature de- termines us to conceive the distinction between

right and wrong as eternal and immutable ; not as arising from an arbitrary accommodation of our frame to the qualities of external objects, like the distinction between agreeable and disa- greeable tastes or smells, but as a distinction necessary and essential, and independent of the will of any being whatever, — analogous in this respect to that between mathematical truth and falsehood. We are justified, therefore, in draw- ing inferences from our own moral judgments with respect to the moral administration of the Deity, on the same ground on which we conclude that what appears to us to be demonstrably true must appear in the same light to all other in- telligent beings. And as moral worth is the highest excellence competent to our own nature, we are justified in ranking moral excellence among those attributes of God which more peculiarly claim our love and adoration.

But not to insist on this metaphysical view of the subject, it is evident that, if we believe that we have derived our existence from the Deity, we must ascribe to him in an infinite degree all those powers and perfections which he has communicated to us, or which he has rendered us capable of acquiring.

From our own imperfect knowledge we must ascribe to him omniscience ; from our limited

power we must ascribe to him omnipotence ; and, a fortiori, from our moral perceptions we must ascribe to him unerring moral rectitude, and goodness unbounded towards his wThole crea- tion.

In opposition to this mode of reasoning, skeptics have frequently urged the impropriety of forming a deity after our own image ; and have represented the argument I stated for the moral attributes of God as arising from the same illusion of the imagination which leads the vulgar to ascribe to him the human form and organs of perception analogous to our own.

But the comparison is by no means just. These is obviously a wide distinction between the possession of a power and the being limited to the exercise of that power in a particular way. The former is always a perfection, the latter is a mark of an imperfect and dependent being. Thus the possession of knowledge is a perfection, and we may venture to ascribe it in an infinite degree to the Deity ; but it would be rash in us, from what we experience in our- selves, to conclude that the Deity investigates truth by those slow processes of deduction which are suited to the weakness of the human faculties. In like manner, although it would be absurd to suppose that the Deity hears and sees

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in a way analogous to what we experience in ourselves, we may without impiety conclude, nay we must from the fact believe, that he pos- sesses in an infinite degree of perfection all our powers of perception, because it is from him that we have received them. " He that made the eye, shall he not see ? He that made the ear, shall he not hear ? " Not indeed by means of bodily organs similar to ours, but in some way far above the reach of our comprehension.

The argument which these considerations afforcj for the great and important truth I wish to establish at present, is irresistible. Moral excellence appears obviously to constitute the chief perfection of the human mind ; and we cannot help considering the moral attributes of God as claiming, in a more especial manner, our love and adoration than either his wisdom or power.

With respect to that particular attribute of the Deity to which the following reasonings more immediately relate, the general argument applies with singular force. The peculiar sen- timent of approbation with which we regard the virtue of beneficence in others, and the peculiar satisfaction with which we reflect on such of our actions as have contributed to the happiness of mankind — to which we may add

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the exquisite pleasure accompanying the exer- cise of all the kind affections — naturally lead us to consider benevolence or goodness as the supreme attribute of God. It is difficult indeed to conceive what other motive could have in- duced a Being, completely and independently happy, to call his creatures into existence.

In this manner then, without going farther than our own moral perceptions, we have a strong argument for the moral attributes of God ; and this argument will strike us with the greater force in proportion to the culture which our moral perceptions have received.

The same observation may be applied to the , moral argument for a future state. The effect of both these arguments on the mind may be in a great measure destroyed by dissipation and profligacy ; or — on the other hand — by a sedulous and reverential attention to the moral suggestions of our own breasts, it may be iden- tified with all our habits of thought and of action. It is owing to this that, while the truths of natural religion are regarded by some as the dreams of a warm imagination, they command the assent of others with the evidence of intuitive certainty. " Be persuaded," says Shaftesbury, " that wisdom is more from the heart than from the head. Feel goodness, and 2b

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you will see all things fair and good." " Dwell with honesty, and beauty, and order ; study and love what is of this kind, and in time you will know and love the author/ '

Just and comfortable views of Providence, and of man's future destination, will lead to the true worship of the author of our being without supernatural aid.

