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**THE INSIDE STORY OF
AUSTRO-GERMAN INTRIGUE**



The Inside Story
of Austro-German Intrigue

or

How the World War Was
Brought About

By

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And

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

ALL the facts in this book were supplied by Doctor Goričar who also wrote the original version of the text. This text was then largely rewritten, and put into its present form, by Mr. Stowe. Since, however, the information, experiences, and arguments are Doctor Goričar's, it has seemed best to use the first personal pronoun in spite of the dual authorship of the book.

THE PUBLISHERS.

AUTHORS' PREFACE

THE evidence presented in this book was gathered in the course of Doctor Goričar's fourteen years' service as a foreign representative of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It demonstrates, we believe, that the Central Empires deliberately brought about the war—planned it, prepared for it, wanted it, and feared only one thing—that they would not get it. Why? Their aim was a new division of the earth—a redistribution of the economic wealth of the world. What other nations had they coveted—and proposed to take by the sword.

How was this to be brought about? By the creation of an invincible Mittel Europa, separating Eastern Europe from the Western nations.

Concretely, the plan called for the conquest of Constantinople, the "cornerstone of the earth," the taking over of the heirloom of Turkey, and thereby the land and sea routes to Egypt, India, and Oceania.

The first feature of this programme was the weakening of Russia. Only a feeble Russia would permit herself to be shut off from the open sea to the south. Such weakening could be effected by conquest and partition only. This accomplished, the final dénouement would be the domination of Africa with all its resources, and this overwhelming predominance would bring in its train the over-lordship of Australia and South America.

The first step was to be a surprise attack on Serbia and Russia. Being unable to find—even after long

search—any justifiable pretext for war, the Central Empires, over a series of years, notably in 1908, 1909, 1912, 1913, and 1914, fabricated pretexts. If they had not found, in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, a most convenient excuse for war, the Foreign Office in Vienna would have continued its machinations against Serbia and Russia until it had succeeded in creating a *casus belli*. To unmask the plots of the Foreign Office at Vienna and show how it was the advance agent of Berlin in this grandiose scheme for world domination is the purpose of this book.

Fortunately, men and parties, in fact all the plotters and preachers of war against Serbia and Russia, have convicted themselves out of their own mouths. The authors have throughout allowed the conspirators to expose themselves, while they have sought to furnish the setting and atmosphere by giving occasional glimpses of the great stage on which the World War was rehearsed.

JOSEPH GORIČAR.

LYMAN BEECHER STOWE.

CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| INTRODUCTION. By ALBERT BUSHNELL HART | xi |
| CHAPTER | |
| I. The Coming to Power of the Austro-German War Parties, 1906-1909—Their First Plot to Create a Pretext for War Against Serbia and Russia. | 3 |
| II. The Second Attempt of Austro-German Diplomacy to Precipitate European War, 1909—How the War Plots Were Unmasked | 28 |
| III. Austro-German Plans for the Conquest and Partition of Russia—Bismarck Effectively Opposes These Plans | 49 |
| IV. The Ofener Hofburg War Conference, October, 1912—Bethmann-Hollweg Commits Germany to War, December, 1912 | 72 |
| V. Count Berchtold, Aehrenthal's Understudy, Concocts the Notorious Prochaska Affair—How the Third Attempt to Start the War Failed | 100 |
| VI. Berchtold's Albanian Comedy—Prince Hohenlohe's Mission to the Czar | 130 |
| VII. Bethmann-Hollweg Predicts War Between "Germandom and Slavdom," April, 1913—Austria's Ultimatum to Montenegro | 147 |

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| VIII. Tisza, Austria-Hungary's Man of "Blood and Iron," Comes to Power, June, 1913—Austria-Hungary Urges Italy to Join the Central Empires in European War, August, 1913 | 167 |
| IX. Emperor Francis Joseph Pronounces World War Inevitable, May, 1914—Tisza Counts on Half the German Army for War Against Russia, March, 1914 | 183 |
| X. Austria Selects Albania as the Cradle for the World War—The Recruiting of Volunteers for War in Albania, June, 1914 | 204 |
| XI. Count Tisza Constructs a <i>Casus Belli</i> Out of the Archduke's Murder—The Final Conference Between the Arch-plotters of the World War—Kaiser Wilhelm, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz | 216 |
| XII. The Military Chiefs Assume Complete Control of Austro-German Foreign Affairs—Count Forgach's Confession Explodes Theory of So-called "Critical Days" of World War | 230 |
| XIII. Russian Mobilization as the Cause of the War—A Glimpse Behind the Scenes in Berlin During the First Three Months of the War | 245 |
| XIV. Mobilizing Half a Million Men in America—How the Austro-Hungarian Consulates Secretly Raised an Army Behind America's Back | 266 |
| XV. The United States of Slavia—A Prerequisite for a United States of Europe | 274 |
| Appendix | 295 |

INTRODUCTION

THE history of a great war is never written while it goes on or in the decades immediately following. Archives are closed, the memoirs and private papers of participants are not revealed, the parties most interested try to throw a cloud about the causes, origin, and progress of the contest. We are only now beginning to understand the Crimean War of 1854, and are still in grave doubt as to the responsibility for war and peace in the struggle between Japan and China of 1904-05.

The World War has proved an exception, for we already know enough of the intimate reasons for the action of most of the great powers for a judgment on the ultimate responsibility, and even on the details of the period immediately preceding hostilities. Conquest and revolution have laid bare the written records. Generals and statesmen, in bickering with each other and trying to throw off unpleasant responsibilities, have furnished the evidence for their own condemnation. From month to month the tide of materials rises till mankind is at last able to pillory the sovereigns, the leading statesmen, and military chiefs of Germany and Austria-Hungary, as the authors of this terrific world woe and the unscrupulous engineers who, for the salvation of mankind, were at last "hoist with their own petard."

To make available for the public some of the accumulating knowledge with regard to the personal and national responsibility for the war is one of the purposes of Doctor Goričar. He has made himself master of many of the self-revealing books, articles, and speeches of the chief actors in the pre-war period. He has also made a personal contribution, drawn from his own experiences, on the official duties of the foreign representatives and agents of Austria-Hungary. He is aided by acquaintance with public men who helped to frame the great decisions, and by intimate knowledge of the situation and aspirations of the members of the mighty Slav race.

This book is therefore much more than a vivid statement of facts already known or surmised; it is a direct contribution of new views based on materials hitherto not accessible even to historical searchers. Every reader will feel that it is a living record of the conclusions of a man who has for years been in the thick of the complications and intrigues which he describes. It is a human document.

A few words should therefore be said as to the personality of the writer. Doctor Goričar is a Slovene; one of the few Slavs who were admitted by the German and Magyar heads of the foreign and commercial offices of Austria-Hungary to positions of responsibility; a man of education, a man of spirit, a man of skill in consular affairs. Yet he could not descend to be the tool of those who employed him. After long service in consulates in many widely scattered places, including Belgrade, he was found so impracticable that he was finally transferred to the United States as a kind

of punishment. In this new capacity he became aware of the system of keeping the official record of Austro-Hungarians in the United States who would be needed when the great war came. Just before the struggle began he returned to Europe and soon left the service of Austria-Hungary forever. The most vital part of this book is made possible by his wide experience in many lands and his connection with public men who sometimes told him momentous truths.

Not the least service is the revelation of the by-ways of diplomacy and influence habitually used by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. The book abounds in incidents and conversations which show us the web of intrigue—the hired newspapers, the forged documents, the artificial treason trials, the invention of outrages upon Austrian officials in other lands. Without undertaking a systematic account of the methods of Austrian diplomacy, the book in every chapter discloses a secret, deceptive, and prejudiced habit of mind from which would spring nothing but harm to other nations and eventual ruin to the Hapsburg Empire.

Doctor Goričar accepts as a fact the complicated and autocratic system of government in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and its historical background; the narrative shuttles to and fro from Vienna to Budapest, just as the combinations of the policies of Germans and Magyars have oscillated. As a Slav, caught in the cogs of this machinery, his sympathies are always with that depressed portion of the population of the former empire. To appreciate his book one must keep in mind the fundamentals of the mighty structure which has now crumbled into fragments. The approach to

the war tragedy brings out the main elements in the strength and weakness of Austria-Hungary.

In the first place, it has been a frontier land, set upon the easternmost edge of Roman Catholic Europe. In the second place, it has for ages been hemmed in between the Teuton, the Slav and the Turk, against whom it was a bulwark of Christendom. In the third place, it is made up of two central units, Austria with a population of 10,000,000 Germans (also 2,000,000 in Hungary), and Hungary with a population of 10,000,000 Magyars. Each of these units dominated a section of the Dual Empire, in which there was a Slav population of 17,000,000 in Austria and (with the addition of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were not strictly within the official boundary) 10,000,000 in Hungary; Rumanians, Italians, and some smaller elements added about 3,500,000 more, mostly in the Hungarian section, making the total of the Empire about 51,500,000 in 1910. From these figures it will be seen that the Slavs were in the majority in the Empire, and also in each half of the Empire. Yet such intelligent and capable people as the Bohemians, the Galician Poles, and the Croatians were submerged by minorities, and compelled to accept domestic and foreign policies contrary to their interests and certain to lead to foreign war.

Another element of the problem was the "*Drang nach Osten*," which was the sequel of the long wars with Turkey, and which made Austria a focus of intrigue and disturbance in the Balkans and eventually the enemy and obstacle of Russia. The Government of the Empire, notwithstanding the existence of elec-

tive parliaments, was practically in the hands of the hereditary nobility of Austria and of Hungary, acting through the governmental machine centred in Vienna in the person of the aged emperor, Francis Joseph, a machine usually called "The Monarchy."

No one is more alive to the weakness, covetousness, and profligacy of that government than Doctor Goričar, for he views it from within. His theme, however, is not so much a discussion of the faults of the Empire as an examination of three fundamental questions: (1) The criminal policy which it pursued in foreign affairs, including the partnership with Germany in a far-reaching plan of conquest and spoliation; (2) The enmity alike of Germans and Magyars to the Slavs, whether within or without their empire; and (3) The deliberate bringing on of the Great War to serve the arrogance and ambition of the ruling classes.

I. The first of these three lines of treatment is based upon the belief that for many years Austria-Hungary and Germany have been conspiring to bring about a war to despoil Russia of territory and wealth and at the same time to make impossible a Pan-Slav union. Doctor Goričar goes back to 1854 to show that Germany was at that time engaged in such a policy. In that period, when Prussia and Austria were rivals, drifting into a war for supremacy in Central Europe, it is hard to believe that they were also co-conspirators watching the opportunity for an eastern war. It is, however, undeniable that in 1878 Germany came to the rescue of the Austrian cause, gave to Austria a right of occupation which was expected to lead to annexation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and pried Russia away from Turkey.

This was followed by the break up of the *Drei Kaiser Allianz*; and in 1882 came the Triple Alliance with Russia outside and Italy inside. From that time it is undeniable that the two Central Powers had a common policy hostile to Russia; and that this pressure led Russia to direct alliance with France and indirect alliance with Great Britain, thus constituting the Triple Entente.

How far the combination of the two powers aimed at the violent destruction of the Russian Empire it is hard to say. The direct evidence of Doctor Goričar makes clear that prime ministers and foreign ministers and emperors looked that way. We have abundant proofs from other sources furnished by the lurid arguments of the Pan-Germanists who were always talking about the fertile lands and commercial opportunities of western Russia. Doctor Goričar sees only aggression and fraud on the side of Germany and Austria; and good temper, love of peace, and a spirit of concession on the side of Russia. Perhaps the colours are too strong in both of these pictures. What the book indisputably shows is that in 1908-09, and again in 1913, the Austrians were for war and the Germans were right behind them. He makes it clear that the World War was postponed from time to time because of the rush of new conditions brought about by the revolution in Turkey, the Balkan wars, and the interference of western European powers which, however, he seems to consider was a minor element.

II. The argument that the war was in essence anti-Slav is put with the fire and earnestness of a member of that gifted and distressed race. The book adds much

to the volume of evidence showing the unpleasant effect on the Dual Empire of the unexpected victory of the Slavs against Turkey in the War of 1912. He rightly includes the Bulgars as essentially a Slav people. Emperor William increased the German army because of the new possibility of a capable Slav military force in the Balkans. The Serbs raised their heads proudly, and the neighbouring Slovenes and Croats and Bosnians were aroused to a new sense of their degradation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From the point of view of the Magyar and the German such race and national elation was treasonable. As a matter of fact, Doctor Goričar makes it clear enough that they did not desire to be Serbs, but were simply on the watch for the opportunity to be free. No American who accepts the principles of his own government can fail to sympathize with that desire and to feel that the repression practised by the Austro-Hungarian Government and the sympathy of Germany were contrary to justice and the interests of mankind. Nor can any American be indifferent to the picture of a future Slav federation inspired by our own success.

III. The book was not written primarily to investigate the causes of the World War, but it throws a searchlight on the whole matter by its inside history of the events of the half dozen years preceding the war. The absorbing narrative places before the reader in quick succession the proof that the German Court, the high officials of the Foreign Office, the general staffs of army and navy, had a complete understanding with the Austro-Hungarians confirmed by frequent meetings and joint plans of action. The whole narrative

converges upon the decision of Austria to smash Serbia for the unpardonable crime of showing to the world that men of the Serb race could combine, organize, and fight.

That decision was reached long before the assassination of the heir to the Imperial throne. It was backed up by the Germans from point to point. The dispatches printed in the appendices make it clear that the pretences of the German officials, that they were not aware of the text of the Austrian ultimatum as it was actually presented, were clumsy lies. It is further proved beyond question that the cry about Russian mobilization was a camouflage. War was determined on; and it only remained, if possible, to put up some kind of paste-board excuse which would keep Great Britain out of the struggle.

With all the conclusions of Doctor Goričar the reader may not agree. That the book is a valuable contribution to the history of the rivalries and intrigues which preceded the war is certain. The lively style, the interest of the narrative, the personal touch, make it one of the essential books on the period. It also points out to the world the inevitable results of attempts to suppress minority races in an empire, and of the destruction of truth, honour, and human sympathy which come from a selfish, secret, and lying diplomacy.

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART.

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CHAPTER I

THE COMING TO POWER OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN WAR PARTIES, 1906-09

THEIR FIRST PLOT TO CREATE A PRETEXT FOR WAR AGAINST SERBIA AND RUSSIA

I WAS Acting Consul General of Austria-Hungary at Odessa, watching the slowly gathering forces of the Russian Revolution which were to culminate a decade later when in October, 1906, Baron Lexa von Aehrenthal became Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dual Monarchy. This was the crowning triumph of a long, ambitious, and arduous career. It placed Baron Aehrenthal practically at the helm of the Ship of State. In Austria the very existence of the monarchy and dynasty was dependent upon alliances with foreign powers. Hence the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to be in fact, if not in name, the head of the Government. Aehrenthal, both in personal characteristics and in antecedents, was typical of the modern type of Austrian diplomat. Through

his Jewish father he was affiliated with "Big Business"; through his mother, with the great land junkers of Bohemia. As a Slav I viewed his taking the helm with misgivings and even dread. He had been for ten years Ambassador to Russia. During this time he had become known in the inner circles of diplomacy as the chief alarmist regarding Pan-Slavism. With him it was a fetish, an obsession.

Aehrenthal now became at once the foremost exponent of a plan which represented the revival of the youthful ambition of his aged emperor and which always came to the fore whenever Russia showed signs of weakness. This plan aimed at the conquest and partition of Russia with the aid of Germany as explained in a subsequent chapter. Thus was Austria to be strengthened both internally and externally and the Hapsburg throne given a firmer foundation. The plan, originated in 1854 during the Crimean War, had several times been laid before Bismarck, but each time he refused, as we shall see, to back it. It had been brought up again as recently as 1904-05 when Russia was weakened from her war with Japan. This time Kaiser Wilhelm refused the bait because, taking advantage of Russia's temporarily impotent condition, he had extorted from her a commercial treaty the terms of which were so ruinous to Russia and so favourable to Germany as in a sense to make Germany the real victor in the Russo-Japanese War.

During the decade in which Aehrenthal was Ambassador to Russia he had made himself, as has been said, the greatest alarmist regarding the so-called Pan-Slav menace. Through the diplomatic and military spy system, which he developed to a degree undreamt of by the Czar's government, he became intimately acquainted with Russia's resources, potentialities, available equipment, and weaknesses. Finally came the Russo-Japanese War, with the defeat of Russia. Aehrenthal became convinced that Russia was now weak enough to be defeated by the combined armies of Austria and Germany, provided the blow could be struck before she had time fully to recuperate. From this time it became his consuming passion to precipitate a war with Russia.

Upon Aehrenthal's accession to the Foreign Office in 1906, his scheme was adopted with avidity by a powerful Court camarilla and at the Ballplatz, and received also the sanction and the patronage of no less a personage than the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The plan, however, was useless unless the unqualified support of the German Kaiser and his army could be secured, as is evident from what follows. The Kaiser gave it his instant and whole-hearted approval and agreed to back it to the limit with his vast military resources.

It is now easily seen why the Kaiser's backing was so readily secured. The Pan-German and

“Mittel-Europa” ideas required the crushing of Russia for their realization. The Balkan Peninsula was the backbone of the proposed Central European Empire. The Balkan States must either become the creatures of Berlin or they must be crushed. A strong and united Russia would never allow her small racial kinsfolk either to be absorbed or crushed by Austria or Germany. Therefore the crushing and partitioning of Russia were as essential to the grandiose Pan-German scheme fathered by the Kaiser as it was to the Austrian plan originated, or more properly revived, by Aehrenthal and fathered by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The war was to be brought about by picking a quarrel with little Serbia and then proceeding to crush her. This would, of course, bring Russia to her rescue and the real war would begin. This war would be fought with Russia, France, and Serbia on one side, and Germany, Austria, Turkey, and perhaps one of the other Balkan States on the other. Provided such a war was started before Russia recovered from the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome could not be doubted.

Not more than six months after the close of the Russo-Japanese War the Croato-Serb coalition came into being. On October 4, 1905, forty deputies of the Diet of Croatia met at Rieka (Fiume) and adopted a resolution, since known as the Fiume Resolution, in which they laid down as a general political axiom the following principle:

“Every nation has the right to decide freely and independently concerning its existence and its fate.” This resolution was promptly endorsed by the twenty-six Serb deputies of Croatia, meeting on October 16, 1905, at Zadar (Zara), Dalmatia. The soul of this movement was the Dalmatian patriot, Franjo Supilo.

Thus came to a close the long artificially stimulated hostility between Serb and Croat, and a new era, which menaced the intolerant dominance of the Austro-Magyar overlords, dawned. The Fiume Resolution created almost a panic of wrathful alarm at the Court and among the great nobles and the land junkers. This furnished fuel to Aehrenthal's fire. The war that he planned was to cure all internal ills and to keep the subject peoples where they belonged—under the heels of the ruling Germans of Austria and Magyars of Hungary.

Before he had been in office two months Aehrenthal ordered me transferred from the Odessa Consulate to that of Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. As a Yugoslav, speaking Serbian and intimately acquainted with both Russian and Balkan conditions, he apparently thought I could be useful to him in connection with his new Russian and Balkan policies. Accordingly, I was appointed Vice-Consul at Belgrade. It was my eighth post; I had served previously in Vienna, then Paris, Berlin, Bucharest, Jassy, Constanza, and Odessa.

It was a bitterly cold morning of mid-winter when I left my mountain valley home in Styria in the Austrian Alps to go to my new post. It was still dark as my sled found its way through the narrow gorges along the river, but when we came out into the broad valleys the Alps in their white mantle of snow lay before us, serene and majestic. I took the train from the old Roman town of Claudia Celeja, named for the Emperor Claudius and long the home of the redoubtable Counts of Celje, to go through Zagreb by the shortest route to Belgrade. My journey through the realms of Francis Joseph gave me ample time for reflection. Before reaching my destination I had to change trains no less than nine times. It was part of the policy of the Hungarian Government toward the Slavic province of Croatia to allow no through trains and to oblige all lines to converge in Budapest. All travellers from Trieste, Fiume, Dalmatia, or Bosnia, or in fact from any point in the southwestern portions of the monarchy, were hence obliged to go first to Budapest, no matter what their destination. In my case this was very much as it would be had one to go first to Chicago in order to reach New York from Washington, D. C. Half frozen though I was from long hours on ill-heated trains, as I approached my destination I was thrilled as always at the prospect of new problems to face and a new country to learn. Before leaving Russia I had discovered that our new government had

already begun to sow there the seeds of sedition and to add fuel to the revolutionary flames. I felt that our policy in Serbia would be at least as unfriendly.

I reflected with whimsical amusement that, were our Foreign Office familiar with the events of my early youth and training and the lasting impressions they had made upon my mind and heart, they might not have been so sure of my suitability for this particular mission at this critical time.

As I reviewed my early youth I realized that there were three events in particular which had made a lasting impression upon my life. The first was a small Sokol tournament in a little village in southern Styria, the birthplace of my mother. The Sokol is a society among the Southern or Jugoslavs which seeks to stimulate national pride and consciousness by means of athletic contests. As a boy I came to see this tournament on foot over mountain passes, and through pine forests. I was never so thrilled as when I saw my eldest brother march with the Sokols dressed as they were in snugly fitting drab uniforms, the coat hanging loosely over the shoulder to show the red shirt beneath. They went through their exercises on the drill ground with a skill and rhythm that would have done credit to the best-drilled soldiers. When I heard the speaker at the end of the meet say that all, old and young, must stand together to defend the sacred rights of our Slav nation, I

was moved to tears. From that time I realized that I belonged to an oppressed people, and to do my part in the winning of our national rights has been the task nearest to my heart ever since.

The second event which lastingly impressed me was the reading of a novel given me by my mother and written by her brother, Dr. Joseph Vošnjak. It was called: "Pobratimi," that is, "Brothers"—not brothers by blood but brothers bound together by a secret oath performed by mixing their blood and solemnly swearing to stand together throughout life for the highest ideals of their people and against all oppressors. The book depicted the epic struggle of my race against the German oppressors and made a profound impression upon me.

The third such event occurred when my father brought me to Celje, farther down the river on which was my birthplace, to enter the gymnasium there. Perched like an eagle's nest upon a high cliff overlooking the town were the ruins of the mediæval castle of the once-mighty Counts of Celje, the battlements of which had for centuries stood as a rampart against Turks and Germans alike. This was a wonderful, an inspiring sight to a mountain boy, but oh! the chagrin and disappointment when we were told that I could not enter the school because I did not know German, and the Government did not allow higher education in the Slovene language! Keenly as we felt our impotence my father and I were never drawn more

closely together than when this blow fell upon us. Such is, I believe, the effect of oppression the world over. These were the three decisive events of my early youth.

After losing a year in learning German I finally entered the gymnasium. When I learned that the Slavs in Austria were numerically superior to the Germans and Magyars and the other races, and that beyond our borders they occupied a territory extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, from East Germany to the Pacific, and when I heard of our long record of fine achievement, both in peace and war, my blood boiled at the insulting effrontery of the Germans and Magyars in always referring to us as an inferior race. When the school authorities discovered that we students of the so-called inferior race had formed a secret alliance of opposition and defiance toward all who slighted and belittled our race, and that we were learning Russian in secret, they notified a number of us that our presence was no longer desired. Thus, in the eighth year of my studies, I was obliged to leave. Only through the insistence of my uncle, the author of "Pobratimi," was I finally allowed to take the matura, or final examinations, in a Slovene town of Carniola.

In 1895 I entered the University of Graz to study law. Shortly thereafter, by order of the Vice-Governor, I was dragged from my studies and pressed into the army as a private to serve for

three years. My education entitled me to military service of one year only and after that to enter the school for reserve officers. Another uncle, Michael Vošnjak, for twenty years a member of Parliament and the organizer of the great coöperative banking system of Slovenia, vigorously intervened in my behalf and finally my military rights were grudgingly conceded by the Minister of War.

I passed my year of military service in Prague at the time of the Czecho-Slav Ethnographical Exposition. This is the city which Alexander Grimm, the great Franco-German traveller, called the third most beautiful city in the world. It was a never-ending delight to wander through the narrow, crooked streets of this picturesque Slav city on the Vltava in the heart of Bohemia and of Europe. Its palaces overlooked the magnificent park and the ancient Royal Palace stood like a citadel on the top of a steep hill looking down over the hundreds of church spires of the old city. The magnificent parades of the Sokols and their tournaments on the heights of Belvedere where 12,000 of them went through their exercises with the unity of one man, the never-ending pageants of the Exposition in the park, the multifold art treasures displayed, and the Slavic plays given in the great National Theatre, were a constant source of inspiration and delight to my thirsty soul. Here I seemed to see a whole people rising like a phœnix from its ashes—a people filled with vitality and energy

and the radiant enthusiasm of youth but in constant grapple with the omnipresent and sinister forces of a hostile government.

My military year finished I returned to the University of Graz in Styria. But here the Germanized student life with its copious beer drinking, its sabre duels, and its shallowness, combined with the insufferable arrogance of the German students, finally so disgusted me that I left. I resolved to leave the Austrian moral and intellectual prison and go out into the great world. As the best contrast to that which I was seeking to escape I first went to Paris, the *ville lumière*, and established myself in the Quartier Latin to study law and political economy at the Sorbonne and to seek in the art museums relaxation from my more sombre studies. It was in Paris that I came to realize that collaterally with the struggle between Slav and Teuton the furrows were ever being ploughed deeper between Teuton and Gaul.

Up to this time educated exclusively in German schools and instigated to despise the very name of my Slav parents I felt that here in Paris I had completely broken the chains which the German drill masters had tried to fasten upon me for life. I had already learned to read the Slavonic Bible and I had learned the old Cyrillic characters. I had also, in violation of the law, mastered Russian. I procured some Russian books directly from St. Petersburg and took them home to read during

my vacations. I read the voluminous "History of the Russian Empire" by Karamzin, the fables of Krilov, and the writings of Tolstoi, the great Slav apostle of peace. My Russian studies brought me some of the greatest revelations of my life. I was thrilled to discover how closely related was our Slovene language, spoken by only one and a half million people, to the tongue of the great Slav Empire. Although our ancestors had left Russia sixteen hundred years before our language had remained faithful in essentials to the parent tongue. Thrilling with the inspiration of Tolstoi's teachings of the universal brotherhood of man I finally returned to my mountain-valley home in the wondrous Alpine world. Trout fishing in the deep gorges with their roaring rivers, chamois hunting on the rugged slopes of the Styrian Alps, and all kinds of mountaineering filled my carefree days for some months. I have often wondered why I ever left my mountain paradise to go into the heart-breaking welter and tumult of a diplomatic career. Perhaps a pair of beautiful Oriental eyes was responsible. They belonged to a cousin, of about my own age, who had married an Austrian diplomat and to whom all doors were open in the great world of politics and diplomacy. She aroused my ambition and arranged for my entrance into the foreign service. I decided to finish my law studies and then to take the examinations for the service of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. I was the more ready to make this decision because some of our leading racial leaders, my uncles among them, had recently decided that we Slavs of the Dual Monarchy should enter governmental service when and where possible in order that we might have some voice at least in sharing and executing the policies of the government under which we were obliged to live. Thus it came about that I who had from childhood up felt an ever-growing repugnance to the government to which we were unhappily subject became a servant of that government. These reflections and many more passed through my mind as I approached the Serbian capital and realized that I was about to step into the centre of momentous events which might ultimately affect the whole world and the course of history.

Arriving in Belgrade I found the Legation in charge of a baron who had grown old in the service of His Majesty, but the real soul of the Legation was Major of the General Staff Joseph Pomiankowski, a Galician Pole, and one of the most zealous and unscrupulous "privileged" spies I ever met in the service. He was commonly called "Pomy." He seemed to be omnipresent and omnipotent, giving orders to everybody, including even his nominal chief. He was directing the policy of the Legation, inspiring its reports, and generally trying to make himself indispensable to his real masters, the General Staff. He radiated health,

energy, and aggressiveness, and was constantly instructing military and political spies and receiving their depositions. I soon found out indeed that our Consulate, also dominated by "Pomy," instead of devoting itself to its legitimate work of studying and bettering commercial relations, was deeply engaged in a feverish search for Pan-Serb conspiracies and conspirators.

One afternoon, after I had been installed in my new office, Consul Corossacz, who was in temporary charge of the office, a good-natured, inoffensive man, opened the safe and showed me a large photographic plate. On examining it I saw that it was an autograph letter from Prince Nicholas of Montenegro to King Peter of Serbia, in which a defensive and offensive alliance between the two countries was proposed. I knew that such an alliance was one of the standing bugaboos of our government. Upon my expressing some doubt as to the authenticity of this letter the Consul said with a good-natured laugh: "You are right. This is one of the documents which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found upon examination to be not genuine. We paid 2,000 dinars [francs] for it. We bought it from a former chef of the royal household who had been dismissed. He allowed us to photograph the letter and then restore it to him in order that it might be put back on King Peter's desk whence, as he alleged, he had purloined it. Well, for once we were taken in, but

we will make many good bargains to offset this bad one."

I handed the plate back to the Consul with a feeling of revulsion. Buying alleged royal letters from discharged chefs was to me a new and shocking kind of diplomacy and I was further disgusted to see that the personally inoffensive Consul regarded it as both a natural and legitimate transaction. I was soon to find that a swarm of individuals of the same character as this discharged servant were doing a flourishing business with our office at the expense of the taxpayers of Austria-Hungary.

Not long after my arrival as Vice-Consul in Belgrade an individual slunk into the back door of that little capital city who was to play a rôle in international affairs as important as he was himself insignificant. On his first arrival in Serbia he was, to use a bit of expressive American slang, "down and out."

Shortly after his arrival in Belgrade he published a pamphlet on the Jesuits of Bosnia in which he denounced the activities of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and the whole Roman Catholic propaganda. He represented himself as a Serb who had been ruined and persecuted by our government because of his pitiless exposure of Jesuitical plots. On the strength of this pamphlet and these representations, George Nastié, whose name was to become scandalously linked with the leading diplomats of the Dual Monarchy, wormed his

way into the students' club in Belgrade known as the Slovenski Jug, and had made himself perfectly at home there by the time Count Forgach, the new Austro-Hungarian Minister, arrived in Belgrade, in the summer of 1907.

On July 22, 1908, a cataclysm occurred in the Turkish Empire which greatly alarmed our government. On that day the standard of revolt was raised by the Young Turk Party in Macedonia. The Young Turks announced that as soon as they had overthrown the bloody and bigoted rule of Abdul Hamid they would open a parliament at Constantinople to which all the nationalities of the empire would be invited to send representatives and in which all should have equal rights. This announced intention to turn the Turkish Empire from a shambles into a happy family was for the moment accepted at its face value and hence aroused great enthusiasm among the polyglot peoples of the realm.

But this feeling was not shared by the Austrian Government. One of the many quarrel-fomenting and war-breeding provisions of the Congress of Berlin of 1878 was that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be temporarily occupied by Austria-Hungary while remaining under the suzerainty of the Sultan. As an inevitable result, the actual control of those provinces was in the hands of the Emperor of Austria, while the Sultan of Turkey exercised a nominal control. Our statesmen were

now greatly alarmed lest these provinces should be absorbed by a reformed and democratized Turkish Empire and that they might thus be forestalled in their ultimate intention to seize the provinces and make them integral parts of our empire. Whether the Young Turks knew of Austria's designs on Bosnia and Herzegovina and hastened their revolution in order to forestall them I do not know, but it is altogether probable that such was the case. I do know, however, that our diplomacy became almost hysterical in its redoubled zeal to demonstrate that the annexation of these provinces, in violation of international law and treaty rights, had become necessary to the safety and integrity of our monarchy.

In May, 1908, I was ordered to Nish, the former capital of Serbia and situated in the southern part of the country, to take charge of the Consulate. On July 22d, the very day the Young Turks started their revolution, I was called back to Belgrade and placed in charge of the Consulate General there.

On arriving at Belgrade I soon realized that portentous events were impending. Some of my colleagues freely expressed the opinion that we were going to create a situation in the near future which would force the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, I was not much surprised when I learned that George Nastič, whose very existence I had forgotten, had issued a pamphlet purporting to expose his experiences as a

member of the Slovenski Jug, the students' club into which he had forced his way, and alleging that it was in fact not a students' club at all, but a revolutionary society. Coming, as it did, on the heels of the startling events in Turkey, this pamphlet created a sensation.

Nastić asserted that the club was the chief medium by which the Serbian Government fomented revolution among the southern Slavs of the empire. He supplied lurid details of the club's activities. For example: to further its terrorist propaganda, it had bombs made at the Serbian military arsenal at Kragujevac. He himself, so he declared, had been sent to the arsenal to inspect the manufacture of these bombs, and they were finally brought to Belgrade and stored in the club. They were intended for use on Austrian soil but were finally diverted to another purpose at which Nastić represents himself as flying into a rage, leaving the club, and resolving to expose the whole conspiracy in order to avenge himself upon his companions. In September, 1907, he did in fact leave Belgrade and returned to Bosnia.

Nastić sought to support these assertions by some postal cards written him from Brussels by a member of the club. The pamphlet concluded with an alleged reproduction of a document known as "the statute of organization for the liberation of the Jugoslavs." This "statute" set forth as

the aim of the Jugoslavs the attainment of national unity through the establishment of a great Yugoslav Federation of Republics. To accomplish this purpose a revolutionary organization was to be developed.

Nastić originally attributed the authorship of the document to a certain Austrian Slav by the name of Milan Pribičević; later to several different authors; and finally to the Serbian Foreign Office. The original, while repeatedly called for, was never produced, although there was every reason why Nastić should wish to produce it and none why he should not.

By my colleagues in the Legation and Consulate these "revelations" were eagerly accepted as a convincing indictment of the Serbian dynasty, government, and people. By the Serbs, on the other hand, they were looked upon as an object of scornful mirth. The idea that a students' club with a few rooms on the main street of a town of 80,000 inhabitants, and with a reading room open to almost everyone, should be the headquarters of a huge revolutionary movement seemed to them ludicrous.

As a result of this publication, many arrests were made by the Austrian police. The first in the batch of "conspirators" were two brothers of the alleged author of the statute for the liberation of the southern Slavs, one a petty official in a remote town and the other a teacher in the theologi-

cal seminary of the Serbian Orthodox Church. They were followed by six schoolmasters of obscure Croatian villages, six petty merchants, two students, two Serbian priests, a forest guard, and the mayor of a small town. In all thirty-three people were arrested, not one of whom was a person of any prominence. They were taken in chains to Zagreb, thrown into prison, forced to associate with criminals of the lowest type, and refused the opportunity to communicate with counsel.

Now that George Nastić had become a notorious character, I resolved to acquaint myself more fully with his career and connections. I already knew that he was connected with our secret police in Vienna, Sarajevo, and Zagreb. I soon discovered that he was also closely associated with certain correspondents of German and Austro-German papers who had been evicted from Serbian soil because of their slanderous attacks upon the Serbian Government. After office hours in the beautiful summer days of 1908 I often went by boat up the Danube to Zemun, a Croatian town opposite Belgrade. Usually a party of us, from the German and Italian legations, as well as our own, went together. On these trips I frequently met a Jewish newspaper correspondent by the name of Steinhardt. He was one of the newspaper men who had been expelled from Belgrade and he now glowered across the river and brooded vengeance. I asked him, banteringly, one day

where he picked up his amazing tales of Serbian affairs. "All things," he replied, pointing to his head, "originate here, and I will teach the Serbian police that on Austrian soil they cannot reach me." Knowing that Nastić was a friend of his, I asked him if Nastić got his facts from the same source, to which he replied in the affirmative. My conversations with this resourceful yellow journalist of the East led me to believe that Nastić received from him at least the inspiration for his sensational pamphlet.

Toward the end of September I was ordered back to Nish. There I had begun to renew my many pleasant acquaintances among the officials and civilians of the city when on October 7, 1908, the news that Austria had formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina fell like a bomb into the quiet old city. Although they knew that I sympathized with them, my Serbian friends avoided me. It was generally felt among the Serbs that this was only the first step leading to events much more important and more tragic. This fear was increased by the fulminations of the German and Magyar press, which now became more vituperative than ever in their attacks upon the Serbian dynasty, government, and people. The Austrians took it for granted that Serbia's resentment would lead to war, and the Austrian Government proceeded with military preparations based upon that assumption.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought Aehrenthal an honour which he had long coveted. The Emperor raised him from Baron to Count and permitted him to drop Lexa, the name of his Jewish father, of which he was not proud. In spite of this reward, Aehrenthal winced under the all-but-universal condemnation of his lawless act throughout the world. Germany alone among the nations at once recognized and approved his act. This recognition had little weight internationally as everyone knew that it was merely Germany's necessary repayment in kind for Austria's condonation of the Kaiser's arbitrariness in the Moroccan affair. Aehrenthal craved justification for his act, or at any rate the appearance of justification. He wanted to impress the public, both at home and abroad, that the annexation was essential to the protection of the empire. All the subsequent feverish activities of the Ballplatz, through the medium of its "literary" or press bureau, to prove Serbia's guilt in anti-Austrian plots were justified on the same ground. Aehrenthal's Magyar colleagues were alarmed by the report that both Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, and even the old emperor himself, were disposed to look with some favour upon the Trialism programme as a possible cure for the Dual Monarchy's chronic disorders and wanted to frighten them away from the plan by some dramatic demonstration of the Pan-Serb menace.

Trialism contemplated the creation of an autonomous southern Slav state which should be linked to the Vienna Government very much as was Hungary. Thus would the Dual Monarchy be changed to a Triple Monarchy. This plan was very repellent to the Magyars of Hungary because it would end their power to oppress and exploit the Slavs and the other subject races. Subsequent events indicated that both Francis Joseph and his heir were as hostile to this plan as the great Magyar junkers themselves. It is probable, however, that they allowed their powerful and difficult Magyar subjects to believe that they favoured Trialism in order that they might use it as a club over their heads.

On November 4, 1908, Emperor William arrived at Eckartsau as hunting guest of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. In the stillness of this Austrian hunting castle, situated on a branch of the Danube below Vienna (the abode of ex-Emperor Charles, the last of the Hapsburgs before he went to Switzerland), an agreement was reached for common action between Austria and Germany. The "critical days" for Europe in this first crisis were in December, 1908, and also, as will be later seen, at the end of March, 1909.

By November, 1908, our preparations for war with Serbia were completed and I daily expected an order from the Legation to destroy all the evidences of the secret activities of my predecessors

and to leave Nish and Serbia by the shortest route and cross into Bulgaria. At this time I resolved to go to Belgrade and find out how matters stood at headquarters. On my arrival I called upon the then Chargé d'Affaires, Otto Franz, the Minister, Count Forgach, being absent. He greeted me with an outburst of wrath and bitterly reproached me for leaving my post at a time when our ultimatum to Serbia was expected hourly. I told him that I did not regard war as imminent unless our diplomacy were so unwise as deliberately to force it. I assured him that the so-called Pan-Serb peril was a nightmare conjured out of nothing more real than the distraught imaginations of our diplomats. I pointed out to him the absurdity of little Serbia being dangerous to our great empire—the second strongest military power in the world.

He violently repudiated my assertions and vehemently protested that Serbia would always imperil Austria's very existence until she was humbled and taught a lesson. He went on to say that Serbia was deliberately corrupting the Yugoslav leaders, especially those of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Bosnia. I retorted that as a Yugoslav I resented these accusations against my racial kinsmen and that he well knew that there was no valid evidence with which to support them. He replied heatedly: "On the contrary, we already have the proofs in our hands. We know how much each Yugoslav leader and each member of the Croatian

Diet has received for his support of the Croato-Serb coalition against us.

“You may have the names of these men and the amounts paid to each one, but I tell you that your so-called proofs for which we have paid so much of the taxpayers’ money are nothing but clumsy forgeries. As you know, some of the documents we have purchased have already been repudiated as forgeries by our own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

The next day I was peremptorily ordered back to Nish, but before leaving I had opportunity to observe the frantic efforts of our legation to gather material which should place on the shoulders of little Serbia the responsibility for the war which was now assumed to be imminent and inevitable. A confidant of one of the attachés told me that all the files of the Legation were being packed in readiness to be sent, some of them across the Danube into our territory and others to the German Legation. One of the Legation secretaries told me that they had been working nearly twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four for several days. Our new military attaché, Major Tanezos, was feverishly engrossed in gathering together through our spies, both military and civil, the final military data about the Serbian territory which he believed our armies were soon to occupy.

