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HOW BULL RUN BATTLE WAS LOST.

THE BALL'S BLUFF MASSACRE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST—FREMONT.

BULL RUN.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report, with accompanying testimony, in relation to the Battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861:

So long a time has elapsed, and so many important events have occurred in the progress of the war, since the campaign which ended with the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your Committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report. The testimony they submit herewith is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that campaign. They therefore submit a brief report, confining their attention principally to the causes which led to the defeat of our army in that battle.

That which now appears to have been the great error of that campaign was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad communication in all that section of country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collected and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months men could have made the place easily defensible against any force the enemy could have brought against it; and it is not at all probable that the Rebel forces would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops.

The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was so nearly expired. In that respect the movement was made too late rather than too soon, and the enemy were a long time to collect their forces at Manassas and to strengthen the position by defensive works. The reason why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to some extent, by the testimony, to which your Committee would direct the attention of those who desire to examine that point.

And when the movement was finally decided upon, much was needed to render the troops efficient. There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even as regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in reference to brigade movements, and none at all as divisions. When Gen. McDowell reviewed eight regiments together—the only instance previous to the battle, as the evidence shows, that even that number of troops were maneuvered in one body—he was charged with desiring to make a show.

Gen. McDowell was instructed, verbally, by Gen. Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of operations against the enemy at Manassas. This plan was considered in Cabinet meeting, and agreed to; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by Gen. Scott as the day when the army should move.

The plan of Gen. McDowell was to move out in the direction of Centreville, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and destroy his communication by railroad with Richmond. He asked that a certain number of troops be given him to operate against the force which it was

estimated that Beauregard had under his command. He was assured that the enemy below should be kept occupied by Gen. Butler, who was in command at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under Johnston, in the Winchester Valley, should be held there by Gen. Patterson. Some days before the battle, upon expressing some doubts in regard to the force under Johnston being detained by Patterson, he was assured by Gen. Scott that "if Johnston joined Beauregard, he should have Patterson on his heels."

The movement did not commence until the 16th of July, a week later than the time first decided upon. The transportation was deficient, and Gen. McDowell had to depend upon others to see that supplies were forwarded to him in time. The march was slow, one reason being that, since the affair at Vienna, near Alexandria, and at Big Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a fear of "masked batteries" caused hesitation in regard to advancing upon points concerning which there was a want of information. There was some delay, on the march, in consequence of the want of complete discipline among some of the troops. They were not sufficiently under control of officers to be prevented from leaving the ranks and straggling.

The affair at Blackburn's Ford on Thursday, the 18th, being more extensive than Gen. McDowell had ordered, drew the attention of the enemy to that point; and, in consequence of the preparations they made there to meet any attempt of Gen. McDowell to turn their position in that direction, it became necessary to adopt another line of operations. Gen. McDowell determined to make the attempt to turn their right, and steps were taken to secure the necessary information. It was not until Saturday that the information which Gen. McDowell desired was obtained.

He then issued orders for the troops to move the next morning, the 21st, some at 2 o'clock and some at half-past 2. The division of Gen. Tyler was in the advance, and was ordered to proceed directly out to Stone Bridge, and take up position there. Gen. Hunter's and Gen. Fitzhugh's divisions were to follow, and when they reached a road leading to the right, about a mile in advance of Gen. Tyler's camp, they were to turn off and proceed in the direction of Ball's Bluff, and endeavor to turn the enemy's left. The movement to the right was intended to be made under cover of Gen. Tyler's force at Stone Bridge.

But there was no order in the movements of the troops that afternoon. Tyler's division did not pass the point, where Hunter's and Fitzhugh's divisions were to turn off, and where they waited. Some of the troops were delayed several hours, all being late to the ^{point} where they moved out and made preparations to fight.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the result was successful, and the main part of the force under Johnston's command, which was very much impeded, and many were worn, the roads were dirty, and it took some hours longer on the march than anticipated. In the afternoon about

ments arrived from Johnston's army, and suddenly attacked our right and threw it into disorder.

About the same time two of our batteries (Rickett's and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, and our entire force began to fall back in great confusion. In regard to the capture of the batteries, it appears by the testimony that they were ordered to take an advanced and exposed position, and were not sufficiently supported. Not long after they were placed in position, a Rebel regiment appeared in their immediate vicinity. Capt. Griffin states that he took them to be Rebels from the first, and directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them with canister. But Major Barry, Chief of Artillery, coming up just at the time, told him that they were some of our own troops coming to the support of the batteries, and directed him not to fire upon them. The battery was accordingly turned in another direction, and, almost immediately after, this regiment of the enemy opened fire upon it, disabling the horses, and killing and wounding most of the men at the guns. That completed the discomfiture of our troops, and the day which had opened upon our success closed upon a defeated and retreating army.

A division, under Col. Miles, had been stationed at Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve, and partly to guard against any flank attack. The enemy did attempt a movement upon our left, but were promptly met and checked by our forces there.

The principal cause of the defeat on that day was the failure of Gen. Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah. He had a force of about 23,000 men; while the force of the enemy opposed to him, according to the best evidence your Committee could obtain, did not exceed from 12,000 to 15,000 men. Gen. Patterson testified that he was satisfied that Johnston had from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and over 60 guns. He also states that a large number of his troops were anxious to return home; that their time had about expired, and he could not persuade them to remain. There is considerable testimony to show that the troops became dissatisfied, and refused to remain, only when they learned that their movement from Bunker Hill on the 17th of July was a retreat, and not an advance upon the enemy; that while they supposed they were being led to the attack, little, if any, complaint was made, and they were in excellent spirits.

In reference to the orders given to Gen. Patterson, and the object to be accomplished by his operations, there seems to be no question. That object was to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard before Gen. McDowell could have an opportunity to attack the forces under the latter. The character of the orders is indicated by the following telegram of the 13th of July (Saturday) from Gen. Scott to Gen. Patterson:

I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester. But if he retreats in force toward Manassas, and it be hazardous to follow him, then consider the route via Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg, &c.

Gen. Scott had, the day before, conveyed to Gen. Patterson the intimation that Gen. McDowell would commence his movement on the 16th of July, and on the 15th Gen. Patterson advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, remaining there the 16th.

On the 17th Gen. Scott telegraphs to Gen. Patterson:

I have nothing official from you since Sunday, but am glad to learn from Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in while he re-enforces the Junction with his main body. First day's work has driven the enemy beyond House. The Junction will probably be carried

is no evidence at what time that dispatch was received. But it could not have been received before movement from Bunker Hill to Charlestown by Gen. Patterson, for that movement was very early in the morning of the 17th.

