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I
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IflflMH'
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE V^ HELSINKI ACCORDS
V
Y 4. SE 2: 103-1-10
Inplenentition of the Helsinki Acco..
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION
THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVENA
OCTOBER 21, 1993
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 103-1-10]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 74-257 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office. Washington. DC 20402 ISBN Q-16-04A049-1
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE V^^ HELSINKI ACCORDS
Y 4. SE 2: 103-1-10
Inplenestation of the Helsinki Acco..
V
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
OCTOBER 21, 1993
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 103-1-10]
JUN 2 7 /a94
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 74-257 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Ot'tlce Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-0440A9-1
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona, Chairman STENY H. HOYER. Maryland, Co-Chairman FRANK LAUTENBERG. New Jersey EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
HARRY REID, Nevada BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico
BOB GRAHAM, Florida CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
BARBARA MIKULSKI, Maryland FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa CONNIE MACK, Florida
Executive Branch
VACANT, Department of State
VACANT, Department of Defense
VACANT, Department of Commerce
Samuel G. Wise, Staff Director
Jane S. Fisher, Deputy Staff Director
Maky Sue Hafner, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
David M. Evans, Senior Aduisor
R. Spencer Oliver, Consultant
Mike AMITAY, Staff Assistant
Patricia Carley, Staff Assistant
Brenda G. Collier, Receptionist
Orest Deychakiwsky, Staff Assistant
John Finerty, Staff Assistant
Robert Hand, Staff Assistant
Heather F. Hurlburt, Staff Assistant
Jesse Jacobs, Staff Assistant
Ronald McNaMARA, Staff Assistant
Jeanne A. McNaughton, Staff Assistant
Tom Murphy, Technical Editor
Michael Ochs, Staff Assistant
James S. Ridge, Press Secretary
ERIKA B. SchLAGER, Staff Assistant
ViNCA ShowaLTER, Staff Assistant
CorINNE R. ZacCAGNINI, Administrative Assistant
(II)
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Jose Maria Mendiluce, Former Special Envoy, United Nations High Commis- sioner for Refugees 4
Frederick C. Cuny, President, Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corp 6
APPENDIX
Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, opening statement 49
Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, opening statement 50
Jose Maria Mendiluce, Former Special Envoy, United Nations High Commis- sioner for Refugees, opening statement ana additional materials 51
Frederick C. Cuny, President, Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corp., open- ing statement 68
"High Priority Sites for Assistance," submitted for the record by Frederick
CT Cuny, Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corp., 73
Material submitted for the record by Veterans for Peace 74
Material submitted for the record by International Emergency Medical Re- sponse Agency 85
(III)
THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE OF BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA
Thursday, October 21, 1993.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held in room 2360, Raybum House Office Build- ing, Washington, DC, at 10 a.m., Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chair- man, presiding.
Commissioners present: Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman, Hon. Edward J. Markey, Hon. Frank McCloskey, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, and Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr.
Also present: Hon. Thomas C. Sawyer, Hon. James Moran, Hon. Charles Wilson, Hon. Louise Mcintosh Slaughter, and Hon. Helen Delich Bentley.
Chairman DeConcini. The Commission on Security and Co- operation in Europe will come to order. Please sit down, gentlemen.
In recent weeks, the tragedy which continues in Bosnia- Herzegovina has been overshadowed by events here at home, as well as Haiti, Somalia, and Russia. This testifies to the significance of the other events, but it also reflects a tendency to want to ignore longstanding problems.
The problem in the former Yugoslavia confronts us horribly day after day. For more than 2 years now, there is a large gap between what we know needs to be done, on the one hand, and what gov- ernments are politically willing to do, on the other. Rather tnan meet the challenge before it, the world shifts its focus.
This cannot be allowed to happen. People in Sarajevo, in Gorazde, and elsewhere in Bosnia are still being killed by sniper fire and by shelling. People are still being forced to fiee, adding to an already tremendous refugee burden as winter approaches.
The effects of aggression and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not disappear by turning off our television sets or turning to the next newspaper page. Not only will thousands more die this winter, resettlement, reconstruction, and reconciliation will take years, perhaps decades to achieve when and if such efforts can be finally undertaken.
Our hearings this morning focus on the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We hope to gain insight into whether they will survive their second winter under siege, whether they want to end the conflict no matter what principles are sacrificed, whether they want to fight on to defend what is theirs, whether they will want to return to their home village or move elsewhere in Bosnia- Herzegovina or someplace else around the world.
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We have two outstanding witnesses before us this morning who can address this issue. Jose Mendiluce is a former Special Envoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugo- slavia, and currently the UNHCR representative in Brussels. His expertise in refugee matters, his experience in the former Yugo- slavia and his personal candor are well know.
Fred Cuny is an expert in disaster relief, who has spent most of 1993 in Bosnia-Herzegovina assisting efforts to keep an infrastruc- ture under attack functioning so that people can survive.
Gentlemen, we welcome you here, and thank you for taking the time to be with us.
I would also like to note the presence in the audience of Ambas- sador Muhamed Sacirbey, the Bosnian representative to the United Nations, who has worked tirelessly to keep that organization and its members aware of the tragic plight of the Bosnian conflict.
Co-chairman Hoyer is tied up in some leadership meetings and will be joining us, and I will yield to Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, given our friendship and experiences together, I continue to appreciate your courageous leadership in this very, very important area.
I think one thing that concerns people who care about this par- ticular issue is that, in recent weeks, developments in Somalia, Haiti, and Russia have, in essence, pushed the suffering, the trag- edy, and the devastation of the Bosnian people off the front pages and news reports. In essence, more and more placing them in the continuing danger of continuing to have to accept this terrible, ter- rible fate.
Just 10 days ago, Conmgressman Charlie Wilson and I were m Sarajevo, and I learned later from New York Times reports that, by current standards, it was a fairly lively day. 150 Serb shells struck the city that day. We could hear them periodically, and we could also hear occasional small arms, semi-automatic, and auto- matic weapons fire, usually seeming to be a block or two away.
When I talked to President Izetbegovic and Vice President Ganic that day, they noted the slow strangulation going on which, while at a different pace, nevertheless leads to death and devastation.
As we all know, last Saturday and Sunday thousands of shells rained down on Sarajevo— up to 2,000 on Sunday, I understand, Mr. Ganic told me that, on Sunday, 60 to 65 people were seriously wounded or horribly maimed. There were nine deaths in Sarajevo due to Serb gunners up on those hills around the capital. Yet we will hear from our witnesses today that people in various enclaves elsewhere in Bosnia probably have it even worse, particularly nu- tritionally.
This has to stop. I do not think there are two people who are more expert than Msrs. Cuny and Mendiluce as to the extent of the suffering in Sarajevo and elsewhere and as to what needs to be done. I appreciate their testimony, particularly the concerns from the Bosnian government for a restoration of the natural gas supply. There is currently no fuel, as I am sure we will hear. The water available is minimal, and there are great hopes that somehow UNPROFOR and the West, among other things, would open up the Tuzla airport rather than rely on a relatively small winding road
as the only means this winter to meet the needs of 800,000 to 1,000,000 refugees in that area.
This issue will not go away. It is a matter of strategic, as well as humanitarian, import, and I think the sooner our administra- tion, the Congress, and the West wakes up to that, the better it is going to be for everyone.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.
Congressman Markey.
Mr. Markey. I thank the Senator very much, and thank you for having this hearing today. I think it is very important.
As Somalia and Haiti move this story deeper into the newspaper, in no way is the suffering of the people in this part of the world in any way diminished. The winter is arriving. Food is scarce. Homelessness is prevalent. Inflation is rampant, and the physical and psychological suffering is almost unmeasurable.
So it is absolutely imperative for us to insure that this moral and ethical responsibility, which the United States and the world com- munity has towards this part of the world, not be lost as for the last couple of months the media moves over to a couple of new sto- ries, because without the attention that has to be paid to it, what we are going to see is that the good work that could be done is un- dermined by neglect.
So we thank you both for your willingness to come here today and helping us to continue to focus on the suffering of the people of all nationalities within the former Yugoslavia.
Chairman DeConcesii. Thank you. Congressman.
Congressman Sawyer.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much, Senator.
Just let me join with my colleagues in thanking you for this op- portunity and to our witnesses for the messages they bring to us today.
There is little more that we can say about the sense of horror that we all share with regard to the human suffering. The work of the Helsinki Commission in that regard is signal for all of us.
I think among the most important things that we can come to understand is the suffering that we have trouble even measuring and accounting for. It is not only a symptom of disruption, disloca- tion, and instability, but is like a virus that has the capacity to spread. In that sense it is one of the large scale, growing, unmeasured, and unmetered human phenomena that is spreading throughout the world today.
We have greater numbers of migrants and refugees than at any time in the last 50 years. The kinds of events that are taking place in Bosnia and throughout the former Yugoslavia are mirrored in so many other places throughout the world, from Liberia to Georgia to countless other places. We have a great deal to learn from what you have to tell us today.
Thank you. Senator.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you. Congressman.
Congressman Cardin.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just underscore an important point in your opening state- ment. There have been events in the United States that have over-
shadowed what is happening today in Bosnia. That is why I think this hearing is so important.
Our only hope of bringing about a resolution of the tragic human rights violations that are occurring in Bosnia is to continue to place a world spotlight on what is happening there. That is why I par- ticularly appreciate the fact that the Helsinki Commission is hold- ing these hearings and look forward to the testimony of our wit- nesses.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Mendiluce, thank you again for being with us, and if you will proceed with your statement, your full statement will be put in the record if you would like to summarize it for us, please.
TESTIMONY OF JOSE M. MENDILUCE, SPECIAL ENVOY, UNITED NATIONS fflGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
Mr. Mendiluce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like, first of all, to congratulate you for convening this hearing. I think it is most important, and I hope it will help to clar- ify some ideas about the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Thank you very much also to all of the distinguished Representa- tives present here and all ladies and gentlemen who came to this hearing.
A text is available for all of you about what are the main ideas I wanted to present here, but if you allow me, and given the fact that the text is presented, I would like to just mention some of the crucial points in my view that have to be retained from the modest paper I was able to prepare.
First of all, in a very telegraphic way, the war was avoidable with preventive means, including clear and strong messages by the international community to those who would start this war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everybody knew that this war was going to start, and no preventive action was taken in time, not enough at- tention to the early warning signs, signals were given, and this made the war unavoidable in practice, but I insist the war was avoidable with enough strength by the international community.
The second point is that the international community became in- volved and assumed a co-responsibility about the events in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The international community became involved througn many resolutions of the Security Council, through the ne- gotiation process, through a massive humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and through all types of condemnations, reso- lutions, decisions, advice, and whatever, but without the necessary means to transform this implication or this action of the inter- national community to stop the logic and to stop the war.
Third, the humanitarian organizations, and in particular, UNHCR, started denouncing the situation in Bosnian before the war started, but as early as May 1992, we told the international community that this tragedy, that the coming tragedy, did not have a humanitarian solution, and that we did not want to be used as an alibi or excuse for lack of political action because in a conflict like this, the humanitarians can only alleviate the problem, cannot solve and cannot stop the logic of the war.
So we say that since May 1992, and since that moment we have been insisting all the time and asking the international community
at the political level not to use us as the main basis of the inter- national strategy towards the conflict.
Despite this, I want to mention also that unfortunately, given the continuation of the war, all of the atrocities and human suffering, the humanitarian assistance is needed, and the fact is if it is not, the solution should not be interpreted in the way that why to do humanitarian assistance. People there need humanitarian assist- ance, but not only humanitarian assistance.
Five is that today we cannot see any prospect of a solution. I am similarly pessimistic, as I think all those who are involved in the activities of Bosnia-Herzegovina — and probably Fred Cuny is going to elaborate on that — we are terrified about the coming winter and about the situation that has been going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only Sarajevo, but also in other areas.
Six, the latest proposal presented by the Co-chairmen, whatever justification at the political level could be, implies in practice this partition proposal would imply, if accepted or if implemented, addi- tional massive displacement of people, and I could elaborate on that in the part of questions, but it will imply no possibility for re- turn for many of the current refugees being displaced, and it would imply that more people will be displaced by force if the interpreta- tion that the local parties to the conflict will make of this partition is the one that has been taken since the beginning of the war.
I would like also to say that ethnic cleansing continues unabated, and there are no journalists in the Banja-Tuka region. My col- leagues have reported that the last four mosques that were not yet blown up have been blown up during the month of September. So there is not a single mosque in the Serbian controlled territory of Banja-luka, and this is part of a genocide in terms of culture and traditions of the Bosnia Muslim people.
So Sarajevo, as we mentioned, is, once again after 18 months of war, under heavy shelling, and people are suffering as you could imagine not only by this current shelling, but by the lack of any prospect for the future, and they do not understand this. They do not understand why it is impossible to stop the massacres of Sara- jevo after more than 18 months, and this time we see an end there because there are other conflicts we do not know exactly. In this case, we have been bombed by the media month after month, and we should know what is going on there. So the responsibility is even greater.
I would like to say also that apart fi*om all of the atrocities, mas- sacres, people killed, this war has destroyed also two other dreams probably. The first dream that this war has destroyed is the dream of the majority of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that even the referendum in the month of January 1992 decided to vote for de- mocracy and decided to vote to live together and decided to vote for multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious society.
These people, this dream has been defeated by this war and by the incapacity of the international community to stop those who pretend to create a confessional or ethnically pure state in that country, with all of the consequences that this would have not only for Bosnia, but also as a very bad example for other parts of the world.
The other dream that this war is destroying is the dream of an international community, able to act in an energetic way to stop violations of all types of principles, international principles at the political and humanitarian level, and to abuse all types of human rights in the way that this war has been doing.
The international community has been and is being tested in this war, and I think that for the time being we can become also a cas- ualty of this war. Many dictators, criminals worldwide are learning the lesson of the international community's incapacity to address this problem and to stop this war, and I think that we have al- ready a few examples of some small dictators and criminals that are using our weaknesses to laugh in front of the international community and to disregard any basic principle of convenience and solidarity, and they are Teaming very, very quickly.
The last point for me is to say that I have the impression in all of the conferences I have been attending since I left Bosnia- Herzegovina, in meetings, discussions, that many people think it is too late. I am not sure if it is too late to save Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, but I think it is not too late to avoid a genocide, to stop the genocide that is going on, and I would like to insist that hun- dreds of thousands of people could become victims and could be- come casualties if we do not do anything else than try with human- itarian means to save the survivors, those who are lucky enough to be still alive.
I do not think that we should say that it is too late to prevent a genocide. If we do that, I think that millions of victims of this war will never forgive us.
Thank you very much.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.
Mr. Mendiluce. Could I add that this intervention idea is on a personal basis?
Chairman DeConcini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mendiluce. And on the basis of my experience in former Yugoslavia, but it does not imply that my organization fully agrees with my statement.
ThanK you.
Mr. CuNY. But I think they do.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.
Mr. CUNY.
TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK C. CUNY, PRESIDENT, INTERTECT
Mr. CUNY. Senator, Congressmen, distinguished guests, Mr. Mendiluce, I am extremely pleased to be given the opportunity to speak on the question of the problems in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, and to testify to the grave humanitarian situation that is confronting the people as we approach this next winter.
What I would like to do today is to look at the reasons why the Bosnians may have rejected the most recent peace plan and to dis- cuss some of the humanitarian problems that are facing as a result and then to suggest some options for U.S. policy in the coming months.
In the aftermath of the Bosnians' rejection of the latest peace plan. Western policymakers seem to be at a loss about where to go next. Many observers had thought that the plan was the last best
chance that the Bosnians had, especially to try and intervene be- fore the coming winter and to reduce the extensive humanitarian problems that are likely to be caused by the outbreak of winter conditions in the next few weeks.
Observers were very surprised when the Bosnians rejected the plan, first the Muslim assembly and later the Bosnian assembly, and when it added conditions that would make the plan unaccept- able to the Serbs and the Croats, it was, in fact, a de facto rejection by the people.
The subsequent revolt by the Bihac Muslims has complicated not only the peace process, but also the humanitarian assistance pro- gram which is lagging behind in contributions of food, materials, and cash, especially in the energy and winterization sectors.
The Bosnians rejected the plan for many reasons. Some were straightforward; some represented political expediency; and some can only be seen in the context of the people's view of themselves at this point in time.
As the Bosnians see the situation, time is on their side if they can hold the republic together. They believe that the Bosnian Serbs are under tremendous pressure from Belgrade to reach a settle- ment so that sanctions can be lifted. They point out that the Serbs continually insist that a phased relaxation of sanctions, starting from the moment that the plan is initialed, be carried out. This has led the Bosnians to believe that sanctions are truly hurting the Serbs and that the sanctions are their main equalizer in the war.
They also know that the enforcement of sanctions has been strengthened during the summer in response to the Serbs' blockade of Sarajevo.
Second, the Bosnians believe that the Europeans will continue to pressure the Serbs into keeping the current level of military activ- ity low in order to keep the United States from intervening mili- tarily. Thus, while the Serbs still have strategic advantage in many areas, basic humanitarian assistance will probably be able to get through at some points to most of the enclaves, to Sarajevo, Tuzla, and to a lesser extent the central zone around Zenica.
If the enclaves do not get food or fuel now, the people will blame the U.N. since these are protected demilitarized areas. If the Serbs tighten the blockade on Sarajevo again, the Bosnians believe it will play into their hands politically.
Third, at the time they rejected the plan, the Bosnians believed that President Clinton has decided in favor of military action if the Serbs continued to attack Sarajevo in northern Bosnia. Apparently the Serbs also believed that bombing was a very real threat since top UNPROFOR officers had warned them continually in July and August that U.S. action was imminent if they did not relax the siege of Sarajevo.
The Bosnian military is opposed to ending the fighting now since its forces have been making gains in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. In the summer they pushed the Croats out of the in- dustrial regions of central Bosnia, for example, around Fojnica, and they are now in position to consolidate their gains in several areas.
They have a number of objectives that they believe they can at- tain: opening a route to the coast, reopening the route to Tuzla through Vares, and regaining control over Mostar. As they see it,
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the Croatian army, or the HV, is in a poor position to support the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) because of the situation in Krajina.
Furthermore, the HVO's blockade of humanitarian assistance has hurt the Croats in central Bosnia far more than the Muslims. Thus, the Muslim dominated forces of the Bosnian presidency are likely to continue to oppose a peace settlement as long as they be- lieve, one, that the Serbs are effectively checked, and, two, that they can take more territory from the Croats.
One incident that may have contributed to the Bosnians' belief that time is on their side is the rebellion of Serb forces in Banja- luka. Some military commanders believe that there are growing dissensions within the Bosnian Serb Army that could weaken the Serbs.
A key factor in the vote that effectively rejected the plan was re- lated to the document itself. When the peace plan was finally pre- sented to the Bosnians, there was widespread skepticism that the form of government proposed would work. Most Muslims accept the fact that the country will be partitioned, and once that is done, they want nothing more to do with the Serbs and to a lesser extent the Croats.
Critics of the proposed constitutional make-up of the government joined forces with the people who still support a multi-ethnic study to condemn the agreement and effectively block its acceptance. Many Bosnians think that the Serbs and Croats are preparing for another round of war. The Bosnians believe that when war breaks out, they will be courted by both sides in the conflict. At that point the Bosnians will be in a position to make a deal for some of the territory they have lost.
There is yet another intangible factor, and a major one, affecting the Bosnians' behavior. They fervently believe that they are the victims and their position is right. Therefore, they assume if they can just hold out a bit longer, they will eventually win military support from the outside. It may not seem logical to an outsider, but the belief is very real.
What do they want? To get the Bosnians back to the conference table in a mood to negotiate, several things must happen.
First, their territorial demands must be met: specifically, a cor- ridor to the sea; contiguous borders with the eastern enclaves; de- fensible borders in the west; elimination of the HVO blockade at Vares; and access to the Sava River which is navigable to the Dan- ube.
Second, their goals include stronger guarantees of NATO deploy- ment, especially a larger and more rapid U.S. commitment to help prevent forced population transfers. They essentially are seeking prepositioning of forces for rapid deployment.
The only other circumstance that would get the Bosnians back to the conference table, in my opinion, is a major change on the bat- tlefield for the better or the worse. Pressuring Mr. Izetbegovic is unlikely to achieve any major results.
UNPROFOR and many others do not share the Bosnians' analy- sis of the situation. UNPROFOR's assessment is far more pessimis- tic. From their close contacts with the Serbs, UNPROFOR person- nel believe that the Bosnians' ploys will not work. According to sen-
ior officers, the Bosnians' move has strengthened the Serb radicals, especially the Mladic faction. Rather than wait, UNPROFOR be- lieves that the Serbs will now move to punish the Bosnians, grab more territory, and complete ethnic cleansing in several areas, es- pecially in Banja-luka, as Mr. Mendiluce has pointed out.
While it is unclear whether they will initiate an all out assault on Sarajevo, they will certainly escalate the level of shelling and
fo after more territory in the north and complete the expulsion of luslims from these other areas now under their control.
This reduces the likelihood that those areas will ever be reoccu- pied by their original inhabitants and will further hamper any ef- forts to forge a unified nation.
What is likely to happen in the next few months? In the near term, the situation is likely to remain fairly static. The Serbs will gradually tighten the blockade of Sarajevo. Sniping has resumed and will gradually become more intense.
Additionally, the Serbs are not likely to honor many of the agree- ments they nave made over the summer with UNPROFOR and UNHCR regarding coal and firewood, restoration of electricity, and so forth. They will undoubtedly try to consolidate some territory in the north, perhaps near Maglaj on the perimeter of Tuzla, and will try to cut off the Muslims' access to Sarajevo from the south.
In the last week, the Serbs have stopped all but food and medi- cines from coming into Sarajevo. All winter supplies, gas and water, equipment, and even blankets, have been stopped. At the same time, political divisions among the Bosnians are likely to grow, making it more difficult to supply aid or to reach political ac- commodation with the Serbs and the Croats.
In short, the people of Bosnia, and especially those in Sarajevo and the various enclaves, are in for a very tough winter.
In the meantime, the Bosnians will probably agree to return to negotiations, but only to prolong the existing situation. They are gambling that the Serbs will agree to give back more territory to get the sanctions lifted. So they will continue to maneuver, holding out for more land and a more workable form of government.
A looming problem for the Bosnians is the growing factionalism among the Muslims. There are disputes among regions: Bihac ver- sus Sarajevo, Sarajevo versus Tuzla, and between the urban Mus- lims and the Sandzaks, or the rural Muslims. All threaten to fur- ther weaken the Bosnians' ability to hold out and would negate any advantages they may have in the present circumstances.
What should our response be as Americans? At this point, the best approach, I believe, for the United States would be to help the Bosnians make their strategy work. It would be unwise for the United States to push a new peace plan based on the old one. The old plan was not, as some have argued, the best deal the Muslims could get. Signing on to a bad plan could limit U.S. options in the future.
Rather, we should help the Bosnians by focusing on measures that will keep the level of conflict low and allow time to work for them. Another, better, opportunity where U.S. power and leverage can be applied should arise soon.
Specifically, I would recommend the United States do the follow- ing:
10
First, continue to threaten the Serbs with air strikes if they re- sume shelling Sarajevo or attacking the other enclaves. I was ex- tremely pleased to see the reaction of the administration over the weekend and hope that it will be strengthened in the next few days.
Since the plan was effectively rejected, the level of shelling has increased. Frequently more than several hundred shells hit per day, not just along the lines of contact, as UNPROFOR often claims, but deep inside the city. A shell went off just the other day killing a person within five meters of my office.
Second, support the Bosnians' negotiating position by further tightening sanctions' enforcement. There are many weaknesses in the sanctions' enforcement that could be closed with military ac- tion, pressure, and by more stringent enforcement of blockade at the crossing points into the country.
Third, pressure Croatia to curb the HVO. This should be done by suspending economic assistance to Croatia if the HVO fails to end its attacks on Bosnians.
Furthermore, Croatia should be pressured into giving the Bosnian refugees better treatment.
Number four, increase our diplomatic efforts to limit the growing political divisions among the Bosnians. Our American Ambassador, Mr. Victor Yakovich, has done a superb job in negotiating between the various political factions, and he should be continued to be en- couraged to do so.
Number five, continue to support humanitarian assistance, espe- cially supporting the U.N. on issues of access and freedom of move- ment and the supply of energy for winter heating and support for the winterization effort.
Number six, continue to press all parties on human rights. Spe- cial emphasis should be given to publicizing the human rights abuses of the Serbs and the Croats. Pressuring them publicly should tend to encourage the Bosnian leadership to take stronger measures to curb similar abuses by their troops and allow the Bosnians to regain the moral high ground that they appear to be losing. We should also give more visible U.S. support to the War Crimes Tribunal.
Mr. Chairman, there is one measure that we can take now that will show the Unite States' resolve in this situation. That is to en- sure that the supply of natural gas to Sarajevo is restored. The Serbs have cut the gas since May. Gas is now in the lines up to Sarajevo, but has been stopped in Serb-held territory from reaching both Sarajevo and Zenica.
Under the terms of the existing sanctions, gas may be shared with Serbia only if the flow of gas to Bosnia is uninterrupted. Since gas is the principal source of fuel for Belgrade, both for heating and for running the city's industries, cutting it off would send a strong message to the Serbs, as well as demonstrating that the West is still behind Bosnia despite the breakdown of the peace process.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Cuny, thank you very much, and, gentlemen, thank you.
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I want to recognize Congressman Wilson who has joined us and Congressman Moran. We will hear from them when we get to the questions.
Gentlemen, the international relief effort has been hampered as one convoy after another has been blocked or turned away. Another problem that has been so widely reported is the practice of negotia- tion and the reporting of paying off of those who block the passage of such convoys by either taking of cut of whatever it is or perhaps in cash.
Can either of vou tell us and bring us up to date just how a prob- lem is that, and why hasn't force been used to get aid through as is authorized under the Security Council resolution?
Mr. Mendiluce.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes, thank you.
Of course, one of the main problems since the beginning of the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the problems in the bar- ricades, checkpoints, and the front lines mainly with the Serbian side in the beginning, but now with the Croats, the HVO also from the Adriatic Coast into central Bosnia.
