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JAPAN AND
THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE



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Japan and the Far East Conference

By
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Preface

What is contained in this little volume is an amplification of articles contributed to the *New York Times* and *Current Opinion*. By putting the substance of these articles in more permanent form I hope to contribute something towards stimulating thought in this country upon the subject of our Far Eastern policy. Americans are so preoccupied at home with their diversified activities that it is not easy to arouse their interest in foreign affairs; and this is notably so with reference to Asia. The approaching conference in Washington will afford an opportunity for presenting to the American people in an authoritative way conditions in Far Eastern countries. Presumably the facts will be gathered in a comprehensive and scientific manner and there will be collated for the guidance of the participants in the conference, valuable data concerning the social, ethnological, political, economic and industrial conditions in the Oriental countries, and particularly in China and Japan. Whatever may be the definitive results of the conference, such an investigation ought to do much to stabilize our Far Eastern policy; and it must inevitably advance the interests of mankind.

H. W. T.

October 10, 1921.

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JAPAN'S ATTITUDE

The foreign policy of the United States with reference to Oriental matters must in the last analysis depend upon our relations with Japan. If Japan had grown to be a world power before America and the European powers had acquired "spheres of influence" on the Asiatic continent she might have established an effective Monroe Doctrine for the Orient, declaring that attempts to impair the territorial integrity or to disturb the political institutions of China or any other Asiatic nation, would be regarded as an unfriendly act. But Japan emerged too late from the condition of a hermit nation, and remained too long subject to Samurai traditions and militaristic influences, to justify her in asserting, as the United States asserted with reference to the American continent, that the extension in Asia of European systems would constitute a menace to her national life and her governmental institutions. Before her military strength had been demonstrated by the Chinese and Russian wars and before her political system had begun to assume the character of a modern representative government, England, France, Russia and the United States had acquired interests in the Far East which made them factors which could not be ex-

cluded by the delayed assertion or the temporary acceptance of such an imperfect imitation of the Monroe Doctrine as the Lansing-Ishii agreement. And so it happens that no great international policy can be inaugurated in the Far East without taking account of the interests of the western nations I have mentioned, although, for obvious reasons, Russia's assumption of the role of an International Pariah must exclude her from present calculations. But it is equally true that so far as the potentiality of strictly Asiatic nations is concerned there is none of them except Japan that need be considered in establishing international equilibrium. A settlement with Japan of Far East and Pacific questions means to all intents and purposes a settlement of the destinies of all the peoples of the Orient, although, perhaps, this generalization ought to be qualified by the statement that such a settlement cannot be permanent if it does not make just provision for the welfare and the free development of the vast populations that inhabit the Asiatic continent, however impotent they may be in the national and military sense.

It is this dominant position of Japan in the East that makes the International Conference recently called by President Harding of historical importance. Whether or not we differ with the statement of the State Department, made by direction of the President, that "limitation of armaments," the primary purpose

of the conference, "has a close relation to the Pacific and Far Eastern problems," those who believe that a better understanding of Far Eastern questions as a basis for a more satisfactory international status than now exists is necessary, will rejoice that at last we are seriously to undertake "the consideration of all matters bearing upon their (i. e., Far Eastern problems) solution, with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policy in the Far East." (Statement of the State Department).

It is, of course, right that China should be invited "to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern questions." But representations by the present Peking government can hardly have much weight in view of its insignificance as a political agency. Indeed, one of the chief difficulties the conference will encounter in dealing with Chinese affairs, will be that the Peking government, politically speaking, is not representative of the Chinese people and remains in nominal power solely through the tolerance of military governors of the provinces who are content to have a "show" governmental establishment in Peking while they enjoy real power as rulers of the people. In view of this situation it is not surprising that the Constitutionalist Government at Canton, a revolutionary organization, according to our ideas of government, headed by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, has instructed its representative in Washington

to inform the American Government that the Peking government is no longer capable of representing China and that it is not qualified to send a delegate to the conference, but that the South China government should be represented. In support of its claims it further continues to assert that the Peking government is bankrupt and politically deserted and that the Chinese people are demanding that its recognition as the government of the nations be withdrawn by foreign nations.

One who has discussed Far East questions with leaders of thought and statesmen in Japan (particularly in the Japanese environment) will not be surprised at the initial hesitation of the Japanese government to join the conference without some definition of the subjects and scope of the proposed discussions. This is due to a caution or reserve in dealing with international affairs, attributable to causes which I will refer to later. But I am satisfied that it will yield to the logic of the situation and that when the conference shall have ended there will be no basis for reasonable complaint that Japan has not at least *discussed* freely all Far East and Pacific questions, even though she may by her veto prevent what she regards as definitive action detrimental to her sovereign rights or an offense to her national dignity.

I remember that in a six day conference in which I participated in Tokio in 1920, with leading Japanese

publicists, statesmen, journalists and financiers, a suggestion that Shantung be made a part of the *agenda* was met with the objection that there was no Shantung question;—that it was a *fait accompli* by virtue of the Versailles Treaty. But the objection quickly yielded to the suggestion that as the conference was designed principally to improve relations between the two countries, and as the people of the United States believed that there *was* a Shantung question, an omission to discuss it would be unfortunate. And I hope that similar counsels will prevail in the Far East Conference. Underlying some of these questions is the principle already asserted by Mr. Hughes in his Yap communication, viz: that as one of the allied and associated powers, a disposition of territory or rights acquired as a result of the war, cannot be made without our consent, and especially where, as in the case of Yap, the territory can reasonably be regarded as within the range of our influence as a Pacific power. This principle affects, in a lesser degree, the Shantung question, although our primary interest there relates to the “open door” in China, while a secondary consideration is based on our adherence to the principle that helpless China should not be despoiled of her territory. But as I shall show later, Japan ought to welcome an opportunity for settling the Shantung question in some authoritative way. She has repeatedly evinced to the

Chinese government a desire to negotiate a settlement, but has, as yet, succeeded in getting no definite response. A discussion in the conference and an understanding by the conferring nations will no doubt lead to a solution which will be to Japan's advantage without any impairment of her sovereignty, particularly as she starts with the enormous advantage of an award under the Versailles Treaty, assented to by England, France, Italy and Germany, of all Germany's rights in Kiao Chow and the Shantung Peninsula.

There is a line, however, beyond which Japan's national rights and dignity will not permit her to go. Thus she will be justified in refusing to discuss Korea or Formosa. Both these territories have become constituent parts of the Japanese Empire, and the fact that there may be disturbances in parts of Korea, and even among some Koreans aspirations for independence, these are clearly domestic questions which Japan will decline to discuss.

To a suggestion that Shantung should be discussed, some Japanese newspapers have "countered" by suggesting that the California land laws and immigration in general should be discussed. Again the matter of racial equality has also been brought up. But Japan will not seriously contend in the conference or elsewhere that the United States, for the protection of its own people, may not absolutely exclude Oriental races, or

that discrimination may not be made against those races in laws establishing qualifications for citizenship. Japan herself is forced to adopt an exclusion policy against China. These are so clearly matters affecting Japan and the United States alone that I doubt whether a way will be found for even their discussion at a conference seeking to reach a "common understanding with respect to principles and policy in the Far East." It would be unwise for Japan again to press the subject of "racial equality." It would surely meet the same fate as at Versailles and a solution of the insoluble question would be just as far away as possible.

The prospective conference makes it timely to consider a variety of Oriental questions of interest to America and Japan.

