INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 HEARINGS BEFORE THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MAY 3, 4, 10, 11, AND 17 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services INSTITUTION ARCHIVES WH.01. DATA LIBRARY WOODS HOLE. MA. 02543 aTA LIBRARY & ARCHIVES science emai el a Vay ee ini Oeean ographic Institution 4 YEU ie WCE } SHI Po we on U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 20733 WASHINGTON : 1961 eet tas 5 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STYLES BRIDGES, New Hampshire MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina PRESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut STROM THURMOND, South Carolina J. GLENN BEALL, Maryland CLAIR ENGLE, California E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi, Chairman STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STYLES BRIDGES, New Hampshire E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine Ir a¢ Be 4 wi Ul ii il Wh mam (WA Architect engineer: Page Chamees approved by eae eee eS Nae AM i RR 2 aS ye 258 Heacilloslitivesthu chyalo yess eyes ee eee oe ee ee 29, 40, 97 ReporstoeNavy and: Airhorce) by 2s. 524s 2 es | ee ee 243 Responsibilitysote a wae ween Dee ee oe Wa a a ed 30, 36, 51, 65, 245 SUG G LON 0 (6) Es ae se ET El eS Iie a A A 28, 61, 63 INA Fen AT Sy Pave eg le rh ea in NA Stee ee See 24, 156 BRE Wie Ml OG TOT StU Cliype ee ee ae i aap Le Ea AN SEE See 190, 197, 200, 210 Clriaubaangnny soy oeiounaver seoor ied eS ee eee ae 2 Construction: AiternatesmethodsrOfe 2-24 Sao se 20 fas ee eee 65, 76, 104, 249 Conmactrawards tory a5 yee epee ee 4,49, 117, 159, 163, 177, 256 Costrcompanisonybetweemt towel sm mesa eee ee ee 6, 251 Emabedimentrot tower legs= 222 = 5255522 s seers 73, 87, 100, 112, 257, 259 JRNDUGVGIS! Roper sth eke ek = ap hee hy apy WL Ao Nan Ce epee Se Ae eae eR 10, 11, 163 Kuss method of erection______________ 66, 87, 102, 113, 121, 248, ‘O54. 257 Lashing down during tow operations_____________- 119, 132, 213, 261, 283 Damage: Brae uN ee 12, 77, 90, 119, 182, 146, 170, 200, 215, 218, 227, 2638 Contractor’s evaluation of tower’ Ss remaining strength 9 ai aS eee Aer 25, 159, 166, 186, 225-231, 272- 278 Pin deterioration._..____ 78, 108, 131, 142, 148, 151, 159, 174, 270— 278, 283 TUNG) SIRES egS ES 22.15. SF pa aU Ma oO 91, 135, 151, 169, 221 Wepartment of Air’ Horce responsibility. 2 —_ 3-2-8. _ 32) 2 eee 13-15, 46, 136 Department of Navy responsibility. _______-_-_---_----- 13, 52, 128, 148, 218 Design: Andi specifica tions see Nui ipl AO a ae 15-18, 27, 110, 208, 221 Grit Crime eNotes eed 9, 15-21, 49, 71, 77-79, 101, 160, 278-279 HB) VAG O Tay fei @ TNs yey NON a Be RR aa Ss ci a Ee a 72, 105, 126-131 Differences between towers__.-.__________-_-_-_- 17, 34, 42-47, 57, 98, 253 Grave yo evan beens (0) eetee ee eee) se aw o eeee a RS Ee nee ae ean SUES 36, 174, 280-284 Large waves result in greater stress__.______-__----_- 77, 83, 196-197, 252 Use of pins versus welded connections__________- 37-38, 101, 109, 149, 262 HG UNESTTeSC ELOTALO WETS Bee ee eee el oo Wee ee ee Rs eee 10, 11 TSC CLV O TS eet SEEN eae es LS ac 18, 22-238, 138, 159, 163-166, ‘174 Operational concept of offshore radar platforms_._____-__-_-------- 4, 29, 40, 49 JREGInGHOIN Ot Avie INO) jorentsKonauavel LS eee sooo s ee 89, 238 Repairs: Attvemptediat seas’ {eee eer Cele eee eee ee ee 108, 127, 134, 218, 224 MS) CFEC Gettin sk Rec etter pe a ee ee Era eee ata ae oe pe 81, 140, 158 Function of Dardelet bolts__..._..._--___- 20, 127-128, 135, 140, 170, 184 PULACHOIM Or WeUIssaGl SyyeWNs. eee ee ee ease 257 @ferernp late eet. fae Meee teMaE cr eR REO ie eel eeu oat 214, 218 Recommendation for ports. 522-22 = 2 ee 107, 133, 145, 218 Replacements ona cece at a a el a na Res eee ee Se ee 15, 20-22, 77, 80-88, 103, 108, 122, 145, 176, 183, 200, 255, 264, 71 Safety evaluation of remaining UO MPSTR EOL els SE SLA ea 28 1, 159, 166, 186 Suablerand hyn anal cht Orces= ae as weet y cowl ets ht Dey ee 194, 247 Structural engineer: Responsibility of._._._____- 30, 36-38, 43, 51, 65, 146, 244 dliowerloss) predicted 22 i ee eee Wiel eRe AUNe 226, 267, 273-275 Underwater surveys by Marine Contractors, Inc__.__..-_-_----------- 168-180 alae Hane whet feanw isd Hk ALM SHAS ein, a Spare ik dey: Srbaity ee Soaniet betwen) mabigt) ne x arbyank rates MIT OE aera Drege Ag ree i eos See Shewel, Se tat ai? pe al we MeL wt wae. Qi Adadatk ; 1} “4 : ih Lhisy) woivird Ln tangs . .. J Veet oF Gieouk-a Lau rh H i tia) Sipe (0 AF 7 £ ths ( yD When 2 beri VAs Uys ak Wotlk tira) ' cfto+r | hee io ae ; " ; : the Le He: ht vits br > Igy eae oa Piva, | uk Fo A le oly wethe as FEZ can - ns i ‘ —F ni ae, ed “1 : : ti att" Peer 23 ORF Lic a {6 con NIA autein, I sceret vary. maeithst-o vist iustiony commenond. Ti was corel nett Aneens. TY taste ine ot 10 eaite fT, any They ue i ¥ brew yeaa ree Sree, AD ichi Shee old siping thet-vou shold aa Ay C7 nh, thiols he te pe ying 2 yous 8 complianast, wes | eh Lb: On arti (ote WhO were WHEL FEAL. bed INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1961 U.S. SENATE, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Bartlett, Jackson, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Smith) met, pursuant to recess, at 10:35 a.m., in room 235, Old Senate Office Build- ing, Senator John Stennis, presiding. Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Bartlett, Jack- son, Saltonstall, and Smith. Staff members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Stuart P. French, professional staff member. Senator Srennis. Ail right, the subcommittee will come to order. I know we will have the cooperation of everyone in being as quiet as the circumstances permit, so that all can hear. Not by way of complete review to all members of the committee, but I think we had some very important and very illuminating testi- mony yesterday which, in very brief substance, showed some very fine work by the Navy, I thought, and the manufacturer. But at the same time, it showed that this most unfortunate tower, even though it was not born with a defect, it nevertheless had a defect in it at the time that it was erected. The broken structure started a series of events that worsened rather than improved and finally led to its destruction. Now, this morning we have Mr. DeLong and Mr. Bauer sir, are the counsel ? Mr. Incorpssy. Mr. Chairman, I am John L. Ingoldsby. I am counsel for the DeLong Corp. This is Mr. Rand, an associate counsel. Senator Stennis. All right. Let me say this, members of the com- mittee. I have not talked to Mr. DeLong, who is going to testify first. We are not requiring anyone to testify to matters that might impose any legal liability on them in any way in connection with these hear- ings. I have advised Mr. DeLong to that effect. We are not looking for someone to punish nor fer someone to blame. This committee is solely interested in the strength of our military program. We are interested in the dollars that we have authorized and appropriated for these purposes. All else is incidental. All else falls by the wayside. We do not expect to be deterred from following through on this point. Again, for enphasis, we do not propose to go beyond January 12, which was the day that things finally came to a head and when a con- ference was held with reference to this structure and its approximate $5 and you, 96 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 strength. We are cutting off, as best we can, at that point. What happened thereafter involves directly command responsibility. Charges have already been preferred against some of the officers of the Air Force. They will be disposed of in another forum. We are staying out of it as that is for the determination of another court. However, I do think that the background of the facts we develop here will help justice be done there, substantially help it, and not hinder it in any way. Now, those of you who will testify, please stand. Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Bauer. I do. Mr. DeLone. I do. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Chairman, Mr. DeLong and Mr. Bauer are both here by virtue of subpenas of this committee. Their counsel have requested that they be permitted in advance of the testimony to make a very brief statement for the record, and I would like to recommend that they be given that privilege. Senator Stennis. All right. We recognize you as counsel for Mr. DeLong. Mr. Incotpspy. For the DeLong Corp., Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. You will have to be sworn, too, if you are going to make a statement. That is our invariable rule. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Incotpssy. I do. Senator Stennis. All right. TESTIMONY OF L. B. DeLONG, PRESIDENT; GEORGE BAUER, VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION; JOHN L. INGOLDSBY, COUNSEL; BERT B. RAND, ASSOCIATE COUNSEL, DeLONG CORP. Mr. Incorpssy. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee and committee counsel, Mr. DeLong and Mr. Bauer are officers of DeLong Corp. and are here pursuant to subpena. A subpena was also issued to Mr. George E. Suderow, chief engineer of DeLong Corp. It is with great regret that we must inform the committee that Mr. Suderow died of cancer last Saturday, April 29. By subpena Mr. DeLong and Mr. Bauer have been required to produce certain material from their files. Although this requirement was made on only a few days notice, these gentlemen have complied to the best of their ability. If any additional documentation specified by the subpena is found, it will be delivered to this committee. DeLong Corp. is an engineering and construction company special- izing in design and construction of marine platforms, docks, and similar structures. This company has pioneered the design and erec- tion of marine platforms for use throughout the world and has engi- neered, constructed and operated offshore drilling platforms in re- mote parts of the world as well as in the Gulf of Mexico. The name, DeLong Corp., has become closely identified with the generic name of Texas towers. The DeLong Corp. erected Texas tower No. 2 which now stands in the Atlantic Ocean off Nantucket, This was the first radar warning COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 97 platform erected. The DeLong Corp. was an unsuccessful bidder for the construction of Texas towers 1, 3, and 4. We understand that this committee’s investigation principally in- volves the tragic collapse of Texas tower No. 4. The DeLong Corp. had nothing to do with the design or erection of this platform, either directly or indirectly. Unfortunately, since the DeLong Corp. is preeminent in this field, there has been considerable confusion in the public mind as to its responsibility, if any. Business concerns, commentators and others, both orally and in writing, have assumed that the DeLong Corp. designed or erected the now collapsed Texas tower No. 4 despite the fact that it was In no way involved. This has created some serious business problems for the DeLong Corp. While the DeLong Corp. and its officials will comply fully with the subpenas of this committee, they are gravely concerned that the public may receive the impression from the fact that the committee has required their presence here, that they are in some way responsible for the disaster which occurred in January. It is, therefore, respectfully requested that the committee recognize on the record that the DeLong Corp. was not directly or indirectly involved in the design or erection of Texas tower No. 4. Senator Srennis. Well, you have prepared a good statement there. I think that is well for the record. The committee cannot reach any conclusion, of course, until the facts are in. The facts will speak for themselves. All right. Mr. DeLong, you have heard the preliminaries here. You understand the situation. You heard the testimony yesterday, did you not? Mr, DsLone. Yes. Senator Stennis. I understand you do not have a prepared state- ment. But I am going to ask you to make a general statement now covering all the facts and the developments with reference to any discussions you may have had, conferences you had about the design for Texas tower No. 4, or any other one of these towers. To make it specifie, I will just put it this way: Prior to November 1, 1955, did you or your engineer discuss with Captain Albers or with the de- signers and architects, a method of design and construction of Texas tower No. 4 substantially different from the method that was actually followed; and if you did, give us the outline, fairly briefly, of those discussions and the engineering principles involved. We are con- cerned here with the soundness of design. Mr. DeLonge. Mr. Chairman, we had some discussions with the design engineers, with the Navy, Captain Albers, and they were in the main part handled by our chief engineer, Mr. Suderow. DISCUSSIONS ON FEASIBILITY, 1954 We were called in, in the early stages of 1954, to discuss the feasi- bility, or whether it was possible to build towers such as Senator Stennis. Pardon me, now. Mr. Suderow is the gentle- man who passed away ? Mr. DeLone. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. DeLonc. To build towers in the Atlantic—and we so advised the Navy that we thought it was feasible. Then in the latter part 98 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 of 1954, and the early part of 1955, about December and January, we were called in and advised that the design engineers had come up with a scheme, and would we look at it with the purpose of erecting it. Wedid. And we said, “Yes, the scheme is all right, we go along with it, subject to certain changes and we would like to discuss them. over a series of conferences.” The first tower, No. 2, had bracing in it. We objected to the bracing. Our experience had given us the knowledge that the tower could be built differently, without bracing, by reinforcing the legs, restudying the bottom condition, and putting your penetration into the ocean floor to such depth that you had what we call fixity at this point and up here, and the column was strong - enough to withstand the sea action. Your brown mark, is where the ground line on the ocean ficor starts. That was agreed on as being around 50 feet. The legs were stiffened up, steel was made thicker, and bracing was eliminated. The use of bracing was a serious objection on our part. But the engineers, the design engi- neers, were very cooperative and everybody put their best effort forth to come up with the solution. Senator Sauronstatu. Mr. Chairman—did you say 50 feet in the ocean floor ? Mr. DrLone. It is 48 to 50 feet—into the ocean bed. The ocean bed is actually here. Senator Sanronsratu. Is that rock or sand ? Mr. DeLone. Sand. Senator Stennis. Mr. DeLong, it will make it clearer for the record and also for those present if you will make it clear that you are point- ing to the model before you. Mr. DeLone. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. That model has three legs without any bracings? Mr. DeLonea. That is correct. Senator Srmnnis. That is the model for tower No. 2? Mr. DeLonea. Yes, Texas tower No. 2. Senator Srennis. It will be better, when you say “here” if you will indicate that you are pointing to the brown part, the lower part. Remember that as best you can. Mr. DrLone. Yes, sir. The reason that I go back on tower No. 2, is because some of the principles of tower No. 2 go over into tower No. 4. It was also decided that a 10-foot diameter leg was sufficient strengthwise, but that the portion that would go into the ocean floor— that is the brown portion—should be larger, and that was increased to 15 foot diameter. WATER DEPTH IS DECIDING FACTOR IN USE OF BRACING Then there was considerable concern about erosion—sand cutting away the steel and so forth. Therefore, it was left approximately 15 feet, I believe, above the ocean floor, the same diameter, steel and concrete and so forth, to provide for erosion or sand scour over a period of time, which could wear the steel away and things like that. But when you get to a certain stage of water depth, this freestanding column is inadequate, and roughly the rule of thumb, is that of about 100 feet—taking into consideration the conditions that you have in the Atlantic, the storms, the sea and so forth, that you have to cope with. So, therefore, when you get to a hundred feet or over, you have to do something else, for example, use bracing. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 99 Now, the theory of Texas tower No. 2, and the theory from the ground line up, or from the storm line, where the bottom of the ocean waves work, is not to have any more obstruction than you absolutely have to have. Therefore, it is very essential—that is a principle you design on, and the Texas tower No. 2 was designed on that principle. Senator STENNIS. Pardon me. The reason appears obvious, but you might state it anyway. What was the reason for that? Mr. DeLone. Because if you put bracing im, you will generate the additional resistance against your structure from the ocean waves. Therefore, you want to at all times let the water flow with a minimum of resistance. So therefore, you can only go to depths of water of about 100 feet. After that the size of your column, we will call the legs columns, become so large it becomes uneconomical. Then, since you have an ocean floor here, which was roughly 56 feet below the water, and you had to accept that and design for it, then you take your next step, where your water is deeper, and in this case tower No. 4 was estimated at 180 feet and it wound up in the end 185 feet, but it is pretty difficult to get the water depths exact out there in the ocean, and we make that mistake every day where we are off a few feet. So when the design of tower No. 4 was discussed with us, it appeared the only logical design in deep water that, figured costwise and strenethwise, was the K-brace design that tower No. 4 was built on. There were other things that we disagreed with and so forth. But the K-brace structure, as it is known, triangle K-brace structure, is the best known method of construction, because when you go into the deep water you start assuming another line of thinking. You say—all right, my ocean floor was minus 56 feet for the Texas tower No. 2 design. Now I have to make a new ocean floor, and that is actually what you are doing with the triangle K-brace structure. You make a new ocean floor. So you say to yourself, where am I going to make this new ocean floor ?—because you want to remember now on this one the criteria was, and the assumption or the basic rule was to leave the bracing out of the water motion zone. So then you automatically come to an answer there. We have to keep our bracing below any wave action. That was done. The assumption was made correctly, minus 25 feet or 27 feet. That was proper design. Senator Stennis. Below the water ? Mr. DeLone. Below the water. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. DeLonge. Now, this became your new ocean floor. Visualize it as your new ocean floor. Now, what you build here had to be just the same as the ocean floor. It had to be a rigid, fixed structure with- out any possibility of movement, because from here up you follow the same principle except that you have a manmade ocean floor which was now minus 27 feet. Therefore, you could lighten up some of these members that went on top here and not design them exactly as heavy as they were here where your water was deeper. And that was done. Senator Satronstaty. Mr. Chairman, if Mr. DeLong is through Senator Stennis. No, he is not through, that is I do not think he is through. You may ask a question anyway for clarification. Senator SartonsraLy. My question is this, Mr. DeLong. You said you went down 50 feet on the embedment for tower No. 2. Mr. DeLone. Pardon me, sir—48 to 50 feet. 100 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 DISPARITY IN EMBEDMENT Senator Satronsrauu. All right—48 feet. Now, we had testimony yesterday that on Texas tower No. 4, they only went down 20 feet. Mr. DreLone. It was 18, sir. Senator SattonsTautu. Yes, actually 18 feet although the original design called for 20 feet, I believe. There is a discrepancy of 28 feet— call it 30 feet. Now, if the water is deeper at Texas tower No. 4, and they only went down 18 feet, and yet you went down 48 feet on Texas tower No. 2 why didn’t they go down deeper on tower No. 4, par- ticularly if you have a new floor as you have explained it ? Mr. DeLone. We don’t know enough about that. Moran, Proctor, Mueser, and so forth are probably the foremost foundation engineers in the world. I am not in a position to make a statement that it is enough or that it is not enough. I will say this; that when we knew and heard just recently that it was 18 feet, it was a surprise. But I would not Senator Satronsratu. What was that? Mr. DeLona. It was a surprise. But I would not be in a position, nor would I want to criticize Moran, Proctor’s assumptions on that footing. Senator Satronsraty. All right. Now, the second question I have, in that same connection: At what depth of water do you start making this second floor that you are talking about, where these K bracings are necessary ? What was the depth of the water ? Mr. DreLone. 185 feet. Senator Sauronsraty. All right. The depth on tower No. 2 was what ? Mr. DrLone. It was 56 feet. Senator Sauronsratu. All right. Now, at what depth do you find it necessary to put in the K-bracing? Mr. DreLone. In a K structure, the first bracing, a triangle K struc- ture, as we call it, your first bracing always starts where you are going to land on the bottom—right at the ocean floor. You are supposed to start your first bracing there. Senator Sattonsratu. I have not made my question clear. There is 185 feet of water at Texas tower No. 4. There is 56 feet of water over there at tower No. 2. Now, if you were building the tower at, we will say, 100 feet of water instead of 185 feet, would you put in the K-bracing? Mr. DrLone. I do not believe at 100 feet. Over a hundred feet we would start. Senator SarronsraLu. Over 100 feet ? Mr. DreLone. Yes. I am quite sure we would. Senator Srennis All right. That is clear. That is a good question: Mr. DreLone. It depends. Senator Stennis. Continue with your story, Mr. DeLong, and point out those things which you think are pertinent. You are making it very clear, so just take your time and tell us the whole story. I under- plang it will take you some 30 minutes or more, but that will be all right. Mr. DrLone. Now, since you have established this level as your ocean floor—that is what the theory is, and what you are trying to do. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 101 Here is your waterline—the blue marking into the gray is your water- line. So you have to think of the same problems that you have had over here when you decided to go 48 feet into the ground and had 15-foot-diameter enlarged lower cylinders, for the ground portion. You have the same problem, because you have the same sea action. Youstill have the sea. This is your new ocean floor. NEW FLOOR JUST BELOW WAVE ACTION The stresses that you have here, less the water depth—you have 25 feet. here, so you have a smaller action floor to work on. You have made it the best that you could, since you are making a new ocean floor, always remembering that you had to put these bracings here below the movement or the bottom of the wave to keep the resistance of the legs against the sea down to a minimum. Now, it became very important, then, that from here down this structure was of sufficient strength and was anchored in the ocean in such way that it would act as it was—for it was designed as an ocean fioor up to here about 150 feet or something like that. PIN CONNECTIONS CONSIDERED POOR DESIGN We disagreed with pin connections because Senator Sauronsraty. Would you repeat that, please Mr. DeLone. We disagreed with pin connections—pin connections. Senator Srennis. You mean you advised against the use of pin connections 4 Mr. DsLone. I would make it a little stronger. We just stated positively that we did not want any part of it, any part of it. Senator Sartronsraty. Mr. Chairman, would you be willing to let me ask a question on that point ? Senator Srennis. Oh, yes; yes. Senator SatronsraLu. I want to get this question of erosion very clear, Mr. DeLong. Now, you said that column was made 15 feet in diameter at that level, because of the danger of erosion. Now, am I correct in believing that salt water causes erosion on steel, and if you have two steel joints coming together such as these pin connections then the size of your lower structure—what do you call that—pole or what do you eall that thing—a leg? Mr. DrLone. Leg. Senator SaitonsTatt. Is it not true that salt water causes erosion where steel meets steel? Am I right onthat? Mr. DreLone. Well, there are various ways of taking care of that, Senator. You can use cathodic protection under water and above water you can paint. Erosion, I think, has been used in a different term here. Erosion is something caused by the elements, water and so forth. Senator Sarronsraty. But if you have a steel anchor cable, and you connect that to a chain with a link, there will be erosion between that steel cable and the iron chain connection in a year, will there not? Now, that is caused by salt water. Mr. DeLone. Well, salt water causes erosion. Senator Saurronsrauu. Well, what I am getting at is that you built the leg 15 feet in diameter to avoid the effect of erosion, «lidn’t you 4 That is what you just said. 102 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. DrLonea. I would like to correct the record. It was designed by the design engineer—how much we had to do with going to 15 feet. But when we all discussed the problems, it came up with a 15- foot diameter, and the erosion that we were talking about, Senator, is the movement of the sand across the banks. And it works on the same basis. If you have seen sandblasting—somebody sandblasts steel or the face of a building. Senator SatronsTaLu. All right. Now let’s get back to the pin. You said you would not have anything to do with pins, didn’t you? Mr. DeLone. For the— Senator SauronsTatu. In fastening. Mr. DeLonge. For the following reason. You have a pin in here. You must have some slack to insert the pin. Then when the sea works on the tower, this pin is doing this, and the impact of it is next to impossible to figure. Senator Sauronstatu. Well, I do not want to delay the chairman. Then the fact of whether you put in a pin or did not put in a pin had nothing to do with the working of salt water on that metal. Mr. DrLone. No; no, sir. Senator SatronsTaLtu. Nor its magnetic attraction to the other metal ? Mr. DeLone. No, sir. Senator SauronsraLy. That had nothing to do with it? Mr. DrLone. No, sir. Senator SauronsTaLn. I just happened to know that because we almost lost a boat due to the erosion between a steel anchor line and the iron chain connection, which eroded in 2 or 3 months. Mr. DrLone. Electrolysis. Senator SALTonsTALL. What? Mr. DeLone. They call it electrolysis. Senator Sauronstatn. Yes. And that had no effect on the pin con- nections ? Mr. DeLone. I do not believe that that had anything to do with the tower. You can make provisions Senator Sattonsratu. Thank you. Senator Stennis. All right, Mr. DeLong. Thank you, Senator. Mr. DeLone. It was merely a different opinion that we, in our ex- perience, did not want any possibility of a pin connection and having a clearance where it would move. And we only saw it one way—as a completely welded structure, because this is your ocean floor—from here down, and you had to eliminate movement. Senator Srennis. All right, proceed now in your own way. You are making this very clear, and it is extremely interesting. Mr. DeLong. So our opinions varied on pins versus welding. OBJECTION RAISED TO USE OF KUSS METHOD OF ERECTION Our next problem in our discussions—we saw extreme hazards and no way of calculating the stresses that would: be put on the structure and the tilting action, and also the possibility that one leg could hit first in the ocean in a storm, and the additional stresses. We just notified all the people interested that we would not go along with it. And our chief engineer advised us that he had worked out a method that was acceptable, that we could use a method which was acceptable to us. That is what we call scheme B in the book which COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 103 kept us from tipping the structure and which let us weld the struc- ture. And then we proceeded from there on in our thinking just the same as the rest of them. Now, the testimony yesterday gets a little confusing as to what condition the tower was in or what happened to it. But I will cut all through that, and go to the last stage. Now, remember, the theory that this tower was designed on, was minimum resistance to the ocean waves. And as this tower started to Senator Srennis. If the members of the committee will excuse me for interrupting, it appears that your explanation of scheme B would be very pertinent right at this point. You have led up to that proposal, and there was testimony about it yesterday. Would it suit you to describe scheme B now? Mr. DreLone. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn scheme B over to Mr. Bauer, because he should earn his pay, too. Senator Stennis. Very well, proceed in your own way. You may proceed with your testimony now. Mr. DeLone. I will go a little farther, if I may. Senator Stennis. You goon. ABOVE WATER “X” BRACING INSTALLED IN DESPERATION Mr. DreLone. As the trouble developed, and in, I call it, a despera- tion move, the top bracing was put in. Remember, now, that it is contrary to the whole design and theory, because here is your ocean floor and your bottom column, and your sea is supposed to come through. So that—when that was done, I would feel that it was pretty close to dooming the tower. And I am very surprised that the tower stood up through Donna at all—that it did not go down completely. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this—that in engineering and so forth, it is like horseracing. There is a lot of difference of opin- lon. We, in our experience, disagreed with the design engineers and so forth. And we said where the mistake was—but the course was taken, and we feel a little to blame that we were not able to marshal our arguments over clearly enough to get it changed. Had we done so, we feel—had we done a better job of presenting our arguments and so forth, we might have been able to avoid a disaster. But we were not, and we blame ourselves for not being able to convince the people in regard to pin versus welded connections. Senator Stennis. Well, that is a very fine attitude and a frank statement about it. It impresses the Chair. Does that cover the high points of your statement ? Mr. DeLone. Yes, sir; that covers my high points. Senator Srennis. We can ask questions later. To get the entire matter before us here, what does counsel propose—that we now hear from the other gentleman as to scheme B ? Mr. Kenpatt. Yes, sir; that ismy recommendation. Senator Stennis. Counsel is very familiar, as Mr. French is, with all these matters. It has taken weeks to get the testimony together. Without objection, then, we will switch over now to Mr. Bauer. What is your connection with Mr. DeLong, please, Mr. Bauer ? Mr. Bauer. Mr. Chairman, I am vice president in charge of con- struction for the DeLong Corp. 104 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Stennis. All right. Do you wish to proceed now with a description of scheme B, and whatever other major points you have inmind? Youmay proceed in your own way. DESCRIPTION OF SCHEME B METHOD OF CONSTRUCTION Mr. Bauer. Scheme B is the method that the DeLong Corp. had anticipated using in putting this tower up when we submitted our bids. The lower part of the tower, tower No. 4, as we visualized it at that time, would be constructed almost identical with this model here. This would be a rigid construction, from this elevation here down. And this would then become the ocean floor, as Mr. DeLong pointed out. Senator Srennis. For clarification only, you are pointing to the model of tower No. 4. Mr. Bauer. Yes, sir; that 1s correct, sir. The main difference in the construction would be that this lower portion of the tower, this rigid K bracing and the three legs, would be constructed in a vertical position. It would never be in a horizontal plane and tipped up on the site. It would be constructed and floated in a vertical position with the finished elevation just above the K bracing. The template. as we call that part of the tower, would then be floated out on the location, and set down on the bottom of the ocean, which would mean that the tops of the legs here would be under water from 30 to 50 feet, and all of the bracing would be below the wave zone. However, our method then would have been to bring out a small, temporary three-cornered platform, with caissons, with jacking cais- sons floated over the templates. The caissons Jowered down into a sleeve on the template, and the work platform, as we call it, would be jacked clear of the water. This is a very light platform, in the vicin- ity of 400 tons, instead of the 4,000 tons that is in the permanent platform. After we got the work platform up off the water, and out of the sea, we would start with the excavation of our footings on the main template. We would sink the footings, and at that time the specifications called for driving a number of pilings down through the footing to a 50-foot penetration, to obtain the fixity of the template at the bottom of the ocean. After the tempiate was alined and fixed permanently to the bottom, then the small temporary work platform would be floated off and the permanent platform, the finished top, 4,000 ton platform, would be floated over the top of the fixed template, Jacked clear of the water and welded off. The complete operation would be rigid and completely welded. There would be no slack or play, no bolt connections of any kind. That was our method at that time. And I think that finishes scheme B. Senator Stennis. Did you hear the testimony yesterday, Mr. Bauer? Mr. Bauer. Yes; I did, sir. Senator Srennis. For contrast and clarification, even though it may be repetitious, just contrast what you have described with what was actually done. I think I know, but some could not be here during all of the testimony. You have described what you would have done. Now tell us what method was used. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 105 Mr. Bauer. I would rather Mr. DeLong would do that, because Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Bauer. May I explain that at the time we went through the method of our construction here, I was engaged in building Texas tower No.2; I was absent most of the time. Senator Stennis. Allright. Mr. DeLong make that contrast for us. Mr. DeLone. The tower, as it was constructed, had some changes. DEVIATIONS FROM ORIGINAL DESIGN CAUSE SERIES OF CHANGES The original tower design had a large diameter what we call pan below, through which, from above the water, you drove piling into the ocean floor, and that was a steel structure, the pilings were driven through, then concrete was tremied, underwater concrete, around the piling so the tower was fixed to the ocean floor. The design, as it was laid out, had a small platform, what we call a temporary plat- form, designed to go out with the structure and upend, so they could then drive their piling—this is the method that we were against, and as Mr. Bauer explained. But after the contract was let, like every contract, people get together and discuss their problems and ways and means of trying to improve the doing of the job. The theory was advanced that the ocean floor was of such material that if they picked something like a 25-foot diameter base, 20 feet deep, and sank it that far into the ground, that it would be a stable struc- ture. And they proceeded on that basis. They made the design changes, which is normal when you start to talk about the problems, and this was done. Again, I say, I do not know from what limited information we have whether it was sound or not, because we assumed that it was because the people that agreed to it—Moran, Proctor— have done many foundations. Then the next change came when the temporary platform was eliminated which, as this structure upended, was supposed to come up with it. It was a light structure—because the template then would sit on the ocean floor, and if it sat unevenly or something like that, you would want a hght weight up here. That is the reason that we came in with a light template originally on our submerged structures, because we wanted a light weight, we did not want to stress the members any more than they had to be stressed. So they eliminated that. Evidently, everybody was in agreement, which is again done every day in trying to work out problems between the contract officer and the engineers and the constructor. But when they eliminated this, they went to the next step. And here is where, like one step leads to another. They decided to bring the main platform in, as the motion picture shows, after the struc- ture had been tipped up, and it was so testified yesterday that it exceeded 4,000 tons. I think our computations at the time, when we objected to the method and said it would be very dangerous to bring the structure—the permanent platform in, even after the legs were fixed—that you would be at the mercy of the sea and a squall or a little storm could come up and you would break up your legs, and just be in trouble. And as the record showed yesterday, it took them 12 hours in which to make the connection. We feel that you are exposed too long to the mercy of the sea in doing that, and you can get in trouble. 106 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 So when the decision was made to use the big work platform and eliminate the small platform, and add 20 feet down below that was going to be sunk into the ocean floor after it was upended, it created a problem because then the bracing which was 25 feet—I believe I am right—25 feet below the water level, 20 feet added on here, plus the draft of the big platform, it was impossible to float it over this tier of bracing. Therefore the next change was made. That was the elimination of this tier of bracing. Senator Stennis. Where you are now pointing ? Mr. DreLone. Yes, sir. Take this brace out, and fold these down, so that they would have clearance in which to come in with the large barge. Now, one of the things that we particularly objected to was the stresses that would come on this tower when it was turned over with all the bracing in. Now, this had a portion removed, and whether it reduced it one-third or not, I would not know, but it made a sub- stantial difference in the stresses that would go on the other two tiers and the remaining members. So the situation, in our estimation, was considerably worsened, if I may use that word. The structure then was floated in and the attachment was made. And in the original design, prior to floating in the main platform and connecting it, with the structure being fixed in the ocean floor, concrete was to be put in around the water line reinforcing it so if the barge hit the legs and so forth they would not cripple, what we call cripple, cave in or something like that. But the method that was followed eliminated the concrete because it could not be put in until after they had the big barge up—that is, the big platform. So you have the unbraced, nonreinforced portion at the waterline. You had also taken out a series of bracing here. So your arm, as your platform was working in the sea, you were working from there down to the second tier of bracing. And where the damage was done, what it was like, what members were overstressed, I would not know. And it would be hard to tell. You can only tell if you have a fracture, but you can’t tell if you are overstressed, because your steel doesn’t show it until it breaks. And what overstressing was done in the turn- ing up, with the members out and so forth Senator Srennis. Right at that point, please point out the braces that were broken when the tower was erected. I think the markers show on the model. Well, perhaps markers don’t show it. Do you know from information which braces were broken in the operation of erecting the tower ? Mr. DeLonc. We understand that the horizontal member was re- moved and brought out separately. The diagonals were laid down and lashed, but still pinned on the leg end. We understand that the lash- ing gave way, and that started another chain reaction causing this pin and that portion which fastened to the leg to break out—just tore it loose from the leg. Senator Stennis. While you are on that point, is it true that the horizontal braces that you have been referring to as having been re- moved before the tower was upended, were later restored ? Mr. DeLonea. That bracing was put back in. Senator Stennis. Put back in. Mr. DreLone. But another thing that happened—the diagonal which is hard to understand why it was not taken off completely and COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 107 replaced the same as the top one, but they probably figured that it would be easier to lash it and bring it back up. But the lashing gave way. And when those diagonals tore loose, they did damage to the connections to the leg. To repair that under water brought on prob- lems, and I agree with Captain Albers that after the repair, you were in serious trouble. I believe that is what Captain Albers testified. Senator STENNIS. That is what he said. Mr. DeLone. And the repair here never did hold. Whether it was improperly designed or improperly installed—when you get into a position like that, I can only say you are in serious trouble. DANGER POINT ESTABLISHED Senator Srennis. Well, if the committee would permit me—and some were not here yesterday and that is the reason I go over this— in attempting to repair the damage done at the time of the upending, is that when the Dardelet bolts were installed? I understand that it is at that point you say that they were in trouble, that the repairs were difficult, and that from that point on, the danger was there. Is that correct ? Mr. DeLone. This was one of the problems that we visualized that could happen to us, and I think somebody had a decision to make, when you found that the braces tore loose, as to whether you should go back to the port and repair Senator Srennis. Now, that is my real question. You are a quali- fied man on this very difficult matter. Faced with the facts as they existed then, what would you have done? Mr. DrLone. Well, I would probably have perspired a little. Senator Stennis. In addition to that, what would you have done? Mr. DreLone. It depends upon how the break was. I would not venture to say that I would take it back because it was a horrible de- cision that had to be made, and I give thanks that I did not have to makeit. I donot know. Senator Stennis. To have returned it to port would have been the way to have completely repaired the damage, isn’t that right? TO ACHIEVE ORIGINAL STRENGTH, REPAIR WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN PORT Mr. DreLone. To restore it to its original state, you could only have done it by bringing it back to the port. Senator Srpnnis. That is the pomt I was going to inquire about. Was there any way to restore it to its original strength without taking it back to port? Mr. DeLone. In my opinion, there was not. To restore it to its original state, you would have to take it back. They were working under water and using Dardelet bolts and things like that are all qaporary repairs. We use them in temporary repairs and work like that. _ Senator Stennis. All right, you proceed if there are other points in connection with that question which you want to discuss. Mr. DeLone. No; I just think that, listening to the testimony and what we know of it, this probably, if there were other fractures or anything loose, was one of the main contributing factors for it to 70733618 108 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 deteriorate so quickly. Because if these collars that they put on did not hold, then the whole structure was working and the sea continually worked on it. Because there is one thing we can all be sure of, the ocean is not going to get tired. You will get tired or metal or any- thing else will tire before the ocean will get tired. That is just the problem you had, it worked on it and OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS Senator Srennis. So that from that point on, it appears, trouble followed on the heels of trouble, so to speak, until the final culmina- tion and collapse. Were the use of Dardelet bolts, and the fact that you had pin connections rather than welding, other contributing factors? Mr. DeLonc. The pins in the ultimate would cause trouble, because, as I say, the sea works on it at all times, causing an impact at the clearance. The original clearance, I understand, was one sixty-fourth. I do not know whether that was enlarged or not, but even at one sixty-fourth, we were absolutely against it. We are against pin con- nections in the ocean, and if the tolerance, as we call it, was increased, it aggravated the situation, or would aggravate it, that much more. Senator Srennts. The next added burden which was imposed on the tower was the addition of above-the-water bracing, is that correct ? Mr. DeLone. This was contrary to the entire theory of the plat- form design and construction. Senator Srennis. It is contrary to the conception of both tower No. 2 and tower No. 4? Mr. DeLone. Because tower No. 4 has the same basis, somewhat the same as tower No. 2 when you take it from the ocean floor and take it from this level. Senator Srennis. All right. Confronted with the facts as they were, when this additional bracing was put in above the water, what was the sound course to follow there? Was there any repair that could have been made, that you think would have been sound? METHOD OF REPAIR SUGGESTED Mr. DeLone. Mr. Chairman, for me to answer the question or make any such statement is something hke Monday morning quarterback- ing. We do not know enough of the situation. When bracing started to give way and so forth, I think that you knew that you were on, as I would say, a short fuse. You were headed for serious trouble, and the only way that it could be done is actually a replacement of the bracing. Then you would have to start in at the top, build up around the legs, up above the water, start smking them down, the same thing you have there. But you would have the sleeve over the legs, then go down with burners and cutting torches and cut these out as you keep sinking. Then progressively from the top, you would work down to the bottom and replace your bracing structure that was giving trouble. After you had it all done, you would grout it in between this leg that is coming down and this leg, and you would have a solid structure. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 109 Senator STrennis. You would replace the old braces with new ones which you would weld in progressively and one at a time. Is that correct ? Mr. DeLone. You would bring them as a section. You would take a whole section, redesign it and lay it nae You would make a caisson or a sleeve that would fit around, full length, that would fit around this pipe. This pipe is 121% feet in diameter so that one would probably be a couple of inches larger. You would make it not too large, but you would try to hold it to a couple of inches that while you were going down, you would still get some support from the structure as you were sliding down. Because this structure, as you were building it, sliding it down, would have to take the place of the structure you were cutting out. You would cut the structure out only ahead of the sinking “of the top structure. Whatever that was you would want to keep, whether some of it broke or not; you would want to get all the benefits you could from it until you "got all the way down. You would have to remove it ahead of the lowering of the section you are doing. So all you are doing, you are floating this braced structure, surrounded by a bigger tube, that this comes down in. As you go down, you are clearing all this up, take that out. Then you have from here to here an unsupported column. You could have hard luck and have a storm and get in serious trouble. But that would be the only way that I could see you could have made some effort to salvage it. Senator Sanronstaty. Mr. Chairman, that would not be a salvage, would it, Mr. DeLong? It would really be building a complete new tower. Mr. DeLone. It would be building new bracing, and that would be a method of saving the tower. Because that is only a portion of the work. It would probably involve 1,800 or 2,000 tons of steel. I am just making a guess. Senator STENNIS. Well, in view of what was testified yesterday and in the light of your testimony today, it seems clear to me that the more practical thing would have been just to abandon the tower when they were confronted with this situation which required putting in the bracing above the water. All right, proceed now with any points that you have in mind, and then we shall go back to Mr. Bauer. Mr. DeLone. I think, Mr. Chairman, that I do not have anything more to add to this. The statement was made that this water depth was impossible and so forth. We do not agree with that. We have offered to build structures in 300 feet of water. We have worked barges in 210 feet of water. It is just a matter of working out the problems. That is all I have to say. Senator Sauronstatu. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ? Senator Stennis. Certainly, Senator. Senator SauronstaLu. Mr. DeLong, did you ever bid on Texas tower No. 4? Mr. DeLonge. Yes, sir, we bid on Texas tower No. 4 Senator Sauronstaty. Did you withdraw that bid when you saw what the plan or design was? Mr. DrLone. We had an agreement to be able to do it under scheme B. That is the scheme that we have described. And under scheme 110 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 B, taking the proper precautions and after considering our estimate of cost, we submitted a tender. Senator Sauronsratt. I am not informed what scheme B is, but T assume that is what you have just described ? Mr. DreLone. Scheme B is where we floated out the template in upright position, which was all welded, and sank it down on the ocean floor. Senator SattonsTALL. I have one other question. Do I understand from your testimony that the fault was not in the design, but in the method of installation and that the resulting damage came from the installation ? AGREEMENT WITH DESIGN Mr. DeLonge. No, the principle of design is not wrong, the K-bracing. Senator Srennis. It is right, you say? Mr. DeLonge. The principle of K-bracing using a triangle struc- ture in deep water is practically the only economical way to do it. Senator Satronstauti. So your criticism is in the method of in- stallation rather than in the design ? Mr. DeLone. The method of pinning, the bracing versus welding, and a tipping of the tower, and the exposure of bringing a big plat- form into the sea and trying to fasten it on the legs and raising it in the air. Senator Satronstatu. So you would only proceed under what you call scheme B, and not under the scheme of installation that was recommended ? Mr. DreLone. That is correct. Senator Sauronstautu. May I ask one more question on physics? Will the strength of the waves in the Atlantic Ocean bring greater pressure on a tower of this kind than the strength of the waves, say, in the Gulf of Mexico? Mr. DeLone. No, I would say they are somewhat comparable. We have had 55 foot waves in the Gulf of Mexico and a 150 mile an hour hurricane at the same time. Senator SauronsraLty. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions. Senator Srennts. Thank you, Senator. The Chair proposes, with the consent of the committee, to let Mr. Bauer finish his statement now. ‘Then we shall have questions, first by members of the com- mittee and then counsel will close on any points that have not been covered. Mr. Bauer, you may proceed. Mr. Bauer. Well, I think that it has been pretty well covered. What I had started to do is compare the two methods, and I think that has been pretty well covered. Senator Srmennis. Well, were there other points that you had in mind that have a bearing on this picture ? Mr. Bauer. No, I do not think so. J think I have completed my statement. Senator Srennis. All right, then. We may now address ques- tions to each of these gentlemen. Frankly, between them, they have covered the points that came to my mind during this hearing, and I think their testimony is much clearer than some of the high-powered prepared statements that we sometimes had to wade through. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 111 Yesterday, I was impressed with the testimony of Dr. Charyk and Captain Albers and with the fact that they were being very clear and frank about these matters. Senator Saltonstall, do you have any questions of these gentlemen ? Senator Santronsrauy. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that I have any further questions. I assume, Mr. DeLong, that you are testifying here now as an ex- pert on this type of structure, and from your experience in ‘Texas tower No. 2, because you did not have personal observation in Texas tower No. 4 after you decided not to go forward with your bid due to the method of installation. Isthat correct? Mr. DreLone. We did bid, Senator, with an alternate scheme of building and erection. Senator Sattonstaty. I could not hear that answer. Mr. DrLone. I said we did bid on Texas tower No. 4, with an alter- nate scheme of erection and construction. Senator Santonstaty. So that when that alternate scheme was re- fused, then you would no longer bid on the other scheme ? Mr. DzeLone. Sir, the alternate scheme was not refused. We were just not low bidder. Senator Sarronstauu. I see. So that your testimony here today 1s as an expert in answering questions as to this method of building the structure rather than from your own experience on the structure / Mr. DeLone. We are here in answer to a subpena, and whether we are experts I think would be a little hard for us to judge. We have been living with these problems for 10 years, but they tell me that an expert 1s a man away from home. Senator Stennis. Yes, Senator, you were detained on other matters. The Chair stated in the ‘beginning that Mr. DeLong was here under a subpena of the committee because of his vast experience with and eiedie of this type of construction. Senator J ackson, have you any questions? Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I merely want to associate myself with the chairman. I think the witnesses here this morning have presented this matter with great clarity and understanding. EXPERIENCE OF DE LONG CORP. IN OFFSHORE PLATFORMS I might just ask this one question: How many of these towers have you put up at sea, not necessarily radar towers but cil drilling and other types of towers at sea, and how long have you been doing this? When did this idéa start, in general ? Mr. DeLone. Since 1949. Senator Jackson. How many have you put up, roughly? Mr. DrLone. Senator, I am just making a guess—50, 55. Senator Jackson. I take it you have had some experience. Mr. DrLone. I can assure you that we have had our pr oblenas, and we anticipate that we are going to have some more as time goes along. Senator Jackson. How deep has the water been at some of the platforms that you have put in? Mr. DrLone. We have worked one off the coast of California in 210 feet of water. At the present time, we are designing a structure to lay a tunnel under the English Channel in 186 feet of water, building submerged tunnel sections, ‘and using a DeLong type platfor m. ley COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Jackson. And your firm is working on that at the present time ? Mr. DeLone. That is correct. Senator Srennis. Mr. DeLong, right at that point, this is a rela- tively new field, is it not, building towers in such deep waters, is that right ? “Mr. DeLone. Well, my only comment on that is the lot of a pioneer is a rugged one. Senator Stennis. Mrs. Smith, we shall be glad to hear from you. Senator Smrru. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I have no questions. Senator Srennis. Senator Bartlett ? . Senator Bartierr. I have no questions, either, Mr. Chairman, thank you. ~ Senator Srennis. The Chairman will call on Counsel Kendall here, and Mr. French, who prepared a good dea! of this information. Mr. Kenpauu. Getting back to the imbedment question, if these legs were not embedded deeply enough, Mr. DeLong, would that contribute to a swaying of the platform ? Mr. DeLone. That is a little difficult question to answer. If the legs were not embedded deeply enough, they would be moving, and as the waves hit the towers, the leg on that side would come up and then come back down. If that condition arose, why, I think you would have problems very quickly. Mr. Kenpatu. Would that question be affected one way or the other by the presence or absence of driven piling ? Mr. DeLone. The driving of piling and concreting them into the bottom of the tower is to operate as an anchor, and also as a load- bearing member. I feel that the question is in relation to tower No. 4, and from what I understand, the footings were in solid position. Mr. Krnpatt. Would that necessarily indicate that there had not been any scouring or sucking action under those footings ? Mr. DeLone. Well, I think it would be. It would be hard to check whether the footings had moved in the sea, down there 185 feet, and 150 feet or 175 feet from one leg to another, whether they are in a true plane to one another, I think, would be a little hard to check. As I understand from the divers’ report the footings appeared undis- turbed. So we are assuming that the footings withstood the elements. Mr. Krenpaty. Well, the situation here, Mr. DeLong, is that, during the course of construction, a change was made to eliminate the pilings and to reduce the embedment of the legs from 20 to 18 feet. What is your opinion as to the effect of those changes as contributing to any motion or swaying of the tower ? ; Mr. DrLone. Mr. Kendall, I do not think that T could express an opinion. I think they were competent foundation people, who analyzed the problem, and I think I would be out of order in trying to second-guess what they did. . Mr. Kenpatu. Do you not have an opinion on that question, as a man experienced and well versed in this field ? Mr. DrLone. Well, you take a tower and put it in the ocean, and the height is 250 feet, from the ocean floor to the bottom of the plat- form, and in sand, and you excavate the footings only 18 or 20 feet, I would say that you would have to be an awful bold man to do it. Because on the tower No. 2, we went in 48 feet, and it is common knowledge that in the Gulf of Mexico, we get scour around the struc- COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 113 tures of 8 to 10 feet. It is also something to worry about that when you put an obstruction down there 25 feet in diameter and the current probably going around it, that it will erode. But I am also quite sure that the design engineer has taken that all into consideration. That is why I say I would not want to be presumptuous enough to question it. But not knowing anything about it and having the experi- ence of the others, why, it appears that you are on awful shaky assumptions that 18 or 20 feet is enough. But I can say again that the design engineer probably has taken all that into consideration, and that there was no erosion and that the footings are in place, from those facts, you can assume that he was correct. Mr. Kenpaut. But he would fall into your designation of a bold man, I believe you said. Mr. DeLone. Well, it is bolder than I would want to be. Mr. Kenpatu. So I take it you would not design the tower to be so constructed ¢ Mr. DrLone. I do not believe that that is an easy one for me to answer. Mr. Kenpaty. Well, let us go to a slightly different question, Mr. DeLong. From the standpoint of future experience, particularly with reference to towers No. 2 and No. 3, for example, which are still stand- ing, do you think it would be worth the expense to go down and recover samples of the caissons and make footing measurements, and so forth, to determine exactly what happened upon the collapse of the tower? Mr. DeLone. Well, Mr. Kendall, I do not know how you mean that. Talking purely from the DeLong Corp., it would not mean anything to us. Mr. Kenpau. Not even in relation to towers No. 2 and No. 3? Mr. DeLong. No; towers No. 2 and No. 83—No. 3 was built the same as No. 2. I do not think there are any problems. We feel confident there are no problems with tower No. 2, and I think that No. 3 was constructed as the design engineers drew it up, and so forth, and there should be no problems with tower No. 3. Your problems are very simple on tower No. 4; itis accumulation. Mr. Kenpatx. Mr. DeLong, this so-called tip-up method of erec- tion, that is a patented process, is it not? Mr. Kuss holds a patent on that process ? KUSS TIP-UP METHOD OF ERECTION OBJECTIONABLE TO DELONG Mr. DeLone. So we understand, but I do not think that he made any charge for it or anything like that. But it is the Kuss method. Mr. Krnvatu. Do I understand you to say that if the Kuss method ae been insisted upon, you would have refused to bid upon tower 0. 42 Mr. DrLone. That is absolutely correct. If we did not have an understanding that we could use an alternate scheme, we would not have bid. Mr. Kenpauy. With whom did you have that understanding, and at what point in time ? Mr. DsLone. Our chief engineer worked with the design engineers. Mr. Kenpauu. That was Mr. Suderow ? 114 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. DeLone. That was Mr. Suderow, yes. And we worked out the methods. It was his job to get the approval. We got the approval verbally, and so stated to our associate, Raymond Concrete Pile. We accepted it and submitted a tender on No. 4. Mr. Kenpatu. This was prior to the receipt of bids? Mr. DeLonge. It was prior to the receipt of bids. In fact, our joint venture agreement, and memorandum of agreement of equipment, was written on October 28, 2 or 3 days before the bid. Mr. Kenpatn. You say you had a memorandum of agreement ? Mr. DeLone. Yes, between us in the joint venture. Mr. Kenpati. What was the date of that ? < Mr. DreLone. October 28. Mr. Kenpaui. We would like you to make a copy of that available for the record, if you do not mind. We have a copy you furnished us under subpena. Mr. DeLone. The memorandum of agreement between the joint venture ? Senator Srennis. Without objection, this will be admitted in the record. (The documents referred to are as follows:) THIS MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made and entered into this 28th day of October 1955 by and between RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation, hereinafter known as ““Raymond”, and Dr LONG CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, hereinafter known as “DeLong” ; WITNESSETH : WHEREAS RAyMOND and Dr Lone have heretofore entered into a Joint Venture Agreement under the name ‘“RAyMoNnpD-Dre Lone” for the erection and construc- tion with the Bureau of Yards & Docks of the United States Government for Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4 and such other Texas Towers as may subsequently be awarded by the United States Government, and, WHEREAS Said Joint Venture will employ methods and jacking equipment solely owned by Dr Lone CorporaTION and protected by United States Patent Applications Nos. 143,627, 283,567, 523,323 and other United States and foreign patent applications filed by DE LoNG CoRPOoRATION, and, WHEREAS it is contemplated that the Joint Venture will use Dre Lone jacks in the erection and construction of said Texas Towers, which jacks shall be the sole and separate property of Dr Lone. Now THEREFORE, FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the premises and the mutual agreement of the parties hereto it is agreed by and between RAyMOND and DE Lone as follows: I De Lone shall furnish to RAyYMoND-DE Lone, a Joint Venture, the use of twen- ty-two (22) Dr Lone Air Jacks, presently employed on Texas Tower #2 being Contract NOy-88201, for a rental price of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per month per jack provided that said rental charge shall not exceed the sum of forty-nine thousand five hundred dollars ($49,500.00) per tower or a total rental charge of one hundred forty-eight thousand five hundred dollars ($148,500.00) for Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4. Raymonp-DsE Lone shall store, repair and maintain said Air Jacks and keep in good operating condition the same as when received, less reasonable wear and tear while in their possession. Upon removal from the Towers and completion of the usage under Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4, the Air Jacks shali be returned to Orange, Texas by the Joint Venture. eT Dr Lone shall manufacture and furnish to RayMonpD-DrE Lone twelve (12) Dr Lone Pin Jacks employing the hydraulic principle embodied in United States Patent Application Serial No. 523,323. A lump sum rental charge of eighty-six thousand four hundred dollars ($86,400.00) shall be charged against the Joint Venture by Dr Lone for the use of said Pin Jacks on Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4. ‘Title to said Pin Jacks shall be and remain the sole and separate COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 115 property of Dr Lone. The storage, repair, maintenance and shipment of the Jacks, together with installation cost on the Towers shall be for the account of the Joint Venture. Upon completion of Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4 said Pin Jacks shall be returned to Orange, Texas by the Joint Venture. Ill It is contemplated that RaymMonp-Dr Lone shall manufacture or cause to be manufactured for use on Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4 a dual purpose supply barge or a single purpose supply barge employing the specialized principle of the De Lone Air Jacks. Said barge shall be manufactured by RayMoOND-DE LoNG and considered as Joint Venture property. It is estimated that the total cost of the dual purpose supply barge shall not exceed three hundred thirty-three thou- sand and 00/100 dollars ($333,000.00) and the total cost of the single purpose supply barge shall not exceed one hundred eighty-two thousand and 00/100 dollars ($182,000.00). A minimum write-off of seventy-five per cent (75%) of the total cost of the dual purpose supply barge or fifty per cent (50%) of the single purpose supply barge shall be written off by the Joint Venture against Texas Towers #1, #3 and #4. Upon completion of said contract and if it appears that there is no further use for the barge by the parties acting tegether, Dr Lone agrees to purchase the barge at its depreciated book value provided that it can- not be sold to any bidder at a higher price. For the use of all jacks provided herein, Dr Lone shail charge RAYMOND-DE LONG a royalty charge of one percent (1%) based on the totai centract price including extras of Texas Towers #1, 3, and 4 or such other Texas Towers contract as may be subsequently entered into by the Joint Venture with the United States Government, provided that said royalty charge shall not exceed the fixed sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) per Tower on Texas Towers #1, 3, and 4. It is understood and agreed that the one per- cent (1%) royalty charge above mentioned and the jack rental provided for under Article I shall not be due and payable by the Joint Venture to De Lone on Texas Towers #1, 3, and 4 until the net profits of the Joint Yenture, ex- cluding royalty or jack rental charges under Article I, exceed twelve and one- half percent (12144%). Said payments shail be due and payable only from the net profits of the Joint Venture as defined herein in excess of twelve and one-half percent (1214%). The term “net profits” shali be defined to inciude the total contract price including extras less all costs similar to Item I to VIII and other field cost specified on Exhibit E, page I of the RAYMOND-DE LONG proposal submitted to the Bureau of Yards and Docks on Texas Towers #2, Contract NOy- 88201. In computing “net profits” for the purpose of this Article only, no de- duction shali be made for General and Administrative Expense (main of- fice overhead of both RayMonD and DE Lone or the royalty or jack rental costs due Dr Lone under Article I. On Texas Towers #1, 3, and 4 the royalty and jack rental charge shall be paid from all net profits over and above twelve and one-half percent (1244%) until the total royalty and jack rental charge pro- vided for herein has been paid. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and seals this 28th day of October, 1955. RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE COMPANY, By G. EF. FERrIs. Attest: H. O. FEDERA, Secretary. Dr Lone CorRPoRATION, L. B. De Lone. Attest: Epwarp A. Fay, Secretary. THis JoIntT VENTURE AGREEMENT entered into this 28th day of October 1955, by and between RAYMOND CONCRETE Pitt COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation (here- inafter referred to as “Raymond”’) and DELONG CorPoRATION, a Delaware cor- poration (hereinafter referred to as “DeLong’’), WITNESSETH : WHEREAS the parties in a Joint Venture were awarded Contract NOy—88201, for the construction of an air raid warning platform designated as the “Texas Towers” platform located on George’s Bank, and have substantially completed said contract, and 116 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 WHEREAS the Navy has requested proposals for three additional Texas Towers to be erected, and WuHer#AsS it is the desire of both parties to enter into a new Joint Venture for the bidding and, if awarded a contract, the furnishing and erection of said Texas Towers, or any of them on which they may be successful bidders, Now THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the mutual obli- gations of each to the other, it is agreed as follows: 1. Raymond and DeLong hereby associate themselves into and as a Joint Venture for the purpose of preparing and submitting to the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the United States Navy, a proposal to furnish, erect, and install three (3) air control and warning towers, referred to as TT-1, TT-38 and TT4, or any of them, and other work that may be included in such a program and if awarded a contract for such work, to jointly perform said contract by furnish- ing, erecting and installing said control towers, or any of them, in accordance with the contract so awarded. The contract and the work thereunder is here- after referred to as the “Project”. 2. The interests of Raymond and DeLong in and to the Joint Venture and in and to all property, materials and equipment acquired in connection therewith shall be in proportion of fifty per cent (50%) to Raymond and fifty per cent (50%) to DeLong. 3. Ali net profits of whatsoever kind and character received from the per- formance of the Joint Venture and any and all losses resulting therefrom shall be participated in and shared equally by the parties hereto in the proportion of fifty per cent (50%) each. 4. All obligations and liabilities of any kind or character which are assumed or undertaken by the parties hereto or either of them in connection with or for the benefit of the Joint Venture shall be shared in the proportion of fifty per cent (50%) each by the parties hereto, but no obligation or liability of any kind shall be incurred for or charged to the Joint Venture by either party without the express consent of the other party. Included as costs against the Joint Venture shall be the charges agreed to in the memorandum agreement signed by the parties this 28th day of October, 1955 with regard to patent royalties and rental for air jacks and pin jacks and rentals for supply barges. 5. All necessary working capital when and as required for the performance and prosecution of the Joint Venture and the Project shall be furnished by the parties hereto equally. 