The policy of UNHCR, and I can guarantee in the 20 months I was there we followed this policy, was never pay any tax to any of these militia men that were asking for taxes. So this implied for us that many times our convoys were stopped for one week even or 10 days or sometimes they were forced to turn back and go to the base.
There have been some reports about units here paying taxes, and this is completely wrong. We never pay taxes. We never pay taxes to anybody in the conflict. Our position was to stay as long as nec- essary, but never pay taxes.
The confusion comes because part of this assistance that has been distributed by units here is also addressed to the Serbian dis- placed people because we do not assist only one type of victim, but all the victims without any discrimination. But we have been forced to negotiate once and again, many times about the quan- tities distributed to one side or the other, and we have been always very open to listen to all sides and revise our distribution targets according to new elements, new data that we could be provided and checked.
Regarding the fact of why force was not used, I think that the most important point here is that you cannot combine — and this is my personal view and experience in Bosnia — you cannot combine a humanitarian operation that is in charge with civilians with soft skin vehicles, normally with soft skin trucks, and the use of force in one or other checkpoint. If we accepted to use force or the UNPROFOR decided to use force escorting a unit or convey, let's say, entering Sarajevo, for instance, the whole operation of units here in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be at risk in the sense that we will become targets from all of the Serbia militia men or the Cro- atians if only once force has been used in one point.
So if you decide to use force, you should use military means to distribute assistance. You cannot combine a civilian humanitarian operation operating in hostile territory and use force here or there if you are not ready to use force all around, and in that case, what
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are the civilians doing? The operation should be militarized 100 percent.
This has been the contradiction since the beginning, and we knew force can be used, but the consequences were to stop all of the humanitarian operations in many areas, at least in all Serbian controlled territory, if the force was used against the Serbian side, or in all Croatian controlled territory if the action was taken against the Croats.
Thank you.
Chairman DeConceni. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Cuny?
Mr. CUNY. Yes, I do. In fact, I am afraid I must strongly disagree with Mr. Mendiluce and correct him on a number of facts.
First of all, the Serbs routinely take a cut of supplies going through on the land convoys. They periodically halt supplies com- ing through at the airport and demand a third and sometimes as much as a half of all supplies coming in.
Chairman DeConceni. From the United Nations?
Mr. Cuny. From the United Nations, from private agencies. All programs that are carried out in Sarajevo are programs that are part of the U.N.'s overall, comprehensive program because every agency working there is doing so under the UNHCR umbrella
Chairman DeConcini. Well, I understand that. Excuse me.
Mr. Cuny. — implementing agencies.
Chairman DeConcini. Just to make a distinction, the ones that you see, that I have seen there, are U.N. trucks that are carrying the goods into wherever, mostly Sarajevo. Are they also being taxed?
Mr. Cuny. In many cases they are, yes, sir. For example
Chairman DeConcini. Have you witnessed that or have you seen people witness the unloading of those supplies?
Mr. Cuny. Yes, sir, I have. For example, currently we are in the process of bringing in a number of supplies for the winterization program, including gas pipes to help people improve their connec- tions from the gas mains in the city which we have put in to the houses. At the moment, the supplies have been blocked at the air- port. The Serbs have demanded one-third of all pipes without re- gard to compatibility of the sizes or anything. They simply want one-third, and we have been advised by UNHCR that the only way we will get them out is to give them the one-third.
Now, what happens is that often these compromises are made to give the Serbs an equivalent amount simply to get stuff through the lines. You do not actually have it taken from a truck, though that does happen, and often more by the HVO than by the Serbs, but it does occur in many locations.
For example, when coal comes into the city, we are obliged to give the Serbs 20 percent of all the coal coming in and to deliver it to the Serb side. We were originally asked by the UNHCR rep- resentative, Mr. Land, to give one-third of the coal to them, but we negotiated another agreement that allowed us to only give one-fifth based on perceived needs.
However, I will point out that the Serbs do not have an energy problem. Thev have access to firewood. They have access to coal in their area. They have access to fuel in their area, and they could
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be delivering it. There is no need for UNHCR to deliver energy supplies to the Serbs.
One of the problems, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that by agreeing to these things, we put ourselves in a very awful bind. I recognize that there is in reality a need to deal with the Serbs in these situa- tions, but when we go back and say we are going to give the Serbs one-third of these materials, it legitimizes their claim that they are the victims, and I think we have to remember who is the aggressor and who is the true victim in this situation.
I do not believe that the unrestricted delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Serb side without very strict checks and bal- ances— which I believe we do not — ^have is a proper way to proceed, and it is creating precedence for future operations that are going to come back to haunt us.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a quick question?
Chairman DeConceni. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Are the Croatians as demanding as the Serbs for a cut?
Mr. CuNY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Just as much?
Mr. CuNY. It depends on the area.
Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Mendiluce, would you like to respond?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes, I would like to clarify because I think we are not 100 percent in disagreement. What I said is when I left the operation in June. I do not know how these things have been evolv- ing and the level of blackmail suffered by UNHCR and the humani- tarian organizations evolved. I imagine that it has increased, the level of blackmail and tough negotiations with 20 percent, 30 per- cent.
What I wanted to say is three things. Most of the cases that they take from the convoys are taken by force, and we do not have any means to stop it. The only means is not to go, stop delivering as- sistance to some areas.
Second, we are not in control of all the private agencies that are working there. They work, most of them, with a UNHCR ID card because this is the only way for them to move in and out in some areas, but we do not have 100 percent control of the mechanisms of negotiation and decisions they take on the ground to arrive at one point or to another.
The third thing is I have many examples of my colleagues not allowing the Serbs to take 50 or 30 percent of the loads of the trucks. We were stopped many, many times going to Srebrenica be- cause we did not accept any assistance to the people in Rogatica, which is a point we have to cross to go to Srebrenica. We were stopped many times going to Gorazde and other Muslim enclaves because we did not accept the blackmail on the ground, and I know that is very difficult to decide.
If you have, for instance, the problem of the pipes and without an international clear position to be more coherent and aggressive against the aggressors, as mentioned, it is very difficult for us to decide. Either we want pipes in, and I do not know how you are going to solve this problem, or you do not have the pipes in for the gas supply.
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So I imagine at that level of negotiations, you have to make deals. The weaker we are because we do not have any international clear backing in terms of action, the more difficult for the U.N. each year to negotiate adequate deals in the sense that I think that there are needs on the Serbian side and they are displaced. With- out contradicting what Fred Cuny says about who are the aggres- sors and who are the victims, but they are also displaced on the Serbian side. It is difficult to have a discussion here about quan- tities, this and that, but this has been taken many, many times m the U.N. each year.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you very much. I do want to recognize Ambassador Sacirbey, who is here, the Bosnian representative to the United Nations, who has done a tire- less job of representing his country here, and I will yield to the Co- Chairman for an opening statement and questions.
Co-chairman HoYER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to wait for oth- ers to question. I am trying to catch up. I apologize for bemg late. I had another meeting at 10 o'clock.
I appreciate both of you being here. The tragedy that is ongoing in Bosnia and in the surrounding area is one of the most frustrat- ing that I think that I have dealt with in terms of being unable to create a consensus for positive, productive action.
Having said that, let me yield, Mr. Chairman, to the other speak- ers. I have a statement that I would ask be included in the record at this time, and I will wait for the other members to ask ques- tions, and then I will come back to questions at the end. Chairman DeConcini. Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you also, Mr. Hoyer.
Obviously with the expertise and with the courage and the can- dor that we have in these two witnesses, we could talk for hours about many of these issues, and we would not get to where we need to be, but for just several minutes, particularly, Mr. Cuny, as I un- derstand it you have been in Sarajevo for 10 months full time, liv- ing the life. You are about to go back there.
I do not have to describe to you, given the events of last week- end, the conditions you are going to be facing personally, for that matter, as to your own safety and the uncertainty.
You said we should continue to keep the pressure on the Serbs and particularly to threaten air power. Talking to Mr. Ganic, for that matter talking to Mr. Sacirbey recently, we know that this more than slow strangulation is going on. We know that the Serb heavy tanks have been moved in, beefed up, reinforcing the posi- tions around Sarajevo, and whether it is slow or fast, the death and destruction is going on.
At some point, just medium and random heavy artillery and sooner or later you do not have a city or a people. At what point would you recommend to the policy advisors just to take out some of those Serb heavy positions that are pounding the city?
Mr. Cuny. Congressman, I have been recommending that we take military action since last February. I believe that strong mili- tary action, or at least the threat, a credible threat, of military force, is needed to bring this conflict to an end.
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Unfortunately, I have not seen the administration moving in that direction, except at two points in time, once in May when our allies blocked it and once in July when the U.N. blocked it.
I am fearful that if we do not take military action, we will see a very prolonged conflict, one with major implications not only for the region, the subregion, but also for other areas nearby. As many people have pointed out, Russia is Yugoslavia with nukes. I think that there is a direct linkage between the way that we deal with this situation and how we are going to have to deal with other situ- ations that are far more important to us geopolitically.
I believe from my own experience in northern Iraq, in Sri Lanka, and even in Somalia that military force has a role in this situation. I also believe that if the United States were to craft a humani- tarian intervention based on a massive, overwhelming threat of force to the Serbs that they would back off.
I do not believe that we should go in piecemeal. I am very much opposed to trying to deploy the peacekeeping troops, as was pro- posed under the last peace plan, because I believe it would take far more to bring about true peacekeeping operations than was sched- uled there.
But if we were to use military force in a credible manner and threaten the key targets, the leadership, make the backers of the Serbs and the Croats aware of what we could do to them economi- cally, as well as militarily, that we would soon see a decrease in the violence.
I would like to point out that in the time periods when we have talked about a credible military force that it has been very easy to move things into the city. Throughout the summer, with the United States talking about military intervention, we were able to move over 700 tons of very highly sophisticated and massive water sup- ply equipment into the city. I do not believe we would have been able to do that, and the fact that now the Serbs are blocking the pipes, it is clearly because they feel that the United States is not going to take action.
Mr. McCloskey. One of the attitudes that I have found during my trips to the region to talk to UNPROFOR and some other offi- cials— and we have heard some of the worst of it expressed by Gren- eral MacKenzie — is that, even if the Serbs are if not "good guys," they are basically the best guys to work with. They are the most cooperative, the most reasonable, and so forth and so on.
The Bosnians are just being a pain, the argument goes. It also fits in with MacKenzie and, quite frankly, even some of our admin- istration's statements fit this pattern. All of the parties are evil, all of them are bad news, they all commit atrocities, and so forth.
One can make a cases that, however inadvertently, UNPROFOR is in the position of administering this ongoing war for the ultimate convenience and victory of the Serbs. Witness the 30 percent tax being exacted at the airport to feed the same Serb gunners who are firing shells on innocent people, and particularly not only what has been done physically and militarily to these people, but I think there is also a feeling that they are being starved spiritually, not even having full rights of human solace.
I find it offensive that journalists and others are searched by UNPROFOR officials at the airport on the way out and that those
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carrying more than six communications or letters out of Sarajevo, Mr. Chairman, have the letters confiscated.
I also find it offensive that people with citizenship rights or the right to reside elswhere, like one family I know with landed immi- grant status in Canada, cannot get out.
Could you comment on this situation? And then I just have one short, empirical question as to supplies there.
Mr. CUNY. I would also like to give Jose a chance, as well.
Mr. McCloskey. I would welcome comments by both of you.
Mr. CuNY. Mr. Chairman, the U.N. is being asked to do with goodwill and humanitarian assistance what the NATO forces and the allies have refused to do with armies, and I think you have to give a tremendous amount of respect to the efforts of all the U.N. community there.
There are, however, some elements of the leadership of UNPROFOR which have demonstrated, I think, a remarkedly pro Serb bias. If you will notice, when there is a shelling of the city, often the Bosnians are blamed for shelling their own people.
Mr. McCloskey. I keep hearing that Muslim snipers are on the streets shooting other Muslims.
Mr. CUNY. Yes, this is one of the myths. For example, the Bosnians are forced to produce their own ammunition. The only weapons they really have to defend themselves in Sarajevo are mortars, and most of the mortar bombs are homemade, and you would expect that in that situation some short rounds. Even in the U.S. Army, which has probably the best mortars in the world, ap- proximately 5 to 10 percent of all mortar rounds land short. So when the Bosnians are firing outgoing from hill positions and they happen to go short, suddenly the United Nations says, oh, they are shelling their own people.
There is no attempt to try and understand the situation from the Bosnian side.
I have been personally dismayed over the behavior of many of the senior UNPROFOR officers in regards to taking the Serb posi- tion. The reasons for that are many. The Serbs certainly have his- toric ties to some of those powers. There is unfortunately an anti- Muslim strain among many of the participating UNPROFOR forces.
But I think that this can be overcome, and I think that one of the things that happens is that over a period of time, many of those officers who start off with those biases temper them. I know in the case of one British officer that I was familiar with, he came in with a very anti-Bosnian position, and by the time he left, he had be- come so frustrated with the Serbs not honoring their many pledges and agreements that he was ready to hang the next one he saw.
I do not think that that should temper or should color our view on the United Nations' effort there. I think the effort is constrained by the fact that they do not have the backup that is needed to force the checkpoints.
Senator DeConcini asked the question to Mr. Mendiluce about why force isn't used. UNPROFOR was not configured to use force to force checkpoints. It was originally asked to do two things: to take over the management of the airport at Sarajevo and, second.
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to provide an escort for convoys for UNHCR, and it was to escort them through, not to force them through checkpoints.
The first time that we went up to a checkpoint and we were blocked, we should have either had the Security Council mandate that checkpoint be removed and NATO mandated it to back them up and to force it at that point. Had that happened, I believe we would not have this problem of access today.
I do believe, contrary to the majority thinking in UNHCR, that military force can be used to get tnrough these areas and that the Serbs, in fact, would back off again, not taking the risk of a major confrontation with the allies in that situation.
They are in a very weak position politically and economically at the present time, and they cannot continue to operate the way they are and have any kind of economy in the next 9 months. They have either got to win the war, which they may be close to doing, or they need to back off and to try and mend their fences, and I believe that we can encourage them through coercive military force or the threat of military force to make that happen.
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you.
Mr. Mendiluce. Just to complement what Fred Cuny has said, I think one of the problems with UNPROFOR since the beginning of its deployment is that they had a military approach, and for them the Bosnian Serb army or the Serbian army, the Federal armv with the uniform of Bosnian Serbs is an army, and they are used to talking with generals, colonels, and so on. So they were im- pressed by this army that has a lot of political people in the ranks, in the colonel level and generals. They are more political than mili- tary, and they are very able to manipulate people that are not pre- pared for this type of discussion.
And, on the contrary, the Bosnian people did not have a very structured army and whatever. So for military reasons, I think they were more impressed about the Serbs.
Apart from that, I fully agree with Fred Cuny that unfortunately in the Western world and in some of the countries in Europe, there is an anti-Muslim type of approach that is very, very unfortunate.
Mr. McCloskey. Some people say this is driving the British For- eign Office in its policies.
Mr. Mendiluce. May be. I do not know, but I think that one of the problems is if UNPROFOR was let alone, without sufficient back-up, without sufficient political back-up and military strength behind, and they iust started losing their objectives. They had a very limited mandate, but in fact, they were adding and adding and adding tasks and activities to this mandate without a clear back-up.
One of the things I was all the time very, very surprised is to read the Security Council resolutions talking about a country called Bosnia-Herzegovina, member of the Greneral Assembly, with a le- gitimate government, and listen all the time to the UNPROFOR of- ficers talking about the parties to the conflict and referring to the Bosnian government as the Muslims, and this is absolutely unac- ceptable, but they did it all the time, even in public reports through the media.
On the other hand, I was also surprised by the attempt to mini- mize the crisis or the shelling or the attacks in different areas.
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When you read some of the update reports, daily reports of UNPROFOR, we were very surprised because they would never in- clude our reports in terms of humanitarian concerns.
For instance, a typical report of UNHCR about, let's say, Vitez is small arms fire took place during the night, but it was very lim- ited to a neighborhood, and some six or seven explosions were heard. For us, seven explosions are seven houses that have been blow up. So seven families on the move, and this small arms fire implies civilians being killed to terrify the population and to force the people to leave.
So the difference from a military point of view was a quite calm night, from a humanitarian point of view was a catastrophe.
Yes, I think that the other problem, just to finish, is that UNPROFOR since the beginning was completely destroying — I mean was not allowed to do their job for many reasons, but the Serbs tested them, and they did not allow UNPROFOR to deploy in areas that were crucial for us, like Banja-luka. UNPROFOR never deployed in Serbian controlled areas. So they were unable to report about atrocities and crimes committed in these areas be- cause they were not present.
But this undermined the authority since the beginning. You can- not arrive with a plan and the Serbs say no, and you accept it. Since the beginning, since the arrival, since the deployment phase, this was very, very serious, and it provoked a lot of problems for us, for you next year, and many of the atrocities were never re- ported officially to New York by UNPROFOR because they were not present, and this is a very serious point.
Mr. McCloskey. Just one final question on this round because there are three or four other questions I would like to ask later, but what about opening the Tuzla airport? Is that not something elemental that needs to be done?
Mr. Mendiluce. We insisted months ago, since Januaiy or Feb- ruary of this year, and Mate Boban sent a request to the Secretary General to discuss it with the Security Council, under request of the Tuzla authorities and the Sarajevo authorities, and fi-om our point of view, the fragility of the access to Tuzla, as has been proved now since the war started between the Croats following Mateboban and the Bosnian army, prove that the fragility of the access to Tuzla was enormous and that the people there
Mr. McCloskey. Regarding the present situation?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes. I think it is more urgent than ever, and it is feasible. I do not have any doubt that the opening of the airport is feasible. I discussed it with many military men, and it is even easier.
Mr. McCloskey. Will the airport be opened?
Mr. Mendiluce. I hope so.
Mr. CUNY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I can throw some light on that. There have been negotiations for the last 2 weeks on opening Tuzla airport. The issue revolves around whose authority it will be oper- ated under.
The Bosnian government insists that the airport is a Bosnian airport and that it should be operated as a Bosnian airfield with the U.N. being given access to the airfield for humanitarian pur- poses.
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The U.N. has insisted that it be entirely a U.N. airfield, and that they take over all facilities on and adjacent to the airfield, with the right to close it to outside users.
The problem comes up as a result of what has been happening at the Sarajevo airport. As you know, the airport is operated by the United Nations and has been restricted to only U.N. use. No other agencies or organizations, and certainly no private or commercial traffic, is allowed to go in or out of that airfield.
The Bosnians, I think rightly, believe that it is their country arid that they have the right to insist on that airfield being in their hands. The U.N. has a better case in the case of Sarajevo where the airfield straddles the lines of confrontation and, therefore, has a need to limit the access, but this is what the problem is. It is not that not evervone agrees that we need to open the airfield. It is a question of wno should be in control.
Mr. McClx)SKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman DeConceni. Congressman Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. Senator, very much.
If I can just get to the plight of the people now in Bosnia, what their conditions are, what the prospects are for the winter, in the last week all gas, water equipment, winter supplies, blankets have been stopped; is that correct?
Mr. CuNY. That is correct.
Mr. Markey. All with the intention, clearly, of creating such mis- ery that you undermine the psychological capability of the people to resist, but you also point out that there is the capacity for us, the United States, to help in cutting off the natural gas supply for Belgrade; is that correct?
Mr. CUNY. That is correct.
Mr. Markey. Where is that pipeline?
Mr. CuNY. The pipeline enters the country iust north of Zvomik, which is an area which is under Bosnian Serb control, and then it comes down and splits into two lines. One line goes to Zenica and Sarajevo. The second goes eastward to Belgrade.
Mr. Markey. What would it take to cut off the supply of gas to Belgrade?
Mr. CuNY. Under the sanctions, the arrangement is that the Bosnian government makes a request that the Hungarian govern- ment turn off the valve at the pumping station on the Hungarian border.
Mr. Markey. So it is under Hungarian control?
Mr. CUNY. Yes, sir. The gas originates in Russia, goes through the Ukraine, and then is reboosted through a pressurization proc- ess at a plant outside of Budapest.
Mr. Markey. What is the likelihood that we could get the Hun- garian government cooperation in taking such a step?
Mr. CuNY. They have cooperated once in the past.
Mr. Markey. In cutting off gas?
Mr. CUNY. Yes, sir, the^ did.
Mr. Markey. OK. So from your perspective then, to ensure that there is a paradox in play, that the people in Belgrade are put in relatively the same condition as the people in Sarajevo in that their natural gas supplier are eut off and that they are, at least for the
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purpose of, say, heating or office comfort, put in a situation that has them empathizing at least with the people of Bosnia?
Mr. CuNY. Yes, sir. If I could explain the current situation, last summer or last May the Bosnian Serbs began to cut the gas off at two stations. One is near the town of Ilidza and the other is in the district of Butila. They did that by first closing a main valve and then a secondary valve, which allowed the gas to flow to the Bosnian Serb-held areas, but not into the Bosnian area.
After several weeks of negotiations and the failure of those nego- tiations, the government did make a request, and gas was turned off. Immediately the Serbs indicated that they would turn it back on. Gas was restored, and for several days we had gas in July, and then the valve at Butila was jammea shut with only a small amount being allowed. During the evenings, we do get gas coming into the city which pressurizes lines up to the area of the PTT building, which is on the western side of the town.
Mr. Markey. PTT is what?
Mr. CUNY. The post and telegraph building.
Mr. Markey. Oh, post and telegraph, OK.
Mr. CUNY. The engineering building that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and LTNPROFOR use as their pri- mary headquarters there.
Mr. Markey. OK, but in general there has been no natural gas since May?
Mr. CuNY. Since May, that is correct, sir.
Mr. Markey. OK. Which is tolerable during more temperate weather conditions.
Mr. CUNY. In the summertime, yes.
Mr. Markey. So I like your suggestion very much, and I would think that that would be the position that our government should take, in fact, almost immediately so that the paradox could be set in the early winter period now, so that they can be suffering quite similarly to the Bosnians by December or January.
I think we have to start it early enough. It should not be a long process, almost immediately it would seem to me, if we would want the civilians in Belgrade to be suffering similar to the people in Bosnia, and I would like that position. I think it is a good sugges- tion.
What about the conclusion that I think you, Mr. Mendiluce, came to that it is too late to save the state for the Bosnians? Is that the position that you take?
Mr. Mendiluce. I say that it may be.
Mr. Markey. May be?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes. The international community could con- ceive that it is too late to save Bosnia, but I say it is not too late at least to avoid a genocide.
Mr. Markey. I appreciate the distinction. Do you agree with that, that it is perhaps too late to save the state, but time to pre- vent a genocide, or is it also time to save a state?
Co-Chairman HoYER. Can I ask if you will yield just one second?
Mr. Markey. Sure.
Co-Chairman HoYER. When you say it is not too late to prevent a genocide, it is my very strong premise that a genocide has been
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going on for 18 months. It may be it is not too late to stop a geno- cide from continuing.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes.
Co-Chairman HOYER. I think that is important.
Mr. Mendiluce. Excuse me. In mv paper I mention cultural, po- litical, and physical genocide. I think that we are in the process of all three, but I wanted to underline that it is not too late to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people that are at risk.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Excuse me. I just wanted to make the point.
Mr. Markey. I agree with the Chairman.
So it is too late to create a state, but it is not too late to stop a genocide from being completed.
Mr. Mendiluce. I would like to clarify this very well. I hope it is not too late to save Bosnia-Herzegovina, I hope.
Mr. Markey. Let me go to you then, Mr. Cuny.
Mr. Cuny. I disagree.
Mr. Markey. Do you feel it is too late to save the state?
Mr. Cuny. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Markey. OK. How strongly do you believe that it is not too late to save the state?
Mr. Cuny. I certainly believe that the vast majority of people who would return to a country that were to be liberated from the influences of the Bosnian Serb authorities would be able to put to- gether a workable, multi-ethnic society.
I think if you look at the migration patterns, for example, many of the people who left have not only been Muslims and Croatians, but also many Serbs, and the reason those Serbs left were largely because they did not agree with the Serbs that were in control.
I believe that there is a healing process that takes place in every country, and that if the conditions are met where you do not have a climate of violence and where law and order is restored and jus- tice is restored, that very quickly the moderate elements in a soci- ety will predominate and will be able to reclaim the state.
Mr. Markey. And in terms of whether or not a genocide is likely to be completed under any circumstances, do you think that that is the case, that the Bosnians right now are incapable of preventing it, or do they have sufficient resources at least for the foreseeable future to prevent the completion of this attempted genocide?
Mr. Cuny. I do not think they have sufficient resources to pre- vent it.
Mr. Markey. You do not. OK.
Mr. Cuny. They do not have the military resources, nor do they have international support.
Mr. Markey. So from your perspective then, what would the ef- fect of, for example, a cutoff of gas to Belgrade achieve? Would we only at a minimum achieve the goal of them unleashing the natu- ral gas for Sarajevo, but not accomplishing much more as long as then Belgrade was basically protected from having to suffer the consequences of their acts?
Mr. Cuny. Well, I think there are two scenarios under which we can operate. The first is the scenario that we seem to be moving along, which is a de facto partition of the country. Under the present circumstances and the lack of willingness of the inter-
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national community to support the Bosnians, we are headed for that, and that is what is going to happen.
In talking with the leadership of the country last May, I was dis- heartened to hear the President and others say that we know what the end game is, and that is there is going to be some sort of settle- ment that will end up with three, large, distinctive groups of people residing in fixed areas under a pretext of a country still remaining, and after several years, the Croatians will annex their areas, and the next day the Serbs will annex theirs, and just leave what is left for Bosnia.
I think there is also the other scenario, which I would hope will eventually happen, and that is that the rest of the world will real- ize that that should not be allowed to happen, and that we can come back in with a credible threat of military force, can stop and reverse much of the ethnic cleansing that has taken place.
I do not believe that, given the fact that as many as a third of the families are mixed marriages, the fact that the population growth is from largely the mixed families, and the fact that many people still want to live in a multi-ethnic society, that that is a dead issue. I believe that it can predominate, can be cultivated, and can nurture and reclaim its roots if it has an environment in which it can happen.