A LOOK FORWARD—GENERAL

Social, industrial and political developments among the vast populations of the Far East foreshadow an epoch of world wide importance. The historian of the future will become increasingly occupied in interpreting the changing phases of the process by which the new order will be super-imposed upon and will submerge the old. Will a culture emerge based upon the model of Western or Christian civilization, or will there be a recrudescence of the wonderful systems which existed in India and China thousands of years ago? Is there anything in the recent trend of history which suggests an answer to this question? We of the Occidental races believe that the civilization which has grown up during the Christian era has brought the human race to the most advanced stage of development recorded in history. What we call Western civilization has thrived in its most perfect flower upon the continent of Europe; but it is now staggering under the grievous wounds inflicted by the great war, if, indeed, it had not before that cataclysm shown signs of decay; and if we could conceive of Europe completely detached from the rest of the world, it would require no great prophetic power to predict an end of its once perfect cul-

ture. While she is tottering to her feet, it is fairly clear that the process of disintegration can be stayed only by the moral, material and political support and inspiration received from America.

The people of the United States have not advanced in culture to the highest point heretofore reached by the European nations;— but we have gone far. And while in the development of our political institutions for the creation and preservation of those rights and privileges connoted under the term of civil liberty, with their reciprocal obligations, and in the cultivation of the moral and intellectual qualities of our people, we have made a notable advance and have furnished models for the rest of the world, our national consciousness is still lacking in some of those things which develop only in maturity and under the influence of traditions centuries old. We have the loftiest aspirations and the highest ideals. In the value of our resources we are the richest, in the vigor, inventiveness, resourcefulness and potentiality of our people we are the most powerful, from the disinterestedness of our idealism we are the most influential, and in our conception of the blessings of representative institutions we are the most advanced, nation of the world. And while we have not reached the stage of development in some directions attained by the older European nations, it is in America that Christian civilization is sometime to reach its

farthest point of advance; and when it does, the inevitable swing of its influence will be to the west and will affect the myriads of people of the Orient.

Bishop Berkeley's beautiful and prophetic words of two hundred years ago may yet find application in the Far East:

There shall be sung another golden age,
The rise of empire and of arts,
The good and great inspiring epic rage,
The wisest heads and noblest hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,
By future poets shall be sung.

Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The first four acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day:
Time's noblest offspring is the last.

And who can say that empire shall not continue its course beyond the point where in mid-Pacific the west becomes the east, and shall not awaken the five hundred millions of people in Northern Asia to "another golden age"?

Historically, it is of entrancing interest to dwell upon the amazing development centuries before the Christian era of civilization in the countries of the Orient. We gaze upon it with wonder and admiration. After its own model it did not fall short of the perfection achieved later by western nations in their cultural development. But it has long been evident that under modern conditions the outworn customs and pursuits of ancient days are placing fetters upon the Oriental nations which have forced them to look to the west to save themselves from utter decadence of their national life. Oriental civilization in the historical sense is doomed. Its institutions cannot be rehabilitated. It must be superseded by some form of civilization based upon the institutions of the western nations. Philosophers and statesmen of the Orient have long been conscious that this development was inevitable.

What does this mean for the United States?

The cable, the wireless and the fast steamship service have made communication with Asia easier than among the original thirteen states when the Union was created. Our two thousand miles of western sea-coast fronts that of Asia with a barrier easily overcome by the devices of modern arts and sciences. Commercial interdependence has already assumed vast proportions. Asiatic nations are not seeking to impose upon us Oriental ideas and customs but, on the contrary, they are con-

sciously submitting themselves to the influences of western civilization, all for the purpose of adapting our institutions to their national needs and implanting them in the Orient. The march of progress will in the course of centuries bring the nations of the East into the family of those nations whose inspiration and national consciousness is founded in the principles of western Christian civilization.

THE DOMINANCE OF JAPAN IN THE EAST

Nearly one thousand millions of people live in India, Japan, China and the other countries of Eastern Asia. A deterioration of their national character without the substitution of the stabilizing elements of the institutions of our western civilization, would be a calamity. The Japanese are the only Oriental people that have the prospect in the near future of creating a progressive self-governing state. India and the other British possessions in the East, the Dutch Islands, the Philippines, China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia, with their vast aggregate population, are subject nations. The art of self-government has made little progress among them, and their people are in a backward state of development. Hundreds of millions of people in India are held together and saved from probable anarchy by the helpful control of Western powers; but the East Indians are dependent races, even though they are enjoying some of the benefits of Western civilization, and are being saved under the British rule from civil strife, and probably from greater desolation by famine and pestilence. The Philippines, if we were to release our hold upon them, would drift no man knows whither. The conditions in Siberia are little better than anarchy.

China as a unified nation, on the model of the modern state, does not exist. Japan alone of the Oriental nations maintains a government representative of her people and is pursuing the arts of civilization under its effective protection. It is a serious question for the people of the United States to ponder, and the coming International Conference will afford a fortunate opportunity for considering, whether, with our ideas of the advantages of self-government, of industrial progress, of law and order and of international responsibility, we ought to assume to interpose obstacles to Japanese activities in the East which are made necessary by Japan's natural and economic and industrial growth and the demands of her people for food, raw materials and the opportunities for self-support. The question cannot be disposed of by broad and dogmatic denunciation of Japan's imperialistic and militaristic tendencies. We must, in our own interest, and the Conference should in the wider interests of modern civilization, give to these subjects the attention and expend upon them the sympathy which their enormous importance demands.

CHINA'S POSITION IN THE EAST

Much is said about China as the ultimate hope of the East; and many who justly admire the moral and intellectual qualities of individual Chinamen, particularly those of the educated classes, are always ready to protest against any action on the part of Japan which savors of an attempt at aggrandizement at the expense of China. But China has not yet become in the modern sense an autonomous state.

In spite of the extraordinary development among her intelligent classes of a national consciousness, the Chinese nation is impotent single-handed to resist external pressure tending to impair its territorial integrity and its national sovereignty. Since it has become a republic and has abandoned many anachronisms in her social, economic and political life, such as the outworn practice of requiring erudite classical knowledge as a qualification for public office, great progress has been made, if not in administration, at least in a recognition of the necessity for adopting methods prevailing in other countries of the world in education, economics and government. Every observant Westerner who visits China is impressed by the enthusiasm and high intelligence of the educated classes, and particularly

of the bodies of students, who appear to be among the principal leaders in the movement for the moral, economic and political regeneration of their country. If these classes of men and women of modern China were representative of its population of four hundred millions, the chance of creating a unified national spirit and introducing into the psychology of the great masses of the people the concept of patriotism and nationality which exists in a high degree in western nations, the outlook would be indeed encouraging.

But how long is this going to take?

The spirit of modern progress has not permeated more than a very small percentage of the Chinese population. The great mass of the people in the inland cities, the small villages and the agricultural districts, have neither knowledge of nor interest in measures which are being contemplated for their benefit by the small minority of their fellow countrymen. They are pursuing their daily tasks and are living their daily lives much as they have for centuries. Furthermore, while some effort is being made to introduce education, the common people are generally illiterate, the contrast in that respect with the same class in Japan being very marked. The government of the Chinese people in the smaller communities continues to be largely patriarchal and their loyalty to constituted authority does not extend higher than the Provincial Governor. A

national federated government and the duties of national citizenship continue to be far beyond the contemplation of the great mass of the Chinese people. A significant evidence of this is the difficulty which any central government finds in attempting to enforce a system of taxation which will produce an amount adequate for its support. A nation of four hundred millions of inhabitants with a country having resources of fabulous richness, is constantly forced to make loans for the payment of the expenses of the quite limited administrative activities of its central government! All sorts of reasons will be adduced for this, but the fact will still remain that whether through dishonesty or inefficiency or national impotence, the Peking government finds the utmost difficulty in keeping itself a going concern.