CHAPTER II

THE SECOND ATTEMPT OF AUSTRO-GERMAN DIPLOMACY TO PRECIPITATE EUROPEAN WAR, 1909

AND HOW BOTH WAR PLOTS WERE UNMASKED

BESIDES preparing public opinion in Austria-Hungary for war against Serbia and Russia, our diplomacy tried to inflame Serbian public opinion against us. Repeated attempts were made to incite the Serbs to some rash act which would serve as a pretext for war. Despite all such efforts the Serbs kept their heads and refused to furnish us with the desired pretext for a declaration of war. The two pillars in this campaign to arouse the war spirit in both countries were the "Literary Section" or Press Bureau of the Foreign Office in Vienna and our legation in Belgrade. The latter furnished the material and the former skilfully disseminated it among the press organs controlled by the Ballplatz. It was in the midst of such stirring scenes and events that I returned heavy hearted to my post in Nish where I was retained but a short time before being recalled to my former position in Belgrade.

To stimulate the war fever in Austria, the Ball-

platz brought forward charges of a widespread Pan-Serb conspiracy. Numbers of obscure individuals were arrested. In January, 1909, I learned that fifty-eight Serbs awaited trial for high treason in the prison at Zagreb. It was not until the middle of January, nine months after the arrest and imprisonment of the first prisoners, that they were indicted. And it was not until March 3d that their trial began at Zagreb.

Meanwhile, in February, 1909, the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, the propaganda organ of Count Aehrenthal, had printed as a *ballon d'essai* "that the question of a European mandate to Austria-Hungary for a 'punitive expedition' against Serbia or even the occupation of Serbia was under consideration among the Great Powers, because of the Serbian armaments and for other reasons." This was to repeat Austria's coup in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 which provinces were also "temporarily" occupied at the "request" of the signatory powers of the Congress of Berlin.

Moreover, on March 6th, Count Forgach, our Minister to Serbia, by direction of Count Aehrenthal, informed the Serbian Government that we should refuse to lay the proposed Austro-Serbian Commercial Treaty before the Parliaments of the Dual Monarchy for ratification unless their attitude toward us was immediately and radically changed. In the meantime, we had massed 200,000 troops on the Bosnian border. Count Aehrenthal

notified our Belgrade office that five high officers of the General Staff had been sent into Serbia on "special mission." Their real names and fictitious names were given in case these spies should be in need of consular protection.

At this point Serbia issued a circular note to the powers placing her case in their hands and requesting that representatives of the powers investigate the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and report upon them. She expressed her willingness that Austrian representatives should be present and should have access to all the evidence, besides offering their own evidence. She also renounced in advance any indemnity in case it should be found that she had been wronged by Austria-Hungary.

In the meantime, Count Forgach feverishly awaited an ultimatum from Count Aehrenthal and countless cipher telegrams passed between them. At this critical time I was suddenly recalled from my Belgrade post and returned to Vienna to learn what fate the Foreign Office had in store for me. On arriving in Vienna I reported at once to Baron Sonnleithner, the head of the Consular Department of our Foreign Office. After greeting me with studied lack of courtesy he broke out upon me with the wrathful words: "Politically you have failed to live up to the expectations of the Ministry." On my suggesting, during the ensuing conversation, that I be sent back to Russia, where

I was already so well acquainted with conditions, he exploded with so vehement a negative that I realized that my services in Slav countries were no longer wanted. Instead, he told me to prepare myself to sail for the United States where I would be employed in future. I spent the month before my departure for America in watching at headquarters the further manœuvres of our diplomats to precipitate war against Serbia and Russia. Before the end of the month, in fact, we were to present an ultimatum to Serbia, and simultaneously Kaiser Wilhelm would send an ultimatum to Russia demanding the recognition of our annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On March 24, 1909, I learned that this long-awaited ultimatum had finally been sent to Count Forgach in Belgrade. On the same day there appeared in the Vienna papers an interview with a "high Austrian diplomat in Belgrade" (presumably Forgach himself) in which the diplomat said that he expected the ultimatum that evening and that it would be presented the next day. Further, he stated that it might well happen that there would be no declaration of war, just as was the case when Frederick the Great attacked Silesia; and Japan the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. The interview concluded with the following question and answer:

Correspondent: "Could the departure of the Minister be interpreted as equivalent to a declaration of war?"

Diplomat: "Count Forgach might even hear the first shots fired while stepping over the threshold of his palace."

The same day a Budapest paper said: "The responsible factors in the monarchy believe that it is both feasible and desirable to do away with Serbia at this time." And it added: "Such favourable conditions for the war could hardly be expected to recur in the future." Herr Von Wekerle, the Hungarian premier, declared: "If the maintenance of peace does not prove feasible at this time it is best that the poison-tongue of the Balkans be pulled out at once. It is by no means advisable to wait until the at-present-weakened Russia sufficiently regains her powers to take the field against ourselves and Germany. It is much more judicious to fight at once."

In the midst of these breathless events, while the Austrian and German armies were poised like hawks awaiting their prey in Serbia and Russia, the astoundingly disconcerting news arrived on March 25, 1909, that the latter countries had meekly accepted the Austrian and German ultimatata and had dutifully recognized as legal the notoriously illegal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thanks to Russia, the World War had been averted—for the time being. But the crisis left behind an incident destined to become famous—or infamous—in history. The incident was the

suit for libel arising out of the notorious "Friedjung Documents." Among the most inflammatory articles that had appeared in the Austrian press at the time was one written by Professor Friedjung, the foremost living Austrian historian. It was printed in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* on the day on which the Austrian ultimatum was delivered in Belgrade. In this article Friedjung scored the "insolent attitude" of Serbia toward the Dual Monarchy and gave our whole list of grievances against Serbia from the time of the accession of her present dynasty. The main accusation was that "Pan-Serbian conspirators were seeking to erect a great Serbian empire on the ruins of Austrian and Turkish rule. The Croato-Serb coalition is directed from Belgrade and large gifts of money to influential Serbs in southern Hungary and Croatia are nourishing the alliance between Croats and Serbs."

In support of these familiar accusations, Doctor Friedjung quoted a confidential report alleged to have been sent by Doctor Spalajković, Serbian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Premier Pašić, in which he gave a detailed account of his meetings with a representative of the Croato-Serb coalition on Croatian territory, opposite Belgrade. This man, a member of the Croatian Diet, offered in the name of the coalition to place five newspapers at the disposal of the Serbian Government for the modest sum of 12,000 kronen (about

\$2,400). Professor Friedjung further asserted that M. Supilo, the founder and head of the coalition, had urged the Serbian Premier, Doctor Pašić, "to spend his summer holidays on the Croatian Coast in order to be in touch with his political friends." In conclusion, Professor Friedjung challenged: "Should any of the heads of the Serbian Government dispute any of these assertions they would be supplied with further details and would be given the names of Croatian deputies and the amounts of money paid to them from the Serbian treasury."

The Professor then repeated the revelations made by George Nastić in his pamphlet, "Finale," with which we are already familiar. This article, which was entitled: "Austria-Hungary and Serbia," exploded like a bomb not only in Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but throughout Europe generally. It contained the first concrete charges against the Yugoslav leaders who had been engaged in alleged treasonable relations with the Serbian Government, and these charges were made not by an obscure and disreputable individual like Nastić, but by an historian of international reputation. Friedjung was the author, among other well-known books, of the great work entitled: "The Struggle for Predominance in Germany," in which he sought to prepare the Austrian Germans for the dominance of Germany over Austria, which he rightly saw would result gradually but inevitably from their

defeat at the hands of the Prussians at Sadowa in 1866. He was, in fact, the first exponent of the Middle Europe idea which has since been more fully expounded by Naumann, Rohrbach, and others, and the foundations for which later seemed to have been laid in the World War by the successes of German arms in the Near East. It was known also that he bore the same intimate relation to the Vienna Government as did the great publicist, Maximilian Harden, to that of Berlin. When it appeared that the war was inevitable, Professor Friedjung was asked by Count Aehrenthal to prepare a series of articles which would provide the great indictment of Serbia. These articles were prepared from material furnished by the "Literary" Bureau. When in the evening of March 24th Professor Friedjung learned that Russia was not going to back up Serbia, he tried to withdraw the article in question, but it was too late.

Two days after the publication of Professor Friedjung's article two members of the Croato-Serb coalition, in a telegram to the *Neue Freie Presse*, declared the Professor's charges against the coalition to be "pure inventions" and challenged him to name the guilty persons. Friedjung declined to give the names, but said that he was ready to face court action and would produce before the court "proofs of his assertions." He added that he was fully competent to "distinguish genuine documents and historical sources from the false

ones." At the same time Messieurs Supilo, Pri-bičević, and Lukinac started suit for a slander against the *Reichspost*, the organ of the Christian Socialists, which had made charges against them similar to those made by Professor Friedjung. Simultaneously Doctor Spalajković, the Serbian Under Secretary, denied all the charges which Friedjung had made against him. Thus started the second of the famous so-called high treason trials, only in this one, unlike the first, the anti-Serbs were the defendants.

Aehrenthal and Forgach realized that the Friedjung charges were unable to withstand even the meagre degree of impartial investigation which an Austrian court in political cases sometimes afforded. Hence, through intermediaries, they hastened to bring to bear all their powerful pressure for an out-of-court settlement. Unfortunately for them, in this case they had brought their charges against men who were powerful even though members of despised and subject races. As a result their pressure was successfully resisted and the to them unwelcome trial had to proceed. It was constantly postponed, but finally on the ninth day of December, 1909, in a Viennese court, it opened.

I was already at my new post in America, serving as Vice-Consul in Denver, Colorado, when the news of the opening of the great trial reached me. I carefully examined the documents as they were

published in the course of the trial and found that all but two were familiar to me, as they had been gathered during my service in Serbia. I found also that I had challenged the genuineness of several of them and had protested both to Count Forgach and the First Secretary, Mr. Franz, against their use. Among the documents, furthermore, there was not one whose charges were not perfectly familiar to me and indeed to everyone who knew anything of the relations between the Jugoslavs and the Budapest and Vienna governments. It all boiled down to the old, old charge that the Jugoslav leaders of our monarchy were in the pay of the Serbian Government in their efforts for unity among Croats and Serbs inside our borders.

In support of his charges Professor Friedjung submitted to the court twenty-four documents. Like the Government's evidence in the former trial, they were offered in German translations and not in the original. Furthermore, they were not given complete, but merely as fragments. Of these twenty-four documents, nineteen were alleged minutes of the Slovenski Jug. On these there appeared six names. Of these the three more prominent were those of Professor Božidar Marković, professor of criminal law at the University of Belgrade, who was president of the club; a former president of the Serbian Parliament, and a former Minister of Education in the Serbian Cabinet.

The five remaining documents consisted of: a circular issued by the Governor-General of Croatia; the report of Doctor Spalajković to the Premier already referred to; a telegram of the Serbian Minister in Petrograd; a telegram from the Serbian Consul in Budapest to the Serbian Foreign Minister, and a confidential order of the Serbian Foreign Office.

Professor Friedjung concluded his defence with these words: "My life work has been historical research, and thus my defence takes the form of a chapter in a historical work, the history of the Balkan problem. I have spoken to you gentlemen as my judges, but at the same time I address my fellow historians, who will also give their verdict as to whether in examining these documents I have acted critically and conscientiously, sifting the true from the false. Every impartial person will, I am sure, admit that I have built upon the sure foundation of reliable documents, and hence I await with complete calm the final verdict of the jury."

When the Professor had finished, Doctor Funder, the editor-in-chief of the *Reichspost*, gave his defence. He was more specific than Professor Friedjung in referring to the sources and authenticity of their documents. He said: "I know their origin; in most cases I know how they were obtained and how carefully their authenticity was tested." He said finally that his attacks in the *Reichspost*

were based mainly upon the report of Doctor Spalajković to the Serbian premier, Doctor Pašić, a photograph of the original of which document had been shown to him and to Professor Friedjung.

The alleged minutes of the Central Committee of the Slovenski Jug for February 26, 1908, showed that at a meeting held on that day, 6,000 dinars (about \$1,200) was appropriated to be sent to M. Supilo, the head of the Croato-Serb coalition, to be used by him in the "impending elections" to the Diet of the Triune Kingdom in Croatia. The prosecution proved that the elections in question had taken place fourteen days before this meeting was held and this money appropriated. On being presented with this dilemma Professor Friedjung said that the money must have been intended for use in a later election. He had to abandon this supposition, however, when it was shown that the resolution by which the money was appropriated stated that it was to be used to help defeat the candidates of "The Frank and Starčević party," and that these candidates had already been defeated two weeks before the date of the alleged meeting. Unable to parry this blow, the learned historian contented himself with an apologetic admission that he had failed to verify the date on which the election actually occurred.

At this point in the trial there appeared, from the point of view of the eminent historian, a very unwelcome volunteer witness. This was Professor

Božidar Marković, the president of the Slovenski Jug, the alleged revolutionary society. Professor Marković took the stand and quietly pointed out to the court that the alleged minutes of meetings held October 20th and October 21st, at which he was represented as presiding, could not be genuine since he was in Berlin on those dates attending lectures on criminal law. He added that his statement could readily be verified by reference to the Berlin police, to whom he had reported his arrival and departure as well as to the hotels where he stopped and where his signature could be found on the registers. This statement caused great excitement in the court room, and the Berlin police were at once communicated with. While their reply was awaited, the Professor continued his testimony. He stated that no central committee had ever existed; that no reports of the secretary's activities were ever submitted to Prince George; that no one by the name of Jovanović, whose name appeared in one set of alleged minutes as vice-president of the club, had ever held that office; that as he had never been in Salonica in his life he could not have there conferred with the Young Turk Committee as he was represented to have done; that the non-existent central committee of the club could never have conferred with a guerrilla band committee regarding the outfitting of raids into Bosnia; that one Milan Stefanović could never have signed their minutes

as secretary as they had never had a secretary of that name; and that the club was founded in 1902 and not in 1904 as stated.

While the court, and indeed all Austria, awaited Berlin's report on Professor Marković's alibi, another uninvited and most unwelcome witness made his appearance. This was Doctor Spalajković, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Serbia, and the alleged author of some of the documents upon which the defence rested its case. Taking up the report headed: "Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Political Department, Belgrade, June 4, 1907, Confidential No. 3027," he pointed out that the total number of confidential reports issued by the department during the entire year of 1907 numbered only 1991 and that the numbers used between June 1st and June 30th ran from 832 to 1040. Turning next to the documents upon which Doctor Funder had stated that he chiefly based his charges, he called attention to the fact that it bore the number 5703 while the highest number actually used by his department on the day in question was 367; also that the paper was signed by a cashier as well as himself, whereas no cashier had ever signed a political report in the Serbian Foreign Office or had ever been connected with the political department. He also asked the jury to note that this report, dated June 4, 1907, spoke of a certain loan which was to be negotiated that coming fall, whereas he had personally com-

pleted the negotiations for this loan in Geneva a year previous to the date of the report. After he had pointed out many more such inconsistencies he expressed the readiness of the Serbian Government to have representatives of the Great Powers, including Austria, visit Belgrade and personally verify the accuracy of his statements and publish their respective findings. As a parting shot Doctor Spalajković remarked: "There are clever forgeries and stupid forgeries, and those contained in the Green Book of the eminent Austrian historian do not belong to the former category."

After the cross-examination of Doctor Spalajković, and after the court had admitted the accuracy of his statement about the loan having been negotiated a year previous to the time stated in his alleged report, two perverse handwriting experts, Austrians at that, both testified that the author of the reports, attributed to the Serbian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was evidently a person imperfectly acquainted both with Serbian grammar and orthography!

On the 21st of December the eagerly awaited report from the Berlin police arrived. It established Professor Marković's alibi. That two of the most important documents in evidence were forgeries was now admitted not only by the court but by the defendants. We wonder with what degree of satisfaction Doctor Funder recalled at this point his remark when he announced to the

court: "The genuineness of our documents is demonstrated not merely by the character of each individual document, but far more by their mutual connection and interdependence. As soon as any part of these documents is proved to be unquestionably genuine the whole chain of evidence is complete and irrefutable." Perhaps he recalled this expression with as much gratification, however, as did his co-defendant his appeal to his fellow historians when he said: "I address my fellow historians who will also give their verdict as to whether in examining these documents I have acted critically and conscientiously, sifting the true from the false."

The next morning, while the trial was proceeding, there appeared on the scene Dr. J. M. Baernreither, a leading Austro-German member of the Reichsrat, and a man known to be in the confidence not only of Count Aehrenthal, but of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. At the request of this dignitary the court adjourned in order that he might confer with the litigants. Doctor Baernreither drew M. Supilo and his colleagues aside and urged them for the reputation of Austria and the dynasty to drop their suit against Professor Friedjung and accept his retraction of the charges against them. He promised them that, if they would do this, the bitterly resented absolute government in Croatia would be modified and they would be given a voice in it. This was the kind of appeal

to which no one in an absolutist country like Austria or Hungary could turn a deaf ear without incurring the implacable hostility of the Government and thus becoming the victim of constant persecution. Taking all this into consideration, and also realizing that the trial had gone far enough fully to vindicate their reputations and to blacken those of their opponents, they accepted the Deputy's proposition and agreed to receive Professor Friedjung's public retraction in place of a verdict against him. After this agreement was made the puppet court was reconvened and the puppet defendant called upon for his retraction. Whereupon the eminent historian, whose scholarly tail feathers had suffered so sorely in the service of his Emperor and his country, was required to rise and make the following retraction:

"I made all the assertions in my articles after thorough examination and only reached the fundamental views expressed after conscientious consideration of all the circumstances before me. I am no swashbuckler, however, and know how to appreciate the importance as evidence of Professor Marković's stay in Berlin now officially confirmed. I therefore conscientiously acknowledge that the two documents of October 20th and 21st must be eliminated, and I should no longer like to base any claims upon the remaining documents. Having made this declaration I can say with a clear conscience that in my whole attitude in this affair

and also in to-day's declaration I have had in view solely the welfare of our common Fatherland."

With these lofty sentiments the once famous and now notorious scholar took his seat, the court adjourned, and the greatest international politico-legal farce and scandal of recent times came to its abrupt end.

Meanwhile, also, the Zagreb high treason trial came to a close. On October 5, 1909, after the trial had been dragged out for fully five months, or fourteen months from the arrest of those first accused, thirty-six of the fifty-eight accused were found guilty of high treason and twenty-two were acquitted. In spite of the law which fixes death as the only penalty for high treason, terms of imprisonment were inflicted upon those pronounced guilty. The court accompanied the verdict with this statement: "The court has relied upon the evidence of the so-called crown witness, George Nastić, only in so far as it was by other unquestionable evidence or documentary proofs supported. The rest of the evidence the court has rejected as irrelevant." Thus ended the first great treason trial—in a fiasco.

Not long after this the Septemviral Table, the Court of Appeals of Croatia, set aside the verdict on the ground that the evidence produced by the public prosecutor failed to prove high treason. The thirty-six persons, some of whom had now been in prison under constant punishment for alleged

refractory behaviour for more than a year, and in association with the lowest common criminals, were set free and declared to be innocent. One may imagine that these individuals were scarcely in a frame of mind and body to be grateful for the good character which their government had finally given them.

Nearly a year later a Belgrade journalist by the name of Vasić confessed to M. Supilo that he was the Milan Stefanović, the alleged secretary of the Slovenski Jug, in whose handwriting, according to the testimony of Professor Friedjung himself, all the minutes were written—the mysterious secretary whose very existence was unknown to Professor Marković, the president. Vasić further admitted that he made these forgeries in the Belgrade Legation with the knowledge of the Minister, Count Forgach, himself. Each document was then photographed and these photographs were sent regularly both to Count Aehrenthal and Archduke Francis Ferdinand. In December, 1910, Vasić was brought before a Belgrade court, and, on his own confession, condemned to five years' imprisonment. The confession of Vasić made such a stir that Count Aehrenthal finally felt obliged to make an explanatory statement. Accordingly he explained in his organ, the *Fremdenblatt*, that "he [Vasić] belongs to the category of individuals which . . . in critical times press their information upon diplomatic agents. His state-

ments were received," he added, "by a subordinate clerk of the Belgrade Legation until their worthlessness became apparent." Although perhaps not so intended, this statement of the noble count was an official admission of the worthlessness of the documents upon which Professor Friedjung and Doctor Funder had based their charges, which were to serve as a basis for a great war. In Vasić I recognized one of the many shady individuals with whom our legation had had clandestine transactions during my service in Belgrade.

I now watched with interest to see what means would be used in the effort to rehabilitate the tarnished reputations of my former chiefs and colleagues in our Vienna and Belgrade offices. The faithful Forgach, after the Emperor had made him a Privy Councillor for his efforts, was banished as Minister to the Court of Dresden for their failure. Otto Franz was also sent to Dresden, but without even the empty title of Privy Councillor as a consolation. To go from Belgrade, at that time the seething centre of Near Eastern politics, to Dresden, the centre of nothing except memories, was indeed a setback for ambitious diplomats. My former chief, Herr Hann von Hannenheim, was sent for political fumigation to Montreal, Canada.

Count Aehrenthal and his associates were indeed under a cloud. They had not only failed to justify

in the eyes of Europe the illegal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and failed to bring on a war with Serbia and Russia—a war so eagerly coveted by their party—but they had actually fastened upon themselves and upon Austrian diplomacy the obloquy of aiding and abetting forgers and forgeries. And worst of all, perhaps, in a monarchical country they had placed a stigma upon the head of the heir to the throne. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the patron if not the actual head of the War Party, of course suffered a diminution of prestige in common with his followers. The old emperor was said to be very angry at the methods which had been employed, although it is more probable that his anger was aroused chiefly by their lack of success.

CHAPTER III

AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR THE CONQUEST AND PARTITION OF RUSSIA

BISMARCK EFFECTIVELY OPPOSES THESE PLANS

BEFORE proceeding with my personal narrative I will introduce the reader to the origin of the Austro-German plans for the conquest and partition of Russia. The world drama is a continuous performance. One scene kaleidoscopically follows another in quick succession. The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the critical period following before the curtain was rung up for the World War were merely the epilogue to the drama of intrigue which opened with the Russo-Japanese War, which itself marked only the revival of plans originated during the Crimean War. Those who witnessed the culmination only of this titanic drama naturally found it as illogical and inexplicable as thunder and lightning coming out of a clear sky. It is to such observers that Prince Bismarck's revelations on Austria's and Prussia's intrigues in the Crimean War should be recalled in order that they may see in proper perspective the managers and stagehands of the World War.

The Teutonic war parties of the World War were in fact merely the reincarnation of the Austrian and Prussian war parties of the Crimean War. In Berlin as well as in Vienna there was at the time of the Crimean War, according to the testimony of Prince Bismarck, a powerful war party urging immediate war against Russia. The propaganda for war against Russia in 1854 was spread chiefly by the Berlin newspaper, *Preussisches Wochenblatt*. Bismarck said: "The party of the *Wochenblatt*, as it was called, played a curious double game. I recollect the comprehensive memoranda which these gentlemen interchanged among themselves, and how by imparting them to me they even sought, now and then, to win me over to their side. The aim specified was the dismemberment of Russia (*Die Zerstückelung Russlands*), by the forfeiture of the Baltic provinces, including St. Petersburg, to Prussia and Sweden, the loss of the entire territory of the Republic of Poland in its widest extent, and the disintegration of the remainder by a division between Great and Little Russia."*

On what grounds was dismemberment of Russia proposed? "In justification of this program" (for the dismemberment of Russia), Prince Bismarck says, "the theory of Baron Von Haxthausen-Abbenburg ('Studies of the International Economy of Russia, the Life of the People and in Partic-

*Bismarck's "Reflections and Reminiscences"; Transl. by A. J. Butler, Vol. I, pp. 119-120.

ular, the Agrarian Institutions') was made use of; namely, that the three zones, with their mutually supplementary products, could not fail to secure predominance in Europe to the hundred millions of Russians provided they remained united. From this theory grew the corollary that the natural bond between us and England should be developed with the added dark insinuation that if Prussia and her army served England against Russia, England on her side would further the Prussian policy."*

From the above, it appears that the dismemberment of Russia was proposed on the ground that if the Slavs, especially the Russians, remained united, they would inevitably attain preponderance in Europe.

The official propaganda for the dismemberment of Russia in 1854 was conducted by Bethmann-Hollweg, uncle of the Bethmann-Hollweg of the World War. It was financed by him and other big capitalists, whose relatives later played leading rôles in bringing about the World War.

"The active and practical realization of these hopes," Bismarck continues, "was confined to the little circle of the Court opposition, which, under the name of the Bethmann-Hollweg group, tried to win over the Prince of Prussia to themselves and their efforts. The party, or more correctly, *coterie*, found its original mainstay in Count Robert von

*Bismarck's "Reflections and Reminiscences"; Transl. by A. J. Butler, Vol. I, p. 120.

der Goltz, a man of unusual competence and energy. The 'financing' of the business (to use a stock-exchange expression) was provided for by the vast wealth of Bethmann-Hollweg, Count Fuerstenberg-Stammheim, and Count Albert Pourtales."

Bismarck discloses a report from the Prussian Ambassador to London from which it appears that England at that time favoured the programme of the Teutonic war parties, going even so far as promising the whole south of Russia with the Crimea to Austria, as reward for coöperation against Russia.

"While Goltz and his colleagues at Berlin," Bismarck further says, "were conducting their affairs with a certain dexterity, of which the article just mentioned is a sample, Bunsen, our Ambassador in London, was imprudent enough in April, 1854, to send to the Minister, Manteuffel, a lengthy memorandum calling for the restoration of Poland, the extension of Austria as far as the Crimea, the deposition of the Ernestine line from the throne of Saxony, and more of the same kind; and recommending the coöperation of Prussia in this programme."

Bismarck then gives a very true picture of the position of the Emperor Francis Joseph, who lived long enough to realize the ambitions of his youth, for a war against Russia: "The Emperor Francis Joseph is in the hands of his police—and during the last years I have learned what that means—and has allowed himself to be deceived by lies as to how Russia incited Kossuth and so forth. He has

stified his conscience therewith, and what the police cannot compass (*nicht vermag*), Ultramon-tanism achieves, namely, rage against the Orthodox Church and against Protestant Prussia. On this account there is even now talk of a Kingdom of Poland under an Austrian Archduke.

“With these childish Utopias, heads clever enough, no doubt, of the Bethmann-Hollweg party played at being statesmen, believing it possible to treat a body of sixty-six million Great Russians as if it were a *caput mortuum* in the future of Europe, which they could misuse as they pleased without making it a certain ally of every future enemy of Prussia in every war with France, to guard her rear in the direction of Poland, seeing that any arrangement likely to satisfy Poland in the provinces of Prussia and Posen and even in Silesia is impossible without the breaking up and decomposing of Prussia. Not only did these politicians consider themselves wise, but they were honoured as such by the Liberal Press.”

Bismarck sharply criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg and his group of dismemberers of Russia; and flays the liberal press which supported them. In order to understand the Austro-German declarations of war against Russia in 1914 one must go back to this Austro-Prussian programme of 1854.

To carry out their ambitious plan for the conquest and partition of Russia in 1854, the Court plotters of Vienna and Berlin needed only a justi-

fiable pretext for war, and right here came their great difficulty. Russia was a traditional friend of Prussia. As for Austria, only six years before the Russian Czar had saved the throne of Emperor Francis Joseph, and Austria from dismemberment in the revolutionary years of 1848-49. For this generous act the Czar had asked nothing in return. But the conscience of Francis Joseph was at no time very sensitive, and that of his Minister for Foreign Affairs and adviser, Count Buol-Schauenstein, a German from Germany, was even less so. He soon found the desired *casus belli*. When the Russian armies crossed the Danube to attack Turkey, the ally of England, France, and Sardinia, the Ballplatz became very indignant and demanded the withdrawal of the Russians behind the Danube.

"The efforts of Count Buol, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to create a *casus belli* were frustrated by Russia's evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia," says Prince Bismarck, concluding, "If we do not hold Austria fast as long as practicable, we burden ourselves with a serious task."

Regarding these events we have also the testimony of the Austrian historian Heinrich Friedjung in his work: "The Crimean War and Austrian Politics" (*Der Krimkrieg und die Oesterreichische Politik*) where he says: "For the next step in the development of affairs the stipulation was of special importance that Austria must make demand on

Russia to evacuate the Danubian principalities, and that Prussia must support this demand. Furthermore, a military convention was concluded under which Austria undertook to put in the field an army of 350,000 men and Prussia an army of 200,000 men. The Czar gave vent to his wrath by ordering the removal of the statue and picture of the Emperor Francis Joseph from his study; giving the statue to his personal valet. The Czar expressed himself on that occasion to the Austrian minister to this effect: "Sobieski and I were the most stupid Kings of Poland for having saved Austria."

What do we learn from these illuminating reminiscences of Bismarck?

First, that the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs had as far back as 1854 painstakingly worked out, and their governments had actually adopted, a complete plan for the invasion and partition of Russia; laboured at all costs to create a *casus belli*; that the Ultra-Catholic Party at the Court of Vienna was instigating war, and that the party led by Bethmann-Hollweg, Prussian Minister and uncle of Bethmann-Hollweg of the World War, was doing the same.

Let us compare the Teutonic war parties of 1914 with those of 1854. With the difference that in place of the defunct ringleaders we find their sons and nephews or other relatives—the personnel is almost identical. In the place of the Prussian

Crown Prince who was plotting with the Bethmann-Hollweg group of the Crimean War we find his grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm II; in place of Moritz von Bethmann-Hollweg, the original leader, we find his nephew, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor who came into office in 1909; General Von der Goltz has been replaced by his relative General von der Goltz Pasha, one of the greatest military writers of Germany and the organizer of the Turkish army; Count Pourtales is represented by his relative of the same name and title, who was German Ambassador in Petrograd at the outbreak of the World War; and finally Prince Fuerstenberg-Stammheim is represented by his relative Prince Egon Fuerstenberg, the Cræsus of the aristocrats of Austria-Germany.

In Austria, Emperor Francis Joseph alone survived to see his youthful dream undertaken; Count Buol-Schauenstein was successively represented by Counts Aehrenthal, Berchtold, Czernin, and Burian. As for Hungary, close relatives of Counts Tisza, Apponyi, and Andrassy, the great conspirators of the World War, were among the leading plotters for war against Russia in 1854.

The same families, the same groups, the same business interests, court, aristocracy, big land owners, and big bankers. The pro-war bankers of 1854 as well as those of 1914 originated in the Semitic banking centre of Frankfort-on-the-Main in Germany, the birthplace of the Bethmann-

Hollwegs, the Goldschmidts, the Seligmans, Jacob Schiff, and the Rothschilds.

All the vast wealth of the banking house of the Rothschilds, amounting at the beginning of the war to some twenty billion francs, was made chiefly in war operations, war financing. The Rothschild brothers of the Central Empires have in fact sometimes financed simultaneously rival groups of belligerents.

Frankfort-on-the-Main is, and has been for more than a hundred years, the chief source of financial backing for wars. Kings, emperors, and war ministers have had to await the pleasure of these bankers before issuing their ultimata. To that centre have been added Vienna, Berlin, and Budapest, the other more important centres of Jewish world finance. In Vienna the Rothschilds' word is law; in Berlin the Hahnemans, Bleichroeders, Mendelssohn, especially the last named, who of late years have controlled Russia's finances. To these same sources may be traced the origin of the World War. In order to distinguish between the Hollweg groups of 1854 and 1914 let us designate them as Bethmann-Hollweg groups No. I and No. II, or that of the Crimean War and that of the World War.

What prevented the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs from carrying out their plans in 1854? The firm but conciliatory policy of Russia: by immediately withdrawing her troops from the Balkans, by

her rapid concentration of a great army in Poland; and by the courage, discipline, and stubborn loyalty with which her armies fought the invasion of their country in the south; and were prepared to do the same in the west. Bismarck also played an important part in frustrating these designs. "Prussia has no real cause for war with Russia," he said, and refused to be a party to these plans.

Thus the Bethmann-Hollweg War Party of 1854 finally sank into oblivion. But in the degree that Prussia grew stronger and bolder through the successful Bismarckian wars, this anti-Russian war party both in Austria-Hungary and Germany first raised its head again, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, but not until the weakening of Russia through the Russo-Japanese War was it restored to full vitality once more. The rôle of Count Buol of 1854-5 was played in 1878 by a Hungarian, Count Andrassy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.

But not until a British fleet appeared before Constantinople to hold in check the victorious Russian armies which stood before the gates of that city, did Andrassy take heart. Great Britain's preparations for war and her declaration that Russia must choose between war and a congress at which the Treaty of San Stefano should be revised instantly revived the bellicose spirit of Austria which had been somewhat dampened by her defeat at Sadowa in 1866 at the hands of Prussia.

Incredible as it may seem, the "adventurous" diplomacy of D'Israeli, Russia's arch-hater, made it possible for Andrassy to enthrone Austria-Hungary in the Balkans by extorting at the Congress of Berlin the mandate for her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This prevented the solution of the Balkan question and still further whetted the territorial appetite of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. So dangerous grew the situation that Bismarck was forced in 1887 to conclude with Russia his famous "Reinsurance Treaty" in order to checkmate the intrigues of the war advocates in Austria-Hungary and Germany who would have endangered his life work, the creation of the German Empire. The "Reinsurance Treaty" stipulated—according to recent disclosures—that in case either party became involved in war the other would preserve benevolent neutrality and do its best to keep other powers from coming in; exceptions being made in case of a Russian attack upon Austria or a German attack upon France.

Germany, furthermore, recognized Russia's "historically acquired rights in the Balkan Peninsula, especially her preponderant influence in Bulgaria," and both parties pledged themselves to act in concert in Balkan affairs and to prevent any territorial changes there without their consent. Turkey was to be forbidden, under penalty of a Russo-German attack, to admit the armed forces of any other power to the Straits, as the British fleet

had been admitted in 1878 when a Russian army sat outside Constantinople.

So much for the treaty, which was secret. An appendix, described as "very secret," went still further. Above all, Germany promised benevolent neutrality in case Russia herself should undertake to seize the Bosphorus and hold it against any outside power, and to give moral and diplomatic support to any steps which the Czar might find necessary "to keep the keys of his empire in his hands."

Bismarck in his memoirs supported his Reinsurance policy with the following reflections:

"I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position. We should then cease to be in the condition of being hounded on by England and occasionally also by Austria, and exploited by them to check Russian lust after the Bosphorus, and we should be able to wait and see if Austria were attacked and thereby our *casus belli* arose.

"It would be better for the Austrian policy also to withdraw itself from the influence of Hungarian chauvinism until Russia had taken up a position on the Bosphorus, and had thereby considerably intensified its friction with the Mediterranean states—that is with England, and even with Italy and France—and so had increased the neces-

sity of coming to an understanding with Austria *à l'aimable*. Were I an Austrian minister I would not prevent the Russians going to Constantinople but I would not begin an understanding with them until they had made the move forward. Under any circumstances, the share which Austria has in the inheritance of Turkey will be arranged in understanding with Russia, and the Austrian portion will be all the greater the better they know at Vienna how to wait, and to encourage Russian policy to take up a more advanced position. As regards England, the position of modern Russia might perhaps be considered as improved if it ruled Constantinople; but as regards Austria and Germany, Russia would be less dangerous as long as it remained in Constantinople. It would no longer be possible for Prussia to blunder as it did in 1855, and to play ourselves out and hazard our stake for Austria, England, and France, in order to earn a humiliating admission to the congress and a *mention honorable* as a European Power.”*

Unfortunately this policy of Bismarck for preserving the peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia was abandoned shortly after Kaiser Wilhelm II came to the throne and the old War Party received a new impetus. From the beginning of his reign the clamour for war against Russia grew every year bolder and

*Bismarck's "Reflections and Reminiscences," Vol. II, pp. 288-289.

louder. The Pan-German Party took the lead in this hue and cry and its publications were not only sanctioned but inspired by the Wilhelmstrasse.

War, according to Prussian conceptions, being a business enterprise, Austria-Germany sought to secure its lasting benefits in a business-like way. Russia's national income is based on her exports to foreign countries; two thirds of those exports go by way of her Black Sea ports and thence through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. These straits are Russia's real outlet. Once this outlet is closed, Russian commerce comes to a standstill and the nation is ruined. The other third of her exports go through the Baltic ports. The sea, therefore, is the life-giving medium which keeps Russia in touch with the outer world and makes possible her economic life.

Austria-Germany's military plan was then a business plan: namely, to cut Russia off from the approaches to the sea both in the north and the south, in the Baltic and Black seas, and undoubtedly to close forever against her the Dardanelles. Whoever owns the coast of a country owns its hinterland—Germany's "liberation" of the Baltic provinces, Austria's "liberation" of the Ukraine, were to be a cloak for the economic robbery, and hence the ultimate political annihilation, of Russia. No country can permanently import more commodities than it can pay for with its exports. Thus

might Russia be reduced to impotence and made a virtual colony of the Central Empires. Like a red thread is this idea woven into the great tissue of all Austro-German designs on Russia. Along these lines both Bethmann-Hollweg groups No. I and No. II conceived their plans.

It took Bethmann-Hollweg and Co. sixty years to bring to realization that which Bismarck called their "Ausschlachtung" or "Zerstueckelung" of Russia—a butcher's term, meaning respectively the "carving out" of a slaughtered animal, and cutting it up into small portions. Of the original "partners" of the original joint-stock company one only, the Emperor Francis Joseph, lived long enough to see the great operation for which the company was founded actually begun. All the other partners had died and their places had been taken by their heirs and successors. The task which the company set itself in the Crimean War was at that time much easier to accomplish. Four powers were already fighting Russia in the south—England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey. Had Prussia and Austria joined them as they planned, the ring would have been complete. In the sixty years that elapsed the magnitude of the task grew immeasurably. Russia had grown stronger both militarily and economically. To overthrow her quickly she must be invaded from all sides at the same time. Furthermore, modern wars are wars of peoples, of "peoples in arms" as the Germans

put it. Preparations had to be widened and deepened. New silent associates had to be brought in and the scope of the whole enterprise had to be enlarged and so popularized as to win to its support the common people. The acquisition of new silent partners was an easy matter, as all the Germanic princes of Europe were eager to join Austria-Germany in such an enterprise. The nation-wide propaganda which had to be carried on at home was of a far more difficult nature. In 1854-55, when the peoples were ruled absolutely and decisions for war or peace were the sole concern of the rulers and a few powerful men, it actually sufficed, as Bismarck has said, to "exchange comprehensive secret memoranda among themselves" to bring things to a head. In these days this is impossible even in the most reactionary countries. In 1854 rulers dealt with armies of 200,000 men; in modern wars millions have to be called to the colours. These people had to be told what there was in the enterprise to make it worth while to risk the lives of millions. Therefore war aims could no longer be kept secret. They had to be explained and popularized in the widest sense of the word. It would take an encyclopædia to enumerate the literature that Austria and Germany used for this purpose. This voluminous Pan-German literature is well exemplified by two books which have never been translated into English and which are little known in the English-speaking world. One is

entitled: "Neither Communism nor Capitalism" (*Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus*), written by Dr. Karl Jentsch of Leipzig and published in 1893. The other is called: "Germany's Problems as a Great and World Power" (*Deutschlands Aufgaben als Gross-und Weltmacht*) written by Otto Delffs and published in 1901.

The quotations from these volumes which follow will show how the theory of Baron von Haxthausen-Abbenburg, already mentioned, was enlarged. These publications were among the first fruits of the Pan-German League, which was established in 1890, in response to an editorial in the *Koelnische Zeitung*, entitled: "Germany, Wake Up!" The *Koelnische Zeitung* is one of the principal organs of the German Catholic Party. Long before the World War it openly advocated war against Serbia and Russia; and, during the war, clamoured for annexations in the East.

In his book Doctor Jentsch says of Russia:

"It has been said that Russia finds it necessary to have access to the Mediterranean, but this is nonsense.

"The Russians need for their existence only two things: that instead of Schnapps (brandy) there should be put into their hands hatchets, ploughs, and spades, and that in lieu of the knout they should be given intelligent leadership; both things we could bring them. . . . In the East, therefore, lies, quite naturally, the war danger, but not

because Russia wants the Golden Horn but because Germany wants Russia's land.

