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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
(COMMUNIST DESIGNS ON INDONESIA AND
THE PACIFIC FRONTIER)



STAFF CONSULTATION WITH
GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY
FORMER CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EASTERN
COMMAND, UNDER GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION



DECEMBER 16, 1957
(INCLUDING INDEX)



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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Jan. 30, 1958

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RICHARD ARENS, *Staff Director*

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propagandist activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

SYNOPSIS

Communist encroachments in Indonesia, actively abetted by President Sukarno, now threaten the entire United States defense line in the Pacific, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby warned in a consultation with the staff of the Committee on Un-American Activities.

The current crisis in that area, General Willoughby charged, can be traced directly to Communist subversion in Washington which induced the United States Government to champion Sukarno in his efforts to "liberate" the former Dutch Republic, despite his previous role as one of Japan's chief wartime collaborators.

General Willoughby, former Chief of Intelligence in the Far East for Gen. Douglas MacArthur, declared that the Russian plans for conquest duplicate those of the Japanese in Southeast Asia in World War II. The Japanese at that time and the Russians today, he declared, were primarily concerned with—

(a) Control of strategic raw materials, such as oil, rubber, and tin.

(b) Driving a wedge to separate the West from Asia, i. e., control of the Malay Barrier in terms of control of sealanes from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea.

(c) The isolation of Australia as a corollary of the seizure of the Malay Barrier.

(d) Seizure of Dutch New Guinea and part of Australian Papua and reaching for the Moluccas.

"The United States fought the Pacific war precisely to stop Japanese expansion. Are they to capitulate to indirect infiltration by world communism, aiming at the same strategic targets, that is, control of the Malay Barrier?" he asked.

"In the face of brutal realities today, the decisions and actions of the United States and the United Nations in the critical period 1945-49 have demonstrated once more an appalling ignorance of facts, international prejudice, and political tendencies that played into the hands of the Soviet Union and paved the way for the Communist takeover of the Malay Barrier," General Willoughby continued.

"Most Americans were not aware that Washington was honeycombed with Communist cells and Communist agents, many of them in high places. They saw to it that the ultimate interests of global communism were served by diverting, suppressing, or supplanting public and governmental reports. Please bear in mind that this was 1947, the year of great betrayals from Peking to Madrid," General Willoughby declared.

General Willoughby stated that Sukarno had been one of Japan's leading collaborators during the war, and before that had been in close contact with Communist leaders in Indonesia.

During the war, he said, "the Japanese had to draw on special elements for their anti-Western propaganda and the elimination of Western influence. They found them in existing Communist factions,

their leaders and associates, which involved the nationalist independence movement, Sukarno, Hatta, Dr. Radjiman, Dewantoro, and others.

"These leaders promptly adopted the Japanese line. Their collaboration with the Japanese was complete. Sukarno promoted the delivery of 2 million Indonesians for work on the southern coast of Java, Papua, Borneo, Burma, and Siam, where they were treated as coolie slaves. In their public speeches, these people adopted Japanese slogans: 'Amerika kitta tarika—we shall flatten out America,' and 'Inggris kitta linggis—we shall overturn England.' Sukarno pressed for the internment of all Dutch nationals. Postwar interrogation of Japanese furnished the evidence.

"Nationalist leaders of substance were divided," General Willoughby continued; "some thought Japanese hegemony inevitable. Some secretly abhorred Japanese domination, particularly the democratic, Socialist, and Communist groups, and prepared for action by the time Japan would be beaten. The leading figure among them was Sukarno, who had come to the fore through his oratorical talent and was imprisoned in the 1930's for sedition. He was made general political adviser to the Japanese military government in Java and was joined as deputy by Mohammed Hatta, an alumnus of the economic faculty of Rotterdam.

"Before the war, Sukarno was in close touch with Communist leaders through the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) and neglected no opportunity to glorify the Soviet Union. In 1945, Sukarno telegraphed Stalin, congratulating him on cessation of hostilities and 'ultimate attainment of Russian aspirations.' At Madiun on November 6, 1949, Sukarno stated that 'Pesidino' (the youth section of Sjahrir's Socialist Party) were expected to put Marx' theories into practice. Speaking before a teachers congress at Solo, he repeated the same confession of faith."

General Willoughby stated: "The links with communism and the Kremlin are demonstrably present; indeed, the so-called nationalist movements contain elements of Communist agitation and guidance, in every known instance. Russia is exploiting the traditional American predilection for 'freedom' and 'anticolonialism' as a smokescreen for the Czarist-Communist colonial expansion from Tashkent to Mongolia. The 'nationalist' leaders are frequently Communist stooges or Socialists en route to Marxism.

"The Communist Party theoretical Monthly 'Political Affairs,' September 1947, laid down the official American Communist policy on Indonesia *one year before* a United Nations Commission headed by Mr. Graham, began to operate. The U. N. C. I. appeared to follow the 'Political Affairs' piece almost to the letter.

"Further 'coincidental' action is noted in boycott of the Australian waterfront federation of all Dutch shipping. The American National Maritime Union then urged its membership to vote for such a boycott.

"The local military leaders are worried over Sukarno's proposed 'administrative plans' that appear to them as sharply gravitating into the Soviet orbit.

"In this connection, the person of Mohammed Hatta seems to emerge in a new and favorable light. In spite of his Communist antecedents

(in the early phases of his career) Hatta has become distinctly lukewarm vis-a-vis Soviet blandishments and actually broke with Sukarno last year, because of the latter's growing pro-Soviet tendencies and rather clumsy attempts to maneuver the Communists into his Cabinet and the Government. This break must be regarded as a courageous and significant act.

"The United States has declared itself and has defined an ultimate Pacific defense line; the island chain running from South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines to New Guinea and Australia. Encroachments on this line, via the Sundas and Moluccas and aspirations for Dutch New Guinea (one of Sukarno's most active political items) are an obvious threat to Australia and the southern flank of the United States defense line.

"The weakening of this line is a prime Sino-Russian objective. It explains their war against Korea and the endless pressures to retrieve Formosa. If and when they dominate Indonesia and the Outer Islands, they are at grips with Australia and can start to roll up that defense line from the West. The situation and the thesis are more readily understood on maps that (a) show the Pacific defense lines; and (b) the southern flank of this line; that is, the significance of the Moluccas and New Guinea.

"Most recent press reports quote an American authority not to be taken lightly: Adm. Felix Stump, the commander in chief of the Pacific. Stump's views are substantially as follows:

"i. Subversion might get out of hand before (the United States) could do anything about it.

"ii. Indonesia has gone so far 'playing ball with the Reds' that the present government may not be able to turn back.

"iii. The Indonesian administration has relied heavily on its native Communist Party, has yielded to pressures and concluded trade agreements with several Communist countries.

"iv. The Indonesian Reds appear to have reached a point where they will demand to be paid off for past services.

"Indonesia is not a member of the SEATO defense organization. Hence, we could not interfere with any overt or covert 'Red aggressions.' The Soviets could and probably will obtain bases and ports in much the same surreptitious manner in which they obtained them in Syria. I maintain that the Russians are starting where the Japanese left off. They want control of the Malay Barrier to seal off southeast Asia and drive a wedge between our Pacific defense line, the Indian Ocean areas, and Eastern sealanes."

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

(Communist Designs on Indonesia and the Pacific Frontier)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1957

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

STAFF CONSULTATION

The following consultation with Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, United States Army, retired, was held with the staff of the Committee on Un-American Activities at 10 a. m. December 16, 1957, in the Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C., pursuant to the authorization of the Committee on Un-American Activities composed of:

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, *Chairman*

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri

CLYDE DOYLE, California

JAMES B. FRAZIER, JR., Tennessee

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana

BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York

DONALD L. JACKSON, California

GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio

ROBERT J. MCINTOSH, Michigan

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director (presiding); Richard S. Weil and William F. Heimlich, staff members.

Mr. ARENS. Pursuant to the policy of the Committee on Un-American Activities to assemble factual material from authoritative sources respecting international communism, we shall today take up the matter of Communist designs on Indonesia and the Pacific frontier.

We are privileged to welcome to the consultation a distinguished soldier and author, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, now retired, whose experience and outstanding military career in the service of this Nation are now a part of history. He is here at the request of Chairman Francis E. Walter.

**MAJ. GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, UNITED STATES ARMY
(RETIRED)**

Mr. ARENS. General Willoughby, for the purpose of this record, would you please sketch your background, beginning with your name and your present address?

General WILLOUGHBY. My name is Charles A. Willoughby, and I reside at 3602 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C. I was commissioned in the United States Army in 1915. I served on the Mexican border and in the First World War. I attended various service schools, including the Command and General Staff School and the War College. Throughout the Second World War and later, during the occupation of Japan and the Korean conflict, I was chief of intelligence on the staff of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. For more than a decade, therefore, I was in the Pacific and South Pacific areas. I returned home with General MacArthur and accepted retirement.

Mr. ARENS. As you know, General, the subject today centers on the Indonesian area. Would you please sketch for us at the outset the extent and quality of your sources of information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Since my retirement, I have had access to no intelligence reports. My present views are private and personal, based on long experience in the area and upon 40 years of training and deduction. Both political and military intelligence are largely a matter of files and indices. Our press services are good examples of intelligence, as witness recent articles on Indonesia in various newspapers and magazines. Evaluation and interpretation of data are, of course, a matter of experience in a particular field. As a linguist, I read essential French, Spanish, Italian, and German papers regularly, and it is astonishing how much they and the technical journals reveal. The magazine "Zeit," published in Hamburg, for instance, recently ran a minutely detailed article on how the Soviet Union abducted and employed German scientists in the rocket and missile field. I have here a brief bibliography of documentations and sources.¹ Finally, I specifically invite your attention to my years in the Pacific as chief of the information-gathering services, a position which brought me into intimate contact with people and events that are today the subject of inquiry.

Mr. ARENS. What current basic preparations have you made for your presentation today?

General WILLOUGHBY. The individuals whose reports I have digested for you are those whom I have known in peace and war. They are Adm. C. E. L. Helfrich, wartime commander in chief of the Netherlands East Indies Navy; Dr. Albert Hyma, of the University of Michigan; Maj. Gen. W. F. Spoor, of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, and who was attached to my office in the Allied Information Bureau during the war and conducted the successful police action against the Jakarta Republic in 1947; Hon. C. van der Plas, a high-ranking Javanese administrator; Dr. E. Van der Vlught, international lawyer and editor; Sir Viner Brooks, the Rajah of Sarawak,

¹ See appendix for Bibliography—Documentation and Sources, p. 37.

and numerous British, Dutch, and Australians of authority and long experience in southeast Asia. Incidentally, I divorce myself from any critical comments on our policies in those areas, since the Government probably has far more data at hand than I. I abstain from speculating on why United States and United Nations pursued certain policies in the Indonesian area in 1946-47, and you can draw your own conclusions from the facts.


Mr. ARENS. Have you filed your reports with United States authorities since your retirement?