The government of Southern China has for some time been practically independent of the Peking government, although there is now no open rebellion. Southern China manages its own affairs, and the Peking government tolerates the situation because it is powerless to alter it. It is a well-known fact that most of the military governments, presided over by veritable satraps, have usurped power in the several provinces and maintain a sort of a feudal governmental establishment, paying little heed to either the central government or the other provinces. The humiliating impotence of the Peking government was lately exhibited

when it refused even to open negotiations with Japan concerning the Shantung question, because it could not undertake to make any binding agreement which it could be assured would meet with the approval of the Chinese people.

A well-informed writer, H. H. Powers, S. B., Ph. D., American educationist and author, who has visited China six times, has summed up the situation in China, with a generalization probably too sweeping, by saying that the trouble with the present government of China is that it is *too* representative of the Chinese people, because it reflects too truly their political morality and their political capacity. He adds that "their disloyalty reflects the rudimentary political consciousness of the Chinese, with whom loyalty has hardly yet transcended the limits of the clan. . . . Their dissensions are representative of the incoherence of China, which has never known a real political unit beyond that of the province. . . . The hands-off policy will keep China what it has made her, a flabby colossus that staggers under its own weight and whines at the pinch of a school boy."

While these statements will probably be vigorously combatted by those who have been thrown into contact with the best type of the modern educated Chinaman, the best friends of China will not deny that the mass of the Chinese people do not now, and cannot for many

years, connect the idea of government with any organization beyond the province, and that their psychology does not include the idea of a modern unified, consolidated, federated nation.

Many people who have come in contact with the progressive element in China, that is, those of the *intelligencia* class, derive from them the belief that if that nation is protected against Japan's aggressiveness, it will be able within some short time to bring about such reforms in its internal affairs, and to create such a national solidarity, as to establish itself as one of the powerful nations of the earth. But if this does not happen within the next generation, it seems probable that, in the natural development in Asiatic affairs, Japanese power, and her economic and industrial development on the mainland, will make inroads on the sovereignty of China as a result of which the nation may be resolved into units which can each sustain itself more effectively than the congeries of provinces now nominally constituting China.

The building of the Chinese people into an autonomous, self-sustaining, independent nation, by educating the mass of her people not only to make them to some extent literate, but also to inculcate an idea of attachment to their country as a whole and of the performance of the duties of citizenship, is a task which will occupy generations. In the meantime, China will re-

main in a very real sense the ward of the family of civilized nations and cannot be expected to take an effective initiative in advancing the cause of civilization in the East. The Conference cannot fairly consider the so-called Far Eastern question without drawing a contrast between the situation of China and that of Japan.

JAPAN'S PROGRESS AS A MODERN NATION

In the last three-quarters of a century Japan has developed upon the lines of western civilization in an amazing fashion. In educating her people, in the development of her agriculture and industries, and in her economic and commercial interests, Japan has progressed with a rapidity and prosperity having no parallel in modern history. Furthermore, her national consciousness has so developed and the patriotism of her people has been so concentrated that the solidarity of her people is not equalled by any other country in the world except possibly France. In the energy and progressiveness of her people, in the vision of her statesmen, in the aspirations of her people for the betterment of their intellectual and material condition; in short, in all of the activities, moral, mental and physical, which we regard as necessary for the development of a modern state, Japan among the nations of the East is in a class by itself.

Gradually but surely she is becoming a representative democratic nation. The manhood franchise has been extended and the demand for universal suffrage is being constantly pressed. The interest of the people in public affairs is manifested at great public meet-

ings. Newspapers are numerous and are no less alert in keeping track of public affairs than the American press. In one of the great cities of Japan I witnessed at many bulletin boards an exhibition of the interest of the people in the returns the day after the election to the Diet. A growing liberal party is gradually but certainly increasing its hold upon the masses. The human material upon which it is working is far from being buried in ignorance, for the percentage of literacy among the Japanese is higher even than it is in this country. The compulsory education law is enforced rigorously, with the result that the attendance in the schools of those within the school age is general. While in some of the districts remote from the great centers of population the instruction of the poorer classes is not such as to give them more than a limited knowledge of reading and writing, there is, nevertheless, a great body of the common people who have sufficient knowledge to inform themselves by reading the newspapers, which they do with the most assiduous attention. There is thus in the making in Japan the kind of public opinion that we deem essential to secure civil liberty, and it is steadily and progressively influencing governmental action. The trend is towards a popular democratic government.

It is unfortunately the fact that the ministers of war and of the navy are not removable upon the change

of the political administration. Thus military affairs are not dependent upon departments in charge of civil administration and as a result are to some extent removed from the restraints of public opinion. But it is generally recognized that the influences working within the country itself and a regard for the opinion of other nations of the world, are gradually evolving a liberal policy which is tending to curb the imperialistic tendency which has been dominant under the militaristic system. Even leaders of the military party are themselves convinced that an imperialistic policy must be pursued, if at all, with much more circumspection than has heretofore been regarded as necessary. Japan asserts that her policy on the Asiatic continent and particularly in China has been dictated by a wise prevision of the future necessities of her people; and there is no doubt that her contention is not without considerable foundation.

But Japan's aggressive militarism has subjected her to the suspicion of entertaining imperialistic designs involving the impairment of the sovereignty of China, Mongolia, Manchuria and Siberia. Her administration of recently acquired territory, particularly Korea, has brought upon her severe criticism. Her tardiness in withdrawing her troops from Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia and the Shantung Peninsula have been especially pointed to as evidence that she proposed to extend

her hegemony over these countries. There is much evidence of her effort to monopolize Oriental trade, sometimes by questionable means, and many people claim that she is a menace to the policy of the open door in China. Instances of oppressive practices by the Japanese upon the Asiatic continent, made effective by the support given to them by military forces, are numerous. One of the commonest charges made against Japan is that her agents have corrupted Chinese government officials and have by sinister means fomented disturbances with pre-concerted designs against China's sovereignty, or at least to prevent her from acquiring a national solidarity which would be a menace to Japan's supremacy.

There is no doubt truth in some of these charges. But it is difficult to determine how far these Japanese activities have been due to mere mistaken party policy and to what extent to a prevailing spirit of imperialism. Intelligent Japanese do not hesitate to admit that mistakes have been made, nor can anyone who has visited Japan fail to perceive that the imperialistic tendencies of the military party are still potent and that they account for some of the aggressive enterprises on the Asiatic continent.

Encroachments by the military power of even the most advanced nations in occupied alien territory are to be expected. The military history of Japan and the

long-maintained predominance of the military spirit in its government, not yet ended, prepare us to believe that whatever may be the policy of the civil administration at home, there may be ground for charges of military encroachments abroad; and we will no doubt continue to hear that Japan has an ulterior design to establish an effective hegemony over the Asiatic continent.

But the military party exerts its power with more regard for the views of other nations, and with a realization, perhaps subconscious, that imperialistic militarism, upon the model adopted in Germany, cannot long endure. The elder statesmen in Japan not only realize this but their views with reference to the present and future relations between Japan and this country were sensibly affected during the late war by the actual and potential military power of the United States. These conditions are working to make the chance of war between the two countries extremely remote, in spite of the irritation recently caused by the California land situation. As the Japanese people are proud and very sensitive, and as they are easily moved to resentment where their national honor is involved, a situation might arise where a government in power might, against their better judgment, be forced by the people to assume a truculent attitude; but recent events have rendered this more and more improbable.