Gen. Scott telegraphs:

I have been expecting you to beat the enemy. If you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied a position of advantage, you have been at least to oppose, his superior in number. Has he not

stolen a march, and sent re-enforcements toward Manassas Junction? A week is enough to win a victory.

To this Gen. Patterson replies on the same day:

The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissance in force, caused him to be re-enforced.

Gen. Patterson testifies as follows:

Question. During all this time you knew that Gen. Scott expected of you that you should either engage and beat Johnston, or detain him in the valley of Winchester, or in the event that he should come down by a route where you could not follow him, that you should follow him via Keyes's Ferry and Leesburg?

Answer. Yes, Sir.

Question. And yet, when you were at Charlestown, you found yourself not in a condition to do either. Now, my question is: Why did you not communicate that fact to Gen. Scott?

Answer. There was no occasion for it, in my judgment. He knew my condition, and to have added to the information he already had would have been a waste of time and paper. I had informed him of my condition, and it was his business to order me what to do. I had asked him: "Shall I attack?" It was not my business to say anything beyond that.

When asked if the telegram of the 18th, from Gen. Scott, did not show that he still deemed it was of the first importance that he (Patterson) should detain Johnston there, Gen. Patterson replies:

I looked upon that telegram, and so did every gentleman upon my staff, as nothing more nor less than an exhibition of bad temper.

Gen. Patterson also testifies:

Question. You say you could have attacked on the 18th if ordered to do so. You knew the necessity of detaining Johnston, and you must have inferred from the telegram of Gen. Scott that he expected or required of you that you should do something in that direction. Why did you not do all that you could to detain him without an order?

Answer. Because I could not go up there without fighting, as I could not fall back again. I had no reason to believe that that telegram was not written in the morning in reply to mine of that morning, [1:30 a. m., asking "Shall I attack?"] Gen. Scott did not say that day, and there was no occasion for my going up and juggling my men without an order, than of doing anything entirely uncalled for—not the slightest occasion for it. * * * * * If Gen. Scott did not fight, and saw the necessity for my attacking, I repeat it was his business to give the order.

In another place he testifies:

Question. When you found you were in condition to detain Johnston, was it not an important fact that fact should have been communicated to Gen. Scott; not the fact that you could not fight Johnston, but that you could not detain him; that your strength was insufficient for that, and that he could not rely upon his being kept back?

Answer. I never supposed, for a moment, that Gen. Scott believed for the fifty-fourth part of a second that I could hold him.

Gen. Patterson further testifies:

Question. You were not threatening Johnston at Charlestown so as to prevent his joining Beauregard at Manassas?

Answer. No, Sir. I remained there because I was ordered to remain in front of him until he left.

Question. You knew at that time that you were not offering any obstacle to his going down to Manassas?

Answer. Perfectly. I knew I had not the means to do it.

Question. Why did you not communicate that fact to Gen. Scott immediately?

Answer. I did communicate my condition, and where I was. Question. When?

Answer. On the 16th I wrote him in detail from Bunker Hill. On the 17th I wrote again, and on the 18th I gave him all the information necessary, and it was his business to order me, and not my business to make any further suggestion to him.

Question. Did you communicate to him by telegraph?

Answer. Certainly. I sent three telegrams to him on the same day.

Question. On the 18th day?

Answer. On the 18th, at 11 in the morning, I telegraphed him my condition, and asked him if I should attack. To have sent further information to him would have been rather impertinent, and he would have so considered it. * * * * *

Question. Why did you not inform him that you were not then in a condition to offer any obstacle to Johnston's joining Beauregard?

Answer. I would have considered it rather a reflection on him to have told him so. He knew my condition.

Gen. Scott testifies:

But, although Gen. Patterson was never specially ordered to attack the enemy, he was certainly told and expected, even if with inferior numbers, to hold the Rebel army in his front on the alert, and to prevent it from re-enforcing Manassas Junction, by means of threatening maneuvers and demonstrations—results often attained in war with half numbers.

Instead of doing this, however, Gen. Patterson came down to Bunker Hill, remained there over the day when he had been given to understand the advance would be commenced by Gen. McDowell; and early the next morning, without waiting to hear how far Gen. McDowell had advanced, or whether he had advanced at all, left the neighborhood of

Winchester, where the enemy was, and turned off to Charlestown, where, as he himself says, he had no means to offer any obstacle to Johnston's joining Beauregard whenever he chose. Johnston at once took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him, and re-enforced Beauregard in season to inflict defeat upon our forces at Bull Run.

Johnston started the greater portion of his forces from Winchester on the 18th; some of the testimony shows that a portion started on the afternoon of the 17th. Gen. Patterson, though only some twenty miles distant from Winchester, and under orders to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Beauregard, did not discover that Johnston had left Winchester until two days afterward, when he telegraphed, on the 20th, to Gen. Scott, that re-enforcements had left there.

In reference to deferring the attack upon Beauregard, when the arrival of Johnston's forces had become known, Gen. McDowell says that the information that he received was too indefinite, mere rumor, and he could not tell how much credit to give to it. The arrival of the cars during the night preceding the battle was not certain evidence of the arrival of Johnston's forces; for it was expected that re-enforcements would be hurried up to the enemy from every direction possible. And he had been assured that "if Johnston joined Beauregard, Patterson should be on his heels."

Gen. Scott testifies on that point:

As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge made against me on the floors of Congress, that I did not stop Brig.-Gen. McDowell's movement upon Manassas Junction after I had been informed of the re-enforcements sent thither from Winchester, though urged to do so by one or more members of the Cabinet. Now, it was, at the reception of that news too late to call off the troops from the attack. And, beside, though opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and sanguine of success. And it is not true that I was urged by anybody to suddenly to stop the attack which was commenced at once. I think, as the 15th of July.

E. F. WADE, Chairman.

BALL'S BLUFF.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report, with the accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Ball's Bluff:

On the morning of Saturday, the 19th of October, 1861, Gen. McCall, commanding a division in the vicinity of Washington, moved his entire command, under orders from Gen. McClellan, to Drainesville and its immediate neighborhood. A portion of his force was moved some miles beyond Drainesville and within eight or ten miles of Leesburg, but was recalled to Drainesville, by order of Gen. McClellan, about sunset of that day. The entire division of Gen. Wm. F. Smith was also sent out within supporting distance of Gen. McCall.