General WILLOUGHBY. The eclipse of MacArthur affected his immediate staff—*sic transit gloria mundi*. They do not enjoy the confidence or favor of the Pentagon. They have not asked my views, and I assume that they do not want them. I have offered my services, and they were declined. However, I have written extensively for publication; books and magazine articles have appeared in *Readers Digest*, *Cosmopolitan*, *National Review*, and elsewhere. Some of these articles have found their way into the *Congressional Record*. My purpose, of course, was not capricious criticism, but an effort to offset the leftist trends in some quarters and the obviously calculated attempts to brainwash an uninformed public by certain tax-exempt foundations—sociological brood sows, suckling a weird assortment of leftists, Marxists, and pseudointellectuals.

Mr. ARENS. Would you characterize the significance of Indonesia in the global struggle between the forces of the West and of international communism?

General WILLOUGHBY. The term "significance" can best be defined in its relation to (a) the economy of natural resources and (b) the geopolitical value of the "Malay Barrier."

MALAY BARRIER



The wealth of natural resources of this area is well known: rubber, oil, tin, and bauxite. The Japanese General Staff understood this perfectly. Indonesia became one of its chief economic targets. The Japanese fleet, based on Singapore and Brunei was self-supporting as regards oil. Today, Soviet Russia, in its drive toward warm water ports and the Indian Ocean, will simply adopt the Japanese plans of conquest, though they may operate (as usual) through puppet governments. Conversely, at the beginning of World War II, the Allies were compelled to defend, retain, and control the strategic raw materials in the Indonesia area. The last line of defense was the so-called "Malay Barrier."

Mr. ARENS. What is the Malay Barrier?

General WILLOUGHBY. The term "Malay Barrier" originated in prewar British-American conferences. The Malay Barrier was defined as the "chain of peninsulas and islands between the Isthmus of Kraa and West Australia, comprising Malaya, Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, and Timor."

The Barrier had first-rate ports, airfields, good communications by road, rail, and sea. Then and now it could not be reached by land; it required a naval expedition. The fall of the Barrier would (and did) entail the fall of Singapore and expose India and Australia; in fact, the loss of the Barrier would split the Western World and force eventual allied advances (for reconquest) to base on the United States or Europe.

All allied prewar strategic planning, conferences and decisions, from Alfred Duff Cooper to Gen. Archibald Wavell, stressed the enormous significance of the Malay Barrier and decided on its defense. The fact that it was a case of "too late" and "not enough," does not diminish its strategic value, then or now.

If we substitute Japan (as of 1942) with China-Russia (as of 1957) the Barrier remains as important as ever and its potential loss, in wrong hands, remains a direct threat to Australia and the defense of the Western Pacific.

Like the Suez, the Malay Barrier is one of the great strategic areas of the world. In the wrong hands, it spells diplomatic problems and military danger for the West. Had it remained in Dutch hands, for the orderly, evolutionary transition from the Netherlands East Indies to a federation of native states (as planned), Indonesia could have remained firmly allied to the West. Today, it represents a power vacuum, probably to be filled by imperialist communism.

Mr. ARENS. What transpired in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation?

General WILLOUGHBY. During the period of occupation (1942-45), the Japanese planned and executed the deliberate destruction of every vestige of white dominion. The Dutch population was herded into concentration camps to endure every privation and indignity. The mass of simple Indonesians did not participate in this action. They had no real grievances against the Dutch. Lt. Gen. Reikichi Tada, Japanese Army, reported (1943) textually:

* * * The Dutch Colonial Administration has been able, to a high degree. The N. E. I. became self-supporting as regards rice. There was no trouble with food and housing. The natives lived happily under the Dutch, who cared for the Indonesian people remarkably well. Only 200,000 Dutch ably governed 60 million natives * * *.

The Japanese had to draw on special elements for their anti-Western propaganda and the elimination of Western influence. They found them in existing Communist factions, their leaders and associates, which involved the "nationalist independence movements," Sukarno, Hatta, Dr. Radjiman, Dewantoro, and others. These leaders promptly adopted the Japanese "line." Their collaboration with the Japanese was complete. Sukarno promoted the delivery of 2,000,000 Indonesians for work on the southern coast of Java, Papua, Borneo, Burma, and Siam, where they were treated as coolie slaves. In their public speeches, these people adopted Japanese slogans: "Amerika kitta tarika—we shall flatten out America" and "Inggris kitta linggis—we shall overturn England." Sukarno pressed for the internment of all Dutch nationals. Postwar interrogation of Japanese furnished the evidence.

* * * in 1942, the Japanese did not proceed to intern all Netherlands subjects.

* * * The Japanese Civil Service strongly urged the employment of Dutch officials. This development was a thorn in the flesh of leading Indonesian personages.

* * * Sukarno and Hatta were in close touch with Headquarters of the Japanese 16th Army. In a conversation with Major General Haiada, Sukarno said: (confirmed by separate report of the Chief of the Kempetal in Batavia)—

* * * You assured us that Dutch influence would be eliminated. Instead you are placing the Dutch in employment. I request you to intern the Dutch population as quickly as possible and repay them in their own coin for their tyrannical past record * * *.

Sukarno's ruthless hostility against the Dutch is the posture adopted by all Japanese collaborators, from Manila to Saigon, a play ostensibly to protect "national independence" from the Japanese conquerors. The ruse seemed to work. These political opportunists were actually supported by the West, in the postwar period. The "double standard" of the U. N. (so evident in the Hungarian uprising) also operated in the Far East: The "Quislings" in Europe were tried as war criminals; in the Far East, they became chief magistrates.

Mr. ARENS. What is your appraisal of the many so-called nationalist movements?

General WILLOUGHBY. The links with communism and the Kremlin are demonstrably present; indeed, the so-called "nationalist movements" contain elements of Communist agitation and guidance, in every known instance. Russia is exploiting the traditional American predilection for "freedom" and "anticolonialism" as a smoke screen for the Czarist-Communist colonial expansion from Tashkent to Mongolia. The "nationalist" leaders are frequently Communist stooges or socialists en route to Marxism.

Mr. ARENS. Is this the case in Indonesia?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, before the war, Sukarno was in close touch with Communist leaders through the P. N. I. (Partai Nasional Indonesia) and neglected no opportunity to glorify the Soviet Union. In 1945, Sukarno telegraphed Stalin, congratulating him on cessation of hostilities and "ultimate attainment of Russian aspirations." At Madiun on November 6, 1949, Sukarno stated that "Pesidino" (the youth section of Sjahrir's Socialist Party) were expected to put Marx's theories into practice. Speaking before a teachers congress at Solo, he repeated the same confession of faith.

Sukarno's associate Hatta, the vice president of the Jokja regime, was long before 1940, the leader of the "Perhimpunan Indonesia," a student movement organized along strict Communist lines. As far back as 1927, Hatta had been a delegate of the "International Congress of the Leagues for the Prevention of Colonial Oppression," a flamboyant Communist front. For years, Hatta kept on close terms with Alimin, then in residence in Moscow.

Another intimate, Sjahrir was in close contact with Alimin, i. e., the Soviet Cominform. It was Sjahrir who appointed the notorious C. H. Campbell as Trade Commissioner in Australia. This first representative of the Republic abroad also happened to be Secretary of the Communist Party in Sidney.

The record of pro-Communist connections by persons high in the councils of the Republic is voluminous. The advent of these people to unrestricted power was predicated on conditions of chaos and anarchy, immediately following the Japanese surrender.

Mr. ARENS. What was the political situation in Indonesia in the period immediately following cessation of hostilities in 1945?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will quote here in full, a letter released by Adm. C. E. L. Helfrich, N. E. I. N., who commanded the naval forces in the battle of Macassar Straits (1942). Admiral Helfrich addressed himself to Gen. Douglas MacArthur through the N. E. I. Command. It had in the meantime been passed to Mountbatten's command. The Admiral's letter is of sharp historical significance.

Batavia, 20th October, 1945

General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Pacific,
G. H. Q.-AFPAC

I regret to have to intrude on your precious time but I feel I want to write to you personally, because conditions in the Netherlands East Indies are developing so unfavourably that, if no action is taken immediately, only a catastrophe can follow.

My return to this country after a long period of exile was none but a great disillusion. Political and military mistakes are made which seem unbelievable, but none the less are true, whilst there is no prospect yet of any improvement.

In the first place, I have to state that the N. E. I. [Netherlands East Indies] and its population had to wait for a long time before the British and Allies returned to the country. Only on the 15th of September *one* British cruiser and *one* Netherlands cruiser arrived and the first small British landing only took place on the 29th of that month.

Meanwhile Soekarno (the "President of the Indonesian Republic") with his satellites had moved about freely, taking advantage of the obvious proof of inability we showed.

On the 2nd of October I arrived at Batavia and noticed a hostile atmosphere which especially was marked by the Indonesian flags (red and white), as well as by the many insulting slogans on public buildings, streetcars and other means of transport.

In my opinion the British made their first political mistake when they did not declare immediately and clearly that they solely recognized the Netherlands Authority. On the contrary, at press conferences the general impression was made that they had nothing to do with "internal" politics, as a consequence of which one generally concluded that the Netherlands Authority and that of Soekarno were put on the same level. It is true that later on the Supreme Commander declared that the statements of the British General Christison had been interpreted absolutely wrongly, but the above mentioned impression had been made, and the reactions to it were very unfavourable.

I simply cannot understand that the British did not explain from the very beginning that first of all Netherlands Authority had to be restored. For had not Japan surrendered to the United Nations of which the Kingdom of the Netherlands forms an integral part? A Netherlands representative signed the

Document of Surrender in Tokyo Bay on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In the clause, which you personally signed, it is indicated clearly that this signing was also done in the interest of all United Nations at war with Japan.

The foundation of the Republic Indonesia by Soekarno, led and supported by the Japanese oppressors, was clearly unlawful and even a semblance of recognition thereof would mean a strengthening of the Japanese political game.

The untenable situation which at present exists is mainly created by this political weakness of the British. It is my firm conviction that nothing would have happened if it would have been stated from the very beginning that first the Netherlands Authority had to be restored and that only after that discussions would be held between this Netherlands Authority and the representatives of the Indonesian political parties concerning (a) the structure of the Government of the N. E. I., and (b) the place which this country would hold in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Moreover, it should have been stated that these discussions would be based on the radio speech delivered by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina on December 7, 1942, for in that speech Her Majesty made it clear that after the end of the war a conference would be held by representatives of all parts of the Kingdom (all members of the conference having equal rights) in order to discuss the new political structure of the Kingdom with a view to a higher grade of independence for all parts concerned. (It is very unfortunate that (a) through lack of proper propaganda, and (b) because Her Majesty made this speech in exile during the German occupation of Holland as well as the N. E. I., this speech could not then be made sufficiently clear to all of Her Majesty's subjects.)

However, when Soekarno noticed that one did not entirely reject the new Republic, he and his satellites automatically became encouraged to go on with their unlawful business, stimulated by British and Dutch military impotence and by an unbelievably weak British military generalship.

The reasons for the Dutch inability are well known to you. Through the late liberation of the Netherlands we were unable to strengthen our forces in time. Moreover, we did not get shipping at our disposal to transport the troops already available, and other reinforcements. One even denied us the ships under the Dutch flag, although during the whole war we put our entire shipping at the disposal of the Allied cause.

