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The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV.

No. 2747

S.\TURDA Y, JAKUARY 2, 1915

[PUBLISHED AS ] PRICE
IXPE1<oCE
LA NEW"PAPER. PUBLISliED WEEKLY

1

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."Ý

CO/>)"liht, Russell & Sons, Suulh>ta

LIEUT.-CO
f
IANDER
ORrvfAN D. HOLBROOK, V.C.

Who, by an act of brilliant daring, n:tued the Oardar.elles ar.d sank v.ilh a torpedo the TUlkish b<:.lIleship MeswdlJch, which.
next to the Gocbcn. is the most powerful unit in th
T urki5h Navy. In order to re_ch this ship it was necessary to
pass under and throug!I the mine-fie!ds, and the exploit loses none of its magnificence by the fact that the currents at the
entrance to the Oardandles are exceedingly treacherous. It is a mailer of congratulation thõt, although hotly pursued and
fired at, the intrepid Commander su
cceded in returning safely 10 his base.

LAND AND WATER January '2, 191

THE

LONDON LIFE

Association Lill1ited.

New Life Business

1912 - - -
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,
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and

Not One Penny I

SPENT IN

. .
om ISSIO.; .

81 King 'Villiam Street,
London, E. C.

I-I. M. TROUNCER,
Actuary and Manager,

186

ITanuary 2, 1915.

LAND ÄND WATER

THE

WAR

By

HILAIRE

BY

LAND.

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, -:SWITZERLAND L-
'

THE DEADLOCK IN THE WEST.
F OR now three weeks-or nearly-a pro-
nounced offensive by all the Allied forces
in the west against the opposed German
forces has proceeded. This offensive
has gained here 50 yards, there 100,
there 500: rarely a thousand, It is still, in the
popular eJTe, OJ a deadlock "-but the phrase is mis-
leading,
, On account of the scale upon which this war is
be
ng conducted, and because it necessarily con-
tams a great quantity of novel tactical features
(due partly to the unprecedented numbers
engaged, and in some degree, but less, to unprece-
dcnted weapons), there is a tendency to speak of

this so-called "dcadlock" in the west as though
it also wcre something unknown in the history of
war, and therefore presenting no elements by
which we could calculate its nature and probabìe
duration.
This view is erroneous. "\Ve have many
parallels in history by which to judge the situation
and some elements for calculating its staying
power. It is evident that these new elements pro-
foundly modify any strict analogy with past ex-
perience, but the elements of the business are
pretty clearly what they have been throughout
military history.
The enemy is holding U lines "-that is, tem-
porary field fortifications-and the Allies in the
west are engaged in forcing those U lines." That
the enemy is sufiiciently numerous to hold U lines"
ovcr three hundred miles long is due to the num-
bers engaged in this new IÜnd of war, and such an
enormous extension is a novel feature,
Another not wholly novel, but paradoxical
feature is the fact that those now attaclÜng are
themselves moving from "lines" which, if the
defenders are (as they can be) largely reinforced,
will in tlwir turn be subject to pressure and have
to be held against a counter offensive.
But for the moment the Allies are on the
offensive in the west, and their offensive is directed
against the lines held by the Germans. The essen-
tials of the problem are exactly what they have
always been. A force holding U lines" can only
be driven out of these in one of two ways; either
the " lines" are pierced in some part so that the
enemy gets round the flank of either of the two
halves into which the U lines" are thus divided--
enfilades it, takes it in the rear, and all the rest
of it; or the encmy gets round one or the other, or
both, of the ends of the U lines" and turns them in
that way. To prevent the latter misfortune, a
man drawing his U lines" reposes both ends of
them upon obstacles which the enemy cannot turn,
or can only turn so slowly and with such difficulty
that he will be met and defeated if he tries to do
so. For instance, Wellington drew up his" lines
of Torres V edras " between the sea and the broad
waters of the Douro, and the French had no choic0
but to try and pierce them, which they failed to
do. The French revolutionary generals conceived
in the same way the" lines" of Weissembourg, re-
posing one end upon wooded hills and the other
upon a broad river (these, if my memory serves me
right, were pierced at one moment, but not
turned).
The Germans in the present instance have
their" lines" drawn from the frontier of Switzer-
land-the territory of which neutral country the
Allies do not propose to violate-and the North
Sea.
Now, if your" lines" are so drawn that they
cannot be turned by the extremities, and your
enemy has no choice but to pierce them somewhere

1*

LAND AND "\V A l' Ell

January 2, 1915.

then everything will depend upon your having
enough men to hold the lines as against the num-
ber of men he can bring against you. And the
problem here is not a mere question of proportion
(as, that one man behind earth can hold up three
men, or five men, attacking him), it is also a ques-
tion of absolute numbers.
To put an extreme case: The Roman vVall
across North Britain is an example of" lines."
Suppose ten men tried to hold it against fifty, their
eIIort would be manifestly ridiculous. Ten men
could not hold it against ten, let alone against
ftfty, because ten men are not sufficient to watch
any force at all that was free to operate against a
front stretching from Carlisle to Newcastle. Tcn
men could not" hold" the 'Vall at all. Con-
versely, a million men with proper artillery could
hold tbose "lines," not against three million or
five million, but against any number of minions.
Because the enemy, however numerous, could not
deploy a sufficient number of mcn at anyone spot
to break down the solid defence which so very
large a body as a million could, with proper com-
munications, concentrate wherever an attack
threatened.
The piercing of entrenched" lines," thcrefore,
depends in the main upon this mathematical con-
ception.
" 'Vhen the defenders of a J line' have become
so rare that they cannot concentrate on any point
whatever in a given time, men sufficient to stop
such numbers as the enemy can (a) usefully deploy
(b) concentrate on that point in the same given
time-then the (line' is pierced," and once
pierced its whole structure disappears. It must
either retire precipitately or suffer disaster. For
instance, twenty men could not hold a mile of wall
against 100 men trying to scale it by ladders.
Somewhere in the r
shes to and fro a party of the
hundred would get up.
Suppose 1,000 men could just hold it against
5,000. That would be because 1,000 was enough
to " man" the wall, i.e., enough to concentrate a
group of ten or so in any point an-d push the ladder
off. But 500 would leave gaps. Six hundred could
not hold it at all, quite irrespective of whether the
assailants were 5,000 or 3,000 or 2,000. And onC3
a body of thc assailants scaled a bit of the wall the
wholè organisation of its defence must collapse. II
.A wa
fare of " lines," therefore, is essentially or a plain of open land between two moun-
one III whICh the attackers v:ear down in numbe1's tain ranges, or belligcrent territory between two
and mate1'ial resources the besieged; the besieo-ed neutral frontiers, or any other kind of issue re-
have not an indefinite power of resistance, but quiring artificial defence between two natural
must, after a certain amount of wearing down, obstacles.
break. It is defended by a General of country F
.That is why the whole thing is compared to the against the invasion of forces from country E.
st
am put upon a vcry hard, but at the same time To defend this issue and to prevent an enemy

)fIttle, substance such as a rod of glass, and that from E penetrating towards F in the direction of tl13
I
why a reserve is kept back to strike at the ricrht. arrow, the General draws up his entrenched lines,

oment, as a hammer might strike just at the A-B, sufficient for the defence of which (but only
rIght moment upon a glass rod alrcady strained just sufficient) are his sixteen units-which I have
by the hands. represented by sixteen dots-holding the lines.
Critics som
times talk as though the existence His wastage in men, or the corresponding increase
of trenches behmd trenches, that is of a series of of his enemies, whether in numbers or in mechalli-
<< lines," parallel one with another behind the cal opportunities for attack, reducing his sixteen
original <<line," rendered the problem in- to the value of ten his lines are lost. They cannot
solyble. <<The e!lemy," they say, <<may be be held with only ten units remaining. 'Vhy

drIven out of hIS first (line,' but he will Because they are too long.
fall back upon his second; from his second It is no good preparing behind those lines.

lpon his t.hird-and so forth. There is no pnd to A-B, ['not-her snics of lines. C-D. Tho ten whoPl
It." But that is not the war the thing works, or he has left will not be strong enough to holJ C-D
2!t

can conceivably work, unless the second lines ar'
shorter than the fi1'st and the third l
.nes shorter
than the second. So long as a General has enough
men to hold his first line against the enemy's num-
bers and mechanical means of attack, so long he
will hold that first line. When he has no longer
enough numbers to hold his first line he is mani-
festly equally unable to hold a second line of the
same length. He can only usefully fall back on Ii
second line on condition the second line is shorter
than the first.
One could put the whole thing in a phrase by
saying that an army is not << pushed" back from its
lines, it is << t1
1'eatened with the breaking" of its
lines.
The effort which you make against an en.
trenched army is not like the effort which you
make in shoving a door open against opposition;
it is like the effort you might make in grinding at
various parts of a long cord. If a man whose
business it was to keep a cord stretched against
you found your attrition m-aking it grow so thin
in places that it would not hold, he might move
it ra,pidly back, sever the weak places and knot
them up again; but he could only do this on condi-
tion that the new line to which he had retired, and
which he proposed to hold with his cord, was
shorter than the old one.
The point is exceedingly elementary amI
therefore cans for an apology, but it is so much
misunderstood at the present moment, and, miJ-
understanding breeds at home such a lack of con-
fidence in the future of this trench fighting in
France and Belgium, that it is well worth insisting
upon.
We have here an isthmus between two seas,

E

>

--'-c"-'--"-- F

T ..

"ITanuary 2, lÐ15.

LAND AND "\V ATER

:äny more than they were strong enough to hold
A-B. Still less is it of any use for him to prepare
further lines such as G- H, for G- H is as long as C- D
or A-B was, and by the time he got to G-If further
wastage may have reduced him to only eight units,
'and it would be quite impossible to think of hold-
ing the lines.
Still more obviously wOllld this be the case if
the country were so formed tbat the next lines
which he could form behind and parallel, A-B,
were, as in the accompanying diagram, each suc-
cessively longer than the original line.

> F

D1

It is self-evident that the only case where a
General who is compelled to give up his original
entrenched lines can fall back to other parallel
lines prepared behind them, is when those other
lines are shorter than the original line. Thus, in
the accompanying diagram, a General who, for

:
F

IV

political or other reasons could just hold A-B with
his original sixteen units, finding them reduced to
ten might well fall back to new prepared lines,
C-D.
He would say: "I have to give up all the in-
tervening country between A-B and C-D (which for
such-and-such a reason I should very much like to
have held), but the all-important thing is to pre-
vent the enemy getting to F, and though it is a
disaster to have to give up the country intervening
between A-B and C-D, yet it would be a much
woræ disaster to let the enemy get to F. There-
fore, I will fall bacl{ en the new prepared line,

C-D, which is much shorter than myoId line, A-B.
and which I can hold with the ten units that are
left to me."
Now the wllOlc interest of the campaign in the
West lies in the fact that the German Commanders
are deprived by the physical and political
geography of Western Europe and by the political
"k'LSk thcy have been set from thus falling back suc-
cessively to shortcr and shorter lines behind their
original line.
This original A - B is for them the existing line
between the North Sea and the Swiss Mountains.
F is the soil of Germany proper, to keep the in-
vader out of which is the grand political object of
the German Commanders at this moment. If they
give up their line A-B, upon what shorter line,
C-D, and up to what further shorter line, E-F,
can they fall back?
Note upon the map on page 4 the existing
German lines in the West, and the conjectural
lines behind on which they might retire, and note
in what a political dilemma either such retirement
would put the Commanders of the German Army!
Their present A-B line which they hold is roughly
three hundred and fifty miles in length in all its
convolutions. I have marked it 1, 1, 1, 1. Suppose
they fell back upon the C- D line passing in front
of Antwerp and Brussels to Namur, then up the
Meuse to the neighbourhood of Verdun. and so
along their original line to the Swiss 1fountains.
I have marked it 2, 2, 2, 2, They would shorten
their total present line by not much more than a
se
enth, and. th
s slight advantage they would only
gam by sacrIfkmg all their present hold upon the
strip of North-Eastern France, which is their
principal political asset in the "\Vestern campaign
as it is now developing. The distance from their
present positions just north of Verchm to Antwcrp,
counting the necessary fluctuations in the liilé.
would be nearly 200 miles. Their existing lines
from tIlC same point north of Verdun round past
Reims and along the Aisne and then up to the
North Sea by Nieuport, are barely 240. and to gain
that 12 or 13 per cent. of relief from the strain
upon their diminishing numbers, as compared with
the increasing strength of their adversaries, they
would have to give up all thought of further ad-
vance on Calais, all Western Belgium, and all the
French territory they hold, except a tiny strip east
of the Meuse Valley.
See what a sacrifice they wou1d be making in
the objects and nature of their war, and for how
slight an end!
There is more than this. There is the loss of
abandoned wounded, and of materials and of
stores that would necessarily accompany such a
retreat-and all this for a concentration of men
hardly perceptible.
But there is a further line behind this again
to which the enemy might retire, and by so retir-
ing really seriously shorten his line and concentrate
his effectives.
It is a line which many must have been struck
by as they looked at the map. and it is one which,
if this war were to be conducted by the Germans
merely as a problem of strategy, they would ob-
viously regard as their next line of defence.
It is the E- F line which. starting from the
Dutch frontier, covcrs Liège, runs along the valley
of the Ourthe, includes the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, and further south reposes upon

a!

LAND :AND WATER

January 2, 1915.

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A

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Thionville and Metz, and then upon the Vosges
cxactly as the present line does. I have marked it
3,3, 3,
Supposing the Allies to respect the neutrality
of Holland, this line we can perceive at once to
have quite obvious advantages. It is hardly two-
thirds of the original line in length; it has three
great fortresses upon its front, nearly half of its
trajectory is taken up with the difficult and highly
defensible country of the Ardennes in the north
and the Vosges upon the south; and, lastly, it
keeps German soil intact.
That line, the Liège-Metz line, we can quite
safely say is at once the obvious and the only
second shorter line UDon which, with reduccd efIee-
tives, a German retirement could safely be made.
But, unfortunately for Germany, German

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problems are not as yet-nor perhaps will ever be
-purely strategical in this war, They are grossly
interfered with by political considerations. To
fall back upon this obvious second line is to give
up Belgium and Antwerp and all hope of threat-
ening Great Britain. It is to confess the begin-
ning of the end. It is morally certain that such a
confession will not be made by such confused
thinkers until it is too late.
This second line, the line, Liège-Metz-the
Vosges, once abandoned, there is no other. The
line of the Rhine, in spite of its great fortresses, is
not one upon which a force seeking concentration
could retire, One has but to look at the map to
sce that this is so. It is a line which, in all its
convolutions, is almost as long as the present line,
and before a German Army should retire to it. that

*

ITanuary 2, 1915,

LÄND ÄND WATER

invasion of German soil which, let us always 'J'e-
member, it is politically essential for the GC'l"man
rulers to prevent, would have taken place.
No; the more one looks at the problem, the
more convinced one is that the enemy will hold on
to his present lines in the \Vest as long as it is just
compatible with his strength to do so, and possibly
a trifle longer.
This would seem to be the whole value of that
DOW persistent Allied pressure upon the immense
stretch of trenches from vVestende to the Swiss
frontier: the certainty that the enemy will try to
hold those trenches up to and beyond the safety
point. It is the fervent hope of every Commander
of the Alìied forces who is watching the struggle
that political considerations, which are already
hampering German strategy, will pin the enemy
just too long to his present line; and that is why
that line must be kept occupied, sawn yard by
yard, frayed and frittered away by the persistent
effort which has been patiently watched in the
"\Vestern campaign throughout now nearly three
months.
But here the reader may well ask by what
right the French and British Commanders are at-
tacking and thus discounting an increasing
strength upon their side and a correspondingly
increasing weakness upon the enemy's side along
the line which he now just barely holds 1
Is it not true that the Gennanic Powers be-
tween them can put in anus more than three times
as many men of military age as can the French 1
Is it not true that the British contingent at this
moment adds not one-tenth to the French line 1
And is it not true tIlat, even when the present full
number of British volunteers are trained, equipped,
officered, gunned and sent out, they will have
added but 30 per cent. to that line 1
All this is true; but it is nevertheless also
true that, so long as the war remains active in
Poland, the Western Allies may confidently ex-
pect that gradual diminution, both in the mechani-
cal weight of armament, and in the proportionate
numbers, of the enemy, which will compel either
his disaster upon the existing lines, or his retire-
ment to a much shorter one.
This they can predict from the following
three converging factors in the case: -
(1) Superiority in equipment passes with time
from the German to the Allied side.
(2) vVastage is very much more rapid upon
the German than upon the Allied side.
(3) The Occupation of the Enemy upon his
other, or East-ern, front, must, as things have
turned out since the second battle for vVarsaw was
engaged, increase for some time to come.
I will take these three factors in their order.
I. Equipment.-The war prepared by Ger-
many and forceù at her own moment by Germany,
found Germany more ready than hcr enemies in
the vVest on several points. She was not more
ready in military science and temper; her strate-
gic theory has been proved, indeed, inferior to that
of the French, and she has made no successful
assault, save with vastly superior numbers, but
many an unsuccessful one with them. But she
had a much larger stock of weapons and ammuni-
tion for the successive equipment of reserves, and
her doctrine of heavy artillery, which has proved
.sound enough, had provided her at the outset of
õ*

hostilities with an immense numerical superiorit,
in this arm. '
But the provision of equipment is, for th-
Allies, only a question of time. The blockade 0
Germany, though but partial, is alreaùy felt Ü
certain essentials in equipment; and in the par
ticular case of heavy guns, once the plant is ready
it can be calculated to a few days what space 0
time will give the English and the Fr('nch shop:
a numerical superiority of output. The rapidit

with which large ammunition can be turned Olf
in the \Vest is again much greater than in the Gcr
manies. England, in particular, has a mucl
largcr population frce from the necessity of ap
pearing in the field, and both France and Englam
receive in larger quantities than they can use th{
materials for the manufacture of all that is neces.
sary to modern war. Already some slight supe
riority in the heavy artillery work is apparen1
throughout the Western lines upon the side of th{
Allies, and every day that passes increases this.
II. JVastage.-In the point of wastage, 'V(
have further statistics which were not availablE
when earlier estimates were made in these pages
It is true that the French have not yet given us th,
number of German prisoners whom they hold, bU1
the Russian figures have been communicated, an<
the French Ministry has openly published the
number of French wounded, from which we ma)
fairly estimate the general statistics of casualties
I hope to go into these figures more precisely in (j
later article. I deal with them here only in roune
numb
rs.
(a) PRISONERs.-The first thing we note ir
these figures is that the Russians before the recen1
action in Poland, counted over 130,000 Germar
(exclusive of much more numerous Austrian

prisoners. It is safe to say that the total numbeI
of wastage from this source, East and vVest, is not
short of a quarter of a million at the present
moment. One German estimate (unofficial it iE
true) gives the German .. missing" at 400,000.
But these may include many unaccounted dead.
Also a quart-er of a million is quite likely too lov.
an estimate for the total number of German
prisoners. But at least a-quarter of a million
there are,
That figure-a-quarter of a million-by itself
means little in the problem of the enemy's C07n-
parative wastage. Of French and Russian
prisoners combined the Germans could produce an
even larger number; a number perhaps a third a

large .again or more: but let us interpret its full
meamng.
Let two very important things be remem-
bered: First, that the great bulk of French and
Russian prisoners taken by the Germans ,,,ere
taken in the earlier phases of the war more than
three months ago. The rate of wastage from this
source is now greater on the German than on the
Allied side.
N ext, let it be noted that all the Gcrman
prisoners in French and Russian hands are true
effective soldiers.
The Germans count in their statistics those
masses of civilian population which they have
seized under their peculiar system of war and car-
ried away into captivity. There are villages in
French Lorraine where none of the old men are
left, and of the males no one but the chil-
dren under sixteen,

LAND AND WATER

ITanuary 2. 1915

The policy has, like every other German
policy in this war. .lack
d thoroughness and ho
o-
gcneity, It has-Just lIke t
e massacres, and Ju
t
like the 100tinO'-been earned to an extreme ill
one place left almost unpractised in another,
But we h
ve enough evidence before us t.o know
that the proportion of p
i

ner
of w.ar m Ger-
many which consists of cn:l
an mefficIents, or of
men below or above the mIlItary age. or o! p?-en
of military age employ
d. upon ne
essary clvI!mn
occupations (such as nunmg or raI!way runmng)
is very large. In the town of AI
Iens alone, for
instance which was in the possessIOn of the Ger-
mans fo; only a few days. 2,000 able-bodied m
n
of military age were taken. largely from the raIl-
way services; and a French doctor recently re-
turned from a prisoners' camp in the North of
Germany has testified
o the n
n?ers o
old men
present there: driven IlltO captIvIty mamly from
the eastern fringe of France, .
(b) KILLED AND "\VOUNDED.-But If wastage
from prisoners is now increasingly against the
Germans, and is already large, wastage from
casualties of killed and wounded is far more strik-
ing. We can infer positively from the known pro-
portion of killed to wounded that the Germans
have lost three men to the French one.
The published Prussian lists of casualties as
reported through Copenhagen make the propor-
tion much larger, something like four or five Ger-
mans killed to one French. But we have no need
to consider the more favourable estimates; at
three to one the ratio is quite sufficient to show
that the present lines in the West cannot indefi-
nitely be held.
The reason of this abnonn
l contrast between
German and French casualties is clear enough. It
consists in several points.
( a) That the Germans had to win at once if
they were to win at all, and were therefore lavish
of men. (13) In the great superiority of French
Field Artillery-and of the excellent Russian gun
when it can be properly supplied. ('Y) In the
superior numbers váth which the campaign in the
We3t was undertaken by the Germans. (8) In
the formation the Germans choose for fighting.
( E ) In the fact that most of their casualties have
occurred in that most expensive of all
efforts. a prolonged and unsuccessful offen-
sive. Of such a nature was all the
fighting on the Y ser and later round Y pres. and
of such a nature has been the whole of the second
battle for Warsaw. (
) In the small reserve
with which the Germans work. ('t}) In that the
Germans unlike the French embrigade older men
with younger. ((J) In that the Germans unlike
the French permit a large number of volunteers
under age to join the colours, and so eat their
wheat green. Etc., etc.
One detail I think will sufficiently illuminate
this contention of the very much more rapid was-
tage of the Germans from casualties. Taking the
number of wounded of all kinds at eight times the
number of dead, * and applying that test to the

.. Frequent reference has been made in these coluIDlli! to the mw.
t4ple 8 as being" coru;ervative," or too low, as a mwtiple to connect
dead and WOU11d.ed;
.e., t
ere are more .(we say) than 7 wounded,
IIOrmally, to I kIlled J.D. actIOn. Corræpondent.s who have doubted this
f
a con.siderat.ion of exceptional casæ may. if j,hey will, colh'lider
this one proof out of ma.ny, The tota1 casualties of the British <:on.
tingent to ð given date in November were 82,000 j ot, thesenotl1ing like
8,000 represented the killed-the rat.io W/16 not even. 1 in II, let. alone
1 in!!.

published official figures of French wounded o! all
kinds. we get for the total number of French kI,lled
in the war more than double but not three t
mes
the numbers of Prussian officers alone reported
killed to date; excl uding the list of officers killed
in the Bavarian, Wurtemberg. and Saxon Armies
-of the former we are told that 25,000 have fallen.
The French with just under 500,000 officially re-
ported wounded may have lost 50,000 dead-everr
possibly 60,000-but more probably much fewer.
Remember that it is not here a question of
total actual numbers but of proportion. 'Ve are
contrasting th.e rate of wastage rather than its
amount. I t is true that more than half the men
wounded return to the front in either ärmy. but
the rate of wastage in killed and wounded which
the Gennan force was suffering when the trench-
work bcO'an, and which it is still suffering, count-
ing east ö and west together. is at least three times
that of its
vestern opponents.
III. The Occupation of Germany in tlt
East.
The occupation of Gennan effort m the
eastern field is the third factor which makes the
reduction of forces in the western trenches to
breaking point ultimately inevi
able. .'Vhat that
occupation is we shall follow III detaIl when we
come in a few lines to the present phase of the
two battles for Cracow and for 'Varsaw; but in
considering this necessary weakening of the
German lines in the western trench-work we are
concerned not with the details but with the general
character of the eastern struggle,
This Polish war is now for the Germans essen-
tially a series of attempts to. reach certain obje
-
tives-notably Warsaw-whlCh attempts neceSSI-
tate the concentration of every man they can spare
from the west; such attempts are necessarily
coupled with very high loss in case of failure to
reach the objective-and that objective has. after
weeks of effort, not been reached. To beat back
Russia and to stiffen Austria Germany must put
very large forces into Poland; she cannot with-
draw them until she has made the threat upon
Silesia fail by the capture of 'Varsaw; and "\Var-
saw she approaches and does not take.
If she sends back forces from the east before
Russia is really ha.rd hit. then Russia readvances
and Silesia is again in peril: for it is not possible
to hold merely defensively the whole' line from tile
Baltic to thc Carpathians.
THE ACTION NEAR LA BASSÉE (IN
FRONT OF FESTUBERT, RICHE-
BOURG, NEUVE CHAPELLE, AND
GIVENCHY).
The sha.rp affair in the neigh bour hood of La:
Bassée, somewhat to the north and west of that
town, which is the only event of moment in the
West this week, is a very good example of the way
in which contradictory accounts come in, and of
how, almost inevitably. each side in a war accuses
the other of falsehood. It is also an example of
the way in which the enemy's accounts may, as they
are intended. create an impression worse than the
truth. Let us begin by the German "\Vireless of
last Saturday, December 26th. It tells us that
the affair between the Germans and the British
forces (including certain Indian contingents) re-
sulted in the capture of 819 men, 19 officers and
loss in dead alone to the Allies of 3,000, But

()*

January 2, 1915.

LAND 1\ND 'V ATER

it gives no detail of day and place save to call it
in general" The action near Festubert."
Now suppose one read that message alone, it
could comey but one impression, and that not at
all a pleasant one for our side, But when you
read the evidence in its entirety you get something
very different.
You have first of all the French message of
exactly six days before, Sunday the 20th, which
tells us that the line near La Bassée was straight-
ened out after the capture of the Chateau of Ver-
melles by the capture of the German trenches at
Givenchy, and that message adùed that to the
D()rth of this position the Indians had
ained a
certain amount of ground and the British forces
had lost a certain amount of ground.
Coming on the Sunday and despatched on the
Saturday, December 19th, these laconic French
phrases referred to the situation upon Satur-
day the 19th. Upon Tuesday, December 22nd, the
Germans, referring to actions already past, tell us
that the English had tried to retain the ground
they had lost, but had been repelled, The Ger-
mans, ho,,;ewr, admit that round Richebourg
(where the Indian troops were) the Allies re-
covered their ground and held it-which is simply
a belated admission of the accuracy of the earlier
French version.
Lastlv there comes the British" Eyewitness"
who, two èlays later, again gives us the òfficial story
as a whole and makes it comprehensible; and now
y.;e know what happened.
It was on the night between Friday and
Saturday, the 18th and the 19th, that the British
forces r
lshed the German trenches, presumably
ne8r Neuve Cllapelle, advancing from 300 to 500
}a.rds. In that succe:;s a certain number of Ger-
mÐns must have been killed, many more wounded
::nd a certain number captured. How many ".-e
<::re not told. On the Saturday morning the Ger-
mans counter-attacked and recaptured part, but
not all, of the ground first taken by the British.
During all that Saturday and all Sunday this belt
of ground "was the scenc of a fi1 1 ctuating struggle
in each rccedinO' ,,'ave of which, of course, the
o
encmy pick up a number of our wounded and take
them prisoner, and note that we have a number
of dead, as indeed they have on their side a number
of dead. The Germans were successful in re-
taking nearly the whole of the ground lost by
them, and upon the Sunday, though suffering
heavy losses a3 they advanced, they continued until
a bout noon to secure their position. During all
this, of course, they ,yere picking up more wounùed
men and making them prisoilcrs, and estimat
ng
the increasing number of dead. In the afternoon
cf Sunday the tide turned again. The furthest
group of houses occupied by the enemy ,vas re-
taken, and by Monday morning the greater part
of the ground first captured, then lost, had been
recaptured again. An armistice, in the cour::;e of
the fi
hting, allowed for the burying of the dead.
This fluctuating of the line, ending in very
much the original position occupied, cost both
sides a heavy price. It meant, of course, for both
sides many casualties. Regarded as an attempt
of the Allies to advance it was a reverse; regarded
as a German attempt to cover La Bas::;ée ît ,,,as a
success for the German. For all these villages,
Festubert, Richebourg, Neuve Chapelle, Givenchy,
lie east and north of La Bassée, and when all are

captured by the Alli
s La Bassée will be unten-
able. Regarded as an attempt of the Germans to
push back the steadily advancing line which now
seriolliily threatens La Bassée, particularly from
the south, it was a failure. And in general the
line stands very much as it stood before the stroke
and counter-stroke were given. But no one would
derive so inconclusive a result from the German
'Vireless.

ON THE \VORD U SiEGE."
I would like to add a note at the elld of thesc
comments on the western field of war with regard
to the metaphor .. siege" applied to the present
situation of the Austro-German forces within the
Armies of the Allies.
It is the penalty of using very exact termin-
ology that the conversational connotations of one's
terms make those terms seem paradoxical. For
instance, if you say of an aristocratic state that
is not a democracy and proceed to praise that state
for its aristocratic qualities, people will call you
paradoxical because they have some vague idea
that a democracy is something humble but vaguely
nice, and that an ari::;tocracy is something haughty
but vaguely bad.
I see by one or two criticisms in the Press that
Colonel
faude's admirable phrase to describe tñe
present situation of the war, .. The Siege of the
Germanies "-a phrase which I was quick to bor-
row with due a.cknow ledgments because it seemed
to me an excellently descriptive metaphor-has
suffered from this penalty of exactitude. I v. ill
therefore recapitulate here the points which attach
to that phrase.
(1) The essence of a siege is the restriction of
the besieged mallæuvre to a particular area, The
more you compel YOllr enemy to a particular area'
from which he has to try and fight a "ay out
through your restricting lines the more are the
conditions these of a siege.
(
) The word .. siege" does not necessarily
connote famine. It does not necessarilv connote
complete containment. Least of all does' it connote
'/tltim.a!c 8Urt'Clldu (tad failurc '/lpon the part oj
th
besicJcd.
,rhen we talk of this particular case as "a;
siege of the Germanies " ,,,e are using a metaphor
subject to all the limitations of metaphor; for the
word siege historically applies to limited areas,
and we are here applying it tû a very large one.
'Vith regard to this particular siege it is evi-
dently true:-
(1) That the blockade (which is something
separate from a siege, though u:òually accompany-
ing it) is imperfect.
(2) That the besieged area can provide itself
,yith foed, though not with all the other essentials
of modern war.
(3) That the circumvallation is not complete.;
(4) That quite obviously the besieged may be
ahle to cut their way out; because the besiegers
are still numerically inferior to them,
None the lc:;;s their present condition, in whic

they are battering against an imperfect ring of,
ho:;tile Armies (and Navies) which they f:ii1 tçf
break, is essentially a state of siege.

1.*

LAND :AND WATER

January 2, 1915.

1
1
,

THE POLISH THEATRE OF WAR.
HAT has happened in the Polish
theatre of war after a month's fight-
ing is an excellent. example .of the
way in which tlns wa!" lIke so
many ill the past, havmg esta.b-
lished its character, develops that character
throuO'hout a whole series of campaigns.
S
it ",.as, for instance, with Marlborough's
wars. They began with the unexpect
d use of the
cavalry at the right moment at BlenheIm, a!ld they
went on -with just the sa:r:ne feat
re appearmg and
reappearing time after tIme untIl Malplaqu
t. So
it was with Napoleon's use of massed artIlle
y,
So it was with \Vellington's choice of defensIve
position and his dependence upon the reserved
fire of a thin line.
This war has already presented a cer
ain f
:1-
ture which on a: smaller or greater scale IS beIng
repeated over and over again. This feature, if it
could be kept up, is the most favourable augyry
we have for the final success of the Allies agaInst
what are still their numerically superior enemies.
It is a feature directly produced by the mind and
method of Prussia, and it is as foHows in its three
phases: -
(1) The determining of a pa
ticula
objective,
at once politically and strategICally Important,
from the attainment of which other subsidiary con-
sequences may flow, but the attainment of which is
the prime task set to the Army.
(2) The successfuJ approach to that objective
as the result of a very carefully thought-out and
widely laid plan.
(3) The failure at the last moment to reach tI
e
objective, a failure involving losses enormous In
proportion to the intensity of the will to reach that
goal-and how intense that will may be only those
who have studied the half-hypnotic theory of
Prussian military text-books can tell us,
The great strategical object in the whole of
this Polish campaign has been, of course, to relieve
the pressure of the great Southern Russian Army
against Cracow. The way in which this was to be
done, if it was to be done permanently, was by
exercising unexpected counter pressure in the
north and taking W'arsaw, which town, as we have
so often seen in these notes, is frorn its gather-
ing upon itself all the communications from
the east, essential to the German plan. The great
advance of that plan, its sudden discovery, is now
ucarly two months old. The battle for \Varsaw
itself has now proceeded in two separate chapters
for nearly a month, and in the last of the3ß
chapters, in this very Christmas week, it has to all
app'earance failed. If it finally fails, if the Ger-
mans do not succeed in taking Warsaw, neither
can they ultimately succeed in relieving the pres-
sure upon Cracow. And, indeed, the first result
of their failure before 'Varsaw in the north was
the recovery of the Russians in the south against
Austrian pressure, and the beginning of a re-ad-
vance by their troops.
Let us never forget the formula which governs
the whole of the Eastern campaign, and therefore
1Jltimately the whole war:-
17
e Russian objectivc Ù Silesia 'll'llich Cracow
bars. The GC1"man connter st1"ol.:e can only be in
the 1L01'th and fails if TVa1 1 saw is missed,
The gi'eat action of which -Poland is the

.

t
t
J
J

t
d
II
f
to]
ti
8
1

theatre still divides itself, therefore, into two sepà-J
rate fields, united by a less important central
" bridge" as it were, which keeps the northern
and southern armies, both of Austro-Germans and
Russians, ill connection with one another. These
two fields are (1) in the north, the battle for \Var-
saw, where the Germ
ns are attemp
ing to take
the town and the RUSSIails are defendmg; and (2)
in the south, the battle for Cracow, where the con-
ditions are reversed,
Before dealing with the present phase of these
two particular actions, the bat.tle for Warsaw a.nd
the battle for Cracow, it may be well to
xamlIle
the position as a whole, Why the RussIans re-
tired before the Austro-German advance I have
already suggested, although it is no t:r;lore tl
an a
suggestion. I believe it to be due .to dIfl?-cultIes of
supply, which difficulties are due, I
theIr turn, to
the conditions of winter, coupled wIth the absen.ce
of railways. The railways to the west of t
e VIS-
tula beinO' ruined, the maintenance, especIally of
munition
for quick-firing artillery, far from that
great avenue of communication, i
difficult. At
any rate retirement there was, untIl after the first
week of' December, and that retirement halted
upon the following line:-

2f
.

lC'C I
. 21i.1es

- I

50
.

T5
.

\I
o

Rather more than thirty miles below VlarsaW',
in a straight line a little nort.h of east, is a .point
where the small river Bzura falls into the V Istula;
from the south. The Bzura runs in this part
through flat country, rich enough in times of
peace, full of plough lands, and falling gently to
the water level on either side, The broad,
monotonous landscape is interspersed by woods,
oue group of which between the Bzura and VV
r4
saw is large enough to be called a forest, bel.ng
nearly twenty miles in extent. We must conCClve
of this landscape in the north as being as yet
largely free from snow, while, the winter remain...
ing singularly open, the frost is not yet sev<,re,
The first sharp frost of some three weeks ago wa

interrupted bJ:: ß tha,w, and the difficultie
of th

Eii

January 2, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

fighting here, especially for the side which takps which are, especially in the case of the Pilica,
the offensive, are curiously similar to the corre- navigable for boat transport; and most important
sponding diÙlculties in Flanders. of all, the great trunk railway through Galicia,
The Russians then having fallen back to just ,'rhich supplIes the largest force, the m3.in Russian
behind the line of this river, their line followed its Army, in the south.
bank up to the place where a sub-tributary called (6) The northern flank has been left open, In
the Rawka comes in from the south. They bay(
other words, the Russians appear convinced that
paid no attention to the preservation of particular the enemy cannot threaten 'Varsaw from beyond
towns, They are evidently concerned only with the Vistula, that is, from the north, and may pos-
having a defensive line as straight as possible, and sibly be preparing themselves to be threatening
using as much as possible the natural obstacles of German communications along that river and
the country. along the railway which runs parallel to it. But
Their line went on up the Rawka behind of this I will speak in a moment.
Skierniewice, and so up the stream to Rawa. At (7) The way the line is drawn is obviously
Rawa there is a break between the Upper Rawka intended to cover the existing investment of
and the Pilica, where there is no natural obstacle Przemysl, the fall of which would mean not only
to defend the Russian front, As this part of the the capture of many Austrian prisoners, but the
country is hilly, advantage can be taken of the release of very considerable Russian forces for the
broken land. The line strikes the river Pilica a front against Cracow.
few miles west of New
Iiasto, passing through (8) Lastly, it is evident that the whole centre
Inowlodz, where it crosses the river, It then con- of this long line opposite Tomasow is defensively
tinues in the same north and south direction past its weakest point, since it has here no natural
Gpoczno, where it strikes the railway line, which obstacle along which to align itself, yet this centre
has very probably been partly restored in the inter- is also the point from which the Austro-Germans
val since the German retreat of two months ago. can act with least effect. The two danger points
There is again a gap south of this without any true are 'Varsaw and Cracow, and the real effort of dIe
defensive obst
lCle upon which the line can rely, Germans and their allies must be to take 'Varsa""
until we come to the upper waters of the Lotsosina, if they can from its own lleighbourhood, añd to
which rises in the hilly country of Kielce, where keep the Russians from advancing from Cracow
again the railway, if it has been repaired, gives an into Silesia. Further, it may be noted that the
opportunity for supply, From these upper waters avenues of supply to the Germans and Austrians
of the Lotsosina the line runs down without break for an attack on the centre are poor. They have
to the Niù.a River, of which it i
a tributary, and plenty of r
ilwap; for operating in Galicia and for
then straight down the Nida to the place where concentratmg men upon the passes of the Carpa.,
that stream falls into the Vistula. It was con- thians. They have one great line and the unfrozen
tinued beyond the Yistula along and behind the Vistula to supply their attack in the neighbour-
River Donajez, through Tarnow, where it begins hood of Warsaw. But to maintain very large
to rely upon a tributary of the Donajez, the Biala, forces against the centre would be difficult. An
through Tuschow, then across the hills to Jaslo, attack in the centre is further hampered by the
and thence bent back eastward to the Carpathian way in which the Pilica runs here, pe-rpendicular ta
:Mountains, missing Dukla by some ten or fifteen the front both of the attacking and defending
miles, and leaving that village and its all-impor- forces. It is, even so high in its course, a formid-
tant pass in the hands of the Au:;trians. able obstacle, with but few bridges and banks
From this general survey there will be appre 4 occasionally marshy; it thus separates the attack
ciated the following points: - into two halves at this point-two halves which
(1) The Russians have evidently fallen back can only with difficulty reinforce the one the other.
upon a chosen position, the clements of which have So much being said of the general plan, let us
been studied throughout the whole of its 200 miles turn to a consideration of the two actions in p3.r-
of length. In other words, the retirement was ticular. Their present phase is instructive and,
deliberately undertaken, and halted where the compar
d with the news of the last two months,
Russian commanders intènded it to halt. reassurmg.
(2) The line so chosen involves a very consider- I.-THE BA TTLE FOR '" ARSA W.
able retirement from before Cracow, the Russian
line being nowhere nearer than thirty-five miles The battle for 'Varsaw is essentially concerned
to that fortress. only with the Hawka and Lower Bzura Rivers.
South ofH::twa there was neither, till now, a sufficient
(3) The line so chosen
qually involves a close German force concentrated nor a sufficiently short
and apparently aangerous proximìty to 'Varsaw, ltpproach to'Var::;aw itself to produce or to make
and the defence of that capital from wry near at desired a decisive effort. North of the Vistula there
hand, the nearest point being Sochaczow, a little was nothing being done. The ,,,'hole action there-
closer to 'Var::;aw than the ne3.rest point ill the fore lay upon a front of about 50 miles, this front
south is to Cracow. . 1
correspondmg accurate y to the courses of the
(4) The line is guaranteed against turning in rivers. Save on the extreme left, as Hawa is
the south by the Carpathian T\Iounhins. Unless approached, the landscape is one very dead and
the enemy could cross these -in very large fOl'ce at even. It is rolling indeed, and diversified by fairly
some pass behind the Uussians, he "ould not be numerous watercourses, especially in the south of
able to make the Russian line fall back any further the field. But in the immediate lleighbourhood of
save by great pressure from in front. the Bzura River it is what I haye described above, a
(5) The line is fairly well supplied with avenues dull winter landscape, with hardly, at this moment,
of supply-the railways, which must be to some the relief of lUore than a ::,prinkling of snow, The
extent repaired already, and which must be River Bzura ie.;, during this lower part of its course,
getting into bettcr working every day; the rivers, ahout 50 yards wide, It is everywhere shallow, and
9-

LAND 1\.ND W AT ER

January 2, 1915.

'ft "'" r S :r-,..
S'" "'l.A

JO
r :.a üsh Mi

20

can be forded in numerous places, even in these
tower reaches. The trenches of either party were
llrawn close to the banks of the water when the action
opened, or at least when the action opened in its last
and most intense phase. This phase lasted, roughly
f'peaking, one week, though the preliminaries which
opened it and the inconclusive skilmishes into
which it dv>Ïndled away 'would between them cover
more like ten days. That ,...eek was the week
betwecn December 18th and Christmas Day; and
it will be seen in what follows how curiously
parallel the whole thing was to the battle for the
possession of the Y Sel' crossings, with only this
difference, that the Y ser is not fordable,
Two main fronts of attack developed. The
first roughly along the line A B sought to force the
Lower Bzura by fords and by what remained of
certain bridges. About two miles below Sochaczow,
near the point marked with an X, stands a
country house. A little above Sochaczow, between
that town and the railway bridge, is a half-broken
wooden foot bridge; and further up the river
still, beyond the railway bridge and on the left
bank, is the village of Debsko. At all these three
places a special effort was made, and the
e efforts
ran successively down stream, The first, at the
beginning of the intense part of the action ten days
ago, was made at Debsko; the second, upon lr.st
,Friùay, by the foot bÚdge above Sochaczow; and the
third, upon Saturday and Sunday, against the point
marked by the country house and the X on the
sketch above,
These movements only refer to the principal
f'cparate assaults; innumerable other partial
attempts were made, and the fiercest fighting of
an was during a general attack upon several points
at once which took place in the course of last
Sunday and Monday,
Now, the characteristic of all these attacks seems
to have been that, with few exceptions, the riO'ht
bal1k of the river was reached, and that the defuat
c:f the Germans (which was ve
y. thorough upon this
lm
) took the form ?f an anmhllation of each body
as It crossed successIvely. "\Ve have the description
of dense columns of the enemy taking the water (not
yet frozen s
ve
t the edges) us
ally. during a night
attack, fordmg It well above theIr mHldlE:s, and still
proceeding, in spite of their heavy losses durinO' this
wading, to scramble through the mud of the f
-ther

30
,
w

bank; and it is once there-often after having
carried the first Russian trench-that each separate
assault was checked, and those who had succeeded
in crossing either shot down or captured, "\Ve know
nothing o
the losses-at least
here has be
n no
official estImate of them by whICh we can Judge,
The estimate has been made that the total number
of Germans concentrated upon this extreme left of
their line for the final assault upon Warsaw was not
less than a quarter of a million men; it may well
have been more, Although the packed and dense
assault did not cover the whole front of the 50 miles,
yet it was developed over a total front, in sections, of
more than 25 miles; for it not only took place along
this main front A B, but also along the front C D
across the Rawka, especially at the village of
Bolimow, and further along the front E F south-ea.st
of Skierniewice, 'Ye mUBt be careful not to be led
away by general phrases, which are nearly always
used in connection with the repelling of an assault,
durinO' which process the losses of the enemy always
seem Oto the succes.sful defensive larger than their
true proportion to the whole forces engaged, "\Vhere
actual details are mentioned, the numbers who got
across and formed upon the further bank do not
seem to have been very large, \Ve hear of one
body (the largest) of 7,000, two battalions in one
case, of a few companies in another, and so forth.
Nevertheless the German losses must have been
very heavy, and that for many reasons, In the first
place, the whole point of the moyement was to break
down the defensive, pass the obstacle, and get
through to \Varsaw at aU costs. In the next place,
the nature of that obstacle means that for the few
who got across, a much larger number must have
been hit in the crossing. The gTound down to the
river on the further side slopes Eke a gentle glacis,
and offers a perfect field of fire upon most parts of
the banks, at least as one approaches the stream.
A little "vay inland, or westward, there is in many
parts a sharp bank; but between this bank and the
stream the fiat ground lies open to the fire of the
trenches opposite. Again, the muddy though shallow
little river is a sufficient obstacle to hold men
attempting to cross it, and it is probable that the
losses during the attempted fording of the stream
make up much the greater part of the "....hole. It
would seem that in front of Bolimow and southward
of Skiernie,...ice the attacks were more concentrated,
especially in the former case, only one or two
crossing places being attempted, and thereÍ<,'l"C
perhaps the losses were less upon this side. But
at any rate the Russian counter blow along both
the rivers was sufficiently strong to check and at
last to silence the fire 0f the offensive, and after
seven days of this heavy ,york, by Christmas Eve,
the attack had dwindled to a few sporadic
demonstrations, By Christmas Day itself it haJ
ceased, The official German communiqué admitteJ
the failure upon Saturday night.
"\Vhether the offensive will be resumed or not
cannot of course be told. If we are to go by the
analogy of the work in the "\Yest, it should be
resumed, but so far (Tuesday evening) the great
effort to reach "\Yarsaw has failed.
But meanwhile there is dcyeloping upon the
left flank of the Germans in tllis region an ob&cure
movement, the value of which is probably exag-
gerated in the correspondence we get from the
Polish theatre of war, but which may turn out to be
of moment. In order to apprecii.1.te this movement
let us look at the sketch on the top of the next page.
10*

January 2, 1915.

LAND :AND WATER

{)
01,.,J!.

'IS rao
. .

It will be remembered that the Germans, when
they failed in the first phase of the second Lattle for
",Varsaw rather more than a fortnio-ht 0. 0 '0, made an
. ð ð
attempt m a rather half-hearted manner to threaten
the town in an altoO'ether novel direction from East
Prussia, advanced b with perhaps fifty or sixty
thousand men along the railway throuah Mlawa to
about the point A B, where they were
hecked and
driven back over the frontier. The Russians who
inflicted this check towards the north are said to
have been reinforced and to have occupied in some
strength the district which lies between the
Ilawa
railway, the Vistula, and the frontier, havino- come
down in number upon the point of Dobrzyn
nd the
banks of the river just below, opposite the town of
",Voc1awek. As I have said, all
this movement is
obscure. We know nothing of the numbers in
which the thing is being done, we ha,'e no official
news. u
on it-:-nothing but private correspondence;
and Jt IS ObVIOUS that anythinO' save a very laro-e
force here would be in danO'e
fl.'om the Uerm
n
. . ð
armIes III E?-st Prussia. Still, if tl
ere is a large
forc
operatmg here to the north, If those slowly
eqmpped and slowly arrivinO' Russian reserves with
which the Russia
front i
constantly being fed
have been largely dIrected alona the rio-ht bank of
the Vistula, then their presencebbelow flock and in
all this Government of Plock which lies between the
Mlawa railway and the river would, from the banks
of the Vistula, seriously threaten the main German
communications: that is, if the forces upon the Vis-
tula were accompanied by heavy artillery and could
l
ope to cross un
er .the cover of its fire. The only
hne of commUnICatIOn for the German armies in
front of ",V arsaw, which now stand alonO' the line
C D and
lave been held up there by the l{ussians in
the fightmg of the last week, is the railway which
goes fi'om Lowicz to Thorn in Prussi:1 and that
railway is vulnerable from the Vistul
for some
miles above and below 'Voclawe
, where it ap-
pro<lches the stream, I only gIve the rumour
for what it is worth. The chances seem to
be heavily against anything coming of such a
movement. It may very well be no more than a
cavalry: raid. It is ve.ry much too far away from
the m:1m field of fidltmo-, and much too QTeatl y in
d . '-' b b
anger on Its own flank from East Prussia above
(the Germa?s have alreaùy moved a brge force to
M
awa, whIch tl
ey. have. r
occ.upied); but if any-
tIung comes of It, Its ongms 1Il tlus unconfirmed
message are worth watching.
H.-THE BATTLE FOR CRACO\V.
The conditions of the battle for Cracow in the
south .differ fundamentally from those for the
possessIOn of Warsaw in the north, It is not only

'\iIIl

that the roles are re,'ersed, and that while it is tho
German object to seize Warsaw, it is the Uussian
object to seize, or at least to invest or mask
Cracow; it is also that the nature of the fiahtin g '
b ,
the

ound, and, we Illay now add, the results, are
so dltlerent from what has taken place along the
B
ura and the Raw.ka, 150 miles away, In fl.'ont of
"" arsaw the Russl3.11s have checked and throwil
bJ.ck the German offensive. In front of Cracow the
Aus,tI:ian movements (stiffened perhaps by an
addIt.IOn of German troops) having pushed the
RussIans back an averaO'e of 50 miles from that
fòrtre
s, which is the gate of Silesia, are now
su
erIllg from a return of the Russian offensive,
wIuch return has for several days in succession
continued to advance.
As we saw abo,-e, the southern end of the
Russian line ran down the Lotsosina to where that
tributary joins the Nida, then down'the Nida to its
m?ut
,
\'here it falls into the Vistula. Beyond the
VIstu.la It followed roughly the course of the Lower
D?Ila
eZ, up to the confluence of its tributary, the
BIala, aDd then ran up that tributary past Tarnow,
through Tuschow, and so across the hills to Opilny,
to Jaslo, to Krosno, and thence southwards it
reposed upon the mountains. This line, it will be
seen, though pushed well back from Cracow, still
kept astr
ddle. of the great main r
ilway of Galicia,
R R, .whI?h IS essen.ttal to the lIfe of any army
operatmg m that prOVIllce. There are other side rail-
wa.ys, some of which I have indicated on Plan IX.,
whICh help to supply the UusÛan army, or at least
to take the pressure off the main line. But it is tlw
possession of that main line which is life or death to
either combat
nt; particularly to the Russians,
bec?,use al?i;g It from the eastward they obtain all
theIr } )rOVISl011S m a naked land where t.he O'ri p of
, . 'Co
wmter IS now far more severe than it is round
",y arsaw to the north.
It is further evident that this Russian line as
it was drawn up at th
end of the mt.irement not
quite a fortnight ago, was desicrned to cover
Przemysl, as I have said. In order to uncover
Prz8I?ysl and r
lieve it from its investment by the
RussIans, an
m order to compel the Russians to
fall back until they were parallel with the railway
R R and at last perhaps should be forced to cross
it to their certain disaster, the Austro-Germau
forces were concerned not only to push alonO' the
northern foot of the Carpathian Mountains f
'now-
ing up the Russian retirement, but also to 'capture
the passes, and so threaten the Russian line in t.he
rear,
Apparently by the calling up of men from
Servia (and paying the price in the disaster suflered
there) the Austrians found sufficient men just to
force. the passes. They occupied first the Dukla
Pass, then, in much smaller numbers, the CI'est of
the Lupkow, and were, in still smaller numbers still
fighting ten days ago for the Uszoc Pass, It was
just at that moment that the Russian counter-
oflènsÌve began; and these Russian movements
always mean, as we know from the past, the coming
up of the newly equipped bodies, for it cannot be
too often repeated, if we are to understand this 'YD.r
that while Russi::t's r.J,'ant:,pc is numbers Uussia'

dis3.dvanta
e (
<;pecially sin
e Turkey came in) is
slowness of eqUIpment and supply.
The new Russian ofiènsive, then, first took the
form of thrm,ying t.he
\ustrians from the left bank
of the Nida, whic!1 they hail occupied, to the right
hank. The fightmg took place especially in the

11*

LAND L\ND WATER

o
.

25'
I
'JfileS!

fO"
.

.50
I

is
I

V'

,....
1.7

'\)\lllJJ .' \,\\111/... ..\lJ

"..,
. 4 .- ."f" ....'\JIII

C a

r

p

...'ý ".
'1111""

___=-- 7lze Orfg:mat
:Russia.rt..Z in.e
_0_._._._ Fi:on.tieJ.7S

regions of Pinczow, Vislica, and New Korcyn, near
the mouth of the river, And the enemy were so
far pushed back that the Russ:ans now stand upon
the right bank. The next obstacle between them
and Cracow is the Nidzika, about a day's march
further on, These operations took place in the
week before Christmas, and up to and including
Christmas Day, and left perhaps a couple of thousand
prisoners in Russian hands, but no field guns.
To the south of the Vistula the Russians
pushed on to the I...ower Donajez, crc
sed the Biala,
and established themselves firmly upon the further
bank. But the most remarkable of these move-
ments of their counter-offensive was that taken
along the arrows from Jaslo and Krosno up to the
foot of the Dukla Pass, An a<.h-ance was maùe of a
full day's march from the front Jaslo-Krosno, to the
front Dukla-Zmigrcù, at the foot of the mountains,
Some 15,000 of the enemy fell into the hands of the
advancing Russians, and it is probab!e that at
the moment of writing the Dukla Pass itself
upon
the possession of which depends every strate)c
movement in Galicia north of' the Carpathians and
every threat against Hungary to the south-is being
fought for, if not decided. This success was achieved
upon Christmas Day. \Vhat the fate of the
Austrians was in the Lupkow Pass meanwhile we
have no official information to guide us; but we
know that on this same Christmas Day the Uszoc
was taken by Austrian troops, or at least the crest
of it; it remains to be asked whether this
movement, counter-balancing the Russian success at
the foot of the Dulda, will do anything for the relief
of Przemysl and tho pushing back of the Russian
1ine,
To venture a guess, it would seem that the
possession of the Uszoc, in spite of the fh.ct that the
l'a
lway from the Hungarian plains to Lemberg goes

ITanuary 2, 1915.

L II

n'lJ

p

".,. . ... ..
/-
.. "".'. fIM'-
.r

IX

over that gap, would not prove of permanent value
to the Austrians. And one's reason for hazarding
that guess is that the Uszoc is too 1.'11' away fi'om
the main operations to be valuable, save in the
hands of a very large body of men, who sh'Juld aho
be oper,lting against a much smaller b. dy beyond
the mountains. You cannot outflank with illil'rior
numbers. You cannot out:fhmk in a very long
détour save with heavily superior numbers. And
if, of the two passes, the Dukla falls into the hands
of the Russians its possession will outweigh by f:.tr
the possession by the Austrians of the U szoc to the
wes t.
We may take it, then, that in its present phase
the battle for Cracow consists in a successful and
continuous counter-offensive on the part of the
Russians, who are using their reinforcements to
press back again along the road whic
l, during the
last month, they abandoned. It remams to be seen
whether Germany and Austria combined can still
produce further reinforcements which shall check
the movement; but, for the moment, both the
initiative and the offensive are, in this region, again
in Russia n hanJs,
Mr. nJo:LLOC'8 next lecture at Queen's Hall 011 the War will
ùe 011 WednesJay, ,Jannary 2ïth.
A CHILD'S HISTORY OF THE WAR,*
ALTHOUGH written primarily for young readers, this book does
not fall altogether into the category of what are genera1!y known as
children's book.s, The author has kept in mind the fact that the great
war which is at present being waged will be the first important memory
of a host of children and thus .. it is the more necessary that there
should .be shown to them as soon as pcssib
p the other side of the shield
, . . , U1at the memory of the Great 'Var should be touched to noble
issues-that it should be, first and forem05t, a memm'Y of deeds II.'!
gal.!ant ns any that Þave been inscribed in Christendom's long 1'011 of
honour," In linking np the inc:dcnts of the book to form a connected
st()ry of t..1te first days of the war, the author ha.s achieved this greater
aim, and, having said this, further criticism is unnecessary, 'Ve
heartily recommend the Look.
... Told in Gallant Deeds." By :Mrs. Bello<: Lowndes. (NÏI;oot.
and Co.) 5s. net.

12*

January 2, 1915

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR
By

FRED

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTE,-Thh Artlcl. ha. beea .abmltted to the Pre.. Bareaa, which doe. aot object to the pabllcatroa A' cealond, &ad take. ao
rupOillibillt)' for the correctaell of the atatemeah,

TIlE NORTH SEA.
A N afterma
h
f the East Coast raid is a good deal
of questlOlling as to why the East Coast is not:
defended by heavy guns. The answer is that a
c:>n
istent feature of British policy has been to
hnllt shore defences to the absolute minimum, on
. the grounds thai every farthing spcnt on forts is
necessanly that number of farthincrs less on mobile defence
aince them is necessarily a limit to
xpenditure. '
That this J?olicy is a. righ
on
can hardly be denied, and
the ar.
uments In support of tIllS VlCW are many and various.
First and foremost, we have 10 remember the circumstance
that if a place be unfortified and undefended it is (or rather
was) recog
ised as immune from attack. To put a iew gun

to .defend It, therefore, merely lays it opcn to be damaged,
as It then ceases to have a nOll--<XJmbatant status,
. Furthermor
, supposing a place to be defended with-say
-SIX guns. It, IS ObVIO
to an.rone th
t if the enemy means
to attack he ,nIl come with enough slups and guns to over-
whelm those six. He has practically unlimit'ed cruns avail-
able, Along these lines secondary fortifications are'" ne
ssarily
a sheer waste of monc)'.
First,class fortifications could in no case be erected every-
where, e:X:ûCpt at an enormous expense for construction and up-
keep, WhlOh could never be justifie<1.
Such fortification of a coast line has been done-it lIas
been done by Germans on the North Sea front. But, compared
to ours, hcr sea front is almost infinitesimal. There remains
also the fact that, though by this expenditUl"e she has made it:
practically imp
ssible for our fleets to
pproach her coasts, it
IS only at first sIght that this looks like a crain. The seemincr

ain is purely imaginary, since, had the
noney expended i

fixed defences been spent in ships, the German Fleet "ould
have been quite equal to ours, and she would not have been in
her present position of having her trade swept from the seas.
. Conversely, had we fortified OUl' East Coast in any really
efficlCnt style, we should not have had a Fleet capable of
sw
ping .the seas, and food by now would probably be at
famme pnces.
Finally, of course, there is the fact that the bombardment
of .coast towns is such an utterly senseless operation from the
pomt of view of military advantages that no one could have
reasonably antioipated the occurrence of such an incident.
Also the risks undertaken were obviously out of proportion to
a.ny possible advantage even from the warped German concep-
tIon of naval warfare.
This, I hope, will serve to explain clearly why our coast
towns arc generally unfortified, and why any fortresses to pro-
tect them could not have been" value for money," even against
the German Navy.
In further connection with the East Coast Raid, one or
two correspondents have called attention to the fact that
photographs of German unexploded projectiles fired by the
b
ttI
-oruiser
in
o Seaton-Carew appear to be capped armour-
plercmg proJectiles, such as would be used for firing at a
warship, and useless for a shore bombardment. It has been
asked whether this indicated a lack of organisation in the

rman Navy.
The answer, I am afraid, is in the negative. So far as
I know, modern German big guns are .supplied with one type
of projectile
mly. This is, of course, an
'all-purposes JJ
shell, .fitted wtth a cap for armour piel'cing, if neæssary, and
carrYlIlg a considerable hioh-explosive charcre the nature of
which is a carefully guard
d secret. It is olaimed to be con-
sidt.rably superior t,-, Iyddite, and to be identical as to compo-
sition wit
the charge now used for German tOl'pedoes. These
have certalIlly proved themselves capable of violent damage.
The number of German shells that failed to burst was very
small, and some failures were inevitable, But there is nothing
in any of the evidence to suggest that A.P. shells were fired" by
mistake." We must content ourselves with the Whitby evi-
dence, alluded to last week, as conclusive proof that, towards
the latter end of the Raid, the Germans, knowing that: British
defending forces were coming up, got" nf'l"vy,"
. Perhaps the, most curious point raised by correspondents is
1Il connecuon with my statement that the Germans regard the
Derffingcr and Scharnhorst as one and the same thing in tho
ma
ter of rating. People write and ohallenge me to produce
a single British Rublication which admits any such thing.

There is no such publication. The trouble is entirely dus
to careless phl'a;;;eolog): on my part j though even so it should
have been clear that: 1Il :\ matter of this sort what we think
counts for nothing, The point I sought to make in the issue
of De
mber 19 was that the Germa,ns mako no "official"
difference between the Derffinger and the Scharnlwrsf.
Officially they refuse to recognise the existenco of a " battle
oruiser" in the way that VlO do. While the sentence com-
plained of was being printed the Germ:\Ils, using their baW;>-
cruisers as " cruisers, JJ were slaughtering the non-combatants
on our East Coast-a dear indic.1tion that they consider their
battle,cruisers aEõ vessels attached to the battle fleet but not
units of it.
This is a pcint which later on may possibly assume very
considerable importance. So long as the Germans employed

mall cruisers or auxiliary cruisers for commerce destruction,
It enabl
d us to use all our old protected oruisers, if not to
chase them, at any rat.e to cut them off or surprise them, as the
slow old Ilighflyer surprised the fast liner Kaiser Wilhelm der
Grosse.
Once, however, the battle-cruiser is imported on the seenð
as a corsair, \.'Ünditions will materially change j and instead of
twelve to one against the corsairs, the superiority will sink to
something like two to one.
Of course, th
re is one particular factor-the Germ.lIl
battle.cruiser has to get out:, and also get clear of pursuit Ly
our battle.cruisers. This is a. nroblem of some considerable
magnitude, Still, since it offer; Germany her best chance of
" doing something," it is probably a feature of the German
programme.
Regarding mattNs in this light, we may probably take it
that the East Coast Raid wag tentativo in object. We may
look for repetitions, perhaps. Should these take place, they
will be designed to familiarise us with tho idea that "baby
killing JJ (to quote
fr. Churchill's immortal phrase) is the be-
all and end-all of German naval strategy.
In connection with the next raid, or the next again, or
the next: after that, we may expect to see the German High
Fleet come out. Not very far perhaps, and certainly not with
any idea of a decisive action, But with a very decisive inten-
tion of covering a rush of the German battle crui!Ærs on to
the High Seas.
The late Commander Rice, R.N, (who met: an untimdy
deatfi in an aeroplano disaster off Calshot), was universally
recognised as "the coming man JJ of the British Navy. It
was an axiom of his that it was absolutely futile to specu-
late what the enemy would do: that: the correct procedure was
to put yourself in the enemy's place and then ask yourself:
U What is the best possible thing to do in tlte circumstances? ..
Then, supposing you were equal to the enemy in brain power,
you were in a position to meet and defeat his best effort. If,
however, you regarded the probable movements of the enemy
merely from your own point of view, you were liable to be
taken at a disadvantage from the ocourrence of the unexpected
instead of the antioipated.
A sounder philosophy than this was probahly never pro,
pounded. From our point: of view any East Coast raid de-
signed to intimidate our. trade can only end in disaster to
the corsairs. But if we dispassionately put ourselves in the
enemy's place the point of view is materially altered. It is
no longer a question of the best way of winning on the water,
where viotory is humanly speaking impossible: it becomes a
question of how to achieve tbe maximum of mischief.
U Attrition" was merely a. Bernhardi theory which cir-
cumstances have already shown to be faulty, owing to his in-
ability to realise the cardinal point that where it is a matter
of a hundred against fifty an attrition of two to one merely
leaves matters as before, and that consequently something like
the abnormal fioure of three 10 one has to be achieved, and
even this-at p;'esent rates-would take years to accomplish.
Obviously, therefore, some other plan is required, and the
utilisation of big battle oruisers in the rôle for which they
"ere originally designed seems the most feasible of any.
The wise prophet always" hedges." I also will hedge by
pointing out that German plans are alwaJs liable to be in-
fluenced by " Mahan theories. JJ
Iahan, in the plenitud? of
his rooipe for thc commanJ of the sea, never properly reahsed
that the Power to which that is unattainable is driven to
seek " other ways." He was content to point out the futility

13*

I:ÄND AND WATER

January 2, 1915_

He failed to point out that it was" cthc'r

of the other waylf.
tuays or nothing."
We do not know how far von Tirpitz is his disciple. If
he be a true disoiple he will sit tight in the Kiel Canal. But
the indications are rather that he will not do so. Apart from
all naval questions, German pu'bIic opinion may-if it haa not
already-demand action of ,,;orne kind.
Also, from what we do know of von Tirpitz, he is " a
man with a head on his shoulders." Given a free hand he is
very unlikely to overlook the cardinal error made by Mahan
and others who, while conclusively proving the necessary in-
gredienîs for victory, have ignored the" most mischief" ques-
tion "l'ihere victory is impossible-which is the crux of the
entire situation. German ootion in the future, therefore, de-
pends somewhat en how far von Tirpitz has a free hand and
on how far he may be hampered by theorists. But, should he
have any free hand, I think 'We may take it as cert&Ìn that
the German battle cruisers will presently be on our trade
routes. In whioh case we shall be faced with a second and
altogether different and more difficult war situation to any
which has hitherto obt:ained.
Of late the German Pres!:i have been overfull of a scheme
propounded by von Tirpitz, the essence of which is to destroy
British commerce by submarine attack. It is not an original
dcheme, since it is all to be found in a pre-war story of Conan
Doyle's, which appeared in the Strand Magazine and in
America in Collie?"s Weekly, where it was luridly illustrated
by Henry ReuterdahI.
The attempt lllay be made as a last forlorn hope j but its
success would depend on at least two factors which Germany
does not possess. These are (1) ability to arrive at and remain
at a strategical point: without British interference, llnd (2)
the problem of how to deal with a powerful neutral like the
U.S,A., finding that inoffensive American civilians had been
treated to a nautical Louvain.
It may, of course, be argued that in a war of this kind
an extra enemy or two would not matter, but seeing the
desperate game that Germany has played for American s}m-
pathy one can hardly imagine her as inviting active
American hostility.
Personally, I think that the whole thing can be put down
to bluff, pure and simple. German múmarine3 are very un-
likely to hamper our trade in any way whatever.
They have talked of their submarines just as they have
talked ()f t'beir Zeppelins. About their battle cruisers they
have preserved a complete Eilence. And on this account I
characterise them as the danger point.
On Christmas Day the first real fight of the .. new war-
fare" took place. Cuxhaven was attacked by British sea-
planes, supported by cruisers and submarines, and defended
by Zeppelins, Eeaplanes, and submarines.
Cuxhaven, of cour!*', is Germany's latest and best naval
and aerial base; and it has been made as impregnable as any
such place can be made, The moral effeet of any attack on
it must, therefore, have been tremendous j the more so as for
the last two or three months the Germans have employed an
t11eir ingenuity in attempts on Portl;mouth-failillg in every
effort-whereas at Cuxhaven we "got: there" at the first
attempt.
Betwoon the British and German official reports there is
a considerable discrepancy. It is puerile to suppose that
either report is deliberately false. We must, therefore, take
it that the truth lies somewhere midway. All we claim is no
loss and Borne damage; the German!/ claim something of tbe
sarno kind reversed.

for any inkling that battle oruisers were about would have
ooincided with a vanished von Spee.
The battle which ensued was, of course, on "slaughter
house" lines, but the strategy which preceded it was for that
very reason of a high "big game shooting" order.
The appended diagram is not, of course, in any way
representative of the tactics employed, but it will, I think,
indicate the problem bettel' than a lengthy verbal description,

C0
@

@)

@

DIAGRAM TO ILUJSTRATE THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEY OF THE
FALKLAND I
LE8 EATTLE AS EXPLAINED IN TIlE TEXT.

G represents von Spee, B I the British battle cruisers.
B 2 other British cruisers, B 3 the Canopus. A point in front
of and equidistant between B 3 and B 2 is wru:re G was lured
to before he discovered the trap. In the form of a diagram
witli sizes to indicate approximate fighting values, it looks
13Ímple enough; but sea warfare is a lllore complicated matter
than diagrams.
For example, von Spee had experienced cff Chile how
Cl'adock, though in hopelessly inferior force, did not hesitate
to attack him. If, therefore, our lesser cruisers at B 2 did
a bolt for it he would bave suspected a trap of some sort. On
the other hand, did they attack him they would have been
annihilated with difficulty.
Wü now begin to see how tricky the problem was.
So far as I can read matters everything centred on the
Canopus j and there must have been some very pretty manæu-
vring on both sides.
Be that a.s it may, von Spee was II contained" until
the two battle cruisers rushed out to annihilate him. Then,
of course, he realised the facts of the caEe. He turned and
tied, while bis lesser cruisers scattered. The sequel was a
foregone conclusion, ",hich does not require discussion, except
in so far as we may credit the Se/wrn/wrst and Gneisenmt on
the magnificent fight that they put up against absolutely over-
whelming odds. 'fhey might easily have surrendered without
any dishonour; but they went down fighting, and to that
extent obtained somt) moral success and spoiled Sturdee's vic-
tory accordingly, since a 8Un"Cllder would have been of in-
finite psychological value to liB.
Against this we can set that the Leip:ig did actuany
hoist the white flag (probably the ward room taLle cloth),
When approached by our Glasgow she fired a shell into her;
but since only one shell was fired we may put: this down to
the perfervid zeal of some" no surrender" German. The
Glasgow, of course, re-opened fire, and the Leipzig went
under.
It is a matter of regret that this should have occurred;
the ship would have been so infinitely more valuable to us a1!
a prize of war. However, sinw the Glasgow had no means of
THE HIGH SEAS. knowing that rhe " white flag trick" was not being played
Detai1.s of the Falkland Islands battle have now come in, on her, she had no option but to re-open fire, as she did. We
and they reveal strateg-y of a high order on the part of Admiral can only put the matter in the chapter of ill-luck.
Sturdec. Admiral Sturdee was, of course, in greatly superior For the rest, "Thank God, we have the ships" SEems to
forw, the r
pective squadrons being something like fcur to be the sanest attitude to adopt. Man for man, I greatly doubt
one in fighting value on paper. whether we can put up anything against the enemy in the
'l'here were, however, certain modifying circumstances matter of brute courage. But it gives us one more indication
which might easily have very profoundly affected results. of how accurately the late Admiral Cradock ju
ged the situa.-
When the enemy appeared, tbe two battle cruisers were tion when he went to his death and the disabled Monmouth
coaling and, therefore, unavailable for immediate acticn. hoisted no white flag, but sank helplessly.
Theoretically, of course, they should not have been coaliDg Physical victory is at present a matter ()f who has most!
simulta.neously j but it appears that both had almost abso- ships to lose, On that &core we can rest content. Moral
lutely empty bunkers, and either of them uncoaled woulå have victory is another affair altogether.
ho. dies best can count
been useless as a fighting unit. To coal together was, there- for much. That: white flag from the Le
pZlg-for all that some
fore, a bit of mere plain common sense, especially as thel'e was unknown German sailor heavily discounted it by subsequently
no particular reason to expect the enemy to appear at the firing a shell-is probably our very best asset out of the Sturdee
time and place that he did appear. victory.
Next, the Canopus, on account of her slow "peed, had no 'fill it be proved, there is no such thing as a fact in naval
fightiDg value against the enemy j they had merely to keep out warfare conducred on moùern lines. When the shouting is
of her way, and hammer the weakly-armed County class over, and the headlines are ('vel', and when all things arQ
cruisers. reduced to a bedrock of fact, I think that we shall find that
It! is clear, therefore, that Admiral Sturdee's positicn was that white flag from the Leipzi[) ",as our hest asset in thQ
.ÐDe in which a mess ()f things could easily havo been made- Battle of the I.'alklands.
11*

anuary 2, 1915.

LAND í\:ND W ATEB

ADV ANT AGES OF CONVERGENT
FIRE.

THE

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

I N" my bst: article I b!lOwed the cumulative influence that
individual courage and coolness exercises on the battle-
field, by enabling a smaller number of men to do tin!
necessary amount of work, thus diminishing the losscs
and economising the vital forces of the whole nation.
This week I propose io e:Iplain how for equal numbers
of men greater results can be obtained from their wllective
fire power by grouping them suitably against the enemy.
Clearly if, say, one mJ.n to the pace can hold his own front
again8t, say, five-fold odds, because he comes of a well-bred
fighting stock and has been suitably tn,ined, 10,000 such men
oan safely hold a from: of 10,000 yards against, say, 20,000
men of inferior race on, say. a 5,000 front, provided the:,
can Eoee either directIy or by means of observation posts or
3eroplanes what the enemy is doing and whet.her he is trying
to mass superior numbers against any part of their position
for a surprise attack, and then they can employ the balance
of their numbers by establishing an overlap on either or both
fip nls.
The advantage thus gained can best be undel'stood by
taking the case of a small force completely encircled--or
rounded up-a po!.ition int.o which want of mobility or local
conditions of camping grounds has often driven us, in the
first case in the Boer war, and in the second in fl'ontier ex-
peditiomi in the mountain passes and district.s in India. where.
very fortunately, we were not the worse fighting raoo of the
two considered as individuals.
Here, for instance, is the typical case of a British bl'igade
with transport, say 5,000 men, compelled to camp in a circle
not exceeding 500 yards in radius-rat.her a close fit-when
camels and other wggage animal8, stores, eto, , have to ùe
provided for.

It will be s
n that if the extreme range of the rifle be
token as 2,500 yards, then every bullet fired from the invest-
ing arc A-B-C, even if it mis"cs the particular heaù at which
it was aimed, has got to come to ground somewhere within
the inner circle and is pretty sure to strike a baggage camel
or somebody before doing so.
But a defcnder'Eo bullet aimed at a man on the investing
line A-B-C, if it misses him will find very little to hit in the
1,000 yard belt beyond him, and is praoticallr a round wasted.
I remember some years ago working out in detail a. case
of tLis sort which had happened during the Tirah campaign,
after which many things were said about our bad shooting and
tho apparent deterioration of our troops as compared with
their predûeessors of some fifty years earlier date. from the re-
sult of which it appeared t11at every Afghan sniping into the
brown of our oamps harl a twenty-fold better chance of bittin

something vulnerablo than one of our mC'n s1100ting outwards,
whercaa with the old musket, range only 1,000 yards, his ad-

vant1ge had onl)" been as about three to one-a fact quite
sufiìcient to account for the trouble the modern hiUmen with
their Martini-Henrys had been oausing us.
The same question cropped up again in South Africa,
where the Boerfi, thanks to the mobility conferred upon thcm
by their ponies, alwars managed io " round up .. our 810\,.cI'-
moving infantry, and thus derived an initial advantage in
probability of hitting someone, according to the degree of
overlap ther established, whether complete or partial. It was
not the fact that the)' 'õ er
better marksmen than our men-
for except with a few of the older men this was seldom tho Q:J.&J
-but it was because their superior mobility gave them the ,ad-
vantage of l)osition that our" regrettable incidents .. were EO
frequently reported.
Of com'se, a. line can only have two endi:i to it, 80 in the
gigantio fronts of the present war this advantage can rarely
appear in thi8 cAtreme form, but it oan still be used locally,
especially by artillery, for directing a converging fire on oer-
bin points ",hich it is desired to storm; and this advantage
belongs entirely on each occasion to the side which has made
up its mind to attack first, and this explains why the
Germans are Eotill trring from iime to time to assault .certain
portions of our lines. This is the only form remaining to
them by which tiley can still derive advantage from the initia-
tive. for ill every other direction they are completely held Ly
us.
Now, if we combine the advaniages which have acorued tf)
us, thanks to our better shooting and 6u
rior coolness, as I
expl.1ined in my laEot article, with these to which I havo just
called attention, we can realise better how far we have gane
towards establishing a complete superiority over our enemy,
I think we may fairly assume that the troops we fought
in the retreat from Alons and on the Aisne and Macne were
at least twice as good a8 the partir-trained masses, all that
are now left to oppose UB j whereas ours can be relied
on in allotting tasks to them fully twice as much as at fu8t,
i.e., we ore ceriain of them now, whereas no staff in the
world could have counted on any men" for such brilliant fight-
ing qualities before they had been suffioiently tested,
\Ve oan, therefore, trust longer fronts to fewer men,
keeping thus greater reserves in hand for the final decir.ion;
and as 1\11', Hilaire Belloo has 80 well pointed out: in his last
contribution to these columns, reservC8 are the hammer to driTe
the ultimate issue home, and thanks to the staunchness of the
first line troops they can be kept out of danger until they
are actually wanted. The enemy mUE.t place more rifles in
his first line and 8upport them with fresh troops and reserVC-8,
all v
ry muoh closer at hand, so that they are swept by the
" overs JJ meant for the first line the whole time the engage,
ment bsts. And from the moment he breaks cover for an
al'lsault he now draws a convergent fire from every gun within
range, for local conditions completely prohibit his atbcking
on a b
'oad front of a couple of miles, as in the earlier days
of the \\ 3.1', which is the only way to minimise the effect of such
oonvergsnce.
It is impossible, of course, to give absolute figUl'cs in a
comparison of this nature, but trying it every way in my
mind I do not think I overestimate our present adv.:ntage in
putLing it as high as four to one. i.e.. setting aside the extra
exposure inherent in every attack. I believe the Germallil are
losing four times as many men in each as
ault they are now
makinO' as previous experience led them to anticipate. or as
"We srlO
ld suffer in attaoking them under simílar conditions.
But whereas \\e are now aooumulaiing or about to ao-
cumulate fresh troops of excellent quality by the hundred
thousand, they have now been compelleù to call out men of
an age and general physical inferiority that no one had ever
dreamed of sending into the field at all, and aro so markedly
short of artillery projeotiles that they have had to prohibit tho
only Ufie of al.tillery fire which gives a certain guarantee of
adequate preparation for their ßssaults,

Tm
1915 edition of .. Debrett's Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage,
and Companionage," published by Dean and Son, Ltd., at 3ls. 6d"
rcflects, on almost every page, the effect of the war, for InUldre-ds of
both titled and untitled names familiar in .. De.ùret!t's" have 8.'Ppesyed
in the casualty lists, wl1i
e thousanòs of Naval ;md Military appoint,
ments and promotions have been dealt with. The volume contains
the n 1mes of all officer;; a1lllounced on December 2 as appointed D.S,Q.

1':;*

LÄND í\.ND WATER

ITanuary 2, 1915-.

CORRESPONDENCE.'

ZEPPELINS,
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR.-I am one of those. \\'110. althou'7b busy, find
time to read each issue of LAND AND WATER mo':e than ()TIre
and consider I get excellent value for time so spent. Heading
Mr. L. Blin Desbleds' instructive and interesting article re
"Value of Zeppelins for Naval 'Varfare JJ in last week's. I
am of opinion that the Admiralty llave taken measures to
prevent the tell-tale glares from the funnels .of warships Leing
seen by observers stati.oned in airships or other air craft.
I expeçt they have provided large (',Qwl-srlaped hoods of steel,
fìxe
over funnels in such a way that they Clin be detached
dunng the day-time and when coming into harbour in order
to deceive the enemy through their spies. This precaution
lJeing 80 simple, it mu8lt be assumed that it has been taken.
On this assumption it appears to me that a further
opportunity for deceiving the enemy in mid-air presents itself.
It (',QÏlsists of the preparation and distribution on the high Beas
of imitation or mock furnace glares at any P.oint and at
finy distance from warships. Let tJlcm be called mock glaref/.
These can be produced in many wa:rs, from the old crude
torcb to the most up-to-date method, viz., chemicals, Between
these you have gas, oil, electl'icity, acetJ'lene, etc. The floats
may consist of .old raft8, old row boats, c2.sks, etc" according
to the class of weather and the condition of the sea. Theoo
could be oast off from tIle warships before night.fall.
In addition to deçeiving the enemy in mid-air it might
also reqnire a wcond torpedo from a hostile submarine to
extinguish one of those lights,
The opinion of Mr. Fred T. Jane
s naval expert and
of Mr. L, Blin Desbleds f()r the aircraft section on this would
be very valuable,-Your
faithfully, J. J. MURRAY.
Mranelg. DulJlin.
Deçember 26, 1914.

To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-We are all the beneficiaries of the excellent paper
by],f, Desbleds on Zeppelins. It raises the entire problem of
lighter versus heavier-than-air fliers. The Zeppc1in, as y.our
correspondent points out, is the most valuable auxiliary of a
warship and for reasons to wl1Í<:h perhaps lw lIas drawn in-
J:tufficient attention in detail.
(1) These hovering hawks, Btationary, a hundred miles
ahead of a fleet and with a wireless conneçtion, can take all
the strain off the sailor man. A dozen men, the crews of three
"hawks," relieved every few hours, can allow whole fleets (0
lie snugly in some adjacent harbour.
(2) Not legs important, these hovering kestrels can detect
both Ejubmarines and mines, A rigid dirigible was recently
used for this purpose by the Italian Govel"Ilment to deal with
Austrian mines in the Adriatic. Thc power of penetration f.or
the eye, exercised vertically by contrast with llOrizontall:r, is
very great. In fine weather especially, submarines submerged
fort.y feet. could be det.ected easily, Recent experiments in
the Gulf of l?lorida by the U.S. Aeronautical Department.
demonstrate this.
(3) But more important still is the personal factor in
the great. problem of heavier versus lighter. The expert acro-
pIanist is, and alwa:ys will De. a super-man; no less, But in
a year or two ev<,ry sea coast town here is likely to have its
Zeppelin scout .or destro:yer. These rapid rigid dirigibles will,

with us, probably represent a popular volunteer effort.
Because any Ulan whose nerve is equal t.o a t<team launch mi<Tht
navigate these diminutive Zeppelins, given fair ""eather. 0 A
friend of. mine, expert in Buch matters, quot.es their (',Qst of
conatructIon at less than .oCIO,OOO.
The
e are some of the reaBons why the Germans, after
nearly nIlle years of anxious experimentinO', LcIieved that their
progress with lighter-than-air machines'" justified a vote of
seven millions sterling. That generous expenditure and all
their years of experimentat.ion is the present Germany makes
to Eng
and. "Ye t<;'-day take up rigid dirigibles at the point
of effiCIency to whIch the enemy has brought them,- Yours
faithfully, :MORETON FREWEN.

DANGEROUS SENTIMENT.
To the Editor of LAND AKD WATER.
SIR,-I gather Íl'om Mr. Jane's artiele in L.
ND AND
WATER of December 26th that. tuwns on our East Uoast are
supposed to be protected by mines.
, It would
em tIlat t.here is .more Bupposition than pro-
tect
on about It, and one would hke to know whether the pro-
tectIon (',QuId not be made a little less inadequate. Or is
this p,rohibiWd by the .. chivalry and humanity" that our
pratt.hng pro-Germans are so fond of prescribing for our con-
duct of t.his war 1 These excellent. qualities seem to have led to
the escape of the Dresden, and will doubtless lend to more
Berious disaEi(ers if they arc not given up in favour of more
practical methods,-Yours, etc"

Y. D.

Prestfelde, Slue" sbury,
December 28, 1914.

THE FIELD FORCE FUND.
To tIle Edit
r of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-The Field Force Fund committee appeal for woollen
shirÍ.g and mufflers for their parcels, which they are sending
to the front in large consignments weeIdy.on the requisitions of
commanding officers.
Requisitions for over 37,000 of these parcels have been
reçeiv<,d during tIle last few days, and must be despatched
after Christmas. All contributions in money and kind will
be at once acknowledged by the hon. treasurer and hon. secre-
tary, c/o Lady Henry Bentinck, 53, Grosvenor Street, W.
December 24, 1914.

MORAL v. MORALE.
To the Editor of LAND AND W A'IER.
Radley College, Abingdon,
December 28, 1914.
Sm,-In a note to hi8 last intere&ting article in LAND
AND WATER, Mr. Bclloc wonders why Moral is so often spelt
Morale. In my youth I always heard it pronounced, as,
indeed, till quite recently I always pronounced it, as a t.ri-
syllable, Morolf, I have always believed it to be the Italian
of the French "ord, Moral.
In the same way, in my early days Napoleon was alwa
's
called Bonapartë with an Italian final e, a pronunciation
which I nm sure Wellington always used, r.nd which Napoleon
himself tried to forgct.-Yours faithfully,

E. BRYANS.

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J6-

JanuJ.ry 2, 1915

LAND AND WATER

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Quality tells more than calumny.

Never before in war bat tb(' value of tbe petrol.
driven engine b('en so incontestably proved as in
th
present conflict. In ('very branch of the
8eI'VICe - heavy transport. despatch riding, gun
haulage. armoured car raids, aerial reconnaissance,
Red Cros. Ambulance work, etc" "Shell" spirit
18 bein" lIsed more extensively by our Forc('s
at Homt and Abroad than any othe
petrol

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LAND AND WATER

J.UlUary 2. I 9 I 5

SUBMARINE IS

By .. AN ENGINEERING CORRESPONDENT"

T HE submarine is playing a very important part
in the present naval war, and has already
demonstrated its power as an offensive weapon,
while, at the same time, its trustworthiness
and radius of action are amazing.
Very little is known about the details of construction of
the various submarines used by the different naval powers,
although they are all of the same type, being based on the
construction of the Holland, built by the Holland Torpedo
Boat Company, The Holland was a small vessel of about
7 0 tons displacement when submerged, with a speed of about
six knots on the surface and of five knots when submerged,
She was completed in 18g8, and in 1900 was purchased by
the (Tnited States Government, remaining in active service
until H)IO. This boat is now preserved as a naval relic at
the Kolval Academy at Annapolis.
Xaval experts throughout the world watched carefully
the experiments carried out with the Holland. These experi-
ments proved a great success, and from that date all the
large naval powers commenced to build submarines. The
llevcIoprnent has been exceedingly rapid, as may be judged
from the fact that the latest type of submarine has a displace-
ment of about 1000 tons, can travel at 18 or Ig knots on the
surface and 12 below, while 1700 to 2000 ton boats are being
considered,
The largest and most modern types of submarine boats
possessed by the three leading European powers bear a
remarkable similarity in their size and general effectiveness
in warfare. The change in motive power within recent
years from petrol and paraffin engines to the Diesel engine
has greatly reduced the dangers from ignition of e:..plosive
mixture3 of fud vapour and air, and has increased to a great
extent the radius of action.
Submarines when on the surface are propelled by internal
combustion engines, but when submerged are dri\'en by
elertric motors, fed from storage batteries, which are charged
by the oil engine when the submarine is running on the
:iurface. The reason for using electric motors when running
submerged is. of course, on account of keeping the air as
pare as possible and utilising it only for breathing purposes.
The outstanding feature of the Diesel engine as compared
with the ordinary internal combustion motor is the complete
absence of any ignition apparatus. As is well kno\,n, the
compression of air generates a large amount of heat, and this
is used to fire the charge in a Diesel engine.
:\103t submarines at present are fitted with two Diesel
engine3, each of 1000 horse power, giving 2000 horse power
on twin screws. An excellent six-cylinder 1000 horse power
Diesel engine has been developed, of which considerable
numbers have been made, These engines are fitted with a
reversing gear, as the advantages of re,'ersing the main
en
ines when manæu\Ting are considerable, since the
power developed by the main engines greatly e:..ceeds that
provided by the elect) ic motors installed for under water
propulsion.
In several countries attempts are being made to develop
Diesel engines of 250U horse power each, and thus obtain a
tot.!1 of 5000 horsC' power for a submarine boat. I t is antici-
pated that with, these engines a speed of about 20 knots on
the surface will be attained as compared with the maximum
at present possible, The largest German boats nearing
co:npletion displace 750 tons on the surface and !.Joo tons
submerged, have a length of 2LJ. feet, and are prüpelled by
two Die,el engines of 2üoo hurse power each. These boats
will have a speed of 20 knots on the surface and 10 knots
sub.n
rged,
In France the majority of the boats are propelled by
petrol and pJ.raffìn en
ines, but for the I,lter bo,lts steam
turbine3 arc b
ing- adopted, The prüpulsiün by steam is not
lIew, and was tried in the earlier FrenclI submarilll'S, but was
,dxlI1doned owin
to the difficulties experienced in closing-
down the )',>il.'r-.; befure di\ ing. It is expected th,lt these
dillicultie" "ill be o\'ercome b
the adoptiun of modern
w,Lter-tulw boilers ha\'ing a \"l'ry high rate of e\ apor,Ltion
,lI1d using the I,Lte"t type of oil fud Imllling app,ll",LtuS.
:\Io"t subm,lrines lbe the system üf .. di\ ing by tla'
head" and use horil:ontal rudders in tIlt' stf'rn, Previous tr)
divin
the b,llld"t tank" arC' tilled \\ ith w,Lter to reduce the
subn1.lrine to a di\ ing conditiun, \\ hen the conning tU\' er
,dune shuws olbove wolter. The boat when thus prepared can

dive by the mere action of the horizontal rudders, the" nose"
being dipped down and the" tail" up. The angle of descent
is not deep and the action of the rudders can be controlled
exactly. Some submarines have horizontal rudders or diving
planes so arranged that their action draws the ship under
water without affecting her longitudinal trim.
Although the general tendency is to increase the size of
submarines, it must be remembered that such enlargements
add to its visibility when running awash, and increase the
time and distance required for disappearing when the vessel
dives. It is, of course, possible to overcome this difficulty by
diving at a steeper angle, but this again intensifies the difficulty
in bringing the vessel to an even keel and increases the danger
of striking bottom in narrow waters,
An invention which will probably revolutionise submarine
warfare is the Fessenden oscillator, which enables submarines
even when submerged to communicate with one another
through the water. The Fessenden oscillator can be described
as an improved method of producing powerful sound waves
by electrical means and communicating these waves to the
water. These sound waves can be received by an ordinary
microphone and telephone, such as is done in ordinary
submarine bell signalling.
By this method :\Iorse code has been transmitted through
water over a distance of 30 miles, and telephonic conversation
under water has been carried out over a distance of about
half a mile. \\ïth improved apparatus these distances will
be greatly increased. It has already been demonstrated in
America that with this invention it is possible for a flotilla of
submarines, when equipped with the Fessenden oscillator, to
make a combined attack on an enemy with only one boat
showing its periscope in order to direct the others, the
remaining ones being directed by telegraphy and telephony
through water. Again, this invention makes it possible for
the submarine when submerged to receive orders or report
movements from and to a battleship, cruiser, or any other
boat on the surface of the water.

THE B,H.S, FIELD KITCHEN,-:\lessrs, Brown, Hughes and
Strachan. Ltd., Holland Gate, High Street, Kensington, have built
up a wide reputation owing to the large number of military ambulances
which they have supplied for conveying the wounded, both at home
and at the front, It is a fine thing to bring the injured soldier swift!}
to the hospital, so that he may receive at the earliest possible moment
the necessary skilled attention, There are, however. other needs
just as pressing if the soldier is to be kept going. We refer to the
provision of good nourishing food. hot and ready to serve at any spot,
either near or far away from the firing line, To this end, :'Ilr. Strachan.
the managing director of the above firm, has designed and constructed
a travelling motor kitchen, fitted up with every requisite for the
speedy preparation and sen ing of large quantities of hot S
J\Ip
and broth, and so on. Simplicity of lksign, combined with lIght
yet strong construction, is the keynote of this ingenious milit,lrv
vehicle, No stone has been left unturned in order to give effective
senice in the smallest compass, simplicity having been studied
throughout, There is every reason to believe tholt these kitchens
will give every satisfaction under working conditions,

Bt:RBERRY COMFORTS FOR OFFICERS.- These most senireable
artIcles of outdoor equipment J.dequJ.teIy meet "ome of the most
p ,ignant needs of our brave defenders. _\ wedtherproof or British
warm, "o\'en and proofed by Burberrvs, should survive the seH"r('st
"ar service on land or sea, whilst waistcoats. shirts, hoods, anll
bivouacs of vanons patterns, made from the famous Gahardine cloth.
are unrivallerl for protection, light "eight, and durability For
nloval ot1icers Burberrvs have ready "ome splendid thick fleece overalls
fnr "eàring under oil;,kin
, These are appropriately called ,. Husky
SUitS." being hoth appro,'ed by and largelv supplied to the AdmirdItv.
-\n illu"tr,lted catalogup of Burberrys' military and naval kits will be
s;,nt post free on appli, ,ltion to Haymarket, London, S_\\',

CHRISTMAS EVE witnessed the opening performance of a gorgeous
Oriental pantomime, entitled" Aladdin," at the National
heatre, in
J.i:ings"av, I,ltely known as the london Opera House. It IS a happ\'
in"plration on the part of the man,lgement to light again the "on?erful
lamp of Aladdin, and no expense has been spared to reproduce m the
I',tlatial en\Ïronment of the i\ational Theatre the famous story of
" rhe .\r,lhian
ights" entertainment. The comp
nv engaged to
interpret the pantomime includes some of the kading exponents of
dran1dtie and pantomimical art, not,lbly l\Ii"s Claire l{om,lÌne, who
11.Is made the ch,'Tacter of " Aladdin " one of her gre,ltest studIes
In adllition, "e 11.Ive l\Ibs Billie 11arIow and :\liss Bessie Burke,
together" ith a host of I'''pul"r comedians, The entire production is
in the hands of the well,known st"ge mandger and producer, J. 1\1.
lones, and the aim of the m.Ill.lgement is to present the pantomime
In all its Orient,Li magniticence, and to n1.lke light and laughter the
donunant note during the"e dark days of war. The prices of admission
are popular, and range from od. to 7s, 6d..' each
eat being so placed
that an uninterrupted view of the st.lge IS obtamed.

188

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

VoL LXI\"

:\0. 2i--t8

S.\TURD}' Y, JA}JUARY 9, 19 1 5

[ l'UlJLlSllElJ AS ]
A NE\\::'l'APElL

l'Rll:E SIXPI;:Xl:I';
PUBLbllEV WEEKLY

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SIR MONTAGUE CHOLMELEY, BART.

GRE:oi"ADIER Gt:ARDS

This well-known Sportsman, who was Master of the Burton Foxhounds for two seasons has
we regret to say, recently leen reported killed in action on Christmas Eve, after having' bee

at the front only a month

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Send him the e\.er re.ul}
means 10 keep in tOllch
wilh all dt bome.

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LAND AND WATER

From Mr. Hilaire Belloc:
., How do I know that the fellow writes with a quill? A most
unlikely hauit! To that I ans.ver, you are right. Les. asser-
tion, please, and more humility. I will tell you frankly with
what I am writing. I am writing "ith a '''atamml's IdRal
Fmllltail, Pm, The nib is of pure gold, as was the throne of
Charlemagne, in the 'Song of Roland.' , .. Well, then.
the pen is of pure Gold. a tm that n/lls strait::ht al.'ay like a 1.'il,
lÌl't:: hOlse, 01 a jolly little ship.. indeed, it is a pen so excellent
that it remmds me of my subject-the pleasure of taking up
one's pen."
From II On Taking uþ Ont"s Pen," contaiPJed in II On NothiJlK," by
Hi/aile L'd/oc. lJj' kind teymissiolJ. ollh
AlI/lJol' and Publuher.

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January 9, 19 1 5

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are kl'epin
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From a returned Traveller:
------------ -

.. Durin\( the last fifteen years spent in and around the
. \Vhite Man's Gra\'c,' I ha\e tried Heaven kno\\s how many
fountain pens. but for stability in the Tropics gi\e me a
\Vaterman e\ery lime A few other pens cracked, other nibs
corroded, one or two [ell absolutely in h\ain. but the' Water-
man' I took out with me in lOW did well. She never leaked,
and though the . I\:roo' boys had hold cf it (in their mouths)
once or twice. the dear old thing kept on \Hiti:og. Lost (tro
te1/l) in the Niger River; o\'erboard in La
l'alma5 she went
on writing just the same. and I ha\e told alì the' boys,' from
Dakar to Bonn}", that my \Valerman was top-hole."
L. BILLINGHAM,
(Origi1JaJ leiteI' may be seen by llJJ)'One inteltsted).

L G SLOAN ""'be pcn K . L d
.. , \J:orncr," Ingsway, on on.

L E. WATERMAN CO. New York: 173 Proadway,
Montreal: 107 Notre Dame St
eet. w.

V/atérïnan's
( I dea l)
Fou ntá.1fiìPe n

On Land & Water-No Pen to equal t11is
Look where you will you cannot find a Pen that will serve you so well as a \Yatennan's
Ideal. V;aterman's Ideal is recogl1lsed the world over as the best Fountain Pen nude.
It never requires shaking, does not splutter or leak, and is made so well that it will give
a lifetime's service. That is why nearly all the busiest writers use \Yaterman's Ideal.

Th
"Safety JJ Type is bcst for men on active service, as it is for Chaplains, Doctors,
Red Cross Nurses, Ladies, TraveIlcrs, and Sportsmen. It can be carried in any position,
and will not leak. Beware of IMITATIONS!
Four types; Regular, S.1fety, Self,fi11ing, and Pump-filling, with numerous designs in
each. Nibs to suit all hands, exchanged gratis if not exactly right, In Silver and
Gold for Presenta[ion. Of Stationers and Jeweilers. Style Booklet free.

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SAFElY
TYPE,

THE BUR BERRY

Lined Proofed Wool, detachable Fleece or Fur
The BURBERRYexcludes
rain, sleet or snow, and
never becomes sodden or
heavy.
It provides luxurious
warmth in the coldest
weather, yet is healthfully
self-ventilating.
It dries with extraordinary
rapidity.
No amount of knocking
about affects its unrivalled
protective properties,
A RECENT LEITER
FROM THE FRONT
"All Officers cominl! out for
the Winter should have a Hurberry
with a detachable fleece lining and
Gabardine Uverall
. They will
be covered wilh mud the first
hour in the trenches, but Gabar-
o,ne dries well and the mud drops
off All our Officers are very
pleased" ith I heir Burberrys."
A.D,P" 16th 1 ondon Regt.
See tllat YOllr BURBERRY
is labdlctl .. /JURLJERR}'S."
MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE.

LORD KITCHENER describes it as
.. a moat valuable addili on to cam-
paigninlr Kit."

SHORT NOTICE KIT
nurberry. If.eep Tunica. Slack..
Breeches, Creat Coats and Warm..
ready to try on; 80 that fitting i.
done when orderinq-. either in Lon-
don or Pari.. Bnd the kit completed
in a few hours.

BURBERRYS HaYlnar,1<et S.W. LONDON
a & 10 Bd. Ma
esherbes PARIS. Basi agatoke and Provincial Al:;enta

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VIRGINIA CIGARETTES

JOHN PLAYER & SONS

beg to draw the attention

of connoisseurs to

"PERFECTOS" No. 2

:::: hand-made Cigarettes, They :::::
== are distinguished by a superb

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= delicacy, the result of a =
== matchless blend of the finest ::::
== Virgil1ia Tobacco. ===

10 6d. 20 - 1/-

50 - 2/6 100 4/9

r(-
"PERFECTOS FIN OS " aro

- 2
lar
er Cigarette. of tb. .am. qUollity

/
JOHN PLAYER b. SONS,

Nottingham, ..
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rf!-)J 'ThoW_., T
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200

;January 9, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR
By HILAIRE

BY

LAND.

BELLOC.

IOTl.- nil Article ... h.. ....ltt.. t. n. Pre.. Buen, wille' .... .ot .lIleet to tll. pablle.tl.. .. en..,.d .Dd t.te. ..
,......I.lIIt' 'or tII. e.rreet.... 0' tllo .t.telDe.b.
h aeeor"aco wltll n. re,.lre.eab 0' tIIo Pre.. Baren, tilt po.ltlo.. ., troop. OD PI... lIIadr.Ua, thll Artlcl. lDalt oalJ bo
re,.r.ed .. ."rozllDate, .Dd DO .enalt. .treartll .t ..J polat II ladleate.,

THE WEST.
T HE week just past, while it has been the
most stagnant of the whole autumn and
winter so far as the trench work in the
West is concerned, happens to have pro-
vided excellent examples of what that
trench work means, and of why slight advances in
one place or another, or slight losses, may be of
such moment,

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We have already seen in these columns what
the general problem of trench work is. A very
long line is held by numbers only just sufficient to
maintain themselves: continual attacks upon that
line are not intended to have the effect of slowly
driving it back, nor even of breaking it in one weak
place (that is the task of the reserve whenever it
comes into play). They are intended, by attri-
tion, to give the enemy pause at last and to make
him consider whether he still has enough men to
hold so very extended a series of defensive posi-
tions. For when he decides that his numbers are
no longer sufficient for that task, he may be com-
pelled to fall back to a shorter line, and such a
shorter line means, in the case of the western field,
a very serious retirement, carrying with it politi-
cal consequences of wllich I will speak later,
But apart from this general character of
trench fighting there are particular examples to
show how success in one region or another may
have effects quite out of proportion to the compa-
ratively small measure of advance made, Of this
we have had this week three examples: the first
a small example of a German success five miles
from Reims; the second a small success of the
French in the plains of Champagne at Perthes;
the third a much more important success of th('
French in Upper Alsace, at Steinbach. I will
deal with the first two together and with the third

eparately.

I.-THE AFFAIRS AT SILLERY AND
PER THES.
About a: week ago the Germans reported and
the French admitted the capture and destruction
of a French trench by a mine, The progress thus
obtained by the Germans in the region of Sillery
was insignificant. The French casualties were
limited to one company, and part of the ground
was retaken. The whole incident if we read it by

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itself would be confusing reading, and apparently
of little moment: one of those very numerous de-
tails of all this fighting with which weeks and
months have made us only too familiar,
Similarly, another telegram, a French one

announced the advance of the French trenches

first by 300, then by 600 yards, in the neighbour-
hood of Perthes, a village about ten miles west
of the ArgQnne Forest and about twenty-five miles
east of Reims,
This French communiqué also, read by itself

would mean very little, and would make almost
meaningless reading. Whether the French ad-
vance was admitted in the German communiqué
or not I forget, nor is it of importance. The little
forward movement was made and it was main-
tained, and like that at Sillery, twenty miles off
to the left in the same line of trenches, it was
apparently of little value.
But when we CQme to look at the thing as a
whole, we see more clearly what particular effects
successes of this kind may have.
Here is a rough sketch of the trenches, over
a space about sixty miles in length, from east to
west, From in front of or north of the town of
Reims, to the north-east of the lown of Verdun.
It will be seen that the line is by no means a.
straight one. From where it starts, well to the-
north of Reims (it has here been pressed back by

1*

LAND ÄND WATER

the French to the low heights on the Rethel road),
it comes suddenly down south, and even bends a
little to the west again round the hill of Nogent,
Indeed, it is the continued occupation of this
height by the German guns which allows the shell-
ing of Reims to be continued occasionally, and
which also supports the outward thrust here of
the German trenches. The French have not suc-
ceeded in retaking that height, Now, it is just
where this bend or forward thrust of the Gcrman
trenches takes place that the French lost thcir
advauced trenches by the explosion of an enemy
mine, and the German thrust was brought for-
,yard, as at A, from the dotted line to the thick
line.
In the same way and over a greater extent of
ground in much the same days, the French line
,"as gdva,nced, as at B, in the region of Perthes.
Many other minor flexions of this line took
place in the same period. Thus, in front of the
'V ood of Forges on the Meuse, in front of Verdun,
at C, there was an attempt of the enemy to thrust
forward which was broken back: while in the
"\Vood of Grurie, at D, they seem to have made a
few yards. But A and n, the movements at Sil-
lery and in front of Perthes, are the most impor-
tant,
Now, why are comparatively small movements
of this kind of importance? The general import-
ance of perpetually keeping the enemy moving and
occupying as many of his men as possible we have
seen. nut what particular importance is there in
small special advantages of this kind? If they
cannot be followed up, of course, there is no par-
ticular or local importance: but my point is that
each such slight advance does promise more than
it actually obtains, and that at any moment a suc-
cess or a failure upon this scale may breed a very
much larger success or failure,
Look, for instance, at these points, A and B.
It is apparent that behind the French line there
runs past the viìlage of Sillery, past the junction
of St. Hilaire, past Suippes to St, Menehould, and
so to Verdun, a line of railway important to the
French supply, It is equally apparent that there
runs along the line R, R, R, R, a line of railway
which crosses the Argonne, and is important not
only to the German supply, but also for linking up
what was the Crown Prince'sArmy in front of V er-
dun with the other German forces in Champagne.
N ow it is the object of either combatant in this
region to reach out and to cut such lines of supply,
and if either could atta.jn his object he would im-
peril the whole line of trenches of his opponent.
If the French from B could get across the railway
R, R, R, R, or the Germans at A could get acrOS3
the railway running from Reims through St.
Hilaire to St. Menehould, the corresponding sec-
tion of trenches between the two railways would
have to te abandoned-by the Germans in the first
case, by the French in the second. During all
these weeks of fighting in this region neither
party has succeeded in reaching either of these two
essential lines; but note that the space to be
crossed is not great-such an advance as was made
at Perthes the other day is something like a third
of the distance the French have to go to achiev0
their object-a.nd that the only rea,son each of
these numerous attempts does not get home is that
the force aga.inst whidl it is made at once brings
TIP men from other parts which are not being at-
2 1t

January 9, 19151

tacked, and strengthens the threatened line. On
the day when this bringing up of men is done
slowly, or on the day when the line is too thinly
held for the gaps to be thus stopped by regular
concentrations wherever they occur, there will
follow in that region a really considerable ad.
vance. And that is why, in spite of such very
small immediate results, the men in the two
parallel lines of trenches continue to attack and
counter-attack. The thing will be still better
understood if we look at it in more detail.
Here, for instance, is the detail of the Sillery

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position. The great road south-eastward from
Reims, A, A, and the railway from Reims to St.
Hilaire, B, B, are the parallel lines which supply
the French trenches, which I have indicated by a
line of crosses. Opposite these French trenches
you have the German trenches, which I have in-
dicated by a dotted line. Of course, in reality
the system of trenches is infinitely more compli-
cated, and the distance between the opposing
firing lines considerably varies: but that is the
general conformation of the line east of Reims. It
is dominated by the heights of the hills of N ogent
l'Abbesse, which the Germans continue to hold.
The German attack which was successful in blow-
ing up the first French trenches was made at about
M, the site of an isolated farm to the south of Sil-
lery, and within the parish limits of that small
town or large villa.ge. The Germans only suc-
ceeded (and that apparently temporarily) in get-
ting the French line back as far as N, but the
sketch is suff1cient to show what they were driving
at, and what proportion their success bore to the
task before them. Small as was the distance, it
was more than a quarter of the way to the level-
crossing in front of Great and Little Sillery at
0, and if the Germans could ever thrust their
trenches out so as to include 0, and perhaps to
occupy the SiHerys, they would cut, and therefore
be masters of, the milway, n, B, and the road,
A, A. at one and the same time, and probably
paralyse a long section of tbe French trenches im-
mediately to the east, which this railw:1y and thiJ
road supply.
Here we have two local examples, at Perthe

and in front of Sillery, of the way in which th.1
trench fightîng is carried on, and the particular
local objects which it has in view, apart from the
general object of ultimately compelling the enemy.
to shorten his line,

January 9, 1915.

LAND ,AND WATER

But the success at Steinbach, at the extreme
south-eastern end of the line in Upper Alsace, is
a matter of greater moment. To that we will
next turn

II.-THE AFFAIR AT STEINBACH.

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A rough diagram of the position in Upper
Alsace (only a diagram, not a map) is afforded by
the following skctch. The shaded oblong, V, V,
,...ïth the passages across it at pI and p2, repre-
sents the Vosges with the two southernmost passes
across those mountains, The dotted line, S, S, S,
represents the Swiss frontier. The continuous
perpendicular line, R, R, represents the Rhine.
The circle, M, represents the town of Mulhouse,
and the star blocking the gap between the Vosges
and the Swiss frontier at B represents the fortress
of Belfort. From the Vosges to the Rhine lies a
fiat plain (slightly inclining, of course, towards the
river) everywhere more than ten, and every-
where less than twenty miles broad. Mul-
house is a very important manufacturing
town, much the chief town of Upper Alsace:
it is not fortified. The trenches as they
stood at this extreme end of the line a week ago
may be represented on the diagram by the line of
dots. Finally, you have just behind that line of
dots, at X, a little promontory, as it were, a jut-
ting-out position from the foothills overlooking
the plain, and just in front of it the small town of
Cernay at C.
Now, from such a diagram it is fairly evident
what the French plan was. The French were
already in possession of the crest of the Vosges,
represcnted in the diagram by the double line run-
ning from V to V. They were in possession of the
passes, but not ill full possession of the mouths of
those passes where they debouch upon the Alsatian
plain. To enter Mulhouse would be both politi-
cally and strategically a result of high importance.
In the first place, it would uncover a section of the

Upper Rhine (fortified, it is true, though not
heavily fortified) and provide, for the first time
since the campaign in the vVest was opened, an
issue into Germany proper. Further, to capture

![ulhouse would be to hold in fee one important
industrial district of the conquered provinces. It
would have its full effect in Germany politically,
and quite inevitably it would draw down (as I
think the mere threat has already drawn down)
considerable German forces from the north,
It is an invariable rule that, if YOU desire to
be rid of a military obstacle, it is e
sier to turn
it, if you can turn it, than to try and pierce it. Or
rather, if you are making for an objective covered
by an obstacle, to get round towards your objec-
tive is usually less expensive than to butt right
at it, In this case of the trenches in Upper
Alsace in front of Belfort, the arrow from Belfort
indicates the direct advance on Mulhouse. Tbat
portion of the trenches was, of course, very
strongly held. But the French, being in posses-
sion of the pass, p2, which is called the Pass of
Thann from the town standing at the foot of it on
the Alsatian side, could, if they broke the Rhine
near X, occupy a gun position there dominating
the plain, and might hope either to proceed to the
occupation of Cernay, and so onwards on the north
of Mulhouse, towards the Rhine, along the double
arrow-thus rendering useless and compelling to
retire the whole of the German line between X and
S. Such a thrust would put Mulhouse into their
hands, and at the same time uncover something
like twenty miles of the Upper Rhine.
Note that the much more probable result of
such a thrust would be to bring German forces
down in considerable numbers from the north in
order to save Mulhouse. But, though this result
would, of course, not be so satisfactory to the
French as the entry into Mulhouse and the reach-
ing of the Rhine, it would have its value because
the number of men by which the Germans hold
their western line is limited, and if it is seriously
menaced in one place it can only be strengthened
there at the expense of dangerously weakening an-
other. This is particularly true of Upper Alsace,
where the forces are few, the quality of the Ger-
man reserve troops poor, and the distance from
the main field of the fighting very great.
X, the gun position which tbe French were
fighting for, is a bill just to the south of the village
of Steinbacb, and to show in detail the whole
value of the movement it is necessary to look at the
succeeding plan. Here it will be seen that the
Vosges fall from their high mountainous part on
to the Alsatian plain, and their terminus along
that plain is very abrupt, High, wooded moun-
tains, across which goes the main road of the Pass
of Thann-and which resemble for their landscape
the lower Californian hills and red woods more
than any otbers I know-fall in sharp foothills to
the plain; and the distinction between the hill
country and the flat along the line, F, F, is more
marked than any other I can recall. For the
Vosges stand straight up out of the Alsatian plain
like a long, mountainous, wooded island rising out
of the sea. From these heights a man looks across
the Plain of Alsace to the Rhine and sees beyond
that stream tbe corresponding heights of th
Black
Forest, The plain is as flat as can be, though
sloping over its fifteen or sixteen miles of e....tent
towards the great river.

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3*

LAND ÄND WATER

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ant. CqlLèd' rW TÞJ.tf.
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1000 yarr:l ranges
Is3,*f6r"
. ;' :a ::; #. ,; j
E11iJlislz Miles

About l,OOOft. above the plain, upon a peaky
foothill, stand the ruins of the old Castle of Stein-
bach, at the point I have marked C upon the
sketch. Steinbach village itself is in the coombe
below, and I have marked it S, Just to the south
()f Steinbach village and to the south-east of the
Castle Hill, there is a tlattish promontory or
tongue free from wood (though there is wood upon
the hillside leading to it), and by its position domi-
nating the plain to the south as well a'> to the east.
This gun position I have marked by the letter H.
Batteries upon H (if the high ground behind is
dear of the enemy) swcep the whole of the plain
and the lo'wer hills around. They ùòininate the
little lump of high ground near the village of High
Aspach: they dominate the other gun position
above Ufl'oltz, and they command the market town
of Cernay.
There is often a coincidence between a view-
point for tbe picturesque and a good gun position;
and it is worth noting that the Castle Hill of Stein-
bach, though not identical with and higher than
the gun position I am speaking of, dominates to
the eye all the plain of Upper Alsacc. It is the
position to which a man climbs who wishes to em-
brace in one view the whole of that sweep of plain
between the Vosges, the Swiss hills, and the Black
Forest.
The fighting, then, was for the village of
Steinbach and the slight hills on either side. It
was concluded, as we know, two days ago, from
the moment of writing this: i.e., on Sunday, Jan-
uary 3. The positions are apparently still held,
and Cernay is already in danger of a further

'JIeigftt's as alJòve plairt

January 9, 1915

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a

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IV

French advance. The thing can be seen in more
detail in the following plan, where the gun posi-
tion above Uffoltz at 150ft. above the plain is seen
contrasted with the gun position south of Stein-
bach, which is 200ft. above it,
All the heavy fighting for the position of the
heights was done by the Chasseurs Alpins from
across the mountain stream called the Thur (which
runs past Cernay and feeds a mill brook running
to that town), and up in the direction of the
arrows, A, A-at least, so I read the rather con-
fused private telegram whicb has come through,
And it would seem that the gun position which thA
French now occupy had previously been defend(;d
by German field artillery, 77's, which were either
silenced or captured.
'Ve must not exaggerate tbis local success.
There are still ten miles between these foothills
and Mulhouse, and another eight or more from
Mulhouse to the Rhine. There is the bad obstacle
of a large forest, and the virtual certitude of Ger-
man concent.ration to relieve the pressure here,
Still, the positions carried, if they are maintained,
are the positions that dominate with tbeir fire all
this part of the plain. This novel pressure upon
Upper Alsace, if it is maintained, will have one
very great political consequence which should
strongly affect German strategy: and of that I
propose to speak next week.
11.- THE EASTERN FIELD.
I N the eastern field there is a dearth of action
after the heavy work of the last month,
which is due to two separate causes. In
the north the second battle for Warsaw has

Røad -
tlJ MUlhouse.

v-

,.

3'anuary 9, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

come to an end through the exhaustion of the
enemy. In the south the comparative lull
(which is not absolute, for there is a continual
Russian advance) is mainly imposed by the-abomin-
able condition of the weather in the Carpathians
and on the Galician plain at this moment.
As to the comparative calm in the north, it
still continues, though with reinforcements the
enemy may renew the attack; but the great effort,
which lasted up to and somewhat over Christmas
Day, has definitely failed. There has succeeded
to it a series of sharp encounters alollg the centre
of the Polish line-none of them in any way deci-
sive-and a curious movement, not very easy to
understand, of the extreme north of the German
line attemptillg to cross the Vistula. The position
of the troops here dces not exactly correspond
with the tributary rivers Bzura and Rawka. "\Ve
can establish it more or less successfully from the
telegrams and it seems to be somewhat as follows:

, Sa.

.;('.
OJ. \,t S
-
O ')A \
'b9.,

vt

Along the Bzura the Russian trenches are every-
where along the right or Warsaw bank, except
near its mouth. Here it would seem that the Rus-
sian line crosses the stream, for Vitkoritze upon
the further bank is in Russian hands. Furth
r

outh along the Rawka, as that narrow stream
gets shallO\ver towards its sources, the Russian
line no lonzer corresponds with the water. So
far as one can make out, it recedes considerably
from the line of the Rawka in front of Bo1imow,
whcre the Germans have established themselves
on the right or \Varsaw bank. But it would also
seem that the real difficulty for an advance upon
'Varsaw there lies not in the comparatively insig-

nificant obstacle of the stream, but in the woods
and low heights which the Russians are here hord-
ing behind it.
8ti11 further south in the region of Rawa the
line comes to the stream again, and there has been
fighting for the points where the two brooks

Bialka and Rylka, fall into the upper waters of
the Rawka. All this Russian line is thoroughly
maintained and seems to be in no danger. But, as
I have said, there is a curious movement going OD

w herein the Germans seem to be trying to cross
the Vistula in front of Vischegrod, It may be
suggested that this attempt means that the enemy
does not believe that even with reinforcements
he can pierce the Bzura-Rawka line, and that if he
is to make another attempt with such reinforce-
ments to seize \Varsaw, he can only do it by esliooLb-
lishing a bridgehead beyond the Vistula, crossing
troops there, and then advancing upon \Varsaw
in the direction of the arrow, Vlschegrod, oppo-
site the mouth of the Bzura, is a town upon whieb
three main roads converge: it is a place where the
throwing of a pontoon would be comparatively
easy by using the island of Yamytcheff, which
stands here in mid-stream. The town is further
protected by a tributary coming in upon the right
ballk of the Vistula. The V istula is here, fa
normal times, about 1,000 yards broad or a little
less: swollen by the recent thaws, it may be some-
what broader at this moment. At any rate, the
attempt of the Germans to cross here and to es-
tablish a bridge with a bridgehead held beyond
upon the northern bank, has been checked by the
action of small armoured steamers, which have
been sent downstream from the depots at Warsaw.
Further south, in all the central part of the
line, in the region in front of and below Petrckow.

ì

"todz.

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'l>.zys
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.5' Õ -7 I
I. I I , r I I I
One WtW a
'erqg;?
ma.rcfr..irtg

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and so on to the Lotsosina, there have been (luite
inconclusive attacks, each checked in turn at the
points marked upon the map by the crosses. It
will be seen that this line runs without

5*

LAND AND W ATEH

ß.exion and in the original direction north
and south. There is no intention on the
part of the Russians of advancing it; all the
efforts of the enemy are to pierce it. The
attacks near Mikhala, Gora, V oImino, Polikhno,
and four or five other places, such as Kamans,
:h:fazornia, Malogorszcz, and Zakrsow, all lie
along this line, and are each marked by a cross,
It is the original line of which I spoke last week,
which runs straight from the Upper Rawka to the
west side of the Lotsosina, and so down the Nida.

o the Upper Vistula. This Russian line is the
straightest and shortest possible for the defence of
Warsaw, It was deliberately taken up and has
been maintained for seventeen days, It has not
hitherto bent, still less has it been pierced.
On the other hand, there has been for the last
few dars no appreciable movement further south
and west of the Russians, towards Cracow, from
across the Nida. 'Ve have no news, for instance,
that the Nidcza has been reached yet by our Allies,
and it is equally true that the passes of the Car-
pathians are not yet in their hands. The private
telegrams allllouncing their capture four or five

J"anuary 9. 1915,0;

days ago were what is politely called Ie an antici-
pation of events"; and that from Rome describinO'
the pouring of troops down on to the Hungaria

plains was rubbish, The position as known at the
moment of writing-Tuesday night-that is, the
position of last Sunday-was that the Russians
held the mouths of all the passes, were nearly at
the summit of the Uzsog, and had driven the
Austrians right up into the hills at the place where
the all-important Dukla Pass debouches into the
fairly open northern country, The Austrians in
t
eir retreat had left-as may be imagined in such
vIle weather of blizzards and snow (for it is much
worse in the Carpathians than in Northern Poland
near 'Varsaw, where the winter is open, very
wet, and still mild) numerous prisoners and not a
little maJ;erial-4 guns, for instance, 3,000 men,
and 68 officers, with half-a-dozen 1vlax.ims, south
of Gorliche, But until clear weather and a frost
come it is probable that advances everywhere here
will continue to be extremely slow. It is none
the less an advance, and none the less a continual
and daily depreciation of the Austrian forces.

THE SUPPLY OF MEN.

I N the last few days that incessant question,
the supply of men, has again been raised in
more than one quarter, both by those \vho
have emphasised anew the present character
of the war, and by those who have put forth
further estimates of enemy-reserves in the public
Press.
It is a matter to which all critics and students
of the great campaigns must continually return,
and the object of the following notes upon it in
this week's issue is only to reduce the matter to
its simplest terms, so that a general judgment may
be drawn which shall also be precise.
To obtain a precise conclusion on this matter
is the more valuable because (for some reason
which is not easy to discover, but probably con-
nected with the advocacy of particular policies),
many authorities are not content to keep to the
plain rules of arithmetic, but are concerned som

to exaggerate, others to belittle, the total existing
forces and the total reserves of force present with
the Allies or with their enemies,
Now, if we keep certain principles clearly
before us, and if we apply those principles to the
published statistics of modern Europe, we shall
arrive at certain numerical results upon which
there can be no doubt whatever; unless we are pre-
pared to call those published official statistics
false, or the rules of arithmetic doubtful.
I propose to pursue the following plan: -
(1) To begin with, the absolute numbers cf
males of what is called" military age." (2) Then
to see how many of these are "potential " forces
for any nation, i.e., how many could (if there were
no loss by inefficiency, necessary civilian employ-
ment, absence in fields other than that of the Euro-
pean conflict) possibly enter the field. (3
Th3tlce
to proceed to what I shall call the" actualities,"
that is, the numbers which, out of these potential
numbers, could in practice be sùmmoned within
one year supposing full equipment and supply
aTailable for them. 1'hese figures I shall call the

" Final figures." But they will need" ,veighing"
by a consideration of age, of efficiency, of rate of
loss,

I.-ABSOLUTE NUMBERS.
Yve start, then, by asking the number of males
of ,vhat is generally but very loosely called "mili-
tary age
' in each of the five great belligerent
Powers.
Weare justified, for the purposes of a
strongly outlined sketch such as this, in omitting
the smaller populations involved, and in consider-
ing only France, Great Britain, the German Em-
pire, Austria-Hungary and Russia.
"Military age" signifies, when the phrase is
used in this arbitrary fashion, all years from the
twentieth to the forty-fifth year inclusive, That
is, the phrase presupposes the calling up and
training of lads whose twentieth birthday fallg
sometime near or after the declaration of war,
and men of succeeding ages up to those who attain
their forty-fifth birthday near the same moment.
How misleading the phrase can be, and how it
must be modified when one comes to practical
judgment we shall see in a moment. But, for the
purpose of establishing first principles, this is the
period of human life in the male which we set
apart under the sacred phrase" military age."
Now, we know from published statistics how
the Great Powers stand to one another in this
factor of strength,
Germany has 12,000,000 such men; France,
7,000,000; this country, 8,000,000; Austria,
9,000,000; Russia, 26,000,000,
The reader will at once protest against these
figures being given unqualified, particularly in the
case of Great Britain and of Rmsia; and we shall
see in a moment how different the " potential,"
still more the" actual" numbers of men available
in action during the current year are froD1 the
mere total numbers of males. thus aligned, But fo

6*

January 9, 1915,

LAND
ND WATER

the beginning of our inquiry we must first set down
those certain official statistics,
It wiH be seen then, that if a nation could put
under arms and train and use for the purposes of
war the whole of its adult male population from
the ages of twenty to forty-five inclusive, and if
all the men thus trained and put under arms were
of equal value and formed equal units in perfectly
constructed and proportioned armies, and if all
this could be done at t.he very outset of war (an
absurd hypothesis, but one necessary to the de-
velopment of this argument) the Germanic Allies
would have begun the fight with a preponderance
of 21, as against 15 in the West; and with a handi-
cap of 21. as against 26 in the East.
If compelled to fight both such hypothetical
enemies at once, Germany and Austria would
have been at a disadvant..'tge of almost t to 2:
21 to 41.
Let me put it in tabular form:-
AlHes, Enemy,
England 8 Germany 12
France 7 Austria 9
Russia 26

41

21

There is the first-and most misleading-step
in the whole affair,

II.-THE POTENTIALS.
Now, let us consider bow these resources
shrink when we consider, not the mere totals
of adult males, but the" Potentials," That is the
most that, under existing conditions of military
organisation and expectation in each country, each
could bring forward in a year, supposing there
were no such tbings as delay in equipment, ineffi-
dents, necessary civilian employment, etc,
In other words, supposing that the five Great
Powers had been able to put under arms at the
outset of the war the total numbers which their
military organisation proposed as theoreticalIy
available for the field, apart from all deductions
necessary for civilian work, for physical ineffi-
ciency, etc., how would the figures stand then 1
The British conception of total possible mili-
tary resources envisaged an Expeditionary Force
of fewer than 200,OOO-but with reserves behind
them. Behind these again a militia (whether to be
used at home or abroad does not affect the argu-
ment, for Britain is part of the European Belli-
gerent area) of, say, roughly, half a million men.
That half million was not, of course, fully trained
for war, but we are considering, for the moment,
only thc hypothesis of total potential forces,
Again, tbe total armed forces of the Crown in this
countr
' were very much larger, of course, than the
Expeditionary Force envisaged, But for the pur-
poses of the European (and decisive) campaign,
the Expeditionary Force and the Tcrritorials at
home or on the Contincnt should alone be con-

i(
cred, For the fOrces used in the Dependencies,
etc., do not count in the active total of the field of
European operations,
Beyond these existing figures Great Britain
might hope for voluntary or compulsory levies,
which we may put for the purposes of this calcula-
tion at a maximum of two million volunteers avail-
able within the time that the Great Continental
Py'\vers could bring in ;Lnd train the total of their

disposable men. We may set down Grea
Britain,
then, with the figures .2 (of a. million) for an Ex-
peditionary Force, .5 for her Militi.ã r Terrl-
torîals "), and obtain the total figure .7, The
figure 2 stands for the 2 millions of maximum
available reserve of volunteers, making a grand
total of 2.7. Seeing that the Expeditionary Force
had its own reserves for filling gaps and making
up the full strength, we are not exaggerating if we
make of this figure 2. 7 the round figure 3.
Let us set down Great Britain, then, the first
upon the list, with the figure 3..................... 3
The French figure 7 allows for no modifica-
tion. Not that all this 7 are, or will be, in the
field, of course, or could be. But tbat the French
military organisation covel'S the whole of the male
population: it is the maximum French Potential.
So, without further analysis we may briefly
set down the French figure beneath the British
one: 7 ...... ."... ",.",......",... ....., ...,....,.... 7
The same rule applies to the Germanic Allies.
'fhe German Empire trains only half its men in
time of peace; but it has an organisation for call-
ing up in batches and using all the rest, and
though in Austria-Hungary the proportion trained
is even smaller and the machinery at once looser
and more complex, yet under the conditions of
war every single man is available as much in that
service as in the German. We may, therefore, set
down the two original figures unmodified in the
case of these two Powers, which again gives us
for Germany the figure 12 ........................ 12
In the same way with the forces of Austria-
Hungary, we are justified in maintaining the
original figure which, as we have seen, should be
set down at 9.......,..........................,...."....9
Russia presents a problem totally different
from that of any other European Power in this
respect,
Though a heterogeneous Empire and un-
able to supply more than a fraction, she differs
from Great Britain. She differs still more,
though she has conscription, from France and
Germany or Austria,
The first thing to appreciate is that the
G
million subjects of the Czar who are of military
age are not available for one united army at a!l.
It is not, of course, as ridiculous to talk of them
under one military heading as it would be to talk
so of the subjects of the British Crown; for these
are even more diverse, And the nucleus of Russia
proper is much larger in proportion to the out-
lyers and dependent peoples than the nucleus of
Britain is in proportion to the British Empire.
Still, to think of the Russian co-efficient as 2G
compared with the German co-efficient 12, is to
think in terms of nonsense. The true Russian
number even potentially available for action
against the Germanic Allies is but a fraction of
those 26: what fraction it is roughly, we will ncxt
proceed to examine.
Lest all this part of my argument should be
misunderstood, the reader may note the diversity
of the Russian Empire and its consequcnt limita-
tions for the formation of a homogeneous army
in the following official statistics published upon
the authority of the Russian Government itse]f
and checked in proportion to the numbers given
in the census. From these statistics we :find that,
of the 26 million adult males of military age, only
just over 15 .are Aryans, ;Lnd of these the Slavs

{l*

LAND AND WATER

proper. including the Poles. count but 14 million

dult males of military agc; while R'llssia proper,
excluding Poles, has available (according to the
same statistics) only about 12-13 million of adult
malcs of military age. There are, of course, very
large sections of the population other than Slavs
upon which Russia draws impartially for her COll-
scripts. but I give these figures to explain in some
part the discrepancy between the apparent and
the real resources of the Russian State in war.
N ext. apart from this heterogeneous charac-
ter. it must be clearly appreciated that economic
necessity forbade Russia to train more than a cer-
tain number of men, or to provide equipment for
them or officers for them. The number so trained
was very large, but less by far in proportion to her
total population than was the case in any other of
the great conscript countries. It may be urged,
indeed, that this left a vast quantity of untrained
material by way of reserve. and that is true; but
you cannot make an army from such sources
alone. An army also needs guns and the
whole framework of regimental officers and staffs,
a.nd that preponderating factor of equipment which
cannot be improvised.
It is true that after an indefinite delay this
great absolute superiority of numbers would begin
to tell. but it would not begin to tell in the first
year of a war, and hardly in the first two years.
It would tell very heavily in a struggle prolonged
as were. for instance, the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars,
We must not, then, think of Russia for one
moment as we think of France or of Germany: a
single homogeneous nation occupying a compara-
tively restricted and highly developed area, organ-
ised under one comparatively simple military sys-
tem which works exactly with the civil administr:1-
tion. We must think of Russia for what she is,
an Empire. She is an Empire. the development of
which is still on the way to modern organisation.
In this process, it is true, she has advanced with
astonishing rapidity. but it is still far from com-
pletion. It is an Empire in which the economic GREAT BRITAIN.
resources of all kinds. including communications The three million maximum potential which
and equipment. the instruction of officers. and the we have set down for England is modified only by
rest, cannot be. as it is in the older countries. co- two considerations, The first is whether recruit-
incidcnt with the maximum man-power ot the ment upon the present system will give this num-
State. ber-which can certainly in theory be attained;
Noone can exactly fix the limits of the num- the second is whether the existing army on the
bers which Russia could put into the European Continent into which the new levies must he
field in an indefinite space of time. But we can .. digested" will be large enough. when the time
make some rough estimate of her potential (not comes. to achieve that process of absorption.
her actual) adult male population thus available You do not pour new levies into a field un sup-
within. say, the space of one year. supposing she ported. It would be fatal. You mix them 'with
could obtain all the equipment she needed and had and embrigade them with. make them fight side
the communications wherewith to feed and to sup- by side with, men who have already formed them-
ply all present upon the field, selves to war in action.
Russia calls up for training every year rather If we allow so long a space as a year for the
more (but not many more) young men than does process. and if we consider both the quality of the
Germany. She calls up anything between a sixth material and the intensive training to which it has
more and a fifth more-that is. for regular train- been submitted, we may. I think (short of unex-
ing; you must allow a good deal of margin for pected disasters). be easy as to this second con-
irregulars, sideration.
\Vhen we consider that Germany by her As to the first consideration, that is. whether
system can lay her hand on just under 4t million our present system of recruitment will provide the
men of military age who have had some full number or no. only the future will show, More
sort of training, we may safely put the similar than half. but not two-thirds, of the task is alrC'ady
number in Russia at over five million. But you accomplished, We have about another million to
-cannot put it at much over five million, because find. To accomplish this by a compulsory
the increase of the Russian population is so rapid. system is a highly controversial proposal. not suit-
S*

January 9. 1915.

and the re-organisation of the Russian forces hils
been so recent, that the later contingents are much
larger than the early ones. In other words, the
proportion of older trained men is smaller than in
other armies. That this has its advantages as well
as its disadvantages we shall see later. Let us
for the moment fLX in our minds that number, five
million,
N ow how much are we to add to that fiVe
million to give what I have called" the potential"?
Here one is necessarily vague, just because
there is this very large mass of untrained reserve
(of very varying quality and even of varying races),
and also because the number that you can find for
your potential is limited by the moral possibility
of office ring them and training them, I suggest
as a maximum one man ill such a potential reserve
for each man who has had some training. That
maximum will, of course, never be reached in any-
thing save quite unexpected length of war, stretch-
ing over many. many years. But let us take it
as a maximum upon which to work the rest of our
calculation. Then if Russia has five million
trained men. we may call her" potential" 10. It
is certainly not more,
We can now set down in tabular form the
following list of " potentials" in millions:-
Allies. Enemy_
Great Britain 3 Germany
France 7 Austria
Russia ... 10

12
... 9

... 21

Total ... 20 Total
III.-ACTU ALITIES.
These potential figures do not. of course. re-
present actualities, They are maxima, and
maxima altogether superior to what will re::tlly
be raised-save. perhaps, in one case-in the full
year, Let us proceed. then. as the last stage in
this analysis, to consider the actualities to which
these " potential" numbers shrink in their turn,

January 9, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

able for discussion in the3e columm, But it is
worth pointing out that this country is the one and
only belligerent country in Europe which can still
manufacture freely, that its industry is largely
supplying the Alliance, and that a voluntary
system fits in an exact and elastic manner the
demand for labour. Under the alternative system
of compulsion you would have to arrange arbi-
trarily and mechanically what men were to be
dra\\'n for service, and what were to be left behind
for industry-let alone for shipbuilding and for
communications, for mining and for agriculture,
and for COID.lnerCe a
d for seamanship, mercantile
and naval; and you would probably get worse
material, too.
At any rate, it is the peculiLlf condition of
the English co-efficient, which we have set at 3,
that it is a potential quite able to become an
actuality. 'Ve have no necessary re.130n to scale it
down.
There is another point about the British con-
tingent attached to this last point, which is that
all the men it concerns are so far (or for much the
greater part) first-class material. We have no
deductions to make for age, inefficiency, or civi-
lian employment, for the volunteers are recruited,
by definition, only between the ages where men are
best suited for the field, and only from men who
have passed the doctor.
Let us set down our English m:lximum
"actual figure," then, at 3.
FRANCE.
The French potential co-efficient of 7 is in a
very different situation. It is a situation neces-
sarily imposed upon every conscript nation, to wit,
that you must deduct from its" potential" maxi-
mum all those who are not efficient for military
service, and all those ,,,ho must be kept back for
the absolutely necessary civilian employment con-
nected with communications and supply. In point
of fact, this French co-efficient of 7 shrinks under
such a test to something a little less than 4. The
inefficients even among the young men in any
nation are more than a fifth, and it is with diffi-
culty they can be kept much below a quarter. To
those inexperienced in the figures of a recruiting
system, such a proportion will seem extremely
high, but it is the unavoidable conclusion of prac-
tice. It must be remembered that the word" in-
efficient" does not mean broken down in health,
or superficially and obviously weak, or diseased, or
malformed. The ineffi.cients are these, and very
much more than these. They are the young re-
cruits who, fQr a qU
lntity of other less apparent
reasons, for such trifles as varicose veins, or a weak
heart, or twenty other things which would be in-
significant in civilian life, are not apt for service.
If this is true of the first and youngest batches of
recruits, it is, of course, more and more true of the
Reserves as their age increases, and when we get
towards the last batches of the so-called" military
age," to the men approaching forty and past forty,
the proportion who would be only a weakness to
an army if called up from their ordinary civilian
occupations becomes very large indeed. To these
we add the men who must, as a matter of prime
necessity, be kept back for the furnishing of com-
munications and supply of every kind, and, a.s I
have said, we scale down our 7 to 4. And, indeed,
4. is an outside limit.........,.................,...........4

GERMANY.
Exactly the same thing applies to a conscript
country such as Germany. I shall deal particu-
larly with Germany in a moment, because round
the possible German reserves of strength a great
discussion is raging at this moment. But we are
quite safe in saying that if Germany had trained
everyone of her adult males, her proportion would
be at least what the French ìs, and for her 12 mil-
lion we must write down 7. The number has been
given in these very columns as high as 7!- by
making every allowance in favour of the enemy
and deliberately over-estimating his strength. But
in practice, and as an actuality, it is as certain as
anything can be that the German 12 becomes 7,
just as the French 7 became 4. 'Va write down,
then, for Germany the actual figure 7 ........,...7

AUSTRIA.
Upon exactly the same calculation we may
decide, without fear of putting too small a number,
to write down Austria at 5! instead of 9,

RUSSIA.
'Vith Russia we approach the only indeter-
minate factor in this calculation of actualities,
We know that Russia after five months of war has
not in the Polish field anything like her total
number of men who have received training, let alone
any additions from her untrained reserve, To some
extent this is due to slowness of equipment, from
the fact that the supply for these very large numbers
was not stored in time of peace, and can only
(precisely as in our own case, and to some extent,
that of the French) be provided after anxious delay
in time of war,
It must always be remembered in this con-
nection that a nation desiring to make aggressive
war upon its neighbours. and planning to force war
at a particular time, will always have an immense
advantage in equipment and supply. If you do not
want to make war: if, still more, you had never
planned war for a particular moment of your own
choosing, it would be folly to lock up, or rather to
waste, economic energy in vast useless stores, most
of which deteriorate or are superseded in a few
year;:;. As a fact, no ci\'ilised nation has dreamt of
doing such a thing except Germany, Germany did
not begin to do it till abou
three years ago, and
Germany was only able to do so because she
intended to make wa.r at one chosen and particular
moment to which this vast accumulation of
equipment corresponded.. The argument is an
obvious one, but it wants insisting upon because
foolish people usually talk of the alternate policy as
"unprèparedness." It is nothing of the kind, It is
simply normal living, If indeed the other nations
had known that Germany would really pm,h calcula-
tions so far as to force a universal war at her own
moment, then they might have provided against
that moment; but no one did this because every-
one-except Germany-knew that to force W<lr
simply at your moment and without grave reason
save the desire for aggression means, in the European
comity of nations, ultimate crippling and decay, and
therefore no one thought that Germany would be so
foolish.
At any rate the matter stands thus: that even
of possible trained men from the Russian dominions

. It is si;:nificant thAt l ve.! Austri., her C:039 ally. bas fouud hel1'elf
!hort of equipment Bn.t baa had to borrow It from Germanr, a millioQ
rifica amoDg other thinKII,

Ð*

LAND ÄND WATER

the number present equipped and fighting in the
European :6eld. is far less than the total, and that
this is in part due to delay in equipment.
But there was very much more than this, In
the first place the Russian forces are divided into
three quite distinct bodies-the Asiatic. the
Caucasian, and the European armies, In the
Polish field, as against Austro-Germany we are only
concerned with the last of these three.
In the second place the Russians, most wisely,
do not use their last Territorial Reserves of trained
men,
In the Russian European Service much the
greater part of the conscripts serve, I believe, for
three years, They then pass into the" Zapas," or
cJasses to be called up for active service in case of
war, and this cc Zapas " only covers men up to the age
of about 37. The greater part of trained men are not
called up for this war after that age. Russia has
of
course, upon the model of Germany, her "Opolchémé,"
like the German Landsturm, which stands for the
older trained men and for all the efficients among
the untrained, She will certainly begin to train the
untrained younger men first, seeing what vast stores
of men she has. What number shall be set down
for these untrained reserves a3 available-consider-
ing the equipment to be produced in the time-
during the first year of active operations on a large
scale, up to, say, the beginning of September,
1915
That is the .. actuality" as opposed to the
Cf potential" in the case of Russia, and we may
suggest a maximum of 3! millions. We may
presume 31 million of trained men out of the five
million to appear, Erst and last, in the European field
alone: for Russia will leave out the oldest categories,
and has to provide for the Caucasus fiS well. We
may add one untrained man to be called up
and trained and officered and, in such a delay,
equipped, for one trained man available at the outset
of hostilities, So we may turn this 3! of trained
wen present in the Polish field to 7, Not nece::sarily
less--but most certainly not more,
I t is n high maximum I know, and very possibly
it will not be reached, perhaps not even nearly
reached, in the first year. Still it is a possible maximum
of actuality; and we may now set down our table
of these actualities, finally, as follows, for the first
full year of active operations on a large scale, that
is, up to the beginning of next September:-

ALLIES, ENEMY.
Britain ... 3 Germany 7
France ... 4< Austria 5i
Russia .. , 7
-
Total 14 Total ... 12i
- -

and these should be our final figures.
But before leaving these figures, let us remember
one very important point whICh tells, happily, in
favour of the Allies.
After a certain limit of age, which cannot be
exactly fixed, but which is certainly not long after
35 for the mass of men and at the very latest
not after 37. the military value of a man not
in long and continual mÜitary training becomes
very low. The French recognise this by using their
"Territorial" Reserve (a phrase which means in
France the older men) for duties different from those
incumbent upon the active army properly so called.
TlIey garrison, they watch communications, they
are separated in the mind of the commander (and

January 9, 1915.

in his dispositions) from the younger or U active 'P
levies,
Now of the five great nations at war, the two
which form our enemies-the Germanic body-are
here heavily handicapped,
When we call Germany" 7" and Austria " 5
"
we are including great numbeIs of men between
37 and 45, but where the Allies are concerned, it is
only the French co-efficient of 4 that suffers this
handicap, The British are necessarily exempt front
this weakness vcca1lse they are picking their men, and
the Russians can be eJ.'empt from it also because of
the ver!l great numbers from whom they can also
choose. And the real weight of the Allies by the
time Russia and England have put into the field
every man they can put in, usefully equipped, will
be greater than their apparent numerical establish-
ment, because upon the whole Brit:Ún and Russia.
will be using younger armies. Numerically the-
Allies should be at their actual maximum as 14 to
12! against the enemy; in fighting power thf'Y will
be much more like 16 to 12.

THE GERMAN MARGIN.
N ow all this elaborate calculation is based, of
course, upon an ideal state of things in which the
losses of all parties would be exactly proportioned
to their original strength. But we know that as a
matter of fact the losses have been much heavier
upon the side of the enemy so far than upon our
own, They have been a great deal heavier in kille<1
and wounded; they appear to have been even
heavier in prisoners.
There is an unofficial but sober and highlv
credible estimate, proceeding fi'om SwitzÐrÌand
and published by a newspaper which haa been
singularly sober and careful amI reliable throughout
this war (the Paris Temps), which sets the prisoners
in the hands of the enemy at about 5! hundn:.tl
thousand, and the German and Austrian prisoners
in the hands of the Allies at over 600,000.
But the first of these figures certainly includes
a great number of civilians, the latter hardly any.
The Germans assure us that they do not count the
vast numbers of civilians whom they have driven
into captivity in their lists of prisoners. But they
are not to be believed, German oflicial information,
as has been repeatedly pointed out in these columns,
is sharply divided into two categories, Much the-
greater part of it is scrupulously, I had almost written
pedantically, exact. But the small amount which
is inexact can invariably be proved to be outrageous
nonsense, and all the worse nonsenr-:.e because it is
often based upon a verbal quiLble." Thus, when
the Germans tell us that they do not count civilian
prisoners, they may be preparing to explain later
they do not call any man "betwecn 17 and 70 a
civilian, But, at any rate, to say that they are not
counting what we should call civilians as prisoners
is nOnsense. We have had only this week an
example of the same kind of nonsense. The Russians
published the figures of 134,000 Gern1an prisoners
in their hands. Upon this the German official
communiqué protested that these figures 'were
swollen with civilian prisoners; and the p:'otest
may have been justifiable enough, for the Russian9

· Scarborough is an II armed port of war"-and later tI.i. means
that it had Te: ritorin.1 I!oldias in tt-e neighbourhood, A" decisi,'&
victory" is won in Polanrl after the Falkland I
1an" battle-and later
this is discovered to be ß Ru
sian retirement of 10 miles-not in action.
Peterko\V is II stormed "-that is, occupied after the l{
eilln retire-
mcnt. &c., &c.

10*

January 9, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

have been able to intern a certain number of German
civilians who remained in Russia, But when the
<>fficial German communiqué goes on to say that
"The total number of German prisoners is not 13
per cent. of the Russian claim" it is playing the
fool. That would mean that the total number of
German prisoner3 in Russian hands was only
17,000 !
But (1) the Germans lost heavily in wounded
and retreated precipitately before the first Russian
invasion of East Prussia, (2) 'Vhen, after their
triumph at Tannenbergthe Germans inyaded in their
turn, they'" ere beaten back from the Niemen with
heavy loss and left heaps of wounded, particularly
upon the causeway of Suwalki, All that was
before the end of the summer. (3) In October
they brought up 200,000 men against 'Varsaw
alone; were beaten, and retreated at the rate of
10 miles a day, suffering a series of heavy actions
as they fell back. ( 4) At the same time they fell
back from the middle Yistula with another 200,000,
fighting the whole time and necessarily losing
heavily in abandoned wounded. In every such
retirement after heavy action great numbers of
wounded men fall into the enemy's hands. (5) Con-
siderable bodies of them have passed the Bzura
between December lOth and 25th and have been
thrust back across that stream again leaving their
wounded, (6) In the prolonged action a month ago,
from Ilowo to Lodz, the whole district for 30 miles
behind the mouth of the trap in which they were
so nearly caught (that is, behind Glovno and
Strykov) was strewn with the wounded of the
whole Army Corps and with innumerable small
isolated bodies which surrendered, It is ridiculous
to suppose that in a series of fluctuating actions
of this kind the various retirements have not
abandoned at least 50,000 wounded men; double
that number is far more probable, and there must
be many unwounded prisoners as well,
An estimate of 17,OCO is one of those extra-

THE

WAR

By

FRED

ordinary statements which, like the 15,000 British
drowned in the Yser, the fortified naval base of
Scarborough, and the denial of the siege guns in
front of Osowiec, leave every critic bewildered.
Something must be intended, some effect must
be expected, but what it is no one living out of the
German atmosphere can understand, And, I
repeat, these monstrosities are the more remarkable,
from the fact that they are embedded in a mass of
perfectly cold and reliable summaries, So much for
prisoners; they are losing a little more rapidly than
we are.
We have already seen what the proportion of
casualties is in the much mOre serious category of
killed and wounded, 'Ve know that of the German
forces alone not quite four men have been hit to the
French one, although the German forces have never
been double the French, We know this, not from
induction, but from official statistics published upon
both sides, We can confidently say that the recent
fighting in Poland, with its continued and unsuccess-
ful assaults in close formation, has been just as
murderous as the fighting in Flanders, What the
total German casualties to date may be we do not
know, but we shall know them soon, because the
German authorities are still careful to publish those
statistics,
VThat is perhaps more important for UB is the
German margin, and it can only be repeated here
what has been said so often in these columns and
what mere arithmetic should prove true, that this
margin is certainly not mom than 2! million men.
From 7 or at the most 7! take 5, and 2 or the most
2! remains, It is much more likely to be under
two million than over. It can be enormously swelled
by using boys, slightly swelled by using old men;
but the use of either of these cateo'ories of material
, ð
IS worse than useless to an armed force, and only
accelerates its failure,
Mr. BELLOC'S next; lecliure at; Queen's Hall on the War will
be on Wednesday, January 2nh.

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTE,-Thlt Artlcl. ba. been .ubmiUed ta th. Pun Bunan, which don not obJect to the publication a. ce.J5ored, aud t
k
. no
rupondbilit, for the corr.ctneu of the atatemenh,
THE MEDITERRANEAN. but, since all Dreadnoughts have some form of armoured
S usual, there is little to l'eport. True, the underwater protection, it would look as though the prot(.
-
A'
Austrian battleship Viribus Unitis is reported tion hitherto deemed sufficient hM proved insufficient in prac-
to have been submarined in the engine-room, and tice, even against the comparatively mild tOl pelloes used by
the report, though unofficial, has been more or the French.
lc
s confirmed, and is probably quite correct. Here, incidentally, it may not be irrelevant to refer once
Since, however, the Au.strian Fleet is more to the oircumatance that the German torpel1ocs appear
steadily pursuing 6 policy of remaining in har- to carry a far more powerful and violent warhead than any
bour, the disablement of a Dreadnought more or less cannot used by the Allies. Most or all of our ships which have been
matcrially aileot results. submarined went down swiftly to the tune of a terrific explo-
On the other hand, there are decided indications of a sion: those of the enemy bagged by us have go no doon in a
rcma.l'kably smart piece of work on the part of the French
.sulmlal'ine concerned, if, as reported, she was attacked in
Pola Harbour.
The ViribUIJ Unit is is the first Dreadnought to be sub-
marilled, ill"o the first ship to survive submarine attack.
Here, at Ð.ny rate, is a vindication of the Dreadnought policy;
-even though nearness to a dock may havo contributed to the
Lattlc->hip's survival.
The safety of a Dreadnought against submarine attack
lies in her bulk-she is too big for a sudden inrush of water
to have any immediate effect. Also, of course, she is con-
structed, with a view to surviving undenmter attack, far
more thoroughly than were the ships of an earlier era, when
the tv.pedo was a much less dangerous weapon than it now is.
Oue haa necessarily to JVrite on imperfect information.!.

H*

LAND 'AND WATER

more or less leisurely fasbion. Tbe inference is that Ger-
many is aheaa of the rest of the world in the matter of
high explosives.
The integral idea of aU Dreadnought anti-torpedo pro-
tcetion consists of some internal armour on vital spots, and
liolid bulkheads. To meet this an American naval officer
invented a torpedo which is practically an eight-inch gun
in miniature. On contact it does not explode in Ule ordinary
fashion, but instead discharges a high explosive sheU int{) the
enemy's inside.
The idea is not exactly novel: because a good forty
years ago the Americans designed a ram caUed the Alarm, on
60mewhat similar principles.
The idea failed because the Alarm had to attack under
fire, and because the ram proved itself at that period efficient
without ulterior aid.
To-day, however, things have altered, and there is un-
doubtedly reason to imagine that the Germans have some
adaption of the American invention mentioned above.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
Tbe most important event of the past w
k is un-
doubtedly the American Note. It is couched in very mild
and courteous language, and entirely devoid of anything
"hich could in any way be regarded as a threat. But it does
very clearly ebtablish the possibility of a situation which I
discussed in one of the earliest of these articles,
In subsequent issues I have shown at some length how
German attacks on BI'itish trade reacted on Gcrmany in the
Pacific, owing to the fact that neutrals suffered as much as
we did, and how buch results as they secured were nega-
tived accordingly.
Now, there is no question whatever that America is hit
by our interferenctJ with German trade, Not improbably
she is hit as badly as Germany is hit. I have not the space
necessary for a fuU consideration of details, but, in any case,
the broad issue is the only thing that really matters. And
this il;8ue is that, just as in the American Civil War of fiIty
)carS ago we suffered from the Federal Blockade of the
Southern States and individual ß1"Îtish traders of ours sougbt
to l"ecoup themselves with II blockade-runners," so, to-day, ;n-
lJividual Amerioan traders
k to recoup themselvea with a
modern and up-to-date form of Llocliade-running.
Here, however, the situation materially changes. In the
American Civil War cargoes had to be run in direct to
Charle&ton or elsewhere on the Confederate mast and there
tlley were exchanged for cargoes of other goods, w'hieh had to
be run out again. In a word, it was all plain sailing.
In this war, however, there is no SUell thing 8S blockade-
running to German ports. Trade is generally consigned to
neutral ports, and aU blockade-running takea place on land.
The net result of this is that the II right of search JJ on
the water is considerably negatived where value Cor money- j&,
concerned. Th& really acu
II blockade-runner JJ is apt to
find a way round any rule of The lIague Convention j and
as a general rule we may take it that his operations do not
properly commence till his II contraband JJ is on the conti-
Dent of Europe. To that extent, therefore, the naval II right
of search JJ is more or less farcical, or, at any rate, more
likely to inconvenience tbe llonest American trader than the
American blockade-runner.
Further, it may be observed that we have an inalienable
I ight to ask Continental neutrals to prevent the smuggling of
contraband, and tIlat in a general way our dcsircs have been
conceded. They would be more easily conceded still perhaps
were our list of contraband rcdueed to the thillgS tll:1t really
matter most-say, petrol, copper, rubber, and foodstuffs.
We have placed a ban on materials suitable for Zeppelin
envelo
s. But could we prevent Germany from obtaining
petrol, we might well allow her to waste her money on silk of
which she could make no use J I am inclined to think that
there is a good deal of contraband which might be dispensed
with, without loss to us and with advantage to neutrals whose
II benevolent neutrality JJ would be very valuable.
Of one thing we may be certain. German)' does not OOD-
duct her elaborate and expensive Press campalO'ns in neutral
countries for the empty benefit of moral symp:thy. She has
. olear eye to material benefits which may accrue from" bene-
volence. "
We may do wcll, t
eH:fore, to follow her example j the
more so as we could easily abrogate for this war a great deal
of that "right of search JJ which, when first formulated was
ba&'ed on the idea of war between countries possessing ex-
tensiv
coastlines. . The coastlines of both Germany and
Austna are so relatIvely small tllat much of the oriO'inal idea
. d . 1 b
18 oorrespon mg y superfluous.
To this extent, therefore, the naval II I'ig-ht of search"
i. obsolete j and, things being thus, we may do well to aban-

January 9, 1915.

don it fiO far as may be. 'Ye are not fighting for legal tradi-
tions, but for ordinary eXistence. And-so far as can be
gauged at present-things Bre such that the benevolence or
otherwise of neutrals will turn the scale in a very tight fight..

NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.
On January I, about 2.30 a,m., during a gale in the
Channel, the old battleship Formidable was struck by a IDinQ
or torpedo, Accounts vary as to v.hcther there were one or
two explosions. The ship Bank in three-quarten' of an hour,
only about henty-five per cent. of her crew being saved. .
.In
iew of the weather conditions prevailing at the time,
a Dllne IS more probably the cause than a submarine, though,
as our E9 torpedoed the /Ida in a considerable sea, the possi-
bility of submarine attack cannot be altogether disregarded.
If &0, it represents very high technical "kill on the part of
the enemy, plus a very considerable amount cf luck, for the
Formidable must certainly have been encountered by acci-
dent, and also we have Dever yet heard of a night attack by
submarines,
A mine is consequently much more probable, especially
since during the recent heavy gales a good many must have
brol,en adrift. In tIle Russo-Japanese War the Japanese
crui!>er Talwsago was lost in almost identical circUllliJtanees,
and some time after tile war had ceased one or two merchant
ships met disaster from mines which had broken adrift in
past gales and floated about ever since.
Theoretically, of courl'e, a mine which breaks adrift
should automatically bcoo
e innocuot!ß, but in actual prac-
tice there are bound to be one or two equivalents of the occa-
sional misfire which happens with a gun.
We may, I think, acquit the Germans of deliberately
having liown floating or drifting mines in the Channel and
North Sea. So far as the latter is concerned, the circum-
stance that their battle-cruisers came out for the East Coa..t
Raid seems oonclusive evidence against allY haphazard an
l
non-systematic mine sowing there j and since their submarin
s
]wve more than once been reported in tile Channel, the same
thing would apply. A drifting mine is jm,t as likely to be
Lit by a friend as by a foe.
Along this line of argument one must put the loss of the
Formidable into the same category as the loss of the Bullt'al'k
-that is to say, pure chr.nce and accident.
Some of my readers have conceived an impression tha

infernal machines were introduæd on board both vessels, but
this theory is untenable for at least two dcfinite reasons. In
the first place, were deliberate internal destruction sought,
far more important fighting units would have been selected.
In the second place, the organisation of a British, or, for
that matter, any other man-of-war, is such that no matter the
will to do so, the accomplishment would not be poæible. The
count against Germany in real crimcs against civilisation is

uffic!ently heavy to obviato any necessity for fUl"ther
llllagmary ones.
As for the Formidable Ilersdf, she was no los8 to speak
of as a fighting unit. A good ship in her day, the Dread-
nought era rendered her obsolete before her time. The really
serious loss,ns the Timf8 naval correspondent has in&isted, is
in the matter of personnel, because while good soldiers can 00
made in a few months, it takes as many years to make a good
sailor.
Fortunately, we have a considerable supply of traineð
men j but the bupply is not inexhaustible, and we are adding
ships to the Navy more quickly than we are losing them, and
the new Ehips in all cases require larger Cl'ews than dir! the
old ones. Consequently, though the material loss of the
Formidable may be relatively insignificant, the loss in per-
sonnel is of the nature of a disaster, quite apart from the
ordinary ethical meaning of the word where human lifo is
involved,

From January 5 to January 11 indusive tne Victoria Cal!
ry, 123,
Victoria. Street, is occupied by an exhibition of competitors' WOI'lI in
the competition organil;cd by Colour, the shilling monthly mapzine
whjeh is doing good Een,ice in the furtooranee a.nd support of modem
Britit;h :!nd Contincntal a.rt. The exhibition is extrcml'ly intereÜing,
rcprese.""1ting as it does the efforts of ne\"1, and in mlmy ca
e" unlmown,
aspirants to a.:-1istic SUCCeM; here and there crudity is evident in the
work s11own, Imt there is sufficient of ta1ent in many of the dl'a"ings
to command notice, and here and thcre on6 may find worll t.h.:lt p:!Ss.eB
beyond mere talent, The judges of the competition inc1ulle tJJ.o lead-
ing British artist!!,
IN War and tlle World's Life, of w!Jich Messrs, Smith, n.lcr
and Co, ha\'e now issued a. fhe,shillir;g edition, Colonel
hude follows
out the Clausewitz theory of war as a p:;.rt of a nation's cleve!op",ent,
and shows dead)' how CJauoe\\itz, Bernhardi, and the w}wlc 61'hoo]
of Celman F1.ilo
opher8 and national guides went wrong in not
recogni
:ng tht the f<lrvi\al of the fittest meant the fittest in :m
ethical senæ. Altllûugh originr.lly publishcd six years ago, the book
was v.ritten with a "iew to such a situation as has arisen out of the
Cerman thir
t. for domil.:mee; and em1:;(\di('
the Round, reasoneù \iews
of a practi.:"l ,';;iter en the l-rin,ir,al topic of the day.

12*

J.lllu
ry 9, 1915,

LAND i\ND W A TED

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NAVAL

WARFARE.

A NEW FACTOR IN THE NORTH SEA OPERATIONS.
By L. BLIN DESßLEDS.

P ROM the military point of view there are, broadly
speaking, two important qualities which tbe
modern airship possesses, but which the aero-
plane still lacks. Th
se two qualities are:-
(I) Capability of remaining stationary over any
given point.
(2) Ability to navigate at night for a con8ider-
able length of time.
On a,ccount of its capability to remain stationary, an air-
ship can observe, in detail, a constantly changing situation;
the results of its obsei'vations can be transmitted, by means
of wireless telegraphy, to the Commander-in-Chief, and "con-
tact" wit.h the el'emy can thus be maintained. The aero-
pIano, on the other hand, must travel in a circle, round and
round any particular spot O\-er which it u desired to make
prolonged reconnaissance, and, in order to hring back to
Headquarters the information it has obtained, it must lose
4' contact." with the" situation."
The range 01 the wireles8 apparatus of a modern Zeppelin
being about. 150 miles, and the speed of a military aeroplane
being about 8eventy miles an hour, it follows that a message
sent from tbe air8hip would reac.h its destination much earlier
than if it "Vi"el"e carried by an aeroplane.
It wO:J.ld seem. therefore, that, so long as no B.ring
maclline exists which can remain stationary oyer a predeter-
mined point and transmit by wireless telegraphy the result of
its observatiens to Headquarters, there is a part that it cannot

fulfil, but which can be fulfilled by the airship. In the pre-
sent war, 80 far as land operat,ions are concerned, the Zeppelin
has
n unable to perform that important function in aerial
operations for two reasons. Firstly, the anti-aircraft guns
of the Allies would not allow it to come sufficiently low to
make detailed observations j and, .econdly, in maintaining a
stationary position, it would be a relatively easy prey to the
quiok and small aeroplane,
On the open sea, however, these two dangers, which, on
land, would threaten a Zeppelin engaged in carrying out de-
tailed tactical observations, would not exist to any important
degree. Whereas, on bnd, an anti-aircraft gun can be placed
almost anywhere, on the 11Ïgh sea it must be plaoed on a
ship, which would be visIble from the dirigible. And, on
account of its greater radius of action, an airship could, with
ease, carry out observations fi-om a position that can, only
with great ri8ks, be reached by an aeroplane. Tbir; point
can be illu8trated by actual figures.

SOME AIRSHIP AND AEROPLANE
RECORDS.

The greateat distance Bown over sea is that traversed by the
Norwegian airman, Gran, On July 30, 1914, he flew in a
monoplane, from Crudcn Day, in Scotland, to Kleppe, in Nor-
way, thus covering a distance of 320 miles,_ Over land,

13*

LAND ÄND WATER

The Island of Heligoland, off the coast of Germany, is
not only a naval basc, but also the most up-to-date Zeppelin
station. FrEJm it a modern Zeppelin can undertake cruises of
considerable length over the North Sea, and can survey the
greater part of that portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Indeed,
an airship, having a radius of action of 300 miles, can travel
from Heligoland to any point bounded by the arc, Z, Z, Z.
Fl"Om any position on that are, Z, Z, Z, a Zeppelin, at &
height of, say, 4,OOOft" could, in fine weather, make observa-
tions over a further distance of twenty-five miles, so that,
although the range of action of a Zeppelin from Heligoland
would be limited by the arc, Z, Z, Z, its range ()f observation
would extend up to the are, 0, 0, 0, The section-lined area,
contained by the arcs, 0, 0, 0 and Z, Z, Z, is a belt wbich,
under normal conditions of wind and weather, would be b&-
yond the radius of action of a Zeppelin, but over which it.
would be able to keep watch. Zeppelins, stationed at Heligo-
land, could, therefore, observe over the thousands of square
miles of sea area which lie between the are, 0, 0, 0, and the
coast of Continental Europe.
Observation, carried out by the Zeppelin over the North
Sea, could not be sent by wireless telegraphy unless the air-
ship were within the cross section-lined area, bounded by the
are, \V, W, 'V, and the mainland of Europe. The radius
of the arc, W, W. 'V, is 150 miles, which is the range of the
In examining duration records, it is important to bear in wireless telegraphy apparatus fitted on a moaern Zeppelin.
mind the fact that the sustentation of an airship, or its If a Zeppelin, therefore, has made an observation beyond ISO-
power to rema.in aloH, is independent of ita propulsion. It miles from Hcligolan
, it would have to return to wHhin that
is, therefore, possible for the airship to remain aloft without range before it could send its Vl"ireless message. This is an
the working of its motor, or motors, thus economising fuel important point to remember in dealing with the new factor
whenever it is possible. The aeroplane, however, has to work which has been introduced into nr.val warfare by the advent
its engine during the whole of ita flight, for, without propul- of aircraft, for it shows that it is only within the arc,
sion of its own, it has no suswntation. Therefore, it follows 'V, W, \V, that a Zeppelin can maintain contact with its ad-
that in establishing duration records, an airship may take vel"saries and H
adquarters.
advantage of the wind to go from one place to another; so If we now examine the radius of action of the aeroplane
that & duration record of this type of aircraft is evidently from various points of the E!1glish coast, we shall see that,
considerably grea.ter than the length of time of its possible with an aviation base near Eheerness, observations can be-
navigation under full power. Also, when concerned solely in carried out within the arp.a contained by the are, A, A, A.
the establishment of a duration record, the airship has not From a point npar Cromer aeroplanes can scout the sea area..
on board a full crew, as would be necessary for prolonged mili- within the are, B, B, R. 'Vith Scar1Jorough as centre, obser-
tary observations, nor has it a supply of projectiles and of vations, by means of aeroplalles, can be carried out within
ammunition. Undcr such conditions a greater amount of fuel the are, C, C, 0, and, from a point near Peterhead, aero-
can be carried than would be possible when the airship is out planes can make observations within the arc, D, D, D.
for a militarv cruise. In these circumstances it can be as- Of all the various circles tbat can be describE:tc1 with a
sumed, with å. fair degree of accuracy, that the probable dura- rR-c1ius of 200 miles about a celltre lying on the English coast,
Hon of an airship voyage under full power is, at present, about the one drawn from a point near Cromer cut,> the greatest-
one-third of the record times already mentioned, that is, one area of the Zeppelin wireless zone. This is useful to note.
of about twelve hours. A Zeppelin, having a speed of fifty Another point of practical importance is that there is a
miles per hour, 'Would thus be able to travel, under war con- zone in the nort.h,east of the North 8ca which can be sconted
ditions, a distance of a,bout. 12 x 50 = 600 miles. Cense- by mBßns of Zeppeiins stationed at HeJigolam1, but wllich
quently its radius of action would be about 300 miles. That cannot be reacJ;ed Ly a-eroplane from the British eoast. That.
of the aeroplane Ìß, as already shown, only 200 miles. The :zone is denoted by clotted lines in t.he sketch.

Iìowever, a distance of 487 miles was flown by the Italian air.
man, Deroye, on July 17, 1913, this being the 1"eC01"d, up to
da
, of a. non-stop flight in a øtraight line. We can thus,
until any furtber reoord is established, assume that no existing
aeroplane can, with a. rea.sonable margin of safety, undertake
a flight over the sea of 8 distance greater than 400 milefl.
The conclusion is, therefore, that, for the present, the radius
of Botion of an aeroplane flying over the sea is about 200 miles.
If we now examine some airship records, we :find that
the French airship, .A.djudant-Villçenot, left its "hed
t Toul
on June 20, 1914, and made a non-stop voyage in a circuit,
passing over Toul, Oommercy, Verdun, Seda.n, Mésières,
M a.ubeuge, Oompiègne, Paris, Versailles, Paris, Meaux,
Chàlons, Vouziers, Montmooy, LLmguyon, Nancy, Neuf-
château, Mirecourt, Commercy, Toul, thus showing that, for
a considerable part of its journey, it must have travelled with
the wind.
On that voyage, which lasted 35hr. 2Omin" the a.irship
carried a crew of eight, besides Captain J oux, who was in
command. This performance of the Adjudant-Vincenot is
the record for duration in a "closed circuit" voyage, tbat
ill, one in which the a.irship eventually returns to its start.
ing-point. Recently the Zeppelin L.Z.24 remained in the air
for 34hr. and 59 min" travelling in various ðirections over
Germany. It did not, however, n.ake a " closed circuit," for
it started ita voyage at Friedrichsbafen and ended it at Johan-
nistal.

RADIUS

THE

OF ACTION
ZEPPELIN.

OF

January 9, 1915,

importance of tnese figures, and of the airship's possible in-
fluence on the North Sea operations, will be readily grasped
if reference be maae to the 6ketch-map on the previoUB page.

THE ZEPPELIN IN THE NORTH SEA.

THE

LOSS

THE

OF

" FORMIDABLE."

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

T TIE heavy loss of trained and most highly effective
seamen, which seems U> form an inevitable feature
of the sinking of any of our warships, simply
compels one to ask the qUc>stion, whether, in fact,
all means of keeping our fighting vessels afloat
after foubmarine attack, in any of its forms, have
been considered, and put through a fair and conclusive trial.
I make no apology fOl" venturing outside the usual
limitations of my articles, for the subject has intereswd me
for years, and as an officer of the Royal Engineers, a corps
formerly entrusted with the business of submarine const de-
fence, it war; part of my duty to make myself thoroughly
familiar with the problems involve
in modern battleship
building, and in particular to follow all the records of ex-
periments made with submarine mines against such vessels
which from time to time the Admiralty placeù at our dis-
posal. The Oberon and the Resistance arc the first two whose
names recur to me.
I saw 6001bs. gun-cotton mines exploded under them nt
different times, afterwards studying- their effect in dry dock,
and I was as convinced then as I am now that even that
char[!e 8ho111(1 not necessarily senù n ship (such as we were
then building) to the bottom, or such as Vl"e bave since built,

unless the mine happem, to explode tile ship's magazine, as it
would appear does occasionally happen, though theory is quite
powerless to explain the bow or why of this occunence. But
service in India called me away, and it was only afttl tile
Japanese War that I approached Sir William White, ,..110 hn.l
just retired from the Admiralty, and discussed lilY Rchellle
with him, Unfortunately, we differed fundnn',e1,taJIy <>n
facts of which I had been an eye-witn
s and he 11.- J not. f..ceE,
and again, since the matter was not one in which I was
directly concernell, I allowed my patent to Inrse, aIld rc-
solved to stick to my own last,
My idea was exceedingly simple, and can Le teElt.d bv
anyone who will try to force an empty bioouit tin, nlOutb
downwards, in his bath-when the )'esistance he wiJI enc.oun-
tel' will IIstonir.h llim.
It was not applicable for merchant steall!ers, becau
e, r.8
a rule, it is uneconomical to subdivide them bv a Lorizontal
plane, Vl"hich interfel'es with tIle fncilit.'-. of lú
ding and un-
loading e.al"go. But all our warships, hOlIl slilall protc
tcll
cruisers upwards, are so subdivided by tho IIrmour r!at6
turtle-deok l'unning right thrüur-h them frolll bow to I3tcrn,
and bencath which all the eng-incl', boiler!", magazines. etc.,
are always placed. Tbis turtle-deck is pierced with Latch-

u it

January 9, 1915.

AND AND WATER

ways sufficient for the service of the ship, which can be closed
down whenever it is neoessary to use forced draught. Th
s
means filling the space below the deck with compressed air at
a pressure of three or four inchcs of water, say a couple of
ounccs only to the square inch.
Now, considering a vessel with a turtle-deck and a big
hole rent in her bottom (as large as you please), it is clear
that we have a somewhat distorted case of the old "diving-
bell," familiar in every textbook of phy&ics for the last cen-
tury at least, in whioh the persons in the bell are kept dry
by pumping in compressed air as the bell descends-the pres-
ßure of air inside being kept equal to the weight of the head
of water outside,
This "diving-bell" idea is in daily use all over the
world by civil engineers for getting in deep water founda-
tions, making tunnels under river beds, etc., and this at
depths far greater than anything required cven in our big-
gest battleship-in whi<:h a pressure of one atmosphere only
would be required to counterbalance the weight of a thirty-
foot column of water outside. At this depth men feel little,
if any, di6Comfort, and can work for fairly long spells. All
that is required to fit out a cruiser or a battleship in this
manner is the provision of what are called "pneumatic
locks" at the hatchways to enable the men to get in and out
to their duties.
Now, to the best of my recollection, the rock on which
Sir William White and [ split was briefly this:
He cOlltended that if a ship was struck by a mine fairly,
the shock would be so great that the vessel would break up
structurally, and therefore the safeguard I proposed "Would
not be werth employing i I maintained that neither the Re-
iistance nor the Oberon, nor, in faot, any fighting ship of
whioh I had ever heard, had been damaged structurally to
this extent, even by 500lb. charges of gun-cotton, which was
doublc tile charge usually employed in torpedoes or contact
mines. So far the experiences of this war and the Japanese
have proved that I was right on this point, for except when
the magazine has been exploded, all ships, even merchantmen
of quite moderate tonnage, have floated quite a reasonable
time, thus demonstrating that the structural damage lIas been
i!mall '
What I believe is no"W required is for a committee of in-
fluential civil engineers and civilian naval architects to tal
e
up the question, and to extort from the Admiralty a definite
reasoned statement of such experiments as have been made
in this direction, and why or in what point they failed.
'l'here may be some obscure reason connected with the
'Working of the ship to justify the neglect of such experiment.'!
-but against this I noticed that the Annual Report of the
U.S. Naval Department a few years ago stated that experi-
ments with compressed air had given satisfactory results.
Dnt even if tho" pneumatic look" difficulty iB really the
-crux of the case, and reoonstruction of older types ill out of
the question, there seems no reason why we should not give an
extra five-feet depth to the double bottom, which is, or oan
be, structurally isolated from the hold of the ship, and then
keep this permanently full of compre.ssed air. It would be
equally effecti"f"e in keeping out the water.
At any rate, it seems to me only right that in such an
important matter the country should be informed in a man-
ner intelligible to competent oivil engineers, who know I'll
about the use of compressed air, whetlier full and conclusive
experiments have been made, and why they have led to no ra-
i!ult.<!. I know that a few years ago a great many naval officers
fully shared my view of the matter.
I should like to take this opportunity of acknowledging
the many valuable letters I'have received from readers of this
paper, and to apologise for my failure to answer all of them-
pres.o;ure of work being my only excuse. I may add that, with
-exceedingly few exceptions, the suggestions these lett.enl con-
tain are not new, and for the most part are already in the
Service or about to be adopted, if the campaign lasts long
enough.

CORRESPONDENCE.
TO DESTROY SUBMARINES,
To the Editor of LA
D AND WATER.
Sm,-I have b
n struck with the many brilliant sug-
gestions towards helping on the work of the Allies ashore and
afloat, but I have thought of two other plans which, as aa
armchair critic, seem to me feasible, and which I have not
yet seen in print:-
Why not acquire the three or four motor-boats,
.. Maple Leaf," " Despujols 1. and II.," etc., which have done
-over fifty miles an hour1 In calm weather, such as the Cux-
haven attack enjoyed, they would be invaluable for locating
.nd destroying the periscopes of the submarines. As they

nly draw about eigbt&ßn incÞ.es of wa
r. no torpedo could

touch them. In,spoocl no submarine or destroyer could catch
them, and being such small marks, they would be nea.rly im-
possible to hit at the pace at which they could travel.
Ea.ch might have a small quickfirer to destroy periscopes.
In fact they could easily come alongside and break or destroy
the latter by pulling an oil drum or something of the kind over
them.
Another lIuggestion occurred to me on reading the
account some weeks ago of a submarine which got caught in
8 fishing net, and had to come to the surface to get disen-
tangled. There are miles and miles of old nets in all our fish-
ing villages, and these could be put outside of the harbour
to be attacked by our fleet, tmd on the enemy's submarines
coming out they would he immediately caught by them, and
would have to come to the surfa.ce at a place of which the
Allies would have already got the range. The neU! could
be sunk to any depth, Bnd would make an almost impene-
trable wall, B& they would effectively stop the propellers of
the submarines, in which they wQuld get twisted up; and
anyone who has done any fishing in a propeller-driven boat
knows how difficult it is to get even a lIingle fishing line free
when caught in a propeller.
I offer these two suggestioIl.9 for what they are worth.-
I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,
Dungarvan Club, co. Waterford. ROBERT T. LOUGAH.

A BULLET TO DESTROY ZEPPELINS.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER,
SIR,-Your correspondent, Mr. D, S, Macnair, suggests
that as it is aocepted that the ordinary rifle bullet would be
useless to destroy Zeppelins, it should be an eallY matter" to
design a hollow bullet containing a charge of some pyro-
toohnic composition which would ignite when the rifle is
fired,"
Permit me to point out that such a bullet has been de-
signed recently by Mr. Charles E. Dawson, of Uckfield (whom
I may mention, incidentally, is the discoverer of the famous
Piltdown skull), 'l'he following de-
rcription of the bullct and the accom-
panying design appeared in a recent
ÏEisue of the Sussex County Herald:-
U An ordinary bullet is bored at
the apex to form a cavity, which is
filled with phosphoru.s and a BIllall
portion is allowed to project beyond the
apex of the bullet. On discharge the
phosphorus is heated, and it flames, or
is predisposed to flame, on coming into
the &lightest contact with another body,
'l'hus on coming in contact with an
airship it would immediately ignite
the gas, and the machine would be
destroyed. An ordinary bullet would,
of courfìð, merely penetrate the en-
velope without doing further damage,
U ?lfr, Dawson's bulletil are ;n-
tended merely for the deBtruction of
airships, and when not in use must
be kept under water to preserve the
phosphorus. The smallness of their
size is an advantage over the shells,
whioh may destroy buildings, 'l'he
þullet$ must be used with care and not
for ordinary usea, aø considerable
damage by fire might be done, "_
Yours faithfully. ARTHUR BECKETT.

\,.

))
_ "JlI
-)

:-
..:-
". ..;; '.:_

.. . .
:". ;:-
..,..
"''' t

J ,
.'
.. ;...'
. ......
... &
....
. ...: t

.. .&.

":. . .:...:
. .,
c".';'
.... .. .

:.. <;
:.

'
:....: ::

:
: ..........
-
.. ....

II MORAL" AND II MORALE."
To the Editor of LAND AYD WATER.
Sm,-With all deference to Mr. BeUoo, the reason why
we spell (or used to speU) " morale JJ with a final e ifl not fa'r
to seek. We borrowed the word from the French in the
eighteenth century, and in French, as everyone knowfi, it iø
spelt moral, but we already had the word "moral," whioh iø
an adjective, and is pronQ.unced "With the stress on the first
.yUable: the word which we borrowed i. a substantive, and
(as we pronounce it) har; the IItress on the second syllable, 130
we gave it a final e, partly in order to distinguish it from the
adjective "moral, JJ and partly to indicate the difference in
pronunciation. The spelling morale was universal from the
eighteenth century until quite recently, but unfortunately a
year or two ago some wiseaore discovered that the French
word is moral, and so now 'We think we ought to alter a time-
honoured spelling in order to shew that we know the origin
of the word. If Mr, Wiseoore is logical, he will suggest that
we oug-ht to write" soverain JJ instead of .. fiovereign, JJ and
" naïf JJ inf!tes.d of " l\p.ïve. "-Your obedient servant,
CHARLES SWEET,

15*

LAND AND WATER

January 9, 1915.

CITY OF LONDON
RUSSIAN CA V ALR Y AMBULANCE PRESENT A TION.

UNDER THE GRACIOUS PATRONAGE 01'
H.M. QUEEN ALEXANDRA
AND
B.R.ß, PRINCESS ARTHUR 011' CONNAUGßT,

TUB MANSION HOUSE,
NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1915.
Russia is losing tbousands of men daily tbrougb want of
proper motor ambulance transports.
Do we Britons realise wbat Russia is doing for bel' Allies!
Russia bas not the facilities for the manufacture, or tbe
possibility of obtaining motor vebicles sucb as England,
France and other European countries possess, '
As a comparison, Britain's cavalry losses are extensive
enough on a fighting line of about 40 miles in extent j imagine
what Rus&ia's are, with imperfect communication, On a front
extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a distance of
nearly 1,200 miles.
'l'he object tnat this committee has in view is to Fhow
England's appreciation of these facts and to remedy as far
as lie!! in their power this most trying position.
It is, to-day, superfluous to point out the vital a&l!istance
which Russia is giving the Allies. Without the pressure
which her magnificent forces are constantly exerting on the
German-Austrian armies, tbe redemption of Belgium would
be indefinitely postponed, and we in England would not feel
the present increasing confidence that the final victory will
lie with our troops.
But while Russia's re&'ources are potentially unlimited,
her powers of immediately equippi-ng tbe masses of figbting
men liihe is pouring forward are greatly handicapped. The
territory where the fierceJ;t fighting is tdking place had, even
before its devastation by tbe Germans, comparatively few rail-
ways or roads affording quick transport. The brunt of the
hardship which thcse conditions impose on wounded Russian
troops falls most severely on the cavalry, wbich number more
than the combined oavalry of all the other Allies, and to whore
brilliant operations the suooeSSES of Russian arms have been
largely due,
In the Carpathians and in Poland the Russian Cavalry
operates on a front often fifty miles away from a base, cover-
ing the Banks of tho army and 6úreening its advance. 'l'he
case of the wounde'd Russian cavalryman, however, is best
stated by Lieut,-Col. Roustam Bek, in the Daily Expres$, who
writes with an intimate knowledge of his subject:
f( The situation of wounded cavalrymen at present is
terrible. 'l'he troopers are obliged to undergo many tortures
while being carried on horseback or in horse-drawn ambu-
lan
s for many hours or days until they reach the field hos-
pitals. Many of tbem are dying when they reach tbese
refuget3, being unable to withstand tbis terrible journey. If
they could have been brought in a shorter time to the hos-
pital their lives could, in many cases, perbaps in the
majority, have been saved.
f( In general, the Russian ambulance equipment is not
inferior to that of other countries. It can, however, easily
be understood that in tbe presence of such an enormous num-
ber of casaulties as have been recorded during the present
war, as well as in regard. to the great distances which bave

Terms of Sllbscl'iption to

"THE

GENTLEMAN

COUNTY

AND

LAND

AND

WATER"

(ESTABLISHED 1862),
AT HOME-Twelve Months -
1
CANADA-Twch'e Months -
1
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve .Months
1

8 0
10 6
17 0

TM aðOl'ø rate. include all Special Nw1ilJerl and POP4gø,

BACK COPIES of .. LAND AND WATER:' containing the
aerleiJ of Artic1E's by HILAIRE BELLOC. "THE WAR BY
LAND"; and FRED T. JANE, "THE WAR BY WATER,"
together with a valnable reference, "THE TOPOGRAPHICAL
GUIDE," can be obtained throngh any Newøagent, or on
applica.tion \0 the Otliceø of ,. LAND AND WATElI," CaNTHAL
1I0UBB. KmG8WAT, W.e,

to be covered from the actual fighting line to the base hos-
pital&' conditions which did not exist during former wars, put
every army in the greatest difficulty in regard to the trans-
portation of the wounded.
"Almost all the frontier railwåyø in Western Poland have
been destroyed by the invaders, and for the most part CQm-
munication by motor cars is reserved for concentration pur-
poses. 'l'his involves the Red Cross in great difficulties in
increasing the number of motor-ambulance!;', for there are
not enough motor-cars in Russia, ,although the number in
war service is 80 gigantic, fully to supply this purpose also.
Every 8pecial motor ambulance would, therefore, be of the
greatest help to the Russian army, and e.<>pecially to the Rus-
sian cavalry.
"I know what it is after being wounded to be carried
by a hor
e-drawn ambulance for ten hours, and I can reali
e
keenly by my own experience how splendid is tbe idca to
help the Russian cavalry. How many thousands of poor
suffering Russian soldiers would have benefited by such am-
bulances, how many would have been drawn from the pitiless
arms of death, and how great will be their thankfulness to
those who inaugurated liuch a humane idea and helped to
rcalise it J "
The gift of ambulance!!, which is under the patronage
of H,M. Queen Alexandra, will be made direct to Her Imperial
Majesty tbe Empress of Russia, as Head of the Russian R6d
Cross. They wiU be in units of not less than ten ambulan
s
each, the first of which it is hoped will be sbipped complete
in January. Further units will follow, making the presen-
tation worthy of the City of London, and of the cause to
which they are dedicated.
In thus giving expression to the friendship and gratitude
of the English nation towards Russia, the City of London
follows ancient precedent. Of late years, unáer the auspiccs
of our own Foreign Office, intercourse and commerce betwcen
England and Russia have immcn&ely increased. To-day,
throughout the vast Russian domains, comprising one-sixth of
the habitable globe, the name of Englishman is everywhere
honoured, and his better acquaintance is eagerly sought. Not
the least of the beneficent consequences which will result from
such a gift, made at I':uch a crisis, will be tIle increaJ!e of our
national prestige and of our friendly and commercial rela-
tions with this great country.
'l'he committee, therefore, feel justified in approaching
with confidence those who have interests, direct or indircct, in
Russia, or in the numerous Russian affairs that ceutre in the
City of London.
The estimated cost of each unit of ten cars, with acces-
sories and maintenance for three months, is 1:6,500. The
services of the drivers are voluntary.
Besides cash contributions, the Committee will gratefully
consider offers of motor-car chassis suitable for fitting to mu-
bulance bodies, as well as for offers of voluntary sen
as
driver!!. Arrangements have been made for the publication
of tIle subscription lists in Russia.
This is the only fund being raised specifically by the City
of London.
All cheques should be made payable to tbe bon. organising
I!Ccretary, Mr. W. E. W. Han, 33, St. Switbin's Lane, Lon-
dou, E.C.

LOOKING BACKW AROS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this ]o:Jmal
on .. The World's War by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to retain in cerrect rotalion this remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOCand FRED T.]ANE,
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is. 6d. each.
Or we will supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complde,
for 6s. 6d.
Owing to the big demand Ecr back numbers already
received we have had to reprint some of tr;e earlier
number,. Same can now be supplied at 6d. per copy,
Order now from your Newsage!1t, Bookstall, cr direct
from the Publishers,
It LAND AND WATER,"
CENTRAL HOUSE, KINGSW A Y, LONDON.

It.

January 9, [9 1 5

LAND AND WATER

Aiding the wounded

ø

N ever in history has better or more skilful at-
tention been given to the wounded than during
the present great war, and the petrol- driven
motor ambulance and hospital have given
invaluable aid in the great work of mercy.
Throughout the war - swept area red - cross
conveyances of the allied forces are run upon

6

II

MOTOR

SPIRIT

and can therefore be thoroughly depended
upon. It is well to remember when pur-
chasing petrol to say' Shell' and insist upon it.
I t is supplied for all the services of the allied
forces only and is obtainable everywhere.

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LAN D A
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THROU(]H

l
HE

EYES OF

WOl\;IAN

January 9, 19 1 5

A

The Trend of the Times

A ' LICE in Wonderland's" Duchess would have been
in her dement nowadays, for numerous are the
morals to be drawn añd many the people who
draw them. :\Ioralising, indeed, is like nothing
so much as an infectious disease, so fatalh' cas\'
is it to catch the h<lhit. It was, perhaps, but to be expected
that Christmas should give the moraliser a rare opportunity.
The contrast between tll(' season of peace and good \\ ill and
the greatest \\ ar in history was obvious, but not too obvious
to form the te"\:t for manv a theme.
ow and again these
sayings grated, yet once iñ a while they rang true and well,
either giving us new thoughts, or crystalIising those vaguely
felt but as yet unexpressed, But if Christmas be allowed as
a moralising season for the moraliser let not the same hold
good where the :\" c\\ Year is concerned, There will be
plentv of time to moralise when the war is ended: at the
prese
t there is too much call for active wor1. to permit of
such an indulgence.
So much is happening besides, where the very idea of
moralising is nothing short of an impertinence. The
platitudes of conventional sympathy have rightly seemed
inadequate in many scores of cases where the hand of the
war has pressed hea\"ily, And the same, in a lesser degree,
holds good about those whose nearest and dearest are s.tiIl
forming part of the fighting line. The would-be comfortmg
remark is sometimes apt to lean towards the sententious and
thereby miss its aim, The simpler the sympcl.thy given the
more we can be sure it will be valued, and if it can be expressed
in deeds, without a single :spoken word, so much the better.
The Inside of 8 Week
Rumour, for once, has proved herself to be anything but
the lying jade of her reputation, Somt' weeks cl.go cl. whisper
went round of Lord Kitchener's inter.tion to give lea\'e of
absence from th(' front to our fightin
men in France, and
experience has sho\\ n this correct. Soldiers, many of whom
have been in the war area ever since August, have been home

for a brief four days, and in scores of happy instances took
the family circle by surprise. It would be easy enough to
draw poignant pen pictures of these reunions, but any of
that which came heneath m\' more immediate notice
would most assuredly be exagger;ted. And this for the very
simple reason that neither husband nor wife dared to let
themselves go, The end of the short four days and its
inevitable parting loomed too near. Any breakdown, any
painful scenes, had to be avoided at all costs, and a\'niJed
they \\er(' until the final good-bye had been said and the
little \, ife could drop her mask of iron self-control.
She told me that this parting was infinitely worse to
bear than the first one, and this is easy to understand, There
are no illusions left now about the sÏleer horror of this war,
and the weeks of scanning the casualty lists and fearing a
dread telegram from the War Office have had their effect
upon the strongest nerves, \\'omen who said good-byç to
their husbands <md sons when the E
peditionary Force first
sailed for France had a sad enough parting, indeed, but
there was a merciful veil of ignorance over all the campaign
would mean, K ow they know well enough the grimness of
the task set, and much else upon which it is wiser not to
dwell. So all that n>mains for the women left behind is to
keep busy-so Lusy that for thinking there is but little time,
and for nef\"e-racking worry still less.

ERICA,

BURBERRVS' annual half-price sale commenced January I and is
still running -\ l<\fge section of the vast b,lsement and first floor of
their palat1.ll sho\\fnoms in the Haym<lrket ,ire entirely devoted to
this sale, To the usu<lI attractions afforded by the well,known quality
of goods disposed of, must this year be added an immense assortment
of men's suits from their completed suit department. An illustrated
catalogue of the sale, including both men's and women's dress, will be
for\\ard"ù, post free, on receipt of a post card, by Burberrys, Hay-
n1drket, Lonùon, S,\\',

How much money do
youW ASTE on COAL?
::;;;;;,.....---- SEE HOW THE" HUE" WILL STOP THE WASTE
,--- \\ You probabl) have an old-fashi
ned
rate like this,
..., which "astes the coal, gl\'CS httle heat, and

warms the chimney instead of the room. '.":hy
."
not convert it into a modern barless fire? I he

cost is slllall and the op'
ration simple.

This i:; the HUE BARLESS FIRE which effec
s
he
tran
fonuation. It is adaptable to any eXlstmg
grate, without the neces,sity of pulling dü\\n l11,,;ntt;l-
piec,'s and remo' mg the prcsent st?':. e: Sahs-

faction is guarcl.nteed, as the Ht; E IS made

specially to fit your stove.
This is the same stove, showing effect produced by
the HUE. Ì\lore heat is given out in the room with

_ ' about half the coal consumption. Kot me
e asser-
, ' , tion but proved bv actual tests. The HUE 1S clean,
, , .. " , hygienic, alìd will burn fO,r hours w!thout attcn-
. I tion. The HUE has beenlI1stalled 11l thousands
,
of private houses, as well as adopted by the
J ' _. þrincipal Railway Companies, Hotels

d
,
1 : ,\ Institutions. \Vithout question it i,s the most e
Clent

'
Barless Fire on the market, and IS equally ,,'ut,lhle
-:-

:or large or small rooms. . . Price from 1St-.
POST FREE A beautifully iUust
ated boo
lc:t, glvmg full paruculars of the
HUE FIRE, sho\\mg how It IS fiXtd, cost, and md.ny other
ill >>ortant points. Send a :Jst card now to
YOUNG 6. MARTEN. LTD.,
(Dept. L. W.), Stratford. London, E.
110 not beo misled by so-called adaptable Barless Fires. which by their very co.nstruction can never be
satisfactory. \Vord" HUE" is cast on every genuine sto"e.

-,.....

.: I.,"T I-iE

.fJ
"'..ß'
t

....
.

BARR'S caShmeãrañCe SALE

Of fine Spring-flowering BULBS, HYACINTHS. DAFFODILS. TIJLIPS.
CROCIJSES. SNOWDROPS. IRISES. &.c. All in Bell
Quali1Y and at Greatly Reduced Prices, Clearance Lists Oil Aþþlicatioll.
BA.RR 6 SONS, 11, 12 6 13 Hlntt Street. Covent Garden. LONDON.

The BEST for USE on

LAND

and

WATER

ROYAL ARMS

RARE OLD

SCOTCH WHISKY

SPECIAL LIQUEUR

1C.
",:..
u:

The most perfect example of the Art of
Blending-the result of I 30 years' experience.

Proprietors:

J. G. THOMSON & Co., Ltd.
LEITH, SCOTLAND.

Aho at 17 FENCHURCH STREET. LONDON, E.C.

21.)2

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LXIV.

No. 2749

SATURDAY, JANUARY 16, 1915

[ PUBLISHED AS ] PRI(;B 81XPEliICE
A NEWSPAPER. PUBU::'!iI:.U WEEXLY

.......-...

· It

1

Coþ)',.,
. t..4J..y...., J.J1IøI...

THE EARL OF DERBY, K,G.

Who has been working indefatigably and has given much valuable assistance as a speaker
in the present recruiting campaign, He had conferred on him the distinction of the
Order of the Garter as a New Year's honour,

LAND AKD \YATER

More letters showing
how OXO is valued
at the Front

The reviving, strength-giving power of OXO has
received remarkable endorsement in the great war.
It is invaluable for all who have to undergo exertion,
either to promote fitness or to recuperate after fatigue.
OXO aids and increases nutrition; it stimulates and
builds up strength to resist climatic changes; it is
exactly suited to the needs of our men at the front, and
in training, a8 well a8 for general use in the home.

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From a member of tbe London
Scotti.b with the British Expe-
ditionary Force.
And so after all these horrors
here I am living in a cow byre
some way away from the firing line
to recuperate. Like manna, how-
ever, your glorious box has arrived.
coffee and milk. butter, Brand's
Essence. OXO-oh joy! Never
"as seen a more glorious box, and
all my cow byre is interested in it.
\Ve start to-night on our feast. and
I am to thank you both from all
my section for being so generous.
Reþrinted from the "Globe,"
Dec. 12th, 1914.

A gentleman has sent us a letter
from bis .on in tbe Army Service
Corps in wbicb be says :-
I must tell you how delighted I
was to get the OXO. It is great.
You should have seen us preparing
it. We made a wood fire by the
roadside, and boiled the water in
an empty petrol can-enough for
three of us. The OXO was made
in mydixie can, in which we soaked
some biscuits, We then placed
the can on the fire to boil; all the
time it was raining hard, but we
were repaid by the satisfaction we
got for our efforts.
I shall be very pleased to get
some more when you are sending
again, as a good cup of OXO
before we turn in at night con-
siderably warms us up.

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From an A.B. on H.M.S. .. Landrf\iI."
In my opinion there is no better gift anvone could make
to our bluejackets. especially at a time like this, and when the
nights (and days) are sO nippy as they are at present.
Personally I think OXO is worth its weight in gold.

OXO is made in a moment and,
with bread or a few biscuits,
sustains for hours

.,

January 16, 191)

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- ,

BY APPOINTMENT.

THE "X" TYRE

l\.10..t motorists will have noted the renewal of attach
on the "X" (or Dunlop) tyre made in the general
and motor press by a foreign tyre manufacturer. By an
inaccurate comparison an attempt is made to show
that his own tyres are superior to Dunlop t} res costing
25 per cent, more.

A t1lGllI
factll1n- who is reduced to such a pass
cal/not have 11/llch confidence in his own goods.

D U NLD P

tyres, on the other hand, sell on their Own merits alone, ana
have from the very first been advertised in accordance with the
British standard of fair play and good taste.

In relation to the service they give, the prices are lower than any
other, and that those prices are accepted and endorsed by the
public is proved by the Îact that since the first Dunlop motor
tyre was made the demand has always exceeded the supply.

\

The Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., Founders throughout the World
of the PneUlO1atic T}'re Industry, Aston Cross, Birmingham j
'4 Regent Street, London,S.W. PARIS: 4- Rue du Colonel Moll.
DUNLOP SOLID Tv RES FOR HEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES

.......................

.Country IL
f
.
Smo:k;ng M;xture

TJ.;. clel;gJ.tful c:ombmat;on of tJ.e But
Tobacco. U. .old in two strengtJ.s

IMILD and MEDIUM

5 D .
þer ounce

1/8

þer
i-lb. t
n

N.B. "Country L;fe" ;. pacJ.ea only
;n or
g;nal þaclteta ana tin. by the
Manufacturers:

JOHN PLA YER t':1 SONS. Nott;ngJ.am.

P58

The Imperial Tohacco Co, (or Gt, Britain &: Ireland), Lid,

.......................

212

January 16, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

By

HILAIRE

BY

LAND.

BELLOC.

NCTE.- Till. Article II.. beeD .Dbmltted to tile Pre.. Bueu, which doe. Dot object to the publlc.tloD .. ceD.ored aDd take. D'
re.pollalbllltJ for tll. (OrreetDe.. of tll. at.telllelib.

ID accordaDce with the reqoiremenh of Ue Pre.. BUl'eaa, tile po.ltloli. of troop. 011 Piau. lIIa.tratln, tbl. Artlcl. lIIaat oaly b.
rel'udcd .. approsllllafe, and no definite Itnnl'th at aay point II ladic.fed.

A NOTE ON THE NATURE OF A
BLOCKADE.
I THINK it has been pointed out in these com-
ments that the essentials of a siege are that
the operations of the bes-ieged force are confined
to a restricted area by the action of the
bes
eging forces; s? that it is the object of the
besIeged to force theIr way out and of the besiegel's
both to prevent the besieged from forcing their way
out, and graduaUy to contract the area within which
the besieged are restricted in their operation.
Subject to this definition, the present phase of
the war may be accurately described as the siege
upon an enormous scale of the Germanic powers,
A condition commonly but not necessarily
accompanying a siege is that caUed the blockade.
The essential of a blockade is that you prevent the
means of livelihood from reaching the besieged,
and also, of course, but as a secondary matter,
the opportunity through munitions of continuing,
their resistance in arms,
You may have a siege without a blockade, as
when an armed force is so restricted that it
cannot break out and yet still possesses avenues
of supply, or is permitted some forms of supply
for political, religious, or other reasons by the
besiegers, But you could hardly have a blockade
without a siege, because no armed force would
permit itself to be starved if it wel'e able to cut
its way out.
N ow the present siege of the Germanies is
remarkable for the fact that it a true siege accom-
panied by a very imperfect blockade, The German
and Austrian armies have tried very hard indeed to
force their way out through ,the lines that contain
them in France and Belgium and Alsace, to ma!'3ter
Servia and get away out in that fashion, to break
tl
rough th
Ru
sian lines in the East. They have
hItherto faIled m all these attempts. But in the
blockade which should accompany such measures
the besiegers have shown no consistent military
policy.
I do not say that the besiegers have not shown
a consisten
moral or political policy: I only say
that they have shown no consistent military policy.
If you desire to reduce your enemy by blockade
you prevent his getting anything u'hatsoel'eT of
which he stands in need. The Romans in front of
Jerusalem, for instance, or the Germans in front of
Paris in 1870, did not say, "We will prevent arms
getting through but we will allow food," or, " We
will prevent the food for soldiers going in, but we
will allow food for civilians." If they had adopted
such a policy they might just as well not have had
a blockade at all.
If the German Empire had the luck to cripple
the British fleet and its lesser allies, it would
establish a blockade ",ith these islands. It would

not allow cotton to go through and thus keep
Lancashire in employment, while forbidding rubber
to go through, or copper, because these two articles
were supposed to "?e of special military value. It
would allow nothwg to go th1'0'UgR, for its aim
would be the reduction of the blockaded pal'ty.
Now the blockade of Germany and Austria-
Hungary cannot be absolute because hundreds of
miles of frontier everywhere march with neutral
powers, and the native products at least of those
neutral POWel'S can reach the enemy at will. It
may not even be possible to prevent a certain
leakage from without through the agency of
private individuals living in neutral territOl'y who
buy ostensibly for neutral purposes but secretly
sell again to the enemy.
,But there is a broad distinction between pre-
ventmg all you possibl!l can from getting in and
deliberately allowing whole categories of gooos to
come in, and even failing to do your best to prevent
the entry of such categories as you have selected
for contraband.
If you do not prevent everything you possibly
can prevent from going into the blockaded area,
then, your "?lockade is imperfect and will almost
certaInly faIl. You may have excellent moral,
religious or political reasons for thus l'Unnin 0 0 the
risk of losing the

ar ; but you. can have no military
reason. As a mIlItary operatIon, to allow cotton,
!et us say, to go into Germany, and to forbid copper,
IS meaningless, \\That you are fighting is the whole
nation with all its resources, economic and social
and inasmuch as you allow those resources to be fed:
by so much do you increase the chances of the
enemy's winning and of your losing, and by so much
do you kill and wound your own soldiers, deplete
your own wealth and prolong the duration of
hostilities.
It is a matter upon which there can be no two
opinions, and one upon which it is singular enough
that there should be any confusion of thought.
Especially is a blockade imperfect when it
allows matt-er which the blockaded country cannot
get at all, save from outside, to go through, and yet
sticks at matter which t.he blockaded country can,
to some extent, find for Itself. 'Vhen, for instance,
it allows cotton to go through and wastes energy
upon preventing copper going through; or when it
a
lows cocoa to go through and is anxious to prevent
mtrates.
There are four causes, and four only, which may
operate upon the government of the blockading
nation to make the blockade of its enemy imperfect:
(I) Religion: as when it would be thought
impious to pl'(
vent certain sacred objects, or cel'tain
men in discharge of a sacred office, from passing
through the blockading lines. This objection is
absolute, but it has to-day, I believe, little weight.

,.

LAND AND 'V ATER

(2) Moral: that is when the various parties to
a combat are agreed upon certain things as human
and to be tolerated upon either side. Thus it
mio'l.t be thought inhuman to cut ofr water supply
and yet tolerable to cut off food. The test in Hus
case is whether the enemy would be willing to
apply the same test as you apply to him. The
morals differ from religion in this, that they are
matters of contract and of reason.
(3) A greater military advantage to be ob-
tained: as when you propose to bring in as your
ally later on (or, what is the same thing, to prevent
his fighting against you) someOne whose supply of
goods to the enemy in a staple matter of trade is
vital to him; or when you yourself need such
supply and fear its being cut off from yourself, if
you offend the neutral by closing the enemy's
market, and when the ad,'ant.age so aimed at is
greater than the disadvantage immedi.1tely suffered,
(4) A private interest: as when merchants
becoming wealthy by export to the enemy, direct or
indirect, prefer their adnmtage to that of the
commonwealth and have power over the Government
to make their advantage prev
iJ-and this last

THE

BATTLE

IN

T HE Russian victory in the Caucasus or, as
it probably will come to be called, the
Battle of Sarikamish, is an event of im-
portance not so much from the numbers
engaged as from the les::;ons it teaches
upon the German direction o.f the Turki::;h Army
at this moment and from its probable political
effect.
It has been suggested tlw,t the action will pro-
bably bear the name of the" Third Battle of Arda-
ghan JJ because some part of the extended action
wa
fought in front of that town while, in the same
neighbourhood, two other conspicuous Russian
victories have taken place; one in 1829, the other
during the last Rus50- Turkish 'tV ar in 1877 during
the Russian advance on KaL's. But the centre of
the action, the place where far the heaviest shock
of troops took place, app'2.ars to have been near
the railhead of the Kars Railway, within a few
miles of the frontier, at the road junction of Sari-
kamish. And the telegrams that have hitherto
reached us already call the battle b,- the name of
this place. "
In order to understand what has happened
and the significance it has in relation to the Ger-
man direction of Turkish militarv effort we mu::;t
first appreciate the nature of that" frontier and the
proportion of the forces involved.
Take an oblong (see plan at top of next
page) bounded on the north by the 45th
Parallel and on the south bv 38th Para.llel
" ,
between Longitude 35 East and Lonrritude 49 East.
Ifhat is, an oblong l1lí,re than 4;:)0 0 but less than
500 miles across a.nd about 700 miles long. 'Vithin
such an oblong all tÌ1e Caucasian territory where
fhe Christian has pressed back the Turk during
the last hundred 'years is comprised.
The broad isí:hmus between the Black Sea and
"the Caspian is the scene, -a tract of land nowhere
less than 300 odd miles across and upon the aver-
.
ge more like 400. The boundary that look:; as

þou
h it were fLx:ed by nature be"tween the one

Janua-ry 16, 1915.

cause may operate in many ways and in the most
roundabout fashion-through shipowners as much as
by merchants-through men who fear any general
diminution of trade throughout the world as
ultimately certain to react upon trade they do them-
selves--through financiers who may pretend, or,
if they are sufficiently stupid, believe that the
counters with which they deal and the lubrication
of exchange are equivalent to wealth itself, but who
most commonlr haye no object but their personal
enrichment, bemg men without national affections,
and at large between all combatant parties.
Unless one of these four causes can be proved,
and one of the first three (which alone are reputable)
maintained, there can be no excuse for weakening
in time of war the military action of the nation by
rendering imperfect and impotent what might be a
complete and potent military process.
It is incumbent upon those who prefer to leave
the blockade of Germany imperfect to explain which
of thebe causes they invoke for their action, and to
make it quite clear that they ha.ve a better reason
for leaying that blockade incomplete than they
would have for making it p::>rfect.

THE

CAUCASUS.

Power and the other is the great Caucasian range
of mountains, the ridge of which runs along the
line A-B. It is one of the most complete natural
barriers in the world, surpassing in this character
the Pyrenees, and rivalling the mountains that
bound India upon the north. Its highest summits
touch from 15,000 to 18,000 feet, its principal
passes do not sink much below 8,000 and 9,000; no
railway has )'et been driven across it, though, as
in the case of the Eastern P
rrcnees, the system
manages to squeeze round at an extreme end be-
tween the mountains and the Caspian Sea. Only
two main roads have been engineered from north
to south through all the 500 miles of its extent. But
this great chain, though it forms so
omplete a
natura'l barrier, does not divide two civilisations;
for religion, which is the determinant of culture.
has produced for centuries Mahommedanism north
of the chain, as it ha,s preserved great bodies of
Christendom, Uniatc and Orthodox, to the south
of it. It is this Christian majority to the south in
what is called G'eol'gia, and beyond this again in
the mountains of .It 1'rne1lia, to which the Russian
effort has perpetually been extended. And its
last limit before the present conflict (a limit fixed
in 1878 after the war of 1877 by the Treaty of
Berlin) W.1S that marked upon the sketch by the
dotted line, C-D, about half of whieh belongs to the
frontier of the Turkish Empire, and half to that
(now a nominal one) of Persia against Russia. This
frontier upon its Persian side is largely natural,
following the course of the Arax:es River, as far
as the nearly isolated mountain mass of Ararat,
which stands where Persia, Asiatic Turkey, and
the Russian Empire meet, but eastward of this
mas::; of Ararat and on to the Black Sea the frontier
follows no natural features, it cuts across high
ridge and deep ravine indifferentl.,', and may be
neglected in any strategic plan. The great fea-
tures of the district between the Caucasus and -
Asiatic Turkey, for the purposes of military hi
-
tory, are:-- -

2*

January 16. 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

3

049E.
4jN'

f'\

'^

-

SE

Lcuul.

(1) A depression running from sea to sea.,
roughly parallel with the Cauca
ian c
ain, and
(roughly also) at an average of SIxty mIles or so
from its summits. Thi3 depression has, of course,
its western and its eastern slope, the watershed
between which on the Pass of Ssuram (at S) is
itself nearly 3,000 feet above the sea. But the
railwa.y follows it all and unites along this natural
trench Baku, the Oil centre, upon the Caspia.n,
with Batoum, the European port upon the Black
Sea, and this railway is connected along the Cas-
pian coast with the systems to the north of the
Caucasus. Not quite midway between the two
seas is the chief town of Tiflis (T), at the foot of
the principal road across the Caucasian Chain,
and the nodal point upon which all land communi-
cations (rail, road, and sea) for a Caucasian cam-
paign must centre,
From Tiflis southwards runs towards the Tur-
kish frontier and the fortress of Kars (K) a rail-
way which crosses two ridges of fairly high moun-
tains and climbs beyond Kars to its railhead at
Sarikamish. 6,000 feet above the sea (Sh). The
mountains between the main Caucasian railway-
that from Baku to Batoum-and the Armenian
frontier, are too complicated to be represented
upon this rough sketch, even in their main lines.
They appear in the sketch as no more than" a
mountainous area," It is all a tangle of high hills
leading up to the Armenian Plateau. But we
must conceive of all the land between the railway
and the frontier as rising gradually by some 5,000
feet, with summits 10,000 and even 11,000 feet
above the sea, and so cut up that travel from one
point to another, save along the Kars railway (and
even that crosses great heights), nearly always in-
volves the passage of a steep and snow-clad ridge.
I shall give later a sketch of that tangle on a
larger scale. In the direction along which the
Rars railway points-that is somewhat south of
west-but over the border and some 80 miles
further on is. at a height of over 6,000 feet, the
town of Erzerum (E), the place of concentration
for the Turkish forces in this neighbourhood.
Finally, upon the Black Sea at T .R. is the port of
Trebizond, the principal Turkish port for this dis-
trict.
With these main elements before us we can
follow upon a somewhat larger scale the details of
the recent Russian victory.
The first thing to seize is that the general plan
of the Germans upon this front after they had
brought Turkey into the war was an envelopment
of the Russian army of the Caucasus, or at any rate

of so large a part of it as should destroy the useful-
ness of the remainder.
There was but one district in which such an
envelopment could take place, for there is but one
main avenue of approach by which a large force
can march from Russian into Turkish territory or
from Turkish into Russian, and that is the road
from Kars to Erzerum. The Russian army would
certainly bring forward the bulk of its forces by
that road, which is further supplied with a railway
as far as the terminal station of Sarikamish, 15
miles from the frontier. Once this main advance
began, and the main Russian force was engaged
in the valley in its march upon Erzerum, it was to
be held in front by resistance upon the main road,
and while it was thus held Turkish forces stationed
upon the left or northward of this main road were
to sweep round and come upon the right flank of
the Russians. There was even one extreme Tur-
kish force still further to the no.rth which was to
come round by sea to work round behind the Rus-
sians while the general engagement was in progress
and to cut the main railway from Tiflis to Kars
upon which the Russians depended for their
munitions. The whole thing may be put
diagrammatically as follows: where K is Kar8,

E_

L
l!.rsians
- - Turks B

S is Sarikamish, and E is Erzerum. A railway
coming from Tillis and the depots of the Russians
in Georgia accompanies the road as far as the rail-
head at Sarikamish. The Russians are expected
to make their main advance upon Erzerum as
along the column A-A. The Turks under German
direction proceed to envelop this Russian advance
by holding it in front with a force B-B, and then
moving forces C-C and D-D round against the Rus-
sians in the direction of the arrow, while yet
another force, E-E, strikes through to cut the rail-
way behind Kars somewhere near X, There was
a certain amount of detached work going on away
to the south, that is to the left of the Russians and
the right of the Turks, but we need not concern
ourselves with that, the study of which would only
confuse our grasp of the main operations.
'Vhat the Turks bad here been bidden to carry
out was exactly upon the model of all modern
German strategy, and that is what makes us cer-
tain that the blunder was made under German
direction. It may even be regarded as the third
of the great failures of this enveloping strategy in
the present war. The first was Von Kluck's
failure to get round the Allied Ann
T in front of
Paris; the second was Von Hindenburg's failure
to get round the Russian line in front of 'Varsa.w;

3*

LAND AND WATER.

and this Caucasian battle, fought with Turkish
soldiers under totally different climatic and topo-
graphical conditions, is a third failure in exactly
the same image,
In order to éffect an envelopment of this kind
the Germans had to count on a numerical superi-
ority of their ally's troops in this region, for you
cannot thus hold in one place and turn in another
unless you are numerically superior to your enemy.
Nothing could make up for this necessity of superi-
ority in numbers save some great superiority in
mobility, which mobility the Turks, lacking any
railways in this neighbourhood, obviously did Dot
possess, "Ve may take it, therefore, that the
120,000 men or so (possibly altogether as many as
160,000) which the Turks had to hand were con-
fronted by no more than some 100,000 Russians, or
at least expected to be confronted by no more.
A second necessity, lacking which a movement
of this sort is bound to fail, is the exact co-
ordination of all the movements. If your various
bodies converging upon the enemy do not keep in
touch and work accurately to a time-table, they
are bound to be defeated in detail, for some of
them will be in conflict with the whole of the enBmy
before the rest have come up. The classic example
of this sort of failure is the Battle of Tourcoing in
1794.
The co-ordination of movements over dis-
tances of more than a hundred miles in such a dis-
trict as this jumble of high mountains between
Armenia and Georgia in the depth of winter was
impossible, and it is difficult to see how the Ger-
mans could have believed it possible. The whole
place is a confusion of immense ridges, arranged

anuary 16, 1915.

on the most complicated pattern, with passes over
them often 8,OOOft. above the sea, and peaks rising
two to three thousand feet higher. The whole
place is deep in snow and subject at this season to
very heavy storms. Translating the diagram into
the actual map and following tbe movements from
day to day this is what happened:-

II'
, .Ardð.hsn

'"

Erzerum
.

c

Towards the end of October there was con-
centrated at Erzerum a force consisting of three
Turkish Army Corps: the 9th, the 10th, and tbe
11th.
With what rapidity the Turks could assemble
their men we do not know, but at any rate the great
concentration was taking place about that time,
and the corresponding Russian concentration was
taking place in the neighbourhood of Kars in those
same days. The distance from Kars to Erzcrum

IRZE

c

,.

t1anuary 16, 1915.

I;AND AND WATER.

'S the crow flies is about 115 miles, and by the The reader who follows these campaigns upon
road over two high passes something like 140 if I the best maps may be curious to note the prolonga-
am not mistaken, Both centres stand very high; tion of the railway from Kars to Sarikamish, and
Kars nearly 6,000 feet above the sea, Erzerum may have wondered why I spoke of the latter place
over 6,000, while the road between them rises at as the Russian OJ railhead." None but the most
the pass to as much as close on 8,000; and we must recent maps give this extension. Two years ago
conceive of the whole of this theatre of operations the railway stopped at Kars. It is only since
as a tost sea of huge mountains separated by a 1913 that the extension to Sarikamish at the foot
network of deep ravines, even the lowest floors of of the high mountains has been opened.
which are deep in snow. ----
The sketch at the foot of the preceding page From such a digression upon the details of
may give some idea of the extremely difficult that impossible country I return to the movement
country over which some German, working with a itself.
map, saw fit to design a converging movement ----
against the Russian columns which were advancing Sundry preliminary actions between the ad-
up the Kars-Erzerum road. vanced forces of the two armies that were concen-
In this sketch I have marked the high moun- trating would have interest in a full history, but
tainous land by shading, and the ridges or crests would only confuse the main lines of this sum-
along which all that high mountainous land is mary. W
therefore proceed at once to the main
grouped I bave marked by a series of dashes, advance, which did not develop until the last ten
Hue and there in the mountains are figures days of November. It was on November 20th that
showing the height of some crest or of a pass, the Russians had reached their furthest point in
while the vaney floors are left white. It will, I their march upon Erzerum, driving the Turks from
think, be clearly seen from such a sketch how Koprikoi. 'Ve shall do well if we conceive of this
impossibly confused the whole district is. Russian success as being rather due to a deliberate
Observe, for instance, how the 1st Turkish retirement u[
on the part of the Turks than any-
Army Corps, coming from the valley of the thing else, because immediately after the action at
Choruk River and making for Ardahan, had to Koprikoi the Turkish counter-advance began. It
cross a high ridge, and had for such a passage was pursued slowly and successfully during the
nothing but one bad mountain road, with the month of December, and took the following form:
height of the pass more than 8,000 feet above the The 11th Corps marched towards Khorosan,
sea; from which, upon the further side, was a which is just over the Turkish frontier and about
sharp fall of nearly 3,000 feet on to Ardahan thirty miles from the Russian railhead at Sari-
itself. Observe in what a tangle of mountains kamish. There was heavy fighting in Christmas
lies the point of Olti and the neighbouring point week, and two days after Christmas the Turkish
of Id; from one of which, Id, the 10th Army Corps 11th Army Corps had reached the outskirts of
started for its ill-fated adventure against the Kars- Khorosan itself, which the Russians were defend-
Sarikamish road, and upon the other of which, ing, I have marked their position at this moment
Olti, that same Army Corps has withdrawn by with the figures 11, 11, 11, Meanwhile, concen-
something which is no more than a mountain trated round the frontier post of Id forty miles to
track. after its defeat. the north was the 10th Turkish Army Corps, which
There is, indeed, in all that extraordinary I have similarly marked with the figure 10, and
confusion of high peaks and gorges, only one between it and the 11th, that is, between Id and
natural avenue for troops, which is the depression Khorosan, was the 9th Turkish Army Corps, which
leading from Kars up to Sarikamisb, a sort of I have mdrked with the figure 9. The Russians
broad floor in the midst of the mountains, the road ''lere well held in front of Khorosan, and their
up which, after the pass at X, comes down on to main forces stretching back along the valley to-
the valley of the Araxes at Koprikoi, the old" Ad wards Sarikamish and so to the rail anù road to
Confluentes." It so happens that between the Kars were to be attacked by the 10th and the 9th
upper waters of the Araxes River and the first Army Corps sVveeping rouncÌ in the direction of the
sources of the Euphrates, near Erzerum, there is arrows, X-X. Meanwhile, far to the northward,
no saddle of high land; and the road passes easily yet another Turkish force having be(;n brought
from the Upper Araxes to Erzerum. But, apart round by C, and consisting partly of troops from
from that main ]ine between the two militarý Constantinople, that is from the 1st Army Corps,
towns of Erzerum itself, more than 6,000 feet were advancing to take Ardahan, and having
above the sea, and Kars, little more than 400 feet taken it to go on along the direction of the arrow,
lower, there is the only good marching route of Y-Y, and to cut the railway behind the Russians
all that land. And the attempt to converge upon a little below Kars.
Sarikamish from the neigh bourhood of J d and Olti, \Vhile we speak thus upon the sketch-map of
as did the 9th and 10th Turkish Armv Corps, was "advancing in the direction of the arrows," we
an attempt necessarily doomed to failure. must constantly remember that this meant in prac-
So was the attempt to bring in a wide sweep tiee the crossing of high mountain ridges in the
an extreme body round by the sea through Arda- blizzards of mid-winter, and at the same time keep-
han, and so on through to the railway behind ing an the movements exactly eo-ordinated. The
Kars. For though, once at Ardahan, such a body first of the failures was that of the body, I, in front
had a clear road through open country before it of Ardahan. The Turks here did manage to take
until it rcached the milwav behind Kars, yet in the town. They had to fight for more than a fort-
order to reach Ardahan it had to cross the hig-h ni
ht to get it, but they were in possession upon
ridge,
\, A, A, the summits of which t011ch 10.00n Nf'w Year's Day. Hardlv h::1d thev est::1 blished
feet, and the saddle over which from the va l1ev of themselves thel:e, however, when a Russian forc

the Choruk was itself over 8,000 feet above the sea coming up ju
t in time broke them two days later,
5'

LAND AND WATER.

tirely to itself as the 10th broke away northward
and the result was that this 9th Corps lost, killed,
wounded, or captured, the whole of its effectives;
all its staff including the German officers present
are prisoners on their way to the interior. All
the artillery of the Corps has been taken and, in a
word, the Turkish centre has ceased to exist.
But the action has continued none the less
during the week that has passed since that date,
while the Russians continued their pursuit of the
retreating 10th Corps, using, for that purpose it
may be presumed, all the troops they originally
had against the 10th Corps, and reinforcements
from those who had just wiped out the 9th Corps.
The 11th Turkish Army Corps holds the Rus- The 11th Turkish Corps began taking a vigorous
sians at Khorosan; the.
th Turkish AImy Corps is offensive in order to relieve the pressure upon the
first above and then in Sarikamish itself; the 10th retreating 10th. The 11th Corps pushed up Lc-
Turki.3h Army Corps to the left of the 9th is coming yond Khorosan in what must have been a very
down upon the valley and the railway,betw.een vigorous offensive, to within a long day's m3.rch
Sarikamish and Kars. For three days, Boxing of Sarikamish, and the position at the end of this
Day and the two days following, there was a effort was much as it is upon the next sketch:
violent struggle between the Turks and the Rus- 'Vith Sarikamish at S, the Turkish 11th
sians of which Sarikamish was the centre. _ The Corps is hitting hard at A (Karai Urgan,
9th Turkish Army Corps was holding Sarikamish, eighteen miles from Sarikamish) and trying
the 10th was fighting for the railway beyond, ap- by so doing to bring the Russians back
parentIy; whether it managed to reach it or not from their pursuit of the 10th Corps.
we have not been told. It seems to have been to- Whether that 10th Corps will in the main get
wards the end of the day December 29th that away or not only the future will show, but the t.otal
the struggle began to turn in favour.of the Rus- result of the operations is to leave the Turks upon
sians, and New Year's Day and the day following this front in a position of marked inferiority as
must have seen the pushing back of the 10th Army against the Russians and to put an end for the
Corps-for nothing else will account for what came moment to any anxiety the Russians might have
immediately after, the isolation of the 9th. The had for the safety of their Caucasian provinces,
position January 2nd would seem to have been of their oil ,veIls at B3.ku, of their frontier strong-
much as on tne following sketch, At any rate, hold at Kars, of the integrity of their main force
on Sunday, January 3rd, the same day which saw in this region, and of their railways and communi-
the victorious entry of the Russians into Ardahan, cations.
and the decisive check administered to the 1st "\Ve must not exaggerate the magnitude of the
rI'urkish Army Corps there, the 9th Corps still event. The forces engaged were but a fraction of
holding desperately to its position in the valley at the total numbers that Turkey can put into the
Sarikamish found itself isolated by the defe:tt of field, and the defeat though complete leaves two-
the 10th Corps upon its left and was wiped out. thirds of the Turkish forces round Erzerum in
rrhe 11th Army Corps up by Khorosan could do being. Whether a new offensive will be attempted
nothing. It had held up the head of the first Rus- upon this same front by the Turks we cannot tell,
sian advance, but it could not go further-it had but we can be certain that much time must elapse
not moved since two days after Christmas. The before it could develop in any strength. There
Ðth Turkish Army Corps was therefore left en- are considerable forces in European Turkey from
6*

upon January 3rd, drove them out of the town, and
checked the Turkish advance on this extreme left
for good and all.
In those same days when the sweeping move-
ment round by Ardahan was held up, that is, the
days at the end,of last year and at the beginning
of this year, the main Turkish advance on the
Erzerum-Kars road, and round upon the flanks of
it was being pressed. The 11th Turkish Army
Corps held the Russians firmly at Khorosan; the
9th and the 10th were successfully struggling
across the mountain ridges and appeared upon the
heights above Sarikamish about Christmas Day,
They had been so far successful as to very nearly
achieve their object; they had very nearly en-
veloped t1lC Russians, and the position in the last
week. of the year may be grasped from the accom-
panymg map.

Ardð.nau

"10
11\ eKfJ fl
I

D

January 16, 1915.

",-JSt' Corps iJ!Jlf8ht:
/
#mahan

'"
,{C?th
rps
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<? tllfli8ht:
.
,

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ikventJi:\ Q destro'i,

Cerps takitlß vigorous otfènsive t:'O
rdùve pr
s$ure on tñë áe.fta:!td
10th-too late to save tIle 9th.

K
.

E

January 16, 1915.