"Germany and Austria, as the executors of the allied powers, should lead their land armies into Russia, while the other powers should assist them in their operations with their fleets. . . ."

And later the author thus defines the modest limits of Pan-Germany. He says:

"How would matters develop after the opening up of Russia and Asia Minor? The colonist groups would form republics under the nominal suzerainty of the Czar and the Porte. The German colonists, spread over these wide areas, would be under the protection of the German Kaiser. In this manner the whole European East, as well as Asia Minor, would form one mighty German Empire, a rampart for European culture against Russian and Mongol hordes, Germany becoming the Empire of empires. (*Das Wahre Reich der echten Mitte.*)

"Whoever does not believe that the German nation, whose ancestors have crushed the Roman Empire and have once already dominated Europe, is capable of performing this task, should be ashamed of himself and had better give up his German name. . . ."

In speaking of Germany's relation to Austria-Hungary the author says:

". . . . The union of Austria to Germany, through which alone the German power may

become compact and solidified, belongs to the problems which our grandchildren will have to solve."

Otto Delffs makes the following observations on Russia:

"The first step is to get back into our fold the lost brother tribes on all sides; the second, our colonization of Siberia and Trans-Caucasia; the third, to push Russia back from the Baltic and Black seas and to settle their coasts with German colonists. Captain Mahan has established the guiding principle: 'Who rules the sea, rules also the land back of it' as we ourselves have established in Africa as our state maxim: 'He who owns the seacoast must own also the hinterland.' In view of these our claims we must without scruples force Russia to transfer her capital to Moscow and let her dream out her existence as a German enclave.

"And for this same reason we must annihilate her before she gets too strong. The '*Cæterum censeo Russiam esse delendam*' must become to every German of culture as familiar as the Pater Noster, and this annihilation must be a literal one; the complete elimination of Russia from the ranks of the Great Nations. If we are too short-sighted and pusillanimous eventually to claim the whole Russian Empire for ourselves and our allies, and consequently firmly to hold it, or if we are afraid of the colonization problems in the Vistula

regions, then we must at the very least demand the cession of Siberia, as through this we get what we need above all—an intracontinental uninhabited colonization area with approximately a European climate. Later we could, if need be, crush the rest of the Muscovite Empire between our two buffers. Allies we will easily find and richly compensate: Hungarians, Rumanians, Turks, Scandinavians, Austrians, Chinese, and Japanese.”

Later he adds:

“When, therefore, after the death of Francis Joseph, the collapse of the Danube Monarchy comes, *we must stand ready to step in with strong hands and take over the heirloom of the Danube.* The main thing in all this is that it must be done before Russia gets too strong.”

The learned Pan-German concludes with this scornful reference to the old-fashioned views of Prince Bismarck:

“But we have already outgrown Bismarck’s narrow range of vision. In forming his plans, he did not foresee that we were firmly to establish ourselves in China and Asia Minor. Here our motto must be for the moment: ‘*J’y suis, J’y reste.*’ We are already placing Russia between two fires. But Bismarck had no idea of all this; otherwise he would have followed the wise counsel of the great Moltke and would have annihilated Russia when the time was ripe. In the year 1871 or in 1881, after the death of Alexander, the oppor-

tunity was offered to carry out this idea with relative ease.”

As early as 1871, flushed with the victory over France, Field Marshal Von Moltke advised an immediate attack upon Russia. Again in 1881 when Alexander I, the Czar-liberator and friend of the Slavs, died, Von Moltke urged the overthrow of Russia.

This preliminary war propaganda was of two kinds, according to the composition of the peoples from whom the fighting material was sought—Pan-Germanic and Pan-Turanian; the first was used with all the Germanic peoples in the alliance; the second with all Turanian or Ugro-Mongol peoples. It may suffice here to say that to win them over the war-makers played on all the passions, hatreds, cupidity, religious intolerance, etc., of all the peoples.

Indeed, Germany's world policy since the time of Bismarck, and especially during the time of Kaiser Wilhelm II, was stupendous. By establishing herself in Morocco, she sought to drive the British from Egypt, and to bring both doors of the Mediterranean Sea and the sea route to India and the Far East into her hands; through her policy in Asiatic Turkey she aimed to create for herself a sure road on dry land to the Indian Ocean; and through the continuation of the Bagdad Road, to reach through Persia the gates of India. Through her policy in Central Africa, Germany

sought to prevent England from building the Transafrican Cape-to-Cairo Railway. By the irrigation of Mesopotamia and the final settlement of that country by German immigrants, she planned to prevent Russia from reaching a southern port. Finally, Constantinople was and is the real key to Austro-German world policy, for this great cosmopolitan city was the apex and common meeting point for the two territorial triangles which Austro-German diplomacy had constructed for itself—one spreading out like a fan north and northwest into Europe, the other running south and southeast into Asia: the first extending on its one side through Salonica and Trieste to Antwerp and Rotterdam in the north and on its other side extending from Constantinople through the delta of the Danube and Kieff as far north as Reval. This triangle, then, embraced the following territories: the empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary with Holland and Belgium added to those of Germany, and the Balkans with Rumania added to Austria-Hungary, while Poland and Little Russia under the joint domination of the two Teutonic empires comprised the remaining territory within it. The other triangle included the whole of Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and Arabia as far as the distant lands of India.

Constantinople was, therefore, the keystone in the arch of Germany's world power and world greatness. Around this pivotal point centred

Germany's world policy, directed—both militarily and economically—on the one side against Russia, on the other against Great Britain. Deprived of Constantinople as the centre from which to direct the destinies of these vast territories, the whole structure, consolidated with so much blood and iron, has crumbled, and the German hegemony over Europe and the world has vanished. England remains mistress of the seas, and a regenerated Russia must break through to the south and again find access to the life-giving sea. That Germany may absorb Russia through commercial penetration before this regeneration has had time to take place is now the greatest danger which faces not only Russia but the world.

CHAPTER IV

THE OFENER HOFBURG WAR CONFERENCE OCTOBER, 1912

BETHMAN-HOLLWEG COMMITS GERMANY TO WAR, DECEMBER, 1912

ALL the actors in this war drama—Forgach, Franz, Tanczos, Hann, and their numerous satellites, foiled, humiliated, and discredited, had been removed from the Imperial stage and were, with what patience they could summon, awaiting their re-engagement. All, that is, except their supreme leader, Count Aehrenthal and his royal sponsor, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Aehrenthal, discredited, feared, hated, almost blind, a broken and dying man, although comparatively young, was forced in bitterness to realize that he could no longer achieve his consuming ambition for the conquest, destruction, and partition of the country whose hospitality he had enjoyed for ten long years. Even the brilliance of the Great Cross which his master, Francis Joseph, "the All Highest," now conferred upon him, could not dispel his gloom. Nor was his despondency lessened by being involuntarily placed upon the

retired list a few hours before his end in order that his Countess on his death might draw the pension of a former Minister instead of the liberal allowance bestowed upon the widows of those who die in office.

The dying man summoned to his sick bed his understudy and successor, Count Berchtold, and to him confided his state secrets and implored him to continue with all his energy the programme and policy of the War Party, just as he had continued Austria's underground work as his successor in Petrograd. Not much more than two years later Berchtold fulfilled the dying trust of his predecessor; the great war was a ghastly reality.

Just as Aehrenthal's plans were for the time upset by the unexpected Turkish Revolution, so were Berchtold's thrown into confusion by the still more unexpected Balkan Alliance followed by the Balkan Wars. When our General Staff and Foreign Office, which since the advent to power of Aehrenthal had been one soul in two bodies, learned that Serbia and Bulgaria were allied and about to enter the baptism of fire as brothers in arms, they were for the moment paralyzed with rage and amazement. As the *Literary Section* of the Foreign Office expressed it: "Enemies to the death have become friends."

For the benefit of those not familiar with Balkan affairs it should here be explained that the Balkan Peninsula is surrounded by three seas and forms

a mosaic of small and great nations, Greeks, Turks, Albanians, and Slavs, of whom the Slavs form the great majority of the population, extending in an unbroken stretch of territory from the Soča (Isonzo), that is, from the confines of Italy, to the shores of the Black Sea. For two thousand years the land has been cursed by bloody, racial, religious, and dynastic wars. Neither all-powerful Rome of the Western Empire, nor cunning Byzantium of the Eastern Empire; neither the Bulgarian Simons nor the Serbian Dushans had succeeded in welding the peoples of the Peninsula into organic unity. Through the centuries the Balkan Peninsula, with its vast stores of undeveloped mineral wealth, has been the coveted prey of Eurasiatic conquerors. It is to-day the beautiful Helen of Troy for whose possession was started this last titanic Trojan war.

At the time of which we are writing there were two proposed solutions for the never-ending Balkan turmoil and bloodshed, one Russian and the other Austrian. The Russian solution sought, through the confederation of the autonomous national states bound together by a custom's union and a military convention and represented by one diplomatic body, to build up on the Peninsula a powerful state which should be the tenth world power. The Austrian solution aimed to perpetuate the turmoil by engendering rivalry and hatred among the several states until it should be possi-

ble for Austria gradually to absorb or crush them and finally to bring the whole Peninsula into a position of vassalage to the Hapsburg crown.

The Balkan Alliance was the first step in carrying into effect the Russian plan. It was brought about by Russian diplomacy. Russia felt that only through the creation of an alliance between the Balkan States could she liberate the Christian peoples of the Peninsula from the Turkish yoke and protect Serbia's independence from the encroachments of Austria. After long and difficult conferences the "Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty" of March 13, 1912, was negotiated. This treaty provided that each power should help the other with all its forces if attacked, and that both together should guarantee to prevent the occupation, even temporarily, of any portion of the Peninsula by any other power; and that in the event of war neither state should under any circumstances make a separate peace. The treaty was to remain in force until September 31, 1920. To the original treaty was added a secret treaty which stipulated the portions of Macedonia which should go to each country in case of a war with Turkey and the occupation of Macedonia. In case of dispute between the parties to the treaty, the Czar of Russia was to be the arbitrator. A few months later the treaty was completed by a military convention between the two states to which Montenegro and Greece later adhered.

During my service in Serbia I had never tired of pointing out to the Bulgarian diplomats the great advantages which would accrue to both countries and to all Slavs from an economic and military alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia and the corresponding dangers from hostility between these neighbouring states. Consequently in those October days of 1912 one of my life-long dreams seemed about to be realized. Slavs the world over, whether in Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Russia, America, Africa, or Australia, rejoiced at this manifestation of Slav solidarity.

To show how completely Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was caught unawares by the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, on October 12, 1912, when Herr von Ugron, our Minister at Belgrade, was asked by a correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse*, the principal Austrian war organ, whether there was any danger of war between Serbia and Turkey, he replied: "Does this peaceful city suggest the outbreak of war?" On October 14th, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece presented their ultimatum to Turkey, demanding autonomy for Macedonia, and four days afterward the actual fighting started. In spite of its feverish suspicion and army of well-paid spies, the Ballplatz had been caught napping. This caused an outburst of indignation and accusation in the German and Magyar circles of Vienna and Budapest.

My service in Serbia had also made it clear to

me that little as we wanted Serbia to enter this alliance and this war we were at bottom the cause for her action—that is, that our policy of economic strangulation toward her had forced her to try drastic remedies in self-defence. During my two years' service in Belgrade and Nish I had come into closer touch with the Serbian exporters, merchants, and peasants than had any other member of our diplomatic or consular corps. I knew their fundamental problem was how to export their farm products. I knew that our government had deliberately made this problem all but insoluble. Serbia is an agricultural country with cattle and hogs, wheat, corn, and prunes to export. For the last eight years, since the overthrow of the pro-Austrian Obrenovitch dynasty, the country had, in spite of our efforts at strangulation, been in a state of rapid economic development.

The iniquitous Congress of Berlin of 1878 had given Serbia impossible boundaries. She had no harbour, no outlet to the life-giving sea. She was almost surrounded by the high tariff walls of Austria and Turkey. For Serbian exports there were three routes only: the Danube down stream across Rumania to the harbours of the Black Sea; the Danube up stream and the railway via Budapest-Vienna through Austro-Hungarian territory; and the Belgrade-Uskub-Salonica railroad through Turkish territory. Our economic policy toward Serbia was dictated by the big export

houses of Vienna and the big Magyar swine-breeders of Hungary, the so-called "swine barons." The first group aimed to monopolize for their products the Serbian market and the second to prevent Serbia from competing with them in the great food markets of Vienna and Berlin; by their monopoly of which markets they were enabled constantly to raise their prices.

But the almost prohibitive duties on Serbian products were not enough to satisfy the greed of the Magyar "swine barons." They developed a device for shutting off the importation of Serbian swine completely and at will. This device was simplicity itself. There was a Hungarian veterinary attached to our Belgrade Consulate. Whenever the "swine barons" desired a complete monopoly of the hog market or whenever our diplomacy desired to extort from Serbia some further political or economic favour, we would learn that disease was rampant among Serbian live stock which would infect our own stock unless importations were stopped. The Hungarian veterinary would then be called upon to investigate. His researches always confirmed the worst fears of our diplomats, and Serbian importations were stopped. The fact that no country in Europe had a better health record for its live stock than Serbia made no difference to this veterinary and from his decision there was no appeal. Doctor Kramarz, the foremost authority on foreign relations among the

Austrian Slavs, said in commenting on this treatment of Serbia: "No nation can very well depend for its existence upon a Hungarian veterinary doctor."

Our repressive measures went further than an attempt to monopolize Serbian markets for our products while keeping Serbian products out of our markets. We actually tried to prevent her from securing markets elsewhere. We prohibited her from exporting via Croatia-Trieste to Italy. We would not allow her to transport her wheat destined for Belgium via the Danube and through Austria-Hungary. She was therefore obliged to take it all the way down the Danube to the Black Sea and then through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

It should be added that our government pursued exactly the same policy of economic oppression also toward its own southern Slav provinces, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, except that having absolute control over them we could be, and we were, more ruthless in their oppressive exploitation.

Through the elimination of some of these flagrant injustices during my brief term at the head of the Consulate General in Belgrade the Serbian exports more than doubled during the next year. This showed how rapidly Serbia could develop if given opportunity. Is it any wonder that one of Serbia's great patriots cried out in despair: "I would give my life if I could take my country

on my back and carry her away from the hostile combination which surrounds her!"

The only solution for Serbia was a port on the Adriatic Sea, to be reached either through an autonomous Albania, or better, through a strip of northern Albania ceded to Serbia for the purpose. With such an outlet for her products Serbia would be in a position to negotiate a commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary in which not quite all the advantages would be on the side of Austria-Hungary, as had always been the case heretofore. All these facts show what inimitable, unconscious humourists inspired our "Literary Bureau" to circulate at this time the slogan that "Austria was again called upon to save a Balkan people just as, through the Congress of Berlin, she had saved Bosnia and Herzegovina."* What our "Literary Bureau" did not say to our peoples and to Europe in general was that our diplomats and statesmen were mortally afraid for the security of the old empire. With the prices for food and all necessaries of life soaring higher every year, with discontent increasing among its peoples, our statesmen found it necessary to rule Hungary by the brutal force of a Tisza and a Lukacs; Croatia and Slavonia with the dictatorship of a Cuvaj; to threaten Bosnia and Herzegovina with absolut-

*Now that Austria-Hungary and Germany are eliminated from the Balkans, Italy is the only Power which threatens to continue the "meddling policy" instead of leaving the Balkans to the Balkanians.

ism; to establish in Croatia a military dictatorship. Slovenia and Bohemia were placed at the mercy of German reactionaries, while Galicia was in a state of latent revolt, because of our encouragement of the rivalry between the Poles and Ruthenes. The Slovaks of North Hungary were dominated by the Magyars, while the peasants of Hungary were exploited by the gentry and the Jews.

Events followed one another with such rapidity in the Balkan War that it was impossible for our Foreign Office to formulate any constructive policy to rob the Balkan Allies of the fruits of their military successes. Consequently Count Berchtold came out with the negative policy of preserving the "status quo"; no matter what the military results no territorial changes should be allowed. In order to avoid complications which might lead to a general European war Russia agreed to this policy. The most apt criticism of Berchtold's proposal was made by the Serbian Minister of Finance, Mr. Paču, who in an interview in Belgrade, in the middle of October, said: "Europe is for peace, but there is no peace. Peace in the Balkans is a never-ceasing, an exhausting war. Europe is for the 'status quo,' but the 'status quo' is chaos. Where was the 'status quo' when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why did not the Great Powers guard the 'status quo' when Italy seized Tripoli? As a matter of fact, the 'status quo' does not exist

for the Great Powers. They remember it only when our needs are in question. They treat us as they treat Moroccans. They conspire behind our backs and then show us their notes or more properly present us with their commands, saying: 'Shut up you there in the Balkans.' Europe regards Turkey as its heirloom, but the Powers cannot agree over the division of the spoils. Therefore Europe protects Turkey." But even this "status quo" formula was only a diplomatic cloak with which to hide the real purposes of our diplomacy.

On the night of October 9, 1912, four days before Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece presented their ultimatum to Turkey, a joint session of the Austrian Ministerial Council took place which lasted until three o'clock the next morning. At this meeting our new credits for armaments were discussed and it was agreed to ask for 400,000,000 kronen, 250,000,000 for the army and 150,000,000 for new men-of-war. This item is especially significant since these ships could not be launched in time to be used in connection with any war that might result from the tension existing between the Balkan allies and Turkey. It was a patent absurdity that a nation of 52,000,000 inhabitants, rated the second strongest military power in the world, should require enormous special military credits in order to go to war with Serbia, a nation of only two and a half million people. The long-

planned war against Russia was, therefore, the only possible explanation. In order not to arouse the suspicions of Europe we announced the formula that we were going to place our southern frontier on a "reinforced peace footing."

Immediately after this conference the "Literary" Bureau began its propaganda for the Ballplatz. In reference to Serbia's known desire for a harbour on the Adriatic it was said that if Serbia had such a harbour it would in effect be a Russian port. As soon as the Balkan War opened we started to sow seeds of dissension between Bulgaria and Serbia. One inspired article said: "After the war against Turkey what will happen to poor and so-often deluded Serbia at the hands of Bulgaria will form a laughable comedy or a tragedy that will bring tears to the eyes according to the sympathies of the spectator." In order to offset this propaganda as far as possible, Doctor Kramarz, the Czech leader and authority on foreign affairs, made a speech in the Austrian Delegations in which he said: "If the Balkan peoples win a permanent victory then will one of the greatest menaces to the peace of the world have been removed with sacrifices which will be slight in comparison with those of a world war. This is the psychological moment for Austria, while guarding her economic interests in the Balkans, to win the sympathies of the Balkan peoples."

How differently our Foreign Office viewed the

situation was shown when Count Berchtold spoke of "Austria's protectorate over the Roman Catholic Church in Albania." Freed of diplomatic camouflage this meant that we should intervene in Albania so as to be able to attack Serbia on her flank and come to the rescue of Turkey. Speaking the same day in the Hungarian Delegations Berchtold said: "The monarchy stands for the 'status quo ante bellum'. We have in the Balkans vital interests touching our very existence and we are determined to guard them under all circumstances." These words should be borne strictly in mind because they are almost identical with those spoken by him in the critical days of March, 1913. Light was thrown upon what was meant by the guarding of "our vital interests" by an inspired article appearing soon after the speech which said: "Austria-Hungary can no more tolerate the formation on her southern frontier of a combination of powers hostile to the monarchy than could she tolerate being cut off from the great thoroughfares of the world." In the same article our attitude toward Russia was illuminated by these phrases: "It is difficult to speak of Serbia without thinking of Russia," and again: "It is difficult to see that what is Serbian is not at the same time Russian."

The threadbare rumour that our Minister in Belgrade had been assassinated was again circulated on the very evening when Maximilian

Harden, the great German publicist, arrived from Berlin to make the keynote speech in this campaign of our War Party. He spoke before a distinguished audience which included the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, and a dozen of the leading generals of our army. He first referred affectingly to "the sad report which he had just heard that Herr Von Ugron, your Minister in Belgrade, has been treacherously murdered." "Russia," he said, "needs at least a year and a half from the purely military standpoint to be ready for war, and even then it will be a great question whether her internal political situation will permit her to withdraw from the interior her few trustworthy élite troops without endangering the dynasty. France, on her part," he added, "has at the moment no powder." He said further: "All the difficulties which Austria-Hungary has had of late years and which it has to-day, spring from the fact that it is the companion of the German Empire, both together forming the Greater Germany which knows no frontiers. Should we not succeed this time in opening the way into the Ægean and the Black seas for Germanic hegemony, then have we reached the beginning of the end. Germany is concerned that the way to Salonica shall not be blocked. The question is not," he continued, "whether one is for war or peace; on the contrary, it is our duty to make war at the time best suited to us and not our enemies, because in the future we shall not be

able to stave off the war. In this world-historic, grave, psychological, and critical moment for Austria-Hungary and Germany it is essential that we be guided by a single purpose. You may," he said, in conclusion, "draw the frontier to which you will permit others to grow; when you have once found that line I solemnly exhort you not to give in a hair's breadth. Do not let yourselves be induced to go to a European conference where a majority would decide against you. Every war is justified, even against a small people, if it is for the purpose of guarding national prestige and if it brings advantage to your country." Some of us recalled this speech of the missionary of the German war party when in 1914 our government turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of Great Britain, France, and Russia that we submit our controversies with Serbia to a conference of the Great Powers. Also when the German Kaiser stated that he could not be a party to "dragging his ally before a European tribunal."

This speech of Harden's applied to the then-existing conditions and to the philosophy and principles of the Austrian and German war parties. For Austria these principles and this philosophy of international relations had been set forth in the *Oesterreichische Rundschau** in an article by General of Infantry, Emil von Woinovich, entitled: "War Fear." This was a review of an

*Vol. 30-31, Jan., June, 1912, pp. 243-8.

article called "The Policy of Concentrated Armaments" which had appeared a month before in *Danzer's Armee Zeitung* under the signature, Salvator R. This article caused a sensation, particularly because Count Julius Andrassy, Jr., published at the same time a statement in which he said: "There should be no war party in Austria-Hungary because only imbeciles can desire war." Salvator R., whose opinions were admiringly set forth by General Woinovich, an Austrian minor edition of Bernhardt, held the opposite view. The General said: "Without regard to the opinions and sentiments in vogue, Salvator R. opposes with pitiless logic the opinion that war, as is generally believed, is the worst evil. He holds, on the contrary, that the peace which Europe has maintained for a generation is foul stagnation. By war he hopes to purify the social and political atmosphere. The many unsolved social and political questions between the states and the state groups of Europe are distasteful to him. He wants, therefore, a radical solution by the sword after the example that has been set us from time immemorial by the greatest geniuses and the mightiest states and nations. He advocates *this radical solution by the sword at a moment when the political constellations are favourable and our military strength is at its highest point.* Salvator R. therefore strongly advocates the *surprise attack* as a matter of war policy, which surprise attack he characterizes as an

unprecedented concentration of all one's forces in the space of a few years, brought about through a supreme effort of all the military and political forces of the state, followed at once by an attack upon the enemy. This artificial calling forth of war must not be considered as frivolous or unprecedented. It has, on the contrary, happened many a time in the last hundred years. For instance, Cavour brought on deliberately through proddings the war against Austria in 1859, as is admitted by the work of the Italian General Staff which appeared not long ago. Bismarck, through the alteration of the Ems telegram, brought about the Franco-Prussian War at the moment which best suited him. This can be attained only by a war policy which stands above the situation, dominating and leading it, a policy which is concentrated upon well-defined objectives to be achieved at definite times, after the manner of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Bismarck, Cavour, or Japan. Also we may say that Prince Kaunitz with wonderful skill precipitated the Seven Years' War, and our great Empress, Marie Theresa, did not hesitate a moment to assume responsibility for it. To speak of the horrors of war is to-day, at least in wars between civilized people, an anachronistic exaggeration. Even wars with an unhappy issue have often helped the re-birth of states which were on a decline, as was the case with Prussia in 1806 and with Austria in 1866. It seems almost as if states and peoples

needed wars from time to time, because otherwise they would sink into a moral morass."

Not long after Maximilian II had delivered his speech in Vienna there was a great war rally in the Ofener Hofburg, the royal palace in Budapest, at which momentous decisions were reached—decisions calculated to preserve the peoples of Austria-Hungary from sinking into the "moral morass" so dreaded by General Woinovich and all the other members of the war party. This rally corresponded precisely both in personnel and subjects discussed with a similar gathering held in 1908 when it was thought that Serbia and Russia would fight rather than accept the illegal seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The personages were identical, that is, with one exception: in the place of the late Count Aehrenthal sat his successor, Count Berchtold. Then, as now, Herr Von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, had an audience with the old emperor just before the conference. From a high personage whom I may not name I heard these comments on this great conference. The German Ambassador had brought to our ^{us} Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm's *carte blanche* for immediate war upon Serbia and Russia. Francis Ferdinand and Berchtold also had audiences with the Emperor just before the conference. When the conference convened under the presidency of the old emperor, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, supported by Count Berchtold, the former Chief

of Staff, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, and the joint Minister of War for Austria-Hungary, carried the meeting for immediate war, or war as soon as it could be precipitated. To Berchtold was assigned the task of arranging in the shortest possible time a suitable *casus belli*. Also these questions were decided at this conference: an independent Albania should be created; the proposed Danube-Adriatic Railway should run exclusively through Austrian territory and not through Serbian territory to San Giovanni di Medua, or Durazzo, as desired by Serbia; 200,000 men from the military classes of the last three years in six army corps should be immediately mobilized.

In order that Turkey might be free to resist Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro with all her powers, Germany and Austria had, some weeks before this royal war conference, vigorously urged their ally, Italy, to make peace with the Ottoman Empire. Italy promptly followed this highly disinterested advice and on October 15, 1912, signed with Turkey the peace treaty of Ouchy.

In commenting on this imperial conference, the war party's paper, the *Neue Freie Presse*, made this significant statement: "We feel that a great hour is near in which will fall the decision for war or peace and that the destiny of this ancient empire and the peace of the world depend upon what is now happening in the Ofener Hofburg." Also the writer sees in the great event "the sign of the

clenched hand raised about to strike." This was the Austrian version of "the mailed fist" of the German Kaiser.

In order to carry out this policy we needed not only the backing of Germany but the consent of Italy. Accordingly, Count Berchtold had gone to Italy where on the 23d of October, 1912, at San Rossore, he had had an interview with the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, who assented to our so-called *status quo* policy in the Balkans in recognition of our friendly neutrality during Italy's war for Tripoli.

Five days later the *Berliner Tageblatt* announced that it had learned "from leading Viennese circles" that "the monarchy (Austria-Hungary) will actively intervene in the Balkans if the *status quo* should not be observed." A week later we dispatched a naval division to Balkan waters "for the protection of our interests." On November 5th Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, went to Berlin where on the 8th he had a conference with Kiederlen-Wacchter, the German Foreign Secretary, and Herr Von Szögyeny-Marich, our Ambassador in Berlin. It was the day after this interview and just before the imperial war conference in Budapest that Herr Von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, had his famous audience with the Emperor, Francis Joseph, at which he delivered his imperial master's *carte blanche* for the war.

This conference produced a profound effect upon the peoples of Austria-Hungary. A dread foreboding of calamity fell among them which a friend of mine described as like the "Chiliasmic terror" of the end of the world which spread dread throughout Europe in the one thousandth year after the birth of Christ. This foreboding was by no means abated by the fulminations of the Ballplatz press. Baron Chlumetzky, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Minister, issued a statement in which he said: "Serbia must know that Germany stands back of Austria-Hungary at this time just as she did at the time of the annexation." "Serbia is the pathfinder of Russia," was another official comment. The *Budapesti Naplo*, an organ of the Hungarian Government, declared openly: "Serbia must never occupy Albania. This is so important for us that if not to-day, then to-morrow, we must go to war to prevent it."

While this agitation was going on, the *Goeben* of subsequent World War fame suddenly appeared off Malta on November 12th. The transportation to Bosnia of 200,000 reservists, just called to the colours from all parts of the monarchy, was begun. At the same time, the joint Minister of Finance, Herr Von Bilinski and Premier Wekerle of Hungary, conferred with representatives of the large banking and credit institutions, to facilitate the raising of two and one half billion kronen for a three months' campaign, a third of which was

designated exclusively for the mobilization of our troops. The gold reserve in the vaults of Austria-Hungary was about to be commandeered as a war treasure.

But while official Austria was straining every nerve to start the war the subject nationalities of the empire were violently opposing our policy of bellicose meddling in the Balkans. Especially loud in this condemnation were the Czechs, Croats, Slovenes, and the Ruthenes of Galicia. So determined was this protest that a German deputy in the Reichsrat actually advised against the war because, as he said, "the great majority of the Slavs of the monarchy are opposed to it."

But these protests had not the slightest effect in modifying the bellicose course of our government. The Department of the Interior had been given the task of lining up for the war the various political parties. The Polish deputies from Galicia were told that events in Russian Poland might have fatal consequences for the Austrian Poles. Baron Werburg, our Consul General in Warsaw, with a host of spies and *agents provocateurs*, working chiefly through Socialists and Jewish organizations, was stirring up the spirit of revolt against the Russian Government. By the same means we worked incessantly among the members of the Polish Social Democratic Parliamentary club in Vienna. So successful were these efforts that on October 25th this club passed the following resolu-

tion: "As the legal representatives of the Polish people, we express our conviction that in the eventual conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia, all the forces of the Polish people must be directed against Russian Czarism." This resolution concluded with an appeal to the Russian Poles to show "a common front against our greatest enemy."

At the same time leaflets were circulated, through the agency of our Socialists, among the Polish workmen throughout Russian Poland urging them, when called to the colours on the outbreak of hostilities, to destroy as far as possible all military materials, to "spoil everything that could aid the Russian armies in their advance," and above all, "to let themselves be taken prisoners." The all-Polish organ, *Slowo Polskie* of Lwow, capital of Galicia, published an article which concluded with these words: "In holding before its eyes the reconstruction of the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish nation must hold itself in readiness for war at any moment." These anti-Russian and pro-German protestations occurred at the very time when the forcible expropriation of Polish estates in the German Ostmark was at its height. In this campaign the Socialist, Polish, Jewish, and Pan-German press was ably supported by organs controlled by the Vatican. Among these the *Oesterreichs Katholische Sonntags Blatt* came out at the beginning of the first Balkan war with this declaration:

“Our ideal is not to perpetuate European Turkey, but to bring the Balkan Peninsula into the possession of Catholic Austria and the Catholic Church.” This ideal was thus defended in their issue of October 27th: “Just as a violent storm refreshes and cleanses the oppressive atmosphere, so we hold when it once comes to real war the moral and economic gain to Europe will in the end be very great. The social democracy is not yet strong enough to prevent a war. As a result of the emotional pressure of a European war it will break to pieces with its millions of casual followers, and under the same pressure modern liberalism will also break down. It will not hurt Europe if its conditions are for once well shaken up.” Likewise the organ of the Catholic movement in Germany, *Das Katholische Deutschland*, said in its issue of October 6, 1912, only a few days before the outbreak of the Balkan War: “But Austria will not be negligent. It has already determined not to allow Serbia to take the Sandjak of Novi Bazar [old Serbia] which long since should have become Austrian. Therefore Austria must take it. With Austria’s troops in readiness the military progress will probably continue to the gates of Constantinople. And we can only exclaim: ‘Good luck to you, Austria!’ May the rotten Turks be driven once for all from Europe! The Turks who in addition to their dirty Islamism have become Freemasons and on that account doubly hate Christian-

ity. Constantinople must belong to Western European Christendom and not remain under the Turks or go to the Russians. May Austria act as supreme arbitrator between the Balkan States, for which position she is especially fitted. May it have the glory of planting again the Catholic Cross on St. Sophia! It truly deserves this glory after its century-old strife against Islamic culture. Good luck to you, Austria! Don't let yourself be disturbed! England is afraid of us. Russia is rent by revolution. France has spoiled powder, and has not invented new powder, and Germany stands behind thee. Now or never Russia's game may be spoiled."

This pro-war campaign was brought to its high-water mark by the speech of the German Chancellor, Doctor Bethmann-Hollweg, delivered on the second of December, 1912. He said: "Germany will stand at the side of its ally, Austria; and, if needs be, will fight." A word as to the heredity of Bethmann-Hollweg will, we believe, be illuminating at this point. His family came from the Netherlands whence it had fled to escape the persecution of the Jews to the little town of Nassau near Frankfort-on-the-Main. Here, where the Bethmanns may be traced back to the seventeenth century, the forefathers of Bethmann-Hollweg had a great banking house, under the firm name of Bethmann, which handled big state loans for Austria. (It should be noted here that at Frankfort-

on-the-Main was also located the original Rothschild banking house which also handled great war loans for the Austrian Government.) Emperor Francis I of Austria elevated the Bethmanns to the nobility. Soon after this, in 1854, a son of the banker Bethmann was created a Baron by the King of Baden. His daughter married a Johann Jakob Hollweg, who became the founder of the family of Bethmann-Hollweg. Two of Bethmann-Hollweg's sisters were married to land junkers of East Prussia.

The German and Magyar press in both empires gloated over the Chancellor's admission that Germany would "fight." They applauded the wisdom of Germany's decision "not to allow its ally to be beaten down and the enemy to come up to her own walls, but to be beforehand in the defence of her frontiers." The leader of the National Liberal Party said in the Reichstag, in support of the Chancellor: "Germany must stand firmly and faithfully beside Austria." The press of both governments expressed the hope that both Italy and Rumania might help them in the coming struggle and that the smouldering war spirit of Turkey might break out anew into flames. This was just after Turkey, as the result of her disastrous defeats at the hands of the Balkan Allies, had signed with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro a protocol to last until the conclusion of peace negotiations. The next sensation was an article by Baron Chlum-

etzky, the confidant of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in which he described a meeting between the heir to the throne and Kaiser Wilhelm in the latter's hunting lodge at Springe. In commenting upon the interview he said: "There are many ways of manifesting friendly feeling—Germany chose the strongest and places herself on our side with the whole strength of her political and military weight." In conclusion he said: "Our demands must not be passed upon at a conference; their acceptance must not depend upon the consent of a European congress; in this also Germany is completely on our side." This was the standing formula of our diplomacy, as we have seen before and shall see later, to look upon a European conference that might settle peacefully our self-created disputes with Serbia as the Devil looks upon holy water.

But in spite of all the fervid enthusiasm on the part of the government-controlled press there were dissenting voices in Germany and these not alone among the Socialists. The *Taegliche Rundschau*, for instance, a paper which normally supported the war party, said: "By going to war now we would fall into the position of having to say to our soldiers: 'We are going to war, not for God and the Fatherland, but in order that the Serbs shall not get possession of Durazzo!'" Along the same line the *Rheinisch-Westfaelische Zeitung*, a paper controlled by the Krupp interests, said:

“In such a case we should not be going to war for the vital interests of Germany.” But in spite of these occasional voices of dissent the war spirit in Germany as in Austria was ever growing more clamorous.

CHAPTER V

COUNT BERCHTOLD, AEHRENTHAL'S UNDERSTUDY, CONCOCTS THE NOTORIOUS PROCHASKA AFFAIR

HOW THE THIRD ATTEMPT TO START THE WAR FAILED

NOTHING ever kindled this spirit in Austria as did the single word "fight" as uttered by Bethmann-Hollweg. The so-called *Nationalverband*, a parliamentary organization representing the Pan-German interests in Austria, was jubilant over the prospect of the German Empire being entangled with us in a life-and-death struggle over Albania. Old Francis Joseph had completely given himself over to the war party which was eager to show the world, and particularly Germany, what a perfect military machine Austria had become. Everything was being done to whip up to the highest pitch the fighting spirit and artificially to create the jingo atmosphere (*hurrastimmung*). In the cabarets and even in the disreputable night resorts the playing and singing of the Hapsburg hymn and the Prince Eugene song became universal. In fact, when on December 16th the Balkan Peace Conference opened in London, we were awaiting the word from the General Staff to fire the first shot.

While public opinion was thus being lashed to fever heat, on the 16th of November Count Berchtold made the following pregnant announcement: "For many days now Vienna has received no news of the Austro-Hungarian Consul Prochaska at Prisrent. This circumstance has caused many anxieties which have been increased by the fact that the Foreign Ministry has no information regarding the Consul and has been unable to establish communication with him." On the same day the report was given out that "The Austro-Hungarian Consul in Mitrovitza, Herr Ladislaus von Taly, has just arrived in Budapest after a successful flight under great difficulties. The Serbian military authorities had interned the Consul in Mitrovitza and had thus sought to deprive him of his personal liberty." Two days later it was announced that "the Minister of Foreign Affairs will in the immediate future demand of the Serbian Government an explanation of these occurrences." At the same time the Foreign Office announced that "Serbia's treatment of our consuls has created an estrangement in diplomatic circles." These statements were made the very day that Doctor Pašić, the Premier of Serbia, declared that Serbia must have an outlet to the sea.

On December 4th the *Neue Freie Presse* gave these further details regarding the flight of Consul Von Taly: "As is already known, the Austro-

Hungarian Consul in Mitrovitza, Herr Ladislaus von Tahy, fled to Uskub on account of the attitude of the Serbian military authorities. From Uskub Consul Von Tahy made his way to Budapest via Nish and Belgrade. On the trip he met a Turkish journalist, Galib Bahtiar, editor of the Constantinople *Sabah*, who, during his stay in Vienna, gave the following interesting news concerning the flight of Herr Von Tahy to the representatives of the *Neue Freie Presse*: "In a cold railway car, without light, without heat, Consul Von Tahy and myself made the trip which lasted approximately forty hours. During all this time we were never quite sure of our lives. Consul Von Tahy spoke pessimistically regarding the Consul Prochaska affair. He said: 'In a coffee house a drunken komitagi [volunteer] was boasting that Prochaska was murdered. I heard with my own ears that fellow tell how the Serbs invaded the Consulate; how, when Consul Prochaska had protested, a dispute followed in the course of which the Consul was struck with a bayonet. I naturally can only say what I heard'."

The same day it was announced that Consul Edl, in service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had been dispatched to Prisrent to investigate the Prochaska affair on the spot, and that a report on the treatment of Consul Prochaska at the hands of the Serbs would be issued the following week. All the while distressing rumours were circulated

and published as to what had befallen the Consul. Besides the rumour of his murder there came a report that he had been seriously wounded and that the Austrian flag had been desecrated by Serbian soldiers, and then came word that the Consul had been outraged in a manner too vile to be described. Even the old emperor, who had the coolest head in the small group of men with whom rested all decisions as to war or peace, when he heard these harrowing stories, exclaimed in anger: "There are some things which cannot be tolerated!" Even the quietest and most pacific of his subjects, particularly the people of Vienna and Budapest, began to shake their heads and say that the honour of the empire could no longer tolerate such barbarities. The proofs only were required to make the people themselves demand war in reprisal for the inhuman treatment of our representative.

On December 5th, toward evening, the report spread that on the following day the renewal of the Triple Alliance would be officially announced. It was universally felt in well-informed circles that we were on the verge of war, not war against Serbia alone, but war against Serbia and Russia, which would mean the beginning of a world war. Never before, not even at the time of the annexation crisis in 1908-09, were there such wild and contradictory rumours afloat as on that night. The "Literary" Bureau announced that "Count Berchtold is pursuing a peace policy which can

only be shattered by Serbia's obstinacy. Count Berchtold will only abandon that policy when all diplomatic means have failed and the principle of the German military writer, Herr Von Clausewitz, comes into effect; namely, that 'war is the continuation of politics by other names'. The renewal of the Triple Alliance was officially announced on December 7, 1912, in the following form: "The treaty of alliance concluded between the sovereigns and governments of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy has been renewed without any alteration." On the same day the various political parties began to announce in the Reichsrat their position on the war with Serbia and Russia which was assumed to be inevitable and immediate.

Also at this time the Ballplatz press issued this warning to Serbia: "Serbia should hasten to clear her international conscience ere it be too late, or, rather, ere Consul Edl returns from Prisrent. Then it might be too late and then very likely the accusation which would be laid before the public of Europe would be such as to deepen the impression of the difficulty of maintaining a policy of peace toward such a neighbour as Serbia." Simultaneously the Prochaska incident was again brought up. "In regard to the Prochaska affair, it is reported in political circles that the report of Consul Edl is already substantially in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But since in

so important and delicate a matter it is necessary to give a complete picture of what occurred, the final personal report of Consul Edl, who examined thoroughly on the spot all phases of the episode, is awaited. Consul Edl is still making the necessary investigations in Prisrent. After his return to Vienna it will be possible to form a final judgment on the treatment of the Consul by the Serbian authorities. At such time, it is said, our government, if the circumstances demand it, will not fail to act in the matter with the utmost energy."