The British impotence could be explained by the fact that through the change of the boundaries of the war theatres they fairly suddenly were put before a much bigger commitment. I am convinced, however, that even with the available weak power one could have performed miracles if one would have taken action immediately.

Neither did I understand the British attitude toward the Japanese from the very beginning onward. The Japanese army soon backed out of their obligations to maintain law and order. The Japs interned themselves, withdrew into well-equipped camps, gathered big stores and even gave or sold their arms to the Indonesian rebels.

It is possible that there still are many moderate Indonesian leaders with whom one could talk, but I am strongly convinced that the whole movement tends to the side of the extremists, which is very powerful, and which under Japanese propaganda and leadership has created some sort of guerrilla army; moreover, this army at present is supplied with Japanese arms.

This guerrilla army, under fanatical leadership, mainly consists of youths of between 15 and 20 years of age, which I should like to compare with the "Hitler Jugend," and which adhere to complete independence free from any foreign influence or domination (Indonesia Merdeka!).

The things that happen, in the meantime, are unbelievable. At present the P. O. W. and Internee Camps for women and children are still overcrowded. Though of course the food situation has improved a little bit, the same misery exists as under Japanese domination, but what is more, the thousands and thousands of women and children in the camps in the middle and eastern part of Java are a prey for the armed Indonesian bands which in those parts are the absolute rulers. Fear for reprisals is the main reason which withholds us now, now that it is too late, to take powerful action, but even if I should like to maintain law and order myself, this is impossible to me because the British General wishes this to be done solely by British troops. Up till now the entry of Dutch troops was even forbidden for fear of reprisals in the above-mentioned camps.

One can even say that public life is entirely in the hands of the republicans; even in areas occupied by the British, such as Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bandoeng, all public works (telephone, telegraph, electrical supply, water supply, industries, railroads and means of transport) are in the hands of the rebels and the British declare themselves incapable to take over these works.

The weapons trade is in full swing. The "Hitler Jugend" disposes of the most modern small arms, machine guns, hand grenades and even tanks and armoured cars. Uninterrupted they build up supplies of arms, unpunished they terrorize the whole population, especially Europeans, Indo-Europeans, Ambonese and Menadonese.

Even Batavia is absolutely unsafe. Murdering and looting is the order of the day, even in full daylight. The entire British and Netherlands Authority is a farce and I am unable to undertake anything myself because I am under the orders of the Supreme Commander and because only he is fully responsible.

I need not tell you what value under these circumstances one has to attach to the Authority of the Netherlands Indies Government.

Even the Prisoners of War and Internee Relief Agency can only perform its duties with the permission of the Indonesians and during the last weeks it was even impossible for this organization to carry on with its work.

The rebels have the entire broadcasting system at their disposal which, undisturbed, extends its mischievous influence over the whole of the N. E. I. The British are doing nothing to prevent this.

In Tandjong-Priok harbour I had to unload ships with European personnel, because all native labour went on strike and because the British hesitated to use Japanese P. O. W.s for this work.

The whole situation is bewildering and greatly discouraging.

We will ultimately succeed, but only after a great loss of prestige, a hard struggle against extremists and an enmity between the white and coloured parts of the population which will only abate after a long period.

I am convinced that only strong political pressure by the well-meaning members of the United Nations on the British Labour Government could change the situation in a favourable way; this action should be combined with a clear statement addressed to the rebels that continuation of the present situation could only result in the use of powerful military means.

Finally, a quick removal of the Japanese troops will greatly contribute to the restoration of law and order.

The Netherlands East Indies in the hands of Soekarno and his followers or any other Indonesian party will only bring chaos to this country and will only create a permanent danger for peace in the Pacific. An independent Indonesia is impossible and will within a short time become a target for political and military powers which aim at upsetting the hard-won peace.

So much for the situation in the Netherlands East Indies.

Wishing you strength and courage in your extremely difficult task, which no doubt is also being made more difficult by outside subversive political influences, I am,

C. E. L. Helfrich
Admiral, R. N. N.

Mr. HEIMLICH. Did General MacArthur have any proposed solution to the deteriorating situation in Indonesia in 1945?

General WILLOUGHBY. General MacArthur had just completed the recapture of Borneo, utilizing the Australian Army under General Blamey. If MacArthur had had his way, the Borneo campaign would have been extended to include the recapture of Java and the Netherlands East Indies. Responsibility for the N. E. I. was abruptly transferred from MacArthur to Mountbatten, who had no immediate means to occupy the islands and disarm the Japanese. A small British Force finally appeared after weeks of a virtual interregnum, since the Japanese pulled back to self-appointed camps, thus leaving local Government to their wartime collaborators, who promptly launched the present "Republic" with Sukarno as the head. The General made a comment of historical significance:

I had planned to move immediately on to Java with the Australian troops and restore the Dutch Government under Van Mook, which would have rapidly brought law and order there as it had done in New Guinea.

For some reason never understood, this proposed movement was peremptorily called off and forbidden from Washington, in spite of my insistence of its complete success with little loss. This was one of the grave mistakes of the war, and ultimately resulted in the chaotic conditions which followed in that part of Indonesia. It completely violated the basic principle of American foreign policy to support the orderly development of dependent areas toward self-government.

I foresaw this, but my counsel was ineffective to change what I regarded as a political interference in a basically military problem. I was to find this deadly weapon in constant future use against me.

Mr. ARENS. Why did the Dutch Government relinquish control of Indonesia?

General WILLOUGHBY. The pattern is confused. I could summarize events as (a) the effect of British pressure on Queen Wilhelmina in exile, a sort of dog-in-the-manger advice since the British Government was then contemplating getting out of India; (b) a sudden shift of command authority from MacArthur to Mountbatten; (c) the vacillating attitude of General Christison, the initial British occupation commander; (d) Japanese duplicity in sponsoring the "Republic of Indonesia" on the eve of their surrender as a malicious blow against the Dutch; (e) the illegal transfer of weapons and armament to the "Republicans," i. e. the Jokja (Sukarno) Government; (f) the negotiations of Van Mook with Sukarno; (g) relentless pressure of the U. N. on the Dutch, the by now habitual attitude of this body to be tough with "small" nations and "cautious" with the big fellows, i. e. Russia.

The crazyquilt of the story from 1947 to 1949, is covered by a competent American historian, Dr. Albert Hyma, of the University of Michigan, and the erudite notes of the late Dr. Ebed Van der Vlugt, international lawyer and editor of "Le Monde Nouveau"; he served as an intelligence officer with the British. My own information is entirely confirmatory of the general pattern.

Dr. Hyma's analysis may be quoted as follows:

* * * On December 6, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, then in exile in England, laid down certain principles of liberation after the war.

* * * The Queen proposed a revised structure of Government in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curacao would jointly participate on a footing of independence. In this structure, there would be no place for discrimination on the ground of race or country. * * *

* * * Queen Juliana fulfilled her mother's promise when she signed a treaty giving Indonesia her independence in 1949.

In Indonesia there was initially no more pro-Japanese sentiment than in the Philippines or in any of the British possessions. Throughout the year 1941, and the first half of 1942, the loyalty of the Indonesian population was unquestioned. The "Federation of Nationalists" including labor unions and the Moslem groups declared in support of the Dutch Government. It took special Japanese propaganda efforts to dislodge this trend. The great majority of Indonesian nationalists were men of integrity; they knew that national independence was certain to come, for in each decade some progress had been made in that direction.

Leaning on their public collaborators in mid-1944, the Japanese made some vague promises of independence (following Wilhelmina belatedly after a lapse of 3 years). When military defeat was imminent, Count Terauchi, the Japanese Supreme Commander, summoned Sukarno and Hatta to Saigon, August 9, to receive instruc-

tions. The Japanese-sponsored "Republic of Indonesia" was not declared until August 17, 1945, 2 days after the Japanese acceptance of surrender terms. There was no consultation with proper representatives of the people. Actually, the Republic was declared by "The Communist Students Committee." The Japanese forces then withdrew ostensibly from further responsibility for public law and order.

There was a lapse of 6 weeks before a small British force appeared under General Christison. The Dutch were unable to mobilize adequate forces except a naval contingent under Admiral Helfrich. The British would not return the Dutch ships that were pooled during the war. Instead, the British employed them to repatriate their own forces. This circumstance must be viewed in the light of General MacArthur's plan to move from Borneo into the Netherlands East Indies, which could have been done easily. "Higher authorities" (whoever they were) suddenly shifted command to Mountbatten, who had no troops to spare.

Shrewdly, the group centered on Jokja and Sukarno, took advantage of the hiatus to expedite their own plans for complete independence. "Home Guard" units had been trained by the Japanese and thus formed an immediately available sizable Republican Army. Contrary to the terms of surrender, the Japanese continued to furnish arms and matériel. Thus even before the British appeared, the new regime was ostensibly a going concern.

It was an "opportunist" creation—without popular sanction or elections and without power to establish law and order. In the riotous employment of irresponsible, immature elements, thousands of Chinese and Eurasians were killed. One Governor of East Java has estimated that in the Republican disorders between 1945 and 1949, some 2 million natives and other inhabitants lost their lives and property. The basis for these outrages are clearly discernible in Admiral Helfrich's "on the spot" report of October 1945. The Dutch exercised considerable patience before taking military measures—"police actions" as they were compelled by public disorder. The Dutch Government was already pledged to a Federation of Indonesian States. Sukarno's slogan: "Merdeka"—which means one nation, one people, one language, was sheer demagoguery. The Indonesian reality comprised 58 races with 58 languages and dialects, varying customs, laws, characteristics and stages of development. Hostile attitudes toward one another was the rule rather than the exception. The Dutch had managed to respect and preserve local autonomy over the centuries. Against a background of British, U. N. and Australian pressure, they accepted the de facto Jokja Republic (central Java) to the extent of their actual control. The Republicans pledged acceptance of the principle of Federation and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union—a pledge they had no intention to fill.

MR. ARENS. What role did the British Occupation authorities play at this juncture?

General WILLOUGHBY. Lord Mountbatten appeared to realize that he had made a political mistake. On September 3, 1945, he ordered the Japanese to dissolve the newly proclaimed Republic. Later in the month, he gave orders to the Japanese to refrain from giving over the administration of Java to any political party.

Contrary to these instructions, Mountbatten's deputy, General Christison, made immediate concessions to the Sukarno group.

Admiral Helfrich protested violently. Christison issued orders that no Dutch troops were to land in Java, although the island was as much of a Dutch possession as Malaya was British.

Evidently there were influences operating behind the scenes. Mountbatten changed his tune and recommended that the Dutch also "negotiate" with the "nationalists." Helfrich's main concern was the establishment of law and order, the release and care of Dutch internees. Christison now proposed a "round table" discussion with the Indonesian "Nationalists." This act amounted to de facto recognition.

The Netherlands Government was already committed to the establishment of an Indonesian Federation. The Outer Islands, however, declined to recognize the Javanese, the "Jokja" Republic. The legitimate Dutch solution was a "federation" composed of the de facto Jokja Republic plus at least two states in the Outer Islands, which had already formed Governments of their own and welcomed the returning Dutch. The clash that was impending was therefore between the Dutch, the Outer Islands and the central Javanese regime. This split was to be repeated again in 1956 and 1957, along similar geographical lines.