Gen. McCall testifies that he was directed to make reconnaissances in all directions for three or four miles from Drainesville, noting particularly the character of the country. About 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, he informed Gen. McClellan that he should not be able to get through his work that day, and received in reply, "If you finish in the morning, return."

On Sunday, the 20th, Gen. McClellan directed a telegram to be sent to Gen. Stone, at Poolesville, of which the following is a copy furnished your Committee:

Received Oct. 20, 1861, from Camp Griffin.

Gen. McClellan desires me to inform you that Gen. McCall occupied Drainesville yesterday, and is still there; will send out heavy reconnaissances to-day in all directions from that point. The General desires that you keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would be the effect to drive them.

A. W. COLBURN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Brig.-Gen. Stone, Poolesville.

On Sunday afternoon Gen. Stone moved some forces to the bank of the river at Edwards's Ferry, and crossed over one or two companies to the Virginia side, but very soon recalled them.

Col. Devens of the 15th Massachusetts testifies that he received from Gen. Stone, about 1 o'clock on Sunday, the following order:

HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION, }
POOLESVILLE, October 20, 1861. }

COLONEL: You will please send orders to the canal to have the new saw flat-boats now there opposite the island (Harrison's) transferred to the river, and will, at 3 o'clock, p. m., have the island re-enforced by all of your regiment now on duty at the canal and at the New-York battery. The pickets will be replaced by the companies of the 15th Massachusetts there. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.
Col. CHARLES DEVENS, Commanding 15th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

About dark a verbal order was sent to Col. Devens to send Capt. Philbrick, of his regiment, with a small party, across the river from Harrison's Island, with directions to push out to within a mile of Leesburg, if possible, without being discovered, and then return and report. Capt. Philbrick accordingly crossed, with, perhaps, 15 or 20 men, at a place where he had crossed some time previously, when he had discovered that the river at that point was not picketed by the enemy. He landed at the foot of the bluff, opposite Harrison's Island, known as Ball's Bluff, ascended by a path that led to the top, and proceeded to reconnoiter as directed.

Before Capt. Philbrick returned, Gen. Stone sent the following dispatch to Gen. McClellan, a copy of which was furnished your Committee:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
Received Washington, Oct. 20, 1861, from Poolesville. }

Made aient of crossing at this place this afternoon, and at the same [time] started a reconnoitering party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island. Enemy's pickets retired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoitering party not yet received. I have means of crossing 125 men over in 10 minutes at each of two points. River falling slowly.

C. P. STONE, Brig.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

Capt. Philbrick pushed out some distance from the bluff, and then returned and reported that they had discovered a small camp of the enemy that did not appear to be very well guarded. This report was sent to Gen. Stone.

Col. Devens reports that about midnight he received the following order from Gen. Stone:

HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION, }
POOLESVILLE, Oct. 20, 1861—10 1/2 p. m. }

SPECIAL ORDER, No. —.—Col. Devens will land opposite Harrison's Island with five companies of his regiment, and proceed to surprise the camp of the enemy discovered by Capt. Philbrick, in the direction of Leesburg. The landing and march will be effected with silence and rapidity.

Col. Lee, 26th Massachusetts Volunteers will, immediately after Col. Devens's departure, occupy Harrison's Island with four companies of his regiment, and will cause the four-oared boat to be taken across the island to the point of departure of Col. Devens. One company will be thrown across to occupy the heights on the Virginia shore, after Col. Devens's departure, to cover his return.

Two mountain howitzers will be taken silently up the tow-path and carried to the opposite side of the island, under the orders of Col. Lee.

Col. Devens will attack the camp of the enemy at daybreak, and, having routed, will pursue them as far as he deems prudent, and will destroy the camp, if practicable, before returning. He will make all the observations possible on the country; will, under all circumstances, keep his command well in hand, and not sacrifice them to any supposed advantage of rapid pursuit.

Having accomplished this duty, Col. Devens will return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until re-enforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In such case he will hold on and report.

Great care will be used by Col. Devens to prevent any unnecessary injury of private property; and any officer or soldier straggling from the command for curiosity or plunder will be instantly shot.

CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.

Col. Devens commenced crossing his force between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, and about 4 o'clock in the morning had crossed his five companies. He proceeded up the bluff and formed his command on the top of the bluff and remained there until it was light enough to find his way. Col. Lee also crossed with about 100 men, and took position upon the bluff. Col. Devens sent out scouts to the right and left, who reported that they could find no enemy.

At the first dawn of light, Col. Devens moved his command out in the direction of the supposed camp. Upon reaching the point to which the reconnoitering party of the night before had proceeded, it was discovered that what had been taken for a camp was a single row of trees, the dim light of the moon shining

between them, below the branches, presenting the appearance of a row of tents.

Col. Devens had advanced with his force to within about a mile of Leesburg; he halted his men there, and proceeded to examine the country about his position as far as practicable. He sent word to Gen. Stone that there had been a mistake about the camp of the enemy; that he was well posted in a wood and concealed, and waited further orders.

Not far from 7 o'clock in the morning a body of Rebel riflemen was discovered to the right of Col. Devens's position, in the direction of Conrad's Ferry; Capt. Philbrick with his company advanced toward them, when they fell back until they reached a ditch, under cover of which they halted and opened fire upon our men; they were soon driven out of the ditch into a corn-field where they obtained cover behind some stacks of corn. Another company was ordered by Col. Devens to the support of Capt. Philbrick; but before they reached him some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance from the direction of Leesburg. The two companies were then ordered to fall back to the main body.

About 8 o'clock Col. Devens determined to fall back to the bluff, where Col. Lee was, which was done in perfect order. He then reconnoitered the woods to his right and left, and discovering no appearance of the enemy, moved forward to his former position.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock the messenger of Col. Devens returned from Gen. Stone with instructions to him to remain where he was, and he would be supported. Col. Devens testifies that it was either then or soon after that he was told that Col. Baker was to come over and take command. He sent word to Gen. Stone that he was discovered by the enemy, but could still hold his old position. About 10 o'clock the messenger returned with this message: "Very well; Col. Baker will come and take command."

Col. Devens states that while awaiting further instructions he directed his adjutant to ascertain the amount of the force with him; the report was 23 officers and 635 men. He sent once or twice to the river to ascertain if re-encforcements were coming, and what he was to do, but he received no further order or message.

About 12 or 1 o'clock an attack was made upon Col. Devens's force, which lasted some 10 or 15 minutes. Receiving no orders or message from the river, he fell back about 100 yards, reformed his line and made dispositions to retire still further if necessary. And in perhaps an hour he fell back to the field just in front of the bluff, where the main action afterward took place. There he met Col. Baker, who congratulated him upon the manner in which his men had conducted themselves.