Our "Literary" Bureau in announcing on December 6th that the Powers were planning a conference of ambassadors on Balkan affairs to sit in London during the deliberations of the Balkan Peace Conference, made this significant remark: "Difficulties may arise in this conference owing to Serbia's injury to Austrian prestige and violations of international law in the Consul Prochaska affair." About this time an enterprising Budapest paper published its recommendations for the punishment of Serbia in the Prochaska affair. These suggestions were so acceptable to the war-party press that they were widely copied throughout both Austria and Germany. They were briefly as follows: "First, all the culprits should be severely punished; second, King Peter should be obliged to crave forgiveness through diplomatic channels for the affront to the monarchy; third, the Serbian Crown Prince should be required to

ask the forgiveness of Consul Prochaska personally; fourth, the Serbian Government should agree to pay the Consul by way of damages a life annuity of 70,000 crowns annually." In connection with this final provision it should be mentioned that Prochaska was a young and vigorous man. Meantime the German war press was echoing that of Austria and Hungary. To cite a single example typical of many others the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung* of Berlin declared itself in full accord with the Chancellor's willingness to "fight" and added, "The case of Consul Prochaska is, according to our view, a *casus belli*; Germany must act before it is too late and must stand for the furthest possible consequences of the alliance with Austria."

Our previous possible war aims having been removed by the unexpected and undesired acceptance by Serbia and Russia of our *status quo* formula left our diplomacy in the embarrassing position of having everything in readiness for the war except a plausible and defensible cause and purpose. They hastily set about to repair this oversight. Their efforts were rewarded by the discovery of a most modern and appealing object. Poor, oppressed Albania, which had so long been ground under the heel of the Turk, was now about to be seized and forced into vassalage to the tyrannous government of Serbia. Albania, small and defenceless though she was, should be rescued. She should be made self-governing—an autonomous principality. The

timely discovery was made that an Albanian prince some hundreds of years before had been distantly related to the Hapsburgs. That made our duty even more apparent. To be sure the scant information we were able to glean about our new protégés was not very reassuring. They were wild mountain tribes numbering eight to nine hundred thousand people, mostly Mohammedans, who had spent most of their abundant leisure serving as mercenaries in the armies of Abdul Hamid, the Red Sultan. They had no literature and not even a practical alphabet. Even their first grammar had been compiled by a studious young man in the employ of our Foreign Office!

Carping critics might have found our sudden solicitude for these down-trodden mountaineers somewhat inconsistent with our traditional customs and practices at the time. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had rescued from the Sultan by means of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, had been so ungrateful as to permit themselves to grow ever poorer, more illiterate and discontented. According to the official statistics of 1910 there were among the inhabitants of Bosnia, seven to twenty years of age, $87\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. of illiterates, which illustrates the nature of the cultural efficiency of the Black-Yellow Party which was alleged as the justification for the annexation of these provinces. Things had come finally to the point where absolutism was threatened to curb their waywardness.

Croatia and Slavonia were under dictatorships. In Hungary two thirds of the population were protesting at being turned over to the tender mercies of the remaining third—the ruling Magyar land junkers. In Galicia Poles and Ruthenes were at loggerheads. In Slovenia a handful of German land junkers were dominating the country. Everywhere, in fact, national self-assertion and development were being suppressed with an iron hand. But our statesmen had robust consciences and found little difficulty in adjusting themselves to the equivocal situation. Whatever its sentimental shortcomings it was evident that an autonomous Albania would furnish an inexhaustible supply of provocations for war as well as a constant menace to our hated little neighbour, Serbia. At all events, we certainly could not tolerate the dismemberment of European Turkey without satisfying the dynastic lust for conquest of our Hapsburg rulers.

And Germany, too, made the discovery that her imperial interests would be jeopardized by permitting Serbia to hold a port on the Adriatic. So the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg and their followers also became solicitous for the autonomy of Albania. Consequently the “war maniacs” or “Black-Yellow jugglers of Vienna,” as they were called by the people at large, were not only backed up but egged on by their confederates in Berlin.

As has been said, no sooner had the renewal

of the Triple Alliance been announced than the various political parties in the Reichsrat began to proclaim their attitude in the war against Serbia and Russia which they assumed was about to begin. Herr Liebermann, the spokesman of the Polish Social Democratic Party, declared: "The Polish Social Democrats are not willing to back up the imperialism of Serbia; they will fulfil their duty and stand faithfully at Austria's side if she is attacked by Russia." Whereupon Herr Karl Renner, a member of the German Social Democratic Party of Austria (later the first Chancellor of the Austrian Republic) sprang to his feet and declared that "the German Social Democrats, too, are in accord with the declaration of comrade Liebermann and will act as one man in using all their powers against 'Russian czarism'." This became the standard formula for their approval of the World War in 1914. These declarations were surprising to the superficial observer since the Social Democrats—comprising in their membership Germans, Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs, Slovenes, and Croats—had in a plenary sitting put themselves on record as opposed to a European war.*

I was one of the first to question the genuineness of the peace professions of these so-called socialists, and during the first year of the war I prepared a pamphlet entitled: "The Betrayal of Socialism" to expose these false apostles of the socialist doctrine. In this paper I pointed out that there was collusion between the war-mad Pan-Germanists of Germany and Austria and the peace-mad socialist extremists of Russia. My prophecies have been all too well fulfilled by the first and second Russian Revolutions of 1917, and their lamentable consequences.

At the same time that the Socialist deputies in the Reichsrat were declaring themselves for the war, word reached Vienna that the foremost representatives of the Ukrainian parties of Galicia had held a meeting in Lvov (capital of Galicia) where they had proclaimed the following: "It is vital to the Ukrainian nation that in a serious conflict between Austria and Russia the whole Ukrainian nation should stand united and firmly for Austria." After all this the resolution which follows of the always-servile Austrian Poles occasioned little surprise. "In the present serious political situation, the Polish Club proclaims that all Polish people inhabiting Austria are holding themselves ready and united, as the occasion may demand it, to fulfil their duty with all their powers toward Austria and her magnanimous and just monarch, who shows understanding of our feelings and recognition of our heavy fate and our national rights, and who places his confidence in us. In this unity with the state and its monarch, as also through reliance upon our own powers and the consciousness of our national aspirations, we see the guarantee of a better future." The foregoing expressions of blind loyalty show how well and thoroughly had the Department of the Interior performed its task in bringing the political parties into line for the war. The only peoples of the Dual Monarchy who remained in irreconcilable opposition to the war were the Czecho-Slovaks, the

Slovenes, the Serbs, and the great majority of the Croats.

When Count Forgach, Otto Franz, Tanzos, and the others were removed from their posts in Belgrade for their failure to bring on the war in 1908-1909, their most active collaborator in Vienna, save Count Aehrenthal himself, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, was also deposed from his position as Chief of the General Staff. He was the first of the faithful to be reinstated. On the tenth of December, 1912, the Emperor reappointed him Chief of Staff. At the same time a new joint Minister of War was appointed. Both appointees were favourites of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Their appointment indicated that the Archduke and the war party had gained complete sway over the old emperor. Hoetzendorf was a man after Francis Ferdinand's own heart. He looked upon war as the panacea for all the many ills of the empire. While he was particularly set upon war against Serbia and Russia he had in 1911 secretly urged war upon our ally, Italy, while her strength was being drained by the Tripoli campaign. He apparently advocated this war on the ground that any war, even one against an unoffending ally, is better than no war at all.

This sudden change in the highest military functionaries on the verge of war still further alarmed the people. And they were by no means reassured when the very papers, which had previ-

ously assured them that the retired Minister and Chief of Staff were so nearly omnipotent that to question their ability was high treason, now turned upon them and represented them as unreliable and incapable. On the other hand, the Ballplatz press now used every device known to the gentle art of newspaper reputation making, to elevate General Hoetzendorf to the position of a national hero. It was this heroic figure who in the summer of 1918 was forced to resign because of Austria's military failures. On the day after these changes in the high command a conference of ministers was held under the presidency of the Emperor at the Schoenbrunn Palace in Vienna.

Meanwhile, we were spending hundreds of millions on war preparations. When the home money market was exhausted we tried to raise money abroad. It is significant that we were unable to secure loans either in Paris or London. Finally we turned to American capitalists, and after long negotiations obtained the paltry sum of \$25,000,000 at the exorbitant rate of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This reduced us to the level of China in point of international credit. Internally our financial and industrial affairs went from bad to worse. Our banks declined to loan money for construction and industrial development. The people, too, were withdrawing their savings from the banks. The Government tried to revive the economic life by publishing all kinds of reassuring news. No one,

apparently, paid any attention to these assurances. Tens of thousands of reservists and young men about to reach military age hastily left the country. Families sold their homes, their land, their personal effects, anything to raise a little money so they could escape before the storm cloud of war burst upon them. In panic they fled to America, Canada, South America, Brazil, the Argentine, the Falkland Islands, and even as far as New Zealand and South Africa. Finally, the Hungarian Government, alarmed by the exodus, announced that no further passports would be issued to men of military age or to those who would come to military age during the next year. This did not stop the exodus but merely kept the police busy arresting, dragging back, and locking up the would-be evaders of military service.

Along the Serbian frontier the plans for invasion were prepared in the minutest detail. An incessant stream of ammunition was poured into Bosnia and Herzegovina toward the Serbian and Montenegrin frontiers. The Joint Minister of Finance, who was also Governor-General of Bosnia and Herzegovina, asked the Sabor (Diet) of these provinces to vote in all haste the necessary credits for new railways and roads of which the greater number were to be constructed between the rivers Sava and Drina, where, as the events of the World War showed, the offensive against Serbia started. These credits were asked at the very time when

the Prochaska affair was started. General Potiorek, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the very man who in 1914-1915 led our armies of invasion into Serbia, in summoning the heads of the various parties before him said: "We are on the eve of the war and it is urgent to vote in the course of the next few days the credits for these railways and the annual budget." In Galicia enormous quantities of war materials of all kinds, including guns, ammunition, bridges, and pontoons, were stored in Cracow, Przemysl, and in Lvow, the capital. These Galician preparations obviously were not directed against Serbia but against Russia. We even made final preparations against attack from the side of Italy. This surely was farsighted on the part of our military authorities. Ever since the annexation crisis of 1908 these preparations had been going forward uninterruptedly, and every branch of our military establishment had been kept on a war footing; 312,000,000 kronen was appropriated by the Reichsrat for new super-dreadnaughts for the navy. Since this money could not be had quickly enough, Baron Rothschild, head of the famous Jewish banking house in Vienna, the money power behind the throne, after repeated conferences with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, advanced the money for these ships. As a result they were known as the "Rothschild dreadnaughts."

The joint War Minister, on top of all this, de-

manded and received a hundred million kronen additional for general military purposes, for that year and for each succeeding year so long as in his opinion it might be needed. Even these vast expenditures, relatively to our available resources, were contemptuously referred to by Francis Ferdinand as "miserable lumps." The obligations for personal military service were increased proportionately with the taxes. Reservists who had previously been called upon for not more than eight weeks' military service in a year were now called to the colours for from two to three years' service. The crowning blow to the rapidly waning liberties of the unhappy subjects of Francis Joseph came through the enactment of the "Kriegsleistungsgesetz," a law which from the beginning of mobilization gave the military authorities complete power over not only the property but the person of every man. By this law were swept aside the rights of labour, the rights of travel, the rights of assembly—in fact, all personal liberty of any kind. It should be realized that this law was made in time of peace and not under the pressure of war. This law, which carried us to the furthest possible extreme of military despotism, was supported in the Reichsrat by all parties, including the Clerical Party, the Christian Socialists, and the German Liberals.

Our progress in a military way was accompanied by alarming retrogression in every other direction.

We had no money for schools and hospitals. The social insurance laws could be only partially enforced because of lack of funds. State officials and employees were wretchedly paid. Our scientists were forced to go to other countries in order to find suitable conditions for their work. Meanwhile, poverty and misery were rapidly increasing throughout the empire, particularly in the cities. The annual report of the *Vienna Waermestuben Verein*, a society to provide warming-rooms for the poor, gives some idea of the conditions among the poor of the capital. Between November, 1911, and March, 1912, a total of 1,000,218 persons came to these rooms, among whom were 209,500 women and 597,000 children. In Vienna alone 98,857 people were without shelter. An average of 5,000 children daily came to these shelters and stood in line for hours to receive the free soup and bread. Hundreds of children spent the nights in these rooms, huddled or sitting on benches in corners, without beds, bedding, nightclothes, or sleeping accommodations of any kind. For the meals of the 5,000 children and an almost equal number of adults the City Council paid 6,000 crowns daily, or about half a cent per person.

One may imagine how the more intelligent of these poor people felt when they heard of our enormous expenditures on military preparations—preparations against little Serbia so far as was officially admitted—Serbia, one of whose crimes

was her desire to export food into our empire and sell it to our hungry people.

In these dreary December days, while the poor shivered and starved, political events occurred with such rapidity that it was difficult to keep track of them. Almost every utterance made or inspired by the Government contained references to the outrages committed by the Serbs on Consul Prochaska. Finally, however, a lieutenant field marshal, in no way connected with the Foreign Office, issued this statement: "According to my information Prochaska is all right, and the rumours about his being greatly misused are exaggerated; nevertheless the treatment accorded him by the Serbs did constitute an infraction of international law." Thus came to an abrupt termination the supposed sufferings of Consul Prochaska—sufferings which had aroused the indignation and sympathy of almost everyone from the old emperor down to his humblest subjects. A few days later it was given out that Consul Edl had returned from his investigation of the Prochaska affair and that an official report on the matter would soon appear. Not long after this the "Imperial and Royal Vienna Telegraph Correspondence Bureau" issued the long and anxiously awaited report. It read: "The investigation which was conducted by a delegate sent by the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the affair of Consul Prochaska in Prisrent, which has been somewhat delayed

owing to the great distances and the situation brought about by the war [the Balkan War] has now been completed. On the basis of this report it can be said to our satisfaction *that the rumours which have been in circulation*, according to which Consul Prochaska had been held a prisoner at his post and had been maltreated by the Serbian authorities, are totally unfounded. The accusation made in turn by the Serbian Government against the above-named consular functionary, and the reasons given for requesting his transfer—namely, that Serbian troops had been fired upon on entering Prisrent from the building of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate, have also been found to be totally false. The Serbian military authorities were found, however, to have committed an offence against international law in their conduct toward Consul Prochaska and the personnel of the Consulate. This infringement will be made known to the Royal Serbian Government with a request for adequate satisfaction. There is, however, no ground for the belief that the Royal Serbian Government, which has shown itself very responsive to the mission of the delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will refuse such satisfaction.”*

*It is a significant fact that at this critical time Austrian monitors and gunboats on the Danube were flashing their search-lights on Belgrade at night and were passing within a few yards of passenger boats. Machine-gun practice by Austrian soldiers along the shore subjected travellers to serious inconvenience. Shots fired from the Austrian shore imperilled Serbian peasants working in the fields. All of these manœuvres were calculated to produce some frontier “incident” which could be used as a pretext for war.

Thus was our Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally obliged to repudiate the alleged persecution of Consul Prochaska which had for so long been utilized to arouse the war spirit of our long-suffering people. Knowing Consul Prochaska as I did and realizing that he had in him none of the stuff of which martyrs and heroes are made, I had from the first been very much amused at the highly imaginary and dramatic accounts of his hardships and heroism. When I learned what had actually happened I was still more amused. While this martyred hero was, in the imagination of Francis Joseph and his credulous subjects, lying wounded and shockingly disfigured at his lonely post in the Black Mountains of the tottering Turkish Empire, he was, in fact, sitting quietly in his official residence in the best of health and spirits, carefully guarded by stately *kavasses* (guards) in their gorgeous Montenegrin uniforms, leisurely sipping his coffee *à la Turque*, prepared by his Balkan servants, while his little companion of the Viennese demi-monde, with her bright blue eyes and flaxen curls, anticipated the slightest wish of her lord and master. All of which goes to show how hard it is to avoid being a hero if the Powers That Be so will it.

Why the Prochaska affair had been abandoned as a possible *casus belli* was soon apparent. A few days later, on the twenty-first of December, the Conference of Ambassadors—that nightmare

of the Ballplatz, which had been convened in London, at the instance of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, in order to prevent the Balkan War from becoming a world war—had recommended that Serbia accept Austria's harsh demands, renounce her claim to the strip of territory on the Adriatic Sea, and again bow to our policy of commercial tyranny over her. Rather than precipitate a general war Serbia and her natural protector and adviser, Russia, had accepted this unjust settlement. Once more, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria and her big ally, greatly to their disgust and disappointment, had won their alleged object without plunging the world into war. This time, as before, their plans had been frustrated by the unexpected and undesired acceptance by Serbia and Russia of their unjust demands. In confirmation of our assertions about the London Conference of Ambassadors we are now able to quote no less an authority than Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador who took part in that conference. On page 11 of his famous confessions, he says:

“As a matter of fact, we had again successfully emerged from one of those trials of strength which characterize our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position to procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established as a vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Hence

this conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although no *German* interests were involved; but we continued to pursue in London the dangerous path upon which we had once entered in the Bosnian question, nor did we leave it in time when it led to the precipice."

The Pan-Germans and Pan-Magyars can stomach anything that succeeds, but the Prochaska affair had not succeeded and was therefore inexcusable. Moreover, it had proved an immensely expensive joke. Through the falling of stocks alone investors had lost two billion kronen. Aside from the hundreds of millions which had been unnecessarily spent on armaments, the dynasty and the diplomacy of Austria had been for a second time exposed to the contemptuous derision of Europe. Consequently Count Berchtold and his associates fell under a cloud just as had Aehrenthal and his fellow conspirators four years before. Berchtold was for a time unable to muzzle even the most venal and subservient newspapers and politicians. The old emperor was again in a rage at being duped, and the courtiers who had neglected him to pay homage to the rising power of Francis Ferdinand scuttled back to sit at the feet of their old master and criticized as far as they dared the conduct of the heir to the throne.

Even the leading Jewish paper, the great *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, sullenly commented: "The

Prochaska affair began as a swollen river and has now shrunk to a little brook that one may ford dry shod. The question remains why the monarchy, through a word of explanation spoken in time, did not quiet the situation." Another Viennese paper, the *Zeit*, wrote: "There are things in the Prochaska affair for which not Serbia, but our own government, is responsible and should give us satisfaction."

A member of the Hungarian House of Lords criticized Count Berchtold for leaving the public so long in the dark in the Prochaska matter. As a result of these proddings an inspired statement appeared a few days later which read as follows: "In all probability the Prochaska affair will come to a peaceful and final solution in a very short time. The Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, Herr Stephan von Ugron, has communicated to Premier Pašić the desire of Austria-Hungary that after the return of Consuls Prochaska and Von Tahy to Prisrent and Mitrovitza, the Austro-Hungarian flag be given military honours by a Serbian detachment commanded by an officer. Serbia has agreed to comply with this demand as soon as Herr Prochaska and Herr Von Tahy return to their posts. Also the official Serbian Press Bureau published yesterday an official communiqué in which the regret of the Serbian Government was expressed over the affronts committed by the Serbian military authorities against the consuls."

But while Consul Prochaska was no longer a boon to our diplomacy but rather a "millstone around our necks," he appeared still capable of being served up once more to whet the jaded appetites of the fire-eating Pan-Germans in Germany. Totally disregarding the official denial of our Foreign Office, German newspapers, including not only Pan-German organs like the *Vossische Zeitung*, but also the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, repeated as true the familiar charges now officially branded as falsehoods. The latter paper, for good measure, added some further lurid details to the effect that Serbian soldiers had forced their way into the Consulate, where they had torn down and besmirched the Austrian flag, and finally had murdered without cause some Albanian families who had taken refuge in the Consulate. Count Berchtold issued an official denial of these stories which finally ended Consul Prochaska's vicarious career as an international figure and a possible cause of world war.

Both Prochaska and the runaway, Consul Von Tahy, were brought back and reinstated in their respective offices. Serbian military detachments both in Prisrent and Mitrovitza presented arms in honour of the Austro-Hungarian flag, and this world-stirring diplomatic incident and "outrage against international law" was closed except for those immediately concerned.

Just as the Friedjung charges had kept recurring to plague Aehrenthal long after their usefulness

had ceased, so now the Prochaska charges refused to be buried by Berchtold's solemn official denials. Professor Masaryk, the distinguished scientist—at this writing the President of Czecho-Slovakia who, as will be recalled, had been characterized by one of the judges in the first high-treason trial at Zagreb as a “raggamuffin, a nobody, and a refuse of human society”—now further displayed his raggamuffinly traits by insisting upon washing the dirty linen of the Prochaska matter in public. “Consul Prochaska,” said Professor Masaryk, “complained that the attitude of the Serbian soldiers toward the Catholic priest in Prisrent was indecent, that they forced their way into the Catholic church and into the house of the Sisters of Mercy to look there for concealed weapons, and that they threatened him with death. In this complaint Consul Prochaska made it clear that the Catholics of Albania were under the protectorate of Austria. The Consul demanded that the officer who commanded the platoon of soldiers who committed these acts, apologize. To offset this complaint we have the deposition of the Catholic priest himself, stating that nothing had happened to him, that no one had forced his way into the church, and that the officers had merely come to the church and the premises of the church to see whether they contained any weapons.” “A second complaint of the Consul states that Serbian soldiers had taken from the mail carrier the cor-

respondence of the Consulate as well as a revolver which he carried on his person. This was considered by Vienna as a particularly aggravated offence.”*

“The third complaint stated that Serbian soldiers had led away a pony that was grazing in a pasture and which was said by some peasants to belong to the Consul.” These three complaints were, according to Professor Masaryk, “the main causes of the Prochaska affair, and led to the official complaints lodged by our government in Belgrade.”

There was a final charge that the Serbs had made hostile demonstrations against the Consul when he left Prisrent. After Serbian diplomatic agents had investigated this charge it was pointed out as tactfully as possible that such hostile demonstrations as may have occurred were undoubtedly directed not at the Consul, but at the lady of doubtful reputation who accompanied him.

For my part I must admit that the treatment accorded his lady companion must have been galling and humiliating to the hero, Prochaska! Some Serbs later described to me the circumstances of this international event. It appears that as the consular cortège left Prisrent, the Consul was seated in one carriage and his *dame de compagnie*

*Undoubtedly the Serbian authorities had prevented the Consul from sending telegrams in cipher. This prohibition is common in war time and is not regarded as a violation of international law.

in another. The rattling of some tin cans, which some street boys with no sense of international etiquette, had attached to her carriage, so alarmed the poor lady of the demi-monde that she sprang from her carriage and clambered breathless and protesting into that of the accredited representative of the Imperial and Royal Government.

When Prochaska returned to Vienna His Majesty soothed his outraged feelings by promoting him to be a Consul General and sending him in that capacity to the distant but beautiful city of Rio de Janeiro, where, like the prince in the fairy story, he lived happily until the overthrow of the monarchy which he had served so picturesquely.

Probably Prochaska did not know himself who had made him famous until the official organ of the Ballplatz published the news the following May that "Herr Koloman Kania de Kanya, Hofrat and Consul General, head of the Literary Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been given by Emperor Francis Joseph the title and character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary," adding: "This nomination is in recognition of the services rendered by this official in the recent past. He will retain his post as head of the Literary Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." So this was the man through whose ingenuity the peaceful entry of a church to look for concealed weapons, the search of a Consular mail pouch, and the seizure of a pony, had developed into an

international imbroglio which threatened the peace of the world. No one can deny that he was indeed an "Envoy Extraordinary" long before his royal master gave him the title.

There were some people in Austria who thought that the international opera-bouffe performances of this distinguished individual did not merit reward. Among these there arose a storm of indignation. Two days after the announcement of the new honours for the head of the Literary Section, the Government was faced by some very embarrassing interpellations in the Austrian Delegations. Among other things a demand was made for a judicial inquiry into the conduct of the official whom His Majesty had just honoured. At this point Premier Count Stuergh made an appeal to the deputies that for the honour of Austria and the Hapsburg Dynasty they drop the matter and refrain from dragging the foreign policy of the monarchy through the mire of a judicial investigation. This appeal was strangely reminiscent of a similar appeal which, four years before, had been made by the representative of Francis Ferdinand and Aehrenthal to the litigants in the Friedjung trial. This appeal, like that one, was successful except that one deputy, Doctor Kramarz, refused to be silenced until he had freed his mind. He said: "An abominable crime was committed against the welfare of Austria through the Prochaska affair, when it was undertaken artificially

to arouse war fever in the populace." "I contend," he said, "and if necessary I can prove it, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew all along that nothing had happened to Prochaska. In the Literary Bureau originated all the sufferings which so wrought upon us. There originated the war fever; there our terrible economic losses had their origin; thence came the ruin of our economic life, those who paid for the crisis with their financial existence have them to thank. What did we attain by the Prochaska affair? Nothing. At least, nothing except to become the laughing stock of Europe and to awaken grave doubts as to the conduct of our foreign policy among all honest men at home."

Had it not been for these revelations the world would never have had authentic knowledge of the real inwardness of the Prochaska affair. In the official Red Book published by our government in April, 1914, and covering this memorable period of our history, the affair is not even mentioned. This modest reticence was apparently followed as a precedent in our later Red Book which sought to place upon Serbia and Russia the guilt of causing the World War. In this book one may search in vain for the numerous dispatches which passed between Berlin and Vienna in the critical days preceding the outbreak of the great war.

As for Prochaska's impresario, the Envoy Extraordinary, as a sop to popular indignation, and

with one of its consummate strokes of unconscious humour, our Foreign Office sent him as Minister to Mexico where later he perhaps found familiar and congenial occupation in helping Foreign Secretary Kühlmann of Germany partition the United States—on paper.

CHAPTER VI

BERCHTOLD'S ALBANIAN COMEDY

PRINCE HOHENLOHE'S MISSION TO THE CZAR

AFTER the exposure of the Consul Prochaska fraud and Europe's narrow escape from war in December, 1912, through the efforts of the London Conference of Ambassadors and the acceptance by Serbia and Russia of the unjust demands of Austria and Germany, there came a great reaction among the peoples of Austria-Hungary. The war spirit rapidly subsided and the artificially created patriotic enthusiasm evaporated overnight. Noisy patriots no longer marched to the Deutschmeister Monument to bellow the Prince Eugene song. In the cabarets and all-night resorts the guests were no longer stirred by the singing of the national hymn. The lust for war and conquest was gone. After its jingo debauch the whole nation seemed to be suffering from a "morning-after" headache and depression. The people felt bitter and resentful toward the Government for having "led them by the nose." The Balkan experts with their "inside sources of information" and the staff trumpeters of the Ballplatz

press became mute. The people saw with anger that every foot of territory which had been snatched from the Serbs and given to Albania was, so to speak, covered with Austrian gold—Albania whose longevity as a nation everyone questioned. This depression was nowhere greater than in the ranks of the “Black-Yellow Party” itself. All of them from the Archduke Francis Ferdinand down to the least of the Ballplatz “press reptiles” (the contemptuous term by which the nobles in the Foreign Service always refer to the Jewish reporters) were plunged in gloom. But the War Party, although disgusted, was by no means discouraged. It began at once to formulate new plans to accomplish its purpose.

The new programme appeared in the January, 1913, number of Baron Chlumetzky’s magazine, the *Oesterr. Rundschau*, under the title “Evil Forebodings,” and read: “We have not spent uncounted millions and brought upon our empire many a heavy crisis to create an Albania that should fall chiefly under the influence of other powers. Even less can we permit this Albania to have a miscarriage which would soon demand of us new and costly cures. Austria-Hungary has assumed, in opposition to Serbia, the responsibility of the fatherhood of the new Albania. We have already paid for the delivery of Albania high birth tolls. We must not now be satisfied with half-way measures. We must, on the contrary, summon the will power to

bring about in the Balkans a new order of things in the way best suited to our interests—the creation of the form of Albanian autonomy most favourable to our requirements, with territorial boundaries such as will guarantee to the new state the possibility of untrammelled growth—the securing from Serbia of guarantees, to be given at once before the final settlement of the Balkan question, of trade rights in Macedonia and Albania and finally a free passage to Salonica. These are in general the problems which must be solved before we can look into the future with anything like confidence. To back down on any one of these points would be to invite grave misfortune for the monarchy. The world would interpret it as a symptom of weakness—as a confession that we had indeed lost that power to act and that vitality which is essential to a great power, as indeed to any state if it shall not gradually fall into decay.” In an article supplementing this, entitled: “Austria-Hungary’s Interest in a Strong Albania,” which appeared in the next number of the same publication, this statement was made: “The military importance of a Greater Serbia in relation to the radius of action of the monarchy consists in this, that such a Serbia would be able to put into the field half a million men and would thus neutralize in each international complication an equally large Austro-Hungarian force, and would thus withdraw it from the main theatre of war. [That

is, from the Russian theatre of war.] This would also affect the military value of the monarchy in the German-Austrian Alliance. Only a strong Albania can serve as a counterweight to this. But for the Austro-Hungarian and the German policy this must serve as the last bulwark against the advance of Pan-Slavism to the Adriatic. Finally, Albania is the last bridge over which Middle Europe can unopposed extend its hegemony into the Western Balkans." We shall see that all the subsequent efforts of the Austro-Hungarian and German governments up to August 9, 1913, when Italy wet-blanketed their plans by refusing to join them in an attack upon Serbia and in a world war, were strictly in accord with the aims set forth in these quasi-official statements.

It should be noted that these statements are based on purely military and strategic considerations. The former military assumption that Turkey could be counted upon at least to hold in check the Balkan States while Austria and Germany attacked Russia had been upset by the alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria and destroyed by the victory of the Balkan Alliance over Turkey. The Alliance could put a million soldiers in the field to checkmate Austria-Hungary should the long-cherished scheme for the conquest and partition of Russia be attempted. The Balkan Alliance or, as it was well termed, the Tenth World Power, was in its ethnic composition predominately

Slav. Serbs and Bulgars outnumbered the Greeks three to one, while all three peoples were adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church, and, as such, naturally looked to Russia as the leading Greek Orthodox Slav power. As a result of the shabby treatment we had always given Serbia, as well as our consistent oppression of our own southern Slavs, we well knew that we could expect nothing of this new world power. We therefore decided that it must be crushed. To crush the Balkan Alliance we believed it was only necessary to crush Serbia and give her allies, Bulgaria and Greece, a share in the spoils. While, on the one hand, we continued our elaborate preparations to crush Serbia by force, we, on the other hand, started, through the underground channels of secret diplomacy, to detach Bulgaria from the alliance with her. Count Adam Tarnowski, our Minister in Sofia, the same man who in the World War actually brought Bulgaria on to the side of the Central Empires, was entrusted with this diplomatic task. His efforts were greatly facilitated by the pro-Austrian sympathies of King Ferdinand. The secret ambition of King Ferdinand for a Bulgarian domination of the Balkan Peninsula, to make Bulgaria the Prussia of the Balkan States, coupled with the determination of Serbia, now that she had been denied her "little window on the Adriatic," to hold her economic outlet on the Ægean through Macedonia, played admirably into the hands of our

diplomacy. Serbia held that the harbour on the Adriatic which she had won with blood and treasure could never have been wrested from her at the behest of Austria had Bulgaria been true to the Alliance and honestly supported Serbia's claims. Since Bulgaria had not helped her to keep her hold on the Adriatic she declined to turn over to Bulgaria, in accordance with the terms of the Alliance, the portions of Macedonia which Serbia's armies had conquered and thus lose her outlet on the Ægean as well as the Adriatic and place herself again in the position of economic dependence which she had fought a victorious war to escape.

In order to crush Serbia and rescue Turkey, and to forestall the interference of Russia, we decided to try to cajole Russia into demobilizing on our northern front. It will be recalled that at the outbreak of the First Balkan War we had begun to mobilize our armies. We had gradually concentrated 400,000 men on the Serbian frontier who were ready at a moment's notice to invade Serbia. We had also mobilized against Russia on our northern frontier. Russia's only answer to this unusual provocation had been to retain one class of the year 1910 with the colours instead of sending the men to their homes. But even these men she held in the interior and not near our border. We sought, by playing upon the well-known pacific ideals of the Czar and by cultivating in Russia a false sense of security, to have these reservists sent

home. With Russia fully demobilized our General Staff had calculated that we could crush Serbia before Russia could come to her assistance.

Accordingly the three objectives of our diplomacy at this time were: to rekindle the war spirit in Turkey, to detach Bulgaria from her allies and thus break up the Balkan Alliance, and, by playing upon the Czar's pacific ideals, to secure the demobilization of Russia's army and thus obtain a clear field for the crushing of Serbia. Adrianople, the second Holy City of the Ottomans, had been conquered by the Balkan Allies. We told the Turks that upon their recapture of the "fortress of Adrianople hung the peace of the world." And secretly we informed the leaders of the Young Turk Party that if they, through a *coup d'état*, would overthrow the existing government and set up one of their own we would lend military aid.

To work upon the peace sentiments of the Czar, Count Berchtold sent Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, a son-in-law of the Archduke Frederick, to Petrograd with a personal letter from the old emperor proposing to his fellow monarch that he demobilize on Austria's northern frontier provided Austria should do the same. All mention of Austria's heavily mobilized southern frontier was studiously avoided. The alleged peace mission of Prince Hohenlohe was widely heralded in the Ballplatz press. Papers like the *Neue Freie Presse* waxed eloquent on the well-known peace sentiments of

Czar Nicholas and reminded him of his obligation to be faithful to the ideals of the great movement for international peace and disarmament which he had set on foot through the first Hague Peace Conference fifteen years before. They further pointed out to the Czar that the causes which had four times during the reign of Francis Joseph brought Russia and Austria to the verge of war had now been removed by the complete victory of the Balkan States over Turkey. They said that no matter who won in the war in the Balkans, which threatened to break out anew, henceforth the Balkans would belong to the Balkanians.

Thus having stimulated the war spirit in Turkey and the peace spirit in Russia we turned our attention to the task of recreating war enthusiasm among our own sorely tried people. It seemed desirable that our new protégés, the Albanians, should manifest their national consciousness and aspirations in some dramatic way and that they should appeal to us to help them. An Albanian congress with representatives from all over the world as well as from Albania was just what was needed. An Albanian congress organizing committee was accordingly quickly set to work and the Congress was announced to open on March 1, 1913.

On January 24, 1913, the first act in our new war drama occurred just as it had been rehearsed. The Young Turks sprang their *coup d'état* under the leadership of Enver Bey, the young Jewish Turk

who had been the hero of the Turco-Italian War and of the Revolution. A Young Turk government was set up which announced as one of its cardinal principles the necessity for the recapture of the Holy City of Adrianople.

With a Holy Mohammedan war thus satisfactorily launched by our Turkish friends we were free to turn to the cultivation of the budding aspirations of our Albanian protégés. The organizing committee of the Albanian Congress originally planned to hold their meetings in the Festive Hall of the patriotic society known as "Austria," but they finally decided to hold it in Tina di Lorenzo Hall of Dreher's Brewery in Trieste in order to guard against arousing the suspicions of unsympathetic observers that there was collusion between the congress and our government. On the appointed day Dreher's Brewery became the cradle of the new Albanian nation. No less than 500 Albanian patriots had come as delegates not only from their Fatherland, but from Rumania, Dalmatia, Greece, Spain, Italy, and even from far-off America.

At the opening session the president of the organizing committee introduced with appropriate eulogistic remarks the representative of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary. This dignitary was none other than Police Director Mahovec, who had rendered distinguished service in the arrest of Pan-Serb con-

spirators during the high-treason trials described in a previous chapter. The police director closed his address with the words that he hoped in the near future to see Albania "a free and independent state" and took his seat amid a storm of applause. On the second day the congress was addressed by Count Heinrich Taaffe, a member of one of the greatest noble families of Austria. The noble count expressed his desire to see the "birth of a Greater Albania." "Austria-Hungary," he said, "will help the new state in every possible way." He concluded with the exclamation: "Long live Greater Albania!" whereupon the 500 delegates rose as one man and shouted: "Long live Austria! Long live the Triple Alliance!"

A teacher delegate exhorted his hearers to go to Albania and "with the sword of Scanderbeg put to flight the band of brigands who want to destroy the Fatherland." The delegates were greatly excited to discover in their midst a Prince Scanderbeg who claimed descent from the national hero whose sword they were thus exhorted to use. A letter was read from an absent patriot in Kroja, Albania, which said: "Ten thousand armed Albanians are assembled in the vicinity of Alessio, and fighting has already begun." On the third day a letter from Count Berchtold was read in which he expressed his best wishes for the welfare of Albania and the "Albanian Nation." This letter seemed to inspire one of the delegates to spring to his feet

and make the modest proposal that Greater Albania should include the whole of Old Serbia as well as Macedonia. He also proposed that "in the name of the Albanian Congress a general revolt be proclaimed in Albania for the defence of the Fatherland." "The Albanian," he continued, "never forgets his vendetta and let whomsoever agrees with me," exclaimed the orator in thunderous tones, "raise his hand and solemnly swear the *bessa*" [the Albanian oath]. All the five hundred sprang from their seats and raised their hands, exclaiming: "We swear—on with the struggle for liberty!" After this one of the delegates shouted amid applause: "We shall make of Kossovo* [Old Serbia] a Serbian cemetery."

Then a Catholic priest, in the midst of a storm of applause, thanked their great benefactors the King of Italy and His Apostolic Majesty the Emperor of Austria-Hungary and their respective Foreign Ministers for their august support of the Congress. A delegate from Bucharest assured the assembly that "Rumania is watching with sincere sympathy the resurrection of Albania." A delegate from Boston addressed the gathering as follows: "Italy and Austria will do everything possible to give us a Greater Albania, but this will not suffice. We also must do our duty. We are the ones who must make war!" And with the cry:

*The famous battle in which the Serbs were defeated by the Turks in 1389.

“To arms! to arms!” the orator concluded his speech amid thunderous applause. Another delegate quoted statistics showing that there were, all told, 1,800,000 Albanians. Another priest then took the floor to advocate the “creation of a buffer state made up of the Kutzo-Wallachs,” a race of shepherds scattered over the Macedonian mountains. This state should form a “buffer state between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania; being, however, under the protection of Greater Albania.” The crowning moment of the congress arrived when Lieutenant Haessler of the Austro-Hungarian army pointed out on a map “how the Albanian frontiers must be drawn,” exhorting the congress “loudly to raise its voice for all four vilayets [provinces], that is, for the Greater Albania, as already proposed by delegate Cacarigi.” In concluding, the president said that Albania now needed only three things: “A flag, a gun, and cartridges.” Thereupon—with shouts of, “Long live His Majesty Emperor Francis Joseph! Long live the Archduke Francis Ferdinand! Long live the Hapsburg monarchy!”—the congress adjourned.

Through this same Lieutenant Haessler in the spring and summer of 1914 we liberally provided the Albanians with these three things which they lacked according to the president of their congress, as will be disclosed in a subsequent chapter.

In describing this birth of a nation the daily

papers of Trieste mentioned that the congress had received from the Austro-Hungarian Government a subvention of 50,000 kronen. This report was never denied by Count Berchtold who might perhaps be described as the efficient, though absent, midwife of the occasion. The president of the congress, however, indignantly denied that any motives save self-sacrificing patriotism had led his lusty mountaineer compatriots to travel from all corners of the globe to the now immortalized hall of Dreher's Brewery. He published a statement showing that the entire expenses of the congress had amounted to only 1,132 kronen and 78 hellers (about \$200.00). Even this modest sum, he claimed, was contributed in greater part by two aspirants to the throne of Albania and not by the government of Austria-Hungary.

Meantime the Czar and his government were struggling to meet the peace overtures of Francis Joseph without endangering the safety of their great country. They were perhaps excusable if they did not regard the events in Turkey or Albania as quite consistent with the pacific protestations of our emperor. There was another disturbing factor with which they must reckon. Persistent reports were circulated that two groups of men were struggling for the rudder of the Austrian ship of state, one group under the nominal leadership of the aged emperor and the other led by the ambitious and energetic heir to the throne.