LAND ÄND W ATEB

First COrpSl/t jliglzt

l
JL
lol(j
II)
1/1[, fJ
lPuln .$
01+ A

4"4

r::::J 1ù.LS$
a.ns
7úrh

which to draw, but the railway could not take
them more than a couple of hundred miles towards
this front; there would still remain nearly two
months of marching by mountain tracks before
Erzerum would be reached, and if, in the interval
the Russians account for the remaining 10th and
11th Corps it is fairly certain that new Turkish
Armies will not be sent north-eastward at all.
Were transport by sea secure such reinforcements
mIght reach the port of Trebizond and the region
of Erzerum in a few days, but transport by sea is
contested and though it has been effected recently
along that coast quite insecure, as we know by the
fate of the two transports sunk by Russian fire.
Upon the whole it would seem as though the efl;ect
of Sarikamish was decisive, so far as this theatre
of the war is concerned,

THE POLISH FIELD.
In the Polish field there is an absence of any-
thing decisive during the whole of the week,
and even of any minor action with any de-
finable result, In Galicia and in Bukovina
the Russians are in the mouths of the passes
and have not yet proceeded to control the summits,
or even to advance towards such control. The
reason probably is that the weather has made
transport for an advancing force impossible. Clear
weather, however cold, would see the beginning
of another forward movement. And here it may
be worth while commenting upon the perfectly
meaningless phrase which has twice escaped the
German General Staff, and which has been re-
peated by their apologists in the United States: I
mean the phrase that" the Russian offensive is
broken." That phrase is not meaningless in itself,
it is only meaningless in the circumstances to which
it is applied. There is a perfectly simple meaning
to the expression" the breaking of an offensive":
it means that your enemy having attempted an
offensive movement has failed in it, not only for the
moment, but so finally and thoroughly that he will
never be able to begin again. A Russian who felt
inclined to prophesy might be inclined to say that
the Austro-German offensive movement against
the line of the middle Vistula and the San was thus

p

"broken," It would be a foolish prophecy, because
so long as there is a great army capable of
threatening your own in front of you, and so long
as it has ample reserves of men, it may always re-
turn to the attack. But, still, the Austro-German
effort has been a very clear case of a vigorous offen-
sive breaking down at the end of its first stage.
On the Russian side there has been nothing
of the sort. There has been a deliberate retire-
ment before the German advance, the taking up
of a defensive line, and the maintenance thereof.
The retirement followed no surprise or lost general
action: it was a calculated retirement based upon
difficulty of supply under the climatic and topo-
graphical conditions of Russian Poland. So far
from being the end of the Russian ofIensÏ\'c, it is
quite manifestly 'the preparation for the Russian
offensive, to which only the accumulation of
supply, a matter of the weather, and the time is
lacking. Whether such a new offensive will suc-
ceed or not is quite another matter; but that it is
not only possible, but in the very strategical nature
of things in the Eastern field, is self-evident.
Meanwhile the last phase of the German at-
tempt to break through to "\Varsaw consists in
something singularly like what happened in
Northern France from three to two months ago.
Upon a comparatively narrow, selected front a
very violent attack is delivered. The terminal
points of this front, the hamlet of Sukha and the
farmsteads called Mogele are about a day's
march apart, and stand upon the Bzura much
where the first violent attack upon "\Varsaw was
made a month ago. Upon that restricted area the
enemy massed in particularly dense formations,
and depending exactly as he did in the West upon
a lavish and concentrated display of heavy artil-
lery, is directing all the weight of his effort; pre-
cisely what he did first on the twelve-mile front
between Dixmude and the sea, later upon succes-
sive narrow fronts round Ypres. Hitherto the re-
sult has also been the same,

THE WESTERN FIELD.
THE ATTACK ON MULHOUSE.
The French offensive against Mulhouse was
much more likely, as was said in these column:;
last week, to bring down German reinforcements
into Upper Alsace than to achieve its immediate
object of reaching the Rhine. although that
frontier of Germany proper, which would thus
have been uncovered, is only sixteen mile
away
from the advanced French positions. "
But, as was also said in the same place, the
bringing of German reinforcements down from
the north to stand against this pressure on Mul-
house is an end in itself, though less serious than
the approach to the Rhine.
Vle must always remember that the great
asset the French have is their superiority in
gunnery; not only in the mechanical superiority
of their field guns, but in the superiority of their
training, rapidity, and genius for gunnery. Tbeir
great weakness on this side at the beginning of tbe
war was an insufficiency of heavy artillery, and
that weakness has now been made right.
Consequently, wherever the French are exer-
cising pressure upon the long lme of trenches, their
gunnery must be met as best can be by German reo.
inforcements in the same arm, The heavy re-

7*

LAND ì\.ND WATER

under most expensi\"e conditions. The French
hold all the gun positions on the foothills, and they
hold, of course, the dominating heights just above.
For instance, above Wattwiller they hold the
height more than a thousand feet above the plain
upon which stands the ruined castle of Herren-
fluh; while above the famous gun position upon
" Hill 432" (which means a point marked in the
Ordnance Survey as being 432 metres above the
sea, or about 1,400 feet above the plain) they hold
the height which supports the ruins of the castle of
Steinbach, also somewhat more than a thousand
feet above the plain,
Against their positions reaching down from
the first of these ruined castles the enemy have
made very determined, but as yet unsuccessful, at-
tempts to carry the slopes from the plain village
of Wattwiller. They have maintained themselves
in Uffoltz, which is divided between the hill slope
and the plain; they have not succeeded in re-taking
the site of Steinbach village; they have failed to
carry and re-capture Hill 432, and in general they
h:lve here established a check to the French ad-
vance, but have failed to throw it back.
In the southern sector they have been more
successful. The French for a moment captured
Upper Burnhaupt, they were driven out of it again
by heavy German reinforcements five days ago,
and at present their line is roughly that of the dots
across the above sketch map.
Our principal interest in this affair so far has
been in the estimate of the German reinforcements
required to stem the threat of the French offensive
I in Upper Alsace, We have some indication of this
in the estimate of German losses during the re- .
capture of Upper Burnhaupt alone, These losses
amounted to about 4,000, of which one-half repre-
sented unwounded prisoners; and that, of course,
must have been during the initial stage of the
fighting, because, as it was the French who retired,
they would have taken no prisoners, either
wounded or unwounded, in the last stages of this
local action, "\Ve may therefore estimate at a
Division the reserve called down from the north to
protect the advance upon Mulhouse from the south
alone; and one is perhaps safe in estimating at
nearly the same strength the forces protecting
Mulhouse from the northern advance. What the
French forces oppoaed are we do not know, but pre-
sumably superior in number of guns at least, and
probably in men as well, for it is they who have
been able to take the offensive.
But the pressure all along this front is not
.1 confined to the direct threat upon Mulhouse, There
'''''x are forces operating in front of Colmar to the
north and against Alstricht to the south; and it
There has been a double effort upon Mulhouse is the most probable development of the situation
sincè the village of Steinbach was captured, now that the pressure, and the bringing up of men to
nearly a fortnight ago. There has been an effort withstand that pressure, will increase continually
from the north by a French offensive in front of all down the line of the Vosges as spring ap-
Steinbach itself, which effort has been met by proaches, It is much the best game for the French
strong German reinforcements there; and there to play, and the Germans know it. It thins the
has been an effort about six miles away to the rest of the line somewhere to within danger of
south, near the two Burnhaupts, where the Ger- breaking point. It has some political value, and
mans have also brought up considerable reinforce- its high political-military value lies in the fact that
ments to check this second movement, here only is the frontier of Germany proper imme-
The :first is about ten miles from 11ulhouse, or, diately exposed to the French offensive. It is
counting right up to the French front, about within sight from the hills. Everywhere else the
11-Hi. The second is no more than eight. On limits of the GermanEmpire, as distinguished from
the northern part of this double effort the German annexed and disaffected territory like Alsace-
defensive, though still maintained, i
maintained Lorraine, or territory merely occupied like Bel

ßIt

inforcements in infantry alone that Germany has
required to meet this novel pressure upon Upper
Alsace must come from somewhere: the whole
point of exercising such pressure is to co stretch JJ
and thin the line somewhere else. But whereas
infantry of sorts can be improvised, gunners can-
not, By which I mean that the heaviest part of
the advantage acquired by the French in thus ex-
ercising pressure upon the extreme of their line is
not that it b:rings great masses of German infantry
there-though that is not to be despised: it is
especially that it compels the enemy to denude
some part of his line of its proper complement of
guns. And you will find that the moment heavy
German reinforcements are needed at some point
where pressure of this kind has been applied, the
second step immediately taken is for the Frenph to
search the line up and down to find where -a weak-
ness in guns may be discovered, It takes a day or
two to move such guns: they may often come from
reserves of material. But it only takes a few hours
to move the gunners, and the gunners, moved from
one part of the line, at once weaken that part of
the line. How the novel pressure upon Upper
Alsace has worked the last few days may be
gathered from the accompanying sketch.

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January 16, 1915..

January 16, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

gium and Luxemburg, are far from the French
line. This attack upon Alsace has got the further
purely strateaical value that if it grows heavy, if
the Germans ohave to shorten their line, they will
be compelled to do so by an abandonment of the
Upper Alsatian plain. It will be their shortest
and almost their only alternative. On each of these
considerations, and on all of them together, it
seems certain that the offensive in this quarter is
serious and is likely to grow .more serious.

THE SUCCESS NEAR PERTHES.
The only other event of the week in the West,
besides the German recapture of Burnhaupt, IS the
local French success near Perthes, in which they
took the height .. Hill No. 200."
And here, again, we can use the highly de-
tailed local fighting as an illustration of what the
present trench work means. Immediately in front
of Perthes, itself 162 metres above the sea, the
ground swells in a sort of gradual lump to a
rounded summit, 200 metres above the sea, or
thereabouts-that is, about 129 feet higher than
Perthes village. All this country is a confused,
bare, rolling land of damp chalk and clay, and
Perthes is almost at the highest of its monotonous
lift. It is from this region that the little muddy
streams, thick, white like milk in rainy weather,
ooze from the ungrateful soil of the Champagne
Pouilleuse, The Suippe rises not far off, and the
Tourbe, near the farm of Beauséjour, about three
miles only from Perthes. What the French have
done is to seize the fortified height above Perthes
village, whieh is marked B upon the accompany-
ing sketch; and the importance of their action lies
in its representing a further advance towards the
railway lying behind the German trenches and
supplying the forces that line them with munitions
and food.
If you had made a sketch of the French and
German opposed trenches about a month ago in
this region, you would probably have had something
like the lines M M for the Germans, N N for the
French, If you were to make a similar sketch
to-day, you would have something like the line R R
for the Germans and S S for the French, And
though the advance does not represent . more than
3,000 yards at the very best from the extreme

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positions held, and on an average more like 1,500,
its whole interest lies in its approach to the railway,
I have seen somewhere the remark that the
capture of the point B or the Hill 200, in front of
Perthes, gave the :French gunners a dominating
position commanding this railway,
This is an error. The whole of that ugly naked
landscape is far too confused to obtain a good gun
position, and there are four lumps of much the same
height in the same neighbourhood, which I have
marked A, E, C and D on the sketch, while the
shallow valleys between the swells of ground are
not much over 100-150 feet deep. Moreover,
artillery by indirect fire can, when it is in range,
destroy such a work as a railway with precision
by mere measurement upon a map. It does not
need to dominate from a height. What an advance
like this does is to give "the guns operating against
such an objective a shorter range over which to
work. If, for instance, the French should reach the
village of Tahure, more than half-way between
Perthes and the railway, then the French,
advancing their heavy guns behind their line, could
make the railway perfectly unusable. As the
trenches now lie it may be doubted whether they
have yet quite achieved this object, The whole
meaning of their push forward here in the middle
of Champagne is the approach towards the railway,
a.nd their foremost troops are now just under four
miles from that line of communication and supply.

THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT OF
THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY.

W ITH the apparent breakdown of the
Austro-German offensive in the
East, with the containment of the
Austro-German offensive in the
West, and the increasing pressure
upon the Belgian and Alsatian extremes of the
German lines there, we have a strategical factor
apparent in the next phases of the war which may
best be called uThe Political Embarrassment of the
Enemy's Strategy."
That is, we may expect, if things continue
upon the same lines, that the enemy will suffer
during the next few months in the following
fashion :-

He will not be able to pursue purely strategi-
cal aims. He will be embarrassed in such a pro-
ceeding by certain political considerations which
may confuse and which will certainly hamper what
ought to be his purely strategical objects.
This point is so important that it is essential
we should make it, even though it seem a little pre-
mature; we shall almost certainly find it domi-
nating the future of the war; and at the outset of
such an inquiry the reader may well be perplexed
by the use of that word U political."
"We perpetually read in military history that
such and such a general U had designed an excellent
plan of campaign, but it was marred by political

9*

LAND AND WATER

considerations." Now this phrase seems ambigu-
ous. For it is evident that every campaign must,
in the wider sense of the term political, be domi-
nated by political considerations. A nation does
not go to war save for certain political ends. Its
warfare is dictated by its foreign policy. It desires
to achieve certain political gains, or to prevent cer-
tain political losses. Save for such a desire war-
fare would have no object and no meaning. Thus,
Austria threatened Servia with the political object
of extending her influence-and particularly the
influence of Hungary-in the Balkans. Germany
took advantage of that situation to force war upon
Russia and Fr.:mce with the political objects of
ridding herself of Slav pressure from the East, of
making herself secure oyer her Polish subjects, of
putting an end for ever to the French menace from
the West, and probably of acquiring a seaboa!'d in
the Low Countries whence she could challenge the
maritime supremacy of Great Britain. All wars
are political in their inception; all h
ve a political
motive behind them, and the strategy of all is
destined to achieve some political encl.
How, then, can we talk of political considera-
tions as << embarrassing" or .. confusing" strategi-
cal plans? \Vhen military history speaks in those
terms it is using the word " political" in a special
sense, and what is meant is that, during the course
of a campaign, certain subsidiary political ends,
far less in importance than thc total defeat of the
enemy. come in to hamper a general and prevent
his pursuing the immediate military object which
he should alone pursue, the weakening and ulti-
mate destruction of his opponent's armed forces.
For imitance. when the Germans invaded
France in the overwhelming force of, say, 16 to
10 last August, they calculated on the " political
lure" of Paris as something certain to divert the
French generals from their plain military task of
maintaining their armies intact until, if it were
possible, they could hold and check the enemy. It
was obviously the business of the French generals
to prevent by any means in their power the anni-
hilation as an offensive weapon of the numerically
inferior forces they commanded, and in pursuit of
that plain object it was the duty of the Frðl.lch
generals to neglect all second<.1ry .consideration.:;,
such as the safety of a particular town 01' district.
TIlC one thing they had to remember was that the
armies must be kept in being, and that the invader
must be held, and later dcfeated, in spite of his
overwhelming numerical superiority.
But the German General Staff calculated that
the threat of material destruction in Paris, and
even of an occupation of the French capital, would
be of such effect that the French generals, rather
than risk this destruction or occupation, would
compromise the whole campaign. They calculated
that the advance on Paris, and especially the im-
mediate approach to the capital, would either con-
fuse the French general strategical plan or would
so change that plan as to make its new object not
the holding of the enemy and his ultimate defeat,
but merely the immediate salvation of the area of
J;:aris.
: By a curious irony the war has so developed
that no one of the Allies, but rather the Austrians
and the Germans, now suffer from this embarrass-
mont, and that the strategy of the Austro-German
forces. which should be directed to the single end

January 16. 1915.
of defeating the Allies in the field, is already
hampered, and will, presumably in the near
future, be much more gravely hampered by con-
siderations not purely military, but, in the
secondary sense of that word, political; and it is
this political embarrassment which I propose to
analyse in what follows. It will prove essential to
our comprehension of the further phases of this
war.
The political embarrassment of which I speak,
and which is already entering into and disturbing
the plans of the enemy, is two-fold.
First: There are the political considerations
which tend to disruption within the Germanic body
by the threat of Hungarian disaffection and of
Austrian defection.
Secondly: There are the political considera-
tions affecting Germany alone, her desire to hold
on to Belgium, not for a military but for a
political reason; her desire to hold on to
Alsace-Lorraine, not for a military, but for a
political reason; her desire to hold on to East
Prussia, not for a military, but for a political
reason; her desire to hold on to Silesia, not for a
military, but for a political reason.
It will be noted when we come to examine the
matter in the form of a diagram, first, that the
danger, certainly of Hungarian, possibly of Aus-
tro-Hullgarian secession from Germany, is, from
considerations of geographical position alone. in-
creasingly strong. Secondly, that the German
Empire cannot equally defend the four extreme
and separa te a.reas- Belgium, Alsace- Lorraine,
East Prussia, and Silesia-to which its politic:!l at-
tachment is now fixed, but will have to chooæ
between them, since these areas are four widely
separated outliers of the whole territory wherein
the German effort at defence is now being played.

IN WHAT THE POLITICAL EMBAR-
RASSMENT TO THE ENEMY'S
STRATEGY CONSISTS.
I.-GENERAL.
I would first ask the reader to grasp the fol-
lowing four simple diagrams.
I shall, for the purposes of elucidating this
argument, which is at oncð of a novel and, I think,
important .character in understanding the future
of the campaign, repeat the two principal of
these diagrams later in the article. But I put
them at the head of my argument in order to make
my principal point clear before I elaborate it.
Here are two oblongs, A (left blank) and B

A

(lightly shaded), Supposing these two obl
ngs c
m-
bined to represent tl
e area of two countl'les whIch
are in alliance, and which are further so situated
that B is the weaker.power.to the .Alliance both (1)
in his military strength and (2) in his ten.l\city of

10*

;January 16, 1915.

LAND ÄND WATER

purpose. Next grant that B is divided by the
dotted line C-D into two halves. B not being one _Diqgra.m.IT.
homogeneous State, but two States, B-1 and B-2.
Next let it be granted that while B-1 is more
likely to remain attached in its alliance to A, B-2
is more separate from the Alliance in moral ten-
dency, and is also materially the weaker half of
B. Finally, let the whole group A-B be subject to
the attack of enemies from the right and from the
left, from the right along the arrows X-X-X, and
from the left along the arrows Y - Y by two groups
of enemies represented by the areas :U and N
respectively.
It is obvious that in such a situation, if A is
the chief object of attack, and is the power which
has both provoked the conflict and made itself the
chief object of assault by M and N, A is by this
arrangement in a position politically weak.
That is, the strategical position of A is gravely
embarrassed by the way in which his Ally B sepa-
rated into the two balves B-1 and B-2 stands with
regard to himself. B-2 is isolated and thrust out-
ward. The enemy M upon the rigbt, attacking
along the lines X-X-X, may be able to give B-2 a
very bad time before be gets into the area of
B-1 and long befol'e he gets into the area of the
stronger power A. It is open to ,M sò to harass
B-2 that B-2 is prepared to break with B-1 and
give up the war; or, if the bond between B-2 and
B-1 is strong enough, to persuade B-1 to give up
the struggle at the same time that he does. And
if B-2 is thus harassed to the breaking point, the
whole Alliance A plus B will lose the men and
materials and ,,'eaIth represented by B-2, and may
lose the whole shaded area B, leaving A to support
singly for the future the combined attacks of 1\1
and N along the lines of attack X-X-X and Y-Y. Let us suppose a Power concerned. to deff'nd
Now, that diagram accurately represents the itself against invasion and situated between two
political embarrassment in strategy of the Ger- groups of enemies, from the left and from the
man-Austro-Hungarian Alliance. B-1 is Austria right. We will again call that Power A, the enemy
and Bohemia; B-2 is Hungary; A is the German upon the right M, and the enemy upon the left N,
Empire; M is the Russians; N is the Allies in the the first attacking along the lines X-X, and the
\Vest, 'Vith a geographical arrangement such as second along the lines Y-Y.
that of the Germanic Alliance, a comparatively Let us suppose that A has political reasons for
small proportion of the Russian forces detached to particularly desiring to save from invasion four
harry the Hungarian Plain can make the Hun- districts, the importance of which I have indicated
garians, who have little moral attachment to the on the above diagram by shadin 6 , and which I
Austrians, and none whatever to the Germans, have numbered 1,2, 3, and 4,
abandon the struggle to save themselves; while it Let us suppo
e that those four districts happen
is possible that this outlier being thus detached to lie at the four exposed corners of the area which
will drag with it its fellow half, the Austrian half A has to defend. The Government of A knows it
of the dual monarchy, cau::;e the Government of to be essential to success in the war that his tf'rri-
the dual monarchy to. sue for peace, and leave the tory should not be invaded. Or, at least, if It is
German Empire isolated to support the undivided invaded it must not, unùer peril of coBapse, be
attcntion of the Russians from the East and of the invaded in the shaded areas.
Fr{'nch from the \Vest. It is apparent, upon the very face of snch a
It is clear that if a strong Power, A, allied diagram, that ,,'ith the all-important sh
ded areas
with and dependent for large resources in men situated in the corners of his quadrilatera 1, A is
upon a weaker Power, B, is attacked from the left heavily embarrassed. He must disperse his forces
and from the right, the ide::!l arrangement for the in order to protect all four. If wastage of men
strong Power, A. would be something in the compels him to shorten his line on the right against
nature of the following diagram, where the weaker M, he will be immediately anxious as to whether
Power stands protected in the territory of the he can dare sacrifice 4 to save 2, or whether he
stronger Power, and where of the two halves of should run the dreadful risk of sacrificing 2
the weaker PO\\-er, B-2, the less certain half, is to save 4.
especially protected from attack. If wastage compels him to shorten his defen-
\Vere Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the sive line upon the left, he is in a similar quandary
Rhine land upon the one hand. the Hungarian between 1 and 3.
Plain, Russian Poland, and East Prussia upon the The whol(' situation is one in which be is quite
øther hand, united in one strong, patriotic, homo- certain that a defensive war, long before he is
11*

IN):A

A

A

'Néaßoa! Territ-ory

gcneous German-speaking group with the Govern-
ment of. Berlin and the Baltic Plain, and were
Bavaria, Switzerland, the Tyrol, Bohemia to con-
stitute the weaker and less certain aUy, while the
least certain half of that uncertain älly lay in
Eastern Bohemia and in what is now Lower Aus-
tria, well defended from attack upon the East, the
conditions would be exactly reversed. and the
Austro-German Alliance would be geographically
and politically of the stronger sort. As it is, the
combined accidents of geography and political cir-
cumstance make it peculiarly vulnerable.
And that is my first point.
My second point concerns the German Empire
alone.

:eM

A

LAND 1\ND WATER

pushed to extremities, wilJ compel him to" scrap JJ
one of the four corners, yet each one is for some
political reason especially dear to him, and even
perhaps necessary to him. Each he desires with
alternating anxieties and indecisions to preserve
at all costs from invasion, yet he cannot, as he is
forced upon the defensive, preserve all four.
Here, again, the ideal situation for him would
be to possess against the invader an arrangement
in which, if he is compelled to consider four special
zones of territory more important than the mass of
his territory, he would have the advantage of
knowing that they were clearly distinguishable into
less and more important, and the further advan-
tage of knowing that the more important the terri-
tory was the more central it was, and the better
protected against invasion.
.Thus, in this last and fourth diagram the

'Dia:Sra.mIY

A

A:J M

A

government of the general oblong, A-A-A-A, dig.
tinguished four special zones, the protection of
which from invasion is important, but which vary
in the degree of their importance; the least im-
portant is the outermost, lightly shaded (1); more
important is an inner one (2); still more important
is (3), and most important of all is the black core
of the whole,
Some such arrangement has been the salvation
of France time and time again, notably in the
Spanish wars, and in the wars of Louis XIV., and
in the wars of the Revolution. To some extent you
have seen the same thing in the present war.
To save Paris was exceedingly important,
next came the zone outside Paris, and so on up to
the frontier. But with the modern German Em-
pire it is exactly the other way, and the situation
IS that which we fì11d in Diagram 3, which I here
repeat

Diqgramllr.

/""
Ny
/

:eM

A

The four external corners are the essentials which
must be preserved from invasion, and if anyone of
them goes, the whole political situation is at once
in grave peril.
The strategical position of modern Germany
Is embarrassed, because each of these four corners
must be saved by the armies. 1 is Belgium; 2 is
East Prussia; S is Alsace- Lorraine; 4 is Silesia;
and the German commanders, as well as the
German Government, must remain to the last

January 16, 191

moment in grave indecision as to which of the fomr
can best be spared when invasion threatens, or, as
is more probable, must disperse their forces in the
attempt to hold all four at once. It is a situation
which has but rarely occurred before in the history
of war, and which has always proved disastrous.
I sum up, then, and I say that geographical
considerations must, if the campaign proceeds
upon the same lines as it has hitherto followed-
the Germans defending themselves in company
with a not too confident pair of Allies against their
enemies to the East and the 'Vest-heavily em-
barrass the strategy of the enemy because they
first tend to detach those uncertain Allies;
secondly, leave the German Empire itself in con-
fusion between the necessity of sacrificing sooner
or later one of four quite separate, apparently
equally important, and all of them outlying corners
of the area now occupied by the German armies.
Such is the general proposition, the details of
which I will examine and, I hope, prove,

II.-PARTICULAR.
1. The political embarrassment due to the geo-
graphical position of Aust'l'ia-Ifungary,
We have already considered in a diagram the
way in which the geographical disposition of Aus-
tria-Hungary weakens Germany in the face of the
Allies. For the sake of clearness, let us rer)cat
tbat diagram here,

N

Translated into terms of actual political
geoO'raphy, these two oblongs, with their separate
parts, are, as a fact, as folJows: where A is tbe
German Empire; the shaded portion B is the Ull-

])ïasram.

certain ally, Austria-Hungary, so far as that
portion is now free from Russian armies, and this
last divided by the frontier, R-S into B-1, the more
certain Austrian part, and B-2, the less certain
Hungarian part, the latter of which is only pro-
tected from assault by the Carpathian range of
mountains C-C-C-C, with its passes at D-D-D.
M, the enemy on the right, Russia, is attacking the
Alliance A-B ;:Llong X-X-X, while the enemy' CIA

12*

January 16, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

the left, N, France and ber allies, is "attacking
along the lines Y-Y-Y.
Hungary, B-2, is not only geographically an
outlier, but politically is the weakest link in the
chain of the Austro-Germanic Alliance, The
area of Hungary is almost denuded of men, for
most of these have been called up to defend Ger-
many, A, and in particular to prevent the invasion
of Germany's territory in Silesia at S, The one
defence Hungary has against being raided and
persuaded to an already tempting peace is the
barrier of the Carpathian .I\Iountains C-C-C. The
mouth of every pass across these is now in the
hands of the Russians, and when, or if the summits
shall be again in their possession, and the Russian
cavalry reappear upon the Hungarian side of the
hills, the first great political embarrassment of the
enemy will have begun-I mean the first great
political embarrassment to his strategy,
1. Shall he try to defend those passes (which
are already nearly forced) in permanent fashion?
Then he must detach men and detach them very far
from the areas which are vital to the core of the
alliance, that is, to the German Empire, A,
2. Shall he send back Hungarian troops to
defend Hungary? Then he weakens what is vital
to him! the strength of the effectives which still
keep the Russians out of Silesia at S.
3. Shall he abandon Hungary 1 And let the
Russians do what they will with the passes over
the Carpathians and raid the Hungarian Plain at
large 1 Then he loses a grave proportion of his
next year's wheat, much of his dwindling horse
supply; his almost strangled sources of petrol;
he tempts Roumania to come in (for a great sweep
of Eastern Hungary is nationally Roumanian),
and he loses the control in men and financial re-
sources of one half of his Allies if the danger and
the distress persuade Hungary to stand out, For
the Hungarians have no quarrel except from their
desire- to dominate the Southern Slavs; to fight
Austria's battles means very little to them, and to
fight Germany's battles means nothing at all.
There is, of course, much more than this. If
Hungary dropped out could Austria remain 1
Would not the Government at Vienna. rather than
lase the Dual Monarchy follow Hungary's lead 1
In that case the Germanic Alliance would lose at
one stroke 11-25tbs of its men. It would lose
more than half of its re3erves of men, for the Aus-
trian reserve is, paradoxically enough, larger
than the German reserve, though not sucll good
material.
Admire how, in every way, this geographical
and political problem of Hungary confuses the
strategical plan of the German General Staff. They
cannot here act upon pure strategies. They can-
not treat the area of operations like a chessboard
and con
ider the unique object of inflicting a mili-
tary defeat upon the Russians. Their inability
to do so proceeds from the fact that this great,
awkward salient, Hungarian territory, is not poli-
tically subject to Berlin, is not in spiritual union
with Berlin; has been denuded of I men to save
Berlin, and is the most exposed of all the enemy's
territory to attack. And every day the problem
re-presents itself to the great General Staff of the
Prussians: U How can we save Hungary without
hopelessly weakening our eastern line? If we aban-
äon HW1gary, how are we to maintain our effec-
tiv

1 :'

Such, in detail, is the political emb8lI'rass-
ment to German strategy produced by the geogra:
phical situation, and the political traditions of
Hungary itself, and of Hungary's connection with
the Hapsburgs at Vienna. Let us !lOW turn to the
even more iinportant embarrassment caused to
German strategy by the corner positions of the
four essential areas of territory occupied by Ger-
many at this moment,

2. The po11:tical emùarrassment due to the
geogmphical position of the four essentia' a1'eas
occupied by the German armies,
'Ve saw in the first part of this analjsis and
followed upon a diagram, which I here reproduce,

:eM

A

a peculiar political weakness in the German
strategiúal position to-day, which consists in the
fact that the four areas which the German Gov-
ernment must for diverse reasons particularly pre-
serve from invasion are (1) widely separated each
from its neighbour; (2) standing at the outlying
corners of the territory occupied by the German
Armies. This point is of the gravest possible
moment, and has perhaps not received all the at-
tention it deserves. Of the four outlying points in
such a diagram, No.1 stands for Belgium, as we
have seen above, No.2 for East Prussia, No.3 for
A1sace-Lorraine, No. 4 for Silesia, And it is the
distinctive mark of this most strange situation and
tM most embm'l'assing of all, that each area must
be preserved from invasion for a different and yet
eq'I-UJlly important reCUDn.
Germany must hold on to Belgium, or it is all
up with her; she must hold on to East Prussia, or
it is all up with her; she must hold on to Alsace-
Lorraine, or it is all up with her; and she must
hold on to Silesia, or it is all up with her. If there
were some common strategical factor binding
these four areas together so that the defence of
one should be connected with the defence of all, the
difficulties thus imposed upon German strategy
would be greatly lessened. Though even then the
mere having to defend four outlying corners in-
stead of a centre would involve confusion and em-
barrassment the moment numerical inferiority
bad appeared upon the side of the defence. But,
as a fact, there is no such common factor. AIsaoe-
Lorraine and Belgium, East Prussia and Silesia,
stand separate one from tbe other. Even the two
on the East and the two on the West, though ap-
parently forming pairs upon the map, are very
dÍBtinct and distant one from the other, while be-
tween the eastern and the western group there is
a space of 500 miles.
Let us, before discussing the political em-
barrassment to strategy produced by these four
widely distant and quite separate areas, translate
the diagram in tbe terms of a sketch-map

LAND AND WATER

On the accompanying sketch-map, Belgium,

\.
r I!.J;\

Æ1l;j

J3
f#ðul ,.
,.
-'
,/'-'"
,
,
'- _I'L.^,
4
,
\ ç
)

\

'

...,.--,,'\. ' Diaara.m. VI,
.
, <:I

Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia and Silesia are
shaded as were the four corners of the diagram.
No.1 is Belgium, No.2 is East Prussia, No.3 is
AIsace-Lorraine, No.4 is Silesia, The area occu-
pied by the German Empire, including its present
occupation of Belgium, is marked by the broad
outline, and the areas shaded represent, not the
exact limits of the four territories that are so im-
portant, but those portions of them which are
essential: the non-Polish portion of Silesia, the
non-Polish portion of East Prussia, the Plain of
Belgium, and all Alsace-Lorraine.
Now. the reason that each of these must at
all costs be preserved from invasion is, as I have
said, different in each case, amI we shall do well
to examine what those reasons are; for upon them
depends the political confusion they inevitably
cause to ari:-se in the plans of the Great General
Staff.
(1) Belgium.- The occupation of Belgium has
been a result of the W 3.1', and, from the German
point of view, an unexpected result. Germany
both hoped and expected' that her armies would
pass through Belgium as they did in fact pass
through Lu..xembourg. The resistance of Belgium
produced the occupation of that country; the
reign of terror exercised therein has immobilised
about 100,000 of the German troops who would
otherwise be free for the front; the checking of
the advance into France has turned the German
general political objective against England, and,
to put the matter in the vaguest, but most funda-
mental terms, the German mind has gradually
come, since October, to regard the retention of
Belgium as something quite essential. (a) It
gives a moot weighty asset in the bargaining for
peace. (b) It gives a seaboard against England.
(c) It provides ample munition, house-room and
transport facility, without which the campaign in
North-Eastern France could hardly be prolonged.
(d) It puts Holland at the mercy of Germany, for
she can, by retaining Belgium, strangle Dutch
trade, if she chooses to divert her carriage of goods
through Belgian ports. (e) It is a specific con-
quest; the Government will be able to say to the
German people: II It is true we had to give up this
or that, but Belgium is a definite new territory,
the occupation of which and the proposed annexa-
tion of which is a proof of victory." (f) The reten-
tion of Belgium has been particularly la
d down as
the cause of quarrel between Great Britain and
Germany; to retain Belgium is to mark that score
against what is now the special enemy of Germany

January 16, 1915.

in the German mind. (g) Antwerp is the natural
port for all the centre of Europe in commerce
westward ovcr the ocean, (h) 'With Belgium may
go the Belgian Colonies, that is, the Congo, fOl
the possession of which Germany has workcd
ceaselessly year in and year out during the last
fifteen years by a steady and probably subsidised
propaganda against the Belgian administration.
She has done it through conscious and Ullconscious
agents; by playing upon the cupidity of Parlia-
mentarians, of rum shippers, and upon religious
differences, and upon every agency to her hand.
We may take it, then, that the retention of
Belgium is in German eyes now quite indispen-
sable. .. If I abandon Belgium," she says, "it is
much more than a strategic retreat; it is a political
confession of failure, and the moral support behind
me at home will break down."
If I were writing not of calculable considera-
tions, but of other and stronger forces, I should
add that to withdraw from Belgium where so
many women and chilùren have been massacred,
so many jewels of the past befouled or destroyed,
so wanton an attack upon Christ and His Church
delivered, would be a loss of Pagan prestige in-
tolerably strong, and a triumph of all that against
which Prussia set cut to war,
(2) A lsace- L01' raine. - But Alsace- Lorraine is
also" indispensable." "\Ve have seen in an earlier
part of this article wbat the retention of that terri-
tory means; bewildcred by the difficulty of main-
taining so enonnous a line in the West, the Gcr-
mans left the unfortified upper corner of Alsace
in weak hands (reserves), and not too many of
them. The French pressure hcre has at once eàUcd
German troops from the north, probably from
Champagne, where, as a consequence, the French
have advanced in five places. Alsacc-Lorraille
is the symbol of the old victory, It is the German-
speaking land which the amazingly unreal sppcr-
stitions of Gcrman academic pedantry discovered
to be something sacredly necessary to the unity of
an ideal Germany, though the people inhabiting
it de
ired nothing better than the destruction of
the Prussian namc. It is more than that. It is
the bastion beyond the Rhine which keeps the
Rhine dose covered; it is the two great historio
fortresses of Strasburg and of Metz which arc the
challenge Germany has thrown down against Euro-
pean tradition and the civilisation of the West; it
is something which has become knit up "\\oith the
whole German soul, and to abandon it is like a
man abandoning his title or his name, or surren-
dering his sword. Through what must not the
German mind pass before its directors would con-
sent to the sacrifice of such a fundamentally S) m-
bolic possession
There is defeat in the very sug-
gestion; and that very suggestion, though it has
alrcady occurred to the great General Staff and
has already, I believe, been mentioned in one pro-
posal for peace, is still intolerable to the ma::;s of
the enemy's opinion.
(3) East Prussia.- East Prussia is sacred in
anothcr, but also an intense fashion. It is the
very kernel of the Prussian Monarchy. When
Berlin was but a market town for thc electors of
Brandenburg, those same electors bad contrived
that East Prussia, which was outside the Empire,
should be recogniscd as a Kingdom. Fredcrick
the Great himself while of Brandenburg an elector
was in Prussia proper a king: a man whose fathet

January 16. 1915.

LAND AND WATER

had emancipated that cradle of the Prussian power
from vassalage to the crown of Poland, The pro-
vince in all save its southern belt (which is Polish)
is the very essence of Prussian society: a mass of
serfs, technically free. economically abject. gov-
erned by those squires who own them. their goods,
and what might be their soil. The Russians
wasted East Prussia in their first invasion. and
they did well. though they paid so heavy a price;
for to wound East Prussia was to wound the very
soul of that which now governs the German Em-
pire. When the landed proprietors fled before
the Russian invasion, and when there fled with
them the townsfolk. the serfs rose and looted the
country houses. Prussia dares not 'see that hap-
pen again. In a way quite different from Bel-
gium. quite different from Alsace-Lorraine. East
Prussia is essential. Its abandonment means
ruin. Forces will be preserved to defend it. how-
ever urgently they may be needed elsewhere. as
the pressure upon Germany increases. The Ger-
man commanders. if they forget East Prussia for
a moment in the consideration of the other essen-
tial points will. the moment their ey
s are turned
upon East Prussia. again remember with violent
emotion all that the province means to the reign-
ing dynasty and its supporters. and they will do
anything rather than let that frontier go, The
memory of the first invasion is too acute; the terror
of its repetition too poignant to permit its aban:-
domnent.
(4) Silesia.--Silesia. for quite other reasons
(and remember that these different reasons for de-
fending such various points are the essence of the
embarrassment in which German strategy will
find itself). must be saved. It has been insisted
over and over again in these notes what Silesia
means, Its meaning is twofold. If Silesia goes.
the safest, the most remote from the sea. the most
independent of imports of the German industrial
regions is gone, Silesia is. again. the country of
the great proprietors. Amuse yourselves by re-
membering the names of Pless and of Lichnowsky.
There are dozens of others. But. most important
of all. Silesia is what Belgium is not. what Alsace-
Lorraine is not. what East Prussia is not. it is
the strategic key, Who holds Silesia commands
the twin divergent roads to Berlin northwards. to
Vienna southwards. 'Vho holds Silesia holds the
Moravian Gate. 'Vho holds Silesia turns the line
of the Oder and passes behind the barrier for-
tresses which Germany has built upon her eastern
front. 'Vho holds Silesia strikes his wedge in be-
tween the German-speaking north and the Ger-
man-speaking south. and joins hands with the
Slavs of Bohemia; not that we should exaggerate
the Slav factor. for religion and centuries of vary-
ing culture disturb its unity. But it is something.
Now. the Russian forces are Slav; the resurrection
of Poland has been promised; the Czechs are not
submissive to the German claim of natural mas-
tery. and whoever holds Silesia throws a bridge
between Slav and Slav if his aims are an extension
of power in that race. For 0. hundred reasons
Silesia must be saved.
Now. put yourself in the position of the men
who must make a decision between these four out-
liers-Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia
'and Silesia. and understand the hesitation such
divergent aims impose upon them. Hardly are

they prepared to sacrifice one of the four when the
defensive problem becomes acute, but its claims
will be pressed in every conceivable manner: by
public sentiment. by economic considerations. by
mere strategy. by a political tradition, by the in-
fluence of men powerful with the Prussian Mon-
archy. whose homes and wealth are threatened.
"If I am to hold Belgium I must give up Alsace,
How dare I do that? To save Silesia I must ex-
pose East Prussia. How dare 11 I am at bay
and the East must at all costs be saved. I wi]}
hold Prussia and Silesia-but to withdraw from
Belgium and from beyond the Rhine is defeat."
The whole thing is an embroglio. That conclu-
sion is necessary and inexorable, It does not ap-
pear at all until numerical weakness imposes a
gradual concentration of the defensive, but once
that numerical weakness has come, the fatal
choices must be made. It may be that a strict.
silent and virile resolution such as saved France
this summer, a preparedness for particular sacri-
fices calculated beforehand, will determine first
some one re
iI:ement. and then another, It may
be-though It IS not III the modern Prussian tem-
p,erame.nt-that a defensive as prolonged as pos-
sIble wIll be attempted, and that, as circumstances
may dictate. Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium, Silesia
or E
st Prussia, will be the first to be deliberately
sacrIficed; but one must be. and, it would seem,
another after, and in the difficulty of choice a
wound to the Germany strategy will come.
The four corners are differently defensible.
A!sace- Lorraine and Belgium only by artifice and
wIth
reat numbers of men; Silesia only so long as
AustrIa (and Hungary) stand finn. East Prussia
has her natural arrangement of lakes to make in-
vasion tedious and to permit defence with small
numbers,
. Between the two groups. eastern and western,
IS all the space of Germany-the space separatinO'
Aberde
n
'rom. London. Between each part of
each paIr, III SpIte of an excellent railway system
is the block in the one case of the Ardennes and
the Eiffel. in the other of empty ill-communicated
P<;>land. But

ch is strategically a separate
th
ng. The polItICal value of each is a separate
thmg, the embarrassment between all four in-
superable.

The current
umber of the .Ariatic RninD contains a mass of
yaluable mat
r wI
h regard to the part onr Indian Allies are plnyin

In the'Var, lucll1lhng an article on .. The Inðian Troop
in Frallce'il
by E. Charles Vivian, and .. India's Rally Round the 10"80" h,
A, Yn8nf Ali. Another exceptionally interesting articlc on the "iall of
T
ing-:I'ao
contributed .by. Shinji I
hii, a .Jap!\uese \\'rÏteF who deals
with
Li .8ubJec
fr
m t
e lI
slde. WhIle toplcalm. many of its features,
t.he 1.e'VMtD mamtaInS Its hterary character, and In this connectiou its
hterary supplement forms a weU-compiled critique of the leadinø'
pn blica.tions of tbe day. ..
In The KUlser.. War, published in handy half-crown form by
Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, l.1T. Austin Harrison holds to the
view that" if
\'e ):ears ago !l'e .had se
n through the <krman purpose
and answered It with conscnptIon, this war would not have b!'Oken
out..., In addi1ion to this, he .separaks <krmany fTom Kaiserism to "
ce
lIJ extent,. a".d-a
angeroUi .attitude at the preðent time-
admits to adrmratlOn of number.ll of German things which I do not
find in this country," including .. a factual h<mesty of thought:.
ThUi the. preface; but, having read ,

re than the preface.
we find In tbe book a fearless cntlclsm of many trungs
wruch we might . do,
ter, and Dot least among them
the treatment of soldiers WIVðØ and dependent.a. The book is lucid
as i
author's work Ulually is, and is a stimulating work, well worth
readIng.
Messrs. J, Arrowsmith have just published Tile Third GrMt War,
by Laurie Magnus, a shilling book desi
ed to prove that the history
of militarism did not start with Rernhardi o.nd Ih.i.s 6Ch()(l1 but w./Lot
combated by both Marlborough and Wellington, The book 'contains a
mass of historical fact in support of its author.s argument, which ï.
well thrust home in view of the limit.s of such a work.

15*

LAND
ND WATER

THE

DRAINAGE OF
PLAIN

January 16, 1915"

THE
CAMP.

SALIS BUR y

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

I THINK it would be greatly to tbe public advantage
if the House of Lords concentrated on the prob-
lem&' of administration immediately under their eyes
here in England instead of discussing questions of
recruiting and terms of lIervi
without adequ
te
figures before them to go upon.
It ifi the caøe that the Wa.r Office is meeting all the re-
quirements of the generals at the front without stint, but
they seem both blind and deaf to the oomplaints of those at
home who are charged "With the very onerous duties of rais-
ing and training the new armies now forming at val'ioull
centres all over the oountry,
It WI\ß common knowledge to everyone that tbe new mil-
lions oould not be trained in a few days, and it would bave
been only reasonable foresight to provide for the rain which
W8B sure to fall in the winter months, though no one could
have anticipated the 6bnormal downpours of the last six
weeks. Yet even one-half the amount of rain whioh has actu-
any falJen would suffice to turn any newly formed oamp into
a bottomless slough,
Everyone of these new sites for hut encampment.s fhould
have been provided at the outset with a decent system of (;ur-
face drainage, and the men, as they came in, might just all
well have been trained to digging trenches, by making drain-

ge channels throughout the camp, as in fortifying imaginary
hillsides against impossible contingencies. The adion of
digging is the same in both caee<;, and all that if,' realJy needed
is to harden the hands and back muscles of the men by pro-
gressive instruction: the shape of the thing they dig is quite
immaterial.
If the men could not be provided "With sufficient entrench-
ing tools at the time, a few of Fowler's trench-ploughing
machines, suoh as are being now u
d .at the front, which cut
out a trench 2ft. 6in.. deep in a single haul, would have paid
for themselves over and over again before now, and done muoh
to stop the grumbling besides improving the health of the men
now undergoing training.
I have one special case before my mind as I write, viz" the
8tate of the Salisbury Camps, with which every reader of the
illustrated dailies is by now familiar. Here there can be no
possible excuse for the condition into which they have been
allowed to deteriorate, for both as regards levels and subsoil
their sites are about the eaJ!iest to keep clear of water in
Europe.

The accompanying sketch gives a section of the ground.
Underlying the short turf familiar to everyone who has ever
lleen 6 chalk down, there is a thin layer of vegetable mould
resting on land and light clay (very light) interspersed with
lIIDall broken chalk flints and rounded gravel. It can 00 seen
in any quarry section all round the chalk hills which encirole
Londou. Sometime! it may be two to three feet thick, in
North Kent, for instance, but on the Salisbury do"\\"ns it is
often not more than lix to eight inohes deep. Below this
comes the chalk, which will soak up watcr like a sponge, and
"hioh normally keeps the whole chalk country so dry.
But when troops enoamp upon it in any oonsiderable
"umberB, &B SOOn as the first smart showers fall the aotion
of the oountless feet going aud coming churns up the surface
dust and vegetable mould into what engineers call II puddle,"
I.e" a.:n impervious clay which retains the water that ma.k
s

the II puddle" in the ordinary sense of tbe word, and thiø
imp&"vious clay in time turns the whole country-side into
a moving creamy sea, "Which flows down country lanes, and
renders them impa.ssable, and this is what has happened in
the present case.
All that was needed, and is even now necessary, is to
break up this impervious film of creamy soup by running
ol'dinary ploughs crisf,'-(}rOfB ovel' the country, or by dig-
ging side drainEi about a foot deep.
If the groUl,d ia very level, II sump" pits must be pro-
vided every acre or so, pits about 3ft. to 4ft. deep, 4ft.
diameter, filled with ohalk Hints or broken brick, and, if
things are vel.y bad, centrifugal sludge pumps can be fitted.
Vickers-Maxim, 1 know, make some of them, and the first
steam-plough in the district can be requisitioned to work
tbem.
It is rea.IJy the duty of the commanding officer on the
epot to see to all this. .Ai!. we know, from the very first, Lord
Kit.ohener stated in the House of Lords that he would back
any man t<> his utmost who took the responsibmty of m<<!ting
bis men's natural and obvious requirements; and that this
was no empty form of words was at once .apparent when
several interesting relics of red tape daYEi were presently sent
back to the oblivion from which it is a pity that they had
ever emerged,

BRUSHWOOD SCREENS FOR GUNS AND
FIRE TRENCHES.
Looking at photographB of the various metIlOds now in
use for hiding guns and fire trenohes from observation, I have
been reminded of a most ingenious method of defence, which
'Was used against UB by the Maories in New Zealand in. the
early 'sixties of the last <<ntury, that might he usefully com-
bined with the existing types, not only to conceal guns in
trenches from observation, but to protect them against shrap-
nel bullets, shell splinters, and possibly to stop many rifle
bullets striking obliquely to the front.
We used Armstrollgs against these" pahs," as they "ere
called, and found that our sh('ll oould do notl1Íng againr,t
them, for they did not offer sufficient re.<>istance to make the
percussion fuses work, and if we fired time fuses to burst out-
side, the splinters were all caught and held.
The idea can be readily grasped from the subjoined
I!ketcb.

Light brUliliwood, willow, and the like, not more than
half an inoh in diameter, if possible, and with the twigEi and
leaves left on, were attached in a thickness of ßbout eight
:inches to a foot, to a horizontal beam, which was lashed to
uprights in such a manner that the screen WI1.9 free to swing
when struok-the lower ends of the stioks being loosely seized
together with yarn, and cut of! jUli>t clear of the ground.
Against a background of forest, orchards, or other trees,
these screens were quite invisible; and sinoe, as I have said,
no artillery fire made any impre!;sion on them, we were forced
to attack them by regular trenoh and sap work. As we were
exæedingly r;hort of white men, we sent out for natives to do
the digging, and as we paid very good wages, tbe enemy
thought it a. pity that good money should go a-begging, so
sent out a portion of the ga.rrison through the bush to work
in our trenchcs, As one dark mau seemed very much likQ
16*

anuary 16. 1915.

LAND í\ND WATER

another, they were made very welcome. But, of course, the
enemy was thus fully apprised of our progr
, and when we
had approached near enough to make a rush for the " pah, JJ
with axes to hack the screens down, they trained every old
gun they could find down our line of approach, blazed off one
volley into the brown of the assailants, then bolted into tIle
bush to a fresh position, where the same game was played over
again.

This idea. of a swinging soreen, bowever, deoorveø far
more attention than it has yet r
ived, We used to be taught
-though I never saw it tried-that two foldø of a blanket
hanging loo;,ely over a string, and kept about two inches apart.
would stop a Snider bullet, and it is quite certain tha.t it
would suffice to stop all ordinary shrapnel bullets and small
splinters of shell. Further experiments might well be made
with the idea,

THE ZEPPELIN BASE ON HELIGOLAND.

THE LOOK-OUT ON THE NORTH SEA.

By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

T HE German airship base of Heligoland Î8 situated
in a sort of ditch, the Sapskühle, whioh, a few
weoks before the outbreak of hootilities, was being
prepared for the erection of the most up-to-date
Zeppelin shed, and the necessary hydrogen fac-
tory. The Heligol&nd shed, which Î8 now com-
pleted, a
a cost of :E20,OOO, is of the same type as tha.i
built near Cuxhaven and handed over to the German authori-
ties towards the end of April, 1914. Like the one erected
in Cuxhaven, the airship shed of Heligoland can shelter two
modern Zeppelins.. It is about 625 ft. long and 180 ft.
wide, &nd is of the r< revolving type, JJ thM is, being mounted
on a pivot, it always turns so as to place itself in line with
the wind. This type of shed makes the entry and exit of the
airship safer, since these manæuvres are thus rendered in-
dependent of the wind.
This ability to always place itself lengthwise in the
direction of the wind is not t.he only remarkable feature of
the Heligoland airship shed, Being mounted on powerful
hydraulic presses, the shed can be made to rise and sink in
the ditch. When the airship Í.'! not in use if. lie<< in its shed,
which is then in ita lunk position j bu
when needed for
action, to allow the airship to emerge, the shed is brought
t.o ita railed position. The ditch is of Buch a depth that,
when the shed is brought to it.g << down>> position its roof
is just below the level of the ground. It is, therefore, im-
possible to perceive the shed from the sea, this fact rendering
its bombardment by our warships very difficult of accomplish-
ment.
So far as known, the shed just described is the only
one on the island of Heligoland from which airships can carry
out operations over the North Sea, and there is every indica.-
tion that the Heligoland airships are kept in constant readi-
ness to sally forth. 'Ve see, for instance, that, on the occa-
sion of the daring air raid which our seaplanes made on Cux-
hayen on Christmas Day, it was the two ZeppeliD3 from
Heligoland, and not those sta.tioned at Cuxhaven, that, at a
moment's notice, came out, apparently, to try to resist the
raid.

BRINGING A ZEPPELIN INTO ACTION.

In order to appreciate the rapidity with which a modern
Zeppelin can be brought into action, it is necessary to have
.ome idea of the method adopted to run it out of ita shed.
Inside the shed there are, for each airship, two rails
running the whole length of the hangar and projecting some
distance outside. Ou each pair of rails there are four small
f.rucks used to facilitate the quick exit of the airship. Two
IItrong ropes from the nose, and two more from the tail of
t.he airship are attached to the four trucks, there being one
rope to each truck, The trucks are so plaood tha.t there are two
of them towards the forepart of the airship and two others
towards ita aft. To each of these four main ropes are at-
bcbed a number of smaller ropes weighted by ballast when
ihe airship is at rest, but held by a number of trained men
when it is in readiness to come forth.
To get an airship out of its shed the motor in the aft
nacelle is sta.rted, causing the trucks to run along the rails,
and the airship thereby issues under its own motive power.
Tbe men, holding the rope!!, run along the rails, and when
t.he two aft t,rucks, which are near and below the nose of the
airship, reach the extremity of the rails, the four main ropes
arc unfastened from the trucks, and the airship is held by
the men only, until the order << Let go I " is given.
When the airr.hip returns to ïts shed, the main ropes
are attached to the truckB which have been brought outside the
.hed. The aft en
ine is started, and the airship enters under
its own power. The sacks of ballast are quickly fastened to

the airship, and trestles, covered with felt, are placed under
the can of the dirigible. The different balloons are then
refilled with hydrogen, and the water pockets, plared between
the balloonB, inside the envelope, are filled with water, which
is the ballast employed on board a modern Zeppelin. The
airship is then ready for its next trip.

THE ZEPPELIN AND TORPEDO A TT ACKS.

Although there is a report to the effect that the Zeppelin
airship has recently been fitted with some apparatu!'. whereby
a Whitehead torpedo can be discharged from it with complew
success, it is not yet as a fighting weapon wherein lies its
greatest value to naval operatioD3. It is, ne'.ertheless, just as
well not to ignore this new fighting element of the Zeppelin
on the score that, the German airship having, up to the pre-
sent, failed under certain conditions, it must nec0\2ssarily fail
under all conditions. Such II. method of reasoning, in spite
of ita illogicality and danger, is that which has generally
been adopted in tbe Press, even by qualified writers. It is,
however, 6atisfacwry to note that the Admiralty does not
look at things in Hie same light, and is, therefore, in a better
position to foresee all eventualitieB.
There are, of course, no detai13 available as yet of the
means whereby the Zeppelin can be u;,ed to discharge torpe-
does, but it may be presumed that, for such a purpose, the
airship is brought down to very near the sea level, and then
the torpedo is fired. And, if it be remembered that the
modern torpedo has a range of action of over two milea, .it
will be reoognised that tbe Zeppelin is provided with a new
means of naval attack that cannot altogether be left out of
account. It is true that, in order to discharge its torpedo
with some ohance of success, a Zeppelin must come within a
range of two miles from the battlßShip or cruiser against
which it may be operating, and that, at suoh a dist.ance, the
airship would be very exposed to gun fire from the warships.
However, when all ha! been said on the subjed, the fact
remains that this new potentiality of the Zeppelin, espeoial1y
at night, introduces another factor int.{) naval fighting whioh
cannot fail to add com.iderably to the strain t.{) which a flee

is already subjected.
The greatest importance of the Heligoland airships, how-
ever, lies in the means of reconnais.i3anoo they caD afford to
the German fleet, and may have been the means whioh rell-
dered possible the recent raid on our East Coast. In compar-
ing the respective values of sea soouts and airr,hips, one might
say that there iø between them the same diffel'enoo as e3:Ísts
between a short-sighted man and one whose sight is keen. It
is important to remember this fact. It explains the apparent
anomaly of our naral airmen bravely oarrying out operations
over land, to the Swiss frontier at Friedrichshafen, to well
int.{) German territory at Düsseldorf and Cologne, and, over
Belgium, to Brussels. In 11011 these instances our naval 1Ioir-
men were taken from their usual naval duties in order to
attack the airship sheds at those various centres, The object
of the Admiralty in thus sending its valiant airmen over land
was not to try to deprive the German armies of their Zeppe-
HnB, which, 4\S we know, are quite unfit for land warfare, but.
in all probability, was to ensure that the German navy should.
if possible, not have better eyes than our own.

There a.re few people 80 well qualified to write on Belgium and itd
people &'J Dr, &rolea, who, in his book, H 01D Belgium Saved Europe,
t.e113 the story of the Belgia.n tragedy, and forecasts, in r;ame degree, the
place {ha.t the Belgian ;nation will take in Europeaa:l civilißation when
Pru&'!i:l!1.i.sm is bot h d
3Al aoo damned, Published at 29, by Mf'6S1'S.
William Heinemann, thi.> book is one tha.t will have a permanent inteTOS'
and will occupy a noteworthy plaG6 &mon
the literature of the irea.1I
war.

17-

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAND AND WATER

January 16, 1915..

CRITICS ON THE HEARTH.
'1'0 the Editor of LAND AND WATER,
Sm,-Your self-styled" armchair critic JJ from Co. Water-
ford is a kindred soul. I, too, was inspired in the early days
of the war with the idea of first catching your submarine (in
fiahing net) and then cooking it. So inflated was I with my
brilliant inspiration that. I wrote to tell the Admiralty how
to do it, and received a most polite printed acknowledgment.
I proposed to cast my net over a. wider area. than harbour
mouth&'-in fact, from Calais to Dover j but can you believe
it possible, sir, submarines have since careered down the Chan-
nel and sent refugee ships and ironclads to the bottom with
impunity t
A friend of mine walked into the office t]]I
other day,

d when entrenched in my armchair immediately assumed
the rôle of critic. lIe assured me he had a. brilliant idea; it
was an invention to blow up trains which were not there. At
least, they were not visible, and the invention went nosing
&long the railway and blew the train up. He a.]so assured
me he had penetrated Lo Lord Kitchener's armchair and had
thereupon sold his invention for eighty pounds. I was
awfully interested in that eighty pounds, but failed to dis-
øemble, whe!l my friend, to my chagrin, quickly remarked,
" But I haven't got it yet j they owe it to me, you know."
I have, of course, heen fired bv this success with new
ambition, e,nd am preparing further brilliant ideas; amongst
others I shall tell them how to send up a. man,lifting kite
(west wind<> being prevalent, and the (kl'mans being east,
unable to I'etaliate), and to haul up by an endle,sfi cord through
1\ pulley on the kite explosive bombs which will be dangled
like the Sword of Damocles, over the enemy's heads, and
then exploded by an electric wire or the wIling of a string.
If that does net annihilate them all, I shall suggest the
provision of Bted screens, V-shaped and loopholed, to be
attached to the front of a push-cart, or fixed upon runners
like mud,skis, each screen to contain within the V a dozen or
øo of men, who will advance by pushing it along up to the wire
entanglement, which will then be cut through with nippers,
and the advance continued in absoIut
security until the
trench is reached. The rest will be easy.
It is evident, &ir, that if our respootive armchairs were
removed to the 10caHty of WhitehaH, where they OUg]lt to be,
things would begin to happen,
May I be permitted, even as my co-inspirationist from
Co. 'Vaterford to conclude with the remark, II I offer these
BlIggestions for' what they are worth" W-I am, sir, very faith-
fully yours.

II CRITIC ON TilE HEARTH."

AERIAL W ARF ARE.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-ln your issue of January 9, "The Airship in Naval
Warfare," Mr. Desbleds, in his very interesting article, surely
makes one very &erious miscaloulation when he says: II This
is an important point to remember in dealing with the new
factor which has been introduced into naval warfare by the
advent of aircraft, for it shows that it is only witJ1Ïn the arc
W,W,W. (150 miles) that a Zeppelin ean maintain contact
with its adversaries and Headquarters." Granted tIlat the
range of wireless of an airship is only 150 miles, what is
there to prevent two airships working togetJlCr, the first 150
miles out from Heligoland practically stationary about

{,OOOft. high, the other ranging 150 miles farther out, buf
still keeping in touch with Headquarters and the enemy
through the intermediate airship. As you can see, many.
modifioations of this could be so worked as to bring practi-
cally the whole of the North Sea within the range of the
Zeppelin.-Yours faithfully, H. TYRELL-SMITH.
St. Aidan!;', Clonskeagh, Co. Dublin,
'.. There is not, in theory, any reason wIlY two or more
Zeppelins could not be employed in the manner described in
the preceding letter. It is only within the arc W,W.W., how.
ever, that a Zeppelin can maintain direct contact with its ad.
versaries and Headquarters.-L. B. D.

THE SPORTSMAN'S BATTALIONS.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-May I ask you to help mE> to raise the neces-
sary funds for the 2nd Sportsman's B.:.:talion 1 The factlil
briefly are tIlese:-
A battalion of 1,400 men costs !:8 to !:10 per man over
and above the money allowed and repaid by the War Office..
and this amount the individuals raising the battalions have
to find. The money is not for luxuries, but for ordinary
necessary comforts which mean so much to a man under-
going strenuous training, and prevents illness, discontent.
and oth(>r troubles. Out of this Iund also administration ex-
penses, adnrtising a!ld printing have to be paid, which are
necessarily heavy items. It would be most kind if your
readers would send me cheques towards this fund, and so
help me in the big national work I have undertaken. The
cheques should be made payable to E. Cunliffe-Owen. and
crossed 2nd Sportsman's Battalion, London Joint Stock Bank.
Ltd., Strand.
Any sum will be gratefullY received and a.cknow]edged
at once, and every care is taken in the expenditure of the
funds.
Thanking you in anticipation for doing the best in your
power to help in this matter, believe me to be, yours faith.
fully, E. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.
Hotel Cecil, Strand, London,

SUBMARINES.
To the Eùitor of LAND AND WATER.
SIR,-The readers of your articlo on Submarines in y

issue of January 2 will be intereskd to have some particu1a.rs
of an earlier submarine than the" HoIla.nd JJ boat to whleb
:you refer.
A submarine was built in 1886, twelve years earlier tb
D
the Holland boat. It was, I think, built at Sarouda's yar4
011 the 'rhames, but I cannot recollect the inventor's nam

It was sixty fret long, eight feet diameter, propelled by twin
screws driven by electric motors and accumulators j these were
used for surface as well as submerged running. There wal
no engine, and the accumulaton- }Jad to be oharged from some
outside souræ. The speed was slow, and the range of opera-
tion very limited.
I made several trips in this boat with the inventor, but
it was not p]ea&ant work, as tllel'e was no periscope, and we
had no idea where we were going.
I do not kliow wllat becamc of the boat.
saw it, it was in the Tilbury Docks.

When last I

C. O. Gnn.!sIIAw.

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LOOKING BACKWARDS.

Readers 01 the special articles app
aring in this Journal
on .. The World's War by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE SELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth bindera to hold
the 6rst thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is. 6ð. each.
Or we will supply the thirteen num!>ers BOUND complete,
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18*

January 16, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

By

FRED

BY

WATER.

T.

JANE.

NOTE.- Thft Artlcl. h. heell ..hmltted to tho Pre.. Boreao, wilieh dOfl IIOt ohJect to tho pohlieatioll a. eco.orecl, aad take. 110
rflpoD.lhility for the eorrectae.. of th. .tatemeah.

NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL
T HE loss of the Formidable is now attributed to a
suhmarine. The claim was originallv made in
Germany, tho,!gh, curiousl.r enough, the number
of the submanne has not been stated. If a suh-
marine were responsible (which I still feel some-
. what sceptical about owing to the above circum-
stance), It must h!\ve been 8 matter of absolute blind chance
and of the one in a thousand varietv at tbat I
.
he claims made in Germany ;bout the wonderful skill

Ihlblte? b
' the delivery of a night attack are absurd. Even
ID d.ayl1gh.t the submarine is somewhat in the position of a

oatmg mme possessed of a certain amount of mobility, fail-

ng perhaps twenty times for every EUCCCSS seoured, and succeBS
IS then par.t1y a matter .of. an invisible opponent having been
bl
ndered Illto by the VICtUll. At night thege conditioDs pre-
,vall to an enormously ex
ggerated degree, The boat (if boat
therc were) must neccs
anlv have been on the surface and she
let fly as the Formidable uilCxpectedly passed her in the dark-
ness.
Here for a moment it may not be unprofitablc to disouss
the shoala of suggestions which have been sent in to LAND AKD
'YATER, though only a small Í1'adion of them have been pub-
l
she
. I would first of all refer to the" diving bell .. protec-
tIOn Idea of Colonel F. N. Maude, Thi
idea as an idea is
quite sound, and, as a matter of ÍIlct, it is a reO'ulation fit-

ent in tho most modern U,S. battleships. Giv
n sufficient
an pressUl'e, a torpedo eXplosion-unless. of course. the
weapon chances to land in a maO'azine-must be rendered per-
fectly innocuous, for no water
ould enter the bole made by
the torpedo.
For practical reasons, however, the 8v!>tem cannot be
applied to old type ships. It has to be assõciated with solid
bulkheads, because watertight doors, what.ever their theoreti-
cal value, -almost invariably give out in critical moments. The
fault doe;; not lie with the doors 80 much .as with the human
element concerned. Either the doors are not efficiently looked,
0.1' cl!>e something gets left in the way to jam them, In addi-
tiOn thereunto, however, Lhey are, of course the" weak link
in the chain," very liable to give way owir: g to some struc-
tural defect.-.defective rivets, or what not, starting the
trouble.
One way or another, therefore, the diving bell idea,
though quite perfect in theory, is in praotice only really
applicable to ships fitted "ith solid bulkheads. Of these vie
have but a few. We started such bulkheads with the original
Dreadnought, out at a later date dropped them again, becau!le
of the enormous inconvenience and loss of efficiency in other
direotions which they entaÍled. And-but here probably I am
8pproaching the regions of " enough said." To recapitulate:
it is the sounde
t of all theoretical defences. but inapplicable
practically to ships not speoially designed for its use.
It remains to deal with a mass of correspondence on tbe
submarine defence question addressed to this paper or to me
direct. I am .afraid that (to be bon
t) I must say outright
that while fully appreciating the patriotic motives which lead
to such suggestion
, not a single one is of any teohnical value
whatever.
The
avy employ!\ a vari
ty of experts wbose sole duty is
to " think out things," and these experts are so multifarious
that what one didn't think of, another would. The only
kno,,"n case of an amateur hitting on a brand new idea is ths't
of Mr. rullen with hi&' fire cOlltrol s
'stem; and we may safely
put that down as the" one chance in a thousand," and even
at that it was only evolved by practiool observation on ship-
....fJard. It could nevel' have been evolved in a chair on shore.
So I trust that readers whose patriotism has induced them to
lIend in " ideas" will forg-ive me for telling- them that were
there anything in any of the ideas to whioh I havo heen tlst.
d
to give publicity, the
avy itself would have hit on the idea
long ago.
,The rock on which all "it1eas" founder is technicl\1
&pplioabilih'. At one end of the soale I will take a corre-
r.pûndent who suggested that warships should be fitted with
underwater windows wh<,refrom obS<'rvers could detect ap-
-pro aching submarines. The idea is brilliant, but, unfortu-

nately it is impossible to see under water more than tWD
or thl'ce yards at the most, and a submarine attacks at any-
thing from onc to five hundred yards.
Somewhere about the other end of the scale a correspon-
d
nt suggest&' steel plates stuck out all round a ship as a sub-
stitute for torpedo nets. Up to a certain point, thi" is logical

nough, and would be efkoctive; but its practical application
IS
o be found in the ine
ective double bottom wbich every war-
ship possesses-
nd t
at was invented fifty years or so 19:t
b,)" the late Su' Edwal'd Reed. An external defcnce
of a similar nature, to be in any way effective, would be so
heavy that it would reduce a wan.hip to the condition of '\
floating log-full
' defensive, perhaps, but incapable of effec-
tive attack.
Kow, the first and last axiom of the British Kavy is to
"kill the enemy." The turtle is amplJ' proteoted by Katurc,
against being killed, but it is the unprotooted human bipd
who manages to make the turtle into soup. His offcnsi\'"c
defeats the turtlc's defensive,
Up to a certain point, protection counts, but when m.wy
:} ears ago Sir K athaniel Barnaby resigned his position all
Chief Constructor of the British Navy, mocaube the Admiraltv
authorities of those days insisted on offence being subordi

nated to defence, he probably voiced an eternal truth-much
as the" submarine menace" may seem to have altered things
since then.
In. any oase, I cannot see in anything donc by German
submarmeíi any reason why we should abandon the Nelson
rlootrine of "Kill the enemy." We have lost ships by under-
,,:ater attack in this war. We shall-as I have regularly in-
sisted-probably lose many more ships to submarines and
mines before we arc through. But "henever opportunity has
occurred we have been the affacl.', and it is af>' the attack th.}t
we shall ultimately win. The submal-ine is a new and pot<.>nt
arm; but everything appears to indicate that its hostile
potency would in effect be inoreased tenfold were we to reduce
our offensive power in any way in order to obtain a certain
extra security against its attack at the expense of our offen-
sivo potentialitieg against larger game. Infinitely better,
surel.". waio' the spirit di;;played at Heligoland Bight by Ad-
miral Beatty when he acted on the fifty years old maxim of
the famous American Admiral Farragut-" Damn the tOl'po-
d,lCs, "
What submarinc;; arc to Uil to-day. tho torpedoes (the word
then used for mine!>) were to Farragut fifty years ago. Thero
iil every reason to suppose that the principles under which
Nelson acted in one era and Farragut in another still held
good.
There is jUf>t one other aspect of the question to which I
should perhaps devote a little attention-the suggestion in a
letter in last v.eek's issue, that raoing motor-boats should be
utilised to atta.ck enemy submarines. I am afraid that there
is not much in this. In the first place, we already have many
fast motor-boats employed on general patrol duty: in
the &eCOnd the sea is a big place, and the chanccs of a motor-
boat and a subma&'ine coinoiding are small. Even so, then)
would still remain the question as to whcther the sighted sub-
marine were German or British,
No matter bow one re
ard;; the question, I cannot hom
any point of view see that any better policy than that of the
British Admiralty could be adopted.
Here we can best go to Germany for elucidation aOlt
guidance. Wo then find a curious state of affairs. In this
country no one with any naval knowledge whatever talks of
the "Eokulking German Fleet." One and all are unanimous
in conceding thai the Germans are doing the best possible in
the oircumstances under which they have to act. We may
say that this or that particular act was folly and a military
error-t,he bombardment of Scarborough, for one eumI'l1}-
but we do not condemn VOn Tirpitz as an idiot.
In Germany, on the other band, we find naval expel.ts with
European reputations declaiming with monotonous insistence
that our strateg-y is all wrong, that Lord Fisher is an ar.:a.
Winston Churchill a braggart, and Admiral Jellicoe an
D-
oompet<,nt.
Kow, all these famous expert-s are more or less in 01086

1!).

LAND AND WATER

iouch with the German Admiralty-they have none of that
independence which obtains with naval writers in this country.
Outside this, bew.-vÐ", they .are- Ge:rmaTIA. and patriots. Ia
neither case r.an we' p06Sihly
magine them laying therru;e1vu
out to explain what we <<:ught to
o to hurt them were what. we
happen to be doing not moonvement to German naval aspIra-
tions. Q,E,Ð" what our Admiralty i. doing is: effective and
inconvenient to German hopes.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
Lord Selborne and others have recently been criticil'!illg
the Admiralty for sending the late Admiral Cradock to meet
the enemy with iß!luftìcient fot'ce. .
'fheøe criticÌ:!ms strike- me &8 1!18gularly unfortunate,
because they display a marked failure to ,appreciate the actual
ci remJlBtances.
Yon Spee, with the
c1tarnhor8t and GnfÍsenau, belonged
to the China Station, Here we maintained (and any old Navy
List will indicate) a f-oroo suffieient te deal with von Spec,
The nermal statiøl1 of Admiral Cradock was in the Atlantic,
where again t
dispositien of fel'oes was equally adequate.
Von Spee el(X)ted, or was ordered, to leðve Riao-Chau to
its fate and to operate in a totally different quarter of the
world. It was a 6mart move; but we- should not blame Scot-
land Yard if all the oreeke of the West End suddenly trans-
fen'ed themselves to Whiwchapel, and the local police were
unable to cope immediately with the situation 1
Thi
, however, is a fair]y exact analogy as to what actu-
ally occurred. With all due deference to Lord .Selborne a
d
his friendi! I maintain that to attook the AdmIralty for lll-
adequacy i
the matter of the 8upply of force to Admiral
Cradock is as abßurd as it is iIl-timed-the more 60 as the
Vanopu3 was sent to reinforce Cradock as a. 8peeies of ultra-
precaution.
THE BLACK SEA.
A large TudtiEh transport is reported to have been sunk
on January 2 by striking a mine at tbe entrance to the
Bosphorus, and on the 6th- another TurkÜ,h trallsport was
8unk between Sinope and Trebioond. This vessel was being
convoyed by tbe light crui6er Medjidieh, which was attacked
by the RUI!I!!ian cruiser Pamiat Merkoo'ria and a destroyer.
As thß Pa1ll,iat Mel'ko.fJria. is cODsiJ
rably more powerful than
the 'l'urk, and the latter esoaped, the action cannot have
-amounted tQ Imatl than the exchange of a 8hot or two at long
range. . .
Stories of th
Goebe,n, c,ontlUue to float round, and she IS
now reported to have struck a mine and been c<>nsiderably
damaged. She hM j however, BO ofwn been reported ba
ly
illjun
,d,. that all I:I.torieil about her are best a<<epted wIth
J'e8erve.
On the 6th the light øruibers Br'eslo.u anti Ha/}
idiek are
rcported to have been engaged with Rus8ian warships, a';ld
to have sustained 4IGnsiderable damage, but no further detaIls
are availab]e at tJle time of writing.
The prinßipal feature of all naval op.erations in the Bl.ack
Sea iB the curious futility that charactenses them. The nval
fleet!! are fairly equaUy 'mat-ched in fighting value, with a
halau\:e. in favGur of the Turco-Gennan combination. The
oper atiolls should, therefore, by all the rules of naval strategy,
have taken the: form. cf a str<>ug attack on the RUSl>ian Fleet,
]usrteaò of that we ha.ve had nothing but & series of trivial
minor operations and bombardments, which cannot possibly
produce any main re8\11t.
When 80m&: ]jttle while ago, the Co!;ben encountere.J the
Russian FÌeet, or a p.ortion of 1t, she was not engaged in seek-
)ng it!; aud, having met it, she W
s mainly engaged in. a.vo
d-
iug action. Her rea.l objective was appa.rently some tnvwhty
of minor value.
There is pre8umably some underlying objective in these
&pp1Jrently aimless movements of the 'l'ureo-GerIDan force:
but it ifi OUI ious that the ohviou8 <<irculllstanc.e that all these
operations could be more eB.Sily and safely performed were
the Russian Fleet defeated first should be I!O completely
ignorod. . .
In the Mediterranea.n, as in the North
a, the lJIactlOn
of the battle fleets of the Germanic powers is perfectly intelli-
gible-their infel iority being such that anything of the nature
()f a Beet action weu]d merely be oourting disaster without
ol,je<:-t. We cannot attack them ooeause there is nothing to
attack. In the BJack Sea, however, more even oonåitions pre-
vail, and the RUIi;aiana have ærtain]y been out l'eady to give
batile. The chan(J6 to attack was- given; but not accepted by
the enemy.

NAVAL LOSSES.
The war afloat has now continued long enough for us to
endeav<>ur to arrive at some kind of profit and loss account.
It is not to be arrived at exactly
becauße, apart from the

January 16, 1915.

foot that tonnage is little or no guide, there is the added com-
plication that on both sides there is a
ndency to conceal or
'lo miaimise lQ.SSoed,
Generally speaking, we may say that on both sides, if
there has been & heavy loss of personnel, a loss of mater,iel has
been promptly owned up 10--& piece of frankness due mainly
to the impossibility of con
a]ment. But whenever the crew
er the bulk of the crew have
en saved,t nothing about
material loss hIlS been allowed to traJlspire,
This,. of course, is ia ace.woda.nce w.ith .]); tb.e. ,:recedents
Qf waxfare-it is folly to disclose what can be concealed. It
is a consideration of this circumstance which prevents me
from giving a.ny exact. detailEd statem.ent a.a to, 1'l\1ative posi-
tions now and when the war started.
Th
re has, further, tø
e taken into c@)llsiderat1e:n ble
eircumstance that on each side new &hips have been added.
The profit and l()ss accQunt, tl1lwefore, cannot possiily be
accurately represented merely by those tabular list-s of fusses
with which the da.ay P1'ess has familiarised us.
As statements (saving f()r the factQr ()f concealed losses)
they are vaJu&b]e; but th.y are practically no Ìlrdex whateVier
to the real "dative position of affa.irs, while they are further
liable to produce an absolutely uncaUed-for peMimism.
In the following statEment I h.ave endeavoured by tbe
use of plus and minu
l8igns of va
i()us sizes to represent meTe
or less graphically the approximate effeet øf the war upon our
Navy and the German fl
t, taking into equal ceD'Sidel'ati-øn
all the various factors of loss, new cOBßtructio.ø, purchasee,
and so on a.nd so forth. A * indicates :aø appreciable ehaB'
,

Dreadnoughts
Battle Cruisers...
Pre-Dreadnought!,..
Cruisers
Light Cruisers
Torpedo Craft
Submarines

British.
+
.

German,

+
.

+
.

.

+

*

AB already stated, this is pUIely appnwmat&; thEr
is
no attempt at exaciitude. I am :merely ende&JVouring to
convey a general id
a. To assist this general idea. I halW
put the "thingii that matter.' in heaview type in the first
column.
N Q one, not even Lord Fishel' ()r VEJn Tirpitz, is in a
position to 88sess re:k'1.tive fighting values one type agaiIL!lt
another to the types in the first column, We, merely knøw
that a Dreadnought in 1,ho ordinary way will certainly LlÎn.k
a pre-Drewnought. We know, also, tha.t a. " crui!er" w.iU
aillk a " light cruiser" in similar cÍreullìstances. But no
c
can possÌbly assess submarines and Dl'eadn
mght.8 and sa.y
that a Dre.adnought is equiva]ent to Be many submarines CD,
vice versa, that a submarine is worth 80 many Dreadnoughts.
All we do knø\V is that alL these variQus arms. 81'8 compl<:me n -
tary tð each other, and tha.t the comparative unimparta.mre
cÑ pre-Dreadnoughts and .. cruisers" is. due to the fact that
they represent types of warf5hil)S which are no longer CElJ'l-
structed.
For the rest., wt'o only kuow f{)r certain that a dozen
Dreadnoughts, plus the complementaJ:Y lesser craft, are
superior to a dozen plus :II Dreadncmghts minus thß comp]

mentary le5ser craft. An.d herefFom we may dedu-ce; SOIllle
idea of Germany's 1088 and o
r gain. Germany haß sustainørl
heavy losses in light cruisers, which are invaJu,:ble for- scout-
ing purposes. We, on the ethel' hand, have Incl'eased

multiplied in this direction! with th.e result that Gel'l
lan-

ships or transports a.ttemptmg to slIp out run sometJung ]i.l-e
douo]e tho risk of dete<<tion that they l.an on the outbreak of
war. This is perhaps the real measure of our gain.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

ACCGrding to Gel'man wireless, the office I' COllllllal1Jing tlm
Austrian 8ubmal,ine U 1'2 has been decøl'ated for h.wing }ro.t
two torpcdQes into the French battleship Coul"bet. The sta19-
ment is complicated by the fact that the
e is no U 1:'3 in

Austrian Navy, which has only e
even boats. altogether. It. Ie.
of cour!;e, possibl
that a beat bUllt
peøu]atIvely by the WhlW-
head Works -at FlUme has been a.cquIred a.nd beoome U 1
; hut
failinO' corroborative evideneoe, the Etory is sifJgularly BUf!ge&-
tive of a Teutonic version ûf the submarining of the ViribUJI
Uniti3.

It is expected that the BubscI'ip
ion list fo
Mr. ßelloc'B forthcoming
Beries of S lectures ab the Queen I! Hall WIll be closed by Monda:y.
the 18th iust.
Mr. Belloc bas an:Mgcd to lecture at the Town Hall, CbeltenlIluna
on the 28th January, and at lJristol, on the 30tb January.

anuary 16, 1915

LAND AND WATER

Ii

II

r;
>

is the spirit of
the Allies.

\

II
Larger quantities of 'Shell' than of any
other Petrol are being used by the Navy
and in every branch of Military Service.
Any statement that other suppliers 9 Spirit
is used as largely by our Forces is not in
accordance with the facts. ' Shell 9 is
working for the Allies only, and therefore
for you. Be on the side of the Allies and
use 'Shell. 9 Refuse any other Spirit.
II
OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE.

C \ -

LAN DAN D \Y.\ T E R

January 16, 19 1 5

TI-IROUGI-I

THE EYES OF

A WOMAN

A Word in Season
E VERYBODY who has helped to arrargc a village
jumble sale is well aware of the motley contri-
butions it attracts, once an appeal for them is
issued, These are so many and various, and
occasionally so grossly unsuitable, that more often
than not an overhauling must take place before the sale is
open to the village at large, It is felt by those in charge of
the proceedings that tattered garden-party frocks, patent
leather shoes of deplorable character, and odds and ends of
t.unished finen' will hardly add to the well, being of the
community, Ànd yet as lõng as jumble sales continue we
may be certain that there will be mistaken people looking
upon them merel\' as a convenience whereby they can get
rid of their accumulations of rubbish, and quite oblivious of
the purpose they are intended to serve.
It would, however, seem at all times to be a dangerous
experiment-this asking for superfluous clothing. There are
too mam' folk who interpret it to their own advantage rather
than that of the ultimate recipient. Perhaps this is not
altogether due to selfishness; perhaps it is owing to that
lark of proportion from which we are assured on excellent
authority a large proportion of the race suffers. Be this as it
may, the effects are disastrous and the same. Lately there
has been an incentive for everybody to ransack their ward-
robes, \Yar refugees have arrived here in the utmost
destitution, making not only a demand for our sympathy but
for our tangible help. To our credit it must be allowed that
this in scores of cases has been given both generously and
well, and in such instances there is no cause for complaint.
On the other hand, certain misguided souls have once again
completely missed the mark, forwarding a conglomeration of
articles fit only for the dustbin, and hardly worthy of that.

;!J 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII!:
=

- -
- -
- -
- How to help Tommy Atkins
- -
- -
:: We cannot all go out to fight, but we can ==
== all do something to help our soldiers who =
= are fighting our battles and defending the =
= honour of our native land, and in this way =
= contribute to their well-being and efficiency =
- -
- -
- -
SEND HIM A FLASK OF
- -
- -
- -
- HORLICK'S -
- -
MALTED MILK TABLETS

Invaluable to a soldier -

in the field and most =
efficient in relieving -
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.
We will send post free to

address a flask of these delicious
and sustaining food tablets and
a neat vest pocket case on
receipt of 1/6. If the man is on -
active service, be particular to
give his name, regimental -
number, regiment, brigade and -
division. -
-
-
-
-
SLOUGH, BUCKS. =
-- =
,,,111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 1 II IF.

Of all Chemisls and Stores, in con-
venient pocket flasks. 1/- each.
Larger Sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

L .b..AI SAmpl. ....1 po,'frufor 34. ;" .Iamp.,

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co.,

NATIONAL

RELI EF

FUN D.

Tllø PriflCtl to tM Pøoþle.
All I.IIH. .., t. .... ,.11 ,.... .. Buc:kinpam Palac:e
"At suc:b a moment we all stand by one anotber. and it is to tbe beart 01 tbe
Britisll people tbat I c:onlidently make tbis most earnest appeal, EDWARD p,"
s.'.cri,lioa. .a'I'e ""roSH' 10 : H.LH. Prine 01 Wile.. l.cki,pI. Police, Lt..o..

It is really not fair that this fresh strain should be put
upon the hard, worked executive of the war refugees' camps.
The mere rejection of the unsuitable takes time, to say
nothing of the waste of energy involved. \Ve are still in the
first month of the }\ e\\' Year, and there is still time for the
making of fresh and good resolutions. Perhaps it is not too
much to hope that people whose interior economy forbids
their contributing aught that is in reasonably good condition
will cease to contribute at all. Thev need not be afraid that
the war refugees will suffer in consequence or that their sorely
needed supplies will stop.
"'ar Clubs for 'Women
One of the best ways we can help the men at the front is
to see that their wives and families are well looked after at
home. And this need by no means stop at material comforts
alone; those are more or less assured. That there is,
however, a necessity to provide occupation and suitable
amusement has been recognised by many people, Lady
Henry Somerset amongst their number, Some short while
ago a club was started at Battersea, called" The Womcn's
War Club." It provided a place where women could meet,
hear the latest news rest in attractive well-warmed rooms,
and buy tea and si
ilar refreshments at small cost. From
the moment it was opened this club had an immense success,
and it was easy to see it supplied a great want in the most
satisfactory manner.
The idea now is to start several other clubs on the same
lines, and of these Lady Henry Somerset will be president,
so that they will benefit at first hand from her great experience
of social work in all its many branches. The working of
these clubs will be nothing if not practical. There is to be a
central bureau, which will supply particulars and details to

NORWICH UNION FIRE
INSURANCE SOCIETY, LTD.

FOUNDED 1797.

With ",hieh i. iJICorþor.,.4 Iho Nor",'." øJld
lA..d... Aed4.,., lfU_r"fIC_ AD.d."....

HEAD OFFICES:
NORWICH & LONDON.

==

FIRE. ACCIDENT.
MARINE.

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Sic:kness. Employers'Liability. Tbird
Party, Fidelity, Bur&)ary, Plate61ass.
Property Owners. Hailstorm, Motor.
Loss 01 Prolits lollowin& Fire, Live Stoc:k

PROMPT & LIBERAL SETTLEMENTS

BRANCHES AND AGENCIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

BRAND'S
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BABB ... SONS, 11, 12 ... 13 Kinlt Street, Covent Garden. LOND.

2 1 4

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV

No, 2ï50

S " T TT RD \ \ " jA ,T UARY [ I'UIJLISIIED AS ] PRICE SIXP
;
C I;
r
L, "'
'" 23, 1915 A 1<o1;W"I'AI'T;R. PUBI.bilJ:;/) WEEKLY

#

CopyrirllJ, F, A, Sll'øi",

LORD DESBOROUGH

A Popular Lead
r in Sport and National Defence

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

J.lIllIar
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224

January 23. 1915

LAND ANb \VATER

THE WAR AND HEALTH RESORTS

By A SPECIALIST

N OT content \\ith organised efforts to capture
the trade of the enem\', those in intellectual
authority are challengiri'g the right of Germany
to claim superio:-ity in the realms of the applied
, sciences. There can he no doubt that many of
us have been too prone to accept Germany's opinion of
herself without sufficient analysis and disputation, and this
mav account for the arrogance which has ended in the claim
of Germanv to dominate the world. Geïman institutions
and methocls had become so idolised in this country that, as
nne writer put it, " we must either imitate them or perish."
The war has changed all that. It would be foolish to go to
the other extreme and underrate the great work accomplished
by Germany in most of the spheres of human activity. That
would be playing her own favourite game of belittlement:
but we are no longpr going to bow down to an idol, and we
know, after careful inquiry into their title-deeds, that the
universal claim of superiority on the part of the enemy is
an arrogant delusion.
In the matters of hygiene or therapeutics Gennany
might seem able to meet the challenge of superiority better
than in most spheres. We have not hesitated in accepting
the excellence of their health resorts and watering-places in
a very practical way. \Ve have been amongst their best
patrons. We had ceased to admit ourselves as rivals, with
a subserviency which only the present state of national
antagonism may impress upon us. The doctors of Harrogate,
Buxton, Bath, and the rest, are now actually courageous
enough to submit their claim for consideration, even at the
high standard Germany claims to have set for itself, and to
have some part in the capture of Teutonic interpsts. This
is as it should be.
For perfection in one branch of medical hygiene I have
indeed looked in vain throughout Germany and Austria, and
have found it " a long, long way" from the beaten tracks
of therapeutics. Perfection is a big word, and yet it seems to
come to my pen easily after visiting an institution which
I found, not e:\.acth' " at the back of bevond," but far north-
ward on the civilisèd paths \vhich fringe the northern seas,
I n an institution looking out across the :\Ioray Firth to the
Black Isle, in a country of rare beauty and equable climate,
there exists to-day a diagnostic and therapeutic system
that, in the thorough and delicate minutiæ of its methods,
seems to me to admit no rivalry throughout the whole inter
national domain of medicine. I do not make this claim
without a sense of responsibility, as I make it without
prejudice, having neither axes to grind nor logs to roll in the
matter. I have assured myself of the fact that those in
authority are actual pioneers in the systematic study and
treatment of disorders of metabolism,
Some twenty years ago a distinguished man of science
made the prophecy that the future of therapeutics would
be in the hands of the bio-chemists, or, to put it in less
scientific phraseology, that the medical treatment of disease
would depend to a major extent upon a study of the changes
that take place in the chemical conditions of the body.
The institution of which I write is, then, the first of its kind
in the United Kingdom which is concerned with the treatment
of the disorder of metabolism, founded upon an elaborate
and systematic study of the chemical changes which are
effpcted by these disorders. I have made a fairly prolonged
investigation into the practices at this institution, and, well
accustomed as I had been to scientific methods, it was a
source of great satisfaction to find that there did exist an
establishment that was absolutely unaffected by any of the
laissez-faire or empirical methods of the medical flâneur-
an institution which counted neither upon some certain
.. cure" nor pushed a scientific "panacea" as an effective
method for nine out of ten cases of disorder. Having some
veal'S ago severed all connection with medical science, and
being unconnected with any of its interests, my view may
seem the more detached and unprejudiced.
Each case is treated on its own merits. To the aid of
the individual patient is called the elaborate investigations
of physicians, analytical chemist. and bacteriologist. Pro-
longed medical diagnosis is supplemented by the most
mmute day-to-day record of blood, alimentary, and other
conditions, Diet is as carefully and systematically prescribed
as medicine, baths, and other healing agents; and the effect
of food, baths, medicine, exercise, etc., noted and tabulated

ach. day with an attention to uniformity and system which
II1splres a confidence which is lacking in other more or less

haphazard methods. This institution is not a place at which
to play at being cured. Sleep, exercise, rest, diet, baths,
massage, X-ray analysis, are all treated with the respect
which must be paid by the patient who "desires to obtain the
beneficent results at which the higher forms of medicine aim,
There is no slackness; the etiology or history of each case is
noted in the fullest detail; the exact na ture of the disorder
is arrived at by a prolonged study made by the physicians,
the X-ray specialist, and the chemist, and the effects of
restriction-increase and modification, as the case may be--
duly noted in the elaborate tables which accompany the
history of the case. The whole staff are in constant
collaboration, and each day the patient is examined with
the assistance of all the elaborate and up-to-date machinery
available in the institution. The chemical laboratories
would do credit to a university, as the various baths are
entirely modern and effecti\"C,
Dietary-an important item in the establishment-is
conducted on the most subtle principles. There are not
half a dozen possible diets for a particular disease, but hdlf
a hundred, and these are carefully prepared under the eye
of the" diet sister" on the nursing staff (an important item),
and the results carefully noted, the idea being-say, in a
case of diabetes-not to give the patient the minimum but
the maximum that he can stand. A careful study of sugar
and acetone results gives the physician an excellent idea in
what way lies the patient's" salvation." Each patient here
ha<; one prescribed meal. which is written on a new menu
placed before him at each meal. There is, therefore, no
monotony but a delightful \'ariety consistent with the results
aimed at, Exercise, baths, and medicine are regulated on
more or less the samp system, under the guidance not on':;
of the medical staff but that of the expert nurses.
It is gratifying to learn, from both physician and patient
alike, that in such cases as diabetes, colitis, anæmia, gout,
heart trouble, emaciation, and other disorders the results
have been most noteworthy, not only in the matter of cure.
but as also affording, in the more untractable cases, a
unique basis on which to found the life of the patient after
he leaves the institution. The lengthy report drawn up for
the benefit of the physician who may be looking after the
patient in his private life is one of the most valuable practices
of the establishment, giving an elaborate summary of the
investigations, treatment, and food capabilities of the patient
on which to base his future dietary and therapeusis.
Apart from the remarkable scientific facilities with
which I have dwelt, I came away from my visit with delightful
memories of social and geographical amenities. The
delightful golf and tennis courses, the excellent shootings,
the facilities afforded for fishing and curling, the charming
park and gardens, the noble sea views and unequalled seaside
walks, the mild winter climate, the high percentage of
sunshine, the low rainfall, the dry and porous soil. the teeming
historical associations, left me a memory which will not soon
fade.
Iore than anything else, I came aWdY with a strong
impression of the word " thorough" and the thought that it
must be very consoling to those who will be cut off from
continental "cures" by the war that there is in the north
of Scotland an institution which has not a rival throughout
the continent of Europe.

Terms 0/ SubscriPtion to
uTHE COUNTY GENTLEl\tlAN

AND

LAND

AND

WATER"

(ESTABLISHED 1862).
AT HOME-Twelve Months H 8 0
CANADA-Twelve Months H 10 6
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve 1\Ionths
1 17 0

The above rates include all Special Numbers and Postage.

DACK COPIES of .. LAND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articles by HILAIRE BELLOC, .. THE \\' AR gy
LAND"; and FRED. T. JANE. ,. THE WAR BY WATER,"
together with a
all1able reference, .. THE TOPOGRAPHICAL
GUIDE," can be obtained through any Newsagent. or on
application to the Offices of .. LAND AND WATER," CE:-ITRAL
HOUSE, KINGSWAY, W,C.

225

LAND AND \VATER

(:"I

\Vhy Waterman's Ideal is selected
hy Kings, Presidents, Prelates, Peers, Authors
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Read this testimony from an Assistant Editor:-
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If you want life-long pen satisfaction for yourself choose
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226

January' 23, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

ROTE,-Thb Artlcl. 'al 'eell I.hmltted to the Preal Bllreaa, which doea aot .hJect to tta. "lIhllcatioll al nalored aud takea ...
relpoallhllit, f.r the correctaeal .f the Itatemeab.

III accordaac. with the reqalremeab of the Preal Bareaa, the pOlltloal Gf troopl 011 Plaal IIIl11tratla, thb Artlcl. mllit Gal, h.
re,arded .. approJilmat., aad ao deflalt. Itreartll at aD, ,olat II ladlcat.d.

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SOISSONS.
O N Friday, January 8, the Divisional Com-
mander before Soissons, at the head of
perhaps 10,000 men, who held the slopes
of the plateau beyond, received one of
those orders of which, during the last
month, there have been distributed, perhaps, 100
to the various parts of the French line. It ,,:"as to
go forward vigorously and attack the enemy's
trcnches upon the crest.
The meaning of this and similar orders, and
the significance of the whole affair in its develop-
ment and consequences, will be dealt with later,
For the moment "e are only following the events
themselves,
The organisation for this effort against the
crest from the slopes was made upon that Friday
evening, January 8,
The orders were sent out, and it would seem
that the movements were made long before day-
light upon Saturday, the 9th. On that day the
French line, which had been no further up than the
base of the slopes and partly upon the valley-floor
round about the sixty- and eighty-metre lines, and
not yet in occupation of Cuffies, began to push up
the chalky slopes that led steeply for nearly 300
feet to the comparatively level top of the plateau.
TIle first German trenches upon the slopes
v. ere carried, and at the same time an effort was

ViUqge O1ut temporary
woocU,t\. bridge of Mi.ssy
Village of Veniul

01

being made to push through Crouy village and
advance up the valley which carries the railway to
Laon. The straight road from Crouy to Missy
(which is marked upon the sketch at the head of
this) was roughly the position of the French right
at this moment, though there "ere advanced
bodies upon the slopes above,
It must be clearly understood that the mass of
the troops were upon the left and centre, and that
the great bulk of the fighting took place within a
mile to east and west of Crouy village.
The French had three lines by which re-
inforcements could reach them, and by which, if
necessary, they could retreat. These were the
bridge over the Aisne within the town of Soissons
itself, a temporary wooden bridge in front of Veni-
zel village, and another behind Missy village.
By the Saturday evening the first part of t11e
effort had been successfully accomplished, The
slopes were in most places upon this three-mile
front in the hands of the French, and they had
reached in some points the plateau itself.
On the Sunday, the 11th, the effort continued.
Trench after trench of the Germans was carried
by the French Infantry, and by the end of the day,
or by the morning of Monday, the 12th, the flat
spur, the summit of which is 132 metres above t11e
se3-, or about 280 feet above the water level of the
Aisne in the valley below, was fully held.

1*

January 23, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

14Õ

%
Comf
t:l'æ

The impoTtance of this spur consisted in its
forming a gun position, whence the valley above
Crouy could be swept, In the accompanying
sketch map it is marked P, and its character is
clearly apparent, 'Ve may regard it, then, as
solidly occupied upon the morning of the 12th.
We shall see in a moment how this French
local movement, with its comparatively small
numbers, its lack of any but a local reserve, etc"
connotes a general plan common to all the line,
and how it resembled work that was being done
elsewhere along the long line. At any rate, by
this Monday we find the :French on top of the spur
at P only just below the general flat of the plat.eau
which the Germans have been holding for now four
months. The French had also taken the village of
Cuffies, but they were still held at the mouth of
the valley where the railway runs, and found it
impossible to debouch from Crony, the village
which holds that mouth.
lt will be seen that the vigorous Fre-nch ad-
vance had already lasted forty-eight hours.
At this juncture large reinforcements of
troops began to appear upon the enemy's side, and
these reinforcements having at last produced an
appreciable superiority of number for the enemy,
the counter-offensive w-as taken by them, beginning
about the Monday noon.
Those of the French who had now gained the
crest of the hills were anxious to observe that the
valley-floor below them was already flooded, and
that the waters were rising to the level of the tem-
porary
ridges. Be
ide the two wooden bridges
at Vemzel and MIssy, the French engineers
had added a foot-bridge. Tuesday saw the
French facing new and very large reinforce-
ments and losing ground on the right. The
waters still rose during all that day, and just after
four o'clock, as the ever-increasing numbers of the
Germans who were being concentrated against the

,-

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,'120 .
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about 1 English mile.

A

Frenchdivisioll were beginning to exercise a serious
pressure, the bridge of Venizel, the central and
most important of the bridges, broke. The re-
inforcements, and in particular the artillery muni-
tions from the other side of the river, were thus C11t
off in the French centre, and it was evident that
unless these communications could be rapidly rc-
stored, the positiOIJ of the division beyond the river
-now fighting, perhaps, three to one-would he
desperate. The order to retire was not yet given,
when the second bridge, that at Missy, in its turn
was carried away.
The French that Tuesday evening still hdd
upon their left and kept the edge of the plateau,
but Crouy, which lìad held them up in the early
ollerations when they were equally matched in
numbers, now became more and more difficult for
them to hold, and they were pressed down the
slopes further east on to the Crouy-Missy road.
It should here be noted, for the purposes of
forming our judgment later on, that no conside:;,'-
able reinforcements werc
uggested for the French
apparently until that same day, T
3sday; in spit.e
of the increasing number of the enemy, the original
strength of a depleted division had to take all the
weight of the fighting.
The German forces continued to increa:s:::.
They were, as I have said, perhaps about three to
one when reinforcements were attempted to lIe
sent forward by the French across the still intact
brid
es, just sufficient to hold the positions already
acqmred.
It was now dark, and after dark, in the night
between the Tucsday and the 'Vednesday, the
French engineers laboured as best they could to
replace the bridges, in spite of the rapidly rising
water. By this time the whole vallev floor "'a5
flooded, . .
'Vhen tbe morning of the 13th came-that i"
the morning of W eclnesday-the French beyond

,,*

January 23, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

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the riyer saw that one of the bridges had been re-
C"::tablished-that of Missy, It had only been done
at vel'J great sacrifice, and there is much in the
work of the sappers that night to recall the Bere-
sina. Across the Missy Bridge munitions began
to be forwarded to the further bank, especially
those for field guns, which were most badly needed,
when, just before eight o'clock in the morning,
after little more than an hour's full daylight for
this work, the single temporary bridge was again
carried away "before the rising flood, and this while
the force in front of the French division had in-
creased to perhaps four to one,
A retirement was ordered, and while the
French still clung to the village of Cuffies and the
spur at P, they were taken back from Crouy. If
Crouy was untenable, the forces along the slopes
to the right were obviously untenable also. On
this same day, Wednesday, as the right fell back,
the left abandoned the edge of the spur and fell
back in line with the right astraddle of the great
high road to the valley. The position was there-
fore as in the accompanying sketch B.
The division which the flood had cut off from
reinforcement was only withdrawn with the great-
(';:;t difficulty, but apparently in perfect order.
By Thursday, January 14, the remains of the
division-probably not more than half of those ,,-ho
had set out on the Tuesday-were back in Sois-

ons; the Crouy-Missy road was abandoned and all
t he north bank of the l'iver from a point about half
a mile above Soissons to a point about half a nlile
above Missy itself. Further to the east and to the
west the French held the hills, and the total result
was that the Germans had here advanced across a
wedge of ground nine furlongs wide upon a front

'lópofPlahtZlL,

of three miles, touched the river Aisne upon that
front, and were within a mile of SOiSSOllS, the cap-
tl}-re of which would give them a bridge across the
rIver.
French detachments held a small point in
Missy village, where the bridge was again repaired
and so allowed the French right to retire across it.
The gUllS protecting this retreat could not be
trusted to the bridge, and after being rendered
useless (no very important detail, for there was no
ammunition left to speak of) fell into the hands of
the enemy: other guns had also been abandoned
further to the left, presumably from the loss of
their teams and crews, as the ground here is not
of a nature to bog them even after such heavy rains.
By that Thursday evening the French retire-
ment was complete, and the French had lost, per-
haps, 5,000 in killed, wounded and prisoners; in

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LAND AND W ATE,R

field guns fourteen (as it would seem); and in
machine guns perhaps a score.
On the morning of Friday, the 15th, Ger-
mans, whose numbers had now increased to about
40,000 men, were everywhere advanced to the line
of the river, and had possession of the road from
were maintaincd by the French, but on that
Friday there was a vigorous attempt on the part
of the enemy to rush the town itself. Such a suc-
cess would have put into the enemy's hands the
junction of four railways, the best bridge hcad
across the river, and have thrown upon the French
artillery the onus of shelling their own city, It is
probable that the attempt 'will be renewed, for the
possession of Soissons is of real value. The hand-
to-hand fighting got at last as far as the suburb of
St. Paul and then went no further, It was
checked there, and would appear to have remained
so checked during the last four days,
The Germans once in possession of Soissons
would have a real advantage, and might almost be
said to have recovered there the initiative. They
would hold a railway junction of first-class import-
ance; they would have a bridge head over the
flooded Aisne; they would haye broken the first
French line.
The Germans out of Soissons north of the riv
r
have accounted for about half a depleted French
division, at a far heavier numerical cost to them-
selves, and have gained 1,800 yards over a front of
5,000 yards, wcakening slightly othcr parts of
their long line, which weakening will lead, and has
already partly led, to a number of local small suc-
cesses of the Allies north and south.
Nor can the Germans withdraw more than a
certain proportion of the men here concentrated
without losing the small advantage gained. Fot
they are in a very narrow salient wedge. 1'h

French arc far advanced on east and west-especi-
ally on the west-and if the Gcrmans are to remain
on the Aisne, even over a front of only three mile3,
they must immobili5e great numbers here to keep
the angle open, They stand roughly as the wedcie
A, R, C, D, on the accompanying sketch, and they

ffâCX

Ie Vál
13
S . f'[iJ R,AÙnc
Olssons

.
Craonne

J

D.
must hold, and, if possible, push back A Band C
D, or retire. They are, at the moment of writing
(Tuesday), engaged precisely in this" pushing
back" of A nand C D.

II.-THE MEANING OF SOISSONS.
Having grasped what happened at Soissons,
let us ask whether the action has any lesson to
teach us upon the present phase of the war,
If we co-ordinate a.ll the facts that we know
with regard to that action so far and consider cer-
tain results in other parts of the field, \ve shall
find, I think, that we have rather important in.
dications given us here of how the enemy stands in
the west,
The salient features of the action at Soissons
are five:-
1. A strong French offensive is ordered with

January 23, 1915,

no more than the troops long on the spot (a
division) against a particular sector of the long
German line.
2. This unexpected offensive delivered at a
point chosen by the French (who preserve the
initiative), though made without special re-
inforcement, succeeds at rather heavy cost to
them.
3. Upon its success and after a delay of rather
more than forty-eight hours very large enemy re-
inforcements arrive, so large that they out-
number doubly, trebly, and at last four times.
over, the French in the district.
4. These large reinforcements are almost
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by
some corresponding proportion of field artillery.
but apparently no new heavy artillery, -
5. Having succeeded in their object of check-
ing and even reversing the French attack by the
bringing up of such numbers, the German
counter-offensive is spent and can go no further.
Now consider those five points as fixed and
then turn to what happened 200 miles away and
more in Upper Alsace nearly a fortnight ago.
1. The French took the offensive because they
possessed the initiative, and they took it at a
point where they were not expected.
2. This unexpected offensive was made with-
out special reinforcement, by no more than the
troops originally present in the district; none
of the great French reserve appears to have been
used; it is successful, though at rather a heavy
cost.
3. Upon its success and some time afterwards
-in this case nearly four days-large enemy
reinforcements begin to arrive, until they quite
outnumber the French in the district.
4. These large reinforcements consist almost
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by
some corresponding proportion of field artillery,
but with no more heavy guns than were present
originally.
5. The enemy using their new-found supe-
riority of numbers, in part reverse the French
offensiyc, but their counter-offensive exhausts
itself and cannot be pursued.
You see that therc is an exact parallel in the
main features.
In certain important details there are impor-
tant differences. At Soissons ground which had
been held for some months is lost by the French
over a breadth of just more than a mile, while in
Upper Alsace all that is recovered by the Germans
is a particular swell of land (Upper Burnhaupt)
from which the French had Lut recently driven
them, while in the main the whole Alsatian opera-
tions record a considerable French advance. The
forces engaged in Upper Alsace on the German
side are rather less than the forces engaged again;;t
Soissons. Also, in the one case, the fight imperils
an important town; while in the other the fight
only concerns a few ruined villages in the moun-
tains. Also, in the case of Soissons, you are fight-
ing nearly as close to Paris as Reading is to
London, whereas in the case of Upper Alsace yon
are fighting in a region remote from the heart of
either belligerent.
But in the main the great features are the
same, and there is but one considerable contrast
to note for the purposes of our induction, which is
that in the case of Upper Alsace, vital as that point
4*

January 23, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

is to Germany, the reinforcements come up nearly
two days later than in the case of the attack on
Soissons.
N ow what are the obvious lessons to be drawn
from this parallel and its differentiating point 1
The first is that the Germans are not Jet working
with new formations.
The Germans, ne'l.'er knowing quite 'It'lwre the
French are going to attack, are in great peril of
having their line broken 'Whenever an attack upon
a considerable scale is delivered. They 'lvill not
,-isk men, as yet at any rate, in trying to recover
the initiatÙ:e for tlwmselves and in being the fi1'st
to attack. They are thus compelled to wait (01' the
French initiative, They meet it 'If.,'henever a strong
at!ack is delivered by hurrying up men from else-
v:here, and the men so hUr1"1.'ed up, though coming
in great numbers, do little more than hold their
own.
This conclusion is indisputable, for it is no
more than a summary of ascertained facts. But
it leads us to another conclusion which, though not
directly ascertainable, follows logically from such
premises of fact.
This further conclusion is that the Germans
strengthen that part of the line which is attacked
by drawing men f1'om other parts of their line, not
from large a'l.'ailable reserves no'r from new forma-
tions.
It is exceedingly important to seize this, for
it makes alJ the difference to our judgment of the
situation.
Supposing the enemy had new large forma-
tions already in the field or new great reserves
gathered and ready to operate in the 'Vest, he
would in the first place not wait until some par-
ticular point of his extended line was attacked,
but would himself begin to attack in force upon a
point of his own choosing. That he does not do
so, but has to await attack, proves that his men
are drawn from the existing lines. But, apart
from this, the rate at which the German reinforce-
ments are brought up sufficiently prove my point.
Such new reserves or new formations of
the enemy would either be grouped close
behind the existing line so as to attack wherever
the enemy thought fit, or at any rate to be used
(even if only defensively) where the enemy thought
fit, or tlley would be grouped at some central
pomt well behind the lines, from which central
point tbey could be directed at a moment's notice
and with approximately equal rapidity in any
direction where a threat against the continuity
of the defensive line was deliverèd.

.------,
, 1
1 I
I 1
1______1

c

d
ot
(B) V

x

Either such great reserves if they existed
would be massed as at A and at B ready to attack
on the points of their commanders' choosing at
(a) -or at (b) or for purposes of general defence
they would be kept at some central point such as
C e,bout equi-distant from aU the points that could
be threatened and ready to be launched wherever
the threat occurred,
But what takes place proves that neither of
these dispositions has been made, and that there-
fore no such new formations or great reserve are
yet present upon the western line of the enemy.
For the German reinforcements do not arrive until
some time after the French attack has put the lines
in peril at some point chosen by the French them-
selves, and, what is even more important to my
case, they don't arrive with the same delay,
Against Soissons, which is a central position,
they come up with a much shorter delay and also in
larger numbers and with more effect than against
Burnhaupt, which is an extreme position. At
Soissons they arrive within two days; at Burn-
haupt after four days.
Put all this toget;"'3r and you may be perfectly
certain that work of this kind is, so far, being
done at the expem:e of other parts of the line.
Talm a line shaped as is the line A, B, C in
the accompanying diagram.

A

I

B

1

12_
Id

l
'-,;

-)

c

y

If you find that on the enemy's being attacked
unexpectedly to himself and through the action of
the Allied initiative at a central point, B, he can
bring up reinforcements within a delay of, say,
forty hours, while if he is attacked at such an ex-
treme point as C he .can only bring them up ill a
delay of, say, a hundred hours, it is sufficient proof
that he is bringing them up from along his line.
For in the case of B he has two short distances
to go, bringing his men up from various portions
of A-B and B-C; in the case of C most of his units
will have a long distance to go, as some of them
will have to be drawn from A-D, which is further
from C than any portion of the line is froll1 B.
Remember that he dares not weaken too much
any part of his line: he must draw men in small
amounts from all along it. The thing is clear if
we suppose him to be drafting men from the four
points 1, 2, 3, 4 in aid first of the point B, next of

fiit

LAND AND WATER

point C, and if we allow for the distanoe be-
tween anyone of these points one day for entrain-
ing, carriage and disentraining, His last rein-
forcements will, in the ease of an attack on B, ar-
rive within a delay of two days, which is the length
of the journey from the extremes to the centre;
while in the case of C his last reinforcements will
arrive in a delay of four days, which is the length
of the journey from A to C,
But apart from this arithmetical line of argu-
ment we have the noticeable fact that before any
of these concentrations took place the enemy's line
is demonstrably weakened in all sorts of points
save where the main attack is being delivered
upon it.
Thus, the last two weeks which have seen a
concentration upon Soissons and upon Burnhaupt,
in two regions where the French had used their
initiative to develop an unexpected activity and to
press home, a whole series of minor successes were
registered by the Allies in many places scattered
along the line, There was the advance bef
re
Perthes, the perceptible advances at Roye, and in
front of Arras, north-e.ast of Verdun and just north
of Pont-à-Mousson. In other words, you get on th

A

c
z

line A, B, C, two strong French attacks which by
successive reinforcement of the enemy are turned
back at B and at 0, but meanwhile you are getting
smaller but more numerous successes of the Allies
at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, where the line must in aU
probability have been perilously weakened by the
enemy,
. ,!he
nemy, then, is still drawing upon his
exIstmg Ime.
There is a second conclusion to be drawn from
this state of affairs which is also of moment in aid-
ing our judgment upon the present phase of the
war, and .this is that the enemy ið now put into
great anxzety by the thinness of his line,
.
en th,e F
ench took Steinbach and the gun
positlon dommatmg Cernay, their whole advance
was no more than a mile and a-half, yet it sum-

oned dow
into Upper Alsace fro
other por-
tIOns of the lme, at least an extra German division,
rIhe French captured, before they lost Burnhaupt,

January 23, 1915,

2,000 prisoners, and accounted for at least as many
more killed and wounded; and casualties of 4,000
do not mean less than a division at work-at lea;:;t
where that division is successful.
The French at Soissons found themseh
es at
last in front of quite 40,000 men upon a front of
little over three miles, Now, let the argument
consequent upon this be carefully noted. If the
enemy had made these great concentrations of
men for the purpose of attack we could not arrive
at the conclusion that he was anxious for the stabi-
lity of his line, On the contrary, we could COll-
elude that he was quite secure behind his" wall ..
and could therefore choose his own moments and
places for striking.
But the enemy made a concentration utterly
different from this in character, both at Burn-
haupt and in front of Soissons. He did 'IlOt mean
to concentrate and did not attempt to concentrate
until the forces that were pressing him had
achieved a certain result, and when that result was
achieved, although in each case it was quite a small
thing in mere distance (the advance of a mile in
one case and of less than two miles in the other),
he at once is at the expense of weakening his line
elsewhere and of forming concentrations for re-
pelling an attack which, slight as it seems, he
judges may be fatal.
It is but the repetition with further proof of
what has been said so often in these columns:-
The lïroblem beJ'm'e the Allies in t'M JVcst i

not tlLs problem oj' gradually pushing back an op-
posing fm'ce; it is the problem of compelling that
fo
'ce under p1'essure to shorten lines which ar;>
al
eady. as st;etched as they can be, consistently
'W
th be
ng he
d at all; and when the compulsion
for shortening these lines sTwll arrÚ'e, it cannot
take the form of gradual retÌ1'ements from one lhw
of trencTlCs to another close behind it; it can onb,
ta./
e th
form of a wholesale retirement, eithf
'
evacuating No,t"thern France and half Belgium OJ'
evacuaÛnq Alsace.
. All this does not
ean that the enemy mar not
III the near future brmg up large reinforcements
and new formations with the object of hold-
ing his line unshortened. It does not mean that

e may not, even in the Ilear future, bring up re-
mforcements so large as to take the offensive again,
It only means that the considerable movements
which we have seen during the last two
weeks, and particularly at Burnhaupt and
before Soissons, prove tRe non-existence so
far of such reinforcement; and it also proves
the twin facts that the enemy fears gravely
for the stability of his line in the west and only
reinforces threatened points at the expense of the
general strength along the rest of it,
We can sum up, therefore, and say that in the
last two weeks, including Soissons, we have had
upon a line of some 400 miles between the Swiss
mountains and the North Sea a considerable bod\'
of German reinforcements successfully resistjn
'
attacks delivered in front of Soissons (1) and i

Upper Alsace (2), but that the concentratioH alone,
the lines to these points has been effected at a cost
of so weakening the general strength of the lines,
that the Allies have exercised suocessful pressure
upon a smaller scale by the French in front of Kieu-
port (0), in front of Lens (b), by the French in
front of Arras (c), in front of Roye (d), in front of
Perthes (e), north-east of Verdun U), north of

January 23, 1915.

c'

d,

LAND AND WATER

t

,I
I '#
'h.)
$
! l.réJC
'1\5
, 2
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!SS

_._e_ Frontier.
-- - J Line of Trenc11es..

e
'"

e
'.
\
o
'.,
.,
(b

Pont-à-110usson (g), at the mouth of the pass just
east of Colmar (h), and that we have not yet against
us any new considerable bodies of the enemy in
the 'Vest, but only the same original line which
already feels itself gravely imperilled,

CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE.
It is worth while examining in detail the Ger-
man communiqué relative to this action, which
reached London last Friday. It is perhaps the
most remarkable point in the whole affair.
As we have seen throughout this war, official
cOIJ.ununiqués are the best documentary evidence
we have; the credibility of the various parties to
them is therefore exceedingly important in the
formation of our judgment, and the German com-
muniqués in particular have been remarkable for
two characters which at first sight seem to go
ill together, but which are perfectly reconciled by
",hat is rather unfairly termed .. a scientific
temper .21

z<D

I
These two characters are:- I
(1) Minuteness in detail coupled with accu-
racy where accuracy is desired.
(2) The harnessing with the same of startling
falsehoods which cannot deceive the particular
enemy in question, and which must have some
political object of influencing domestic or foreign
neutral opinion, or even the opinion of Govern-
ments and peoples allied with the enemy in ques-
tÏton.
These two contradictory characters are recon-
ciled by the motive of the German authorities.
'" hich is neither to tell the truth nor to tell false-
hoods for the sake of truth and falsehood, but to
tell the truth only for the sake of obtaining general
credit, and to tell falsehoods when it is thought
wise and useful so to do upon the basis of such
credit once obtained.
The official German communiqué which ap-
peared in print last SatUl'day is a very good ex-
ample upon which to work. I quote it as it ap-
peared in the Westminster Gazette (which has from

7*

LAND AND WATER

January 23, 1915,

the LCCTinninø- of the war, and even before its out- carried away certain bridges. 'Vc are 'asked to
brcak,o been 0 remarkable for the volume of its believe that out of such a unit-10,OOO at the least,
German information), and as it was delivered 15,000 at the most-over 5,000 are prisoners
through ilie Marconi channel. and at least 5,000 dead. The statement has
"The German booty taken in the battle no conceivable significance in arithmetic or
north of Soi:;sons up to the present amounts to in any other form of analysis, Put as low
5,200 prisoners, fourteen cannon, six machine- as you like the proportion of wounded to
guns, and several' revolver guns.' The French killed (and in an action of this sort the pro-
suffered heavy losses; five thousand killed French- portion of killed to wounded is very high),
me'n were fOl;nd on the battlefield, Their retreat you cannot in the most murderous action get it
south of the Aisne came within range of our hcavy lower than one to three where such numbers are
artillery. In how far the proportions haye concerned. It is almost certain to be higher than
changed, compared with previous wars, a compari- that, but let us put it at that; then the killed alone
son of the battle discussed here with the results of account, with the wounded, for nearly twice the
the battle of 1870 shows, although the importance force present! :Five thousand killed means at the
of the battle north of Soissons cannot be compared very least 15,000 wounded. So, after leaying
with that of the battle of August 18, 1870, the nobody to get back across the Aisne and nobody
width of the battlefield approxim
tely corresponds to be t:lken prisoner, the Ger.inans have already
to that of Gravelotte and St. Privat. The French a.ccounted for twice the number of Frenchmen pre-
los
es of January 12 to 14, 1915, howeyer, pro- sent if they ,vere ten thousand, or 5,000 more than
bably surpass those of August 18, 1870, by a con- ,'rere presènt if they were 15,000. No matter by
siderable amount. This is the truth." what avenues you approach the rcsul
, the Ger-
The salient points of this statement are: - man figures of men make nonsense: whIle the Ger-
(1) The minute detail of the number of man figures of guns are less than the whole truth
prisoners mentioned, 5,200. and probably based on a real estimate of numbers
(2) The mention of the number of French hitherto counted.
killed, 5,000. 'Ve h::J.vc no need to accept on their OViD autho-
(3) A very extraordinary recollection of and ritv 'the French accounts, ,,,hich tell us the COlD-
parallel with Gl'avelotte, pa
atively small number of troops engaged upon
(1) A very exact enumeration of guns. their side, admit a loss of guns larger than tIla
On the fourth point one remarks with interest Germans claim, allow for somewhat over a thou-
that the German estimate is too low. The French sand prisoners, and tell us that the enemy did not
have admitted a loss of more guns (counting pursue. Even if the French contradiction did not
machine-guns) than the Germans give. exist, the German account is a foolish mixture of
The third point is negligibìe. The two accuracy and falsehood on the face of it.
actions, Gravelotte and Soissons resemble each 'Vhy this folly? The gcnera.l accuracy of
other in nothing save that Germans and French- German official news has been amply insisted upon
men were opposed, and it would be wasting the in these notes, and occasional nbsurdities inter-
space of this paper to analyse such puerilities, mingled with such accuracy noVl and then noticed.
But the first and second statements are really Those absurdities have been increasing of late in
worth watching. Thcir value will be /npparent to proportion to the accurate rest. 'Vhy?
all acquainted with the elements of military his- I can only hazard the suggestion that there is
tory, and I think they can be made apparent to something in common between the fantasies them-
the general reader as well. selves and the romantic language which commonly
On -the right bank of the Aisnc in front of accompanies them; and that that something in
Soissons was a French dh,i=iion (three brigades) common is a necessity for impressing domcstic and
already depleted by war, and further weakened neutral opinion. Hence the silly parallel with
by the big offensive movement ordered ten days Gravelotte (which would be like comparing
ago when the spur above Crouy was taken by it. Givenchy with Waterloo),hcnce the theatrical rant
French officers, eye-witnesses of the scene, tell us about all this being done" under the eyes of the
that about 10,000 men were .engaged. That is vVar Lord himself," hence the comparison of the
prot,ably the rough figure. Bllt swell that figure German failure in front of vVarsaw to the great
as we lllay we cannot make the :French more than victory of Salamis, and hence those extraordinary
l{),OOO in the nature of things. Had they been phrases which appear reiterated at regular in-
perfectly fresh troops just sent out, there would tervals that (for some mystical and incalculable
not have been preænt in the thick of the action reason) victon T , that least determinable of aB
many more than 17,000 men, and thcre is no doubt human events, must necessarily fall to the German
whatsoever in the mind of anv observer used to General Staff which has hitherto failed in everv
the meaning of such units that, under the con- single one of its main plans: the envelopment òf
ditions of this action, after the heavy fighting the Allies in the 'Vest, the entry into Paris, the
which had preceded it, the months of war behind it, investment of Verdun, the march upon Calais, the
and the general disposition of the French along seizure of Warsaw and of the railway nexus there,
all this section of the line, 10,000 is Dcarer the the subjugation of Scrvia and the" counting out ..
trut.h than 15,000. But 15,000 is a maximum. of the Servian Army, the raiding of Caucasia, etc.
The total front over which the action ranged, It will be an advantage to the Allies at least,
à front of trenches and of thinly stretched line, and in particular to those whose duty it is to study
was less than three miles, but alÌ the heart of the this war in dctail, when the German commulliqués
actÍon was in a section of less than It. return to the older plan (far better suited to the
.. The w
lOle P?int of. th
battle was the impossi- German te
perament) of accurately detailing a
b!hty of remforcmg tIllS smgle French division in mass of undigested matter, and thus supplement-
tIme because the sudden rising of the Aisne had ing the continued frankness with which the Ger-
8 1t

January 23, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

man casualties, German prices, and other capital
points of news are conveyed by the Germans alone
pf the belligerents to the outer world,

'THE EASTERN FIELD.

I N the eastern field of war there has been an
almost complete lull along the whole line,
with the ex.ception of some violent fighting
upon the Bzura, which has not advanced the
enemv, and in connection with which the
Russians håve attempted no advance either,
There are in this field but two points to notice,
upon one of which we have so little information
that it is impossible to do more than state the frag-
mentary ne\".s and base a doubtful gue3s upon it.
The other is a still smaller detail, but clearer in its
meaning and effect.
The first of these two pieces of news is the an-
Ilouncement that Russian forces have occupied
Sierpe in the belt of North Poland between the
Nistula and the East Prussian border, h3.ve pushed
forward across the Skwara (1 ) and are therefore
within forty miles of Thorn. Such a position is
()bviously upon the flank of the main German line
()f :cammunication for Hindenburg's advance on
"\V
rsaw, to wit, the main railway from Thorn to
'\Varsaw. This railway ne:uly touches the Vistula
at a point about half way between Plocz and the
frontier, and is everywhere within raiding dist:mce
()f a force that shall have crossed that stream from
the 1\ orth,
If we were dealing with considerable bodies
<:f :l
ussians operating in this theatre the news
would be of great moment, but I submit that in
the l'ack of further evid'2nce we have no right to
presume Inge operations as yet in this belt of
North Pobnd betwccn the East Prussian frontier
2.nd the Yistula, and until we know more about
them there is no ground for planning out any con-
siderable consequences or iHustratin ó the move-
ment as a whole.
It appears to be so far a movement of cavalry
()perating in no great numbers against smaller de-
tached bodies of cavalry upon the enemy's side,
and one's ground for believing this is, first, that
very large Russian movements in this di=itrict,
being supported by no railway, woald necessarily
be slow and would as necessarily have given rise
to vigorous changes of disposition in the German
forces south of the river. There has been no trace
()f the latter and therefore we should not, in the
lack of further evidence, believe in the former. A
Russian force has entered Plocz, but everything
turns upon the total number of the Russian forces
north of the Vistula, and, I repeat, that if that
number were very great the whole German batt
e
front would turn northward. That t
lere may be
a movement there later on the part of the Russians,
.and that it will profit them is seen by merely look-
ing at a map, but that they will soon be able to
.concentrate and to equip sufficient men in this dis-
trict so easily there is no proof.
The second piece of news which, as I have
said, is more detailed and certain, though dealing

nly with the minor point concerned, the seizure
--of the Kilribaba Pass by the Russians in the
:wooded Central Carpathians between Bukovina
and Transylvania, that is, in the midst of that
Ruman.ian population, the Russian presence among
1rVhom IS having such a powe,rful effect upon the
9"

international position of the Rumanian Govern-
ment at this moment.
This is the first point upon the watershed of
the Carpathians which the Russians have crossed
since the second battle for Warsaw began, and
since, in conformity with the Russian retirement
on the north for the protection of 'Varsaw, the
Russian Armies south withdrew some forty or fifty
miles from Cra,cow to the line of the Dunajec and
abandoned the passes over the Carpathiañs, watch-
ing only the mouths of the same.
Now, the remarkable point about this is that
it has taken place at a comparatively unimportant
moment, The great passes which carry one the
railway and the other the high road from Transyl-
vania into Bukovina run to the north and to the
south of Kilribaba, and here the Russians have
not even attempted to move to the crest of
the pass until better weather shall assure their
transport, The Kilribaba is only a saddle of
wooded land between the sources of two mountain
torrents, not suited for taking any considerable
body of troops from side to side. "\Ve must wait
for such a movement until weather conditions
render it possible for the Russians to bring up
wheeled transport in sufficient amounts for the
support of heavy columns and the forcing of the
heights, and it is not in any way probable that this
movement upon a minor saddle in the wooded hills
can be used for any large offensive movement to-
ward3 the Hungarian side, But the pass has this
advantage: the road down from it on to the Hun-
garian side is easy and moves away from the
nearest railhead, so that the enemy can only con-
centrate against it with difficulty. .
THE CAUCASUS.
In the Caucasus we are still without news from
the Turkish side, and that may make us fairly cer-
tain that the Russian description of the conse-
quences of the late Russian victory is accurate
enough. The fighting at Karai Drgan, in which
the 11th Corps of the Turki::;h Army (the only
corps, it may be remembered, which remained in-
tact
fter the débâcle ,of a fortnight ago) atte
ted,
by vIgorously attacking the head of the Russian
Army, to withdraw pressure from the retreat of
the broken 10th Corps, has, according to Russian
accounts, collapsed. It cannot be true that this
large body of men has been "annihilated," for
there is no account of their having been surrounded
or intercepted in their retreat, but it is evidently
true that the whole body has given way, that great
numbers oÎ the unwounded stragglers haye fallen
prisoners to the Russians, as well as masses of
wounded, and evidently also, great quantities of
field equipment and artillery. The unofficial
statement that the whole of the artillen r of the
11 t
Corps has been taken cannot be àccepted
untIl we have official confirmation, and it is in an v
case exceedingly unlikely. 'Vhat would happen
in an action of this sort, fought in driving snow
thousands of feet above the se.'l, would be the per-
petual abandonment of pieces stuck in the drifts
during a retirement, or captured time and again
by swoops of cavalry on the rearguard, but they
are not conditions under which the whole artillery
of an Army Corps is to be found concentrated in
one area and taken en bloc. That did happen
apparently to the artillery of the 9th Turkish
Army Corps on January 3rd and 4th, but that. as
we know, was intercepted and surroumied.

LAND AND 'VATER

Nothing of the sort has happened to the 11th that
we can gather,
, None the less, the Turkish offensive in this
district is evidently at an end, and the First Army,

January 23, 1915,

comprising three Íull corps and the greater part of
a fourth, no longer exists, save perhaps in suffi-
cient force to undertake the defence of some pre-
viously fortified position,

A FURTHER NOTE ON THE NUMBERS
OF THE GERMAN RESERVE.

upon the known proportion in armies where uni-
versal service is really imposed (as in France or in
Bulgaria), but merely upon the normal returns of
German calculations dealing with men who in any
case are not to be taken as soldiers.
For the Germans can call up of young men of
military age just over 600,000, Of these they take
half to be soldiers (including, of course, none of
those who are at all doubtful in health), the re-
maining half they draft into either very partially
trained or, more often, wholly untrained reserves.
They chose to put down the incapable on paper at
so Iowa figure as 7.73 per cent., but that is per-
fectly ridiculous in practice. Noone can get the
proportion when you are taking men for actual
service, and not merely for being written down a.s
possible soldiers on paper, below 20 per cent., and
the real proportion in practice is .much more like
25 per cent. The absurd allowance of 7.73 is
arrived at by only examining a selection of all pos-
sible young men, and by putting into a nominal re-
serve (knowing tbey can never be used) many of
tbose who, in actual conscription, would either
have to be rejected or would break down,
(3) Those who are wedded to the higher figure
allow between 20 and 45 a loss of only 2 per cent. a
year for each year, half for death and half for
accident, etc.
These decreases, in practice, are also far too
low. They represent the number of males who are
incapable not only of military service (because they
are dead, or have been run over by carts, or have
gone blind, or mad), but also everyone up to 45,
no matter what the state of his lungs, stomach,
heart, weight, brain, eyesight, feet and veins
Common sense will tell anyone that after 35, at
least, men who have never been soldiers in their
lives and are suddenly called up from sedentary
occupations, do riot show a proportion of 25 per
cent., as young men do, of inefficiency (which only
means military inefficiency), they show a propor-
tion of certainly half and probably more than half.
They do this without question when the age of 40
is approached,
Now, in order to form a judgment as to what
the real reserves in the German Army are now,
we simply have to decide which of these two views
is in practice sound. We know from proved and
ascertained experience that at least 25 per cent. of
men must be rejected, That leaves 9 out of 12
million. 'Ve know that at the very least 2 million
of able-bodied men must be retained to rUll II the
nation." That leaves you less than 7i million. "\Ve
know that 5 million are already in arms at least.,
Surely the calculation is obvious!

OTES upon the actions reported in the
various theatres of war have their inter-
est and sometimes, it may be hoped,
their use, if they are accurate and sober
in the formåtion of opinion. But
another matter, which has been referred to several
times in these columns, is, if we judge it accurately,
not only of interest but of the highest practical
importance, and that is the real reserves of the
enemy.
My apology for returning in a few lines to
that subject this week is that the discussion has re-
appeared with some activity in the Press tbis
week, and that a sound conclusion upon it is
really vital to our expectations of what the war will
become in the future, and of what this country in
particular must expect to meet in the spring.
Figures have already been given to show that,
though paradoxical enough, the mere reserves in
man power is larger in the weaker of the two Allies
-Austro-Hungary, but for the moment we are
more concerned with the possible reserves or II dis-
posable" men left to the German Empire for pos-
sible later use in the field.
Now, here there are two schools, roughly
speaking. The school which expects Germany to
produce, trained and equipped within the next few
months, certainly three million, possibly four
million, of men; and the school which estimates
her powers in this direction at certainly less than
21: million, and probably nearer two million men.
I have so often given figures showing on what
the second school relies for its judgment that I am
almost ashamed to repeat them, but as they are
absdtute figures and seem to lead to unavoidable
conclusions, and as none the less very different
conclusions have been reached upon other figures
by other forms of computation, I will briefly re-
state them here,
We have not got to guess, we know the total
number of adult males of military age, from 20 to
45 years inclusive, in the German Empire, It is
in round numbers 12 million men.
We have not got to guess, we know that Ger-
many has hitherto put into the field at least 5
million. She may have put more, she cannot
have possibly put less, for her known minimum
losses, coupled with the known minimum number
which can hold the western and manæuvre on the
eastern front, make this calculation certain.
Five from twelve leaves seven. Now, the
quarrel is between those who say that of this 7
million 4 million may appear (as an extreme), and
those who say, as another extreme, that only 2
million will appear. The argument for those who
think that four will appear is probably based upon
three erroneous elements of calculation. Mr. BeUoc has arranged to lectura at tbe Town Hall, Cbeltenham,
on the 28th January, and at Bristol, on the 30th January. IIi.. nexl1
(1) They consider only the tota.l number of lecture at the Queen's Hall, will take place ne:i:t Wednesday a

adult males and omit all reference to necessary 8,30 p.rn,
Cl 1 m 1 t th t th h f In response to the general desire for Iln afternoon lecture, Mr.
.vi e p oymen: a is e c ie error, Hilaire Belloc will speak at 2.30 on Tuesday, February 9th,. at the
(2) They calculate the number of U unfit," Dot Queen's Hall. His next evening lecture is on 'l'ueaday the 2tith Jnst.
10*

January 23, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

By

FRED

BY

WATER.

T.

JANE.

NOTE.- Thil Artlcl. ba. beea .abmiUed to the Pre.. Bal'eaa, which .oea Dot ohJect to the p!lblicatioD a. cea.ored, aad take. DO
re.poa.ibllit,. for the COI'I' ectae.. of the .tatemeata,

HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
The "Konigsberg."
T HE Konigsberg, which was bottled up in tha Rufugi
River, East Africa., is now reported to have been
destroyed. According t<J a story published by tho
Southf:,nd Telegraph, the captain of one of the
merchant ships which was sunk in the blocking'
operations, who had just got back, states that the
Germans oompletely hid the ship with foliage, entrenching
some of the crew to prevent any outting-out expedition.
The ship waB, however, located by aeroplane, and with
fire directed from aloft, her destruction by gun-fire quiokly
followed.

Von Spec's Squadron and the Admiralty.
In reply tQ correspondence rec.eived on this subject, if
readers who write asking for details or an explanation aa to
the meaning of my statement last w
k that we had a "suffi-
cient force" on the China Station will refer to the issue of
October 10th they will find" deleted by Censor." I can only
re)?Gat that the force was sufficient to deal with him. Ap-
parently he outmanæuvred us by slipping out secretly before
war was declared,

The" Kronprinz Wilhelm."
The German armed liner Kronprinz Willtelm ILlS been
heard of again, having recently sent into Las PalmN! the
orew;; of one British and three French ships sunk by her. As
the first was captured BO long ago as October 28, and the
other datæ are November 21, December 4, and December 20,
it will be clear that the career of this 23!-knot corsair is not
of a particularly mischievous naturc. From the British ship
she took 3,000 tons of coal; but of the others, one French
steamer was in balla.st and tho other two Frenohmen were sail-
ing vessek
The inference from the above intervals is that the Kron-
prinz W ilhdm must have been considerably harried by British
cruisers, which, though unable to get into action with her,
have sufficed to negative her activities to 1\ very large extent.
Theoretically, a ship like the Kronprin1. Wilhelm would be
able-if unimpeded-to capture a ship or two a d.1Y.
The U Dacia" Case.
-\ case which m;\y have hr-reachinri oonsequenC'æ is that
of the
rman merchant ship Dacia, whioh has been purchased
by the son (American) of a German, and has loaded a cargo
of ootton for Bremen. It involves a delicate problem of
ownership and a variety of other issues on which quel:ltions of
,precedent are likely t,o be founded lat.er on.

2JRI7'IJ'H
E./IS
.//FRIé'A

,......,."''''-
_.1 !'

'. o

(jERMÁJ.r.'....

E.ltS'T
ø?emb
Is.
.ß:FRIe.l.t. OZanzi.bar

East African Operations.
A somewhat belated report of an East African affair has
just been is:med in Berlin. It is to the effect that on Novem-
ber 2 two British cruisers and twelve transports appeared
off Tanga and subsequently effected a landing of 8,000 troops
at Ras Kasone, where, after a three days' fight, they were re-
pulsed by 2,000 Germans, although supported by a heavy fire
frop:l the cruiser..i

This report can, I think, be taken with a oonsiJeuòle
grain of saIt j two gunboats and a 6IIlall landing party of
marines iii more probably the correct presentment of affairs,
The British force is stated by the Germans to have oonsisted
of one European and four Indian regiments,

THE BALTIC.
With the advance of winter there appears to be a complete
lull in the Baltic. The German ships ãre reported to have
withdrawn entirely, but whether they have done this because
they believe the Russians to be ice-bound, or as part of some
scheme of strategy, is not evident.
As I pointed out some time ago, there is no absolute necer>-
sHy for the Russian Fleet to be frozen in, since Libau is an
ice-free port. Abo there is a good supply of powerful ire-
brcakerø, in addition to which the new Dreadnoughts of the
Gangoot CbS3 have ice-breaker bows instead of the usu:11 war-
ship prow.
Conse..luently, although nothing has happened of late, it
by no means follows that the next few months will be un-
eventful.

THE NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.

Up to the moment ot writing there has boon a singu-
larly quiet time in naval operations, or, rather, perhaps, one
should say, in operations that are heard of, for only th08ð
actually engaged can say what is going on behind the scenes.
Perhaps the chief actual incident is the way in whi.:h
Germany h33 seized the Von Tirpitz idea of commerce de
btruction by means of submarines and aircraft.
Either operation would, of cou r.se , be "piracy" pure
and simple, devoia of even the technical justification
hiclt
W.lS put forward in the matter of the East Coast Raid. Con-
siderations of this sort, however, are not at all likely to inter-
fere with any German schemes j and so it is mere waste of
paper to discuss questions of legitimacy. Far more germanð
is the qUe3tion: II Can anything really be doneî" In Con.1!\
Doyle's story, "Danger," everything was done, and done by
eight submarines only I
Conan Doyle, however, was engaged in writing fiction-
a readable story dealing with fictitiouB Bubmarin{\1l hr
superior to any existing craft. His boats were r>omewh,.t of
the genus of Jules Verne's Nautilus, in .. Twenty Thousand
Leagues Under the Sea." We have not got to deal with Cap-
tain Sirius or Captain Nemo, but with the technical possi-
bilities of the present year of grace.
Now, supposing we credit Germany with twenty suital>le
Bubmarincs--{)ertainly the utmo!.t effective foroo that she Ius
available for the purpose.
The first tlling that occurB to one is that this would ICJ.va
her with few or no boats to continue ordinary naval open-
tions with, and a state of affairs of that sort would materially
a.;;sist the British imhore squadron in rendering itself particu-
larly unpleasant, plus a free hand in arranging for an Ull-
comforta.ble l'eæption for returning German submarines,
We may perhaps allow an average of four torpedoea p
r
boat-call it a total of eighty torpedoes. Now the history Qf
the war is that it usually takes two torpedoes to sink a W.lr-
ship, and that a mine, which is infinitely more powerful,
has nothing like the effect on a merchant ship that it has on
a warl:lhip. \Vherefrom we may assume that a liner (having
no magazines to be exploJed) would certainly require two toJ,:-
pedoeø and pos.sibly three.
Data as to the number of misses made by German sub-
marines are not available, but one way and another we oan
safely put them at fifty per cent.
Along thei!e lines we get a hypothetical total of twenty
merohant ships destroyed out of a gl'OSS total of four thousand
or so. And those twenty, it has to be remembered, must either.
be sought for out at sea or else waylaid more or less inshore,

here motor-boats may be expeoted to 00 "hunting peri-
scopes.' ,
One way and another, therefore, especially since we are
by now fully alive t<J the trick of the " mother ship" under
a neutral flag, I do not think that the German threat can be
regarded as anything but " stupendous piece of cheap bluff,

11*

LAND AND WATER.

The aerial part of it certainly is bluff pure and !)imple. The
6ubmarine part may possibly be attempted as a final effort;
but if so it is certainly doomed to failure, not only for the
reasons stated above, but also because it fails to take into
account the circumstance that the British Navy wculd un-
doubtedly be doing somethillg ill tilt; meantime.

*

*

*

The Loss of the .. Formidable."
I have received an unpre
dented number of letters on
this subject dealing directly with the cause of the disaster-
more than one of them anonymous, and therefore impossible
to reply to privately. Of these the most important is a corre-
spondent who elects to sign himself .. Yours disgubtedly,
Ono who knows." I designate his letter as important in
spite of the fact that on one page he attributes the disaster
to .. disobedience to Admiralty orders," and on the ncxt lays
an the blame on the Admiralty I This because he mentions
60me other incident lmown to me as having occurred, but to
which I cannot refer because it woulå certainly be deleted
(rightly I think) by the Censor.
Other correspondents favour me with stories of signalling
to German submarines which they have either heard of or seen.
On this subjed of signalling I may mention that in the
capacity of sccutmaster at a certain place I have bpent many
a weary night in damp ditches in company with a police
inspector watching Sus})ccted houses and places, but (mudl to
my disgust) never :ret struck a case ",hieh had anything in it.
I have also done duty with the military on similar fruitless
nocturnal expeditions.
That information gets out is true enough; but over six
months of some perlional experience I am reluctantly com-
,pelled to confess to complete (or almost complete) scepticism
to nearly all the signalling dories, If there be any spy
signalling it is very rare, and it ifi of the utmost importance
that v.e should keep our heads in the matter, became every
false alarm makes things easier for genuine spies. T]lis is
the psychology of the official apathy of which we occasionally
bear so much. In so far as the enemy may be connected
with any signalling or &upposed signalling, I should
ay that
in the majority of cases it is done with the direct objed of
creating the II nothing in it" idea.
Returning to the general mass of correspondence I find
that a large number of readers refuse to accept my theory that
if a German submarine accounted for the Formidable it was
a matter of " blind chance." A foolish captain &talked by a
cl()..ver Q erman submarine' is the favourite theory. I am unable
to find any evidence whatever to support tha.t theory.
Even in daylight there is a tremendous amount of luck
in submarine operation
, and at night, especially in a gale,
a submarine must necessarily be blind, and no amount of
skill can affect results, Given a single mine adrift and a
submal"Ïne, a ship would in such circumstanccs l'un almûat
exactly equal risks from either.
As for the second e"Iplosion there is little or no evidence
on w]lÍch to base even a hypothesis as to wllether it came
fl"Om the engine-room or was caus.fd by a second torpedo.
The sinking ship having been located it would, even in a gale
at night, be quite possible for a submarine to work round
aDd fire at hcr; but it would be a case of wasting a torpedo
to bave done so.

Non-Sinkable Ships.
Amongst the mass of correspondence which Lave reached
me in connection with the loss of the Formidable comes a
letter from France recalling an old plan of Captain Bazin,
the integral idea of which was a Bat-bottomed ship supported
by huge cylind
rs. This particular idea is unfamiliar to
me; but I take it that in substance it is more or less en the
lines of a vessel subsequently projeoted by the great Italian
naval architect, Cuniberti. Any liucL ship would be proof
against either torpedoes or mine!)'. But it is by no means
clear how she would manage to attain any Fpeed, or where
.he would stow her machinery.
In any case, however, the duration of modern war!) is not
long enough to permit of the introduction of new t;ypesj even
in the old wars, which were infinitely more lengthy, it was
ral.ely found possible to embody new ideas. In 1795 the two-
decker Glatton was e.1'perimentally armed with twenty-eight
68 pounder cannonades, and twenty-eight 42 pounders. She
fell in with six French frigates-one of them a GO-gun &hip,
two others of 36 guns. With her what ,,;ere in those days
abnormally heavy guns she beat ofI the attack without the
least difficulty, though by all the gencral ideas of the time
she should have been an easy prey to her antagonists. Yet
it was never found possible to adopt a corresponding arma-
ment for other British
hips-some kind of technical diffi-
culty presumably intervened,

January 23, 1915.

To construct a ship en Bazin lines would certainly take
at least two and a half years, probably longer, and it would
then be only a purely experimental unit.
The sensational stories about the rapid building of the
Dreadn.ougltt some years ago are mainly responsible for the
prevalence of incorrect ideas on the subject of the rate of
construction. The rapid building of the Dreadnought was
somewhat on a par with the II exprebB locomotive built in a
day," of which we oceasionally hear. There is really little
oDr no abnormally rapid building-what does take place is a
rapid putting toget/Ler.
In the case of the Dreadnought the maximum of material
was all collected together before the Bhip was commenced j but
for that she would have taken the normal time to build. It
is impossible in actual practice to accelerate construction to
any very great extent--there is a limit to the number of
hands which can be usefully employed without getting in each
other's way-and in addition thereunto guns, armour plates.
and varioufi other things are made by processes of which the
integral factor is a very slow cooling which can net possibly
be expedited.

*

*

*

Dummy Warships.
One of the German llewspapers published in New York
has come out with a tale about old ships being bought by the
British Admiralty and converted into dummy warships.
Whether true or not there is nothing novel in the idea.. Apart.
from the familiar <lummy guns which figure so largely on
modern battlefields, the dummy warship is quite a classica.l
idea.
It has not proved particularly useful in the past-nnless
the story be true that Russian cruisers took a group of dum-
mies at the Pe
cadores to be Togo's main fled.
In these days of submarines, however, there may be morEt
possibilities in dummies than in the past, as though surface
detection of the deception is probable in most atmospheric
conditions, a good deal of uncertainty would prevail through
a perisc()pe. On thß whole "WE' may not feel ungrateful to the
Germans for suggesting the idea.

General Matters.
To " Constant Reader," "T. K.," "L. !II. B,," "A.
L,," and others. I regret inability to refer to the quc
tioD
raised. The Admiralty prefers reticence, and in mattc:s of
this sort the Admiralty is necessarily the best (and the only)
judge. I am quite unable to agree with tJIe criticisms of
Admiralty policy. Critics of it, I tllink, totally fail to
realisc the magnitude of the task with which the Admiralty is
faced.

With reference to the series of shorl, hist.ories published by the
ElUyclopædia Britwmica, reviewed in these columns recently, we
regret tha.t by an error the publishers were wrongly named, The
volumes are published by the EncycIopæðia BTitannica Co., by per-
mÌlòsion of the Cambridge Universit.y PTess, and not as stat.cà la.st.
week. It may be stat.ed in passing that they embody t.he histo
y of
the countries concerned in the war in a. form and compass that is un-
obtainable from any other sourCe, and wiH be found particuJarly usefuI
by Etudents of t.he war.
THE political causes which have led up to the present war are
briefly summarised in The Origim of the War, a two-shilling volume
hy J. Holland Rose, published by the Cambridge University Press.
Beginning wit.h the Anglo,German rivalry of 1875-88, the a.uthor traces
the development of t.he Fresent situa.tion from the world-policy of
Germany, the )'lo1'Occo trouble, and the Baghdad railway, t.he unhealed
sore of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Far Eastem question. It is an able
study of the principal problems of modern international transaclioIl&
and German aims.

TcJ'JJi,
of SubscI'lptlon to

"TH E

COUNTY

GENTLEMAN

.AND

LAND

AND

WATER"

(ESTABLISHED 1562).
AT Il011E-Twelve :Months õE1
CANADA-Twelve Months oE1
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve :Months öE1

8 0
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Thø abo.,. rate. include all Special l"-umlJer. a'Là Po.tagø.

BACK COPIES of .. I,AND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articll'll by HILAIflE BELLOC, .. THE WAR BY
LAND"; and FRED T. JANE, "THE WAR BY WATER,"
tOj!'ether with a valuable reference, .. THE TOPUGltAPHICAL
GUIDJ<;," can be obtained through any Newsagent, or on
application to the Offices of .. LA
D AND WATEH," CENTr..AL
HOUSE, KINGS WAY. W.C.

12*

January 23, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

THE AEROPLANE ON THE OFFENSIVE.
A POTENT QUALITY HITHERTO UNRECOGNISED.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

NOTE.- Tbh Artlcl. b.. beeD .abmlUed to the Pre.. Bareaa, wblcb dOli DOt object to the pablicatioD a. ceD.ored, aDd takll DO
rllpODlibllity for tb. correctDe.. of tbe atatemeDb.

I T is with a decp sense of responsibility. and after very
mature consideration. that this article is written. It
will be a matter of considerable regret if it does not
attract, in a practical manner, the immediate atten-
tion of our authorities, and does not convince them
of the value of the suggestions therein made. It is
obvious that, in the present state of international

olitics, .the writer cannot go into details to prove. by dot-
tmg ,th
I'S and crossing the t's, the soundness of his views j
but It IS hoped that his conclusion. based on general reason-
ing, will appeal to those on whom rests the very heavy
burden of directing our military operations in the present
conflic
. inasmu.ch as it is contended that. by the employ-
men.t, In. a particular manner. of a weapon. now in our pos-
sessIOn, It may be possible for the Allies to reduce. by many
long months, the duration of the present war.
It is beyond contest that the worth of the aeroplane,
at the front, has been demonstrated for certain purposes.
such as reconnaissance work, dispatch-carrying, and other
epecifio uses, which. as Sir J olm French recently told us,
are suggesting themselwa almost daily. Th
most f.'aluable
way, liOwever, in u!hich the .Allics could use tlte aeroplane is for
offcnsive purposcs on a comprellensiz,c scale.

A GUN WITH A 150-MILE RANGE.
In f&ct. in the hands of the Allies. the aeroplane could
now be regarded as being equivalent to a powerful gun with a
range of about 150 miles. a much more formidable weapon
than the large Krupp gun which was so conspicuous in the
first stages of the war. Besides having a range of from seven
to e
ght times that of the Krupp siege-gun, the aeroplane,
consldered as an offensive weapon, would not. like the
German monster machine. require any complicated preli-
minary installation for its proper working. The offensive
aeroplane would almost always be ready, and its missile
would reach its aim with a greater certainty than if it were
fired from a
y existing long-range gun. Soml1 figures. from
actual expenence. will prove the truth of these two state-
ments.
In November and December, 1913, the French air-
man, Helen, flew during thirly-ninc consccutive days. an
ave:oage distance of 330 miles a day, most of the flights being
made in tempcstuous or foggy weather. Another French
airman, Fourny, a few weeks before. had flown an average
of 439 miles daily for l,ccllly-tltrec consccutÙ'e days. These
performances, among others, show that, in the beginning of
1914, there wc:re aeroplanes in existence which, almost every
day, had a rangß of over 300 miles, or a radius of action
onr 150 miles, and this conclusion regarding the reliability
of the flyiug,ma.chine applies with even greater force at
prez:mt, in the beginning of 1915. It is not too sanguine,
thercforß, to assume that we have now in our possession de-
signs of machines capable of flying 150 miles over territory
occupied by the enemy, there to discharge their shots or
explosives, and then to fly back to their base.
The practicability of considering offensive aeroplanes as
being equivalent to a ISO-mile range gun having thus been
<lStablished, it remains to show its efficiency.

EFFICIENCY OF THE OFFENSIVE
AEROPLANE.
Since the beginning of hostilities the aeroplane, as we
bave been told in various official dispatches. issued either
by the War Office or the Admiralty, has, on several occa-
sions, been used for the dropping of projectiles, such as,
for instance, on various airship sheds at Friedrichshafen,
Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Brussels. The exact amount of
Success achieved by our airmen in their o1Iensive operations,
thus carried out, has ne.er Leen officially published. It is
not, therefore, possible to discuss the success or non-success
of our airmen in these special offensive missions. Nor is it
proposed to examine the question whether those airmen, who
were detailed for those missions, had had a suitable train-
ing di.ffering from that of ordinary military aviators usually
employed on reconnaissance or kindred work to especially
'fit them for their offensive undertakings. But, apart from
what little offensive aerial work has been carried out at
the front since the beginning of August, 1914, there are
available some figures. obtained in peace time. which will

rve as a guide in considering the efficiency, in actual pra.o

hce. of the aeroplane regarded as the equivalent to a 150-
mile range gun,
Towards the end of 1912 the airman Gaubert piloted
an aeroplane in which Scott. acting aa bomb-dropper,
dropped dummy bqmbs on a goal of a circular shape 33
feet in radius. &ott. who had been training himself for that.
purpose, dropped the " bombs JJ from a height of 820 feet.
and he succeeded in dropping on the target 12 projootiles
out of 15. thus securing an average of hits of 80 per cent.
This feat was surpassed III the following year. towards the
end of 1913. when the French Lieutenant Varcin, who had
also undergone special training, dropped. on a pre-arranged
date, from the same height of 820 feet. fifteen bombs on
a target of the same radius. namely. 33 feet. Lieutenant
Varcin succeeded in hitting the mark thirteen times. his
average of hits being thw very nearly 87 per cent.
These figures speak for themselves. There is no long-
range gun in the hands of the Allies, or in those of thcir
adversaries, which. however well served. could secure &
higher percentage of hits. It can. of course, be objected
that at a height of 720 feet. from which the " bombs" wero
dropped so successfully, the aeroplane would, in actual war-
fare, be very much exposed to artillery and to infantry fire
from below, This objection is well founded j but there is
no reason why, with a sufficient amount of training, a large
percentago of hits should not be secured from greater
altitudes. especially on bigger targets. This would be the
more attainable when one keeps in mind that, at a height
of 720 feet, an aeroplane is more subjected to " tossing" and
" pitching JJ on account of the mnd eddies which exist near
the earth's surface. than it would be at a height of from
2,000 to 3,000 feet. where the atmosphere is more steaKly.
At an altitude of 3,000 feet an aeroplane, which of necessity.
is in motion, is practically immune from artillery and infantry
fire.
It may, therefore, be concluded that. with sufficient nnd
adequate training, an aerial bombardier can be formed who
will render the aeroplane the equivalent of an efficient 150-
milß range gun. It is not too much to ask for the adequate
training of aerial bombardiers when constant practice is de-
manded from the artillery and infantry in order that they
may be efficient. From information which the writer pos-
sesses it would appear that efficient aerial bombardiers can
be trained velY quickly.
EFFICIENCY OF PROJECTILES.
There is another important point to be considered in
connection with the offensive aeroplane, quite apart from the
machine itself j it is the efficiency of the projectile to b

dropped from the aeroplane.
Let us consider, in turn, the wcight of projectile an
aeroplane can carry, the quantity which can be dropped at
a time, and its possible effect. The weight of projeetile an
aeroplane can carry will depend. of course. on how far from
the base it is required to be dropped. The greater the dis-
tance an aeroplane has to travel the greater is the amoun

of fuel and lubricant that has to be taken on bO:Ll"d the
machine, and. consequently, the smaller is the quantity or
projectile that can be carried.
As regards the amount that can be dropped at a time.
we have to guidE.' us some experiments carried out at the
French military centre of Cha.lons,by Captain Bousquet, who.
from a height. of over 3,250 feet, suddenly dropped from his
machine a weight of 242 Ibs., without the stability of the
machine being affected in the slightest degree. The services
which an aeroplane, carrying 700 or 800 Ibs. of projec-
tiles. can render, from the offensive point of view. can.
therefore. be easily conceived by the reader. and need not be
laboured.
The effect of the projectile from an offensive aeroplane
would depend not only upon its nature but also upon its
m:J.SS. It does not require very much imagination to under-
stand the effect of bombs filled with some modern explosive
and weighing 100 or 150 lbs. each,
Having thus established the value of the offensive aero-
plane the writer proposes to discuss, in his next article, the
especial importance of a strong aeri:ù offensive in the presen.l
war.

1"'(*

LAND AND WATER.

January 23, 1915.

THE COLOURS OF
AND BRODRICK

ON

UNIFORMS
CAPS.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

T HE subject of the colours of uniforms is by no
means novel, and was discussed by our anc
s-
tors almost as widely as it is to-day.
On t.he whole they found a very practical
B<JlutioD, rendered possible by the fact that in
those days there was a distinct and radical differ-
ence ];ßh....een the duties of light infantry and of the line.
The line did the actual shock of battle work, the light in-
fantry or rifles the preparatory 6kirmishrng, mostly in
broken or wooded ground, and
very country solved the pro-
blem of invisibility to suit i
prevailing tone. Thus, Lord
Amhelst in America, about 1758, clad his light infantry in
.. nut brown, It an excellent oolour for the Canadian woods.
In Germany, whence came the "l'ifle It or " jager It regi-
ments, a dark green suited the shadows of their pine forests

e:,ter, or was thought to do so.
In the Peninsula, with few trees but much red aDd dark
c.cI1re rock and mountain, our brick-red tunics were parti-

TIlar]y good, and green not in much favour. The Duke of
Wellington, when asked his opinion as to the colours of uni-
forms, said that in his experience he had not found it a matter
<.f much importance, but that it was essential under aU

ircumstances that each army IIhould show a clearly-marked
èiff-el'ence of profile in it.s headdress against the skyline; and
a little l'eBection will show how sound this reasoning was.
But in these later days we have forgotten the Duke and
the wisdom of our forefathers, who often spent m()re )"ears
at the front than we Bpend months at the manQ.'uvres, and
wben we adopted the" Brodrick" cap (it was not Bl'odl'iek's
at aU, by the way) it looked to me as if we had attained
the very nadir of our imbecility, for both termans and
Russians, in their fiat-topped forage caps, showed precisely
111e same 8ilhouette against the sky as our own, and as we
"Wore nearly the same-coloured greatcoats, it seemed impos-
eiEIe to conceive how mistakes could be avoided.
Fortunate]y, the Germans elected to stick to their "Pidie]-
tmulie, It or spiked helmet, <!ll service, so that the matter of
the caps haa about righted itself, but there have been many
regrettable incidents, I am. told, due to the similarity of tone
in our clothing.
The truth is that the whole question about " eo]our It
bas never received any scientific attention at all from the
people responsible for our Army clothing. We took to khaki
because in India and South Africa we were not only operating
in a country with which it blended easily, but O\1r fighting was
almost entirely of light infantry character, Le" in open order,
in small bodies, where concealment is the essence of the
whole problem.
In France and Flanders the war is of a totally different

('hal'Roter, where the great decisions which depend
on the co-operation of artillery, infantry, and on the
cDntrol the staff can keep of the movements are the chi$f
things that matter, small Bkirmishes being only a temporary
condition that will now pass away as the weather improves,
In these big operations the essential is tbat the gunners
f;bould be able to watch the infantry closing on the enemy,
and support them with fire, over their heads, to the very last
moment possible.
This is wby the French neyer would abandon theÏ1' red
breechð.'l as long a.s So certain old artillery general lived. Like
every otber nation, they llad played with tbe question for
years before the war broke out, and numerous reporto had been
presented from the infantry advocating various shades of
greeny-gre,ys and khakis, but he struck his pen through every
one of them, pointing ()lit in very direct language that if he
could not see their little l'ed breeches (but he used a. coarser
word) how the -- heU was he to know when to cease firing
in support 7
He died about three years ago, and, as is generally
known, a Dew invisible colour was approved by the French
just before the war, but too late for its introduction, and it
is fortunate indeed that this was 80, because it is now be-
coming quite applU'ent, especiaJly to English onlookers, that
for this same reason the little red breeches are proving worth
thousands of lives to our Allies.
An English artillery officer describes the attack on
Vermeilles the other day as a" dl'eam, It the co-opera.tion
of guns and infantry was so perfect. The gunners could see
the red legs twinkling ah
ad of them, and kept up S\1ch a
storm of shrapnel over their heads that the enemy could not
Bee to take aim. The IShells kept raining in on them t.iIl
the last twenty-five ya.rds (he said) had been reacbed, tben
the guns ceased, and before the Germans could look up to seÐ
what had happened the French were upon them with thc
bayonet, and the place was carried.
Similar accounts have come to me from other source!!
during tbe earlier phases of the war, and I feel perf
ctly
satisfied in my own mind that where all other conditions
have been ISO Dearly balanced, this last factor, the power
of covering the infantry advance for a couple of bunèred
yanIs more owing to tbeir visibility, has just turned the
scale in favour of the French infantry.
Genera.lly their success has boon attribute<l to the 75mm.
gun, It is, in fact, an excellent gun, but at these ranges
an modern guns are so nearly perfect in accuracy that U'ere
is nothing to choose between tbem. Wihere the French score
is in the perfect co-operation of the guns with the infant.ry
which they have been able to attain.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"MINE AND TORPEDO NET DEFENCE."
SJR,-It is by no means surprising to learn that Sir Wil-
liam White combated Colonel Maude's suggestions for the
oonversion of battleshipEi into diving-bells, seeing that as a
practical naval architoot he must have been well aware of the
general impractioability of any such proposals.
'Ihe protective deck or dooks of the modern vessel of war
poseess three functions: -(1) To keep out shot and shell from
tbe engine and boiler rooms, from the magazines, and from
the vital portioDB of the flhip's interior economy. (2) To give
lateral strength and stiffness to the general construction of the
Teasel. (3) To Ileal hermetically, as far as it may be possible,
all lower compartments from the inrush of wawr consequent
upon the breaching of the bottom by the explosion of torpedo
Ðr mine.
These decks, however, for the ordinary working of HIe
.hips, are pierced bye. large number of openings, e,g" engine
and boiler room hatohways, funnels and funnel-casings, ash-
boistB, lIhell and ammunition lifts, ladderways and hatchways
for the passage of the crew, etc., etc., and it is obvious that
in proportion to the number and magnitude of tbese Ðpenings,
the princi
]e of the diving-bell must disappear; and no
naval archltoot who haa had experienoo of fitting air-looks
to boiler rooms, worked under forced draught, would
desire to multiply or extend these cumbersome and clumsy
contraptions to other compartments of the ship. Colonel
Maude writes all a Royal Engineer and inventor, but I think
be scarcely realises the extremely narrow limits ()f space and

weight within whioh the naval designer is compelled to work.
The art and mystery of battleship design may be compendi-
ously if crudely defined as the effort to squeeze a quart into
6 pint pot-a task of proverbial diffioulty.
Colonel Maude writes lighthearwd]y of increasing t.
e
depth of ilie double,bottom fTom 3ft, to 5ft., not realising that
the draught of these vessels has to be oalculated within inches,
and that every cubio foot of air space added at the bottom of
the vessel tends to fiend up the centre of gravity of the Ehip,
to shorten tbe height of .. meta-wntre" (that theoretic pivot of
the vessel's pendulous suspension), 4lnd generally to disturb
the ca]oulations of stability upon which the 8afety and sea-
worthiness of the ship depend. In these directioIl8 I fear that
the problem of safeguarding a ship against mine or torpedo
attack has already been mainly thrashed out, though proù:\bly
still something remains to be done in providing contrdled
water-oommunioation between tbe severa] transverse and llOri-
r:ontal compartment.s ()f the ship.
Few vessels go down by direct vertical submersion, but
when one or more side-compartments have been breached the
inrushing water upsets tIle stability and ÍI,im of the ve;;scl.
till, with more or less rapidity, it turns turtle and goes to the
bottom.
Apart from the active defence of a battleship by gunfire or
wrpedo boat patrols, and beyond all question of construc-
tional design, there still remain to be explored the possibi]i-
ties of net-defence, wbich in my judgment have in recent
)"ears been grossly neglected by our naval authoritiea, Tho

1""

January
3, HH;;, I

LAND AND W ATERì

explosive effect of a mine is intensely local, and if only it can
be kept twenty or thirty feet from the side of the ship, its
destructive en
rgy becomes practically innocuous.
Admirals and other naval expert&' often object to nct-
defenoe on the ground that it is cumbersome and difficult to
handle, that it is, under modern conditions, largely ineffective.
and that it tends to interfere with the speed and manæuvring
qualities of the ship-but in reply it may be said that these
nets and their supports can easil
be designed 60 as to become
<x>mplctely effective for the purpose proposed, and that it is
better to lose a few knots' speed, notably Vïithin the narrow con-
fine.'! of the North Sea, than to lose the vessel itself; and there
can, I fear, be little doubt but that we shall continue to be
horrified by news of fresh naval disasters, and the still more
irreparable loss of gallant lives until our naval authoritie<j
take into more serious consideration this most pressing prob-
lem of Net-Defence.-Yours faithfully,
ARNOLD F. HILLS, !lLI.N,A.
Hammerfield... Penshurst, Kent,

RUSSIA AND AVIATION.
To the Editor of LAND AND W ATEB.
SIR,-Having lately come over from Russia on important
business which has kept me very occupied, I was fortunate
enough in a spare moment to read :Mr. L, Blin Desbleds'
article on "The Airship in Naval 'Varfare," published in
your esteemed journal of January 9th, 1915.
With all due respect to Mr. Desbleds, with whom I am
somewhat acquainted through c:>rrespondence, I cannot agree
with his views on the subject treated by him in the before-
mentioned article,
Having had intimate experience of dirigibles or airships
for many years I may state that the capability of the airship
to remain stationary over any given point is extremely pro-
blematical. In practice I have never seen it done in average
weather or even under the ideal conditions of the White
Nights of Northern Russia, better conditions than which it is
impossible to find, except perhaps on the paper of the mathe-
matician.
When attempting to keep an airship stationary over any
given point, instead of doing so the airship, even when on its
best behaviour, drifts slightly about in every direction, with-
out any definite wish of its own as it were, the toy of every
phenomenon of the element in which it floats, and not even
superior management of the vessel will fully counteract this
behaviour, which those having deep practical experience of
airships know to be sufficiently aggravating and disconcerting
when endeavouring to do with accuracy anything requiring
this quality of remaining stationary, which the airship is gene-
rally supposed to possess, such work can be better carried
out when the airship has a certain amount of engine-driven.
accurately-gauged headway I
Under the general term of aeroplane, it is apparent from
1111', Desbleds' articlo that he compares the small type of aero-
plane generally known with the modern airship, quite ignoring
the existence of the large 400-h.p. to 900-h,p. aeroplanes, an
equally modern development, wh-ich Russia, keeping its own
counsel, has brought to a high pitch of perfection during the
past two or three years, and with which I have had also much
to do.
The comparison made by :Mr. Desbloos is unfair, as these
large aeroplanes are as superior for general utility to their
small sisters as the modern airships are to the early smaller
airships.
These large aeroplanes can be made so to hover as it. were
over any given point. as to attain very &imilar conditions to
those obtained on an airship having a very slight amount of
herdway as aforesaid, for periods of time amply sufficient for
their operators, with the modern perfection of instruments, to
fulfil Vïith accuraoy anything which previowly it has been sup-
posed could better be accomplished on airships, when trying
to make them remain stationary over a given point.
These large aeroplanes are fitred with four engine.<!, an,.!
have a speed of seventy miles per hour, and can be made to
fly non-stop, whenever so required, for twelve hours, and they
can be as easily navigated at night for such periods as in the
daytime. They have ample crew accommodation, and carry
an installation of wireless telegraph with B range of not less
than 200 miles, searchlights, machine guns, bomb-dropping
a.pparatus, and photographio laboratory.
Such aeroplanes have proved their complete superionty
to airships, and their use during this wa.r has brought great
beu?fit to Russia, and the sooner 01'eat Britain has such
machines the better.-I am, Sir, yours truly,
C. J. H, MACKENZIE-KENNEDY.
Member of Technical Committee,
Imperial All-Russia Aero Club,
33, St. Swithin's LIme, London, E.C.

PROTECTION AGAINST SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR Sm,-I enclose a. memo. re submarines. I have
a!ready sent the substance of it to the Admiralty, but it was
mixed up with other proposals, and not so clearly put lIS
it now is, They do not consider the idea practicable. I
have asked them whether I may communicate my ideas h
the Press, as some others have done, and they agree.
I should be extremely glad if you would (in LAND AND
WATE
) give, briefly, :rour ideas on the proposal. I kn<>w
you take great interest in such matters. Various similar
ideas were commented on in The T'imM in November.

1. l\Iain Idea.-The idea is to arrange 80 tha.t a. submari!le,
in fairly sballow or confined warers, shall notify ita pre-
sence and its whereabouts. It is propOf!ed to lay down wires
which the submarine will touch and break or displa
,
Since the vertical height from keel to top of periscope is
considerable, a system of horizontal wires would be most
efficient.
2. Wires.-To be laid horizontally one above another,
and at such interva1s--say 25 foot--that a. submarine must
strike one or other. To be suspended at suitable intervals
by cords or wires from floats. To be a.nchored at the ends
and at other points If neoossary. See sketch Fig. 1. Lengt'h
of a wire not to be so grea.t as to seriously retard the sub-
marine, otherwise the latter would become aware of the fact
t
at it was entangled and might go astern a.nd shake off the
WIre.

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3. Indicabr Floats.-A subma.rine f5triking ø. wire would
double it up and carry it along. Connected with each
end float there would be an indicator float (A, fig. 1 and 2),
which would remain on the surface and move along in wake
of submarine and show a flag. A watching destroyer could
follow, At night the float could carry a light or be coate:!
with luminous paint.
4, Remarks.-Wires could be laid acrooa mouths of har-
bours, etc., or around selected areas of sea. (e.g., areas near
Belgium when ships shell the coast), or even right across
the Straits of Dover. The south part of the North Sea Ü
only about 120 feet deep. The wires would be in lengths,
eacÌí overlapping the next. They would be more simple
than a system of nets such as has been proposed. In some
cases it. might be suila.ble to attach the ends of t.he wirea
strongly to the shore. The breaking of the wire might in-
terrupt an electric current, and so signal the presence of the
submarine, Of cour5e ships crossing the wire would ha.ve to
stop engines and slow,

E. S. BELLAst!!!, M.I.O,E.

30, L3ns3own Crescent, Cheltenham.

15"

LAND AND WATER

EXPLOSIVES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
SIR,-Mr. Jane's "tatement " that Germany is 1!.1
ead of
iDe rest of the world in the matter of high explosives" seems
to be wel! founded (at least, so far as we are ooncerned), and
to constitute the explanation of several apparently isolated
facts. I venture to put forward some suggestions and to ask
Eome qUQstions.
(1) Is t
is
ot probably the explanation of the effect
produced by the German siege guns and Jack Johnsons1 The
debated questìon of the size of these guns is not the impor-
tant one, but the explosive. We hear ncthing of such
deva8tating effectB being produced by our shells.
(2) The picture!; recently published of the ruined forts
at Tsingtau E.'Uggest that the Japanese possess an equally
powerful explosive. The fall of Tsingtau seems to have sur-
prised the Germans as much as that of Namur did ourselves.
Further, a rumour declares that the Japanese have I'eported
cur torpedoe.s to be of no use, that is (I take it), compara-
tively speaking. Could we not get some aid from our ally1
(3) Does this throw any light on the comparative rapidity
with which the Good Hope and Monmouth were destroyed once
the German armed cruisers got the upper hand 1 The Good
Hope blew up a little more than an hour after firing began,
;md the Monmouth sank within a little more than two hours.
On the face of it the odds did not seem to be so hugely against
us. The battle at the Falkland Islands was of much longer
(Juration.
(4) What effect may this superiority in explosive shells
and torpedoes be likely to have cn the great naval battle which
will take place when the German Fleet has completed equip-
ment, trained the reservists and new recruits, and effected a
sufficient attrition of the British Fleet by mines and sub-
marines 1 If it does. It is rather melancholy that after the
EJxperience of the Boer war we should have allowed ourselves
to be caught again with an inferior armament and one which
affect.'! everything-shells, torpedoes, bombs, mineß, and hand
grenades. What are our chemists doing1-Yours,
H, J. C, GRIERSON,

THE LOSS OF THE JJ FORMIDABLE."
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
SIR,-I have been deep]y interested in reading Colonel
Maude's description of his idea for keeping fighting vessels
afloat after submarine attack.
The reference to the" diving bell," which under the new
n
e of
cai
on bell is now of such practical uti]ity in
CIVIl engmeermg works, very happily iJlustratoo Co]onel
Maude's suggestion for le6Sening the dangers attendant on
naval warfare.
There is, however, this difference between the diving
bell _and
hß warship. The diving bell rests on the ground
at the bottom of the :water, the weight of its structure being
greater than the weIght of the water which it displacæ.

he filling of a spa
e in a warship with compressed air is
mtended to prevent It reaching the bottom-in fact to main-
tain it at the surface. If the bottom of a caisso
bell is,
say, 30 feet below top water leve] , it will be necessary in
order to prevent water entering the bottom of the bell to
charge the ben with compressed air and maintain it at a
pressure per square inch equal to the weight of a column
()f water 30 feet high and 1 inch square in section. The
pressure of the air inside will then balance the external pres--
sure of the water at the bottom of the ben.
Now, supposing when in this condition the bell is puno-
tured--say, at a. vertical height of 4 feet from the bottom-
the balance in pressure between the air inside and the water
()u
side is broken; for at the point of puncture the he:J.d of
water is redllced to 26 feet, whilst the pressure of the internal
air at this level is stiH equa.l to a column of water having a
head of 30 feet. Air wi]] now escape through the puncture
and water win rise in the bell until it reaches and covers
the orifice. The remaining air will then be locked in the
upper part of the bell, and water will ceaoo to enter. If
the ben had been constructed with a watertight bottom, and
instead of being punetured it had ripped open-say, from
the bottom to a vertica] height of 4 feet from the bottom,
the result would have been the same.
With considerable diffidence I would like to compare the
punctured bell with the punctured ship, but wish it to be
quite understood that I make no pretence to Q, knowledge
of marine engineering, and if my comparisons are at fault
I we]come corrections.
t be1ieve that a ship floats because the weight of water
which it displaces is less than the weight of the ship itself,
and that when a ship fins with water to such an extent that
this difference in weight ceases to exist the balance of
buoyancy is lost and the ship sinks.

January 23, 1915.

. :rmag ine a ship to be constrocted with an absolutely
aIr-tIght deck, and every part of the exterior of the ship
below the deck also of air-tight construction. Assume
fUl'ther that the bottom of the ship is 30 feet below top-
wa
r leve], and that the whole of the space below the deck
is fiUed with compressed air at a pressure equal to the external
he
of water-in fact, under the same conditions a8 the
caIsson ben before referred to. If such a ship be punctured
or breached may I not reasonably conclude that she will fill
with water until the top of the breach is well covered 1 Thig
filJing with water
ill decrease the
ifierence in weight
between the water dIsplaced by the ShIP and the weight of
the ship, and if to such a degree that the balance of buoyancy
ÌB ]ost the ship sinks,
Now if my
onclusions with regard to the ship are
corr
ct then I thmk answers to the following questions are
req1llred before. ihe practical utility of compressed air as. &
means for keepmg a vessel afloat after submarine attack can
be demonstrated: - '
I.-Is it practicab]e for the space below an air-tight
deck to be fined and maintained with compressed air at &
pressure of, say, 15 Ibs. per square inch without lessening
the fighting power of the ship or the crew to an appreciable
extent 1
II.-In tl1e event of submarine attack wou]d the ex-
plosion so <1am'l.ge the ship as to render the deck and the
exte1'Ìor of the ship
low the deck and above the highest
point of the breach no longer air-tight1
IlL-Is the highest part of the breach caused by sub"-
marine attack at such a level that, under aU conditions,
sufficient space is left between the highest part of the breach
and the air-tight deck to preserve the balance of buoyancy.
-Yours faithfully, JOHN CHADWICK.

OILSKINS AND RUBBER BOOTS.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-The response to the appeal which I made
for oilskins and .. gum" boots through the medium of
your paper, has
n most generous, but further efforts are
needed to collect the large number (4,000) n.s],ed for by the
Commandant of No.1 Base (France). The receiving Depôt is
at 8, Beauchamp Plaoo, Brompton Road, S.W., "\"fhere aU gifts
are gladly acknowledged. Letters may be addrel;scd to Urs.
Bruce Williams, 22, Alexander Square, S.W,-I am, Sir,
yourEi faithfuUy, 1I. A. WILLIAMS. .
22, Ale:xanJ.er Square, S.W.,

BURKE'S PEERAGE (l!Jl5 edition), published by Messrs. Harrison & Sons
(Bookselling Dept.), 45, Pall .Mall, London, is now to hand. This
valuable work of reference should be in everl,library.
As evidence of the fact that .. Burke' is corrected efficiently and
right up to date we notice that the following items appear in the kxt of
the work:
The death of Sir John Barker, December 16th, 1!H4;
The death of Sir H. F. Grey, December 17th, 1914;
and the Addenda brings the happenings up to December 19th.
Mention is also made in the text of the honours given by the King in
France, i.e" The Order of Merit to General Sir John French, Tho Garter
to the King of Belgians. The Bath to Genera! Joffre, and The St. Mi('haeI
St. George to other French Generals, and 0.11 the D.S.O,s and V,C.B
conferred up to December 19th.
The deaths of three Baronets who had long been lost sight of 81'&
nlso now recorded, j e., Sir Henry Burnaby, 5th Bart. ; Sir RichlUd H. K.
Farmer, 5th Bart, ; and Sir George Compton Reade, 9th Bart.
The price of the volume is 4ò2 213. net,

LOOKING BACKW ARBS.

Readers of the special artides appearing in this Journal
on .. The \V ar by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rot:\tion thi:; rem1rkable serips
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have. therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the 6rst thirteen numb
rs. at a cost of 15. 6d. each.
Or we will supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complete,
for 65. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numb
rs already
received we have had to reprint some of the earlier
numbers, Same can n()w be supplied at 6d. per copy.
Order now from your Newsagep.t. Bookstall. or direct 1
from the Publishers,
U LAND AND W ATERttt
CENTRAL HOUSE. KINGSW A y, LONDO
-J. I

':1;*

January 23, 1915

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

ARMOURED
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are run on 'Shell' Motor Spirit
because it can be thoroughly de-
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and because it is so pure and uniform
in quality. It is used in all branches
of the service for air, land and sea.

,
,

II

MOTOR SPIRIT

is supplied to the Allied forces only
and not to the foes of our country.
Fill up on 'Shell' and refuse any
other spirit.

??'7

LAN l) A i\ l) \ \' ATE l{

LONDON &
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FIRE
tNSURANCE COMPANY
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BURGLARY.

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This old-fashioned stove was the subject of a recent
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Household coal, and required considerable

utention. It was converted into a HUE
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BARR'S Cash Clearance SALE

OflineSpring-ßowering BULBS. HIIAt:INTHS, DAFFODII.S, TIJLIPS,
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jallllar} 23, 19 15

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

How to Live
T HE lot of the housekeeper does not seem likel
t,
become any easier as time goes on. Considering
the present state of affairs during the past five
months prices have not mounted as rapidly as
they might have, but of late they have shown a
distinctly upward tendency. And it is unlikely that these
will decrease in the near future; instead, we must make up
our minds to expect the reverse, Bread has gone up in price,
eggs are dearer, butter shows at least an additional penny on
the pound, and even such a modest commodity as kindling
for the domestic hearth shows a shrinkage of quantity, the
bundles of firewood being palpably sm,tlleL
As a matter of solid fact, we should consider ourselves
fortunate that things are not \\orse than they are, and nobody
at present has much to grumble at so far as the supply of
their creature comforts is concerned, Many of those creature
comforts, however, are going to cost them more, and those
who, like Mrs. Gilpin, are of a frugal mind are wondering
where and whence they can economise. And this is a point
which can very fairly puzzle the brains of the cleverest of
women. The really clev(>r housekt'eper knows that economy,
like cleverne"., itself, must be disguised if it would achieve
success. There is nothing more damping to the spirits than
the clever person who is yet stupid enough to brazen his
cleverness. There is nothing more chilling in the home than
a " drawing in .. atmosphere. How to avoid this impIession,
and yet effect all necessary economy, is the problem of the
day to all housekeepers.

The Meons to the End
Those who really wish to solve the problem in the most
practical fa"hion can best do so by drawing uf a summary of
their daily routine and studying it. Few things are more
illuminating than a list of this sort. \Ve see our mode of
living down in black and white, and can gather at a glance in
what direction money can be saved. This needs some very
clear thinking, because there are certain ways in which mOTJey
must not be saved, howe\'er harsh may be the demands upon
our purse. As good patriots it is incumbent upon us to
support the organisations working for the good of our soldiers
and sailors. Looking farther afield, we should stretch forth
a hand of comradeship to our Allies, giying help wherever we
can, and thus promoting that feeling of oneness which i"
amongst the foremost assets of the Allied cause. Then there
may be cases of want, only indirectly caused by the war, but
demanding our aid more forcibly now than at any other time.
for, strange though it may seem in these days of terrible
strife, there has yet never been a time when the brotherhood
of man should be more apparent. \Ve are all members of
one large family fighting in a common cause, and the strongest
must help the weakest or else both family and cause will
perish in the ordinary course of events. All these claims
upon us, then, must be generously accepted if we would do
our share of the work.
1\0 better term has evcr been coined than that of
"personal expenditure," Expenditure is personal; so
personal, indeed, that nobody can regulate it but ourselves,
For this reason it is well nigh impossible to lay down an

hard and fast rules about the spending of money. People
must cut their coat according to their cloth, and it is only
the owner of the coat who can judge the true value of its
material and the particular way in which it should be cut to
suit him. Once this is acknowledged, however, there still
remains something that all can banish from their
daily life with the best economical results. If we made up
our minds to rigorously bar all superfluities and diligently
examined ourselves as to the exact meaning of the word,
how much more simple would our lives become. It is the
easiest thing in the world to waste time, money, and energy
on the superfluous; but we have reached a point when
mistakes of this sort will be swiftly punished, and it behoves
us all to beware.

A Foe to Fight
There is an enemy to be fought in the home as well a

abroad, and it is quite as in"idious a foe. Its name is \Y,
.ste.
Napoleon once said that stupidity was worse than a cnme,
but in this case we must quote the reverse, \Vaste has
always been stupid, but at this present time it is
riminal.
There is a legitimate output for every penny of our mcomes,

228

January '2J) 1915

L .\ 1\ D A X D \Y ATE R

:!J 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I!:
= =
- -
- -
How to help Tommy Atkins
- -
- -
= We canno.t all go. o.ut to. fight. but we can =
= all do. so.mething to. help o.ur so.ldiers who. =
= are fighting o.ur battles and defendin:; the =
- honour of our native land. and in this way -
co.ntribute to. their well-being and efficiency

SEND HIM A FLASK OF
HORLICK'S

AL TED MILK TABLETS

...
\\11" I'
t

Invaluable to a so.ldier
in the field and mo.st
efficient in relieving
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.
We will send Po.st free to' any
address a flask o.fthesedelici'(ru;
and sustaining fo.o.d tablets and
a neat vest po.cket case o.n
receipt o.f 1/6. If the man is o.n
active service, be particular to.
give his name, regimental
number. regiment, brigade and
divisio.n.

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Larger Sizes, 1 6, 2/6 and 11/-

Liberal SamPle sent post fre. for 3d, in stamps

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229

L.-\ ;..r 0 A;..r [) \\'.\ TEn

J,lIluary 2.3.19'5

THltOUGH THE Eì-ES
OF A WOMAN

and we must not shirk its responsibility. I t is a \\ i-.;e "'oman,
therefore, who make') uncompromising \\ arfare against wastl'
and finds it her business to see there is no such thing in her
household. It \\ill not be a \'elT ca'i\" lìght to win, but each
da) that pas"L" shows how necessar

it IS to wage.
Some people, in order to prevent a leakage in household
expenditure, are puttmg both the111seh'es and their sen'ants
on a fiwd weekly allowance. A definite sum i<; allO\\ed per
head each week, ann the vexed question of why the h.tker's
book is double that of the preceding week is neV(:r raised,
Why the housekeeping book.;; should tÌuctuate for no special
reason it: always an unsolved problem, but this plan certainly
prevents it arising. l\Iost things, indeed, at the present day
..;eem to resolve themsL'\\'e<; into tlH' plinciples of mathematics,
and for the ide.llist and dreamer they are hard times indeed,
I t is only the practical mind that delights in the ruthless
reduction of everything to pounds, shill in!:?;s , and pence;
but it is the practical mind that tides O\'er a financial diftìculty,
and housekeeping is nothing nowadays if it be not common
sense wnt larg
.

ERICA.

CORRESPO
DENCE

5TH BATT. RIFLE BRIGADE DEPOT, MINSTER,
ISLE OF SIIEPPEY
To the Editor of L-\:\D AXD WATER,
SIR,-I should be extremely obliged if you would kindly
insert the following letter in your paper. There must be
hundreds of old garden and deck chairs stored away which
would be of the very greatest value to our soldiers for their
wooden buildings, which are being built for winter quarters,
:'IIanv of our soldiers have neither mattre<;ses nor chairs. and
have to sit on the wooden floors, which is very trying after
long marches.
\Vould any of your readers who can do so very kindh'
send to-

ERIC GILBEY,
5th Batt. Rifle Brig
t(lc,
:\Iinster, Isle of Sheprev.
Tf possible, each county should supply its o\\n camp

I

-

C 'l.LCIUM car
ide. hitherto almost entirely a foreign production,
,'.m now be obtamed of English manufacture in considerably better
'luality than heret?fore. Our illustration shows the Thornhill factory
of Mes,rs, Chas, 13mgham & Co" manufacturers of all, British carbide,
with no less than twenty,three points in the United Kingdom at \\hich
,l stock is maintained for the convenience of consumers. The quality
of the product m3.Y L
estimated from the fact that one of the 1.l<g
st

t .el firms in the world insists on " Thornhill" carbide, and will not
use the foreign product.
;\IESSRS, BRYANT & !\lAY, the well,known match manufacturers
have des!gned and put on the market an exceedingly u
eful metai
case, which takes the ordinary matchbox and protects the contents
and the striking surface from damp or any other injuries. The case
IS neat and workmanli
e in appearance, and should win favour among
the who have occasIOn to use matches in expo,>ed position>;. It
would be a useful addition to a smokers' outfit in the trenches at the
present time.
THE inventors and makers of the medicated gelatine leave,>
referred to in this issue,are Savory & 1\loore, of 1.13 New Bond Street.
IN these exceptional times much importance and interest attaches
to the publication of that well-known annual, " Sutton's Amateur's
Guide in Horticulture," a copy of which for 1915 has just b
en received,
In an address to their customers "Iessrs. Sutton direct attention to
the vital necessity of producing at home foodstuffs of all kinds on as
extensive a scale as po
'>lble and those who have land suital:le for
raisi,;-:; ,garden crops. will no doubt be alive to the advantage of
cultIvatmg every a
aIiable yard. not only to meet mdividual wants,
but to pro'. Ide agamst any natIOnal emergency.

F or the Comfort of
Mounted Officers

THE KHAKI RIDING SHIRT has been
speciaIl}' designed for 10!1g days in the s3ddle, By means
of a tail piece attached to the back of Ihe shirt which is passed
between the legs anJ fastened in front, it is impossible for the
skirts of the shirt to g"t out of place. or for the shirt ilselí 10
ruck up Absolute com
orl and adJilional warmth is Ihus ass'.ued,

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ITHEKI

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Pure Cashmere Underclothing and Body Belts in different
weights, Beautifully soft, warm and comfortab!e,

TURNBULL & ASSER

.sporting Hosier.J
71-72, JERMYN STREET, LONDON, S.V/.
(5 doors from St lallle
s Strept.}
Telegrams: .. Padd} "hark, London" rt'lC'pho"1e 4628 Gerrr\nl

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MILlY ARY
WATERPROOFS
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cut for riding.

Medium weight

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Detachable fleece
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" Comforls fDr Ihe Trenches."

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:: MANCHESTER:
= 90/92. Cro.. St.
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GLASGOW:
72, St. Vincent SI.

23 0

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXI\'

O. 2751

SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1915

[ I't:
U"III':1I .\" ) PRICE 81)",1'1:'1(('1:
A :\1.\\""1'_\1'1..:1:' !'t:BLI"Ht.1I \\ EEKL\

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Col " 'hl, Eo .anD

MAJOR J. H. S. DI
-I
IER, V.C.
This officer served his machine gun during the attack at Klein Zillebeke until he had been
shot five times-three times by shrapnel and twice by bullets-and cuntinued at his post until
his gun was destroyed. For this act of bravery he was awarded Il.l
V.c., also the new
decoration-the Military Cross.

LAND :\):0 WATER

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24 0

J.Uluary 3 0 , 1915

LAl\JD AND \\Al
1<

THE PART PLAYED BY RAILWAYS IN
MODERN WARFARE

By .. A.M.I.C.E:'

A THOrGH the great war now raging has \\ith
some justice been called a .. motor war." 0\\ ing
to the enormous use made of motor tran
port,
it might even more trul
be described as a
.. railway war." Although motor tran
rort h<1s
pla\'ed a great part in facilitating the mO\TIrcnts of \'ast
armies, in feeding the large masse,;, and in proÙdirg tl'cm
with stores and ammunition, the railwa\'s ha\'e l.;een and
continue to be the chief means of transportation,
The Franco-German \"ar of 1870-71 was really the fiEt
great conflict in which railwa
's became an imrortant elerrer.t
of strategy anll tactics, and since that date there have only
been two land .-ampaigns of first-class importance in which
the\" were used to a large extent, namel\", the South :\frican
and Russo-Japane;;.e war
. rnfortunatèl
', both camraigns
\\ ere conducted in sparsely populated districb prm'idt"d
with \'ery few railway facilities, and as these wars \\ ere
fought outside Europe but little attention was directed to
the \\'ork of the railwa\'s,
A Commission of r
ilwav innstigation, instituted by the
French Government during the armistice in I
7I, stated that
a railwa\' is a docile aDù powerful instrument \\hich should
be used- with intelligence. Its numerous and disciplined
staff is accustomed to obeying precise orders emanating from
one authorit\., and is, of course, completely bewildered when
contradictor,. instructions are sent in from different quarters
at the same time, The Commission reported that this
important element of useful working had been completel

o\'erlooked in the Fraaco-GerITan \"ar, and this was proved
hy numerous facts, In conSl q lence of different orders,
cåunter order
, too frequent requisitions from military
,tuthorities causing fatal ddays and blocking up the sidings,
fighting between generals for priority of trains, etc., the
French railways were hopelessly crippled during the best
part of the war. On January IS, 1871, 6,500 \'ans were
immobilised for such reasons at a single spot on the Paris-
Lyons-:\Iediterranée Raih\ay. Inexperience of the practical
working of the raihl..-ays for militarv purposes resulted in t);e
accumulation of abundant provisions at one place, \\hile at
other places the armies lacked everything, During the
march of Bourbaki's arm\" an obstruction in the station of
Clairsal resulted in 15,Oòo men remaining eight days and
nights in the cars with food for three days only, The
Commission reported that the capabilities of railway trans-
ports are practically indefinite and are only limited by the
amount of rolling stock a\'ailable. The Eastern Raih\ay of
France transported on an average 12,000 to 15,000 men per
day, with cavalry, artillery, and war material, the trains
following each other every hour or half-hour. Each train
usually contained 1,200 men or a battery of artillery \'inoy's
,trmY-50,ooo strong, with artillery-was transported in
thirty hours, while on :'\m'ember 22, 1870, 100,000 men \\ere
rrJllcentrated at Ie :\lans in three days by three different
raib\'a\" lines.
The French admitted that the Germans made more
efficient use of the French line
than the\' did themselws,
because the German railwa
's were being managed by a
C, ,\'ernment Commission which had absolute control over all
the different railway companies, This arrangement is, to a
"ertain extent, the same as that instituted at the beginning
,f the war in Great Britain.
During the war of 1
70 the ordinary passenger and goods
: '.tffir of the German railwa\'s d\\ indled to practically nothing,
the principal busine
s consisting in moving troops, forwarding
siege guns, ammunition, con\'oys of provisions and stores,
and in bringing back from France many numerous trains of
sick and wounded, as weB as prisoners of war. Of the French
arm\' captured at :\fetz 70,000 wpre sent off by railway
through Saarbrücken, whilst t)5,ooo, \\ ith an escort of 16 for
('ven' 100 were forwarded b\" rail to Germanv via Trier.
Pass"enger' carriages were reciui
itioned and fllfl'ished by
every German r,tilwa\' compan
' in proportion to the means
at its command, and fi\'l' trains, \\ith 2,000 prisoners in each,
left :\fetz e\'en' dav. \\ïthin two weeks after the declaration
of war the Germàns laid ro miles of railway on the right
bank of the Rhine, opposite the fortre'>S of Germersheim, to
Graben, near Bruchsal, in order to form a junction from
Worms to Germersheim, This short line proved of great
strategical importance, and was found of immense use for
the rapid conveyance of troops, \\ïth the fall of Toul and
\fetz the Germans obtained uninterrupted communication
between Germany and Xanteuil, about 46 miles from Paris,
24 1

The French destroyed the railway bridge over the :\Jarne,
and consequent I\" the (;ermans had to send their siege guns
from this point to l',tri,.. b
' road, fhe Eastern R.tilway
Cml1pdn\' of France suffered most at the hands of the Germans,
as thio.; r.tilwa\' was entireh" in their possession. Its loss in
rolling stock was, hO\\ e\'er: small, a" most of it was brought
safeh" to the main station in Paris before the German ad\ ance.
One of the results of the \\ ar of 1870 was the wry
important arrangement carried out beÍ\\een the Engli
h and
German Go\'ernments, by which the English overland mails
to India and Australia were di\'erted from the French route
and com'eyed through Germany to :\Junich, and then over
the Brenner Rdilway to "erona. whence they passed through
I taly to Brindisi and shipped to Alexandria,
l"p to the present war railways in this country have
ne\'er been called upon to handle such a volume of traffic as
has been necessitated by the transport of the Expeditionary
Force to France, and also in connection with the movements
of Territorials and Kitchener's Arm\', but those familiar with
our railways have always felt confident that at the critical
moment the railway companies would not be found \\anting-.
In the South A,frican War the London and South-
Western Railwa\' did admirable work, The Chairman of the
Compan
stated'that between Ortober 20, I8q9, and
aturday,
February 3, IqOO, there had been embarked at the Company's
\\'han'cs at Southampton 3,244 officer", II4.933 men, 12,929
horses, 2h7 guns, and 997 militar\ wagons, with 10,000 tons
of stores and ammunition. This traffic was conveyed over
the line in 5q2 special trains, and in no case was a transport
dcIa\'ed b\' the train sen'ice,
-The folIo\\ ing figures show the number of troors and
material handled on specific days on the London and Sout h-
\\'cstern Railwa\'. All this traffic was carried at a time
when trade was -excellent, and in no case was the ordinary
public train service interfercd with :-
Officers r.lilitar)'
Date, IB'-9. and Men. Horses. Guns. \\"ag{Jns
Friday, Oct, 20 4566 16 5 3 8
Saturday, Oct. 21 .. 5048 103 20 89
Sunday. Oct, 22 4859 524 9 27
;\Ionday. Oct. 23 4255 437 5 38
Tuesday, Oct. 24 [581 272 9 4 1
Saturday, Xov, 4 ' 3652 344 2 8
Saturday. Xov, II" 2222 6 1 5
Wednesday, Xov. 15 828 406 12 4 2
The London and Korth-Western Raih\ay also shipped a
large number of troops from Liverpool and other places,
The company brought them from various parts of London
and the country. In connection \\ith the South A.frican War
this company -carried 62,071 troops, 126 guns and horse
in
359 special trains without interfering with the ordinary
traffic, Lord Roberts, in his report on the field tran
port,
referring to the Railways Department, said that the difficult
and arduous work performed by this department reflected
the greatest credit upon all concerned, From Capeto\\n to
Pretoria is 1,040 miles, and Pretoria to homati Poort is
29 2 miles more and, considering the enormous length of line
to protect, it was a wonderful achievement to carry an army
of 250,000 men with aU their equipment into the heart of
the enemy's country.

(To be conllnlled),

Terms of Subscriþtion to
uTHE COUNTY GENTLE
L-\

ASD

LAND

AND

WATER"

(ESTABLISHED 1862),
.\T HO:\JE-Twelve1\Jonths n 8 0
CAN.\DA-Tweh'e :\Jonths
I to 6
ELSE\\'HERE .\BROAD-Twelve :\Ionths
I Ii 0

llle above rates I"clude all Sfecial Numbrrs and Postage.

BACK COPIES of .. LAXD A::o.ID WATER," containing the
series of -\rticIes bv HIlAIRE BELLOC. "THE WAR BY
LAND". and FRED. T. JA"'E. .. THE WAR BY W-\TER: "
togf'ther with a \aluable reference, .. THE TOPOGRAPHICAL
G VIDE.' can be obtained throll!:h anv ::o.Ie"sa!:ent. or on
application to the Offices of .. L \::0.10 AXD WATER." CESTRAL
HousE. Kt'ir.sWAY. \V,C.

LA !\ DAN D \V ATE R

January 30) 19 1 5

,...
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FORTNUM & MASON

,.
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-"" -':'." '7}1
., i:u "r
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By AÞÞn;"lm

t..

Mess Purveyors
for the Front

execute orders, singly or at stated intervals, for thousands of
Naval and Military Officers on Active Service,
Fortnum 6' Mason supply carefully selected articles to large
numbers of Regiments and Batteries (and separate companies) in
France. The prices are strictly competitive, and the unique and
up-to-date experience of the Firm is placed at the disposal of those
interested, and particularly Mess Presidents.
Special Catalogues for Household Use, Ordinary Export, or
the Front, are sent on application.

FORTNUM & MASON
182 Piccadilly, London, W.

LTD,

Telegrams: .. FORTNUM, LONDON,"

Telephone: REGENT 41.

24Z

.January 30, 1915.

L:AND AND W ATERì

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

!lOTI.-Tbl. A.rtlch ba. beeD lub.Utell to tho Prea. Bureau, whIch 1I0ea Dot object to the publlcatioD a. ceDlorell aDll tallea D'
reapoDdbillty for tho correctDea. õf the datemeub.

ID .ccorll..c. wUh tho requlremeDb of the Prea. Bureau, the pOlltlOIll ef troop. on Plan. lIIudratlnf thl. Artlcl. mud oDly b.
ltfarlled .. appro:simate, aDll D' lIefiulh dreDrtb at any poInt I. indicated.

THE WESTERN FIELD.
T HE news from the western front in the
course of the last ",eek has involved no ap-
preciable movement of troops, Indeed,
the mark of all the last few days has
been that throughout the ,,-hole field (by
land) the campaign has been stationary. The line
at Soissons stands just where it did, as does every
part of the western front; even in Alsace, where
very large German reinforcements have failed to
take the wooded height of the Hartsmann 'V eiler-
kopf which overlooks Steinbach and Thann.
The real interest of the time is the approach
of that moment-now not far distant-when the
German Empire shall begin to put forward its new
formations which are also its last reserves, '
How these will be used, and where, are the
main points upon which all speculation now turns,

?

(J)

ttt

'mods

1 2, .3
I I . I
i'()gys 'Marck

clear that if ever he can bring large reinforcements
of sufficiently good material for the action he
should try in his first new offensive in the "\Vest to
invest Verdun, unless some political folly attract

him to the mere name of Reims, as it attracted him
to the mere name of Calais,
It is evident that a really successful offensive
down the line of the .Argonne would be the shortest
way of closing the buckle, of which the wedge at
St. Mihiel is the clasp, and to conceal the massing
of men under modern conditions a great belt of
woodland is perhaps the best opportunity.
In the same way the French, for their offen-
sive, have already considered the Vosges and its
forest. But the advantage of ,,"oods in concealing
a concentration is set off by the disadvantage of
woods as a field for attack. What seems conceiv-
able is the use of such a belt as the Argonne for

@M<<z

@TóuL.

I

:PLAN 8I10IDNG 'InB BJ'IUA'IlON IN mB nCUiI'IY OJ' VERDUN.

and obviously the most vital matter offered to our
judgment.
I hope next week to have room for its discus-
sion at length, meanwhile there is some interest in
r
marking the very active efforts the enemy con-
tmues to make in the Argonne, because it is pretty

concentration, and thence the delivery of an offen-
sive stroke southward and eastward from it acrosS
the Clermontois, the fairly open land beyond Cler-4
mont and towards Triaucourt, that is, along tho
upper valley of the Aire. It is evident that this
movement, if it is successful, will isolate Verdun.

1*

LAND AND WATER.

t]ó Paris &,
Chalo11S
and th

1'Iortñérn ba!f
of the
French Lin

'1õ
Cba.lons
and Pat'is

Æ
Oq
h

January 30, 1915.

LL..J2 e

aZ],c{
Centre
Showing tb
11umflrøus FI:
t1Ch conununie.ations
f
rr.apïa conc
ntratwn at a.1UJ point threa.untd
in ehi r
intrant G
rman Lin
bttw"n
St. Mihi4and th
'Argöl1ne.

l

'To along th

Southern end
dthe French
Line.

and the isolation of Verdun would mean either the
falling back of all the French line to the south of it
or the exhaustion of the southern half of the
French line in repeated attempts. at relief. In
either case such an investment would break the
grip in which the Germans are now held on the
west. It may be suggested, but it is only a sug-
gestion, that the continued activity in Argonne is
in preparation of such a move,
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how
Ilny concentration here could succeed against the
rapid means of counter-concentration which the
French possess immediately behind the German
r
-entrant angle, There is full railway opportu-
nIty for massing troops by the big double lines
through Chalons and the other parallel line to Bar-
l
-Duc, and there are very numerous cross-lines,
smgle and double, and for all movements within
t
is angle the French have obviously the shorter
line, f
r they are inside the concavit)T formed by
the resIstance of Verdun.
In connection with the resistance of Verdun
there arises a point which has heen put by more
than one correspondent, and which may as well be
dealt with here.

II

\Vhy (it is asked) does Przemysl, which is
quite isolated from the rest of the Austrian forces,
still hold out, and why (it might be added) is no
effect produced by siege work against Verdun?
\Vhy does that fortress continue to impose a dan-
gerous re-entrant angle upon the German line in
spite of the fact that modern permanent fortifica-
tion is, as has been repeatedly pointed out in these
columns, since the lesson was learnt at the begin-
ning of the war, dominated by modern howitzer
fire? Liège fell in a few days, N amur in a few
hours, Maubeuge in something over a week. \Vhat
is the meaning of these apparently exceptional
cases?
The answer to that question is that yet an-
other German theory has been proved true. There
is a method of defence (alternative to permanent
fortification) -which ,ve know that Metz has
adopted since August, and which we may presume
that Verdun has, and Przemysl as well, and this
may be described as follows:-
- Since the vulnerability of a permanent work
consists almost entirely in its restricted area, since',
that is, an enclosed fort with a known position
upon the m3.p can be destroyed by distant ho-n it.

2*

LA
D AND WATER

J"anuary 30, 1915.
zcr fire ("hich the guns of the fort with their fbt
trajectory do not dominate, and which with its
long range and therefore large circumference of
action the auns of the fort cannot easily search
out), let the O permanent fortification be abandoD:ed
and a series of trenches traced upon a perimeter
larger than and exterior to the perimeter of the
old forts, and let the mobility of heavy guns be
organised as well as may be-for it is always a
difficult matter-by the laying of light rails within
such "orks. Let the emplacement of them be
chosen in positions naturally concealed upon the
edge of wooded heights and whatnot, and then the
defence loses nearly all the disadvantages it had
through the known position of restricted fortified
areas. You have established a quasi-mobile ring
of defensive fire and replaced the old immovaùle
riEg. The fire of those who desire to invest a
fortress so organised bas to search as best it may
for the unknown gun-positions of those whom it
would besiege, and having found them is never cer-
tain that precisely the same position will be l1ehl
upon the morrow. The only condition nece:;;sary
to the success of such a plan is the condition of
numbers. You must have more guns and a larger
number of trained gunners, and they have, of
course, to do a great deal more work than under
the system of narrowly restricted permanent forti-
lìcations.
I believe it will be found when the history of
the \\ar is written that Przernysl has been holding

out under these conditions, anll that our Russian
A.llies haye been kept at a distance from the old
permanent work'3 precisely as the Germans in the
regions nortJ:1 and east of Verdun are kept at a
distance Ìrcm the old permanent works of that
fortrcEs.

THE EASTERN FIELD.
I N the eastern field of war there are three re-
maining points of interest, the action in the
Caucasus having come to an end apparently
with the escape of the remnants of the 10th
Turki
h Army Corps and the safe retirement
of the 11th, The Battle of Sarikamish now three
weeks past has had its decisive effect, and has
killed the Turkish offensive
gainst Caucasia,
while the long-reported concentration of troops
for an advance again51t Egypt has not yet begtill
to take effect.
The three points of interest then are:-
First: The reported move against Servia;
second, the actions on the frontier of Bukovina,
near and upon the crest of the central Carpa-
thians, where the old Northern Roumanian fron-
tier marched with that of Austria-Hungary; and_,
third, the hitherto curiously rapid advance in
Northern Poland between the Vistula and the
frontiers of East Prussia.
I name the three movements in the order of
their apparent importance,
As to the first: We have as yet no grounds for

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believing that it will be pursued. The news of a
considerable advance against Servia was put for-
ward through the same sources as that which the
German Government has used time and again with
the object of deceiving the Allies. We had it from
tIle same sources as the news that masses of G
r-
man troops were being concentrated for a new at-
tack upon the Yser more than a month ago when,
as a fact, the whole German effort was being de-
veloped in the eastern field. and at the very
moment when the German General Staff had de-
termined to stand for some time upon the defen-
sive in the West.
Moreover, it is elementary that a diversion
towards Servia a t this stage ,\
ould be very bad
general strategy. The Austro-German line in the
eastern field cannot be held as the German line in
the 'Vest can be held, that is, continuously from
end to end, It cannot be so held because it is
nearly hrice as long. The coming of better
weather, the equipmcnt of further Russian re-
serves, may put the extremities of the line in peril
at any moment. For it is obvious that a line of
trenches can be turned like any other line by supe-
rior numbers when they are available, unless that

January 30, 1915.

line reposes, as does the line in the West, upon
two absolute obstacles-the sea and a neutral
frontier-and unless there be men enough to hold
the whole of such a line. The Austro-German
forces in the East are not numerous enough to hold
a line from t.he Carpathians to the Baltic continu-
ously, and therefore they are in peril of a Russian
offensive whenever Russia has sufficiently ad-
vanced her equipment and munitions to attempt
it, or even when the first more favourable condi-
tions in the weather permit it, To waste ten Army
Corps in a distant and quite separate field under
such circumstances and that against an enemy
whom it is comparatively easy to contain along the
line of his frontier rivers, of the Save, the Drav.e
and tho Danube, would obviously be bad stra-
tegies.
But there is one possible motive for suc'h a
blunder which, like every other disturbance of
Austro-German strategy, is political in character.
and that motive would be twofold:-
(1) If Servia could really be successfully occu-
pied a road would be opened for the provision of
munition, and if necessary later of reinforcement
to the Turkish Ally of the' Germanic Powers,

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January 30, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

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(2) Much more important, it might be hoped
that BIDgaria would throw in her lot then with the
Germanic Powers.
The reason of Bulgaria's tendency in this
direction is already history and is fairly ",idely
known. But because it is not always fully appre-
ciated in the complexity of the present struggle
it may be worth repeating here.
"\Vhen Austria forbade, after the Balkan War,
the access of Servia to the Adriatic, she embroiled
Servia with Bulgaria by suggesting and permitting
the occupation by the former country of land which
was (in the main) racially and by culture and tradi-
tion, Bulgarian, This area is roughly marked
upon the accompanying sketch-map by the letter
'À. Bulgaria was offered, indeed, compensation
towards the East in the district B, but that district
was not historically Bulgar at all; it was Greek

nd Turk, and the artificial arrangement, so cha:t-
acteristic of Viennese international policy, may
be compared to a settlement that should give
France a slice of Spanish soil, while condemnin,g
her to lose a further portion of Lorraine. ThIs
unnatural plan was the cause of the second Balkan
War in which Bulgaria lost. To recover for herself
the district, A, is a permanent object of Bulgarian
policy, and if Servia were subdued in a third Aus-
trian attempt upon her Bulgaria would, of course,
be offered this district, A, as the prize of her joining
with her excellent Army, unstricken as yet by the
present war, the Germanic cause.
Apart from that political reason there is no
military reason why a great body should be wasted

by itself in the south when it may be needed at any
moment to guard the issues of the Carpathians, or
to fight against a new Russian offensive in Poland,
and until one can get better evidence of such a
movement it is as well to hold one's judgment in
suspense as to whether it is taking place at all.
(2) The movement upon the frontiers of Buko-
vina is in another category, We know that the
Russians have made an effort here in spite of tho
abominable weather conditions, and we know of
what importance it is to Austria that Hungary
should be saved from a second invasion. The ne'ws,
therefore, of an Austro-Hungarian concentrat
on
upon this corner against the Russian movement is
probable in itself, and is borne out by the fighting
of which we haye official news.
There are two points about that fighting which
are specially worth noting.
The first is that comparatively small forces
are being employed here upon either side, Let it
be noted that the front is a short one, not more
than fifteen to twenty miles, and that the last ac-
counts speak of "a whole Austrian division" as
being engaged in the region of Kirlibaba. But
when one talks of a whole division in this way it
mcans that the fighting has hitherto been in terms
of brigades, and that compared with the forces
hitherto present in the region, even one division is
a considerable new unit. Now, consider that upon
the Polish front, that is, along the Donajec, up the
Nida, and so across to the Lower Vistula, there
cannot be less than 100 divisions at ","ork upon the
enemy's side, probably a good deal more, and then

5'"

LAND AND W ATLR

one can estimate the comparative unimportance
in mere numbers of what "is going on on the Rouma-
nian frontier,
The second point to note is that the fighting,
such as it is, has not given the 'Russians permanent
possession yet of the crest, that is, of the passes
over into Hungary.
The main lines of the geography of this reciion
may be appreciated in the sketch on page 4,
where it will be seen that the front spoken of in
the eommuniqués lies upon \VIlat is for the Russians
the wrong side of the range. The last accounts
speak of places ten miles east upon the aver-
age of those points upon and just bej'ond the
crest which were mentioned ten days ago, and this
almost certainly means that the fir.:it points upon
the summits seized by the Russians were held by
no more than outposts, which fell back before a
new Austro-Rungarian concentration from the
three railheads at A, B, and C,
These two matters, the supposed new move
against Servia, the Bukovina movements, are not
very important points, but they are all there is to
now for the moment in this south-eastern field.
The third district in which there has been some
movement is, as we have seen, that between the
Lower Vistula and the East Prussian frontier.
The accounts have been meagre from both sides,
and western judgment has been a good deal puzzled
by the rapid mention one after another of a series
of places which scelI
to mark a curiously rapid
advance of the RussIan forces upon the flank of
the main German line of communications between
Thorn and other German depots, and the German
Army on the Bzura and the Rawka threatening
Warsaw. The matter is strategically of the
utmost simplicity.
For provisioning in a ruined land the German
front along the Bzura and the Rawka, where the
l)id is being made for "\Varsaw, there are only two
divergent lines of railway, the one leading to
Thorn, and the other, widely divergent, leading
to Silesia and ultimately to Posen. Further, so
long as it is really open, the Vistula is an avenue
of supply in itself. N ow, it is clear that anyone
operating in the region, A-A, with a large force is
in a position to threaten the Vistula line, and if he

COPPER

AND

T HE di:;cussion of a military pl'obl
lll differs
from the discussion of a political pro-
blem in the same way that the discus-
sion of means differs from the discussion
of an end.
Every war is fought with a political object, but
the conduct of a war once it is engaged is not a
political. but a military affair, In other words, one
may say 'J This action tends to make you win the
war, that action tends to make you lose it," and the
political comment to be offered against such purely
milit
ry grounds of action must have a ven" great
weight indeed if it is to expect attention. 'For to
103e a great war i3, next to losing its soul and
Iib
rty, the worst thing that can happen to a
natIOn. This is particularly the cac;e in a war
such as is this war J deliberatèl y forced by a power
whose avowed object, proclaimed throurrh years of
:publi
action and speech and print, is m
stèr.r over
Its nelghbours, and the cnforced change of their
lives to its own model.

January 30, 191:5.

can c,r035 the river to threaten the railway; ,,,hile
at one point, B (,,"hich Ï3 Vloclawek), the IÍne could
actually be destroyed by heavy artillery operating
from the further bank of the stream. But there
are certainly as yet no large forces in thÙ; northern
wedge of Russian Poland, and we may be confident
that the moycments of which we heal' are, as has
been said Lefore in thc5e comments, no more than
the movements of c
n-alry. For this conclusion ,YO
have eviden.ce which has already been gin
n, but
which it may be well to recapitulate,
'Yc have in the first place the rapidity of the
movements, in the second place the equally rapid
fluctuations of the front (if it can be callcel a front),
and in the third place the obvious i.ndiffel'e.nce of
the great German forces in front of 'Yar3a:w to
what i;; going on upon their flank. To such
arguments may Le added the fact that, since there
is no railway to support a Russian mOì-e of this
kind (the 'fhole district has only one north and
south line through 1flawa to Warsaw), large - in-
fantry llion'ments would have to be accomplished
even more slowly than elsewhere,
Glance, for instance, at the names of the
plac2s where contact has been established, \Ye
bear of such contact at Konopka south of I\llawa ;
again at Sierpe, and across the Skrawa; then for
one Lrief moment we hear (a week ago) of contact
at Skempe. That Í3, we have isolated 81..irmishes
over a field forty or fifty miles broad, and in places
separated by distances which bodies of infantrr
could neyer deal with in the time.
The m03t advanced post of which therc is lllcn-
tion scorc,:; a local German success at Lipno; later
the telegrams speaks of another brush a t least a
day's march further East again, and all of thi

means" ithout doubt that only comparati,-ely small
bodies of cavalry are "feeling" for each other
along that dreary land of stunted trees, ,small
s,,yelb of heaths, and bottoms of mar3h and mcre,
not that an,. comiderable movement is or can be yet
afoot thC're, 'Vhen such a movement reallr doc..:;
develop, 01' if it can develop in spite of the German
forces Ul)on its flank in East Prussia, we
hould
at once be aware of it hr the retirem
nt from the
line of the BZllra, ,vhich' would be imposell in that
case upon the German forces.

COTTON.

If J ou are about to fight another man for your
life-and for Lis; if at the outset of such a struggle
you see a third party handing him a lethal weapon;
if, seeing this, lOU neither protest nor attempt to
:prevent it, then it means either that you are y.-i1l-
lUg to sacrifice
our life rather than break some
principle ydlÍch forbids you to interfere, or it
means MIat YOU Lelieve interference would illvolrc
even greater dangel'3 than the possession by your
enemy of the lethal 'reapon in question.
These elcmentar
- principles are surely quite
clear.
N ow, proceeding from them, the fir:;t thing we
have to cstablish in a purely m,ilit
D' criticism
upon a policy of contraband is that the blockade of
an euemy should be as complete as p03sible: l,ut
that general point ha3 already been dealt "jth in
the:-;e columns. It is too {'arly to return to it. and,
moreo\'er, the perfect hlockàde of the GermaniC's
i
not p03sible in the sense in which it is po::>",iblc to
block the entr
' of good=! into a full,}' besi{'g
d to"Yn.

ç;,,.

January 3D, 191j,

LAND AND WATER

because, at the very least, they can obtain some
supplies from neutrals.
nut there is another point which will be
universally conceded, and which has not been dealt
,,,ith in these columns. It is of the first import-
ance. It is of capital importance at this particu-
1<11' moment,
H for political reasons distinctions must be
made between absolute contraband, conditional
contraband and free goods, it is at least clear that
the scale so established must run from more
dangerous to less dangerous goods, "\Ve may
doubtfully allow luxuries to pass into a besieged
place; we may still more doubtfully allow certain
necessaries-medicaments, for instance, or (less
surely) clothing-to pass into a besieged place; we
may do so from a respect for a particular code of
morals or from fear 'of a neutral who is supplying
the enemy with these. But before we allow guns
and ammunition, and, in general, lethal weapons
to pass into the hands of the enemy, we must surely
have infinitely stronger grounds for our action.
Now, the point to which all this leads up IS
that cotton is to-day in the latter case.
Cotton is not only a harmless substance whjch
provides the civilian portion of our enemy with a
livelihood, with wealth, and with clothing. Nor
is it even only a necessary requisite for the equip-
ment of his troops whose function it is to kill or
disable as many Englishmen as they can, It is
also-and the matter is so clear that one marvels
it should ever have stood in doubt-the equivalent
of what was known to generations of soldiers 3S
the chief factor in ammunition-gunpowder,
\Vhen you allow cotton to go into Germany
you are behaving exactly as though ttí.e Germans
had allowed train-load after train-load of good olù-
fashioned black gunpowder to come week by week
through their lines into Paris during the great
siege of 18'70. You are supplying the enemy with
a lethal weapon just as much as though you were
to send an order to some neutral country begging
them to cast heavy artillery for the benefit of the
Germans and undertaking to let those guns enter
Germany without molestation, And you are in
particular permitting Germany to obtain that one
element in her power of killing your s-oldiers which
she cannot supply of herself,
These are, of course, strong words, but they
are as clear a part of the truth in the present situa-
tion as is the weather or the numbers we discover
for recruitment.
It is not to be presumed from this statement
that no political argument can be found strong
enough for the raising of the blockade (1) in the one
matter of cotton.
In time of war there is no public duty more
imperative than acceptance of existing authol'it.."
of whatever character; and the political authori-
ties of a great country to-day have before them, as
no private citizen can have before him, all the
evidence upon which they determine their policy.
But what, perhaps, is not always before them or
,before the public is the purely military aspect of
that policy, and it is only to emphasise the military
.aspect that this note is written.

J. I am reminded by a corrcøpondent tnat, atrictly lipeilkin
, in the
English language and In legal terminology the term .. blook3.de" applieø
only to the prevention of goodø from entering a port. But I know of
no other oonvenient term to dC6cribe what ill called abroad a "bloeDs"
and 1 therefore continue to ulie it.

There mîght have been the very best and
strongest reasons to convince Bismarck in 1870
that the free passage into Paris of train-loads of
gunpowder was worth permitting, He would,
perhaps, have had a difficulty in persuading
Moltke, but still good reasons might conceivably
have been present. It none the less would have
remained within the due province of criticism to
point out that what was going in was not black
sand, but an explosive which, when you put a
match to it, discharged a missile, and that such
missiles killed and wounded German soldiers.
"\Vhy does one sn,y that cotton is the equivalent
to-day of what was then gunpowder?
Because every explosive charge which launches
a missile in modern war is simply cotton treated
in a particular fashion-" nitrated" to use the
barbarous jargon, The proportion in which it is
"nitrated" gives it its explosive character or
lack of chemical equilibrium, For instance, the
famous T.N,T, (not a cotton explosive), abo
t
which such furious nonsense has been written, is
a stable form: a triple nitration, The French
formula is less stable, that is, more explosive; it is, I
believe quintuple; because the French nitrate more
highly than the Germans, But in every case, where-
ever a modern weapon is discharged cotton is the
stuff that launches the missile. All the factories have
their plant for the treatment by nitration of cotton,
and it is in terms of cotton that every operative
in the process and every engineer connected with
it has thought for years.
The chemicals whereby cotton is suhjected to the
process of nitration which turns it from a h::rmlcss
vegetable product to an explosive are obtainable
by Germany and Austria ill spite of the blockade.
l'hey are obtainable in any quantities, for they
are obtainable in the last resort from the air.
The air we breathe contains, as is now very ['cnerally
known, nitrogen. But cotton cannot be produceù
in Europe at all. It is a sub-tropical product
and the three great sources of it are the Southern
States of the American Union, India and Egypt,
The supply from India and Egypt we can ourselves
control. The whole question, of course, turns
upon how to deal with the supplies from America.
Whether to purchase them ourselves or no : \\ hether
to let them go through to Germany freely.
It will here be objected by those who are
familiar with the elements of modern armament that
other substaÙces than cotton can be used for the
purposes of making the explosive in question. \V oc(l
pulp, for instance, can be used, and has been lI
P!1.
Almost any substance c[lpable of absorbing' a fluid,
of fixing elements in it, and of subsequent dissectioll
and moulding into any shape large or small, might
take the place in theory of cotton.
This is true. The ohjection is sound, GIld
Germany and Austria have inexhaustible resern:s
of wood, for instance, which might replace cotton if
cotton were denied them. Or they might fall back
on rags.
But the check that would be produced by a
stoppage of cotton supplies ma.y be compared to the
check that would be produced by a sudden change
of calibre in armament. It would mean the
erection of new plant for the manufacture of
this all-important military material, the charge
used in your guns and rifles, and it would mean
what is perhaps more important under the strain
of war, new habits in the workman aud kls

7*

LAND AND WATER,

chiefs. It would mean a host of new experi-
ments. It would mean even after the delay of
changing from one material to the other, uncer-
tainty, checks in provision, the calling in from time to
time of badly manut.l,ctured or dangerous stuff. It
would mean either under-nitration for fear of
mistakes in the novel materials, or accidents and
explosions in the magazines. It would be a yery
serious check to the em'my for a prolonged space in
the war; it would be a permanent drag upon him
throughout the war.
'Vhen we say that habit is in the workman
even more difficult to change than plant in the
machinery, the practical man acquainted with manu-
facture must be consulted, and will surely support
such a contention. Under the strain of war
especially, when every unit of energy that can be
spared is being forced into the business of armament,
of continued and feverish supply, to ask great bodies
of men suddenly to change tricks of manipulation
and acquired routine connected with a particular
material and to adapt themselYes to another untried
material is like asking a general to change his front
in the stress of battle. It is imposing upon this side
of the enemy's strength the greatest weight we can
impose upon it.
To see the importance of the matter in its full
light we may contrast cotton with copper,
Copper is indeed a military necessity just as
much as cotton is, Copper also could conceivably ba
replaced, but only by a worse material, and at an
expense of change in habit of manufacture. Copper
is not a product of the enemy's country save in com-
paratively small amounts, He must obtain it from
without, and the blockade treats coppðr as contra-
band, Further, the main supply comes, just a8
the cotton comes, from the greatest of the neutral
countries. Copper is necessary to the manufacture
of a rifle cartridge because its alloys and compounds
can be drawn in the closed shape without a rim or
joint, which makes the metal case of the cartridge
gas-tight, These same compounds being much
softer metal than any iron do not upon the explosion
of the charge similarly damage the chamber into
which the cartridge fits. Copper is necessary for
making rings round eyery kind of shell, which rings
take the rifling as the discharged projectile
le:nres the chamber and passes into the
muzzle of the gun. But the amount of copper
needed in proportion to the stocks available to
Germany is something quite different from, and.
f
r less than, the similar proportion of cotton for
explosives. It is true that something like .t4 will be
paid in gold by the German Government for as much
copper as you could buy in the outer market for .tl.
But that is because Germany and her ally are
wisely making
royi.bion for a prolonged struggle,
and are determmed not to be balked for lack of
mere material. High as is the price of copper in
Germany and Austria to-clay the civilian electrical
works are not yet shut down, and the great reserves
of copper in the foreign areas controlled by Ute
German and Austrian armies ha ve not seriousl y b
en
damaged yet.
The ci,'ilised world handles eyery >-ear, if
I am not mistaken, somethint)' like a millIon tons
o
of copper, Of this Germany handles eyery year
auout one-quarter, or 250,000 tons. Take such a
stock of rifle cartridges as two thousand million,
?r s::,"y 50
.rounds a man for the Germany Army
lQ l,tS orIg1llai strength, the amount of copper
re1UIred for that vast stock I make out to be

January 30, 1'915.

10,000 tons, or one-twenty-fift.h only of the normal
supply for the total industry of the nation, What
may be needed for the rings of shells, large and
small, would be a much more difficult calculation
,
for you have all sorts of sizes to take into account,
and the rate of expenditure can only be very
roughly and inaccurately guessed at. But multiply
it by four times the amount required by the
infantry, and you are still at no more than a fifth
of the normal amount handled by the nation in
the year. Add to this the fact that the war was
brought about at the moment chosen by Germanr,
that is, after Germany had been laying in stocks
of every kind, and had prepared the fullest possible
equipment, and add to this consideration again the
known fhct that the main masses of copper in the
occupied countries-the electric light cables, tbe
electric tramway cables, etc,-have not yet been
touched, and you can but conclude that while it
is an obvious military policy to prevent the entry
of copper as far as possible into Germany and
Austria, yet such a blockade can as yet, and for
a very long time to come, do no more than un-
quiet the enemy for the future,
"rith cotton it is otherwise. It is not a material
of which very large stocks are accumulated, or one
which remains in stock very long, for it is bulky, and
it is of its nature rapidly manufactured, Fl{rther,
it cannot, like copper, be reduced to its original state
once manufactured, Again, it is far easier to control
the imports of cotton than of copper. It is im-
possible to conceal it, It moves in vastly larger
amounts, and there is not, as there is in the case of
the metal, a corresponding use for it ill most of the
neutral countries, Finally, the addition to our old
stocks of cotton by purchase 'would be an operation,
if immediately expensive, yet not ultimatelrdepletino-
the resources of the nation, 0
There must be repeated once more at the close
of this note what ,vas said in the middle of it :
Political considerations may be strong enough to
account for any modification of what would app
ar
upon the surface to be a military necessity. It is
none the less important for eycryone concerned in
this grave issue, the public, as well as their governors,
to appreciate that the entry of cotton in Germany
and Austria does not mean the entry only of ã
material which clothes the enemy's soldiers and
increases the enemy's general wealth; it means in
the eyes of those who supply the armies e,-eryt.hing
that used to be meant years ago by the word gun-
powder, It means the one most obvious and purely
military necessity ,,,hich the enemy necessarily lacks,

7'erJlu oJ'SUbSC1'iption to

"THE COUNTY GENTLEMAN

AND

LAND AND "W A TER"

(ESTABLISHED lS
2).
AT 1I0
IE-T\\'"elV'e Months - .
1 8 0
CANADA-Twelve Months .
1 10 6
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Tweh'e l\Ionths
1 17 0

The aliin'e ratu include all Sptcial ltíwtber, and I'l1sta:Jð.