Mr. Markey. All right. Let me then conclude then because I want to know what your recommendation would be in terms of United States action or a position we should take in terms of insur- ing that there is the natural gas. I think that you are correct on that, but the food, the water, the blankets for this winter.
What should we be willing to do in order to insure that that is there? What action would we have to take, even if the U.N. or oth- ers are not willing to take a step as far as you think we should go to insure that those resources are there for the people of Bosnia?
Mr. CuNY. Congressman, I believe that there is a lack of political resolve on the part of the Europeans.
Mr. Markey. On the part of?
Mr. CUNY. The Europeans.
Mr. Markey. OK.
Mr. CUNY. And I believe that only the United States showing ef- fective leadership, and strong and effective leadership, is going to get the Europeans to move to support the Bosnians and to find their conscience.
Mr. Markey. So you say there is an anti-Muslim bias that is spread throughout that European community?
Mr. CuNY. There is some of that, but I think that the problems of Europe are much deeper than that. Europe is an area where every country has minorities, has many of the same problems in- herent in them that Bosnia has, and the European outlook is veiy different from ours. They would rather contain a conflict and let it burn itself out or just try and control it rather than intervene to change it.
I think that historically that has not worked. Certainly we wit- nessed what happened in World War II, but as long as the Serbs do not threaten their neighbors, we are going to find it unlikely that the Europeans are going to be willing to intervene.
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I do believe that there are leaders within Europe who see the dangers, and we need to support those leaders. We need to begin supporting the resistance and the opposition within Serbia. We need to cultivate the people who oppose ethnic cleansing in all of those communities.
Mr. Markey. So which countries do we have the highest likeli- hood of forming an alliance to make sure that these resources are there throughout the winter?
Mr. CUNY. I think that we will have to influence all of the par- ticipating countries of NATO.
Mr. Markey. But which countries are the best bets though?
Mr. CUNY. The best bets are what may appear to be the worst, but I think certainly the British and the French can be pressured into joining.
Mr. Markey. And which countries are the worst bets?
Mr. CuNY. Certainly I would think Spain, Germany, and Russia are the worst.
Chairman DeConclni. Congressman, thank you.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Chairman DeConcini. We are going to proceed. I am going to ask members to restrict themselves to 5 minutes, i am going to first yield to members of the Commission, and then I will yield to our visitors who are with us.
Congressman Fish.
Mr. Fish. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuny, I am heartened by what you say, and what I say and what I ask may have already oeen covered. I am sorry to have ar- rived late, but where you rely on strong U.S. leadership interests me. After what the United States and the rest of the world has al- lowed to happen, do you really think there is any hope for an end either to ethnic cleansing or to shelling or to the availability of ade- quate preparation for the winter without either lifting the arms embargo or shelling Serbian positions around Sarajevo?
Mr. Cuny. It depends under which strategy we decided to play out. If we decide to go with accept the de facto partitioning of the country, there is probably very little we are going to be able to do.
I still believe that the United States can craft a credible military threat and end the fighting.
Mr. Fish. Well, we, some of us in the Commission, met with the Bosnian Muslim President here a few months ago, just a couple of months ago, and that is what he said. He said, you^ know, either end the embargo or shell the Serb positions around Sarajevo, and that will open up the highways. That will allow us to get the heat- ing facilities, the food we need, the material to rebuild the cities and prepare for winter.
Neither of those things were we willing to do, and so what is strong leadership?
Mr. Cuny. Mr. Chairman or Mr. Congressman, excuse me, the Serb checkpoint at the airport is a man and a woman in a broken down, old container. The Bosnian Serb liaison officer who is stop- ping everything at the airport is rotated. There are two people there that are unarmed. Many of these checkpoints are old men with rifies that are so rusty that it is probably doubtful that they could be fired safely.
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Yet you will see in many cases one old man with a rifle standing in front of a column of tanks, Saracen armored cars, other vehicles, stopping this movement. We are not talking about a credible resist- ance on the part of the Serbs. The Serbs have a lot of weapons, and they can fire with impunity into the city, but, in fact, they're very vulnerable to the kinds oi pressures that we can put on with a modern military force.
This is not Somalia. I know that there are many people in the American military establishment that would like us to think that because it is a civil war, that we are facing the same type of prob- lems we are facing in Somalia. There are clear lines of contact in most of the areas we will be operating. If we go in on the side of the Bosnians, we do not have to worry about protecting our rear areas. We do not have to worry about our drivers coming up and shooting at us. We are going to find a population as we did in northern Iraq, the Kurds, who were extremely supportive and be- came, in effect, force multipliers for our troops.
Intervention in Bosnia can work.
Mr. Fish. You are talking about troops.
Mr. CuNY. It can work with air power alone, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fish. It can work with air power alone. Thank you.
Chairman DeConceni. Are you finished, sir?
Mr. Fish. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
Chairman DeConcini. Congressman Sawyer.
Mr. Sawyer. I thought you were going to go to the other mem- bers of the Commission.
Chairman DeConcini. There are no other. These are all. We are glad to have them here and your interest, as well.
Mr. Sawyer. I am pleased to be here. Thank you. Senator.
Mr. Cuny, you spoke in your final point about the importance of the continuing human rights abuses and the importance of pub- licizing them and providing visible support to the War Crimes Tri- bunal. We face this task in the context of the coming winter.
Let me just ask you: is there a coherent inventory of humani- tarian needs, on the one hand? Is there a coherent inventory of hu- manity in the areas that are affected as a measure of those needs, and perhaps even most importantly, is there a way to elevate war crimes and the tribunal to hold people responsible for the lives of innocent human beings?
Do we have the capacity to measure the humanitarian needs in human terms, and do we have the capacity to protect those lives?
Mr. Cuny. Thank you. Yes, sir, I believe we do.
First of all, in terms of the needs, within the Bosnian and the Croatian areas, the needs have been well documented by the UNHCR and the numerous nongovernmental organizations and the ICRC, and I think that they can be quantified, and we certainly know that there are variations in the level of need in different areas. Certainly the people in Zepa and Gorazde and the enclaves in the east have a very acute level of needs for personal supplies, for food and so forth, because they are in a restricted area, cannot freely leave to get fire wood or fuels, do not have access to farm- lands to grow their own food.
Sarajevo has another level of need. It is in some ways less per- haps tnan the enclaves because there is a thriving cross-border
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trade that has accounted for a substantial portion of the food avail- ability there.
In the central areas, people have far more access, even in the Croatian enclaves or the Muslim enclaves, in those areas, to fuel, but far less to food. So we can quantify the needs and look at vari- ations and, I think, very accurately target.
I think one of the things that we have to recognize is that the UNHCR has done a superb job in providing food and medical sup- plies. No one in the country is starving, except in the enclaves that they cannot reach. Any place that they can get to, they have done a marvelous job of getting food and the humanitarian supplies there.
The problem we have really is bullets, which do the killing, and ethnic cleansing, and the difficulties that we have in being able to reach those populations are legend. The Serbian controlled areas continue to be problematic, especially in the Banja Luka area. Up in the northwestern regions of Bosnia, the northeastern areas, are all areas where population movements continue to take place.
Beyond the War Crimes Tribunals, which are aimed mainly at the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, I think we could do a lot more. We should be targeting the perpetrators. We know who are per- petrating these crimes, and we also know one very interesting fact, and that is there is a very high suicide level among Bosnian Serb troops. There are many people who do not like what is happening there, and I believe we should be exploiting people's conscience.
We should be going out and naming names. We should be telling the wives what their husbands are doing over in those rape camps. We should be going in and publicizing the human rights abuses and name the commanders of the units and where they came from and the villages they are tied to, and make it uncomfortable for these guys so that they start putting pressure on from the inside to stem those human rights abuses.
We can do that by using resources such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, organizing additional radio broadcasts, take the in- formation, beam it back in, and help destroy the morale of that army.
Mr. Sawyer. Do we have the capacity to hold those specific peo- ple whose names are known for the lives of specific people?
Mr. CuNY. We do not have the ability to do that because we can- not capture them or control them. However, I do believe that we can put a lot of pressure on them to stop the abuses, and at some future date I would hope that we are able to bring them to justice.
Mr. Sawyer. When I say hold responsible, I mean in terms of knowing who and when and where.
Mr. CUNY. Yes, sir. The names are well known.
Mr. Mendiluce. May I respond?
Mr. Sawyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mendiluce. Briefly, I would like to add only that the names are very well known, and we have a long list of criminals that have committed crimes in different areas.
Mr. Sawyer. I am not talking just about criminals. I am also talking about victims.
Mr. Mendiluce. I was talking about the bringing of the crimi- nals to the War Crimes Tribunal, and the problem is that the win-
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ners do not go ever to War Crimes Tribunals. So if we allow these people to win, they will never be sitting in a War Crimes Tribunal.
Mr. Sawyer. I understand that.
Mr. Mendiluce. And this is a very serious point, but the names are there. We know them and even physically we meet with them.
The other point very briefly is I fully agree with what Fred Cuny said about humanitarian needs and so on. The horrible thing is that by using all humanitarian means, we will not by using, even having access, even with the pipe supplies, with the gas supply, we will not save the problem because killings will continue. Ethnic killings will continue. So the limits of humanitarian assistance are there, are very evident.
Today it is even worse because we do not have access, because we have blackmail, because of all of these things. But even if every- thing works at that level, we would not stop the war. We would not stop the logic of ethnic cleansing or further displacement or de- struction and killing, and this is something that we have been suf- fering since the beginning of the war, looking hopeless in terms of stopping this.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.
Chairman DeConceni. Congressman Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Mendiluce and Mr. Cuny, I want to congratulate you for your courage and your contributions. Sarajevo is not a very pleasant place to be, and we appreciate what you have done.
I want to get at a couple of simple things. First of all, I totally agree with Mr. Markey. I do not know whether we could prevail upon Hungary to cut that valve off or not, but I would certainly think that we ought to make our best effort.
Second, we keep struggling with the air strikes and the arms em- bargo. Now, I have visited with the French, and I have visited with the British, and of course, have visited with the Bosnian Muslim government. Those of us who would really like to lift the arms em- bargo, keep getting the threat though that the French would leave. I personally do not believe the Serbs will ever stop what they are doing until somebody hits them back, and the Bosnians cannot hit them back because they have not got anything to hit them with be- cause, as you say, they have only got homemade mortar shells, and they are making their own rifle ammunition.
But what would happen if the French did leave? Say the U.S. unilaterally lifted the arms embargo. I mean they are just watch- ing. What would happen?
Mr. Cuny. If the United States were to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, probably there would be a thriving arms market heading toward Serbia, as well, and the question is: can we restrict the arms through the blockade and sanctions to those other areas, as well?
Mr. Wilson. No, no, no. The fact is that the Serbs have got the arms anyway, and so I'm asking, if we're going to give the Bosnians a fighting chance? It may be a hopeless military situa- tion, but in a hopeless military situation sometimes you don't want brave men to sell their lives too cheap, and sometimes that changes the equation.
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Mr. CUNY. Congressman Wilson, my entire career has been in- volved in humanitarian assistance, for 25 years since Biafra on, and I have never until now advocated lifting an arms embargo, but I believe that in the situation of Bosnia that it is immoral to deny the Bosnians the right to defend themselves while effectively per- mitting a much better armed aggressor to pound civilians day and night.
Mr. Wilson. That is exactly what I think. However, then we get to the question that we always get back to. If we lift the arms em- bargo, will the British and French leave? That is what they threat- en every day.
Mr. CUNY. They may leave. I doubt they would.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. What would happen if they did?
Mr. Wilson. So what?
Co-Chairman Hoyer. I agree, if you will yield just 1 second. That has been what we heard at the parliamentary assembly when Mr. Moran, Mr. McCloskey, Ms. Slaughter, and Mr. Cardin, who is not here, and I offered a resolution to lift the arms embargo.
That won in committee, as you probably know. It lost on the floor of the parliamentary assembly, and it was not overwhelming, but our British and French allies were principal opponents.
The fact of the matter is UNPROFOR is an observer. UNPROFOR is not protecting anvbody, in my opinion, and it is cer- tainly not confronting anybody if we nave this old man with a rifle stopping convoys that are delivering humanitarian relief.
So what? So if they leave, what happens?
Mr. CuNY. Senator, I would like to follow up on that and just point out several things. I think that the British and the French have exaggerated the threats to their own forces. For example, if we were to offer military assistance, especially in the form of air strikes, we would actually increase their safety. I do not believe that we could not craft an intervention or air strikes that would give our allies time to protect themselves, to hunker down, and that what would happen is one morning the Serbs would wake up, and they would have an air show overhead, and they would not threaten our troops or the UNPROFOR troops on the ground with that going on.
I have witnessed an American military intervention in Northern Iraq. The day that we went in, we had troops placed to protect the NGOs that were already in there, the ICRC. When we went into Somalia, we adequately protected the NGOs and the humanitarian agencies before we went in, and we would do the same thing to pro- tect the UNPROFOR forces.
It is true that some of them are in the line of fire. Certainly the Canadians in the enclaves, in Sarajevo, but if we are going to apply military force, we would do it in such a way that the Serbs would not have a chance to fire, and if they did, they would be punished very severely.
I do not believe the Serbs would run the risk of massive retalia- tion against unknown targets, possibly even in Serbia, to run the risk of opening fire on a U.N. headquarters. It just would not hap- pen.
Mr. Wilson. Isn't it also likely, Mr. Cuny, that without the Unit- ed States being engaged either with air strikes or with a portion
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of a NATO force or without the United States being directly en- gaged, wouldn't that make it a lot tougher for us to talk the Hun- garians into cutting off the gas or any of the rest of these things?
Mr. CUNY. I does not make it any tougher to talk to them, but I think
Mr. Wilson. Well, I think it makes it tougher to get them to do it.
Mr. CuNY. Not in the case of the gas, but I certainly think in terms of stronger action on behalf of the Bosnians, we have to
Mr. Wilson. Do you think that Mr. Markey's suggestion is at- tainable?
Mr. CUNY. Which suggestion is this?
Mr. Wilson. His suggestion, his very specific suggestion, that we persuade the Hungarians to cut off the gas.
Mr. CUNY. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely I believe it is attainable.
Mr. Wilson. What do you think it would take to attain it?
Mr. CUNY. Well, first the request has to come fi-om the Bosnian government, and I think when it comes, we need to immediately support that and to make presentations to the Hungarians to turn it off.
Mr. Wilson. And you think they would do it?
Mr. CUNY. Absolutely.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you.
Mr. Moran. Yes?
Mr. CUNY. I am sorry. I would like to finish just one more thing in response to Senator Hoyer's comment about the vulnerability of the troops. The British troops are the ones who are actually the least in contact with the Serbs. Their biggest threat is from the Croatians. In most cases where they have forces deployed in those areas, they are out of range of the Serbs and in most cases of the Croatians, but the only credible threat to the British forces and to the forces operating in the central zone is not from the Serbs. It is from the Croatian forces.
Chairman DeConcini. And your statement would stand as it re- lates to the belief that Croatian forces would not take retribution if somebody
Mr. CUNY. Attacked the Serbs.
Chairman DeConcini. No, no, no, did something to the Croat na- tionalists, say, in the Mostar area.
Mr. CUNY. Yes, I think in the Mostar area the Spanish are the forces that are the most likely to be hit there, but they are largely disengaged at the moment.
Chairman DeConclni. I see.
Congressman Moran.
Mr. Moran. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the two witnesses for their intellectual honesty and their professional conduct on this issue. It is, at the last, encouraging to hear two people speak can- didly and with a sense of humanity and responsibility for what is happening.
And I am in total agreement with the tenor of the questioning of all of my colleagues, but I have the sense that we in this room are operating in something of a vacuum. Certainly there is very lit-
29
tie support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia. In fact, I think there is insufficient support within the Congress itself for any further en- gagement in Bosnia. In fact, there may even be a majority who feel that President Clinton has been unnecessarily aggressive on this issue.
I see it as a genocide, as Mr. Hoyer suggested, in fact.
We are not the only ones who recognize this is genocide, who rec- ognize the horror that is taking place, who see the similarities with what took place on the part of Nazi Germany versus the Jews and other populations, not just the Jews in Nazi Germany.
Where is the international support? Mr. Hoyer explained briefly what took place and the CSCE problem, and tnat was not just one instance. It has been ongoing. Hungary is sympathetic primarily because it has so many refugees it has to deal with because of this conflict.
But where are the Muslim nations, if in fact so many tens of thousands of people are being killed because they are Muslim, even though most are certainly not fundamentalists and few even prac- tice the religion, but why is there not more pressure? Why is it up to the United States to spearhead this?
I do not expect much from England and France. Turkey, the fact that they would not intervene on behalf of Azerbaijan indicates that they are not interested in getting involved. They would be a natural ally here.
But what are some of the other international forces? Have they attempted to pressure a lifting of the embargo, Mr. Cuny?
Mr. CUNY. Congressman, the United States policy and that of many of the Europeans has been to try to keep the Arab countries out. We have in many cases used a lot of persuasion to try and keep this from becoming a Muslim-Christian confrontation, and as such, we have emphasized in our foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern states especially that they should try and remain out or have a very low profile.
In fact, many of the Muslim governments are providing support, not only peacekeeping troops and small contingents. Certainly the Egyptians and a fairly large contingent are there, and a tremen- dous amount of financial support has gone to the government.
But there have been obstacles placed in front of wider participa- tion by the Europeans and the United States.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Cuny, I totally understand that, and that you would expect, except that there ought to be some quid pro quo. We stay out of it if you accept even a nominal amount of responsibility for fairness and protection of the Muslim populations, and you know, we have not gotten that.
It seems to me that there is more leverage on the part of those countries who would be natural allies to the Bosnians that has not been exerted. Even Israel; the Jewish organizations in the United States have been some of the most aggressive in trying to intervene and get us to stop this genocide. So there is no conflict there within the Middle Eastern countries. Why have they not exerted some dip- lomatic leverage here?
Mr. Cuny. Well, I would submit, first of all, that we are their natural ally. First of all, Bosnia is a multi-ethnic society. It is not a Muslim country, and if we want to try and continue to see that
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country evolve, we, the West, and the democratic nations that be- lieve in what they stand for are their natural allies and we should be their first line of defense.
What is most alarming to me is that the collective security mech- anisms that were established in the aftermath of World War II, which include the United Nations, Security Council, NATO, have all failed to stop what they were designed to do.
I think we have also seen that NATO is, much to our surprise, is quite moribund in being able to meet these needs. If there was any institution that should have been able to put together a credi- ble intervention or take the leadership in this, it should have been NATO. Yet we find that the Germans are not engaged. The French, who are not a formal member of NATO, are not participating. Brit- ain is only committing a limited amount of support, and that leaves us with countries with very small military forces and very little in- fluence in the region.
I think that is very alarming and that we need to not only inter- vene from the point of view of saving Bosnia, but also saving the collective security mechanisms that we set up to prevent this type of thing.
Mr. MoRAN. Or just cutting off our support for them if they are no use when they are tested, and the fact is even though many peo- ple in NATO think they should be involved, unless you get the kind of consent that is missing, in effect, a country like England or France has veto power, and so all of that enormous, massive finan- cial and military commitment is of no use to stop exactly the kind of situation that they were there to prevent.
I appreciate your putting that on the record, and I just, again, appreciate the fact that both of you are willing to tell it like it is. I wish that there were more people listening to what you had to say today.
Chairman DeConcini. Thank you. Congressmen. Gentlemen, thank you.
We are going to proceed. I am going to have to leave to go for three votes. So I am going to turn the chair over to Co-Chairman Hoyer.
Ms. Slaughter is next.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Jim. This one makes strange noises?
Gentlemen, I am really pleased you are here, and I also appre- ciate your candor. I want to start by telling you that as an observer and as a member of Congress, what has appeared to me from the outset is that U.S. policy in this area was just one colossal mistake. I look back to the early days when General MacKenzie was direct- ing the U.N. As I recall, he was the first commander. He constantly sent back word, "Don't do anything here. You can't do anything here. It's not possible to do anything here." And so we did not. To even a casual observer it had to be apparent that every time the United States made any threat, even of the dropping of humani- tarian aid, the Serbs got very nervous and raced to New York to talk.
Now, somehow our leaders failed to understand this. We were a strong enough threat to really to make them stop, yet we simply did not do it.
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We were told that in order for the United States to be involved, we would have to put 250,000 troops on the ground and take total control of the situation in a hostile area or environment of moun- tainous terrain, where Tito had stored enough ammunition for 10 years.
And yet time afler time it was proven to us that there was sim- ply nothing that we could do; that we should not be doing any- thing. Those of us who watched this with absolute horror could not believe that suddenly we had become so helpless.
I really have been more and more concerned about General Mac- Kenzie. When he came back after he was replaced, he traveled and gave lectures, and his expenses were paid by SerbNet, a group of American Serbians. It struck me that for the U.N. commander to have that kind of bias, to show it or even attempt to show it, was wrong. I have questioned that from the outset.
The U.N. involvement has been absolutely astonishing to me. Stemming from the time they were moving the Vice President of Bosnia to the airport in a U.N. carrier. It was stopped, six Serbs came over, opened the back door, and killed the Vice President in front of the U.N. observers. It should have been obvious right then, I think, that what we were doing there was of little or no concern to the Serbians.
It was a disaster that the U.N. could not get aid through, that they had to pay bribes everywhere they went and that we were to- tally unable, it seems, to exert any kind of force at all through the U.N.; it was embarrassing. Throughout this time the while the United States made only little threats every now and again.
I felt sadness a couple of days ago when the Secretary of State said, "Now, just remember we could hurt you if we chose to." We have made it so clear. We have done everything but write it across the sky that we are not getting involved; we are not going to do it.
While we were in Helsinki in July, the G-7 countries were meet- ing in Tokyo, Japan. I remember how pleased we were that they had signed a statement that none of their countries would accept enforced borders. Since that meeting ended, we have not heard an- other word about that. The United States was one of the signers, yet where do they really stand on whether they are going to accept enforced borders or not:
It looks as though the United States and other signers said that, but at the same time are happy not only to accept enforced borders, but will help enforce them. This is almost like Alice in Wonderland having to believe six impossible things before breakfast to really understand what has gone on here.
We obviously missed a chance, as you pointed out, to unify the large numbers of Serbs who disagreed with what was happening in their name. We have never contacted any of them as far as I know, to really start a counterforce in Serbia against what their leaders are doing.
Again, I honestly think that historians could make very good analogies between World War II and what has happened here. Yet there is no discussion about that at all. We will all look back with horror and pitv at the ineffective inaction that we took in this country if that nappens.
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Somehow, somebody in Sarajevo heard I cared. I got a letter last week asking if I would please tell my President that they are oper- ating on people with hacksaws, there is no anesthetic, and there is nothing to cleanse wounds. The fact that we accept that in the 1990's is so intolerable to me.
At the same time, we go into Somalia and apparently do hand- to-hand combat, or whatever it is we are doing over there. I think without question those of us in Congress, if we do nothing else, need to determine what the U.N. is going to be. Is it going to be a rapid response force that could readily go in and keep peace, or is it just going to send people over in blue berets to stand by and watcn, with no force or power behind them?
I do not think we want to see this spectacle ever again. I reaffirm my commitment that enforced borders will never suit me. I am em- barrassed and ashamed of the policy in this country — I do not know what the underlying reasons are. Obviously I am not a military person, but it looks to me as though the situation grew and made no sense; the best thing we thought to do was to ignore it, hoping to God it would be over soon. People of conscience really cannot ac- cept that as a way to go.
Thank you very much for being here.
Mr. CuNY. Thank you.
Ms. Slaughter. I do not want to ask you to comment on General MacKenzie. I know you have been candid, but they do not call me "Slaughter" for nothing. So I can say that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McCloskey. And you would not deter them, even if you wanted to.
Ms. Slaughter. I would not.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. [presiding] Thank you very much, Con- gresswoman Slaughter.
I think the depth of feeling shared by everybody on this Commis- sion and a number of our colleagues is reflected in the views that were just expressed by Ms. Slaughter.
Let me ask you a few more questions, if I can, Mr. Mendiluce.
I have read your testimony, and you may have referenced these, but I would like to highlight them. First of all, are there areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina which continue to be isolated from inter- national relief efforts? And if so, can you identify those areas?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes. In all of the Serbian controlled territories, all of the minorities living there, Bosnian, Muslim, and Croats, are not reachable at all because the distribution channels are con- trolled by the Serbian side, and we have all proof that any assist- ance arriving to the real victims, Muslims and Croats in the Banja- luka region in northern Bosnia or in other areas where there are still minorities living there.
Second, regional, 100 percent regional
Co-Chairman HoYER. So let me ask.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes.
Co-Chairman HoYER. There is no access to any minorities that may be in distress located in Serbian controlled areas at this point in time?
Mr. Mendiluce. Exactly.
Co-Chairman HoYER. What about Croat controlled areas?
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Mr. Mendiluce. The same.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. The same?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. So the only areas accessible at this time are Bosnian controlled areas?
Mr. Mendiluce. Accessible for Serbs?
Co-Chairman HoYER. Yes.
Mr. Mendiluce. You can have access for Serbs in Serbian con- trolled areas, but for the minorities living there, no. So in practice for the real victims of the war, access is very limited to areas like Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa. I have received reports that we are only authorized to bring some food, but not winter materials, no shelter, no blankets or any other type of winter materials.
Sarajevo, you know the situation and the problems to bring the assistance there, and central Bosnia, accessible, but with enormous limitations due to the negative attitude of the Croat side and of the Serbian side, for sure.
So not accessible, minorities, and then many problems also in Bihac. The access is also controlled by the Serbian side.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Can you compare for me the treatment of Bosnian refugees in Montenegro with those in Croat controlled areas or Croatia?
Mr. Mendiluce. Well, in Montenegro, in particular, I think that the treatment received by the Bosnians Muslim refugees, was quite adequate generally speaking. In Serbia, I do not have the latest news about the treatment of non-Serb refugees coming from Bosnia.
In the case of Croatia, things have deteriorated, and there are an enormous quantity of incidents, increasing levels of harassment and discrimination towards the Bosnian refugees of Muslim origin for obvious reasons, both for the fighting between Croats and Mus- lims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we are very afraid about the fu- ture of the several, around 250,000 Bosnians from Muslim origin that are refugees in Croatia. We are very concerned about it.