In relation to the orders to Col. Baker, Gen. Stone testifies:

I can give you all the early orders to Col. Baker. I sent him an order, about midnight on the 20th, to send the California Regiment to Conrad's Ferry, and have them there at day-break; to await orders there; to have the remainder of his brigade raised early; have a comfortable breakfast, and be in readiness to move at 7 o'clock in the morning. Late in the night it might have been between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning—I sent a cautious order to Col. Baker, knowing that volunteers make too much noise sometimes, to have that regiment march with silence and without raised guns. From that time I sent him no order.

Gen. Stone testifies that between 8 and 9 1/2 o'clock, when Col. Baker was with him, and they had discussed the whole matter for some time, he gave him a written order to take the entire command of the fight at Ball's Bluff. That order, with a communication from Gen. Stone to Col. Baker, sent some time later, was found upon his body after he was killed. The two papers are as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION,
"EDWARDS'S FERRY, Oct. 21, 1861."

"COLONEL: In case of my being in front of Harrison's Island you will advance the California regiment of your brigade, or retire the regiments under Col. Lee and Devens now on the Virginia side of the river, at your discretion, assuming command on a level.

"Very respectfully,
"CHARLES P. STONE, Brig.-Gen. Commanding.
"Col. E. D. BAKER, Commanding Brigade."

"HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION,
"EDWARDS'S FERRY, Oct. 22, 1861—11:30."

"COLONEL: I am informed that the force of the enemy is about 4,000, all told. If you can push them you may do so, as far as to have a strong position near Leesburg, if you can keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If they pass Leesburg, and take the Guo Spring Road, you will not follow far, but seize the first good position to cover that road. Their design is to draw us out, if they are obliged to retreat, as far as Goose Creek, where they can be re-enforced from Manassas and have a strong position.

Report frequently, so that when they are pushed Gorman can come in on their flank.

"Yours respectfully and truly,

"CHARLES P. STONE, Brig.-Gen. Commanding.
"Col. E. D. BAKER, Commanding Brigade."

Col. Baker proceeded to Harrison's Island, and finally concluded to send over troops to re-enforce Col. Devens and Col. Lee. One of the witnesses states that Col. Baker was in doubt for a time whether to recall the troops already over, or to re-enforce them; but, upon hearing some one on the Virginia shore call out that they needed assistance, as the enemy were coming, he determined to re-enforce them, and proceeded himself to the Virginia side, and assumed command. Col. Baker directed the forces to cross at the point where Col. Devens and Col. Lee had crossed with their forces.

The means of transporting troops at Ball's Bluff was exceedingly limited. Between the Maryland shore and Harrison's Island were only three flat-boats or scows, all together capable of crossing about 125 men at a time. On the Virginia side of the island there were at first only a Francis metallic life-boat and two small skiffs, together incapable of carrying from 25 to 30 men at a time. After a time, one of the scows, or flatboats, was taken from the Maryland to the Virginia side of the island.

The landing on the Virginia side was at the foot of a very steep bluff, up which a narrow path, widening toward the top, wound its way; and on the top of the bluff was a cleared space or field, bordered by woods, which afforded a cover to the enemy until within a short distance of where our troops were formed.

Col. Baker, according to the testimony, arrived on the field between 1 and 2 o'clock, and proceeded at once to form a line of battle upon the field at the top of the bluff. The amount of the force engaged upon our side was between 1,700 and 1,800 men, consisting of about one half of the 15th Massachusetts Regiment, under Col. Devens; a portion (317 men) of the 20th Massachusetts, under Col. Lee; the Tammany Regiment, under Col. Cogswell; and the California Regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Wistar. The enemy's forces were about 4,000 men.

The enemy began the attack—some of the witnesses say between 2 and 3 o'clock, others at 3 o'clock—at first heavily, on the right of our line, then moving along toward the center and left, where the hardest fighting took place.

Your Committee do not deem it necessary to go into the details of the action. It continued for over two hours, our troops contending most bravely against greatly superior numbers. Col. Baker fell between 4 and 5 o'clock, having been most conspicuous for his bravery and almost reckless daring. When he fell the line began to waver, and some portions of it gave way before the destructive fire of the enemy.

After the death of Col. Baker, the command devolved upon Col. Cogswell of the Tammany Regiment, who proposed to attempt to cut through to Edwards's Ferry, which was assented to by the other regimental commanders. Upon attempting a movement in that direction, they were met by a Mississippi regiment coming from below, which opened a most destructive fire upon them. Our troops gave way, and retreated down the bluff toward the river. This was about dusk, so that our troops were somewhat concealed by the bushes on the side of the bluff. The enemy continued to fire upon them from the top of the bluff. The men attempted to escape to the island in the boats and by swimming, being exposed all the time to the fire of the enemy. The flat-boat was soon riddled and sunk, the life-boat drifted down the stream, and the skills were lost. Many were shot while in the water; others succeeded in swimming to the island;

some few, under cover of the darkness, succeeded in escaping along the bank of the river, and finally reached our lines. But the greater portion were killed or taken prisoners.

In relation to the operations at Edwards's Ferry, under the supervision of Gen. Stone and the immediate command of Gen. Gorman, as there was no serious fighting there, it may not be necessary to go much into detail. The crossing was commenced about daybreak by the forces under Col. Dana of the 1st Minnesota Regiment, and was continued until some 2,500 men were crossed over that day. The means of crossing were very limited, as at Harrison's Landing, consisting of three or four flat-boats or scows, propelled across by poles. The place of landing was very good, and covered by our artillery on the Maryland side. There were no important demonstrations made by our forces on the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry. Some reconnoissances were made for a short distance, and one regiment of the enemy seen, probably the Mississippi regiment that arrived on the field at Ball's Bluff, near the close of the action there.

Gen. McCall's division had remained at Drainesville all of Sunday and Sunday night. Gen. McCall testifies:

"At 6 o'clock on Monday morning I reported to him (Gen. McClellan) that the engines whom I had consulted reported to me that they would finish their work in two hours. I sent that express to Gen. McClellan at 6 o'clock, and got his reply, dated 8 o'clock, telling me to return as soon as the work was finished. I got his answer between 9 and 10 o'clock. I ordered the troops then to be ready to move, and as soon as the work was finished I returned to my camp under orders."