In this critical phase, the Netherlands Home Government fumbled badly. Instead of backing Helfrich against Christison, they practically repudiated the Admiral. Initially, the Hague refused to let their representatives deal with Sukarno. In November 1945 Dr. Van Mook, long associated with the Netherlands East Indies appeared on the scene and conferred with Sukarno. In the presence of van der Plas (attached to MacArthur's Headquarters in the early days) Van Mook advised Helfrich that the Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories had given him permission to negotiate with Sukarno. This statement has later been questioned. While pushing the Dutch against the wall, the British confirmed their possession of Sarawak, on Borneo, by proclaiming it a "Crown Colony". At the same time British forces were withdrawn from Java to reinforce the British colony of Malaya. Here we see once again that international cancer, the "dual standard."

Conceding legitimate nationalist aspirations, the Republic of Jokja as of 1945, can hardly be considered as "representative" in the parliamentary sense, or an expression of popular universal will.

Mr. ARENS. What actions were taken by Communists and/or anti-Communists?

General WILLOUGHBY. At this point, the P. K. I. (Communist Party) entered the picture aggressively. "Red Army" units were organized in Java and Sumatra. There were some interesting features: Tan Malakka, old-time Communist, was arrested and jailed. Actually it was a victory of one Communist faction over another. Amir Sjarifuddin, Moscow's secret agent, had orders to purge Malakka. As he was at that time Secretary of Defense of the Jokja Republic he was most effective. This obviously strengthened the Stalinist Communists. Prewar Red leaders returned from exile headed by Alimin. Understanding the predilection of the West for semantic generalities, they adopted the cover of "independence" and "nationalism." The year 1948 brought another attempt at Communist armed insurrection. There were intimate discussions with party

leaders in Russia, Australia and England. Tom Driberg of the left-wing British Labor Party figured in these contacts. The veteran Muso, backed by the full weight of the Kremlin returned to Indonesia. This will illustrate the shifting character of Indonesian politics: In 1946 the Republicans crushed the diversionist Tan Malakka by an alliance with the Comintern Alimin. Now, they engaged Tan Malakka, in turn, to assist in the liquidation of Muso-Alimin and Sjari-fuddin. Muso was executed and about 35,000 of his adherents placed in concentration camps. The Jokja Government gained great prestige abroad by this anti-Communist action. Later events were to demonstrate that the orientation of Indonesian leaders toward Soviet Russia had not abated.

In the meantime, nothing was done to activate the "federation" agreed upon at the Linggadjadi Agreement, March 25, 1947. The Republicans had demonstrated complete intransigence. The Dutch position was supported by the later Renville Agreement (aboard the American ship *Renville*), Jan. 17, 1948. The "sovereignty" of the Netherlands was again confirmed until effective transfer to the Federated States of Indonesia. The Jokja Republic (Sukarno) was that of a "component" state. As late as January 20, 1948, the United States State Department considered the agreement "a healthy basis for the political and economic development of Indonesia."

There is evidence that the Republicans had no intention to abide by these agreements. On January 25, 1948, General Sudirman said in a formal broadcast: "* * * that he did not consider the armed forces bound by that agreement."

At this juncture, the Dutch applied military force and quickly occupied all important points in Republican-controlled territory. Without bloodshed, the entire Republican administration was captured in its capital Jogjakarta.

This brilliant military action was conducted by Maj. Gen. Spoor, Netherlands East Indies Army, who had been attached to G-2 at MacArthur's Headquarters in 1942. He controlled the N. E. I. branch of the "Allied Intelligence Bureau" which handled operations in enemy territory during the war. He died in 1951, frustrated and embittered, his successful operations completely nullified.

This drastic action raised a worldwide furor, based on ignorance of the complex situation. It was a Roman holiday for "neutralists" and Communist sympathizers. Naturally India took a lead and summoned a protest assembly to be held in the spring of 1949. United Nations action was demanded.

I wish to pause here and bring to your attention an important Communist paper of American origin, the September 1947 issue of "Political Affairs", the American Communist Party organ, delineating policy, at a high level. The date is important.

MR. ARENS. The committee assumes that you develop this document as a feature of international Communist planning, postwar or current, and that it has a direct bearing on the Indonesian situation?

General WILLOUGHBY. The relationship of this document (of American origin) with the Indonesian embroglio, of the period, is so striking that it cannot be called a "coincidence."

We have already established the quasi-Communist background of certain Indonesian leaders who vaulted into political control after affili-

iations or sympathetic collaboration with the Japanese occupation troops. Considering the international character of Communist maneuvers, light is thrown on the Indonesian situation in an article by Charles Bidien in "Political Affairs," the American Communist Party organ, September 1947. Bidien is a Kremlin trained Communist agitator; he was finally arrested for deportation (1949). This Communist "insider" revealed that the Indonesian Government was about two-thirds Communist controlled. The sinister implications of this article, laying down Communist policy for Indonesia (1947) is the fact that a U. N. commission, headed by Frank Porter Graham (1948) appeared to have followed Bidien's recommendations almost to the letter. Note these extracts from the Bidien article:

(1) * * * the impact of the Socialist revolution in czarist Russia gave tremendous impetus to the colonial liberation movement (in Indonesia and elsewhere) * * * (Communist) revolts broke out in Java and Sumatra (1926-27).

* * * The Socialist Party of Indonesia, basing its political position on Mao Tse-tung's writings, has worked in harmony with the Indonesian Communist Party for the past two years (1946-47).

* * * Today, the government is a coalition of the Nationalist, Moslem, Socialist, Labor, Peasant and Communist Parties.

* * * They must insist that no American supplies be sent to the Dutch * * *; and a boycott should be declared here on Dutch goods, and an embargo on Dutch * * * shipping * * *.

* * * the National Maritime Union in the United States has called on its members to vote affirmatively that the entire membership "boycott all vessels designed to aid the Dutch in their war of aggression." * * *

* * * the demands of the (Sukarno) Republic are clear: (a) international supervision of the cease-fire order * * *; (b) withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia; * * * (c) * * * diplomatic recognition; * * * (d) membership in the United Nations; (e) * * * there must be no bypassing of the U. N. by the United States * * *.

This is the year 1947, when Soviet influence in the U. N. was strong enough to indict "colonialism" as a smokescreen of their own Siberian and Central Asian conquests and almost succeeded in ostracizing Catholic Spain, the only European power to defeat Stalin in the Civil War of 1936-39. We have here one of many examples of the U. N. operating for and in behalf of Communist-front governments and, as an end result, to facilitate Communist ultimate takeover.

The Communist Party theoretical Monthly "Political Affairs," September 1947, laid down the official American Communist policy on Indonesia *one year before* a United Nations Commission headed by Mr. Graham, began to operate. The U. N. C. I. appeared to follow the "Political Affairs" piece almost to the letter.

Further "coincidental" action is noted in boycott of the Australian waterfront federation of all Dutch shipping. The American National Maritime Union then urged its membership to vote for such a boycott.

MR. ARENS. General, there were newspapermen in that area at the time. Do you recall their summaries of the situation there?

General WILLOUGHBY. The press representatives are always a superior factfinding mechanism; indeed, they provide superior intelligence although their on-the-spot reports may be subject to editing in the home office. The shrewd, able, and sometimes cynical reporters were well aware of the ambiguous part played by the United Nations Indonesian Commission. Fifteen reputable reporters traveled to southeast Asia to get at the truth of the Indonesian situation. Thirteen of them were killed in a plane crash at Bombay on their way home.

I have here extracts from their eyewitness reports that are most significant.

H. R. Knickerbocker wrote:

What we have done now is to force out the Dutch so fast that the place of power they leave empty will be filled either by the Soviet Union or the United States. If we had been less hasty, the Dutch might have and I think would have filled this power vacuum. Now the United States will have to take over from the Dutch the task of keeping communism out of Indonesia. Considering our record in China, the only people that can be happy about this are the Communists.

Mr. Knickerbocker also said the following:

United Nations interference in the Dutch East Indies has greatly increased the danger of communism here and has promoted the interests of the Soviet Union * * * the most disturbing single discovery we made here was that the U. N. observers seem to be proceeding as the most unscientific of "scientists." They came here with a thesis to uphold; the thesis that the Dutch were always wrong and the Indonesian Republic always right. Their reports coincide with this preconceived thesis. * * *

One of the reporters out there was a Pulitzer prize winner, Mr. S. Burton Heath. He wrote this:

Only two things have been established beyond doubt. One is that the representatives of the State Department here actively resent the coming of American newspapermen who almost unanimously condemn the State Department's Indonesian policy as a menace to American security. The other is that American and Australian junior officers assigned as field observers for the United Nations are convinced that their factual reports are being distorted before they are passed on to Washington, Canberra, and Lake Success. They say it is useless to submit antirepublican or pro-Dutch reports. * * *

Most reporters wrote similar complaints. Mr. William H. Newton said:

American observers representing the United Nations here say they are unable to send objective reports to either the United States Government or the United Nations concerning the situation in Indonesia. Instead, the reports are "consolidated" or distorted to favor the Republican cause. Both American and Australian officers in the field are gravely concerned over the fact that their reports are, in effect, censored and distorted before they reach the top levels of the United Nations or their respective governments.

Finally, let me quote from a report filed by Mr. N. A. Barrows:

Certainly, even a newcomer out here cannot penetrate without wondering why the picture given the outside world is so often distorted and falsely emphasized.

Mr. ARENS. General, would you care to venture an opinion as to why these distortions were made, particularly in regard to our own Government?

General WILLOUGHBY. If we refer to Mr. Barrow's wonderment we can only assume that he, like most Americans, was not aware that Washington was honeycombed with Communist cells and Communist agents, many of them in high places. They saw to it that the ultimate interests of global communism were served by diverting, suppressing, or slanting public and governmental reports. Please bear in mind the fact that this was 1947, the year of great betrayals from Peking to Madrid.

Mr. ARENS. In terms of the Bidien study, what happened in 1948 and 1949?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will resume my narrative of "evolution" leading to the final expulsion of the Dutch. Months of complex negotiations followed, involving the United Nations, the United States and

the immediate parties. The Dutch suggested a "roundtable conference" in The Hague. At this point, the views and desires of substantial areas of Indonesia collectively called "Federalist" must be accepted as an element proper for U. N. intervention though in the end, nothing was done for them. The Federalist states were many times larger in area than the Jokja Republic. They looked to the Dutch as their champion against "centralist" designs and control. If the U. N. Charter was to be taken seriously, other than with pious phrases, these areas were entitled to self-determination. It soon became clear, however, that pressure from Britain, Australia and the United States was too heavy for the Dutch to resist. The subsequent Hague Conference of 1949 merely ratified what outside pressure had already made inevitable. The Dutch moved out. The conference gave lip service to the organization of Indonesia on a federal pattern; the actual effect of transfer of sovereignty was to place the Jokja Republic in a position first to dominate and then to subdue the remaining parts of the archipelago.