In Serbia, I do not know. I do not have any concrete news, but there are very few Muslim refugees from Bosnia in Serbia. There are more in Montenegro and they are treated according to basic standards.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Mr. Cuny, would you like to comment on that question?
Mr. Cuny. Yes, I would like to support Mr. Mendiluce in his com- ments. I have here the latest lines of contact that were
Mr. Mendiluce. You have this. Sorry. My testimony you have this moment. It is available.
Mr. Cuny. Yes. They are more or less the same.
Each one of these areas which is marked is an area we are hav- ing difficulty with access in reaching populations. For example, in Mostar, there are three areas that we are having trouble reaching: in the north, Tasanj, the Maglaj area. Both areas are difficult to reach, and no humanitarian assistance except what is air-dropped into those areas is reaching them.
Certainly even large areas in the Bosnian controlled zones; Tuzla, for example, can only be reached by convoys from Belgrade,
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which is very tenuous. So you have different degrees of difficulty in reaching different areas.
We have Hsted in our reports a total of 17 areas that are of high priority to reach as a result of the conflict and obstacles put in our way by the various combatants.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Do we have that?
Mr. CUNY. No, sir, but I could get that for you and contribute it to the record.
Co-Chairman HOYER. All right. Thank you very much.
Do you have any knowledge of the relative question? You an- swered the first part. In terms of relative treatment, of say Bosnian refugees in Croatia as opposed to refugees in Serbia and Montenegro? Do you have any information on that?
Mr. CuNY. I have some information on the case in Kosovo, where the treatment of the citizens of Kosovo, of course, is abominable. There have been increasing human rights abuses, disappearances of personnel.
Just yesterday I was a party to a briefing at the Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, where a team from Common Ground who had just returned from the Kosovo area gave us a very alarming report on human rights abuses in that area.
I also have quite a bit of information that has been provided by colleagues working with groups inside the areas around Banja- luka, that the deportations and expulsions of Muslims in those areas, as Mr. Mendiluce pointed out, has increased substantially in the last 2 weeks. There have been at least 7,000 people who have been forced to leave that area or have been put under pressure to leave.
The mosques in those areas have been demolished, and a tre- mendous amount of repression aimed at the Muslim population there.
Co-Chairman HoYER. With respect to the delivery of humani- tarian, particularly medicine, to Serbia itself, do you have any in- formation on that?
At a dinner I saw Princess Catherine, who apparently is of the royal family of Serbia, and she expressed a great concern about hu- manitarian aid, particularly medicines, getting to Serbia, that there was a real shortage there. She and I did not necessarily reach agreement on why that was, but can you comment on that? Mr. Mendiluce perhaps or either one.
Mr. Cu>fY. Well, just two comments that I have. I am not fully aware of the medical status there. I do know, however, that the Serbs' medicine is not proscribed by sanctions. So they have the ability to buy whatever medicines they need.
In addition to that, there have been humanitarian aid provided by numerous groups, including American Serb groups, as well as many others, and I believe also the United Nations. So I do not be- lieve that the normal medicines that would be required in that country should be in shortage.
I do know that there is a shortage of dialysis supplies. There is a particular disease that is very common in the Balkans which af- fects the kidneys, and that dialysis is required, and there is always a shortage of that equipment in the area. Beyond that, I am not aware of specific shortages. Perhaps Jose.
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Mr. Mendiluce. May you allow me?
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Yes, Mr. Mendiluce.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes. First of all, I think it is true that the health system and the availability of medicines and equipment has collapsed in Serbia and Montenegro, but the armies are still func- tioning very well. So as Mr. Cuny says, medicines are exempted from sanctions. So it is up to the political leaders in Belgrade to establish their priorities. Apparently the priority is not the health of their own people.
And I would like to elaborate a little bit more on that, on sanc- tions, because sanctions are affecting refugees living in Montenegro and Serbia and also the poorest in the Serbian society, but are pro- ducing enormous benefits for the Mafia in power. I can tell you that one of the most well known war criminals, Mr. Arkan, is buy- ing all of the pharmacies in Belgrade and other areas. The phar- macies are closing because there are no normal supplies of medi- cine, but he is bringing through the black market medicines that probably is brought by normal channels because of the exception in the sanction, but are not appearing through the normal distribu- tion channels, but just through the black market, and this war criminal, Mr. Arkan, is one of the leaders in making money with this.
Petrol, the price of petrol in Belgrade has been reduced 30 per- cent in the last 1 month, which means that fuel is available and at prices that are not astro, pricing. As you can imagine, $3 per liter, which means maybe three times or two times the cost in a normal European country. So this could give you an idea about the volume of petrol that is going in in Serbia.
We are making a complete study about the effect of sanctions. I think it is important because sanctions are one of the crucial issues in the approach of the international community, and every truck of fuel that you can investigate very easily, which are the roads they take, gives 10,000 net profit to the Mafia that is in control of traf- fic, and in a situation like the situation in Belgrade, you can imag- ine that Mafias are not parading out of control of the politicians.
So every truck, every trailer, I mean, a ton truck is providing $10,000 cash net in currency to the Mafia that controls this traffic, and you could imagine who is behind this Mafia.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Let me switch and just ask a couple more questions. There are a lot of questions that a lot of us could ask, but I agree with all of our members that this has been candid testi- mony. Unfortunately, much of it comes as no revelation to the com- mittee. The frustration that I expressed at the beginning is that the Western world has been unwilling to act in light of the infor- mation that you have given to us and thus viewed as impotent.
Going back to Mr. Wilson's question about lifting the arms em- bargo, Mr. Wilson's observation that arms are getting to the Serbs in any event. The Europeans argue strenuously, and I think one of you observed that what would happen is an escalation in the arms trade, in the black market arms trade in that region.
But are we correct in concluding that this would make little, if any, practical difference to the Serbs?
Mr. CUNY. To the Serbs?
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Co-Chairman HOYER. To the Serbs. In other words, the only peo-
Ele, from the perspective of a lot of us, that are really being hurt y the arms embargo are the Bosnians.
Mr. Cu^fY. I believe that if we
Co-Chairman HoYER. But the Europeans argue, to the contrary, that the conflict would escalate very substantially because you would arm the Bosnians. The level of confrontation would escalate in terms of the kinds of weapons being used.
Mr. CUNY. Two observations on that. The first is that one of the myths that has been perpetrated by the opponents of giving more sophisticated weapons to the Bosnians is that they do not have a military tradition and will not know how to use them.
The Bosnians were the largest segment of the Yugoslav arms in- dustry during the Yugoslav period. The biggest market for Yugo- slav weapons was in the Middle East, and Mr. Tito exploited the Muslim connection to the Middle East, and many of the technicians who actually designed and developed some of the weapons, and cer- tainly the factories that built them, were largely Muslims.
The head of the RMK arms industry, for example, is Muslim. Many of the other people that have been involved in the technical development of optical tracking devices, the missile systems, and so forth that were marketed to places like Iraq were Muslims.
Therefore, the capability of using highly sophisticated weapons that could equalize the fight is there. They know how to use them. They have designed and built them, and if we were to provide them things like "smart" mortars, anti-tank missiles and so forth, I think that they could do quite well with them.
The second thing is that the standard of the Yugoslav military is about that of the Iraqi military. It had some of the latest hard- ware. It did not necessarily have the latest software. The ability of the Yugoslav army to take effective countermeasures against mis- siles and so forth is probably not there.
So by selective arming with the kind of sophisticated weapons that we could make available, I think we could make a big dif- ference, and I think that we could very quickly provide weapons and the training necessary so that they would be able to account for themselves very quickly before the market could come back in and make a difference on the side of the Serbs.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Mr. Mendiluce.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes, if I could add a more general comment, I have been very surprised since the beginning of this discussion months ago about the international attitude regarding the arms embargo because I did not understand very clearly why the inter- national community, through the Security Council resolutions, has recognized that the Bosnia-Herzegovina country and the govern- ment and the forces loyal to the government are suffering an exter- nal aggression coming from Serbia and Montenegro. That is why the sanctions were imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. So it is rec- ognized that a sovereign country with a legitimate government is suffering from external aggression.
How can we not protect this country or not allow this country to defend itself? So I am not an international lawyer, and I am not an expert, and I am saying that in a very, very personal way, but I do not understand the coherence of the Security Council and the
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negotiation process in this level. I think it is one of the very strange cases in which we condemn a country not to have the right to deiend itself.
So implicit to this is that we also are using the concept of parties to the conflict being not coherent with the fact that Bosnia- Herzegovina was recognized and is a member state of the U.N. As- sembly.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Let me ask you a last hypothetical ques- tion, and then I am going to recognize Ms. Bentley for such ques- tions as she might have, and then unless there are other compel- ling questions that individuals want to ask, I am going to ask Am- bassador Sacirbey if he would like to say a few words.
My last question: if we bombed Serbia, if we took action, military action, against Bosnian Serb positions or Serbia itself in terms of supply lines or something of that nature, what action do you be- lieve Croatia would take?
Mr. Mendiluce. I cannot answer this question without asking political asylum in the United States.
[Laughter.]
Mr. CuNY. I believe that by taking unilateral action against the
Co-Chairman HoYER. Mr. Cuny already has that, so we have to expect an answer from him.
Mr. Sawyer. We will take care of you.
[Laughter.]
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Do not count on it. The United States record of taking care of it lately is pretty poor.
Mr. Sawyer. Yes.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Mr. Cuny.
Mr. Cuny. Senator, I believe that if we were to target our action against the Serbs, the Croats would very quickly get the message, and that they would back off, as well. Croatians are European wannabees. They would like to be a part of the European Commu- nity. They certainly would like the economic trade, restoration of tourism, and so forth. They do not want to be painted in the same light as the Serbs.
And in the crazy mythology and self-deception that goes on in the Balkans, I think they see themselves in a very different light, and I think that we need to wake them up and make sure that they understand exactly what they are doing and bring to the at- tention of the government that it is not acceptable.
Certainly a message delivered tactically on the Serbs would be interpreted, I think, as a means of forcing the Croats to decide where they stand. Do they want to continue to court Mr. Milosevic and the dark side of Europe or do they want to come out into the light?
Co-Chairman HoYER. Ms. Bentley.
Ms. Bentley. Thank you, Mr. Hoyer. I am just going to follow up on a couple of comments and questions that were asked that I heard.
On the refugees in Serbia and Montenegro, most of those are being taken care of in people's private homes, aren't they? Because there are no camps there; so they have got 600 and some thousand, and I think you need to hear this figure, Mr. Hoyer. They have got
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600 and some thousand refugees that are being taken care of in private homes there, and with the sanctions on food and that there, it has been very difficult, and they have been taking care of these.
Ninety thousand of them are not Serbians. They are Mushms and Croatians who are being taken care of in these homes. I think the record should show that, that they have been very empathetic there.
On the matter of the — I am glad you mentioned about the crimi- nal Arkan because this is a very critical result of what these sanc- tions have been doing. They have allowed the Mafia to mushroom. The poor people are really suffering. You have got two or three re- tirees, pensioners every day committing suicide because they can- not get food. They are starving, and these bums — I call them other language in private circles — are making out like millionaires and are buying up the whole thing.
This is part of the problem. The wrong people are the ones who are being hurt. Are you seeing that, Mr. Mendiluce, or not?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes, I fully share this point of view. It is dif- ficult to say that as a consequence the international community should lift the sanctions because it would be interpreted in a very wrong way probably.
Ms. Bentley. I know.
Mr. Mendiluce. But I think that after the experience of Iraq and after the experience of Serbia and after the experience of my own country when the international community declared an embar- go against Franco, and General Franco was fortified for 20 more years because he was able to use the Nationalistic speech that ev- erybody is against us, so the people should be united; these types of sanctions, at least the way in which sanctions are designed and implemented, should be revised by the international community.
For the time being, Milosevic, if he was the target of the sanc- tions, is not suffering, and I do not think that we can detect that the plans of the Bosnian Serbs have been affected in a serious way by the sanctions, and the pros and cons should be evaluated be- cause the people that are suffering, and even the refugees that are there, some Muslims, but also normal people that are normal citi- zens, they are hopeless.
Ms. Bentley. The little guys.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes.
Ms. Bentley. The little guys are the ones that are really suffer- ing under it.
You mentioned convoys going from Belgrade into Bosnia. What kind of convoys are going from there?
Mr. Mendiluce. Humanitarian convoys, you say?
Ms. Bentley. You said that convoys. I did not get the whole. You said convoys, yes, humanitarian convoys. I think you were referring of going from Belgrade into Bosnia.
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes.
Ms. Bentley. What kind of convoys?
Mr. Mendiluce. Well, we send different sizes of convoys, ten, 12 trucks.
Ms. Bentley. Why are they going from Belgrade? That is my question.
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Mr. Mendiluce. From Belgrade because it is easier to reach the enclaves, the Bosnian enclaves, of Srebrenica and Gorazde from the Serbian side, and as much as we can use these roads, it is the only available road to reach these areas.
Also for Tuzla, given the difficulties with the Croats from the Adriatic Coast into central Bosnia, it is also easier if we can reach Tuzla from the Serbian side. So that is the reason. It is a logistical one and to keep open as many options as possible.
Ms. Bentley. They have not been trying to block those?
Mr. Mendiluce. Yes, every day, every week, I mean, and that is very important. We are not allowed to bring into these enclaves any material apart from food, and this is absolutely horrendous in terms of the coming winter and the situation of these protected areas that are more like refugee camps or detention centers than protected areas.
Ms. Bentley. I have seen some things on potential internal civil wars both up in Bosnia between the two Muslim groups. Is there a group that — and maybe the Ambassador can tell us about that — against Izetbegovic, another one of his — Bihac, yes. That was the name I was reaching for. What is that situation in your eyes?
Mr. Mendiluce. Well, I think I should not elaborate on the polit- ical side. Maybe the Ambassador would like to explain the point. From a humanitarian point of view, well, any additional conflict or tension in any area is affecting even more the capacity of delivery and distribution of aid, and my colleagues report from Bihac that the tensions in the area are affecting our capacity to deliver and to have access to everybody.
Ms. Bentley. And yesterday — I do not know whether you know it, Mr. Chairman — Milosevic dissolved the parliament in Serbia, called for a new election on December 19th. I do not know what that portends. I do know there is a strong opposition group trying to form against him, but I am afraid that one of those opposition groups may be the wrong one that may get in power.
You laugh. You know what I am talking about.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Yes.
Ms. Bentley. Well, I think you referred to it Mr. Mendiluce. There is so much going on there, chaos on all sides, that I think it would be very difficult to determine who are we going to help. It is a sad situation.
Mr. CUNY. May I make a comment about sanctions?
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Mr. Cuny, if you can make that briefly. Unfortunately I have to leave at 12:30, but if you will make a brief comment.
Mr. CUNY. The whole idea of sanctions assumes that there is a collective responsibility for aggression by a society; that we are making the society and the country pay for the actions, and there is an assumption that the sanctions will penalize that country, as a country, for taking those actions.
And when sanctions are imposed, then it becomes incumbent on the leadership to decide how it wants to spend its money. Does it want to continue to prosecute a war, or does it want to divert the monies it has to buy humanitarian aid, food, and other supplies for its population.
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And how a country responds to that, I think, is very paramount in our view. As Mr. Mendiluce pointed out, it is not beyond Mr. Milosevic to deny the procurement of medical supplies and so forth to his own population in order to prosecute the war, and I think that the populations of that country need to know that that is what is happening, and I think that is part of the process that we need to stay the course on sanctions and not be tempted to release them simply because some of the poor people are being hurt.
The society does have a collective responsibility for that, and un- fortunately it means that we have to wage economic war on them for doing that, but I think we have made that decision as a govern- ment, and other nations have backed us in this, and the United Nations Security Council has supported that, and to start trying to break the sanctions by providing humanitarian aid ourselves is de- feating the purpose.
Ms. Bentley. Well, isn't some humanitarian aid supposed to be exempt, food?
Mr. CuNY. It is exempted, but they are expected to buy it, not for us to give it to them.
Ms. Benti^y. Yes. Well, the people do not have the money.
Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Mendiluce?
Mr. Mendiluce. May I comment very briefly?
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Yes.
Mr. Mendiluce. I strongly disagree with Mr. Cuny on this point. I think that to establish that a whole country that is suffering from a dictatorship is collectively responsible for what its leadership is doing is strongly wrong politically and socially and, of course, at the humanitarian level.
I fully disagree. My country, one million people were killed by Franco, and we were collectively made responsible and instead of being liberated by the allies, we were kept with the Franco regime, and then we were sanctioned after one million people were killed and one million refugees went outside of Spain.
So I do not accept this type of approach because I was a victim of this, and I had to suffer Franco for 25 years of my life, thanks to this sanction approach. So we can discuss long hours about sanc- tions. I think that the way in which sanctions are being designed today are reinforcing the power of the extremists, those who are in power, and even worse, those who are growing thanks to the Na- tionalistic speech that they can present to their people.
Unfortunately, the people do not have access to information. The information they receive is manipulated, and maybe if we are able to invade with the radios and TV chains to have an influence and tell the truth, we can discuss it, but for the time being, every Ser- bian citizen is completely brainwashed by the media under the con- trol of Milosevic. So they cannot be made responsible. I do not ac- cept this from any point of view. Sorry.
Thank you.
Mr. CUNY. If I could come back, UNPROFOR estimates $1.6 mil- lion per day was spent on shelling. The value of the humanitarian aid that we are providing directly and indirectly to Serbia is 1.5 million.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Per day?
Mr. CUNY. Per day.
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Co-Chairman Hoyer. The problem, of course, is the alternatives. The international community has opted for economic sanctions in many different areas because of the desire not to resort to mihtary action, and essentially they are the two alternatives available to the international community to effect change in actions which are contrary to international law and human rights and humanitarian concerns.
I understand your position, and I think it is certainlv a rational position, and probably as a practical matter is absolutely correct in terms of who is hurt, whether the sanctions be in Haiti or they be in any other place, but the fact is the alternative, if you want to effect action, is something that the international community is very loathe to take, that is, military direct action against Milosevic or who is the general in Haiti? Cedras.
That is our problem. I want to thank both of you very much, and I think you have been candid and very helpful. We probably ought to have a hearing like this daily.
Mr. McCiX)SKEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Mrs. Howard, it is always good to see vou. Everybody ought to know Frances Howard, whose brother, Hubert Humphrey, was probably, in my opinion, one of the greatest public servants this country has every has, and she is, as well.
Thank you for being with us. We appreciate it very much.
Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. McCloskey. I just wanted to say I think this is one of the best, the most factual and informative we have had even if, as you say, we know much, but not all of the information already, and I sincerely wish that the major leaders, people with names like Major, Clinton and Mitterand, could sit down with these two gen- tlemen for an hour, particular with Mr. Cuny's 10 months on the ground in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia, and just listen to the truth and think about acting on the truth.
So it has been an invaluable day for us, I think.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Thank you for that observation.
I want to say that I think there is going to be two, perhaps more, hopefully more, two direct actions that are going to be taken out of this hearing. I think both Mr. Markey, Mr. Wilson and myself, and I am sure we will be joined by others, are going to take imme- diate action on the gas question which may have some impact.
Mr. CUNY. Thank you.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Again, it goes back to your issue. If you cut off the gas, who do you hurt? Probably those that are in power can get alternative supplies. The overwhelming majority of the popu- lous will not be able to do so, and they will be the ones who will suffer, obviously the premise being, as Mr. Cuny has stated it, that you have an alternative application of resources.
At some point in time the populous will become so distressed that they cannot support even the military effort that is isolated to some degree from what is going on in the civilian sector.
And the second thing is the Chairman and I were discussing
the publication of and the granting of infamy to those persons who you say we know clearly are committing atrocities, and the publica- tion of those both in print and in broadcast through RFE, Radio Liberty, and other outlets that we have available.
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I think that you make a good point in terms of, if nothing else, at least of denying them the anonymity that covers their actions.
Again, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. CUNY. Thank you.
Co-Chairman HoYER. We appreciate it very much.
Mr. Ambassador, if you would like to say a few words, I think we have about 10 minutes.
Ambassador Sacirbey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. And I apologize. Well, I do not apologize. You were not on the schedule, but we are glad to have you speak.
Ambassador Sacirbey. Well, I am not either sorry. I think that I must commend, even though I am not supposed to, I think, by protocol, must commend the two witnesses for the detail of infor- mation. Obviously it makes my comments, by definition, less lengthy, and I will try to add some breadth to what was said from a different perspective rather than to emphasize their points.
First and foremost, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is grate- ful for the support of you. Congressmen and Congress women, who obviously are now bringing the issue of Bosnia back at a critical time, when the winter is coming, and when I think of those who had conducted this aggression would look for winter to be an ac- complice in a continuing murder and genocide.
The situation in Bosnia, I think, conveniently has been forgotten by some because for a while things seemed to get a little bit better, but, of course, those of us who are knowledgeable kne^y that what certain aggressors were waiting for was the winter, which could be as effective in committing genocide as shells or bullets.
Also, if I may add, we continue to pursue the negotiated option to provide peace. We also are committed to the concept of peace in a multi-cultural society not just as a form of rhetoric, as a way of trying to gain support within this capital and other capitals, but also because we believe that a free and democratic society is at a relative advantage during a peaceful period and is at a aisadvan- tage during war.
Converselv, I think the same can be said about a fascist society or dictatorship, that it is at an advantage during war and a dis- advantage during peace.
Therefore, one of our options for winning the war and one of our strategies for winning the war is peace, and I think this adminis- tration and other capitals should be aware of how committed we are to this strategy.
Second, under what conditions would we, in fact, accept a nego- tiated settlement? Well, of course, by what I just said, it has to be a real peace, a viable peace, because if it is not a real peace or via- ble peace, then our strategy is not one that can succeed and our state is not one that can survive and our people are not in a posi- tion to survive a genocide.
What are these specific conditions in great detail? Well, first, the viabilitv of the state that may be carved out of any partition plan would be critical. We cannot do something that is already unjust and flawed in and of itself, which is ethnic partition, and then compound the flaw by providing for a remaining Bosnian state that is not viable and that continues to be threatened economically, po- litically and obviously militarily by the same aggressor.
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And second, we need to have credible implementation and en- forcement procedures if, in fact, a peace agreement is signed. Some of the latest global events lead us to doubt that, in fact, there is a strong commitment for an implementation and enforcement ef- fort, one that I think this country would need to be actively in- volved in, and now we are back to square one, trying to evaluate all of our options.
As the winter comes, it is important for us to focus on the hu- manitarian issue. For a long time over the last 6 months, there has been a lot of talk of lifting of the arms embargo. We strongly are in favor of this option, the lifting of the arms embargo, because we believe it is necessary for us to defend ourselves and to try to produce the type of environment that would allow for credible nego- tiations.
But right now, with winter coming, we really need to do what is necessary with the greatest haste to minimize the suffering of the population, and in this context, we must, I think, face the reality that is a very unpleasant one that the humanitarian effort, in fact, has now been usurped to serve political goals, the political goals of those countries that have failed to take the necessary steps in Bosnia to stop the war.
What do I mean by that? That despite the efforts of the commit- ted and brave individuals, the brave individuals of UNHCR, that the humanitarian effort is being maintained at a threshold level that is just sufficient to forestall any resolute action to stop the war. Effectively, the remedies that are being provided are designed to forestall actions designed to bring about a cure.
Finally, in this context, I am convinced, as is our government, that the objective of many governments in Europe is not to bring about a peace in Bosnia necessarily or to bring about the victory of justice, the rule of law over the forces of aggression and the forces that would use genocide as a weapon. Their objective is the surrender of a country and a people.
In fact, consistent with some of the comments made, it seems that the victim now, in fact, is being further victimized because we are not willing to accept our fate as losers. We know that, in fact — even we accept that fate — that we cannot depend upon either the mercy of our enemies or the goodwill and good faith of those who supposedly are there to help us.
In this context, I would like to just add one point that I think is relevant in view of the issues discussed. The nature of the U.N. mandate in Bosnia and how it has been usurped, I think, has done tremendous harm to the entire U.N. structure. The usurpation of the humanitarian agenda of UNHCR, I think, is very unfortunate, very damaging, and when we see the results on the ground some- times, we see young men and women who have been sent there, particularly young soldiers as part of UNPROFOR, who are being told that there are no good guys or bad guys here; that there are no victims and aggressors; that this is a very confusing situation, and before we know it, many of these individuals now who are there to help our people are involved in the black market, prostitu- tion, sometimes to engage in terrible crimes against our people, in- cluding the crime of rape.
44
What is a credible strategy? Well, the threat of air strikes, in fact, has produced some tangible results. It seems that every time there was a threat that was perceived as being real, we saw posi- tive consequences for the people of Bosnia.
But what I am concerned about right now is that as the threat of air strikes has been forgotten over the last few months, that the threshold under which air strikes would be undertaken is not ade- quately robust to stop the strangulation of Sarajevo, that is, that the line that has been drawn in the sand is one that does not re- flect the true suffering of the people of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities, and that by the time that the international community may react with air strikes, that, in fact, the work may have already been done by those who would use slow strangulation as a weapon against our people.
In my opinion, the threat of air strikes needs to be pro active rather than reactive. What I mean by that is we need to demand that the siege of Sarajevo and other safe areas be lifted and use the threat of air strikes to accomplish this result.
Now, some may say, well, we should not threaten; the United States and NATO should not threaten air strikes unless they are serious about using those air strikes, and the answer is, in fact, I believe if you do not continue to emphasize greater demands to im- prove the status of the population, that not only will the population continue to suffer greater and greater hardships, but also that, in fact, the air strikes are more likely to be used because the threat will be forgotten and will be tested by those at whom it is directed.
In this context, if I may just add, there is a newspaper article from the London Financial Times yesterday, and I would just like to read one very small paragraph that describes the latest on- slaught of the Serbian force of the regime shelling on Sarajevo.
It says, and I quote, "This latest onslaught marks any attempt to maintain a semblance of normal life in the valley below. Efforts by the U.N. to clear the rubble-strewn streets, restore power, water, and the telephone lines or repair the tram lines in the dev- astated city appear utterly absurd given the Serbs' ability to strike at any moment."