Both Gen. McClellan and Gen. McCall testify that the movement to Drainesville was for the purpose of reconnoitering the country in that direction. But Gen. Stone received no intimation of the object of the movement. On the contrary, the language of the dispatch of Sunday might well lead him to believe that the movement had reference to driving the enemy from Leesburg. The dispatch contained no intimation that Gen. McCall was to be soon withdrawn from Drainesville. He was directed "to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg to see if this movement has the effect to drive them (the enemy) away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." Gen. Stone made demonstrations both at Edwards's Ferry and at Ball's Bluff, and promptly notified Gen. McClellan of what he had done. He sent that information on Sunday night, and he testifies that he received no intimation from Gen. McClellan as to what he should do, whether to continue the demonstrations or not; and received no intimation that Gen. McCall was not close at hand to come to his assistance until about 11 o'clock on Monday night. It was a very general impression among the officers and men at Edwards's Ferry during Monday that Gen. McCall would come to their assistance; and Gen. Stone testifies that he cautioned his artillery about firing upon any troops that might show themselves in that direction, lest they might fire upon our own forces.

In regard to that matter, Gen. McClellan testifies as follows:

Question. Do you remember whether or not you informed him (Gen. Stone) of the withdrawal of Smith and McCall to their former positions?

"Answer. I think I did."

Gen. Stone (Feb. 27, 1863), after stating that upon hearing of the death of Col. Baker he proceeded to Ball's Bluff, where he learned the full extent of the disaster, and at once determined to withdraw the troops at Edwards's Ferry, testifies as follows:

"And then, knowing that I could go myself quicker than anybody I could send, I turned my horse and cantered down to withdraw my troops at Edwards's Ferry back to the Maryland shore. I supposed at that time that I had about 2,500 men across the river; and the reports I had heard opposite Ball's Bluff were that the enemy had been largely re-enforced, and they were then about 10,000 strong. I saw that there was great danger of Gorman being overwhelmed at Edwards's Ferry. I did not know whether McCall would be there to assist him or not. I was in utter ignorance in reference to him or his position."

"I at once commenced retiring my troops as quietly but as rapidly as I could, taking the precaution to have my artillery on the Maryland side so placed as to cover the troops on the Virginia side. The ground on the Maryland shore commands

perfectly the ground on the Virginia shore, and it would be an exceedingly dangerous thing for troops to advance and attack any body of men on the Virginia shore, directly at Edwards's Ferry, while the Maryland shore was well held by artillery."

The moment I had given the order for the retiring of those troops, I reported by telegraph to Gen. McClellan, at Washington that we had met with a repulse on our right but I was doing the best I could to secure the left, and to retrieve. I am not quite sure now whether I telegraphed to Gen. McClellan, before I went up to Harrison's Island, that Col. Baker had been killed, or whether I put that in the same dispatch in which I informed him of the repulse.

Having sent that information to Gen. McClellan, I continued withdrawing the troops, watching carefully, so as to use the artillery for their protection if necessary. After some time—I cannot tell how long, for one takes but little note of time—under such circumstances, but apparently as soon as a message could go to Washington and an answer be returned (being carried by a courier on horseback four miles each way from the telegraph station to Edwards's Ferry)—I received orders from Gen. McClellan to this effect: "Hold all the ground you now have on the Virginia shore if your men will fight, intrenching, if necessary. You will be re-enforced." Perhaps the words "if your men will fight" came before the rest of the dispatch; and my impression is, though I will not be positive, that the words "at all hazards" were used in the direction to hold all the ground on the Virginia shore.

I am sorry that I have not possession of a single paper, telegraph or otherwise, of the records connected with my division, or of the way in which I was commanded by my command. I was ordered to report myself here, in Washington, at once; and having not the slightest suspicion of why I was required to do so, I left all my papers as I would have done had I been going out for a two hours' ride; and from that time to this I have never seen a single paper of any kind I then left behind me. I make this explanation to show why it is that I cannot speak positively about the language of dispatches received and sent; why I cannot, perhaps, give their exact words.

I saw all the danger in which my troops were on the Virginia side, but I supposed at that time that Gen. McCall was very near there, and I took it for granted when Gen. McClellan telegraphed me to hold my position on the Virginia side at all hazards, and that I should be re-enforced, that he had the means of immediately securing me.

I cannot state positively when it was that I telegraphed to Gen. Banks. My impression now is that just as I started to go to Ball's Bluff, when the report of Col. Baker's death reached me, I telegraphed to Gen. Banks, requesting him to send up a brigade. When I got to Harrison's Island, and before I returned to Edwards's Ferry, I dispatched a messenger to meet whatever brigade Gen. Banks might send, and conduct it to Conrad's Ferry, instead of to Edwards's Ferry, from which my dispatch to Gen. Banks was sent.

And my impression is that when I returned to Edwards's Ferry, and telegraphed to Gen. McClellan the fact of the repulse at Ball's Bluff, I sent another telegram to Gen. Banks that he had better bring up his whole division. I know I sent Gen. Banks such a telegram; but at what time I will not be positive.

Some time was lost in communicating with Gen. McClellan, by my receiving a dispatch in cipher, of which I had not the key, from him or from his Chief of Staff. What the contents of that dispatch were, I have never learned. I immediately responded to it. I have received the box, but have not the key. Whether the dispatch was in cipher or in code of whatever; but I presume that the dispatches which came afterward covered the same ground.

I cannot state now, after so long an interval of time, at what hour I telegraphed to Gen. McClellan, urging that the reinforcements should be sent to Goose Creek, on the Virginia side, supposing all the time that Gen. McCall was not far off. The response to that, which I think I received about 11 o'clock on Monday night, was the first intimation I ever received that McCall had not all the time been near me. That dispatch informed me that no reinforcements could reach me from the Virginia side, but that Gen. Banks would reinforce me from the Maryland side.

Question. How far was Gen. Banks from you?

Answer. He was about 14 miles in my rear.

Question. Did that first dispatch from Gen. McClellan, promising you reinforcements, contemplate that they should come from Gen. Banks?

Answer. Yes, Sir. I suppose so; but at the time my idea was that McCall was close by me. And I was led into an error, late in the evening, by receiving a dispatch from Gen. McClellan's headquarters, whether signed by him or his chief of staff, I do not now recollect, assuring me if there was a road from "Drainesville" to Edwards's Ferry. Now, there is no such place as "Drainesville;" but there is a "Drainesville." And having in my mind that McCall was at Drainesville, I took it for granted that the operator had made a mistake, and had meant Drainesville instead of "Draines-town," which was the name of a place in Maryland, and which proved to be the place meant. I replied to that dispatch to the best of my recollection, that there was a good road from Drainesville to Edwards's Ferry. I presume that that caused some misconception at headquarters, because they undoubtedly had "Draines-town" in their minds when they telegraphed that "Drainesville;" just as we had "Drainesville" in my mind when I saw "Drainesville" in the dispatch. But that is not very important, only to show how errors will creep up.