BACK ('OPIES of II J,AND AND WATER," containing the
serie"i of Artldeø by lIILAII:E DELLOC', II THE W AU BY
I.AND"; and }<'ItEU '1.', JANE, "nm WAR ny WATER,"
tog(:tl.er with a valuaLle reference, "TIlE TOPOaflAPlIlCAL
GUIDI<:." can be obtained through any 1\c"sagcnt. or on
application to the Oaìces of J'LANU AND W Al'Jo.:lt," CENTRAL
HOUSE, I{IKGBW AV, W.C.

S.

Januarr
O, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

By

FRED

BY

WATER.

T.

JANE.

NOTE.-Thh Artlcl. ha. "eea .ahmlttd h tlu Pun Barna, whic!! don aot object to t!u p:JllllcatiaD al cCluor
d, aD4 taku ..
I'eliloalibilit, for t!l. correctacu of the ltatelilcah.

THE NORTH SEA.
The Dattle of the Nortb Sea.
K Sunday, 21th, Admiral Dcatt.y's battle-cruiser
s1ua.dron m
t the German battle-cruiser squqd-
ron III tl
e
ol'lh ðea, :md. havill'" chased it, suc-
ceeded in silll
in;; the Blüclter and daman-in'" h 0
lJattle-cruisers. 0 0
.' .
fhis is pl'Obahly the most important naval
aC,lon \',ll1ch the war has :ret seen. I use the word U prob-
a
ly JJ
e;ause we do not know what was the German objec-
tive. II It wel'e merely to indulge ill another East Coast raid
then the action has less military siO"nificance than the batt I;
of the Falhland Is1an
s. If, Lowev
r, the German objective
was to endeavoUl' to shp out on to our trade routes-as I re-
cently suggested in tLese Kotes they will !Sooner or later
attem p ; to do
then tlle
attle tak
s on a very high impor-
tance, .01' these oattIe-erUlsers "Hould have been far more dan-
gel'ous in. the
tlantie t
an von Spee's ships would llave been
had .\(hmral Sturdce faIled to find them off the Falkl
nds.
The idea. of a foiled coast raid will probably be most
p1cMlllg' to popular. se.ntil
H'n
in this countl'Y on account oi
the eleulent of
oehc JustIce mvolved, but for evel'y pound's
worth of material damage that the German ships could have
achieved against the CO:1st towns thej' <XJuld have ùone some-
thing like ten thousand pounds" worth on the hiO'h EeaS to
6ay nothing of a possible inte
ruption of our food suppl;.
. As the Ge
ma
s tu
n
d tall and ran for it so soon as they
Blgltted Beatty s slups, It IS clear that they were not out spoil-
ing {or a fight at all hazards, On the other hand, to turn and
run for it was the only logical thing to do.
To have fought a pitched battle would have re1>lllted in
annihila
ion "ith small prospect of inflicting much, if any,
ùamage III return, {or the British squadron had a very con-
sidCl'able superiority, as the following table of guns' avail-
able on the broadside will indicate;-

,...

BnITlSn.
Lion ................ 8 l3.5in.
Tiger ...'........... 8 13.5in.
Princess no.al... 8 13,jin.
r\ew Zealand ..... 8 l2in,
Indomitable 8 l:!in.

GEmUX,
DCl'ffiinger ......... R l
in.

evdlitz ........ '" 10 Hin.
?'IòItke ............ 10 Hin.
ßlücher ............ 8 Bin,

That is to say, 40 big guns :1n-ainst 28, plul 8 inter-
mediates unlikely to do much dam
ge. I have <>mitted all
reference to lesser guns, as it is oovious that, though well
supplied with these, the Germans would not be given an oppor-
tUlllt

f u
iDg them. Still, the mea1>ure of our big gu

supeJ'lonty IS not mcrely a inatter of numbers, but also of
superior size and, consequentl
", greater effective range and
pel:etl'ative power. Altogether, therefore, our !Superiority
l11a.\" be put as at least two to oue, and the German admiral
codJ ha\'e I.ad no delusions wbatever as to the re
lllt of a
general action had he attempted one.
.\s things were, he got off with the 1063 of his ""I1'eake;;t
sllip, the BìÜc1ler, and considerable damage inflicted on two
of h:.

attIe'cruisers-probauly the ]kr[ilin[Jcr and lIlo1tl.'e,
pre:,unung the flagship, Se!/dlit=, to be leading the line.
Ko duubt he had hopes of gettin
back ooÌore our ships
coulJ close sufficiently to do liÍl11 mueh serious damage. Ko
douht, also, he had dreams of drawing his pursuers O\.er mine
fidùs or in the ,yay of submarines. Of all this, however, 'l\"e
8 1 1aU prouahly see nothing in tbe German repol.ts, l\"llich we
may be cel'tain l\"ill make much of .. the B,'itish in over\', hehl-
ing i..rcc," and a .. masted"\"' rclreat." ".e need not O "'ludn-e
. 0
them such an explanation.
There is one circumstance in connection with the actiun
y, I.:ch puzzles me, :I.lld that is the a ù;;ence of tlle German
battle-cruiser, rOll cia Ta/ln, v.hich is, or \\as, the flagal.ip of
Uear-Admiral }<'unke, a fast ve"sel anned with ei;;ht ll-il!ch
guns, and certainly a 1110l'e fittin,
unit to the squadl'on than
was the much weaker Ellie/la.
As to wIlY she was ah;eJ.t tl:ere are three po;;sible
Lypotheseø. Of these, the first, that. sile was unJeq;oing refit,
is iwprõbaùIe, A. Eecond is that she has eit11e1' been sunk or
badly damaged oy mine or suomarine, and the loss concealed.

A third po
sibility is tLat she c:J.me out and managed to slip
aw:J.Y bound for the tI'ade routcs. Whether she will ....et then)
is anotLer matter. If she docs, the Gcrm:ms wiU þrobablv
consider the Blûclta well lo;;t; and till the whereabou-ts dr
the Yon del' 'J.'ann is ascertained, we may dõ well to avoid
over-ebtion about a victory, of which the
J1ain signific:1,noe is
in any case that our ships were at the ri
ht spot at the right
lìlomed, ratLer than the precise a:uount of damaóc inflicted.

Submarine Attacks on Mercbant Shipping.
On J anuar: 21 the Bl,:tish steamer D!lTll'OT.l \\"as cap-
tured and sunk by a German submuine off the Dutch Coat-to
Accol'din ó to the. accounts which have been issued. three torpe-
does wcre fired mto her, and it then too:;: b
r about half an
hour t
sink. The sublll
rill
is st:\td to be U 19, and the
approxImate cost of the torpedoes fi!"(
d mu"t have been some-
thing like double the value oi t!te c.ug'o of the DUr/mrd. A
erui
er could l.ave dona the samc work at aho
t on.e-tenth to
one-twentieth of the !Sum in\'ulvcd. The Cermans :r:av, of
course, obt:}in more value fùl' IlU;.cv I.ex: til:1C, hut t;kincr
one thing. with another it.looks as th'J
;
!1 the von Tirpitz pia;;
of attackmg merchant slllps b,; sULm3rll1CiJ has ecoIlomi:: d;s-
abilities likel
" to rendel' it inoperativc, the r..ìore so
3 onlv
a rel:ttively
mall numocl' of German sabmarinc;; ::ore arm
d
\\ itL gm::s, and &0 al'e unable to co;npel a steamel' to :,tor.
A submarine which can get out is, of course.
n effioient
sub.st:tate for a crui
cr ",hieh cannot; but sil.lee wal' is mostlv
f\ matter of psychology and mOlley, pa;:ing twopence for a
penny is not likdy to endure vcr,' Io:-:g,
O.f .course, :} <'C1.tain amoullt or capital is injured, out r.f
the fõallIn3 of various ve";"e},, Lein,:; ealloellcd. nut I {Ol' 011,'
ausolutcl
" refuse to believe that much rllOneV is to be nudc O!lt
of commerce v. arfare unleG
:t be on a he';.v. scale. And if
nothing can be made out of it, the odda are" that tllC encllIv

s accumulating financial los,;;ci> and
asting E.h-ell ó th acrorJ-
mgly, 'ro adopt a chess analog., at the bc..t there is litllo
in it except e.xch:}nging pieces. . Cnk-.;;s a ....reat deal of dis-
crimination. be used by the eneInJ., it is :1,'" great deal nwl"o'
likely to b
equival
ut to throwing pie
cs away. There is not
the remotest occa1>ion for panic in an" \Va'," whatever.
Kor, so far as the lJuru'Q1'J i'i
L.c
rned, is thei"e anv
re:}son to descl'ibe the operation as "pi
'acy." So far as tJ.

circumstances admitted, c: 19 aciNI exactìy :1
tIle Emdm
acted. Her ultimate fate, we m:J.Y hope. and believe, will be
more or lcss the S:1me. Everj't:ling was wbat is vulO"arlv
I " f '" d J " .
mon n as :1 :}Ir cop, an to !oee..-: to I'epresent thin<rs other-
wise is foolishn<,ss. <I
This statement will, I e.xped, Lring m2 a certain storm of
protc.;;t from th03e 'l\"ho fail to reJ.lise that wo are engaged :11
a w:}r of facts without regard to sentiment, If the Germans
ßubmal'ine a single merch:lIlt ship, leaving LeI' crew to drown.
we shall then have a VCl'y decided case Co. vengealì<'C. But our
case then will certainly not be improved bv hysteric;; now a.IJùtlt
perfectly legitimate ånd I'easonable acts
f ';ar.
So long as :} merchant ship is captured and destl'O\C,I
only fifter her crew have been ßal\'ed, there i" nothin'" tö bo
said, whether it be from the air or from under the sea. 0 Ther"
is no difference in principle involved, Ii the enem\" considef'l
himself lil::ely to obtain advantage by such procedure he i>J

orally as "Hell as legall;: entitled to seek that :}dvantage, It
IS by no means to our disadvantage that he should divel't his
torpeJoes from main to subsidiar
" object;;.

The Admiralty and the 'VUe
For some time I hJ.ve been recei,':::,:;" letters wh:ch e.xpre;:;'1
profound di
s:}tisfaction with the _\JlIliraItv and our AJ-
mil'als. Of late these letters Lave increased'ill number fi!"!
intensity, and it i'J abund:mtlv dear that an ever-incrcasin,.
section of the public is comi!l;; to rcganl Winston Churchill .1

a "gasb:Jó." Lurd Fisher as a "noodle," and .\,Jmiral Jdii-
coe as an "inOOlnpetf\nt."
The 01,1;:." satisf:1d\Jr
. fcature of this state of :1!T.1ir's i'l
that it is characte1'Íst!cally British-it happened regubrlv in
t:le olJ \\"ars. With the po:-.sible ex eptioa of the
Tr:lfa'l-Tat.
campa:;m, I1le;'e wa" I
eVl'r Il W:1r in wLich the great BriJsh
11tÒlic \\ a') no
firllll;' cOllvi nceJ of the incompetence of nil

9'"

LAND AND WATER

those primarill responsible for its naval operations. I am by
no means sure that I should attempt to except the Trafa1gar
campaign-no less a person than the .great Duke of Wellington
regarded
elson Wi a II vapouring and vllin-glorious charla-
tan" I
This, or some similar term, is frequently applied to Mr.
Churchill. From one point of vicw it is wrrect: he has said
things about tho enemy which smack much of the democratio
political platform. But, we have to remember t1::t this is a
democratic war, and that the millions like their stuff wen
spiced, and need it if they are to be kept up to the mark.
For the rest, Mr. Churchill is the first First Lord we have ever
had who has laid himself out to become familiar with the
technicalities of his post. lie entered office deeply distrusted,
and cordially disliked by tEe Navy. The outbreak of "War
may not have scen him loved afloat, but it certainly found him
respected and esteemed in a way that no predeces<wr ever was.
We now come to Lord Fisher, a man with an absolute gift
for making personal enemies, and a. remal'kable talent for
making himself unpleasant to any em'my. That, apart from
his record, is proof that he is no " noodle." As for his record,
that began in the Meditenanean years ago, when he was
thoroughly abused for sacrificing old ideas about" steam tao-
tics" in faTour of 80me new-fangled fad of his own about the
value of the torpedo. These ideas are accepted to-day, but
when promulgated they wcre regarded as modernity carried to
Údiculous excess. It is possible that Lord Fisher may occa.
sionaUy have anticipated to-morrow a little too quickly; but
there is certainly no "back number" about him. The only
error he is ever likely to make is in crediting the enemy with
better brain than he actually possesses. But I really do not
think that we are likely to arrive at any ultimate trouble over
a Sea Lord \\ho is inclined (by his r<<ord) to over-eòtimate
the enemy's brain. Rather, I think, we should esteem him
as a man prepared for every wntingency.
We now come to Admiral Jellicoe. Ilis record in naval
manæuvres is that he never was beaten. 'Var may be
different, but every naval mRnæuvre scheme simulated real
war as nearly as was possible. He" as easily the best man at
the game. and the games that he played were many aDd
various.
Now, without any eye-wash, compliments or anything of
that sort, I may say that all the critics, non-technical or worf.e
as they may be, are all actuated by genuine motives, but this
war is emphatically a case of "trust -the man at the helm."
(The above was written before news was recei,-ed of the
action in the North Sea. In order to avoid scemillg to pose
as a prophet wise after the event, I have therefore cut out
certain paragraphs which followed th
e remarks, and "Ifill
merely refer readers back to a previous issue of these notcs.)
A word may be added as to the German official statement
tliat one Bl'itish battle-cruiser was sunk. The statement is
incorrect on the face of it; but we ell all do well to avoid regal'd-
ing it as an official lie, At the Yalu the Chinese honestly
believed that they h:id seen a Japanese cl'Ui.ser bink; at
Tsushima the Russians were equally convinced that they saw
a Japanese vessel go under. Similarly, and for ,r;;imilar
reasons, I am of opinion that the German claim is mado in
all good faith; and if we call them liars we shall merely con-
vince them that their claim is true, inspirit them aCC<Jrùingly,

nd discount the moral eITect on them of our victory accord-
mgly also.
The, correct explanation ef the
rman claim is pl'obaUy
as follows. 'l'he Bl-üclu:r "'&S b'een to drop astern in a sinking
oonùition. A little later, the British ships were up round and
about her, and other German observers saw her sink. The
wish being father to the -thought, it was perfectly natu-ral
honestly to presume that the unreco
nisable maESI of sinking
wreckage was one of the British w8rshirs. It has been abso-
lutely demonstrated that precisely similar reaoons accounted
for -the mistaken claim at Yalu and Tsushima. There is an
{)ld saying about the danger of assuming your opponent to
be a. fool. It can be equally dangerous to assume him a liar,

Air Raid on the East Coast.
. The air raid on Yarmouth and district has probably a can.
slderable significance. We may take it that it was merely a
rewnnaisaance somewhat on tho lines of the first naval raid
on Yarmouth, when the Halcyon was fired at. ''.'e must be
prepared for the next effort to be quite on Scarborou
h lines.
and perhaps more so.
Empl1'asis i. laid by the Germans on tbe flWt that their
,II naval ail'ships" "lfere concerned in the raid. This may be
merely a reply to the fact that it is the British naTal air
r-
'Yice wh
ch has played havoo with German Zeppelin t;heds on
more than one occasion i but personally I am not inclined so
to regard it.
There is considerable difference between navigatinc. a diri.
gible over water and over land, and I am inclin:ù to be

January 30, 1915.

sceptical as to whether any purely military Zeppelin could
cross the North Sea.
The German naval airships are said to be differently con-
structed to the land ones, owing to experience gaineù.
I have no exact information as to where this differcnce
exists: I merely know of its existence. But the point is
an important one to remember. It has something to do with
a variation of cooling between the atmoj;phere of sea and land,
and the consequent expansion or contraction in Ie gas bags. JJ
Further I cannot follow it.
If, however, the difIerence in construction is so great as has
been alleged, it means that only the naval Zeppelins which
Ilave been built and the crews specially trained for sea work
are seriously available for ofÍensive operations aoross the
North Sea against this wunt!,y.
As to the operations which have alreaJ y been indulged i.n,
the less said the better. From the military point of view,
they were absolutely fatuous: one cannot possibly conceive of
even an expected military advantage (except in sO far that it
has increased recruiting in this wuntry, which was certainly
not ilie object SOUgllt after). From the llUmanitarian stand-
point the affair was mere ordinary murder in cold blood,
Comment has been aroused by thecireumstance that neitllcr
by sea nor land was any defensive attack made on the hORtile
aircraft. It is rather generally attributed to inefficiency on
the part of ih
Naval Air .service, and all others concerned_
I do not thinlt this criticism justified. I have seen somc-
thing of our aerial defence work. It is not in the publio
interest to go into details, out whatever else it may have
been, there was certainly no lack of efficiency visible.
Even on land and water, where men have been accustomed
to fight for thousands of years, surpriscs still occur, dcspite
all precautions. In the air, which is an entirely new battle-
field, surprises are nC{)essarily far more easy, since all pr<<au-
tions have as Jet to be based to a very large extent on theory.

THE BLACK SEA.

That the Gocben Jl1l.8 ken considerably damaged is now
independentIy confirmed, neutral eye-witnesses having seen
her carefully screened oy transports. The chances of her
being effectually repaired by the dockyard at Constantinople
are small, as the resources for any such work are inadcquate.
and the temper of the Balkan States hardly of a nature to
lend itself to the smuggling through of spare parts, etc.
One way and another, therefore, there is fair reason to
hope that the Hussians, who have at present secured the undis-
puted command of the Black Sea, will wntinue to hold it
undisputed till the end of the war.
At present they are making full use of their advantage,
and the Turkibh loss of war material, sent ovel'seas in sVite
()f the obvious danger. must be growing very serious. The
latest report is that a transport carrying most or all ûf -the
TUI kish ac]"(}planes hns been JestroJcd.

GENERAL MATTERS.
ANSWEHS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
P. S. (Castlecaulficld).-An idea substantially t;imilar to
yours was mooted many Jears ago. I do not know whetJ1Cr it
]13.8 been adopted. If tbe Admiralty is not I!Ylllpathetically
l'eb"pOIL
ive, it m:!y either mean that the idea is in use, or else
1ha,t there are technical difficulties in t1e \Vay of its employ-
llient.
A. S. II. (Dundee), and P. H. (Southend).-I (10 not
think tbat I "as in any way unduly optimistic in utilllating
that there has bem }]O numerical net increaso in the German
Æ'ubmarines, TIley have cnt.lÍnly lost more boats than they
aúmit t.o; and they could not pos:<iLly yet have eOlllpl-eted
mo.re bo
Üs than "ere in their normal programme. That since
tho war began they have laid down a great many boats is
probaLlo enough, but none of these would as Jet be complete.
ÅS regards the value of Ecouts, whether or no both fleets are
intent on engaging docs not materially afiect the question. It
is in any case of the u
most importance for an admiral to be
kept informed of the exact strength, formation, and course
of the enemy, before that enemy is actually sighted. Áß re-
gards my statement that, .. For the rest, we only know for cer-
tain that a dozen Dreadnoughts, plus tho wmplementary lesser.
craft, are superior to a dozen plus,x Dreadnoughts minus the
complementary lesser craft," did not merely refer to 8couta
only, but also to deäroyers. submarines anù auxili:j,IY vessels
of every 80rt or kind.
E,. D. F.-I am inclined to think that II Hartmann, tbe
anarchist," was one of the best futurist stories ever written;
but you must remember tbat it was a story, not a quootion- 01
existing facts, such al we now have to deal with, anù I am
afl-aid tbat Jour II suggested floating battery" comes into
ilometLiDg like the same category.. That ill to 118y.I. it docs Q<lt

10*

J anuarr 30, 1915,

LAND AND V/ATER

6t present exist, and this war \\ ill b over long before any
tmch ve.s.sel could exist, even supposing the idea to be feasible.
.We Lave to fight thijj war with cÚsting material.
"One Who Knows." - It ia oùviously impossibl:: to dis-
cuss tho cfficienc,r of any subordinate admiral. I ha'-e read

our letter with much intereat. I am not personally acquainted
with the officer ruentioned, but I was a frcquellt visitor on
bcard his ßagffiip in a previouil command, and I am bound to
say that views expressed about him in tho wardroom in no
way comcidecl with YOU1's. lie may have" gone off" since;
but I am afraid that I should require more evidence than the
stat.ements of an anonymous correspondent before I would
suggest any tmch thing in these columns. It ia obvious that
:you Lave inside knowledge of tho naval service, but-so kn'c I I
OthCl' matters apart, don't you think that I'd be "hat the
Americans call "soms cad" to att.aek a nav:!l officer on
evidence sent anonJ'mouilly, e,en granting that all J';>U alh:go
werc quite true 7
E. H_ (Hatch End), Dnd various other,.,-I appreeiate
your sentiments, but I think you are quite wrong. I have
dealt with the subject in the body of my article this week, as
I think it is certainly one of supreme importance, If my
urguments do not satisfy you, I shall be extremely obliged if
you will write again to the editor for publication, because I
for one am firmly convinced that this qUe<!tion or ilie
Admiralty and the public iil a matter of f,u greater moment
than the 6ubmarining of a batticahip or two. As I h:\vs said,

I think critics of the Aùrniralty are incorrect; but there e3:iilta
the old stor.r of the danger of sitting on the safi'ty-valve,
and I trust that
-ou will under6tand that, absolutely unspn-
pathetio though I am to yoar arguments, I do realise that the
underlying motives of your criticisms are entirely patriotic,
and on that nccount "orthy of appreciation and commenda-
tion, on which )"Ou will, I hope, forgive me if I 6uggc
t the
possibility that I know more about the inside and unwritten
history Qf the naval war than you do I From tho King to tho
errand boy, we arc all of us engaged in a struggle for national
eIÍstence. This being so, views naturally vary widely; but
n() one outsido a lunatic as
'lum would seek to grind an axe.
Did I think that the Admiralty" as \" rong I l>hould assuredly
aB,,
rt it in no uncertain words.
M. H. S. (Reading).-I do not believe in t11e Cerm.:m
,u super-submarines." inte::J.ded to attack British commerce
on the high seas. They bave nlso been heard of ns intcnded
to transport an invaaing army to {)ur shores. The rea60n
for my scepticism is, that if they had such craft the Germ:lnl
would have been careful to observe absolute sccre-oy about.
them.
L. M. M. (Edinburgh). - Thank you for your Idler,
which I am answering privately. The contents are better not
published.
A. C, (Hamilton).-You will see that I have already d
:\lt
this week with one of the questions raised by you The rest
I will-so far as pos;;ib1e-l"efer to in my next week's nQWs.

THE

ACTION

OFF

THE

FALKLANDS.

AS DESCRIBED BY AN OFFICER ON THE "INVINCIBLE."

NOTE.- Tbh Artlcl. ba. been 'lIbmitted to tbe Prell Boreall, wblcb don Dot ohject to the pllblic
ti;)n 1.1 cenlored, and taku DO
resp;)l!libilit, for t!lc correctnell of tbe .tatemenh.

c-\.\.. It

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6-itel. efP .t-ð\: þl1(Z/
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t. 'ld

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, """1.... 1 c-)

' """yo
Jt S '
,14-

J(;fl
tf J-'
G!.asgOh'ð
1!lJ
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ð ilú{cxibLe
carJl"'a

:nVJ<

p. St.W!.o/

..2

EXPECT by now you h'lVC heard all the news about the
sinking of the Scharnhorst, GnfÌsenau, Leipzig and
Nttrnberg. Anyhow, as .all censorship is removed I
will tell you as much as possible of the 08.{}tion and
events leJ.ding up to it. The situation was more or
leð:> as follo\\s:-
On Monday, December 7th, we arri\'"cd at Porl Stanley in
the Falkland I8landB and prepared for coaling. The Canopus
battleship was install
d t!..cre as guard ship. The ships, there-
fore, in Port Stanley on D.:-cember 7th were Int}incible, In-
flexible, CarnaTt'On, Cornu all, [{ent, Glasgou', and n,.i;>!ol and
Macedonia. . . .
At 7.30 a.m. on De-.:emOer 8th we E.tarted co:)lÌng, we
being aneIïored in Port Stanley (" we II being us and In-
'fi.exible). Kent l\nd Cornwall and Bristol had finished, Glasgow
was doing repairs. At about 8 a.m. signal station reported

four-funnelled warship in sight, and tLen shortly afterwards
Ii li
ht cruiscr. These were recognised 38 either the Schß1'n-
llOrst or Gneiseno.u and the Nurnberg. We irumedi:jtcly gave
order;; to the fI
et to raise steam for full speed. The Kent,
Cornwall and Glasgow proceeded out almost at once, and
si
n:jlled the movements of the enemy to us from the entrance.

he Canopus opened fire with her 12-inoh guns from her moor-
IDgS,
The enemy were then reporteJ tv be retiring, but 'Were
later repol'tcd to be waiting further off, having bC"n joined by
three ships. We then knew thJ.t the whole squadron, consist-
'1*

ing of Scho.rnTlOrst, Gneiscnau, Leipzig, l,urnb
rg and Ðre,-
den were there. "'e t of course, could hardly believe our luck,
as this was the very squadron that we had come out to destroy,
and they had come to find us instead ()f we them (of course,
it W80S o'bvious that they did not know that the ITlt'illcible ::nd
Inflexible were with the fleet), and their reason for commg
was to destroy Our coal and wireless station.
At about 10 a.m. we left harbour, ha\'"ing got steam for
full speed. Directly the enemy saw us they turned round and
went away at full speed-they were then about 14 miles away.
The disposition Was then as in Plan 2.
The Kent, Glasgow, and CarnaTl'on were ,going und
r 2t
knots and therefore we had to reduce 'Speed to keep them
w;th
s' we were however, slowly overtaking the enemy.
" 1 . h
Tbe enemy altered course, and we were near y ng t &litera
ohasing them, as in Plan 3,

Gæi.<'enaa ð,
'lJresdß.n 6
,Scltarnlzorst ò
$uremfilIr$'6
- Leif'sf:! A.

I
t
I
I
about'
/1 miÚs
I
I
I
I
. ,

'
,ð /(ept ð Inpim:ible
"ð 6!afgow ð Inflexible
ð Cornwall

ð CarllarJ/o It ,

j

LAND AND WATER

Seeing that the Carnarvon, Kent and Glasgow couldn't
keep up we went on 24 knots, and at five minutes to one we
epened fire on the sternmost light cruiser. The ScharnTwrst
men, seeing that to run away was hopeless, turned anù en-
gaged us, and the three light cruisers (enemies) made away
pursued by the Emt, Cornwall and Glasgow.
It was then li1ra this:-

.11

I

X
<:' .

' '-% 'dEnemys l(gh/:'
..-

... \:Pc:;>'" (raisers rumlÍJ1ð (1l(J':J'
- '- '...
'''-'
'
lIre ckzg

L.
"
% ,-

lKen

.h t!

Cornwall
. , 1Jristól .4

When we darted <Jpe11Ïng fire I saw no more as I had to
80 down ini:o th.e turret, but this is roughly what happened.
1'he German shIPS' largest g"C.ns were 8,2in., while we had
12in" and it was therefore up to us ro keep od of their
pene
rative range and torpedo range, and sink them with
gun fire. \Ve found soen that we were Qn slightly diverging
courses; the Germans seeing this turned to starboard in the
hope of getting away, but we also alwred starboard and came
up with them firing the whole time, viz. :-

"

-.

I
I
I
I
\

C(}ars
sééereá
0/ EneOlJ!
,
,JJ0n eÆct'ive
Ta;l!le
, ,
'....' ..(---
......--.!..:_----
...,
, ,
Coarse steered "
l!J1 Brit[s/t..

We then found the smoke was getting in our way, so we
altered. viz. :-

,,-,
,

.., .
'- '
'- -
t-.. -
JPt
'I
I
I
A
Coar.fe :
stéered by r
:British. :

..

-
_,...,"t' -

Caar.re s

re{i
Iý Eræmy

6

e.nd got the other side of the enemy. Shortly after this !.be
Scharnhorst E.'Unk (3.55 p.m., after we had been in action two
hours). We were then concentrating on the GneÏsenau, the
ScharnT,orst having slowly listed to port find then turncd
bottom up, and the proTJellers were seen Eti1l going round.

he Gneisenau fougbt on very gallantly, when at 6,12 p,m. she
h5ted ro port aild slowly dived down.
Now to go back to what I did-tho whole of the time I
1Vaø superintending tLe loading in the turret. Several things

January 30, 1915.

5

broke down, but we Boon got, thcm into action again. It
WM rather awful, &oDd I was in a bit of a. funk as I couldn't

ee wbat was happening, and :)'ou quite distinctly heard the
screech of their shtdls, and one qnite cady made the whole
rock by hitting somewhere near. They let us know when
they could about how the action was going. Of course, I never
saw the ScltnrnTlOrst sunk, but after the" cease fire JJ had gone
I looked through the telescope anB saw the Gneisenau heel
over and dive.
Now came the (<wEul pa.rt. The Inflexible, Carnart'on,
and o
rselves .tJurried up t.o where she had disappeared, shown
by sh
htly dlscoloured water, and on coming up close saw
a gOO<1 amount of v.reckage with men clinging to it. Never
shall I forget it--they were mostly calling out, and it sounded
like a wail to us. We all lowered ooats as quickly as
possible, a.nd piel.ed up as many as possible, but heaps must
have sunk as the water was 40 degs., and they were all numb.
It was awful being on the ship, because when all thl' boats
were away i-hey kept floating past, some swimming, some un-
conscious just beneath tbe water. 'Ve lowered people down
on bow lines, and hauled them up the ship's side----Bome of
them were quit-e dead when they came in. Altogether this
ship saved about 115, of which 14 were dead. The Inflexible
saved about 70, nnd the Carnarvon a few. As regards the
enemy's light cruisers, tile G01"llu'O.ll and Glasgow sunk the
Le.ipzig, and the Kt1It tbe .Yurnberg. The Ðresdell, "\>e sup-
posc, got away,
As regards our damage, eighteen shells hit us, doing
various damage. Of these I will name one or two of the
most important :-(1) Entered wardroom, burst, went through
deck beneatb, absolutely wrecked wardroom, nothing left
whole except steel walls, which were riddled with splinters.
(2) Entered through upper deck and burst between wardroom
pantry and my cabin, wrecked pantry, large splinters entered
my cabin, wrecked bunk, set fire ro be-dclothes, and wrecked
drawers
nder bunk, made splinter holes in walls (the hose
was then turned on my ca.bin, wetting most of m)' clotbes which
weren't burnt or riddled). (3) Entered sta.rboard side, went
through two decks and entered Admiral's pantry without
burs Ling. It is ccdainly miraculous that we bad no casual-
ties, except the Commander slightly wounded. The Inflexible,
which was only hit three times, had one killed and three
wounded, tbc ](ent about seven killed and six wounded, and
I don't know about the others.
I daresny )'OU have noticed that I haven't mentioned
&oout the Bristol. She luckily couldn't raise steam in time, and
150 came out lat-er with the Macedonia, and was able to capture
()r 5ink the enemy's merchantmen and colliers. I told you
that we had 101 saved on board. Seven of these are officers,
and the funny part is that I know two of them, and have met
them several times when I dined on tbe Gncis{lIau in China.
(the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in Cbina when I was
there). However, the fcllow I likcJ. best, who was in tbe
Glleiscnall, I 11m afraid was drowned.
The weatlu:,r during the action was quite calm.

AT Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on Fcbruary 8, at 3.30,
1trr. Hilaire Belloc will give an illustrated lecture entitled
" The Progress cf the 'V3.1.."
AT Devonshire Park, East-bourne, on February 4, at 3.30,
Mr. F. T. Jane will give an iJlustrated lecture on .. What DIe
Navy Í.'3 Really Doing in tbis War."
Mn, HILAIRE BELLOC will lecture on "Strategy, Numbers and
Material," at Queen's Han on the afternoon of Tuesday, 9th Febru;;ry.
His next e\"emng lecture there ìa on Wedne6day, February 17th.

LOOKING BACKW ARBS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on .. The \Vat by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOCand FRED T.JANE.
We have, therefore. prcpJ.red speci:al cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen nu:nbers, at a cost of 1 s. 6d. each.
Or we wiJI supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complete,
for 65. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numbers already
received we have had to reprint aome of the earlier
numbere. Sa;ne can n::)'w be sU;1plied at 6d. per COP}'.
Order r.cw from your Newsagenl. Bookstall, or dircct
from the Publishers,

"LAND AND \V A TER,"
CENTRAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY,LONDON.

12*

January 30, 1915,

LAND AND WATER.

MUST

THERE BE A W AR
ATTRITION?

A

PLEA

FOR A
By

STRONG AERIAL
L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

OFFENSIVE.

OF

NOTE-This Ar
ide has llcell. submitted to the Press B\!r
a\!, which d
es not object to the p!1blic1tioll. as c2n
;red and takes 11."
responsiti!ity for the corNetteSS of the sbtcm;nts.

I T might .be an interesting theme for tbe military his-
torian to di
;cus3 how the Napoleonic wars would ,have
ended, bad not the French, a hundred years ago, been
defeated at Waterloo; but there can be no two opinions
that Wellington's crushing victory brought to its close
a campaign which might .have been very protracted
had it not
een for the opportune intervention of the English
contingent in suppor"tof their Prussian allies. Yet the result
of the Battle of Waterloo-which has shaped the course of the
:history of the great nations for the last hundred years, and
has exercised a greater influence on the political history of
the world than anv other r
orded event-in its last resort
depended upon a timely participation of the English guard.
It is a matter of pure speculation to imagine wbat would
!be -the pre-sent relative position of the European powers had
the Haye-Bainte been crushed and the English troops, which
were under cover in the corn fields, been annihilated before
they could take a timely part in the
attle which dash.ed to
the ground, for ever, the dreams of conqu.est of the great
Buonapart-e.

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO AND
AIft.CRAFT.
Let us now consider the battle of Wat.erloo in the light
of modern knowledge, and see how its result might have been
affectoo by the employment of certain appliances which scien-
iific progress bas since brought to the service of war. Let
us picture to ourselves the anxiety of Napoleon at his enforced
ignorance of the position of 'Vellingt-on's men and we shall
then have no doubt that, if he bad had air scouts at his dis-
posal, he would not have failed to make good use of t.hem.
This is clear from a perusal of his military Manue.l, especially
that part dealing with the importance to a commander-in-
chief of having exact information about the strength and posi-
tion of the enemy. Let us 8.Ssume that bis air-scouts had
located tbe position of the English troops, waiting in con-
ooalment for orders to part.icipate in the battle t.hat was
already engaged, and let us, merely for the sake of argument,
suppose that he could not take from the general field of battle
0. sufficiently strong force to hurl against tbe Briti3h forces
either to destroy them or to keep them in check, thus depriv-

ng his enemy of a reserve which might 'be thrown against
him, 88, in fact, it waH, at the eritical moment. What
would a Napoleon do in the llypothetical Waterloo we ar5
considering 1 He would know that if he did not. annihil3te
the English troops or succeed in keeping them away from the
:field of ibattle they would be employed against him at a well-
timed moment; and yet he had no troops to use for the pur-
pose without courting disaster from another quarter.
Let us exert our imagination a little more. Let us sup-
pose that, at this grave moment, somo daring airmen of the
Napoleon's Imperial Flying Corps, realising their commander-
in-chief's perplexity, hinted to him that their aircraft, besides
being valuable for reconnaissance or kindred work, were nlso
of great offensive value, and that the worth of their suggestion
was rcco,snised by their oommnader. The quc.stion which
would immediately present itself to the Napoleon for solution
would be, bow best to use his offensive aircraIt t.o attain his
special object-that is, either t.o anniliila.te the English troops
or to prevent them from coming to the assistance of their
Prussia.n allies.

THREE KINDS OF AERIAL OFFENSIVE.
'fhree metbods of dealing with the problem would sug-
gest themselves. He might (1) carry out an aerial raid over
the grõund occupied by the English; (2) attack, from above,
the English troops lying In the cornfields; and (3) by destroy-
ing the roads, bridges, etc., prevent the English contingent
from partic-ipating in the battle.
If the Napoleon possessed but a small number of aircraft,
the first solution would be the only one capable of adoption.
Its effect, if the opemtion were constantly repeated, v.'ould be
either (1) t-o force the English troops to take up a new posi-
tion not exactly of their own choosing, or (2) to compel them
to take part in the general action sooner than they had anti-
cipated. In either case tbe aerial raid could not do more
J,han alter the original plans of the English commander in

some detaib, and would not influence, to any consider3.bl.
de:>ree, the issue of the b!ittIe r
ging at that moment_
o If, howe,-er, the Napoleon ,had at his disposal a power-
ful force of aircraft, consisting not only of a great number of
machines but also of an adequate body of airmen, fitted and
trained for offensive work, be would be in a position to adopt.
the second course open to him; th3.t is, to make a regular
attack from the air on the English forces below. Thera
would then be a battle royal t-aking place in a vertical plane,
and of such a novel character to tho
on the ground th
t, not.
only morally-because they would ,be unprepared for it-but
also materially, they would be at a disadvantage to the aerial
attackers. The fighters from the air would be provided with
the equivalent ()f a great number of big guns, all placed in
position, and roady to deal death and destruct.ion, right and
left, whilst the soldiers below, in replying to the attack, would,
almost entiTely, be relying on their rifles whicb they would use
with astounding inefficiency, for all their training and prac-
tice had boon based upon a. .horizontal range. The result.
would have been that the English reserve would have found
themselveß in such a difficult position that not even a dis-
ordered retreat nor a precipitate flight oould save them from
the aerial offe1Î.sÌ\'e.
For certain reasons, some based on local and economic
factors and others on the psychology and training of his air-
men, the Napoleon of our hypothetical \Vaterloo might, how-
ever, prefer n()t to engage the English force in a vertical
battle, but, by directing his aerial attackcrs to destroy all the
possible routes 'by which the Engli3h reinforcements could
march to the support of their Prussian allies, he would pre-
vent them from influencing the battle in progl"<
ss. F"r the suc-
cess of SUM a plan. it would be necessary that the .aerial attack
should result in the destruction of all the avenues whereby
the enemy could receive timely reinforcement. Such an at-
tack must be made in force, and the same bridge, or ro
d, or
pas.sage \Should be attacked several times to ensure certain
destruction, An aerial raid, of a small number of aircraft,
made with the object of desEroying avenues along which rein-
forcements could be sent to the frollt, would not, however,
lead to the mor3.1 eertitudð that the aim of the raid ha.s beeu
accomplished.
Let us now turn from the hypothetical \Yaterloo which,
as regards many details has, of necessit)", been very imper-
fectly and inaccurately examined, and let us see how, in the
present. conjecture a strong aerial offensive Qf the Allies might.
considerably cmtail a campaign which, by the employment
of the ordinary method of warfara only, pl'Omises t.o bfl a very'
protracted onl'.

MUST THERE BE A WAR OF
ATTRITION?
Almost alllhe foremost m'ilitary critics of the world have
repeatedly declared that the present great Emopean 'War
must be one of attrition. Must it, however, -be s01 Yes, if
the Allies do not apply to their utm'Jst aU the legitimate
means at their command. No, if they employ, on a eom
re-
hensive scale, a. method of attack which, as we ha,'p seen.
might have reversed the l't\sult.9 of Waterloo and which, 89
the writer has pointed out in his last article,. could prove of
inestima.ble value in the present war, and especially in tho
situation existing to-da.y at the front.
Without taking into account the misery and poverty a.nd
grief of hundreds of millions of women and children, who, by
no process of logic, can be made respoD.5ible lor the W3.r j
without considering that every day that passes E>ees the
destruction of thousands of noble and ,'aluable li,'es i without.
being influenced by the fact that. all the scientific progress
of the world, i'elating to a true and well-understood civilisa-
tion, ÛI at .a 8tand
till, the writer contends, on purel,r t
h-
nical ground3, that it wight be profitable to the Allic3, with-
out relaxing in any degree the rigid application of thc plan
of camp'J.Ìgn of their commanders, in whom they have full
confidence, to
nter upon a formidable aerial offensi,'e which
might rend er a \1"'11. 1' of attrition unne cess ary a.fter all. Think
. "'l'h" Ae:oplane on the OlIensIve." Land an4 U'ater, January 23.
1
15.

11:*

LAND AND "\V ATER

January 30, 1915.

()f i
J Expressed in terms of money only, every day by
hich
th-e duration of the war can be shortened means a saV1ng of
I)cvcral tens of million ponnds,
The writer for obvious reaso
s, cannot, in an article
meant for pubÌication, expre.!Sg llimsclf otherwise than in
gencral terms. So he will, to-<lay, content himself by asking
bis readers to con.sider the effect it would have on the dmation

of the war jf an aeria t attack 1:;y the Allies succeeded in cut--
ting, fer twenty-four hours only,'sll means of communication
'betwoen the Germans in thÓr trenches and t1leir ,base. And
from his information as well as llÌos tecJmÍcal knowledge and
c
lculations, the writer knows that, in seriously suggesting
a strong, comprehensive and sustained aerial offensive, he is
not a victim of wild dreams.

INVISIBLE

QUESTION OF
UNIFORMS.

THE

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

I N my last article I quoted t1le opinion of the Duke of
Wellington, .Hat in his day the colour of uniforms
was of small importance 8B compared with the
de.sirability of an easily distinguishable silhouette
against the sky-line, and it must be apparent to any-
one who thinks the matter out that it must be (if even
less importance nowadays, when men begin to fire on one
&Dother at ranges measured by the mile. There were riflemen
in the Duke's days in all armies who could shoot as straight up
to about 400 yards as we can shoot at 1,200, and the sport of
picking off officers, shooting down gun teams, etc., was as
popular then as now, and concealment to the stalker mwt
have been quite as important, and far more difficult to obtain,
just a.s it i'5 quite easy to get within a mile of a black buck,
but to creep up unobserved within -the la.st two hundred yards
is much harder. The truth is, &5 I said before, that the
whole question never received any scicntific tactical con-
sideration at aU, e.nd that we were rushed into the change
from red to khaki 'by an utterly uninstructed public opinion
which will cost us far more lives in the near future than the
reformers ever expected to save,

;ji;'>

<!III
I'

Cut this picture out, plnce It
niust dlffercnt b"cJ.grounds at a distance
away from tbe eye8 until the ßg1Jre looks no Inlge as a man appeals at
, ðOO ;yaros, i.." about half an inch high.

I produced my fie-Id glasses-an unusua]]y good pair, with
a big field for picking up colours in tllie dark or in a. half-
lightr-and there, to my a.stonishment, I saw the two missing
battalions drawn up in line, quietly waiting in their appointed
places. I said nothing for a few moments until the Ueneral
became impatient, and then I passed up my glasses. I waa
the only one present whose unifQrm allowed him to wear
field. glasses in full dress, and the General's a.stonishment was
complete,
He had had much experience in the Mutiny. As we rode
!heme afterwards we discussed the case and similar happen-
ings, and found an explanation simple and scientific enough.
All the infantry were wero:ing '5carle,t alike, and all in
marching order, bub whereas the one battalion we had
detected at ()nce wore brown belts, the others had the usual
pipeclay belts of the period. The white pipeelay belts broke
up the mass of each individual into rectangles and triangles
not exceeding 12 inclles in size, and at anyt1Iing over 1,000
yar<1s these little surfaces dwindled to points too ISmail to be
perceived as colour by the optic nervcs.
Then we compared notes, and I carried out obser-
vations for quite a long period under his direction,
which led to the final conclusion that except .ag(\inst
8 particular background it was not the colour but the
size of the unbroken mass of it that mattered. Even
II Skinner's Horse," who then wore a most conspicuous canary-
eo loured tunio or kaftan, became inviSible at 1,500 yards
when wearing their white 'belts, whereas Uley, or any other
regiment, in complete khak,i, belts and all, could be picked
up at a couple of thousand yards or more with ease. But
the essence of the whole matter lay in immobility. M()ving
troops can always be deteoted, and the trouble is that it ill
precisely when troops are lying down--i.e., not moving-
that both Staff and artillery want to know exactly where they
are, and that. is just the time when, with the pres-ent khaki,
you c1\nnot find them.
The moral el1ect on the men themEelvcs must also
not be neglectoo. In the present war, the cause for which
we arc fighting is eo great that no hardships or dis-
comfort seem able to depress the men, but it will not
always be so, and I can recall many instanoes told me by
men in India, and in the Zulu War, of the electric effect
produced ()n a II fed up" òody of men by tIle <Jrdcr for a
general clean-up and an inspection parade. Whi"!n the men
saw themselves again as a whole, clean and smart in spite
ûf retreats and hardship, the regiment found its own 80ul, so
to speak, and became a different body.
Let me cite a single instance told to mo by t1e Subhadal"
Major of a n
tive cav.nlry regiment who had been thron
h
the dreary experience of the siege of Kandah3.l' in 1879,
where .depression had reigned supreme and the native regi-
ments were more than a little df)ubtful in their minds as to
the invinci,bility we had claimed.
Roberts' column had arrived OVCTI1ight, after the march
from Kabul, and next m()rning, the 1st September, my friend's
regiment marc<lled out to take up its position for the coming
battle. On tho way they were overtaken, first by the 9th
Lnncers, then by a battery of R.H,A" both of tllcm turned out
to perfection as if for a Royal inspection, and he said, II Sahib,
the sight of those men, so splendidly smart and efficient,
made our hearts go up with a bound, and we fought that
<lay 30'S we had not fought for montihs before; but if they had
been all rusty Rnd dirty it would have ,been a very different
story, for our men were very full of doubts that morning."

I do not question that there are times when concealment
is desirable, but I do mamtain that in the big battles which
lie '
ead of us it ill far more important for the success of
the wh()le army that the Commander, and his Staff generally,
Bhould be able to see how the several units under their
command are combining their operations, than that here
or there a few skirmishers should retain a whole skin. The
trouble is that a littIe more con.siderati()n of the matter would
have shown us how to combine both requirements at the same
time.
r found the koy to this problem some years ago at a c()ld-
weather camp in India, by the following curious experience.
Riding with the Staff for a big Divisional inspection on
& great open plain, witihout a scrap of cover for miles, when
approacihing tIle ground we found that we could see one single
scarlet battalion drawn up, and, away on its left, the glint
and movement of horses betrayed a battery. Apparently two
battalions were still missing, and, a.s the General did not wish
t.o catch the line unpreparcd, we pulled up and waited.
fE
SEÐ. MASK"ELYNE AND DEV.4.NT are inviting convalesccnt ßCli!ien
There were the usual caustic comments on the _ and _ and failars to their' entert..inme.nt.at St, George's Hall. Reserved 6.'a.tS
will be given, frce of charge, to an1 convalescent !!Oldie1's :toll sailors
Regiments. "Late again, as usual I JI kind ()f thing. But who a.
k for them TIlls invitation boLds good for a.ny performance
presently a slight movement in the interval caught my eye. until the Easter bolida)6,
It,it

January 30, 1915,

LAND AND 'V ATER

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE GERMAN RESERVE.
To the Editor of LA
.D AND WATER.
Sm,-There seems to me to be one possible loophole in
Mr. Belloe's calculation, of which a 6upporter of the larger
-four million-figure as that of the German reserve might
avail himself. Of the 12,000,000 males who enter into the
calculation, Mr. BeUoc dispooos of 25 per cent" tbat is
3.000,000, as the usual proportion of persons unfit for military
service. Of the rest, 2,000.000 at least are needed to keep the
mecllanism of internal industry going. But would not the
nforesaid 3,000,000. or a very large number of them, be com-
petent to do even hard civil work, though unable to endure the
exceptional severities of a military campaign 7 Or, if by
themselveð tl
y were unequal to the burdens of industry,
would not they, with tile addition of 1,000,000 completely
l1.b!-e-bodied men, be able to do .as much as the 2,000,000 which
is Mr. BeUoc's figures 1 In that case the Germanll would have
put into tbe field 5,000,000, be keeping 4,000,000 men for tho
running of the country, and possess a reservo force of
3,000,000 men.-Yours. etc.,

J. K. MOZLEY,

Pembroko College, Cambridge.
JanuarJ' 25,1915.

To the Editor of LAND AND WATER
DE.!R Sm,-May I venture to indicate some factors which
seem to bave escape"d Mr. Belloc's attention in his" further
noto on the numbers of the German Reserve" in your issue
of the 23rd instant 1
Mr. BcUoc says: "We have not got to guess, we know
the total number of adult males of military age from twenty
to forty-five years inclusive, in the German Empire." But
the German authoritiea would seem to have cast their net over
A much wider period than this. Youths of eighteen, and
even young('r, seem to have been called to the colours j nor
does the age limit of forty-five appear to apply, judging from
the description we get of prisoners taken.
Again he says: "We know that at the f.'-e.ry lrost two
million of able-bodi{'d men must be retained to 'run the
nation.''' Surely, much of this most necessary work can be
done, and well done, by men physically unfit for military
liIervicc.
ThUl
, GC'rmany's potential reserve of men would seem
to be appreciably larger tban Mr. Belloo's contention would
allow. But there is another side to tbe question.
Germanv ma\' be able to call up and drill these men.
Sh
may even be -able to officer them quite as well as we are
able to officer our million, But when 'l'l"e oonsider the delay
end difficulty we experiepcc in arming, equipping and clotb-
ing tl1at million, with all the world open to us from which
to draw raw material, bow much greater must be Germany's
difficulty in the task of equipping and supplyin
with ammu-
nition her potential millions, with her industries stifled and
cr.amped by tIle silent pressure of hostile sea power'
It might not be prudent to build too confidently on this,
but it seen"U! at least probable that our enemy will at most be
able to furni
h from this source drafts for his existing forma-
tions, and thot he will be quite unable to form from this
material new Field Armies.-Faithfully yours,
GEO. M. r, MunRAT.

Kingstown,
January 24.

To the Editor of LAND AND W ATEJt.
DEAR Srn -With reference to Mr. Belloc's articles as tG
the number of'men that Germany still has in reserve, particu-
larly his article in the current issue, is there not one point
which ne has overlooked 7 From the 12 millions betwoon 1B
and 45 he deducts 3 millions as being militarily unfit, and a.
further 2 millions for "able,bodied men to run the State" j
/but curely out of the 3 millions tbere will 00 a very large num-
ber who would be sufficiently able-bodied for tbe purpose of
"running the State." Moreover, there may be a large num-
ber of men from among those over 45 wbo would also be
sufficiently able-bodied for the purpose. It seems to me that
from the 3 millions and those over 45, Germany ought to be
a.ble to provide, if not the whole, at any rate the greater part
of the 2 millio1l.s required to "run the State," leaving these
free to serve in tbe Army; and If 1 am right as to tbis, it.
would a.bout 'bring the figures of the reserve up to tho num-
ber of 4 millions, with wllich Mr, Belloc disagrees.
It would be interesting if Mr. Belloc could give us his
:views as to this.-Yours faithfully,

HARRY KNOX,

14, St, Helen's Place, E.C.
January 22.

TilE BLOCKADE.
To the Editor of LAND AIm WATER.
Sm,-Mr. BeHoc a.sks why the blockade of Germany can-
not be mooe absolute, by which he means why she cannot
be cut off from obtaining anything whatsoever that is trans-
por
ed by sea to neutral countries and thence transmitted to
Germany, for nothing 18 reaching German ports direct and,
&s ho admits, we cannot intercept the products of neutral
countries contiguous to Germany.
The an
wer would seem to be particularly easy. \Ve
are invited to defy the Declaration of Paris, to make every-
thing contr3lband without reference to its warlilce character
or any presumed destination for military purposes, and to
apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to everything, T()
do any such thing would be to botray each and and every one
of the causes for which, according to Mr. Asquith, we took
up arms, the faith of international treaties, international law,
and the rights of neutral states. Surely eyeryone must see
how impossible that is.-I am, etc.,
A, A. MITCHELL.

7, Huntly Gardens, Gbsgow.
J auuary 19.

THE FORMIDABLE,
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-In reply to the letter of Mr. John Chadwick about
the loss of the Formidable and the use of oompressed air to
prevent similar disasters I tbink my !x>-et answer is to ask
loll'. Chadwick wbether he thinks a' naval architect of Sir
William White's eminence would bave wasted his time in
talking to such a hopeless amateur as he plainly imagines me
to be.
lt was part of the neçessary intellectual equipment of
a
o
al Enginee
officer to be thoroughly familiar with the
prmcipies governIng the construction of battleships; and as
I spent some two-thirds of my service of forty years in dock-
yard towns, and had watched the construction and completion
of pretty well every type of vessel in the Navy since the laying
down of the old Alexandra, about 1872, I nm quite nware of
the strurtural difficulties be alludes to. But I am equally con-
fident flwt the!! can be overcome.

F, N. MAUDE.

WATER-LOGGED TRENCHES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-N umerous letters from the trenches describe them
as sloughs of mud slush, into which the men sink Bom
times
to the waist; others refer to the unavailing efforts made to
ameliorate this condition by the use of pumps, dne to the
muddy mixture deranging the mechanism of the applia.nces.
Such a problem could be solved by resort. to mol"&
primitive method5. In Eastern countries and in Eastern
Europe and Russia it is customary to raise water from
shallow wells and streams by the simple apparatus 1 will now
describe in its application to trench slush, an appara.tus
wbich could be constructed in half an hour from materials
at hand, .and by which one man could dispose of several
gallons a minute without exertion,

The materials would consist of a short tree trunk of
about four to six inches in diameter, or a baulk of tim
lr,
of a length sufficient to rest horizontally from one side of a
trench to the other. Alternati\'ely of a tree stump about six
to eight feet long, t.crminating in a Y-forked end. Upon
this beam, or wIthin the fork of the Y, is balanced a sapling
some 20 to 30 feet long. The butt end is further weighted

.."'...

LAND AND "\V ATER

by lashing to i
ð eupplcmentary weight, preferably an addi-
tional piece of tIle butt end or stump. A bucket is attached
by a. cord to tho taper end of the sapling, which is then ad-
justed upon the beam so that it balances like a see-saw. The
sapling should be slightly hollowed or cut away at the ful-

rum where it resta upon tIlC beam, to prevent it from
.lipping.
Immediately beneath the bucket a. sump should be dug
()ut, into which the slush will <ìmin. The operator stands
a.t the butt end, and by raising this the bucket descends into
the sump, where it fiJ1s, and is then raised by & downward
pull upon the buH end, which may have, if necessary, a.
flhort cord attached to it. The fined bucket is thus hoisted
well above the trench, and may be swung sideways over the
wge, deposited and tipped over by a. few deft movements
imparted to the butt,
This slight exercise, a relief from the monotony of
(Joing nothing, would suffice to chain and keep dry a con-
siderable section of trench.
The accompanying illustration will make clear the con-
etruction of the appliance and its use.-Vcry faithfully yours,
HOWARD C. CLEAVER.
35, Eerners Street, W., Jam
al"Y 18,1915.

THE GERMAN MIRAGE OF lSiO,
To the Editor of LA
n A
D W -"TEn.
8111,-1 ]lave been rlanoing over the ",",ork wl1Ïch ",",as
translated and edited by
Iajor-General J. F. jlaurice, C: B.,
about fifteen years ago, on the Franco-German 'Val', ",",ritten
by the German generals who took part in it. It is well worth
re-examination to-day, as there can be little doubt that the
easy victories therein described have done more than any-
thing to egg on tIle Kaiser and the 'Military party in Ger-
many to their present campaign. Here, for instan
, is ,,"'hat
J,ieutenant-General Albert VU
1 Deguslawski wrote of the
French preparat.ions in 1870:-
It The results of the mobilisation were on the whole So
defcctive that tho corps "hich were already in position
at the end of July were imperfectly provided with the
needful trains, arubulancçs, ammunitions, and provision
columlis. so that the offensive movement planned for the
31st July had to he postponed, and meanwhile the Ger-
mans anticipa
d the French attack. The French forti-
fications were very insufficiently garrison cd, and them-
Eclves were for the most part antiquated and unfit to
offer any lcngt.hy resistance to the artillery of the Ger-
mans. Of the fOl'treBses on the frontiers, {Ietz alone had
advanced forts, and even these were partly unfinished."
TIle conclusion of thi&' (krman general's remarks upon the
war of 1870 is of interest, eince by reversing the names of
Franoo and Gel'maDY, it describCB exa,ctly the position to-
day:-
II The challenge of France made the national sentiment
()f Germany burst into full flame. All internal disputes
were forgotten, and the whole German army down to the
humblest of the rank and file was inspired by a sense of
the righteousness of their cause, and filled with defiant
æurage, with an a6surnnce of victorJ', and with the firm
determination once for all thoroughly to Mettle accounts
with the old enemy."
Could any better description be penneû of the feelings
cmd intentioDB of the Allies 1-Your übedient servant,
J. LA1WFEAR LUCA!',
Spectacle Malia,' Co.

Glendora, llindheaJ. Surrey.

FIEL Q-G LASSES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-Although the appeal made by my father, Lord
Ro'berts, to .sport.smen and others, to lend their race, field
or .stalking glasses for t.he use of officers and non-commis-
sionoo officers under orders for the fl'ont has :been most grati-
ifing 8 very large number of glasses are Btill required.
Up to the present some 18,000 pairs of field and stalking
glasses ha.ve been recéved. Theße have been carefully
examined and classified by an expert before being issued.
The names and addresses of DIe owners are registered, and
the glasses theIlllielves are engraved with an index number
in order that tne owners can be traood at the conclusion of
the war and their property, when possible, returned to them,
Many people who did not posse.ss field-glasses felt that
t.hey would like to contribute towards the fund which has
been raï.;ed for the purpose of purchasing them, and sent

heques lllstead.
My father was deeply grateful for the generous response

January 30, 1915.

made to his appeal, but at the same time he rea.lised that an
even greater number of glasses would be required, the Btock
in hand being nearly exhausted, while the can ff)l" them was
continuous. He had made up his mind to appeal to the
public once again, and a letter to this effect had been writt
n
but not signed, before he left for France, I therefore yen:
ture to make this further appeal in his name.
All contributions wiU be dealt with in the same ",ay as
fOl'merly and duly acknowlNlged.
It is important to note that all glasses, cheques and
communications should be addressed to the Socretary,
National Service League, 72, Victoria. Street, Westminster,
8, W.-I am, Yours faithfuUy, .
AILEEY ROJJERTS,

WHAT OUR CHEMISTS ARE DOING.
To the Editor of L,uw AND WATER.
8m,-I,ettel's such as the one in your issue of the 23rd
inst., signed n. J. C. Grierson, unless oontradicled, do much
harm; they make people think - that everJthing our AmlY has
is inferior to that. of the enemy., lIe statcs that "we have
been caught again ",ith an inferior armament, shells, torpe-
(Júcs, etc." I cannot lipeak with authority on torpedocs, but
I fancy when we come to use them they ",ill be found not
",anting. 1 have served for forty Jears in the ROJal ArtiHel'v,
EO know something about guns, and can state that our shraÍ}":
nel shell and fuzees arc 6uperiQr in every way to thoso of the
Germans. Only thi
morning 1 haTe received a lettcr from an
n.A. officer "\\ho has been out since the beginning of the "\\ aI',
and in it he says :-
" The high-c:lplosive of the 6-inch howitzer is a ",",onder-
fully good shell. It always detonates e"en on the softest
ground, and with great effect, I have ncvcr seen any German
Eibell, even the ll-inch they had up at Ypres, to equal it for,
force of e:lplosion."
1 think this is an answer to his question, ""'hat are our
chemista doing1 "-Yours faithfully,

R. A,

TilE ADRIATIC.
To the Editor of LAND AND "rATER,
DEAR Sm,-As a "el'y interested reader of LAND AND
WATER for many yem's 1 take the liberty of asking for a little
more information regarding the operations in the Mediter-
ranean.
In a recent issue Mr. Jane states "th:1,.t the Allics
have made no attack because they have had Dothing to
attack." Surely, if tho enðmy Fleet is not in open water it
must oe lying in Pola and Cattaro, neither of which ports
would seem proof against guns of large calibre, and thc only
conclusion one can come to is that our attempt to reduce these
places beal's 8 very poor comparison with the J aI,ancse
methods at Kiao-chau.
I feel o/5ure tha.t numbers of your readers will be (,lad to
hear from Mr. Jane on this matter, as I have met such quan-
tities of interested people who seem to think that a. ,'eil Ï3
drawn over doings in this particular area.-Yours truly,
J. A. BUBNS.

Abbey \iew, Dalkey, Co. Dublin,

A STUDY IN SELF-EXPRESSION.*

Though concerned largely with sociological problems, and
this in no dreary and weariS()me fasl1ion, the dramatis pereonlØ
of this novel are not made subservient to the theme, nOI:
allowed to be merely pegs on which to hang ideas of social:
reform and other things. Philip Crayford, pathetic in his
solitude, is the central figure, albeit his dominance is moro
felt than insisted on. We feel his son Paul, around whom
the story is woven, to be altogether I\, lesser though probably
more arresting charact-er, E.nd the author has ghcn us a fino
study of the young man's gr<'ping for self-expression, reaching
out towal'da his ideal, and coming to its attainment DU'ough
apparent failure. The feminine characters command leBa
sympathy; it is not easy to see Joan .Altringto,.n, the princi-
pal woman character, with Paul's, eyes, for to us her innate
wo1'ldliness, covered with a gloss of sentimcnt, render her
an improbable 50uroo of inspiration. It is a relief to turn to
Mrs. Kennaird, sinccre, though lacking Joan's inbred delicacy,
Taken altogether, thero are many types here worth con-
sid()ring, and we commend this book as a thougl1tful and
l'eaUy interesting work.
... The Young Man Abøa1om." By E. Charles Vivian. (C1ar

and Hall. 6&,)

1
*

January 3 0 , I q 15

LAN D A X D \\Y ATE R

II

is the spirit of
the Allies.

Larger quantities of 'Shell' than of any
other Petrol are being used by the Navy
and in every branch of Military Service.
Any statement that other suppliers' Spirit
is used as largely by our Forces is not in
accordance with the facts. ' Shell' is
working for the Allies only, and therefore
for you. Be on the side of the Allies and
use 'Shell: Refuse any other Spirit.
I'
OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE.

243

L A }J D A
D \ \' ATE R

TIIROUGH TI-IE EYES
OF A \V OMAN

The Garden in \" ar Time
E VERYBODY 10\"Cs a garden. and one of the
outward ,1I1d vi
ibl(' signs is the writing of many
gardening books. The pos
ession of en'n a f('\\,
yards of ground seems to draw its OWIH'r towards
th(' craft of the pen. People "ho in the ordmary
course of events would have remained silent fed in
pired to
record their gardening experiences, They are helped out on
every side. i\early all the great poets have expressed
beautiful thoughts in beautiful language on man's" purest
pleasure." Some personal notes, combined with aptly
chosen quotations and attractively illustrated, form the
somewhat slight basis of many a gardening book--and,
what is more, many a gardening book that is infinitely well
worth the reading from every amateur's point of view.
Guite recently one of the more modest of these
pubIi
ations reachëd me, It was a small booklet of perhaps
sÜ.teen pages, and there \\ as not a dull word in it from start
to finish. The history of gardening was its fascinating
subject, and the writer had evidently made it his very happy
hobby as well as study. There was a delightful note of
personal enjoyment through every one of his strictly limited
pages.
The war news that morning had not been particularly
cheerful, and this booklet seemed to promise a welcome
relief from war-time thoughts, And so it proved for a short
while, until in course of time the writer traced the historv of
gardening from its earliest beginnings to the si--.:teènth
century, At this time we learn the garden of a house was as
important as the rooms of the house itsdf. Every house\\ife
was her own manufacturer. Through the good services of
her garden shf' made cordials, potions, preserves, lotions,
essences, and soaps. Every foot of ground was cultivated,
and all that grew had its very definite purpose, It must not
be w,lsted, but in course of time gathered and used in the
making of some household necessity.
Then once more the mind played its accustomed trick.
Try though we will, touch on any topic we may, one and all
lead back to the same absorbing subject. Even this picture
of a sixteenth-century garden followed the inevitable rule,
and thought turned from it to thf' war. As time goes on we
are all bound to think more seriously of the food question,
l'nlike our ancestors, we no longer manufacture at home.
We are dependent for our daily bread upon many sources,
most of which are beyond our immediate controL It would
look as if our forebeãrs had infinitely the best of it. And
that being so, can we in the present day, in any way, follow
their example.

Gardening as a Business
\Ve seem to have wandered far from the time when
everybody baked their own bread, killed their own meat,
and furni<;hed all the contents of their store cupboards
themselves. Instead, we deal with some great store which
supplies us with every detdil frum flour down to boot buttons.
Numbers of people live in great towns possessing not so much
as one half-inch of land, while even those who live in the
country have little notion of turning their land to their
profit. And the result is simple, We are all the slaves of
fortune. \Ve depend upon others for every necessary of life.
It is an artificial way of living, and is therefore at any time
likely to b(' upset by an artificial set of circumstances. A
gamble in wheat in the United States of America spells
privation in many a home in England, and so do other causes
equally as wanton.
This is the eleventh hour, and it is too late to funda-
mentally change the mode of living of millions of people.
It is not too late, however, to husband every resource we
have. The lucky possessors of gardens can see that every
square inch is utilised and that none of the produce is wasted.
They may, indeed, if good fortune be with us, find they have
never enjoyed their garden to the full until this present year
of grace. Gardening as an amusement is one thing, but
gardening for both amusement and benefit is another, Every
cabbage ha<; its economic value now. It is a more important
vegetahle than it was a short twelve months ago, when flippant
folk looked upon it as an evil, but fortunately an unnecessary
one. Potatoes, again, deserve far more consideration than
has hitherto fallen to their lot. \\"e can hardly cultivate too
many or give them too much space, even if we abandon some
of our flower beds to do so,

January 30, T 9] 5

:!.I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII! 111111111111111

How to help Tommy Atkins

We cannot all go out to fight, but we can
al1 do something to help our soldiers who
are fighting our battles and defending the
honour of our native land, and in this way
contribute to theirweU-being and efficiency

-
-
SEND HIM A FLASK OF
-
- HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS
..f" ,.0
"
l\

.

"-'_'t
-"'""
J

Invaluable to a soldier
in the field and most
efficient in relieving
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.
We wiU send post free to

address a flask of these delicious
and sustaining food tablets and
a neat vest pocket case on
receipt of 1/6, If the man is on
active service, be particular to
gi"\-'e his name, regimental
number, regiment. brigade and
division.

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IE""__
...- '
--

RUGS! RUGS!! RUGS m

WE WANT 5,000-
OLD OR NEW
HAVE YOU SENT ANY YET?

If you have not, please send as soon as possible.
If you have, please get your friends to help,

THE BRITISH AR:\IY HORSES
AT THE FRONT NEED THEM
BADL Y DURING THE COLD
":INTER MONTHS, AND WE
ARE GETTI
G URGENT
D E MAN D S FOR THE 1\1.

The R.S.P,C,A. FUND for Sick and Wounded Horses, nnclf'r
the Chairmanship of the Duke of PmtT.lnd, is TH E OK L Y
OI
GANISATION APPlh>VED BY THE AIUIY COUNCIL
for aiding the British Horses at the Front.
E, G. FAIRHOLME. ROI/, Spc. to the FIII/d,
105. Jermyn Street, London. S,\V.

244

J.lIlu.lr) 3 0 ) 1915

L A
D A K D \V ATE R

TJi
F tt
moking Mixture.
MILD and
MEDIUM

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EREAL paO EC ORS

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<r..r.

OFTHE PEOPLE:-
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comprdll;lls11/C þ'o/Ù:ic.s
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:!J IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I!:

\ OX WAGON

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Full 'Price Lid on application.
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LA i\ D A X D \Y ATE R

THROUGH THE E"YES OF A
WOMA.N

({ I ',,
J from pQP

..J...J.)

The owner of a g lrden, with its fruit, its \"('getahle:", ib
I"<lot:" and its I]('rb,., I'; in a more el1\'iable position th,ll1 the
mere to\\ n d\\clll'r. .\t any rate, he approaches more I1l',lrly
the former scheme of things, when even' house was sufficient
to itself, for food supplies were concentrated around. It
is to be hoped th,lt all who o\\"n a garden will recognise their
!espon.;ihilitie.;- ,1Ild tlwir priÙleg"s
rh" Suppl) and the Demand
The working parties started all over the country e\'er
.;ince the \\',lr heg,1Il h
l\'e up to the present been as busy a<;
po..,.;ihle. EnTything that e\Trybody could do \\as w
nted,
,lid so nohoch' W,I"; \\orking to no purpose, But now, 111 the
l1.lture of things, it i,.; some\\'hat diflerent. Some of the r
ed
Cms.. centres, hospit,tl,.;, and other institutions are o\'er-
bll! dened \\Ìth snpplies, whibt others ha\'e not got enough,
It is, then. \"l'n' necess,u\' to make sure that the institution
to \\ hich gifts ,{n' fon\',trrled hds need of them. .And this can
be done without the slightest trouble to anyone but the
Emergl'nL'\' "oluntaIT .-\id Committee of the EmI-:ress C
ub.
The\' han' made it their special work to di<;cO\'er the nnmedlate
need of the immediate moment and supply it.
\\'orking parties who arc in doubt should seek the
l ommittee's help at 35 Do\"Cr Street. Piccadilly, \\-, They
can do this pither by letter or hy \"Ìsiting the clu
, .l\Iembers
of the Committee can be found there any tIme between

January 30, 1915

II a.m. and 5 p,m., and here advice can he had for the
a<;king. It is all part and parcel of the excdlcnt \\ ork the
organisation is doing, and heIps to ðplain the e"\.tent of its
gnJ\\ th, The Committee is in constant communication
\\ ith hospital ships, hospitals on shore for both soldiers amI
",tilors, and the \'arious Red Cross centres, and can he looked
upon as nothing ,..hort of .In intelligence bureau, :\ot onl
'
will they gi\'e ach ice, but the.' are quite willing to be of
sen ice in fon\ arding work to different destinations, It is
efficient aid, this and can hardh- ha\'e been oflcred at a more
opportune moment. \\'e do not \\"ant to stop all our J..nitting
and sewing, yet many women ha\'e feIt inclined to stop lately,
u\\ ing to doubt as to whether more gifts were needed,
Iore
are undoubtedl\' needed, but not e\"l'IT\\ Iwre, and we must
be sure that the work of our hands is iwt sent in the \\ mng
direction. It certainh' win not if the \"oluntan' .\id
Committee at the Empiess dub han' anything- to !'ay to it.
ERICA,

HARBUTT'S ., FIBROUS PL!\STICT"E .. is not only useful to gunner
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small plug.. are made of the plasticine, cone
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ears these noi'ies are nearl, cut otf, or reduced to a slight murmur, but,
strange to say, one ("an stilI hear ordinary com ersation, The plug

can be removed in a moment bv ouhitle pre
"ure belo\\ the ear.
.. THE English\\oman's Year Book ,md Directory, 1915," is di\ ided
into two parts: one including education profe
sions, and social Iifc,
and the other being mainh' dc, oted to philanthropic e[fort in its many
manifestations, One of the most interestmg features is the t,lhle 01
"Records for \\'omen," shO\\ing how all ,\Iong the line \\omen are
breaking new ground in those professions and honours previously
supposed to be e"c1u'iively men's privileges,

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M ORRIS recognises that the present situa-
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For similar Gannenls the usual price is Sò5 5 0
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TESTI\IO'JAL-"I feel that 1 must thank you and }OIlr
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Khaki ServIce Tunic &:3 3 0 Infantry Trousers ' &:1 1 0
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Telephones: Nos. 784. 728 Regent. Telcgyams: "Gr
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11

are shod with Beldam
will not
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Car
wet
always

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

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Vol. LX.IV.

o. 2752

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1915

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--WAR BOOKS OF PERMANENT INTEREST-

War and the Empire
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W.C.

25 6

February 6, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

'-

WAR
By HILAIRE
NOTE.- Thl. Article hat lieeD 'Dbmltted to the Pre.. Bareaa, which doe. not object to the pÐblJcatloD .. etnlored and tab. no
rtlponaibllitJ for the corredDell of the Itatemenh.
In acccrdaDce with the reqalrementa of the Pre.. Bareaa, the pClitlcn. of troops on Plan. lIlaatrat:nr thll Article mult only be
rerarded al apprc:dmate. aDd DO defiDite atren(th at any poInt II hldlcded,
E D But the enemy, upon the model of his simil
r
THE EASTERN FI L . action in the "\Vest after similar failure there, has
I N the eastern field Russia has now developed entrenched himself and has begun to depend upon
a plan the elements of which are quite clear, the support of heavy artillery for the maintenance
though the counter-moves of the enemy are of his entrenched position. These trenc.hes rUll
as )-et only partially developed! and the fa.c- from the Middle Vistula to the UpI)Cr VIstula, a
tors making for success or faIlure are stIll line not far from straight and approximately 160
quite indeterminate. . miles lona. From the Upper Vistula to the Car-
The plan is, briefly, to hold the centre "WIth no pathians the front continues just along the Dona-
more than sufficient troops (even in front of War- jec river, then up a tributary, the Biala, up to tl!e
saw), and to attack-with political. as well as foothills of the Carpathians, and here a certam
purely military objects-on the two 'Ymg s , amount of continued trench work, but more the
The opportunities and difficultIes of these I balance of artillery and the vile weather, keeps it
will discuss separately, stationary.
Upon the immensely extended
ine !1 thousand It is this length of line from the Middle Vis-
miles long in its total trace, countmg Its recesses tula near the mouth of the Bzura to the Upper
and local salients, the Russians have endured::\s Biala (a tributary continuing the Donajec line)-
to all the centre a violent offensive, tbe culminating say, 200 miles or more-which may be regarded
sector in which has been the fifty miles imme- as the centre of the whole vast scheme; and that
diately in front of Warsaw along the I:ower Bz
ra centre is for the moment immobile, The Germans
and its tributary the Rawka. ThIs offensIve, and Austro-Hungarians, who are in much larger
though still renewed, has failed, and is probably numbers here than their opponents, cannot ad-
nearly exhausted. It has cost the enemy VC!y vance further than the line so drawn up, not even
beavily in men, probably in men permanently
IS- in front of 'Varsaw.
abled or killed or prisoners along the whole PolIsh But on either side of this centre are two wings,
line, as many as a quarter of a million-p.erha
s differing greatly in cJlara
ter, and it is upon th
se
more. The difficulties of ambulance, especIally In two wings that the RussIan movement IS takmg
the centre of Poland, haNe rendered unusually place. The southern or left Russian wing runs
hiah the German permanent losses, and correspon- all along the base of the Carpathians from the
ùi
gly low the number of the wounded who will upper torrent-reaches of the Biala to the borders
ever be able to return to the colours. of Roumania: that is, to the district called the
Bukovina, Austrian before this war in poW.ical
definition, Roumanian in population,
All along this left or southern wing the HuS'-
sians are more or less advanced into the mçuths
of the Carpathian Passes. They do not hold the
summits of anyone of them, and against the efforts
they are about to make in this region-particularly
from the Bukovina-the Germanic Powers are
massing very large forces, the nature and the
chances of which will be discussed in a moment.
On the northern or right wing of the immcnsø
Russian line the situation is as follows:-
There are three sectors:
(1) The district between the Vistula and the
East Prussian border, a district in the form of a
wedge, a hundred miles broad at its base, dwind-
ling to nothing at its apex in front of Thorn.
(2) A front upon" the region of the lakes,"
this front stretching roughly from Goldap to Oso-
viecs, This front is about sixty to seventy miles
broad,
(3) Finally, there is the llorthern sector rUll-
ninO' right up to the Baltic and measuring about
lOOt> miles or a little more in extent.
With these elements clear we can study our
Ally's plan as it appears to be conceived for the
immediate future, and the enemy's apparent coun-
ter-pIan so far as this has developed.
But before taking either of these movements
upon the wings in detail, we must appreciate the
most general conditions under which the whole
struggle must take place for at least four months

'rHE

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BY LAND.
BELLOC.

1*

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I;ÄND :AND WATER

February 6, 1915. 1

j.)
4)i-
Co'

\
1-4..-

'Third Scd#r

-that is, so long as winter keeps the externJcl Rus-
sian ports ice
bound,
(1) The first of these conditions is,. the restric-
tion of our Allies in the matwr of equIpment.
There is no great mystery about this, and it
has often been mentioned before in these com-
ments, because the judgment which is so necessary
to public opinion in
hi
seven: struggle depen
ls
upon our just appreCIatIOn of It, and because III
tbi;:; case the facts are a great deal better known
to our opponents tha
to any civilia? centres
amon a the Allies. Bneflv, all the AllIes began
the w
r short of the full equipment and the full
reserves of ammanition which it has proved to de-
mDnd. while the enemy began the war not with the
full equipment and reserve of ammunition which
the war has proved to demand-for it has far ex-
ceeded his expectations-lmt with a great deal
more of both equipment and ammunition than we
had. The reason of this is perfectly simple. Berlin
wanted war and has prepared for it during the
last three years with the greatest secrecy and
energy and has declared it at exactly her own
moment, subordinating everything to that one end,
while the Allies have only considered war during
that period as a possible catastrophe to be avoided
by every means in their power, and surely to be
successfully prevented if another crisis should acci-
dentally arise, The whole thing is as simple as
an,'" onè of the corresponding problems that con-
tim
ally arise in daily life. A knows that B wishes
him ill, but he is not going to give up his normal
occupations in order to devote himself entirely to
the ruin of B, because he has often called B's bluff
in the past and because, judging other men from
himself, he cannot believe that B is going to give up
everything for the sake of attacking him, and be-
cause it is no part of healthy living to devote one's
entire time and opporhmities to a struggle which
may never take place, If Europe were a chaos
and nations a hand of cut-throats, then the obvious
policy for England and France would have been
for both these countries to go to war some years
2*

1Jr,

acto before the creation of the heavy howitzer,
when the French had submarines and the Germans
none (an interval of several years), before the
Germans had developed their Fleet, and when the
French Army had the new quick-firing gun and the

rmans the old gun, which could not stand up
aaainst it for a moment: again an interval of
s:veral years. But to force war like this with
the mere object of destroying another member of
the European family is not in the morals of the
West. It is only with reluctance that even now
a mi:lOrity of the West (outside France) has com:;}
to regard Prussia as an outlaw,
Under such circumstances it was inevitable
that the anarchic Power keeping its efforts secret
shcmld begin the struggle with a great adva
t
ge
in equipment a.nd in reserve of ammumtIOn.
Luckily there went with its plans what nearly
always happens with too frigid a calculation, to
'wit, an exhaU3tion beyond the point to which cal-
culation haa reached: an inability to face unex-
pected issues. The enemy allowed for, at the
most six months of war, He calculated that
the .é\.ustro-Hungarian forces would hold up wit

out disaster a Uussian advance; he under-estI-
mated the expenditure of ammunition, aDd he
id
not aUow for a blockad
, even such a partIal
blockade as h8-3 beeu imperfectly established. He
is therefore himself handicapped from now OR-
wards, but he was able to put into the field more
men than the Allies during all this first and second
phase of the combat. H
still has more men, and
that leads me to my second point with regard to
the eastern field.
(2) The Russian plan is not a plan of envelop-
ment, for a plan of envelopment is impossible 'Yith
inferior forces, and the number of RussIans
equipped and at the front between the Roumanian
frontier and the Baltic is certainly less than the
number of the enemy opposed to them.
But if this'dual att:mmt on the extreme nortlì
and on the ex.treme south'" of the extended line is
not an attempt at envelopment, what is it? It is
a plan of mnbar1YtSs'tJwllt and division.
In order to explain that definition we must
first define what envelomuent is.
Supposing
'ou had on this huge semi-circle

A c
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G ...... \.p.
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D
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from th3 Baltic to the Carpathians the
enemy along A-B counting as 3 and our Allies

February 6, 1ü15.

LAND ÄND WATER

along C-D numbering 5; then by massing the
extra two units at either end they would begin
pushing the corresponding ends of the enemy back.
A would fall back to E, and B to F, The pressure
would continue because there would always bo
superior forces against the enemy on either horn
of the crescent and the enemy could not reinforce
either horn without danger of having his centre
broken in becau::;e his numbers would be too small.
He would be pressed back anc! back until with the
advance reaching, say, G on the north he would
be in peril for some one of his great lines of com-
munication, such as M-M. Long before that hap-
pened he would have had to fall back with his
centre and with his other extreme as well. If he
did not fall lx'lck in time bis centre would be cut
off and at least one part cf his line-perhaps the
",hole of it-would be swamped.
But if things are the other way about, and if
Ä-B counts as 4, while C-D as yet only counts as 3,

A
,#{JC
ID

\)'ß
ß

D

ttcre can be no question of C-D acting in this
fashion. By the time he had massed mcn at either
extreme, C or D, leaving only just enough men in
the centre to hold firm, he would yet not have men
cnol:gÌ1 at cither extremity to maintain a con-
tinuous and successful advance indefinitely. The
enemy could easily mass men to stop him by with-
drawing forces from thcir own centre (which they
can well afford to do), apart from the fact that
their lines at the extremities are already
tronger
thaiIl his.
Indeed, C-D upon a ficld of battle would be
foolish indeed if he attempted any such movements
upon the extremities in force.
But a line a thousand miles long passing
through "ery various political areas is not like the
field of a single battle. It may offer political
f\pportunities of ,vhich the ,,,eaker force call take
advantage. This happens to be the case in the
C1.stern feld to-day. At A and C you have that
province of East Prussia upon which German
('pinion is more sensitive perhaps than any other
part of the national soil. It has already suffered
:invasion, and though the Germans won a great
,.ictory at Tannenberg five months ago, and drove
;3*

the inVaders out, there is a lively recollection of
the event throughout the Empire. fI'he great
estates were raided, the peasantry (who are half
servile in condition) rose in revolt against the Prus-
sian squircs and looted the country houses; there
,,;as a stampede of refugees to Berlin and very
heavy material damage done. On the other end
of the line at D-D you have two important con-
siderations embarrassing the enemy. The first is
that the presence of the Russian forces ill what is
nationally Roumanian territory more and more
urges Roumania to move, and Roumania has half
a million fresh men admirably trained And
e-quipped, On what is politically Hungarian soil,
and still free from invasion, at least three million
men of Roumanian blood and speech inhabit the
eastern slope of the Carpathians and naturally
attract Roumanian interference. It must not be
forgotten that here, as everywhere, the Germanic
Powers as a whole stand for the principle of sub-
jecting populations to an alien Government; the
Allies stand as a whole for the reconstruction of
the minor nationalities in Europe,
The second consideration embarrassing the
Germanic Powers at the southern extremity, B-D,
is the peculiar position of Hungary. Hungary
was as much the cause of the war as anyone, for
Hungary claimed to keep subject Servians and
Roumanians against their wills, but the Hunga-
rians have no cause to sacrifice themselves for the
Germans; they are something quite apart, and, as
was shown in these notes some time ago,
the gravest political weakness of the Germanic
Allies consists in this necessity they are under
of placating this outlic'l', the alim}, suspicious,
and now actively discontented Hungarian element
on the outer edge of their body. If Hungary went
the remaining half of the Dual JVfonarchy 'Would
be almost compelled to make peace, and when that
had happened Germany certainly could not hold
out.
V\T e talk ccntinually of the war as though
" Germany" were the only enemy. 'Ve too often
forget that the forces of our enemy are nearly
doubled, their reserves more than doubled, by tile
alliance of Germany with Austria.
Now, an invasion, though it were but partial
and temporary, of Hungary by Russian forces
through the extreme passes of the Carpathians, or
by Russian and Roumanian forces combined, when
Roumania enters the field, might just prove that
extra straw on the camel's back which would de-
tach Hungary frÐm the aBiance and break down
the whole Germanic scheme.
To sum up, then, Russia attacking at the two
110rns of the crescent cannot hope to env{ lop;
she has not the men for it. She will not, during
the winter months, have the equipment to provide
the men for it. But she may perfectly well by
causing alarm at both sides of the long line, under
the political conditions of those extremities, cause
grave embarrassment and division to her cnemy.
She may make Hungary so clamour for reinforce-
ments that Germany, in terror of losing Hungary,
wiII throw too many men towards the south-cast
and "eaken herself elsewhere. If, while that is
happening there is a successful raid going on in
Eastern Prussia she may well compel the Gernians
to reconsider tl1Cir policy of helping Hungary and
fluster Germany into withdrawing troops from the
south to secure the north,

LÄND AND WATER

fifteen miles or so from the frontier (less from the
very nearest point), its occupation, should the Rus-
sians be fortunate enough to force their way there,
would be of considerable effect, not only because of
the political blow struck, but also because forces
diverted to pre'Vent a continued advance over the
Niemen (which the Germans call the Memel) would
be working very far away from the mass of the
German Army. Numerous as the German forces
in the East still are, they cannot be everywhere,
and it is almost certain that in the attempt to de-
fend East Prussia the Germans would pile up in
the north an excessive number of men.
The movement has for the moment only begun,
and we have no right to form any judgment as to
its development. The Russian cavalry has cut the
railway at and destroyed the station of Pogegen,
just north of Tilsit beyond the river, an afternoon's
walk. In its advance on the town from the south
it has reached and occupied Lasdehnen, a small
town not more than eight miles from the frontier,
and the larger railway junction of Pilkallen,
about fourteen miles to the south and not ten
miles from the frontier, South of Pilkallen they
are still engaged with tbe Germans in a group of
woods which lies between that point and the main
railwav, and their line runs southward and west-
ward, "getting further and further from the fron-
tier until it touches the lake region somewhere
apparently behind and south of Goldap. \Vhat
happens to it in the lake region itself is not
very easy to determine. A private message which
reached London on Friday last said that the Rus-
sians were already in occupation of Lotzen,
If this is true it is news of very high importance.
for they would therc hold the principal defile
through the lakes, and the principal railway junc-
tion of the whole district. But I can find no offi-
cial confirmation of such important news, unless
the German official communiqué, which told us at
much the same time the Russians were repelled
from the Lowentin Lake, may be regarded as con-
I.-THE EAST PRUSSIAN FRONT. firmation: for the mention of a repulse-and no
. The Russians at the beginning of the cam- more-in an official communiqué always connotes
:paIgn, when the number of their equiDped men was a more or less successful attack by the enemy.
lllferior to that which it has now rêached, dared \Vhen it is quite beaten-still more if the enemy
not attack north of the central section of the East lose ground-the official communiqués are much
!,russian front, It is never safe to separate an grander. The Lowentin Lake is just south
Isolated body too far from your main line, and had of Lotzen, and if there has been fighting
the Russians in October and November attempted along any portion of it then there has been
to work much further north than \Virballen, their fighting in the immediate neighbourhood of Lot-
forces would have been too extended or would zen; but it is remarkable that no Russian official
have had an isolated portion to the north, Some- news should apparently exist upon the subject.
what increasing numbers, as equipment slowly Lotzen, it may be noted, is over forty miles within
grew, have permitted them to act nearer to the the frontier, and an advance so far would, among
Haltic, other possessions, involve the occupation of the
. Now, this is of great importance. The middle Imperial hunting grounds and country house at
öistrict from Wirballen southward between
fargrabowa,
Goldap and Snwalki towardsOsowiecs is the region \Ve may sum up and say that on this front our
of the lakes. It is one tanr:rle of defiles between Allies have, over a front of about a hundred miles,
endless pieces of water of various sizes, and penetrated the enemy's territory through a zona
marshes, These defiles are both fortified and of about one day's march, narrowing northward"
thoroughly studied by the enemy, But to the to less than this; but southwards, where the region
!lorthward of the main railway line the country of the lakes is reached, extending to much more,
IS more open, There is a certain amount of marsh, to two or three days, or even four days if th'3
but the further north you go the easier the ground private telegrams which reached London at the enl
becomes. of last week are accurate. The amount of terri-
The political centre of all this district is the tory occupied in this raid is about as much as that
town of Tilsit, famous in Napoleonic history and held by the Germans in Flanders, reckoning from
it is upon Tilsit that the most northern' new the sea to the line of the main railway and a little
Russian move is converging. .Though Tilsit is only beyond. Hut the Germans' foremost trenche3
4.

On the western lines in France we cause such
öiversion by attacking unexpectedly at the most
widely separated points. Now on the sea, now in
the centre at Soissons, now right up in Alsace at
the southern extreme. It is a mechanical system
which produces perpetual going and coming up
and down the German line, and as perpetually
wears it down,
In the East, where there i.3 neither railwa.y
facility for this nor a closed line of trenches to be
broken, there exists wha.t does not exist in the
West, and that is grave diversity of political
objects at the extremes of the line, and it is of this
that our Allies in the East are taking advantage,

"
.1.
,,."

'Tbln! Stcr",

February 6, 1915.

,,,,"

February 6. 1915.

LAND AND WATER

and its garrison blockaded by the Russian armies.
The reader will also note the position of Bukovina.
the situation of the Roumanian population under
Hungarian rule (interspersed. it is true. with Mag-
yar and German elements. which also form. as a
rule. the wealthier portion of the community),
and lastly he will note the way in which, these
passes once crossed, the roads down them lead
directly to the Hungarian Plain. which is wholly
without natural or artificial defence.
Lastly. it must be remembered that the whole
of this fighting is taking place in deep snow. and
under the most abominable conditions of weather.
N ow let us see what are the positions and the
objects of the two combatants. As to position.
the Russian line runs everywhere along the foot-
hills of the mountains much as I have marked it.
until the neighbourhood of the Bukovina. where
the Russian line advances much more closely to the
summit of the range. and has. at one moment.
actually crossed that summit. though not holding
any part of it at the present moment, the furthest
point it ever reached being at Kirlibaba. where
there is no good road, This means. of course.
that the Russians have massed most of their troops
(in proportion to what the enemy had to oppose
to them) towards the south-east, It seems to be
true conversely that the Austro-German attempt
would take the form of a special concentration tõ-
wards the north-west. \Ve cannot know, we can
only guess. but the best guess to make under the
circumstances is that the enemy will put stl'O

forces in front of the Bukovina frontier to prevent
its being crossed (indeed. those forces are already
present) and will then make Lis chief effort across
the Dukla. the Lupkow, the Uzsok. and the
V olosc, It is obvious what such a swarming north-
ward and eastward from the Carpathian ridge
here would mean. It would mean the attempt
to relieve Przemysl and (that eternal objective in
all this fighting for months) the pushing of the
Russians beyond the main raihvay. Lemberg-
Przemysl-Tarnow. by which alone an army in
Galicia-particularly in a winter campaign-can
live,
Which of the two forces has the better
chance of success we cannot yet possibly deter-
mine. \Ye know that (krmany has lent at least two
corps; we know that Austria-Hungary has called
E up the heaviest force she can possibly spare; we
can safely conjecture that pressure upon Serbia
has been removed (I believe the information
The length of the whole curve. which is the upon it to have been false. as I said in these
first element to consider, is from the Donajec to columns a week or t)\O ago); "We know that so far
the Bukovina, not very far short of 300 miles, the pressure has been strong enough to prevent a
Next. the 300 miles are not a uni- further Russian advance into the hills. and. lip to
veri:al front across which the general action may the tiIì1e of writing-Tuesday evening-that is all
stray; they are, for strategical purposes. a series we know. The near future will tell us both whether
of defiles. which defiles are the passes over the Russia alone can force any of the passes and also
mountain, There are six main passes from the whether Rou..--nania will come in, in time, But
Roumanian frontier to the basin of the Donajec, note this. If the Russians do force in any numbers
and the railway is carried across the range in anyone of the passes they have done thè trick, for
DO less than four. These main defiles are in their in this feld alone they have better lateral commu-
order the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, the nications by raihmy than the enem)', and the
V olocz, the Delatyn. and the Borgo. which last lies country beyond the hills is vulnerable in the
in the knot of the mountain system, where Rou- extreme. Put a Russian Army. for instance.
mania and the Bukovina and Hungary meet, The marching down the valley of the Szamos or the
reader will note upon this line the position of Bistritza, and quite certainly the enemy's forces on
Przemysl. It lies about forty miles from the sum- all the northern passes-leaving no more than just
mit of the range and about one-third of the way enough to hold them-will turn back south to chal-

long the whole curve. It has long been isolated lenge the inv5ider& of Hungary.
5*

near Noyon are one-third more advanced into
French territory than are the Russians in East
Prussia even if they do occupy Lotzen-and there
can. of course, be no comparison between the
economic and political importance of the two belts.
I have seen. by the way. in connection with
this German advance into East Prussia, the crit-
icism that it would be baulked by the line of the
Niemen or Memel. I cannot see how this is the
case; that line is perpendicular to the general ad-
vance. which is taking place on both banks and
with sufficient forces. Tilsit could just as well be
occupied from the south as from the north, the
only advantage of the attack from the north being
that it further embarrasses the enemy and cuts him
off by railway from the town of Memel and the
sea.

,.. -

H.-THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
The effort at the Carpathian end of the line
differs in every possible respect, political. geo-
graphical and strategic. from the effort on the East
Prussian front.

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þ

LAND AND WATER

THE WESTERN FIELD.
I N the western :field there has been a series of
those attacks and counter-attacks which
have upon the side of the Allies the object
(and upon the whole the result) of slow
y
wearing down the enemy's numbers III
greater proportion than the loss('s sustained
against them, but the actual movements recorded
have been quite insignificant and merit neither
illustration nor particular analysis.
The most conspicuous have been the very
violent attack in the region of La Bassée, the cap-
ture of the big dlme or sand hill just east of the
river outside Nieuport, and the rather heavy work
in the Argonne, in which one line of French
trenches was taken and the French lost ground for
about two hundred yards.
The most remarkable point about these various
engagements has been perhaps the hea\ry German
loss connected with the days immediately preced-
ing and coincident with the German Emperor's
birthday.
It is not a very great matter nor a verr mate-
rial one, but it is curiously worth watching on the
part of any student of this war, that the enemy
adds to his high military efficiency little marks of
superstition or non-military motive which throw
an interesting light upon his psychology of war.
One cannot imagine a modern French com-
mander acting in thiS fa
hion or in that because
it is July 14th or the anniversary of Austerlitz,
but we have tbe Germans crossing the frontier
on the same day and hour as in 1870; making
Sedan Day coincide with the daring (and luckily
disastrous) march across the Allied front near
Paris, comparing a brigade action with Gravelotte
'" because it had the same frontJge in kilometres " ;
and now wasting a number of men in three days
which had no direct military si 6 nificance, but
which happen to coincide with tlle Emperor's
birthday: as though it were part of the business
of war to give one's commander-in-chief a present,
and that present a sacrifice.
It is not wise to ridicule too much this not
logical and not material sentiment in war: this
touch of superstition. One oertainly cannot con-
nect it with rational plans, but no one will deny
to the enemy a great excellence in drawing up and
maturing such plans. The touch of non-rational
motive which you find added to such plans, both
br individuals,and by nations, usually connotes a
high exaltation oÌ feeling, and it is an indication
of the enemy's mind which must not be neglected,
We shall probably:find examples of it recurring in
the future of these campaigns. If it is exagge-
rated it will be all in our fayour.
The capture of the great dune will prove of
importance if it gives the Allies a sound gun posi-
tion, That it does so as against the plain to the
east is obvious, The Dunes run in this region be-
tween the main road and the sea, and behind the
main road is a fiat, cultivated and pasture country
full of water, meadows and ditches and traversed
by the main canal between Nieuport and Ostend.
!From any conspicuollii one of these numerous sand
hills, once its summit is occupied, there is a clear
range eastward as far as, say, Slype, 7,000 yards
away, and southward well beyond St, Georges.
,But what one cannot tell, what no one can tell

less he is on the spot, and ca.nnot always tell

February 6, 1915.

then, is the relation of the position to other posi-
tions amid these tangled heap;:; of sand bound to-
gether with coarse grass, which line the whole of
that coast for fifty miles. It may be that the posi-
tion here captured is of such importance that it
will permit a steady advance eastward along tile
main road, more probably it will meet opportuni-
ties of resistance eastward among the low heights
of the same formation and will not seriously ad-
vance our offensin upon this ex.treme flank of the
enemy.
The fighting ill the Argonne bears out what
was said in these notes last week: that the enemy
would continue to make vigorous efforts in the
wood3 west of Verdun, because one part of his
plans must be the attempted investment of that
fortress vrhen he can bring up hi3 l1ew formations.
Perhaps it w
)Uld be more accurate to say: " Be-
cause one of hi.3 commanders is advising the ulti-
mate att'3mpt to procure such an investment"; for
there is ani will continue to be upon the side of the
enemy a series of disconnected plans each depen-
dent upon a diff8rent commander. That is ouite
evident from the way in which for now three
mO:lths the enemy's energy ha3 been spent upon
one point after another, not only as opportunity
seemed to suggcst, but as individual Generals ob-
tained the ear of the chief command, or were le:t
free to act ea
h in his own region,
Beyond this there is nothing to be said with
regard to the western field at the moment of writ-
ing- Tue3dJ.Y evening,

THE COMING GERrvIA
OFFENSIVE
IN THE \YEST,
Although it is true that nothing is less easy to
forecast than the COli.r3e of a w..u, yet there are
sometimes circumstanc
s in which onè can be fairly
certain of the g::meral course ". hich warfare will
take when a particular campaign has reached a
certain point in its development.
For instance, when one of the French armies
was contained in Metz (in 1870) by the Germans,
and the only other regular forces the French pos-
sessed had been captured wholesale at Sedan, it
was so obvious that the next German move would
be an advance on Paris that no one concerned with

he defence of the French allo.....'ed for any other
I33ue.
The next development of our enem
.'s plans is
not quite so obvious as that; but it is fairly clcar
that this next move will be a venT heavy assault
upon the western Ene in the hope òf breaking that
line.
The reasons for this are Llirh' obvious; the
enemy is aware that the French arè working with
a large strategic reserve. He is abo aware that
Great Britain has, more and more r\"ady day by
day as equipment increases and as training is per-
fectel, another reserve consisting of nC"\Y forma-
tions, and one which in future can grow, not in-
'deed indefinitely, but up to limits far beyond what
was expected in Germ
l1Y when the war hroke out.
His total reserve of men i;:, not2
.million. Man!
converging lines of proof and reports which are
believed to be reliable in the 'Vest combine to put
the German J' disposable" reserve which has not
yet been put into the field at no more than tWQ

6*

February 6. 1915.

LAND :AND WATER

million of men. The enemy is not certain of the
,quality of the British new formations. or of their
rate of equipment. Sometimes he seems to make
calculations upon these too favourable to himself.
But what his real judgment is we can hardly tell.
because we only hear the official accounts put
forward to affect opinion within Germany itself
ß,nd to affect the opinion of neutral countries.
At any rate. he knows that if he allows too
long a delay to pass he will be confronted in the
;West with bodies superior in number to bis OW11.
and against a superiority of number he believes it
impossible to contend; his whole theory of "War is
based upon the certitude of a numerical superi-
ority, This superiority he still maintains; he
knows that he will not now long maintain it.
Therefore he must :fight.
He must :fight rather in the 'Vest rather than
in the East for the following reasons;-
1, All the resources of the future in every-
thing but unequipped men are to be found in the
;West.
2. His efforts ur;on the East have failed to
attain the objective of '
Tarsaw. but they have suc-
ceeded in keeping his enemy there at bay, And
he may presume upon the rigors of the climate to
prevent any considerable pressure being renewed
upon him in this quarter before the spring. This
calculation may not be a wise one.; an exceptional
period of '
ery hard but very clear and windless
weather would probably permit successful action
by the Russians on the extreme north of their line.
Such action they are contemplating already. but.
take the line as a whole. and it is improbable that
the enemy believes in the danger of serious peril
from the East before the spring,
3, Upon the \Vest. on the contrary. he can
shortly come. say. after the next six weeks upon
drier weather and upon a better chance for attack-
ing. This is particularly the case in the more
inland parts of the line. and the mention of this
leaves us to consider where that effort may come.
There are five main fields of action in the 400-
mile line betweEn the Swiss mountains :and the
North Sea.

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1, First and southernmcst is the district pro-
tected by Belfort and the !:outhern half of the
lV osges 1\fountains.
2. Next we h
ve all th
t J'('gìcn the key to

which is Verdun. because the southern part is
blocked by Epinal, and because nÐar V erdun alon

of the great fortresses arc the' Germans threaten-
ing, an action in which would first require the in-
vestment of Verdun.
3. Next you have the open Champagne dis-
trict west of the Forest of Argonne.
4, Next comes the "elbow" of the line. the
Soissons district and all its neighbourhood to tLe
north up. say. as far as the Albert-Arras region.
5, Lastly. tl:ere comes from this Albert-Arras
region to the sea" hat may be called the Flanders
district. including, of course, much territory that
is not within the limits of Flanders.
Now. it is absolutely impossible to say which
of various opportunities an enemy will take. Tte
whole business of generalship is to prevent an
opponent from guessing what you are to do next.
But we can examine these five sectors so that.
when the shock comes, we may be able to estimate
its chances. and at the same time to judge where
the attack would seem to be most dangerous. Let
us take these five sectors one by one,

1. To attack in mass with their new forma 4
tions upon the sector of Belfort would have one,
and only one. advantage; the success of such an
advance would be followed by the turning of the
whole French line. It would be necessary for the
southern portions of that line to fall back as a
whole to some such line as A-B; it would uncover
Nancy; it would turn the barrier fortresses; it
would isolate or uncover Verdun. Judged in terms
of its difficulty. however. and not in terms of its
advantage, it would be the most hopeless of
achievements of all the tasks the enemy could pro-
pose to himself. The Vosges are an obst
cle across
which only heavy and prolonged fightmg would
carry the offensive. They were abandoned last
summer, and have had to be painfully recovered
by the French only because they were turned upon
the north. After the battle of
fetz, in the region
X. in the last ten days of August, the country to
the WC:jt of thc noríhern end of the Vosges was in
the hands of the enemy. and the French line had

7*

LAND AND WATER

to fall right back from the crests of the mountains,
as along the arrow, the original French line being
A-B before the battle and C-D after it.

A .Metz
", X Sittof
'._......., - '.Baffle of'Metz
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C
Nancy.

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I:WISS f'ØJ
) Z

n
t we are supp03ing for the purposes of this
analysIs a new German offensive undertaken with
the fullest strength available agaimt one sector of
the line. If these new formation,> should attempt
too wide an advance, if they should try at once to
attack the first sector from the cast and to turn it
from the north they could not succeed. The main
battle would inevitably develop upon the northern
front, and the French from within the angle could
-con
entrate there verr much more rapidly than
their opponents. The thing could oul y be done at
the beginning of the campaign, and
vith the ad-
vantage of complete surprise at this stage of the
war, where every party to it has learned by heart
the nature of the fight, that surprise, 'where a large
body of men were concerned, would be absent.
South of the obstacle of the Vosges the first
'sector only consists in the narrow gap of BeHort,
and BeHort is not onl\' amono- the strono-est of the
JOb
fortresses, but has had six months of leisure in
which to .develop the new character of siege work:
to e
tabhsh temporary and concealed batteries far
outsIde the old permanent works, and to desil"J'n a
covering trench work all alon rr the eastern half of
-the circumference of greatl/' ex.tended fortified
zone.
Whether the enemy will think the advanta O'e
of breaking the J.'reneh line here great enouo-h to
,counterbalance the vast difficulty of the task
and
,therefore worth while, only the future can show.

r TI .
-. Ie second sector, which may be called the
sector of Verdun, was already marked in these
notes last ,'reek as that in wllÌch the principal
German effort, when it came, might ver
' prolx:tbly
be made. .It .has at first sight no conspicuous ad-
vantages; It lllvolves the reduction of what must
8*

February G, 1915.

I
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I <' :E iMl

P.
C>
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Xl

have become in the course of the la3t few months a
most formidable new system of defence, and pro-
gr,ess coul
no
be rapid. or dependent upon sup-
phes, \Vhlle It was takmg place, moreowr, the
French should haye ample tiJ,l1e to concentrate.
But when one looks a little more close!\- at th

problem one may well believe that the Verdun
sector would especially attract the enemy.
Apart from the ge_leral considerations m
n-
tioned last week, there are special points well
worth remarking.
(a) The enemv has here very short and verv
excellent lines of ràilwa,' communications , as abn;'"
. b
A-A to Treves and Coblentz, along B-B to Spires.
along C-C to Strasburg. Great depots adyanccd
t? ,yithin a st.one's throw, so to speak, of his øbjec-
hve, are avallable at Lux.embourg. at Thionyille
and at Mctz. Yery numerous railwa
' line"',.; con-
nect him in a couple of hours with the fluthcr ba5
s
on the line, and a network of these runnino- north
o
and south, as well as east and we3t, permit him to
mass men very rapicUy upon any point of this
sector.
(b) The conformation of Òc line is already
such that one particular and succe3sful effor
t
would complete the investment of Y erelun. Th,

cnemy holds the wedge ending at
t.. Milliel, and
the line to the north and cast of thi.:i goes rùlmd in
three-quarters of a circle, It is cll1y the remain-
ing quarter, or a little more, that has to be joincJ
up to eITect the enemy's pl
rrose, and he would, diJ

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x@

February G, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

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he threaten to achieve such a success, put the
French commanders in the dilemma whether to
allow a large force to be invested upon the frontier,
and so hold up further offensive there, or to retire
while there was yet time, and in so doing to give
the whole of Lorraine and most of the Barrois to
the enemy, to abandon the he:1vy artillery in posi-
tion and to jeopardise the whole line to the south.
One may repeat that, merely as a problem
upon the map, the most obyious move for the new
German attack would be down east of the Argonne
on to the main railway supplying Verdun, and

- t]õ Pari, &
Chalon.
Gnd tb,
1'Ic,.tfut'Ø ball
øfthe
rre.ncb Lin,

!lõ
Cb
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and Pari'.

.c
ol,rt".s
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g, t1u 1IUllUrøtt' F
CØlDaauniCAtwlU
for r:lpUt con<<ntrAtlOn at aJUj poÚJt thruteJd
in th( rdntrant Ci<rm.tn Line bctwUA
St. M
id. and the A
nnt.

-
TøaJong tA,
Southern en4
\tftlu F.løeb
Line.
II

Compiegne

thence downwards towards the western bank of
the Meuse opposite St. Mihie!. The counter argu-
ment to this is onl)' what may be seen almost any-
where on the line, the facility for rapid concentra-
tion upon the French side. But this facility is
rather more extended at this particular point than
anywhere else. It is, as a sketch printed last
week and here reproduced shows, a close system
of railway, douLle and single, of Verdun railway
system, normal gauge and light, and can be fed at
once from all the depots that lie towards Paris,
from all that are drawn up between the frontier
and the centre, and from all that are rescn'cd
further south. There is, perhaps, no point
between the Swiss mountains and the sea where 3.
larger number of the French resen-e iu men and
material could be more rapidly put into the field
than the arc now protected by Verdun,
3, Sector of Champagne. Three elements
combine to make the new offensiyc attempt to
break throuah in the sector of Champagne-that
is, the open o country from Reims to the Argonne.
The first is that this sector is the centre of the line
so that existing troops could be concentrated more
rapidly upon it than elsewhere, The second is onp
of those politic..11 reasons which have already had S(l
much effect upon the conduct of the campaign from
the German side: the reoccupation of Heims would
be a success to put heart into the further Germa.n
offensive. The third reason is the nature of tJlC
country; how f..'ìr the advantages here are counter-
balanced by the defensive character of modern
French work, only those who have had experience
of the latter during this campaign can say, But

i

xi

9*

LAND :AND WATER

country behind him, M-M-M and N-N-N, You are
dependent on 0-0-0. It is almost true to say the
first appearance of a great force upon the side
of such a salient is sufficient to prevent the com-
mander of an equal enemy force from proceeding to
attempt an issue through the point of the salient.
'Vhatismuch more likely, if the enemy proposes 1.0 use
his new armies in this sector at an, is that he would
move to attack one side of the angle, as Soissons to
the east of it or Roye to the north of it. But
even so he would be acting under difficulties and a.
corresponding force striking at the side opposite to
him would, if it were successful, destroy him, The
only advantage that he would have would be that
working inside the angle he could more quickly
decide which side to attack than his enemy could
concentrate for the counter attack upon his flank.
Take it all in all the use of the new German
armies in the "elbow" of the line would be the use
of them in the worst possible place of all the five
sectors. If the gap made were narrow it would be
useless or rather disastrous, and to make it broad
against the convergence of the defence on either
side is hardly possible.
5. The last sector, the sixty miles or so :ITom
the Arras region to the sea, would of course, if it
were the object of attack, reproduce the conditions
of all the earlier fighting. These conditions would be
reproduced with the advantage to the enemy of his
new formations and increased numbers, He would
have the same objectives the French side of the
Straits of Dover and the possible turning of tho
French line by the North. He would guarantee
here it will be made only because the lure himself from any future danger of being attacked
of Paris will prove politically too strong for purely along his own right :flank from the Belgian coast
milit-ary plans. The point of a salient like this and in general success here would rank only second
is not the best point for attacking a line as a in its military effect to success in the sector of
whole; if while you are attacking inside the angle Verdun, while the political effect, for what that is
and trying to break it at its point (a) your enemy worth, would be much greater. Further, it would
with an equal force strikes it on either side as at (b) be a local success won after months of effort over
or (c) he will imperil you far more than you are ground the names of which are the household words
imperilling him, he will be quite certain if he is of every party to this campaign in the west, the
successful to cut the avenues by which you live, for enemy would hold Arras itself, Bethune, Boulogne
those avenues are necessarily confined to the narrow and Calais, Hazebrouck, St. Orner, Ypres and
area of the angle, You do not, even if you break Nieuport. That is only a moral point, but it is
through, threaten his communications, which, worth counting. More than one critical authority
especially under the particular circumstances of the has gone so far as to say that the new oflènsive "\vill
case in question, are at large. He can be fed, certainly be delivered against this fifth Eector. That
ammunitioned, from anywhere along the open seem.s to me a great deal too strong. . Nothing ia
10*

the sweep of country from the Argonne to Berry-
au-bac is much the most open in the whole line, and
the soil is one which, though very sodden and difficult
immediately after rain, is fairly quick to dry. It is
the BOil in which the Prussian regiments found it
impossible to move forward at Valny, but had
they attacked three days later they would have
carried the hill, for even half a week of dry wind
gives you fair going. In the Champagne Pouilleuse
the earth is a mixture of chalk and light clay, the
obstacles in all this sector are quite insignificant,
there are no woods save a few regular stunted
plantations, and the streams are little white sluggish
things, such as the Suippes, which not even stop
vehicles in all their upper courses,
The drawback to making an attack in force in
the Champagne Pouilleuse is that it has to be con-
ducted in a country where every movement is
observable for miles, that were it successful it would
find immediately in front of it one of the best
defensive positions in the whole of France known as
the II Cliffs of Champagne" and consisting in steep
hillside running north and south fl.'om the neigh-
bourhood of Reims right down to beyond the level
of Chalons and to nearly opposite Vi try.
4, The fourth sector, the "elbow" where the
great line of trenches comes nearest to Paris (you
can motor out from Paris to the trenches, spend an
hour upon your message there and be back in Paris
all between breakfast and lunch) looks the most
tempting opportunity of all, but that appearance
is little more than a suggestion caused by the
shape of the line, If the attempt be made

,.

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February 6, 1915.

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X5

February G, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

certain in war. As a mere mathematical problem
Verdun is easier of solution and more fruitful .of
re8ult than Flanders; further, the fifth s
ctor is the
laBt to dry with the approach of better weather,
and lastly, it has been more exhaustively studied
for purposes of defence than any other. But that
the chances of the new ofIensive being. directed
against this familiar ground are high no one will deny.
It need hardly be pointed out that when ,the
new German offensive is made (as we presume it
will be made) it must succeed or result in a situation
which will put within sight the termination of the
war.
Germany will be using the last of her reserves,
She will without a doubt, if she attacks at all, attack
to win finally and with her whole force and at any
expense whatsoever, It will not be an efiòrt after
which the offensive, if it fails, will be able to fall
back upon another prolonged defensive, For fall-
ing back thus upon a prolonged defensive means
the awaiting of further reinforcement and the
opportunity for recuperating strength. But after
this next efiòrt no such reinforcement can be
expected upon the enemy's side; the throw will be
a final one.
This doe.s not mea.n that the struggle will be

FINANCIAL

short. It may be prolonged, as the fighting for
Warsaw was prolonged; or the tremendous (and
happily unsucoessful) effort to obtain the Straits of
Dover. The efiòrt may be postponed until the
spring or e"en the late spring. It may come upou
us before the end of February. When it is at bst
in movement it may occupy two months or more
before it shall either achieve success or confess to
defeat, But it is coming; and when it comes it
will come upon one of these five sectOl:S and more
probably upon the second Or the fifth than upon thð
first, third or fourth.

A NOTE ON THE EGYPTIAN
ADVANCE.
Though the advance against Egypt has not yet
developed, it is worth remembering by wh3.t road
the enemy appears to depend for his main supply,
and it is a point I will develop at lcnath next week
with a sketch map, 0
That route would seem to be neither the se3.
road nOlO the Akaba road, but rather up the Wady-
el-Arigh Southward-where there is no serious
obst::tcle to a light rail,,-ay and no {ear of attack
from the sea-then, from where the Wady strike.a
the Pilgrim road, to Suez,

PRESSURE

WAR.

AND

T HERE has been a good deal of talk in the general experience, Your individual or your
la.st few days of the fina.ncial pressure group of individual:; not possessed of sovereign
upon Germany and upon Austria-Hun- power cannot get food or arms without the pos-
gary which results from the pres
nt cam- ::;es5Ìon and use of the current medium or the
paign, The point merits attention in instruments of credit based upon the current
these notes, for, though it is not strictly military, medium. nut the sovereign power can perfectly
it i3 a subject with which every student of military well obtain both ,,-ithout the use of such a medium.
history is acquainted from the past. Take all the gold away from the enemy and, if it
The particular error most common in connec- ,,,ere possible, deprive him of the power of issuing
tion with this subject is the error that an enemy instruments of credit, you would yet leave the
can be reduced by the lack of what is vaguely enemy as 'well able to fight as ever, The only case
ca
led " money"; a term used confusedly in such in which the possession of the current mediwn
statements to mean (a) the total amount of (which in our civilisation is gold) and of Ìllstru-
current metallic medium possessed by the enemy; ments of credit based upon that medium is appa.-
(b) this plus the instruments of credit b
sed upon rently necessary to a nation fighting for its life is
the metal; or (c) (much more uncertain) a general the case of foreign exchanges, And even here th6
estimate of all economic values real or imaginary. necessity is not absolute. To appreciate this trutil
in services or in goods at the service of the enemy. let us see what the current medium does and what
Generally speaking, when public men discuss instruments of credit based on it do.
the matter, they mean by" money" either (a) or The current medium does not produoe wðalt,h
(b) or both muddled together, and a calculation is -guns, wheat, cotton for powder, copper for
made that because the stock of gold in the enemy's shells, for instance-it does not even, in the largest
possession is dwindling at such and such a rate, or view, create a demand for them: all it does is to
because the instruments of credit based upon that make their e:rchanae easier.
stock are exchanging abroad for less than their face In normal tÜÌles, and under the régime of
value, therefore within such and such a space of private property, one citizen produces, or controls
tirn3 the enemy, though still possessed of arms, a stock of, wheat; another of guns; another of
food, and men, will be unable to contim
e fighting. copper; another of cotton, etc. Tbe man: who
That the error is a gross one all military hi;:,;tory wants copper may bave wheat to give for it, but
proves; revolutionary France (for instance) was the man "ith the copper may not want! the wheaL
bankrupt, and her instrl'.ments of credit exchang- He may want the guns; and the man with gun3
ing at a negligible fraction of their face value at may not want either copper or wheat-he may
the very moment when she was ahout to enter on want cotton-and so forth. As only in rare cases
her stupendous career of victory, and to change do two indi\'idual citizens pO.:isess each a surplu3
the face of the world. of what his particular known to him neighbour re-
lt is an error, I say, to believe that an enemy quires. some common denominator arises whicli
can be beaten from lack of this " money" -save all will take as a common standard of value, It
possibly through some distUl'bance in tho arl'ival of reaches that position through a number of charai-
necessary and foreign supplies-and it is an error ters: permanence, desirability, ease of carriage.
proceeding, like most economic fallacies, from the etc" and in our civilisation that place has boon
extension of private and particular to public and taken by gold.
11*

LAND AND WATER

:-r'ebruary 6, 1915.:

If the number of transactions iJ;l a community The presence ofa current medium, even fictitious,
increases much more rapidly than its stock of gold let alone genuine, is not necessary to the continuance
there would be a difficulty in effecting them (inci- of a war or the national life as a whole within the
dentally prices would fluctuate wildly and tend to boundaries of the nation, but it is necessary for its
fall in the most disturbing fashion) were not more foreign transactions unless the government of the
and more of the wòrk done, as production
nd con- other countries whose citizens me tradinO' across the
sequent exchanges expand in volume by instru-
rontier:will consent to be at the pains of organising
rnents of credit, that is, by promises to pay, to mternatIo
al exchange, and that no neutral country
which" credit" or the belief that they certainly at peace WIll be at the expense and trouble of doing
will be redeemed when presented generally to oblige a customer who happens to be at war,
attaches. By this contrivance one ounce of gold "\Ve may sum up, then, and say that Germany will
does the work in exchange of ten or a hundred or a never from failure of gold be exhausted in her material
thousand; for to one instrument of credit presented power to make war with goods produced within her
for payment in a given time there are always many own boundaries, But may she not be exhausted if
in circulation, gold or its equivalent fails her in her power to make
So far, so good. In normal times if you with- war with materials that have to be imported from
draw
')ld from the public or make individuals fear outside?
that instruments of credit will not be met there is To see how far that is likely, let us see how the
a sudden break put on all exchange and therefore citizens of a sovereign power trade with foreigners,
on all production, Take a concrete case. Let us say that there
But. if the Government-:the sovereig
power are in Lombardy (as there are for a fact) large
-steps In to compel productIOn and to dIrect its stocks of india-rubber; the German armies are
goods to the conswner, or by an artificial currency, in bad need of india-rubber, The German manu-
successfully imposed, supplies the place of true cur- facturers export to Italy electrical instruments
rency, there may be inconvenience, but need cer- made in Germany, In time of peace the normal
tainly be no famine in anything the nation can process of commercial exchange is this: the German
make, manufacturer sells to an Italian importer a number of
For instance, take all the gold away from a electrical instruments for the sum of MY 1,000 ounces
country and the man who makes hats can still of gold (the said 1,000 ounces being called by
exchange those hats with the man who makes boots, different names in the different European countries,
aud the man who makes boots exchange those boots but the ultimate medium of exchange being gold
with the man who grows wheat, and the man who measured by weight). The Italian merchant does
grows wheat exchange that wheat for hats with the not send the 1,000 ounces of gold in a bag to the
man who makes hats, and so forth, there passing in German manufacturer, but sends him a piece of
each transaction neither metal nor the promise to paper on which he writes a promise to pay to the
pay metal but any symbol such as a bit of paper on German 1,000 ounces of gold; and this piece of
which is printed the name of a familiar coin. If this paper he sends (or in the origins of the system sent)
enforced currency be increased beyond the sum to the German manufacturer who supplied it. A
which would have been used in actual gold, supposing firm making motor-cars for the German armies pur-
gold had been present, prices rise, and an attempt chases india-rubber from an Italian manufacturer,
to regulate currency of this sort, based as it is upon and
ends liirn a piece of paper promising to pay
a guess as to what would have taken place if gold had 1,000 ounces of gold. The sum total of these trans-
been present (a guess that can never be accurate), actions, so far as international commerce is con-
always leads sooner or later to a vast disturbance in cern ed, is that Germany has lost a certain amount
prices and an according suffering and strain in the of electrical instruments, and has gained an
commonwealth, but still this strain does not kill a equivalent amount of rubber; while there lies in
nation, it does not prevent the producer from pro- Germany a paper promise to pay so much gold, and
ducing or ultimately two producers from exchanging. in Italy a paper promise to pay the same amount
If the citizens come to doubt the value of the of gold, Those who deal with bills and other
paper altogether, that is if a man taking a .!1 note instruments of credit compare the two situations;
suspects that nobody will take it back from him, it is they find that the sums cancel out and no gold
of course exceedingly difficult to force the fictitious passes.
currency, and in the old days one of the greatest The real process is of course a million times
difficulties a Government had in getting such more complicated than that, The foreign exchanges
fictitious currency to work was the coercing of its ramify through all commercial countries, and conce:m
,subjects into taking that currency; but we have not two foreign merchants, but thousands upon
changed all that. The police to-day are everywhere. thousands who are continually exchanging and re-
A modern government is the absolute master of its exchanging, The acceptors of bills do not work for
subjects; not only from its vastly increased orgallisa- nothing, and their profits further complicate the
tion but from the nature of modern lethal ,...capons, afiàir, while, of course, the deals that cancel out one
and we may be quite certain that the modern against the other are not deals known to a small
government, particularly such a government as that circle, but moving as currency does, at large over
of Germany, can force a fictitious currency upon its the whole surface of commercial life with its millions
subjects for a very long period. of individual purchases and sales; but the principle
But even if it had not this power, even if the is that which appears in this purposely sin
ple-
fictitious currency breaks down, there still remains eÀample, and it will be apparent from that example
in tho last resource the power of the government to that although no Italian actually gets GClmrm gold
organiso national industry under its own inspection in that particular set of transactions, and no Gérman
and to have the stocks of raw material registered actually gets Italian gold. yet business would not
and taken over by its officials, the workmen set to hare been done unless the Italian mcrchw.t ltad
work upon them, and the finished products delivered believed that the GeTman could pay him, gÚd V},CTI.
where their consumption is necessary. ,the time came.
i2*

February G, 1915.

LAND 1\ND WATER

cient to continue her resistance and her armed
struggle for a long time.
3. "\\T ood and materials for shelter: In all
these Germany and Austria-Hungary are abundantly
supplied, not for one year or two but for (.;er.
4. Fuel. In all fuel except petrol the Ger-
manic allies are abundantly supplied not for one
year or two but for a generation or more. It is true
that the main coal supplies lie near the frontiel'R
and are subject to the first effects of invasion, but as
matters now stand there is no limit to the enemy's
supply in this rt'g-arLI, and mineral oil is not a
necessary fuel save as it is burned in the internal
combustion engines; in other words coal will do all
that Germany and Austria-Hungary want in the
way of fuel whether for their machines or their
warming, and the absence of petrol strikes only at
our next category, armament,
5, Armament. It is only in this category of
armament that we find the enemy seriously em-
barrassed a.nd a decreasing power to pay for imports
in gold affecting him. With a blockade imperfect,
the financial position of the er..emy, though it
cannot ultimately reduce him in his domestic
energies, may embarrass him if his stock of gold
fhlls, or if his instruments of credit are inflated; and
the importation of foreign goods which are neces-

ary for the prosecution of the war may be gravel)'
Impeded.
The armament of a modern nation needs the
2. Textiles for clothing. following materials-iron and coal: coal for working
up the iron and for producing steel. 1Vithout
3, Wood and other building materials for iron and coal it would be crippled at once. Iron
shelter. and coal the enemy possesses in superabundance.
4. Fuel for warmth and mechanical actions Next, modern armament needs explosives, and our
of all kind dependent upon heat. explosiyes consisting of various substances chemically
trea,ted, the main propellent explosi\'e is cotton
5, Armament, chemically treated. But, as we saw last week, cotton
These fixe cat.'gories cover the whole field, can at a pinch be replaced by wood pulp, It would
The nation can continue to exist and continue to be a change expensive in time and in energy; that
fight indefinitely if it has just enough food, just expense might be fhtal in the midst of a gren.t war.
enouO'h clothing, just enough íuel and just enough but still, theoretically it is possible. Therefore. in
shelt
r, and in proportion to its numerous supplies the matter of propellent explosives, the enemy can,
a corresponding and at least not inferior supply of though hampered by increasingly bad credit, suppl}'
weapons and projectiles and explosives. himself. Explosives of disruption, such as you
have in a torpedo or a shell, are composed of
1. As to food, The Germanic allies h3.\ r e materials which, if I am not mistaken, the enemy
enough food-not enough food to be comfortable- possesses in abundance.
for a full year, They will not have enough food in We may take it that no difficulty in foreign
the second year of the war if certain portions of exchange, no financial trouble can prevent tho
their territory are occupied before next harvest- enemy from making all the guns he wants and
notably East Prussia and the Hungarian plains; all the shell and all the bullets. V{ e may take it that
but it is nourishing an illusion to confuse the great at the expense of Borne strain (which might at the
discomfort to which the enemy will be put by critical moment of change be fatal) he will get aU
having to husband and to ration his food with true the explosives he needs, but there are certain
famine or the actual absence of such food. necessaries in which he is not thus provided; chief
2. Textiles. The materials of clothing are among them are horses and petrol. The allies
necessary in great quantities to a modern EUl'opean opposed to Germany have been obliged to bU}F
n3tion; we cannot live in our climates without them; horses from over se.a in very large numbers. The
but the German stocks will last a very long time, Germanic powers are not in that position; they would,
One can conceive that a modern nation which has if they could, buy horses in similar large numbers,
been a larO'e manufacturer of textiles in time ofpeac.e but the avenues of entry are closed to them, Even
would pr
ceed for certainly two years even if it if there were no blockade, financial difficulty would
imported no raw material during that time, But as here hit hard an important source of supply.
a f:wt the Allies have allowed Germany to obtain Petrol the enem}F had in equally sufficient
all tbe cotton and all the wool she wanted. She amount so long as he imperted freely frlJm Roumani3.
cannot produce all the wool that she needs, and by and so long as he had at his disposal all the
no means can she produce the cotton she ne('3, for Galici:m oil wells. The first of these supplies we
cotton is a sub-tropical product, but if an unsatis- believe to be stopped, though we are not certain
f:tCtory exchange at last so impaired her in these on what date import ceased. The second fluctuates:
imports that they cea,ed altogether (a most unlikely his Rupply is noW gravely insufficient, and even if
event) she would still have domestic stocks sufii- no blockade existed the financial strain would
13*

Now, suppose the Italian begins to doubt the
German's ability to redeem his promise, It is
obvious the German Government cannot step in
directly, It cannot coerce the Italian, or force its
currency upon him; or, still less, make hiln manu-
facture the rubber and send it to the German army
motor-car man.
At the very beginning of the strain, from the
moment that foreign neutral merchants were doubt-
ful whether they would really get paid in full, the
exchan/J"e would begin to go against Germany badly,
sh
wo
ld have to promise on paper to pay 11
ounces of gold to get foreign materials for which she
would only pay 10 ounces of the actual metal, and
as the prices went on she would have to promise
to pay not only 11 but 12, and then 12 to 13, and
so forth.
It is obvious that as the strain increases matters
may become very bad indeed, and foreign imports at
last hardly obtainable, The only way out would be
for the forei(Tn Government, acting as a friend,
to guarantee i:J Germany's ultimatdy paying, But
even if a neutral were to go so far, it would only
affect the narrow circle of excbanges taking place
entirely between Germany and that one country,
There are required for a modern nation
prosecuting a war which covers all its energies,
and is a fight for life, the following main staples-

1. Food,

LAND AND WATER.

handicap him in his purchase of this material from
abroad.
Lastly, there is a category of things necessary
to war, which he either possesses only in small
quantities or doe3 not possess at aU, We have
already seen in these notes how he stands in the
matter of copper. He is, perhaps, just beginning to
feel the strain here. If the war be prolonged he must
feel it, and even in the absence of a blockade, an in-
secure financial position would hamper him in his
purchase from abroad of a necessary factor in
armament, He needs, also, antimony (which he
does not possess at all) for the hardening of lead,
and he needs indiarubber acutely. It is in this last
item that insecure finance would. perhaps, hit him
worse if the war were prolonged to a second year.
Even in the absence of a blockade, an un:f:wourable
exchange would gravely affect his power of purchase
over aD. article which is tropical in origin, and
nowhere obtainable within his frontiers.
Quite apart from the blockade by sea and with
reference only to their financial position the Germanic
Allies,
as their position becomes unstable through the
strain upon gold, this latter will not handicap the
enemy in any of those things vi tal to the p:rosecu-

February 6, 1015.

tion of war save horses, petrol, rubber and certain
metals, of which the chief is copper. All these
materials, some of which must be purchased in large
amounts, and notably horses, rubber and petrol,
would be gravely endangered by a really unsound
financial position of this kind. Petrol and rubber,
which are necessaries for modern war, would be
the most aflected.
But if we look on the situation as a whole it is
not true that blunders or unavoidable trouble in
mere financial arrangement will compel the enemy
to peace within a suitable period, certainly Rot
within one year, probably not even two.

At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 8, at 3,30,

Ir. Hilaire BeIIoò will give an illustrated lecture entitled
.. The Progress of the War."
Mr. Hilaire BeIIoo will lecture at Guildford on Saturday
afternoon, February 6, and at Queen's Hall on the afternoon
of Tuesday, February 9, on .. Material and Matters." niB
next evening lecture, on If Tbe Progress of the. War," is on
February 17.
)Ir. Fred T. Jane will lecture at Queen'a lIaIl on Frid
y
evening, February 26.
Owing to great pressure on our /Space Mr. BeIloe is tIllable t() deal
with "Correspondence" thiIt week,

THE
l

WAR

By

FRED

BY

WATER.

T.

JANE.

ROTB.-TIIII Artlcl. .... heeD ..blllifud te tll. Pret. Bureau, wllich .oe. uot obJed to the publlcatloa U uD.øred, and take. n.
re.poaliblllt:r fn th. correctacil of the ..atemcntl.

THE NORTH SEA.
The North Sea Action.
A DMIRAL BEATTY'S further report puts a some-
what different complexion on the North Sea fight.
n was apparently not the two-t
ne affair that
it &Ppea.red on paper to have been, but a more
or leæ equal fight which, bad Hipper's tactics
been good enough, could comparatively easily
have boon a German viotory-a victory mainly averted by the
lac' that Admiral Beatty was the superior tactioian.
Reports are still not full enough for complete comment,
but certain main facf6 emerge very olearly indeed; and no
fUJ'ther informa.tion thai we may ever glean is likely to affeot
ihetie main fo.cts one iot.a"
Now, marshalling these facts in ohronological oròer, the
first is that the German battle cruiser squadron was o.ccom-
panied by light vessels. Since it certainly did not take these
Jeeser vessels with it for the pleasure of their 150ciety, it
follows that they were taken for some definite object.
For the bombardment of an undefended British seaport, a
light cruiser would be 88 efficient as a battle cruiser, and a
good .deal more economical, In this connection, by the way,
it is important to remember that for many a year all German
naval p<Jlicy has been along the lines of getting a pennyworth
of value for every penny expended. It is true that in the
Trade War the reverse of this obtained; but the blame for
that lies with unexpeoted British naval activitj', .not with
errors of joogment on the German side. t;imilarly, the first
East Coast raid was a wonderful waste of money without
result--but they did not so regard it. To them it represented
II We riBk:J:. We stand to gain. :J: + y. Under the head of
"*Irightfulness" 11 will be a valuable asset to us. Therefore
it is worth risking a few 'ight cruisers to obtain y."
In the second snd destructive raid, y having been pre-
'Iumably ea.....jJy secured before, they thought that II might also
tie inoorporated, and they obtained such IZ as having killed
and wounded a number (Jf non-combatants may represent.
To us this does not seem a military asset, but the German
mind is attuned differently to the British mind, and in a
matter of this lIorl it is (Jnly the German mind that counts.
_ Now, of the "baby-killer" raid we know two things.
Of tlies e it is fairly weIi established that it was a battle cruiser
e:xpeditic>n pure and simple, carried out , apparently, without
auxiliaries.

On the t-hird ()gress the German battle cruisers were
accompanied by a full complement of destroyers and I'mcb
other auxiliaries as would be required for a battle. From
this the inference is that a battle was expeoted-to take
destroyers out for what Mr. Churchill calla a II baby-killing II
expedit,ion would be a w.aste of money along tho lines of the
economical German mind. '
I suggested last week thai a. poosible German objective
'Was to get battle cruisers (Jut on the trade routes, but I have
no desire to labour the- point. I wiI] mCl'ely say that if th:1t
u-ere their objective they had arranged for it in the smartest
possible way,
'Ve now come to tho preliminaries (Jf: the action. Here,
again, the Germans exhibited a very high technical aLility
to grasp things. When (Jur light squadron fouBd them and
did not at once turn and run, the German admiral imme-
diately deduced that a British force
uperior to his own was
somewhel'e in the vicinity.
I 8JIl somewhat inclined to fancy that the really correct
thing for our light squadron to have done might have been
to do a "cut and run." Perhaps they did. Equally,
l)el'haps, that gave the show away. You never know. In
chess, a knight that retreats is often more dangerous than
one that advancE:,s, and in naval waxfare you cannot sit ùown
for a.n' hoyr and think ìl1ings out like you can in chess. The
onl y possible thing to- do is to act 01
the instant and alo1l!) thð
fnaÙ
idea.
The action, whatever it was, of our light squadron is,
therefore, a matter (Jf minor significance; whatever they did
",as bound to be right or bound to be wrong, aecOl'diJ1g to-
the enemy's reply.
The enemy's reply was absolutely correct. It....as to
turn about and run fo-r it, taking no chances. So swiftly
and well was this accomlJIi
hed by the German.s that only our
two fastest battle cruisers, the Lion and Tigcr, had any actual
important part in the battle, otbe.r than the finishing oil the
rearmost and slov.est German.
The guns per broadside really cllgaged were as follo\,s:
BRITISH. GERMAN.
Lion .............., 8 13,Sill. Derffiinger 8 l:::in,
Tiger ............... 8 13,5in. Seydlitz .....,...... 10 l1in.
Moltke ............... 10 llin.
Bliicher ,.........., 8 SiD'.
Omitting the Bliicl'eT as hopelesdy outranged and n sort
of Iamb sent to the slaughter.. this gives us 1G B1'Ìti
h Cg

il4-

February G, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

The Submarine Attack on Trade.
On January 31 three British merchant steamers were
captured and sunk of! the Merßey by the Germa.u. IJUbmarine
U21. In each of these casas the usual çruiser routine was
fo
lowðd, warning being given to the crew tQ leave, and their
shrp .then destroyed. ï'his was unploo.sant, but it was quite
legitImate warfare.
In the <?ha.nnel, o
,fuvre, on the same day, two more
merchant
hlpS were hIt and one of them sunk. According
to an offiCIal sta
ment by the French Ministry of Marine,
both of thasa ShIPS were torpedoed without warning. It
c!ranced that the crew of the sunken ships were saved, as

ome French torpedo craft happened to be abGut. But this
lD no way excuses the act, which was a deliberate attempt to
slaughter non-combatants without warning, and so come:;
under the head of "pil'a.cy." It is tQ be hoped that should.
the crew ?f this submarine ever be captured there will be no
false senÍlm
nt about
aldng them prisoners of war. They
s
ould be tned, and, If condemned, hanged as any ordinary
pIrate would be.
That submarines were in the Channel we have long
known, as we have had experience of them before, but that
they should ha.vE; got into the Irish Sea. is certainly un-
e..x
ected news. It throws a marked sidelight on reports
. The a.dvanLage in favour of the GQrmans, reckoning the wh
ch have been current B8 to mysterious signals and lights
Ingger guns, would be four numerically, but their guns being WhIM have been seen on the \Yelsh coast. Signalling there-
generally inferior, and Bome of them probably out of action, abo,uts seemed pointless, and so the stories were not generaIIf
they would be the weaker squadron. Still, as Hipper had behev.ed. Now, howN'er, it certainly looks 8B though &. sys-
the speed gauge of these three British_ships, it certainly looks te

lCally-.a.rranged ca
paign was b
ing indulged in; and
on such evidence 118 is available as thouO'h he should have the
Ighta are probably mtended to indicate tQ German sub-
been able to slow down, and give the Tiga some serious marmes tilie places where supplies have been smuggled in in
punis
eJl.t, or else inflict more da.mage on the Lt'on. the past.
There are four ;reasons, any of which may explain why . Ther
is only
me recorded c
of any trace of fmp-
JIipper did not attempt to do this. They are:- piles haVIng been discovered near any spot from which si",-
(1) That it did not occur to him. naIling has been reported. That WM an empty teJl'g&.llo

(2) That he W/18 too damaged to attempt it. drum of petrol; but &.8 al.l the German submarines burn
(3) That he was obsessed with the idea. of drawing the lleavy oil, it probably had no connection with the war. It
British squadron into a mine or Bubmarine area. øta.nd.s w reason that the enemy would not be 80 indiscreet
(4) That he was in a state of what is vulgarly known as as to signal from the place where the stores actually were,
"blue funk." but adopt some code to indicate that the stores were so many
Now, of these four rea30ns the first is very improbable miles away in one direction or another.
Indeed, because it was so palpably obvious and because the . A. really systematic
arch of all likely hiding places.
.tory of the Horatii and Curiatii is as old .as the hills. lDcluding lonely and deserted buildings, outhouses, san
y
Against the second reason is the circumstance that the dells, etc., could be carried out by too civil population
Germans officially deny our statement that two of their battle along the eûasts, who might be enrolled as special constablea
cruisers were badly damaged. In matters of this sort one does for that purpose. Or for that matter, Boy Scouts could be
not do well to discriminate too much hetween the official employed, as part of their training is the search for hidden
r-cporta of either side--that is to say, it is rank folly to objects, and aillo Boy Scouta have a wonderful trick of
assume that one Bide is truthful and the other an unmitigated nosing out things which do not strike other. people.
liar. By far the safest thing is ÍI:> .assume that the other It was a Boy Scout who some years ago discovered a
side is "moderately truthful. JJ Anò this, 50 far 3.8 the German who had been serving in the British Army for :two
North Sea action is concerned, we may find proof of in the years under an English name, and about whom no one
fate of the Bliich-er, She was hammered and hammered till had the remotest suspicion es to his nationality.
she was more or less out of action; but it took a couple of In any case, one main point is clear. It is absolutety
torpedoes from the Arethusa to send her to the bottom. A impossible for a German submarine to rea.ch and maintain
vivid illustration of the old motto of the torpedo school: "A itself in the Iri
h Sea for more than about twenty-four hours at
gun cannot sink a ship I " On which account I incline tQ the very outside, and when the problem of having to get
the opinion that we damaged the Germans a good deal less home again is taken into account this seems an exaggerated
than we think, and also somewhat more than they admit. proposition. The distance from Heligoland to the Mersey is
War is not a matter of "glory headlines" in the halfpenny roughly aoout 800 mil
perhaps & little more for a sub-
:press, hut of arriving at as near the actual truth as possible. marine compelled t-o observ

crecy. There and back call
put of all of which I am inclined to fancy that Hipper could it 1,600. The maximum radius of UU is 2,000 miles, At
have slowed and closed .a.nd done extra damage had he the very best, &llowing for lying by and everything, that
desired to. could not possibly give her more tha.n three days in which
The third reason-that of drawing the British into & to operate. Allowing for contingencies, twelve hours would
lrap--is, I fancy, the most probable of any, It represents .be nearer her actual limit, and even this is a generous rel-
the integral idea. of Teutonic notions of naval warfare. I eulation.
have not seen much of them at naval war game, but such little Economical speed, on v.hich the endur:mce calculation'l
as I have seen has always been influenced by some such idea, are made, is, however, a slow speed, and at that a. result
as being considerably superior to any stand-up fight. It is achievoo under the most favourable conditions. One way

to a certa-Ïn extent. But i\..s weak point is that it pr&-Imp- and another we arrive at the fact tha.t while it is just physi-
,05es a certain amount of stupidity on the other sid&-a cally possible for UU to get off the Mersey and returfi
dangerolls assumption to act on. home, there.. are very ma.teria.l possibilities against ber re-
The fourth reason is permissible. It is to be deduced maining off the Mersey for more than an hour or so without
from the wild firing at nothing of the first EMt Coast raid; ..id from outside.
from the hurried and wild bombardment of Whitby in the Now all the evidence is to the effect that she must have

econd raid (when British ships were known to be approach- remained there for considerably longer than the possible
iJlg). But I tnink we should discard it, if only f?r .the
a.s
n Eeriod.
that it is blank foBy to n.ssume that th
enemy IS mfenor III We ;must discard all theories about an intention of ra-
eourage or det.ermina.tion to win, JIlaining t.o do 118 much damage as possible, and then Sur-
When the war is over and tlJ(
boo1;:s are opened, anò all rendering-for one reason that her supply of torpedoes or
is known, I think we shall find that we won and Germany explosive.! is necessarily very limited; for another, that
.lost the "ba.ttle cruiser action of the North &a." because Buch &. policy would result in the extinction of all the
Hipper was obsessed with the idea of getting øomething for German submarines without much more loss to the British
.oUting out of drawin
our ships over a submarine or mined )Ieroantile ,Marini!! th;trJ, was achieved singl&-ha.nded by the
area., and because Beatty, as the superior tactician, was able lfmcùn.
tIo fathom that idea. In short, it WM rather an affair of ..t prWri, there<íore, there are stores and suWlieø fiOW,e-
:Beatty t'ers-nl Hipper, than an affair of a certain nlimber of wherc-eitilier on the Welsh cOllSt or on the Irish ooast, or
British ships ag8.i.nst & certain number of German ones, possibly on both. Maybe, also on too Isle of Maa, since
15*

.guns against 28 German guns; Qf lefiJ5er power and calibre, it
is true, and four of them likel,}" to be masked on account of
,,,the ecbdon formation of the turrets of the Seydlitz and
/J[ oltke. Let us, then, call it 16 versus 24; and since the
16 were higger and better guW!, we arrive at a " more or less
equal." One big hit may do twice the damage of one lesser
-bit. But if the lesser gun is big enough to do serious damage
and can get in twice as many hit'S, the bigger gun is unlikely
to score much off it. I do not say that this was the exact
proportion, but I do say that when the Lion and T
ger forged
ahead and engaged, the .action was the most equal thing we
b
ve ever seen in this war, or are ever likely to see. Thus
.the second stage of afIairs,
The third stage arose when the Lion was" damaged."
The Blücller (which never counted for much) was out of it,
6D.d, coming up astern, was allother British squadron fully
equ-al in gun power to the German one. Deleting one
>Øchelonned turret in each case, the respective broadsides
iWere :-

BRITISH,
Princess Royal,.. 8 13.5in' l Derffiinger
New Zealand .., 6 12in, Seydlitz ............
Jndomitable ,..... 6 12in. Moltke ...............

GERMAN.
8 12in.
a 11in.
a Hin,

LAND AND WATER

U&l insisted on some of it!! victims being sent there. BlufI
is 88 frequent in the great game of War lIB it i.s in the game
of "Poker, '!
In any case, it seems abandantly evident that either
(On our own coasts or adjaeent thereunto in our own waters,
the German submarines must have some bascs of supply..
The surest defence rgainst them is not to seek for needles
in hay, but institute a systematic search fo
every 1i'ossi
le
base. Deprived of these, the German submarme corsauB wIll
80(0(1,.. become helpless.
THE BALTIC.
The Russian N-avy has not been long in demonstrating
tJlat winter is no bar to its activities. On January 25 the
small cruiser Ga::dle was submarined off Rugen, where she
was patrolling.
Though only a small vessel, the torpedo failed to sink
bel', and she was towed into Sassonitz by a fen'] steamer.
The Gazelle was an old vessel of small size and little
fighting value. However, she was well fitted up for tho work
she was engaged on, so bel' disablement is useful to the
Allies.
The submarine probably came from the Aland Islands,
which are quite 500 miles from Rugen. This fact, coupled
with the weather conditions, will probably have a consider-
able moral effect on tho Germans, who in the past 11ave had
a tendency to regard the Russian submarine service as ineffi-
cient.
It is officially announced that on the 25th a Zeppelin
dropped nine bomlJ
on Libau, and was then brought down
by gunfire,

THE ADRIATIC.
Certain corrcspondenfB want to know why the French
Fleet is so inactive in the Adriatic. It is suggested that if
tho Austrian battle flcet will not come out, then the Fl'ench
Fleet should bombard Cattaro.
Now early in the war there was a. bombardment of
Cattaro, but it produced little effect, and so was discon-
tinued. Had Ca.ttaro fnnen, all the other bases oould have
been capturoo, but there would have been a. twofold danger
in the attempt: in the first place from submarines, and
in ihe second place, of being callght with depleted maga=
zincs, just as Persano was caught by Tegethoff at Lissa.
That liLde studied naval campaign of fifty years ago probably
influences profoundly the present situation.
To attempt a. ðerioUll bombardment of a strong position,
with a "fleet in being" no great distance away-a fleet
wnich, though in1erior, is not more inlerior than was that of
Tegethoff to Persano's lI,t Liss_is to court a French replica.
of the Italian disaster in the past.
The policy of the French Navy is dull and unexciting, but
tIle object of war is not to provide headlines .and interesting
reading for the general public. (It is 88tonishing how many
people there are who fail to rea,lise this. It is d1Je probably
to pÍcture palaces and " football. ") The French .axe doing
the right thing with thcir battle fleet, just as 0111' Admiralty
is doing the right. thing with the British battle fleet..

ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
A. C. (Hamilton, N.B.).-(l) In reply to :rour ques-
tion, the sea.-keeping abilities of British:and German sub-
marines of equal date are more or less the same, b1Jt with
a theoretical balance in Our favour, because our boats are

enera.lly larger. On the other hand, as the (krmans un-
doubtedly employ mother fihips under a neutral flag, and as
we consider it beneath Our dignity to play a similar triok,

February 6, 1915.

their actual sea,keeping qua.lities a.re probably twic-e thai
of ours.
(
) ÅS boats ccluis par;bus Ql,!l" Bybmarines are ccrtain1I
supenor to the German class,
'. (3) T!1o o.ermaIlS have undoubtedly displa)-ed very great
darï
g wIth their submarines, but if you investigate you
will find that this daring is mainly confined to foUl' or five
Doat.s which have done all the work to d-ate.
(4) ÅS.
egards t!le relative merits of big ship!!, the
modern BrItIsh warshIp is superior to the German in the
mat.te; of olfwce. In the matter of defence, that is to say,
aV01dmg bemg hurt, the advantage rests ",'ith the German
ships. Our theory is to hit the enemy so hard that he
Gaunot do auy hitting back. The German theory is to be
able to take aimost 1Jnlimited punishment and tru.st to luck
that the relatively fooble reply hits will eventually achieve
victory.
(5) I (
o not tnink that the fact of the men appearing
on s.hore wIt
the name of their ship on their caps is likely
to pve anyth
ng away to the enemy. For example, it might
be a blind; it might be that they llad just been relieved by:
another cr
w and had not time to change their cap ribbons.:
or tl1E
y m1ght have been suddenly drafted to another ship.
(6) I think that we would be well advised to be careful:
a15011t accepting storiefl of German treachery. In the Franco-
German 'War of 1871 nous sommcs tranis Waß the undoing
of the French troops in many a batile.
A. F. K. (near Bath).-We, all of us, find the Censor-
ship trouble.some. Occasionally the Censor's opera.tions have
tu
ned a reasoni'd argument into seeming drivel. On the
other hand, it has to be remembered that the Censor works
on inside knowledge, and is seldom, if ever, in a position to
eJíplain his rf'aSOll for suppressing certain information. As
JOu are a.n Orlord man, may I rder you to the history
of the Peloponnesian War, and reque-st you to ask Y01Jrself
whether the Athenians would not have fared better if the
democracy }md been kept less informed about the course of
naval operations. n is possible, of course, to cite one case
in which the pre.ssure of non-technical public opinion did
lead to an a,(h-antage, but against this I think tlIere a.re many,
in which the re\'erse obtained.
A. E, J. (Reùhill).-Comment on the matter to which
)'OU refer is not permitted by the Prcss Censorship.
F. E. B. (Broadstone).-There are plenty of small crafti
patrolling looking for sllbmal'ines, but a submarine is a diffi-
cult fish to catch.
E, (Uckfield).-(l) It is the fortunes of war that the
smaH craft which have to do the spade work rarely get into
the limelight. Occasionally, as in the case of the .Ant" usa,
they do, but., generally speaking, it is necessarily the big
ship which is equivalent to the star act-or.
(2) As regards the official reports of the Falkland Ishnùs.
there is probably some good reason for this being witI-JlCld.
(3) The third matter to which you refer is better not dis--
cusseù in print further than I have already ù<me.
A. P. O. W. (Highgate).-Your idea is quite sound, but
f;0 far as I know, it is alre-ady in application. You will unùer-
stand that to discuss it is not to the pulJlic interest, It
is extremely important in this war to kill the enemy without
letting the enemy know how and why he 11as been killeJ.
H, S. J. (Saundersfoot),-I commen!ed on the matt(:r to
which you refer several weeks ago, but it was deleted by t.he
Censor. If it is now nllowed to be published, you will see
my views on the matter as then written. If you do not see
them, JOu will understand that the fiat of the Censor is still
against publication.

Terms (if Subscription to

"TH E

COUNTY

GENTLEMAN

AND

LAND

AND

W" A TER"

(ESTABLISHED 1862).
AT HOME-Twelve Montha .
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1
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve Months
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to 6
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TER,"
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LOOKING BACKW ARBS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on .. The Wat by Land and Water" will doubtless
wisb 10 relain in correct rotati:m this remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
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16-

February 6, 19
5

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

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addition, it indicates the political boundaries,-fortified zones,-rivers,-
hilly countries,-mountain passes,-manheø,-feo-landa,-railways,-
road..-canals,-industrial area.. all these features are shown in different
forms and colours, so as to be readily distinguishable.
The whole Map i. divided into z-inch squares, representing roughly 100
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Each square has a .eparate number and letter, and places falling within
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February 6, 1915

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The County Gentleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV

No. 2753

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1915

[ PUBLISHED AS ]
A NEW"l'APER.

l'RICE 8IXl'E
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Copyright, \Y, cS- D. DoæJU)I

QUEEN ALEXANDRA

Under whose Patronage the Field Force Fund is appealing to
our readers this week with a novel suggestion for assistance

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

February 13. 19 1 S

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lounted on Linen, strongly 2/6 _
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bound in Cloth case, with Explanatory
- Article by Hilaire Bel/oc, and Index NET
AT ALL NEWSAGENTS OR DIRECT FROil
LAND & WATER
=-
-= - MAP DEPARTMENT

, C EN T R A L H 0 USE, K I 1\ G ;:, \V A Y
I[ . LO
.
ON .
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having special reference to i1Ir Belloc's remark-
able week../y If/ar Allalysis in LAl\ D & W ATE R

Special Featllres of
the Map

T liE l\.1AP is 33" x 4- I f' in size, and is in eight colours,
-Belligerent areas are shown distinct from neutral
countries.- The l\.1ap indicates only those places
which are likely to be mentioned in war news and
despatches; it is therefore dear and easy to study.-In addition,
it indicates the political boundaries,-fortified zones,-rivers,-
hilly countries,-mountain passes,-marshes,-fen-1ands,-rail-
ways,-roads,-canals,-industrial areas, all these features are
shown in different forms and colours, so as to be readi ly
distinguishable,
The whole l\.lap is divided into 2-inch sguares, representing
roughly 100 miles each way, so that approximate distances
from one place to another may be calculated immediately.
Each square has a separate number and letter, and places falling
within each square are specially indexed with such number and
letter, so that any place may be found immediately by reference
to the Index,

2;8

Fcbruary [3, 19 1 5

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U\l.la r
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.. But all mankind's concl'rn IS charity."

A KOVEL and interesting scheme has
been inaugurated by the Committee of
Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund.
I t has been arranged through the
medium of LA
D AND \Y ATER that clergymen,
1Iembers of Parliament, schoolmasters, members
of local committees, and other public speakers,
shall have the privilege of giving as lectures in
aid of this fund the valuable articles which have
appeared in this paper since the commencement
of the war on the operations of the war by 1Ir.
Hilaire Belloc-whose masterlv criticisms of thf'
.. \Yar by Land" have been so-fa,.ourablv noticed
in high military circles-by
Ir. Fred. -T. Jane,
the great naval expert on " \Yar by \Yater," and
the interesting and practical suggestions on
.. Tactics and Strategy" by Colonel F. N. 1Iaude,
c.B., together with questions dealing with aero-
nautics from the ablE' pen of 11r. L. Blin Desbleds.
. These lectures will be illustrated by lantern
slIdes of the maps, plans, and diagrams which
have appeared in the article
from week to week
There will be no charge whatever made for these
privileges, but the only condition qualifying the
ofier is that a charge for admission to the lecture
\"ill be made or that a collection be taken and
that the proceeds shall be allocated to the Oueen
Alexandra Field Force Fund. The lectures,
lantern slides, and the advertising matter will be
supplied free of charge.
B\" this means those ,,'ho are unable to serve
the empire in the firing line are given a great
opportunity to help our gallant troops at the
f
ont, whose needs are increasing dail
". There is
lIttle doubt that such a series of lectures will be
an instantaneous success, as the articles from the
pens of the above-mentioned writers have been
acclaimed b\" the Press as the finest contributions
to the literature of the war. The subject matter
of the lectures is de::tlt with in such a lucid and
fascinating manner that, whether in town or

LOOKING BACKW ARBS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal on
.. The World's War by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this series of articles by
HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED. T. JANE. Special
cloth binders have therefore been prepared which will hold
13 numbers, and these can be obtained at a cost of 1 6 each.
TWO BOUND VOLUMES dealing with the War from
August 22. 1914, to February 13, 1915, are now ready for
sale at 6 6 each
Order now from your Newsagent. Bookstall, or direct
from the Publishers,

.. LAND AND WATER,"
CENTRAL HOUSE, KINGSW A Y. LONDON.

,<" \

hamlet, they are bound to attract large and
enthusiastic audiences.
In every parish in the United Kingdom there
is some one sufficiently gifted to undertake these
duties, and in the country districts there should
be no difficultv in obtaining the use either of the
village hall or'schools for suitable accommodation
where the lectures may be held, and it will be
found that there are rñan
" who will gladly give
their services and do the necessary organising
that will ensure local success.
Such lectures would, apart from helping the
object for which they are instituted, be
f great
educational yaluf', and they should be gIven at
regular intervals-,,'eekly or fortnightly-as the
war proceeds. The profits thus accruing will
ensure for the troops a regular supply of those
small necessities and comforts which the soldier
so greatly appreciates.
:\. few words with regard to the Queen
Alexandra Field Force Fund will not be inappro-
priate here.
This fund, which is operating with the
('x press sanction of the \Yar Office, has for its
objects the provision of comforts for our soldiers
on active sef\'Ícf', the purchase of these comforts
on specially ad\"antageous terms, and their equit-
able distribution wherever the
- are required.
The committee are in constant touch with the
commanding officers at the front, who notify the
needs of the men under their charge, so that the
articles supplied are exactly what are wanted, and
waste and overlapping are obviated. The require-
ments of the men already at the front are consider-
able, but much heavier demands are bound to be
made in the near future, when our Expeditionary
Force is augmented by the new armies which are
now almost ready to take their places in the field.
As can be gathered from the title, the fund
is under the patronage of Her 1Iajesty Queen
Alexandra. The prnsident is Lady French,
the chairman is the Countess of Bective, and
,Mr. Ralph Upton is acting as hon. treasurer.
It is hoped that every reader of LAXD AXD
\V ATER who has the gift of addressing audiences
will avail himself of this opportunity of affording
help of such a practical kind to the troops, and it
is also sincerely hoped our readers will draw the
attention of their friends to this unique scheme
and magnificent opportunity of rendering a very
great service.
Particulars of lectures held, the amounts
received, and other details, will be published in
LAND AND \YATER, and further particulars will
be gladl\' furnished to am"one who cares to make
applicatIon to 1\1rs. \Yilliam Sclater, honorary
secretarv, Oueen Alexandra Field Force Fund,
24a Hil1 Street, Brompton Road, London, S.\V,

Terms 0/ SubscriPtion to
uTHE COUNTY GENTLE:\IAN

ASP

LAND AND \V A TER"

(EST-\BUSHED ,862).
AT HO
IE-Twelve Months
1 8 0
CANADA-Twelve Months
1 10 6
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve l\Ionths
l 17 0
Tht abol'e "ates .nell/d. all Stecial NI/mbers and Postage.

BACK COPIES of .. LA
D AND WATER," containing the
series of ArtIcles by HIL.\IRE BELLOC. 'THE 'VAR BY
L-\ND"; and FRED, T J,\
E," THE WAR lW WATER;"
can be oblained throuf'h any Xel ,.::ent or ûn application
to the Offices of .. L \
D AXD \\' \TER, ("ESTRAL HOUSE,
KINGSWAY. 'V.C.
Teler"one: Telej(rap"ic Addre.'
.4 -.z I(
ent. U Agenù ["UI . \\Pt; teem, Lc Ion:'

o f.vreu,",

aDreuJl.

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OXO at the Front
CONTENTED CANADIANS

Sergeant in Princess Patricia's
Canadian Regiment writes;-
At last we are where we wanted
o be and are contented with our
ittle lot. Christmas Dinner con-
;isted of bully beef and biscuits and
,\'hateverwe could fOJ age. :My friend,
)ergeant -, and myself did Dot
\0 so badly, as we had 1 carrot,
t turnip, 2 leeks, 1 onion, OXO,
md 12 oz. of bully beef, with three
lard biscuits, all mixed up and
)oiled in a bully beef tin, It sure
nade a tasty dinner.
Reprinted from the" Daily Mail,"
Jan, 7th, 1915,

Scottish Soldier's cheery letter.
II In one billet our mess kitchen
\'as partly blown away with s.
;hell, and the old thatch made a
'ùIDfortable shakedown. Seven of
[__ mixed up dinners and messed
JUt of one tin-potatoes from the
,lit, bully beef, OXO and hard
uiscuits - which we enjoyed im-
mensely."
From tM Gla
gow .. Datly Reco,'d,"
Jan, 4th, 1916,

Reprinted from" Carlisle Jonrnal,
Nov, 13th, 1914.
.. Yesterday morning I had 31 patients
.. -slightly sick, sprained ankles, and
.. 8uch like. I discharged 12 of them to
.. duty in the afternoon, At 6 30 I hRd
.. to stand ready to get in cases brought
.. down in motor ambulances from a
'. hospital nearer the front. I saw
" them all in, had hot OXO and bread
. for them, and went up for my dinner,
, got back about nine o'clock, and then
,. ....neð. to dr.1Ii the casel needing it
II mOl'.'.

L.\);"J) AND \rATER

E Ghel

o 8RUSSElS

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(I Esb..",,<!)'

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"'I.U.U
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A Strong Support

The revlvmg. strength - giving
power of OXO has received rc-
ll1at-kable endorsen1ent in the great
,var. It is invaluable for all ,vho
have to undergo exertion, either
to pron10te fitness or to recuperate
after fatigue.
OXO aids and increases nutri-
tion; it stin1ulates and builds up
strength to resist climatic changes;
it is exactly suited to the needs
of our n1en at the front, and in
training, as well as for general use
in the hOl11e.
OXO is made in a moment and,
,vith bread or a few biscuits, sus-
tains for hours.

A cup of OXO between meals
efficient safeguard against
and Influenza.

IS an
Colds

Large numbers of the OXO staffs have joined His
Majcsty's Forces; wages at the rate of over [,5,000
per annum are being paid to them or their dependents

'.

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OXO Ltd., Thames House, London, E,C.

280

February 13, 19 1 5

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OXO in the Navy

The two following letters have been
received by the Editor of "Popular
Science Siftings," 123, Fleet Street,
London, E.C,

From the Commander of
H.M.S. .. Viking."
The ship's company of R.M,S.
"Viking" are most grateful for the
gift of OXO sent by "Popular
Science Siftings." I need hardly
say that OXO is a most suitable
gift for the crew of a torpedo boat
destroyer in Winter.

From the Captain of
H.M.S. .. Tiger."
" I should like to express to you
the very grateful thanks of my
Ship's company for yoill' most
acceptable gift of OXO, which you
have so kindly sent for their use.
Your present, I can assure you,
will be much appreciated."

From one of the men of
H.M.S. .. Colossus."
"Raving had some OXO sent
me by my brother, who advised
me to write for some more, I now
take the opportunity of writing for
.e1 worth. It is grand for night
watches, being taken before we go
on, as it takes such a short time to
make, and must be taken warm,
hence the susta.ining power we get,"

February 13, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

ROTE.-Thla ArUda b&l heen .nbmlttrd to the Prru Burrau, wbicb dor. not ol;!rd to tbr publltatlon &I can.ored and take. ..
rrlponalbllit, for tba corrrden. of tb. datem.nta.
I. accordanel wltb tha reçulrementa of tbe PUll Burrau, tba pOlltlon. of troop. on Plan. lIIudrdlnr tbl. Artlda MU.t onl, ba
rrrarded a. appro:dmate, and no definita atrrnrth at anl poInt It Indicated.
'THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL. gics of the campaign is very high, and supposin

that, from geographical circumstances of any kind
the crossing of the obstacle 'were manifestly impos.
sible, while the molesting of it from the easterIJ
side were easy, then it would still be the busines

of any wise commander to maintain a series oj
attacks upon the Canal, although ,he should hav(
no hope of crossing it. For it is not the occupa-
tion of Egypt that counts in itself so far as thE
mere progress of the campaign is concerned-
though it would count, of course, heavily as a
priæ in the settlement after the war-it is onl}
Egypt as the ground from u'hich the Suez Canal i

controlled that is material to the large operatiom
of this campaign: and from tDe point of view of thE
enemy the complete contI'ol by themselves of that
waterway, though valuable, \yould not be very
much more valuable than its increasing interrup-
tion,
Germany and Austria and their Turkish Ally
are already held by sea. Even if the Turkish in-
vasion should succeed in obtaining control of the
Canal that control 'would haw, therefore, little
positive value to the Germanic alliance. But the
negative value of interfering with commerce
through the Canal is exceedingly high.
Much of this country's food, certain of its re-
inforcements, a great mass of its general trade,
is dependent upon that strip of water; and so has
come to be all that rapid communication with the
vast, foundational, Indian Dependency which, in
the last forty-four year3, has grown to wholly re,
place the longer route by the ocean,
There is here a parallel 'with the maritime
strategy of the enemy in home waters.
Thus, the submarine threat cannot, it is evi-
dent, actually account for any very large propor-
tion of the tonnage entering and leaving British
ports, 'Vhat is hoped from the submarine threat
is that the sense of insecurity may be so nouri
hed
A by occasional and unexpected disasters as to in-
terrupt the regularity of our supply. It is evident
into our hands, The enemy lost a considerable, that this feeling of insecurity can be more ea
ily
though not very high, proportion of killed, effected in a highlÿ circumscribed area such as this
wounded and prisoners, and has now so far retired belt of communication beh\een Port Said and Suez
that none of his troops (we are officially informed) than upon the high seas. It is cnough that first
is to be found within a belt of twenty miles from one point upon the Canal and thcn another should
the eastern bank. be rendered difficult of passage fairly frequently,
Now, the first point we have to seize in con- for all regular traffic through the waterway to be
nection with the whole of this expedition against interrupted. It is this, I think, ,,-hich accounts for
Egypt is the strategical object in view, the experiment-for it was no more-of last week.
'Vhat was the motive of the enemy in prepar- It is probably this which accounts for the employ-
ing and conducting this attack? 'Vhat will he ment of but a portion of the forces the enemy had
intend when he knows it? at his disposal. And it is this which makes it
It may, I think, be prudently suggested that fairly certain that the attempt will be renewed.
his motive is not simply the occupation of Egypt It is evident that the chief instrument for
and the driving of the British forces thence; nor merely molesting the users of the Canal would be
his task only the obviously difficult one of sur- heavy artillery. Heavy artillery concealed in the
mounting the obstacle of the Canal. He has also irregular land lying east of the Canal, dependent
a secondary and most important object, which is 'upon its long range for a certain immunity, and
the rendering of the Canal unsafe in the opiniûn of occupied both in threatening the water and per-
shippers for commerce. haps in lessening the depth by ruining portions of
:The value of this .object in the general strate- the banks, would be a very serious menace, Only,
1*

THE

WAR
By HILAIRE

T HE movements upon either front, even
upon the East, have been so slight this
week up to the moment of writing (Tues-
day evening) that there is little matter
to analyse. But such as there halve been
we discover in the eastern field, and the most. im-
pOl'tant perhaps of the episodes over that very wide
area is the attack upon the Suez Canal and the
failure thereof on February 2nd.
It seems that the total number of the enemy
that reached the region immediately east of the
Canal, in what the Turks can a Reconnaissance in
Force, ",as not less than 12,000.
No successful crossing was effected at any
point, save by four men, who were captured. The
operation of bridging at one point (Toussoum,
opposite the Sand Dunes, south of the Ismailia
lake or Lake Timsah) was permitted 1.1p to a
certain point and then attacked. The bridge was
destroyed. Much of the bridging material fen

JljenaJ{ill
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February 13, 1915.

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those who are ät once acquäintea with the nature
of the banks at various points and with the pro-
bable effect of heavy shell fire upon them, are com-
petent to say how far this method of attack could
proceed, But it is evidently that upon which the
enemy would rely ifit were open to him.
But that it is open to him we may gravely

íloubti. for to bring pieces of any size across the
'desert would probably prove impossible, even with
the use of petrol traction and of a light railway
ìo supply the columns, And this phrase" a light
ra.i1way JJ leads to the discussion of a point which
bas been deLated elsewhere than in these columns.
Among men acquainted both with the ground
,and with the Turkish service, there seems to be a
debate as to whether the laying of a light railway
to aid these operations will, or even could, be
undertaken. As one eminent critic put it the
other day," The Turks are no great railway
builders." If the task is undertaken, it must be
remembered upon the other side that the layin a
of such na!row-gauge fixed rails and iron sleepers

or cross pIeces, as would permit of provision and
water reaching a front, say, a day's march east
2*

of the Canal, without too great irregularity, would
have little in common with the regular engineering
of a permanent way. It is astonishing across what
irregularities of soil the old Decanfille lines (for
instance) could be used, and at what pace they
could be laid.
There runs from the point of EI Arish upon

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the sea coast up to the heart of the peninsula an
ancient watercourse (now dry save towards its
mouth and in exceptional seasons), "Which takes its
name from the place where it reaches the sea-EI
Arish, This dry watercourse of the Wadi-el-
Arish is said, by those who have seen it and
travelled upon it, to afford a fair ground for the
laying down of a light railway; and at a point
about midway between Akaba and Suez (but a
little nearer the latter point), the upper reaches
-or what were once the upper reaches--of this
watercourse touch the Pilgrims' track from Suez
through Akaba' to Mecca. The rails might then
follow the track up to a point, say, ten miles east
of Suez.
There would be no need to ca.rry them further,
for we know that the enemy" is supplied with petrol

February 13, 1915,

LAND ÄND WATER

vehicles and could distribute water and munitions
from such a point, As the land falls rather steeply
down on to the level of the sea a little before the
Pilgrims' Road reaches Suez, such an arrangement
would have the further advantage of avoiding the
difficulty of bringing the rails down that slope,
A direct connection with the Mecca Railway
past Akaba (or just round the top of its gulf),
whereby communication might be established with
Palestine, Syria, and the depots in the north, has
been rightly pointed out by competent critics to be
a task of great difficulty, and probably impossible
in the case of such a campaign as this. And that
for the following reason, From the Mediterranean
Sea to the southern point of the Sinaitic Peninsula
the land gradually rises up to the ridge marked on
the sketch, d, d, d, d, d, which (if there were any
water to speak of in that land) might be called
"the watershed." This stretch rising up from the
Mediterranean is the desert of EI Tih, diversified
by several groups of high hills, but distinct from
the great limestone peaks in the southern triangle
beyond.
These bave been compared in their for-
mation to the Alps, and they occupy all the tongue
of the Peninsula, shaded upon the sketch-map with
cross hatching, It is in the heart of this latter
formation that the Jeb-el-Musa, or Hill of :Moses,
stands, which is traditionally identified by many
with Sinai-much where I have marked upon the
sketch the letter X. Now, the consequence of this
formation is that from and above Akaba there is
a deep gorge, The edge, or escarpment, of the
Sinai tic plateau runs along the line e, e, e, e, e;
and it so happens that immediately upon the other
side of Akaba, along the line b,\ b, b, b, you have
another escarpment rising steeply towards the
Arabian Desert. So that, to establish a line from
the existing railway along the Pilgrims' Road,
even if you took it round so far from the sea that
it was nowhere in danger by fire from that quarter,
you would have to build for the crossing of the
Ghor, the profound trench 3,000 feet in depth be-
tween the cliffs at b, b, b, b and the opposing cliffs
at e, e, e, e. It is exceedingly unlikely, or rather, it
is impossible, that the enemy should attempt this;
but it is conceivable, though not perhaps probable.
that he might attempt the laying of a line of
narrow-gauge field railway up the Wadi-el-Arish.
as I have suggested.
The attack with which the Egyptian garrison
has just dealt struck at two and perhaps three
points, marked upon the accompanying sketch, A.
B, and perhaps C, of which A is EI Kantara, the
end of the northern, or sea, road, B the most im-
portant Toussoum, just south of the Ismailia lake,
and C the slight skirmish reported north of Suez,
The shaded portions along the line of the Canal re-
present areas where water in greater or less width
prevents immediate access. The main attack near
Ismailia at B had the advantage that it threatened
the junction between the lateral railway of the
Canal and the railway to Cairo. To attack at the
point A had the advantage that the invading troops
had marched by the shortest route-the age-long
sea-road of all invasions from the Levantine coast
to Egypt, The attack near G---if it was in any
force, or was correctly reported-would mean that
some portions of the enemy had already used the
Pilgrims' Road; this point has the advantage that
it is the nearest point to Cairo.

But it matters little where the Canal is crossed
so long as it is effectively crossed at any point; and
its molestation is possible, and might be long con-
tinued, without its crossing being effected at all.
Prisoners have already given accounts of the
roads by which they came (the northern road is so
far reported only), but we have not yet sufficient
evidence of which of the three possible routes will
be. or has been, taken by the main force. It is
probable, or certain, that this first attempt was
made by three separate bodies coming by !various
routes, or at least by the southern and the northern
routes simultaneously, From the same source-
the statements of prisoners-we have evidence that
depots of water are established somewhat to the
east of the Canal, upon which depots it is hoped
that a fairly continuous presence of troops may
depend. But the whole of this evidence is still so
fragmentary that nothing certain can be based
upon it,
As the reader will observe if he looks at the
sketch published in these comments some weeks
ago, and here reproduced, regular fresh-water
supply is not obtainable until the western bank of
the Canal is reached. There there is a sweet water
canal fed from the Nile. It was further remarked
in the article then printed, that the best chance
of a crossing would obviously be where the banks
were high, the passage of the water narrow (a
minimum of 180 feet), and cover from the fire of
ships in the Canal most easily obtainable, These
conditions are combined, or rather the height of
the Sand Dunes suggests them, opposite Tous-
soum, where the strongest attack appears to have
been made,
One last point is noteworthy in connection
with these attacks on the Canal and those which
are likely to succeed it: which is, that the enemy
are apparently depending here upon mixed and
inferior material for their recruitment. If ever
they should be able to bring, by petrol traffic, fairly
heavy pieces to threaten the Canal, and should de-
pend upon the fire of such pieces, the compara-
tively small number of men upon whose efficiency
the action of th{)se pieces must depend would ren-
der the problem of recruitment for this army less
acute; but so far as its main forces are concerned,
a large proportion of them are Syrian in origin,
in some measure disaffected, and, as we are told
by those who have had opportunities for personally
judging the matter, poor material. 'Ve have also
in the official information from Eg:rpt the remark
that the collapse of the Turkish attack was accom-
panied by a certain measure of voluntary deser-
tion. especially from this same Syrian element.

THE ACTION AT BOLIMOW.'
N ext let us turn to the violent assault de-
livered this week upon the Russian lines defend-
ing vVarsaw.
Although the movement resulting upon it has
been slight, the attack made by von Hindenberg
upon the lines of the Bzura and the Rawka was
not without its importance, both as evidence of the
enemy's condition here, and as an appreciable suc-
cess for our Ally.
The ground is already familiar to those who
have followed the sketch-maps published in these
comments. The front of the Bzura and its little
tributary the Rawka runs about three days' march

:r; Ä N DAN D W ATE R.

February 13, 1915.

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Scale of Milu

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away, west of Warsaw; and that front has been
maintained for now two months almost unaltered.
The gn'at attack of the oth8r day, in which
something less than four corps (the equivalent of
that with which von Kluck struck at the Briti:3h
contingent at the opening of the war) massed upon
a front of about 10,000 ;-ards was engaged, did not

fail until it had been pressed with singular tenacity
and with corresponding loss. Of the whole line
(which stands at present much where the dots run
upon the accompanying sketch) it was the front,
A, A, just in front of Bolimow, the front most
immediately threatening the city, which was
chosen for this attack. It is not the German point
nearest the city: that is on the Vistula. But an
attack along the Vistula bank is impossible because
of the fortress of Nev Georgievsk, between "\Var-
saw and the mouth of the Bzura, and difficult,
naturally, because the district is a belt of marshy
forests on the left bank.

nr

The German trenches are here upon the east
of the Rawka-a position which does not repre-
sent any -retirement of the Russian line, for the
very slight rise of the ground for some little way
in front of those trenches (becoming steeper as one
goes eastward) gives the Russians an excelIent line
upon the low heights that look down on the little
stream. Upon these 10,000 yards or so the enemy
attacked with a force which may have been any-
thing, in its present condition, from 80,000 to
120,000 men, and more probably nearer the former
than the latter figure. The attack was supported
by rather less than 100 guns a mile-no very heavy
proportion for such a concentration-and both the
fire of the German artiIlery and the massed Ger-
man columns of infantry which were thrown
against the Russian trenches wcre seeking to effect
a breach only just wide enough for their purpose.
In other words, they were limiting the hammer-
blow by which they hoped to tear through the Rus-
sian defence to the very strictest and weightiest
form compatible with a permanent success. You
must not strike in too narrow a front, because, if
your breach of an enemy's line is to be of perma-
nent value, it must not be less than of a certa..in
extent: it must be wide enough for you, when you
have effected it, to have room to turn him left and
fight and begin hammering at the ragged eclges of
either of the two torn halves.
How near this 10,OOO-yard effort was to suc-
cess we do not know, because we only have the
account of one of the combatants. For the same
reason we cannot decide what the total losses of
the defeated assailants may have been.
The account which puts thrm at 30,000 must
almost certainly be exaggerated. Such a propor-
tion of losses out of such a force in such a time
would be crippling, and no commander would risk
being thus weakeneù, unless, indeed, at the most
expensive moment of the action success h3.ù 3eemcd

February 13, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

o nearly certain as to warrant a local---:-and brief
-<::ontinued waste of men. But though the figure
30,000 may be too high, the losses must certainly
bave been, from the nature of the fighting, severe,
It must never be forgotten that a great assault
which fails is tactically, and for the front which it
covers, a defeat. You come out of it not as you
were, but weaker than you "'ere, both morally and
materially; and that in proportion to the effort
JOU made to succeed. So true is this that in the
case of the action before Bolimow the Russians,
when they had repelled the enemy, were able to
make certain advances; notably just below the
junction of the Rawka with the Bzura, at the point
marked D, and at the point marked K (which is the
village of Kamion). In both these points the Rus-
sians crossed the river and established themselves
upon the further side,
The details of the action are fairly simple,

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From in front of Skiernievicz (8), past Boli-
mow (B), runs the little river Rawa, which falls
into the Bzura at A. It has in front of Skiernie-
vicz a belt of woods on eithcr bank (marked with
shading on the plan) which stretch aU along the
railway to 'Varsaw, past the roadside station of
Bednary (at Ba) to Zyradov, at Z,
On either side the ground falls gently down
to the Ra'wa; but on the eastern side there is a roll
do" n again to the little parallel stream of the
Sucha, and on the crest of this roll, or rather just
in front of it, covcring Borjumov (Bo), Gumine (G),
and the Chateau and \V orks of V olia Shidlovska
(V), run the Russian trenches. The German
trenches face them, between the crest and the
River Rawa. From Z to 'Varsaw is about twenty-
six miles.
The Germans massed their guns on the night
of Tuesday last, February 2, on the ridge 'west of
the Rawa, along the crest I have marked with a
line of crosses. It was a snowy night. Air work
was impossible, and they took advantage of the
weather to concentrate on that narrow front, from
S to not quite A, nearly four corps. That same
night they attacked the positions Bo-G-V-Ba,
grouping thcir densest force just north of the
woods against V on a section Y-Y, about 3,000
yards in length, or less than a third of thcir total
local front. All 'Vcdnesday the advance made
ground. The Chateau at V was occupied, so was
Gnmine, G; while behind the v;oods and up the
railway the Germans carried the station of Bed-
nary (Ba) in a corps-à-corps. Upon Thur
day,
February 4, the issue was stil1 doubtful; the Rus-
sian line still pushed back to the crest or beyond it,
5*

and the weather still a scurry of snow. But on
Friday the tide turned; by the Friday night the
whole crest was recovered, and by Saturday morn-
ing the German line (whose most advanced points
had reached to the dots on the sketch) was back
west of the line of dots and dashes "\vhich roughly
represents the present Russian positions,
The massed attack smouldered out on the
Sunday and ceased altogether on Monday, the 8th,
It had, after six days of effort, quite failed.
But the local result along that front (which
might give to the action the name of Bolimow, for
that is the name of the village just beyond the
stream on the slopes in the neighbourhood of which
the artillery was posted) is not perhaps of such
importance as is the indication it affords of the
enemy's general attitude towards his chances upon
lhe eastern front. This last violent bid for War-
saw means that the pressure in East Prussia is
being felt. It means also, perhaps, that the pres-
sure upon the central Carpathians, to which I will
turn in a moment, is giving anxiety. It is true
that in East Prussia considerable enemy reinforce-
ments have arrived, so that the forward movement
of our any there would seem for the moment to be
held; and it is further true that in the Carpathians
the Russians' advance in the centre has gone with
a retirement upon the southern extremity of their
line. But these heavy blows delivered by von Hin-
denburg upon the centre in "T estern Pòland have
hiìrierto been directly connected with the desire to
draw pressure off some other part of the line, and
it is probable that this last action in front of Boli-
mow was no exception to the rule,

.:B

THE

SITUATION IN THE
CARPATHIANS.

I said last week that the Russian effort was in
the main intended, when the advance was resumed
upon the Carp
thians, to press over near the
Roumanian frontier and from the Bukovina;
while the enemy's object 'was rather to bring pres-
sure to bear in the central portion, westward of
and south-westward of Przemysl. In t.he fighting
that has followed, each party has failed exactly
where he chiefly attempted to succeed-and that is
always what happens w11en you meet a blow by
countering elsewhere, in the set German fashion.
The enemy have b
en compeJ1ed to fall back,
perhaps, over the Dukla, certainly over the rail-
way pass immediately to the east of the Dukla,
because the Russian communiqués speak now of
thc front passing in this region through :Meso-
Laborcz; and as Meso-Laborcz is beyond the ridge
this should mean that the Russian advanced bodies
are here over the main crest of the range. This
advantage is not absolutel
' certain; it is only to
be presumed from the wordmg of the communiqués
issued by one side, but it is a probable inference.
In the Bukovina, on the other hand, there has
been a retirement of the Russian forces before an
advance in considerable strength of the enemy,
The enemy have not only re-occupied the heights,
as the summit of the Kir1ibaba Pass, but have
passed oycr the Borgo and ha ye entered Kimpo..
lung.
.. The double situation, and the change from the
corresponding situation some ten days ago, may
best be seen by comparing the following sketch,
where the Russian line is marked in what is its

rJí\:ND
ND WATER

February 13, 1915.

The official returns of the total casualties to the
4th of February in the British contingent of the
Allied armies, coupled with a recent publication of
the Prussian lists, affords a new opportunity for the
comparison of wastage,
Our casualties here will be found to support
the general conclusions which have been arrived at
in these notes with regard to the former rate of
wastage in the Allied service and in the enemy's, and
to prove how much heavier is his than ours,
The British casualties are just over one hundred

thousand, and that means, Toughly, 25 per cent. of
all those who have at one moment or another crossed
the sea. These figures are very nearly in the same
Whether the considerable reinforcements proportion as those which can be deduced from the
along the Bnkovina front, which we know to French declaration late last autumn-allowing for
include German troops-probably Bavarian for the passage of time since that declaration was made.
the most part-include new German formations or It is interesting to compare such rate of
Dot we cannot gather from the evidence, And that wastage with the official German figures: but it is
îs. a pity. because our judgment of the future of the impossible, unfortunately, to accept the official
campaign at this stage very largely depends upon German figures as the equivalent of the Engli
h,
our discovering whether the enemy has begun to ule and that for two reasons: First. the Germans do
his new fo'rmations yet or not, and, if so, in what not put down the cases of lightly wounded; secondly,
numbers. there is no compendiary German declaration of
It is alreaäy more than six months since the casualties to date, but only the publication of long
first mobilisation: he must in such a space of time lists, which are necessarily imperfect and belated;
have had full opportunities for training, and from as are, for that matter, the newspaper lists published
what we know of him he must surely have had them on our own side,
ready provided with a sufficient equipment. The The fundamental factor in any such calculation
more of his new formations that may now be actu- is the relation of wounded to killed. It has

lIy present, Qr that may' have been' present in the repeatedly been affirmed in these notes that a
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present probable position, with the corresponding
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recent fiohting, the less reserve is there to be used
for the
newed offensive upon the west.
It is possible that in tile captures of the next
few days, if our ally continues to press across the
central portion of the range, we shaIl have in more
detail the evidence upon this very important point
:which is at present lacking,

v

THE WESTERN FRONT.
There is upon the western front in the present
week nothing to record of any importance. at the
moment of writing, Tuesday evening. The front
has fluctuated in no point appreciably, and, save
for the engagement of two or three battalions In
the heart of the Argonne, there has not apparent1y'
been any attempt at a movement,
It is hardly worth remarking that the German
official communiqué has been at the pains of deny-
ing that the considerable effort made at the end
of January (round about January 27), which effort
was broken with the loss of perhaps 20,000 men,
had no connection with the Emperor's birthday.
It was, according to the German version, no
more than a coincidence. Whether these things
ale coincidences or no only has this value to a
student of the war: that if the non-military motive3
at work are [1S strong as we believe them to be they
are some guide to the state of mind of the enemy.
There is no more in it than that, I forget, for
instance, on exactly what date it was that the Ger-
mans went through the Arc de Triomphe in Paris
after the cessation of hostilities in 1871, but if any-
one will look up that date and see whether it cor-
responds to a particularly strong German effort in
the west it will heip him to form his judgment.
Hitherto it has undoubtedly been true that these
almost religious exercises have influenced the plans
of the enemy in some degree,

THE

CASUALTIES,

February 13, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

multiple, certainly not less than 7, is safe. Of
8 men that fall on a large average but 1 is killed;
or again, if we know how many are killed, then to
find less than seven times as many wounded may
convince us that the lighter cases are not mentioned.
This principle has been challenged by many
cl-itics, but I think it remains :firm when one is
considering great bodies of men, and averaging
losses over many hundred thousands. It is a highly
conservative estimate, as the British figures
prove, and the fighting has not spared the British.
Upon that basis the German multiple, which
Vias under 4, and is still a good deal less than
5, will not do; it must mean that the Germans
only note grave wounds (which the relatives of the
wounded men should hear of), and death,
Then Prussia admits in her lists just under a
million casualties, Many of the entries appear-
ing are so far back as August 20th, and the lack of
any reports from recent heavy fighting in Poland and
the Carpathians justify us in turning that million into
twelve hundred thousand. It is probably more, Next
we must add to this 1,200,000 the lighter cases
(for though these return, as do ours, they are
necessary to the total which we are about to
compare with ours), and add at least 50 per
cent. for these-for if you add to a multiple of
less than 5 in order to reach the very reasonable
and certainly too low multiple of 7, you must add
50 per cent. to the first .figures-add that 50 per
cent, for light wounds, and it turns your 1,200,000
into 1,800,000 of Prussian hit and caught, apart
:from sickness. The reality is almost certainly
nearer two millions or even beyond two millions, but
we are here deliberately making what is called a
" conservative" estimate, i,e" an estimate against
our expectations or hopes,
Here, then, you have 1,800,000 for the total
Prussian lists if (a) all casualties whatsoever were
included; (b) all to the present day "..ere collected,
Now to these Prussian lists of all kinds you
must add the lists of the non-Prussian parts of
the army, which I now take to mean (though
at first I believed it meant more-all who were
not technically Prussian) the Saxon, the Wurtem-
burg and Bavarian contingents alone, These are
rather less than a quarter, but much more than
a fifth, of the total armed population of the
Empire. Supposing we add 400,000 for these
unknown published extras (which is only just over
22 per cent,-the real figure is nearer 23) and you
get 2,200,000, excluding sickness in any fo'rm, for
your grand total.
Now what percentage is that of the men put
under arms up to now by the German Government 1
'Vhen we have discovered that we are in a position
to compare our wastage with theirs.
Our wastage, remember, we found to be about
25 per cent.
The men put under arms by the German
Government so :&1.1' are certainly not less than five
millions, If they have brought none of their new
formations into the field save an insignificant
number of volunteers, then their losses stand in
the very high proportion of 44 per cent, of casualties
of all kinds, excluding sickness, out of the total
number of men they have up to now put under
arms. But it is wise to weight the scales against
one's own expectations and to allow a larger number
than five millions armed to date and therefore a
lower percentage of casualties. But the Germans
bave celtainly not yet armed six million men. Let

us suppose that they have armed as ma.ny as five
and a half millions so far, then their losses in casual-
ties of all kinds, excluding sickness, will be forty per
cent" and that I believe to be not far from the true
estimate.
I believe that when the history of the war is
written it will be discovered that of every hundred
men put into uniform and given a weapon in the
German Empire from the outbreak of the war to the
beginning of February, 1915, forty were hit or
caught; and I equally believe it to be a just estimate,
which the history of the war will prove when it
comes to be written, that the casualties of the Allies
(in the West at least) are, to the casualties of their
opponents, in a proportion Dot very different from
that of twenty-five to forty,
This great difference is one of the prime factors
in the changed aspect of the war as it proceeds, and
in the opportunity for the Allies' attaining an ulti-
mate numerical preponderance,
If it be asked why this difference in wastage
should exist I think the answer is found both in the
expectations with which the enemy forced this war
and in the method by which he has therefore COjl-
ducted it, as well as in the tactical traditions of his
serVICe.
To win rapidly, and therefore necessarily at a
high expense of men, was at the very core of the
German plan, To use tactical methods which were
also expensive of men, was a tradition from which
he neither could nor desired to escape, and we know
by his quite recent action in front of Bolimow that he
has not modified this tradition in the least, even
after the exceedingly heavy lessons taught him,
and even though the campaign has now endured
long beyond his fil'st expectations, and has cost
him far more in men and in material than he had
planned for upon his most extreme provision.
Certain consequences follow from this tre-
mendous rate of wastage in which, however, I have
made no eHort to estimate the corresponding margin
of sickness. 'fhe first consequence is one which
somewhat modifies om' view of the enemy's in-
creasing weakness through wastage. 'Ve must
remember that about one-half of those who are
wounded can return to some form of service. One
half of the wounded, excluding the killed and the
prisoners, is about three-eighths of the casualties.
Now three-eighths of 40 per cent. is more than
three-eighths of 25 per cent" and the total number
of killed, disabled or caught upon the enemy's side,
is, therefore, not in so high a percentage compared
with Ours as on a first view one might conclude.
When you have allowed for the returns of the
lighter cases, you get only one quarter of the
German forces permanently out of the running,
while you get for the Allies on the West between
15 and 16 per cent., or something rather less than
one-sixth.
The next inference from our figures is one that
very closely touches the immediate future of the
war.
We know from past calculations based upon
official lists what indeed might have been expected
from the nature of Prussian fighting that the loss
in officers has been particularly heavy, even heavier
than it has been among the Allies in proportion, and
we are fairly safe in estimating that not far short of
one-half of this professional body upon which the
enemy's service is utterly dependent for cohesion is
now out of the field, that is, not far short of one-half
of those officers employed in the active line and in

7,iJ

LAND AND WATER

command of units, as distinguished from those em-
ployed behind the army and upon the staffs.
'V ell the action of the new formations which
Germany 'proposes to bring into the field has always
threatened the Allies with its superior efficiency on
this very score. The enemy has told us that though
we could raise in the c
se of Russia and of England
very large new formations limited in amount rather
by the
lowlless of
q;tipment than by the la
l
of
recruits, our areat ddiiculty would be the pronSlOn
of a sufficic
t body of officers, As against the
orio.inal force which the enemy put into the field
and with which he proposed to win a short and
decisive campaign th
t prediction. was sound. It
will hardly apply to Ins new formahons now, There
is, indeed, a carefully arranged f;ystem whereby
reser'"e officers of more or less training are prepared
for such formations, but their value cannot be com-
pared naturally with the professional soldiers who
are now permanentl.r out of the field,
It would be very foolish to exaggerate this
element in the situation, but it is not one to be
ncglected. What would perhaps be still more
interesting and what unfortunately we have not
been told is the rate of loss among the non-
commissioned officers of the German service. For
the German seryice differs from others, p:uticubrly
from the French, in the way in which these men
are obtaincd. They are as a body distinct in age
and in outlook from the mass of those ,
hom they
command. They are older, they are professional
soldiers, they are picked for character and to some
extent for social position. They furnish later the
lower elements of th:lÌ highly dm-eloped Lureau-
cr.:üic system, which the modern German Empire
has established to the a.dmirat
on of certain of its

February 13, 1915.

enemies, to the disgust of othcrs, At any rate
the new formations are still more difficult to
imagine lacking this elemeat than lacking their
proper element of professional officers. For with
all the military excellences attached to the sen"ice
of our enemies elasticity and initiative in the lower
ranks are not among them. One may say without
either exaggeration or the fear of that detestable
error which consists in belittling one's opponent
that the Germans could not improvise armies as
Gr
at
ritaiI
is doing to-day, or that they would
malIltam an ImprO\'ement under the strain of war
such as the French service has maintained. It
is the corollary of their full preyision, with
its prepared equipment and all the rest, that
the duration of the war beyond its expected limit
and the wearing down of the original military
framework upon which it depended tells more
severely in the German case than in om's. The
last conclusion connected with this calculation of

vasta
is the chief one; and that is, that progress-
lUg as It does at a g-reater rate than th3.t of their
opponents, the numerical superiority of the central
powers-which they stiH retain by a precarious
margin-will, if they cannot effect a decision within
the next few weeks, disappear altogether, and that
the gradual equipment of the Ilussians and of the
new British contingents will at least dip the scale
against them. And we haye yet to see how tl:cy
will meet a campaian under the conditions of
numerical inferiority 7 for we must remember that
the whole scheme of German strategic and tactical
traditions is based upon a certitude of numerical
superiority against the enemy, as is their treatment
of rermanent fortifica.tions and every other product
of their military mind,

A

FURTHER

ECONOl\1IC

POINT.

T HESE notes dCLllt last v.eek with the certain relation to it. Bd it is neither parallel
elements of one side of the economic fac- nor equivalent to it, and one nation, spending
tor in war-the real effect of a metal re- apparently far more than another equaIly ".calthy.
serve, and of the instruments of credit may in reality be under a far less severe cco
omic
based upon it to a nation fighting for its strain. To appreciate this, let us ex::tmine what it
life, and it was attempted to be shown that the im- is that a nation consumes of its wealth under the
portance of such a reserve and the instruments effcct of a great war. A great war consumes or
based upon it was yery greatly exaggerated by sucIl lessell.3 the ,.,-ralth of a nation in two ways-direct
financiers as have come to consider the mere and indirect. It consumes the wealth of the nation
economic effort almost entirely in terms of the directly by the dcstruction of existing wealth,
mere medium of exchange. It was attempted to whether ,,,hen the enemy destroys such existing
be shown that, save in a doubtful case of certain weaIth or when the military authorities of the
foreign supplies, our enemies would be able to con- nation itself destroy such existing wealth for
tinue the war even under the strain of an increas- military reasons. Indirectly a great war les3c11::;
ingly adverse exchangc. 'Yhile for internal effort thc potential wealth of a country, or lessens its
they were free even if their currency snould break wealth production for a considerable space of time
down altogether-of which, by the way, there is no because it puts the economic energies of thc nation
likelihood or sign. to the production of things not useful in normal
Perhaps it may be advisable in the lack of times, and therefore not usable in consumption
general news this week to turn to another aspect save during the period of war; it further re-
of the economic question, which is the strain im- duces the economic power of a nation by taking
p03ed upon the Allies by their present rate of ex- men from the manufacture of things which will
penditure. It is a question which has come to the help to produce further wealth and putting th
m
front lately through the meeting of the various to the manufacture of things which, once con-
Parliamentarians nominally responsible for sumed, produce no further ,...ealth; finally, it dis-
finance in the various allied Governments. The locates the normal machinery of production, and
econo!,nic stmin imposed upon a nation by its ex- leavcs many producer::; without a demand for thcir
pendtt'lo'e of material du'rinC) a great 'lm}" is not to wares.

e meaSllred
'n te1"ms of the stmin imposed upon All that expcnditure upon the part of the
Its exclwquel'. national exchequcr which is effected under the
. '\That the ,?ublic authorities are spending is headings of the nourishment, the billeting, and the
mdee(l some gmde to the real strain, It bears a paying of troops, the paying for service other than.
8*

Fcbruary 13, HH5.

LAN DAN D ". ATE R,

milit-ary scrvices, the prOn:ilOn of pensions, of
uniforms, huts, etc., and even the production of
armament; the hire of transports, of colliers, the
ordering of every kind of material for the conduct
of the campaign, is not equivalent to an added corr-
sumption of national wealth. It is merely for the
time being the eanalisation of economic wealth into
channels other "than those which it usuall v follows
in time of peace, and what is more, this canalisa-
tion is upon the whole (for th
moment only) asocial
benefit; for it tends to provide neeess
tries for the
poor and to check the provision of luxuries for thð
rich, 'Vhen you tax a rich man heavily for war
purposes and use the money for producing
uniforms and boots you are, in fact., destroying his
power of demand which would have produced a
fur coat, and using that power of demand to cause
the production of boots and clothing which will
keep a large number of the poorer members of
society from the weather. In the same way, when
you tax a wealthy woman heavily in tL.'l1e of war
and give high pensions to the widmys of soldiers
you are turning what was the power of demand
for a new motor-car into the power of demand for
bread and meat and milk, and so forth all along
the line. A nation that chooses to be generous in
its payment and equipment of soldiers and raises
the money as far as possible from its wealthier
classes is not really" spending" newly apparent
large sums at all,
Of direct destruction of wealth, of direct ex-
penditure, of real consumption in Will' of what would
not have been consumption in peace, in a word, of
extra strain, you have two forms,-first the destruc-
tion of existing wealth by the enemy or by one's
own forces-as when the enemy dropped Lombs on
Great Yarmouth, or when we dig trenche3 across a
man's garden on the East Coast: secondly, the loss
which arises from the disorganisation of society,
from a sudden call upon men to do new, unusual
things for which they are ill fitteù, and a sudden
cessation of their activities in a field where they
have acquired experience and dexterit.y. This
dislocation tak:es a thousanrl shapes. You see it
most clearly perhaps in the professional chsses
and some skilled 3.l,tisans where there is a gap,
lastirrg often as long as the W;ir itself, between
a man's power to produce wealth upon his ordinary
lines and his opportunity for turning to some
new activity. In peace, for instance, a rich man
was prepared to give a hundred measures of wheat
to a skilled artist who \\"oulJ proJuce him a
certain piece of furniture, in war the hunch'ed
measures of wheat are taken to feed the armies. It
docs not follow that the skilled makCl. of the furni-
ture will either be able to join the service or to take
up any other form of production, in which case the
commonwealth as a whole docs lose such economic
yalues as he would have produced had he been
employed to make the furniture,
In the first of these categories Great Britain
has suffered "ery slightly: far !ess than any of her
Allies. For there has been as yet no serious llestruc-
tion of property either by the enemy or by her
Government for the pm'poses of war within her
boundaries. In the second category also the expense
has been surprisincrly small and the transformation
of society has b
en eflected with comparatively
slight friction.
But the indirect effects which follow upon the
setting of men to non-productive from productive
0*

tasks is serious in the case of
Ul industrial country
such as this. There is already an indirect form of
loss through the closing of one great mat"ket with
which the industries of Great Britain exchanged.
And since what comes into this island is largely, if
not entirely, procured by the exchange of what goe.i
out of it, and since what goes out of it and is offered
for exchange is provided by l::t10ur and capital used
in a reproductive manner, the putting of men to
tasks which give, when they are accomplished,
material tIw,t can never furm capital or be used for
the pwductioll of wealth, ultimately lowers the
economic po"'er of a nation: Lowers it progressively
and cumulatively as time goes on, and is particularly
noticeable after the lapse of one complete year.
because it is within the cycle of a year that
agricultural production, upon wl.ich ultimately all
economic effort depends, runs through its cycle.
You have a hundred measures of wheat which
are your capital. You use them to fe
d sailol's who
take a ship across the sea for you and bring you
back more measures of wheat, Or you use them in
feeding labourers who till the land for you and this
produces further wheat. Your capital is used pro-
ducti\-ely. But use them in feeding the crews of
transports who take your t.roop,; across the sea, or
in the feeding of the
e troops themselves in the field,
amI there does not result from your expcnditure
any further wealth. It ends in its consumption,
Similarly, if you burn a certain amùunt of coal in tho
production of an engine for creating wealth, such as
a loom, your coal, though consumed, has been an
agent for producing further wealth; but if you bUnl
your coal to make a shell, then, when your shell has
been delivered and exploded, the process is at an
end, and no further wealth has resulted from tIle
consumption of your product, The conclusion of
any such analysis must be very plain, It is
two-fold. First the mere figures of nationa]
expenditure conceal the truth and give rise to ar:
illusion. That nation appears to be spending most
which is pl'Oviding most generously for equipment.,
pay, and tile rest of it, but during all tho
earlier part of the process the total economic
positi r n remains precisely the same as though
the Government haJ left the taxes at tllcir
ordin31"y cost during a time of peace, the real
expenditure lleing during the fir
t tew months of a,
great war. In the case of a nation whose territory
is not damaged, when a certain time has elapsed, amI
particularly aftCl' the revolution of one year, a bharp
strain is felt and that strain increases, because as
time proceeds you discover that your people have not
been producing wealth at the old rate, anù
he
effect of tllis cessation of useful and its replacement
by unuseful labour is cumulative. 'Vhen wars are
sm'ere amI cOIllj;aratively short of duration one may
expect a perioll of great strain immediately after
tbeir cunclusion, but hardly an economic strain
during their progress 'Yhen wars are lengthy,
tllC double strain is felt of exhaustion in slocks and
of impotence to replace those stocks. And of courso
if the territory of the nation is ravilged as well you
come to enormous items of expenditure, such as
have ruined Bc1gium and a fringe of Frana,", and of
East l)russia and of 'Vestern Poland.

IIII', HILAIRE BnLOC will lecture on the" Progrees of the War OJ at
Queen's Hall at 8,30, February 17. 'l'ickels for this lecture are now
nearly all 601d,
lib. FnF.D T. JA:s'E will lecture on the" Naval War II at Qucen'ð
Hall at 8,30, 1"cbruary 26.
PROFFSSOR V, ß. L""'Efi will lecture on .. lIIodern Explosin!6 II (with
experiments) at Queen's Hall at 8,30, March 2.
Schools, 6ociclies, etc., would apply at the Hall for special terms,

LAND AND WATER

THE

WAR

By

FRED

February 13, 1915.

BY

WATER.

T.

JANE.

NCTE.-Thla Artlcl. hal beeu lubmltted to the Prell Bureau. which cion not object to the publlcatlou .1 uu.ored. and talln 110
rnpoulihility for the conectl.ell of the .tatemellb.

THE NORTH SEA.
T HE most important item of news this week is, of
course, Germany's declaration of a "general
blockade" under terms of something very like
piracy pure and simple. If the official German
statement means anything at all, it means that
both British and neutral merchant ships are to be
submarined without warning and their crews left to drown
in a desperate attempt to create" frightfulness." It is true
that certain exemptions have since been made. but they have
probably only a paper value,
Since the method has actually been put into operation-
even to the extent of discharging torpedoes at a hospital ship
-we must take it as a war idea seriously embarked on by
Germany.
That the Germans regard nothing as sacred where to dis-
regard offers advantage we have long known. But Germany
apparently half-prepared to assert "If you won't be a friend,
you can be an enemy for all I care" is a new proposition. It
is not an unsound one from the German standpoint.
Along the lines on which this war is being conducted it
can make little military difference to Germany whether the
United States be a strict neutral or an active enemy. In her
relations with lesser neutrals the situation is not very
materially different, In the ordinary way-il the U"nited
States indulged in indiscriminate blockade running-a small
neutral state may be inclined to pass on contraband to Ger-
n:;any. But if a strong neutral like the U.S.A. is quarrelled
with, a stopper is at once put on the hypothetical smuggler.
There is nothing left to smuggle with I
Now, 50 far as the United States as a neutral is con-
cerned, it matters nothing at all to her whether she trades
with us or Germany, provided the profits be the same.
But it certainly matters a very great deal whether trade with
Germany means detention and Prize Court proceedings,
whereas trade with England might entail the chance of de-
Btruction without warning.
Out of which I am inclined to think that the first result
of Germany's declaration of piratical intentions will be to
G
rmany's advantage. I do not think that the advantage
wIll last, because sooner or later German pirates will sink
by mistake an American ship or a ship carrying Americans.
Then, if these are left to drown, there will be serious trouble.
From the military standpoint such trouble would not affect
Germany. The naval odds against her are already such that
Ehe could view an increase of odds with comparative
equanimity. Taking distances into consideration, America,
if involved, could do little or nothing on the spot to counter-
Act the Bubmarine campaign.
Indirectly, of course, by tho stoppage of shipments

e c
uld hamper Germany enormously, but it might hamper
:AmerIcan trade to an almost equal extent. Consequently the
Germans reckon steadily on a "nothing doing." And this
probably is exactly what will obtain until they leave a score
Ðr so of American citizena to drown" by mistake."
So_oner or later, of course, this will happen. Then-but
I am afraid not till then-will Germany realise the analogy
of the pig which attempts to swim and so cuts its own throat.
This will be the end of their submarine warfare against
cur commerce. But it is idle to disguise that they have taken
the last desperate step; and though every post brings me half-
8,doz.en "ideas" as to how to fight submarines, the bed-rock
fact remains that the problem is yet unsolved.
Evcntually, of course, it will be. But it is not accom-
plished yet, and there are no indications as yet that the real
" how to do it " has yet been discovered. It will be. But we
are still waiting for the will,be: and a thousand well-mean-
ing and patriotic civilians who have never been inside a sub-
marine in their livcs will never hit off the antidote. Borne
day the technical folk will, and then the aspect of affairs will

hange. But every single suggc-stion which has been sent in
IS of the "put salt on the bird's tail" order. Many of the
sugl?estio
s sent in display a high ingenuity; yet one and
fill mv
nab.ly forgct the cardinal fact that by the time the
submarme IS located she has probably discharged her tor-
pedoes. The future lies with the inventor who can discover
a submarine at least fivo milE's off. He "ill not do it with
a microphone--ideas on those lines have been tried and
,

failed. There is possibly some opening for a camexa obscura
able to differentiate between the vertical lines of a periEcope
and the horizontal lines of a wave, but only an extremely

mart optician (or someone in some such line of business) would
have a chance of tumbling across it. There is not the ghost
of a chance of any amateur finding out how to do it. And
unless the skilled optician had some very clear idea as to how
submarines work I am afraid that he would do little better
than the ordinary amateurs.
I am strongly of opinion that the British Navy will solve
the apparently impossible submarine problem just as it solved
many another apparently impossible problem in the past.
The swarm of privateers in the Napoleonic wars constituted
a very serious problem, but it was eventually dealt with.
Every bane has its antidote.
For the rest we can only express the hope that our
people will emulate the Russians who, having caught some
Germans dropping bombs from a dirigible on an undefended
town, have definitely declared that they will treat them as
common felons. If we catch any German submarine folk
who have torpedoed merchant ships without warning and left
the crews to drown, it is to be ho
d that we will have the
sense to hang them off-hand, and if circumstances admit to
hang them at the yard arm of their trawler mother ship from
which they worked, and to set that trawler drifting for the
rest of the pirates to see I It is true that the prospect of oeing
hanged in chains did not do much to deter the pirates of the
old days, but it has to be remembered that Captain Kidd and
his fellows operated solely for loot, and that the circum-
stance of bcing invariably drunk served to render them
rhilosophical as to their ultimate fates.

\

, ,.
.

11Al' TO ILLUSTRA1E AREA Oi' U21'8 OPERATlO:XS.

The Neutral Flag and Passive Defence.
. The fact th.at a subn:arine can torpedo a merchant ship
qUlte unawares IS not entIrely advantageous to the submarine
or entirely to the disadvantage of the liner. A submarine
lying submerged taking peeps through her periscope,
especially if any sea be on, has very limited vision. and is
somewhat in the position of a sea anemone which has to wait for
its prey to come to it. The odds, therefore, are greatly against
any particular merchant ship coinciding with any particular
submarine. That is why U21 operated on the surface; it
gave her better vision and considerably more speed.
Supposing the Germans to think better of the full terms
of their declaration about attacking British and neutral ships
alike. it is presumed that by using a neutral flag British
ships would have ample opportunities of evasion.
The ruse would be quite legitimate; but its practica-
bility is perhaps another matter. It would give tIie Germans
an excuse for any neutral sunk on the grounds of " suspected
British" and increase the risks of neutrals. Out of which I

10.

February 13, 1915.

LAND ÄND WATER

am inclined to think that, as in the past wars, our trade will
have to be carried on under tue Red Ensign, and the risks
of such damage as enemy submarines can do taken in the
lIame chapter of accidents as stray mines have to ,be taken.
And we shall probably find that the threat is far worse than
the accomplishment.

certain amount of gun power for the sake of better protec-
tion. Our 1914 Naval Estimates provided for one ship of
the Queen Elizabeth class, and three battleships. When war
broke out there were five" battleship cruisers" of the Queen
Elizabeth class under construction. In any case, the war will
probably be over some while before the Ersatz Hertha is com-
pleted.
Lioutenant (Sheffield).-(1) The Agincourt was originally
the Sultan Mehmtt Rcchad V. All her guns are mounted in
the centre line, and she is practically the sam,)! as British
ships of equal date.
(2) The Chilian ships at the beginning of the war were
the Almirante Latorre (taken over), and the AlmÏ1'ante Coc1
-
I'ane. The ships building for foreign countries in (krmnn
Yllrds at the outbreak of the war were the Greek battle cruiser
SalamÏl, two small Russian cruisers, Mooraviev .Amursky and
N evelskoy, and two destroyers for Holland. These were all
taken over by the German Navy. Two or three other Chinese
destroyers were reported to be on order, but it is aoubtful if
they have been commenced.
At Monfalcone, in Austria, there were building for
China one cruiser of 4,900 tons and three cruisers of 1,900
tons. In addition, at the Stabilimenfo Tecnico, twelve de-
stroyers were on order for China, but it is doubtful if any
of them were laid down at the outbreak of war.
(3) The Lion and Tiger have the same armament, but
the disposition is such that, whereas the former only bears
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. two guns right aft, the latter bears four. Our first ship to
A. D. (Corstorphine).-If the Germans took the Blüchcr carry 15-inch guns was laid down so long ago as October,
to be & British warship sinking they would have been quite as 1912, whereas the first German ship mounting 15-inch guns
justified in dropping bombs on her as we were in torpedo- was no' laid down until April, 1913, and they can hardly
ing her, So long as a ship keeps her colours flying she is complete her much before the end of the pres;Jnt ye:u.
deemed to be still fighting. J. L. G. (Westmins1i3r).-(1) I think that it is extremely
R. R. O. (Birkenhead).-A periscope is a difficult thing probable, if not certain, that the East Coast raids were
ío see at the best of times, and no one but a submarine officer " managered" by German agents in this country.
would have any chance whatever of detecting the nationality (2) The question you raise as to why, if the FOl'm1'dab 1 c
of an attacking periscope. When boats are on the surface Wil.l really sunk by a German submarine, the German Ad-
there is no difficulty whatever in recognising a German boat miralty has not published the number of that vessel, is very
on account of a peculiar rise in the bow. intricate. Personally I still keep an open mind on the ques-
G. S. W. (Tunbridge Wells).-In discussing the North tion, and think that it is quite on the cards that she blun-
Sea action I was guided entirely by Admiral Beafty's stafe: dered into a mine which had broken adrift, and that the
ment that the Lion and Tigel' were separated from the rest. second explosion had something to do with the boilers.
of the Fleet. Hipper was certainly capable of seeing that. An alternate possibility is that if it were a German sub-
and equally seeing that the Lion was hit, and had an oppor- marine she went down with her victim.
tunity of which he did not or could not avail himself. As (3) So far as attrition is concerned. the Germans are cer-
regards the speed at which the battle was fought. it was cer- tainly making nothing out of it. nor are they ever likely to
tainly nothing approaching the maximum speeds which have do so.
been recorded of the various vessels engaged. Very high H. H. (Le Court),-As regards your query about the
irial speeds have been recorded for various ships. For German submarine coming alongside a victim flying the white
example, the Blüchcr on her trials reached 25.8. bul it is ensign. it is idle to discuss whether the Germans were right
doubtful if she could have maintained more than a speed of or wrong in doing 10. Up to a certain point the rules of naval
23 knots during the chase. and that was prooa.bly the speed warfare allow of the misuse of flags, but the Germans are
of the German squadron. bound by no laws or rules whatever; and there is nothing
As regards the more modern vessels, they are all tur- more to be said.
bine-driven. and speed with turbine ships is somewRat of an M. H. L. S. (Reading).-Many thanks for yours. In
elusive quantity. That is to say, there is a certain high speed reply:' If the Admiralty suppresses good news they have
which can be maintained lor several hours on end. and there probably some strategical object in view in doing so. and
is ,also a considerably higher speed which can be reached. their reticence should be supported at all costs.
during a short special spurt. S. M. M. (Edipburgh).-I am sorry. but I do not think
B. S. (Cambridge).-As a rnle, large ships are always that it is advisable to discuss the scheme to which you refer,
accompanied ,by small craft. Light cruisers and destroyers though it may interest you to know that it was invented by
are more capable of picking up a crew in the water than a German. and that if our people make us.e of it the Raiser
any extemporised slow vessel would be. is being hoist by his own petard.
F. W, (Lincoln).-At the time the loop was made the M. T. W. (8carborough).-I am greatly interested in your
Schamhol'st was clearly in a critical condition, and probably letter. The figure eleven on a piece of Ihell which landed
the Gneisenau was considerably winged. Neither Ihip prob- near you does not go for anything. because the Germans usa
tl.bly was in a position to attempt anything tactical. The the metric system.
loop of the British Fleet was presumably to get clear of the The "washers" to which you refer are probably the
smoke (as stated). Incidentally a ship end-on is more likely bands round the shell, which enable it to grip the rifling when
to be hit than one broadside-on, the difference between a hit leaving the gun, If there was an 8.2. that would probably
and a miss being mainly a matter of elevation. Supposing a have come from the Y orck. which was known to have been
Ihip to have a freeboard of 25 feet, the target offered by her there,
would be approximately 30 feet, as a shot passing at, say, 27 The only other German armoured cruiser with four fun-
feet would pitch on the deck somewhere on the other side of the nels which could have paid attention to you is the Roon;
:vessel. The beam of a ship 75 feet or so broad il roughly the other two four-funnellers, the Schm'nhorst and Gneiscnau,
!3quivalent to a vertical target of five feet. Supposing a ship were attended to by Admiral Sturdee off the Falkland Islands,
to be end-on, instead of the target representing 30 feet it All the battle cruisers have two funnels only, and the
would for a ship 500 feet long be something like 65 feet, and Blücller only had two funnels. I think you may take it that
therefore twice as likely to be hit. it was either the Roon or the Y orck which paid its attention9
J. R. C. (Dublin),-The German armoured cruiser to to you and your fellow-townsmen. although the story exists
.which you refer is the El'satz Hel'tlla, which was laid down in to the effect that the Von der Tam
was in that particular

uly, 1913. Nothing very definite is known about her, Le" "baby-killing expedition." and got hit from behind by a
whether she is a sister to the DerlflìllflCl', with eight 12-inch torpedo from a British destroyer.
guns, or whether she carries a lesser number of 15-inch. It J, R. P. (Grantham),-(1) I am afraid that it is outside
is more probable that she is a sister of the Derlflinger and my province to advise the particular newspaper you mention
'Lutzow. In any case, the idea that she can be both faster "not to make an ass of itself over the perspective of naval
end more heavily armed than anything we possess or have operations." It is the prerogative of the halfpenny press to
building strik
me as highly improbable, the more so as the lay things on thick. The reason they do so is that the

.German practIce for the laBt few years has been to sacri.fi.oe a public demands it.
11*

The North Sea Action.
There is a tendency in some quarters to crtticise
Admiral Beatty on the grounds that he did not allow the
Germans to get nearer to our shores and commence bombard-
ing while he cut off their retreat. Criticism of this sort is
easy on paper; but apart from the fact that a raid may not
have been the German objective, is the circumstance that the
Germans appear to have turned tail directly they sighted oUr
light squadron-though here, incidentally. their aircraft may
have spotted our battle cruisers likewise.
Undoubtedly this is the main purpose for which aerial
scouts at present exist, and a fleet seeking to evade action
with a stronger force is probably strengthened accordingly.
In a word, the attack is far more difficult to-day than it was
ten years ago. Belore the war speculations to this effect were
many and various. It is curious that what appears to be the
first practical demonstration should have happened without
comment of any sort..

LAND AND WATER

(2) What with German spies and other things, I do not

e how your suggestion could be got to "ork.
(3) Your suggestion of electácal1y-dri\-en pumps wbich
Bhould be employed to squirt water into the German trenches
is mOre in Colonel Maude's líne than mine. From wbat I hear
from friends in the trenches the Germans aTe much more
careful than we are in the matter of arranging their drain-
age; but when you get out thero I am certainly of opinion
that you might do a great deal to make our trenches more
comfortable, if you got your idea adopted and could solve
the mud problem.
W. II. (London).-You ask why not hunt submalÌnes as
we hunt whales 1 This idea was promulgated by Lord Charles
Beresford about eighteen months ago. The trouble is that,
although the analogy between the whale and the submarine is
conect, the whale is a silly 60rt of animal, entirely ignorant
that it is in any danger; the submarine, on the other hand,
is a terribly intelligent whale.
As regards your statement that as an II exciting, profit-
able, and glorious sport it should surpass anything yot seen
en land or water, and that there would be no lack of men
to take part in it," if it could be got up as a new kind of sport,
it is not impossible that--supposing enough participant9--
lome results might be obtained, but I am rather afraid that,
taking all circumstances into consideration, the odds are
that amateur sportsmen engaged in the job would be l'ather
more dangerous to British submarines than to German ones.
J. W. S. (Sanderstead).-It is quite true that if a sub-
marine fires a torpedo at a ship at too close a range she is
quite likely to be destroyed by her own action. I have noted
)-our suggestion, and have forwarded it to the proper qnarter.
1 do not think that it is novel. It is all right in theory,
but certain technical difficulties seem in the way. Quite
apa.rt from t
e Press C-ensor, you may rest assured that no
idea likely to give a hint to the enemy would be published
in the columns of LARD AND WATER.
J. II, B, (Edinburgh).-The maximum draught of any
battleship never exce-eds more than about 30 f-eet. Any battle-
Bhip would be quite safe in eight fathoms. 'rhe Dogger Bank
presents no obstacles to any warship. It is simply called
.. Dogger Bank" because it happens t.o be shallower than the
rest of the watel. round about it.

February 13, 1915.

J. C. P. (London).-(l) See reference to neutral flag in
article.
(2) A certain number of our merchant ships carry a gun
Or two aft for protection, but that is against armed liners,
The chances of a merchantman detecting a submarine sulr
merged are practically nil. The latest German plan appears
to be to torpedo without warning.
(3) The U21 has returned to Germany after her Irish
Sea exploits, BO there is no more to be said. She probably
achieved it lashed alongside some vessel flying the neutral
flag.
(5) The German battle cruisers returned to ßeligcIand
by the north entrance instead of by the usual southern routes.
A submarine is not ubiquitous, and 1 think you should re-
member before suggesting that our submarines are incompe-
tent that if some time ago our battle cruisel's managed to
enter HeJigoland Bight without being injured by German sub-
marines acting in their own waters, it is only natural to
assume that German warships under more favourable condi-
tions should be able to maintain an equal immunity. It is
true that the German battle cruisers had been knocked about,
but the steaming capacity of all of them appeaR to have
been unimpaired.
A. B. H. (West Hartlepool).-Unfortunately, your letter
of December 24 has only just reached me. If the enemy had
fired a hundred rounds they gave you a hundred shelle. It is
a matter of one round one shell. As regards the Germans
having the range, they could work that out by chart with-
out further knowledge, though I dare say that you, in common
with the other towns visited, had Bome German fellow-townø-
men who amplified the information.
Z. E. P.-Sometlling such as you suggest was Brst mooted
in the Crimean War, and has figured in " future war stories II
since. Presuming it to be feasible, there would be an ample
supply of volunteers without occasion to call on you. I am,
however, asked to convey to you an appreciation of your
offer.
N. II. (Wales), and O. G,-I have personally forwarded
the matters to which you reler to the proper quarter. It
seems to be highly significant.

THE VERTICAL BATTLE.
INFLUENCE OF AERIAL ATTACKS ON TRENCII WARFARE.

By L. BLIN
I N i
las
,analysis, tho meaning of the word "victory JJ
18 a
ihtr to force an oI)ponent to accept the views
of ,hIS "\"lctor upon terms, or conditions, imposed by
the latt
r. In e\'ery.,day life victories are won,
ma.ny tlmes a day, by an individual who
imposes his will upon another, or by the ope-ration
of the law when it forces tbe inhabita.nts of a countl'y to
foll.ow certain lines of conduct laid down by the
leg
slator. Just as the greatest possible victory for the
legIslator would be tho total absence of offenders against the
laws he has laid down, so the greatest victory a commander
cxmld win would be the .absence of the enemies he expects
too
ncounter. Although this seems like enunciating an axiom
whIch everybody knows, )'et the necessity for the enunciation
is 110t ploonastic, because for some there cannot Le victory in
ille present war unless a great many of their enemios are
exterminated, and for others a victory means a triumphant
entry of the Allied troops into Berlin nftÆr hm.d,fought and

loody encounters. .Again, victory to many means the destruc-
tion of the German fl
t and the capture of the German
c:<>lonies; whilst to others it means the abdication of the
Kaiser and his imprisonment for life in a fortress or on a
des
rt island. Final victory for t.he Allies may be accom-
p8Jued by a.U th
se thing's, but, in essence, victory has nothing
whatever to do with battles, or with the killing and maiming
of a great numbGr of the oppanents, or with the sinlÔng of
iheir shÌps and s;\.i]ors, or with the capture of their colonies,
or with the imprisonment 01 their commanders. It may be
necessary to take one, or more, or all of Buch actions in ordel"
too ensure the pc-rmanency of a vidory. But, essentially, the
moder.n view of victory is the ability to impose upon nations
oI?posmg us our notion of right or 'Wrong, in their rdations
!"I th other countries, in at least the same degree as it is
unposed ,upon the inhabitants of our country in their inter-
COlU.se wIth one mwther. It foHows, therefol'e that the more
easily, and the mor
promptly, we can force
pon our oppo-
nents tho adoption of a code of international ethics, accopt-
12-

DESBLEDS.

able to the Allies, an<l obtain the necessary guarantee that it
will be kept by them, the greater will be our victory.
Without in the slightest degree criticising what has been
done by our commanders, to whom the State has entrusted
the task of carrying out the operations to enforce our views
and those of our Allies, the \niter desires to press home the
point which he has already, on two occasions, brought forward
in these columns, namely, that a strong, comprehensive, .and
sustained aerial offensive might result in a. m
ch earlier
victory than would otherwise be the case.

AERIAL OFFENSIVE AND TRENCH
WARFARE.
In its present stage the war is essentially one of trench
work, at least as regards the Western field. In his articles
:Mr. Hilaire Benoc has made the character of this method of
warfare very clear, even to the !ay reader. The writel. has,

\
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\
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b..",o ...._ %.

February 13, 1915,

LAND AND WATER

Ih.erefure, no need to explain the state of affairs in France
and in Belgium, with which the reader must be now perfectly
fa.míli:U". In stuclying the dra\';ings illustrating Mr. Belloc's
articles the reader cannot have failed to notice that at many
points on the Wt:stern front of operation the situation is
somewhat as indica.oo i::J. Diagram 1, which does not desig-
nate any parJ.iculat. portion of the confronting lines, but only
the general state of conditions prevailing at a great number
of points from the North Sea to Alsace. In the diagram, A"
A., A. represents a portion of the German line, and B" B"
:8. the opposing portion of the line occupied by the Allios.
Behind t.he portion of th
German line under consideration
there is a railway system with a branch, R, R, 'R, running
almost parallel to it, and having nodal points at P, Q, S, T
and Y. This railway system cannot be destroyed by the
ordinary meallil of attack, but would bo exposed to an aerial
offensive. There is possibly another railway syst{)m behind
the line B., n" B, of the Allies, but wlùch, for the purpose
o
our argument, need not be indicated in the diagram.
Now, let us suppose that the Allies had, at some point 0,
behind their line B., B" B" an aerial base 0, from which
t.heir aircraft could earry out offensive operations within So
circle of radius M containing the nodal points P, Q, S, T
and V, and let us examine the effect of the destruction by
means of aircr:}ft of one or more of those nodal points on
t.he en('my in the trenches along A" A., A..
If our airmen succeeded in destroying the nodal point
'8, and did damage there of such maguitude as would require
considerable time for repair, they would, during that time,
deprive the enemy, on the right of S, of quick and direct
railway communication with those in the trenches to the left
of S, but the enemy could still send reinforcements and sup-
pliC5 by rail along the whole of the line we are examining,

same remark
apply to the nodal points V and T.
If it were the junction Q that was destroyed, rail com-
munication between the enemy would be maintained along

e line, but Buppliee during the time necessary for repair
'WOuld only reach thf' troops in the portion of the trenches we
are examining through the branch r, T. Supplies and
reinforcements could, however, be sent from ont' portion of
the line to another Ly means of the branch R, R. R, If our
airmen succeeded in destroying the nodal point r the Germans
in the trpnches along A" A" A, would be prevented from
direc
railway communication
ith their base, but would still
be able to transfer troops and supplies along the line R, R, R.