They can strike at any moment because they are allowed to maintain their heavy weapons around the hills of Sarajevo and other areas. Therefore, any attempts at normalcy, any attempts to say that the strangulation of Sarajevo has stopped until those heavy weapons are removed, I think, are erroneous and obviously go against the interests of the Bosnian people.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. Congressmen and Con- gresswomen, thank you very much.
Co-Chairman HoYER. Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you one ques- tion, and, Mr. McCloskey, if you want to ask additional questions, I want to turn this over to you. In any event, let me ask you a question.
The lifting of the arms embargo seems to be a principal, if not the principal, objective in the short term. Has the Bosnian govern- ment made a formal request to the United States to take such ac- tion either unilaterally or take actions within the U.N. Security Council to lift the embargo?
45
Ambassador Sacirbey. We certainly have to the United Nations, Mr. Chairman, and we, of course, have been in some detailed dis- cussion with the United States administration about the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. Of course, we are not encouraged as to these efforts.
Co-Chairman Hoyer. Were not encouraged?
Ambassador Sacirbey. We are not encouraged to pursue these efforts.
Co-Chairman HoYER. OK My apologies, but I am going to have to leave. Before I do, I will recognize Ms. Bentley.
Ms. Bentley. I just have one question, Mr. Ambassador, that I asked earlier. What is the struggler or what the press has been talking about between Abdic and Izetbegovic?
Ambassador Sacirbey. If I may give you a more detailed answer, which I think you deserve, first, in a society where the rule of law is being abandoned and it is being abandoned by the international community, and where the legitimate government of Bosnia is not in a position to enforce its authority vis-a-vis the defense of its own people, we can expect fragmentation to happen. Obviously it has happened.
But I do not believe that Mr. Abdic is a real threat. Mr. Abdic has shown himself to be an opportunist who is interested in some sort of warlord status.
Ms. Bentley. One of those.
Ambassador Sacirbey. And we know a few of them that are al- ready thriving. He is interested in the Bihac area, but even there luckily we have almost the entire Bosnian military supporting the government in Sarajevo, and therefore, Mr. Abdic's rebellion is very limited.
Of course, politically it is damaging because it comes to the at- tention of individuals such as vou, and these issues are brought up, but I think it should be the objective of any international body in- terested in peace in Bosnia to try to keep Bosnia from fragmenting, and of course, over time we can expect that these types of tests will be presented to the Sarajevo government, and at some point the Sarajevo government may no longer be able to withstand them as its credibility is damaged by the lack of international support to stop the war and, of course, by the lack of international support to give the Bosnians the ability to stop the war themselves.
Ms. Bentley. You mentioned warlords. That is one of the prob- lems in this whole mess over there, isn't it, that there are a num- ber of warlords around, each of whom want to proclaim their little kingdom and they are going to go on and do — not on all sides. I am not talking about just on the Bosnian side.
Ambassador Sacirbey. Well, I think we should, again, make a distinction between symptoms and causes. The warlords are not the causes. They are the symptoms. In my opinion, the causes are an overbuilt military structure in Serbia, propaganda, bureaucracy that is surviving from the old communist period, and these people are looking to perpetuate power, and the only way they have seen the light to perpetuate power is to convert their philosophy from communism to effectively fascism.
Until you move to change the Serbian regime, effectively dissolve this military, dissolve this unnecessary bureaucracy-propaganda
46 '
machine, I do not think you will have stability in the Balkans, and I know of great interest to you, I do not think you will have peace for the Serbian people.
If I may just deviate a little bit from your question, there was a talk of whether or not sanctions against Serbia are effective, and the answer is, of course, they hurt the little man, and they hurt in particular the other minorities in Serbia, not just the poor Serbs.
But I think intellectually you have to be prepared to adopt one of two options, which is a direct military confrontation with the Serbian military, and that is obviously the most effective way of dealing with the cause of this war, or try to undermine it with its own population through the sanctions.
A gentleman that I consider to be a great Serbian patriot, Srdja Popovich, made a comment on television on a show that I was with him, and I understand the reasons for his comment. He said, "I feel like a clairvoyant German in 1941. The best thing that can happen to Serbia is for this military regime to be defeated on the battle- field." . ^
I understand the reasons for his comment because what is hap- pening is the sanctions are destroying the little man, destroying the fabric of society, strengthening the Mafia, strengthening the ex- tremists, and of course, this is not only at the expense of Bosnia, but the expense of Serbia.
Ms. Bentley. That is a very good analysis. Thank you.
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, Ms. Bentley.
Mr. Ambassador, can you comment on the likelihood and the pos- sible utility of an all Balkan conference to address not only Bosnia, but the pending crises in Croatia, Kosovo, Sandjak, Macedonia, et
al.? . .
As I read in a newspaper account yesterday, it is not at all un- likely that we could see civil war between the Montenegran Serbs and Serbs and different Serbian and Montenegran factions within Montenegro, and the point is that unless this problem is stemmed, it just goes on, in essence, forever. It won't bum itself out in the short term.
Ambassador Sacirbey. This is an important message that I have for the international community, and I am acting now on instruc- tions from Sarajevo.
We do favor an international conference on the entire Balkan re- gion. However, we are dismayed by some of the reports that we have received regarding this conference.
Let me emphasize we not only favor the conference. We would very much like to see it happen because we believe that the issues in Bosnia are interrelated to issues relating to our neighbors. But what concerns us is now there is talk of a conference that effec- tively would be stacked against those entities that would represent justice and some semblance of a fair peace settlement in Bosnia, and that, in fact, this conference would be run by those countries that have been responsible for the absurdity and the tragedy and the crime that is the current situation in Bosnia.
We think that is
Mr. McCloskey. Do you want to state those countries for the record?
47
Ambassador Sacirbey. Well, I have done it before, so why not again? Britain and France.
Mr. McCloskey. ok.
Ambassador Sacirbey. In particular, Britain.
I think it is unfortunate that we would adopt the analogy of tak- ing a patient who has been badly mangled on the operating table by an incompetent doctor, taking him back to the same doctor so that the doctor can finish the job. It seems to us that the doctor here would be more interested in protecting his own reputation and finding ways to blame the patient for the blotched operation, rather than trying to correct the situation.
In this context, again acting on instructions, we deem it essential that the participation of this conference be broad, include all of the members of the Security Council, include all members who are neighboring in the former Yugoslavia include nations contributing to IJNPROFOR, and I think this is critical in view of the fact in the past certain European countries have stated that they somehow believe that they are the only ones contributing to UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia, and that is not the case. There are many others, and certainly many others would like to come in.
It is important that the United States be represented at the highest level. I note for your record that Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger was representing the United States at the last inter- national conference. Of course, any lower representation at this point in time might be seen as a step back by the United States on this problem.
That would be unfortunate when, in fact, the current United States administration has signaled to our nation that they are more than previous administrations committed to the cause of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Finally, I think if, in fact, we are to have NATO committed in the form of peacekeeping or peace making in Bosnia, we think it is essential that NATO be invited to the table since their both prac- tical as well as political view of any settlement would be important.
We have found that some of the promises made to us in the past regarding peacekeeping and peace making efforts to have been not fulfilled, to say the least.
Mr. McCloskey. To say the least, ves.
Ambassador Sacirbey. And we think that obviously that who will be called upon to fulfill those commitments should be at the table from day one.
Thank you.
Mr. McCloskey. Thank you very much.
I want to thank everyone, particularly all of the panelists. Thank you so much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was adjourned.]
49
APPENDIX
Statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Hearing on the Fate of the People of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Raybum House Office Building, Room 2360
Thursday, October 21, 1993
In recent weeks, the tragedy which continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been overshadowed by events here at home, as well as in Haiti, Somalia and Russia. This testifies to the significance of these other events, but it also reflects a tendency to want to ignore long-standing problems. The problems in the former Yugoslavia confront us horribly day-after-day for more than two years now. There is a large gap between what we know needs to be done on the one hand, and what governments are politically willing to do on the other. Rather than meet the challenge before it, the world shifts it focus.
This cannot be allowed to happen. People in Sarajevo, in Gorazde and elsewhere in Bosnia- Herzegovina are still being killed by sniper fire and by shelling. People are still being forced to flee, adding to an already tremendous refugee burden as winter approaches.
The effects of aggression and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not disappear by turning off our television sets or turning to the next newspaper page. Not only will thousands more die this winter; resettlement, reconstruction and reconciliation will take years, perhaps decades, to achieve, when and if such efforts can be finally undertaken.
Our hearing this morning focuses on the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We hope to gain insights into whether they will survive their second winter under siege, whether they want to end the conflict no matter what principles are sacrificed, whether they want to fight on to defend what is theirs, whether they will want to return to their home villages or move elsewhere, in Bosnia-Herzegovina or around the world.
We have two outstanding witnesses before us this morning who can address these issues. Jose Mendiluce is the former special envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia, and currently the UNHCR representative in Brussels. His expertise in refugee matters, his experience in the former Yugoslavia and his personal candor are well known. Fred Cuny is an expert in disaster relief who has spent most of 1993 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, assisting efforts to keep an infrastructure under attack functioning so that people can survive.
50
Statement of Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Hearing on the Fate of the People of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Raybum House Office Building, Room 2360
Thursday, October 21, 1993
Mr. Chairman, for eight and one-half years now I have been chairing or co-chairing this Helsinki Commission, which has traditionally focused not on political, military or economic affairs in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, but on people - on people and their rights as individuals. There have been, during this time period, much frustration and anger over the denial of human rights and violation of humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.
Never, however, have we on the Helsinki Commission had to agonize and express such outrage over what was happening, and being allowed to happen, than in regard to Bosnia- Herzegovina during this last year and one-half. I think it is fortunate that we have this Commission to look at this tragedy regularly, to make aware and inform ourselves and the American public about what is happening. It is equally unfortunate that we have had to do so, and that the aggression and genocide occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not stopped a long time ago, as many of us strongly advocated. Perhaps the only redeeming value of all of this is the chance to meet people with courage and people who care, like the two witnesses we have before us.
I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that there was one other such person who was invited to present testimony but was unfortunately unable to appear, Roy Gutman, the Pulitzer- prize winning Newiday journalist who first exposed the systematic implementation by militant Serbs of the policy of ethnic cleansing, including the detention camps. His commitments as a journalist covering the former Yugoslavia precluded his presence here, but in responding to our invitation, he said that, if he were here, his main point would be to get all the information out on what has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, information which inevitably leads to the conclusion that this is genocide. Our State Department has released some of this information in eight reports to the United Nations, but, Mr. Gutman reports, there is more that can and should be released as well.
1 take the effort to establish an international war crimes tribunal seriously, and hope that this information can be used to prosecute those responsible, from the camp guards, murderers and rapists freely roaming the hills of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the political leaders in Pale and Belgrade which devised and directed the larger strategy of which they were a part. I have said many times before that an important, long-term factor affecting the fate of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including their chances for reconciliation, is the satisfaction and deterring example of justice served. It is also important to do this for the sake of those engaged in relief operations, who are frequently attacked in Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of international humanitarian law. Given the willingness to tolerate or even deny the existence of genocide, I am somewhat skeptical of the willingness of the international community to prosecute those responsible for it. But a prosecutor, a Venezuelan, has just been nominated by the Secretary General, and, subject to his approval, I think our government should do all that it can to assist and encourage him in his job. Certainly, this Commission is strongly behind such an effort.
I look forward to hearing what our witness have to say about this, and about the needs of the Bosnian people for the coming winter. I hope, however, that they can also focus on their direct experiences in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina and give us some sense of what these people are thinking, and what they want. In the end, it is their fate with which we are concerned, and I believe strongly that we must help them to the fullest extent possible.
51
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Presentation by
Jose Maria Mendiluce Former Special Envoy of the High conunissioner in Former Yugoslavia
(United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees)
Hearing, 21 October 1993
(to be checked against delivery)
52
1. 18 months have passed since the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, we live a scenario not even the more pessimistic could have predicted. A scenario of hatred, displacement, destruction, systematic human rights violations and atrocities, of civilians killed, wounded, taken hostage, trapped or in detention/concentration camps, a situation that constitutes one of the most dramatic humanitarian tragedies of recent times.
2. At the time of preparing this hearing, no perspective of peace can be detected and we are approaching a second winter. Deliberate attacks on humanitarian convoys and staff, lack of access, open hostility, increasing numbers of displaced persona, lack of respect for the humanitarian character of UNHCS activities,... are creating additional problems for the operation led by OMHCR in cooperation with UNPROKOR.
3. In view of the prevailing situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina , it seems appropriate to analyse what was wrong in the approach of the International Community to confront the crisis. More than 200,000 people killed {many of them civilians); 4,2 million victims (among them more than 3 million refugees and displaced, hundred of thousands trapped, under siege and shelling), hundreds of villages destroyed, thousands of women raped, are signals impressive enough to seriously question the "success" of a strategy based on a massive humanitarian operation and a process of negotiations without the readiness to intervene in a more decisive manner.
4. The divisions at the international level on how to address the crisis, both within the UN and the EC and the lack of sufficiently developed preventive diplomatic means contributed to the developments as they evolved. So did the lack of significant or sufficient analysis on the early warning signals from the ground together with the difficulties confronted in different key countries in terms of electoral processes, other internal and external elements on domestic agendas, along with additional issues that could be added to this list, made in fact and in reality apparently impossible for the international community to address the problem in a preventive way.
5. One of the key elements that was absent in the process was a dear decision by the international community, to confront the crisis not only with diplomatic and humanitarian means, but also with the necessary strength and coherence to show that it was ready to negotiate and act in a more decisive way to stop the process of territorial gains and ethnic cleansing. This process had already started in Croatia and set the trend that was going to follow in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6. Since the war in Croatia and mainly once war started in Bosnia, as early as April 1992, it became obvious to UNHCR that one of the basic characteristics of the conflict was that the civilian displacement was not a consequence but an objective of the war (a finding which we reported early on). For this reason, UNHCR insisted on assisting the victims as close to their homes as possible. We deployed staff to negotiate the prevention of expulsions of civilians in some areas. Such "preventive protection" did not succeed, as figures show, to prevent displacement, neither in Bosnia Herzegovina nor in Croatia (UNPAS).
53
7. But it was also evident (as the High Conunissioner rightly reported aa early as June 1992) that this humanitarian tragedy, with all the foreseeable consequences, did not have a humanitarian solution, but a political one. Since the beginning, when ONHCR defined the policy of the agreaaors as "ethnic cleansing", we knew that whatever we were going to do, was not going to avoid the tragedy. We were forced to be realistic in our objectives, and concentrate our efforts in saving as many lives as possible while waiting for a peace settlement. The fact that the International Community based its strategy, primarily, on humanitarian assistance, instead of on more decisive political action, forced UNHCR to desperately attempt to avoid the worst, well knowing (and predicting) the consequences in humanitarian terms, of this incomplete strategy to prevent or stop the war .
8. The approach referred above using humanitarian work as main strategy of the International Community's resjxsnse, generated a great deal of contradictions. UNHCR has been subjected to all sorts of manipulation attempts by many of the actors involved (local and international).
9. How to solve the dilemna between the right to stay and the right to leave, with ethnic cleansing as main policy of those who were winning the war? How to protect the rights of the people without being an instrument of ethnic cleansing? How can one qualify as "success" our ability to cross front lines to feed the people in enclaves, besieged areas, etc, while at the same time the same people were killed under shelling, sniper fire, were raped, and terrified? How to accept the tendency to consider our role more or less as a trucking and airline cc^pany, reducing our objectives just to feed those persons lucky enough to survive?
10. From our humanitarian perspective, only a very pragmatic and flexible approach has helped us to address the very complex issues in the middle of all these contradictions. While trying to protect and assist people where they were, we help them to evacuate in some cases (Bosanski Novi, Srebenica, . . . ) and negotiate to keep the borders open for those who needed asylum or protection abroad (assisting them as "refugees"). Ethnic cleansing was a two-fold strategy: killing and expulsion. Por us, the debate was finished early in June 92 s We decided to help people to survive. We choose to have more displaced or refugees than more bodies; But we suffered all the time of attempts to manipulate us or to use us as an instrximent by all sides to avoid or to assist in displacement. In many cases the victims were hostages of their own military and civilian authorities.
11. The "safe area" concept has been another element of debate for UNHCR for many months and the future of gome of these areas is a matter of serious concern, without a just political settlement and good-will from the Serbian side, the "safe areas" have become de facto large refugee camns. totally dependent on international assistance and their situation is rapidly deteriorating at all levels. Surrounded by enemy forces, without basic shelter, medical care, infrastructure conditions, isolated and with almost all the families with members missing, separated, killed, living under sporadic shelling or sniper fire, these areas are S^ecoming more and more a sort of detention centers administered by the UN and
54
assisted by UNUCR. These are the risks of decisions talcen in good faith and in the assumption of a political process of solution that never ta]ces place. Srebenica, zepa, Gorazde are already in this situation described above. Bihacs is still cut off, Sarajevo is a shame for humanity and so is Mostar. Bosnia is more complex than Northern Iraq. And never was the commitment of the International Community comparable to the one of the Allied Forces in that country.
12. UNHCR staff in the field have felt more and more trapped, together with UNPROFOR, in a no-win situation, confronted with a growing tragedy that could not be stopped or reversed without the use of all necessary (other) means. And this has been reported systematically since the beginning of the war. To use our presence in the field and our relative "successes" in feeding the victims, to justify the lack of political decision to confront the crisis, or even worse, to use us as human shields against any sort of international military action should not be acceptable. The seriousness of the crisis and the responsibilities of the International Community require decisions without using or abusing the humanitarian organisations to justify political unwillingness to intervene .
13. The last proposal of partition, whatever political justification there might be, will imply (if ever accepted and implemented) more displacement of those living on "other's" territory and of those who are not ready to live in totalitarian, ethnically pure or confessional states (democrates, mixed marriages, etc.). Many Bosnians of the three nationalities have been fighting and losing a war to protect their right to live together : they are the casualties of this war. ws abandoned than. They will not have any space to stay or to return to (for those who have fled) without a just political settlement, based on basic principles and respect for hiwnan rights, and this constitutes a dream no-one seems to believe in today.
14. These elements of analysis are an attempt to show that there are many contradictions between principles and pragmatism, between political proposals and humanitarian concerns (displacement, right to return, ...) and human rights (non-discrimination, freedom of movement, religious freedom, etc) that are not duly addressed in the political process.
15. Regarding sanctions. UNHCR experience in Former Yugoslavia has shown that sanctions imposed to end a conflict can, if not properly designed and iropl^aented, affect the ability of humanitarian organisations to respond effectively to the victims of the same conflict, penalising most those who suffer and reducing the willingness of people and countries to provide asylum or refuge. In this sense, the situation of refugees in Serbia and Montenegro is of serious concern and UNUCR plans to assist them, in an area where many nationals are living in even worse conditions, which could provoke rejection and even violence.
On the other hand. Security Council resolutions adopting sanctions rarely mention humanitarian mandates and adequate exception procedures, we think it advisable to revise the "sanctions policy" in light of some recent experiences.
55
16. It is probably too late to save Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it should not be too late to stop the process of destruction and genocide (political, cultural, almost physical) of the Bosnian people. With the current lack of political progress, based on a lack of political will of the international conmunity, more people will die, by killings or through starvation in the coming winter. There are no prospects for return for the Muslims, nor for the Serbs and Croats loyal to the Bosnian authorities. More displacement will take place by force (ethnic cleansing continues in many areas) as well as due to the lack of basic supplies. The horror of shelling and sniper fire with which people in Sarajevo live and die will continue. We are condemning millions of women and children to desperation. They will never forgive us.
56
ANNEX I
CHRONOT. OGY OF SOMF SIGNIFICANT gVENTg
TN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1 a a 1
Croatia and Slovenia proelaia indepandence . Flgbting breaks out
Buropcaa Comunity establishes the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia chaired by Lord Carrington
UN Seeretary-Ceneral appoints Cyrus Vance as his Personal Envoy
At BZC<»I Fed. Govenuaent of Yugoslavia requests miRCR assistance
ON Secretary-general asks tWHCR to assist displaced persons in Yugoslavia as lead huaanitarian agency
tJHaCR dispatches assessaent nission and then Special Envoy to Former Yugoslavia
First OiraCR relief shlpsents reach Belgrade and Zagreb
Ceraany announces that it will recognize Croatia and Slovenia
|
June 25 |
|
|
Sep |
07 |
|
Oct |
08 |
|
Oct |
08 |
|
Oct |
25 |
|
Kov |
26 |
|
Dec |
17 |
|
Dec |
23 |
19^2
Jan 02 Cyrus Vance negotiates Sarajevo Accord, the first lasting cease-fire in the war in Croatia
Jan IS The European CoBBuni'ty recognizes Croatia and Slovenia
Feb 29 More that 99 per cent of those voting in a referendua in Bosnia and Herzegovina cast ballots In favour of independence. Bosnian Serbs boycott the vote. Barricades erected in Sarajevo.
Mar 03 Bosnia and Heraegovina proclaias indepandence
Mar 20 First large scale displaceaants occur in northern Bosnia. Zagreb Office dispatches aid to influx point in Croatia.
Mar 27 The UN High Coimissioner for Kefugees appeals to all parties to refrain froa action that causes new displaceaent of civilian popixlations
Apr 07 European Coaaunity and US recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as independent. Fighting in eastern Bosnia intensifies
Apr 07 sc Resolution 749 authorizes the full deployaent of OHPROFOK to URFAs
Apr 11 UNHCIt begins distributing food aid to displaced persons froa the Mar in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Apr 11 ONBCR In Sarajevo issues emergency appeal
Apr 15 Five xmHCR trucks hijacked on the ttay froa Belgrade to Sarajevo
57
Apr 27 Yugoslavxa ' s serblan-lad parliaK^nt proclaias the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mouteneerro)
Apr 30 High CogHU.ssioner writes to Foreign Ministers of Group of 27 appealing for funds and stating that unless energetic action is taken up to 500,000 people could becoae displaced as a result of the conflict
Ma; 16 OMHCX t^^orarlly evacttates staff froa Sarajevo as tlie capital becomes engulfed in the conflict
May 18 An ICRC delegate is killed in a eortar attack on a convoy entering Sarajevo
ICXC announces temporary withdrawal froa Bosnia and Hersegovina
Security Council Resolution 757 nandatory sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
tmPROPOR becomes fully operational in all of the UNFAs
Croatia tightens border restrictions for those fleeing the war in Bosnia
UNHCR resnaes operations in Bosnia with land deliveries to Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja-Luka. Office reopened in Sarajevo
President Mitterand of Prance visits Sarajevo
Security Council Resolution 761 authorises reinforcaaent of UNPROFOR to ensure security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of huaanitarian assistance
Jun 29 ONHCR airlift of huaanitarian assistance to Sarajevo begins
July 01 First ONECR organized evacuation of Muslias and Croats froa Banja-Luka area (Bosansky Novi)
July 07 07 leaders threaten use of force to ensure that relief reaches Sarajevo
July 09 President Ixetbegovic reports 60,000 Bosnians killed by SeA forces and 1.4 Billion displaced
July 29 UH High Coaaissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, convenes a ainisterial-level international meeting in Geneva. More than 2 Bd.llion are said to have been displaced. A comprehensive huaanitarian strategy is adopted centred on access to safety and assistance for survival.
Aug 13 Security council Resolutions 770 and 771 foreshadow the use of force as last resort to ensure relief aid for Bosnia and conpliance with its call for a half to "ethnic cleansing"
|
May |
24 |
|
May |
30 |
|
Jun |
09 |
|
Jun |
16 |
|
Jxm |
16 |
|
Jun |
29 |
|
Jun |
29 |
58
Avtg 13 rollowiag reports of atrocious living condition* in detention cai^a, the international coMMimitj denonces crimes against hiawnity at an extraordinary session o£ the Oil Eu«an Rights cowBission which appoints Xadeuss Masowiecki to investigate human rights violations
Aug 15 First URBCR convoy since Nay successfully reaches Oorazde
Aug 26 UK Secretary-Oeneral and UK Prime Minister, John Major, as President of the BC council of Ministers, co-chair International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in London. A frameMork for an overall political settlement is established and a Steering committee is set up. Lord Carrington steps down as EC mediator and is replaced by Lord Owen
Sep 03 Shooting down of a UNBCR/ Italian relief plane and death of four crew memhers leads to month- long suspension of Sarajevo airlift
Sep 03 The Steering Co^Littee of the International conference on the Former Yugoslavia opens in Geneva under the co-chairmanship of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen
Sep 10 UK Secretary-General requests security Council to enlarge OMPJlOFOIt's mandate to include the protection of humanitarian assistance provided by DMHCS and others
Sep 29 UMBCR High Coemissioner for Refugees predicts that 400,000 could die during the winter without political measures, oMrgeney aid and resumption of the airlift
Oct 03 Resumption of the Sarajevo airlift suspended since 3 September
Oct 05 Cyrus Vance criticises the slow deployment of UM forces to protect relief convoys. UNBCR estimates at three million the number of refugees, internally displaced and besieged populations requiring assistance
Oct 09 SC Resolution 781 imposes a ban on military flights over Bosnia and Hers ego Vina
Oct 15 Fighting erupts between Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia. tJHBCR becomes actively involved in cease fire negotiations
Kov 04 Croatia tuns back hundreds of Bosnian Maslim refugees, saying they can absorb no mora
Hov 12 Expanded OKPROFOR assumes operations in Bosnia and Bersegovina
Kov 16 Security Council Resolution asks the Secretary-General, in consultation with miHCR, to study the establishment of safe havens for affected populations
Hov 29 A UMHCR convoy reaches the Muslim town of Srebenica, cut off since April by Serbian forces
I
59
1 a a 3
Jaa IX peace tAlks r«suMe in Oenera in tte fraaoMork of the intamational Conference on former Xugoslavia and a conpreliMisive peace plan is put forward by tbe co-chairsan, the so-called "Vance-Owen Plan"
Feb 02 a uxHca local staff aeaber is killed in an attack on a relief convoy
Feb 09 Peace talka resuae at OS Beadqaarters ia Mem Tork
Feb 17 UHHCR tei^orarily suspends aanj of its operations in Bosnia and Beraegovina in face of widespread blockages of kuitanitarian assistance and resuaes on Fab 32
Feb 27 ITS Airdrop operation starts ia Bosnia and Hersegovina
Mar 03 Security Council votes resolution 816 enforcing the "ne-fly sone' over Bosnia
i^r 02 Stoltenberg naasd to succeed Cyrus Tance witb effect f roa 1 Kaj
Apr 08 latBCR evacuates 150 vulnerable people froa Srebenica
Apr 16 Security Council Resolution 819 requesting increase in UXPBOFOS
presence in Srebenica aati to treat it as a safe area
Nay 06 Security Council adopts resolution 824 deaanding that any taking of territory by force cease inaediately, declaring Sarajevo, Tusla, lepa, Gorasde, Bihacj and Srebenica as safe areas
May 08 Eeavy fighting erupts in Nostar between Croats and Muslias aad spreads north
May 19 Vance-Owen Peace Plan rejected by Bosnian-Serb referendoa of 15-16 Nay
June 01 OMHCK convoy hit by shells killing 2 Danish drivers and a local interpreter and wounding 4 other Danish staff
June 17 BC warns of the 'explosive elxture" of "the intensification of war, the absence of a decisive political breakthrough, the restriction on asyltia and the virtual depletion of resources for the husanitarian efforts"
June 17 Lord Owen concedes that Vance Owen Peace Plan is no longer of any use
June 19 secret eeeting occurs in Montenegro seaside resort between Karadzic, Boban and maps
June 22 First toracit convoy in 4 weeks reaches oorasde
60
5 -
July 16 At Meeting of the Bunanitarian issues Working Oroup of the International conference on foner Yugoslavia, donor countries aake pledges for another $126 aillion for tbe Oil operation in forssr Yugoslavia, Of which $63 million is pledged to xnacR. In the High coaaissioner ' s o%(n words "As long as tbe victiss have hope, we cannot and must not give up"
July 27 Peace negotiations between the 3 warring factions resune in Qeneva
July 30 Technical Meeting : Shelter and Infrastructure in Bosnia and Ber2egovina convenes in Palais des Nations, Geneva. Tentatively decide to create a Management structure to act as coordinating body for shelter, energy and infrastructure activities in BiB.