I think that by this statement I must remove any unpleasant impression with regard to my improperly exposing troops to disaster at Edwards's Ferry, since I acted under the in-

structions of my superior officers; and also under the impression that our forces under Gen. McCall were near us on the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry.

Question. How happened it that you failed to make this statement, concerning those orders, on your former examination?

Answer. Because I did not deem it proper to give any of the orders of my superior officer which he had not himself previously published or authorized me to use. The morning that I came before your Committee I was instructed at Gen. McClellan's headquarters that it was the desire of the General that officers giving testimony before the Committee should not state, without his authority, anything regarding his plans, his orders for the movements of troops, or his orders concerning the position of troops. That covered this case.

Question. Did you understand that to apply to past orders and transactions as well as those to be executed in the future?

Answer. I did not know, and did not know, what orders to others were given contemporaneous with those I received, and I might create wrong impressions by giving the orders I had received from my commanding General, unless there were at the same time produced contemporaneous orders given to other Generals. And I presume that the Chairman will remember that I stated, when giving my testimony before, that I could not give any orders from my commanding General except such as he himself had made public.

Question. Did Gen. McClellan approve of the crossing at Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, on the 21st of October, 1861?

Answer. I received a dispatch from Gen. McClellan in reply to one which I had sent him, informing him of the crossing of Gen. Gorham and Col. Baker. That dispatch to me commenced with these words: "I congratulate you and your command." I took that congratulation on the fact of my having crossed, as an approval of the crossing; and as I had received no information whatever concerning Gen. McCall, in my own mind I supposed that it was but a simple thing of Gen. McClellan in connection with any other movements he might be making.

Question. Was Gen. McClellan informed of your means of transportation for crossing troops?

Answer. Some time during the day—and I think it was in the same dispatch in which he asked me for information of the enemy, and I should think that that dispatch must have reached me about noon—Gen. McClellan asked what means of transportation I had. I replied to him by telegram, stating the number and character of the boats at each crossing—at Edwards's Ferry and at Harrison's Island.

Gen. McClellan testifies in reference to the crossing of Gen. Stone's forces into Virginia:

I have no recollection of any order which justified the passage of the river in force. I am sure that I had no intention that he should do that.

The events that occurred subsequently to the operations of Monday—the arrival of Gen. Banks with his forces, the arrival of Gen. McClellan, and the final withdrawal of all our forces to the Maryland side of the river—are fully set forth in the testimony herewith submitted, and your Committee do not deem any comments by them to be necessary.

In connection with the battle of Ball's Bluff, two points remain to be considered: First, whether a crossing was justifiable under any circumstances, considering the very insufficient means of transportation at the command of Gen. Stone. Second, whether the forces under Col. Baker could, and should, have been reinforced from the Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry, when it was known that the troops under his command were engaged with the enemy.

In regard to the first point, all the testimony goes to prove that the means of transportation were very inadequate. The testimony of Gen. Stone would seem to indicate that, while he was inclined to deem it sufficient, under what he understood to be the circumstances under which the movement was made, he left much to the judgment of others; and this much can be said for him, that he received no intimation that a movement across the river would be expected from him, or would be justified, until the day before (Sunday) it was actually made. And the reason—that he had for supposing that other forces were within a short distance to render him assistance are set forth in the previous portion of this report.

In reference to re-enforcing Col. Baker, the testimony is very conflicting. There is no question that it was known that the forces at Ball's Bluff were engaged with the enemy. The firing or musketry was distinctly heard at Edwards's Ferry, on both sides of the river. The only question is whether reinforcements should have been sent under the circumstances, and whether there was any sufficient reason why they were not sent. Gen. Stone testifies that he received no intimation from Col. Baker that he needed re-enforcements; that he received lit-

tle, if any, information from Col. Baker in reference to the condition and progress of affairs at Ball's Bluff; and he also testifies that, even if re-enforcements had been needed, they could not have been sent up on the Virginia side; that the enemy had earthworks and batteries between Edwards's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, which would have made it extremely hazardous, if not impossible, to have sent any re-enforcements by that route. Some of the other witnesses testify to the same effect. Others testify most positively that, so far as they were able to judge, there was no obstacle whatever in the way of our troops passing up on the Virginia side from Edwards's Ferry.

It cannot be denied that had re-enforcements promptly arrived at Ball's Bluff from Edwards's Ferry, the result of the battle there would, in all probability, have been greatly to our advantage, instead of being a most melancholy disaster. The evidence is so very contradictory that your Committee refrain from expressing any positive opinion upon that point, but all by each one to form his own conclusion from the testimony they have been able to obtain.

One other subject remains to be considered before closing this report—the arrest and imprisonment of Gen. Stone. Your Committee would have made no reference to that subject, but have submitted the testimony without comment upon their part, had it not been for the efforts that have been made by many to hold them responsible for all that has taken place in reference to the arrest of Gen. Stone.

In the course of their investigation concerning the causes of the disaster at Ball's Bluff they obtained testimony, most unexpectedly to them all, without explanation, seemed to impeach the military capacity and the loyalty of Gen. Stone. That testimony, as in every other instance that they deemed of importance, was brought to the attention of the proper authorities here, and the War Department was informed that, in the opinion of the Committee, a prompt investigation should be instituted. First, Secretary Cameron, and afterward Secretary Stanton, were informed that the testimony before your Committee was of such a character that some explanation by Gen. Stone was required.

Gen. Stone was called to this city, and on the 31st of January, 1863, appeared before your Committee, at the instance of Gen. McClellan, and stated that he had been informed that certain testimony before this Committee affected him in such a way as to require his explanation. He was informed that there was testimony which might appear to impeach his conduct in the Ball's Bluff affair; to show that he had had undue intercourse with the enemy, both by letter and by personal intercourse with their officers; and also that he had permitted the enemy to erect formidable fortifications and batteries within reach of his guns, and which he could have prevented. The statement was made in general terms to Gen. Stone, and without indicating who were the witnesses who had testified, in order that they should not be called to account by their commanding general for statements made before a committee of Congress.