6. All funds advanced by Raymond or DeLong and all funds received for the performance of the contract and the Project shall be deposited in such bank or banks as the parties hereto may agree upon from time to time and be held for their joint account, subject to withdrawal by such person or persons as the parties hereto may from time to time designate. 7. The parties hereto shall both make available for this work the technical advice and benefits of their individual experiences and shall in all cther re- spects endeavor to share the responsibility and burden of the performance of the work. To that end, each of the parties shall furnish to the Project such of its personnel and equipment as may be required for the performance of the Project, and as either of the parties may be able to spare without detriment to its other business. Raymond shall make available the administrative and accounting personnel. 8. Neither Raymond nor DeLong shall make any charge against the Joint Venture for the time which may be expended in connection with the performance of the Project or for any services rendered on behalf of the Project (other than for mutually approved actual out-of-pocket expenses and for plant rental as hereinafter provided) nor shall either Raymond or DeLong be entitled to com- pensation or reimbursement for any part of the salaries of their executives or other officers or employees, or for any part of their general overhead expenses except where such executive officer or employee is assigned to the Project by mutual agreement. 9. No charge shall be made for rental of equipment furnished to the Project except upon terms to be mutually agreed upon. 10. A complete set of books and accounts correctly and adequately reflecting the business transactions of the Joint Venture shall be kept in accordance with good accounting practices which shall be open to the inspection of either party at any reasonable time. 11. Upon the termination of this Project, the parties hereto shall liquidate the assets of the Joint Venture and shall render a true and correct accounting, COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Nez. each to the other, of all expenses incurred on account of the performance of the Project and of all moneys or other property received as a result thereof, and the parties mutually agree upon the termination of the Project and the Joint Venture to settle and adjust all accounts in connection therewith and to pay each to the other such sums as will result in each of the participants receiving fifty percent (50%) of the profits or bearing fifty percent (50%) of the losses arising therefrom. 12. It is specifically understood and agreed between the parties hereto that this Joint Venture Agreement extends only to the performance of the Project together with any changes or additions thereto or extra work thereunder. In no event shall this Agreement extend to or cover any other or different work. 13. Neither Raymond nor DeLong shall sell, assign or in any manner transfer its interest or any part thereof in this Joint Venture without first obtaining the written consent of the other Joint Venturer; and any attempted assignment without such consent shall be void. 14. In the event that a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or other custodian of the property or franchises of either of the parties shall be appointed or if either of the parties shall be declared a bankrupt or insolvent or be dissolved, then and in any such case the other party shall have the right at its option to exclude the insolvent party, its successors, receivers or legal representatives from further participation in the management of the Joint Venture and may take over the interest of that party in the Joint Venture (but without prejudice to the obliga- tion of that party or its representative to bear his proportionate share of the loss resulting or to result from the Joint Venture) and shall in addition have the right at its option to wind up the affairs of the Joint Venture and in that con- nection to carry on and complete the performance of the contract. Upon com- pletion or sooner termination of the contract and receipt of payments therefor under the contract, the party not insolvent shall account to the insolvent party or its representatives and such party shall pe entitled to receive an amount equal to the sums advanced by such party plus such party’s proportionate share of any profits earned and received to the date when such party was excluded from the Joint Venture or less such party’s proportionate share of the losses resulting from the performance of the contract whether before or after the date when such party was excluded from the Joint Venture. In the event that the share of the losses chargeable to the party so affected exceeds the sums advanced by such party toward the working funds of the Joint Venture, such party or its representative shall promptly pay the excess 'to the remaining party. The books of the Joint Venture shall be conclusive in establishing whether a profit has been realized or a loss sustained and the amount thereof. 15. The obligations herein assumed by each party are solely fer the benefit of the other party of this Agreement and are not intended to, and shall not, enure to the benefit of any other person, firm or corporation. 16. This Agreement is entered into in the City of New York, State of New York, and shall be governed in all respects by New York law. 17. All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement or the breach or claimed breach hereof shall be finally settled under the rules of the American Arbitration Association of New York State. In WitNess WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement under their seais the day and year first above written. Attest: RAYMOND CONCRETE PILE COMPANY, By G. F. Frrris. H. O. Fepera, Secretary. Attest : DELONG CORPORATION, By L. B. DE Lone Epwarp A. Fax, Secretary. Mr. Kenpatz. In other words, Mr. DeLong, I understand that you were not actually bidding tower No. 4 as it appeared in the designs and specifications, is that correct ? Mr. DeLone. That is correct. Mr. Kenpartz. And you would have not constructed it in that manner even 1f you had bid low? Mr. DrLone. On our setup, I do not think we could have done it. 118 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatzi. Was your understanding with any person other than someone in the Moran, Proctor firm? The contracting officer, for example, would not you have to have that understanding with him? Mr. DeLona. Well, I listened to the contracting officer’s statements yesterday, and I do not feel I want to take exception to him. He said he did not have any understanding. I did not talk to the con- tracting officer myself about it. It was handled by Mr. Suderow, and I accepted the contract officer’s statement that Mr. Suderow did not have an understanding with him but had an understanding with the design engineers. You want to remember, we were consulted on the first one and helped work out the problems on Texas tower No, 2, such as taking out the bracing and the method of erection, and so forth. So the relationship was friendly, cooperative, and we felt no hesi- tation, after the method was discussed with the design engineers, and if you will look in your copy of the Design and Construction Report, at figure 48, as constructed, you will see part of the method in there for scheme B. But I will say that Captain Albers, no doubt, is correct when he says that he did not have a definite understanding. Mr. Kenpati. Do you have any other documentation of the fact that you did not bid and did not propose to construct tower No. 4 if successful as it was designed? Did you have any plans or drawings? Mr. DeLone. We have dr awings that we submitted to you, on the method of installation. The date of them is October 26 or something like that, our last erection drawings. We had another method that we prefer, which we would use in dee per water, but our chief engineer was unable to get approval on that method, so we went to the method that we put our r tender in on, on scheme B. Mr. Kenpati. Would you explain briefly what those drawings are, and make them a part of the record, sir, and give the dates again? (The drawings referred to are shown facing this page.) Mr. DrLone. We have a drawing here dated September 30, 1955, which is the method that the DeLong Corp. would employ today put- ting structures into 200 or 300 feet of water. But our chief e engineer reported to us that there were certain objections; the design engineers were not happy about it. They thought they did not want to go along, so we worked out the alternate scheme of taking pam of their tower the way they had lined it out, and do it in a method that we could live with and feel that we would be successful in it, and have it under control. After all, it is dated the 17th day of October 1955. This drawing is the basis for the agreement between the joint ven- turers, Raymond Concrete Pile at that time, a the Raymond Inter- national, who were our co-venturers on tower No. . 2, as to how we would do it, as to what equipment, what special jacks to raise the structures, and so forth, how it would be written off, special barges, and things like that. Mr. Kewpati. Were these drawings or plans submitted to the design engineer and the Navy? Mr. DsLonc. W ell, the drawing dated October 17 is in the book as ficure 48. Mr. Kenpaty. That is the design and construction report that you refer to? Mr. DreLone. Yes, sir. ee 70793 O-61 (Face p. 118) No. 2 PLAN \WIEW TEMPORARY PLATFORI4 1 a x TEMpAT. Hontng aw IPLAT "Une To_pe7 Toh le (POE, LATFO! WER TEMPORARY PLATEORM REMOVED PERMANENT Te eee # TP 7 DipTroeH lore OVER TEMPLATE WITH QnTeol 7oNnERS WITH _TEHPORARY PATE M/ TEMPLATE, JACKED UP £ PI DRIVEN DEAHOUSE ED. = WADED OFF PLATFORM cape ToP YoKe Brags Caisson x i PLATFoum MULL Tor Youe —) BAAsing Caisson Tetenany Caisson ly J =a PRATFORm AUka Se SS ae Staswe Canine |! 4 £MOse Bascive 7 f af [DE LONG GORPORATION | 29 BROADWAY NY. 6. N.Y. i oF RAISING ' METHOD OF . Ecevation B. A DEEP WATER PLATFORM. || SPOT wehnke ys Beenie 70733 O -61 (Face p. 118) No. + COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 119 Mr. Kenpaur. Well, I take it, then, your answer is what? I am talking about prior to the bidding on November 1. Were they sub- mitted to the design engineer and the Navy, or either one of them ? Mr. DreLone. Mr. Kendall, they would not have been submitted after the tender. Mr. Kenpau. Let us see if we cannot answer this responsively, Mr. DeLong. I take it your answer is either yes or no. Now let us get the yes or no. Mr. DeLone. The reason my answer is the way it is is because it was handled by our chief engineer, and I personally did not handle it or have the agreement or present the papers. Mr. Kenpatyi. You received a report from your engineer, did you not ? Mr. DeLone. That is correct; that it was approved and it was agreed on. Mr. Kenpaui. Approved by whom ? Mr. DrLone. I have to go back and try to talk to some other people and so forth, but I know one was Mr. Rutledge, the design engineer. Whether it was with Captain Albers—evidently not, because Captain Albers said that he had no prior agreement. But the design engineers submitted it in their design criteria, method of construction, and so forth. So I think it was between the design engineer and ourselves, and that there was no question in my chief engineer’s mind or the de- sign engineer’s mind that the contracting officer would not approve itp Mr. Kenpatu. In reviewing the bids that were received you were low on everything but Texas tower No. 4, or any combination where Texas tower No. 4 was involved ? Mr. DeLong. I believe that is correct. Mr. Kenpauy. Well, can you explain why you should be low on towers No. 1 and No. 3, and more than a million dollars higher on tower No. 4? Is there any reason for that that you can give us? Mr. DeLone. Well, I think it is probably an evaluation of the problems that made a difference. We made an estimate, evaluated all the problems, the special equipment that we would have to use and so forth, and put it in our estimate, a fair bid and we were not successful. In the comparison of bids, tower No. 4 and tower No. 3 on the face of it, makes you think it was lack of knowledge because the figures are very close together, one tower with another, and one tower is in 80 feet and one tower is in 185 feet. DEPTH OF WATER IS IMPORTANT COST FACTOR IN BIDDING Mr. Kenpatu. In other words, the greater depth of the water con- tributed to a substantially increased cost; is that what you mean? Mr. DeLone. Always does. Mr. Kenpatyi. Mr. DeLong, to get back to the erection process for a moment, would you say that the loss of those diagonals during tow was a serious structural mishap ? Mr. DeLone. Will you repeat the question, please ? Mr. Kenpatyi. Would you say the loss of those diagonals during the tow or erection was a serious structural mishap or defect ? Mr. DeLone. This, I would say, was quite a disaster. 120 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpaty. The chairman asked this question, Mr. DeLong: Is it not a fact that if that had happened to you, you would have taken that tower back to port for repairs ? Mr. DeLone. That question I think I answered to the chairman. Mr. Kenpatu. I think you declined to answer it, and I think you havea very definite opinion on it right now. Mr. DeLonc. I would not know. I do not know what my decision would be; yes, sir. To be perfectly frank, we would probably have a meeting to see what could be done and so forth. To say that I would definitely go back to the harbor, I would be making a state- ment that I do not know the answer to. Senator SatronsTaLu. I value your testimony more when you give that answer than if you had given an answer yes or no. Mr. DeLone. Well, Senator, you really do not know. Senator Satronsrauy. I said I respect all your testimony because you did not answer it. Mr. DeLone. Thank you. Senator Stennis. Proceed, Mr. Kendall. Mr. Kenpaty. May I have just a moment ? Senator Srennis. Certainly. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. DeLong, I do not want to belabor this matter, and certainly I do not want to embarrass you. The point was made in my original question, and I can understand that you do not care to say bluntly what you would have done, because you did not face those facts. However, on your other testimony and your knowledge and ex- perience, I very definitely get the impression that you would certainly have leaned toward taking the tower back for repair or rebuilding. Is that correct ? Mr. DeLone. Mr. Chairman, you see the problem that would face you at that time. If you went back, you would open what we have referred to as a Pandora’s box. You would say, “Well, I had this problem once, will I have it again?” So your natural reaction would be to try to tough it out, stay there and try to repair it and do some- thing with it. If I were committed to this course, that would be my reaction. If I were in this position, I would make every effort to stay there. Senator Stennis. That is the next point. As you have expressed it, having been committed to that course—you mean by that the method of erection, I assume ? Mr. DreLone. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. In other words, if I understand you correctly, if you had gone back for repairs and had continued to follow that method of erection, you could have been confronted with the same problem again ? Mr. DrLone. That is correct, sir. You might be. You might at that time leave the diagonals off instead of trying to lash them, which is—that decision to lash them is not an unreasonable one, because to take them off, you would have to make another pin connection down there. Senator Stennis. If they had taken them off before they upended the tower, they would still have had the problem of putting them on under water; is that what you mean ? Mr. DrLonc. They still have the problem of putting the top pin in. That is the pin in here [indicating]. But they evidently made COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 121 the decision, and I would not say we would not make the same de- cision. But if we had made it, we would have had the problem of say- ing, “Boys, we wish we had taken it off, because we had the other connection to make.” Since you had to make the connection anyway, it would be one more. Senator Stennis. By that line of reasoning, this problem goes back to the method selected in getting the tower in place ? Mr. Del.one. Well, Mr. Chairman, we just disagreed with the method. KUSS METHOD OF ERECTING CREATED PROBLEMS Senator Srennis. Well, it is a fair statement, is it not, to say that this trouble actually goes back to the method selected in putting this tower into position 4 That is the way it looks to me, as a layman, based on the testimony that I have heard here. As I understand your concept of this thing, that was the wrong method by which to erect it, and the facts have certainly proved that something was seriously wrong. Mr. DeLone. Mr. Chairman, under our method we would not have faced these problems. Senator Stennis. I know you would not. Mr. DeLone. That was our objection to it to start with. We were visualizing and foreseeing problems that could arise like this, and worse. Senator Stennis. That is correct. Well, I think that is clear. You have made that clear. I shall not press that point any more. It seems obvious to me. Senator Jackson, do you have anything further ? Senator Jackson. No further questions. Senator Srennis. Senator Bartlett? Senator Bartierr. No, sir. Senator Stennis. Mr. Kendall? Mr. Kenpati. Mr. DeLong, had this Kuss tipup method ever been used before this time? Mr. DeLone. Not to my knowledge. Mr. Kenpatn. Has it ever been used since this time? Mr. DeLone. I would not know. oe Kenpatu. As far as you know, has it ever been used since that time? Mr. DreLone. I would not know. Mr. Kenpatu. I would like you to comment, if you will, on the state- ment that Captain Albers made yesterday when he said the system DeLong submitted was not suitable for use on tower No. 4. Mr. DeLone. On Texas tower No. 4? Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. Mr. DreLone. Well, I think the only one we are talking about is the scheme B, the scheme that he no doubt heard about, and probably in his opinion, it was not suitable for tower No. 4. Mr. Kennatr. In your opinion, was your scheme entirely workable and suitable? Mr. DeLone. We had taken their design, taken the risks, as we saw it in our opinion, out of it, made it a welded structure, and said we mou put it in, that the end tower would be as they called for in the plans. 122 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. That is all that I have. Senator Srennis. While these gentlemen are conferring here, we are nearing the end of your testimony, and of Mr. Bauer’s testimony. For the committee, I certainly want to thank you for coming here. Your testimony has been very revealing and very frank, apparently, and it has been helpful to the committee. As I said in the beginning, we are not looking for someone to punish or to blame. The question involved is the strength of our defenses, the avoidance of these mis- haps in the future, and the proper expenditure of the appropriated dollar. We thank you very much and commend you, too, for what I consider to be very frank, honest and fearless effort to throw light on this sit- uation. Do you have another question ? Mr. Kenpauu. One question, yes, sir. Senator Srennis. All right. Mr. Kenpautu. Mr. DeLong, I direct your attention to the model there, to the red diagonal strands, that represent proposed cable brac- ing to replace two panels of K bracing. Do you have any judgment as to the adequacy or suitability of that? CABLE BRACING INADEQUATE Mr. DeLonge. I have an opinion on it. Mr. Krenpauyi. Would you express it, please, sir. Mr. DeLone. It would not do any good. Mr. Krenpatx. You mean the cable bracing would not do any good, or that your opinion would not do any good ? Mr. DreLone. The cable stretches. As it gets stressed and so forth, it stretches. It might save the day for another week or month or 2 months, or something like that. Senator Srennis. But it would eventually stretch and be of no use, is that right? Mr. DeLone. Absolutely. Senator Stennis. All right. Anything else? Mr. Kenna. No, sir. Senator Stennis. All right, thank you again, gentlemen, for the committee. We appreciate very much your appearance here. The committee proposes to proceed, if you have other witnesses. Mr. Kenpatu. We have nothing further for today, sir. Senator Srennis. All right, sir. Again thank you and all the others who attended yesterday as witnesses. This is not a law suit, but if there is any further point that the Navy wants to make with reference to this matter, they certainly will have an opportunity to do so. If there is no further business to come before the subcommittee, we shall take a recess subject to the call of the Chair. (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.) INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1961 U.S. SENATE, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CoMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Bartlett, Jackson, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Smith) met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room 235, Old Senate Office Build- ing, Senator John Stennis presiding. Present : Senators Stennis, Bartlett, and Saltonstall. Staff members, Preparedness Investigating subcommittee: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Stuart P. French, professional staff member. Senator Srennis. All right, the subcommittee will come to order. We are very glad indeed to have all our guests, and we want always to have open hearings when we can. But we do want the cooperation of everyone with reference to having reasonable quiet so that everyone can hear and attention can be given. The committee has a rule that all witnesses who testify before it are sworn, so I am going to ask all those who are going to testify, so far as is now known, to stand and be sworn. We want the reporter to be able to report all your names. Do you, and each of you solemnly swear that your testimony in all of these proceedings will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Captain Wuirtr. I do. Commander Foster. I do. Mr. Crockett. I do. Senator Stennis. Turn your names in, now, to the reporter, please, -and I shall read a brief opening statement. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee today resumes its inquiry into the reasons why Texas Tower No. 4 collapsed. This offshore platform, designed as an extension of our early warning radar system, fell into the Atlantic in January of this year. Twenty- eight lives were lost. We have heard the testimony of the Air Force, which had charge of operating the tower; the Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks, which constructed it; and the architectural firms which have partici- pated in the Texas tower programs. All, more or less, have added credence to the facts uncovered by the subcommittee which tend to show that the tower’s nickname “Old Shaky,” should have given rise to its abandonment long before it fell ‘into the ocean. 123 70733—61——9 124 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Evidence heard during the first 2 days of hearing has pointed to, the method of putting the tower in position as the beginning of the end. Also, evidence has been offered which has led the subcommittee to question the structural integrity of the tower at the time it went into operation because of damage sustained when it was placed on its per- manent site some 80 miles from shore. Several additional questions have been raised thus far. One deals with the underwater repairs which may have permitted some motion in the tower’s bracing system and which, in turn, may have caused a gradual deterioration of the tower. Another question deals with the pin connections used in construc- tion. A pioneer in the design and construction of offshore, open sea platforms told the subcommittee that, in his judgment, pin connec- tions should not have been used in the design. We are not questioning the concept of a three-legged braced struc- ture. This theory has been proved both feasible and practical—as evidenced in the design and construction of Texas towers No. 2 and No. 3, which are still standing and upon which great reliance has been placed by the Air Force, the operating agency. The subcommittee hopes the witnesses to be heard today and in subsequent open hearing will place in the record additional pertinent facts that will help the subcommittee determine all of the circum- stances surrounding the design, construction, and repair of Texas tower No. 4, which may have led to its collapse. Today, we expect to hear the following witnesses: (1) Comdr. Edmund R. Foster, of the Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. Navy, who was the resident officer in charge of construction from January 1957 until November of that same year when the tower was turned over to the Air Force, and remained in that assignment until August 1959. (2) Capt. Thomas J. White, who has been district public works officer, Ist Naval District, since January 1960. (3) Alan Crockett, of Marine Contractors, Inc., who made two or three underwater inspections or surveys of the tower while it was still standing in order to check its structural stability. After the tower fell he went underwater and made examinations to determine the cause. The Chair wishes to reiterate that it is the position of the subcom- mittee that we will not intentionally go into the question of command responsibility which is involved in the proceeding that has been brought by the Air Force against some of its officers. In attempting to prevent that, we have agreed upon a cutoff date of January 12, this year. This will be adhered to as closely as possible. On that date, which was 3 days before the unfortunate collapse of the tower, a conference was held, the facts were considered, and there were cer- tain exchanges of thought. The proceedings and charges against the officers and their defense are altogether matters for the Air Force in accordance with established procedures. We want to protect the Air Force and protect the rights of these men. We do not want to prejudice or interfere with the Air Force proceedings in any manner. We shall keep that in mind and want to. " COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 125 keep the public advised of our position. I make that statement again so that all concerned will know. I appreciate the presence of all you gentlemen and the cooperation that has been shown by the Navy and by the Air Force. TESTIMONY OF COMDR. EDMUND R. FOSTER, CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS, U.S. NAVY, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. W. C. G. CHURCH (CEC), U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR CONSTRUCTION, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS; GORDON EDWARDS, CONSTRUC- TION MANAGEMENT ENGINEER, BUREAU CF YARDS AND DOCKS; JAMES AYERS, UNDERWATER CONSULTANT; AND CAPT. WILL J. DAVIS, U.S. NAVY, LEGAL OFFICER, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS Senator Stennis. Commander Foster, I understand that you flew in here from Guam ? Commander Fosrrr. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. We appreciate very much the fact that you are here. I understand that you have a prepared statement; am I correct ? Commander Fosrrr. Yes, I do, Senator. Senator Stennis. Do you wish to read that statement, or put it in the record and summarize it? We shall do whatever is your pleasure. Commander Fostrr. I would prefer to read it, Mr. Chairman, if that is agreeable. i Senator Srennis. Very well. Proceed in your own way, Commander. Commander Fosrrr. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Edmund Foster, commander, U.S. Naval Civil Engineer Corps. I have been a civil engineer since graduation from Pennsylvania State College in 1935, where I majored in structural engineering. I have 18 years’ experience in the Civil Engineer Corps of the Navy, much of which has been spent in the field of construction. Prior to joining the Navy, I was for 7 years an engineer with the Tennessee Valley Authority, progressing from engineering draftsman to the design and construction of heavy structures as a structural engineer. Senator Stennis. Commander, excuse me. Senator Saltonstall, this is Commander Foster, who has flown in from Guam to be our witness today. Senator SattonsraLtu. Thank you, Senator. Commander Fosrrer. I am presently on duty at Guam in the office of the officer in charge of Navy construction in the Guam area. I reported to my present duty station September 20, 1959, from the district public works office at the Ist Naval District at Boston, Mass. At Boston I was the assistant officer in charge of construction and as such was the officer immediately responsible for the construction of Texas tower No. 4, and the work later required to correct the deficien- cies that developed in the summer and fall of 1958. When I arrived at Boston to relieve Capt. John Albers, the design phases of the tower had been completed, the contracts for construc- tion had been let to J. Rich Steers/Morrison-Knudsen, and the con- struction of the tower was underway, in that the assembly of the plat- 126 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 form was pretty well along and work on the legs was in its initial hases. P By and large, in the discharge of my responsibility, I adhered to the original plans and specifications under which the contract had been let. There were, however, two changes and one installation in- jury repair which I approved and which I believe are pertinent to these hearings. DEVIATION FROM DESIGN IN PERMITTING INCREASED TOLERANCES IN PIN CONNECTIONS Shortly after I took over, and before moving to the site, the con- tractor requested increase in tolerance between the diameters of the holes and the pins which comprised the connections to the bracing and to the legs. Specifically he requested an increase from one sixty- fourth of an inch to one-sixteenth of an inch for all pins except those which required placement under water. For the latter the contractor requested a difference in diameter of one-eighth of an inch between the pin and the holé. This request of the contractor grew out of difficulties encountered in the insertion of pins through holes in some of the pin plates because some of the pin plates which were welded either to the braces or the legs became slightly out of line in fabrica- tion. The one-eighth-inch tolerance requested for some of the other plates relates to the fact that they were to be inserted at the site and therefore under water which, at best, makes for difficult insertion. This request of the contractor was ultimately approved by me after consultation with the design engineers. REDESIGN FOR COLLAR CONNECTION TO REPLACE BROKEN BRACES The second and last change which took place at the site involved the correction of the bracing casualty which was suffered after arrival at the site area during a 1-day storm, followed by 1 day of rough weather immediately prior to upending. The braces in question were the two K braces in the AB plane which were to connect the lateral brace at the 25-foot level to the legs at the 76-foot level. Senator Sauronstaty. Mr. Chairman, could the commander point those out by referring to the model ? Senator Stennis. Yes, if you will, Commander. Commander Foster. That is these two braces right here [indicat- ing], sir. Senator SatronsTatu. In blue? Commander Fostrer. These two blue braces in the top panel here, Senator Saltonstall. Senator Satronstatu. That is on which side? Commander Foster. This isthe AB side. These two braces were tied together by metal couplings for and during the tow in order to permit the platform to be floated into jack- ing position after the legs were on the bottom. One brace came off sometime during the storm. The other came loose and came off during the course of towing the tower to its exact position. During the storm and rough weather we were anchored. I went out to the site 2 days before the legs arrived to set and mark the erection site. I trans- ferred to the platform in the late afternoon of its arrival and was in COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 127 immediate touch with events thereafter. I transferred from the plat- form to the legs for the final tow to the exact site and the upending process. Immediately after the brace casualty, I was careful to listen, rather than talk about it with the contractor’s people. I should like to em- phasize that at that point the tower still belonged to the contractor and the decision as to what to do next was his and not the Govern- ment’s, through me as the Government’s representative. I was not, nor is any military engineer on a contract project, the boss or job superintendent. I was there more in the role of inspector, having after the fact authority to accept or reject work as it progressed. Consequently, I bided my time because I knew that the district public works officer and a representative of the architect and engineer were en route and expected shortly. Such discussion as I did have imme- diately, was, for the most part, confined to discussions of leg damage, if any, between myself and my assistant, Ensign Poulos. It should be borne in mind that the missing braces were not at that time vital to the immediate phase—the upending of the legs. Also, until the legs were sunk in the ocean, they could always be refloated and returned to port, if required. I therefore took no action to delay or stop the upending phase of the work. ATTEMPTING REPAIRS AT SEA DEEMED FEASIBLE The representative of the architect and engineer, Dr. Rutledge, and the contractor, Mr. Steers, arrived the night of the upending and initial placement operation. Discussions commenced forthwith. Mr. Steers was positive that the braces could be replaced at the site be- cause of the fact that no damage had been done to the legs. Dr. Rutledge and I agreed that site repair was feasible and possible and that a satisfactory solution could be devised. Sometime later—a matter of perhaps 2 or 3 weeks, and after clear- ance by the district public works officer—Moran, Proctor, Mueser, & Rutledge assisted the contractor in designing the massive collar brace that was ultimately utilized. The design and method of installation was submitted to me for approval. I discussed the solution in detail with Mr. Kuss, who was throughout the project my contact with the architect and engineer on structural matters. Thereafter, I approved the collar brace solution, and it was installed by means of both Dardelet and collar bolts as well as concrete bracing of the legs on the inside. After the legs and braces were in position and during the platform installation, injury in the form of perceptible denting or dishing occurred to the “A” and “B” legs caused by the rubbing action of the platform against the legs due to sea swells. I would like to interject here, sir, that there was some dishing of the “CO” lec, as well. Senator Sarronsraty. Mr. Chairman, would the commander explain what the word “Dardelet’”’ means? Commander Foster. Senator Saltonstall, it isa patented bolt which, instead of a smooth shank, has a serrated shank. May I examine it ? This is a Dardelet bolt. Of course, they come in different sizes, lengths, et cetera. 128 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpauu. Will you explain on the record what that is, Com- mander ? Commander Fosrer. This is a bolt similar in appearance to an ordi- nary buttonhead bolt, except for the fact that the shank is serrated, rather than smooth bored. Senator Stennis. Why ? Commander Foster. These serrations are to hold the bolt tightly in the hole which is prepared for it, and are always installed with a driven fit. They do not slip loosely into the hole. They are driven into the hole. Senator Stennis. Allright. Proceed with your statement. Commander Foster. These dents were in the nature of 10 inches deep, 6 feet wide, and 10 feet in length. This was repaired by placing steel reinforcing in the concrete lining of the legs in the dished areas. The tower erection was completed without further incident and was accepted by the Navy for delivery to the Air Force in November 1957. The following summer the Air Force reported that the tower had commenced to move excessively. Divers were thereupon hired and positioned for underwater inspection and tightening of any loose bolts at the earliest. The contractor was consulted when the divers reported that one pin was loose and one retracted on the K position or angle on the lateral brace at the 25-foot level, and that the collar on the B leg showed evidence of movement. He agreed to perform required cor- rection at his expense, including replacement of the Dardelet bolts with T bolts in the collars. By so doing, we made certain that the collars were tight and would remain so. This project, which was constantly inspected by divers during and after the performance of the work, was satisfactorily completed in May 1959. NAVY NO LONGER DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN TOWER NO. 4 PROBLEMS From that point on the Navy performed no more service at the site in connection with Texas tower No. 4, and I was detached on July 1, 1959, to goto my present duty station. I was, to say the very least, shocked by the subsequent course of events and I come before you today both as sorrowful and as anxious to find the answer as anyone here present. “ Senator Srennts. Well, that is a very fine statement, Commander oster. Shall we let counsel proceed now, Senator, for about 20 minutes? He has these points in mind. If you have to go in the meantime, we shall yield to you at any time. Senator Sauronstaty. Mr. Chairman, I expect to be here for an- other 20 minutes at least. Senator Stennis. Does that suit you all right? Senator Barrierr. Yes. Mr. Kenparti. Commander, at what time did your tour of duty commence in Boston ? Commander Fosrrer. I would like to refer to the record. It was either late in November or early December in 1956. Mr. Kenpauti. When did you take over responsibility for Texas tower No. 4? Commander Fosrrr. At approximately January 1, or a day or two before, when Captain Albers was detached. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 129 Mr. Kenpatn. January 1, 1957? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Mr. Krnpati. Who were your immediate superiors ? ae Commander Fosrrr. They varied. Captain Randig, the district public works officer, was my principal superior. His deputy was Cap- tain Plichta. Mr. Kenpauu. Were there any others during your tour at Boston? Commander Fosrrr. Upon Captain Randig’s retirement in June 1957, Captain Plichta was elevated to the position of officer in charge of construction. Captain Thomas White became the deputy, al- though I am not certain that this occurred simultaneously. Captain Plichta later retired and was relieved by Captain Husband. I would like to refer here for the date, sir. I do not have that in my head. Mr. Kenpatu. I think that will be sufficient, Commander. Did your authority as the officer in charge of construction include the approval or disapproval of requested change orders in design and construction procedures ? AUTHORITY OF OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION DEFINED Commander Fosrrr. My authority, sir, was rather defined in the negative. It was all of the authority possessed by the officer in charge of construction except that which he was not allowed to delegate by law. These items concern matters other than of a technical nature. Mr. Krenpatu. If you will excuse me, Commander, that answer to me is not responsive, because I do not know what the duties of the officer in charge of construction are. Commander Fosrer. I am sorry, Counsel. Mr. Kenpatt. So if you will answer specifically as to whether or not your authority included the power to approve or disapprove change orders requested during the course of construction, I will appreciate it. Commander Fosrrr. I believe that the change order itself was signed by the officer in charge. However, the preparatory work in connection with it was done by myself. Mr. Kenpary. Did you have the authority to make that decision yourself without reference to higher authority ? Commander Fosrer. I considered that I did, and in those cases where I did, it was never questioned. Mr. Krenpauu. Now, you had nothing to do with the change whereby the temporary platform was eliminated and the permanent platform was substituted ? Commander Fosrmr. I did not, sir. Mr. Kunpauu. Did you have anything to do with the change whereby the driven pilings were eliminated ? Commander Foster. No, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. The principal change, as I understand it, which you approved, was the increase of the tolerances in the pin connec- tions, is that right ? Commander Foster. That was one, sir. Mr. Krnpati. What were the other principal changes that you approved ? 130 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Commander Foster. Well, the substitution of the braces, as I said in my statement, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Well, with reference to the pin tolerances, I believe the original design was one sixty-fourth of an inch, is that correct ? Commander Foster. That is basically correct. Mr. Kenpatxi. Now, what were the changes subsequently made and approved by you? Commander Fosrer. An increase to a maximum of one-sixteenth in all cases except what amounted to the top panel bracing, in which case, one-eighth. Mr. Kenpauy. Will you point out on the model the top panel that you refer to? Commander Fosrer. That would be this whole plane of bracing at the —25-foot level; these connections [indicating ]. Mr. Kenpatu. In other words, you permitted an increase to one-sixteenth inch in all pin connections on the tower except the top level of bracing, in which you permitted an increase to one-eighth inch; is that right ? Commander Fosrrr. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. What was the reason for increasing those tolerances? Commander Foster. As I mentioned in my statement, sir, the con- tractor had experienced considerable difficulty in trying to make up these connections, and as I am sure you can realize, when you are trying to insert an 8-inch pin, which may weigh 300 to 400 pounds 125 feet in the air through five layers of plates, with one sixty-fourth inch difference in diameter between the hole and the pin, this is a difficult situation. However, before approving this, we had con- siderable thought and consultation with the architect-engineer and with full knowledge that this might have some effect on the structure, for which reason I took it up with the architect-engineer; I did refer to him, and after his approval and based on my own assessment of it, I granted that approval. Mr. Kenpatzi. Did you have any reluctance, hesitancy or doubt about the wisdom of granting that increase in tolerance? Commander Foster. I did not, sir. Mr. Kenpatxu. As an engineer, do you not believe that the increase in the tolerance to one-eighth inch permitted some motion in the tower as erected ? Commander Foster. Well, it certainly would permit more motion than a smaller tolerance would; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. So that it actually permitted more motion than was called for by the original design. is that correct ? Commander Foster. I would say that would be a true conclusion; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Would it be reasonable to assume that with the pas- sage of time the motion of the sea and the sway of the tower, the impact of the pins as they fetched up would increase the wear and the tolerance? Commander Foster. IT am not sure, sir, that impact is the essential element here. ' Mr. Kenpatri. Well, I may be using incorrect terminology engi- neeringwise, Commander; I am sure you understand the essence of my question, so will you please answer on that basis ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 131 Commander Foster. I think theoretically ; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. As a matter of fact, it is no longer theoretical in the case of Texas tower No. 4, is it? Commander Foster. I am familiar with it up until the time I left the project, sir, but although I have read some of the recent develop- ments, | am not particularly sure on the latter part. Mr. Kenpatu. You are fully aware of what happened from the his- tory that has been given to you, are you not ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. In your judgment as an engineer, would not the fact that it was found that the tolerances had increased to 1 inch substan- tiate the judgment that this was caused by the motion of the tower and the motion of the sea and the fetching up of the pins? Commander Foster. I am sorry, sir, I got lost in that question. But { would like Senator Stennis. He will restate it if you got lost. Mr. Kenpatt. I may be lost, myself. TOWER MOVEMENT AND IMPACT OF PINS FETCHING UP DEEMED NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERIORATION IN PIN TOLERANCES Based on the history that you have received, and including the fact that it was subsequently developed that the tolerance in the pins, as a result of an actual observation and inspection, had in some cases increased to 1 inch, would it be your judgment as an engineer that that was caused by the fact that the tower was moving and by the impact of the pins fetching up ? Commander Foster. It would not, sir. Mr. Kenpatt. What would be your judgment on that question ? Commander Foster. Tf I may review as briefly as I can the history of these braces and pins, I shall try to answer the question. I cannot do it in a sentence or two, however. These braces were installed in the latter part of August and early September of 1957. The tower was delivered to the Air Force in November 1957. In the fall of 1958, we were advised by the Air Force, and I believe it was the occupants of the tower, that they had noticed excessive motion and we immediately engaged a firm of divers, the Marine Contractors, Inc., to inspect these braces and, in particular, the collars were what we had in mind, because we felt some of the bolts might be loose, but also the pins at the 25- foot level. They did so, and I believe they worked in September or October of 1958. Their report was made in November. Now, this report a year after, or a little better than a year after the braces were installed and the tower was in place, showed no evi- dence of wear on any pins. It did mention one loose bolt, for which I think there was an obvious reason: The collar at the other end ae riding, and therefore, this bolt was not fetching up, so to speak. WEAR IN PIN CONNECTIONS NOT PERCEPTIBLE FOR YEAR But in the record, the evidence is that for a year, at least, no wear was perceptible. We started repairs, but bad weather forced us to cease. We picked up again when weather permitted in the spring, £32 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 tightened up the through bolts, and substituted other bolts for the Dardelet. bolts. But I get back to the point of wear. Up to that time, there had been no evidence of any unusual wear. That was the reason for my negative answer to you. Mr. Kenpaty. That was within 1 year after the tower went into operation that you are talking about? Commander Foster. A little more than a year, sir. Senator Srennis. What was the approximate date of this inspec- tion? You said you turned it over to the Air Force in December of 1957? Commander Foster. November, sir. Senator Srennis. Well, you refer then to a subsequent inspec- tion; when was that inspection made? Commander Foster. This inspection that I referred to was made, T believe, in September or October of 1958, and the report was dated in November of that year. Senator Srennis. All right. Mr. Kenpatu. Commander, were you present when this tower or template was towed to sea for the purpose of erection ? Commander Foster. I was present at Portland when it was towed out of the drydock, and I was present at the site when the tow arrived. Mr. Kenpauu. Do you recall what the design criteria were for the stress to be encountered during the tow? Commander Fosrrr. As I recall, it was a 15-foot wave and a 50- knot wind. However, this is out of memory, and if it is critical, I would like to check it. Mr. Kenpatu. Was the criteria exceeded during the tow ? Commander Foster. Not to my knowledge. Of course, I was not with the tow. Mr. Krenpatn. What were the weather conditions during the tow? were any storms encountered ? Commander Foster. There were conflicting weather reports re- ceived. I have here excerpts from inspectors’ reports, which I would be glad to read if you desire. Mr. Kenpauy. Well, Commander, you referred in your statement to a storm that was encountered during the tow, and that there was rough weather following it. Commander Foster. This was not precisely during the tow, sir. It was after the tow arrived out on the site. There was a storm. Mr. Kenpauu. Was the tower then still in a horizontal position, or had it been upended ? Commander Foster. It was then in a horizontal position. Mr. Kenparz. And what were the wind and waves during that storm? Did they exceed the criteria, or did they not? Commander Fosrrer. In my opinion, they did not come close to it. Mr. Kenpauu. Now, when you discovered the diagonal braces to be broken during or after the tip-up process, were any discussions held by you with reference to what should be done or whether the tower should be taken back to port for repairs? Commander Fosrrr. There was considerable discussion about the effect these braces might have, sir, but as I said in my statement—— COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 133 Mr. Kenpauu. Just a moment. Who participated in those discus- sions Commander Fosrrr. I am going back 4 years, sir, and I would hesitate to pinpoint any particular person or particular place to identify what I shall call a general discussion. Mr. Kenpauu. Well, you participated in it? Commander Fosrrr. As far as I am concerned, sir, the only discus- sions that I had that had any meaning whatsoever were with Mr. Steers, who represented the contractor, and Dr. Rutledge, who repre- sented the architect. engineer. Mr. Kenpauu. Did you discuss then whether or not you should attempt the repairs on the site or return the tower to port for repairs? Commander Fosrrr. I am sure that this subject came up, sir. Mr. Kenpatz. Commander, do you not know it came up? Commander Fosrrr. Yes, sir. Mr. Knnpatu. Did anyone, during the course of that discussion, make a suggestion or recommendation that the proper thing to do would be to return the tower to port for repairs? Commander Fosrer. A suggestion may have been made. It did ,0t emanate from either of the two people whom I said previously were the ones whom I was primarily doing business with. Mr. Kenpautzt. Who made the suggestion ? Commander Fosrrer. I do not recall that it was made, sir, but it may very well have been. Mr. Kenpauu. Do you say it was made or it was not made? Commander Foster. I say I do not recall such a suggestion having been made, but it may very well have been. But there was, as I say, considerable discussion on this subject at the time. Mr. Kenpatu. But your testimony here is that neither the architect engineer nor any of his representatives nor the contractor nor any of his representatives made such a suggestion or recommendation ? Commander Foster. As I stated in my statement, sir, we discussed the possibility of putting in the permanent replacement brace, and agreed it could be done. This was the hinge on which the return to port would have to turn. RECOMMENDATION FOR RETURNING TO PORT FOR REPAIR Mr. Kenpatu. Now, we shall go back to my question I asked a min- ute ago. Commander Fosrrr. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatt. Is the answer to my question “yes” or “no?” I asked whether you state here today that neither the architect engineer nor the contractor nor any of their representatives made any suggestion or recommendation that the tower be taken back to port for repairs. That is my question. Commander Fostrer. That is a rather general question, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. That is a very specific question, sir. Commander Foster. It requires me to go back a long time in time. I do not recall such a suggestion or recommendation. I am positive, in the recollection of my memory, that it was not made by Dr. Rut- ledge or Mr. Steers. 134 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. Can you extend your answer to Mr. Kuss or Mr. Rau? Commander Fosrrr. I do not believe Mr. Kuss was on the tower at that time, sir. Mr. Krnpatt. That is not my question, Commander. I asked if you would say that they did not make that suggestion or recommenda- tion ? Commander Fosrrr. I would not say, but I do say further that had Mr. Rau made it, I do not believe I could have received it. Mr. Steers, the head of the company, was on board and he would certainly speak for the contractor. Mr. Kenpatu. You will agree that the loss of these braces was a serious problem and a serious defect in the tower and a mishap? Commander Fosrrr. I agree it was a serious problem. I would not agree that it was a serious defect. Mr. Kenpari. You do agree it was a serious problem ? Commander Foster. It was one that required serious consideration, and got it. It was a problem, but not, shall I say, a fatal or vital one. Mr. Kenpatu. The vital decision, then, was whether or not to at- tempt repairs at sea under water or return to port. That was the question, right ? Commander Fosrrr. I would say that would be a fair statement of it, sir; yes. DECISION TO REPAIR AT SEA OR RETURN TO PORT Mr. Kenpaty. Who ultimately made the decision to attempt to make the repairs at sea ? Commander Foster. I would like to refer again to my statement, sir, that this tower was not, at that time, the property of the Navy, nor was it the responsibility of the Navy. This tower belonged to the contractor, and would belong to him until such time as he turned it over to us in an acceptable condition. And if the contractor or any of his representatives felt that, (1) it was unsafe at the time, or, (2) he would be unable to make a succesful repair at sea, it was up to him to take the tower back, not up to me to tell him to. I did not consider it to be unsafe at the time, nor did I consider that we could not put in a successful brace. My statement was that I took no action to stopping or moving one way or another. This was his baby. Mr. Krnpatn. My question was, Commander, specifically, who made the decision to attempt the repairs at sea ? Commander Foster. I approved the belief, if you like, that a repair could be successfully made at sea. I believed it then, I believe it now. As to the decision, had the contractor had any doubt in his mind, it was his move. I took my action only based on the fact that he thought it could be done, our architect engineer thought it could be done: I, myself, thought it could be done. So I allowed them to stay and go on with the process. Mr. Kenpatt. So.that it ultimately was your decision ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. If you had told him, we have to take this tower back to port for repairs, he would have done it, would he not? Commander Foster. He would have been happy to do it, I think. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 135 FUNCTION AND USE OF DARDELET BOLTS Mr. Kenpatu. Now, you have been discussing the repairs with the use of these Dardelet bolts, Commander. Is it not true that Dardelet bolts are customarily used for a temporary repair? Commander Fosrer. I could not answer that precisely. In my evaluation of the brace, I considered the bolt in the problem. Mr. Kewpatu. I am discussing now, generally the question of what is the function of a Dardelet bolt and what it is used for. Is it not true that customarily and generally, they are used for a temporary fix? Commander Foster. I do not believe that is true, sir. Mr. Kennan. Do you know whether it is true or not? Commander Fosrrr. I would not hesitate to use them in permanent work. In fact, I would use them in preference to an ordinary struc- tural bolt. Mr. Kenpauu. So you say they are used for a permanent fix? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, after the tower was upended, Commander, I believe that the permanent platform was floated in and jacked up prior to the legs being embedded and prior to any stiffening of the legs with concrete; is that correct ? Commander Foster. That is correct. Mr. Kenpaty. Was that a factor which was taken into considera- tion in calculating the original stresses? Commander Fostmr. I was not involved in the project during the calculation of the original stresses, sir. I really do not know, but I would not—I am not in a position to say. Mr. Kenpatx. Will you describe by reference to the model that you have before you the damage which was sustained by the tower legs, or to the tower legs, from the platform ? Commander Foster. As it stands now, the dishing: Mr. Kenpauu. Just for my information, what do you mean by dish- ing, Commander ? Commander Foster. These legs, or caissons, are cylindrical. If you can imagine taking a cylinder and pushing inward on it, a slight in- ward deformation occurs. Mr. Kenpatu. You mean a dent? Commander Foster. Not precisely a dent; a flattened effect. Mr. Krnpatu. Go ahead now and show where this happened and describe them. Commander Fosrrr. Right at the waterline on the C, and B, and the A leg, as the tower now sits. Mr. Kenpatu. Of what height and of what depth were they? Commander Fosrrr. They were approximately—they varied, but approximately 10 feet in height, approximately 6 feet in width, and I think the maximum was about 10 inches indentation in depth. Mr. Kenpauu. Did that injury give you any particular concern? Commander Fostsr. It did at the time; more a feeling of what might have happened than what actually did. Actually the injury was assessed to not be too serious. It was re- inforced inside and repaired in that way. 136 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpaty. After the tower was upended and installed and the work was completed, I believe you turned it over to the Air Force in November of 1957 ? Commander Foster. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Did the Navy at that time certify in writing as to the structural stability of the tower? Commander Fosrrr. We filled out the usual forms, sir, and I am sure, in turning it over, it was understood that this tower was as speci- fied, et cetera. Mr. Kenpatu. Do you have a copy of that instrument with you? If so, will you make it a part of the record ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir; we do, and I shall produce it in a moment, sir. (The document referred to is as follows :) COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 7 138 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Items excluded from this acceptance: Arctic tower. Radome deck. All stairwells. . Painting of all doors. Main deck compartments 9 and 11. Second deck compartments 102, 109, 176, 181, 182, 183, and 184. Reentry maintenance scaffold. Trunnion-type hose reels for hot salt water hose. . Heat exchangers 5 and 6 with associated piping. 10. All floor tile. Construction deficiencies : 1. Complete the Sage changes in the arctic tower and on the main deck. 2. Complete touchup of interior painting. . Furnish missing keys and repair broken locks. Complete one coat of paint on the exterior of the deck house. . Touch up exterior painting. . Furnish tags for valves. Repair insulation in rooms 226, 201, 229, and 19. . Complete the painting inside C leg. . Replace windows spattered with weld. 10. Install flame arresters on leg purge fans. 11. Replace cable on 2-ton hoist. 12. Install missing nameplates. 13. Furnish all materials not presently on board and inventory all items furnished by the contractor. 14. Furnish radio interference suppression certificates for diesels and boilers. The contractor agrees that the above construction deficiencies remain in the accepted portions of Texas tower No. 4, for the contractor to cover at no further cost to the Government and will be corrected on or before December 15, 1957. The contractor further agrees that all items excluded from this acceptance will be completed on or before December 15, 1957, at no further cost to the Government, except as resolved prior to the acceptance of these items. /S8/ Steve J. Poulos Lt. (jg) S. J. Pouxos, (For the U.S. Navy). /S/ 4. Larson Mr. H. Larson, (For the Contractor). /S/ Reginald L. Stark Capt. REGINALD L. STARK, (For the U.S. Air Force). BO 90 SU OCG? BST Certified to be a true copy. Mr. Krenpatu. Now, prior to turning it over to the Air Force, and after the completion, was an underwater inspection made of the tower ? Commander Fostsr. No, sir. Mr. Kenpati. Why not? Commander Fosrrer. It was not considered necessary at the time, or indicated. Mr. Kenpatu. But none was made. Commander Foster. None was made. TOWER MOTION CALLS FOR INSPECTION Mr. Kenpati. One was subsequently made, I understand, because of the motion of the tower. Commander Foster. That is right. Mr. Kenpatu. And in that inspection it was found that the Darde- let bolts were not holding the collar in place; is that correct ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 139 Commander Fosrsr. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, did you contact Moran, Proctor, the architect- oineer, about that situation ? Commander Foster. Moran, Proctor were kept in close touch with all developments that had any structural significance on the tower. Mr. Kenpatu. Did you have any written communication with them ? Commander Fosrsr. I believe we did, sir, but I cannot be sure. We did a lot of telephone business; we consulted together, we wrote back and forth. I am positive that we consulted in this case, but I can- not recall. Mr. Kenpatx. Will you check and see if you do not have a letter to them and a reply from them with reference to the situation ? Commander Foster. Yes, I have a letter from Moran, Proctor to the officer in charge, dated December 5, 1958. Mr. Kenpauu. Was that in reply to a letter that had been written by you? aaron Foster. It refers to a letter of December 2, 1958. Mr. Kenpatu. Will you make both of those part of the record, please, Commander? Commander Fosrsr. Yes, sir. I think one we shall have to pro- duce, sir. We have the December 5 letter here. Mr. Kenpaty. You may furnish that. Senator Srennis. All right. Those letters will be made a part of the record. (The letters referred to are as follows :) en DECEMBER 2, 1958. Moran, Proctor, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, 415 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. GENTLEMEN: Your letter of 28 October 1958 states that the scheme indicated on Steers Morrison, Knudson sketches showing details and arrangements of the T boit for fastening the collar of the replacement brace to the A leg of TT 4 will result in the best possible solution of the problem fixing the collar to the leg. However, this office has been requested by the Air Force to issue a statement in writing advising if the stability of TT 4 will be as secure after the repairs are made to the collar at A leg as originally designed or more specifically will the high tensile T bolt now being installed make a more secure connection than that provided by the Dardelet bolts. An early reply will be appreciated. Very truly yours, JosEePH G. A. Riccio, Assistant to ROICC. DECEMBER 5, 1958. OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas TowrErRs NOY Contracts Navy Building, 495 Summer Street, Boston, Mass. Dear Str: We have your letter of December 2, 1958, requesting a statement regarding the adequacy of Texas tower No. 4 bracing after affixing the collars of the replacement with the new high tensile T-bolts. We believe that, when the present program of retightening the main bolts and installing the T-bolts to the proper tension at the connections at the bottom of the two diagonal replacement braces is completed, the structure will be as strong or stronger than with the original arrangement utilizing the Dardelet bolts and that the bracing thus restored will be Substantially equivalent to the original design. In the original design we had complete freedom as to arrangement of struc- tural members making up the connections and were able to establish the correct working points for the intersections of the members, but we were unable to achieve such conditions with the replacement braces due to various inter- ferences. Therefore there exist some secondary stresses which are not present 70733— 61—_—10 140 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 in the original design. We have estimated the importance of these stresses and find that percentagewise they do not greatly affect the overall strength of the panel involved, but nevertheless there is some decrease in the factor of safety and it can be said that, had the loss of the original braces not occurred, we would have had a more perfect structure strengthwise. We do not believe that the replacement connections affect the rigidity. Very truly yours, Moran, Proctor, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, THEODORE M. Kuss. Mr. Kenpauu. Was that difficulty that was ascertained as a result of the underwater inspection treated as a design deficiency, or as a construction deficiency ? Commander Fosrrer. Construction deficiency, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. At whose expense were the T-bolts installed ? Commander Fosrrr. At the contractor’s expense. Mr. Kenpatu. No additional allowance was made to the contractor for any work in connection with that? Commander Fosrrr. He did some work at the time with regard to an oil leak, which I believe we did allow. But the repair of this brace, he did. Mr. Kenpati. Commander, do you have a T-bolt in front of you there, so we shall know what we are talking about, and tell us briefly how you would install this? Commander Foster. I think we have a sketch here that showed the specification for installing this bolt. May I refer to it? Mr. Krnpatu. Yes, sir, you may. Commander Foster. Our problem here, of course, was that we could not get into the inside of the caisson. Horizontal slots were cut through the collar, through the skin of the caisson, which would per- mit the entrance of the T-head in a horizontal position, after which it was rotated to the vertical, which brought it in bearing up against the caisson skin or the leg skin, and the nut tightened up to a pre- determined torque. Mr. Kenna. Just to go back for a moment, there is a memorandum from Captain Husband with reference to this matter, which states that it is not considered that the contractor is obliged to provide the alternate T-bolt installation on this leg without extra reimbursement. Commander Foster. I recall that letter, sir. Mr. Kennan. So with reference to replacing the Dardelet bolts with T-bolts, that was not treated as a construction deficiency ; is that right ? FAILURE OF COLLAR CONNECTION WITH DARDELET BOLTS TREATED AS CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY Commander Foster. Yes, it was, sir. There is maybe a little point here that should be clarified. The contractor was required to install the brace with the Dardelet bolts originally shown, which he did. Hewing very close to the line, when we sent him back in there to fix it, theoretically he should prop- erly have installed the Dardelet bolts. However, this could not be done. The holes were outsize. Another means had to be found. He was willing to install the T-bolts, which we felt were equal, if not better than the others, so he agreed to install the T-bolts. However, in our letter to the Air Force, we were not COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 141 sure at that time but what he might make an objection to that installation. He did not; later he installed it. Mr. Kenpatu. Will you make that memorandum or a copy of it a part of the record? I think it is dated December 4, 1958. Commander Fosrrr. Yes, sir. (The memorandum referred to is as follows :) DECEMBER 4, 1958. From: District Public Works Officer, Ist Naval District. To: U.S. Air Foree Installations Representative Office, New England region, building 112, south, 424 Trapelo Road, Waltham 54, Mass. Subject : Texas tower No. 4; stability and deficiencies. Reference: (a) AFIRO, NER itr GEN/CPS-1 of November 21, 1958. Enclosures: (1) Copy of inspection report dated November 25, 1958, made by Marine Contractors Co., Inc. (2) Sketch showing T-bolt replacements—two sheets. 1. Enclosure (1) is furnished herewith as requested by reference (@). The inspection covered by the report was carried out September 12, 1958, through October 5, 1958. 2. Beginning November 1, 1958, repairs in the area of the dardelet bolts on the A caisson were begun. These repairs consist of the substitution of 40 specially fabricated T-bolts for the 78 dardelet bolts originally installed. It is considered that this installation when completed will be superior to the dardelet bolts in that it will be better able to withstand the tendency to work loose indigenous to subject structure. 3. Adverse weather has impeded progress of the repair work to date. Out of 27 days it has been possible to make only 16 dives. Out of the last 13 days only 2 dives were possible. It is estimated that approximately 50 percent of the scheduled work has been accomplished to date, consisting principally of cutting slots for the new bolts. No bolts have been installed ; it being considered desirable not to place the bolts until all slots are ready to receive them. 4. Concurrent with the work of repairing the A leg collar the Marine Con- tractors Co., Inc., has conducted a detailed inspection of the dardelet bolts at the B leg collar. A copy of the report of this inspection will be forwarded when received. 5. Concerning responsibility for the troubles encountered at the collars the following conclusions are submitted : (a) “A” leg dardelet bolt failure—Responsibility not determinable. Although there is reason to believe that the contractor may not have installed these bolts in accordance with the plans, there is no way to demonstrate this conclusively at this time. Conversely, it is possible that the bolts were correctly installed. (Refer to enclosure (1).) (b) “B” leg dardelet bolts ——Al|though no failure was observed, approximately half the bolts were loose and could be extracted by hand. Interim reports from Marine Contractors Co., Inc., to date establish that bolts are not all of design diameter and length, and some holes are oversize. This is considered to be a construction deficiency. The contractor has verbally agreed to make the proper installation as soon as weather permits in the spring. It is not considered that the contractor is obliged to provide the alternate T-bolt installation on this leg without extra reimbursement although as previously stated, the latter design is believed to be superior. It is intended to provide diver inspection under Navy contract after the original contractor completes repairs contingent upon the availability of funds to finance such inspection. 6. As indicated by enclosure (1) there is still an oil leak in the ‘‘A” caisson, in an area covered by the collar. It is possible that a hole similar to the one already plugged exists in which case a construction deficiency is indicated. It is also possible that the leak is through the housing on the interior of the caisson to accommodate the dardelet bolts, in which case a design deficiency is indicated. Based upon interim reports of the current inspection the latter alternative appears more probable. Unless a hole in the caisson is discovered during the course of the repair to the collars it is considered that the leak will have to be accepted. Although no firm estimate of cost to remedy the leak is possible at this time, it is believed that this cost will be exorbitantly high. If the using agency can operate without the storage provided by the “A” leg caisson, it is 142 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 felt that this would be the more practical and economical solution. It is noted that without the storage provided by this leg, the tower would have a capacity of 24% months’ fuel with the increased demands envisioned in the pending modifications. 