Aug 05 Peace talks in Geneva stall after Serbs overrun Mounts Igaan and Bjelasnica overlooking Sarajevo
Aug 09 HATO approves plans for air strikes on Bosnian Serbs if they don't lift siege on Sarajevo
Aug 14 DNBCS Staff ueaber, Boris Zeravcic, shot and killed in Vites
Aug 16 Peace negotiations scheduled to resuae in Geneva
JMM/Kh/015S8
61
AMMEX 2
Lirt or 8«"«f-f«" sTCORiTY co^'^TIlf nii°^^"^"^*
X. - GA RES 43/131 of 8 Decembar 1988, Humanttartan assistanc* to victim* of disasters and similar enierg«ncy situation*.
2. - GA RES 45/100 of 14 December 1990, Humanitarian asaiatanoe to victims of disasters and similar emergency situations.
3. - SC RBS/688 of 5 April 1991 insists that Iraq allow access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to maJce available all necessary facilities for their operations.
4. - GA RBS 46/182 of 19 Deceoiber 1991 - reaffirms respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of all States and allows humanitarian assistance to be provided with the consent . but not necessarily with the request of the affected country.
5. - A/ReB/46/219 of 14 April 1992 on the operational activities of the United Nations system .
6. - A/RSS/47/120 of 10 February 1993 on "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy and related matters".
7. - S/RES/724 Of 15 December 1991, acting under Chapter VII, decided to establish a CoaoLittee of the Security council to recommend appropriate measures concerning violations of the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.
8. - S/RES 752 of IS May 1992, fully supports the current efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to all the victims of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
9. - S/RES/757 of 30 Hay 1992, acting under chapter VII, increased actions of sanctions against Yugoslavia.
10. - S/RES/758 of 8 June 1992, extending UNPROFOR's responsibilities, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajewo and its airport.
11. - S/RES/760 of 18 June 1992 establishing a 'no objection" procedure for essential humanitarian needs.
12. - S/RES/764 of 13 July 1992 reaffirms that persons who commit or order the Commission of grave breaches of the (humanitarian law) conventions are individually responsible.
13. - S/RES/769 of 7 August 1992 acting under Chapter VII calls upon States to take national or through regional agencies or arrangements all necessary measures to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance.
14. - S/RES/770 of 13 August 1992, allowed the possibility of Invoking military force under Chapter VII, either collectively or individually, through regional agencies or arrangements, to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.
15. - S/RES/771 of 13 August 1992 called upon States and humanitarian organizations to provide informations on violations of humanitarian law.
16. - S/RES/776 of 14 September 1993 in which the Security Council was "noting with appreciation the offers made by a number of States, ..., to make available military personnel to facilitate the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian asssitance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such personnel to made available to the United Nations without cost to the Organization", stressing the Importance of air measures and of reinforcing the security of humanitarian activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, authorized the enlargement of UKPROFOR's mandate and strength In Bosnia-Herzegovina, "including the protection of convoys of released detainees if requested by the International Committee of the Red Cross".
74-257 0-94-3
62
17. - S/RES/780 of 6 October 1992 expressing grave alarm aJscut mass ki-llings and ths continuance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing".
18. - S/REs/781 of 9 October 1992 establishing a ban for military flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina "for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19. - S/RES/816 of 31 March 1993 authorized Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban of flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina .
20. - S/RES/819 of 16 April 1993, acting under Chapter VII demanded the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parte in Bosnia-Herzegovina .
21. - S/RES/820 of 17 April 1993, demanding full respect for the right of the UNPROPOR and the international humanitarian agencies to free and i,inimp<=;fied access to all areas in the area of Bosnia-Herzeoovina and further strenghtening of sanctions.
22. - S/RES/824 of 6 May 1993, acting under Chapter VII, declared Sarajevo and other threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuela, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Strebenica as safe areas.
23. - S/RES/827 of 25 May 1993 deciding to establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for humanitarian violations.
24. - S/RES/836 of 4 June 1993, acting under Chapter VII, decided to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in S/RES/824.
63
19/ia/93 12:49 UNHCR •> 2022264199
NO. 350 P015
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FRONTUNES
AMNEX }
•0^ -»ctmittouut
tSAu(uul993
64
19/10/93 12:49 UNHCR ^ 2022264199
UNHCR OFFICES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Austria
Italy
Romania
Greece
^ UNHCB OeSce / Prucnce ~! UN ProUcted Area* (UNPA») * Former 'yufoilav R^ublie of Macedonia
August 1993
65
19/10/^3 12:49 UNHCR -> 2822264199
NO. 350 P017
SECURITY INCIDENTS ( 3 September 1992 - 27 August 1993) ^"^ ^^
[492J Nuxnber of incidents involving UNHCR and other personnel
Notes; Not ill ioddcott b«vc been reponed to UNHCR thus the above map only shows « pmial ptcDire of (he security problem.
By 27 August. 56 soldien had bttn killed • 29 in war niated incidens - since the deploynMOt of UNPROFOR.
Since the tan of the war 34 journalists were killed (+2 missing)
66
19/10/93 12:50 UNHCR ^ 2022264199
NO. 350 P018
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FRONTUNES
ANNEX id
|
p |
-IMCOMOtiCOCTINS |
|
• |
-SUJLSVO/UEU |
|
<N> |
•tOSMANPSESDBtCY |
|
<D |
•aOSMANSSB |
|
O |
-lOMANOOM |
|
■■■ |
• noNniM |
|
-^SSS!!^gi^ |
|
|
<JH{> |
•ACSVERaNIUIC |
25 August 1993
67
19/10-^3 12:52 UNHCR ^ 2022264199
NO. 350 P019
. - -iWWEX 4
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
|
::s- PRESENT LOCATION |
FROM CROATIA |
FROM BOSNIA AND v. TOTAL |
S- |
|
|
:": ■:;":"-;-.'■■;-"-■-.'-"■' ■"■^ - |
■.:...• .\r- -■;--.:.-■ -■ |
HERZEGOVINA^ |
.y-.:..;-':;;'i^;; |
'-■^: |
|
CROATIA |
247.000 |
280.000* |
527.000 |
R |
|
UNPAs |
N/A |
N/A |
87.000 |
E |
|
SERBIA |
160.000 |
300.000 |
460.000 |
R |
|
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA |
N/A |
N/A |
2.280,000 ■ |
•E |
|
MONTENEGRO |
N/A |
N/A |
59.000 |
R |
|
SLOVENIA |
N/A |
N/A |
32.000 |
R |
|
Pm MACEDONIA |
3.000 |
29.000 |
32,000 |
R |
|
GRAND TOTALS |
N/A |
N/A |
3.477,000* |
M |
R - REGJSTERED E - ESTIMATED
N/A - NOT AVAILABL&APPUCABLE
includes also refugees from other republics of former Yugoslavia as well as an estimated number of unregistered refugees
estimated number of beneficiaries including refugees, displaced and other vulnerable groups
does not include some other 128,000 persons estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance
All figures arc rounded to the next thousand Source of inforroaiion:
Croatia - Office for displaced peraons and refugees (ODPR)
UNPAs - UNHCR Field OfTlces
Serbia - Serbian Rod Cross (through UNHCR Office in Belgrade)
Bosnia and Herzegovina - UNHCR Offices
Montenegro - Moatenegran Red Cross (through UNHCR Office in Belgnde)
Slovenia • Slovenian Red Cross (through UNHCR Office in Ljubljana)
FVR Macedonia - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Red Cross
(through UNHCR Office in Skopje)
«!
BOSNIA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Mr. Chainnan, Senators, distinguished guests:
I am extremely pleased to have been given the opportunity to testify today on the grave humanitarian and political situation in Bosnia.
In the aftermath of the Bosnians' rejection «>i the latest peace plan. Western policy-makers seem to be at a loss for what to do next Many observers had thought that the plan was the last, best hope to halt the war before the winter and believed that the Bosnians would agree to the plan in order to secure the deployment of NATO troops, something that has been a key element of the Bosnians' foreign policy. Observers were therefore surprised by the rejection of the plan, first by the Muslim (Bosnjnak) Assembly and later, in effect, by the Bosnian Assembly, when it added conditions that would make the plan unacceptable to the Serbs and Croats. The de facto rejection of the plan, and the subsequent revolt by the Bihac Muslims, has complicated not only the peace process but also the humanitarian assistance program, which is lagging behind in contributions of food, materials, and cash, especially in the energy and winterization sectors.
Why the Bosnians rejected the peace plan:
The Bosnians rejected the plan for many reasons; some were straightforward, some represented political expediency, and some can onfy be seen in the context of the people's view of themselves at this point in time.
As the Bosnians see the situation, time is on their side, if they can hold the republic together. They believe that the Bosnian Serbs are under tremendous pressure from Belgrade to reach a settlement so that sanctions can be lifted. They point out that Serbs continually insisted that a phased relaxation of sanctions starting from the moment that the plan was initialed. This has led the Bosnians to believe that the sanctions are truly hurting the Serbs and that the sanctions are their main "equalizer" in the war. They also know that the enforcement of sanctions was strengthened during the summer as a response to the Serbs' blockade of Sarajevo.
Second, the Bosnians believe that the Europeans will continue to pressure the Serbs into keeping the current level of military activity low to keep the United States from intervening militarily. Thus, while the Serbs will still have strategic advantage in many areas, basic humanitarian assistance will be able to get through to Sarajevo, most of the enclaves, Tuzla, and to a lesser extent, the central zone (Zenica). If the enclaves don't get food or fuel now, the people will blame the UN, since these are protected, demilitarized areas. If the Serbs tighten the blockade on Sarajevo again, it will play into the Bosnians' hands politically.
Third, at the time they rejected the plan, the Bosnians believed President Clinton had decided in favor of military action if the Serbs continued to attack Sarajevo and northern Bosnia. (Apparently, the Serbs also believed that bombing was a real threat, since top UNPROFOR officers warned them last August that U.S. action was imminent if they did not relax the siege of
Sarajevo. However, recent events in Somalia m^y have tempered this view, making it more difficult to assess how likely the Serbs believe military intervention is.)
The Bosnian military is opposed to ending the fighting now, since its forces have been making gains in Central Bosnia and in wester? Herzegovina. In the summer, they pushed the Croats out of the industrial regions of central Bjosnia (e.g., Fojnica), and they are now in position to consolidate their gains in several areas. They have a number of objectives they believe they can attain: opening a route to the coast, reopening; the route to Tuzla through VareS, and regaining control over Mostar. As they see it, the Croatian Army (HV) is in a poor position to support the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) because of the situation in the Krajina. Furthermore, the HVO's blockade of humanitarian assistance haf hurt the Croats in Central Bosnia more than the Muslims. Thus, the Muslim-dominated forces •f the Bosnian Presidency are likely to continue to oppose a peace settlement as long as they believe (1) the Serbs are effectively "checked" and (2) they can take more territory from the Croats.
One incident may have contributed to tjie Bosnians' belief that time is on their side: the rebellion of Serb forces in Banja Luka. Som« military commanders believe there are growing dissensions within the Bosnian Serb Army that could weaken the Serbs.
A key factor in the vote that effectively rejected the plan was related to the document itself. When the peace plan was finally presented to t^ie Bosnians, there was widespread skepticism that the form of government proposed would work. Jvlost Muslims accept that fact that the country will be partitioned, but once that is done, they wa»t nothing more to do with the Serbs - and, to a lesser extent, the Croats. Critics of the propose^! constitutional makeup of the government joined forces with the people who still support a mylti-ethnic state to condemn the agreement and effectively block its acceptance.
Many Bosnians think that both the Serb$ and the Croats are preparing for another round of war. The Bosnians believe that when the wap- breaks out, they will be courted by both sides in the conflict At that point, the Bosnians will te in a position to make a deal for some of the territory they have lost
There is yet another, intangible factor -- a major one ~ affecting the Bosnians behavior: they fervently believe that they are the victims, that their position is "right" Therefore, they assume that if they can just hold out a bit longer, that they will eventually win military support from the outside. It may not seem logical to an outsider, but the belief is very real.
What they want:
To get the Bosnians back to the conference table in a mood to negotiate, several things must happen. First, their territorial demands must be met, specifically:
• a corridor to the sea;
70
• contiguous borders with the eastern enclaves;
• defensible borders in the west;
• elimination of the HVO blockade at Vare^
• access to the Sava River.'
Second, their goals include stronger guarantees of NATO deployment, especially a larger and more rapid U.S. commitment to help prevent forced population transfers. (Pre-positioning of forces for rapid deployment is the key.)
The only other circumstance that would get the Bosnians back to the peace negotiations would be a change in the military situation on the ground ~ for the better or the worse. Pressuring Alija Izetbegovic is unlikely to achieve any major results.
A different view:
UNPROFOR does not share the Bosnians' analysis. UNPROFOR's assessment is far more pessimistic. From their close contacts with the Serbs, UNPROFOR personnel believe that the Bosnians' ploy will not work. According to senior officers, the Bosnians' move has strengthened the Serb radicals and the Mladic faction. Rather than wait, they will now move to punish the Bosnians, grab more territory, and complete ethnic cleansing in several areas. While it is unclear whether they will initiate an all-out assault on Sarajevo, they will certainly go after more territory in the north and complete the expulsion of Muslims from Banja Luka and other areas now under their control.' This reduces the likelihood that those areas will ever be reoccupied by their original inhabitants and will further hamper any efforts to forge a unified nation.
What is liluly to happen for the next few months:
In the near term, the situation is likely to remain fairly static. The Serbs will gradually tighten the blockade of Sarajevo, but are unlikely to resume prolonged, full-scale shelling, as they did last winter and in May-June. Sniping has resumed and will gradually become more intense. Additionally, the Serbs are not likely to honor many of the agreements they have made with UNPROFOR and UNHCR regarding coal and firewood, restoration of electricity, etcetera. They will undoubtedly try to consolidate some territory in the north, perhaps near Maglaj and the
' Tlie Sava is navigable to the Danube for barge traffic.
' UNHCR recently reported new incidents of violence against the estimated 40,000 Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka. Additional mosques in the area have been destroyed and Muslim religious and political leaders arrested. Two sixty-five-year-old women were raped and two middle-aged women were kidnapped and severely beaten. An elderly man was shot to death in front of his young granddaughter, another old man was tortured and an 80-year-old woman was stripped naked.
perimeter of Tuzla and will try to cut off the Muslims' access to Sarajevo from the south. In the last week, the Serbs have stopped all but foo4 and medicines from coming into Sarajevo -- all winter supplies, gas and water equipment, and even blankets have been stopped. At the same time, political divisions among the Bosnians are likely to grow, making it more difficult to supply aid or to reach a political accommodation with the Serbs or Croats. In short, the people of Bosnia and especially those in Sarajevo and the various enclaves are in for a tough winter.
In the meantime, the Bosnians will probably agree to return to the negotiations but only to prolong the existing situation. They are gambling that the Serbs will agree to give back more territory to get the sanctions lifted, so they will continue to maneuver, holding out for more land and a more workable form of government
A looming problem for the Bosnians is the growing factionalism among the Muslims. TTiere are disputes among regions - Bihac versus Sarajevo', Sarajevo versus Tuzla - and between the urban Muslims and the Sandjaks (rural Muslims). All threaten to further weaken the Bosnians' ability to hold out and could negate any advantages they may have in the present circumstances.
What the U.S. response should be:
At this point, the best approach for the United States would be to help the Bosnians make their strategy work. It would be unwise for the United States to push a new peace plan based on the old one. The old plan was not, as some have argued, the best deal the Muslims could get; signing on to a bad plan could limit U.S. options in the future. Rather, we should help the Bosnians by focusing on me.isures that will keep the level of conflict low and allow time to work for them. Another, better opportunity, where U.S. power and leverage can be applied, should arise sooner or later.
Specifically, the United States should do the following:
1. Continue to threaten the Serbs with air strikes if they resume shelling Sarajevo or attacking other enclaves. (Since the plan was effectively rejected, the level of shelling has increased; frequently more than a hundred shells per day hit the city.)
2. Support the Bosnians' negotiating position by further tightening sanctions enforcement
3. Pressure Croatia into curbing the HVO. This could be done by suspending economic assistance to Croatia if the HVO fails to end its attacks on the Bosnians. Croatia should also be pressured into giving Bosnian refugees better treatment
' When the peace accord was effectively rejected by the assembly in Sarajevo, Bihad declared itself an 'autonomous republic."
72
4. Increase our diplomatic efforts to limit the growing pobtical divisions among the Bosnians. This is the time they need unity.
5. Continue to support humanitarian assistance, especially supporting the UN on issues of access and freedom of movement and the supply of energy for winter heating.
6. Continue to press all parties on human rights. Special emphasis should be given to (a) publicizing the human rights abuses of the Serbs and Croats (pressuring them publicly should tend to encourage the Bosnian leadership to take stronger measures to curb similar abuses by their troops and allow the Bosnians to regain the moral high ground) and (b) giving more visible U.S. support to the war crimes tribunal.
Measures we can takt now:
The most important immediate step the United States can take is to ensure that the supply of natural gas to Sarajevo is restored. The Serbs have cut off the gas since May. Gas is now in the lines up to Sarajevo but has been stopped in Serb-held territory frc«n reaching both Sarajevo and Zenica. Under the terms of the sanctions, gas may be shared with Serbia only if the flow of gas to Bosnia is uninterrupted. Since gas is the principal source of fuel for Belgrade, both for heating and ioi running the city's industries, cutting it off would send a strong message to the Serbs -- as well as demonsUating that the West is still behind Bosnia despite the breakdown of the peace process.
Frederick C. Cuny October 13, 1993
73
HIGH PRIORITY Sites for Assistance
Submitted for the Record by Frederick C. Cuny, Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corp.
|
1. |
Sarajevo |
|
2. |
Vitez |
|
3. |
Zenica |
|
4. |
Tuzla |
|
5. |
Maglaj |
|
6. |
Gorni Vakuf |
|
7. |
Banja Luka |
|
8. |
Bihac |
|
9. |
Mostar |
|
10. |
Srebrenica |
|
11. |
Zepa |
|
12. |
Gorazde |
|
13. |
Doboj |
|
14. |
Cerska |
|
15. |
Prijedor |
|
16. |
Bijela |
74-257 0-94-4
74
October 20, 1993
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 237 Ford House Office BIdg., Washington, DC 20515
re: Hearing on the Fate of the People of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Dear Chairman DeConcini,
Veterans For Peace, Inc. (VFP) has been trying to evacuate war-wounded Bosnian children since April of this year. On May 25, 1993, we notified Ms. Norma Tinio, UNICEF Emergency Programs Officer, in New York, that we had obtained written commitments for pro bono hospital space, services and medical treatment in the United States sufficient to treat more than 50 wounded Bosnian children. Ms. Tinio acknowledged our offer on June 2, 1993, in writing.
We notified Manual Fontaine, UNICEF-Sarajevo, of this offer by fax on May 26. Kai Schubert of UNHCR-Sarajevo acknowledged our offer on May 28, 1 993, in writing.
On June 3, 1993, I received a fax from Ms. Norma Tinio urging me to contact Dr. Daniel Wiener, Chair of the International Rescue Committee's Medical Advisory Board in New York. I was on the phone with Dr. Wiener for about an hour and a half. During that time. Dr. Wiener tried to persuade me that VFP should stop requesting assistance from hospitals and physicians in the United States because: a) medical aid is getting through, b) all necessary surgery is being performed locally, and c) it isn't practical to evacuate the wounded to the United States. I told Dr. Wiener that what we were being told by physicians in Bosnian hospitals was in direct conflict with his assertions, and that we would continue our efforts.
On June 11, Congressman Tom Andrews (D-ME) notified Mr. Albert Peters, UNHCR-New York, that VFP had secured pro bono hospital space and service
UETERHNS FOR PEACE, INC., P.O. Box 3881, Portland, ME 04104
Ph (207) 773-1431 Fax (207) 773-0804
75
for over TOO wounded Bosnian children. Mr. Peters acknowledged Congressman Andrews' letter on June 1 5, in writing, suggesting that Rene Van Rooyen, UNHCR-New York, was the proper individual to notify. Congressman Andrews sent a similar letter to Rene Van Yooyen on June 28, 1993.
On June 18, I visited the UNHCR office in Split, Croatia, and requested a UNHCR pass authorizing me to enter Sarajevo to assess the need for additional hospital space in the United States, and to help facilitate the evacuation of wounded children from Bosnia. UNHCR Chief of Mission Anne Shephard-Dawson denied my request for a pass. Appeals to UNHCR-Zagreb and UNHCR-Geneva were also denied even though, days earlier, two historians were allowed to enter Sarajevo to assess the damage to historical buildings.
On August 8, 1993, the picture of 5-year-old Irma Hadzimuratovic appeared on the front page of newspapers, and on the screens of televisions, around the world. She had been wounded eleven days earlier and was dying, but her physician, a Dr. Jarganjac of Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo, was unable to get the UN Medical Evacuation Committee to approve her evacuation until he notified the media of her plight. She was then evacuated immediately to London. You will recall that Irma's case created a public outcry in the United States and UNHCR officials found it necessary to defend their past decisions and inaction. During the next three days, on CNN, ABC's Good Morning America, and other national news programs, Peter Kessler of UNHCR-Sarajevo, Sylvana Foa of UNHCR- Geneva, and Barbara Frances of UNHCR-Wash DC, all insisted that they would have evacuated Irma and many others much sooner, but no hospitals in the United States or western Europe had offered to accept them.
To date, we have, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, successfully evacuated four wounded Bosnian children (see attached). Two of them were evacuated by a British nurse, Sally Becker, overland from Mostar to Croatia. Ms. Becker had asked for UN assistance, but was denied. We believe one was evacuated by British UN forces, also overland to Croatia. And one was evacuated by Dutch UN forces, and was approved by the UN Med Evac Committee. We suspect the committee approved this case only because national ABC-TV news cameras were documenting the plight of this wounded 14-year-old boy who is now being
76
treated at Brighton Medical Center, Portland, Maine. Immediately
following his evacuation, UNHCR-Zagreb advised all UNHCR field personnel
in Bosnia, in writing, that "this little project is not a formal UNHCR Medevac program".
According to a June 24 communique from Professor Dusko Tomic of the First Children's Embassy in Sarajevo, there were 13,204 wounded children in Bosnia. Professor Smikavic of the University of Sarajevo reported that there are 2,846 severely wounded children in Sarajevo alone who should be evacuated.
According to the Red Cross of Nova Bila, Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Since June (1993), approximately 3,000 displaced people have taken refuge in Travnik, in the territory of Nova Bila. Of those 3,000, 850 are children, and there are also as many children who are native population of this area. Since June, there have been 137 wounded babies in the Franciscan makeshift hospital in Nova Bila. Our children have, therefore, been living without electricity and water during this period of four months. All medical assistance has been taken away, as there is only one doctor in the Franciscan hospital, and no specialist for children's illnesses. Because of the use of well water, cases of enterocolitis and hepatitis have appeared and a large number have gotten skin rashes. Due to the unhygienic conditions of life, we fear other epidemiological problems as well. . . we ask that the evacuation of these children to a safe area be immediately effected".
According to a Reuters news story dated October 6, 1993, "Since April, the United Nations has flown out 193 patients, 43 of them children, from Sarajevo."
Senator DeConcini, we still have more than 100 pro bono hospital beds waiting for wounded Bosnian children. Hospitals that have heard about our program through National Public Radio or the American Hospital Association publication are contacting us almost daily and we are confident that we could increase that number to 200 within ten days. We would be most grateful for any assistance you may be able to provide in persuading the United Nations and its agencies to provide the medical assistance that is necessary to save the lives and limbs of the wounded in Bosnia, or begin mass evacuations from Bosnia immediately.
77
i^, i
Armored UNPROFOR personnel carriers can safely transport the wounded to Sarajevo where they can be airlifted out to points in western Europe and the United States. I have spoken with U.S. military pilots who have assured me that 20 to 30 cargo planes deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo daily and that each of these planes can be rigged to evacuate 2 or 3 wounded. They also assert that this would require each plane to be on the ground in Sarajevo not more than an additionalal ten minutes.