There were times when the highest officials did not know whose orders to obey. They were trying to serve two masters. As this situation became known in a general way to the man on the street it naturally did not escape the attention of Russia's diplomats. The extreme old age and weakness, both physical and mental, of the Emperor, on the one hand; the aggressiveness of the heir to the throne, on the other; the daily expected death of the one, to be followed by the ascension to the throne by the other, made our courtiers and politicians sway like willows in a wind. When the old man fell into a state of torpor they swayed to the side of the heir. When he rallied and had a period of senile energy they swayed back to bow again their servile backs before their choleric old master. This dual control resulted in the greatest confusion in the upper councils of the Government. This pulling and hauling for the rudder of the ship of state created apprehension at home and distrust abroad.

The mission of Prince Hohenlohe to the Czar gave our old friend Kania de Kanya, the chief of the press bureau, a providential opportunity to alarm our people as to Russia's dark designs upon them. Each day the Ballplatz press pictured as more and more hopeless the efforts of Prince Hohenlohe to dissuade Russia from her warlike designs upon us. The war dread of our people was by no means lessened when on the 4th of

March, 1913, they learned that Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany was about to call upon the Reichstag to raise the peace footing of the German army to the enormous figure of more than 870,000 men and to levy a special military tax of more than a billion marks upon the people of the nation. It was further understood that the Chancellor was taking this action at the behest of his royal master. Coming at a time of special tension over Albania and the Balkan situation in general it could only be assumed that Germany's immense increase in armaments was immediately related to those situations. This assumption was confirmed by the German press. *Germania*, the medium of the German Centre Party, which had become one of the strong pro-war groups, said in explanation of these increased armaments: "The assumption heretofore existing that, in a European war, the Balkan States could be held in check by Turkey has become untenable in view of the present state of affairs. To-day Austria finds herself in case of war face to face with two fronts."

Early in January the Czar had declared that he would not allow himself to be dragged into war. The three hundredth anniversary of the coming of the Romanoffs to the throne of Russia was to be celebrated on March 6, 1913. The Czar was particularly anxious that his efforts in behalf of international peace should be emphasized on this

occasion. He desired that the world-wide publicity which the occasion would naturally call forth should be used to promote the idea of world peace. He was therefore particularly desirous, at this time of all others, to demonstrate Russia's pacific attitude toward her neighbours.

Accordingly on March eleventh Czar Nicholas accepted the unfair proposal of Emperor Francis Joseph and agreed to disperse the men of the class of 1910 while Austria-Hungary was to reduce to peace strength her forces on the Galician frontier. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency in announcing this demobilization added: "As appears from the discussions carried on with the cabinet of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy harbours no aggressive intention toward its southern neighbours." This was a clever bit of Russian diplomacy which put the Ballplatz in a very uncomfortable position. When in the course of the negotiations on demobilization the Russians had pointed out the unreasonableness of our demand that they demobilize while we refused to demobilize against Serbia on our southern frontier, the least our side could say in rejoinder was that this mobilization indicated no aggressive intentions toward our southern neighbours. In other words, the obvious lie which our diplomats had told in the decent obscurity of secret diplomacy was now trumpeted abroad to all the world. "The Czar of Russia has extended his hand to Emperor Francis Joseph in

order that the three hundredth anniversary of the reign of the House of Romanoff may be an unforgettable moment for the whole world—that of the triumph of peace, whose enthusiastic adherent the present emperor, Czar Nicholas, ever has been, as was also his august father.” Such was the comment on this memorable event in Petrograd and Paris.

CHAPTER VII

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG PREDICTS WAR BETWEEN "GERMANDOM AND SLAVDOM," APRIL, 1913

AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO MONTENEGRO

WHEN Kaiser Wilhelm learned of the Czar's decision to accept the proposal of Francis Joseph to reduce the strength of the Russian army on the Galician frontier, in an exuberant order of the day to his own army, he exclaimed: "*Gott mit uns!*" The day after the announcement that Russia had accepted our proposal Count Berchtold stated in the Austrian Delegations: "We have vital interests in the Balkans for the protection of which we must under all circumstances intervene." It will be noted that this is practically the same statement which Berchtold made in the critical days of December, 1912, when our armies were daily expecting the order to march against Serbia. At the same time General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, the Chief of the General Staff, that tireless advocate of "war at any price," came out with this characteristic statement: "Our monarchy is too patient, she is treating Serbia and Montenegro with too great leniency. She must show her

fighting will to counteract the evil designs of her neighbours and she must at any cost retain her influence in the Balkans. By war we must, according to the military idea, augment the prestige of the monarchy and win for it more respect." Now that Russia had committed herself to a peaceful policy our war advocates threw off all restraint. They demanded with ever-increasing boldness immediate war—war for the "redistribution of the earth." This had become their modest slogan. One of the Court councillors elucidated this new slogan in an article which appeared in the January-March, 1913, issue of *Oesterr. Rundschau*. In this he makes the statement: "We are trying in these historical times to act as history requires. The great wide world is knocking at our door. We must rush out and make world history. As the possible fruit of such action there lies before us the whole Oriental world—Turkey, Persia, and China—which are doomed to destruction, and we might have also Morocco and Tunis, and possibly even Egypt. Parts of Asia and Africa as well as Europe are the great goals which to-day command the attention of Europe."

The hated London Conference of Ambassadors was a constant stumbling block to our warpropagandists. No sooner did we think up some demand which seemed sufficiently preposterous to provoke war than the tireless ambassadors would secure its peaceful acceptance by the Balkan States and Russia.

In the meantime, we had to content ourselves with the piling up of armaments. This process went forward as briskly as in the most palmy days of the Prochaska affair. We turned our special attention to the building up of a great air fleet and to the development of a great new gun factory in Hungary. The proclamation authorizing this gun factory was signed by Archduke Karl Franz Joseph, the last Hapsburg Emperor, in his then capacity as a major in the Ordnance Department. This was a branch factory of the famous Skoda Works. The great Hungarian Jewish munition manufacturers, Manfred Weiss and Deutch & Son of Budapest, were financially interested in it as in the parent factory. The Krupps of Germany and the Hungarian Government were also financially involved in the enterprise.

This rampant militarism was, if possible, even more flagrant in Germany. There all the anti-military Sauls seemed to have been converted by the apostles of militarism into militaristic spend-thrift Pauls, to whom henceforth no demands for armaments on land or sea could be too great. Even the Socialists joined in this orgy of militarism. Russia's legitimate aspiration for a free passage through the Dardanelles and Serbia's equally legitimate desire for a commercial corridor to the Adriatic were given as reasons for this reckless prodigality in military expenditure. The Balkan Alliance was referred to as "overbalancing the

scales in favour of Slavdom." And all Germany constantly reiterated that "Germanic Austria" must serve as the advance guard in stemming the advance of the Slavs.

When the Ballplatz learned that six thousand Serbs were marching over the mountains to the aid of their Montenegrin brothers who were closing in on Skutari the Old Gray House (the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office) became almost a madhouse. The "press reptiles" were let loose and began to shriek in the war press: "The future World War has again received a new name, and that name is Skutari." "Europe," wrote the *Neue Freie Presse*, "which is rolling up billions and bringing up the peace strength of its armies to a height never before dreamed of, resembles one of those electric travelling cranes with a capacity for carrying immense loads but which if a pebble is caught in its mechanism is easily put out of order. The pebble is Skutari, and Europe the Titan who could crush the whole Balkans between its thumb and forefinger without being aware of any exertion, endures the malicious teasing of the march of new Serbian battalions against the encircled fortress without defending itself against the worry. Will Skutari fall and will its fall develop new complications threatening the peace of Europe?" But as the march of the Serbs was completely in conformity with the rules of warfare, Skutari being a Turkish fortress defended by Turkish troops, and as we

could not go to the rescue of the Turks without exposing ourselves to the obloquy of intervening for the decaying Mohammedan power and against the liberation of Christian people, we had to have some more presentable cause for entering the war. Since this time our General Staff for strategical reasons desired to invade Montenegro we needed a *casus belli* against that valiant little country, the "eagle's nest" of the Jugoslavs.

Accordingly, Count Berchtold ordered the "Literary" Bureau to discover at once what Montenegro had done to violate international law or to flaunt the sensitive honour of the Dual Monarchy. He had only a few days to wait. On the 21st of March Austria-Hungary and Germany were "shaken by the terrible news" that a Franciscan monk, Father Angelus Palitch, had been foully murdered by Montenegrins! The war press shrieked for vengeance for this "incredible crime" — "this crime that was crying to Heaven for vengeance!" "A reliable report," said the *Neue Freie Presse* in its issue of March 21st, "giving the details of this crime, discloses that it was committed with bestial ferocity and barbarity and in a horrifyingly bloody manner. The adventures of the Franciscan Father Palitch are politically of great importance. We must protect the peasants of Djakova who are robbed of their most essential rights. We must insist upon the investigation of the base crime against the Franciscan Father

Palitch not only because since olden times has the right to protect Albanian Catholics belonged to Austria-Hungary, but even more because the new situation in the Balkans, which our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has pledged itself to take cognizance of, logically presupposes that the laws of humanity and civilization must not be trodden under foot so near our frontiers." On the same day the Catholic organ, the *Reichspost*, said: "The Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Cetinje, Consul General Weinzettl, has made energetic demands on the Montenegrin Government for satisfaction for the more-than-obvious violations of international law which have so deeply offended the honour of Austria-Hungary. Should the Montenegrin Government fail to meet the demands, then diplomatic action will take a more cogent form and finally even military coercion will be adopted if necessary to give Austria-Hungary full satisfaction. Austria-Hungary demands the following: first, the unhampered exodus of civilians from Skutari; second, an investigation of the death of the Catholic priest, Father Palitch, murdered by Montenegrins near Djakova (when Austria-Hungary laid the demand before Montenegro that the bestial assassination of this priest be investigated in the presence of an Austro-Hungarian Consular official, the Montenegrin Government refused to comply, declaring that in districts occupied by Montenegrins, Montenegrins only had the right

to conduct investigations. This reply signifies an unfriendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary); third, the coercive measures to force Albanians into Orthodoxy must cease henceforth; fourth, complete satisfaction must be given for the lawless acts which were committed by Montenegrin military and civil authorities against the steamer *Skodra* at San Giovanni di Medua." In conclusion, this article stated: "What will happen next will depend entirely upon the behaviour of the Montenegrin Government. Most likely the crisis will speedily develop, but important as the grievances of our monarchy and Italy are, the underlying cause of the crisis is the desire of Montenegro and Serbia to capture the town of Skutari and thus cut off for Albania the very possibility of existence for the future."

The lawless acts which were committed by Montenegrin military and civil authorities against the steamer *Skodra* took place when the Hungarian steamer *Skodra*, owned by the steamship company "Ungaro-Croata," was commandeered by the Montenegrin authorities to help disembark helpless Serbian soldiers from Greek transports which were being shelled by a Turkish warship in the harbour of San Giovanni di Medua. As both skipper and crew of the *Skodra* were blood kin to these Serbian soldiers and gave their assistance gladly the commandeering was of course only a formality. This act of mercy was, in spite of this,

branded as lawless by our scrupulously law-abiding diplomats who had seized and held whole provinces contrary to law. In order to enforce our demands upon our new enemy—this time an arid patch of mountain country inhabited by 250,000 people—we dispatched a whole squadron of our fleet in battle array to the Montenegrin coast. Thus seven battleships, an equal number of cruisers, and a whole flotilla of torpedo boats patrolled the open roadstead outside the shallow harbour of Antivari. Truly Goliath was on the war-path against David! And Goliath had the backing of the greatest military power on earth. On March 23d an inspired article in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* said: "Austria-Hungary is determined to secure satisfaction from Montenegro for her violations of international law. In so doing she is acting not only for the protection of her own violated rights and interests but also for the protection of international law and for the principles of European civilization."

The Austro-Hungarian version of the manner in which the Franciscan monk, Father Angelus Palitch, met his death was as follows: On March 7th several fanatical orthodox ministers together with some Montenegrin soldiers attempted to compel 300 Albanian Roman Catholics to embrace the orthodox faith. The 300 were tied with ropes and given their choice between orthodoxy and death. Among the 300 was Father Palitch who, on his re-

fusal to abjure his faith, was beaten with the butt ends of rifles and finally bayoneted. According to the Montenegrin version of the affair Father Palitch was arrested by the Montenegrin police for attempting to stir up revolt against Montenegro among the Albanians and was being taken under escort from Ipek to Djakova, together with other suspected persons, to be tried on this charge. On the journey he broke away from his escort and attempted to escape. His guards three times summoned him to stop, but he paid no attention, whereupon they fired upon him and killed him.

These two contradictory reports about the death of Father Palitch were all that the public had to go by until the *Vienna Zeit*, on April 13th, came out with the following recital: "Two interesting documents are published here to-day. The one is a manifesto of the Committee for the Promotion of Austro-Hungarian Literary and Humanitarian Interests in Albania. The other is an official Serbian statement on the post-mortem inquiry into the death of the Franciscan friar, Father Palitch, whose alleged martyrdom for refusal to embrace orthodoxy figured prominently in recent Austro-Hungarian semi-official indictments of Montenegro. According to this Serbian statement the post-mortem inquiry was made yesterday at Djakova by two Montenegrin doctors and one Serbian doctor in the presence 'of the consuls.' The inquiry established the fact that Father Palitch was killed

at a considerable distance by rifle shots. There were no traces of bayonet wounds. Should this statement be substantiated by the consular reports, the blood-curdling story of Father Palitch's martyrdom, supplied to the *Neue Freie Presse* from an unspecified source, and reproduced by the *Reichspost*, would rank with the stories of the treatment of Consul Prochaska; and the Montenegrin declaration that Father Palitch was shot in attempting to flee from political arrest would be confirmed."

The death of Father Palitch as a possible *casus belli* was rendered finally untenable by this brief announcement which appeared three days later: "The mixed commission which has been holding an inquiry into the death of the Catholic priest, Palitch, who was arrested on a charge of publicly inciting the Albanians against the Montenegrin authorities and was killed, yesterday signed its report. It is declared that the commission found no convincing proof that Palitch was beaten and maltreated in prison by the Montenegrin authorities, and that no evidence was forthcoming of his premeditated murder by the Montenegrin escort." Disappointing as these findings must have been to the Ballplatz, our war leaders at least had the satisfaction of knowing that they had presented our "energetic demands for satisfaction" to Montenegro before the chief charge upon which they rested had been shattered.

Even before this disappointing report appeared, however, the plans of the Ballplatz for bringing on war had been foiled again by the good offices of the abhorred Conference of Ambassadors. On March 28th they had sent a collective communication regarding Skutari to the Montenegrin Government to the effect that, since the powers had reached an agreement regarding the northern and northeastern frontiers of Albania, Montenegro was "invited": first, to raise the siege of Skutari; second, to discontinue hostilities in the territory allotted to Albania according to the aforementioned agreement; third, to proceed rapidly to the evacuation of this territory. Naturally enough Montenegro and her ally, Serbia, had no opportunity to decline these unwelcome "invitations." Thus for the third time our diplomacy, and that of Berlin, won its ostensible object and lost its real object—war. A clamour of protest again arose against Berchtold and his associates for deceiving the public. Doctor Kramarz, the Czech authority on foreign affairs, again voiced his periodic protest: "The Prochaska affair is not the only thing that Kania (the head of the "Literary" Bureau) is guilty of. A second such affair is this of the Franciscan monk, Palitch. To him awful things had happened; to this man originally represented by the *Neue Freie Presse* to be a saint. That he scarcely deserved. We have done that which would be possible in no other country: we have kept the augmented effectives

under the colours for six months and our army partly mobilized. Everywhere the report was spread that Russian troops were mobilized in great numbers on our frontier. Not a word of this was true. I declare on good authority that Russia retained under the colours only her last year's class of reservists and they were not held on the Austrian frontier, but in the interior of Russia."

So serious was the tension in Europe created by our never-ending demands and bellicose attitude that the ambassadors at the London Conference were in a state of mind to yield to our every whim rather than have us run amuck and plunge Europe into the horrible disaster of a general war. Consequently they complied with their usual alacrity to our next demand which was for a naval demonstration of the Great Powers against Montenegro to enforce the decisions of the Conference. Hence the Great Powers, including even Russia, who authorized France to represent her, in order to humour and temporarily pacify our war-mad diplomats, consented to participate in this international *opéra comique*. The might of Europe fittingly symbolized by its ironclads assembled in the Adriatic to threaten Lilliput Montenegro with death and destruction if she did not obey the orders which had been sent her. But for our statesmen and their Berlin collaborators this apparently humorous performance known as the *Flotten-Demonstration* had a very much more serious purpose than the

coercing of helpless little Montenegro. They hoped by means of this coöperative action to commit, at least diplomatically, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Italy to their policy of hostility toward Montenegro and Serbia; indeed in some degree at least to their whole Balkan policy. If this hope were realized they might reasonably expect to secure the consent of the powers to occupy Montenegro and Serbia just as they had in 1878 won their consent to occupy temporarily Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this once accomplished they would be free to undertake the conquest and partition of Russia—their real ambition.

In commenting on this naval demonstration the *Neue Freie Presse* said: "England and France are represented among the men-of-war lying at anchor in the roadstead of Antivari [a Montenegrin port]. The commanders of the vessels will do the rest. Their soldiers' hearts will not permit them to allow their fleets to become an object of derision. There is no retreat, even for Russia, who empowered France to represent her. The diplomats can wind themselves like snakes and swallow their words. The admirals will not do this: they will not bring shame to their flags." The next day the official press became still more threatening and outspoken when the same organ announced: "The monarchy was not one of the originators of the London Conference of Ambassadors. It will submit to its decisions as long as it sees fit. Sku-

tari must become Albanian, be it with the consent of Europe or, if it must be, and Russia thus wills it, without the consent of Europe. The monarchy in demanding this will not stand alone." Light was thrown upon this final sentence a few days later when on April 4th Herr Von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, said in the Reichstag: "The German Empire stands faithfully with Austria." And a few days after that its meaning was made still clearer by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg when he said in the Reichstag in introducing the army and taxation bills: "*One thing is beyond doubt. If it should ever come to a European conflagration which would set Slavdom against Germanism, it would be for us a disadvantage that the position in the balance of forces, which was hitherto occupied by European Turkey, should now be filled in part by Slav states.*" These words, coming as they did after the Chancellor's announcement in December that Germany would "fight" for Austria, were particularly full of sinister significance. He continued: "We are endeavouring to lessen the tension between Austria-Hungary and Russia concerning the Balkan problems as far as possible, but in spite of this we must not put our head in the sand. That we shall remain faithful to our ally beyond mere diplomatic mediation goes without saying."

These words created indignation among all Slavs everywhere and they were by no means accepted

without question by the more liberal German leaders. The social democrat, Haase, for instance, in referring to the Chancellor's reference to the conflict between Slavdom and Germandom, said: "The German people, and I think I know the sentiments of the great masses, will refuse to go to war for the imperialistic aims of the Austrian prestige policy." The frivolity of such an undertaking would cause indignation such as we have never yet witnessed in Germany. The Russian people have no thought of war."

The conciliatory attitude of Russia in consenting that Skutari be awarded to Albania, in violation of both the interests and the rights of Montenegro and Serbia, caused a brief relaxation of the international tension and gave the peoples of Austria-Hungary a little breathing space in which to look about them. At this time, on April 12, 1913, Sergius Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the statement that "difference in race by no means leads inevitably to antagonism between races." This was generally accepted by the peoples of Austria-Hungary as Russia's reply to Bethmann-Hollweg's reference to "the conflict between Slavdom and Germandom." It was taken as an assurance that the Slavs of Russia at any rate had no desire for war. This reassurance was increased by the announcement that the Czar was to attend in Berlin the wedding ceremony of the Princess Victoria Louise, the Kaiser's

daughter, in spite of the offensive sabre-rattling of the German Chancellor. These indications of a return to normal conditions were gratefully noted by the nerve-wrecked and tax-burdened peoples of the Dual Monarchy.

Official Austria, however, was quick to detect and resent these symptoms of a desire for friendly relations with her Teutonic neighbours on the part of Russia. As the surest way of arousing Russian resentment the semi-official press taunted Russia with having "sold out the Serbs ten times over" by consenting that Skutari be taken from Montenegro and Serbia. When on April 23d the news arrived from Cetinje that Montenegrin troops had entered Skutari the Ballplatz press fairly seethed with rage. The cry went up: "With or without Europe's consent send our troops (who were ready and waiting on the Montenegrin frontier) to correct with the sword the errors of our diplomacy, and to heal with iron the failures of our diplomacy." On the 25th, Count Berchtold made representations to the Conference of Ambassadors in London asking that "coercive measures be adopted against Montenegro because of her opposition to the will of Europe." "These coercive measures," read his message, "should be carried out by all the powers or by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy alone as the mandatory of Europe." The *Neue Freie Presse* said in an inspired article commenting on this proposal: "If the Great Powers will act

in accord, peace will be preserved and Montenegro will receive the proper punishment; should this hope be vain our monarchy will declare, just as Count Anton Auersberg says in one of his verses: '*Ich bin so frei, frei zu sein*'; there are only two alternatives, with Europe or against Europe, Skutari must become Albanian."

Count Mensdorf, our Ambassador in London, proposed to his colleagues of the Conference that "they force Montenegro to evacuate Skutari by authorizing Austria-Hungary to occupy forthwith Montenegro's only harbours, Antivari and Dulcigno, not by an inter-allied detachment taken from the international fleet gathered opposite the Montenegrin coast, but through an expeditionary force strong enough eventually to operate against Skutari." As always, Count Berchtold sought to persuade Europe that "Balkan affairs are no concern of Russia's, but are solely matters to be settled between Austria-Hungary on one side and Montenegro or Serbia on the other. . . . Should diplomatic notes be insufficient, iron must decide!" At the same time he addressed a circular note to the Powers the gist of which was: "Austria-Hungary cannot tolerate the situation created by the entrance of Montenegrin troops into Skutari. The prestige of the Great Powers has been assailed. Austria-Hungary therefore invites the Powers to decide what steps are to be taken to restore that prestige. Should the Powers fail to arrive at a

speedy decision Austria-Hungary would feel compelled to take steps which would assure the will of the Powers being respected and compel Montenegro to evacuate Skutari."

A statement published in Vienna on April 27th said: "In the course of Saturday afternoon Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf [Chief of the General Staff] had a long conversation with Count Berchtold, and toward 7 P.M. went with him to Schoenbrunn, where they conferred with the Emperor until 8:45. This morning's journals are careful to point out that His Majesty consequently retired to rest later than usual.

"To-day the Austro-Hungarian heir-apparent arrived in Vienna and had a long audience of the Emperor this afternoon.

"Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf has for the past week been urging upon Count Berchtold and the Emperor the absolute necessity of some kind of military action to save the prestige of the monarchy among the Southern Slavs and to raise the morale of the Austro-Hungarian officers, who would be disheartened were their long winter of hardship and effort to end tamely in a demobilization."

About a week later semi-official agents of the Foreign Office were spreading the rumour that "Austria-Hungary will to-morrow address an ultimatum to Montenegro, and that military action against Montenegro will immediately follow unless

the ultimatum is complied with. Should Montenegro resist and be assisted by Serbia," add these agents, "Austria-Hungary will regard the Montenegrin or Serbian territory she may occupy as territory definitely conquered."

The open rejoicings of the Slavs of Austria at the victory of little Montenegro over the hated Turks still further increased the rage and bitterness of our military and diplomatic leaders. The Czecho-Slavs in the north, the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in the south, were in a state of joyous exultation. In Prague, Zagreb, and Ljubljana the police were kept busy hauling down the flags which the people raised in honour of the victory of their Montenegrin and Serbian kinsmen.

At this critical juncture of affairs we opened conversations with Rome to find out how far we could rely upon Italian coöperation in using force against recalcitrant Montenegro. Count Berchtold, as indeed all Austrian statesmen, was always more than skeptical of Italy's willingness actively to support the policies of her Teutonic allies when it came to a "show down." Just because of this doubt of Italy's devotion to our policies we were particularly anxious actively to engage her in a military venture on our side. We felt that if she could be induced to aid us in forcing the Montenegrins and Serbs to evacuate Skutari that she would then feel obligated to follow the course once entered upon even though it should lead to war

against Russia and France as we believed and hoped it would. On May 2d Italy announced that she had "accepted the invitation of Austria-Hungary for armed intervention in Albania by landing Italian troops at Valona."

Thus once again all was going smoothly for our diplomacy and there seemed to be hardly a possibility that the long-coveted war could be again avoided. Even the loyal *Neue Freie Presse*, organ of the Semitic business interests, had said a few days before: "Contrary to our wishes the sword will have to decide. . . . In the next few days we will see the monarchy underline her word with the sword for the first time since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

The Austrian Poles again declared their blind loyalty to the monarchy and its Germanic foreign policy. This they did in spite of the fact that only a fortnight before the Prussian Diet had authorized an expenditure of 175 million marks for the expropriation of the Poles of Prussia, and in spite of this comment made at the time by the Prussian Minister, Baron Schorlemer: "The Prussian Government has the holy duty to aid Germanism (*Deutschtum*) in the economic and national struggle against the Poles: this particularly in view of the possibility of a world war."

CHAPTER VIII

TISZA, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S MAN OF "BLOOD AND IRON," COMES TO POWER, JUNE, 1913

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY URGES ITALY TO JOIN THE CENTRAL EMPIRES IN EUROPEAN WAR, AUGUST, 1913

IT WAS the Slavs who once more frustrated the cunningly planned Austro-German assault upon humanity. On the advice of Russia both Montenegro and Serbia surrendered unconditionally to our demands. On May 6, 1913, King Nicholas of Montenegro informed Sir Edward Grey, as the president of the London Conference of Ambassadors, that he placed the fate of Skutari in the hands of the Great Powers. The same day the Serbs evacuated Durazzo and again renounced their "little window on the Adriatic." At the same time the Czar showed his willingness to overlook the many evidences of Teutonic spite and enmity by carrying out his previously announced intention to attend the marriage in Berlin of the Kaiser's daughter, the Princess Victoria Louise.

Meantime, thanks to the secret machinations of our diplomacy, the strained relations between Serbia and Bulgaria had almost reached the break-

ing point. Bulgaria had mobilized on Serbia's frontier, ready for instant attack upon her ally. Serbia issued a statement saying that "a strict observance of the Treaty of Alliance is excluded in view of the results of the war; Serbia cannot cede to Bulgaria the territories conquered by the Serbian army."

The yielding of Russia and her small protégés gave our harried people another short breathing space. It had long been the policy of our government so to alarm the people by the dangers supposed to be threatening them from outside our borders that they would be too distracted to give attention to the innumerable internal ills with which they were afflicted. The sword of Damocles was ever suspended over their heads. But this sword was now blunted by excessive use and the people looked about them. What did they see?

In Bohemia relations between Germans and Czechs had become so strained that the whole administrative machinery was paralyzed by the never-ending obstructionist tactics of the German minority faction in the Diet. The home budget could not be voted and no taxes could be collected in the richest crownland of the monarchy. The war of nationalities in Galicia was just as acute. The Governor-General threatened to resign because of his inability to secure any kind of a working agreement between the Poles and the Ruthenes. The conditions in the other provinces were almost as

bad. Added to the never-ending internal political and nationalistic conflicts were the thousands of economic wounds from which the old empire was slowly but surely bleeding to death. By the middle of May, 1913, the internal situation had become so ominous that our statesmen dared not sound the usual alarms about the external dangers which were alleged to be threatening us for fear of precipitating in the Delegations a debate on internal conditions.

In Hungary the situation was no less desperate. Even the most confirmed optimists began to despair of the future of the monarchy. The officials of the Foreign Office were particularly gloomy. They felt that the disruption of the ancient empire was now inevitable. Those of them who were Hungarians were openly preparing themselves for the complete separation of Hungary from Austria. They even parcelled out among themselves the posts in the new Hungarian Foreign Office, which, as they believed, would soon be established. This prospective golden opportunity for more jobs considerably mitigated their grief over the desperate plight of the empire. The heads of the Government were faced with three alternatives. Either they must grant radical reforms which would transform the old empire from the bottom up and which would abolish the century-old special privileges of the rulers and the ruling classes including the Court, the nobility, the high ecclesiastics, and the gentry,

as well as the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers who grew rich on government contracts; or, secondly, they must plunge into the universal catastrophe of a great war in the hope of floundering through with their previous privileges intact; or, finally, they might drift on in the cross currents of indescribable confusion until the constantly increasing poverty and suffering of the great masses became insupportable and produced civil war. Since the foreign war alternative was the only one which offered the ruling classes as such any chance of survival it was naturally the one they chose to act upon. But before taking the great plunge it was essential to put their house in order or at any rate to give it the temporary appearance of orderliness. This was especially necessary in order to inspire the confidence of their great German ally who had learned from Bismarck to be distrustful of the Hungarian portion of the empire. A strong man completely devoted to the Dual Monarchy in its then existing form and enjoying the full confidence of the ruling classes of Germany and particularly of the German Kaiser himself was needed in Hungary to bring order out of the chaos which the weak and incompetent government of Premier Lukacs had created.

The man selected for this task was Stephan Tisza. "The apple does not fall far from the tree," as the proverb says. Tisza was a true son of his father—of the man who had ruled the turbulent

Magyars with a rod of iron. In fact, the son as Premier, eight years before, had shown the same iron hand. And last but not least, Tisza was *persona gratissima* to Kaiser Wilhelm. In him therefore were concentrated the hopes of the Viennese Court camarilla. He must be their saviour from this dangerous situation. He was the relentless man who, with "blood and iron," would drive the discontented, desperate masses into the reeking slaughter houses of a great war. Tisza did not disappoint their hopes. He became the stormy petrel of the mighty hurricane which presently swept over Europe. He was a man of unflinching determination, apparently without nerves, and even in the most desperate situations his presence of mind never deserted him. He subjected himself to iron discipline and demanded that his subordinates do the same. He was always permeated with the consciousness of being in the service of his king, and subordinated his personal affairs to what he believed to be the interests of that service. He had had an operation on his eyes which prevented his glancing to right or left without turning his head. He had always to look straight ahead. This physical limitation seemed to have transmitted itself to his character. He pursued his purposes relentlessly without turning to right or left. Bismarck had remarked that in Hungary there were only two kinds of politicians—lawyers and hussars. Tisza was a hussar. When

asked, on assuming power, how he would overcome the opposition of the deputies who were not convinced by his arguments he replied: "I shall bring in the soldiers or the police." On June 4, 1913, just after Tisza had taken office this comment on his methods appeared in the press: "A year ago to-day Count Tisza, as President of the Hungarian Parliament, ordered the police to eject the obstructionist opposition from the Chamber. To-day, the captain of the Hungarian Parliamentary Guards was belabouring an opposition deputy with his sabre in the Chamber."

This was the way Tisza carried out the Emperor's mandate to bring the Hungarian Parliamentary opposition into line with the policies of the Government. On June 11th the new Premier thus addressed the Labour Party: "Does not the external situation demand that we abandon all pusillanimity; does not the external situation require of each member of the nation that he do everything in his power in order that the whole attention of the whole nation be concentrated upon its great vital interests, which perhaps now will decide the fate of the nation for centuries to come?" In a speech the next day he said: "The harmonious coöperation of all the factors in the monarchy is a necessity both for upholding the monarchy as a great power and because the very existence of the Hungarian nation is dependent on the maintenance of the monarchy as a great power." In conclusion he

said: "I am convinced that the Hungarian nation and the monarchy will find their places and will emerge from this development with a new lustre; but we must throw all our mental and material powers, all our political ripeness and all our moral preparedness into the service of this great aim; great interests are endangered; we have been thrown into the scales of world history and upon our own weight depends whether we shall make those scales rise or fall." Thus through the mouth of "the bloody Tisza" did Austria-Hungary challenge Russia in particular and the Entente in general to mortal combat!

The Premier's words were supported by that veteran war organ *Oesterr. Rundschau* in an article entitled: "Austria-Hungary and Russia's Historic Mission" signed by "Austriacus." The modest anonymous author said: "The Japanese-Russian War proved that Russia, before whose might all Europe trembled, was not invincible and after the defeat of Russia in the Far East, not only the people of this empire, but the whole of Europe, began to breathe more freely. Nevertheless, world peace is still in great danger, as can be clearly seen by the attitude of Russia in the Balkan crisis. Russia must therefore be weakened as Bismarck at first outlined, because only a weakened Russia will keep the peace." A second article in the same journal, written this time by a "High Officer," states: "Love of peace means fear of war, fear before that

elementary force which undermines the old and decayed, and causes new buds to spring forth. We fear in case of misfortune that the standing of the monarchy as a great power may be jeopardized. Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria would make a splendid Balkan Triple Alliance, established on a solid foundation and in which each member would find a free field for its own activities in spite of its collaboration with the others. . . . Serbia would thus have her hands bound. Austria-Hungary could then bring into action nearly her whole military forces against her strongest enemy [i. e., Russia].”

As has been mentioned before, the creation of Albania by the fiat of the Great Powers deprived Serbia of her longed-for outlet on the Adriatic. As a consequence of this action of the Powers, Serbia declined to turn over to Bulgaria the portions of Macedonia which had been assigned to her by the Treaty of Alliance.

Here was an opportunity for our diplomats to sow discord between the Balkan allies and disrupt the Balkan League which seriously menaced our aspirations in the Balkans. In these efforts we were successful despite the attempt of Russia to prevent a fratricidal war between the two Balkan states.

Fresh from a conference with Count Berchtold, Tisza thus stated our policy in the war which, through the intrigues of our diplomacy, was now im-

pending between Bulgaria and Serbia: "Our starting point is naturally that here also the Balkan States are independent, and that they are, consequently, free to choose their own method of settling their differences. They may—and we should deplore it deeply if they did, but they are entitled to do so—choose the method of war, or they may choose mediation or a tribunal of arbitration. . . . Any other procedure* would possess the character of an intervention and would be totally incompatible with the cardinal point of our policy, which is the independence of the Balkan States."

King Ferdinand's reply to the Czar's appeal suggests that he and Count Tisza were at this time "two minds with but a single thought." He replied: "The Balkan States are strong enough to decide themselves concerning their weal and woe and will be faithful to every Great Power that will respect their independence."

Soon after this on July 2, 1913, King Ferdinand's armies, relying upon our military intervention to assure their success, were hurled upon their Serbian allies. They were speedily and painfully disillusioned. Before our diplomacy had time to prepare the way for military intervention the Serbian armies, by a series of lightning-like blows, had crushed their attackers and were marching

*It should here be recalled that the Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia provided that any irreconcilable differences between them should be decided by the Czar of Russia.

victoriously toward Sofia. Before our diplomats had recovered from their painful stupefaction at this sudden and unexpected turn of events the Bulgars had on July 10th placed their fate in the hands of Russia. Our lamentations were loud and long. "The east flank of the Triple Alliance is crushed," so they ran; "the whole Triple Alliance has suffered a loss of power which cannot be made good by placing our armies on an even higher peace footing." Just as when Skutari was taken, the official lamentations were drowned by cries of joy wherever Slavs were living. Little Serbia stood triumphant on the battle-field once more. In the wreck of their schemes our diplomacy had, however, one great consolation which was thus expressed: "Beside the corpse of Bulgaria lies also the corpse of the Balkan Alliance, that innermost, true alliance, the union of states and peoples who are striving toward a single object; that alliance will never rise from the dead."

No amount of explanation, however, could alter the fact that the outcome of the Balkan Wars had been a severe blow to the prestige of the Teutonic Powers and was likely to postpone, if it did not completely wreck, their scheme for the creation of a Mittel-Europa. Turkey, the protégé of Germany, had been practically excluded from Europe. From the wreck of the Ottoman Empire arose greatly enlarged and strengthened, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Not only had the territories

of these states been enlarged but their national consciousness had been stimulated.

Moreover, in both of the Balkan Wars our diplomats had "backed the wrong horse." Our disappointed war leaders determined, therefore, to strike Serbia before she was able to recover from the wounds of the Balkan struggle. Much depended upon Italy's attitude, because at this time we were not disposed to risk starting the war without Italy's adherence. Accordingly, we asked Italy whether she would support us in an attack on Serbia—whether she would accept our view that the attack was defensive and that therefore she was obligated to aid us under the terms of the Triple Alliance. In a speech in the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914, Giovanni Giolitti, the Italian Premier, said of this effort: "During the Balkan War, on August 9, 1913, I received the following telegram from the late Marquis di San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs: 'Austria has communicated to us and Germany that it has been their intention to act against Serbia, defining such action as defensive and hoping for an application of a *casus fœderis* by the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable.' I answered Marquis di San Giuliano thus: 'If Austria attacks Serbia a *casus fœderis* evidently does not exist. It is an action she undertakes on her own account. It is necessary to declare this to Austria in the most formal manner, hoping that Germany will act to

dissuade Austria from a very dangerous adventure.' ”

Meantime, Count Berchtold had repeated conferences with the Emperor at Bad Ischl, the imperial summer residence. One such conference was held on July 5th at the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, when Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Our immediate forcible intervention for Bulgaria was considered but vetoed because of Italy's doubtful attitude. At later conferences held on the 16th and 17th of July, when Bulgaria already lay shattered on the battle-fields, we considered whether we should intervene to prevent Serbia reaping the advantage of her victory. We decided, however, that there was still hope that the peace terms about to be made at Bucharest might be twisted to our advantage and hence we once more stayed our “clenched fist raised about to strike.”

In spite of the protestations of King Ferdinand the Peace Conference at Bucharest took the normal course of conferences between victors and vanquished. By August 5th the growing resentment and alarm of the Ballplatz was thus expressed by one of its mouthpieces: “The Bucharest peace *pourparlers* are liable to cause anxiety in Austria-Hungary. The situation created by the exaggerated demands of Serbia and Greece as well as other causes are unhappily bringing nearer and nearer the necessity for the revision by Austria-Hungary of the whole peace work.” It will be observed that

our tender solicitude for complete independence of action among the Balkan States began to wane now that such independent action was not to our liking. From then on the necessity for the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest became our insistent cry. The Peace Conference at Bucharest adjourned on August 8th. It will be noted that it was at this very time that we asked Italy whether she would support us in a "defensive attack" upon Serbia. Two days later Count Berchtold made this official comment on the Treaty of Bucharest: "International revision or political revision, that is the question which must be decided at the present time," and at the same time he went again to Bad Ischl to discuss the situation with the Emperor. The old monarch was much impressed by Italy's decisive answer to our overtures and felt that our diplomacy had blundered again in leading us unto a position where we could not obtain the support of our southern ally.

Undoubtedly Kaiser Wilhelm shared our emperor's disappointment over the Treaty of Bucharest, but he shrewdly concealed it. In fact, he at once telegraphed King Carol of Rumania that he accepted the Peace of Bucharest as final. He began also to show special favour to Rumania.

The Ballplatz, on the contrary, came out with the statement: "The result of the Bucharest Peace Conference cannot be considered as final, but at best as furnishing valuable material for a

conference of the Powers which will be called upon to revise the findings of the Balkan States." The best explanation of this apparent conflict between the views of Vienna and Berlin is given by Baron Von Chlumetzky, the spokesman of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in his publication *Oesterr. Rundschau** from which we have so often quoted. In it he says: "Austria-Hungary was obliged to put its weight in the scales in favour of Bulgaria, if it did not want to betray the great interests that were at stake. The statesmen of the Triple Alliance must not be afraid to show occasionally divergent principles, if this serves the cause of the Triple Alliance itself by preventing the formation of a Balkan confederation under the auspices of the Triple Entente. If Count Berchtold and Herr Von Jagow, following the principle of the division of labour—by separate marches and united attack—come even one step nearer their objective, they may easily ignore the frog croaks over the apparent estrangement between Vienna and Berlin."