7. Your views on the foregoing analysis are solicited. A. C. HUSBAND. Copy to: Cdr., 4604th SUPSQ, Otis AFB, Mass, w/incl. Mr. Kenpatzu. When were these bolts finally installed ? Commander Foster. It was in the spring of 1959, May or June, I believe. Mr. Kenpati. Did the Navy then again certify in writing to the Air Force that the tower had been restored to its original design strength ? Commander Foster. Substantially so. Mr. Kenpauu. Was that in writing? Commander Foster. I believe it was. Mr. Kenpatut, You have a written communication to the Air Force from the Navy certifying to the structural stability of the tower, is that correct ? Mr. Epwarps. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Would you make that communication a part of the record ? Mr. Epwarps. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Had you, prior to that time, received any communi- cation in writing from the architect-engineer with regard to the certification ? Mr. Epwarps. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Will you also make that a part of the record, please? Mr. Epwarps. Yes, sir. (Norr.—Certification took the form of formally transmitting to the Air Force a copy of the design and construction report on page: 64 of which appeared the following statement :) A repair program carried out during the summer of 1959 provided for tighten-- ing the main bolts to draw the collars tightly around the tower legs and the installation of T-head high-strength bolts through slots burned in the legs to: form a tight and secure connection between the collars and the tower legs. It is belived that these repair operations have Secured the replacement braces and that the foundation structure is now operating in close approximation to the original design condition. Mr. Kenpnay. Now, just one further question, Commander. To go back to these pin tolerances, in view of the looseness or the slack in the Dardelet bolts, is it not your opinion that there would have been a deterioration in the pin connections from impact until such time as these T-bolts were installed ? Commander Fosrrer. Well, as I stated previously, Mr. Kendall, an examination was made a year after those braces were installed, and no evidence of such wear was found. I do not—I shall stand on that. Mr. Kenpatt. Was an inspection made of the pin tolerances throughout the tower at that time ? Commander Foster. Just at the upper level of bracing. However, I believe this was considered the critical one so far as tolerance went. Mr. Kennan. Did the architect-engineer—that is, the Moran, Proc- tor firm—did they give a new criteria of wind and wave forces before: the T-bolts were installed ? Commander Foster. Yes, they did. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 143 Mr. Kenpatu. Is that the letter I have already asked you to put into the record ? Commander Foster. I think so, sir. (Nore.—The letter in which new criteria was given, reads as follows :) NEw York, N.Y., July 3, 1958. Subj: Movement and stresses in Texas towers. Ref: OinCC letter April 18 transmitting Report on Measured Oscillations of TT-4. ‘OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas Tower NOy Contracts, Navy Building, 495 Sunvmer Street, Boston, Mass. Dear Siz: We had hoped that the oscillation frequency count made on TT-4 and submitted to us with the referenced letter might furnish some information as to the general behavior of the tower, and a possible clue as to the functioning of the new diagonal struts which were placed on the tower in the upper panel of the A-B side to replace those lost in transit during construction. We thought that perhaps, by comparing the period as measured, with the theoretical period of the elastic structure, we could definitely state that the braces were effective. Unfortunately the field measurements were not made in severe weather as the maximum reported height of swells during the observations was 15 feet and the wind velocity only 25 knots. The period of the movement reported at the same time was between 15 and 18 cycles per minute and there seemed to be no definite correlation between the period and the wave or wind condition. Our analysis shows that, with the bracing working, the period of oscillation should be be- tween 26 and 46 cycles per minute and without the bracing being effective, rigidity would be reduced so that the period should be between 16 and 19 cycles per minute. The ranges mentioned cover various assumed ranges of compressi- bility of the sand foundation. It can be seen that the measured frequencies agreed pretty well with the cal- culated frequencies for the condition of the bracing not being effective and it might be at first assumed that such was the case. However, as before stated, the conditions were not very severe and, for such as they were, the total move- ment was probably not enough to take up the specified tolerance in the fit of the pins in the pinholes so that, although the braces may not have been effec- tive during the conditions prevailing when the oscillation count was made, more Severe weather conditions with a larger potential sway might cause the pins to engage and result in a shorter period. Thus the frequencies measured proved nothing conclusively. Similar measurements during a severe storm would pos- sibly be more fruitful. For the record, a very condensed summary is attached. Figure 1, which shows average measured frequency plotted against wind velocity. Table 1 shows conditions assumed for computations of theoretical frequencies and a summary of our calculations. In the above discussion, torsional oscilla- tions were not considered, as the periods for this type of motion are completely out of the significant range. As a result of your verbal request we also investigated the ability of the tower legs and bracing to withstand natural forces in case the replacement braces were loose at the lower connections or rendered useless for other reasons. The results of these computations are shown in table 2. It will be noted that two sets of computations were made: (1) to see how much of a wave could accom- pany 125-mile-per-hour wind and (2) to see what magnitude of wind and wave could be tolerated if combined in accordance with the formula shown and de- fined at the head of table 2. It will be seen from an examination of the table that, for both sets of conditions, the weakest link in the entire system is in the legs at elevation minus 75 which is at the top of the highest panel of bracing assumed (for purposes of this investigation) as working. The most pertinent figures of this table are emphasized with an extra box around them. The fol- lowing facts are to be commented on: (1) Without any wave and without exceeding the basic stress of 20,000 p.s.i., the tower should withstand a wind of 96 miles per hour. This is too favorable a condition to be expected over a long period of time. (2) With the steel permitted to go to the yield point the tower should with- stand forces from two combinations, viz: (a) A 125-mile-per-hour wind with a 36-foot wave. 144 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 (0) An 87-mile-per-hour wind with a 67-foot wave. The tower was designed for a 60-foot wave accompanied by a 125-mile-per- hour wind while at the same time the maximum allowable stress was permitted to increase one-third above the basic stress. It would seem entirely possible to get a 125-mile-per-hour wind as this is not rare in tornadoes or hurricanes and it must be assumed that the maximum wave either preceded, or lagged behind, the maximum wave gust, which is a more or less likely supposition. ; In any case it is of considerable concern to think of the tower having to sustain the impact of a hurricane without the upper bracing in place. We still recom- mend a diver inspection of this tower with special attention being given to the bolted collars which had to be substituted for the destroyed connections at the lower ends of the upper diagonals on the A—B side. Since these diver programs are difficult and costly to organize, the diver should probably go out with equip- ment suitable for tightening the collars if they should be found to be loose. With regard to the often discussed program for measuring deflections of this and other Texas towers, it can be said that information on the motion is desira- ble from the standpoint of Air Force operations and for safety reasons. Actually, the type of information which is needed for the latter probably differs quite appreciably from that required for technical considerations involving signal reception. A third purpose for recording motion would be a purely scientific one involving correlation between wave and wind data, tower motion, and tower stresses. A program to fit this third objective would be extremely comprehensive and very difficult to sustain, due mostly to personnel problems associated with the relative remoteness of the towers. The instrumentation, particularly the wave- recording instruments, would be difficult to maintain. It is possible, however, that, with the assistance of the Hydrographic Office, some sort of limited pro- gram might be set up which would result in wave force information. It should be mentioned that equivalent information might be more directly and accurately obtained if the complexities of tower strain and motion were not involved. This sort of investigation is, however, a subject aside from measurement of tower motion and accompanying strain. For indications of structural distress in a tower during severe meteorological conditions a minimum instrumentation should provide for measurement of tower deflection over separated periods and limited to times when tower motion might be thought alarming or for other special reasons. Measurements of translation in two directions would be made at a location as near as possible to the geometric center between the legs and no attempt made to measure rotation. This would resemble in purpose the program undertaken on TT—2 by the Lincoln Laboratories in 1956 but would be set up with a somewhat dif- ferent approach. Whereas, they were concerned with small movements, and also rotation, the new purpose would be to measure larger general movements of translation only. Their approach to the problem was to correlate readings of strain gages installed on the legs with seismic accelerometer readings so that the strain gage readings could, at any subsequent time, be used to estimate the motion. This method was not too successful mostly because the strains were too small during the calibration periods and too small, in any case, to measure the motions in which the sponsoring parties were interested. Also, the strain gages and associated lead wires were in extremely uncomfortable and difficult locations in the legs which greatly discouraged if not prevented maintenance. The minimum program offered here would be to have accelerometers permanently in place to measure motion in two directions only. No attempt would be made to simultaneously measure strains (and stresses) but rather these would be computed from the recorded deflections. We investigated the instrumentation problem in 1956 and, after considerable difficulty in locating interested parties, secured a proposal from Arde Associ- ates of Newark, N.J., for assembling and installing a system involving two accel- erometers at each corner (a total of six) which, with electronic integrating ele- ments, could be used to register translation and rotation. With the program suggested hereinbefore only two such instruments would be used, which would measure only general translation and no rotation. The Arde proposal was sent to your office in May or June 1956 and we re- ceived a reply from the officer in charge of construction that the study was not required “at this time.” You will find in the Arde Associates’ proposal an COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 145 intelligent discussion on various possibilites for measurng movements and a quotation for doing the work, which we thought was quite reasonable. We believe this should be an active subject, and requires further consideration. Very truly yours, MorAN, PRocTOoR, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, THEODORE M. KUSS. (Accompanying charts to above letter in committee files. ) Mr. Krenpatu. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. Commander, after one question, I am going to yield to Senator Saltonstall.” He has an appointment which he must meet. J I want you to know that I greatly appreciate the great amount of skill that the Navy showed in the difficult task which was assigned it. I think that this is to the Navy’s great credit, and to the credit of the men that were representing the Navy. So adverse questions are not asked to discount the Navy nor the task as a whole. REPAIR OF BRACES BETTER PERFORMED IN PORT But, now, just as a practical matter, in getting right down to the very bottom of this thing, is it not just commonsense and practical to say that this repair job on these broken braces could have been per- formed much better back in port than at sea? Is not that correct? That is the way it looks to me, and if there is some explanation to the contrary, I wish you would hit it hard. Commander Fosrrr. Mr. Chairman, I would say certainly it could be done much easier back at port. Senator Srennis. It would have been more effectively done? Commander Foster. Generally speaking, yes, sir. But still, that would not go to prove that an effective brace could not be made at sea; certainly perhaps a better one ashore, but our problem was to replace an existing one structurally; in other words, put back a brace that we felt would do what the original brace would do if it were there. Senator Srennis. Well, it just looks to a layman that these braces were essential; otherwise the plans would not have called for them. As I understand your testimony, you say that is where a great deal of the stress was. The next step is, that when they were broken, perhaps no one was at fault. There was a heavy and tossing sea, as | understand, when they were broken. However, this did call for the restoration of their full strength in the most effective way. I get the idea that perhaps this was not done in the most effective way. Maybe it was done as well as it could have been at sea, but it was not done in the most effective way, comparing the effectiveness of repair in port with the restoration at sea. Now, am I wrong in that conclusion ? Commander Fostsr. No, sir; I would say that the T-bolt scheme that we evolved later was superior to the original Dardelet bolts. There may be even a better way. However, I would like to reem- phasize that the original brace as conceived was designed to take all of the loads that the other members would have, and I believe as far as design, a little more. Of course, you make allowances for the fact 146 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 that this had to be braced under water. It was certainly more difficult to do it at sea than it would have been at shore. Senator Srennis. Well, your whole concept and design to start with was to avoid making these connections under water; that is why you had the tower fabricated and connections made before you took it out there, is that not right ? Commander Fostsrr. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. I yield to Senator Saltonstall, and I may ask a few questions later. Senator SatronsTatu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I ask just a few questions, Commander? It is not clear to me what relation you had to the district public works officer. Commander Foster. I was one of his assistants, Senator Salton- stall. Senator SatronsratL. Who was the district public works officer? Commander Foster. During the time that the tower was towed to the site, upended and installed, it was a Captain J. Plichta, now Ad- miral Plichta, USN, retired. Senator Satronsraty. Admiral Plichta ? Commander Fosrrr. Plichta, P-]-i-c-h-t-a, sir. Senator Satronsraty. Did he at any time go out to this Texas tower ? Commander Fosrrr. Yes, he did. Senator SanTronsTatu. On page 3 of your statement you say: We military engineers do not get into the contractors operations as such. Consequently I bided my time, because I knew that the district public works officer and a representative of the architect and engineer were en route and expected shortly. Does that mean that you were going to leave the decision as to what to do up to the district public works officer ? Commander Fosrrr. Not necessarily, sir, but knowing he was com- ing, and as I indicated, we were not pressed for time at the moment as to whether this should be taken back or not, I meant to discuss it with him and later did. He was delayed, however, in arriving at the tower site. Senator Satronstatu. So that you took the responsibility as his assistant in charge of this particular operation ? Commander Fosrsr. Yes, sir, but I would like to point out that the decision there, my decision, was not to interfere. Counsel put the question as though it was up to me to say we should go back to port or not. I decided to not interfere with the contractor’s operations. He was free to do what he wished. Senator Satronstaty. Well, the next point is, if you decided not to interfere, you, as the representative of the Navy, accepted this tower in November of 1957 ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator SauTONSTALL. You accepted it for the Government ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator Sautronstatu. Yet, on page 5 of your testimony, you stated that the tower was not completed until May 1959. What do you mean by that, your repairs? Commander Foster. Well, when we delivered it in 1957, we fully believed that it was ready for delivery. We discovered later, due to COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 147 this motion, that there had been the brace trouble indicating it had not been installed properly, we went back to the contractor. Senator Sartronstatu. You did what ? Commander Fosrrr. We went back to the contractor and had him repair it. Seu SALTONSTALL. But the Navy then owned the tower at that time ? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator Satronsraty. And the Navy had paid for the tower? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator Satronsratu. So that the tower was completed and ac- cepted for delivery in November of 1957, yet for a year and a half afterward, it was not satisfactorily completed until May 1959. Dur- ing that period, the Government owned it ? Commander Foster. The Government had accepted the tower, yes, sir, but within a year after acceptance, we had discovered some detec- tive workmanship, called a construction deficiency. On that basis, the contractor was called back to repair it at his expense, sir. Senator SarronsTaLu. Now, did the Navy at any time recertify that as satisfactorily completed, or were these simply repairs after the job had been accepted ? Commander Fosrrr. After these repairs were made—and they went further than repairs. It was, to a degree, a modification of the bolt- ing. At that time, the brace was back substantially to its original strength and was so certified. Senator SatronstTaty. So that in November 1957 the tower was accepted by the Navy as properly completed; then it began to get into motion. You had these repairs made and the Navy again, in May 1959, certified that the tower was safe, is that right ? Commander Fosrrr. It was accepted in November of 1957 as being complete and ready for use, accepted by the Navy and delivered to the Air Force. However, the deficiencies subsequently discovered, we had the con- tractor come back and repair. In other words, make good on some- thing he should have done before November of 1957. Senator SauronsTaLL. Well, what I am trying to get at is what the Navy did in May of 1959, when the Government owned it, and had owned it for 18 months. Did the Navy again certify that the tower was safe ? Commander Fosrsmr. Yes, sir. NAVY AGAIN CERTIFIES TOWER SAFE IN MAY 1959 Senator Satronsraus. So that in May 1959, you, as a representative of the Navy, certified that the tower was safe Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator SatronsraLtu. And you say in your statement that the Navy did not do any work on this tower after May 1959. Of course, as you went out to Guam, you do not know that? Commander Fosrsr. That is true, sir. As far as I know, up until the time I left Boston, we did no further work on Texas tower No. 4. Senator Sattonsratu. And you left on July 1, 1959? Commander Foster. Yes. 148 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Sautronsrautu. So that during the period between July 1, 1959, and January 1961, you do not know whether the Navy had any- thing to do with it or not? Commander Fosrer. No, sir; I regret that. I should have clari- fied that. I was speaking only within the period that I was there. Senator Saurronstatu. Mr. Chairman, I cannot recall whether we have had any testimony on that, but I think it would be very im- portant to find out, through correspondence, memorandum, or any- thing else, if the Navy performed any additional work or whether de- ficiences were called to the Navy’s attention after July 1959. Senator Srennis. Gentlemen, you have heard the observation of the Senator. Would the Navy check its files to see whether any ad- ditional work was done? Commander Fosrer. I understand that the Secretary of the Air Force made such a statement. Senator Srennis. We shall check with the Air Force, too, but if you will check, we would appreciate it. Captain Davis. Sir, if I may make a point, the Undersecretary of the Air Force, when he testified, stated that from that time on, the Air Force took over contact with the contractors and entered into the contracts for repairs. Senator Satronsraun. So that from May 1959 the Navy did nothing further on this tower ? Captain Davis. At the site. We may have been consulted at the dis- trict public works offices on various things. Senator SaLronsTaLL. You made no examination, no recommenda- tion, for repairs or anything else? Captain Davis. No, sir. Senator Srennis. I think the Senator’s inquiries are very per- tinent. Commander, if you have anything covered by the Secretary’s state- ment, that is all right. Senator SatronstaLty. But the Navy did certify that the Govern- ment accepted that tower in November of 1957. When this tower be- gan to shake, the Navy was called back and recommended and super- vised repairs. So that in May 1959, the witness, the commander, again certified that the tower was safe ? Captain Davis. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Admiral Church had indicated he wants to say something on that point. Admiral Cuurcu. Senator, I only know from hearsay and my own review of the records in connection with this that the Navy had nothing to do after the May 1959 certification. But I believe that Captain White, who is the next witness, is in a better position to abso- lutely certify to the committee on that matter, sir. He was a district public works officer and a deputy since that time, sir. Senator SatronstaLtL. May I ask one more question ? Senator Stennis. Certainly. Senator Satronstatt. Why did the pin tolerances deteriorate as much as they did if it were not due to tower motion or pin slap, if you want to call it that ? Commander Foster. Well, I think in my previous statement, I men- tioned only impact. Certainly tower motion would contribute to any COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 149 wear. My only point, sir, is that with the information I had at hand, there was no exceptional wear or any evidence of excessive wear evident. Now, wear—a drop of water falling on stone will, theoretically, wear alittle of it away. But you may not see it. Senator SarronsraLu. Well, let me ask this, Mr. Chairman, as a final question. We had a witness here the other day, Mr. DeLong, who testified that he would not do this job in the manner that it was done, lifting up the legs and so on, and that he had no use for pins as such, and that if this were going to be done, it had to be a welding job. Now, did you recommend pins to straighten out this difficulty ? Commander Fosrrer. No, Senator Saltonstall; I was not involved in the design stage of this tower. Senator Satronstartn. But you did believe that the pins and the bolts would do the job of keeping the tower safe? Commander Foster. I had no reason to question it, sir. Senator Sauronsraty. In other words, in your opinion, it was the decision of the contractor, and when he said he believed this was satisfactory and would keep the tower safe, you approved that sug- gestion or recommendation ? Commander Foster. This refers to the change in tolerance of pins, sir? Senator SaurronsTaLy. Would you repeat that, please ? Commander Fostrr. Does this refer to the change in tolerance be- tween the pin and the hole? Senator SatronsTauu. No; it refers to the fact that pins were used rather than welding, as I understand it. Secondly, of course, it would refer to the increased tolerance of the pin, which youapproved. Asa layman, I would suppose the more the tolerance, the more opportunity for wear. Commander Fosrrr. As to the first, that decision was made before I got on the job. As tothe second Senator Sauronstaty. How could it have been made before you got on the job? ORIGINAL DESIGN CALLED FOR PIN CONNECTIONS Commander Fosrnr. The design was complete and the contract was let. The contractor was building a pin-connected tower when I got on the job. Senator Sanronsratu. But the pins were put on the braces that were separated when the tower was being put up. The admiral is nodding his head negatively. If I am wrong in that conception, I would like to know. Admiral Cuurcu. The collars were not pin connected, sir. They were connected by the Dardelet bolts, and later by the T-bolts. Senator Sauronstarn. I could not hear that. Admiral Crrurcu. The collars on the braces were not pin connected. They were connected by the Dardelet bolts, and later by the T-bolts on the second repair. Senator Sarronsratn. Then the question of pins rather than welding came in the original design ? 150 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Admiral Cuurcnu. Yes, sir; the original structure was pin con- nected on a design basis. Senator Sattronstaty. All right, now, either the admiral or the commander may answer, Who in the Navy approved this concept in the original design ? Commander Fosrer. I shall have to ask the admiral to answer that. Admiral Crurca. Senator, the design was carefully studied and was—I am speaking from my review of the record. It was carefully studied by Captain Albers, by the district public works design division, by the Bureau’s design section, and approval was given by the Bureau to this pin-connected structure. NAVY ACCEPTS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN Senator SarronsTaLy. So that as a Member of Congress sitting here trying to find out all we can about this subject, the top authority in the Navy approved this design ? Admiral Cyurcu. Yes, sir. Senator Sautronstatu. So that would go directly back to the Bureau of Yards and Docks? Admiral Cuurcu. The Bureau of Yards and Docks accepts full re- sponsibility for the pin-connected design, sir. Senator SatronsTaLtu. That would be the senior officer in charge at that time ? Admiral Cuurcu. Whether he personally had a conference and approved it, 1am not sure, sir. But Iam sure that his technical people that were well qualified in this work did review it, and I am positive that he would accept the responsibility were he asked. Senator SALTonsTaLL. So that Commander Foster’s responsibility lay in seeing that the original decision of the Bureau of Yards and Docks was carried out satisfactorily ? Admiral Cutron. Yes, sir. Senator Savronsraty. When he certified that it had been satis- factory in November 1957, he was working for or he was employed as the assistant in the Bureau of Yards and Docks responsible for supervising this construction ? Admiral CHurcu. He was our direct representative at the site, sir. Senator Sauronsrauty. Then, when it was accepted and these repairs followed, Commander Foster, again as a representative of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, stated that in his opinion the repairs were satis- factorily completed. Admiral Cuurcu. Yes, sir, I understood him to say that, sir. Senator Sattronstaty. And the Navy had nothing to do with the job after July 1959? Admiral Cuurcu. To our knowledge we did not, sir. Senator SALronsTatyt. But there were discussions, et cetera ? Admiral Cuurcu. I believe that you will find that there were ex- tensive informal discussions all along on this method, sir. Senator Satronstatu. Informal discussions ? Admiral Cuurcu. Yes, sir. Senator SaLronsTALu. Giving advice to the Air Force? Admiral Cuurcu. To my knowledge, only general discussions, rather than specific advice, sir. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 151 But as I indicated, I believe Captain White, who was the District Public Works Officer in Boston, and to whom any inquiries of that nature would have been directed, is the man to answer this question. Senator SaLtTonsTaLy. Just one more question. Is there anything in the Navy records, Admiral, that you have gone over that would indicate any formality to these discussions? Admiral Cuurcu. None that I have seen, sir, and I believe there are none. Senator SattronsraLt. And nothing related ? Admiral Cuurcu. No, sir. Senator Satronsraty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator, very much. Commander, there is no use for us to go over ground that has al- ready been plowed. In engineering, I never did get beyond black- smith shop, so I know I do not have any technical knowledge on these things. But just as a practical question, now, if the pin slap and the tower motion did not cause this deterioration in the connections, and you have said that a while ago as much as one inch was found later, if this pin slap and the tower motion did not cause that deterioration, what did? CAUSE OF DETERIORATION IN PIN TOLERANCES Commander Foster. I hope that any remarks that I made was not construed to mean that motion will not cause wear. But I think the timing here is important. When did this deterioration take place? Certainly if two objects rub against each other long enough, there will be wear. But the word that was used when the question was first addressed to me was “impact.” I said I thought there were other factors which should be con- sidered. Now, if you take a piece of sandpaper to sand a board, obviously the harder you lean on it and the more often you rub it, the more you are going to wear it. I believe it is within the realm of possibility that one serious storm would cause as much wear on a given pin there in that tower as perhaps a year of milder weather. This is not a result of computations or anything, but merely reading over the record of the inspections made and the amount of play that was found im each one. Senator Stennis. Well, the deterioration which was found in these connections, I believe had resulted in a tolerance as high as an inch at one time. Really that shocked me, because I know that gives a lot of leeway. Was this caused by this continual motion which was more intense at some times than others? That is what caused the wear and tear on the tower, is it not ? Commander Foster. Sir, I never found an inch deflection. Senator Stennis. I thought you used an inch a while ago. Commander Foster. No, sir. Senator Srennis. Have you not seen the reports indicating that it was as much as an inch in places? Commander Foster. I believe I have scanned them, Mr. Chair- man. F have not really studied them. Senator Srennis. Have you not seen in those reports that the divers inspections found tolerances of as much as an inch? Commander Fosrrr. This was in the spring of 1960, I believe, sir. a2 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 _ Senator Stennis. Well, now, let us see. That is in the record, is it not? Commander Foster. Yes, sir. Senator Strnnis. Now, as I say, if the looseness of these pins did not cause that deterioration and the tolerance to increase, what did? Commander Foster. I would speak now strictly as an engineer. Senator Srennis. Well, as a professional engineer, what is your judgment ? Commander Iosrer. Certainly what caused the clearance at any time is wear, the pins against the plates or the plates against the pins. Senator Srennis. All right. Now, I do not know, but if it had been welded, you would not have had that rubbing and that wearing, would you ? Commander Foster. Well, I would not expect—no, sir. Senator Srpnnis. Well, that is the way it looks to me, and that is the way it looks to you as a professional engineer? Commander Fostrr. By saying that, sir, I do not wish to give the impression that I do not believe that a pin-connected tower can be successfully built. But I would answer the question as I did. Senator Stennis. I understand that fully, but it was my concept that the welded connection does not permit the motion and the wear- ing, while the other does. Mr. Counsel, do you have anything further? Mr. Kenpauu. One or two more questions, Mr. Chairman. The fact of the matter is, Commander, that this is the type of structure that if any brace failed to function as it should, then ex- ceptional or additional stress would be thrown upon other braces, is that not right ? Commander Foster. I believe you could say that generally about any structure, Mr. Counsel. Mr. Kenpatx. And if that upper diagonal did not work as it should, as apparently it did not, would not that cause the pin connection to: deteriorate ? Commander Fosrrr. Theoretically, yes. But I must go back to the report made in 1958, which certainly did not indicate that. It indicated that the collar had been loose for some undetermined time, but there was no apparent wear, or at least none mentioned. One pin was loose and the brace was not taken up tight, but no wear was indicated. Mr. Kenpatu. Your position is not that because it showed no ap- parent wear in one year, it did not happen sometime later, is it? Commander Foster. Oh, no, sir. Mr. Kenpati. That is all I have. Senator Stennis. Just one more question, Commander. Refer to page 4 of your statement, will you, please? I shall read briefly one paragraph: After the legs and braces were in position and during the platform installa- tion, injury in the form of perceptible denting or dishing occurred to the A and B legs caused by the rubbing action of the platform against the legs due to sea swells. These dents were in the nature of 10 inches deep— that means that the dents penetrated into the tower leg that much, is that right? Commander Fosrrer. Yes. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 as Senator Stennis (continuing). “10 inches deep, 6 feet wide”—that is 6 feet on the upright—“and 10 feet in length.” That was rather severe, was it not, and somewhat of a surprise to you ¢ Commander Fosrrr. It was a surprise, and I was concerned about it. Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, you said next: This was repaired by placing steel reinforcing in the concrete lining of the legs in the dished areas. You felt that the damage was corrected by putting the steel rein- forcing in the concrete lining; is that right Commander Fosrrr. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. That did not give you any more trouble? Commander Fosrrr. No, sir. Senator Stennis. My inquiry is that I was surprised that as serious a matter as this was not anticipated and protected against in the original design. Ji impresses me. What is your professional thinking on that ? Commander Fosrer. Well, I think this was an outcome of the change from the platform, the temporary platform; in other words, had conerete been able to be placed in the legs, that would not have happened. But this was impossible at this stage. It was the only way to do it, and we did it this way. Senator Srpennis. I commend you for having made this repair so successfully. My remark was that it seemed to me that it could have been quite serious if you had not gotten to 1t quickly and effectively. I just thought that should have been anticipated and hedged against after you decided to change the platform plan. Commander Fosrrr. At that stage, sir, there was no way to hedge against it. Senator Srpnnis. You had to wait for the injury to occur, you mean ¢ Commander Fosrrr. No, sir; what I mean is we picked the quietest time we could and were very careful in hauling this platform in. I understand the committee has seen a movie. The contractor’s men really worked heroically in taking steps to minimize this chafing Senator Stennis. I was not suggesting anything to the contrary. I think this just emphasizes the fact that you had a difficult job to do and that you should have allowed sufficient margin on all these major matters. This particular trouble was due, though, to the change in the plans about the platform installation; is that right ? Commander Fosrrer. In my opinion; yes, sir. Senator Srpnnis. All right; do you have anything further? Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. Commander, you mentioned a movie that was shown. I believe that movie showed that during the tipup or the tipover, the template rotated 17 degrees in one direction and, correcting, rotated back 17 degrees in the other direction. Is that right? Commander Foster. That is approximately so, sir, give or take a degree or two. Mr. Kenpatu. Was it not a fact, sir, that that was an unforeseen factor ? Commander Foster. It generally followed the behavior of the model study that was made. 154 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. Was the stress that was exerted by this rotation taken into calculation in the design criteria ? Commander Fosrer. You mean stress because of this rotation side- ways rather than endways? Mr. Kenpauy. Yes, sir. Commander Fosrrr. I presume it was, but as I say, this design was already settled when I got on the job. I would think as an engineer, however, that those stresses would be much smaller than stresses that would be imposed on the structure once it was in place. Senator Stennis. Senator Saltonsall, do you have a question ? Senator SaLTronsTaLu. Just one more question. You were in no way responsible for the design, Commander ? Commander Fosrrr. That is right. Senator Satronsraty. You and Captain Albers were responsible for seeing that the design was carried out? I asked that question before. Commander Fosrrr. That is correct. Senator Sauronsratu. Now, did you have any responsibility, or did you make any recommendations as to the design, when you saw it was being carried out? Did you see any fundamental weaknesses and report them ? Commander Foster. I cannot recall that I did, sir. I do not believe so. Senator SauronstaLu. In other words, as an engineer in charge of supervising the work and seeing that it was done according to contract and design, you saw no reason to change that design due to any funda- mental weakness as it was going up? Commander Foster. I had no reason to feel that at all, Senator. Senator SattonsratL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. If counsel has nothing further Admiral Cuurcu. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement to cor- rect a misimpression ? Senator Stennis. Yes. Admiral Cuurcu. Captain Albers was the officer in charge of con- struction both for the design of all three towers and for the construc- tion phases of No. 2 and No. 3. Commander Foster was the resident officer assistant, as we called him, for the construction phase of tower No. 4. Senator SauronsraLu. What Navy man was responsible for the design ? Admiral Cuurcu. Directly, Captain Albers. Overall, the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Senator Stennis. He testified the other day. Senator SanronstaLy. Captain Albers took the responsibility. I did not realize he took it for the design. Senator Stennis. All right, Commander. Could you remain with us the rest of today? Matters might come up that we would want you to explain. We certainly want to thank you for coming here to give testimony. We shall appreciate it if you will just spend the rest of the day with us. Now, as the next witness, Mr. Counsel, I understand we have Captain White. Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. Captain, come around, please. | COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 155 TESTIMONY OF CAPT. THOMAS J. WHITE, CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS, U.S. NAVY, DISTRICT PUBLIC WORKS OFFICER, FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. W. C. G. CHURCH (CEC), U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR CONSTRUCTION, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS; GORDON EDWARDS, CONSTRUCTION MAN- AGEMENT ENGINEER, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS; JAMES AYERS, UNDERWATER CONSULTANT; AND CAPT. WILL J. DAVIS, U.S. NAVY, LEGAL OFFICER, BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS Senator Stennis. We are glad to have you here, Captain. Do you have a prepared statement ? Captain Wuirr. Sir, I have not. Senator Stennis. All right, with the consent of the committee, do you wish to make an opening statement, Captain ? Captain Wurre. No, sir, other than to introduce myself. J am Capt. Thomas J. White, civil engineer, officer in charge of construc- tion in the Ist Naval District with headquarters in Boston, I am a graduate engineer. Senator Srennis. How long have you been the officer in charge of construction ? Captain Wurrter. I have been district public works officer, sir, since January 1, 1960. Prior to that time, going back to August 1957, I was the deputy district public works officer to Captains Plichta and Husband. Senator Stennis. Now, proceed with your qualifications, your pro- fessional qualifications, sir. Captain Wuirer. I am a graduate civil engineer, 1932, from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, with a degree of bachelor of science and a civil engineering degree. Senator Srennis. That is very fine. That is a good start in life. Captain Wutrr. Thank you, sir. Mr. Kenpati. Captain, at what point in time did you first have any connection with the Texas tower program ? Captain Wuire. In August 1957, when I reported in as deputy district public works officer. Mr. Krnpatt. Since January 1960, you have been the district pub- lic works officer, is that correct ? Captain Wuits. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. Have you had since that time any correspondence with reference to Texas tower No. 4? Captain Wuirr. Yes, I have. Mr. Krenpauy. Did you receive by mail a copy of a teletypewriter exchange dated March 1, 1960, which originated from the 551st Air- eraft Karly Warning and Control Wing? Captain Wuirer. I received a copy of a dispatch which had been sent from that wing to the Air Force installations representative. Mr. Kenpatyt. What generally did that cover, that is, what was the subject matter and the contents? Captain Wurrtr. I have a copy of that, if you would like me to read it, but it covered generally the fact that an underwater survey had been made of Texas tower No. 4, and it indicated that some repair work was necessary and that this work was of sufficient urgency in the (OCC tt 156 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 opinion of the architect and engineer that it had to be accomplished during the coming construction season. Mr. Kenpatu. Will you make a copy of that a part of the record, please, Captain ? Captain Wurre. Weshall be happy to, sir. Senator Stennis. It comes in the record at this point. (The document referred to is as follows:) MarcH 1, 1960. Routine. Deferred. 551st AEWE&CON WG Otis AFB. 26 AIR DIV (SAGE) Stewart AFB. Info: ADC ENT AFB. AFRCE, NE, 424 Trapelo Road, Waltham, Mass. (Mail.) ist Naval District, Boston, Mass. (Mail.) Unclassified from 551IDC 0979. Action 26 AD (SAGE) for 26 IDC; Info ADC for ADIFS, AFRCE, NE. Subject: Underwater Structural Deficiencies—TT 4. This message in 6 parts. Part I: On 20 Jan. 60, 4604th SUPPRON informed this hq of excessive motion and unusual noise being experienced aboard subject tower. Underwater inspection by contract was performed on 8 Feb. Divers reported pinned joints of bracing at minus 25-ft level have horizontal motion of approx 1 inch and joints at minus 75-ft level motion of % inch. This motion has increased from original tolerance of 14 inch since May 59. Part II: Increased sway prompted meeting on 25 Feb with original structural designers of tower (Moran, Proctor, Mueser and Rutledge of New York). Info obtained from meeting in- dicated firm recognized sway problem and prepared design for additional bracing above sea level as part of cancelled FY61 MCP SAGE modification program. Part III: Installation of additional bracing as outlined in Part II above will present construct costs of $400,000 to $500,000 and AE costs, including Titles I & II services, $16,000. Part IV: Mr. Kuss, structural engineer of above firm, con- siders subject deficiency of emergency-type nature from which tower may be lost during winter storms if work not accomplished within next 5-month period. Part V: Based on previous records of sea conditions, structural bracing repairs must be completed NLT 1 Aug, requiring expeditious action in procurement, fabrication and construction phases of this project. Part VI: Complete report, including meeting minutes, being forwarded your hq under separate corre- spondence. FRANCIS Kapp, Major, USAF, D/C for Installations. EMERGENCY CITED Mr. Kenpatt. I believe it is stated in that message that Mr. Kuss, who was the design engineer, considered the loose pin connections of an emergency nature; is that right ? Captain Wuirte. That is correct. Mr. Kenpautu. And he stated further that the tower might be lost if it were not corrected by August 1; is that right? Captain Wuirr. That is my recollection; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, as a result of that, did you feel that some inde- ert investigation was necessary to determine what it was all about ¢ Captain Wutrr. I did not. At some time previous to this, IT had some discussions with Colonel Cipolla, who was then the Air Force installations representative, or later became the Air Force civil engi- neer, with respect to some possible repair work that might be required to the tower, and the colonel asked me if we would be interested in acting as the design and construction agency for this work. Over COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 157 the telephone, and this is where most of this conversation took place, I indicated that we would be happy to act as the design and construc- tion agency for any repair work due to structure of the tower. Mr. Krnpauu. Here is the point, Captain. Here you received this message in which the design engineer said: This is an emergency ; if we do not do something about this tower, we may lose it unless something is done about it by August 1. That is right, is it not? Captain Wurre. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. Did you then make an independent investigation or study to determine what the facts of the situation were and the prob- lem with which you were confronted ? Captain Wurrr. No; I did not. Mr. Kenpatyi. Were you familiar with it at that time to an extent that you did not need to make such an investigation or study ? Captain Wuirte. No. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, did you, Captain, on March 15, write a letter about it? You did, did you not? Captain Wurtrr. I did. Mr. Kenpaty. To whom was that letter addressed ? Captain Wuirer. To Colonel Stephany, who succeeded Colonel Cipolla as the Air Force installations representative. Mr. Kenpatt. Do you have a copy of that letter with you, and if ‘so, will you make it a part of the record ? Captain Wuire. I am sorry; I do not have it with me, but it will be made a part of the records; yes. Mr. Kenpaty. You will supply it as part of the record ? Captain Wuite. Yes. (The document referred to is as follows:) Marca 15, 1960. Lt. Col. R. C. STEPHANY, U.S. Air Force, New England Civic Engineer Region, Waltham, Mass. DEAR LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHANY: Several weeks ago Colonel Cipolla ‘discussed with me the motion difficulties being experienced by Texas tower No. 4. At that time, the basic cause for the exaggerated motion was not defi- nitely known. However, it was suspected that it was probably due to motion of the underwater collars to which the horizontal and diagonal bracing mem- bers are attached. It was contemplated that correction of the motion difficulty would involve installation of additional bracing above the water level at an estimated cost of $500,000. I advised Colonel Cipolla that while I definitely did not wish to become involved in problems of a purely maintenance nature ‘on the Texas towers, the motion difficulty appeared to be related to the original design and for this reason I would look favorably upon a request for the Navy to administer both the engineering and repair contracts required for correction of the difficulty. - Last week I received your memo furnishing me copies of the diving contrac- tor’s data and Otis Air Force Base request for authority to engage an architect and engineer to develop plans, specifications, and cost estimate for necessary repairs to the underwater structural bracing. However, I have not as yet received any correspondence of a formal nature which would indicate the inten- tion of your office for the Navy to award and administer the architect and engineer contract. ' If it is your intention that the district public works office award and admin- Aster the architect and engineer contract, it is suggested that formal notification 158 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4) be furnished. Also, since the Otis Air Force Base request for architect and engi- neer authority did not mention funds, it is considered appropriate to mention that the architect and engineer fee will probably approximate $30,000 based upon the $500,000 construction estimate noted above. With best personal regards. Sincerely, T. J. WHITE, Captain (CEC) USN, District Public Works Officer. MOTION DIFFICULTIES APPEAR RELATED TO ORIGINAL DESIGN Mr. Kenpatu, Let me read to you a portion of that letter, Captain, and see if this not correct. Youstated: I advised Colonel Cipolla that while I definitely did not wish to become involved in problems of a purely maintenance nature on the Texas towers, the motion difficulty appeared to be related— and this is the important part— appeared to be related to the original design and for this reason I would look favorably upon a request for the Navy to administer both the engineering and repair contracts required for correction of the difficulty. That is a direct quote from that letter, is it not? Captain Wuire. That is correct. Mr. Kenpauu. Will you tell the committee just what you meant by the statement that the motion difficulty appeared to be related to the original design ? Captain Wurirr. If I can, I would like to quote from an earlier sentence in that same letter. Mr. Kenpatu. Go right ahead. Captain Wuite. I shall start at the beginning: Several weeks ago, Colonel Cipolla discussed with me the motion difficul- ties being experienced by Texas tower No. 4. At that time, the basic cause for the exaggerated motion was not definitely known. However, it was sus- pected that it was probably due to motion of the underwater collars to which the horizontal and diagonal bracing members are attached. In that context, I was referring to this bracing that had been in- stalled at sea as a part of the repair work that has been discussed. Mr. Kenpatu. You considered that as a part of the original design ? _Captain Wuirs. The original design of this repaired bracing; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. That was approximately 214 years after the tower had been turned over to the Air Force for operation ? Captain Wurrr. That is right, approximately. Mr. Kenpatxu. And you are stating that the motion difficulty was related to the original design ? Captain Wuirr. Based on the information that I had, yes, because as I said earlier, the basic cause was not known. However, it was suspected, and on that premise, that was the basis for my statement. Mr. Kenpatu. You did have information about the matter and had had discussions about the tower, had you not? Captain Wuirs. That is correct; yes. Mr. Kenpatt. In the light of what you now know, do you still feel that the tower motion was related to the original design? And I am including the installation of the Dardelet bolts as part of the original design. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 159 Captain Wuirs. Well Mr. Kenpatu. Captain, excuse me. You stated on March 15, 1960, that the motion difficulty appeared to be related to the original de- sign. You just told me that you thought that was a correct statement. Captain Wuirr. That is correct, to the original design of this bracing system that was used in the repairs. Because at the time that I made this statement, I had no knowledge of anything else that could be contributing to this motion. Mr. Kenpauu. We are including that field repair as part of the original design, and you say this difficulty appeared to be related to the original design, did you not ? Captain Wurre. That is correct. Mr. Kenpauu. You stated that that was a correct statement. Now, has anything happened since then to cause you to change your mind? Captain Wuitsr. No, I do not believe so. Mr. Kenpatu. So that statement is just as true today as it was in March of 1960, is that right ? Captain Wurrs. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. But is it not true, Captain, that the motion difficulty at that point in time that you were talking about was not due to the collar movement, but was due to deteriorated pin connections ? Captain Wurrr. That could have been, because the information that I had available to me indicated that there was some wear in the pin connections in this top level of bracing here, and over in these pin connections on either side, so that the motion could very definitely have been related to the wear in those pin connections. DETERIORATION OF PIN CONNECTIONS Mr. Kenpatu. As a matter of fact, your information showed that the pin connections had deteriorated to such an extent that, in some cases, the tolerance was as much as an inch ? Captain Wuirr. Oh, generally. I would not like to be pinned down to the last 16th, but in that range, yes. Mr. Kenpatzi. So when you were writing this letter as late as March 1960, it would be a true statement to say that the motion diffi- culty at that time was related to the deteriorated pin connections, rather than to your collar difficulty ? Captain Wurtz. That is right. Mr. Kenpatx. Now, Captain, on January 24 of this year, I believe that you held a conference in response to a dispatch from the 26th Air Division relative to an inspection of towers 2 and 3, is that right ? Captain Wuritr. That is correct. Mr. Kenvaru. Did you have occasion to pass upon the award of the contract for that inspection ? Captain Wurre. I did. CONTRACT INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF TOWERS NO. 2 AND NO. 3 AWARDED TO DESIGN ENGINEERS Mr. Kenpaty. Was that a negotiated contract ? Captain Wuire. It was. Mr. Kenpatu. To whom was it awarded ? 160 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4: Captain Wuirr. Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Mr. Kenpatu. Is that the same firm that designed the towers? Captain Wurrr. It is. EVALUATION CALLS FOR SEAWORTHINESS OF REMAINING TOWERS Mr. Krenpatt. Now, Captain, why would you go back to the same firm that had designed the towers and who had attempted the repairs on tower No. 4 to make an inspection of the structural integrity of the remaining two towers? Captain Wurtrr. Well, it seems to me that it was rather basic, that we were given a job by the Air Force to make an investigation to determine the seaworthiness of Texas towers No. 2 and No. 3. Associated with that job was a matter of extreme urgency, because there was a lot of concern, certainly, following the tragedy of Texas tower No. 4, as to what the condition of the other two towers was. Now, this concern was shared not only by the people that were on the towers themselves, but by the families of those people. This was a matter of urgency. So it seemed to me that the best people who were in a position to go out on those towers, and specify and determine which parts of the towers should be thoroughly investigated, to de- termine their structural accuracy, was the firm that originally de- signed the towers. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, Captain, with all deference to the time ele- ment and the urgency of the matter, it appears from the record that the design engineers, time after time, have been consulted, and no one else, about repairs to tower No. 4. Now they are called upon by a new contract to evaluate their own work in towers No. 2 and No. 3. Now, it is not very likely, is it, that they would admit that there was a design deficiency in towers No. 2 and No. 3 if they found one? Captain Wurre. I would like to disagree with you just a little bit on one of the premises that you stated; that is, that they have not been called upon to review their original design in no way. What they have been called upon to do is to see whether the towers as con- structed meet the requirements that were established by their original design. Mr. Kenna. That is not what your memorandum of January 24 says, is it, Captain? Does it not say that the purpose of the investi- gation was to determine whether towers Nos. 2, 3—and I am quoting here—“were structurally capable of meeting the original design eri- teria and performing their intended functions?” Now, certainly that brings into play your whole concept of design, does it not? Captain Wurrr. I am sorry, could I see that? Mr. Kenpatu. Yes. Senator Stennis. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Senator STennts. Captain, you are ready to start? Let us have order, gentlemen. All right, gentlemen, let us proceed. Mr. Kenpatu. I believe I had a question pending, Mr. Chairman. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 161 Captain Wuirr. Yes. I think I am ready to answer the question now. : Mr. Kenpati. All right, sir. Captain Wurre. It has not been, nor is it now our intention, to have Moran, Proctor go in and review their original design of these towers. Now, the intention of this contract was to satisfy ourselves that the towers as constructed were as they were designed. Mr. Krenpati. Well, Captain, if you will pardon me, will you explain to me how you can determine whether or not the towers are structur- ally capable of meeting the original design criteria if you do not take into consideration the design of the towers ? Captain Wuire. I am a little unclear Mr. Krnpauy. Well, the design is based upon the design criteria? Captain Wurrr. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. So if you are going to determine whether or not the structure is capable of meeting the design criteria, you have to exam- ine the design, do you not? Captain Wurrs. As I said earlier, sir Mr. Krenpatu. That is a simple question; it can be answered yes or no. Captain Wurrer. As I said earlier, sir, it has not been and it is not now our intention to have Moran, Proctor review their original de- sign calculations with respect to the original design criteria. It is our intent under this contract to have them, and I think it is stated in the contract that the contractor in the shortest reasonable time shall investigate the structural condition of Texas towers Nos. 2, 3 and shall furnish the Government a report thereof. In doing this, he is to make an examination of all the accessible critical welded connections in the tower structure by means of magna- fluxing, radiographic examination, or other means necessary to pro- vide maximum possible evidence or evidence of the presence of defects in or near these connections. Mr. Kenpatu. Captain, may we go back to my question? I asked you how you can determine whether or not the towers are structurally capable of meeting the design criteria, and that is the language of your memorandum, unless you take into consideration the design? You cannot do it, can you? | Captain Waite. Well, sir, I think we are separating on a point of semantics, really. I tried to tell you what the intent was and what we are going to pay for under this contract, and we are not going to pay for Moran, Proctor to review their original design calculations and determine whether or not that design was capable of satisfying the original design criteria. We are satisfied that that decision was correct. Mr. Kenpauy. Then you are telling us that your memorandum does not mean what it says? I shall not belabor this point any longer, Captain. Will you make a copy of that memorandum a part of the record? It will speak for itself. Captain Wuirr. I think the services he is actually to provide throughout the body of the memorandum, and those services speak for themselves, as you say. 162 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 (The memorandum referred to is as follows:) JANUARY 20, 1961. From: 20. To: Files. Subject: Evaluation of requirements and determination of scope for inspection of Texas towers 2 and 3. 1. In response to the U.S. Air Force 26th Air Division dispatch 172100Z, a meeting was held at the office of the District Public Works Officer, 1st Naval District on Thursday, January 19, to discuss requirements and determine scope of the requested inspection of Texas towers 2 and 3. The following persons were in attendance: Dr. P. C. Rutledge, Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Maj. R. W. Mix, USAF, Otis Air Force Base. Mr. C. E. Hadrun, 26th Air Force Division Headquarters. Mr. H.N. Grattan, 26th Air Force Division Headquarters. Mr. J. J. McConnell, Otis Air Force Base. Capt. T. J. White, CEC, USN, District Public Works Office, IND. Capt. W. R. Boyer, CEC, USN, District Public Works Office, 1ND. Mr. R. S. Seddon, District Public Works Office, 1ND. Mr. R. S. Seddon, District Public Works Office, 1ND. 2. After discussion it was concluded that the following areas should be inves- tigated and evaluated to enable a determination that Texas towers 2 and 3 were structurally capable of meeting the original design criteria and performing their intended functions: (a) Make magnaflux, radiographic or other recognized tests deemed neces- Sary to provide maximum possible evidence of absence or presence of defects at all welds on shear plates and girders at the leg connections; all high stress areas of the girders also, the legs in the critical areas, from the top deck to a point approximately 25 feet below the bottom deck. It was decided also that if the results of these investigations indicated areas or points of fatigue or excess stress, that further such investigations as indicated necessary would be conducted. (6) Inspection for corrosion in the high stress areas of the structure particu- larly in the underwater portions of the caissons and in the shear plates and girder areas at leg connections also, for the effectiveness of cathodic protection. (c) Underwater inspection for determination of any possible structural dam- age, scour at the caissons and to investigate and recommend action regarding the sunken fender at TT-2. It was recognized that effective diving operations probably could not be undertaken until late spring or early summer and that such delay on this item would of necessity have to be accepted. (d) The tilted leg on TT-3 was discussed but it was concluded that the re sults of magnafluxing or other investigation at the connections between this leg and the platform structure would indicate the effects of tilt in the leg involved, upon the structural and stability characteristics of the tower. (e) Re-analyze the stresses in and the safety of these structures under the con- ditions of wind and wave effects experienced at TT—4 during Hurricane Donna (1960) being encountered at the respective sites. It was concluded that assist- ance by the Oceanographic Institute at Woods Hole would be required to evaluate all reports of the wind and wave conditions experienced at TT—4 and to extend the results of these evaluations to the maximum wind and wave conditions that should now be considered possible at the locations of TT-2 and TT-3. The Navy (Mr. Seddon) agreed to arrange for this analysis and evaluation and to provide such data to MPMR without cost. (f) If, upon completion of the above analysis, a need for structural strengthen- ing of these towers is indicated, to recommend design modifications or improve- ments deemed necessary to increase the structural capabilities of the towers. 3. The request for a study to determine the feasibility of installing instru- mentation or indicators to forecast structural conditions of the towers was deemed to be a separate matter and accordingly would be handled as such. It was, however, pointed out that previous studies regarding instrumentation for movement and stress measurements had been made and it was generally felt that the reports of these studies could be reviewed, revised or updated as appropriate in the light of recent developments in this area and effective recommendations made. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 | 163 4. It was discussed and made clear that except for transportation from Otis Air Force Base to the towers, ali contacts, negotiations, and other matters re- garding this work weould be between the A. & E. contractor and the DPWO. Also, it was agreed that all negotiations and administration of the contract for this work would be handied by the DPWO without the need for consultation, reference to further clearance or approval by Air Force representatives. That the point of contact for the DPWO, 1ND with the U.S. Air Force would be with the commander, Otis Air Force Base, and all distribution of information or re- ports regarding this matter within the Air Force shall be made by the com- mander, Otis Air Force Base. 5. The urgency and importance of getting inspection work at the site underway was repeatedly stressed. It was therefore recognized that some premium costs probably would be encountered and that such costs in this instance were justi- fied. Due to the many unknown factors involved, a firm estimate of the total probable cost of this work was not available at this time. It was arranged that Dr. Rutledge would submit a proposal to the DPWO and advice as appro- priate would in turn be forwarded to the commander, Otis Air Force Base, at the earliest date practicable. In the meantime, it was considered necessary that a preliminary allocation of $25,000 be made available by the Air Force to enable an early and orderly start of this work. 6. Dr. Rutledge was instructed by Captain White to proceed immediately to incur such obligations as were necessary to get the work underway at the earliest date practicable and was assured that a formal letter of intent or notice to pro- ceed would be issued at the earliest date possible. Also, that any obligations incurred to carry out this request would, in the event of cancellation of this work in the meantime, be reimbursed. It was indicated that inspection engineers and magnafluxing equipment was desired at the site at the earliest possible time, preferably on January 23, to which Dr. Rutledge agreed to make every reason- able effort to meet the desire. As requested by Captain White, Dr. Rutledge agreed that he would submit his proposal as quickly as the necessary informa- tion, prices, and other matters could be resolved and that in the meantime work would proceed as expeditiously as practicable. W. R. Boyer. Copy to: Dr. Rutledge (1), Major Mix (2), BuDocks (2), Code 21 (1). Mr. Kenpatt. One final question, Captain. How much money was involved in this contract ? Captain Wurre. It is going to amount to about a total of between $225,000 and $250,000. Mr. Kenparn. Does that include the entire inspection of the towers ? Captain Wurtz. That includes everything that we are going to do with respect to this study. Mr. Kunpati. Why does the copy of the contract show only $83,000 ? Captain Wuirer. For the reason that in order to get this contract started, we had to get authorized the work in increments, because other items of work to be accomplished, such as oceanographic studies, such as underwater scour determinations, such as corrosion surveys—we were not able to get a price on them in such time, nor were we able to sufficiently define the scope of the work that was to be done under these particular things to write them into the contract at the time the original document was drawn. We have since added those items of work by change order. Mr. Kenpari. But you honestly feel that by employing Moran, Proctor, the original design engineers, you are going to receive a com- pletely objective report of the structural stability of towers No. 2 and No. 3? Captain Wuire. I have no question of it, sir. If I had any ques- tion of it, I would not have given them the contract. Mr. Krnpan. I have no further questions. Captain Warr. I would like to ask one question. We are clear now, are we not, that the original design that was in my letter to Col- 164 ' COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 onel Stephany was the original design as related to the replacement bracing, and did not go to the original design of the complete tower structure ? Mr. Kenpaux. Yes, sir; [think we understand that. Senator Srennis. Well, Captain, I am not going over what you and counsel have covered. I really have not had a chance to be fa- miliar with this phase of the facts. As I understand now, you have a contract with these gentlemen for the inspection of towers No. 2 and No. 3? Captain Wuire. That is correct, sir. Senator Srennis. And this contract was executed when ? Captain Wurrn. We started working on this—— Senator Stennis. I mean about when? Captain Wuirr. About the 20th of January, sir. Senator Stennis. I beg your pardon ? Captain Wuire. About the 20th of January. Senator Stennis. After tower No. 4 collapsed ? Captain Waite. That is correct. Senator Stennis. And that collapse is what caused you to decide to make this exmaination of towers No. 2 and No. 3? Captain Wuirer. This is what caused the Air Force to ask us to make this examination; yes, sir. Senator Srennis. Well, I was going to ask you just how you got back into the picture. So the Air Force asked you gentlemen to come into the picture with reference to towers No. 2 and No. 3? Captain Wurre. That is correct, sir. Senator Stennis. And this firm that you employed is the one, as I understand your testimony, that made the original design of towers No. 2and No. 3? Captain Wurre. That is correct, sir. Senator Stennis. Now, it does appear odd, just being frank about it, that you turned to these gentlemen for the inspection after the experience that you and the Air Force had before. This is no reflec- tion on this company. I do not mean it that way, but it appears odd that you would go back to the same group to evaluate the situation now, which it seems to me necessarily includes the whole design matter. They will have to defend their design or say that it was inadequate, will they not? Captain Wire. Sir, I would like to withhold an answer to that question until I get the results of the survey. Senator Stennis. Well, I just say, looking down the road to the future, when you go out to employ someone that has already com- mitted themselves to such a major part of this whole inquiry, it is their “child”; they will have to stand by the design or say that it was profes tomally inadequate, will they not? That is Just commonsense, 1s 1t not ¢ P Captain Wurre. Certainly I would expect them to stand by their esion. Senator Stennis. That is right. So when they bring in the verdict on this inspection that you assigned them, they are going to be passing on themselves as far as the design, directly or indirectly, is concerned, are they not ? Captain Wurre. I think that maybe there is confusion in the issues just a little bit, Senator. But what we are asking these people to do is COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 165 to determine that the conditions that exist in towers No. 2 and No. 3 are the conditions that were encompassed in their original design. Now, we have gone a little further than that to the extent that we are making an oceanographic study to determine whether or not the expected conditions now are the same as they were then. Senator Stennis. I did not question you, or them either, when I asked the question. I am just getting to basic commonsense, as I see it, in saying that when they bring back their verdict on towers No. 2 and No. 8 under this special contract they, directly or indirectly, to a substantial degree, will be passing on their own design. That is the way it seemstome. How does it lock to you? Captain Wurre. No, sir; we have not asked. Senator Stennis. May I ask you to give a reason? You say “No.” What are yourreasons? Pinpoint your reasons. Captain Warre. I do not know whether I can make this clear or not. Senator STrennis. Well, do the best you can. Captain Wuire. We have not asked them, nor are we asking them now, sir, for a statement as to whether or not their original design was capable of meeting the conditions under which that design was pre- pared. We are not asking for that at all, sir. Weare going beyond that and asking: are the towers as they are constructed, and are the conditions of these members, and are the things that exist out there now the same things that you thought would exist at the time that you prepared your design? The results so far have indicated that there are no conditions out there now that were not anticipated in the ey design, sir. enator STENNIS. So you are not asking them to certify anything about their opinion as to whether those towers are reasonably safe or reasonably adequate or anything like that? If you were, you would certainly be asking them to pass, in part, on their design, would you not? Would not this necessarily follow, if you were asking them if they were safe or if they were adequate? Captain Wuirs. Yes, sir. Now, a part of this package, of course, is a verification through in- dependent studies as to whether or not the wind and wave conditions which these towers were designed to withstand have changed or not. Now, certainly, the field and the knowledge that has existed in the past, and, to a large extent, still exist with respect to the effect of wind and waves and what might be expected from certain types of storms and what their effect will be on these structures, fixed struc- tures in the open ocean, is extremely limited, sir, and it was limited at the time the towers were originally designed. We would like to augment that information by the information that has been developed by the people who have been on these towers by subsequent studies. Senator Stennis. All right, that is a new point. I hope they are able to bring you something worthwhile on that. But if they are not giving you an opinion as to whether or not those towers are adequate and reasonably safe now, I do not see what it is you are paying them the $225,000 for. That is what you want to know, is it not, whether the towers are reasonably adequate or reasonably safe for continued operation You have had this misfortune about No. 4. Now you and the Air Force want to know whether to go on operating these others as | see it. 166 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Captain Wutrr. That is correct. Senator Stennis. Now, that is a very sound position for you to take, I think. But if you are not paying these $225,000 to $250,000 to these gentlemen to tell you whether or not they are reasonably safe and adequate, I do not see what you are paying them for, except the little point that you mentioned at the last there about the new conditions you might run into. Captain Wurre. That, in our opinion, sir, is a very important point. SAFETY OF EXISTING TOWERS IS PARAMOUNT Senator Srennis. Well, I do not mean to belittle it, but it is com- ing pretty high at this figure. It just seems to me that the unan- swerable logic of the thing is that you very rightfully want to know about the safety, the reasonable safety and usefulness and practicality of the remaining towers, and that you have employed a firm to inspect them. But as a part of it, the way it looks to me is just the same as though a jury, after having been sent out, should come back and say, “We, the jury, find for the jury.” You just do not do things that way. It seems to me as though you have got to have someone who has not been connected with the design originally to pass on those matters. Captain Wutre. Senator your analogy may be correct, sir. The only thing I would like to add, sir, is that I was faced with a problem that had to be solved in the shortest time it could be solved in. After thinking of all the factors that were concerned in this matter, it was my decision to go back to the firm that originally designed these towers and give them this job, because in that way, I thought that the job that I had to do could best be done. Senator Stennis. Well, I think your concern is very commendable, sir. I think you and the Air Force both have a special responsibility. However, if you were going to determine the responsibility for the situation as to Texas tower No. 4, you would not have gone to this firm, though, to evaluate it, would you? Captain Wurre. I was not asked to do that, sir. Senator Stennis. I know. But if I were to ask you, or if the com- mittee were to ask you, to recommend someone to determine the situa- tion with respect to Texas tower No. 4, you would not go back to the designing firm to do it, would you? And I speak of the firm with great deference; it is one of our best ones. Captain Wurre. I would rather defer an answer to that, Senator. Senator Stennis. All right, I do not want to press you. But I think the fact that you want to defer it shows that you would not turn to them, and your better judgment would lead you away from them. If you would rather not answer it, that is all right. Anything else, gentlemen ? Mr. Kenpatt. I have no further questions. Senator Srennis. J want to thank you again, Captain, for being with us and bringing us these facts. If you will remain with us during the day, please, I would appreciate it. Captain Wuirer. Sir, I am here at your pleasure. Senator Stennis. Gentlemen, shall we proceed ? It is now 12:20. Do you have another witness? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 167 Mr. Kenpaty. We have another witness that will take us about 45 minutes. Senator Srennis. Well, let us proceed, and see if we can get through by about 1 o’clock. TESTIMONY OF ALAN D. CROCKETT, MARINE CONTRACTORS, INC., EAST BOSTON, MASS. Senator Srennis. Mr. Crockett, you were one of the gentlemen who were sworn this morning ? Mr. Crockert. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. Mr. Kendall, I think that you can identify Mr. Crockett for the record and get his background. Mr. Kenpatt. I believe your name is Alan Crocket, is that correct ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpati. Where are you from? Mr. Crockett. I am from Boston, Mass., associated with Marine Contractors Co., Inc., as general manager. I have been there for 4 years. Mr. Kenparx. Will you state for the record your background, in- cluding your educational attainment and your business? Mr. Crocxertr. Professionally I am a mechanical engineer, so li- censed in the State of Maine; class of 1944, University of Maine, me- chanical engineering. I am qualified in the Federal courts in Massachusetts as a surveyor, predominantly marine, however. Mr. Kenpatt. I did not hear that last statement. Mr. Crocxerr. I am qualified in the Federal courts of Massachu- setts aS a marine surveyor, and am on consulting boards of Thomas Walsh, a firm of attorneys in Boston, and Sanger & Sanger, admiralty attorneys in Boston. Mr. Kenpatu. You are presently connected with the Marine Con- tractors ? Mr. Crocker. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. What type of business are they engaged in? Mr. Crockett. We are specifically a marine repair concern. We deal with marine surveys, actual repair operations, underwater sur- veys of most any nature. Senator Srennis. Mr. Crockett, you do not have a prepared state- ment ? Mr. Crockett. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not, with the exception that I would like to make it clear for the record that I, as an engineer, or my company, have never been considered in any of the design prob- lems or the original design of any of the towers, nor have we been consulted with this in mind. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Crocxerr. Our work has been predominantly observations of existing conditions. Senator Stennis. All right, thank you, sir. Mr. Kenpaty. Mr. Crockett, you are here in obedience to a sub- pena issued by the committee, are you not? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. 168 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. You were subpenaed because we were advised. that your company from time to time made certain underwater surveys or inspections of Texas tower No. 4; is that correct ? Mr. Crocxerr. This is correct. Mr. Kenpatyu. When was the first survey you made? UNDERWATER SURVEYS OF TOWER NO. 4 BY MARINE CONTRACTORS, INC. Mr. Crocxetr. November 25, 1958, was the date of issue of the actual report. The survey was conducted just prior to that. Mr. Kenpaty. Will you briefly explain to us the significance of your findings, insofar as they pertained to the structural stability of tower No. 4? Mr. Crocxerr. The survey was to consider the inspection of all underwater connections and bracings on caissons A, B, and C at the minus-20-foot level; the examination of the collars on A and B eais- sons at the minus-65-70-foot level; also to inspect both collars on each side in the way of the Dardelet bolts. The second phase was to tighten 36 holding bolts on caissons A and B collars at the minus-65-foot level to a torque of 1,300 foot-pounds; also to assist in locating an oil leak in the A caisson. We did this survey and it is a matter of record—I can read it to you, if youso desire. Mr. Kenpaty. I would like you to explain it as best you can so that we can understand it, and submit a copy for the record if you will, please, sir. Mr. Crockett. Will do. The bracings, all bracings, caissons, and underwater parts of the tower foundation were found to be heavily coated with marine growth. The growth appeared much denser in the zero to minus-20- or 25-foot level, ending completely at minus 90 feet. AIl underwater parts were found to be very well protected from use of the cathodic protection. Their appearance was black in color, with fine scales of about 20 mils. At the minus-23-foot level Mr. Kenpaut. Excuse me, Mr. Crockett. Can you give us a synop- sis of the significant findings affecting the stability of the tower or the collar connection there? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. We found at this time, on cleaning of the collar connection, that the B caisson collar had no vertical motion. Mr. Kenpauu. Can you point it out on the model as you go along? As you do, indicate which sides are A, B, and C. Mr. Crockett. This one [indicating] is A, this one is B; this other one is C. The collar at B was found to be without vertical motion; all bolts, nuts, and double nuts were found to be in place. However, the Dardelet keeper plates were loose and several of the studs and nuts were missing from these plates. The plates were three-eighths of an inch thick steel plate installed over the heads of the Dardelet bolts to endeavor to keep them in position. This plate was installed with eight half-inch studs welded to the caisson. The plates were installed in the field and do not show on any construction print. The collar holding bolts were found to be at an average of 900 foot-pounds COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 169 torque. These bolts were torqued to 1,300 foot-pounds. They were found to be holding at 1,300 foot- pounds after slight sea conditions— that is, on checking at a later date, a day or two later, after we had encountered slight sea conditions. Mr. Kenpaxn. At that time, Mr. Crockett, was any consideration or particular attention given to a possible deterioration in the pin connections, particularly ¢ on the A B side of the tower ? Mr. Crockxerr. We examined all the pin connections at the minus- 93-foot level and found that they were reasonably within their tolerance. In order to ascertain whether a pin was exactly within its tolerance, it would have to be opened up; that is to say, the locking devices on the extremities of the pin would have to be removed to determine the clearance between the pin diameter and the diameter of the hole. This was not done. However, we could ascertain very slight motion, which was, say, possibly an eighth of an inch in clearance, which we felt at that time was within the design tolerance. Mr. Kenpatu. This is a survey that was made approximately 1 year after the tower was in operation ? Mr. Crocxerr. That is so. Mr. Kenpatu. What did you find with reference to the collar con- nections secured by the Dardelet bolts? Before you answer that, let me ask you, Mr. Crockett, are Dardelet bolts ordinarily used for a permanent fix or a temporary fix ? Mr. Crocxertr. It could be used, I suppose, as a permanent fix. However, it has been my small experience in the past to use them temporarily, Mr. Kenpart. Now, will you go ahead and tell us what you found with reference to the collar connection and the Dardelet bolts? COLLAR CONNECTIONS IN VERTICAL MOTION ON LEG Mr. Crocxert. The A caisson collar at the minus-65- to 70-foot level was cleaned of marine growth over its entire connection area. We found the caisson in the way of the top and bottom edges of the collar shined to bright bare metal. This bright metal, approximately 2 inches in width, was caused by vertical motion in the collar. Upon further investigation, we found that several of the jam nuts and double nuts that secured the 2-inch collar hold bolts had slackened away from the holding nut an inch or two. Mr. Kenpautu. So you found that collar was sliding up and down on the caisson ? Mr. Crockert. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. And that the bolts themselves had slacked to how much? Two inches? Mr. Crockert. Some of them were off in fixture as much as 1 to 2 inches. This was not the case in all the bolts. However, we found that the collar bolts have very slight, if any, torque when we endeay- ored to torque the connection. Mr. Kenpatx. Then did you conclude from that that the fix that involved the collar connection was not holding? Mr. Crockett. Say that again, please. 170 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. The repair work, involving the installation of the collar, was not holding, as I understand it. Mr. Crocxerr. Not at that particular time. We also found that the Dardelet keeper plate that we had found on B caisson was missing on A caisson. Mr. Kenpatyi. What is the keeper plate? Mr. Crockett. The keeper plate was a field installation, I am given to understand, to hold the Dardelet bolts in place, obviously. It was ‘a steel plate some three-eighths of an inch thick covering the entire area, the Dardelet area, secured by half-inch bolts to the caisson. Why this was installed? I have never seen it on any drawing and I do not believe there is any specific note in the design of this. I believe it was a field installation. Mr. Kenpauu. Were the collars on both the A and B legs moving vertically on the leg? Mr. Crocxerr. The B caisson collar was found to be firm, without motion. The A caisson collar was found to be in vertical motion. Senator Srennis. May I interrupt there? Was it in this Dardelet bolt connection and collar that you found this 1 inch or more play ? Mr. Crocxerr. It had to be through that section, sir. This collar on A attached to the A caisson here [indicating] had vertical motion as much as an inch on each side. That would make a motion of about 2 inches. Senator Srennis. The brace where it fastened ? Mr. Crocxerr. The whole collar structure. Senator Srennis. The brace is attached to the collar? Mr. Crockett. Yes. Senator Srennis. So it had a motion of an inch up and an Inch down, to make a total of 2 inches? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Some of these Dardelet bolts were found to be missing at this time. This was also at the time we found the Dardelet bolts were of not true size according to specifications. Normally, in a thing of this nature, we examine the specifications prior to a survey, and we found that the holes were oversize and that the Dardelet connection had not been installed according to the drawing. This was a matter of record. Mr. Kenpatu. This brace you are talking about was on the AB side at the minus 25-foot level ? Mr. Crockett. This brace T am talking about was right there [in- dicating] on the A caisson at the minus 75-foot level. The motion ap- pears at the top and bottom. Mr. Kenpauy. Well, did that indicate that that brace was not func- tioning properly ? Mr. Crocxerr. It was functioning, but not properly. It was still intact and still holding, but it did have motion in it adverse to the de- sign. The design was to have it firm. This is why we were there, to endeavor to draw this firm. Mr. Krenpatu. What was done as a result of your inspection or your report ? Mr. Crocxsrr. We torquedsthe collar holding bolts on both sides up to 1,800 foot-pounds, and in so doing, we stilled the vertical motion such that at the time we left this connection, it was firm. However, at this time, we did not deal with the Dardelet bolts. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 171 Mr. Kenpauu. This was before the T-bolts were installed, I believe ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir; this finding was the generating factor that dreamed up the T-bolts. Mr. Kenpatv. It was after your report, your examination, that the decision was made to install the T-bolts? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatx. Now, at the time of your first examination there, how closely did the collar conform to the caisson ? Mr. Crocxerrr. In part, very well. However, at the point of con- nection between the diagonal and horizontal bracing, it did not con- form to within three-quarters to an inch of space. Mr. Kenpatu. Three-quarters to 1 inch in space? Mr. Crocxert. Right. This was the object in endeavoring to torque the bolts to 1,300 foot- pounds. Even after we got to 1,300 foot-pounds in torque, we could not make the collar conform 100 percent. However, we brought it up tight enough so that it had not vertical motion. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, when did you make the next inspection of the tower ? Mr. Crockerr. As a result of this particular survey, a T-bolt con- nection was put into effect, and we were given an inspection contract to inspect the repair done by J. Rich Steers of New York. It was June 26, 1959, that our report was submitted. Mr. Kenpaty. Mr. Crockett, will you make that a part of the record, and also your report of November 25, 1958 ? Mr. Crocxert. I will, sir. (The documents referred to are as follows :) NOVEMBER 25, 1958. Subject: Contract No. NBY22027 Texas Tower No. 4. OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas Towers, District Public Works Department, First Nawal District, Boston, Mass. (Attention: Mr. Joseph Riccio). Dear Sir: As directed in your contract, we are submitting a survey report, the conditions of underwater parts of Texas tower No. 4, and the repairs accom- plished during the time of the survey. The contract was divided into three specific parts: I. The survey and inspection of all underwater connections and bracings on ecaissons A, B, and C at the minus-23-foct level, and the examination of the collars on A and B eaissons at the minus-65-foot level. Also to inspect both collars on each side in the way of the Dardelet bolis. Il. To tighten 36 holding bolts on caisson A and B at the minus-65-level to 1,300-foot-pounds torque. IIl. To assist in locating an oil leak in caisson A. Under item one, the examination and survey produced the following findings: All bracings, caissons, and underwater parts of the tower foundation were found to be heavily coated with marine growth. The growth appeared much denser in the minus zero to 20 or 25 foot level, ending completely at minus 90 feet. All underwater parts were found very, very well protected from use of the cathodic protection. Their appearance was black in color and a fine scale of about 20 mils was apparent. At the minus-23-foot level all horizontal spans, pins, and locking devices were cleaned at their connection points. All horizontal spans were found intact. The pin at the center connection in the diagonal brace on A caisson to the horizontal span between A and B caissons was to be found to be loose; that is, the pin was in position with all its keepers intact. However, the diagonal brace did not seem to be bearing on the pin. The pin in the horizontal span between A and B caisson at the B caisson connection was found to be withdrawn approxi- 70733—61—_—12 172 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 mately 9 inches; its locking devices and keeper pin missing. All other pins, connections, and bracings were found to be in excellent condition at the minus- 23-foot level. During the repairs, a temporary locking device was fabricated and was installed to insure the pin’s staying in its present position. The pin, although withdrawn 9 inches, was still in shear with all parts of the connection. B caisson collar at the minus-65-foot level was cleared of marine growth. The collar was found to be without vertical motion; all bolts, nuts, and double nuts were found to be in place. However, the Dardelet keeper plates were loose and several of the studs and nuts were missing in the keeper plates. A rectangular plate three-eighths of an inch thick was installed over the heads of the Dardelet bolts to stay in position. The plate is secured to the caisson by means of eight Y%-inch studs welded to the caisson. This plate was installed in the field and does not show on any construction print. The collar holding bolts were found to be at an average of 900-foot-pounds torque. These bolts were torqued to 1,300 foot-pounds. They were found to be holding at 1,300 foot-pounds after slight sea conditions. As well as could be ascertained without removing the keeper plates of the Dardelet bolts, we found that several of them were loose at the upper and lower extremities of the collar. On further examination of B caisson, we found two double sheave blocks and 70 feet of wire cable hanging from shackles at the minus-70-foot level. These blocks were removed and salvaged, the cable dropped. This removal was made at the request of the naval inspector, Mr. Kelleher. A caisson collar at the minus-65-foot level was cleaned of marine growth over its entire connection area. We found the caisson in the way of the top and bottom edges of the collar shined to bright bare metal. This bright area, approx- imately two inches in width, was caused by vertical motion in the collar. Upon further examination, we found that several of the jam nuts and double nuts that secured the 2-inch collar hold bolts had slackened away from the holding nut an inch or two. It was also found that the Dardelet bolt keeper plates were missing. None of the Dardelet bolts on either side were in place, having either fallen out or sheared off. We found six Dardelet bolt shanks still in the caisson. The bolt holes had the appearance that the bolts had been sheared by the vertical motion of the collar; that is, the holes had a top and bottom elongation rather than a true round hole. Each of the holes with the elongation seemed to have been radiused on the extreme edges, indicating that the bolts had finally sheared after considerale vertical motion. Concerning the collar holding bolts and nuts, it was found that several of the nuts were hand tight. Our first operation endeavoring to torque the bolts to 1,300 foot-pounds gave us no indication of torque on any of the bolts. However, we were using a 2,000-pound meter on an extremely large wrench such that there may have beer slight torgue on some of the bolts not indicated by the heavy wrench. We tightened all bolts with a hand wrench and then torqued to 1,300 foot-pounds. Over a period of 1 night, we found on examination the following day that the bolts were again out of torque. We had found on close examination at the top and bottom edges of the collar that the collar was not conforming 100 percent to the caisson. Consequently, when the bolts were torqued to 1,300 foot-pounds, the collar was drawn closer to the caisson so that our 1,300 foot-pounds was not true. The reason being the collar could not be drawn to full friction with the caisson in one operation of tightening. Through the night with the working of the collar and bracing, the collar would further conform to the caisson. We then torqued the holding bolts up to an average of 1,800 foot-pounds endeavoring to draw the collar into friction in one operation. This was successful in stopping the vertical motion. However, the torque over a period of 2 standby days was reduced to 1,300 foot-pounds. We again torqued to an average of 1,800 foot-pounds and in this operation we were suc- cessful in holding the bolts at a constant torque. The collar at this time was bearing in friction approximately 80 percent. We checked the pin at the extremity of the diagonal brace from the minus- 65-foot level on A caisson to the center of the minus-23-foot horizontal span from A to B caisson; this is the pin that was found to be out of shear and loose in the initial survey. At this time, this pin was in full shear. The jamming nuts were brought to bear for the last time during this repair period. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 173 We were requested by Mr. Kelleher to further examine A caisson to de- termine whether or not any of the construction blocks and cable were pres- ent. This request was carried out, and we found two double sheave blocks on A caisson in the same position as had been previously found on B caisson. These were cleaned, rigged, removed, and salvaged. These four blocks that had been salvaged were thoroughly cleaned and used as an example of the eathodie protection substantiating the previous opinion that the protection was very effective. Re item III: The third item in the contract stated that we were obligated to assist in the locating of an oil leak in A caisson. We made several exploratory dives from zero to minus 165 feet and did not locate a leak. During these periods, a fluorescent dye was mixed into the oil in A caisson. The quantity of oil in A caisson was inereased to insure a greater depth of oil and to in- crease the head pressure. After such time as the dye had thoroughly mixed in the oil, we made further exploratory dives. The leak was indicated by the brillant oil slick at the surface of the water. We found the oil leak at the minus-63-foot level of A caisson. The hole was approximately 7 inches above the top of the collar and 8 to 9 inches to the left of the top Dardelet bolt hole on the outside of A caisson. It had the appearance of being a burned hole larger on the outside than it was on the inside, approximately one-half inch in diameter and in the area of the in- ternal concrete plug. We drilled, reamed, and tapped to insert a 44-inch pine plug. After this operation was completed, the oil slick at the surface stopped and we saw no evidence of any other leak. However, on gaging the oil ullages, we found a 4inch loss of liquid in 24 hours. This developed that there had to be another leak. At this time there was no apparent oil slick. We further increased the volume of oil in A caisson and there developed another oil slick. This slick covered a greater area than the previous slick. We investigated, and found the leak to be within the bounds of a 2-foot-square area in the upper section of A caisson collar between the collar holding bolts and the upper Dardelet bolts. _.A portion of the oil was leaking out of the top left-hand Dardelet hole; the remainder upward between the collar and the caisson. We drove a wooden plug into the upper left Dardelet hole endeavoring to further determine whether the leak could possibly be in the area directly behind the Dardelet holes or leaking to the left of the Dardelet holes with such force so as to tunnel a path in the marine growth between the collar and the caisson at the upper left Dardelet hole. Upon the insertion of the plug, we appreciated a slight leak in the upper center and the right Dardelet hole. However, the upward volume was greater increased. Weather conditions permitted no further investigation at this time. The weather conditions did not give sufficient light for photographic defini- tion; that is, of the 70 exposures developed, we did not have distinction or light sufficient to use the photographs to substantiate the survey. We examined C caisson in its entirety and found all solid connections to be intact and in excellent condition. We examined the horizontal bracing at the minus-77-foot level and also at the minus-135-foot level and found all to be in excellent condition. Respectfully submitted. A. D. CRocKETT. Notr.—For the record, we installed a rubber expanding pipe plug in the out- let of the air operated valve at the minus-140-foot level on A caisson. This plug was installed to insure no water loss in A caisson while we were endeavoring to determine the whereabouts of the oil leak. MARINE ContTRACTORS Co., INC., East Boston, Mass., June 26, 1959. RESIDENT OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas Towers, First Naval District Public Public Works Department, Boston, Mass. Dear Sir: As instructed in our present inspection contract N.B.Y. 27190, we are pleased to submit the following summarization. 174 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 The period of inspection May 22, 1959, to June 13, 1959, excluding May 26th to June 3d, Marine Contractors’ divers watched the procedures and progress of Stears M.K. divers installing the Hi Tensile T-bolt connection on caissons A and B Texas tower 4. All work performed by the installing divers was accomplished in a good workmanlike manner, and in accordance with standards set up by the contract- ing officer. The T-bolt connection was completely installed and all nuts were torqued to 1,300 ft.-pounds. The collar-holding bolts were torqued to 1,600 pounds. The installation is complete on caissons A and B. The T-bolt connection tended to conform the collar to the caissons in a very satisfactory manner. However the vertical motion of the collar and cross brace is now reduced to zero. Considerable increase in the marine growth was noticeable since the dates of last observations in September 1958. Submitted with this report are three sets of pictures taken of the operation and are self-explanatory. Yours very truly, MARINE CONTRACTORS Co., INC., ALAN D. CROCKETT. Mr. Kenpatu. Go ahead, sir. Mr. Crocxerr. This particular phase of construction and repair was done in a good workmanlike manner, as so stated here : All work performed by the installing divers was accomplished in a good workmanlike manner, and in accordance with standards set up by the con- tracting officer. The T-bolt connection was completely installed and all nuts were torqued to 1,300 foot-pounds. The collar-holding bolts were torqued to 1,600 pounds. The installation is complete on Caissons A and B. Mr. Kenna. At that time, was any consideration given to a pos- sible deterioration in the pin connections? Mr. Crockett. I think not, sir. However, we did find in the orig- inal survey that the pin at the connection of the diagonal brace from B caisson to the horizontal brace between A and B caissons at the minus 25-foot level was found to be slightly withdrawn. It had lost its taper pin and holding collar. Mr. Kenpatu. This is not an increase in the tolerance, but a with- drawing of the pin ? Mr. Crockett. A withdrawing of the pin. Mr. Kenpatu. This was at the time of your original inspection ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. On your subsequent inspection, was that limited to making a determination of whether or not Steers had properly formed the repair work? Mr. Crocxerr. At the time of June 26, 1959, when we inspected the repair, the pin had been withdrawn and replaced, and new keepers installed. It was then intact. Mr. Kenpatu. Did you find anything of significance structurally wrong with the tower at that time? INSPECTION REVEALED NOTHING STRUCTURALLY WRONG AT THIS TIME Mr. Crockett. I would say not. We did not find anything struc- turally wrong at that particular time. Mr. Krnpatu. Did you thereafter make another underwater survey, and if so, when ? Mr. Crocxrrr. I did. I made a survey. The report is dated February 16, 1960. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 175 Mr. Kenpauyi. What was the purpose of that? Mr. Crocxerr. The procurement officer from the Air Force base, representing the Air Force at the particular tower, requested that we do an emergency examination because of erratic motions, oscillations, that the tower had generated, and also peculiar noises throughout A caisson. Mr. Kenpatx. In other words, you were employed by the Air Force on this occasion because they experienced excessive motion, and were also hearing noises under water; is that correct ? Mr. Crockett. That is correct. Mr. Kenpauu. You made the underwater survey ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. My. Kenpaxyu. What was the significance of your findings? Mr. Crocxerr. We found at this time, in examination of all the brackets and pin structure connections, that we had an aggravated wear from being within tolerance at the minus 23-foot level, and progressing to an inch and an inch and one-eighth. This measurement of an inch or an inch and one-eighth is taken by motion in the pin, an external motion in the pin, rather than a meas- urement between the pin diameter and the keeper plate diameter, the hole diameter. Consequently, it could be plus or minus one-sixteenth, something like this. Mr. Kenpatu. This is at the minus 23-foot level you are talking about ? Mr. Crocxerr. Yes. Mr. Kenpatn. Was that on all planes? Mr. Crocxetr. Reasonably. Through the AB section, we found a greater amount of wear. I would have to refer to the record to distinguish one pin from the other. Mr. Kenpatyi. What was the condition of the pins in the lower braces, that is, in the remaining portions of the tower? Mr. Crocxetr. This lower panel [indicating], we found the pins were in their original tolerance. There appeared to be no motion whatever to them. As we increased to the minus 75-foot level, we found that they had slight wear; at the minus 25-foot level they had almost double that wear. We found a half-inch to five-eighths of an inch on the 75-foot panel, and as I say, an inch to an inch and one- eighth in the minus 25-foot panel. Mr. Kenpatu. What about the lower panel ? i Mr. Crockett. That appeared to be stable in its tolerance. Mr. Kenpatu. The greater wear was in the top level of bracing? Mr. Crocxerr. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatt. And the wear diminished as the braces went lower ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatxi. What did that indicate? Mr. Crockert. It would appear from the motion of the tower that the excessive motion was creating an excessive wear. This wear was generated over a period of some 14 or 15 months from being within tolerance up to and inclusive of an inch to an inch and one-eighth. Mr. Kenpatxt. Would you say that was substantial deterioration ? Mr. Crocxerr. I most certainly would. Mr. Kenna. In addition to that, what else did you find on that survey ? 176 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Srennis. Just a minute, Mr. Crockett. Before you ge into that, we can hear you all right here, Mr. Crockett, but the press has a special responsibility. They are interested in your testimony and they are sitting behind you, and do not have the advantage we have. Could you move those two microphones in to give you a little more freedom in shifting your position, and then try to stay a little closer within reach of one or another? Mr. Crocxert. I feel like an orphan up here, Mr. Chairman. My cohorts had substantial company. Senator Srennis. You are doing all right. Just proceed. Mr. Kenpatu. I believe I had a question pending; did I not? Mr. Crocker. Yes, you did, sir, and I would like just 1 minute to consider the record. Predominantly, that was the total of the finding. We made a state- ment as to the oscillatory motion and directions, that it seemed to terminate very abruptly in a northerly direction. Mr. Kenpatxi. Was any repair work generated as a result of this survey, Mr. Crockett? Mr. Crocxerr. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpaty. What was it? INSTALLATION OF X-BRACING ABOVE WATER CONSIDERED Mr. Crocxerr. Upon several consultations after this survey was tendered, it was decided by the powers that be to install this so-called X-ray bracing up here. Mr. Kenpatu. That is shown in red on the model? Mr. Crocxert. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. That is above water? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauy. The X-bracing ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Mr. Krnpatu. Now, prior to the installation of that above-water papa ne did you have any discussion about it with Mr. Theodore uss ? Mr. Crocxetr. Mr. Kuss was present at the meeting at Otis Air Force Base at the time the total wear was considered in the pin bracing, and at the outset of the consideration of the X-ray bracing. It was his statement that this had been previously designed, but no specifications written for it, and he felt that this could be put into effect immediately. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, did you then have any opinion about the possi- ble efficacy of that X-bracing without the repairs of the brace at the minus-75-foot level ? Mr. Crockett. The opinions I had at the time were strictly personal. Lyne not paid for any consultation as to whether I felt this or I felt that. My personal opinion was that a repair should have been made from the lowest defective connection up to and inclusive of the minus- COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 177 25-foot level prior to any other repair. This is my own personal opinion. Mr. Kenpatxi. Did you express that opinion to anyone at that time ? Mr. Crocxert. I did, before that meeting. Mr. Krnpauu. Was Mr. Kuss there at the time? Mr. Crocxerr. Mr. Kuss was there. Mr. Kenpati. What was Mr. Kuss’ reaction ? Mr. Crocxerr. Mr. Kuss was in favor of the X-ray bracing. Mr. Kenpauu. Without repairs at the minus-25-foot level! Mr. Crocxetrr. He felt repairs should be made at the minus-25- foot level, but I feel that he felt that the X-ray bracing would seriously enhance the stability of the tower. Thus he deemed it advisable to go ahead with the X-ray bracing first. Mr. Kenparn. Was not installation of that X- bracing contrary to the origina! concept of the design of the tower! Mr. Crocxerr. I believe that it was. Mr. Kenpatu. In case I have not asked you, Mr. Crockett, would you make a copy of that report of February 15, 1960, a part of the record ? Mr. Crocxerr. Yes, sir. (The document referred to is as follows: ) FEBRUARY 15, 1960. BASE PROCUREMENT OFFICE, Otis Air Force Base, Mass. Reference contract No. (19-603) 60—4520. To nonpersonal services to furnish all plant, labor, equipment and materials. and accomplish all operations required for the emergency inspection of underwater structural bracing Texas tower No. 4. In accordance with tech- nical provisions and general clause. In accordance with the terms of general clause and technical specifications of the above-cited contract, we respectfully submit the following report. Inspection performed, February 8, 1960. Weather conditions severe: Wind 25 to 30 knots. Seas 15 to 20 feet height. Cloudy. Three divers down to complete survey of bottom and entire length of each caisson including the structural bracing. BOTTOM Bottom of caissons A, B, C, were found to have a buildup of sand around the caisson footing approximately 6 feet in height. The bottom area around the tower contains considerable debris; namely, 50-gallon drums, construction steel, wire cable rope, blocks, hoses, etc. © caisson had an abandoned diving platform against the footing. However, none of this debris is doing damage to the caissons. CAISSONS A, B, AND C The caissons were surveyed from the surface to the bottom minus 185 feet. Hach caisson was found heavily coated with marine growth and mussel beds to a depth of minus 90 feet. No obstructions, cables, blocks, wire, or blocks were found on the surface of B or C caissons. A caisson had a rope hawser around the caisson at the minus-25-foot level and had considerable wire rope below 100 feet minus. We found no hanging or loose articles attached on any of the cais- sons that could account for any of the reported noises heard on the tower. The 178 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 collars on A and B caissons were carefully scrutinized and proved to be within motion. All of the portable connection bolts were in place. The high-tensile connection bolts were secure and appeared to be tight. We did not check these bolts for torque. The collar holding bolts were in place, but several were ob- served to be loosened. The welded diagonal strut attached to the collars was intact and no fractures noted. The sea suctions and discharge connections in the caissons were found to be heavily coated with marine growth. HORIZONTAL BRACING OF SPANS, DIAGONAL STRUCTURES The horizontal bracing at minus 125 feet was found intact, all pins were in place, and all keepers secured. The clearance around the pins was felt to be within original tolerance of one-eighth inch, plus or minus. No fractures were noted in any of the welded sections. The diagonal struts pinned at each caisson and rising to the center of the horizontal spans at minus 75 feet were in place and all caisson pins appeared to have no increase in tolerances. The pins at the upper end at minus-75-foot level had clearance of approximately one-half inch. This play was consistent throughout these particular connections at this level. The horizontal spans at minus 75 feet had clearance at the pinned connections at their extremities. The play was found to be greatest in the A and B sections. The span between A and B caisson at the minus-75-foot level at the B caisson connection has approximately 1 inch of clearance. The clearance at the A caisson connection was approximately one-half inch. The diagonal struts ris- ing from this level to the minus-25-foot level were in very slight motion at the lower connection but had approximately 1 inch of clearance and in motion at the connection to the minus-25-foot span between A and B caissons. The pins at the extremities of this span have 1-inch clearance at the A and B ecaissons connection. The triangular bracing between the horizontal spans was found to be in place at all three levels. All welded sections were without noticeable fractures. However, not to be found on the construction drawing were bolts in the connection flanges at each horizontal span. il bolts were in place and appeared to be tight. The welded connections at all three levels on A, B, and C eaissons appeared to be in good condition and no fractures were noted in these areas. At the connection of the horizontal span at minus-25-foot level the 4-inch pipe slip joint was found to be fractured. However, there seemed no danger of any part of the section being carried away at this time. SUMMARY This concern did a similar survey on tower No. 4 last October 1959 [sie 1958] and the results did not show the magnitude of clearance to be found in the pins that we have appreciated during this survey. We feel that there is approximately three-quarters inch increase in clearance between the surveys. It should be noted that the above survey was superficial in that we did not remove any of the flanged keepers on the pin extremities, thereby could not determine whether the pins or the flanges were receiving the greatest wear. The tower movement is very erratic in an oscillatory direction. The extreme motion seems to predominate in a northerly direction and slightly in a westerly direction. This motion terminates very abruptly in the northerly direction and at times has reverberations at this extremity before recovering to normal. The noise factor heard on the tower in the vicinity of a caisson is resulting from the motion of the tower taking up total clearance in the pins and flanges on one side or the other to bringing the two metal surfaces together at the ex- tremity of motion causing the metallic bang. PLAN REFERENCE Texas TT-4 bracing details, 678262. Texas TT—-4 replacement braces, 780310. To be found marked in accordance with this survey at base installation office in care of Lt. F. Weaver. Respectfully submitted. A. Davip CROCKETT. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 179 Mr. Kenpaut. I believe, Mr. Crockett, after the tower collapsed, you were called by the Air Force to provide diving and possible rescue work in connection with the tower; is that correct Mr. Crocxerr. That is correct, sir. Mr. Kennepy. Would you briefly describe your activities in that connection and give the subcommittee a description of the wreckage location and caisson footings and footing integrity, and so forth ? Senator Stennis. Just a minute, Mr. Counsel. This is something, now, after the collapse of the tower. Does this testimony involve in a substantial way anything concerning the officers that we mentioned this morning ? Mr. Kenpatt. No, sir. Senator Srennis. It will not. All right, Mr. Crockett; proceed. POSSIBILITY OF SURVIVORS TRAPPED IN PLATFORM Mr. Crocxerr. In short, we were called—in fact, at the very outset of the tower collapse, there was a feeling on the part of some of us that there possibly was some life still on the tower, even though it had been submerged. There have been many cases in the past of people living in submerged objects for some little time. We felt there was— it was worth the risks involved to go out and endeavor to get into the tower to ascertain whether or not there was any life there. This we did, and found there was no life, and I personally do not believe there had ever been any life from the time the tower collapsed. In fact, we know from further searching operations into all the compartments of the tower in its present position, and we found one body. The body was recovered, and I assume delivered to the proper lace. SURVEY AND DESCRIPTION OF TOWER WRECKAGE At this particular time, we were requested to make a survey of the conditions of the tower as they existed, with its relative position to its original position. Mr. Kenna. Will you tell us what you found on that? Mr. Crockett. This we did. We found the tower wreck to be some 200 yards, at a bearing of 245° from its original site. The AB side bears at 355°, whereas the original AB plane on the original site was just a few minutes short of 30°. Mr. Kenpauu. Did you prepare any drawings or sketches of the position of the wrecked tower on the ocean floor ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, I did, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Do you have those with you? Mr. Crockett. Yes, I do, sir. Mr. Kenpatxu. Will you submit them for the record, please, sir? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. (Norr.—These two sketches of tower wreckage will be found on pp. 33 and 34 of the subcommittee report.) Mi USOT Did you make an examination of the footings of the tower ¢ 180 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Crocxerr. We did; however, somewhat superficially. Mr. Kenpatu. What do you find in that connection ? Mr. Crockerr. We found that two were fractured and that one had been bent. Mr. Kenpatu. Are you talking about footings now, or the caissons ? Mr. Crocxerr. I am talking about the caisson attachment at the footing. The B caisson bent just above its footing. I might say we found all three footings to be intact. We did not see or find any distortion that was evident at the time, nor do we feel that they were cocked out of a perpendicular plane with the ocean floor. Mr. Kenpaty. You say you did not feel they were? Mr. Crocxerr. We did not. Mr. Kenpatt. In other words, you found them to be structurally sound at that time? Mr. Crocxerr. We did. Mr. Kenpatu. As far as you could determine. Go ahead. Mr. Crocxerr. We found the B caisson to be bent. We found the A and C caissons to be fractured. A1]l three caisson sections that remained attached to the footings were lying on the ocean floor. We found a 115-foot section still remaining attached at A caisson at the original wreck, which is assisting in holding the wreck into the angle or plane that it is presently in. Mr. Kenpatxi. Did you prepare a drawing showing the caisson fractures also, Mr. Crockett ? Mr. Crocxerr. Only of the footed section; not of the ends. How- ever, I do have some photographs that were taken of the ends, but they were taken under adverse conditions, with about 2 or 3 feet of visibility. Mr. Krnpati. You have provided us with copies of those photo- graphs, I believe? Mr. Crockett. I have. Mr. Kenpatut. Will you make your drawings of the caisson frac- tures a part of the record also, please? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. (The drawings referred to are as follows:) COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 181 CAISSON VRACTURE Poorins | aes seeRvS” Sereno Ce ies if i | 4 My af OCeAM FLOOR. ae RH i A] a ait oF i! ah f : qe ob a i Mt ih, af! H i ih ; nD = : =~ wee es we eee Ee eS a red TEXAS TOWER NOF : TYPE FRACTY RE, ‘ CAISSON FOOTINGS CAISSON A+ C' WN + 4c’ Re, PHOTOS SHOW PARTS OF FRACTUAL) 182 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 FLAT FROM GEKOING MOMENT > BULDGED AREA A PHoTos #4 Foorne IwrAce [ oe DisvoRTION al " ™~ Foorins ? t \! Vy OCEAN FLOOR "y ee es ae ca ~-~—a aon ee = -—-— = = he ee ee i} | ee nee ee ee Ne SEVERAL PHotos #4 of FRACTURED END TEXAS TOWER N°4¢ BENT CAISSON “B™ COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 183 Mr. Kenpaut. Mr. Crockett, go back for a moment to the installa- tion of the X-bracing last August, I believe it was. Do you now have any opinion as to the effect or result of the installation of that X-bracing ¢ ; Mr. Crockett. It is kind of like Monday morning quarterbacking. My opinion has not changed since the outset. 1 felt that the re- pairs should have been made from the bottom up, rather than put- ting the X-bracing in. I feel that the development of that X-bracing put a great big hinge in the caissons above the minus-75- to the minus- 25-foot levels. But this is only an assumption. Mr. Kenpatu. Will you elaborate a little on what you mean by a great big hinge? Mr. Crockett. We know there was total loosening of at least an inch in the minus-25-foot panel by actual observation. After the X-ray bracing had been installed and further stabilized the upper panels or sections and reduced slightly the motion, encountering sea conditions that the original design had purposely deleted, the X-ray bracing because of it, had to put an action throughout this minus- 25-foot panel on that tower. Mr. Kenpatu. Do you think the installation of the X-bracing had anything to do with the ultimate collapse of the tower ? T mean by that, do you think that it was calculated to prevent the collapse or to cause the collapse? Mr. Crocxert. I have no doubt that it was calculated to prevent the collapse. _ Mr. Kenparu. I do not mean what the design engineers calculated, but do you have an opinion as to what the actual effect would be? ~ Mr. Crocxetr. Not as such, no. Mr. Kenpatt. I believe that is-all, Mr. Chairman. _ Senator Stennis. Now, on that very point that counsel makes, Mr. Crockett, one of the gentlemen who were here the other day was ques- tioned about that. As I understood his testimony, he said that the X- bracing—that is, the bracing that is represented in red on that model— which was not originally planned to be there and which is above the water, that witness said, as I understand, that due to the obstruction of the waves that were hitting it, it put more force on the tower. Is that not correct? Mr, Crockett. I am inclined to agree with that, sir. Senator Srennis. And therefore created more stress and more strain. on the tower. And on the other hand, the X-brace itself taken alone did add cer- tain strength to the tower. Now, did one offset the other, or is it more probable, in your opinion as a professional man, that the X-bracing made it more likely that the tower would fall under those conditions? Mr. Crocxerr. I do not feel it is, as such. I feel the continual fracturing of the lower brackets and bracing was the ultimate cause, and very severe sea conditions. Senator Stennis. So if I understand you correctly, then, the X- bracing shown in red did not contribute much one way or the other? The added stress or added strength resulting from the X-bracing was not the determining factor, but the original defective condition 184 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 below water about which you have already testified was the main contributing factor to the collapse, is that right ? Mr. Crockett. I feel that is the case, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srpnnis. Frankly, I think your testimony is very signifi- cant on this point, because you are the man who made these inspections from time to time, and you are the man who made inspections after this unfortunate collapse. If I understand you correctly, and I do not mean to repeat, but sometimes that is necessary, the real basic and pri- mary trouble, and cause of this collapse, was those defects which you reported and which had been there to some degree all this time? _ Mr. Crocxert. I did not say that, sir. I do not attribute any one particular thing to the collapse of the tower. In fact, I do not think a man in two shoes exists who does have an opinion as to why the tower collapsed. I think the tower collapse is an act of God, and the reason for this is a continually aggravated failure that there just was not time enough to make the proper repairs before adverse sea conditions kept repeating themselves. Senator Stennis. Well, you found those conditions there—I do not remember the dates now that you testified about, but I do recall that the conditions which necessitated the Dardelet bolt repair had been there some 2 years before the collapse. Mr. Crocxetr. That is quite so, sir. Senator Srennis. And when it developed that the Dardelet bolt was not successful, there was an attempt to supplement that Dardelet bolt repair with what you call a T-bolt installation ? Mr. Crockett. That is quite right. Senator Stennis. And in January 1960, I believe it was, you found the condition was so pronounced that there was a movement in those pin connections of an inch or more; is that correct ? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir, that is very correct. Senator Stennis. Then that condition continued to exist on through until September 1960, or thereabouts, when Hurricane Donna came through, which added additional strain. Did you examine it again after Hurricane Donna? Mr. Crockxerr. No, sir. Senator Stennis. That was September, 1960, was it not? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. And this condition continued to exist then, until January, 1961 ? Mr. Crocker. That is quite right, sir. Senator Stennis. During all that time, was there no chance to make effective repairs of these troublesome conditions that became aggra- vated rather than diminished? Mr. Crocxert. I feel that repair by the installation of the X-brae- ing was an effective attempt, that the designers had done all they thought they could within the time they had to rectify the damage that had been made by Hurricane Donna. Senator Stennis. I mean repair below the water, down where the Dardelet bolts were and where the motion was. Was there time to repair that, or was it just a hopeless case ? Mr. Crockrrr. There was a repair instigated there. There was a clamp to be installed in this particular area [indicating] to beef up the weaker section. They endeavored to put some cables on the out- COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 185 side—they were endeavoring to put some cables on the outside. At the time the tower collapsed, they were in the process of grouting the A and B eaissons. I believe the work predominantly had dealt with A caisson. Senator Srennis. I know they were endeavoring to put the cables on there, but they never did get to that, did they ? Mr. Crockett. No, sir. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EFFECTIVE REPAIRS Senator Srennis. I am talking about the time element now, and whether or not there was a chance to make the repair. It seems clear to me that this thing continued on for a period of 2, 214, or 3 years, without anything effective being done with reference to the original trouble with these braces and Dardelet bolts. Now, further, I understood you a while ago to say that when you discovered this serious situation had developed, you advised that the repairs be made below the water at this original trouble spot rather than the X-braces being installed above the water; is that not correct ? Mr. Crockerr. That is correct. However, I was not in a position at the time to advise or be consulted as a consultant with regard to this particular operation, sir. Senator Srennis. Well, I know, but that was your opinion. Mr. Crocxerr. That was my opinion, which I so stated. Senator Stennis. And instead of making a serious attempt to make further repairs below the water, they installed the X-bracing above water ? Mr. Crockett. This was done by people who were better versed than I in the construction field. I am not a civil engineer, sir. Senator Srennis. I understand, but you have given us the benefit of your opinion. I do not know just how the engineers and you gentlemen in that profession use the term “act of God.” I have heard that used a good deal in this investigation, and I have a very great reverence for acts of God in law. JI am a lawyer myself, and I have some idea what it means there. But it seems to me that to write this off as an act of God is falling far short of the mark. God had a good deal of help in this. Mr. Crocxerr. I think He did, but I think He generated several of these hurricanes out here, perhaps, that gave us the initial push. Senator Stennis. Well, of course, the hurricane or storm, at the time of collapse, would, in law be classed as an act of God. Mr. Crocxerr. I would like, Mr. Chairman Senator Stennis. Please say anything you want to say, we are trying to get information the best we can. Mr. Crocxerr. You made the statement that this thing was kind of aggravated over a period of 2 or 3 years. I would like to say that after completion of the installation of the T-bolt connection author- ized by the district public works office in Boston, it was my feeling that the tower was within its bounds of original stability. We felt that we had no adverse motion in the pin connections, with the excep- tion of the one that was withdrawn shghtly, and it is a possibility that the pin was just not split sufficiently to make it keep intact. But this 186 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 was rectified, and the Dardelet error had been rectified, and we feel that at this time, this being June 26 of 1959, the tower was up to its original design. TOWER AT ORIGINAL STRENGTH, JUNE 26, 1959 Senator Stennis. Well, that is good. I am glad to hear that clear- cut opinion of yours at this time. That was June 26, 1959? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Bee Stennis. That is when you completed one of your inspec- tions? Mr. Crockett. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Well, my reference to 2 or 3 years of continuing trouble was just a rough estimate, based upon my recollections of the time that the various inspections covered. How much time elapsed from your first inspection until the last one? Mr. Crockerr. Oh, 1958, September, until the present. —- Stennis. Well, you were first called in, then, in September of 1958? Mr. Crocketr. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Well, your testimony and the testimony of the gentlemen from the Navy has certainly made much clearer to me, and I believe to the public, the difficulties that were involved in this matter in coping with the weather and in coping with the unfortunate things that happened during the towing and erection of this tower. It seems to have been plagued all the way. Do you have any other point in mind now that has a bearing on this situation ? Mr. Crocxerrt. I do not think so, sir. Senator Stennis. I am sure you are willing to bring it out. Mr. Crockett. If I had it, I would. Senator Stennis. We certainly want you to have the chance. Counsel, do you have anything further? Mr. Kenpatu. I have one or two questions. Mr. Crockett, the storm during which the tower collapsed was not unusually severe, was it? Or do you think it was? Mr. Crocxetr. I do not have the specific wave heights and the time of the seas. Mr. Kenna. You know it was well within the design criteria? Mr. Crockett. I am not even certain of that. I am not in a posi- tion to state one way or the other whether it was or was not. I have heard conversations to the effect that it was more severe than the original design criteria. Mr. Kenpatu. The storm during which the tower collapsed? Mr. Crockett. Yes. Mr. Kenpauu. It was not as severe as Hurricane Donna, was it? Mr. Crockett. No. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Crockett, you have two other drawings in front of you, I believe, which show the history of the repairs to the tower. Will you make those a part of the record, please? Mr. Crockett. Yes. (Note.—The drawings referred to will be found on pp. 25 and 29, Nea of the subcommittee report on the collapse of Texas tower o. 4. Epceres COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 187 ’ Mr. Kenpstu. That is a2llJ have, Mr. Chairman. _ Senator Srennis. All right. Thank you. Now, gentlemen, those of you who have testified already this morn- ing, do you have any point that has come to your mind that you want to bring out and think ought to be put in the record ? (No response. ) Senator Stennis. All right. The next meeting of the committee will be at 10 o’clock tomorrow. This completes our testimony for today. I understand that it will take 1 day beyond tomorrow. I think that most of the high points and major facts have already been covered. Now, we want to thank you, gentlemen, all of you who testified this morning and others of you who came here with them, for your atten- tion and for your attendance. I think this is very impressive testi- mony and very valuable in connection with the committee’s responsi- bilities, as well as the Navy’s responsibilities, the professional engineers’, architects’, and so forth. = again, with the special thanks of the committee, you are now leased, those of you who are here under subpena, with the apprecia- ion of all of the members of this committee. We thank you again, gentlemen, and we will take a recess until omorrow morning at 10 o’clock. (Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene t 10 a.m.,on Thursday, May 11,1961.) | EOE IEE ai me whit gut opmion of yhars as thik tema Stuak wing iaRe!: Lie ONY =) Minsibek yuri eerene dr0% rod gab. £ eae iw Ji fhe Biss 2. 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TUES ’ watt BAS tin i) Eqnresid “aay: Ruparitrssy, ob she matey, tortion 7 Rater sada igaliopeaaed INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1961 U.S. SENATE, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, _ Washington, D.C. The subeommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Bartlett, Jackson, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Smith) met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room 235, Old Senate Office Build- ing, Senator John Stennis, presiding. Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, and Saltonstall. Staff members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Stuart P. French, professional staff member. Senator Srpnnis. May we have order, please? We want everything arranged where all can see and all can hear, and we cannot accomp- lish that unless everyone cooperates in keeping reasonably quiet and being attentive. This morning the subcommittee is privileged to have Mr. Given A. Brewer and Mr. Robert Vanstone as witnesses. Both of these gentle- men are from the Brewer Engineering Laboratories, Inc., of Marion, Mass., and they are here at the request of the subcommittee. Gentlemen, in keeping with the unbroken custom of this investigat- ing subcommittee all witnesses here are sworn. So if you gentlemen will please rise now you will be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Brewer. I so swear. Mr. Vanstone. I so swear. Senator Srennis. All right, gentlemen, have a seat. Mr. Reporter, you have the names of these gentlemen. The Chair will not review the testimony that was heard yesterday, although the Chair considers it quite valuable. The Chair reiterates that it is the subcommittee’s position to avoid transgressing In any way into any hearing that may be held by the Air Force as a result of charges against military personnel. We are not going to take any substantive testimony beyond Janu- ary 12, which was 3 days before the unfortunate collapse of this tower. Our inquiry is directed into design, construction, and repair of the physical and structural part of the tower. These gentlemen are emi- nently qualified in this field. Now, the Chair is going to ask Mr. French, who has been the chief investigator in this matter, and who has done a fine job, to proceed with the examination of Mr. Brewer. All right. 189 190 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 TESTIMONY OF GIVEN A. BREWER, BREWER ENGINEERING LAB- ORATORIES, INC.; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT VANSTONE, ASSIST- ANT ENGINEER TO MR. BREWER Mr. Frencu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your appearance here, Mr. Brewer, is in response to a subpena issued by this subcommittee, is 1t not? Mr. Brewer. Yes. Mr. Frencu. Would you briefly acquaint the committee with your general professional qualifications as an engineer, and include both your education and experience, please, sir? Senator Srennis. Pardon me just a minute, Mr. Brewer; please speak into the microphone so that the committee can hear you. Mr. Brewer. Yes. Can I be heard satisfactorily? It sounds like I can from the room. Senator Srennis. I beg your pardon? Mr. Brewer. Can you hear me? Senator Srennis. Yes, just so you stay directly in line with the microphone. Mr. Brewer. How is this? Senator Stennis. Very good. Mr. Brewer. Fine. My background is a graduate from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1938. My courses combined mechanical, electrical, and some aeronautical engineering. Following graduation I joined the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., and I was a structures engineer with that company throughout the war ears. After the war ended, I began as a consulting engineer specializing in experimental mechanics. This system that I consult in utilizes electronic instruments and electric strain gages to measure stresses and vibrations in structures. ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTS TO MEASURE STRESSES AND VIBRATIONS I utilized these techniques when I was an engineer with Lockheed, and during this period, during the war, I decided that this might be an interesting field for me to conduct after the war. So I started after the war as an independent consultant, and in the intervening time have conducted some 200 studies on mechanisms and structures utilizing these techniques of electric strain gages, and oscillographic recording devices. This is a technique that is somewhat like an electrocardiogram, where we paste a strain gage on a structure, such as this tower, and connect it to a machine that looks very much like an electrocardio- graph. Then, as the tower oscillates in the waves, the stresses are converted into electrical signals which then make a wavy line on a paper, and by analyzing these lines you can determine the stresses and the fre- quencies, very much like a physician does when he analyzes some organ such as the heart in a human being by analyzing this record. So, very briefly, this is the general technique that I have used to study structures that vary from helicopters to these Texas towers that. we have under discussion today. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 191 Mr. Frence. Did you have an occasion to conduct a motion study on Texas tower No. 44 Mr. Brewer. Yes, I did. We installed electric accelerometers and strain gages on Texas tower No. 4 in 1958, and throughout that winter in 1958-59 we had recording equipment on board which recorded the sea height, the wind velocity, stresses on the three legs, and accelerom- eter motions at three corners of the tower platform. Mr. Frencu. Would you tell the committee, please, sir, what the purposes cf your study were? Mr. Brewer. The purpose of this study primarily was to determine the motion of the tewer under forces of the sea and air. RADAR AFFECTED BY TOWER MOTION It was the primary concern of the Air Force at this time when they activated the tower, it could be observed physically, that the tower was in motion, and the Air Force was concerned with the fact that these motions, particularly if they were rotational, would throw off the base of the radar search, so that the radar search mechanism in- stead of being on a firm foundation fixed on the earth, would rotate back and forth at an angle and, as a consequence, make, or introduce, an error if you were detecting a bomber in flight. As a consequence, it was necessary to determine just exactly how much in terms of angle this platform rotated. Obviously, if it was only a few thousandths of a degree, the error would not be great. However, if it was on the order of a few tenths of a degree the error would appreciable. So that the Air Force then commissioned us to determine the tower motions particularly in rotation, how many degrees did it rotate as a function of sea state and wind upon the structure; that was our primary purpose. Mr. Frencu. Did your responsibilities include anything in connec- tion with an analysis of the structure itself ? Mr. Brewer. We also were commissioned, secondarily, to measure stresses at the deck, at the juncture of the deck and the leg, that would be at this point [indicating] on the tower, to measure the stresses at that point since they would be the maximum above water stress, and to report them also as a function of sea height and wind force on the tower, to the Air Force. Mr. Frencu. Now, prior to conducting any measurements on the motion of the tower did you have any conferences with any representa- tives of the design firm of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge? Mr. Brewer. Yes, sir. I believe we had two conferences, one at our preliminary meeting and another where we went into the details of the instrumentation, and the data that we hoped to obtain from our installation on the tower. This occurred in New York at the office of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Mr. Frencu. In the course of any of those conferences or discus- sions, did you acquaint the design engineers with the method and the instruments which you proposed to use ? Mr. Brewer. Yes. At that time, the second meeting, I reviewed the techniques that I planned to utilize to measure the tower motions 192 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 and these—I think you can appreciate the fact that on this tower when it is in motion, since you are on the ocean, you have almost no way of determining how much it is moving, because you have no fixed ref- erence point. FUNCTION AND USE OF ACCELEROMETER As a consequence, we decided to measure the motion, using acceler- ometers and, Mr. French, you suggested that it might be well to ex- plain very briefly what an accelerometer is. I think, perhaps, the simplest or, at least, the most direct analogy would be to point out that the inertial navigation systems used in sub- marines today, and also in our second line of missiles, employ accel- erometers to determine the distance that, and the course that, the vessel or missile has taken. This accelerometer is actually a weight, and in the case of these accelerometers that we used, the weight is suspended by very fine weblike wires, and these wires, suspending the weight, detect the shghtest motion of that weight by straining the wires, and by this strain they change their electrical resistance, so it is possible for us to measure very slight motions of the mass with respect to the earth from these wires. Now, this is the same principle that is used in inertial navigation in missiles and in submarines; that if you continuously measure the acceleration, and then by mathematical means—double integration, it is called, but it is a mathematical procedure—you can then determine from the slight accelerations what the actual direction and distances are that are traveled by the object. Dr. Draper, utilizing this device first put it in an airplane, and flew directly by this integrating accelerometer to Los Angeles—this was, I think, about 10 years ago—and it came within 10 miles of Los Angeles. This device has been improved so that nuclear submarines can op- erate for several weeks under water, and come up within a fraction of a mile, where they are using techniques such as this one. We did the same thing. We put three on the deck of the Texas tower, and by recording the electrical output of these accelerometers we were then able to compute the motion in terms of inches. This was done by double integration, and we did it in this case just by hand mathematics; we did not use any computers. So that simultaneous with this, we measured bending stresses, and the like, and by correlating the bending stresses in the leg with the motions that we got by mathematical analyses of the accelerometers, we were able to relate the two, so then we could go directly to the strain data on the leg and get the motions. This saved all mathe- matical analyses, but until you find the correlation between the mo- tions in the leg, the stresses in the leg, and the actual motion in the leg, you cannot tell anything from the stresses. So once there was established this relationship, we were then able to go rather quickly as far as the analysis was concerned. My. Frencn. Did any of the design engineers object at that time or disagree with the method that you proposed to use? Mr. Brewer. No, they did not. I believe my memory is correct that Mr. Kuss, of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge felt that an COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 193 accelerometer measurement, even if it only obtained the frequencies, would enable him to calculate the tower stresses by analytic means. Mr. Frencu. Did you have any discussion with reference to the extent of platform movement which could occur before the known tolerances in the pins were taken up ? Mr. Brewer. Yes, we did. I am not certain whether it took place at that meeting. If you will excuse me, I have some notes of that Meeting. Not at the first meeting, at least I do not see it here on a quick examination; but we had a second meeting on November 12, 1958, in Boston, and at that time Mr. Kuss, who was in attendance, stated that the tolerances, in other words, the clearance between the pins and bracing here—there are pins that join this bracing to the legs, and those pins, if they fit in a large hole, obviously they will permit some motion of this bracing, which means the entire tower could then go back and forth without utilizing its bracing until the pin fetches up against the other side of the clevis. MOTION OF PLATFORM PERMITTED BY TOLERANCES Now, the tolerances at that time, as they were given to me, were about an eighth of an inch, and Mr. Kuss computed that would allow about a 2-inch motion at the platform; that is to say, the tower could move 2 inches back and forth before these pins would take up against the known clearances that were allowed in the design. Commander Foster at that time stated that during construction of the tower it had been necessary to enlarge these clevises somewhat to permit mechanical assembly, so there were some that were larger and had a greater clearance than an eighth of an inch, which meant it could move, presumably, more than 2 inches before these pins would take up—that is, before the tower would be completely rigid. So what we discovered on our first measurements was that the tower behaved as if there were no bracing at all. In other words, the tower moves back and forth at a frequency indicated from our instruments that would be the same as if there were no bracing whatsoever under the water, and during that entire winter, where we recorded motions and stresses and waves pericdically, we never found excursions suf- ficient enough to make the tower behave as if the structure down be- low were indeed clamped tightly. Senator Stennis. Pardon me. Repeat that, will you, Mr. Brewer? Mr. Brewer. During the winter we left the instrumentation above the tower for the entire winter, and Air Force personnel ran it for us. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Brewer. And this instrumentation recorded the wave height, the wind velocity, wind direction, the stresses in three legs, and ac- celerometers at three points—all of this information was simultane- ously recorded on a graph like the cardiogram. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Brewer. Now, from an analysis of that you can tell, and we were able to tell, what the period of motion, that is, the frequency, how many times a minute, the tower oscillates back and forth, and that frequency never changed appreciably during that winter, and that, very briefly, means that the tower bracing down below never came into effect as far as we could determine above the water. 194 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Now, that could be the result of a number of things. This is not to say that the tower bracing was not there. As I think you will see, if the pins are loose and have a certain amount of clearance, the bracing can still be intact structurally, but the tower can nonetheless move back and forth until these clearances between the pin and the bracing are actually taken up by the excur- sion of the tower; and, of course, we have no way of knowing what the conditions were underneath the water except that the tower bracing was ineffective within the degree of motion that we measured, which was approximately plus or minus 3 inches. Mr. Frencn. You also found a degree of rotation before the pins would fetch up, did you not? Mr. Brewer. Yes. It is a complex motion. The tower is not only going back and forth in a random manner, but it is also rotating in a random manner, and the mechanics of it are such that it probably never repeats itself, because it is a combination of translation and rotation that is set in motion primarily by the waves bearing against the three legs, and the waves themselves are a very random structure, so that the tower never does the same thing twice. So we took quite a jot of statistical data and made plots and tables from the data that we recorded. Mr. Frencu. What were the maximum weather conditions which you encountered during your study ? MAXIMUM WEATHER CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED DURING MOTION STUDY Mr. Brewer. The maximum—the condition that created the—well, the maximum sea state that we recorded was 30 feet—that was a wave 30 feet in height—and in conjunction with that, I believe it was a 55-knot wind—yes, 55-knot wind and a 30-foot wave. That was the greatest sea state and air state we measured simultaneously. There were other conditions where we had less waves, that is, waves would not be as high, and the wind would be of a higher velocity. Mr. Frencn. Under what sea conditions did you find you experi- enced the maximum translation of the platform ? Mr. Brewer. Curiously enough, this recorded waves of approxi- mately 10 to 12 feet in height. These waves set the tower into greater motion than those of a larger height. it rather corroborated the experience of the tower personnel who had told me that it seemed to them that sometimes the tower would move or appear to move more with a small sea state than it did on a very high sea state, and for a while we thought this might be due to the pins taking up. That is, on very large waves, perhaps, the tower moved to the point where the pins took up, and therefore it was more rigid, but subsequently we came to the conclusion that the small waves have just the right spacing so that they can strike all three legs simultaneously and, as a consequence, impart more energy into the tower than a single, big wave that hits only one leg at a time. This is our belief. Mr. Frencu. Well, you are aware of the fact, are you not, sir, that merely a static force analysis was made for the computation of design. Would you kindly define the difference between “static” and “dynamic.” COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 195 STATIC AND DYNAMIC FORCES DIFFERENTIATED Mr. Brewer. Yes. A static analysis, I think we could use as an analogy, perhaps, a diving board, a springboard. Tf you simply went to the end of the diving board and stood there, you would bend the diving board, and you “would have stresses all along the diving board as a simple cantilever beam, and the stresses would be a function of your weight at the end of the diving board. Tf you jump up and down on the diving board you would impart greater forces and greater stresses to the diving board. This would be a dynamic loading ‘of a cantilever beam. Now, if you jump up and down at just the right frequency, and that corresponds with the frequency of the diving “board, you can get tremendous stresses and forces into the diving board, so that if the frequency of the dynamic loading corresponds with the resonant frequency—that is the frequency at which the structure itself naturally vibrates at—you can get tremendous vibrations, and this is like a violin string. When you work a bow over the string, and you do it at just the right frequency, you get very high amplitudes, and it makes a sound. So that dynamic loa ding, if it is in the right frequency spectrum, can produce loads, produce stresses, in a structure very much higher than the same load would do if it were quite static. Again, like a person, he still weighs the same amount of weight, but if he Jumps up and down on the diving board, he can impart a weight three or four times his own weight to the diving board. Mr. Frencu. Now, in view “of your findings that 10-foot waves caused greater stresses than waves of 30-feet in height, would it be reasonable at least to suggest the possibility that a dynamic force analysis should have been made in computing the design of this tower? Mr. Brewer. That question, of course, is one that comes up after this was observed. Now, in the original design, and I was not in on this, and I am merely speaking from what small knowledge I have of the original design, but in the initial design it was assumed by the designer that the underwater bracing would ‘be tight and would be effective, and that the natural frequencies would be about 37 cycles a minute. When the tower was constructed, the actual frequencies were very much less; they were 19 cycles, and this means that the tower had much greater motion for the same amount of force on it because of the very much lower natural frequency. So that this condition was recognized at once by the designers and by the people who were responsible for the structure as being bad, and, at the time we were there, they were making strenuous efforts to correct the structure beneath the sea. In fact, the divers were down, and they were making attempts to put collars on where there had been some damage, and they were making every effort that could be made to try to restore the integrity of the subsea structure. So I cannot really answer that question directly. The only thing I can say is that if the tower had such a low fre- quency at the beginning, as a design fact, then certainly it would have been well to look into the dynamics sof things. 196 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 But the tower, having a low frequency, as it did after it was made, it was apparent to everyone that this was bad, so that it might well have been interesting to and, perhaps, valuable to, make a dynamic analysis, but certainly the first thing to do was to restore the initial integrity of the tower, and they were doing it at the time we were out there. Mr. Frencu. But would it be reasonable to infer from your findings that the static force of a single 35-foot wave might well be less than the forces exerted by a series of 10-foot waves? Mr. Brewer. Would you repeat that question ? Mr. Frencu. Would it be reasonable to infer from your findings that the static force of a single 35-foot wave might well be less than the forces exerted by a series of 10-foot waves? Mr. Brewer. That is possible with the low natural frequency, but actually we know that tuning did not take place, but if you have multi- ple impacts on three legs which gave forces roughly comparable to the 30-foot wave, and this is borne out by a diagram which is in one of our reports which shows this to be the case, but this is not a resonant phenomenon. It could be though if the tower had an even lower natural frequency ; it could be conceivable that it could get resonance with the waves and have some really tremendous stresses and motions. But we have no evidence that suggests that that occurred. Senator SattonstatL. Mr. Chairman, would Mr. French permit an interruption ? Senator Stennis. Mr. French, I think you have used your time at this point. I yield to the Senator. Senator SatronsTaLu. I want to understand, Mr. Brewer, as a lay- man, what you said about a diving board. I think I understand it. What you are saying is that if a person out at the end of a diving board is in time with the up and down motion he can produce more dynamic stress than if that person on the end of the diving board gets out of time with the up and down motion. Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Sauttonstaty. And, therefore, it becomes less of a stress. | Mr. Brewer. That isright. His stress still is greater, however, than if he just stands quietly at the end of the board. Senator SatronsraLu. His stress is still greater when he stands quietly ? Mr. Brewer. No. Senator Sauronsratn. No. That is what I understand. STATIC, IMPULSIVE, AND RESONANT LOADING CONDITIONS Mr. Brewer. There are three things we are speaking of. If you stand quietly at the end of the board you have a stress on the board that is called a static condition. Tf he jumps once on the board, that is called impulsive loading on the board, and that would be greater than a static case. If he repeats the jumping and gets it just exactly right, depending on the mechanical properties of the board, then he can get an even greater loading, and that is a third thing called a resonance. We have then a static loading, impulsive loading, and then we have a resonant loading condition. These are the three things that occur. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 197 Senator SatronstaLtu. And what you are saying is that these 10- to 12-foot waves would be right in time with the movement, so that it would cause a greater stress ? Mr. Brewer. No. I wanted to draw a distinction, that the reason that the smaller waves caused more force was because they are just the right spacing, so that they hit all three legs at once. Therefore, you have three times as much force. Senator SattronsraLu. I see. Mr. Brewer. And a single wave hitting one leg, as very roughly you could have one very large wave, if you only struck one leg, and it is down by the time it gets here to the other leg, you really, in effect, are only creating a load on one leg. Senator SatronsraLL. What you are saying about the three legs would be like the man out at the end of a diving board keeping in time with the up and down motion of the board. Mr. Brewer. Well, that would be the resonant case, tuning case. Let me see if I can think of a better analogy. If you can imagine waves of just the right height so that one was hitting here and an- other one hitting here simultaneously, that is the condition I was speaking of ; whereas, with both the larger wave and the smaller wave, that won’t happen. One would be up here [indicating] and down here on this leg. You see, it takes a unique spacing of the waves to hit all the legs at the same time, and a wave, to do that for this tower, the wave height must be about 12 feet; 10 or 12 feet. Senator SattronstaLL. I understand. Mr. Brewer. If it is a bigger wave, it has a longer period, and it does not do it, later it doesn’t do it, and that is not the tuning. Now, a tuning case, and we have no evidence of this, a tuning case would be if the waves hit a leg at the right frequency of the tower so that each time the tower went back another wave hit it; that is the re- sonant case, the third condition. The tower was designed on the condition of one enormous wave striking the leg, which is a static case. Now, the static case is usually the less force. But again you have to look into the mechanics of the structure to decide whether a dynamic case 1s worse than the static case. If you have a very short impulse on a tower that dosen’t do nearly as much as one that is on for a longer time. This has to be done by analysis and, as Mr. French has suggested, a dynamic analysis of the tower might have revealed, under the case that we found, that the loads would be higher. But this was already recognized as a bad condition, this very low natural frequency, and they were making efforts to stop it, to tighten up, to increase its natural frequency. Had it been done then, the dynamic loads would not be as great. But this is something that I couldn’t say without actually looking into it, and that was not our job. We were not asked to do that, and we had not done it, so I am speak ing now on the basis of opinion. Senator Stennis. Senator Srennis. All right. Is there anything further, Senator Saltonstall ? 198 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Satronsrauu. I have some further questions, but I will wait for your interrogation. Senator Srennis. I was just going to suggest that we let counsel finish his examination and then we would both proceed. Senator Satronsrauu. All right. Senator Srennis. All right, Mr. French, you proceed. We will allow you 20 minutes now, or such amount thereof as you may need. Mr. Frencu. Thank you, sir. CRITICISM OF BREWER STUDY BY DESIGN ENGINEERS Mr. Brewer, in the design and construction report for the Texas towers on page 64, there is a short paragraph that I would like to read to you: During the fall of 1958 a subcontract was given to the Brewer Engineering Laboratories, Ine., to perform motion studies on the tower. These consisted of horizontal acceleration measurements in the vicinity of each of the three legs correlated with strain gage measurements on the legs and simultaneous observa- tions of winds and wave direction and amplitude. These studies were not very successful mostly because it was difficult to determine the true translations which involved a multiple integration of the curves obtained from rather ir- regular data. Would you kindly address yourself to the criticism that has been expressed ¢ Mr. Brewer. Where is that statement, sir? Mr. Frencu. On page 64 of the Design and Construction Report for Texas towers. Mr. Brewer. I guess we don’t have a copy of that. I see. This actually is a comment on our study by another party, and it says— These studies— which are our studies— were not very successful mostly because it was very difficult to determine the true translations which involve the multiple integration of the curves obtained from ratber irregular data. I don’t agree with that statement. I feel that our data were quite comprehensive, and that they were accurate, and that it was success- ful, and we have a number of plots in our reports that show the cor- relation between the acceleration, the double integration accelerom- eters with the strain gage information on the legs themselves, and within the limits of experimental accuracy, these data showed a good correlation. Mr. French has these reports and the plots that I refer to. Mr. Frencu. Can you briefly tell us, sir, whether or not in your report the platform excursions coincided with the striking of waves? Mr. Brewer. They did not. The tower was in motion continuously. We have no records—every record we took, the tower was in motion. Now, we have simultaneous records of wave passages from the wave staff, together with the tower motions, and they are in the back of one of our reports, and if you examine the oscillograms, you will see the wave passage going by, which appears just like a profile of a waye, but you will notice that the tower motions continued after the wave and they also preceded it; that is, there is enough loading from the waves going by so that the tower—and the tower has such little damping that it is ina state of continuous motion. —— COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 199 Now, the bigger waves, the waves around 10 or 12 feet, do make it move more, and the larger ones move it more, so there is a general correlation between the tower and the wave motion. There is very little damping. Mr. Frencu. I believe that in your report you stated, in effect, that if the motion of the tower were objectionable it could be rectified by the installation of above-water X-bracing Are you acquainted with the fact that the tower was so designed to keep the resistance to wave passage to a minimum, and would not the installation of above-water X-bracing mitigate against the origi- nal design assumptions 4 Mr. Brewer. I believe it would mitigate it. You stated “rectify” in your statement. I don’t believe I made that statement. Mr. France. No, I am sorry. This was just. my term. Mr. Brewer. Yes, mitigate, I would say. I would feel that X- bracing would mitigate the motions. I did, however, say this was only a suggestion on my part that should be followed by an engi- neering investigation, because the addition of the X-bracing, of course, would present a greater plan form to the wave which might actually impart greater forces and, therefore, the integrity of the tower might be endangered. So my “suggestion was that the X-bracing be investigated from an engineering standpoint to see if, indeed, it ‘would reduce the motions without endangering the tower. Mr. Frenci. Would that require a complete reanalysis of the design computations ? Mr. Brewer. I would think so. Mr. Frency. Would you have an opinon as an engineer as to what the probable net gain in structural integrity would be achieved by the installation of X- bracing? Mr. Brewer. Well, if you installed the X-bracing, it is conceivable that you might reduce the integrity of the structure. But you would, under the conditions as we did measure them, you would reduce the motions, If we are speaking of motions, by putting in the X-bracing it would reduce the motions somewhat, but it might increase the loading im very heavy seas on the tower, which might ‘be harmful rather than beneficial. This is what I meant by having an investigation made before this was done. But I am quite confident that the X- bracing would reduce somewhat the motions of the tower, so if that was objectionable from a radar standpoint, that would be wood. But if it presented a greater profile to the advancing waves so that the tower was then overloaded, that would be bad. So this is something that would have to be determined by com- putation investigation. Mr. FrEeNcH. ‘We had testimony yesterday that pins were loose in the minus 25 and minus 75 foot levels. Do you feel that those should have been corrected prior to the in- stallation of X-bracing above water? Mr. Brewer. Well, I would certainly not be qualified to answer that. I would think that, first of all from an integrity standpoint, I would feel that the underwater bracing should be repaired, and then to re- 200 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 duce the tower motions, the X-bracing might or might not be in- stalled, depending upon whether it would aggravate the loading on the tower, but certainly the underwater bracing must be repaired to make the tower agree with what the designers had planned for in the way of strength and motion, but primarily strength. Mr. Frencu. Well, if you had no bracing under water, what would be the effect on that column ? TOWER LEG WOULD BUCKLE WITHOUT UNDERWATER BRACES Mr. Brewer. We have only cursory computations on this, and these are therefore only given as an opinion. But it appears from these computations that you would have the collapse of one leg if the tower bracing were nonexistent. Mr. Frencu. Did you include, within that cursory examination combinations of bracing failure which might lead to column failure? Mr. Brewer. No, we didn’t make that exact computation. This was just a quick column computation, and it was based on assuming that the concrete maintained its bond, and also assumed fixity of the ocean floor and some other things like that; and again, I must add that this was a very cursory computation. But it did appear that the column failure was—it was marginal so far as strength in a simple column, and actually this was a beam column, which makes things even worse. Mr. Frencu. Mr. Chairman, we would like to have the reports of Brewer Engineering Laboratories, Inc., introduced as part of the offi- cial files of the subcommittee. Senator Srennis. Very well. It will be incorporated at this point, Mr. Reporter. (The document referred to will be found in the subcommittee files. ) Mr. Frencu. [I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis Mr. Brewer, I have a few questions to ask. It seems to me, if I understand the latter part of your testimony, that you said that unless the integrity of the tower bracing was restored beneath the water, in your opinion, that it would lead to a collapse of the tower. Did I understand you correctly ? Mr. Brewer. No Senator Srennts. I want to be certain. Mr. Brewer. No. The question, I believe, was, should the tower bracing be repaired before the X-bracing was installed. Senator Stennis. Yes. RESTORATION OF SUBSEA BRACING DEEMED MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR Mr. Brewer. And I felt that the most important thing was to try to restore the integrity of the bracing beneath the sea. Senator STENNIs. Yes. Mr. Brewer. Because unil that was done the tower did not have the strength that the designer had planned for. Senator Srennis. Yes. Mr. Brewer. This isan opinion. Senator Stennis. Well, I understood that. Mr. Brewer. I would not predict collapse. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 201 Senator Stennis. I thought you added something about the collapse of a pier. Mr. Brewer. I said. Senator Stennis. I do not know just how you connected it to your other testimony. Mr. Brewer. No. The thing we said about the collapse of the pier, if the bracing beneath the water were nonexistent, let us suppose all the pins fell out or all the braces broke so that none of the structures were present, then we have the feeling from very limited calculations that one of these legs would have collapsed; that is, would have buckled, which would have allowed the whole tower to come down. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Brewer. So obviously, since we know from our investigations above the water that this bracing is ineffective mathematically, something should be done to restore its effectiveness. Now, we have no way of knowing above the water whether this bracing was ineffective merely because the pins were in large holes, which is not very serious, or whether there were actual members that were missing, so that you would have to refer then to the testimony of the people who made the underwater inspection to determine just what was wrong with the undersea structure. Our above-sea measurements indicated that it was totally ineffective. That means it is either gone or loose. Senator Stennis. Well, that is a very impressive point. I wanted to review it not just for the purpose of repetition but to be certain that I understood you correctly. Based upon the instruments which made these recordings, your con- clusion was that these braces down there, for some reason, were in- effective ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Srpnnis. You are not expessing an opinion on what the reason was, because you did not go below water. Is that correct ? Mr. Brewer. That is right. We have no way of knowing that. Senator Stennis. Thank you, sir. Senator Saltonstall, do you have any questions? Senator SauronsTauuL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; just two or three questions, Mr. Brewer. Mr. Brewer, you were employed by the Air Force; is that correct ? Mr. Brewer. Indirectly. Wehad a contract with the Hallicrafters Corp. of Chicago who, in turn, have an Air Force contract, and this was just a mechanism; the Hallicrafters Co. takes small contracts, deals with small contractors, so the Air Force has an overall contract with them which will pick up these small contracts. That was the reason for doing this. Senator Sauronstaty. And what company was responsible for the radar and the instruments, and so on ? Mr. Brewer. Which company was that? Senator SauronsraLtn. What I am trying to get at 1s, you say you were employed by the Mr. Brewer. Hallicrafters Co. “enator SALTONSTALL. What company ? Mr. Brewer. Hallicrafters, H-a-]-]-1-c-r-a-f-t-e-r-s. Senator Sauronsran.. You were employed by the Hallicrafters Co.? 202 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Brewer. Correct. Senator Satronstatyt. What was the relationship of the Halli- crafters Co. with the Air Force? Mr. Brewer. They had a general contract, sort of a catchall con- tract, so that small contracts that come up from time to time during the year are done through them, and then they are on an overall con- tract with the Air Force. Apparently it is too comphecated to have a small contract such as ours negotiated each time with the Air Force, so that all of these small contracts go through a larger company. Senator Sauronsratt. The Air Force was responsible for the safety of the tower, was it not? Mr. Brewer. I believe at that time the Navy was responsible. Senator SauronstTaty. Mr. Chairman, that would be in direct con- flict to the testimony we received yesterday. Are you sure of that, Mr. Brewer? Mr. Brewer. No, I am not sure of that. Senator Satronstatn. What I would like to try to get at is this: We are told that the Air Force took over this tower from the Navy in December of 1957. You were working in 1958-59, were you not? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Satronstaty. And you were working for this Mr. Brewer. The Air Force; that is right. Senator Sauronsraty. Were you wor king for the Air Force through this Hallicrafters Co. ? Mr. Brewer. That is right. Senator Satronstaty. What is the relationship, so far as you know, between the Hallicrafters Co. and the Air Force? Mr. Brewer. They are a contractor to the Air Force. Senator Satronsratt. The Air Force had taken over the tower, had it not? Mr. Brewer. I couldn't tell you. Senator SarronstaLy. You couldn’t tell that? Mr. Brewer. It was my impression that the Navy was responsible for the structure of the tower at that time, but it is only my impression. The Navy was mm charge of making the subsea repairs at the time I was there, and the Boston Navy Yar d Senator SALTONSTALL. So you were not directly employed by the Government ? Mr. Brewer. No; indirectly. Senator Sauronsratu. Now, who asked you to go out there? Mr. Brewer. We were asked by the Cambridge Air Force Research Center to submit a proposal to measure the motions of the tower; that is, through Cambridge, through the Mitre Office in Cambridge, through a Mr. Donegan. He is an Air Force civilian employee. Senator Sarronstati. Did you have anything to do with the tower prior to the time that you went out there ? Mr. Brewer. I had measured some motions on Texas tower No. 2, 2 or 3 years before, and therefore I had some prior experience on this. This was done for Lincoln Laboratory at MIT. Senator SattronstaLy. But you had nothing to do with the design of the tower? Mr. Brewer. No, I had nothing to do with the design of the tower. Senator SauronstaLtn. From your study out there and from your COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 203 examinations of these motions, and stresses, have you any opinion as to whether the original design was adequate and proper for the purpose ? Mr. Brewer. I wouldn’t have any opinion on that. Senator SauronsTauy. You would have no opinion on that? Mr. Brewer. No. The only opinion I would have is the one I gave, which is that the subsea structure appeared to be totally imeffective, and this was reported. You see, my primary responsibility was to measure how much it moved from the radar standpoint. Senator SALTonstaLy. Would you repeat that, please ? Mr. Brewer. My primary responsibility was to measure how much this tower moved back and forth and around and around because it affected the accuracy of the search radar; but, secondly, | did measure the stresses and was asked to measure the stresses, which I did. Senator SatronstTauu. We have had considerable testimony concern- ing the use of pins as opposed to welded connections. In your opin- ion, was it properly constructed ? . Mr. Brewer. f never went underneath the water to look at any- thing, and the only knowledge I have of that is just talking to the divers and talking to the Navy people, and we have transcripts of that in our reports of these conversations. Senator SarronsTauu. So that you have no opinion on the question of pins versus welding, or the tolerances of the pins, and so on? Mr. Brewer. We have no direct knowledge of this. Senator Sauronstaty. You have no direct knowledge of that. You never made any underwater inspection ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. We never went underwater. Senator Sanronsraty. Did you approve of the strengthening above the water, by the use of X-bracing as shown on the model in red? Mr. Brewer. I think I have to go into that a little bit. I suggested that would be a worthwhile avenue to investigate, putting X-bracing above the water. But I said this isa suggestion. But that it should be investigated from an engineering standpoint, first, to see whether it would be actually helpful; it was my opinion it would be helpful. So when you ask did I approve, I did not. I suggested that this would be a worthwhile avenue to investigate. I was never asked to approve it, and I never made any measure- ments on it. Senator SaLronsTat. I see. So you took no responsibility for offering an opinion as to whether this strengthening above the water, as shown on the model in the red, was adequate or not ? Mr. Brewer. Well, my suggestion was that the X-bracing might be added to reduce motion and not to necessarily strengthen the tower. But I did suggest that this should be looked into because it might well have the opposite effect as far as strengthening the tower. So I never made any drawings or calculations of anything. This was simply a suggestion I gave to the Navy people when we were discussing the motions that I had made otherwise. Senator Sauronsratiy. You told Senator Stennis, if IT heard it cor- rectly, and I would like to repeat it because I think it is very impor- tant, you told him that the above-water inspection showed that the 70733— 61——__114 204 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 underwater braces were ineffective. Did I understand you correctly ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. The motions, in other words, from the measurements we were able to conduct above the water, which were measuring stresses in these legs above the water, and measuring the motions from the accelerometers, we were able to calculate that the tower behaved as if there were no bracing whatsoever under the water. Senator SauronstTaty. Your work was to determine the motion of the tower ? Mr. Brewer. That was our primary purpose. Senator Sarronsrati. In your opinion, was the motion of the tower increased or diminished by the bracing above the water that is shown in red on the model ? NO MEASUREMENTS MADE AFTER X-BRACING INSTALLED Mr. Brewer. We never measured it after that. I suggested that that would be a worthwhile endeavor, but we were never commissioned to do that, so we have never been on the tower since the bracing was put in. Senator Satronsrati. But you did have an opinion that the bracing above water would not strengthen the bracing below, if the bracing below was ineffective ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. All it could do was reduce some- what the motions of the tower. Senator Sarronsrauu. Yes. One other question: You went into this analogy of the diving board, and a 10- to 12-foot wave, as opposed to the 35- foot wave. What would be the effect on the bracing above the water, as shown in red on the model, as affecting the length of the wave, and striking the legs of the tower, if any ? Mr. Brewer. Actually what we were speaking of, where it hits all legs simultaneously there would be no force change provided the waves didn’t hit the bracing. I said there would be no difference. Senator Sauronstratt. No difference. Mr. Brewer. As long as it didn’t hit the bracing, as long as it didn’t hit the bracing. Senator Satronsratu. In other words, the effect of a 10-foot wave on the tower, the dynamic movement, to use your expression Mr. Brewer. Yes. Senator SaLTonsTaLt (continuing). Would not be affected by the bracing above the water. Mr. Brewer. Well, the movement would, but not the stresses. Per- haps I did not understand your question. I would expect that with the 10-foot waves, and with the bracing, the tower would not move as much as it did without the bracing. But I would expect the stresses would be very much the same; that is, you would not change the stresses in the steel, but you would reduce the motion somewhat, pro- vided the waves didn’t hit or were not sufficiently large to hit, the bracing. Senator Sanronsrarn. One final question: Did the motion of the tower increase, during that winter when you were making these eh es ? You made them between November and March, didn’t you? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 205 Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Sauronsratu. In the winter of 1957 and 1958 or 1958 and 1959? Mr. Brewer. 1958 and 1959, right. Senator Sattonstaty. Did the motion increase, from November 1958 to March 1959 ? Mr. Brewer. It seemed to be primarily related to the sea height, that is, we have a plot—I can quote that—we have a figure which, I think, illustrates it better than words. We have plotted tower motion against wave height, and throughout this period you will see this, that ‘there is a correlation here between the motions of the tower and the height of the waves that were im- pinging on the tower, and from that you will also see that the waves in the 10- to 12-foot category had almost or as great an effect as the waves way up in the 30- foot category because of the simultaneous leading of the legs which I mentioned earlier. That, for the record, is our figure 17,3 in report 173. Senator Sauronstay. Did you give an opinion to your employer, the Hallicrafters Co., that the tower was safe or unsafe, from your observations ? Mr. Brewer. I am not sure; I don’t believe we gave any opinion as to that. I think we merely said that the stresses that we measured above the deck were moderate at that point. Senator SaLronsratu. So that from your observation and examina- tion, in terms of your employment, you had no opinion as to whether the tower was unsafe for the purposes for which the Air Force was using it, during your examination or afterward ? Mr. Brewer. Well, we had no opinion on it because we don’t know the conditions beneath the sea. The stresses beneath the sea could be very materially higher than those we measured above. KNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONS OF SUBSEA BRACES WOULD AID ABOVE-WATER STUDY OF STRESSES If some of the bracing was gone, and if someone could tell us exactly what braces were gone or what the structure beneath the sea was, we could then make some rather accurate calculations of what the stresses were, and they could be very appreciably higher than those we measured above. But this is contingent upon an exact knowledge of the subsea structure, and we never had that knowledge. Senator SALTONSTALL. Were the stresses excessive “at any time, in your opinion, at the maximum of the 10- and 12-foot waves which were causing the most motion of the platform ? Mr. Brewer. They were not excessive where we were measuring them; no. Senator SALTONSTALL. So at the point where you measured the stresses on the legs and bracings and while you were measuring them, the stresses were never at any time excessive / Mr. Brewer. Well, they could be underneath the sea. Senator Sauronsrauu. I see. Mr. Brewer. We don’t know what is going on beneath the sea, sir; you see, that 1s our problem. 206 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 All we know is what we measure above the sea. Now then, if this bracing, for example, is all gone, there is some indication from some quick computations made that actually you could have complete collapse of one of these legs without any severe forces put on them. Tf all these bracings were gone, it is rather likely these legs would simply buckle because they were too long, so you wouldn’t need any waves at ali. Another factor was if some of these braces were gone, then down. near the footing on the bottom of the leg you could have stresses, perhaps, three times as high as we measured up here. Now, when you have stresses three times as high, moderate up here, down here [pointing to ocean floor] they might not be moderate when you consider the salt water and, perhaps, holes and things like that, but that is speculation because until someone tells me that the structure is like underneath the sea, I could not possibly tell whether the stress is three times as much; I could merely say it could be three times as much if the structure is gone. I could also say it may be likely that you could have column failure in one of these legs without any waves, provided that all the structure is gone. You see, this is all contingent on knowing something that I don’t know, what is the condition of the subsea structure. Senator Sanronstatt. What you emphasize to us is that this bracing above the water, as shown in red, was ineffective to strength- en the tower if the braces below the water were gone or were not sufficient. ; Mr. Brewer. Well, it would help partially. For one thing, this column failure is a matter of length. Therefore, you shortened the column by putting these braces in, so speaking of pure column fail- ure these braces have indeed helped out, even though this structure might be gone down here [pointing], from the standpoint of de- flection, this bracing has helped it because it has reduced the mo- tion of the leg and, therefore, the motion force. However, if under heavy seas they present a profile to the waves, that increases vastly the force on the tower and then, perhaps, they have made things worse. But these things can only be determined by an analysis which we did not make. This was a conversational opinion which I gave to the Navy on one of the trips back when I suggested that they look into the pos- sibility of this for reducing motion, and it was not made to reduce stress or improve tower integrity. Senator Satronsrauty. But, if the bracing below the water were gone, then the braces above the water, shown in red, would not be sufficient to hold the tower in place. . Mr. Brewer. Well, I would hate to say that without making an investigation. As I say, a cursory investigation that we made indicated you could still have column failure if you lost all the bracing. Senator SartonsraLn. You could still have what ? Mr. Brewer. Column failure; that is, one of the legs could buckle sunply from the weight. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 207 You see, the weight of the tower if you have no bracing here is sufficient to buckle these legs; they would just fail like straw because they were too long, so the bracing exerts, among other factors, a stabil- izing Influence on “these legs so they don’ t buckle. Now then, if all the bracing were gone and you don’t have the X- bracing, it is far more likely ‘that the buckling of this leg would oc- cur without any wave forces being put on the tower at all. Senator Sarton cnivn, You would have no opinion regarding this method of construction of the tower as opposed to the construction in towers No. 2 and No. 3? Mr. Brewer. Well, they were vastly different, of course. Texas tower No. 2 has no bracing either above the sea or below and it is in much shallower water, so the legs themselves resist these translational forces from the waves, and the natural frequencies are very high on tower No. 2; and, well, the stresses are just a tiny fraction, a and we motions themselves are in the order, I think, of a few hundredths of a inch as compared to several inches on this. So they are not at all similar. Senator Sauronstann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Symington ? Senator Syurneron. Mr. Brewer, did I understand you to say that you have no opinion about the original design, as to whether it was right or wrong? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Symrnetron. That is because you were not in on the original design ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. We had nothing to do with the de- sion of the towers. We were merely asked to measure the motions of the tower so the Air Force could determine whether there would be large search radar errors. Senator Symineron. If you were asked to measure the motion of a skyscraper that had been up for 5 years, and then in the sixth year it fell down, you would still feel that you did not have a right to say whether or not it was designed properly in the beginning? Mr. Brewer. Well, I think I understand the meaning of what you are saying. Senator Symineron. It seems to me, based on your testimony, you have said that many things were done to correct this tower, but that those things weren’t adequate. Nothing would have had to be done to correct it if the original design had been adequate, would it ? Mr. Brewer. Well, “the original design I can’t comment on. £ be- heve it was adequate, but what I do want to point out was that this tower was not built in accordance with the original design. Senator Symrneron. Then let us shift it and Say the « original con- struction was inadequate. MEASUREMENTS ABOVE THE SEA INDICATE THAT SUBSEA BRACES ARE INEFFECTIVE Mr. Brewer. The original construction had either, because of fail- ures in transport or for reasons unknown to me, resulted in a tower 208 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 that behaved as if there were no subsea structure. This we observed, and this we reported, that our measurements above the sea indicated that the subsea structure was totally ineffective. Now, we weren’t charged with the responsibility for finding that out. However, we found it out, and we felt we should report this, and we did. Senator Symineton. I understand that. It is sort of a Tinkers-to-Evers-to-Chance as to responsibility. I am sorry I have been out of town and not present for some of these hearings, but I wonder why, if the design was all right, or the con- struction was all right, or both were all right—why if it was right, you wouldn’t have to do ail this repairing, would you? Mr. Brewer. Yes. The reason they tried to fix it is because it was not functioning according to design. Senator Symineron. That is my point. Mr. Brewer. The tower was moving more and moving at a lower frequency, and this was detected by our instrumentation, and the people responsible for the tower were making efforts while we were there to rectify the condition by sending down divers and making repairs. Senator Symineron. That was my point. Mr. Brewer. It was my suggestion after they make repairs we could come back and measure the motions again, and ascertain whether it had been improved or not. This was not done. Senator Symineton. To whom did you suggest that? Mr. Brewer. I have a letter. If you will excuse me a minute I will see if we can find a letter. Senator Srennis. Yes. Mr. Brewer. It is a rather simple thing. If they were able to restore the integrity of the subsea structure, then the natural fre- quency would go up to the 37 cycles that the designers had calculated, and if that was the case, the motion would go down, and probably the stresses. But this could be determined by an experimental pro- gram, and I did suggest that, and we may be able—if we cannot find the letter right here, we can Senator Symineton. If you give the contract to a reputable con- tractor based on his statement that a design is right and have a pro- duction contract, generally when you start creating the building, you do it under a performance bond and then somebody is responsible for not building it in accordance with the design. In this case, what I am interested in is: Who is responsible for these men getting into this trouble? It seems that there was a great deal of effort to repair an obviously faulty tower, and that effort did not result in the desired end. BREWER LABORATORIES NOT CONNECTED WITH DESIGN Mr. Brewer. Well, I would like to say at the outset that we had nothing to do with the design of this tower, and the reason we were brought in, the only reason we were brought in, was because when the tower was first occupied, these motions were noticed by the per- sonnel on board, and it was not known at that time how much the COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 209 motions were because there was no one who could think of a way to measure it. So, because of my experience on tower No. 2, I was engaged to measure the motion, so that the people could tell whether they were a matter of an eighth of an inch or 8 feet, because speculations ran in that whole spectrum. So our job was, and our responsibility was, not to design or to pass on the design or to pass on the danger or anything else, but simply to measure how much were the motions and, in conjunction with measuring the motions, what were the stresses at the deck. This we did, and this was reported to the designers, who have a far greater knowledge of the integrity and the considerations of this tower than I do. Now, if someone had asked us to design the tower and to make a stress analysis of the tower, that would be another matter. But we were not asked to do that, and we were brought in after the tower was built. Senator Symineron. I understand that, and let me hasten to say in no way am I criticizing anything you did or didn’t do. As you give your testimony, it appears that perhaps if they had taken your advice for another look based on your calculations, maybe this could have been avoided. It couldn’t have been built right in the beginning. That couldn’t be possible, if by right is meant that the tower was supposed to stand up. T have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Brewer, you have said now that you made a report and a recom- mendation, and you were not called back to make a further test. Did you find your letter? Mr. Brewer. Yes. I can quote from this letter; it is dated June 16. Itisto the Air Force, Cambridge Research Center. Senator Stennis. Well, do you mind if we just put it in the record ? Mr. Brewer. All right; just put it in the record. Senator Stennis. All right. You may read it and then we will put it in the record in toto. Mr. Brewer. I will just read— Senator Stennis. The pertinent parts. Mr. Brewer. I will just read this one paragraph, and I quote: Senator Stennis. Give the date, Mr. Brewer. Mr. Brewer. June 16, 1959: I believe an engineering study should be made evaluating quantitatively the several methods proposed for reducing tower motions. Then: I would like to suggest for your consideration that a task be organized to make an engineering study of the various methods of TT—4 reinforcement, together with a prediction of the excursion reduction due to this reinforcement. I also recommend that we reinstrument the platform again this coming winter to determine whether or not the underwater reinforcements now being carried out by the Navy have been effective in reducing tower excursions. Senator Srennis. All right, Mr. Reporter, put the entire letter in at this point. 210 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 (The document referred to follows:) JUNE 16, 1959. Mr. Jonn F. DONEGAN, CRLD, Air Force Cambridge Research Center, L. G. Hanscom Field, Bedford, Mass. Drag JOHN: By this time you will have received our Report 173, describing the motions and stresses of the TT-4 platform, as observed through the winter of 1958-59. I believe an engineering study should be made evaluating quantitatively the several methods proposed for reducing tower motions. Because of our experience in measuring the tower’s excursions, and identify- ing the origins of these excursions, I believe we are in a good position to carry out further analyses. I would like to suggest for your consideration that a task be organized to make an engineering study of the various methods of T’T—4 reinforcement, together with a prediction of the excursion reduction due to this reinforcement. I also recommend that we reinstrument the platform again this coming winter te determine whether or not the underwater reinforcements now being carried out by the Navy have been effective in reducing tower excursions. Yours very truly, Given A. Brewer, Chief Engineer. Senator Stennis. Mr. French, do you have anything further? Mr. Frencu. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. Senator Saltonstall ? Senator SaALtronsTatL. No questions. Senator Stennis. Senator Symington ? Senator Syminetron. No questions. Senator Stennis. We appreciate your coming here, Mr. Brewer, and I believe your testimony has been very relevant and very reveal- ing in many ways. As I understand it, your examination and study, aided by the recordings of your instruments showed that the bracing of the structure under the water was totally ineffective. Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator Srennis. Yes. And you were never called back any more after your first examinations and your first recordings Mr. Brewer. Well Senator Stennis (continuing). For similar work, I mean. Mr. Brewer. That is right. After they made the reinforcements and put in the X-bracing and these things, we were never called back again; that is correct. Senator Stennis. All right. We thank you very much, and you, too, Mr. Vanstone. You are here under subpena, and we appreciate very much your coming here, sir. Is there anything further? Mr. Brewer. Sir, there is one thing Mr. Vanstone pointed out which should be in the record, and that is what we said about it being totally ineffective under the water applies to the excursions we made which were plus or minus 3 inches. Now, no one can say if it moved 4 inches they might have been in- effective. If it were due to pin looseness, you can imagine if it went 4 inches, maybe the pins would take up. GREATEST MOTION DETECTED WAS PLUS OR MINUS 3 INCHES At least within the range we measured that winter, the bracing within the sea was totally ineffective, but this must be qualified by — tC“ i;7TCS COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 211 saying that the greatest motions we observed, measured, were plus -or minus 38 inches. Senator Stennis. That means 3 inches one way and 3 inches the other way ? Mr. Brewer. Yes. For that range there was no evidence that the underwater bracing was helping at all, helping this structure. Senator Stennis. Well, my impression is that this is the most re- vealing testimony on this point that we have had. . Senator SatronsraLt. Would the Senator yield? Senator STENNts. Yes. Senator Sarronsraty. Would I understand, just to make it clear to a layman’s mind, that because of this 3-inch motion above the water you came to the conclusion that the braces under the water within those 5 inches were not efiective at all? Mr. Brewnr. That is correct. Senator Sarronstatn. Did the bracing become effective if the mo- tion was greater than 3 inches? Mr. Brewer. Well, they could be. You see, we have no way of knowing, because 3 inches is the greatest the tower ever moved that winter. Senator SALTONSTALL. I see. Then the most motion that you detected above water was the 3-inch motion ? Mr. Brewer. That is correct. Senator SattonstaLy. And that 3-inch motion was something which proved to you that the underwater bracing was not doing its job? Mr. Brewer. That it wasn’t doing anything over that range; we knew that. Senator Satronsraty. Yes. Thank you. Senator Stennis. Allright. Thank you again, gentlemen. Thank you very much for your testimony. We have as the next witness Mr. E. G. Rau, who was the chief engi- neer for the contractor who had the responsibility for the construction of this tower. Mr. Rau, will you come around, please, as soon as these gentlemen have left the table. Allright. Mr. Rau, you understand that it is the unbroken custom of this committee to have witnesses sworn. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony here at this hearing will ay the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you od? Mr. Rav. I do. Senator Stennis. Are these gentlemen who are with you going to testify ? Mr. Piuz. No. Mr. J. Rich Steers is on the right side, and I am the counsel. Senator Stennis. You may advise the witness of course. Mr. Rau, we are glad to have you here, sir. We have had other testimony about this matter, and we always like to have the gentleman here who did the actual work and construction. Mr. Rav. Thank you, Senator. le, COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 TESTIMONY OF EUGENE RAU, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF ENGI- NEER, J. RICH STEERS, INC.; ACCOMPANIED BY J. RICH STEERS AND EMIL V. PILZ, ATTORNEY Senator Srennis. Mr. Kendall will proceed with his questioning. You have no prepared statement ? Mr. Rav. [ have no prepared statement, Senator. Senator Stennis. Do you have a preliminary statement? Mr. Rav. I would like to make a preliminary statement. Senator Stennis. Let him first identify you properly for the record, so we can get your connections and background, then you can make a statement as you see fit, and then counsel can ask questions. Mr. Kenpautu. Mr. Rau, first, I believe you are here as a result of a subpena issued by this committee? Mr. Rav. Yes, I am. Mr. Kenpatu. What is your connection with Texas tower No. 4? Mr. Rav. While I was vice president and chief engineer of J. Rich Steers, Inc., I was fully cognizant of the construction. We were doing the construction of Texas towers No. 3 and No. 4. Mr. Kenpatu. J. Rich Steers was the contractor who built the tower under a joint venture with Morrison-Knudsen; is that correct ? Mr. Rav. We were the sponsors under a joint venture; that is right. Mr. Kenpauu. I believe you indicated you would like to make a preliminary statement. You may doso. Mr. Rav. Well, to give quickly my past. experience—— Mr. Kenpnary. Yes. Mr. Rav (continuing). I am a graduate engineer, graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1933. I joined J. Rich Steers, Inc., about 6 months after graduation and have been associated with this organization ever since, except for 214 years of service in the Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. Navy, during World War IT. I have a professional engineering license in a number of States, and I have the title of vice president and chief engineer which I have held for some 13 years. In turn, the firm of J. Rich Steers was founded at the turn of the century, at which time it was known as Henry Steers, Inc., and it was changed to the present name in 1929. We are a heavy construction outfit doing all types of heavy con- struction, but in general, more marine work than land work. Since, during and since the war, we were involved in the construc- tion of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, which amounted to some $80 mil- lion ; we were involved in the construction of Wheelus Field at Tripoli in Libya; Port Lyautey, French Morocco; Asmara, Eritrea; the Voice of America station in Tangiers; the rehabilitation of the harbors in Greece under the Marshall plan. We were involved with the construction of early warning radio stations in Greenland, and just this past winter we finished a manage- ment contract that we had for the construction of radio station WFAU-FM which, incidentally, was completed a number of months ahead of schedule, and was able to be put into service. We have done a number of marine construction jobs such as piers, breakwaters into the Atlantic and Caribbean, and we have done a lot of complicated towing in the Atlantic Ocean. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 213 ‘So with this past experience of marine work, when the Texas tower program became a fact back in September of 1955, we thought we _ would like to put a bid in for it. After all, the construction of these towers, to us, was a marine problem. The only thing that we did not fully have experience on was the jacks and the jacking assemblies and the actual jacking up of the ‘towers. Therefore, we associated ourselves with Morrison-Knudsen in Sep- tember of 1955, because they had with them a man named Lucas, who was a former partner of DeLong’s for a number of years, and had experience, a number of experiences, in jacking up the platforms. As you know, we submitted our proposal November 1, and it was accepted in the latter part of November. Soon after that we started to order our materials under the priority allocation that we had, but within a month or so this proved to be inef- fective. We had trouble getting materials or at least getting them on order and getting them delivered in time to construct, which we had to do under our contract, both towers in 1956. The first part of January of 1956 we brought this to the attention of the Navy, and it was then decided instead of concentrating on two towers and end up by not building either one that year, we should concentrate our materials, our allocations, to one tower, and be able to start one in the year. We decided to start Texas tower No. 3 first, so that at the completion of this fabrication, which was done in Portland, Maine, we sailed on August 7, 1956, to emplant Texas tower No. 3 some 65 miles south- east of Nantucket. As you gentlemen may recall, this was only 3 days before what we had been warned was the beginning of the hurricane season. We did this because of the fact that we were told it was most im- portant to emplant these towers for the defense of our country. It was part of our early warning system. We got the tower out on site, and had it jacked up only 10 feet above water when actually a hurricane came up the coast and, fortunately, veered east of us and missed us by about 100 miles. You can well imagine what would have happened to the tower and 130 men we had aboard if it had continued on its original path. We completed the installation of Texas tower No. 3 in the winter of 1956 and, as I recall, it was actually—we actually removed our men from the tower in March of 1957. At this time we concentrated our full effects or efforts on the con- struction, fabrication, of Texas tower No. 4. This tower, being the first of its kind ever attempted, why, it was quite a challenge engineering wise and otherwise. We fabricated, continued fabricating, the tower in the spring of 1957, and in order to visualize what we had to contend with out on the site, we actually built a model, a template which, I think, this com- mittee saw last week in the motion pictures we had made. With this model we were able to visualize our problems in upending, also in being able to tell how it would react during the upending and we in turn made some changes to it, because of these experiences. Finally, in the latter part of June 1957, we sailed with the template and platform for offshore New Jersey. 214 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Tn connection with the lashing down of the diagonal braces in the three planes, we had suggested since this was a temporary lashing down, we submitted a drawing which, first was approved, and then, finally, just before we sailed, it was disapproved and changed. We objected to this; in fact, we wrote a letter to that effect that we didn’t think the lashing down, the securing of these braces in these three planes, was as secure as the suggested method that we had made, and so, as I say, indicated in a letter, a copy of which we have here. Mr. Kenparyi. Will you make that a part of the record, Mr. Rau, please? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; we will, Mr. Kendall. (The document referred to follows :) JANUARY 23, 195T. OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas Towers, Boston, Mass. ‘ Dear Str: Today, we received from Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge S. & M—-K drawing No. 47, Rey. 1, CCS plan No. 3038-00-33, and CCS plan No. 3038-00-21. All these drawings contain notes or corrections which we consider beyond the requirements of our contract. All of these drawings contained the following note: “For field welds to perma- nent bracing preheat prior to welding, and use low hydrogen electrodes. Post- heat to 400° F.” or words to that effect. Insofar as known to us, this type of requirement is not required in NavDock Specifications 47142. Therefore, if this procedure is to be required. we request that you issue us a directive so that it may be considered as a modification to our contract. We do believe, however, that if this procedure is to be required that it will result in a delay in the fabrication and erection of Texas tower No. 4. On CCS plan No. 3038-00-21 Texas tower No. 4 template bracing stowage at elevation minus 73.67, several corrections were indicated. This CCS plan is based on S. & M.-K drawing 438, Rev. 1, which was approved by Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge on July 24, 1956. The corrections indicated for the CCS plan modifies the S. & M—K drawing. Furthermore, we feel that the changes now indicated by Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge will not give us as secure a structure as shown on 8S. & M.K drawing 43, Rev. 1, which has already been approved. Also, these changes at this late date will result in a possible delay to our subcontractor Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc. We, therefore, request that you reconsider the corrections indicated to be made on CCS plan No. 3038-00-21 with the view of eliminating same. Very truly yours, Srerrs & Morrison-KNUDSEN,’ By E. G. Hers, Alternate Project Manager. Mr. Rav. In order to assure ourselves that we were able to tow this template and to know what conditions we could do it under, we em- ployed a consulting engineer to figure the stresses during tow, and it was determined, after consulting with the Navy and the architect- engineer that a 15-foot wave was the maximum wave that we wanted to tow this template in, and that 15-foot wave, as I remember, if my memory serves me right, would give us about 10,000 to 12,000 pounds stress, which is far under anything that would be allowable on this structure. With the Weather Bureau at Logan Airport in Boston, Woods Hole, Flovd Bennett Field in Long Island, and the Navy weatherman here in Washington, we were able, every 4 hours, to get a reading on the weather, and after launching started towing it to the site. We arrived at the site on the morning of July 4,1957. At that time the template and the bracing were entirely intact. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 215 Senator Symineton. Would you mind defining the word “template” as you use it ? Mr. Rav. What we called the template are the three legs with the corresponding bracing, which included during the towing a 6-foot diameter buoyancy strut, which is not shown on this model. After we anchored the platform, by that time it was practically noontime, we decided to prepare for upending the template. However, due to the time it took us to make the preparations it be- eame about dusk, and at that time the wind started to kick up, and the seas started to increase, and it was then decided to hold off the upending of the template until July 5, the next day. During the night of July 4 and early morning of July 5, we had a fair amount of sea. We kept the template under tow heading into the wind at all times to diminish any effects the weather may have on the template, but the following morning it was observed that one of the diagonal braces on the A-B side was broken off, and the other one was damaged. DAMAGED BRACING DISCOVERED Senator Symineron. Would you mark that; could you show us what that was that was broken ? Mr. Rav. That was these two braces here, one of which, I don’t recall which one it was, was broken off, and the other one was damaged. During the tow they were the ones folded down and secured to this horizontal brace at elevation of minus 75 feet, and this hori- zontal brace at minus 25 feet was secured down about elevation minus 50 feet, if I recall. During July 5, the weather was still bad, and we couldn’t think of upending the template. it was during that time that I had a conversation with representa- tives of the Navy concerning these two diagonal braces as to what was to be done and what could be done. ft was pointed out in the conversation that there were only two ways of doing the work. One was taking it back to Portland, put- ting it back in drydock, and actually putting the braces back exactly as they had been when we left the yard a week or so before. The other was to have a design made by a competent A. & E.— Senator Symineron. A competent what? Mr. Rav. A. & E., architect-engineer, to install braces under the water. It was also pointed out at that time by me if we did go back to Portland, which we would have had to do because it was the only drydock at that time anywhere in the vicinity that could handle a structure of this size, we would not be able to emplant the tower in 1957, but it would have to be held over until 1958. It was then the decision—the decision was then made that we would go ahead with the upending and get a design for the installation of permanent braces underwater. Senator Savronsraty. Mr. Chairman, would you permit the wit- ees Mr. Rau, to take that model and show us how it lay on these yarges ¢ Mr. Rav. No, sir; it didn’t lay on barges. It actually floated. 