AERIAL A TT ACK versus AERIAL RAID.
}'rom the foregoing it will be gathered that 1.he destruc-
tion of any single point of such a railway system as we have
been cOllilidering would only lead to temporary difficulties
and slight delay, but woald not render the system entirely
useless to the enemv in the trenches. .As an aerial raid, con-
øidered merely as M oflensil'e operation, could result in the
destruction -':)f onI}" one point, the conclusion which is forced
upon us is that generally speaking, so far as their nffcllsire mlue is
tonctTned, aerial raids can only lead to local and temporary I!mban'ass-
fM7ÚS, but cannot hare a f'cry grcat influcnu on the characic?' of
trt1lch toarfare.
If, however, the nodal points r, T, and S were destroyed
by a simultaneous and concerted oorial offensive, and the
destruction were of such a character as to entail delay {or

ERIAL BASE:

-
O

bu...(Õ,<::\
"". II".

the
eccs.sary rf'p:tir, thf'n the German troops occupying the
territory, sho" n by section lines in Diagram II., would be
deprived of raihva'/ communiration with both their base and
their nc.ighbours i
the adjoining parts of the country. If
considerable deby were neL'essary to rep:LÌr tho nodal points
P, T, and S-and bv considera.ble delav is meant one of
only twent:J-four hou;'s-then it wonId be a relativoly e:L<;Y

.>t

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,
"

,
\\
\\
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"
"
,'......
......

.<

'D' ...001....... m.

mattcr for the Allieos to force the surrender of the enemy
occupying the trenches contained within the section-lined
area. The result of such an aerial offensive would enable
the Allies t-o occupy tho ground previously held by the enemy
in very much the samo manner indicated in Diagram 111.,
where the dotted lines represent the position occupied by the
Allies previous to the assumed successful aerial offensive, Rnd
the full lines thc'ir position after such an offensive, The
German position would then be somewhat as that indicated, in
the same diagram, by means of a c{mtinuous thick dark line.
n will thus be seen that if an aerial -offensive wero made
with success at various points along the whole line of the
German trenches the result would be the driving of a number
of powerful wedges int-o the enemy's line, which would be
bound to break at some point. A successful aerial offensive.
however, at anyone place depends, as we bave seen, upon
the simultaneous destruction of several vital nodal points.
The failure to sllcceed at anyone point may mean the failure
of the whole aerial offensive. Hence, in order to tnsure thl
'It!:cess of an atria! offensive at ami place the rm'ious rilal poi,;t,
must be subjected to a simultancou$ aUark in þrce and nd sin/l,l,
raided.

THE N-SQUARE LAW.

The success of an aerial attack depends, to a great degrce,
upon a l:1.w which is well,known to military and nayal
strategists, and which applies with equal strength to aerial
warfa.re. That law is known as the ,. 1l'8'1ltare law," because
it show3 that the fighting strength of any force, whether on
land, on the sea, or in the air, varies as the square of its
numerica.l strength. The following explana.tion, although
not a mathematic'Ù proof, will help the reader to grasp the
meaning of that law so far as it applies to bomb-dropping from
oaeroplanes.
Everytning !Jeing equal, two aeroplanes can carry twice
8.S many bombs as a single machine. If the bombs from one
machine were dropped until there were nono left, and then all
the bombs wert' graòually dropped from the second machine,
then the fightir.g strength of the two ma.chines would be twice
that of a single one, If, however, the two aeroplanes
dropped their bombs simultaneously, they would do tho same
damago in half the time, or twice as much damage in the same
time. Hence t,he fighting strength of two aeroplanes act-ing
simultaneonsly is twice a;; gre:Ü as it would be if the machi
e.!J
were acting at different times. It follows, therefore. that the
fighting strength of two aircraft acting simultaneously is fonr
times thL' fighting strength of a single one, that is, if we double
tho number of macl1Ïnes in an air squadron, the fighting valueof
the squa.dron becomes 2 3 times as great. In the same way, if
W6 treble the number of machines of an aerial fleet, itß fight-
ing value becomes 3 3 , or 9, times as great. The importanco
of the nll11iber of aircraft sent out on an offensive, nnd likely
to Le engaged in a vertical battle, is thus made evident.
P.S,-Tho writer would be much obliged if all firm!!
capable of manufacturing any aeroplane parts, whether in
large or small quantities, would communicate with him with-
out de!ay. In view of possible developments of great im-
pOl'tan<
o the writer wishes to get into touch with all those
who arc in a position to undertake the manul:tcLure. according
tù dr
win:::3 and specifications, of simple aemplane parts.
either of wood or metal.

One of the most noteworthy bookg of thi.
pret;
nt yc:tr is
fr.
J, Mills Whi-tham's Sran.'were (Methuen a11<l Co" 6&.), .....hich, dC31-
ing with the tra;jooy of a country \'iI1ag(', makcð fine drama.
ut of
very 6:mple element<;. The figure of TIaikes, t:he farmc.r, dommalA's
the book, and th:s mm'6 characlE'T is <1dineated "ith
l1eh Tuthle<6 in-
eight as n
minds u.
of Ha.rdy a.t hi!! best; not, that RaikE'lS UI the only
good portrait, for there are others <'qually convincing, :tnd t:he .. chorus,"
;racy of the wil, if; .a!so well drawa. A strong, well-written book this,
tho bffit its a.ut.hor b.a..
yet proda.cod.

LAND AND WATER

ON
A NOVEL FORM OF TRENCH DREDGER FOR DRAINAGE.

TRENCHES

AND

February 13, 19154

TRENCH

WORK;

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

T is interesting to notice how the trenches in Flanders
and everything connected with them are gradual
y
working their way through a cycle of change back to
the types of thirty years ago.
We began the campaign with ideas tal.en from the
conditions of the South African campaign, and as it
happened the Germans also had closely copied our types.
Generally, they were all cut exceedingly. steep and narrow,
with the parapets kept down as low .as possIble, SO as to afford
the smallest possible target to the enemy's artillery, and as
long as the ground was
uitable and the weather dry, they
answered their pUrp<>6e sufficiently well-that is, giving good
cover to the men from the splinters thrown backward by high
explosive shells.
Moreover, as they had generally to be laid out in the dark,
no one coula be certain where their prolongafions might rest
when daylight came; hence the numerous traverses we were
accustomed to make in South Africa came in handy.
But it is open to question whether they saved us as much
as we thought they did, for almost from the first the Germans
took to locating them by aeroplanes from above, a.n.d clearly
the broader belt of freshly-turned earth made when the exca-
"ated soil was thrown out to form parapets, both to the front
and rear, was far more easily visible from above than the
parapet in front, and the trench (Jnly, would have been.
If, for instance, a "Taube JJ could detect the broader
line at,
ay, 5,000 ft., it would have had to come down to
3,000 ft. to see the smaller mark, and its risks would have
increased in almost a double ratio as the height diminished.
But a Taube which found and signalled the range would cost
us far more in men than we hoped to save through the protec-
tion afforded by the parapet at the back.
The superiority of the German siege artillery on the
Aisne, and at first in Flanders, simply compelled us to fight
our way in so close to the encmy that he could no longer use
artillery fire, least of all big, high explosive shells, for
fear of hitting his own trenches, and thus we came back to a
condition of affairs in which the inconspicuousness of the front
parapet hardly mattered. At fifty yards you can see a 12 in.
parapet: just as well as a 3 ff.. one.
We did not exactly tumble to this obvious point for the
fll'st few weeks, and meanwhile the rains descended and the
floods came, and the steep-sided trenches collapsed; the subsoil
water rose up through the bottom, and I imagine both our
men and the Germans have had about as hard a time during
the last few month.s as has ever been recorded in hi.story.

Moreover, at these very short distances apart, attacks and
counter
attacks became almost nightly occurrences, and then it
was clearly apparent that these deep, unstepped trenches were
veritable man-traps if the enemy charged home. Troops could
neither spring out of them to charge or escape from them to
run away j in fact, they had no chance at all of putting up
a fight for their lives, and the consequences have on several
occasions been pretty disastrous on both sides.
It is, however, the rain which is responsible for the
general trend of opinion in favour of more rational ideM.
Men returning from the front have again and again repeated

to me as quite a new idea the phrase I so often heard from my
old Crimean instruct-ors, " Men don't mind so much the chancð
of being killed; what they cannot endure is the certainty of
having to stand knee-deep in slush and ice." And judging,
from photographs I have t>een, we are rapidly coming back to
the old C:rimea.n type of trench, viz., one that is broad enouglì
for convenience of movement, and sloped s-ufficiently for men
to _attack out of it; for the power of counter-attack is the most
vital feature of all to be preserved for the ;sake of the moraJ
of the troops.
Nor is there sufficient reason why we should cling to a flat
target any longer now that the artillery superiority has prrssed
so markedly over to our side. We now not only outnumber'
our enemy in guns of all calibres, siege and field, but we have
unlimited ammunition behind UB, and can employ a system of
silencing his guns whenever they appear, to which want of
ammunition precludes his making any adequate reply. Fur..
ther than this, the skill of our gunners has been proved to be
superior to anything he can bring against us, and our shells
burst with certainty, where 20 per cent. (I have even heard of
30 per cent.) of his projectiles never burst at all,
We can therefore afford to go in for a higher parapet.,
which not only gives us the advantage of command at shori
ranges-which is as important now as it ever was-but we can
also diminish the difficulties of drainage to a minimum, the
most important point for many weeks to come.
The sketch will make this clearer,

In section A as fast as you bale out the water it filters
back again. In B you can jUßt keep it under.
Further, all kinds of rough but effective appliances for
liftIng the water out of B can be employed. The water ca.n
be allowed to settle in sumps (C) and then pumped out; but
pumps soon clog in muddy water, and the simplest and most
practioal apparatus I know of is an application of the (J}'di-
nary dredger type, which can be easily improvised out of the

Sa.,nd bag Parape t'

'Pl:mll 'Revetment:

S
anding Ledg<?
III \

materials usually to be found in village smithies' and wheel-
wrights' shops. It consists of a number of buckets shaped like
a coal-scuttle, attached to an endlcss belt rotating over two
drums (A D), held apart by a straining piece (C), and
mounted on any convenient platform of sleepers, or similar
timbering. A man turns the handle at A, and the contents
of the buckets as they tip pour out into a trough which leads
them clear out of the trench on the side away from the enemy.
The sump pit can be made a continu-ous drain, and the v.hola
apparatus moved backwards and forwards to prevent too large
an accumulation of mud piling up at the rear of the trench

1A*

February 13, 1915.

LAND ÄND WATER

CORRESPONDENCE.

FINANCIAL PRESSURE.
To the Editor of LAND Arm WATER.
DEAR SIB,-Mr. Belloc, in his interesting article" Finan-
cial Pressure and War," published in your issue of
February 6, shows that, f;.'om a :financial standpoint, increas-
ing stringency can only diminish the capacity of a country
to carryon war in BO far as it may affect the import of
goods from foreign countries.
It may be reasonably assumed, therefore, that it would
,be good policy for a country sítuated ßS Germany now is to
import either solely, or in as great a. proportion of the whole
as possible, those items mentioned by Mr. Belloc a.s being
vital for the prosecution of hostilities, such as horses, petrol,
I"ubber, and certain metals (chiefly copper); in other words,
that the less Germany imports of those commodities which
can possibly be dispensed with the greater her :fina.ncial
capacity for the purchase of the vital elements.
Now, Mr. Belloc postulates that although Germany does
not produce internally sufficient food stufIa for comfort, yet,
þy exercising great care, the nation can manage to exist
:trithout the shortage in any way affecti.ng her capacity for war.
It would seem, therefore (paradoxically enough), that
.honld Great Britain decide to include food stuffs as con-
traband, the action would actually assist our enemieø by
rendering it financially possible to procure the vital elements
for II. longer time-thus prolonging the period of resistance.
Of c'Ourse, this line of argument does not take into
account the effect of II. shortage of food on the comfort of
the individual, and so on the moral of the nation as a whole,
which might far outweigh the financial gain; but fro
a
kgioll.l standpoint it seems difficult to refute.-Yours faIth-
fully, J. H. CLOSI:,

. Rowsley," Rosebery Roaa, Cheam,

AN EASILY MADE EAR-PLUG FOR SOLDIERS
IN THE FIRING LINE.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-SO many soldiers are suffering from the effect
on their ears of tl1-3 awful noise of the battlefields that it
might be of use to them t.o know of the most effective way
of keeping out the concussion. Years ago 88 a yolunteer I
suffered greatly in this respect, made many expenments, and
found the following beyond all comparison the best.
Take II. little piece of muslin, scrape off into it some of
the wax of a candle, fold it up int.o a little pill the size of
the ear opening, tie it round close above the pill with some
thin thread, leaving tags about three incheð long; cut off the
spare muslin, and that is all. The resulting plug, which
looks like a miniature grenade, can be pushed into the ear
at any time, fits itself accurately, owing to the warmth of the
body keeping it just neither hard nor soft, and it can. be
pulled out again readily by the tags of the three.<!. Holdmg
it near eo fire will soften the wax enough to be easIly moulded
jo the proper size.
Wool as ordinarily used is of no value at all, any hard
pluO' tends to injure the ear, while the little candle-wax

re
ade fits perfectly and yet is absolutely ha
ess. .One
can be made in five minutes; though, of course, a llttle adJust-
ment in the amount of wax used is needed to get a perfect fit.
Should anyone care to ask me I shall be happy to send a
.ample to them at any time.-Believe me, etc.,
OLDFIELD THOMAS.
15, St. Petersburg Place, Bayswater, Vv.

THE FIRST LO;lD,
To the Editor of LA
D AND WATER.
SIR -I do not think the" :Man in the Street" olJjects
either t
Lord Fisher or Admiral J ellicoe; certainly not to
the latter. But they do object to a civilian using. autocratic
power at the Admiralty which the folly of Parhament has
given him. . .
The" Man in the Stroet .. holds Mr. ChurchIll responsIble
for the Cressy disaster, the three cruisers being sent in defiance
of naval opinion. .
For the Pacific defeat in seuding Admiral Cradock WIth
an inferior force to attack a superior.
For the Antwerp expedition of untrained men.
For the myslery of the Goeben at Messina.
They also object to the First. Lord of the Admiralty de-
Bertin
his post at Whitehall for the trenches at Antwerp.
They are also aware of his treatment of Sir George Calla-
ghan, and feel the anchoring of the Niger g-unboat off Dover,
Bnrl the Formidable disaster is probably owing to his defiance
øf naval advice and in his helief tJlat he is a second Nelson.
- ....
OAS'I-DWELLER IN CORNWALL.,

THE AGE QUESTION.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-Could you see your way to give ia one of
your future !issues of LAND AND WATER som
notes on the
qualifications of naval officers 1 It seems at present that the
entry to this service must .be determined before the age of 13,
and after that age a boy desiring to enter the service is
barred. Surely a lad having a good education should have
an opportunity of entering at least as late as 16. I am con-
cerned, because I have a boy aged 14 anxious to enter the
Navy, and find he.is too late. I do not k'now if this i3
within the scope of your paper, but if it is I should be
obliged by a note in your correspondence columns.-Yours
fait1úully,

NAUTICUS.

CATCHING SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of LAND Arm WATER.
DEAR Sm!-One of your correspondents mentioned
the efficacy of an ordinary fishing net for catching and
disabling submarines. I have been told that Messrs. Brunton
Bros., of n, St. Stephen's House, Westminster, have already
devised 8 scheme which hall been probably shown to the
Admiralty. The scheme consists in attaching a net to the tail
of a torpedo (not charged), and on a ship sighting a submarine
the torpedo is launched across the bows of the latter, the net
trails out behind, and unless the submarine !;jees and evades it,
disaster is the result. I believe that this has been tried ex-
perimentally.-Yours faithfully,
l.!AURICE A. WOOD.
Cecil Chambers, 861. Strand, London. W.C.

EARLY SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-M:r. Grimshaw's letter in & recent issue has pnved
interesting to many readers, no doubt; to m)"self particu-
larly so.
In 1884 a submarine boat was designe,d by Mr. J,
Waddington, and built at Birkenhead by Messrs, Cochranes,
of that city. This vessel Wa3 approximately 40 feet long
and 6 feet greatest diameter, bpering to a point at each
end. The rudder was fixed under the boat, and diving fins
or planes were fitted. A conning-tower and pumps for alter-
ing the displacement were a part of the equipment. Pro-
pulsion was effected by one 20-h,p. electrio motor, made by
Messrs. SiemellS, driven by a battery of accumulators sup-
plied by the Electric Power Storage Co., the whole electric
installation being fitted by the writer and his partner, Mr.
F. H. Perry. The battery, which weighed over five tons,
had to be charged from an external source.
The electrio power was guaranteed by us to drive the
boat at 8 mile.!! p.h. upon the surface, which was easily accom-
plished. In all the chief features it will be seen this ship
was a prototype of the present-day under-water ship. The
designer hOO hope.!! of interesting the British Admiralty in
the iâea, but without success, and I believe eventually l

all the money sp6nt on the work. Of course, the boat WM
never properly fitted for diving, but Mr. Waddingt-on's belief
was that, havinO' shown the invention so far advanced,
further assistance
both financially and mechanically, would
have been available to complete a practicable submarine.
The first trials took place at the end of 1884 in the great
float at Birkenhead. When everything was in place, three
men, including myself, went inside, and tho conning-tower
hatch was then bolted from the inside, the tanks then fill
d,
and the boat, a.ttached by chains from a cran
at. the d?ck
side, was lowered to the bottom. CommumcatlOn bemg
est:>.blished Dy telephoue with those above, it mr,.y be imagined
the stay below was not very prolonged, just sufficient !<> sh3w
everything was tight. Aft.erwards th
boat was dIlven at
various speeds, and performed evolutIons up?n the surface
which certainly were most wonderful at that tIme. The hull
was almost entirely flubmerged I\.t times; in fact, two of
those 0::1 board were h
artily glad when the trial "\"I'M over.
The nose of the boat was a solid st-eel piece about three feet
loug, and in making a sharp turn II.

1l spee1 we ju

missed running into the 8.S. ..A.la,.'w,
hlCh wou
d ha:e meant
our going down like a stone an
the bIg steamshIP bemg sunk,
as she was lying up for repaIrs. . 1 .
Although the submarine of to-day IS marve.Ious in l

perfection, the same ri.sks exist, added to many others; and
I take off my hat to the crew of any submarine.-Yours truly,
CHAS. W, Co

15*

LAND AND WATER

February 13, 1915.

THE INDIAN TROOPS.
To the Editor of LAXD A.....w W A'IER,
Sm,-I am encouraged by the generou!I response of the
public to the appeals for supplying the King's Indirrn troops
in France witb .. comforts," "hich are practically necessaries,
to draw attention to the urgent requests that I have received
for "waterpoof hoods" to protect the puggarees (turbans) of
the men from getting Boaked by rain and snow. 'fbe demand
comes from so many quarters tbat I fear the few I am able
to send will m
et but tbe bare
t fraction of tbe need.
In addition to pants, vests, socks, gloves and similar gar-
ments, which wear out quickly and require constant renewal.
there is a general request for condensed milk, brown sugar,
cigarettes,sugar crrndy (for non, smoking castes like the Sikhs).
spices, etc.
With the balance of tbe money standing to the credit of
" The Indian Troops Comforts Account," with :Messrs, H. S.
King and Co,. 9, Pall )Iall, S.W., I slwJl, so far as it will
re:Jcb, endeavour to comply with these requcsLì.- lours faith-
fully,

AMEER ALl.

2. Cadogan Place. London, S.W.

MR. H. J. C, GRIERSON AND EXPLOSIVES.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-Are our explosives so ineffective as
Ir. Grier-
son would suggest 1 The II ela wben torpedoed on September 1 G
by Eoubmarine E9 "as reported to have sunk in under balf an
llour.
According to a letter of an officer on the InfiexiUe (the
TimfB. January 20) one of the German ('ffieers said Ulat one
turret had been IJlown bodily overboard by a 12in. Eohell. I
do not know what a Gin. turret weighs, though I have seen
them under construction and it 15trikea me that it must be a
monstrous explosion which would move one, let alone blow
it overboard.
Is it filiI' to compare the battles of Coronel and Falkland
Islands 1 It is reported that the Good II olle and the M onTlWut/J
closed with tbe German ships so ae; to bring their ligLter guns
"ithin range. In the Falkland Islands battle it appears to
bavc been a stern chase according to Jane's description of the
figh t,.
Tue Good lJope was laid down 1897 and the MonmoutlJ
1899, The Sc/wrnlwrst and the Gnelsenau 190,1 and 1905.
."rmour is improved every yeaT. guns, too. so that ilie
two ulder boats were outclfLssed in every way to a greater
eItent (judging from Fig/Ltin!J Ships) than the latter were
in the Falkland Battle.
The" Fire Question" is also answered in the T;metlletter
of the 20th inst.
.he not we English a bit too ready to condemn EngliFli
production and to belaud that of the fOl'eigner1 Wouldn't it
be as well to follow Mr. Jane's and Lord Beresford's
tlvice
and trust the Admiralty1-Yours faitJ1fully.
Em:\EsT IIILLABT.

The Hawthorn!!,
Tanshelf, Pontefract.
P.S.-Will you allow me to add that your journal gives
me the greatest slltisfaction to read of anytI1Íng I have found

verything else, newspapers and periodicals alike, appear
eIther openly or IiUgge.<Jtivcly to be governed by politics.

BOOKS FOR CAMPS AND TRENCHES.
To the Editor of LAND AND W ATEB.
DEAR SJR,-It would be vel'y kind of you if you would
dr
w tJ:e attention of your many readers to the Camps Library.
['Ius LIbrary was started by Sir Edward Ward with the object
of preventing overlapping by forming a central depot to
which the public could send all books (old and new) intended
for the use of our soldiers at home and abroad. He also
wished to creat
a distributing organisation from which all
c
mps and recreation rooms could obtain books and maga.-
&lDes.
. The Library has, I think, justified its existence, as

u.rIDg the last two months it has not ()nly formed lending
hlira.1'Ïes of over 30,000 volumes in the various camps and
l'Nreation rooms throughout the United Kingdom, but has
also sent thous<'1Dds of books and magazines to all the regi-
ments serving abroaù, as well as to the various convalescent.
camps and to a1l the field ambulances
\Ve have special facilities for tra
sit. and there i.s little
delay in getting the books to their destination.
Thanks to the splendid generosity of the public large
boxes and pac!>ets of books arri.....e here daily. for in these
grav? yet great days everybody loves to give. As .someone
Bendmg books writes this morning. .. For the men in the

trenches, from a grateful woman. who appreciates her quiet
home mOre than e.....er. She has two dear boys at the frontl.
and she only mshp-.!i she had more books to .send." .
\Ve want more and more books for the demand made
upon us by camp and trench is imme
se.
\Ve should also like to make the Library known ..
widely as possible among the .....arious camps and recreation
rooms who need books. Sir Edward Ward's idea is that eaclì
camp should form its own lenùing library, and work it for
itse1f -with its own rules .and r
gulations. We charge ..
small fee (to pay for packing, etc.) for books sent to the
camps, which then becomB the entire property of the regi.-
ment acquiring them.
We are here to help and to help other people to help.
Booh should be sent (carriage paid) to the Camps
Library, 22, Earl Street, Westminster, and small donation.
towards expenses we should so like to get.-Yours faitHul1y..
EVA ANSTILUTHER (Hon. Sec.)..
22. Earl Street. Westminster, London. S.\V.

CRITICISING THE ADMIRALTY.
To VIe Editor of LAND Arm \V ATER.
DEAR SIR,-In response to Mr. Jane's comments.

marks. and invitation in current issue, I desire to say thai
I am unable to work up any enthusia.o:;m for either " lunati.cl
asylums II or tbe " grinding of axes "; &SO that I and very.
many others consider the -withholding of frank criticism oJ
our Admiralty and other departments is harmful in the ex:..
treme; also that the repeated successful demonstrations bJ:
the enemy on our East C<>ast have created a. distinct feeling
of uneasiness and insecurity. And. finally. that. the main
point of my letter to Mr. Jane has not even been touched.,
far less disposed of, in spite of his knowledge of (( the
inside and unwritten history (or policy) of the nav& w'ar."-
Yours truly, E. H.
Hatch Enò.
[There is DO .. withholding" of criticism. The Ad

miralty has made no important error to date, however mat-
ters may appear to amateur critics of them. There are, I
think, still people who belie.....e the moon to be made of greeD
cheese, and that the earth is flat. But they have gi....en up
demanding "frank criticism" of astronomers and geo.-
graphers who I>elieve otherwise. For the rest we are fighting
to bea.t Germany-not to create a feeling of ease and securitI
in the civil
opulation.-FRED T. JANE,] .

RULES
DENCE

REGARDING CORRESPON..
FOR PRISONERS OF WAR:

1. Letters, postcards. and pootal parce1e should be addressed AI
followlI ;-
(Name. initials, rank and regiment).
British Prisoner of War.
in Germany (or A
tria-Hungary),
c/o General Post Office.
Mount Pleasant. LondODo
"\\""hen tl1e place where the prisoner is confined is known. the wordø j
II At ," should be inf!erted at the beginning of the thir

line of the address. It is recommended that parcela should no'
be sent unless the place of confinement ÌJI known.
2, Communications should be limited to private and family new.
and to necessary LuÚness communicatiorul, and should not. be Hnt t.oo
frequently.
Xo references to the naval. military, or political situation, 01' to
nayal and military movements and organiSQtion
, are allowed. Letten
or postcards containing such references will not be delivered.
3. Friends of prisoners of war are advised to send postcards in
preference to letterø, AS postcards are le.ss likely to be delayed, If
letters are sent they shou1d not exceed in length two sides of a 8he

of notepaper and should contain nothing but the 8heet. of not('paper.
Letters :md postcards may be ..-ritten in English (though let-teTS iD
German are proba.bly deJivered more quickly). On no account should
the writing be crossed,
4. LetteI'll cannot. for the pre
ent be accepted for registration.
S, Postage need not be paid either on letters or parce1a addreueð
to British prisoners of war.
6, X 0 letters should be enclosed in parcels, and newspapers muat
not. on any account. be sent. So far as is kno..-n there is no ot.h6t'
re.striction on the contents of parcels; tobacco may be .øent, and wi.lJ,
be admitted duty Cree, but foodstuffs of a peri.!}lable character Bhould
not be 8Cnt.
7. Remittances can be made 1y money order to British prisonera
of war, No charge is made for commission. Instructiom as to how
to proceed can be obtained from post offices. The transmission of coin
eit.her in letters or parcels. ÌJI expressly prob.ibit-ed, Postal orders

bank notes shou1d not. be sent.
8, Postal parcels will be insured without charge,
9, It. must. be understood that no gllarantee of the delivery of
either parcels or letters can be given, and tha.t tIle War Office accepta
no responsibility. In any case considerable deìay may take place, and
failure to receive an acknowledgment 6hould not necessarily be taken.
as an indication that letters and parce1a sent have not. been de:ivered.
10, So far as is lmown, pr;soners of war in Gcnnany are allowed
to write letters or postcards from time to time; but. tJ1ey may not.
always have facilities for doing so, and the fact that no commur.icat.iODl
is received from them need not give rise to anxielly.
W AB OFFIC8

16"

.February 13, I Y I 5

LA K DAN D \V ATE R

Two British
suitable for

Made Safety Fuuntain
British Soldiers

Pens

These pens do not leak
in any position and will
conveniently fit into a
uniform pocI{et.

Onoto Pens are the only standard
10/6 pens all British made by a
British Company with British capital
and employing British labour.

-è no to .' ens

THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., LTD., LONDON

HOTEL CECIL

BOMBS

From Hostile Aircraft

THE

The danger arÜ,ing from fires caused by bombs CAN
BE :\IET by installing

COST of LIVING REDUCED

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DURING THE WAR

THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER.
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Exceptional inclusive terms to Resi-
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Raids by hostile aircraft are not a matter of theory
to-day. They have actually occurred, and may be
expected again.

BE PREPARED!!

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Even if you have an up-to-date l\IOTOR FIRE
ENGINE IN YOUR DISTRICT it CANNOT be in
TWO PLACES AT ONCE. It is to your interest
to take reasonable precautions.

DO NOT DELAY!

A large number of II Kyl-Fyre II Extinguishers have I
been supplied to the Army and Navy Authorities for
Hutment Camps, also Red Cross Hospitals, etc., etc.

Telephone: GERRARD 80. Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

Apply, KYL.FYRE, Ltd.,
12 Elms Buildings, EASTBOURNE.

281

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

f.ebruary 13, 19 1

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282

February 13, 1915

LAND AND WATER

HOW

NAVAL

GUNS

ARE

AIMED

By SIDNEY GRAVES KOON

T HE marvellous accuracy of our naval gunners has
been timp and again a cause for self-congratula-
tion on the part of those of us who never saw a
naval gun fired. But how many of us know the
intricate process by which that success is
achieved? How many know the complex relations that
exist between the enemy's speed, his distance from our gun,
the weight of our shell, the velocity with which it leaves the
muzzle, the rolling of our ship as it tears through the heaving
billows? The certainty that, sooner or later, a dreadnought
action must take place in European waters lends point to a
brief study of this subject.

' :f;t <'_--=
.:=:==<:::=.1..-----<>-------<---_

________ r. _________________=

FIG. 1.

\\'hen a battleship A, Fig. I, fires a shell at a hostile
ship B, that shell takes a curved path C-C-C, called its
.. trajf'ctory." If the gun is properly aimed the shell lands
on the target, explodes with a horrid noise, spreads destruction
round about, and sometimes sets fire to the ship B. If the
ships are very close together, as was often the case a century
ago, the path of the shell may be practically a straight line,
like that shown below the trajectory. Unfortunately for
this ideal condition of shooting, however, the attraction of
gravitation acts so persistently upon the shell in its flight
that the gun has to be aimed well above the point to be hit,
under penalty of falling far short and burying the shell
harmlessly in an inoffensive ocean. So the shf'll starts on a
course such as that of the upper straight line, from which it
is gradually pulled farther and farther down as it wings its
flight across the miles of water between its gun and the
enemy's ship. The angle D between the straight line above
the trajectory and that below it is called the "angle of
elevation" of the gun. The distance between gun and target
is the" range." And it is the correct determination of this
range which is the most difficult part of accurate naval
gunnery. The greater the range the greater must be the
angle of elevation; the lighter the shell the greater the
elevaLm for a giwn range; the greater the velocity with
which the shell starts its journey tl1P smaller may be the
angle of elevation and, consequently, the flatter \\ill the
trajectory be.
But there is another important element, and that is the
location of the exact target from right to left. If it be
desired to hit tlU' enemy's mast and the shell actually hits
something a hundred feet away on either side that is not good
gunnery. So we have the two things to look out for-the
gun's elevation to correspond with the exact range and its
.. traverse" to correspond with the location " sideways II of
the point to be hit. The range is determined simultaneouslv
from several positions on the ship, of which one may be K
in Fig. 2. The method will be described later.

I \
'

"I r/ 0 0 \
'-'
.
--- --, '
' , ,- --
F '
-=
:-
-- =-

j I
, G '---- ---' " 1"4"
..........
' ,
'- - - ------?'; '.

FIG. 2.

The traverse is in many cases adjusted by an officer in a
narrow place in the turret G H. This is the man who firf's
the gun. He stands between the gun F' and the armoured
wall of the turret, and looks at the enemy through the
peculiar-shaped telescope E'. What he sees is indicated in
Fig. 3, where the "cross-hairs" of his telescope are shown
to be on the forward funnel of the hostile ship. The axis of
this telescope is very accurately parallel to the horizontal
axis of the gun. And the telescope pierces the heavy armour
of the turret in the manner shown in order to avoid having a
small shot or piece of
hell come right through into the
turret if it should chance to land just where the telescope is.

If, now, our shell could cover instantaneously the distance to
the enemy, a shell fired from this turret, with the correct
elevation, would strike the forward funnel. But it takes a
modem shell 16 seconds to tra\"el the six miles now considered
a moderate battle range. During 16 seconds the enemy, if
steaming at 20 knots speed, would have moved ahead 54 0
feet. Consequently the shell would strike 540 feet behind

FIG 3,

FIC.7.

FIG. 6.

the point at which it was aimed, or perhaps 200 feet behind
the stern of the target ship. So we see that, just as in
shooting at a \\-ild duck on the \dng, we have to estimate the
enemy's speed and anticipate him-in this case by 540 feet.
Now to get the range. Several instruments are in use
for this purpose, all based upon a simple principle of
trigonometry. If we know the angle L of a right-angled
triangle. Fig. 4, and know the side M opposite that angle.

FIG. 4.

l

L :

N

then the side N can he readily computed. In this case Jo.1
is the distance between centres of the mirrors P and P
in the instrument, Fig. 5, while N is the range sought. The

I
1è-+-------- :==1;
FIG,5.

I
,
it

side J1 is kno\\n to the thousandth part of an inch. So it
remains to measure the angle and thus determine the range.
The mirror P is fixed at exactly 45 0 to the axis of the tube
pp'. A ray of light, entering the instrument at P and
reflected to the mirror R, is again reflected into the eye-
piece S. where it forms the lower half of the image in Fig". 6
and 7. Similarly, a ray of light. entering at P' and reflected
to R' and thence into the eye-piece, forms the upper half of
the image. The mirror P' (or sometimes R' instead) is
adjustahle. The amount of movement of that mirror
necessary in bringing the two hal\'es of the image in Fig. 6
into correct mutual position, as shown in Fig. 7, may be
measured to the fraction of a minute of arc. .-\nd' this
measure, shown on an ivory scale, tells the officer using the
.. telemeter II --or .. stadiameter, II as it is variously called-
just how far away his target is,
The arc of movement of the mirror is almost inappreci-
ably small. With a 6-foot .. base line" PP', an angle of
40 seconds of arc (one ninetieth of one degree) represents a
range of 10,300 yards, or about six miles. An angle of
30 seconds shows the range to be 13,750 yards. As an angle
of 29 seconds indicates 14.225 yards it is evident that an
error so small as one second of arc (the thirty-six-hundredth
part of one degree) will produce, in estimating this 8-mile
range. an error of 475 yards, or a quarter of a mile, To
correct such errors, and at the same time those variations
due to the action of atmospheric conditions upon the powder
used and upon the refraction of rays of light passing over
long distances at sea, "spotters II are employed. Men \\-ith
powerful glasses, stationed in elevated positions from
which they can watch the fall of shells in the water, verih'
or correct the range as detennined by stadiameter an
l
telephone their observations to the ordnance officer below.
In this way it takes only a few shots to locate the exact
range required, after which hitting the enemy is a mere matter
of the precision with which these various elements may be
continued in their several combinations,

28 3

LAND AND WATER

*
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Regd,
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Scuthernhay, Exeter,
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This CUIRASS is soft
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and warm as fur, but
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The County Gentleman

AND

D&WATER

Vol. LXIV

o. 2754

[ PUBLISHED AS ] PRICE SlXPBNOB
A X.EW"PAP"U, "" , '"
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S:\TURDA Y, FEBRUARY 20, 19 1 5

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GENERAL SIR ARTHUR PAGET

Who is taking to France and Russia the decorations bestowed
by King George on officers of the French and Russian armies

LAl\V Af',;D \VAIER

February 2:::, 1915

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in his haversack enables the Soldier
to reinforce his energy and strength
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Febru.lry 2.0, 1915

LAND AND "VATER

TIlE

TORPEDO

By .. A.J\I.I.C,E:'

T HE torpedo is to-day one of the principal arms
of na\'al warfare, and IS carried in practically
en'ry type of \\arship from the submarine to the
largest battle-.hip, .\Ithough this has been the
case for several years it can safely be said that
the introduction of the submarine greatly increased the
importance of the torpecto as an offensive arm,
The modern torpedo may be looked upon as a small
submarine vessel \Ùthout conning tower and periscope,

/
STRnlEA

COMPREsSED AIR
CHAMBER

BALANC.E
C...AWBItA

DETONATOR

the in rushing water causes the appearance of flames and
smoke so as to indicate the spot where the torpedo has struck.
The compressed air chamber consists of steel \\ ails
having a thickness of about a quarter of an inch, and has a
capacity of about 12 cubic feet. It is capable of withstanding
a pressure of about 2.000 lb. to the square inch, although
the actual working pressure is 1.470 lb. per square inch,
This pressure is reduced by means of a reducing valve to
515 lb. per squar:e inch, at which pressure it supplies power

DEPTH RECULATOR
RlJDI)ER

T
E.All'oIc:. RUODLD

DIAC.RAMMATIC SKETCH or A TORPEDO.

capahle of travelling at a very high speed under water, and
carrying a charge of gun-cotton which explodes on strihing
an object.
The torpedo was invented by Commander Luppis, an
officer in the Austrian
avy, who sold his patent to \Vhitehead,
an English engineer engaged in the well-known naval works
in Fiume, Practically every navy throughout the world
uses the Whitehead torpedo except that of Germany. which
employs the Schwartskopf type, In France some torpedoes
are made by Creusot, and in America by the Bliss-Leavitt
Company. There is, however. very little essential difference
between the various torpedoes.
A torpedo looks very much like a steel cigar, and varies in
length from 14 feet to 19 feet and in diameter from 16 inches
to 21 inches. There are six main parts in a torpedo, and,
beginning from the nose, they are as follows: (a) the head,
(b) the chamber containing the compressed air, (c) the balance
chamber, (d) the engine room, (e) the buoyancy chamber, and
(fl the tail end.
In the nose it carries a small thin steel rod which ends
in the detonator. When the torpedo hits an object the steel
p:n is forced violently inwards and fires the detonating
rTIlxture, consisting generally of fulminate of mercury, which
in turn fires the main charge. consisting of about 200 lb. of
wet gun-cotton,
In order that this great charge is not fired accidentally
a small safety pin is provided in the nose, and until this is
withctrawn the detonator cannot operate. Other safety
appliances are also provided, such as a small safety fan, which
is spun round by the water, and must revolve a certain number
of times, representing a certain distance travelled, before the
steel rod is free to move, It is, of course, important that the
crew should see that these safety devices are removed before
firing the torpedo. and it is, of course, a very easy thmg,
especially in the excitement of an engagement. to forget to
withdraw the safety pin. In such a case the torpedo would
be quite harmless when striking an object. Thus severa]
torpedoes were found during the Russo-Japanese \Var
which had not exploded, though they had struck the
steel netting protecting battleships against torpedo attacks,
For practising torpedo firing in times of peace tl-re torpedo
is fitted with a dummy head made of thin copper and filled
with water, so that the weight is equal to that of the" war-
head," When the head is destroyC'd by striking an obstacle

to the engine. If the air were carried direct from the
reservoir to the engine the energ
stored \\ou]d be e:l.pended
in a very short time, while the speed of the engine woulct
rapictly decrease.
The balance chamber contains the mechanism for
regulating the depth under \\ater at which the torpedo is
adjusted to run. In the engine room is placed the compressed
air engine for dri\'ing the propellers. The engine is generally
of the three-cylinder type and has an indicated horse-po\\er
of about 60, In the American Bliss-Leavitt torpedo a
compressed air turbine of the Curtis type is employed.
The huo
'anc
- chamber provides the buoyancy of the
torpedo, so that when a torpedo has exploded its charge it
can come to the surface and be picked out of the water. It
also contains the gyroscope, which is an instrument for
automatically correcting the course of the torpedo for any
deflection which it may experience.
As the torpedo leaves the tube a bolt in the latter catches
a trigger on the former. and this releases a spring which
starts the gyroscope. In case the torpedo s\\en'es in the
water the position of the gyroscope relative to the torpedo
alters, thus putting into operation compressed air valves
which direct the steering r udder in such a way as to correct
the deviation, .\ torpedo, in fact, rushes through the water
along a zigzag path about two feet broad. The great
accuracy of modern torpedo firing is largely due to the intro-
duction of the gyroscope, The tail section carries the two
screw propellers and the horizontal and vertical rudders.
each worked by a small am..iliary air engine supplied with
compressed air from the main reservoir, but entirely inde-
pendent of the main engine,
The auxiliary motor controls the horizontal rudder
automatically by means of the balancing mechanism, and
thus ensures a constant depth of immersion. while the motor
working the vertical rudder is controlled by the gyroscope,
The latest type I8-inch Whitehead torpedo contains a charge
of about 200 lb. of wet gun-cotton, and maintains a speed of
43 knots for 1,000 yards, 32 knots for 3.000 yards. and 28 knots
for 4,000 yards. The 21,inch Whitehead torpedo carries a
charge of 300 lb. of gun-cotton, weighs nearly 2,000 lb., and
has an effective range of some 7.000 yards. .\ curve is given
showing the range and speed. The great increase in range
of the torpedo during the last few years is chiefly due to the
(C01Ulllued 01& þage

I:S)

295

LAND AND WATER

February 20, 19 I 5

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Passe-Partout your
WAR PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS

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If only they had Waterman's Ideals!

He
e is an extract from a soldier's letter which appeared in a London
DaIly. , It is brief, but it e.xplains why many a long-expected
letter IS delayed, or never wntten at all, or is so hurriedly written
that few personal details can be given.
"I must close 1l0IT' as
there are þlC1lty waitil1{{
for tile þen and ink."

Don't let YOUR Soldier or Sailor friend have to
.. wait his lurn .. lor pen and ink. Send him a

Watérïnan's
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hoose the" SA FETY" type, as
It cannot leak however carried.
Ideal as a Pen, and Ideal as a gift
for Soldier, Sailor, Doctor, or
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Every pen guaranteed.
10/6 and upwards for Regular
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12/6 and upwards for Safety and
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ql AVOID. SPECIOUS IMITATIONS.

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THE HOME OF THE "BLIZZARV
Being the swr}' of the Australasian Antarctic Expedition, 19II-J9I4
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" The b e lt written acc o unt o f Antarctic Ex ploration we have t#fJer read." -Morning Post.

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The Life-story oj tbe "Fatal Countess n whole trial in connection with the ",urder
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THE LONELY NIETZJ'CHE. ByFraaFõrstor
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"Int<n<ely interesting. Nietzsche is Il good biogr"pbi,"1 subject, Ilnd the long pilullges
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2Q6

February 20, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

T HE new interest which has arisen not un-
expectedly, but with great rapidity in
the present "eek is the German strategic
counter-offensive, "Which has at last been
undertaken in the eastern field. I t is
the only great interest (by land) up to this moment
(Tuesday evening) and it merits particular atten-

tion. That interest alone will fill this week the
great bulk of these notes, reserving for next week

discussion of those doubtful elements on which may
be based an estimate as to the duration of the war.
This new German counter-offensive in the East
bas various aspects, general and particular, with
'which I prODose to deal in turn.

r

. .Kovno

o n t ·
f l' ."'-' L
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1
I Approximate position of "',
.. ,s,
Gi'rman Austrian Front Sunday Feh 1 1 th 1915 '
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LAND AND WATER

February 20, 1915.

THE GENERAL MEANING OF THE
MOVEMENT.
I.
The new counter-offensive taking place as it
does upon both wings of the enemy's lines between
Roumania and the Baltic has, in general, two dis-
tinct elements of the highest moment to us in the
'Vest First it is apparent that t.he recent efforts of
the Russians, though acting with inferior numbers,
have at last drawn the newly trained men of the
enemy to the East, not only ill the regular drafts
which have been coming in for a long time past to
fill gaps, but in larger numbers, including probably
whole new formations on a grand scale. The enemy
has, therefore, decided that a violent new ('{fort in
Poland is necessary to him, and that until some
sort of more or less c-onclU3Ì\-e result is arrived at
there he must continue to direct on to that field his
remaining reserves,
Secondly, it is obvious that this gre.'!. t move-
ment has not one co-ordina.ted strategic object.
This last point is really an important one for
us to seize. It is on a par with so much that has
already appenred in this campaign that we cannot
afford to neglect it, and the lack of co-ordination
apparent in this new counter-offell5ive is perhaps
the chief adverse element to the enemy in the whole
problem-for on the north, that Ì3, upon his left
wing. he is acting with a purely strategic object,
upon his right with an object largely political.
\Ve must not misconceive the origin of this
double motive, It is not due to confusion, it is due
to necessity. In the north the political problem is
a clean one. Two great forces at the orders of two
great Governments with no serious neutral within
striking distance at all are at issue, and victory
-or defeat will be detDrmined by the action of exist-
ing armies alone. Therefore is it that the problem
the Germans are engaged in at the Baltic end of
their line is a purely strat.egic problem.
On the other hand, the problem the Au
trians
and Germans are engaged upon at the Carpathian
end of their line has become mainly a political one.
Here there is a powerful neutral-a neutral
capable of throwing into the field nearly or quite
half a million men, a neutral whose capacity for
war, though not recently tested, is believed, inso-
muoh as this capacity depends upon organisa.tion,
to be very high, and a neutral whose popular sym-
pathies are vel'y well known to be opposed to our
-enemies, That neutral is Roumania,
So long as the problem in the Carpathians re-
mained a strategic problem, so long was the
struggle a struggle for the northern passes, and
ultimately for the great transverse railway by the
use of which alone can an army in Galicia live
through the winter: so long was it secondarily a
struggle for the release of Przcmysl, but in the last
two weeks the German General Staff and their
l\ustrian Allies havo evidentJv received news
which c
n
n
es them, rightly 'or wrongly, that
Roumama IS m the act of deciding.
The whole weight of the campai:m upon the
-south, or right wing of the Austro-Ger
ans, there-

ore, has swung as though upon an axis. It is but
three weeks ago that their main effort was directed
to the maintenance of tbe Dukla, of the Lupkow
and th
Uszog, a.nd not a month ago wh.en Russian
forces III Rukovina were steadily advanc in 0' , and
in one place (Kirlibaba) had crõssed the ridO'c of
the mountains. 0

To-day the new German bodies and the neW'
German drafts, which were here helping the Aus-
trians, and in every probability a great mass of new
Austrian troops as well, are doing more than hold
as best they can the Russian strength in the Dukla,
Lupkow and the Uszog Passes, while they are
bearing heavily against the Russiãns to the South,
have forced them back well into Bukovina, have
passed the line of the Sereth River, and propose
to attack Czernovitz: the reason of this swing
being the desire or necessity of the Austro-Ger-
mans, first to produce the moral effect of impress-
ing Roumania in this neighbourhood, and secondly
to produce the local strategic effect of separating
if possible the actual Russian from the potential
Roumanian Army in the near future,
With these preliminary observations we can
examine the whole of the eastern field and the new
developments therein. And I propose to take that
examination in the following order:-
First.- To analyse the northern opera.tions:
thnt is, in brief, to consider the lines of the Niemen
and Narew.
Second.-To examine the present situation in
the Carpathians.
Thirdly.- To consider what indications we
now have of the presence and extent of the new
enemy formations in both fields, Inadequate as is
the material upon this latter point, it must Le
stated as clearly as possible, because what we shall
have to meet in the Vlest in the near future de-
pends entirely upon what the enemy is having to
spend now in the East: he only has a certain num-
ber of men to 6"0 round.

I.-THE LINE OF THE NIEMEN AND
THE NAREW.
T HREE points have been perpetually in-
.
:3ted upon in these notes as the founda-
tams to any apprehension of the War III
l' oland, These three points are:-
(a) The inferiority (which tis bound
to continue for some time to come) of our Allies in
numbers, in equipment and in amount of ammlmi-
tion in the face of their enemy's superiority in all
three,
(b) The lack of railways upon our Allies' terri-
tOrj, coupled with the necessity of a railway to the
functioning of a modern army, particularly in its
artillerv,
(c)" The all-importance of Warsaw as a bridge
and a railway nexus: its importance being such
that the Germans holding or cutting off Warsaw
destroy the offensive power of Russia west of the
Vistula and the San-that is, the offensive ro"\'..
r
of Russia against Prussian territory as a whole,
Now, in the light of these three principles, the
strategic object of the new German advance in th

north is perfectly clear, They propose to control
that one of the three main railways meeting in
"\Varsaw which runs northward and eastward-
the main international line to St. Petersburg,
With that in their hands the capture of "\Varsaw is
aohieved, Munitions cannot in great amounts,
nor the newly equipped men as they :probably
arrive in great numbers, supply the defensive of
the vital points or maintain that long line which
stretches across Poland from the mouth of the
Bzura almost due south to the Carpathians.
The natural defences lj'ing along this line of

n.

February 20, 1915.

LAXD AND
WATER

.-..- _

.
t?rc.

Gumbinneft o

,

1
ii
It

t 0
I
10 15
1, 20'1$
I 1 -

150
I

1.00 T
I J: n 3 1ish :M O l
1 eS

LAND l\ND WATER

February 20, 1915.

railway and standing before it like a sc
een! shel-
tering it from a Ger
an advance, CO
SlstS III two
rivers, the River N lemen and the RIver N arew,
In its detail it consists in the central part only of
the River Niemen (from the point (a) near Jur
urg
to the point (b) near Grodno), of the Borbr
a trIbu-
tary of the N arew; of the N arew down all ItS latter
portion until it falls into the Bug, and of the Bug
up to its junction with the Vistula at Novo
Gcorgievsk,
The weakness and the strength of /this con-
tinued line are as follows:-
Its weaknesses:
First, its great length, It is in length from
where the Niemen enters German territory to
where the Bug, after receiving the Narew, falls
into the Vistula, excluding the sinuosities of the
rivers and taking ônly the straight lines between
one defensible point and another, more than 250
miles in extent,
Secondly, it does not, as does the Rhine, for
instance, form a complete barrier, because (a) the
last seventy miles or so of the Niemen run through
German territory and both banks of this lower part
of the river have been in Germån hands continu-
ously, so that a crossing here and the turning of the
line is easily effected. (b) There is a gap between
that point, Grodno, where the Upper Niemen
turns eastward and ceases to form part of the line,
and the point where the Borbr becomes available
as a line of defence,
Thirdly, the strength of the line has been
made to depend very largely upon permanent forti-
fications, and we know from the experience of this
war that permanent fortification has not the value
which it was supposed to have. Kovno, Olita,
Grodno, Osovwiecs and the string of fortresses on
to the Vistula are so many local strongholds, the
power of resistance of whICh it is now known will
depend much more upon the number of men that
can be spared for the defence of outer temporary
works than the existing inner permanent works-=
that has been the universal rule ever since the be-
ginning of this war wherever a fortress has been
in question. Verdun is proving it to-day and so
almost certainly is Przemsyl.
Fourthly, not all these fortresses are of similar
value. The last one, Novo Georgievsk, has the
highest reputation, but many of them are of the
second class, or at least are reputed to be of no
greater strength.
The strength of the line, on the other band, is
best seen when we examine it in detail.
The Niemen where it leaves the Russian terri-
tory is about 500 yards broad and a deep, navi-
gable stream till quite half-way between Kovno
and Grodno it retains this character to the full,
and even as high as Grodno or rather in the reach
which is below that fortress it is still a formidable
obstacle,
Secondly, just as the Niemen becomes
narrower, more winding and therefore more open
to an attack, the enemy finds himself in that con-
f
sed au? difficult country which is the continua-
tIon of hIS own Masurian L!lke district. He is in
the midst of all that tangle of marsh, lake aud
forest, the central town of which is Suwalki.
Thirdly, to the south of this, again, where a
small.scale map suggests a mere gap between the
two rIval streams, the defensive line is admirably
strengthened bv nature in two ways, There

is the great. mass of forest several days'
march in length and breadth, which takes its
name from the town of Augustowo, and is con-
tinued in another great mass of forest southward,
while the
alley of the Borbr, especially below
Osowiec and before it falls into the Narew, is ex-
ceedingly difficult of passage; vast stretches of
marsh, notably the Lafi and Wizna marshes, miles
and miles broad, interrupt any passage west to
east,
:Fourthly, though topographically the weakest
part of the line, is the Lower N arew. This stream
is, below Ostrolenka, a very appreciable
obstacle, comparable in width, I believe, to the
Lower Oise, or the Thames above tidal water, and
having no natural passages. But, more important
than this is the fact that this last portion of the
line is within easy relieving distance of all the great
forces concentrated round Warsaw, and depending
upon the stores and the communications of that
principal depot of Russian Armies in Poland.
There is a good treble railway service to Ostro-
lenka and Warsaw, and nowhere more than one
day's march from the line or well within two days'
march,
Fifthly, and lastly, there should be noted
in the whole character of the line a particular topo-
graphical point which may very well prove of im-
portance in the near future, and which has an
element of strength in it against weakness due to
the fact that it can be turned in German territory,
That point is as follows:-
In the neighbourhood of the fortress of K.ovno
the course of the Niemen turns a corner, It is all
very well to command ,both banks of the river in
the neighbourhood of the Prussian frontier, but
you cannot turn the line, in spite of commanding
the right bank, until :you have fought your way
round a long detour right round Kovno. It is
strategically true to say that you must hold Kovno,
or at the least invest it before you can have really
turned the line of the Niemen. Therefore upon
Kov:no, by all deductions from the ..more obvious
necessities of the case, the German offensive must
be directed. Part of the present movement may
be regarded as a direct advance upon Kovno, for
there are forces moving along from Gumbinn<.>n,
which forces had got as far as Wilkowyszki last
Sunday, There are other forces following along
either bank of the Niemen itself, which forces had
at the same moment got about ten miles inside the
Russian border.
The going here is tolerable, There are cer-
tain local marshe3 of no great size across t.he
northern paths from Tilsit to Tauroggen, where
the northernmost German forces now are; there is
an excellent causeway, and all that countrv do'sn
to the Gumbinnen-Kovno line, a front of fifty
miles, is fairly well provided and tolerable in sur-
face, though it must be remembered that the alter-
nate frost and thaw of the season have rendered
the roads worse than usual. Alternate frost and
thaw, by the way, though more extensive this year
than usual, are not unknown in Northern Poland:
Napoleon's retreat of 1812, fot instance, a little
south of this point (which legend has transformed
into an almost Arctic operation) proceeded, as a
fact, two months earlier in the year, through
exactly the same alternation of frozen ro:tds and
thawing slush. It would have been less disastrous,
perhaps, had the frost alwavs held,

February 20, 1915.

LAND :AND WATER

both his pursuit of the Russians after Tannenberg
and their earlier operations were conducted in
this difficult belt, the answer is that which I gave
last week, that until either party had suffi.cient
numbers equipped and ready neither could extend
its line so far up to the North as the open country
beyond the lakes and the Kovno-Tilsit district.
Now, with sufficient forces for reaching north of
the lakes and near the Baltic, to link up with the
general line, obviously the enemy, as much as our
Allies, will prefer the easier going, and the attack
will hardly develop its main strength in the
Suwalki, Kovno, Osiwiec district.
. That is why we hear of the Russians holding
theIr own at Lyck. They are holding their own
at Lyck because the main German forces are not
pressing in the centre at all, but to the north and
to the south of it,
Now, when you get south of Osiwiec you are
on that string of minor fortresses Lomza, Ostro-
lenka, Roshan, Pultusk, Sierok, which all follow
the line. of the river an
repose upon the very
strong rmg of Novo GeorgIevsk. Nevertheless it is
to be presumed that a great effort will be made by
the enemy in this belt and probably a little to the
south of Ostrolenka. It is true that he bas here
no railway, but hè has fairly good roads and a
railway to the north of him, not much more than
two days' march away on the frontier, and to the
west of him at (C), (C) from four days to nothIng
according to his approach to that railway down the
river Narew, We may sum up and say that this

e,,: German offensive in the north, not unexpected
In
ts. natu
e, but somewh.at unexpectcd in its
rapIdIty, wIll presumably mclude two different
operations-the attempt to invest Kovno and the
attempt to pass the Narew south of Ostrolenka.
Of these t"Yo o
erations thc former definitely turns
the defensIve lIne; the latter alone would imme-
diately strike at the great northern line of com-
munication of which 'Varsaw is terminus; and we
must again bear in mind at this stage thåi in the
two operations Kovno, which will be quite a sepà-
rate matter on the Russian defensive side from the
holding of thc Lower Narew, is the easier task for
the enemy to undertake. But the stroke at Ostro-
lenka and south of it, should it be successful would
be the more fruitful for the enemy because it would
lead, were it successful, to the cuttinO' off of
b
Warsaw.
1Ie
while, tbe enemy is, as usual, making
everythmg he can of his advance in his reports:'
every bogged or disabled gun of the Russian re-
treat is counted, and every wounded man left
behind-while vague total numbers, obviouslyex-
aggerated, arc given us of his captures as he ad-
vances. But it is quite certain that there has as
yet been no decisive action in this field, The "hole
business has been the retreat of half-a-dozen Rus-
sian corps before, perhaps, ten or twelve German
ones, just concentrated for this new effort,

Kovno, then, is the point upon which we shall
probably find our attention fixed during the next
few days. Any turning movement round Kovno
for the investment of that fortress meets with two
obstacles, with which I shall next deal.
Upon the right bank of the River Niemen
in front of Kovno, from the point of view of
the German advance along that bank there are two
obstacles, of whiüh the one is far more serious than
the other. The first of these is the small River
Dubissa. The line of this stands at a mther less
distance from Kovno than does the Ilne of the
Bzura and the Rawka from 'tV arsaw. It is in the
twenty odd miles away at its junction with the
Niemen instead of in the thirties. It is important
to note this, because it is evident that the furnish-
ing of a defensive front being, as it is, in the nature
of the spokes of a fan, a certain amount of elbow-
room is of advantage. If you have to distribute
ammunition and food over a front, say, of thirty
miles from a point only five miles behind that front,
your extreme munitionment will be very much
more hampered than your central munitionment,
and the co-ordination of your defences will be
adversely affected. Still, twenty odd miles 'is
enough for a radius, and the Dubissa might well
be the line upon which a defensive to prevent the
investment of Kovno upon the north would stand.
. But the. Dubissa is even at its approach to the

Ie,men qUIte a small stream, and it slopes away
In Its upper reaches from the Kovno position.
Much nearer Kovno, indeed about an hour or two
outside the western suburbs of that half-Polish
town, is a far more formidable obstacle, the
Niewiasa. This stream is deeper and broader than
the former: It is
ot defendable by marsh land,
but there IS a consIderable belt of wood in strips
along either banK, a feature which, unfortunately,
cuts both ways, but, on the whole, is better for the
defence in the situation of that particular line,
bec
use the .woods screen the massing of men
behïI:d the flver better th:ln they do the massing of
me
ill front of it. The Niewiasa, then, is the line
whIch would be the obvious position were it not
so near the town
tself, The \Vilia, a very formid-
able stream, whIch enters at Kovno itself is of
, ,
course, out of the question except at some distance
from the town, for the town itself is astraddle of
the water. Indeed, Kovno has only been fortified
Le.cause it affords protection to the junction of the
Nlemen and the 'Vilia, just as Namur affords it
to the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse.
By this it is not meant that we shall see a stand
either upon the Dubissa or the Niewiasa. A line
of trenches might be held upon the right bank,
well forwaJ;d of either position,-or, again, a main
German advance from the soutlt miaht be the chief
. b
operatIOn, but so far as natural obstacles are con-
cerned, these are the only two in the neighbour-
hood of the northern German advance.
Such being the elements of Kovno and its dis-
trict.. (the point where Napoleon watched his
armIeS cross into Russia, his hands clasped behind II.-THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
his. back and he whistling "
Ialbrook.JJ It was the F these are the conditions upon the extreme
heIght of June; there was hardly darkness in J left or northern wing of the vast line, and
that high latitude, though it was but just past the 4 if these purely strategic considerations de-
midnight), let us consider next the more southern .i. termine the actions there taking place

portions of the line, what determines the corresponding action
The enemy has already experience of an upon the southern or right hand, '" here the
attempt ypon the Grodno district, where he failed Roumanian border marches with that of Russiä

o conspICuously last autumn. If it be asked why and of the Austro-Hungarian empire 1
5*

LAND AND WATER

February 20, 1915.

I have already said in the remarks prelimi-
nary to this that the political factor was here
predominant,
It will "þe seen. in the accompanying s
etch
that there IS ;uothmg to prev;ent Russian and
Roumanian forces from joining should Roum:mia
shortly go into the war, because a common f::"ûn-
tier between Russia and Roumania runs several
hundreds of miles, None the less a wedO'e str.lCk
in by and including the position of C
ernovitz
would cut the Russo-Roumanian effort in two for
it would cut the main railway which affects' all
the eastern Galicia.n a,ad Bukowina portions.
The Austro-German. advance in this region, w
lÌch
w
uld be very senous, already threatens that
raIlway. A mere gan !
or breach in the 1me thou....h
. ' 5
SerI?US, would not be fatal. But a thorough occu-
patIon by the enemy of the whole of :Bukowina
would be a very different matter. There is no
goo
_ railway system running through the western
terrItory by which the Rus3i:m army in GalÌcia,
yvestern and central, could act as one with an army
III Northern Roumania. Tile above sketch sho\v-

(çI

Q."

,,"

Q:
,..,
V)
..

-.-- .--

.....

....,. 111...

iug the railway system'on either side of the fron-
tier is sufficient to prove this. What the war's
fortunes lll:lY be here in the next few days w-e
cannot tell, but we can establish a critel'iC'n of tile
enemy's success. If he occupies Czernovitz in
force he has in this region established his object:
for that town is the axis of all the railways,
Now, what about the Northern Carpathian
Passes yvhcre the cneIL.Y originally intended to
make hIS greatest effort, but from 'which he has
been diverted to this new southern effort aO'abst
Bukowina, and which are now in part held by OGr
Ally?
The position is very confused, and it is mad3
none the easier to u!lderstand by the fragmentary
nature of the Russian and of the Austrian COill-
muniqués.
Let us first state what we positively know,
We know that the Russians are over the crest of
the Dukla, we know that they are not yet deboucl1-
ing .from t
at wide and easy valley on to the Hun-
gl1rmn plam below; they are not even yet at the
southern mouth of the pass. V.r e know
that they
were some days ago acr033 the crest of the Lup-
kow, and we have n.o nc
'\S from the enemy (as we
surely should have If thmgs were so) to the effect
that they h:1V0 lost that ad-rantage. But here agaia
we know that they have not yet advanced beyond
about half-way down the Hungarian slope, even if
t.hey hav
for so far. Our Allies do not, so far as
I C
"'l gather, hold the crest of the U sZO"'. The-'
are still fighting on the upper torrents of the 8a1{.
They. here cl,aim .cer
ain successes, but their Nry
mentwn of t
:e d13tllCt proves that they are there

lj)On the wrong side of the hills, 8
utll of tl;e
U szog they are certainly everywhere east of the
crest lmtil we get to the Bukowina" "\"h2!:'c, as we
\lw
e seen, they have fallen right back on to the
plam.
The general position is therefore to-day, or
W3.S 1.1st Sunda?, as in this sketch.

G
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Przemysl \l.(

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More than that we cannot S:lY, but what wð
mn gather both from the effort here and from the
effort hundreds of miles away in East Prussia, i3
that Ùe enemy, both Austrian and German, h
8
now begun to use very seriously the newly trair
c.l
men sent forward as drafts to replace losses, and
even the new formations with which we have so
long been threatened,
We further know that he i;:;. for Ole moment
at least, making expenditure of these last reserves
of encrgy upon the e;!.stern field, Let us turn,
t:.

February 20, 1915.

LAND í\.ND WATER

therefore, to the last point, which is a guess the Germanic Allies are badly handicapped, espe-
-it can only be a very rough one-of what he has cially in the northern field of Poland, by the state
to spend in this fashion, and of the proportions in of the roads in the general thaw that comes after
which this reserve fund of human energy has the winter.
already boon drawn upon in the hope of an imme- Put all this together and you will remark that
dia.te decision 'in Poland. Germany and Austria have it in their interest to
III.-THE ENEMY'S USE OF NEW MEN. put as many men as possible into the eastern field
just now.
U PON the two opposing sides, that of the Now, bow long does it take to train a new
Germanic Powers and that of the man, and in what way is he best used?
Allies, two contrasting elements of re- It takes about six months, and after six
serve power hav:e appeared. months JOu can use your man with fair confidence
It is that contrast which lends tbe even in -large masses, but he makes t'erzJ much the best
cIue to all the later phrases of the campaign, and rnaterial'when he is mÏ;J:ed uith existing units, and
!be development of that contrast should decide the very much the '\"\"'"orst when he has to act in large
ISsue, numbers upon his own account and under the
rI'hat contrast is as follows: - leadership of his own officers, of whom but a small
Roughly speaking, upon the Germanic side proportion can be professional. To all these con-
there is a limited known reserve of man-power for siderations add the following and concluding
which equipment was prepared in sufficient or one: (1) That Germany had everything ready
nearly sufficient amount before :Berlin forced the for training a large untrained body espe-
war upon Europe. That is the advantage :Berlin cially earmarked as a recruiting ground, (2) that
obtains by choosing her hour for fighting and by Germany and Austria have lost very heavily-
having spent over two years in making all ready much more in proportion than the Allies, (3) that
for the unexpected blow, The limitation of the every factor in the struggle besides those meIl-
human forces at the disposal of Berlin and its tioned (the factor of the imperfect blockade grow-
Allies is a necessary disadvantage, ing morc perf
ct, the factor of enormous wastage,
Roughly speaking, Russia, Britain, and, to the psychologIcal factor of a populace dependent
a much less extent, France, have a certain elastic upon self-confidence, the factor of the wastage of
reserve of man-power. cadres, the dynastic factòr, the factor of the hesi-
As to man-power France has some elasticity, tating neutrals-aU but one of them anti-German,
because (a) she did not expect to use her elder men etc.), makes it important for Berlin to impose an
nor desire to do so, (b) she refused to use men inconclusive peace as soon as possible; take all
below the military age, (c) men exempted were as these considerations together, and it can only
a rule exempted whoUy and not labelled for mili- be reasonably concluded that the Germanic
tary but non-combatant office (for the most part), Allies have put into the field as many new men as
(
) she has a certain recruiting field in her colo- they can have found in equipment (for the six
meso months have passed), that they have drafted most
Britain had a difficulty, but a much greater of these in as new material to feed the existing,
elasticity. Her difficulty was that her new recruits but heavily depleted units, that they have equip-
required lengthy training, ment ready for such, and have therefore been able
The difficulty of Russia lav wholly in the to put them forward the moment they thought
ta:rdiness of equipment. She had a large trained them sufficiently trained, arid, lastly, that they will
reserve of men; young men and very apt. be very chary of using wholly new formations; in
It must be remembered that the Germans, other words, tbat they have already very seriously
having control of the Baltic, and having drawn upon tbe actual human materiaL available.
through their Turkish alliance control of the Dar- This new German and Austrian offensive in
danelles, blockade Russia absolutely, save upon the eastern field, of which the present week has
those ports, Archangel and Vladivostok, which seen so striking a development, is, it may be
are ice-bound at the critical period. The German reasonably conjectured, the first considerable
Government is neither afraid of neutrals, nor too effect of the new levies. It will be of the greatest
careful of financiers-who, for that matter, are importance to one's judgment of the campaign to
still laying their money all over the world on its see how thOEe levies comport themselve
, and in
success. The German Government prevents any- what numbers they would- seem to have appeared.
thing from getting into Russia that it can prevent, The first of these elements lies in the future.
This tardiness in equipment is the great han- The second is susceptible of a rough-but only a.
dicap on the allied side. But it is a handicap
ery rough-speculation.
which every day tends to remove, Therefore, the \Vc know that upon tbe West the enemys
Germanic Powers are, more than ever, fighting numbers ha"\"'e bBen maintained: had they not been
against time. maintained a line of 400 miles, with quite 5,000
Next, note that when the numerical prepon- men a mile, could not bave been beld. We are as
derance passes to the Allies, that moment will cor- certain as ('alculations can make it that the German
respond more or less with the coming of better losses, allowing for the slightly wounded already

eather, which will permit of a vigorous offensi"\"'e returned, or about to return, give us quite a
III the West, before it permits of a vigorous offen- million and a-qu
rter men of absolute loss
sive in the East, and remember that this vigorous and probably much more (the Germ
n Army
offensive in the West will, unless Germany gets a alone is here considered, b{'cause as the questio:!1
decision in the East, be begun by the people who is one of proportion. its sole e
ample will suffice).
have the initiative, who, in the West, are thp. Now, we are eQtwllv certain tbat numbers have
Franco-British forces. Next note that 'unless a been m:ìintain{'d in 'the East :mrl even increased
decision in the E
t
reached before the spring before this offensive movement was begun. We
7*

LAND ÄND W ATEB

Februáry 20, 1915.

mày then safely say that a million and a-half new
men and probably more have been drafted in in
one way and another up to the present moment.
But, though there is a very active newspaper dis-
cussion still raging upon the point, evidence h

been given in these columns to show that the avad-
able reserve of men (not boys) in Germany's hands
would not be very largely over two million: two
million and a-half is certainly an excessive figure.
Well, then, it would seem that by whittling
down every item so as to weight the balance against
false expectations, we ma.y justly say that the Ger-
man Empire-and presumably the Austro-Hun-
garian also-had used and brought up something
like half of their available reserves in ma.n-power
before this new counter-offensive was attempted.
ífhat counter-offensive is proving serious
numerically and still has great" weight of men be-
hind it after more than a week of effort. The Rus-
sian retreat has been rapid, and it has been pro-
voked, without a doubt, by the discovery of very
great bodies of men newly appeared in East Prus-
sia, The same is true hi a minor degree of the
:Austro-German success and of the corresponding
Russian retirement in Bukowina, It follows that
to the very heavy drafts of new men demanded by Everything of interest this week has concen-
the enemy's army before tbe recent movement, and trated upon this new development in Poland. In
amounting to probably more than one-half of their the West the stagnation has been almost deeper
total margin, there' have recently been added even than in the week before, The wooded height
further large new forces, and the conclusion would (not quite 3,OOOft. above the plain), which the light
seem to be that the enemy is now not far from Alpine troops carried in the V oages five days ago.
having put into operation in one way and another affords no more than an incident. The loss of a
the greater part of his available reserve in men. French trench in the wood before Souain:was up
m
He may have a third of that reserve
till un- the same scale, The wood fighting of the Argonne
equipped, or for some other reason not yet usable has had so little effect that if you trace it on the
in the field; be may have a trifle more. He has not map you find no more than a few pace3 won and
got a full half, And he is being compelled to use lost not in the decisive direction-which is nortÌ1-
the flower of this new and last material in the East west and south-east-(for the Germans are trying
because our Russian Ally, with all their heavy diffi- to close the buckle and the French to keep it open),
culties of equipment and their serious lack of com- but at right angles to that direction: the recent
munication and in spite of a strict blockade (which and unimportant conflicts of the Argonne have
he must wonder that the enemy does not also suffer I) þeen waged in the heart of the forest, not on its
in spite of stiIl inferior numbers, and in spite of Verdun edge-and their front has faced away
that lack of railway facility which is the life of a from Verdun, The only other movement worth
:winter campaign in such a climate, has managed recording has been the attempt of the Germans to
to keep the eastern field unceasingly actrve and an shell the Allies out of their new trenches upon the
increasing menace fo our opponents. 'We shall big sandhill east of Nieuport, and their failure
have discoverea. before this campaign is over that hitherto to recover what they lost here a fortnight
we bave owed very much to the invincible tenacity ago.
of the Russian soldier. On the Servian frontier things sGem to be at a
The full consideration of these numbers, of standstill. There is no news from the Caucasus
the new formations and new drafts on the enemy's nor (at the moment of writing) any rl"newed at-
side, I will reserve for discussion next week upon tempt upon the Suez Canal.
KOTE.- Thla Article hat been .abmltted h the Pre.. Bareaa, which dOel not object to the p:1blicaUon I. cen.orell and take. no
re.ponslblUty for the correctae.. of the atatemenh.
I. aecordaace with tile requlremenh of the Pre.. Bareaa, the Jlotltlon. of troop. oa Plaa. IlIn.tratln
thla ArUcl. mast onll be
rerardcd a. approJ:lmate, Ilid n. deflaite .trenrth at any point It Indicated,

the elements we have fore-calculated, the duration
of the war. It is enough for the moment to sum
up and to say that the enemy has already called
up more than half of his margin of men, that he
has been compelled to put his latest and large addi-
tion into the eastern field, that he is tbere expect-
ing an immediate decision, and that if he fails t.o
obtain it he 'lvill be unable to fm'ce a mere defen-
sive upon the East such as lte ILas established on
tILe }Vest, and 'will therefo're be unable eitha to
withdraw large f01'ceS from the East to the TT"e1t
or to raise new men in drafts or new formations in
any considerable number,
But if he does arrive at a:; decision in the East,
then he has still a large margin of men-probablr
equipped and ready-to come upon us with tho
better weather, and to try and break the cord
which !till binds him in the 'Vest, He must act
quickly and while still the Polish weatnerñampers
him, because his time in the West is drawæg sborj;
and about the coming of the nightingales it may be
too late,

THE

FRONTS.

REMAINING

WAR BY
By FRED
CHANNEL.

THE

NORTH SEA AND
Hostile Submarine Bases.
t F Von Tirpitz has so far failed to create any particular
effect on our mercbant sbipping with his submarine
commerce warfare, be has certainly managed to attract
attention and arouse widespread interest in the ques-
tion of how tbe German submarines mana"'e to act and
, k . f 0
eep gomg so ar away from tbeir bome ports. It
il impoasiblo to reply individually to the scores of readers
'!l*

T.

WATER.
JANE.

who have sent in information or theorics on this question.
60 I am bere dealing with the matter in a general way.
noughl)", the-correspondcnce on this subjcct resolves itself
under two main heads: (1) Signalling and shore bases; (2)
independent sea suppl.\-,
As regards the first of these, the usual theory is th:lt
stores exist at various places in these islands-not neeessarily
on the ooas
-and tbat tbey are taken out in small neutral
coasting steamers, times and placcs being signalled from tho
.hore. No doubt something of this 60rt has happened in the

!February 20, 1915.

LAND 'AND WATER

past, . a
d to 60rne extent may c:ontinue to happen; 68, despite
a.ll vlg,llan
e, th
re are plenty of lonely places from which
signallmg IS J?Osslbl
. On the oth.er ha?d, a gooa many re-
port
about (il
nalhn,
have! o
lDveshgation, proved sus-
ceptIble of a simple explanatIon "-though here perhaps
the culprit would be particularly careful to arranCJ'
for that i
'1'he second group of theorip.\! is along the li
e that the
Germans, foreseeing the pOBsibility of land stores beina un-
earthed, have arranged a seoond strin'" to their bow i
the
sllape .of stores s
nk at certain easily-Ioc
ted shallow spots, and
!o thel
subm
rl1les are
na.bled .to keep the sea for prllctically
mdefimte penods--:-the hmlt bemg running out of torpedoes.
There are no Inheren
difficulties in the wav of obtaining
such, submeróe
sto
es. They are sure to be provided with
apphanoes which will make grapnel fishing for them quite
eas,}', and once they are brought to the surface their trans-
ference to t?e submarine at night is a most simple proposition.
Mr. Simon Lake, U.::;.A., inventor of the Lake su1J-
ma
'ine, hM, however, been amplifying this matter to an extent
which-though no doubt useful to Mr. Lake as an advertise-
ment-has discouraged a number of people in this country
to a totally unnecessary extent.
One special feature of the Lake submarine is that it has
two submerged trap doora in it's bottom. Throu"'h these doon
mi
les can be laid, or a diver explore the botto
of the ocean
qUite. as tho
ou.ghly as many a year ago Captain Nemo, of the
Nautilus, did In the pages of Jules Verne.
So far, so good. But Mr. Lake (or his interviewers for
him) has made the further statement that the German sub-
marines have adopted all his submarine trap-door devices.
So far as I
an ascertain, they have never had the prescience
to do anythIng of the sort. Photographs of the sections of
the htes
type of German submarine (presented by the Kåiser
to a Cerman museum) give no indication whatever of any
such.
seful door. In any case, it is unnecessary for tl10
obtaInmg of underwater supplies. For that matter the Lake
device, if I remember rightly, was originally adve'rtised for
the quite unm
litar! object.
f reoovering t'reasure from by-
gone wrecks. To give a mlhtant touch later on the obvious
alternative of mine-bying was substituted. But, so far as the
J)
urin
of previously laid under-water supplies is concerned,
SU'Jmanne trap-doors do not affect the question.
The Great Air Raid.
On February 12 a force of thirty-four Britisll naval
a
roplanes attacked Ostend, Zeeùrugge, and dist.1"Îct with a
,new to destroying c:ommunications and the German naval
base at ZeeLrugge. Ostend railway station was more or less
destroyed, and miwhief inflicted on the railway in BCveral
l'bce.s, It was, of course, impossible to ascertain the exact
damJge inflicted, and it is important to note the official state-
ment that " no submarines were seen."
.Probably directly the aeroplanes were sighted any sub-
manncs at: Zeebruóge promptly went below
nd remained
thera till danger was past-their most scnsitHo course, It does
not follow, however, that the German submarine service sus-

ined no damage. We may reasonably assume that there was
II. submarine or two Leing put together, or, if not that, at
any rate, plant for tho purpose which must have been con-
liderably d3maged.
While it is wise not to exaggerate tIle importance of the
raid. there are several l)(.ìnla in connection with it Vrhich
call for attention.
Of the
e, tho chief seems to be the complete impotence of

he l,and fire. Seeing the large number of m
chines engaged
It might havo been expected that what missed one would have
hit another on the principle of " 1Ìrinrr into the brown." Also
a fair number of aeroplanes have be;n Lrought down during
the war by shell and rifle fire, and what haa happened before
might we!l have been expected to happen ogain.
Ono mference is that the defenders were flurried with the
numbers of the attack, and 8<> fired on no regular ßystem:
but aa the force probably divided and attacked several spotB
8imultaneously, this is a questionable hypothesis.
So we cannot make much out of thia point, saving that
obvioua enti-aerial gunnery is proved to be a very exact
8cience indeed, needing a great deal of training and probably
II. good deal of natural aptitude as well. The ordinary" man
behind the gWl" seems more or less completely harmless
eg:1Ïnst aeroplanes. "
No doubt this will be remedied in time, but the selection
of suitable men end the necessary training is unlikely to Le
accomplished very quickly.
The lesson of most importance, however, is that the
seropl:me is the correct reply to the aeroplane. The German
offensive-defensive in this direction seems to have been ex-
tremely feeble or else non-exisient altogether. It is this cir-
c:umstance which robs the Ostend and district raid of ita
importance as a ...,aide and lesson, and makes "Great Air
YicLDrr" sound ultra-Yellow Press.

Of far more real importance probably was thE' foil
rl

rman attack on Dunkirk( which has been chronicled merely
in short paragraphs. Here tlie Germans retired on findin:'
Allied aeroplanes prepared to fight "hem in the air. Thei;
position was roughly "Everything to lose and nothin rr to
gain." b
One swallow does not make a summer but herein may
1i
the g
immerings of a new law which will ;ventually sharply
dIfferentIate between war in the air and war as we know it
on land and water.
On the ordinl}ry elements of the past it has been abund-
antly proved that victory is almost bound to go to the attack,
because it. is able to select its own time and place. At first
glancE' this øeema even more true of the air. We do not
immediately recognise that the circle has perhapa been over-
shot, that the attack ia hampered by having two objectives:
(1) Destruction of something on land; (2) Destruction of de-
fending aircraft which intervene. The defence, on the other
hand, has only the Bingle objective of destroying the enemy.
Hence as time goes on we may expect to see aerial war"fare
become more and more puzzling and intricate, and not im-
possibly a diminution in the number of air raids as
" counters" come to be more and more studied.

his, at any rate, seems to be the outstanding lesson of
DunkIrk! and, unless I am greatly mistaken, we may expect
at no distant date to see aerial warfare resolve itself into
something an
logous to modern che.ss as played by the best
masters, or fencing as displayed by its leading exponents.
The surprise attacks of to-day will, in the fm:ure come

o be regarded as inexpressibly crude amateur effortB,' bear-
mg about as much resemblance to what will bo evolved a

the naval warfare of the early Plantagenet days Leal's to t1..:
naval warfare of to-day.
This, perh
ps, is the best illustration of any, for I}nyone
who has read history eV
D in the most cursery way. In thost'
old da.ys the French ships would casually sack an English
town, and tLe English ships as casually sink a French one,
Only very gradually was it discovered that the ship must
fight th
6hip for any military asset to be secured, Takin

the .stupld bombardment of Scarborough, the Hartlepools, and
Whitby into account, it would look as though Germany has
not yet succeeded in arriving at a true military p<::rspcctive,

f tbe .turns out to be equally obtuse as regards the air, ßho
IS aslnng for trouble as surely as Pers:J.no asked for it at
Liss:J. nearly fifty years ago.
. Air power is governed by exactly the same immutable laws
as IS sea power, only a good deal more 8<>. By evadin'" our
aerial defence it is perfecfly possible for German ai
craft
to do quite a lot of damage to London or other places. By
further evasion it is possible for them to return in safety.
The risks, however, are great, and while the mastery of the
air is in dispute, any such action is foUy from the militarv
standpoint. "
The Power which secures the mastery of the air will be
in exactly the same position as that which secures the mastery
of the seas-that: is to say, aWe to bombard and destroy with-
ou
let or hindrance. But the idea. that the -air admits or
substantial re.sulta from surpriscs and evasions ia entireh-
incorrect. It is pleasing to record that the fact that ,,"e
employed thirty-four aeroplanes to do to O"tend what could
Ilave Leen done by half-a-dozen or so proves that we at least
have recognised the cardinal fact which governs aerial warfare,
The obvious inference is that we were out for a fight and
that the Germans declined action. If it means an) thin<Y at
all it means that we have learned the lesson of ilie Plantarr
ner
Navies better than they. "'hioh is all so much to the go;d.

Gr
hame-White tumbled into the water; Samson will prob-
ably emulate him soon. After that we shall have no more
qir-dcities, and the real business of aerial war will begin,
It will be a war in which there is no place whatever for
" heroes" -to Le brutally truthful a war in which the buIl
of
those engaged hope that every" hero" will die an early death,
I know the Naval Air Service pretty well. It is not
afraid of anything that Germany can put up against it. nu

it ia in deadly terror of adulation from the ßensational Press.
The only thing the Naval Air Servioo all_ a whole desires is
that whatever it achieves or docs not achieve should be put
down to the N'iVaI Air Service as a whole. In a general way
their motto may be summed up as: -" Do your job, but be
careful to keep out of the limelight."
There is no one who hates the sensational Prcss quite so
much as the successful "air bug JJ or the successful "sub-
marine crab. JJ By the time the eulogies on him are finished
he feds a veritable worm, and even his beat friends regard
lLÎm in a somewhat similar light. It may 8<>und strange: but
I know of more than one flying man who haa funked thingll
for fear of being suspected of seeking big headlines in the
daily Press.

g.

LAND AND WATER.

The Blockade Threat.
By Ule Wne t.hðle lwu are in pl'wt.. t.he momentous
18th
'ebrua.rl will have come &nd gone. Whether i" will
be difierent from the 18th January or the 18th December I'e-
mains to be 1Ið6D. Personally, I am inclined to think it
will turn out to be a crude, attempt to induce Admiral
Jellicoe to alter his dispositions-hardly a promising scheme.
In any caae, &nd supposing the scheme of piracy to be em-
þ!l.l'ked on ill . la.rger measure than heretofore, the Germans
will diicover t.ha.t. all Mr, Churchill hinted in Lis øpevch in
toLe House of Commons, the resources of the fuitish Navy
...e by no means exhausted. The po$sibility of all German
l(w auppliea being cut off &Ii a retaliatory measure may
lL..ke von Tirpiu hesitate aa to the perfection of his .scheme.
Also, quite apart. from what. the Navy lIlay be doillg,
t.be .spirii of Ule British Mercantile Marine is, as '.....e have tiOOn
Íl1 the case of Captain Propert of the Laerú8, hardly of a
lòa.ture to submit to the latest form of "Kultur,"
Furthermore, if von Tirpitz has studied the psychology
of our Firat &0. Lord, he must be well aware that Lord
Fieher's .. Ruthless, Remorseless, Relentless," was and is
fr.r more than a mere alliterative phra.se.
A cleverly reasoned article in the ])aily Mail tbis week
.uggested that. Germany'" best move is to compel the U..S.A.
io make war on her, as that would gÎye her the opportunity
of offering peace while power remains to her, on the grQund.
that Bhe could Dot fight all the rest of the world. and that.
any refusal of the Allies to make peace, which would eDfloble
GClm
ny to prepare for a further struggle, would put
Amencan sympathy on the side of Germany. This may
eJl:plain the "blockade."
Meanwhile, however, se.era! neutrals a.re painting their
nationalities in ,large letters on the sides of their ships, and
aU no doubt will eventually adopt this form of protection.
This will render more or less inoperative any use of the
Leutral flag by us-and there would be difficulties in the
li'&Y of a.dopting the neutrals' protective S)'6tcm,
The psychological moment will .come if and when the
pirates sink without warning a British liner on boud of
..h.ich are American passengers.
It is somctime3 said that the ratio of "real Americans"

the. entir
population of the United States is small, espe-
cially In votmg power, and that immigrants of non-American
ideals
in the majority, Personally, I doubt this, except
perhaps In the ca.se of German-Americans. Otherwise after
a few years' residence, a high proportion of immigT
ts are
apt to become more American than the Americans. And
no real American is going to stand by unmoved and
his
fellcw-countrymen left to drown because Borne German has
& notion about "frightfulness." Nor, if the American
u,:tion be. dragge
into the conflict, does It seem likely it
wIIllove Its enemIes to the extent; of enabling them to repeat.
the performance on a more auspicious occasion.

F
bruary 20, 1915.

tatement
s to the loss. of three cr
isers and one dest:royer
In the actlOu 011 the Bight of Hebgoland is quite corroo&.
There was so much fog about th
t it wu impomble for UI
to ascertain the end B",J'ength of the Germans. 1:Þe four-
f
nnelled crui
er was
robably the Rocm or To res. Very
lIkely &he receIved a hIt and hauled out of action. It haa
fUJ.tber to be remembered that a ship can e3.8Ìly get a funnel
gr t\\O knocked out of her in action, aud 10 subsequently be
presumed to be another VCll6el.
D, G.. (W:'1.les),-Yo
r
heory. about.. small coastine
.teamer bClng In commUDlcatlon with the German submarinel
is by no means improbable. As to the "well-dressed

tran](:rs .. in your
istrict, I would say that your beat couriß
IS to plCf( a few prIvate quarreIa with them and learn Vihat
language they use \
llen They are excited.
T. W. (}Ianchester).-'l'he lost German destroyer to which
yo
refer is, of course, 590. The other matter I am referring
to In the text, though, as nothing has appeared ab()ut it i

the Prcss, it may come under the ban of the Censor.
W. Y. (Athlone).-The idea of bullets containing ph<>&-
phoruQ or something similar in the base being fired at
Zeppelins is all right in theory, but, in practice, suffers from
t:b.e fact that hydrogen is not an explosive unless mÏJ,;eù with
air, Given enough Quch bullets ripping up one part.icular
bag, it is possible that an explosion might QC<:ur, bu
I doubt
if it is in the probabilities.
A. H. A. (Glasgow).-I have forwarded your information
to the proper quarter.
R. D, B. (Dorset) and H. W. R. (York).-Something
similar to what you Imggest is already in existence.
L. F. S. (London),-I do not think that there is anything
that our Navy does not know in the matter of locating minejj
and sweeping for them. The device to which you refer is 60mo-
what similar to that employed by Farragut's monitors in
the American Civil War. It was effecÜve so long as it was
merely 8 question of the bow of the ship hitting the mine.
In the Russo-Japanese 'Var it did more harm than good, as
this war saw the introduction of blockade mines-a couple
of mines fa6tened together in suoh a fashion that on the
connecting cable being touched one mine would be brought
up against one side of the s1íìp and the other to the other.
W. AlcC. (Cornwall),-I have forwarded Jour letter to
the proper quarter, The story you 1.
1l me is interesting, but
you can trust the Navy to be very much on the look-out in
the district you mention.
L. L. S. n. (Leighton ßuzzard).-Tbe speed of 26.4 knots
assigned to the Blücher M best speed in .. fighting ships",
merely indicated the maximum 1:0 which she reached for a
minute or two; the 25.8 was her best on the measured mile.
None of these fancy speeds go for much.
You have more or less caught me tripping about tho
Y orck. She ran on to German mines after the first attempted
East Coas
raid. The four-funnelled cruiser" was either the
Boon or Yorck," but the Torde having been previously dili-
GENERAL MATTERS. posed of, it was, of course, tbe Roan, or one of tbe new four-
G. P. (Odord).-As the Germans have officialIy stated Cunnelled light cruisers still left in existence.
tL,Ü their fleet -took the offensive in the NOl.th Sell. acfion it C. (St. Leonards).-See answer to the above.
certainly looka on the faw of it as though their offi
ial n. M. (Hendon).-It is possible that the Brunton fJcheme
announcement that three Britil!h destroyers were sunk waS:l åbout which a letter appeared in the correspondence columns
" del
berate lie.': Personally, however, I am still of opinion last week, may have points about it, but I am afra.id th8.t
that It was more proBably an honest misconception on their would not apply to your proposed improvements. Apart
pa
t. They saw one ?f cur destroyers hit, anù tbe speed at from other questions the difficulties of fitting would be very
which they were runnIng away, coupled with the smoke, etc" great. With reference to your two questions, any reply
would cause that destroyer to disappear almcFt instantlv and would 1:,e cen.sored. Your theory of detecting periscopes by
jf a couple of boats slowed down to stand bv tLey'
ould means of a masthead observation using a suitable colour

s? s
m to have dis
ppeared and would be pr;s
mably sunk. scrlen is decidedly interesting, and has the advantage of pro-

hls
s an und
a
atIc explanation, but, in all naval hi'!;tory, cceding along a known bn.sis. At any rate. it. would be
I beheve that It 18 only the Turks and Chinese who have wOFth trying.
deliberately circulated false official stories of SUCCCl!SeB. The J. T. S. (Ba1lyhooly).-(l) All the text-books give the
reasons for not doing so are not a love of the truth hut a monitors engaged ofi Zeebrugge as carrying two 6in. gUM
wnsiderlltion of the effect on moral should the lie be dis- forward and two 4.7 howitzers aft. The draught is given
cHcred in the countrv of the liars ' llS 8
feet. (2) The amount of ammunition carried in 6uper-
At first sight this Beems disco
nted by the German Bt
te- Dreadnoughts is ample for all neeùs, but it is not a.dvisable
ment tbat they" took the oflensive," but that, after all i8 to 6tate the exact amount. It may console you, however
only our old friend's "strategic movement to the rear" .
nd to know that it is more than you estimate.
r liuppoae that Hippt'r hRS long since e:xplained to Von Tirpitz F. C. H. (Liverpool),-Certainly if a merchant ship
that. II oflensive JJ meant endeavouring fo draw ßeatty into sighted a submarine, made for her and let go an a.nchor at
· mille field. "What we would like to believe and what we the same time, and the submarine, submerged, were hit by
have to believe are not always one and tile se.me thing-. the anchor, 60mething would undoubtedly happen. But as
. W. B. J. M. (Kensington), H. R. (He.mpstead), E. T. the submarine would be moving under water in the process
(LIverpool), G. H, (Bournemouth), and others.-You will note of diving, the chances of success do not seem very great.
that I have dealt wiLL the submarine matters to which :r ou W. H. B. (Headingley).-Experiments for the detection
refer in the text this week. of periscopes are extremely interesting. I followed the
P. J. B. (
ndon, W.).-I am afraid that I cannot add any rough examples with much interest, ßnd would advise you,
further conjectures as to why Hipper did not return to òirectIy you have made a rough working model, to submit
attack the Lion and Tigcr. On page 15 of the issue of it to the Admiralty without delay.
February 6 you wiU find tb:'Jt tbe attempt to draw across a E. J. P. (Lowestoft).-Many thanks for your kind appre-
mine field theory is the probable explanation. ciation.
. Ã. G. C. (Barnt Green).-I have not read the pamphlet to (A large number ()f replies is unavoidably held over'
"hlch you .refer, but you may take it that the Genr.an official until next week.)
10.

February 20, 1915.

LAND AND WATER

THE FUTILITY OF AIR RAIDS-
THE EFFICIENCY OF AIR A TT ACKS.
SOME POINTS IN AERIAL TACTICS AND STRATEGY.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

N the mind of the public there exists a great misconcep-
tion about the mcaning and the scope of an aerial
offensive, and the plucky raid of Friaay, the 12th
inst., which was carried out "ith great skill and
valour by our airmen over the districts of Bruges,
Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend, has probably
increased that misconception instead of clearing it up. This
misapprehension, which appears to be shared by a great num-
ber of military critics, is due to the fact that there has been,
up to the present, a general failure to distinguÏE;h between an
aerial attack and an aerial raid. It is, of course, no easy
matter to draw a sharp distinction between an attack and a
raid, so far as the new weapon of war is concerned. The
attack ana the raid are both offensive actions, which depend
not only upon the aerial force taking part in them, but also
on the relation which those offensive actions will bear to the
carrying out of a pre-arranged plan of operations. In his last
article the writer endeavoured to prove two propositions:
firstly, that so far as trench warfare is concerned, aerial raids
can only lead to local and tcmporary embarrae.sments, and can
have no important infiuence either on the character or the
duration of that kind of wad are; and, Beconàly, that, in
order to ensure the success of an aerial offensive at any place,
the various vital points must be subjected to a simultaneous
attack, and not simply raided, Additional confirmation of
this reasoning has been acquired, once more, by the exploit
of the 12th. That raid also affords us evidence that those two
conclusions as regards trench warfare can be extended and
made to apply to other kinds of warfare as well. In fact, the
announcement issueà by the Admiralty opens as follows:-
During the last twenty-four Lours, combined aero-
plane and seaplane opel'ations have been carried out by
the Naval Wing in the Brug"es, Zeebrugge, Blankcn-
berghe, and O"tend districts, with a view to preventing the
development of sllbmarine bases and establishments.
Here we haçe the object of the raid clearly set out. It
was" with a view to preventing the development of submarine
bases and establishmentiil JJ that the raid was undertaken. Let
us now see how far that object was achieved. The Secretary
of the Admiralty's announcement gives the resalt of the raid
in the fOllO\\ ing terms:-
Great damage is reported to have been done to Ostend
Railway Station, which, according to present information,
has probably been burnt to the ground; the railway
station at l31anb.enberghe was damaged and railway lines
were torn up in many places. Bombs were dropped on gun
p08itions at Middlekerke, also on the power station and
German mine-sweeping vessels at Zeebrugge, but.the dam-
ag,e done is unL.nown. .. . No 6ubmanncs were
seen.
Whether these results prove that the special object of the
raid has been, or has not been, accomplished, the writer would
not like to sav in an article meant for publication. But there
is one concl
sion which can, with certaintv, be drawn from
the Admiralty report, and which cannot bé controverted. It
is that whatever Ulay be the real amount of damage done by the
raid, such damage can only c9.use local and temporary embar-
rassments, which may delay, but will not prevent for ever, the
development of th08e submarine bases and establishments.
'rhe Admiralty further states:-
Thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took
part.
Here we have the reason why Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe,
and 08tend are 8till a.vailable for the German!! to use a8 8ub-
marine balles. If. these places had been aerially attacked in-
stead of aerially raided, and if these attacks "ere constant and
continuous. the German bases on the Korth Sea would be gone
for ever. 'In his last article the writer has erplained the
meaninO' of the II n-square law, JJ which establishes the fact
that th: figMing strength of any force t.aries QI tile square of
itl numerical stnngtll. He now proposes to bring forward
some other arguments which still fm.ther prove the value .of
an aerial offensive on a comprehensive Bcale, and the necessIty
for a larg-e number of aircraft.
In Diagram I, ABC D represent a vertical pbne con-
taining the line of flight M N of an aeroplane, and B E H C
the horizontal plane, or ground. If there is no wind-nn
atmospheric condition which hardly e"\"cr occurs--or if the
:wind, either 110 head one or a following one, is exactly in the

A LINE e' Ttlr.H'f
1.1,.. t-t- ,
.
"
ve.,.t i c.a.1' \
.. . 1'l Q n e \
o

/',r

__
--7

...

It'
...

E

:DJAC. R..ANI'

line of flight M N of the aeroplane, a bomb, dropped flom
the aeroplane at the point A, will follow a course which lic?lI
entirely in the vertical plane and will strike the ground at.
some point 0 lying in that plane. If, however, "hell L

bomb was dropped there was a wind blowing in some cro.'
direction W, the bomb would be driven by the "ind out of
the vertical plane, and strike the ground at some point 0 I out-
side the vertical plane. In the same manner, if the wind blew
in some direction W', the bomb woufd strike the ground on
the other side of the vertical plane ABC D. Now, since
at different altitudes, the wind may blow in different direc-
tion, it follows that a bomb, dropped from an aeroplane,
flying at a great height, may be swa,red one way and then
another, and that that process may be repeated several timcs
before the bomb actually strikel the ground. Several methodi!
have been devised to 8teady the bomb in its downward COUr6J,
and a number of inventions have been made with the object of
reducing the influence of the wind on the bomb to a minimll'rr.
The fact, however, remains that the influence of the wind 0.1
bomb-dropping cannot yet be ignored.
The factor introduced by the wind, which can be easilv
corrected by artillerymen on the earth, where the speed an.t
direction of the wind can be easily estimated, leads, in the case
of :!.ircraft, to a difficulty arising from the fact that the force
and direction of the wind cannot be easily gauged by th

airman who createl his own 8peed relatively to the air. The
conclusion to be drawn from the preceding remarlts is that, in
tbe present stage of development of aerial ballistics, bomb,
dropped from aircraft, at a greal altitude, may fall either fo
the right or to the left of the vertical plane containin{J t!.

machine, and that, therefore, to ensure tIle efficiency of a1l
aerial attack bomb. should be dropped from aeroplane. not
only in the t.ertical plane containing the target, but also in
other verticnl plane. to the right and to the left of thai
targøt.

- - .. - - - - -- .. - -

.--..-

-. - ,
}-H-
_ _ _ _ -""'7."-t
- - .. - - - - .
-

?__._.._.

- - - .

'Dj"
1'\AM 1t

11*

LAND AND WATER

February 20, 1915.

"D , .. 0 '" #It.... x:rr .

From this concJusion we can deduce a formation suit..
able for an offensive aerial fleet which is indicated in Diagram
2, where .A denotes the leader of an aerial aquadron of nine
aeroplanes. In thia arrangement the leading machine ßiea
over the vertical plane containing the target, and there are
on each side of that plane four machines. If the bomb.
dropped from the machines on the right of the leader are
blown by the wind away from the target, those dropped [rom
the machinC8 on the left of the leader will be blown towards
the target.
The Bame arrangement for a larger number of aeroplanes
can be made as indicated in Diagram 3, where each dot re-
presents a machine, and an examination of that diagram will
make evident the importance of the number of the aircraft
necessary to effect an aerial offensive of real value.

COMING SIEGE OPERATIONS
THE INSTRUMENTS TO BE
EMPLOYED THEREIN.

THE
AND

COMPARISON

WITH

SEBASTOPOL.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).

T HE resemblance betwcen the present war of trenches
and the old siege warfare grows daily closer, and
from all my friends at the front I hear indications
of changes towards the more wholesome methoda of
former days. Sapping and mining are going
st
ong, and every day we hear of mines exploded,
crater
occupied, and succes6fully maintained, against the
enemy a counter attaclts.
. It ia this succcssful tenure of the ground won that empha-
slses the advantages we are accumulating, for the holes blown
out by mines are mere death-traps for the troops that rush
them, unless and until their artillery has secured a consider-
able ascendancy over the enemy's guns and infantry. What
happena now is something like this. Before our mines are
e.,ploded, our gunners have located and ranged upon every
German gun position in their section; then, as soon as the
mine is fired, and the crater rushed, everyone of our guns
turns on the enemy, and covers their batteriea with "howers
of shell, thus rendering it impossible for them to interfere with
?ur men.in the mine crater whilst they are engaged in convert-
mg the side towards the enemy into a fire position, and helping
thcm to scatter his columns aa soon aa they break cover for
the counter-stroke that inevitably follows every mine explo-
sion, whoever makes it.
We did exactly the same thing in the Crimea, and so did
the Confederates in the siege of Petersburg, and the lines cover-
ing Richmond.
Some day it may occur to the man on the spot that driving
mine galleries at the rate of one foot an hour in order to create
a moderate sized crater once a week is a very slow and tedious
method of progression when one's howitzer shells will produce
as many craters, big enough for the purpose, and, moreover,
grouped with Bufficient accuracy, wherevcr and whenever you
please. Then we shall adopt a far more rlipiù and secure
method of progression than any we have hitherto tried. The
idea ia in the air; I have watched it coming for a long time,
and one day we shall wake to find its universal applicatìon.
Meanwhile we are also beginning to find out that trenches,
in tIlemselves, arc nothing; it is only the men inside them that
render them unassailable; and as week by week the quality of
our adversaries deteriorates, our operations will crystallise out
into a more co-ordinated form, and we shall begin to apply in
. more drastic manner the resources we possess for localising
the defenders in each separate sector of the front, and apply-
ing to them in a modified form, but equally effectively, the
mcthoda of isolation from suppliea and reinforcements which
bave always in the long run undermined the soul of the defence
with the greatest certainty. Men may get accustomed to shell
fire, and grenades, etc.; they never become acclimatised to
bunger and cold.
Our chief support in this coming phase of the campaign
will be our airmen, and the manner of their operation is
clearly foreshadowed by the raid on the Belgian coast last
Jieek.
What happened there, locally, will soon be gcneral, at
chÐsen points, all along the front, and until the Germans can
find men as bold and daring as ollr own there is no protection
tor them from
hÏi form of aUaclt.

Raiding the node points of the enemy's communication.",
wheth4)r by road or rail, they will gradually make the supply
of the men in the trenchca almost a matter of impossibility;
and as our gunners gradually work up under cover of (lur,
trenches to ever closer ranges, their shells will go ß
-ing miles
beyond the enemy, tearing up the roads between the dcpôts
and the front, until the aupply of food and small arm ammu-
nition, to say nothing of heavier articles--tren
h mortars, roll.
of wire for entanglements, etc.-becomes practIcally ruled out.
We know what our men suffered during the first months, "Wilen
all the advantages of heavy artillery, searchlights, and so
forth, were on the enemy's side. We have been profiting
largely by that experience, and intend to improve on the
example given UB.
All this it needs no prophet to forecast. It is nIl in t]18
course of natural evolution. We are passing rapidly through
the same e
-cIes our ancestors traversed again and again in the
past; the objects befol'e us were always the same, and all. we
have had to do has been to adapt our new means to the acqUIsi-
tion of the same ends. In the Crimea we had no searchlights,
but we used star shell and carcases (smoke shells) for the same
purpose, and "hen our siege train prove
inadequate we
brouooht out and employed heavier weapons In numberø never
befol
thouooht of. We even went beyond the mechanical skill
of the age,
nd designed a 36in. mortar, by the side of whicli
Krupp's much-vaunted 42 c.m. mortars .would have looked
mere babies. But t.he war ended before this monster could be
brought to the front and it was concluded, as I think this one
will, by the sudden' and complete collapse of the moral will
power of the enemy,
We had never succeeded in easily investing him. Supplies
could still, with difficulty, get through to the last, ?ut the cease-
less strain of slaughter and the hopelessness of rehef gràdually
undermined hia powers of resistance, and the end came
abruptly with the 6torming of ,the
I
l.akoff by the FrencL, an
operation in "hich Madlahon s DIVIsion of the French Army
lost nearly 50 per cent. of its men in a rush from the trenches
of barely 200 yards. That night the enem.y .was in full
e-
treat and at some time not very far off a similar assault (In
which I hope we shall play a more distinguished part than
we did that d
y), only on a far greater Bcale, will bring about
a similar re6ult.
Men remain human beings only, and like causes produce
like effects, wliatever the weapons may be by which these
causC8 are set in operation.

TnE current issue of tbe Aeiatic Review is noteworthy, in view of
the present prominence of matters Grecian, for an article on .. Greece
and the Wa;r," by Professo.r Platon DrakouleIJ, wbo ranks aa ODe of
the principal autboritieIJ, on Greek affa.it;!, lltandi!lg pro
ably øeco,nd
only to Mr, Venizelos bl1JU!elf. The artIcle, dealmg as lt does wIth
the policy of Greece ilie rÙle of the Young Turk party, and tbe element.
out of which the present situation in ,tbe Balkans has a
Ït! ..
valuable contribution to current war literatme. Other Ulterc.stmg
articleIJ including" England, Turkey, and the Indian Mohammooa
:'
by Sy
d Hossain and a descriptive sketch of the Cocos-Keeling
Iele.n.ds where the' Emden was destroy6d, make thi& an extremely topica1
and l'
dable number of tbe A,iatic.

12*

February 20. 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

A

DIARY

OF

SYNOPSIS.
AUGUST 3BD.-8ir Edward Grey stated Briti.-3h policy and revealed
Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglectlDg our obligationa
to France. lolobilisation of the Army, Ultimatum to Genuany.
German and French Ambaaaadors left Paris and Berlin.
AUGUST 4TB.-Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English
Government took over control of railways. War declared between
;Engl..nd and Germany.
AUGUST 5TD.-Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of St-ate for
War. H,M.S, Amphlon struck,. mine and foundered.
AUGUST 6TB.-tIouse of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of
credit for oEl00,ooo,ooo, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by
600,000 men. Sta
control of food prices.
AUGUST 6TD.-Lord Kitchener issued a circul.1.r asking for 100,000
JIlen.
AUGUST 9TD.-The enemy's lIubmarine, U15. was sunk by H.M.S,
1Jirmingham.
AUGUST lOTD.-France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans
advanced on Namur. The mw Press BUreau establi5hed by the

vel'Dment for the issue of official war news.
AUGUST llTII.-England declared war against Austria..
AUGUST 15TB.-The Tsar a.ddressed a Proclamation to the Polish
popula.tiom of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to
Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and
the uae of the Polish language,
AUGUST 16TB.--Japaneae ultimatum to Germany demanding the
withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.
AUGUST 17TB.-'l'he British Expeditiona.ry Force safely landed in
I'ra.nce,
The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.
AUGUST 18TH,-General Sir H. Smith,Dorrien appointed to com.
Jnanù of !Ill Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in sac-
c:e
iou to tlw la
GeneraJ Grierøon.
AUGUST 2OTB,-'l'he Servians gained a decisive victory over the
Austrians near Shabatz.
AUGUST 21sT.-The German forces entered Brussela.
AUGUST Z2ND,-Servia announced that their army had won a great
yictory on the Drin&. The Anstrian lossetl were very heavy.
AUGUST 23BD.--Japan declared war on Germany. The Rus.sian
army gained an important victory nea.r Gumbinnen against .a. force of
160,000 Germans.
AUGUST 24TB,-It was announced that Namur had fallen.
The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark
in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was
occupied by the Germans.
AUGUST 27TB.-Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the
German armed merchantman KaÌ&er Wilhelm der Groue had been sunk
by H.M,S. Higltflyer on the West Africa. Coast.
AUGUST 28TB,-A concerted operation was attempt
d against the
Germana in the Heligoland Bight,
The First Light Cruiser Squadron Bank the Mainz. The First
'Battle Cruiser Squaùron sank one cruiser. Koln class, and another
cruÌ36r di.s.a.ppeared in the mist, heavily on fire, /Iond in a sinking
condition.
Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total
British casualties amounted to sixtv-nine killed and wounded.
Lord Kitcheßoer announced that" The Government have decided
that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India....
SEPTEMBER IsT,-The Russiana met with a check in East l'russia,
but were successful in minor enga.gementa in Galicia.
SEPTEMBER 2ND.-Continuous fighting was in progress along almost
the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinc,
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
guns. The French Army gamed ground in the Lorraine region. ']'he
Ruui3.D Army compleLcly routed four Austrian AImy Corps near
Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.
SEPTEMBER 3RD.-The French Government moved to Bordeaux.
SEPTEMBER 4TB.-The Russian Army under GeneraJ Ruzsky cap.
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General ßrussiloff took Halicz,
SEPTEMBER 5TB.-The fonnal !Ùliance of England, Franc
. and
RU5SÌ.a was signed in London by thð representatives of the three
Governments concerned, Linding each nation to conclude peace, or
discli3S terms of peaoe, only in conjunction with ita Allies,
S:,'TEMBER 6TB,-It was announced that thð scout-cruiser Path-
finder foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mme.
SEPTEMBEB 7TB.-General Joffre's plans were being st
'\dily carried
out. The Allied forces a.cted on the defcnsive and were successful in
checking and forcmg back lD a north-easterly direction the German
forces opposed to them.
SEPTEMBER 8TB.-The Allies gained ground on the left wing along
the line of the Ourcq and the Petit M.orin river, Here the British
troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from
Vitry-le-Fmnoois to Sennaise-les-Bains the enemy was pressed back
in the direction of Rheims.
SE!'TF.
CER 9TH,-The English Army crossed the Mame, and the
enemy reCi
",() about twenty-five miles.
SEPTEMBER 13T1I.-On the left wing the enemy continued his retre.at-
ing movement, The Bdgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive
to the south of Lierre.
SEPTEMBER 14TH.-All day the enemy stubbornly disputed the
p
sage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings were
6Ccured by sunset. On our right and left the French troops were con-
fronted with a similar task, lD which they were aucoessful.
SEPTEMBER 15TH.-The Allied troops occupied Rheims. Six hundred
prisoners a.nd twelve guru were captured by the Corps on the right
of thð British.
SEPTEMBER 16TB,-Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max
Kennedy Horlon, returned safelv after having torpedoed the Gennan
cruiser Hela six miles south of ÏIeIigoland.

THE

WAR.

SEPTEMBEB 19TB.-The Rnaaian Azmy seized the fortified positions
of Sieniawa and Sambor.
The British auxiliary cruiser Carmania, Captain Noel Grant, Royal
Navy, øank the Cap 'l'rajalgar off the east coast of South Amenca.
The action lasted one hour and forty-five minutes, when thð German
ship capsized and liunk, her aurvivors being rescued by an empty
collier.
SEPTBMBU 22ND.-H.M. IIhips AbouHr, Hogue, and Creuy were
sunk by lIubmarines in the North Sea., The Aboukir was torpedoed.
and whilst the Hogue and the CreS8!! had closed and were standing
by to save the crew they were also torpedoed.
SEPTEMBER 23RD.-Brit.ish aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered
an attack on t.he Zeppelin sheds at DÜßseldod and
'light-Lieutenant
Collet. dropped three bomba on a Zeppelin shed.
SEPTEMBEn 27:m.-Between the Oise ILDd the Somme and to the
north of the Somme, the battle continued along a very extenBive front
with perceptible progress on our part. By the evening our troops
regained the ground they had lost. Between the AIgonne and the
Meuae there was nothing new to report.
SEPTEKBER 28TB.-At certain points. notably between the Aisne
and the AIgoune. the enemy made further violent attacka, which were
repulsed.
OcrOBER IsT.-:I'he arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force at
Marseillea waa anoounced.
OcrOBER 2ND.-Hia
ajesty's Government authoriaed, a mme-
laying policy in certain areas.
OcrOBER &rB.-In RU.88Ïa the German army, which was operating
between the front of East. Prussia and the Niemen, was beawn all
along the line and retreated, ab
doning a considerable g,uantity of
material.
OcroBER 9rB.-The British navaJ airmen carried out another auo.
ce.ssful raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Düs5Cldorf.
OcrOBER lOrB.-Death of King Carol of Roumania..
OcrOBU llTB.-The Rus.sian cruiser rallada was sunk i..u the
Baltic by a German subma.rine.
OcrOBER 14TH,-The Belgian Government removed from Ostend to
Havre.
OcrOBER 15TB.-H,M.S. Yarmouth (Captain Henry L. Cochrane)
sank the German liner M arkomania off Sumalra, and captured the
Greek steamer Pontoporos.
ÜCTOBER 16TB.-H.M.S. Hawke (Captain Hugh P. E. Williams,
R.N.) was attacked and sunk by submarines,
OcrOBER 17TH.-The new light cruiøer Undaunted (Captain Cecil H,
Fox), accomp3nied by the destroyers Lance (Commander W. de M:,
E fi aerton), Le.nnox (Lieut. Commander C. R. Dane), Legion (Lieul. C.
'.
A sop), and Loyal (Lieut. Commander F. Burges Watson), sunk four
German destroyers off the Dutch coast.
OcrOBER 25TB,-A German lIubmarine was rammed and sunk by
the destroyer lJadgeT (Commander Charlea Fremantle, R.N.) off the
Dutch coast.
OcrOBER 29TB.-Admiral H.S.H, Prince Louis of Battenberg re-
signed his position as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
OcroBER 31sT.-H.M,S. Hermes was lIunk by a. torpedo fired by a
German submarine in the Straita of Dover.
NOVEMBER 2YD.-The 'Admiralty declared the whole of the North
Sea a military area,
NOVEMBER 4TB.-It was reported tha.t the Scharnhor8t, Gnciserzau,
Ltipzig, Dresden, and Nürnberg concentrated near Valparaiso, and
that an engagement was fought on November 1st :I'he Monmouth was
sunk and the Good Hope very severely damaged. ;I'he Glasgow and
the OtTanto escaped.
NOVEMBER 5TH.-The German cruiser Yorel struck the mines
blocking the entrance to Jahde Ba.y and sank.
NOVEMBER 7TB.-The fa.ll of Tsingtau was announced.
NOVEMDER lOrB.-The Emden was drhen ashore and burnt nt
Keeling Cooos Island by H.M,A,S. Sydney (Captain John C. 'I'.
Glossop, R.N.). The Kðni{/sberg w:us imprisoned in the Rufigi Island
by H.M.S. Chatham.
NOVEMBER llTB.-H.M,S. ^'iger (Lieut,-Commnnder Arthur P.
Muir, R.N.) wae torpedoed by a lIubmarine in the Do"ns, and
foundered.
NOVEMBER 14Tn.-Field-Mnrshal Lord Roberta died lit the Head,
quarters of the British Army in France,
NOVEMBER 23RD.-The Gennan submarine UI8 was rammed bv a
British destroyer, the Garry, off the coast of Scotland. -
NOVEKBER 26TH.-H.M,S. Bulwark blew np in Sheerness Harbour.
DEL'F.MBEB &rB.
British IIquadron under Viae-Admiral Sir
Frederick Sturdee lIighted off the Falkland Ia1ands a German squadron
consisting of the Scharnh8Tst, Gneisenau, Nürnberg, Leipzrg, and
Druden. Three of these five war.ships were sunk, including the flag-
IIhip of Admiral Count von Spee, The tlwo others fled from the action
a.nd were pursued.
DECEMBEB 9rB,-Valievo wa.e retaken by the SeriJiarul, who ener-
getically pUI'Bued the Austrian forceø.
DECEMBER IOrB,-A further telegram WaJ\ received from Vice-
Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee reportil'g that. the Nürnberg was also
sunk on December 8.
DECEMBER 13TB.--Submarine Bll, Liel\t...commander Konnan D.
Holbrook, R.N., entered the Dardanelle.s, and, in Ðpi
of the difficult
current, dived under five rows of mines IUId torpedoed the
rurkish
battle6hip Messudiyeh, which was guarding the minefield. When last
seen the M u8udiyeh wa.s ainking by the litem.
DECEMBEB 16TB,-In the morning a German cruiÐeT force made a
demonstration upon the Yorkshire roast, in the course of which they
shelled ßartlepool, Whitby, and Scal'borouJ::h. They were engaged
by the patrol vessels on the IIpOt, and a British patrollin
squadron
endeavoured to cut them off. On being sighted by Britu
h vesse'.
the German:!! retired at fnIl speed, and, favoured by the miBt, sue-
reedod in making good their escape,

L:AND AND WATER

DECll:lliIIIB 17TB.-G:reat Bri<tain proc1a.!med Egypt a British Pro-
t.cciQrate.
DECIIMBER 24TD,-A German aeroplane drop
d a bomb into .
garden at Dover, doing no grea<t damage a.nd cau.sing no ca.sual<ties.
DECIIMBER 25:rD.-A (kTilian aeroplane flew OV
Shee.rnees. Pur-
med by three BritÏ5h machine.!! Bnd iiTed on by anti-aircraft gUT'" it.
made off towards tbe East Coast.
Bcitish cruisers, dest.royers, submarinl'l!l and lSeaplan
mOOe a com-
bined ra.)d on Gel'lDan warship" lying in the roads off Cuxhaven. Uu1'
ships while.tanding 'by to pick up the seaplane8, were them.sehes
attacked by enemy ZeppeJins øea.plø.nC8, and submarines. They beat.
off the a.ttack and succeeded in picking up three out of the Eeven
airmen with t.heir machinea, Three other pUots who returned late!"
"ere picked up, &CGOrding to arrangement, by British submariue.!!,
....hich were standing by, thcir machines being sunk. The extent of
the d=1age by the Briltish airmeu's ,bombs cannot be Cßtimalted, hut
.11 were discharged on poinlta of military signi1ìcance,
JANUARY 19TD.-German aircraft :raided the East Coast .in the
evening and dropped bomba on Yarmouth,
JANUARY 24TB,--.Early in the morning a EritiBh pr.tro!ling squaàron
øighted three German battle-crniscrs an.d an aImoured cruiser, the
1Ilucllt7, steering
wal'ld8, The German warships turned and made
fo.,. bome, but. were brought to Action. The Blücher WM sunk, and
Iowa ot.hu Gilrman battJe,cruiseTa were øerioWily damaged.
JANUUY aíTB.-'Ûn ilia Yser front Belgian:t.roopa made progl'e8a in
&.he Pervyse district.
Ne&il' La Baøée, at Givenchy and Cuinchy, the e.Mmy d
:ivercd
fift lWtt&clu 011 Ù1e .Britiah line.s. A.fter having made .light progress
the GermaJUI were driven back.
JANt;ARY 27TJL-Jn
e region of Ferthes, OIl Hill 200, four violent
at.t.a.ck.s by the eoow.y were repu1aed.
A.t St. Mihiel "e de.stroyed the new pontoon briògcs of the ent,my
1m the MeWloll.
JANUARY 28TB.-1n the Vosges we mafje appreciable progres.s to Ü.e
I!orth of Seno.ues, on the alopea of the Signal de 1a Mère Henry,
We also progTessed in .Alsa.ce in the region of Ammert.z;willer-llt:.rIll-
hau.p.t Le iBM,
JANUARY 29TB.-In :Belgium, in the region of Nieuporl, our infantry
Cained .. footing in the Great Dune. A Gel'maii aircraft was Drought
..:1Wn by our
UIlð.
JANUARY 3OrD.-BefOT'e Cuinchy, near La. Bassée, the BritÏßh Army
reptù.øed !.he ItJttac,k of three German battalions.
JA..'i'UARY 3lST.-ln the acctol'S of AJ'Ta.ß, RoOye, Soisson!!, ReiIDß, and
Perthee our batt
i
destroyed two of the enemy's guns, 5e.eral
worXa, aDd &
in number of mortars, anfj dispencd several evncen-
t.ra.tioIlB Ðf troops, bivouacs and convo)'s,
FUlIUARY laT.-The enemy v.i.c!ent1y attacked our trenches to the
north of La. Daæée,Bethune road. He was repulsed, and left numeJ:ous
dead on the ground.
FKIIRUABY 2ND.-TlwI '.I'm-lis attempted to CIOIiI the Suez CaLal nca:r
Tw;swn,
They were allo"ed t,o bring t.heir bridging mate-rial to the bank
1IIlll10Ie5ted. When. the bridging operations had actuaJJy s
art{'d \\e
attacked them. Ou-r attack was completely suocessful, The
,ncrr..y
Bed in disorder, leaving the whole of the Dridging material in our
Iunds, and acme of the enemy were drowned in the Canal
The enemy alao attacked u.s on !.he EI J
tara frout, L&t were
ea:;jly repulsed,
FEBRUARY 4TD.-In t'l1e district of Albert an,d QuesL.oy
,S.mtE\Tre
.e destroyed aeveral blockboUBEB,
In the Woone, in the valley cf the Seil 1 {', we obtained 8d
'al]ced
post øuc
and scattered soæe cf the en<:my'ø convoys.
FEBRUARY &rD.-In Obampagr.o, ncr'vh of Beanséjour, our troopa
made slight progTCæ during the night,
FEBRUARY 7TD.--.Between the C..na.l and !.he BÉthune-Ln ra-ssl>e
1'Oa.d, at a point one kilometre to the e..st of Cuinchy, a. brick field,
....here the
emy ha.d maintaiMd himse!f up to tl.e pre.swl, was
captured by tbe British.
{EBRUARY 8TD,-To the !lOuth-west of Carency we made a. successful
coup de main on a German trench, which wa.s ",reeked by a mine, and
tile defenders of which we
c ki1Icd or captured.
To the we.st of Hill 191, to the north of Mas.!õÎ:;es, our battt'rica
c:be.cked an a.ttempt to make an attc.cK.

February 20, 1915.

A DIARY OF
DAY BY
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9th.
The enemy bombarded Soissons, Furne5, and Ypres.
In the Black Sea Russian cruisers bombarded a.
'u.rkish
battery near Trebizond and sank a steamer with her cargo,
and the Turkish cruiser Breslau bombarded Yalta.
The Willu:1mina, the United States ship laden wit.b food
for Germany, arrhed' a.t. Falmouth.
WEDNESDA Y. FEBRUARY 10th.
In the West insignificant encounters ma.iruy confined
to artillery firing and throwing cf bombs.
In the East the Germans lost tens of thousands of men
during their six days' attack on the left bank of the Vis-
tula.
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11th.
German forces amounting to about a brigade made a.n
attack on the Marie Thérèse works in the Argonne.
The enemy delivered a violent bombardment against
Nieuport and the banks of the Yser.
The Russians feU back from the line of the Masurian
Lakes towards their frontier.
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12th.
Thu.ty-four :British a.eropll:.nes and seaplanes ma.de a
raid on the :Belgian coast; con!Îderable damage W:1.S done to
the enemy'ø bases Iilld establishments.
Flight-Commander Grahame-'Wihite fell into the &ea. off
Nieuport, but was rescued.
.An attack by the enemy in the direction of Arracourt
was repulsed.
In tl.!e Vosges French Chasseurs carried HiH 937 with
insignificant. losses.
SATURDAY. FEB
UARY 13th.
In Belgium there were some axtilIery duels.
At La Boisselle we exploded a mine and occupied the
cavity.
The enemy bombarded the villages of Bailly and Tracy-
le-Vaz. The heavy artillery reached tho railway station of
Noyon.
SUNDAY. FEBRUARY 14th.
There were artillery duels in Belgium between the Oise
and the Aisnc, and in Champagne. In Lorraine, in tho
region of Pont-à-1úousson, we delivered a counter-attack
against the enemy, who had occupied Norroy, and who had
gained a footing on the tuljacent height. The fight <Jon-
tinued.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15th.
We carried about 250 mètres of a trench between
Béthune and La Bassée. In the Argonne, in the ùirectioD
of Bagatelle and Marie Thérèse, the struggle continued very:
stuDbornly from trench to trench,
In Lorraine the enemy succeeded in occupying the
height of the Xon Beacon and the hamlet {)f No:rroy. He
was repulsed by II. counter-attack as far as the slopes n()rth
of the bea.con, where he still maintained himself in some
porùons of trcnches,

THE
DAY.

WAR

CORRESPONDENCE.

"-e fire receiving daily numerous letters from our readers dealing with the military and naval situation, also
!uggestions reKarding inventions. It is only possible in these columns to reply to a few of them. but we take
this opportunity of assuring our correspondents that the subject matter of their letters are carefully dealt
wHh and forwarded to experts.

THE MAN IN THE STREET.
To Ule Editor of LAND ü"D W.A.TER.
ibB,-In your lut. i.sue II. .. Coa.st-dweUer in Cornwall"
took upon himself to pose as the .. Man in thQ Str
t," a;d
Ù1 that. capacity to indulge in a violent diatribe against Mr.
Churchill.
It migbt be interesting to learn on what grounds the
centJeman in the !leighbourh<X>d of Land's End claims to be
t.he mouthpiece of public opinion. but as "an individual in a
neighbo
ing by-way JJ I should like to protest against bis
U3umptlon of the titIe on this occasion, D()t, because I think
thAt Mr. Churchill may be perturbed by such .condemnation,
but because I have a

ling of EYIllpatby for the (f Man in the
Bt.reet.. JJ
The "1x!aD in the Street" has a sense of justice, and
regarus wl1,h repu
ance
he idea. of condemning a man
tm.hear
on the bas13 of rumours and supposition.. He does
not desIre to conòemn Mr, Churchill until the facts are known
and any charges against him proved. If Mr. Churchill has
made mistakes (iB it not a privilege eYen of grea.t-ne6s 1) he

will have to face fair and straightforward criticism when those
mistakes are pro\'ed j but may we be preserved at such times
as these from the .carping criticisms of the armchair type I
Would the" Man in the Street" look with favour on tbe
insinuation that "the I Formidable' disaster was probably
owing to Mr. Churchill's defiance of naval advice, and in his
belief that he is a second Nelson "f "Probably," forsootkl
Does that word convey tbe impression of fair criticism f
Incidentally, I m:l.Y mention that many men in many
London streets have given Mr. Churchill the credit for the
mobilisation Rnd readiness of the Navy at the bcginning of
August... and in consequcnce he W88, and in my opinion is
stilI, a favourite in the eyes of the public.
I might also mention th::.1 there wo.s a successful raid
made by naval a.eroplantò.S last week. Perha.ps, if any aero-
planes bad been lost, their loss would be due to Mr.
Churchill's belief that he is a second Blériot I
I do not desire to put myself forward in opposition as
the" Man'in the Street/' and I therefore sign mY6elf,-Yours,
etc., A L.u.DLt1ßn.EB IN .AN ALLEY"

14*

February 20, 1915.

LAND :AND WATER

CRITICISING THE ADMIRALTY.
To the Editor of LAND AND W ATEn.
SIR.-?!fr. Jane'. comments upon my letter in current
issue are 80 elusive and wide of the mark as to render fUI.ther
correspondence nugatory, but I crave permission to state dis-
tinctly that Mr. Jane has all along refrained from and depre-
cated criticism of the Admiralty, and, further, that many of
UB were uDder the impression that "a feeling of ease and
security in the civil population" W&8 one of the resulta to be
expected from the preseuce of our North Sea Beet I-Yours
truly, E. H,
Hatch End.

To the Editor of LAND AND W A.TEB.
DEAÄ SI&,-I aM quite in ø.greement with your corre-
spondent, .. E. H.," who contends that" withholding of frank
criticism of our .Admiralty and other departments would
be harmful," but a criticism to be of value should be eu-
téTed upon with a full knowledge of the points criticisoo.
Tbe very fact that your contributor speaks of" repeated
gaccessful demonstrations by the enemy on our East Coast"
proves both that he has only a surface knowledge of the
incidents, and also that the East Coast folk who are better
informed are, like BI'er Rabbit, "lying low and saying
nuffin. "
As an East Coast resident, let me assure "E. H," thai
no feeling of "insecurity and uneasiness" erist-s among the
East Coast people as a whole. \Ve are taking our risks with
the rest of our countrymen, and are quite convinced that,
\1'hile Fieher, Scott, Wilson, Jellicoe, etc., remain at their
respective post-s, there will be very little call for a layman's
criticism.
Let our friend ask the first Jack Tar he meets on
leave how things are going. He won't be t<>ld anything,
but the broad grin that will develop on Jack's face ehould
reassure him. p,

THE LINE OF THE RHINE.
To the Ediwr of LAND AND WATER.
SIR,
May I oall attent.ion to what WQuid appear to be
a fiaw in Mr. BeUoe's ()therwise cogent reasoning in his all-
important argument in regard to holdi.ng and falling back
to second, or third, defensive lines. Throughout he
3B8umes in each illustration, though he omits to say
so, that the physical characteristica or natural strength
of each alternative position is equal-the only factor
he deals with being the compa.rative length of each. When
he appli
s his rea.ßoning to the several lines 1, 1, 1, 1, " the
present "-2, 2, 2, 2, " Antwerp, Namur, Metz, Swiss fron-
tier "--3, 3, 3, 3, II Liége, Metz, Swiss frontier,"
finally
to " the line of the Rhine," he lí"gfitly dismisses the latter
a3 negligible on account of its greater length.
It is true he refers to
rman political essentials in this
connection, but it is to be remembered that they have already
undergone considerable modifications, and, it. is to be hoped,
win have to submit to further ones.
I devoutly trust I am mistaken, but the natural strength
of the line of the Rhine, backed 68 it is bv numerous
parallel railway!!!, has always appeared to be on
that might
weIl be effectively held by a rélatively smaller force, and
certainly by a. much smaller one than now ()pposed to us in
the west.-Yours <>bediently,

8, bTHUB PETO.

Downs Court, Sandwich, Kent.

MOTORS AND AIR RAIDS.
To the Editor of LAND AND 'WATER.
SIR,-Through the agency of YOllr interesting paper,
'W0uld it be possible ro collect a number of mmers of motor-
cars or motor-cyclcs "WIio could be issul'd with rifles apd
sl'ecially-prepared ammunition 8.8 recommended by your cor-
respondent, Mr. Arthur Beckett, in your issue of January 9
Since his letre"!" was written Zeppelins have visited this
country, and so far as we know returned to Germany without
injury.
These pests may come 3g-ain any calm night, and it is
clearly time to find an antidote in .any part of the country.
sLould one of these phosphorous bullets ignite the gill! in a
Zeppelin balloon, II,S Mr. Beckett claims, I venture to say the
destl'uction of one or two .with their crews woula prevent our
German friends again favouring UB with t.heir attention.
The owner of a car or eyole weuld have tho advnntagl) of
local knowledge, and cuuld choose hi8 own site from which to
!attnck.
Mr. Beckett's remark on the adviaability of a small bore

weapon being used is sound, and the danger of causinr firM
could not be too oarefully impressed on the usen,.-Youn
faithfully.!

FRANCIS SAUNDERS,
Lieutenaut Commander,
[N.B.-It is highly improbable that the War Office wouIJ
permit any unauthoriBed body Qf men to form Iroch 1\ corp.
as suggested by the writer .-EDfToa.]

HARDENING HORSES.
To the Editor of L.A1iD ANI) W ATKB,
Sm,-After, yean of practical experience in handling
horses, especially in America, I am concerned to n{)te t
at
numbers gathered for our New Army have been loet; through
being picketed out unsheltered in exposed situations.
Of course l for campaigning horses must get used to erpo-
sure, Lut that should be a gradual process. They IIh1>uld in
no case be out in winter weather without wind breaks, if there
are no natural ones, such a5 woods or banb. {Vet does not
hurt a horse with a winter coat on, but draught and cold do;
and to tie a horse out in an exposed situatiun without wind-
breaks or natural shelter ill abllOlute murder.
I see that a number have died of what; ill called <<rug
pneumonia," caused by their being supplied with rugs that;
get wet through and are not dried off. If, however, the horses
were provided with wool-lined ta.rpaulin cluthll, such as are
used for dray horsell, these would be cheap and effective in
keeping their backe dry and turning the wind. In New
Ze:J.land, wt>rk Ranee are not stabled, but, after being rubbEd
dry and fed, are turned out with waterproof rugs on, ùf
course, the tr?uble in campaigning would be to carry the rugli
along, but this would be amply repaid by the horses saved.
In W. Virginia, our horse. ran out in rain, snow and
sleet, but had always shelter to go to. We never lost one from
pneumonia, but if under the same conditions they had been
tied up in exposed pi a-ceIJ , they would have died. To leave
sick horses in the open is a scandal; no colonial would m:lke
BUch mistakes.-Faithfully yours, COLONIAL.

THE GERMAN LOSSES.
To the Editor of L.um AND W ATO,
DE
SlR,-M:r. Belloo thi. week makes all intereating
calculatIOn of the total German losses up to date. This calcu-
lation is based upon the assumption that. the Germans do not
include in their lista the number. of those lightly wounded.
Thi3 assumption, however, i. not correct. During a
long period of captivity in the enemy's country, one of my
few pas
imes was the ghoulish one of poring over the endless
Verlusthsten,' after each name waø given one of the follow-
ing categories: leiclLt verwundet, verwundet, schwer fJerwun-
det, schwer fJarletzt, vermiB8t, gefangen, or tot, Of these
leicl
t verwundel appeared oftener than any other category
but verwundet. I have still in my possession a Yerlustlist
in which eighty out of a total of 420 casuaItiee are IIpecifically
given as <C leicht
rtl'Un-dft."-YourII faithfully,
2, Savoy IEll, W.C. C. J. TnOMA!!, M.B., B.Sc.

THE SAILORS AND SOLDIERS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of LAND AHD W ÂTEL

IUB Sm,-We shall be extremely grateful if you will
permit me to ulle your vnluable paper u II. medium for ao
appeal on behalI of the abo.e Pund.
The need of t.obacco and pipes for our eoldierll and sailon
is very urgent, and "wo shall welcome any donation. eit.her in
money or kind, that will enable us to remove this want. I

is true that thEre arc several other Funds opened to thill end,
but when it is rea1ised that to supply every man with only
half an ounce of tobacco each (a modest estimate of one day',
requirements) nearly 28 tons of toba.cco are needed, it wilI'ba
realised that the fear of any overlapping i. almost IlUperfluous.
Anyone desiring to help the Pund can do 110 by (1) Bub-
scribing direct; (2) taking a collection box; (3) organising an
entertainment or c<>ncert. Chequ6!, posta.! order., etc.,
Ehould be made payable to Mr. Roy Hornima.n, hon. treasurer,
and crossed "Barclay's Bank." Should a.ny of YOUT many
reader.! be inu-rested and would like further particulars of the
Fund, I should be most happy to answer anv in'luiri
,-
Your QIJedient Bervant, W. EV.Ã.N Cor,T,rsoN,
CC!ntral House, Kin
sw3Y, W.O.

HOST1LE SUBMARINES,
To the Editor of LAND ABD W:A.TBB.
DEAB Sm,-With regard to the threatened attack 011
our Mercantile Marine bv German BlIbmariDel with the
intention of blockading oilr ports a.nd stopping our o,,"or-
.eas trade, it haB occurred to me that an effective way of

15*

LAND AND WATE:e

dealing with this would be 10 anchor deeply-sunk mines
right on trade rout(!s, Bome distance from such ports as
Liverpool, the Eristol Channel, the Clyde l the Thames, or
Belfast,
If a. field of these mines were mooroo at a depth of,
say, 40-50 feet from the surface, and 10 or 15 miles from the
entrance .to the ports, I think it would greatly hamper the
movement-s of hostile submarines. If they went below they
would run the risk of contact with the mines, and if they
remained on the surface a destroyer could deal with them.
I think the knowledge that the mines were there would tend
to keep them on the surface and make them more easily
got nt,
If the mines were securely moored at a sufficient depth,
they would be no danger to passing ships, and would still
be near enough the surfaoo to catch a submarine running
Bubmerged; and, if a suitable depth of water were chosen,
tbey would still be near enough the bottom as to make it
danger0118 for submarines to pass under them.-Yours truly,
CUAS. E. ALLAN,

A USE FOR BEER BARRELS.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER,
SIR,-The Germans sink our merchant .ships by torpedoes
from submarines. Let us procure a d<Jzen old merchant
steamers, give them cargoes of empty boor-barrels bunged and
well packed, and roped together, and send them to and from
the estuary of the Thames to the entrance of Rotterdam} with
an inviting-looking deck cargo hiding a 4-inch gun. Such
boats could not be sunk by one torpedo, or by two, and the
4-inch gun would ßuffice to sink any submarine that dis-
covered herself for the purpOEC of challenging.-Yours truly,
R. W, WESTER:Y.
Authors' Club, 2, Whitehall Court. S.W,

To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR Sm,-In a recent issue Mr. Arthur Beckett de-
scribes a bullet for the destruction of Zeppelins. One grave
objection to these is the fact that they must be kept under
wa.ter, which can only be conveniently done at fixed sta.tions,
where anti-"aircraft guns would be more efficient; in addition,
a hole in the point of a modern bullet containing a gradually-
diminishing weight would materially affect the ballistics.
Experiment has shown that when flaming bullets are
fired against hydrogen bags enclosed in an external enve-
lope the number of actual ignitions of the hydrogen is very
sma:n, possibly due to the vacuum caused at the moment
of impact.-Yours very trulYI - KENNETH GOADBY,
46, Hartey Street.

THE CHINA S'I\\.TION.
To the Editor ()f LAND AND WATER.
Sm,-In that portion of your article appearing in a re-
cent number of LAND A...."'m WATER under heading .. The High
B-eas Generally. ,-our correspondent, Mr. Jane, staWs:-
"V on Spee, with the SchaTl1hoT8I and Gneisenau, belonged
to the China Btation, Here we maintained a force sufficient
to deal with Von Bpee,.
Being one among the many II others. (along with Lord
Belborne) who venture to criticise the Admiralty, may I ask
why thia << sufficient force. allowed Von Spee to escape from
Kiao-Chau I Obviously, ü our force there had been I< suffi-
cient. Von Spee would never have reached the Pacific, and
the nation would have not been deprived of the gallant Admiral
Cradock and the many brave seamen. 1Ifany of your readers
would be glad to know what our I< force JJ is on the China
Btation, and would be equally gratified to learn when, and by
whose order, the Canopull was sent to reinforce Admiral
Cradock'lI fleet. The British people, after all, pay for the
Fleet, in cash 88 well as in tears, and the Admiralty is com-
mi
ting a grave fanIt in concea]ing these particulars.-Yours
laithfullYt A. L,

THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS,
To the Editor of LAND AXD WATER.
Sm,-In estimating tIie total forces which Germany can
put into the field, there is one important difference between
the two schoola which Mr. Belloc has omitted to mention, He
himself starts with men of twenty yean of age, but the other
school expects Germany to put into the field at least a million
youths below that age. Though not the best of troops, they
would be by no meana negligible.-Yours faithfully,
HExny ßURY

Mayfield House, Farnham.

February 20, 1015.

CHOOSING KIT I
To the Editor of LAND AND W ATEn.
DEAR SIR,-Some time ago JOu were kind enough to sup"
ply me with the addresses of the makers of certain articles re.
commended in your paper. I have got them, and find them
all excellen t.
I would like to trespasø again on your time, and would
be very much obliged if you could tell me the maker of the
water-bottle mentioned in your issue of January 2, and a]so
let me know where I could obtain the saddlebag described in
your number of January 9.
'l'hanldng you in anticipation.-I am, yours truly,
A. V. T. ROBINSON
(Captain, R.E.)..
6, York Terrace, The Lines, Gillingham, Kent,

TIIE BLOCKADE.
To ilJe Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SJR,-\Vith reference to the threatened submarintt
blockade and your articles in LMID AND W.a.TEB, Should
not our Government and the French Government hence..
for
h intern their prisoners of war on board ships and duly!
notify the German Government that these vessels might
possibly have an occasional cruise round our coasts I-Yollrsll
faithfuJIy.

ALBERT E. BURNS.,

A COMPARISON.
To tbe Editor of LAND AXD WATER.
DEAR Sm,-I have read each week, with very greal
pleasure, Mr. ßellao's articles in your valued paper. In hill
description of the Battle of the Caucasus, in the i6Sue of
J'anuary 16, however, he makes a statement ro which I find
it difficult to give credence. He says that I( in order to effect
an envelopment of this kind the Germans had to count on a
numerical superiority of their ally's troops in this region,
for ;)"ou cannot thus hold in one place and turn in another.
unless you are numerically superior to your enemy." I give
one example which /Seems to me to disprove this. At the battle
of ChancellorsviIle in 1863 Lee, with 62,000 men, divided his
force, sending part under Stonewl1ll Jackson to turn Hooker'.
right, whilst he, wÌth the remainder of his army, held him
in play along hi. front. Hooker's total force was 130,000
men, Surely that is an example of such a thing being done.
not by numerical superiority, but by astounding numerical
inferiority. And the world knows the great victory then won
by the Confederates, and the price they paid for it througJì
the death of Stonewall Jacklion.-Yours faithfully,
NORMAN BJlUCB

N airnside,
Bearsden! Dumbartonsbire!.

TIIE FIRST LORD.
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER,
Sm,-I expect there will be many to answer your corre..
spondent, the I( Coast-dweller in Cornwall," but I should like
;you to allow me to peint out two matters to him. First, if he
blames ?lfr. Churchill for our defeats, he must praise him fOli
our victories. The other matter is that it iø not a good plan
to change horses when you are crossing a stream.
I am not concerned to defend the First Lord-if be is Ii
Nelson, his family history would warrant it-nDr do I carp at
your correspondent's use of the word I( civilían." In hi.
øense, I almost think Julius Cresar would have been a civilian.
I am sorry for him if he does not realise that a good deal
of U autocratio" po\\"er is in vogue in the Navy.-Yours sin-
cerely, M. GARDNER,
Fal'm Corner, Tadworth, Surrey,

MR. BELLOO will lecture at Chester at 3 p.m. on Friday.
February 19th, ann at Rove Town Han at 3 p,m. and 8.30 p,m.,;
on Tuesday, February Z3rd. Mr. Fred T. Jane wi!] 1ecture on the
Naval War at Queen's Hall at 8.30 Friday, February 26th, ProfeJ3sol'
Lewe.s will 1edure on Modern Explosives at Queen's Hall .t 8,30
Tuesday, March 2nd.

NOTICE TO READERS.

Next week"s issue will contain an article by
Mr. Bellae on .. THE DURATION
OF THE WAR."

16*

February 20, 1915

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addition, it indicates the political boundaries,-fortified zones,-rivers,-
hilly countries,-mountain passea,-marshes,-fen-landa,-railways,-
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JOHN PLAYER 6. SONS.

'/ \ Nottingham. I '\
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The Imperial Tab .ceo Co, (of Groat Britain and

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297

LAND AND WATER

February 20, 19 1 5

THE

TORPEDO

(ConJi..ued from þage 295)

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use of heated air in the engine, The air as it issues from the
resen"oir is heated in a small steel chamber by means of a
small liquid fuel burner, and this "superheated" air is
delivered to the engine. The application of heat consider-
ably increases the quantity of energy available, and the
distance through which the torpedo can be driven is thereby
greatly increased,
Torpedoes are fired into the sea either from above or
helow the surface of the water, and are expelled from the
tubes either by compressed air or a small charge of powder.
As the torpedo carries its own power, only a force sufficient
to throw the torpedo clear of the ship is required. \Vhen a
torpedo is fired from a deck tube and strikes the water it
lmm<:>diately dives to the depth (generally about IZ feet) at
which it is intended to run.
It is now recognised that the submerged torpedo tube is
the best for firing torpedoes, as it is much safer from the
enemy's gun fire, and also because a more accurate course
can be set, since when droppÏ11g from the deck into the water
the torpedo i
bound to be deflected to some extent.
\Vhen firing a torpedo under water from a moving ship
a steel bar is pushed out from the ship's side, so that the
torpedo is protected from the rush of water along the hull of
the ship, which otherwise would drag the torpedo out of its
course, In some shios this bar is moved out before the
torpedo is fired, whil
in others it shoots out automaticallv
the moment of the firing of the torpedo and returns again
when the tube is clear.
A torpedo tube consists of a cylindrical vessel fitted in
the bow or stern, or in both, as the case may be. One end
projects a small distance beyond the vessel and is fitted with
a sluice valve, so that the water cannot enter the ship,

uitable safety devices are provided, so that the torpedo can
only be fired when the sluice valve is open. The torpedo is
pushed into the tube from the inside end just as a shell into
the breech of a gun.
A firing director is provided so that the torpedo can be
fired at the right moment. It is a difficult matter to fire a
torpedo so that it will hit the object aimed at, as allowances
must bl:; made for the speed and direction of the two opposing
vessels and the time necessary for the torpedo to cover the
distance between the ships, In a running action between
torpedo boats and battleships only some 20 to 30 per cent, of
the torpedoes fired are expected to hit. As a modern torpedo
costs from {600 to {I,ZOO, unsuccessful torpedo attacks are a
pretty expensive form of warfare.
Attempts have been made to use electric waves such as
are used in wireless telegraphv to control the direction of a
torpedo after it has been fired, but up to the present these
inventions have not vet passed the experimental stage,
The only real defence a
ainst torpedoes is gunfire against
the craft carrying them. Against the torpedo itself there is
no real defence except trying to get out of the way by smart
manæuvring. Until the advent of the submarine, a torpedo
(Taft approaching a vessel could be seen in daylight, and was
either destroyed or put to flight. In those days only the
night attacks were likely to succeed. But the submarine is
practically invisible, both b
' day and night, hence the great
opportunity of a successful torpedo attack and the difficulty
of destroying th(' submarine,
If a ship is at anchor the torpedo net is employed. It is
a steel net suspended from booms from the shiv's side. The
distance between the ship and the net must 'be such that,
when a torpedo strike" the net and explodes, the water can
shatter the force of the explosion
It is doubtful whether a net is a suffiCient safeguard
against model n torpedoes fitted with a net-cutting device.
These torpedoes are capable. under favourable conditions, of

piercing wire nets and leaving a hole large enough for the
torpedo to go through.
The subdivision of modern battleships and crmsers into
several watertight comp
rtments, so that when hit by a
torpedo it can still float and probably be saved, can hardly
be considered as a defence.
There is great scope for na\'31 engmeers to discover a
method by which torpedoes and submarines can be detected
at a distance, so that there is time for the ship to get out of
the way. Perhaps it is also possible to devise apparatus
capable of altering the direction of hostile torpedoes after
having been fired by the enemy.

WAR PUBLICATIONS

IICOII

I T is interesting to note that the management of" Colour," the suc-
cessful and artistic shilling monthly, has arranged a second art
competition for subscribers, entrance to which includes an exhibi,
tion of the competing pictures at a London gallery. The last number of
" Colour," by the way, is well up to the general standard set in earlier
issues, and the frontispiece especially-" The Green Parrot "-is a
fine piece of reproduction in colour work. Both in its artistic and
literary items" Colour" is of such a high level of work as to give it
a leading place among periodicals of the day.
l\Iessrs. \Villiams and Norgate's "Home University Library"
includes two volumes by l\1r, Hilaire Belloc which are of exceptional
interest at the present time. Of these one is the" French Revolution,"
a critical study of the great upheaval with which the eighteenth
century ended, and one which enables us to realise the chief personages
of the great drama, since the work is free of the sentimentality which
characterises so many of the studies of this period and deals in
realities, The other volume, " \Yarfare in England," is a brief outline
of the various wars which have been fought out on British soil, from
the Roman Conquest to the last Scottish wars, The initial chapter on
strategical topography is an illuminating lesson in the art of war,
Messrs, John Murray have just issued a shilling edition of
Professor Cramb's "Germany and England," which, reviewed in
these columns some time ago, has proved one of the most popular
books on the causes of the war--as it is one of the sanest of treatises
on the subject,
In " The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain," published at
5 s . by l\Iessrs. John :\Iurray, Professor Cramb has been at pains to
trace the growth of Imperialism, " whether conscious or unconscious,
from the earliest times." It is not a book to be read lightly, but an
earnest study of British destiny, and its author's conclusion, that
" the purple fringe of another dawn is on the horizon," embodies the
feeling that is gained by a careful perusal of the work. \Ye recommend
it as a worthy tcxt-book for students of the highest forms of
Imperialism.
In "Echoes from the Fleet" (\Yilliams and Norgate, 2S, net)
Mr. L. Cope Cornford has embodied a number of sketches and stories
of the Kavy of to-day. All are worth reading, and some are very good
indeed; the book as a whole is of such quality that Lord Charles
Beresford describes it as " a valuable contribution towards a better
understanding of the Royal Kavy," Such appreciation, from such an
authority, renders criticism on the part of a landsman superfluous.
Apart from the technical value of the book it contains some ven'
good stories, \Ye need say no more.
"Battle," by Haldane :\lacfall, publi
hed by
lessrs. Simpkin,
Marshall & Co" is a well,compiled work describing the work of an
army, In these days, when those who cannot fight are thinking and
commenting on war, it is a very useful little volume, and we commend
it to the notice of those who wish to understand more clearly the
way in which armies perform their tasks.

MOTOR FUEL.-From personal inspection we can testify to tl]('
immense care taken by the Shell Company in the endeavour the,'
are continually making to improve their methods to ensure that the
quantity and quality of the spirit Sh.ll! be up to the highest standard,
To the motorist gummed up valves and dirty sparking plugs are
often a source of serious inconvenience, and both these calamities
arise from the use of spirit which hdS not been properly refined or
which contains alien nlolterial. l\Iotorists and aviators by using
Shell spirit mfeguard themselves against accident and inconvenience,

Terms of Subscription to
uTHE COUNTY GENTLEMAN

AND

LAND

AND

WATER"

(ESTABLISHED ,862),
AT HOME-Twelve Months n 8 0
CANADA-Twelve l\Ionths n 10 6
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve l\Ionths5:1 17 0

The above rates ÙlC/J.de all Special Numbers and Postage.

BACK COPIES of .. LAND AND WATER,' containing the
series of Articles by HILAIRE BELLOC, .. THE WAR BY
LAND"; and FRED. T. JANE," THE WAR BY WATER;"
can be obtained through any Newsagent, or on application
to the Offices of "LAND AND WATER," CENTRAL HOUSE,
IÙNGSWAY, W,C.
Telephone: Telegraphic Address:
457 2 Regent. II Agendoruffi. Westcent, London."

2g8

Fenruary 20, 1915

LAND AND WATER

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The smo\ter who is ever on the look out for .. some-
thing better" in smoking mixtures should try a pipe of
.. Three Nuns:'
Henceforward he will become one of the contented

mokers-content so long as he can secure his beloved
mixture.
The fragrance. once experienced, can never be
forgotten. Thai is the fascination of .. Three Nuns."

..

BOTH ARE OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE.
PER 6
d. OZ.

No, 363,

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A Test;n/! Sample will be forwarded on
application to Stephen :\litchell & Son,
Branch of The Imperial Tobacco Co. (of
Great Britain .'\. Ireland), Limited, Glasgow.

"King's Head" is similar, but stronger.

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CIGARETTES.
3d. for 10.

LAND

The Regulation British - made " Smith's"
ELECTRIC SIGNALLING & READING LAMP

<-Push-piece

This view shows the importance
of the Lamp for map and
despatch reading. The push-
piece can be operated on without
opening the case, and the case
can be detached without un-
buckling the belt. Suitable for
any climate and waterproof.
Batteries .. British Made."

Size of Lamp. 51)( 31)(:rt Iflches

Price complete, 19/6
Including two extra bulbs in lid.
Extra batteries 1/6 each
Extra bulbs 1/- each
In orderin
Extra Battr.nes the following
will be sufficient:-
Post immediately an.."-' Batteries No. 295
to ........................................................
'I')

NIGHT WRISTLET WATCH
Screw Front, Damp and . FIGURES AND HANDS
Dust Proof. ,," ' I I I I I I ,.1'" Very Luminous.
Lroer IrlQ'llenunt. Fully 'Jewelled. '\, [?:V. liøt.h Watch FNlly
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yëì.- The same Watch with
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Price, in sn"er Case,
3 0 0 HI. II' \'
2 10 0
Any watch or wristlet made wUh luminous hands, figures or spots from 7/6
S SMITH & S O N L TD" Grand Hotd Buildinu, TRAFALGAR SQ.. w.e..
. , and 68 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.
- Høld
rs ( /i.,..e RøJ/aI1Varrallls. (FstQhlislz
d 18.J1.)

.. SMITH'S OJ NOTED DAY AND

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TREDEGARS, LTD.,
53 VICTORIA ST., LONDON, S.W.
Electric Lighting Specialists.

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The Service Pocket Lamp.
Invaluable to all men on service,
Complete with spare battery, Covered
in real leather. British made throughout

"
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3/6

Postage Abroad, If- extra.
OJ at Home, 3d.
On receiPt 0/ remittance with full address
same will be immediately dispatched,
car,fully packed.

INDIGESTION

A Life-long Sufferer Finds Relief.

Messrs. Savory & Moore continue to receive the most
remarkable testimony to the value of Dr. Jenner's Absorb,
ent Lozenges for indigestion, etC. Many sufferers, like
the writer of the letter below, find that the lozenges are
successful even in cases of long standing, when all other
remedies tried have failed to give relief. They are made
solely by Savory & Moore, who strongly recommend
them for Acidity, Heartburn, Flatulence, Hunger Pain,
and all forms of Indigestion. They are pleasant to take
and quite harmless.

TESTIMONY,
.. Oxford Lodge, Southampton, Oct., 1914,
.. Miss Sargeant, having used Messrs, Savory & Moore's Absorb-
ent Lozenges, wishes to express her very great appreciation of them.
She has found them an extraordinary cure for indigestion, from
which she has suffered all her life, and has never before found that
any advertised remedies have done her the smallest good,"
Box,s Is, l
d" 2s, 9d" ønd 4s. 6d" of all Chemists,
A FREE TRIAL BOX
of the lozenges will be sent to all who write, enclosing Id. for
postage, and mentioning LAND AND WATER. to Sa,'ory & Moore, Ltd.,
Chemists to The King, l'Ua New Bond Street, London,

DR. JENNER'S
ABSORBENT LOZENGES

AND WATER

.

February 20, 19 1 5

.

A SOFT
SERVICE CAP

<Polent No, 5002/14 J,

Price -

16/6

\-

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.

Obtainable only from
STUDD & MILLINGTON MtLlTARY OUTFITTERS
. ,51 Conduit St., London, W. .

.
Officer's

.
Ideal Water Bottle

A suitable
and most
acceptable
Present
for those
at the Front.

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Nickel Silver.
Non-corrosive.
Silver-plated
inside,
Covered
with Khaki.
Screw top,

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Price e...,lete:

/

18/6

.Þ

STUDD
rJ

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Capacity 16 'Pin/.
MILLINGTON,

.

51 CONDUIT STREET.
LONDON. W.

THE WINTER IS
NOT YET OVER
- bitter winds
sweep over the plains
of Belgium in the
early Spring.
Extra protection IS
still acceptable to
officers and men.
rt'
Russian Hood Scarf in fleecy
wool matenal. 12/6
.. Stanley" Cape Sheet of
.. l\1arshproof," as supplied
by us to the British Red
Cross Society, forming cape
or motor-apron, ground-sheet
or sleeping-bag, 10/6
Lined fur. 6 guineas.
Woolly Cardigans with long
sleeves, strong in wear, grey.
80/- a dozen.
Fleecy Mittens or Cuffs in
dark assorted colour., special
value. 11/- a dozen.

rt'

MARSHAlL' &
SNELGROVE

Special Department for Cam-
p .igning ACL'essories. Direct
Entrance (.orner of Oxford
Street & M,trylt:bone Lane,

LONDON

The Countv Gentleman
"

AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LXI\'

". S \TURD \\ FEBR T' \ R\ [ PLllLISnI::D A5 J PRICE SIXPENCE
.
o 2iS:) : \.,,', \.
.î. , . 27, 1915 A :\E\\'"P,U'EH, l'LliLl"HbV "hbh.L\<

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GEKER.-\L SIR DOlTGLAS HAIG

Commanding the I st Army Corps

J .-\ X D :\ X D \ Y .-\ T F R

February 27, IqIS

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THE ROLL CALL OF THE LONDON SCOTTISH. A Photograph, full of human interest, taken b)' an amafeur.

SNAPSHOTS AT THE FRONT
AND ON THE HIGII SEAS

Wil1 Officers and others sell i their War Snapshots to the" Daily
firror,"
Bouverie Street, London, It pays better than any other newspaper for all
pictures used. Films d
\'eloped free of charge, and originals returned
if required. Senders' names not disclosed.

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February 27, 1915

L A X D A K D \Y ATE R

SHOOTING
REAL & IMAGINARY

By GUY C. POLLOCK

I \:\1 not yet, I regret to say, in
u('h a c"
e that much
learning has made me maù, .But it becomes dail
'
more app.lrent to me that continual stud\" of military
experts not exduding the notorious Bernhardi wl:o,
I sincereh- trust, is likeh' to draw no ro\'aIties for the
extraordinar\" sale of his candiC! and unprincipled \"()Iume-
has thoroughly fogged such intelligence as once I boasted. It
has been my lot not only to read the military experts but to
talk to some of them and to tak(' counsel \\ ith them; and
I refer now not to ..;uch milit<ln' expert
as you and I, who
could teach General Joffre and Sir John French and -\ùmiral
Jellicoe their busine5s, but to the þukka experts whos(' quali-
fications gi\'e tl1('01 authority for the ù,lih' instrurtion of a
hitherto unnIÎlitan' nation in tIle colo
<:al art of war.
Rightl
' or wrongly, I draw certain inference
from the
doctrine of these men; and J find that it may be applied to
the inglorious sport of game sh03ting, in which some few of
us, because military authority sets up such humili.tting
standards of age and physical fitness for martial occupation,
are still engaged at less frequent intervals than was formerly
the case, One of these inferences is that large flanking
movements are the essence of both strategy and tactics.
Another is that the success of such movements presupposes
a quite sufficient force of all arms, combined with an excellent
accurac
' of fire and a perfect fire control.
Unfurtunateh', the special constable and m\"self were
compelled to disrègard these a:\.ioms when we eadea.\"oured to
destro\' the enem\- force of partridges with a ludicrously in-
adequàte arm
', It so happened that the old soldier was
compelled to fail us at the last moment, His defection was
was onl\" made known to us when we reached the platform.
I f we had remf'mberf'd our militar
' experts we should,
perhap"', ha\'e withdr.lwn our force in
afety without
risking di,;aster. But one beater and one black dog awaited
us at thl' wa\'siùe station, and the da\" was n'n' fine, So we
pursued our' entl'rprise, filling the train iournè\" "ith much
talk of our country and with gloom
' su"picions of a suppu,;ed
German spy in a corner of the carri.!ge- -\\ ho turned out a
private of the new arm\".
All the morning, then, we pursued our partridges with
indifferent "nccess. An unusual drought- which would ha\'e
been so valuable to the good fellows who are S.l \"Îng our skins
for us in trenches often half full of water- had made these
birds uncommonh' suspicious of human approach now
become particularl
' audible on the baked stubbles and through
the langui..;llÎng root fields, Our line of tlm'e, e\"en when
reinforced b\' half a beater in the shape of a small boy, could
not cope with the tactical situation, If \\ e ðtended to a
hundred paces the con'\'s rose in the gaps of the line and
flew awa\' unpursued b
' shot-until we became so chagrined
that we fired .lhsurdl\" long shots. \\ ith the sole rcsult of
frightening the bird,;' into more protracted flight. If we
do,;ed on the centre and took the few field" of good co\'er in
narrow
trip,; the coveys rose far away on the unguarded
flank, Be,;ides, a little of this sort of sport goes a good long
way, To divide a ten-acre field of mangolds into three
'iections, and to take each section against L the wind across
the drills, retracing one's tired ,;teps beÍ\\l'cn each section.
is well enough when three guns, kno\\ ing that Í\\O or three
coveys are in the field, have a reasoned hope of getting so
near them that every gun may come into action. But when
two guns, with a beater and a half, aided b
' a wilful black
dog, divide ten acres of mangolds into fi\'e "ections, doubtful
whether any coveys are actually in the field, and moralh'
certain that if so thev will rise out of shot, one consequence
is certain. That coñsequence is that they compound "ith
strategy, abandon the retraction of tired steps, blunder over
the field in the easiest way, and are so surpri,;ed when a
close-lying covey does rise that they miss "ith all four barrels.

That was, more or less, the first four hours of the day,
Fortified by tea, the partridges were found in an unexpectedly
kindl
' mood, All the familiar coveys were on the ground
-\\ ithout any too visible ravages by our former batteries.
,-\11 waited for us in roots or on stubbles. ,Most got away
without paying am'thing like the toll that should have been
exacted,
ot for thc first time nor, probably, for the last
I ha\'e entered-in small, "hy letters-in the game-book
"
hooting abominable." But it was a glorious late Septem-
ber e\"ening, and we cheered the chief beater by talking to
him of Zeppelin raids and telling him that. after all, his
hrothf'r (somewhere on the Ri\'cr .-\isne) might not have a
f.lInil
' monopoly of the unnen-ing excitements of e:\.plosives.
But there is \"et another inference to be dra\\n, I think,
from the military' experts and their literature. That is that
anticipation is the most important thing of all. The number
and the variety of militar
' anticipations would appal me if I
were to consider them in cold biood, And anticipation has
a fiero::e satisfaction utterly denif'd to the prosaic fact with
which it so seldom corresponds, I shall therefore anticipate
the doings of three whole guns on the little shoot when, not
too late in October, we snatch, if it so m.!\ be, three more
days from the \Heckage of an annual holiday.
First for the total bag in modest figures. It shall be
fifteen brace of partridges, t\\ enty-eight pheasants, three
hares, and thirty-fi\'e rabbits, \\ ith onf' duck, two plover,
and fi\'c pigeons to add a ple.tsant \'ariety. \Ye are to
hoot
with the d.ccuracv re"en'ed for our best davs. \Ye are to
find the withy bed full of phea<:ants, of which
e\'eral- -let me
be candid-are to escape by the back door. In Kilkenny
Copse-you see how frank m
' imagination is-\\e are to
suffer a reverse. .\n unfortunate lapse on the part of the
black dog, who will therc run in, despite all objurgatIons.
and set up a premature flush of bird
, and some confuo.;ion on
the part of the guns will help
e\'eral of thesp birds to go
scot free But when "e come to .-\shwales \\ e "hall deal
vcrv faithful1\- with it,; ele\'en phea
ants, killing ten of them
with a mortal preci,;Îlm of fire Then shall b(' accomplished b

onc of us the two a<.::reeahle feats of a high pheasant and a
hare to two barreb, follow('d as soon as the new cartridges
arc in by a right and left out of the covey of partridges which
bursts suddenlv and attractiveh' out of the shelter of the
bottom hedgerO\\, -\nd on one 'of the other da \'S we are to
find our partridges in that most curiousl
' subl11i
sive and quies-
cent mood which surpri
es tlIP shooter at iJ1tervals throughout
the season, so that we make ha\' of them while the sun shines,
and are .tmply re\\ ardcd for minch and countermarch.

Terms of Subscription to
uTHE COUNTY GENTLEl\1AN

A:>/D

LAND

AND

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(ESTARLlSHFD 1
6
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AT HO:\IE -Tweh'e Months n 8 0
CAN.\DA-Twelve l\Ionths n 10 6
ELSE\\"HERE .\BRO.\D-Twelve
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Tht abovt ratts ,,,ellide all Sttcial Nllmbers a"d Pastagt.

BACK COPIES of "LA;o..rD AND \\ATER," containing the
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L-\!,;D" ; anù FRED, T, JA
E, ,. THE WAR BY WATER'"
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I I

Fl:bruary 27, 19 1 5

LAND AND \\ATER

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IlT The v. ristlct w .Itch illust"at
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D 3 6
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DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to Resi

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INEXPENSIVE & EASY LOCOMOTION
DURING WAR TIME.

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158 SLOANE ST. Iby Sloa.ne Squa.re" S,W.

3 T2

'c )fUary _',

;].

L _\ X DAN D :\\
ATE R.

LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.

rrHE

WAR

BY

lWTE.-TlJls .\rtic!c h:;.s been scbmiHcd (0 (lit p(
.s Bur
.HI, wId>:!. d!lcs lIot object to the publication .. ccnsored, and take. .,
re:;po'lsib!:ity (Oi' t
.e c3rccltness of th
statements. ' .
In accordance
ith tile rcq;!!r!:mcnh 01 t11e Prcs
3uclnu. the (l95Hi9'!S of troops 011 Plans iIIustra1ill;:! tbij Article must only be
res.uJe
aii ilt'prð.:Ündte. adJ no deiiuih: slrcnglh at dllY I,oint b indi".ted,

THE E.\ST PRUSSL\N FRO:NT.
\i{V H:\ T has hnppN!ed upon t}w l'<l<jt
". l'rnssÏ;1I1 frontier in the course of the , '
Ia.,t fortnight. is now pC'rf{'ctl,\r de"H.
. :m:l we mu
!; seize it::; dC'tail
brfore
,..c proC'ècd to its Ine:1J1 in g,
rpOll Tebru:ìry ith, just aft.:'r tho great
cJort. in Cront of ,""'arsaw hat! Ùiled, "\yith "\'ery

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I'ea"\T los.:ies to the enemy, the concentr(1t.ion of
German troops in Ea!'.t Prnssi(1 ,..as complete and
the ad\'ance ag(1inst the Russian innl.ders taken.
Some have conjeC't.ured that the grC'at attack
upon ,"T
H'SàW frOlI] February 2nd to J'ebrnarr
8th wa3 no more than a diversion, wit.h the obje
.t
of withdrawing the Hussian attent.ion from the
',low whkh mH; ahout to fan in thE' North. This
conception is a little far-fc[ched. The effort

made against the Rawka line in the first week or'
the month was extremely serious, yery e:xpcnsÏ"\'e.
antI only just. failed of 'success. But ,\ hether it
"'ere (1 feint or no, it was during its progress that'
the German troops, already pressing in East
Pru%ia, were joined bJ' the new formations. the
importancc of which ,rill be discussed in a
moment, and that the cle,l ring of the invadC'd
pro\'inte was begnn. The belt. of East Prussia.

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,,'hith our Allies kHI occlll'ic,I aud completel.v
denuded of snpplici, ag a;:::ain:;t their nel'('ss:tl'.r-
rctrC'at (for, as Ins IJeen rC'pcat('t!I
' poir:..trd out
in these columns, the H,ussian equipped nllmh('ì'

are not) et sunicicnt for an outcr adnuwc upon
either wing) had l'C'a\.'l}f't! the ri\'cr, th' line- A H
in the (11.10\ e m:l p. The Hussian forcf's in thi

di
t.rict. an:onnteJ to no mol'f' than fom' army
('(}rps-s:l.Y, aftcl' the ,rastc of "aI', l
O,núo to
1*

LAN D A X D "i 1\, T E R.

Februarr 27, 1915.

. 'lZO,OOO men, and t.hese four al'1ny corps we wiJI
'indicate upon the sketch (pnrdy diagrallu
aticallr,
of course) by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4. Ag
llIst tillS
force thCl'e appeared up
n tl
e whole l.me
rom
;J.'ilsit to the Southern frontIer anytlllng from
300,000 to 500.000 Germans, who madt' it their task
to de..l,r Prussian territor,}" of the enemy and to
n(hance upon the line of the
lemen and the
Xarc\V.
]
et it here be pointûd out that upon four
ff'pal'ate occasions the Russians have been sudden ly
l:tt..
c.b.ed by a German mOYement in force. The
ftl'
t 31. TnmH'nberg, six months ago. Xext in the
Fadden ath'anee during Odober through Russian
roland. .\c}.t in \"on Hindellberg's great stroke
to c-apture 'Yafsaw at the end of Xoyember or the
hq.::iuuing' of December; and lastly in this struggle
in Ea st Prussia, during the last fortnight.
The reason of thc::e sudden attacks has heen
J.lq,;dy the perfection of the German railway
,
)
tcm and the imperfection of the Russian; but
,there may haxe contributed to them the difficu1tr
of air wòrk ul1,ler the "cather conditions of the
time and place, and perhaps other factors of which
\\"1' kIlOW nothing. At any rate, these sudden
,:l1t(]['ks haye continua11y taken place, and haxe heen
::I
J'c!l1,ukable for their rcpetition in the Eastern
field as fo]' their absence in the "Testern.
1 on !lave, then, :;1.uddenJy and unexpe(.teùly
,nU;Jt:king the foul' units upon the line
\. B :'1ny-
t!,ilw from ej(.ht to ten unitt-::, O'oin o ' direct alon'"

:')
0 ð
't'lt' direction uf the al'1'OWS from the "est. At the
f
r:-<t shock th(' Ru:>sian rctiremi'nt "as immediately
(,!'del'(.d, fur it was appan',lt that yast1y superior
f..rl"\
s had CO!1JC into conti.H"t ".;th the four Russian
a.!'m
- corps, \\ hidl togf'thfr l.nnstituted the] Oth
Uus:-:ian :'I1'm
., anll which hall heen forcing their I
\\ a
- into East Prus:,;ia, '" i th the spf'cial object 0 f
CmhalT:J.8;.-;Ïng the general plan of the enemy .
LetwC-CTI t he Baltic and the Carpathians. '
That mtirement wonl,1 ll:tye heen normal "here the
hadcd lines n'IH'cscnt the Germans
('Hough hut for a succes
ful piece of
tratf'gy on and the uHt-::hadcd ones the Hussian:,:. 4,
the elJe
HY's r1art, which cost the Hussians pf'rhaps tll1
eatencd with Ya
tly
npel'ior forces and
:)0.000. }>nhaps 10,000, men, and rather le
s than returning from (" faDs back on to the po:,;itiflJl
JlaJf the artilJery of one corps, This successful of the dotted oblong ...\, meanwhile Jlwkil)g' fN'
l}i{'
{' of strategy I will neÜ pl'Oceeù to describe. Kovno at K. :Meanwhile:
tries to falJ back
The bIO\" aimed at unit So. 4- was directed to\vards the position B, hut before he gets there
"ith
pecial weight against the left-hand of its is badly crushed upon buth tianks hr the extcnding
]ine at C. The German commanders cyidently pre- en('my in front of. him ilnd by the spreading Otlt of
:-upposcd-allil with justice-that the fourth unit t}lè.Ü cneun"s lines, which takt's immediate aùmll-
of the Hwssiall command, in peril of b('ing thus tage of thë gap bet,yeen A 31111 B, and of :1 only a,
cut off from the rl
st of the army and ha\ ing small proportion makes gooll the retreat to the
behind it the advance 011 Koyno, would fall back frontier.
itS rapidly as possible upon that town. Permanent
Iealm hile 1 :mLl 2, lower down th(' liJJ(',
fortifications are always-and neces
arily-a lure fought normally enough and suficrcII no di
aster.
to an army in peril from superior forces pressing They retreated in not too great haste, fighting for
it. And this fourth unit had, as a fact, not only more than a week with their l'eal'guiHds to defend
f.lllen hack with the utmost rapidity toward
.:; the narro\vs hetween the }akC's Ül. the Masurian
]\O\"no, but also had turned slowly in the press of region (half shaded upon the map). The last
tliat rct1'eat from facing east to facing nOl'th- stand of the'ic rcarguards "as lOunù the town of
f'nst. The unit immediatC'lv to the south, Xo. 3 Lrck, which was carried by the enemy upon the
(which was the 20th Army Corps under Bulgakov) 1Òth of :Fehl'uary. By the 12th all the nu
sian
neither retreated with the same rapidity nor forces were out of Gcrmllu soil. 'Yhat [ ha\"o
in the same direction, The precipitate retire- mlJctl the fourth corps was
afe hack near KO\Jw,
ment of No. 4 under the pressure upon its the third had for the most part disappeared in its
}t.>ft left Xo, 3 exposed, and the enemy broke in disaster, tbe second a!ld the first ",ere standing in
through the gap thus left hct.ween No. 3 :ll1d front of the line of the
îemen, ::Ind Jay tlJCJ"C in
No.4. No, 3 could not even attempt to extricate front of Grodno, pa
sil1g in front of Osowicc to in
itsrlf by a paraJlel march towards Koyno-the front of Lomaz, On Sunòar, the 14th, the large
di,stance was too great-while No.4 was marching German forces, having reordered their Ijne, pro-
fiùmewhat 110rth of east, 3 was falling back eeeded to two ta,sl{s, the advance of the smaller
"onth of east, and suITel'c(1 the whole weight of body from :\ViJkowiski and Marianpol to the
the German north centraJ adyance. No. 4 go
Lower :Nlcmen and the adyanee on the ]ine Gro.Jno-
2*

.away, hut :Xo.. 3, was hent., 1)31't.ially em-eloped, and
for the most part wiped out as a :fighting fmce.
Lt was not \\ holly emeJoped, as is proved by tile
fact that it did not lose even a full half of its
guns, and t1mt cert.ain elements eomposing it
escaped entire. But of the thirty odd thousand
men composing it the greater part neyer returned
to Russia. They "ere killed. or picked up as
wounded, or, Fome portion of them, captured as
unwounded prisoners. The whole moyemcnt may
bo clearly enough se(
n in SOhle such tliaO'ram as
". '-" 0
the followmg:

K

c::
(í)
$::
w..,.
'Qì
;

o

(U
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O::;f)wiec-Lomza. That 3lhi\HCe was
Ílw. He:tvy
as ha d bpen t h(' H llssia n I01':
w,-J, th(' Tos:;c,..; of t hè
enemy attacking the well-defendell n<.urOW5
hetween the lakes must Dave bet'n far he<)\'iel' than
that of tlIt", Hussians in wounded anll killed (
an

in the 20th Corps), ami thl'H' appf:'ar<: to haH' beell
somet.l1Ïng like a ha It for the ret)!wwisatillll of the
ath-a.ncing force before its ncxt effort wa
marle.
Tha t. next cffort took the fOrlIl of a llumber
of loeal actions upon the Thllrsdar amI :Fritll1,\-
and
aturdaY of last w{'C'k, and it. is interestiu."
. -,
to note where thesc 10G<.\ t actions took p1ac-{.,
I)e
ause thcse point$ are an indicat.ion of the
approach vf the cnemy to the \îemen and -Safc"\\'
line. '
You 113'-e threc point::> in particubr, E(lch of
thpm is about ten wilcs from thl" defeasive line
of the rivers, tlu' fa.te oi which line lends all il

]Heaning to the pre
t'nt turning 1I1lJ\'e!U<.'llt, for tht'
inyestment of 'Va r
rt.w.
Yon have, first of a 11, an cng
g't'ment taking-
pla.cc on tht" road betwee-ll Grodnl.' and Lípskl.l,

"12'+1
.. .II . . I .

,'"
.

M i1
I.

some\....here about the point mal'ked X. Then' is
only one highroad in thi8 ùi:.;trict. It wa.s upon
either side of this causeway that tltf' action fK'ems
to Lave diverged, and its Ìocalitv shows that the
('nerov havc 1 )as3cd without ('h(.ck throuo'h the
v M
forest of _\.ugustowo: an adn
nta(;-e "Lidl ther
owed to the partial destl'Uet.ioll o of the 20th
UU8sian Armj- Corps. The cnemy i
in hig ne
t
column aiming at the ceutI'al point of Osowiec.
"-c arc not. gi\-cn the name of the locality
where the shock took place in thi::ï line, but it
nU13t havc been at. much the same distance from
thc river a5 on the Grodno admnce, and at about
eight miles or so from the Bohr one, wLich
i::; part of the Xiemcn-Xarew line. fig in
the following plan. U..-re, again, only one
main road crosses the belt of marsh tIìro1.1. o 'h
which the little riYer 131...11,,1' sluggishl.\' wind
,
the great marsh known as t.he :Marsh of
Lafki. Our indication as to the localit\-- of thi

shock is afforded by the news that the gtlÌIS of the
forts of Osowiec, the range of whose north-wcE;l.ern
sector lies somcwhere alung the line A B. were in
action: so your central Germa,n admuf'(, bad
r&1.ched, by'last Saturday morning at ]atl'o;t, to
within a day's march of the defensÌye point of
OsO\'\'iec, upon which eyerything here depeulk
The third point on which the Gt'rman adrance
Ims de\'e1oped, as shown on the foHowing page, i

further south still and is concerncd. \\ ith the hend
of the Xarew east of Lomza.
This is a very import.ant point.
It is here that the defensÌ\'c line al'IH'úacIJc;;;
most nearly to the railway which it is the ohjeet of
the enemJ: to cut. .'J:herc' are 110 o1Htade
of lll
u!)h
1*

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just at this placf', when once one is wcst of the
great "}Tizna marsh.
Here, aga.in, the action took pla('{' at al.out
a day's march from tIle Llefensi\e line. The "ilhtFp.
of JC\nLbno is the starting point for t\\O COlll
1

that might be taI-.ing thp roads for \Yizna
:wd I.omza. respecti\e1). At 8Iì.
' rate, it i
th

outpo:;;t 'which must he taken before LOHlLa and
the line of t.he Xarew at this point can b(' cafl'ied.
l'pOl
Friday, or po
sibly as latt' a
Saturday
morn Illg'. a counler oifensiw undcrtaken b, tLd
Russian::: carried and h.e l )t Je"labuo a"'ctÌnst the
I' Q
uerman!=;.
l\IattCl'::; therefore in gf'nera 1 stand thus. Th

Hussian retreat has bf'en eUeded }iOrmalh- cnouo.1t
,,"'ith the los
of not. 1
per cent.. of it;;; gmìs :md
f
such wounded prisoner!=; as a rapil1 r('tirement
J)('fol'e an unexpected blow deli\-erctl fly greatlr
superior numhcrs nercssarih' in\'oh'cs. But to thi

general statement there is àn unfortunate exc('p-
tion in the army corps lost, the 2nd on[' in tht1
l1us::;ian line frum south to north, the 20th, of
which two diyisiollS disappeitred anti of which llot
quite one-half of the artillel'J' appears to ha \/e
been takeH.
The remaindcr of the 10th Rns
ian arJUY,
h::u'ing lost altogether, 83,\', 3j,OnO 01' 40,000 JHèu
and 6U or 70 out of. say, 6UO p;nll
, is now just in
frout of the dcfcusi\'e lÌ1ll"' l\icmcn-nobl'-
ar
w,
",hid} ('O\ers the ma.in railway fceding ,\Yar3<lW
from the
.E., and on Saturday last (\\e 1mV(' no
latcr nc\,:::ò at the moment of writing, Tuesday
cH'ning) it ,,'as engagcll with nll'ious port-ions (;r
thc e11elIl1' on point
about a dar's march in front
of thi:
dèfensÌ\e line. '
80 mueh !K'ing said, let u.s t.Ut'll to t.he ohjcet
and ('ompatatnc SUCC(',.;s or faIlure of the UCl'lUaU
mo\emenL in thi
region as a whole.
The effort oI the Gcrmans UDon the frontier

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? /lr, .
ê</_V-.r"
I, 'J
,

IJ
::J

.
4",q%-

"12:0""
.. . 1 . I

.0
,

Milu.

of E:1st Prn'S!"-ia ana n
aili;"t the line of th(' Kicmcu
a.nù the :,are\y is then de'l'lnlJC'll and ullmist.ak-
ilf;le. Tlle'- iHe' 011 tk,t line as 1 \';rite. "-hat ('011-
dnsiolJs doc.; the position lead us to as to the
uatul'C of their aUat:k !
The first thin
we mu
t i\ttpmpt to settle> is
\\'hethel' our original ('stimate that the great
moyement \\"i

intcmk,l to piel't:c the dcfpudèd
line of the XiU1WD a.nd \a1'{'w ;lJld to rC.1eh the
mailJ rnih'êlT lying behilJ(} that linc 'Ya
an accu-
rate' esti!llatt' fir no.
TIll' lIf'xt .in(l;
H1('nt I Pl'OP()
{' to re\Y('igh is
the eoncIu:;ion th;Lt the new formations wcre cer-
tainly IH'(''':l'llt l11'l)}) tJie German sidC'.
The tbird iudgmellt "hic-h we 111<1\' return to
-a um,. h Ie::.s ì'mp
rtalìt matter-is the measure
of tbe> (
t'I'ma.n sU{'{'(':-:s in this field to far.
:\.:- to t he fil'
t of t!J('sc poill t:; :
It is c!c[j r tha t if the Gcrman effort was Hot
dirC'd(
d :\t the piercing of tlle .:\îf'lIwn-Narew line

,nd th{' :-e;zing d tIle raih',ay heyond it, it had no
st ra tcgi.(' ohjc(,t.

Ii d(lc:., not follow tlwt tll{' Gcrm:m moye was
f'ither pnrp!1!"d<'ss (which ,\Ould J.c impossihJc) or
iil-direct(.,l. It limy hayc ha!l no ol)je(:t hut that of
.. countcring:' .1 m-t as a wall. finlling himself t.oo
hard JH"t>sscd Ly .m enemr. nta
tÌeliwr a sudden
hlow c'.hau-.;;ting to himsdf for the moment. and
Jwit her iHtcndetl nor expec-te'd to fmish his oppo-
HC'nt, but i1t i'lny r.1te suf1j('ient to r<:,lie\c the pres-
SHre for a tiuw. If the' Gcrmans were acting in
this \\"a\', then the {'ondusion to "hit.h so many
C'l'itics c;f this (':unpai
n Iune comc, thnt GermaD
:
f('els IJt'l'!'elf besi<>ged al1d is aetiug like one
l;esie
'ed. is (loubly llrowd. ror to expend so much
elleq::y on \'\- hât i
110 more than a sortie, and was
not intended to be more than a. sflrtie, with no
flcnnitf' oJ,jet.:t of final succe
s in front of it, would
be a fuB (:onfession, H.ot only of aS8iegement, but
of HC'arly hopc!{'ss a
s]egem(;llt.
But it is not t.o be bclicyed that the German
G('Uf'f'aJ Staff as yet adopts that. attitude. That it
J"f'gards t]le forces of jt
clf and of its a]]y as held
i11 the East li1Hl \Yc
t is ('el'tain, heeause thilt i

a 1,lain fact, 01.1, iùus to ewry oh
{'rYer. But
that it regards the position in the ]
3st
1S so
desperat.e that a }}}('re Ilea,'," demonstration lead-
ing to llûthing is all that is left to do,
t:mmnt IIC :!ec{'pted. The Germans and
An:<;tl'ians arc still in snperior numhcrs upon
this fmllt. They C'Cl't3ÌIIJr haye i1 l.oneerted plan,
;nul it is :llmo
t wearisomc]y oln'ious that the
Pl.ssession of "-:U&'1W i
, th{' kf'Y to that plan. It
is not tû be ('l(.diterl that "ith th(' knowJedge-
('ommon to :myonc pos
e
siJJg a J'nilway map,-of

'TarMw /ieing the t.
tpihd poiiit of the campaign,

V'dH'U<l1'Y 27, 1!)1 fl.

5

they wfluld wakf' a 1Hm c Jike i hi", round the north
tlañk of the \\
;H:oan po
ition \,
ith()ut H1("wing to
thr<:,atf'H "';11:-<a\\". Th<,y mil" be dleck(,tl in tb(.ir
front, and \\- hen t h'y ;j...." dlcc:keù t h('
- may pre-
tend, fir cle
i l'(, to helint"". that t I1p\' }w\-er
attemptec] tIre threat at aB. }3ut it \\iH l:C'lajr('
a
most eogcllt and ('xct'ptioJI:lJ pJ'(ì{lf to ('om ince
anyone that. ;1. mon
rn('})
upon
neh a
(';lk was
undertakeil for llothil1g m(;1'(, than at the least a.
dell1onstl'atÍ0]1 allt! i1t the 11('
t ê1 Cfluute]' hlc'''.
It may 11(' urf;c'tl (ns C'{,lt;lÍn crjti
}s h:lm
already urged) that the eile:n
's ol)ject Wê.l" H
(,l'eI.v
to denr the illY;lt!cr out flf GeI' 1 nan soil. That is
surely quite ilìcreflih1c, for the simple H'aSCH that
it is not\\ar. :,hort of :-:allth-
- politi....d inanities
upon the defèIli-i,-e beint!: mor::l êlJ](1 the flffcn
iYe
immoral, human
pee:h C:UHlot be fl ;uBC'(l to C
-
press till' ineptitmfp of an operation '."hidl s\iou1d
consider mcrc polllicê.l 1 fr(\ntÌ{']'s.
\n iì "nn'
o(':'\
into tIll' field ill OJ'de't, to (}(,fcat oî:her ,"!'J'í'rlcs
ftl':1tegie:llly. rnat is. it goes iHto the field in
order to ]'('nll['1' th(' O l l l ,)o:-;JJW arm". tÌ1]'OU!{Ì1 Jo:'
e

(") '- ....I
of CyelT kÍJHl. wÌ!{'tlwr of Jllunhe'l's lJ]' l'ohc.;ion.
o
much i'nf'erjor that it l";;Tl no Jm'gc]' op;lose ,\ ith
success. It (kef: not g'o ir1to thc 1i
.:Jtl 1Il(,H>lr to
clear eel'hliu g(-Of;T:ìl;l:il'dl areas to ,,,hii'll its
leatlert-; happen to b(' atbH.hPtl. If it did tlUI!,
it would siJU I ,l\- he a
kino' for dcfeilt in till' fl
tUl'C
. "
and spendilì
its st.rength in an o"j(.'
.t tlrat "as
not mi]itaJT at <111.
L(4 us
then, talcQ for grallt('(l th;lt the enemy
has the O1dy conef'i,ahle :'ootl'ntrgie obje
t the' 1'e'g!OH
affords, nnt! that he is t l'
'iJlg to breaJ\: the :\"Ìe1!1C 1 1-
Karcw line; 1'urthr,l'. that. h{' is trying to c/o this
in order to t'ut the' raihY;lv hdlÍnd (hilt ]ÍJ)('. How
do his chaut'cs uf suct:e:-;s"look in the light of the
late
t 11m,;:; !
"Te note, in the first l'lace. t.lwt the Hnssian
reti rcUI{']}t. <l S .1 whole, l\ as neither coufu::-pt! nor
suhjeet. to the will of the cnemy. The nm.;giam

have not l'<,t.il'{'t! in sUl'h dircdion
amI sueh tlire:--
tions only as the superiflr forces her ore them ùeter-
mined. TIlf'Y have retired upon diyerg-ent HIlt'S
tmyards ehoscll J)i1Ses-Koyno, Osowie.:, J
omza.
On one of thea' lines they haTe sufìcl'{.tl a local
dis..'tster-t he line through '...\llgnstO\\-o. The others
bave licen accurately ful1O\\
ed. They han
f:O
retired that each of tIle fortres
cs defending' the
Hne of the ri,-cl'S shan be at its maximum Htrcngth
if or when the e>Tlemy reaches t.hat IÜ}(', and hv
this method of rctireli;cnt they haTe l<>ft. the cllem,r
the choice either of neglec-tiug the remaining forc

upon the northern flank hetween Grodno nUll
Kmno-whirh may then go south at their tim

\\ hen the i!>sue is joined upon the 1\are\\-o1' of
following the ]'e>trrat up to the :.\îcmNl betwf'cn
Grodno and 1(O\-no and tIlcn. sf'paraiillg tht'ir
forces, by t he marshy district of fOl'('sb bet\Yee'1l
Crodno :1nd 0:';0" ie('.
It is important to uote this charade!' of the
region of t.he l'f'trcat, lIot only he>cansc it shows
that the retreat was, though rapid, in t.he maill
orJerlr, but aJso JJceause it {'nables us to judge thp
neeurat'Y of the German r{,pol'ts and the c-onfidC'l1ee
the RW::::íians still pli1cc in their fortified line. It
a bo perm i t.s us to be PC]'Í eeOy ærta i II t 1m L the
retirement "as c-ffeded in the face of wry greatly

upprior Gernwll forres.
:Kext., let it he noted that the Germans .He
ùire(;tin
their prineipnl effort., not to\' a l'lI the
Xiemen, but towards the 2\a.rew, and that is again
wlmt would h{' C'x})('cteù of it furce whose pl'iu;ipal
ohject was the railw:i)T line screening
y al'
aw
4 ì1

Fc1.1rnary 27, l!)1j.

L A X D A X D JV
\ l' E n,

from the north-east. -Fot' the nearer to 1Yarsaw
that line is reached, in feason, the OTeater the
effect. the cutting of it wiU hayc upon t1Je fortunes
of the city. That Xeo Gcorc,'ieysk Ü::;elf can be
speedily l'ecluced must he at ]eilst so t1oul)tful to
the cncnn' thilt he must, attack the '\arcw line
well abo\e the junction of tl1:1t rin'r with
the Bug. The attaek wilL of coarse, if it
dcn.'lops, ('onc'ern the \\ hole stretch of the river.
I am speaking only of the point where he will pre-
sumably use his greatest force auJ attempt to
break through. lie has ag::linst him in thi
attempt
the paucity of the roads, the condition of the soil
(another serious thaw h<n-ing just set in), and the
:lhsencc of an}' railway
aYe the' two lines, one on
Osowiee, the' other through )n
n\a, more than
100 miJes ap:U't.
The raihnlY from
Ilawa nm uring up
ammunition for an attack OIl Xeo Georgie\'sl\:, uut
not for the middle Nan
\..., and if Osowiec gives
him a. beUer road and a I;{'ttel' railway for a single
flppr'ì:t('h, it is y('t. tbe luudeBt point in the whole
line for any particular single approach, f.or it
stand
in a, mass of nw.r:;h and forest. In spIte of
his difficulties, how('ver, it seems clear enough that
tIt(' enemr intends a heaY
- attack upon the Karew.
anLl that if he does not ddi\er it it wiU only be due
to his own mise,alculatioll of the ditHculties and
the strength of the positiun gathered again
him.
It is true that pel'man
Tlt fortifications have
p;one down to how-itzer fire in thii> war, but it has
only done so where there ha, e been good roads for
tlw big caterpillar wheels to trayel on and railways
to Lring up the heaT)' ammunition of thc monsters.
Now let us turn tl} the second question-
",hether, as has bCC'lt statetl ill some quarter3
\\orth,\' of r(':;ped, the ene-my bl'Ought np his new
formatiom as I suggested last" eek.
The additiona.l erillcBee appearin;:; since then
seems to me lo make it C'Ìe.uer than c\er that hr-
dill bring np sHch ne\\' fomwtions.
It is true that. th(' G.'and Duk(' spca.k
of cer-
tain fOl'l
g ',....ing lÞl'ought np by thc enemy from
tht' front imm('diat(>lr b('fore "
al's.l\' upon the
BLur:t an
l th... Uawka
. nut the,,(' C'a1:llùt be in any
.1 I ' 1-.., .." , J
('OUSH.era, Ht' uuml'l..'r. .L w:" toreC'o:; upon t 1C two
]'iH
r
in rrout of ""<lor::;:!w ha \'(' already Ix-en
h....:ITily t.'it'll tl ,,'ou!.t he impús,;<iIJle to diminish
thr[)}
afd.r in any ('(.n
iderahì(' degree.
The Cllcm
- b1l1 in East !'nI3sia up to about
the fir
t \"'.ee l , in Februè.ur \elT small fnrc('ô indeed
-as t.he scale' of thi
wa'" goe
-i. Ill' held p0
itions
the n:
tural strengt.h of \\ ltich is inf
rior to none in
l
ul'op('. He held tlk'nl ag.I,inst nothing more than
the 10th Ihl3,>Ütn Al'lII\', enTl'i.iôting of no more
than futH, iu'mr C't)I'ps:
(:t he \\ as ('omp('l}ed to give
"a" som!'\\ halo It i
not. erl'tlible 11(' ha.d Inucb
1l10l'e thau f\n,OUU or l(iLI,fliI(J men ill th(' fielù.
After the fir:-;t \H't".. in February hc appears
with anJ'thillg l:('t\\('{'n :100,1100 and 400,000 men.
""here' did tlJc c:dra llço\\' 1'!Il'c(,,,; COl!l(' from? Kot
frùm the C:H'pat.hian front. for that. nceds ('very
man the eneBW ('an sr
re and more. \ot fmm tbe
wc
t front, which i'> WIT }H'a\"Ílr trÌ('t!, and into
whieh, as:-t fact, he has h:\d J.. put n(';,,- forecs quite
l'('cent Iy.
'\'òt fl'OI11 any con..,it.l.'rab!e tm ined r(';er\'c,
hcc:-4-us(' \\(. know fì'o!l1 ('1-erç inti ica,ticII' of tbe ca m-
J':tign PIIt! r rom {'\ er
' e"'p!'{:...
inn of Gel.'llIaJl st rate-
gic:.tl opiniün that he d(l\.'
upt work with such a
l'l
er\C (ltIdike the l
relH h). ot' r.lther, tu he :!C-t'U-
ritte, lie doc:-; not wol.'I( with a large onc. It is the

strategy of delay "hie-It doc's that, :wd n')f, the
strategy of sudden action,
The extra men can Oldy haY
come from the
ne\\< ]c\'ie
. In what numbers these new levies, anlt
in what formation, h:lì e appeared we cánnot
ex.actly tell, but we may surely safely estimate
those present upon the whole of this front from
the Uumanian border to the Baltic at this lllonwut
as not less than six and probably not more than
tcn corps. 1'11a t is not Jess than a quarter of '-

mi11ion nor more than ahout 400,fJOU 111en. The
point is of eonsiderahlc importa nce to our jmlg-
ment of the whole nàr at this juncture, hec.1.u,-;e
there is nothing upon which we must try to oMnia
a. juskr opinion than up0n the enemy's Durgin oÎ
men. ""Y e know that he has bt....C'1l fining gaps with
l1C
wly-traineù men, ,ery largC'ly. we know that
these new formations haye aPl1e<tret! upon tlle
East; it seems possihh' that SOJl1(' of them llilye also
appearcil in .AIsal'c. Il0w manr hayc alto
ctber
been put in the iÌeld np to now from tit!' German
Empire alone ''Ie cannot yet ten, but if \\e say,
counting all the filling of gaps that has gone on in
the last few months,
Uld ('ountin
thc
new great
masses in the J
ast, s.omething oY
r three-quarters
of a million, hut lc
:=; than a miliioTl, "c probably
shall not be far" mng. It is a point ,\ hjeh rather
concerns the analysis upon the dlU':'ttion of thr-
'Htr whieh "ill follow this; for the mnment let
us be content 10 cündude th.1L the lie\\' ÙWfiìßtions
ba,-e certainly appca,r<'fl anll that. so :far thc
' han

principallyappc:tred ill the I
ast(,I'n Jie-1d :Wlf, pa.r-
tieularly in this a.ction or serics of actions against
the
'ïemen :Jut! the Xarew.
1'J1f' third point of our c"'nqniry is t.he extetlt
of the succe.;s so fa.r S('orC'd J)y the ('11C'1U) :lgaiust
the 1mh Hus:iÍan
\rmy.
Let uô ilrst SlWI UP \
hat is (.xadh' known.
beinO' illlwiu('(l dil'ectÌv or indireclh: by the
o . , ,
defl'ilt
tl as weB .u affirm"I} b:" the vidf)r.\()us 5ilh
.
Two JidsÍons have :c,.ufi(,l'ed 50 !';{'\Ocre1v as to
count no longer in the Hel.!. Hut the guus 'of J('8.';;
than one di \'ision h:n e been lo,.',;t. The rpt iremcnt
in the ease of C:"1 L"h Uu
'-)ii\n oo\I,L \\ il.h tl1(' (";u cp-
tion of the Í\Hì t1i\-isÌ(,n,g tÙ
lt \'\,('re ÌSI_l}<t{ed, lk1s
been protcct('c1 upon e\'ery route aut.! in en'ry r::'l
-
sage or defile by a l'f'dr guard. These l"l'.:U'
uard::;
ha,\c necessarily
uff"l'('d bC<l\'lh-; tlt(.y h;IH' a}&)
n
c('ssarilv ah;!THlol1f'It lì'
n" or'th{'il' ,,"otllJÙl...tt to
the ell('nn:. On th(' otlvi' h:.ìn,.l thf'f(, has I:C(,11 hut
a Slna 11 propot,tion of thl' ,\ lmlc forc(' engagNl in
such actions. If \w pnt duwn ;Jt ahout 12 ppr l'
ut.
the g('nel'al IO'3ses oi the retiremcnt and add the
destl'lldion or little Ie.....;; tÙ:11l thl'" d
,
truction of
tbe h\o belated di\'ÍsjntL-i, w(' l:1[bt Tt'\ie.(' OUl'
l"arlic-l' <,"'timatC's aIhl n How f,
r somC'i:hill
me!'
40,000 out of aetiou--kiJl('{J. \\Ollmtelt, and
pl'i
Onel's. up..n t.he nn
..;ia u ",ide.
That i

YNT hc.H-.Y ton to 11;1\'(' p:tit1. It is
morc than a <(lI1Irh"'r of t.he wLul
j(ith nu
ia.1t
Al'n1\'. On the útht'l'lwnd, we must 1'('lIlemtX'r that
the \
hole a I'my was hut ;\ Sl:u.lH prnpnrt ÍU
l of the
tota 1 Hus"ian lin.'. Vour arlll)' {'or!'s out of.
perhap3, seveuty-fi \ (".
The lO;{5 in ma.tel'ial "as surpri...ing1r
ma.U
so rar a

nns go. In transport it seems to lla\'

lxx-n hc.avf. \\ hidl i
what one would e'xPl"._t undet'
the' conditions of !';uch a retrcat undf'ftal...en with
all the b.td Iud.. of a Iw"t>nt tha.w and foHtt\yed by,
a. he.n y itl n of sum.. .
'VhaL the corresl'omling 111sS('::ò of the att
H:k-
iog sid(' mar lI;He b(,(,11 ,\C can o:ll.r gue
s. The
5*

LAND A
D
VATER.

ùlìly lossc-s in gnns "'üuld be the casc
\\ hieh
Io
ùC'
Ul' in n ra}Jidly-pressed advance of guns (h8-
<'Ibled bv the cnenl\"s fire. In transport hardJy any
Joss, Jnit in !/lell å ycry heas} one. Yon ÙO ll?t
force a quantity of defiles betwecn nmr:;he
and,m
!"l.lch \wather against CWll a greatly wfrl'}or
,-oucm.r (Russians were inferior b:" perhn ps
'me to
three) \\ it hout Jû::.i ug a gl'('a t many meu 11l the
proec&s. And that is pal'tieularJ) true \\ ]Wll 0]1('
i9 using raw troops newly levi('d. They must he
used in fairly dose fO::.'lllatiou to be kept t(
grt.hcl"

ì,nd their
uccess dC'pcnfls upon llla
,;s. We ph all
riot be far '" rong if \"C put Jown t he ]os
of !,he
\
hoJo operations at 10 per cent., or f;oU}('t.hmg
1tu'gcr for the a.ttaclÜng bollies and tIle sma]Jel'
J'etreati ng' hod ies, It is pl'oha h]e ur (crtain
that the German oß"enIÚ,-e had more than
forty ndd thousand men hit during tholSe
lliIìè days. But, OIl the othel' Land, it
mU8t JJe r(
m('lnhercd th3 t these lo
sc<) Ill'e not
-as in the Russian case-absoJul.e, AJJ t he ea
ê'i
of sJjghtl,y ,\ounded reeoY(;l', and, among' the
pursuel'S,
U'C ret umcd ultimately to the fighting
line, \\"bcreas most of (Ten the sJightly woulltled in
R forl..-.c retiring \yit.h such pl'('ripitatioll as did the
UU
8ian faU into the cncmy's hands il!'; prisoners
antI <H'C JUlSt for good, Of unwoundt'd prisoners,
t.he enemy's losses must h;n-e been insignificant.
The UUßsian :l('('.OUIlt PUt8 them at 1,000.
Such wouM
l'('m t-ü he the S1.1TIHnalT of C0111-
1 );'1l'ati,,-e Josses on both sides; aud the sttitemcnt
nHIr; me to a further (!)llnncllt upon the I)}'(':"ent
condition of the Germ..m oftkial conunulliClués,
"'c han" already b(:'{'ll in the c;ll'h'c.>r l'OHl-
ments puhli::;hc(l 8û
ne months iJgO in th('
'p
cohmms "hat W
8 for lung the charadcI' of
the German ofiì.cial communiqué. It \\:-1.5
3ccarate, ope.n, and, 3:-> far as detail \\ould
allow, t.el'
e. \\ e haw further sc('n that when tIle
hope of a speedy and de.:isin
,,-jdor)" wn
Jo
t the
German ofhl'ialeommuniqné changed :;omc\'dult in
tone. It hevan to indufle, &i.Je by ::-idf' \\ itb the old
type of information. manif('st,
though 1'<11'0 and
not commonly important, cakvlateù ina('t:.UJ'(ff'i(":,
};omrtimes IkJiber3te, and in our ("YCS f;Hltastie,
fabehnods. J say" in our CYCS" ht>("ause it. was
e
idcllt that thesè fal::,;ehoods
\Cl,(, not intcmIeJ 1'01'
nul' consumption and may haye been wi!>e cnough
for the purpose for \',hidl tLey were designed.
\Yith the eommuniqué upnl1 these mon'm('nts
in East Prussia, and again:st the :, i('!Uell anù the
Narew, we :;eClll to ha\e reached a t !Ürd pha:-.c, in
\\ hich the document for the first time deals in
})hrascs at OIH.:e yague and capabJe 01' gra\e lllis-
)nterprt't:1tion 35 well as llredJc
:-;}y JJoa
tfu1.
This is no pal'til.:uÌar 3et'llsatioll of t he enemy,
Official llocmm:nts of this
Ol't in \\ ill' h;n e bC'r!}
far the emnmouC'st throughout military hi:-:torr,
and particulal'ly on the lo
inp; :-;itÌc, But t hey make Iu the W"cstCl'J1 fidll of war there Las not hef'TI
a remarkable contra
t with "hat we 1I;1\'c hitherto this weck,
tI1Y more t.h..111 the 13st, a mOyeUlellt of
bcen led to e
pect from thr c;ermal1 General :-;taf;, :mfikicllt importance to justify a ('areful analysis
a1]d they point to bomc disarm}' in the ùomcstic or to O('l:Upy the :;pa\.:c of these cuh
mn
.. But such
opinion whit'h they are .]o;Ïgncli to afIt'd. npGatioIls as Ita,ye takc-ll place, In spIte of the
Thus, t.here is a ddiher:lte confm,ion hd\\ceH immohilit.y impot;ed upon both combatants by tho
the figures élPplying to the late sf'p..l1'at(

ì1ll1 51.1('- ,...eathel', h..ue tlJÏ8 two-fold illtcre!:it: }ïr
t, that
lessful mOWBlcnt eJparing the llll
sians Ollt of they:-;11O\\- tIle prc,;sure upun the German line to h(\
J
ast Prussia and the 1(" iutcr hatt Ie," \\ hieh j[ anything, incrcf.1!;ing, :lUll, secolldl
-, tlla t in ono
obyiou:;lv is USN] as :t tf'rm for the \\ hole ma
s of point there :,if.:'émS to }Je bomc int!ication of a new
tIle opcl:ations since October. l"mnatic.ll lli\'\in
l'rached the field. The slight
l:m t.hf'r, fur the former, \\'hich is capabJe of :1 thallccs l1ìalle },cfül'c LOillhæl'tznIe-a matter of a
fairJy do:-;c al1aly
is by ::;tudcnts of \Yal', '\'C ilre fe-w yal"<1:-:-the tubcr pu:-,h f01'\
arù in the Cham...
given creùibJc fig-un.'s. IPss than a tlo](\n hattc'i"ic:3 pap'e di
tl'Í(-t over a Ù'O!:t of (,\YO or threc miJes.
and 10&::.e8 of somc 40,(11)0, "hereas for the ",l;ole tIlc sligIlt bu(:ce
s just ea:-:;t of Yal'cnl1CS am1 south-

Jt

Fchrual'
- 2';, 1û1!).

JJU
iuess of llIany months-in whieh anah-sis is
impof'sible hceau8e all details arc lacking-;v(' are
gi,en fant
]:4jc figures. Again, we are told that
.. the 10th Army Corps may be regarded
8
Laxing ef:'
!:.(-'d to nist:' That is rhetorical nOll-
f'ensc.
The lOth lnmy has lost, at a guess, 12 per
l"('nt., ccrtainly not 20 pel' c('ut. of it.::
t]'ength as
b tht'('("-qU:H't(TS of its eompoFitioJl. TIle remain-
ing qlHl1'kr IJa,; iudeed becn 80 sen
rcJy dealt ",.-ith

s to hay(' ltl
t the (-,xlst.e
1('e as a separate corps,
wJ1ile of t.he tú1:)} artiJ}erv of the 10t.h Army a fc,v
Ilea\'} pieee
, and more "than 10 hut less
than a
dozen batteriel< han'
180 h("('n lost, out oÎ the

e\'ent
- or eighty "hich acc0l1lpanJ the whole
IOJ'(e.
Remark, again, that the series of com-
muniqués, \\ hen they are an taken t.()g('ther. do not
read l
on8ecuÜn"1v. \Ye are first told that the
enemy must han" lo:-t f;uch and sUe'h a number,
\\e are next told tLat. he has po
itiwly lost a lesS('r
number, and there arc othcr di8crepa.ncies of the

a me 801'1.

-\Jlth('s(-' are not wry important. points, hut.
tlwy are \\,01.tl1 noting, ju
t 38 the deme:mour of a
witne
8 in a law eOUl't is worth noting, 1'01" the
German eomnumiqués are one of our 'T1 y few
::-ources (1f tvidcnc( upon the caJnl'
lign while it is
m })l'Ogre8s.

THE CARP ATIIIAN FRONT.

rpou the t'arpathiau front t.here is no nC\HI
8.1\-e that, 1W\\' a week olIJ, of the occupation of
C.zO'no\\itz. It i
a pity. H mc:ms tJUlL the eucmy
h;,1S thrust Lis wedge ill betwe.en a possible
Humanian illtCl'\."cntion and thc Russian armies in
Galicia. It nwam, aJHo the oec-upat.ion of thnt ra11-
\"ny ccntre which the eapit:-11 of Bukm ina iI'>, anti
th<:; importancc of \\hich J point.c,1 out l:j<;t time.
It m("
U)s :ìllthat, no HlUJ'(" Lut unfol'tunatdy 110
le
s. It dOt'S Jlc...t nU"<"iu. as C'f'rtni]) of the <.-n(';J1\"S
l'ap('1'f' fl:lW
u
g{'::'t(':j, illat th
Rnbsi8n PO.-.itiol1'in
I,
aJicia i!-o thrcatel1{',l The left Hank of the Rus-

,i1in nrmlrs in GaJida nUl he mainfaill('<.L in
;pite
of the OlTupation flf Bukm-ina.
Iol'('on
r, the
l"I)mliml1;l'atinn
of the eHemy's force in Bukoyina
arc wry (lifh! nIt. Th('y go' mTr passf-'S ùc('P ill

,UO'\'. anllllH' :aiJway (jOf'S not, et
crç(' thcm. A8
a :-1. n..t{

'ic movc it 'h{'cms far '"Jc.ss t ]Wll ,,"h
1t i

hap}ìcni;
g in tIle north a)!ainst t.he "-nl'saw r3il-
\\-a
-. hnt a
a po}itif'il1 I\)oye it has the importanre
which 1 lllì\e tJC'st:ribed. It \\ uullI lx'gi n to lun-e

;t ràtqÓc impol'

nt"c if StlIIIÎ:;lrWS 'H
r(' occupied,
for tlmt \\onll] gi\"e raih-,ay \.:olmnunicatioll .ìC:l'OSS
the mo
mtai1l8,

THE \VESTER
FIELD,

February 2ï, 1915.

T, A \" n _ \ X D "r ATE R.

east of Yerdun, the ocenpation of one of the :;pu"

in the Yosges overlooking' the Plain, a '.e an so
many small local adml1ccs which, 1.:lt{'n indiyidu-
ally, mean little. But taken togethet' the
T me:w ,
that oVe!' an the line UpOIl which they haw'
occurred the German position::; :ll'e n(j\\ Leing held
with a strid minimum of UlC'H. Thi" does not mea n
they will continue to be ::;0 held. ThC' moment the'
eneim' feels more secure in Polai1d he will l'01l1f'
haek'in gn-ater strength npon thf' \'
('st. Hnd, as I
)lave,said. there are indil'<!tions that, in OIlC point
of thC' Alsatian front, some of hi
Tiew hodies JWTP
already come into the field. The c\'idL'!l('e for this
i-; 110 lliore than a IIrief scntencc in the French COJll-
muniqué of )I0uday to the effect thfl.t eo
}siderahle
maS5(-'
of t.he enemy h
d rec('nt.ly
ppeared in front
of" the ntllev months, which lie cast of Colmar,
:md that thpv had comf' on i,Il, pe.(.uliàrly dcep and
solid form. ;rhe\" must h:ne come fr(H!l somewhere,
:md their presence, coupled with their arrange-
ment. sugg
ts new leyics. . ,
But mueh the most important point ou all
this front until the large new bodies a ppc-a l'. npon
either side is thc weiO'ht of the hean" artIlleiT.
,-We are assured. hoth in }'rench al
tl Lugli;h
e\'itlcnce, that the hC'avy al'til
eIT on the French
side now dominates it,:; opponent. but outy per::;onal
clements could tktel',uine hO\\ far this is the eas
,
a 11 d the q lwstinn 0 f derrrce here is \ cry i 111 [ )Ort3 n t .
" L
f.:.liould a really dec-isiH' superiority appear, it
would mean a great deal. It \,nuld mean some
embarrassment for .Immunition on the ('nemy's
side alft! some hreaking
traitJ in it.:; mallufadul..e.
It will, peI'haps. mean that tilt' hJockadf' in cert;tin
Jl:etals i::; beginning to tell, :nul it will tkcid{
more
than :tH}' t,ther f:1dor exeept some grí'at supe-
rioritv in numbers thE' issue of the ìWXt athanc('
(III eiÚwl' side. 'Vithont his tltf'JI grf'at superiority
in IW(t n- njc{'e
, th(' e-llemy con J d 1l0t ha \-e done
,,;hat hp did during the a(l\anl'e on l'a.rig. ""it 11-
out it IH' ('(luld 110t han' stood ;IS hf' dit! (III the
_\isne, Lackiug' it, he \\-illlt<tr<!lJ sUl"<.:eed in t!1('
.td".1IH'C with new nllmÎJl:'rS against our posit.ions
01' r('sist a enrres l londilw adyanec from our side.

A POE\'T CPO:\' THE IJ \H.O.\:-\EL LES.

TIH.' a Hat'k upon the Da rlla 1If>]]PS is on 1,\'
il)dire
.'tl,\ a l;u,,1 operation. It is chietly a 1I;w
d
opet'atjoH with a wHal uhket. a.nd cn!ltlllct.f'd In
t li(' ma in h" na \I'd fort'(,
. There is 011(' point about
it- \\ hie-h rÌJ(,l'its atti'nt.iCln in ('ounediOJ1 with the
lalld strateO'y of the affair. The Uali1'oli pcnin-

mla, as it f;" called. whieh forms the EUl'Opean
side of the DarJauell('s Straits. Hfld \\ hich take

its name from the town of Calipoli, north of these

traits a.t G (s('e plan (j) is divided from the main-
land h\ :\al'l"o\\'s. whi( h may J"C ('1-1 ned thf' Ist.hmus
of Bu(Ür at B B. .
.\ow, it i
e\'idf'nt that if this Isthmu
i8
('aptuft',1 and held in sulTiL'ÌeHt fo!'c{' hy a power
e"mmalldinO' the SC1-I, t.he reduction of the isolated
C'>
forts marked hy (,l'Os
S UPOI} thE' diagram, l)ing
t(1 the sonth along the Eurol'(';m shor(' of the ])ar-
(Ianellf's, is onJ,' a question of tillie. and \",'ith [t
n 1 od{,I'n sj("o'e train and hig-h explosi\'cs, a (lnestion
of what sh
uld be a short time, It is of interest.
t.hen'for{', to Hote the' ('ouditioHS of the Isthmus of
JJulail'. Thc
" are here il1diealed in a roucih sketch.
(Plan 7).
Th{' Isthmus is. gener
II'y speaking. occupied
Ly one big lUlup of hill, with three summits, 433ft.,
'1*

o
,

JC
I

20
t
M rL F.S

4>.Mt., and 4:36ft. resDeetivelv. Lhe 2.0uOft. COJl-
J. ,
tour reaching close to the sea upon eit.h('r side a,nd
the highC'st summit being a little to the south-
east of the eeJ 1 trai point. Thi::; highe'st summit í

crowned \'. ith a permanent work-of the yalue of
\';I1Ïl'h I know nothing-ånd there are. of COllr
e,
e'ntrenched ] inC's reaching acrORS the na 1'1'0\\ ('.-;1;
part and following the ridge hum A to B. Bat
this line can be turned by anyone in command of
tbe sea, A range of 6.000 yard
droT's sheer from
thC' top to the \\ ate-I' on the 5ea side 0 f t he 1st II HI us
right oyer the hills into the nanbnclles
traitsj

G
lf t!f Xez:o :_ . yr

"

-'-l
: ' 't'- '-'.. Cß 1
.,' : , ". -'.., -'-. Q U_alf'
" " ...nð; ., 1
-',

' T-: '1', "'-_ ',200 .
,\ ' " \. .. - ,'1M
, \ -...... ,'.'
---
, '. í \ ',.I ---;, '-.
, . "", . 436; . 'to .
.' " , ..fIIt.
"
'.."
,', . Au.-, .... _I - , ,
,'
.=
Ø'I;. -. ,400 ::-'
" ..,. /"'......, ',,,
t'
'" ,
. -_..,-:.... .t
",' .,,--,; ; \ '.1,

::,',./"
.iV
' '.. .." .,
, ",'- - . 0 . ,- . , . ,
r:/ :' *?JOO þr
';) (/ ...
.,--' ,:tþ 1

8: j,'}'"../;/ \. '-. f./

'.'
,: II . --".

'...:.........,_....... ...,'"

-; ;:;
: e ll:;::I

>
S-

.

I

"

IOØØ
..J.

201"
,

JDØ/1
I

4CN 5OD

,

éiJI1(J

-J

Yards '
t

VLI.

:Illd ther(' is deep wat.er cloæ up to the north..
western ::òhofe of t.he Isthmus.
The whole operation of û('.('u!'ying thi
littlc
Lclt of Jand or of sweeping it from the s.ea to pre--
vent its being cros...<:e<l by the cTwmy dosclÝ,
l'f'semh]es that which the .Japaue.se lwdel'took wh('ft
the-y made untenable by their ml
n-of-w<tr the
idlimns" hich unites the PC'nil1sul<l (If Port Al'lhur
to the mainland,

L A X D A :\ D :\I.:\. T E R.

:Fchruar;r 27, 1915.

THE DURATION OF THE 'VAR.
I.

T IlE first question e\'cryone asks hilll
clf J
ither the enemy, y.11o is 110'.\ in the strict 5('11se
about the war is, \Y1mt \"m be its tìf that teull hes'ïcgcd, \\iH raise the siege or the
probabJe duration? It is a matter which sirge will continue.
has not been discU:5scd in these COIUlIlUS ril'S{-, Hote that be Lan only rai
e the siege bv
J)ccausl', as \\j1J be again insisted upon in.t hreaking through UpOH the Wc:;t.

J}IOmcllt, it is llOt susceptible of calculation or A loeal and sut1ìcicnt ùe::isioll in the East
cìescription. But as the maUer is now molO than might, indeed, enahle l1Ìm to bring great forces
C
\T'r a sUbjf'l't of public discussion, and as more hack \\e&t and might therefore imliI'cctly sc
'ure
or Jc,,;s trustworthy reports of this and that his ultimate obj
ct; )mt that object "ill
nly I
e
:wthol'it-atiw opinion arc being circulated, it may fina1Jy sOt.:lH'rd if Jus !"ucccss 111 the "est IS

)e wi.sc to cOllsiùer the elements of our judgment eoml'lctr-tl13t l
, if he h1'ml" thc> line containing
m tIns matter, him and find himself ahle to dcÚ:'at in a fimll
The )'cason that interest and conjec-ture upon manner the l.;'l'CIH,h army aIlll it
allied Bl"Ìtish
the Juratioll of the ".11' haye become so much more cuntingent,
acute of late is that the end of the" inter is in III the (.1.8e of t.hat alterl1atiye :1IJ disrussion
:;ight and that this momcnt coineides \".-ith the f'nel of the duration of the "i;ar falls to the ground.
of the pcriod required for training the encmy's 'fhe menace to our ciyi1i
ation would he then so
nc,\' 1e\ i('s and for equipping our O\nl. The thiys apparcnt amI 80 prc
:"ing that c,"cry re
ource ]Cft
through whil'h we are passing are ther(;fore a. to thr "'r
tcr-n Allies \\Ould be brought into play,
Jittle more F'-uitahle for this \'Cry indeterminate AntI there GlU be no question, espe:.'ially upon the
discu:-;:-;ion than were those of the past, and we part of this cuuntrr, of :'Hlmitting the final
)11;1)' \\ ithout imprudence smn up the only elemcnts re
ult.
upon \\hit-h any judgment can be ha:-;e
l. It is pl'Oh:lhJy true to say that in case of sUf'h
l;jl'st Jet it be said tlmt aIry attf'mpt to e
ti- ft ..lisa<;ter a state of mU' \\fIuld tc:'!mic::dh T remain
mate \
ith precision tl
e pn.-,lJHblc dn.ration of
my c\-en af
('r the ,"cry di<;t::mt period in ,,:hieb 1 he
c'amp.ll
n wbatsoe\er IS a fol1y. It IS a fony mto defcatcll parties s!wuhl ha\f' !'uffered complete
\
hich thl' cnemy 'ery eouspieuou-;lr fen when he exhaust.ion, for, to ns
ël l'hrR
e jn
tly whidî 11<13
)nade sueh careful :J.)Tan
ements for a six months' been often used l'atl'cl' \'iilLlly in thi
l"ë 1 mpail:!'ll,
campaiJ.!:H and failed to
fol'(';jee the pû
sibiìity of sueh a :situation \\ou.ltlliteralJ\" and exact.J\' m
n
a campai
n lasting for a year-or at any rate life or dwth to Cl'cat Britailt. It \',"ould l)lean
made no filII preparations for the F";tU1e. the se
ul'it
; of her food supply, and without
'1'11(']'(' is no reason \\ 11\
\ye shoull} imitate food n1f'n dif'.
1his folly h
' pretending to àll
' limit of our own, It is onlv in the
f'eond nJtcrnati\-e that any
(':-;pCt:iall.\' after so man

months of \\arfarc lunc f'Jc.:;nent for f1.v1ging thc possible dUlë1tion of tJ;c
taught Us how full of unexpeetctl accidents <1, war ran h(' cOllsidered. That. sec>ond alternati\"e
WOtl('1'1l c-ampaign (;a11 be. i
the maint(,I1an
e of the present sic-ge, and the
Hut though {'ycn the yaguest prophecy waul. 1 ealcuJation upon \..hieh \\
e are engagcd somewhat
}In gratuitous fo11y, it is in this, as in almo
t all fe-moLdy rescmhJes the sm'L of cHkulèitÌon ,,-hid.
utheI' lIlilitary aíTairs, possible Lo put t,,-o aJteI'lla- p\-erv t)e8ir
inp: :UJltv gPl]N,tJ has alwpys matlc of
t.;\TS and 1"0
::tY ill the one ca
e, .. the \\'<Il' will the })owe1' 'ôf 'l'c<.;i:,t:tuec of the besjrgc.d.
)IOt he of If'sS than such awl slwh a duration;' in I.ct us ::;ee of ".-hat Llie settlcwents ptiuL:ipal1y
1 he oth('1' ease, .. it will not be of less than some consist,
uthe1' limit."' 1. Therc is fil'.-;;t the demrnt of wastage, an!l
Before tahuJating :J.nd col1l'il1cring the eJ('- that ba.s a triple form-the wa.stage ill mmtJx.r;;

})ClJt
or :-,ul'h a judgment, one probable anù Olle ()f men, the w<lstage of ammunition, and the
]mpl'Obahle diF'-turhing factor in the cakulatinu ru,trictinn of suppJies due tu a more or less
Jhust bC' f'limillatC'd. The Pl'Ob.lhle factor is t!le perft"Ct hloehHle,
entry of one or more of the nations now lleutr<:l '1. Thcw i
secondly the dement of HCW
juto the campaign: the improbable factor is nmnhcrs-tllat if., Gf recruitmei1ts UP0]l eithct'

('pal'aLC' a<:tinn, open or coUt'f'aled, uron the part sillf'. ('an the besieged army count on more na'u
CJf anyone of the .:\l1ics to the detriment ot the -if so, 110\\ llJ:ì)l\- i C.H1 tJte besieger COHIlt on
lest. further llumhc:'s-'::,i f so, in \\ hat
Ilùount?
1f ('ithl'r of these .listul'hjn o ' fa et OJ'R he 3. The third elcment is the cleme
lt of tOtJO-
1 . 0 I
at mILled all forms of caleulatiol1 upon tlÚ
graphy, 'Vhat efre
t upon my siege wiII it ha\e
J'l
tter fall to !he ground. \Ve can only judge to occupy thi!':, that, and the other poÜ.t of
"dth the matrl'wl wc hayc to hanù of \\hat will nmtage. and "bat dJ'e:,.:t will it June if the enc1llY;
fonow j f, for instance, Houmë-lllia and Italy thrcw on his sitle Jl1:1 1 wge:-) to push ont .wl! O("
l-:'p
' this:
their \\cight into our st:ale before ncxt
Ië;Y, or if that, or the other point-after breaking m

lines

ulgarja joined the enemy \
ithout a corrèspond- V
- e "jiJ cODfo;idel' those three nw in elements
mg recoupment upon our side; or "hat y.üuld of the l'ak-ul<itions in dchl.il.
J1appen if some one of the ;\ 11 i(':
, from exhau1:'tioH 1. l.;'ií'
t, as to the ,\ a stage of men.
or .from ;my other rea,>on, pursucll the common ThO'e is no need to leitcrat<' in this allah-sis

JhJed with less vigoul' than the 1'e..;t, it is perfectly the eaJcu1atioHs whidl haye so often found pÏace
Impo

ibJe to determine, in t;.e<;e column!';, 1\:fy I'r;Hlcrs kIlO'\' upon \\ lwt
ElimiHatin o O' thesc disturbin cr factors thf'J} ll!!tH'CH the r <1J"C J)<l:>('I} .-:nd that. aJr(,
Hh' some little
tllere )'í'main two grrat n]t('rn

i\Ts up
n th
t
ì'ìì(, ago,
IIC ('ould ('--;timate th(' ti)taÌ permanent
trellcra) charadeI' of whi<:h we can ùeciùe at once. }')S:-C8 of Gerln.lny 011011(', exduding ca
e
of sil:k

6*

Februal'
' 27, H)1j.

L A X D A X D ",Y ATE R.