Locke says we have a power of doing what we will. " If it be the occasion of disorder, it is the cause of order, of all the moral order that appears in the world. Had liberty been ex- cluded, virtue had been excluded with it. And if this had been the case, the world could have had no charms, no beauties sufficient to recom- mend it to him who made it. In short, all other powers and perfections would have been very defective without this, which is truly the life and spirit of the whole creation/ '

Now, in so far as happiness and misery depend on ourselves, the question with respect to the permission of evil is reduced to this : Why was man made a free agent? Or, in other words, why does not the author of nature make his creatures happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and put it out of their power to incur misery by vice and folly ? A question to which — if it is not too presumptu-

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ous to subject it to our discussion — the two following considerations seem to afford a suffi- cient answer.

In the first place, we may observe that per- haps the object of the Deity in the government of the world is not merely to communicate happiness, but to form His creatures to moral excellence ; a purpose for the accomplishment of which it was absolutely necessary to bestow on them a freedom of choice between good and evil. This observation is hinted at by Butler in the following passage : " Perhaps the Divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely per- fect mind may be pleased with seeing His creatures behave suitably to the nature which He has given them, to the relations in which He has placed them to each other, and to that which they stand in to Himself, which during their existence is even necessary, and which is the most important one of all. Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with the moral piety of moral agents in and for itself, as well as upon account of its being es- sentially conducive to the happiness of His creation.' '

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A second supposition which may be sug- gested in answer to the foregoing question is, that perhaps the enjoyment of high degrees of happiness may necessarily require the previous acquisition of virtuous habits, in which case a greater sum of happiness is produced by the present order of things than could have been gained by any other. Nor is this merely a gratuitous supposition ; for we know it from the fact that the highest enjoyments of which our nature is susceptible, arise from a conscientious discharge of our duty, and from the possession of those qualities which virtuous habits have a tendency to form or to inspire.

The sufferings produced by vice are on this supposition instances of the goodness of God, no less than the happiness resulting from virtue. The final cause of both is the same, — to pro- mote the improvement of our nature ; as it is from the same motive of love that an affection- ate parent rewards the obedience and punishes the disobedience of his child.

I would add, however, as a necessary limita- tion of this remark, that it applies only to those slighter deviations from duty which may occa- sionally occur in the conduct of men habitually virtuous ; for in the case of crimes of a deeper dye, and which unfit a man to continue any

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longer a member of society, remorse produces the unmixed agonies of despair.

These observations justify Providence not only for the permission of moral evil, but for the permission of many things which are com- monly complained of as physical evils. How great is the proportion of these which are the obvious consequences of our vices and preju- dices, and which, so far from being a necessary part of the order of nature, seem intended, in the progress of human affairs, as a gradual remedy against the causes which produce them. Whatever evils are consequences of vice and prejudice are not a necessary part of the order of nature. On the contrary, they lead to a correction of the abuses from which they spring. They warn us that there is something amiss in our own conduct or in that of other men ; and they stimulate our exertions in the search of a remedy, as those occasional pains to which the body is liable tend to the preservation of health and vigor, by the intimation they give of our internal disorders.

Some of our other complaints with respect to the lot of humanity will be found, on examina- tion, to arise from partial views of the constitu- tion of man, and from a want of attention to the circumstances which promote his improve- ment, or which constitute his happiness.

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When we compare the condition of man at the moment of his first appearance on this scene with that of some other animals, he appears to be in many respects their inferior. His infancy is more helpless, and of much longer duration. Most animals are covered with furs, or with skins of a sufficient thickness to protect them from the inclemencies of the seasons ; and all of them are directed by instinct in what manner they may choose or construct the most conve- nient habitation for securing themselves from danger and for raising their offspring. The human infant alone enters the world naked and exposed, without a covering to the fury of the elements, surrounded with dangers beyond his ability to cope with.

Notwithstanding, however, the unpromising aspect of his original condition, man has no just cause to complain of the bounty of nature ; for it is in the apparent disadvantages of his condition, in the multiplicity of his wants, and in the urgency of his necessities, that the foun- dation is laid of that superiority which he is destined to acquire over all the other inhabitants of the globe.

The necessity of certain inconveniences in our external circumstances, to rouse the energies and to improve the capacities of the human

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mind, is strongly illustrated by the compara- tively low state of the intellectual powers in such tribes of our species as derive the neces- saries and accommodations of life from the im- mediate bounty of nature. No other explana- tion can, I think, be given of those peculiarities in the genius of some of the South Sea islanders.