216 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Srennis. Pardon me just a minute. I hope I am not too much wedded to our system, but the gentleman can testify directly as to just what occurred. I believe we can understand it better if we let him finish his story then go back and question him about any points that we have in mind, Senator. Senator Satronsrauu. I just wanted to understand a little better what he was talking about, but that is all right. Senator Srpennis. All right, Mr. Rau, if you would rather clear up the question that the Senator has in mind you may do so. Mr. Rav. Well, actually the template floated on the A—B legs in that position, and in upending, we flooded the buoyancy struts and then the compartments in the legs at certain intervals to upend it in this direction until we had finally had it upended completely in a vertical position, at which time the bottom of the legs were some 15 feet, if I recall rightly, above the bottom of the ocean. It was then towed into position, and the last flooding valves opened, and it was sunk down to the ocean floor. Senator Sauronsrauy. Which braces were broken ? Mr. Rav. It would have been these two braces that were partly sub- merged between the “A” and “B” legs, and between elevations minus 75 feet and minus 25 feet, these two. Finally, the weather cleared on the morning of July 6, and we proceeded to upend the template. It was at the beginning of this upending that the other brace, which I mentioned before was damaged the night of the 4th and the morn- ing of the 5th, broke off completely and floated away. We upended the template, and had it completely upended by late July 6, set it on the bottom of the ocean early Sunday morning,. July 7, and brought the platform in that afternoon, securing it to the legs in the late afternoon, after which we fastened to the jacking system, the platform, we fastened the jacking system to it during that night, and started the next morning to jack the platform up on the legs. A lot of the other procedures this committee, I know, has heard of, and we have seen it in the pictures you showed last week. We completed the construction of this tower and turned it over to the Navy, I believe it was, in November or late 1957. After inspecting, making an underwater inspection, to make sure os pins and everything were satisfactory, we turned it over to the: avy. Senator Stennis. Does that finish your statement ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; it does, Senator. Senator Stennis. I just have one or two questions, and then I will call on the other Senators. Some may have to leave, and we will let: the Senators ask their questions, and then counsel can cover the other: points. You referred to the fact that you had completed the structure. Does: that. include the underwater repair that has been testified about? : ae pe It included the replacing of the broken diagonals on the: A-B side. Senator Srennis. I think you ought to explain. Some Senators could not. be here during all the hearings. We have had that ex- plained before, but I think you, as the man in charge of construction: COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 217 should explain just what was done in the underwater repair after the upending. Mr. Rav. Right after the upending, we engaged the architect- engineer to make a design of these two braces, the architect-engineer being Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, and as soon as we obtained’ a drawing we let a contract with Bethlehem Shipyard in Staten Island to fabricate these braces as quickly as possible so that we could get them in place. As I recall, they came out sometime in August 1957, and the braces consisted of a height the same size as the original brace, pinned at the end the same way as the original brace. The difference was, of course, here when it broke off it only left a. stub against the leg, and there was no we ay of fastening it underwater, so this became a collar, two half sleeves, as it were, with flanges, that were bolted and pulled together, and fastened to the legs, and those were installed and, as I recall, from the records, completed in Sep- tember 1957. Senator Srennis. What was your opinion, after this installation, as to the strength of the tower as compared with what it would have been had there been no loss of braces ? Mr. Rav. Well, we felt, with the competent architect engineers that were doing the work, Mr. Chairman, that it was a complete replacement of the initial di agonal bracing. Senator Srennis. That means that you ‘thought it was restored to its original strength ? Mr. Rav. Thatis right, sir. Senator Stennis. And stability ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Did that prove to be true or did this brace break again $ Mr. Rav. No, sir. The brace Senator Stennis. Did the clamp or collar remain secure? Mr. Rav. I was thinking of the time later, this last fall, that is why- I hesitated. No, in late 1958 it was reported to us that one of the clamps, I believe around B leg, I am not sure, it was around one of the legs, was loose, and the clamp was actually moving up and down. Senator Stennis. That is the clamp or collar that had been specially- designed for the replacement of the braces? Mr. Rav. That is correct, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. What did you do then, or what was done—whether you did it or not? Mr. Rav. It was then decided to replace these Dardelet bolts with T-headed bolts, and they were completely installed by June, 1959, and checked a number of times since then and found to be tight at ail times. Senator Stennis. You heard the testimony of this ‘gentleman this morning, Mr. Brewer, about the instrument tests that he made in the winter of 1958 and 1959? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; I did. Senator Stennis. What is your reaction to the matters developed by the use of his instruments?. | Mr. Rav. Well, I am not familiar with his instruments, Mr. Chair-. man ; no, sir. 218 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Srennis. All right. Mr. Rav. In fact, until this morning I didn’t know such a test was made. Senator STennts. One further question: When you were confronted with the situation of the broken braces, as I understand it, the alter- native was to take it back to port or attempt to make the installation and repair underwater. CONTRACTOR CLAIMS NAVY HAD TO MAKE DECISION ON WHERE TO REPAIR TEMPLATE Now, whose decision was this? Yours, the Navy’s, or the Air Force as to what should be done? Mr. Rav. It would have to be the Navy’s, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. I beg pardon ? Mr. Rav. It would have to be the Navy’s, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Rav. Because we would not be in a position to make such a decision. Senator Stennis. You were just the builder. Mr. Rav. That is correct, sir. Senator Srennis. Yes. ied was the architect-engineer in any way involved in this de- cision ? Mr. Rav. The architect-engineer, Mr. Phil Rutledge, arrived on the site actually after the upending, which would be the night of July 6, 1957, at which time he was brought into the discussions. Senator Stennis. But the upending had already taken place. The decision had already been made, and you had upended the tower. Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. . Senator Stennis. So he was not involved in the decision ? Mr. Rav. No, sir. Senator Stennis. Did you make a recommendation as to which course would be taken; whether to go back to port or undertake the repair at sea? Mr Rav. As TI recall, I did not. Senator Stennis. You did not make any recommendation on that? Mr. Rav. No, sir. Senator Stennis. Was your attitude then that you were at the serv- ice of the Navy and would abide by its final decision ? Mr. Rav. That is correct, sir. Senator Stennis. And you would follow the course that they sug- gested ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Stennis. Does that give a full picture to this committee of what happened ? Mr. Rav. I believe it does. I didn’t go on with the other details because Senator Srennis. I mean on that decision Mr. Rav. Oh, yes, sir; yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Yes. There was no difference of opinion then between those who dis- cussed the matter as to what should be done ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 219 Mr. Rav. No, sir; because I can assure you if the decision was to tow it back to Portland we would have done it because, after all, we had to complete the project to the satisfaction of the owners, in this ease the Navy, and I could certainly not have made a decision to go ahead under an order to tow it back. Senator Stennis. I beg your pardon ? Mr. Rav. I could never have gone ahead with the decision of up- ending it against an order to tow it back. Senator Stennis. So it was entirely their responsibility and not yours? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Senator Saltonstall ? Senator SatronsraLu. Mr. Chairman, I have just a very few ques- tions. Senator Srennis. Certainly. Senator SatronsTauu. First, let me ask you this question: After you turned this tower over to the Navy in November 1957, did you have anything more to do with it? Mr. Rav. The next time we were out on the tower, Senator, as I recall, was in the spring of 1959. Senator SatronsTaLu. But did you do any work on it? Mr. Rav. We did work on it, as I say, in the spring of 1959, that was the next time I recall. Senator Sauronstati. Under whose orders did you do that work? Mr. Rav. That was under the Navy. Senator Satronstatu. The Navy? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Satronsratu. That was work outside of your contract? INSTALLATION OF T-HEADED BOLTS Mr. Rav. No, that was the installation of the T-headed bolts in place of the Dardelet bolts. Senator Sauronstaty. And that was done under part of your orig- inal contract ? Mr. Rav. We had been in conference with the Navy during the winter of 1958 or early 1959, I don’t know the exact time, I think it was December of 1958, and it was mutually agreed we would sup- ply the manpower to install these T-headed bolts as soon as the weather permitted. ‘METHOD OF SECURING THE LASHED-DOWN BRACES Senator Sarronstatu. Now, you said, if I understand your testi- mony correctly that you did not approve of the method of the lashing down of the braces for towing; is that correct ? Mr. Rav. We did not approve, Senator, of the change that was made to our suggested method of securing the braces. Senator Satronstatn. What was your suggested method? Mr. Rav. We wanted to weld—we had an angle frame over these braces folded down, and we wanted to weld it and make it a pretty 70733—61—_—15 220 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 solid structure, and the decision was that after, from the letter that we have here evidently approving it, a decision was made not to permit the welding and we, in turn, had to bolt this angle frame. Senator SauronsraLu. Now, there has been a great deal of dis- cussion Senator Symineron. Will the Senator yield? Will the Senator ask who made that decision. Senator SauronsTaLu. Senator Symington asked who made that decision. Mr. Rav. Well, this is a letter dated January 23, 1957, to the officer in charge of construction, Texas towers, in Boston, and in this letter, this was signed by our alternate project manager, a Mr. Ed Herb, and he acknowledged receiving from Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge of a drawing, of our drawing No. 47, revised such and such—all of these drawings contain a notice of corrections which we considered beyond the requirements of the contract, and then he goes on to say down in the last paragraph: “On Continental Copper & Steel’s drawings,” which they had made for us showing this holddown frame plan so and so, TT—4 template bracing stowage elevation minus 73-64, several corrections were indi- cated. “This CCS plan is based on S and M-K drawing 48 which was approved by Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge.” This was on July 24, 1956. “The corrections indicated for the CCS plan modifies the S and M-K drawing.” It was, to answer your question, Senator, it was made by the archi- tect engineer, Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Senator Satronstatu. I didn’t hear that. Mr. Rav. The corrections were made by the architect engineer, Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Senator Symineron. The question that I asked was who was re- sponsible for not making the corrections in accordance with the rec- ommendation of the producer, and the answer is the people who in- structed them to do it differently than they thought was the better way of doing it, was the firm with the name ending in Rutledge. Senator SauronsTaLu. Thank you. It was a firm then and not the Navy itself? Mr. Rav. No, sir. This letter though objecting was addressed to the Navy. Senator SatronstTaLy. There had been a great deal of discussion here about the relative merits of pins versus welds. Did you have any- thing to do with making the decision as to whether there should be pins on these braces or whether they should be welded? Mr. Rav. We had nothing whatsoever to do with the original design, Senator. Senator Sautronsraty. So that your job was to carry out the de- sign and construct the tower according to the designs that were given to you? Mr. Rav. That is correct, sir. Senator SatronsraLu. And you made no recommendations or sug- gestions or anything else regarding those designs? Mr. Rav. No, sir; we did not. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 221 DAMAGE TO THE LEGS Senator SatronsTaLu. Perhaps it is immaterial now, but one of the legs was severely dented through an accident. I don’t recall exactly now just what the accident was. Do you recall what I mean / Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; I do. It was during the time the platform was brought into the template, and the 12 hours or so it took before we could actually raise it up on the template, all three legs were damaged to varying degrees. That, I think, is what you are referring to, sir. Senator SauronsTauu. Did that damage on those three legs weaken the tower in any way, in your opinion ? Mr. Rav. A correction or repair to the damage drawing was given to us by the Navy which entailed placing solid concrete inside these legs after we welded off H-beams and put in steel reinforcing. I say solid concrete. Actually we left a hole, as I recall, some 24 inches to leave access to get below, but I believe in that respect with all our concrete reinforcing in there, that it repaired that portion of the legs to its original strength. Senator SaLToNsTALL. So that would not cause any weakness of the tower in the future? Mr. Rav. I don’t believe so, sir. Senator Sauronsraty. Now, let me ask just one more question: Were you supervised in your construction as the work went on? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; we were. Senator SatronsTaty. By whom? Mr. Rav. Well, the Navy had representatives on the job at all times. Of course, Commander Foster was out there at varying times, and he had a lieutenant whose name I don’t recall now, and several— Lieutenant Poulos, and several civilians. Senator SatronsraLu. So that as the construction went along you were supervised and, to the best of your knowledge, you did the work satisfactorily ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. I may add to that, as I recall, the Air Force had one warrant officer represented at all times. Senator SauronsTaLL. Were any comments or suggestions made to you as you went along as to the strength of this tower ? Mr. Rav. No, sir. Having the designs coming from what we felt was a competent architect-engineering firm or joint venture firm, why, we did not feel we were qualified to make suggestions. Senator Satronsratn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Senator Symington. PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS Senator Symineron. Mr. Rau, I am impressed with your testimony. As I understand this, the Air Force wanted a tower built. They went to the Navy and the Navy got in touch with the Anderson firm and they with another firm. As a result, they were given an order, first a feasibility order, then a design order with money passing to the contractors. Also as a result, an order was given to you to build the tower. Is that correct? 292. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Symrineton. Who did you get that order from? Mr. Rav. From the Bureau of Yards and Docks. It came out of the 1st Naval District in Boston. Senator Symineron. From the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Did the Navy give you or tell you where to get the designs from which you were to build? Mr. Rav. Well, this job was actually bid on competitively, Senator. Senator Symrneton. Yes. Mr. Rav. And the plans, the complete plans, were furnished each contractor who bid. ‘There were, for tower No. 4, only two bids. Senator Symrncton. Who drew up those plans? Mr. Rav. A joint venture made up of Anderson-Nichols, and Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Senator Symineron. Those two firms drew the plans? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Symineron. And the Navy accepted the plans? Mr. Rav. Evidently they did. Senator Symineron. Because they were the plans that the Navy asked you to bid against ? Mr. Rav. Yes, bid on; correct. Senator Symineton. Yes. Now, you constructed the tower on the basis of those plans? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Symineron. Has there ever been any statement, verbal or written, that you did not construct them in accordance with those lans ? E Mr. Rav. I don’t know of any, sir. Senator Symrneron. You know of no criticism of your execution of the design ? LETTER OF COMMENDATION Mr. Rav. No, sir. In fact, at the completion of our project, which was the building of both Texas towers No. 3 and 4, we received a letter of commendation for our work. Senator Symrneron. You did receive a letter of commendation ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Symineron. After you built the tower then you lugged it down by sea to where you were going to install it; is that correct? Mr. Rav. That is right, Senator. Senator Symineron. Did you make any mistake in bringing it down that you know of? Mr. Rav. No, sir; because, as I mentioned before, when we arrived on site, why, the template and platform were intact. Senator Symrneron. You put it up? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Syminetron. Was there anybody from the Navy there at the time? Mr. Rav. Oh, yes, sir; in fact, during the upending of the template, Commander Foster was actually in the control house, as we call it, on the template. Senator Symineron. Did you direct the upending, your firm, or did he? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 223 Mr. Rav. No, sir; we did. Senator Symrneton. You did? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Symrneton. Did he object at any time to the way you did it? Mr. Rav. No, sir. I donot know of any objection. Senator Symineron. Then, at a certain time you had completed the work of locating the tower, is that correct ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Symineron. When did you find that the tower was broken? Mr. Rav. Do you mean when did we first know that any braces were broken, Senator ? Senator Symrneron. That is right. Mr. Rav. The first indication of any braces being broken was in our inspection after Donna last October 1960. Senator Symineron. But you did not know of any failure at the time that you upended the tower ? Mr. Rav. Oh, I am sorry. We, as I explained before, during the night of July 4 and the morning of July 5, the two braces folded over on the A-B side, at elevation minus 75 feet were damaged ; one, in fact, was broken off, and the other was damaged, I am sorry. Senator Symineron. That, I thought was your previous testimony. Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. I didn’t understand it. Senator Symineron. Was that at the time of the original installa- tion ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Symineton. Why did they break off ? Mr. Rav. We had quite a severe storm that evening of July 4 and early July 5, and in fact, it was so severe that some of the gentlemen, Mr. Steers here and Mr. Rutledge who were coming out on Mr. An- derson’s yacht, never were able to get out of Patchogue, Long Island, and they finally had to go back and they came back on our boat from Fall River on the 6th, Mr. Steers did. Senator Symineron. Was the storm one—this is a surmise, but I think it a fair question—was the storm one which you feel was greater than the people who designed the tower felt any storm would ever be? Mr. Rav. Well, Senator, of course, the storm which you are re- ferring to was the storm that hit us while the template was in floata- tion prior to upending. If you are referring to the design criteria that were set up by the architect engineer for after the template or platform was in place, they are two different things. Senator Symineton. I understand. But my point is that in an effort to locate responsibility, was the design basically at fault or was the fact that you decided, regardless of the storm and with the ap- proval of the Navy, to put it up on that day or night or 2 days and 2 nights, what was the primary reason for the breakage of the tower? Mr. Rav. Well, the primary reason for the breakage of those two diagonal braces on the night or early morning of the 4th and 5th of July, was due to the successive storms and, of course, we were out there some 85 miles from the Jersey coast, and there was just no place to run; we just had to ride it out, and that 1s what we did, to the best of our ability. 224 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Syminctron. If you had had it installed before the storm came up, do you think you would have had any of this trouble? Mr. Rav. Well, I will say this, Senator: If we had installed it on July 4 when we started to upend or started the preliminary operations which we were hoping would upend it, and were not hit with a storm on the night of the 4th, we wouldn’t have had the trouble of losing the braces and having to replace them. Senator Symrncton. When you saw that it was wrong, weren’t there discussions as to whether you should take it back to port or whether you should try to fix it there? Wasn’t there any discussion of that? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; there was. Senator Symineron. Tell us about that. Who discussed it? Mr. Rav. Well, I discussed it with Commander Foster. Senator Symrnton. What did he say ? Mr. Rav. As I recall, and I checked these with some of the men who were present at the time and in the discussion, that it was finally decided that we would upend, and that a design of two diagonal braces to be installed underwater would be made. Senator Symrneton. Who made that decision ? Mr. Rav. As I recall, it was granted by the Navy. The decision was given tome by Commander Foster. Whether he made it or made calls or something, I don’t know. Senator Symrneron. Did you feel at the time that it was the right decision ? REPAIR AT SEA DEEMED THE CORRECT DECISION Mr. Rav. Well, sir, being out there in 1957 knowing the urgency of getting the job done so that it would be put into the chain of national defense, I think we felt it was the right decision; yes, sir. Senator Symineron. I think that isa good answer. The warrant officer of the Air Force, was he present at this decision ? Mr. Rav. I don’t recall whether he was present at this particular decision or discussion. He was more put on there by the Air Force to observe. I don’t recall his ever getting into discussing decisions or giving any decision. I think he was just there for observation purposes and to familiarize himself with the operation of the towers so that when the Air Force took it over he would know what it was all about. Senator Symineron. Did you have any relationship in the construc- tion of this tower with anybody in the Air Force from a contractual standpoint or Mr. Rav. Until last June of 1960 we never had any relationship with the Air Force contractually. Senator Syminetron. What was your relationship last June? Mr. Rav. Well, last June or actually, I think 1t was—may I refer to some notes—actually some time in the latter part of May the Air Force contacted us and told us that. they wanted to install braces above water and do some other incidental work. We, in turn, sat down with them and went over the work that they wanted done, and finally we received a contract from the Air Force on June 3, 1960, for performance work. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 225 eres Symineton. Why did they want to do this additional work ? Mr. Rav. Well, they said there had been, as I recall, a lot of motion in the tower, and they wanted this bracing above water installed to stiffen the tower. Senator Symineron. I would like to ask a question, just as a lay- man. We have heard a lot about motion. As I understand it, the Empire State Building moves a couple of feet in the wind so the question implies relative motion, does it not ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Symineron. And they thought that was dangerous? Mr. Rav. Well, it may have been a fact that was more mental or they thought it was more mental for the boys aboard having this motion all the time rather than serious to the structure itself. Senator Symineron. Did you feel at that time it was a danger to the lives of the men aboard ? Mr. Rav. No, sir; I did not. Senator Symineron. Did you ever at any time feel it until it fell? Mr. Rav. I felt that it was in a weakened condition in January of 1961; yes, sir. Senator Symrneron. And at that time what did you suggest ? Mr. Rav. Well, if I may, Senator. Senator Symrneron. Let me rephrase my question to ask it this way; what happened between June 1960 and January 1961 to make you feel that there was danger in this setup ? Mr. Rav. Well, we received this contract, if I may start from June? Senator SymMineTon. Yes, sir. Mr. Rav. We received this contract on June 3 from the Air Force to, as I mentioned, to install these braces above water, to make under water inspections of the pins to test and tighten collar bolts, if necessary, at elevation minus 65 feet; to test the K-brace bolts which connect the main legs to the platform, magnafiux the welds connect- ing the K-braces, which is a method of checking welds to see if there are cracks actually in the weld which cannot be seen by naked eye. Then, in Mugust, July and August, we had addendum to this con- tract to do some additional miscellaneous work. We completed that work in the first part of August, and we re- moved our men, I think it was, August 10. Of course, Hurricane Donna struck on September 12, and soon thereafter we were contacted again to first replace the maintenance scaffold which was almost completely carried away during Donna, and to do some more investigating of the welds on these braces above the water to see if there were any cracks in them, and also to inspect the braces underwater. We went out—in that contract, incidentally, there was also an item called item four, which required us to inspect, do this inspecting, and report our findings with pictures and all. CONTRACTOR ASKED TO EVALUATE TOWER’S REMAINING STRENGTH At the bottom of the last part of this item it required us to make a report or to have our report include a statement concerning the 226 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 tower’s structural capacity or incapacity to withstand future storm conditions within the tolerances set by the original design criteria. I pointed out at that time to the Air Force, and this was, maybe the first or second of October 1960, that we did not have the capabili- ity of making such a report, and I requested permission to call in Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, which permission was given us; in fact, an addendum came through on October 21 stating that we would call them in. I called Mr. Carlton Proctor on October 3, and told him about this requirement, and asked him if he would do this for us, giving us a price, and I sent him the addendum, marking out the item I was talking about, a copy of which, incidentally, I have here, and that was a report that he was to make for us. We completed this work in the middle of November 1960. During this inspection we found one of the diagonal braces between elevation minus 75 feet and minus 25 feet broken. The Air Force then asked what could be done as far as repairing it at all, and we, in turn, called in—they may have talked to Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge directly, I don’t know, but I know I talked to them, and on the 22d of November we had a meeting in our office with the Air Force, and Mr. Carlton Proctor, Mr. Phil Rut- ledge, and Mr. Ted Kuss were present and they gave suggestions as to how they would repair the tower. Senator Symineton. At that time was the question of danger a question that came up ? Mr. Rav. No, sir; it was not. Of course, we knew the tower was weakened, but the question of danger was not mentioned. Senator Symrneron. Did anybody think about it? Did you think about it? At that poimt were you getting nervous about the men on the tower ? Mr. Rav. Well, trying to go back 6 months, Senator, and recall, I would say that since the hurricane season had passed, the weakened condition wasn’t exaggerated as much as it would be if it were, say, August rather than November, December. Senator Symineron. You were in and out of this year after year. At some point the question of weakening became a questi6n of danger. I was wondering inasmuch as you were the builder and knew the plans—I say this without any implied criticism—what was the time when you came to the belief, if not to the conviction, that something ought to be done quickly, or ‘these men would be in danger ? Mr. Rav. Well, we knew when this meeting was held on the 22d of November that we had so much work to do; we pointed out to them at that time how long it would take us to doit. We had figured on com- pleting the job by about the first of March 1961, and we then pro- ceded with that work. DANGER BECOMES APPARENT It wasn’t until January 8 when the brace between minus 175 feet and minus 125 feet was reported to me as broken that we became more alarmed. Senator Symineron. Then what did you do? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 POT _ Mr. Rav. Well, if I may just transverse to the day before, our divers, in preparing to put in these cable braces went down to move out the hydrostatic cable, and found this one brace broken. By the time they came up it was late Saturday night, and the report was not phoned in to us until early Sunday morning, in fact it was phoned in to one of my enginers who called me about a quarter of nine Sunday morning on January 8. I told him immediately to call the architect-engineer who, in this case, was Ted Kuss, because he knew Ted Kuss’ home phone, and report the findings to him. Senator Symrneron. And then? Senator Stennis. Pardon me just a minute, gentlemen. What date isthisnow? You have given the day of the week. Mr. Rav. This is Sunday, January 8, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Rav. That the conversation—it was actually found on Saturday, January 7. Senator Stennis. Very well, proceed. Mr. Rav. It was January 8 that we had this conversation, or these conversations. Mr. Kuss asked my enginer if there was any other damage found, and he said he had not talked to the tower directly, why, he said, he didn’t know, but he would call the tower immediately and call him back, which he did. And it was reported back to him that, to their knowledge there was no other damage found by the divers the day before. He talked to Mr. Kuss again later in the day and conveyed the in- formation to me by phone, asked me—if I may read his telephone conversations, I think it would be better than my Senator Symrneron. Could you put it in the record ? Mr. Rav. Yes,sir. I would. Senator Symineron. The nub of it was what? Mr. Rav. Well, he asked about these diagonal braces, whether this new break would change the idea of these braces; whether, in turn, this one should be lowered down to minus 175 feet to take care of this other panel, and it was at that time that Kuss said, no, he didn’t think that would be the right thing to do. Senator Symrneton. What firm is he with again ? Mr. Rav. Moran, Proctor, Mueser, & Rutledge. Senator Symineton. You had a meeting on the 12th, didn’t you? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Well, all that week we were in contact with Ted Kuss; our engineer Bob Koch was actually talking to him and conveyed all the information to me, talking about the capability of the tower as it now stands. Senator Symrneron. Did the Rutledge company send anybody down to the job during this time? Mr. Rav. No, sir. Senator Symineron. So that it was all on the phone or in writing or in person without going and looking at it; is that right? Mr. Rav. Actually it was all on the phone or in person. Senator Symrneton. Yes. Where was the meeting on the 12th of January ? Mr. Rav. It was in my office. 228 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Symrneton. In your office? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Senator Symineron. At that time was Mr. Kuss there, too, at that time ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Well, to start with, the morning of the 12th, after we asked almost every day from the 8th to the 12th the capa- bilities of the tower, and all, our Mr. Koch talked with Mr. Kuss, along about 10 o’clock on the 12th Senator Symrnetron. Ten o’clock in the morning? Mr. Rav. In the morning; yes, sir. It was that time that Mr. Kuss indicated this 55-percent capacity after the wire bracing was in place. PERCENTAGE OF TOWER’S REMAINING STRENGTH GIVEN When Mr. Koch gave me that information, as soon as he got off the phone, why, I sat down and discussed it for a few minutes, and I told him that I had been thinking of the tower all week, and that since we were having that meeting this morning at 11 o’clock, that is, on January 12, that I was going to recommend evacuation. I called Mr. Kuss up myself and asked him exactly what he meant by 55 percent. Senator Symineron. You say you told them; who did you tell be- fore you called Mr. Kuss ? Mr. Rav. About evacuation or recommending evacuation ? Senator Symrneton. You said you told them. Mr. Rav. Well, I was talking to our engineer Bob Koch, and Mr. Steers actually stopped in my office, and I told him then that I thought we should recommend evacuation. Senator Stennis. All right, pardon me just a minute there. I don’t know that the witness has understood about our situation. For reasons we don’t need to repeat now, we have agreed that we would not go beyond the conferences of January 12, in this hearing. I want to apprise you of that now so that you may understand it. Mr. Rav. Yes, sir; I do. Senator Symineron. Mr. Chairman, I understand that. But I do think it is in order to ask the witness if he recommended evacuation. He built it. We haven’t asked to whom he recommended—what I am trying to find out is the relationship between the Government contractor, the designer, and the producer. Senator Srennis. Pardon me, the Chair has ruled with you. The question was asked properly, and I think answered, and that is what I wanted to apprise the witness of. Senator Symineron. I have never seen Mr. Rau before in my life, to the best of my recollection. But the testimony shows that he was in contact daily with the designer by phone, and the designer never went down and looked at it; that at a certain point as a result of what the designer told him about the percentage from the structural aspect, he decided he would recommend evacuation of the tower. Senator Stennis. That is in the testimony; that is what he testi- fied to. Senator Symineron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. Senator Srennis. I think that is the proper cutoff point, and I think that testimony is very relevant. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 229 Just one minute more now. Going back, Mr. Rau, you certainly know the facts in this case, and you say that you had completed a certain amount of construction there, as I recall, sometime in Novem- ber 1960. Did you say that you finished some construction at the time? Mr. Rav. We actually finished a change order to our initial con- tract on about November 13, 1960. Senator Stennis. 1960. Now, you said that in November 1960, you knew of one broken brace, and then in January 1961 you found there was an additional broken brace; is that correct ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Stennis. I beg pardon? Mr. Rav. That is right. Senator Srennis. Two broken braces. You said that after this second broken brace was found, in your conversations, you gentlemen talked about doing something, but that nothing was said about danger or anything of that kind. Why were you having these conferences if you didn’t think there was some danger ? Mr. Rav. Are you referrmg, Mr. Chairman, to January or are ou i Senator Stennis. Yes. The January conferences after you found this second broken brace. You have testified about having con- ferences even prior to January 12, and you have covered these in de- tail. What were you conferring about on January 12 if it wasn’t dangerous? Mr. Rav. Well, we recognized that the tower was in a weakened condition. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Rav. And that we didn’t believe it would withstand a hurri- cane or any extreme, very extreme, storms; in fact, on the 12th of January I requested from the Air Force the weather reports. Senator Stennis. Yes. I think you have fully covered the situa- tion on January 12; that is very clear. But what I am asking you 1s why were you having these confer- ences after you found the second broken brace if it wasn’t about the danger that was involved ? Mr. Rav. Well, there was definitely an amount of danger. Senator Srennis. Yes. That is very obvious, isn’t it? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator Stennis. You say that the tower was in a weakened condi- tion, but still no one discussed the possibility of danger yet. I haven’t heard any other reason given for the conference except that a dangerous situation existed, and something had to be done about it. That was the situation, wasn’t it? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Senator STennis. Yes. Now, I never have called upon one witness to pass on another wit- ness’ testimony. Unfortunately, however, we have such a direct con- flict in evidence here, that I think I owe it to you to read to you a portion of the former testimony. This is no suggestion that you are wrong in your testimony but I do think we should point out the area 230 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 of conflict upon the question of whether the tower should have been returned to port for repairs. When Commander Foster testified earlier this week, the question arose during his examination by Mr. Kendall of who made the deci- sion to make the repairs at sea after this defect developed in the tower. Mr. Kendall asked the following question of Commander Foster: The vital decision, then, was whether or not to attempt repairs at sea under- water or return to port. That was the question; right? Commander Foster. I would say that would be a fair statement of it, sir; yes. Mr. KenpAatit. Who ultimately made the decision to attempt to make the repairs at sea? Commander Foster. I would like to refer again to my statement, sir, that this tower was not, at that time, the property of the Navy, nor was it the respon- sibility of the Navy. This tower belonged to the contractor, and would belong to him until such time as he turned it over to us in an acceptable condition. And if the contractor or any of his representatives felt that, (1) it was unsafe at the time, or, (2) he would be unable to make a successful repair at sea, it was up to him to take the tower back, not up to me to tell him to. Now, further: I did not consider it to be unsafe at the time, nor did I consider that we could not put in a successful brace. My statement was that I took no action to stopping or moving one way or another. This was his baby. Mr. Kendall said: My question was, Commander, specifically, who made the decision to attempt the repairs at sea? Commander Foster. I approved the belief, if you like, that a repair could be successfully made at sea. I believed it then, I believe it now. As to the decision, had the contractor had any doubt in his mind, it was his move. I took my action only based on the fact that he thought it could be done, our architect-engineer thought it could be done; I, myself, thought it could be done. So I allowed them to stay and go on with the process. As I say, I thought I owed it to you to read that testimony. I don’t know just how vital, in view of all the testimony considered together, this matter of responsibility for the decision will be, but you can see it is a highly important one. And, as I understand it, you stand on the fact, and it is your testi- mony squarely, that you did not make the decision and that it was not your responsibility ; is that correct ? Mr. Rav. Mr. Chairman, I gave the testimony as I remember it; yes, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Rav. Being it was our responsibility to upend the template, that is true. But it was also our responsibility to turn over to the Navy astructure that they would accept. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Rav (continuing). Before we had final payment. So I couldn’t very well have made a decision to upend with the idea that in the end, come November or whatever it was when we completed the tower, that the tower wouldn’t be accepted. Senator Stennis. At that point you were ready to follow either course that the Navy decided upon, and either go back to port or at- tempt the repairs at sea. Mr. Rav. Under the circumstances we would have to be. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 931 TOWER AT 55 PERCENT OF DESIGN STRENGTH Senator Stennis. All right, I think you made that clear. Now, as F understood it, the estimate was made on January 12, that under the conditions then existing the tower was only 55 percent as strong as its original of design strength. Mr. Rav. That is right. Senator Stennis. Is that right ? Mr. Rav. And that was the information I received at 10 o’clock in the morning of January 12. Senator Stennis. Who was the gentleman who made that estimate, and what was his affiliation ? Mr. Rav. Mr. Ted Kuss, a member of the firm of Moran, Proctor, Mueser, & Rutledge. Senator Stennis. All right. Mr. Counsel, do you have additional questions ? Mr. Kenpatu. I have one or two, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it, Mr. Rau, the 55 percent estimate of the original capability was on the assumption that the cable bracing had been installed ? Mr. Rav. That is right, Mr. Kendall. I would like to make one thing clear here. After receiving this information, as I started to say to Senator Symington before, I called Mr. Kuss up and asked him exactly what he meant by 55 percent, whether that 55 percent was 55 percent of the 125-mile-an-hour wind, which was the original criterion, and 55 percent of 35-foot waves or exactly what it was, and he explained to me then, which I knew and I just wanted explained by him, that the stress on the tower due to wind and wave action is in proportion to the square, so that actually it is not directly proportional, as I had put it. Instead of being 55 percent of the original design criteria, maybe 80 or 85 percent. He didn’t know the exact figure, but promised to get it for me. Mr. Kenpauy. The point I have in mind is that when he made that statement he was not saying that at that time the tower was 55 per- cent as strong as its original design strength. He was saying that when these repairs have been completed some time in the future it will then be 55 percent as strong. Mr. Rav. When the cable, diagonal cable, bracing was installed; yes, sit. Senator Stennis. Any further questions? Mr. Kenpatyi. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Do you recall, Mr. Rau, what the criteria was for wind and waves during the tow ? Mr. Rav. I assume you are referring to the towing of the template ? Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. Mr. Rav. We employed a consulting engineer to figure what the criteria should be during the tow, and he came up with 15-foot waves at a maximum, which would stress the members between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds per square inch, which is, of course, far below the allowable stress on the members, and this was submitted to the Navy and approved by them. Mr. Kenpaty. That was in combination with a 50-mile-per-hour wind, I believe; is that right ? aga COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Rav. I don’t remember the velocity of the wind. I do re- member definitely though that the 15-foot waves Mr. Kenpauu. Did the storm which you encountered while at sea exceed that criteria ? Mr. Rav. The storm that we encountered at the site after arriving, I do not believe it did exceed the criteria; no, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. One final question, Mr. Rau. When the loss of the bracing was discovered, and you had these discussions, did not you or your firm have some opinion or recommendation as to what should be done as to whether or not it should be taken back to port? Mr. Rav. Well, as I mentioned before, Mr. Kendall, the tower, as we understood it, was something to be erected and put into the national defense, the early warning radar system, and therefore such a deci- sion had to be weighed as to how important it was for defense. Mr. Kenpautu. You were not operating in a vacuum out there. This was the situation that was confronting you, and you participated in the discussions, and certainly you must have had and expressed an opinion as to whether this was the preferable thing to do or whether it was preferable to take it back to port. Mr. Rav. Well it is hard for me to remember now exactly how I felt. But, thinking now as I should have been thinking then, whether T did or not I don’t know, I would say the decision of upending it and putting the braces in underwater was the decision that should have been made, Mr. Kenpatn. Do you think that was a sound decision under the circumstances ? Mr. Rav. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpati. Under the circumstances confronting you at that time ? Mr. Rav. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. Let me see if Mr. French has some questions. Mr. Frencu. Yes, sir; I have. Senator Stennis. All right, Mr. French, you have some questions. AGREEMENT OF DESIGN ENGINEERS TO EVALUATE TOWER’S REMAINING STRENGTH Mr. Frencu. Under item 4 of the contract, Mr. Rau, I believe the design engineers were to come up with new wind and wave criteria for the tower; is that correct? Mr. Rav. That is correct, Mr. French. Mr. Frencn. At what point in time did they agree to perform this particular work? Mr. Rav. I contacted Mr. Carlton Proctor on either the 2d or the 3d of October, telling him about such an item in the specifications, and asked him if he would cover it for us, and also asking for a price to do the work, and on the 3d of October we actually sent him a note indicating what was required. Within a week after that IT talked to him about the work and he agreed on doing the job for us. Mr. Frencn. Did you ever receive any written confirmation of the agreement to perform this work ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 235 Mr. Rav. We did not receive a written agreement until January 4, 1961. ae Frencu. Would you make that a part of the record, please, sir? Mr. Rav. Yes. Mr. Frencu. Have you ever received a report in accordance with the function which the design engineer was supposed to perform under item 4? Mr. Rav. No, sir; we did not. Mr. Frencu. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mr. Rau. Is there anything else you want to say on any point, upon which you think elaboration is required? We always like to give the wit- ness a chance to discuss any point he may desire to cover after his questioning has been completed. Mr. Rav. On just a couple of Mr. French’s questions there, the lateness of the letter confirming this conversation I had with Mr. Carlton Proctor back in October, October 3, we had worked with this firm on a number of occasions, and a lot of our work is done verbally, and confirmation is just a matter of record, and when it comes in, why, it comes in, and it is a part of the record. So that the timelag there had nothing to do with any lag in preparing the report. Mr. Frencn. I understand, sir. I wanted the date on which he agreed to perform the work. Senator Stennis. Thank you. I want to say this to you, sir, it seems to me that you and your com- pany were confronted with a very difficult task. We appreciate the fact that you have come here with refreshing frankness and willingness to tell this thing just as you saw it at each step and as the events unfolded, Everything considered, and as I understand the facts, it does not appear to me that there is anything about that which was done which should reflect on your construction or your ability to do a very difficult task. Mr. Rav. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (The documents previously referred to follow:) Memo or MAIN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION By R. C. KocH RELATIVE To TT-4, JANUARY 8-15, 1961 SUNDAY, JANUARY 8 8:25 a.m.: Received call from Dick Tower stating that V. Yavorosky had called him from TT-4 and notified him that the divers during one of their dives on Saturday had found-that the diagonal brace from —125 to —175 toward B leg on the AB side had broken at the pin plates on the upper end of the brace at the end of the pipe. Also, there were 4- and 8-inch-long circumferential cracks in the pipe at the end of the shell adapter plates on the above-water X bracing in the AB plane, at the upper connection at A leg. 8:35 a.m.: I ealled Mr. Rau with this information and then Mr. Kuss of M.P.M. & R. at his home. JI gave Mr. Kuss the above information and asked him what this meant with reference to the tower. He replied that offhand it didn’t seem good but that he couldn’t say exactly at this point since it was very com- plicated. He asked if there were any further breaks or if these were the only ones. I answered that these were the only ones reported to me but that I would eontact the tower myself to make sure, and to talk with V. Yavorosky and tell him to have the divers make a further inspection. Also discussed briefly with 234 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kuss the need for and possibility of making repairs to the diagonal braces as well as revising the wire rope bracing system to take care of this. He felt that a complete picture of conditions was necessary before a decision could be made. 8:45 a.m.: Called Dick Tower at home to let him know that I had talked to Mr. Rau and Mr. Kuss. We discussed the practicality depending on what the designers decided, of what might be done to repair the brace such as a collar of some sort, replacing it entirely, or altering the wire rope bracing somehow. 9:00 a.m.: Contacted V. Yavorosky on the tower and he confirmed the broken brace and cracks in the X-bracing as given to me previously. I then asked him to repair all cracks in the above-water bracing as soon as possible and to have the divers make a further inspection as soon as possible to determine if there was other damage. He replied that he would do this but didn’t think that the divers could get in the water that day. I asked V. Yavorosky how the tower was acting and he said it seemed fairly steady. I asked him when he thought the break had occurred and he said he thought within the last month. 9:35 a.m.: Talked to Henry Schutz at home in Teaneck, N.J., to advise him of the information that had been given to me. We discussed the possibility and practicality of repairing the broken diagonal at this time in the event that M.P.M. & R. felt it necessary to do so. He thought that some sort of a collar could be put on at —125. We talked of the time it would take to do this type work at the site at that depth. Henry felt that it would be a long job at this time of year since diving time at that depth was quite limited and diving weather poor. Also, a diver required decompression time on the way up and if the wind and waves increased suddenly it could be dangerous getting him out of the water. We also discussed the possibility of doing the work if the designers low- ered the bottom connection of the wire rope. Henry did not feel it practical to work productively at depths over 130 feet approximately. It also was not known how the leg could be filled below —146 if it was necessary to do so. 10:20 a.m.: Called Mr. Kuss of M.P.M. & R. at home. Advised him that I had contacted the tower and that the information I had given him originally was what we knew at the time. I ask him what we should do now—whether we should stop or continue or if it was necessary for the wire rope bracing to be redesigned, put at a lower elevation, or something else done to make allowance for the broken diagonal at —125. Mr. Kuss said that he had been doing some thinking about this since I had called him earlier and that the situation was probably not what he had first thought and that we should try to install the wire rope bracing as designed as quickly as possible. I said that this was not an operation that would take a week or two, but that we would certainly try, as we had been, to do it as quickly as possible. I asked him if we should bring the fill materials out to the tower as we had planned. He said that he thought we should go ahead with this and all work. He pointed out that if the horizontal brace at —125 was not broken that he thought the wire rope bracing system would be effective since he thought the legs would be quite stiff from —185 to —125 even without the diagonal brace. Mr. Kuss asked when the vertical pipe struts would be ready, and I said that the first one would be ready on the next weekend and the second one approximately 4 days later for transportation to the tower—weather permitting towing and installation. I said that we would inspect underwater as soon as possible to try to determine if there was further damage and that I would let him know as soon as we knew anything. I said that Steers—and I knew that the Air Force would too—would like to know what this broken diagonal meant with reference to the structural capacity of the tower. I asked that he look into this and let us know as soon as possible. 10:48 a.m.: Informed Henry Schutz of my last conversation with Mr. Kuss. 10:51 a.m.: Told Dick Tower of my latest conversation with Mr. Kuss. 11:30 a.m. (approximate) : CWO Hardy of 4604th SUPRON at Otis called and asked if we had the information about the broken diagonal at —125 and if we still wanted the AKIL-17 boat at our Jersey City yard the first part of the week to load the fill materials. I told him of my conversation with Mr. Kuss and that, with Air Force approval, we would follow Mr. Kuss’ suggestion and con- tinue as planned and at the same time make an underwater inspection to try to determine if there was further damage. He said that this procedure seemed to make sense and that the boat would be at our yard the first part of the week with the exact time still to be set. 1:30 p.m.: Talked with Mr. Rau of my latest conversation with Mr. Kuss and CWO Hardy. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 235 MONDAY, JANUARY 9 Morning: Received a call from Mr. Ciccio and Colonel Battison from 26th Air Division, Syracuse, relative to information about the broken brace. I passed on what information I had and what the plans were. Mr. Ciccio replied that this approach seemed very logical. They asked what precautions had been taken relative to the tower. I replied that I understood from CWO Hardy that the commanding officer on board had authority to call the Coast Guard and/or the Air Force for boats or “choppers” at any time he deemed it necessary. For further information or details I suggested that they contact Otis AFB although I would try to find out myself. Morning: Called Mr. Kuss of M.P.M. & R. to follow up request for informa- tion on tower condition with broken diagonal brace. He said it was quite com- plicated and that he was putting a man on it right away. I also advised him that we were going ahead with getting fill materials to the tower, as he had suggested. He approved and asked if we had any further reports from the divers. I said that we had not but would inform him as soon as we received such information. Afternoon: Talked with CWO Hardy relative to boat arrival at Steers’ Jersey City yard, and also asked him about question of precautions on tower for evacuation if necessary as asked by Mr. Ciccio. He confirmed that the com- manding officer had authorization to contact Coast Guard or Air Force for help at any time. He suggested that Mr. Ciccio call Otis if they required further details. Afternoon: Called Mr. Ciccio at Syracuse but taiked to Colonel Battison who was in at time. Repeated conversation with CWO Hardy to him. Also sug- gested that he call Otis for additional information direct. TUESDAY, JANUARY 10 11 a.m. (approximate) : Received a call from V. Yavorosky on the tower stat- ing that the divers had been down and had made an inspection of the brace at —125 on AB side and found no further damage on the horizontal brace, the other diagonal brace, or the legs at the end of the horizontal brace. They also re- checked the collar at —75 and it was solid, no movement, and no bolts loose. Tower appeared to be quiet. I told him to continue underwater inspection and to investigate as many areas as possible including cleaning legs and braces at con- nections for inspection. 11:30 a.m. (approximate) : Called Mr. Kuss of M.P.M. & R. to advise him of my conversation with V. Yavorosky and to apprise him of the divers’ findings. Mr. Kuss said that he had a man making calculations and would advise us as soon as they were complete. He also said he had his soil experts investigating the possibility and effectiveness of a rock berm at the legs because of the broken lower diagonal brace. THURSDAY, JANUARY 12 9:30 a.m. (approximate) : Mr. Kuss of M.P.M. & R. called to say that they had finished some of their calculations and the tower when the wire rope bracing was installed would be good for approximately 55 percent of the design criteria. He said that they were still investigating the possibility of rockfill around the legs. Iimmediately reported this conversation to Mr. Rau. 5 p.m. (approximate): Called Henry Schutz on the tower to report results of meeting held in our offices with Air Force and M.P.M. & R. Advised him that it was agreed that we would do certain work while the Air Force was winterizing their equipment and removing other equipment, as follows: (1) Divers to con- duct underwater inspection, (2) repair and reinforce all cracks in above water bracing, (3) complete installation of vertical shear plates at center vertex (AB side) ; (4) place fill materials presently on tower in legs and grout B leg as shown on M.P.M. & R. drawings. Also told him of the 55 percent as given by M.P.M. & R. Henry informed me that they had gotten approximately 4,000 bags of fill material on tower and had installed about 25 percent of it in B leg. FRIDAY, JANUARY 13 5 p.m. (approximately) : Talked with Henry Schutz on tower. He informed me that they had been diving but had nothing new to report. Said that he and Captain Phelan were wondering if it was essential to bring the grout materials and mixer out at that time and if they could forego this part of the operation 70733—61——_16 236 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 for now. iW talked to Mr. Rau about this and it was decided that this grouting could be put off until the spring. I so informed Henry. I asked him how the tower was behaving and he said very well and had been since the clamp was installed at —T75. SUNDAY, JANUARY 15 4:40 p.m.: Received call from Henry Schutz on the tower. He had been trying to get in touch with Dick Tower but was unable to. He gave me a “Raymond” number to give to Dick Tower and asked me to have Dick call him at 5: 45 p.m. through that number if he couldn’t get the tower via the usual Highlands number. I said I would do this. I asked him how the weather was out there since it was raining, sleeting, snowing, and blowing inshore. He said that it was the same way out there. I asked him how the tower was acting. He said that it had been stormy since Saturday night with northeast winds of about 60 knots and seas from the northeast now about 25 to 30 feet high. He said that the tower had been very steady up until 10:30 a.m. approximately when there was aloud noise. He said that apparently something gave down below. I asked him what he thought it was and Henry said that he didn’t really know and they couldn’t go down to find out at this time. He said that since 10:30 a.m., the tower had begun to move and oscillate and seemed to have a rotary motion. If asked him how much he thought it was moving. He said about 50 percent of what it had around the middle of December 1960 and before the clamp at —75 had been installed. He said that the clamp was 100 percent complete including the additional reinforcing cover plate and all pin plate bolts double nutted. Hen- ry also stated that they had completed welding and reinforcing of all cracks in the X-bracing above water including installing the vertical shear plates at the ver- tex on Saturday (January 14). Hesaid that up until a little while ago they had not been able to get on deck or the maintenance scaffold due to winds up to 60 knots. A while ago he and Captain Phelan had gotten down on the maintenance seaffold as the wind let up a bit and had found a 20-inch vertical crack at the intersection where the interior vertical %-inch thick gusset plates met at A leg, from the AB and AC sides. I asked if there was anything else they had observed and he said no, because they couldn’t move the maintenance scaffold due to the wind. I asked him what the weather reports indicated. He said that they were trying to get all reports available. They expected a lull in the morning at which time they would try to get off by “choppers,” which had been alerted. What they were concerned about was a report that two lows were expected to combine off of Cape Hatteras and move up the next day. He said that the AKL-17 had been taking quite a beating trying to stay close to the tower in the heavy seas. I said that I’d call Dick Tower right away and give him the message and telephone number. Henry did not sound overly concerned at this time. 4:54 p.m.: Called Dick Tower and gave him the message and number to call for Henry. 5:30 p.m. (approximately): Received telephone call from Mr. DiCocco in Syracuse. He had just gotten in from a ride with his wife in nice weather up there. I pointed out that it was miserable in New York. He wanted to know what I knew about conditions on the tower. I filled him in on my conversation with Henry. STATEMENT OF WorRK, REPAIR HURRICANE DAMAGE—TEXAS TOWER No. 4, DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1960 Item 1.—The contractor shall replace the revolving maintenance platform (referred to hereinafter as the “flying bridge”) at Texas tower No. 4 to match the one which existed prior to September 12, 1960, in all respects except for the folding foot ladder which was attached to the bottom portion of the flying bridge. The contractor shall fabricate a new flying bridge which matches the old flying bridge in all physical respects (except for the foot ladder). The con- tractor shall transport the flying bridge to the off shore location known as New York Shoals and shall erect the flying bridge on the underside of the platform of Texas tower No. 4. The completed installation will be such that the opera- tion and performance of the new flying bridge will equal or better operation and performance of the old flying bridge prior to its destruction on September 12, 1960. The new flying bridge will be complete in every respect including painting. Any parts and/or accessories (such as pinion gears, motor drive COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 237 mechanisms, etc.) which are salvageable from the old flying bridge may be re- used on the new installation if approved by the using agency and if a financial credit can be mutually agreed upon between the Air Force and the contractor. The contractor shall dismantle the old flying bridge, transport same to the mainland and dispose of same as the contractor sees fit. Item 2.—As soon as practicable, either before, during or immediately after the installation of the new fiying bridge, the contractor shall inspect all the welded brace-to-caisson joint connections above the water line for structural integrity utilizing magnaflux testing methods and procedures. Within the limits of feasibility all visible and/or accessible welded joint regions will be tested includ- ing the delta ‘truss connections, and the 10-inch pipe strut connections as well as the vertical “finger” plate connections. Item 3—As soon as practicable, either before, during, or immediately after the installation of the new flying bridge, the contractor shall perform an under- water diving inspection of all joints beginning at the —23-foot level to the ocean bottom at —185 feet. Item 4.—The contractor shall furnish a narrative report to the Air Force in 10 copies covering the inspection findings for items 2 and 3 above. The report shall be as comprehensive as possible and shall describe as completely as pos- sible the existing structural defects discovered from the level of the ocean bottom to the level of the caisson-to-platform connections. The report shall include any and all documentation which will be of assistance to the Air Force in visualizing and understanding the location, nature, and extent of the struc- tural damages. This documentation shall consist of photographs (including underwater photographs) and as-built drawings or sketch plates which would be meaningful and useful in supporting the narrative portion of the report. Photographs, in particular, will be left in large part to the discretion of the contractor. The position and direction of all cracks in the above-water joint connections will be accurately indicated on as-built drawings or sketch plates and shall be photographed as well, if said cracks are large enough to be cap- tured on film properly. Underwater photography will be held to a minimum and photographs will be taken only of those pin-connected joints which, in the opinion of the contractor, will require repair or pin replacement. The report will include the contractor’s appraisal of the structure as a whole along with specific recommendations as to the nature and extent of the repair work which the Air Force should accomplish, if any, to correct the damages which are detected under items 2 and 3 above. (Finally, the report will include if possi- ble, a statement concerning the tower’s present structural capacity or incapac- city to withstand future storm conditions within the limits set by the original design criteria of winds up to 125 knots in combination with breaking-wave ac- tion having a crest height of 35 feet as measured above mean sea level. This statement of the present structural stability and storm-worthiness will be of key importance to the Air Force in determining the limits of safety for estab- lishing storm warning personnel evacuation procedures for Texas tower No. 4 to prevent the loss of life in future.) Moran, Proctor. MUESER & RUTLEDGE, New York, N.Y., January 4, 1961. Re: engineering work, Texas tower No. 4. J. RICH STEERS, New York, N.Y. GENTLEMEN : In connection with your field examination of Texas tower No. 4 in October and November 1960 following Hurricane Donna, we wish to con- firm our conversations regarding our participation in this work. We understand that the Air Force concurs in our activity in this matter. We agree to examine the results of your findings of damage both above and below water on Texas tower No. 4, to evaluate any structural deficiencies which may be found, and make recommendations as to repairs or modifications to be made to the tower as a result of your findings. We agree to do this work for the sum of $2,500 which would not include the design of, or the preparation of speci- fications for, any new work which might be required as a result of your examina- tion of the tower and our recommendations. Very truly yours, WILLIAM H. MUESER. 238 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Srennis. Certainly many questions arise from the fact that the several efforts over the long period of time failed to effect the re- pairs or restore the tower to its intended strength. So far as your construction itself is concerned, however, it seems to have been sound. The inability to make the repair underwater effec- tively doesn’t reflect on your company as I see it. Of course, I am a novice in that field. I want to ask you whether the radar instruments on the tower con- tinued to function in spite of all the motion and movement and ob- vious danger involved prior to January 1961 ? Mr. Rav. I can’t answer that question, Mr. Chairman, because I am not qualified to. Senator Srennis. Well, did you hear it discussed at the January 1961 conference ? Mr. Rav. I didn’t think they had a complement large enough aboard the Texas tower No. 4, from sometime in November on, that could operate this radar equipment. Senator Srennis. Did you hear it discussed before they reduced the number of personnel ? Mr. Rav. Lamsorry, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. I asked whether you heard discussion by the Air Force or anyone in authority that this motion was so great that the radar wouldn’t function ? Mr. Rav. No, sir; I did not. REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF ATR FORCE PERSON NEL Senator Stennis. Even after Hurricane Donna, so far as you know, the radar continued to function until the time the crew was cut down in number ? Mr. Rav. I was not told about that. Senator Stennis. You don’t know anything to the contrary ? Mr. Rav. No, sir. Senator Stennis. Well, do you know why the crew was reduced ? What was your understanding of why the Air Force reduced the crew ? Mr. Rav. Excuse me, sir. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Rav. We were—we knew nothing about the reducing or the decision to reduce the number of men aboard the tower until actually after it happened, and I don’t know who made the decision or what decision was made. Senator Stennis. I am told that the crew was reduced in number by the Air Force on November 16, 1960. Mr. Rav. That is, as I recall, about the date, sir. Senator Stennis. I wanted to know whether the crew was reduced because the radar would not function or because it was considered dangerous for them to be out there? Can you shed any light on that question ¢ Mr. Rav. I cannot answer that, Mr. Chairman, because I do not know the reason. Senator Srennis. Well, that is why I asked you previously about whether there was any discussion of danger in January. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 239 It seems that we haven’t heard anything about whether the radar was functioning, but it does appear that 2 months before the tower collapsed, the crew had been greatly reduced. Certainly an almost conclusive inference arises from all the proof that this was done because of the dangerous condition of the tower, Mr. Rav. That may be assumed, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. I don’t think we can assume things, Mr. Rau; we must have facts. I wanted to know whether you can shed any light on that directly. For the information of those who may be interested, I think that this concludes almost all of the hearings on this matter. There is an additional witness that we will hear next Wednesday, and when we do take a recess it will be until 10 o’clock next Wednesday morning. In the meantime, if either the Air Force or the Navy wish to present further testimony concerning this matter, they will be given an opportunity to do so and may make arrangements by contacting the Staff Director, or Mr. Kendall, or Mr. French. Is there any other point you wish to cover ? Mr, Rav. No, sir; I do not, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. All right. With special thanks, Mr. Rau, to you and your associates, the com- mittee will now take a recess until 10 o’clock next Wednesday morning. (Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to re- convene at 10 a.m., on Wednesday, May 17, 1961.) cf q th qiarey acer 7 at > W15).. r tS + AN Bets tueld, Tor t 8: eed , 4 ey grarebertn ae Metoa west Rr ay “Eyal Pape TE ay Anais ee at a ta ed iey mae sia ae 7 guint i fate’ Pie : ol Wiss ied | aa sigricl 2a , at od i id hes ani cea rs) ‘te Le ; fit eh tod E i agtit basi aA ac eR es OM oe bas. TN cahahal? sxsu sed iliw gurdedicnes rite . - spares, zeheeahaW x40 dootso OL fate oh Mit SE bana # nL he ot deter we ed tae gyro, “tA. att tadtio Ti sarkinaen ete mares fyi (orld wo Seva ajith ss: sfitdisgs vats wae one ae RAE RIAA delegate babi Yet Die oe Olt © aT 3) Eo Shek yb vr Renee pe A BQO A eh eee BO tebe. ale 1 40 TotvaTe 5 ees we a "* F4evoo of een BOY tidg 18 “Tass £9 : Me Tac. .! t Hisar =} oe dou ob 13 14fa , apie ie achat : dul ai ae Lh pia yang WG yy aS Poa ‘ili, Sai ay ad tio bin Hoy Pot Jha” ka 9h Arey TGS 3 ¥ ne, Z : “ bes SULCPEOLN, ane! ety tao N90l5 6 OF Tigh! Yedsat #9 oth Bae Th ae: Bi, ot awe Ba! § hay Sadaiguosdse odlh rt we tid: Oh da of Bey “t reer eid yalh wabesnd we tf tio »Att A OL a a’ thas | Kt rT; f eek a r a t : : < li a4 ih | tS. al ? It ; $y i! é Pi ’ fe : : 7 % aie many wu ii vi 4 ay i ( , he + We " e Te cine ae ' a 1Ora! ee ‘a : ; . = | : : i joie fo ¥ miss "at } { ti 1 a ¢ * rea} — XT iy +g { Y iw, hie a ee ; , . ; L 5 } i I é —¥: sve) eet ‘ INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1961 U.S. SENATE, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Bartlett, Jackson, Bridges, Saltonstall, and Smith) met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 235, Old Senate Office Build- ing, Senator John Stennis, presiding. Present : Senators Stennis, Saltonstall, and Smith. Also present: Staff members, Preparedness Investigating Subcom- mittee: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Stuart P. French, profes- sional staff member. Senator Stennis. All right, the subcommittee will come to order, lease. : Members of the subcommittee, the Chair has a short opening state- ment. The subcommittee today continues its inquiry into the facts sur- rounding the collapse into the Atlantic Ocean of Texas tower No. 4 on January 15 of this year, taking the lives of 28 persons. During previous sessions, the subcommittee has heard from repre- sentatives of the Air Force; from the firm which actually constructed the tower; representatives of the Navy who were in overall charge of design and construction of the tower; engineers and divers who made actual studies and underwater inspections of the tower after it was constructed, and from officials of a pioneer firm in the field of erect- ing such structures. From their testimony we believe now we almost have a complete story surrounding the short-lived and tragic history of Texas tower No. 4. However, the picture cannot be complete without hearing from officials of the firm of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge which was responsible for the design of the tower. We are privileged this morning to have two members of that firm here today: Dr. Philip Rutledge and Mr. Theodore Kuss. We under- stand that the firm used a patented process developed by Mr. Kuss to up-end and erect the tower on site. Inferences which might be drawn from previous testimony here might raise some questions as to the design, method of construction, and stability of the tower after it was erected. 