I1CS8, at a million ane! a quartel', 311ll the total
permanent losses of hel'
clf and her aHy. l:0unting
üf course the yast number of Austro-Hungarian
prisollfrs, at about double that amount.
"Yhat is more important is a compari
on
hetw('en these Ya
t figures and the corre8po11ding
ligurcs of the All ies. 'Ye ha \T a j.a
i s for ca 1cula-
tion, as my reader
know, in the Briti
h ofikial
figures, al;d in one-the only one--ollieial pro-
nouncement dcJi\'cI'('d in Frallce now ne
rJy three
months ag(l. On the baÚs of both the
e
tate-
J1ìents we n13
' justly regard the totallo

es of the
;W' e:"tern Allies (e'\:duding siekne
:".) in perma-
nently di
abkd, killed, ;Pld captul'('d of rather
more than half a milliml, but a great deal less
than three-quarters of a lIliJ1iou men. Tn other
,yords, the Germanic po" ers 11i.1YC JJct'!1 \Ya
ting,
and ar(' wasting. at
rate ll('
r('r four than three
times the rate of the ,y e
tern Allies. It is true
that they 1m \'e w'ry much more Tllf'n than the

\-estern'Allies, ami it is dso true tlw,t "e haye
J}O figures upon whic-h to ('stimate, e\Tn generally,
the corrc
ponding Hus
ian los"E's. though \ye are
l H'ett y safe in l:alculating that the lattcr will
I3rllÌ
-. counting genuine ÌH'isoners of war-t}lat
is. soldiers talæn as prisoJl{.'1'r-t0Ul:h the millIoIl.
rerlwps three-quarter
would be ncarei' the mark,
but the v,hole thing is, ul'on that side, ob\"Íou
ly
a lUere g-uess.
'fen, v, ith the "'a
tage [is regards the
;\Ycstcrn field ('"\ h('
'e tl!f' ulti
'1atf' decision must
Jie, though illl1irectly, as I haye
:1id, the E:lstO'H
fielf! must detf'l'mÍI;c t.he ,,- C':-tern l('sult), let us
nc2I..t l'onsider the function of ammunition.
Herc, ag;;in, \\e hü'le no pre
'ise or eyea
general figures to guide Ufo;, hut "c can tuke a.
Lroatl snrwj' hased <upon the simpk
t :md \\ ide
t
eonsidcrations. It if.; !lot (.n1\- that G(,I'JrWBY lla'5
to he supplied. It is G('r
l..aì
- rulll h('
' An
.:', and
if Gr-:,'m:my is higbl
' illdn
tlialised. as highJy
il}(1LH:trÜdi
cd as England 11crs<..1f, Germnny's
Alh' is not so.
. Xow we l:..nm\' that in tho:"-(, materials for
ammunition "hieh arE' abundant hoth ,"
ith the
Allies and y, ith t Jl
rIleHJr. the fador is that
{,lthel' \\Ol'king at their 'fulle::t pre,'
Ul'e ou
hardly meet the dCmaltlI. "
c em r01"
ghlr, hut
justly. condude that" ith tlle f'xhau!:'tiou of the
origÌIwl 8tocks the eTIe'JìY's PO::-iti011 bcco]ìws, in
('oillparison y,-ith om' own. more
ulll more lliIiicult
in this narticular of ammunit
on.
,,,hat is his no;-;ition \, ith l'cf1'ard to the

M
., {' 1 . f . 'I 1 '
' 1 1
nece""ïtlcs Û1 I e III tne
Impe 0 10"'-1'-.
There is 1l0thi!lg morc diflic-ult to df'tcrmil:e
in all our eakulatie;lls Up\JH the war. OIl the onc
hawl we know that the whoI(' ri'u:,
ii1n sn;te11l
(l('pends upon eX,3et callulations, with aÎl the
f;trength
U1<l y;('aknc:,:s attaching' to thi

me
'h
H1ical ,,-ay of making \\ar, a;id \\ ith its
corollary of falsehoOlI Heycr ))l'o'-'è{'ding fl'flm
emotion, but al"ay.s from rca'"'vhed Ill()tin
.
Our kno\declgc of this (har.ldel' in tl1(' Prus-
sian SY::item ,yould natural]y Índillf' n8 to hrlieyc
that ail the talk about the )'Jilll'h for fooll :m<l the
open proclamation of s('
U'city is :1, faIF>dlOOll
de5ignelÌ to Je
('i\e U'3 as to the elle;n
's real
l'esom'c{'
.
On the otlwr haneI. we IHU1:-it weigh aga inst
this }Jre:-umption (\\hieh fl'l1l1,J "c-ight in Iml1lY
quarters awl 1m!'; hf'cn suppnrtCll h
- some of the
brst erities upon (Jur PI'C'

;) the fae't th(lt y.)U
cannot cany through a r1an bej'ond a, ccrtain

magnitlllle for more than :1, certain time. The
bread taxes are realities, so is the war bread, aud

o are the l\.no\\n imports required by Germany,
from year to year; so is the sum spent by the
German Gowrmncnt "hich cannot baye passed
more than a certain alllount for proyisions, so i,;;
the estimate of the enemy that the ".11' would
hanl1) last more than si'i: montlls, so is tIle fad
that he made ,,-a l' immediately after han-est.
Put all that together :l1}(f it seems much more
likeh' that the scarcity is real than that it is
merèly an elaborate IÙ'Ctrnce; and to this \\0
must add two facts-first, that the rrussi
m
falsehood, ,,-hen it is calculated, is usually of it
,"ery simp1c and eyen a, crude nature. T(; carry
through a fa lsehood of t his highly co HI I' 1 ita ted
length a '1<-1 gig:mtic character is ::;omething of
"l1Ích \",-e han- no e:xperieH(,c in the eareer of
Bi
marck and his successors.
But the way in which this scal'eity in food
:ll1d in other ne(.es
aries of life, such a
textiles,
\yill affcct the dur:ltion of the war, depend

entirely upon the
ttietness of the blockade to
whid} \\e HllJject the enemy.
There are t\\"O f,actol's, hoth political, \dlÌl.'h
trnd to modify the sCY('J'ity of this blockade.
J eriticise ncither: I merely state th(:m.
The first is a point of foreign polity. [t i:-;
l.elie\'ct1 by many e':ccJlent judgcs-,or has 1)('('11
IJdiewtluutil quite latel
--that a 8tric-t blockade
would co:st us more in complications with neutrals
than it would admntage us against the enemy.
The
cc-ond is a conception, pa rtI
- huwan i-
tarirrn, partly of baser origin, but filllling COI1- -
timltll. though rcstrided. exprc:,,
ion in our r1'e::-::o:,
that to 8J 1 ar(' the enemy the rigours of a complete
blockade is at once our duty .u)e[ our iiitcl'ei't.
,y e ne
d not here diF>C'u
s thc 01)\ ious point.
t hat of all na t ions in the world the Prus:;ia n is
1ra
t 1I10\ed )'y considerations of humanity. and
t }.at it would ne\-er cros
the mind of oue of her
!<tatc:-men or gfHerals to spare this ('oi.lntry any
l'igf\ur in l,lockaùc "ith a powcr of blockade
op{'a tv them.
I }'eprat. t11('s(' not(.s ar(' not political :lUd arc
110t to be' u::'etl for the purpo:ses of critil'if.;m.
o
f
l' as this
pC'cific (JUestion is cOIll'rl'J)cd-tlle
du"ation of the war-there is no factor in tllC (:al-
c-ub,tiollS more dear than that of the blo,-ohalh'.
"'lwte\'el' the forces may be, tending to 01(1 or
to continue the war, and howc\-er illdetf'l'llIillate
nul' etl kulatioils of them may Ix" the force' of a
}'10d\:;-1tlc is at onc(' an PO\H'rJ'ul and ÌìH'alllllahl('.
and the duration of the \U11' i
. other thillg
!J('iHg
Cq:'li11. c-alrlliable in an rX<letJy ÌlJwrEL proportioll
tn the rigGur or the blot:hade. The
ltarpt'l' the
.,1ot'k
e1e the
.h(l'"ter the war. The \\c.tkel' the
blütJ.;1' Ie the longer th(' \\ .H.
lt IHn:':t. h' remembered in this e'mmc
ti()a
that the hlntkade froJll "hich tll(' Uermanies

'Jrrer, if.; I
()t mlly that imposed by the
\Jlie':I
tire,
, of "hidl f01'(e, of l'lìUl'
e. tlH' ßrÍl i::-h
fleet is far the snp(,l'iOl'. ]-'lïH1l'e will not aHow
(;( l'UW,!l\ ill) onnC'e of certain materials \dlilh
h('
1.p'!=,e1y (.I.ntrols. Hu
"ia, far more important as :t

nUL(, or !'uppl
-. "ill Hot allow UC'l'many 01'
Au:,;tria a gr.11n of 1'ootl for th(' diI'(....,t íc
,di1lg or
LeI' people 1)1' f,Il' t h(,l r incl i rcrt fpcc1iug t hrough tllC

k(-e1" (.j' hri' eaUk. 4\1IeJ Hu:;sia mu h('re lllt off
g-r;; into t lIP Hl1nc of ;:;11 pf'r eClit. per î:unil'ý
ill t ;:(' (
crm;1fl ElIIpirC'. :-:he ean compd, and
has t:o:l1l'llkd, that Empire to hill \a
t
9 11

LAN D A X D J\"
\ T E R,

quantities of animals the support of whil'h is
no 10nO'er possible. .K ot the least important
has begn the action of Russia in the matter
of horses. Normally, Hllssia sends into
,Germany 1:50.000 horses a year. Kow
he is
sending "none. Further, Rus:,;ia sends in vast. sup-
plies of eggs and butter and the rest dairy produce
in general, which h.H'e also been cut off.

\nd there is one more article 01 import which
Germany needs and which will wry grayely affect.
the future of this war, and that is labour. ,"
hat
nunihcrs can be spared from civilian occupation
for the formation of the new armies in Germany
is the most poignant. and the most doubtful of the
matters we touch in this country. But \vhatever
the margin may be, it is heavil)' affeded by the
abseHl'C of Italian and Slav labour, anll the place
of these yearly immigr
H1ts cannot ne,U'ly be taken
by the use of prisoners of war.
'Y c may sum up and say that in evcrr dement
of wastage or of the 5'tmia imposed by time upon
the resources of the enemy, the argument points
to" a rds a \\ ar of shorter rather than longer dura-
tion if the conta.inment of the enemy coutinues
unbroken and if the blockade "hich i"t is now in
our pO\wr to impose is at la
t seriously impo,.:pd.

\s to the preeise limits for the duration thus

February 27, 1915.

influenced, it is of cour"e absolutely impossihle to
make even a rougb gue
s, but the foUowin o ' ele-
ment in our judgment should be careful1
'
ot.ed.
The pinch for food and the pineh for ammunit
on
has already begun upon their side. The accumula

tion of ammunition beyond what we a.re aetual1j

expending haR just ]Jeglln on the 'Yest. Allow,.
now, three full months and the weight of yalu-:
ahle projectiles upon the two sides will hav

turned in favour of the 'Yestern Allies anc{;
against the Germanic power:5-ij the
r are still:
éOntained, and the same calculation, a little more,
prolonged, giyes the early summer as the corre-'
sponding date for the chief f'fleet of the blockade:
of food. Kot the end of May, but the end of June,
or beginning of July gives the point of ma"\:irnum
strain in this rega I'd, and that strain" ill be very;
heavily iucreased indecd if Lhp Hungarian plain,
or any considerabÌe part of it, should fall into
Hussiàn hands before-the harvest.
Ev
rything, therefore, seems OIl this line of
:ngument, to converge upon the early summer ago
the decisive moment. :
But it is only one Ii ne of argument. There_
remain two more, as I have said: the supply of .
men and t.he topographical argument. 'Yith these
I propose to deal nðt week.

TO

END

THE

,V l\R.

IIO\V \'ICTORY l\IA Y BE OBT i-\INED AT A COST OF
10,OOOJOüO.
By L. BLl
DESBLEDS.

IL\TEYER may be the resource
of the
eTle1
1Y in men, food, sU1>plles, arllla-
ment, and ammunition, and ",hate\'er
may be their 1J.l'açery, determination,
amI tenacity, the,AHieg could end the present \',-ar
we11 within six months. This result could, more-
over, be achieyed at an expenditure, iu li\cs and
money, yery much ]('58 than any amount which the
most optinÌistie milita.ry expert, in his mo
t opti-
mist ic moments, would yenturc to fix. It is true
tkit, in order to bring about such a r{'sult, it would
be nerc

ar'y to re\ ise onr ideas concerning the
method
of warfa rc whidl 0111' generals antI strate"
gists ha \ e inherited from tllf'ir predeces::;ors. If
ít be ê1CCUI.'ate to say that the oLjc({ of a war is
tn end that war on tc>rms aeceptab]e to the yietor
,
then, if it could be l )l"O\'ecl tlmt. , b , y a sli!!ht re-

THE l\tEA:'\ING OF \ERL\L 'SCPRE.\L\CY.
adjustment of our ideas in the light of modern
('ondiLions, we could bring the present war to an Before an explanation is gi\'ell of \vhat i3
earh r dose, it would he rf'asonable to as!:iume that, meant by the phrase" II cOIJtprell(>/Zsirc mill SllE-
wheÌ1 such proof is f'Rtablished. we shaH be expe- fa illed aerial of.ïcnsl fe," it would be \\ ('11 that the'
ditious anti thorough in giving effect to our reader should have a dear understanding of tho
modjfiNl views. rea I value of aer()lIautic
in the presf'nt war.
In the present artic1e the writer propo
es to At the bt"ginllil1g of hostilities thN(, was \'('ry
hring forward e\,it]ence, based on actual facts and little available experience, obtained in <tdual'
e,per1{'uce. which will prove that an aerial offen- warfare, to enahle onr military :wthorit.it's to Î1a\rp'
siye, on a comprehensive aud sustained scale, can a clear conception of the cap:lhilities of the fiftlt .
lead to a. {{uick and glorious cone1usion a war arm. Perhaps the principal reason tlmt. at first.,
\\'hidl, otherwise, may be both protracted and induced onr Government to dcyote a certain
cost-h,. amount of attention to the new weapoll was lhe
'The writer de;;;ll'E's to ebborate his views, at fact that. ot.her Go\'C'rnments were cHcüul'aging its
some lengt.h, on this all-important propositiun, fIe rclupmen t. Then thp other GO\'el'nlUcnts, f'CC-
and claims e3.1'l1e8t attention both on the score of ing our efforts to create an n.il' fit'et., incl'C',tsc-d
his technical training and experience in ael'O- their own efforts, with the r(':,;ult t.hat., a H'1n' or
naut.ics, and on the fad, also, that, possibly, he so previous to the bC'giulling of the }ll'e
eiIL W'
H'.
k1.s gi\'cn more thought and consideration to the the world \\ itnes5cd a competition among tho
10.

capa]Jilitie8 of militarv arronantics than, Jw the
\'ery force of ('i)'('umst
mc{'s, it ,
las been possihle'
for any member of oÙr Go\"ernme'nt, 01" of those öf
our AÜies, to.devote to the l)ew \wa.pon of \":'al'. It
is, therefore, in bi
t('C'lmÌ<'L I 1 capacit,v tlrlt th!..

writer hring
.forward his \Ícws in the hope that
they may be c0nduciH' to th(' !'>pal'ing of many lin'
,.
great sorrow, and mneh sael'itice. Iff' would Jiko'
the reader to realis(' that it. is neit.her 11lek of
Il10desty nor self-congratulation. but. rather, aa
parnestness tÌlat his vjews shouìd r('c
i,e careful
consideration, and a deep sense of lilora 1 l'esponsi- .
bilitv t.hat he should do hi
utmost to S
I fe
thou"samls of Jin'ö, t.hat ha\(' Ih'ompted him to
"rite tIle prec('ding few words, although th('
' lU
ly'
seem self-laudatory.

Fcbru:1TY 27, 1915.

LAND AND
ATER.

tj

o

l.ls E
J.r

Mark-Sm.

Sh.ETCH YAP OF ESSEl; SHOWING THE KR1:;pr WORKS.

kacling nations for t.he U Supremacy of the :J'3 a tlired measure of our ahility to prcseryc our

'\ir "-a pleasant-sounding phrase, but, at the initiatiye, "-e iHe thus Jed to define the term
moment, lacking in rxact meaning. Xow, after " Supremacy of tbe _<\ir " as meaning the c-3pa-
sevcn months of arduous fighting, and after the bility of airmen to giH', in good tiwc, the ncces-
new arm bas been scycrely testcd, the phrase has sary information \\hieh ",ill enable their com-
acquired a concrete meaning which it is necessary mandel's ah,ays to possess the initiatiyc, Thi!'l
to deiìne. definition assumes that the part playrd ùy air-
General Sir John Frcnch, in his admiraLlc craft is connecteù "ith, and illseparahle frolll.
(]C'spatcbcs from the front, has ùrawn forc-ihlc the sUt.:cesses of the armics to "hieh t.h(T am
attention to the seniccs which Lis airmcn render attached. It is a ..
uprelllacy of tbe '
\ir"
cJaily to the Army, In fact, our Army owes a ha\-illg. to a certain
('gree, Dcgatiyc tharad('ris-
great part of the ascendancy it has c:-:tablished tics. To a defealül armv-, with its units broken
oYer tbe enemy to the precious assistance given by up and fleeing in 'ario
ls dire:.:tions, or to au
our airmen. It can be said that the sen-ices \\ hich army too ,,'cak to tal\.c al}vantage of the illforma-
our aircraft render to our Army can be gaugeù by tion supplied by its airmen, such a .. :o;upl'f'mal'Y:
the asccndancy \\ bich our airmen e
ercise oYer of the
\.ir " would he almo
t valueless. It i""
tho'3e of the enemy, The amount anll accuracy of howe, er, the kind ûf aerial suprcmaty afl('i
the information ,,'hkh our air scryiee gi\es to"our which the ,-arious nations \\cre stri\ing "hen tjl\-:
commanùers relati\'cly to that gi"Cil to the enemy's war broke out during tbe declining days of .Juh',
generals b,r theirs ma}-, in most cases, ùe taken 1914. Through Jack of any at:cumulated ('xpcr
...
11-

LAN DAN D J'
ATE n.

{'nee to guide them, the military authot'itiC's ûf
the \'ari
us countries 11<HI not sufficient. data tn
Tn'ppnre thcmsdn'
f(Or HUJ' other kind of aerial
6Upl'e mar -r,
It shoultl not be nssumed that 8uch a
" Sn!)l'emacr of the
\.ir," because of some neg. 1 ,-
t i \"e
, ha 1'a cte.rigt
cs, is not. of
he B'yea t
st va I u
.
:The truth hes III the opposIte ål1'edlOn. "e
shou1!1. ther('fore. grudge no praise to all those
\\ ho haTe helped out' country to ohta.in tbat
fiU j 1l'emaC\T rit.ht nt. the ber.Üming- of hostilitie,:;.
, 0

1
It I::; a supremacy of such coltsiùerable \"alue t wt,
,....p shonld nm lio ri
k of compromising it, and,
,,,hatcH'r de\-elopment
we may wish milital',\'
aeronautics to ns
ume. it must not be to the
(letriment. of the particular supremacy \\e ha,-c
(tlre
tdr aeqlÜred,

TWO Kr
DS OF .\.ERL\L SUPRE
L\CY.

Tlw filet ren1:1 ins, howen'r, that we arc now.
n-; r
'gnl'(l
miJihuy aeronautics, in possession of
(!ata \\"hieh 'H're nut. available when the ,';nr
1.1'01,(' llut, ;:O;ome l'fl'('oncci yed ideas concerning
tlw \alut' of ;t:riatioll han' }'eceÌ"\'ed terrible blow.;
:J11l1 h;t\(. met with a quid\. de::;truction. lTnfore-
scC'u u:,:cs or the aeroplane haye come into pro-
winenee. Pm' airmen h<H'C ShmYll a greater
"aIont' flUfI acJaptabiJitr than eycn the most.
cnt.husia:{tic supportpr of the new arm could
11;ne e-..:peded. I t i
, thl'l'<,fore, wen that we
shoul!! }1:'luse mIll ta.ke. stork.
\Yhen thi
is dune. w<, shaH find that a most.
impt'l'tant qua lit), (If tht' aeroplane lta
I)('en
I,rought to light. This quality is its "\"a hIP- inl'
offen:'\1.\'C ol't'mtiont:. \Ye ha\e already, !-.t. .f
r
as;; tho lIumb
'r of ma
hines i3 con('ernell,
utilis('d it in a tiwÌfl manner in carlTing out
a nUlllber or raid:;. h that timidity du{'
to the fact tIta t "e han" not rea 11." g"rasJ'e(t
the full ,alue of the ft
roplano fot, offl'n-
siw Put'pl'se
? 0,> is it bccause \\"e are so engage!!
in maintainÜlg the supremacy we haw :Jlt'eady
oht:t int'tl that ,....c e;t unot. vigorously push on the
<Ì('\('l<.pment of a l'(,:ll ofì{'n:ii H' air-fleet?
The \\ rit{,l' ha.s. iu thl'
e columns, eonstant.1y
pxplained the Ï:n[Jot'tanl'0 of fin aerial offen,,:iy
.

j fIeC the puhlica!" ion of h is a rtirles the
Allmim1í)" ha\-e 1'l'pllrtelt two air raid
by aerial
MtHildl'O)J,.. Ot tJtÏrft-fflut' a.nd forty aeroplane;:;
stl'ong- n'spC'cti\l.1y. C'omparC' t.hc' result of these
l"lid
with tho="e unt1l
"t;t,k('n with a still smalIcl'
JìlU;1!;('l' of JI1af'hin
s-tlH' Cmchay("n raitt on
C'hristn 1 1s nay, 191-:1:. for in
tance-alld yOU" ill
}'c';llise e!c{t 1'1,\: the impcH'til nee of the 1ll:1jJ.l}(',' of
neT'oplalll's compo.-;ing an attacking af'ri;ll fleet.
]ìOl' nJ1'en:-iÌ \
e \\ IIl'k. ot' }I('t'lIlunent nllne, it is not
nn nil' fled (,f n feW" dO/en macbincs that is
r('<jlÚ,'ed. Imt (l1i(' of aJ)ont a t1JOusand, 01' more,

tl'nng.
'Yith SIwll an {lit' fl.:et we conM enter upon
tIle' ('unqt1(':,t of a sl'C'(ltlll kiwI of .. Snpl'cruacy of
the ....\il'," a kind in which the offensi\c ,-all1e ûf
th
lift]1 ann wou!,1 Iwt1cl' its...1f felt" in a 10('1'-
ma.n('nt manuel', l1lilf's 1_1t
) und the rë1.ngt
of our
gun
. -1n f:'H't. Sllc.h (In ail' Heet would he n forc<,
that. could IIOt. II(' st..IPI'('tl hy trench("s, riYCl'ð, (fl'
fortifi{'d i'la,e('
; it. \\ouhl :.1(' a force in who!';(' way
1"\(. o"',
tack';,,; could bC' put, and which would carr)'
the w[lr s{l'aight. into the heart of the enemy's
countrr,
Thi::; S('('(llìtt kill,] of ::.uprcmacr could IJC

February 27, Unj,

obtained by the Allies weB within six months, and
the possession of it would mean an utter imp03-
sibilit.\
for the enem
y to continue the struggle.
Such a state of affair
cannot be reached" ith fin
ofJ'ellsi,"c fleet of a few doæn, or e\Ten a few
hundreds strong.

THE BCILDI
G A
D l\L\Ni'JING OF AN
AIR FLEET 2,000 STRO
G.
In connection with the employment of a('ro-
pla,nes at the front, it is important to remember
that the fifth arm is stiU somewhat frail in con-
struction. :Major "T. S. Branel\:er, Roya.l Artil-
lery (Royal Flying Corps H('serYc) Gcneral Staff,
in a lecture dcli\-ered at the rniversity of London
a few wecks before the beginning ot hostilities,
said: " A good a\erage pilot may fly, day after
day, round an aerodrome and make man.r land-
ings without e\er straining his M'roplane, or
e\ell hreaking a wire: but in wal' the pilot must
fly in any ,\eathe1' to obtain information anrl
hìnd on àlmost any ground to deli"\'el' it. The
result wil1 be numerous smaU brrakages and
st.rains, all of which take time and skiU to
repair, and which demand t.he proyision of a
large quantity of spare parts, a.nlI their ddin
ry
,,,herever they are required in the theatre of
\\ur. The ditlieult)T of supply of spare parts \dU
he increased in proportion to th{' numbC'L' of
different types of aeroplane employed. The same
a.pplies to engines, which, in adllition, require
thorough p<,riodic overhaul afkr a compara-
ti\'elv short time a.t work.

. Aga. in, in war there will bt' no shc(ls
:tntibhle for housing :machine;') on the ground.
The af:'roplane of t h
moment cmmut staIH1 for
Inug in th
open without serious dptcrioratinll in
its thing qua lit i{"F;. All tit is points to
the fact" t.hat onl,\' :t sma}} pruportion oi the
aeroplanes in the fie1.1 will he fil to take the air
at any
in"n moment." The
e. antI oth(,l" rea80ns,
show that if 1,000 aeroplanes arc to be alwaY3
rea,dy for otTensÍ\Tc purp05P.-S. we Illast pog..-:e
s at
least twice that number of machincð antI keep on
making groll the losses.
Kow the qurst,ion which prc3ents it;;;elf is
whether it woultllJe possihle îor this countl'y to
l,uih1. in tbe spac-e of a fcw month:;, 2,000 aero-
1'1<11]("8, train the men nccessary to pilut them,
form t.he necessa ry cont.ingent of mechanics
which would be required to accompany thC'U1 at
the front. Bnd organise an adequate transport
srl'\'ice. The writer has gonc ca.refull,\' into these
questions and h{' is conyinced that. though the
dTort wonM ha\Te to be a considera hIe Olle, the
format.ion of n powerful offensi\'e af'ria I fled.,
tltOrotlO'hly equipped and manned, c.ould hf' pro-
duced in this countn T in t.lte tÍme stated. It can,
besides, be assert.ed' that such a tit'd. could be
brought int.o e
âstenee without interferipg ".-it.h
or hindel'Ílw. in the slighti'st degree, the develop-
ment of theJ.H'esellt air He,et .which is 80 nec.e!':sar.y
to our arnue::; for l'eCOJU1.1.1&"anee antI kWlh'ell
work.
Se\-eh monl h
ago no one coultl ha \'e fore-
hlld that the Britigh Army could be ma.de millions
strong. "'e haye ma,de the effort and suec{'edcli
in producing a ne\\ Arm
hy far stronger th:Ut
auy w-hich we ha,\'e had in the pa.st. In the saIllC
mànuC'r. i,f th
eounh'y (k
cide.<; to consillt'l, tho
creation of an offensi vè air lle.et 2.000 strtlflg, the

i'1 Jt

. ('.)l'lla l'Y :!ï, I!) 1 G.

L ..:\.
j)

..:"i..:.\ 1)

"riter is in
})t)
lhnn to inllieatc how this ecruJ,1
be ..l('('O:nl'li
ll(:rI, in En
l;lnd, "ithin :,;ix months.

THE
IEA
I
G OF .\ .. CO
lPREHE

IYE
Al\"D St'ST.-\J
ED :\EH.IAL OFFE
SI\'E:'

The re;Hlt'I' hfls, prnhahly, by now some idca
of \\ hat the \\Titer means hy the phrasf' " {f C{JfII-
l,nllcusirc (lII,d silst!iÎncd (/eriol off r IlJsll"I'." 1t
is a kind of offensin: that is not to be confu
ed
\\ ith a l'aiJ. rlllikc the laUeI'. a c01uprehensi\"e
and
u:"tain('IJ aerial d'ft'nsÍye would render tl:c
ma illtcml1lCe of a hostile fie hI a l'my impossil)le,
and \\ould brin
to an enJ the s
-stelll of tl'eneh
warfare which is long anJ costly in li\"{'s anti
money. "
ith a powerful oíÏellsi\"c :lir Hcct, our
airmen could attaek, Jljght and day, the l'oad

3
;1 railwël
-s behind the hostile line::;, and coul.l

,\\ A 1 .L 1{"

}H'C,-ent the encmy from l'ccci\"ing supplie
,
it mmnni t ion, 01' reinforccmcnt.
The pos
ession of 311 al1cquate o.ffcnsiYÐ
;:tel'ial flf'ct would ena'-Ile us to strike, "ith might
aud \\ ith iltisured r('sult
, at the enemy's ar
emds.
] n the sketch map iR
hown the we-.;tern portion
of the to\\n of E:;
eu, whic-h is "en within the
wnge of our airmen, and where are situated the
;!igautie I
rupp'::; "ol'ks. These workshops lie in
tLe '\e
t of the to\Yll and (:o\-er an area somc"hat
greater tban that of the City of LondOIl. Imagine
\, Jwt the d('
tl'uction of such an arsenal would
mean to the enemy, 3nd iuwgine what would be
t he plight of the Gel'maìl armies if they \'-ere

udd{,lll
T dcprin
d of guns and of amllìunitioll.
And such an air fiert, built and equippec} on the
seale inllicated in the prc2t'ding lin('
. and capable
of de,aling such a ùecisiyc bleW'.' as the lki'tl'uction
of Essen, \muld cost less than :'210,oon,OOO!

THE

'VAR
By FREl)

BY
T.

'VATER.
J

NE.

THE MEDIl ERRAXEAX.

XO 1'1;.-1 his Altide has bcen I!ubmittcil to the Prcss Rurc;:", "bid! &loc
net I1I1:eLt to tllc pl:b!ic:;U.... liS (crlsor<&I, :IIul 10:hL'. 010
respoDsiÞ;:it} lor tbe (OrrC(tDc56 (If tlu: UlitcrucDtS.

0 1
ti.e 19th
u Anglo,French force of lJ:>ttle!'hip",
battle cnli:oers, find aUIiliarit's of H,rious kinðs
O1òCllCll firt' d 8 :un, on the ])zrd"uE'llcs forts lit
C'apc Dc1les auù KUIll I\:a!e at long range-
j)robahJy
iJ( or
e,"en miles. Em'ly in the \Hir a
Thild bombar<Ìnlt'nt haù I)ro,"
d that the forts cou1d he out-
r;ougcd-l'robably they mOl1ut nothing he
n-i{'l" than 8.2's in
the ",ay of modern gun!', plus a number of higgpr guns of
ob
okte p;:UP!""
rp to 2.45 only hi
guns \'!-He cmplo)'<,tl fcr Ule aUack;
but then Yicc,;hh'1Ïml Cardl'n, wl.o \\.." in command. or<Ìen>d
d,ips carryiu
gU'lS of 6 ilU'h or there..bo\!t" to do
e in to
near nillbe. Two fVI-is OIl Ow European
idl" were !:ilenced,
lIud one on the A
jntic biùt', The ,hombardment cea!-ed at
du<.k, whE'U one fort was btin firing, :Soue' of lhe \\"arships
enga?ed "as hit.
In genpral, this may be regard('ù as the mObt impOitant
naval operation t.o ùate. EHJl as an illustmtion of the
uLifluit)' of Sea l")ower it has its lessons, for the Briti
h bhips
engaged were drawn from nil fluarters of the gl
be (the l1z-
!1f'.1:ibl,., for imtancl", fl>ught at tho FaJ!dúll(Os, and the
T, ii/llll,'f as
i"tcù ill Hie bomhardment of Kiao Chau). The
IJl'iucipal1ohips engagt:d, and their broacl"ides were:-
lJIUTISH. FRENCH.
h-R,..)'ibl, ...... l312in. flo/n'ti.. 212in" 110,8, 45,5
Ar/lW,,.IIW6/1... 412in., 5 9,2 (,'lIIt!o;",. 412in" 5 5,5
('/:nnmllis ." 412in., 66in. SlIffrt:IJ. 412in" 5 6,4
,1"w!JI'('IlU ..' 412in,. 66in.
FOl'ty big guns fil'ing steal1ily naturally "ere eapahlo of
doing au enormous amount of damage.
Yht't.her they did so
VI" no is another matter. Eombarded forhficatIons have often.
afttr II. "hort interval, 8, knack of resurrecting themseh'es in
a \\ay "hich !'hips cannot. This is due to the fact that unle
s
a gun be actually hit, the effect of !:hell fire is merely to
ùe
troy the gun's crew or posEibly bury the gu.n in dbbris.. To
viO' away the débril! and find fr<,
h gunnl"rs IS comparatIvely
ea
y. lIence it has become a canon that & bomhardrnent must
he followed up by II. landing I)arly to destroy all gu
s. that are

tia 6er\.-iceable, There al'e also canonS as to military co.
()peration.
The pasFage of the Dardan
lles lias alway? been rega.rdt'd
118 all e:dremely difficult ol'erahon. Tho Itahan8 are said to
have contemplated IInd deciùcd against
t in the
r recent .\\".ar
"ith Turkey, though here, of course, lDternatlOnal pohtICs As Mr, Jklloc ]Ias been allllOulieed to lli
clls!' U;i" we.ek
Illay have had weight in their councils
. ' the DUl'ation of. the '\"ar froni the Joli1itRry "t
nd!)oint, it will
The fort!", qua forts, being Turklbh, are probably mudl perhaps be of mtere
t to say a fn\' \\on1s abcut the !'ame
less formidable tþan they are supposed to be, and th
y are a11 f1uc:!tion from the purely n3'\"al ft-amll)oint. }[(,l'<', since,
f!u8ct'ptilJle to long range bombardments. Dan
e!" hes rather hUllianly speaking, the situ:>.tiou is all agaiu!7t any Tr
iJ:,IO"ar.
in the rJ1Îlle fields laid in the narrows. These WIn hll.ye to be we are nece!!sariJy reJ.uced to con
idcri!lg the le
c; dr:>hl
tio
cleared under fire from field artillEry and dÐ.e fil'e (even f;Up- iswes which mwt uIt iU1Ptdy hring Lostiiities 10 a cOJldu
icu.
poI>ing all forts to be 8ilenced), unle68 a I>tl'ong allied army The>-e are all ('onu>incù iu the l;hl'n<;e, "f-ilel,t l")r<,s
ure

rerat8
a10ng the GaUipoIl Peninsula. ,of Sea. l'o\\"er," though ,,"UhjfoCt, (\1' c.ou!'!'e, to h<:.w n.ilitarr
SllrI)O!,ing, tl1eretote, that (as a!!EUmeð) an attempt l,o, û!,eratlOm may e\l'lltur.te.
13 11

force the I>ard
melle!', aull !'o reach amI caph're C'UH"t:;\I-
till')]'!e is toward (the 11
;.umpiion I1wy be "l'(.ng) it \\illlJt:-

s hoth Dud. worth
n.l Hornby dhlTi:Jcd it in thi' paÜ-" a
llifficult :illli daugerous ta
I
,"

,-

),fAl' TO ILLl'STRATE THE D.AHDAX.I::l,LE').

On the other hand, the å(h-an(aJ:;e" of nIcC'<,
fuJ "perRtio",
1'i"ou!d })e enormous. Turkt')" 1'i"ould be elill'inated from the
\\al' by tbe fall of Con
talltinolile, but, thü would l>e amO!lg
t]le least of the bl"nefits.
Corn and oil, \\"hich \'!-e neetl fl'Om the RIRf'k Rea h11r1)Om'<j
cannot reach UE while TUl'kev rl,lef at ('oll,t
!lIt;Il('.de. Hf'uce
the immediate remIt \\"ouIcÌ be an uch
ngc of
I
eful -conl-
1H0ditics bet \\ een the Allies.

DCRATIO
OF THE "-.\R.

The3e military üperat.iCH13 n"!', of conl'!'ø, ehtin.I,Y ontsi.le
'1"Y 1'1'0\ ïnce;'1 "have no iUe'lfl3 of (,itilLlatiiJg the pnìbahiJif ie,
o{ a r.usd:1Il 3ch"anc{\ 01' ""h,lL mav h-\ppen in tht' \Ye
l .in 019
<,pring. I can
imrly I'eeord the iIanticaI irnp!"(,
;Úo'l. el
t:irely
l' _ a il'l/If;ral ill> i'rC6Si07l, wbich hom the miiitary pGlnt. cf
"iew may be jl.
t as inaecur:>te a, from the na.'al point of
,icw arc 'military ideas as to the PilI't plaY-hi hy Cle X:JXY,
Y ei'Y i'ou"I;ly and quite crudely the 1'llwl ide:!' of th

h nd \\"al
fare r
ay be put down as something .'err like" si 0111'-
mat...," 01', at any rate, "pE'rpet.ual chec!,," ""hidl comes to
about the same i.hing', L do u<'t :J&
ert nuL this dea i..
eon-ed,: it is far too liable to ÎJe nrset I J ? side t"acto!', sUl'h !t3
re
om'c>
s, focd, ammunition, and v:Ìl,'t. not.
H /It, fa'.e in i:o far as the supply of men i,; con,
ej'iled, it
spelllS to me tIll't the \\hole oi the <.lher qnesliu!I,: 111'1' cntin
ly
ua,al; enl iæly m:.!tters h!wing t.o do wilh the ,. ,;Ïlent.
1>I'eS"III'(' of Sea Pewet.... and as entin'ly u'lt"}Hnede/J witil
the gain or los3 of " 6011:1' gn:uHd .. in the buJ warfare,
Of cOUl"'e. a
lIddell preponder;!ne
of !>he'lgt,11 nil 011(>

;idc or the othel' might aitel' the \dwl!' lI"peet ûï th.. hn!1
e m:l'ùigll: I 11m Ilcce c ,"'lI'ily C(.!l!Ìne/l entin:ly lo con
iduilig
tlliu;::
on t.he :IYl'ol.hesi:> of the l!'aiulenIHu:e of lhC bfutli.5 '1'/0
O
I laud /lml what will happen LÌlen,
Tn dal!! the Na\'y hils hit Cennany "';el',:{ LJnl hy thp
R'Hlihibtic.u of her o
-e1'3ea
: h'IHì.., RUll al:;o ,t cutting cfi of
fUll I sup1'li!'s whieh is pl'ObaJ.ìy !r01'(' appal"!ut th
n rC1!Ì,
Pcrsonally I do not beli<Jve that. we have appre\.'ial.lf ::IIedell
Germany's food Kupply 01' that ;"'1' shaH ever do 60. !},) 1I1!llter
wII:;l lIIea
III''''<; we may take. ,\\'e can cut on cl'i'ti\iu Im::I\l'ie

deal' to the Ger.nan stomach, we may I'ender the natioHlI1
tpndeucy to o\"e\'eal difficult of accempÌishment, we m3Y make
them UlwoIIIfol"tal}!e and dis!!;\'t1l1t1pd, bul I am cOll\'iul'cd that
the entÍl'e t"crcp cf the ßriti
h N /IVY wiUne\'er f.r{f/'1'
It single
t:t'l'mall, The utrr.ost \'11' can do i,; to dt'i\'e th{JlfI to 3l!ppOI't
life on ahout l he same orO\'euder thllt miHions ill thi.1 COll'1try
1ian
'iub
i
ted on fO!' tÎle Ia!'t one or two hundn
ll year'!, .
80 far from
:horteuing th!' duration oÎ 011' war, T aln
illcli!lPrI to tbin
' that an E'mha\'(;o on G
l'i1;all food,;tuff
:frO!I1 over
eas will IplJgHwll thE' strng-
l,
, amI serve tu kpt\p
\!p to the !Tratch the" hate" which is GCt'UJiHlY'" main
moti\'e pewer.
C'un
'-'fjuent1y it n:ay be that. pos:-ihly our h('"t prJ1Ïry
would be to let the G
rlilal1S
et all the food they w,ont, 1'-,'"1:111
i i' neces:'ary
pel1dillg money in secing th:tt t lieir focli is

hllndant!
Conplell wilh thi
, llOv:'eVt'l', everything iu the natm'e nf
raw mahrial of any sm'l:, or kil1l1 would h<<.1:1 to he dedll.etl
ccutrahand-in a pl11'ase, we
bould Ûara fill' il/lllt.'f,.;",
, /lU'
fl,t' illdil-ith:"t.<. Wit.h heth exports amI impÜl't.s cut cff, tbe
hulk (,ì the civil population \Vould be out of employment--i.e.,
withGut the means to pUl"chase food. 'I'he Get'IJ:!.111 Govern-
mellt. wonld he cc'npelINt to reSQi.t to fre-e dole'l, and the
II
c\'a1 effect ot' such Cll a p('pulation would very SGon 1Jlake
it
elf ieIt. Whal happe'1c(1 to ancient HOli:e wouhl jwt n<!

ssul"edly 1JefaU Ct'i'tl
aIlY, and even a threat to stop foott
1i\lpplie
(let alone can-ying it <.out) wûuhl probahly end t.he
war to a cerlainty
ix months fWill now were It policy of this
sort pUl'
,ued ill the int.erim.
'I'he adopt.icn of piratical methods by German submarinc'!
i
geuel';:l!y IJelie\'ed hm'e to be due to economic rre

nre and
t;hol'tag'
of food s'lpplies. I gl'eatly doubt wh
ther this he:;
1IIu('h to do wil h the wallel' except. in the" talk departmenl
."
Rather, I ta!::e it., German public opinion wanl,; to 'lee the
Navy on whidl it. ha
spent fiO mueh Inoney " du !'omethillg.,..
and suhl11arine attack on commerce rep\'Cseuts the dle;!pe'lt
/Iud most showy way of seeming to " do something."
Alto
ether (looking at t.he malter, of CelU'
l', e 1 Itirel:,
from the point of view of what om' Navy can necompli"h). [
should Bay that-failing some pN'hap
l"tlther improhable
dmstic ehan
c in t h(' flitual-ion on IRnd-a Ila\ial war hal!
d <.oil
atteml)ts to cUl'tail German food supply may w;,11 f:;1J on in-
definitely, e
'en if Gel'many did not pos
esq "eo\,(''! of eminent
chemi
l6 perfectly capable of inventing dlemil'al 6uh :tillltes
for evel'y known form of feod.
If, on the ether ha'1d, we mm'e or IE's'! glut the;""'! with
focd, hut, by the stoppage of o\ersea trade, imporL 01' export,
<Jf c\'ery !'ort and kiud. create a vast population uuahl.
t"
l)urchase food, nnd forced to fiuhsi<t on Go\'et'nHlcnt chal'it.y,
I am indined to think Lhatthe llriti..h Navy can etld the war
ilbide si '( mouth'!.
The " dramatic effect" of \Y atedoo (po
!<ibly. for t bat
maUer, t,he pre\"iousdramalic effect of 'l'r2.falgar) La.o; ever since
Niu,lcd 11'1 to the faet of t.he cnonnous power which lhe :f!\\'v
wields ill the mattei' of apparently i1/{linc l USI'lf.
. 'I'he lluhlr

can en\'i,age to the full a rt'gilJic:nL fighting in the l1'eUl:he
:
what it cannût ell\'i

g
is that a battle
hip, floating :o:eeminglJ

iJI.... T!lileq al1<llUil('q from anywht"ri', may ùc altering f,ú.r good
alht ail the hi"lOl'Y of thc world,
Ll't me add that Lhe l"l'ason for this i< t.hat no onf'! It;!i! e.er
lna11.1g p d to
"J1'nill 1/'''!1 ill :t mannei' to be " underst.andi'tI
ot the people." No one 1":81' will. It is a fuet beyond ('xplain-
in
. Only a Îairly good dies., plny
r ean propedy r::oali::!e a..
inkliug. The great .Napoll'on himse!i could nev;>r I{rnp it.,
and h
ft'li bec:HHe h
could lWt.
\t::;t. Helena, lIU doubt,
tou loltc, he realised,
All th!' iudie.ltio\\<, of the pnnent war are that Il!'ith"r
the KÛser nor \'011 Tirpitz call see further through a brick
wall thall conld };' apoleon, 01' they \'lOuld never 1la\'"e !Jigne'l
their OWIl d<:,ath wan-ant'! by theil' fatuoui:' dedaration of

RlIhmal'iup hloek'lde. al\d so ðelivered therr..-;"h'el1 into onr
halld.. i'Jr the flake of munlering a few lIon,comLatant3.
Bel ween thi., kind or tbing aud tht' p,'aetiee of C'hinese pi"l\te
.
w1:o paint horrid faces on the hGw3 ot theit' junk". the
differðJIC"!' is wdl,ù;gh l!egìigibl<J where th6 Briti"h
;.ny i,.
cOHe('rned.
To thi,; extent the duration of tIle war wiII hE' .horteneJ,
The Gi'rmaJ!' lire out to " fl'i,,'ht.en lhe enemy." The Uriti"Ü
'" ,
N av] is out to " kilí tile enemy."

THE SlJB:\L\RI='i'E U BLOCKADE,"

Th.> poliry of lC!!.\'ing the crews of fluhn:arine "i;,tiw'1 to
dr(1Wll \':ilhout .....IIl'niu
ha,., been followed by wme Gc!'maa
:mhmarine" 1mt net hy ml:er'l. Preo::umab!v all German
dlj,>pr:! are 110L yet "b'loodcd" to the meth
d:! of Captaiu
Kidd anti hi" îellow-rirales.
The prob,',l)le mNive of the poli...y 1 have di3cuiI8ed eha-
whel'e in thi<; artide; here I am cudea-.."oUl'ing to fiwl 811
lIistOl':eal anulogy wltieh \pay have some bearing O!l thit
que:>tioll.
Thi, i,i 'iomewhat. .1iffit,dt to fi.:,1. .\I1C'il'nt, history t('om"
with j'lsbncps oÎ c31'tured men,hant ships, whPRe crc
'I wer.'
eithet.
laughtered 01" made iuto f'bveò<. But e\'NI i'1 tho-"t)
long ag') duy!! thet'e wa" a certain logic':!l idea oi plu"I'Jt'r: I
call1:ct recall any hi'ltorical imtal1('e of sl'1.uv,hter of non-
COl\lb,l
anh for thr mere I'e'lull- of slaugbtE'r. Primit.ive man
inlhe SLone .\ge may ha....e arted onlJUmc 1;H1'1l linesj but it it
douht.f'IL ]0'01' slaughter without some idea of tangible ga.in
we must prcb2Lly gc hack to the pi'imi!Í\'e ap".
'fIle suggestion of
,u ape iuteHi
ellce as the motive foreo
i., not. however, fiO much due to the wanton I!laughter an,1
tle
t.l'IIclicn of all and <;\wdi-y, a" to the inability to }I
r!:ei"6
the futility.
Once'llIerl'hant ships take to C'rui"iHg in group". it mu<<!!
foHow, a.'1 1 sugg!'sted la
t wee:r, that the main danger will L,)
run lJY the f'ubmarine ng'gres
or-so that e\'en such ape,lik"
joy It" may he obtained frcm wdnton destrul'tiûll ""in nct, 1:;.)
fcrthcomill
, Equ
ny ape-like is the iJ1ðbility to reali
e that
dra:!i..Ïc relali1JLory meaSI\l'e5 are to be e:rperl-ed. JlleaSltrl:l

whi"h (it f:'uffieieut, ,;uhmarine succes
be seelu'cd, may \'tin t.)
the enlirl:l G
rman uation (indUlìÎi.g the Kai3er) being pro-
claime.ì outlaw
and common munlere!'s.
One's amaz..ment i'1, hGwevel'. not at Lhe s1aughtering
wa'ILounC5:! of lhe German plan, but Ill. its sheer stupidit.y.

ANSWERS TU CORRESPO
DENCE,

J), D. W, (
oUt.l1 Shieltb).-'I'he _\dmiralty is alway]
ready to con-ider any scheme that is reasonable; no II iuflli-
cnce OJ i:i required,
B, II. H. (I.ondcn, W,C',),-AU data pnblishcl1 abod
recent big guus have been ext.remely vague. The e,dreme
pc!:siLle rangø is therefore entirely conjectural. It is further
complicat.ed by t.he fact that t,he service muzzlc velociLy id not
tbe ll1ilximum po-:;5ihle: also the mounting does not admit of
the maximum of elevation,
'1', H, (Winche:<ter).-(l) Would be censorcd. (2) WhE'!l
C,wiIlan armed lineril were to be expected the .1 '1',ifm'i.!, W!\'l
useful; later eu her work \Vail to he done efplally well by a
kss co,:l1y \"e
,ieL (3) The war will probably he o vel' before
the cx-Greek S,damis is completed. It take3 about a YE'ar to
hui!tl and equip a submarine. (4) .AHowing the obituary
notices to appear wa" an official oversight, I::)uch notiL'l'3 are
now forhiddeu, I believe.
H, R. (:-it" N
ots),-(l) See rE'ply to" B, II, n." above.
(2) Y ollr theory tbat messages ai'e sent, to Germany by rn
an't
vi the "
\gony" column i
wry probably correct. But, it
could aho ùe done via" Want place"," "Situations va('ani:,'

and wh'!t not, There seems no way by which it con!..l be
stopped, (3) Therc is nothinf: novel ahout the submari!\e
mine-layer, (4) Somet.hing similar to the scheme you Bugge'lt
i.. already employed, 'I'he AdminlIty leave
llothing to chancd
in mattel'3 of l hi,,; sort, but, they ....isel,y say no!hin
as tv whai;
tury are doinS:
H't

Februarv 27. 19J 5.
"

LAXlJ

A 1.'\ 1J

.n Ii. 1. J
.1\,

, .
R. E, C. (E:;;}jllg).-Many Old-JIb for the CUUillg. The of h-Mling information for ca
ll, I Lave no \ptl-}Jathy ",ith JOli
16,utot-rslian Gcvel'nment lias certainly done il
!Share and done whate\'el'. J do not wish to Le Iu':e, hut \'re sll of us are up
it wtH. agl\il1
t a f'Ommon enemy. and no .. indut'ements" "hould be
L. M. (South Shiehh),
Tbel'e are plenty ()f dnice,s f()r cOll'<iclercll. r"l'haps, howevCl', you li:n.e }lot u!:'
d .. induce-
oM.ainiug (lceuracy \\ith bomb-dror})inI;" hut the trouble i!< mellt" in the Lngii
h st'm'c: ill w!lieh ease I al>010gi5e for
that when bombs are dropped from allY hl'ight there is alv.ay!:' the above remarks and refer you back to the lìrst sentence
the unknov.-J1 factor of the wind in between tliA machine and of thill,
the target. The v.ilJd })IOWII nt diffE-rent velocities at differt'l1t "T. ß. F. (St. Nt',\lpl M!>t).-Our remote descendants
a}t,itudes, sO deflections oceur "hich canllot Ije allowed for may
eø f'Olflet hing along the lines which you suggest, hut
from great height". te-ùay it \\"ould be entirely iml>racti{'able.
, J. n. (Edillburgh).-So far as I know the idea
'ou
GoGo (Birkenbead),-(l) A zi g -za!: cour
is the be o !;
a;'igge
t is already in acti,"e operation. I .

V. N. S. p, (London, :;.E,).-Yery man). thanks for
'our tung beeame a Hlbmarine. when mbmerged. is blow 1llOving,
FYJUIJathetic letter. I am not at nIl sure that tIle perbon to unable to
ee ,-ery \\ell, and compellell to IJe bow;! on in orðer
..-bfjIU you refer resides in an .. Engli
hman's" home. His to fire its tOl'}>edoes, (2) It is, of COllI'se, illegal in any ca'<J
1 . ] } L . d ' \\"11atl'\'er to
illk merchant shiD
without \'Iarnin g , and,
!IHld\\-riting certam y a})pear:s to lave een acqmre 111 .
another cou1)tr", indeed, to sink HII'm at, all i" ollly }ega!1y permissi})}e when
n. 1<'. 'V: (Du1>lin) ,-A dicti11guished te{.hnical e:xpelt Ulere is no reasonable l)o:,;;ihility gf bringing them into port
with pI'ize crew
, H'O\\eyer, Germanv has cast. 1\'ide all idea':!
y,rote h.,t \\eek and gave JIle II rÚumt: of experiments whieh of illt
rnalional law, and re\'ertctf to the ethics of t\\"o
lie \\,as carrying out with a view to the productil)D of an
. 1 thou
and
TearO ago.
instrument
{,nle,dIRt a10ng the lines wlnt:h you lave since
fuggested. It may interellt yeu to 1..110\\ th...t you ha\e illde- D, S, H. (London, N.y,T.),-Your idea for locating mines
IJemlently liÏt. on a !>imilar idea, i... l'ert3iuly iugenioulI, but the whole area could he !;\
ept more
A, }t, 8. (Xewcastle-on-Tyne).-Your view that it is quickly than your" detectors" could })e laid dOVon.
.. tmcolJllllOnly like "hining to };rocÍaim to the world that tI,e T. C. (Hayward's Heath).-So far only one of the Cllile
n
f{-1)ow you al'e fighting ill UH\(l and then cOHlIJla!l1 becuuse he Dre:ldnoughts has Lf'en tatt'n oyer, the ATn,';,'olltf' J,,:iol'1't:.
I>ites' ,-our I'tomach" i
. I think, a le\"el-Ileaded oue. Of now the ('(l1Imla. The other Chilean
bip, the .1lmiml/te
nur"
, to
i"k !!hips "ithout "<lrnill); is piratical; but. hy l'fJI'hrnllf', is far le
s advanced, so the fluestion of taking her
making too much scream about it-, \\e run the gl'eat, ri
k of o\"t'r can110t yet arise, TlIe poli.,y of the British Admiralty
l>la} ing iato Gerlì,any's haud
. is 10 incon\"enience as little as m:;y he neutrals who ha\Te bhips
.. I I lJUildillg in tl,i" countr y .
\\" T, II, (Torquay and K..w YOI'J..).-loll
l!n
t Ie mout)
of au f'nemy's harhour is mainly a "a..te of Ir,ine!!. })e('au
e M, J. C, (Gla
gow).-(l) Uuughly
pe::.king, enol'S of
fit the lJe,t it can mel'ely deby the enem,\T. The Japant'se "Jirection" in modern gunnery ùo not eJii.,t. Xo matter whd
'll.a
ted enùlcss mines off the clltrance to l
ort Arthur. The the Hl11lle, "direction" is mainly a matter of .. hitting the
Ru
..ia)}s, of cour"t', maintainf'd a regular !-en-ice of sweeper" hay
tack." .. Elevation," on the other hand, is gon>rncd
to l:.eep a chan,JCI quite deal', 1t is more than probable th:it hy many factors, of \\LiC'h a few a1'e COlTect c!>timaiioil net
the Uerll;an ILines arol'mllTeli
o:and. &C'" are what i;. known cnly of tllC nmge but of ",-here the t:nget will be ,dlen the
60S okernltion mInes, i,e" they
re e:xploded at will from the
heì! fetches up, Vlu'iations in po\\Qcr, the motion of the ship

h01'e, lu"I, theref01"e, fJl'ly dangerous to a ho..tilc Ye

c1. fÌlin
. and a few othel' contraptions as well, (2) The article
C. M,-UnfoJ'tunateh", to {Ji!-cuss 1I10:"t of the watters to to \\hich JOu refer deal'! \\-itJl Americau )1a,'al gunnery, \\hich
"'}Iich you reff'r is fahfJo. i am quite satisfied in my own mind dillers from ours in ,arious ways. The American!' tl1Ínk tbt'ir
\U'y the 1Je
t. \\Te think our
is, The (;f-rman'l }un'e l 'roh-
float the Al,miralty is COlTfct ill its policy. As for the con-
t: f,ting rllmc.ur
. one may be 11!' t:OITeet as auodleI'. I bee and a\:.ly a third way !'ti!l! Allp..ay, you v.iU reali'e th:ìt
U1y
I . , b .. I t'J, planation as to how and why a Briti
h sllelll1Ît
a t;ern';tn
f'yTnpat H,e "it I 1 e tantalisi l lg !!ituahon in wb
I you find ..

hi}> in a tendel' } )lace i;, ( . .uite ina } J } )J"o p riate at the l irellent
}ou:.-.U. r 11m a fello"
nf:cr('I'.
t;me. Be content to thank Ged for the hits, and ùon't 1,001er
Jl, A. }f, (Hil..hgatl' ) ,-r()rcl,' \\

a P emìip for Booll. I ., I

lew It s done FO ollg as it is dOlìC,
p, H. If. (Xevrì,ury),-(l) 1 h;we forv.an!('d the lett
r I'. G, C, (l
otter's Bar),-Jt is il)lro

-itle 11) IHl!'WCl" Y our
l\:\;o1.1t the f.II,
;[(lI/;,l to the editol', Your ,iew i
, of COUr
(;. fi
<rst queëtion, As J'f'garùs the' se,cond. so far II" 1 know t-16
CltTtd. (2) He "our ql(e!-tiül1, the Aùmi('aIty bas witll1wld d
J .. Iranage to get O\1t, of E
hjerg within the 24-hour limit
iu!oi"ll1lltioll for strRte;;ic;:II'e11HHls wLtich are to om' a<h'allta g e. ".," .
.<,ccol'umj< to my mforlì1at.Ïtm there \
a" nothi1.g p:itti"l/larly
,. X, Y. r..", (Sl'ilrh0l"úugh) ,-A
I-heme like yours WëS \Hong ,,:th hu, but the "t'lithel'" "as ba
l and
he took :l{hall-
f'), [erimentetl with !>ollle )-ear!'
go. I do not know ",ith what tage of 11ltuuation:iI Lm\f tò gain 11111eh JJeeded re...t. There
"'Ic"e
s. is no nat ion !TO attae1led to J IIternahonal La\\'" as GCr.'l:OUY-
J, If, (A
hholll'ne).-:Sf'e anE\\'er to" X, y, Z," n})o\'e. 'l/"}/t'1/ a,f"f{I/{U!It' i
in 1" tf/'I,ÚlInl /1'11111 a.
.1, S, (Dulldce).-T lIave re:!d )"0111' communications "ith A. Z. (London, N,),-] am afraid that heYOlH I informing
rre<:t jlltere!'t. Y.m appeal' to lw\'e co\'cred en'ry pos
ible you tl1l'.t the Qflnll Eli_liTH:}, i.., aIrearJr 1-.l1o"n in the ?\a\-y
a.rgnrnfllt. as " lilack Be
s " J c:mnot J,(i..-e YOU any inforllJ
tinn Hi
h i'

n. "T. C. CDunfermline),-It. was IOJJg ago officially you dellire. Unt, }'OIJ can "-"lee}; in
o
r beù .. to the extent
n:que!'tet.l Blat no
peculiitions as 1-0 fut ure fleet o}Jerations l,f tating it that I.cnl J.'i-her \\ ill proha 1Jly kno" bet tel' \\ lnt
Fhc,urJ lJe madp, 'rhis was a wi.;c :,tep fOJ' till; following rea"OI1. to do \\ith her than" the l11Ilj(orit}, of tI.e memhers of your
'Jhose \\"ho write neeessarilv !!et to know odds and emls of club W}1O di
eu
sed tÌle 111atter." H it quite true that I
!Ie\\'" ",hid} have J'ot seen ti,e light, and 1"1'0111 the"e oùò
amI uphoM the Admirlllty as again"t civilian opil1iou whi.,h is
o'dl! it is not difficult to prophesy ::.s to probable happeI1iJlg
, " }ll"OfoulIdly clissati!'fied ": but what- would you have 1 "'hen
Ilial w very po
sibly unintentionally to aid the enemy to
you order a f-uit of clolhes, (10 you ÙO the cutting and fitting,
l,ridr,e lhe gap whieh t'Jii
b between the Briti
h mind and the or l10 yûu leave it to your t.ailud
';l'1'nl/\I} oue. L< "Patriot" cI.ondon, \\T, ).-Y OHr 27 J"f'aC;nlHl "HV
J
, :M. T. (WimLleJon),-
OlTY, but J am not alloy,ed to Admiml Jellicoe
honld have ll
s Laure fleet off J1t'li..-o]an;'
tli"cuc;s the mattl'r, fürm interesting (though terrilJly lengthy) rf'a{hlg. I
llOuld,
JI. O. M, lJ, (Landil.:;.:n),-(l) }filny thani.s lor your howe\-er, he more impre
l'ed \\ith
'our "ptitJiot1sm JJ ar.d
If1hg "nd int.eresting leUI'r. H i::; the eUr
e cf the country
.ollr convidinn of Olll' Allmiralty's .. illeol>l}
lt'nf:e OJ
that t.he orùinal'Y pupulatil)n }i\'ill
in di!'trids remote fro III tread1f
ry JJ j.f :rour I
Her ":, '5" were lifter tIle J;;nglis!)
tianJ.':et. i" totally ineapahle nf reali
iug that we al'e at war, A imte..d f.f the Gerlllan style. TbN. cnly thing in )"C.UI' letter
Flohll German raid in Ol
C of these places woul.l}H'olJa!;ly be a \\ Heb J Ciill'coll!ératul"te you on is .. J prefer to "lòonymoll!'
I J le"..illg in di"gui'e, (2) I ha\e di
cm:
ed tIIC underwater be," Here
'ou are undouMedly w;..e!
..upply of SU1J:n11lìne
tOJes in last w('t'k's iFsue, 1\hich coin- J., K. (London, S.'Y,).-'fhe fiag,,1 1 ip of tIle Jtali:m
...ideù with Jour letter. (3) Both Philip of Spain, in Eliza- Aùmiral l)enano at Li,;;a "a" the ,1 f'JI,I, t/JI <', Ow .. D('ead-
LfHulD <lays, and Napoleou, at n lat.er era, bad designs of lioUg}'t" of her era. lIe
}Iifted his flag to }Ier from the
iU\'"a!;iou conc1uctt'd with flat-bottoilled boats; schemes which it c d' /tf/[;a
hOl't 'y before the hattIe, and kept llcr out of the
)}e,er c
me off. T}Je Gcrmans are repClted to l,arbour
imihr line, Had },e gone into ac,icn. Jealling the Tta];éil'8 in the
l)lal1
, fmt, t.hongll thf'Y might be immune from torpedo attack, A/l(JI"/ut,)/.,. Ill' woullI prok.hl,y h:n'e won-t.Lc Au
trian fleet
Hìey "ould certainly not e
"a}>e "hell fire. I fancy that their \\ il'l distinctly inlerier in !,}lÌps.
l,ìight '\\-oull\ be rcminiscent of tIle Turks on the :;ucz l.:anaJ. .J. P. G, (London, :;, W .).-Y our fcheme iq ingenious, I
llìore you "ill f-oon reco\'cr amI he aljle to go back, l,ut. 1 am afmiJ that it ,",ould he out of court on account of
M. "T. (l3ournemouth, (!x llf'lgium).-If you have any- weight, and also on ac.
ount of the comp/i..'ation sf filling.
t1,:ng 0: value to give to the I:.,iti..h Admiralty, you should The ordinary J3ullivaut torpe{;o jlet is f.lI'
illlplo' and ùf h.r- j
-t;fier it t.o thf'm direct-. liut. if )'OU want to Dlate it a mattcr }e..s ",,,ibht,
15-

J - ,

CORRESPONDENCE.

LARGE ORD
.-\
CR FOR SIEGE OPER.\TION3.
To the Editor of L\
w .\::m V;_\TER.
SIR -In L.\xD A
D 'YATER of Fehruary 20, ('olenel
)hUole :nall[' some interesting remark! on thè operation:! at
th'! siege of Sebastopol. A good deal of useful information
might. be oblain['d fròITl cardul stndy of this si{'ge, hut of late
years it ha>! been quite ignorell. The tactics employed by the
great t'ngineer, Tolllehell, which delayed the siege for so long,
;u1(1 the skilful co-operation of the ,Freuch and Hriti
h bat-
t
I'i'!<; in ;t

i>!tino- aUdcks on outworks and at the 1111al aS3ault
011 the )1alakoff, are worthy of careful !.tudy. Oue g.'eat
1t',
oll tau.:l,t by the siege was the great power exercigt'd hy

.I"tillerj é:nd the nec,"ssity for it
devé'lopmeut. .At
eba
topol,
It.. Colunel :\ldude pOillt
out, yery lI1ueh more powerful
onbance were ernpJ'1yed than those lIsed in iormer sieges,
}JIII, the greal:'sL diect was produced hy the fire of large mOI't'tn
-13-ineh, The result of the fire may be jnllged hom the Îdct
tll,tl for some hvo months before the fall of the pl<lce. the
rH
"i,1l1 c:J.suJ,hies wei'C one tlIGu"ancl each d3.Y, Colon"l
:;\hulle meulions ::\laHel's morL:!r or 33,inehes c:llibre. whieh
\\"1<; a trial in the rig-lit dii"ectioll. RuL tbere were diftìcultie<(
i I tìie manur.l
tnre of n:
ry large onhullce at that. time, ;1'1(1
the autIlOrities failed to gra
p tàe importance ef Ule idea, Tt
i; a clIl'iou' fact tInt Antwerp, when besieged hy the Prench
in 1832, surremlereJ c
!ierly from the moral effect produced
hv a Ìcw SlIC]]S fìn
d from It ITIeu"ter morlar with a calibre
of 2-l inehes, whieh t 1\;J HeIgi'UlS con
id
I'ed "t he fiiJi
hi ng
I<lrúlH
10 the enemy'>! Inrb:<rous mal\ner of acling,"-Yours,
&l'"

Cll \RL'-:S Ow;:x, .:\Ltjor O"'I\('ral.

TIlE 9f11 L.\
CEP..S.
To the E,]itor of I.A'\D AXD \Y.\Tr:R,
SIR,-Can any oì your rr.ililary reader,; seUle tl1Ï:i CJu
s-
t ion
! see a l'IUCh'<,ch'el'tised print whieJt d{'pict3 tl\e
9.11 J.; neer:" c!largillg C"rman gUlls. The letterpi''''s3 de3crib-
i<1g Üliil print f(.lls how the J,ancers captured the gum at
1\..lon," and that the original pid,ure is by Mr. ,1. lIalfon! n,ns,
The 9ih Lancers haye
hown exceplional gallantry, and
li')l]e aI''! ].r<tvel' or ha..-e :.\'{fered IHore severely than they
Inure, BuL I am told that tIley on no occ3"ioll charg;>d gll.B
;Ü do"e quarlel'
. as shm\!l hy .:\J r. Halford Hm'!' , aHcL that
tht'il' ÙtUiOns atlac1;: was again.'! a great uumher of infantry.
v:hom t-hey ði,/ not con,c Ilear to on aceGllnt of barhed wire
dd;>nce3,-=-- Y OUi',""

OLD SÜLlJIt:R,

GER
L\
Y S RE,UtYES.
To the Ellitur of L\
[) .\XD \Y.\í'ER.,

II!,-_\ cúrrc,;pond,mt of the Timcs, under the hf"ading
of "
ix \\\,pl..
in Germany," slat
s that thN"e are 7,)0.000
].idced men in rf-sen-e of th
1915 category. I fail 10 see how
t;.i
can be po
'il)Je, fOl' in 1897 the Gel'man !,opuJ,ltion wail
o<lly 54.000,000, and I h
{'\Huhcr of male bÜ th3 dilL not
e,.
eetl 94:;,000 at the tht'n hirthrate of thid.y-fin.. P('\' 1.000.
Tlle d"?.t.1I,; in the fii'4 ye:!r of liìe in Gcnnanv at tÌiat date
w::or;) 198 pH 1,000 in Pl'lI

ia, gnd as hig"1I as 282 pel'
1,000 in onc S:ate, At the lowe,-t estimation 189,000 wo)ldd
it,l\'e t1l{',1 ill the IÌrst veal' of lift', Ii to this number i
", ath/Nt
the dl'atl!s helween tIle íìr,.;t, anti eighleenth year,.., 3n,1 COI}-
t;Îller tI,
numher of t:"fit., it doe,; not seem pLs
ihle tÌlat lJ:e
e
li"'ale as giveu a1)0\'e can be coned.-l am, Sir, yeurs
obcdit"litly,

l.h:DICU'S.

TIlE EfFICIENCY OF .\IR ATTArKS A:'\D TIlE Itm
E
HALLWAY mUDGES,
To the Edilúr of L\.XD AX!) "'\'l'ER.
Sm,- Up 10 the IJl'esent no system of conei>.l't...d air attacks
ha3 been attelJlpted again3t the vital node points in EIC
westet'llline oi German communic:tlions-'llaH1e:',', the l'ailway
Lridges oycr the Uhine. .
Of the railway l>ridgps from Cologne to tJle SWi3S frontier,
only those from Cologue to ::\Iayenee are o\'er 120 mile, from
Yenlun, and the rem?in,ter arc within strikina distance from
Nancy, if we tal{ß 120 ;,-.iles-thc di
ta\1ce f
'om Ht'lìol't to
Friedrichsha.ven-as a feasihle rad;us fOi' opi'ratious. '1':18
aeroplanes might he mccl ill squadrons of fi,.e to make siltml-

taneous attaå'l on Ole hot t1e-11<>ek>! Íorwed hy the hridges.
1 have only a copy ei the 18g6 Tillley .\tJas by mo, whidl
wouId mak
it appear that l
ei'e were then only twelve rail-
way briJc;es ill the :iJ"
.\ in qnc;;tioli, Thi3 would lll'cd a fI,?et
of ;;ixty aerOpL
!Ie3, only 30me t,wen
y n;ore than the number
u;;elJ Jast week on the Belgian coa't.
The targets off
r.?d bj Hie hridges are ]011g, and the diJlì.
cuIty CdU;;êtl by the LId tint the, are nalTOW weule! he
cOUlllel'acted hy thc adoption oÌ
Ü. i" Blin Deshlecl's ]Jlan of
dropping hOl'lb" in other \'ci"ti
al11bne;; to the right alHlleft
by eaeh sqnaJron,
Great delay and confl1,-io\1 auwlIg U\i>. German Iransport
woul.l r
511lL even ii h.,di the bri.1g

were 'Icy':>.rely damaged
011 the same day, In l'oloael ::\Iaudc's words, " Raidiu<T i.he
node point;; o( the elIÜH'Y',; l'011Ia:UI:ic.\lions wiJ1 grad
i3l!y
make the supply of well in the t"'llcheil almost a matter 01
impc
,,:bility,' ,
Th
concerted opel':Üion ought to he repeated he fore t1:e
rel),\.ir
to the bridzes l:a'."e beell conmleted, To m.lke tho
l,hn a SU,'ee,-, th
I
vo faeters of co,ci:lin3.t.ioll and ri>.p tition
oi aU2.ck are ess
utial.-I re:nain, !:;ir, yonr obed:t'.It ser\'ant,
II, J. TUù1f-\s.

New Ilouse, "
1itl;iUr;iL

PERTH ES.LES.II :,:1
LUS,
To the Edilvr of I.,\
, D .\XD "\\'.\TER,
Sm,--The vi1!a:!;c of thi:" naì:\f' hail been promine!l.tly
mentioned in h13ny of Ill'! Fr
w>h ollie:dl n:e5
3ge1 conCerl1ill

the war,
\.n inquiry addreò',...ll hy the rre-o;ent wI'iter to the
colu!nn
oï your contc:nrorary, T"ff" all.f {h''''';,'s;, a" to the
meaning oÌ the latter l)art of thi
name has hrought a \'a:aed
reply from an cstt'cmed COlTC,'pollclent, to the ef\'et't lha!. ihe
name siguifics Perthe:< ''1'(//' Hur1w,. L"" "houlJ he spelt If'

or [è,<, an o1).,olt'te word meaning" near:' " by Lhe "i.1e of,"
from the I"llilll"lu<. It i
now only u-<t'd in connediG!1 with
place-nan.e!'-e,g., Ple,,
i
-lez-Tulll's, Hlirlus i" a Idrger
vil!ag p , ahout a mite south-east from Perlhes.-Yùur obedienl;
servant,

J, L\XHFE\R IXC'As.
,<.'p",'/af'le .Ua/.-f'/'s' ('UUll'lIl/:/.
Glendol'a, IIindhcad, Surr!"y.

SLmIAnI
ES .\:\D \IERCIIA:\T YES:ELS,
To the E.lit"r of L.UD ,-\XD 'Y,\TEIt.
Ih:_\R Sm,-Th;J im,l,pidiolB to the IJltei' \':l1;'n attaeketl
hy tIle furlilei' an>, to gi\-
the wb!llai'ine theil' st"ru anll
tealU
Rway a;t fast liS pù

ibl
. \Y(mlll it net he an adciiliolla1
security to the 11I:)rc1illl1t vC
;;iel
if, while th1i'l adiug. thpy
were Lo Lhrow ove\'\
o.tnl a qual'tity ûf o
d fì
h;n
net
, which
wouIeI entangle a tOl'PCttO ::!clIL in pur::uit of t:':>Hl ?-YOUl',i
faithiully,

[[, ,J, p, THo\L-\s,

Elcot Pal'k, Kinllmry, :P.crb.

TIlE W EST Y 0 It K S H IRE It E G I
I E N T.
Tu the Eliitor cf J..nD AXD '\\'_\TElt.
{)I....R
iR,-\\ïll yüu al10w 11 ' to appeal thl"O!igh 111e
mediuHl of your papH' for warm gl,), ;
3 al1d mi ten:< for the
J/lcn of tlip 12th St'n,jee Hai.Udion, 'Vest YOl.1
s]lirc Uegiwt'llt.
now traini'l
at Lei;{ìIlcli BU
1.arcll ::\Iudi oì the,;e men'"
time is sp
l;l ou th,'- riJ;:: ra II !:"e ,
nll they suffer \'cry mudi
fwm celtl ha!ld
amI c'hi!IJlaill
, neithêr of whid\ al'e COI1-
duci,'e to gocd n:arks,uall
hip.
People ;;eml qUcli\titics of warm cIcthing to 0'11' men at
the frr,nt, hut are a Jittle apt to forget the 11'en ot' the ne\v
arJlIie>! at hOllle.-I am, Sir, YOtll"
fiJ,idlfu1ly,
JhBI,TfE J,\QL"I.:S pIn,),
A
hl,'gll, Gl'Ove Road, Leighton Buzzard.

)Jr', Hilaire D,'lIve will leduro at the Borough Ho.I 1 1, Stafford
\\ e((11 'S((,IY. 3..( :\trlllh, ahd at the Temr
la,1
e H"ll, Dcrby, 01

lhurs'l.\y, 4th
11I'c:h,
. His HC\t ledure at Quceu's H"Il, London, will be on the e\'en:n;; of
luestl....\', 9th
Iuch,
!III', Jane ,\il! ledm'e on ti.o Xa\'31 "'ar at Queen's lIdll, L-oncbn
on k .-aby c\"t'uil,g next, the 26th in,t. .
1'IOft
,... I.c\HS will lel"lt;re at Quccn'i Il..U 011 .. .\10c!
lQ
1'::![P
l'5i\"e,j .. on Tucsda
', 2r,J .\lal"
b..

16.

February 27. 19 I 5

LAND A
D WATER

.

os

..

From

Are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
made by ét British
Company with British
Capital and Labour.

10/6
upwards.

THOMAS DE J,A. RUE t!r. CO" T.TD" La
!DON.

o . 'l'li
LIF ,,

Smoking Mixture.
MILD an.
MEDIUM

lun-ing special reference to JÆr. Belloc's remark-
able 'ü:eeklY War ,/na!\'sis In LAND & "',\TER

I .- t
,1"; .
.;;,
( ì
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.,
,
.
.J
1ì)Þ

0 r
:.
5d. p" ,,,,,.
,
'ONTENTMEHT' .

I _
,
..

Q

Special Features of the
lap
T HE MAP i. 33 w " .p
w in .ize, and i. in eight colour..
-Belligerent areas are shoy, n distinct from neutral countries.- The
Map indicate. onlv tho.e place. which are likely to be mentioned
in "af news and de.patchel; it i. therefore dear and easy to
tudy.-In
addition, it indicates the political boundaries, -fortified zones, riverø,-
hill) countries,-n1ountain passes, -manhC's, fen-lands, -raily, '1\ ot:,
roads,-canals, -industrial areas, all these features are IIhown in different
forms and colourø, 110 a
to be readilv distinguishable.
The whole I\lap il divided into z-inch squares, reprelenting roughlv 100
miles each w;n, so that approximate distances from one place to another
may be calculated immediatelv.
Each square has a separate number and lener, dnd places I'alling within
each square are øpecially indexed with such number and ldter, so that an\
place mav be found immediately b,' reference to the Index.
ø
PRICE: 'Iounte f 0" linen, stron,r:ly bound in Cloth case. 2/6
with Explanator_v Article by Hilaire Relloe, and Index SEr
AT ALL NEWSAGE
TS OR DIRECT FROM
LA
D & \VATER
!\lAP DEPARTMFNT
eE
TR.-\L HOrSE, KIXGSWAY
LO:\DO:\
w.e

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N PL . YER 8& SONS. Not.
ingham

THr; 'M"EQIAL TL.r'\
l("r"'1 .ç f"'I
G::2L&.T U
I""IN" IAt.......,n.' \Tf

11

LAN DAN D \V A T F I

Feloruary 27, I9 I S

THROUGH THE EYES
OF A 'VOMAN

The One and Only Subject
A :\IXK home fro,]) the front on a few days' lea\'e
re ('ntl.\- had one hith>r cause for complaint.
He admitted that the mud in Flanders was
muddier thd.n am' mud that had e\'er been
kno\\n or imagitlcd. He granted that the
trenche
at times were not the mo,;t comfortable form of
habitation, but there was one thing only that reall) roused
him to \\ rath,
" \\"hat 1 can't stand." said he, "is this inrðsant war
talk. You people talk of nothing but war from the time you
get up in the morning to the moment you go to bed at night.
\\"hat Kitchener has said, what Fi
her is doing, why the
Grand Duke rf'treated, \\'h\' this or that news has been
suppressed: Zeppelins, Taubes, the new English gun, Joffre's
spring plan of cd.mp.Lign, so on, and
o forth, c\'ery minute of
the da.\', It's sickening!" Here he paused for breath, as
may rea "on ably bf' 'iupposed, but shortl.\' .tfterwards informed
us that the on1\' people who did not talk incessantly of the
war were the soldiers themsP!\'e,;, and that other folk had
better follow their example,
This ma\' be and no douht is quite true, but the
question 1H'\.èrthdess remain,,: \\"hat else is there to talk
.lbout? Precious little in wry truth, The point is: Had
we at times better be dumb than talk .lbout the war and
nothing hut the war? Personally, 1 am inclined to think
we had, .\ny kind of obsession is dangerous, but the war
obsession is more so than most, as all will agree who give the
nutter half a mon1l.'nt's thought. The way in which even
the mildc-;t and meekest amongst us welcome with fierce joy
the news of carnage amongst the enemy or a report that all
the Kaiser's sons have been killed is a case in point. It is
\'ery natural, no doubt, but in quieter moments many of us
will wonckr at the depth,; of ferocity which we have displayed.
Feelings we never dreamt of possessing have been betrayed,
and with blood and thunder for ordinal'\' tea-tahle talk it is
really no cause for wonder they have rise;1 to the surface.

The Practical Side of Things
Since August even the least practir.ll amongst us ha\'e
attempted to become practical members of a practical nation.
\\"e have honestly tried to eschew vanities, and each woman
in her way, he it small or vastly important, has endeavoured
to be of some positive use. Complete households, from the
mistress to the srullerv maid, have turned to with a will,
and worked with fingeÌ's as well as with brains. There has
been very little idling; it h.1", in fact, been almost a com-
petition amongst women as to who could be the busiest, and
many have mapped out ewry moment of their day, grudging
almost a minute of wasted time, And all has been governed
by this one object of usefulness. The dilettante has been
sternly banished from the scene, and no half-way measures
welcomed,
Xo clearer proof of the practical phase through which
women are passing can be given than that furnished by the
new skirt. This new skirt has been intimated for some
time, but it is only now, when women are forced by the
rapidly approaching spring to pay conw heed to their w.lrd-
robes, that its claims are being senously considered, A
delightful book has just reached me from
ew York, which
has something to say, albeit very little, upon the matter of
clothes, It is \uittcn bv :\Irs. Beatrice Forbes-Robertson
Hale, the \\'ell-known fen1inist-though shl' is rather better
known in .\merica than over here-and is called "\Vhat
\\'omen \\"ant."
:\Irs. Hale, writing in June of last year, when tight skirts
were still habitual, goes so far as to say: "I doubt if one
can touch pitch without being defiled more readily than one
can habitually wear a hobble skirt without being belittled."
If she had been writing at the present time on present-day
fashion she could have no such text for her theme. For the
latest skirt is exceptionally full, and wide. It measures,
indeed, no less than five yards round the hem, and it is
exceedingly short, into the bargain. Such a practical skirt
ac; this has not been seen for years, save for country use.
Kow we are invited to wear it at all times and seasons.
Every skirt is short and full, whether it be for day, afternoon,
or evening use. I t will be delightful to move unshackled
once again, and, to quote :\Irs. Hale once more, by this gain
in freedom our" accoutrements gain in sanity."
IConlinueå On page 316)

PERMANENT COAL.

A Clever Invention. An Inexpensive Appliance.
Suitable for all Coal-Grates. which Saves
Scuttles upon Scuttles of Coal.

An exceedingly c1e"er im'ention by a ","orlh-country scientist bids fair to
re, olutiunise :\11 exislin
ideas of coal consumplion, It is sUllable for !(ratl <
of a!l kinds and sizes (includi.lg hilchen ranges). and only costs 3/'. or j b
post free.
No Alteration in Appearance or Fire. No Treatment
or Fuel. No Special Installation. or Renewal.
The Incandescent Fire Mantle is a device of special degi
n and com-
position, fulh' protected by Patent. which is simplv placed in the centre of any
grate, I;
ci('nlifically utihses the heat ener
v created by the combustion
of the coal. which, instead of flying up the chimney, as is the case of the
larger portion of such energy in ordinary grales, is made to bring Ihe manlle
to incandescent heat. Thus there lies in the centre of the fire a wl,ite hot
mass which may be termed e,erlasling coal, throwing off more I "at than
coal alone can gi'e, vet absolutely unhurnable, and as good al the end (,I
lwelvc months a< it is the first day, The appearance of the fire is in no \\a,
altered; the mamle is completely cO\'ered by the surrounding coal. and its
presence cannot be detected,
o I:-;STALLATION, ALTERATLON, OR SPECIAL
TREATMEXT OF THE FUEL OR THE C;RATE IS r\ECESSARY, There is no
recurring expenditure of any kind; \\hen once yon have purchased the fire
mantle at its modest price of 3S you can enjov for ever a beautiful Iv bri
hl
and hot fire at an enormous sa\"Ìng of coal. The mantle is placed into the
grate wilh exactly as mueh -and no more-trouble than it is to put on a
lump of coal. It requires no attention or care of anv kind.
Remarkable Test Fi4ures,
As the result of a recent strictly supen ised test upon modern grates, it
was found that the a"erage consumption of coal per grate in the ordinal',
grate (eight grates were experimented upon in this particular test) was 34 lb,
of coal for a period of II hours, On the following day one of the new fire
mantles was placed in each of these same grates, and the coal consumption
per grate for a period of 12! hours was then fonr.d to have been reduced
to 191b, 30z,. whilst the heat was greater.
Saves its Cost in a Few Days.
The price of the Incandescent Fire l\Iantle is 3s, (3S, 6d, post free),
which small sum is saved back in a few days, The mantle lasts for an
indefinite time and can be used in grates of any size. pattern, or construction,
On account of the proportionate saving in postage, two mantles can be
dispalched post free to any address in the kingdom on receipt of 6s. 6d., and
three for only 9s, At this time of enforced economy. and with the additional
danger of the present high coal prices rising still further, the great saving
effected by the Incandescent Fire l\lantle should not be neglected, Orders
and remittances to be addressed to The Incandescent Fire l\lantle Syndicate,
(Dept. 28),9 Station Parade, Queen's Road. London, S,E,

'IIIII.
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""':
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A
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ã Are you Run-down i
. -
_ 'When your system is undermined by worry or over,work -
- -
_ -when your yitality is lowered-when you feel" any, -
_ how"-when your nen'es are "on edge "-when the =
= least exertion tires you-you are in a "Run-down n =
= condition. Your system is like a flower drooping for =
_ want of water. And just as water revives a drooping -
- -
_ flower-so' 'Vincarnis ' gives new life to a "run-down" _
= constitution. From evC'n the first wineglassful you can =
= feel it stimulating and invigorating you, and as you _
= continue, you can feel it surcharging your" hole system =
- with Ilfif' health-llew strength-new vigour and new -
- -
- lile. Will you try just one bottle? -
_ 'J _
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æ Begin to get well FREE. æ
- -
= Send for a liberal free trial bottle of IWincarnis._not a mere taste _
_ but enough to do you good, Enc!ose three penny stamps (to pay _
= postage), COLEMAN & CO. Ltd.. W212, Wincarnis Works, Norwich. =
- -
I

i
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111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

3 1 4

e ruary 27, 1915'

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GREEN STRIPE'& OVG.
Scotch Wl1iskies.

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Dreadnought H,M.S, COLOSSUS. 20,000 tons displacement; length 546 ft,; beam 8
... . completed 1911: engines 29,Lw h rsc power'
speed21 5 knots; cost about El,730,ooo; maximum coal capacity 2,700 tons; guns, 10 12-in., 16 4-in., and smaller; 3 torpedo tubes; crew 900.
From the original by Montague Daw:; n,
C
þyr"ht of :\IESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDlNHL'RGH.
LE . . -
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IA
D

TIIROUGH TIlE E'YES OF A
'VO
1AN

(Continued ITom page Sa)

Good "ork in Belgium
\"hen - hi
t..J \' of the war comes to be written it is quite
likph th.lt "P,I"(' ilM
' he found for mention of Dr. Hector
:\lul1lo .1I1d hi;. gallant hand of helpers. For a long time
pa
t th; \lI1h1.1I.\I1c(, ("oq)S ha" been doing
pkn(lid work in
BeIgmll1. The\' h,I\"L' c-,;tahli"lì('d centres at .\nt\n'rp and
(;hent, .\I1d after heing forced to lea\"(' these pbces ha\"l' nO\\
J)),:d.' tlll'ir head(pI,II'tI'r,. ,It Furnes. Th,' work is ('mlless,
.1I1d the "train upon all conn rl1l'(1 a II':a\'y 011<', hut the
I,' Jrps i
h()url
' re,lpin
ib H'\'.-,ml. rhere is hardly a soldier
,lInongst thl' ,\lIies who JJ,IS not heard of its fam(', and m.IIlY
..I them ha\'(' ,dread\' causi' t" bless the d3\' "hen Dr. :\Iunro
.1I1d his st.lff took' a hand in the hospital work abroad,
:\uml)pr
of wounded soldier" !Jan' been resctl{'d from the
tiring line b
' on
' or .\lìoth,'r of the Corps' motor ambulances,
:11.ullIed hy pluck
' hdp,'rs, ,1Ild the r(,
c1ll' work h,15 often
heen carried out under circumstances of great danger and
difficult\"
.\mongst the member" of the \orps i-; Lady Dorothie
Feildin!:;", one of Lord Iknhigh's daughters, She is a pretty

irì with ,\11 inliaity of pluck amI cour.lge, and apparently

ir.'l..s-., E \"l'witllf',;sc-; I eport tha t tllne aitel time she has
g,Hle out unciel fire to bring in the \Hmnded, and that she docs
not know the meaning- of fear. It is a splendid reputation
to ha\'e wnn, The l.Ist time ] saw Lad\' ])orothie was at
,\scot. She was \\"ltching the King and' Queen dri\'e a\\'ay
just before the last race, the fir,;t day of the meeting. She
W.IS \Tn' well dressed amI vcr\' .lttracti\'e to see, \"l.t ] do not
doubt she ha<; ne\'er been hetter "uited than by tlie workman-
Jike kit she is wearing at present while on her \\ork of mercy
.1l1d sor('ly 11l'P(led help,
rhe Discipline of \\ or
The chance of the sih er lining
(Jes far towanls making
the hlacl;:e-;t of cloud,; toler,lhll', It appe,ll,; to the optimi-.m
th.lt is l.lknt in ('\'eIY man, no nMttpr how strenuous1\- he
nnv dem' it. It would he hard for Ih all if w(' could sll.Itch
no -gleam of comfort from the rlread e\"l'nt which ha" ()ver-
wh':Imcd hunl.lnit\.. Life \\"Ould he well-nigh intolerable, all
sacrifice \'ail1, and th
future a thing of no account. .\s a
111.ltter of hJ.pPY fact, wc can look with confidcnce upon the
rt'verse side of the shield, \\'e look forward to a future full
of hope and promise, one in which \' d.lue,; will 1M \'e been
rl'adjuste
1 and seen aright, It is the old story of the cleansing
lire, and it is fortunate that it is so, Othen\"ise all things
would resolve themselves into one gigantic puzzle, the
,lIbwer to which was for ever missing.
It is thi., hope of the ultimate issues that is helping
many a \\',);11an to face her life just now, In spite of d.ll the
....tivities into which we ha\'e plunged, in spite of our com-
mittees, or
a'1Ïs.Itions, institutions, and schemes of a hundred
;tnd one dc-;.'riptinns, there is a terrible amount of time left
tllr thinking. Women ha\'e the infinitely IMrclcr p.lrt of
w.nching and \\'aiting; ahout tlMt there is no shadow of
douht. The only thing to be done is to take a long and wide
enough \'iew-not to limit events to February of 1915, but
to imagine what Februaries of succeeding
ears will be,
when peace is restored; and for the first time in most of our
b'es we realise what peace really means, In com1110n with
many things, it is in its absence we have grown to appre-
ciate it, and the lesson could not have been learnt in any
other way.

ERICA.

SCOTTISH l\10TOR Al\1BULA:"JCES

AT Buckingham Palace on "-edne"lay H,M, the King inspected
.1 numher of motor amhul,mces "hich are heing sent to the front hy
1 he Sr<)tti
h BranLh of the Briti
h I{erl Cro
s Society, Parked in the
\1,111. the lon

tring of Cdrs looked \'ery handsome and imposing,
-tr('tchinr:: ,l
they did from the \"ictoria :\kmorÜI to nearl)' half,w,l}'
.limn the avenue, At the close of the inspection the IÙng, addres
ing
Sir (;eorge Beatson, chairmdn of the Scottish branch, and other
members who were present. s;J.id :-
"I cannot refrain from expressing my appreciation of this
splendid gift which has come from Scotland, [ assurp you,
gentlemen, [ appreciate it very highly, and am quite sure it "ill
be of th" greatest
ervice to our troop
in France, I am glad to
have this opportunity of expre

ing my warm th.mks to you, and
I "an af,ure you that this inspection IJ.l
afforded me the greatest
interest and pleasure,"
The ""ottish Branch of thi c Sori!'ty has ma(le the work a national
one, all d., having suhscribed, \\"e think that a little more than
the mere mention of the fact is due to the man to whom the Society
owes the SHeCt of the nIO\(:'lncnt and the rc.IÌ!'oin!{ of over [140,000-
no mean total. \\'e refer to :'lIe. J.lmes In!::li
Ker, j,P., whose
Ilnce,,,ing enofl
k,,,, nude the
cheme pù
slule.

\ i\ D

\\' ,\ T E r

Fcbnl:1r)'

19 1 5

,.,.,
- ,)

HARVEY'S I
"Golf Blend" Scotch Whisky
In -
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Can be
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Expeditionary
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f.
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Sample 4 I
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Sprcial Term! 10
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Send for 'Price Li:cl
and Samples.

DRINGS'

UBA VERSACK RATION"

A delicious
lcat Paste for making
Sandwiches for the Haversack,
Issued as a Luncheon Ration by
many Units now m training.

Price lOd. per

pound

Supplied in hl( ds of 3 Ib, to 5 Ib, each,
SAMPLE U'/LL RF SENT O'V .f/PPLlCATlON,

DRINGS LIMITED
56 MOORGA TE STREET, LONDON, E.C.

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Adequate air pressure will make your tyres last
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of the subject that has enabled the Dunlop
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THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO, LTD,.
Founden Ihrouvhonl .he World of the Pneumatic Tyre Indultry_ Allon Cross,
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entleman

AND

LAND & WATER

Vol LXI\

No. 2756

SATURDAY,
IARCH 6, 1915

[ PUBLISHED AS ] P R ICE S I X P E lH" E
A
EWSPAPEi{, PC Hr.ISHED WEE" I, Y

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WING-CO
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Whose brilliant air feats have been 50 eminently successful.

LAN jj 'A 'Ñ D \ç A 1Ê R

VALUABLE PATRIOTIC
ABSOLUTELY

PICTURE
FREE

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"'

.. THE CHARGE OF THE BCOTS GREYS"
By LADY BUTLER.

This mag-nificent Reproduction from the Original Painting by Lady Butler, depicting" THE CHARGL
OF THE SCOTS GREYS AT \VATERLOO," the en!(ra\ed >urface measuring 26 by 14 inches 01
Fine Plate Paper 32 by 20 inches, we offer FREE OF AI L CHAHGE as a SPECIAL BOl'US t<.
e\"f>ry Reader of .. LAND AND \VATER" purchasing ANY TEN ufthefollowing High,c1ass Engra\ings.
"hich we offer at the GREATLY REDUCED PRICE of Ol'E GùlNEA PER SET OF TEfo;
SUBJECTS, WORTH TEN GUINEAS PER SET OF TEN,
This remarkable offer will be the more appreciated when we say that the Artist's Proofs of
"THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS" in a larger size have sold at THIRTY GUINEAS
EACH, and Indi3. Prints at Three Guineas each,
\Ve now offer to the Readers of u LAND A
D \VATER"

1 0.1 o. OW

TH ENGRAVINGS FOR 21/-

WITH u THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS" AS A SPECIAL BONUS,
The ten Engravings can be selected from the following list, viz,;-
Engraved - Plate
surface. paper.
I nches
Inches.

ARTIST.

Tille,
1, "BESIDE THE STILL WATERS" -
2. "A WOODLAND STREAM"
3. "THE CAPTIYE ANDROMACHE II -
4. "THE LAST WATCH OF HERO" -
5. "THE LADY OF SHALOTT" -
6, "HOPE" -
7. "SOLDIERS HALTING" -
8. " SOLDIERS PLAYING" -
9, "AND WHEN DID YOU LAST SEE
YOUR FATHER II 22 X 12 do.
10. "DIANA OF THE UPLANDS" 20 X 15 do.
11. "THE HOME OF THE DEER" 23 X 15 do, }
12. .. THE KINGFISHER'S HAUNT" do. do.
13. "IN THE HEART OF KENT" do. do, l
14, "THE WEALD OF SURREY" do. do. r DOUGLAS SHERRIN,
15. "IN LOYE" 22 y 1
do. )
16. " AWAITING THE DECISION" do. do. r LEYTON BROCK.
17, "TO THE RESCUE" 23 ) 15 do, )
18. "AN UNWILLING PLAYMATE" do. do. r LEYTON BROCK,
19, .. THURSDAY" 22 X 11 do, l DENDY SADLER,
20. " FRIDAY" do. do. r
The above 20 Fine Art Plates we offer at the following nominal prices. viz" One Plate 2/9, Two
Plates 5/-, Four Plates 9/6, Six Plates 14/-, or any Ten Plates for 21/- ; or the complete Twenty for 40/-.
securely packed and carriage paid to any part of the ""orld, And to every Header purchasing not less
than Ten Plates for 21/- we will present" THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS" FREE OF ALL
CHARGE, by way of SPECIAL BONUS,
In ordering please give the titles of the pictures required, and if ten or more plates are ordered
THE FOLLOWING COUPON SHOULD BE SENT WITH THE REè\lITTANCE. All orders
will be executed in rotation as received,

22 X 1

do.
22 X 10
20xt2
do.
191 X 14

20 X 14
do.

30X22 }
do,
do. }
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

LORD LEIGHTON, P.R.A.

B. W. LEADER, R,A,

J. W. WATERHOUSE, R.A.
G. F. WATTS, R.A,
} E. MEISSONIER,

W. F, YEAMES, R.A,
C. W. FURSE, A.R.A.
G, WILLOUGHBY,

"LAND AND WATER" COUPON.
This Coupon entitles the Holder, purchasing not less than len of the above Plates for 21/-, to one
copy of u THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS," from the original painting by LADY BUTLER,
L. W. COLBAN-EWART, Managing Director,
THE BRITISH ART ASSOCIATION, LTD.
IUNDER ROYAL PATRONAGE}
251 KENSINGTON HIGH STREET, LONPON, W.
N,B.-ANY OF THE ENGRAVINGS SELECTED WILL BE EXCHANGED IF DESIRED,
AND THE REMITTANCE RETURNED IN FULL IF PICTURES ARE NOT APPROVED,
Remittance must accompany each order, and cheques should be crossed: .. LONDON CITY AND
MIDLAND BANK."
All orders should be addressed in full:

L. W. COLBAN.EW ART, Managing Director,
THE BRITISH ART ASSOCIATION, Ltd.
251 KENSINGTON HIGH STREET, LONDON, W.

30

March 6, 1915

WEBBS'SEEDS

.
-:

.
....

".....
WEBBS' SELECTED AILSA CRAIG ONION.
6d., 1/-, and 2/6 per packet. post free.

All who have Gude.o 0110.14 oltAiD

WEBBS' GARDEN CATALOGUE.
_.urau:r UI__. POST .....

EDWARD WEBB " SOlS (STOURBRIDCE> L TO.,
'l'he KIDC'o _.. .MU...IDG..

BEGONIAS

for Exhibition, Greenhouse, BeddinËJ
Hanging Baskets, etc. Awarded 4-0 Gold
Medals. Seeds z/6 and 5/- per packet.
DELPHINIUMS

from our unsurpassed Gold Medal Col-
lection, choicest named varieties in strong
ground roots, most lovely shades.
OTHER SPECI.4LITIES:
Carnations, Cyclamen, Polyanthus, Blue
Primrose, Violets, eto.
l/lust'at
d Catalolffið Free..
BLACKMORE& LANGDON, BATH

SHANKS'SM

:S

Thoroughly Reliable Machines. Fitted
with all modern improvements. Includ-
ing High Tension Magnetos and Relief
Clutches. The Motors are of ample
power. Used by the London. Birmingham.
Edinburgh. Manchester, Nottingham, and
Renfrew Corporations. Also by The
Royal Automobile Club, The Royal Flying
Corps, loc.. loc.

. >.
-

Ji

'
- 'o/,j"" .""'..,
,.

:J. ßI/:!
11l
1.,'__ 1'i'",,,,,;:,

: -,,,;;__
J
___ 'v.I, ",1', ,,': \
"{,,
. "-t"'

A. SHANKS A SON, LTD.,
ARBROATH (SCOTLAND) Bnd
BUSH LANE HOUSE, BUSH LANE,
CANNON ST., LONDON, E.C.

WHISTLER

II STRAND.

SECOND.HAND GUNS
PRISM GLASSES

CATALOGUE AND PRICE LIST ON APPLICATION

\Lm.:h 6, 1915

L.\
D A
D \rATER

..,rmed mtl) the cords in which it i.; u
,_'d. Propellant.; of the
nitro-cellulose-nitro-glycerine type Lire used by Italy, Japan,
Great Britain, the Gennan and Austrian navy, Bra7il, and
Argentine.
:\Iodern smokeless powders develop a much larger total
\'olume of gas for the same weight of charge than the old
gunpowder, and, therefore, greater velocity of the projectile
ur bullet is attained than fonnerly, the gas production taking
place gradually during the whole time of the passage of the.
projectile down the bore. Although the total propelling force
is greater it is more regularly sustained, so that the ma"\.imum
pre<;sure is not increa
'd. In the old pm\'Jers almost complete
combustion of the nplosi\'e took place before the projectile
hd.d time to move far dO\\ n the bore ()f the gun, and therefore
the mU7Z1e was much shorter than in modern gun<;,
We \\ill now deal \\ith the disruptive explo,>i\'es of

roup 2, to which nitro-glycerine, dynamite, and gun-cotton
belong, Praçtically every country has adopted piCl ic acid
as a bursting charge for shell"-, under a different name and
with certain differencps in composition con,>isting merely in
the addition of an ingredient to reduce the melting point,
Picric acid i
obtained by the action of strom; nitric acid
on carbolic acid, and i,,- a most powerful e)",plosi\-e. I t is a
j1ale yellow crystalline solid, intensely bitter in taste, has a
high melting point, and was largely used as a dve long before
its explosive properties were discovered. Eugene Turpin, of
Paris, introduced picric acid mixed \\ith collodion in the
French Sen'ice under the name of melinite, Picric acid
solidifies from the melted condition in a closer or denser form
than from the water solution, in which form it can more
readily be exploded by detonators. Lyddite, which is used
in the English Service, is simply melted and solidified picric
.lCid, A disadvantage of picric acid is that when left in contact
with metals or oxides it forms \'ery dangerous detonating
salts, and therefore it is necessary to \'arnish the interior of
shells, gi\'ing special protection to the detonators and tak;n

the utmo"t precautions to prevent access of foreign bodies
while the acid is in the molten state. In order to O\"E'rcume
these disadvantages a new explosive has within the last few
\ cars been introduced, and is known as trinitrotoluene or,
brieflv, "T,X.T." The French Service calls it tolite, the
:-:-panlsh Government trilit, while the Carbonite Works of
Schlebusch call it trot
1. It is obtained by heating toluene
\..ith a mixture of nitric acid and sulphuric acid. Toluene is
a liquid hydro-carbon obtained along \\ith benzene from coal
tar. Trinitrotoluene melts at about 80 0 centigrade, is nearly
insoluble in water, and does not form metallic salts, as picric
acid does. It is used chiefly in shells, and has practically
superseded picric acid, The Germans. use it also with great
,>uccess in mines and torpedoes, for which work gun-cotton is
generally employed, In the Austrian Anny and Kavy a
very powerful explosive has been introduced under the name
of ammonal, which i<; a mixture of trinitrotoluene, ammonium
nitrate, charcoal, and alUillinium.

Detonators are used for exploding the ðplosives of the
first and second group, Sinc(; r
oo, \\ hen Howard invented
fulminate of mercury, and since 1815, when Joseph Egg
made the first cap, but little progress has been made in the
manufacture of these articles, the only development being
that potassium chlorate enters partly into the compositil n
of detonators, For smokeless powders a hotter flame i,,-
found essential, and is obtained by adding a combustihle
substance. A percussion cap consists of a little metal cap or
case filled with a mixture of fulminate of mercury and
potassium chlorate. When a percussion cap is struck by the
hammer of the gun or rifle it detonates and evolves the
necessary heat to inflame the neighbouring powder charge
The composition uSl'd in percussion caps varies according to
the nature and si7c of the powder charge to be fired. It
contains generally potassium chlorate, mercury fulminate
and antimony sulphide, to \\hich ground glass is sometimes
added. Detonators are generally made of copper tubing
\'arying in length from one and a half inches up to six inches,
and are charged with fulminate of mercury and other
in
redients. These detonators arc Ignited either b\' mean<;
of safetv fuses or hy electricity. A safety fuse consists of flax,
spun and twisted in the same manner as in cord making, ha \-ing
a column of fine gunpowder in the centre. Its rate of burning
can be varied from seventy-fi\'e to fort
',five seconds per yard.
The electric fuse consists of a \'ery small and fine piece of
iridium-platinum wire, which is \\[,lpppd round with a small
piece of fleecy gun-cotton in close pro"\.imity to the fulminate
of mercury. '''hen an electrir current is passed throU!:;h the
fine wire it get<; red hot and "ds fire to the gun-cotton, which
in turn ignites the fulminat{', and this, being placed in close
contact to the explosive chan;e, detonates the latter.
The electric fuse is employed in all large siege and naval
guns. By this means a round can he fired at the exact
moment by merely pressing a button, and all the guns can be
fired simultaneou<;ly from some central position, It has been
found that a small quantity of mercury fulminate placed on
top of trinitrotohlPne forms an excellent detonating mixture,
and a great many detonators manufactured in Germanv use
this mixture, :\Iercury fulminate is obtained by dissolving
three parts of mercury in thirty-six parts of nitric acid,
keeping the mÏ:\,ture at a low temperature until dissolved,
when seventeen parts of alcohol are added. The fulminate
settles in crystal<; wh,;:h are thoroughly washed, after which
it is taken to the drying rooms.
The loss of the French battleship Liberté and several
other explosions brought home the importance of stability
of explosives. Although modern explosives are far more
stable than those in use twenty years ago, it is necessary to
take strict precautions when storing large quantities of
explosives, On all British warships cooling machinery is
installed to keep the magazines at an even temperature of
700, as at and below thi<; temper,lture it can be safely assumed
that std.bilitv is permanently assured.

THROUGH

THE

EYES OF

A WOMAN

The AII.Powerful Present
W E have often been told b\' philosophers and
such-like authoritative people that the true
secret of enjoyment is to live in the present
and let the future take care of itself. Human
nature is so constituted, however, that it is
frequently difficult to follow this advice. It is a matter of
temperament, no doubt, but even the most sanguine tempera-
ment is apt to have its moments of reflection in which WOt'"
yet to come conspicuously figure. The odd thing is that at
the moment, whether we be inveterate optimists or most
pessimistically inclined, we are obliged, more or less, to live
from day to day. Probing into the future is too unprofit,lble,
as most of us have prO\'ed, It is quite impossible to prophesy
the fate of Europe, society, or any individual a year or even
six months ahead, I doubt, indeed, if we can do it for a<,
long as that, So at last we have been obliged to curb any
tendency to anticipate, and women have been specially
constrained thi" way Sufficient unto the hour is the evil
thereof. It is a good motto, but lately we have been able to
substitute the better one of letting the morrO\\ take care of
itself. Those women whose men are at the front learnt the
necessity for this in the early stages of the \\ar. The very
stress of anxiety forced them to look upon no news as good
news. It would have been impossible to get along otherwise.
A pretty woman whose husband has lately been mentioned

in dispatches voiced this to me a short while ago .. I n
ver
now," she said, .. look for\\ ard one minute after the other if
I can possibly help it. It docs not work very well in the
household, but it is infinitely better for me," And such an
exaggeration as regards her house may be permitted to one
whose mélla
e runs on oiled wheels, whatever ib mistress
may say to the contrary

On a Radical Change
In spite of all we may say and thin\... to the opposite,
in spite of the days \\ hich inevitably arise when we hardly
think of such matters at all, the time comes when we must
look for a while on the lighter side of things. It is really
necessary, not only for our O\\n sakes but for that of every-
body connected with us. A well-written amusing novel can
be as good as a tonic, an evening at a laughter-pro\-oking
playa rejuvenator. And in our less tense mom<.>nts we can
certainly spare time to marvel at the radical change which
has overtaken \\omen's c1othb. Things being as they are,
it is \\ onderful how it ha<; come about, but that it has not
onh come but means to make a definite stay is obvious.
}.;"o
\', this change has not come from Paris. "'hatever may
be written or said to the contra[\., the hig ateliers of Paris
-with a very few exceptions-are not open. It has doubtless
been originated by the manv model designers, who, escaping
from Paris when she was threatened \\Îth "iege, came over

33 1

LAND AND WATER

THE NEW LADY LONDONDERRY CohrlfAt,
fø4a.... u.ZZie CI"vZe.
Who h.. '.Bio.led women working on Ibe land while the men are a' tbe froot.
She i. Colonel-in-Chief of that much di.cnlled body, Ihe Women'. Volunleer Re.erve

here, and are working in this country, And if \\e may judge
from the n 3ult--, they have been surpassingly busy. Our
skirts, our coats, and the treatment of our necks are all
fundamentally chan;::ed. It is really almost bewildering,
rhe advent of the short, wide skirt has already been so
widely discussed that there are few words left to say about
it. Instead of long. full coats we are invited to consider
short cut-away models verging towards bolero type. And,
greatest change of
all, we are told that
bare throats must
not be seen during
the daytime. Thos\'
of us who han;
grown attached to
the collarless blouse
and its feeling of
freedom and com-
fort will no doubt
dislike this new
fashion intensely,
Still, the possibility
is that in the short-
est while from now
we shall all be
swathed up round
the throat in
mummy-like
fashion. The turn
of the year and the
approach of spring
with-it is to be
hoped - sunshine
makes c1othes-buv-
ing a necessity, and
we shall assuredly
exchange old lamps
for new.

The Teaching of
New Trades
Whatever may
happen in the im-
media te f u t u r e ,
when brighter days
s h 0 u I d certainly
dawn, the past few
months have not
been easy ones for
London dress-
makers and their
workroom staffs. It
is difficult, indeed,
to know what many
of the girls would
have done if the
Queen's" Work for
Women JJ Fund had
not come to the
rescue in \'cry pra:;-
tical fashion. With
the aid of the
Central Committee
on Women's Employment numbers of dressmakers have secured
work which has literally saved them from starvation. They
ha ve become flannel-belt makers,shirt makers, and sock makers,
and have learnt their new trade in remarkably quick time.
Forty girls are now working full time at the Committee's
Test Workroom in Piccadilly and over seven thousand are
being employed on a large War Office contract for regulation
shirts for the Army. It is not an <'asy thing to learn a new
trade in a limited space of time, and at first. from all accounts,
the organisers of the work had a very difficult task. They
were absolutely determined, however, to make the scheme a
success, and were never daunted, An excellent system of
dividing the work was adopted, It was soon found that
while one girl was good at sleeves another was expert at
button-holing. Each girl, therefore, was set to do the task
at which she was best, and shirts have often been the work
of four or five pairs of hands in consequence. Sock-making,
again, under the Committee's guidance has become a great
indu,>try, A contract for over two million pairs of socks has
been undertaken, and it is estimated that through it over
twelve hundred women will be employed weekly till July.
The spectre of unemployment amongst women is a very real
one, but methods such as these will do everything to lay it.
For the big idea of employment-not charity-is the motive
underlying all appeals on behalf of the Queen's Fund.

March 6, 1915

\lore Abou! Books
No rival to the Camps Lending LiLr.lry will be found in
the War Library, which makes its appeal from Surrey House,
Marble Arch, London. To this address the public are asked
to send all the books they can spare for the use of sick and
wounded soldiers. It is in this last respect that the difference
between the two libraries lies. Though they agree in their
request for as many books as possible. their purpose is at
variance, Quoting
from the Secrctarv
oft heW a'r
Library's letter,
they supply the
sick, while the
Camps Library
supplies the strong.
The War Library
appeals for maga-
zines as well as for
books, and hopes
that these will be
for t h com i n g as
quickly as possible
in view of the large
number of wounded
now being brought
to England. The
importance of the
part cheerful books
and magazines play
in a soldier's con-
valescence can be
gauged from a
letter written by
Sir Arthur Sloggett,
Director - General,
Medical Army Ser-
\-ice, referring to
the Library's work.
In it he says: " We
shall be only too
glad officially to
recognise the gener-
ous efforts which
you are prepared to
make in collecting
an d supplying
literature for the
hospitals, .. As a
matter of fact, this
work was started
in August, since
which time hos-
pitals in France, as
well as in Great
Britain, have re-
ceived a number
of books. In com-
mon with many
things, however, it
is one thing to start
a good work and
another to maintain it. It is with the latter effort that
the crux of the matter lies, and it is everybody's business to
help if they can in one degree or another.

r
\ .
...

,

L.

,

In the Soulh of France
The Allies have much in their favour, and not least is
the fact that the Riviera will be at the service of all the
wounded soldiers who can manage to be sent there. Even
the shortest while of bright Riviera sunshine is the best tonic
known to man, A feeling of health comes with the first
glimpse of blue sea, bluer sky, and the golden fruit of the
orange groves. Life is not without its compensations after
aU. This morning's mail brought a letter from the manage-
ment of a Nice hotel enlarging upon the advantages of the
Sunny South at this time of year, Chief amongst them was
the fact that the season would be .. Germanless." The
Teuton and the Cðte d'Azur go together remarkably badly,
and nothing spoilt Monte Carlo so much ac; the German host
it attracted year after year.
This German invasion spelt the fashionable doom of the
Principality. Every French hotel proprietor recognises this,
and 'several in the past took steps to stem the German
tide, following the example of the brilliant Parisian who
can make or mar the fortune of a town at will.

ERICA.

33 2

March 6, 19t5

LAND '\ND WATE

The Church Army

(jf All Soldiers are welcome in our
RECREATION HUTS
in camps and barracks at home and in F ranee
and Egypt; for Rest, Recreation, Refresh-
ment, Reading, Writing.
f]J All Soldiers' Wives are welcome in our
RECREATION ROOMS
in garrison and other towns, for Rest, Recrea-
tion, Refreshment, Reading, Writing, and
latest News. Crêche for Babies.

OTHERS WILL BE. OPI:.NE.D AS FUNDS PE.R:\U r.

Prebendary CARLILE, Hon. Chief Secretary,
Headquarters: Bryanston Street, Marbte Arch, London, \\.

OLD (ALABAR
MEAT
BISCUITS
FISH
BISCUITS
HOUND
BISCUITS

fA=

-:'"

AND

A perfect
feed
for every
breed.

Marvellous

Fire

Scouts.

Extinguishing by Boy

ffi

m

,,

.

.

- , , ,-
i I tJ
.,
r' .1 :l
.
1
'"

'"
ì'
Ilil
I
"

T HE usefulness of Boy Scouts as Firemen was forceabl}
demonstrated at a recent display, when a lar!,:e woodeD
building was saturated with petrol, paraffin, etc" and set on
fire. Although the fire was of terrific fierceness the Scouts
completely extinguished it in less than 4G seconds. The Chief
Scout, Sir Robert Baden Powell, ha
warmly expres,ed his
approval of the merits of the" Kyl,Fyre" Extinguisher.
No house should be without a supply of this wonderful
appliance, as the risk of serious fires is greatly increased owing
to raids by Hostile Aircraft.
., Kvl-Fyre" is an ideal appliance for RED CROSS
HOSPITALS, HUTMENT CAMPS, etc., instantly exting-
uishing Electrical and Petrol fires.
The price of this remarkable extinguisher is only 55. each and
full particulars can be obtained from

"KYL-FYRE Ltd.,"
12B Elms Buildings, Eastbourne.

M)
..,\\
\\
\\\\\:"
::(G.1l- i - IJ

' e

"'; fi ; 1'W
'

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- "'

"".;

; ê

_V'
ø-

VIRGINIA CIGARETTES

JOHN PLAYER & SONS

beg to draw the attention

of connoisseurs to

uPERFECTOS" No. 2

== band-made Cigarettes. They :::::
- -
:::: are distinguished by a superb ==
delicacy, the result of a _
_ matchless blend of the finest _
- -
::=. Virginia Tobacco. :::

10 6d. 20 - 1/-

50 2/6 100 4/9

-

-
"PERFECTOS FINOS" are

2
larJer Cigarettes of tbe .eme Quality

/
JOHN PLAYER it SONS.

Nottingham,
J'\
tr;J ';
_TW;
.

_'M
':I }

.llllli l
-

i"
\ ':.:.

::::::.:
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.

-

- ,..
- -
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æ =
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ã Are JOu Run-down Ë
. -
_ "'hen your system is undermined by worry or o\'er-work -
- -
_ -when your vitality is lo....ered-when you fccl .. any- =
_ how"-when your nerves are "on edge"-wheu the _
= least exertion tires you-you are in a "Run-do\\ n " =
= condition. Your system is like a flower drooping for =
- want of water. And just as water revives a drooping _
- -
_ flower-so' Wincarnis ' gives new life to a "run-down" _
= constitution. From even the first wineglassful you can =
= feel it stimulating and invigorating you, and as yon _
= continue, you can feel it surcharging your whole system =
= with new health-new strength-1lew vigour and flew =
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1I11111;lilllií.;lliiililllillliilllilllllllllllli

11,

LAND AND WATER

'Don't send imitations! GitJe him a

Waterman's
fòuntainPen

t
ì
:'R' ,

,. ,

j=
i!

f ...
J .
'-
......... I
-' .-,

He certainly deserves the best of all the Fountain
Pens. Haven't }ou seen his oft-expre'sed wish in
vivid letters from the Front? "II only I had a
Fountain Pen!"

Waterman's Ideal Fountain Pen ha- never been succe's-
fully imitated, Some pens may look like Waterman's
Ideal, but they don't \\rite like it-there are differences
in nib, patented COnstrul tiun,
and materials used,

When you decide to give him
the best send him the" Safet) "
Type Waterman's Ideal. He
can carry it in any position
in his pocket - no dip is
needed - and it can't leak.
Just the right pen for Travell<:r>,
Sportsmen, Nurses, Doctors, ete.

Waterman's Ideal is made in
four types - Regular, Safety,
Pump-filling and Self-filling.
Nibs to suit all hands. Every
pen guar,lI1teed,

t I J

h'

IJj'

In Stiver and Gold for Presentation.
Of all Stationers and Jewellers.

L. G. SLOAN, "

;',fr

KINGSW A Y, LONDON

Which shall it be ?
BRITISH
S ,. "
'"
I
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'''' iliA
....

'j/ ';,
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(ß
rtt\ Ctl\

,po[hnari$

:...

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,

Similar Taste I
Similar Properties I

rER
DOZ

pr"'. Repd. Repc1.
)u.\rfo,.. Pintlll t.Pmt....
6/- 3/6 2/6
CARRIAGF PAm.

PER
DC7

A. J, CALEY & SON, LTD.,
Chenies St, Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.

March 6, 1<) 15

INEXPENSIVE & EASY LOCOMOTION
DURING WAR TIME.

THE
ALL BLACK

....

CúLDEN
\ SUNBEAM

\\
r-

,

\

.,...

"

TO replace the cars and the horses,
ride a Sunbeam with the Little
Oil Bath. It is by far the easiest run-
ning Bicycle in the world. The above
is an illustration of the All- Weather
Model. Price List free on application to

3 SUNBEAMLAND, WOLVERHAMPTON.

London Showrooms:
67 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
168 SLOANE ST, (by Sloane Square), S.W.

HOTEL CECIL

THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
Residents and Officers.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Telephone, GERRARD 60.

Apply, MAN AGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

33....

March 6, 1913.

LAND AND
ATER..

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE.-1ÄlI .lrtldo IuJ lIeca .ubmUte4 to the Pru. Buren, "blell doe. lIot object to tbe ,lIlIlIuU_ .. ccuefIC, ... Ilk. ..
respoulblUt) lor the corred.eas 01 tile .t.temellta.
(II Reeordaau wJUt tJle rcqu1remeatl 01 thl! Prell BuruD, the po.IUoas 01 troopa 011 NaDI muatratlJlg UIla ArUcJ. aut .all ..
regarded a. sppro,dmde, aall 110 deflnU. .tccugtJa at Ray polRt b lR4ieatcl.

T HE forcing of the Dardanelles is by very
much the most Ï1
portn.nt event strate
ic-
ally which we ha,ye seen in this war SInce
the battle of the :l\Iarne. It is evident
that if this operation be successful we have begun
to solve, lon
before the end of the winter, the main
problem of Russian equipment and munitionin rr .
and at the same time released foodstuffs of whi

our market is in need. At tbe same time we have
released the Balkans from their besitation. we
have left Austria without an objeet towards the
soutb-east, we have cut off all supply available for
modern war to the Turkish forces in Asia,
Politically the event is of eyen greater
magnitude.
The ",-hole of this week. however, these opera-
tions have been na\.Tal in character. and do not
come within the scope of these comments,
rpon the western front there has been t90
litt1e movement to make any commentary worth
while, and so far as that field is concerned I shall
deal this week only with its most important aspect
at the moment, which is t.he call for ammunition,
Of movements upon anv general scale we have no
examples except upon the eas'!:ern field. and with
this, therefore, I sb.a.li begin my comments tha

eek.

THE EASTERN FRO
T.

The eastern front continues to be what it bas
Lcen for the last. two months, not onl,}: that field of
I.'

operations in which there is most movemðn! and
chance for a decision, but that upon which tÌlit
future of the campaign for tho moment mosQ
obviously turns.
It presents the same strategical interest which
it bas presented since the beginning of February,
when the triple action was engaged of holding thð
Russians in front of 'Varsaw and of attempting
to push them back upon either flank, But in using
this phrase it is necessary to modify one conclusion
to which a certain amount of public criticism ha1
come. presumably in error. Men speak as though
the action along the whole eastern front from
the Baltic to the Roumanian border was one
united conception. an effort to push in tho
two flanks of tbe Ilussian army so as t.)
compel the centre to abandon the line of
the Yistula and the all-important bridge-
head for the same, which is politically the
capital of Poland-:\Varsaw. It is a false judO'-
ment. The enemJ's effort on the left wing of t
ð
Russians in the south is not a strategical effort
balancin rr what he is doing upon the right wing
of the R
ssians in the north. It has a different
motive. and it is proceeding in a different fashion.
As hag been pointed out more than once in
tnese columns. the effort in the south is probal1ly;
political: though political only, of course, in tItð
sense of a political action affecting later strategy,
the enemy is pushed into the Bukovina in order,
as we have seen. to intercept any potential com

bination between the Roumanian forces and tI-:ð
Russian forces in Galicia. But the hope by thi!
effort to turn the Russian effort in Galicia and to
attack it seriously in flank is not, pro
able, , for
reasons which I hope to show later m t
lS art!ele

But in the north, by far the most Imporl
nti
field what he set out to do wag undoubtedh- to
1501a'to :\Yarsaw, and in this attempt we still b.vQ
to follow the main point of interest this week.
THE ATTE
IPT TO FORCE THE NIE
IE
i
A
D THE l"AREW.

The Battle of Przasn}'sz.

\..

1

LAND AND
ATER.

I musf, at the risk O'f wearying the reader,
ret:Jeat the elements of the position in order to
m
ke clcar what has taken place in the past week,
;\Varsaw is the meeting-place of the railways

ast of the V istula. Of these lines, the southern
ones, marked 2, 3, and 4 upon the sketch, especially
:3 and 4, lead to \Varsaw from the more important
basps, But the northern one, marked 1, leads to the
capital of Petrograd, connects the northern armies
upon the East Prussian frontier with the main
force near ,\Varsaw, and if cut ""ould isolate
iWarsaw in some degree, and would check in some
measure its flow of reinforcements; but, most im-
portant of all, would lead in a few days to the
cutting of the remaining railways, For there is
110 natural line and no fortified line that l"wuld
a;m-e Ra.ilways 2 and 3, and ultimately 4, if once
this sheaf of railways y,;ere entered by the enemy,
rI'he riyers are not transverse, and there are no

'orks north oÎ the Brest- I vangorod line,
,"\Ve know that the enemy has done everything

o take "\Varsaw by direct attack along the front
A-B, and has failed. \Ye know further that since
February 7 he has changed his plan, and while
only holding along A-B, has determined to strike
for the railways behind \Varsaw from the province
of East Prussia; that is, along the arrows C.C.C.
lJ..Iastlv, we know that there lies between this attack
from .C.C.C. and the sheaf of railways the fortificJ
line represented by the Rivers Nare,v and :\lemen,
along which are stret.ched the strongholds from
ROYJlo in the north to Neogeorgiesvk in the south,
p<lssing by way of Grodno, OsO"wiecs, Ostrolenka,
&c.
L-et me also repeat the mnin point of the whole
t.hesis, since it is that upon which current opinion
in this country has l:.een, to some extent, confused.
lJlzless tho Germans pierce this fortified lilLe, and,

a ving pierced it, carTY on, they have been defeated
ill tltcil geneJal plan, a.nd .u;oz:ld lW1..'6 been stron[Jtr
for not ha.

ing undutaken it. If, on the contrary,
tlu;y pierce tltÌs line and carryon till they reach
tIle -railways, tllCY fta1JO succeeded itl t!leir plan.
It is exceedingly important to grasp this per-
fectly simple point, not because we are noting the
Ecores in a game, but because ,"e are "atching a
military actIOn upon which our own fate to SOlliO

tent depends.
"Y nl
s t
lC German Headquarters had a plan
of thIS kmd, Jt had no plan at all-and that is not.
to be believed. Merely to clear the enemy out of
East Prussia is not a military object, bèc<!.Use it
promises nothing for the future of the war. But
to isolate, and ultimately occupy, :\Yarsaw pro-
mises evcrything; for, holdinz that nodal roint,

TOU prevent further offensi ye action by the Rus-
Eians for a long time to come, and you are free to
bring many of your forces now in the East back
'ITestward, D.S also to u
e in the \Vest your last new
formations w'hen they reach the field,
But it is in the \V cst that the onlv final decÏ-
EÌon of this war can be achiewd. T"Ilerefore do
the Germans rarticularly intend to take 1Varsaw;
I'nd to take .vVarsaw on the lines of tbe present
f'
fol't means to pierce successfully and con-
t

uously through the defending line of the
l\ICHlen and the Narew until they reach and cut
t.ho Hhmf
f railways. To do that ,,"ould be to take
l\Varsa W III reverse. To fail to do it means that
they haye lost this movement again and that they
bave 'ITasted energy for nothing.
Let us keep that quite clear. Their local
Juccess in enveloping one Corps a fortnight ago

.March 6, 1915.

does not affect the greater issne. The enemy must
in this field win or lose as a whole, and an oirensh"'e
which fails in its PU1'pose is not something which
canceìs out in 'war: It is a minus quantity. An
offensive ,,-bell fails leaves the attack weaker tpan
it found it.
,'Vith aU this postula.ted as a foundation for
our judgment, let us see how the struggle now
stands in front of this Niemen-Narew line. The
issue is Lv no means vet decided, but the ne-ws of
tbe past ,yeek is, upo
the whole, favourable.
Three main points of attack marked tho
objectiyes of t.be German advance.

B

(1) A point a little aboye Grodno and outside
the fort.ifications of that stronghold.
(2) An attack upon Osowiecs, and an attempt
to pierce through and strike at the line beyond.
(3) Of particular importance, an attack upon
the sector between the ::Mla.wa milwav and the
town of Ostrolenka. This last is the most perilom;
and the most vital of the three moyements, because
the nearer to W"arsaw the enemy gets on the rail-
ways, the more powerful is his effect,
I will take tbese three issues in reverse ol'Jer
to their present yalue in the campaign,
(1) TIle A ttack upon Grodno, This attack
alone of the three has, up to the present date, suc-
ceeded in piercing the line, but it has not pierced
it in great numbers, and it has not pierceù it
thoroughly at all, ,'Ye should eyen have tbe right
to regard it as a diversion in the general plan
,,,ere it not that thcre has been used upon this
sector tbe best of the ten Army Corps which the
Germans have concentrated for their great eHort
from the north. It is the same body as that which
had proyed the deciding factor in the cnyeloping
of the Russian 20th Army Corps the othcr day.
It is the German 21st Corps, in b"arrison during
peace time upon the French frontier, and corre-
sponding somc"hat to tbo French 20tb and 6th
Corps,
But though a bOlly of such excellence b
s been
used right up here on the left of the general effort,
y, e mu
t not conclude that that point was there-
fore rega rJed as of special importance by t.he
enemy. 'Ye must rather decide that when the con-
centration was effected three weeks ago tho 20th
Corps was put where it W:.1S in order to act where
the harùest work had to be done in forcing the
defiles between the lab,s. Tlw t was apparently
the task assigned to it. AntI this being so, it could
not but appear when the Prussian frontier was
crossed in tbe region of Suwalki anù Augustowo,
eyen though that region were not after the first
operations the chief theatre of the struggle.
At any rate, the attack npon the Nierucn by

2.*

:March 6, l!n5.

LA
D AND

ATER.

.::1
[i

.
(j )
sf >:
Lotun I .Su.walkj
:21 corys () - -1-
uuJñ
r,.to
. -__
ß
"t' the tkflJ,. oí>.

. ::::.. Pr-"!.JnqalÙJn of
h
twpm t.1t.e fý
. -'. th
act:;on cF-
two main Li1ke.J. ,sf!
o' tÍ1t' 20 th COrp3
C>
o
C
this Corps in this region bas not, so far, come to
very much. The river was crossed, but the crossings
were not., b.r the last adviccs received, decisively
maintained.
r 0 have no direct evidence at the
moment of writing (Tuesday evening) that the
bridgehe.ads beyond the river had been retaken by
tbe Russians; but we have got the mention of
fighting upon the left bank in the last few days-
that is, upon the Germ3-n siùe of the stream-and
it is selL-evident tbat no very large movement
across the Kiemen here could be taken with a
single Armv Corps, cut off from help from the
south bv thè fortress of Grodno. Grodno would
either ba ye to be taken or masked by a large force
before tbe passage of the riyer was securely held.
Xhe p3.ssage of the Kiemen here has beC'n effected
at tlle point where the Augustowo forest gets up
to the river, and it is under the coyer of the

sector of the ring of forts, exactly as he attacked
them last October. "When he suffered defeat in his
attack. He is acting now with very much larger
forces, but with no better guns. (\Ve must wait for
better proof ot tbat 420 millimctre.) \\
e have no
news oÏ tbe result one way 01' the other, except that
the attack bJ the siege-train has now proceeded for
something more than a 'week ,,-ithout our hearing
fro
n the enemy's side of any result Jet followÍI,g
on It.
(3) The Fight l'ollnd PJ'zasnysz. Tùe fi6hì
round Przasnysz is much 1l1ore seriolls, and we
have more details of it to hand. In this third sector
the enemy h
s clearly failed. Eut I will again
modify the impression which such :t st:1tement
might make, by pointing out that the action. as a
,yhole, from Grodno to tho Vistula, has not \eb
been decided, and that we must not jump to i he
LOnc1usion that it is, merely because there bas been
a rather pronounc
d German retirement in that
sector of it ,vbich most immediately threatened
.\V arsa w.
"-ith that proviso we can proceed to tbð
description of the action.
Upon the same dm;s whiL.h saw the defeat of
the 20th Russian Armÿ Corps at Augustowo and
the approach of the enemy to tbe fort Ífied line
(from Tuesday, February 16, to Thursday.
Fcbruary 18), a strong movement was apparenti
upon the extreme left of the Rus:;ian positions
along the rivers. Tbe following diagram "ill

Frontier
---..-.
.-.-.

Feb 18- 20

, :t.. t \t R

.

'P

R..
.

ù't
v/"

E

make clear ,,,,hat was tried. Thc l
ast Prussian
fronLÏcr being represented diagraruatically by the
line A-B, and the linc of the Karcw by the line

I-X, the Germans were advan
'ing up to anti
forest that the crossings ha,-c been made. ;\Yhat upon the front l'--R (letters "hi, h represent the
we do not know is whether behind the crossing two towns of PJocz, upon the Vistul<l, :lPd Raehiaz.
thus effected an\' considerable bodies of the enemy :l.bout thirty milf's to the north-c.lst), \Yar
:l'" and
are prepared to'moyc. If they are, the attack here, its railw:J.}.:'s being some sj'dy mil\.'s away up the
north of GroLlno, may be serious. If thE'}' are not, Y istula. Our ally informs us of the checking of
it will have to fall back with tile retirement of this <l(h'ane:c upon the front P- R on or about this
the other two e501'ts further to the south and west. same datc-Febmary 18. It is proba1)lt'. hO\ycveI'.
All on0 can say is tbat, according to the neW3 that the pressure hele being exerÓ
cd was LaHeJ
alread\' reccireJ the crossin rr of the
ïemen north quite as much at the ,,,ill of tl'e cr!C'my as :1t that
of Grõdllo, thou
h efiected
'cr a stretch of four- of our alh-, for on tLat
amc ò
n'--FcLruar\' lR-
teen miìe::\, appe
rs to be insnfliciel1t in strength upon anotIlPr front of about the same kDgth
to t.he
anù not dcrclopi'lg. :\Ye must \\ait for further north bet.ween Mlawa (represcnted by the letter
r.ews to judO'e wk:ther it can progress or no. 1\1) and Khorgele (representetl by the Jetter K)
(2) Ti
Atlílrf..; on 03011:iecs. The attack on "as dÍ!'i('overC'd a laq;c concentration of two Corps
Osowiecs is strai
htîorward enough. The enemy pointing southward directly towards the fortified
here has urouO'ht
lp his principal siege-train and line of the l\ iemen. Against this latter and
i,:; a.t present ooccupied in attacking the western dangerous concentration, separated as it was b

I"

LAN DAN D Yi. ATE R.

:Marcb 6, 1m!>.

t\e raihrny from '!\nawa lo New Georgievsk, tbe
Uussians immediately moved up from their forti-
fied line N.N,
., and tbe t,,""o bodies, thus ad,-ane-
ing, met in the neighbourhooù of Przasnysz (wbich
I indicate by tbe letter P).
The action that follo
ed might ","ell be caned
the action of Przasn
rsz by tbose who ha'\e the
ability or t1]c temerity to pronounce that name, for
upon the possession of tbis plaec depended tbe
result of the struggle.
There were two reasons for this: First, that
Przasnysz stands in the middle of the dry npper
,,'vtcrsheù bet\ycen the Rh.-er Orzce and the Riyer
}jdyna, and has therefore, in tbat marshy land,
peeome the cent.re of dh-erging highways lrbicb
Jeaù towards the south; and secondly, be('allse
Przasnysz ha ppcnf>ù to become the " nucleus," as
it were, of the battle.
Often when a great action is joined some one
point becomes a nucleus of thi
sort, so that its
retention or loss by one side is e(lui'\
lent to
tmccess or fÚlure in the action by that siùe. And
this was the case with Przasnysz.
UP<?n Saturday, February 20, ten days ago,
ne rapId Gelman a(lva.nce fmceù a Russian
brigade, ,,-hich ,,;-as acting as:m outpost, bark
upon Przasnysz, passed on east and ,,-cst of that
town in two bodIes, one along the arrow I haye

F
b1arked r, the other aJong tbe arrmv I ham
marked II, ",hile a third body along the arrow
marked III made for anJ held the passages of
the Orzeo River, Ail these boùies, pressing south.
had nbout four days' ma.reh in front of them if
t hey were not 8 rrested before they should reach
the Xarew and the fortified line. It so happened
that between the lines of adyance I and II thero
is a ridge of rather higher land in t.hat endless
flat snow-covered waste, "bich may be con-
Teniently called The Riùgo of V oliaycrslorska,
which lies just beneath it about half-Tmy betlreell
Przasnysz and Cziechalofi. I haye indicated this
ridge by the letter V find the sbaded made The
Russian advance Eeized this riùp-e and held it
o
tltroughout that week-end and on until 'Vednes-
daJ', :February 24. Their tenacity, though almost
6urrounded and violently attacked from both sides
of the hi
h ground. ,,-as what decided tbe battle.
On that \Vednesda
T. the 24th, tbe Germans got
into Przasnysz, taking there twenty guns and a.
num
e
of prisoners, which.seem to }
ave included
Eome"hm
lIke half the brIgade whIch l13,ù been
press,ed mto that town from outside, But tho
Russian force U p on the ridue still held' and it
I:J .
\\""a
upon t,he same day, just at daybreak, tbat the
mam RussIan advance from the south against tho

pressing German line l
('gan. This adyance "\"'\as
stretched upon that morning of '1{ednesday, the
24th, from the point Y upon the map sho\Yl1 to the
point marked Kr, ,\ hieb stands for the town of
Kraznosiclcc. upon the Orzee. It was first suc-
cessful from the right, forcing the Riwr Orzec, in
spite of the German 36th Division of Reserye,
,\"hich was holding the passages. On the next day,
Thursday, the 25th, the centre of the German line
"-as pushed back 011 to Przasnysz, from which it
had moved forward somev;hat the day before, and
this Thursday "as the hottest day of the action.
The pressure thus effecteù upon their centre for w
bade the Germans to prosecute as vigorously as
before their attack upon t1Ie ridge north of V,
and on either end of this the Russian forces rnO\ed
up in rescue of the advanced forces which had so
suc
essfully beld that height. By the morning of
Friday. the 26th, it ,vas apparent that the German
line ,yas beginning to waver, and in the courso
oÎ the da
the first Russians entered Przasnysz,
and the sIdes of the ridge to the west. of it wero
already cleared. But the action still s,yung, and it
",'as not until the whole of tIle Saturday had been
passed in the most furious fighting in the open
t!Jat the Sunday morning saw the full retreat of
the German lino.
This retreat has been caned, rather unjustly,
II. rout. That is was not a rout is sufficient ìy clear
from the fact that (If the whole h..-o Army Corps
] 0,000 prisoncrs alone remail1eù in the Russians'
hands after the full retreat had begun, and "'-e
presume tbat most of these ,,-ere wounded, But
It was a hurri{'d retreat, as is again proved by tho
confusion of tbe various units; and by :Monday
mornir:g the success of our all)
a.long this sector
was complete.
"r e may sum up, then, and say that the great
German advance on the Narew and the
îemen
has at the moment of "riting a.chicyed the followw
ing position:-
:From t\\'(>lve miJes north of Grodno to about
t.wenty-six miles north oÎ th3t fortress, in a region
where dense woods coyer both banks of the broad
river, certain detachments, so far smaH, have
effected a crossing, 'Ye have not heard that they
have yet issued from the woods, and strong efforts
are being made to thrust the
n back.
J.ower down, in front of Osowiecs, the effort
to break the fortified line is taking the form of a
bombardment of the eastern works of that fortress.
In the centre, the sector mOßt dangerous to
.Warsaw, the sector of which Mlawa is tbe priu w
cipal town, the enemy has received a severe check,
losing Przasnysz, which was the centre of his
aetion, and falling back in full retreat towards his
o,"\"n frontier.
That is how the t1Iird great bid for Warsaw,
tbe attempt to take it in re..-erse, stands at the
present moment; or. rather, stood upon
fonday
morning, the ne" s of wbich 'was the last to have
reached London at the time of writing,
THE BCKOYI
A
1 saiJ at the outset of these remarks upon the
eastern front that the Austro-German move into
the Bukodna did not promise any great strate-
gical result, anù that because tbe taking of the
Galician Russian army in flanl{ was hardly pos-
sible from the Bukovina nlone, or at any rate from
that portion of it now occupied by the enemy's
armies, I would like to make tbis point clear.
because 'while it.is but a theory, anù a theor,r in
.(-

!farch 6, 1913.

LAKD AND
:.\TER.

contradiction with certain views tlml have been
put forward with admitted anthoritJ-. it seems to
IDa at the moment the be$t theorv.
Anyone holding the Bukoviñ a , and particu-
larly Czernowicz. holds, a3 I have shown in past
numbers of this paper, the communicat.ions
whereby Roumania and the Russian army in
,Calicia might join hands, It holds the knõt in
which the railways join. ELlt unless more than the
:Bukovina is held. there is not a sufficient a venue
of supply for t.he working of large armies round
upon tho flank of the TIussians in Galicia, and
the consequent freeing of the northern Carpathian
passes from the im ader. let alone for the relief
of Przemys1. You are den ling here with tho
thickest portion of t.he Carpathian chain, and rail-
ways are, especiall.r in a winter campa.ign. of the
first importance to your supply. Xow, the only rail-
way of this region crosses tbe C'arpathian chain
on the line between l\Iarmora3 and Kolomea.
iThere are railways leading up the valleys of tLe
r:mge, with its dense woods and p'oor roads, but
there is no crossing the ridge untIl this Kolomca
railway is reached. From Kolomea to Przemysl
itself is a matter of 160 mill's, and to the Dukla,
as the crow flies. a matter of nearer 200 miles. A
firm hold well north of the Bulmyina by the enem".
which should include the whole of tbis line across
the mountains. will enable supr>ly to reacb a large

CjI
Englub "'au.

so
,

.".. .-

army which could work against the flank of the
Russian armies to the west in Galicia, and thus
turn the grip of the Russia.ns upon the western
Carpathians. But until, or if. the Austro-Germans
}ìush beyond the central Carpathians and occupy
much more than the Bnku,-ina alone, the aWll1.le3
of snppl,y seem insufficient for any such attack.
Since writing the abow, news has ("(\me that
the Austrian forces are as far north as beyonll
Stinisland, and even if cheeked tbere it is èlear
that the railways into the plain are now in their
hands. which will, if the position i3 maintaineJ,
change all these conc1usio.3.:j,

THE CALL FOR A
nICSITIO
.
If YOU were to ask off-h:md a man of good
obserYaÌion, wen educated, and perhaps one
Rcquainted with war and yet not a. soldier: .. "rha.t
is the prime factor at this moment in the problem
of the trenches? JJ he might be at a loss to an5"-er

-ou, or, rather. manr such men woulJ ghT' manJ

diff(Òrent answers, But a solJier on the spot. at
any rate a soldier anywhere near the higher com-
m:ìnd, would almost .certainly reply: " Ammuni-
tion. nnd especiaìly hea....)" gun nmmuni
ion." .
This is the point lra Lan
to ('on3Ld
r most
carefully from now onwards, and it is onc of those
poin
s. i
which public
p.ini(ln and a .fair grasp
bv clnlw.ns of the c.ond
tlong abroad IS of great
yàlue. Just as it was of "alne to point out that

o.

cotton is to-day gunpowder, and that the cotton
that went into .Germanv did not onlr make shirts,
but also killed Britisìi soldiers, so it is of im-
porbnce to insist now upon this business of
ammunition. :For public opinion well awake to the
one as to tbe other will snpport all t.he publio
action necessary. "Thereas public opinion con-
fused or ignorant upon these essentials.sometimcs
lea,-cs the authorities ,vithout driving po\\er
behind them.
The reason that ammunit.ion, and in paT">
ticular bcaYJ gun ammunition, is so important is
this: In the other factors of the trench problem
(to giye it a short but convenient name) Europcan
armies, such as thc Allies and the Cerman, are
fairly enough matcbed. But in the provision of
ammunition. and particularly of heay)' gun ammu-
nition. we call, if ,va choose, dûminate more anti
more.
The fire discipline of t.he Allies is superior
to that of the enemy, and this is particularly true
of the British contingent. But the field of fire has
become so ,.ery much shorter than was expected
that this advantage is more or less eliminated, I
do not mean that the excellence and steadiness of
the shooting is not tested quite as much O\-er 0.
narrow field as a wide one, but I do mean that
troopa which haye now been exercised for months
in the art of stopping a man before he coycrs two
hundred yr..rds haye got to be mllch of a muchness.
In the construction of trenches. from tho
detail of their comfort to the tracing of
heir
position, tho enemy was altogether :mperior to the
Allies some months ago. Tl1e AllIes arc now at
least his equal. In the sanita tion necessary to this
kind of siege warfare tbe Allies are probably .the
superiors of the enemy. 'Ve haw reason to .dunk
that his losses from sickness are far supenor to
ours. In machine gnn work we were his inferior

in the bC'O'inning and arc saill to be now his equals.
In field
iln work the Allies Lad, and maintained.
I am told, supC'rioritr both in rapidit,Y of fire and
iTl accuracy. This is said to be particularly true
of the French who certainly had the best weapon.
and, what is'more probabÌe, the best tradition.
TInt take the thing all round, and there does not
seem, according to the eyid
nce of tho
e Wl.lO ham
suffered actu
l experience In the field durmg the
last few months, to be now any chance of con-
spicuous difference saye in this matter of heavy
gun fire, and what that rueans can perhaps be .most
graphically pr
sented to the eye by an Ideal
sect.ion of the Ime.
It is of course, no more than the simplified
suggestio
of gro
md
vhich takes a
i
fì.Ilitð
variety of shapes m tIllS four huntlren null's of
line. 'But, such CIS it is, I hope it. "ill serve tG
show ven- roun-hly how the trcnch fighting it
, o.
condllctetl.
The first C'lement in that fighting is, of courso.
the line of the trenches thcmselyes. Let us sup-
pose that in this
ction they run a
\\"c see them
in the accompanymg skctch. In reahty, of COUfSf".
tIte ultimate lines of the two opposing forces are
much more regular, especially where t here has
h'en Lean- nttackinO' and counter-attacking, and
n real plan would b
confused with a number of
empty trenche;; aLnntloned; but fO[, the purpose
of nn
illustration these hm roughl? parallel lines
will .serre to stand for tLe- opposing lines in a
particular section: of the field. These adnmco
trenches are yery narrow ditches, deep in compari-
60n with their mouths, provided eycry few )Taflls
6*

LA
D AND YfATEll.

.

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with interruptions of earth "hich prewut their
beinO' swept
dl)ng their whole length with fire in
case
n enemy gets up to the line, and also provid("d
with hollows underground where men not actually
on the watch can rest aüd sleep. The trcnches do
not consist of one individual line, but of a complex,
one set behind the other, sometimes two, sometimes
three, sometimes more than three, tbough there are
6cctions in which t.he nature of the ground and of
the defence is snch that retirement to the places
behind the trench "'here the stores of ammunition
and the quarters of command are can be euected
".-it-hout a complexity of this kind. From the front
line to the seeond, from the second to the third (if
there is a third) trenches perpendicular to the
general line and zigmgging so as to save those who
pass through them from enfilading fire (that is,
fire along the length of the trench) are constl'ucted.
These are tbe trenches of communication, longcr
or shorter according to the l.:ind of coyer afforded
and to anyone of a thousand accidents of ground.
These two systems of trenches opposing one
the other (which would look, upon a complr.te plan,
more like cracks in glass than anything PIse) fight
ea,ch other in a number of different W3}'S. The
object of all such fighting being, of conrse, to make
one's opponent abaI1don his trenches, or, better
Et.ilJ, to kill, wound, and capture him in his section
of trench as vou carry it. Let us see how this can
be accomplis'hed. W
Supposing the opposing forces possessed
nothing but riiles and storcs of explosi,-cs, then
tlley would fight only thus: They would continu-
ally watch y, ith periscopes and through smaJI
opening:; on the edges of the trench the mmcments
of their oppone
lts, shooting at any object that
6howed itself. l
rom time to time a body ',,"ould
Jf'a\Tc some section of trench and try to rush across
the open. They would choose for this a favourable
moment., at llusk, for instance, or in the dark, or
I)crhaps whe
they thought their enemy was off his
guard. Agamst such a rush the <lcfenders would
pour as heavy a fire as they could, and in most
cases they would stop it, particularly as in front
of the trenches are constructed obstacles of all

:March 6, 191J,

I

kinds, f"special1y r
f't'Îol'ks of barbed wire
stretched intricately among a num 1 )er of pos
s.
It is ob, ious tha t "ith fighting of such a sort
the t" 0 forces "ouiJ pretty wen immobilise one
the other unless there ,,-pre merwhelming numbers
upon one side. 'Yhere the trenches are fairly close
small hombs thrown by hand or grenades ('[In be
used as \\capons of offence to c1t'

r or to confuse
the opposing trench, and otheJ' devices, such as
trench l:i:lOrt[JfS aNI spring catapults, are used.
The impossibility of trench fighting being dcci(led
between equal forc('s in this fashion is heightened
by the use of machine guns, ,,,hich are so posteJ as
to rake the approaches to a trench anJ to mow
down the men caught in the wire cntanglements in
front of it.
But to such small arms tlwre is added the fielù
artiUCl'y, a weapon firing a shelJ a.bout three inches
in diameter and covering at its point of explosion
a radius of, say, something like a cricket piteh,
The concentrated fire of a number of these gUllS
will, of course, make any piece of ground unten-
able. And if you can concentrate such fire upon a
particular attack
TOU male it sufl'er even more
seyerely than rifle fire eYen makes it suffer. This
fire from field guns has tbe further use of keeping
down the firing power of the trenches opposed to
it. It" searches" them, and by carefully timing
the fuses of the shells it can cause considerable
losses eyen through the ,"cry narrow entrances
which are all the trenches present to the surface.
If one side had field artillery and the other had
not, the side" hich had field :'trtillery would ulti-
mately, though slowly, brea.k the resistance of the
trenches opposed to it. But the effect of these
shells, "ith their flat trajectory skimming the
surface, is ten-fold more against an ad,-ance in the
open than it is against men dug in, These field
guns must further be used very accurately, for
they fire O\Tel' their own men and are posted in COIl-
cpa led positions "ell behind the line, their ranQ'o
being at an extreme not more than six thousand
yards and their useful work mostly done at rang'cs
between one thousand five hundreJ and three
thousand yards. Ther also work against one
another, a battery of such guns attempting to keep
do\',n the fire, and, if possible, to destroy, other
batteries ()ppos('d to them. In such a rlan
as that whi..:h I have giyen you might .1aye
a field battery concealed in some sueh po
i-
t.ion as A, and working against another fiehl
battery concealed in some such position as B.
Both A and B wonld be used to fire at the trenches
opposed to them oyer their own men, to sweep the
zone between the trenches in case of an attack,
and to shoot at each other, and to keep do" n each
ot her's firf', or, if possible, to destroy each otber.
These field guns also shoot at marks well behind
the lines on "hich they are established, as villages
or posts where they belieYÐ that men are concen-
trated for relieying the men in the trenclles; they.
fire at t 1 w roads along which transport can come-
and so forth.
Thus A will she}} a village placeJ at C, and
will shell the road leading from C to D, another
village or place of concentration, but with field
a.rtillery alone and fairly matched on the two sides
the trench pro}'lem, as I haye called it, will not be
solved, because with the broad trajectory of such
weapons, and the comparatin;1y sruan mnge an<l
the comparati...-ely small radius of action of the
shell, their true" ork is rather L1gainst men in the
6."

March 6, 191';.

L .\ N DAN D Y1. ATE n.

open than against men dug in. It is in the third
kind of weapon that the solution is rather to be
disco'ærcd, and this kind of weapon is the heavy
gun. The hca'T guns are concealed just as all the
otherg are; positions are chosen for them well
behind the lines where thcy arc effectiye on account
of their much lon;;er raI
g'e: 6,000, 7,000, 8,000
Jards or more are m-ailable to them as ranges of
perfectly accurate fire, and their effect against
men in trenches is something ,cry different, a11d
that for the following causes:
(1) In the first placE', what thér shelh do
when they fall is on quite another scale from the
shells of the field artillpr\". J n the mC're numerical
computation (which is ñot eyerything) they have
an effect "arying "Ìth the size of their calibre,
.\. six-inch gun dOPs not fire a shell twice as effec-
tiyc as a three-inch gnn. It fire'3 a shell eight
times as effective. But one cannot put the thing
numerically at aU, because a six-inch shen falling
into a trench has far more than eight times the
efiect on the defenders, both in actual losses and
in the confusion emsed, than a three-inch shell,
(2) These ,hc:lvy shells destroy a trench where
th<"y fan. They" knock it to pieces." They
batter the walls of earth and make the1!l fall in;
they open big craters, ruining the spade work in
their neighbourhood, and they e'l"ate :l st.ate of
,:,-fi'ai
s 'which cannot be repaireJ wllile the shelling
IS gomg on.
(3) In the third place, they are much harder
to discover, working as they do at a long range
Ilnd with a higher angle of fire than the smaller
picC'e3. They can be concealed, not only by arti-
ficial methods, but behind considerable rises of
ground. It is obvious that the longer the range of
Il piece the larger the arC:l you have to search in
order to discover it,

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Pieces witb such a radius as A-B firing at
a mark at B must be somewhere along the line

A-A-
\. But pieces with a range of G-B c.an
be anywhere along the much more extended line
C-C-C, and their choice of concealment is
therefore much greater.
(4) The big piece is not disturbed by rille fire
or by field "un fire or by any weapon except its
own peer. I have, for instance, a battery of heavy
pieces behind tLe hill at 11. It is well conceaied,
and it can shell, with disastrous effect, the whole
line of the enemy's trenches betw('en F and 0, and
nothing can knock it out ('':.eept a similar body of
the enemy's, similarly concea.led at N. The only
W:lY in which the gum at N can knock out the

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guns at:M is by f..nding out exactly where they are,
whet.her by their flashes, whil:h ought, if the c<;>n-
cealmcnt hag been properly managed, to be m.
visiLle, or by air work, and it is, in point of fact,
air work alone whieb is of any real use in this
kind of struggle.
(5) Perhaps the most. important of an t}
e
advantages of the hcayy piCce after the effed It
has where the shell Îalls is the angle at which the
shell falls. A heavy piece firing at a range of
several thousand yards comes down upon the
trenches from above, and the eITeet is largely pro-
portionate to the angle at ,..hicb the blow fnlls.
Thus, we see in this dia.gram how the trajeo-
tory of a field piece at F exploding a shell at A

.-
0 0 -

o._o
G

"",
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-.. ....

-....
..... ..
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_.-.._-_...._

..æ: -----
F T

)II

II

above tho trench T will do a certain amount of
e"'(ecutioll, but tbe heavy gun at G, firing
alonO' the trajectOl'Y G-A. comes right down on
to t
trench with a very different and much more
active blow. At very lòng ran g es it has the eITccfÏ
of falling almost perpendicUlarly, and with an
accurate aim, of destroying all the work and mos

of the mind within it.
Z.

LAND AND "jYATER.

Xow, thesé principles belnz, grasped, Ief us
add to them the follo"frmg conditIons of the cam-
})aign in its present phase :'
(a) The air vmrk of the Allies has now estab-
lished a definite superiority over that of the enemy.
It is one of the most notable features of the war,
and pcrbaps one of the least expected, and ita
liuccess is largely clue to the excellence of t.he
iBritisb work in this field. Therefore, the AllIes
do find the positions of the enemy's heavy guns
roore rapidly and more often than the enemy finds
the position of ours.
(b) The blockade puts the enemy at a disad-
:\.3.nta cr e \vhich increases with time, All shells need
coppe
bands to engage in the rifling of the piece
IUld to give them the t,,-ist upon which depends
t]1e accuracy of their fire, Now, copper, though
the cl!emy is not yet actually short of it, is giving
the enemy concern. His fear for the futuro
makes him consider evcry shot, and the blockade
will now have another effeet more slow in its
de\elopment. E,-ery great shell is propelled "With
nn expenditure of
otton of so many pounds. Of
iron ""ith which to make the shell, and of nitrates
,with which to make the expJosiye within the shell
lhe cnemy has no lack, But in copper he has long
been hampered, and he will now be hampercd in
cotton. The heavy French artillery, v.-hich in
this region quite dominates that of the
f:'nemy, was used lavishly. It was not only used
to battcr the trenches and to cover the assault,
but also to create a ditch or zone of impassable
f:l'ound beldnd the enemJ"'s trenches, so that he
l:ould not bring up reinforcements or fresh ammu-
nition. But to act in that way the commander
must fcel no sort of anxiety for his rcseryes of
nmmunition, He must be as prodigal with it as
though his supply were infmite.
It is here that this nll-imporfance of a great
purp]y of hea,"y ammunition comes in. The side
\\hicb is quite free to use as vast 3. supply as it
d100ses must ultimately baye its will over the side
:\Y hich is hampered, anù counts every shot.
But here the reader may say: .. I can well
IU':!dcrstand that the enemy will be increasingly
hampered in his production of bea'1: ammunition,

March 8, 191!5

buf why should this quesTion !rouble fo arise, and
in particular to the British, who have the markets
of the ,,"orId open to them 1 .

The answer lies in the fad that the prodno-.
lion of a shen is so very much slower a busines

than the employment of -it in action.
I was present the other day, by the courtes

of one of the confractors for ammunition in the
Nortb, at the manufacture of a number of five-inclì
shells in an enormous factory (used in time of peace
for the production of ycry different machinery)

Some bundreds of men were turning and pressing
the cases of five-inch shclls. I saw the cutting
tool slowly paring do\\n the surface of the thick
metal, and I consIdered as I ,,-atched that tedious
process bow, whcn.the eylindri-conical body was at
last completcd, Its copper band attached and
pressed in and smoothed down, its intcrior fined
with the explosh-e, its fuse attached, and tbe whole
long business c?me to its conclüsion, I
night see
that shell run mto the breech of a five-lDch gun,
discharged, and hear its explosion miles away, aU
in as many seconds as it llad taken hours to make.
The big shed in which I watched this process was
working to produce, I believe, 3,000 sach sheng,
and I was told in how many days they "ould be
delivered.
There is needed for the proper supply of the
heavy guns, and, thercfore, the chief factor in a
decision upon the '\T est, all the hea-vy gun ammu-
nition that the whole resources of tbe nation can
turn out at the utmost speed and with the most
vigorous resolution and skill. There mn never be
too much for the appetite of tbe great pieces.
There can only too easily be an insufiìciency or a
hitch, and on the continuHI increase of that supply,
and on tbe swelling and further s\yclling of its
stream depends the immediate future of this
country more than on any otller single factor. One
could almost wish that half of the energy ùevoted
to the very satisfactory results of yo1unta.ry re

cruitment could be turned on to cll1phasising and
re-emphasising this all-importance of the supplY1
,,'hicIt the hcayy gUllS are hungry for, and for
which they will clamonr when the hour for thQ
advance bas sounded. ror there lies the key.

------"

THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
II.

E hays seen that three mate1"ÏaI
factOl's must be considered in any
judgment, or rather guess, upon the
possible duration of the
-ar, and
that these were: (I) the factor of wastage-in
Eupply as in men j (2) t.he factor of numbers-
!that is, of recruitment upon either side and of

quipped recruitment j and, thirdlv, tho geo-
;::;raphîcal factor-that is, the effcct upon the
duration of tho 'war of the seasons, of varying

leYations of land, natural obstacles, t.ho 60ils
ill trench warfare, etc.
To these must be added, in conclusion,

hat sometimes proves the most important
thing of aU toward.s the end of a. \nll
the moral
tø.ctor. ' - .

"With the first of thIs series we dealt lJriefiy;
last week. Let us turn this week to the secoTId

Beîore entering the subject again, hmyever,
it is necessary to r('.reät this wal'ning: TI::at no
guess\york upon thIS ma.tLer has any finality.
All one can do is to state the elemcnts upon
which a judgment turns; to attempt prophecy
in the mattel. is gratuitous folly. The v"holt)
thing may be compared to 'what a man might
judgo of the chances of a good eleyen pitted
Bsainst another cleyen of equally proycd merit.
Ito could only say in the early middle of the
game: " The wicket being what it is, the score
standing as it does, the J)i1
t form of either team
Leing such :m<1 such, I take it that the end will
be so anù so. anù will be reached in fmch anl1l
..

March 6, 1915.

LAND
ND :W:ATER.

ellch a time," He does not mean by this to
assert j he is only.stating a probability more or
less well founded, according to the evidence he
brings forward.
To this main criticism I think a second
should be added. particularly impol'tant in the
case of any military judgment. It is this: There
Is all the difference in the world between saying
that the critical moment should arrive round
or after such and such a period. and naming
that period as "the end" of hostilities. There
has been in every military operation which
history records a point. not always exactly
defined. but lying within fairly narrow limits.
after which the end "\Vas in sight j but how long
the journey would take before that end was
actually reached nearly always depends upon
factors not in the cognisance oï contemporaries.
All that I am trying to do in these notes is to
gauge the critical moment which, if it is .suc-
cessfully past. will put the enù of the war in
flig:ht for the .Allies. and even in this task I am
domg no more than making the roughest of
guesses.
So much being said, let us consider this

econd point of the reserye of men, "Te have
seen that the factor of wastage brings one to a
critical point in the early summer-say any
time between early 1Iay and late June.
Now an examination of the problem from
the point of view of man-pm"\""er converges upon
somewhat the same penod. I should not be
surprised if something of what I here have to
say is censored. Etill less complain a t any
exercise of that necessary power, But I shall
be as discreet as my limited knowledge permits
JIle to be.
Upon the side of tho enemy"\"\""e have three
elements to consider-always excluding, as I
said last week. the unknO\yn chances of
neutrals joining in, These three e
ements are
what Germany hü.s to put fcrwarJ of trained
and equipped men and U.!te:l; what Austria-
Rungar.r. and what Turkev,
Germany is at once the Power 'which "\"\""e
can best judge in this regard. because her
problem has been more thoroughly studied.
and, as we shall see in a moment. her h\'o Allies
can hardly be judged Ea\"e upon the analogy
of her own position.
\Ioreovèr. what Germany
can do is the important point. for "\íhat she
cannot do, certainly her Allies cannot"
'VeIl, then. tlie (\Yo things that we haye
to note about the reserve of Germ:m man-power
8,re. first. its total amount. and. secondly. the
size of the batches in 'which it can be succe
s-
fully put into the, field.
As to the first of these, I "\"\""Ill simp!y repeat
the estimate "\"\""hich h:ì.s been so continually put
forward in the:::.e columns, and which I belieye
to be amply supported by independent
estima.tes of the highest official character.
Germa.nr. mer and aLove the men she trained
and eqUIpped for the fin
t efforts of the war-
her regular forces-comIl1ands a maÀimum
reserro man-power of perhaps more than two
millions and certainly less than h, 0 millioJ19
and 3. half. 'Ye need not return to the argu-
ments stated 0' er and oyer again in the5e
columns in fa\"olll' of this number. upon which.
as I 113.\"e said, a weighty agreement e:xÜts.
There is only one point upon v. hich we neeù
linger, for that is one which has appeared often

in the correspondence coJumns of this papèr,
and it is one upon which there is al"\"\""ays a good
deal of misunderstanding: I mean the propor-
tion of military efficients kept back for civilian
emplorment. It is obvious that great mas-,es of
the necessary work. both agricultural and in-
dustrial. can be done bv men who would not
pass the doctor. But that one allows for in
making this estimate. The point is that a Yl"l'Y
considerable amount of absolutely necessary
"\"\""ork can only be done by lllen who certainly
"\"\""ould pass the military doctor. That is true of
a great deal of railway work. of most minin.g.
of nearly all the heavy "\"\""ork in metals .which
provides. remember. not only the guns and
the ammunition and the shipbuilding. but
also the necessary upkeep of yery heavily
"\"\""orked railways, and of all the auxiliary
machinery "\"\""ithout which neither can a great
campaign be conducted nor the general life of
the nation maintained, It is even true in some
degr
e of agriculture. and if any proof wero
lacking of a truth EO patent.. here is an
excollent examplo. If there is one nation
,,-hich has trained every man available it
is the French, Yet the French in the
heart of the cam
aigl1 have been compellccl
to accord leaye III rotation to men at the
front for occasional absolutely necessary
agricultural wOl'k in the interior, and tho rail-
way "\"\""ork. though nothing like" hat has been
necessary to the German Empire in this war.
has aaain compelled the French to retain so
considerable a proportion of military efllcient

that even in the small belt of France occupied
br the enemy these huxe appreciably s\yellcù
the total of priso.ners taken by the Germans;:
for. as we all know, the totals giyen hy the
Germans of their prisonNs include lllany more
than the actual soldiers captured.
To leave this point, then. and to return to
the Germ3n resen-e of man-power, Let us can
it two million four hUlltÌred ihou
anù-a very
high estimat.e. That figure is conyenie 1 1t, both'
because it "\"\""eighs the scalf's agaim,t our expec-
tations or hopes. antI also becaw;;e it is diyisible
into three batches of 800,000, the importance of
which figure will be apparent in a moment.
How many of this re
erYe has Germany'
already put into the fiel<ll
To judge that. let us note that t"\"\""o consider-
able bodies of newly trained men, whet,her
ùrafted into existing formations or formin

now units. have already been noted, and their
numbers roughly estimated in the field, The
:first batch came in with t.he late autumn of last
year, The last batch llaYè be
un to appear with
the more recent operations of the latp "inter-
and here let me aùd that I am reYising and
somewhat changing here upon later informa-
tion earlier estimates of my own. \\ hich "were
based upon insuÍÌÌcient data,
\Ye know. again. that the numhrr ,)f men
Germany can tram at anyone time is limiteù to
a certain maximum. Her machincry of in-
Etruetions. including ground accol11niodation
and instructors, permits her to producf>, in
succesphe relays. batches of no more than
800,000.
\Ve need not. unfortunately. moùifv ihis
much by any cOJ1fo;ideratÌon of ùiflìcuity in
equipment. for Germany has hccn prf'parin

this war for three years. two of which h3se been

..

L A :x D A X D .'\V ATE n.

Rpent in vc-r,Y active preparations, and she made
the war at her own moment, when these pre-
parations were complete. ,Yo mny roa
onaLly
presume that she would put the newly trained
men into the field as rapidly as she posc;;ibly
could, for her great advantage is in this very
fact, that she alone WÐS prepared, and that, in
the long rUll, time was against her. "
e mÐY,
therefore, reasonably conclude that her fil'::;t
relay exhausted one of these batches; her
seco"nd relav the second, and that a third only
remains. tor in two million four hundre
l
thousand you have three groups of 800,000
caeh. Ailo\\ing (in spite of a certain l'roportion
whom we know from prisoners and from lctteri't
and diaries found to have been sent forward
after a v['ry short training indeed) that the maS-i
of each balch has recei\-ed full three months'
training, and allowing, in order to weight the
scales against our expectations and hopes, that
not all of the theoretical maximum of anyone
Latch could ÌJe dealt with, vet ,ve shall not haye
much more than a million Ìeft, while in all prob-
ability the remaining 800,üOü of the theoretical
calculation are over, rather than under, the
mar k.
On what kind of date ought '
e to e""{poct
the appearance of thef:e last levies 1 At the
earliest the end of April, at the latest May; or,
at the very latest, for that margin which might
not be accommodated in the training gronacls
at once, and could only be put in as the earlier
units left for the field, we might admit that

he last of the newly trained men vlOuld B ppear
III the month of Juno.
This calculation givt:'s us much the f'RlllO
critical date-the early snmmer-which we
found in discussing the. first factor. It is upon
an examination of the re'3erve of man'power, ßS
upon an examination of wastage, tho carl.v
8ummer that should pwyide the critical
moment. After that moment the ma.n-poy;rer of
the enemy cannot bo increased or recoured
apprcciahly so far as Germany is concerned.
For Austria-Hungary we have data far less
ccHain. Such vague and gencr:ll indices as ws
h3.ve got may be put very briefly thus:
As the Dual :Monarclrv trained and armed
ori6'inal1ya smaller propoÙion of its total popu-
lation. a hrger margin remained theorehcallv
available. On the other hand, the Du
il
1I!0narch.y had nothing like the organisation for
the rapid training of largo masses of men in
rotation that the U
rman Empire had, and we
are putt ing the figures very high indeed if wu
allo\\: a reseryo yet to appear pl'Oportionate to
the German reselTe, and if ,';re admit a furtJll'l'
600,000 as availahle for Austria-Hungary at tho
same date. \\'e mnst remember that the serious
threat uuder \yhich the Austro-Hunaarian
dominions, and particularly Hnnl")'i.1fv,
have
lain since the invasion of Ca1icl
, étud tho
l)fcsence of the llu'5sians in the Carpathian
,
lUust have already Ul'CT('(1 the inclusion of all
t ' . 0
MI.t was aY.ail
Lle, howcn
r imperfectly
tram
d, anù It IS hardly likely that there
remam more than half a million of douLtful
ma.terial
n tl1is fie!d. T}
lat may be an under-
estImate If the earher lenes were mismanaaeù.
The u!lder-('
tim
te may even be grace. But
there IS no SH{n III the efforts this part of the
Germanic .Alliance has hitherto made of

:Uafch 6, l
nj.

steady recruitment, There is rather everv in.
dication, F:ince the threat to Hungary' first
hecamo serious last autumn, of great måsscs 01
imperfectly trailled men having Leen pushed
fOf\ya rd. .
Of Turkev, all wo can say, knmvinrr the
clifficulties in
eq nipment, and' the totally dif-
ferent social conditions one has to deal with, as
weU as the hopeless variety in recruitment, is
that this bmnch of the enemy's alliance will
hardly put forward in tho near future any con-

iJerablD oodies beyond those already ÍtI the
field, either f'0 office red or so munitioñed as tt)
menace tlH
oppoF-ing Powers in any unexpected
llegree. Tud\.Ísh territory is already nearly
isolated fì'Oill iis .Allies; Its farther and mOfe
completei::;olation would seem imminent.
"'0 may sum up, and say that the key to
Ow understa.nding of all this factor is the
Uerm
Í1 rcernitmeÏlt, that this has been studied
fair! v carefully, and that if a further million
can be provided thence bv the early summer,
,,-e have ill that figure the limit.
Again
t these figl1re3 W0 know that the
Allied recruitment is of throo kinds. There is
the training of tho rrench new class alreadv
complet{'d. 'Ye have next the new British
Armies, and we h
Ye lastly the enormous
nus
:inn reserve of men, whose presence in the
Íield demands one thing only-equipment.
Now the problem of Russian equipment,
which we ha\-e touched upon before in con nee--
tion with the ice-bound ports of that Power, is
affected by two efÏorts no"",, in progress; the first
is the forcing of the openings to the Elack Sea,
the fortuno of which is not vet decided, The
second is ihe completion o( the broaJ gaug'j
line to Archangel, on which the Hussian ne'ws
officially passed has just informed us that it i:l
in progress, but how far advanced we are not
told. The old avenue of supply ffOl11 .Arch-
angel was not more than many hundred miles
of single narrow gauge lino, very insufficiently
pro-videà "\\-ith rolling stock. 'Yhen that insuffi..
cient avenue will Le supplanted Ly a full rail-
way, ,ye do not yet know, Imt, apart from thi.s.
with the early summer entry thrOl
zh the ports
which are kept open with such dimculty, if 8,t
all, during tho wint!:'r, \yill begin again, ant!
here, as in other lincs of analysis we ha.ve
examined, though a liHlo later than the date
npon which those other lines converge, we find
tho critical moment corresponding to the o{>en-
ing of the summer season, with a possibility
that good fortune at. the mouths of the Black
Sea may very considerably advance such &
moment.
To put th
matter in the most general terms
possible, it would seem as though by the begin-
ning of May, at the earliest, by the end of .Tune,
at the late
t., and with increasing force in the
interval Lehveen, the crisis of the war, so far a!l
reserw's of power are concerned, should be
I0Hched. III that period something liko R.
balance in men might well be established, and
if that pel'iod Le successfnlly past, the tide
would seem-judged Ly these necessarily im-
perfect arguments-to he turnin,
.
Thore remain to be considered the geo-
graphical and the moral factors- the first
capable of cIo!:::e scrutiny; the laiter liable, of
course, to no more than the vaguest judgment
-and with these 1 propose to deal next week.
10*

March 6, 1915.

LAND

AND

THE

\VAR
By FRED

Y{. ATE R.

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

l\úIE.-lbi. Artide b:l. beeD .ubm!tted to tbe Pre.. EDrea., which doe. Dot ob!ect to tbe publicatioD .. cen.ored, alld taLes ae
rc:sl'oDsibiiity f(lr tba çor rettness of the .tatements.

THE DARDAi\ELLES.
T HE official details now published of the preliminary
ol"'eraLÏons in the Dd.rdanelles indicate ycry
clc2.rly the immense relative ::uperiority of fons
to sbips.
The florts were:-
A, Cape Helles.. ................ 2 9,2
B. Seddul Bahr ...................... 6 10,2
C. Orkanieh Tabia .................. 2 9,2
V. Kum Kalossi Tabi:l. , 4 10,2
It is improbable that any of these were modern gunl',
U 1'ie kno\\ that iu the fir;,t bombarùment of Februal'Y 19
they \\ere outranged.
Tbe 9,2's are pre5umably Yil'kers guns of øbout fifteen
yelll'S ago. At Rud about that time Turkey was buyiug
Vi.ckers guns. The 10,2 is an old Krupp size, and as like
&II not EOme of these guns were there ,\ben the Britisb Fleet
trent up the Dp.nlanelles in 1878. The 10.2 would appear to
be idemical with the 26 centimetre ca!>t-steel breecbloader of
22 calil)res. There are later 10.2's, II model 1889," of 40
and 50 calibres, v. ith muzzle yelocities up to about 2,500;
but these would (being on shore mountings) hardly be out-

&nged by the guns of an old battles
ip lite the rwgrance.
In øny case, howeyer, the forts wcre not II first class,"
and in addition thereunt{), being Turkish, are most unlikely to
haye been in any high state of efficiency. Yet they Eur-
riyeù the fir!>t heavy bombardmel't, ønd were only finally
..educed aft-er oyer seyen hours' firing from the British ships

uun Elizabeth, .A ganzenznon, I rruistibltJ. f' engeanct,

lbion, and Cornu-ellis, and the French Ehips GGuloÌ3,
6utfren, and Cltarlemagne - all sbips making excellent
practice against an indifferent reply.
From ibis wO can get ß clear inl.ling of tbe magnitude
of the taclr: on which the Allied Fleet ia engaged, e.nd-unless
Tur1...ish re<Í!>tance liuddenly collapse&-plogress is likely to
be Elow and tedious.
By the 26th four miles he.d òeen gained-t.bat 18 to say,
.....ept clear of mines. In øddition, Fort Dardanus (E),
mounting four 5.9-inch (probably old Krupp gunG), had
been more or less silenced by long,range fire from the .Albion,
J{a;atÙ:, end rengeance.
The
hole of these operations must, however, be regnràed
as merely preliminary. narder WCI k is probably ahe;;.ù
when II The K arrows" come il1t-o the zone of operation
,
and only good luck combined with the mo!>t brilEant tactical
..rrangeILcnts e.re likely to Eave WI from more or lcss con-
aider able losses.
Tbe public impression that forcing tbe Dardanel1cs Is a
ø:.ero parade is ,-ery erroneous, The actual ta
,k is one of
øtupendous magnitude, perhaps ono of the greatest na,'al
operations e,-er undertaken. If it is to be paralleled at øll
1\e mu>t go back to the fall of Constantinoplo (Byzantium)
to tLo Turks, and reflect that they will loso it mainly owing
to the prevalence of conditions similar to those \'y which they
gained it. However, its slow results ",ill be a m:eful les
on
to those misguided people who are wont to demønd why t
e
}3ritish Fleet does not bombard Cuxhaven and force the Klel
Canal. Ships v. forts must eyer be a yery hard task for the
,hi ps,
my our latest DreadnougLt, the Quun EU:a"beth, should
baye been sent to the Dardanelles to join up with a crowd of
()ld ships is a matter of comidcrable public conjecture. The
probablo reason is the most ob-\Ìous. She is a brand-new
fbip of an entirely new type just commissioned. Any ne\;l
-
commissioned lihip requires time to "shake clown." It IS
doubtful whether, had sbe joined the Grand Fleet right off,
the Queen 1:li=abeth would haye been of much nlue. In the
Dardanelles she cøn get 5haken down and" bloodcd," and
" practical experienc
obtaine.d 11.8
th? exact yalue, of
the I5-inch 6hell whIch ilIe 11 hurling mto the Turkish
fortificatlonø.
A furtller complication of the attack, ønd one which will
t,e most acute off Cbanak, is thAt tbe Turu haye abundant
tacilities r"r placing ßcatini m.ines to drift
"wn "nth the

Ja1.AI' TO ILLUSTRATE THE POSITIOXS L'\" TITE DARD
EI.LI:S.

current agaimt the Allied Fleet.
feetil1g this attack will
demand unceasing blill and vigilance.

GENERAL MATTERS.
The Recent Air Ra
d,
In the issue of J'ebru:).IJ 20 I dealt with the hig air raid,
and mentioned the dio;1ike oi the _-\ir Service to the ùeification
which is apt to befall any of its members ,,'ho chance to get!
iuto the limelight. I was ende.\youring to comey Ùlo:.t it is
inevitable that this should happen with a Jlew arID and the
sensational Pres
, but that the phase will p
5S. EiU'er I
worded myself clumsily, or else some people read things irre-
spective of the context. In any case, I deeply regret to :End
that at least one reader is under the impre!O
ion that I
intended to imply that a cel-tain ài!>tillgul
bcd officer was II OD
tho boom." Nothing was further from my thoughts.

ANSWERS TO CORRESPO
DE
TS.
H.
. R. (Rugelcy).-There is a possibility th
t ß
lufficiellt1y sensitive instmment could be con
trncteù, but I
fhould imagine that the motor,boat would see the }'eriscopa
long before the detector would work.
R, P. (Deal).-Your suggestion would not affect matter.
except in abnormal ca
es on account of the depth of water.
W. T. C. (Belfast),-No such appliance is ImO\-.n.
T. F. H. (Birkenhead).-Yery many thanJ..s for your
letter. The circumstance has already been report
d.
H. N. (Ticehurst).-Although experimentally lSub-
marines have bccn detected by 8eroplanes, aircraft appear to
be of very little use for this purpose unù"r war conditions.
This is due to the fact that in peaco experiments tho sub-
marines would be somer-here at a certain timo and al,o the
ørea of water in which they had to be looked fer ,.....1S small.
In war practice, of conrse, the area of wat-cr is very large
indeed and tho time of the submarine an absolutelv iudefinite
quantit,y. J
W. C. W. (Liskeard).-(l) Discus
ion on tlli!l subject i!
forbidden. (2) The Sala/l,i, Yoa!> eXfected to be completed at
the end of this year. As she
as being built by the VuH:an
Co. at consiùerably over the llormal German rate of construc-
tion it is improbable that they can expedite bel'. The Lut=oU',
building at Scbichau's at Danzig, was down for completion
next July, but as her con!>truction could easily be accelerated
it is quite p051'ible that IShe is already "\"ery nearly completed
for Eea. Three battleships of the K oem.!] class were com.
p!eted shortly after the outbreak of war. The fourth \"e8
el
of the clasa will probably be completed in the course of .
11-

LAND

montE or so. (3) I am afraid that tDe stories of the sin..\:Ing
of the H ,rtTia and the Kais,,' P/-ilhtlm d,r Gro
3t are versions
cf one and the same thing, due to vague descriptiolB, and
both of them also may be incorrect stories of the loss of the
'Friedrich Karl, which is the only German ship officially
announced to have been lost in the Baltic since the Magde-
burg was destroyed. (4) Suggestion noted. (5) It is im-
possible to disintegrate item8 like th03e you have quoted from
the jf ar.cnurian If eu',. It is pleasing to hear that they regard
jt as official that the Von der Tann and J{arlsrullt are sunk,
but disquieting that they credit the Fr03nch Na.vy with having
lost the Jean Bart and Courbtt. This was officially denied
by the :French Admiralty and officially stated as correct by
the Austrians. Possibly the Manchurian Xeu',i was quotin/{,
End not giving any official Russian statement. (6)" Fight-
ing SI1Ïps " will be published about Mayor June as wmal.
F. T. (Midhunt).-A pleasant fe:lture of the present
:war is the way in which everybody seized with an idea spread:l
it about in the hope of its being useful. You may, however,
hke it that our destroyers know all there Ï3 to know in the
matter of hunting submarines. Did you ever see a man with
8 gun making his fir:;t effort to shoot snipe 7 Our destroyer:!
are (or were) in that position agaimt hostile submarine!!. 'fhe
principal danger from submarines is the fad that they are 110
VIO'l'el weapon. It is only the non-nautical Germans who
imagine that in the submarine they ha....e discovered something
which sets all the laws of Nature at defiance. We s1all evolve
an antidote in due course.
H. R. B. (C
eckenhaIll).-..\.ll that you suggest hu been
done for a long tIme.
R. G. (Brislol),-To foul the propellers of a submarine i!
excellent in theory, but in practice, unfortunately, it is rather
on all fours with catching a bird by putting salt on its hill

rhe bigness of the sea is the cause of the trouble. Imagine a
grasshopper in a ten-acre field seeking to locate and make
8 meal off some particular insect aud you get a not very
exaggerated analogy I
8. O'D. (BramhaIl).-You may depend upon It that the
Naval Air Sen,ice has long since utilised aeroplanes for every
purposo to wbich they can be put.
H. M. (Kingstown) and W. D. S. B. S. (Bournemouth).
-You have both hit on the same idea independently. It
Is all right in theory. but in practice would be too slow to be
of valuo, to 8ay nothing of the fact that a torpedo in motion
h always a good way ahead of its betraying bubbles. More-
over, the chances of anyone particular merchant ship beiug
attacked are very small, The best defence ÏII that adoDted by

ho .Admiralty, I:
T. H. M. (Crosshaven),-Time fuss shell are used a 17 ainstJ
-aeroplanes, as wêll as shrapnel; but any land fire is
eces-
lIarily haphazard. 'l.'he correct reply to the aeroplane is the
aeroplane. Anti-aircraft gum will no doubt impro\'e: they
ma.y very possibly improve EO that dirigibles become entil'ely
worthless; but they Bre never V03ry likely to provo) a satù-
factory defence against aeroplanes.
F. J, R. (London, E.C.).-(l)
Iodern submarines havð
two periscopes, and there is no probabi!itv of their beiu17
caught from behind. (2) .AircraiL have pro,:ed of little or n

,-alue against submarines. The idea of .. harpooning JJ t.hem
was suggested some time ago by Lorù Charles Beresford. The

rouble is to find the submarine. Ail remarked some while
ago in this column, it is ea!lY to harpoon a whale, because it
lacks intelligence enouóh to wake itself scarce when danger
threatens. The submarine, on the other hand Ï3 a very
;utelligent whale. '
F. .S. (Guermey),-:V:any thanks for your enclosure.
!Least said soonest mended. Your enclosure is conclusi'\"'e and
unpleasant. evidence that the German official report of t!J.tI
ß'anga affair was not the bluff that I asstpned it to have beeJl.

ll the same, we shall presently have Tanga.
A. W. (Eideford),-The German was probably bannle!l",
or you would not ha.....e encountered him in the \V
v you did.
!A favourite method with the Germam was to put
harmle
s
man to aUracli attention while the real spy worked unseell
,behind.
H, S. (No addres,,) ,-I have forwarùed the matter to t1l8
!proper quarter. Probably they are unaware-of Vlhat is under-
Jleath t
e sheep's clo
hing at the place you refer to. Fortu-
nately, If your surmise be correct, thero! Ï3 a proverb which
.-uns: II Every bullet has its billet."
.. A :Man in the Street."-Your 8u-l7!"'estion ha!! been in
øperation ever since the war started. "':>
. H. B. J. (Golder'lI Greeu).-Yo
lr,plan for the destruc-
tion of øub
ariue' is ingenious, but I aIn afraid Hlat ti,,
]
.r. too elusive tQ b. destroyed on ilia lillæ you .ugge3t...

A
D

ATER.

March 6, 191
.

C. P. M. (1Iaicla Vals. W.).-Your theory I, correcf.
but you may recKon that our lIubmarÍl1a expert.a thou
ht of
it long ago.
R. B. (Blrkenhead) ,-No, I do not consider you ".
blithering idiot," but I am afraid that you are amongst the
multitude which fail8 to reali3e the intrinsio difficulty of
getting into touch with a 5ubmarine. Once in touch, Buit-
able methods of destruction are simple and plentiful; the real
problem is how to find the needle in the bundle of hay.
J. T. H. J. (Cymmer),-There is nothing intrinsically
wrong in yoùr idea for combating 8ubmarine:l except that!
the submarine blockade danger is hardly important enough to
warrant such eIt,ensive precaution8. It is necessary to
remember that snbmarines, like aircraft, are novel weapons
of w:arfare, 1 a
d consequently get headlines out of all pro--
portIOn to tneIr actual fighting value.
N. B. M. (London, S.W.).-I am quite ready to concede
that GEJrman-Americans have their rights, and no doubt from
their point of view JC Deutschland libel' alIes .. interests them
more than JC The Star Spangled Banner." But as the busi-
ness of Mr. 'Winston Churcbill is to look after the interesl3 of
t"i
count.ry I am afraid that I cannot follow your theory
that anything he or the Admiralty may do against Germany
is JC a low-minded policy." I take it that you are a German-
American and honestly ent.itled to sympalhise a!! you will, bull
you cannot expect us to sympathiso with you. The Germans,
of cour3e, are delightful people, but it happen!l to be the
busines!! of this country to kill the enemy. and I am afraid
that even if you called Mr. Winston Churchill a d--d
nasty brute you would not induce a 6ÍD
18 BritÍili sailor to
be unduly 80fLhearted thereby,
II Retaliation. "-Your sc]leme of a trap for German IIUb-
marines is absolutely perfect in theory. It would certainly
work, but do you realise that the chances of anyone particular
merchant 6hip being pirated are about ons in a thousand,
while the cost of what you 8Ugg
st would be something like
one in a hundred-i.e., we should bo paYIng through the nose
against imaginary dangers Y But when all is said and done
there is no certainty in any 6('heme, and no scheme can safely
bo based on the theory that tbe hostile submarine is not very
wide awake. I do not believe that there i!l any such thing as
passi\'e defence against Germany's submarine .. blockade,"
Safety only lies in an offensive-defensive by the Briti3h Navy.
n. M. (Hampstead, N.W.).-Ideas more or less like
your suggestion, though not always so carefully worked out,
come to mo continually from correspondents. In so far &I
the scheme Ï3 practicable it haB long becn in op
ration.
A. W. Y. (Gla
_gow),-A" you say, your idea Ì3 not novel.
but your proposed application of it most certainly ie, and 1
suggest that you communicate with tha Admiralty direct,
being careful to explain to tham e:xacUy how it works La
e-.:ery way.
W. C. (Wincanton).-(l) At 17,000 yards -A shell would
have drop enough to felch up against the protective deck,
rl'he curious thing is that it ha3 ne\.cr been absolutely settled
whether a projectile fired at long range with a considerable
elevation reache!! tl,e target point downward, or poin'
upward as it leU the gun. (2) High angle fire to the full
extent of 45deg. or more is not possible from warships.
becsuse no proyisiou for such extreme elevation id made. It
coulll, of course, be secured by inclining the ship sufficiently.
(3) !our idea of traillihg seagulls to detect periscopes by
feedmg them from periscopes i'
on the face of it ludicrous.
But in actual practice it might "ery well work in inshore
waters, Come to thiu:, of it, the idea tha.t the jumping lid
of a boiling kettle cot:ld rê,-01utioni3e motive power mus'

lso haye struck many past sage9 33 ludicrous. By the way,
If you look up back uumbers of ihe Strand 1lagarine of aboull
ten years or so ago, YOI1 v.-ill find t
at one Angus Sherlock,
writing about Nasal \\-ar Game, detailed a scheme abou'
utilising porpoises for ll:n al purpose'!. So far as I recollec\
t.he Umpire allowed the claim. 'l.'he French once seriously
considered training eagles to attack aviators, and at the
present time I believe that parrots are utilised to give warn-
ing of approaching aeroplane3. One v:ay and another, there.
fore, your iJea about seagulls cannot Le considered sìHy.
de'1pite the fact that tho Tilll(s paragraph of February 25. to>
which you refer, merely suggest" that. the ilubmarine chanced.
to frighten the seagulh.
E. D. F. (J
oudon, S.W.).-Yol1r Bcheme b ven
interesting, but I am mther doubtful whether the capli;e
balloon would slay there, also as to whl'ther it would reaH,y
see very much. .A3 I ha ','e so frequently lIugge5ted in these
columll3, the submarÏl1
j" a very wily fuh.
12-'t

March 6, lü15.

LAND

A
D

A TER.

A NOTE OF \V ARNING.
BRITISH AERLL\.L SUPREl\1ACY l\1UST NOT BE CO
1PR01\IISED
BY AIR RAIDS.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

JfOTE.-TIW article hu bCCD lubmittc::'I to tl:e "rcil Bureau. ,.-hlch dOCI Dot obJcct to thc pubHcatloD as ccnlorcd, and takcl DO
rcsponlibilit) for the corrcctuc5I or the Itatemcntl.

T ""O principles !eem to haye guided our military
authorities in dealing \Tith the production of air-
craft dming the period immediately preceding
the outbreak of hostilities. These two principleB
are I
(a) E
real1y promÚ!!:r!
ly OOI'.Âructed aIrcraft must b1! .inn a
trial.
(b) Eyery promls'nr oonstrud{)l" must
g
HIl "trork,
As students of military aeronautics :ire "en a\Tare, tIle
adoption of those two principles by our authorities and their
adherence to them were not brought about ",ithout much
pressure from aeronautical de
igners, constructors, and a
certain eection of the technical Press. Anvhow, when the
WB.!" broke out, tlJese t\"\o principles being aÌready in opera-
tion, the country found itselI in possession of several designs
.f aeroplanes, especially suited for nlÍlitary pnrp05es, and of
a number of firms who had already acquired considerable
experience in aeronautical construction, "Then, therefore,
In his laet article, the writ.cr expressed the "iew th;;.t no
praise ehould be grudged to those who, right at the beginning
of hostilitie
, enabled Great Britain to secure that kind of
aerial IlUpremacy for which the yarious countrics were 8
ri\"-
lng, he had in mind not only our Eplendid airmen and those
on tho General Staff who were responsible, in all its details,
for an intricate and then untried organisation, but also those
designers and constructors who, in t.he early clays of aeronau-
tics, have had on many occasions to face with an empty purse
official apathy and general indifference. The writers also
.ho, in the public Press, support.!'d anJ cncourageù them
.reserve as well their meed of recognition.

THE NEED FOR CRITICIS:\I AXD
SUG"';ESTIONS.
The writer f!! led to mention th" aboye facts because
there has of late been a tendency, in certain quarter!!, to
point to the exploits of our Flyillg Corp!' as evidence that
criticism of, and !;uggestiolls to, His Idaje5ty's Air Depart-
ments are out of p!ace and can ser:e no purpose. It can be
esserted, however, and proved, by means of indisputable
.oc
melltary and other evidence, that our Air Service owes
the efficiency it already possessed when the ",ar broke out to
the very I!harp criticism to which it llad been Bubjected in
th" püst. As revards out.
ide 5ugge
tion!', the writer con-
tiden that now,
ore than ever, the8e Bhculd be \>,elcomed:
(1) &>...&UlIe in !tudylng the n
" military uses to ",.bkh.
n,ry
day, it i, found that t.he aeroplane can
put" o
r aut.h,orJtl
a
dQ not pos-;e
, the accumulal.e<l e;<perl
n,
e wInch 4']','sts In
the case of other methods of U"Brfa
e, lhey are, thenf"re,
110 betur prepared to d
.aJ with them t
n any other .tudt:d
of military aeronautics.
(I) Because an Ìmportant ullfor
e
n pot-eTitiality for oITen!!...e pn:-

ce ha. TiOW become evid,ent in ,n

aeroplane, a!,d till.
potentiality, on account of Its pOB31blilty of s
ortelJll1g the

ar, nnat be ù""eloped and emplo
ed Tilth 114 btt!e deLay u
may be..
To none, therefore, !ihould Imgge
tions be more W"elco
e
&han to those responsiUe for the development of our Air
lI.rvice and for ita adaptation to the important tabk l,ring
before i\.

attached. TIle main yalue of EUch a fleet being the c:>rryin:r
out of careful, and at times difficult, obsenTations, it follows
that, npart from the reliability and qualities of the nircraf1
constituting the Hluadron, the principal factor influencing
the efficiency of auial reconnaissance is the capability of the
obser\"er to make and report his observations accurately and
carefully. *" Both pilot Rnd observer must be able to read
find understand a map jm;t as quickly and easily as they can
a book, eud at
\I1Y moment of a cross-country flight they

hould both knoW" e:uctly where tLey are. Beyond tLis the
obser\"cr-cr, ill a
ingle-scater, the pilot-must be able to
rick up troops on the ground, det-ermine what they are,
estimate their D:n:r:bers, and mark their precise po
ition on
the map, He may ha\'e to do this in a rough wind and in the
midst of fleeting and distracting douds, and either during
his return journey in the air, or after landing from a long
and perhaps &larming and uncomfortable flight, he must
urite a clear, int.eHigible report of 1\,1at he has seen. All this
is difficult, and, in consequence, the results of aerial recon.
nais
ance will sometimes be inaccurate and misleading.
.. This liability to error "ill be intensified Ly subter-
fuges undertaken by tlJe enemy with the express purpose of
deceiving the aerial obser\'cr. Small forces may be strung out
on roaùs to represent large columns, while the ma
s of the
troops al'e kept hidden in woods and yillages; dummy trenches
may be comtructed, while real ones are hidden; gUl!s may be
made to look like bi\"ouac shelters, bushes, or country carts,
while country carts may be made to look like guns. Bi\"ouacs
can alld ha,-e been completely hidden from above, and troops
billeted in villages v,-iU be hard to locr-te. The game of
deceiving the airr::' an offers endle
s opportunities for in-
genuity, the only dra",back being that all theso tricks give
the troops that carry them out a great deal of trouble and
t"xtra work without the satisfaction of eyer kno\\ing whether
they haye been successful . . . The be:>t guarantee that
aerial reconnais5
nce will oyercome the difficulties pr6!'ented
by imperfect obsernition and hostile subt.crfuge lies in the
careful training aDd v.ide experience of its observers, and in
the presence d sufficient uumbers of aeroplanes to enable
doubtful inform:.otion to be checked and corrected without
delay."
I,ow, !lnc-c in his last artic1e,t for reasons therein ghen,
the writer has been led to define that .. Supremacy of the
Air JJ which we have alre8dy acquired a!! meaning .. the
capability of airmen to gi\-e, in good time, the necessary
iuformation which will enable their commanders always to
pos
e
s the initiative," it foUG"s 01at, if for some reason,
u
h
as the carrying out of a raid or an attack, we deprive eY
n
momentarily our land or sea forces of a number of aenal
observers of "careful training and wide experience," we
compromise, at lea
t for a time, the retelltion of our aerial
Euprema
y as above defined. .
Further, it do
s not follow tbat lienal observers of
.. cardul training and wide experience," v.llOse number is
limited and who
e HT\ ices are indispensable to the com-
maudcrg of our land &nd tea forces, would male the be
t
aerial bombardier
. t
The writer ha'!, beside!!, e:a:plained on variou
occafions
why at:rial attacks
hould be made .in forc
. Consequently,
if an aerial attack be undertaken '''ilth an all' fleet meant for
the maintaining and develcping of that supremacy of the
air", hich is at present ours, not only would the personnel of
tbat fleet not be be
t suited to employ the aeroplane as an
offensive weapon. but a]50 by such a policy we would run tI,e
risk of compromicing the most valuable assi:..tance which the
I!.irmen atlached t.o our Army and
a...'Y can render to our
land and sea fol'COs.
If, therefore, tJle country decides to endeavcur to

mE TWO KINDS OF AERIAL SCPRE
I,\CY
The ",rit.er has already, on a former occasioD, tried to
make clear the point that, speaking in a genel'al manner, the
Fresent war has Bhown that an aerial fleet ma:)" be employed
In two 'll'Spl
(1) It. mllY form pa.rt of our
nd BI'eI sea forcu J
ud .
(2) It may be tlsed Il!I an
n.d;vidual f
ce ,:.hi"'h Tl'JlY !let
.th
1'
independently of or 1D co-opc,ahWl "PõlLh our la.nd and sea
forca
In the following lines it will be nplain
d '" 11Y, EO fe.r
.. the present war is concerned, the ,ame a,r-wl.flut c{1n
o' . From a If:du
on .. The _o\erop'a...e in ',"ar," ginn at the l'nh efoo
per/orm the tlt'O prurding functioTiB '/l'Ïth the bat pf)l$o.M" ø'ty of wndon. by }I..jor W. S. Dran
ker, Hop! Artillery lU.F.o"
r",'lIlt,. \\'hen it is com,idered as a part of our land or !':ca lìeaer-re), General Stan.
forces, an air fleet or an air 6quadron is especially concerned t .. To End tbe War," LAXD A
-n ".
TEB, February 'Zi, 1915.
with the reconnaissance or kindred work necessary to the t See .. The l.eroplane 011 !..be OlrelWYe," LAl,D j,KD WAUB,
eDDlDl&Dder of the force to which the air fleet or 5qU ad ron, i, Jc.uary 23, 1915.
1.3-

LAND

AND

'R1c(ORYj
A"'t,R ·

1 F .'
I
.
I

.

.l..

FRI EN DL Y

DLAGß.U! TO lLLUSTR,\TE A SUGGESTED VE'I'ROD 01'
AlililA.L ATTACK.
obtain an aerial supr
macy which would enable us, almost
immediately, to carry the war right inLo the heart of th.

æ... ATE R.

:March 6, 1913.

enemy's territory, a special offeIlBive &.ir fleet must be creatad
at once.

SCGGESTED METHOD OF AERIAL ATTACK.

In the diagram FFF represenb! the boundary line
between a friendly territory and the enemy's country. This
boundary line may be defended by trenches, fortifications,
or natural obstacles. TTT represents a portion of th3 enemy's
territory which it may be necessary to attack aerially. Such
an attack must be made on a comprehensive and sust&ined
Bcale. For this purpose it is suggested that the requisito

number of aeroplanes should be collected at a certain numbzr
0; bases, Bl, B2, B3, and B4, and Cl, C2, C3, and C4, and
that, at first, the machines should start only from tbe basc5
Bl, B2, n3, and B4, at !luch times as to fly, almost simul-
taneously, over the ground to be aerially bombarded, The
squadron starting from Bl would fiy over the outskirts of
the territory to be attacked and gradually drop its bomb,
oyer th3 outer circle it would describe. The squadron from
B2 would fly over tlle circumference of a circle inside th"
one described by the preceding squadron, and fly in the same
clockwise direction. Similarly the I!quadrons from B3 and
B4 would de3cribe oLher inner circles as indicated in the
diagram.
This comprehensive aerial attack could bo rostained by
four other aerial Bquadron3 which would start from basi\1
Cl, C2, C3, and C4, immediately the four squadrom from
Bl, B2, B3, and B4 have returned to the frizndly territory.
and would fly over the ground to be bomb!l.rded in a direo-
tion contrariwise to the one adopted by the squadroIl3 from
Bl. B2, B3, and B4.
In concluding thIs article, the writer whhe!l to r"peat
his note of warning that wo should not be tempted to JllI1,ke
it a practice to carry out two entirely different kinds of
operll.tio
reconnahsanCð and attack--with the Barn. ai.c:
ßee

SHIPS v. FORTS IN THE DARDANELLES

By COLONEL F.

N.

l\lr\UDE, C.B.

to move In fairly deep water and the e
e of observation of
fire eIIect from their fighting tops.
In low-lying country, behind sand dunes, for example, it
used to be nearly impossible to Bee where one's sheHs were
falling, even after the Bite of the battery was located; bu'
in the Dardanelles this facility for escaping observation dOM
not exist, and even if it did the modern aeroplane completøly
overcome!! these difficulties.
Elimi'lating this one advantage of invisibility posse3!1od
by tIle land battery, the Bhip now has things all bel' own
way, for Bhe represents a. power of concentration of fire undel'
a single control far in excess of anything that has ever been
proposed in coast batteries Bincs the day:! of the old stone
batteries of the Crimea.
Of course the number of fighting ships must bear !lome
reasonable proportion to the number of batteries they will
enga<>e; but even against a fair superiority of lanù batteri81
the
odern battleship possesses advantages in practice whic1a
the layman BeeID3 never to be able to take into account.
It is, of course, the object of the batteries to wing the
"Lips, just as it is Lhat of each ship to hit the batterics; but
Now it happens that this particular site of the Dardanelles ",hen
as the battery, or group of batterics, can only predict
has been made the subject of countless controversies ever where ß ship will be, Bay, a minute in advance, and Lhat only
flince the British :Fleet steamed past Lhe Turkish batteries in on condition that she is clearly vi<;ible, the ship always kno.n
1878. \Ve have always known every sounding in the straits lJalf an hour in advance, if need be, what her range to tb.
and all about the condition!! of current and auchora<re which battery will be, because ller speed and helm-angle are enlireiy
governed the application of Bubmarine mines to supplement under her captain's control, and he can vary either, or both.
the gun defence of the forts. a, he pleases.
I suppo
e this particular case is the one instauC'e in Further, thanks to Q.F, guns and the extraordinary
history in which both R,E. and R,N, expelt opinion has been power of modern artillery, a
hip c."!.n froro time to lime 50
in entire agreement-i,e" we botb accept.ed the Dardanel1,'s shroud the fort in a cloud of du
t, 8IDoke, and dirt, thrown
as an indefensible site, as against f;uch ships as the British up by bursting shelh, that for EO'lle minutes all observation
Navy could always bring to reduce its defence, if the ()ccasion of Lhe Bhip's course from the fort, or from anywhere near it,
made it worth while to incur a certain amount of risk. becomes ill1posábl;>, :md while the dust so raised is setUiilg
I believe, in fact, that the German engineers held much f;he can change her cou"
e and reappear at an entirely
the same view; but the Turkish forb on the Dardanelles unkno\\-n ranae for her enemy.
afforded such splendid positions for Messrs. Krupp to dump It is clea
that there are ways of overcoming this dim.
their monster exhibition cannon, as these passed out of date, culty if it has
en t.hought out and installed in advance; but
that other than intellectual ar,uments prevailed at Constan- it is quite certain from the .. progre!!!! reports" hitherto

nople. rcceived that this is A. development well beyond any whi

;Ihe wbole guestion really turns UpOfl the freedom of ship!! the Turks h&ve &II yet worked out...
14-

F OR something more than thirty years the whole
political question of t:!6 Near East bas turncd
upon the matter which is now being put to the
test in the Dardanelles by the Allicd squadrons
of France and England.
It has been partly a naval question, partly one of land
defences, and opinions have varied in proportion as the
sailors understood the engineers aud the engineers under-
stood the sailors.
It bas always been an axiom of the German school, trained
exclusively on land, that guns in forts could beat guns on a
moving platÌorm at sea; but OHr sailors have as consistently
maintained the directly opposite view, whilfl our own
enginecrs, almost equally at home cn land or sea, have refused
a complete assent to either extreme, pointing out that no
hard and fast rule could be drawn, but that each case must
be judged by the advantages which a selected site afforded its
defendcrs and the skill with whicJI the engineer and artillerist
had applied the means at hand 1,0 the attainment of the object
in view.

March 6, 1915.

LA
D

AXD

A TER.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THB COST OF A SAILORS' IlO
IE.
To the Editor of LAXD AND "HER.
EIR,- Y ou may ha-çe noticed that the Scottish N E.tional
Council. o
the Y.M.<?A. haR been doing really good work at
the tralD..lDg camps lD. Scolland EÍnce the be..,innill<1' of the
b ..
"ar,
"W" e h
-çe had a -çery urgent apped from Iu\""ergordon to
do somethmg for the Navy men who spend their leisure time
ashore there. These men when they get their leave ashore
ba\""e I1.bsolutely no place to spend their time, and certainly
no,pl
ce to spe
ld a, ni.ght in; "
e han em
arked upon tha
bUlldmg of a s::II
rs hOille wIth fifty bed cublcle
, restaurant,
smo1.e room, bIIlmrd room, and entertainment room accom-
modation-a place where they can go freely, alld always find
. warm welcome, comfod, and entertainment.
The appeal from the officers and from t:!Ie district has
been so st.rong that we have embarked upon t
le construction
d tbe home without the funds being secured. The total cost,
Including fUrI1i
hing, will be 5.:3,600. Towards this we have
gathered
900, and have received ;E500 Ià.!! a Treasury grant
on condition that it is finished in three months' time. Weare
appeal.i1!g for the remaining !:2,200. The national indebted-
ne
to our sailors goes without saying, and I am sure the
need for this sum only wauts to be made known to insure ih
being receiyed. A recommendation to the undoubtedly
'ympathetic reader! of your splendid journe.l would be ()f
inestima"b1e yalue in securing the required amount.-Tha.nk-
iI!g you in anticipation, I am faithfully your!,
k;DREW H. PI:TTIGRE'V,

"THE 9TH LANCERS."
To the Editor of L
XD A..D "'ATEP..
8IR,-"'ilb reference to the letter bead
d II The 9th
Lancer
," which appeared in LAXD AXD W....TER of
February 27. I am able to ans\\"er If Old Soldier's" question.
On August 24 the flank of the 5th Infantry Division
1I"as threatened by a very heavy G.ttack by the enemy's
infantry. The 9th Lancers and part of the 4th Dragoon
Guardo; were ordered to charge with a view to checking the
encmy's adyance. This they did uncler a terrifio fire. being
Murported Ly the remainder of the 4th Dragoon Guard
,
t.he 18tÌl lluss:trs. and L Eattery R.H.A., No guns were
cllal'gl'd. The mistake made by Mr. H. Ross a.nd other artiste
Is, I think, due to the fact that it was immediately after ths
dmrge tl1at Captain Grenfell went to the help of tRe 119th
Battery. This battery had suffered \""ery heavily, and, o\\"ing
to the heavy lire, was unable to bring up tbe teams. Captain
Grenfell, as!;isted by offi.
ers and men of the 9th Lancers,
helped the gunners t.o m
n-handle the guns cut of action.
I think ß good many people have mixed up the two
Incidents. I enclose my cind.-Yours,

x,

liAr-; AIR FLEET 2,000 STRO='lG."
To the Editor of LAXD Al,D \Y ATER.
DEAR SIR,-Your plan ought not to fail for the 1\ant of
"apit:tI. Though the Government may not at once vote tùe
money, cannot an appeal be made to the publio1 In thiJ!
appeal let patriotism be put before dividends.
I venture to Imggest the following points, in sketching
the lines of a pat.riotic limit.ed liability company.
1. The cOlJlpany shall be formed with a capital of
11:10,000,000, divided into In shares, and at allotment
preference shall be given to the small subsc1Íber.
2. The maximum dividend shall be 5 (or e\ "n 4) per cent,.
.0 that the shareholders shall feel that they are helping their
country at least as much 8S their pockets.
3. The employés shall have full trades union rates of pay
(and shall fulther have divided among them 2
per cent. of
tile profits over and above the fixed dividends paid to the
sharehoIJers).
4. That any further profits that may accrue shall be paid
Into a !oiukinO' fund, which sinking fund shaH be used to pay
oft the shareholders at par, either by annual drawings or as
a whole when the sinking fund shall have reached the sum
of the capital.
5. That at each drawing and repayment of capit..1 t1le
Government shall step into the place of the former owner of
the stock, so that in tho end the Government sball own the
)Iohote concern.
The general public would, by suh!!crilJing for t.he stock.
.,oid the necessity of lit.ill further in1latiI1.f[ the pres
nt \""olume

of Go'."ernment expenditure; tLev 1I"ould llot be enrichinO'
then:!sel
es at the expense of the' State by reccivÜ:g a high
rate of mteres
;. and t!ley would, by means of the sinking
fund, end by gl'nng tbe:r country the present of Æin cr<'anised
busine
s undel'taking free of cost. Þ
By sub,cribing the capital, 60me of UB 'fi"ho are not able,
by roason of age or health,. to ser-çe our country in the field.
would feel that we were domO' somethinO' in the sen'ice of the
I l' 11 " "
peop e, u:-D. m our sma way helping to perform a ÅElTOt'Plua.
-1 remam, yours -çery truly.
J, W. W ILLIUlS.
!,erhaps !ou will .say that this is sentiment, not business;
but lr: WDr tIme senhment has greater power than ever,

ew Rouse, \Yadhurst,

ANTI-S{;B
{ARINB TACTICS,
To tbe Editor of LAXD AND WATER.
SIR,-In the discusÛons which ha\e appeared in the news-
papers as to the best form of I1.nti-submarine tactics. I ha-çe not
yet see
a suggestion that a special type of boat should be con-
litructed for the .purpose of attacking this new enemy. De-
5tl"Oyers
ere designed and constructed for the special purpose
of attackmg torpedo boats. Is it not prob..ble that 8. new type
of
\""es:el will hav
to be designed for the special purpos: of
ahackmg Imbmannes t If this proves to be the caEe let us
consider tbe principal points "hich :should be embodied in the
de
ign :
(1). She must ba\""8 Bpeed at least as great as that of tbe
lubmannej also Ehe must respond quickly to her rutider and
t.urn in a small circ 1 e.
(2) She must be adapted for ramming a.nd constructed in
luch a manner that she will withstand the I!hock of collision.
(3) She must carry deck I1.rmareent somewhat more
powerful than that of t.he largest submarine and also a large
.caUer gun to use against the periscope.
, (4) She .s
ould ha,"e. as low ß freeboard as is comratib!e
..nt
a capabIhty of keepmg at sea in Etormy weather and, if
pO
:Slble, she should bave no mast or funnel in order that
he
may be in\""Ísible at a distance.
Possibly so
e of our torpedo boat!! could be adapted to
fulfil the more Important of these conditions, but if not, is
there any good reason why the Admiralty should not, without
clel1:y, construct ß few specially designed a.r.ti-submarine boats t
Destroyers are too large and too valuable for tile purpose. and
as for steam yachts, whose maximum speed is twehe or
thirteen knot;'!, and which are slow in answering their rudder-',
I am confident that no yal'l1u;man would consider them at all
fit to cope with a fast and acti,e submarine enemy.
If the Admimlty He trusting to armed steam yac'hts or
to unarmed merchant steamers and trawlers for the destruc-
ti?n
! the enemy's submarines, I \""Cllt.ure to tbink tllat they
\\ ill m
co"t"er before long that they ha-çe made a gnn'e mi.ot.ale
and one ....hieh may ha\"e serious consequencc3.
Perhaps I :should add that I 8m writing this letter in tlle
c?pacity of a yachtslJlan of forty years' experience and aim
1\5 an ex-officer of the Royal En{;ineu:s,-I rem
iÏn, Sir )"ours
faithfully, '
D\:
LE\"B.

TIlB EAST KE='IT HL'=,rr.
To the Editor of L
XD A"\D \VATER,
DEAR Sm,-The East Kent lIt.nt has fonred a ce,rr- úf
Mounted Scouts,
The Committee comLts of Mr. H, "W". Selhv Lowndes
(the )1,F.lI,. ",110 is chairma!'). :\1r. S. L. nan-ies (hon, se,'.),
::\lr,.r. E. Churchill (hon, sec, P. and D,). Mr. J.D, Maded.
alld Colonel Baynes, who is in command.
CaptÚn Bell has l.iudly lent llonrne Park {or JrillinO'.
'fhe corps is rccogni
ed by the \Var Office, anù already a
number of drills h,].\'e taken place.
Amongst others who llave enrolled and attf'nded the
mounted drills are )Iessrs, Selby J,owI'd' h , Harri
r. CIl\n'
hi1l.
1.Tniacke, Collard, Tanner, ::\Iiles, Turner, IInnt, K.I,ey,
)'Iaxted, Coleman, Goodson, A+end n, CaLhie, &c., and it is
hoped that hunting men in Eact Kent ,..ho are not elio-ible for
Lord Kitcllener's ." rlT:Y wi]! jcin a
'on as pc ihJe. <>
)11', A, F. Uniacke, of 13,
', 0.., ..
e'
:=;trel't, Canter-
1mry, who is tbe hOD. see" "ïl f r <h"lll r rti lal I as to
conditions, d,'iH9, uniform, J..c" on application. - YoUl

fé).itbfu1ly,

II. \y,
n
Y J.C"XDES.

15*

LAND

AND

NET DEFENCB,
To the Editor of L.\YD AND W AUIt.
BIR,-Permit me to recur to the pressing, yet perplexed,
problem of defence against mine and torpedo attack. Many
methods of protection will suggest themselves to your reader!!,
which may be classified into two main cat.eg-ories of .Actil1e and
Pa3sÏt'e defence. Neither silould be negle"Cted at the present!
time.
To deal with II Acti\'e "defence first. II Forewarned is
forearmed," Ko owner, or sea-captain, ahould allow hi3 ship
to sail without a ful1 and sufficient equipment of guml,
machine-guns, rifles, and, above all, gunners, for dealing
faithfully with submarines and other II vermin" of the high
lieas. K cr should anti-aircraft artillery-in these dap of
Zeppelins and 'l'aubes-be forgotten; while a pent-home steel
net, suspended awning-whe hetween the masts, should furnish
11 satisfactory protectioll against the impact of sky-dropped
Lombs.
\Vith regard to II Passive" defence, there is, in my judg-
ment, no protection comparable with that of ateel-net crino-
lines, only the old-fashioned system of torpedo net defence
has to be reco'13idered, extended, and enlarged. The explosive
energy of mine3 and torpedoes is intensely local in its opera-
tion, and if the explosion can be kept, foay twenty fect, from
the foides of the \"essel attacked, it; will, in most cases, prove to
be comparatively innocuous; and eyery foot of increased
distance rapidly reduces its percussive foree, I venture,
therefore. to suggest that all sea-going vessels should for the
present be aupp!ied with a Y -shaped framework forwar.i,
constructed out of fotout pitch-pine baulks, ateel joists, or
girders. "Cpon these baulks would be suspended steel neh
composed oi rings-say six to eight inches in diameter, linked
together in yertical, lateral, and horizontal planes, as illu.i-
trateù in the following diagram,

&
,o:>i,
"

.-

Cor
"

;J>

It ,"'.
, ,',
ò?

- _ "':,..

.'
';

...

<.
<. -i

............;:,....-

.

l'J

...

<.
>-

, ?-'

",

:-"
-

.
...-. '" ..
.::
-

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..

.

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..,:

-<,...:. .-

.

.
,-.

.

"'\-:z ....

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..
,:t.., .....:.:..

Take a 8hip of, say, 300 feet in length (difl'e.ren
ølzes of
vesse13 would, of course, \""ary proportionately in their equip-
ment). I calculate that the weight of nets for Buch a ahip,
running fore and aft its total length, and having the depth of
the '\"esqel's draught, together with cylindrical, cigar-shaped
tloaters, for carrying the weight of suspension, and linked in
ße:Úble connection with stout steel chains (vide accompanying

e
. , f- .J
:500'
,
, .

,

äiagram), would not ('xceed, say, fiiteen to twenty ton.!!
the cc.st of which, according to th
complexity of the Íìttino!!'
might be estimated to be between E300 and i:500. The!!s n
t

." ould, of course, im-olve a certain reduction of 8peed but the
fittings could be ea
ily d"3igned so that the nets a
d their
tloate1'3 could be taken aboard at will, when the ves;>,el wa9
stearr:ing or sailing outside the ZOll3 of probaLle mine danr:rer
,or of submarine atb.ck, The loss of speed in.oh-ed i9 a seri
m
.maLter, but not
o be taken into account u compareq with

S\TATER.

!larch 6, 191ð..

the sinking of tho ship iteelf, and the even more lrreparabJ.
loas of gallant lives.
. Thu.s II actively II and II pa.ssively" armed onr meroaÞ
tIle marme, no less than our naval fleets, miO'ht continue te
p!ou
h t
e oceans with øupreme indifference to the petty malioe
of
lratlcal foes, and the terror of "the destruction which
w
l , eth in dar

ess" would øwiftIy cease to overshadow the
Bpl
lts of. thos
who go down to the Bea in s}úps and oocup'1
theu bUalne33 1D greaL wat-era."-Yours faithfully,
bNOLD If. HILL&.
" Hammerfield." Perulhurst, Kent.

TßUTONIC TRLiH.
To the Editor of LAND A!fD W ATICIt.
SIR,-_'\.3 Mr. Hilaire BeHoc some time ago juBtJy doubt"
in your paper the accuracy of the number of pri!ionen of 11'''.
offi
ially stated as having been captured by Germany, the faL-
lowlllg may interest you.
'l'he Fran/;fllrter Zeitung, which during this war nveale4
itself as the most Jingo pap5r in Germany, and is therefore
not to be auspected of P lavin g the German authoritiea un.
I ' 1 .
II easa,nt tnc,is, atated on }-"ebruary 25 that Germany &nil
Austna-Hungary held then together 805,000 prisoneR of war.
Of the 462,000 Russian9, 230,000 were in Austria-TIunga?
D
ducting also 50,000 Serbians held there, altogether 525,000
pnsoners were, according to that Garman paper, in Germany.
When seeing that report I happened to remember that the
German Chief Headquarters is.c;ued December 31 en officl.a1
statement, Baying: "The total number of prisoners of 11'&1
interned in Germany, not induding civilian prisoners, .Up
at the end of 1914, 8,138 (lfficera IUld 577,875 men (total
586,013)." And that official I!tatement added: " These
figures do not include 11 number of th03e taken in the CO!lne of
the pursuit in Russian Poland, nor those at prosent on the11
way to concentration camps. .. Yet, leaving thoae out, you wil1
notice that the German Chief Headquarters mentioned o.
December 31 not less than 61,000 more pri!loners of war thaa
the Fran,.!t;rler Zeitung reported to be in Germany va
February 25 I
In order to make it clear to our readers in Holland what
reliance can be placed on the German official reports, I t-ooll
further the trouble to calculate very carefully the number of
prÍ30ners of war which, according to the official reports een'
by 'Wolff's Bureau from Berlin to our paper, a.re supposed te
have been captured on both fronts by the Germans betweeQ
January 1 and February 22. In that time there were reported
118,426 prisoners of war captured by the Germans in Eli.d
Prussia and Poland and 15,453 on the Western front. Addinf
these to the number officially reported on December 31, we go.
a total of 719,892, or 194,892 more than tl13 Fran!.jw-u<<
ZeitZ/ng reported on February 25.
One other proof of how the II nation of poeh an.
thinkers" iil juggling with its numbers of pri
oners. Accord-
ing to the Berliner Tageblatt, the German Mini!'ter at Berne
issued to the Swiss newspapers the atatement that the numbØl'
of German war prisoners up to the end of January were: In
France, 49,350; in Russia, 2,030; and in England, 7,247,
total, 58,627. Now, the official atatement iasued from the
German Chief Headquarters on December 31 contained the
following remark: II The Russian stat,ement nlleged to have
been iSl!ued by the Rusaian Ministerof \\'ar, that 1,140 German
officers and 134,700 men have been captured by the Russiane,
Ï3 incorrect, as the RUS3ian figures include all civilians arreste4
on and since the outbreak of war. The number of actual
prisoners of war is not more than 15 per cent. of theae figures."
Very well, 15 per cent. of 135,840 gives 20,376 "actual
prisonera of war" which official Germany acknowledged to b.
In Russia at the end of 1914. And the German :Min1.3ter a.
TIerne has the hardihood to say that four weeks later b

2,030 German prisoners of war were in Russia. T
The Teutonic mind appeari to be a wonderful thinC.r-4
1. am, Sir. your. sincerely,
JO:::nl C. VAl( DEB VEEB
(London Editor of the Amsterdam TdegraafI..
49, Minster Road, N.W.

MR, HlLAIRB BELLOC'S LECTURES ON THB WAR.
Llandudno....... P!er paV!I
on...5atarday....,..... g March, ð p,m.
Colwyn Ba.y... PIer PavIlion... Saturday......... March, 8 p.m.
London............ Queen', Ha.1l.. Tuesday,......... March, B.30 p,

Winchest-er....... Guildhall......... Wednesday...... 10 Ma.rch, ð p,m.
Salisbury......... Victoria. lIall,.. Wednesda,y...... 10 March, 8.30 P,IDw
Dournemouth.... Pavilion,.......... rhursda.y.........l1 March, 3 p,m.
Weymouth...... l3urdon Room-. 1.huraday........,11 March, 8.30 p,m.
l'lymouth.........Guildha.l.l........ Friday......,..,.. 12 March, 21 and 8.30"
Exeter
._..... Victorl6 Hill... &tllldy.__1.4 ldt.rrll. 2.30 p,,.
15'

\larch 6, 1915

LAXD
\.ND WATER

.

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From

Are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
made by a British
Company with British
Capital and Labour.

10/6
upwards.

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for CUTLERY. etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes, I

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GOLDSMITHS,
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SILK MERCERS

FIRTH'S
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ARTICLES \IADE FRO
t THIS
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HOTELS,
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CJ CUTLERY OF THIS STEEL

IA Y BE HAD OF ALL THE
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SEE THAT KNIYES BEAR THIS

IARI\..

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--=-
MILITARY
LUMINOUS WATCHES
(VISIBLE AT NIGHT)
FITTED EITHER WITH THE ORIGINAL PATENT
SCREW CASE, OR A PATENT SOUD ONE-PIECE
CASE INTO WHICH THE MOVEMENT SCREWS
(as preferred). DUST AND DAMP PROOF.
THE FINEST SERVICE WATCH OBTAINABLE

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(STAINLESS)

Æ.2 15 0

Original and Sole Makers:

Alao in Plain Nickel or Oxydised Case, One Guinea.
NOTE.-All watclr
s sold by Harrods carry a guarantee for three y
ars.

THOS. FIRTH 6. SONS, LTD.
SHEFFIELD.

HARRODS LTD. LONDON, S.W.
R. BURBIDGE, Managing Director,

335

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

T HESE articles are written from practical experi-
ence of military matters, with a view to keeping
our readers in touch with the various requirements
of active service. Changes of climate and the peculiar
conditions under which the present campaign is being
waged render different items of equipment advisable at
different times, and we are in touch with officers at the
front and others from whom the actual requirements of
officers and men can be ascertained. The articles are
not intended to ad\-ertise any particular firm or firms.
We shall be pleased to supply information to our
readers as to wher
any of the articles mentioned are
obtainab:e, and we invite correspondence from officers
on active service who care to call our attention to any
points which would be advantageous in the matter of
comforts or equipment, etc., to those who are about to
leave for the front.

In the manufacture of articles of kit generally, a good
many makers suffer from not knowing the actual require-
ments of their customers. For instance, there was shown to
me a day or two ago a waterproofed and lined vest, which
would have heen perfectly admirable for a motorist or for
any man not called on to undergo any extreme exertion, but
for a soldier, whose life alternates between absolute stagnation
in the trenches and violent movement in marching and
attacking, it was of very little use owing to insufficient
ventilation. It was a good thing, but not for campaigning
purposes. The same is true of a multitude of articles made
for military use; they are good things, but they are made
without knowledge of the conditions under which the troops
are working, and they are unpractical in design.
A New Flask
" All the advantages of silver, at the price of nickel,"
sums up a new flask which is manufactured in nickel and
silver-plated inside with a view to the absolute avoidance of
corrosion. The flask is, first of all, made in two parts, in the
usual oblong shape; these parts are joined to form one
unleakable whole, and then the interior plating is done, so
that the flask is equivalent to a silver one so far as its interior
goes. It is then fitted with a good bayonet top, and there is
a flask which is within the reach of any officer as regards
price, is neat in appearance (if that is desired), handy in
form, and sufficiently stout in manufacture to stand any
amount of knocking about without acquiring the dents and
creases to which silver is liable, owing to the thinness in
which it is made up. Here is a really serviceable article for
the officer or man who has not yet got his flask.
Waders
I have recently inspected a new pattern of wader designed
for use with the ordinary military boot. It is made of the
same thickness of well-waterproofed material from top to
toe; it reaches well above the knee, and fastens to the
suspender button at the waist. It weighs just over one
pound, folds into very small compass, and slips over the
ordinary sock inside even a close-fitting boot. It is
absolutely waterproof and protects from frost-bite, and it is
about the cheapest thing of its kind yet introduced. The
average pattern of wader--even if it can be worn with an
ordinary boot-necessitates having a size two or three times
larger than usual, but one would be surprised at the ease
with which this article will go into the ordinary boot-
without discomfort to the wearer. There is thus no necessity
to carry an extra pair of boots, and as these waders are
portable and cheap they are eminently useful for trench
work at the present time.
A Chilblain Cure

ome time ago a simple remedy for chilblains was
suggested in these columns, and with reference to this a
correspondent writes: "Seeing this remedy for chilblains
suggested, I wondered if the following excellent remedy
would not be more easily obtainable than camphor dissolved
in brandy. I myself have cured chilblains with this remedy
for years, and although it sounds rather a drastic remedy,
it does not hurt in the least. It was given me years ago by
an old Irishman who had used it repeatedly and always
successfully. The procedure is to dry the chilblains well,

lCooot....... _ /M,. 8&1i)

March " 191!

An Oilskin
1
:. ,; '\

without the sticky feeling

1- . " \
.., HIS Oilskin-coat being specially treated is
f '1í1 rr I,.j able from ordinary oilskins.
1" II
ENTIRELY WATERPROOF. LINED WOOL flEECE

,', J "1' Can be worn if necessary over G,eat Coat,

r
,I.... r PRICE 50/-
I
, J Oilskin Cap, also non-stioky 3/6

I ,

", _ j MOler Cycle SUit, For .hose who surr...
. Jacket and Overalls, wirh cold feet.
37/6 Chamois lUlher Sock.
Also suitable for Aviators. 3/9 per pair.

,

Q
SClr

Reoent Strr!et. London,W.

f\'--
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"
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," t.
........ . f , '
::: "
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KHAKI SHIRTS
For Active Service

THESE Shirts are made from a vt:ry
durable and unshrinkable flanl1e1,
w"ven specially for use, in the Regulation
< hade.
They are a good weight and are exception,
ally well cut, made and finished by our
own workpeople in our own factories.

.\

Price, with a detachable collar 6 / 11
to each - - - -

Khaki Collars
Made from oddments of
Regulation Shade Flannels.
Usually 1/6 each. Now
8/6 doz,

,.
n..."..."...."......"........"""..".."'''''''...''.''''..no._

Zephyr Khaki Shirts. li r est Egyptian

j COllon for summer wear. 7/ II

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\-.

PRACTICAL KIT

OFFICER'S WATERPROOF. lined fleece, l s, d,
guaranteed waterproof. An ideal Service coat - PrIce S 5 0
With lining, detachable 6 15 0
Without lining 3 3 0
.. I have given one of these coats a personal trial unùer bad winter
conditions of weather, and have found it all that could be desired in
wet and in cold; it fulfils the double purpose of waterproof and
warm coat, and, unlike the coat with detachable lining, is not unduly
heavy. The proofing is of the very best quality, really proof against a
soaking rain for any length of time; the lining is a soft, light fleece,
which altogether takes away the" feel" generally associated with
waterproof garments, makes the coat comfortably warm for winter
wear, and is so light in weight that on a dry, cold day it is preferable
to a cloth coat; the fact of its being windproof adds greatly to its
warmth. A further point in its favour is that it is thoroughly well
ventilated, and altogether it seems about the best all purposes coat
that one can obtain,"-Author of" Choosing Kit" Article, LAND AND
WATER, Feb, 13, 1915.