The Dutch virtually capitulated to U. N. and United States pressures. The vacillation of their political parties at home, of course, was a deciding factor. The Roman Catholic Party had joined with the Socialists in a common front. A reliable source reports a conversation with H. E. Johannes Cardinal de Jong: "* * * It is an alliance de raison; my heart is not in it." The "double standard" of the U. N. was again apparent, in the speed with which the Security Council acted on the rather stereotyped invocation of Australia and India of Articles 35 and 39 of the Statute, calling for a "cease-fire." Compare that with the fact that the Security Council has ignored the appeals of South Moluccas under like conditions. Incidentally, the Australians are now changing their tune, since they discovered Sukarno's aspirations to take over Dutch New Guinea. That area is geographically and ethnographically identical with Papua. Are the Australians willing to give it up to the natives?

Throughout Indonesia, there remains a continuous resistance to the creation of unitarian or centralized dominion. The Westerling affair was for the most part an attempt at self defense on the part of the Sudanese. Capt. Abdul Aziz organized similar resistance in Makassar (Celebes); in true oriental fashion, he was decoyed to Java under false pretenses and then arrested.

Centers of underground resistance continued to function. Sultan Hamid II of Borneo was taken prisoner because of opposition to the Jokja regime. Dr. Mansur of East Sumatra tried to protect his State by a genuine federal status. The Atjehers of North Sumatra are restless. The Amboinese took up armed resistance. The Republic of South Moluccas is still fighting. They feel that the Javanese group are a tyranny, covertly oriented toward Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. Do you have other documentations on the situation leading up to U. N. intervention in Indonesia?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have mentioned Mr. van der Plas, attached to MacArthur's Headquarters, a longtime civil servant, in high position in Eastern Indonesia. Equally significant, and indeed in a higher administrative echelon, we must mention Dr. H. J. Van Mook, the last Deputy Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies. Both men were interesting types though greatly differing in personal and psychic characteristic. Van der Plas was a trained diplomat,

cultured, erudite, of enormous patience and enormous tact. He played a great role in channeling the energy of his people, refugees from Indonesia in Australia, into proper and effective channels. With an odd prescience, he concentrated on Dutch New Guinea and the Moluccas, as if he knew that this immense area would become the last remnant of the century old Netherlands East Indies domain.

Dr. Van Mook was a different personality. An expert colonial administrator in responsible positions, he was dynamic. An executive "driver," he cut through redtape and the lethargy of defeat. It was he who picked Colonel Spoor then attached to G-2 to eventually command the Dutch forces that made such a brilliant showing, later on, in the police actions in Java.

I select pertinent comments from his papers, generally confirming Admiral Helfrich and suggestive of the completely idiotic performance of some "statesmen" of the period:

Re Japanese Imperialism:

* * * There is no other example in human history of a nation which less than a hundred years after its emergence from two and a half centuries of almost complete medieval and feudal seclusion, became one of the most aggressive and powerful military empires. Neither are there many examples of self-delusion which made it take on half the world at one time to satisfy its greed. It was as if all the national energy had been bottled up for centuries to explode in a raging expansionism, once a crack was made in the containing wall * * *.

Re Japan and Russia:

* * * Here was a coloured people who had successfully challenged the white race on its own preserves. Asiatic nationalism got a tremendous fillip out of the defeat of Russia in 1905, then considered as a purely Western nation in those years.

Re Japan and the West:

* * * At the end of every victorious war, Japan had to relinquish part of her spoils under Western pressure. Russia, Germany and the United States forced her every time to mitigate territorial, economic and political demands.

Re Japan and Asiatic Co-prosperity:

* * * Japan might have found (in her own experience) the spiritual impulse to become the leader of Asiatic emancipation. Instead she distorted her great opportunities. The only strong nation among disunited peoples and amorphous populations, the only "progressive" state among backward or inert races, she acted like wolves among herds of sheep. (During the war) the most profoundly upsetting activities were Japan's violent and systematic anti-Western propaganda and her perversion of the youth of South East Asia. In this field, the Japanese proved themselves master craftsmen * * *.

Re Japan in Occupation:

* * * The Dutch and Eurasian prisoners of war and the internees were very harshly treated. Very many in the first category were transported to other parts of the coprosperity paradise; thousands were worked and starved to death on the horrible railroad from Thailand to Burma. The treatment of women and children was, if possible, worse than that of the men. * * * It will probably remain unknown how many Indonesians were killed, raped or starved to death. Labor slaves (romushas) were shipped by the thousands to the Japanese forces in New Guinea and the northern Moluccas and were left to die of hunger and neglect * * *.

Re Sukarno:

Nationalist leaders of substance were divided; some thought Japanese hegemony inevitable. Some secretly abhorred Japanese domination, particularly the democratic, socialist and Communist groups and prepared for action by the

time Japan would be beaten. The leading figure among them was Sukarno, who had come to the fore through his oratorical talent and was imprisoned in the 1930's for sedition. He was made general political adviser to the Japanese Military Government in Java and was joined as deputy by Mohammed Hatta, an alumnus of the economic faculty of Rotterdam. Sukarno's gifts as a demagogue were useful to the Japanese. But the ideal of an independent Indonesia was a very real part of an otherwise rather vain and unstable character. The more serious leaders turned away from the transparent devices (of Japan). Hatta was closely connected to the last group. Sukarno, however, went on and on, praising Japan, reviling the Allies, urging his people to aid the war effort. Was he only putting up a smoke screen to hide plotting for revolt? There is no evidence that he was very active in "planning." Aid to the "war effort" merely impoverished the people. Estates and factories rusted and decayed; plantations were uprooted. This meant unemployment for hundreds of thousands; it meant poverty for all—but a few henchmen of the Japanese and the black marketeers.

Re Communications:

* * * There was no contact with the outer world. Dutch submarines were constantly on war duty; the Allied Command refused to free them for secret reconnaissance. Indonesia was practically bypassed. A. I. B. (MacArthur) dispatched several parties to the N. E. I. including itinerant "Hadjis" but the underground was nothing like the Philippines. Left to their own fantasies, the Indonesians plotted and dreamed. And the Japanese whispers always gave the same direction to those dreams. * * *

Re Japanese Godfathers to Independence:

* * * When the Japanese realized that defeat was imminent, they fostered a "committee for the preparation of independence" May 28, 1944. Sukarno and Hatta were designated chairman and vice chairman. On August 7th, Field Marshal Count Terauchi summoned Sukarno and Hatta to his Headquarters in Saigon for last-minute instructions. On the 15th Japan capitulated.

Re Allied Military and Political Postwar Vagaries:

* * * It was generally understood that war would result in an accelerated growth of nationalism. Queen Wilhelmina agreed to Indonesian independence as early as 1942. Restoration of prewar colonialism (except for Russian Asiatic conquests) was heavily underscored by the United States; Secretary of State Sumner Welles formulated this point: "We must assure the sovereign equality of the people the world over. The age of imperialism is ended. The right of people for freedom must be recognized." Acceptance of a principle is a far cry from orderly implementation. American public opinion was manipulated to view European democracies with colonial interests in Asia with distrust. This propaganda hardly ever mentioned the political and military efforts of British and Dutch Allies. A spate of leftists and fellow travelers entered into the activities of the Offices of War Information and Strategic Services (O. W. I. and O. S. S.) in the Far East; the same happened in the British and Australian intelligence and propaganda services. Their action overshot the mark, ignoring the fact that a badly organized liberation would expose millions of people to the miseries of revolution and chaos. * * *

Re Impact of Allied Delays:

* * * There were hundreds of indispensable men and women in the Netherlands twiddling their thumbs (needed for Indonesian rehabilitation). The transportation of 5,600 men (Dutch) was reduced to a paltry 600. We could not even obtain the use of our own (Dutch) transports (27 ships with a carrying capacity of 60,000 men); Malaya, Thailand and French Indo-China were given priority. The sweet taste of victory turned to gall in the mouths of the thousands who had suffered patiently. This feeling grew worse when it became known that even for evacuation of prisoners and internees, other nationalities got priorities though the Dutch stood third in their contribution of transport vessels.

Re Mountbatten and Christison:

* * * It has been previously established that the shift from MacArthur to Mountbatten was engineered in London and Washington. The job was beyond

Mountbatten's capacity. It is obvious that MacArthur's expedition that took Borneo without effort could have been extended to Java.

* * * In Indonesia, as in Annam, the Japanese assisted at the outbreak of a revolution they had helped to foment.

Mr. ARENS. Exactly when was the so-called Republican Government established?

General WILLOUGHBY. The Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed August 17, 1945, in the house of Japanese Rear Admiral Maeda, at Batavia.

On September 6, Admiral Mountbatten ordered Marshal Terauchi to stop the revolutionary movement and maintain Japanese responsibility for law and order. The order was ignored.

A cruiser H. M. S. *Cumberland* arrived at Tandjung September 15. This was no protection to 60,000 cooped-up, starved, and exhausted men, women, and children, in the interior.

General Christison only learned on September 27 that he was appointed to the occupation command in Java. He had never been in Indonesia before. Admiral Mountbatten suddenly reversed his former nonrecognition of the revolutionary Republic and Christison took the precipitate step to invoke the assistance of "Republican authorities" and thus gave them a kind of international recognition which irrevocably prejudiced the future.

The withdrawal of the Japanese to their own camps, the absence of any sign of Allied troops and Allied activity, the absolute vacuum of authority, spawned criminal and irresponsible elements, as it always will.

The months from October until the end of December 1945 saw horrible scenes of cruelty and mass hysteria. In Surabaya all the succeeding phases of the French Revolution from the first seizure of power to the terror, seemed to follow each other in a few weeks, ending with a gruesome "people's tribunal" in the principal club where a number of defenseless Dutch and Eurasians were "tried" and delivered to the mob to be clubbed and speared to death.

"Bersiap" meaning "Be Ready," was a slogan, a cry for mob violence against some unfortunate passerby. Some two to three thousand Dutch and Eurasians, men and women, were thus murdered.

Re Negotiations with a Shadow Government:

The first Republican cabinet which contained a number of avowed collaborators and some very shady characters, had been replaced on November 14th by a much more competent group under Sutan Sjahrir. I decided to explore possibilities and previously contact Sukarno—especially to afford some protection to our internees. The British (technically still in occupation since Dutch forces were delayed) furnished Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who later became Lord Inverchapel and Ambassador in Washington.

Sjahrir appeared reasonable but under pressure demanded full recognition without guaranty of protection of (Dutch) interests. Communist youths actually kidnaped him on the night of June 27th. At this point Sukarno and Hatta stepped in and cleared up the confusion. It was obvious, however, that armed bands and chieftains were not controlled.

* * * A brighter scene was presented by the outer islands, Borneo, Celebes, the Molucas, the Lesser Sunda Islands from Bali to Timor and New Guinea. Representatives assembled July 14, 1946, at Malino. The prevailing fashion of the time, which found a Machiavellian design in everything the Dutch proposed, failed to note that the conferences were held in a peaceful atmosphere and delegates coming from every corner of the area were overwhelmingly in favor of a

federal structure of Indonesia (Federalists). Current separatist movement had its root in the free formation of those states: East Indonesia, West Borneo, West Java, and East Sumatra, etc. They did not feel compelled (then as now) to maintain an artificial unitarianism. Another British ambassador appeared on the scene, Lord Killearn. This effort resulted in the Linggadjati Agreement. It is possible that the Dutch home Government fumbled, at this point.