" The natives of Otaheite, and the adjacent Society Isles, are generally of a lively brisk temper, great lovers of mirth and laughter, and of an open, easy, benevolent character. Their natural levity hinders them from paying a long attention to any one thing. You might as well undertake to fix mercury as to keep their mind steady on the same subject. M

Such, indeed, is the constitution of the human mind, that it may be safely affirmed that any individual might be fixed through life in a state of infantine imbecility, by withholding every stimulus to his active exertions, and by gratify- ing every want as fast as it arose.

Nor is the activity of life merely the school of wisdom and of virtue to man ; it is the great source of his present enjoyment.

11 The happiness of man when most distin- guished, is not proportioned to his external pos- sessions, but to the exertion and application of his faculties. It is not proportioned to his ex-

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emption from danger, but to the magnanimity, courage, and fortitude with which he acts. It is not proportioned to the benefits he receives, but to those he bestows ; or rather to the candor and benevolence with which, as a person oblig- ing and obliged, he is ready to embrace his fellow-creatures, and to acknowledge or reward their merits.

" The rich and the powerful, say the vulgar, are happy, for they are exempted from labor and care. Their pleasures come unsought for, and without any alloy of pain."

What do the idle devise to fill up the blank of real affairs? Not a bed of repose, nor a succession of inert and slothful enjoyments ; they devise sports that engage them in labor, and toil not less severe than that of the indigent man who works for his bread ; and expose themselves to dangers not less real than those which occur in what are thought the most hazardous pursuits of human life.

For the subjects of those complaints which have been now under our consideration, a foun- dation is laid in the general laws of nature, and in the constitution of the human mind. The one is adapted to the other, as the fin of the fish is adapted to the water, or the wing of the bird to the air ; and if the order of things was

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changed in conformity to our wishes, the world would be no longer a scene fitted for such beings as inhabit it at present. Our complaints are founded in our ignorant conceptions of our real good, which lead us to mistake what are in truth excellences and beauties in the scheme of Providence, for imperfections and deformities.

The circumstances on which these complaints are founded are in some degree common to the whole race ; and wherever this is the case, I believe it will not be difficult to trace the bene- ficent purposes of Providence.

But what account shall we give of the evils produced by what are commonly called the accidents of life ; accidents from which no state of society, how perfect soever, can possibly be exempted ; and which, if they be subservient to any benevolent purposes, contribute to none within the sphere of our knowledge ? What account shall we give of those cruel calamities which so often overwhelm individuals, and ag- gravate the miseries of their condition so far beyond the common lot of humanity? That troubles should occur in the life of man we can see obvious reasons ; and in fact they do occur in a sufficient degree in the life of the most for- tunate. But why those awful strokes that so often fall on men of inoffensive or virtuous

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habits, and who do not seem to stand more in need of the school of adversity than many around them who enjoy in security all the goods of fortune ?

On such occasions we must no doubt be fre- quently forced to acknowledge that the ways of Providence are unsearchable, and we must strive to fortify our minds by the pious hope that the sufferings we endure at present are sub- servient to some beneficial plan which we are unable to comprehend. In the meantime, it is of the utmost consequence for us always to re- collect, that accidents of this sort are insepar- able from a state of things where the inhab- itants are free agents, and where the Deity governs by general laws.

They could not be prevented but by partic- ular interpositions, or in other words, by sus- pending occasionally the general laws by which his administration is conducted. That the evils resulting from such suspensions would far out- weigh the partial good to be gained from them, is obvious even to our limited faculties.

With respect to these general laws, their tendency will be found in every instance favor- able to order and to happiness. This observa- tion, I am persuaded, will appear, upon an ac- curate examination, to hold without any excep-

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tion whatever ; and it is one of the noblest employments of philosophy to verify and illustrate its universality, by investigating the beneficent purposes to which the laws of nature are subservient. Now it is evidently from these general laws alone that the ultimate ends of Providence can be judged of, and not from their accidental collisions with the partial in- terests of individuals ; collisions too which so often arise from an abuse of their moral liberty. It is the great error of the vulgar — who are incapable of comprehensive views — to attempt to read the ways of Providence in particular events, and to judge favorably or unfavorably of the order of the universe from its accidental effects with respect to themselves or their friends. Perhaps, indeed, this disposition is in- separable in some degree from the weakness of humanity. But surely it is a weakness that we ought to strive to correct ; and the more we do correct it, the more pleasing our conceptions of the universe become. Accidental incon- veniences disappear when compared with the magnitude of the advantages which it is the object of the general laws to secure : " or," as one author has expressed it, "scattered evils are lost in the blaze of superabundant good- ness, as the spots on the disc of the sun are lost in the splendor of his rays."