In reply to this general statement upon the part of your Committee Gen. Stone proceeded to make an explanation in general terms. They then reported to the Secretary of War that the testimony upon the points to which his attention had been called was conflicting. They made no recommendation as to what should be done, one way or the other; merely reported to him that the testimony was conflicting.

Not long afterward they learned through the press that Gen. Stone had been arrested, and sent to Fort Lafayette. The immediate cause of his arrest they did not know. They were satisfied that the information which they had furnished to the department had in all probability furnished some of the grounds upon which his arrest had been made; but they did not learn until more than a year afterward what was the immediate cause of his arrest at the time it was made.

Gen. Stone was arrested on the 8th of February, 1862. On the 28th of February, 1863, Gen. McClellan testified before your Committee as follows:

About ten days or two weeks before Gen. Stone was actually arrested, the Secretary of War gave me a written order to arrest Gen. Stone, for the reason that he had been informed by the members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War that they had taken testimony tending to show that Gen. Stone had been guilty of conduct not consistent with loyalty. Gen. Stone was removed from his command, and, I understood, appeared before this Committee.

Finally, on the very day of his arrest, a written report was made to me of the examination of a refugee from Leesburg, which, so far as such a thing could, tended to corroborate some of the charges made against Gen. Stone. I satisfied my own mind of the sincerity of this refugee by personal examination, and then showed the statement to the Secretary of War, upon which he directed me to give the order to arrest Gen. Stone immediately, and to send him under guard to Fort Lafayette. The order was carried into execution the same evening.

Since the release of Gen. Stone he has been permitted by your Committee, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances attending his arrest, to examine all the testimony which your Committee have taken in reference to the administration of his department, and to make as full a statement to the Committee as he considered necessary. That statement, together with all the testimony, is herewith submitted.

It is due to Gen. Stone that your Committee should state that it appears, from the documents before your Committee, that immediately upon his arrest he demanded that he should be furnished with a copy of the charges against him, and be allowed the opportunity of promptly meeting them; why his request was not granted your Committee have never been informed. B. F. WADE, Chairman.

DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST.

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report, with the accompanying testimony in relation to the Department of the West:

Your Committee have been unable to take all the testimony necessary to enable them to present a comprehensive report in relation to the administration of affairs in the Department of the West, more particularly while under the command of Gen. John C. Fremont. Compelled to remain in attendance upon Congress during its sessions, they were unable to visit the Department in order to take the testimony of witnesses there. And they did not feel willing to call from so great a distance the witnesses whose testimony was necessary to fully elucidate all the facts, as their services were constantly required in the field. Throughout their investigations your Committee have strictly adhered to the rule adopted by them from the first, to ask the attendance of those in the military service only when no detriment to the public interests would result from a temporary absence from their command. When Congress closed its session last Summer, many of those who had been most actively engaged in the operations to which your Committee desired to direct their attention had been ordered to other parts of the country; some were in Tennessee and Mississippi, some in Arkansas, some in the Army of the Potomac, and others in the Department of the South under Gen. Hunter. Such testimony as was within reach your Committee, have taken. But they are fully aware that their investigation upon that subject has been far from complete; and they, therefore, present but a brief report, together with such testimony as they have obtained.

When the Rebellion commenced Missouri was one of the most turbulent among those States which the Rebel leaders sought to gain over to their cause by the connivance and treachery of the State authorities, and by the presence of armed forces to operate upon the fears of the people. The number of Federal troops in that region was very small; a great portion of our troops, stationed in the Territories and at our military posts upon the Western frontier, had been basely surrendered by Twiggs to the Rebels in Texas. St. Louis, the great commercial emporium of the State, was preserved from falling into Rebel control only by the prompt and fearless course pursued by General, then Captain, Lyon, who, not waiting for orders or authority, occupied the United

States arsenal, when threatened by the traitor Governor of the State, and dispersed the Rebel troops who were collected under the specious name of State Guards, in a camp of instruction near St. Louis.

The difficulty under which our commanders there labored in obtaining supplies of arms, clothing, &c., for volunteers, was far greater than was felt in any other part of the country. Distant from all the principal depots, at a time when the ability of the Government was taxed to the utmost to arm and equip the large number of volunteers called into the field, those who were, from time to time, placed in charge of that department, were compelled to act under the greatest disadvantages.

Just previous to the appointment of Gen. Fremont to the command of that Department, the state of affairs in Missouri had become very alarming. In every portion of the State the Rebel forces had appeared and assumed the offensive; all through the State they were committing their depredations, and Jackson, the Governor, had appeared with a large force of troops furnished by the Rebel authorities from Arkansas and Texas, in addition to those he had been able to collect in Missouri. Pillow and other Rebel Generals had collected a large force from Tennessee, Kentucky, &c., and were threatening the south-western portion of the State and Cairo at the mouth of the Ohio. Gen. Lyon, who was the highest officer in command after the removal of Gen. Harney, had, with his limited means, been most active, and had taken the field for the purpose of preventing Jackson, with his superior forces, from getting possession of the northern portion of the State.

In July, Gen. Fremont was assigned to that command. He proceeded to New-York City, where he spent some days, endeavoring to arrange for supplying his Department with the arms, &c., which were absolutely requisite. He reached St. Louis on the 25th of July. Gen. Pope, who had been assigned the command in Northern Missouri, was calling for troops to enable him to take the field; Gen. Lyon, in the south-western portion of the State, had been calling for re-enforcements for some time; Gen. Prentiss, at Cairo, was also asking for re-enforcements. Gen. Fremont first re-enforced Cairo, as being the most important point, situated, as it was at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, and controlling the navigation of those two rivers. The number of troops that he could obtain for that purpose was small; but the enemy were led to believe, by the large number of steamboats that went down from St. Louis that the re-enforcement was far greater than it really was; and Pillow, who had a force estimated at 12,000 men, was deterred from making the attack he had contemplated.

Cairo being re-enforced, Gen. Fremont at once took steps to send troops to Gen. Lyon. The number of the enemy opposed to Gen. Lyon was almost overwhelming. It was supposed by many that he would retire before them until he should meet supports. He himself seems to have contemplated such a movement, for, after the affair of Dog Springs, he retired to Springfield; and Gen. Sturgis testifies that at that time, Gen. Lyon expressed his convictions that re-enforcements could not be sent to him.