In connection with all these activities of the Japanese, it must be remembered that Japan is an enlightened and civilized modern nation; and that her statesmen of all parties feel the responsibility for adequately caring for the interests of her citizens, both in the matter of providing for their creature comforts and also for their enlightenment and training in the duties of citizenship. Japan does not and cannot produce enough to feed her people. She is without the raw materials to maintain her industries. Her population is increasing at the rate of from 600,000 to 700,000 annually. Her circumscribed islands are overcrowded and the restricted area of agricultural land compels the Japanese to adopt methods of cultivation not equaled in their intensive character in any other part of the world. The people on her islands already number 376 to the square mile, indicating a density exceeded only in Belgium and Holland. Agricultural Japan is one continuous truck garden, and waste land which is capable of being developed for agriculture is rarer than in almost any other country of the world. Of the entire land area of Japan only 30% is arable, while about 65% is mountainous or swampy, or unavailable on account of the climate for agricultural purposes. If there are sixty millions of Japanese in Japan their existence would have to be dependent upon the cultivation of 44,000 square miles, or one-fourth

of an acre *per capita*. To provide food for her population and raw materials for her industries, it is absolutely essential that Japan should extend her industrial activities to the Asiatic continent. The fact may as well be looked at candidly by the coming conference and that cannot be done without a study of Japan's real necessities and an endeavor to deal with them sympathetically. Opposition to Japan based upon insensate prejudice or condemnation of her methods as being based solely upon her militaristic and imperialistic designs will not bring a solution of the problem. If the United States and other Western powers refuse to recognize Japan's needs because they wish to maintain for some indefinite period China's national integrity, territorial and political, they will force Japan to adopt a policy which would be by no means agreeable to them.

MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE JAPANESE

I cannot help attributing some of the charges against the Japanese, particularly where they affect their responsible statesmen, first, to a national self-sufficiency, which is perhaps not unnatural in view of the recent military and industrial history of Japan, resulting in a reserve which causes them to react rather tardily to a new situation in international diplomacy; and second, to a temperamental caution. I would not attribute to them that quality of inscrutable mentality popularly called the Oriental Mind, for I do not think such a thing exists. Most of us who have dealt with Oriental questions spasmodically and indolently, have found the assumption that such a mind exists convenient in explaining international episodes which we have had neither the inclination nor the facilities for thoroughly investigating. A closer acquaintance with Oriental people, however, has led me to the conclusion that their mental processes are not essentially different from ours. It is true, of course, that their viewpoint is affected by national customs, religion, historical traditions, inadequate knowledge of conditions existing in distant parts of the earth, and, more than all of these,

by the difference in the language. The difficulty in the Japanese in conveying ideas is fraught with much greater danger of misunderstanding than is incident to intercourse with nations whose language, being more nearly allied to ours, can be much more readily acquired than the bewildering Chinese ideographs, and the complicated Japanese language which is largely based upon them. Assuming that the Oriental way of looking at things is due to these conditions, it makes it desirable, if we would avoid international misunderstandings, that we should make a special effort to overcome the difficulties in the way of complete mutual understanding.

I have found Mr. Kumasaki, the Consul General of Japan in New York, a very candid observer of the causes of our misunderstanding of his countrymen. He recently wrote to the *New York Tribune* as follows:

“My suggestion is, Japan will be better understood when she is looked upon as a nation of ordinary human beings animated by the same motives and aspirations as all the rest of humanity. Japan may differ in many ways from the countries of Europe, or those of America, but the Japanese people in their essential human qualities do not differ a particle from the Americans or any other people.

“Viewed in this light, there is nothing strange or mysterious about the Japanese. The history of the nation during the last half century shows how closely

her behavior approximates those of the western nations.

“Japan for over two centuries preceding 1854, when the country was opened to foreign intercourse, had been a hermit nation. She had kept her peace and troubled nobody. There was not a single war, internal or external. The Japanese is rightfully proud of such a long period of peace as has never been experienced by modern nations of the world.

“But once having been forced to enter the arena of international competition, Japan equipped herself with the best available weapons of modern civilization for survival. She had to fight several wars. It was the instinct of self-preservation that compelled her to fight them and her moral and physical superiority that enabled her to win them.

“In order to make clear the true position of Japan let me call your attention to Japan’s rôle in the Far East as its stabilizer and as the leader of liberalism in those regions. This is often overlooked, perhaps, because it is so obvious.

“First look at the map of the Far East. If you eliminate Japan from it how much will there be left in the shape of law and order, prosperity and progress, in that quarter of the globe? The history of the last century in those regions is nothing but a record of aggression and spoliation of the weak peoples by strong

powers from Europe. Japan's presence as a well ordered and adequately defended nation, vitally interested in the maintenance of peace among her neighbors, has served undoubtedly as a check to wholesale exploitation. Unfortunately unrest and civil turmoil exist in certain parts of the Orient to-day. But suppose there were no Japan, such as she is, and that she were a part of the spoils to be divided up, what would have been the chaos!

“Japan is conscious of her important rôle. She is conscious of the immense difficulties of her task. She welcomes heartily the support and coöperation in other great powers in maintaining peace and order in the Orient. It is for her own good and for the good of all.

“Secondly, Japan is the leader of liberalism in the Orient. The Japanese constitution was promulgated in 1889. During the following thirty odd years the nation has been developing steadily along the lines of representative democratic government. The big merit of the Japanese progress is its evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, character. We have moved steadily and unflinching forward, adjusting our affairs to the needs of changing times.

“With the termination of the great war a phenomenal change is coming over the Japanese nation. A keen desire to catch up with the most advanced of nations

is evinced in various new movements among the Japanese people.

“If you think that the Japanese are all of one mind you are badly mistaken. The Japanese differ among themselves in ideas and beliefs as much as they do in their physiognomy. There are reactionaries and conservatives as well as liberals and radicals. And with the ever growing freedom of speech and press all questions, social and political and economic, are being discussed all over the country.”

I have not seen anything recently which seems to me to sum up so correctly as Mr. Kumasaki's statement, the position of Japan and the Japanese people.

The self-sufficiency of the Japanese, to which I have referred above, was illustrated in Paris in relation to the Shantung matter. They rested on what they regarded as the merits of their case, while the Chinese delegates took pains through effective propaganda to excite the sympathy of the world in their contentions, —and succeeded. The caution of the Japanese is probably due in part to the brief period of their association in international relations with the other nations and in part to domestic political influences; perhaps also to the treatment they have received at the hands of the powers in the past, notably in the case of Port Arthur.

But whatever the cause, it does not seem to me that Japanese statesmen excel in those arts of diplomacy

which conciliate and organize public opinion in foreign countries;—and to that fact may be attributed a part at least of the prejudice and suspicion which has been aroused concerning some of their activities.

Leaders of thought in Japan do not hesitate to admit that Japan has made mistakes, particularly when they speak of acts for which political opponents are responsible; for internal politics plays a large part in Japan even in matters affecting international relations. But such apologists generally add that mistakes are to be expected in the conduct of the affairs of a nation which has been developing its modern civilization for only three-quarters of a century. Upon many matters, however, the Japanese with some insistence claim that the rest of the world has been misled through an inadequate understanding of the facts and of the Oriental environment. They are tolerant of differences of opinion concerning their national policy, and are more than willing to disclose what they claim to be the facts; but they are extremely sensitive when action by other nations, and particularly by America, is predicated upon a supposed inferiority of their race; and when one has seen the remarkable development in the economic and industrial life of Japan, the solidarity with which the Japanese people pursue their national aspirations, the effective manner in which they are cultivating the modern arts of civilization, and the importance which they at-

tach to universal education of the people, one is not surprised that the people of Japan expect to be ranked as among the nations of the earth who have reached the highest point of civilization, precisely as they are now recognized as one of the powers of the world.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

By the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Wilson administration recognized that propinquity and political interest justified Japan in claiming that she had a peculiar relation to all Asiatic matters. Certainly, so long as that agreement continues to be a formulation of our policy in relation to Oriental matters, we cannot object to Japan seeking economic advantages on the Asiatic continent. Furthermore, the agreement puts America in a situation where it can do much; for her friendly intervention will be of enormous influence in Japan; and in the approaching conference she would perform a world service by not permitting pressure in behalf of China to result in restrictions upon Japan which that country would seriously resent.