241 BAZ COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 For the record, and for the benefit of those gentlemen who are here today to testify and their firm, we would like to make it clear that we recognize clearly the problems that are necessarily involved. It may very well be that the witnesses and their firm may have claims asserted against them for civil lability as a result of the collapse of the tower. I emphasize that there may be such a situation. I do not state that such claims exist ; I do not know. Recognizing their rights as citizens and private individuals, the subcommittee is reluctant to take any action which might conceiv- ably jeopardize or infringe upon their defense to any claims which may be asserted. We feel the testimony of these gentlemen will benefit both the sub- committee and the firm they represent. We also feel it is possible that an unfavorable inference might be drawn from their failure or refusal to testify. However, gentlemen, if you now request that you be relieved from testifying upon the ground that it may jeopardize your defense of such claims, we will reluctantly excuse you. Mr. Rutiepee. Sir, we will be happy to answer any questions. Senator Srennis. Thank you. That is a very fine spirit, and we appreciate it very much. Gentlemen, as I have already said to you in our little talk a while ago, it is the unbroken custom of this subcommittee that all witnesses be sworn. Will you please stand and be sworn ? Do you and each of you solemnly swear that your testimony in these hearings will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Rutrieper. I do. Mr. Kuss. I do. Senator Stennis. All right. Now, the Chair feels, members of the subcommittee and you gentle- men who are going to testify, that this matter can be taken up as well and perhaps more thoroughly by questioning these two gentlemen at thesame time. We can proceed more quickly in that manner. So if there is nothing from any member of the subcommittee, I am going to ask Mr. Kendall, our chief counsel, to proceed with the questioning. TESTIMONY OF PHILIP RUTLEDGE AND THEODORE KUSS, MORAN, PROCTOR, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, NEW YORK, N.Y., ACCOM- PANIED BY FORBES D. SHAW, OF THE FIRM OF WHITMAN, RANSOM & COULSON, NEW YORK, N.Y. Mr. Suaw. I would like to say that Mr. Rutledge would like to make a preliminary statement. There is no prepared statement, but I think it would be well at this time for him to make an opening state- ment. Senator Stennis. Thank you for that suggestion, and we shall be very glad to have a statement from either or both of you. Mr. Shaw, the gentleman who has just spoken, is the attorney for these gentlemen, and we are very glad to have you, Mr. Shaw. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 243 DESIGN ENGINEERS’ REPORTS TO NAVY AND AIR FORCE Mr. Rutieper. Mr. Chairman, we have no prepared statement. We have in leu of a prepared statement submitted a series of reports to our clients, who initially were the Department of the Navy and later the Air Force. These reports are the Feasibility Report which was issued in 1954; the Design and Construction Report which was issued in 1959; a report on design of above-water braces, shown in red here on the model, to the Air Force in 1960; a report on the construction of the above-water braces to the Air Force and their effect, issued in August or September 1960; and a report on motion and stability, issued to the Department of the Navy. I believe that these reports have been available to your staff, sir. Senator Stennis. Allright. Thank you very much. Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. This most important one Mr. Kenpauu. Mr. Chairman, I believe we have copies of all of those except the last three. Senator Stennis. All right. Those copies that you have available there you could leave for our files, and we shall return them after we are through. ‘They are for the files, and not for the record at this point. Mr. Rutteper. Yes, sir. Senator STENNIS. You may proceed, sir, if you have any further opening statement. Mr. Rurieper. I think that completes our statement, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. I believe your presence here this morning is as a result of subpenas issued by the subcommittee ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Both of you are with the firm of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge? Mr. Kuss. That is correct. Mr. Rutiepce. That is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. Will each of you apprise the committee of your en- gineering background and qualifications? Mr. Ruruepcr. I graduated from Harvard College in 1927, received a master of science degree from MIT in 1933, received a doctor of science degree from Harvard University in 1939. In the mterim, I worked as a construction engineer, as a structural designer for Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.; as an instructor in the Harvard Engineering School; as a professor at Purdue University, as professor of civil engineering. I was professor of civil engineering and chairman of the department of Northwestern University Tech- nological Institute, and in January 1952 joined the firm of Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge. Mr. Kenpauu. Mr. Kuss, would you do the same, please? Mr. Kuss. I am a graduate of MIT, 1925. I am also a graduate of the Bethlehem Steel training course for graduate engineers. Since that time, I have worked for various contractors and consult- ing engineers on heavy construction. I was chief engineer for the Pacific Bridge Co., San Francisco, for 7 years, engaged in building bridge foundations, drydocks, salvage of ships at Pearl Harbor, and building of floating drydocks. That is typical of my work. 244. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpauzi. How did the Moran, Proctor firm become involved in the Texas tower program 4 PARTICIPATION OF MORAN, PROCTOR FIRM BROUGHT ABOUT BY INVITATION OF MR. ANDERSON Mr. Rurtepcr. Well, the latter part of March 1954 we received a telephone call from Mr. Anderson of the firm of Anderson & Nichols stating in very vague terms that he had a project. As I say, he de- scribed it in vague terms. He requested Mr. Proctor of our office to come to Boston so that he could describe the nature of the project, which he could not describe over the telephone. Senator STennis. Just a minute. Gentlemen, move those microphones over nearer to you, please. Do you not have an extra one? Rig up another one there for their convenience, please. You see, the press and those that are interested in this matter must have a chance to hear, gentlemen. We can hear you all right, but un- less you use the microphone, the audience cannot. If you will move it over a little closer to you and proceed, he will put in another one there as we progress. Mr. Kenpauz. Then I take it that origimally you were invited to participate in the project by Mr. Anderson, and that you had not been contacted by a representative of the Navy prior to that time? Mr. Rutieper. To my knowledge, that is right. Mr. Kenpauu. And you subsequently agreed to go into a joint ven- ture for this project; is that correct ? Mr. Rurieper. After a number of conferences, we did. Mr. Kenpauxi. Mr. Anderson, in testifying before the committee, stated that your firm was invited to join in this joint venture, and that your responsibility under his concept was for the footings only; that is, the part of the structure actually under the bottom of the sea. Is that in accord with your understanding ? Mr. Ruttepcer. No, sir. Mr. Kenpatxi. What is your understanding? Mr. Rurteper. Through a series of conferences from the end of March 1954 to the end of May 1954, the nature of the project was de- veloped. The two firms reached agreement on the parts of the work each firm would do. We submitted a series, we prepared a series of letters to the 1st Naval District, proposals for the work. The letter on which the contract was based was submitted on June 1. At the same time we made an agreement between the two firms on the breakdown of the work, which firm would do what work. Mr. Krenpaty. What was that agreement, sir? Mr. Rutiepcer. The agreement is a signed document listing the items of work, the firm that is to do each piece of work, and the proportion of the fee that is applicable to each piece of work. Mr. Kenpati. You say that was a signed document ? Mr. Rurteper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. What was the date of the document, please, sir ? Mr. Rurteper. The signatures are dated June 1, 1954. Mr. Kenpautyi. Would you make a copy of that available for the record, please, sir? Mr. Rutteper. We would be glad to. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 245 (The document referred to is as follows:) Texas towers—Fee breakdown Item Amount JASN | eS ee ee ieiGeneraltadmimistravioni ssa eee eee eee ee es ces eee $1, 500 UNS ANI LE Sea eee 2. Project management and engineering direction -------_-_---_------_- 6, 000 (ACIN pV Paces BE. 3. Collection of data, liaison with Navy, Air Force, consultants, etc_--- 10, 500 IMISIE IMS ake Jeg es 4. Preliminary studies for foundations, design waves, wave forces, 16, 000 analysis for basic structures and forces, location of structures for wave and foundation conditions. M.P.M. & R.-__- 5. Preliminary design of foundation structures, review of proposed 26, 000 schemes and construction methods. NS Nee SESS 6. Functional design of superstructure, living space, equipment, power, 9, 250 storage, and supply. YINCSIN |e sl yeh acme ae 7. Preliminary design of superstructures and mechanical equipment___- 14, 500 IME SIE SINIE, ie DRS 8. Cost estimates and outline specifications for foundation types and 14, 000 proposed schemes. Am Nea ees ee 9. Cost estimates and outline specifications for superstructures, equip- 9, 250 ment, etc. M.P.M. & R___--- 10. Summarization of studies and theories for design criteria for founda- 5, 000 tions. (BOtiies eas eee 208 Prep sratlOoneOfnep Ont e see 2s tes en ee ee ae oe 8, 000 Bothees eee TO Contingenctes: ere ees ee ne ee See OR Oe ee aE ees 10, 000 FING Gel leeav deanna ee OE iat ae ee Woot Mea eee ea 130, 000 INGE SIDINGS DRG SS oe Ye gS We a ee ee eee a ae BR 70, 000 BEING CO soe el eS ee SSS Se oS SR Rbe Satan toice Se BSS Bee EBs 60, 000 Mr. Kenpauu. Was this before or after the meeting with Captain Albers when he, himself, specified and dictated what the respective responsibilities of the firms would be ? Mr. Rurieper. My understanding is that, from reading the testi- mony, that the meeting in question was on July 22, 1954. Mr. Kenpatu. This was prior to that time ? Mr. Rutteper. This was June 1, 1954. Mr. Kenpatu. Prior to reaching that agreement, had you or anyone in your firm had any discussions with either Captain Albers or Captain Wesanen concerning division of the responsibilities ? Mr. Rutitepcr. We had—to my knowledge, we had had no discus- sions on division of responsibility. We had many discussions with then Commander Albers and the engineers of the 1st Naval District regarding the scope of the work, the problems involved in the work. But we did not discuss with them the division of the work between the two firms. DIVISION OF WORK BETWEEN ARCHITECT-ENGINEERING FIRMS Mr. Kenpauy. Well, can you tell us briefly what was the division of work, as indicated by this signed agreement that you have referred to? Mr. Rurieper. It consists of 12 items. : The first item, 1, general administration; Anderson & Nichols, 1,500; Item 2, project management and engineering director; Anderson & Nichols, $6,000 ; Item 3, collection of data, liaison with Navy, Air Force, consultants, etc.; Anderson & Nichols, $10,500 ; Item 4, preliminary studies for foundations, design waves, wave forces, analyses for basic structures and forces, location of structures for wave and foundation conditions; Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, $16,000. 246 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Item 5, preliminary design of foundation structures, review of pro- osed schemes and construction methods; Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, $26,000 ; Item 6, functional design of superstructure, living space, equipment, power, storage supply ; Anderson & Nichols, $9,250 ; , Item 7, preliminary design of superstructures and mechanical equip- ment; Anderson & Nichols, $14,500 ; Item 8, cost estimates and outline specifications for foundation types and proposed schemes; Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, $14,000 ; Item 9, cost estimates and outline specifications for superstructures, equipment, et cetera; Anderson & Nichols, $9,250 ; Item 10, summarization of studies and theories for design criteria for foundations; Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, $5,000; Item 11, preparation of report; both firms, $8,000 ; Item 12, contingencies; both firms, $10,000. Mr. Kenna. Did that division of responsibility remain through- out the completion of the project, or was any change made subse- quently ? Mr. Rutieper. This continued throughout the feasibility report. At the completion of the feasibility report, the amount of work in- volved in design was different than in the feasibility report, because we were to design five structures which were quite different structures, but the superstructure, the architectural, electrical, mechanical, was close to being the same in each of the five. Mr. Kenpatu. Dr. Rutledge, a subpena was served on you, in effect requesting that you produce all vouchers or memoranda showing expenditures of money for the entertainment or social activities of Captain Wesanen during this time. Did you do that, sir? Mr. Suaw. If I might interrupt, Counsel ? Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. Mr. Suaw. There was a specific time period specified in the subpena, as I recall. Mr. Kenpatu. I think that is correct, sir. Mr. Rutieper. Sir, we searched our files for the time period speci- fied, which was—I don’t have it in front of me. Mr. Kenpary. June 1, 1956, through January 1, 1958. Mr. Ruriepcr. We found nothing for the specified periods, sir. We searched our files from the beginning of the Texas tower investi- gation to the present day. We find one expense slip in the amount of $52.55. Mr. Kenpatr. That was for Captain Wesanen ? Mr. Ruriepce. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. For what purpose? Mr. Rurteper. This was July 22, 1954, railroad and taxi to Bronx- ville, car mileage to Blind Brook Country Club, tolls, charges, Blind Brook Country Club, dinner. Mr. Kenpatu. Dr. Rutledge, in the design of this tower, I believe it was contemplated originally that the resistance to the passage of wind should be kept at a minimum; is that correct? Wind and waves, that is? Mr. Ruptepce. Yes, sir; that is correct. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, is it not true that tower No. 4 would be sub- jected, both to aerodynamic and hydrodynamic forces ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 247 Mr. Ruttepex. Yes, sir; all of the towers were so subjected. Mr. Kenpatn. Why was only a static force analysis made in de- signing the towers 4 STATIC FORCE ANALYSIS COMPARED TO DYNAMIC FORCE ANALYSIS IN DESIGN Mr. Ruriepce. Sir, the analysis was based on dynamic loading. The forces acting on the tower were computed from dynamic forces of waves and wind exerted on the tower, using the maximum combina- tion of forces produced by the design wind and wave, which was the design wave hitting two of the legs with maximum force, and with a portion of that wave or another wave acting on the third leg with a torce corresponding to the position of the wave. These forces, which are dynamic forces, were translated into stresses in the structure on the basis of static analysis for an instantaneous condition of the dynamic force. Mr. Kenpauu. Are you saying now that you made a dynamic force analysis, as well as a static force analysis 4 Mr. Rurieper. The term “dynamic force analysis,” I believe, is somewhat misleading. We computed the spring constants and the natural frequencies of these towers to compare them with the fre- quency of application of wave forces. But 1 am not sure of what you mean by a dynamic force analysis. Mr. Kenpatxt. Well, state for the record what the difference is be- tween a dynamic force analysis and a static force analysis, basically. Mr. Rurtepee. I still am not clear. We use dynamics to get the loads, the forces acting on the structure. From there on one has to compute the stresses on the basis of a static analysis. The dynamics is to compute the natural frequency of the structure. Mr. Kenpatt. I believe, Mr. Brewer, in testifying before the com- mittee, if I understood him correctly, testified that waves of 10 to 12 feet in height caused a greater stress than waves of 30 feet in height. I believe he so stated in his report. Isn’t that an example of why dynamic forces should have been calculated ¢ Mr. Rurieper. The condition that Mr. Brewer was describing in his report was for small waves that create very small stresses, where the wave length is equal to the distance from one pair of legs to the third leg, so that the crest of the wave hits—the crest of two waves hit all three legs at the same time. This condition creates stresses which are far below the stresses that are used for the actual design analyses, because the waves are smaller. He is comparing this condition of 10- to 12-foot waves with 28-foot waves, or 30-foot waves. But our design analyses were for 60-foot waves of this type, or for 35-foot breaking waves. Senator Satronstaty. What was that last statement again, please? Mr. Ruriteper. His comparison is for 10- to 12-foot waves versus 28- to 30-foot waves, from his measurement. His stresses, then, are in the order of 2,000 to 2,500 pounds per square inch. Our design analyses are based on 60-foot greenwater waves, or 35-foot breaking waves, which create stresses in the order of 20,000 pounds per square 248 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 inch. So the magnitude of the stresses is approximately one-tenth of those of the design stresses. Senator SatronstaLtL. Mr. Chairman ? Senator Stennis. Senator Saltonstall ? Senator Sauronstay. I would like to ask our Counsel, if we have had any testimony of anything greater than a 35-foot wave? I had not heard of any that I can remember. Mr. Kenpvatt. I think the testimony shows that during Hurricane Donna, there were waves of at least 50 feet in height. Senator Sattonstaty. Fifty feet. Mr. Kenpatu. But Mr. Brewer’s testimony and his report did show that you had a greater platform movement with 10- to 12-foot waves than with a 30-foot wave ? Mr. Rutteper. I believe this is correct. The movements were still relatively small movements. I might also point out that Mr. Brewer’s measurements were made at a time when we had discovered that the collars on the—at least one of the replacement braces were loose, so that the braces were not acting effectively. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Rutledge, when was Mr. Kuss employed by the Moran, Proctor firm ? Mr. Ruttepcr. This was about January or February 1955. Mr. Kenpatxi. Did Captain Albers have or play any part by sug- gestion, recommendation, introduction, or otherwise, in putting Mr. Kuss in touch with your firm ? Mr. Ruriepcr. No, sir. We had known Mr. Kuss for many years. Mr. Kuss was chief engineer of the Pacific Bridge Co. on the Golden Gate Bridge when we were working on the caissons for that bridge. Mr. Kenpatu. Had Mr. Kuss’ patented tip-up method ever been con- sidered at all in the design of tower No. 4 prior to his employment by Moran, Proctor ? Mr. Rutieper. It was considered ; yes, sir. KUSS ERECTION METHOD USED FOR FIRST TIME Mr. Kenpatyi. Had the Kuss method ever before been used in the erection of an offshore structure such as this ? Mr. Ruriepcr. Not before 1955; no, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Has it been used since that time ? _Mr. Rutreper. According to magazine advertisements, it has; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Kuss has it patented. He would know whether or not it has been used. Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; the method has been used. It was used last year on a tower that Standard Oil put up in the Pacific. Mr. Krenpati. In what depth of water, Mr. Kuss? Mr. Kuss. 100 feet. Mr. Kenpauu. Was the fact that Mr. Kuss was the holder of this patent a consideration which led to his employment by your firm, Mr. Rutledge? Mr. Rutteper. No, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, prior to the opening of the bids for towers No. 1, No. 3, and No. 4, on November 1, 1955, did any member or employee COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 249 or representative of the Moran, Proctor firm have any conversation or discussion or other communication with any representative of the DeLong Corp. concerning the design and method of construction of Texas tower No. 4? Mr. Rurieper. We may have been asked questions about the design drawings and specifications. Several contractors asked us questions about these. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, I make specific reference to Mr. Suderow. Did any member of your firm or any employee of your firm have any con- versation or discussion with him about this design ? Mr. Rurieper. It is very possible. Mr. Suderow was chief engineer of the DeLong Corp. They were in a joint venture that built Texas tower No. 2. It’s very possible that they asked questions about the design and specifications for these three towers. Mr. Kenpatt. Isit true that DeLong or his representative expressed considerable doubt and made considerable objection to the use of pin connections and this Kuss tipover method ? Mr. Rutiencr. It was not expressed to us, sir, to my knowledge. Mr. Kenpatyu. Then I take it it is your testimony that there was no agreement, understanding, or recognition, either express or im- plied, with DeLong and any member of your firm, that if he were the low bidder on tower No. 4, he would be permitted to use a substitute or alternate method of construction ? Mr. Rutrieper. We had no authority to make such an agreement, and we did not make any agreement. Mr. Kenpaui. We have here, and it has been introduced in the record, Mr. Rutledge, a drawing dated October 17, 1955, which Colonel DeLong has identified as his proposed method of constructing and erecting tower No. 4. Are you familiar with that drawing? Mr. Rurieper. No, sir. Mr. Kenpaty. Will you look at it, please, sir? Mr. Ruriepnce. Yes, sir. To my recollection, I saw this drawing at a meeting in the Bureau of Yards and Docks, in Capt. Garner Clark’s office. Mr. Kennan. Captain who’s office ? Mr. Rurieper. Garner Clark. ¥ Mr. Kenpatr. What was his position ? Mr. Rutieper. He was Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks for construction. Mr. Kenpatu. Located where? Mr. Rurreper. In Washington, D.C., sir. Mr. Kenpauy. And you saw it in Washington ? Mr. Rurreper. That is my recollection; yes, sir. Mr. Krenpary. Was that before or after the opening of bids? Mr. Rutieper. The date of the memorandum concerning this, that the meeting was on October 20, 1955. Mr. Kenpatu. That drawing does show an alternate or substitute method of constructing and erecting tower No. 4, does it not? ALTERNATE METHOD OF CONSTRUCTION Mr. Rourteper. It shows a method that is somewhat similar to one of the methods we studied, which is described in our Design and Construction Report. 250 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatu. But it is different from the tipover method that was actually designed ? Mr. Rurieper. It’s different in the way the connection is made be- tween the foundation structure and the platform. Mr. Kenpatu. It is different in other particulars, too, is it not, Mr. Rutledge? There is no vertical tow to the site; there is no tipover. Mr. Rurtepce. It shows a vertical tow with a 65-foot draft. Mr. Kenpau. I meant there was no horizontal tow; excuse me, sir. Mr. Rutuepner. Yes, it shows a vertical tow at a 65-foot draft. That was one of our considerations. There is no harbor on the east coast, to our knowledge, that has a 65-foot draft out of a shipyard. Mr. Kenpatu. Why did you see this drawing on October 20? Mr. Rutiepee. Sir, may I read my memorandum on this subject? Mr. Kenpatt. I hope it isn’t too lengthy, Mr. Rutledge. Mr. Rutteper. This is one paragraph, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. Go ahead. Mr. Rutepce (reading) : Following this conference, Capt. Garner Clark asked Messrs. Kuss and Rutledge to come to his office with Commander Albers and Commander Aubey. Captain Clark was concerned about a visit from Colonel DeLong and George Ferris, in which they tried to persuade Captain Clark that they could produce an alternate or modified design for TT-4 in 10 days. Captain Clark has re- fused to give them a permission to submit a bid based on an alternate design. Both Mr. Kuss and the writer doubt that the various forms of alternate design as described at this meeting can be made feasible, and both are sure that an alternate design which gives any adequate consideration to the structural and construction problems cannot be produced in any time period in the order of magnitude of 10 or 20 days. After discussion of this situation, Captain Clark agreed that he was satisfied that he had done the right thing in rejecting the proposal of a bid based on any form of alternate design. ALTERNATE METHOD DISAPPROVAL Mr. Kenpauu. So you disapproved this drawing and adhered to the Kuss method; is that right Mr. Rutieper. According to this memorandum and the situation, Captain Clark had already disapproved it and he wanted confirmation of his disapproval. Senator Stennis. Who made that memorandum, Mr. Rutledge? Mr. Rutteper. I wrote the memorandum, sir. This is the last para- graph of a three-page memorandum. The first 2144 pages are con- cerned with the problem of design of fenders for the towers 1, 3, and 4. Mr. Kenpati. Would you make a copy of that memorandum a part of the record, please, sir ? Mr. Rurieper. We will be glad to. (The document referred to is as follows :) MEMORANDUM To: Office. From Philip C. Rutledge. Re: Fenders for Texas towers structures. Date: October 21, 1955. A conference was held in the offices of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Washington, D.C. on Thursday, October 20, 1955, to discuss the problem of fenders to protect the legs of Texas towers TT-1, TT-3 and TT4. Attending this conference for the Bureau of Yards and Docks were Commander Albers, Commander Aubey, Mr. Gordon Edwards, Mr. Vannce Duncan, Mr. James Ayres and Mr. Ralph Stokes. For M.P.M. & R., Messrs. T. M. Kuss and P. C. Rutledge COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 25k attended. The discussions at this conference lasted from 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. with about 1 hour break for lunch. After very lengthy discussions of the abili- ties of the tower legs to survive an accidental impact of a barge or ship it was finally decided that fenders would be used on all three towers. We were in- structed to proceed with final design drawings for the fenders of the towers on ‘the basis of the following decisions: (1) It was decided to use the chain-type fender for which we have prepared preliminary designs. (2) It was decided that the design energy to be absorbed by the fender should be one-half of that previously used in our fender design studies. In other words, the design energy to be absorbed by the fender should be 25 percent of the total energy of a 500-ton barge or ship with an approach velocity of 10 knots. (3) It was decided that each fender should be supported by 12 chains on the grounds that the chains can be used to provide protection for the legs above and below the depth covered by the actual fender structure and on the grounds that the chain is a small part of the cost and it seems probable that Commander Albers can obtain salvage anchor chain at nominal or no cost for this use. (4) For the fender structure itself in the region of mean sea level it was decided to use a three ring type structure with the ring spaced 10 feet apart vertically and braced together as shown on our preliminary design drawing. (5) It was decided that we should investigate the desirability of using hori- zontal rings of chain, cable, or pipe struts between the vertical chains at one or more levels above the fender structure. Our studies on the desirability of such horizontal supplementary rings are to be submitted to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. It was agreed that these represent final decisions in regard to fenders and that we can proceed with the final design drawings for the fenders on this basis, subject only to the usual review by the Navy of our design drawings. We should receive a letter from the Navy giving us these as final instructions. If we do not receive such a letter within the next few days, we shall have to write a letter stating that this is our understanding of the results of the conference. Following this conference Capt. Garner Clark asked Messrs. Kuss and Rut- ledge to come to his office with Commander Albers and Commander Aubey. Captain Clark was concerned about a visit from Colonel DeLong and George Ferris in which they tried to persuade Captain Clark that they could produce a modified or alternate design for TT—4 in 10 days. Captain Clark has refused to give them permission to submit a bid based on an alternate design. Both Mr. Kuss and the writer doubt that the various forms of the alternate design as described at this meeting can be made feasible and both are sure that an alter- nate design which gives any adequate consideration to the structural and con- struction problems cannot be produced in any time period in the order of mag- nitude of 10 to 20 days. After discussion of this situation, Captain Clark agreed that he was satisfied he had done the right thing in rejecting the proposal of a bid based on any form of alternate design. Puitie C. RUTLEDGE. Mr. Kenpati. Mr. Rutledge, in view of the greater water depth at the site of tower No. 4 and the more extensive bracing system and related matters, why is it that the bid of J. Rich Steers and Morrison- Knudsen was in practically the same amount for tower No. 4 as for tower No.3? Can you explain that, sir? Mr. Rurieper. I cannot answer that question, sir, because I did not make the bids. Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir. But on the basis of the design, do you not think that it would be Oe that TT-4 would be more expensive to construct than COST COMPARISON BETWEEN TEXAS TOWERS NOS. 3 AND 4 Mr. Rurieper. Apparently the contractors did not think so, accord- ing to their bids. Mr. Kenpatu. What is your judgment as an engineer, sir ? 707336117 252 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Rurteper. The types of structures are different. The erection of tower No. 3 required nine supplementary legs, which subsequently had to be removed. The design of tower No. 4 did not require these supplementary legs. I am not in a position to read the contractor’s mind, but apparently he thought that the various differences between the two resulted in an equal, approximately equal, cost. Mr. Kenpatu. I believe I asked for your judgment, Mr. Rutledge. I am sure you made some cost estimates when you put the bids out. Mr. Ruriepcr. We did make cost estimates, and I do not have those in front of me. Butas I recall, they were in the order of $500,000 more for tower No. 4 than tower No. 3. Mr. Kenpatzt. Would you say that DeLong’s bid for tower No. 4, which was approximately $1,300,000 more than he had bid for tower No. 8, was somewhat more realistic than the bids of J. Rich Steers and Morrison-Knudsen ? Mr. Rutteper. I would not say that it is more realistic; no, sir. The contractors’ bid is, in my opinion, as realistic as one can get. It is each contractor’s opinion of how much it’s going to cost him to do the work, and he expects to make a profit on it. Senator Stennis. In keeping with the pattern of proceeding here, if you will permit an interruption now, Mr. Rutledge and counsel, I shall ask if Senator Saltonstall has any questions. Senator Sauronstaty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If counsel has a few minutes more to complete his questioning, I will gladly wait. If he will take a long time, then, I would like to ask a few questions at this time. Mr. Krenpatu. I have a considerable amount more, Senator. Senator Satronsrauu. I thank the chairman very much. Mr. Rutledge, there were just several questions I would like to ask you, as a layman. Now, you stated that this structure was designed for 50- to 60-foot waves, and that the stress, as I understand it, from those waves is very much greater than the stress exerted by 10- to 12-foot waves. As I understand it, the third leg would be hit at the same time as the first two legs by waves of 10 to 12 feet. Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Senator Sarronstratt. And therefore, there would be a greater stress on the tower from a bigger wave if they came together, some- what like an undertow, and one wave would be contacting the other; is that correct ? Mr. Rurteper. I don’t believe, if I understand you correctly, sir, that that’s correct. The small waves create quite small stresses. But it’s quite possible for the crest of two small waves to hit the three legs simultaneously, so that we double the small stress and we get a meas- ured stress of approximately, according to Mr. Brewer’s measurements, in the order of 3,000 pounds per square inch. LARGE WAVE RESULTS IN GREATER STRESS On the other hand, when a 60-foot wave, one 60-foot wave, hits the structure, we get stresses in the order of 20,000 pounds per square inch, or seven times as much. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 253 Senator SauronsTaLu. In other words, you would believe that one big wave would give a lot more stress than the small waves, as Mr. Brewer testified ? Mr. Rutieper. Iamsure of it, sir. Senator Satronsratn. Now, one question where there seems to be some considerable disagreement, if I recall the testimony correctly: Who designed the structure from the superstructure down? It was my understanding, and I stand subject to correction, that Mr. Ander- son testified that ultimately they had nothing to do below the super- structure, and that your firm designed all the legs and the support of those legs including the subsurface foundation of those legs; is that correct ? Mr. Ruriepcr. That’s correct, sir. From the very beginning of this project, that was the situation. Senator Satronstati. Referring to that model for a moment, from the white part of the tower down, your firm had all the responsibility for design ? Mr. Ruttepce. We also designed everything below the white part and the main structure members around the white part. Senator Satronstauu. Isee. So that the Anderson firm designed the electronics and the arrangements of the bunks and the facilities above the platform ? Mr. Rurreper. The structure contained a great deal of electrical, mechanical equipment, large diesel generators, a great deal of wiring to supply power to the radars. They had a large amount of electrical mechanical work to do, and also they did all of the location of parti- tions and this kind of thing inside the tower. Senator Sartonstaty. Am I correct in understanding that there was no previous construction of a tower at such depth of water, that you know of ? SIXTY FEET MAXIMUM DEPTH OF ALL PREVIOUS TOWERS Mr. Rurzieper. That’s correct, sir. When we made our studies in 1954, the maximum depth we could find was 60 feet that anyone had ever built a structure, and these were all in the Gulf of Mexico, where conditions are much less severe than in the North Atlantic. Senator SattonstaLu. And this was in 185 feet of water ? Mr. Ruriepcr. This is 185 feet of water; yes, sir. Senator Sauronstatu. Did you have anything to do with supervis- ing the actual construction after you created the design ? Mr. Rurieper. Our responsibility was restricted to two items. We were required to advise the officer in charge of construction at his request. We were also required to have an engineer on the tower while borings were made at the exact location to certify that the ocean bottom materials were satisfactory for support of the tower. Senator SattonsTauu. So that after you completed the design of the legs, bracings and footings, you had no responsibility in supervising construction ? Mr. Ruriepcr. Except for these two items. Senator Sauronsratn. Except for those two items, which were to determine that the borings were satisfactory below the sand, and what was the other one? 254 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Rurieper. To advise the officer in charge of construction, at his request. Senator Satonsrati. Did he make any such request ? Mr. Rurteper. Yes, sir, a number of times we were called into con- sultation on the particular items. Senator Sarronsraty. And you have records of the advice that you gave him at that time? Mr. Ruttiepcr. I am reasonably sure that we have records of all such meetings. Senator SauronstaLu. Well, now, did you at any time, when you gave such advice, inform the contractor or the Navy that you were proceeding in an unsafe way ? Mr. Rutieper. No, sir. We would not advise the contracting officer that anything he wished to do was unsafe. Senator Sarronsratu. No, I mean did you find that he was doing anything unsafe? Mr. Rutiepce. No, sir. Senator Saronsraty. So that you believed that your design was carried out and that the tower, as you designed it, was constructed properly ? Mr. Rutiepce. Well, there was the instance of loss of two of the folded-down braces, which was an accident, but certainly was not improper construction, and there was the replacement of these braces and certain difficulties in the installation of the replacements. But beyond that, I would say yes, with these exceptions, the con- struction was as designed. Senator Sauronstati. Now, did you approve of the method by which the template was moved to the location ? Mr. Ruriepcr. Our approvals were restricted to items that were covered in the design and specifications. The actual procedure for towing the structure was part of the contractor’s construction methods, which we did not approve in any form. Senator Sarronsrati. Well, when you made the design, did you contemplate that it had to be moved by sea from Portland to the location ? Mr. Ruriepcr. Yes, sir, the design and specifications include the erection of the foundation structure, the part below the white top, in a horizontal position. They include the upending and placing in position by the Kuss patent and the design and specifications take full responsibility for the upending and placement, the actual rotating of the structure. Senator SatronsTaLL. You approved of that ? Mr. Rurtteper. Yes, sir; that is part of the design and specifications. Senator SatronsraLtu. Now, let me ask you this question: Did you have any responsibility for, or take any part in, designing the supports that are marked in red on this model, after it was shown that there were difficulties? Mr. Ruriepeer. Yes, sir. We designed those red above-water brac- ings under a contract with the Air Force. Senator Satronsrauu. Did you believe that that increased the stress on the legs as a whole, when you put those red supports above water ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 255 INCREASE IN STRENGTH THROUGH “X”’-BRACING REPAIR OUTWEIGHED INCREASE IN STRESS THEY WOULD IMPOSE Mr. Rutepce. It increased the stress, the forces acting on the struc- ture, but it increased the strength of the structure by an even greater amount than it increased the forces. Senator Sauronsraty. Well, then, you used the figures—I want to recall them correctly—a 60-foot wave would give how much stress? Mr. Rutiever. Approximately 20,000 pounds. Senator SattronsraLy. 20,000 pounds per square inch ? Mr. Ruttepcr. Yes, sir. Senator Sattronsraty. How much did it increase the stress per square inch by putting in these supports above water ? Mr. Rurieper. I believe Mr. Kuss has figures on this, sir. Is that right? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Senator Satronsraty. Mr. Chairman, do you want him to answer? Senator Stennis. Yes, they are both witnesses. Mr. Kuss. The installation of those red braces added about 51 tons of horizontal load on the tower as a whole. Senator Sarronstaty. I cannot hear you, Mr. Kuss. Mr. Kuss. The addition of the red braces added 51 tons to the hori- zontal load on the tower from the wave action. Now, the basic loads that this 51 tons were added to were for wind, 418 tons; for wave, 401 tons. So that Senator Sarronstauu. Well, now, 401 tons; how many pounds per square inch? Mr. Kuss. [ll get to that later. Senator SauronsTaLL. Excuse me. Mr. Kuss. This is the load on the tower. I’m not talking about the stresses in the legs. So this 51 tons additional added about 6 percent to the total hori- zontal force. Now, in turn, what that did to strengthen the tower is this: It decreased the bending in the legs to 36 percent of the maximum design bending, original design bending. It decreased the stress in the critical strut—that is, the first horizontal below the red—do you follow me? Senator SauronsTauy. [t decreased the stress there? Mr. Kuss. It decreased that stress there to 65 percent of what it was before. In other words, I am trying to point out that this bracing did far more to strengthen the tower than is brought in by the additional wave force. Of course, we knew all this when we put the braces on. In addition, of course, it stiffened the tower, but those are engineer- ing facts. Senator Sattonsratu. Well, now, did the cable bracing down below the water have any effect. pro or con ? Mr. Kuss. Those cables were not in, sir. Those cables were not in. Senator Srennis. The cable bracing was not ever actually put in. It was planned, but the tower collapsed before that was carried out. 256 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator SauronstTaLu. Go ahead. Mr. Ruriepce. I would like to make it clear that the reason for this, and I believe Mr. Kuss’ figures are based on this, is that the A-B side replacement braces—between minus 25 feet and minus 75 feet— these were believed to be somewhat ineffective, which made this upper bracing, we felt, necessary. Senator SatronsTaLu. So that you believed that the upper bracing that was put in would be satisfactory to keep the tower safe? Mr. Rurtepce. On the basis that the two replacement braces were not doing their job. Senator Sarronstatu. Let me ask you this question : You mentioned Captain Clark of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. He refused to allow a bid on the DeLong design. Is that a correct understanding of your testimony ? Mr. Rutiepce. He stated that he refused to allow any alternate to the plans and specifications. Senator Sauronstatt. So that Captain Clark of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, who is the superior officer, as I understand it, of Commander Albers and Captain Wesanen, accepted your design as the design that he believed, as a representative of the Navy, was the proper design for this tower, No. 4? Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Senator Sauronsraty. And there were no other designs considered, so far as you know, except yours? OPEN BIDDING ON DESIGN Mr. Rutieper. Sir, this design was put out for open bidding. There were two bids eventually submitted by two joint ventures. To my knowledge, there was no irregularity or alternate in any bid submitted. Senator Sauronsraty. Then, after you completed your design, which encompassed everything below the upper platform, your only responsibility in connection with this tower came when the Navy officer in charge would ask you for your advice aside from your respon- sibility to determine that the soil conditions in the ocean floor were proper ? Mr. Ruriepce. Yes, sir. That’s spelled out in our contract. Senator Sarronsraty. Now, how far down below the surface did those legs go? Fifteen feet, was it ? Mr. Rurieper. They were to go 20 feet, as redesigned with caissons. That was relaxed to 18 feet because, when the structure was actually in place, the water depth was 185 feet, rather than the 180 feet that was supposed to be at the location where placement Senator Sauronsrati. These legs were put down 18 feet below the level of the sand ? Mr. Rutiener. Yes, sir. Senator Sarronsratu. And that, in your opinion, was satisfactory to hold this tower up? Mr. Rurieper. It was more than satisfactory ; yes, sir. Senator Sarronsraty. Is not that a lesser depth of embedment than some of the other towers have, including some in the Gulf of Mexico? = ee le COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 257 EMBEDMENT OF LEGS ON TOWER NO. 4 MORE THAN ADEQUATE Mr. Rutiepcr. Towers No. 2 and No. 3 have no underwater brac- ing, sir, and the legs have to be held or fixed against rotation by the sand gripping them around the bottom, like I’m holding the pencil and pushing on the top. Here the bracing prevents the rotation—the truss prevents the rota- tion of the legs, and the embedment has to resist only a horizontal push of the waves. The depth of the embedment was quite adequate for that. Senator SauronsTatn. So that the depth under the ground, in your opinion, was satisfactory ? Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Senator Satronsratn. To carry out the design ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. Senator Satronstaty. Thank you. Senator Srennis. Thank you, Senator. Mrs. Smith ? Senator Smiru. Mr. Chairman, I think my questions will be answered through the questioning of counsel, and I yield to him. Senator Stennis. I yield back to the counsel, and you may proceed, Mr. Counsel. TYPE OF CONNECTION FOR THE BRACES IMMATERIAL TO USE OF KUSS PATENT Mr. Kenpauzi. Mr. Kuss, in your tip-over method of erection, I believe that it was necessary to use pin connections; is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. No, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Could you have used a welded connection in your tip-over method ¢ Mr. Kuss. Yes. As far as the patent is concerned, any kind of a connection could have been used. Mr. Kenpati. We have had testimony here to the effect that the use of welds raised the probability that upon the tip-over, the thing would fly apart or break; is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. There is no foundation to that. Mr. Kenpati. What was the determining factor in using the pin connections ? Mr. Kuss. We used the pin connections for several reasons. In the first place, a pin connection is pretty standard for all big trusses, such as for railroad bridges and structures of that type, of unusual size. Welded connections, if we did want to use them, would have to be much larger in dimension and be rigid. Now, that rigidity causes what we call secondary stresses. In other words, there would be bending in the connections at the ends. Fora fine type of structure like this, we thought that secondary bending should be eliminated. Any extra stresses we would get by welding would be in welded details. Now, the other reason for the pins is that the stresses in the mem- bers are much more accurately determinable with pins because it re- duces a great number of unknowns in the structure, so that we can compute the stresses much more accurately. 258 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Now, these pins cost money. We weren’t trying to get a cheap tower, but we thought it was the best connection we could devise. Mr. Kenpatu. Do I understand that you don’t consider it essential that the undersea braces be as rigid as possible ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; in the sense I’m talking about. We did not want to have bending moments at the end of the struts where they connect to the legs, because that introduced unknown stresses which would be repeated with every motion of the tower. Mr. Kenpatyi. Wasn’t it essential that the undersea braces be as rigid as possible? Mr. Kuss. Sir, I’m talking about the individual braces. Rigidity does not mean strength, sir, necessarily. Strength is one thing and rigidity is another. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, didn’t you want to establish as great a rigidity as possible in the undersea braces ? Mr. Kuss. No, sir. We were purposely avoiding rigidity at the ends of the members. Mr. Kenpati. What do you mean, at the ends of the members? Mr. Kuss. Where each member connects to the legs or where they connect to one another. Mr. Kenpatu. Where did you want to achieve your rigidity ? FUNCTION OF TRUSSED SYSTEM Mr. Rutieper. Sir, the truss system, as in any truss, provides the rigidity of the structure. Mr. Kuss is discussing the joint. The over- all rigidity is provided by the truss. This is similar to a very large bridge. To our knowledge, in the main connection joints in a large bridge, completely welded connections have never been used. The connections or major members are either pinned or riveted or bolted. Mr. Kenpatz. I am anxious to get the distinction, Mr. Rutledge. Mr. Rurtepce. I beg your pardon? Mr. Kenpaty. I am anxious to get the distinction that you have mentioned. Mr. Rurtepcr. Well, the rigidity—we need rigidity in the overall structure against lateral forces. The system of bracing members pro- vides that rigidity. On the other hand, the joint where these members come together, if they are completely rigidly connected at the joint and there is a very small deflection, it tends to bend each of the members at the joint, which puts in what is called the secondary stresses. Mr. Kenpatn. Now, as the architect-engineer, were all the changes which deviated from the original design approved by your firm? CHANGES APPROVED BY ARCHITECT-ENGINEER Mr. Rurteper. They were approved as they affected the ultimate structure. Mr. Kenpatx. Was the elimination of piling approved? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kernpatz. The elimination of the temporary platform? Mr. Rutiepex. Yes, sir. Mr. Krenpatu. The increases in pin tolerances? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 259 Mr. Rurievcs. We were asked by Commander Foster for our ad- vice on the pin tolerances. The contractor had requested that the specified tolerances be increased to the standard tolerance for this type of construction, and we finally agreed that it could be increased to the standard, which was one-sixteenth of an inch. Mr. Kenpatu. And one-eighth of an inch on the upper braces which were to be lashed down ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. Those pins, because of the method of con- struction elected by the contractor, those pins had to be placed under water. Mr. Kenpau. Didn’t that increase in the pin tolerances make it even less rigid and permit additional motion ? Mr. Rutriepcr. We computed the motion that could be contributed by such pin tolerances, and the result is in the order of four-tenths of an inch horizontal motion at the top. Mr. Kenpatu. At the top of the platform ? Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Mr. Knnpatu. Mr. Brewer testified that Mr. Kuss told him the tower could move as much as 2 inches without taking up the known pin tolerances. Mr. Kuss, is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. Mr. Brewer made a misstatement there. He said that Mr. Kuss computed this. Now, I was in attendance at the meeting with Mr. Brewer, and we were having very general conversations. He said, “Mr. Kuss, how much do you think the tower will move?” At that time I had no figures whatsoever, and I told him 2 inches. My computations consisted of kind of waving a piece of chalk at the ~ blackboard. It was purely a guess. Mr. Kenpatu. It was a conservative guess, was it not? Didn’t the studies show it moved as much as 8 inches? Mr. Kuss. His studies did, but we don’t know that that was as a result of pin tolerances or what. Mr. Kenpaun. It was platform movement, though ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Mr. Krnpaty. If the pilings were considered necessary to a depth of 48 feet at the time of the design of the tower, why is it that they became unnecessary a few months later ? Mr. Rurweper. Sir, for foundations, it is quite common to have ee as an alternate to piles. We had 21 piles at the base of each eg. Mr. Kenvati. Forty-eight feet in depth ? Mr. Rurrener. I believe that they were to be 60 feet. These were replaced by caissons 25 feet in diameter, and the original contemplated depth was 20 feet embedment, and we analyzed this completely. The effect of the caisson 25 feet in diameter with full bearing, em- bedded 20 feet, was completely identical to the piles. For this reason we approved the contractor’s request to change. Mr. Kenpaty. What was the original embedment of the caissons ? Mr. Ruttepcr. Twenty feet. Mr. Kenna. Did you increase the embedment when you eliminated the pilings, or just what did you do to compensate for the elimination of the pilings? Mr. Rurrieper. There was no embedment at the base of the legs, or no enlargement at the base of the legs, with piles. 707383—61—_18 260 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpatx. That is the point I had in mind, sir, that I wanted to clear up. Mr. Rurieper. The legs sat on the ocean bottom, with a small rmg through which the piles penetrated and fastened the piles to the leg. Then when the contractor requested a change from piles to caissons, we computed a range of possible combinations of required diameter and required depth of embedment to accomplish the same result, and gave this to him, from which he selected the 25-foot diameter and the 20-foot depth. ELIMINATION OF PILINGS Mr. Kenpatu. Now, the elimination of the piling, I believe, sort of resulted in a chain reaction of changes, did it not? The result of the elimination of the piling made possible the elimination of the tem- porary platform, is that correct? Mr. Ruttepexr. No, sir; these were independent changes. ‘The con- tractor first requested to shift from piles to caissons because he felt that he would have difficulty driving the piles. Then he later re- quested that the temporary platform be eliminated and that he be per- mitted to use the permanent platform in heu of the temporary plat- form. Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir; but didn’t he say that we do not need the temporary platform because we have eliminated the driving of the iles? r Mr. Rurteper. No, sir; that was not the reason. He still had—— Mr. Kenpauy. That was not one of the reasons ? Mr. Rurtepex. He still had to sink caissons and place concrete in them, which was a factor Mr. Kenpatt. The fact that you eliminated piles did not contribute in any way to the elimination of the temporary platform ? Mr. Ruriencr. To me, these are completely independent. Mr. Kennatz. Mr. Kuss, what do you say ? Mr. Kuss. I would say they are independent. Mr. Kenpauu. The elimination of the temporary platform did lead to the lashing down of the braces during the tow, didn’t it ? Mr. Rurteper. That was one of the consequences. The adding of the caissons added 20 feet to the length of the legs. That meant that when the foundation structure was placed on the ocean bottom, the braces at minus 25 feet would be 20 feet higher, or minus 5, 5 feet below sea level. Then when he wished to use the main platform in lieu of the tem- porary platform, the main platform weighed something over 4,000 tons, and had a draft of about 11 feet. So that in order to use the main platform for construction, he had to fold these braces down. Mr. Kenpatu. And that brought about a situation which you orig- inally intended or attempted to prevent; that was the making of con- nections under water? Mr. Rurueper. Yes, sir; because this is a difficult construction oper- ation. However, our responsibility in terms of our contract was in terms of the ultimate structure, and his proposal, if carried out com- pletely, would result in the same ultimate structure. Mr. Krnpatyi. But that did compel you to face the problem of con- necting these braces under water, which you originally set out to obviate ? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 261 Mr. Rurieper. It compelled the contractor to face this problem, sir. We did not face it. Mr. Kenpauu. But you approved that change? Mr. Ruriepcr. The ultimate structure would be the same by this method. If he produces the same ultimate structure, we actually cannot, without getting into serious trouble, we cannot disapprove, if there is no effect on the ultimate structure. Mr. Kenpatu. Let’s see if I understand you. To do so, I will ask whether or not you approved the elimination of the temporary plat- form, substitution of the permanent platform, and the lashing down of the braces during the tow ? Mr. Rutriepce. We approved the basic construction methods that the contractor proposed to use. Mr. Kenpauu. Well, does that mean you’re answering my question yes or no? Mr. Ruriepce. Your question includes items which we did not ap- prove, which were part of the contractor’s responsibility. Mr. Kenna. I'l] take them one at a time, then, sir. Did you approve the elimination of the temporary platform ? Mr. Rurtteper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauy. Did you approve the substitution of the permanent platform ? Mr. Rutepeer. Yes, sir. LASHING DOWN OF UPPER BRACING DURING TOW Mr. Kenpauy. Did you approve the lashing down of the upper bracing during the tow ? Mr. Rurtepcer. No, sir. Mr. Kenpaui. Why didn’t yeu? Mr. Rorieper. Because this was not a matter that affected the ultimate structure and it was not our responsibility. Mr. Kenpaux. Did you approve a method which was submitted by the contractor showing exactly how the braces would be lashed down during the tow ? Mr. Rutitevcr. We approved a drawing as affecting the ultimate structure, and it so states on our approval, that it is approved with respect to the permanent structure. Mr. Kenpatxu. But you did approve the method submitted with some modifications that your firm made, is that right ? Mr. Rutrteper. Only as the method affected the ultimate structure. Mr. Kenpatx. Didn’t you give a letter of approval of the method of lashing down the braces, with some modifications that your firm made ? Mr. Rurieper. The approval is stamped on the drawing, sir, which Says: “This drawing is approved with respect to the ultimate structure.” Mr. Kenpatu. Well, why did you suggest some changes in it, then ? Mr. Rurieper. There was a series of events here because there was a year’s delay in the actual construction of this structure. During this period there was a large amount of indiscriminate welding to the members, and in the course of the actual fabrication, we disapproved unnecessary welding to any of the permanent members. 262 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kennan. So you did suggest some modifications of his scheme and told him to do it in another way 4 ant, Mr. Rurieper. No, sir; we did not tell him do it this way. We told him Mr. Kenpati. You suggested that he do it this way ? UNNECESSARY WELDING TO BE ELIMINATED Mr. Ruruepce. No, sir. We told him that welding, unnecessary welding to the permanent members, would have to be eliminated. Mr. Kenpauu. Did you give him a letter on that Mr. Rurrepce. We sent a marked drawing. I don’t recall a letter, sir. Mr. Kenpatui. Let’s go back just a minute, Doctor. Mr. Rurweper. Yes. Mr. Kenparxi. When you eliminated the temporary platform or ap- proved the elimination of the platform you did that ? Mr. Rutrteper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpautx. You approved the substitution of the permanent platform ? Mr. Rutepce. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. You knew then, at that stage, that that would neces- sitate the lashing down of the upper braces, did you not? Mr. Ruriepce. We knew that the upper braces would have to be folded down; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpautu. Therefore, when you approved the substitution of the permanent platform for the temporary platform, you approved the lashing down or folding down of those braces ? Mr. Rurieper. We knew that they had to be folded down. Getting them to the site and getting them in the ultimate design position was the contractor’s responsibility. Mr. Kennan. But if you had knowledge of the fact that they had to be folded down when you approved of the substitution of the per- manent platform, you’re not suggesting that that didn’t constitute an approval of the folding down of those braces, are you? Mr. Ruriepvcr. No, sir. We knew that the braces had to be folded down. Mr. Kenpatu. And in practical effect, you approved it ? Mr. Rutruepce. Of the folding down; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Rau testified last week that you further approved the submitted method of lashing down, and later changed that meth- od. Is that true? Mr. Rurteper. It is true that there is a drawing in 1956 for the lashing down, which is stamped approved with respect to the perma- nent structure. Subsequent to that drawing, during the actual erection of the struc- ture, because of a large amount of indiscriminate welding to the per- manent members, we issued an advice to the officer in charge of con- struction that all indiscriminate welding, temporary welding to per- manent members, should be eliminated. Mr. Kenpatu. Which members of your firm were out at the site when the tower was towed for erection, and at the time it was deter- mined that there was damage to the lashed down braces? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 263 Mr. Ruriener. Our resident engineer for the borings, Mr. Barry Englander, was on the platform during the tow out. I personally arrived at the site with Mr. Steers at midnight of, the day that the foundation structure had been rotated to a vertical position, and when we arrived, the foundation structure was in the vertical position. DAMAGE TO BRACES DISCOVERED Mr. Kenpatu. And the damage to the braces had then been discov- ered, I assume? Mr. Rutitepce. So I learned later. Mr. Kenpatt. Was Mr. Kuss there then ? Mr. Ruriepee. No. Mr. Kenparxi. Did you or any member of your firm have any dis- cussions about what was the proper thing to do then about the lost braces ? Mr. Ruriepce. When Commander Foster transferred from the foundation structure to the platform on the afternoon of the following day after we had arrived at around midnight, the foundation structure had been placed in the correct position and had been lowered down to the ocean bottom so it was setting on the ocean bottom, and the party who were on the foundation structure then came to the platform. Commander Foster then told me about the loss of the two braces, and we discussed the situation. Mr. Kenpatz. Did you consider that a serious mishap or defect ? Mr. Rutievcr. We considered this as serious. We considered it particularly serious during the construction period. We discussed possible correction and we believed that replacement braces could be designed that would serve the function of the lost braces. Mr. Kenpati. Was there any discussion of the possibility of taking the tower back to port for repairs? Mr. Ruvrteper. That entered into our discussions and considerations. The upending and placing into position had been difficult and hazard- ous, as all operations at sea are. This was a consideration. We considered that if we took it back to port, there would be a year’s delay in the construction of this entire structure, for which there was considerable pressure, and we felt it would be possible to design and have installed adequate replacements. In considering all of these factors Senator Srennis. Will you suspend right there just a minute, Dr. Rutledge? (Brief recess. ) Senator Stennis. Allright, gentlemen. May we have quiet, please? May I say this, gentlemen: Your references to the tower model as you point out various parts of the structure are quite helpful to us. I think if you would just put the model over closer to you, about where the water pitcher is, it would be so much more convenient to you. Then you can use your pencil as a pointer. J am sorry we do not have a long pointer. It would save a lot of time, as well as make it more convenient to you. Proceed, gentlemen. 264 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpati. Had you completed your answer to that question, Mr. Rutledge? Mr. Rurueper. Frankly, I have forgotten the question and I have forgotten my answer. Mr. Kenpatu. J think we'll get back into it. As I understand it, the representative of the Navy, Commander Foster, and yourself, and a representative of the contractor partici- pated in these discussions; is that correct ? ; Mr. Rutiepcr. My discussions were separately with Commander Foster, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. You had no discussions with any representative of J. Rich Steers, Inc. ? Mr. Ruriencr. I was present at a subsequent discussion. I had no part in the discussion. Mr. Kenpatu. Did you have any recommendation or did you ex- press an opinion as to what should be done ? Mr. Rurieper. I did, to Commander Foster. Mr. Kenpatu. What was your recommendation ? Mr. Ruruepcr. I told Commander Foster that I believed that re- placement braces that would accomplish the result of the lost braces could be designed. REPLACEMENT BRACES DESIGNED Mr. Kenpauu. Were they designed ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauyu. Who designed them ? Mr. Rurieper. We did. Mr. Kenpatu. What generally did they consist of ? Mr. Rurieper. It consisted of two braces of the same size that utilized the existing pin connections at elevation minus 25 feet [indi- cating], that were fastened to the legs by collars above elevation minus 75 feet, because the connections at minus 75 feet had been broken in the loss of the two original braces. Mr. Kenpatu. So your firm was responsible for the design of the collar replacement and the use of the Dardelet bolts; is that right? Mr. Rurteper. We did this work for the contractor and were paid by the contractor for doing it. Mr. Kenpauy. But the design was your responsibility ? Mr. Rurieper. We designed them for the contractor; yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauu. We have had some testimony here to the effect that Dardelet bolts are usually used for temporary repairs. What is your judgment ? Mr. Rurteper. Dardelet bolts are used, I believe, just as frequently for permanent structures as for temporary. Mr. Kenpatu. Nonetheless, in this particular case, it developed that they did not hold; is that not true? : Mr. Rutieper. It developed that they did not hold, for reasons that I believe Mr. Crockett has presented to this committee. Mr. Kenpatu. In any event, if the lashings had held during tow, you wouldn’t have been faced with the problem of the use of Dardelet bolts at all? COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 265 Mr. Rurieper. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Well, going to the early part of 1960, I believe that there was a report that a diver examination had revealed loose pins and worn connections in the underwater bracings at elevations minus 25 feet and minus 75 feet ; is that right? WORN CONNECTIONS IN BRACES CONSIDERED SEPICUS Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir; Mr. Kuss attended a meeting at Otis Air Force Base where that report was presented. Mr. Kenpatx. Did you consider that a—possibly I should direct this question to Mr. Kuss. Mr. Kuss, did you consider that a serious consideration ? Mr. Kuss. Well, it looked quite serious, for the reason that this looseness had developed in such a short time since the last diver inspec- tion. It was quite mysterious to me and somewhat alarming. If it had happened over the 4-year period that the tower was up, it wouldn’t have been so puzzling. But there was about an 8-month gap between the divers’ report that everything was tight and this report that desig- nated loose pins. Mr. Kenpain. Was it your opinion, Mr. Kuss, that the situation was so serious that if it wasn’t corrected, it would worsen at an ac- celerating rate and raise a serious question as to the safety of the tower ? Mr. Kuss. As I said, because of the uncertainty of what was caus- ing this apparent rapid loosening of the pins, it could have been quite serious. We were alarmed. Mr. Kenpatyu. Well Senator Srennis. Pardon me, let’s put a date on that. You per- haps did already, Mr. Counsel. When was it, now, that you are talking about there, Mr. Kuss, when you say, “We were alarmed”? An approximate date? Mr. Kuss. This is February 1960. I don’t have the day; February 1960. Mr. Kenpauy. You did write two letters with reference to the prob- lem, didn’t you, Mr. Kuss, one dated April 1, 1960, to Major Phelan? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatn. And you stated in that letter that the “loose pin con- nections are a very serious matter since there seems to be no way of satisfactorily remedying this condition.” Is that right? Mr. Kuss. That’s right. Mr. Kenpauu. And furthermore, “that the condition was one that would tend to worsen at an increasing rate with time?” Mr. Kuss. It couldn’t do anything but increase; yes. The condi- tion could not get better. It would increase, if anything. Senator Srennis. Were you reading from the letter, Mr. Counsel? Mr. Kenpatz. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. This is Mr. Kuss’ letter? Mr. Kenpauy. Mr. Kuss’ letter to Maj. James Phelan. We would like to have a copy of this letter made a part of the record, Mr. Chair- man. Senator Stennis. [tis so ordered. 