On August 26th, while we were clamouring for the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest and blackening the names of Serbia and Russia, the long-suffering Czar again extended an olive branch to our emperor. The Russian Ambassador presented to Emperor Francis Joseph an invitation from Czar Nicholas to bless the Russian chapel in Leipzig

*Vol. 36, July-September, 1913.

which had been erected to commemorate the victory over Napoleon in 1813 and which was to be consecrated simultaneously with the great German monument erected for the same purpose. This friendly act on the part of the Czar and his government stirred even the deadened conscience of old Francis Joseph and he once more awoke to the character of the conspiracies which were being hatched by Francis Ferdinand and his confederates, Berchtold, Von Hoetzendorf, and the irrepressible Tisza, who was striving to become known to fame as the Bismarck of Austria-Hungary. While the old emperor remained in this mood the heads of those who had brought such indescribable misfortunes upon the people of the monarchy were in danger of falling. By the middle of September, 1913, the imperial disapproval had led both Count Berchtold and Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf to feel a longing for retirement and the quiet life. Count Berchtold was preparing to retire to the management of his vast estates in Hungary or Moravia. Any change in the "Old Gray House" would have been welcomed by the people generally as a change for the better.

Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, whose official demise would have been even more welcome to the people, felt that he had been flung aside by the inexorable course of events on the world stage. For the moment he was tired and disgusted. One consideration only

kept him and his tool, Count Berchtold, from quitting in disgust—the consoling thought that the aged emperor could not hang on much longer and that then Francis Ferdinand would become the “All Highest” and they would be free to work “their own sweet will.” Although their master never became emperor, in less than a year he had in quite a different way rewarded them for their patience by bringing them their heart’s desire—war against Serbia and Russia.

CHAPTER IX

EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH PRONOUNCES WORLD WAR INEVITABLE, MAY, 1914

TISZA COUNTS ON HALF THE GERMAN ARMY FOR WAR AGAINST RUSSIA, MARCH, 1914

IN APPROACHING the last series of Austro-Hungarian machinations in the years 1913-1914 I wish to quote the prophetic views of three statesmen. First, Count Andrassy, fresh from the Congress of Berlin at which Austria received the mandate temporarily to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, said to Emperor Francis Joseph: "Majesty, I am bringing you the keys which will unlock for us the gate to the Orient." Second, Peter Shuvaloff, the Russian statesman, wrote four years later: "I am convinced that the giving away of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria will one day imperil the European peace. From there will come the spark which will ignite the powder, and in the glow of this all-devouring fire the Slav problem will then have to be solved." Finally, Ivan Hribar, a Yugoslav statesman said ten years before the world war: "Bosnia will be the grave of Austria-Hungary."

Indeed, "whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad." It was as if an inexorable fate was driving the old empire to self-destruction. We were at peace with all our neighbours. We were fairly prosperous, although labouring under old internal evils, until Count Aehrenthal conceived the idea of curing the latter by war; war with Serbia, war with Russia, and, if necessary, war even with Italy. With a fanatical tenacity we evoked the war-spectre until it became a ghastly reality.

The years 1914-15 were regarded in Austria-Hungary as the time limit for starting a successful war against Serbia and Russia. There were several reasons for this.

First, Bulgaria was humiliated and the Balkan League was shattered. It was important for us not to allow the situation in the Balkans to crystallize so as to prevent a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest.

Second, the destruction of the Balkan League brought in its wake the virtual "secession" of Italy from the Triple Alliance. Hence the necessity for Austria-Hungary and Germany to revise their diplomatic and military plans for the conquest and partition of the East.

Third, Russia was growing stronger every year and would be in 1917, according to calculations of our war leaders, able at least to defend herself against the united aggression of the Central Powers.

Up to 1915, at the latest, she was powerless, as we thought, against our invasion.

Fourth, the internal political chaos and economic depression of Austria-Hungary if allowed to mature would have dissolved or weakened the empire so irremediably that an active external policy, to say nothing of a great war, would have been unthinkable.

Fifth, in 1917 the *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary, regulating the economic relations between the countries had to be renewed or the disruption of the old empire would have become an accomplished fact.

Sixth, in 1917 the commercial treaty of Germany with Russia, which she had concluded in the Russo-Japanese War, and which practically made Russia a German province, expired.

All of these circumstances are significant in explaining the feverish anxiety of the war parties in the Teutonic Empires to precipitate the European crisis before the balance in international affairs became unfavourable to them.

Our disappointment at the refusal of Italy to join us in the attack on Serbia lasted only so long as it took us to rearrange our plans according to the changed circumstances. Italy or no Italy, war had to be brought about. We were prepared to the last button; Russia was not. Our general staff grumbled; it had already perfected its plans, and was unwilling to wait. Count Berchtold had

failed to provide a plausible cause or pretext for war. A new orientation of our whole policy became imperative, in view of the changed conditions in the Balkans and within the Triple Alliance. The two ringleaders of the war groups, Kaiser Wilhelm and Francis Ferdinand, decided to meet to consider the main points of the future policy. The meeting was set for October, 1913.

In the meantime, we hastened, on the one hand, to consolidate our position in the Balkans; and, on the other, to obliterate traces of our criminal designs. First, we gave Bulgaria a loan of thirty million francs. We were without money ourselves; the year previous we had gone to America to get money for our mobilization in the Prochaska crisis, but Count Berchtold himself now ordered the directors of all our banks to scrape together the money.

The conference of the Kaiser and the Archduke took place at the castle of Konopisht on October 27, 1913, after which they proceeded to Vienna to lay their plans before the old emperor. Quite ingeniously our Foreign Office commented on the meeting at Schoenbrunn in the following manner: "Emperor William comes to Vienna just at the right time, because the adherents of the Alliance need more than ever before to see the two monarchs—as the personification of the treaty—side by side." Before the meeting of the kaisers was adjourned, it was decided to hold one more meeting before the European conflagration broke out.

This meeting was fixed for the spring of the following year, 1914.

The fruits of the meeting at Konopisht were soon visible. Before the meeting of the two kaisers, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria had arrived at his castle in Murany in Hungary, and soon afterward transferred his residence to Ebenthal, near Vienna. When Kaiser Wilhelm left, the King met Count Berchtold, by whom he was very heartily received. At this first meeting after the Bulgarian catastrophe, King Ferdinand received from Count Berchtold once more the promise that Austrian diplomacy would not rest until it had brought about a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest. It was thought by some persons that the King was still wavering between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, but such was not the case. Bulgaria had already received from Austria, as we have seen above, the first instalment of a loan and had placed an order with the Austrian Waffens-Fabriks-Aktien-Gesellschaft for the completion of her armaments. King Ferdinand was at that time in the camp of the war-plotters of the Central Empires.

Although the King was advised to hasten back to Sophia, where great bitterness prevailed against him, he lingered in Vienna long enough to be received in audience by the Emperor twice. These audiences were more than an indication how painfully and pressingly the Central Empires

needed Bulgarian friendship, because it was just at that time that the public in Austria-Hungary was aroused by the publication in Paris of the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. That treaty provided for an offensive and defensive alliance and was a surprise to the people of Austria-Hungary, because it contained the clause that Bulgaria was to come to the help of Serbia with 200,000 troops if the latter should be attacked by Austria-Hungary. The complete adherence of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to the policy outlined in the first meeting at Konopisht was the last link in the formation of the great conspiracy of the Germanic princes against the peace of Europe. This conspiracy comprised, besides the two rulers of the Central Empires and the kings of the German Empire, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King Carol of Rumania, King Constantine of Greece, and Count Tisza, the uncrowned king of Hungary. That Rumania's immediate entry into war on the side of the Central Empires was not effected in the first days after the outbreak of the war was not due to any reluctance on the part of King Carol, but to the almost unanimous opposition to such action among his responsible statesmen.

In order to encircle Russia completely with hostile powers the unconditional adherence of Turkey to the Austro-German war programme was necessary. For this purpose a new *coup d'état* was carried out which practically placed Turkey com-

pletely in the power of the Central Empires. On the very day on which in Bulgaria the pro-German Radoslavoff was once more entrusted with the formation of a ministry, Enver Bey, the tool of Germany, was appointed Minister of War, and made a pasha. These changes took place on the 4th of January, 1914. Thus Turkey came into the circle of the conspirators, and Enver Pasha played the rôle of a German prince in Turkey thus completing the war alliance of Germanic princes formed to destroy Serbia and overwhelm Russia. With Enver Pasha there also came into power Talaat Bey.

The necessary arrangements having been completed, it was decided to postpone everything to the spring of the following year in order to avoid a late winter campaign. Before starting a new campaign of incitement for war and of fabricating a *casus belli*, our diplomats felt it absolutely necessary to put themselves before Europe and the whole world in a proper light. Europe had become tired of the constant machinations of our diplomats and statesmen against the peace of the world. The affair of August 9, 1913, when Count Berchtold asked San Giuliano to start the World War by attacking Serbia, was then known to the diplomats of Vienna only. Berlin and Rome were anxious to impress upon the world how peace-loving they were. Emperor Francis Joseph himself in his speech from the throne on November 19th said that the Austro-

Hungarian Government "throughout that troubled period aimed at the protection of the political and economic interests of the Dual Monarchy and the consolidation so far as possible of the situation in the Near East. Thanks to the proved readiness of the army and navy it has been found possible to attain these ends by peaceful means."

Count Berchtold spoke openly of the "existence, during the last crisis, of sentiments hostile to the monarchy not only among certain Balkan states, but also among the Great Powers." Count Andrassy and Count Karolyi, on the other hand, considered that "grave mistakes have been made by Count Berchtold in maintaining the principle of the *status quo*, in demanding a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, and in the attitude adopted shortly before the outbreak of the second Balkan War, which could not fail to produce an impression that Austria-Hungary wished to provoke hostilities. Austria-Hungary did not allow the Balkan situation to become crystallized. Austria-Hungary has often put difficulties in Serbia's way, and she seems inclined to continue to accentuate this policy."

That the World War did not break out, in August, 1913, instead of August, 1914, was due, in the first place, to Russia's conciliatory attitude; secondly, to the wise policy of Great Britain as conducted by Sir Edward Grey; and, finally, to the Italian statesmen who—although going very far in their complaisance with the policy pursued by

the Ballplatz—nevertheless became alarmed at the eleventh hour at the prospect of a world conflagration, and declined to follow Austria's lead.

A new issue with Serbia arose from the attempt of the Serbian Government to purchase the shares of the Orient railroad line. The possession of the majority of the Orient railway shares by a syndicate of Austro-Hungarian and German banks gave the monarchy a strong voice in the settlement of the question—made it, in fact, an Austro-Hungarian, if not an Austro-German, question. This purchase in the spring of 1913 of a requisite number of shares to bring the majority into Austrian and Hungarian hands was effected at the instance of the Vienna Foreign Office. The purpose of the transaction was—first, to keep the "road to Salonica" open; and secondly, to enable Austria-Hungary to control, through the medium of the company, the development of the railway systems in the western Balkans. The value which was set upon the possession of this control as the means of attaining the former object was emphasized by Count Berchtold in the Austrian delegations.

A still more vivid light was thrown upon the intentions of our diplomacy by the special solicitude which Count Tisza displayed in the Rumanian national question, and by the attitude of both the Austrian and Hungarian governments toward the Ruthenian population of northern Hungary and

eastern Galicia. As regards the first, it must be remembered that there are living in the eastern part of Hungary, in Transylvania, some three million Rumanians, racial kinsmen of the people of the Kingdom of Rumania. It was considered as imperative by our diplomats, and foremost by Count Czernin, our Minister at Bucharest, to satisfy to some degree the national aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanians in view of the expected world war, as the discontent in that part of the country was intense. The most implacable enemy that the Slavs and Rumanians of Hungary ever knew, namely Count Tisza himself, was negotiating with the Hungarian Rumanians to bring them into the government fold in return for various concessions. Count Czernin said in a conversation with a press representative that an understanding with the Hungarian Rumanians would effect an improvement in the relations between the monarchy and Rumania. Tisza, however, denied absolutely that there was any connection between the negotiations with the Rumanians and the relations between the monarchy and the Rumanian Kingdom. Finally Tisza's negotiations with the Rumanian leaders definitely failed. In a long memorandum communicated to the Hungarian Premier the Rumanians stated that his proposals were not such as to remove, even for a short time, the differences which existed between the policy of the Hungarian Government and themselves.

As regards the second question, namely the treatment of the Ruthenes in northern Hungary and Galicia, neither the Hungarian nor the Austrian government acted in a way to reconcile them with their lot. In this connection, two monster trials were instituted: one at Marmaros-Sziget in Hungary, and the other in Lwow, Galicia. To understand these new machinations of the Ballplatz it must be pointed out that among the races which composed the population of the Hungarian crown there were about a half million Ruthenes. They were settled along the northeastern fringe of the country on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. On the other side of the mountains three million of their brethren lived under Austrian rule in Galicia, and some twenty-five million were subjects of Russia. The Ruthenes in Austria-Hungary are for the most part peasant folk, belonging to the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church, which preserves the Orthodox rite but acknowledges the Pope. During recent years there has been, however, a tendency in some districts to leave this church for the Greek Orthodox religion to which the mass of Ruthenes in Russia belong. In this movement the Hungarian Government professed to see a definite agitation with a political purpose—namely, the ultimate absorption into the Russian Empire of the Ruthenian districts of Hungary.

The Marmaros-Sziget treason trial, which lasted

for months, was conceived on a large scale (just as was the Zagreb trial in 1908-09). When the proceedings began, the accused numbered 189 persons, but there remained on the day of the opening of the trial only 84, the rest having been discharged. Chief among them was one Alexi Kabalyuk, otherwise known as Father Alexi, who together with 24 of his companions was charged with having coöperated with three brothers by the name of Gerovsky of Czernovitz, in Bukovina, to convert the Ruthenian Uniate population of Hungary to the Russian Church, and to unite the parishes under the Metropolitan of Kieff; this they strove to do by the distribution of pamphlets in which the Russian Church and the Russian national idea were glorified, and the Hungarian nation and the Greek Uniate Church decried. Prayers were said for the Czar, the Russian Emperor's family and army. Furthermore, it was charged that they carried on agitation against the Hungarian state, having as its purpose the absorption into the Russian Empire of the Ruthenian districts of Hungary.

The truth was that under Polish influences new customs and ceremonies, abhorred by the people, were introduced into the Uniate Church by their Metropolitan, Count Andrew Shepticky. As a result, thousands were leaving it, and were going back to the Orthodox Church. Uniate priests who remained faithful to the ancient Slavonic Liturgy, so loved by the people, were harshly

persecuted, while Orthodox priests, although native Galicians, were imprisoned. The action of the Uniate ecclesiastical authorities, and not any propaganda from the neighbouring Russian Empire, was the cause of the Orthodox movement.

On March 3, 1914, the state trial at Marmaros-Sziget closed. Thirty-two of the accused were found guilty of incitement against religion and the State, and 23 not guilty, the heaviest sentence, four and one half years, was passed on Kabalyuk; on the others from six months to two and one half years.

This trial had scarcely ended before a similar one began at Lvov. In this case the charge of treason and Russophile agitation in favour of the Orthodox Church was levelled against Austrian subjects, the chief of whom were two priests, a writer, and a university student. The preliminary examination lasted nearly two years, the accusation covered 190 closely printed pages, and over 100 witnesses were called. This trial of four Ruthenes on a charge of treason began at Lvov on March 9, 1914. It differed in one respect only from the trial held at Marmaros-Sziget, the accused were not ignorant, but educated persons. They had been in prison nearly two years before the trial began. They were charged with fomenting agitation from 1909 to 1912 in favour of the incorporation of Galicia into Russia, and of having spoken contemptuously in public of the Catholic religion. The proceedings were watched by two officers of

the Austrian general staff, because three of the accused were charged with espionage in the interest of Russia.

During both trials a constant agitation was kept up in the Austrian and Hungarian press against Russia. The papers constantly referred to the "sinister" influence of Russia. In Austria-Hungary they spoke of the "rolling rouble" that finds its way into the pockets of Austro-Hungarian citizens for the purpose of agitation, etc. While this new movement against Russia was raging in Austria-Hungary, it was thought necessary, by the German Foreign Office, to open an anti-Russian agitation simultaneously in Germany, and what was said there in the very days when the political trials in Austria-Hungary were coming to a close was little short of an unofficial declaration of war against Russia. The campaign was opened by the *Kölnische Zeitung* on the eve of the day on which the verdict in the Marmaros-Sziget trial was expected. On March 2d the same paper published an article by its Petrograd correspondent in which he dealt with the relations of Russia to Germany by declaring that "Holy Russia is not in a position to give backing by the force of arms to her political threats."

But the campaign did not stop there. It involved the whole press of Germany. The *Berliner Tageblatt* outdid the *Kölnische Zeitung* in an article about the relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany to Russia, which it published on March

9, 1914. "A preventive war," it said, "is in general to be condemned, but there are cases where a state is driven more and more into straits by an overwhelming adversary, and to save itself cannot allow the enemy the choice of the most propitious moment.

"It is impossible to let Russia go a step farther, and even then if it comes to war with her. . . . Germany and especially Austria-Hungary are suffering heavily under the strain of their present armaments. They are better than ever prepared for war. With time, however, the chances are growing better for Russia. . . . The burden of the war in the eastern theatre of war will fall principally upon Austria-Hungary. From all we hear the Austro-Hungarian army is now well organized and equipped with all possible weapons. Russia is by no means invincible, and it is wrong to think that a victory over Russia would bring no fruit. On the contrary, Russia is the colossus with feet of clay. Her existence depends for the greater part on the need of peace or rather the good will of the inhabitants of central Europe."

Chauvinists and militaristic writers enjoyed the utmost freedom. General Bernhardt explained in the *Post* that "Germany must be prepared for war in the near future," and attempted to show that "the recent French and Russian army measures have created a new situation not foreseen in 1913." The Pan-German press advocated German

claims of all sorts, especially in Asia Minor, "which is still to be had but only if Germany does not shrink from the extreme test, that is really to risk war against Russia and France as well as England." There were then in the field the gun-makers, the ammunition manufacturers, the army and navy, the clericals, the Pan-Germans, and the Semitic business interests. There was little more to be desired, unless it were the adhesion of the Socialists who hated Russia and all her works. As the Socialists had already placed themselves on record in the crisis of 1912 as favouring war against Russia and Serbia, their support was certain, and their attitude well known to the Government.

Alarmed by so much noise about an immediate outbreak of war, the Hungarian paper, *Az Est*, sent one of its best correspondents to Petrograd to interview Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister. Sazonoff's measured words are in striking contrast to the provocations against Russia contained in the Austro-German official press. He stated that he was "unable to understand the sudden outburst of excitement in Austria-Hungary and Germany." "Last year," he said, "tension between the monarchy and Russia certainly did exist, but that is a matter of the past." In regard to a certain tension or jealousy existing between Germandom and Slavdom, Sazonoff said that "the policy of great empires in this twentieth century is not conducted according to sentiments.

The interests are the decisive factors in this realistic world. A war as you picture it yourself would in our day be a world war. The interests of the world, though, demand at all costs peace. The Treaty of Commerce between Russia and Germany must be renewed in 1917. But I see also in this field not a point which could lead to dispute. We are principally an agricultural state and Germany is our greatest market. It will not be difficult to come to terms under such circumstances. In criticizing Russian armaments, the Austro-Hungarian press is apt to forget the very great increases which the monarchy has effected in the strength of her army by the reform of 1912 and by the bill presented last year and already passed by the Austro-Hungarian parliaments. Also do not forget that our annual birth rate is three and a half millions. Consequently, we can allow ourselves an increase in the peace footing of our army. This is a luxury which ceases to be a luxury as soon as foreign armaments force us to similar measures."

No plainer and no more reasonable words could have been spoken by a statesman of a threatened country than these of Sazonoff. To bring them into relief it is necessary to contrast them with the speech of the Austrian Defence Minister which he delivered the day after the Sazonoff interview. In introducing on March 13, 1914, the Recruit Contingent Bill, General Baron Georgi said: "It was generally hoped that it was permissible to

look forward to a long period of peace. The monarchy had during the Balkan crisis shown her love of peace and her disinclination to attack another state. Conditions in the Near East, however, were not yet sufficiently ordered to exclude the possibility that the monarchy might find herself suddenly, and even against her will, involved in war. Austria-Hungary's love of peace must not be regarded as weakness and no doubt must be allowed to exist that she was absolutely ready and decided to reply, if necessary, to any attack with a counter-attack." This statement is of significance, as it was made a few days before a further visit of Kaiser Wilhelm to Austria.

While Kaiser Wilhelm deliberated with Kaiser Francis Joseph and Count Berchtold as to when and how best to precipitate the war, the German Kaiser again reminded the Viennese of his famous "shining-armor" speech, by presenting to the City of Vienna a large plaque commemorating his reception seven years before at the Vienna City Hall.

Commenting upon Kaiser Wilhelm's visit, Count Tisza in his Weekly *Igazmondo* on March 23, 1914, said: "To-day sixty-five million Germans are opposed to only thirty-eight million French, and according to human foresight, Germany will more and more overtake her old foe in the future as regards population and military strength. What follows from this? To-day three fifths of the

population of Germany suffices to counterbalance France. Approximately two fifths of the German military strength is available to be thrown in the scales in case of a great world war in the east of Europe . . . in this war we can count on nearly half of the German army."

Count Tisza was severely attacked for this article by Count Karolyi in the Hungarian Delegations on May 12, 1914. He pointed out the profound impression which Tisza's statements had made in the Dual Monarchy; and, in fact, in all Europe. "I do not want," he said, "to make the Premier responsible for the attacks on Russia. It is nevertheless without doubt that the Premier has great influence on a certain part of the press. I am speaking now of his own article in which, so to say, he mobilized the German troops on the Russian and French frontiers. It is certainly an offence to a state if the premier of another state calculates in an article how many soldiers would suffice to overthrow the state in question, in this case Russia, and how to hold France in check. Nobody can call this tenderness. If the premier of a country writes such an article, it carries greater weight than if somebody else does it."

By the preparations which were going on at the same time in the Austro-Hungarian embassies abroad, I know that the meeting of the two kaisers was of the utmost significance; that the date for the beginning of the war was set for the summer of

1914; that the old emperor had been completely won over at that meeting to the views of the German Kaiser. Encouraged by his success Kaiser Wilhelm then proceeded to Trieste where on March 27th he had a meeting with his other archplotter, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at the castle of Miramar. Confirmation of my views in regard to the conclusions that were reached at the meeting of the two kaisers (it must be noted that the greater part of my manuscript was written during the European war) was given by Mr. Morgenthau, ex-Ambassador of the United States to Turkey, in his book, "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story" where he said: "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Turkey, Marquis Pallavicini, also practically admitted that the Central Powers had precipitated the war. On August 18, 1914, Francis Joseph's name day, I made the usual ambassadorial visit of congratulation. Quite naturally the conversation turned upon the emperor, who had that day passed his 84th year. Pallavicini spoke about him with the utmost pride and veneration. He told me how keen-minded and clear-headed the aged emperor was, how he had the most complete understanding of international affairs, and gave everything his personal supervision. To illustrate the Austrian Kaiser's grasp of public events, Pallavicini instanced the present war. The previous May, Pallavicini had had an audience with Francis Joseph in Vienna.

At that time, Pallavicini told me, the Emperor had said that the European war was unavoidable. The Central Powers would not accept the Treaty of Bucharest as a settlement of the Balkan question, and only a general war, the Emperor told Pallavicini, could ever settle that problem." Knowing, as I do, Marquis Pallavicini—I served under him while he was Minister in Bucharest—I can fully understand that he was capable of making such an important revelation to one of his foreign colleagues, as he himself is neither keen-minded nor clear-headed, and is of a talkative disposition.

But what Marquis Pallavicini forgot to mention was the fact that he himself had made at that time a stay of three days at Bucharest during which he sounded various political personages on the question of whether Rumania would follow Austria-Hungary and Germany in the event of the former declaring war, the Marquis affirming that Austria-Hungary would be obliged to proceed to this extremity and that the replies given were in the negative.

CHAPTER X

AUSTRIA SELECTS ALBANIA AS THE CRADLE FOR THE WORLD WAR

THE RECRUITING OF VOLUNTEERS FOR WAR IN ALBANIA, JUNE, 1914

WITH or without the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and with or without the so-called previous mobilization of the Russian army on August the first, 1914, war was decided by Austria-Hungary and Germany in March, 1914, for that very year or at the latest the following year; and nothing could have stopped the two war parties from carrying this decision into effect.

This explains why we were again on the lookout for a pretext for war. As the machinations against Russia in the two Ruthenian trials had fallen flat, the Serbian wound was again opened over the matter of the control of the Orient Railway in Serbia. This controversy was in an acute stage at the time Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, was conferring with Count Von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, on matters of the utmost importance, in the watering place of Karlsbad.

But soon an even better opportunity for our diplomats to make trouble in the Balkans arose once more in Albania, and the situation there shaped itself so favourably for fomenting trouble that both the Ballplatz and our General Staff were absolutely certain that in Albania the spark would be dropped which would explode the powder magazine of Europe.

As a matter of fact, the first shot in the World War was not fired by the boy assassin of Sarajevo, but by an Austrian officer at Durazzo, the capital of the new Kingdom of Albania.

Before describing that scene it must be recalled that the Kingdom of Albania was created by the Conference of Ambassadors in London at the end of the First Balkan War. It lacked a prince, but one was soon found in a close relative of the Queen of Rumania; hence the particular interest which Kaiser Wilhelm and King Carol of Rumania, both Hohenzollerns, displayed in the Prince of Wied. In the past German princesses have overflowed the dynastic marriage market of Europe; a Russian grand duke once called these German princesses less gallantly than cynically "*marchandise d'exportation*." This *bon mot* could fairly be applied also to German princes that have become a special article of export to the Balkans, as Carol of Rumania, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and the Prince of Wied. It was at the close of February, 1913, that Prince William of Wied received at the an-

central castle of his family at Neu Wied the Albanian deputation headed by Essad Pasha which offered him the Albanian throne. Before this new, artificially created "Emperor" ventured into his realm, he visited the courts of Europe and secured for himself from the various European governments a big yearly subsidy in gold. Hardly was he seated, however, on his throne in the old court-house in Durazzo, which had been hastily converted into some semblance of a palace, than this newly made throne began to shake violently. Never did a prince face such a difficult situation. He had to deal with a race of which the northern half does not understand the southern half, and which is divided by three religions: Catholic in the north, the followers of the Orthodox Church in the south, and the devotees of Islam scattered all over the state. Ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid had disbursed a great deal of money among the Albanian mussulmans of the mountains; while Austria and Italy had vied with each other in the zeal which they displayed in financing the Albanian chieftains and members of the clergy. The Mpret, the title of the new emperor, soon discovered that he was sitting on a powder magazine. Central Albania had always been convulsed by bitter feuds. Homes there are like great fortresses with loopholes as windows. Indeed it was a primitive society where no dishonour was attached to brigandage and free-

booting; where fighting was honourable and agriculture despised. In the north and in the south everything was in flux. The spirit that our diplomats had aroused to foment a great upheaval in the Balkans could not be appeased. The rebels who had been incited by the Ballplatz against Serbia and driven back by the latter into their own country, revolted now against their new ruler and marched on his capital. In this predicament, when the revolt was at its height, and the overthrow of the new emperor was impending, a conference was convoked by Count Berchtold at Budapest to decide on the measures to be taken in Albania and also on a general policy for the Balkans. In this conference the Italian Ambassador participated, as did also Herr Von Tschirschky, German Ambassador and confidant of the German war party in Austria. First these men resolved on an Albanian *coup d'état* and Essad Pasha, the all-powerful minister and the real ruler of Albania, and his wife were arrested and placed as prisoners on an Austro-Hungarian cruiser. This happened on May 20, 1914, but it was too late to save the throne of the Mpret. Three days later, when the insurgents marched on the capital, the Prince, his family, and staff, hurriedly took refuge on board an Italian war-ship. With this adventure, the reign of William I of Albania practically came to a close. There was much mutual recrimination in the Italian and Austrian press as to who counselled

the Prince to flee. Count Forgach, then Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the Prince acted on the advice of the Italian Minister. However, the Prince returned to his palace when the insurgents were held up at the gates of his capital by his "army" headed by a party of enterprising Austro-Hungarian officers, who turned upon the insurgents the guns they had brought with them from the famous Skoda works. Count Forgach explained this occurrence by stating that "these officers were present in the town to test cannon which had come from Austria." "It was natural," he said, "that they could not stand by, inactive. But their participation in the affair was due to chance and not to a pre-arranged plan." The reader can estimate how much credence can be placed in the words of Count Forgach, made notorious through the forgeries and theft of documents in the annexation crisis, if he realizes that the Austro-Hungarian officer who fired the first shot from a Skoda gun in the Balkans was none other than the notorious Lieutenant Haessler, known for his leading rôle at the Albanian Congress at Trieste. This was, in fact, the first shot fired in the World War. From that moment on sporadic fighting continued in Albania, until Austria officially declared war on Serbia.

Following this exploit the Austrian merchant-ship *Herzegovina* was chartered by the Albanian Government from a private company; Austrian

guns were put aboard her, with Austro-Hungarian gunners, and she was sent cruising along the coast of Albania. She attacked the Albanian insurgents who had occupied the heights along the seacoast. Meanwhile, we had dispatched a squadron, including two dreadnaughts, to Albanian waters to relieve the *Herzegovina*, while the Kaiser ordered the German cruiser *Goeben*, of World-War notoriety, which was at Dedeagatch, to proceed immediately to Durazzo. The flames of the World War were breaking out in the Balkans, and the greatest activity was apparent in the Ballplatz and in the Ministry of War at Vienna.

What the German Kaiser could not furnish conveniently without disclosing to Europe his intentions, namely, the soldiers asked for by his colleague in Albania, the Austrians were asked to provide. It was expected that such action on the part of the Austrians would be interpreted by Europe simply as an act of good will with no serious significance. Count Berchtold promised, upon the advice of Herr Von Loewenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Minister to the Court of Albania, to raise a volunteer corps in Austria to fight in Albania, in the hope that through the fighting in Albania the whole of the Balkans would soon flare up. Our Minister of War had already, in February, 1914, with great foresight, established a three-months' course of instruction in the Albanian language for officers in the Austro-Hungarian

army. Moreover, we had a nucleus of a fighting force already in Albania, batteries of quick-firing guns—a brand-new product from the famous Skoda works at Pilsen—with all the men necessary to man them, officers from our regular army, and many non-commissioned officers in the guise of mechanics, engineers, etc.

While the great mountain manœuvres of the Austro-Hungarian army in Bosnia were taking place our General Staff was organizing a volunteer corps at Vienna for warfare in Albania. We would have sent regular army units to Albania had we not feared to disclose our real intentions too soon. Volunteers, therefore, were considered as the safer way out of the predicament. This was just at the time when the Constantinople Committee of Union and Progress was about to expel all Greeks from Asia Minor and from Turkish Thrace as a prelude to war with Greece and the reconquest of Salonica and reoccupation of Macedonia. The only hitch in the plans of the war-maniacs of Austria was caused by the outburst in the Italian press which clearly showed that it was distrustful of intervention in Albania by Austria alone, and demanded that if there was to be intervention, it must be by Europe as a whole.

In spite of the prospects of a brighter future which were opened to Turkey by the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the partition of Turkey between Austria-Hungary and Germany was a

foregone conclusion. Austria-Hungary was to receive, besides the spoils in the Balkans, that part of Asia Minor of which Alexandretta is the virtual centre. What agreements were reached with Italy in regard to the *modus operandi* in the Balkans for the near future I am unable to say. It is to be hoped that the future will disclose what agreements if any were made in this regard at the conference of Kaiser Wilhelm, the King of Italy, and his Foreign Minister on board the *Hohenzollern*, at the end of March, 1914. It is certain that any extension of our sovereignty over the Balkans had to carry as compensation an extension of Italian sovereignty in Albania. It was Doctor Friedjung, with whom the reader is already familiar from the Friedjung trial of 1909, who published in his new monthly magazine, *Der Greif*, an article entitled: "The Content of the Triple Alliance in Regard to the Approaching Partition of Turkey in Asia." "The so-called periodical renewal of the Triple Alliance," said he, "refers only to the German and Austrian agreements with Italy, whereas the Austro-German agreement is renewed automatically until and unless one or other of the powers gives notice of renunciation." His second point was that since 1887 Austria-Hungary had been pledged to allow Italy an equivalent expansion in the Balkans for any Austro-Hungarian expansion there. This provision has been kept secret out of regard for good relations with Turkey."

These revelations Doctor Friedjung made on the strength of conversations he had had with Count Aehrenthal and Kiederlen-Waechter. The question arises, therefore, was our diplomacy willing to let Italy participate in the partition of the Balkans after the refusal of that country to join us in a world war in August, 1913? The possession by Italy of Valona would have meant the bottling up of the Adriatic. So keen was the desire of Count Berchtold to bring about the revision of the Treaty of Bucharest that he was willing to make even that sacrifice. As late as May 11, 1914, hardly six weeks before the death of Francis Ferdinand, Berchtold was severely criticized in the Hungarian Delegations for this concession to Italy, but he was upheld in his policy by the great landed proprietors of Austria, who stated through their mouthpiece, Count Clam-Martinic, on May 20th, that they were "willing to uphold Count Berchtold to the limit, even if complications should arise which would lead directly to the World War."

Emboldened by such language we wanted to hold the Prince of Wied on his throne at all costs, in order to prevent an international commission from getting hold of affairs in Albania. As we could not launch officially a call for volunteers the General Staff entrusted the recruiting of the volunteers to two lieutenants of the reserve, one of them a sculptor by the name of Gurschner, and the other an architect by the name of Leopold Wirth, the

latter of whom had taken part in the fighting at Durazzo. The appeal for volunteers was supplied to the press through a news agency which maintained close relations with official circles. In two days several thousand men had volunteered, most of them reserve officers, doctors, and students who had already seen military service. It was stated at the time that the expenses of the expedition would be met out of "private funds." I cannot say whether the expenses of recruiting and equipment were paid by the War Ministry or out of the secret fund of two million kronen which Count Berchtold had received for his secret dispositions on November 28, 1913. Certain it is that not a single volunteer would have paid a cent out of his own pocket for that adventure.

The first units left at once for Durazzo. The account of this hazardous trick of our diplomacy was most touchingly portrayed in the Ballplatz organs. The recruiting officer Wirth said on the 26th of June—that is two days before the death of Francis Ferdinand—"In Durazzo my Austrian patriotism has come to a new life. There I have found again my Fatherland. . . . With the help of a thousand volunteers and more, the honour of Europe and the throne of the Prince can be saved." A Viennese professor of international law said that "the recruiting and sending of the expedition to Albania was from the point of international law without objection."

On the 27th of June this Austrian Don Quixote adventure had risen to such proportions that the recruiting officers were swamped with dispatches from Austria-Hungary, and especially from Germany. A manufacturer from Hanover offered to join the volunteer corps with a whole troop of his men. High aristocrats and officers from Berlin and Jena, as well as officers and non-commissioned officers from all over Germany, offered their services. The comment of the *Neue Freie Presse*, representing the Semitic business interests which were especially hot for war against Serbia and Russia, was as follows: "These volunteers do not want to fight for a country which is so alien to their hearts and a nation for which they can have no sentiments, but they go to fight for the monarchy. They want to fight not for the Prince of Wied, in Durazzo, Albania, but for the Emperor of Austria in Vienna."

Then the paper went on to say: "Two thousand men want to go to Albania but millions are sharing the idea which is compelling the volunteers to go to Durazzo to participate in the fighting on the side of the Prince. The popularity which the proposed march of volunteers to Albania has reached is proof of how strong the desire is to show before the world that Austria has much more vitality than our adversaries are willing to admit."

While this comedy was being enacted in Vienna

by Counts Berchtold, and Von Hoetzendorf, Archduke Francis Ferdinand was reviewing for the last time his army of manœuvre of 100,000 men in Bosnia, and was just preparing for the triumphal entry into the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.

CHAPTER XI

COUNT TISZA CONSTRUCTS A "CASUS BELLI" OUT OF THE ARCHDUKE'S MURDER

THE FINAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARCH-PLOTTERS OF THE WORLD WAR—KAISER WILHELM, ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND, AND GRAND ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ

BEFORE reviewing the incidents surrounding the Archduke's murder and how this act of a half-grown revolutionist was converted by the experienced hands of the Austro-Hungarian war-plotters into a *casus belli*, I must tell of the last meeting which the Archduke had with Kaiser Wilhelm at Castle Konopisht in Bohemia. The reader will remember that Kaiser and Archduke agreed at their first meeting at Castle Konopisht in October, 1913, to meet in the spring of 1914; and that instead, the meeting had taken place at the end of March, 1914, at Castle Miramar, the once favourite residence of the unfortunate Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico. The nearer we drew to the outbreak of the World War the more frequent became the meetings of these two leaders of the Teutonic war parties.

These interviews were always held under some flimsy disguise: of a hunting party for boars, deer, chamois, pigeons, pheasants, and so on. This time it was held under the lovely cloak of a "review of roses" which were in the most wonderful bloom and fragrance in the *Rosen Monat*, i.e., June—the month of roses. Kaiser Wilhelm, it was said, had seen the castle of Konopisht in the fall, and wanted to see it in the full glory of its roses. Thus surrounded by beautiful roses these two relentless spirits reached decisions which soon were to make humanity bleed from a million wounds, and dye with crimson the fields of Europe.

On June 12, 1914, the two "garden-friends," as they were termed by the press of the Ballplatz, met once more in the old historic castle situated in the heart of Bohemia, in the midst of a people who watched with misgivings the happenings in the castle. Among the men who came with Kaiser Wilhelm for this last meeting the most noted was Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz. This personage who came into such sinister prominence in the World War, as the originator of the U-Boat warfare, excited even in those days the most fearful forebodings, and the imagination of many a man in Austria saw behind the lovely flower beds and the festive reception halls the ominous spectre of war. Amid the fragrance of the flowers lurked the stench of war. As if by prearrangement the attention of the press was centred upon the person

of Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz. The organs of Count Berchtold designated him as one of those "iron skulls which could even break through walls," and as "the indestructible, far-seeing, and keen personality that will surely find in its time a place in the German Valhalla." Oddly enough the public was also reminded that "the presence of Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz at Konopisht recalls again the question which was never fully answered, to wit: What were the contents of the Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Germany?" The text of the treaty was made public property by the late Prince Bismarck, but the duties and rights in the treaty were never disclosed and the late Prince himself cynically remarked that this secret would never be revealed even after the treaty was no longer in force.

The deliberations of Kaiser and Archduke were held in such profound secrecy that only the representative of the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt* was allowed to write, basing his statement on a "well-informed source," that "in spite of the intimate character of the meeting the conviction could not be dismissed that highly important political questions and especially the Austro-Hungarian naval policy would be discussed." There is little doubt, however, that the conspirators considered the whole Balkan situation.

On the last day of the Kaiser's stay with the Archduke, Count Berchtold came to Konopisht to take part in the deliberations. The Archduke

Francis Ferdinand hurried from the conference to Trieste to embark on the Austrian dreadnaught *Viribus Unitis*, which was to bring him to the shores of Dalmatia. The great Bosnian manoeuvres of the 15th and 16th Army Corps began according to schedule on the 25th of July and ended on the 27th. They were conducted under the leadership of Field Marshal Potiorek as army inspector of Sarajevo, the very man who was, according to the dispositions of the General Staff, to lead the Austrian army of invasion into Serbia. The coming of Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia was greeted, as a matter of necessity, by all papers, even by the radical Serbian opposition paper *Srpska Riječ*, politely and cordially. Only the Serbian radical paper, *Narod*, ignored the visit, and brought out instead an article commemorating the famous historical Serbian battle of Kossovo Field. Otherwise the visit of Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia was not marred by any discordant note on the side of the sorely tried Yugoslav people.

How the Archduke and his consort met their death when on the 28th of June of 1914 they made their triumphal entry into the capital of the annexed provinces is well known. This incident was at once seized upon by the Ballplatz and our General Staff as the God-sent instrument by which they were finally to be able to realize what for six years, in spite of constant intrigues, they had failed to accomplish.

The value of the Archduke's assassination for the war party was twofold. First, it obliged both adherents and antagonists of the dynasty to approve of every action taken to vindicate its honour; second, in an international sense, it gave to the harsh action of the Ballplatz a moral support which no other *casus belli* could have received. It was realized that the Archduke's murder would arouse great sympathy in all the monarchical countries of Europe.

These calculations later proved correct. The whole blame for the outbreak of the war was, therefore, at first attributed to the Archduke's assassination. This was the moment for Austria to act. It was only necessary to point to Belgrade, and to make a *causal nexus* between the Archduke's murder and the Serbian Government. The murder of a king is not an infrequent occurrence in monarchical countries. Three murders had occurred around Emperor Francis Joseph himself. His brother Maximilian was executed in his overseas empire; his son, Crown Prince Rudolph, was killed in a love affair; his wife, Empress Elizabeth, was stabbed by an Italian.