But Secretary Lansing informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the policy declared in the agreement was to continue only so long as the President and the State Department should determine. Furthermore, it is evident that Japan has had an understanding of the effect of the agreement quite different from that entertained by Mr. Lansing and this country generally. We have understood the agreement as implying nothing more than the open door, while Japan's

statesmen and her press have interpreted it as a recognition of the dominant political power of Japan upon the Asiatic continent. And now it is clear that Mr. Harding's administration is proposing to put an interpretation on the Lansing-Ishii agreement which, while it will insure the open door in China, will withhold recognition of political power. Mr. Hughes has recently written to the Chinese Minister as follows:

“The Government of the United States has never associated itself with any arrangement which sought to establish any special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly States; and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in designated regions of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry, or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.”

It is not easy to reconcile either the text or the spirit of this statement with the language of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and it is certainly contrary to the import of that agreement as it has been interpreted in

Japan. This illustrates one feature of our treatment of Oriental affairs that has been extremely unfortunate, and has gone far in impairing the lasting character of our influence and our policies; for these have not been continuous or consistent. I need only mention the reversal by Mr. Wilson of the "dollar diplomacy" of Mr. Knox and the return by Mr. Wilson to a similar policy in his approval of the Consortium for the purpose of giving China financial assistance.

JAPAN'S IMPERIALISM

The Japanese are undoubtedly extending their sphere of influence on the Asiatic continent, notably in the Shantung Peninsula, Southern Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, and they are consolidating their power in Korea and Formosa. Japan insists that her motives are economic; that she is merely extending her trade, or seeking, by colonization and the investment of capital in industrial development, to provide for that part of her population which is overflowing to the mainland, and to secure raw materials and food for her rapidly increasing people who remain at home. But it is asserted by Japan's critics that her Asiatic policy will lead to the dismemberment of China; and certainly, if that is Japan's purpose, China, unaided, would have small chance to avert such a fate. China is like a great slumbering giant, and the vital question of the Orient is how long the world will wait for her to awaken, and how long Japan can be restrained in her national aspirations, in order to let China catch up and create a balance of power, giving stability to both of the two great Oriental powers. No nation on earth has more interest in this question than the United States; and it will undoubtedly

engage the most careful consideration of the coming conference.

One thing that should encourage us to believe that our attitude in the conference will influence the future policy of Japan is the rather recently developed solicitude of the Japanese people concerning the public opinion of the United States. It does not need a long sojourn in Japan, or much contact with her people, to discover that they are more anxious to know what we think of them than we are to concern ourselves with their national activities. The liberal element is particularly anxious to justify Japan in the eyes of the world for such measures as the occupation of Shantung and the annexation of Korea; and members of the so-called military party are themselves by no means indifferent. It results that the opportunity afforded to America as a great power on the Pacific to keep Japanese aspirations within reasonable bounds, was never better, in spite of the exacerbation temporarily caused by the California situation. But will America deal wisely and consistently in the conference, and afterwards, with the Oriental situation? If its Eastern policy is to change with each administration so radically as it did when Mr. Wilson became President, it is not reasonably to be expected that it will be very effective. Nor will a futile protest in the conference against a *fait accompli* like that of the Shantung provision of the treaty with Ger-

many have any useful result or improve the relations between the two countries. What is needed is a definite, well-rounded, consistent and continuous policy with reference to Oriental matters. If such a policy can be adopted and formulated in conference, it will have enormous influence in shaping the destinies of the East.

In the matter of potential military strength, if we leave out of account financial considerations, Japan is so powerful that she could probably subjugate all of the hundreds of millions of people living in China, Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia. But fortunately for the rest of the world, Japan has advanced far enough in her grasp of modern world conditions to understand that an attempt at any such gigantic conquest would ultimately prove disastrous and that no modern nation could long endure should it undertake such an enterprise against the protest of the family of world nations. And while she often exhibits a caution in her international relations which tends to excite suspicion as to her ulterior designs, Japan is at the present time peculiarly receptive of advice from the western nations and particularly from the United States, in relation to her policy in the East.

Under these circumstances what is the best policy for this country to pursue? Ought we not to participate with other powers in the conference in seeking to influence Japan's policy in Eastern Asia? And in so doing

ought we not to approach Japan's problems sympathetically from her standpoint and not in a spirit which prejudges her case?

OUR INTEREST IN DEALING WITH FAR EAST QUESTIONS

Two thousand miles of our western sea-coast front the islands and the shores of Asia. By cable and wireless we are in daily communication with all parts of the Orient. Fast steamers brings us no further from them than were Virginia and Massachusetts from each other for many years after our Revolution. We have extended across the Pacific a chain of outposts commencing with Hawaii, passing through Guam and extending to the Philippines. Our interests require that an open door in China should be maintained through which we may participate in and seek to develop trade among her millions. We have not hesitated both through diplomatic channels and through manifestations of public opinion to let Oriental countries understand that as a nation we have an interest in such matters as the Shantung Peninsula, the twenty-one demands of Japan on China during the war, the economic concessions of China to Japan in Southern Manchuria, the occupation of Siberia, the recognition of a special interest on the part of Japan, on account of propinquity, in the neighboring countries of Asia, the Con-

sortium, and the mandatory of the Island of Yap. It will hardly be contended that we have not clearly, if spasmodically, asserted our national interest in the political affairs of the Far East. It may be unfortunate, according to the way in which one looks at it; but it remains the indisputable fact that our material and political interests in the East and the responsibilities which have been by fate thrown upon us, demand that our political relations with the countries of the Orient, and especially with Japan, should be made of the highest concern to the American nation. And from the standpoint of national idealism also American public opinion will no doubt continue to concern itself with Far Eastern Affairs.

Although the United States is one of the most practical and progressive nations of the world, it is equally true that it is the most idealistic. Instances illustrating this are numerous. I need mention only a few, such as our refusal to take Cuba, our payment of \$20,000,000 for the Philippines, which was not better than a liability, our attitude towards Mexico, our return to China of the Boxer indemnity to be used by her for educational purposes, and to Japan of the Shimoneseki award. However other nations may dislike us or criticize us, such things as these check any tendency to distrust our national motives. This national idealism not only gives us a growing interest, but also

a potent influence, in the development of civilization in the Far East. As I have said, the civilization which has reached its most perfected form among the western Christian nations, moves inevitably towards the west. In mid-Pacific the West becomes the East, and signs are not wanting that the influence of western civilization is slowly but surely making its impress upon the ancient and comparatively obsolescent civilization of the Far East. America cannot view with indifference a historical epoch having such significance for the uplifting of humanity.

Then too our trade situation with the Orient is of first rate importance. Our imports from Japan in 1920 were half a billion dollars and were about equal to those from the United Kingdom and from Canada. They far exceeded those from any other of the chief countries of the world. Our exports to Japan were more than a half a billion dollars and were far in excess of those to any other of the great countries of the world, excepting France, the United Kingdom and Canada. Our trade with Japan is four times that with China, which has probably six or seven times the population of Japan. The maintenance of the commercial relations between the two countries having such commercial relations is clearly of very great importance.