I? a. d,

POCKET FLASK, oxydised, plated inside,
non-corrosive. Strong and light 14 6
SAM BROWN E BELT, best bridle leather 2 15 0
HAVERSACKS, extra large and strong, Made
from an officer's design
WIRE NIPPERS,insulated bandles,inleathercase
Do. insulated handles, Ironside pattern
LOADED STICKS, weighted pigskin knobs
Do. covered all over pigskin
OFFICER'S NEWMARKET WHIP, with
thong, covered pigskin - 1
II ACTIVE SERVICE n MESS BOX, filled
for six persons - - 6 1 8 6
LUMI NOUS WATCHES, in wrist strap, silver 2 2 0
I Send fOT full List of WaT Equipment. I
SWAINE i!J ADENEY

12 6
12 6
15 6
12 6
15 0

1 0

81' appoiotm...t to H.M. The Kin.
185 PICCADILLY. W.

33 6

:\larch 6, 1915

Ai'"

i 1

-:-")
e-'ì

f

l

--

I

LAND AND 'VATER
MONTHLY
LITERARY REVIEW

WM.

BLACKWOOD

SONS

é!3

.. BLACKWOOD "-"The most brilliant of our magazines "_has a unique reputation for military articles. During
the present crisis its circulation has reached a point unequalled since the Franco-German War.
By far the best account of events at the Front is appeal'ing in

Blackwood's

Magazine

under the title of .. The Diary of a Subaltern:'
The January and February numbers are out of print In spite of largely increased imprr"sions.
ORDER YOUR MARCH COpy A -r ONCE. I
In it appears also .. With Rawlinson In Belgium," being the diary of one who had e.xceptional opportunitic" for
witnessing the events immediately follO\ying the fall of Antwerp and the historic stand In front of Yl'H '-

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The Peace of the World - H. G. WELLS
Germany and Double Allegiance
OLIVER E. ßODI
GTO

On Secret Service in Germany
MAJOR STUART-STEPHENS
Kultur - - - .1 .
Th P G D g I AUSIIN HARRISON
e ro- erman an er
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Heinrich von
By H. W. C.

Thought of
Treitschke
DAVIS, M.A.

Fenow of ÐBUiol College, O>..ford; SonlPtinlf' FC'lIo\V of -\.11 SOld,,' ('ollp
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.. h certainly clears the air: to 2"et this lucid exposition of Treitschkc'!'õ political ideas from a respon
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.. Mr. DavIs has done hi"i work with R"reat skill artd discretion."'-}l.fanchl!'st,.,. Guardian..
.. Mr. Davis has done a public s
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THIR TY-FIVE YEARS
IN RUSSIA

By GEORGE HUME
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While we keFnly walch our Russian ally, it is an opportune moment
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gain a beller understanding of a kindly, socIal, and deeply religious
people, whose standard of morality is love, whose religion is faith, and
whose philosophy is a mixture of hope and fatalism,
'''Thlrty-live Years in Russia' is that rare thintJ in our literature, a book
wriUen by a substantial and representative Briton, who has no axe
to grind and favours no type of political propaganda."-'Lhe 'Lime..

THE ORIGIN, CAUSES
AND
OBJECT OF THE WAR
By Sir PERCY FITZPATRICK
AUTHOR OF .'THE TRANSVAAL FROM WITHIN."
2s. 6d. net.
Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, who has long occupied a prominent position in
Soulh African politics. bri
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What is the reason of the war, the cause, and how has it come about?
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view 10 which
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0 be had from all .'Booheller.,
London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd.

March 6, 1915

LITERA TURE
FOR THE MONTH

"Culture "

By R. A, SCOTT-JAMES

A 'EW volumes of general literature still straggle
out from the I'rcs'-'-a few novels, a few volumes
of essays and poems, a few "orks concerned with
the older misceIlaneous interests of the world..
But for the must part the liter.try horizon is stil1
dominated by the war, There are some books which record
actual incidents from the many fields of battle; some which
explain the causes of the war, or foretell its effects; some
which set out to tell the history of it; whilst others more
modestly describe the past wars of En
lish, French, and
Germans.
It happens that the two most conspicuous of the books
th:l.t have been recently published really do, in the important
sense of the term, begin at the beginning. They are books
which serve to show that we are not merely at war with
German armies, or even with the German nation, but with
the mind through which Germany in her public capacity is
and has been thinking. In other words, they enlighten us
ahout the" culture" that has been so much bruited, and
reveal it as a culture which was already carrying on war
against everv other culture in the world, These two hooks
are concerned with Treitschke and Neitzsche, the two German
professors who have exercised. rlirectlv and indirectly, a
profound influence upon the imagination and political thought
of modern Germany. It is by a strange irony of circumstance
that these two men, so different in character and ideals,
should both have contributed to the same end, Nietzsche,
as we-shall see, would have deprecated the result; he would
have poured scorn upon the crude misunderstanding ""hich
has made modern Germans actually range themselves under
his banner. Once, in a dream, he looked into a mirror, and
saw not himself, but "a devil's grinning face, a deviJ's
scornful laugh," That devil's face is the popular miscon-
ception of 1\ietzsche. This distortion of him brings him
nearer to Treitschke, and the two men together are repre-
sented as apostles of militant Germany; and we shall not
fully appreciate what it is that we are fighting again
t until
we understand how those two men have expressed-or have
appeared to express-the spirit of modern Germany.
There is no work accessible in English which gives a
better all-round account of Treitschke than

II The Political Thoul!ht of Heinrich von Treitschke,"
By H. W. C, Davis, M.A. (Con&table.) 6s. net.

The compiler of this book, Mr. Davis, a Fellow of Balliol
College, Oxford, has, as far as possible, let Treitschke tell hi"
own story; that is to say, the greater part of the \'olume
consists of extracts from his writings, and br the rest Mr.
Davis has outlined the main events in the professor's life,
and those movements in German history which influenced
and thrilled him, In his earlier writings Trcitsrhke's style
seems to have been heavy, invoked, unnecessarily obscure,
In his l.lter works a kind of animal strength enter:, into it,
and in the" Politik " he is forceful, impassioncd, and clear.
It is the" Pulitik " and the essays on Engli"h History which
matter for us; every re.lding man should know something
about these works. But those who can plough their way
through the chapters devoted to his earlier works will see
more clearly not only how Treitschke developed, but how
Germany, under Prussia, was developing with him,
Treitschke is the master in the school in which Bernhardi
is no more than an apt disciple, The gospel of the modern
German State is the gospel according to Treitschke. It is
not that this learned professor had any extraordinary creative
genius or that he diverted his country from the course it was
following. He followed the trend of his time, he expressed it,
and in later life-from 1874 to 1896-when he was a Professor
at Berlin University, he so well stated what was going on in
the minds of the vounger men that his words" were swallowed
as a gospel "; th-ey" expressed the new ambitions of Germany
for' a place in the sun: for sea-power, for foreign trade, for
a colonial empire."
It had taken him many years of professional and political
life to arrive at the uncompromising dogmas of his" Politik."
He was born in 1834. He was brought up, as he says himself,
.. in the atmosphere of the Court of Dresden, in circks whose

33 8

March Ó, 19 I 5

L .'\ 1\1 U A. 4'\j U W A 1
K

-

one political idea was hatred of Prus<;ia." His whole life was
a protest against his early upbringing. The revolutionary
movements of 1848 stirred him profoundly, They did not
make him a revolutionary, but they helped him at first to be
a .. Liberal," a believer in populdrly elected local governments,
and a central executive controlled by a parliamentary system.
But German Liberalism in the 'fifties was not opposed to the
system of the modern Empire, then non,existent. It was
opposed to the petty princes and the narrow-minded govern-
ments of the separate states, and Treitschke became the
foremost .. intellectual," who championed the cause of a
united Germany; who asserted that before all else Germany
must become one nation, strong, undivided, compact, under
an all-powerful ccntralised government. And he saw that
there was only one means of attaining this end. Prussia was
already strong. Prussia had behind her a successful military
his
ory. He became known a<; the" apostle of Prussia."
It must be remembered he was a theorist who believed
himself to be also an historian, though his range of reading
was narrow-and his theory was that of the State. He was
influenced most of all by Aristotle's .. Politics" and .. The
Prince" of l\Iachiavelli, The first taught him that the
State was an end in itself, to which every citizen owed
unfailing obedience and devotion, The second taught him
that the State is set above ordinary law and morality; that
its success is the paramount consideration; that no ordinary
scruples must deter the ruler, whose business is to make the
State strong.
lore and more it was the idea of the State
as sheer power which grew upon Treitschke. Prussia ",as
the one embodiment of po\\cr which he saw ready at hand.
[t was Prussia, then, that he welcomed as the saviour of
Germanv.
By" degrees his Liberalism, his belief in Parliamentary
systems and the vote, his interest in the average man and
the" indi\'idual," were swept overboard. He and the young
Germans who were growing up around him became infatuated
with the idea of a nation which was to be united, unique,
pre-eminent, and dominant, The Franco,Prussian \\'ar
seemed to be only the beginning of a glorious career of ascend-
ancy, which deri\'ed especial glory from the fact that it was
military.
Happy the generation on whom a stern necessity enjoins a
sublime political ideal, a great and simple and universally compre-
hensible ideal, which force
every other idea of the age into its service!
And such an ideal exists among us to-day-the unity of Germany!
\\'hoever fails to serve this ideal is not living the lite of his nation,
Our life is spent in cafl1p. At any moment an order from the
Commander,in-Chief may
ummon us to arms again. It is not for
us to pursue the myriad glittering hopes of freedom which flutter
through this age of revolution, to let our eyes be blinded by desire.
He welcomes war because .. over and over again has it
been proved that it is only in war a people becomes in very
deed a people." \\'arfare is therefore an" important function
of the State," .. It is to war that all the States we know of
owe their existence." .. Even among civilised nations war
is still the only form of law-suit by which the claims of States
can be asserted." \Var also promotes heroism and manliness,
and is the best training school for the manly virtues. And
he goes on to show that there is no law beyond itself to which
the State can submit. In dealing with uncivilised nations
.. the necessity of employing intimidation is ob\'ious." And
similarly, .. there never has been a State, and there never will
be a State, which, in concluding a treaty, seriously intended
to keep it for ever."
There is no need to point any moral. Treitschke, let
it be clearly understood, has stated the theory of government
which the German nation accepts. Given that the State is
the German State, then Germany can do no wrong. It may
be patriotism to break treaties. It may be patriotism to
massacre civilians, It is the supreme morality of the German
citizen to serve a State which abjures morality. The position
has, at least, the merit of being logical. If we read Treitschke
at least we may know what it is that we are fighting.
It is worth noting that \\hilst Treitschke attracted,
Nietzsche frightened Germany, The devilry of the doctrine
of sheer physical force was not evident when preache
by a
man who was so well disposed to the acceptable vIrtues.
Treitschke proclaimed the glory of war, but only against the
enemies of Germany. But Kietzsche, in effect, proclaimed
that Germany 7t!as the enemy; that the danger lay within.
Treitschke exulted in the unique culture which Germany
was creating for herself; and he claimed to make smooth the
way for the fine practice of religion and the free development
of the Christian virtues.' Nietzsche denounced German
culture, and poured scorn upon the pretensions of her scholars,
the sentimentality and hypocrisy of her religionists, and
he
slavishness of the accepted codes of virtue. In attackmg
Richard \Vagner he was att,I,_'king the ir10l of f". (,TV

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68. THE TI\IFS.
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March " 1915

Pan,German, and offended alike the orthodox in religion
and in art,
Indeed, it was only when he was" misunderstood" that
from being the object of attack he became in his turn a new
idol of the German people. Inevitably, he became much
talked about; and the young scholars brought up under
the Treitschkean regime began to see points of contact
between him and their master. How obvious was the parallel
between Nietzsche's super-man and Treitschke's ideal
ruler! The one was to be a "free spirit," free from all
obligations which he had not imposed upon himself. He
was the aristocrat, conscious of his own strength and
vision and courage, He was not to be bound by the meaner
virtues which slaves had created for their own protection,
Gratitude for favours conferred, pity for weaklings, sympathy
with degenerates-all of these " moral .. qualities Nietzsche,
the immoralist, scorned a<; marks of subjection to habit,
indolence, and the survival of slavishness. The philosophy
of Nietzsche seemed to young- Germany the acceptable
philosophy of ruthlessness, egotism, and the right of the
strongest.
No doubt Nietzsche was more talked about than read.
The best antidote to this misconception of him is to read his
works, which have been admirably translated in Dr. Oscar
Levy's edition, and also an extraordinarily attractive book
recently published :-

.. The Lonely Nietzsche." By Frau Fönter Nietzsche.
Translated by Paul V. Cohn. Illustrated. (Heinemann.)
ISs. net.

The author is Nietzsche's sister. She does not pretend to
share his views or to be especially qualified to expound them.
She was a clever woman of much good sense and tact who
was always on confidential terms with her brother. Thi"
volume opens in the year 1 8ï6, and covers all his most
important productive period, and brings us down to his death
in 1896. There is no irrelevant domestic gossip; no tittle-
tattle about a great man. It is a sympathetic biography in
which the author describes the conditions under which her
brother worked, and lets him speak for himself through
scraps of conversation, letters, and his books.
There is nothing in his life to bear out the popular view
of him as a morose, irritable man, and a misanthrope. On the
contrary, he could enter with all his heart into the deeper and
the lighter sides of friendship. His breach with Wagner
affected him plofoundly and made him ill. In Wagner he
thought he had found his" ideal" of a man-his" goal"-
and when he discovered his" staginess," his" histrionic self-
deception," his rei gious insincerity, he e"'\:posed rather than
concealed his sense of loss in the words: "Do thou go east,
and I will go west." E\"Cn when strangers intruded into his
periods of solitude they found him courteous. "Nothing,"
he said. " can compensate me for ha\'ing forfeited \\'.Igner's
sympathy during the last few years, Even now, my
whole philosophy is shaken after an hour's sympathetic
conversation with some entire stranger."
His" superman" was not a man deprived of the natural
affections; his" immoralist" was not a man really relieved
from moral obligations. "'hat Iw denounced was the
murality uf ease and habit. His own life was one of strenuou!"
labour anù sacrifice, a perpetual struggle against ill-health.
and the sacrifice of every impulse which did not lead him
towards his goal. In his view the" moral" obligations were
too paltry to be considered in comparison with the conllict
within a man to attain his own God, "If you give rein to
all your meaner qualities," he wrote to Fräulein
<tlome,
" who can go on associating with you?" "Heroism involves
self-sacrifice and duty-and that daily and hourly." His
ideal was that of a .. spirit which plays naïvely; that is t!'
say, spontaneously and from a sense of overflowing <lbundano
of power "-his supermen were "argonauts of the ideal, '
seeking their .. highest expression," and questioning them,
selves before each action: "Is it such that I want to perfurm
it time and time again?" How different is this .. will tt.
power" of Nietzsche from the gross ideal of physical strength
which is set up by Treitschke, the .. blund beast" which
the former feared would be confused with his superman!
":\Iy foes have become mighty and have distorted my
teaching," he complained, "The coarse grained," as his
biugrapher writes, " have turned the image of the superman
i'lto a devil's grinning face."
I t is enough now to notice that his sister, in this admirable
biography, has shown us Nietzsche more fully, and has
proved how distorted is that German interpretation which
finds in him the counterpart of Treitschke. "The rulers
there (in Germany) are men of heavy, artificial souls. . . .
And it was among them that I spent my whole youth! ..

34 0

March 6. 1915

LAND AND \\ A

In speaking of Nietzsche it is very n.ttural to turn to
the English advocate of the superman, and I find ready to
my hand two new books. One is

.. Bernard Shaw: A Critical Study," By P. p, Howe.
(Seeker.)

ow, we cannot say of Mr. Shaw that he is a .. caricature of
his (
ietzsche's) notion of a disciple," for
Ir. Shaw would
indignantly deny that he is a disciple of :\ ietzsche or anyone
else that has ever lived in the world. But it happens that he
has spent about half of his active life in asserting the super-
man ish idea of the duty of every man to be himself to the
utmost, translating the moral and transcendental ideal of

ietzsche on to that everyday. workaday plane which in
intellectual matters is supposed to be the sphere of the
Englishman. The war, in removing us by a generation or
two from everything that preceded it, has put men like
1\Ir. Shaw under the perspective of distance; and though he
still remains to us a brilliant dialectical essayist, a stylist
with an incisive pen, a satirist with a gift for exposing the
foibles and minor hypocrisies of his time, a humanitarian
who attempted to be a dramatist, and a witty, likeable
historical personage, notable in his day, he seems thin now
in comparison with the great men.
But that is no reason why Mr. Howe should treat him as
a mere joke and an excuse for fireworks. It is true !\Ir.
Shaw's manner has never lent itself to reverential treatment
at the hands of a critic; but !\Ir. Howe might at least have a
little reverence for his own functions as a critic. Regarded
as a squib, or as a Fabian Society debating joke, his
attack on !\Ir. Shaw is amusing. But it happens to fill a
",hole book. He quite truly points out, in sentences which
'Coruscate with Chestertonian raillery, that Shaw is,
first and foremost, a Fabian advocating" efficiency," that
his style aims only at effective assertion, that his dramas
are only so many excuses for" talking," that his characters
are puppets, that his" laughs" are debating-society retorts,
that he is not an artist, and that he has only made" serious
drama" funny: But he seems to admit that Mr. Shaw is a
moralist, and he should, therefore, as a critic, have examined
that part of him in which his excellence lies-his moral
principles and beliefs. Mr. Howe acknowledges that he can

tate a case; he does him less than justice in not explaining
that he had also a case to state.

.. Kil!ing for Sport,"
H. S. Salt. (Bell.)

By Various Writers. Edited by
2.. 6d. net.

II
re !Ilr. Shaw describes himself "as a critic and as a
cd<;tigator of morals by ridicule (otherwise a writer of
comedies)" I t is characteristic of him that he damages
the arguments oi the writers who follow him by making
light of the injury that is done to the animals " killed for
"port," dwelling entirely upon the moral damage that is
done to those who kill.

.. The HUlDan German." By Edward Edgeworth.
(
Iethuen,) 10s. 6d. net.

If we would study German " culture" on its domestic,

"cial. everyday, average side, we may learn something from
\Ir. Edgeworth's book. The author suffers from facetious-
ness, and a sla:lgy, staccato style. The merit of his book
lies in the fact '.
Iat he is writing of what he knows familiarly,
..lIld he shows us various types of German-the hapless
middle-cla::õs official. the maid-servant, the tradesman, the
profcs,>or, and even the baby. A superficial book, but
itbtructive as a picture of Germans in their homes, in the
"t, rept at the theatre, or on holiday. I am inclined to think
tl.at it ..,hows us German" culture" on its worst side,

BEFORE THE WAR

.. Frederick the Great and Kaiser Joseph: An Episode
of \\ ar. Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century." By
Harold Temperley. (Duckworth.) 5s. net.

We cannot get to the beginning of the European tam;le
without considering Frederick the Great, and I \\ish I had
more spare to give to !\Ir. Temperley's mastetly acrount (jf
Frederick's later years and his relations with the Emperor
Joseph, The book wa
written before the war Lea,an, and j"
to a considprahle extf'nt based upon .1 stud\! of unpnhli...h d
dispatches from Berlin and \ïf'nna in Iii" il). IjJ"'"lIl1,
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consolidation of Prussia anù the character of tho: 1,..lI1 \\ h "I
Wilhelm II. belic\l',; to be his aller ego, :\ow \\e SCl' II'l

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I

THE

IAND&

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MAP of the WAR
DRAWN UNDER THE DIRECTIOr-; OF

HILAIRE BELLOC

having special reftrtlllt /0 Mr. Bel/oc's remark-
able weekly IVar ..1nalysis m LA:IID & \V ATER

Special Features of the
lap
T HE !\lAP i. 3]' X 41
' in .ize, and ia in eight coloura.
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I..- The
Map indicates only those places which are likely to be mentioned
in war "ews and d<spatche8 ; it i8 ther<fore clear and easy to stud). In
addition, it indicat
. the political boundaries,-fortified zone
,--riv
nJ-
hilly countries,-mountain passes, -manh
8,-fen-land.,-railways,-
roads,-canals,-industrial ar
as, all these featuTf:s are .hown in different
forms and colours, 80 as to be readily di8tinguishable.
The whole !\lap i8 divided into z-inch square.. representing roughly 100
miles each way, 10 that approxÎnlate distances from one place to another
may be calculated immediatel)'.
Each square has a 8eparate number and letter. and place. falling within
each square ..e 8pecially indexed" ith such number and letter, so that any
place OldY be found immediate' by reference to the Index.
ø
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record that has yet appeared_ '-Daily TÛ'J:rd#lr.
1.0NDON: ELKIN MATHEWS, CORK STREET, W.

, .

,

March 6, 1915

mantle of the one fallen upon the shoulders of the other.
" The question of right (droit)," said Frederick, when he was
invading Silesia, " is the affair of the ministers," and, later,
" the jurisprudence of sovereigns is commonly the right of

he stronger." "\Vhen one has an advantage," he argued,
In the strain of a modern chanceiIor, " is he to use it or not? "
l\Ir. Temperley describes him as fult1l1ing Burke's idea of one
of the" great bad men of history." But in domestic policy
he had the judgment to see that the interests of his people
were identical with his own, and he aimed at an impartial
administration of justice and religious freedom. As a
diplomatist, he understood-as Bismarck understood-that
an enemy must be isolated and allies must be found. His
successor to-day can more easily imitate his hardne"s, his oppor-
tunism, and his Spartan pose than his diplomatic talent or his
administrative genius, Frederick the Great left an " adminis-
trative machine"; he could not bequeath his genius,

Ir. Temperley's book is not a mere piece of research,
carrying on in pedestrian spirit the task which Carlyle left
incomplete. It is a vigorous, clearly thought out. brilliantly
written study of Germany and Austria during a period of
transition, at a time when two striking personalities, Frederick
and the Kaiser Joseph, "made things hum" in central Europe.

.. The New Map of Europe, 1911-1914: A Study of
Contemporary European National Movements and
Wars." By H. A, Gibbons, Ph,D. (Duckworth.)
6s. net.

I t is interesting to invert the role of the prophet and see
what we ought to have seen, that events of recent years were
leading us straight to the war. The German temperament,
the expanding industries of Germany, her desire to found
colonies, the French claims to Morocco, the temporary
Algeciras settlement. the Agadir incident. the closing of
Persia by the Russo-British agreement, the check to Austro'
German ambitions in European Turkey by the successes of
Bulgarja, Servia, and Greece--these are some of the main
factors which Dr. Gibbons reviews wIth some knowledge and
detachment. He is a clever American, who has been travelling
about in Europe and the Near East since 1908. arriving
dexterously on the scene wherever politics, revolution, or war
promised him a tourist's diversion, His book is particularly to
be commended in that it is one of the first to give full promin-
ence to the supremely important part which the Near East
has played not only in precipitating but in causing the war,

.. The Influence of King Fdward, and Es,ays on Other
Subjects." By Viscount Esher. (Murray.) 7s.6d. nel.

Lord Esher can speak with authority about the lives and
personalities of Queen Victoria and King Edward, He
dispels certain favourite popular illusions. King Edward's
death was not hastened by the political crisis of 1909, He
did not " mould the foreign policy of his country," He did
not initiate or plan the Triple Ententp. "He always recog-
nised that to initiate the policy of Great Brit.1in was the
business of Ministers for the time being, and hi.. function was
to criticise or approve it. and finally to support it with all
his powers," He was genuinel
' a friend of the German
Emperor, and believed in his desire for peace. but he shared
the general view that the Navy and Army should be kept as
strong as possible. Lord Esher eulogises, with the necessary
formality, his tact, charm, and talent, but speaks more freely
about his youth and education, He quotes in full a docu-
ment which should be imperishable -the Memorandum
issued .. for the guidance of the gentlemen appointed to
attend on the Prince of Wd.les," the most delightful part
being a description of "the qualities which distinguish a
gentleman in society,"
fhe other essays in this book are of less value, but those
referring to national defence are instructive as representing
the usual Conservative view current before the war.

DURING WAR
The materials are still lacking for a complete scientific
account of any period of the war. But preliminary judgments
can be formed; preliminary history, even, can be written.
In the \Vest a first distinct phase of the war came to an end
with the retreat of the Germans before Paris and their assump-
tion of a defensive position on the lines of the Aisne. Anything
up to this point is sufficiently distant to form the subject
matter of preliminary history.

.. Nelson's History of the War," By John BuchaD.
Preface hy Lord Rosebery. Vol. I. (Nelson,) Is. net.

l\Ir. Buchan is not, in the stnct sense of the term, a
military expert; but he is a man of affairs, a student of
history, skilled in grasping a situation, and still more skilled

34 2

The County Gentlemall

AND

LAND & WATER

\ 01 LXl\

:\0 2ï5ï

s:\ Tl"RD.\ Y :\IARCH 13, 19 1 5

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Chief Engineer to the British Expeditionary F ürce

Sir John French, in a recent de
palch -tales: .. I wish particularly to mention the excf>lIent
ervices perforrrrd
by my Chief Engmeer . who has been ir,defaliRable in supervising all such work. HIS ingenuih i!pd
skill have bc::en most valuable m tn.. Ircal cOPslrllcticn 01 tne various expeèimls "Inch npc:uer.ce has
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Liberal Sample Bot:t:le sent: post: f'ree f'or 3d. in st:amp..

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35 2

:\1.1rch 13, 1915

LAND A
D \VATER

THROUGrI

THE

EYr
S

A

OF

WOMAN

By MHS, ERIC DE RIDDER

LuþJ"g'" .l/uJ..,.. (aLl" C,a,ies LADY BEA fl Y
One of the many American women who have married
El1glishmen now lighting on land or sea, Her hu,band,
Admiral Sir David Beatty, i. one of the foremost men of the hour

fhe Need for Rest
I T is very hard to realise the necessity for rest in these
days. Xearly en'r\' woman has her weeks crowded
with one engagement after another, for if social
doings are more or less in abeyance a vast amount
of benevolent work is occupying everybody's time.
I t is quite casy to work hard for several weeks at a stretch,
giving ourselves no repose during the day time of any sort
or kind, Then tll!:'re inevitably comes a time when nervous
strain begins to tell, and we
become trying not only to
ourselves but to everybody
dse who chances to cross our
path. The fact is that it is
"nly now that an are beginniI}g
to feel the immense strain that
the past few months ha \'e been.
There is a kind of tension
in the air which reacts upon
our nervous sv<;tems, little
though we feei inclined to
acknowledge it ; and the result
is that nearly everybodv is
living at infmÜeiy higlJPr pres-
sure. Our very morning
papers, awaiting us so harm
lesslv on the breakfast table,
ma}: any day hold the news
for us of some tremendou.;

hock. Every postman's knock
may herald the tidings of some
nerve-racking news. These
are destructive days to li\'e
in ; of that there is no shadow
of doubt.
The onlv thing to be
done is for everybody to try
to counteract this restless in-
fluence as much as possible,
It can be done, of course, by
mind concentration on matters
far removed from war news,
but it is not everybody who
has either the training or the
ability
r this, The next best
thing is not to over-fatigue
the poor willing body. And to
this end even the shortest of
rests during the day will lead,
Since the war started many people when dressing for
dinner have abandoned the evening gown of convention in
favour of the rest gown. l{est gowns are, indeed, amongst
the best innovations known to the world of dress. They are
l'asy to don and comfortable to wear, besides being infinitely
becoming when the work of clever hands. If we can possibly
manage to secure half an hour's rpst before dinner,time, and
only rise to garb ourselves in something reposeful when our
dinner is of the informal character that permits it, we shan
have gone far towards the prevention of fatigue.

The Shapeless Silhouette
At any other time but this it is safe to state that most
women \\"(;uld have talked of the fashions and nothing but
the fashions, As it is, the new models are of a sufficiently
surprising character to have caused much comment and
remark. A girl whose marriage has just figured amongst the
many war weddings, and who was married in a simple
walking suit, voiced the common opinion about the new
skirt very neatly recently. "As I walked up the aisle," she
said, " in mv short, fun skirt I felt like a Dutch girl." And,
as a matter" of fact, the new skirts have a distinct touch of
Dutch style about them, They need to be carefully made
because, a<; it is to the unaccustomed eye, they only just
e<;cape vl'rging on the clumsy side.
It is an amclzing thing this matter of custom. As f'ach
new design is introduced it has always been the fashion for
every woman to declare that she thinks the new styles aI'/"'
perfectly hideous. A short while after that we hmr no
,>uch sweeping opinion, and in a little time again we may
meet her any day of the week out-H('roding Herod in her
adherence to the latest mode, whatever it may h,lppen to be.
As a nation, it cannot be dlmbted that \\e are apt to
dislike aught to which we are unaccustomcd. fhis being so,

and granted that we are a race slow to take up new ideas, it
is little short of amazing the progress we make when once we
do. Once we have thoroughly made up our mind we assimilate
an idea with great speed, and in no half-hearted manner. 50
it is quite likely that in a short while from now every woman
will have adopted the shapeless silhouette so definitely
decreed. The days of the hour-glass figure have been gone
for a long time, hut they have never seemed so remote as
now, when shapelessness seems
to have been pushed to an
almost unkind extreme The
natural figure is completel
'
disguised hy the short, full

kirts dnd short, full coab
which are falling to our lot.
hut there js a certain charm
about Ow \'ery impudence 01
the proceeding, and the audnce
of the thing is undmiable.

.

One Hundred Miles of Pennies
The organisers of the
Oueen's .. \Vork for "'omen ..
Fund never let the grass grow
under their feet. Every scheme
that can possibly be suggested
for the promotion of the fund
is heeded, but it is rarely that
such a good money-collecting
idea is brought forward as
their mileage scheme. Lady
Roxburgh and 1\Irs, C. Arthur
Pearson are organising it, and
they hope to raise [22,000 in
pennies before they finish. The
name of the scheme explains
itself, but its magnitude can
only be grasped after a
moment's reflection, It is in
very truth a great task that
these ladies have undertaken,
for it is no less than the collec-
tion of a hundred miles of
pennies.
A hundred miles of
pennies. we hear, heaped in a
pile would make quite a moun,
tain of copper. If we imagine
that this great mound had heen taken from a long string of
houses, each house having a frontage of thirty feet and ever}
householder contributing a penny, we can get a mental
picture of the undertaking, for such a line would not only
span the circumference of the earth, but leave 5,124 miles
to spare.
It is hoped that girls and womenfolk all O\'er the country
will help in this mighty collection of copper. Even the
poorest amongst us may fee] moved to contribute one penny
towards the :\Iileage Scheme, while those richer in possession
of this world's goods will probably send many pennics v.itl,
their contribution,
lost people know the headquarters of
the Oueen's .. Work for \Vomen " Fund; but at the risk of
repetition it may be said that the address is 33 Portland
PI are, and that particulars of the work will always be
promptly forwarded.

)

The Potato-Bread Spirit
The news that Germany is making bread out of potatoes
has been received in different ways by different people.
While some have looked upon it as d sign of grim deter-
mination and methodical forethought on Cermany's part,
others have made it a suhject for ridicule, The cheap jester
is, unfortunately, always with us, and the war has not brought
about his extinction.
One of the points making a rt'cent speech of l\lr. Iloyd
George's memorable is his apt rt'Íerf'nce to what he has
aptlv called .. the potato-bre,ld spirit." The Chan("pllor's
opinion is that this spirit shoulll terrify us, not give us cause
for mirth, because it is the right spirit for a nation meeting
a great emergency, Few will di.;;agree with him. With this
question the morale of the whole Germ,ll1 nJ.tion is concerned,
Fortunatelv fur us, tlll'rt' i" much to make us cunl1lh-nt,

\LuutllUleJ on page a(5)

353

LAN DAN n \\" ^ T E l

March 13.19'5

Which shall it be ?
BRITISH
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TO CYCLISTS

Why not let the Cycle do it?
/J/J;

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VI..":

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T L LltH.iL Ott. B"'TH

The Suno am is sti11 the only bicycle which has a
really Weatherproof Gear-case and a proper system
of Automatic Lubrication.
\Vhy do riders waste their energies pushing round
dirt)' and badly lubricated chains and driving bearings?
\Vhy not let the cycle keep these clean?
Why not let the cycle oil these parts?
Think of the power you waste, and the time you spend
doing work that the cycle will do itself-IF it is a
Sunbeam-IF it has the I.ittle Oil Bath.

3 SUNBEAM LAND, WOLVERHAMPTON.

Illustrat
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London Showrooms,
57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E,C.
158 SLO-\NE ST, (by Sloane Square), S.W.

HOTEL CECIL

THE

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351

March 13,t 1913.

LAND AND
ATER.

....,

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By I-IILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE.-Th.IJ ,\rtlcD ... beeD JIIbmltted to the Press BureaD. wlilch does Dot object to th, PUbUcatiOD U cetlsore4 .114 tale. R
respoDslbllUy for the ,orrectness of the .tatements. ,.
In accordllDce wlUa tho reQulrem
d nt. of the I'r
ss BureaD, th e posltlons of troop. on Pillns IIIDttratlng tlill A.rtIc!e mud oaly b.
rC:iII. ed as approXImate, aDd ao definIte .trength at any polat IJ I.odl&:ated.

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A
THE ATTACK O
THE DARDANELLES. from their most restricted part opposite Chana!(
A s the understanding of the att.ack upon to.Nagara Point, are a
near as possible three sea
the Dardanelles Involves a little study mIles more; but, as ,nIl be seen from the aceom-
of the conditions by land, both upon panying sketch map, there are in these Narrows
, the European and upon the Asiatio but two critical points, that of the passage of
lude, I may, p
rhap.s be excused for attempting Ch
na
and tha,t of the .passage opposite Xagara

o
e
nal:rs:s m tlllS part of the paper of what Pomt Itself, whICh last IS well over two thousand
IS, m ItS. mam features, a nayal operation. 'Vho- y
rds. R
ther mo
than twenty miles beyond
ever desIgned the method of attack desen-es well Nagara Pomt, OpposIte the town of Gallipoli the
of Europe, and if, as was probably the case, that Straits broaden out into the Sca of Marl
ora.
man was an Englishman, this cõuntry deserves Upon tbe European side the Straits are covered
well of Europe, too, For the method of attack is by a peninsula of land known as the Gal1ipoli
not only one that would have been impossible but peninsula. Its conformation determines all these
for the recent development of naval gunnery, it is operations.
also one that ShOl'ì-S peculiar orirrinalitv, ànd its This peninsula is closed to the north by an
success, if it is attained, willlarg
ly depend upon isthmus, known as the Isthmus of Bulair, frOlll the
the power wbich the latest British men-of-war town lying immediatelv bevond it tov.-ards tho
haye to attack the forts in the Karrows of the mainland, and across tfÜs ñarrow neck of sorno
Strait by indirect fire from the open sea. three miles from A to B upon the plan haye been
, , The. Da
danelles arc a passage of salt water constructed permanent works with the objcct of

h1fty mIles
n len
th as the crow flies fro
their defending the peninsula from attack by land nnd
entry to theIr eXIt, and somewhat more If the from tbe north, 'Vitbin the peninsula itself are
slight turnings of its channel be followed, It con- a somewbat confused mass of heights, the hirrhcr
sists roughly of two parts, one a sort of funnel. summits upon which are to be found a rano-e wï1Ìch
reaching from the mouth, which is o\-er four follows the sea coast along the line C D. Tile peak3
t.housand r ards across, to tbe Karrows, between of this range at e e e arc not far from a thousand
Chanak and Kilidbahr. where there is less than feet. At I the culminating point is reached in a
two thousand yards between tbe Asiatic and the summit 0 between tweh-e and thirteen hundred
European shores. and tbese Karrows may be feet.
regarded as forming one continuous belt as far Of the remaining heigllts scattered cyerv-
north as the lighthouse at Kagara Point, The where alon rr that narrow belt of land I have chosèn
distance to the
arrows from the mouth i
just a few, mer%ly as examples; g, for instance, is
oyer tweh-e sea m
les, or rat.her _more than thll'teen over eight hundred feet, so is h; k and l are owr
anù a half land mIles, and the :r\arrows themselves, nine hundrcJ fcct 4 and of sucb summits (Yar
-ing

-

LAN DAN D "J'T ATE R.

:March 13, 191J.

from four hundred feet above the sea to nearly a
t.housand) there arc, perhaps, fifty or sixty, at
least, in the confused jumble of these bills.
It will be apparent from this, and from what
follows, that if the Karrows, witb their heavy;
fortifications, bad stood at some such point as
11
I, tbe passage of the Straits would bave been
;\ ery much more difficult, even under modern con-
ùitIOns. No indirect fire could have reached the
Asiatic sbore from the open sea beyond, for the
range would have been one of over twenty-fh-e
thousand yards, and only by the greatest good luck
and with no precision in firing, however close the
bombarding ship had lain inshore, could the Euro-
'Dean shore even bave been touched across the full
tl'eadth of tbe peninsula: while the high range
C D, steep on the sea, would have compelled the
bombarding ship to stand well out to allow for tbe
trajectory of tbe shell to pass over heights so near
the shore from a thousand to twelve hundred feet
above the gun platform. But where the Narrows
Ilctualllr are, the conditions were far more favour-
able. The line 0 P, which represents the shortest
range to the main works of K.ilidbahr from the
open sea, is a range of exactly eleven thousand
yards, and even 0 Q, along to the Asiatic shore
heyond, is not fourteen thousand, It was possible,
tberefore, for the latest and most powerful of the
British men-of-war to attack both shores by in-
direct fire.
Indirect fire signifies fire at a.n object invisible
from the firing point and sustained only from
mlculation and through tbe directing of tbe range
by a direct observation in the vicinity of the target,
.\\ hich direct obse
vation is conveyed to the firing
})latform out of sIght.
It is clear from tbis that the reduction of the
forts upon the Rarrows from a gun platform such
flS that of a modern man-of-war, lying outside in
the open sea, at, say, R, necessitated three develop-
ments equally modern and unsuspected when the
permanent works of the Dardanelles were
òesigned. First, beavy guns operating with accu-
racy at a range of over eleven thousand yards (up
to over twenty tlwusand yards I) from the vessel'
,sccondly, observation from the aIr above the target
to correct the fire; and, thirdly, wireless tele-
graphy to convert the results of observation to the

un platform. It is these three quite recent
,dc\Telopments in.modern military and naval science
that bave permItted this great experiment.
Between 0 and P-that is, in the strip of
bnd intervening between the Dardanelles and the
;Karrows and the open sea to the west-there lies a

reat lump of rather flat-topped hill called the
(Pasha Dagh, Its eastern slopes come down rather
steep o
to the Dardanelles, but its highest summit,
at a pomt near p. marked by 0. cross, is only 653
feet, The plateau slopes somewhat and the slope
down from its western edge towards tbe open sea

is easy, broken only by a small ravine at V V. As
a consequence of this disposition of the land, a
man-of-war, with guns possessing an accurate
range of fire at from eleven to fifteen thousand
yards, can make sure of bitting the works at p.
and, of course, can make still surer of hitting the
works at Q. If we represent the land and sea in
section, it will be clear why this is the case.
Drawn to scale, the slope of the Pasha Dagh
bas a comparatively flat summit, and its steep fall
on to the Dardanelles may be represented by the
sky line of tbe shaded portion in this diagram, tbe
highest summit at X being no more than 653 feet'
above the water level A B. Supposing a sbip to
lie at about the point R, the trajectory of her fire
will, roughly, be represcpted by the dotted line
R P and R Q, topping well over the comparatively;
lo,:-lying land in b.etw
en, and reaching P in spite
of Its presence, whICh IS under the steepish eastern
slope of the Pasha Dagh, and, a fortiori, reaching
easily the point Q beyond, the observation of the
hits and the correction of the fire being made by
hydroplanes above P and Q at Sand T, which
hydroI?lanes can, by win'less, report the resuìts to
the ShIP at R.

Iean\Yhile, to support and emphasise the
effect of this fire from the largest and newest naval
gun platform in the open sea at R, you have a
number of ships firing at somewhat shorter range
furtber down the channel at positions rounù about
W, and these ships can also, to some extent, help
to correct tbe fire of R by tbeir observation of the
hits as seen from the level. The guns upon the
naval platform at R are to most of the larger guns
in the forts a.long the Narrows, roughly, as the
cube of 11 is to the cube of 15--that is, they are
more than one-third as powerful but much le
s
than one-hal_f .as po\",erful. An ll.-inch gun is in
power to a 1a-mcb gun much as 13 IS to 33. There
beeJ? to ba\-e been, over and abo\"e the ll-inch guns,
wh10h were the normal heaviest armament of the
Turkish forts in the Narrows, two 14-inch O'tll1S
upon the eastern side at Q. These more n;arly
approached in power the naval guns turned upon
them, but tbey had no opportunity for indirect fire
becau
e they did no
know ",here the naval gun

were m the sea outsIde, nor had they obscnation
from the air (we may presume), nor were they
mounted for firing westward, and, beyond all this;
they had the difficulties of steep land immediately;
in front of them, interfering with their high-angle
fire.
The permanent works upon the Narrows
tbemselves would seem to be somewhat accordinO'
to pla
C. But, of course,
he sketch is onlYj
a.pprOXllllate, because no map gIves the exact posi-
tIOn of a permanent work. It IS only obtainable by;
Secret Service in peace or direct observation in!
war.

s
c:a:;

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c::<:oI

..-" J'..... '..-l-J-:Jr:I

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....
.... ----.
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---- PAsha Dagh ..- 'C .... ......... .....,
ft ...... VV

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ß// qø7 ßØ;'ØØZ/& :
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VardaneHes B

.:n

2*

:Uarch 18, lOllS.

EA:ND
ND
A:TER.

!

.S
/

more between No.5 and the shore and to the north
of 1\0. 5_ Altogether, eleven permanent works
seem to have been established on this projecting
hillside within the limits of little more than a'
mile, A twelfth was established at Cape Dema.
which I have numbered 6 upon the plan. .
Upon the opposite, or Asiatio shore. four
principal works must be considered, One, just
outside the town of Chanak (No.7). close on tbe
water, was particularly powerful and fast. with
two 14-inch guns, and corresponded to its twin
work (1) upon the European shore. Half a mile
further south Hamidieh, No, 8, defended the
Narrows in their southward aspect from the
Asiatio side, and it seems to have been upon these
two works, 7 and S, that ihe greater part of tbe
fire from down the Strait was concentrated.
Supposing these formidable works to be
reduced (the works below them towards tbe .lEgean
ha ve already been silenced), there still remains,
before the whole passage of the Narrows is in tbe
hands of the Allied Fleet, a. group of further
works on the Asiatic side, strong batteries at 9,
10, 11, right along the shore up to a. low elevation
on the Nagara Point itself at 14, and a smaner
work behind Abydos Point at 15; while on the
European side a somewhat less formidable series
are to be found, roughly, at the points 16, 17, 300
feet above the water, crowning a very steep slopa
at 18, and one similarly placed at 400 feet up, at
19, and a similar work at 20, But all these bat...
teries above. or north of the N' arrows. would seem
to depend ultimately upon the Karrows them 4
selves, If the great group of works between the
two lines CD and E F can bo reduced, the problem
of the Dardanelles is soh-ed, although there
remains a lengthy task for the Allied Fleet before
c the Sea of Marmora is reached.
according to the report, that the first battery was It is worthy of remark that the shores are
blown up on Thursùay. The further batteries in steep on everywhere, and that there is plenty of
this group stood upon the hillside at 2. 3, an4 jI:. water, except in the bight below Chanak, in the
and an especially powerful one, apparently, at 5, shaded portion inside Sari Siglar Bay, where th(f
facing the northern approach to the Narrows. soundings vary from two to four fathoms, where a
Between 5 and 3 a group of two minor works stood five-fathom line comes well out from the shore and
upon the sloDe, and fOllr other main batteries lay, a small strip just north of Chanak from Sari
the one bet;een 2 and 3. one behind 3, and two Siglar Bay; but neither of these bits of water i.(
lit

By far the most powerful group of batteries
lie upon the slope of the Pasha Dagh between the
escarpment at B and the water at its foot. and of
these, again, it would seem that the most powerful
,was just outside, and to the south of, the buildings
at Kilidbahr, at the point marked 1. It is here,

wi 16 '""

.
k
M
L L 1!. 5

-A

L A X D A
D YV. ATE R.

:Uarch 13. 1915.

t1sefuI or neces
arr fo the bombardment of the
"orks, All that IS being untIertaken from far
down the cbannel.
There is one aspect of this tremendous picce
()f work ,,"hich must not be neglected, The Turki"sh
forces b:y land are considerable. and though full
communication between tbose upon the GalIipoli
peninsula antI those upon tbe mainland to the
north is interrupted by the continued shelling to
,wJÜch a portion of tbe AHied Fleet subjects the
})cninsula of Bulair, ret there is already a con-
t;iderable concentration of men. witb many field
pieces. occupying the peninsula itself. T;ltimately
these forces wiH haye to be reduced. It can hardly,
with the weapons at its disposal. imperil the pas-
Eage of tbe Dardanelles by the Fleet when once tbe
:pcl'Inanent works upon that Strait haTe been
I-educed. But it can render all land operations
Jifficult ,,"hen the turn of tbese shall come. unless
R force equal in amount and munitions can be
landed somewhere in the north to meet it or to cut
it off from the other Turkish forces on the main-
Jand. The concentration upon the Asiatic side
cannot be dealt ,,"ith in the same way. But tbe
Jìossession of the Dardanelles ,,"ill forbid its junc-
tion with the men in the GalJipoli peninsula..

II.
THE :\"IE\IEN-NAREW FRONT.
, Tbe efforts of the enemy to pierce the forti:fìetI
]ine upon the Siemen anù the Xarew. and so to
reacb the "
arsaw raihmy beyond. seem to haye
come definitely to an end, The issue was in doubt
until after the publication of last ,,"eek's number
l)ut the communiqués on both sides since then shm;
cJc
rIy enough what h

bappened, The force
whlCh had crossed tbe
lemen below Grodno has
;repassed the river and is retreating through the

Augustowo forest. The force which was defeated
at Przasnysz at the other end of the line has faUen
back right to the German frontier, and all that
remains of the effort is a diminished bombard-
ment of Osowiecs in the centre-presumably, in
order to IJrewnt tbe Russians from using the rail-
W"ay that passes through this town for their
advance. It was said at the beginning of the
mOTement that its whole meaning was to be tested
by the Buccess or failure of the Germans to pass
the line of the
arew and :N'iemen. It ,,"ould seem
at the moment of W"riting that had failed.

III.
THE CARPAl HIfu
FRONT.
It was repeatedly insisted upon in these notes.
in dealing with the
\.ustro-German action across
the Carpathians in the Bukowina, that the main
purport of that pressure was political. and that
the occupation of Czernowitz meant, above all, the
separation of a potential Roumanian army, should
Roumania decide to intervene, from tbe main
Russian armies in Galicia round Przemysl and
Lemberg. But this opinion I must now modify,
for the success of the attack upon the Bukowiña
and the occupation of Czernowitz was followed up
in such a fasbion that to tbe first political object
of the move could be added a purely strategic one.
It has been pointed out more than once in
these columns that no effort upon the south-
eastern. or left, flank of the Russian army in
Galicia could hope for success unless the Austro-
Germans were in possession of the decisi ye points
in the railway system of Soutbern Galicia, by
which they could get supplies across the mountains
and concentrate men.
Xow, for tbe few days, as was clear from the
note appended to last week's article and put in as a
postSCl'lpt at the last moment, the Austro-Germans
nearly succeeded in getting hold of the two decisive
points in this raIlway system, and therefore
during t1lOse daJ-s distinctly menaced the Russian
flank. In order to see what happened, the follow-
ing sketch of the railway system may be of value.
In this sketch the more important lines are
marked with cross bars, the three railways which
alone approach the complicated Galician system
from Russia are marked with double lines cut into
segments. the less important railways-those of
Galicia and Bukowina-with marked single lines,
a.nd the Russian frontier with a hatching.
To hold Czernowitz at C was indeed to cut
off the Roumanian system from the Russians, and
also from Galicia to the north, but until Kolomea.
at K was held. no railway transport across the
mountains "{\'as available to the Austro-Germans
for any considerable effort against the southern
flank of the Russian armies in Galicia. which had
tbeir central base at Lemberg at L, and which are
invcsting Przemysl at p, Even with KoJomea in
their hands, the Austro-Germans would be ham.
pered until the>: obtained tbe point S, Stanislaus,
where four raIlways meet, and until they were
across the line S p. which lies under the foothills
of the Carpathians and permits of transport for
the munitions that could have come across the
mountains by the railway passes 1. 2. S. and 4.
The summits of all these passes are in Austrian
bands, the only
mmit remaining in Russian
hands being the road pass at Dukla. D.
Now, the Austrians. as we knew. after a tele..

(-

ItIarch 13, 1915.

LAND í\.ND
KTER,

gram which reached London after the last number
of this p:l per was going to press, did get into
Kolomea, and, what is more, though we were told
nothing about it at the time, they got, what was
much more serious, into Stanislaus. A further
effort, carrring them to Tarnapol at T, would have
turned the Russian positions III Galicia; so much
so that it would have involved the Russians
retreating from Lemberg and the relief of
Przemsyl-in a word, the abandonment of the
whole Carpathian front bv the Russian armies. I
cannot find that we were told that Stanislaus had
fallen into Austro-German hands, but this indeed
was inmlyed in the mention of an action at the
point marked X to the north of Stanislaus, and,
roughly speaking, during the four or fh'e days,
Februar
r 27 to March 3, it ",.ould seem as though
this railway junction of Stanislaus, and the direct
line to Przemsyl which runs from it, was in the
hands of the enemy,
But we now know that an action, offensim
upon the Russian side, 'laS successful. .!
olomea
"ould seem still to be in Austrian hand9. There
is therefore still the opportunity for the enemy
to provision himself across the mountains Ly rail-
"ay line 1\0. 4 and to continue his new effort.
Stanislaus. and with it the railway parallel to the
range. which is under the mountains from S
to P. was retaken by the Russians upon Thursday
last, March 4, and if it can be retained bJ them
the point will be of capital importance, ror so
long as Stanislaus is in Russian hands the single
line from Ko, 4 across the mountain3 will bardly,

I

provision a sufficient effort from the northward
against the flank of the Russian army to Galicia.
Yery hea\
' fighting has taken plåce, roughly
along the lme :M K in the eastern footLills of tho
range, with the object of rcliedng Przemsyl, but
also with the further object of bringing pressure
to bear here, while the flanking mOH'ment "ffas in
progress to the plain, and with the further object
of s('izin
the railway line S P. According to
the RussIan arcounts
an these efforts haye so far
been brought to a standstill, with very heavy loss
to the enemy.
"That tI1C _\.ustro-Germans were tr:ying to do
in this latter plan can best- be described in the
follo" ing two diagrams, L being Lemberg and
P Przemsyl, the inwsted fortress. Przemsy}
the Austrò-Germans attacketl across the Car-
pathians in numbers increa3ing as one went
further south aÌong the line. their object being to
push the original Russian line at E F bark to
ABC. and thence back into a rect:mgular form.
such as ABC', which done, they could m3SS to
bring the greatest pressure against A B-that is.
against the flank oÎ the territorr occupied by tho
main Russian army, This army'was faring sòuth-
,,'est. towards E }', with the object of forcing tho
Carpathians "'hen the moment should permit that
operation. A strong attack in flj,nk upon A n
would have forbidden it to continue its r ressuro
against the south-west, and, if successfu . would
ha\'e compelled it to retire from Galicia alto-
get
er, to raise the siege of Przemsyl, to fall back
behmd Lemberg, along the arrow (1), If it bo
5 1t

LAND 'AND
ATER.

March 13, 1915.

asked how this plan could be sound, leaying the
loner line B C perpendicular to the line of A D,
the 0 answer lics in the disposition of the lowcr
obstacle in that. step bel
nv the C?-rpathians, ,:hieh
main obstacle IS the rIver Dnmster, It WIll be
apparent from the following sketch that the
pushing back of tbe Russian l
ne morc. and more
eastward will at last succeed m throwmg a por-
tion of the Russian forces bebind this obstacle,
and when that was done, a comparatively small
force sufficing to bold it upon that line, the mass

0 r

of the Austrian effort could have been turned to
the left and north-west against the flank of tbe
Russian armies. In other words, Be would bave
been immobilised, and A B, and particularly the
portion A D, Y
'ould have been subject to the mo
t
pressure. The original Russian line, some SIX
"eeks ago, ran along the line of crosses, mostly
oyer tbe ridge, and only at the point E (at the
Eeskid passes) falling behind it. The Austro-
German effort had the effect after about a month 'g
,",ark of forcing the line back to the full black line
parallel to, and in the main beyond, the moun-
tains. Czernowitz at C was occupied; so was
Kolomea at K.
The enemy's thrust thus accomplished the
beginning of his final design; for Stanislaus at
S was occupied, as we have seen, and the ulti-
mate Russian positions, beyond whicb they were
not forced, were reacbed in tbe last days of
February--corrpsponding to the dotted lines
behind the full b]a,ck line upon the sketcb. If at
the ape'C of this point, between Sand H-that is,
upon the right between Stanislaus and Halicz,
the effort could have been continued, and if our
any had been compelJed to fall hack to the river,
tbe whole of the Russian position in Galicia
,would have been in peril, for it would have heen
taken in flank, It is not to be wondered at,
therefore, after the very heaviest fightin<7 took
place at this point, about half-way between Os and
H-that is, on
he main road uniting Stanislaus

with Halicz-and this turned, after a three days'!
battIe, in fa,our of the Russians. Stanislaus ",-as
reoccupied, the thick black line on tbe sketch
roughly re-est:;blished! and the plan .of forcing the
Russian armIes behmd the DneIster for the
moment was defeated. At least, this seems to me
to be the explanation of what has been taking
place upon the plain below and just north-east of
the Carpathians in the last seven day's.

IV.
THE EFFORT IN CHAMPAGNE.
Although the ceaseless attacks along the
YV estern frout upon one sector after another do
not, cannot, nnd are not intended to break
through tbe line, and have, therefore, no more
tl:
an a continuous and not a decisive value at
this moment (their business is rather to wear
down), yet there is one portion of tbem which
has illustrated during the last few weeks the
French intention in this kind of war so

rrø
SltMing
Llrt.e'/Mling W G.er
tlu! A onn.e.
Somm
tb German Pa5it'1 0 t1.f
Secorullo

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H ... .TaP1ur.
lírst'Main. Riål!.!t. _ 8
Pl"csëñ. 'i!il"encl Trønc1zn
e. rarm 1Jf-- '
perlhe"

lIr _ - 'Ð
..... -- .....
- --- .",

A

C.,
ViUe sur
Tourbe

IfIIÞ' -- .... .... -- - - - -- -- -. ... P
E-

m

Suicnes
.
u

.çß -.
%$
Fnnch Front'

.

thoroughly that it is ,yell worth follm\Ìug in
some detail. I refer to the section between the
camp of Cbalons and the forest of Argonne,
the eastern of the two sections to which the
open, rolling, chalky district between Rhcims
and the Argonne is divided.
Many '" eeks ap'o, when the French line
stood not very far f
om Suippes, it was pointed
out in these columns that 'the chief ciIed of a.
prolonged and successfuf advallce i
this
is-
trict would be to get upon the raIlway hne,
which here runs all along behind the German
positions and feeds tbem. This raih.. ay line
continues through Argonne, and helps to link
up the German armies in Champagne ",ith
the Crown Prince's army in front of Verdun. At
the moment that criticism was written tIle
distance of the French trenches from the rail-
way was, if I remember right, rather more
than four miles, and in all the long weeks that
have passed since that date no more than a mile
of total advance has been gained. The nearest
French trenches are still quite three miles from
the railway.
The French are in front of Perthes and of
the Farm of Beauséjour. But they are a long way;
from tho position of Tahure, for instance. ,Tbcl
i*

Iarch 13, 1915,

LAN DAN D JV.. ATE R.

have reached a line roughly corresponding fo
the line A-B (a front of not ten miles) on the
above sketch map, having advanced in the
course of nearly two months from about the line
C-D, and in the course of, say. four months
from, roughly, the line E-F, It is clearly
apparent. even from so elementary a sketcli,'
that the rate of adyaTlce is insignificant, and
that although this has been a sector of peculiarly
concentrated effort.
;\rbat. then, was the object of the French
commanders in this sector, as in the others of
which this one may be taken as a type 1 It was
here, as everywhere else, attrition, and this
wearing down of the enemy has been effected
here as everywhere else by the two new factors
of superior aviation and superio! work with
heavy guns, coupled, perhaps, with greater
and increasing reserves of heavy gun am-
munition.
The enemy has nearly preserved his original
line, e\"en in this sector. He has fallen back at
a rate of less than thirty yards a day on the
average. It is self-evident that work of that
kind is not, and never was. intended to be tho
" pushing back" of the enemy out of France.
It is the fastest rate obtained on any part or
tLe line, and yet it would take three years of it
to go t
íentr miles and a lifetime to put the
enemy back entirely into his own territory.
let alone to defeat him.
Xo: tbe object in \ iew here, 3"- {Terywhere.
in the ,,? est, is usury. Here we h:1\'e a front,
taking in its extremes, of not much more than
twelve miles from herond Souail1 to beyond
YiIlc sur Tourbe, and on that front the Germans
ha\'e fought month after month under the increas-
ing di&'ldvantages of superior heavy gun fire
and of wholly superior aviation. Thf're have
been whole days together duriHg "hich no
German airmen hme been SCPil above the
French lines, and it is not. I believe, an unjust
f'stimat{' tl18t the Frcnch ha ve taken three
observation flights to their enemy's one in this
. 1 t
smgle sec
or.
Kow, these two things combined, supe-
riority of air-work atld superiority of heavy
gun work, mpan, the first that the enemy has
Ilot lx>en able to gauge the w{'ight of attack

gilÌnst him: secondly, that his maintenance
of the line has on].\' been possible at a very
heavy n:pense. Both these converge together
upon a common eITect of constant and heavy
logs.
Sot knowiup' (lUite "hnt he has in front
- n ,
of him, the enell)y ma::.scs and attacks in m3SS;
losing perpetually out of proportion to his foe
he must as perpetually reinforce. It is exactly
three weeks, at the moment of writing, since
this great f'ffol't began in its pre,;ent form. The
order for the new offensive dates from Tuesday.
the 16th of Februarv. In that interml theÌ'e
has been sent as 'reinforcement.s alone, not
counting the troops originally presf'nt-, some
80,000 to the Gernwn front. It i
significant
that much tho greater part of these great
numbers has been hurried for\', ard in the last
ten days, and that the \"orst casualties on the
enemv's side ha,-e occurred in the same period.
The
Cologne Gazett{' of the Sunday before last
gaye a conspectus of the Eghting and its results.
The remainder of the C\ iùence is only dra\'Yn

from the statements whiC'h the French censor.
ship has passed. :\Ve must remember that in
this particular case there is special opportunity,
for information, tbat direct observation accounts
for a good deal. and that the margin of error in
the French calculation cannot be great,
It is an estimate drawn up from the samð
sources' which gives one a total German loss
since the attack began, e'(eluding prisoners, ot
certainly over 40,000. That is to say, about a
third of the total German efÏectiws put foot on
this piece of the front, for there were certainlYj
40,000 already present before the reinforce-
ments were moved up. It has already been
rn
ntioned in a previous issue of this paper, I
thmk, that up to a date now nearly a fortnight
past not less than 80,000 rounds of shell had
already been deliyered in that sector. and it i1!
this fortune in ammunition. coupled with a
better handling of the heavy pieces. that has
determined so he:1vy a loss to the enemy,
The a<.lmntage will probably be continued.
The line A-B on tbe sketch map above roughly
represents a crest from which the land gradually'
slopes down to Tahure, and then, after a slio-ht
swell, falls again on to the l'aiI-w'av. This sec
t}d
crest I have marked in a dotted
line upon th&
sketch map. It is considerably lower than the
first, and joins round to the first in the direo-
tion H.
It is possible. therefore, that after further
prolonged efforts the railway itself may be
reacbed and the whole German line be
com.
pelled to fall back some appreciable distance
-though there is littlt' doubt that by this time
a parallel light line will have been built behind
the main railway. But e\'en if that success be
achieved, the lesson of this front-Sonain--
Perthes-Beauséjour-Yille sur Tourbe-is not
to be discovered in the rate of the adrance but
in the heaviness of the enemy's perpetual
losses.
The particular district in question lIas ad.
vantages O\er nearly all the rest of the front.
It is quite open ground. save for the group of
""oods west of Perthes; it is light soil which
dries quiclær than any other part of the wholo
line, and it is fairly centra1. It is thoroughly'
well supplied by the ra ilwav in }'rench hands:
\" hich runs four or fhe. miles behind 3nd
paraHel to the French positions, and tbe soil is
favourable to rapid excavation and gives good.
dry 10dO'ings when it is tunnelled out. The
effect of the adyance here is therefore more
markecl than elsewhere between the VosO'es
and the sea. But tl1e kind of thinO' that is O'oing
on here is going on everywhere, though u
ually
upon a smalJer scale. and the reader will do
"en to mark this particular section and tho news
from it in order to judge the nature and the succeSi
of the \yar of attrition in the "\Icst.

THE CALClJLL"S OF THE CER:\fAN LOSSE:i
In connection with this matter, one natur-
any turns to the very high estimate issued by
the Press Bureau upon French al1tÞority fot'
the total lossf's of thc enemy. That estimate i3
no less than three million fòr the German forces
alone, counting sick, and, apparently, exc1udjng
the lightly wounded who have returned.
To de3-1 \\ ith these figures is particuhrlJ'í
difficult. because one is in the following dil.
7*

LAND AND
ATER.

Mareh 13, IDlE>.

mma: If ,,"e g
by
hat \\e
ear fro!?, sober
observers at the tront, who are III a posItIOn to
co-ordinate all reports and to sift them, ,,"e are
ready to accept the very highest figures, It is
true to say that, in proportion to the actual
experiences of our witness
s, to, the
ppor-
tunities they have had of seemg wIth thClr own
eyes, and of comparing together the multitude
of documents presented to the General Staffs
upon this subject, are they more inclined to
raise their cstimate of the enemy's losses,
Thus I have myself, in these pages, estimated,
from what I was then told, the losses of the
enemy in three ,,"eeks against the salient of
;Vpres at oyer 100,000, and pel'haps as much as
120,000. But I have been told by one who
was present in an that fighting, and in a
position well calculated to judge things re-
ported to him, as well as things that he saw,
that this original estimate of mine was far
below the mark, and that it could safely be
doubled.
'Ve are then, when we base ourselvcs upon
the evidence of eye-witnesses and of those who
have the first-hand evidence before them, led
towards the higher figures,
But when one takes the experience of
former ,,"'ars anù calculates the proportion of
sick out of the total casualties on the analogy of
the figures on the Allied side, and tests all this
by the published official German li
ts, one is
inclined to a much lower estimate-to some-
thing not much more than half what the highest
figures viOuld present,
The most seyere criticism the higher
estimate has receired actually halt:cs the large
recent French estimate of three million, This
criticism proceeds from the pen of a "Very com-
petent critic in this country. But to put the
total loses at only a miHion nnd a half is
certainly far too low, It is allowing only 5
per cent. for sickness at anyone moment. It is
not allowing for the large floating total of
slightly wounded (for while the slightly
wounded are constantly returning, their ranks
are as constantly beinQ' supplemented by new
casualties at the front), and, aboY6 all, it is
placing far too much reliance upon the German
official figures, It can be affirmed as a :piece
not of conjecture but of arithmetic that eIther
the proportion of German dead is utterly
abnormal, or that the Prussian list is published
"ith more care, and first, the dead, next the
sere rely wounded, next the slightly wounded,
and that. with all this they are àhvaJ-s very

gra"Ye1y in arrears, We know at a given dat

the proportion of British dead out of the total
casualties. It was more than 11 and Jess than
14 per cent. 'Ve cannot accept for the enclllYJ
a proportion of bet"een 20 and 25; or, at least,
if "6 do we must be prepared for very much
larger lists of total dead at the end than we
have yet been gh-en. This lowest estimate, for
instance - arrived at, as I ha"Ve said, by a verYJ
competent critic in this country-allO\ys for a
quarter of a million of German J.ead. It is true
to say that there is not an authority on the
General Staffs of the Allies who has carefulIYJ
"eighcd the figures who would not J at least.
add 50 per cent. to that number and be more
readily prepared to double it.
It must be remembered before we leave this
subject that men perpetuaIly write as though
estimates of this kind had for their object either
the unduo heartening of public opinion or the
stiffening of it for a special effort in recruitment
or in endurance. In other ways it seems almost
to be taken for granted tbat these estimates
must be false one way or the other, on account
of the supposed motive with which they are
inspired, But there is a third motive, after all,
whIch is much the best, and that is the desire to
obtain, eyen in matters of conjecture, to as
great an accuracy as possible, And I think that
if we strictly confine ourselyes to that motive
alone, though we may not admit absence from
the field of three million of the Germans, "\Ie

ill probably accept two and a half mi1lion,
and most of these absent for good.
Take the analogy of our own kno"\ln and
published casualties at a certain date: 2j per
cent. of total forces in casualties, and of casual-
ties rather more than half death and serious
wounds; death being, say, one-eighth and serious
wounds between, say, three-eighths and a half.
Remember that those msualties relate to a force
which bas been successfully passing through
,-iolent action anù then through periods of lun,
while the German forces haye been, on one front
or the other, perpetually engaged in an hitherto
fruitless attack. .Admit the Germans have put
forward to this date six: million-probably more;
admit, also, what is certainly the received opinion
with the best authority abroad, that their loss
from sickness far excèeds ours in proportion.
Remember that on the Eastern front the propor-
tion that retUl'ned is far less because the ambu-
lance difficulties are there much greater-and you
cannot in the end reach a much lower total than
that which I have suggested.

THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
III.

CONCLUSION.
I N preceding articles we haye seen that the
critical point in the great call1l)ajgn will
presumably come, EO far as men anù
munitions are concerned, in the early
part of next Bummer, or, at the earliest, in the
late part of the sprinfl.
'Ve have lastly t; consider the climatic and
J.he moral factors.

It is again necessary to emphasise what
f!hould he an obvious truth, but what the eager-
ness of our expectations tends to mask from our
judgment: that no reasonablc conclusion upon
the actual Jength of the campaign Cd,n be
attempted, It would not only be more guess-
wol'lr, but it wou1ù be gratuitous folly- All one
can do is to estimate the main factors which
converge upon what I hayc called the critical
.-

March 13. 191f5.

L.A.
D A
D
ATER.

oint-t.he moment "",hich will presumably be rest. and that is the central "",atershed of
that of greatest strain-a 60rt of watershed in Pol
nd, between the upper waters of the Pilitz:1
the history of the 8truggle, after which the and those of the
îda: the higher 1
U1d which
failure or success of ,,'hat is now an attack upon Flopes westward away from the hill group
a besieged district will begin to take clear round Kielce. It is not a portion of the lIne to
shape, And eyen this conjecture upon the ,,'hich much attention has been directed until,
critIcal point in the campaign must be made oddly enough, the last few days, All the heavy
8ubject to the resen'ation that the entry of work has been dOIle to the north or to the south
certain forces now neutral would heavily of this, 'Yere there no such thin
lIS the
modify any conclusion now drawn, This being fol'tress of Cl'a c 0"'", the same remall wou]J
said, let us consider the two remaining factors apply to the northern bank of the "Gpp
!'
I have mentioned aboT"e. Vistula and the approach to Sile
ia, but,
First, in the matter of topography, we must Cracow standing as it does, the :first sector upon
remember that the forcin
of an entrenched which, EO far as climate and conditions of soil
are concerned, action on a large scale wiH he
line, or the wearing of it own, and HIe com- easy, is that which I haye here mentioned-the
pelling of an enemy to shorten it (which is the watershed between the Pilitza and the Cpper
problem in the west) is, eyen supposing Yistula basins, "G nfortunately it is hardly here
superiority in heary artillery, and in muni- that any decision could be attcmpte<1, It lead3
tions, and in air work, a problem to be stated nowhere. The passes in the Carpathians do
in terms (among other. terms) of soi
an? of not benefit so early by the change of season,
climate, And largely III the same dn'echons though they are furthcr south. They are not
must be stated th
:(>roblem upo
the Eas!ern free till nearly a month aftm' the snows have
fI'out, for though It IS not there In the maIn a melted round 'Kielce, and it is the passes in the

uestion of impelling the enemy to shorten his Carpathians which obviously offer the hest
hne, or attempting to force a lm.e of tre
ches, strategic opportunity and the greatest political
yet the crossin a of the CarpathIans, qUIte as fruits to an ad\'ance.
much as the ð possibility of advancing in
Northern Poland, is a matter of climate and of The marshy district which is eyen now im-
soil. perilling the German retreat from the Xiemen
and from the Xarew. though far ,,'orse in
Now it has further to be remarked tbat one winter than ill spring, is neycr easy going even
part of an extended line, if it is sufficiently in the driest of years, and in the open winter
broad, suffices to ùetermine an issue. And we which has prayed such a handicap to the
must consider the effect of the weather, of local Russian efforts in this frontier, has only been a
conditions, of soil, not only oyer the whole of handicap, because it has reproduced the con\li-
the two areat lines, but especially the favoured tions of, spring, \Yhen tho sno'Y lllclÜ:, there 1S,
portion gf them, In the ,yest
his portion speci- along tnat belt of land from LIthuama. to Cen-
ally favoureù as a rule by clImate and always tral Poland, a Etate of affairs in which armit'o;;
by soil is the Champagne. 'Ye haye already must be almost imlllobili-sed, and, in general,
seen, in another part of these columns, the action upon this northern part of the Eastern
conùitions enjoyed in the district between front (:'0 f31' as climate anù local conditions of
Rheims and the Argonne, ovel' the flooded land soils, and apart fI,)m other questions of num,
to the north and the hilly land to the south of bers and equipment and munitioning) must be
it for advance. The possibility of such an looked for later than in the we:;:!.. It must also
a.dvance comes earlier in those conditions of be looked for some,,
hat later (but not so late
Boil than elsewhere, and the rainfall is less as in tho north) in the passes of tho Car-
heavy in the spring than in the fen country to pathians. The earliest portion to get fit, the
the north or in the hills to the south, but if we centre, near Kielce, heing unsuitable in situa-
asked on what date in the year the conditions tion for the main blow,
become really favourable for action here, But far more important than these yery
tbouah we find it a little earlier than the date general lllater
al consitleratioI1'3. are tho<ìO
which we arriyed at in considering the resern's l1loral ones whIch haxe heen but l111pel'feclly
of men and the question of material, yet we do understood, perha, p::: so far, in tho wcst .at
not find it so much earlier as heavily to disturb least, and which it bchoyes us to gra
p C}mte
our calculation. Anù it is again in the lat
dearly. All centre upon the attitulÌe of th.o
spring or early summer that the critical GermanR. It is the Germans who, by theIr
moment would seem to come. Though the early efforts,
'illlllaintain the _\ustl'ian alliance: it
summer is, perhaps, too late a .date to p
t for is the German cJeterminaLion of force which
this particular factor, save III exceptIOnal still controls e\'cn the doubtiùl Hungarian
years, the end of April is, roughly, in this part position; and tho German mood to-day, tho
of France, which is already centra.l and Con- chance of its changing to-morrow. are what
tinental in climate, suitable to actIon u,Pon a probably
he nati
)lls of the \Yc
t .1laYO n
m,t
larae scale. The snow is still melting III the difficulty In gra
pl11g, and what It IS most Ull-
Vo
ges for a month after all the choking plain portant for thelll.to grasp. .
to the east and to the north of the hill
of the The foundatIon of tho whole matter IS, :is

feuse is clear of wet, The moment differ
, of has been so often repeated in these columns.
course, from year to yea!", and I. h.ave seen bad the complete confhlenco of the Ge
'mans in tl
ü
conditions of flood in early Apnlm the
Iarne certitude, or, rather, the neces
1fy, of theu:
portion, but in the latter part of the month one victory.
Is nearly always in iull spring, Acted upon hy the Cllormou" nm\ s of the
Upon the Eastern front there is only one first six wecks, neither one 1101' the other of
sector where the topographical conditions of these two fa
t?rs ha
1.)f' P Il lllC<!SUl'CÙ to it5 ful]
soil and climate have a real adyantage over the extent b
T BnÍ1sh opilHon.
9-

LAND AND Jv.ATER.

March 13, 1915.

We can best understand how the German
people looked at the chances of t
e .wa!.
remembering what the average ImperIah
t
n
this country felt upon the sea power of Bntaln

n, say, the years 1896-1900.
ot onl
was
there no question for a moment m the mmd of
any German that counted, or with the general
mass of opinion, as to the invincibility of the
German army, but there was what counts more
than calculations: there was faith. There was
that unquestioning "taking for granted" of
certain conditions which seemed to be part of
the nature of things.
n is our judgment, of course. partIy
because the war has been presented to us in a
partial manner, but more because as a reflec-
tion of our own mood, that the German has
long lost his confidence. He has not. If he is
losing it at all, he is only beginning to lose it.
For in the first weeks of the war came that
series of crushing victories of which we only
heard in this country doubtful and confused
accounts.
There was 1\letz and there was Tannen-
berg, There was the avalanche of advance
upon Paris. There has been no corresponding
t;ort of defeat, And just as great nations may
decline for generations without noting the slow
process, so the losing partner to a campaign
may greatly faU from a worse position to a
,vorse, hardly noticing his lapse until the first
shock of defeat touches him,
The enemy, I make bold to say, will not
realise" the critical point" which we have dis-
covered in reserves of men and in material, and
to some extent in climate, until the invasion of
his Boil upon a large scale has begun, or until,

preceding this, he suffers on some one fro
t a
serious local defeat, such as the German armIes.
at least, have not yet suffered,
The number of German :prisone1's in France
is very large. I have been gIven figures (under
reserve), and if those figures are accurate (1
do not publish them here) they are much in
excess of anything that the most sanguine
opinion in this country was ready to accept,
But whereas at Maubeuge alone anything
from twenty-five to thirty thousand men
capitulated and were lost to the French army,
whereas in the advance on the 11:arne tho
Germans must have picked up many thousands
of French wounded, prisoners, anù stragglers,
whereas in the battle of l\íetz we know that
they captured something like ha1f a division,.
there is no single action in which the French
have taken prisoners great numbers of
Germans by one tactical move. The accumula-
tion of their great haul has been the result of
an unceasing trickle of surrenders proceeding
for months, and even at the battle of the MaI'ne
the total of tho German prisoners was made up
of a number of small units. Further, the wise
French policy of not publishing these numbers
(wise because it ultimately weakens the enemy
by confusing his calculations) yet tends to keop
up a fictitious confidence in Germany, and wn
may make certain that we shall not find in tho
neår future, not in the late spring or early
summer, the date to which every other form 9f
argument leads us, a "critical'" point in thf'
factor of moral. That point of the frrctor of
German moral will come earlier or later,
perhaps even so late as the very eve of collapse,
and it will only be determined by the material
ravaging of Gemlan soil or the dramatic effect
of a local disaster on a really consideraùlo scale.

NOTE.-Tbls A.tlcle bas been submitted to the Press Burean, wblch dou not object to the PUbUClitlOII as censored, and takes no
responsibility for the correctness of the Itatemcuts,
THE DARDANELLES, outside it, whereas the ship is self-contained in the same
respect" the handicap against the ship is clear.
In the Dardanelles we have so far managed to Ollt..
raT/gr. the forts. But given forts of eqnal range to tlU' ships.
we are reduced to realising that, while the ship may hit or
may miss, the fort is-humanly speaking-absolutely certain
to hit.
Illdeed it is only in this strength of the fort, that its
weakness lies. As every garrison gunner knows, many a
fort has guns liable to be outranged because hitting was
regarded 85 so certain that medium calibre guns were con-
sidered amply to suffice. Outranging is a modern pud novel
idea cf which the first glimmerings only appeared in the
South African War,
It was not inventcd in tllRt W:lr. The real perceivers of
the value of out ranging were the Brazilians, who many years
before insisted on being supplied with wh:lt were then
abnormally long guns, on the grounds that they require,l
something which could hit the ellemy from a range which
he could not reach in return.
The only comment this evoked at the time was con-
fined to sneering speculations about Brazili:>n "nprve
"
8nd what not. To-day, of course, outranging is the lasb
word in the science of war.
Along such lines forts Bre liable to be reduced; bub
spar!; from this nothing has ever happened to negative the
old proverb that one gun on shore is worth a dozen such
guns afloat. "'
e cannot be too careful in avoiding false
The fort guns may, of course, be blinded by dU'
t and deductions from successes in the Dardanelles.
débris; but as the. forts' position-finders, &c., are not located In connection with the Dardanelles operations there is
iu the fort, but In any unkno
and inconspicuous place a certa.in cynical humour about the fact that German naval
10.

THE

WAR
By FRED

O PERATIONS in the Dardanelles continue, Fortu-
nately the Turkish guns are mostly obsolete and
the garrisons none too efficient or well provided.
And so we continue to make "some progress,"
and shall so continue till there is a. sudden" give ",
and Constantinople once more falls.
But it cannot be too strongly emphasised tbab .. one
swallow does not make a summer," "\Ve have a certain
n
mber of ships which we can spare for these operations.
ShIpS which we could lose without jeopardisina our naval
superiority: This-coupled with the fact tha.t the enemy are
not a bramy folk-makes the Dardanelles effort possible.
But all the evidence is to the effect that had the Dardanelles
been Germ
n instead of Turkish no fleet could possibly have
done anythmg whatever, even were the fador of mines and
submarines excluded.
The factor of mobility is, of course, a considerable asset
to a s!úp, but. against this must be put .the relative targets.
Allowmg heavily for spped and for selection of ranO'e we still
let target ratios somewhat as follows: _ <> ,

* . .

to
[: SJ =011
êJEJæ

SHIP.

,,3

FORT,

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

:March 13, 1915.

LAND

A
D

experts are advising the Austrians to remember Tegethoff
and how oil Lissa he attacked and defeated a numerically
/luperior Italian Fleet which was bombarding that island.
Between Tegethoff and Lissa there was nothing j 'between
the Austrians and the Dardanelles there is the bulk of the
French Navy.
The Austrian Fleet is In exactly the same strateaical
Fosition as is the German High Sea Fleet. It can stay in
J,i.arbour or it can come out and accept annihilation.
On March 5 the first step at attacking the Narrows was
made. The Quun Elizab
t1
opened a long range bombard-
ment, firing twenty-nine rounds in all. blowing up Hamidieh
1I Tabia.
The forts operated against were:-
MEDJIDIEH TABIA (J). NAYAZIEH (T).
2 11-in. Ill-in.
4 9.4-in, 1 1O.2-in.
5 3.4-in. 11 9.4,in.
BunDIEH II TABlA (L). 3 8,2-in.
2 14-in. 3 5,9-in.
Of these the guns in J and T lire probably old Krupp
pieces. The official report Bpeaks of Hamidieh Tabia (L)
being armed with the II best and heaviest guna "-but
.pecifies no further.
We are left in doubt as to whether" best" is used in the
.ense of best guns in possession of the Turks or best guns
uisting. That is to say. whether Fort L was armed with a
couple of 14in, 36 calibre Krupps of model 1889. and construo-
tion some later dat,e. weighing 90 tons but of no very con-
.iderable range, or the modern 14-in.. which most gun factors
bave produced during the last two or three years. Probably
the guns were the old 90 ton j unless Krupps managed to do
. deal with Turkey o,'er these 14-in. guns which were intended
for the German Navy, but never mounted, owing. it is said,
to a difficulty in connection with 1.he design for naval
mountings,

THE SUB:\:'IARINE H BLOCKADE."
SO far the "blockade" can hardly be described as suc-
llessful. I am by no means sure that eyery merchant ship
destroyed has not cost Germany a submarine.
\Vhen one comes to think of it, a fair number of sub-
marines have in the past been sunk or damaged by merchant
.hips which La.e run into them purely accidentall:;. Now.
thallks to the example set by SYTen and Shippin!J, not cnly
bave our merchant ship3 been taught that" attack is the best
defence," but also they have been taught that there is more or
less a price on the head of every pirate and outlaw.
Supposing, of course, that the submarine be sighted, it
Is more or less even odds whether the threatened merchant
.hip will not knock out the enemy. To be ,'ictimised means
either death or probable trouble j to succeed means money;
kudos. and the still higher gain of " done my bit." This last
is also certainly something of which Von Tirpitz did not think
when planning his great .. blockade."
It is never wise to prophesy too directly; but, it is difficult
to get away from tIle impression that the British Navy and
the British )Iercantile :Marine bet,ween them are perfectly
capable of dealing with the .. blockade," without allY neces-
.ity of those" retaliatory measures" of which we have, per-
liars, already heard too much in Parliament and elsewhere.

GENERAL MATTERS.
AI\''S"\VERS TO CORRESPO
DENTS.
J. V. M. (Burge!'s Hill).-(l) Subject is taboo. (2)
You may be quite satisfied that the QU,.u/, Mary was not
nnk at the battle of the Dogger Bank. (3) Big special guns
.re rather like the big gooseberry and the sea serpent which
we used to hear 60 much of in more pel!ceful times. (4)
What the Gernums may accuse us of does not. I think,
amount to much. So far as I can make out, they intended
to fall on us sudàenly in their own time. We forestalled
them, and they make up hymns of hate ac"'ordingly. From
&heir point of view I suppose the- grievance exists.
A. C. S. S. (Cheltenharu).-(l) The f!!to of the Von

r Tann is purely a matter of speculation. (2) The Dresden
Ia probably in hiding
omewhere. (3) The Kolbag has not
been sunk. (4) We can only speculate as to how many sub-
Jnarinê
Germany has lost, but it must certainly be far D:.or.
than 811e admits even now.
B. P. (Leiccster).-(l) A gun of any kind in an aero-
plane meanl! so much extra weight which could otherwi
e be
vied for carrying I'drol or for borr-b!l. (2) The Aæerican
ff Lake" type oi
abmarine can-ieB tubes which can b.
trained e:r:a
ly as you I!U
bcst,

YV.. ATE R.

A. J, W, (Hellifield).-Obstructions such as you sug-
gest would be wa
hed away in next to no time.
E. C. W. (Gayton).-(l) There is great difficulty in
classifying the Q'uecn Elizabeth!!. They are too fast to be
ordinary battleships j not fast enough to be .. battle
cruisers." That is how they come to be properly designated
as "battleship cruisers," (2) The Bi"i", was formerly the
Turkish Rechad V, The B,'ol,,. IInd Polk71rr wI're two
Chilean destroyers completing at White's Yard at Cowes.
A. S. O. (Dover).-Your idea is certainly no...el. and
if not practicable for the sea might h:).\"e aerial possibilit
es,
You might certainly submit it to the Admiralty. Ha\"e the
iipecification neatly typed.
Z, H. L. (Rome).-Theoretically aircraft can detect
B1lbmarines under water quite easily. In practice the cb.ances
of their coinciding sufficiently are something like ten
thousand to one against.
II PROTEIN."-I am not a chemist. but I understand
that chemical foods are within the region of chemical
possibilities. certainly near enouah should the necessity be
omnipresent, No doubt they owould be no nicer tllan
.. potato bread." but" needs must when the devil drives."
The aeroplane would probably still be a toy had it not been
for its war utility and the consequent strenuous develop-
ment. In the same way a people faced with starvation on
account of war would keep on seeking substitutes. chemical
or otherwise, for ordinary articles of food.
C. S. (Lh-erpool).-(l) Submarines haye often been down
a hundrcd feet and more. but the exact depth to which on6
could go would entirely depend on her construction, All sub-
marines can go deeper than any practical purpose necessi-
tates, (2) The depth to which a diyer can go depends on
his experience and en his heart. Fifteen fathoms is as deep
as most fancy going, though the limit is about twenty-five
fathoms. But a quarter of an hour is about as long as any
m:m could stand it. You will find much i11teresting iuforma-
tion about divers in the pages of .. \Vhispers from the Fleet,,"
by the late Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. who lost bilt
life in the Battle of Chile.
W. H. (Cadford St. Mary).-I do not think there is the
least danger of German or Austrian submarines managing
to interfere with the operations in the Dardanelles,
W. R. J. (Brecon).-Your idea is ingenious. But it, or
some variation of it" cont,inually reaches me. Some ideas
are more ingenious than others, The cardinal defect of all
is the Bame: .. The submarine is too wily a fish to he had
with lobster pots.>> It can so very easily impro, ise a defence.
The best tcc11llical Lrains of the Briti.,h Navy have been at
work on the whole problem for years. Honestly I don't think
there can be a non-technical ci\'ilian idea which the British

avy bas not already long ago considered, and either flung
aside as no good or else adopted. Seeing the careful way in
which yoq have worked things out, I do not like replying
to you in this seemingly cavalier sort of fashion, but perhaps
when I tell you that any number of people write and say:
II My idea is to put a mine in the way of a submarine: the
authorities, if they appro,.e, can work out details," you will
appreciate that the length of this answer puts you into a quite
different category.
X. (London, W,),-Leave things to Lord Fi::.ht'l'. You
are fuBy entitled to II think that he is an incompdent ass."
but supposing he had the time for it, what do you think
be'd think about you 1 .. Democratic righh" may be all
right in peace time. but just at pre"ent we happen t,O be at
w:'r, and advice (or orders) to the man at the helm from
pa
sengers is out of place I
L. D. (Halifax).-Noted. Uut the German spy fe.er is
bcing overdone. Some ::\Iini
ter!l. remembering the old party
political days, may have o\-ert:one their talk a bit, but,
generally speaking, they have not done badly. "\, e should aU
of us låbonr to keep thcm up to the scratch, but. in my
opinion criticism qua criticiëm is to be deprecated, Whcn aU
is said and done we haye to sink or swim together.
K. G. C\Iaccle
peld),-From almost prehistoric days
th6re have been e11thusia
ts who belie\"ed that ships could
defeat forts; but an the teaching of hi<;tory is that it can only
be done (as in the Dardane1l6s) by using overwhelming force.
HERBERT STI:pm:
so
(Liyerpcül),-(l) It is IH
"er po,;-
sible to arri\ e at exact particulars, but the bulk of the
twidence is that the EII/dt://, sank the Russian cruiser in Penang
under the Jap:mese flag. .. \Var is war" (as rriuce lIenry
of Prussia said), and in war eyeryone hits below the belt when
the chance occurs, ThE. Tt
.ians took things that \\ëY, 'Ye
cannot do better than follow 1.hpir c>.ample, They reckon to
return it .. in kind" :J!le day. To outrage International I.aw
is silly on th:-t account, (2) r all1 afraid that the gyrations
of Lord lleldane are ou:"ide tJ,e pl'm ince of thi" article. So

11-

LAXD

AND

far as I can gathÐr, ha is a. II heaven-born genius" or an
" out-and-out traitor," according to the politics of ,,:llOe\'er
sizes him up. Personany, I Lave only a lit
ra
y aC9,uamtauce
with him; so far as that goes I can put him In neither cate-
gory. An I can definitely say is that-so far as my experience
goes-he was out to do his job according to his lights. Every
politician has to do a ccrtain amount of eye-wash. neyond
that he is honest" or he would not be where he is. There is no
monopoly of honesty on either side.
A. :F. T, (London, W.C,).-Your idea is all right, but
you can safely lay sixty to one that the Brit.i"h Navy tumbled
to it six months ago.
F. G. (London, N.).-F.ifty people at least have sent, in
the same idea before. See l'eplies to several. It. is something
like a million to one whether any non-technical idea sent, in
is worth the p3pcr t13t it is written on. At the same time,
it is worth a lot against Germany. Your idea is not, but the
spirit wbich prompts you to send the ide!! along is quite as
potent as if you were a man (or two men) in the trenches. I
take off my hat to any lady who tries to do her bit. no matter
how ridiculous that bit may be. As a matter of f
t" your
particular idea is not in tbe least ridiculous, but experiments
long ago proved it to be impracticable.
A, E. (Cardiff).-Your idea is quite sound. The only
tbing' against it is that it has been in operation ever since the
war began. Not quite as you put, it, perhaps, but the same
integral idea. The British Navy is no fool, and there is little
that it has not thought of long since.
B. C. (London, N.).-See the last three replie!!.
111. F. (Quinta, St. John, Madeira).-(l) Yes. You are
right. I have acknowledged the silly pen,-slip about the
y orc1:. (2) Re the Queen Eli
abet;,., see answer to
liE. C. "'T.," above.
" ALPHABET" (Cardiff).-Duly noted. There have been
German spies galore; but a certain amount of perspective
should be observed. Think of the number of our people who
ha\'e harmlessly been to \viesbaden, Baden-Baden, &c. It is
easy to overdo -the spy busincss and to help the enemy accord-
ingly.
N. B. },I, (London, S.W.).-I am glad to learn that you
are not a German-American. Three weeks ago I suggested
that attempting to starve the civil population was probably
a mistake. Apparently you and I are arguing to the same
effect from different standpoints. Where I think you get
adrift is as follows: You do not seem to realise that Mr.

y.,T ATE R.

Iarcb 13, 1915,

Churchill is a Democrl.tic Minh.ter compelled to mini"teJ'
to a democracy-and you know what Mr. Bumble (vide
"OlÏ\'er Twi
t ") said about" the public." Consequently
:Mr. C'hurchiH has to consiàer his audience as weil a') his
job. I will allow that he has let off " hot air" on more than
ono occasion, I will further admit that there are few abusive
adjectives which I d
d not apply to him in the piping time3
of peace, but-we are at present at war, and it, is due to him
that we are where we are. l'lilmam qt!Ï meruit feral J
W. II, .M:. G. (Eastry).-Yc3. Some of the ideas abou6
nets and torpedoes are fif!;ortcd and peculiar 1 As for the
Zeppelin basket, that re
Ily does e:!..Ïst. It was originally
designed to carl)' a machine gun, but now I believe is used
for bomb-dropping, being let down wh:m the machine is
more or less stationary. Nut Íwpo:,>,ibly it i3 sta,yed to pre\'entl
being" dragged" wbrn in motion. Otherwis(', of cours&-
exactly a3 you suggest--it would be draggd to goodnesa
knows where.
\Y. n. G. T. (Tr>ronto, Canada).-Many thanks for the
cutting you enclose of the American" exrert's "views. I
have no means of asærtaining the naval qualifications of
!.h. Benjamin, "naval expert," but I c,crtainly agree with
you that his opinion that Admiral Beatty should be shot
for not haying plu'lged into a clever German trap suggests
tbat Mr. Benjalflin's flymp
thics do not lie with the I:ritish
Nayy. Put your tru.st in Adnáral neatty, and let the
Germans say what, they like.
"VERIEST Tu
o JJ (Dunmore).-At lleligoland, so far
as we know, the Germans h,tve concreted e\'erythi!1g, w.
could probably ease off torpedoes without number and leayo
the bas
s of the fortifications untouched. \Vhea our really
big guns come along it is not imposgible that, we may gradu-
ally disintegrate the hland, but ,I am afraid that it is
exceedingly improbable. Destroying a fort is somethÏu{; lik.
trying to kill a tortoise which you cannot capsizo.
.. AIR BUG" (Dundee).-I think that the Army and
N az'?J Ga;:
fte hit the right nail on tho head. All thcse (( air
mechanicg JJ know a great deal about the technique, butl
where war 8tratcgy is concerned they are apt to be babies in
arms. They can never realise that the wrm!l 'Il'ill 'flot b
idl,
in the meantime. Our Army would ha\-e been in nerlin by
now if German gUllS and Ger..nan rifles had not been in the
way.
II ENCORE RET,UB. TIO:S. JJ -Sorry I mhmnderstood you.
Wbat you now explain as the idea suggested hail Leen ÏD
operation ever since the war be
an.

GREAT BRITAIN'S

AERIAL

POSITION.

By L. ßLIN DESBLEDS.

D DRING six consecutive weeks the writcr has, in
these columns, endeavoured to draw the aerioml
attention of the authorities to the great value of
the aeroplane for offensi,'e purposes, and in one of
bis articles he suggested the creation of a special
air fleet 2,000 strong. In studying the potential capabilities
of the fifth arm he has been lcd to c
rtain oonclusions, which
were explained ill his articles, and some of which it may now
be useful to repe
t. lie therefore a
ks those who m"3. y bo
concerned with the adaptation of the new weap of war for
OfIt'llsi\"e purposes to bear in mind the following vital points:,
(1) An air fleet may be usffi for two distinct purpoSl.'s :
(a) It may form part of a. land or sea force, whcn its rôll1
mU5t necessarily be limit,ed to the oper:lt,iol1!! of tbat forc-6
cons:dered as a whole. It iil as a part of a land or a 61.'1\
fo
ce that, gpnerall
. 6peaking. tl,1.' belligerpnts, whether
IIlh
d o!, opposed to U5. han'. up to tbe prp&ent, emplo
'cd
theIr aIrcraft. In 611ch employm
nt of their aeroplanes
the British ha \ e obt:lineJ so great an asccndancy O\'cr
their a
h'crsa1Ïes that they now claim to POS6CS!! the
"Supremac>' of the Air." '1.'his term should, in reality,
come)" no other fact than th"t our airmen can carry out
more comprehcnsi\c and more detailed and reliable òbser.
'ations than thoS6 of the enemy.
(b)
t ma
' be looked upon as a fGrce of offensive and destruc-
tl\'e m.lu
, to ,be employed either indcpendentl>' of, or in
c?-operat;on wIth, a land or a 6ea force. 'Vith the excep-
tion of a, few raid., which can only be rpga.rded as \'ery
t

l1d acnal altack
, t].e cm]Jlo!lm
nt 01 aiTcwlt lor ofien-
litre and dfetfuct"
e purpodca Ita. not
ct become an
a
cOlllpli,
"ed l act,
( 2' , F ' d

o
con
, crations ba5ed npon the carr,}"ing capacit
, .)f
eXJ.3tmg a'::ITaft ,a
d upon the lack ()f precisll kno;\"-
lcdge of
ena! balhs!Jea, as wen as upon \-ariolU í)cJleral data.,
a,7! oncn"I/
c pIT fleet mllst be IItrong in number.
13) '1 he same fIIr fl
et IInould not at one time, b
Ilud to lorm 'P flTe
01 a land OT a a'a 10Tce. and at aMtl'
T t.Tole to act as an inde-
pendcnt fOTce. The pl3.n of detachinl!: from &11 air ß
t forming
12*

part of a. land or a I!(;a force a number of machinca to c&IT"!
out an offensi\-e operation, such as a raid, which can cnlllead
t{, local and teml'orar,)' ad\'3ntages, has, 6inco the opemn'T of
hostiliti(:s, been adopted both b
' the Allies and b)' the en;'my.
'1.'his, althoug!-L it mai not haH, led to permanent rc.sult!t, haA
been useful. It has pro\'ed in actual practice the potential
,-alue of the oficnsi\e aeroplane, and has established the im-
portance of the nnmber of aircraft in & fleet carrJin.. out offen-
siye operations. But it is an action which must "not be too
frCfluentJy rcpcated, as Bueh a course ma
' cOmprOTILSe the a.eri

8upremacy which i.. alreu.J)' ours aDd yet h,I.\9 no rea.l iulluenl'4l
()!l the war.
(4) ..1 powcrlul offcnsÏt'e aiT flut ßpecially built fo ac:f either inde.
lJClldent1y oj OT in co-opcTation witlJ a land OT a sea 10Tcð
enol/lel bc c.-cattel at once. That force could permanently in-
ßuence both t!-Le chara.::ter and the duration of \.he prel!ent Wall.

BRITAIN'S UNIQUE POSITION.
In considering the capability of tbe British Isles to pro-
duce in a short time a. very large number of acroplanos one
cannot fail to realise that a great part of the resources ;f the
c?unt
which could be er
ployed in the production of an offen-
81\'e all' fleet are still unutilised. In his last article* the writer
referred to the two principles which seem to have guided our
military authorities in the production of aircraft durin.. tbe
period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities.
These two principles-(a) every promisin a constructed aircraft
must be given a trial, and (b) every pL>romising constructor
must be given work-were also, in a greater or les!! dearee,
t
lOse "!"bich guided tbe foreign countries. To these two prin-
cIples IS due the fact that at the beainninO' of the war all the
principal belligerent countries pos
essed L> ieveral successful
desig
s of
ircr:aft and a numb?r of firms who had acquired
expenence lU 8lrcraft constructIon. But 'noW', owing to her
voluntary system of military service and to her command of

....A Kol;s or Warniu.:," L.1:!i"D A..'1D Wun. l\la!..:h 6, 1915..

Iarch 13, 1915.

LAXD

tbe seas, the capability of Great Britain to construct aircraft
on a large scale is unique.
Of an the nations now at war, Great Britain, by reason
Ðf ber system of voluntary military service, has had ber
industries the least disturbed, and on account of the
Eupremacy of her N a"\"Y she is not 6hort of any material that
Dlay be required in the construction of war weapons. Hence
these two causes ha"\"e given to the country the means of SUPIJly-
ing her armies with more and better aircraft than is possible
to the enemy. The full significance of the
e two causes of
the aerial 6upremacy which is at present ours-(a) an undis-
turbed industry; (b) the naval supremacy-will be readily
understood when it is remembered that the aeroplane con-
Etructor depends for the carrying out of his work upon a Great
number of industries which, in their turn, derend upo
an
adequate supply of the neccEsary material!!. Confronted by
a disorganised indu"try, an aeroplane constructor, howeyer
taJented and however experienced, cou1ù not easily produce
a single machine. To give the reader an idea of the various
industries on which the aeroplane ccmtructor depends for
the construction of an aeroplane, !!ome of them will be men-
tioned. The motor industry must supply him with a light and
reJiable motor; the propeller maker with a suitable propeller.
'rho wings of the machine must be covered with a
trong and
light linen fabric, which must be supplied by the linen in-
dmtry. This linen fabric itself mU:-Jt be treated with 1\
.. dope," the manufacture of which depends on the chemical
industry. The "heels of the machine are proyidt'd by the
<,}cle maker, and their covers and inner tubes by the rubber
industry, and the production of hundreds of other small but
important parts, such as turn-buckle!;, different flanges ønd
connection!, tee-pieces, various bps, vahes, nut
, nipples,
})etrol fillers, fuel and oil tanks, pulleys, bracket
eats, chassis
Eprings, and many other parts, the mere mention of which
would require some several hundred words, depend upon 8
large number of miscellaneous engineering industries. It i!!
thus clear that with her industries disorganised and deprh-ed
Ðf the nece!'sary material, comprising wood, rubber, "teeI.
copper, aluminium, fibre for linen, petrol, lubricating oil, and
other substances, it is "\"ery difficult, if not irupos!'ible, for a
country to try to create during the war an air fleet capable
of offensive operations of permanent value.
In her ability to produce aircraft Brita,in stands alone.

A
D

y{ ATE R.

France, on account of her compuhcry system of military
service which called to the colours thousands of men who
suddenly had to lea"\"e her industries 6hort of labour and 01'-
gani!'illg power, does not now possess the tithe of our resources
for aircraft construction. The occnpation by the German9
of the highly industrial districts of Northern France still
further reduced the industrial resources of our Ally. It i9
for this reason that Fr:lDce, v.ho, under more fortunata cir-
cumstances, ,",ould probably have created a grand offensl\'e
air fleet, now .finds hersell iDcapable of e"\"en attempting the
effort. It is upon us that the burden rests of creating
such a fleet. It is a duty which we a.re bound to perforn'.
since it. may, without interfering with our other arrangements,
lead to a much shorter war and to a smaller sacrifice of lives.

THE BUILDI
G OF 2,000 AEROPLAl'\ES.
Aeroplanes can now be built much quicker t.han at the
beginning of hostilities, both because fewer types of machines
are constructed and because greater practice in the construc-
tion, on a larger scale, of the various parts required has beeD
obtained, The rate of construction can be further increa"ed,
and in creating an offensive air fleet 2,000 strong, the writer
suggests the adoption of only one type of machine. This type,
which would be the standard type for the offensive independent
fleet, should be built outside the regular aeronautical industry,
which is already fully employed in producing the necessary
machines for our present aerial fleet, which, on account of its
"\"arious duties, D1ust necessarily contain units of variou9
standards. The offensive air fleet, being brought into existence
for one single definite purpose, would consist of only or.e
type. The creation of such a fleet would not preyent the
development of aeronautics, would not interfere with the estab-
lished aeronautical industry, and would employ numerOl;S,
and as yet untapped, engineering and other resources
of the country which are now unutilised and are lying fallow.
The writer makes t.his comment advisedly. During t.he la!õfl
few weeks he has been in toucb witb scores of industrial firms
nIl over the country where work is 6lack through want of
orders, and who are desirous, and capable, of Buppl)'ing all
the T"arious necessary parts for the creation, v:ithin six months,
of an offensive air fleet on the scale indicated. The list úf
these firms the writer is prepared to communicate to the
authorities 6hould it be required.

-

THE ASCENDENCY OF THE ALLIED
AIRCRAFT.
'VI-IAT IT ME1-\NS IN THE CO
IING ADVANCE.
By COLONEL F. N.
lAUDE. C.B.

RILE e\"eryone is wondering when the Great
Ad.ance from France and Flanders to the
Rhine will begin, no one seem!! to ha'"e noticed
the grov.th of a new factor in the conduct oí
warfare, whicb, working quit
silently, h'l.s
completely cbaDged the nature of the vast problem before the
Ailies.
It began to m
ke its appearance some six months ago,
when Sir John French in his dispatches wrote of cur
muperiOl'ity which was evinced by our airmen as compared to
tho!õe of the German!!.
But, even then, scarcely anyone began to speculate
lIeriousJy on what might follow tbis ascendency, because no
one could have believed tbat by degrees such a power would
in BO short a time be 80 firmly established as to render the
German nir fleet for all practical purposes as non-existent ;tS
tbe ships in the Kiel Canal. But, reading between the lines
of the French communiqués, it was possible to see wbat wa9
comino when day after day artillery duels were decided ""ith
the vabntage t() the gunners of the Allies.
If we look back to the dates when this remark first np-
peared with reGularity, it will be evident tbat at that time
there could be b no question of our numerical superiority in
guns, or even in ammunition supply, to account for the fact,
and as between the actual skill of the gun-layers the ad,-aIJ-
tage could only be trifiilo1g.
The factor which remains a!! explanation of tbe phrasing
of tbe reports was .. facility" or "superiority of obserra-
tion," and it was in the domain of tbe flying men that we
could look for tbis facility, as all other methods were the com-
mon property of both sides.
Week after week, a8 tIle communiqués told C?f enemy
IUn!! ømaehed up by direct hits, of batteries 6ilenced, and

wllOle lengths of trenches blown in, it became more especially
evident that our ascendency was iccreasing, and when at
last began the series of French local attacks on a considerable
scale, in Alsace, then near Soissons, Rnd since in almost ewry
Bector of defence in turn, there could be 110 doubt tbat "e
had firmly establisbed it.
In eacb case these offensives were seen to rom pel the
Germans to bring up reinforcements t() avert the danger
threatening some vital point, generally one of the lat.eraI
railways, on which the cohesion of tIle fighting front depends,
As Mr. Hilaire BelIce has so well :,hown in the
e page q ,
the Germans were very hard put to it indoed to find rein-
forcements for the threatened sectors. At Soissons, than;
s
to the locd Imperiority of numbers whicb tLey were able to
accumulate and to the rise of the Aime, they could claim ilU
advantage whicb loomed very large thrcugh the turgid lan-
guage of their announcements. But this did not by any
means suffice to put the observers of the game olf the true
line. The reccnt operations between Pel tbés and Souain, to
mention only the principal group, have confirmed the impres-
asion which has been iorming in my mind for some time-
yiz., that the French have now attained so entire a mastery
over enemy movement!! that they can oblige him to come oufl
into the open nnd attack them when and wherever they please.
This is the meaning of the announcement they mnde officially
last week that" at a given point and at a given bour we ale
free to do what we win."
I belie,'e the claim to be thoroughly justified by t!HI
circumstances, and its importance it is difficult to o,'er-
estimate.
In e"\"ery battIe, f:iege, or campaign the chief object of
the commander on one side has always been to compel his
ad\"ersary to use up his reærves prematurely at ason:e pcintl
13*

LAND

AND

chosen -for him to waste them, not selecled by him of his own
volition. . .
Though Napoleon general
y st;cceed,ed, In lll
lat
er cam-
paigns, in :!o completely domlllatm9' hIs ellemy s wIll as to
realise this illea!, he never ccitabl1shed such a degree of
ascendency as this quotation f;om the Fren.

l report confirms.
Indeed, it was an inconceIvable proposnIon for any leader
to arrive at until the con,ing of the aeroplane, as handled
by the Allied airm
n, created tl
e p.ossibility. And t!te asser-
tion of this power m a commmucatIon meant to be circulated
to the enemy has been made intentionally to establis
a moral
superiority over the enemy commanders. Moreover, 1t Bho
s a
very nice appreciation of the psyc
lOlo
y of the Germ.an
atlOn.
For bow is any stall to mamtam confidence m Its .own
canacity to handle its day-to-day problems when, as m a
ga
e of che
s, the other player cries constantly" Check 1 JJ W
One may try one move after another, analogous to the
brinrring up of reinforcements, but the word follows each
effort, until it dawns upon the beaten player that he is in
truth cornared, and the next announcement will be
" Nate I"

"JV. ATE R.

:Marcb 13, 1915.

N ot11Ïng could bðtter illustrate the confidence which I.
felt by the French General Staff in their power to deal witti
the present situation. The same remark applies, of course,
to our own people, and this extraordinary position of
Buperiority (one never yet obtained by any army in war) we
owe entirely to the extraordinary aptitude for air-service
developed by the flying men of both nations.
If we compel our enemies to continue attacking us under.
for them, the most unfavourable circumstances possible to
produce, we can continue the process until the numbers at his
command are no longer adequate to hold the present extent
of front. Then, and then only, need the Allies Bend forward
tJIeir own troops to hasten his retreat.
The German line is already wearing very thin in places.
Events in Austria and Poland make it exceedingly improbable
that their men can again be transferred from East to 'Vest #
and as for reinforcements Btill to be found within the Germaø
Empire, I am in entire accord with the estimate given 1a5'
week by Mr. Hilaire BelIoc, with the exception that I thinJè
it is the very outside limit of German endurance, and that the
end may come some weeks sooner t,han he anticipates.

J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

G \RDENING IN SCHOOL AND 1I0
1B,
To tha Editor of LAXD AND 'VATER.
Dr:lR SIP.,-The true amateur gardener is an enthusiast
"ho welcomes every opportunity of increasing his (or her)
knowledge and Bkil1. Good gardening book! are not wanting,
but what is badly needed is a practical demonstrator in the
arts of trenching, digging, raking, hoeing, seed-sowing, plant-
ing, and BO on, accompanying the work with short explana-
tory lectures of an informal character ou the principles under-
lying it.
Teachers of gardening and Nature-study in and around
London will particularly welcome Buch an opportunity. In
the schools of the London County Council alone gardening
is taught in three hundred departments, and the wide educa-
tional value of gardening in its relation to Nature-study anù
other subjects is now beginning to be recognised in private
schools.
With a view to helping teachers and amateur gardeners
alike I have arrangcd to give a course of ten lecture-
demonstrations in gardening in the beautiful gardens of the
Royal Botanic Society (Inner Circle, Regent's Park, near
Baker St,reet Station) on Saturday mornings, beginning
March 6, at 11 a,m.
All interested are cordially invited to be present at the
first lecture-demonstration, which will be free. Tickets for
the course (105. 6d.) may be obtained from me at 9, Temple
Fortune Lane, Hampstead Garden Suburb, N.W. (telephone
Finchley 1262).-Yours, &c.,

nELE
COLT,

LAND TRAINII"G.
To the Editor of LAxD AND 'VATE1\.
DEAR SIR,-Kitchener's Army is magnificent. I am
second to none in my admiration for men, officer;!, and what
both have achieved. I, who have watched my husband's
battalion grow from three to 1,320 men, know what I am
talking about; but out of our thirty-three officers I do not
think one, e=>:cept my husband (the C.O.), has ever heard
8 Bhot fired in anger. Perhaps one or two were in the Boer
war. Anyhow, with the utmost keenness they cannot help
lacking in one thing-i,e" experience of war under modern
conditions, In all the letters I get from the front from
brothers, cousins, and friends, the cry is, " Come and learn."
One week of personal experience in the trenches is worth three
months of drill book and listening to others' experiences.
Would it not be possible to send relays of officers from
Kitchener's battalions, two at a time, for a fortnight each, to
replace two at the front in eael] regiment W It is well known
that Bomo of those who have been right through the war are
deadly stale. A fortnight away would bring them new lif
,
esp.ecially with the interest of imparting what -they know and
seemg Bome of the stuff preparinO' which is O'oin" to come to
their help. On the ot,her hand, "'our young b offi;ers here are
deadly keen to learn, and two of them could easily be spared
at a time for that purpose, I do not, of course, venture to
5
Ule deta
ls and I am not blind to the possibility of casual-
bes occurnng among the new officers, but it would not lead
to any mure casu allies, as there would be two instead (who
hav
borne the bt;rden. and heat of the day) safe at home
re3{,wg, and I beheve 1t would sa,o a great many mistake!!

and therefore casualties when the time comes for our arden'.
but inexperienced, young officers to take their regiment.
abroad. It would, of course, cost Government something, but
Buch a trifle, compared with the advantages I believe would
be gained, does not count,
Ii, Sir, you think there is something to be said for t.hf.
idea I should be grateful if it could be forwarded to the
proper quarter,

C.O.'s WIFB,

AN APPRECIATION,
To the Editor of LAND A:-'"'D WATER.
SIJ
,-I beg to inform you that I regularly receive th.
copy of LA
D j.ND W UEB which you so kindly Bend me e\Fer1
week.
I very much appreciate your paper, which is mudi
valuable to me. As you may have noticed, I have already,
quoted Beveral times in the 'l'emps Mr. Hilaire Belloc's very
remarkable articles.-Thanking you again, I am, yours verI.
truly,
BOISSONNET
(Li(ut.-Colond).
21, Boulevard de La-Tour, Maubourg.

GRA TITUDB,
To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.
DEAR SIR,-Owing to your courtesy in publishing my
letter appealing for gloves and mittens for the 12th Wes'
Yorks, I have had enough sent to supply nearly every man in
the regiment with a pair. I tried to write and acknowledge
every parcel, but Borne wero sent anonymously. In the name
of the men of the 12th West Yorks I desire to thanJc
most heartily all those who 50 generously responded to rel
appea1.-1 am, Sir, yours very truly,
BABETTa J A.QUES.
Ashlj'll, Grove Road, Leighton Duzzard.

HARDBNII"O HORSES,
To the Editor of LAND AND \V ATElt.
SIR,-I have now had some experience, ever since last
November, in conditioning horses from Canada for remounts.
l\Iost have come in poor, some very poor, Beveral far from
well, Bnd so far all have gone out in very good case.
I hav3 tried keeping them on hard water and on mix
d
water, and on quite Boft rain water out of a big tank. No
doubt all horses do better on Boft water, but in all my experi

ence of horscs, in not a few countries, I never found any 50
susceptible as the Canadians to the difference ol water, The
advantage of the all-soft is most marked. The general
thriving has been remarkable, and the beneficial effects on
coats and slins wonderful. Many of these horBes have very
bad coats and very bad Bkins, but with the soft water all goes
well. 'Ve also not infrequently dress the bad ones all ove

with sulphur and train oil, worked into a Btiff paste nnd well
brushed in, against the lie of the hair, with an old water.
brush. Tho effect is magical. I have done this with bad..
coateù horses for years. :Iliany tails have arrived badly
rubbed, Eome rubbed to Boreness. For this zinc and carbolio
lotion or ointment is hard to beat. If a horso rubs the
stump ol há tail againBt whitewaah he geta it itcl1y, and will
14*

:March 13, 1915.

LAND

A
D

eontinue to rub it to its destruction. All my boxes are tar
varnished t,o well abo\"e the top of the tail of a I7-hands horse
and whitewashed above. I have not clipped any of the
Canaàians.
I don't believe in clipping horses t,hat ",ill have to stand
out, and so exposing their vital organs with the thinnest
fikin over them. A sick horse in a box will stand wit,h his
muzzle to an op
n window to his advantage. A horse out in
a wind wiU st,and with his tail to it. In a cold wind Arabs
put a long sheet on to below the hocks, which generally blows
in between the hind legs and keeps tlle belly warm. For
fitanding out in a windy, exposed position it is ",ell t<> have
woollen rug:! with brass eyelets along each long side and to
lace them under the belly. This is the North African plan
for cold windy nights.
I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that in Africa In
very hot weather, and elsewhere, I have never known a horse
go wrong from the sun on his head; and I look upon the sun-
bonnets that were at one time fashionable as nonsense, but
under a hot sun horses standing out for long sometimes are
seized with vertigo, and die rapidly with the sun shining on
their loins. This is prevented by putting a numnah, or folded
blanket, over the loins. No harm comes to them when in
lIlotion, but the standing out may be fatal.
W. W. Lt;PToN.

Old },falton,

TO ATTACK ZEPPELINS.
To the Editor of LA
D A
D WATER.
DEAR SIR,-The phosphorus-tipped bullet which figured
In a recent issue of your paper would not succeed in igniting
the gas of a Zeppelin. Phosphorus bursts into flame at a
touch in the presence of oxyaen. But a balloon contains
hydrogen. Consequently the" phosphorus could ignite only
on lea\'ing the balloon for the outer atmosphere.
It is, however, obvious that Zeppelins should be attacked
by projectiles charged with some species of pyrotechnio mix-
ture, but this must produce its own oxygen.
It is also obvious that a stream of bullets or shells of the
ordinary type, fired at overh
ad marks frem Maxbm or quick-
firers, v.-ill result in a shower of spent projectiles somewhere
in the .. defended" city-a shower that would mean death to
many harmless citizens and much damage of property-while
the Zeppelins attacked would probably be the WOI1'e merely
by a few unimportant holes.
What is needed is a bullet that will ignite the gas of
banoons, damage aerorlanes equally with the ordinary bullet,
faci!itat,e aiming, and fall in a harmless condition.
I venture to think these qualities are possessed by a pro-
jectile patented by me la<;t December.
The pyrotechnic mixture is carried
in a thin aluminium sheath A, which
li1<1.V be stiffened in larger calibre!! (up
to -Ii inches) by a lining of quick-
burning celluloid. The conical cap B-
of celluloid or other Jight, tough, and
brittle material-contains the load of
the projectile, which makes up the
",eiabt to the normal. This load con- f)
6is
not of solid lead, but of filing3,
or very fine sbot; c is a movable parti-
tion resting on a ring; D is a wad; E a
cbarge of powder.
"When the pyrotechnic mixture ill
consumed and the summit of the
trajectory attained, the charge of
powder blows the empty shell A away
from the loaded cap B, and the lead f'
promptly spills, 80 that (A) the cap,
(B) the load of shot, and (c) the empty case fall se\'"e
aIIy
and harmlessly to the ground. A shower of such objects
would be no more dangerous than a severe hailstorm, and all
easy to avoid-by going ind?ors. No one can escape from
projectiles falling from a heIght of two or three mIles and
capable of penetrating roofs and floors.
This form of projectile has other advantages. In order
that the gases of explosion upon expulsion may not tend to
expand the case A 01' blowout the whol?
ontents, the pr
-
jectile is d1"Ïven out by a fuse-plug or dnvrng-plug, 1', ThIs
is blown out by the gases of combustion almost immediately,
but not before, the projectile has t!aveHed two. or three
hundred feet. During the brief penod before tlllS release
there is no very perceptible escape of sparks or smoke, so that
the exact position of the gun is not revealed. . ,
But once the plug is blown out, the I?roJechle leaves a
rocket-like trail of sparks and smoke, whIch by day, or . by
night v.ill plainly mark the trajectory of the proJectile.

.:i: -.:i .
:.
,.' i
...- t....
'. (':-i "
.I::I-h"

:
:4,
!ri:
: .!:::
..'.
.".... :.;. .....
".. . ^

f"

ATE R.

Especially will this be the C2.se with machine-g
ms, eo tl1::itJ
to hit a Zeppelin should be as ea
y almost as to strIke a
utter-
fly with the jet from a garde.n-hous
. But
errelms are
notoriously not an easy mark \Hth ordlI
ary proJect:Iles. .
I do not suppose our Government w
n adopt thIs devI
e-
such inventions usually go abroad. I gIve you the"e parhcu"
lars so that, when Zeppelins are flying o\'"er I/Qndon and the
shot and shell of our defenders are raining down upon our
housetops and our heads, your readers may at least h2.V6
the satisfaction of knowing that they are not the victims of the
ine,itable.-I remain, Sir, yours \
cry truly,
BER!\ARD :MIALL.

THE SOLDIERS AND SAILORS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of LA
D AXD W AT.I:R.
Du,n SIR,-'Ve have received an urgent appeal from the
Hospital Bristol, St. Malo, France, for tobacco and pipes for
the wounded men in that town, who number several thousand.
VIe are urgently in need of funds and should greatly
appreciate assistance from your readers, most of whom are
no doubt smokers and will appreciate what the loss of this
little luxury is.
At the present time we have more applications for
smoking material than we can possibly cope with.
Cheques, postal orders, kc., crossed" Barclay and Co,,"
llliouid be made out to the Hon. Treamrer, Mr. Roy Horni-
man.-Your obedient servant,
W. En.N COLLISON, Hon, Sec.
Çt;ntral House, Ringsway, W,C.

THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of LAlm A!\D WATER.
DEAR Sm,-Let me say at once, frankly, that I am one
of those who have II axes to grind." Not a velY large one, but
still an axe. You will see the edge of my axe sticking up in
the course of this letter. Further, please note I am not
attempting to criticise anyone or anything; I am endea.our-
ing to state facts-from my own point of view, of CQurse. I
have ventured to write to you because I am somewhat puzzled,
also because the particular question which puzzles me has not
been dealt with to any extent in your esteemed jeurnal,
although Mr. Blin Desbleds did just mention it once. It seems
to me to be of some importance. I am puzzled by an apparent
anomaly which may very likely exist in the particular case
....ith which I am familiar alone, but which, on the other
hand, may possibly be more general than this.
Here 19 the anoma.ly. According to the speeches of
Ministers and the articles, leading and otherwi"e, in the
papers, it is of great importance that all the el1giueering
works of this country should be employed to tbeir full capacity
in turning out war matericl. for the use of H,M. Forces aud
the Allies, and one might imagine that practically every firm
of that description, however small, would be doing wllat it
could in tbis direction. From what one reads, even in the
columns of your esteemed journal, it might be mpposed that
En<>'land and her Allies had to strain every nerve, 1I0t only to
supply the forces in the field at the present time, but to equip
the new armies now being trained, and that tbere is not au
enainecriu" sho p in these islands which could not be .. doit'g
" - I:J
its bit."
But is this really the case 7 Is it not rather the fact that
the Naval and Military authorities have the situation very
well in hand, and that plentiful and perfectly adequa_te
supplies of every kind of war material are asst1red from the
output of the Government shops, and .from t
at of t
e larg:e
firms with whom the Government lD or<.!mary hmes IS
accudomed to contract 7 Let me put a concret.e case.
After the war had been in progress for some n1ont,hs a
I!mall encYineerina firm which for several years had æen en-
deavouri
O' to
rfect and market a speciality found itself
faced with the following situation:
(a) It 1\"fiS impossible to 1;0 on tr)ing to make tbe s
cia'ily,
becau6Ð
(1) Many of its best emplo:'
es hand.cd in their notices o,,"inp:
to the very large bonuses and hIgh "dgCS oDeJ 'd by. tIle
big firms wbo were enga
ed on contracts for war malcnals,
The men verv naturally desired to palticipate in tbt.!'<'
bonuse.s, and tbe increase in the coaL of living accc'1tuated
their desire.
(2) Raw materials, which had becn steadily rising in
price, finally became unobtainab!e in ccrl
in cas"s; the
firms who .supplied them "be2 ing to b" c'fcnsed irom
quoting," since they 1\"ere fuHy occupied on l>o\el"ßment
work.
(b) The firm, therefore, had (1) either to close down and let their
employees go; (2) to dose dm, n, partialI J ' culting' d01' n
f'xpen.ses as far as possible, and ren-';'1ing in a state of .sus,
pended animation for the
riod of thè "al'; or (3) to try and
obtain GO\ emment work.

15*

LAKD

AND

After careful consideration Ule latter alternative was
decilled upon, amI reque:,:t!! to be allowed to quote were for-
warded to variou!I Go;,emYJlcnt departme.ilts and to several of
the large manufacturing firm!!.
The majoritv of the big fìrm3 had no work they could
offer, Some bai work not 8l1Ïtable to the ca.pabilitie9 of tba
small firm abo\-e mentioned, and one a!!1.ed for a definite
quotation. but after having considered it found tbe pri('es
altogether too high, although these had been .. cut JJ to tha
limit y, hich would allow the small firm in question a bare
profit.
Of the Government departruenh, some said they had no
work they could offer, sewral sent polite acknowledgment!!..
followed ill onc case by requc3t9 for quotation!! for different!
kind" of work wbich have been and are being submitted to
the be2t of tbe firm's aLilitv, and one wired that an interview
with the firm's repre3ent:Üh'e was de.oired. Tbis was followrd
1] a H
ry small "sample" order, and by assurance3 tha'
l:'ora orders would b
fortbcoming, So!:ir so good,
t::"nfortunatdy tha process abo\'e mentioned 1m3 been go-
ing on for some time, and tbe firm's employec3 baye been and
ue still wcrrying find asking" \Yhen shall we get the Go\'ern-
rr.cnt work 1" They state, and with Borne justice it must be
Ðc'!mowledged, that" thi3 haJ been going on since Chri.3tmas,
and all you have to show us is one Bma!! order. JJ It should be
remembered that their friend.3 in Leed3, on t116 Tyne, in the
West Riding, and many other places are earning very high
wages, and the large firms are continually advertiJing for men.
Naturally they feel em-iom.
On the firm's side of the matter, too, there is nothing to
feel part
cularIy joyful about. For month:! now the wage!!,
rent, rates, taxes, aU other expenses have been going on
and nothing coming in. Such a process cannot continue in,
definitely. I wonder if flny of your readers have ever con-
sidered what it costs to run even a very, very small manufac-
turing bmines3. To take a purely hypotbetic:!.l case, and one
nothing to do with the firm above mentioned, it is a very,
wry small bus.ineS3, as busine""e3 go nowadays, the wage:! biil
of which is only l:100 per week. Yet how many of your
readers would care t.o be called upon to find that sum at the
present time, plus the corresponding overhead charges and
aalaries 7
Now, of course, we are at war, and in war someone must
inevitably suffer. It may well be tbat it is better for the
country that the small firms should close down and tbeir work-
men go to aid the output of the large firms. This wiII entail
the entire extinction of Dlany of the small firms for good and
all, since a small shop depend::; on ih workmen who have been
trained in its speciality to a greater extent than do the lar
e
shops. Once the men ara scattered tbe firm as an .. entity ,
disappears.
However, tbis may be quite a necessary and unavoidable
feature o
the war, and it may be truly argued that it is n,,'
worth w!ule to try and keep the small firms alive becausa
(a) They c:lnnot tlITIl Ollt the qll3.ntitiea of whicl1 the !aria fll'DI.I
are capable i
(lI) Th('
' cannot do &11J thi'Jg like the nùIDoor of diffðrani nrlatI.
of wOlk j
(e) Th
ir price3 are bOllnd to
e øcrrnewhat higher, IIhoe 1u7-
capital, the ver:: latest mach.illi'r
', and ,"eat output ali øp

economy of proolld;.--n.
On the other hand, tbe I!mall firms may be u!leful in theIr
own wv..y, and it may be more ad,'anta<Yeom from the national
point of view to employ them rather th
n to let them go under.
If it is (and it i3 a point for the authoritie3 to decide) then 1.
a very simple way of doing it. That i3-
(
\

\'e them wor
suitabJè to their CApacitIes.
(
I <';He thi'm WOfii: promptly.
,:,"ou will bave ob.ervec1 the axe in the latter part of this
InorJmately long letter,-With apologies, yours faithfully,
u OXE OP TilE PRJ
CIP.\L5 OF .L SMALL FIR)(."
11, Bootbam Crescent, York,

THE DJFFERE
T SPBEDS OF A
AEROPLANE,
To the Editor of L.\
D A
;D WATER,
DE.\R SlR,-I have for 60me weeks Leen tryina to find
out the answers
o the Beries of questions given belo
, Pcr-
llaps Mr. L. DIm Desbleds wou1d kindl)' furnish them, Ð!I
thcy are probably of interest to many of yom readers a3 woll
a3 to me1
}, Dr. ,Clazebrook, in a lecture re,port!'d in tedrn.ic,al Jonrna13 and
d:ul)' papers, B
3tt'd that one of the fI) ing machincs could
tIa\'e! at a mnm1llm speed of,
aJ<, eightJ-'
\:6 miles per hour,
and down to forty per cent. th.is \'Ias a mWlmllm. DOE's thi.5
wean t1->at, in fa\'ourable air condit:ons it cowJ fly hori,
"ontall
' at Gny desired speed be: .\'e-en the.s
two limit:! fõx half
()I' onø Lour, or more! '
2. Dr. G'
zeb:CoOk mentioned the 10""t'r lim:t as ('specially useful
f", a!:.l:htm
p\l!'p;'>SC3. Ia thÜ merðl,)" in facilitatini .electing

Jv. ATE R.

Iarch 13, 1915.

. spot on which to a.l'ght, or In occnpyini leu dLitance &WI
time in cOIl"Jng safely to land r
3. Has the lower speed limit a<hantages in sconting, as in a fift;r-
one hllndred mile trip a gre:lt-er time wOllld be taken, and coa-
sequently the country could be examined more closel)"!
4, What are the meanll wfÚch allow of this range of speed! Adjust.-
ment of the angl" of the wings, or of the tail or of both!
6. Is the power required abollt thø samØ thronghollt the ranga, (Ø
is the motor rUll fa:!ter or &lowar 80S the speed is va.ried up (Ø
down 1
6, Is there any small quite up-to-date book pùblished (lvin& ex

general informatio.il such 80S
ed for above r
-Yours. very truly,

II EXQUlRU.'-

EEPLI>:3.
1. The staumen' mea.I1lI that for a certain amOlUlt of power ...
aeropldone can fly horizontally a
t..-o specds-a high speed and
a low one. In the ill5tancø quoted the lower speed is forty
per c
nt, of the higher one. The ac.('ompan
'ing Cll1\e will
make the point clear. It rðfers to a lIIériot monoplane, but ILIl
other &eropla.nea have a CI11'"\"O of a øimlL1r cha.ra.ct.er. Thi.

CllJ"P
SMwlqg- t.Æe re!aæJn. berwt!t'rt
r..!rP in.clåuzf:ion or""'azz aßrqph.nd
and t.fie Ef. J? re'1aired t'offý æ
at' e/uzf' ir
úit.aeion.

!U B

------------- ------------------- -..---.

A: ...:

--------.---f------ I -------r-----
: ' .
HI: d: :B

liu:tir..a.ti.:m. Út a1.,'17'ees

o

--

curve showa two important facti!: (a) there III an InclinatiOil.
and where the hone-power OA is a ßÙnimum j (b) tb..re ar.
t"1:0 inclinatioIlJl, Bi and B2, of the machine for wh.ich the
horse-powor DB, re41llired to fly it horizontaJ.I)', b the same.
Therefore, for a given hOi"òe-power DB a machin.e ca.n fl1
horizontaU,y eilher at the inclination BI or at B2. Kow, te
each inclination of the macbine tbere corresponds a speed.
Tht'r..fore, for a ginn horse-power DB, the ma.cwne can 81
horizontally at II. ap9E'd corresponding to the inclinatioIl'Bl (Ø
at tl1at ddined by the incJilllltion B2, If the motor 'ii'U pÐ-
fedly elastic the horseo-po\\ er it d
\ eloped c-auld be r..gulatðd
to give any amount of power comprised between OB IInd t.h.
minimwn 0_\. In sllch a case the aeroplane could be flown ..
any Inclination comprised between Bl &lid B2---i.
., it woul.
have aDY epeed contained wit11in the limil.a of those definoo b,1
lil and B2. Unhappily, aeroplaue IDûtora are not very elas
.
as regards power, and one cannot rel
' to fly at any dc.W.I-.4
speed bch\een th" two limit.il which a.re (h'_ by t.h. ame
amount of power.
2, It could be employed for all theM pnrpæeL
2\, Yell.
4, AdjUBtment of 10n
tud
na.1 l.udiaa
ioo of 1.he mac.hilM ..
explained in (1) abol'e.
6. This ù explai'led in P.eply 1.

. I sm afraid not. O!le could commIt with advantage the P.eporW
of the Go"\'crnment Ad\'isorv C'mnrnitt..e for Aeron!lIltiCð, the
wcrks of G. Eiffel, and of bro. PrandH. There is, of COIlrM,
. spociaJ periodical literatllI'o dcalin
with aeronautics. Th.
bf>st two are, to my mind. La Technique ..4.tronautique

L'_4é7op1.ile. There iil also a fì1'st,rate Germ= public

which. at present, however, 1& not aylilla.bla..

In the appeal which appeared in our columns last wee]ì
on bebalf of the Y.M.C,A. for fnnd3 for the construction of .
Sailors' Home at In,ergordon from Sir Andrew H. Pettigrew
we omitted to give the address to which sub3criptions could
he sent. These should be addressed to that
ent1eman a'
6, Marlborough Terrace, Gla3g0W, \V,

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S LECTüRES ON THE WAR.
BOllrncmonth.... Pavilion,.......... rhllrsday.........11 lIIarch, 3 p.m.
\\.eymouth...... Bllrdon R-ooms. Thur"daJ .........11 :March, 8.30 p,m.
Pl.rmouth.........GuildhaU........ Friday............ 12 March, 3 and 8.3Q.
Exeter............. Yictoria I1aJl.. Saturday..........13 :March, 2.30 p,m,
Leeds ............ Albert Hall ... T1->ursda'....,......18 IIIa.rch, 3 and 8.30.
?\ewC88t1e ...... {I.'own Hall .... Frida\',.
.....,... 19 March, 25 &lid 8.30.
Glasgow......... ,......................IIIondi w ........... 22 March.
Edinbllrgh ...... ....................... .Tllesdåy .........23 March.
Seats may now be boo1.ed for the next eeriell of LectllNlØ a.t Queen'.
H:illj these 8.rð to be &:ven on tJJe firat WeWle.sd.L,y In April. M&lo
and June.
!\Ir. Fred T. Jane will lectuI'e at the Mechan:c's Han, NottIngham"
at 8, on Wedr>csrlay, 17th March, unde. the &æpicea of the Navy League"
lIis Grace the Duke of Portland has cOIlßentcd to take the chah.
1111'. Walter LC'a.f, D. Lit
, wiU loot re on .. Th3 Dardenellea II ..,
th. Æolia.n Hall on rÙlav, March 26th, at 8 p,m, Tickets, pri

7s, 6<1. and 2... M., C&D. be cb
iaoJ. hwu MW 1', S
ra.cl1ðJ' bB.
\ ictoria Street, B. W.

16-

March I J, I q I 5

L A
D A"\' D \y t\ T E R

.-

.

.

..

.
.

.1. ens

From

Are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
made by a British
Company with British
Capital and Labour.

10/6
upwards.

THOMAS DE LA RUE &: CO.. LTD.. LONDON.

I for CUTLERY. etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.

!Q

:

od

t
.T W
RI
F
I
.ENT 1
AN EFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR THE FEET AGAINST WET I
AND FROST OR THE RIGOURS OF A TRYI NG MARCH,
I CChe Jollowing leller.. lupical of many received. .how how invaluable it ha
proved 10 our >olJiers in Ihe trenches :--
.II Lieutenanl write. :_U EJCcellent. MJI feel have been .oaleing often,
and have never been cold .ince J u.ed it,"
.II private of the London Scotti.h, writing 10 hi. doctor frrend. .ay. :
.. CChank !Jou once again for the ointment you.o leindly .ent me, and to tell Jlou
howeJCcellent J found it, J managed to keep mJlfeel and anltle. quite warm,"

FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL

I
I
\:

ARTICLES \I...\UE FH.O\I THIS
STFEL, BEING ENTIREL) UN-
AFFECTED BY FOOD AC] US,
FRIll'S, YI:\IEGAR, etc., WILL BE
FOl'
D TO BE OF F
Ük\l( )I'S
AD\'A
TAGE I
HOfELS,
CLUBS, RESTAURANTS,
CA:\IPS. NEITHEH. THE I\.NIFE-
BOARU NOH. CLEA:\II
G
\fACHINE IS NOW NECESSARY.
(' CUTLER) OF THIS STEEL
'fA) BE HAD OF ALL THF
LEADING "fANt'FACTI' HE HS,
SEE THAT KNI\'ES BEAR THIS
\IAH.I\..

SQUIRE & SONS, I2".D:
Chemists on the establishment of H.M. The King,
4130XFORD ST., LONDON, W.

f'
. I '
J

' Richard Dehan's Latest Success

The MAN of IRON

If

By Richard Dehao, 6
Author of "THE DOP DOCTOR." S.

BlS\1....RCK
"One reads the eight hundred pages with
ever-increasing absorption in the terrible
and wonderful story."- Pall Mall Gazette.
"Remarkable for scope and po,".rer, for
grasp of the larger aspects of the subject,
and for great interest at this moment."-
El'enir,g Standard.

IFiRTHl
f'STAi N LESS)

Original and Sole Makels:

THOS. FIRTH &. SONS. LTD.
SHEFFIELD.

HEINEMANN

355

L .\ :\ f) ,\:\ D \\ \ r F 1<.

March [3, [
P5

i\10TOR AMBTJIJANCES
NEEDED

By AT,IER rON FLEMI!\JG
I) l'RI
(, mv wandering" in France and Belgium,
arc;Jing for that which, under thp pre"ent
"trid censor
hip, is almost as clusin- as the
f,II11Olh philosopher'
tonL
" rea] .. war r.ews,
to \\it I ha ve had Illany OppOl tunities of
...tudying the que"tion of motor aillbylancl'
and of act
I.Llly
-;eeing them doing- th,' work for which they \\pre destmed,
'[ure th,m once ha\ e they stood me in good stead dnd spiritpd
me a\\av frum ,l\\"lzward corners, Still it is not of the assist-
ance wl{ich they havc rendered to me personally that I \\ish
to \\fite, hut uf the very real \\ork that they ha\'e done in
connection with the rernO\'al of wounded men, and the
thousand
of \'alnable lives thev have saved, not only those
of our 0\\ n countrymen, but of tlie men of France and Bèlgium,
:\[odern \\ arfãre, from the \"erv nature of it-and from
the \',I.;t number of combatants engaged-means huge
casualt\' li.;ts, and from the extent of it-the length of the
tìghting front- the great difficulties in the way of the quick
removal of the wounded, hea\"y wastage of life owing to the
absence of that immediate attention which so often saves the
lives of badly \\ ounded men, when neglect, even of a temporary
nature, would inevitablv mean death. To obviate this
neglect as much as it is humanely possible is the mission of
the Red Cross, and to those who realise what modern warfare
reallv means it \\ill at once be obvious that to tdckle the
matter snccessfully not hundred" but thuusands of ambu-
lances are required; also, that these thousands must Le
const,mtly at wurk, which also means efficiency, and a \'ery
high standard of efficiency at that-a standard which it is
impossible to maintain unless there is at e\'ery hospital base
d. sufficiently large number of reserves and a properly equipped
repair depôt and staff of mechanics,
Since my return I have been tackled by several people
in connection with the subject of Red Cross work.
ome of
them have been possessed of enough common sense to enable
them to rcalise the actual condition of things with regard to
the necessity for a very large number of suitable ambulances;
others, I am sorry to say, have been frankly sceptical and
have openly sneered at the efforts of many really good schemes
to raise money to buy more ambulances. To these latter
I have but one thing to say: it is impossible to have too
many! It is bad enough for a soldier to be wounded in the
service of his country, bad enough for him to suffer the pain
which his wounds bring him, but it is infinitely worse should
he have to lie where he drops for hours-sometimes for days--
until he dies from exhaustion or loss of blood, It is to put a
stop to this kind of thing to alwa
's have at hand plenty of
assistance and a sufficient number of vehicles to enabL'
these badly wounded men to be conveyed rapidly and comfort-
'lbly to the nearest place where skilled medical aid may be
obtained, It is for this reason that I repeat my assertion
that there cannot be too many of these ambulances in the
field at any pdrt of the extensi\'e front.
During the early stages of the war there was an appalling
scarcity of Red Cross cars. Both the enemy and the Allies
do not appear to have thoroughly realised the huge number of
casualties which modern conditions render inevitable, for it is
.L well-known fact that the German Red Cross in the first two
months of the war were very badly provided with vehicles
,md medical supplie", On our own side matters were rapidly
remedied, and our own \Var Office also made prompt arrangp-
ments to cope with the situation by placing large orders with
practically all makers of repute for a steady supply of
suitable vehicles with bodies built to their 0\\ n d
"igns,
In the early days it was surprising to see what a number
of old crocks of cars were sent out to act ao.; ambulances.
People at home :>eemed to think that any old scrap-heap of a
car, \'vÌth as rhe.lp a bodv as possible, wa
good enough for
the work. I used to see cars pulled up by the roadside, miles
away from anywhere, with the gear, box dropping out, or the
back a:c1e gone, or some other complaint usually the outcome
of senile decay. One car simply shed its body en route,
Fortunately, it was empty at the time: had it had its load
of wounded 011 board I shudder to think of what would have
happened to them, Possibly it may interest mv readers to
know that many of thesf' ambulances are expected to--and
in many ca<; ; do--run anything from one hundred to one
hundred and hfty miles per day every day of the week. A
practical motori<;t \\iU at OIlU just what this means and
how reallv good a car mu..,t be to ..,tand up to the work.
Only .1 sound clId,.,,,i... can do it, 0 that it can easily be seen

,Lí.I'. vi I :'....

It earned that title when it undertook tasks in tests and trials which
most people .thought were only to be accomplished by the big powered
modern tourmg car.
.. AudacIous" I-yes, and-victorious!-
Vict
rioUB in the ALPINE TRIAL-the greatest and severest of all
tourmg
ar tests-when the little Singer, bristling beside its big brothers,
never faded on any gradient. completed the course. and finished far
ahead of ti me !

Victorious _in the R.A.C. 6 DAYS' LIGHT CAR TRIAL, when it was
awarded S11vel" Trophy and gamed 200 Guineas for best aU-round
performance!
No wonder it is known &s .. The Audacious little Singer"!
And that, by the way, is the title of a most artistio Foldel" which we
have just pUblished-let us send you copy.

SINGER It CO., Ltd.. Coventry and 17 Holborn Via,. E,C,

I"

,
.,,-
'
Q}} ,
,

j

S\
(
C4.r,
11
'\., )
---

PR1CES :-

f205 & f215.

35 6

.. <(;he Toad has an incurable habit of
dispro\>ing whal look. convincing enough
on paper."

C LAIMS for tyres may be divided into t"'o
classes-paper claims and road claims. ,The
paper claim is to compare your tyre with a
rival's, show a cash saving of 10, 20 or 30 per cent.,
and declare that your tyre is the superior in that
proportion. That is not the

DUNLOP

w
y. A!I Dunlop claims are essentially road claims.
1 he ROAD is the only true arbiter between tyres
and tyres, and the verdict of the road last year was
overwhelmingly in favour o
Dunlops. To take one
instance out of many-the Tourist Trophy Race.
Every manufacturer used Dunlop tyres
(with one exception).
All the prizes were won on Dunlop tyre:;.
We believe that the motoriôt prefers the road claim to
the paper claim. The enormous demand for Dunlop
tyres confirms us in this,

The Dunlop Rubber Co" LId"
Founde,. ,hrouabou. .he Wortd of .he
PneJmatic Tyee Indultry,
Alton CrOll, Birmin8bam; 14 Rr:lf"nt
Stree', London, S.W, PARIS: 4 Rue
du Colonel Moll,

(j
TR HH: ..
ld A It Ii:

March 13, 19 1 5

LA l\ D A X D \Y ATE l{

.

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,
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A' t,

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a., t r- 1
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Ushel

S
l.REEN STRIVÊ &"OVG
'
Scotch \V11Ískies,

"Sup om 0 'n
ai/Waters"

e!

Battle Cruiser H,M.
, [NDOMITABLE, Dlsi-Jac nt 17,250 tons. Built by Fairfield Shipp ng and EngIneering Co. Comp" cd
Length 562 ft.. beam T
. C_ at.lt f:1.752.COO. Engine 46,000 horse power; best speed 28'7 knots. Guns," [2-"... 164-_1..,
3 torpedo t b
submerged, Maximum coal capacity 3,000 tons. Crew 7[:0
Fr no t,",o original by Monta
e Dawr"n.
<:ot1rithl o[ :\lrS
HS, A:'IIDhE\\ l'SIIEH /I" CO., DISTILLERS, P.DI:\:BL'RCH.

\
n

l\10TOR A
IBL'L \
CES
EEDED

.. I

that the \\"{ 'ding-out pron i w. fairh rapid and that not
\ e r\ mam' of the old crocks ,un [\'ed thl ordeal.
Ill!' ne rI for rt e on"tant <;upply of uitable \'ehicles is
\ e r\ .11, and \\i11 remain ,,0 cI" long a
the war lasts, for the
,1\\ IlII T ld )ndition- I"ombint'd \\ith in.. ,lilt IJard work.
I\JU,j f a neu it\ \\c:U the \ chicle" out murh quicker than
tIll \\ ould be " 1m out under nOi mal conditions; not only
Ih,lt, but a
our troop'" ,Hh,lI1cc' thl \\ork will helome much
II< 1\ iLr 0\\ in" to the inq e. "ill!; c1i,t.l ne"- hetween
t" figilting fr
nt ,mtl th(; u...st ho"pit:J1 h. .-\nother
iJllportant \\ork \\hich ha" to be le('\"(OII"<I \\ith is the fad
t h,lt thc fir ,t large batch of ambulan{" h,l\ ,lIre,uly done
the equi\ alent of three ye ars work. It one compares their
mileage \\ ith that of the d\ er,lge {".Ir' normal l\Jilf"I,
e in peace
time", and that, therefore. a lot of t!WIH arc due to crack up
,It about the same time, al"o, it TIm:;, ,11\\-,1\', bf' ren1f'mhered
that although the Lars ha\
bl en fairly looke<l after It ha<;
been a TIuttC'r of sheer impo- .ihility to gin- them one-tenth
part of the attention that they would have received in the
ordinary \\ay.
'Iy ad\ ice to am" philantlJJopic31h' minded person who
fecls inclined to pre"ent a motor ambul,U\ce to the Red Cross
is to select a good strong cha<;sis of some well-kno\\ n
make, and one of which spare parts are ea<;ilv and quickly
obtainable, hand it O\'er to a reallv good b()d
'-builder who
specialise" in ambulance bodie", and who is not likely to
produce an abortion of a body that is apt to fall off the
chassis the first time it is subjected to rough work. Along
the long str,light roads of France, through the flatlands. the
wind at times is very strong, and 1 have seen, more than
once, some of these canvas and lath atrocities, which are
known as "cheap" ambulance bodies, simply give up the
ghost altogether and collapse like a trodden-on matchbox,
enveloping their unfortunate occupants in the debris, to
wait possibly an hour or more until the arrival of an empty
vehide to their relief.
The need for a sufficiency of motor ambulances was
brought very c1earlv before me during the ten days I spent
with the FICnch Red Cro
" in the vicinity of Arras,
at the time of the second as<;ault of thi" much-beleaguered
place. At Feuchy, a little hamlet about three kilometres
from Arras, tþere was a field hospital-a place \\ hich 1 shall
never forget as long as I live, a veritable Inferno. Every
house in the village had its fun complement of dead, dying,
and wounded. They lay literally in hundreds on the side-
walk-some on straw, the majority on the \\et ground.
\Vhenever there was a vacant space, due to the removal of
a body, it was quickly taken up by a fresh arrival. To
deal with this never-ceasing tide of wounded, to convey
them to the hospitals in AHas, there was-what do you
think? One large hay wagon! It was only due to the
devotf'Cl services of two citizens of the town who owned cars
that the majority of the"e pOOl Ùt'\ 1.1-; were pnabIed to get
into hO<;Ditals at al1.

...

r

"'4
. .
.... ,....- ;a.

.-. I,
, -
'I
11 .
I
,

't,.

"

......

A WELL-DESIGNED AMBULANCE BODY FITTED
TO A CADILLAC CHASSIS
Two of tbele were aivento the Red Crosl Corps of the AUltr.llan EJ:
ditiOll""
For.c
b,. R. Barr Smith, E'Q" and one by Me..... Eyes & CJOwle. Ltd. The
vchu" es arc completdy equlÞDed wi,h elf'clric Iluhtina and lIelf-starler. 6ve demount-
able nm.
lyres, and tubes. whllc{ the:: bodies. which arc of local manufacture. have
been eqUlpr-..d to the la!!lt d..tall. and are 6Ued with four well-spruna Itretchen and
accomn la n for one aUrndAnt inside. or with the I.rdchen down they will CUr}'
ten ,,\tghlly wounded IOMlen. There arc .1.0 6tted locken lor lurgÎcal appliance.
ud w.J.ter tank

\ ,,() \\' \ T E R

March J 3, I C) ;

THE BURBERRY

Genu;"e
BrtTbeTTV
Ga,.mntt",
are lubdled
Æ. BUTtx,,} ..

THE YOKE BURBERRY
A new cavalry weatherproof. The
front is cut to faU \\-ell forward
and cover the horseman's knees.

SHORT NOTICE KIT
Burberry. keep Tunica. Slack..
Breeches.Great Coat. and Wanna.
read
to try on: .0 that fittinK i.
done when ordering. either in
London or Paria. and the kit com-
pleted in a few hours.

Lined Proofed Wool or detachable Fleece
The remarkable weather,resisting proper'
ties of THE BURHERRY first becam

generally known to Military Men during
the South African War.
The reputation won during those memOr-
able days has been more than justified
during the present campaign, which ha,
conclusi
'ely proved it the most serviceablt:
,afe;:uard against bad weather,

TH E HURßERRY is the only self-

'entilating weatherproof top-coat which
has consistently demonstrated its use
fulness as a shield again'I the rain, snow,
y, ind, mud and water which are the eveT! -
day conditions under which OUr gallant
Army is fighting in Flanders and Picardy_
The following tribute from the trenches is
aD example of numbers of letters and
Press comments received recently:
"JlIst a line to congratulate YOIl on the
water-resisting Ploperties of "Our goods, I
was moved into the trenches and could not
get at my overcoat, and aU I had in it.
place was one of your Troþical rain coats.
This stood three davs' ram. and alth01tgh
the 1IIe"'s coats "'ere soal/Cll. nothing !'ot
thrC'II[[1z. tll\' flllJuerry.JI
(Capt.) E. ,11,. 14th Co, London Regt,
26-1-5.
MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE

FUR-LINED BRITISH WARMS
at GREAT
Y REDUCED PRICES
Usually NOW
17 Lined Pony Skin" - 9 Cns.
6 6.,
14 Lined Wallaby -. II Cns,
7 7..
II Lined Mannot - - 12 Cns,
7 7..
TheBe afford OfficerB a rare opportunity of
obtaininK luxurioua Warm. of auperb quality.

BURBERRYS
Haymarket LONDON
8 & 10 Bd. Malesherbe.. PARIS
Ba.ing.toke and Provincial Agents

ALL
BUT

MATERIALS COST
TH E PRICE OF

MORE
THE

FAMOUS

12 h.p. ROVER
CAR

ß350

WILL

NOT

BE

ALTERED

THE ROVER CO., Ltd.
METEOR WORKS, COVENTRY.

59/61 New Oxford Street,
London. W.C,

and at
and

16 Lord Edward Strut.
Dublin.

35 8

The County Gentleman

AND

AND & WATER

V 01. LXIV.

No. 2758

SA TURDA Y. l\1ARCH 20. 1915

[ PUBLISHED AS ]
A XEW"PAPElt.

PRICE SIXPEKCE
PUBLISHED WEEh.LY

..

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.

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--

,

-

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--

. .

. ' )
\ -"
. I
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I I J ,

.

.

L þyTJ&/oI., J. R..> II 6-

MAJOR-GENERAL W. PULTENEY, C.B.

Commanding the Third Army Cor('s

L ,-\
DAN D \\ ATE R

March 20, 1915

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:\larch 20, 1915

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

THROUGH

THE

EYES OF

A WOMAN

By MRS, ERIC DE RIDDER

Copyright, Madam. Lal,i. Chari..
THE MARCHIONESS OF LlNLlTHGOW
Though she is engaged wilh many philanthropic schemes at Hopetoun
House, South Queensferry, Lady Lin/uhgow 6nd. lime 10 help
in the hospital work abroad, She has raised a fund in
aid of Ihe French hospilals, and medical slores are
being sent Bcro.s the Channellwice a week

The Change in Things
T HROUGH the nature of things, on account of
our geographical position and because of our
natiunal character, the v.ar has seemed to many
an onlooker to leave England untouched. \Ïsitors
from France have found it difficult to reconcile
the sight of London going on serenely, much the same as
usuJ.l, with the fact of a great nation fighting for her very
existence. It is, of course, intensely ddìicult for them to
understand, and it can hardly
be expected that they would.
The change in the nation-
for a change there is-is far
too subtle for any foreign
mind to understand. I t does
not matter how close may be
the bonds of union between
two nations or how inter-
mingled their interests may
be. Certain manners and
customs in the one are bound
to be as a sealed book to the
other. It cannot in the very
essence of things be other-
Wise. So it comes to pass
that it is only we who are
living in the centre of thing..:
who can understand thf'lll
as they are. "'e can see th

change in the men who have
joined Kitchener's Army. It
has happened in front of our
very eyes. 1\1en who have
spent all their days before in
office and shop, some of whom
spent nearly all their time in
underground rooms away
from sunshine and fresh air,
have become changed beings.
They have grown, they have
,;traightened, they have filled
out, They are leading a life
at last-not an existence. It
needs but the briefest glimpse
of the faces as one of the new
battalions s\\ings through the
streets on a route march to
prove this, Has the war come
as the liberator of thousands
of men from lives that were
not worth the liyjng? One
wonders. I,n any case, it is
hard to believe that when
once it is over they will settle
down to the old drab routine
once more. They are playing the greater game, and the <;>ld
limitations are fading in consequence. Nobody can WIsh
them back or regret this change the war has brought. In
this particular way its influence is golden, and even a drab
routine should melt beneath the glow.

Those Who Slay at Home
The frame of mind of the non-combatant population is
more difficult to gauge. To the foreign temperament it
must be baffling, if not indecipherable. We, of co,:rse, know
from our personal experience that this war has bltten deep
into the lives of the greater majority of people. \ye know
that in scores of cases it has left traces \\ hich will never
pass away from the lives of those it has seare
. 'ye re
lise
that days yet to come will bring this brandmg Iron mto
many a home as the casualty Jists grow bigger. We see
numbers of people being called upon to display cour
ge and
fortitude to an almost unlimited extent; we are wItnesses
to the way in which they do it, but are ,,:S
il
nt in our
admiration as they are in their grief. The disClphne of war
is no mere term, but the most tangible of realitie
, as many
are proving day after day. And yet to the untra
ned eye It
would certainly seem as if nothing out of the ordmary were
happening. We can hardly blame our visitor
from abroad
if they are deceived by this lack of ?e
onstratlO!1' We can,
indeed, hardly wonder if they are IrrItated by It. It must
be irritating-intensely so; the least imaginative person can
see it. Even those of our Allies who pride themselves upon

their knowledge of England, her people, and their ways are
apt to feel it. "I cannot," said a well-known Frenchman
the other day, "understand London. If the Germans \\ere
as far from you as they are from Paris, if they were at
Oxford, for instance, you might at last realise \\ hat war
means." A few of us perhaps do not yet realise it; others
who do betrav the knowledge in no \isible way. It is no
wonder that the report of our indifference is a growing one.
And yet the change this "ar
is making in all our lives is an
immense one-so immense
that nobody can calculate it.
Only time will give the answer
to the sum, and perhaps it
will never be finally supplied.

A Leiter from Belgium
A short while ago men-
tion was made in this article
of the Hector 1IIunro Ambu-
lance Corps. Last week a
letter was recei\'ed from two
officers in the Belgian Army,
which I have great pleasure
in repeating word for word.
They ask that their name"
shall not be published, for
reasons they themselve5 give,
at the end of the letter. It
runs as follows :
.. \\'e have just received tho
number of LAND AND \VATER of
the 27th of February. \Ve read
in this number, under the title
.. Through the Eyes of a "'oman,
Good \\'ork in Belgium," an
article on Lady Dorothy Feilding
and Doctor ðl unro, \\ ho, since the
beginning of the war, have been
so devoted to all our \\ounded,
and we are enchanted to see
that through your ne"spaper the
names of these two braves shall
be known. But we both think
that to be just vou should add
three other names to those two:
;\liss "ary Chisolm, :\115, Gleason,
and :\lrs, Knocker.
These three voluntarv nur

have e
tablished their ambulance
in Pervyse quite near the trenches
Pervyse is shelled every day, but,
nevertheless, they remain and
h('lp day and night our wounded
and sick men, going near the
trenches to pick them up. The\
are billeted in a room in a ruined
house, and we believe their names
must be kno\\n as an example of
devotion and abnegation,
\"e should like you not to J'ublish our names under this letter,
lor we do not want these three ladies to know that we wrote you."
Such a tribute straight from the headquarters of the Belgian
Army shows that the fine work being done by English" omen
amongst the wounded in Belgium is fully appreciated.

'-

---

Girls' Palriotic Clubs
The helping hand is being stretched out in all directions;
it is one of the cheering notes of these difficult times.
lany
signs have made it obvious that the need for girls' clubs in
the many new military centres is a great one. Once these
are formed they will provide a place to whieh girls can take
their men friends, in which they can find books to read,
papers to see, to say nothing of the comradeship of their
own sex. A committee on behalf of the dubs is working
at 33 Park Lane, W. In order to raise the neee"sary funds
an alphabetical scheme has been drawn up. Twenty-six
well-known ladies have offered to receive donations from
those whose names have the same initial letter as their own.
A full list of these will soon be published. Meanwhile the
work has many influential friends to help it on its \\ay.
Lady Sydenham is the honorary treasurer, and 1IIiss Emily
Kinnaird, \\ ith her great knowledge of social \\ork, is taking
a leading part in the movement.
\\'omen's United Service Clubs
So many leagues and societies have been founded for
the public weal d.uring the last few months that Lady Jellicoe
<c"""ftwJ (1ft p
,. 380)

37'

LAND AND \V A TER

A USEFUL STEED DURING
THE WAR.
TheRoyal Lady's.sunbeam
b;ith the Little Oil1Jath Gear=Case
and
!:12 12 0 ---;;
Speed Gear

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,
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.-

-

The Easiest Running Lady's Cycle in the \Yorld,
The All-black pattern for. use in al
. weather
is
one guinea extra-its cham and dn vIng beann&s
are enclosed in a weatherproof metal case, and It
only needs occasional
iping over with a damp
sponge in order to keep It clean,
Illustrated Catalogue on aPPlication to Dept.
3 SUNBEAMLAND, WOL VERHAMPTON.

London Showrooms:
57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
158 SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Square), S.W.

Which shðll it be ?
BRITISH
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Similar Taste!
Similar Properties!

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J.--.
-1.Ù BR ITI S"' 'f (
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I' R..pa;

arts. Pints.
6/- 3/6
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Re e
"PIIlt-.
2/6 t
T.

PFR
noz.

A. J. CALEY & SON, LTD.,
Chenies St, Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH,

March 20, 1915

"My heart's right there."
Your Soldier friend off to the Front, or at the Front-
has he a Waterman's Ideal? If not, m,:ch as he may
desire to write to you, the most convement means of
doing so is missing.
end him.a Waterman's Ide
l, so
that he can write as his heart dictates, clearly, qmckly,
and without trouble.
Wat
an.s
M\
i!)
Fountain Pen

Send the Safety Type-it can be carried loose
in the pocket in any position and will not leak.
A LANCE-CORPL. IN THE
ROYAL FUSILIERS, writing
to his brother, said:
.. Can 1/OU 8elld me a Fountain
Pcn' The Pe-ns here are no good.
JI IIenever I want to write there are
four or five Q/ OTLr fellcwB buz.oitlg
r01md the inkweU,
He got a Waterman's Ideal
(Safety Type). and is delighted
with it.
10/6 and up\\ards for
Regular and Self-
Filling Types.
12/6 and upwards for
Safety and Pump-
Filling Types.
Of Stationers and Jewellers every-
where. Rooklet free from-
L. G. SLOAN,
.6 Ch
lJ
1t (tømcr It
Kingsway, London, W,c.

HOTEL CECIL

THE

COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Telephone: GERRARD 60.

37 2

Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

}'larch 20, 1915.

LAND AND YfATER.

THE
By

WAR BY
I-IILAIRE

LAND.
BELLOC.

NOTE.-ThiJ ,\rtlcle Ius been submitted 10 the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publlcaUoa .. ccnlored, aad úkel ..
responsibility lor the correl:tncss 01 the .Ulewent..
In ai:COrd3nçe with tlte requirements of the I're
s B!lrean. tbe poslt19ns of troops on Plans lI!ulllratloJt tblll Article mOlt 00 1 1 I"
r
baCiled as approximate, IInd no definite IItrengtñ at any point Is indicated.

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10
E1}gwJi yiti?s

THF 1''"0 ACTIO:XS OF I A B.\S
ÉE AND
PERTHES IN CI-J...\l\IPAG:'JE.
T HERE has been fought in the last few
days b,r the British and Indian forces
noÌ,th of La Bassée, against the Bayarians
and a rcmnant of the Prussian Guard,
an action which is highly significant of the ends
to which all trench warfare in the west is designed.
L('t us try and see ,,-hat happened.
At the beginning of last week. Monday and
Tue
da'y, the 8th and 9th, the heayy French
fighting one hundred miles to the south of tþe
British positions in Champagne had come to Its
dimax and had achieyed its- purpose. It is im.
poriant to cast one's eye to that distant point.
because, as will be seen in the sequel, what the
Briti
h did near La Bassée was dosely co-
ordinated with the French effort in Champagne,
and the two together exactly illustrate the now
sllccessful plan of attrition to which so many;
months of effort hayc been directed.
This heav:y French action in the Champ
gne
district had drawn down to the German front
reinforcing tr.x>ps from all along the line, but in
particular east of that COlilltry in front of Lille,
bct,\een Ypres and La Bassée itself, "hich is

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where the German line faced the British Expedì-
tionarT force.
D"uring those same days of
Iondar anti
Tuesday, upon the left of the British line-that
is, in the neighbourhood of Ypres and some'" hat
to the south of that neighbourhood near
\.rmen-
tières-pressure bad been exercised upon the
('nemy of a little more than normal kind. and, in
t.he words of the description upon which all this
is b3sed. a definite mastery over the enemy in this
section had been obtained. He ha d, it ma y bt1
IJresumed, been led to e\:pect further mo, eJilent
here-let us sa
', between Ypres and Armentières,
and on the night of the Tuesday a sma 11 hody of
the enemy made a counter-moye upon St, Eloi, just
outside Ypres, which was repeIIed.
But with the morning of \Yednesday, tho
10th, it was apparent that the plan designed b.\.
the British command was of a ditTerent characte!.'
from "hat the enemy expected, and that as a great
effort "as about to be made, not upon the left and
left centre between Armentières and Y pres, but
upon the e\:treme right in the neighbourhood of
and to the north of La BaE>
ée, where for some
time past the enemy's pre

ure upon the allied
line (" hich here joins its t" 0 ('ontingeut8, the
French and British) has been p:n-ticularly strong.
1*

LAN D A
D ;\'
ATE u.

MardI 20, 1915,

The line in the immediate neighbourhood of
t.nis field, beginning with the canal b
t" een J
a
:Bassée and Bethune, r:Hl some\\ hat as follows (so
fat as can be gathered by an obseryer at hom3
from the French and English reports). It started
from the neighbourhood of Cuinchy just north oi

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that slight slope of land which the French car-
ried some weeks ago, ,yhen they took the ruineJ
ch
tteau of Yerme11es. The trenches covered tho
little yillage of Givenchy and then ran down the
slope upon which this place is built on to the
marshy flat just west of Festubert (which the Ger-
mans foolishly and Flemishly spell with an h). This
point in front of Festubert represents the extreme
of the indentation which the local German suc-
cc
!'ses caused in the allied line in an attack they
t.1e1iyered mainly against the Indian troops some
.weeks ago. From this extreme point it 'went
J)orth-eastward again, not far from the lane that
leads from the church of Festubert to the high
road on the east, passing by the group of scat-
tered houses near Quinquerue; thence it went
north, stiIl with a little east in it, coyering the
two Richebourgs, until it struck the high road
l) bout a kilometre behind Neuve Chapelle church.
,Thence it ran off due north-east to the R'un '
N ood,
or Bois de Grenier. It was in this small section
that the chief effort was to be made. If the reader
:\\ ill look at the accompanying sketch map he will
fee that the importance of the salient held by the
Germans round La Bassée largely consists in the
railway facilities of the place. (See Plan III.) It
is fed by lines which supply it from the neighbour-
hood of Lille on the north-east and Douai on the
south-east, which lines support one another
in a whole system of communications, all based
on the main railway which l'uns from Donai to
Lille. It will further be seen that, so far as the
:'
lllm
mications with Lille are concerned (and
Lllle IS, of course, the principal depot for all thiR

!1

part of the German front), the junction outside
the yillage of Don is of great importance. There
concentrate upon it the t,,'o lines leading to LilIe
from La Bassée as well as the lines from the
south and the line .from Formelles in the north.
That is "hv Don was bombarded by Briti sh air-
men. ::\Iu
h stress has been laid upon the high
road which a Iso runs from La Bassée northward
to Estaires, but this is not of any great import-
ance, for it ends, so far as the Germans are con,
cerned, in tbe air, being cut by the allied trenches
about five miles from La Bassée and before it
reaches any source of supply. It is, hO\yeyer.
true that a smaller road coming in and join-
ing this main road from Estaires at
euve
Chapelle somewhat relieyes the pressure upün the
main road north-eastward out of La Bassée, which
is the chief artery of transport communication
with Lille.
Before the action began the village of 1\ euye
Chapelle, and the church which is its centre, lay
between the t\\ 0 lines of trenches, British ami
German, the British holding apparently the
line marked A B in the sketch on p3.f;-e 4,
and the Germans the main Yillage street marked
C D. It was about half-past seven in the morn-
ing of :\Yednesday, the 10th, that the action
opened with a yery heavy and conce1ltrated fire
from the larger guns and from the ho\\itzers
behind the British lines, parallel upon a smalJer
scale to the corresponding deluge of heayy
artillery fire which opened each of the great recent
actions in Champagne. This rafale (if one
IDay apply that term to heavy artillery, which
more properly belongs to the work of field bat-
teries) continued for oyer half an hour. It so
dominated the German trenches that it quenched
their fire while it was proceeding, :md on the same
eYÍdence the men of the British trenches were free
to move at will during that period. Shortly after
eight o'clock, following upon this preparation, the
assault was launched, and was immediately
successful, the whole group of German trenchf's,
rouO'hly in three lines, falling into the hands of
the oBrltish, save at one point, which held out tin
noon. This point, which thus continued untIl
midday to form the resisting angle in the midst
of the British advance, would seem to haxe lain
somewhere Uf'ar the point marked with an X upon
the sketch map IV., and it ,yas maintained against
three separate attacks. It fell at last to the
arrival of reinforcements, and the "hole line
straightened o
t from a point about a mile and a
half north of Neuve Chapelle, south-westward, to
more than half a mile in front of the yillage. On
the south of this moyement, another a(h-ance from
the southern of the two Richebourgs all but reached
the little wood called the Bois de Biez, while in
the afternoon, upon the north, again in front of
Neuve Chapelle, another ach-ance coyereù a
further four hundred yards of ground. -:\Iean-
while one point in the line had continually hel,]
a O'ainst the British aùvance, and this was the
c;oss roads at Z (see plan IV.), where the village
street falls into tbe main Estaires road and comes
on towards Richebourg l' A voué. The enemy here
held out till half-past five in the afternoon,
and the place was only carried by nightfalJ.
The total result of the operations will seem to hayc
been the occupation of a belt shaded upon the
small map opposite. The next day yery violent
efforts upon the part of the enemy weve m3.(1e to
recoyer the lost ground, the strongest being made
2*

1\
arch 20, 1915,

EA'ND AND JVATER.

from the cover of the Biez wood, But the enemy;
failed to debouch from this point against the
she1ling of the wood by the British batteries on
the village of Neuve Cbapelle itself.

,
La Ban"
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A heavy fire from the German field hatterÏt"9
was directed on the village, but did not result in
the recovery of any ground. The op('ration
resulted in the capture of some 1,700 prisoners,
and this seems to have bef'Il the result of the dirf'P-
tion of the attacks being both to the north and to
the south of the village; at least, that is the
French account. The result of these ('[forts aho\"e
and below the built-upon area being to surround,
when they closed upon the east, a consìde1'11hle
body of the enemy still fighting among the build-
ings themselves.
As to the developmC'nts foI1O\\"ing upon this
considerable action, tl}('y have been, so far as th,>
enemy is concerned, slight up to the moment or
writing. One violent attack delin"red at
t.
Eloi put the enemy, for the second time since
the trench "ork began, in poss('
3Ïon of the hou
e

of that village. The attack was made by th("
lWurtembergers, and was carried out in the dC'ns(>
masses of that tactical formation which the enew\"
cannot abandon, because it is the strongest thin

in his tradition. It was upon Sunday night that
the effort was made, It was preceded, of COul'
("
by a heavy bombardment, both of the treflchc:3
themselves and of the town of Ypres, behind or
near which, presumably, were stored the mUlli-
tions which supplied the trenches to the south.
,The retirement from the ,'illage in the face
i*

I;AND
ND lYl:ATER,

March 20, 1915.

, Ri
11ebourg
St\ia

To Roug
- Croix

..al1å fstaires - '
t\ '

G ernlan resLstançe -' ,
here tiUnoon. I

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.To La Bassee

One fM.ile.

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hoth of these wry superior numbers and of a opening phase, and which was designed in cxad
threatened em-clopment upon the :Mondav took co-ordination with and upon the same general
place during the darkness. Before da"'ll the tactic as the plan adopted by the French a
arriyal of rcinforcements permitted of a counter- hundred miles further along the line, had only
attack, which was partially successful, and by tbe value "hich it had because the positions
daylight the whole of the Yillage was recaptured of the enemy trenches had been exactly dis-
anù the greater part of the trenches ill front of covered and marked, and because at the_ begin.
it, from which the British had been driwn. "ere nÍIw of such a deluge the machines in the air
also reduced. ' could send word of the first efl'ects of the fire.
Such is the mere recital of the eycnt.
t. Anyone who kn()ws that f()ggy, ungrateful,
:Eloi, just south of Y pres, has been carried by the marshy land of Flanders, where eYery debate
.'\TurtemLergers anù immediately recoyered JJY tbe of "TesteI'll Europe has been fought out for
13ritish. The line which ran in and re-entered a thousand years, knO\\'s ,vhat its sky and air
bel
i!1d
em-c Ch3p
lle now bulges into a sligJit commonly mèan in the winter months and how an
sahcnt III front of It, and the ground gained at ohs('nation from abo\"e must, upon most days, be
the !Ilaximum ,,'idt.h of this,belt (the fighting was ('onductf'd with peculiar hardihood anù with a
agamst t.he Bavanans and the remnant of the p(>culiar sense üf ]))a
tery oyer an enemy's power
Guard) is about 1,500 yards. to reply whether from the ground or from t.he
But the character of the action is of mueh sky.
greater moment than its scale, and it is to an Hut this "sllPC'1'iority in air ,,'ork which t.he
analysis of that charadeI' w
shan next turn. :British han> now fina]]y, and for a long time past,
'Ve Dote, in the first place, how much :H.hicwd is furtht'r JH'oyC'd in another indirect
de}?ended in it upon the :superiority in the nit' and most interc
ting fashion.
whIch the British forces ha,-e established for Before-the'successful and ,iolcnt attack upon
tbemsel\"es.
em-e Chape]]e was launched there" as an enor-
The deluging of the enemy trenches with mous coneeutration of material. One does not pro-
lIeavy shell, which was the characteristic of the duce anar,tilJeryhcU of ttJat sort from hea\"y piece

4it

_... r ,

1vlarch 20, 1915.

LAND AND WATElt

of the working of that policy which has been a1
the back of aU the allied effort in the 'Yest since
the beerinnin rr of Deccmber, and since the enemv
o 0 ' ,
confined himself in the "7 est to holðing his line
while using all his available men for his greater
effort against the Russians-an effort so far
fruitless. That policy is, as ',ì'e know, the policy,
of ., attrition."
Everybody knmys in general what that word
means in connection with the trench warfar(\. It
means the wearing dovm of the enf'lìlY's nllmben
and qualities until he sha 11 no longer be able to
hold the great length of trenches--0wr foul'
hundred miles long-to ,,-hich he is now pinned.
'Yhen he can 110 longer hold that line he must
shorten it-a perilous operation, further im-oh--
iug the loss of territory he now keeps in Belgium
anù France, or it will break. and ill either case
the critical moment will be the opportunit;r for
the launch of the main effort against him.
The enemy. upon his side, is fighting in the
East for a decision to enable him to push hack
troops "Test before that policy of ,. attrition "
shall have imperilled him in the "Y est , and if he
can, in time, do thi::>, the policy of attrition ha<;
failed; but if, OIl account of his losses in the l
ast.
or of his being detained there too long, or of the
renewed equipment of our R113:>ian ally, in greater
eft'orts with the frc-eing of icehound ports or ti,e
'VI forcing of tLe Dardanelles. he fails to strengthen
himself I"uffieienth in the ,,7 e:-;t in time, then it is
the policy of " attrition " which will decide the
war.
n behow'3 us, if ,...e are to understand tho
campaign in the "7 est , to see clearly ,..-hat is meant,
b
' this policy. Yon 'Yea r down your c-nPIH)' b):
cau<:iu rr him numerical I05se..,; in men and in
If-;.ateri
l, and moral los
in strain, sickness, anù
fatigue.
XOW', it is dear that rou ('[In thus wear down

Ollr enem,r by continually attacking him, but it is
abo. unfortunately, clear that you onl," do so at a
certain expense to yo
n'self. Alld if that expense
is equal or superior h) tlJHt of tllt' CIWI1I.\' you am
IIOt succeeliin cr in your J )olicy of .. attrition ,. at
c>, .
alL FOI' YOU are usin cr more men thall he is, :nlll
that is sOJ)1ething whi(11, seeing- tIwt he still has a
numerical snpport in the ,,-ho1i' field, \Yould he a
disastrous fault leading straight to ({('t('at.
The policy tlm:; can ouly Le suc('('ssful if you
a.re makitw the enemv 10'3e U l ìon the whole, anll
ü. . 1
takin o ' the entire front upon an :!\"crage. conSI( er-
r> . I '"1 II ' '"
ably more fHen 111 t Ie process of .. 1l1:)') PIg L:lall
'.OlÌ al'e losing, and can make him snfl'er a gre,ltcl'

tmin than you are suffering,
At fH'st sio'ht it would s....ent that this was
õ:'> "
impos
ihlf", for the attnek to ,,"11Ich .\ ou :It'(" COJ1-
tinualh- condemned in such a method is normallv
more {"x pensive than thf" de f ("llet".

But there are certain {'!PH1ents of the eX[lct
situation in the "
est which, if they arc co-
ordinated, would be'seen to oO'el' nn ol;portuHit
Y
for the success of thi::; policy, although it in..-oh-es
('ontinual attaL'k,
The3e elements are !t<: follows :-
1. The enemy is not wOì'king in the ""est
with a large reserve. . He must m:c all the men bo
call possibly spare for getting, as quiddJ as pos-
THE POLICY OF .. ATTRITION." sible, his decision upon the East. He is, thel'c-
The truth is that the t'.\"0 combine
..l actions, fore, presumably holding his line with only just
that in Champagne and that north of La Bas
lre. the n
lmber <?f men he l'e9uin's for tlmt purpo:-:o
giwa \:('1')" clear mode1. upon a rather large scale. and IS keepmg no consu.ierable number uuem..
S

.
,
.
I

,'

I
.8 :

..:

/ 0
I

,
,

.,.
.

,
En!Jlirh Miles

without a va
t preYÌous accumulation of transport
to feed the big guns and the howitzers which are
going to do the damage. In the earlier part of the
war such an acculllulation would ha,-e
n
spotted by the enemy. His air work was still the
equal of ours. and often its superior. It is the
sharp characteristic of this last piece of bt;lsiness
that the enemy was taken completelv by surprise.
He seems to h
ì,'e had no idea that a 'cOJÌcenìration
of this sort was going on right in front of him.
He seems to have been compl
tely taken in by tIle
small demonstrations south of Ypres on the
:Monday and the Tuesday before the big attack
was launched upon the \Vednesday and fought
its way to a conclusion on the Thur
LlaY.
It has next to be remarked tlwt th
handling
- of the heavy artiller
', when it ùid come into pla
,-.
was evidentl:. superior to that of the correspond-
ing large pi{'ces upon the enemy's side, and
hat
the munitions, for which there has }Jeen so anxIOUS
a cnll from the front, must haye arriwd in an
increased stream.
It i
further to be noted that the action con-
tradict..,; what man\" serious observers had fearNI
-namely. that the 'loner winter trench work would
, 0 . I
destroy' the power for \"Ìgorous attaek III t 1e me.n
who had suffered it. That ha
been the experI-
ence of most wars in the past. anù it was fen red
that it mia-ht. be the experiene.e of this war.
L'lstl
. the move show
in a particularl
-lnc-id
lllalllier tlìe \\orking of that potier of attrition
o
which such frequent allu
ion has been made III
these pagf:s. But that i
so iml'.?rtant a point tl
at
it des
rn's a separate p.1Ssage. tor we can sf"ek tor
no better opportunity of examining the method at
work.

5
.

LAN D A X D :W. A T :c R.

!\Iilfch 20, 1915.

tllowa J.>E'hind that line, upon the chance of w..ing
the':11 la tel'. .
2. He requires for the holding
f th,e, line
ð ('onsi der3 hIe t\ .!'ec on account of IllS I111htary
tradition anù of hi
school of ,"':ar. The type of
(Jis
.ipline whi('h promott's a
1fl enforces c1t:sc
format ion ill a
{at'k, and wInch redu('f's to, Its
100H'st \altH' indiyidual initiatiye ill the soldlpr,
lws !!l'eat Hlt'rits in war, as this ('il11lpaig!l has
pro\-cd: but it has certa in inevitable defects, one
of which is that YOtl must always pack your InCH,
CH'Jl when YOU arc deft'udillg.
3, 'Ihè' aHied air \Vork and the allied grow-
ing supply of hpil\Y pieces awl thei
' munition
cf.mbined ha:>.
i\pn their heavy 31'tIIINY dear
superiority in the \Ves
over that .of the ene
n
T.
4. It is accf'pted tnat the samtary condItIOn
of the enemv is in the \V<,st gran'ly inferior at
this moment'to our own. T do not bring forward
the e, idence for this: I onlv state it as it has been
told to me, and I believe it "to be a true statement
unoll the evidence I have heard.

N"ow, put all t.his together, and observe what
follows npon it if the policy of" attrition" is COll-
òncteJ in a certa in manner.
Suppose upon a particular section of the
front, such 3S that in the Champagne district, the
light chalk uplanù, some twenty to forty miles
e:-lst of Rheims, you order for a certain short
l )f'riod an attack to be delivered on the German
ines. You are not intelldeù to break through.
You may break through by a bit of lnck, but that
i
not your main object. Your main object is only,
for the moment, to make the enemy in this field
lose more men than you are about to expend.
In the first p]ace, your assault is backed by
hrayy artillery far superior to his own. He loses
hca \'ily from that.
In the sec-ond place, it is so important for
him to preserve his line (where, by definition, he is
npon the defensive) that he will mass men in very
consiùerable numbers against you so as to be cer-
tain of ensuring his line against breaking.
In. the third place, he can only obta in men by
horrowmg all up and down the line. He cannot
horrow from a large reserve, for by definition he
has not got a reserye. His whole plan excludes
it. He can only get the greater part, at least, of
his reinforcements by sending for units to all sorts
of places hetwe<>n the Swiss mountains and the
:East. It takt's him some time to effect that con-
centration. and until he has effected it he will not
ndl11it a counter offensive, because all the tra-
ditions of his selTice forbid this until he has
sccuretl a considerable superiority of number.
In the fourth place, when he has so concen-

r[ltcc1 a very great number against your develop-
Ing attack, he will, by his mnsistently dense
f()}'mation ",..-111:n he takes the counter òffensive
10::;(' more heavily than you in your open order. '
In t
le fifth place, the superiority of the allied
firld artIllery y\ ill rarticularly try him during
such rushes, and that superiority is amply
!J.ssured.
Iinal1y, Ilnt only does he thus lose very
hea;.'ily in maint:1ining his ground, first by a prè-
['anous dpfenc(', and afterwards by a dense
['('unter offensive in the section where the first

ttack was deli\-cred, but the other sections from
\vhich he has horrowctl are all more or less
"eakened. SOl
lC one or more of them will be more
"eakf>nt'd than the' rcst, :lllfl the chance!'> are that
these lOt:al wcakueHses "ill be discoyered anù

taken a<<lyantage of. Thc' allies in that distant

ect.ion will deìiycl' an attack ultimately depend-
ing on, and produced by, the main attack far
a way, and if the weakness of the enemy at the
point of this scc'ond3ry attack has been pushed too
far he will rU l l the risl" of heavy local losses
there.
Sow appJy this to the two sections-the
main one in Champagne, the secondary one
at La Bassée, aUtl the plan of" attrition" becomes
dear in t.hat excellent double model.
Tn the first place, it becomes clear that the
great action in Champagne brought down tbe
enemy's numbers there by a prodigious amount.
probably not less than 50,000 men.
AntI in the second place, it becomes equally'
clear that this action in Champagne drew men
from the north, and precisely from that region
where at the very moment that the action of
Champagne ceased f,úe British offensive was taken
round Neuve Chapelle, just north of La Bassée.
As to the first point, we haye the clements
for an exact calculation,
The full French acmunt, as published for
official information in France, gives US a very
accurate list of the forces which the Germans
brought up upon this front, and we have further
information, to some extent, from the same
source, of the points from which the German rein.
forcements were drawn when the French attack
began on the 16th February. The Germa.ns bad
here 119 battalions, 31 squadrons, and 64 field bat-
teries, 20 batteries of heavy guns. In the chief
effort, the three weeks that the main action lasted,
they further brought up t""enty more battalions
of cavalry, six of which were of the Guards, two
more batteries of heayy gnns, also of the Guards,
a nù a "hole regiment of field artillery-not less
than the equivalent of a full army corps.
The total number of men of every arm con.
centrated upon this narrow front in the course of
this devastating piece of fighting was not less than
200,000, and probably as much as 220,000 men,
and of those, certainly one-fifth-probably nea.rly
a quarter-were to be found in the casualty lists
before the achievement of the French purpose.
For if 10,000 dead were accounted for, as they;
were within the zone \yhich the French could per.
son ally suryey and t
bulate, you have not less than
12,000 at the very least over the whole action, and
it is not credible, eyen in \'Ìolent and close fighting
of this kind, that the proportion of vwullded to
dead was much less than 3 to 1. It would be \T'ry
astonishing if it were any less-that is, excluding
unwounded prison
rs.
As to the districts from which the Germans
hurriedly drew their reinforcements when the
front in question was beginning to be pr{'ssed in,
the French have been able to identifv at least siJ)
batteries of field U1,tillel'Y, six baitàlions of tile
Guw'd, and tu'o !wavy batteries of the Guard as
baving come f1'om tlte district in front of tho
British trenches in t!te North.
There is another way in which we æn e
ti-
mate whnt the German losf':es were upon this
front. The Germans have informed us (and one
sees no partic:ular reason to bclieye that the infor-
mation is inaccurate when it tells against them)
that the losses in Champagne in those days ex-
ceeded the German losses during the recent heavy
fighting along the East Prussian frontier.
ow.
though the Germans ,,-ere successful in that fight-
ing in the East until their reyerse before rzrasnJ
z
6*

March 20, 1915.

L
\ N DAN D "r ATE R.

at the end of February, Jet it is no eX:1gge'ration
to estimate their totallo

es at. more tlwn 40,000.
They were handling in E;
st PI'n
sia certainly ten,
and; acc.ording to
t he latest offici<ll :Freneh esti-
mates, fourteen arm)' corps. ::ulll it is not to be
belipved that a force of nearly or more than half a
million men fighting thus d3jr after day against 3.
dt'termin{'d enemy, tnongb successful, could baye
lost less than 10 per cent. 'Ye must further add
to the fourteen army {'orps which the French
calcubte to have been present together in East
Prussi3 three independent divisions of caYalr
'.
Lastk, the French note a further piece of evidence,
conve.rging to"ards c.\.actly the same result-to
wit the e
ll)lovment of at le3st fh"e German armV'
J 1., .;
corps agaiu;:;t them at this point. and that cer-
t3.inly, for among their prisoners the
' they ha,'e
discoH'red men belonging to tbat total number of
separate corps.
It is worthy of remark that the Guard seem
to have suf'ferecÌ specially heavily, as might have
lx-'en e"ì:pected, seeing that these troops. of the best
q uality were called in towards the end and most.

,
murderous part of t.he struggle to reinforce the
fioreh-tried German front. It is probable that
two reO'iments of the Guard ceased to c"ì:ist as in-
dependent units. Thme is proof, for. instance,
that in one r('O'imcnt-the second of thIs famous
bod\'--c(
rtain ð units had to be dealt with as
follows :-
The second and the fifth companies were
e1imiI1ated. The remain.. of the first. the sixth,
and the seventh "ere drafted into one new com-
pany, composed of aU that "as left of
hese
hree.
Kote, 1100',e\'er, before lye leave thIs lmsmess,
that the whole
fÙ1Ïr was a gradual admncf'. very
well contested by an eJ1cmy still determined; for
thouo'h :numerous machine guns were capt.urcd, as
('Ile i
'ench [I fter another was carried. not a single
piece of field (H'tillery was 103t by the encIllY, an(l
nfter a check: so serious we may legitimately regard
th;1t as proof of thf' discipline and orderly nature
of itg resistance, en'll to the end of the violent
conflict.

\s io the 8e'cond point. the wenkening of the
German line in thC' north b\ this action in Cham-
} laO'nf' and the a.dYalltn2'e that could therefore be
o . L'
taken near La. Bassée of such weakening by the
English. '''e know that quite SlX thousand men
and a bl'i!l'<.1de of artill{'l'v too'ether ,vith two
n ..' t"1
IJaU<>ries of heD vy gnu!':, came from this neighbour-
hood down into' the Champagne district to the
reÌnfOl'lemt'ut of the Germans there pre%cd by the
l'reHch alhance. The pri
oncrs :ll1cl the deat!
have, a..:; we lmve seen. bpcn sufficient to establish
what UJlits they \yere that were thu
Lorro\
eJ
r
)}u
nalldprs for the defence of the German posItIOn
upon the front bet"eell Souain and Yil1e-sur-
T(,urbe, and the exact ('onespont1eT!ec hf'tween the
t \yenty d:l.Ys of French effort en"t flf Rheims all(

the meeeeding four da: s of Briti:3h drOIt south of
Lille is fully cstablisheJ.

TI IE R.\TE (!F W.\
TAG F.
'Ye must not omit, in thf' pl'e:-:ence of s11('h
I!eì'o
, a. fu rtÌler re reI eUl't' to t he "(I tc ot t hf' cnem:'T's
,; asLl}:;e. The poliey which hope,;; to t"Ætinue that
",i:Ist;lg'e at a grea tp I' }>3',>(' tl1:1.11 01,:r OWl} ha.!
ahead,' heen de
tTib('d, but the' absoJllte rate ot
\\a;-;ta':'e i,j n'it to be dp"pisE'd, fOJ'llj)O:1 it will ab,)
f1epen
i. as "eJl as I1pon tilt' pr0portimJate rate,
the ultimate e:.hiHlstioH of the enem
.

In other word
\ we not only depend upon
wea,rin o ' him down faster than we wear ourseh'es
down,
e also depend upon wearing him down at
at least such a. pace that he shan bf' embarrassed
to within some defined and limited time in the
holding of his present positions.
Observe that the detail of the"'p two actions
reported by the Briti8h and the J:.'rench respec-
tively have' been only two sections of his line, the
one but a front of tweh'e miles, the other but a.
front of four, at the most, and accounted ,vithin
a space of little over three weeks for nearly 70,000
m
n, the British estimate being, after a careful
examination of the enemy's evident losses in the
1.:1 Bnsée district from the recent action, not less
than 17,000, and perhaps 18,000.
Kow, 70,000 men i
nearly the equivalent of
t\\"o full army corps. and the total line upon which
this kind of thing is being carried on is not to be
measured in sections of tweh-e or fourteen miles. It
i
400 miles long in the "\Vest. It is anything from
700 to 900 (according to its sinuosities) long in the
East, and in the East the enemy losscs haTe been
further accentuated, during tbe winter at le:lst.
by the difficulties his ambulance work has experi-
enced. It is reported (and the report has nothing
improbable about it) that. the enemy's ambulance
work at one moment in front of "Tarsaw com-
pletely brol
e down. In those empty plains so ill-
provided with roads in the best ,...eather (and
durin rr the recent succession of frost and thaw a
mass;f Kapoleon's " Polish mud ") the succouril1g
of the wounded must have been a tnsk far more
difficult of accompli
hment than it was in the
hio-hh--orO'anised and fulh'-de\'clo p ed 'Yest, and
o J 0 .
we know that the tvpc of attack and the propor-
tion of losses was ñot less. but more, than it has
recently been in the "
est. It rather resembled the
yiolent as&'lults upon the line of t.he Y ser which
mal'ked the end of October and the middle of
Km-ember.
'\That th
tot<.ll rate of mlstage has been from
the Bnkm\"ina to the Balt.ic in these four months
of ince;:;sant strugf1'le WI: ha,e no
tatistics to tell
us-not eH
n a ge
era I gl1e<:.-; is possible; bu t we
are quite safe in
a
ing that the proportionate
rate has been tlouhle that in the' "
st. and the
absolute rate treble. ,n,l<Ü more it may have been
\\e cannot tell.
Xow the siO'nifu:ancl: of sLl
h wnstaze lies in
C\ .,
this. That the enemy is now really fighting for
tim
as he never was at the beginning of the cam-
paign, though our Prt'.3s \HIS too fond of r
cord-
Ì110' it as the ('hid element then present III the
st
uggle. It neeùs hut. the ;llTival of .n
unitions
and the increase of eqUIpment for addItIOns very
hrO'e indecd to npppar in thp RU3sian line, and
the
e additions should he coincident with the drier
weather following upon the tllaw of the spriug.
And at the sam{' time
hould appear tlu" new COIl-
t il}O"('nts in the ,\
e
t-tha t is. the recent 1v tra iue(l
o .

-ollnger 'Frell('h leyy. and the much laI'gel' new
Br.jti:::h armie::;. It is a sort of l'<1Cf' hetween tl:e
ad\ent of all the
e reinfol'C'C'ments to the
\ni('s

nd the pace' at which the wastage of the enemy is
continued. .fJ(' cannot reinfol'('e-wlwte,er our
n
ilrmist Prf''-'", TN!.Y s<.""-at 31H"thing like the rate
01' to 3m thinn- like t.fle am(\Ul
t "hlch the Allies
(':1 Il 1'0;11. force
h('n nth'(, l'quipnll'nt. antI munitions
H'àL"h the RU"..;Îalls. and ,,'hel: Ol}ce our own new
contingent-- are' full} flttf'd out for scniee abroad.
r\E>ry sueh pit'f(, ("If n
'.\'S as that from Cham.

7"

L A X DAN D
v. .A T E R,

:lIarch 20, 1915

paO'ne or from La Bassée, though it does not m
an
and is not intcnded to mean the approachmg
breaking of the GCl'!lJan line, does
?
n _
he
further graye weakenmO' of the total fo.:.ee "l
h
which the enemy can llOpe to meet. the maID
ßdvance ,yhen the moment for that m::im 3,(hance
has sounded,

THE GER
IAN AND FR.E:'-JCI-I
CO
DIUNIQUES.
There has been giycn us dur,ing this ,,:eck in
connection with the moyement Just des:.>rIbed a
,cry exccllent example o
t}le con tr8 st !)et ':een the
German
md Frcnf'b oHie13l commulllquð-;: and
we shall do ,,"('11 to compare the Í\\O, !l0!, because it
is profitable to a
us(' an enen!.r or prals
an <dIy,
hut hecause our Judgment of the war 1S 13rgely
based upon the ofticial cOil1nmniqw{s issued by t.he
liTe principal belligerent powcrs, ::IS au a l)preCla-
tion of their methoùs is essential to such a
judgment.
It has alreallv been pointed out in these
columns some ",eeks ago that the 'Frcncb and
German C'ommuniquts are distinguio;hf'd by t,yO
elements in the German re})ort :
First, it is detailed cÎnd accurate in certain
particulars, ::Ind has maintained that accuracy
from the beginning of the war.
Second, it contains statements oftcn detailed,
llut deliberately and positiyely false.
It is, we may remark in passing. to no purpose
to::l buse the enemy for this second ff'Rt"Ul'e. It is a
feature dp1iberatèly inserted with a legitimate
military purpose-to wit, the confusion of the
enemy.
Sow to this se
onù feature thcrf' has been
ßdded in an increasing deÄrpe tlur!Ilg the last few
months a tbird featurc, which it is important for
us to note particularly if we desire to follow t.he
8tatc of mind and the aims of the enemy since the
war entered its present phase. This thiÌ'd feature,
as has been also pointed out in these columns, con-
8ists in yague statements applying to large opera-
tions in a general fashion, anù apparently betray-
ing a puzzling lack of juògm{'nt in a people who
ha, e so C3. refuII
- cOl1si dned a II the dHU)['CS of this
great
ar, whIch is of their O\\n mal\.ing allJ
brought about at their own chosen hour.
The features of t.he "French C'ommuniqué can,
I think, be put down with equal simplicity. The
French communiqué has for its cardinal character
the omission of all things whatsoe.-er that may be
of admntage to the enem
? Howe\"Cl' indirect this
ndvantage, it is avoided hy a reticence pushed to a
degree whicb would perhaps be impos5ible anv-
where else than in "Francc. For the "FreDch CO
-
ception of national discipline, utterJy ùifferent
from the German (for it is spontaneous), is quite
as severe and certainly more practical.
Coupled with this reticcl1ee, the l'rench eolU-
muniqué often admits d
liberately optimistic
explanations of a re\'er
e or chec.k I mean that
it does not only keep silent about numncrs, casual-
"ties, movements, and so forth, but it "ill fre-
Ruent]y counter ad\
crse rumour by publishing an
official explanation intellJcd to 8UPPOlt the
national temper,
\Ye must remark that (as is to be e"\pected)
this second feature in the French cOlllllluniqué has
been less frequent during t.he last phase of the war
than at the moment of great trial ill the first ,,,eeks
of actiye operations.

Lastly, we note a feat.ure increasingly common
in the French communiqué since the correspond-
ing feature appeared in
he German COUl-
llluniqués- I mean the deta:led _ reply to those
detailed false statements wInch the enemy has
recently increased in number. .
Now in order to haye a reasonable estlll1::1te
of both ,
itnesses in this series of evidence, we
must if I )ossible estimate not only their hahits,
, , 'I .
but their moti\"es for tbpse 11al)]ts.
\Yhr does the German communiqué show the
fcatures ,.-e haye noted in it?
'Yh\? does the French communiqué show tbe
featur('s
we ha,ye noted in it?
The accuracy in llcta j} "hich is a uniform
fe:1tlue of the earlier German commmJiflués, and
which is still a leading feature in the presen
on
s,
proceeds, 1 think, f!'Om a tendency obsena ?l
III
an m.odern German work, ,yhich tcndency a inend
,,"ould call .. thoroughness" anù an enemy. .. plod-
c.ìÏ1w." As in th(
ir historical works and 111 UJany
oth
r departments of moùern G<>rman ::Ic1Ï\-ity, so
in these military records, the modern GC'J'l 1 1:=!ns
have an appditc for detail, an
l w};leîlf"Cl' you mH-
8ideì' df'taiJ
'OU are unusually wchned to He-curacy
in deta it It is illdee(} t.he m:uk of t()!) closf' an
attent.ion to deta.il in HllY department of thought
that, vdJiJe your gcnerai judgment
s Oftt:'11 i111-
pairell by it, your pr('('
sion of pal t lc-u}al' state-
ment is improved. ..And, other i!lJugs bcmg C(1 1Ial ,
a German offieia I J'l'::'OT'(l win usu
d}y be mom
trustwor1hy for its details, wiI] contain }css errors
l1ue to em'ot ion f3 tiQUC 01' 1a zine
,s, tha n \\ ill
, ,-,'
corresponding rec
rds or ot her soc
('
tic:;., ",
In a IlIood \,IHch docs not If'110 ltsC']i to taJse-
hoou, or in the ahsence of moti\"es for the snme, the
German communiqué lrns hc('n thoI'onghly trust-
worthy,
,that. tJIPH, of the ina(.'curüte elemellts whieh
'\"e haye Hoted?
It bas lIecn pointeù out frequently in t.hese
columns that the inain motiye in this has been t.be
misle.1,dillg of the enemy commanders by st
.te-
ments which m:lY be (It.t.ppted for the shm't tIme
by those comman'del's, anù \\ouhl, if at:ceptcd, dis-
turb their plans.
:For inbtance the enemv receiws a scwre
cheek, loses a grp;t numhcr of 1)1('n anù guns.
nd
is oc.cupit'd in a confused and too rapId r{,
lI'e-
ment. His l'ommand('I's a
'e not fm' some httle
time ablc to compûte the exact extent of their
losses. H tbe moment he immelliately sf'lL.C'd aI1l1
the Germans publish (':;timaled los::;es mut:h larger
than the true ones, anù as much as the enemy can

)e got to believe during tl
is period of ('o
fusioll,
It must affect that enClllY s plans adyersely, auu
this fact is magnifieu if, intC'l'mi'i:ed with the
e'
aO'{J'eration ,-ou mino'le undoubtedlv true bits of
- f"Ib ' J 0 .J
statistics. YO)' instancf', you say :-
.. In tllf' lél1.f' near -LoU en we diseoH
l'(',l such
::Inù such a number of IH'a"y pie
es which the
enelllj- had thrown in during his rf'tre
t, hf'cause
he could not t8ke them away wit.h him, ànd \\e
C3pturell such and sU0h a number of um\ùì.lIlLleu
. "
pnsoners.
The comm:lnù('r of the defeated and retiring
force suncys the great confusion of his t:omm:Lnd
an,] knO\',g 1 hat he has lost, cry heavily, and is,
perhaps, r(,Hd y to accf'pt, f.)1' fortY-f'ight hours or
so, before the full statist.ics come in. the fignres
given b
- his aùyersary. He cannot well ten of tbe
men mIf;.<;ing, "hat proportion are kiHcd, what
wounded, and ,\hat unwounùed prisonel'&, If the
8 1t

:March 20, 1915,

LAXD AXD ").YATER.

proportion of the latter he H'ry high, if may make
l1Ím belieye that the moral of his forces has been
seriously affected, :Meanwhile he docs know that
the heavy guns in question 'lcere thrown into the
lake, and his knowledge of this detail tends to
make him accept the rest.
Finally, if things are not going as ciyilian
opinion has bt'en led to expect. it is of both mili-
tary and political importance to reassure that
opinion as best one can, :Ko Government and no
General Staff negìects that duty; and what we
haye to remember in the German performance of
it is not so much the eÀ.
1ggeration or inaccuracy
as the curious clumsiness (as it seems to us) which
marks this third Îeature.
For instanæ. after such a cOlllmuniqué as
that which I haye just quoteù. there may be added
some sueh phrase as .. the enemy is now dis-
per8ed and our troops are occupied in collecting
the enormous booty left behind in his rout." This
phrase may corres'pond to a \el'Y different reality,
In point of f.let. perhap5 what happened was that
the German foret'. haying got too Ïar from its
real head, was abead of its supplies, and was
unahle to makt' good a yigol'olis punmit. But the
truth is put in this more flattering fashion in order
to reassure opinion at home and to L'onsole it for
the absence of further fayourable deyelopments.
,\Yhen we turn to the communiqué the Ger-
mans haye issued" ith re
ard to the prolonged
French efìort upon thc Souain-Yille-sur-Tourbe
front (it lasted for the ten days from the 26th
February to the 8th
Iarch), we get an excelJent
example of all these feature
. 'Ye are told that
the French fired about 100.000 hcayy shell. That
is accurate. "Te are next told that the front was
at first held by" two \\"eak Rhine di"isions"
against a quartèr of a minion men. This is a false-
hood so large and dear that at the first reading
it astonishes one: but t.he ll10ti,-e of telling it is
soon apparent,
nHI from its eharader we c
Ul
judge the nature of similar statements in other
evidence of the same sort. It docs not need am-
det::! iled proof to assure all t he
oldiers. and e\'eÌl
most mere sturlents oÎ war, that the front in ques-
t.ion could not possibly haye been held in that
fashion. Two depleted didsions means something
less than 30,000 men-i.t'., something less than
2,000 lllen a mile. Further, the point in question
was not held; it g:ne way. But the statement is
not without a cause. It hàs Îor its main object the
c.onfusion or mis-information of the rl'ench com-
manders. who know pcrfeetly well that it is nOIl-
Bense. It has for its object thc heartening of
domestic opinion. Hence the sentimcntal detail of
tht' district from which the defenders were dra\\ n,
M. e shall appreciate. howt'yer, that such statement
is not as dumsy as it looks wben "e remember that
the German' ci,-ilian population c
nnot, any
more than the French or our own, hear the full
truth or indeed any truth which their Gm'ern-
, .'
mellt does not desirc them to hear. It will un-
douhterlly proye, \\ hcn we can get the real facts in
detail in some official history of the war, that
troops from the Rhine prm-ínces were present;
that they withstood in some part of the field a \'Cry
formidåble assault for !':omc little time: that they
behayed wit.h ganantr
-; :md tl
at, perhaps. the
r
w-ere for the moment isolated from support. It
,,,'ill also probably appear that about this time
there was danger of grumbling in tllf' Rhinf' pro-
.riuces. and that this emphasis upon the deeds of

the troops from that district was of poJitical ad-
yantage to the German Goycrnment.
Xe
t turn to the statement in the same COlll-
muniqué that oyer 2.000 unwoUJ1l1eù Freuch
prisoners ,yere taken. That may be true, or it m[lY
not. )108t probably it is untrue, because in a pro,
longed but successful ad,-ance a capture of this
sort, though quite possible, is unlikely: it is rather
the kind of thing you get in a retirement. But the
:French commanders can harùlr haye a positiye
knowledge upon the subject. They" ill discoyer
that a certain number of men are missing, anJ the
more the enemy can get them to belieye there are
missing unwounded the more t.hey may affect the
French commander's judgment of the condition
of his troops: although it is a doubtful game to
play \" ith the army of Champagne, the temper of
which is by this time thoroughly ,yen known to its
leaders.
Xote again the charaderistic compliment
paid to the courage of the French troops. That
has been an offieialuote in the German despa tdlCS
for some time past. It is connected ,Ùth the idt'a
that the French are ready to make peace and are
fairly sympathetic to the Gennan senice, and this
in its turn is a parallel to what we know of the
reaHy startling incapacity of modern Germany to
understand things outside itself-a feature often
prcsent in nations after a considerable period of
rapid material progress, Finany, obserYe the illl-
possible remark with which the c0 1 umuniqué
doses: II The French lost 44,000 men, which is
about three times the amount of the German
losses:' \Vhether the l;'reÐl.h lost OWl' 44.000
men, we haye no eYÌdt'nce to tell us, though
it is an unlikely figure, but that the
German losses were only 14,000 to 15,000
men is more nonsense. But, it is not nonsense
written without a cause. The French hno"
, of
course, more or less, what the German losses haye
been, beea use they hn ,'C ::1 dvanced oyer t.he ground
upon which these losses haye taken place. For
instance, they hate counted the dead, anù they
rendereù an estimate of 10.000. It would be
foolish ior the French to lie in this matter, bt'cal1se
the Gerruans approximately know their ownlm:,,'ses
hy this time. amI. upon a general advance of this
sort thousands of l;'renchmen are able to L'or-
roborate the official estimate or to discover its
falsehood, if it is false. Seeing that numbers of
those who fall are buried Lv the enemy or are ,\ith-
ùra,yn upon the point of death, we ñ13V be fairly
certain that the total losses in dea.d werè more, and
not less, than 10,000, and we may be equally eertain
that the total losses in "ounded and unwounded
prisoners were at l('<1st three times as many. That
is the very lowest multiple one can possibly take.
The German statement, therefore, is not eYen
intended to deceiyc the eJ1eJ1n-. Its fal!':itv is
dearly designed to a political ånd c10mestic end.
And here again we can guess what tLat enù may
be,
An oLsencrs of reLent action
in the East and
the \Vest are agreed upon the enormity of the Ger-
man losses. 'Ve further know to what that high
percentage of loss is attributed. It is attribut.ah1e
to the tactical traditions of the enemy: his. fighting
in close order; to the superiority of the _\llied
heavy artiHery in t.he "Test, "hieh in its turn is
due to the superiority of the Al1ied air work, and
its repeat.ed ('hanCt'
during such \\ork, as in Cham-
pagne, with its freqnent ref irt'n:ents üf the enemv
in masses O\er open fiEld, and its equally fre{Jucllt
9>>

LAN DAN D ,,
ATE R,

larch 20, 1915,

counfer-01ÏencC's for country almost devoid of lie in the postponing of tlu" task-though that is
colour between the occasional stunty pine and of considerable moment to the Russians-it rather
larch plantations with
vhich. the policy of lies in the time which the larger interval gives
Kapolcon III.
tudd
d tIns regIOn of the camp the enemy to recuperate his forces. Unless a
of Chalons and Its neIghbourhood. The dry, poor permanent work has been totally destroyed, the
chalk soil is often capable of no other crop, and guns dismounted, or sha ttered, or the mountings
the plantations take the place of what was once displaced, a few days' grace will enable the de-
useless waste. fenders to set things more or less right a.gain.
In the French communiqués, both that pre- .\Vherms a certain number of shell of a certain
cedinrr and that following the long German com- calibre-say. ll-inch shell-fallillg upon a per-
muniqué of this week concerning this section of Illanent work, may destroy it if the delivery of
the V{estcrn front, we have also this featurc, such shell be unintermitted and rapid, a yery
peculiar to the French records which have been different effect would be produced if the same
noted. number of shell is only delivered in small groups
Thus there is a remarkable absence-common and after long and irregular intervals. The moral
to aU these statements--of figures, which could be effect alone counts herc, and the material damage
of no use to the enemy. Masses of German pris- done by a partial bombardment is. as we have seen,
oners have been taken. \Ye know this from the capable of being restored if a sufficient breat.hing
evidence of eve-witnesses describing columns as space is afforded.
they passed tllrough to the rear. Portions of the Further. the reader must remember that \yhen
French Press and certain private letters bear you are dealing ,,,ith o\'er a score of permanent
sufficient witnesses to what we would, in any case, works, as is the case with the Narrows, the diffi-
have expected to be the result of so prolonged and culty is multiplied by much more than the mere
successful an effort. But when it would be at once multiple of guns. A group of permanent works
interestin
to the student and of high politic:! I like this are much more than ten times as formid-
value in lleartening opinion at home, the full able as a couple of works would be. First.. because
figures of these captures are not gi,'cn us. It is a of t
le \\ay in which they support each other
fixed French principle that they should not be dis- agamst a gnn platform upon the water; secondly,
closed. Captures by the British, both of guns and because of the way they can support each
men, are differently treated, and the German other against attack from land. Xo permanent
method is in high contrast, for it perpetually men- \York can be regarded as finally reduced until it
tions the number of prisoners captured, and has been destroyed to thp satisfaction of the land-
usually makes a point of e"\.aggeratiIJg this. ing party. Its mere silence, eyen its wrecked ap-
The French communiqués are again largely pcarance as seen from aho\ e, does not completely
concerned with a detailed refutation of the Ger- guarantee shipping that may have to pass it for
man claims. They are careful to melltion what the future. Until a landing party has occupie(l
the enemy already 'knows, the e""-tent of his con- t he work, and either completed the necessary
cent l'a tion. They eyen point out-what is valu- dc:)trudion or satisfied itself that there is no mOle
able for us to learn and knO\v-news of the enemy. to do, the work may still be formidable.
the \\ay in which that concentration was eÍfecteù \Vhere you lla
-e a swall group of works this
by borrowing men from other parts of the line. task is mudl easier in proportion than where you
On the other hand, they say nothing of their have a large one; for against the parties landing
own losses, rarely even to make them out lc
s than to effect the final dcstruction of partially wrecl,:clI
the enemv claims. forts and batteries, other forts and batteries still
In g
neral, we may S:lY of t.hese two pres
nt in e",,-istence can fire.
communiqués that they are not onl.r the latest but All these consideration!': combinf'd shoulLl
the fullest examples of the principal witncsses \ye moderate the expectat.ions of those who looked for-
haye in the judgment of this gre
t debate, and :ne ward, after the first unexpected success of the
a fair guide to the temper of those witnes
f's in Allied Fleet in entering t.he Straits, and after the
the future eyidence that will be laid bpfore Ug. dC\Tclopment of the noyd principle of attack to
THE EASTERN FRONT. which the Narrows was subjecÌf'd, to a rapiJ ad-
vance by us upon Constant.inople.
On the Eastern front there is virtually There is, of conrse. as was pointCll out in this
nothing to record this \.eek-or at least in progress paper at the time (and German critieisrn was made
-worth analysis at the moment of writin rr ('Ì'ue:)- to that effect). the problem of the land force-so Lntil
day evening). 0 the shores of the DardanelJes on either side are
It is e\'ident that the forcincr of the Dar- sufficiently held, commerce cannot use that channe1.
danelles is going to be-,dlat eYer
'one who knew The problem of holding the land is partly
the district and the means employcd was prepared political and partly military. Only thosf' ac-
for-a lengthy business. quainted with the Near ,East (which the p1'cscnt
The chief element in the delay is, of course, writer is not) can decide how far a political threat
the weather in that district and, àt. this time of to the capital would disarm the Turkish armies
the year. the" black sea scud" hanrrinp' low amI in the field; such:t threat to the capital might be
preyenting all air work, the gales fr;m the North, delivered by the fleet without procuring the SUl'-
together make the chances of bombardment only render or the withdrawal of the troops to the
a
ailable sometimes after rather long intenTals;' sout.h. The military problem, supposing t.he fleet

l
h a \"e
y high wind or with lo\v-Iying clouds, it to be successful in reaching the Sea of 1Harmara.
IS ImpossIble for the machines in the air to correct but not successful in causing the withdrnwal of
the indirect or long-distance firinp' of naval guns; troops through political action, is two-fold. Tho
and, with this fire uncorrected,
ven the largest occupation of the Straits by the fle-et.. should the
high-explosive shells at such ranges would be forcing of them be sncèPssfu1. will pl'eyent the
wasted. . Asiatic shore from reinforcing the EUl'opean. But
.The chIef dra
,back to these delays docs not the reduction or thc dispersion of troops ,,,aiting
lO:t

},larch 20, 1915

1; AND 1\ N D LW: Ä T E R.

.,
y ..
..........
ê
S
/

(.
--.

" C
r:; .
"-,

\
I
j

f;V I
úft

upon the opposing shores, is very different in tbe
:European from what it is in the Asiatic case.
On the European side it is e\'idcnt that e,-ery-
thing- depends upon the Isthmus by which the
Galhpolí peninsula hangs to the mainland: the
!Isthmus of Bulair,
That Isthmus, as has been repeatedJy pointed
out in these columns, is completely subject to gun
fire from the open sea. It is already untenable by
the enemy, and would, if it were possible, be still
further secured by ships acting from within the
t:::ca of ::\Iarma ra. A sufficient force landed here
could contain for an indefinite period, until
exhaustion and surrender, any garrison that the
enemy may hayc put into the Ga llipoli Peninsula,
Bnd if such a force were supplied at its leisure
with a sufficient siege train, it should make sure
of an advance sufiìcientIy strong to destroy any
temporary works the enemy might erect in that
tangle of hills.
But on the Asiatic siùe the problem is yery
(lifferent. It really depends upon the po"\\er
the enemy may have to furnish himself with
munitions, and particularly" ith a good supply
of munitions for his artillery.
Sow this clcpends, of course, upon ,,-hether
he has ùepôts of such munitions, and upon his
communications with the salllC, and it is to be pre-
sumed that this factor has been the main one in
decidinlY the bombardment of the coast near
Snn-rna o and of the railway sen ing that place;
while it is probable that action near the Bospbol'US
later on, if the forcing of the Dardanelles be
achieveJ, 'Would similarly star\ e the Asiatic side
of the Dardanelles from the north. But if yery
Iarae stores of munitions are already accumulated
in that district, the problem of holding the A.siatic
shores of the Straits upon a sufficient belt
o make
the commercial passage through them qUIte safe
and continuous wi1l be a serious one.

and a further rather more detailed Russian
account of the same action-which reports nothing
decisive. There is no deyelopment worth noting,
ei
her by way o! the expected Ru
sian re-advanc

into the Bukowma or the debouchmg of the enemy'
from the foothills into the Galician plain in the
neighbourhood of Przemysl. It looks as if,
t the
moment of writing, the opposing lines were
occupying very much the same situation as they
did upon the yery important ca pture of Stanislaus
by the Russians, not quite a fortnight ago.
On the East Prussian front there is the same
stagnation and lack of news. ,,- e had some <.lays
ago an announcement from the Russian side that
the Germans were massing a wry important force
to act again in the regioll of Przasnysz, and to
attempt once more the march southward upon the
communications behind "T arsa w, in the neighbour-
hood of that town, and the forcing of the Narew
line upon its lower part, near Xeo Georgie,.sk.
We find no further news, boweyer, of this
moyemr-nt, and if it deyelops, shall probably not
haye the result of the dcyclopment until nc-
t week.
The German papers, by the way, are strenu-
ously denying that there was any movcment of
troops from the "... est to the East in aid of Yon
Hindenburg's great concentration at the begin-
ning of February. If this criticism be directed
against the absurd exaggerations which we have
had in the Press, representing the Germans as
perpetually moving yast bodies backwards and for.
wards between the two frontiers, it is salutary and
seasonable, but if it is intended to conw,T that no
mm-ement whaterel' has taken placp, it is to be con-
trovert.ed by the clear eyidence of prisoners and
material captured, for we know in this positive
manner that one corps at least of the 10th, 12th, or
14th that v;ere massed in East Prussia, and still
remain there, was the 21st corps from Alsace-
Lorraine, and it was this corps which alone suc-
TIlE CARP A TlU -\NS. ceeded in piercing for a moment the defensi\ e line
'\Ye have of movements in the Carpathians no by passing the Xiemen just below Grodno. It has,
ne,,:,; of importance, save a vague Austrian COIH- of course, since achieying this feat-which was
muniqué to thp effect t]13t a considerable battle I1DS nbout a month ago-fanen back ngain to the neigh-
de\eJoped north of the Uzog pas!> in the footbills, bourbood of the frontier. and now lies upon a line
and claiming a considerable number of prisoners; running from the "ooJs just east of Augustû\\o.
11*

LAND

AND

THE

WAR
By FRED

,\V ATE R.

:March 20, 1915.

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTE.-Thls Article has been sulimiUed to tile Press Bureau, which does Dot object to tbe publlcatioD al ceDsored, aDd takes D8
ruponsiblllty for the correctness 01 tbe statements,

x

-

'.

THE DARDANELLES,

U XDUE optimism, or, at any rate, a total failure
to appreciate the difficulties connected "lith t.he
forcing of the Dardanelles, continues to be a
feature of the situation whera the lllass of the
geueral public is concerned.
'Ve have much airy ialk about t.he " wonderful progreo"
of modern gunnery" rendering this or that, possible, as witness
the nonsense which has been written about .. the wonderful
gUlls of the l/lInn Hli;abt'fll-," enabling indirect fire to be
used over the Gallipoli peninsula.
It, of course, makes good headlines to at.tri1.Hlte it all to
modern gunnery, aircrait obs!)l'\'ation, and so on and so forth;
but, as a matter of fad, aircraft (if employed) were merely
a refinement. of methods which were common o\'er almost equal
distances so long ago as the Itusso-Japanese V{ar.
In this particular war, at Port Arthur, indirect fire was
the order of the day more often than not. Eady in the wal',
using the heights as ron observation station, the Russian
Refl'Î-;on, herself invisible, landed a couple of 12,inch shell
right alongside the Japanese Fuji, firill,!!; o\'er a considerable
neck of land and at a range of something over lell miles, Ry
canting the ship, and so securing extra f"le\.:<tiGn, the same
thing could have been done at fifteen. '1'he Japanese at the
time put it down to land forts; but a'l none of the land forh
had such guns, this Ü!ea su1.>seqnently became untenable for
obvious reasons.
Again, Captain Kuroi, commanding- the Japane3e naval
shore batt.ery, dropped many a shell on the Russian :Fleet ill
Port Arthur, althou
h it was quite invisible to him. For
"obsen'ation" lie relied partly on a capt.i\e balloon with
primiti\'e signalling arrangements, partly Oil obsen'ation
from ships outside, which had to ba careful to keep well
away from unreduced land forts.
"Later Oil, 203 metre Hill was captured, and an ideal
observatiùl1 station secured; but plenty ûf damao-e ;','as dOlla
before that ....
So far a3 the DarJanel1ps are concerõled (:<ee plan), any
battleship at X, given an oh
erving ship at Y
more or Ie:>:!
out of range of A alld B), could at 8,ay time witl.in the last
ten or twelve year3 shell A amI H with cOl1siden,bl<} accura"y,
t
e necesqary information b:>illg w:ireles,ied directly or in-
directly as per pl,lß on page 13, using Z as a repeating Rhip.
Now all this has becn obvious for yea1:l. ,Equally
obvious is it that at any time during the pel'iod, 8uppoail1
the
forts at the entrance to be destroyed, the key to :\ and n
must lie at C, whidj should have heen fUl,tiíìed p.c('onlingly,
That no defensi\'e works were erecl
J muat be put
IO
"1
to Turkish casualness or stupidity. It is ïol1y to Bupp03e that
the Germans failed to recogniso the joint in the armoUl', much
as they may have relied npon the old verity that the Îort is
superior to the ship. P\Jssibly they c'llculated that reverence
for that doctrine would alone suffice to 8a..e the Danlanel1es
from auy attack, Possihly also thQV ne\'er really expectcli
to be able to drag Turkey into the w'al', aucl ba"i
g done BO,
found it impossible to obtain the lleces
ary g1in
to defend
Chanak's heel of Achilles.
It bas also to he remembered that ìf,erely in erect R
small extemporised !Ii '{-inch battery is a matter 'of a wcek to
· fortnight at th6 least; to esh hl
sh really eliìcient big gun
forts must at lea
t be reckoned in months. aud more pl'obably
10 yea
s, even wer
,t.here no problem of fiuding the guu:',
Illountmgs, amllHllutlOn, and othel' detail:!,

ç",
/':/.p-

Here let us take a chess analogy, Everyone who ha

merely a nodding acquaintance with the game (which nodding
acquaintance incidentally represents more or less accurately
Turkish knowledge of mcùcrn war), knows the wonderful
things that could be done against the most skiliul opponent,
if onl!! an extra move could be worked in here and there.
Black iB handi!.'apped from the first by being a move behind;
in this part,icular Dardanelles game Fat9 or stupidity, or
both in conjunction, have put Black (the German-Turkish
combination) three or four moves behind-hand.
But-if we are to obtain any level-headed or corred
estimation of affairs-we must keep all tbe superlatives out
of court. We must never forget that circumstances have
heen on our side, that the stars ha\'e fought against Sisera,
that an intemely difficult and dangerous operation is being
carried out, and that its success or failure depends entirely on
three factol'!!:
(1) Outranging,
(2) :Making the uttermost of every weak point in the
defence.
(3) The psychological effect of slow but sure progress.
This, of COUl'se, in no way coincides with the general
public view of the Dardanelles affair. At, any moment tho
third factor may intervene and render all else
ugatory. But
failing it, the task is colossal; and, had the Dardanelles been
German. I for one am absolutely convinced that they would
have proved impregnable even against outranging fire, since
there is no limit, to the armour which can be applied to R
fort gun, nor any limit (other than the financial one, which
can be n9g1ected) to the number of guns which can be
mounted.
This fact the Gern:ans assimilated many years ago, and
they {lave fort.ified their own coasts accordingly. \,-'hen,
eve:ltllally, the V!'I'V third-rata defences of the Dardanelles
succumb'to ovel'wltelming naval force, we may expect some-
thing in the nature of a public demand for similar operations
against the rcally first-dass defences of Cuxhaven or Heligo-
land. 'Ve may also expect to find the Gf"rman Press and its
na\-al experts eXplaining at great lengt.h that forts are hopeless

gain:!t, ships, in the hopes that they will be q(lOted over here.
It is here tlll
t d:mger lies, dang!'r of popular attempts to
forc9 AdmiraIt.y policy. Such attempts do not stand to suc-
ceed, but Ule occurrence of them to any exlent is bound to
cilcourage the enemy as a si
n of weakness. Herein lies the
true inwal'dtl
s3 of .. Trl1st the Admiralty."

THE S
iYHNA OPERATIO
S.
The imponance of the Smyrna opel'at-ions is somewhat
apt to be O\'cl'!colced, It is true that they are of less import-
ance than wUdt is being done i'l the Dardanelles, though in a
way, of com'se, they are a natural corollary. For example,
the capture of Constantilloph
is bound to turn Turkey into an
Asiatic Power pure and simple; so that, in addition to its
actual value as a gl"eat trade centre, Smyrna has a hypot.he-
tical value of conaiderable significance.
\Var is necessarily a mat.t-er of anticipating and allowill

fQr contingencies, Since a siege and defeuC6 of Const.antinople
is out of the question because of the Allied Fieet, we may
take it fOI' granted that (unless pl'evented) the Turks will
withd,'aw all their European troops to Asia ::.\-linor-a concen-
tration not lo be igllor
d.
From what. we know of Tm'kish conceptions, or rather
mi
concepLions, of sea power, it, was ever in the chaptel' of
1?-*

!Iarch 20, 1915.

LAND

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fJUq(,f<,E

possibilities that an attempt would be made to collect trans-
ports at Smyrna with a view to operations against Eavpt.
\\ïth a view to protecting these, the fortifications were"pro-
bably being improved. There was also always the possibility
()f an Austrian squadron managing to evade the French Fleet
and get into Smyrna.
One way and another, therefore, it was necessary either
to disable Smyrna or else to maintain a lengthy and consider-
able close blockade of the port.
From all of which it is abundantly clear that the bom-
1:Jardment of Smyrna comcs into a totaUy different category to
the bombardment of Scarborough and other of our East, Coast
towns. In the first case, we have definite operations as a
definite and integral part of a definite scheme j in the other,
mere aimless destruction in no way commensurate with the
risk, probably not even worth the cost of the ammunition
expended.
THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.
The most important event of the week is undoubtedly
the destruction which has been wrought on hostile submarines
by British destroyers. It is not impossible that the reported
einkings of submarines by merchant ships may be imaginary
or partial successes. That is to say, there exists a possibilit!l
of sunken wreckage being occasionally taken for a submarine,
also the further possibility that a submarine may be struck
and merely damaged to the extent of her outer skin. To a\'oid
being unduly optimistic we should consider tl1ese things, and
perhaps discount by fifty per cent. in order to be certain of
being on the right side.
,,"'here destroyers are concerned, however, we have two
recent tangible ca6es of organised destruction resulting in the
loss of the boats and the capture of the crews. This last is
certainly an application of the truth of the pro\'erb that" a
live dog is better than a dead lion," because the taking
prisoners of crews is evidence which cannot be concealed or
Imppressed, and proof to the German people of weak points in
that submarine blockade on which so much faith was pinned.
To us it is also satisfactory as indicating that we are
learning the limitations of submarines, and acquiring practice
in \vays and means of de
troying them. In this the ram seems
easily the best weapon, as it was expected it would prove to
be, since it is the I!Ïm pit-st.
The problem of the crews has probably been best dealt
with in the way in which the Admiralty has acted. To accord
the .. pirates" the ordinary treatment given to prisoners of
v. 11.1' would have been manifestly incorrect. On thc other hand,
to hang them, though logical, would probably havc defeated
the object in view. It is necessary to rem em bel' in connection
with this blockade that tIIC German Rubmarines are acting
under definite orders from their own Admiralty. AU the sub-
marines have not carried these instructions out to the letter;
Fome captains have bf'en careful not t{) ontrage the laws of
l1UlJlanity. To a
certain and differentiate ùuring the war is
neceB8arily difficult, if not impo!>!::ible in many cases. TIle
,;ertainty of, an ignominious death as the certain re
ult of

AND

V.ATER.

o L 1
l'

.,
1". E ']{ INS U L.II .

.If

5 / Jl

"f

1 11

. J

capture would tend to drive aU submarine officers to hh-
maelite tactics.
The British" reply" has now been definitely prcclaimed.
,,"'hether it will ha......e sati<:factory results remains to be s"-'en.
There i!1 ever a great deal to be said for the alternati\ e policy
of ignoring the blockade altogether. \Yf.' all ynow the psycho-
logical advantage secured by the man who refuses to lose his
temper in a quarrel or the fate of a boxer \\ ho .. Je
es his
hair. JJ
To be sure v.-e lla';e not done that, and our proclamation
is moderation itself. All the same, l1Owever, it will so be
represented in Germany to the German public, and by Ger-
man agencies to all neutral nations. It is along such lines
that we may lose as much as wc gÛn, cCI'reet t!,engh the
.. nply " gua reply may he and is.

THE HIGH SEAS.
On March 14 the German corsair ÐNSd," (which
escaped after the battle of the Falkland Islands) was canght
hy the lí (lrt alld IJ'laS[IOW off the island of .T:Hln Ff.'rnandez,
and after a short five J1"}inutes' action hoisted tbe wbite flag.
She was, of courfoe, bopeleßSly outgunned, and it is little
wonder that she Eank soon aft-el'wards.
The significance of the incident lies in the state of im-
potence to which, as a conair, she had becn reduced. J nctead
of destroying and harrying British trade, she was herse1f
barried and in hiding.
There remains now only the Karl.qullt', also in hiding and
a];,o impotent. Two armed liners remain, but of these the
Prinz Eitel, should she leave t.he harbour w}lere 1'Ìle is now
definitf.'ly located, is practicaliy certain to be de
troyeù.