Re Violation of the Linggadjati Agreement:

* * * The efforts for implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement failed. The Jogjakarta Government had no real authority beyond Central Java. Only the propagandist machine worked efficiently: Its constant theme was the perfidy of the Dutch.

Shooting at Dutch outposts and kidnaping of people continued. Tampering with the waterworks of Surabaya, flooded the countryside. Two months went by in fruitless talks. The Dutch occupied the works by force; the flood was stopped within 2 days by very simple repairs. General Spoor initiated his police action that promised to bring order in a surprisingly short time—but equally prompt was the intervention of the U. N. Security Council at the behest of Australia and India, August 1, 1947.

Re U. N. Intervention:

It seems beyond doubt that the U. N. had no prima facie right to take action. The N. E. I. under current agreements was still sovereign. Belgium filed a resolution to test the competence of the U. N. Security Council with the International Court of Justice: It was denied.

This is one of the first instances of the "dual morality" of that body. It is the year of Stalin's drive to boycott Catholic Spain. Much more serious civil wars were raging in China, and Vietnam. The Council did not act. Even in Palestine, the Council "reconsidered." This evasive posture accentuated the almost scornful peremptoriness with which the Dutch were treated.

The rapidity and success of the (Dutch) police action were beyond expectation. It met with no popular uprising (as was alleged); in most places the common people evinced a sense of relief. After the Security Council intervened, Jogjakarta began again its campaign of subversion. Yet law and order improved constantly for over a year. Even elections began to take place (never possible under the Republic) to form the States of East Sumatra, Madura, and Pasudan. Here again, the U. N. Security Council intervened arbitrarily and refused admittance of representatives. At last, in 1949, they were recognized at the Round Table Conference in the Hague.

Dr. Van Mook, normally conservative in his style, is almost bitter in his reference to the U. N. "Good Offices Committee" composed of Messrs. Kirby, van Zeeland, and F. P. Graham:

* * * The members were not impartial; they were influenced by the Governments that appointed them. The Secretariat was definitely partial. The Secretaries (an Indian, an Australian who was a naturalized American citizen) and a man with a chequered past exercised unwarranted influence over their principals. The Committee encouraged Republican intransigence. "You are what you are" said Frank Graham. The first fruit of this liberal counsel was a surreptitious Consular Treaty, concluded by Mr. Suripno, Republican "envoy" at Prague, with U. S. S. R., the opening wedge for Communist infiltration. During months of negotiation, the Dutch had the impression that the "Good Offices Committee" was very critical of their actions while Republican irregularities were ignored or hushed up.

I am prepared to confirm Dr. Van Mook's statement. MacArthur dispatched a group of American officers to assist in the U. N. "cease-

fire" order; my own office sent a senior colonel, J. R. Myers, whose impressions appear to confirm the general Dutch posture.

Mr. ARENS. Have you any data on the Red Chinese factor in Indonesia?

General WILLOUGHBY. It is a factor that has become important throughout East Asia. There are millions of Chinese emigres who form sizable minorities from Singapore to Manila. They are divided in allegiance between Red China and the remnant of Nationalist China on Formosa. There are 2½ million Chinese in Indonesia. The oversea's Chinese (Hua Chiao's) have always been under the influence of the Chinese Government of that period. It was active under the Manchu Dynasty; it continued under Chiang and under Red Peking. The influence which the Chinese Government exerted was mainly in the field of education. Special secret agents were sent to the South Seas to guide and coordinate education at the numerous local Chinese schools. Textbooks printed in China or Singapore stressed love and obedience to their fatherland. With the rise of communism in the thirties not only Kuomintang literature but increasing amounts of Communist texts were distributed.

The Netherlands East Indies Government was able to cope with this subtle indoctrination through an efficient secret service until it was replaced by the Sukarno Republic. Chinese communism stepped into the shoes of Manchu Emperors and their successor, the Kuomintang. The Chinese Embassy took over the control of the Chinese schools.

As early as 1951 all schools in Jakarta were issued new textbooks with a clear-cut Communist slant. Geography texts, for example, consist of four sections, two of which are completely dedicated to Communist China. The Soviet Union is referred to "as the staunch supporter of world peace and China's faithful ally." The terminology is identical with texts for Russian children.

The next step was the gradual removal of anti-Communist teachers, by terror and intimidation. As an interesting sidelight on the role of "the family" as opposed to Communist indoctrination, the conspirators were confronted by the conservative and critical attitude of the parents. To offset this "adverse influence," the Chinese pupils in Indonesia were submitted to a rigid discipline, requiring complete secrecy about their work and the teachings at school. If stenciled subjects for instruction had to be taken home, they had to be returned next morning. If one of the stencils was missing the teacher considered the pupil, who was responsible for this, as a "leak" and he was severely punished. The efforts of Chinese parents to get hold of those stencils (in order to pass them on to the (indifferent) Indonesian authorities) were opposed and thwarted by their own children.

Through these practices, the Chinese youth in Indonesia is rapidly being communized. Of the Chinese population in Indonesia 70 to 80 percent are Indonesian subjects (Warga Wegas). When the Communist educated children reach voting age, it is expected that they will form a hard core of Communist agitators, who will be of great value to the Indonesian Communist leaders.

Mr. ARENS. Is there an exchange of student youth groups?

General WILLOUGHBY. Many Chinese youths from Indonesia and other countries in the South Seas are already going to their Communist "fatherland" where they are studying at Communist colleges.

They are specifically trained as Communist agitators after which they are returned to their country of origin. They are then accompanied by secret agents and propagandists, who control their activities. In Canton, a school has been established where Chinese youth from abroad is educated for special services. After their return from the Chinese mainland, the Communist college graduated Chinese start their activities in Indonesia. They keep in close contact with leftist Indonesian youth and join it in propagandist activities. They are active in both the Indonesian and Chinese press. They also form propaganda teams, moving about the country in a blend of entertainment and Communist speeches.

It is no secret that the Indonesian Communist Party maintains close contact with the Red Chinese Embassy in Jakarta and it is an open secret in Indonesia that most of the funds of the Communist Party are supplied by the Red Chinese Embassy and by certain elements of the Chinese community. The Chinese merchants are frequently pressured to contribute to so-called welfare funds. During the Korean war, they were openly urged in the Chinese press in Indonesia to contribute money for funds out of which airplanes were to be bought to help the "heroic peoples' volunteers" in their fight against the "American imperialists."

Mr. ARENS. What does the Sukarno government do to lessen or stop these activities by the Red Chinese?

General WILLOUGHBY. One could expect that this dangerous trend of "communizing" the Chinese population in Indonesia would be opposed with the utmost vigor by the Indonesian Government; however, it has done nothing in this respect. On the contrary, Sukarno was and still is the main promoter of "cooperation" between the Communist and Nationalist Parties in Indonesia, the PKI and the PNI. In the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953), Sukarno's figurehead, crypto-Communists entered the Government and the PKI pledged support. The Communist Party then saw its chance to start a vigorous campaign among the Indonesian population, especially in Java, which is the most densely populated island of the archipelago, containing more than three-fourths of Indonesia's population.

Consequently, at the first elections in Indonesia in 1955, the Communist Party emerged as one of the four largest parties in Indonesia. During recent elections for councils in Java the Communists increased their lead and in many towns like Semarang, Surabaya, Bandung, etc., they now have an absolute majority.

The impact as well as the internal cohesion of the Chinese is reflected in relative statistics of newspaper circulation and the percentage of literacy. The percentage of Chinese who read in the vernacular is 25 to 35 percent, while only 10 percent of Indonesians read adequately. Consequently, only 1.2 percent of the Indonesians will buy daily papers; this is largely explicable on the grounds that the bulk of the Indonesian population are farmers and live in cohesive but isolated village communities while the Chinese, primarily retail merchants, are concentrated in the cities. There are about 15 newspapers published in Chinese. The total issues amount to about 100,000 copies. This modest circulation is not conclusive as papers are circulated from hand to hand within local groups. The political orientation is about equal

as between Communists and Kuomintang adherents. "Sin Po," the leading Chinese daily, also prints an Indonesian edition. This marks the Chinese segment of population as relatively literate and aware of foreign affairs.

Mr. ARENS. What efforts have the present Indonesian Governments made to resist the encroachments by agents of the Soviets?

General WILLOUGHBY. As regards Soviet encroachments, a variety of factors will have to be considered. On the surface it would seem that the Jokja Republic has a good anti-Communist record, since they suppressed at least two armed uprisings. In the act of suppression, however, this Government allied itself successively with two Communist factions. The record suggests that Sukarno wanted to stay in power and that in order to stay, both Malakka and Alimin had to be broken.

It has been shown that both Sukarno and Hatta had longtime affiliation with Communists. Lately Sukarno has supported the Communist Party as an entity. While Hatta has the same general background, he broke with Sukarno last year over his sponsorship of Communists in Government. If we simplify matters and ascribe genuine "nationalism" to both, it would appear that Hatta is the more conservative type and worthy of the careful attention of the West.

Recent reports, in the period 1956-57 (though repetitious), indicate Sukarno's marked predilection for Soviet Russia. His visit to Moscow must have impressed him deeply. He talked against the "Western parliamentary system" and called for "guided democracy on the basis of discipline," etc.

There is no question that the Communists are gaining in Indonesia, in a climate of official tolerance. The June elections, with parallelism in the provinces, show Communist gains in local contests. In Jakarta, the Communists moved from fourth place (96,000 in 1955) to second place (137,000 in 1956). Nationwide, the Communists won about 1,500,000 more votes than in 1955.

Mr. ARENS. What about the economic factors?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would clarify this point by developing certain relations between irresponsible "nationalism," the confiscation of property, the collapse of a delicately balanced economy which, in turn, created a climate favorable to a Communist takeover. My sources are in substantial agreement on this interrelation.

The Asiatic is an individualist; if he is commercially gifted, like the Chinese and Indians, he is out for profit. The chaos of revolution, however, is tailor-made for Asian as well as Western "carpet-baggers."

The Chinese spotted valuable raw materials in Sumatra, stocked during the war, without a chance for export. Singapore was the prime mover. Relatives and business associates on the spot did the collecting; every kind of craft that had escaped wartime destruction was used for transport. Moreover, there were important stocks on the estates belonging to absent Dutch and foreign companies and all sorts of equipment and movable property which were stolen.

Trade began to boom, but the Singapore traders always made 100/200 percent profit—and Malaya obtained a lot of extra United States dollars for rubber and other products. The Dutch could not prevent it until they had sufficient small ships to patrol the coast. The traffic was possible only with the connivance of the local Republican bosses, both military and civilian.

Opportunistic sharp practices were, of course, not limited to the "carpetbaggers" of Singapore. The case of Mr. Matthew Fox, vice president of Universal Pictures, must be considered one of the more exotic flowerings of the free economy. He appeared, when Indonesia was invited to attend the "U. N. Economic and Social Council of International Trade" at Havana, November 1947. The Indonesian delegates were Mr. A. K. Gani, Minister of Economic Affairs; Mr. A. Maramis, Minister of Finance; and the Republican Trade Commissioner in New Guinea, Mr. Sumitro Joyohadikusumo. Such delegations are expensive and hard money (in Indonesia) was scarce. Here enters Mr. Fox and on the strength of advance in dollars—\$25,000 according to the draft as first initialed in Havana, \$80,000 as subsequent rumor had it—the big "dignitaries" of the Republic concluded an agreement with the American financier.