Respectfully,
^ ^,
^euyl Gi^nesio '"^-iiin::>an/Executive Director
pc: VFP President COL James Burkholder, USA (Ret), Tucson, AZ VFP Exec Vice President Louis Sinclair, Waterville, ME VFP Vice Pres for UN Affairs Ben Weintraub, Staten Island, NY VFP Secretary Susan Rettig, R.N., Philadelphia, PA VFP Treasurer LtCOL Robert Taft, USA (Ret), Ft Ashby, WV VFP Directors
Charles Bonner, Lancaster, PA
CPL Stephen Fournier, USMC (Disab Ret), N. Yarmouth, ME
Edwin Hart, Esq., Huntsville, AL
Ted Heselton, W. Kennebunk, ME
Sanford Kelson, Esq., Pittsburgh, PA
Charles Nixon, Los Angeles, CA
Peggy Tuxen-Akers, R.N., Ann Arbor, Ml
VADM Ralph Weymouth, USN (Ret), Wonalancet, NH
end: (a) VFP Children of War Rescue Project (CWRP) Fact Sheet (b) VFP-CWRP September 25, 1993 Update
(c) About Veterans For Peace
(d) About the International Organization for Migration (lOM)
(e) lOM letter dated June 29, 1993
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VETERANS FOR PEACE CHILDREN OF WAR RESCUE PROIECT (CWRP)
In September of 1992. Veterans For Peace, Inc. (VFP) UN-NGO Representative Ben Weintraub informed VFP's National Board of Directors that UNICEF officials had requested assistance in delivering humanitarian aid to remote villages in the mountains of Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H). VFP quickly organized several teams of its members, including truck drivers and logistics experts, who volunteered to assist in that effort. However, due to the limited number of truck convoys that were allowed to enter B-H, UN Peacekeeping military commanders were able to provide a sufficient number of personnel for that portion of the mission that was eventually accomplished. In addition, VFP members nationally have been collecting medical and humanitarian aid for shipment to B-H in cooperation with the Brothers' Brother Foundation of Pittsburgh, PA.
In April of this year, the VFP National Board learned of the Medical Evacuation Program for Victims of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia being conducted by the International Organization for Migration (lOM), and similar efforts organized by other international agencies. VFP National Executive Director Jerry Genesio of Portland, ME, contacted lOM officials in Washington, DC, and offered to organize a national VFP project designed to assist in their efforts. Sanford Kelson of Pittsburgh, PA, who is an attorney and a member of the VFP National Board, volunteered to go to Croatia and B-H and, from April 20-28, 1993, Kelson met with officials of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the French contingent of UN Peacekeeping forces, and U.S. Embassy personnel in the region to coordinate the lOM/VFP effort. During this period, Genesio began coordinating the efforts of VFP's 77 chapters around the country to identify medical institutions and physicians interested in participating in the project and, from June 16- 20, Genesio also visited the region and met with U.N. officials in an attempt to expedite the evacuation of wounded Bosnian children.
All evacuees are first transported to Andrews AFB in Maryland. They are then flown by commercial carrier or, if necessary, by a US Air Force medevac plane, to cities where pro bono hospital space, services and medical treatment have been offered.
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Each of the children evacuated will be accompanied by a parent or guardian. In addition to locating hospital space and services, VFP chapters and members are organizing local community efforts to provide appropriate accomodations, hospitality and local transportation, hidividuals fluent in the Serbo-Croatian language are also being sought to serve as interpreters for local healthcare professionals and hosts. Volunteers who wish to participate in or provide funding for local efforts are urged to contact VFP Executive Director Jerry Genesio, or VFP Maine State Chairman Jack Bussell, at the VFP NaUonal Office, P.O. Box 3881, Pordand, ME 04104, Ph: (207) 773-1431.
During the last week of May, 1993, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and UNICEF were informed that more than 50 beds were available and, as of June 1, 1993, commitments to provide pro bono hospital space, services and medical treatment for 100 wounded children had been received from medical centers around the country. We anticipate that negotiations currently in progess with still other institutions will be successful and expect that the total number of wounded children VFP vsill be able to accomodate at any given point in time should approach 200. Pediatric specialty services offered include Plastic Reconstructive Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, Eye Surgery, Neurosurgery, Urological Surgery, Gastro- enterological treatment and treatment for severe malnutrition. It is anticipated that children selected for treatment will remain in the United States for an average of 12 weeks and, following medical release, they will be returned to refugee camps in Europe or to their homes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina if hostilities have ceased.
On September 8, 1993, three wounded children evacuated from the Bosnian city of Mostar to Croatia by a British nurse arrived at Andrews AFB. Two are being treated in Maine and one in Maryland. Six days later a fourth child, evacuated from Zenica arrived in the US and is also being treated in the state of Maine. We have been anticipating the evacuation of several wounded children from Belgrade since September 15 but, to date, we have received no assistance from the United Nations Medical Evacuation Committee in Sarajevo though reliable sources have reported that there are hundreds, perhaps even thousands of wounded Bosnian children who would benefit by evacuation, and many who might not otherwise survive.
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VETERANS FOR PEACE CHILDREN OF WAR RESCUE PROJECT
September 25, 1993
Nermina Omeragic, 13, was preparing medical supplies for distribution to the wounded in Mosiar on August 14, 1993 when she was hit by mortar shell fragments. Her lower right leg was shattered and several inches of the tibia were destroyed. She was evacuated b>' a British nurse, Sall>' Becker, and was flown to Andrews AFB near Washington, DC by the US Air Force on September 8. Nermina was to be medevaced to Maine on September 12 but, following her arrival, a USAF flight surgeon determined that her wounds were badl\' infected and saving her leg became a race with time. An emcrgenc>- flight was arranged and Nermina arrived in Maine on September 9 for immediate surger> at Maine Medical Center, Portland. A week later, muscle and blood \ essels from her abdomen were transplanted to her lower, right leg. In about 8 weeks she will undergo a bone graft. Prognosis is very good. Nermina is accompanied by her brother, Nermin, 15.
Maja Kazazic, 16, of Mostar was hit b\- mortar shell fragments that severely wounded both of her legs and her left wrist. She under\\'ent immediate surger\' in a makeshift field hospital where her lower left leg was amputated without anesthesia. She was also evacuated b\ Sallv Becker and flown to Andrews AFB by the USAF arriving on September 8. Her wounds were also badiv infected. VFP members met the plane and took her to Memorial Medical Center, Cumberland, Maryland b>- ambulance for immediate surgery. Prognosis is vcr\ good. She is accompanied by her aunt, Mijda Pauno\ ic.
ArncI Martinovic, 17, of Mostar was hit b>- artillery shell fragments causing major head wounds. We understand that he was evacuated b>- British forces without UN assistance. He was Hown to Maine on September 12 by the USAF for possible neurosurgery at Central Maine Medical Center, Lewiston. Prognosis is guarded but optimistic. Arnel's father and 22-\ear-old brother were captured b>' Bosnian-Croat forces about six months ago. No word has been received from them since. They do not know that Arnel has been injured and is now in the United States with his mother, Zinetta.
I'din Mehinovic, 14, of Zenica was hit bv mortar shell fragments on May 26, 1993. He suffered major damage to his left kidnev , spinal cord and chest including laceration of the inferior vena cava. The vein was patched and his left kidney was surgicallv removed at Zenica. lOM and VI P have been trving to evacuate him since carlv June. On August 13, UNHCR-Zagreb reluctantl> acquiesced to the evacuation but issued a statement emphasizing "that this little project is not a formal UNHCR Medevac program." Six other children also scheduled for evacuation from Zenica had, in the meantime, died. British troops finallv evacuated lidin to Sarajevo on September 14 and he was medevaced to Italv the same dav. On his arrival at Andrews AFB on
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September 15 it was determined that he had received no pain killers for the past 6-8 weeks and was in a state of extreme mental anguish. He was transported by emergency medevac airlift to Brighton Medical Center, Portland, Maine on September 16. Prognosis is guarded but optimistic, lie is accompanied by his mother, Hazemina, and brother, Esmir, 1 1.
Danijela Djokic, 14; Boban Stankovic, 13; and Svetlana Miljkovic, 12, all Serbian children suffering from gunshot wounds to the spinal column, are scheduled for evacuation from Belgrade to the US under the VFP Children of War Rescue Project within 2-3 weeks. Danijela and Svetlana have been accepted for treatment at Portsmouth Regional Hospital, Portsmouth, Nil; Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, Chicago, IL; and St. Marj's Regional Medical Center, Lewiston, ME, respectively.
82
i^.
AROirr VETERANS FOR PEACE. INC. (VFP)
VFP is an organization of military veterans engaged in educational and humanitarian activities. It was founded and incorporated in the state of Maine on 8 July 1985, and was approved as a non-profit, tax-exempt organization under IRS Code 501(c)93) on 31 December 1986. VFP was granted official United Nations' Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) status on 20 November 1990. To date we have enrolled nearly 4,000 members in 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and we have established 77 chapters nationally. In addition, we maintain a close working relationship with similar groups of military veterans in Canada, El Salvador, Great Britain, France, Israel. Japan, Hungary, Russia and Ghana.
Major VFP sponsored and organized projects include: a) A 17 member Fact- Finding Delegation to Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1987; b) The Nicaragua Environmental Science Project which tested drinking water sources in rural villages to identify and correct or replace contaminated supphes in the interest of reducing the infant mortality rate; c) The Central America War Relief Project delivering medical and humanitarian aid to war torn communities in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador; d) A 50 member official Election Monitoring Team sent to monitor the 25 February 1990 Nicaraguan Presidential election; e) the Children of War Rescue Project (operated in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration of Washington, DC) identifying hospitals and physicians throughout the United States that will provide pro bono space and services for child war victims of tlie conflicts in the former Yugoslav republics; and f) educational activities and publications related to our prior military and ongoing humanitarian experiences. Other projects endorsed and supported by VFP include: a) Aktion Friedensdorf ( Peace Village) at Oberhausen, Germany; b) The Alhance for Our Common Future; c) the Washington, DC VFP chapter's Stand For Peace Project; and d) the Albany, NY VFP chapter's SE Asia Medical Aid Project.
Full VFP membership is open to U.S. mihtary veterans of all eras, military veterans of foreign nations who reside permanently in the U.S., and non- veterans who have served with the U.S. military in a professional capacity during a time and in an area of conflict. Immediate relatives of veterans are eligible for Associate membership.
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83
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
(lOM)
The lOM is an independent, non-profit, humanitarian organization founded in Brussels, Belgium in 1951. It later established its international headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Its purpose is to assist in and coordinate the relocation of refugees to areas where essential life support systems exist. The lOM has 50 offices around the world, including one in Washington, DC, and is supported by 46 member nations. Its work is coordinated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international and national agencies.
The lOM has modeled its Medical Evacuation Program for Victims of Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia after its efforts, carried out over the last several years, in the rescue of victims of the Afghan war with the former Soviet Union, and the Kurdish people immediately following the recent Persian Gulf War. The lOM has already placed many victims of the conflicts in the former Yugoslav republics in Finland, Hungary, Norway and Svdtzerland where hospitals and healthcare professionals are providing critically needed care that is not available locally due to the ongoing war in that region. Germany and Italy are also preparing to receive patients under this program.
lOM funding for certain transportation and administrative costs is provided by a grant from the U.S. State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs. Additional transportation capacity is contributed by the U.S. Air Force Medical Airlift System through the Office of Global Affairs at the Pentagon. However, the largest source of support for the program in the United States comes from private hospitals and physicians around the country. All hospital space and medical treatment is offered on a pro bono (free-of-charge) basis.
For additional informalion concerning the lOM program, contact Nidia Foley, Alex Lupis or Clarissa Azkoul at iOM, 1750 K Street. NW, Suite 11 10, Washington, DC 20006, Ph: (202) 862-1826.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LES MIGRATIONS
j: OJM: ORGANIZACION INTERNACIONAL PARA LAS MIGRACIONES
•Wephone: (2021 8621826 '''SO K Street. N.W.
Cable AddrcMPromigiant Washington ^"^^nii""
TVIm: 2mB!> WajluDgton. D.C. 20006 Fax: 12021862-1879
June 29, 1993
Jerry Genesb CEO/Executive Director VETERANS FOR PEACE P.O.Box 38B1 Portland, ME 04104 FAX: (207) 773-0804
Dear Mr. Geneslo:
I wanted to tal<e the time and write to you personally, on behalf of the International Organization for Migration (lOM), to thank you for the enormous efforts you have made in lining up hospital space for the wounded children of the former Yugoslavia. Your time atx) energy in this respect are crucial to the success of our Special Medical Program.
As we have discussed, the conditions in Sarajevo present a great many logistical and security challenges. Trying to carry out any program In a war zone situation is dangerous, but It becomes even more tenuous when trying to move people, injured people, out of harm's way to temporary medical care In another country. Due to these concerns, an evacuation from Sarajevo seems to be taking longer to organize than expected. We are experiencing the same situation in our attempted screening of nearly 200 Identified medical cases in Tuzia, originally planned for June 1 3. but postponed to a later date, since the heavy fighting In Ifie area precluded the lOM team from travelling to that city.
Although I know It has been difficult keeping the Interest and commitment of hospitals In place through these many weeks of uncertainty about the projected evacuation of victims of war directly from Bosnia, 1 hope we can ask you and your hospitals to remain on board while lOM continues to pursue possibilities of evacuating some these victims out of the conflict areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the end, the only way we can move them Is If we can count on people like you to confirm that free hospital care and community support is ready and waiting.
Again, let me express our sincere appreciation for all your hard work to date, especially given the extremely difficult circumstances surrounding this program. 1 only hope you will be able to keep this wonderful effort going for a while, and that lOM will continue to be able to count on you and the members of your organization to help In this worthwhile humanitarian program. Thank you again
MLyi^^-^
WA5HINOTON MISSION
85
International Emergency Medical Response Agency I E M R A
lEMRA is a non-profit, international humanitarian aid organization that is providing urgently needed medical support to the former Yugoslavia. In order to contmue and expand its mission of aid lEMRA is seeking the support of individuals, organizations and governments.
CONCEPTION
The International Emergeno. Medical Response Agencv (lEMRA) was conceived in direct response to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with the sole purpose of providing effective and efficient support to the regional medical infi^structures serving populations devastated by the conflict.
lEMRA was formed to address an unfidfilled niche in the overall aid effort, namely the supply of specific, urgently needed medicines and medical equipment to the exact points of need. In this way the aid supphed has the ma.\imum effect on life and health.
STRATEGY
In Europe and the United States, lEMRA has generated funds from the pubhc. private and business sectors Support is also available firom government fundmg bodies and other philanthropic organizations.
Through a compact, non-bureaucratic structure these funds are used in the most efficient and effective way possible to provide medical relief to the former Yugoslavia. lEMRA takes a 'marketing' approach to the business of international aid - finding out exactly what is needed, obtaining it and delivering it exactly where it is needed This targeted approach allows lEMRA to keq) the percentage of funds spent directly on aid relative!} high, (a minimum of 70% of donated fiinds is spent on medical aid) and allows the costs of delivering aid to be kept to a minimum.
Discussions with the seven national associations of the US pharmaceutical mdustry have resulted in an agreement wherebv short dated pharmaceuticals will be donated to lEMRA for humanitarian use. However, this agreement will not be brought to action until the State Department approves the transport of lEMRA's US onginated aid to Europe by the Department of Defense, Humamtarian Affeirs section.
lEMRA has received encouragement for its activities in the former Yugoslavia from State Department humanitarian funding offices This is in response to operations already carried out. and lEMRA's increasing abilitv to provide specific aid to specific points in the Yugoslavia There is also interest in the potential for lEMRA to deliver aid to areas and towns m parts of former Yugoslavia that have been cut off fi"om aid for long penods This at a fraction of the current cost of the international air drops being conducted m these areas.
METHOD
Medical shortages are assessed m the hospitals, chnics and refugee centres This information is relayed to Munich, Germany where information from other aid organizations is also taken into account in order to prevent delivery of redundant aid, and hsts of priority medicines and medical equipment are drawn up To date lEMRA has been supplving medical aid to the Sarajevo hospitals, but with expanding resources will target over 60 hospitals and clinics in Bosnia alone, as well as many others throughout the former Yugoslavia.
86
These medical supplies are obtained either from doctors and organizations collecting medicmes for the former Yugoslavia, or are purchased at discount from pharmaceutical and medical suppK compames. For example. lEMRA's relationship with Ba\cr AG (Germany) allows pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies to be bought at cost. In addition, Bayer provides a 30% of volume donation on top of the order In one operation lEMRA fle^ in a consignment of post-operative antibiotics that had not been available in Sarajevo in over a year.
STRUCTURE
Once established as a Foundation lEMRA will be headquartered in Cologne, Germany, convenient to pharmaceutical corporations, government and mihtary air bases. This will be the centre of management, finance and buying; co- ordinating and controllmg all of lEMRA's activities.
The centre of operations will be in Zagreb, Croatia, wiiere all activities from need identification to aid distribution operations will be coordinated At full plaimed size in the former Yugoslavia there will also be three mobile field offices providing extended control and support for operational activities. These will be staffed and operated by international medical and logistics personnel.
The United States program (lEMRA USA) will be a financial and physical aid generation branch of lEMRA, registered under its own auspices and involved in its own autonomous aid generation programs The potential impact on aid provision to the former Yugoslavia of lEMRA's current discussions and agreements in the Umted States IS huge, and represents a new channel of humanitanan aid if tapped.
about peace and hopefuU> long term resolution of the tensions in the region
No matter how quickly peace comes, the medical infrastructures m Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia have been almost destroxed and are entirely dependent on outside support
Despite the uncertam political and social fxiture of the region, there should be no question as lo what the international communities' obligation is Those suffering in this conflict have a strong moral claim to international generosity .
The potential that lEMRA has created for providing medical aid to these people in the manner planned can make a substantial difference to the lives of the victims of this crisis. To link the different elements, and realize the potential of this project, requires positive steps in Washington DC from a few key people, and the support of those who want more done in the former Yugoslavia.
-lEMRA-
Capitol Hill
Zibe Ayeen Tel. 1 / 202 / 544 0904 Fax. 1 / 202 / 547 1285
Germany
Meichelbeckstr. 4A, 81545 Miinchen. Tel. 49 / 89 / 642 32 52 Fax. 49 / 89 / 642 32 92
The current situation in the Balkans is characterised by extreme imcertamty. The international community, led by the United States, Britain, France and Russia is trying to estabhsh a frame work for bringing
87
War Tom: the bewildered gaze of a Bosnian child, safe now In a refugee camp, reflects the horrors of war.
hihonich.hinisoiin I. runnini: acrnw an inier>eciion larccicd h> Sjrj|c\o •* omni- prcscni Serbijn snipcrv. Ashton vvav ^hoi through ihe ici: 'Thc\ cci a rcuard lor killmj: journaliNiN.*" he \a>^ "Foui IncnJv ot mine w.en[ in Irontol mc.and I eould \ee the vniperv on the hndse. talking and noi dome anxihini: Then I siancd across wiih nd ihere wa^. a quick move- mem on the bridjie ot a man lakmi: aim " One ol the whizzmg bullets ucni ihrouyh hiv leg: as he raised hmisclt on his arms, another bullet passed within inches of his stomach On the same da> . CNN journalist Margaret Moth was shot in the face near the airport "It \oure there." Ashion says, "its onK a matter of lime "
Ashion wiis luck\. the surgeon in Sarajevo had specialized in ski-tcam inju- ries, and repaired the tendons m his ugl\ wound one b\ one Doctors had said he'd ne\er walk again: but. after a month of recuperation in Munich's Bogenhausen hos- pilal. Ashton was back ai work m Saraievo However, the expenenceopened his eyes to
88
j^fS^fi^*
ihc (Jansicr. Allcr ^ c\o-.c iiiIIcjl'uc uj- ki lied I'll Chrisima-. Dj> inincinhL-lplohii ;ji.Moul(i| ;cd;mL'l.•r^lU^•.llUJIl^'n.lhL•plca^(ll Ihc doc'lcirv al Ihc Saraitnii hospital ihai lie cniildhclpmiirch'. iiiublli/ini:Mippon lumi ahriiad ihan h% hcin;: murdered mi ihc immii line hcgan m sound t(>n\ incine
Whal «as needed «as an orL]jni/ali(in which could adniiiiisier aid lelicl on ihc
"Death and violence are nothing more than television novelties to most people; but scratch their BIVTWs, wa\k up the steps too noisily after 10:00 p.m.. and you've committed a horrendous crime."
— John Ashton. Sarajevo journal
inumaie scale Ashion «as alread> provid- ing: bringing desperaielv -needed supplies andequipmeni direciK lo Ihe hospitals which had requested them The prnhlem v. ith most CMsting organizations, says Ashton. is thai the\ operate on too large a scale. pro\ iding hospitals with huge quantities ol a single Item, but not nccessanU the item that hos- pital needs "The main problem is the sheer scale ol the disaster." he esplains Praising the el Ions ol the L'NHCR.lhc Inicrnationai Red Cross I IRC J. Medecins Sans Frontieres ( MSFi. and the \^ orld Health Organization ( WHOl. he adds that the traged\ is sn large that "the> simply cant cope "
Thus, on January 2. 1^9."^. in Munich. Ihe International Emergency Medical Re- sponse Agency (lE.MR.Al was born To-
gether« lib Neu Zealander Tony Cijrdnei. whom he h-idiiK-iduiuvj hisrcc."- ciA inNUinichi.isi -Xugu^i Ashton. ..-louiidcdlhc. 'I
.11
Cur
he had be
tipcialulg out ol a Munich aparimeni. lEMRA hJ^ already IIoh n in small loads ol medical supplies including aniibiolics %Khich ha\e been una\ail- able lor a year in some hospitals Firms such a- Bayer Le\crkuscn soon agreed lo contribute, and the Marburger Bund, j German medical associa- tion noted lor iis suppon ol aid organizations, is fully behind the ellori
■■\Nere filling a spe- ciHc niche." say s Tony Gardner, w ho brings a background in business and market con- sulting to his post as business manager ol lEMRA "Our small size and unbureaucratic nature mean we can be much more Ilesihlc and supply hospitals directl\ with the mosi urgently -needed medicines at the time they need them Our Zagreb office will recenc requests directly Irom the hospitals and pass the inlormalion on to us " .Ashton adds thai there's no question of competition between the aid organizations "The others are happy to ha\e all the help they can get And we're happy to lake their supplies to hospitals, too. if we can help All that matters is sietlins; the stuff where it's needed, recard-
^hodo
I hat.'
Shellshock: most drivers are afraid to use this empty street, which often comes un- der heavy fire. Surrounded by wreckage, a boy on a bicycle takes the risk.
Survivors: one of the concerns of the aid organization I.E.M.R.A is the fate of the civilian population in war-torn Bosnia after the actual conflict Is over.
Of late, activuy at lEMRA has gained momentum, preparatory to the opening of Us new headquarters in Cologne this Au- gust, Together with the Munich-based en- terprise Famosa Consulting, a start-up and development adviser group for charities. Ashton and Gardner have drawn up a bust-
"One woman in Sarajevo said, 'I re- member v^atching T.V. coverage of Lebanon 12 years ago, knov^ing nothing like that could ever happen here, to us."'
— John Ashton. Sarajevo
ness plan show ing how the foundation will be set up and expanded in coming years. Among other things, the plan calls for a L'.S, office lo organize fund-raising; in the meantime, lEMRA is being financed through donations and the personal savings of its two co-founders Determined lo keep their administrative costs at a minimum, Ashton and Gardner are exploring every possible source of financing in an eflort to raise the
Ccrinnued on pane 32
89
Siinitiii Sdiajevo
Cimiiiiiwil linm imvi 2.<
m<>nc> lhc> iiccdl«hcci>mi.'i>riii.ull> n.\.i>^- iii/cd ;i^ J loundalion i.S/i/;(»(l'| ."kI pur- ihjsc Ihc\ chicle- i,.vi.irirL-,;;ul.ujL-li\ cries II, Mil Spill .ind Z.rjicb Thc> hope ip h.l^c Ihc liiNl inick- cm ihc rn.id b> ihc end .•! AueiiM
Wllh the iiilra-micluic iIicnvc dr.nvn up. Avhion .ind Gjidnei hope lu ciealc an oi i!ani/aluMi capable ol pnn idini! help on a « orld-« ide ha-is. w hcrev ci ii- needed, ex en
At a Serbian checkpoint: "It is extremely hard to face these men and smile at their jokes, be- cause you kno« the} have murdered un- armed people in cold blood."
— John Ashlon, Sarajevo journal
after the terrible Balkan war!'- finalK over And "even if the warends tomorrow." sav> Ashton. "It will require a further three lo five years to deal ».ith the mountain of physical and psychological problems that will be left behind."
Performing an anenal bypass on a six- vear-old bos without anaesthetic, just to keep him alive long enough to get him into the operating room for his other wounds; w atchmg doctors amputate the leg of a young woman, one month pregnant, who rushed out of shelter to try to help the victim of a shelling, only to be hit herself by the neM round; seeing people bleed to death in the emergency room from relatively minor inju- ries, because there aren't enough doctors to attend to them all; comforting a w oman who pleads w ith the doctors to save her life as her intestines spill out on the hospital bed: John Ashton has seen enough of the horrors of war in the former Yugoslavia. And he's working lo try to alleviate them, to prevent the deaths that can be avoided and convince Sarajevo's citizens that not everyone in the world has turned their backs.
For further information about lEMRA. and details of how you can help, contact lEMRA. c/o Marburger Bund. Riehler Sirajie 6. 50668 Koln (tel. 0221/73 31 73l- Donalmns can be sent by check (payable to lEMRA I or transferred lo the foundation 's account at the Deutsche Apotheker- und Arvebank Koln e.G.. BLZ 370 606 15. account number 000 368 1629.
90
SpotUght
HERAUSGEBER Spoti-gm-veiagGmbM
CHEFflEOAKTEUR: Burnrarfl Reflei
HEDAKTKDN Margarei Davis Q< *ar McMasie' TEXT SPRACME D: K,an Brenmef (Sieirventetef oes Cf^eireaaKieursi Ei^saDcm Erpf Peier Green PROOUKTION Safan Googn (Bfioreoakijor) Maia Sitoia- Carton IngnO SlLrm-Whysall (Cnelm vom Deng.