ANSWERS TO CORRESPO:"iDENTS.
\Y. 11. fWestmeath).-When DucRw('rth went through
tl1e Dardanelles he was fired at from hole!'! drilled in the rock,
which projected huge stones. Thi.. hall gi,'en rise to the story
of similar submerged terredo-dischargel's to-day. 1t io; )Jet
\e1"Y likely tbat any such exist--in any C3!ie, they could exi!it
anywhere just as \';ell as at the :N" <lrrows. Ten years ago the
Germans installed, 38 part of their dcIences at Cuxhaven and
elsewhere, huge submerged drums fittpd with torpedo tubes.
A. P. R. (l\Iolltreal),-There are practically no "tactic
"
in modern naval warfare 'compared to the tactics of th3 ohl
days. The German criticisms of British tadics do not count
for rr.nch, and t]1e'alleged " bad manæuvlidg .. of the North
Sea action was due to t he fact that Admiral Beatty reIUscd
te be dragged into a cle,'cr German trap.
C. S. P. (\\"ilubJedon).-It is imlloslo.ible to an
wer your
question as submarines vary so, but in a rough sort of "Way
you might give the de!'troyer half a minute it spotted, though
it has, of course, a fair ch:mce of not beiub" spotted,
DUCKS AND DRAKES (llythe),-The course of a torpedo
is'not to be deflectCJd in the way you suggest, I believe {,hat
in the early day
of torpedoes one or two provisional patents
\\ere takcn out., but that tbey neYer came to anythillg.
13*

LA':-"D

AND

E. II. G, M. (Dc\"(;n),-The wavy gold lace band indi-
cates Royal Naval Reserve. The white band indicat
s that
he is in the pay department of that branch of the ServIce,
- E. W. S. (London, "'.,C.),-The bcst known bo
h-
dropper is the Scott, invented .by an office: of the U.S: FIYlllg
(;or1's. It was described and Illustrated III Aer?noutlcs some
time a"o. If you mail 65 cents to the AeronautiCs Press Inc"
250, 'Vest 54th Street, New York, you will get th
particu
ar
copy. Any of our aerial journals would also give you lll-
formation galore.
J, L, (Glasgow).-No; quite impossible,
S. N. T. (York),-With reference to tbe Dardanelles,
you have not taken into account my I,Joint of the immen
e fir
-
superiority of the ships of the Allies ellgaged. Ships (If
stationary), armed as the forts were, would have been
annihilated in seven minutes instead of seven hours I
G. lIIc!' (Belia
t),-The device you mention is a very
old one.
T. L, B, (Windermere),-Your suggestion. that, as
English prisoners in Germany are apparently ?emg b
dly
underfed, exchanges should be made on the basIs of 1l'eI[Jltt
instead of numbers, is certainly original I I doubt, however,
whether the idea would find favour at Donington Hall I
, BRUXE (IGlmarnock).-The original idea. of the sub-
marine was direct attack on the bottom of a sbp from below,
but it has long since been gi\'en up. It is not possible to see
under water for more than a very short distance. That is why
the submarine when submerged uses a periscope, and has be-
come a practical instead of an impracticable weapon of war,
C. R (Epsom),-I do not think your idea is very
feasible. It has a certain attractiveness, but, you have to
remember that the average anti-aircraft gun is of small
calibre.
W. T. (Canterbury).-Theoretically, of course, a pro-
jectile from a rifled gun should reach the target point up, but
that this has never been regularly believed is evidenced by the
fact that the turrets of most battleship!! are inclined at such
an angle that the net result would be the receipt of a direct
blow instead of an indirect one.

:.\,: ATE R.

:March 20, 1915,

Some time ago a series of experiments were carried ou6
in America with a view to settling the point, photographs
being automatically taken as the projectile passed tbrough a
series of tissue paper screens. In tllÍs case the evidence Yoas
point downwards.
You will, of course, be familiar with the fact that tbe
modern rifle bullet in leaving the muzzle has a distinct waggle
for some 1\vo hundred yards or so before it settles down to its
flight, though it was some little time before this was definitely
discovel'ed. In sOllle similar kind of way it may be that the
gyroscopical action of the projectile from a long modern high-
velocity gun undergoes interferences.
Ba all this as it may, there is not" or until recently was
not, unanimity of opinion amongst gunnery experts.
Incidentally, at the Battle of the Yalu the old Japanese
battleship Fuso was hit by a shell on the side. This sl1e1l
went tlpwords, and, striking something, was deflected back,
so that it actually came out through the same side of the ship
some feet above where it had entered. This was at one time
evidence for the striking point-upwards theory.
A. R. B. (Torquay).-Nothing is to be done with
magnets.
A. P. B. (Willclsor),-(l) Answered in the text. (2) I
do not think there is any truth in the rumour that the
Japanese Fleet is going to participate in the attack on tbe
Dardanelles. For one thing, we have ample force without
it. For another, the Japanese Fleet has still its own duties
in the Pacific, (3) Any reply to this question would be
censored,
A, J, R. (Rutherglen),-The first cost of a submarine is
a very variable quantity. According to the German :Nayal
Estimates, they work out at about J:6,OOO eacb. Our own
Estimates give little, if any, clue. The latest type could
certainly be put at about J:IO,OOO, and probably more. lIIaIlY
thanks for your appreciatory remarks.
S. G. (Isle of Null).-Something similar is already

in use.

(Several r
plies 'ldcl over till ncxt 1l'eeli.)

INFLUENCE OF
AIRCRAFT
By L. BLIN

AIR POWER.-I.
AND CAVALRY.
DESBLEDS.

HEN Admiral Nahan wrote" The Influence of This is due to the fact that aerial reconnai;;sance and cavalry
Sea Power Upon Modern History" he had, to reconnaissance are of two entirely different characters, and
guide him in his judgments and deductions, can be made to 8upplement each other. The former has
the minutely recorded evcnt!! of centuries. already, in numerous instances, relieved the cavalry of cer-
Probably a few generations hence another tain duties and responsibilities which were placed upon it
:Mahan will prove the influence of air power on the produc- simply because, before the advent of aircraft, no otber arm
tion oî a state of world politics which, to his readers, will be could undertake them. Certain tasks were assigned to the
modern history. And although to us the influence of air cavalry not because they could be pel'fectly accomplished by
power on generations to come, or in shaping the course of it but because those tasks would be less satisfactorily per-
history, is still enshrouded by the mist of onr limited know- formed by any other arm. It was, for instance, part of the
ledge, yet it is obvious that, side by side with the influence cavalry's work to be sent out, unsupported, to very gl'eab
of sea power, so cogently made evident by Mahan, there is distances from the main force, in order to gather, at random.
now another power, brought into being by the advent of air- and in all directions, information concerning the enemy which
craft, which is forcibly asserting itself. might prove of strategic value. The cavalry had, for thi:l
The writer will not attempt to predict to what degree reason, very often to undergo a strain quite out of propol,tion
the war will be influenced by the work of air navies. There to the results achieved, and which wasted much of Ít3
are not sufficient data on which to base any conclusion; but strength and resources. By relieving the cavalry of at least!
the information contained in the official reports already pub- a considerable portion of long-distance and random recon-
lished by the War Office and the Admiralty is enough to naissancð, the advent of aircraft has greatly diminished the
indicate the character of the influence which air power has strain to which it was hitherto subjected.
already exercised. From this it will bo possible to make Unless prevented by a superior force of aircraft, an air
certain deductions of considerable value for the immediate squadron, or even a single machine, can carry out in clear
future. weather long, distance reconnaissance with very satisfactory
Not taking into consideration the numher of combatants rcsults. This work can be accomplished by the airman much'
of the opposing armies now trying to force history into two more quickly and with much less strain than is possible to the
different channels, there are two factors which, so far as the cavalry. Since the beginning of hostilities it has, therefore,
land operations are concerned, distinguish the present war been possible, by the employment of aircraft, for the Com-
from previous ones. These two factors are tIle eml)loymellt, mander-in-Chief to save his cavalry much fruitless marching,
on a large scale, of railways and quick motor transport for and, possibly, much fighting, for the same amount of informa-
strategic purposes, and the application of aircraft to the need'! tion which his airmen obtained with ease. The full significance
of war. To a certain degree, as will be seen, the influence of of this fact must not be overlooked, Unprovided or insnm-
these two factors is interdependent. Aircraft affords a quick ciently provided with aircraft and reliable aerial observers,
method of reconnaissance, and railways and motor vehicles a an army, forced to depend entirely, or almost entirely, UpOll
means of taking advantage of the results of those observation.. its cavalry for strategical reconnaissance during the period
;with as little delay as may be. preceding a battle, would, when the opposing armies began
But it is important to note that the employment of air- to close, have its cavalry so tired and scattered that their
craft .ro
:econnaissance work has not diminished, and can- useful employment at a critical moment in the battle migbt

ot dummsh, the value of cavalry reconnaissance. In reality, be seriously hampered.
It has made the cayalry of even greater worth than before. There are, however, many details of reconnaissance whicq
14-

:Marèh 20, 1915,

LA
D

AND

can only be obtained by t.he canilry. For in
tance, it may
not be possible for aeri.i.l obsel"\'ers to di
tilìguish, from a o-reat
height, beh
een friendly and encmy troop:!. In such a
ase,
\\ hen once the position of the troops has been locat.ed by the
airman, the cavalry could, if n
ccssary, be sent out to det
r-
niÏne the point. The cavah'y \\ould then only he ascertaining
the correctness of a specific observation, amI would not
be u:,ing up its strength on, pos
ibly, an uncel tain
mission.
There are also other poilits connected with reconnais:õance
which are altogether beyond tlle capacity of aeiial observa-
tion. The airman cannot, for instance, discover the morale
of the enemy on the ground. Nor can he find out their
pbysical condition. An air fle6t caunot keep in touch day
and night with any particular unit of the enemy. These are
some of the reasons why the lise oÎ aircraft does not dimini
h
the value of the cavalry fcr reconnaissance. Again, t.here is
the pos"ibility of bad weat.1:...r rendering an aerial reconnai3-
Eance out of the question, or the case where the enemy is under
cover in a wood.
From the preceding lines it will be gathered that the
co,operation of aircraft with cavalry henceforLh gives to a
Commander-in-Cbief a met.ns of carrying out reconnÚ$sance
wbich his predecesscrs did not possess. Therefore, Napoleon's
dictum that" an army is nothing except for it'! head" has
at tbe present time an even greater force and significance
than a century ago, for the" head:' by the judicious com-
bination of aerial and cavdry sconting, now possesses better
" eyes. JJ
There is a point connected witb aerial scouting whicb it
i'! important. always to l.eep in mind. It is that t.be Com-
mander-in-Chief must have an exact. estimation of the tem-
perament and training of his air scouts, for 011 these con-

:\V ATE R.

ditions must depend the degree of reliance to be placed on
their observations, carried out at times under difficult cir-
cumstances, It Dlay be that there is a greater degree of
understandina between Briti!;h airmen and their commanders
tl,an thel'e isObetween those of the encmy, and this possibly
has contributed to the ascendancy our airmen have gained.
Ii such be really t.he case, it would ioHow that, as far as pos-
sible, the same air reconnaissance squadron and ca\'alry force
should always be employed t.o co-opeo'ate with each ot.her EO
as t.o ensure the best results from such co-operation.
Another comideration of importance in connection with
the use of aircraft for reconnais.<:ance duty is that tbe com-
mander must always have a sufficisllt number of machines in
reacline
s to start at a mOJJ":ent's notice. There mu
t also be
an amrle number of trained aelial obs
rvers in order that too
great. a continuous drain "hould not be placed upon a small
force, It is only with a large air fle"t tIl?t a commal1der in
the pre<;ent war can derive the full advaut
ge of tbe co-
operation of his ail craft anJ ca\'alry,
In concluding this chapter on the Influence of Air
Power" the writ.er cannot do b",tter than quote t.he follov.-ing
lines frO'll Sir John French's de"-patch, dated NO\'ember 20,
1914: .. The ",ork perforwed by the Royal Flying Corps has
cont.inued to pl'ove of tIle UÞ1,OSj vaJ'le to the success of t.he
operations. I do not con
ider it advisable in this de
patch to
go into any àetail as regards the daties p.!,pigJl:><l to the Corps
1!.nd t.he llatuïe of their work, but almost every clay new
methods for eTIlploying thel11, bOlh !'trat.cgically and tacticalJy,
are disco\"ered and put into pradiC'e. The de\elopment of
their \.;se and emploYlllent has, indeed, been quite extra-
ordinary, and I feel sure that no effort should be spared to
increa:>e t.heir numbers and pel"fe,;t their equip:11ent and
efficiency.' ,

CORRI
SPONDENCE.

SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' TOBACCO FL'l'\D.
To the Editor of LAXD A
D WATER,
DEAR SIR,-As I know your valuable paper is eJ\.tem,i\cIy
read both by naval and military officers on active service, I
should be extremely glad if you would allow me space to af:k
IIny Commanding Officer who is short of tobacco for his troops
at t.he Front to communicate with me, and my committee will
be pleased, as far as lies in their power, to forward a supply.
I will take this opportunity also to thank those 01' your
readers who have so kindly and promptly contributed towards
the needs of the wounded at the S1.. Malo Hospitals, !:25
wolth of tobacco aud pipes Ì1a\"e already been despatcheJ,-
Your:> faithfully,

"T, EVAX COLLISON, Hon. Secretary.
Central House, Kingsway, "'.C.

QUEEN ALEX-\NDaA'S F.ELD FORCE FU:';O.
To the Editor of L.\XD Al'D 'VATER,
SIR -Your 17enerous support of the good work being
carried
n by this'" fund prompts m
to writ.e that a sugges
ion
for it.s auamentation has been submItted by the present wnter,
in hiah quarters, by a proposal t.o hold a Wellington and
"Tate
loo Loan Collection of pictures, trophies, etc" in Lon-
don during this centenary year of the great battle, in aiJ of
this fund,
The exhibition miaht also well include portrait.s, etc., of
Kilpoleon and his gene
'ah, and. any .other available. work (of
which there are a larae number III thIs country), whIch would
., .
materially add to the interest of the collectIOn,
At Apsley House alone there is a wealth of souvenirs,
includin a the areat marble fiaure of Napoleon by Canova-
'" '" to 1 . h
totaUy unknown to vast numbers of ou
.own peop e III t e
present generation,
nd to our m:"ny VIsItors III t
e metro-
polis from the countnes of our Alhes and our Colomes. .
A suitable location at Kensinaton or elsewhere can readIly
be found for the exhibition, and the fund in which Her
Majesty Queen Alexandra is taking so great an int.erest, and
to which she has graciously lent the advantag
of her naJ?e,
would, without doubt, substantially benefit durlllg the commg
mont.hs.

I am, Sir, your obeJient servant,
J. LAXDFEAR LUCAS.
Spectacle Makers' Company.
Glendora, Hindhead, Surrey,

ANTI-SUB:\fARINE TACTICS.
To the Editor of LAXD AND 'VATER.
SIR,-In your issue of :\larch 6 your eorre
ponde
t Lorù
Dunleath 5ubmits proposals in this connection which are

certainly de;:ervin17 of earne
t COl1sideration, Some II1{)nth,
ago I aj)proachl;d the allthoritie:! with \'ery similar proposal..,
but the submarine menace had not then become so acute, Pos-
sibly a comparison of my suggestions with those of yom" corn'-

pondent may be of interest to your readers.
It should he noted that I approach the
ubject from the
stanòpoint of a naval architect, with many years' practical
experience in tbe design and con"truction of "essels of \'arioub
type!'. It is unquestionable that for submarine chasing a
srecial t.ype must be evolved.
My conclu"ions as to th
principal points which should
he embodied in the decign of a submaline chaser are, how-
e\'er, somewhat different flom those
ügge
ted by Jour }Jle-
vious conespondent.
(1) Spnd.-Tbis llJU
t be at least twice as great as the
Eurface speed of tbe fastest
ublllarine likely to be encountered.
Quick response to the helm is, of course, of the utmo
t im-
portance, combined with ability t.o pivot quickly, like a .. (J.y
on a pin," as I have heard it expressed,
(2) Rammillg,-This should have no place in the pro-
J.osed tactics, and should, therefore, not be taken aCC01;.nt ct
in the design. For destroyers snch ramming t.actics are quite
feasible, but not for the light fast craft I advocate. Besides,
shaUow dl'aft is, in my opinion, of the ut.most. importance,
and this is not compatible with ramming tactics, unle:!s the
Mtbmarine is caught ill the surface condition, "hen gun fire
would much more cert.ainly destroy iL.
A,I"1llamwt,-One Q.F. gun on a circular, all-round
pedestal, say, on top of a conning tower, with some form of
launchable spar torpedo in t.he bow, and a couple of large
calibre machine-gt1ns are
ufficient A single torpedo-tube
carried on an aU-rol1nd racer aft might be useful in emer-
gency against enemy vescels, thus increasing the scope of the
t.ype, but it is possibly a mist:J.ke to depart from the primary
purpose of submarine chasing.
Invi ibility.-Low freeboard col11patible with speed anJ
scaworthiness is, of conrse, important, but high spl'f'd in the
vessel I propose and sea-keepiug qualities absolutely compel
a hiah forecastle; wireless telegraphy calls for some form of
mast; and high power for a very substantial funnel or funnek
It should be IJoSbible, however, t.o so arrange the profile of the
vessel as to very materially ill1pl"OVe t.he ill\i"ibility as com-
pared with, say, a modern deotroyer,
Let us now consider the practical de<:ign oi a "e:-"el em-
bodying t.he.se characteristics; kecpi';l
, in view the s
preme
importance III tIle present. case of raplmty of constructIon aUtI
"implicity of haudling, withcnt which all our Bugge tions are
quite useless, since shipyards are O\ercrowded with work, and
highly-trained CI"e\\ s are needed in many ot her direction",
1 fhclild t.ake as my model a cross bel\\een a reduced

1;'*

LAXD

torpedo-hoat di':;troyer and tlIe TIII'biT/ia, witlI possibly also
some effort to work in a hydroplane after-body.
I shmtld give the full body, "ith its high furecastle and
flaminO' bow lines, very much the form of the latest
destroyers, keepi\lQ' draft 'at lowest possible limits. and round-
in::;-up tlle keel from mid:,hips to stern. The fuB beam wonlel
be e,n-ried \"ery far aft 011 the load-line. very much as in tho
case of thè l';I1'biT/ia already referred to, Perhaps an en-
larged J{ap'
Lurf would best represent the type advocated.
Such a \'esscl at moderate speeds up to twenty knoh
woulJ travel Vðrv easily with moderate change of trim, but
at speeJ,'< of thi;ty kn
ts 01' thereby .. squat
i\lg OJ. would
occur to a considerable extent, a tendency whIch mIght he
utilised to advantage in quiet water!! to obtain a hydroplane
effed. very conducive to quick handling on the rudder.
Roughly speaking. such a vessel could be worked out on
a length of 200ft" a di;;placement not exceeding 350 tom.. and
a draft of 7ft, at normal trim, Twin-screw turbine!! and
two ex pres!! boilers, oil-fired, Vlould be fitted to de\'elop fivß
to six thousand S,H.P.
A word as to the tactics to be used with such vessel!!.
Flotillas of eight or ten woulà b3 based on each large shipriu;
district or naval base-e,g., Thames, Forth, Mersey, Tyne,
Bristol Channel, and so forth-with special enlarged flotillas
for strategical points. such as Do\"er Straits, Mull of Cantyre,

t, George's Channel, &c" &c. Ships making port or ap-
proaching danger zone!! would be shadowed by one or more of
these special cI'aft rapidly varying their positions relati\'e to
the ve=
el sbadowed by alternating periods of slow with
sudden bursts of high speed, than which there would be
nothing more disconcerting to tho submarine. It is \lot too
much to claim that no submarine would think or waciLlng
torpedoes in ath.cking a vessel so protected, nor would it IJo
safe for a submarine to even show its periscope in such a neigh-
Lourhood. FiotiIla3 of the
e vessels would also employ
.. scaUer JJ tactics in water!! "here a submarine has been
located, It is at present impossible to locate a submarine's
course after it bas once dived. but a number of fast vessels
can from a given point" scatter JJ o\'er the points of I he com-
pass and with fair prospect of locating the submarine again
at it3 neÜ effort. in surface observation.
Unfortunately, such a programme as I have outlined re-
quires the building of at least a hundred new vessels of this
Bpecial type, Frankly, this is quite out of the question at
present; at least, in thi!! country. All our available ship-
building re
Ollrces must be utilised to provide the units for
immediat!
necessities, such as cruisers, torpedo-boat
de"troyen, submarines. and other t.ypes which the Censor
might not lik
to ha\'e enumerated, It might be possible to
get round thi3
'!;fficuity, hut here again publication is inad-
lI1i
si ble,
In my opinion. some of us ought to help the authorities
by building and experimenting with some such crait as (
ha\'e cutlined. gi, ing special attention to simplicty of con-
stnlcliou and standardis3tion of parts for rapid reproduct.ion
in batl'lle
, One thing may be definitely stated, and that is
that the mere desi
n of a thoroughly practical anti-submarine
craft pri'SeIIlS no difficulty at all. To provide a hundred such
for early deli';ery is quite anothCl' mattel'.
J, R.

WASTAGE.
To the Editor of L\.XD ,u.n 'V.'TER.
S!ll,-
eldcm indeed C:in it he
aid that l\Ir, B
Iloc does
not m"k
his meaning abullda'ltly clear, But his criticism ill
yoUl' la;.t i
sue of the miiit:J.r,r writer's figure!! is difficult to
follow,
:ðlr, Belloc lI:ls to!,1 U3 tlIat the total German casuaItie!!
arf' forty per cent, of their whole force in the field, which he
put.s clOW,I at 6,OOO,OOJ, Thi" it ",rill be noticed, would gi\.

2,400.000 cas
lalties in all,
Oil the other halld, he e,timated last month the IJrr-
m01/tl/f losses of Germany alolle at 1.250.000 (to he ùoubled
if Austria is includeù). 1'his faidy corresponds with the
larger figure given latel' by the milituy writer.
If, then,
Ir. Bellcc's 2.500.000 refers to ]If1'I1I01/l'nt
losses only. is lie now including tho
e of the Amhian .\rmy
a!! well
If not, is he estimating the fo"'
list of casualties,
and not (like the ìlIilitary writer) the permanent losses only 1
Yours faithfully,
Shr<-w. 1 )ill'Y. A. L. 0,

MI LI r ARY HONOl'RS.
To the Editor of I..t!\O
:>'D "'.\.1'
R,
I!E\R S!R.-Your military correspondent may be able to
explam to those who, like mygeli'. are 110t com"ersant with

IlL

A
D

,: ATE R.

:March 20, 1915.

thing!! warlike the following' approximate figures based OD
the recent list of Militar,!, Honours:
PercentaS!e of IIonoUf'l awarded to R<gimental Officers
in Lhe Field...................................................... 5 p,o.
PercenLage of HOUOUB awarded to !Otaf!' Offieera in the
Field........ ...................,. ,.. .,........,.........,.,..... '., 35 {I,o.
Casualties among J:e;;imenlal Officers ........................ 30 p.o.
Cd.iSUll.hies among Lhu Stu.ff .., ..................,..,..,........... 5 p.o.
It would seem from above almost as easy for a Regi..
mental Officer to acquire a place in the" Roll of Honour JJ a.
for a Staff Officer to appear in the" List of Honours. JJ
'While at the 3ame time the Re
iment.al Officer run!! six
times as much chance of being knocked out, with one-seventh
the chance of being noticed.-Yours truly,

CIVILIAN.

March 2, 1915.

ARTICLe ON SUB
IARINES,
To the Editor of LAXD AND \VATER.
SIR,-XOW that submarines are so much before the publio
wOldJ it 1l0t ùe meful ii your paper, which has so mallY
interesting artides in it, was to get some naval expert who
can \....I.it
intelligibly to O'ive us an article on Bubmarine:'!'
The public know vcrÿ littl;' about their strong and weak points
or really what their capabilities are or how they can be be
1I
at bcked or guarded against. I would suggest the following
points would be of interest:
(11 How bn
can they 5t:lr under water, and how do they st"7
1o:>lIe:lth the
urÍi\ce?
(2) How long does it take th
m to sink or ri56!
(3) What rate do the.... t!"aYeI as a rule a!xJ\'e and below t't.
surfac
! '
(-t) What is the smaIIt',t :ifl
, gun, lmUet-, or shell which will
pierc
them!
(5i How long ('an t,he
' keel' the se:l without repleniahing t.heå
stores!
(6'1 \\'hat Ïg theil' armament besides torpedol's!
(7) Ho'\' do me'l-of-'nr and t!;i"[Ifodo-boats att-ack Bnd defend.
tbeuIseI .,"es a
tills!, slibnld.rine$ r
-Yours truly,

P. C, S, P.'YNE,
2nù Lieut, Beds. Yeomanry.
13, High Street. Olney, Bucks.

L,\ :\fÉOAILLE
IiLlTAIRE.
To the Editor of L,\SD .'
;D "'.\TER,
DE.tR SIR.-I should be much obliO'ed if YOU could give
me the following illionnatioll thl'ough YO
lr papèr, with regard
to the French decoration" La 1Iédaille Militaire .. I
(1) How lUany classes are there Y
(2) What e1a
s al'e the W.O" N,C,O" and men to
receive whose ll
l1le:!
ppeared in Army Orden
undel' date X 0\"t'11lber 5, 1914 '1
(3) What colour is the ribbon

(4) Is the ribboll colour the same for all classes t
\Ya\'erley Hotel, Bournemouth.

x.

MISSING.
To the Eùitor of L.\XD AXD W.\TER.
SIR,-Vle
ee daily in the newspapers reports from our
front that" a :3edion of our trenches ha,-e been lost or recap-
tured," and that besid
s the" killed and woundeù" mallY
hundreds of our men are .. mis
ing, OJ It seems hardly
possible that a section of a trench can contain so many. An
explanation of thi:;-to me alld ollIel's a puzzle-as to where
the lUi
sing come from, and where they go to. and how they
gi't there, migllt quiet our dou bts.- Your ohedient servdnt,
Y.

Ta!lgier anù Con
titlltioIlal Club!!,

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S LECTL'RES ON THE WAR.
Xe.....castle....., ,.. Ti>\m Hall........., F..;d".\.............. 19
[areh,3and8.30.
C:IasgO\\ ,......... f;t. A:rd,'ew's Hall.
Iulîda.v............ 22 :\Iarch, 8.15 p.m.
Eùit:blll'gh... ('sher H;>IL.,...... Tu<.-sd,l;' ........... 23 :\Iareh, B p,m,
-'lam.he5ter.... FI'ee T.-.,dl' Hall.... \Vcdn<.-<;day....., 2

fa.-ch, 8.30 p,m.
SouthpOl.t......... C'ambridJe Hall.... Thursd..\
,..,...... 25 :.Iarch, B p.m.
f'eats may now he booked for the next snips of Lcchn'es at Quoon'.
Hall: these are to be gi\en on the fi'-3t Víednesday in April,
1ay.
8lid June,
MR, JANE'S LECTURES ON THE NAVAL WAR.
Bournemouth,... Payilion,............ Frid,'
...............19
[.U"dl.;3 p.m.
Gllildford......... ßOl"Ouf);h Hal!....,..
atul'day........,..20 :\[arch. 31',m.
Hovo,....,........, 1'o'....n Hal!.......... Tuesda
....,........23
Ia.-ch, 3 p,m,
Bath..........,...... Aßs
mbl)' Rooms.. Thursda
...........25 !\Iarch,;3 p,m.
:\lah-ern,..,........ .-\.ssemlol
R"onl.s.. FIida.\"...,......,..,26 :\la1'ch,;3 P,In,
Shre\\5blll,y....... _\s,
emLI)' Ruonl3, S..tllnlay,.........,27 :\farch,;3 P,IIl,
:\Ir, \Yalter Leaf. f),Litt.. wiì\ iedul'e on "The Danlanellu" at
the lEoEan Hall on Friday, March 26th. at B p,m. Tickets. prico
73, 6d" 5.
" 2.. 6,1., a'ld Ls" can be uh
aillt'ù from .\Ii.ss P. Stradley, 58,
Victúria Street. S, 'S,

4'rinled by TUB YrCToRH Hou!!!!: Pam=o ('0" Lm" Tudor Street, Whitefriars, London, E.O.

March 20, 1915

LAND AND \V A TER

,-,'

e

.

s

-

are the only St8;ndard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.

THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO" LTD.

FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL

for CUTLERY, etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.

ARTICLES l\IADE FRO'I THIS
STEEL, BEING ENTIRELY UN-
AFFECTED BY FOOD ACIDS,
FR UITS, VINEGAR, etc., WILL BE
FOUND TO BE OF ENOR
IOUS
ADVANTAGE IN HOTELS,
CLUBS, RESTAURANTS,
CAMPS. NEITHER THE KNIFE-
BOARD NOR CLEANING
MACHINE IS NOW NECESSARY.
g CUTLERY OF THIS STEEL
MA Y BE HAD OF ALL THE
LEADING l\IANCFACTCRERS.
SEE THAT KNIVES BEAR THIS
MARk.

-'FIRTHL
(STAINLESS)

Original and Sole Maliers:

THOS. FIRTH 6. SONS, LTD.
SHEFFIELD.

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO
READERS OF "LAND AND WATER."

MY
March to Timbuctoo
By GENERAL JOFFRE

With a Biographical Introduction, II The Abbé," by ERNEST DIMNET,
author of "FRANCE HERSELF AGAIN."
Bound in Cloth, with a Portrait Wrapper. 25. net.

E ENEMY'S
COUNTRY

A DIPLOMAT'S
MEMOIR of 1870
Being an account of a balloon f'scape
from the Siege of Paris, and a Politi-
. cal Mission to London and Vienna,
By FREDERIC REITLINGER
P, it-'ate Secr
taF1l to M. Jules Poure,
11t ad 01 the National Defelice Guvern.-
ment of lfIlO,
Translated from the French by
HENRY REITLlNGBR
With Pictorial Wrapper, Clctb,
25. net.

Being the Diary of a little tour in
Germany and elsewhere during the
first days of the 'Var.
By MARY HOUGHTON

With 80 Introduction by
EDWARD GARNETT
Cr. 8vo. Cloth, 55. net.

YHIE

LITTLE TOWNS OF FLANDERS

A Book of Woodcuts by ALBERT DELSTANCHE
With a Prefatory Letter from EMILE VERHAEREN
This edition, with the plates printed from the original woodblocks, and thø
text set in FI01"ence Type, wIll be limited to 500 numbered coPies, 100 of
which will be signed by 111. Delstanche. The unsigned coPies, demy 4to,
bOlmd in boards, wIll be sold at 12S. 6d. net. The signed coPies, bound in
vellum with silk ties, at {,I IS, net.

LONDON

CHATTO & WINDUS

ST. MARTIN'S
LANE, W.C.

Harrods
for

Khaki Shirts
Officers

'Yarm and
Comfortable

T HE Officers'
Khaki Shirt..
one of which
i. here sketched, are
thoroughly dependable
in every way; they
are smart, too, and of
the correct style and
pattern for regulation
wear.

The cut and work-
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highest order, and carry
the obvious stamp of
having been made by
expert shirt - makers.
Tue fitting is perfect.
Quoted here are the
prices for different
stylel :

With collars attached, each 8/11 and 10/6
Without collars, - each 8'6 and 10/6
Collars to match, - each 1/- and 1/6

HARRODS LTD. LON DON, S.W.

R;cluJrd B.r6;4.. Ma..a,;.., D;r<</w.

7

LAND AND

WAfER

March 2:J, 1915

AN APPEAL

}leU)' T

Our U Land and Water" Ambulance Scheme

By ATHERTON FLEMING

A RELIC FROM THE FRO"T
Pathetic interest aUaches to the above plcture:- The gOUQleø, which are of .. T.iplex. .. alalp. were reco\'er d from
the wreck of an aeroplane which fell nose 6r
t and buried It! eDuine IOm
2 ft. in the frozen a"ouod. The
unfortunate pito", face was completely wrecked by the iOltr\lment board. but. a. will be seen. the ala.. of the
goggles which were .till in position was found in the condition ,hewn in the illustration. It stand. to realon
that had the pilot been wearing ordinary ala'i Q'oKiles .nd escaped with hi. life he would mos' probably have
been blmded

cek's article I endeavoured, to the
hility, to impress upon the readers of
hl" absolute necessity for an adequatl"
"I ,lmbulancp" at the front, We cannot
We cannot take the risk of having

( .'.......'
t
...
. ( -
"
;j -,

.'

.
., "$"

....- "':.!

:0 be replaced at once, or our wounded

intention of the proprietor,;
a subscril'tioll list with till'
.U1\' rate- more than one 1f
to do thi<; the sum of [,500 is
good one, the sum required
i5 not large,
:md I am surt'
the readers of
LAND AND
\V ATE R are
suffKientIy gen-
erous to enablf'
the scheme to
be carried
through snccpss-
fullv. Ko suh-
s c ; i p t ion ",ill
bet a a small;
the modest
sum of one
shillmg from P3ch
rea d e r would
be sufficient t (1
sup ply a fleet
o f ambulance,>,
One ambulancp
only is asked
for, for thl"
i nit i a I effort.
P lea s e heIp to
the best of your
a h i lit Y . Full
particulars 01
the scheme
will be gin'n
In our neht
Issue, and the subscription list will tben be opened.

must su!fer. It is the
uf this journal to open
idea of replacing Olll', at
funds will a 1l0\\ _ In ordel
n<.>('ckd. The cause is a

Q

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A PARAS

tUlf

ENGINE

car be a four'c
linder, high-powered one or
, single'cylinder, it is equally liable to the in,
nvn as loss of power-a form of lazinc

, if
, but one for which there is ah\ays a cause
can be treated, and. "hat is more, cured,

los
of power can be considered under three
mpression; (2) poor ignition; and (3) poor

nay be due to leakage at either the inlet or
: plug. compression chamber (if it be a detach-
rings, If a little soap or oil is placed round
'he engine started up. escape of bubbles will
he leak, and when found it can be remedied,
-lain is broken a new plug is ncee sary; if the
, .. blows" a new washer is required. Copper
10" made of all si"es and shapes, but, failing
ct of asbestos cord rubbed up "ith a little red
l f::as-tight joint. Inspection "ill reveal if the
-, and they are pitted, they require grinding,
In its seat perfectly. This can be proved by
ù marking the seat in a few places with chalk.
and press it well home, 1\Iove it round with
it out, and if the fit is correct it will at once
the piston rings may be a cause of their not
n, Pulling the engine round after injecting

h the compression cocks is the treatment,
>r worn piston rings are the last and, I believe,
n this class. Treatment will depend on the
new piston rings may be needed, or if the liner
need relapping, and, if much is so removed,
s rinb3, With proper lubrication, however, a
'e or four years on the set of rings, and the
uire lapping in double that time; but this all
',uffirient OIling,

" LAZINESS"

Poor ignition may be due to the plug. coil, accumulators 0\
contacts, If the plug is sooted it should be taken out and cleaned or
a new one put in, If the platinum points on the coil trembler han,
worn irregularly remove the screw and trembler blade, and \Hth ol
very fine file dress them so that they are square with one another:
then replace, and, "ith the contact,maker at contact, adjust the
trembler to give a good" buzz." If the accumulators are run do"n
get them recharged, and if away from home borrow a fresh set, If
none can be obtained it may be possible to get home by adjusting
the sparking plug points a little nearer to one another, The usual
place where contdct trouble occurs is at the contact, maker ; the
fibre wheel may be worn out of truth with the \\ ipe, or the latter may
itself be irregularly worn. A new "ipe can be fitted or the old one
can be filed true, If the fibre ring is much "om it "ill need spinning
in the lathe, but on the road the \\ipe can be usually adjusted so as
to get the engine to take one home with a good pull. Often the spring
that keeps the wipe in contact merely wants bending or pulling out
so as to cause it to press more finnly against the ring, :.\Iud or oil
on this part is a frequent cause of stoppage, but occasional cleansing
\\ ill prevent this. Loose terminals or partly-broken wires, too, may
be the cause of poor ignition. also imperfect insulation of the leads,
The latter at the accumulators often corrode; after attaching them
it is well to smear on a little grease, which will prevent the acid, which
often ,lightly escapes, from attacking them. All exposed "ire,
should also be well insulated, I believe in putting them througl
rubber tubing and then lead gas piping, and using tinned copper win
covered with vulcaniscd rubber, This may be dearer, but it obviate

all possibility of a .. short,"
If the water circulation is imperfect the engine" ill heat, the cylinùer
oil may then burn, and the rings. among other possibilities. not hold
compression; in addition. the cylinder will be so hot and the gas will
expand so much that a full charge cannot enter. and what does, as a
result of the excessive heat, wiII explode prior to full compression. so It is
as well to see to the pump and also tholt the water t.wl contains "oller,

TwO

Q

10

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em

...,

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aM

'Yra, """

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374

Malch 20) 1915

L A\
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II NUN" Tob
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Nothing SO shortens the miles as a pipe of that rare smoking
mixture, .. Three Nuns "-the 8taunchest companion in the world.
Delicious alike in taste and flavour, this pure dustlen Tobacco has
endeared itself to every smoker who has ever tried it, by its
character, its individuality, and its unequalled coolness,

A 'fE ting Sample will be forwarded on application to Stephen
Mitchell & Son, Branch of the Imperial Toùacco Co, (of Great
Britain and Ireland), I td" Glasgow.

'
,:.

I
If I

.\.\"

'-

,

,

--
'f
"..

., King's Head" is similar but stronger.

'L

BOTH ARE OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE
PER. 6!d, OZ.
II THREE NUNS" CIGARETTES
MEDIUM 3d, for 10. No 39D

-
, ..,

r

."
', \ 4 ! > ., . A ,i
II
.:Ç.. , '. . .
:v - ...,
if-' .Y'
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If" - _.., \]-
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- '.iJ"ì\
-
- -.Q. --
A PARABLE OF PARA.
The tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE FIRST.
T WO merchants of the East met at the gate
of the city, each with his ass well-laden
as iff or a long journey. " Whither goest thou,
friend?" asked the one. .. Dost thou perchance
also journey to Damascus?" "Even so," replied
the other, "and if thou be willing, we will journey
on our road together, for these be perilous times
and the way is hard."
"Yea, verily, thou art right, friend; hard for
man and beast. Hast thou seen to it that thine
ass is well-shod?" "Of a surety, good friend,
and shoes have I to spare should aught befall,"
Whereon the other smiled in his beard, but
answered not, and they went on their way, the
one with the other. (To be u;ntinued,)

,

/

you cannot
German car;
might buy a Neutral
should buy

buy

a

you

car; you
British

a

car.

H UMBER CARS ARE EN-
TIREL Y BRITISH.

PUBLISHED BY
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO, LTD.,
Para Mills, Astun Cross, .. Birmingham,
14, Regent Street, LONDON, S,W, PARIS:', Rue du Co!onel Moll,
Fe. llrllll' , 01 tIle rncumatic TVT
In
115trJ' t"r"u
h(lllt tile If rrld.

HUMBER LIMITED, COVENTRY.
LONDON: 32 Holbom Viaduct, E,C,
60-64 Bromptou Road,S,W,
London Repair Worka-C.nterbury Road.
K.lbum. N W,
SOUTHAMPTON-27 London Road.
ARentl Everywhere.

375

March 20, 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

.
;.-

I' '

THE WINTER IS
NOT YET OVER
_ bitter winds
sweep over the plains
of Belgium in the
early Spring.
Extra protection IS
still acceptable to
officers and men.
&('
Russian Hood Scarf in fleecy
wool material. 12/0
.. Stanley II Cape Sheet of
.. l\iarshproof," as supplied
by US to the British Red
Cross Society, forming cape
or motor-apron, ground,sheet
or sleeping-bag. 10/6
Lined fur. 6 guineas.
\Voolly Cardigans with long
skeves, strong in wear, grey.
80/- a dozen.
Fleecy Mittens or Cuffs in
dark assorted wlours, special
value. 11/- a dozen.

"

-,,'
..

Ie'

MARSHAlL' &
SNELGROVE

Special Department for Cdm-
p...igning Accessories. Direct
Entrance Corner of Oxford
Street & Marylebone Lane,

LONDON

'The
SUBMARINE
MENACE

The sanest, surest safeguard for all those who ad
en-
ture at sea in these days of mines and submarines is the

, Gieve '
Life-Saving Waistcoat

Of the twelve officers taken from the water on the sinking
of H.M,S, Formidable ten were wearing this waistcoat.

-rom rec::
nt evid
nce given by the above and others
In, a pO
ltlon to, Judge,
he
uperiority of the .. Gieve"
Llfe-Savmg Waistcoat hes m the following important
ADVANTAGES :-
. U ' Od The '... f e h arer d ls kept afloat .nd.fi...tely. although fully clothed and can
ress I e so eslres. .
iI. .Can always be wo
n (deflated) with or without Uniform as an ordinar
wal coat wllhoutlookmg unsightly or feeliog uncomforlable, y
i
1l
i
ð
:e-:
.atp.i sufficleotly to ke.ep wearer afloat within 20 secDnds. and when
oth
rs if Dece

a:y
ut 3 0 seconds) IS buoyant enough for "earer to assist t"O
4.
ach waistcoat carries a flask ready for emergency.

. 0
at
er how roug
the Sea or how strong the gale the II Gieve" Life.
-;h ng a;stcoat
eeps ItS wearer alu a)'s head and sh(.s.dders clear of the water
b;.
s:if
:dr

h:r
. permits him to recline in any position, and freely to belp

Made to any size.
!lannd lined,

50/-
}

On view and on
sale at

GIEVE'S

LOND"N-6S SOllth Molton Streel
prRl'f \lOUTH-The Hard, '
DEVONPORT-.u Fore Street,
C!'IATHAM-Railway Street.

EY
IGUTH-I & 2 GrosTen r Place,
SHEEI NESS-72 High SI1'e-t Blue Town
EDINbURGH- 30a t.eorKe
t
et '
HARWICH-Kingsway, Dovercourt.

Gieve, Matthews ø.
Seagrove, LId,

.

.

A SOFT
SERVICE CAP

(Patent No. 5002/14),

Indispensable to Officers
at the front, most comfort-
able to wear, and retains
its shape, RQlls up into
small compass for pocket
or haversack. Absolutely
Waterproof, with a back
curtain that folds inside
when not required. Kept
in all sizes. :-,
Price - 16/6 J
Obtainable only from
:
STUDD & MILLINGTON MILITARY OUTFITTERS
. ,51 Conduit St., London, W. .

\; .
.A\ I
.,
\
/
,.J
II
{
, - .--- -

"DRYFOOY"

THE IDEAL
WATERPROOF

COpy of letter ju.t received from the FronL
From Lleut--Co!. C, E, Stewart, Black Watch, Isl Batt.,
1st Division, British ExpedlUonary Force :-"Thank you
so much for the' Dryfoot' which arrived safely, It has
been well tested by me. and has certainly done all \I
professed, In spite of the muddiest of fields. my boots
have kept dry Inside, so I know that It will be very
welcome to the men.'.
WHY NQT SEND YOUR FRIFND IN CAMP
A TIN 1 IT WILL BE APPRECIATED,
To be obtained from allleadine Shoe Firm. & Storea
Price 11.. large tin; 6d. smaD tin.
So/" "humfil. lu,..,rs.-
THE SEAL

\\ holesale only.

PRODUCTS, LTD.
Kilburn, London. N,W.
I

-

2f.!1;!!}

!J5
.. ... .....
OFFICERS' KIT.

Officers at the Front have learnt from bitter experience that the
excessive strain on active service renders uniforms made from
any but the finest Khaki useless in a few weeks, Although there
is a regulation colour, there is no regulation ql/ality for Officers'
materials, and in consequence the best quality costs from 300 to
4 00 per cent. (a startling assertion, but true) more than the
indifferent qualities often used.
The prices charged for Service Kit by Pope & Bradley are quoted
for the finest and most expensive materials procurable and for
West End workmanship. The policy of the House has always
been to supply only the best that money can buy, and considers
its reputation at stake over every Military garment produced.
The initial \Var Office grant is amply sufficient to cover a full
equipment from Pope & Bradley, and it is a false economy to en-
deavour to try to save a few pounds by buying second'grade Kit,
Service Jacket (Heavy Khaki Serge) ot3 3 0
Do. (Guards' Baralhea) .. ot4 4 0
Bedford Cord Breeches (Buckskin strdpp d) ot2 12 6
Slacks .. otl 5 0
British Warm , . ot3 IS 0
Service Greatcoat ot4 10 0

MUFTI.

The Mufti productions of the House represent the highest tradi-
tions of Bond Street tailoring, and, by tmding upon a rigid cash
basis, are offered at the most moderate prices compatible with
their quality.
Lounge Suit. ., from ot4 4 0
Overcoats ot4 4 0
Evening Suits. ot6 6 0
Upon application, we shall be pleased to forward our book, "THE MAN OF
TO-DAY," dealing exhaustively with men'a dress in every phase.

TWO ESTABLISHMENTS ONLY
14 OLD BOND STREET.

:

S

3i G

The County Gentleman

AND

LAND&WATER

Vo] LX IV

Xo. 2ï59

S.\ TURD.-\ Y, :\IARCH 27, 1QrS

[ PUllLbHJ.;lJ AS ] PRICE SIXPENCE
A
L\bPAl'ER, Pl>BLISliED \\ EEKI.V

.

:'I
..

'- .

"

..

---

1. .

-

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CoþYTlgloJ. '-"/a\',/I,

VICE-AD1HRAL SACKVILLE H, CARDEN

Commanding the Allied Fleet which is en
aged in oper.ing the way of the DJ
danelles

LAND AND WATER

March 27, 1915

PERMANENT COAL.

A Clever Invention. An Inexpensive Appliance,
Suitable for all Coal-Grates, which Saves
Scuttles upon Scuttles of Coal.

An exceedingly clever invention by a North,country scientist bids fair to
revolutionise all existing ideas of coal consumption. 11 is suitable for grates
of all kinùs and,' es (includmg kitchen ranges), and only costs 3/-, or 3{6
pOSt free.

No Alteration in Appearance of Fire. No Treatment
of Fuel. No Special Installation, or Renewal,
The Incandescent Fire Mantle is a device of special design and com-
position, fully protected by Patent, which is simply placed in the centre of
ny
grate, It scientifically utilises the heat energy created by the combustion
of the coal, "hich, instead of flying up the chimney, as is the case of the
larger portion of such energy in ordinary grates, is made to bring the mantle
to mcandescent heat, Thus there lies in the centre of the fire a white hot
mass of what may be termed everlasting coal, throwing off more heat than
coal alone can give, yet absolutely unburnable, and as good at the end of
twehe months as it is the first day. The appearance of the fire is in no way
altered; the mantle is completely covered by the surrounding coal, and its
presence cannot be detected. No INSTALLATION, ALTERATION, OR SPECIAL
TREATMENT OF THE FUEL OR THE GRATE IS NECESSARY, There is no
recurring expenditure of any kind; when once YOII have purchased the fire
mantle at its modest price of 3s you can enjoy for ever a beauti{ully bright
and hot fire at an enormous saving of coal. The mantle is placed into the
grate with exactly as much-and no more-trouble than it is to put on a
IUQ1p of coal, It requires no attention or care of any kind.
Remarkable Test Figures.
As the result of a recent strictly supervised test upon modern grates, it
was fou
d that the average consumption of coal per grate in the ordinary
grate (eight grates were experimented upon in this particular test) was 34 Ib,
of coal {or a period of II hours, On the following day one of the new fire
mantles was placed in each of these same grates, and the coal consumption
per I(rate for a penod of 12i hours was then found to have been reduced
to 191b, 3 oz., whilst the heat was greater,
Saves its Cost in a Few Days.
, The price of the Incandescent Fire Mantle is ]s. (3S. 6d. post free),

hlch ,small sum is saved back in a few days. The mantle lasts for an
mdefimte tIme and can be used in grates of any size, pattern, or construction.

n account of the proportionate saving in postage, two mantles can be
dIspatched post free to any address in the kingdom on receipt of 6s. 6d" and
three for only 9'>, At this time o{ enforced economy, and with the additional
danger of the present high coal prices rising still further, the great saving
effected ?y the Incandescent Fire Mantle should not be neglected, Orders
and remittances should be addressed to The Incandescent Fire Mantle Syndi-
cate (lJept. 76),9 Station Parade, Queen's Road, Peckham, London, S,E,

The

LOVE OF A BAR6AIN

H E love of a bargain ili
U not essentially the pre-
rugative of women; it is
not the exclusive enjo}ment
of the low-of-purse, It is
inherent and innate in all of
us-no matter what our
po,ition.
In other words, the know-
ledge of having secured un-
usuaJly high value for our
exp
nditure brings a secret
joy and satisfaction_a joy
and satisfaction transcending,
in point of fact, those which

follow even a free gift of
something of great worth!
Every purchase made of
Jelks & Sons may be re-
garded in the light of a
bargain. 0" ing to the
widespre,ld business they do
by private treaty, by
ecur-
ing complete and beautiful
ho"'e
from well-circum,
,tanced people who, for one
reason Or another, are
giving up housekeeping-
they are in 3 posi tio n to
offer

High-grade Second-hand Furniture

at prices which are \\ ithout
parallel in the business,
E:J.ch month they publish
a H.\rgain List of article

r,lnging from a Jacobean
sidLhoard to a lizard skin
including artic1 of "øErtu:
ani des of common use,-
household gOI I of \ery

description. Luvers of a
bargain would do well to
send their names and
..ddresses to Messrs. Jelks
to be placed on their list
for a free monthly copy
of this unique guide to
" the better things" In
furniture.

A penonal c.Jl is
...h tcd otherwise WRITE TO-DAY FOB. TJJE DE8CRIPTIVE BARGAIN
BOOnE1' . I: !it free). L if)n Ð \f'r
e!i ..lllJJstric- . uly. Country Orders CarriitlíC Paid.

Est,ll i"Iu:ú W JELKS
Dver ,- . 6' SONS f:
:!t.
ru,
263, 265, 267,269,271, 273, 275. HOLLOWAY ROAD. LONDON, N.
Tete. : 2598. 2.59i :ro 'Jf!, tn!

Telea-rams; II }cllu
REMOVAL ESTIKATR FRES

. London ..

-

of

"'"

or
-!"'

l)

,i "'-

r_I
::-,

JS I j ..J c.-
"...""
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-,. '"
r. -.'- - ::.f '4

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1

.............
Send rum ð.Flask of

HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

Think what a blessing these delicious Food
Tablets are to men on active service.-They
are always ready for immediate use, and a
few dissolved in the mouth will maintain the
strength of the Soldier when he most needs
it, They supply sufficient nourishment to
sustain for hours; give increased body heat
and vitality; prevent fatigue, and relieve thirst.

Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.

We will send post free to ANY address a flask of tbese
delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat vest pocket
case on receipt of I{G, If tbe man is on active service
be particular to give bis name, regimental number, regiment:
brigade and division.
or all Chemists and Stores in convenient pocket
flasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2,6 and 11/-

Liberal Sampl.. Botti.. s..nt po.t f're.. for 3d. in .tam...,

1

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., Slough, Bucks.

I!!CII

/iliK
/ /,

/ A
æ J J ==
- -
- -
- -
- -
æ Are Run..dawn æ
_ JOu _
1:1 _
_ \rhen your system is undermined by worry or over-work -
- -
_ - when your vitality is lowered-when you feel" any' _
= how"-when your nerve
are "on edge "-when the =
_ least exertion tires Y ou-you are in a "Run-down" -
- -
_ condition. Yonr system is like a flower drooping for ..
= "ant of water. And just as water revives a drooping =
= flo.... er-so . \Vincdnlis ' gives new life to a "run-down" =
_ constitution, rrOIn even the first wineglassful you can _
- -
_ feel it stimulating and invigorating you, and as you _
= continue, you can feel it surcharging your whole system =
= with new heaIth-llll.. strength-lItw vigour and neu' =
= life. Will you try just one bottle? _
- -
- -
= Begin to get well FREE. =
= -
- -
_ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of a\Vincarnis'-not a mere taste _
_ but enough to do you good Enclose three penny stamps (to pay .
- poslag
J' COLE:\IAN & CO, Lid" W2IZ, Wincdrnis Works, Norwich. _
- -
= -
I

I
- -
= -
- -
1IIIIE.'lllllllllllli
1111111111111111111111111I

3 86

\1.trch 27,1915

LAND AND "VATER

THI{OUGII

THE

EYES

OF

A WOMAN

By MRS, ERIC DE RIDDER

Copyrighi, Mada.... Lallie C%a,les
THE DUCHESS OF MARLBOROUGH
Nobody i. working harder oa behalf 01 her adopted land than t e Duchess
01 Marlborough, She is generally in the chair at the principal meetings
01 the Women'. Emergency Corps, and her name figures in the
Alphabetical Scheme lor the Girl; Pdlriotic Club.

Dress!>. Clothes
.. D RESS!" said the
Iere )Iale in - a superior
way. .. Ho\\ can you possibly think of dress
at such a time as this? ..
.. But I am not exactly thinking of
dress," I ans\\ ered, looking up meekly from
the pile of patterns and designs my dressmaker had just
sent me. .. I am thinking of clothe<;-a very different thing ..
.. That's mere femiIli' e prevarication," said the
1cre
:.\Iale, who is a lover of long
words.
U :Ko, my good man,
it's not," said I. .. Far
from it. It is a case of
"heer necessity. I, like most
9ther women and like the
ladv in the song, ' have
nothing to wear.' \Ve have
got to buv some clothes,

r \\e shali have to remain
indoors, clothed like squaws
in blankets."
.. So I suppose in a
short time," said the :.\Iere
:.\Iale, with an ever-ready
\\it, "I shall have the
pleasure of seeing you in a
wide skirt, a coat like a
badly cut mess jacket, and
a pill-box hat."
"To say nothing of
boots tweh'e inches high,"
I put in, not to be outdone
in this flight of fashionable ..
fancy,
The
Iere )Iale grunted;
there is no other word for
the sound he made.
" What did you say? "
I asked.
" I didn't speak," said
the l\Iere Male in a tone
which spoke volumes.
.. Then I will," said I,
now thoroughly aroused.
.. I t isn't because we women
arc thinking of dress and
nothing but dress that we
are buying clothes; we are
buying them because we
really need them, in the
first place, and because we
have some regard for the
dres,makers, in the second."
.. From altruistic
motives," said my friend,
with his horrid habit of usiI g
words of three sdlables
and over, and wï"th more than a tinge of sarcasm.
.. You can call them what you like," I retorted, .. but
the fact remains that the present spurt in clothes buying is
spelling salvation to the dressmakers, It means money for
heaps of little workroom girls over here, to say nothing of
the midinettes in Paris."
.. So you women are in the right, as usual:' said the

Iere
\Iale, only half convinced, but well on the road to
conviction, neverthële.;;s.
.. Exactly," I said.
.. And you have had the last word, as u<;ual! ..
" Precisely," said I.

The Helping Hand
As a matter of fact, the Mere
fale, even is his most
arg'lmentative mood, is a helpful being. He enabled me to
'iee in a flash what this revival of industry must mean to the
dressmaking houses. It must have lifted from many the
:hreat of impending ruin; it must have relieved scores of
minds, from the brilliant directors of famous establishment

to the humblest worker in the smallest workroom. I tis,
of course, no use pretending it is charity pure and simple
that is leading us all to the fitting-room. It is nothing of
the kind. Our needs for new garments are too many and
obvious to allow of any such philanthropic gloss. The only

thing is that by replenishing our wardrobes \\ e are keepin

many in employment who were in ùanger of seeing their
means of livelihood vanish away. \Ye are doing a kindnes"
to others as well as ourselves a
we order our new spring
clothes. And, all other consideration<; "et .\side, why !->houhl
we go about in dismal dowdiness. Things arc glormÿ enoug-h
without us m.1king them more so by appearing in metaphorical
dust and ashes. I hold no brief for reckless e)",travag.ll1ce in
clothes, .\t this time it
would seem to l1io:;t of us
\\ orse than criminal. There
i", howe\'er, "uch a thing as
the happy medium. It i"
easy tú t.\lk about- -not SIJ
f'asy to find. [n this par-
ticular case it C.1n soon be
defillLd; midway it lies,
exactly beÌ\\ecn needles..;
eÀpense and undue
f'conomv, A ])oint for nicp
discrimination in \'ery truth,
b ,It im'aluablc \\ h, nonce \\ e
have fin.1lly arnved .It It

,

The :\1 arker Gardeners
A letter has just reached
me from the I
iviera, It
is written bv a fortunate
mortal at St. Jean, Cap
Ferrat, th.1t fascinating
pot
within short distance' of

ice. The a\'erag
\'isitrr
to the l
i\ iera knows
little of :-;t. J can, but
the few who do recognise it
as one of the beauty sprts
of the earth, The part of
St. Jean which is not sea -if
such an Irish statement ma}
be permitted-is one big
flo\\, er'garden The mimosa
is beginnin
to fad
, but
heaps of lovely things ha\'e
arri\'ed to take its place,
Festoons of ivy-leaf ger-
anium, clusters of roses,
-.weet-smelling stock, bed
:lfter bed of carnations,
\\hite, rose and pink sweet
peas now on the verge of
flowering-the list is well-
nigh inexhaustible, St.
Jean, in common \\oÍth all
the neighbouring district,
contributes to the
ice
flower - market; but the
demand for their fragrant
treasures does not cease here. Great ba.;;kets, hampers, and
boxes of flowers are being fom arded regularly to Paris and
Lonùon. And this not only in spite of the war, but in spite
of the fact that every able-bodied Frenchm.ll1 has either
joined the colours or is working on Army supplies, Last
year numbers of men were \\orking in the flo\\er-fìelds; this
year the women are doin
all the work concerned with them.
l\fy letter tells me that there is not a single man \\orking in
the gardens surrounding the "ill.1 in \\hich it is \uitten, save
one who is over seventy. The Gardeners have gone, their
wives are working in their stead, and the work-hard though
it often is-is being carried out just the same in thf'ir absence,

'-

'.

\

"'

A SERIES of lectures, with practical demonstrations. v.ill be given
every Friday (except Good Friday) at 3 p.m" from February 26 to
April 16, on " Cooking for the Sick and Convalescent," at the Queen's
Gate Hall, Harrington Road, South Kensington, under the dlbpic
of the Gas Light and Coke Company, The lecturt . are intended for
the assistance of those who have generously undertaken the \\úrk of
nursing wounded and invalid soldiers back to health, and ",ll be
given by the company's staff of fully qualifieù lady advisers, all of
whom hold diplomas for cooking. Admission to the lectures and
demonstrations will be free on presentation of a ticket, to be obtained
on application to the Gas Light anù Coke Company, Horscferry Road,
Westminster, S, \V,

3 8 7

LAND AND WATER

IF, knowing all you know,
you still can ;;;'port German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
Ii naris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

"SIR IS"

a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antJcid properties as Apollin-
arts and similar to it in taste.

Repd, Quart..
Per Do.. 6/-

Repd. Pints. Repd. H Pints.
3 '6 2/6 Per Dorj
Carriage Paid,

..... Sample Eottl. FREE on receipt of Coupon

Name

Address......___..___.. . ,..

- ..
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral WaJers

A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenies Street Works. LONDON: Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.

:!.IIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII!:
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= =
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- =
- =
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The Best Wristlet for the Front
- -
- -
= . . . . and for the training camp, too. =
You cannot send him a more useful gift) _
= or one that he will treasure more. =
- -
- -
= I t will keep good time on the march, in =
the camp, and in the trenches. ;;
= All Waltham Watches have an enviable =
- -
reputation for accuracy of timekeeping _
= wherever watches are known. =
- -
For that reason the gift of a Waltham is =
= always most warmly welcomed. =
- -
- -
= .Æsk to 1ft the exquisitely dainty series fir ladies' wear. =
- -
- -
- 'Waltham Watches ::
- -
- -
= Of all Reliable Watchmakers IS"" j,wø"",s. ==
- -
= For Gentle me. - S.lid Silwer eue. - Por LMIeI =
= Ma]umuS .
8 10 0 No. J
Æ3 14 0 I Ma:dmt1l
. J' R.uby - -
5 U I =
=
d
Wa
thaz; ::a: =:: :
: : I:
111nnid.. 6 0 SaP..... . I .0 =
- -
= SOLD ALSO IN- COLD AND "OURD COLD CASaS. =
- -
= II WrisUee WøtÒI II Pamþ1&l. aM WaUlksm Wåc1I Boolda þoa( /N4 fro. =
= WALTHAM WATCH CO. (Dept. 63). I2SHighHolbom.London.W,C. =
- -
@ III 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111IlIlIn l iE

March '1.7, 1915

HOTEL CECIL

THE

COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Telepbo_: CERRARD .0.

Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

PRESSING-
PUSHING-
PLOUGHING

THESE three words each picture the amount of Energy
needed to drive a Bicycle according to the amount of
Friction generated by the chain and driving Bearings.
When there is NO
Friction, as in the case
of the Sunbeam, then
the Rider only has to
press on his pedals,
When there is some
Friction, as in the case
of many so-called high-
grade machines, then
the Cyclist has to push
on his pedals. Butwhen
Cram various causes
there is much Friction,
then the unfortunate one has to plough along on his pedals.
The point to emphasise is that the Sunbeam's Little
Oil Bath Gear Case: saves the Friction and the Pushing
and the Ploughing.
For Easy Cycling, then, get a Sunbeam. Write
for the new Sunbeam Catalogue to-

3 SUNBEAMLAND-WOLVERHAMPTON

Loudou Showroo"l 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, )!,C.
ISI SLOANE ST. (by Sloaue Square), S.W.

388

Iarch 27. 1915.

L A :N D A K D Jv. ATE R.

THE
By

WAR BY
HILAIRE

LAND.
BELLOC.

NOTE.-Thls \rticle has been submitted to the Prus Bureau. which doel not object to the publlcatlon al ccnsored, and takcI ..
responsibility for the correctness of the statementl.
In ACtordsnee "ltk the requirements IIf the Prus Buruu, the positions o. troopl O!l Plans illustrating this Article mDJt 001 1 III
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at auy point is Indkated.

T HE capture of 'Varsaw. with its railway
bridges, is, as has been the theme of these
articles for many ,,'eeks past, the capital
operation of the enemy in the present
phase of the \Var,
If he can obtain possession of that point, he
guarantees himself in the East against a Russian
advance for some time to come, and is free to mass
in the 'Vest before the munitioning and new
equipped armies of the Allies in the "rest imperil
his line through Korthern France.
The fortunes, therefore, of the campaign for
.'Varsaw must be grasped as a whole if we are to
understand the present phase of the "\\? aI', and I
propose to take the opportunity of the present lull
and indecision in this quarter to rec,apitulate the
operations there and to lead them up to as precise
a description as our scanty views permit of the
situation at the moment of writing.
It ,\ill be remembered t hat the Germans.
after having failed to take "?arsaw by direct
attack from in front along the Bzura ånd the
Rawka (which attempt had lasted nearly two
months, and had cost them in total casualties per-
haps two hundred thousand men) determined with
the beginning of Februarv to attempt the capture can now see that his probable main object in doing
of the city from behind. . Their plan was to come this was to distract attention from the concentra-
down from the Xorth to cut the fortified line of tion of his troops in East Prussia, though, at the
the Xlemen and the Xarew and so to get a-straddle same time, we must remark that his effort wa3
of the sheaf of railways that com'erge upon the sufficiently yiolent to warrant some hope of his
Lridges of \Yarsaw across the Yistula. breaking through in this last attempt. At any;
This is the fundamental point of the Eastern rate, with Februarv 8 and 9 his admnce "ith
Campaign in its present phase. I ha,-e described the large forces roncentrated in East Prussia
it more than once in these pages during the last began.
six ,...eeks. I take the liberty of repeating it again He had immediately opposed to him nothing
this week because a clear comprehension of it is but the Tenth Rus<:ian
\rm,r, a force of no more
essential to the comprehension of the present than four Army Corps, amòunting, after seyeral
position, months of fighting, to perhaps not more than from
The position, then, atthe opening of February 120,000 to 140.000 men, e,'en aUowinO' for the
"as that on the accompanying sketch map. The drafts by which they had been replenished.
enemy having failed, after prolonged efforts, to Such a force is, for a campaign of the present
capture 'Varsaw at 'V by a direct. attack alol1g the dimensions, a \\eak one. It does not represent
line B R (which is the line of the Bzura and the more than a fifteenth perhaps of the total Russian
Rawka) from the direction A, gathered certainly forces operating between the Baltic and the
more than ten, and possibly fourteen, Army Corps Roumanian frontier.
in East Prussia-that is, :mything from 400,000 This tenth Russian Army was either taken
to nearly 600,000 men-and designed to come by surprise or at an
' rate còmpeHed. to a YeQ

down in the directions BB B and get a-straddle of rapid retreat before this greatly superIOr concen-
the railways 1, 2, and 3 which converge upon the tration of the enenn', and its retirement took up
bridges of "?arsaw and by which alone a Russian the whole of the second week and extended into the
Army, working westward of the Ri,'er Yistula, third week of February,
can live. In front of those railwavs stretch like :\Yhen the Germån force-s struck it, in an
a screen the fortified lines of the Ì\arE'w River, immediat.e superiorit
, of at least five to two, and,
prolonged by the fortified lines of the I\lemen counting the German forces behind the first line
Ri,'er. The enemy's design was to push out from in a superiority of quite three to one, the situation
East Prussia and break that line. of this tenth Russian Army \\as that set out in tllQ
During the first week of Fel J rna ry he delivered next ma p,
a very violent attack upon the Bzura Rawka line It had slowly fought its way over the I:asf
which lasted from February 2 to February 8. y..
e rrussian Frontier. going partly north of the lakG
1-

THE POSITION ON THE EAST PRUSSIA1\;
FRONTIER. ,
I.

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LAND AND
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district and partly engaging itself in that district
until it had come to occupy the line A B; its right
wing was within half a march of the East
Prussian town of Tilsit, its extreme left was a
couple of marches south of the town of Lotzen.
lt had not quite penetrated either to Insterburg
nor, I tbink, to Lotzen itself, and it must be re-
garded as a chain of four forces, each an Army
Corps, which I have numbered in the accom-
panying E'ketch 1 to 4. These four Army Corps
retired very rapidly before the advance of their
,astly superior enemy along the arrows marked
upon the sketch towards Kovno, towards Suwalki,
towards Augustowo, and further to the Bouth.
During this retreat they suffered no more than the
losses normal to a perilous operation of this kind,
say ten or twelve per cent., in men and material,
sa,-e in the case of one Army Corps (the Twentieth
Uussian Army Corps), which, either because it
deliberately remained behind to act as rear-guard,
or because it was so handled that it got out of
touch with the forces to the north and to the south
of it, suffered envelopment, and was almost wiped
üut as a fighting foræ.
This disastpr occurred in the marshy forest
district surrounding the town of Augustowo, and
the success (though but local and partial in a cam-
paign of such dimensions) was a heavy score for
the enemy.
The enemy exaggerated it, naturally, and told
us that the Tenth Army as a whole had been

lestroyed. This was, of course, not the case; but
]t had lost through normal casualties and throuah
this particular disaster quite a third of its m
n
hy the time the first chapter in the great movement
was closed, which we may fix roughly at the end
of the third week of }'ebruary-say, Saturday,
February 20,
In this first shock the newly-concentrated
German forces had everywhere crossed the frontier
of East Prussia, and had, along the whole
cres
ent of their advance, penetrated into Russian
terntory.
:\Vith the last week of February, from Feb-
ruary 21 to February 28, inclusive, opened the
second chapter, and to understand this "e must
Jiave recourse to a third sketch.
,The object of the enemy being, not the purely

sent.imental one of clearing German soil of tbe
im-ader, but the practical one of cutting the rail-
ways behind 'Varsaw (if he did not succeed in
achieving which task his movement would ha,'e
failed), he proceeded to ach'ance upon those rail-
ways in t.hree main bodies, which I have marked
in the accompanying sketch 1,2, and 3 respectively.

Jr

'lJa.ltic
Sea

m

The first and BmalIE-st body was directed
against the l1eighbourhood of Grodno. The
second was directed against the fortress of
Osowiecs, the third was direct.ed upon a broad
front towards the lower Narew, and the reason of
this disposition ,vas as follows:
It is obvious that the effort t.o cut the railways
behind 'Varsaw would be successful and rapid in
proportion to the closeness to Warsaw at which the
ad,cancing force managed to strike home.
A success bv column 1 would be of little use if
column 2 were held up and column 3 ,yere defeated.
For column 1, supposing even that it could
get past Grodno and cut the railway behind that
fortress, would have a very long way to go before
it would get at the next of the railways which
spread out diyergently eastward from Warsaw;
and coming up so Yery far behind that city would
have but little effect upon its fate. _
But if column 3 could manage to force the
defensÍ\'e line and get upon the railways imme-
diately in the neighbourhood of "\Varsaw, where
they all come close together, and where the cutting
of the first would be rapidly followed by the cut-
ting of the second and third-and that so neitr to
the city that this success "ould immediately isolate
it-then the object of the great German movo
would be decisively accomplished.
Further, a blow thus struck in the neighbour-
hood of .'Varsaw would divide in two the main
Russian forces in the Xorth; it would leave the
great army in Warsaw in front of it and to thf'
"est isolated from the bodies that had retired
upon Osowiecs and upon the upper Narew,
Ne,-ertheless, it was necessary for column 1
and for column 2 to be operating as they did, both
because their action would occupy tbe Russian
forces in the \forth and pre,-ent their coming down
South to the relief of the neighbourhood of
2*

:March 27, 1915.

EAND AND WATER.

arew falls into the Ri,-er Bug, which almosf
immediateh- afterwards falls itself into tha
Y istula, at" the highly important great modern
fortress of Kew Georgievsk whence a railway
leads to 'Varsaw on the one hand and up to the
Prus'3ian frontier at Mlawa on the other.
The whole of this line, in a chord drawn from
one extremity to the other, is just over two huntlret I
miles long. In all its twists and turnings it is
considerablv over two hundred and forty. And it
was the bu;iness of the el1emy to get through this
fortified screen, and that without too much delay,
if he desired to take 'Varsaw beÎorc the meltin a
of the ice in the 'Yhite Sea or tbe possible forcÌ11g
of tbe Dardanelles should permit the further
munitioning of Russia and before the ne,,,, armies
appeared in the 'Vest from England.
As we have seen, he attacI...ed durinD' the last
OJ
week of Februarv in three main hodies-the first
towards Grodno:the second to\\ards OsO\"iecs, the
third in the region ,
hich I ha'c marked upon the
sketch with the letters _\ B. a front stretchil1g"
from the neighbourhood of Khorgele to that ot
MIa wa.
In order to follow the fortunes of this triplo
attack it is necessary to apprecié'te the fact tl:at
here upon this frontier, as UpOTl the whole lillo
where Russia and Germanv meet. the enem,- lmg
prm"ided a perfect network of railroads upòn hi,3
side to which the Russians haye built nothiu

corresponding. Indeed. it "as the knowledge tl1;1 t
the Russians, sooner or latel', \\oldd perfect their
system of railroads which. amon;
other things,
tempted the German Gm-ernment to force on tho
war at the moment it did. Thi
German series of
railwa) s, the main line exactly folIo" ing tho
frontier and feeders corning out from it :1t re 6 'u]ar
intermls, is dearly shown upon the sketch. 'Ya
- -< shall see how this affected the fighting.
The smallest column, con::;isting of Oldy ono
Army Corps (the 21st
\.rmy Corps of the Cerman
acti,Te Army, a first-rate body). cros!'ed the
ieTl1f'n
at the point I ha"e marhed X upon the sketch,
about fourteen miles north of Groùno. It was aHa
to do this under the COWl' of a thick belt of wood
"hich here passes the ri\"er anù e\:tends eastward,
but it did not cros
in any great forcf', and, a" "'0
have seen, its object was no more than to occupy
the enemy in this region and to preyent his fOJ'{'es
there from coming down South to th(' ma in fie-Id
of action near 'Yarsaw. rrecise details as to this
crossing are lacking, but it would seem to have
taken place round about F('bruary 20, and such
units as got across the water" ould se-em to h;1\ 0
lingered thel'e for rather more than a week. await-
ing the developments that might take place d{"\'ll
IV South. They did not proceed further than the
But. a natural ob
tade suitable to tlle pro- limits of the ",mod which had coyered the
longation of a defensi,'e line or SCref'll is discovered operation.
in the neighbourhood of Grodno in the shape of In front of Osowiecs the second column had
the small sluggish river called the Bobr. This for its mission the redudion of that centra 1
stream oozes through great belts of marsh" hich fort fe:?s and gaining pos
f'ssion of the railway
are ero-;sed by only one cause,m.\" and railway, and which here crossed the fortified linf'.
at the point of this cros
ing the little town of
ow the elements of O
m\i('C'
are simple
Oso"ie
s has been fortified.
ome t"enty odd eTlongh. You han' a rin,òr (sce plan 5)
\ 13, '1,
miles helow Osowiecs the Bobr falls into the townlet at C' on its banks. a raih\:lv and a ro::lol
Karew, ,,,hieh riwr takes on from that point tlw parallel to each other on the linC' DLE, and UpflH
task of the defensin" screen. There is a small either side of this crf'ssing p1a{'(" at (' two gre.)t
fortified point early in this continuation at Lomm, marsh,," di::;tricts '\: X and Y y, the narro":

'p-
a more important one at Ostroknka 10'Hòr down. twcen L" hieh a 1'(' occupied of ('Ourse hy the crossin

:md below Ostrol('nk:1 a fortified point at Rozan, and by th
to"'1l of O
owi
cs it
elf. Tabn

then a more impOl'tant one at Pultnsk. A short
dYallt:)ge of so strong :t situation, permanf'nt
day's march south of Pnltllsk, at S('roek. thp works 11:1.\'c ll("en ('recte(1 round 050\\ ipcs. as at
J;,.

Yar5aw, and secondly because the cutting of thE'
railway eyen high up would pre\-ent the arriyal
of reinîorcements from the Korth down on to the
threatened district near the Vistula.
'Ye have then this second chap
r of the great
mowment opening with the advance of the three
German bodies upon the whole line of the Kiemen
a.nd the :!\"arew with the object of piercing tha.t
line, and particulaTly with the object of piercing
it in great force at its Southern end bet\yeen the
two fortresses of Ostrolenka and .Kew Georgievsk.
The fortified line of the N iemen and the
Kare" consists in the following elements.
It starts with t,he fortress of Koyno upon the
broad and considerable obstacle of the lo"er
Ki("men and runs up that riwr to the correspond-
ing fortress of Grodno about eighty miles a way.
Between the two is the minor fortified point of
Olita. At Grodno there is a great bend in the
River
iemen, the upper reaches of which come in
from the East, so that the line of the river is no
longer useful as part of the sereen to defend the
sheaf of railways that converge on :\Varsaw. In-
deed. the main line from 'V arsa w to Petrograd
cuts the 1\iernen at this bend.

\}
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s

.
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^'

LAND AND
ATER.

March 27, 1915.

D

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-..,

A

c

-
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--.-- -
-
--

R

s

E

P Q Rand S. The German siegc train coming l
p
früH1 the direction D had the adnmtage of the 1'311-
WRr to supply it " ith its ammunitiün and to Illo\'e
its'l1my)' pie;es. It bad the dis3dyantage of being
a hIe to OCCUPY 110 more than a rathcr narrow sector
I\V Y bet\\eèll the marshes, and to this must be
added the fact that the roads, or rather tracks,
running lattcrly from the main causc,yay are yery
poor, and at this time of year. especiaJl
- in this
(open winter with its alternate frO!;t and thaw, ill
Rble to support the passage of heayy munitions.
FurthC'r, the district is wry flat, as may be pre-
8umcd from -the presence of so much marsh, and the
opportunities of hiding a howitzer from the direct
fire of the permanent works are not nume-rous.
From all these causes combined the hombarù-
ment of Osowiecs, though hegun in this la
t week
of February and continued to th(' pre
ent time,
has so far been of no cHert. It has been reporteel
that the Germans here emplaced pieces of 16 to 17
inches calibre. I yenture to doubt this until there
is better eyidence.* But it is certain that the large
'.Au
trian pieces of about 11 inches were presel1Ì,
and it is remadmble that the bombardment should
haye been prolonged oYer so many weeks without
any apparcnt r{'sult, \\:'lwther this were due to
insufficiency of air work or to whateycr other
cause, we are not toJd. At any rate this bomLard-
ment of Osowiccs, the ,york of the second column,
'was, like the adyance on Grodno. onh- subsidiary
to the main operation, "bieh was the a'ch'anc:e UpOÌl
the lower Xarew and the attempt to pierce that
line anù get upon the railway in the neighbour-
hood of \\Tarsaw. This ad,-ance was conduded
apparently in a force of four l'orp
, among which
it was destructiye to place t\\-O composed in the
main of the new German le,-ies.
Having massed upon the front :3IJawa-Khor-
gele, about a day's march in front of the Prussian

· There are prcbabl,)' no1\' in tJ.e field a f
w nnc German ho,,-i!;:H8
ållbout 14 or 15 incbu a.Ebre.

frontier railway, and supported with munitions
from that line," being further supplied from its
right by the rail"ay which runs south-,,-estward
across the Frontier through M:la"
'a, the German
line began to advance upon Monday, February 22,
The district is one line between the Rivers
Orzee and Lidynia, which riyers reach the fortified
line defending tbe 'Varsaw railways about fifty.
miles away from :MJavm and Khorgele.
The Germans advanced not qUIte half way fo
the deÎensiye line, having, for the centre of their
effort, the town of Przasnysz. Their right followed
the railway line down from
lla wa, their left tho
marshy river Orzec. They reached Przasnysz
upon 'Vednesday February 24, after a carefulJy:
co-ordinated advance in line of rather oYer twenty
miles. Upon Thursday, the 25th, they over-
whelmed the Russian outpost there (a Brigade
with a few guns), announced a great YÍctory, and
re-formed their line for further advance.
Another larger Russian ad,-anced body, a
"hole division, occupying a swell of land at the
point I ha,-e marked X en this sketch, detained
them and fought ,ery gallantly for thirty-six hours
against far superior numbers in order to permit
tbe arriyal of three Russi3n Army Corps coming
up along the direction of the arrows from the

"'[

vr
Karew. The right of this Russian force forced the
pa
sages of the Or7.ec
gainst a
tubborn qe!'I
lan
resIstance, the left relIeved the Iso]atcd c.hnslOll,
which had bren holding out at X, and the G('rman
line be9'an to give way. It is worthy of note that
the R
sians discoyered the 11e'" levies to be in-
sufiìcient, though in eqnal or superier numbers, to
resi:;:t this adY3l1cr. In the course of Fridav,
}'ebruarv 26, Przr.snysz was rc-occ-uried by
the Russian forces, and a general Germall retire-
ment began. It was I!O rout., as the jo
rn
1ists of
the .Allies were 8angume enough to ma mta 111; only
ten thousa.nd prisoners and perhaps a score of
gUllS fell to the yictors. But the signif1('
1 nee of this
éxtended action-" hich goes by the name of the
Battle of Przasnysz-hr in the faet that it
marked the clof;.e ot'thc
cl'êJlld chapter in this great
operation, and the frustration of thc German
design to reach and pierce tte
arew defensive
line.
As the GC'l'man retiremcnt in the first (lavs of
::\[arch fdl back in orùerJy and leisurel
T fashion
to the origin..d Jine
llélwa-K,horgele, the nearer
it got to its fruutier railway, the stronger it
became, and the Icss effectiye was the Hussian
pressure against it, From that day to this, oyer &
4*

:Uarch 27, 1915.

L
\ K D A X D "r ATE R.

period of three weeks, the Germans haye here
remained entirely upon the defensi,-e. Kor have
the Russian forces, which could effect no general
strategical results bJ" further adyance north,yard
in this region, been re-inforced for the purpose of
prosecuting such an adyance. They remain dra wu
up in front of the German lines. content to contain
the enemy, and to watch any further attempt of his
to take the offensive again.
For about a fortnight, the fizhting here took
the form of a sea ttered number of local e:lgage-
ments, in which the Rus5iam han:
taken a ccrtain
number oÏ guns, continuou:; driblets of prisoners,
and haw, in a few places, ad,'anced slightly by the
capture of disputed points.
At the end of the fortnight. about a week ago,
the Russians noted a yery cOll8icJerable new conc
n-
tration taking place ï'n front of them. They
announced the imminence of a new great battle
and of a further attempt upon (he part of the
enemV' to force the Xarew line. but the situation
has ñot developed, and, a fter three weekg of in-
decisin
' and petty actions. not only on this front.
but eyerywÌtère along the frontier, a delaile,l
German communiqué enahle3 us to define, with an
accuracy rare in this Eastern campaign, the exact
cordon of po
Ütions held by the Germans as late ao)
a week before these lines will aD l )('ar, Thur5da,;,
. -

Iarch 18.

-.
'\
(ì),. ,(, MEMEL
.Dfll
i C III \
Q )}I, \.,.",., Taurqgqen. F'.DVl-!O
cl
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Zurominr--!......
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The German line, the'n. upon tLat day, start-
ing from tile Yi"tula, ran :1,S follows:
}'rvlIl just east of Ploc:-\:, it ran almost ùup
nOi,th to Zuromin, which mC'ans that the flank here>
has beE'H Ix'nt ,...ell back bv some recent TIu5::;Ï.:tU
oIlcentratioTl in that regioli, for, quite a short time
a '-0, it v.as far eastward of such a line. From
LJ '
Zuromin it tnrnC'd to run
outh of
Ilawa, south
of Khorgde, nnd just sonth of
Irsz
'niec, and 0.1
south oÎ Kolno. There it beneI:-. à little anav from
tL0 frontier, fol1o',yS the IE'tt bank of tht' Bot
r for a.

Vii

'"ery short distance, anù is then Lent round in
froÌÜ of the guns of Osowiecs. From those
marshes it turn
nurthw:ird, just includes Augus-
to\\"o, co"er
the local chief town of Suwaìki, an,j
reaches .Mariampol tü 5trike the main inter-
national line from Berlin to Petrograd at thd
st;lti.)n of Pilwiski. Thenc'e it bends right back
c!08e to the frontier, an,i reaches Tauroggen,
beyond which point it is not prolonged.
:'\0"\<; it is clearly apparent. from the trace of
this line upon the sketch, that it is drawn 'with th

single object, for the moment, of C'OYering tht' East
Prussian frontier, and of drawing its proyision

from the scheme of railways that runs just within
German territon-; and though, from such a line,
further Gel'mañ forces màv initiate a third
chapter in the great. movemerÌt, and may attempt
yet another 31hance in force against the line of
the .\lemen and the Xarew,
'et the maia object of
remaining in precisely this situation, with such
considerable forces, is the political object. of sa'. in

German soil for the moment f['Om further moles-
tatioll. \\
ith the exception of the point at A,
\\ here the line just touches the Bobr, the whole
sY3tern is clearly designed as a screen against raids
into East Prussia.
It is the first. rule in war not to do what your
enemy expects you to do, but it is a secondary rule,
sometimes of ,-a.lue in practiee to do, from time to
time, what, for any reason, he p:irticularly desire

vou not to do. It is evident that the enemy is, bY'
the disposition of this line, nervous abòut the
purely political element in the situation, German
soil. He ,..ill, apparently, make some considerable
sacrifice for the, Hot military, but political, object
of &1. ,ping that soil from furt her suffering. The
Russian:;, therefore, haw, in the last few days,
undertaken an cxpedition detached, and preStÌ1òl-
ably of no ,'ery great size, against th
isolated se;t-
pOi t of )Iemcl, in the extreme north of the Ea
(,
FI'u
sian proyiuce.
"-e mu;;t remember th:1t East Prussia is
Cel'man in its wealth mueh morc than in Ït"i
texture. It is the squire
and the merchants in
the towns-the town population in general-that
regards, ,yith peculiar tear, TIussian action oyer
the frontier. Th:1t the attack on "Men:el has ...
strategic object ma
' b
doubted. PI.ophecy, aIllI
eH'n conjecture, in any carnpJ.ign. particularly in
such a campaign as this, where the yalne of serrecy
has been so thoroughly comprehended on ('"ery
side, is futile enough, but it is not easy to bt"lie\"o
that am: serious action ('ould be undertaken from
the
Ieñlel di
trid. It lies at a "ery great distance
Îrom the mas:,> of the Russian forces, and an
advance from that cornC'r would butt at once into
the seriou.s obst:1cle of t he broad and deep :\lemcIl.
just near it3 mouth, and upon all that Tilsit dis-
trict which our Ally found it impossible to
tra....er5e in hi::; Ja",t ad"-,lIlle of Decer..lbel' aIhl
January. "-e are. therC'Í,-Il'e, f .:tirly safe in 1'\'gard-
iug the ra id upon Mempl as dl'3Ìgned to increase
the ner\-oU..:;ne",:; of the enenn- onh", and as furthf'r
designed to increa8P an e\:a:;pèration ".hich i

n i'piuent in the willI ord<.'r for looting :llld burnin

masses of Russian prop<.'rty by way of re,-enge for
this incursion, exa::;peration of such a sort being
the wor",t possible counsellor in war.
The telegrams to hilllll speak of the participa-
t ion of th<.' civi1i:w population of )IemE'1 in t hi)
fi
hting. If that is so, it will mean, of course,
that the German example, though it will not ha'6
5""

L .\ X D .\
D .\V.\ T E R.

March 27, 1915.

bcen followed hy our Ally, can.at least be pleaded
for any just se,-erity t}
e RussIans .lU3{ lla

8e:11
fit to exercise at )IE'mel III the pursmt of kglLlmalc
"arfa re, aT1d the first instance of this kind. ,,}
ich
'ntl' has afforded may be valuable a<; some 111(hc
-
tion of" lu=t the enenlY's policy will be wheìl, or. if,
ho.;;tilities upon a considerable scale shaH be rapng
on his own soil. W" e must wait for further news to
know ,...h('ther the raid into
Iemel can even be
continued.
Xothing would be easier than for the enemy
to mo,-e considerab]e Ïorces in relief of the to\\"J1.
He has a gooù rail\\ay leading up to it on his side,
and thE' Russians h
ne not, I belie,C', ëlny such
facility of communication on thpÜ's. But the
diyersion is interesting. and its conseqnences may
Le ,\Ie]] worth follû\\ illg.
II.
YE r Ar;A
N -ATTtUTIO
.
It is rIght enough that "hat has be
n mill
first \JY a few indiyiduals concerned \\lth the
c>..ad study of the pre:>ent campaign, and \\ hat
tbey llL1\ e learnt from those actively el1Wlged in
profecuting it in the field, should somewhat
later be published o
cially, and this is ",h.at h
s
happened in the case of the trench-fightmg 111
tbe \Vest.
It h
s been pointed out continuaJl,v in these
columns for many neeks past that the effort
against the trenches in the \Vest was not, in the
main, an effort at brf'aking through, but an effort
at wearing down. In the ultimate analysis, vic-
tory consists in the imposing of the victor's will
upon the vanquished. This, in its turn, is only
possible by the miliUllY success of the ,ictor's
army over the vanquished, and this last phrase
only means. when it is translated into tei'ms of
reaÌ things, the disannanwnt of your opponent in
n larger measure than of your (\wn forces; and in
proportion to the extent of his disarl11
ment, CO!1l-
pareù with your mVIl. is your victory complete.
Xow an enemy is disarmed (by compul;:;ion
1'::lther than persuasion, which is another matter)
by OIle of five methods or by any number of them
combined, These fixe arc death, disableme 1 1t from
wounds, disease, capture, and the destruction of
his org.miséJtÍon or cohesion.

uprosing your enEmy meets you with a
number of armed, equipped, and organised men
equal to your own, and supposing that in any
fashion, after sueh and such a lapse of time.
you have l'('duced the number of his armed,
equipped, and or
anisf'd men to one-ha1f of your
own. You haxe lost, of course, heavily, and it is
tlJe difference 1'etween his losses and" yours that
lia') put hiIll into this unfavourable posture.
IIa ving to meet you now one to two, he is
hardly sanguine of success. He already dis-
counts defeat; he.is perhaps pr<,pared to accept
part of your terms, If you are not satisfied with
tl
is, if you bdieve yon can go on increasing the
dlsproportion, aad if you regard your fuJl terms
P.<:. essential to your future safety, you proceed
n,lt
) th
tad
or disarming him ?y death, ?y
bllmg III aetlOn. by c<.1pture, by dl!"ablement III
al-tion, by breaking up his Ol'ganisation with
IJf>Hvy hlows ag:tillst him, and by allowing the
"w
t:H.!e due to sie1.ness to run its course.
B
ing already tv,o to one, you can probably
IIc r t:'lel'ate the Pil((, of the process, and in a com-
paratively short time compared with the first
period, disarm forces, yet perhaps by a number

rnd qU:1litv combined, not as one to two, hut one
to four, eÕ 1 npared with
onr O"Jl. 'Yhen he is
in 8mh an cxb-emity he will probably accept your
terms; and if he does not, why you go on.
All the wars of history, all the great actions,
dra.matic or dull, all the campaigns, whether slow
fond confused like the Peninsula, or simple anù
immediate, like that of IS15, are, at bottom,
nothing more than examples of this fundamental
process.
All war is the atten
pt to disarm tite enemy,
:md we only talk of .. A \Var of Attrition ., as a
!"pecial case when we mean that the process is a
continuous and detailed one instead of a rapid
and ,,,-bolesale one,
"That happened, for instance, at "Taterloo
-a decision 3lTi\ed at within ten hours? 'What
happened ,vas that a French force, acting in the
proportion of about se..-en to six (if I remember
rightl
) founù its opponents swelled by the adyent
(If their Allies till their fighting, no longer more
than seven to nine, broke under the strain (that is,
lost cohesion) and, upon reforming after the pur-
suit, stood to their oppOl:ents no longer as seven
to nine, but as less than three to ten. The Duke of
:\Vellington's c01l!mand and Blucher's h:::d dis-
armed the French by killing, by captm
, by dis-
a blement through wounds, and by scatterll1g them.
They had lost a great number of men themseh'es,
but they had made the enemy lose a very much
larger number in proportion, with the result that
two or threE' days after the battle with the figures
stated in this extreme contrast, about three agaiT1st
ten, nothing 1110re could be attempted, especially
as to the numerical dispropartion ,vas
ddeù of
course the moral
hock.
There is an inevitable tenllency everywhere,
sa'-e perhaps in the higher command, for armies
and the civilian oninion behind them to be struck
hy the adjuncts of' military success more than by
its fundameniaÌ character. 'Vhether the enemy
reheats or gc'cs forward: whether he lo
es guns:
whether he is fighting on his own soil or 0"'1 ours:
whether a success is achieved quickly or tardily.
All these things have their value, for they are
of moral effect, but ultimately the real test is
.. How do the numbers of armed, equipped and
organised men, and of the materials at their dis-
posal, stand upon either side, and if, by your
method of action, whether l"abian or Napoleonic
(though the phrase is hardly fair to Napoleon, who
could be as Fabian as anybody) you are more and
more tending to leave your C'nemy in a 10\\ er and
lower proportion numerically to yonI' û\Hl men,
you are heading for victory, and if the contrary,
you 3re heading for defeat." .
In this particular case of the trench figbtmg
across Xorth-Eastern France you ha,-e as pitiless,
but as clear an instanæ of this last prillciple as
history has ever afforded. The" Eye \Vitness "
"ith the British forces has at last set it openly
for official publication, and it has been aiming for
months past in a II the work of the Allies: the work
is a work of attrition. There might be a collapse
at any moment in some section of the enemy's de-
fensiye line. There might be, therefore, a breach
achieved there. If that comes off unexpectedly, so
much the better. But it is improbable, and it is
1 1 0t the main ealcuktion. The main calculation is
directed towards perpetually lowering the
llumbers of the enemy as compareù with the
numbers opposed to him, both in men and in mate-
rial, until at long last the tide shall have turned.
6*

March 27, 191.3.

LA
D AYD ,WATElt

In the Frenc'h formula" the enemy. baving
been dra\..n to put forth the maximum of his effort
before your m..-n maì::imum of effort against him is
reacbed, the grov. th of your effort to a maximum
shall correspond with the decline of his."
It is the only principle upon" hich forcE's in-
ferior at first in number and in munitioning can
make for ultimate ,'ictory.
It must, therefore, \,:hcther after such a sharp
loral success as .Kem'e Chapelle the other day, or
after a sharp local reverse such as that o.í.' Soissons
some months ago, be perpetually repeated that
what counts (supposing discipline and all moral to
remain unaffected) ia not the local defence or fC-
tirement, but the proportion of total losses even
at Soissons, where against a single depleted French
Division certainly two. and possibly three, corps
converged, and "here reinforcements failed
through the breakdo\\n of the bridges in the floDJ
of the Aisne, the enemy lost about three men to
the French two. A French body of about 14,000
men beyond the Aisne lost in killed and wounded,
and in prisoners, half its effectives. The blow was
se,-ere, the eneHlY ad V"anced over an a r('a almost
e'{actly eqt:al to that seized by the British a fort-
night ago at Xem'e Chapelle. But the enemy
gained this local success at an expense of not less
than 12,000 men. That is the estimate of men
who 'Yere not engaged in influencing public
opinion, but surveying as eye-witnesses the .nature
of the action: of mE'n who saw the dense German
masses swarming down the valley to Conchy at i
s
narrow mouth. and who saw the play of the 75 a
upon those masses from the spur abo\'c Soissons
\yhich was ultimatelv abandoned.

\.t "\"em-e ChapèHe, tacitly anrllorally a suc-
cr;;.:;, yon haye the same principle at work as at
boissons. which was taritlv and locally a defeat,
Si.we that at XeU\"e C'bapelle the prl
portionate
enemy losses were more than three to t\\ o--more
nearly t\\O to one.
The enemy hag told us that Sir ..Tohn French's
estimate of 17,000 to 18,000 losses upon the Ger-
man side is ridiculous. i.mJ that the real losses were
more like a third of that amount.
Let us digress a moment to analyse that
statement.

TIlE GER
IA
CO:\nIL'l\:IQt:E ABOUT
NELYE CHAPELLE.
The advance at Xetn'e Chapelle was -;le
aaainst a front of over 4.000 yards and covered
a Q depth nearly a mile wide a"t its maximum, I
belie,-e or possibly a trifle more. The total area
rushed' was, I suppose, nearly two square miIeg
in extent, and the succeeding lines of trenche

occupied were not far short of tW? and a half
miles long, Let us suppose that thIs front were
at first being held by so small a number as 6,000
men. The calculation is a wry rough and con-
fused one, of course, bccause a defensive front is
not held by one fixed number of 1I1en, \
-h
are
rooted there like trees, but by a mllllmum
actually on the spot always, with co.nsiderable
reinforcements available in a comparatively short
time, whene,'er selious pressure de\elops upon
them.
The troops on the spot upon that "?ed
es-
day morning wer
taken completcJr. by surprIse.
For thirty-five mmutes they were III as bad a
storm of heavy shell as bas fallcll Oil anyone in the
campaign, except possibly' at one moment near

Perthes three weeks ago. A further belt of shell-
ing immediately behind them forbade retirement,
even in disorderly groups. The moment the
shelling ceased, the British concentration wag upon
them. Of prisoners taken, apart from all other
casualties, you have some 2,000, and under a
shelling from which there was no escape yon
have the greater bulk of the men who were
llolding this first line of trenches.
Next following upon this completely success-
ful stroke of the 'Vednesday morning, you ha\ß
three successive days, if I am not mistaken, of
attempts to retal"e the positions lost, There is
here no question of surprise; the enemy is not
able to concentrate, unwatched, as the British,
either from weather conditions or from the polity
of the enemy's air work, we believe concentrated
unwatched, before the main action. The Ger-
mans' counter - offensÌ\-e is expected and taken
for granted. It is met as every such expected
attack can be met. It is poured in from
reinforcements and still further reinforcements
and is regularly and methodically repelled.
That means upõn the face of it continuous
heavy losses, necessarily exceeding those of
the defensive, and particularly exceeding them
in the case of troops who come on. as we know,
as the enemy does in this campaign.
.'Ye know what the losses were upon the
successful side in the first surprise att:lck and ill
the defensive \\-ork whidl succeeded it, and it
lasted, I understand, for three days. The enemy;
asks us, in his statement of his own losses, to
accept for these losses a figure only two-thirds
that of our own. That is nonsense, and does not
even, as has often been the cafe in the p3 st with
the enemy's figures, accomplish misguidanc('.
.No one will believe it. If the enemy had
said: "Our losses were not 18,000, as YOU
imagine, but very little more than 12,000," "ths
statement wouhl hare had its due effect. and
would have had ,..'eight with that kind of man
who always tcnds to read against e\'el'Y confi-
dence; but when he says that his losses were nut
6,000, there is nothing doing.
Those who are interested in this point may
further note a very characteristic detail. Rome
weeks ap'o the French published thcir estimate
of tbe G
rman losses on the Perthes front. The
Germans issued a statement in v
hich thp,' used
the ,-ery same phrase that the losses werë " not
a third of the :French estimate."
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that tho
de, ices of this sort for misleading an enemy aro
perfectly legitimafe, and that the ('nemy's mis-
statements of this kind are no more unworthy
than the calculated reticence which is so strikin

a feature of the Allied accounts; but there id
apparent in this German work e
actly \\ hat )"Oll
get in the great bulk of German historical work
and textual criticism-to wit, the sharp contrast
between painstaking and bad judgment. Thð
enen1\" , as a general rule (and partil'ularly in th

earl/ stages of the carnpaig-n). gives us \'ery
careful statements of accepta ble detail. IIp S0111<'-
times gives us false' statements C'arefuH)" thou::: ht
out, for the sake of producing effects whit"h lllay
reasonably be c'-pected-e.g., "hen hl' tell::; t h.

public at homp tlwt Scarborough is a fortifiel)
port, or that London, ha\ ing been in fear of
Zeppelins (which it is), ,vas hiding in cell<:ll':i
(which it was not). He has also often given us, and
7*

L .A
DAN D J.Y. ATE R.

:March 27, 1915.

!ometimes continues to gi\"e us, false s(atem('nta
\yhich sufficiently resemble thc truth as to be
acceptable, or which so refer to matters we cannot
judge as to lea,.e us in Joubt-e.g., his statement
that the whole of the Russian 20th Army Corps
had bone ,,"'ith a loss of some 50,000 men. The
real loss in that particular case turned out in the
long run to be somethiug under 25,000,
But he also puts in (and particularly of late,
since he has begun to feel embarrassed) statemcnt

which do not belong to either of these categories
and" hich it is stupid for him to put forward, as
that noted in the beginning of this week's notes,
that the whole Russian 10th Army Corps had
J)een "iped out, so that the German prisoners
in Russian hands were onlv a sixth of the
numbers officialJy gi,'cn by the Russians, and this
last protest about his losses at Keuye Chapelle
came under such a heaùing.

CAUSES OF SUCCESS OF THE POLICY
OF ATrRITIuN.
To return from this digression to the policy
of attrition, we know, anJ it has been analyse!:1
in these columns, why one can calculate upon
the vroportion of losses of the enemy being
nearly always greater than that of the Allies,

lthough the Allies are the attacking party. It
IS due to the facts that the attacks are carefully
r
l':ulated to a local effect alone; that superior
Rlr ,,?rk allows them to concentrate with greater
E:CCUl'lty than the elemy; that the.heavy artil-
lery on the Allies' side is now at least equal to
that of the enemy, and usually, from the excellence
?f air work in corre
ting the shots, surpasses it
lJl effect; that the Allies work with larO'er
b

reserves than the Germans in the West, and that:
the German counter-offensiye is nearly ah..-ays
unùertaken in massed formation.
Xow, so long as this principle of attrition
can be continued successfully, that is so long as
the tenacity required for so strict a plan avails,
neither the command that orders it DOl' the public
opinion behind the command at home will cbange
their policy, for the Allies in the West are heading
directly for the aim of all war, which is tbe dis-
a rmament of the enemy in greater proportion than
o11'e own disarmament, in a given time.
That policy will be working both in the
means and in the end. It will be working in tbe

lleans
e('ause the c
aseless fretting at tbe lines
IS contmuously costmg the enemy more than it
costs the Allies. It will be workin a in its ends
as well, because the fruits of such a policy, 'unless
tile encmy can achiae a decision in the East and
bring back masses u'estlcaJ'd, must be ultimately
the breaking or the shortening of the German
lines l with the consequences frequently being
described here. "í e are able now to estimate one
wry considerable example of this policy of attri-
tion, of the way in which it is conducted and of
its
'esults in the Champagne figh
ing. Full
detaIls of the whole operation upon the Perthes
front lJa\'e been supplied by the French Govern-
PIent and by an English eye-witness, to whom the
French GO\-ernm
nt gaYe special faciliti{'s, so
that we are in a position to follow out, in detail,
the \\ hole of this large operation.

THE OPER-\.TIONS IN CHA
IPAG:\'E.
The whole front of this great effort, \yhich
lasted from the middle of February to the end of

To SrMcnchou1d

.J.

1

2.MJ1tS

\

To S!Mcnehould
A,

s-

:March 27, 1915,

I;AND l\ND lWATER

lh
first W'
ek in
Iarcb-that is, for three ""eeks
-IS contamed bet" een the high road running
frøm .Sommepy to
uippes through Souain, and
t?
hIgh road runmng through Cernay through
v Ille-sur- Tourbe to\yards Ste. 1\fenehould. That
front is fed, on its French side, by the railway
from Rheims to Ste.
Ienebould and on th'e
German side by the railway fro'm Rheims to
t
e Pass of Grandpré in the Argonne. The
dIstance between the two high roads is all
axerage of about tweh e miles. Less than nine
at the north end, and nearly fourteen at the
south end. This country is a very peculiar
one, the characteristics of which I ha,-e alread\T
l )artl y described in past numbers. It is a rolling
and of chalky texture, but not like the chalk of . The. 16th and the 17th February were spent
ou! towns-chalk friable and mixed with a very m fightmg for a little field work which the
thIll, 1'001' earth. The crops are insignificant, Germans had strengthened at the point (1) in
and the" hole area is studded with little stunt.ed front of Beauséjour Farm. It was taken and
l:'lalltations of pines, deliberately introduced bv Ipst in part for a week; 23rd February still saw
Goyermnent some
fty to sixty years ago, and ,ery that point in front of Beauséjour in dispute. The

T
ular and ugly III appearance. Just south of 27th came. and it was not yet wholly carried. It
It IS the big camp of (,halon8. dedic-ated as such was not until the last day of the mònth that the
sterile districts often are (like SalisDu;y Flain work was entirely in French hands. Exactly the
and Darh
lOor here)
o military use
. and espe.:i- s
me thing went on with point (2), which'is a
ally to artIllery practIce. The few villages, which lIttle swell of land. upon the crest from which
tr} to nourish themEeh-es by the cultivation of this one can see the fall northwards towards the
bnd, are quite small, ranging from one hundred Dormoise, except that it "as taken two da,.s
to b.,-o hundred inhabitant',> (thus
Iassieges ha
earlier-on the 26th. The most yiolent efforts
Jess than one hundred amI fifty,
finau('ourt were malle during all the succeedinO' week to
harely t.wo hundred, Peï,thes it:'5elf only one recapture it, and the Gm,rd, whichbhad been
hundred aI
l
se,'enty, and Hurlus ju
t o\-er one horrowed from the La Bassée district and the
hundred, wnIle Tahure had-it is still in German neighbourhood of ?\euve (,hapelle, were hm'led
h
.
d:S-01
e hundred alH
ninety-nine). Even at it. day after day. Point (3),
vhich is alEo
, Ille-sur- TOUi'be has but lUst oyer five hundred. upon the crest, the German') retained almost to
It gives some idea of the
contours of this bare the end. At (4), just in front of the ruins of

md br.rren couT'ltry siòe ,,"hen we know that the Perthes, it '
"as tl
e same story-a yery gradual
v,ater levels of the Dormoise and of the Tourbe 3(hance agamst German field works, which was
ar(' about two hundred feet helow the crests of the not successful until the end of February; and
6wells bet"een the watercourses. at. (5) a regular
little e
ort ,,,as, just like the
The choice of this front for the considerable pomt at (1), halt taken m the first days of the
French cffort that has been I:.1ade ,'as due both to mmement, but only finally held on 'the 27th
the f
lt that the t
lÍn chalky soil dries rapidly in February. Lastly, at (6), on the extreme west of
{'
ch
ntcl'"ml of 'Hndy weather, bet"een tbe da,s th.e:se few five or six miles, a ,,,ooded post, helll
01 ram, and to its beinO' the watershed of tlìis ,nth. the gr
atest tenacity by the enemy, was not
pa . rt O . f C . hampa o O'ne. All the little stleams of th e carrIed untIl the yery enù of the moyement upon
_ the 7th of
Iarch. '
dIstrIct rIse round aoout these Ùllages, the places
at the head of each stream heinO' distinD'uishell Xow, in this effort, somethin!! like a q uarter
by the prefix Somme, meaning sou
ce. Th
whole of a 1/1 ill ion of men "er
pushed up on the French
place IH
s
een for
ges a n3.tural fighting-grounù. sH!e, first and last, ùurmg the three weeks. The
\ al
llY IS m the nCIghbourhood; the place where appli('
ti
n of that blister brought up on the
AttIla was defeated is not so far off. enemy s sIde a smaller or larger number, There
. "Then the attack l
egan the FI
nch line lay ".-as no .qllesti l on G
f breaking through. The task
111 and out of the road running' from Souain to "a.:; to torce tIe ('r111ans to borrow men from all
Perthes. It is a bad little road, kept up out of up êìnd 110wn the line (which among other thinO'i)
the. local ratcs, and 110t forming part of the proJuced Sem"e ChapeUe) to make them co
-
natIOnal sYStem. I remember it well. But that tinually in the
e weeks of counter-offensive ami
is by the' wav. The French line on this 15th fruitle
s as
ault pour out their strength an
l
September ran as the dots run from A to B. It "'
ste It.. .:'\0 one attempting to gauge an effort
al:jo ran, of course, on eastward and ,...estwarfl ?f that kmd b
the mere
elt gained comprehend:;
be}ol1l1 A and B, but the great French effort "as Its purpose. The first \IOlent afh'ance which is
made just there. exp<'l1si\e, but which is prefaced b,' a
d1Ïrl\YÌ1HI
of heavy gunfire (destructive to 'the enemy in
Xow, in all the work of those three weeks kill<,d, wounùeù, and prisoners, at least as Iim c h
the French got no further than the line (' I A ll ' , . 1
marked with crosses. "hich gi,es them po
:sessioll
s to t
e.:-1. Ies SH e), is cxpensi\"e. but its object
. 1 ] IS.
ttal11eJ. It gets posse.ssion of points upon
oi t Ie crest over ooking the depres
ion through WJ1)
h .the enemy hr
aks Inmself over anll oYer
,..hic-h the Dormoise runs. The average agaIn m the succeedmg days, and in the balancc
al]v'ance was not, I suppose, mOle than fin' to be struck at the end of these continual effort.'
hundred yards, but was, perLaps, nowhere a full t
e weaker in proportion to the
\llies eYer;
thouc.and. t TI ' 1 ' I . '
. .' .. Ime. Ie, CIY S Ig Itness 01 cach a(h-ancc is
And that IS tYPIcal of the whole busmess H1 almoEt a measure of its g reat meaninO'
/:4.'
9*

ewry part of the line. The order is not to break
tbrough-J et: it is to wear do" n,

8th .
0.2 I __
.' line oFFeb,2 - _-';;'--I?
@. eQ'}!.i) _,- Beausejour
---- l
--- F -c - b 15
Farm
- - C1 lne 0
e.
Perthes

o

2 ,
.
En!JIisb Milt's

t
.

$
,

1)

EAND AND
ATER.

THE FALL OF PRZE
IYSL.
The fall of Przemysl presents a number of
points of interest which must be dealt with in
more detail next week, when a fuller account is
available than we have at the moment of writing
(Tuesday). But the news, in its most general
character, at once suggests two very important
results: The moral effect upon Austria and the
material effect upon the campaign in the release of
men and material for the Russian operations upon
the \Vest and the Carpathian front. The first
thing we must try and estimate is the number of
men this success is likely to release.
,W-e shall ha,.e no detailed information upon
this, bec
lUse, naturally, no army provides us with
figures of that sort.
But we can fix a minimum without much
difficulty.
Przemysl held out for five months. Its per-
manent works were, therefore, never seriously
under heavy large calibre fire, :\Vhether it was
because of the difficulty in munitioning with large
high explosive shell or, as in the case of Verdun,
because the big pieæs of the defenæ were moved
out of the permanent works and put into tempo-
rary field works upon an exterior circumference
to the ohl permanent works does not much affect
our conclusion, In either case the line of invest-
m
nt was a very long one necessarily. Przemysl,
bemg blockaded and not bombarded, this peri-
phery \\as maintained at its utmost limit until
qu.ite the l
st few days, and we may take it as
faIrly certam (though we cannot be quite certain
till full details arrive) that the place surrendered
as a consequence of exhaustion in supply and not
of attack upon its permanent works.
"Te can only guess at the periphery thus
held. On the analogy of Verdun (which has ne,.er
been completely invested even on the date of
maximum, September 5), the periphery of in-
vestment would not be less than fifty miles. Give
the outline of the outermost permañent works no

ore
han
hirty miles, and fifty miles for t.he
lllv
Stlllg lllle
cannot be an exaggeration. I
behe,-e they wIll prove t.o have been more.
Now turn to anot.her factor in t.he calcula-
tion-the garrison which was defending the F

place: If we estimate it.s original strength at
certamly over 140,000, we shall aO'ain be certainly

\ ithin t.he mark. These figures bare purely con-
Jectural, the figures of remainin a efficients at t.he
close of the siege are necessa
ily far smaller,
and for the exact totals we must wait for
further ne'
s. It has been proved in t.he
c:mrse of t.lns war t.hat the real chance for the
rmg fort.
ess aga!nst. mo
lcrn large high explosive
shell, .wIth t.heir ra pid destruction, I ies in
the SIze and mobilitv of the defendina
nrmy, which throws out- temporary works and C
entrenchment.s, external to t.he old ring of per- Dukla it.self (which is in Russian hands) to the
manent .work
. The Germans have been as busy Kolomea railway pass (4) is just one hundred and
as bees III domg this round lVfetz since the battle fift.y, The other three railway passes (being the
of the Marne and round Antwerp since a month Lupkow (1), the Uzsok (2), and t.he variouslv-
,ht.er, and the French have been doing nothin a named one whicl
leads from lVIunkacs . to Stryj
else north and east of "Verdun. For the holdin
(3) are twenty, SIxty, and a hundred nllles from
of SUC? lines successfully, numbers are ob\iouslÿ Dukla respectively. Przemysl st.ands fifty mile:J
essential. A bare hundred thousand would give north-east of the ridge of the mountains (just
less tha
three thousand men a mile, and that beyond the foothills and about half-way between
number IS almost cert.ain to be exceeded. The the first t.wo passes) at P. Thc main R1.Ìssian line
very prolongation of t.he defence is proof of the of communications for an the armies in Galicia
num
r of
nen thu
immobilised by the siege. right up to t.he front against Cracow runs throuO'h
I ow, 0 contam such a number. we may. as Przemysl to Lember g at L and from Lembera in
w- '--

1.1arch 27, 1915.

a maximum, take the old multiple of three to
one; but ,,,hether so large a multiple is necessary;
or not depends upon local communication as
much as anyt.hing. The Russians have presum-
ably laid down sections of light raihvay to facili-
tate movements along t.he investing lines, but we
ha,'e as yet no means of gauging the efficiency or
the extension of their communications round
the place.
Even if it were safe, however, to take a lower
multiple, anù t.o hazard the conjecture t.hat the
number of men required for containing the garri-
son of Przemysl is less than three hundred
thousand, we must remember that a portion of
the troops thus occupied were upon t.he Car-
pathian side of the town, and that, though the
troops now released for further action upon this
front will increase the forces facing the Austrians
i
the foothills of the mountains by Sonak and
LIsko, yet we cannot count the whole of the
troop
round Przemysl as now forming a new
offensIve element upon the Russian side.
It is perhaps t.he lowest safe estimate to take
two hundred thousand as the force certainly;
released by the fall of the city. It mav very:
well be that this number is far below the
mark'
but in such calculations one must always weiO'ht
the scales against the hopes and cxpectations O of
one's own side.
110re important in its ultimate effect upon
the campaign than the mere number of men
released will prove the eliminat.ion of t.his
secondary objective in t.he Austro-German effort
and the new power UDon the Russian side of
moving t.roops at will, \\
ithout the embarrassment
of that large interruDtion in Russian communi-
cations and movem
nts which the siec-e of
o
Przemysl formed.
In order to appreciate the considerable im-
portance of this new factor, we shall do well t.o
grasp the main elements of which Przemysl is the
centre.
The ridge of t.he Carpathians from bevond
the Dukla to the Kolomea railway pass "is

stretch of one hundred and sixty miles. From tho

wa.

Iarl:h 27, 1915.

LAND

AND
ATER.

h\o main lines along the arrO\...--hc:lùs towards the
Uussian depôts in Russi:lll territory. I have
marked this main line of communication in
double. The four railways across the passes of
the Carpathians (1, 2, 3, 4) join the lateral rail-
way along the foothills of the Carpathians,
\, hich the Austrian!'> hm e for months been trying
to get a-straddle of, and only once really domin-
ated, during the few days "hen they held Stanislau
at the end of Februarv.
Xow, in this railway s,ystem, the imestment
of Przemysl made à gap and an interruption
represented roughly by the circle ABC, and the
Austrian front, moving across the Carpathians
{IUd attempting to relieve Przemysl and turn the
Russians out of Galicia, lay along the line of
crosses D E. So long as Przemysl held out all
the munitioning and supply of the Russian front,
which was wit11standing the Austrian pressure,
upon that line DE, was based upon Lemberg, and
Euffered difficulties in proportion as one went
"e
tward towards the Dukla. 'Yith Przemysl
fallen, these difficulties disappear, and the whole
front becomes of equal strength for the recep-
tion of reinforcements and of munitioning. At

THE

WAR
By FRED

the same time the main raih\ay line through
Galicia, which the circle of im-estment ABC
round Przemysl interrupted, is released for fully
supporting the Russian front towards Cracow,
\yhich stands about eighty miles away in the
direction F,
In a word, tbe fall of Przemysl will gh-e the
Russians in the next week or so a complete and
restored s:et of communications behind thcir Car-
pathian front, which has hitherto been hampered
and interrupted by the resistance of the fortress.
Bodies of men can be mo\'ed at will, and rapidly,
against any point that is threatened by an enemy,
concentration, and such concentration is far less
easily effected by the enemy along the detached
lines which separately cross the mountains at 1,
2, 3, and 4, than bv the Rus'Jians who hold all
the connected lines
n the Galician side and the
lateral railway along the northern foothills of
the range.
For a further analysis of this important
piece of news we must wait for the full details
which will presumably come in during the rest of
the week. and I will deal with them in the next
issue of this paper.

-

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTE.-Th11 Artlde lull been líUbmitted to tlu
Press BUfeau, which does cot objcct to the I'ublkatloa DS cCDsored, DDd tal.cs DO
fcsp0l1sibili1y fOf tbe I:Grrcctacss 01 tile statcments.

THE DARDANELLES.
T HE Dardanelles continue to renllán the chief centre
of interest, and, reading between the lines, it is
clear that at tbe end of la
t week the Allied flEet
had received something of the IJature of a set-
ba('k-the Germans will probably eventually call
It a II decided defeat. JJ
I haloe been somewhat severely criticised in the past for
imisting in these Notes tbat forcing the Dardanelles must
nece
:;arily be a ve.y difficult and dangerous operation, and
net the mere II naval parade JJ which 80 many people were
inclined to ima!!ine tbat it would be,
ow tbat losses ha'\e
been sustained;' there is a tendency for the undue public
optimism of yesterJay to be replaced by an equally undue
pessimi
m. It is necesQary, therefore, to empbas!se the fact tbat
\\-bate\"er public opinion in the matter may be, our Admiralty
most certainly did not enter upon these orerations without
carefully counting th
cost or \'iithout being prepared for, and
IInticipating, losses. Nor \Vas it under any delusions as to the
relative fighting values of ships and forts. Conseque
Itly,
though we have h2d one set-back, and may yet experIence
others, there is every reason to belie\ e that Constantinople
will ultimately be reached; though there is always a possi-
bility that its actual capture may be effected by the Russians,
if (as now seems established) the Got:.btn is really out of
IIction.
A Russian capture would be politically advantageous,
o",ing to the fact that Constantinople has been her goal for
centuries, and in the event of success, will presumably be
claimed as her prize of the war. If Russia captured Constan-
tinople, it would clear the air of a possible bone of contention
between the Allies on II dragging chestnuts out of the fire JJ
lines.
\\"'1at Rmsia can or cannot do depends entirely on the
condition of tbe Got:.bcn. A disabled Got:.bw means that
Russia has undisputed command of the Black Sea, and that
Russia is, therefore, in a position to land a large invading
force to the north-west of Cape Rumili, and thence march on
Constantinople-a distance of twenty milC!! or so.
The military operations which would be entailed are out-
Fide my province, and I have no means of estimating the
fortunes of the troops once they were landed. I refer to them
merely to point out that any operations, to be Fuccessful, must
necessarily be conducted with both naval and military forces,
the ",ork of the Russian fleet being mainly confined to cover-
in'" the invasion and maintaining o\-ersea communications-
a thing \'wbich, in aU her previous v.ör" v.ith Turl"ey, Russia

",as ncver able to do, owing to the Tul'ks alwaJs ha"ing be
n
the I!uperior naval power.
Now, however, all that is changed, and the mere presence
of Ru:osian warships off the Ee
pborus must teem with un-
pleasant suggestiveness for the Turkish Government. It is

"

5

10

Sea Miles.

fJ,'<P OF TUE l.!O!>PBOlit:S.
al<o likely to affect matters in the DardaneIle.., and should
lead to tbe withdra",al of troops from the Gallipoli prniusula,
a matter which ,,"ould gl'eatly facilitate the re(!uctiOJ] of the
forts. One of the many advantages of forts is that, though
they be BÏlenced by ship fire, their permanent dcdru tien is
practically impossible, unless lanùirg parties be 1::-- 'ød, end
that, in tbe face of a strong cO\"ering field army, is a Hry diffi-
cult operation for a fleet wbich necesQarily has only a strictly
limited number of men available.
[atters are simplified if
the fleet is accompanied by a military force capablo of exten-
sive operations, both against the mobile field army and of
attacking forts in the rear.
An attack on the Bosphorus by the Rm,.an Black Sea
fleet, should it take place at all, is likely to be confined to a
long-range bombardment of the outer forts. FlO.n Cq)O
11*

-----------
--- ---
---
--- -----------------
- ---
-

:

!"

.:.:::.:. ---
....-'-
;
- -

LAND

AKD

Rumili to Comtantinople is, roughly, only about fifteen miles;
but compared to the Bosphorus, the Dard
r;telles are as a
broad highway to a country lane, In ad
ltIon, the V;holo
passage is tortuou3 an? surrounded by hills from which a
plunging fire can be dehveI'cd.
The forts are probably even more third-class than th05e
of the Dardanelleg; but the position is Imch that a single six-
inch shore gun is probably equivalent to the entire broadside
of a battleship in destructive capacity. :Purthermore, there
are few opportunities for outranging on account, of the many
twish and turns, and over the greater part of the course
attacking warships would have to come singly and in the
terribly disad,'antageous end-on position. The deadliness of
that positiou (the ideal one of a past generation) is not so
much that only a portion of the guns can be utilised, as that
the chances of being hit are multiplied several fold, Hitting
with modern gunnery is purely a matter of elevation-misses
in the matter of direction are 50 rare as to be almost negligible.
Owing to the use of heavily armoured bulkheads, being
" raked" has no longer the terrors of the old days, but
modern gunnery and long modern ranges have introduced a
new danger. 'fhe appended diagram indicates how a com-
paratively slight error in elevation (that is to say, in comput-
ing range) may leave a ship broadside on unscathed, while
seriously damaging the end-on ship.
Of course, t.here is an apparent off-set to this. That is to
say, an efficiently gan-isoned fOI.t normally knows all the
ranges from constant practice, and (in theory) is, therefore,
unlikely to make errors in ele,'ation. In practice, however,
when under fire, errors are far easier. In fact, a ship attack-

--------------------

Fort

J\
ATE R.

}'Iarch 27, 1915_

venient and more or le:!s dangerous so far as hypothetical
damage is concerned, but an assurance against fatal results.
Ilie really important part of the business is the actual
bombardment and ih results. Of this, only the general out-
lines have yet reached us. But we have been told enough to
know that the forts ha,'e given a better account of themselve3
than the British public expected.
It is to the last degl'ee improbable that either our
.Admiralty or the }'l'ench Admiralty were under any
delusions. In the early days of the war, when the GermanI
smashed Liége without difficulty, it was at once assumed on
all sides that the days of forts were numbered. It seemed
clear that the heavy gun was omnipotent.
Along that assumption Cattaro, the Austrian station
in the Adriatic, was bombarded, and all of us took as a fore-
gone conclusion that the lesson of Liége would be repeated.
and all the Austrian naval stations fall into the haùds of the
Allies.
Cattal'o forts recei,-ed a great many shells and a great
deal of apparent damage was done. But, after a while the
attack was relinquished, and has never been remmed. Ib
waS-R3 I mentioned at the time-somewhat of the nature
of an experimental bombardment, As I also mentioned.
there wa
every reason to believe that the experiment would
be successful.
Apparently, however, it all only went to prove that what
Kelson and others of hi:! era thought of forts agaill3t ships il
just as tr:.ie now as then; just as true as when, in 1882, after
the British Fleet had pounded the Alexandria forts into ruinl
the American OffiCHS who witnessed it laid down the maxim

--

'...

'...
....

------....-
",

13roadside on.

End-on..

DIAGt:UI TO ILLCSTIL\TE now A. SHIl" EXD ON IS A. BIGGER T
naET TJUN A bIIIr nnOAD6IDE ON.

Ing a fOI.t relies mainly on obscuring the fort's vision with
rlust, and tite shatie
ing of nerves by big shell expbsions, which,
a:I hke as not. do no other harm, 'fhat is why the fort
retaliates by placing its position finders well away from tbe
fort. This ensures range,findillg being faidy fl'ee from tùe
dust problem, but it does not protect the siaht-setter from
nerve-strain, Consequently the net result is o that the end.

>U ship remains a
a seri,)us disadvantage whenever the range
IS more than pomt blank. Consequently, also, a Russian
attempt to force tho Bosphorus would be a necdless risk of
wal'ships. '
\Ve may now revert to the Dardanelles operatioll3 them-
seh'es. That two British ships, IrrcsisfiMc and Occan and
one French ship, the BOlLt'ff, were sunk by floating mi
es is
not a matter of any great military significance. The fight-ing
value of all tIll' JC, so far as UJodertl naval warfare is concerned.
was very slight-in a line of modern Dreadnouahts anv of
them would have been a drawback rather tha: a help on
accou!}t of tbeir relatively slow speed and comparat.ivelv short-
ran
glln
. K or does the fact that damage was done by
floatlllg. mmes amount 10 much; such mines were e::ipecled,
Rnd the11" effects. of conrse, well unden:tood. The disquietina
feature here is that inadequate provision appcal's to ha\"

bcen made to
eet this form of attack. I say" appears,"
because some t.une ago there were apparently well aUlhenti-

ated
umours. of a G
rman
ubmarine having been smuggled
luto Constantmople In sectIons, and a German submarine
may, ped\aps, have done what Turkish mines arc assuIPed to

aYe done. Inciùentally, the Germans attribute the
damaze to "torpedoes." And here, en possallf, it may be
observed that had seyeral submarines been a\'ailable fm' the
?efence, the Allied Fleet would probably ba\'e been rendered
Impotei1t.

s for the actual floatin
mines, these arc ea
i1y to he
provIded agl'iust by precisely the same means as those
t'mployed fifty years ago against" torpedoes" -as mines were
then called-by Admiral :Farragut ill the American Civil THE SUß:\IARINE .. BLOCKADE"
,W.ar.
boom defence in the bow is ample to render floating This particular German "re\'ue," like Ie Charley's
mmes 111110CUOUS,' and. all that tbey C:in really accomplish is Aunt," is still l"Illlning; but its failure may now Le taken as

compel attaclnng shIps to adopt the end,on position-incon- assured. To say that the Germans ha\'e lost a submarine for:
12*

tha
"save in exceptional circumstances ships are no good
a.ça 1I19t fm.ts,"
At Ale::iandl.ia there were very exceptional circumstance!'!
-a fleet out of all proportion t.o t.he mediocI'e defence amI all
the fOI'lS " low site" ones. In the Dardanelles th
se circum-
stanc
s are partially repro":'uced to some considerable extent--
that is to say, an overwhelming naval force is employed, and
the forts are of a third-rate nature.
Yet even so, considerable damage has been done. '1'he
b
f1c:r:i1.JZc has sustained a heavy casualty list. The losscs of
the :French FieeL which engaged the forts at close range llaye
not yet been publi
hed, but we know that the ship::! were
fI-equently hit.
'fhe 'fm'ks (or their German advi;õus) appear to have
been past masters at feigning disablement, or in bringing up
heavy howitzers to replace lost guns during the intervals when
bad weather caused a lull in the operations--a condition
which has obtained throughout the attack.
The price of victory is going to be heavy-as like as noli
the losses of tll9 Allies have only just commenced. But the
reward of yictory
orn ships from Russia, munitions of war
to Rus:>ia in r
turn-is so great that heavy sac.-i.fices will be
well justified. Once the Narrows are passed the worst should
be over-once the Sea of
larmora is reached, success i

assured, But the way is long and difficult, and there has
ne\"er been any occasion in th!) war in which it is so absolutely
necessary that the general public shall trust the British Ka\-y.
It is idl
to dem' that on the face of it the destI'uction of
three battleships i; one day by all!'ged float,ing mines seems
8uggesti\'e of carelessness or stupidity, or what not, But it
is necess:uy to remember that (apart from the possibility that.
it was a submarine which did the damage) th
brief offici:11
statement gives no inkling whatever as to the dispositions of
the sl1Ìps or the conditions under which they were compelled
to act. Criticism of the Navy in such circumstances is not
folly; it is crimi"aZZU1Inc!/!

March 27, 1915.

A N D

LAND

e!ery yictim that they have secured would be hyperbolic; but
there is every reawn to believe that when the balance-sheH
of the operations is available {Ol' study it ",ill be found that,
taking loss of merchant shipping on ot
r side and loss of
!ubmarines and 108s of their 8t1't'ices for war u'ork on the
German Bide, it will be found that Gcrmany figures as tho
loser. The effort was, of course, mainly psychological; that is
to say, it mainly depended on creating a panic which was not
created. Thus at one fell swoop it dropped from the stars to
60lid earth, and all the illusion with which the Germans hoped
to surround it melted into thin air.

THE WAR I
THE AIR.
Four ZeppeJins have dtacked P<:ris, four hostile aero-
pIanos have made
n attempt on Deal. In bot.h cases the
attack WáS beaten off, a further illu:itration-if one were
needed--of the Îact that in aerial warfare as it is at present
the attack is handicapped by iis dual objective of destroying
nnd also having to ward off and look cut for counier-attack,
whereas ihe defenders have only the single objecth-e of
destroying the attackers, Over Paris anti-aerial guns appear
to have taken as prominent a part in t.he defence as defending
Ileroplanes; off Deal the defenca was al'ncst entirely aerial.
That U1Ìs aerial defence is the lx.st defence can now hardly
lie questioned any longer. The net result may be put down
IlS further proof that aerial warfare reproduces ships v. fort'3
on an enlarged scale. Successful attack must be in over-
whelming force.

A
SWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
II. D. p, (Letchworth),-It is ne(?essary to ta1.e into
account the enon ;ous number of inventions and ideas which
are submitted 10 the Admiralty. This i., bound to create
delays fUch as thl't to which you rcfer. There is aIm the
point that altho'lgh the thing may be perfectly \,"orkable, ,It
may not he applicable to the conditiens of mcd
l.n naval \\-ar-
fare, This is thc crux of the question. To take an extreme
ca!'e, consider the in\"e!ltcr who de!'igns a fenes of al'mour
plates ten or t\
enty f
et away from the ship's hull as a
defence agb-iust torpedoes. As a defen
e, this, of course,
would be ahsoluteIy idaal, but it is tetany inapplicable
because it would rf:nder the ship unable to move! This, of
course, is an extreme case, but it iHuslrates my point in hyper-
bole. I quite see your point about the 5UCCêSdul inventions
of non-experts, but I cannot can to mind
E.ingle case ef any
such invention applied to naval matters. The \Vhitehead
torpedo might at fh'st sight appear to cont.radict this, but
'Vhitehead was a competent engint'er working en certain
definite lines connected with his own profession. The vast

w t-

.,
. , --
, A"" -t
, .

majori
y of people who 5ulimit things to the authorities
simply send in the II idea J7 which they are con'\'Ínced II would
work were proper experiments carried out with it." It ið
these absolutely non-technical people who chohe the way for
those who, though non-naval, are at least engineers.
W. M. H. (Eastbourne).-(l) The II/flexible normally
belong'3 to the Mediterranean squadron. That reason alo11ð
would account for her employment in t.he Dardanelles.
(2) The QIlU1l Eli:abeths are, in a sel1Se, improved battIe-
cruisers. Lackipg a littIe, perhaps, in speed, they have an
improved protection as a compensation. The reason 110 more
bGttIe-cruiserB are being built was explained by Mr. Chmchill
some time ago, when he stated that it was considered better
to build a batch of these fast ships in one year than to build
them at the previous rate of one a year. (3) The Germans
have a successor to the Lut::ou', but it is doubtful whether
she win be completed in time to take part in the present "'-ar.
'V. N. (Chester).-Very considerable crews are required
for the armed merchantmen, and you may rest assured that
the Admiralty have not inflated the cOllll>lements beyond
what is required,
P. P. (Glasgow).-A good many aeroplanes are fitted
with wireless, and so, alw, am many submarines, The dis-
tance c\'er which messages can be t.ransmitted from either
are, hO\':ever, sILal!. You may be quite sure that the matter
to which you refer has not escaped the attention of the
2utharities.
H. W. H. (London, N.W.).-Chain shot, if fired from a
ImfficientIy large gun, would certainly be effective 'lgaiu
t
periS('opCB. The difficulty, however, is to see the peri
core ill
time.
J. M. (Cork).-A torpedo with a war head-i.e" an
cxplosiye charge, which misses its mark-is adjusted to sink
automatically. Otherwise, it would be as dangerous to friend
as to foe. In peace time it would, of course, be adjusted t.o
come to the surface at the end of its run.
G. W. T. F. (Londou, S.W.) and ot.hers.-The photo-
graph of the Lritish and French ship8 off the DardaneJles is
authentic enough, but it is by no means clear that all the
D,iìltoJls were t,l1
re. It is \'ery difficult to recognife !õome of
t IJe more distaut ships. In any case, you may be quit.e certain
that the AJlied fleet elsewhere is quite capable of dealing with
the A ustriau. :,-hould they come out.
G. L. S. (Che1tenIlam).-B 4 was a misprint for B 2.
The ot.her boat to which you refer was sunk some time ago.
S, B. C. (Barnes).-The story to which you refer is not
()nly quite probable, but also \'ery probably hue. For "ery
obyio'ls reasons the Press Censor has feen to it that. it has not
hppeared in print.
N .B.-ltlall!l A1l8U't'TS are wlat.oidaU!I lu:ld O.'lr tliis tN'('
.

EVOLUTION
ON THE
COLONEL

SIEG ECRAF1"'
WESTERN FRONTIER.
IvI A U DE, C. B.

F.

By
T HE eugagement at N euvc C'hapelIe is a striking
example of ille degree to which the :;.ttlJck iu war
has now dominated the defence.
In the old days 10,000 defel
cier8 of Sl',
h
!'taunchues8 as the Germans certain!y have dis-
played would probably have held their own ag:!.Ìnst aU the
Ilctual rifles aDd bayonets our trcops l'rougl,t into the field, hut
to-day the defence, qlla defence, practicalìy brol[e at the
first rush, having inflicted in.5ignifieant losses on their
assailants.
\\"hat fûllowed-yiz" the fighting in which our sCI'ious
lcsses occurreà, was essentially of the nahue of a field battle
in which neith
r side h;;d time to {'uhcnch, bilt went at each
()th"r in the open, or seiz!'d on \"illa&es and houses as points
of support--whel'e the line!'! were HJ intermingled that
artillery power could not be called in to prepale the way of
the attal'kers.
As the whole f\
ture cour<:e oÎ the wnr now turns on this
esta bli
hed fact, it ",ill he of interest 10 recapitulat6 tho
Fucces!'i\-e !'t.eps by which this present relat.ioll of attack and
def'
:lce h;;s h
en attained.
As I have pointed out in pre\'ious articles HIe GUlllal1!'!.
when comf,elled to ab:mdou their attack on Paris, fell back
1l10ng tIle roads by wlIÌch their heavy artiIIery was ad...an.:;ÌIIg
for I he bombardment of the defences of t!Jat city.
Thanks to tl,e presence of this oVHwhelming artili.ery
fire our offensive came to a standstlll, for our field guns and
infantry were clearly overmatched by the hea\'y German gilliS,
together with both field artiHery and infantry, in numbers

OF

N.

Eti}] superior to our own, "hich a\\aiteu us in positions their
resen-o troops had had ample time to prepare; Giso at this
period the German aircraft showed n distinct PI't'poudcl'aneo
in numbers aud activity as compared to ours. .
\Ve met the situation, as I ha\'e before explained, by
getting in under the German guard, i.e" by entrenchir.g Cll
the !õidcs of the lIills sloping toward:! us, so that the ellel.ly'8
gUlmers could no longer lay their guns on liS by direct \'ision,
but had to rely on the observation of thér airmen, which
procedure certainly helped, but was by 110 means equal to
laying by direct sighting.
But we could 1I0t Üop the Germ:m infantry from massing
l1chind the brow of the hills and attacking us JO\\llhill, alii I
ultimately, under cover of darkness, di
ging themseh'es ir.
within fifty to one hundred paces of our firing line.
This, howeyer, obliged the German hea\"y guns to c
a
e
firing for fear of hitting too many of their 0\\ n
ide, ßrù
our gUll!', as they came up, fOllud themseh'es ir like cas(', so
that, as the front extended, and reached the great })lains of
tbe north, the two infantries, acting undcr the ill
tinct of
seIf-preservation, get as do!õe to one another as t.hey possibly
could-fifty to one hundred nnd fifty )'ards-in order to secure
protection from the incessant shell fire, which is the m:>st
UlleJldUl'ahle of all the slrains of war.
The al'tillery arm, being thus for the limo eliminated,
there was 110 longer any dominant reason for keepÌi1g the
trenches flat with the soil, since concealment at fifty )'ards
was quite out of the question, and, as the higher you made
the parapet, the more you escaped from the mud, the! height
13'>>

(IF the parapets again increased, un
iI.' as I proph
sied, the old
!liege type of trench fOllnded on Cnmean experIence, began
to reappear.
Had we been quicker to see what was coming, we might
bave sa\'ed many lives, and our men generally would have
been spared much suffering.
- Then, however, both French and British siege guns
beo-an to arrive at the front in numbers sufficient to hold their
O\:n ao-ainst the Germans, and finallv, assisted by the growing
ascendancy of our airmen, the Alliës began to dominate the
German gunners completely.
This brought about a further step in the e\'olution of
sieo-ccraft, and one which is entirely novel.
'" As the German artillery fire weakened, matters became
very mu<.h more comfortable for our supports and reserves.
Inst<.>ad of restin" in cellars and dug-outs our men could
come above crrou
d again, and could enjoy decidedly im-
proved sanita
y conditions in ihe wrecks of houses still left in
the ,'illages.
The moment the German batteries began to shell one
of these places our gum replied, and laid them out for that
day, at least.
Our gunners, however, were free to shell and destroy
everythino- within miles which could give cover to German
Bupports;bconsequentIy, the latter were driven to dig them-
lIelves in e,-en deeper, and driven to take greater precautions

J. arc 27, 191&.

to keep the target, presented by the trenche
, low and
invisible, more so, indeed, than we Lad had to do at the
beginning.
In some place
I am informed that (where the soil allowil
it) the Germans have had to dig trenches nine feet deep for
their supports to live in, and the labour of scattering the
earth to hide them, to
ay nothing of getting it out in the first
instance, is excessive, and sanitary conditions, of COUT3e, are
almost impossible,
Moreover, though, by means of trestles and pickPts
driven into the soil, it is practicable to arrange these trenches
so that men can fire out of them, they are exceedingly difficult
to climb out of, and, if an attack is pushed home, their
garrisons are caught like rats in a trap, without hope of
escape.
In tIle watpr-Iogged plains of Flanders, such deep
t,renches are, of conrse, entirely out of the question, and here
the difficulty of keeping sufficient reserves within easy reach
of the fight.ing line is becoming more and more acute, an
advantage we are pretty certain to make the most of before
many weeks have passed.
Now this process is goipg on in 80me form or other at
every point elong the w'hole of the fighting frent, and it
makes every movement of the enemy more difficult in propor-
tion as the number of our siege guns is increased, and the
store of shells available for them grows gr
ater day by day,

OUR AMBULANCE APPEAL.
AN OUTLINE OF THE SCHEME.
By ATHERTON FLEMING.

F OLLOWING the announc.ement made in our last
is"ue to the efÏ
ct that the proprietors of this
journal have decided to open a surn:cription list
with the object of raising a sum of money-E500-
for the purch
Qe of a completely equipped motor
ambulance, I have reccived many letters, suggestions, and
inquiries. To answer all letters is impossible, so I am
endeavouring to explain hereunder the features of the
scheme. All suggestions will be filed, and will receive the
most careful consideration when the time con'es for laying
out the money. Several writers have made very practical
remarh as to the ultimate destination of the 8.IPbulance,
and there has been at least one ofÏer of both a car and 11.
driver, Taking the question of destination first, and that
has been very carefully considered, I have come to the
conclusion-aIter making recent investigations and adding
to them my own personal kuo\dedge of the conditions-
that the Belgiau Field Force is still the most badly off with
regard to R
d Cross facilities, The work of Dr. Hector
.Munro and 11is helpers has done much to alleviate the
Bufferings of these poor wounded Belgian soldiers, who
cannot look to their own country for help for the simple
reason that all but a small portion of Belgium is in the hands
of. the ene
y. The remaining strip of Belgian territory is
bemg tenacIOusly held by these brave men; it.s loss would
mean a severe blow to the Allies. To succour and cheer
these long-suffering soldiers has for months pa
t been the
work of Dr. :Munro, and only those who ha,.e scen can
nnderstand what he and his helpers have had to go throuah
during these months of bitter weather. Theirs has be
n
a plain, straightforward night and day fight with t.he
horrors of. modern warfare in all its grim and grue-
Borne realIty. Dr. .Munro is not engaged in this
work for the sake of the limeliaht; it is for the sake
of the Belgian soldier, He has noC the financial resources of
a huge organisation such as the Bl'itish Red Cross behind
him, yet he has done wonders with the lit! Ie help he ha

received, and he is now appealing for more help. That is
why I have come to the conclusion that the readers of

,\
.D A';D \VATER cannot do better than show their appre-
ClatIon of his services by presenting him with an additional
motor ambulance. It is proposed to deal with all monies
lubscribed as stated hereunder:-
1. That a subscription li
t be opel1ed with this issue
of LA';D AXD \VATER for the purpose of raising the sum
of E500.
.2, That t11is sum be devoted to the purchase and
eqUipment of a suitable motor ambulance, containin'7
accommodation for four stretcher cases and alternativ

accommodation for II sitting-up" cases and orderly.
3. That the chassis be of a well-known and reputable
make-to be decided lat.er-and the con"truction of the

body be handed over to an expert ambulance-body
builder.
4, That details of equipment, such as ligllting, &c"
be left to the discretion of Dr. Munro, owing to his better
knowledge of the conditions under which he has to work.
5. That the motor ambulance--which will bear an
inscription: II Presented by the readers of I,AND AXD
WATER to the :Mullro Field Ambulance "-shall be handed
over to Dr, Munro for use with the Belgian Army.
6, That should there be any balance in hand after
the purchase and equipment of the ambulance the decision
shall rest with the proprietors of this journal as to whether
it shall be handed to Dr. l\Iunro for the maintenance and
upkeep of the presentation ambulance or med in the
nucleus of a second fund for the prO\'ision of another
motor ambulance,
7. That all cheq'les, postal orders, or money order

should be made payable to "L...SD AND WATER :Motor
Ambulance Fund" and crossed .. London County aud
\Vestminster Bank, Ltd." All subscriptions will be
acknowledged by the proprietors of this journal.
This is the way we propose to deal with the matter as

oon ;tS the state of tIle subscription Ji"t enahles us to do so.
It does not require a great many subscriptions to raise the
modest sum of ESOO. As I mentioned last week, the sum of
one shilling from eaeh r
ader would he sufficient to supply
a fleet of ambulances. Yet it is e
sPutial that
l'rr.'1 Oll

should send their shilling, Please do not let your faith in
your fellow-man lure you into thinking that the list will
easily be over-subscribed without your assistance; if every-
one did this we would be a very long time in raising E5-not
to say anything of E500.
I make an earnest and personal appeal to everyone
who reads these lines to send somet/ling.. never mind how
small.
Ioney spent on a cause such as this is never money
wasted. I have spent some months in the war area, and
I k110U' what the wounded have suffered and are still suffering.
The matter is now before you, the subscription list is open,
and tho success of the scheme rests entirely in the hands of
L \XD AXD \V -\ TER readers.

=

MR. HILAIRb BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
A Berics of lectures on the Progres;; of the "'81' from monlh 10 mo"lh
will be given at Queen's Hall on the first Wednesday in Aplil,
ray,
and June, Sedts are nmv being allotted.
A lectul'i
will also be ,:;iven at the OpeT:t House, Tnnbridge Wolls,
on Friday, Apl'il9. at 3,30, on .. Tho Stratf'
Y of the War."
Mr. 'Bclloc will lecture <m the Víar at Easlbourne on
Iarch 27 J.
MR. JANE'S LECTURES ON THB NAVAL WAR.
Mah'ern ........... Assembly Rooms Friday.... ...., '.... 26 March, 3 p.m..
ShrewJ!bury,...... SpE'ech Hall....,.... Saturday.......,.,.. 27l\1arch, 3 p.m,
Glasgow........... St, Andrew's Hall ì\londa
,....,......... 29l\Iarch, 8 p,m,
Edinburgh........ Usher H!tll.......... Tuesday............ 30 .!\lart'h, B p.m,
IInndee... ., Kinnaird HalL.... Wednesday..,....,. 31 March, 81'.m.
Torquay.........,. The Pa\ ilion....... Saturday............ 3 April, 31'.m..

14*

l.Iêll'dl 27, 1915.

LAND

AND

:WATER.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SAILORS' A
D SOLDIERS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of L.
'\D A,."']) \VATER.
nEAR SIR,- On behalf of the abo"\"e fund a military Rugby
match has been arranged between the H,A.C. and the

,A.M.C. (Aldershot). This \\ill take place next Saturday,
at the Athletic Ground, Richmond, at 3,15 p,m. Prior to
the match, by permission of the officer commandÜJg and the
Court of Assistants, the H,A,C, (Headquarters) brass band
will play selections, also during the interv-al.
.Many of your readers are supporters of Rugby football,
and would welcome this opportunity to witne
s a game, and,
at the same time, help a fund which is engaged in the good
__ork d supplying tobacco to the British treeps and the
wounded in the hospitals in France.
Six Internationals have intimated their int-ention to take
part, and four of the remaining players have played in
;Jntern;;.tional trial games.-Yours faithfully,
'V. E\'AR COLLISOJ\',
Central House, Kingsw2.Y, ",,C. Hon. Sec.

OUR NEW AR
:lY HORSES.
To the Editor of L.\xD A
D 'WATER,
SIR,-In reply to questions asked by Sir William Byles
In the House of Commons on March 1 l\Ir. Tennant stated
(a) that under one per cent. of horses purchased for the New
.Army had been cast as unsuitable; and (b) that less than
two per cent. per month (italics mine) had been lost from
.leath and destruction before leaving this country. He further
It-ated that the percentage was not considered high.
Let us see wbat it means. The Times of January 5
bad an inspired article congratulating the country on t.he
lupply of 140,000 horses secured in addition to II 36,000
magnificent horses" for the Expeditionary Force and 18,GOO
lor the Reserve formations. It was admitted some wrong
'uns had got in and that some folks had cheated the nation
lor their own profit. Taking Mr. Tennant's one per cent. we
get 1,400 as the figure for wrong 'uns bought by ignorance
or chicanery, and allowing E40 apiece for them we arrive at
the Eum of .E56,OOO as the amount of loss-less, of course, the
Æmall Bum received for them on being cast.
But turn to the percentage of horses which have died.
Two per cent. per montl
on the above figure of January 5
for 6even months of war works out at 19,600 horses which
bave died. Reckoned at E40 apiece, and allowing E34,OOO
lor Mr. Tennant's" under two per cent." as margin, we get a
total monetary loss of thra-quartfrB of a 11l
lljon. Does Mr.
Tennant not consider this high 7
But to Eome of us it is not the financial loss that is the
most griev-ous question. It is the appalling and unnecessary
I'uffering thrust upon so many thousands of highly senti
nt
creatures. A total of unnecessary pain and cruelty wInch
fhocks and shames us. And we ask once more: \Vhat is
being done for the horses that are still sick, still tethered .in
Jines unsheltered to face the bitter winds of March and ApI'll 7
-I am, Sir, yours faithfully

E. WARD.

161, New Bond Street, W.

THE NEUTRAL FLAG.
To the Editor of L
ND AND \VATER.
DEAR SIR,-It would appear from what is called the
Lu
itania incident that the public are ignorant as to the uses
and the practice of flying a national flag at sea. .
A merchant ship on the high seas normal.ly fhes no flag
at all-only on the approach of another ship .would the
national Baa be broken. In coast.al waters a flag will probably
be flown, Å flaa is never flown during the night-from sun.
down to sunu
for obvious reasons. If the Lusitania
arrived at Liverpool in the morning much of her passage of
the Irish Sea would have been in darkne!'s.
The National flag is always flown from a special flagstaff
at the stern or, if she is so rigged, from a gaff on the mast.
The flyina of a national fla rr from the masthead is no claim to
its use n
tionally, but is intended as a compliment to the
nation so honoureù. In this complimentary way vessels
entering a foreign port will usually fly at the masthead the
flag of that foreign country. In tl
e s
me way a ve!'sel car.ry.
ing many foreigners-a!! tJle LU
ltama wou,ld be. carrymg
Americans-might fly, at the masthead, theIr nabonal flag,
llJerely as a compliment to them.

TIle attempt to secure protection by deceiving the enemy
by flying a neutral country flag as an ensign is probably
justifiable, and in the case of an ordinary" tramp," not dis-
tingui
hed by build and hav-ersing no specified route, the
re!>ult has a chance of succe<:s. In the case of passenger liners,
whose routes and time tables are published (and 2.t any rate
approximately maintained) the ruse might dccei\ e an un-
uEually obtuse German naval officer. An absolutdy distinc-
tive ship 1ike the Lusitania stands alone, and she would be
identified as the Lusitania long before it was possible to make
out what ensign she was flJing.
Possibly some non-nautical passenger took the use of the
American flag at the masthead to be the use of it as a national
flag. This would be an easy error for the nou,nautical
passenger to fall into. But if the Lusitania did re&Jly replace
her own British ensign by the use of an AmeiÍcan flag, thereby
pretending to be an American ship, her Commander must
have an exceedingly low opinion of the intelligence of a
German commander of a submarine, :Fmther, the speed of
the Lusitania is such that a submarine would not h'lvC & ghost
of a chance, either submerged or awash, of successfully
launching Po torpedo, I fancy that mo:,t sailors ",ill, at precent,
believe that the Lusitania never flew an American flag in
ph\ce of her own ensign, but that if !>he did so-that she did
a fooli!>h, because unnecessary and ineffectual, thing,-
Obediently yours,

NAt:TICAL.

Hillside Cottage, Newbury.

MILITARY RE"ARD3.
To the Editor of LA"'D AND 'WATER.
SJR,-I am glad to see a letter in your paper calling
attention t.o the want of proportion in awarding rewards for
military serviocs. In the last list of casualties there is one
Iõtaff officer wounded out of oyer two hundred names. Ever
finee I joined, in 1860, it has always been the
ame-the
combatant gets the kick8, the st.aff the halfpence.-Yours
truly,

R. P.

THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of LASD A
D \V ATER.
DEAR SIR,-I have read with very great interest and
appreciation the letter in your issue of March 13th from
.. One of the Principals of a Small Firm." 1 should like to
take the opportunity of heartily supporting all that he says,
especially as since that letter was written Lord Kitchener has
informed the nation of the really urgent need for the in-
creased manufacture of munitions of war, and therefore all
doubt as to this urgent need, which is queried in your cor-
respondent's letter, is now at an end.
1 should like before going further t.o make it quite dear
that my firm, which is one of the small ones, has no complaint
",hateHr to make with regard to ordinary Go\'ernment pro-
cedure as regards inqniries and contracts, which is both good
and businesslike, but if the country is actually in need of
more war munitions than it can at present obtain, there are,
1 believe, many firms who woulc1 be only too glad to under-
take more Government work than they have yet obt-ained,
many, doubtless, having obtained none at a11.
I am glad to believe by my own experience, and by the
fact of the very big wages being paid by firms recognised in
times of peace as firms who make for the Government, that
the question of price is not very acute, so long as the Govern-
ment know that they are obtaining goods from firms who
have previously satisfactorily Impplied their demands, and
that the Go\'ernment is prepared to pay those firms extra
when it is found necessary to work overtime, night-shiits, and
week-ends.
On the other hand, it appears that in dealing with new
firms the Government is very keen as regards price, and no
allowance is made if these firms have to put on & night-shift,
wbich will cost them considerably more proportionately than
would a night-shift to a big firm whose custom it was often to
run one.
In normal times it is quite right for the Government to
buy as cbeaply as ever they
an, and to be as keen as possible
in so doing, but it is quite another thing now, iI our e:xistpr.s
as a nation to a large measure depends on the supply of f
j.,
war material, and I would su
gest that it is better to 1,
generous as regards prices when offering "'.)l'k to new firm'!,
15*

LAND

and thu!! enable them to enter into the manufacture of the
ur"entlv requirt'd articles.
o I believe that if the Government could see it!! way to
offer busine
;; to various firms at a definite price, and at the
f'ame time allow the firms, should that price be too low for
them, to state at what price they could undertake the work,
it w
uld be found that a very large number of small firm3
could supp!y a considerable amount of material to the sati3-
fa
tion of the Gon'rnment departments concerned.
Lord Kitchener in his speech requests that firm!! having
men and machinery at liberty should place them at the
disposal of the Govèrnment, but he does not say how thi" can
be quickly and effect.i\'ely done. Those of us who are alreadj'
receivÍ11" inquiries from certain Go,"ernment dcpartments,
and :ret are not fully employed, would b
glad to get. i?to
touch quickly with other departments wno are reqUirIng
good;; such as we can satisfactorily manufacture, while firms
who are not on any Government department's list, equally
dC3Íl'ê a simple and quick method of obtaining suitable work.
I remain, yours faithfully,
OSE or THE PRIXCJPALS OFAxOTliER SlI_\LL FIRM.
]'1anchester.

II THE DIFFERE:-.IT SPEEDS OF AN AEROPLANE:'
To tIle Editor of L_'-sD .\XD 'WATER.
DE\R SIR,-"ïth reference to his letter in your issue of
the 13th inst" " Enquirer" may be interested in the follow-
ing in:ormation. His question (6), \VhiIe there is no small
book published that covers the whole ground of possible
illquirit's relating to aeroplane Gapabilit.ies, the need for such
book is not felt if one is well grounded in the fundamental
principles, and these may fairly well be grasped by the study
of .. The Mechanics of the Aeroplane JJ (1912) and " Flight
"ïthout Formulæ JJ (1914), both translations from French
works by Comm. Duchêne, published by Longmans, Grêen
and Co. at 7s. 6d. net. The feature of these work!! is their
clearness and simplicity, and the absence of mathematic!!
render5 them easily understandable by the layman.
lIis qUi'5tion (4). While it is true that in the particular
machine referred to by Dr. Glazebrook the Bpeed is con-
trolled by adjustment of the angle of attack of the machino
ao a whole, it should be borne in mind that it is quite feasible
to '"ary the Bpeed by other means in suitably designed
machines. For example, subsidiary aerofoils may be used as
air brakes, or the angle of incidence of the wings alone may
be altered relatively to the body of the machine, either with
or without alteration of the camber of the wings.
Yours f aithfullv,
BERTRur G. COOPER,
Secretary and Editor, Aeronautical Journal.
11, Adam Street, Adelphi, London, W.C.

KHAKI.
To the Editor of LAXD AXD WATER.
Sm,-The majority of people, if they think about tIle
matter at all, imagine that "khaki JJ is a product of recent
years. This is not so.
.. Khaki" was ll!Ied in India a!! far back a!! the late
'60's or early '70's for soldiers' uniforms in the hot weather,
the material nsed being a kind of cotton drill. A simibr
material has been in use in Arabia and by the Fireworshippen
of Persia from time immemorial, and is in use to-d:IY in
Persia for making their outer robes, the material being made
from a natural self drab-coloured cotton which is still culti-
vated in small quantities in some parts of Persia-notably
Kashan and Yazd; the stuff, of course, being entirely home-
made-i.e., grown, spun, woven, and made into crarments,
which, by the way, are very durable. All these p;oces!!es of
production have come under my own personal observation,
"'e read in the Press that our manufacturers are hard-
pressed to provide a sufficient snpply of "khaki" material
for our new Army; but we have, surely, in tlle cultivation and
development of this particular cotton a potential means of
securing our future supply of, at any rate, cotton "khaki JJ
absolutely irrespective of the supply of .. dye stuffs,"
, A supply of seed of this cotton could easily be obtaiued,
and India, Egypt, and Africa could doubtles!! do the re5t in
the COurse of four or five years.
The plant is a healthy grower, with stranO" branchinO"
haul
.s, full pods, and a long and strong staple, The5

qualItIes co
dd, no dou?t, be readily imprO\'ed upon by tha
cotton-growmg experts m the countries above-named,
I wonder if this will be of sufficient interest to the
.ut
oritie!! and manufacturers to merit their consideratioù!
--1' oun obediently,

r:

B. W. STAIXTO
,

Prinl
d by 'l'm: "{(TORn HO:;3E PIlIXTI
G Co" LTD" Tudor Street, Whit-efriars, London, E.C,

AND

W. ATE R.

J\Iarch 27, 1915.

"LAND & WATER" WAR LECTURES.
PROGRESS OF THE SCHEME.
"ïd

pread interest has been aroused in the L.-\XD AND
"-ATER Lecture Scheme CJ1 behalf of Queen Alexandra'"
Field Force :Fund, As our readers know, these illaminating
lectures h:we been arranged from the articles by Mr. Belloc
and 1\1r. Blin Desbled;; appearing week by week in our
columns, and, in remote country villages and large towni
alike, audiences have followed (,he skilful argument!! and
penètratilig analyæs with keen appreciation.
The purpose of t.he scheme is two-fold-to extend tha
advantage of the most expert wal' criticism available and to
render substantial aid to au organisation that has done
splendid work in brightening the lot of our gallant soldiel'"
at the front.
,Financially Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund ha]
reaped no inconsiderable benefit, and it is hoped th
t publio
men, clergymen, literary societie3, &c., in districts not yet
touch9d will respond to our invitation in even larger numhers.
and so still further augment a fund that n8ed;; every helf)
possible to cope with the neces!!ities of the new armies read!
anon for the front,
Edger as every patriot is to do everything within mortal
power to help our troops, but for Queen Alexandl'a's Field
Force Fund much effort would be lost and much waste in-
curred for laek of preper organi.sation and faciEt.ies,
',"orking in direct co-operation with the 'Yar Office, the
Fund supplies comforts to the units in the field with the
utmost economy and absolute fairness of distributioIl.
It enjoys special facilities for cheap purchase of articles
required and for free trall5!llission of the;;e and gifts in kind
straight to t.he men.
This i!! how it is done. Our readers will agree that a
better !!ystem could hardly be adopted. Instead of supply-
ing the articles on the principle of " so many men" so man!
cardigan jackets, or pairs of socks, or pounds of tobacco, a3
the case may be-a method obviously unfair and w
teful,
since some soldiers are well provided for by their friendd,
while other!!, perhaps the greater number of whole regimenb,
have no friends, or have friends too poor to send them gift.s-
instead, it is arranged that the Commanding Officers send
lists from time to time of the precise thing!! their men want.
The saving i3 enormous.
Our soldiers' needs are not diminishing as time goes on,
but increasing, To the glory of England the enormous
armies that have been in training for so many month!! pagt
will be sent with all speed to reinforce those already at t.he
front and to llelp strike the decisi,'e blow. In the trenche!!
these new men will want comfort!!-the comforts that are
" nf'cessarie!! JJ there. How \'er.r urgent is tlie need (or
money and supplie!! will be readily seen,
\Vith one exception, the lectures are illustrated by slidE's
prepared from the maps and plans appearing in L.\:m AVO
\'" ATER, Thu!! the clearnes!! of the subject-matter as regard'!
arrangement and terminology is heightened by diagrammati,}
reference ea3ilv followed by the audience, In most imtance;t
additional slid
s of topical Interest are provided.
So far, four lectures llave bepn prepared, their titl;:r

giving readers who have followed the war articles in these
columns sufficient clue to the material utilised.
(1) "The Failure of German Strategy. JJ
(2) .. The Deadlock in the West. JJ
(3) "Can Aircraft End the Wad ..
(4) .. How Long Will the War Last 1 ..
Each lecture is complete in itself, but where a series can
be cri\"en it is usuallv adyisable to follow the above order.
Texts of the lecture; and full particulars will be scnt tt)
applicants who can arrange for public meetings, at which
t.here should alway!! be a collection on behalf of Queen
Alexandra's Field 'Force Fund, except where, in the same
interest, a charge i!! made for admission. To save local
expense, partially printed posters and other adverti3Ìug
matter are supplied free. Letters should be addre!!sed:
Th8 Hon, Secretary,
Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund,
24A, Hill Street,
Kuightsbridge, S. W.
The success so far achieved has been extremely gratifying
to the Field Force Fund Committee, and no less to ourselves,
whose privilege aud pleasure it was to initiate the scheme, But
to the Bcope and usefulnes!! of the idea there is no nece3sary
l;mit. Not a town or village in the kingdom but should have
it!! \Var Lecture!! to arouse patriotic interest and enthusiasm.
All that is wanted is the response of public-spirited citizem
willing to spend a little time and interest in a cause most
worthy.

\1arch 27, 1915

LAND _\
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3 8 9

LAND AND \VATER

MJ.rch 27, 1915

THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ST'EAM TURBINE
IN WARSHIPS

By .. A.M.I,C.E."
T HE development of the steam turbine, both on
land and sea, has been one of the most remarkable
industrial developments of modcrn times.
Although the first marine turbinc was constructed
in 1894 for experimental purposes and the
-\dmiralty adopted it in 1898 as an ðpcriment in a small
destroyer, we find that at the end of the year 1913 Great
Britain alone possessed 226 warships fitted with steam
turbines, having a total horse-powcr capacity of 4,339,300,
and 98 merchant ships with a total horse-power capacity of
928,790; truly a marvellous development.
1\Ir. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on
the Navy estimates, praised the design and performance of
British warships, It is only natural that our Navy should
lead the world in regard to engine-room performances, for the
steam turbine, the modern propelling engine of the :Kavy,
is a British invention, and was tried by our Admiralty four
years before any foreign powcr experimented with this type
of engine.
The invention of the steam turbine by the Hon, Charles
A, Parsons has revolutionised the production of mechanical
power on land and sea. I t has rendered possible steamship
speeds far greater than could ever be attained with recipro-
cating engines. Although the adoption of the steam turbine
is quite a modern engineering development it is, as a matter
of fact, the oldest steam engine in existence.
The Greek philosopher Hero described a primitive
turbine in the second century B.C. This turbine consisted
of a hollow sphere mounted between two bearings. The
sphere was partially filled with water and placed over a fire.
The steam escaped from two bent tubes fixed at opposite
sides, and the reaction of the steam caused the ball to rotate.
Hero's machine was only a toy. but it worked well and formed
the earliest-known use of steam for the production of motion,

othing further was done until Branca, an Italian architect,
constructed-in 1629-a machine in which a jet of steam from a
boiler impinged on a wheel and caused it to rotate. :\Iany
inventors worked at the problem until. at the end of the
..ighteenth century, "'att invented the steam reciprocating
engine of to-day, in which steam acting on a piston imparts
a rotary motion to a wheel. :K othing further of any real
,alue was done until 1ß84 because during that period
inventors were too busy perfecting \Vatl's steam engine.
The first turbine brougllt out by Parsons had a capacity
of only 6 horse-power, and was used for driving a small
electric generator. The successful introduction of electric
lighting about that time created a demand for good high-speed
steam engines for driving electric generators, and thus gave
,m immense stimulus to the study of the steam turbine,
A turbine may be defined as a machine in which rotary
motion is obtained by the gradual change of the momentum
contained in the fluid, which may be either steam or water.
Essentially the steam and wate
turbine (or water wheel,
\\hich is familiar to everybody) resemble one another. Steam,
however, is a highly elastic fluid, and water is not, and this
fact renders several modifications in design necessary. Steam
and water turbines are divid
d into two classes-reaction
and impulse In the reaction type, of which Parsons is the
h,est known, the steam passl's alternately through many
nn
s of fixed and revoh ing blades, and expands slightly
dUrIng the passage through each ring, at the same time
imparting its energy to the movable blades. In the impulse
cia"" the steam is passed through special nozzles, in which

he
team expands and attains a very high velocity. It then
Impmges on the blades of a wheel, which is set in motion.
The steam turbine is, thl"refore, a very simple machine,
depending for its action entirely on the þhysical properties
uf
team. It was essentially developed for driving dynamos
to generate electrical energy. The great difficulty which had
to be overcome in the early turbines was the excessive high

peed, but 1\1r., Parsons, after several attempts, found that
the mos
pr
chcal method of keeping down the speed was
the apph
atlon of .. multiple stage expansion." This is the
rombmahon of several small successive turbines, which
together form Ol1e turbine, tÌ1e steam passing through all
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A PARABLE OF PARA.
The tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE SECOND,
N OW it came to pass that the two travellers
were delayed on their journey. "Look!"
cried he who had bought wisely; "thine
ass has cast a shoe." And it was even so. So they
tarried awhile, and he who had bought too well
shod his beast with a shoe that he had to spare.
And the wise man smiled again in his beard, and
they continued on their way, the one with the other.
And behold the way was exceeding rough, and
they were yet again delayed. "Look, friend, thy
beast has cast another shoe!" And it was even so.
So he shod his beast with yet another shoe, but
was sore distressed, for the way was long and
hard, and he felt not safe. And they continued on
their way, the one sore troubled in his mind, and
they spake not the one to the other. (To be continued,)
MORAL:-Depend not on quantity but quality,
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
Para Mills, Aston Cross, .. Birminghdm,
Founders .f the Pneumatl& Tyre llUtustry throu
hout tJu W.rlll.

39 0

March 27, 1915

L A
D A }; V \" ATE R

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2 12-pounders (field); S torpedo tubes submergec!. Crew 755.
From Ihe orlgtnal by Montague DaWllOn
CoPJri,At 0/ MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDI:\IBURGH.
(Es'a"'lshed a century,)

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?f"lT

LAND AND WATER

March 27, 1915

the elements. After the first difficulties had been overcome,
and engineers began to be less sceptical, it did not take a
great deal of time to make the steam turbine a great success.
The chief reason was that it was proved beyond doubt that
the turbine exceeded the best type of reciprocating engine in
steam economy.
The success of the Parsons turbine on land led, in 18 94,
to the formation of a company for applying the steam turbine
to marine purposes, and the famous Turbinia was built-a
small boat 100 feet long, 9 feet beam, and a displacement of
44 tons. The early experiments were disappointing because
the speed obtained was low. After several experiments it
was found by Mr. Parsons that the speed of the
propellers was much too high, due to the high turbine
speed, By redesigning the propellers and the turbine
machinery to enable a lower propeller speed to be obtained,
success was attained in 1896, when speeds exceeding
3 2 knots were obtained-a wonderful result for such a small
vessel. By dividing the turbine into three separate ones,
the steam doing work successively in each one, each driving
a separate propeller, the speed of the turbine was much
reduced, with a consequent increase in the propelling force.
As a turbine cannot be reversed, a special astern turbine was
installed on the centre shaft, which runs light when the
vessel is moving forward,
In 1898 the Admiralty ordered the ill-fated destroyers
Cobra and Viper, having a displacement of 370 tons and
390 tons respectively. The turbines were arranged some-
what differently than in the Turbinia, there being four turbines
in each boat-two high-pressure and two low-pressure ones--
each driving a separate shaft. Remarkable results were
obtained with both vessels. With the Viper a speed of
37 knots was obtained on the measured mile, and the Cobra,
on a three hours' trial, steamed at an average speed of
34 '6 knots.
Unfortunately, the Viper was wrecked near the Channel
Islands in August, 1901, and in September of the same year
the Cobra was lost in a storm in the North Sea. These
disasters had nothing whatever to do with the turbine
installation. Experience with these vessels had shown that
at high speeds the steam consumption was less than in boats

fitted with reciprocating engines, but that at low speeds the
steam consumption was rather greater. In the next destroyers
-the Velox and the Eden-special " cruising II engines were
installed. In the Velox two sets of reciprocating engines
were installed to be used when steaming at about 12 knots,
while in the Eden two small turbines were installed for a
similar purpose.
In 1902 the Admiralty decided to use steam turbines in
the Amethyst--one of four third-class cruisers then building
The three other ships-the Topaz, Diamond, and SaPPhire-
are of exactly the same dimensions and form of hull, but
were fitted with the best type of rec_procating engines, so
that an excellent opportunity occurred for exact comparative
trials. These light cruisers have a displacement of 3,000 tons,
and were designed for a speed of 211 knots. The Amethyst
was fitted with two cruising turbines, one of the high-pressure
and the other of the low-pressure type.
(To b. co,,'i..u.4)

Terms 0/ SubscriPtion to
"THE COUNTY GENTLEMAN

AND

LAND

WATER"

AND

(ESTABLISHED 1862).
AT HOME-Twelve Months n 8 0
CANADA-Twelve Months
l 10 6
ELSEWHERE ABROAD-Twelve l\Ionths
1 17 0
The above ,.ates include all Sþecial Numbers and Postage.

BACK COPIES of .. LAND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articles by HILAIRE BELLOC, " THE WAR BY
LAND"; and FRED. T. JANE, " THE WAR BY WATER";
can be obtained through any Newsagent, or on application
to the Offices.of "LAND AND WATER," CENTRAL HOUSE.
KINGSWAY, W.C.

Telephone:
4572 Regent,

Telegraphic Address:
II Agendoruffi. Westcent. London."

GANT'S

FAMOUS SPORTSMAN'S

DIARY.

CONTENTS.

Page

78
65
.. 61
84
75
61
25
88
8

ATHLETICS
AVIATION
:BILLIARDS
:BO'ì:ING ..
:BRIDGE. .
COURSING
CRICKET
CYCLING , , _ . . _
DAILY WANTS l>ll'nO
AU\' .. .. ,_ ..
DISTANCES (Comparative Tables of French and English)
FISHI!'I"G . , . , .. . . .. . . .. 57
FoOTBALL (Association) .. 34
FOOTBALL (Rugby).. .. .. .. .. .. 40
FRENCH OWNERS' COLOURS (with English equivalent)
COLF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 43
HOCKEY . . 45
HUNTING .. .. 57
LAWN TENNIS .. .. 48
LIGHTING-UP TABLE .. it
MOTORING ,_ ,. .. ,_ .. 71
NEWI\[ARKET COURSES (Length.oO ..
OLYMPIC G'\MES .. .. .. .. 39
pOLO .. 60
ROWING.. .. 82
SHOOTING , _ .. .. .... .. 57
STARTING PRICE READY RECKONER .. 5t
SWH[MlNG .,
5
TU RF .. .. . , .. .. .. ., .. t9
W EIGHTS (Comparative Tabl... of :French and English) ..
WRESTLING.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 84
YACHTING .. 84

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39 2

The County Gentleman

A.ND

LAND & WATER

Vol. LXV,

No. 2760

SATURDAY. APRIL 3. 1915

[ PUBLI8H.KD AS, PRIC'E 81 'tPBNCJI:
A NEWtlPAP.Klt.,J PUDLISHEI. WEEKLY

"

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C.þyrilloJ, MII,,11 & Fo.

MAJOR-GENERAL (TEMPORARY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL)
SIR W. R, ROBERTSON, K.C.V.O" C.B" i).S.U.

The New Chief of the General Staff

LA:-" D .\:-.. J) \\- ATE R

,\pril 3. '9' ç

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fhe tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well.
';HAPTER THE THIRD.
A ND in a little while they came upon a village,
and he who had bought too well sought
out the smith that he might provide him
with yet another shoe, for he had none left, And
the good smith said: " Yea, master, shoes can I
sell thee, but not of this fashioning. Doubtless
could I procure the shoe thou desirest, but since
thou canst not wait awhile 'tis all 1 have to offer,
See, thy friend's beast is so shod, and thou sayest
he has hdd no misadventure." And the wise
man said, "Take thou the shoe and come with
me to a pldce where we may r.::st, and I will
enlighten thee as to the tale of this shoe."
(T.. be continued.)
MORAL: -
You can always get d Dunlop.!!. you need it,
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., L TO"
Pdr" Mill
. A,wn Cross. .. Birmin
ham,
I (I . '.' I I I M llf/lfIl1l TJ're blt/usery throllg/lIJ1zf the World.

\
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_ When your system is undermined by worry O . r over,worl. -
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= want of water. And just as water revives a drooping =
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Ë Begin to get well FREEl! ã
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_ but enougb 10 do you good, Enclose tbree penny stamps (to pay _
_ po.lage). COLEMAN & CO. Ltd.. WZ12, Wincarnis Works, Norwich, _
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11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

2

.\pril J, 19 1 5

L:\='JD A
D WATER

1'HROUGH

TIlE

EYES OF

A

WOMAN

By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER

COf>}',i,Iú, Maåa.... Lalli. Cha,l.. LADY LOV AT
A characleri.tic pnrtrait of La"y Lovat. who i. one of Lord Ribble.elale'.
picture.que daughters. Her hu.band, the lour teen h Lord Lovat. i.
the founder ud Honorary Colonel 01 Lovat'. Scouls, which were
originally rai.ed lor .er.iee during the South African Wat

The Gentle Art of Argument
W HAT an argumentative race we are becoming!
We can argue almost every hour of the day about
some controversial point or another. Even
those people who never had an opinion of tlH'ir
own-or if they had were too timid to voice it
-have rushed into the fray, Should racing continue as usual,
ought there to be such a thing as fashion, should we have
conscription, is the censorship too strict, or, on the other
hand, ought we to have no
news at all? Everybody
has different opinions; no-
body is shy about making
them heard. Many people
have no \\ish to listen to
anybody's ideas but their
own. The result is that
every one is talking at once,
and many a gathering that
set out to be a quiet and
friendly occasion has come
to a very
trained clos n .
To my way of thinking,
people with determimd
views and penetratirg
voices ought to come under
military discipline, They
take an unfair advantage
of the helpless mortal
placed next to them at the
luncheon or dinner table.
rhere is no getting away.
The mJrtyrdom must be
endured for at least an
hour, and often longer.
.\nd the worst of it is that
the people who talk mo
t
are those who know least.
The information is never
first hand. They have
always heard some wonder-
ful story from somebodv
who kno\\ s somebody elsé,
whose cousin has the kev to
all the secrcts of State, The
amazing t,Lle is launched;
some equallv intrepid soul,
with an equally rasping
..oice, challenges it. Then
ot r6Ument is let loose. Some people talk all the time,
hardly daring to draw breath in case their flow of ideas should
be interrupted ; others take advantage of anything
<tpproaching a lull. There is more than a hint of flat contra-
diction, there is certainly a growing acidity of tone. Somebody
with a noble effort of tact manages to change the subject.
.\11 is peace for a few minutes and then, alas and alack I we
are on the rocks of controversy again, though nobody can tell
how e..xactly it has come about. It is really enough to put
an end to all attempts at hospitality. We can nevet be
certain that our guests will not come to metaphorical blows
over one or another of the burning questions of the day.

On Talking and Thinking
The truth is that the war has made everybody think
harder than they have ever done in all their lives befòre, and
everybody has ãn opinion of their own. To some this is such
a novel e:\perience that they burst into argument as easily as
,) bird bursts into song, The worst of it is that from an
oIr:"'1ler to a bore is a very small step Also, that the habit of
argument grows, until it becomes an almost mechanical one.
We surely do not want to emerge from this war professional
controversialists, It would be a bad omen for future peace,
èven when this present clashing of arms has cEased,
" Do vou know, I have really got into a positive habit of
saying' I don't think so at all,' .. said an attractive hic;hwoman
to me the other dav.
"But I thoug'ht you never argued," I said, hoping that
this charming trait in her charming self was not to be totally
abolished,
"Well, I never have till now," she admitted, shaking a
pretty head upon which one of the new veiled sailor hats was
pre-ttily poised. " But since we crosse,-l to England I h Wf
done nothing but argue. I have argued till I am hoarse, I

have argued about Ireland. I have argued about Bosnia. I
have argued about every stone of Constantinople, though
I don't know it, and have never been near the place. I have
even talked about war and warfare with a wounded \\ arrior,
and shrieked contradiction into his ear till mv voice went."
.. How luckv for him," I murmured iñ the trdditional
stage aside.
.. I don't think so at all," saId she; then stopped and laughed,
" No," I said, after ,l
befitting pause, .. as a
matter of fact, neither do
I."
.. Besides," said my
friend, wrinkling up her
nose in a \\.tV she alone
amongst women c,m make
attractive, "he \\ as n .lllv
only very slight I)
wounded! ..

The Invaluable Motor Car
One of the most unu_
tentatious yet one of the
most useful forms of \\ ork
is thåt being donc by the
Ambulance Column of the
London district. The idea
of this Column originated
in the days before Wdr,
when some far-seeing
people were working at
Red Cross training and
often getting laughed at
for their pains. I t is an
entirely voluntdry \\or1...
carried out by means of
motor ambulances and
private motor cars. The
object is to meet the trains
of \\ ounded as they arri\'c
at the London statiun
,
and convey them from
thence to the variou..,
hospitals, A fleet of pri\'ate
motor cars under the
Column's direction have
conveyed numbers of sick
and wounded men, ever
since our wounded first started to arrive b. ck in London.
Over 22,0<<;>0 have already been helped in this splendid way
and the total is a growing one \\ ith every day that passes,
Mr. Lancelot Dent, and his wife, who is a tireless Red Cros"
worker, are the organisers, and their address is 83, Westbourm'
Terrace. The services of the Ambulance Column are placed at
the entire disposal ofthe \V ar Office, and there is no other organi-
sation of the kind, The process is a very simple one, As soon .

the War Office knows that a train of wounded men is due to
arrive in London they ring up :\Ir. Dent and give him particulars,
Mr. Dent then calls up the motor cars at his disposal. and the
soldiers, many of whom are in a terrible state from fatigue
and wounds, are duly met. This is the only work of the kind,
and the gratit
?e thi.s work draws from our fighting men
would be surpnsmg, dId we not-many of us-know there is no
more grateful soul on earth than disabled Tommy Atkins. He
takes things very much as a matter of course in a general
way. It is his job to fight, too sadly often it is his job to get
wounded. But when he arrives back in London, travel-
stained. worn, and frequently in sharp suffering, it is little
short of a godsend to him to find a comfortable car, in \\ hich
he can make the last lap of the joumey along the streets to
hospital. ?lIany people, seeing the crying need for help, have
lent their cars. But many more are urgently needed. With the
horror of incessant casualty lists in mind, "ith glad pride in
Engli
h pluck. heroism and endurance, many, no doubt--once
they know of the Ambulance Cdumn-will send their cars to
help it. Mr. Dent's telephone number is Paddington 6054,

THY-latest playing carrls issued by Thomas De La Rue & Co" Ltd.,
have on
he back a reproduction of Bert Thoma
now famous
picture, " 'Arf a Mo', Kaiser." A proportion d the l-'col.t
on ch
pack of cards on which the picture apf'drs I
being devotcrl tv rai-ing
funds to send tobacco and cigarettes to soldiers at the front.

J

LAND AND WATER

April J, [9 1 5

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k ,:' with you at home
Depend upon it,ifhe has the opportunity to write
he will write, Give him the world's best Pen-

Wat
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(I dea l)
Fo ulltilInPe n

The SA F E T Y Type is recommended
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can be carried in, any position, in pocket or bag, and
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Safety and Pump-Filling Types, 12/6 and upwards.
:\sk your stationer or jeweller to show you a selection
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L. G. SLOAN, Ube lPen <romer, KINGSWAY,
LONDON, W.e.

IF, knowing!!! you know,
you still can support German
productions, \ve do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

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a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
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... J'ample 'Bolt Ie FREE on receipt of Coupon ....

Name____________
Address _______..........___,....."

Usual Purveyor of
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A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Cbeaies Street Works, LO.DON; Cbapel Field Works, NORWICH.

Abolishing Cycle Friction

THIS is an illustration of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
Wheel in action inside its dirtproof Gear-case,
See how the moving chain picks up the Oil and sprays it
into the Spcf'd-gear l\tJechani,m The same action takes
place in the F rf'e \V heel and in the Rear Hub. So the
whole Driving
Bearings of
Sl1nb
am Bi-
cycles are al-
ways clean,and
always oiled,
In consequence
they run with-
out Friction,
and are guaran-
teed notto w
ar,
much less wear
out. This
simple Inven-
tion ha<; helped
to make Sun-
beams by tàr
..:.-... -_ . . ..' II .. \ I. .. the most im-
THE LITTLE OIL BATH portant high-
. , grade Bicycle
Iß the World, Futile and vain attempts have often
been made to imitate it, especially by Foreigners. The
Sunbeam's abolition of cycle Friction is one of those
Triumphs of British Workmanship of which this
Country can indeed be proud. Ride a Sunbeam,

.

..

J
/::

J lig,
o ,,:

.- J '.

.- ..., " .
" þ
t" -....
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'ì
"i. 4 ..

,

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.:i., J

Writ
for th
N
w Cotologll
II

3 SUNBEAMLAND--WOLVERHAMPTON

Loudon Showroom.: 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C,
I
8 SLOANE ST, (by Sloanr Squarr), S, W,

HOTEL CECIL

THE

COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

TeI..,ho".: GERRARD 60,

Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

4

..

:April 3, 1915.

LAN D A :N D .w ATE R,

THE
By

,V AR BY
I-IILAIRE

LAND.
BELLOC.

NOTE,-Thls article has been submitted to the Press 8uccJ:u, which does Dot obJed to the publicatioD as censored, In4 tlkes ..
responsibility lor tile correctness 01 the Itatements,
In accordan
;: with the req.lIrements oJ the Press 8 ureau. the p9sitlons or troops OD I'lanl illustrating thIs trlldo mUlt only'.
reg.uded ns approximate, a:1I1 no definite strength at any point Ii Indicated,

.
"
.

..

u

U'.

L

THE CARP A TIIIAN FRO
T,
1hc Russian Advance, the Uzok and the Lupkow
Passes.

I T not infrequently hnppens in the course of
a campaign that what had been, sometimes
oycr a considerable period, a secondary
field of operations, becomes a field of first
importance. success or failure in which prov
s
'decisi\Te. There seems some pos:Úbility of thIS
being the case in the future with the Carpathian
front.
Upon the whole EasteI'n front "\Vnrsaw w3;s,
nnd is, the critical point. \Vith the qermans. III
JYarsaw (especially witl.l Prle
ys] still h?ll.lmg
outj, the Galician operatIOns-hItherto sta.tIOnary
-would have failed altoO'cthE'r, and a retIrement
of tbe Russian armies fr
m the plain cast of the
Carpathians "\)oulù have had to come.
But v;it.h Warsaw un taken, anrl, apparently,
now in no danger of falling during tbe immediato
fut.ure, and witb t.he interruption of PrzemJ'sl
none it is fluite :mother matter. Northern and
l:eI1tral Polânù may well stand immobile v;Lilo
more decisive operations take place in S<?utLern
Poland' find at the outset. of these operatIOns "TO
E;hall do' WE'll to master the general and the particu-
Inr conditions of t1W.t Carpat.hian front, where a
gre:Ü action has been at issue for more than a
1-

A.
.....

week, and stiH at the moment of ,vriting ()'IondaYi
e\ening) (1) remains undecided.
The genera] conditions of the Carp:-athian
front may thus he summarised, A broad belt of
mountain land, running roughly north-west hy
south-enst, and, for the purposes of this field,
about 250 miles long, or a trifle more, stretche3
from the Roumanian frontier to the sources of tbe
Dunajec riyer. above Kew SandeC'. This lin
, of
the Dunajec rn"er, prolonged by an upper t1'1011-
tary coming in from the sou
h, roughly .dcfin
3
the extremity of the RUSSInll occnpatIOn 11\
0:11icia. It will be Ob5é'ned that this front (which
I have marked on the sketch B with a line of
crosses stretching from A to B) menaces Cracow:
at a distance of rather less than fifty miles upon
the RveraO'e. The Russian armies occupyin
the
Galician Ï)lain to tbe east of the Carpathian
mounta i 11S ha ye heen :pressed back in tbe southern
end of their occupatIOn to, roughly, the line of
crosses C D, and are in possession of the crest of
the Carpathians only upon the narrow issue
between Band C. But it is further to be
remarked that this particular section of tbe fron

Be is precisely that in 'which the Carpa!hians can
most ensily be crossed and where there IS the best
system of communication immediately to tLe east
òn the Galician plain for the su p port of an effor

(1) Tho f'yigenciNI or the prea3 in tohe h"liJolY wee:' &dva.nco tht
writing of t.hli wue by twenty,four hour&.

LAN DAN D 'V
\ T E R

April 3, 1915.

the Russian front upon this sont1wrn side> ruulling
as do the crosses on the sketch. Fntil Przemysl
fell the Russians "ere therefore grin ou,;]y haÍn-
perl'd in thcir mm-ements of mf'il.
Once Przemysl haù fallen, hO'YC'TC
', the ,d!tîle
rnihnlY system 'Y:18 free, and .1]1 parts of it 1J01 th
of this lateral line ,yere at th(' Rnssians' disposal.
It seemed uncertain wh:lt use the Russians would
immediately make of their new opportunity. But
t11e most ohyioHS and immediat.e adnmtat>'c pro-
vided for them by the fall of Przemysl ''':1S to
attack along that Cl'C'.:5t Be,., hcre they a lre
dy
commanded one pl'jücipal pas:) across the range,
and where they v. ere alreaùy so far admTIcell
towards the mastery of the ridge immediately to
the south. Thi
spC'tor B C hy in the immediate
B neighbourbooJ of Pl'?C!llysl, the quart.er of a mil-
lion of men or so l"('leased by the fall of the pJace
could be brought up at once, and the stril\Ïl1g of a
blow here for the forcing of the Carpathians wag
easier than an ach-ance elsev;hel'e-as against the
Cracow front or to\'ïal'ds t 1 )e Rukovina. It would
carry more weight and could he delin>red at om'e.
To this plan, thereforC', the TIu:""ians seem to
have turned, and they are at present enf;(lgc,l in
attempting to master a suflieicnt belt of the main
ridge to enable them to advanc-e when the weather
serves down on to the Hungarian plain.
Thi8 belt, the front unon which tllC'Y are now
fighting, may be tlefmcd hj' t,yO extremities, ,Rì.rt-
field, the lü!:al name for which i
nartfa, and
sixty miles ofi to the east, upon the other side of
the t.:l'est or the mountains, Baligroù.
It is these sixty miles the conditions of "hi('h
ha\o to be' analyselÍ.
First let us eXêlP1Ìne the fldnwtnges of com-
munit.:ation, "hil h the Ru
"iaIl8 .here enjoy oyer
their oppOnelJts. (.Pian D).
TJ)(' ba8e of the whole thing is the Jat<'>l'all'ail-
wa y J'unnÍ11P' in front of the foothi11s on the
, r>
Galiei[lTI side, from the junction at
..mol;:
towards .Jasko. At Sanok t.:01H('S in the raihrav
from the Hllngari
n side, which crosses the l'idg'e
of the mountain by the saddle known as th0 Lllp-
kow Pass, where also a good road-hard, broad,
and excellently engineerf'd-erosses the moun-
tains upon a line ahno
t coincident ",;th that of
the railway. Three other road
l, which have no
r
lÍl\Vay c
rre
ponding to them, also cross the
mount..lÍns in this re
ioIl: that passing br Jaliska
and starting from Rymano\Y, that :;;ta.rting from
Sviduik and o'oing oyer the Dnkla Pass to Dukla,
and that starting 'from Bartfe]ù (with the railway
accompanying as far as the
tatioll of Zboro) and
leading to Zmigrod. All these communications
crossing the main ridge of the Carpathians are
f'a.sv, and, as the map shows, they stand close
together, permitting of the adyance of paranel
coJumm; in support one of the other. The country
is fairly open, the heay)' \Y('ods not heginning
c until the shaded are>3 marked A upon the right of
t he sketch. The passes are quite low. '1'11(> Lnpkow
the circle of dots set round it on the sketch. The J>ass is not a thou
and feet &bovc the towns (If the
provisioning of the Russians further west could, foothills, the Dukla only 500, and this last ht>ight
indeed, be effected round by Raw::\, Russka, to the is but little surpassNI by the summit of the
junction of Jaroslav, but it was a small and incon- Jaliska and the Z1lligrod roads upon either sidf'.
,cnient line, and further the great masses of men J'urther, a most importaut point, thpre is a
immohiliseù to maintain the sif'ge of Przemysl bad good lateral road running from Ranok to Zmi-
to be providell for first. The line which runs later- grod, and serving the terminaJ of each of these
r. By to the foothills of the Carpathians through avenues of ëHhTance.

J3cCO. San ok, Sambor. anrl Stryj, to Stallislau, The situation of the Russiam; upon this Bart-
"as eycl'ywhere quite close to the Au
trian effort fc1d-Balig1'od front, beforo the fall of 1 'r7pmys]
2*

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fit the invasion of J-Iuì1ga
'y in the Jiredion of the
arrow.

'\Vhen we come to tht> closer analysis of tJJis
section of tLe front in detail, Vie shall see how im-
port:ll
t tbis point is. So lOl
g as Pl'zemysl hell
out
the raIlway system at the JI

posal of the RussI.ans
in the Galician plain, though close and sufficIent
for the supply and moyement of ,-ery great
numbers, was interrupted. PrzemJ s1. as we [itW
b,st week. made a great hole in the rallway system
of the pla,in, and in particula.r cut that main line
"hir}l is the h:lckbone of all the Ualic,ian com-
mumcations, and \\hich is the principal awnue for
Russian supply. This truth can, perhaps, hest be
f'xpressed hy the addition here of
mother slight
fkrtch in "hich this railway Rystem is expressed in
its relation to the front of c110rt we are considering.
The double line marks that main ayenue of com-
munications of which I speak, and just east of
IÆmberg, L, it splits into two branches, crossing
t
le R.ussian frontier and Jeading to the main
Hussian depôts in the South and East of Russia,
Lemberg being itself. of coursc. a large advanef'd
'::1.:"e. T11f' lesser rail"avs 1 haye markcd with
single }i'1es. Now Przemy
l, at P, so long a
it held
out, caused an interruption roughly representeù by

lP ots

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oþ .!P'
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10"-::
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April 3, 1915,

LAND AND
ATER.

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D.

on the 22nd
Iar('h, seems to have been somewhat are forcing the positions in the immediate neign-
as follows. Tbe Russians held tbe wbole of the bourhood of the places "here tbe road and the rail-
ridge oyer a line of about ten miles from E to F. way from Sanok to
Iesolaborcz cross tbe ridge
From about F their line bent outwards on to the close to tbe village of Lupkow.
southern slope of the Carpathians so that they It is perfectly clear that the whole Russian
securely held the low and broad Dukla Pass, and effort is directed towards the piercing of this
it would seem that the line did not reach the II waist JJ of the Carpathians, and the occupation
crest again till somewhere about the point G; so of all the roads leading down on to the Hungarian
tbat the salient on to the Hungarian side of the plain upon a belt of some fifty miles. :\Vhat wa
mountains, the grip upon the passage of the crest, have to watch in the next few dars is the progress
represented nearly twenty miles. The telegrams our allies may make in this effort.
are too meagre to make quite certain upon thi3 It is worth noting in this connection that the
point, but I deduce from the news of the fortnight concentration upon the Bartfeld-Baligrod sector
before the fall of the fortress tbat the Jaliska road leaycs deliberately neglected for the moment the
was commanded just beyond the summit. Beyond next railway pass across the mountains. the F zok.
G the line ran to some sucb point as H. with Bali- and I would beg my readers' attention to some
grod either just within or just without the limits digression upon this momenta ry neglect of the
of the Russian 9Ccupation. At any rate, it is quite Uzok, because it is important to the strategy of
certain that both the summits of the railway and this moye.
of the road on the Lupkow Pass were still in 'Ve a11 know that a modern army is depenù<,nti
Austrian hands last Friday. upon the railway. Kow the Russians, making this
After the fall of Przemysl. a week ago, this effort across the Bartfeld-Baligrod front alone.
Baligrod-BaTtfeld front was immediately rein- will, even if they are successful in reaching, with a.
forced, and the effect of this pressure was im- short delay, the plain upon the further side,
mediately felt. The Austrian retirement began depend upon only one line of railway. that crossing
âown the slope towards tIle Hungarian plain. the Lupkow Pass.
Heights dominating the Lupkow Pass on the ridge It may be that as further reinforcements come
were carried by the Russians. 'Ve have not yet through the now liberated Galician railway;
got any sufficient accounts to justify our saying system, an attack will be made upon the U zok
that the Russians command the road and tbe sunultaneously with the attack upon the Lupkow,
railway itself, where they cross tbe ridge of the The two lines stand one to the other in the
Lupkow Pass, but we can safely put the Russian fasbion shown upon the accompanying elernenta ry
line upon last Friday, the 26th, the third day after sketch (E). The three road passes, Polianka, Dukla,
the entry of the Russian troops into Przemysl. at and Jaliska (marked (1), (2), (3) upon the sketch).
tho new front indicated by the dots K, K, K upon are succeeded next in order by the road pass (4),
the sketch just given, We'know that the Austnans and the railway pass (4A), which go by the common
have . evacua
ed the point of Zboro. tha
the name of Lupkow. At a distance be
'ond th6
RussIans are Just above
Iesolaborcz, and that they Lupkow of Borne forty-five miles, another mor

J*

L A X DAN D :\\

\. T E R.

April 3, 1915

CD
"

' ]l) f'rzfJl1)'s1
To Sambor
@ l..emt,
&i'
'el
II @

(i)cÐ
(l I'

...

recently-built railway crosses the crest near the
hamlet of li zok (5), anù proceeds down upon tbe
Ualician side to Sambor, and so bryond to Przemysl
(like its neiahbour, through the Lupkow), and by
anotber lineOto Lemberg. These t,yO railway lines
masterinO' the range do not meet until far down on
tbe Hun
arian Plain. There is a fairly gOOf!
lateral r
1.d lea(lin er along the Hungarian side of
the foothills from H:omonna to Berczna, but there
is no railway comnnmication,
If the liussians, therefore, content themselves
with trying to force the Lupkow and obtain posses-
,;;ion of the raihHIY communication oyer the crest
at that point, tbry ",ill be relying upon the
.Austrians luwing to abandon the U zok (5) (the
(-rest of ,,,hich they still command) on account of
the fcar tlwy will feel of tbe appearance, sooner
or later, of Russian forces behind thcm upon the
Hungarian plain, The Russians cannot move in
any great force in Hungary without a railway.
,To command the Lupkow alone would not be
cnou
h; they must, for a
eneral movement, u 1ti-
mately cOlluÌland the "C zOl\:, too. But, supposing
they do not force the U zok, they can haTe no hope
of obtaining it save by the threat of this len2thy
turn ing ll1m ement.
Now, there are excellent reasons, in spite of
the incom-enience of working ,yith a single rail-
way, for ]caving the Uzok alone and concen-
trating upon the Lupkow for the ll1oment. It is
not conceiyable tbat the Uzok win be left alto-
gether alone, supposing that the Austrians cling
to it obstinately in spite of tbe threat to their rear.
It is only a question of time for the Russians to
hring up suffieif'nt reinforcements to permit them
to act upon the Uzok as "\"Yell as upon the Lupkow;
but for the moment it would seem as though the
JJupkow ","ere their principal objective, and a
detailed examination of the t,yO passes shows why.

o _
. -

..'
.

!I
I

-"

The Luplww is roughly thus. The railwi.l)T
haying come up a yery easy valley from the qah-
cian side, enters its last gradient towa.rds the ndge
at a point rather more than 1.200 feet above the
sea-at a point marked A in the sketch. It only
rises some 240 feet more to Radoszyce, anù tbence
to the summit at B, the tota.l rise is but just oyer
300. Upon tbe further side the gradient is slightly,
stepper, Yidrany being only just under 1,100 feet
and l\Iezolaborcz under 1,000.
At the summit there are two short tunnels,
the longest of whidl is barely 400 yards, and
the crests in the nrigllbourhood are quite low-
2,100 feet or thereabouts. Therefore the destruc-
tion of these tunnels (,yhich are rock tunnels)
should be repaired without too much diftìculty, and
the heights in the neighbourbood (some of wbich
are already carried) aro neither steep nor
elentted.
Tbere are no considerable viaducts or long
bridges. Lastly, and most important of all, the rail-
way pass is easily turned hy road. One road turns
it in its immC'diate neighbourhood, running from
the yillage of Hadoszyce, on tbe Galician side, to
Yidrany on the Hungarian side by very easy
gradients, 0' er a summit but slightly exceeding
2.000 feet. The other road coming in from the
Jalislm Pass (which we haye seen to 1)e already in
Russian hands) strikes the railway just beyond
Yidrany at Mesolaborcz, and turns the railway
line yet aga in, It should be impossible for tbe
A ustrinns to command the railway summit if or
"hen these roaùs arc in the Russian possession.
And it should equally be impossible for them to in-
flict any "ery permanent injury upon the line
which here crosses the rangC'.
Further, let us remark fhat tbe country all
about here is open, Vi ith only isolated ","oods; and
the formations, though of limestone, not craggy or
particularly lending themseh-es to 10C<'tl defects.
Last.ly, the height of this Lupkow saddle is so
inconsiderable that it is aJready only patchy with
snow, and the snow "ill be no serious encum-
brance before the cnù of the month if t.he
eason is
rea sonably oprn,
Kow, with all these conditions, those of tl1C
U zok Pass form a comp]ete contrast.
In the first place, the Uzok Pass, being in the
heart of the mountains and away from the central

' waist," stands higber; tbough that is not an im-
portant point., for it is less than 3,000 feet abm e
the sca. But it is also far steeper from Turka, the
mountain town at the Galician foot of the F zok.
The rise to the summit is over a thousand feet,
IHld on the further side the road presents all the
cllaracter of a true mountain pass, zig-zagging
do,"yn towards Hunga.ry, on to the bamlet of Fzok
itself. A few miles furthcr it has fallen (foHow-
ing the upper torrent reaches of the Riwr "Lng)
by nearly 2,000 feet, and is still a mountain road
,,-hen it enters the larg('r flat Hbove Berezna and
there receiycs the lateral road coming from tbe
Lupkow Railway and Homonna. Again, dense
masses of wood on the Hungarian side clothe the
mountains eyery" here in this part; beech on the
lower slopes, pinrs cliwbing up thickly to the
central road. On the further, Galician, side, from
",-hich the Russians must approach, there is but
bad lateral communication for the massing of their
troops. Tbe mountain formation here resembles
that of the Jura. It runs in parallel ri(lge
,
crest upon crest, of which the main ridge of tIle
4*' I ' · - I, t.

:April 3, 1915,

LAN D A
D "T ATE R.

. '"
.

'
"_...,_,v

, '

, " .

, . \ -a.
tJ'ara1Ld Ri4gd
'05 ".

Jura ßrm'atWn\ ' '.. '''..
,
'," ".... '.. /

'
,? \. .... ".
· JTUrkA
',

? \

.:.... (J J
--"<
.s' r
^
"o!. "... r
,.Ill, " y r,...
.'."", (þ"'''

#" '"\

'JÍo,a S H'U
'1{ ..

f fi)ttf -
;f .. - :1 13 IIO
'1 , 1,. ßerezfla., . - . - . , -- -A --- . - .
1/ - C].(jie#.
0,

Carpathians is only the last.: and such format.ion
admits of no easy systcrn (If f'ouwmnication. TIle
last lateral road by which a Hussian conccntl'<!tion
against the pass can be e[reeted comes in on Tudm
itself. The forcing of the pass, therefore, cannot
be aided by the adH'llt of bodies alTiYÌn rr from
either side. It can be accomplished only b
? dircct
attack on a very narrow front. Xor is the line of
the railway turned upon the further side until \\e
reach the road from Homonna. which comes in a

low down 2.S TIerezllfi, nearh- t\\'o da n;' march from
the summit. ..
For more than three days of Y('rv good mareh-
, I 1 '1 f "
mg, an
more Il\:e onr ayerag(' days. tl'OOpS
atternptlllg to force the "(;zok P;1S
arc tied to a
single road of a true monnta inol1s cha rader.
I'Vhen we return from this g('neral char;lrter of ti.e
pass for road and railway alike. to tbe raihnw

tlone, the ease of it;; defence or destruction,
Hì;1
the corresponding difiiculty of its -"eizure are also
apparent..
A detailell sketch of the railw<1J ero5sing is
somewhat as follows:

"

"

t
Milr6:

.

.

+

.n

At the summit itsdf a tunnel of a mile.
between A and B, vulnerable from its length, ù.ifii-
cult of repair if it ,vere dest.rowd, meets olle.
Immediatel
' beyond the' summit upon the
Hungarian side the raihnlY is compelled, hom the
steepnes:; of the ground, to turn and loop in true
mountnin fashion, cOIltinuaJ1y pa.ssing through
short tunnels and oycr not. inconsiderable ravines.
At every such point a retiring enemr could cut it.
,,-hile the fall on the Hungarian side i
so steep
that hy the time the railwa
' has reached the neigh-
bouring point X it has ah'eiHly faJ1t'n llearlJ' 2.000
feet. from its summit. '
The l
zok. therefore, is a railway pass far
less canable of fa l )id seizure and use than is the on
... 5 11

Lllpkow. X'or i5: it.l'er.larkahh' that. the line was not
en l'l'ied
cross the
zok at this point until many
years after the englllecls had thrown a raihYav
across the Lupkow, .
Before leaxinf; this front it must be premised
that a ycry rapid advance is unlikely until the
spring' weather liberates the roads coínpleteh'.
' [ ' I t ". f I R . . .
Ie I're Q (-'n cnart 0 t Ie uSSlans IS rathe

to master t.he
Uìi1mits and to open the gates into
Hungary
I!::tn to p
lSS through those gates in force.
Though, IÏ they f:uccE'cded in capturing tho
c
f;':1tps, the adyauce mto lIun
ar'y ,\'ouhl hardly L

(jelayctl. beyond the mont.h of April.
[t IS worthy of remark in this mnneetion tllat
the Austrian manæU\rcs
I think three years ago
-tul'11i"d upon the thesIs of the defence of t/;e
Hungarian pl...lill under conditions presuming- Ute
los? of Pl'zem};sl
!ld the loss of the main range.
It 1
generally oche-;;ed tlwt the lesson drawn from
those manæUn"e3 was that a crescent position
tëlk(\n up nlong the 'western foot of the mountains
\.
ould not be held, save with the aid of strong rein-
forcements from the north.
Now it is fairly certain that the enemy couJr-1
Hot find heavy reinforcements from the nòrth in
the ease of 11 Russian a.dmnce. If Austria Dud
GC'l'1n::th'y had bepll fighting Russia alone. and if
l
ussia had attained her presf'nt position in sì.lC'h
sl11gJe comuat, one might imagine sudl reinforcc-
lI
ent to l'e pos.:;ihle; but Germany woujd r..d he in
a. position to throw consid('w()le numbers into
thi
field ill aid of her allr \yit.h "Tarsaw uutaken

nd wit.h the siege conditions, with Cermans to
their trelle-hcs in the \Ye:>t, l.wbl'Okf'n.
. "'-e h
l:C been ma!1Y mt)uths cXIJectin
the
ultlllla
c eff

t of
u
stan numhers. Their snp-
posed ImU1ecuate cOed was a gra,-e error of iud
l'-
Jl),ent.
nd the ddny under \\ hid.. thc',' would 1efTi

t.o .teil .was .far longer than opiniòu was lcd n to
LclJcn' ìJl tI.us country b

mo
,t military critics and
Ii)' :111 publIc men. Bnt It was an ultimat(' factor,
bound .t<? COI
!C into play if till' enemy l'onld obtain
110 deC'/stOn III the East and shnuld let >"outh :i fter
mont.h
lip h
- ,,,'ithout pinning or tJ('cisi\-'clr c:dl':lt-
itJg II is opponcnt in that quarter:
IHd Jt woul(1
sæm as thl)n
h, with the fall t)f Pl'æm\'sl. this
dOllbje ('lenient ú1' time and of nnmhelS in f;lmm'
of ihe ...\llics wcrt' :It Iëlst becriuni:J'" to teU ù'h)l! the
( ' 1 . I' 0;:) l
,arpat Han il'OIH.

PH.zE
\IYSL
Th(' fnrtll('l' news and details following upon
the' en :Ilurc (If l)rzemysI. la('kin{
whil"h we
L ,0
remarked last \\e('k that it \\as impùs
ible to statu
thf' full
fft'd of tl
tt. arhien'l!lc-nt. are not yt"t to
IIaHd. 1 he only delll11to finul'{' we 11:1\'e to 0'0 UT)on
. . f ,., 0 b J
1" a qnas!-o hCial F(.ltemcnt that the total number
(,f prisoners was 120,000. The cst imate of 100,000
was, the'refore, not so far out, a nd, indeed, it
shouJd be dr.n' Owl. the defence of ' So larO'(' a I )eri-
'"'
meteI' as frum tbirty t? ihirty-li\e miles couM
hardly be und
rtak('n \nth a smaller nurnber of
troops. "\Ye are al:-:o t0lù Llwt the total numbel'
of Hu
"i;m prisoners found ,
ithin the fortress was
about 3,000, and. furthcr, that the n-reatel' numhel'
r->

were, as was to be expectcd, (':lfeS ot wounlled.
Of captures of materÜ' l. on1\' fonr locomoti\'eq
were srizetl, apparently iutart; h'ut of other ro!linlP
stoek a Yery bl'e.lt quantity, amI a certain stoek o'f
co:lI. Of the rate of tht> guns we 1:1\'e heard
nothin
as "\t't.
It is <:h,:a l' tha t th(' lc<
st muubt'l' of men set frc{\
the Hussian side by the f
lJl of the fortl'c:>s

LAND AND 'VATER.

April 3, 1915.

cannot be Irs;:; than a quarter of a million, "llidl
estimate has been u
ed in the abO\c note:; upon tlh>
present Carpathia II position. .
It is further dear that no conSIdel'il hIe
destl'ucti0Il of the raihYaj's of whieh PlZemysl is
the junction can hayc taken plae(', I'eeausc the
Illon
mcnt of troops hf'O'an almost immrdia tcly

} .
after the entry of the Rn
"i;ln (orees into t Ie
ìÌ
T,
The main interest of the
l('ge ran only, It lS
to be feared, arise much later, when full det..'1ils of
its character arC' published. 'Vhat militmJ
students in the 'Vest really want to know IS
"ht>ther the power of prolongc,1 resistance "\\ hi('h
Przemy.sl
hO\...-ed \\ as due nm
nly to t.hc org
nisa-
tion of temporary \\orks outsIde the. mner rm.g-
as at YCl'dun and
.letz-or whether It 'Y3S mamly
due to the absence of a proper siege train on the
Hu
;:;ian siJe. It is fairly eyident from the very
brief notiees recei\ ed that the fortress, when it
dill f:]]J, feH from exhaustion, and not from bom-
bardment or assault. Therefore, if Prze l l1ysl held
out of its own strength against regular and
dc,'eloped siege a.ttack, it would go far to show
that the opinion formeù at the bcginning of the
war, that the modern siege train has destroyed the
modern fortress, must be reyised. That the modern
siege train can, with superiority in air craft,
cìestroy the l'est,'ictcd permanent "'ork, and that
in a few days, is now a commonplace. Bnt it by no
means follows that fortresses cannot be devised for
the future which shall be possessed of very numer-
ous mobile batteries, in only some of which gnns
need be placed (and which t.hese wl're the enemy
would have to find out for himseJf\, while the
opportunity should he afforded for tLe completion
of still more numerous temporary works [I t short
notice. 'Vlmt dooms the peru!anent work as \ye
no\\ understand it is the restricted and known are.t
upon which the high explosive shell of the assault
hlS to work. Once eliminate or modify the two
factors of restriction in orea and lmown site, and
the strength of the defence may be revived.
Ano)tl1c1' m:Jttel' of interest would be to dis-
cover what ,,",,1,S the sanitary condition of Przemysl
Ilt its fall, what was the proportion of death from
wounds and what from disease, as also the organi-
sation of large s('rties under modern conditions.

A

REVIEW OF
MIND UPON

I T is important from time to time, e\ en in con-
nection "ith the mere dry bones of military
study, to review the mental attitude of the
enemy.
The conclusions in this firld are not SUSCCi)-
tihl(' of positive proof.
. Eyidence is at hnge,. and may be variouo..;ly
mterpl'cted, but one cannot f?rg;o pcriotlica I juù
-
lHent of the m.attf'r, because It IS ultimately upon
the ]!1
ral attItude of the two opponents that 11.
C:lJnp111gn depellcl
. and the moral attitude of the
enemy at particular (;l'itical moments helps us to
gange the dewlopment of the pha
e succeeding,
Such a critical moment is approachiwJ'. 'The
end of \,,-int
r,. th,e enemy's continued 0 heayy
wa"ta
e, IllS IJlmt: ot I e 'er
Tes, the ne1Y contingellt

A hout to appear III tIp> 'V ('st all detC'rmine thjs'
and it is ad\ isabJe to t:1kc stock no\". of the enemy'

6*

But foI' all this we IIlU::.t wait until detailed news
arn Yes.

THE 'VESTERN AND OTHER FROl':TS,
There has been no news of consequence this
,veck up to the moment of writing (:\Ionllay eYCll-
iug) upon the 'Yestcrn front.
The Hartmannsy,cilel'kopf, a wooded height
of on'r 3,000 feet in the Y osges, which stands
bohlly out from the foothills anù dominates the
whole plain of Mulhouse, has been recaptured by
the French. Here, as neady always, the French
are silent upon the number of their prisoners.
The Belgian t1'00p8 haye ad1Ïe\Ted t,...o slight
successes upon the Yser. The trenches captured
bv tbe :French south-east of Verdun at Les
Èparges, just at the ba<:;e of the hiHs called the
Heights of the Meuse, were in part retaken by tho
enemy on Sunday, and \H're tben almost entirely
recaptured by the French beforo t}1e end of
the day,
In general the mass of loeal a.tt
cks upon
various parts of the 400-mile line does no more
than continue the series of these during the last
winter months. The choice of assault remains
almost always with the Allies; the object of attri-
tion remains the same.
An insignificant skirmi:;;h took placc towards
the Suez end of the Suez Canal. Of its nature "\\""0
can guess nothing except that it can have dealt
with nothing more important than reconnaissance.
The enemy retired towards Naldal, half-war to
Akaba.
On the East Prussian front we have yery brjef
nC\ys describing fairly heavy figbting, especially
nt the \yestern end of the line bet\veen Mlawa and
Plock, But there is no appreciable change of ad-
yance or retreat in the opposing lines that face each
("Ither from the point where the Niemen enters Eøst
Prussia to the Vistula. It is probable that tbis
inunohiliiy is principally due to the spriì1g thaw,
which turns the whole of these marshv districts
into an impossible sludge. The bombå'1'l1mcnt of
080\\ iecs still continues in desultory fashion, anll
has now entered its gixth week. There is no result
apparent.

TI-IE GERMAN
THE WAR.

mind, from the opening of the campaign to tho
present apparent change ill his moral attitude,
The mood in which Germany, controlling also
her powerful ally, began tbe war is by this timo
a matter of history.
The enemy possessed an instrument of "a r
amply sufficient for victory (in bis opinion),
acco,cI.-ling to the plan he proposed-a plan, ill hjs
opinion ag:1Îll, moraBy reasonable; and, as a mili-
ta ry operation, so pri.1ct icable as to be certa in of
su(.cess.
He had not used this instrument for aggres-
f.Ïon, be had not used it eyel1 (save quite recently)
to threaten; but he kne;y that it was ready to use
whenever he chose, nnd the moment for using it at
last arrived.
If we desire to grasp this simple attitude
common to tIle dirc3ing winds in Germany, \ye

\pnl 3, 1915.

LAND AND 'VATER.

cannot 00 better than rec.all the attitude of similar
men in this country towards the position of
England
t sea. Consciousness of superior
st.rength dId not here produce aggression. It does
not necessarily
e:tn aggre
sion. It always pro-
duces a party wInch would lIke to use such advan-
t.age ac
ively. but, especially after a long peace,
there will be stronger counsels ao-ainst the runnino'
of the slight risk im'olvedandfo
lettingwellalon

"\Yt'" know that the higher authority in
Germany was for many years against action.
But there 'was this great difference bet"een
the,
,,-o parts of the parallel here drawn. The
BrI!I
h Heet h
d one aim only. to defend an amply
St
ffiCIent natIOnal patrimony long acquired.
,W here
s the German forces, thourrh conscious
that time "as "ith them (for the
uIPbers and
",eaIth of the German Empire were raJ)idlv in-
cre.asin
), were in the hands of men who 1 felt two
things ,,,hich might move them to action at last:

ïrst, that German)"
md not her due, especially
1ll th
matt
r of Col
mal e'ì:pa
sio
; secon
ny, that
HUSSIa, w
Ich "as III proportIOn IncreasIng even
more rapIdly than Germany, might ultimately
become dangerous. Against the Slav spirit as a
,,
ole the German spirit is arrayed in a'
nn'\.ture of contempt and fear difficult for the 'Vest
to understand.
R
ther n:ore than three yc
r3 ago elements
provokIng actIOn began to outweIgh the conserva-
tiye factors in the German directing mind. The
ultimate cause was, of c()un
e, the change in the
attitude of Britain, which had, in its turn, been
due to the German threat by sea. Germany had
chosen to build a great fleet, manifestly designed
to challenge that of this country.
The immediate action was the French move
towards :Morocco, ultimately supported by the
British Goycrnment. But, though less acute, the
Russian men:lce (as the Germans thought it) "Was
increasing side by side with this ". estern proyoca.
tion-as the Germans regarded it. to be.
'Ve can be mathematically certain 'when the
ðecislon ,\ hich ch:mged the Gerwan attitude from
one of indefinite delay and of a mere reJiance upon
time as the ally of their Empire to a determina-
tion to attack came.
It was in the summf'r of 1911 that the direct-
ing minds in the Germ!tn EmpircdecidcJ upon "War.
"-hen I say that this is mathematically
certain, I me<,"tll that it is a judgment susceptible of
mathe
natical calculation. The accumulation of
store::; and of complete equipment for a particular
date, the study of t
ie effect of l'ea\ y artillery in
the field, and the necessary length of and prepar-
ing ammunition therefor; the enlargement of the
IGel Canal; the increare in the number of trained
men-every step which we now see to haye been
taken by the military authorities and the Govern-
ment of Berlin-exactly con\"erges upon the
summer of 1914. It "Was not, however, believed
that Great Britain .would actively join the Franco-
Russian alliance against Germany 'when Germany
forced war, though it was believed that Great
Britain was the author of the general scheme
which threatened German expan;:;ion.
"\nlCn a preparation of a1)out tÌ1re
years,
designed for the summer of 1914. was afoot, It was
obvious that the war must be forced as soon as
possible after the han-est. Ewrything was well
thought out and ac.cnrately ordered. as brfits a
civilised nation preparing secretly for an act of
"ar to 1..0 eilC'Cted at its o\vn woment.

Stores of cereals, dependent upon the harvest,
Blust be waited for. but for some months before
that date other accumulations of stores not depen-
d
nt .upon the harvest must be provided: money,
certam ,:netals not sufficiently present within the
boundarIes of the Empire. and so forth. The finan-
cial dispositions began to be taken, apparently,
shortly aÎter the beginning of 1914.
There was a realisation of foreiO'n inyest-
o
ments; th
re was a steady accumulation of gold;
and, most Important of all, there was a plan laid
"hereby the City of London should even if Great
Brit'liñ did not enter the war, be h
mpered in the
fin an cia 1 support of those ,,110 (in the German
conception) were to fight England's battles upon
the Continent.
An admll'3ble occasion for the prete'ì:t of war
was afforded by the assassination of the heir to the
Austro-Hungèlrian thrones at the end of June.
Immediate ad, antage could not be taken of it. how-
ever, because it came a little too soon. The harvest
was not gathered ::md the last preparations were
not made. For a whole month Eurone "as allowed
to believe that the crime "ould h'aye no serious
international consequences. At the end of July
the Austro-Hungarian Government presC'nted to
Serbia-that is, yirtua l1y to Uussia-a challenB'e
of such a sort as had neyer been prescnted III
Europe before. It was a direct demand for war.
But the ally of Germany. which in this matter
acted as her servant, had not tbe determination of
the master. As late as Thursday, the 30th of July,
Austria hesitatetl. The Gmernment at Berlin ãt
once stepped in and made matters certain Ly the
double ultimatum presented within the twenty-
four hours to Russia on the one side and to France
on the other.
Xo\\", the mood in \\hich the directing mind of
Germany entered a great eampaign at this moment
was one absolutely certain of immedi3te yietory.
The Russian rnobilisation would be slow, Russian
communications were bad, the Russian object in
the W3r "as not national sah-atioTl. To hold up
Russia upon the East was at Ollce easily possible
and amply sufficient. It would be many months
before Russia could be a menace, though ultimately
-within a year, say-Uussia might hme found
time to equip a.nd to munition those very consider-
able numbers which were her principal asset.
But meanwhile in the West a decision could
be arrived at. and that witbout peril of miscar-
riage. France could be suddenly attackcd in oyer-
'" helming numbers and in a fashion for which she
,,;as not prepared, and the destruction of the
:French resistance would make possible in a com-
parati,.ely brief space of time an arrangement
with Russia upon the East.
The space of time thus required for the com-
plete success of the enemy's plan was the more
restricted from the fact that this plan did not in-
volve too large a direct political achievement. It
hardly aimed at annexation at all. It aimed at
undisputed hegemony in Central and "\Vestern
Europe. France was not to be dismembered, but,
already in active decline (as the Germans thought),
was to be rendered incapable of giving further
trouble.
Russia had only to withdraw her pretensions
in the Balkans, and to leave the economic expan-
sion of Germany and Austria a free hand to\\ards
the South and the East. England, after these first
rarid blows, "Would accept the result.
In the popular mind this decision took the

7-

IJ A X DAN D 'V ATE R.

April 3, 1915.

form of confidently expecting great yi<:tories at the
outset of war and a victorious peace, perha ps
within a few weeks, certainly within six months
of its inception.
The first of these expectations was amply
realised. The strong fortress of Liége \, as roJll-
rletely in German hands. \
'ith!n tell d:1} s of the
nrst shots. The full mobhsatlOn or the German
forces had not been completed a fortnight when
the greater part of Belgium was se,:'urely held.
The capital, Brussels, was entered and o\?cnpied
immediatel.... afterwards, The first Freneh armies
gathered tò'meet the shock were b01'1 1 e down in an
avalanche of invasion. All tb(' 8Ì:x: weeks succeed-
ing the forcing of the ,val' \wre an uninterrupted
triumph, eren e.'fceeding 1rhat /illd bcpn e,Tl'ectcd
by tlle general public in the GOlJ/ún Empire: tIle
whole garrison of
Iaubeuge, the crashing blow oÏ
the battle of :!\Ietz, the uninterrupted a!1d enor-
mous charge through
orthern France to the \'ery
gates of Paris, prisoners by the hundred thousand,
and guns in interminable numbers. To crown all,
just as the decisive stroke af?:ain!"t the heaten
French Army made possible tht' immccliate oc
upa-
tion of Paris, with the appro:H-h of :Sedan day,
the German population received the astounùing
news of Tallnenberg.
The point has been repea tedly ('mpha
is('d in
these pages. It needs no further elaboratioll. The
mind of a nation influenced by a legitimate exalta-
tion of this kind can changè but \'Cry gratlt13l1y;
and eannot. change at all
aYe under the presf:.ure
of some \ ivid and clearly defined disaster.
Xo such disastf.r followed. Xothing ha p-
r encù which could reasonably make the gcneral
I
y opinion of German)" a bmìdon its oJd unques-
honed confidence in the supremacy of its military
machine and in the certitude of ultimate yidol'V.
But what happened was of a nature \"hich: if
(t ('o
ld not thus affect the popular mind, \\a8
certam to affect the dÙ'cctinn mind and in l )ar-
. ;J , ,
tIcular. the soldiers ultimately responsible for tlle
conduct of the campaign. :For those soldiers had
planned a great strategy of a simple sort, amI the
plan had manifestly gone wrong. The battle of
the ::\Iarne meant that the envelopment or crushing
of the French Army was thenceforth impossible.
It meant that the rapid decision in the "rest was,
therefore, equally impossible, and that the cam-
paign "{',-ouId be indefinitely prolonged, 1\1ore than
that at first it did not mean.

he
eeond. c:hapter .of the \yar emphasised in
the (hrect.mg Illlhtary nllnd of the enemy this new
mood. Pumed to a line of trenclles 400 miles lOIlO'
but still in superior numbers, the obvious task f(
;
the enemy in the 'Ye::,t was llOW to break through.
From the early part of October to the middle of

m.-ember the enemy's Great General StaH massed
IllS yast numerical superiority for a greHt attempt
to break through the northern end of the line, first
l
pon the front Di
muùe-Xicuport, then upon the
fr
n
of tl
e salIent of Ypres, held by the
Bl'ltlsh contmgent. He disastrously failed in the

ouble atteml?t.. He suffered yery heayy losses
llldeeù-certamly the cquiyalent of six army corps
-and he knew that the future was more doubtful
than eYer.
But it must be clearly borne in mind that the
ren.ewed
ailure.' most significent to the stafr, bad
no llnmedIate effect upon the popular conception of
!he '\\'ar. As we see clearly enough from the
m::.tance of our own popuhr opinion, such purely
a*

ath.entitious conditions as tbe fact tlw,t wn.r 'was
taking place on the enemy's soi
, that there was no
dramatic single surrender of large numhers of
prisoners and guns, &c., "ere quite suflìeient to
maintain (though they could not reinforce) the old
confidence.
"T e know how different is the attitude of the
purdy military observer from that of the general
public in Ðny military operation.
P<,rhaps the clearest C'xample of the contrast
is to be found in the fact that mer3 ad\-ance is
coupled in the popular mind with the idea of suc-
cess, and it is orten even identified with it.
The t!Iil'd ch,lpter of the war Opêl1eÙ with yet
anot-ber cBangc of plan upon the part of the
enemy's directing milita.ry mind.
Ho liJllch time Imd passed by the middlc of
Ncyembcr that Russia might ill the course of the
next Îe\v mont lls prm e formidable. If shc became
r
..l
ly
onnidablc in equipped numbers and ammu-
mtlOI1 III a farther fi\'c or si:-.. months, and no deci-
sion lw d in the meantime been ren.ehed in the
,y e
t, the Germnn fortunes, alreaùy ycry ùoubtful,
might begin to turn to\\arùs disaster. By this time
-the middle of ",oyemher-quite half the anti}.,
able untr
ined German men to ùc put into the fiel,l
had already becn put into the field. The rcmainiuO'
. ö
margm W:1S llot yery large, and t.he wastaO'e from
the conditioI1'; of a \","inter campaign, from the fact
that eyerything had been de::3igned for a short y;ar,
but, aboye all, from the stratef,!Ìe and tactical tra-
ditions of the PI ussian selTi

, was continuously
enormous.
This thinl clwpter thercfore teak the follow- .
ing form:
The Germans, ,...ith their Austl'i::m :-:lly, were
to pin the Hussians behÏIHl the Yi"tula while still
the' \vinter lasted. To ao:>hieH' t.his illllllobilisation
of the encmy upon the East, it ",as neeeSf:.a1T for
the Gf'rmalJie alli:mce to command ]JermanelltJv
the l'..Üh,ay hl'id

es of \Yarsaw; a.n(fto thflt. cnâ:
leaying' in the "-est only just sufiìeiellt numbers
t,
hold th
line, the main energy of the
ncmy was
Ulrected tnroughout the wbole of the Wllltel'.
. The grand stratesy of this third phase is still
m progress, but so far it has failed precisely as the
grand strategy of the first phase, the em'elopmcnt
or destruction of the French, and the SEcond phasf",
the Lreaking out in the 'V cst, had fa iled in their
turn.
The attempt to carry 'Varsaw by dircd, attack
from the 'Yest broke <1o\...n an d \\ as abandoncd
ait-er the first \...eek in l
ehruary. The attCll)l)t to
carry it rmuHl the northern Hank broke dow
, in
its first cfiort at least, hy the first \ycek in :March.
\Ve are just coming to the first week in April, and

Yarsa\Y, with its bridges, is still secure.
A sccomlary, and rather politit:al tha.n mili-
tary, field connected with this main Polish effort
\vas that of the Carp
.thian front. The Austro-
Germans must clear the Russian armies from
Galicia if they were to free Hungary from the
nlf'nace of Í1l\"asion during the coming sprinO".
'Vith this object in mind thcy massed forces f..f.r
superior to the Russians in the field, and planned,
while holding the Russians along the front of the
mount
.ins, to turn them in flank from the south-
east, They w
l'e aided j n this cone
ptÍ<?n by the
prolonged rcslstance of Przemysl, wIth Its garri-
f-:on of some three to four army corps. Should
Przenmsl fall, it was cerh
in that the Russian
f1rmies
in Galicia could not be expelleù. Przemysl
fell upon l\Ial't'h 22. The abandonment of the

ÄpriI3,1915.