IMMIGRATION AND THE CALIFORNIA LAND QUESTION

It is the reaction which has followed the assumption by America of racial superiority that has caused more irritation than many of the other questions, more important to us, which have been the subject of international discussion. The Japanese have felt that they have not only been treated as inferior to Americans, but also to other people less advanced than they who are permitted to enter the United States under restrictions milder than those imposed on them. There seems to be no expectation (or any very strong desire) on the part of Japan that we should change our Oriental exclusion policy. But there is a good deal of irritation on account of the manner in which California has been recently dealing with the land question, in its effort to prevent Japanese residents of that state from acquiring agricultural lands. This question should not be confused with the general immigration exclusion policy of the United States, which is embodied in the "Gentlemen's Agreement," negotiated by Mr. Root, and which is faithfully observed by Japan.

The Japanese are not a colonizing people—their love of their native land is too intense for that. Japan's statesmen seem to be willing at present to keep as many of her nationals as they can in the Archipelago or in Formosa or Korea, or, if they must be colonized, to send them, as they now are doing, to those other parts of Asia which are near at hand and are being developed with Japanese capital.

But in California the effort has been to prevent Japanese who were permanent residents, although not citizens, from acquiring control, through leases or by transfer to their minor children, of agricultural lands. The legislation to accomplish this was based on initiative petitions, and the political agitation which it has aroused, was marked by exaggerated and inflamed statements concerning Japan and the Japanese. The new California land law was not directed in terms at the Japanese, but generally at persons who were not qualified to become citizens of the United States; and under the citizenship laws of the United States as "white men and Africans" are eligible to citizenship but "Mongolians" were not mentioned, the Chinese and the Japanese are by implication excluded. It is this discrimination which operates to make the new California law apply to the Japanese; and that, as I have said, is the chief cause of complaint on their part, and espec-

ially because they are thus treated as inferior to all "white men and Africans."

It is urged that the effect of the California statute is to deny to the Japanese the equal protection of the law, in that it discriminates among different classes of aliens, conferring upon one the protection of the law which it denies to another. It is also claimed that the provisions are in violation of our treaty with Japan which provides that Japanese residing in this country "may own or hire and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises, and lease land for residential and commercial purposes." But I do not believe that a satisfactory solution of our relations with Japan, so far as they are affected by the California land question, will be found in a decision upon a mere question of constitutional law. From the international standpoint the vital consideration is that a single state of the Union is insisting upon its own solution of a problem affecting its local, social and business interests, and, in the words of Governor Stephens, "is very sensitive about any interference with or restraint upon the sovereign right of the State to deal with its domestic land problems." It has not so much concern as to the manner in which that solution may affect the interests of the country at large.

It is this phase of the matter that ought to engage the attention of every American citizen.

I do not mean to be understood as saying that the position which the people of California have taken is not without justification, or that the Japanese who have settled in California are themselves without blame for the situation which has been created. The Japanese government might have anticipated, and perhaps have adopted measures to prevent, what has happened. The Japanese have selected a part of our country with a most salubrious climate and fertile land. They have made no effort to distribute themselves, and, with their prosperity and their increasing enjoyment of the advantages afforded them by the protection of the state laws, they have not conformed their customs and manner of living to those prevailing in America. On the contrary, they have concentrated themselves in limited areas, which has resulted in the establishment of communities in which have been retained Japanese social, domestic and religious customs. This was sure, sooner or later, to result in prejudice and discrimination. Furthermore, by availing themselves of their rights under the letter of state statutes while ignoring their spirit they have invited new and discriminatory laws. Thus it is charged (I have no figures showing the extent of the practice), that in order to evade the disability as to land ownership, they have, under the legalistically correct advice of California lawyers, purchased land and had it conveyed to their minor chil-

dren. They have then been appointed guardians of these children, thus becoming the practical owners of land they could not buy themselves. They have also formed corporations qualified under the California law to acquire title to land and have become the sole stockholders. By such methods as these they have been enabled lawfully to enjoy the benefits of land ownership, in spite of laws which were designed to prevent precisely that result. This procedure was certain to bring reprisals. If there is discrimination, the Japanese government and the Japanese people, in dealing with the question as an international matter, ought not to overlook these antecedent conditions.

I would not adequately deal with this phase of the subject if I did not observe that subjectively the Japanese are more intensely nationalistic than any other nation on earth, with the possible exception of France. In their feelings for their nationals who are settled in other countries, the psychology of the Japanese people differs from that of the American people. They seem to be attached to the interests of their fellow countrymen wherever they are, and they are keenly sensitive to any affront offered to them by foreign nations. We Americans, on the other hand, have comparatively little experience with American citizens who emigrate to other countries. The comparatively few who have gone to such countries as Mexico and the

Orient have well understood that they would be expected to conform to the laws and customs of the countries to which they emigrate, and that our government would not lightly interfere to protect their interests. We do not quite understand how an American citizen can reconcile himself to permanently leaving his native country or becoming naturalized in a foreign land. It is a little difficult, therefore, for us to realize the intensity of feeling which has been aroused in Japan on account of the rights of Japanese citizens who are seeking the protection and advantages to be enjoyed under a foreign government. I mention this matter merely to show that the viewpoint of the two nations is, if not irreconcilable, at least such as to require it to be dealt with with some delicacy.

It is undoubtedly true that the amount of land in California owned and worked by the Japanese is not large in comparison with the entire area of cultivable land in the State. Of 27,931,444 acres of farm land, the Japanese own 74,769 acres and lease 383,287; and the average farm in California is approximately 320 acres, while the farms of the Japanese average only 56 acres. The total of farm products in California, according to a report of Governor Stephens, was valued at \$507,811,881, to which the Japanese contributed \$67,145,730 or 13%. The Japanese produce 80% to 92% of certain products, like berries, celery and as-

paragus, and the American farmers monopolize such products as hay, grain, potatoes, grapes, beans, rice, cotton, corn, fruits and nuts. But these comparisons do not quite present the concrete conditions; for the Japanese colonize in districts of limited area, notably the Sacramento Valley, and there by their industry, their economy and their frugal habits, they soon drive out the neighboring American farmers, who are unable to sustain the competition, largely because their standards of living materially differ from those of the Japanese.

But there is no doubt that in these and other matters gross exaggeration has caused groundless fears. I noticed an example of this in a recent article in the *World's Work*, where a writer comments upon the fact that, after the "Gentlemen's Agreement" in 1907, under which the Japanese agreed to discontinue the granting of passports to laboring classes, the number of Japanese arrivals fell from more than 30,000 in 1907 to less than 4,000 in 1909, but that after that they largely increased until in 1919 they numbered more than 16,000. But it is not stated that the 30,000 immigrants in 1907 included about 20,000 who went to Hawaii. The writer exhibits a table showing that the aggregate arrivals since 1908 have been about 120,000. If these were added to the Japanese population according to the census of 1910, which was about 40,000,

the present Japanese population would be 160,000. As a matter of fact, however, the census which was recently completed shows that the Japanese population of California is 70,196, an increase of only 28,840 or 69.7% since 1910. Perhaps the writer in the *World's Work* did not intend to have the deduction made that all of the arrivals went to increase the resident Japanese population, but from his figures an uninformed reader would probably arrive at that conclusion. The fact is, however, that in the period mentioned in the *World's Work* the figures given include arrivals in Hawaii, and the *departures* are not deducted. The figures for arrivals, therefore, show only one side of the account, and do not represent the net result of immigration into continental United States. These facts render the tabulation of the writer in *World's Work* of little value in determining whether the increase in the Japanese population in California is so great as to give just cause for apprehension. The figures of the recent census show that California now has a population of 3,426,861 and a Japanese population of 70,196, or about 2%. In 1910 it was 1.7%. The rate of increase, being 1/30th of 1% per year, is not alarming. Furthermore, it appears that a very large part of the increase of the Japanese population consisted of women, no doubt many of them "Picture

Brides," brought to this country to establish the families of the farmers who preceded them.