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Many of our moral qualities, too, are the result of habits which imply the existence of physical evil. Patience, fortitude, humanity, all suppose a scene in which sufferings are to be endured in our own case, or relieved in the case of others.

The argument for the goodness of God which arises from the foregoing considerations, will be much strengthened if it shall appear farther that the sum of happiness in human life far exceeds the sum of misery.

It is of importance to remark how small is the number of individuals who draw the atten- tion of the world by their crimes, when com- pared with the millions who pass their days in inoffensive obscurity.

We may add to this observation, that even in those unhappy periods which have furnished the most ample materials to the historian, the storm has spent its rage in general on a com- paratively small number of men placed in the more conspicuous stations of society by their birth, by their talents, by their ambition, or by an heroical sense of duty, while the unobserved multitude saw it pass over their heads, or only heard its noise at a distance.

I have spoken of the multitudes who pass through life in obscurity, as if their characters

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were merely inoffensive, and entitled them only to a negative praise, whereas it may be reason- ably doubted if it is not among them that the highest attainments of humanity have been made. Much the larger portion of our species not destined to come forward on the great theatre of human affairs, how meretorious in most instances, how exalted in many instances, is the general tenor of their conduct! And when unusual combinations of circumstances have forced even those denominated the weaker sex into situations of difficulty and danger, what splendid examples of constancy and mag- nanimity have they left behind them ! Every person, too, who has turned his attention at all to the manners of the middle and humble classes, and who has studied them with candor, must have met, among the many faults that may be fairly charged on their education and their circumstances, with numberless instances of integrity and of humanity which would have added lustre to the highest stations. There is not a more interesting circumstance mentioned in any biographical detail than the emotion which Moliere is said to have discovered when a common beggar, to whom he had hastily given a piece of gold instead of a small copper coin, returned and informed him of his mistake.

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These imperfect hints, if they are allowed to be well-founded, go far to justify a very pleasing idea of Mr. Addison's, that " there are prob- ably greater men who lie concealed among the species, than those who come out and draw on themselves the eyes and admiration of mankind.' ' We are dazzled with the splendor of titles, the ostentation of learning, the noise of victories, while God sees the truly great and good man, the philosopher in the cottage, who possesses his great soul in patience and thankfulness, under the pressure of what little souls call poverty and distress.

The evening walk of a wise man is more il- lustrious in the sight of God than the march of a general at the head of a victorious army. A contemplation of God's works, a voluntary act of justice to our own detriment, tears that are shed in silence for the miseries of others, a private desire or resentment broken or subdued ; in short, an unfeigned exercise of humility, or any other virtue, are such actions as are glorious in the sight of the great searcher of hearts.

Having dwelt so long on the beneficent ten- dency of those laws which regulate the more essential interests of mankind, I must content myself with barely mentioning, before leaving this subject, the rich provision made for our en-

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joyment in the pleasures of the understanding, of the imagination, and of the heart. How delightful are the pursuits of science, how various, how inexhaustible ! How pure, how tranquil are the pleasures afforded by the fine arts ! How enlivening the charms of social- intercourse ! How exquisite the endearments of affection ! How sublime the raptures of devotion ! The accommodation of our sensitive powers to the scene we occupy is still more wonderful, inasmuch as over and above the care which is taken for the preservation of our animal being, and the means provided for our intellectual and moral improvement, there ap- pears to be a positive adaptation of our frame to the earth we inhabit ; an adaptation our Maker could destine for no other end but to multiply the sources of our enjoyment. Surely he might have contrived to enlighten the earth without displaying to our view the glories of the firmament. The day and the night might have regularly succeeded each other without our once having beheld the splendor of a morn- ing sun, or the glow of an evening sky. The spring might have ministered to the fertility of summer and of autumn without scattering over the earth a profusion of flowers and blossoms, without refreshing the eye with the soft verdure

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of the fields, or filling the woods with joy and melody.

" Nor content With every food of life to nourish man, Thou mad'st all nature beauty to his eye And music to his ear."

14 The whole frame of the universe," says Epictetus, u is full of the goodness of God; and to be convinced of this important truth, noth- ing more is necessary than an attentive mind and a grateful heart."

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