What really happened after the death of the Archduke was this: The diplomats packed away their notes, the General Staff unpacked its war plans. The directions worked out for the beginning of the war, which were lying in the vaults of the various ministries, were at once applied, and

everything developed from that moment according to schedule.

Deprived of their patron saint, the war press organs of the extreme right began a deluge of invectives, insinuations, and accusations against Serbia and Russia. The *Reichspost*, mouthpiece of the Christian Socialists and of Francis Ferdinand, demanded on the first of July that "the last unavoidable step be undertaken against this nation of assassins of royalty," at the same time announcing that "some sort of ultimatum from the Austrian Government will be sent to Serbia." The clerical journals of Germany declared with one voice that "Belgrade bears the responsibility for the plot"; conservative journals stated that "Germans must now make a definite stand against the Slavs." The *Germania* and *Kölnische Zeitung* insisted upon the connivance of Serbia with the crime. All the papers knew in advance that diplomatic steps would be taken after consultation with the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of War.

In Belgrade the first sentiment aroused by the murder at Sarajevo was one of simple human horror and pity. The Belgrade press condemned the bloody deed and expressed the deepest indignation at this act of anarchistic folly.

Taking advantage of the feeling aroused by the murder of the Archduke the authorities in Austria-Hungary began a ruthless persecution of our own

Serbian subjects numbering several millions. This persecution subsequently grew in violence and with the official declaration of war was extended to the whole Slav south. Its dimensions and its horrors were even greater than were the crimes committed by the Germans in their invasion of Belgium.

On July 6th Archduke Frederick, who after the death of Francis Ferdinand became the leader of the Austrian war party and subsequently Commander in Chief of the Austrian army, had an audience with the Emperor, and on the following day a council of ministers was held in Vienna at which were present, in addition to the three joint Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance, the Austrian and Hungarian Premier, Count Stuerghk and Count Tisza. Before the council was held, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, and the Naval Commander in Chief, Von Haus, conferred with the ministers. The same night Count Berchtold left for Ischl, the summer residence of the Emperor, to receive his sanction for the decisions of the conference. According to an official communication the object of the council was to "discuss measures of internal administration for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in connection with which the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Naval Commander in Chief were consulted on certain 'technical points'." This was the official cloak under which the most momentous decisions in the his-

tory of Europe were hidden. The conference was solely of a political character as neither the two Ministers of Finance nor the two Ministers of Commerce were present.

“All decisive factors are in accord,” wrote Baron Chlumetzky, the confidant of the dead Archduke and the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, “that the Greater Serbia question must be decided once for all, if it is possible, by peaceful means; if not, by blood and iron.”

The two military chiefs were consulted on nothing more or less than the exact dates, when both army and navy would be ready to strike. Also the date for the ultimatum to be sent to Serbia was set for the 23d of the same month, and the 28th of July was agreed upon as the day to start hostilities against Serbia: that is, exactly three weeks were asked for by the army and navy chiefs for their final preparations for war. Lastly, it was decided that the declaration of war against Russia would follow the declaration of war against Serbia within ten days. I will explain this delay later in speaking of the protestations that were made by both the Austrian and German governments against the Russian mobilization. The utmost secrecy was maintained concerning this conference. Only the *Pester Lloyd*, the organ of the Hungarian Government, was permitted to give an explanation why “no allusion was made to the projected diplomatic *demarche* at Belgrade, for the

purpose of drawing the attention of the Serbian Government to the trails, which according to the Sarajevo investigations, lead directly to Belgrade," by saying that the "matter is not yet sufficiently ripe to be submitted to the glare of publicity." "The Serbian Government," the paper said, "will be shown to be a nest of pestilential rats which came from their territory over our border to spread death and destruction. If the Serbian Government shows readiness to exterminate this nest of rats it will have furnished proof of its upright sentiments, and again make good its title to neighbourly correctness, which, of late, has been disputable."

At the Vienna Conference Count Tisza took upon himself the task of making capital out of the assassination of the Archduke. He acquitted himself in a masterly fashion. While ceaselessly attacking Serbia through the press, and casting aspersions on Russia, he remained silent when asked to declare himself officially in regard to Serbia's guilt. On the day after the Vienna Conference Count Andrassy put several questions to Prime Minister Tisza. He asked: "How could the Government, in face of the well-known critical situation in Bosnia, plan the visit of the heir to the throne, on the Serbian national holiday, when such a visit would be interpreted by the Serbs as a provocation? Having risked the dangers inherent in such a visit, why did not the Government take proper measures

to safeguard the Archduke? What excuse had the Government for allowing the heir to the throne to continue on his way after the first attempt on his life?" Count Tisza's reply was marked by studied reserve. "The Archduke," he said, "stood under nobody's guardianship or control. He had regarded his Bosnian journey purely as a military inspection, and the Austrian and Hungarian governments received no preliminary notice of it, nor did the joint Minister of Finance receive any information as to the details of the programme." To the question as to possible diplomatic steps in Serbia Tisza replied that he could give only a quite general answer.

This was the rôle Tisza had to play. Had there been the slightest proof of the complicity of the Serbian Government or of Serbian subjects in the crime Tisza was not the man to hold back such proofs. It was through official silence that Tisza constructed a *casus belli*, departing entirely from the method followed hitherto by the Ballplatz—the making of countless accusations which finally could not be sustained.

On July 14th Tisza came to Vienna to confer, first with Count Berchtold, then with Count Forgach. It was at this visit between Tisza and Forgach that the ultimatum to Serbia received its final form. I know this from my conversations with Count Forgach.

A second attempt was made on July 15th

to force Tisza to declare himself. In the Lower House of the Hungarian Parliament, replying to an interpellation by M. Szmrecsanyi, Count Tisza said regarding Serbia's connection with the Sarajevo murders, that "Austria-Hungary's relations with Serbia must be made clear. War is a sad argument. The question has been raised whether the present uncertainty must not inevitably be decided by war, and I must say that a state which does not consider war as the *ultima ratio* can not call itself a state."

When Count Berchtold reported to the Emperor at Ischl the results of the fateful Council of Ministers, no official communiqué was made public as to the cause of the audience. The *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, which had relations with the Foreign Office, stated, however, that "no diplomatic step which may be made at Belgrade will imply any interference with the sovereign rights of the Serbian state, nor will anything be exacted which could be interpreted as an affront or as a humiliation." This statement was made to appease somewhat the feverish excitement in the monarchy. Furthermore, to deceive Europe, the same skilful manœuvre was tried in Austria as was resorted to in Germany. All the war chiefs were sent on leave of absence including Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army; Herr Krobatin, the joint Minister of War, and both the Austrian and Hungarian Ministers

of National Defence. But those who were closely watching the situation in Austria-Hungary were not deceived by these manœuvres. The real gravity of the situation could not be concealed.

On the 21st of July, that is two days before we presented the ultimatum to Serbia, the mobilization of officers of the reserve was started. On the same day Baron Giesl reported to Count Berchtold, from Belgrade, that "a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the monarchy as a great power, even for its existence as such, can not be permanently avoided. If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia, we should share the responsibilities for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation in any future war which must sooner or later be carried through." The baron at the same time warned the Minister of Foreign Affairs against half-measures, long discussions, or compromises.

A third and last attempt was made in Budapest on July 22d, the day before the ultimatum to Serbia was delivered, to make Count Tisza lift the veil surrounding the conference of July 7th. Contrary to expectations Tisza did not answer these new interpellations of Count Andrassy on the Austro-Serbian situation. "I am unable," Tisza said, "for the time being to reply to you—I do not consider it in the interests of the country that the matter should be ventilated at this moment nor am I in a position to impart information."

The following day, July 23d, the fatal ultimatum was sent to Belgrade. The contents of this document are too well known to call for comment here. On the day following the presentation of this ultimatum, Tisza, for the first time, broke his silence. Before the Hungarian Parliament he said: "In the conviction that our cause is just and that the vital interests of the monarchy and of the Hungarian Crown demand it, we will bear all the consequences of this step." Then Count Andrassy rose and made the following declaration: "In spite of the great differences which separate us from the Government, we will do our patriotic duty in every respect." Tisza on his side thanked Count Andrassy "for his great services" by saying: "I never expected anything else from him." With this statement the comedy was closed. On hearing Tisza and Andrassy exchange these words all the deputies arose and with wild applause and cries of "Hail, Hail," the sinister performance came to an end.

Keeping in mind the above facts, the reader will be able to understand the cynical farce which the Ballplatz diplomats played between that day and the declaration of war against Serbia on July 28th and against Russia on August 6th. The days between July 23d and August 5th have been declared the thirteen critical days of the World War, meaning that the outbreak of the war was an imminent danger but still avoidable by

the application of the proper diplomatic means. In reality, those critical days never existed as far as Austria-Hungary and Germany were concerned. This is clearly shown by my own conversation with Count Forgach of July 27th.

CHAPTER XII

THE MILITARY CHIEFS ASSUME COMPLETE CONTROL OF AUSTRO-GERMAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COUNT FORGACH'S CONFESSION EXPLODES THEORY OF SO-CALLED "CRITICAL DAYS" OF WORLD WAR

IT WAS on the eve of the outbreak of the war that I arrived in Vienna, having left San Francisco, my last post, in the beginning of April, 1914. From the facts which I disclose in Chapter XIV in regard to the mobilization of an army of half a million Austrians in the United States of America I knew that war was coming, and was firmly determined to resign my position in case of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia and Russia.

In August, 1913, I was asked in San Francisco what I thought of the general political situation in Europe after the close of the second Balkan war. "Now will come," I said, "the great World War." "Why do you judge that the great World War is in sight?" I was asked. I replied: "I am certain of the coming of the World War from the official knowledge I have of the preparations for it. It will take only a cablegram with one word to put

everything in motion as far as the minute preparations in America are concerned. An army of half a million men will be on the eastern coast inside of fourteen days to be transported to Europe, provided that England remains neutral, and it is expected in Austria-Hungary and Germany that she will do so."

On leaving America, in April, 1914, to spend a six-months' vacation in the country of my birth, I went by way of Japan and Russia to gauge the feeling there in regard to the general political situation of Europe. In Tokio I received very important hints from Major Putz, of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff—our military attaché in Japan. He told me that both Austria-Hungary and Germany were making frantic endeavours to get Japan on their side, but that unfortunately the friendship of Japan for Russia was at the time a great obstacle to their designs.

On arriving at Mukden, Manchuria, I visited the German Consul of that locality, Hugo Witte by name. In conversation with him I said: "You told me that the political situation in the Far East is the best barometer for judging the situation in Europe. Will the great European war, according to your opinion, really come in the near future?" His reply was as follows: "As sure as death. You Austrians will soon get a new emperor who will be ready to do everything and who will strike at the next opportunity at Serbia and Russia. In short, a man who will not let himself be put off by any

considerations from precipitating the war which is essential to Austria-Hungary's ultimate peace and security." "Why should Germany," I said, "proceed aggressively against Russia?" "For the simple reason," Mr. Witte replied, "that Russia has immense, undeveloped, and uncultivated territories in her empire. These territories must be opened up to human activity. Russia threatens the whole world. We must finally procure for ourselves peace, and that for all time. The continuous unrest and war danger, in peace time, must finally come to an end. Pan-Slavism must be destroyed for ever. Russia must be partitioned among Austria-Hungary, Germany, Sweden, Rumania, Turkey, and Japan. The situation has become intolerable for us. The last hour has struck. We must give Russia such a blow that we may take away from her not only the Baltic provinces but also Petrograd, and make Finland independent or give it to Sweden. Austria-Hungary must get Little Russia with Kieff; Rumania must get Bessarabia; Turkey must get the Caucasus, and Great Britain must grasp the opportunity of finally assuring herself the possession of Thibet. As allies we shall have Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece (to which latter country we will give a part of Macedonia). Persia, Afghanistan, and Japan must invade Siberia. We reckon with absolute certainty on a revolution in Poland, Little Russia, Finland,

the Caucasus, and other parts of Russia. We want to keep open the great commercial and military Transsiberian road for ourselves in order to be able to protect Tsingtau in case it should come to a partition of China. We count with absolute certainty on victory because Great Britain will certainly remain neutral. Against France we will sacrifice more than a million men and will strike at a certain weak line in her defences. This weak line is Belgium. In this way we shall break into France. The Russians, on the contrary, we will allow to come as close as possible and will give them free access near the fortress of Thorn. We will then surround and completely annihilate them. We will destroy Russia and will ask at the Peace Conference such economic advantages as will make our situation secure for all time. Then we shall finally have peace in the East and we will be free from this eternal menace of war on the side of Russia. Thus Pan-Slavism will be crushed for ever."

This conversation I had with Consul Witte in the early part of May, 1914, and I took great care to record it exactly word for word. To a Spanish colleague with whom I travelled through the Far East I said at that time, in acquainting him with the conversation I had had, that according to all appearances war would break out sooner than was expected. As far as the German Consul's reference to Tsingtau was concerned, I must mention

that as early as the winter of 1913-14 the great project of a German railroad stretching from Constantinople to Kiao Chau was advocated by Germans, first by a certain Herr Landrichter Romburg, and then by Herr Henning who was of the opinion that the most propitious moment had arrived for a firm economic policy in China which would make of Tsingtau the great world harbour of the future in the Far East.

In Vladivostok I called upon Dr. G. Stobbe, the German Consul of that locality, with whom I left the city, he going to his home and I proceeding by train to Chabarovsk. The conversation I had on the train with him confirmed in all essentials what I had heard in Tokio and Mukden. Among other things he said: "You see over there the point where the three empires, China, Korea, and Russia, meet. It is from that corner that the blow will be struck and the advancing Japanese will cut off the fortress of Vladivostok. These fools, the Russians, are spending hundreds of millions of roubles to hold Vladivostok, and do not know that it will soon be taken away from them and that they will thus lose the last port they have in the East. The alliance of Japan and Germany is a certainty. In the war between Germany and Russia we will let Japan take Siberia up to Lake Baikal."

Full of heavy forebodings I travelled on, nevertheless hoping against hope that the disaster of war would be averted. When in Askabad

under the scorching sun of Russian Central Asia I heard for the first time that Archduke Francis Ferdinand had been assassinated. I hurried home, visiting on my journey my colleagues in Tiflis in Trans-Caucasia, also in Moscow and Petrograd, everywhere seeing ominous signs of the coming war. When on July 26th I arrived at Warsaw I was more than startled by what I saw there in the office of our Consul General. This was one of the greatest consulates that Austria-Hungary had before the war. The whole Consulate was like a beehive, although the day was Sunday. It did not take me long to find out that the general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian armies was in full swing. On visiting the Consul General, Baron Werburg, who was at the same time First Secretary of our Embassy in Petrograd, I had a most interesting conversation with him in regard to the coming war. He told me in so many words: "War is inevitable. The mobilization is well under way." "You don't mean to start war against Russia," I said to him. "Of course we will," he said. "Russia is not prepared this time and is completely at our mercy." "You are greatly mistaken," I told him; "I have travelled more than four months all over Russia and I am absolutely convinced that in starting war with Russia we will bring the greatest disaster upon our country and upon Europe in general, because Russia will defend herself to the last man. She has plenty of fighting

material, is comparatively well equipped, and has excellent roads although they are not numerous." "You don't understand me," Baron Werburg said, "it is not by military force alone that we will overwhelm Russia, but by other more potent factors, and that is internal revolution." "In my opinion," I said, "this is the most elusive hope that we can have in an engagement with Russia. The Russian Poles will not revolt if it comes to war." "I am absolutely certain," Baron Werburg replied, "of revolution in Poland as well as in the Ukraine and other parts of Russia."

This gave me food for thought, and leaving him to his revolutionary activities I tried to ascertain among the officials how things really stood in regard to the revolution which was in preparation. I was told by one of the secretaries whose name I cannot divulge that for years revolutionary propaganda had been carried on by the Consul General in Warsaw. The same was done by our representatives in Kieff, Odessa, and other places, as I ascertained later in Vienna. Before leaving Warsaw I was asked by Baron Werburg to act as a courier for him, in order to avoid sending a special messenger to Vienna. I consented to do so, and highly important documents relating to the war were subsequently entrusted to my keeping. Had I wanted to betray Austria I could easily have done it then and very important material would have fallen into the hands of the Russian Government.

From Warsaw I went to Granica and crossed into Austrian territory. I found the morning papers there with big headlines: "Revolution all over Russia!"—"The Czar of Russia murdered!" I found later that this report was intentionally circulated by the already familiar *Literary* or Press Bureau of our Foreign Ministry. This news had gone the rounds of the whole German press. "The wish was father to the thought."

On arriving in Vienna I at once proceeded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver my secret dispatches to the Political Department. Then I went to see Count Forgach, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs with whom the reader is familiar. Count Berchtold, the minister, was absent that day from the city, having gone to consult the Emperor in Ischl. It was Forgach, who in the absence of the minister, acted as his representative. When I was announced to Count Forgach, I was asked to wait because he was in conference with the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine. The conversation of the French Ambassador with Count Forgach lasted some time and it was not until half-past six in the evening that I was received. The count greeted me very cordially. During the troubled period in Belgrade at the time of the annexation crisis he had, in spite of our violent differences of opinion, shown marked consideration toward me. He was personally one of the most likable diplomats that I have ever known. Having

inherited from his Jewish mother the best qualities of the Jewish race, he was keen and ambitious and one of the most capable of men. There is no doubt that he would have become Minister of Foreign Affairs of the empire had not his ambition carried him too far and had he not associated himself with Count Tisza. Soon after the latter became Premier of Hungary in June, 1913, he brought Count Forgach from his diplomatic exile at Dresden to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Vienna in place of Count Szapary, who was sent as Ambassador to Petrograd. These diplomatic changes took place in the month of September, 1913.

After having exchanged the usual phrases of greeting I at once turned the conversation to the topic of war. "Do you know, Count," I said, "that our note to Serbia has made an immense impression in Russia? The people are greatly stirred by the sharpness of its tone and it is regarded as one of the most provocative acts which our diplomacy has done in the long, troubled period since the annexation times. I am afraid," I added, "that it will lead to grave consequences." "Why, there is nothing in it," answered Count Forgach, "that could be interpreted as an aggression against Serbia or Russia. We merely ask what is right." "It is not only in Russia," I said, "that the note has made a profound impression. I had occasion to hear, and to convince myself from the newspapers, that the note has been received throughout

Europe, especially in France, Great Britain, and Italy, with general disapproval. I heard in the Ministry that it was Count Tisza who had composed the note. Knowing you as I do, I never doubted from the very beginning that the note had not been composed by you, Count." "Well," said the count, "but I was one of the signers of the note [*Ich habe die Note mitunterschrieben*], therefore I fully approve of its contents."

I was then closely questioned by Count Forgach on the conditions I had found in Russia during my travels there. I told him all I knew about the splendid human material the Russian army and navy had; about the excellent equipment that I had seen in several parts of Russia, and many other things that would weigh heavily in the scales if it came to a war with that country. I also said that all our calculations might prove wrong in the end when it came to the supreme test on the battle-field, and that the reports of our representatives in Russia about the unpreparedness of Russia for war were all too optimistically believed. I pointed especially to the Russian railroads which were in good condition although perhaps not sufficient to carry out quickly the great requirements under stress of a rapid mobilization. I said all this to impress Count Forgach and to try at the last moment to convert him to a more conciliatory attitude toward the great issues that were arising.

Although I knew the determination of the Count

in the matter of war and peace and that his opinion had long been made up, I nevertheless tried to do all that was possible to impress upon him the great responsibility he and his colleagues would assume in precipitating a great European war. "Russia," I said, "will never permit Serbia to be crushed." "What has Russia to do," Count Forgach retorted, "with our dealings with Serbia?" "I will not argue that point," I said. "It is not a matter of opinion solely, but I am certain that Russia is determined to go to the limit, where her life interests are at stake as they are in the Balkans. Russia must of necessity guard her political and economic interests there. If she loses free access to the Mediterranean her entire commercial life and industry will come to a standstill. In Samara on the Volga," I said, "I spoke to a prominent industrialist and great land-owner from Orenburg. He told me that the war with Japan did not interest Russia as such, but that it would be very different if Austria-Hungary and Germany should attack her. 'That,' he said, 'will be a life-and-death struggle for Russia, and we are willing to sacrifice our lives and our fortunes on the altar of our mother country.' From a different angle I heard the same story from a teacher in one of the Cossack stanitzas on the Amur River in the Russian Far East. Speaking with him on the political situation of Europe he said: 'We Russians will never allow the Balkan Slavs to be crushed. We

feel one with them and with the Slavs of Austria-Hungary.' Such is the spirit all over Russia." Realizing the gravity of the hour I implored Count Forgach: "Do everything in your power to avoid war with Russia. It will be the most terrible war the world has ever seen. Do everything in your power, Count, to continue with Russia the peaceful diplomatic conversations. To that end, engage the good services of France. M. Dumaine has just had a long conversation with you. Through him you can exercise a deciding influence upon Russia."

As a last resort I said: "The Slavs of Austria-Hungary will regard the war with Russia and Serbia as a fratricidal war, whatever our statesmen may say to the contrary. The revolution in Russia, on which we are basing such great hopes, is a chimera. In Granica I drew the attention of a Pole from Russian Poland, who travelled with me, to the headlines in the newspapers which clearly portrayed our wish to see a revolution started in Poland. He was greatly amused at our ingenuousness. 'The interests of the Russian Poles,' he said, 'are with Russia, politically and economically, and not with Prussia.'"

I was surprised at my own boldness in presenting all the various arguments against war, some of which were of a very dangerous nature to mention before a high Austrian official. But I was so appalled by the frightful menace of the im-

pending calamity that I paid no attention to my personal security. Besides, Count Forgach knew me very well. I had had a similar conversation with him in the crisis of 1908-09. I concluded with the plea: "I beg you once again, Count, to do everything in your power to avoid the World War." To which appeal he replied: "Diplomacy can do nothing more, everything is already in the hands of the military." With these words he shook my hand and I left him hurriedly to go in search of my numerous Slav friends in Vienna.

For a long time I wandered, lost in thought, through the crooked old streets of that fascinating, gay, careless capital, that soon—I realized it only too keenly—must pass through the terrible ordeal of fire. One thing was clear to me and that was that war was inevitable. "Diplomacy can do nothing more; everything is in the hands of the military." I knew Count Forgach too well not to realize what a terrible meaning these words of his had. I remembered distinctly how he, as Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade in the days of the annexation crisis, waited patiently long days and nights to deliver the ominous ultimatum to the Serbian Government; how, finally, he lost in the diplomatic game he was playing; how he was transferred, or rather banished, to the unimportant court of a German vassal potentate; how finally the war party had rescued him from there and brought him to the Ballplatz

where the great war plans were made. His day of revenge had come.

Realizing that nothing would deter these terrible men from carrying out their plans, I resolved to stay in the capital to see how the great events shaped themselves. My first interest centred around the problem as to how the Ballplatz would extricate itself from the extremely delicate position in which it was put by Sir Edward Grey who at the beginning of the conflict proposed that "the ambassadors of Germany, Italy, and France should meet under my presidency in London," thus virtually reviving the London Conference of Ambassadors which at the time of the Balkan Wars had proved such a reliable instrument to hold in check the war mania of Austria.

Our war party dreaded nothing so much as a conference of ambassadors or indeed any influential international conference. It would again spoil their game. I learned that Germany had, the day before, that is on the 27th, declined to participate in the London conference "because she would not place Austria before a European tribunal." Count Berchtold came out on the 28th of July, as I learned later, with the statement that Austria-Hungary could neither recede from her demands nor enter into any discussions about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. This was exactly in line with the views stated by Count Forgach the previous day. The

events that quickly followed each other that fateful day did not surprise me. First, the declaration of war against Serbia; second, the answer of Count Berchtold to Grey's conference proposal, namely, that that proposal was nullified by the state of war which already existed.

On the day of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia mob demonstrations took place in Vienna before the Hofburg, the Ballplatz, and the Ministry of War, the demonstrators crying at the top of their voices: "Down with Russia!" "Down with Serbia!" "Long live the War!"

The Socialist paper, *Vorwaerts*, of Berlin, on July 28th, in an article entitled "War or Peace," said: "Czarism is not this moment the worst war danger, but the ill-informed Austria which lives under the insane illusion that it needs only to give the signal, and the whole of Europe will sound the bugle to bring the flower of its youth as a holocaust for the assassination of its heir to the throne."

The die was cast. The fatal step, which was to plunge the world into the most terrible catastrophe of history, had been taken. Thus after six years of intrigue did the Austrian and German diplomats and military leaders realize their aims.

CHAPTER XIII

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION AS THE CAUSE OF THE WAR

A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE SCENES IN BERLIN DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE WAR

THE Austro-Hungarian war party had finally reaped its triumph. Our armies were storming the gates of Serbia and our militarists hoped to lay Serbia, on the 18th of August, the name-day of the Emperor, as a gift before the throne of old Francis Joseph; and then proceed with all their forces to the conquest of Great Russia. "We will throw Russia behind the Volga; nay, we will chase the Russians behind the Ural Mountains; back into the steppes of Asia." So I was told by an imperial Court official when talking with him while watching the mobilization in the spacious court of the Emperor's stables. "Will Russia attack us," I asked, "or will we attack Russia?" "We will find a pretext for war with Russia," said the official, "sooner than anybody thinks. Besides, we expect that Russia will attack us on account of our invasion of Serbia; and Russia's move will automatically bring Ger-

many into the war." "Does this last follow," I asked further, "from our treaty of alliance with Germany? We have not been attacked by Serbia and I thought that the Treaty of Alliance was purely a defensive one." "You remember the great debate last year between the Socialist and Centrist parties in the German Reichstag," the Court official said, "when Prince Loewenstein accused Herr Ledebour and his political friends of trying to prevent Germany from making war by fomenting internal revolution?"

"The obligation to help Austria,' Prince Loewenstein then said, 'arises if Austria is attacked by any third power; Austria on her side would certainly help Germany if—assuming the fantastic case—we should attack Denmark, and should be for this attacked by France and Russia.' Applying the above formula to our attack on Serbia, it follows that Germany will join us, that is to say, our attack on Serbia will automatically provide Germany the *casus fœderis*."

But even at this I was extremely curious to see how Germany would find a plausible pretext for war against Russia, if Austria was attacked by Russia alone. I very soon learned how the German war party created such a pretext in the Russian mobilization. Problems of time and distance seriously influenced Russia's mobilization. Her far-flung garrisons in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia weakened the strength of her army.

In the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 Russia received a very unpleasant reminder of the danger of unpreparedness for war. At that time 800,000 German troops could have been thrown upon the Vistula at the very outbreak of the war, while 400,000 Austro-Hungarian troops could have been thrown against Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk from the south, thus cutting off the Russian armies in Poland. The operation would have been successful, because Russia would have been unable to oppose this force with more than a couple of army corps within a week's time. The rest of her army, of which 800,000 men might have been aligned against Germany and 400,000 against Austria, could not have been ready under three weeks, and could not have taken the field under a month. This in spite of the fact that Russia had on a peace footing at that time an army of approximately 1,200,000 men.

In the crisis of 1912 and 1913 Russia's position was better, because, seeing Austria-Hungary mobilized, on the Serbian as well as on the Russian frontiers, Russia retained a year's class under the colours instead of sending them home as reservists. Hence our wailings at that time regarding the Russian mobilization, and finally the sending of Prince Hohenlohe with an autograph letter of the Emperor to Czar Nicholas to beg him to send the surplus troops home. Profiting by this experience, our General Staff wanted this time to baffle Russia;

to hold up her mobilization; to gain time to mobilize our whole army under the guise of a "partial" mobilization, and be ready for the invasion of Russia before the latter had time to mobilize. According to the Austro-German plans for the war against Russia and France Germany was to throw herself first on France, while the whole brunt of the fighting on the eastern front would be born by Austria-Hungary. "Mobilization means war" was therefore the cry of German diplomacy, when Russia followed our example and ordered the mobilization of her southern military districts on the 29th of July, that is the very day following our mobilization of ten army corps. Austria-Hungary ordered a general mobilization at one o'clock on the morning of July 31st. In order not to be placed at a strategical disadvantage Russia once more followed suit and ordered the general mobilization of her armies about 11 o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, expressly declaring, however, that she did it as a measure of security, "being always ready to submit to the Hague Tribunal, or the mediation of the Powers as proposed by Sir Edward Grey." Russia, moreover, emphatically denied that "mobilization means war"; in fact, in her past troubles with Austria both Austria-Hungary and Russia had mobilized and their troops had stood for long months guarding the frontiers without war as a consequence. The German Government, however, seized upon the Russian mobilization as the most

plausible available justification for the predetermined war. Russia's mobilization, if not delayed sufficiently, meant the overthrow of all the German plans of campaign and the possible loss of the war. The course of the World War proved these fears to have been well founded. It was Russia's unexpectedly rapid mobilization and her thrust into East Prussia that made the German armies pause before the Marne, and withdraw at least two army corps to throw them against the invading Russians. This gave, for the moment, to the French, British, and Belgian armies a numerical superiority, and saved Paris.

This was the Kaiser's reason for crying at the top of his voice to Russia: "Mobilization means war!" He thus repeated Napoleon's strategy. Count Segur, in his history of Napoleon's campaign of 1812 against Russia, says that Napoleon made complaints on the 25th of April, 1812, among others, against Russia's armaments, as a menace to the safety of his empire. Czar Alexander I, through his Ambassador, Prince Kourokin, vainly protested to Napoleon his pacific intentions. Napoleon interrupted the Czar's envoy: "No, your master desires war; I know through my generals that the Russian army is hurrying toward the Niemen." But there were two more reasons for wishing to represent the Russian mobilization as meaning war. First, in Austria-Hungary mobilization was slower and the distance to be traversed longer,

by at least ten days, than in Germany. To restrain Russia from attacking Austria, the weaker ally, the German diplomats tried to deceive Russia, and keep her undecided in the first critical weeks while Austria was operating against Serbia. This explains also why Austria actually declared war against Russia almost ten days later than she did against Serbia; the dates being respectively July 28 and August 6, 1914. I have stated in a previous chapter that when I arrived at Warsaw on the 26th of July I found the mobilization of our nationals in full swing at the Consulate General, for the whole district of that consulate. That was two days before the official order for the partial mobilization in Vienna was issued. In Austria-Hungary itself the mobilization of the officers of the reserve began two days before the presentation of the ultimatum. As far as Germany is concerned, I learned from a Prussian army contractor in Berlin that on July 25, 1914, artillery was sent from Breslau, German Silesia, to East Prussia.

The second reason for the Kaiser declaring "Mobilization means war," was, militarily, even more significant. In our plans for the conquest of Russia we imitated Napoleon's plan for the invasion of Russia. Napoleon did not consider a mere frontal attack as prudent, or, as being most effective, for bringing Russia to her knees. The outflanking movements in the rear of the Niemen and Vistula armies were considered by both con-

querors as of vital importance for a quick and decisive result. But we did not content ourselves with one outflanking movement, as did Napoleon.

The Austro-German General Staffs conceived the plan of one frontal invasion and one principal, with two, or rather three, minor flanking invasions in the rear of the Russian armies. This was arranged to create in several parts of the Russian Empire such conditions that the mobilization in most of her military districts would be disorganized or that the mobilized troops would be needed elsewhere, that is away from the German main line of attack. This should have served, in the first place, for the invasion of Russia by Sweden and Rumania. If the above plans had matured, as arranged by the German Kaiser, not only the military districts of Warsaw and Vilna, but also those of Petrograd, Kieff, and Odessa, would have been badly disorganized and Russia would have been prevented from concentrating an army sufficiently large to take the offensive in the great Vistula triangle. To paralyze Russia's mobilization in other districts—or to attract mobilized troops to other and far-off battle-fields—invasions of the Caucasus by Turkey and of Central Asia by Persia and Afghanistan were planned. This formidable menace of flanking invasions on her most exposed frontiers would have disturbed the mobilization also in the military districts of Stavropol and Tiflis, both in the Caucasus, as also in the military dis-

tricts of Central Asia and western Siberia. Thus the districts of Moscow and Khazan only would have remained undisturbed. That the Kaiser's great scheme of simultaneous enveloping, flanking, and rear attacks on Russia came to naught is due solely to the decision of Russia to mobilize at the first signal of the Austrian mobilization.

I stayed for a few days in the excitement of Vienna, after our declaration of war against Serbia and the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, when suddenly I remembered that I had come fifteen thousand miles to visit my people at home. I therefore left Vienna to go to my home in southern Styria. Arriving there I found the simple mountaineers so bewildered and frightened by the orders for mobilization that they scarcely noticed my home-coming. My stay was brief as a telegram arrived from Vienna signed by Count Berchtold himself ordering me to proceed at once to Berlin for temporary duty there and on my way there to call at the Ministry. Upon my arrival at Vienna I was informed that I must not express my views. I also learned that I was watched by spies. I had evidently spoken too freely. In Vienna reports were circulated that Russian airmen had bombed the railroad from Cracow to Vienna; furthermore, that a hundred million francs in gold were en route from France to Russia through Germany and Austria in a hundred automobiles, and that everybody must be on the lookout for

these automobiles. The first report of "the bombing" of the railroad was, of course, an invention of the familiar type, fabricated by the "Literary" Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was in line with the similar news circulated in Germany that French airmen had opened hostilities against Germany before the declaration of war by bombing Nürnberg and two other German cities and that they were violating the neutrality of Belgium by flying over that country. Our Foreign Office also circulated reports that Russia had opened hostilities against Austria-Hungary without a declaration of war just as it was reported that France had done against Germany. In regard to the shipment of a hundred million francs in gold to Russia it was a crude hoax on the part of our military authorities but it served a very practical purpose, as people everywhere watched the roads and searched automobiles for spies, etc.

From the telegram received from Count Berchtold, I knew that I must be in bad odour in Vienna. Arriving there I called first on Baron Sonnleithner my departmental chief.

"Why did you not call on me before?" the Baron asked me, angrily. "You were on leave of absence," I replied. "Where have you been all this time?" the Baron then demanded. "In Russia," I replied. Then, as if bitten by a snake, the Baron sprang toward me and shouted: "You are a Russophile." "Yes, I am a friend of Russia.

They are my racial brothers. If that is a crime, I ask to be placed at once before a court martial. Such courts martial are already working at full speed in the south. I have heard that fully 1,500 persons have been put into the old dungeons of the mediæval castle dominating the City of Ljubljana.”

“That is not true,” said the Baron. “Of course it is true,” I said. “I had this news directly from a German judge who was sent to that city to investigate the cases. I ask, therefore, once more, to be sent south and placed before a court martial if I have committed a crime by travelling through Russia.”

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot ask to have you court martialed,” answered the Baron, “you are too highly placed in the service and too well known abroad. Your execution would make too much of a stir abroad.”

I then asked him to be allowed to return to America, to my post in San Francisco, instead of going to Berlin. Then I went to my hotel, destroyed a part of my notes containing the impressions of my journey in Siberia, wrote out my resignation, and brought it to the Ministry. There a friend of mine intervened and begged me to withdraw my resignation and to go to Berlin. I suspected that my bold conversation with Count Forgach had caused me all this trouble. I realized that to get out of this Austrian prison I had to act prudently. I therefore consented to remain in the service and go to Germany. On leaving the

Foreign Office, I met Herr Von Nuber, Austro-Hungarian Consul General at New York, who was then on leave of absence. We went together into a café on the Kaerntner Strasse and our conversation soon turned to the war. "I was all morning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Herr Von Nuber told me, "and got some very interesting news." In order to learn this news, I suppressed my feelings and appeared entirely in sympathy with the war against Serbia and Russia. I then said: "What is really our purpose in invading Serbia?" "We must dispose, once for all, of Serbia as a state and of the Serbian race," Herr Von Nuber said. "I was told in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that our aim in making war on Serbia is to crush the Serbian army and completely to annihilate it; this accomplished, we shall let loose Magyar bands in Serbia to whom we shall give the task of murdering the women and children of Serbia in order to make an end forever of the menace of a Greater Serbia."

This important news was enough for me. It only confirmed what I had previously heard from other Austrian and Hungarian sources about our proposed civilizing mission in the Balkans. From what happened later it is known only too well that the plan of Austria-Hungary was carried out to the letter. The case of martyred Serbia is an analogue to that of Armenia. When I was in Tiflis, some three weeks before the war, I heard similar

views expressed in regard to Armenia by a German Secretary of Legation who was then on his way to Teheran, Persia. In order to understand why Austria-Hungary had singled out Serbia and the Serbian people for destruction and why Germany had done the same in regard to Armenia, the strategical situation of both Serbia and Armenia must be considered. The strategical importance of Serbia is great because it lies across the great natural high road which connects the East and the West, Asia and Europe. The whole Balkan peninsula is covered with a tangled mass of steep and inhospitable mountains which are very difficult to cross. The great commercial highway, Berlin-Bagdad, follows the broad valley of the Morava south from Belgrade toward Nish, where it branches off straight south to Salonica, while the other branch proceeds over easy mountains into the valley of the Maritza through Bulgarian territory toward Adrianople and thence to Constantinople. To push through to Salonica and Constantinople was our principal goal in the Balkans. Hence, we decided on the destruction of Serbia, as it lay in the path of our ambitions. In considering the geographical position it is to be noted that Armenia is like a wedge thrust into the heart of Asiatic Turkey, separating the tangled mountain ranges of Asia Minor from Asia proper. This gives Armenia its strategical importance. Just as Serbia bars the way from Europe into Asia, so does Ar-

menia stand across the way from Asia into Europe. Serbia and Armenia guard the approaches to Constantinople from the east and west respectively. Such being the strategical significance of Serbia and Armenia it can easily be imagined what an important rôle was reserved by history for their peoples. The geographical position of these two countries has quite naturally directed their history along parallel lines. Most of the European conquerors of Asia, as most of the Asiatic conquerors of Europe, have used the natural highways leading through these countries.

August 18th, the name-day of the Emperor, and the day set for the annihilation of Serbia, had passed, and almost no war bulletins were given out in regard to the conduct of the campaign in the south. It happened that the day after I was invited to lunch by my friend the young and energetic Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce of Vienna, to whose lot it fell in the course of the war to place our industries on a war footing. While we were at table in one of the fashionable restaurants on the famous Kaerntner Ring he told me of two curious conversations he had had that very day: the one a telephone conversation with the Austrian Premier, Count Stuergh, in regard to the food situation, during which he told the Count that the latter would certainly meet the fate of Count Latour (who was hanged to a lamp-post by the revolutionists in 1848). The other conversation

was with the Lord Mayor of Vienna, during which the latter told him that our troops had taken up (on the Serbian front) "positions in the rear." I had a hard time to suppress my feelings at the joyous news that my Serbian brethren instead of being annihilated by the Austrians had actually beaten them. When after lunch we left the restaurant, I was surprised at the peculiar darkness of the streets although the sky was cloudless; but noticing crowds of people looking through smoked glasses at the sun, I remembered that there was a total eclipse of the sun. This seemed to me an omen of the eclipse of the old Danubian Empire, which had deliberately plunged the world into a vast catastrophe. The same evening I left Vienna for Berlin firmly resolved that I should never set foot again in that city until the Hapsburgs had fallen and my Slav brethren who make up more than half of the population of Austria-Hungary were liberated for ever from the yoke of their German-Magyar oppressors.

In Berlin my position soon became intolerable. I sometimes failed to conceal my pro-Entente feelings, as for instance once in conversation with a volunteer worker at our office, the son of a millionaire banker from Vienna, who wanted to denounce me at once to our Ambassador, but was prevented from doing so by one of my friends to whom he had confided his intentions. One day Prince Hohenlohe, our new Ambassador to Berlin, said to me: "Please be careful what you say. These

Prussians are terribly scared that something may happen in Austria among our Slav subjects." During my stay in Berlin I came upon the trail of the Austro-German propaganda that had been set on foot in Italy, Rumania, and Turkey, to keep those countries out of the war, or to bring them into the war on our side. A high Hungarian official serving as a commercial attaché in our embassy told me on his arrival from Vienna in the early days of October that our government had spent some eighty million francs in Rumania alone, and that an equal sum had been disbursed in Bulgaria, to say nothing of what had been distributed in Italy. As for Turkey, a volunteer worker whose son was in the employ of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin confided to me one day that he had just received a telegram from his son. "You know," he said, "he was sent to Constantinople with four million francs in gold for Enver Pasha."