AUTOHEN Cotif' Beaven (GfOitomanneni KatnanneCfactineiilGroflbnBnnieni Bnan Demrng fljSAi Pete' Fiynn (Ausralieni Sleene Harvey (inanfl) lar Johnson Gareth Wyn Jones CiautUincf ljep*e-N3tiamura DavO Marsi M)Cfi3e; Maun Uz Ncnoison Bnan RoCwnson (USA'AanaOa). Jofin Smilhoacx
GESTALTUNC: Gisela Weinberger
Posai^cflnfi f5osaacM629 82158 G^aterSng
Hausanscnntr Freihamer Stt 4D, 82166 GrateHng
Te«ion (089) 8 54 82-0 Tertian (0 891 B M 82-23
Er stammt aus Virginia. Er war Matrose,
Koch und Schickeria-Fotograf. Bis er vor
einem Jahr aus der New Yorker Szene in
das Grauen auf dem Balkan geriet und
statt geiifteter Stars verstiimmelte
Leichen ablichtete. John Ashton
resignierte nicht, sondern wurde aktiv.
Te«l(yi (0691 8 S4 SMfr-UMBz-lQ
VERTfllEB Montka Nisller, Tel (0891 8 54 82- 12 VERTRIEB HANDEL MZV BreslajerSlr 5 65386 Ecriing. Bemd Zoeni, Tel 1089131900627
LTTWO: Repfostudio Krammer, 80799 HuncJien
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SPOTl.UiHT: John, what exactly is the International Emergency Medical Re- sponse Agencs ■ lEMRA'' ASHTON: Its an organization that re; sponds to the immediate needs of hospitals in areas ot war or extreme poverty. We supplv specialized medicines for victims or other patients
SI'Oll.KiHT: What is the background to the organization * How and wh\ did you sei II up'
ASHTON: 1 worked in former Yugoslavia in Saraievo and in central Bosnia, and 1 made contact «iih the hospitals in Croatian and Serbian temtors ,And 1 ftmnd out that these hospitals were just not re- ceiving esen hall ol what thc> aciuallx needed trom the other organizations
SI'OI I.K.iri: How did sou come to be in lormer Jugoslav la in the first place ' ASHTON: 1 went dow n there as a photo- lournalisl, and 1 onl> planned logo lor two dass Bui then 1 walked into a hospital and saw the siiuatum 1 have a paramedical background, so when ! sav\ sureenes being done without anaesthesju and without ovygcn jl was shockedl I realized that these are simple things iti gel to tormer 'lugoslaMj So 1 went lo the UN and i helped them come up w ith a plan to get the owgen bottles out, and this is what started m\ interesi in the hospital system there Sometimes we had o\er 100 \ictims in a one-hour period, and we could not cope with the situation We d run out of simple things V^e would boil the gauze and re-use It on another patient And we'd do the same with needles and plastic gloves Esery- thing we d boil and re-use if we could do 11 1 was coming to Germany every three weeks tor masbe a week's rest, and ! met people here in the German community who were willing to help, sending small
amounts of medicine, giving small amounts of monev for me to buy medicine That worked quite well. But it was only supplying enough for a couple of days each time I went back in. And the situation became so dangerous, because 1 was still try ing to make a lis ing as a photographer Come Christmas time, when my friends were staning to get wounded and killed around me. 1 decided lo get out and do something from the outside, bringing medical supplies in to hospitals in former Yugoslavia
SI'OTI.K.HT: A large number of organ- izations are already working in the Balkan war area, as you mentioned, including the United Nations, the International Red Cross and the World Health Organization. Is another organization really necessary .* ASHTON: Absolutely. The problem is. many of these organizations are spread out around the world W hat we have decided to do IS to Stan w ith former Yugoslavia and work with one problem at a time .And we approached these organizations and talked to them about the problems they w ere hav - ing. and how we could fill a cenain niche in their programme And they were very happy to have someone else come in with trucks, with medicines, because they can- not handle it all themselves.
SI'()T1.U;HT: And how can you be sure that the medicines you send to former Yugoslavia reach the hospitals that they're meant for''
ASHTON: We put everything into the sys- tem immediately It goes straight to our warehouses in Zagreb and Split, and straight on a truck as the hospital calls for it Within two to three days the hospital can have their supplies — as opposed to the other organizations that otten lake three lo four weeks What we're planning to do is
91
'NCOUNTEI
ha\e each [ruck manifested and ha\e the chief of each hospiial sign for his manrfesi. and also to Inotits I the donors who eue large donations that he has received their goods.
SPOTLIGHT: A lot of readers will have read in recent weeks about the collapse or the near collapseof the United Nationsajd effons. You're con\ meed that lEMRA can succeed despite these difficulties^ ASHTON: Absolutely Ive worked with the local commanders. I've travelled through their front lines many a time, and I've established a good relationship with them, so that we can travel without the L'N But at the same time we have to give their hospitals medication, and ii has to be a very diplomatic operation They're all very upset with the United Nations, be- cause they expected the UN to come in and stop the war. which was not the United Na- tions mandate. So they harass the convoys and make it very difficult for the UN to get through, whereas private donors get their supplies through The Red Cross doesn't even use UN escon.s. They talk to local commanders and deal with local doctors
,SP0T1,K;HT; 'louve worked as a photographer in a number of war areas, in- cluding Lebanon and Afghanistan. How does the situation m former Yugoslavia compare"^
ASHTON: This war is the most inhu- mane, immoral war I've ever seen in m\ life Here everything is being completely burned, everyone is being slaughtered be- cause of their ethnic background Every woman who is captured basically is raped
in some sectors ol ihi>. war 4 8 million people have had to leave their homes, more than .■(86.(XK1 — almost JlXJ.iHW — people have died in one vcar in Bosnia alone It's appalline whai - happening' there And the intemati(»na! communnv lust doesn't seem to be standing up to its promises to try to halt this ctmflici
SI'OII.K.HI: How long do you antici- pate that lEMRA will be working in for- mer "lUL'oslavij '
ASHTON: II the war stopped tomorrow. 1 imagine we would probably have to work there another five vears just to get the in- frastructure back up to a substandard level, where il can lunction without support V^e re taking tour per cent ol our donations and pulling them aside in a special ac-
John Ashton, executive director of the International Emergency Medical Response Agency (lEMRA), talks to Ian McMaster.
count, .^fter the war is over we will donate this money to the reconstruction or re- equippins of hospitals These hospitals in ormer 't'ugoslavia were very much like he modem hospitals in America or Ger- many. All the hospitals had Siemens X-rav equipment and IBM technology But hey're deliberately tar°eted as military argets. and this has destroyed a lot of the equipment there They're using car head- ipi. with car battenes. over the operat- table. Thai's the only light available for surgery Its very easy to make a mistake under these conditions
SP0TLK;HT: John, thank you very much for talking to SPOTLIGHT, and good luck with your project. ASHTON: Thank vou very much.
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agency I eid33nsi ] — Agcniur |
(i,„u>r — SpcrkJcnim |
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lo respond — reagicren |
Qtd — Hilk- |
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pmem — Armul |
dnpiit — inn/ |
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i,c„m — Opfer |
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bmkf;rounJ — Hinierprund |
((' luiriiw ! hxr.ivl — siorrn. hicr angreifen |
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surscr\ — Chirurgie. hier Opcraiion |
in yUmvhur \ sI.ti.tI — ahsihbchien |
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Qiuievhesia \ .a:n:><^\:i\^] — Njrkose |
nicdennci/cln |
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U'lupiun — gelangcnnchmen |
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Id tope yiiih — lenig uerden mii |
!•■ rupi — vergcwjltipen |
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fiuuze — Gaz£ |
apptitlirii.- — crs^hreirkcnd eniseulich |
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communir* — Gemem.sch3tl Gemeinde |
1.- imrHiptiit — cHAdnen |
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wf'unt/fJ— ver*undei |
!•• ei/uir — jussuiien ausrusten. einnchten |
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t\arehouie — (N^arcniLager |
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a\ oppined in — im Gepensjiz zu |
dilihenii,i\ — vnrsji/lich hcwutli |
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,,, rorvn — /ur ZtcKchcihe machcn |
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fuhrcn regiMncrcn |
hrtidlamp — i AuH'iSchemuerter |
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ixnnup. — intormicrcn, hcsmigen |
For further Information contact lEMRA, c/o Marburger Bund, Riehler StaBe 6. 50668 Koln (tel: 0221- 733 173). Donations to lEMRA can be sent by cheque or transferred to their account at the Deutsche Apotheker- und Arztebank Koln e.G., BLZ 37060615, account number OOO 368 1629.
You can hear the original version of this interview on this month's SPOTLIGHT cassette.
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92
International Emergency Medical Response Agency
-lEMRA-
Business Plan
(Summary)
(Rievised 3 09.93 - English)
93 Contents
Charter p. 3
Mission Statement P. 4
Background P. 5
Strategic Plan p. 5
Structure P. 8
Growth p 8
Personnel p. 8
Finance p 9
Legal p. 10
Programs p. 10
Operations; Former Yugoslavia p. 1 1
Performance Evaluation p. 12
Organizational Culture and Values P 12
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CHARTER
The International Emergency Medical Response Agency offers immediate medical assistance to populations in distress and institutions serving those populations.
The International Emergency Medical Response Agency is an independent, highly responsive, non-bureaucratic, non- profit humanitarian aid organization with the charter of providing specific, urgently needed medical aid to site specific locations.
The International Emergency Medical Response Agency follows a policy of strict neutrality and impartiality. We support the universal right to humanitarian aid and demand unhindered fi"eedom of action in pursuit of the fiilfiUment of this charter.
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MISSION STATEMENT
lEMRA's first and current mission is to respond to urgent requests for specific medical aid from hospitals, clinics, refugee centers and other medical aid organizations in the former Yugoslavia.
Distribution of aid is executed by lEMRA directly to those points of need according to prenegotiated agreements with all sides in the conflict. lEMRA recognizes the right of the victims of this conflict to humanitarian aid, to request assistance, and demand freedom of activity in pursuit of this mission.
IEMRA's increasing ability to quickly and consistently deliver specific medical supplies fulfills a role unable to be met by other aid organizations operating in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, lEMRA will take an active role in the rebuilding of the region's the medical infrastructure in the post-conflict period.
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Background
Working in the front line hospital system in the former Yugoslavia for almost nine months, I witnessed the degeneration of the most advanced medical system in Eastern Europe Many of the hospitals were comparable to those in western countries, but have been reduced to a level of care that would not be accepted in the west because of heavy shelling, lack of medical supplies, and often no water or electricity.
Delivery is part of the problem, but simply procuring specifically needed items seems to be a difficult task for even the most experienced of the international organizations. Through discussions with the medical communities in Germany and the United States, I have discovered that getting those supplies is possible
I have established an excellent relationship with most of the Non-Government Organizations and parties involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, in doing so recognizing a weakness in the aid effort and a niche that lEMRA has been designed to fill.
John Ashton Executive Director.
Strategic Plan
lEMRA's underlying philosophy is to provide requested medical aid to site specific locations. Conceptually, this can be seen as 'aid marketing' - finding out exactly what is needed where, and ensuring it gets to those points of need To achieve this goal consistently, EEMRA will limit its number of commitments, focusing on the former Yugoslavia in the foreseeable future.
Situation Analysis
The current situation in the former Yugoslavia region is characterised by uncertainty. The international community, led by the United States, Britain, France and Russia is trying to establish a framework for bringing about peace and hopefully long term resolution of the conflict and tensions in the former Yugoslavia.
Events in the region obviously effect lEMRA directly, hindering or helping aid efforts. However, the medical infrastructure in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia has already been severely damaged and is entirely dependent on outside support. Further conflict only increases damage to the system, the amount of resources necessary to support and restore its capabilities, and the urgency of lEMRA's mission.
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Regardless of immediate peace or continued conflict, it is imperative that health and medical support to the region increases lEMRA is dedicated to support of the health system in the former Yugoslavia during and after this conflict, hence while each development potentially influences lEMRA's operational activities and short term goals, medium and long term goals of support remain unchanged
IEMRA's role in the overall aid effort in the former Yugoslavia is filling a niche in the supply of specific, urgently needed medical supplies. The United Nations group of organizations and other Non-Government Organisations (NGO's) are doing much to address both medical and non-medical needs, however they are not able to fully meet general needs and there is a particular deficiency in the supply of requested and specific aid. lEMRA operates in a targeted manner, supplying specifically needed items to 'site specific' locations, and works closely with other organizations active in the region. There is a real and recognized need for fiarther help and IEMRA's expansion will have a synergistic eflfect on the aid effort.
Aid Generation and Distribution
Traditionally humanitarian aid is generated largely through financial support for the aid organization, which then uses the funds to operate and purchase the necessary aid This is supplemented by physical donations Given the expense of aid, particularly medical aid, decreasing the reliance on financial procurement and opening up a direct link between the medical industry and the aid community would substantially benefit aid efforts.
lEMRA is negotiatinging with the American pharmaceutical industry to make available pharmaceuticals to EEMRA for humanitarian use Motivated by humanitarian concern, this agreement will also provide public relations and financial benefits to the industry and frees financial resources for lEMRA to use in procuring other aid more difficult to obtain.
IEMRA's logistical strategy in the conflict zone is to use its own transport infi^astructure to ensure that requested and specific aid is delivered to site sf>ecific locations in accordance with prenegotiated agreements with all parties involved, international and those in conflict. Operations will be conducted fi^om three locations, specifically Zagreb, Split and Belgrade to provide different options for gaining access to specific locations.
Fonn and Growth
The charter lEMRA has defined is the effective and efficient support of medical structures serving populations devastated by disaster and conflict The goals of lEMRA are not short, term and it is planned to change focus from the former Yugoslavia with time However, for current purposes the situation in the former Yugoslavia is IEMRA's 'raison d'etre' In order to best approach this and future missions it is necessary to examine, 1) the resources necessary to operate effectively
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and efficiently; and 2) the form of organization most suited to the task and to organizational goals.
The resources necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the stated charter and mission are organizational, physical, and financial EEMRA is currently establishing the organizational structure to facilitate the coordination and control of the mission (This is dealt with more fiilly under Structure). Physical resources are the means for carrying out the tasks required and will be obtained as they are needed The most important single resource is financial, hence a considerable part of lEMRA's activities are directed at generating the necessary funds. As outlined in the Programs section, lEMRA is fund raising via a number of methods, the principle being application to private and government funding bodies, working with the medical manufacturing community, the running of mass fiind raising campaigns, and approaching individuals and organizations. Given the difficulty of flmding humanitarian aid efforts and the general cost of medicines, lEMRA is placing an emphasis on the relationship with the U.S pharmaceutical industry to ease the reliance on financial support.
In order to attract essential resources outlined above, the organizational form must be substantial and secure, and operations effective and efficient Through knowledge and experience EEMRA is establishing a structure that can provide support to the medical field in the former Yugoslavia, and other regions in the fiiture 77?^ key task, then, is to establish an organization with these capabihties and to attract those essential resources.
Based in Germany, the form taken must conform to German law. DEMRA is registering in Germany as a 'Stiftung' (literally a Foundation), which in Germany is a secure and respected type of institution This security is largely based on the capital investment requirement which must remain intact while the Foundation operates The benefits to lEMRA of this legal form are financial security which ensures stability, and the fact that the inherent qualities of a Foundation are well suited to attracting the necessary resources.
lEMRA is in the process of legalization and registration in Germany, Switzeriand, and the U.S. Until full legal status is granted, lEMRA will continue to operate under the auspices of the German medical association Marburger Bund, itself a Foundation in Europe, and is negotiating the same arrangement with the American Medical Association in the U.S.
The urgent situation in the former Yugoslavia has persuaded lEMRA to pursue a dual path of growth, primarily establishing the Foundation in Germany and aid generation branch in the U.S., but also expanding operations to provide whatever relief possible. With establishment and growth lEMRA will expand according to a strategic plan of increasing resources and capabilities with the constant goal of planning and implementing an effective and efficient aid mechanism that will significantly and positively effect human health
99
Structure
lEMRA will be headquartered in Cologne, Germany, convenient to pharmaceutical corporations, government, and logistics facilities that will be utilised This will be the center of management, finance and procurement, co-ordination, and control of all EMRA activities.
The Zagreb office will be the operations center in the former Yugoslavia, coordinating the aid distribution process. Field staff will include Medical Officers, Escort Officers, drivers and warehouse personnel Three mobile field offices, staffed and operated by medical and logistics personnel, are also planned for the former Yugoslavia.
The United States program will be an aid generation branch of lEMRA, based in Washington DC, registered under its own auspices, and involved in autonomous aid generation programs, though under the direction of Cologne This office will have responsibility for all activity in North America
lEMRA is being staffed by a compact core of professionals in a 'flat', team oriented structure in three locations, Cologne, Washington and the former Yugoslavia With responsibility in the hands of those carrying out the tasks, EEMRA will operate as effectively and directly as possible, avoiding administrative and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Growth
The expansion of lEMRA will follow a precise path that will establish the Head Office in Cologne and aid generation capabilities in the U.S , expand humanitarian aid operations in the former Yugoslavia, and then further increase aid generation activities in Europe and the U.S.
As a scale for expansion, amount of finance available for growth is the most appropriate as this is the greatest variable in the growth equation After establishing the Cologne OflBce, funds will be allocated as laid out in the Finance section, between activity costs and actual aid.
Personnel
lEMRA is recruiting a small number of people, experienced in the areas in which they will work, to form a compact and effective team. The unusual circumstances in the former Yugoslavia have produced a specific job market where experience is extremely important. The region has skilled and knowledgeable logistics and medical personnel, and it is fi-om this group that lEMRA will recniit international and local staff to fill the necessary roles.
100
Former Yugoslavia
The current crisis in the former Yugoslavia is lEMRA's first mission, with the goal of immediate and future support of the medical field in the former Yugoslavia. Realized in the first instance through the provision of medical aid to the hospitals, clinics, refiigee centers and other aid agencies active in the region, and in the medium and long term support in rebuilding the regional infi"astructure.
IEMRA's role is strictly neutral, with no partiality shown to any side in the conflict, and lEMRA calls on the universal right to humanitarian aid, to request assistance, and to demand fi"eedom of action in this humanitarian mission.
Zagreb Office
The Zagreb operations office will be staffed by internationals and locals with specific experience in the relevant areas This office will co-ordinate the activities of the Zagreb, Belgrade, and Split warehouses that will provide logistical capabilities from different geographical directions to the different areas in need.
Finance
IEMRA's finances will be centered in Cologne, Germany, where the Financial Manager will control the flow and accounting of funds Funds generated outside of Germany will be transferred there, with the exception of operating and procurement funds required in the U.S., which will be retained by that office fi-om funds generated there.
Budgeting
The budget per se has not been included in the Business Plan, however two budget summaries follow. The first refers to the initial capital lEMRA requires to establish the Cologne office and begin regular aid operations. The second summary refers to lEMRA at full planned size, to achieve this will require a building process (deah with under Growth) and budgets during that process will be considerably smaller, based on the growth steps planned
Budget Summaries - Europe (Conversion Rate DM > us .5917 as at 2.09.93) I : Initial Capital Requirements
Equipment and Estabhshment US 23,076
Operating (per month) US 18,936
NB/ These operating costs are as accurate as possible for this operating level, however this is still only a projection of costs.
101
D : EEMRA at Full Planned Size - Europe and the U.S.
Total Capital (Start-up) Requirements US 4 000,526
Total (Monthly) Operating Requirements US 465,668
Total (Monthly) Medical Aid US 1.420,080
Total (Monthly) Funding Requirements US 1.885,748
Annual aid per victim US 5,56
Banking
Bank accounts in Germany will be the central mechanism for allocating funds to the different aspects of operating This will include an account that will hold a percentage of donations to be allocated after the conflict for regeneration of the health care infi-astructure in the former Yugoslavia The Deutsche Apotheker- und Arztebank e G will provide the required banking services in Germany.
Legal
lEMRA is being registered under German law as a non-profit Stiftung (Foundation), in the legal district of Cologne. This status entitles lEMRA to tax free benefits and allows the issue of tax deduction certificates to donors and sponsors. The U.S. branch will be registered in America under its own {EEMRA (USA)} auspices as a non-profit organization, under US / IRS 501C3 registration Legal establishment as a non-profit humanitarian organization will also be carried out in Switzerland to provide legal representation in that country where much of the worid's peace and humanitarian community resides.
The required legal structure of lEMRA includes a Board of Trustees, Executive Board and nominated management. The two Boards are the ultimate sources of authority and legal representation of the organization Authority necessary to manage the organization and represent it legally will be conferred by the Boards onto management staff.
Programs
Activities related to the generation of funds and aid are classified as Programs, while activities aimed at the distribution of aid are classified as Operations lEMRA's primary focus in aid generation is funds, as this is the most flexible form of aid and can be used to buy the specific medical supplies that vsdll be needed. To generate the necessary funds lEMRA uses a number of methods of fund raising.
10
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
102 11111 ^^ ^
3 9999 05983 518 9
1) Formal Funding Proposals
Various government and private organizations in Europe and the United States that provide funding for humanitarian organizations.
2) Advertising and Direct Marketing
Given the seriousness of the Yugoslav crisis and extensive and in-depth media coverage it is cost eflFective to fund raise through targeted appeals to different groups in the community using advertising and direct marketing.
3) Networking
Being in contact with a large number and wide variety of organizations and individuals has resulted in an ever growing network that provides support to lEMRA in a number of ways, including funding
The U.S. Pharmaceutical Program is a primary ^d generation program, with goals of physical and financial support. As outlined under Strategy, this program is based on benefits to both the industry and lEMRA and has the goal of providing a direct link between the producers of pharmaceuticals and those who need them urgently.
An important aspect of fund raising is the offering of the possibility of tax deductions to donors. Due to the nature of lEMRA, the Cologne legal district has granted lEMRA the right to a provisional tax number prior to having its full legal capital requirement in place. Related to this is the increase in tax deductions available when a donor enters into a sponsorship type relationship with lEMRA in Germany, an option that will be used in our relations with larger donors in this country In the U.S., the IRS 501C3 status will allow tax deduction benefits to donors.
Operations - Former Yugoslavia
Operations are a process that begins with need identification, procuring the required medical aid, and distribution of that aid to the site specific points of need. The Cologne office will be active in each phase and will co-ordinate with both Zagreb and the U.S. with regard to their roles.
Cologne
The Cologne Office will be the center of all activities; carrying out central financial, fund raising, public relations and management functions. This office will guide and support the Zagreb operational office and the U.S. fund raising branch.
Zagreb
lEMRA's office in Zagreb will be the coordination and control center for the entire aid distribution logistics system in the former Yugoslavia region It will support and advise the operations out of Split, Belgrade and the three mobile field offices currently planned for Sarajevo, Pale and Zenica This office will control finances in the former Yugoslavia and work closely in coordination with Cologne.
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Aid Distribution
Through this mission, lEMRA will provide aid to as many medical institutions in the former Yugoslavia as it can effectively and efficiently support while achieving its goal of targeted provision of aid Over sixty medical institutions in Bosnia have been identified and the Croatian Ministry of Health is compiling a similar list of Croatian institutions for EMRA A policy of targeting specific aid where it is needed means lEMRA will not attempt to provide blanket coverage of all needs, but rather focused medical support where it is most needed
Identification and Ordering of Medical Supplies
Medical Officers in the field will be the primary mechanism for identifying and assessing medical needs. This information will be combined with that collected by Escort Drivers on delivery of supplies, requests fi-om the institutions themselves and information provided by the International Committee of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to prioritize medical needs Ordering of medical supplies needed will then be referred to Cologne by Zagreb. At this stage the possible sources of particular supplies will be approached, in Europe and the US, and those supplies procured as quickly as possible.
Logistics
If procured in the U.S. the supplies will be transported via commercial or military aircraft to Germany or directly to the former Yugoslavia. If procured in Germany, the aid will be flown or trucked to the same warehouses in Zagreb or Split From these locations lEMRA's own vehicles will transport the aid to the institutions that need it, ensuring site specific provision of the aid
This logistical system will rely on a fleet of trucks and vans of different types to transport aid to the different destinations. In potentially dangerous areas international drivers will be used, and where safe, local drivers will be contracted. Warehouses will hold transit goods, and be the staging points for convoys.
To gain access to these areas lEMRA will prenegotiate agreements with all parties concerned By observing strict impartiality, and travelling independently, EEMRA will avoid many of the access difficulties experienced by the United Nations because pf their unavoidable political associations In risk areas deliveries will be accompanied by Escort Drivers in order to provide support and representation for the delivery. However, it is a goal of lEMRA's to be accepted by the United Nations as eligible to travel inside UN protected convoys when conditions make this necessary or advisable.
Performance Evaluation
To fulfil its stated mission of effectively and efficiently meeting the immediate needs of the medical field in the former Yugoslavia, lEMRA must constantly evaluate its activities. This will be done at two levels, the organizational, and at the individual level The organizational evaluation will be based on financial measures involving percentages of funds used for aid and for costs, and budget comparisons. The
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104
individual evaluations will be based on assessment of quality of work in a relatively informal manner made possible by DEMRA 's compact size As well, it will be a responsibility of key people to constantly assess whether operations and systems can be improved, and if so how Overall responsibility for performance will rest with the Business Director.
Organization Culture and Values
DEMRA is an independent, compact, responsive, non-bureaucratic, non-profit humanitarian organisation wdth no interests other than the provision of medical aid to save and improve lives We are a team in which each member, through their particular role, has the responsibility of supporting the effort of supplying aid as efficiently as possible to populations in distress. Given the nature of our mission, everyone must accept responsibility and decision making, with the formal structure of the organization supporting effectiveness, communication and initiative
International Emergency Medical Response Agency
lEMRA
Europe Meichelbeck Strafie 4A, 81545 Munchen, Germany. Tel. (49) (89) 642 32 52 Fax (49) (89) 642 32 92
U.S.A.
South Garden, 6331 Pocahontas Trail, Providence Forge, VA 23140
Tel (1) (804) 966 9088 Fax (1) (804) 966 9089
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ISBN 0-16-044049-1
9 780160"440496
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