A corporation in which Mr. Fox was to possess the majority of voting shares was to be set up as "the sole and exclusive agent of the Republic for every conceivable transaction, in the United States, covering purchases, concessions, licenses, franchises, and development enterprises." Every precaution was taken that no outlay should be made unless covered by Indonesian produce; the remuneration was to be a modest 7½ percent commission on all payments, including costs of transportation, etc. The Indonesian Government waived its sovereignty with regard to claims or controversies, submitting its agencies to United States arbitration proceedings. Gradually, the authorities concerned realized their position; adverse political agitation was feared in America if this curious monopoly were to be exposed officially and, for a time, pressure was brought to bear to prevent its publication. Eventually, the Fox Corporation modified its demands for a closed shop.

If the Fox maneuver can be charged to rampant, amoral "capitalism," there is another case in which "international communism" was to play a covert role.

Mr. Campbell was an Australian manufacturer in a small way but closely allied with Communist circles in Australia. He offered to "assist the Republic" as trade commissioner, asking no pay. The Republic, in its infancy in 1946, gratefully accepted. Mr. Campbell must have had early training amongst the Madison Avenue boys, since one of his colorful proposals was "the entry of an Indonesian winter sports team" in the Australian annual event on Mount Kosciusko. Mr. Campbell was not nearly as amusing, when he attempted to put an Australo-Indonesian corporation together which was going to monopolize trade between the two countries, with Republican "preferences" and the assistance of the tightly organized Australian dockworkers, who would see to it that "noncorporation cargoes were delayed by special treatment." Mr. Campbell, of course, was to officiate—but not gratis—in this corporation.

Fiscal responsibility is one of the prime requisites of orderly Government. Nationalist aspirations can hardly be made an excuse for practices that are unacceptable under the norms of the free economy. There is indeed a growing tendency amongst these fly-by-night establishments to repudiate financial obligations and to confiscate properties without proper compensation. Indonesia has just recently repudiated her international indebtedness to the Netherlands. Certain U. N. proposals are becoming rather vague and fuzzy with provisions to protect individual property against confiscatory practices.

The very recent outbreaks against the Dutch, the seizure of legitimate business by Communist controlled labor unions, and so forth, confirm the fiscal and economic irresponsibility of the Sukarno "Republic."

Mr. ARENS. Are there any counterbalancing influences in this situation?

General WILLOUGHBY. They are found within the Mohammedan party, initially called Serika, later "Masjumi," in the immediate entourage of former Vice President Mohammed Hatta (who split with Sukarno, though a rapprochement may be possible this year) and a portion of the "intelligentsia" who support the Socialist, Sutan Sjahrir.

In the "outer islands," Communists have not been successful except along the east coast of Sumatra, the plantations area of Deli and the oilfields of South Sumatra.

The "separatist" tendencies, a recent phenomenon which completely vindicates the initial Dutch plan for a federation of several states may become a counterbalancing factor. The Borneo coup of March 1957 was the latest in a separatist series beginning with Sumatra (December 1956) followed by the Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Lesser Sundas. The resistance of South Moluccas is within this separatist category. The leadership in every case was military. These leaders object to Sukarno's pro-Communist tendencies though their real reasons were economic. They coined the phrase "Javanese Centralism." Java contributes less than 20 percent toward the exports that sustain Indonesia's foreign exchange. The other 80 percent comes from outside Java. The "provincials" feel that Java absorbs a major share of income at the expense of local improvements. The much maligned Dutch "colonialism" was managed much more efficiently, while maintaining peace and order and prosperity.

Finally, the local military leaders are worried over Sukarno's proposed "administrative plans" that appear to them as sharply gravitating into the Soviet orbit.

In this connection, the person of Mohammed Hatta seems to emerge in a new and favorable light. In spite of his Communist antecedents (in the early phases of his career) Hatta has become distinctly lukewarm vis-a-vis Soviet blandishments and actually broke with Sukarno last year, because of the latter's growing pro-Soviet tendencies and rather clumsy attempts to maneuver the Communists into his Cabinet and the Government. This break must be regarded as a courageous and significant act. Hatta's stand coincides with the separatist movements in Sumatra and Borneo. Sukarno appears to realize the gravity of a permanent political crisis. He has made a gesture of reconciliation. The "separatist" chieftains were invited to a conference under "safe conduct" in Jakarta this last September. A "Committee of Seven" was appointed comprising Sukarno, Hatta, Djuanda, Lei-mena, Azis Saleh, Hamengku Buwono, and Major General Nasution. This committee is expected to resolve the "separatist" movement but as a byproduct may well stop the drift toward communism of the "central" government, i. e., Sukarno. At this moment, the outcome is not clear though it is doubtful that the "separatist" local governments will give up the advantageous economic position on which their movement was based in the first place. It is ironical that "separatism" must lead to some structure of "federalism" which was the initial plan of the Dutch, backed by their intimate knowledge of the country.

The United Nations Indonesian Council failed to understand this—and seemed to care less.

Mr. ARENS. Have you any comments on the status of Dutch New Guinea, recently called "Irian"?

General WILLOUGHBY. The roundtable conference could not come to an agreement regarding the status of Western New Guinea. "Irian" is a hitherto unknown designation, cooked up in Jakarta circles. The Republic has reached out for that Asiatic piece of real estate under the sweeping slogan of "Merdeka"; the open sesame for postwar confiscation and thinly disguised brigandage. The acquisition of "Irian" is obviously one of Sukarno's pet idiosyncrasies. Recent separatist movements ranging from Sumatra to the Moluccas would mark this project hardly feasible. Nationalist aspirations which are now tenderly nursed by the West could be academically carried to the ludicrous extreme to return Mexico to the Aztecs, Alaska to the Eskimos, and the American Southwest to the Apaches; their historical claims are probably more legitimate than the current crop of "liberators" from Kashmir to Ceylon.

The Dutch must have reflected that the Australians, who occupy the eastern half of New Guinea, were not induced to relinquish their possession; they must have noted that Sarawak remained a British Crown entity, while the rest of Borneo went to Sukarno's domain; they could hardly overlook that the British took their time in relinquishing Malaya while retaining commercial rights and a strong financial position. The Dutch must have reflected on the dubious "rewards" of their wartime alliance and sacrifices (1941-45), the recent Indonesian repudiation of their monetary claims—which does not disturb the U. N. in the least who appear to have accepted confiscation and repudiation as attributes of "national sovereignty". The whole case of "Irian" is another exhibition of the "double standard" of the U. N. political morality.

British New Guinea (Australian Papua) was "annexed" in 1883, while Dutch New Guinea was acquired by treaty as early as 1660. After the fall of Napoleon, the British specifically confirmed Dutch possession by the Conventions of 1814.

Just as the Australians did, the Germans wedged in along the north coast in Kaiser Wilhelm's Land and the Bismarck Archipelago. The Germans were kicked out by the League of Nations in 1919. A cynic might recognize here a natural affinity between the paternal league and its quasi-offspring, the present U. N. It was not in the nature of a surprise that the area became somebody's "mandate," i. e., Australia's.

With an eye on neighboring Australian Papua, the Dutch drew proper conclusions and declared New Guinea a part of the Netherlands. The area is about 157,789 square miles and the population is estimated at 195,460. The territory is thus practically undeveloped. In racial type, the natives differ completely from the Indonesians. They are Negritos, Papuans and Melanesians. The tribes are savage, almost stone age; head hunting and cannibalism are prevalent. Since "sago" is a principal diet and can be found anywhere, there is little incentive for work. "Colonialism" i. e. the energy and skill of experienced administrators, like the Dutch, may develop this raw land; the Javanese are not remotely likely to do it.

Mr. HEIMLICH. How does the Indonesian situation fit into the overall pattern for the Red conquest of Southeast Asia?

General WILLOUGHBY. The Russian plans, utilizing Red China cannon fodder, may copy the Japanese advance in Southeast Asia in 1942. The Japanese were primarily concerned with the following:

(a) Control of strategic raw materials, such as oil, rubber, and tin.
 (b) Driving a wedge to separate the West from Asia, i. e., control of the Malay Barrier in terms of control of sea lanes from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea.

(c) The isolation of Australia as a corollary of the seizure of the Malay Barrier.

(d) Seizure of Dutch New Guinea and part of Australian Papua and reaching for the Moluccas.

The United States fought the Pacific war precisely to stop Japanese expansion. Are they to capitulate to indirect infiltration by world communism, aiming at the same strategic targets, that is control of the Malay Barrier?

The United States has declared itself and has defined an ultimate Pacific defense line: the island chain running from South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines to New Guinea and Australia. Encroachments on this line, via the Sundas and Moluccas and aspirations for Dutch New Guinea (one of Sukarno's most active political items) are an obvious threat to Australia and the southern flank of the United States defense line.

The weakening of this line is a prime Sino-Russian objective. It explains their war against Korea and the endless pressures to retrieve Formosa. If and when they dominate Indonesia and the outer islands, they are at grips with Australia and can start to roll up that defense line from the west. The situation and the thesis are more readily understood on maps that (a) show the Pacific defense lines and (b) the southern flank of this line; that is, the significance of the Moluccas and New Guinea.

Most recent press reports quote an American authority not to be taken lightly: Adm. Felix Stump, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific. Stump's views are substantially as follows:

i. Subversion might get out of hand before (the United States) could do anything about it.

ii. Indonesia has gone so far "playing ball with the Reds" that the present Government may not be able to turn back.

iii. The Indonesian administration has relied heavily on its native Communist Party, has yielded to pressures and concluded trade agreements with several Communist countries.

iv. The Indonesian Reds appear to have reached a point where they will demand to be paid off for past services.

Indonesia is not a member of the SEATO defense organization. Hence, we could not interfere with any overt or covert "Red aggressions." The Soviets could and probably will obtain bases and ports in much the same surreptitious manner in which they obtained them in Syria. I maintain that "the Russians are starting where the Japanese left off." They want control of the Malay Barrier to seal off Southeast Asia and drive a wedge between our Pacific defense line, the Indian Ocean areas and Eastern sea lanes.

Mr. HEIMLICH. Can the United States salvage the deteriorating situation or reverse the trends toward "centralism" and, ultimately, toward the Soviet orbit?

General WILLOUGHBY. It is fairly obvious that the United States, together with the U. N., is largely responsible for the course of events since 1945. Both were parties to various political agreements that would have normalized the progressive transfer of authority from the Netherlands East Indies Government to a federation of autonomous States. Both failed to support these agreements in the end. The Holland Government itself must share the blame for "buckling under" instead of adopting the British and French intransigence, in the disposition of their "colonies." A firm hand was certainly indicated when "liberation forces" or "independence aspirants" created disorder and chaos. This appears to be the age of irresponsible independence movements in which confiscation of properties, terrorism, repudiation of international debts, and undisguised Communist measures are fashionable and appear to be tolerated by the West without a murmur.