On many important phases of my stay in Berlin I must remain silent in order not to imperil certain people who were friendly to me. I watched the interminable movement of German troops, in the early part of the war, first to the region of the Mazurian Lakes, then from the French front to the Galician battle-fields, going to the rescue of the defeated Austrian armies. The chief news about the happenings at the front and about troop movements I received from our old surgeon, a Prussian

staff-surgeon, who for some fifteen years had been connected with our office and who had numerous friends among the high officers at the front. In spite of the horrors of the war and the impossible Prussian atmosphere in which I had to live, there were many humorous scenes enacted at the office, especially in the countless war marriages which, among other duties, I had to perform for our subjects who were called to the colours. Amid the scenes of this tragi-comedy I met a beautiful young lady with a French name, Baroness D—, who wanted to leave Germany but who was unable to do so not having a passport. She was suspected of being a spy. I risked my head in giving her a document that brought her safely across the frontier.

In the middle of October, 1914, Baron Haymerle [Franz Freiherr von Haymerle], First Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Berlin, son of the well-known Austrian statesman, Baron Haymerle, told me during a conversation lasting two hours—on the good and bad fortunes of the war—that Austria-Hungary, greatly perturbed by the victorious march of the Russian armies in Galicia, had asked a revision of her agreements with Germany, and had accordingly entered into a new agreement as regards the war aims of both countries whereby Germany bound herself not only to help Austria-Hungary to drive the Russians out of Galicia, but also not to lay down

arms until Kieff, the capital of the Ukraine, was conquered for Austria. Through these new stipulations Germany reaffirmed Austria's claims to the whole of the Ukraine, that is, the whole southern part of Russia, and declared also her determination to complete the conquest and partition of Russia.

These *pourparlers* marked the first revision of the war aims as they were laid down in the agreement concluded between Austria-Hungary and Germany prior to the war. To deprive the Slavs of the life-giving sea by pressing the Russians from the shores of the Baltic and Black seas was the underlying idea of this first Teutonic partition of Russia. By the terms of this first agreement the whole northwestern part of Russia, that is, the Baltic provinces, including Petrograd, Russian Poland, and Lithuania, was to fall to the lot of Germany; while Austria, besides retaining her grip on Galicia, was to receive as her share of the war spoils the whole of the Ukraine, including also the old Khanat of Crimea, with the prospect of reviving all the aspirations of the Ukrainians to the region north of the Caucasus, and to the territory between the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains, far into the region of the Orenburg Cossacks. Possessing this and other highly important news, I realized the time had come for me to leave Germany before it was too late. I had discovered that a man by the name of Rosenthal, with whom I became ac-

quainted through a German volunteer worker in our office, was watching my movements more attentively than seemed to me necessary. That my suspicions were well founded I learned nearly a year later, when I heard that Rosenthal, who claimed to be an American citizen, had been executed as a spy in the Tower of London, having been sent to England by the German Government to procure the British Admiralty plans. Rosenthal had told me that he was an American citizen, and a native of the East Side in New York. He always wore a little American flag in his button-hole, and spoke English perfectly.

It was a Sunday morning, late in October, 1914, when I secretly left Berlin. Twenty-four hours later I was on Swiss soil—a free man. I proceeded to Rome, where I lived in complete retirement for some time. On December 20, 1914, I sent in my resignation from my post as consul at San Francisco. I gave as the reason for my resignation that my Slav sympathies did not permit me longer to serve the Austro-Hungarian Government. Before my resignation was accepted by His Majesty I was approached at my hotel by Count Colloredo-Mansfeld, who told me he came in the name of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to dissuade me from my intentions of leaving the foreign service of Austria-Hungary. When I remained deaf to all his entreaties and arguments, the Count finally came out with the full truth: "If you dare to say

or to do anything detrimental to the interests of Austria-Hungary after your resignation, you will pay dearly; besides, it will involve your relatives at home."

Seeing my determination not to be led into any shameful compromise, the Count at once assumed a more prudent and dignified attitude and said: "I admire you." A few days later I received a communication from Count Berchtold telling me that "His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty has with serene decision of January 27, 1915, most graciously condescended to approve of your request to be relieved from the Civil Service."

I never felt better in my life than on that day, when I was relieved from the oppression of Austrian official life. Having become a free man, I at once placed all my experience gained in the foreign service of Austria-Hungary, and the special knowledge which I had acquired during the war, at the service of the Allied cause. One thing I especially tried to impress upon the ambassadors of Russia and France was that the greatest danger for the Triple Entente lay in Sofia; for fully two months I endeavoured to make them understand the precarious position in which Russia and Serbia would be placed if the Entente should disregard the necessity of placating Bulgaria as quickly as possible. Later events proved that this warning was only too well founded. Seeing that all my suggestions remained unheeded, I made a final

attempt to warn the Allied Governments in a memorandum dated January 1, 1915, which I presented to the French and Russian ambassadors. In it I said in substance: "All roads lead to Rome. But the road to a sure and speedy victory for the Allies leads through Sofia. Reconstruct the Balkan League; or at least do everything in your power to prevent Bulgaria from attacking Serbia." For fully two months I laboured with the French and Russians in Rome to convince them that this war involved Russia's very existence, that Austria-Hungary was not fighting a defensive war but a war of conquest. My pleading was in vain. Seeing that the leading statesmen did not realize the danger which threatened them, I started, broken-hearted, for America. Here I emphasized even more the danger that was threatening the Allied cause.

In the summer of 1915 I foretold the absolute annihilation of Serbia; but to my great sorrow my pet idea of the necessity of reconstructing the Balkan League to protect Serbia was never seriously considered by the Allied Powers. I started with new plans, when I saw that all my entreaties were in vain. I regarded all through 1915 and 1916 the recognition of the independence of Poland as an essential protective measure for Russia and the Allies, pointing out to the Allied diplomats that the granting of independence to Poland would reconcile immediately the Austrian Poles, the fiercest

opponents of Russia, to the Allied cause. The Poles in conjunction with the Jugoslavs and the Czecho-Slovaks would have brought about the destruction of the Dual Monarchy at an early date. Seeing that this also was in vain, I tried to impress upon the Allies the urgent necessity of giving at once binding promises for the liberation of all Slavs, which measure would have led all the Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary at once to give full support to the Allies. Nothing, however, was done until it was too late; that is, until Serbia and Russia were "bled white."

CHAPTER XIV

MOBILIZING HALF A MILLION MEN IN AMERICA

HOW THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN CONSULATES SECRETLY RAISED AN ARMY BEHIND AMERICA'S BACK

AMERICANS are familiar with the intrigues of German and Austrian agents in the United States after the outbreak of the World War. The activities of Count Von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador; Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador; Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, revealed the widespread organization of Teutonic propaganda in America. What is not so well known is the extent of the preparations made by the German and Austrian authorities in the years before the outbreak of the war to mobilize German and Austro-Hungarian subjects in the United States.

During the First Balkan War in 1912 certain mysterious telegrams began to arrive at the offices of the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives in the United States. In these telegrams detailed instructions were given concerning the steps to be taken for the mobilization of the great army of German and Austrian reservists living in the United States.

Austria alone had, according to the latest United States census, nearly two million subjects in the United States of America, not to mention the tens of thousands that had gone to Canada in recent years. In the year 1907 some three hundred and forty thousand subjects of Francis Joseph came to the shores of America. For the quick and effective mobilization of these men, great care and minute planning was necessary. Arrangements had to be made for the concentration of the men scattered throughout the country at certain designated centres; for bringing them by the quickest and cheapest routes to the Atlantic seaports; and, finally, for their transportation to their home ports.

During the First Balkan War, the first orders were given to all the Austro-Hungarian foreign representatives to arrange with care lists of all the reservists known to reside in the different districts of the consulates. These orders were repeated and elaborated during the Second Balkan War, which had taken such an unforeseen and unfavourable turn in spite of the high expectations of Austrian diplomacy.

It must be noted here that it is the duty of every man who has served in the Austrian army to report to the Consul twenty-four hours after each change of domicile, his new address. It is therefore an easy matter to keep track of all military men even in a country where people are not forced to inform the police where they live.

Orders were given by the Ministry of War carefully to classify the men, in alphabetical order, into groups according to the year in which they were recruited. Furthermore, to separate the *Linien* troops from the *Landwehr* and these two classes from the *Landsturm*. After all this work had been completed and the lists thereof sent in—and this was done regularly—the foreign representatives of Austria-Hungary had to figure out carefully the expense of bringing each man and each small group of men from their widely separated places of work—some being in the backwoods of Oregon, others in the mines of Arizona or Nevada, others in Alaska, still others in Louisiana or Florida, and so on—to the nearest concentration points, where they were to be placed under the command of the highest ranking officer.

In these figures had to be included the double pay (*Kriegsloehnung*) which the soldier was to receive from the time of mobilization for the entire trip from the place of work of each reservist to the first rallying centre; from there to New York as the chief rallying centre for most of the mobilized men; from New York to Trieste or Fiume, the two chief ports of Austria and Hungary respectively, and from these two points to the outfitting places of each man, designated in the military passports. It was even contemplated—this for the cases where suitable persons were not available to take command of the various detachments gathered on the first

mobilization order in the most important rallying centres of America—that special men should be sent out from the different consulates to such places to bring the men safely to New York. If necessary, officers of the various consulates were to be dispatched for this purpose. The figures thus calculated for each district separately had to be sent to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Washington and from there to the Foreign Office in Vienna, to be in turn again transmitted to the Minister of War or the Minister for National Defence. Naturally all this was done with the greatest secrecy; all orders of this kind were given as “strictly reserved” (*Streng Reservat*).

In addition to these preliminary matters, arrangements were made for the printing and distribution of “mobilization proclamations” which were to be sent to each reservist. The mobilization orders were printed by the Ministry of War in Vienna in its own secret printing shop and sent through the channels of the Foreign Office in Vienna and the Embassy in Washington by special courier to avoid their being opened and recognized by the United States Customs officials. Once in Washington the mobilization proclamations were distributed to the various offices by express. These proclamations were accompanied by strict orders to keep them secret and were placed by the consular officials in safe-deposit vaults. These documents were printed not only in German and Magyar, but also in the

nine other languages that are spoken in Austria-Hungary and were delivered to us in 1912.

Each consulate was, moreover, given minute instructions concerning the distribution of these proclamations and other details connected with the anticipated mobilization. Hundreds of thousands of envelopes had to be addressed in a few days; hundreds of thousands of mobilization orders had to be provided with names and addresses, the various data of mobilization, and other necessary information such as the routes to be taken to the points of assembly. Furthermore, tickets had to be obtained from the various railroad offices to be sent to the men with the mobilization orders as it was not considered safe to send money to the reservists; and money or express orders had to be arranged for each man, providing him with the necessary means of sustenance for the trip.

The plan for the division of work required for carrying out the mobilization orders in the shortest time possible was worked out by the Consulate General of Chicago and the Consulate of Cleveland and was then, by order of the Embassy in Washington, adopted by all the consulates in the United States. The plan provided, in the greatest detail, for making the work of mobilization strictly mechanical and efficient; even the most petty regulations were made concerning the distribution of work among the clerks; what was to be undertaken first; how long they were to work on one line of

orders and how long on another; which of the Consulate clerks should write the envelopes; who should fill out the mobilization orders; how the various officials were to relieve one another in the mobilization work to avoid exhaustion through too much over-work.

Besides these military measures, precautions were taken by the Austro-Hungarian foreign representatives in America to prevent the outbreak of revolution in Austria-Hungary, when war should be declared. While the Austro-Hungarian Government rejoiced over the steady current of gold that was flowing from foreign countries, especially from America, to Austria-Hungary, in the form of the savings of the emigrants, it was in deadly fear of the golden current of free thought and ideas of political liberty which also poured from the great American Republic into old aristocratic Austria-Hungary. The oppressed races, especially the Slavs, which came to the shores of a free country like America, wanted to help their brethren at home to free themselves from political bondage. To keep the truth from the people at home, where the press was under the control of the Government censors, both Austria and Hungary deemed it necessary to establish a cordon guarding the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the contagion of the free thought of America.

An order was issued by Count Berchtold, two years before the outbreak of the World War, to

all Austro-Hungarian representatives in America to prepare "black lists" of all the Slav newspapers issued in foreign countries, with a proper classification of "Anti-Austrian," "Anti-Hungarian," or "Anti-Monarchical." In these black lists the consuls were required to make careful mention, not only of the political opinions which each paper professed, but also those of its editor. This paternal care went so far that the Viennese and Budapest governments wanted to be minutely informed as to where the editor was born, where his relatives were living, with whom he had connections at home, and when he expected to make a trip to Austria-Hungary to visit his relatives. These black lists were from time to time revised so as to be always up to date. Special reports about the movements of editors had also to be made to the Foreign Office at Vienna.

As a second and more drastic measure a black list of all the Southern Slav patriots and sympathizers in the United States had to be prepared, in which special care was to be taken to indicate the political opinions of the black-listed men, with the names of all their relatives in Austria-Hungary and where they lived. Also for these black-listed persons the consuls had to give exact data for every voyage such persons proposed to make to Europe. Thirdly, the Foreign Office ordered its representatives to attach to the lists photographs of the men listed.

Nearly all the newspapers, with the exception

of those subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian Government, were entered on the black lists, thus losing the right of entry into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Furthermore, the most prominent men among the Jugoslavs, despite the fact that they had long ceased to be citizens of Austria-Hungary, had their names and photographs placed in the Criminal Album of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

I steadily refused to put a single man in my consular district, which comprised all the territory west of the Rocky Mountains as well as Alaska, on the black lists. So far as I know all the other consuls complied with the order. As soon as war against Serbia was declared, these lists were taken from the secret vaults and all the persons listed who were in Austria or Hungary were put into prison. As a result, numerous citizens of the United States, former subjects of Francis Joseph, who at the outbreak of the war were visiting the country of their birth, were arrested by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and were released only after the most strenuous protests of the American Embassy in Vienna.

No person who knew, as I did, of these detailed preparations for war which were made during the year 1912, could fail to be convinced of the deliberate purpose of the Austrian and German authorities to precipitate a great world cataclysm.

CHAPTER XV

THE UNITED STATES OF SLAVIA

A PREREQUISITE FOR A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

“I now most earnestly hope to see a genuine republican Russia, a democratic Russia, the United States of Russia, a democratic Federal Republic of Russia come out of the present chaos. The motto must be Justice for all and an abhorrence of class tyranny of every kind.”—Theodore Roosevelt’s last message to Russia, December 12, 1918.

IN THE Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Central Empires realized their fondest dream: the conquest and partition of Russia. The subjugation of the whole Slav race had become a fact. Great was the outcry throughout the world, and especially among Russia’s Allies, against this ruthless crime.

But having ultimately overthrown on the battlefield the military might of the Central Empires—and to this overthrow Russia and the Slavs contributed half of the blood—have not the Allies revoked the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk? True, but with what results? Has not one of the Allies—Japan—occupied half of Siberia, and geologically the richest part of it? And have not Russia’s for-

mer Allies been guilty of shutting her off from all approaches to the sea, "to let her dream out her existence as an inland empire," as was Germany's desire? In other words, whether consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, the Allies in effect have sanctioned and perpetuated the Germanic blockade of Russia which during the war had been so much more effective than the Allied blockade of Germany.

But by shutting off Russia from all approaches to the sea, and by erecting on the ruins of old Russia a series of small states with arbitrary frontiers, can peace be established in the East permanently or even for a number of years? If Russia is Balkanized, will the Russian and Balkan Slavs be able to play their historic rôle in the future: namely, that of shielding the Western nations and Western civilization from the inroads of Asiatic conquerors? Will they not rather be helpless!

Where, then, lies the solution of the greatest problem the white race, and with it the whole of mankind, was ever confronted with; namely, to prevent the Balkanization of Europe, and a future world conflagration.

The solution lies in a United States of Europe. Its main basis must be found in the recognition of the principle of the equality of the three main races which people Europe: Latins, Germans, and Slavs. The beginning of this United States of Europe should be a United States of Slavia, to

extinguish in the East the very sparks of a future world war, and to erect instead a bulwark of Christianity and Western civilization. This federation should serve as the connecting link between the Orient and Occident; the safe blending ground of European and Asiatic peoples and civilizations. Once the United States of Slavia, comprising all Slav peoples, and embracing in its membership, with equal rights, numerous Semitic and Mongol peoples who are inextricably linked with them, is firmly established, Europe will at last be in a position to frame the Constitution of the United States of Europe.

If the Western nations: Germany, France, Italy, and above all Great Britain, sincerely desire the peace of Europe and the world, they will wholeheartedly support the project for a United States of Slavia as a basis for a United States of Europe.

To advance the idea of a United States of Slavia in Europe is no longer premature. The supreme moment of history to which all Slav nations have for centuries been looking forward as the hour of their liberation has, through the victory of the Allied nations, at last arrived. To-day the Slav is free, whatever his particular name or nation may be; he brings forth new ideas, new philosophy, new views of the world; and the world is taking gradually increasing interest in everything opening new horizons to Slav national life.

In the foreground of all the modern tendencies

of the various Slav peoples stands one which is almost as old as the Slav race itself, namely, the tendency to unite not only culturally, but also politically into one big federated state. That which for centuries has seemed a Utopia is to-day rapidly approaching the realm of practical politics.

It is a matter of common knowledge that, up to the time of the World War, to the American public in general "Slavs" were a type of working people coming from somewhere in Hungary or southern Europe. Later, the American press identified Slavs with Russians and used the terms interchangeably, usually speaking of them as "the hosts of the Czar." But as the war advanced the American public gradually came to realize that Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, etc., form part of the great Slav race. As a matter of fact, the Slav race is itself a branch of the Indo-Aryan race, and consists of three main groups: the Western, the Eastern, and the Southern Slavs. The Western Slavs include Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, and the Slavs in Germany (i.e., the Serbs of Upper and Lower Lusatia and the Cassoubs and Slovince or Wends in West Prussia and Pomerania). The Eastern Slavs are the Russians whose southern branch goes by the name of the Ukrainians in the Ukraine, of Ruthenes in Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. Finally the Southern or Jugoslavs (Jug meaning south in the Slav language) include the Bulgars, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Each of these various Slav nations has its partic-

ular language, which, however, is of one common Slav origin, so that wherever the Slavs meet they can understand one another. There are differences in idioms and vernaculars which make, for instance, Bulgarian differ from Slovene, etc. But it may safely be asserted in at least a general way that within a few decades the only recognized Slav languages, of the educated classes, will be Russian, Polish, Yugoslav, and Czecho-Slovak. A congress of Slav scientists, merchants, industrialists, statesmen, and publicists should be held in the near future to plan ways and means for the introduction of a common language for all the Slav peoples. Each Slav nationality should be represented by the same number of delegates at such a congress, and the common language should be adopted solely with a view to the interests of the whole Slav race.

The Slavs greatly surpass other European races in numbers. According to the figures of Professor Niederle, which are somewhat unfavourable to the Slavs, there were 136,500,000 Slavs in 1900, while in 1916 their number was estimated by Professor Masaryk at 156,700,000. In 1900, the Russians were put at 94,000,000, and the other Slavs at 42,000,000. The Russians, therefore, were more than twice as numerous as all the other Slav peoples together. Interspersed among the Slavs are smaller or greater groups of many other peoples of Semitic or Mongolian origin, forming with the

Slavs one national unit and bound to disappear in time into the great Slav sea which stretches from middle Europe far into Asia, and to the distant shores of the Pacific Ocean. Inevitably then the Slav race will tend to surpass the western Europeans in numbers and importance.

In one of its main aspects the World War was fought for the political and economic liberation of the Slavs, and it was left to America to speak the final word and do the final deeds in the great world cataclysm. The war itself, from a political standpoint, was first a consequence of the long delay of the Great Powers of Europe, in liberating the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke; and, secondly, a consequence of the unwillingness of the Entente Powers to permit the Balkan Slavs to fall again under the domination of the Central Empires. Furthermore, the Czecho-Slovaks of Austria-Hungary, in the very heart of Europe, had to be liberated from the German-Magyar yoke. And finally, the crime of the iniquitous partition of Poland—by which a nation that once was the pride of Europe, the cradle of human rights, was held in bondage—cried out for undoing.

Owing to the errors of European statesmen—committed especially by Germany and Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, and at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, which with all their fatal consequences led to this war—all the Slav nations, not even the Russians excepted, were gradually

being again enslaved by the Pan-German-Magyar-Turkish *bloc*.

It was particularly President Wilson who seemed to realize that only the liberation of the Slavs from German-Magyar-Turkish slavery, in whatever form it existed, could bring a lasting peace to the world. Finally, all the belligerent nations of the Allies came to realize that only through the liberation of the Slavs could world peace be had. They saw that, otherwise, Europe would be a slumbering volcano ready to burst forth again at any moment and bury under the melting lava of its passions all the nations of Europe, thus disrupting the world even more tragically than did even the World War.

Consequently, toward the close of the war, the Allies centred their efforts to a great extent on the annihilation of the German-Magyar-Turkish supremacy over the Slavs with the result that new Slav states, to wit: Czecho-Slovak, Jugoslav, Bulgarian, Polish, and Russian, arose to new national life from the ruins of the short-lived Mittel-Europa. As yet, these states are not stable; their frontiers have not been drawn, and some time must probably elapse before this can be successfully accomplished. Even more human blood may have to be shed before this can be achieved at all. With all this, other great problems have appeared on the troubled world horizon, like that of Russian bolshevism, the Jugoslav-

Italian dispute, etc. While keeping all this in view, farsighted Americans should familiarize themselves with one great aim which the Slavs regard as the logical conclusion of all their historical and political traditions; namely, the establishment of a great Slav federation resembling that of the United States, which would insure their rights of nationality, language, economic independence, and, above all, their lasting freedom.

There being in Europe only 70,000,000 Germans, 45,000,000 English, less than 40,000,000 French, 25,000,000 Spaniards, and 33,000,000 Italians, as against some 220,000,000 Slavs and other peoples inseparably associated with them, it is not in the least astonishing that a certain belief in the so-called Pan-Slav peril has arisen among the western European peoples. Still, these apprehensions lack justification for the simple reason that the philosophy and religion of the Slavs are widely different from those of Western civilization; and that the Slavs in general are a war-hating and peace-loving people. Their uniting in one great federation would help to stabilize the peace of the world instead of endangering it.

The economic advantage arising for America out of such a solution of the complex and ever-menacing European problem cannot be too much emphasized. American industry and trade would immensely profit as the newly created Slav federation would be eager to conclude the most advan-

tageous commercial treaties with her American sister republic in order to throw off the German economic and political yoke. America, by thus aiding the Slavs to secure permanent freedom, would win for herself permanent access to their immense European and Asiatic markets; would become their teacher and guide in the upbuilding of new industries in the Slav countries; in the developing of the limitless natural resources of the Caucasus, the Ural, and the Altai regions of eastern Siberia, the Amur region, and the Maritime Province, etc., as well as of the Balkans and Poland. America would thus have opportunity to direct the development of the immense deposits of coal, iron, and gold, and the boundless wheat-growing plains of the Slav countries. There are about eight million Slavs in America from whose ranks the necessary commercial, industrial, and political agents could be recruited. No country ever had the opportunity to start such vast and widely embracing commercial and industrial activities as America has to-day among the Slav nations of Europe.

The Americans of Slav origin will with enthusiasm support American development of Slav countries, thus aiding to establish a mutually helpful relationship between a great Slav federation and the great American federation. The American Slav is fond of saying that "Slavia is his sister, but America his adopted mother."

On many historical occasions, in meetings, in the press, and in national conventions—one of the foremost of which was held during the All-Slav Exposition, in Prague, in 1848—the Slavs have pledged themselves to help and to promote the idea of the independence of each of the Slav nations, and of the Slavs in general. To-day, the Slavs of Europe are planning a federation of Slav nations, not for the waging of future wars of vengeance, but for the preservation of their own and the world's peace.

To-day, more than ever, the Slavs are profoundly convinced that only unity can save them from destruction; and unity means federation. This federation must begin with a federation of the Western Slavs and another of the Southern Slavs, with complete independence of all the member nations in their internal affairs. To these two federations should be added a federation of Eastern Slavs, i.e., of those states which have arisen in place of the former Russian Empire. For both Western Slavs (the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles) and the Jugoslavs (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgars), are convinced that even if so united they will still need further support. This support can best be found in a union or confederation of all Slavs, that is in a union of the Western and Southern Slav federations with the Eastern Slavs, i.e., with Russia. Therefore, what the Slavs are striving for is, in the last analysis, the creation of a United States of Slavia on the basis of the Swiss Federation,

or the federation of the United States of America, with each constituent state free to adopt its own form of government.

To exclude Russia, Serbia, or Bulgaria from such a federation because of past differences would be, to say the least, very unwise. By such confederation the immense eastern and southern Slav markets would be thrown open to all the Slav nations, would quickly enrich them, and heal the terrible wounds inflicted upon them all by the war.

All the hatreds of past centuries ever provoked and nourished by Austro-German intrigues will melt before the warmth of the sun of freedom. Hatred is a bad adviser in diplomacy. Hate never wins the sympathy or support of humanity. The Balkan Slavs, for instance, had the sympathy of America in their war of liberation from the Turkish yoke, but they lost it as soon as they began to fight among themselves.

On January 3, 1919, President Wilson delivered in Rome a very remarkable speech in which he said: "The great difficulty among such states as those of the Balkans has been that they were always accessible to secret influence; that they were being penetrated by intrigue of some sort or another; that north of them lay disturbed populations which were held together not by sympathy and friendship, but by the coercive force of a military power.

"There is only one thing that holds nations to-

gether, if you exclude force, and that is friendship and good will. The only thing that binds men together is friendship, and by the same token the only thing that binds nations together is friendship."

This that was said of the Balkan Slavs may be said of all the Slavs. The German-Magyar-Turkish *bloc*, which so long held under its supremacy and exploited the Slav race, spread a net of intrigue throughout the great Slav world, inciting one Slav people against another, thus artificially breaking them up into quarrelling fragments. Austria-Hungary maintained her precarious existence only by the ruthless application of the famous unofficial state maxim of the Hapsburgs: "*Divide et impera.*" The only remedy which can heal all the wrongs created by past intrigue is mutual sympathy, friendship, and justice. But these ideas are not new; they are, in fact, traditional among the Slavs. That an American president, as leader of the great American nation, has endorsed them is but a proof that the American and Slav souls are to-day vibrating with the same passion, the same deep desire for friendship, sympathy, and justice among the nations.

In the great work "Slavdom," published in Prague by a score of prominent Slav public men, Dr. K. Kramarz, the founder of the new Slav movement, Neo-Slavism, while most warmly defending the Poles against the Russification inaugurated by the Czar's Government, says: "The

Slavs do not intend to live for the conquest of or by the oppression of non-Slav nations; the more so then must we exclude the idea that any Slav nation should prosper at the expense of other Slav peoples or by making an unfair use of its political, cultural, or economic superiority. *Suum cuique* must be the first law of the Slav world."

Justice, sympathy, and friendship among themselves must therefore be the chief aim of the Slavs. As to their internal affairs, or interrelations, it is the unanimous opinion of the defenders of the new Slav idea of unity that each Slav nation has the right to govern herself; that she has the inalienable right to liberty of conscience, that is, religious liberty; liberty for her own language, that is liberty in education, in speech, of the press; and liberty of administration in all her internal affairs. This Slav federation would oppose vigorously any attempt, for instance, at the Russification of the Poles, or Polonization of the Czecho-Slovaks, or vice versa, just as the Slavs have in the past opposed all attempts at the Germanizing of their kinsmen. To express it differently: the place of every Slav nation inside this great Slav family would be that of "A daughter in her mother's house, a mistress in her own." This formula will insure to each Slav nation its distinct nationality and language and the right to its existence as a separate nation, until time and circumstances shall merge them in one organic whole.

But the scarecrow of Russification is buried forever, because it was the Germans, and particularly the German Kaiser, who influenced the Czar and persuaded him to use oppressive methods against the Poles.

In an exactly similar way must be viewed the national problems of the Balkan Slavs. There must be no Bulgarizing of Serbs, or Serbization of the Bulgars. No Slav nation should be permitted to force its nationality or language on any other. All enlightened Slav leaders must realize that only if they hold firmly together on grounds of justice and tolerance can they be successful in dealing with friends or foes. If they come in single file before the forum of the world they will make little impression. If, on the other hand, they march on to the scene in an unbroken phalanx, they are bound not only to make an impression, but to score a success.

The Slavs must realize that "United we stand, divided we fall." Further, the Slavs must say to the world: "All for one and one for all." They must say aloud and in no uncertain terms that there can be no peace in the world until the Slavs, all of them, are liberated. They must make the world realize the meaning of the famous *mot* of Joseph de Maistre: "Bury a Slav aspiration, a Slav idea, under a fortress and that fortress will blow up." But their unification is the *sine qua non* to make the diplomats and the nations of the world respect them and prevent them from committing the blunder of

dividing any Slav nation or putting it under a foreign yoke.

The common affairs of the Slav Federation should comprise the army and navy, the customs service and diplomacy. Everything else should be managed by the various states composing the Union, in accordance with their local customs and desires. The common affairs must serve as a shield of protection against external enemies, and should repose in firm hands.

The Slav Union, by adopting the principle of nationality, may do away with national disputes and leave no ground for friction. Where there is a majority of a given nationality in a given territory, the inhabitants of that particular community should be entitled to national schools, thus protecting their rights as a distinct national group.

The only definition of the term "Slav" should be the speaking of a Slav tongue. Any other definition will fail to win the support of the Slavs, as it would fail to win the support of any modern nation. No nation, speaking a Slav language, be it Bulgarian, Russian, or Polish, may be excluded.

THE TRANSITION AND THE DEFINITE PERIOD

In uniting the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgars in the Yugoslav Federation; the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles into the Western Slav Federation, and all the Russians in the Eastern Slav

Federation, there will of necessity be two periods through which the state-forming process will have to pass. The first, the period of transition: during which Poles must be governed by Poles, Czechs by Czechs, Slovaks by Slovaks, Slovenes by Slovenes, Croats by Croats, Serbs by Serbs, Bulgars by Bulgars, and Russians by Russians, while there will be as many languages. This first period may last for one or two generations.

When the second period arrives all the smaller Slav nationalities will have melted into one nation, which by mutual agreement among enlightened leaders will have been welded together by the use of a common literary language.

There should be complete liberty of creed in all component states of the United States of Slavia; a strict separation of Church from State; above all, no such thing as religious control, or supremacy, should ever be permitted; such, for instance, as making Poland an exclusively Catholic state.

No such a thing as a Catholic Slav nation does or can exist. Even Poland is not Catholic, because she has among her population a great number of adherents of other creeds. Poland, in her greatest period, when she was admired by everybody and by all nations of the world, stood for complete religious liberty. In the Czech and Slovak lands the people are more divided as to religion, but they consider themselves as absolutely united in spite of religious differences.

As for the Southern Slavs, they are composed of the Orthodox, Catholics, Mohammedans, and Jews. Absolutely no distinction can be made between the people because of their espousal of any one of these religions. The Jews in Serbia have fought valiantly on the side of the Serbian Orthodox people, and have shown themselves worthy of the complete confidence which the Serbian Government wisely confided in them. The Jugoslavs must and will always condemn the former Austrian Government for creating animosities in the Southern Slav countries, especially in Bosnia, by instigating religious hatreds, by instituting in Bosnia a constitution based on religious differences, so that the local Parliament in Sarajevo was even elected on religious lines. The Jugoslavs discarded the idea of religious intolerance a long time ago, as they recognized in it a treacherous weapon of the Austrian Government deliberately devised to hold them in slavery.

The capital of the United States of Slavia should be erected wherever in the view of the joint delegates it will best suit the common interests of the several states. Whether this be in Moscow, Kieff, Yalta, or Cracow, is quite immaterial. The federal capital of the Balkan Slavs should be similarly located. If necessary, a new city should be built, so situated as to meet the needs of the various peoples comprising the union. Also the capital of the Western Slav Federation should be located in

one of the smaller towns on the Polish-Slovak frontier rather than in a big city. Experience has shown that great industrial and commercial centres are not a fit environment for quiet legislative and administrative work.

While the Slavs are passing through the chaotic and possibly even turbulent and bloody period of transition from the old hopeless thralldom which they have so long suffered into this stable, peaceful, and contented condition they must ask their European and American friends to be patient with them and to remember that all the great, free states have had to grope their way upward from confusion and turbulence. Let them remember also that the Slav ideals are their ideals, and that as they achieved their aims so the Slavs shall achieve theirs, provided they are aided and not thwarted or neglected by the older and more powerful nations with whom they have fought in a victorious war against the would-be oppressors and exploiters of all mankind.



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE

Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.

March 29, 1919.

Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.

Annex II.—Memorandum of Reservations by the Representatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission, April 4, 1919.

(Signed)

ROBERT LANSING

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

“The conclusions reached by the Commission as to the responsibility of the authors of the war, with which the representatives of the United States agree, are thus stated:

“The war was premeditated by the Central Powers, together with their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.

“Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many con-

* Since this book was written the ultimate confirmation of some of our fundamental contentions, contained in these extracts from this report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, etc., has been made public. THE AUTHORS.

ciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.

“The American representatives are happy to declare that they not only concur in these conclusions, but also in the process of reasoning by which they are reached and justified. However, in addition to the evidence adduced by the Commission, based for the most part upon official memoranda issued by the various governments in justification of their respective attitudes toward the Serbian question and the war which resulted because of the deliberate determination of Austria-Hungary and Germany to crush that gallant little country which blocked the way to the Dardanelles and to the realization of their larger ambitions, the American representatives call attention to four documents, three of which have been made known by His Excellency Milenko R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris. Of the three, the first is reproduced for the first time, and two of the others were only published during the sessions of the Commission.

“The first of these documents is a report of Von Wiesner, the Austro-Hungarian agent sent to Sarajevo to investigate the assassination at that place on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and the Duchess of Hohenberg, his morganatic wife.

“The material portion of this report, in the form of a telegram, is as follows:

Herr von Wiesner, to the Foreign Ministry, Vienna.

Sarajevo, July 13, 1914, 1.10 p.m.

Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying

the weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected.*

“The second is likewise a telegram, dated Berlin, July 25, 1914, from Count Szoegyeny-Marich, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, and reads as follows:

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations.

Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other Powers.

We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a *fait accompli*.†

“The third, likewise a telegram in cipher, marked *strictly confidential*, and dated Berlin, July 27, 1914, two days after the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum and the day before the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war upon that devoted kingdom, was from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna. The material portion of this document is as follows:

The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for

*Herr v. Wiesner an Ministerium des Aeussern in Wien.

Sarajewo, 13. Juli 1914, 1.10 p.m.

Mitwischenschaft serbischer Regierung, Leitung an Attentat oder dessen Vorbereitung und Beschaffung der Waffen, durch nichts erwiesen oder auch nur zu vermuten. Es besteht vielmehr Anhaltspunkte, dies als ausgeschlossen anzusehen.

†Graf Szoegyeny an Minister des Aeussern in Wien.

Berlin, 25. Juli 1914.

(285)

Hier wird allgemein vorausgesetzt, dass auf eventuelle abweisende Antwort Serbiens sofort unsere Kriegserklärung verbunden mit kriegseröffnenden Operationen erfolgen würde.

Man sieht hier in jeder Verzögerung des Beginnes der kriegseröffnenden Operationen grosse Gefahr betreffs Finitimehung anderer Mächte.

Man rät uns dringendst sofort vorzugehen und die Welt von einseitigem *fait accompli* zu stellen.

mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excellency's knowledge by the German Government.

The German Government gives its most binding assurance that *it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals*: on the contrary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration and only transmits them in compliance with the English request.*

“Of the English propositions, to which reference is made in the above telegram, the following may be quoted, which, under date July 30, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin:

If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately.†

“While comment upon these telegrams would only tend to weaken their force and effect, it may nevertheless be observed that the last of them was dated two days before the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, which might have been prevented had not Germany, flushed with the hope of certain victory and of the fruits of conquest, determined to force the war.”

**Graf Szoegyeny an Ministerium des Aeussern in Wien.*

(307, Streng vertraulich.)

Berlin, 27. Juli 1914.

Staatssekretär erklärte mir in streng vertraulicher Form sehr entschieden, dass in der nächsten Zeit eventuelle Vermittlungsvorschläge Englands durch die deutsche Regierung zur Kenntnis Euer Exc. gebracht würden.

Die deutsche Regierung versichere auf das Bündigste, *dass sie sich in keiner Weise mit den Vorschlägen identifiziere*, sogar entschieden gegen deren Berücksichtigung sei, und dieselben nur, um der englischen Bitte Rechnung zu tragen, weitergebe.

†British Parliamentary Papers, “Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915),” “Collected Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War,” p. 78.

BERLIN WANTED WAR ON SERBIA, BERCHTOLD TOLD

RESENTS CRITICISM AND INSISTS GERMAN ENVOY IN-
TIMATED MILITARY ACTION WAS SOUGHT

BY KARL H. VON WIEGAND

Herald and Examiner Staff Correspondent

BERLIN, Oct. 8, 1919.—I have just received an important telegram from Count Von Berchtold who, as Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, formulated and sent the ultimatum to Serbia which brought about the World War.

The Count, who is in Berne, Switzerland, answers a message from me in which I asked him four questions touching on as many vital points raised against him in the revelation of the secret records of the Vienna Foreign Office and the accompanying commentaries by the compiler of the recent Red Book, Doctor Gooss.

In these disclosures Berchtold was represented more or less as the alleged arch-conspirator that forced the great war. The former Austrian Foreign Minister now informs me in his telegram that he was led to believe that Berlin wanted military action against Serbia and that he feared Germany would drop Austria as an ally if the latter did not take aggressive action.

ADMITS ALTERING RECORDS

He admits having made alterations in the records and gives his reasons therefor. He states he advised

Berlin in time of the contents of the ultimatum to Serbia.

I was with Count Von Berchtold in the fourth Isonzo battle near Gorizia, where he served as a cavalry captain attached to the staff of General Wurm as a dispatch courier. I also knew him in Vienna. I, therefore, telegraphed him asking whether he could give answers to the following four questions:

1. Why he had made alterations in the original drafts of records of cabinet meetings in Vienna.

2. Whether the German Ambassador at Vienna, Von Tschirschky, had given him the impression that Berlin wanted war with Serbia.

3. Whether it was true that he had not given Von Tschirschky the textual contents of the ultimatum to Serbia.

4. Whether it was true that he had not given Berlin any answer to Sir Edward [now Viscount] Grey's last proposal for mediation which was forwarded to the Austrian Government by Berlin.

Here is the Count's telegram to me in answer to these questions:

Wiegand, Berlin.

The following is in answer to your questions. I am making an exception to meet your special wishes:

1—The subsequent changes and corrections in the protocol drafts were made because the recorder, not being a stenographer, made notes in longhand, but not verbatim. As a result of this incorrect versions occurred, even whole passages being omitted. This made necessary the subsequent corrections and supplementary notes.

2—Repeated conversations and interviews I had with Ambassador Von Tschirschky could create no other impression than that his [the German] Government expected warlike action on our part

against Serbia. Especially a conversation I had with him during the early half of July convinced me that if we did not show this time that we were in earnest, then on the next occasion Berlin not only would not support us but would in fact "orient" itself in some other direction.

What that would have meant for us, in view of the ethnographic composition of the Dual Monarchy and the territorial aspirations of our neighbour states need not be explained.

3—Tschirschky was informed about the material points in the ultimatum to Serbia before the final editing of the note, and the textual contents were given to him two days before the Belgrade *demarche*.

4—We accepted, in principle, Grey's last mediation proposal, with two reservations which the military [advisers] found necessary. In view of vital national interests of the Dual Monarchy being involved therein, this acceptance signified a great sacrifice for us, as in mediation even an ally must be calculated upon as a possible opponent.

The delay in answering Grey's proposal was due to the fact that the answer was not determined by us until July 30th, and the ministerial council, as far as I recall, could not convene until the following day because of the absence of Tisza [Count Stephen Tisza, Hungarian Premier, later assassinated].

(Signed) BERCHTOLD.*

*From *Chicago Herald and Examiner*, October 10, 1910.

THE END



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