But, however exaggerated statements made in the heat of the recent political campaign in California may have been, the question is a real one to the Californians and the situation created in certain localities ought to be dealt with in justice to the citizens of the state. The Japanese are not seeking to abandon the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907, or to have the bars against Oriental immigration lowered. But they are restive because they are not treated like other nations of the world, however backward the people of such nations may be. This complaint may be removed if our immigration laws are put upon a more scientific basis. The necessity for this has been pressed upon us by the impending danger that we may be flooded by immigrants from Southern Europe and the Near East. The new Immigration Law I hope may be an opening wedge to a better condition. It is based on the principle that the number of immigrants allowed to enter shall be made dependent upon the ability of our country to absorb, assimilate and Americanize them, without undue disturbance of our social and industrial conditions.

Probably the conference called by President Harding will not deal with the California question. I wish it might. But Japan's participation and the considera-

tion shown to her unquestioned position as one of the powers of the world will certainly have a good effect.

In an article published in *Current Opinion* last winter I wrote as follows:

“I hope the pending diplomatic negotiations may contribute something to restore cordial feeling between the two nations. If these fail, however, the suggestion is worthy of consideration, that there be appointed an international commission which will attempt to find a solution of the troublesome question, having regard for Japan’s national pride, for the vital interests of California, and for the rights of the entire American people. Objections having force have been made to such a commission. But the controlling consideration in its favor, in my judgment, is that in no other way than by the report of an international body composed of eminent men, in whose membership California is represented, can a conclusion be arrived at which will have the necessary weight with both the people of California and the people of Japan.

“So far as the general subject of immigration is concerned, that, of course, may be dealt with from the national standpoint, but the ownership and leasing of land is a matter usually regulated by state laws, and when national action is proposed, the interests of the state must not only be considered but the people of the state must be assured that their interests have received

from an impartial body the attention which they deserve. It would, in my opinion, be within the competency of the treaty-making power of the United States to enter into a treaty with Japan which would render null and void a provision of the California statutes, or even of its constitution, with which it was in conflict, for the Constitution of the United States provides that treaties of the United States are to be 'the supreme law of the land.' But the national government has always hesitated to deal with the rights of states by the exercise of the treaty-making power, and it probably will not attempt to do so in the case of California."

SHANTUNG

Another matter which will undoubtedly engage the attention of the conference called by President Harding is the Shantung question. When I was in Japan about a year and a half ago the public men of that country were inclined, as I have already said, to take the position that so far as America was concerned there was no Shantung question—that it was settled by the provision of the Treaty of Versailles under which Japan succeeded to the rights of Germany in the Shantung Peninsula. But Japanese statesmen were quite willing to state Japan's position so far as it related to China.

The Shantung province has a population of thirty millions. It contains the grave of Confucius, which sanctifies its territory. On the sea-coast the district of Kiao Chau, formerly occupied by the Germans, occupies a territory of about twenty square miles. Tsing Tau, the city within that district, became during the German occupation a beautiful modern city. Japan occupied Shantung for the purpose of organizing its campaign against the German forces in Kiao Chau and Tsing Tau. After the capture of these places, the military occupation of the country con-

tinued, and the Japanese forces policed the railroad running from Tsing Tau to Tsinan-Fu, the capital of the province, a distance of 170 miles. Up to a certain time the occupation of the Shantung province was undoubtedly a justifiable incident of the war. It took place when the Allies were only too glad to avail themselves of the efforts of Japan to destroy the military power of Germany in the East. As the war drew to a close, however, the question of Japan's withdrawal from the Shantung province came up sharply for discussion, and particularly in connection with the negotiations at Paris which resulted in the Versailles Treaty. If Japan had not given her assurance to the allied nations that her occupation of Shantung would not be made the basis for an interference with the political independence of China within that province, Articles 156, 157 and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles, relating to Shantung, would probably not have been adopted. But Japan agreed to refrain from interference with the political autonomy of the Shantung province, and also at a convenient season to enter into negotiations with China for a settlement of the Kiao Chau situation and of the claims to the economic concessions in Shantung which had been made to Germany. Sufficient evidence of this agreement is afforded by President Wilson's statement to the Senate Committee that he had an understanding with the Japanese delegates in

Paris "that Japan should return to China in full sovereignty the old province of Shantung so far as Germany had any claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish a residential district at Tsing Tau, which is the town of Kiao Chau Bay; that with regard to the railways and mines she should retain only the rights of an economic concession there with the right, however, to maintain a special body of police on the railway, the personnel of which should be Chinese under Japanese instructors nominated by the managers of the company and appointed by the Chinese government."

Since the Peace Conference, there has been ample evidence of the willingness of the Japanese government to carry out promptly this agreement. Viscount Uchida, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Prime Minister Hara, have made unequivocal statements that it is the intention of Japan to make good the promises of their Peace Commissioners; and the Japanese Foreign Office has made repeated efforts to open negotiations with the Peking government, with a view to making the complicated arrangements incident to the withdrawal from Shantung of Japanese troops which have been maintained there, as the Japanese continue to assert, for police purposes. What these difficulties will be is foreshadowed in a dispatch from Geneva dated December 9th, 1920, in which Baron Hayashi, the head

of the Japanese delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations, is said to have repeated the assurances given by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, after commenting upon the weakness of the Chinese government, to have added:

“We must settle how it shall be open and what guarantees we get that it remains so. Just the other day, for instance, one of the free ports of China was burnt by mutinous soldiers. We must have protection against that. . . .

“What they call public opinion is often that of school boys, traders and newspapers. It is often artificial. It always urges the Government to stand firm and does not consider the consequences. . . .

“I say it is difficult for us to deal with China. We see here a bright young man, Wellington Koo. He is a nice boy, but when he goes home he has no power. The Parliament behind him has no power. The army is revolting and half the fleet has joined the rebels. How can we make an enduring treaty with a Government like that?

“China needs a strong man. We wish she could get one to set her in order. Then we could negotiate and give back Kiao Chau, which we intend to do, but first we must have guarantees. Who can give them to us today?”

The Peking government quite obviously hopes that

the League of Nations, and perhaps the coming conference, will enforce some solution of the entire question which will be more favorable to Chinese interests and more satisfactory to the Chinese people than would have been possible if the concessions to Germany had remained in effect. The Chinese delegates to Paris sought not only to curtail Japan's political and military control in Shantung but also to recover the province freed of all claims based upon the concessions to Germany, as well as of all economic rights claimed by Japan as compensation for her services in destroying the German power in the East. In her last official note to China on the subject, Japan expressed her willingness to arrange the details of a settlement at any time that China might be ready and urged China to expedite the organization of a police force on the Shantung railroad so that Japan might safely withdraw her troops. After a long delay, an entirely inconclusive reply was made by China, to the effect that "the people throughout China have assumed an indignantly antagonistic attitude toward the question. For these reasons, and also in consideration of the amity existing between Japan and China, the Chinese government does not find itself in a position to reply at this moment."* But the

*NOTE:—Since this book went to press the Chinese government has informally handed to the Japanese Minister in this country a note which for the first time since the Shantung controversy arose, states China's attitude. (Dispatch from Peking,

promises of the Japanese government have been so plain and unconditional, and have so pledged the nation to the United States and to other nations of the world, that they amount to an assurance which Japan could not and would not withdraw. The influence of the United States at the coming conference ought to be

published in the New York Times of October 8, 1921.) The delay in negotiating with Japan is explained in the note as resulting from the fact that "the bases Japan claims to negotiate are all of a nature most objectionable to the Chinese Government and the Chinese people, or are such which they never have recognized. Furthermore, regarding the Shantung question, although Japan has made many vague declarations, she has actually had no plan which was fundamentally acceptable. Therefore the case has pended many years, much to China's expectation to the contrary."