Upon reaching Springfield, Gen. Lyon halted his forces, and, after waiting there some four or five days, announced his intention to march out and attack the enemy. What reasons influenced him in forming that determination are not well established by the testimony. Some of the officers have expressed their conviction that he apprehended that the enemy, should he retire further from them, would fall upon his rear and cripple him, or force him to fight a battle under great disadvantages. His brave spirit, doubtless, led him to meet the enemy he had gone so far to reach, and endeavor to inflict such a blow as would lead them not to press very closely upon him. Whatever his reasons may have been, he determined upon the attack. The battle was fought at Wilson's Creek, on the 10th of August, and, though the enemy outnumbered our forces four to one, our army was eminently successful.

Gen. Lyon fell leading on a regiment to the attack. His loss at that time was most deeply felt. Dying

as a brave soldier would wish to die, fighting for the cause of his country against those who were seeking its destruction, his example has exercised its influence upon those who have since won the glorious victories which have made our armies in the West so illustrious.

After that battle our forces retired to Rolla, the enemy being so severely punished that they followed only at a distance. At Rolla they were joined by the troops that had been started to their relief, but had been delayed for want of transportation.

In September, Col. Mulligan, who had been upon an expedition in the northern part of the State, was obliged to fall back before the forces of the enemy advancing against him under Gen. Price. Col. Mulligan made a stand at Lexington, and prepared to resist them, sending for re-enforcements. Gen. Fremont, upon hearing of Col. Mulligan's situation, made arrangements to send troops to his assistance; but from various causes they were unable to reach him, and the enemy succeeding in cutting off his supply of water, he was compelled to surrender.

Shortly after this, Gen. Fremont determined to take the field in person, with all the forces he could collect together. He was deficient in transportation; so much so that the Adjutant-General of the army reported to the Secretary of War that Gen. Fremont would be unable to move. He did move, however, and by Nov. 1 succeeded in reaching Springfield. The enemy, some 2,000 strong, had been driven from that place by Major Zagoni, who, with barely 100 cavalry, made the most brilliant charge of the war.

Preparations were made to engage the enemy, who were understood to be in force in the immediate neighborhood of Springfield. The day was fixed, and the order of the attack determined upon. Just then Gen. Fremont was removed from the command, and Gen. Hunter appointed as his successor.

Gen. Hunter testifies that he became satisfied that the enemy were not so near as Gen. Fremont had supposed. He determined, therefore, to withdraw to St. Louis, which was done, and active operations in the State were suspended for some time.

In relation to the administration of Gen. Fremont, much has been said about the high prices paid by him for arms and other supplies; the unnecessary fortification of St. Louis; delay in re-enforcing points threatened by the enemy; undue assumption of authority, &c. Your Committee can but briefly notice those different points, on account of their inability to obtain full evidence in relation to them.

This much, at least, appears to be established: Gen. Fremont, upon taking the command, was clothed with the most ample authority, and the exigencies of the Department were such that much should be pardoned in one compelled to act so promptly, and with so little at his command. Whether that authority was exercised, in all respects, as it should have been—whether Gen. Fremont was justified in all that he did by the circumstances under which he was called upon to act—your Committee do not undertake to express a positive opinion.

In relation to the purchase of arms, &c., it appears that the Department was very destitute of supplies of all kinds; the demand was most pressing, and the Government was unable to supply it. Some of the arms engaged by Gen. Fremont for the soldiers in his department were diverted to the Army of the Potomac—the primary object of the Government then being to collect and equip an army at Washington as soon as could possibly be done. This rendered it the more important that other arms should be obtained. Yet with all that Gen. Fremont deemed it proper to do, his department long felt the want of adequate supplies.

In reference to the fortifications about St. Louis, Gen. Fremont but carried out what Gen. Lyon before him had deemed necessary. In reference to the manner in which it was done—as the Government has had its agents to examine the contracts for that work, as well as other contracts, your Committee forbear expressing an opinion.

In regard to re-enforcing promptly those points threatened by the enemy, so far as your Committee

have the evidence before them, they believe that Gen. Fremont acted with energy and promptness. He was peculiarly situated. The first call—that of Gen. Lyon—was pressed upon him so soon after he took command of the department, and he was compelled to act so hastily, without time for fully surveying the field before him, and ascertaining the extent of the resources at his command, that even if he failed to do all that one under other circumstances might have done, still your Committee can discover no cause of censure against him. But in regard to both Gen. Lyon and Col. Mulligan, your Committee have discovered no evidence of any disregard for the public interest, or want of energy or inclination upon the part of Gen. Fremont. Troops were collected by him as soon as could be done, and they were promptly sent where the exigencies of the service demanded. Some of them were diverted to other purposes than those for which Gen. Fremont designed them. The Government called upon him for troops to be sent to the east, at a time when he was most earnestly engaged in procuring forces for the assistance of Col. Mulligan. Those that were left were sent promptly, and only failed to render the assistance needed from causes over which Gen. Fremont had no control.

Gen. Fremont early turned his attention to the building of gunboats for our Western rivers. Whoever is entitled to the credit of originating the idea of employing such means of warfare in that section of country, it is not to be denied that Gen. Fremont perceived the advantage to result from them. Our brilliant victories in the West will bear enduring testimony to the correctness of his judgment in that respect.

But that feature of Gen. Fremont's administration which attracted the most attention at the time, and which will ever be most prominent among the many points of interest connected with the history of that Department, is his Proclamation of Emancipation. Whatever opinion may be entertained in reference to the time when the policy of Emancipation should have been inaugurated, or by whose authority it should have been promulgated, there can be no doubt that Gen. Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of subduing this Rebellion. In proof of that it is only necessary to refer to the fact that his successor, when transferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying the same principle. And the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has applied the same principle to all the rebellious States, and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vestige of treason and rebellion is destroyed.

The administration of Gen. Fremont was eminently characterized by earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty. In the exercise of the almost unlimited power delegated to him, there was no evidence of any tenderness toward treason, or any failure to fully assert the dignity and power of the Government of which he was the representative.

The manner in which that power was exercised was to be judged by the results, and the policy of continuing him in command was a matter for the authorities above him to determine.

In order to pronounce a final judgment upon all the affairs in the Western Department, much more information is necessary than is in the possession of your Committee. They have undertaken merely to state what seems to be borne out by such testimony as they have been able to obtain.

E. F. WADE, Chairman.
Z. CHANDLER,
JOHN COVODE,
GEO. W. JULIAN.

As the testimony which the Committee submit in relation to the Western Department is so incomplete, the testimony of so many witnesses deemed material by the whole Committee, being wanting, the undersigned decline to concur in the above report, and, for themselves, prefer to submit the testimony without comment.

D. W. GOOCH,
M. F. ODELL.

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