266 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 (The letter referred to is as follows:) Moran, Proctor, MuUESER & RUTLEDGE, New York, N.Y., April 1, 1960. Re motion of Texas tower No. 4 and condition of bracing connections. Maj. JAMES PHELAN, Commander, 4604th Support Squadron (TT), Otis Air Force Base, Mass. Drar Sire: As a result of the diver inspection of the underwater bracing be- tween the legs of Texas tower No. 4 and from reports of experience of personnel on the tower, we wish to make comments and recommendations. The diver’s findings were reported to Air Force representatives in a meeting at Otis Air Force Base on February 9, 1960, and subsequently the findings were summarized on a drawing prepared by the Air Force and titled ‘Underwater Structural Deficiencies, Texas Tower No. 4” (drawing OTS—140-061), dated February 11, 1960. The findings indicate that on the A—-B side there are loose pin connections on all of connections of the horizontal braces at elevations +25 and +76. Also the main bolts of the collars connecting replacement braces to the legs just above elevation +76 are not tight. The loose pin connections are a very serious matter since there seems to be no way of satisfactorily remedying this condition. Furthermore, the condi- tion is one which will tend to worsen at an increasing rate with time. This is because the looseness induces impact stresses in the pins and pin plates which are greater than for the nondynamic design assumptions and will become increas- ingly greater as the play in the joint enlarges. There are no circumstances which would tend to alleviate these conditions if corrective measures are not undertaken. Due to the complexity of the pin con- nections (multiplicity of plates involved, ete.), there seems to be no practical way of restoring the defective connections to their originally conceived con- dition. It would be exceedingly dangerous to remove the pins for replacement. Even if the pins could be removed, however, it would be necessary to ream the holes to a larger circular shape to fit new oversize pins and we believe this to be impossible. After careful and long consideration we have concluded that the only practical cure for the situation is the addition of new above-water braces which we have advocated and designed. We recommend this type of bracing for all three sides because the requirement of their being entirely above water does not provide an ideally effective depth and the bracing on the A—C and B-—C sides reduces bending components from these sides almost to zero, thus increas- ing the factor of safety in the A-B system. The bracing on the three sides will also reduce the general motions of the tower, including rotation and will diminish the tendency to develop impact on all of the bracing pins, including those which have not as yet Shown any distress. Time is of the essence in the program for erecting new braces. The hurricane season has been pretty well established as beginning after the first week of August and the schedule for construction to be reasonably sure of accomplishment should be essentially complete by that time. If the new braces are not secure by then and are lost due to hurricane action the tower would be forced to under- go another winter’s exposure and it is very doubtful if the deteriorating pin connections will survive. This means that a contract should be let immediately so that fabrication can be started by May 1. Allowing 5 weeks for fabrication and 8 for erection brings the completion date to the beginning of the danger period. Due to the above-discussed urgency, and the contingencies inherent in the type of construction involved, it would appear that a cost-plus-fee contract would be most ideal for the accomplishment of the work. This would permit the Government to assume the hazards which would otherwise be generously in- cluded as contingencies in competitive bidding. It would enable the Govern- ment to ask for extra expediency measures, if necessary, and it would permit the Government to negotiate with the contractor who built the tower (J. Rich Steers Co.) and who is most familiar with all of the conditions attendant upon the work. We trust that the foregoing makes our position clear, but will be glad to furnish further information if desired. As you are aware, we have made every effort to expedite the plans and specifications pending a formal A. & E. contract and these are now available for initiating the work. Very truly yours, Moran, Proctor, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, By THEODORE M. Kuss. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 267 Mr. Kenpatu. You also wrote a letter, I believe, dated August 10, 1960; is that right ¢ Mr. Kuss. To whom was that, sir? Mr. Kenpatu. That is to the base procurement office, Otis Air Force Base. Mr. Kuss. We'll have to check that. LOSS OF TOWER PREDICTED Mr. Kenpatu. That is a letter in which you enclosed your report on your analysis of the existing damage. Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is this one [indicating], yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatx. And in that report, you again stated : The looseness of the pins will in all probability continue to worsen, at perhaps an accelerating rate, since the sloppiness contributes to the magnitude of the impact stresses on the connections and the increased impact in turn aggravates the wear in the joints. It was therefore concluded by our office that it would be hazardous to permit the conditions to remain uncorrected through any more winter seasons, with the ultimate loss of the tower being the possible result of such neglect. Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; that’s m the report. Senator Stpnnis. You wrote that letter, Mr. Kuss, on the date in- dicated by counsel; is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. August 10, yes. Senator STENNIS. You say that is your letter ? Mr. Kuss. Yes; this isa report. Mr. Kunpauy. We would like for the letter and the report to be a part of the record. Senator Stennis. It will be so ordered, and counsel, in order to get these facts in mind as they are developed, I would like to see the first letter you introduced and the second one, too. I shall glance at it, at least, as soon as these gentlemen finish. (The document referred to is as follows :) Moran, Proctor, MUESER & RUTLEDGE, New York, N.Y., August 10, 1960. Subject: A. & EH. contract AF19 (603 )-708 BASE PROCUREMENT OFFICE, Otis Air Force Base, Mass. (Attention: Capt. B. A. Grassfield) GENTLEMEN : In accordance with the terms of the subject contract, we herein submit our report on the analysis of the existing damage and recommended emergency repairs to Texas Tower No. 4. At the time of this writing, the emer- gency repair work has been completed and a description of the actual work as performed in the field will be described in a report to be prepared by our firms under the terms of our title II contract covering the field supervision of the construction work. Very truly yours, Moran, Proctor, Murser & RUTLEDGE, THEODORE M. KUSS. Report ON DESIGN or BRACES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR HMERGENCY REPAIR WORK, Texas Tower No. 4 INTRODUCTION Diver examination, in the early spring of 1960, of the underwater braces of Texas tower No. 4 revealed conditions which are summarized on drawing No. OTS-140-061 issued by the Otis Air Force Base and titled, “Underwater Struc- 268 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 tural Deficiencies.” This summary shows the existence of loose pin connections on the A-B side for all of the pins at elevations —25 and —76. This looseness permits excessive oscillations of the tower resulting in annoyance to the per- sonnel on the tower and causes concern as to the ultimate safety of the struc- ture. The looseness of the pins will, in all probability, continue to wersen at, perhaps, an accelerating rate since the sloppiness contributes to the magnitude of the impact stresses on the connections and the increased impact in turn aggra- vates the wear in the joints. It was, therefore, concluded by our office that it would be hazardous to permit the conditions to remain uncorrected through any more winter seasons, with the ultimate loss of the tower being the possible result of such neglect. Statements of our conclusions were contained in a letter from our firm to the Air Force dated April 1, 1960. In that letter we recom- mended the installation of additional braces between the legs above the water on all three sides. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE MEASURES The choice of schemes for correcting the deficiencies are limited and, from the point of view of cost and practicability of accomplishment within the summer season of 1960, the placing of the braces proposed offers the only satisfactory answer. The seemingly obvious solution of repairing the pin connections had to be rejected because of the complexity of the connections and the inaccessibility of the inner pin plates. All of the defective connections are underwater which makes any reliable repair work, especially that involving welding, almost impossible. In addition, there is motion in the joints at all times and no practical means could be suggested which would eliminate this motion while repairs were attempted. AJl work of assembling and attaching the proposed braces will be above water and the work will be capable of being inspected at all times during installation and afterward. DESIGN CRITERIA The original design of the tower was based on the action of a 35-foot breaking wave combined with a 125 mile per hour wind. The behavior and strength of the tower with the new proposed braces was analyzed for the same forces. BEHAVIOR OF TOWER The diver survey indicates that the pin connections are in a satisfactory condition on the B-C and A-C sides so that the discussion which follows, and which is illustrated on attached SK-1, applies to the A-B side only. The forces indicated and discussed are those resulting from the portion of the total applied force taken in the A-—B plane. The behavior of the A-B system with moments in the legs and reactions at the bracing points is shown on SK-—1 for both the present condition and the condition after the new bracing is installed. It is assumed, in each case, that before the loose connections take up, the system acts as a portal frame sup- ported at the lower end at elevation minus 126 feet (the first level at which the pins are tight). Because of the improved stiffness of this portal system with the new braces installed, the magnitude of the lateral force taken by the portal before the original bracing system is called into action is much greater than for the existing condition. After the original bracing comes into action the proportion of the total load taken into the damaged pin connections will be much less for any given wind and wave load. As a result of introducing the new braces, moments in the legs and forces on the existing bracing are changed as follows: 1. The maximum moment in a leg is reduced from 29,600 foot kips applied at elevation plus 67 to 10,640 foot kips applied at elevation plus 12. 2. The horizontal force on the existing bracing is reduced from 850 kips at elevation minus 25 to 556 kips at the same elevation. It is to be pointed out that these figures are, to a certain extent, qualitative since the computa- tions are based on an estimated 1.6-inch deflection at elevation minus 25 before the existing braces come into action. The deflection is derived from the diver’s estimate of the play in the pins. If the pins are in reality less sloppy than estimated, this is all to the good but in any case if the wear in the pin connections increases, the more beneficial the new braces become. N Weg) gible Fangjation Neg lg bf Translation Braver es 4 Pr BTQNed LEGEND AND NOTES 4, ~ Force required tor displacement? of the tower, the A-& plane, to take up the clearances the pring. ‘ be Ae Pemarder of design Force 7 4-B plane. My - Total design force im A-B plane, SOG tens e - Angle ef relation colineiden’! wth Tordd My 4 , is é de- Displacement of tewer leg 28 derived trop "Underwater Structural Defic.encies, Texas Tower "2°, Owg No. OFS -/40-OG6/ Issued by Chis Aim Force Base, Massachusetts. Qo splacemen!t ef tower leg before loose cornrerfions come info acrion ‘ Q@Bernding moments due to force wy, @ Bending moments due to force Hz 4Tota bending moments nr 4-8 plare for design force Ar. BF Reactions gf Facing pane! pc (Af pir conrections valves ore given thugs *) . 10640" [ian] MORAN, PROCTOR, MUESER & RUTLEDGE CONSULTING ENGINEERS 415 MADISON AVE. NEW YORK !7_ N.Y CONDITION 70733 O -61 (Face p. 269) COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 269 It is to be noted that the above computations are for static loading assumptions. A comparison of dynamic effects would probably show comparatively greater resulting benefits because of the decreased amplitude of the oscillation and also because the natural period of the structure will be decreased, making it less likely to coincide with that of the larger waves. A byproduct of the new installation is a diminished angle of rotation of the platform in the horizontal plane. Although the introduction of braces on the B-C and A-C sides was principally for the purpose of giving lateral support to the A and B legs at the points of maximum moment stress, these braces also contribute to (1) the general stiffness of the tower, (2) diminish the angle of rotation, and (3) further decrease possible future wear of pin connections on the A-C and B-C sides. OTHER WORK SPECIFIED In addition to the preparation of drawings and specifications for the fabrica- tion and erection of the braces, there was also specified certain other work to be undertaken at the same time and under the same construction contract. This included : (1) Torque testing of all of the bolts in the collars which attach the lower ends of the upper diagonals to the main legs on the A—-B side. These included the 114-inch-diameter T-bolts and the 2-inch-diameter main collar bolts. The former were to be torqued to 1,200 foot-pounds and the latter to 1,400 foot-pounds. With these applied torques no turning of the nuts was reported. (2) Testing of bolts in the K-braces between the tower platform and the main legs to a torque of 700 foot-pounds was specified. A few bolts turned under this torque. (3) Magnafluxing of the welding of the k-braces to ‘the platform and of the lower deck plate to the legs was specified. No defects were found in this welding. (4) Further and more complete examination of the loose pins at elevation —26 was. specified in the construction contract. This involved removal of the keeper plates at one end of each of the four pins and measurement of the play between the pins and the pinholes, all to be verified by underwater photographs. In general the play was found to be less than estimated on the previous, less thorough, examination and appear to be a maximum of about one-half inch. A complete report on the findings will be rendered under the terms of our title II contract covering the supervision of the construction work. FUTURE PRECAUTIONS As to future precautions and inspection of the tower structure, we consider it advisable to examine all of the new bracing connections at intervals of not more than 1 month or after each relatively heavy storm. The main purpose of such examination would be to discover any cracks, large or small, which may have developed in the welds or plating. At the same time the 144-inch-diameter high-tensile bolts of the new braces should be examined by jarring with a hammer as is done in a rivet test. We do not believe that it will be necessary to test any of the old bolts on the underwater collars or the kK-brace platform connections unless a very severe storm approaching design conditions has occurred. In such event we recom- mend that ‘the K-brace bolts be given a rivet type test. Respectfully submitted. Moran, Procror, MuESER & RUTLEDGE, THEODORE M. Kuss. Senator Stennis. All right, proceed. Mr. Kenpatu. Is that when you recommended the installation of the above-water braces ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Rurieper. Sir, this was a confirmation of the recommendation which had been made in May or June. Mr. Kenpatu. And they were installed in August 1960? Mr. Rutteper. Installation was completed shortly after the 1st of August 1960. 270 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpauxi. Was a complete stress reanalysis made before mak- ing that recommendation ? Mr. Kuss. Oh, yes, sir. Mr. Kenpati. Do you havea copy of that? Mr. Kuss. The stress analysis is in the report. Mr. Kenna. That is all right, if itis in the report. Mr. Kuss. Here is a sheet showing the stresses before and after the installation. Mr. Kenpauu. Weren’t the braces and the pin connections at the minus 25-foot and minus 75-foot level in bad shape at that time ? Mr. Kuss. They looked to be, sir. Mr. Kenpautu. Well, wasn’t it considered necessary to effect a re- ir of those braces ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, if possible. Mr. Kenpatu. Was it done? Mr. Kuss. No, sir. I would like to give you a little history of this, right here. Mr. Kenpatu. Yes, sir, go right ahead. Mr. Kuss. At our meetings with the Air Force, when it was de- cided to put the above-water bracing on, we all agreed that something would have to be done to the pins ultimately, but the way the tower stood, it would have been impossible or very dangerous to remove the pins, as, for instance, to put in larger ones. We felt if we could se- cure the tower with the above-water bracing, then, when the weather was suitable, we could go after the pins and do something to them. © p DIFFICULTY IN EXAMINING PINS Now, along those lines, when the contractor was erecting the above- water bracing, it was provided in his contract that he examine those pins, reexamine them well—that is, better than they had been ex- amined before. That meant taking off the washers at the ends of the pins so that you could actually see the relationship of the hole to the pin. That was part of the contract he had. We had no information on the true condition of the pins, because the previous divers had al- ways had to contend with the fact that there was a plate which covered the hole. So although we knew the pins were loose, we did not know the exact conditions. We couldn’t combat it until Mr. Kenpatxy. You knew the braces were ineffective, didn’t you, Mr. Kuss? Mr. Kuss. They were not ineffective. Mr. Kenpauu. Well, they were not working properly. Mr. Kuss. Yes, they were not working properly. Mr. Kenpatu. I take it you do not agree with the statements that have been made in the record that the installation of this above-water X-bracing, without correction of the difficulties in the undersea brac- ings, caused the tower to act like a huge hinge? Mr. Kuss. No, sir, I don’t understand that. Mr. Kenpatu. You don’t understand it or you don’t agree with it, which, or both ? Mr. Kuss. I don’t agree with it. Mr. Kenpatu. How long would it take to make a stress reanalysis of this tower? e COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Dial TIME REQUIRED TO COMPUTE STRESS REANALYSIS Mr. Kuss. Of the stress in the various members, you mean ? Mr. Kenpauu. Yes, sir; such as you made in connection with the installation of the above-water X-bracings. Mr. Kuss. Well, for each different condition, each different problem, it might take a week. Mr. Kenpatu. How long did the analysis that you made take? Mr. Kuss. I would say a week. Mr. Kenpartu. That is a complete stress reanalysis ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. Of the entire tower ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Mr. Kenpatu. Now, as to the installation of this above-water X- bracing, did you certify that the tower had been restored to the original design strength ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Mr. Kenpaty. Well, how could it have been restored to the original strength when you admittedly had the deteriorated pin connections below water and braces were not functioning correctly ? Mr. Kuss. Our analysis took in the fact that the pins were loose. Mr. Kenpauu. You considered, then, that it had been restored to the original design strength ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatxi. As a matter of fact, you put that X-bracing in the area where the impact of the waves was the strongest ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpati. And that was a complete departure from the original design concept ¢ Mr. Kuss. From the original design, yes. Mr. Kenpatu. And each storm that hit that X-bracing resulted in eracks in it, didn’t it ? Mr. Kuss. I don’t know that. Mr. Kenpatn. Well, were there cracks in the X-bracing after X-BRACING SATISFACTORILY INSTALLED Mr. Rurieper. While the X-bracing was being installed, when it was partially installed, the contractor was facing the difficulty that occurs in every welded connection, that with a partial welded con- nection, if a storm hits, the connection isn’t strong enough to take the forces imposed and cracks occur. These occurred at least once, and possibly twice, during the installation of the above-water bracing, and these are in the record of our resident engineer who was supervising this work. When this entire bracing was completely installed, there were no cracks in any of the connections. The contractor corrected all of the cracking. Mr. Kenpati. That bracing was completely installed in August? Mr. Rutiepee. In the early part of August the work was completed. Mr. Kenpauu. Well, after Hurricane Donna in September were there any cracks ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir; but that was a different situation. ne HOD AEs After the storm in December 1960, were there any cracks ¢ 272 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Ruriepcr. We have no report on that, sir. Mr. Kenpaty. Those were the only two storms of major conse- quence, I believe, until the one on January 15, is that right? Mr. Rutiepcr. We have no specific information on that, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. All right, Mr. Kuss, about the middle of November 1960, did anyone in the Air Force ask you to tell him what the re- maining strength of the tower was at that time ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Mr. Kenparu. Who was it, sir ? Mr. Kuss. Captain Grassfield. Mr. Kenpatu. What about General Elder ? Mr. Kuss. Let me get these dates straight. Mr. Kenpatu. About the middle of November 1960, isn’t it true that General Elder called you on the telephone and asked you to tell him what the remaining strength of the tower was? ESTIMATE OF TOWER STRENGTH Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. What did you tell him? Mr. Kuss. This was—at that time, I refused to estimate the strength of the tower. Mr. Kenna. You gave him no estimate at all ? Mr. Kuss. No, sir Mr. Kenpauu. At that time, your firm had agreed with J. Rich Steers, Inc., and the date of the agreement was October 3, 1960, to evaluate the remaining strength of the tower in terms of its original design criteria, isn’t that right ? Mr. Kuss. That’s right, sir. Mr. Kenpauyi. Why couldn’t you give him an estimate in Novem- ber 1960 ? Mr. Kuss. This damage was so extensive that it came completely outside the terms of what we expected to find. Mr. Kenpatu. You just told me that it would take about a week to make a stress reanalysis, and you had here about 6 weeks. Go ahead, sir. Mr. Kuss. I have considerable knowledge of this tower, sir, having worked with ita longtime. From the conditions that were discovered, I knew without making any figures that it was very dangerous. It wasn’t a matter of figuring. Furthermore, we had no knowledge that we had a report of the total damage. It could have been more, so I didn’t want to encourage anybody that it was safe in anyway. Even though I had made an analysis, it might have been based on the wrong premises. Mr. Rurteper. Mr. Counsel-— Senator Srennis. Pardon me, let us not interrupt Mr. Kuss, if you will. He has been asked a question. You were not through with your answer? Mr. Kuss. I think I was through, yes. Senator Stennis. It did not appear to me that you were, excuse me. All right, excuse me, Mr. Rutledge. Mr. Rurteper. May we put it on the record that we were first informed about the damage by Mr. Koch of J. Rich Steers Co. on COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 DHS November 14, in our office. He had received a radio call from the tower and he transmitted this information to us, and the telephone call from General Elder was on the morning of November 16. Mr. Krenpatz. From the date of October 3, 1960, until November 14, your firm had made no stress reanalysis? Mr. Ruriepcr. We had no information, sir, on the damage except that the maintenance bridge had been destroyed. We hunted up the drawings for the maintenance bridge so that they could replace that. Mr. Krnpautu. Mr. Kuss, were there any other occasions when you were asked by anyone in the Air Force as to what the remaining strenoth of the tower was? Mr. Kuss. I TOWER CONSIDERED UNSAFE Senator Stennis. Pardon me, Mr. Counsel. I wanted to be sure I understood Mr. Kuss. Mr. Kuss, as I understand your testimony, you say that about November 16, 1960, when you got this additional infermation about the condition of the tower, even without having to make any calcula- tions, you knew from that incomplete report although you were not certain that you had the full picture as to the damage, but from that incomplete report, you considered the tower highly unsafe and dangerous; is that right? Mr. Kuss. With the damage reported to me, it was very serious, and it may have been more. Senator Srrnnis. Very serious. Well, now, could we make that more specific? J am not trying to put words in your mouth at all. You are the witness and you are an expert witness. But as I have understood the tenor of your testimony, it is based on this knowledge that you had, even though it might not have been complete as to all the conditions, you considered it highly dangerous; is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; yes, sir. Senator Stennis. All right, [just wanted to be certain. Mr. Kuss. Iso told General Elder. Senator Stennis. Yes, I understand. That is what you then told the general. General who? Mr. Kuss. General Elder. Senator Stennis. And that was November 16? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Senator Srennis. All right, now, Counsel, you have another date inmind. Will you proceed ? Mr. Kenpaii. Ul ask you this, Mr. Kuss. At any time prior to the collapse of the tewer, did you report to anyone an estimate of the remaining strength of the tower as it then stood ? Mr. Kuss. No. Mr. Krnparz. Wasn’t it possible to make an analysis between Oc- tober 3, 1960, and January 15, 1961? Or from November 14, 1960, to January 15, 1961 ? Mr. Kuss. I don’t know as I was asked to make any analysis. Mr. Krenpary. That is what your contract was for, Mr. Kuss. You had a contract with J. Rich Steers, Inc., dated October 3 to evaluate the remaining strength of the tower. That is true, isn’t it ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. 274. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpauu. And up to January 15, you hadn’t given an evalua- tion, had you? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; I had given an evaluation that it was very dangerous. aes Mr. Kenpauu. Is that what you call an evaluation of the remaining strength of the tower ? Mr. Kuss. Under the circumstances, that was it. Mr. Kenpaiu. That is a good engineering evaluation, that it was very dangerous? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kenpauy. But you never came up with a detailed analysis such as you have in this report, did you? Mr. Kuss. No, sir. Senator Srennis. Pardon me again. While you are on this point, you used the term “very dangerous,” and I think that is understood. But as I interpret it, you mean that it was just dangerous for human habitation, and that it was likely to collapse under any additional strain, is that correct ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. I don’t see any need for adding any figures tothat. That isaconclusion. Senator Stennis. I understand your testimony, but I wanted to be certain I understood the element of danger to humans and the likelihood of collapse. Mr. Kenpatti. If you had given some figures, Mr. Kuss, wouldn’t the Air Force have been in a better position to evaluate the weather forecasts in relation to the strength of the tower ? Mr. Kuss. I didn’t want to have them do that. That would be highly dangerous and misleading, because I did not know the total damage, or couldn’t be sure that I knew the total damage. Mr. Kenpatu. Finally, I believe a figure of 55 percent of the original strength was attributed to a statement made by you. What did you mean by that statement, and when was it made ? PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL STRENGTH ESTIMATED Mr. Kuss. This was made on January 12 in the Steers office. Mr. Kenpati. What did you mean by the statement ? Mr. Kuss. We were discussing the installation of the rope bracing. Mr. Kenpatx. That is what we have been referring to as the cable bracing? : Mr. Kuss. The cable bracing, here in red [indicating]. In order to evaluate whether even with the installation of that in, it would be worthwhile. I was asked to evaluate the strength of the tower after the rope bracing was in. Mr. Kenpatu. In other words, you said that after that cable had been installed but without the replacement of the lower diagonal, it would be 55 percent as strong as its design criteria ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Mr. Krnpaty. Then at that time Senator Srennis. Have you answered ? Mr. Kenpatu. He said “Yes.” At the time of the collapse, since the cable bracing had not been installed, the tower was even weaker than that ? Ee COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 275 Mr. Kuss. Much weaker. It was worse than the time I told them it was dangerous. Mr. Kenpatu. It had gotten worse all the time, because you had some more damage in the December storm, or you discovered some after the storm ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Kewnpatt. Do you have any judgment as to the percent of strength at that time? Mr. Kuss. After Donna? Mr. Kenpvatu. After the December storm. Mr. Kuss. You see Mr. Krenpaty. As of January 12,1961, say, Mr. Kuss? Mr. Kuss. Sir, I was almost surprised the tower stood up. Senator Srennis. What was that, now? You were surprised that it stood up ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Mr. Krenpauy. During what period? Mr. Kuss. During any of the moderate weather periods that they had. Mr. Kenpati. So you made no estimate in figures of the remain- ing strength of the tower and have none now ? Mr. Kuss. No, sir. You see, the percentage of residual safety is, when you are getting down to 95, you are on Mr. Kenpati. But the intensity of the storm during which the tower ultimately collapsed was nowhere near the design criteria, was it, Mr. Kuss? Mr. Kuss. We don’t know. Mr. Kenpati. What is your information on that? It was an or- dinary winter storm, was it not ? Mr. Kuss. I suppose, but we had no figures on that. Mr. Kenpatt. Well, it was not a storm involving winds of 125 miles an hour and breaking waves of 35 feet, was it ? Mr. Kuss. No, I don’t think so. REASON FOR COLLAPSE Mr. Krnpatn. We are faced now, Mr. Kuss, with the tower col- lapse, and we have several alternatives—faulty design, possibly; faulty construction; faulty repair; or a combination of all of these things. Can you or Mr. Rutledge tell us now what made this tower collapse? Mr. Rurreper. If I may answer, sir, from information that we have heard, and I believe it was part of the testimony here, the tower during Hurricane Donna was subjected to forces that were very much in excess of the design criteria forces. Mr. Kenparu. Does that conclude your observation on that ? Mr. Ruttepcr. These forces of Hurricane Donna, as has been tes- tified, broke two of the panels of bracing in the tower. With two pan- els of bracing completely gone, the tower was in a very dangerous condition. It definitely did not have strength to resist the design cri- teria, and it could resist only something very much smailler. As Mr. Kuss has testified, it was essentially impossible and ex- tremely dangerous to say what it could resist. 10733—61——19 276 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Mr. Kenpauu. If the forces of Donna were considerably in excess of the design criteria, then it necessarily follows, does it not, that the de- sign criteria was inadequate? Mr. Ruriener. The design criteria were studied very carefully in terms of the information available at the time of the design. It is apparent that the storm did exceed those anticipated. Mr. Kenpatu. That isall Ihave, Mr. Chairman. Senator Stennis. Thank you very much, Mr. Counsel. Gentlemen, I have just a few questions here. Mr. Kuss, may I go back toa statement you made a few minutes ago ? You said that you were surprised that the tower stood up, and that is when you were testifying with reference to either November 16 or the November 14 discussion, as I understood it. Mr. Kuss. No, sir. Senator Stennis. No? When was it, then ? Mr. Kuss. This was after they discovered the bottom-most bracing, when all three panels were gone. Senator Srennis. When did that happen? Mr. Kuss. When did they discover that these three bottom braces were gone? Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Kuss. They discovered that when they were going down to begin to make the installation of the rope bracing. They discovered that the lower panel was gone. Senator Stennis. Could you give an approximate date of when this was ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, that was January 8. Senator Stennis. January 8? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Senator Stennis. So after you learned that those facts were true, not knowing how long they had been true, then it was a surprise to you that.it had been able to stand at all? Mr. Kuss. That is right, but we do not know when this last brace broke. Senator Srennis. I know you don’t. My question covered that. But whenever it happened, it was a matter of surprise to you that the tower could stand any further? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, and you see, that is a good example of why I didn’t want to give any estimates back in November, because that could have been broken then. That is typical of something you don’t know. COMPLETENESS OF EXAMINATION QUESTIONED Senator Srennis. You did get certain information in November 1960, but you understood then that that was a complete examination of the tower, is that correct? Mr. Kuss. I understood then that it was. Senator Srennis. You understood then that it was a complete examination ? Mr. Koss. Yes. Senator Stennis. With great deference to you, I thought you gave as the reason just a few minutes ago for withholding a firmer estimate was the fact that you did not think that was a complete examination. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 207 Mr. Kuss. Sir, I gave that as an example of a fracture that might not have been discovered. I did not say that it was not in place at that time. Senator Stennis. Well, it is probable that these braces were torn loose down there during Hurricane Donna? T know that is highly speculative, but do you think it probably happened then? Mr. Kuss. I don’t know. Senator Stennis. You don’t know? What I am leading to is the period of reasonable notice of this situation. Was not there ample time to make a more thorough examination between November 14 and January 12? That was a period of 60 days. Mr. Kuss. Well, sir, I was informed that the tower was given a complete examination when we got our report of November 14. I presumed that was a complete examination. Senator Stennis. All right. Anyway, when you learned in Jan- uary this lower brace was broken; that 1s when you were really sur- prised that the tower kept standing in view of that condition ? Mr. Kuss. As long as that condition was true; yes. Senator STENNIS. Yes, since it was true, since it started and as long as it continued ? Mr. Kuss. Yes. Senator Stennis. Now, I want to ask Mr. Rutledge this question: We have had the testimony here from you and others as to what hap- pened during the upending and the unfortunate fact that the braces were broken loose. Now, aiter the tower was upended and put in place, Mr. Rutledge, did you ever approve this tower as it stood there in the water? When it was first upended, the braces were broken. Now, you did not approve it in that condition, did you! Mr. Rutieper. No, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Was there any time from then on until it fell when it was in condition where you could approve it ? Mr. Rutiepes. To my recollection, sir, we did not or were not re- quested to make any such certification, except upon the completion of the installation of the above-water X-bracing in which the Air Force requested a certification which we provided, that it was in a condition to meet the design criteria. Senator Srannis. I understand that, Mr. Rutledge, but with all deference to you—I do not think you are being evasive or trying to be evasive, but I dont’ think you answered the question. You are a highly responsible gentleman in every way, and a highly competent one. Just as a layman, after hearing all this testimony, I can’t think of any time, from the time it was first upended until it col- lapsed, years later, that I would think it was in top condition or in the condition for which it was designed. . Therefore, I wouldn’t have approved it, as I see the testimony. Now, you know more about it than Ido. Was there a time, from the time it was upended and erected until it collapsed, that you could have approved it as it stood ? Mr. Rurieper. Yes, sir. We did not approve it. But after the slippage of the collars was corrected with the bolts, the T-bolts Senator STENNIs. Yes. 278 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 TOWER MEETS DESIGN CRITERIA IN SUMMER OF 1959 Mr. Rurieper. And the tower was inspected underwater for play of pins, in my opinion, at that stage, which was in the summer of 1959, following an inspection by Mr. Crockett, the diver, I believe the tower was in a condition equal to the design conditions. Senator Srennis. All right. That is very specific, and very good. That was my next question. When did it meet these conditions; in the summer of 1959 until when ? Mr. Ruriepcr. Until we received a report of looseness of pins at the minus 25 foot elevation on the A—-B side. Senator STennis. Yes. Well, now, when was that ? Mr. Rurieper. Approximately 8 months later. Senator Stennis. Well, now, 8 months from the summer of 1959, just making a quick calculation, would be somewhere around February 1960. Mr. Ruriepce. Yes, sir. Mr. Kuss. February 14, 1960. Senator Stennis. That is all right. It is very clear. The condition of the tower was less than its design strength, and it never did regain its original design strength again; isn’t that correct ? TOWER STRENGTH DIMINISHES Mr. Rurieper. With the addition of the above-water bracing, it had a strength equal to the design criteria, on the assumption that the re- placement braces on the A—-B side were defective. The actual looseness of the pins was measured during the installation of the above-water bracing. The actual looseness of the pins or play in the pins was in the order of three-eighths of an inch to seven-sixteenths of an inch, as measured by the divers after they took the keeper plates off, and these measurements were part of the contract which involved the above- water bracing, and the measurements are included in our report to the Air Force dated September 9, 1960, on page 2. Senator Stennis. All right. You know, of course, from the record that there is a conflict of evidence, as I understand it, about the ex- tent of the looseness of those pins, and also the effectiveness of these braces. We have the testimony of Mr. Brewer, I believe, about the results of his motion study. Is that correct? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Do you want to address anything further to the point I brought up, with reference to the conflict in the evidence? CONFLICT IN EVIDENCE ON EXTENT OF WEAR IN PIN CONNECTIONS Mr. Rurieper. There are two points there, sir, if I may bring them out. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Ruriepee. First, on the looseness of the pins, part of the con- tract between the Air Force and J. Rich Steers, Inc., for the installa- tion of the above-water bracing was to remove the keeper-pin plates COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 279 from the pins, to make measurements of the pins, pin clearances, and to take underwater photographs of the pin clearances. These measurements were made, the underwater photographs were taken, and the underwater photographs were supplied to the Air Force directly by J. Rich Steers, Inc., asa part of their contract. We received the measurements, which are included in our report. With reference to Mr. Brewer’s testimony, he was testifying for conditions of waves which were far less than the design criteria con- ditions. The forces exerted by the waves were relatively small. The stresses measured and created were relatively small, and in my opinion, it is quite possible, under these quite small stresses, that the stresses in the underwater bracing in the truss system were so small that it didn’t show much effect of the underwater bracing. His measurements do indicate when he gets to the 28 foot waves, which I believe was the highest during his measurement, that the underwater bracing was working. «Senator Stennis. Allright. I think you have made your testimony clear on that point. So your point is that when you got the above water x -bracing in- stalled in September 1960, this restored the tower to the original strength; is that correct? Mr. Rutieper. Yes. Senator Stennis. All right. Now, Hurricane “Donna” occurred soon after? Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Senator StENNis. September 1960, was it not ? Mr. Rutieper. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Isn’t it true that the deterioration in the pin con- nections and the resulting motion of the tower, was caused by the wear and tear resulting from the motion of the sea? If not, what did cause it? MOTION BECAME EXTREME Mr. Rurieper. Sir, in the report that we received initially, that Mr. Kuss testified to, which created considerable alarm, the report was a motion in the order of 1 inch. This was extremely alarming, because we could not understand what was causing this, that some new element had entered in. We could not believe that the pins could wear this amount and on the basis of that information, we considered it an emergency situation, and that the above-water bracing should be installed on a crash pro- gram. At the same time we requested these accurate measurements of the pins. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Rurtepcr. The recorded measurements were three-eighths of an inch clearance, and we are not entirely sure whether this is entirely wear, or part of it existed in the original construction, because we do not have records of measurements from the original construction. Senator Stennis. Now, that is a new point, as I understand, that you raised, that this slackness of the pins which showed an obvious danger might have been due to faulty construction ? Mr. Rurzeper. I would not classify this as faulty construction. It might have existed in the constructed condition, sir. 280 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Srennis. Well, if it had been constructed as you designed it, you would not have had that much motion, would you? Mr. Rutieper. That is right, sir. Senator Stennis. Therefore, it was either faulty construction or it was due to the wear and tear from the motion of the sea. It had to be one or the other ? Mr. Ruriepver. It was construction different than specified, or wear and tear ; yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Now, as the designer and as one who is familiar with the subsequent difficulties, aren’t you able to say definitely whether it was constructed properly ? PCSSIBILITY THAT CONSTRUCTION MAY HAVE BEEN IMPROPER Mr. Rutieper. We had no part in or responsibility for construction supervision. Our contract required us to advise the officer in charge of construction at his request. Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Ruriever. And we didn’t have any people looking to see whether the fabrication and the construction was in accordance with the plans and specifications. Senator Srennis. Well, I do not want to belabor this point, but it seems to me that it is a major one. The only information I have about such matters arises from the fact that on one occasion I built a house, and the architect followed up on his blueprints and his designs to see that the house was properly constructed. Mr. Rutiepcr. We do that, sir, on, oh, perhaps half or three-quar- ters of the jobs that we do, primarily for private industry. Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, that is a very reasonable part of your obligation, if it is in the contract. Now, why didn’t you do it this time? It wasn’t in the contract ? Mr. Rurieper. Because the standard practice of the Bureau of Yards and Docks is to do construction supervision themselves. They have a very competent. staff for this purpose. Senator Stennis. All right. So it wasn’t in your contract, and you therefore had no responsibility at all to follow up on this and supervise the actual construction ? Mr. Rutteper. Except for the two items I have testified to. Senator Srennis. Those excepted ? Mr. Ruttxper. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Now, you must have something rather concrete and tangible in your mind as a basis for saying that this construction might have been improper. Now, what was it, Dr. Rutledge? Mr. Rutiepeer. I have no specific information about this construc- tion. I simply state this from experience in checking up other struc- tures. We frequently find individual points or certain details that exceed the specification limits, because it is almost a physical impos- sibility for the people who are supervising construction to check absolutely every detail. Senator Srennis. You are familiar with this matter. It became a matter of concern to both you and Mr. Kuss, and attracted con- siderable attention before it fell and, of course, after it collapsed. I imagine you discussed this matter considerably. Based on any re- . | ; | COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 281 ports that you had before or after it fell, what have you learned about this original construction being in accord with your specifications ? Mr. Rutieper. I think the major thing that we have learned is that the sea conditions in an extreme storm or hurricane can be much greater than anyone thought they could be at the time of the original design. Senator Stennis. My question, though, was, Mr. Rutledge—maybe I didn’t make it clear. What have you learned about whether or not the construction came up to your specifications? That is the ques- tion. Mr. Rutieper. The things we have learned specifically were that, first, the two braces were lost; that they had to be replaced; that in the replacement, the installation resulted in motion of the collars, which had to be corrected; that the upper minus 25—that the pin at the upper minus 25-foot level, that pin clearance in the holes was either larger or had increased to something larger than speciiied. Does that answer the question, sir? Senator Srennis. Well, I think that is getting down to it. Based upon that information and your professional knowledge, do you think that probably the construction was not up to your specifications with reference to pin tolerances and related matters? Mr. Rutieper. As far as I know, sir, at the time Mr. Crockett ex- amined this tower in, I believe it was, June 1959, everything was re- ported by him to be apparently within the design tolerances. Senator Stennis. I know, and I am not trying to get you to say anything. You are under oath. What I have asked is whether, based on your information, do you think the probabilities are, after all, that this construction did not come up to your specifications originally as to pin tolerances ¢ Mr. Rurieper. With only those exceptions, sir, I think that the tower was constructed properly and in accordance with specifications, and that when these, I would class, rather small deficiencies were cor- rected by 1959, that it was, in fact, in accordance with the design. Senator STENNis. So, if the construction was all right so far as these pin connections are concerned, then the deterioration was the result of wear? Is that correct? Mr. Rutiepcr. That is a point we do not know definitely, but ac- cording to the evidence, if the evidence is correct, that would be true; that the increase from one-eighth to three-eighths would be wear. Senator Stennis. And is it your opinion that that is what caused it? Mr. Ruruepcr. My opinion, sir, would be that we don’t know defi- nitely; that it could be wear or could be small changes in the original. Tn fact, there is no way of knowing. I might mention, of course, that these pins are designed with quite low stresses in anticipation of some wear. Senator Stennis. Well, we are about back where we started now with reference to the two alternatives. But, of course, the other tes- timony, Mr. Rutledge, as to the deterioration in the pin connections, shows a greater figure than you think is the correct figure as to the in- crease in tolerances. Mr. Rutiever. I believe, sir, that the figures contained in our re- port and shown by the photographs were very carefully taken and from what we can see of the figures, they look reliable. 252 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Stennis. Well, based upon your information, is that what you would call ordinary wear and tear for those pins? Mr. Rutrieper. It seems larger than ordinary wear, yes, sir. Senator Stennis. All right. Now, just a few more questions here. If the X-braces increased the net strength, and that is your opinion, I am sure, you said so and I believe you are telling the truth as you see it, why were they not in- cluded in the original design ? Mr. Ruriepcr. They were an emergency measure, sir, because the report immediately prior to their design and installation was an unusual and alarming condition of the pins at minus 25 feet. These were a means of correcting an existing structure, which we felt had the potential of being in a dangerous condition. We would not con- sider the above-water bracing a sound or economical solution for an original structure, but we were faced with what we felt might be an emergency situation. Senator Stennis. And that situation was the loss of the braces below the water, as well as the increase in pin tolerance ? Mr. Ruriepee. No, sir. At that time, there was no loss of braces below the water. There was the reported looseness of the pins at elevation minus 25 feet. The braces were still there and intact. Senator Stennis. So the X-braces were put in just to meet the situa- tion resulting from the looseness of the pins? CORRECTION OF OBJECTIONABLE MOTION Mr. Rutiever. And to correct or to improve the motion condition that the personnel had found objectionable. Senator Stennis. Well, that motion condition was due primarily to the looseness of the pins, wasn’t it ? Mr. Rutieper. I don’t believe so, sir. The motion was part of the fact that this structure is almost 300 feet above the ocean bottom and it sways, as any building or structure sways due to the elastic de- formation of the members. Senator Stennis. And it was swaying more than you expected it to when you designed it. Is that right? Mr. Rutiepcr. We analysed for the sway under design conditions and design stresses and our computations anticipated a sway of plus and minus 4 inches under design conditions, a total of 8-inch hori- zontal motion. Senator Stennis. Now, you refer to the personnel and to the ob- jections or the uncertainty engendered in their minds. You are talk- ing about the men that occupied the tower? Mr. Rutiepcr. The Air Force people, yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Did that situation exist over several years, so far as you know? Mr. Rurience. We were informed that the tower had swayed from approximately the time of original construction and Mr. Brewer’s measurements were measurements of the character of the sway. Senator Stennis. Now, I have another matter here. T think you have covered this, but I was reading the contractor’s testimony last night or yesterday and also the Navy’s. In substance, the contractor said that the Navy made the decision to attempt repairs at sea rather 4d gat we ee SS a ee COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 283 than take the tower back to port. The contractor said he approved the Navy’s decision. The Navy said the contractor made the decision, but that they approved the contractor’s decision. Now, what part did you have in that decision ? Mr. Rutiepes. Sir, I was on the supply ship, the Steers-M-K in Fall River at this time, or coming out of Fall River with Mr. Steers to get to the site. I had no part in the decision to which you refer. Senator Stennis. Did any of the members of your firm have any part in that decision ? Mr. Rutieper. Not to my knowledge, sir. BRACES TORN LOOSE DURING TOW AND UPENDING Senator Stennis. Now, perhaps everybody has understood except me, but is it true that the braces which were broken in upending were torn entirely loose from the rest of the framework ? Mr. Rutiener. Sir, my understanding is, and this is hearsay, that during the tow prior to the upending one of the braces was torn loose and actually came away from the structure and that during the upending process, the other brace was observed to break free of the structure. Senator Stennis. Two braces broke free of the structure ? Mr. Rurievce. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Before it was actually upended and put in place. Mr. Rutieper. That is what I have understood, sir. Senator Stennis. That is what I understood, but I wanted to cover it because there seemed to be a little confusion. LOOSE PIN CONNECTIONS Now, Mr. Kuss, may I refer back to your letter of April 1, 1960. It seems to me that it is very pertinent. In refreshing your recollec- tion, one paragraph reads as follows: The loose pin connections are a very Serious matter since there seems to be no way of satisfactorily remedying this condition. Furthermore, the condition is One which will tend to worsen at an increasing rate with time. This is be- cause the looseness induces impact stresses in the pins and pin plates which are greater than for the nondynamic design assumptions and will become increasingly greater as the play in the joint enlarges. Now, that just sounds like a whole lot of commonsense packed into a very few words to me. I know you thought that was correct when you wrote it and you still think so, is that right ? Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. Senator Stennis. Now, as I understand it, as to these pin connec- tions which were loose, there was no satisfactory way of getting at that and remedying the condition itself. Mr. Kuss. We had not been able to devise any. Senator Srennis. Yes. Mr. Kuss. I attended a meeting at the Stewart Aib Force Base to discuss this thing. They had their engineers present and I had one of mine and we spent the whole day trying to figure some way to fix those pins. We still hadn’t given up. We found no way at that time, but we still hadn’t given up. 284 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Kuss. As I mentioned before, I believe, we felt that possibly, if we got these above-water braces in, then we could go down and take out the old pins and at least put in a larger one. But you could not do that until the above-water braces were in. Senator Stennis. So that is when you installed the X-braces above the water. You never were able to do anything about the loose pins, were you? Mr. Kuss. No, sir, you see, we were able to examine the loose pins more carefully and we were still talking about them, but winter was coming and we couldn’t have done anything before the next year, anyway. Senator Stennis. Let me repeat this last sentence again : This is because the looseness induces impact stresses in the pins and pin plates which are greater than for the nondynamic design assumptions. That means that it is greater than the design assumptions that were cranked into the design; is that right? Mr. Koss. Yes, sir; I think that is another one of the practical statements. Senator Stennis. Beg pardon? Mr. Kuss. I think that is another one of the practical parts of the letter. Here is a member that is floating loosely in a hole and there is bound to be some impact. Senator Srennis. It is so plain and well worded that I was afraid I didn’t understand it, not being an engineer. However, it seems to me that you made it exceedingly clear. Your commonsense prediction there was that the looseness would become increasingly greater as the play enlarged. Do you have anything further? All right, Counsel. POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY Mr. Kenpatu. Mr. Rutledge, I believe you suggested the possibility that the looseness in the pins could have resulted from a contractor deficiency; is that right? The possibility ? Mr. Ruttencr. I would hesitate to call that a contractor deficiency. I would say it would not be unusual if a one-eighth-inch tolerance was specified and three-sixteenths of an inch actually did occur at one or two locations. Mr. Kenpatu. J believe the first underwater inspection was made in the fall of 1958? Mr. Rutiepcr. Yes, sir; I believe this was in September 1958. Mr. Kenpatu. And that revealed no slackness in the pin connec- tions ? Mr. Rurieper. That is right, sir. Mr. Kenpatu. If it had been the fault of the contractor, would not the slackness have been revealed at that time? Mr. Ruriepexr. Sir, this is a very difficult measurement to make, and in order to make it the keeper plates would have to be removed. These are the plates that hold the pins in position. To my knowledge, the keeper plates were not removed at that time. COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 285 Mr. Kenpatu. But it would be true that if the inspection was prop- erly made, that it could not be a contractor deficiency or fault ? Mr. Rutcener. If it were an accurate and complete careful exami- nation; that is correct. Mr. Kenpatn. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Senator Srennis. Mr. Rutledge, is there any further point, in view of the question that you have been asked, that you wish to make ? Or you, Mr. Kuss? You may confer with counsel if you wish, briefly. Mr. Suaw. Mr. Chairman ? Senator Stennis. Yes. Mr. Suaw. I have no doubt that counsel for the committee and the men that investigated this matter prior to these hearings checked into this matter. I have not heard any questions asked with refer- ence to two documents—three documents—that I think are quite sig- nificant as bearing on the slippage in the pin, as bearing on estimates in percentages of the tower. I would refer the committee to a document, a letter, dated Septem- ber 18, 1958, from Mr. Kuss to the Officer in Charge of Construction, having to do with the first diver inspection of Mr. Crockett. I would refer the committee to a communication from the Officer in Charge of Construction to the Air Force installation representa- tive, office, New England region, Boston, Mass., apparently dated Oc- tober 8, 1958. And I would refer, in that connection, to a further communication which appears to be an interfile memorandum at- tached to this letter reporting on an Officer in Charge of Construction conference of October 1, 1958, on stability of Texas tower No. 4. Senator Stennis. Who are the letters from, Counsel ? Mr. Suaw. I thought I had indicated that. Senator Stennis. I think you did but I didn’t hear. Mr. Suaw. The letter I referred to was from Mr. Kuss to the Offi- cer in Charge of Construction. The other was from the Officer in Charge of Construction to the Air Force. Mr. Kenpaty. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether those are in the record already, but we certainly have no objection to their being made a part of the record at this time. Mr. Suaw. I am quite sure they are not in the record and that is the reason I raised the question. Senator Stennis. Very good. We will be glad to insert them in the record at this time as an exhibit to Mr. Rutledge’s testimony and Mr. Kuss’. (The documents referred to are as follows:) SEPTEMBER 18, 1958. Re: Stability of Texas tower No. 4. OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION, Texas Towers NOy Contracts, Navy Building, Boston, Mass. DEAR Str: We were informed yesterday afternoon by Mr. Eugene Rau, of the firm of Steers & Morrison-Knudsen, contractors on the subject tower, that the diver employed by the Navy for inspecting this structure had found that the collar connecting the replacement brace to the “A” leg in the upper panel of the bracing was loose, that some or all of the 1-inch sheer bolts were missing, and that the cellar had a movement of approximately 1 inch up and down on the leg cylinder. This indicates, of course, that the brace is ineffective and further- more the opposite brace in the same panel and connecting to the “B” leg is also 286 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 useless since the bracing is of the ‘K” type, and the stresses in the two inner connecting diagonals are equal. This is a serious condition. In July we made a study of the strength of the tower if such a condition should exist. The results of this study were reported to you by letter of July 38, 1958, and indicated that with an allowed increase in stresses up to the yield point, the tower would stand moderately heavy weather. At that time we had no real reason to believe that the braces were not working, and since the stormy season was still some time off, we made no great issue of the subject except to recommend in our report that a diver be employed to inspect the bolted collars and that a program be inaugurated to measure tower deflections. As things stand now the diver inspection has been made with a resulting discouraging report, and also the beginning of the hurricane season has come. We are concerned that the tower cannot safely withstand a major hurricane with the braces in the present loose condition. We recommend that every possible effort be made to tighten the bolts connecting the two halves of the collars holding the two replace- ment braces. If possible the tightening of each bolt should be to a torque of 1,300 foot-pounds using a winch to pull the wrench. The collars should be tightened to a point where they do not move with respect to the legs, even if some bolts are broken and have to be replaced in the process. Only then can the problem of restoring shear bolts or connections be met. In the meantime, and if the collars cannot be tightened and the shear bolts replaced, we are compelled to warn you that a definite hazard exists to the safety of the tower and the personnel aboard in the event of a major hurricane passing directly over the tower location. Very truly yours, Moran, Proctor, MurESsSER & RUTLEDGE. TrmEODORE M. Kuss. OcroBer 8, 1958. From : Officer in Charge of Construction, Texas tower. To: Air Force Installations Representatives Office, New England Region, Boston, Mass. Subject : Stability of Texas tower No. 4. Encl: (1) Report of OICC conference of October 1, 1958, same subject. 1. This letter confirms information reported to Commander, 4604th Support Squadron on September 24, 1958, regarding the stability of Texas tower No. 4, and reports subsequent developments from that date to October 3, 1958. 2. The governing criteria (max.) for the design of the tower was as follows: Wind velocity : 125 miles per hour. Wave height: 35-foot breaking or 60-foot nonbreaking. Resulting allowable stress: (1/SC +50 percent, not to exceed 29,000 pounds per square inch. 8. After reports from the using activity that the tower seemed to move to a greater degree than the previous towers, the A. & E. was requested to compute the conditions under which the tower could be considered safe presuming that the upper bay of bracing in the A-B plane is inoperative. The results of this study are tabulated below: (a) 125 miles per hour wind plus 36-foot wave nonbreaking, or (6) 87 miles per hour wind plus 67-foot wave nonbreaking, with maximum resulting stress 30,000 pounds per square inch. 4. A recent inspection disclosed the following discrepancies : (a) The pin connecting the top strut to the B leg was partially retracted, although it appeared to be in full bearing against the fish plates. An emergency stop has been applied to this pin to prohibit further movement until equipment to make permanent repairs can be obtained. (b) The collar which connects the K brace to the A leg at elevation 65 was not tight around the leg. The 2-inch bolts did not exhibit the required torque, and the Dardelet bolts were sheared off. In effect, while these conditions pre- vail, this particular bracing panel is not functioning, and the modified stability conditions given in paragraph 3, (a) and (0), above would apply. 5. During the inspection the 2-inch bolts were tightened to the designed torque. Hence, at present, the tower is safe for greater wind and wave condi- tions than those quoted, but until the Dardelet bolts are replaced, will not reach the original design condition. ee COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 287 6. Special replacement bolts are now being fabricated, and will be installed as soon as available, consistent with weather conditions. 7. A copy of the notes taken at a conference held on October 1 is furnished herewith as enclosure (1). A copy of the inspection report will be forwarded when received. T. J. WHITE, Acting. Memorandum. From: 110. To: Files. Via: 100. Subject: OICC conference of October 1, 1958, on the stability of Texas tower No. 4, report of. 1. A conference was held on Wednesday, October 1, 1958, in the office of the officer in charge of construction to discuss the stability of Texas 'tower No. 4. The following personnel were in attendance: Mr. Ted Kuss representing Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, the A. & H. Messrs. Gene Rau and Robert Koch of prime contractor, Steers, Morrison- Knudsen. Mr. David Crockett, representative of Marine Contractors, the diving con- tractor. Captain Stark, Lieutenant Matheson, Warrant Officer Hardy, Air Force of Otis Air Force Base. Comadr. E. R. Foster and Joseph G. A. Riccio. Mr. J. FE. Donegan of Lincoln Laboratory. 2. The Marine Contractors representative reported the latest situation. 3. The A. & E. representative stated that if the top guy of bracing in the A-B plane was not operative, he felt a hurricane could cause serious damage and possible loss of the tower. He further stated that, in his opinion, with this bracing inoperative, the tower could withstand 87 miles per hour winds accom- panied by 67-foot nonbreaking waves. Captain Stark stated that the tower had already sustained 87 miles per hour winds with 55-foot waves for a 9-hour period. 4. It was concluded by the parties present, that the repair of the leak, which was discovered during the inspection, should be deferred if it required disturb- ing or moving of the bracing in any manner which would adversely affect the structural integrity of the tower. 5. It was agreed that the Dardelet bolts which sheared in the coilars, be re- placed with high-tensile steel T bolts. It is estimated that 3 weeks will be re- quired for delivery of the T bolts, and approximately 2 weeks diving weather to install them. The installation should be completed by November 15, 1958, weather permitting. Mr. Kuss mentioned that additional bracing of the template on the AB side only, and baffles in the oil tanks are being considered under the modification program, the feasibility study for which is now being prepared. Mr. Suaw. Could I also say this, that I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in handling my clients. Senator Stennis. We are delighted to have you here, sir. We think you have served the country and the committee. Mr. Kuss, do you have any further point you wish to make in view of the questions that have been asked you? Mr. Koss. I think not. Senator Stennis. All right. Now, the Chair again announces that as far as is now known, this will conclude the testimony in this hearing, unless the Navy or the Air Force wishes to present further testimony. It is again announced that we shall be glad to hear further from them if they wish. I do ask, however, that they notify the counsel or the director of the staff immediately if they wish to be heard further. All right, if there is nothing further, I thank you, gentlemen, very much. Your most fine attitude in coming here should be commended. I think you have helped the cause, as I say. The committee will have a report on this matter as soon as it reasonably can. 288 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 We are confronted with an amazing series of events, gentlemen. The design, fabrication, construction and upending of the tower rep- resented a difficult and far-reaching undertaking and task. It was no child’s play to construct the tower, to tow it from port, to erect it or to operate it. It was all most demanding. But it is an amazing series of events to me that from the time it was upended until it collapsed, years later, there was never a time, except for a short interval as I view the testimony, during which the tower even nearly approached its intended and its original design strength. This is not the time to assess blame. The committee is not trying to assess blame at this time. We are interested, as we announced in the beginning, in the strength of our military program, and our defense program, for which the Air Force and Navy deserve a great deal of credit. We are interested in following up the dollars that we in Congress take away from people to pay for this program and other Government programs. We want to strengthen the military and the armed services, not weaken them. We want to protect the individuals involved, contractors, professional men and all where protection is justified. I think this hearing has been timely in another way, if I may say so. It appears to me that the full development of these facts up to January 12, 1961, by the legisla- tive branch of the Government, affords a proper and a necessary back- ground against which any man in the military who may have charges preferred against him may be tried properly. Without the facts de- veloped here, I don’t see how it would have been possible, unless the military went through an inquiry similar to ours, to have gotten all the background facts and information in their true perspective. Now, I repeat that the committee has endeavored to refrain from inquiring into the facts in the case which occurred after January 12, 1961, which was 3 days before the tower fell. Those facts will be a major part of the matters in dispute in any court-martial proceedings that may be held, if they are held. Now, the chairman has not said a single word throughout all these hearings about the 28 men in the service and out of the service who lost their lives in this tragic occurrence. I have refrained from doing that, not because of lack of concern, interest or appreciation for the sacrifice that they made, and not because of lack of sympathy for their rela- tives and loved ones, but merely in an effort to keep this committee out of any inquiry except the hard facts involved in the design, construc- tion, repair, and operation of the tower. But I thought that before closing we certainly ought to express our great regret and respect as well as the utmost appreciation of the committee, the Congress, and the country for the service of these 28 men and the sacrifice that they made for their country. I think that they deserve the same recogni- tion, the same credit, as do those persons who died in actual combat, in time of actual war, and in battle. It certainly was a battle station to which these men were assigned and we bow in appreciation of their service and respect to their memory. They were patriots in every sense of the word. All right, with the thanks of the committee again, gentlemen, to all, the committee will now take a recess subject to the call of the Chair. (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.) O ear : ——-