There has never been an election in Indonesia. "Parliament" in Jakarta consists of the original "revolutionary council," who have subsequently appointed a number of former Federalists. No constitution "by the will of the people" has been written. President Sukarno himself was never elected.

A United Nations Commission UNCI was a party to the evolution of Indonesia. The action involved the Security Council which essentially has done nothing. UNCI was morally obliged to supervise and/or activate the execution of the Agreement of Linggadjati, March 25, 1947, the Renville Agreement, January 17, 1948, and the subsequent "roundtable agreements" (1949). All these "agreements" specifically guarantee the "right of self determination"; this is a basic United Nations Charter principle. It would seem appropriate that reference is established to this principle, favoring U. S. recognition of "separatist movements" in Indonesia or rather a return to, and repudiation of, acts in violation of the above agreements. A first step should be the recognition of the "Republic of the South Moluccas"; this action is long overdue.

The trend toward "separatism" in Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and the Moluccas, i. e. the Outer Islands, was foreseen by the Dutch in their proposals of 1942 and 1949. They involved precisely a "Federation of Autonomous States"—a scheme no better nor worse than current British Commonwealth structure. These proposals, the Linggadjati, Renville, and roundtable agreements were formally accepted by the United States and U. N. and thus constitute the juridical basis for recognition now.


The orderly development of separatist areas contains elements of resistance to communism on religious and racial grounds and will tend to offset the purely politic and opportunist "centralism" that appears to be susceptible to, and is drifting into, the Communist orbit.

The interest of the United States and the West can best be served in terminating the fiction of "Merdeka" and its power vacuum and in supporting the economic and ethnographic divisions that have sprung up spontaneously in 1956 and 1957. A first step should be the recognition of the "Republic of the South Moluccas," a Christian minority

clearly entitled to the same kind of benevolent treatment that the U. N. has accorded Ghana and the crop of current "nationalist independence movements" from Morocco to Yemen, from Kashmir to Ceylon. A second step should lead to recognition of the separatist movements in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes.

Trends toward economic and ethnographic independence fit smoothly into the pious generalities of the U. N. "charter", etc., in that they represent bona fide aspiration for self-determination of minorities.

LOCATION AND EXTENT OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN REPUBLIC



Mr. ARENS. Can you comment on the Amboinese or South Moluccan independence movement?

General WILLOUGHBY. I prefer to follow my usual method of abstaining from personal opinions and, instead, select authoritative statements by a competent expert. In this case, an Indonesian naval officer who served under Admiral Helfrich, one Lt. Comdr. K. J. V. Nikijulw, a native of Amboina. Note extracts covering various phases of the current civil war between the provisional Republic of the South Moluccas and the Javanese, viz:

LOCATION AND EXTENT OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN REPUBLIC

The South Moluccan Republic is located among the islands between the Moluccan and Arafura Seas; between New Guinea and Celebes on a horizontal plane and between the southern Philippines and Australia on a vertical plane. Territorially, it includes the following island groups:

The Spice Islands (Ceram, Buru, Amboina, Haruku, Saparus, and Nusa Laut), the Banda group, the Kai group, the Aru group, the Tanimbar group, the Southwesterly Islands, and a number of smaller groups of inhabited islets and atolls. The total area of the Republic approximates 39,000 square miles, and the population is about a million and a half. In racial distinction to the rest of Indonesia, the population is Melanesian.

During the Pacific war, MacArthur advanced in a series of landings on the north coast of Dutch New Guinea. His outpost position to guard against Japanese air attacks on northwest Australia (Darwin) was in the Moluccas, specifically Aru and Tanimbar Islands.

Halmaheira was one of MacArthur's intermediate positions before moving on to the Philippines. It is obvious that this wartime contingency may occur again. The South Moluccan Republic is thus a strategic outpost of prime importance and a link in the general Pacific defense line: Philippines-New Guinea-West Australia.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS

The islands of the South Moluccas were discovered by the Portuguese during the great period of European exploration in the 15th century.

Amboina became the Portuguese base of operations in their voyages among the other islands, and a fort was built at Hitoelama on the northern coast of Amboina, ruins of which are still standing on the outskirts of the modern village of the same name. After the Portuguese came the Spanish and, in 1599, the Dutch took over the administration of the islands but still used Amboina's protected deepwater harbor and surrounding hills for the establishment of a naval base.

During World War II, the Japanese used it for the same purpose after the Dutch Navy was destroyed in 1941-42.

Mr. ARENS. Was the South Moluccan Republic legally entitled to declare itself independent of Indonesia?

General WILLOUGHBY. The South Moluccan Republic had full legal right to declare itself independent. Under the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of Linggadjati of March 25, 1947, any minority was so enabled.

ARTICLE 3

The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies, with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for such territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

ARTICLE 4

(1) The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

This careful provision for the right of minorities in the vast and racially intricate structure of the Indonesian Archipelago was unilaterally repudiated without warning by the Republic of Indonesia as early as December 1949, although the official repudiation did not take place until August 17 of the following year.

Besides violating the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement, as noted above, the Republic of Indonesia also rejected their commitments under the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, and the Roundtable agreements of 1949. Paragraph 2 of the Renville Agreement's 12 principles affirmed that—

It is understood that neither party (Indonesia and the Netherlands) has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati agreement.

The final provisions of the roundtable conference, which was attended by members of the United Nations as delegates and signatories, specifically provides for United Nations action in the event of their being dishonored or repudiated.

Article VI of the covering resolution is explicit:

The United Nations Commission for Indonesia or another United Nations agency shall observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements reached at the roundtable conference.

Thus, painstakingly, the negotiators of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Renville Agreement, and the Roundtable conference did attempt to safeguard the right of minorities in the Indies.

Mr. ARENS. What is the present political condition in the South Moluccan Republic?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is now a state of siege and military occupation which was imposed by the Republic of Indonesia after the declaration of independence. While the entire Republic of South Moluccas is blockaded, so that food and medicines are unattainable by the population, only small areas of the islands of Amboina, Buru, and Ceram are actually held by the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

On September 28, 1950, after a 5-month hunger blockade, using vessels belonging to the KPM (Royal Dutch Packet Co.), the Indonesians landed between 18,000 and 20,000 soldiers on the island of Amboina. This landing was stoutly opposed by the population, armed with shot-guns and spears, backed by about 1,000 regular Amboinese troops, former members of the Netherlands Indies Army. Instead of an operation lasting "3 or 4 days," as the Indonesians predicted, almost a full week was required to land the troops against defensive gunfire. Even when tanks were landed and supported by aircraft and warships, 6 weeks of continuous fighting were necessary before the Indonesians could establish beachheads along the Amboina coast. It should be noted that during the heat of the Indonesian assault they were assisted by the confusion caused by a severe earthquake and tidal wave, which added to the damage already produced by Indonesian flamethrowers and heavy artillery. And it should be further noted that the Amboinese had already undergone the privations and shortages caused by the Indonesian hunger blockade which was thrown about the Spice Islands shortly after the declaration of independence in April (1950).

Mr. ARENS. Are the armed forces of the South Moluccan Republic still offering resistance?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. While ammunition is extremely low, the Moluccans have not forgotten the use of their ancient weapons of klewang (cutlasses) spear and bow and arrow, and the occupying forces are unable to expand their beachheads to effect full control of

the islands. The Moluccan people have sworn that they will never surrender their lands to the Republic of Indonesia.

The settlement of the war is a matter for the United Nations Security Council. The Renville Agreement and the Roundtable conference were supervised by the United Nations and it is, therefore, a matter of moral concern to the United Nations when the provisions of those agreements are repudiated.

Mr. ARENS. General Willoughby, we are deeply indebted to you for this scholarly presentation of the historical developments which have led to the present crisis in Indonesia. In conclusion, would you summarize the situation?

General WILLOUGHBY. The establishment of local military rule has, in recent months, left the puppet leader, Sukarno, in control of nothing more than the island of Java. The Outer Islands have successively developed separatist movements based on economic necessity and ethnographic differences. These include (1) the Celebes, the lesser Sundas, and the Moluccas; (2) Sumatra; and (3) South Borneo.

It is significant that this subdivision was initially proposed by the Dutch in 1942 as a federation to be associated with the Netherlands Crown—a structure similar to the British Commonwealth. The Dutch proposals were reiterated and confirmed by the Linggadjati (1947) and the Renville (1948) Agreements under the auspices of the United States and the United Nations. The story of the pressures exerted on the Dutch to relinquish these agreements has been detailed in this consultation. It is now obvious that this was a concession which has resulted in chaos, disorder, and probable Communist domination.

One must credit the Dutch with expert knowledge of a country which they had successfully and humanely governed for more than 300 years, and with their proposal for a practicable, federated structure, suited to the limitations of the average Indonesian.

Recent events have proven the Dutch right, and the spontaneous political evolution of Indonesia confirms the fact that a conglomerate of 3,000 islands, 58 races with 58 languages, varying customs, laws, and ethnic characteristics cannot be unified by a phony propaganda slogan such as "Merdeka." Instead, there is a drift into separate entities with uncertain economic future and certain temptation to grasping political forces such as Asiatic communism.

In the face of the brutal realities today, the decisions and actions of the United States and the United Nations in the critical period 1945-49 have demonstrated once more an appalling ignorance of facts, international prejudice, and political tendencies which have played into the hands of the Soviet Union, and paved the way for the Communist takeover of the Malay Barrier.

Mr. ARENS. General Willoughby, may we once more express our appreciation to you, on behalf of Chairman Walter and the entire committee, for your courtesy in meeting with us here today.

The consultation is concluded.

(Thereupon at 1 p. m., Monday, December 16, 1957, the staff consultation was concluded.)

APPENDIX


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THE AMERICAN DEFENSE LINE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

American aircraft, based on (1) Okinawa, (2) the Philippines, and (3) Formosa, acts as a barrier, as a protective shield against enemy debouchment into the Pacific. Similar air positions in Malaya and Thailand represent connecting links, tied in a common defense under SEATO, recently formulated in the Manila Pact. Note that in World War II, Dutch New Guinea (5) and Australia (6) were our last line of defense in Japan's conquest of southeast Asia, in which Formosa played an important role. It was from Formosa that the Philippines were "air blitzed," and the air and naval bases of this island continued to play a role for 4 more years.



THE AIR CHAIN: JAPAN, KOREA, FORMOSA, OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, BRITISH BORNEO, BRITISH MALAYA, AND THAILAND

The central, dominant role of Formosa is self-evident, an indispensable link in the interlocking defense of the West Pacific. Conversely, Formosa in Red hands will break this chain irreparably and will jeopardize Okinawa and the Philippines, at flight radii of 600 miles, as shown by the heavy circle.



PACIFIC OCEAN

(THE MALAY BARRIER)

THE PACIFIC FRONTIER

NEW GUINEA

AUSTRALIA

PACIFIC OCEAN

RED SEA

PHILIPPINES

BORNEO

JAVA

CELEBES

INDONESIA

MALAYAN PENINSULA

1000 MILES

700 MILES

1500 MILES

100 MILES

100 MILES



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