As to the most recent proposals of Japan the note continues that if they "are to be regarded as Japan's final concessions, they surely inadequately prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to settle the question."

The note ignores the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, to which China finally became one of the signatories. It also rejects Japan's proposal for a unified railway system in Shantung and for the operation of the joint mines appurtenant to the railway. It is insisted that the Japanese army of occupation should be immediately evacuated, and that "China will immediately send a suitable force of Chinese railway police to" protect the railway.

The note concludes as follows:

"Further, in view of the marked difference of opinion between the two countries, and apprehending that the case might long remain unsettled, China reserves to herself the freedom of seeking a solution of the question whenever a suitable occasion presents itself."

Precisely what this cryptic statement implies one can only conjecture. China has not presented her case to the Council of the League of Nations, or attempted to procure an amendment of the Treaty of Versailles. Perhaps her diplomacy perceives that if the Shantung question is considered at the coming conference in Washington the Chinese government's continued refusal to make some definite response to Japan's advances may prejudice her case.

exerted to induce China to enter into a negotiation for the friendly settlement of the Shantung question. China can safely do this for it is quite certain that the public opinion of the world would not tolerate any over-reaching by Japan or any settlement which would involve an undue encroachment upon China's sovereignty in the Shantung Peninsula outside of the Kiao Chau district. Even within that district only such arrangements for the protection of Japanese interests will be sanctioned as are recognized by the principal allied and associated nations and the world as reasonable under the circumstances. Neither the Council of the League nor the conference can act except by unanimous vote; and insistence by China upon terms unsatisfactory to Japan would result in Japan's negative vote and the continuance of the existing status in the Shantung Peninsula. However unsatisfactory that status may be to China, it has a basis of legality in Articles 156, 157 and 158, which make Japan the legitimate successor of Germany in the peninsula. It is to be hoped that neither the Council nor the conference may have to act (or refuse to act), but that an arrangement satisfactory to the delegates of both China and Japan may be arrived at, and that the unanimous judgment of the Council of the League, or of the coming conference, based on such arrangement, may enable the Peking government to obtain approval in China which

would be withheld from any agreement made by the impotent Peking government as a result of an ordinary diplomatic negotiation with Japan. But if the Chinese delegates, against the protest of Japan, attempt to obtain support for China in repudiating the succession of Japan to the rights of Germany, under Articles 156, 157 and 158 of the Versailles Treaty of Peace, and the several agreements made between China and Japan during the war, on the ground that they were exacted from China by coercion, because China was powerless to defend herself against a possible invasion through Siberia, and Japan was the only nation in the East which could successfully destroy German power in Shantung and on the seas, a field of controversy will be opened up the consequences of which no man can predict. Such an attitude on the part of China, if supported by the League or the conference, would necessarily require the nations especially interested in Oriental affairs to inaugurate some kind of an effective policy by which the solidarity of Chinese territory and the independence of its government should be maintained. That would involve an intervention which would be a grave undertaking.

But China is patient. It has certain weapons which it can use effectively. Passive resistance with the Chinaman is a spontaneous art. A commercial boycott is even now being used with great effect as a re-

praisal for the action of Japan in proposing the twenty-one articles and retaining its hold upon the Shantung Peninsula. The strength of such a weapon as this cannot be ignored; and the spirit and enthusiasm and patriotism of the enlightened Chinaman must also have their effect. But can all these forces be marshalled in time to avoid the pressure of Japanese civilization and the resulting disintegration of China? A solution by the conference of this question will not be found unless it deals with Oriental, and especially with Japanese, affairs, with a sympathetic view of the national necessities created by the growth of Japan's population, and with an intelligent conception of her national aspirations; and closer attention must be continuously given to the conditions which from time to time exist in the Orient than has been possible in the past.

THE IMPROBABILITY OF WAR

Unfortunately, there is an appreciable number of Americans both in this country and in Japan who believe that war between the two countries is inevitable, and they point to certain preparations in Japan as indicating an aggressive policy on her part. But such investigation of these matters as I was able to make lead me to the conclusion that the preparations referred to were defensive in character and were no more elaborate than the exposed position of Japan in the Pacific Ocean made reasonably necessary. There is no party in Japan which, from the standpoint either of inclination or of national policy, seriously contemplates war with America. All organized political parties seem to agree that the cultivation of cordial relations with this country is the best public policy for Japan. In this connection the words of Mr. Roosevelt uttered in July, 1918, come back to me. He said:

“Japan is playing a great part in the civilized world; a good understanding between her and the the United States is essential to the international progress, and it is a grave offense against the United States for any man by word or deed to jeopardize this good understanding.”

Japan is becoming more and more a democratic nation. The manhood franchise has been greatly extended. The interest of the people in public affairs is obvious to even a casual observer. On May 11th, 1920, I was a witness to a manifestation of such interest in Kobe, which I have already referred to. In perhaps a dozen places in that city I saw crowds obstructing the streets where bulletin boards were displayed showing the returns of the election the day before to the Diet—the lower house of the National legislature. Such political consciousness as this indicates is reflected in the Japanese press whose wide circulation shows a demand for detailed news items and such free comment upon public affairs as fill their columns. It is not improbable that the mass of the people are taking a growing interest in politics as they are in industrial affairs; and as 95 per cent. of them are literate it is not probable that this interest will abate. Now, the common people of Japan do not want war. They are intensely occupied with their internal affairs; and I am satisfied that this attitude will go far to neutralize the belligerent feeling that may exist among those who still adhere to the militaristic policy, and particularly the young and enthusiastic army and navy officers looking for a career.

The fact, already alluded to, that under the Japanese form of government the ministers of war and of

the navy are not removable as a result of changes of political administration, and are thus to some extent beyond the reach of public opinion, will not probably long prevent the evolution of a liberal policy under which the militaristic influences in governmental administration will be gradually diminished. This will also naturally curb imperialistic ambition for the acquisition of territory, particularly on the Asiatic continent.

NECESSITY FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

But all this is not to say that Japan will not some time extend her territorial possessions, if that becomes necessary to satisfy her national needs, particularly in feeding and clothing her people and in obtaining raw materials which are required in her essential industries. If China, America and the western powers who have an interest in Oriental affairs, refuse to recognize these needs, Japan will, despite all objections, be driven to supplying them. The most ordinary considerations of prudence require that she should protect her people against the evils of overcrowding her already densely populated islands. That she wishes to accomplish that result by dismembering China is by no means clear, but that she seeks to obtain an economic foothold in Manchuria, Mongolia, Shantung and perhaps Siberia, as a means of procuring raw materials, and that she will encourage her people to emigrate to those countries, is not only probable but seemingly justifiable. If this aspect of the situation is dealt with by the coming conference sympathetically from the viewpoint of Japan's national necessities, a settlement of pending Asiatic questions will become more simple, particularly as never before has Japan been so sensitive to adverse

criticism of her imperialistic tendencies as she is now. The friendly intervention of America in these matters would not be resented; and we occupy a position which would enable us by intervening to be of substantial service to civilization in eliminating possible causes of international trouble in the Orient.

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