LAN DAN D
V ATE R.

attempt to tUl'n the Russian flank had already
beC'Il settled after a little-known battle of critical
importance fought ten miles south of Halicz, which
ended on :\Ial'l'h 4 "ith the Russian occupation
of St:mislau.

ll
h, then, is the present sit.uation of the
c.ampaign in t.he mind of the directors of German
strategy. They see their Ol'Ïginal plan an gOlle
to picces,_ they see t.he second phase (which was an
atte
npt, not to restore the original plan, but to
reùl'f'ss its disastrous l'ailure) endin
in the middle
of Noyember in a furthcr complete failure, They
n?te day by day, ,<;it.h the figures brfore them, a
gigantic and unceasing rate of "\Vast age immensely
superior to that of their enemy, especiany to that
of their enemy upon the 'Vest, anù thcy perceive,
with winter rapidly drawing to its end, with the
munitioning of the R.u
sians in sight wit.hin the
next few weeks, with the Dardanelles seriously
threatened, with the new contingents about to
appeal' in the 'Vest, anll, perhaps most important
{If :111, ,Ùth the rapid production of ammunition
and of sufl1cient ll('a.yy art-mery for trench work
in t.he vVest. that the third phase of thi s plan for
the inunobiJif:Jtion of the Hussian armies is heaù-
ing straight for a third disappointment.
Jt is morn lly crrtain that unùer such conùi-
tions the Great. General Staff of the German Army
no longE'r presumes upon yjeto!'y.
It is Illora]ly certain that it no longer pre-
sum('s upon imposing its OJ'igiual will upon the
will of the l'r:u1co-R.us:5ian-British alliei:'.
A critical turning-point in the minù of the
enf'my has been rea
hed. The clwnge has run its
full course in the directing part of that mind. anJ
the tuning of German public opinion to another
key has also bpguu,
The all-important. prohlem which 'yc must try
to solve at this moment is the present state of the
German mind, direct.ing aud directed, towards the
future of the campaign,
I will hazard the suggestion that it is at the
present moment an att.itude to be defined somewhat
as follows:
" The war has not gone as we expected. W. e
admit it freely, But it has become something
much more serious for us than the danger oÌ
ùefeat. '\-e are--no m
lttcr t.hrough what accident
or whether we are to bl<11'1e or no--fightiug for our
existrnce. The issue ought Hot to be of this charac-
ter. \Ve did not threaten the existence of others:
we only threatened their too great power, and tried
to take the place we thought our due. 'Ve are pre-
pared to meet a reasonable demand upon us and
to discuss terms. \Ve quite understand that to
leayc certain districts in German hands after the
war would be unwise. 'Ve quite understand the
demand for limited autonomy in Poland; but, of
course, Russia will have to follow suit. \Ve do ask
for certain facilities in the Low Countries, especi-
ally for trade a.nd outlet to the spa; but we want
nothing more than that-which is, aft('r aU, only
the public recognition of advantages which would
be ours anyhow by the natural progress of our
trade and produce."
In some such attitude as this they would
approach Europe and the neutral countries. In
other words, they woul(l be asking for a draw.
Now, this is something which has been long
foreseen and much discussed-in these columns as
elsewhere.
But the novel feature which df'pends upon
9 uite recent evidence is the way in which the state

of mind behind such a demand is already appa-
rent on the German side. '
It is no longer a case of prophesying that some
such attitude would ultimately be adopted. It is a
case of recognising that it is already adopted
to-day.
The directing military mind of the enemy has
decided tha.t victory in th(' original sense is now
quite impossible. It proposes, as will be argued
in a moment, the ultimate resumption of what it
rrgards as the vital part of the struggle-the
attack on England; but in the immediate future
it wishes for peace upon terms that wiH leave
Germany almost as strong in proportion to her
neighbours as she was last )-ear, It is preparinCl'
the general public opinion of Germany for a corre

sponding movement of opinion upon the part of
the neutrals, and perhaps of certain clements
which it belieycs it can find among the Allies.
:\"ote, for instance, the double work which is
appearing in our Press, as in tbat of other coun-
tries-one limb of which work consists in the new
moderate description of German 3ims and of Ger-
man successes therein, the other limb of which con

sists in describing the still perfect organisation
and still calm confideilcc of the German military
machine. .
In the first of these Tllatters the most striking
document has hecn General Bcrnhardi's summary
of the war for the Ameril'ans. General Bernhardi
is a very lucid and, "hat is more, a. very weighty,
writer. His technical work is, I belieY{'o univers:
ally a.dmired by aU those competent to judge it, and
his excursions into politics, if less Yëìluable, are :-rt
clearly the product of a man who c.an think his
subject out and state it "ell, His re1igion may not
be our religion; but one can be certain aftcr read- ,
iug his work that he writes whatc, er he does write
",ith a definite object and fits his means to his end,
'Vhat he has been recently writing for America.
is, therefore, a piece of evidenee
to be closely:
studied. And it amounts, roughly, to this: II 'Ye
baye not done "\Vhat "\vc thought we could, but we
are not defeateù-it is not eyen possible to defeat
ns in any thorough manner; and meanwhilc we
have clear aùyantages over the enemy "hich we
permanently hold."
He then proceeds to summa-l"Îse those condi-
tions, and it is well worthy of note tbat th('y are
the sort of things which pariicular1y appeal to
ei,-ilians,
md whieh few soldiers would, if they
were ,vriting for soldiers only, take the trouble to
mention.
The document is as yaluable a witness in what
it leaYes out as in what it puts in. J'or instapC'e,
the (to us) extraordinary description of the battle
of the ::\1 a me if', from the point of ,-iew of the
writer, and of the effect he desires to producc, e
-
ceeding]y well done. The right wing of the
German Army fell back slightly, but before
supel'ior numbers; it fell back in gOOtl orùer; its
lo
ses wcre inconsideraùle, &c., &c. O,lC can COIl-
cci,-e a less able man making a fool of hillU;elf in
trying to describe so that it should appenr f<l,our-
able to l1eutrals, and particularly to unÏIlstructel1
opinion, that deadly blow deliyered in the second
w('('1\: of
eptembcr which "ould seem already to
have ch::nlßwl the court:e of
uropea
l h.ïsto
T'
But L1cneral Bcrnhardrs descl'lptlOn IS per.
fedly suited to the object he has in ,icw. It is
true that the Allied nUTnbers were supcrior to tIle
German right wing. The fact that the çoneentra-
tion of this superiority upon one part of the field.
9-

L
\ N D A
D "r.\ T E R.

althoug11 t!l.. total forces on
b.e AHied si
e ,,\Tere
hea,'ily inferior, was 3: trmm]!hant pIece of
strateg,f he discree
ly \"ells: It IS true that the
l'ctirem<:'llt was at Its maXlllllllll over but a few
mile
-say three or
our days' marc?-alld at t!
e
piyot end of the SWltlg hardly n0tlceable, It IS
true that the lo
ses "ere not heavy for an oper:1-
tion of the kind, or at least not exaggeratedly
beayy. And what he goes on to say is eq1}-aHy t
'ue
-that the :1tt
mpts to turn the German l'lght wmg
fa iled,
But the skill sllown in the concoction of this
document. thouo'h worthy of
Ollle admiration, is
not tIle m3in pcint. Thp main poin
is t.he object
he clearlv h3S in view. And that object IS not the
compelljrlg of the neutrals to any exagge

ted
ld-
miration for Germany: on the contrary, IL,S object
is rather to provoke a limited and sober respe
t.
Let
nyone umtCqua.inted with military history as
a wh01e, of all principles of stratcgy, and the
main lines of the present campaign, read Bern-
hardi's ,,'ork. Such a reader will conclude that thp
Germans have Hot done as well as they expecte(l,
but they can still put up an interminable fight
which .it would be fool ish to prolong.
Bcrnhardi knows that Germany is making for
defeat, and that any nation, once defeated. can be
and will be crushed. He is a soldier. But his
civilian audience here and elsewhere do not know
this.
E
....at.tly the same thing is aJ1parcnt in the
descl'iptiye articles of German ambulance work,
German recruiting, German food supplies, and t.he
spirit of the German people at home, which are
mysteriously appearing even in the jOlll'llals of the
natioTls now fighting Gcrmany. " We have no exa 1-
tation. such è'S there was at the beginning of the
l'ampajgn, but there is a cn refully calculated dis-
;emination of con.fiàenre--not confidence in any
decisive success, but confiùence in the power of in-
definite re::3istance."
Intrrviews granted by public men in Germany
to their journalists, and equally finding their way
into the Press of the Allies, are upon th(' same notl'.
As though by order, all fantastic boasting has dis-
!l.ppeared, and its place has been taken by a sort of
quiet I'c 6 ard of the future, which is intended not
to terrorise, but to make the enemies of the Ger-
manic alliance regar(l the struggle as intermin-
able.
'Vhen we turn to a third category of evidence,
the dome::.tic Press of Germany, we find a slightly
different note, but one still in consonance with the
effect "hich is aimed at in the neutral countrips,
an
upon certain sections of opinion among the
AllIes.
The fact that the war is still being prosecuted
in forción territory is perpetually insisted on.
The fatuous description of the siege work as " the
invincibility of the wa}] of steel" regularly
appea.r3 and rea.ppears. No hint is given of the
plain. rnilit
r

ru.th that, in a state of si
ge such
as tI11S, the InItIatIve has passed to the besIegers.
Ta!\:e a particular instance. The whole break-
down of the grea.t German U sortie" aO'ainst
l\V ar.sa w is recorded as a series of local sucgcf-ses;
a:n d III that record the absence, or, rather, the nega-
tIOTJ,
f general success is forgotten.

ow, this impression, deliberately calculated
and unposed upon the German public in one

orm, anrl upon the neutral and allied public
m ar:other Q9{'S not of course dt>ccÌye its

April 3, 1915.

o,,'n puthors. The Great General Staff knows its
own losses, it knows the adverse conditions of the
present siege work; it has reckoned very seriously
the limits of time wit.hin which it is working. But
we s/wuld fall into disastl'OllS error if we imagined
lntblic opinir>n in Gel'Jwmy WflS merely playing 11,
pad. It is honeBtIy convinced; and it does not
recognise that it is acting under orders.
This is. of cour
e, 12ss true of public opinion
in the Dual1\fonarchy. The Press, the accounts of
tl'3xellcrs, and private letters amply testify to the
big rifts in thz corre'3ponding state of mind which
it has heen tbe object of Germany to produce in the
mixed populations of her ally. She has failed; an.d
whereas Germany proper has suffered no dramatIc
blow which could awaken the public conscience to
the truth, Austro-Hungary, in the fall of Przemj sl
and in the now certain peril of the Carpathians, is
not in the same case. Further, Austrian soil is
occupied, and the Austrian losses in prisoners are
hardly less than double those of the Germans. The
Austrians taken prisoner by this time must be well
over 400,000. Przemysl, at the end of the story,
and Lemberg, at the beginning, alone account for
far more than half that number.
Austro-Hungary, then, is already, so fa.r as
its mind upon the war is concerned, entering that
condition which the German mind would only
enter after some considerable local defeat or after
the occupation of some considerable pOl tion of
Germvn soil, or after the surrender of some con-
sitlerab1c garrison.
'VeU, the general lesson to be drawn from the
present attitude of that which is morally the chief
part of our enemy seems to me to be th
s: '
e
must rcO'ard his pre:,;cnt confidence, especially Ul
its cal
nec:;s and superficial strength, as at
once a real emotion vnd a particularly arti-
ficial one. I do not mean that there is not
the chance of chRnge adverse to us and favour-
able to him. But I do mean that the gulf
betweeTJ. the milita.ry re
lit.y and the public
opinion supporting the German soldiers is a
gulf to-day very much ,videI' than any which has
existed previously in this war. Bet\\ een the height
of almost in
ane e
altatioll of the first days and
the very great achievements of the German arI
lY
in those same first days therc was no such stram.
To-day there is all the strain that accompanies an
unstable equilibrium, all the top-heaviness that
any State suffers (particularly in time' of war)
when those who know are in a mood utterly
different from those whom they instruct.
"\\r e often hear it said that the awakening wi1l
be terrible. It is no more than a private judgment,
but personally, I .shou
d do
bt i
.. Change
of
opinion-the flddmg 01 publIc OpInIOn from Illu-
sion and the fitting of it to reality-are only ter-
rible when violent. It is even possible, if
things were
ishandle
l, tl
at the enemy
ight g
t
his inconclusIve peace III tIme, and that Ins publIc
should never learn the present anxiety of its
rulers,
But one thing is certain: if h(' gets his incon-
clusive peace, then, \yithout doubt it will be but a
truce so far as this country is concerned. And
whateyer a settlement might do for the satisfac-
tion of the Continent, it would leave the German
Empire at least determinell and able to pursue, at
no very distant dat
. it::; task of undermining the
supremacy of Great Eritai:l at sm and the whole
intf'
'national pcsition of the
e isla.nds,

10:'

FRENCH'S
BLIN DESBLEDS.

A IH'il 3, 1915.

LAND

AND

INFLUENCE

OF

SIR

JOHN

By L.

Yi ATE R.

AIR

POWER.-II.
MESSAGE.

l'ìOTE.-ThiJ article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, w hicb does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no
responsibility for tile cor rectness of the statements,

II

I feel sure that no effort should be spared
their numbers and perfect their equipment and

to increase
efficiency. "
I N these words Sir John French, in his report, dated
No\'ember 20, 1914, concluded a stirring paragraph
dealing with the im'aluable Ben-ices his aircraft had
rendered him in times of great stref's. The importance
of that message canot be o\'erestimated. If aircraft
are to have any considnrable influence in shaping the course
of the present war II no efforts should he spared to increase
their IlUmbers and perfect their equipment and efficiency."
And here arise two very seriou.i and pertinent questions: Are
we doinO' our utmost and are we utilising to the full extent
the reso
rces of the country for aircraft comtruction 1 These
are tl,e questions to be examined now that the influence of
air power has begun to be realised. . .
And in order that the reader may, when consIdermg tbese
two questions, be in a position to judge for himself w
eth
r
they can be answe
ed in the affirma
ive o
in the negatIve, It
is nec2ssary for lum to know certam thmgs about the pro-
duction of aircraft.
Before enterinO', however, upon the necessary 6J1,"plana-
tions to enable the" reader to grasp the preE>ent !,osition of
Great Britain'ø aircraft producti\'ity, the writer wishes to lay
&tress upon the fact that, in writing this article, he is. solely
actuated Ly tho consideration and by the hope that It may
prove useful to tb03e responsible for the construction of our
air tIeet. He has no intention of criticising a Department
which has risen splsuðidly to faee an unprecedel!ted situation
and to ul!dertake a ,,"ork at least 1mmty times as great as
that for which it was or"anised. It is to the great credit
of our Aeronautical Dep
rtment tl18t its achievements are
already sufficient to allow us to judge, in actual practice, of
the possible ultimate influence of Air Power.
An aeroplane in flying order consists of, several hundred
lJß1aU parts, of metal or of wood, carefulLY I?ut together.
These parts tbemsel\'es are simple of const.ructIOn, .and ern
be made in any fairly-well equippe?, work
hop. . Tbelr manu-
facture does not demand any con5werahle specIa! knowledge
Dcr any special experience. A gocJ mecba11lc or ,:
od,
wOlker can easily produce them und!::r proper supe
vIslo.n.
Tbe assemhling of the parts to form ,compl,ete macbIlle
IS,
11O\Ve\"er a more difficult work and reqUIres aaequately tramed
men. It wilI tbus be seen that, broadly speaking, a
rcraft
construction depends upon two factors: (1) t.he makmg of
parts; and (2) their erection. .
That there is a very great and pre
lIlg demand for aero-
plane parts cannot be doubted. These palts are !lot only
required for the cOllstruciion o.f the complete mach
nes
?ut
are also ind!spensabl5 for repaIrs at t,he front. . It. IS gIvmg
away no secret of tbe Allies' ae.ronaul1c
1 orga
satIOn to s
y
that each machine tbat is put mto servICe reqUires
certam
DumLer of spare parts to make good,
vitb as little delaY,as
possible, the breakages which are lllseparable from tne
employment of aircraft 0\ e
unprepared ground. In fad,
it h
s been estimated that, III the pre<;ent stage of d
\elop-
ment of aeronautics, quite a thirù of the numbe: of aIrcraft
on active service is, at any ono time, in the repaIr sbops. It
is tberefore a matter of surprise thaI:. tbe full resources of
tl
e country' for the manufacture of aircraft are not yet
utilised, especially iu view of Sir John French'ø meSf'age
quoted at the commencement of this article, .
To supply the need of our army and I!I' galla.nt Cm
-
mander-in-Cbief for a numeroua and well-eqUIpped all' fleet IS
manifestly our duty, and no pains should he spared, and. no
possible means neglected in t.his eude3.\'cur. Our A.erol1au
Icð.l
Department lIas done m
gmficent work
.and for Its achIe\"e-
ments the country owes It a debt of graLltude. B'!t the fact
must be faced that thi3 department is now taxed to Its utmost,
oIInd is not organi"ed on ß scale sußìcient to meet the un-
eJipected E>ituation arisiug out of the war, .
To the excessi,e demands made upon our AeronautIcal
Department must be ascribed th
tbree follov.ing causes of
delay whicb hinder it fl'om takmg full advantage of the
industrial resour<:es of the country.

Tbese causes are:
1. Considerable delay in having the necessary material
passed by the Government inspectors,
2. 1'00 much time is allowed to elapse between tha
giving of consecutive orders. 1.'his is eapecially
the case when orders are given to the smaller
firms.
3. Most serious. The manufacturers experience a
great delay, in some cases extendillg o\"er several
months, before they are paid for the work done
and tbe goods supplied.
The elimination of the!'e three unfortunate causes of
delay brought about by the high pressure at ".-I1Ïch our
Aeronautical Department is now working, would, without any
d<.;ulJt, gn.atly accelerat" our rate of aircraft production.
And as well as the n
c!}ssary removal of this cbeck to
the manufacture of aircraft due to tbe causes ari",ing from
an overtaxed organisation, there are also l1umerOl1S sources
of supply which would, if utilised, stilI further assist to in-
crease our possible rate of aircraft production. As evidence
that tlIese sources of supply are as yet untapped, and a,re
only waiting to be drafted into cbannels of usefulneS3, t1: e
writer will quote from a few of a great number of commum-
cation3 which he bas lately received from industrial firms all
over the country.
In ß letter dated February 17, 1915, a firm having
already experience in the manufacture of aeroplane parts,
says: .. \Ve could easily wake tbree times the qU
lltity if we
had tIle orders; the main difficulty is to get the material
passed by the \Var Office inspectors. For insle-nce, we have
had one order on hand since December last and fini.,hed tho
tools early in tbe year, but we are still without the matel"iaI,
(lur customers informing us that t.hey cannot send the steel
as it has not yet been approved. As it Beems to be only
mild sto::e1 strip for the wire strainers tbere ought not to be
this delay. Provided this obstacle could be removed, \\e could
give immediate delivery, as we h1>.ve the tools made. JJ
Tbe manager of another engineering firm wl"Ítes:
II . . , . Several of our mechanics are at the front.. . but
we are decidedly short of work for those re
nai:lil'
, moi"Uy
0\"61' age, or could not pass the dodor,. . 1.'110 T.la],ing of
aeroplane parts would suit us \'cry well, since we F.re well cut
out for the work. . . . Should you be able to put bome work
in our way, we would all do our best to gi\'e satisf
{-tion.JJ
011 March 3 another firm, evidently not \\or1ing to its
full capacity, writes: II . \\'e La\ e excelknt facilities
for turning out in quantities small fittings, hoth in wood and
metaL JJ
One of the largest contracting firms in this country
writes: .. Weare of opinion that a considerahle amount of
our present machi.nery could be ut
lised . '. . hut, in dl
probability a certalll amount of specIal macblllery would 1Je
necessary. We feel cOl1\in
ed that should our I'
ant be
capaLle of doing the work wIthout any large expendIture of
money for special machinery, our directors. wou!d be only to,

pleased to be of any use to the Government m tIllS \'\ay, ,
From a,nother letter: .. I h8\'e a large factory equiJlped
with up,to-dale mad1Ïnery" aud, owing to the pie. .nt slack-
ness of trade Bame is not belli" fully used, and I tll1"k I could
, 0 . I II
undertake to manufacture any small pall 111 I,cla.
.. ""e have a large pattern-shop, foundry, fcrgin
, turning,
and fitting shop," ,nites another P1anagcr.. \Ve are at
the pre!'tent moment ratber slack, and .could gl\'e ,I)l"o>..pt and
immediate attention to any work WblCh you r:Il
P he able
to place our way. '\Ve enclosc yO? a p
otograL'h h'" . 'g. the
interior of our ererting-shop. wInch WIn gl--e ) T" ""e l(
a
of tlte capacity of our works."
The writer couM give many similar eJl,"t.ra t" from the
numerous letters he i., receiviu" d,lÏly from indt' . I fir inS.
He thinks however, that tbe e
cerpts be has given are cum.
cient to sh
w that tbere are yet a great number of engineering
firms not workinO' at their full capacity, and that these firm.
are willing, anl are prohably sufficiently well-equii','ed, t.a
carry out tbe construction of aeroplane parb.

11*

LAND

AND

THE

WAR
By FRED

"JV.. ATE R.

Äpril 3, 1915.

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTE.-TIIIs Artide bas been submitted to tlte Press Bureau, "bid. does not object to tlte publication as censored, and taJ.u n.
r
sponslbllitJ for the correctness of tlIe statements.

THE l\IEDITERRANEA
.A
D DARDANELLES
U p to the moment of writing plonday evening)
t!lCre is a species of lull in t
e Dardanelles opera-
tIons and a tendency to behe,-e that the set-
ack
received by the French Fleet was more senous
than at first imagined. The paucity of llews
concerning the French is doubtless mainly responsible .ror
this, also the information that navalreinforcemellts are bemg
despatched.
rhis, of courEe, wculd, on the face of it, seem
to suggest tlIat the Allied Fleet lW,3 either been found imufiì-
cient tor the task in hand or c1-<e that it ha3 been damaged
more Ladly than we have been led to belieye,
Actuallv, there appears 110 reason for deQPondency of
IInv kind. No one at
ll conversant with the various factors
ill;olved ever expected that there would be any sort or kind
of walkover. The forb have posÛbly proved more formidabl9
than w
s fir;:;t anticipated, but perhaps the chief of the" moro
formidable than expected JJ factors is the mobile artillery
aUack on the mine-sweepers.
}
ven here, however, it is we!! not to draw too serious
conclusions about the officiall!1 unexpected having happened.
Taking all the informaticn available it wonld appear
that the first big attaclc which led to the destruCtion of the
four forts at the e'ltrance was Eomewhat of the nature of a
reconnaissance in force. It would look as though the in-
tegral idea was to test the defences and weaken them so Î&r
liS might be preparatory to the landing of a strong military
force on thð Gallipoli Peninsul
, such as is now taking place,
and that VlCre was no deliberate intention of attempting tn
force the Narrows. To wtlich may be added (as surmised
last week) the creation of a, di\'ersion to allow time for a Rus-
sian lall(i attack from the nosphorus direction to develop.
There was, perhaps, the further consideration that with
large naval activities taking place so near home Turkish
military operations against Egypt would bo heavily handi-
capped. It is, indeed, quite within the zone of possibilitie3
that owing to the, perhaps uncxpected, rapidity of the recent

rurkish movement against Egypt, the Allied Fleet com-
menced operations at an earlier date than had been origina1!y
intended. This nt any rate would be a quite logical use of 6
Fleet in co,operation with milit:uy operations, and a -cleH
use of the potentialities of S
a Power. History teem3 with
instancea of warship3 being employed to exert, pressure at one
J)oint in order to affect the iS3ue at some other and far
diatant spot.
Any of tIle ahove are fl'r more reasonable suppo3Í( ion!!
than the hasty aS3umption of " someone has blundered," or
that the task ha3 been urderestimated by those respoH;:;iblð
for its inception. 1'here is every expectation of e,'entual
victory, but roseate anticipations of its, early accomplishment
are best left alone. J.'ar more probably there will be slow and
arduous progress, culminating in a sudden and perhaps un-
expected collapse of the defence.
From now onward we may expect the atlack to assume
three distinct phases:
(1) Purely na,"al operation!!.
(2) Purely military operations on sllOr6.
(3) Concerted joint operation3, rc!mlting from the inde-
pendent actions of the first two.
This last, if the teaching of history goes for anything,
will be the critical stage of affairs. In the past combined
Daval and military operations have always had an element of
chance about them; and been brilliantly successful or dismal
failures. according to how far or how -little the naval and
military commanders have understood each othe1'3' limita-
f,ions, and possibilities.
AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES.
A statement has been circulated to the effect that Austria
Is building twenty large submarines with a view to a " sub-
marine blockade" of the Mediterralle:m. That she is build-
ing them is probable enough; but the rest of the story i3
rather ab:mrd. Not only is Austria faced with the problem
of finding trained crews, but she is a1so confronted with the
problem of how to get through the French blockade in the
Adriatic, to say nothing of bases and the return home again.
Probably the real idea is some kind of counter-attack on
tho Allies in the Dardanelles, or on trade therelhrough later

on, when Constantinople bas fallen. The threat can !Rfely
be heavily discounted, whatover form it may ultimately take.

SUB!\IARINE Al\'D TORPEDO OPERATIONS.

TIÚs being the firzt war in which submarines lla\'"e taken
a rea} part tIH'Y were bound to be a factor of varying import-
ance with a hypothetic;:,l value rising and falling until t1l9
submarine had ac l justed it;:;ðlf into the general scheme of
thil 1 gS. The past saw a precisely similar process in connec-
tion with torpedo craft_ In the early days of the
e nearly
every admiral held views towlly different from those of every
otlIer admiral--thcl'e views running the whole gamut from
omnipotcr.ce to impotence.
1'his varialion of opinion was little if at all due to pre-
dilecLioll, progressi....i;:;m, or conservatism; but almost entir
ly
caused by personal experiences, which in the early da!"
varied very considerably_ A brief study of thð e";olutioll of
torpedo craft will thereìore go far to elucidate the position
of submarines in the present war; all the more so, perhap9,
bec:m';e Admiral Fisher has been so closely identified with
the progre33 of both arms, and his work in Loth cases has
fullowed the same general idea.
Like the suhmarine, the torpedo-hoat first appeared as
a vory triyial craft armed with a very inefficient weapon. In
the American Civil \Yar of some fifty yearn ago it was a
hybrid sort of ve
sel--ha1f submarine, half torpedo-boat.
seemingly just a3 likely to develop in one direction as in the
other. In the yea1'3 that followed it developed as an above-
water craft, iu part owing to the difficulties which then
existed in connection with suitable submarine motive power.
in l}art owin<>' to the fact that in the war of 1877 the Russians
extemporised launches as spar torpedo boats, and made a 1l'a,.
factor of them, in part because of the advent of the \Yhite-
head torpedo, which l'cndered the boat's actual contact witla
the enemy no longer neL'essary _ 1'here was no adapting the
\Yhitohead to the elementary idea of a suhmarine,
Some two or three years later, the old ll'fn:iblr (the
n,.radnoll[Jltt of her day) was equipped wilh a con pIe of small
torpedo-boats, wh
ch she carried as an integl"ill portion of her
armament, and it was Lord :Fisher (then captain of the In-
fl';l'i"!-) wbo, askeù what be woukl ùo if he met a warship
equal to hi;:; own, replied that he would prohably net engage
her and risk recei\-ing as much darpage as he coulù inflict.
but wait tillllighL and then send Lis torpeùo-boats to attack
tho enemy_
Thereafter Lord Fisher was closely aR'iociated with lhe
development of the torpedo-boat as a self-contained sea-going
otfen5i\'o arm. Sillce he was the creator of the r rTnon tor-
pedo scheol he may he regarded as tho father oÌ our torpeclo-
service in very e:uly days. "
'l'his development was later on attended wIth varYlDg
fortunes, }'or example, in the 1890 naval mana-un'e:!, the
entire fleet of olle side was torpedoed almost immediately
after" War was declared.''" 1'he circumstance was more or
less lmshed up at the time so far as the general puhlic was
concerned-and the event" was considered 1I0t to have taken
place" on the grounù;; of some technical poiLit. ill the reaùi'lg
of the rules.
Still, here wa!! tIle torpedo-boat in a Rtate of omnipo-
tence, In the following year, howe,-er, certain speci:J.l torpedo
manæm-res w!Jre carried out wilh entirely different result'!,
the toroedo,boats LeinO' hunted down and renùereù impotent
.I. 6 0 . 1
to an extraordmarv degree. In the ne'd year agalfi somewnal&
sil:"'ilar r
5u1ts occ
ure..L I am writing as an eye-witne
s of
the,'!e variou3 operations anJ of many thing
which happened,
Lut, \'ery prop
rIy, did, not find tileir ':ay
u
o print at. the
time. 1'he swmg of tHe pendulum ot opllllOn was extra-
ordinary.
1'hese variou!l operations ullimately l
d to the evolution
of "de;;trovers," on the homeopaLIiic p:'illciple that .. the
torpedo-boa-t i3 the correct reply to the torpedo-hoR t."
Generall y S p eakin". there followed a vel'y general cOll\'idion
<> '.
that the torpedo menace was an empty llilase; a state 0,
opinion which endureù till I
ord Fishel' (then ('ommal1dt>r-in-
Chief in the Mediterranean) starLled the worI,l by gi\'Ü:ð" U}J
the time-honoured" ;,team tactics" aud substituting lh,:,'e

for the :>va.3ion of torpedo craft.
It i3 indicativa of .. opinion JJ at that ti!ne that for thii

12.

April 3, 1915,

LAND

AND

lie wa!l most fiercely assailed and criticised, de
pite the fact
tl:at once at least in test operations his entire fleet ",as
torpedoed. HO"ß"cver, the net result was the rehabilitation
c! torrcdo craft and very large destroyer programmes. In this
f.tage the torpedo-boat itself practically disappeared, its place
being taken by the destroyer, which was facilt'- princcps till
the Russo-Japanese "Tar, wherein it accomplished less than
the enthusiasts had expected, mainly because war experience
taught means of evading the worst dangers.
This particular ",a1' also taught the future possibilities of
I!ubmarines, despite the fact that the elementary bcats there
engaged proved absolutely non-effective.
rhe net result of
the \\ ar was that the destroyer assumed its proper place in the
6cheme of things-roughly something midway bet",een the
two extreme points of ,dew which were held in the past. The
mo
t generally accept
d modern view is that if destroyers find
battleships at night they will successful!y torpedo them-their
handicap is the Dnding.
Now, if we come to consider tbe evolution of tbe sub-
marine, we find a not very dissimilar series of vicis
itudes.
. From being tIle idle dream of inventors, the submarine
luddenly came to be regarded as an invincible arm, destined
to sweep the seas of all abo\-e-water craft. That was before
our Na.y had any submarine.., or in the carly days of the
elementary Hollands, which bave long since been scrapped.
IJater came a pelicd when it became known that only one
IIf our Holland submalines had ever tOl"pedoed a \\arship
under battle conditions. This was subsequently follo\\'ed by
a Eeries of ùisa6ters of which the net result was a decided
tenùency unduly to depreciate the value of the submarine.
From here onward" it if:, for ob,'ious reawns, inad\'isable
to deal too fully with the course of events. It suffices to say
that some little while before the war the wbmarine had easily
reverted to a position of very high importance; while we had
Ule official st.atement. that it was probably de
tined e\entuaHy
to replace t.he de
tro
'er altogether. _
Since the war vicissitudt"s have continued. It is cln:r
tbat tbe German
placed unlimited faith in thE'ir submaril'es
-8 faith \\hich, at any rate till quite recel,tly, OppUlt'O! t

be abundantly jUFtified. I say .. appeared" because while
their successes can be counted, the rccord of their faiiures is
l1eces
a1'Ìly vague. Some- record of tcrpedees whicb failed to
11it officially exi
ts no doubt, but a record of how many
German submHines failed to gain suitable po
ition" for attack
must r.eces
arily be unknown. \';hat we do know, howen
r,
is t}1at me-ans for combating the .. new danger JJ aro being
de-adily perfected-three German submarines having hc(n
officially
tated as sunk by the N av)' since the blockade began,
plus
tl)er los
cs cf "hich no full details are available. The
net re,ult of this is perhaps an undue dl'preciaticn of the sub-
marine t]<lll submarine.
Yery e!'rJy in the war I ventured to prophesy in these
Notes that for rea EOns ha.ing to do \\ ith the lu-rmlilltl, G
r-
man submarines would eventually prove far l..s!! efficient tbm

mr own, and that we should fiml the bulk of the \';ork èor.e
l'y a few only of their boats. This last has certainly hap-
pened. [' ;!R, sunk la
t week, ",as commanded by the !'.U:II'
officer who distinguished himself against our CraÚ,.,
in z: 9,
and wlto, in his new command, did most of such work as \\ as
dcne by the .. blockaders. " In
il bmarines t!lC n
::,'J :s co'-
t.ainly more than the machine; and G..rn::an na\-al officers M (I
cla.;s lack tbat ability to adapt themselves to the peculiar
conditions, as between officers and men. which are e!'scnlial
to the successful and effective use of submarine
, and ,"'hidl
c:.bLain in our E'en-ice.
Here a worcl or two may be said about the curious thecry
belJ by a EOmewbd considerable section of t.be British puhlie
that the German submarine service is superior to our 0\\ n.
It is well to correct tllis idea. It is obvious tbat so far as
f1.atérÙ:l is concerned, as a gf'neral rule, the bigger the bod
the more potentiaUy efI
dive
he must he.
Now, any British boat is larger than any Germ
n boat d
equal datc-we have always led in dimensions. Increased
dimensions necessarily mean increased !'peed, or illcre;o.
ed
radius, or increased habitability {a .ery important point), or
very pos
ibly all three in varying degree. Our hoats are,
therefore, as machines, capable of accomplisl1Ìng all that the
perman boats have done, and more. This is obvious.
As regards pasmwcl I have already eXplained "here
our advantage lies. Yet there is the unfortunate public im-
pre
sion which justifies the sarcastic na '"a I jest: .. To the
public e..-ery German submarine is a pirate, eHry Briti
h
!iubmarine inefficient I ..
In vain did the Jf:raelites of old explain the impossibility
('of making bricks "ithout straw. Egyptian ideas on tIle
ro
sible and impossible still IJrevail. _vletaphorically
peak-
ing. our submarine sen ice is .. .without straw JJ in ju
t tlJe

W ATE U,

fame way as is our battle fleet. And so we hear little or no-
thing of the weary routine of work of our boats, and as a nation
fail to realise that they arß .. containing JJ the enemy, despite
the fact that a fast squadron has slipped out now and aO'ain
withcat loss from our submarines. 0
To turn to Plore general matters, it seems clear from
recent events that tbe submarine is essentially the weapon
of the stronger power, and likel) to grow less and less impor-
tant as the weapon of the weaker. The whole or most of tha
destruction wbich our X avy has inflicted on German sub-
marines has been mainly due to the fact that we are the
stronger power. llad the Germans been able to support their

l1bmariße .. blockaders" with cruisers, they would have had
none of the hazard of secret bases, and their liability to be
rammed would ha\ e beEn reduced to a minimum.
If, and wh
l1. the German big ships (jffer opportunity to
0111' submarines, these two incOJlYenieuces will be absent on
our side, and we may confidently lock forward to the sub-
warine coming definitely into its own as the weapon of the
Etronger naval power. As the weapon of the weaker we may
(as measures to neutralise its menace are developed) look to
bee it fade in importance. Tl1Ìs, of course, is exactly what
eventually happened with torpedo craft.
For the rest, the Admiralty figures of the net result of
tIle submarine l}lockade dUl'ing one mopth are nineteen
British merchant ships sunk, out of 5,970 which reached or
left home ports during tbe same period. The chances of loss
"'Ere, therefore, just about 1 in 314; and something like half
Il dozen" pirates" may have been accounted for-lest in the
procef:!'. 'fhis wcrks out at an average of six ships per pirate.
The cost of German submarines (pact'- a recent o!l1Ïssion
of a cipher in all answer to a correspondent) works out at
from :1:60.000 to :1:100,000 for the little boat.., and about
:1:170,000 for the larger. As the blocka,ders are mainly large
submarines we may pool the average cost per boat at.
Toughly, :1:150,000. Allowing for torpedoes expended, up-
keep of tenders. a,nd "hat not, the blockade lllust ha
,e cost
Germany pt least one and a half million pounds in dead loss
_ q'lite probably it bas co
t her two millions, and this irre-
spect.Î\"e of loss of "ar hen' ices of her E'ubmarines, and effective
crews now òro"ned or captureò, who can hardly be replaced
within the time-limits of lùodem war.

AERIAL OPERATIONS.
German aircraft llave also co-operated in the submarine
.. b]ockade," but so far without any result whatever. A 8tOry
has been published of one British merchant ship which fired
rockets at an e.ttacking aE'roplane and frightened it off accord-
ingly. The story may be ac;?epted-with some limitations;
the chances of hittiug being to all intent5 and }HnpOSes non-
exi
tent. 1'he aeroplane is reported to have sought higher
altitudes in consequence of being fired at: possibly the pilot
buspected some new kilìd of \>"ar rocket with wire entangle-
ments attached.
'Yhile the German aircraft have beE'ß mostly engaged in
more or less fatuous operations, the British aeroplanes have
been conducting operations of a direct military significance.
Bombs have been droppeJ on a German submmine yard 1'<1-
centl, e
tablished &t Hoboken.
The exact amo\lnt of damage done is nece
sari]y conjec-
tural; but., according to Dutch report.., one suhmarine W3S
destroyed, and others damaged, considerable havoc 1-eing abo
'Hought on the work
h{\ps.

MR, H1Lo\lRE BELLOC"S WAR LECTURE3.
LonJon,........... Quem.1! Ha!!...... \Yedncsday.. ....... 7 April, 8.30 p.m.
A sel"ies of Iprtu
es pn the Progres:, pf the \,"ar f!'Om monlh to month
"ill 1,1' gin'l at Queen's Hall on the first Wednesday in April,
laJ.
and .TuN!, Scats arc now beir.g allotted.
A leC"ture "ill dso he gi
e'1 at the Opera Housl', Tunbridge Wells,
on :Friùa
'. April 9, nt 3.
, on .. The Strat:>gy of tile War."

\IR. FRED T. JA
E'S LECTI'RFS ON TIlE Nt\VAL WAR.
Tnr(jliay............J'a\ iliPn...........,- 8atnrda
'..,....,..... 3 April, 3 p.m.
l'l
-moutb....,.....GuildhaU........... \Vednesday.,....... 7 l\pril, 8 p.m.
MR. CRAWFL"RD PRICE (Eyt:.
,i;nes8 in the East) LECTURES
ON ShnBlA-Tile T:i'e o! 0 Gallant No:;oo.
ElaekplJoI......... "inter Garden.... 'fue3'lar,............. 13 ApI;!.
Yo: k,.............. Opera Hou.c....... \\'edoesda).......... 14 AiJli1, 3 p,m.
:\fau hester....... Free 1'r.II.Je Hall. Thl11sda)'... .. 15 .-\rllil, 8 p.m.
::;c,uthpolt.......... CamLlidgo Hall.. }..li(!3y.......,.. ,.. 16 April, 8 p.m.

\Ye Ita"e re{"l'iwù a co:'y of .. Warren.s :\Iap Gu:Je .. to the motor.
moto
c
'de, anù c
,le trade.. in Londol1. It forms a uscf"l and ,aluable
(tì:('doQ', as it contains en'ty ()lie connected with thEse traùes in
alrha
tical orùrr, a'td a!lI-:> geographically arranged o\er SCHilt" maps,
5') a.
to show the e
.n,'L pO!lition of each firm. It is a !'treet guide to
o
er 8.000 ët-eds, anù aùdn'.
s "an be turned up either from the
I>lreft.s or {mill tho aII,I...bcli"i:.J 1;"'1. 11 ï.; a ,-aluaLlc book for motOli
t.

I Ù n'c
;)r l')"CIu,t3.

13"

L
\ N D

AND

THE

PASSAGE

WATER.

April 3, 1915.

OF

THE

RHINE.

By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

rnrXG the h:st few weeks the Allies, each in their
D
eparate spheres of action, have completely demon-
t-tl'ated their power to hold their ground anywhere
and everywhere that it may please the enemy to
assail them, On the French frontier we have indeed gone
farther, and 113\'e given comincÌng proof tLat we can malce
the Germans dance to our piping-in other words, they nlust
attaclc us where and whcn \\e dictate, and not where they
migùt them:,elves choose to strike.
This ought to satisfy tIle most. greedy for the moment.
But. 1i0 !'ooner is one bogey laid than another springs up,
Judging from my correspondence and the daily papers, our
people now appear to be obsessed by the fear that we shall
vever be able to force the passage of the Rhine.
I cannot share this fear, or doubt, for after studying
that river from thi3 point of view for very many years, and
aetting a
ide ior a time t.he question of improvell1ents in arma-
ment, I know very well that t.he pa!'sag<' of the Rhiue has
been forced again and again, and" V.hat man has done, man
can do." is
g
od working mollo,
Now there is a curio:!s paradox about the pas
age of
waterways which !Ias never rec'3i,"ed the attention it df!òt;n"es;
it is one- that military hist.ol'Y shows as holding true within
limits quite wide enough for the present purpose, and thi&
is, that once a strEam becomes too deep to wade a,nd too
wide to jump, tho:! wider it grows, still remaining navigable,
and the longer it becomes, the easier it is to surprise or force
its passage, .
This is only another way of expressing the Axiom that the
Power which controls the sea can disembark its troops, within
cer:-ain limits. wherever it pleases. But though sea power
depends on fleets, it is the fire power carried by the 8hips,
not. the ships themselves, that confers the ultimate power.
In all fighting,
ince firearms definitely established them-
selves a,; the principal weapons on the battlefield, no position
has ever been carried, except by surprise, until or unle
s the
assailant llas first established a local superiority of fire power;
and as far as the defenders are concerued it has been quite
immaterial to them, once the superiority has been acknow-
ledged, whether the weapons which delivered the bullets were
fired from a floating or a land platform.
The case of the Yser Canal and Dixmude is not to the
point here, because it was not only too short for t.he numbers
engage] to admit of a genuine surprise, but also because the
Germ"ns never really succeeded iu obtaining a sufficient fire
Buperiority, except quite locally, and for an insufficient time.
The Rhine, however, is some 400 miles in length from
Basle to the Dutch frontier, and is navigable throughout the
wholc of this course,
It is also everywhere 1'0 wide that unless it is illuminated
from end to end by flares, star-shells, or searchlights-a some-
what lar<;:e order-ordinary darkne
s is quit,e enough to hide
the movements of men on the one bank from sight on the
other bide of the river, except where it runs between rocks,
j.
., from Bingen to Coblentz, From below Goal' to Bonn
the clay banks, some 15 feet sheer, are covered wit.h reeds
and scrub, giving concealment from anything except aero-
plalH's,
BeEnd this screen the concentration of men and gear
necessary for
he construction of rafts or bridges hI's always
been made.
Belew Cologne-indeed, in several other places-where
thE' river widens out. the breadth is too great for tIle fire of
the old,fi!
hioned muskets to reach across it; even the field
artillery of Napcleon's time did not effect much damage
again
t such targets as the enemy allowed them to see,
The boats atte-mpting the crossing therefore had to facs
the um,haken-i.
" ainll'd fire of the defenders, which up to
200 yards was about as accurate as t.hat of modern rifles at
800, and there was then no shrapnel shell to cmupel the
attackers to kei!p their heads under cover,
Of course the assailant always tried to surprise an
unguardeà passage; very generally he succeeded in so doing.
But he could never be SUl'e that his surprise would in fact
mate1"Ïali::.e; consequentJ y he had to set his teet hand Ù8 pre-
pared for the worst. before making the attempt.
At. tIle pl'e cuL time, thank::, to the increased ran<<e of all
arms and to the Ï1.lllllensely augmenLed power of ou; shells,

the conditions ha\"6 altered enormously in our favour, I UB.
the word" enormously JJ with deliberation, and not loosely,
because it is impossible to give an exact numerical ratio to
define it,
But let anyone who wishes to arrive at a real approxima-
tion of the advantages we now po
sess, take a scale map of any
big river running through plains or lightly rolling country,
and having selected any point for crossing, strike two arcs
from itr-one of 3,COO yards, tIle other of, say, 12,OOO-and
then calculate the area enclosed between them which would
be awtilable for placing his co,'ering batteries.
Then remember that. the advantage accruing is not only
due to the greater opportunities for concealing his guns
afforded by the outer area, but also to the ampler space
secured for the placing of still more batteries-which do not!
need to be in one line nowadays, but can be arranged behind
and ill front of one another to fire over each other's heads.
You can have eit1ler perfect concealment and fewer gun!
or less concealment and more guns, but the advantage is
always partial concealment and in proportion a greater
number of guns.
On such an area you could in fact place all the heavy
batteries of the French and Briti
b Annie!' without serious
inconvenience to one another, and thanks to our aeroplane
ascendancy, you could converge aJI their fire on a single point!
of your own choice.
The passage of a rÏ\'er is in fad only the same problem
of the a,gsault on Neuve ChapeJIe, for example, with the
Eldvantage thrown in that a close f]l"e defence of the lastl
100 yards or so is quite impossible owiug to the sheer fall of
the banls into the ri,-er.
Trenches could not exist on this slope in view of the
enemy, and the firing liuc must of necessity be drawn well
back from it, while we, on our side, can scarp down the edge
of the bank, and convert it into a firing position for our
subsequent advance.
Moreover, by the time we reach the Rhine-and that may
not be long ahead as things are going now-the quality of
the troops opposed to us will be ,'ery much lower than those
we have already faced, and, after, all, ,\hat,ever may be the
nature of an obstacle, it is not the natural impediment to
physical progress that signifies, but the courage of the men
who stand behind it.
This subject is of such great practical interest at Ula
moment to tbose of our men who will have to undertake the
exploit of carrying the Rhine, that I would suggest to my
readers to secure, if possil'le, some military histories of classio
passages of rivers, 1citlt 1Il0P,q, and send them out

t
leir
friends in the trenches, so that the men may be famlhansed
by lectures, given in billets, wiLh the real nature of the task
before them,
Jourdan's passage of the Rhine at Nenwied in 1794;
Napoleon's passage of the Danube at the. Isle of Lob.a?,
n
1809; the Russian passage of the same nver below 81hstna
in 1877. are instances whieh occur to me,
No> very precise detail is needed; the essential point can
easily be hrouaht out--yiz" the increased area between the
two arcs referr
d to alJove for the placing of the guns. This
can be convincingly shown with a blackboard and chalk;
failing that, the diagram could be drawn with a stick on the
ground.
The essence of the tIling is t1lat what our ancestors did
that we can also do, more especially since we now possess an
ovcrwhelming advantage on our side,
That much of the correspondence that has been addressed
both to the Editor a,nd myself on military matters has been
unanswered must not be regarded in any way a'! an act of
discourtesy, but has been due to the iJI-health of the writer,
who hopes to deal with them at an early date.

A 'Vellington and ""aterloo loa,n colIedi<:n of pictures,
rop
i
,
&c., in thia centenary
'ear of the gl'..at battlo, IS conl
mplat-e<1I'3 a1<1 vI
Queen Alexandra's :Field Force Fund; and the Hon. Charlutte KnulI
s,
at :M"ulborou"h HoU.!!e, ha'l addresscd a. letter concerning it to Mr. ,1.
Landfear Luc
'1, of the. HurIin:;ham Club and the Spectacle :\Iakers'
l.'ompan)'.

At the Annual Gpnpral !lleetitlg of the Hunters' JmprovempntJ
fiocietv it was unanimouslv resolved thnt the sum of f:25 should bl!
allocated for the relief of sick lInd wounded horses in th-e War. Afte.
conside1Ïn" the clAims of the Blue CroS.'! Society and of the R.S,P.C._\.
FU11d for
j{"k and \\OImded horses, the meeting dedd<Jd that th
s.urs
vot-e<1 ahould be equally divided between the two a.bove-na.med Socletle__

14*

.Avril 3, 1915.
...

LA
D

AND

ATER.

CORRr
SPONDENCE.

A
APPEAL.
To the Editor of L.\
D A!,D Vi T "-TER.
DE\R SIR,-After the outbreak of the war my husband
and I. wi
hing to do .. our little bit," subscribed o\er :1::100
t.owarùs the war relief funds Rl1d ga\ e hospitality to se\"eral
Belgian refugees.
But when Lord Kift'hener's appeals kept c0l 1 1ing for
more men and still more II..el', mv husband decided that he
ought to offer himself, so he thre
l up his bu
ine-"!! and also
resigned a working directorship Lringing him in :E300 a year
and joined as a private in the O,T,C.
He has just now got his commi"éon and find!! hi'1lf.elf

traitened in means for the purchasc of needed extras.
So I v. rite to ask you if you would be so good as to
il1<;ert thi!! lett"r in YOllr papcr in case any of your readers
feel dispcsed to lend to my hmband for the period of the \Yar
any of thc following:
A pair of biuoculars.
A revolver.
A sword.
A pri3matic compas
.
Credentials would be sEont. to any person!! good enough to
.fier such welcome help.-Belie\"e me, yours faithfully,
OFFICER'S \v.FF, K,A.
X .B.-R
plies to this l"tter should be addressed to the
Editor, LÅ
D A:,D '\T ATER .

AMBl'LA
.jCE.
'1'0 tile Editor of LA:;;n AKD 'YATER,
DE\R Sm.-Since the middle of December I have been
In France anù Belgium aU ached to an Ambu1ance Corp"
but owing to various reasons. wc 111\\ e never been a Ue to do
the work ,,'e expected to. I and t\\-o others 1lave now leÍt
the Corps and are very anxious to get to work. I should be
glad if you could hindly put llS iu touch with :my bcdy whiLh
would be glad of our services. I have a beautifu1 ambulance
to accommodate four stretcher
or ten sitting-up cases, and
drive and care for the car myseìf, amI hold .First Aid certi-
ficates. Mrs, Campbell co01{s, drives, nurse!', and does First
Aid. 1\1rs. Ore-Patclson is a trained nurse. Our services
are given v01untarily. \Ye are willing to go to France,
Delgium, Set'bia, the ]}arda.IeUes, anywhe'e at 8.11 where
there is plenty of hard work. Our l'ea"on for leaving the
Corps was that we realised the impos"ibility of a pIÏ\'ate un
t
ever being allowed to work,
If YOll could give me the names of any units needing help
to whom we could apply, I should be most. grateful.-Yours
truly,

(Miss) O. KELso KU;G.
SwcetlJa\\s Grange, Crowhorough, f:,us
eA,

KH,\KI.
'To the Editor of L
KD AXD WATER,
Sm,-It may interest your corrc"pondent B ,Yo Stainton
Rnd others of your readers to know that khaki was used for
militarv uniformR in India in 1857. Dunlop's Khaki Risala,
of \\ohi
h my father was a member, was a V01unteer Force
of cavalry raised at :Meerut during the :Mutiny, and did very
gooù work in that district, I belie\-e their uniforms were
dyed with a reddish-brown earth called" Mu1tani Mutti."
The only really fast khaki dye I know which will stand
e-
peated washing without losing its c010ur, and I have trIed
mR1IY, is that invented by the firm of Lehmann and Gatty,
Khaki, of course, is the Hindustani for dust,-Yours
faithfully,

I!\DIC'"["s.

Po
esdown.

1\1 0 TOR A
I B U LAN CBS N BED ED,
7.'0 tll
Editor of I.AXD AND \VATER.
DEAR SIR -This will be .. world without enù .. so long
as it is left to i>ri\ ate owners of cars to give them free, gratis,
and for nothing. Our soldiers are wounded in the service
of their country, and for this service funds are provided by
their country. Why should it stop short there an
Bay:
.. Now we have done with you, find Borne good samarItan to
come and he1p you and set you on his own beast'"
ure
y
it is up to that same country to supply the beast. If It WIll
do this there will be an ample supply of samaritans.
Because people have been able to buy a car - often. at
con
iderab1e sacrifice-wIlY are they to be expected to gIVe
it up any more than th()
e who ha\e hOl'
e
, a/ld vans, and
10nie", for nothing 1

There is an enormous amount of cars 80 owned in the
country "hich would at once be at the disposal of the Red
<.'ross 01' any other ho
pitaJs if the 0\\ ners were guaranteed
that their cars would be replaced at the end of the war or if
a fair sum would be given for them at the start; and, more
than this, the owners wou1d ill many cases be wining to give
their services free if it were demanded for the conveyance of
the wounded from field to ho
pital. If it was dearly under-
stood that no car wouJd be accepted unless it were strong
and se
viceable as to chassis, sound in every way as to engine,
and dnvers must be thoroughly ccmpdent for the work, and
the o'\'.ners wou1d be at no loss, there would be an ample
sUfply of cars and drivers fer al1 requirements, and the
pitiful tale of the wounded left for hours and days untended
\\ ould cease. .:\lany car:; would be u"eful aR tbey are. In the
c:o"e of ambulance bodies b;;ing required, these ought to be
supplied, and not left to the 0\\ ner to rig up a body which
" ought to do."
For this pUl'pose cars
hould be real1y good, well hung,
and well
prl1ng; thereby mu-:-h suffering will be saved to
the wuunded, for whom they ale intended. Now that the
1arge stock of second-hand or, to spf'ak more t.ru1y, tenth-
hand CRrs has been e:!.hausted and left in the B"I"Í:m or
French ditch, the gcc.d and souml car will co'ne Ï1
to use.
I know, because I ha,"'e seen that the depots for these have
been practically cleared out; and at one of the large
in
the country I v.as told by the manager that the ambu1ance
h:ul heen a gcdcelld to them, a<; it took all the old chassii
which they had had in stock for years, and had given up all
hope of sel1ing, This is not the kind of ambulance to offer
to a \\ cunded man, nor cau it he sound bu:o:iness to u"e a
\Vorn-out aJ tide which must be left by t he road
ide III II
few d2's.
TJ;is is a War Ollic/> job amI should be takcn in band
at once,- Yours faithfully,

H.GRßERT OKrDI:
.

TIlE SMALL f1R:\1.
To the Editor of L"'''D A'o,D \-Y.\TER.
SIR,-In a recent issue "Oue of the }}rÎ1J1'ipals of a
Small :Firm " laments that orders for WRr mat-erial all go to
tha big J!lanufachu'ers.
Your correspondcnt i<; evidently not a manufacturer of
textile
, or he might havc a differe 1 1t tale to telL
The experience of tllO!'e in the textile> tradi!s is tbat as
often as not manufacturers, hrth large and small, arc passed
by altoget.her, and the contracts are gi....en to middlen;en, who
may know nothing whatever about the goods they handle.
Over rnd over again has it happened in I.anca...hire and York-
shire that a manufacturer sends in his tender, and after
ome
wceks' waiting }'ecci\'e9 the official intimation that his offer is
dediuerl. and then a few dap l::ter sellR the identical goods
to a middleman (the succe.3sful tenderer) at a higher price
than he quoted direct.
The soldiers' clothes and equipment besr, accordingly,
t,wo profit", though there is evide,)tly no valid reason why
they should bear morc than ('ne. A" to how this comes about,
there may be various opinions, Among disinterested
oh,eNers there can be but one opinion as to whether the
puhlic good is served thereby.
Yours faithfully,
.. OXE OF THE PRIXCII'ALS OF A LARGE FIRM,"
,50, riccaàilly, JlJandle"ter,

CANADIAN RED CROSS.
'1'0 the Eùitor of LA
D A
D WATER,
nFAR SIR,-May we a!'k, as a great favour, that the
accompanying notice be inserted in L\SD ASD "TATER:
The Information Department of the Canadian Red Cross
Society, 14, Cockspur Street, gratefully acknowledges the
many generous offers which hm, c been made to it on behalf of
the sich and wounded of the Can:ldian contingents.
Offers of priyate hospitality, oî dri\'es for convalesceDts, of
singing ill tlJe hospitals ha\e all been noted, and will be made
use of as occasion arises.
'For the present the number of yoluntary visitors t.o the
bo
pita1s in :London is sufficient,
Thanhing you for ) our liud consideration,
incerel,
)'ourB,

(Lady) J"CLJA DRm"'o!o
D.
C,UJ. dwn REd Cro
<; Society, Coc'.' pur Rh'''et., R.\Y,.

15*

LAND

AND

LETTER CASES.
To the Editor of LAXD AXD W
TER,
Dr:.\n Sm,-Finding that thera is a great demand for
small waterproof pocket letter-nses for the soldier;!, I am
employing some women 011t of work to m
ke t?em. . _
Thev measure 6! hy 4
lllche:!, are light III weight, an,}
,Çonhiu
rit.ina materil1ls.
I can sUI
ply them at 9lL each, which cO\-ers CO?t of
material and making aud leaves a surplus over tq haud to the
Red Cr053 and St. John Ambulanc.e Societies,
The C3ses were greatly appreciated during the South
.Afrieall war, and I ha,-e sent many to the front now.
I shall be very glad to receive orders.-Yours truly,
C. :MI:,XIE Gi!EE!'I'.

The :\Iooriag'l, St. Albal13.

SIGNALLING IN THE FIELD,
To the Ellitor of LA
,D AXD 'VATER.
SIR.-:\Ior:'O and !'cmaphGre, wilh flag, or di
c, or hand,
ha,'c each marki'll disa(h-antage3. Morse is slow to semI-
semaphore require3 quite six feet of cover behinù the Bender.
I suo-aest the followilla n:etJ.wd of renderin a semaphore les:l
o::t 0 0
conspicuous:
Substitute for the lowest radii a wave of the flag from B
tl) F and hack and from F to Band back-e,g" A becomes a
wa,'e of the flaCO' from B to F and back, G a wa\'e of the fle,g
from F to n a:d back, I a si
n-Ieft hand as at present at C
riaht a waH' of the hand fr
m n to F and back, N crossing
o ,
waycs from Band F. 1'he time lost to semaphore A, G, H,
I, K, L, )1. K, Z. X, Y, wa,-e, and S is at the rr,ost one letter
for lel tel'. Time stiìl gained oyer l\Iorse all other letters except
T and E (perhaps I). In the suggested code A = about---,
G = about - - . less one -, If
about. . . . le
s one .,
I - . . plus one ., K = -. - less one -, anll so Oil.
A man sitting down could use tllis code with his hands or
with disc3 and be screened by a fair-sized bush. III this
country a g{)C3e bush would cover a man sending by hand.
sitt,ing down. \Vould it coyer him standing up or kneeling t
The answer is, very rarely.-Yours truly,
" FL.\.GWAG.",

Bath Club, Dover Street.

SL"B
IARINH CHASERS.
fo the Editor of L!.ND AXD \Y A.TER,
SIR,-I read wit'h great interest the proposals put for-
ward by your corre'pondent "J. R." in your iggue of
March 20, As I am of the opinion that it is quite practicable
to ev.oÌ\'e a sati<!faclory " submarine chaser" on much more
modest and economicalline3 than those suggested by" J. R.,"
it is possib1e that you may consider the following as being of
sufficient interest for publication,
As a beginning I may say that I agree with your corre-
8pondent'i! general conclm,ions aa to Bpeed, armament, &c"
except that I con
ider that a Bpeed margin of 10 to 12 knots
,quite sufficient for the pm'pose.
My objedion to the vessel proposed by " J. R," is that
it would be unnecessarily expensi\'e and that it would re-
("juire too large a crew to operate. Incidentally I Illay point
out that your correspondent's proposal is similar in almost
every respect to the .. 30 knot" destroyers turned out in
the later 'nineties, which were 210 feet long, 350 tons dis-
placement, 6,000 I.ll.P., nnd 8 feet draught. This type,
however, carried the comparatively powerful armament of
one 12pr, Q,F., fÌ\'e 6pr. Q,F., and two tOi"pedo tubes, and
consequently if broug}.t up to date would be ootLer vessels
than that prop05ed by "J. R."
Now as to an altemati..e. There are in the French Navy
th1'ee or four score "Torpilleurs de Defence Mobile," Nos.
295-369, built 1903-1909, and ha,'ing the fcllowing char-
acteristics: Length 122 feet, displacement 97 tons, 2,000
I,H.P" and 26 knoh Bpeed, These handy little craft aro
armed 'with hem Bmall Q,F. guns and three torpedo tubes.
What we want Íi! somet
ing a little lighter Ilnd faster; a com-
promise between the French boats and the Tllrùinia would
a
out .. fill the bill."
The Tllr!,inia, mentioned by your correspondent, was
100 feet long, 4-1 tom displacoment, 2,300 I.H,P., and 34

knots speed,
1'he
approximate particulars of the type I sugge
t would
be as fo!lcws: Lengtb, 105 feet; beam, 12 feet 6 inche ;
dl'3ught of hull, 4 feet; e1J:treme, 5 feet; displacement, 75
tom; I.H,P., 1,800; speed, at least 28 knots. The sp<'9<l esti-
In:!!:.e is mOlte
t, 83 it i" based on an Admiralty co-efficient of
200, wherea; the corre3pondina fi"ure in the case of t,he Tur-
binia was c\'er 220. 1'l1e ma('hin
ry would be eithor turbine

v.. ATE R.

April 3, 1915.

or internal comhustion engines of the Bame type a8 installed
in submarines. Possibly the laLter would be preferable as
Leing Ellready a standard pattern and capable of quick and
easy manufacture.
The armament would consist of a 12pr. Q.F. forward and
a 3pr. Q,}:o'. aft, on an anti-aircraft mount.ing. I
ave n?"
been able to investigate the weights of such a vesselm detaIl,
but it might also be possible to mount Il torpedo tuhe.
A vessel such as I ha.....e prop03ed would not cost more
than one-third of tho cost of the type proposed by " J. R.,"
and could be manned by a crew proportionately small. There
are many smaH yards in which vessels of this kind could be
built without di
turbing the supply of the present needs of
the Government, ancI they could be largely maImed from the
ranks of the Motor Boat Iteserve.-Yours !lincerely,
J. D. C.

Glasgow.

OUR l\10TOR AI\1BULANCE
APPEAL.
AN EXCELLENT START.
By A THERTO
FLEMING.
I ' T iõl my ..-cry pleasant duty this week to announce that ati
the time of going to press we are in receipt of a large
, uumber of Bubscriptiom for the benefit of this fund,
the amounts ,"arying from one ,.hilling to thirty
pounds. The first appeal to onr read8rs has produc{)d
nearly one-quarter of the amonnt asked for, 1'his is exceed-
ingly Batisfactory, and no more than I expected from the
readers of L,
XD AXD WATER. Ne,'erthelæs, more money is
wantell, and, for the benefiL of t.hose ,,-ho have not ns yet
read the appeal which npp<Jared in our la5t issue, I reproduce
hereunder t.his rouah outline of the scheme:
1. That a
ubscription list be opened with t.his issue
of LAXD .um \VATER for the purpose of raising the Bum
of :1:500.
2. That this sum be devoted to the purchase and
equipment of a Buitable mot,or ambulance, containi.ng
accommodation for four stretcher cascs Iwd alternatIve
accommodation for" sitting-up" cases and crderIy.
3. That t
e chassis be of a v.-ell-known and reputable
make-to be dec.icled later-and the conslructioIl of the
body be handed over to nil expart ambulance-body'
builder.
4. That detail
of equipments, such as lighting, &c.,
be left to the discretion of Dr. :l\Iunro, owing to his hetter
knowledge of the conditions uuder \\'hich he has to work.
S. 1'hat the molor ambulance-which will bear an
inscription: II Presented by the readers of L.um A1\D
'VA'i'ER t.o the :Munro Field Ambulance "-shall be handed
over.to Dr. Munro for use with the Belgian Army.
6. 1'hat should there be any balanc.e in hand after
the purchase and equipment of the a,mbulance the decision
shall r('5t with the proprietors of this journal as to whethf'r
it Bhall be banded to Dr. Munro for t.he maintenance and
upkeep of t.he presentation ambulance or used in the
nucleus of a Bccond fund for the provision of another
motor ambulance.
7. That all cl1eques, postal orders, or money orden
should be made payable to II LASD A:'JD WATER Motor
Ambulance Fund" and cros!'cd "Loudon County and
"\'"lestmin5ter nank, Ltd," The a,ddref's of this journal ill
Central House, Kingsway, London. AH Bubscriptions will
be ackuowledged by the proprietors of this journal.
VI- e Rre on the eve of great events-of fierce fighting on
both sides, decisÌ\-e battles which will decide the fate of
n:!.tions. Every little thing one can do to help Bhould be clone.
The LAND AXD 'YATER Ambulance scheme is but a "ery, very
BillaH effort to help in Borne ml'terial way, and the ambulanco
itself will be, I hope, ready to do its share just about the
time when every available help is of vital importance.
Belaium's brave army is rapidly being got ready for
its dash nt the enemy, when t.ho word is given, Remember
that the Belgian army is dependent upon us and that they are
only waiting for the time to come when they can avenge the
cruel outrage of their country. \Vhat they have Buffered is
for the Bake of Britain. Please let them Bce that we appreciate
their facrifices, and that, when the great forward movement
take:! place, they shaH go into battle knowing that at least
one more unit has been added to the little fleet of ambulances
commanded by the man who has aÌ1'eady done so much fOJ::
the Belgian wounded-Dr. Hector Munro, to wit.

PÚilteJ by TiI
YI
.Ül:I\ H(lust. l>J!,C':n,,, Co., L'lD" Tudor Street, Whitefri:lfs, London, B.C.

;\pril
. 1915

L A
1) A X D \Y ATE R

'e

e'

0'
"

Pens

are the only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British. Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.

THO" I\S DF L-\ RUE & CO, L TD

FIRTH'S
"'STAINLESS" STEEL
ForCUTLER.Y.etc.
HeiIfLe.r .Rusfs, Sfains, nor lÌ1r.nishes.

.

Ärlicl.e.s -m.áð..e, From. -th\.s
s
e e1. ,'"be inB en\::i.re.1 y u.n.-
at"'Feci:ed:by -Çooël a...c:\.d...s,
h-u..its, vinesa:r;cl.c.,w-illÞe
fòurul i::õbe Of-.... enormous
adva.nta.ge i.ñ'h.o1::-els,
clu.bs. res-taura.n-ts a..nd.
ca.;rn-e
e1:l:he;r -l:hê1...nife-
board. nor-the clea.nin.

machine is now necessa.ry
G.il:ler:q of ' this steel tn

be ha..d. of' aU the le

ma.nifadurers. See thai:
kni.ves bea.r -this marL

I I
original and, Sole Makers
\ THOS. FIRTH&SONS..LT.D
SHEFFIELD.

TIle Truth
abollt
Apollinaris

I N vie'll' of attempts to create undue
prejudice against Apollinaris, the
public 'ldll be interested to know the true
facts of the case.

A "ollinaris &' Johannis. Ltd., is a
British (:omÞl1nv 'li'itlz 4.500 ßritislz
Shareholders, who ha'l..'e invested over
2.3.000,000 ;11 the Company and 'li,ho
hold 97 of the total capital.

At the commencement of the War the
German Government, recognising the
British interest in Apollinaris, placed
Supervisors in control of the spring in
the same way as the British GO'l..'erll-
ment has appointed Supervisors in
control of some concerns in this country,
u'here German interests are paramount.

Apollinaris water is a natural product
of the soil and comes from the Apolli-
naris Sprin/!, situated in the Rhine
Provinces,

In 1872, a British Company, recognis-
ing that the 'It'aters of the Aþollinaris
Spring were greatly superior 10 those of
any other know1l11lineral sprill{!,success-
fully secured for British interests the
world-wide distribution of this famous
table water.

Since its foundation 43 years ago, thL'
business has been carried on under a
Roard of Directors consisting entirely
of British subjects.

Attempts to create prejudice against
Apollinaris call, therefore, only dama/!e
the interests oJ a Rritish Comþany and
its 4,500 British ShareJwlders.

6,U,..

5

T \ '\ P \
J) \Y \. T E R

April 3, '9' S

@

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'

i Whiteley's Furniture I

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In our Furniture Ga11eries YOU can inspect the most rnJ

complete collection of Furniture and Furnishings, and rnl

everything offered carnts the Whiteley note of sound rnJ

' 1 1m

constructIon and supreme va ue. rnI

1m

+.. +H+-,:'-+-'''''-+' ..._'...
.....

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--- ---- of Income "\vithout 1m
BI 1m

-... _ '.. Disturbing Capital

@1 t I .." If you so desire you may furnish im
. lout of income at \Vhiteleys,

.,
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I!ì) v \11 goods are supplied at the im

,^ 1 f ", h

marked cash prices A deposit rnI
B; -...-
;;:
.; Jf 10 per cent. of the total im
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"::'. - . -

...:::. ) purchase is required, and im

.

......,.: __ payment of the balance may 1m

he extended over a period ot im

one, two, or three years, 1m

Superior Dilling Room
)Uile, conslructed 01 l\tlahogany, .md "ell hlll>ht:J, d(.>'l)ned all", according to the value of the rnI

I Chippendale. g-oods selected. The only

@J 6 ft. Sideboard, with ver)' fine fi
ured ,,'ood, and onul11ented brass gallen',
30 : 0: O. .hidition to the net cash price 1m
!!II O"al End Dining Tabie. ..dIen extended measures 8 ft. 0 in. by 4 ft. 0 in"
11 : 19 : 6, is intert::st at the rate of 5 per im

Set of remarkably fine Chippendale design Chairs, comprising 6
m;lll and 2 Carvers, 1m
Ei1 uphohtcred in Morocco, 5:24 : U : 0, cent, per annum on the out-

Luxurious Easy Chair, upholstered in best Morocco, hair stuffed, S;H : 10 : o. standing monthly balance
.

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\Yhiteley's Catalogue
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@I of Furniture for 1915 @
ffi1 I .m

is no,,, ready t' m

.-----, \ I

@1 This is a pcrfect guide to r."D""""r' , I

furnishing the home with taste
o-''" I r, 1 1 ' ! ::::::: ..., E j l I @ m

anJ eCOllom ) '. It includes ..A 1-
complete estimates for fur- 1 I' ;: _
C_ I l
1m
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showing cvery item in detail. "... im

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\\' ri te to-day and we wi II , rnI

forward you a copy by return 1r:1
11 igh Grade Bedruom Sui.e, cumtcucted 01 well seasoned M.lhogan}, and finished as

post free. antique. The \Vardrobe, Dressing Table, and Washstand are half-circular in shape.

The Suite complete,
3X : 10 : 0,

4 fl, 6 in, Bedstead en suite
9: 9 : O. rnI

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........'..... ' þ C' .' '. -" +,-.. ........ ... ---.+.....:,... ... :.... ....+ ..... +- ..,'-+-.
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W ffi. Whiteley Ltd., Queen's Road, London, 'V. rnJ

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6

April 3. 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

T HESE articles are written from practical experi-
ence of military matters, with a vie\\ to keeping
our readers in touch with the various requirements
of active service, Changes of climate and the peculiar
conditions under which the present campaign is being
waged render different items of equipment advisable at
different times, and we are in touch with officers at the
front and others from whom the actual requirements of
officers and men can be ascertained. The articles are
not intended to advertise any particular firm or firms,
We shall be pleased to supply information to our
readers as to where any of the articles mentioned are
obtainable, and we invite correspondence from officers
on active service who care to call our attention to any
points which would be advantageous in the matter of
comforts or equipment, etc" to those who are about to
leave for the front.
Letters of inquiry with reference to this subject
should be marked" Choosing Kit."

Aluminium Perfected
Hitherto, the drawback of the aluminium water bottle has
laid in its joints. It is impossible to solder aluminium in the
\\ay that is pursued with tin, and consequently the Service
pattern of water bottle in aluminium has been a failure, for
a certain percentage of these jointed bottles le
ked at the
joint even when new, and the rest could not be depended
on not to leak at some inconvenient occasion, while the
material used in closing the joints of the metal lent itself to
corrosion if anything but pure water were placed in the
bottle. There has now bren evolved, however, an alu-
minium water bottle, of the ordinary Service shape and size,
.. spun up" out of one piece of aluminium, without a single
seam. It has no sharp internal angles; it has the freedom
from corrosion peculiar to pure aluminium; it is the lightest
serviceable water bottle yet made; and it will stand the hard
wear of active service as long as a man is likely to require it,
Strongly covered and fitted into a "cIadle" for attachment
to equipment, it is a practical article built on common sense
lines, and thoroughly to be recommended for hard Service use.
A Waterproof Cape
In the matter of keeping out the rain one sometimes
needs additional protection to that provided by the regulation
or other coat one has taken, and for this purpose a water-
proof cape, designed by an officer, on practical lines seems
about the best thing. The cape in Question is not supposed
to take all the work of waterproofing, as a coat does; it is
designed so as to cover one almost to the knees, giving plenty
of freedom to the anns and plenty of room inside, and is
provided with its o\\n fastening strap so that it c
n be
attached to the equipment when rolled up, It rolls mto a
very small compass indeed, and its weight is a matter of
ounces only. This particular cape has found m<l:ny patrons
among men actually serving in the trenches, and Its extreme
portability is a great point in its favour,
A Cap Cover
Passing reference was made a few weeks ago to a water-
proof cap cover which protects the back of the neck by me
ns
of a flap exhnding down over the collar of the coat, and, \\lth
spring weather coming shortly and the need for heavy balac-
lavas disappearing, this cap cover is worthy o!
lOtlce. It
fits over the field-service cap and tran<;fonns thIs mto a h
ad
covering something like the old-time head-dress?f the J ndlan
Army, by means of which the back of the neck IS thoroughly
protected. With even a closely fitting overcoat collar the
water drips down the back of one's neck and causes exasper-
ation, but this curtain, falling over the collar, saves all that,
and completes the equipment for keeping out the wet at all
points.
By Way of Correction ,
In referring to a folding open periscope a week or Ì\\ 0
,lgO, reference was made to th
clips which suppor,t the
mirrors of this particular pattern In such a way as to Imply
that these clips were not of sufficient stren
th. After re-
examination of the clips-cspeciall
those of the larger p,attern
instrument-I am convinced that only very rough usage mdeed
would impair the efficiency of this periscope. I make this

(eo."...... H pa,. Q)

",..::

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Easter Sale

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OF

Men's

Wear

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F ROM now until Easter we
are offering some very special
bargains in shirts, pyjamas,
men's wear-especially in Khaki
clothing of all kinds-in our well,
known and reliable makes.

"r
I
Oilskins, in various shades.
non,sticky, Colours, brown
and green_ Unlined, from 22í-
Lined f.eece - 50/-

Of Special Interes t
to Officers

,
....

Silk and Merino Underwear. ideal for
summer wear, incn:am, grey. pink, blue and
helio. unshrinkable.
Vest. 6/6 Pants. 7/6 Drawers, 6/11
Khaki Wool Socks. good. heavy ribbed
make. durable and well fiued for marching
Per pair 1,6
Weatherproof Overcoat, full shape. Raglan
shoulders, light weight.

i'-
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Price 42/- to 63/-
Mackntoshes. fawn cola.. - from 25/6
Diuo, Regulation - 63 ,-
British Warm Coal. lined fleece 55/-
Our own material, special quality - 75/-

Khaki Flannel ShOrts, with a 11 b (i
.l r

:2

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de=:

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PRACTICAL KIT

OFFICER'S WATERPROOF, lined fleece, [s, d.
guaranteed waterproof. An tdeal Service coat - Price 5 6 0
With lining, detachable 6 15 0
Without lining 3 3 0
"I have given one of these coats a personal trial under bad winter
conditions of weather, and b.we found it all that could be desired in
wet and in cold, The proofing is 01 the very best quality. reall} proof
against a soakong rain for any length of time, A further point ir its
favour is tbat it is thoroul{bly well ventilated, and altogether it
seems about tbe best all purpoS811 coat that one can obtain, "-Author
of" Chocsing Kit" Article, LAND AIID \VATBR. Feb, 13. 19 t 5,

Æ

.. d.
16 6
17 6
5 0
1 0
5 0

MAP CASES, khaki canvas, double fold
Do. do. three fold
Do. do. do. with
pocket - 1
Do. be
t pigskin, three fold - 1
Do. <lo. do. with pocket 1
POCKET FLASK, oxydised, plated inside,
non-corrosive. Strong and light
HAVERSACKS, extra large and strong.
Tade
from an officer's design
PRISMATIC COMPA
S,

14 6

12 6

in leather case
&:3 1 0 0 & 4 10 0
PRISM BINOCULARS (+ 5 and + 8) - - 8 17 E
LOADED STICKS, weighted pi!;skin knobs 12 6
Do. covered all O\'er pi
skin 1 5 0
OFFICER'S NEW MARKET WHIP, with
thong, covered pigskin, loaded butt - - 1
II ACTIVE SERVICE" MESS BOX, fitted
for six persons ' - 6 1 8 6
LUMINOUS WATCHES, in wrist strap, silver 2 2 0
Do. do, metal 1 6 0
I Send for full Li3t of War Equipment, I
SWAINE i!3 ADENEY

1 0

BJ' appoiatmeDI ID H.M. The Kin,

185 PICCADILLY, W.

7

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LAND AND WATEI<

Apnl 3, 19 1 5

H

For the 1D8n on
Active Service

Amidst the hardships of Active Service, mdkeshift com torts and facilities are absolutely
necessary. The Officer's Field Kit illu<;trated below is one of these" indispensables ..
-with our usual" something hetter" in make and quality. There are a hundred and
one other such on view at our Showrooms, as the following list merely suggests :_

Valises &om 63/- Active Servlcf' Knives - 15/- Water Bottles- 10/6
Sam Browne Belts +5/- FI asks for Service Jacket Periscopes - 1+/6
Camp Knife, Fork and pocket - z7{6 Drinking Cups (collapsible) 7{6
Spoon Combination 3/6-7/ 6 Map Cases - from IS/- Torchlights - - +/6
Watch Wristlets from So/- Compasses " 3 0 {- Air Cushions - 7/ 6
Sleeping Bags - +5/- Writing Cases for Service Swagger Canes - from '1./6
Swords - - from 8+/- Jacket pocket i/6 Senice Whistles - z/-

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OFFICER'S FIELD KIT (War Office sealed pattern). Compactum
Bed and Horsehair Pillow in green Wille.den canvas, War Office Bag,
Folding Bath and Washstand, Water Bucket, Folding Chair, War Office
Lround Sheet, Brown W
r Office Canvas Kit Bag with loeL:

1:7 : 10 : 0

NET CASH

Silversmiths to His Majesty King George V

LTD.

158-162 Oxford St.. W.

2 Queen Victoria St., E,C,

220 Regent St., W,

R

The County Gentleman
AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LX\T No. 2761

SATURDAY, APRIL 10. 1915

[ PUBLI<;HED AS ] PRICR SIXPENCF.
A NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED WEEKLY

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C,}yrl!JH, J, Russell a..1i So...

BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. W. BARNARDISTON

Who Commanded the British Forces co-operating with the Japanese at the Siege of Tsingtao,

,.

lAND AND WATER

April 10, 1915

Distinctive
.. rrailor Gowns "1\ Uj

... ...
'.
In the New Spring Mode

J UST as "Land and \\T ater" has built
up a name for authenticity in Naval
and Militarv matters so has our
REGENT S'(REET House earned
fame for Authentic Fashions.

--

And further-the Fashions shown in our Regent
Street Salons are always in good taste-the qualities
are sound-and the Values unsurpassed. Just now
the Spring Costume Styles are the special attraction
and some particularly interesting creations are shown
in Tailor-made Gowns. Note the two examples
pictured :-
R.S. 22. C. Coat and Skirt in Cowert Coating, Plain Skirt
with double box pleat at bllck; Coat cut rather shorter in front,
back panel ending with box pleat; high roll collar. In a
variety of materials. 6 gOIl.
R,S, 21. C. Well.cut COllt and Skirt. Coat cut on newest
lines raÙ1er shorter in front than bthind, fastening with straps
and 'ball buttons' collar of black edged black and while cord.
Skirt in latcst styie cut very full.
arle in our own workrooms
in a valiety of materials to order. 8
gOll,

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The Regent St
House o.f
Peter Robinson, Ld.

B.S. 22. C.

B,S 21. C.

"'

HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

/

The reason for the smiling face-

:,,?

'IIIII.
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Think what a blessing these delicious
Food '{'ablets are to men on active
service, - They are always rea(ly for
immediate use, and a few dissolverl in tho
mouth will maintain the stren<Tth of the
Soldier when he most needs it, They
supply sufficient nourishment to sustain
for hours; give increased body heat and
vitality; prevent fa.tigue,and relieve thirst.

_ / A
- ..
= / J =
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
æ Are Y OU Run-down =
- -
- -
= \Yhen your sJstem is undermined by worry or O\'er.\\ork =
- - when Jour vitality is 10\, ered-\\ hen you feel "an
', _
= how "-\\ hell 'your nerves lire" on edge "-when the least =
= exertion tires JOu-you are in a "Run.down" I'ollllition, =
_ Your s)stem is like a flower drooping for \\ant of "ater" _
= And just as water' revi,'es a drooping flower-so '\Yincarni,' =
= gives ne\\ life to a .. rnn,down" ('onstitution, From e\"el\ =
- the first wineglassful :rou CIUI feel it otimulating IInd in, _
- -
- ,'igorating you, and as you ""nlinne, you can feel it sur- _
= ('harging your whole system with lIelC he'tlth-new str"ngth =
= -7/f "" vigour and II(W life. \\ïll )"ou try just one LottIe! =
i Begin to get well FREE. Ë
= -
- -
_ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wlncarni8 '-not a mere taste _
- but enough to do you good, Enclose three penny stamps (to pa) _
- postage) COLE)IAS &: CO" J.td" W
12, Wincarnis Works, Nor"ich, _
- -
= -
I
18j I
- -
- -
- -
iilllllllllllllllll..II....I........III..III....1II

Send a Flask to \'OUR Soldier.

We wlil send post free to ANY address a flask of
these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a
neat vest pocket case on receipt 01 1 6. II the man
15 on active service. be particular to give his name,
regimental number. regiment. brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket
flasks, 1 - each, Larller sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

Liberal Sample Bottle sent post -free -for
3d. in starn ps.

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO.,
5Iou
h, Bucks.

-'1

April 10, HH5

LAXD A.XD W.\TER

TIIROUGH THE EYES OF A 'VOMAN

By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER
way for a sale. In the first days of the war, it is quite likely
that calculated pleading on behalf of a cause was not necessary.
9rganisations first in the field had the advantage of an awakened
mterest, Everybody was eager to help and attention very
aliv
, Time has passed, an
there is, perhaps, a plethora of
chantable endeavour. It wIll be a case of the survÌ\-al of the
fittpst. The fittest, not only in object. but in presentation
of that object to the public upon whosp support it depends.

Cf'þYrlght, .wa.1a'''
Lal/i
C1,arles. LADY WIMBORNE
Who has helped to dispatch a Nursing Unit to Serbia, in response to an urgent
appeal lrom those in authority .here, Lady Wimbome is the new Vicereine
01 Ireland, her husband having been chosen as successor to Lord Aberdeen

A Vanished T}pe.
O KCE upon a time a very clever, humorous artist
drew a very clever, liumorous picture called:
.. The Lady \\'ho Will 1:\ot Be Ignored." There
she was, as true to type as anything ever put
upon paper. It was thp day when skimpy
skirts, gigantic hand-bags, and hats with sky-scraper plllmës
almost as tall as their "earers, were indicated to a long-
suffering public. Some
women compromised,
adopting the fashions
with modifications as
Englishwomen very
frequently do. Others
flatlv refused to have
anything to do with
the modes at all, and
a third class went to
the other extreme.
They wore skimpier
skirts, more aggressÌ\'e
hats, and carried morp
arm-breaking and
colossal bags than any-
body else. Thev were
detërmined to make an
impression, resolverI
not to be overlooked,
Among them was
.. The Lady Who Will
Kot Be Ignored" ; the
flamboyance, and fun,
and foolishness of the
thing was irresistihle.
That perhaps wa<;
flamboyant fashion at
its height. But though
the fashion died, flam-
boyance continued to
flourish in various
stage!' and degrees.
And now it has van-
ished from our midst
very quietly, very sud-
denly, very unmistak-
ably. Coats and skirts
are our staple form of
wear. All the bi
shops
say that they are sell-
ing little else. There is
a ban on bright colours,
there is a ban on ex-
aggeration of design.
In a word, we are un-
obtrusive. Good taste
in clothes has becone a shibboleth. It is amongst the first
fruits of the war, and a result with which few will quarrel.
The pas!':ing of the Flamboyant Lady, indeed, is a relief both
to the eyesight and mind.

I

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The Business Side.
It is one thing to provoke interest, quite another to keep
that interest maintained, Every promoter of a charitable
scheme realises that, Public support is certain to flag if
public interest be not carefully cultivated and nutured, Even
the best of causes is apt to suffer, if its virtues, its aims, and
its workings be not continually trumpeted abroad. It is one
of the sad proofs of the fickleness of human nature. I t is a
proof. also, of its forgetfulness if reminders are not constantly
forthcoming. That being so. it seems amazing that the
business side of a big charitable undertaking is so repeatedly
neglected. Appeals are often couched in the prehistoric
language of charitable officialdom, They are conventional,
monotonous and lifeless. And in consequence they fail in
their object, or at any rate reap no full measure of success.
It would be well worth many a society's while if those re-
sponsible spent part of the funds upon the salary of an e\.pert
advertisement \\ riter. Its cause may be one of the best on
earth, but it is not ah\ays enough to allow this to "peak for
itself. Sbmebod,' well graduated in the art mu<;t speak for
it And this not once, but many time,." if the funds cHe to
continue growing, If a society is to flourish. it must bp run
upon the lines of an up-to-date busine s establishment. The
societies which do flourish are those who re1.1is' this. and
pave the way for funds as the shopkeepC'r pa,'e.;; the

The "Land and
\\' ater" Motor
Ambulance.
Þ1 \Yar is so much a
man's business that
we women are only too
glad to find an\" wav
in which we cañ help,
If we cannot fight our
country's battles
directlý, we can cer-
tainly do so indirectly
bv helping those men
who are fighting for us
in the allied cause, It
is, as <J. matter of fact,
almost the sole way in
which we can help, -and
that being so, it is
fortunate it happens to
be an unusually im-
portant one. It is for
this reason that the
.. Land and Water"
Ambulance, through
the very nature of its
work, makes a special
appeal to women. This
has been proved by the
generous way in "hich
women have already
subscribed towards it.
Is it too much to ask
that even' woman
reader of .; Land and
Water" will consider
sending some sum-
no matter how small-
to our )Iotor Ambu-
lance? It might per-
haps be so were it not
that the needs and suf-
ferings of the wounded
form an .. Open Sesa-
mp " to every woman's
hedCt, and' that this
.-\mbulance will help one of the smallest and most suffering of
the Allied nations, as those who read its particulars will discover.

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The French \Vounded Emergency Fund.
The strain upon our medical resources, naturally enough,
brooks no comparison with that upon those of France The
French Anny holds an infinitely longer battle-line, ib
casualties are proportionately great, and its hospital accom-
modation is taxed to the uttermost. The French \\'ounded
Emergency Fund has its headquarters at 3-1-, Lo\\ndes Square.
S,W., and through its agency medical stores and clothing are
being sent across to France. \\'e are, most of u
. so well
aware of the truth and limitation of the saying, that charity
begins at home, that it is delightful to find an e\.ception to
the rule. Our o\\n Medical Service is well organi"ed and
working splendidly, as the ,",ounded back from the front
testify O\'Cr and -over again. The French system IS not
working so easily, for the simple reason that there is a well-
nigh intolerable demand upon the supply. The whole medical
organisation is strained almost to snapping point; it might
have snapped, indeed, if certain individuals hy dint of almost
superhuman efforts had not managed to prev. nt it, Here.
once again, can we prove that we are Allips in the fullest "en
'
of the word by helping the French \ynundpd EnlPrg 'nc

Fund, which acts as a bridge betwcën us and the \\ ounded
French soldiers. Ite; helper<; meet the rr0 s-Channel Stf lmers,
and - , that the bales of goods are transfured "ithout dela)
to the various French ho"pitals, Everybody" ith an affection
for France ha- a golden opportunity for sho\\ing it by "ending
a present of money or clothing to 3-1-, Lowndes Square,

LAND AND WA fER

April 10, 1915

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The tale of the man
who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE FOURTH.
A ND they came to a house of rest and ordered
wine. And he who had bought wisely spake
thus: "In the beginning there was no shoe. And
then there arose a wise man who bethought him of a
shoe, and another there arose, far-seeing, who pictured
all that it might mean. And after much labour and sore
travail, the world saw that it was good. And the shoe
spread till all the world made service of it, and many
were the imitations of the shoe that arose, saying: 'We
also are liS this shoe, and even finer than this shoe: So
it has come to pass that he who would know the shoe
he should buy is sore puzzled, for of the makers of
shoes, one pulleth him this way and another pulleth
him that way, till he knoweth not what he shall do.
But I have travelled far and wide, and many are the
shoes I have used, yet this is the shoe of all shoes that
liketh me most. And, now, friend, we will eat, and then
will I proceed with the tale of the shoe." (To be continued.)

"

.

! 8->

,

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22

April 10, 1915.

LAN 0 A N Ð Yl. ATE R.

THE
By

WAR BY
I-IILAIRE

LAND.
BELLOC.

NOTE.-Thls .rtlde bll been l:lbmlUed to the Pren Bucc311, "hlch doci not object to the pubUl:atloll II ceuore4, u4 iÜeI ..
responsibility lor the correctncJI 01 the Itatementl.
Iu .c
ordaJlce with the requirements 01 the Preis Bureau, the pOSltloul 01 troops on PIB!!I lIIultrating this Article mOlt oaIl ..
regarded al appi'o:dØ1ate. and ao dellnUe Itrength at any point II Indicated,

I '
; .

THE DETAILS OF PRZE
IYSL.
W E are now in a position, through the
Russian Press, to grasp dearly
enough the nature of the defence of
Przemysl. It will be rem(,lllbered how
at the time of the surrenùer all details were lack-
ing, and it vms impossible to do more than con-
jecture the most important points, Yet an under-
standing of Przemysl was exceedingly import.ant
to a general understanding of the campaIgn,
because the controversy upon the change in modern
strategy had ma inly. turned upon the rôle of
permanent fortification in modern war and
because litter phases of the wa.r must, whateyer
happens, put that debated question again to the
test.
Of course the grea.ter part of the study of such

'Railwaf to Galiâan 1wrsitmArmy"'"
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a case as that of Przemvsl can ouly be accom-
plished upon the ground, aad in the accounts
l'ecei \'ed therc are lllall)" puzzles, which only a
knowledge of the ground could soh"e. Still, we
know enough now to be able to dl'aw certain COIl-
clusions, and, further, to be able to understand the
nature of the operations.
I hayc giy('n upon thc accompanyin
sketch
map the main feat.ures of the ground,
The town of Przemysl stands at the point
where the Ri\'er San leaws the foothills of the
Carpathians find enters the Gaìician plain. It is,
therefore-more than most; fortresses-a real
door. So long as it is held, the main RyenUa
acrOS3 the Carpathians is closed. The trunk
railway. which feeds all armies operating in
Galicia and rnns from the Russian frontier
to Lemberg and Cracow, is dcliberatel:[ bent
1-

L A i\ DAN D 'Y ATE R.

April 10, 1915.

flrtificia lly round so as to pass through Przemysl.
fwd the fortifications of that to'Yll command
the use of the line. Further, the railway
0\ er the Lupkow Pass, the I!I<?St dire.ct fro
n
Buda Pesth anù Yicllna, Joms tll1
ma:]}
line at PrzePIysl Station.. This es
entIal r
ul-
way junction, t
Ie most ì
portant strategIcal
point, perhaps, III a11 GahcIa, I haye marked
11})On the sketch with the letter A. The town
itself which is in normal times about as large
in p
pulation 3S Colchester, and y"hich .is "
ry
miÅed in race and creed (quite a thIrd of It bemg
J e,,,ish), stands upon the right bank of the S3!1,
IInù the higher foothills which buttress the maIll
range of the Carpathians here approach close to
t he stream from the south. The water leyel at the
town itself is about 600 feet aboye the sea, while
the hills in the immediate lleighbourhood of the
town to the south haw summits more than 700 feet
aboye this level.
The formation is continueù on the north side
of the riyer in hills only slightly less eleyated and
considerably softer in outline. A sort of rounded
plateau here dominates the San, rising to a sort
of backbone a thousand feet aboye the sea, or some
400 feet abum the" ateI', ,,'ith its highest summit
another 300 feet more. To the eastward opens
out the great pJain, through which the San runs
"ith many turnings. boundeù often by marshy
fìelds and occasionally leaving stagnant back-
.,..ate!'s, whÏ<:h repl'espnt its old course.
The town is not, therefore, one of those ideal
ring fortresses whidl stalll} surrounded by fairly
isolated heights. It is a site which has been
fmtifif'd in spite of the diftì.cu1ties attacbing to the
tround, and not on account of natural opportuni-
ties atiordèd.

ine main works defend the place. They
II re often reckoned as eight on account of the
I H'oximit y and common object, and probably the
, inking up also of the two \Yorks south of Side-
Ii:::ka, the south-easternmost horn of the ring,
U'ah.ing these nine worb in their order from
the north of the river on the east, the first is on
the spur of the thou:;and feet contour, overlooking
the village of Letowninia, It is supported at less
than four tbousaud yards range by tbe second
;",..ork, which is upon the northern summit of the
plateau oyerlooking the village of Ujkowice, The
first of the
e works is at about five thousand yards
range, the second is neady seven tbousand yards
ran
e from the centre of the place.
The third fort is on the open glacis of the
plateau, between the villages of Batycze and
Ial-
kowice. It is probably the strongest of all the
'Y01'I
s, "ith tbe possible e':ception of fiye and six.
It dominates the great main road to the north, and
i
a good !Ì\-e miles (or eigbt thousand yarrls) range
from the town.
The fourth work is at a rather DuzzlinO' dis-
, 0
tance away upon the cast. A gap which can only
he accounted for, if the information supplied is
l;
fJ'ee:t, by some J
eculiarity .of the ground-pos-
E'bly marsh. It hes but a lIttle above the water
!e\el, and oYerlook
the village of Bolestrizyce,
The gap between thIs fourth work and the fifth is
even more remarkable, amounting, it would seem,
to close on ten thousand vards. But eycn without
It kno
vledge of the ground, the map 'is suffici8nt to
explam thIS, because there is a considerable area
o
mars
in the lx>nds of the riyer that correspond
wIth thIS gap, and because the main railway and
2*

the road "hieh comp in from J
emberg through

fedyka are thoroughly dominated by ea
h work
on the north and on the south.
This fifth great fort and the t" in work, 1\0. 6,
close in its neighbourhood. haye a characteristic
that can oaly be explained by some feat.ure in the

round. They are yery far thrust out from the
fortress, and they are eddentJy regarded as guard-
ing a joint in the armour, because a whole system
of smaller works, temporary and permanent, haye
been thrust out beyond them towards the hills in
the neighbourhood of the yillage of Popowice.
Another big gap occurs between fort six and fort
seyen, ,,-hich oyerlook the \'alley of the little tribu-
tary riyer, the 'Vial', from the east and from the
west. But after this fort sm-en the rather abrupt
and confused hiB country to the west of it bas been
heavily defended.
Fort eight, on Lipnik Hill, is the highest in
the whole system-l,350 feet above the sea. and
some 750 above the yalley floor. It is only just
over two thousand yard.s from its neighbour and
not much more than three thousand from the ninth
and last fort of the ring, ",hich stands on an
abrupt spur immediately overlooking the San.
Apart from these large works there are eight
or nine smaller works, the general design of which
is to close tbe gaps bet"\\een the larger ones, and
in the course of the siege a considerable number
of temporary works were erected all along the
ring, some of \..bich are indicated upon the
sketch.
In the immediate neighbourhooo. of tbe town
a dosed system of trenches was drawn to cover
the last thousand yards or so of the approach, and
was extenLled on the north-wf.'st up as high as the
village of Lupkowica, upon the plateau, so as to
prevcnt this outlying portion of the enceinte from
being too immediately oyerlooked,
1\ow, the first thing tbat strikes us upon the
inspection of such a system is the absence of that
extension of temporary batteries outside the
original ring which has marked the defence of
Yerdun, and which, it was guessed in these
columns, would be found attached to J>rzemys1.
And the absence of these can only mean that 'the
Russians could not. or did not. bring up against
the place any very heavy pieces. For in
tance,
there is a whole district north-east of the fown
where forts one and two are merlooked from
further heights, which run up to 1,300 feet; and
had Przemysl been subjected to such an ordeal
as the Verdun forts suffered in early September,
fort one and fort two could haye been knocked to
pieces by indirect fire from behind these neigh-
bouring hills as surely as Troyon was battered to
pieces by the big Austrian ho\\itzers hidden
behind the heights of the )feuse,
This is of a piece with all we know of the
siege. It "'as a mere investment; and the place
fell, not from the piercing of any part of its
armour, but from exhaustion.
In connection with this, howewr, it is in-
teresting to note with v.:hat care the defence
organised works and destroyed communications
with the apparent object of fighting to the last,
and only letting the place fall to an aS8ault. No
other explanation fits the t.racing of that enclosed
enceinte of trenches ,yhich coyered en'rything in
the immediate neighbourhood of tbe town, or the
destruction of the main raih\a
T bri(lge oyer the
'Vial' at B, which so astonished the HussÜtns when

April 10, 1915.

I:AND AND WATER.

ukla.
}Jali6ka
........-
Latowiska.
if' r-h-;-" oj,
%laMichowa.
I "JL'" +ot e ,c,)( If

k
,. 11 JC 11 1C oJ. <f.A
0 '':-
lb'''' ": -t ... ur a
Svidnick _ .
,q,{j · q r'p Q ... h?

;'
" " .... -+

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QJ'J ,1-,>= Uzok ",c,

t""
''If"o '.Fa".. '10.,.
g
i((
,_ ...

l"q .' "' It.,.'"
J( )( " " Ie JC vlffw3.'unaa 'Russian Line:-'
J'
;.-) '\
last saturáa.y
- ø.ð-
..,
o
10 10 80
1 . J
"frf des;

t.hey entered the city. The point B is amply pro-
tected by the ring of forts, and to destroy the
þridge there, so as to cut the road and the railway
communication from Lemberg. the chief sources
of supply, has had no effect (considering that
the fortress capitulated intact) save to hamper the
revictualling of the place rather cruelly.
There are other small points in connection
with the system, one of the most curious of which
I haye marked with the letter O. The trenches
here did not follow the natural obstacle of the
river, but ran inside it, just enclosing the parade
ground. And still more remarkable is the care,
already alluded to, which has been taken to guard
in a special manner all the south-eastern approach
in the neighbourhood of Siedliska and Popowice.
One would naturally expect that the most vulner-
able sector would be the north-east one; but there
is doubtless some local reason for making the
defence especially anxious for this sector defended
by forts fiye and six.

THE CARPATHIAN BATTLE.
The news of direct and recent action this
week is very scanty. The most important part of
it is from the Carpathians.
It is annoying that a series of great actions
upon which will, perhaps, depend a great change
in the whole war, and the theatre of which is the
Carpathian Range, should be so meagrely reported
in the 'Vest. The great war is one co-ordinated
operation, and the lack of full accounts of any
decisive part of it makes it impossible to judge
the condition of the whole.
From such information as we have, however,
it is possible to construct some idea of the Rus-
sian achance, its rate of progress, and its critical
points.
In the accompanying map we have all the
points marked which have been mentioned in the
last few dispatches, and from them we can dis-
cover pretty accurately how the Russian line lies.
The point is, of course, to establish its relation to
the main ridge of the Carpathian :Mountains,
which ridge is as it were the wall still defending

the Hungarian plain. That part of the ridg<<
upon whIch the Russian effort is now being so
weightily directed is called the Beskid :Mountains.
and the front of the Russian Army last Saturday
would seem along this stretch to be as indicated by
crosses as follows.
In the neighbourhood of the Dukla all the
three road passes, the Polyanka, the Dukla itself,
and the Jaliska, are in the handa of the Russians,
but the position there would seem to be almost
stationary. The foremost Russian line on the
Hungarian slope beyond the ridge is much
what we saw it was last week. The Austrian
references to figbting near the railway at A, in tha
upper \alley of the I..aborcz, establishes a point
there, but I think it is doubtful whether the roaù
oYer tbe J
upkow Pass, cutting off the bend of the
railway, is already in Russian h:wds. The railn,ay
at its summit certainlv is not, for we arf> told that
the Russians haxe taken tbe point B. the last
8tation before the summit upon the Galician slope.
Thence the line goes roulHl in front of the high
moutain village of .\Y ola )IidlO\\a. and more or
less follows, for the next twenty miles, the Pulo-
nina heights. .
These heights are a wOùded ridge parallel to
and only just lower than the main ridge and "Water-
fhed of the mountains which stands facing them
0' er a deep valley to the south. The Russians in
t.he last telegram receiyed, which relates to Easter
Sunday, report that they haxe actually got across
the main rIdge also at one point just east of the
Rustok Pass, The situa tion here can best l>e
understood by a reference to the following sketch:
Eetween the Polonina Range (which is less abrupt
on its northern or Galician side) and the 1\1a in
Ridge in the Valley of Eoreky, a profound ravine,
some two thosand feet deep, into \\hich the wooded
Polonina crest falls very steeply and out of which
the main range rises on the further side. All this
valley and the district as far as Cisna has been
abandoned by the Austrians, and just beyond
Cisna the main range has been crossed, and the
Russian outposts are on the further, or
Hungarian, southern slope upon the stee
forest
buttresses of the main range, called the Smolnik

II

1*

LAXD AND
ATER.

April 10, 1915.

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Hills. A second breach has been made in the line
after the Dukla and about thirty or tbirty-five
miles away,
It is not clear whether upon the Uszog
Fass road they ba ,'e a hold of Turka. or
no, but it is probable, and thence their front
reapproaehes the central range until it finds
itself on the Stryj road opposite German contin-
gents which hold the mountain village of Koziowa,

'urther east, the front hardly concerns the main
,Carpathian battle, for it bends back further and
further away from the mountains,
One may sum up the Russian position in the
hiJJs as it ""as at the end of last week by Baying
that the Lupkow Pass is ""ithin an ace of falling
iuto their hands, that the whole ridge for more
than thirty miles on, eyen in the neighbourhood of
the Uszog, is immediately threatened by their
attack, which is now close up against the last
Elllnmit, and that, in the sector between the t;szog
8ud the Stryj railways they are a distance yaQ'ing
from one to two days' march from the summits of
the hins.
It is obyious that if Russian success shoulJ
come in this neighbourhood it ""iH, no more than
the corresponding task in the 'Vest, take the form
of a mere slow pushing back of the enemy. The
fight is against a line which ,viH either maintain
itself, or break, or be compelled to take up S0111e
I;horter position: and what that shorter position
can be on the l'arpathian front it is not easy to
discm-er.
'Ve know that in the 'Vest if the Germans
I!h.ould eY
r haye to abandon their pre
ent 425
mIles of lme they haye behind them a line nearly
It fifth shorter, and yet another behind that. the
best line of an, quite a third shorter than their
present line. Eut there is no such choice for the

12

.1

Ira

Austro-German forces in the Carpathians. They
must hold the mountains or giye them up.
They will ha\e no such opportunity for tJ:e
defence to which th('y are now reduced if they fall
back into the open plain, or if they are found still
unsuccessful in any counter-offensive when the
snow melts and the'l1ew pasture comes in the open-
ings of the mountain woodland, It is significant
that wry considerable German reinforcements are
being sent to this front. Eut those reinforcements
are not inexhaustible. If they number, as it is
beliewd, already seyen army corps, they ba,-e
surely reached the rua-x:imum of the stiffening
which they C3n 11ere lend to an unfortunate ally.
l\IearÌwhile, we must wait patiently to note
week by wfek upon the ma p the na ture anù the
extent òf the Russian :Hlnmce towards and over
the ridge which, as I said at the opening of this, is,
perhaps. at this moment the most critical field of
the whole war.

THE RAID O
CIIOTIN.
The present pha.
e of the war, in whil"h dose
grips are estahlighed mer long lines of country
and adyancc is either yery slow, as in the Carpa-
thians, or balt('d altogether, as in Franc(', natur-
a By tempts such forc('s as may be free for them
to engage ill 1'llirls. 'Ye had a Russian
:me on
:Memel the other da,-: we bayc hall an Austnan one
flt Chotin; and wè should doubtless haye C01'l'C-
:;ponding efiOl-ts in the ". est" ere they possible. As
they are not possible. their place is taken by OC('3,-
sioÌlal dashes through tllf' air, \\ hich, like thrse
]
abtern raids, are not cxnetly co-ordinated with
any general pIau, but arc only intended for so DC
local í'ffect, or by similar dashes across Ow Rea.
The history'of this sort of operation is 1lways
the same. You may wat<,h it at work in war after
4*

pril 10, 1915.

LAND AXD "TATER,

war. The r8iders aim at nothing morC' than annoy-
ance. The:" therefore \\ ork with the lea5t possiLle
numbers. The \-alue of the anno'-ance they calise is
stricth- moral. The c01ltlitions' und{,f which it is
worth" while raiding and the conditions under
which it is not depend entirely on the enemy's
state of mind, and particularly on the state of his
civilian mind and on the pressure that cÏ,"ilian
mind can exercise upon the gm'erl1l11t:'llt and upon
the army. Xo raid eYer presupposes a permanent
occupation. The succcss of a raid is to be
measured by two things: the amount of damage
done and the ultimate safety of the raiders,
Judged by these standards, the raid lJTI .ólemel
seems to bave heen fairly worth while; the raid
on Chotin hardh- WOl ih while.
The Russiañ raid on :\Iemel w:n lndertaIicn
because the whole German sehenie depends upon
tbe intC'grity of German soil. On that depends the
opinion which is the foundation for the almies,
and though Memel is but an extreme outpost, yet
its temporary occupation profoundly affected the
Germa.n mind. Indeed the wh:)lc (,{ that East
Prussian land has come to be for the Germans
what a sore tooth is for a sleenless mind. SUi11e-
times it stops aching, but it ha
ached and may
ache again. On the other hand, the J{ussian
raiders of
Iemel did not do a11"rthing like as much
wrecking as they might have done, hut they could
boast that they escaped with very little loss-for
the German accounts of their capture were almost
certainly fa lse.
The raid upon Chotin satisfies the criteria of
a raid less. It was indeed undertaken In' the
Austrians with no "Waste of forces. It seenÌs as
though the whole boùy did not consist of more
than one dÜ"ision of second-liue troops with a
brigade of cavalry, :Moreover, this littl
force
appears to ha\e been roughly handled. '"1, e haye
only tbe account of one side so far, but the account
is probable enough, because from the nature of the
ground, as will be seen in a moment, the position
of the raiders "\ías always somewhat perilous.
It is not accurate to speak of the " wiping
out" of the invaders, as it is put in one message.
for the total number of prisoners does not COlee to
much more than fifteen per cent. of the im-aders.

\\
\
t
n <v

t
J
> \ aj,fìiestt'l-
, I. - . _,.-- t1J\...:. '\.
+ + \ ChotiniJ

"'JI" .IC
. -i

CZin

-
c ttlL

.,

f
.\"l
,

",,5 O\'\tt , 11'i\,
1i\þo.

f>t\."- · f
O\)J

AUSTRL
G Al E.
"t

CfÆ

f11

But the di \"ision must ha ve snffel'f',l h('a Úl.... in
killed and \\ounded :13 well. aad it 113.':; cerl.àin}y
failed in its object. It has done WL'.r litHe hal'l
l
in the di:;trict attacked, anJ e\'cn if it had k'êU

more successful it \vould not han' affected Hussian
opiuion seriously. The eastern fighting, from the
Baltic to the Blal'k Sea, has taken placl' upon soil
tl1:lt is p,)litically Hussian, but the nationality of
all the:oe marches is not Russian. The little corner
on the Dniester, for instance, of which Chot.in. r
understand. is the chief town. is Roumani<1 n in
speech. population. and religion.
This corner is connected with the quite
modern and artificial frontier of the district. Its
elemeJ1ts nwy Le seen in the accompanying sketch.
The Riwr Dniester runs in a \erv tortuou

channel through hilly country, cOl)1Íng from
Galicia and running through Podolia on its \\"(1)"
to the Black Sea, For a few miles it forms the
frontier between Austrian Galicia and the Hus-
sian Empire. The frontier then turns up nort.h-
wards. following a small tributa ry caned the

orntg. Sout.h of the Dniester the frontiel' run:-;
along an arbitrary line north and south for rather
more than thirty miles, until it strikes the Plut h.
on \\hich riYeì: C'zernowitz stands. From tbJS
point the Pruth becomes a Loundary betwe{,ll
Houmania and Uussia, as also for a few r.1Îles
).et"\\een Houmania and Austria. The RUSBian
lincs awl t11e Austrian Jines being them run in
thi5 district much as the line of erosse5 in the
accompanying sketch.
The mid follo\\ed, roughly, the line of the
D1TOW in the sketch, and got about hali-war to
Chotin-or, S:lV, Olie day's march into Hussia.n
territory. Its
advance 'Lodies, holding two vil-
l:1gea, '
as then rounded up anù the rest retired.
The whole thing 'was on a yery small scale, and is
onl" interc8ting as an example of this tendency of
a state of deadlock to break out into raid. 1 t i:i
just. possible that a subsidiary oLject of the little
ef(lIrt \\ as the impressing of 10t:al Houmaniau
opinion. But, if so, the effect was not wort.h any
consillerable cxnense of men.
The detail
of this affair can best be appre-
ciat{'d by fl gl.mce at sketch IV.

\s is so frequent upon this frontier. the good
roads belOlw to the Austrian side, and hcwllId
them there i
often nothing hut a tl'<1c1. of ('al"'h,
B,' sueh (t good road thl' _\uglJ.jan d!, ision
appeaÌ's to have marched up frol'1 Czernowitz to
the ,'jIla.ge of Poporoutz. \\ here' app
H'cntl,\T it,
h'1lted aÍi.er the first da,"s march. On the se{'ûntI
day it ...youM seem to ha\:e cros...ed the frontier and
to ha \"e taken the track which leads along the el)ge
of the fore6t to the market to"n of Chotin. on the
Dniester, rather more than twenty miles away.
This forest stands on the rig-ht bank of tho
Dniester, O\C1' ail area of about fifty sqnare milec;,
and i3 rayinC'd Ly numerous brooks falling into
the ri...,'-'1". It. stands somewhat hi
h, and to lite
south of it j,,:1 plateau of open country dotted with
IHunerous villages. To hit)e an allmm:f> in stICh
counttr was impossihle. The alhane('ù bodi('>; oC
thl
raid wou1d H'el11 on the second day to haye
been billeted in Í\\ 0 yillages on the clÌg-e of tl,o
fOì','st.
zillJ\
-Q' and Manicy. Here' they took
contact with considerab]e bodies of Ilussian irre-
gulnr c:t\-alry, accoTHpanied, of course. h
' a strong
force of guns and many dismounted. Th('
main column feU ba,ck, defended hy a rearguanl
occupying the two villages, and the troops form-
in()' this rcarguard appear to have suffered hea,yily.
TI
c.. ('on!'i
ted of Hungarian rcscn'ists, and ]o
t
ab,)t;t t\\O thollsar.d prisC'ners, It may Le pre-
suwed that the whole of the body that escaped i

Iw now L,ll':': bcyonù the frontier.
. w
"'"
oJ

LAN DAN D JY. ATE R.

April 10, 1915.

<Y
.v.

CZ'êrnó\\'itL'" ,4

-

... t?\
<. f

. ' .

t-Ii? ".
/
- /
.
I
.
J
,;'
(
\
.
l

THE "'ESTERN FRONT,
The only news of interest upon the JV estern
front at t
e moment of writing (Tuesdal evening)
is the capture by the French of Regnieville. a suc-

l1 etz

st.Mihiel

Pont å MoÍt$son
v

cess "hic
they achieyed last Satm:day, fonowing
upon theIr capture of Feyen Haye, two d
ys
befOle

vi

5
I

. .,.
to
r
Mil

1"\t

'2.0

. '

Slow as are the results of all this siege work.
the particular advance in question may quite pos-
sibly prove of importance to the near future, and
in order to understand why this should be so, one
has but to grasp the elements in this elementary
sketch.
'Ve all know that the Germans have for six
months occupied a curious wedge pushing up to the
:l\Ieuse at the Bridge of St. Mihie!. The effort they
made was a considerable one with large forces,
and its object has long been clear. If eYer they
had the good luck to be able to take a vigorous
offensive in the 'Vest again, it would greatly in-
crease their power if they could invest the fortress
of Verdun, and so make the whole French line fall
back, In order to effect this, they advanced in
September in great force up to the point of
t.
Mihiel, on tbe Meuse, and held it. :MeanwhIle.
much further along their front (which is indicated
on the accompanying diagram with a double line)
they proposed, by attacking vigorously from the
Argonne, which lies to the west of Verdun,
to complete the ring. The wedge at St.
Mihiel was a sort of buckle to which they
desired to fit the strap by pushing down
from the north-west. In this attempt thcy have
been quite unsuccessful. They have, if anything,
gone back in the Argonne. They lost Vallquois
a fortnight ago, and their line through tJ}(' woods
is bent where two months ago it was straight, but
6*

1\pl'il 10, 1915.

LAKD AND 'VATER.

--

..

.......-,....

les fparges
>.V

....
...:/',
-,.
\?

they !':til1 hold on to St. "\Iihiel in the hope that
latèr forces released from other theatres of war
m.IV enable them at la.3t to ach-ance from the

\rgonne. They hold on thus to the ndvance post
of 6t.
Iihie1 not without SOIne peril. The position
is awkward. th1'eatenH1 on either side, and depen-
dent upon a line of supply from Metz, the first
lwH of which is furni
hed with a railway, long
e...:tabliahed. to Thiaucourt, and the second half
"iLh a field raihn1Y the Germans themselves have
constructed, taking it through the middle of the
"edge, as far as possible from its two thre3-tened
C ,lp'",,,:
\'.0\:-"".
In sketch YI. the shape of the "edge
ocC'Uvied will be seen roughly delineated. It funs
fron
the "\108e11e to the :Mense. and its two edges
are being bitten into contif1l 1 ally by the slow
French a dVilnce. On the north tbat ac]yance has
been f'Ol1sideraLle, and the }'rench have taken Les
Eparges, but on the south the action is mOle im-

ø
,

.

J

2
.

,

Mil,u

portant bec.ause the line at Thiaucourt comes close
to this southern edge.
The French ad\ance at Thiaucourt ix'gan
from the main road which runs from Cum-
mercy to Pont à M<;msson. Once they got hol
of
this they ad,'anced mto the wood called the Wood
of the Priest (Bois dn Prêtre), slowly making their
way ill de!':perate fore
t fighting comparable to
7*

...... -- - --

1

-
-
- .

m

1lII

tbat of the Argonne. They hold at the present
moment very nearly the" hole of this wood, lyin

on a front indicated by the line of crosses, and
somewhat belped by the'fact that the whole of this
ground slopes away from the high road, which is
about 1,100 f('et aboye the sev. down to the \'alley
in which the milway runs, 400 feet below. They
carried, as 'we have seen. Feyen Haw, and last
Satarday Regnieville, two tiny hamlets, the one
with less than 200 inhabitants in time of peace,

he o
her with a trifle on
r : both now, presumably,
In rums.
From Regnievillc yon cannot !';ce dovm into
the valley to Thiaucourt. the nearest point of the
enemies' supply railway, because of a belt of wood
which interrupts the view, bnt if the French ad-
,anC'P can pass this wood and t'3tablish itself well
on the slope beyond, the railwa.\' is done for. The
big guns working behind the linf' "ill have it in
rangf', and there are a mass of vulnerable points,
culverts, and one narro,y rnad bridge. if I am not
mistaken, which would be within e,,-treme range of
gnns posted between the high road and the woods.
The whole thing is an advance upon Thiaucourt.
This detail of Regnieyille whicb we ha,-e bct'n
reviewing, and all similar locnl successes, past and
present. in the trench \\arfar<,--Perthes, Xeuye
C'hapelle, the Hartsmnnnweilprkopf-havc one
common feature which must be grasped if \\e are
to understand the present phase of the war. This
common feature is the domination exercised O\'el
the new trench warfare by the heaxy gun.
:Many f'xeellent criLics haye said that tL('re is
nothing ñew in this, because whene, er siege work
was coneerned the hea "Y gun was ob,'iously the
master -weapon. They are right so far, that the
action of the heavy gun along the 'Yestern front
in the present phase of this war differs only in
degree, and not in kind, from the
ction of eyery;
big piece t.hat ha.s been turned nga1l1st any earth-
work during the last thr('(' hundred years. But the
novelty of the present work consists in two points:
the degree of exactitude necessary to the fire of the
heavy guns, and the degree in the number of their
projectiles.
As to the first point, exactitude, it is necel.

LA
D AND 'YATER.

April 10, 1915.

sar!!, from the closcness of the tren<:hes and their
size, and its possibility is part1y due to the <:harac-
tel' oÎ the modern weapon and the exact stan-
dardisation of propclJant (',-;:plosin's, but much
more to the supremacy in tlw air ".-hieh the .Allies
haye established. It is a matter of Jegitimate
pride that the pioneer work here was mainly
British work.
'Ve are told by those who hm e c, ery oppor-
tunity for forming a personal judgment that the
mastery of the air acquired hy the ..:\]]ies is a
mastery due to just those qualities of aùventure
and daring which many haye too hastily imagined
t.o haye yanished from modern war'. The enemy
has flying machines not differing apprecÜ1bJ,v frOIìl
those of the Allies. He can rise as high. He l:an
fly as fast. 'Vhere he seems to hayt:' failed is, as
e,,-erJwhere in this war, on the not cakulaLlc side
of human effort: the spiritual side that supple-
ments the machine, Direct attaek in the air, flr-
ing in difficult weather, flying low, he le.aycs
mainly to his opponent, and therefore his opponent
masters him,
The essence of the type of attack whil:h the
French haye perfected in the last month or two
is this:
On a chosen day the infantry in a particular
section of trenches are Lid to stalìd hy for ùeliyer-
iJJg an
ssault. As against that da): a great con-
centration of heavy pieces a.nù of munition for
them is arranged, This concent.ration JUav be

rasped by the enemy or missed.
Iore usuaJÍv. it
IS largely missed, because of his iumerfect 'air-
work. At flny rate, once effecte(l. on the mOI'lJiu'J'
chosen the heayy piect's begin to deli\-er a concen

trated fire against the cnemis trenches. ] t lasts
for a
pace of time v3!ying with the nature of the
work III hand, At
euH> Chapdle this tornado
",as kept up thirt.y-fiye minutes. On the Beausé-
jour front it seems to have been kept np usually for
bursts of rather less than an hour. The other day,
on the
-Iartsn
annwe.ile!koJ?f, it W:1S kept ùp
almost wIthout mternnsslOn from ten m the morn-
ing until two in the afternoon.
This cannonade must, to be of nllue, obtain
an exact accurary of rmwc. So close are the two
opposing forces, so small is the objectiye presented
by a tr
ncb, and so necessary to the re::mJt is the
lveal .efleet .of each projectile that, sayc with an
exactIt.ude lJl deliyel:Y unknown before t.he presmt
C3mptHgn, the metllOtl would fail. It is the
m
chine in the air, partly by its previons recon-
naISsance of tbe precise trace of the enemy's
trenches, pa:r:tly by i
s spotting of inlli\-idual shots,
th
1t de
erlllll1eS tins accuracy, and, once deter-
mm
d, It sha
es the enemy beyond tbe power of
c.ontmued resIstance.
.An exact co-ordination mw;t be obserycd
b
tweeI?- the "ork of the heavy guns anll the work
of the mfantry that foHows it. The infantry in
the trench
s cannot, of course, move uutil tbe a
til-
1er
work IS over; but the "ery moment it is over,
"lllle th
en?my who has beeT] subject to that can-
nonade IS stIll stunned and distraunht by it and
ILJn
before the survivors can remoùcl the tre;lcÌles
whIch h
Ye been knocked to pieces by the heavy
fire,.the mfantry leap from their trenches aJIlI rush
the mterycuing space and the first trenches of their
opponents. They establish themselws hurriedly
but a
th?roughly as they can, before the counte
'

DffcnSlye IS launched.
To interfere with the Y:Llne of that counter-

offensi\-e. the hc
ny gun fulfils anot.her task. It
next creates a zone of fire behind the capturcd
trenches, passage through ".-hich zone is sometimes
impossible anù alw:lYs exceftlingly costly.
It "in he seen t}wt this methoù cümt<1ntly
pursued doc:; an that the war of attrition demands.
It hUs and wounds grea t numh'i'S of t lw C'nf'my;
it lcaws initiatiye entirely in the hands of the
ABies; it cauæs cOIIsideral;le batches of prisolw]'S
to be passed continna.1Iy from the CIwnl\'s Jipcs
into ours. It has hut OÌ1C d1awbad.;:. It'is
prrs-
lllodic on al:count of the enormous amount of
projectiles it con
UlìJes in each effort.
But it mar bc a5ked whr so ob, ions an
arr
ngement is' mainly in the 110ssession of the
AllIes, and "hy the enemy. sin('e two can play at
any game, does not attf'mpt similar action against
us.
Sometimes, of course. he cToes attempt it: as,
for instance, in the attack on St. Eloi the other
day, in front of Ypres. But he doc') not attempt
it once to ten times t.hat it is tried against him.
Anù the reason that he thus finds himself perpetu-
any receiying blo..vs which he cannot adcquately
return is main]y ùue to his now fixed inferiority in
the air and next to his husbanding ùf ammllniÙon,
Here the sec'O'ld point, t.he slHJeriority in
munition of the ABies ill the "-est, COI)}(>S in. 'It is
of the first importance, but., unfortm1:1tf'h-, it is
a matter on which, in the n:1tl1re of things, "'c baye
yelT scanty niùeucc indeeù. 'Ve do k1l<fW, how-
e,'ci', that, 'for reasons which will be 8np'gc
teù in a

L
moment, the enemy is stiU chary in his nse of big
shell along the 'Vestern front.
In the first place, he is certainh 1w.mp('1'ell for
l
id::el, and probably already sOllle,,-hat h.
mpcretl
for copper.
In tIte second place, he proL:ilJI
' fel'ls more
than do the Allies t.he burden of reIinÍ1Jg guns and
of completing new prioes. The reason of this.
paradoxical a.s it may secm, is that he was so much
Letter prepared with heavy artiJIcry than were
the Allies at the beginning of the war. If yon
ha,-e everything l'e;lùY amI thought out for one
set of things, you exclude by all that pn'paration
another unexpected set of things. .Just as a buc1\:-
ward country suddenly de,-elopillg itself win more
easily get the latest maehinery than an old and
'H'althier country, long de,'eloped, so a country
which has prepared for the use of a pDrt.icular
weapon in a certaiumaximum quantity, and to be
cxercised over a maximum time, is likely to he at
a. loss when the allotted time is exceedeJ and the
quantity proves insllflìÓent, compared 'with ri,-als
who take up the whole thing on a nm-e! scale.
In the third place, he wants many of his
heavy guns for the Eastern front. The only real
adnmtage the Austro-Gcrmans have over tho
Russians is their superiority in this weapou.
Take it away from tbe cnemy in the East and he
is beaten.
In thc fourth place, neutral markets for muni-
tions are closed to the enemy; a handicap which
makes him rage most furiously, for it offenùs his
sense of justice,
And, in the fifth place, counting every man as
he does in such an industrialised state, and keep-
ing a bare minimum back to supply his armed
forces from the factories, he is hampered somc-
what for labour.

COTTO
,
Explosiye he has in auy quantity he likes, both

6-

April 10, 1915.

.

propell
nt explosiH' and explcsiye for bursting
charges. The latter he makes from the distilJatioll
of coal, which he has in
bundance, and which he
can nitrate at will. The former, thanks to the
ddibel':'Ite relaxation of the blockade, he nnw pos-
sesses III a YNT large amount. Indeed. the main
questio
for those,' hn are agitating in tbis matter
to consider no'" is whether it is worth while to
preyent his getting cotto;}, since he already has
such a yery great
to('k vf it. He cannot use
:lI1ything except cotton. aad we haye alJü\yed
him to accumulate ab('l
t nne million bales.
.\Ye haxe forbidclel
,..nol to go into Germany,
though wool comeS trom the Empire, amI though
wool only clothes his soldiers. 'Ye haye allow'etl
cotton to go in frer1y, quite as much since the
Order in Couuc.il as before. The matte,' is b un -
po,u]er. The matter is contI'o' ersial, and, thei'f>
fore, I will not debate it here, but I helieye my
figures are correct. A ]IliHion bales is, I belieye,
80mewhat sbort of the material for.300,000,000Ibs.
of explosi,-e, and at tb<" same time it is tbe support
of large numbers of his industrial population.
"'hether it is wortb wbile or net to have pro-
yisioned him-and to continue to pro,'ision bim-
so handsomely with the one chief matPi'ial factor
in modern war, and the one which he could Hût
possibly get without our aid, it is for those who
know all the facts-and I do not pretend to know
tbem-to determine.

A SIG
IFICA
T WITl':ESS.
One mu!-ot be Wl'
- careful in fol1owing the
cyidence--cspceial1y the eyidence for numbers-
in th(':,e gl"eat campaigi1s, neyer to nUc)\\' any ele-
ment into one's calculation that is not what the
French call .. positiye:'
Xor should one put into the wrong categories
the yal'ious aetiyitie:,; of the enemy. One should
not. fur instance, mix up false 'news which is
deliberatel
' sp]'(:ild among the German pupulace
with oftìcial news circulated by th(' Go"ernJl1ent
for French, English, and Hm-isÌan General Staffs
to acccpt or reject.
I will not, therefore, exagp-erate tbe import-
ance of the following piece of German propa-
ganda, but I do use with regard to it the "ord
.. significant H because it is a. yery dear example
of something which I ha,-e insisted upon per-
petually in tbe3e notes-to wit, that the yarious
Ee8tions into which the enemy's efforts at influenc-
ing opinion is divideù are fàirly clear-cut, 'Vhat
I am about to quote throws a ,-ery clear light upon
the way in wbich neutral countries are being
coached by Germany,
It is a series of figures published in an organ
of tbe Swedish Press as late as
farch 19. and
purports to be (what it no doubt is) a summary
furnished by a writer" who has been recently in
Berlin." Its principal figures are as follows (to
the nearest round figure in tens of thousanùs) :-

For RUSSIA: 750,000
770,000
Ii million
For the FRENCH: 460-70,000
500,000
720,000
For E
VGLAXD: 120,000
80,000
180-
0.000

dead.
pl'lsoners.
wounded,
dead.
prIsoners.
wounded.
dead.
pl'lSOner8.
'" ounùed,

.

,
..

For GERJIAS1
i 340,000 dead.
130,000 1 Jl 'lsoner8.
620,000 ,younded,

0\Y, I need not tell my readers tbat these
figures are fantastio. 1Iy point is rather to im-
preF:s upon t.hem the fJ.'I.wlity of the phantasy. It
is, th.is: The
nemy is getting now into the habit
ot hJttmg blmd, 'Ye h,n e had plenty of neces-
sary falsehood by wa.y of suppression, and not a
little falsehood bv way of direct statement or
implication on al(sides"in this great v.ar.
But rou will not find at all in the sta tements
of
ny of the Allies, nor wiU you find in any of
the statements issuing from Germam' (until these
last few weeks) the elemellt of the ;nonstrous.
"Then one reads, e\-en in (\ffkial l'rench
accounts, the news of prisoners who bdieye that
the Germans are in Pari5, or allY startlpr of that
kind, one hesitates to beliC\e
1 he story. But
s,t
tis
jcs such as the a!)oye--sent to SUI;posedìy
fl'lenolj l1ewspaì'crs-gn'e one pause.
The Brit isl! prisoners in this silly circular
are multiplied br four; tbe British dead by less
than fen, but more than 8i.1]; while the total
wounded of all sort
are made out little more than
the dead.
TJ}e German figur('s, all added tOf/etller, come
to less than the bebtCl1 and imperfect oflìciallists
(publiEhed hy the AlJies) for PI llssia aloae a 1110nth
ago, and giyc a proportion of ins tlwn tLCO
u.oundcd to one killed.
The French prisoners are more than double
the total numbers which the Germans ha,-e
been able to make up by counting eyery conceivable
ciyilia.n item into their own ofiìcial numbers (as
publi::sÌ1cd for us - who can judge, not for
neutrals), Tbe total of French casualties, adding
the sick, amount to more than the "bole im-
metliate front Frent:h fighting line.
It is clear ibat these figures were not m-en
exaggerations of existing lists. They were made
up out of the author's l1ead and had no relation to
reality, But they 'H're certainly sent to the Press
of a nputml count]'\' 1Jelieyed to be fl'iendh-.
The lesson to ì)e learnt from an incident of
this F.Ort seems to me to be three-fold.
In tl1e first place, and nwst impOl tant, it is
another piece of eyidcnce showing the working of
the enewy's mind; wherein there is that mixture,
not uncommonly found in intli\Tiùuals, of patience
and bad judgment; or, let me say, of accuracy and
responsibility, where ullculable things are C011-
cerued. coupled with great incapacity "here
things incaleulable (like the nìilld of the tlupe) are
conecrned,
In the st'conù place. it is a piece of cvidence
sLowing us that a Xorth German or Prussian
statement is alwa) s quite simple; and that ,
'hen
we h::n-e got to the moti\e of it we can put a label
on it without fear of error. Such an enemy state-
ment is always either rigidly accurate, or false,
but; quite creðible, or f:JIse and fantastic, as the
case may be; but the three categories do not run
into one another, These bits of enemy news are
simpl
- accurate or simply false, and if ialsc either
credible or quite ridiculous,
It ,,-oultl be interesting, by the way, to collect
and criticise a whole conspectus of this kind of
thing. Such informations must be numerous in the
Press of neutral countrie
, and particul::rly in the
Press of countries still thougbt by the German
General Staff to be fayourable to the German cause...
9*

n..1 V

_1 Ì\ D

1

\pl'il 10, 1915.

.\ -

"

,-

l'HE 'V AR BY WATER.
THE SUBl\'I-\ RINE POSITION & l
HE "BLOCKADE."
By FRED T. JÅ_NE.

NorE.-This \rticlc has been submitted to the Pr.:
s R'lfe:!'I, \\hlcll does 03t object to the publication as censored, aDd tllku nil
responsibility for the COJ
ectncss 01 tbe sta!ements,

T HE most important in('i
eut during the la,t week
is not one that at first sIght would appeal' LO h
\"e
any particular rignifi('ance outside the operal!OlI
itself. It is some long time since we fin.t sellt aero-
planes to drop bombs on submarines building or
being put toget hel' at Zeebrugge, and t be work came into the
category of .. doiug damage" rather than aught else,
Of late, bowever, aerial attack on submarines has been
resumer! with considerable aSfidnity, and thcre i" eVl'r:y
reason b believe that what appears to the public merely a

.. anothe!' daring air raid" is really part of a sl'heme of high
general strategy. Indeed, it is not impossilJle that we al"e
witnes<;illg the dawn of an entimly new era in naval warfare,
Refore the war there was a somewhat general iwpres
;oll
that aircraft had to a great extent neutralised submarines.
Theorie" varied in d,1
'lil; but in all the møin idea was that
submarines would easily be detected from tb
sky and tben as
easily destroyed by bomb-dl"Opping unlefs tbey hastily Luried
themsel\'es many fathoms do,
'n or were protected Ly af'rial
consort'!, \\'c also heard a great df'al of the ideal combination
of aircraft and submarines. but to all intents and purposes
we bave seen nothing of the sort,
On the other hand, two fIJctor9 have by now made them-
EE'l\'C'! abn.ldantIy dear. Of tht'se the fir!'t is that, ,qil'f'll tlj(

cn/J/1l1(1I.{ L'f the sea, the sO;:<1I craft of the superior Power
Co'!n do a g:'eat deal in the way of eliminating suhm<!ri11"s-,
how mu:,h we shall have to wait until the end of the war to
learn, However, the mere fad suffices,
The second factor is that, [Jivf'n tlte. command nf tlte air,
submarinE's huilding or lying at theil' bases can Le altacked
and destr'JyeJ, This last, however, may he merely a tempo-
rary pha<e, at any rate, so far as building is concerned, he-
C'1use bomhproof sheds offe.' an obvious remedy Ullle
s tÌle
air power available he sufficient to prevent tbe construction
of such s;.feties, or they can be destroyed by gun fire from
big s!:ips in bombarJments like that of Zeebrugge some
months ago.
Neithu factor se:èms to have pre
e!\ted itself to the
German mind, any more t1wn a third factor, which I shall
discuss later-that of persn7l1/d,
Detail'! of new German submarine constructinn are, 1'0
fill' as the public is concerned, necessarily hard to come by;
they are naturally only approxirr>ately to be an'i,-eù at, and
then olily by piecing together odd scraps of information
deri\'ed from neutrals. \\'e, of course, know tJ 1 at on the
outbreak of ""ar Germany had fr?m eight to twelve sl;b-
marines in various stages of cO:lbtmction. These C'Il1 hardJy
ha,-e suffil'ed to replace los"es which may run to anything'
between fifteen and twenty. Some of the reported ramming:!
by merchant ships may be duplications of the same
tory, or
the rammed submarine may h3.\'e merely been injured some-
wilat and not sunk. None l Ùp It'ss, considerable losses mnst
have been sustained, and, one way and another, the available
force of German submarines at the present moment IlHi5t be,
relatively sreal"ing, inconsiderable, e8pecially when W6
remember that they ha\'e the Ualtic to attend to as w..ll as
01\1' waters. \\Tith things as they were German sulJmarines
wOl
Id ha,'o gl'adually died out, just as the commerce raiding
crUisers did,
But-jl1dging from tIle reports of neutrals-there is
every reason to believe tbat on the outbreak of war Germany
!<uddenly laid down from fììty to sixty submarines. Thib lias
been so clten reported, and reported from so many differellt
F.ources. that it may safely be assume'! as a fact, In addition,
the improvi
ing of submarine building yards on the Belgian
coast suggests that !ill the pri,'ate yards of Germanv are abo
building !out.linarines. .
Now. the average time for cOllstruclion of a su}.marine
uncle! n<:rmal conditions is anythin
from a year upwards.
But m CIrcumstances of pre.,qure nine months is a qnite
ros
ible and reasonable period, and the war has now IHsted
nearly nine months. Therefore, we Dlay expect a very el1rly
Bud large liP/meTical increa
e in German submarines,
Now, this mean8 that on the outhreak of war Germany
Bud
euly alLe
ed bel' naval pnlicy, her usual programmo
hanng bE'en SIX hQab a year, Why she made this sllllden

change nlU"t nscessarily be a matter of surmise. 'Vc can if
we will attribute it to a. pre,war belid that the British Empire
would not be co,oper<!.ting with France apd Russia. Or we
C3n attribute it to a sudden realisation of the impotence oÏ a
few big bhips againbt many-a sudden falling-away from
Gennan eyes of the bcales of convention, Yet again the easo]
with which in rapid succession our l'nthfináír and the three
Cres..irs were submarin
d may L1:.ve had much to do with th

sadden conviction of Germany th
t her future, instead of
lying on the water, lay under the water.
Possibly all three causes operated. In any case, how-
ever, the net result is of the nature of a new era, a vast
increase (for as soon as one boat is launched another appean
to be laid down) in tIle numbsI' of suhmariaes and a decision
to regard the submarine as the principal warship for modera
requirements.
Now, where numbers are concerned this i!l perfectly
feasible; but w}\f're pcrsonnel is concerned the matter assume!!
a son.ewhat different aSpt'ct, So far as men go, submarine
crews can probably he trained inside a month, Their dutiell
are mainly mechanical.
\Vilb submarine offic
rs, however, the state of atrail'5 i.
totally different. On the officers evel-ything depends, and a
femi-traiui)d s:lhllia1Íne officer is ratLer worse than useless.
It takes a good two ycars or the better part of tJ,at time to
traiu an oITicer to commaud a submariue efficiently, On hill
nen'e, skill, enàurance, and judgment cverJthing depends to
a degree of which the gencrd public (and, for that matter, a
fair 11umber of senior ofiicer:,) have no conception whatever,
\Vhen war broke out Germauy b::.d available fomewhere
ahout one hundred trained submarine officcrs at the outside.
Of these, cne way and anothel', she must have lost lJ'lything
from one-third to ;:, k.lf, and none of those officers whom bhe
may have trained in tha interim can yet be suitable for effec-
tive command,
So far as war pfficiency i!; concerned, we may take it,
therefore, that the nnmPriclJ1 iilcrea
e and the cITeetive in-
crease will not be at all one and the same thing, It will
nece:'sarily mean the scrapping of all the older boats, or else
relegating them to training service, It will also be necessary
to p.'ornote to the command of large boats officers from small
boats and officers who have bern second in command of boats,
and who-to a certain extent-are, therefore, still CI under
training, "
Consequent.1y, if fifty new submarines be ad.led to the
German Fleet in th
course of Ule next
ew \Veek
, it will
not mean fifty bo;>t'i added to the effecti\Te force of those
already exi;et,ing. It will, however, mean the substitution
of newer and gl'eally improved boats for older ones, and here
our aerial raids to check new constmdion perform a special
fnnction. Germany, having failed in her challenge to us on
the sea, is now about to fight for the under-sea mastery.
The recent air raids on submarine bases indicate that
0111' .Admiralty is fully alive to the situation and determined
to leave no stone unturned in maintaining our submarine
superiority, Speculations as to aU tht> measures being taken
are unde
irable; but no harm is done by drawing attention to
the fact that when this war started wo bad two or three sub-
marines to everyone possessed by Germany and a much more
considerable building programme in hand. This naturally
imrlies a far largoI' number of trained and efficient officers-
that is to say, bumanly speaking, we possess as heavy a
margin for the new warfare as we did for the old.
It is tnte tbat in the new warfare in which Germany La!
elpcted to seek naval salvation there is the problem of how
submarines are to fight each other. Unle8s both sides are
det.ermined on a surface fight nothing is to be done save by
surprisE's, which of necessity are likely to be few and far
between, But, as I pointed out la;;t week, tbe superior Power
has the advantage of being able to adopt the offen!'ive, and
the net result of Germany's great submarine move will prob-
ably be that we learn to attack her in ways that else we might
not have deemed possible.
In the wanton slaughter of non,combatants in merchant
sllips von Tirpitz is probably t.raining our Navy to adapt
itself to the new ora in naval wal'Íare; indeed, tho red net

10"

April 10, 1915.

, .

ftsu1t of the submarine II l)lockade" may be the hastening
(,)f tDat era. If the "blockade JJ has taugbt us the limita-
tions of the submarine, it has also served to give us a clearer
idea than heretofo-rn of its potentialities.
It is early days yet to prophesy that this war 1\ ill "it.ness
the disappearance of the Dreadnou!lht as a nayal unit. Such
a state of affairs could perhaps only be brought about by a
!Uccession of incidents in which the ÐreadliQ/(.'lld was invari-
ably annihilated by the submarine-and it is a far cry to
adopt that as a probability.
None the less-for all that, little to justify such an
hypothesis appears to have occurred-there is reason to belie.....e
that the next tw"o or three months or so are going to v.itness
profound modifications of many of the pre"iou"ly accepted
Ideas of naval warfare. If not fully up to the propl.ecy of
Admiral Sir Percy Scott a year or so a
o, all the present
Indicat.ions are that the capital ship will presently be the
lubmarine, all other vessels gradually becoming subsidiary
and auxiliary to it.

THE DARDANELLES.
"Up t
the tiII'e of writing (:Monday night) there have
been no further developments in the Dardanelles. Occa
ional
tad weather interferes with the oper<?tions, and mine sweep-
ing is comiderably bampered by the perhr.ps somewhat
unexpected activity which the Turks (or, more rrobably,
their German advisers) are displaying in the matter of repair-
Ing forts and making uso of mobile artillery.
At and about the Narrows the dlannel is 50 restricted
that 6\"ery sort and k;nd of weapon can be utilised to annoy
the mine sweepers, wllile concealment of guns from aerial
obser\"ation has now become such a fine art that it is unfair
to eJ.:pect too much assistance from the sky. Pending the
clearance of the shores by a land force, it is difficult to s.ee
how progre"s aHeat can be aught but very slow aud tedious,
e<:pecially since eyery spell of bad weather gi\"es opportunity
to the enemy to make good his damages.

THE BOSPHORUS A
D BLt\CK SEA.
The Rw:sian Black Sea Fleet is now reported to be con,
i!ucting operations against the Bosphorus defen('e
.. but so
far as can be gathered notbing of a serious nature has }et
been attempted. Yery prohably the Russians are badly
hampered by lack of equipment and H!pplies for any co-
operating land force, wbile they are Hndou bte.l1y furtb
r
hampered by the circUldstance tlnt they can ill 2.fiord to lose
any of their sLips, as they ha,'e no l'esen-e to draw on sucb as
we and the French ha\"e.
The àifficu1ties of any naval aclion ag;;.Ïnst the Bosphoru!!
were dealt witb in these Notes a fortnight DgO, One way and
another, therefore, it is likely enough tl.at Rus ian progre;,-j
will be as slow or slower tl.an our own.
The small TUI'kish cruiser JlerljidÏFh is scn.i,officially
reported to ba,-e struck apd been sunk by a mine in the Black
Sea, \\here she was conducting some m&rauding operations
devoid of aU milital"y significance. Her loss CÛl1 1Iz.\'e no
material effect 011 the campaign, as her fighting ,alue was
.mall and she \\""as getting olJ.

A "SWERS TO CORRESPO
DENTS.
F, A. C.
I. (Bath).-(l) .t.Il except tbe
el'Y late
t
Cenn",!! submarines havo a peculiarly raisE'd how whi"h
cannot be mistaken. (2) The captain of a n
erchant ship
would certainly be unable to tell tbe nation:Ility of a suh-
merged submarine from its peri<:cope. On tho other l
aJ1
,
no British submarine would approach a J.;erchaut slup m
Bu('h a condition, so " sunk by mistake" that way would he
e.n improbable evcnt. (3) In tbo national interest the
AdmiralLy may at any time see fit to conceal a lo"!!, but yon
may bike it t.bat they would immediat;.-
)" inform pri,ately all
the relati\"es of the lost.
POBBJ.Es,-The Navy has quicker way., of dispo
ing of
hOGtile mine fiE'lds than by the scheme t\ hieh )'ou Bugge,;t.
\V. A, 'V. (C'lifton),-You are by no mean., alone in
critici<:ing the responsible na"al authoritieq became the (hf'l'n
and other s!lips were sunk by Hoating n:ines. ]
ut. as I P?intE'd
{,ut at t.he time, 110 information bas yet been forthcolmug as
to the conditions which obtained, and in the ab.,ent::e of any
Buch information both eomII'ent and criticism mu!'t neces
arily
be unfair and futile. Trust the British Navy.
R, N. (Belfast).-A submarine C:in lie at the bottom of
the sea pro"ided the water be not too de(.p, It could do
o
down to 150 fet't or w. If, of course, it tried to do the same
thing in the deepest part of the A tlantic the pre!'sure \\ Guld
crumple it Ill'.

1 .

-'

J, H. (Scarborough),-(l) I am sorry, but J do not lnow
tIle answer myself. Po!'sibly some of the big projecti13-maker
,
such as Hadfield or Forth, would give you the infon !ation you
require. (2) The niu. and 12in, German shells ha\"e t\\""o
('opper bands; I do not remember what tlle 8.2 has. (3)
The marks on the nose of the shell presented to you by the
German warships are no clue to the dimension<; of the sbell.
(4) Nothing seems definitely certain as to wbich I"hips bom-
barded Scarborough, but the sllips out are generally believed
to have been MoUke, Seyc!litz, D. ..flinger, ron cia Ta illl ,
Blüclu r, and some of the small fa
t cruisers like the Rosioc'
.
One. at least, will never be seen again.
M. W. C. (Bristol).-(l) At the present moment., to all
intents and purposes German cruisers are swept off the seas.
The fate of one or two is somewhat uncertain, but they aro
certainly quite harmless. (2) The Gazf'lle was got into har-
bour badly damaged, (3) The Admiralty yery wisely object
to comments on questions having to do with the palticular
condition of any particular ship, (4) The Emden's landing
part.y apparently got away wbile the S!/dT'e!/ was otberwise
engaged. (5) Portugal has no Navy suitable for model"}
na, al warfare. She bas been seyeral times repOl ted as being
teclmic:1lly at war with Germany, but that appears to be the
end of the matter.
E, P. S, (Cheltenllam),- When a ship is interned she i3
u!'ually more or less taken posse!'sion of by the port authOli-
ties, and it is legally correct to disarm her.
,Yo C. S. (West llamps.tead).-Devices for catl'hing sub-
mariJl
s under water are as common as blackberries. They
are unfortunately nearly always based on a failure to appre-
ciate the capabilities of modern submarines.
O. \y, J. (Liverpool),-A de,-ice such as you sugge
t is
feasible, but eyen at tbe present time the submarine is
.. nobody's friend. J1 It might deceive merchant ships, but
would not decei,-e naval officer
.
A. B. P. (Willchester).-I do not thinJ... that there is
any truth in t.he rumour to which you refer, but in any case
it is inadvisable to allude to it in PI'int. For the successful
COlldu.
t of this war it is absolutely nece<;sary for the public
to tru ,t the responsible authorities and to be content to remain
ignorant about matters "hich are nó.turally of the utmost
intHest to everyboùy.
R. C. B. (Londen, S,W,).-If you study the title of that
photograph of the Fleet out...iùe the Dardanelles, you will se.e
that no date is specified. It ",a., pr-obably taken quite early in
t.he war, alid no connection with the more reCE'nt operations,
E, S. R. (St. Andrews).-The scheme you suggest is
quit-e feasible, but the B1"Íti"h Navy is bardly likely to be
caught napping that way.
,Yo 8. C. (Glenarm).-Tbe scheme yon "ugge!'-t was em-
J
loyed in the American Ciúl "Tar and lIas been ill use e\"er
hnce.
J. S. D. (Bighgate) ,-(1) American m.'\\3p:;perc; are
al\\ ays disco-rering .. young iu\'elllor:; J1 who ha\"e hit on !'-ome
idea to re\"olutionise \\ar. The writer of the parl1graph which
you el1closed is obviously entirel)' ignorant of ",lult can be
done \\ il h modern torpedoes, Any of the latest \\Ï1iteheads
"ill ea!'-ily travel five miles, (2) Your periscope suggestion
was, I happen to know, mb'ilitted to the Adn,iraHy by an
optici<!n ,-ery early in the war. It is, of course. based on a
device commonly used in the music-halls. The bulk of the
periscope!! which are seen by people are hallucinations-even
men daily trained to look for them find it very hard to !'ee
them. (3) I understand tbat this idea has heen e-..:perimented
with, but that it did not prove practical. (4) I think the
fame 8lJSWer applies.
HùPEFUL (York).-There is little limit t
tbe :,uxiliary
services for which subnarinE'c ('an he eml'loyed, l'ut
uccess
::]",a,'s depends entirely on the indi\'iduality and abi 1 ity of the
officels in charge,

MR. HIL-\TRE BELLOC'S WAR LECll'RF.
.
B:!m:
J!llam...... 1'''''11 Hall.. 'I'll .clay,........... 13^rliI.3,
O
8,30
Lea1 ..ugtol1......,TO,,1l lId]!..,....... \\
'IIt'SÙ
......... 14 Ai'lil, 3 P,nI.
),.... "'ghanI, .AJb
ltndJJ...... \\"d. 8<1 .......14A:)I'il,8p,m.
Lund 11,...... I.lu"" I'.. ha!l.... \\..: ,1 r ,...... 5 :.\1.1, n,;';O p,m.
:\IR. FRED T. JA
E O
THE NA\"AL WAR
J.e<. .5......... .. .\Ibel t llaJL...... '1'1...1 làY 13 \ 'II: ,ß 1',1>1.
f'1,fli,'J.. Y' 'e-I:,\l!:l.lI......F,:rla\. ....,]6.\. il P",JI'
H: at,;......... Kh' I..., ..
a'u.da .... lï .\:11;1. 3.
\ .m.
!'om. CRAWFlJRD PRICE ON "SERRlA."
B"..
r(V1L....,.. \\ïlltel r:ardp s..,\[, IIfay 12 "Ill 1.8 p.m.

"u Lù..<-.lgh......Op'.ra JlOII ,,'1'111 13,\ 13 AI ii, 3 1',1>1.
), .." ......,...... U'- a H" ____... '';(',h', I.,
........__ 14 APlål,3p,Hl.

laJ'\ b sler,...... :FllC Trade Hall. fh 15 '\1' ;1,8 p,m.
t, uthT){)..t..,...... Cambl :II;,.! Hal'.. FI ',' .' ___. ".._ 16 '\1'1';1 8 p,m.
PROFr:SSOR LE" r:S O
., \IOD
R:'I1 F\..rr.O<;I\'PS."
T\ rCrì:\)........... l'a' .J;f)n............ r. j! '" ................ Ð _\: 1:1: 3 p.m.

11*

.

pn 10, 1915.

INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.-III.
CO.OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT WITH ARTILLERY.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

I N a previous article the writer endeavoured to show that
the advent of aircraft relieves the cavalrv of certain
tasks for which it is not really suited, the;eby increa
-
ing the value of that arm, provided always that the
latter is capable of taking full ad\'antage of its air
sen-ice. The ascendancy, for instance, which our air service
Bcems now to p03sess over that of the enemy is due not only to
the sUPel'iority of the service itself, but also to a very careful
and intimate co-operation that, for efficiency, must exist
between air squadrons and the forces to which they are
attached. Destroy that close co-operation and you destroy, at
the same time, aerial efficiency as at present known.
It is not only as a means of reconnaissance, supplement-
ing the cavalry, that aircraft have already exercised an ill-
direct influcnce in the present war. The aeroplane has a1;o
rendered invaluable service to the artillery.
The cmployment of smokeless powder by the belligerents
bag rendered the location of targets for artillery a very diffi-
cult'matter indeed, and has l'esulted in a great waste of
ammunition and a great amount of useless wear and tear of
big guns. This is especially the case where the equipment of
the gun enables fire to be delivered from positions hidden to
the opposing artillery.
Ascendancy in the air now enables a commander to use
his aircraft to co-operate with, and to assist, his artillery. The
assistance which an efficient air service can render to the artil-
lery can be classified under four heads:-
(i. >: Discovery of hostile batteries, their strength and
arrangement.
(ii.)" Indication of concealed targets.
(iii,) Observ3;tion of fire and assistance in the process 01
rangmg.
(iv,) Information concerning the effect of the fire,

I

Thus, suppose that, as indicated in Diagram II., an artil.
lery commander at A wishes to determine exactly the distance
A B of a hostile battery B hidden from him, and that he
decides to have recourse to the services of one of his airmen

., ,

.

for that purpose, he would indicate to his aerial observer tIt'3
direction of B, and would decide with him at what altitude he
would fly over the enemy's battery. The airman would then
go to some suitable place, e, behind A, and from there would
rise to the prearranged altitude, II. In passing, it is interest-
ing to note that the aeroplane reaches its altitude by moving
in a spit'al until tho required height, H, has been reached.
It then flies out, keeping at that height, towards B. At Ð
it is immediately over B, and it has to make this fad known
to the artillery officer by means of a system of signala which
tho writer cannot indicate in an article meant for publication
during the war.
;I.f the artillery officer at A knows the exact moment when

..

D

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-

---

---._--.--_._

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........ 6
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............-- I
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-- ------ ....,...----.,.---r--
- -"'\, '1'
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,ti8 r
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I
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:H
I
I
,
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H.
,

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I
,
,
.
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A

"..
"
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,-
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r
I
t
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:B

In Diagram I. an illustration is giv6n of a position where the aircraft is at D, a point vertically above B, then all he
8.n enemy's battery B is concealed from the artillery at A. has to measure in order to determine the distance A n is t.ho
Tho battery B may be so concealed by trees and bushes that angle DAB. He has then sufficient data either to obtain
the ordinary methods !Jf reconnaissance cannot easily locate the range A B by calculation or by means of a range-finder.
it. An aeroplane, flying from A over fl, may determine the It is impossible to over-estimate the value of exact ßnd
pc3Ïtion of the battery, unless the battery itself is rendered quick range finding. Its importance is threefold:
Invisible from above. In most cases, however, there will be (a>. It is conducive to a quicker destruction of tllf;
some sign of activity near B which will attract the aerial enemy's battery,
observer's attention and which will enable him to make a (b) It reduces the waste of ammunilion and the wear
detailed obsen-ation of B, and tear of the guns.
In assisting an artillery commander the airman Is most (c) It reduces the time to which batteries may be
often given the general direction of the enemy's battery rela- exposed to the enemy's fire.
tively to his own, and his task consists in locating the target In other words, an aerial ascendancy which allows tho
along that direction. co-operation of aircraft with artillery, whenever the situation
In such a case the aeroplane rises to a prearranged height demands it, is of such great moment that no country possessing
behind his artillery commander's battery in order to run less such an asset should run the risk of compromising ilJ
danger from hostile fire. "'hen Ute airman has reached the effectiveness.
required altitude he flies out towardll the battery, in the It must not, howe\Ter, be forgotten that the influence 01
indicated direction, to locate exactly the target. The location air power resulting from the co-operation of aircraft with
of the battery enables the artillery commander to determine artillery is just as indirect as that arising from its use with
the distance of the target with a great de
ree of accuracy. the cavah'y or any other arm, An artillery commander can'
12- I

:April 10, 1915.

UAND

tal;:e fun I'dvantage of the assistance of his air F-en'ice only
if he is not out ranged by the artiHery of the enemy, and if he
has an adequate supply of guns amI ammunition, Ii would
be of no avail to him to know the exact range of the enemy's
battery if the enemy did not anow him to place his guns
sufficiently near enough to damage their battery, or if he haJ
not sufficient ammunition for that purpose, It is thus cIeal'
that it is but an indirect influence \\hich air pm\er can exert
when it is obtained as a result of the co-operation of ail' units
with land and sea forces. An air fleet can only exert a direct
influence if it be employed as an entirely independent force.
The general conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from the
facts which the writer has already explained in this, and the
prcçious articles, on the Influence of Air Power is that such
IUl influence can be exercised in two ways:-
(a) Indirectly, by the co-operation of aircraft with
ca.alry, artillery, &c.
(b) Directly, by employing aircraft as an independent
force.
The first demands that air fleets, or air squadrons, should
be placed under various cavalry and artillery commanders,
whilst the second makes it clear that they should form a force
capable of acting either independently or, when necessary, in

AND

'VATER.

dire\:t co-operation with the Commander,in-CIIÏef. 'The in-
adviE-ability of employing an air fleet, at one time indepen-
dently, at another under the on1ers of cavalry or of artillery
commanders, is ob\ ious. Such a method would not lead to the
close and intimate co-ordination necessary to an air fleet
acting in co-operation ".-ilh ca\"alry or artillery, and would
110t, on the othel' hand, lea\'e the aerial force sufficiently
free to act on its own initiative and at its own time. And
yet to benefit fully from influence of air power it is necessary
to be able to use its dirut, as well as its indirect advantages.
"-'ith air fleets, as we now have them, it is neces
ary to com-
promise their direct, in order to profit by their indirect
influence, and 'I.'ice 1.'trsâ. The dilemma in which a Com-
mander-in-Chief is at present placed as regards the employ

ment of the aerial force at his disposal is the foHowing: Shan
he employ his air fleet to exert direct influence, in which case
he would have to forego the alh-antages accruing from the
co-operation of his aircraft with his other arms, or shaH he
employ his aerial force to e.;;::ert the indirect influence with"
which we are now familiar, in which case he would ha.e to
renounce the possible effect of the direct influence of air
powed 'This dilemma the writer proposes to deal ",ith in his
next article.

NAPOLEON'S PASSAGE of the DANUBE
1809.

.

111

By COLONEL F. N. l\IAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

T o show how much easier tbe passage of a great rÌ\-er
has become, thanks to t.he improvement which
has taken place in modern armament, tllere is
given here a brief account of the forcing of t.he
Danube by Napoleon below Vienna.
It was in face of the whole Austrian Army, some 240,000,
In 1809, a.nd there are many points of similarity bet",een
it and the passage of the Rhine which we shall undertake this
vear; t.herefore Napoleon's operation is particularly interest-
. ,
lllg at t11C pre
eIlt moment.
In March, 1809, the Emperor had conjured out of tIn
earlh, 50 it seemed to his enemies, one of the greatest armies
he had eWl' led, consisting of about 200,000 in the first line,
follo",ed by many reinforcements. Its numbers came as a
complete strategic surprise to the Austrians: but, like a not her
I'.rmy now arrayed against 11S, its magnitude had becn attained
by the sacrifice of quality, and it could no longer attack on
the battlefield except in heavy massed formations, 60 curiously
does history r!õpeat it.self.
Essentially by weight of numbérs skilfully concent.rated
at the decisive points, Napoleon had driW'n the Austrians
before him right a(
ross Bavaria and tbl'Ough t.he mountainotB
barrit;r ",hich lies bet",ccll the B:n'arian fnmtier and Vienl13.
He forced them to evacuate their carital and to transfer all
their available troops to the left bank of the Danube, whic1.l
runs north of the City of Vienna about three miles away,
The ri,yer here is as wide a.s the Thames at Grayesend,
and runs wit.h almm:;t equal speed-i.
_. four miles an hour in
flood, and t.he floods were endless that, year_
O\"er that width of wat
r the artillery and musketry fir&
of tbe time wa.s of no avail, and as the Austi'ian pickets were

lert on the opposite bank, which they held Îor thirty miles
above the city and twenty miles below it (quite a narrow
'ront even then for a quarter of a million to defend), the out,
look for the French, the prospect of their cro!'sing the Danube,
w-as far from inspiriting. But some eight. miles below Yienua
tHiS an i:,land-that of Lobau, about 1,000 yards long, 300
wide, and !;<'parated from the AustrÏi,n shore by fifty yards of
\\ater, its borders denæly clothed by willows and reeds.
The Emperor dctermined to surprise the passage of tbe
river at this point. Colle<'ting all t.he yesse!s and timber
neces
ary for bridging in the liltle ÍI'ibutary wlách, flowing
through Vienn:>, enters the Danuhe just above the Lobau.
under cover of night parties of light inf:mtry in boats cap-
t.ured the island, drove out the Au::.triall pickets, and th,)
building of the bridge at once was begun, the \\ hile a fleet of
l
oats ferried n
ore trcors t.o tbe island. ThE' s}lOrt lu'idge'l
between Lobau and the ll'ft bank gave \'Cry lit.tle trouhle to
the French, 8nd at dayligllt Napoleon attacked the village!i
of Aspern and Esslillgen with tIle first troops to arrive on the
ground, while ceaseless Etreams of reinforcements poured
()o\ Er t he bridges.
At midday, l\owever, a big ßoo(l poured down tho 1'1\1'1'

carrying with it quantities of timber from the hills, breaking
the main bridge. This was repaired again, and again
destroyed. this time \ery seriously. The Austrians during
this time, fighting with desperation, had repulsed aU the
French efforts, and, driven back, crowds of wounded and
beaten troops came streamÍJlg into the island.
This was, perhaps, the most critical moment e\-er faced
by Napoleon. His marshals, seeing what they beliend to be
a débâde, urged instant retreat out of Lobau, ming all a\"ail-
able boats as ferries.
This the Emperor absolutely declined to consider. He
realised, as perhaps his marshals did not, that at the fil'st sign
of withdmwal on his part all South Germany v.-ould riE-e
against him, and the rttreat once begun ",ould ne.er cease
until the French had reached the Rhine.
So he remained, and fortunately the nt;xt day the
weather moderated. Then he Ol'dered the most coloE-sal pre-
parations for forcing the passage of the Dan'ow al'm of the
Danube, deploying his troops in face of a victorious army on
t.he opposite side, and military history holds no like record.
The arsenals and storehouses in Vienna supplied the
Emperor w
th ample IlJateriaI, and after six weeks' labour
the whole front of Lobau facin:; the enemy was con\"erted into
a huge battery of siege guns some 200 in number. These
could ::.weep a zone inland 600 yards broad with such torrents
of grape and case shot that no Austrians could sun.i\'e within
it; neither could they entrench, for the Bubwil water lay too
near the surface.
Finally, two great bridges were complf'teù, and a picket
boat sen'ice wa.s organifed to deal with t.he fireships and rafts
of tilnber y.hich were sent by the Amt1"Íans to drift down
the CUrrelJt agaim;t tIle b:'iùges.
Meanwhile they (the Austrians) had di'awn as near to
tIle river as the FrenC'h guns would allow, and lar literally in
formation for imn:ediate action confronting the French.
In spite of this, under co\"er of night and later of the
rr:orn;ng mi
ts, the Emperor succeeded in sellding o"er the
Danube a first contingent of nearly 100,000 men, and with
them adlie,'ed \\-hat was pmctically a surpriH', The 100,000
were followed before nigl:tíall by as many more, and for fort.y-
eight hours one uf the greate!'òt battles in history raged, the
recult most uncertain to either side, until at lengt.h the
Am:triaus, sati.,1Ìed with the puni
h:nent they had inflict.cd
:md knowing that great reinforcemE'l!ts must l'each them
before long, ga\'e up the field to the l'renc11, and re
ircd to :},
fresh position, while the Imperial troops were too crippled to
pursue. An armistice followed, and finally condition::. of
peace were al-ranged, ",ith \\hich ",e ha\"e noth;ng to do.
"'hat is of interest is for us to note how immeasurahly
simpler tIle case ",ould h:>\e beE'u fOl' Kapoleon had the
present-day appliances, both c;,-il aJ'd DJilit:IIT, been a\-liil-
able on both siGes in his time, .

13*

IJAND

He did not capture and th:.'u hold on to the i5land of
Lobau bec:luse he lilted doiaz so, but because in no other way
could he create au artillery superiority sufficient to sweep
out a space large enough for the deployment of his army. The
process of fortifying the island occupied weeks, during th!)
whole of which period his enemy was receiving reinforcement

and orgaJli'ing new ones, and his attention was then concen-
trated on the one and only point from whcnce the enemy could
come,
Durin'" all these weeks rumours of the repulse suffered
by the Fl:'ench at Aspem and Esslingen were spreading
through the country and enC'ouraging the inhabitants to raid
the ,French communications, and incidents revealing the
intense ill,will of the people, and not to be concealed from
the troops, could not but deprfoss their spirits when they
provfod to be of daily occurrence,
To-day the howitzers and light siege gun train accom-
panying every andY, together with the field batteries, 01lce
they had establishcu a relat,i\e seperiol'ity over the enemy, as
those of t,he Allies have done in France, could have cl'eated
ancl llIaint
ined an eve
more intolerable zone of destruction

. ,
---- ---------------- ----

A

OF

DIARY

SYNOPSIS.

AUGUST 3ItD.-Sir Eùward Grey shted British policy and revealed
Germany"jj amazing offer, in the event, of our llPglecting our obligations
to France. J\Iobilisat,ion of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany.
German nnd French Ambassa.do1"3 left Paris and Berlin.
AUGUST 4TH,-Gelmany rejected England's ultimatum. English
GovernmE'nt, took over control of railways, "'ar declared bet\,eell
England and Germany.
AUGt'ST fiTH,-Lord Kitchener appointed S::cretary of State for
\Var. H.M,S. Ampltion struck a mine and fouudered.
AUGUST 6ul.-House of CommoIU!, in five minutes, passed a vote of
credit for E100,OOO,OOO, and sanctioued an increase of the AmI) by
600,000 mc!!, State control of food plicl'
.
AUGu8T BTH.-Lord Kitchener is
ued a circular asking for 100,000
men.
AUGUST 9T1I,-The enemy's submarine, C1J was sunk by H.:\i,S,
Birmingltam.
At'Gl'sT 10TH,-Fl'3.nce declared Wl\r on .\uslria"Hungary, Germans
ftd\.anced on Namur. The ncw Press Bureau established by the
Government, for the issue of offie-ial war news,
AUGUST llTH.-England declared war against Aust,ria.
AUGUST 151'H,-The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish
popu1ations of Russia, German), and Austria, promising to rl'
tore to
Poland complcte autonomy and guarant
es for religious liberty and
t.he use of the Polish language.
AuGt,sT 1611l.-Japanese ultimatum to Gl'rmany demanding the
withdra\\al of her vessels of war from the Far ElISt,
AUGUST 17:fH.-The British Expeditionary J!
orce safdy landed in
France,
The nelgian GovE'rnment, t,ransferred from Brussel8 to Antwerp.
AUGUST 1BIH.-General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appoint,ed to COIll-
mand of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in suc-
cession to the late Gencral Grierson.
AUGUST 21sT.-The German forcl'lI entered nnu;sels,
AUGUST 23RD.-Japan dedared war on Germany,
AUGUST 24TH,-Fall of Namllr,
AUGUST 27111.-The German :Jrml'd merchantm
n Ka;,..r WilhAm
del' C'r'o

was sunk by H.M,S, Higl.{lyp,' on the \Vest, Africa Co:u;t.
AUGl;ST 28'rH.-A com'Crtl'd operation was att-empted against the
Germans in tho Heligoland Bii!ht,
The First Light Cruisl'r
quadron sank the .linin:. The Firi!t
BatHe ('Illiser Squadron sank onA cruiser, Kolli class, and another
cmiser disappeared in the mist" hea\'ily on fire, and in a &.inking
condit,ion,
Two Gcrman destroyers were 8unk and many d:lmaged,
SEPTEMBFR 3RD.-The Frendl GO\ermlll'nt, mo\ I'd to norde.aux.
SEPTE\IBEIt 41H,' The Russian Army under General RUZßky cap-
turcd Lembcrg.
S;'PIE
lr.F.lt 5TR.-The formal alliance of England, France, and
Russia "as signed in J
ondon b)' t,he representath-es of the three
GovernmL Ils concerned, binding each nation to concludo pE'ace, or
dÏ3cuS3 terms of proce, onl
' in cû11junct.ion with its Allies, End oC
retreat, flOm Mons to Marne.
SEPT.E\I:3ER 6TII,-The scout-cmis.er I'athfi/!(ler Coundered af
"r
running upon a mine.
Sm'TE'IBER 7TII,-Fall of l\Jaubellge,
SEPrnlBER 9TH.-The English Army crossed the :\Jarne, and the
enemy retired ahout tWE'nty-fh e miles.
SI:PIDfßER 13TH.-On the h.ft, wing the enE'my continued hill retreat-
ing mo\"cment" The Belgian Allny pw;hoo forward a "igoroU8 offensive
Lo the south of J.ierre,
Sr:P1E:
mFR 14lH,-All day the enemy stubbornly disputed tho
passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings \\ ere
secured by sun
et.
bEPTE\lHER 15TII.-The AliiI'd trvops occupied Rheims,
SEPTE\fßER 16nI.-Submarine R9, Lieutenant,Commander Max
Kennedy HOlion, torpedoed the German cruiser [[cla six miles eouth
of Heligoland.
SEPTE"\!ß:r:n 191'H,-TIJe Bliti.
h aUÀiliary cruiser rflTmania, Captain
Noel Grant, Ro
al Nayy, sank the Cap 'l'rafalg(tl" off the east coast of
South AmPlic'a,
SEPTE\lBFI: 22
D,-U.M, IIhips .-{lwahr, Hogue, and Ore,s1/ were
Bunk by suLIIl.\rincs in the
orth Sea..

AND

,V ATE R.

Ap'ril 10, 1915,

from 3,000 yards range as Napoleon's siege guns could aCCOD14
r lish at 500; and insteaJ of 200 guns, a modern army would
probably dispose of nearly 2,000 in a case of Bimilar im4
porl:mce.
The nights would have been just as dark and the currentJ
just as B,wift, !Jut the means of overcoming these difficulties
are now so incomparably more powerful that they would noli
present to us the
ame problem that Napoleon had to solve;
while working undf'r cover of Bearchlights the degree of dark..
ness no longer matters, for, turning their beams full on the
enemy, you can follow up in th'! shadows outside them with-
out the chance of being Been, while you can when detected
put out of action any searchlights of the enemy.
The whole qu
stion returns to the old one I quoted lastl
week: .. What man has don9, man can do. JJ And if in 1809
the Fl'ench forced the passage of the Danube with the troop'
and materials then at their disposal, and against a strate",ical
numerical superiority, they--or we-to whoever the task
llay
be given, can force the Rhine with far greater ease in view of
the greatly better means we now control, in all of 'U'hich thð
rdative superiority now belongs to us.

THE

WAR.

SF.PTE\lD!':R 23RD.-Briti
h Aeroplanes of the Na, al wing de!i\.ereoJ
an att."\Ck on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf.
O

roßER lsr.-The arrival of the India.n Expeditionar
' Force .

Ial,;ellles,
OCTOBER 2
m,-IIis l\Ia.jesty's Government authorised a min.
layiu:!; policy in certain areA3,
OCTOBER &rH,-In Russia the German Army, which was operatin

between t,he front, of East, Prussia and the Niemen, was beaten all
along the line and rctreated, abandoning a considerable quantity of
mat,crial.
OC'1'OBF.R 9TH,-The British naval airnlC'n carried out another sue>
ccssful raid on the ZcpIX'lin sheds at, DÜSSE'!dorJ',
O(,TOBER lOTH,-Death of King Carol of Roumania.
0< TOBER llTlI,-The Russian cruiser Palladu "ß.i sUlik in the Baltio
by a German submarine,
ÛCTOBER 14TH,-The Belgian Government removed from Ostend to
Haue.
()(.TOßER 15TH,-H,:\I.S. YarmoutlJ (('aptain Henry L. ('ochran8)
8ank the German lim'" Jlar/.:olllania off SUll1atr
, and captw'ed the
Greek steamer l'onloporn."
OCTOBER 16TH,-H,!'\LS. Tlawl:e (Ca,ptain Hugh P. E. \\ïIliaInø.
R,N,) was attacked and sunk by submarmes.
OLTOBER lÏIH,-The ncw light cruiser Un<latlnlcd (Captain ('ecil H.
Fox), I!I:companied by the destroyers Lance (Commander \V. de M.
Egcrton), Lennox íLieut.-Commander C. R. Dane), Legion (Lieut" C. F.
Allsop), and Loyal (Lieut,.-Commander F. Burgeil Watson), sunk foUl'
German destroyers off the Dntch COlISt.
OCTOBER 25TH,-A German 8nbmarine WI\..!! rammed and 8unk by
the destroyer Badger (Commander Charleil FremantIe, R.X,) off the
Dutch coast.
OCTOBER 29TH,-Ad'l1iral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenherg r.
signed his position A.'i Fir"t :::;ea Lord of t,he Admiralty,
OCTOBER 31sT.-H,M,S, IleTTIle
was sunk by a torp.,do fireù by a
German submarine in the Straits of Dover.
NO\'F.\lßEIt
D,-The Admiralty declared the whole of the North
Sea a military arpa,
NOVE\lBER 41H,- It wa
reported that the Scl!f/Tn"()T
t, GnÛs"na",
LeipÛg, Drcsden, aud NÜmbng concentrateù near Valparaiso, and
that an engagement, was fought on No\embcr ht. The !I1om/lOllt"
and the Good Hopp were sunk. The Glasgow and the Otranto Cßca\,OO,
NOVEMBER 5TH.-The German crniser Yorck IItruck the mine.
blocking the entrance to Jahde Bay and sank.
JS"OVEYBER 7TII,-The fall of Tbingt.au was annonneed.
NO\-E\fBER 10nr.-The Emden was driven ashore and burnt, ..
Keeling Cocos Island by II.}I.A,S. Sydncy (Captain John C, T.
Glossop, R.N,). The Kün;gsbug WIIS imprisoned in the Rufigi Islancl
by H,}I.S. ClwtllOJn.
JS"on:MB1':R llTII.-H.:\LS. NiY'T (Lient.-Commander Arthur P.
Muir, R.N,) \\as torpedoed by a 8ubmarine in the Downs, and
foul1dpred.
NOVE\lRF.R 141rJ,-Field-l\Jarshal Lord Roberts died at, the Head.
quarters of the British Army in France.
NOVE
IRER 23nD.-'l'he German submarine U18 was rammed by a
British destroFr, t,he C'OI'ry, off the coast of Scotland,
NOYE
IßER 26TH.-H,M,S. Bulwark blew np in Sheernc.s Harbon!".
DECE
IRER B1'H,-A Brit,ish 8qnMron nnder Vice-Admiral Sir
Frederick Sturdee sigh too off the Falkland Islands a German 8qnadron
consisting of the öcharnlwTst, Gneisenau, Ni1rnberg, Leipzig, and
Dresden. Thrco of these five warships were sunk, including th
flag.
8hip of Admiral Count, "on Spee.
DECE11BER 9'rll.- V alievo was retaken by the Serbians, who eneI',
getically pursued the Austrian forces,
DECHIBr:R lOru,-A further telegram vms re(,E'ived from Vic8-
Admiral Sir Fre<
erick Stmdee reporting that the I''- ürnberg wail also
IIUI1I{ on December Bth,
DECEMRER 13TH,-Submarine Bl1, Lient.-Commander Norman D.
Holbrook, R.
" entHed the Dardanelles, and, in IIpite of the difficul'
current, dived nnder fi\'e rows of mines and tor
edoed the Tnrkish
battleship Mc<,sudiyeh, which was gnarding the mm
fì.eld.
DECE:I1BER 16rH.-In the morning a Gtrman crnUer force made a
denoonst.rat,ion npoll the Yorkshire coast, in the course of whieh they
øhelloo Hartlepool, Whit,by, and Scarborongh. They were eng&ged
by the patrol vessels on the 8POt, and a British pat,rol1ing squadron
.ndeavoured to cut them off. On being lJight.ed by British VllUt'la

14.

April 10, 1915.

LAND

the GermaY1B retired at fun 61' -,.d, and, favourcd by the Illist" suc-
oeedoo. in making good their '''Lape.
DECEMBER 17Tll,-Great Britain proclaimed }
gypt a Blilish prl>-
tedOlate,
DECE:.IEER 24TH,-A GemJan aeroplane droppod " bomb into a
gardcn at Dover, doing no gre.J.t damage and causing no casualties.
DECEMBER 25TH.-A Gernnn aeroplane flew ovcr SheCIness. Pur,
lIued by three Brit,ish machines and fired on by anti,aircI'a.ft guns, it
made off towards the East Coast,
British cruisers, destroyers, !ubmarinl's, and seaplanes made 3 com-
bined raid on G.-rman warshi],s ])ing in the roads off Cuxhaycn. Our
IIhipst "hile standing by to pick up the seaplanes, wl're themseh-es
atLacl{cd by enemy Zeppelin.
, seaplancs, and submarines. They beat
off the attack and succeeded in picking up three out of the s!!\en
ailmEl1 "ith thlòir machine.s, Three other pi]ots who returned later
\H're picked up, according t.o arrangcment, by BI'itish I!ubmarim:s,
which were standing by. their machiu{'s being sunk. The cxtent of
the damage by the BritÜ!h ail'men's bombs cannot be estimated, but
!ill wele diecharged on points of rnilital'Y significance,
JA
UAnY 19TII.-German airclaft raided the East ('oast in the
evening and (!I'opped bombs on Yarmouth.
JASUAItY 24TH,-Early in the morning a British patro1líng squadron
"il('hted thrl'.e GI'I'ma.n battle-l'l'uisers and an annoured cruiser, the
Blüclu!.T, ateering
e.stward.s, The German warships turned and made
for ]lOme, but
ere brought to action. The Bliicher "as swik, and
two other German battle-cruisers were seriolL'3!y damaged.
FEIJRU\RY 2
D.
The Turks attempted to cross the Suez Canal near
T1L5sum.
They were allo,,"ed to bring thl'ir bliègiug material to the bank
nnr.lo1estcrl, \\ Il(
u the bridbilll!; operations bad actual1y :star led we
attacked them, Our attack wã
completely l!Uccesaful. The enemy
fled in di
order, leaving the whole of the bridging materia] in our
hands, and some of tho en em) were dl"Qwned in the Canal.
The enemy also at talked us on the E] Kantma hont, bllt \""'e
euily rcpulsed.
Fl:lJnu\;ty 9nI,-In the B]ack Sea Russian cruisers bombaH1ed 1\
TUlkish battery near 'flcbizonù and sank a st('nmer "ith her cal'[;",
aud tLe TmkÜ!h cruiser Breslall bombarded Yalta.
The Jrilhelmi1la, the United StaLes 8hi{) laden ,,;th food for
Ce.rmJ.ny, arri\'ed at Falmouth.
FEBRU.\RY lITH.-The Rus
ian!! fell ba<:k from the line of the
Masurian Lakes towards their frontier.
FEBI:UA:tY 12rH.-ThiI,ty,four Bziti.!ih aerop!anes and seaplan
s
made a raid on tho Bdgian coa.t; cons:dcrablo damage ,,;\8 done to
tLe cnem,)"s basI's and establíshml'nts,
FEßRU\ß"I. 16'lR,-Fort.y British aeroplaneil and seap]anc!!, as
isted
by I'ight French aerop]aJ'es, dropped bombs on Oatend, Miùdlekerke,
Ghistclles, and 7eebrugge.
FFBRC.\RY 171H.-A Zepp"!in "as \\l'ec1.ed on the DdUidl is]aI!d of

'anoe.
FEBRC\RY 18TH.-In LOlraine thE' Fronch c3l'l'ied 11le \illage of

OlTOY.
Another z.,ppe]in "\\"as wrecKed off t]le Danish coast,
l'EBRU
RY 19TH.-The Austrian Âuny oc.:upi,;.J CLefliO\\jtz, the
Ruuians fdlling back beyond the Prut.h.
A Bl'itish fleet of battleahips and battle cruisers, and aided by a

trong French squadron, the" llu!e under th
cLlmnand of ''ice-Admiral
&ck\-iIle 11. Caz'den, began an aUaek upon the forts at the entrance to
the Dardanel1e3. The forts on the European side \'<el'e lIilencoo..
FEBRU\RY 21sT.-A Gelm;m aeroplane visited ES3eA aHd dropped
bombs on Co1chester, Bramlree, and Coggeshall.
The l,'rench torpedo-boat DO{Jlle struck a mil
e lit AntÍ\ ari and
rank.
l
EBRUAnY 25m.-All the fOlts at, the enhance of the Darc1anelle3
were successfully reduced,
FEIJRUÀRY 26rH.-Gleat Blitain formal1y de.::kred a blockade of
Gel man Eaat Africa.
The Germaps retirE'd along the" hde front in thp Pr:msnysz region.
FFBRUARY 2BTH.-Tlie Dacia "3S arrested in the Channel bv a
Frl'.llch cruiser and condnct.ed to Brest, .
.:\hncH IsT.-The Prime Minister announced to tl>e nome of
('ommons that commodities of any kind were to be prevented, b

1I1eall8 of the Allied Fleets, flOm reaching or lea, ing the German
l<:mpire,
The Russian Army concluded the operat.ions FOund Prza.'!n
sz,
... here they defeated t\\'o arm
' coz'ps ,Uld c1ro\'e them b..ck to t.ho
frontier.
'f4Rf"H 2ND,-The captain of the Briti
h collier TllOJ"lldit reported
ramming and sUù..ing & German J'ubmaI'ine off Beachy Head.
MAnl:H 3Rn.-Oporatiüns ill the Dardanelles weI'" lC5UlliCd and mO'e
forts were sihmced.
MARCH 4Tll.-The GeTman s,l1>marine L-8 \\as sunk off DOHI' by
dl'stroyers. her crew being I\a\ cd.
The RU.!sians re-entprcd 8t-anis l an and crc
sed t1le IÆkwa.
MAnCH 6TH.-A lòqnadlOn of hattleships and cruiscrs, under the
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, b
gan tbe bombaIdrnent of
mYl'J1a.
)hnrH 8TH,-Six aeroplanes of tlw Na\ a] "ìing, under Wing,Com,
mander Longm:Jre, carried out .an ail' attack en Ostend. :Bombs wcre
dlOppt-d on the subma1'Ìno bage and on Ü1e KurEaa1, the head'1uarteu
()f the military.
:M
RcH fuH.-In tbe Rouse of Commonl! :\{r. Lloyd George brought
in a Hili to enable the Gm ernm
nt to talce mer an)' factor
or \Vol'k-
IIIhop in "hich war material c,>uld be l)I"oduced.
.:\haCH 10'1 H.- British troops, supported by J!'r
nch al tillery, carried
Ule \ iIlage of X euye Cha]dle, and ad, anced north-cast and .south ea
t
of it.
The Grrman losses "ere \ery hea'
', ar.d 1,000 prièoneTI! and EOme
machine-gLlns werp eaptur
d,
The C.ìerman
ubmarino L"J! wae rammed and slink h
' the deßtJ'o
'er
Arirl. Ten of tile ere\'\' of twenl)-eight \orere I!a\.ed. .
?lhRol llTJI.-A B;ilish air squadl'on bomba.rdí..J Westende. and
BlitÍt.h ",iators I!u<'ceeded in ùCII!J'o\'ing the rail\\ay junctious at COUl'-
tl'ai and ?\renin, .
The (:l'!ma
l au
iliarv ("uis!'!' Prince Eit.l Fr'-cúrich al'l'i\t'd at
:K e" port '\ c" I! "it h tllP c,."w
IJf w"sf'ls sunk by hpr.
II,!lf. aux ilial Y CI l.;"er /J"ymlO "liS tnl'{,edoed in the Fil th of ('I) de.

AND

T A TER.

!\hP.t:.H 12'rH,-Th
Bdtish troops c
rtl1red the "illagl' T:Epinette
Iond gained possession of part of the German lines near Pietre,
eapt..n'ing abO!lt 400 prisc>ners,

hRCH 13'fR.-Tho British tro')ps cros
ed the brook of I,ap'
,
wlJich runs para\]e] to the road from Ke,IYo Chapelle to F:eurbaix, and
b..t" een this road :md Aubel'S they ca]ltm'ed sc
cral t.Iencbes,
)hRCII 14TJI.-H.M.S. Ulasyow and H.:\I.S. Kent S3l1k the Dradm
near Juan Fcmande.': Island.
'[Annl ISTH.-The British Army, which t,he German attack ba"
compellpd to fan back beyond St. f:!oi, rc-captured the ví!lage and
almost the "hole of the neighbouring t.rellches, in spite of se\elal
counter-attacks by the enem)'.
.:\1 \RC'H 17TH.-The Flench troops continued to make pwgl'e 3 in the
region of Perthe3.
MARCH lBTH.-Ru.sian troops reached :\1cl11el, after <-rr'
sing the
fronti,eI' near GOl"llbdy and beating the German forces, (:aptUling Imme
machme-gulls and n1Qtor,caI's laden \\ith stores.
AfteI' tpn òa)s of mine-sweeping imide the Dardanelles, the Bzitish
and French fleets m:ule a general attack on the fortresses at the Nall'ows.
'JlIl'OO b'ttHe'ihips were lost in the"e operations by I!triking mine&-
the l
l'ench lJoJtr:et, and the 1l"resist,ib ' e a.nd the Ocean.

I!lRCII 19rn.-At P1'2;em)'sl the garrison made a determined 8úrti....
The ene"l
\\a
íOl'l'ed back on his own line d forts. In repulsin'" the
sortie the RIl
sian t,TQOPS captured more than 4,000 prisoner! and I!i
teen
machine-guns.

lAR(,lI 2OTH,-In tIle V o-ges the Great and the Little Reic1>acker-
kopf were ca
)tUI'eù by the cn"my.
MARCH 21sT.-Two Zeppelins attacked Paris in the early hO,JT8 of
thl' moming, lhe material da.-nage done v,as iß.l
igll;ficant.
.\lARCH 2'2:m.-1he fortress of PI'zem
's] I!uuendered to the
nüs

ans.
\hnC'1! 23Rl'.-A Tmkish fOI'ce, 1,000 str.:mg, \'<as routed n
ax the
!"uez Canal. ,.
:\hRCIl 24Tu,-Brit.i,h aviators carried out 1\ succ
ssrul raid on
GCllnan 8nl.maril
e8 lwing const.. ncteJ at JIobo]_en, 11ear AnÌ\H'rp.
l\[u
cn 25Tu,- The U"'l'man :submaI'iue Uf9" as sunk with all ha,nds.
The Rus2i
n3 capturEd
II important Austrian positi<JIJ in the
J.upl.ow Pa9s; 5,000 prisone;g and Sè\ elw, dozen machine gurul \1\ ere
taken.
}\! mCH 26TJr,-Fren
h a\'Ìators bO'1,barðed the a;rs]lip r;h
d.s of
Freøc.'tty and Ule station of ;\Ietz, and also the ba.rraclu! to the cut of
Str.assboUl'g.
]\f UlCH 27nf.-In Alsace the Frenth troops captured tile I!urnmit
of Hm'lmanns\Hikrkopf. The Germans abandoned important mat.crial
IInd left m:m{'roll
df03d on the field,
:!\lARCH 2Bm,-Belgian 8\iators hombarded the a"l'iation enrol' ai
G hi,
telles.

DAY BY DAY.
Tuesday,
Jarch 30.
NOi-th,east of St. Mihiel, French artillery forced the
enemy to evacuate in disOl'der the \ilI:>ge of Hendicourt.
'Vest of Bois-le-Pretre, 1.'rench troops can-ieù a line of
trenches and captured about 100 prisoners.
"'cdncsday, March 31.
In t.he Argonnc, the French captUl'.:!d 160 U1fotre!! 01
trenches.
,FIC t lCh aviators carried out a series of r2.ids in the
". oevre, in Champ::.glle, 111 the Soi<:sons di:;h ict, and in
Helgium.
The llrili:;h :-leawers PlnmillÙm and ('1'01/'11 of Ca,.tditJ

unl, off the S('illy [sles by (',!8.
1 hur"day, April 1.
l3riti:<h aviators made a sllcc
ssful raid on Gel'llian I>uh-
marines at Hoboken aud Zeebrugge,
Iu tha \\'Gevre, :French troops occulJied the village cl
Fey-en-Uaye.
The Ru:;sian troops captured a selies of fOl'tificd hei...hb
on the Reskid mountains amI in the direction of Chol..in. .,
FI iday, April 2.
The German submarÍIrc r 10 de
t/"Oyed tbl'ee trawler.!
off t Ìle Tyne.
On the Niemen front the TIl1ssian tJ'ool's drove hack the
GerflnD; and il1flicted heavy losses.
B,'wh of Bulgarians made a raid into Serbia, Their
flHad. 'Ll
'epubed by It Serbian regiment. anù they were
driven from the field carrying their wounùed.
Saturd
IY, April 3.
In tIle region of the SOI11!l1e, at La Bui

dJe, wine war-
fare ('out inned with marked a(h a'lt.age to the I"rendl troop:;.
Near Lassigny and in Upper Alsace German attacks
were repulsed.
Sunday, ;\.pril 4.
'rile day was quiet on the \Iohule wfo
tel'1l front exC'ept. ill
tile \V oeyre, where lhe prf)gr('
s of the 1-'1">11<'11 troops cou-
tinued,
On the frout to the we"t of the Niel11en fi"Minor dt:\'elulJed
greatly in fa\'oUl' of the ]{u

ian t.roOIJ
, 0 <>
\I,m 'ay, April S.
The Frl'neh troOI)!! c'! pi l1l'elì t h I'ee !lUCC O ' ; \'e lines of
tJ-cnc!1e<; at tbe Bois cl' Ail!y.
outll-el'st of St. M ihif'l. They
;;.bo gltined a footing in a portion of the (cnt"my'!; v. crl,!; to the
1101'( I,-ca...t of I
.
nn illf'.

IS-

LAND

AND

}V A '1' E R.

....\ pril 10, 1915.

C()RRESPONDENCE.

!\lILlT \RY HO
OURS.
To the Edit.or of L
N"o .\"ID WUER,
SlR,-lf rew:lrd
for ndour only are taken into account;
(V.C.'s, D.S,O.'ti, and :Military Cr
6s(,:\), I think it will be
fOllud that Ute regll1leiltal officer hail his ahare. More of t.hese
could not be givcu wit-hGut cheapening them.
Such r
wardd a3 are gi':en to the StatI-t' ,g. , C,B.'ø,
(',:\l.G.'s, and brevE'ts-are naturally not obtainable by
junior regimental officE'rii. Tha proportion of Staff to regi-
mental officers who rccci, e these appears at first Bight, theLe-
fore, to be high, though it i3 not really BO. It must alBo be
remembered that the Staff are selected Jr.en, aDd are, there-
fore, likely to do better th.J.u their regimental brothers.-
Yours truly,

\ RFGIY:;:èiH,L OFFICU,

BLINDED SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.
Arrang,'mcnts for their Comfort and Occupation.
LIFE AT ST. DCNSTAN'S,
To the Editor of LA:m AND 'V.
TER.
Sm,-The vast numher of IE'tters whieh have reached UII
d
uing lhe last few week, with regard to BailorB and Boldief!l
who h<::\"o been biir.:ded in the war shows eo keen a publio
int&rest in ['nd sympathy with these bra\"e fellows that I feel
I may a3k you to permit me apace in whi.:-h to acquaint your
readerd with what Í3 being done to comfc'rt and to holp them.
So far as we know at present, th'2re are iu thilj country
Jlearly fifty soldiers who have 10<!L their sight at the front,
including thl'ee officer
, and three Belgians, w
10m we are
glad to tn'at on an equalit.y with tIle British soldier.
\Ve kno;v of only one blinded sailor-a middhipman.
After we had aettled in our minds the be'lt Btaps to
pursue, we called into our comnels some of t.he leading
e3:peLt3 among these who spend their livcil in the care of the
blind. \';e wcre gratifiE'd to learn that in the m:lin ths
arrangements v.e had devised met wilh the cordial ap:>roval
of this g:lthcring.
Thi:; spacious hOHse, wiLh it
fifteen acres of grounds,
which lead direct illto RegellL'3 Park, Iwd which hail beea
BO generously placed at our di3
0"al by Mr. Otto Kahn, ie
I\n ideal place for our purpose. An arm of the large Regent')
Park lalH
runs into t.he gardcns, tnu!! rendei';ng easy rowing,
an .ideal form of e
ercise for blind pcople,
The premises are well adapted fOi' the purpose of tem-
porary training-rooms and workshop.
.
1'he occupatioll3 which are being taught here are I
1. C,
RI'BNTnY.
2. BOOT REl'.\IRDIG.
3. :MAT MAKn:O.
4. R-\SKET M
KINO.
5. TELEPHONE Ol'ER-\TfXO.
6. 1rh'>So\.GE.
7. POULTRY F.uauYG, :\hRKET C,\RDEXINO, &0.
These arrangements cover the indust.rial field which will
be, for the present, open to the blinded Boldier, In the
majority of instances we do not expect to complete the traia,
iug at St. Dun"tan'B. Our ftinction here is to dÌE;cover the
pursuit for which a man is best fitted and give him pre-
liminary instruction in it.
The grant which has been made by the Prince of Wale,,'!!
Fund for the purpose will enable liS to an-:mge for completion
of training and to Bettle the men in life. The co:!t of running
the minded Soldier:!' and Sailors' Hostel ia borne bv thð
Nation:Û Institub for the Blind, the Red Cross Societj, and
the Order of St. John.
A special fund has been startell irom whieh to supply the
men with typewriter:! and other apparatus, and also to p"y
the travelling expense3 and board and lodging of near reI;/.-
tives who li\'e in the country and who are invited periodi
aliy
to spend a few days close to their husbands, sons, or brothers.
V..-e im'lte contributions to this FUild,
:Funher, the National In<>titute for the Blind ha3 placed
at tile dispelsal cf the Committce a seasiJe home, which it hM
lately esbblislH
d at Brighton. This comfortable and com-
modious home will be used aa a convalescent resort for men
who require a period of repase after being discharged frOlI1
hOi>pital. It will aho be ased for week-end:; and briei ho;idavs.
The t.railliag of the blinded so
dier is not confined. to
in
ustrial pur"uits. All the men are learning to read and
wrlte Braille, and ill most cases are making remarkably quid{
progre
s. They lef'rn typewriting. too, and are given lectures
on int.erestillg Buhjects by the le:tding experts of the day.

Tll) f:
ar of occupying too IllliCh of your valuabld space
prevents my dWé'Uing upon the happy couditions under which
our commnnitv here live3. A chee,.ier set of fellows it hM
newr been my.good fortune to meet, and the kindness of many
friend!' in prcyidiflg them with flowers, fruit, and other
luxurIes is unendit:.g,
The Lulie;; belonging to Voluntary Aid Detachment.s who
lo('k aftei. them do much to make their lives bright and happy.
It is not for me to express an opinion ps to the perfection
of the plans which have been made, but I do venture to say
that no blind JYlell have e\'er bern given so grand an oppor-
tunity of m:lking good in the wo;:ld as is afforded to these,
\Vho will deny that no trouble or expense can repay HICm for
the sacrifice which t.hey h,we made in defendin a cur home.
and upholding the honòur of the British Flag V-Yours faith-
fully,
C. ARTHUR PE;\RSOY,
Chairman Blinded Soldierð' and Sailon'
Care Committee.
St. Dun.>tan's, Rcgent's Park, N.W.

TIlE SMALL PIR:\I.
To the Editor of LA
D AND W_
TER.
Dz....r. SlR,-VTiU you permit me to t.hank "On!! of th.
Princinals of Another Small Firm" for his kind apnreciatioß
of my 'letter, and also for hi,
inter
sting remark!!' a3 10 the
procedure of t.he Government when dealing with small firmø'
I quite agree with all he says about prices, and I think the
Government would, a3 he suggest:!, fiihl it very advantllgeoll'
wh!Jn' obtaining tenders to state the prices usually gi leu for
the work, and to allow tho firms tendering to put in their
quotations, if these prices ",ere too low to enable the firma
to undert.ake the job. One oi the cl1Ïei difficulties of a "!ma11
firm v.-hich has not previously lludert!l.kelJ. Government work
Ì3 to know at what price" about" it would !Jbnd a chance of
having its tender acceptcd. Often a gre3.t deal of time which
might be much mOLe usefully employed is needlessly wasted
in getting out estimat.es at which the Government officials do
not have to glance more than CIlce to know that they are
hopc1e'lQ1y "out"; on the other hand, firms frequently do
not feal justified i!l quoting for work which they couU well
(10 because their machine tools do not happen to be epceÌal1]
(lesigned to do that pc.rticular cIa!'s of wOl'k, and comequently
they could not. do il; quite so cheaply as a faetory consLructed
801ely for the job. A good definite" lrad .. frem the Govern-
ment Ft.S to prices ou ead.1 piece oÎ work required wou
d Bave
much time aud money and pr:r\"c to be s. rcal economy if)
the end,
'Vith the hUer part of your e
teemed corresponc.lent'.
letter I am in entire agreement.
I.ord Kit!.'hener has said that the need for munitio.l1!l ÍJ
urgent; the Timu has had a leadina article on" Shdls". on
all sides we hear a loud .chorus co
demni!1a Btrikes and 'dis-
"
putes, and all delays in and hindranccs to output; and in the
daily Pre"s we are repeatedly told that the winnina of the
war depends jus
a.i much upon tho workshop"! of the"country
as upon its brave soldiers.
'VeIl, for our part, we ahouM only be too deliahted to b.
doing our bit. Let the Government give tn the W"
rk and tell
us to go ah
ad, Vte would do our level best, and I can assure
you that among the small firms strikes are not likel.., to intef'.
rupt output. .
But the grent and apparently alm03t insuperable obstacle
in the way is the reluctance of the Government to give us the
order;!, :For three months now the firm with which I am
connected has been attempting to obtain Government work,
and all they have gi\'en us up to the present is one Bman
BRmple ordei'. The majority of the departments Bent polite
acknowledgments of our leLbrs, and to ono we have had the
pleasure of submitting Borne tenders, but 30 far nothin'" has
materialÏ3ed beyond the sample order above-mentioned."
Y our3 faithfully,
ONE OF T!m PRDõCIP,\LS OF A SM.
LL FIRM.

OUR AMBULANCE APPEAL.
At the moment of going t.o pre3s our Fund totah 1:530.
and it is our very pleasant duty heartill to thank all those
who Lave boen BO generous liS t.o aS3ist us III Buch a prompt (1 d
subJtantial manner. Further Bub::,criptions are etill ne('d
d
to form a small fund for the upkeep of the motor ambulauoo.
Next we<Jk a full list of Bubscriber3 will be published.

I'rint
bj" 'filE \'IL:hIItr\ HOUSE l'Rbl"1Nù Co" LID. L Tudor Street. WhitÆfr.iarB, Lon:l:m. E.C.

April 10, 1915

LAND AND WATER

lunWIIIIIIIIII_WlIIllllIIIiIlIIlIllI 111111111 '"

1111 II uJllllll11l11u 111I1..I1i.w..III

I1'''' t[
I ï!!I"
"l

O.
t-

I
n

,

giP.

Does not
LEAK

many
position.

Military
Size

FIRTH 9 S
"STAINLESS') STEEL
ForCUTLER.Y.etc.
MiÞlier .Rusfs, Sfains, .nor mrnjsnes.

I I
Original and Sole Makers
THOS. FIRTH&SONS.L T }>
SHEFFIELD.

.

.

Àrlicl.es
f"rom.. -this
si:ee1.,'"being ent:i.rely u..n.-
a-fFecl::ec!by Food.. a..cid.s,
h-u.its, vi nesa:r;d.c..willbe
fòuñCl i::õbe (,f' enorrr\.ous
a.d.va.T\.-t-age i.ñhotels,
clubs. rest:au-ra..n.
s and..
ca.;m-r.s:-Nel.iher -thê:ln
e-
'board. no,-
he clea..ni.n.

ma.chi.ne is noW' necessa.ry
Cu1:le
of -this steel Tn

be ha.a of'aU the læ

m.an#a.c.turers. See -tha..i::
kni.ves bear- -this ma

Officers' Kits by

,
'
--
PRACTICAL-the one word
sums up the Hazel Kit, With
a hundred years' experience of
Military Tailoring. with 1,300
skilled workers, and with a com-
mand of the market for materials,
we can put everything UJorth
having into Hazel Kits-with
accuracy, economy and despatch.
PATTE
NS ON APPLICATION.

"
1 11:;;

\
\ )
. I'
\
[ .,

,
\

Jacket. waterproofed serge or whipcord Þ 1 ð
Trousers. waterproofed serge or whipcord 1 9 6
Breeches, waterproofed Bedford cord,
buckskin strappings ... n. ... 2 10 0
Great Coat, wate'1"oofed Melton ... 8 III 0
British Warm, waterproofed AfeltoD.
fleece lined ,.. a 0 0
Cap............... ...0150
Sam Browne Belts, complete ... ... 2: 12 6
Gabcrcotton Weatherproof ... 4 4 0

I *'Ii).

:
,f':

Perle<! IItting assured by our sell,measuremea! form.

--

HAZEL & CO., 5 lA, BERNERS ST., LONDON, W.
Telephone: Regent 4960 Telegr.uns: Ie We..taz
l, London."
Branches: 6 YO
K PLACE, LEEDS; 84 MILLE
ST
EF.T, GLASGOW;
and '37 LONGMAIlKET ST
EET. CAPE TOWN.
1111"1111111111111111111111111111111111111 111IIIIIII1I1II1I11I11IIImllKu..

IF. knowing
you know.
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

"51 RIS"

a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as Apollin-
aris and similar to it in taste.

Repd. Quarts.
PerDoz. 6/-

Repd. i Pints.
2{6 PerDoz.

Repd, Pinta.
36

Carriage Paid.

..... Sample 'Bottle FREE on receipt o/C;:,upon .....
Name

Address ________m

. ---
Usual Purveyor of
Afin ral If-"

A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenles Sfreet Works, LONVON; Chapel Field \\ orks, NU
WIC".

2

.)

IL-t X D A X D "r ATE R

April 10. 1915

HISTORY AND DE,TELOPMENT OF 'THE
STEAM TURBINE IN WARSHIPS

THE

( cOllclltdnl)
By .. A.M,I.C.E:'

After a long serie" of exhaustive trials it was found that
the Topaz obtained a speed of 22'1 knots when developing
9,933 indicated horse power, while the Amethyst steamed
23.63 knots and developed 14,200 horse-power, notwith-
standing the same boiler power was installed in both ships,
The economy in steam consumption especially at high speeds
was considerable. At thc same time, the manæuvring
capabilities of the turbine cruiser proved to be quite satis-
factory. These trials definitely proved that the steam
turbine was superior from every point of view to the old type
of engine, and it was decided to install them in future in all
torpedo boats.
In 1905 a committee was appointed to consider the
question of the dcsign of alIlloured ships, and the adoptioTl
of steam turbines was recommended for all such ships, The
Dreadnought was the first battlcship in the world to be fitted
with steam turbines. It must be mentioned, however, that
at this stage the Admiralty was probably largely influenced
by the Cunard Committee, who at the end of 1904 had decided
to install steam turbines in the Lusdania and lvlauretania.
An official statement was issued by the First Lord of the
.-\dmiralty in 1906 regarding the ddoption of turbines in the
Dreadnought, in which it was stated that although the steam
turhine system of propulsion hd.s some disadvantages, it was
adopted because of the saving in weight, reduction in working
parts, reduced liability to breakdown, and its smooth working,
ease of manipulation, saving in coal consumption at high
powers, and hence boiler-room space and saving in engine-
room complement; also because of the increased protection
due to the engines being placed lower in the ship.
The uSUd.l arrangement in battleships and battle cruisers
is to fit a high-pressure turbine on the outer shaft and a low-
pressure turbine on the inner shaft on each side of the ship,
so that therc are four shafts, e,tch carrying propellers, in each
ship. The two inner shafts carry each the cruising and low-
prcssure ahead and astern turbines. In later types of ships
the cruiser turbines have been done away with because the
"eight and space saved have been utili sed to increase the
efficiency of the main turbines when running at half power.
The three battle cruisers of the invincible class are equipped
with turbines developing about 42,000 horse power, whilc in
the Lion class they develop about 75,000 horse power. Such
ships could never have been built with reciprocating engines,
as, owing to the superior economy of modcl11 turbine instal-
lations, at least 30 per cent. less boiler capacity is required,
The first foreign warship to bc fitted up with steam
turbines was the French torpedo destroyer No. 293 in 1902.
The steam turbines were imported from the Parsons Marine
Company. Although France led the way on the Continent,
nothing further was done until the 1906 programme, when
another torpedo boat was equipped with turbines, while at
the end of 1906 it was decided to fit the battleships Voltaire,
Danton, Vergniaud, Condorce!, Didero!, and J/ irabcau with
turbines. Each vessel has a displacement of 18,374 tons, a
speed of 19 knots, and a turbine horse-power capacity of
22,500, These battleships are fitted with Parsons turbines,
and the arrangement is practically the same as in the
Dreadnou/{ht. In 1908 the French Navy decided that in
future all warships should be fitted with turbines,
In Gennany the marine steam turbine was adoptcd late
in 1902, and a small turbine destroyer was put in hand. The
vessel SI25 has a length of 215 feet and a tonnage of about
410, and was equipped with Parsons turbines similar to the
British destroyer Eden alrcady mentioned, In 1903 the small
cruiser LÜbeck, having a displacement of 3,150 tons, was
equipped with Parsons turbines, and tests were carried out
hetween this boat and the H ambur<:-a similar cruiser,
equipped with reciprocating engines. The trials werc again
entirely in favour of the turbine,driven ship. The first large
armoured vessel built in Germany with turbines was the
battle cruiser VOlt der Tann, which has a length of 561 feet
and a displacement of 19,000 tons. This vessel proved
thoroughlv satisfactory, and attained a speed of 27 knots
wbpn developing about 70,000 horse power. The earliest
(
rman buats employed turbines made in England, but the
".ter on, " were constructcd in Gennanv.
A "tf:tm turbine is e"scntially a high-speed machinc and
"hould b run at a fairly high speed in order to get the
ma:\.imum "team economy, On land steam turbinc" for

enerating ekrtri. Po\\ er an' run at spccds varying from
1,000 to 3,000 n \'olutions per minute, but in ships this is
not possiLI, as the (rew propeller mU'it he run at a fairly

low speed, In order to get the maximum efficiency out
of a turbinc on board a ship it is necessary to run the
turbive at a high and the propeller at a low speed. At present
both are connected rigidly, and therefore it is necessary to
coml?ro
ise on the speed question, the result being that the
turbme IS run at too low and the propcller at too high
speed.
At the end of the year 1913 Parsons turbines were
installed in the following number of ships :-

\\ AR
H[rS,

:\IERC \ "'IT II E SH[P
.

Total Total
Country, ;'\lumber, I horse-power '\umher, horse.po\\er
capacity. capacity.
Great Britain 226 4,339.]00 9 8 92
, 790
Germany 3 S f,5o
,600 5 19 1 ,000
Franc. 34 601,800 12 16 4,5 00
U.S..\, 37 553,3 00 8 86,000
-- -

There are great possibilities in the interpo"ition of a
reduction gear between the high-speed turbine and low-speed
propeller so that each may work at its highest efficiency.
The application of mechanical gearing to destroyers was
preceded by extensive researches, The Parsons 1Iarine
Company carried out a, series of experiments with the
V cspasian-a cargo boat of 4,350 tons displacement. There
are two turbines, which are connected by means of
mechanical gearing to the propclling shaft, The steam tur-
bine runs at about 1,250 and the propcller at 63 revolutions
per minutc. The results have confirmed the theoretical
considerations as regards economy obtainable by this new
application and shown great reliability in running, The
loss of power in the gears is small, amounting only to
some 2 per cent.
There are at present a few destroyers in the Navy fitted
with gcared turbines, while the application to larger warships
is. under consideration. The geared turbine has already been
installed in several Channel steamers, and excellent results
have been obtained,
Several other methods of power transmission between
the propeller and turbines have been proposed, the most
important being the hydraulic and electrical transmission.
The hydraulic s\'stem has been developed in Germany by
Dr. Föttinger, of Dantzig. In this system the steam turbine
drives a centrifugal pump which delivers water to a hydraulic
turbine, which is connected directly to the propeller shaft,
This system was employed in the Kiinigin Luise, of the
Hamburg-Amerika line, which had a displacement of 1,800
tons. The steam turbines ran at 1,825 and the pro-
pellers at 453 revolutions per minute, It will be
remembered that this vessel was fitted out as a mine-layer
and was sunk by the AmPhion on August 5 near Aldeburgh.
The system gave complete satisfaction, and it was understood
that the German Admiralty were considering its application
to a very large warship.
In the electrical transmission system, which has been
successfully developed in America, high-speed turbines are
coupled to electric generators, which in turn drive slow-speed
motors, the latter being coupled to the propeller shaft, The
U.S.A. collier JuPiter was fitted up with the electric trans-
mission gear, and exhaustive trials were carried out. A few
weeks ago it was announced that it had been decided to fit
the latest .American super-dreadnought, the California, with
the electric transmission gear. The California will have a
displacement of 32,000 tons, a speed of 21 knots, and will
carry more weight of armour than any previously built
batt"Icship, The great steam economy thus obtained has
resulted in a considerable reduction in boiler and con-
denser-room space. The decision of the American naval
authorities is of great importance, and the performances of
the Cahfornia will bc watched with interest. An ad\'antage
of the electric and hydraulic system is that the astern turbine
is not required, while a furthcr advantage of the electric
"ystem is that all speed control and manæuvring can be done
directly from the bridge without signalling to the engine-
room staff, O\\ing to the flexibility of electric power.
The possibilities of the various systems of "speed
reduction" in warships are very great. Owing to the higher
over-all efficiency of the low-speed propcllers and high-speed
turhine greater steam economy, with a consequcnt reduction
in weight and space, is obtaincd.

2-1

.-\pril 10. 19 1 S

LAND \ND WATER

j I 1/
.

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Ushel-'
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GREEN STRIPE iY OYG.
Scotch \V11iskics.

_.
.

-.

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.

preme I ,
a./ a ers '

-

H,M.S, BIRMINGHAM. Light Cruiser. Displacoment 5.400 tons. Lew'th 430 ft,; beam 50 ft, Built Elswick, GUIIS,!J 01 L in,
4 3-pounders; 2 torpedo tubes. Engines 22,000 h,p, Speed 25 knots
(From the Original by Montague Dawson.
Copyright of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO" DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
(Es!c.
!.shed a Ct:ntur-y.)

LAND AND WATER

April 10, 1915

FORTNUM & MASON'S
" fORT M.ASON" (West African) BOOT
Now procurable in sufficient quantity to meet
the huge demand of Officers in F ranee.
HAND-SEWN, LEATHER ALWAYS
SOFT tI WATER-PROOF. Per Pair
35, - 35!- 35/-
" FORTMASON" TRENCH HELMET

Made of rubber,
comfortable
With peak 6/6

lined neece. Warm.
and waterproof.
Without 5/6 each.

Fortnum ð Mason, Ltd..
182 Piccadilly, London, W.

.....

\',. \\

" DRYFOOY"

/-
." #' '
r

THE IDEAL
WATERPROOF

f..
I
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,

"

Copy of letter just receIved from the Front.
Fro
Lieut.,Col. C. E, Stewart, Black Watch, ht Batt"
let DIvision, British Expeditiol1sry Force: - ., Thank you
:10 much for the' Dryfoot. which arrived safely. It baa
been well tested by me, and has certainty done all it
profc88ed. In spite of the muddiest of fields, my hoots
have kept dry inside, 80 I know that it will be very
welcome to the men. ,-
WilY NOT SEND YOUR FRIEND IN CAMP
A TIN? IT WILL BE APPRECIATED.
To be obtained from all leading Shoe Firms &; Stores,
Price 1/- large tin; 6d. small tin,
SoLs Manufacturer.:

>-

-

THE SEAL PRODUCTS, LTD.,
Wholesalc only. Kilburn, London, "N. W.

YOU CAN'T

GET

WET

IN

The Guinea

A Feather Wel
ht Waterproof
For Civilians and Soldiers Alike.
.. You can pu' if in your poc/ed when 'he .un .hines."

Warmth without Weight
\Veighs only 21 oz.
The Guinea .. J\lat.t.amac OJ is made from
a 8p
ciallJ: woven feather,weight matta
fabric of Intense strength, and is guar-
anteed absolutely waterproof. In
appeara
ce it is indistinguishable from
the,ordmary weatherproof, but it is
car
Ied as easi
y as a newspaper or will
go mto an ordlllary pocket.
Practically U ntearable.
Not Transparent,

In a .. Matt,amac" you can't get wet.
Thoroughly well cut and made, Storm
collar and adjustable wind cuffs. Smart,
roomy, free-for every outdoor purpose,
La.sts years, any climate. Iu fawn,
khaki, or grey.

,

II Every Requisite for the Comfort
of our Soldiers at the Front."

TURNBULL it ASSER

Sporting Hosiers

Waterproof Oilskin
Shell Waistcoat

Khaki Stocking
Puttees

""

...

)

,

"

,J

'"

"
"

,

With sleeves for wearing under
a tunic, Specially designed to
pre,ent any damp penetrating
to undergarments. Extremely
light In "eight, folds into
small compass and can be
carried in the pocket.

For use in Home SfIvjce when
off parade. or at the Front when
out of the firing line. '1 he
Stockings present the same ap-
pearance as regulation puttees,
but can be t"ken on and off in
a second. Officers ha,'e found
them the greatest comfort and
relief as a quick chan!,:e after
the strain caused to the legs
by ordinary puttees,
Price 7,6

Price 27/6

71-72 JERMYN ST., LONDON, S.W.
(5 doors from St, James's Street.)

Telegrams: .. Paddywhac/e. London."

Telephone: 4628 Gerrard,

....

Service Kits
for Officers

IN 48 "OURS
W E have supplied hundreds of outfits to Officers of
all grades and Regiments in H,M, Army to
their entire satisfaction. The regulation Service
Khaki is of the very best quality and the workmanship
is second to none. Write for prices and patterns of our
various Khaki malerials.
PRICES
FIPLD SERVICE COAT (Regim
ntal Button", and Badg
5
of Rank extra) - J::3 3 0
B"D
ORD CORD BREECHES ' 215 0
INFANTRY K
ICKERS 1 10 0
SLACKS . t 1 0
GREAT COAT (Regulation Buttons
xtra) 313 6
BRITISH WARM (Fleece-Lined) , . 4 4 0
REGULATION (Wate'1'rool) SUPOVER - 215 0
Oftr Rel"-
s(nlative 'W'I11lJe pleased to '1Lvzit rtPOlt any ReJ!i
.
REI D BROS Militar
and SporUn&,
Ta,lors and
. Breeches Makera
209 OXFORD STREET, LONDON

I

"

STORM PROOFS
For ACTIVE SERVICE

(Naval and Military)
A RUBBER-COATED CLOTH PRODUCED BY ELVERY'S.
.. A tough pliable base is provided. upon whicb the
apecially prepared surfac
is I.id. and the chief point
about the material is that it is ablOlutely impervious to
wet. will not crack. and will stand a 8I'eat strain with-
out tearina. Pail. of water can be poured over tbe
rubber surface with impunity; nothinll can soak. in,
and a rub down will render the Ilsrment absolutely
dry,"-Extract from "Field:' 27/2/15,
SERVICE COAT (AI Ulu,otra.tedl - - - - '10/..
Al
lI.llpplit'd with detAchable "'eece Linin....
CAP COVER with curtain rllxed ur det...chn.hle) - 5 8
KHAKI RUBBER GAUNTLETS, , , , , - 7'8
REGULATION WATERPROOFS, .troDK aud relld.ble
(lUfd.IIUY ('1 ('L\
hYI' - . _ _ _ _ &&/_
WATERPROOF ItIT in every detal1
OU.t.ins. WAd en. Legging_, Waterproof Boou,
6leepina B&g VaUse_. Air CuahiolUl. &c.
GOODS SENT ON .APPROJ'.AL BY RETURN,

J. W. ELVERY & CO., Ld.

Waterproof Spedallsts, [Estd, 1850.
31 CONDUIT STREET, LONDON. W.
(One door "'(>111 :\
". Boll'" Shet't.'
AI.u at 46 " 47 Low.,r 8s
k\llle Stre..t And 34
1\8IA.U Street, DUBLIN
and is Paluck Str..e[. (OUh-.

26

The County Gentleman
AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LXV No. 2762

SATURDAY, APRIL 17, 19 1 5

[ PUBLI
HED AS ]
A NEWSPAPER

PRICE SIXPE
CE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

-
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Cøhri
' t. Hlø.t". P/p"ø..t"

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE EDWIN PATEY

Commander-in-Chief, Royal Australian Fleet

LAND

LONDON &
LANCASHIRE
FIRE
tNSuAANCE COMPANY
L

SECURITY

5J927,293.

FIRE.

CONSEQUENTIAL LO
S.

ACCIDENT.

BURGLARY,

MOTOR CARS.

DOMESTIC SERVANTS.

MARINE.

Head Offices:

{

45 DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
155 LEADENHALL STREET, E,C.

NORTH BRITISH

L Iß CHER
CROSS" ..... .

sINE/ l .;ý

r
/ ' ..
....,j
, .,
",3"-'
/ d ' ú '
/. i"1 J The
"....."} ,
perfect
J}
k--, ALL- .
,-' " r RUBBER
NON-SKID
assuring safety on
all road surfaces, as
used in all departments
of u War Service."

-

l\

..

THE NORTH BRITISH RUBBER CO" Ltd.,
169, Great Portland Street, LONDON W.
Factories: Castle MUls, EDINBURGH.

L\ND WATER

April 17, 1915

The reason for the smiling face-

, . ,-- --.
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I
tJ

HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

Think what a blessing these delicious
Food Tablets are to men on active
sen-ice, - They are ah\ays ready for
immediate use, and a ff'\V dissolvecl in the
mouth will maintain the stren"th of the
Soldicr' when he most needs it. They
supply sufficient nourishment to sustain
for hours; give increase,l body heat and
\'itality; pre"ent fatigue, and relieve thirst.

V.J

Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.

We \\iII send post free to ANY address a flask of
these delicious and .sustaining food tablet.s and a
neat vest pocket ca.se on receipt of 1/6. If the man
Is on acth'e .service, be particular to give his name,
regimental number. regiment. brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and !5tores, in convenient pocket
fl..kq, 1 - each, I.ar!,:er sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

Liberal Sample Bottle sent post f'ree f'or
3d. in stamps.

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO.,
Slough, Bucks.

-
.IUII.
-
-

::::::::::::::::::::.'...... '1
, '\#!@!I!!i!j':':
L ' =

i
- -
= -
- -
- -
æ Are Run-down æ
_ you _
. -
- -
_ When your system is undermined by worry or ov
r-work -
_ -when your vitality is lowered-wben you feel .. an)', =
= how"-"hen Jour nerves are "on edge"-when the least. =
= exertion tires you-you are in 1\ .. Run-down" conùition. =
_ Your s)'stem is like a flower drooping for want of water, _
= And just as water re...ives adroopin
flower-so 'Wincarnis' =
= gives new life to a "run,down" constitution. From even =
- the first wineglassful you can feel it stimulat.ing and in- _
æ vigorating you, and as you continue, you can feel it sur, =
_ charging your whole system with new he9olt,h-new strength -
- -
_ -new vigour and new life. Will you try just one bottle! _
- -
- -
æ Begin to get well FREE. æ
- -
- -
_ _ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wlncarnls '-not a mere tast.e _
_ but enough to do you good, Enclose three penny stamps (to pa
.
_ postage). COLEMAN &CO" Ltd., W:!12, Wincarnis Works, Norwich. _
- -
- -
I

I
- --
- -
= -
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

3 6

A pril I 7, 19 1 5

LAND .\0:D \Y \TER

THROUGH

TI-IE

EYES

OF

A

"TOMAN

Bv MRS, ERIC DE RIDDER,
the subject of atmosphere, The different atmospherl. to
1)1' found in different hou
e,.., the \"aried atmfl<;phefl . 11l \ J.nous
"hops, \n .\merican girl who had just cro", .d thE .\tl<>n,ti r
,md narro" l
escaped ship" reck through a German st
bman
e.
ga \ e us her \'iews, which "ere wpll \"orth attentIOn.
h
outlined the difterence there is between a serond-rate shop,
and one of assured reputation. It i<; one \,hich apparentl\"
c.trikes the .\merican mind very sharply. E\'ery woman
listening knew what she meant. In some places the c1!s
omer
is almost forced to feel that those who sen e pay but a nUl1lmum
of attention, and that only because the
' are paid to do M
It i" here, of I urse,
where all the better class
shops score. Their staff is
trained to stud\' custom-
L'r
, their whim< and their
\\ a \'S, and to gain the
knõwledge quickl\'. It is
alwa\'s plea
ant to go to a
shop' where one is recog-
nised, and gi\ en a full
meed of courteou" atten-
tion in conc.equence It
flatters e\"en'b0d\"s \"anitv
to feel no ñwre 'unit of à
shopping public to be
dealt "ith a
quickh' and
e\.peditiously as po""ible,
but a custo;ner whoSL \"Ïsit
is \'alm'd,

A Cross-Examination .
" W H \ Tare \ ou supposed to write about.
asked Cedlia, as the train ha\"Ïng shrie'Üngh'
run through a seemingh' endless tunnel.
emerged at last into "unshine and peacl,
Cecilia and I were week-end \ ic.iting hnund
together.
This was the sort of question that could only be counter-
question
d.
" I mean," she said, in reply to m
query, " that I should
never be surprised if I were to find one week you had dt:'\'oted
a whole paragraph to the
best wa\, of button-holing
flannel petticoats, or to the
making of a cake without
flour, sugar, butter-"
"If you can gi\'e me
such a receipt," said I.
hreaking into this "ithout
delay, ".1 \\ill not only gin'
one paragraph, but two to
it, if indeed I do not de,'ote
the whole article to such a
::oplcndid invention, Every-
body would clamour to read
it. . Perhaps, though, - this
cake wouldn't need cook-
. ) U
mg.
"Don't be so silh',
"napped Cecilia, \\ hose
temper railway travelling
never improves, "Y ou
know quite well what I
mean, If \'ou do not \\ rite
about cook-ing, I should sa\'
that was the one thing you
did not write about."

'\
'-)

Personal, with Due Apolog}
"It is a general arti-
cle," I said, \Ùthout much
brilliancy, but \\ith more or
less accürac\',
" Yen' - general," said
Cecilia, whose temper still
seemed ruffled.
" To tell yOU the truth,
my dear," sãid I with a
praiseworthy attempt at
explanation, "my article
often seems to me, m\ self, to be a humble imitation of the
\Valrus and the Carpeñter, \\'ho talked of man
- things."
" There are some ideas for \'ou," said Cecilia, who can
never resist an Alice quutatiòn, "You ha\'e not yet
t
lked,
,f ' shoes, and ships, and sealing wax. of cabbagec., and
kmgs.
" I could write pages upon shoes," said I, thinking of the
full short skirt of the mOI
ent, and its demands upon foot-
wear,
Cecilia s:lid nothing, but-perhaps unconsciou<;ly-put
forth a small foot, perfectly shod in darkest bro\\ n crocodile
leather.
"
o," I said, following out my train of thought. "it is
on account of the war, \\ere it not for that it would be a
dress article. As it is, it's a mi
ture, because there seems
so much else to write about as well,"
" I have got a few ne\\ clothes to sho\\ you," said Cecilia,
who was rapielly becoming good tempered again.
" You are quite right though," she went on magnani-
mously. "There is heaps more to write about, perhaps that
explains your mixture article,"
" The mixture article," I said, "exists for the mention
of anything of interest to women. For that reason the
letters that arri,'e asking for mention of such and such a fund,
or such and such a work, are alwa\'s ver\' welcome."
" They receive attention," quòted Cëcilia,
" Always," said 1. " and generally the written \\ord,"
" Then," said she,' 111 future I shall e\.pect a full account
of everything to which I lend m\' \'aluable patronage, or-"
But the threat, if threat it was, "as lost in the bustle of
arri\"al at the station of our destination.

The Clothes \\'e Need

It is the pers0nal note
in busine"s that pays, and
in the fair American's
opinion, \\ ith C cilia as
pconder, thi,;; is the rea-
son \Vh\' the Regent Street
Hou<;e of Peter Robin,;;on
has made its hugl" --uc-
cess, The atmosphere is
admirable here, the trained
attention as pérfect a" pos-
sible. .. You alwav get
well looked after there, and
the\' seel11 to kl:O\\ b\' in-

tÍIìct what \'uu wãnt,"
said CpI'ilia, romin; into
111\ room to sa\ ';' ,rl_
night, .lfter we had gone upstairs to bed
he \\ as
wearing a satin \\ rapper in a 100'el) shade of geranium pink,
\\ hic h set off the pale gold of her hair.
I learnt that these wrapper
are to be bought in different
colourings at this Rel2;ent 5treet house for the mode"t pril e
of 2QS, 6d, They are really delightful garments, and ju
t
the thing needed after the long days
o mam' are spending
iust now engaged upon some charitable work or another.
it is the greatest relid to slip out of a street suit into "omething
soft and clinging, These wrappers ha\'e a roll back collar.
and drape from one side to another beneath a cI(,\Trh fmi..hDd
fastening, but thl"
are of sufficiently simple design to serve
ðcellently as dressing gowns.
I ingerie, of course, is always a feature here, and .lt present
there are some unusually fascinating nightgo\\ ns to be secured.
The\' are of finest French lawn, embroidered b\- hand in a
bold, yet dainty floral pattern, and marvels of cheap-
ness for 12S. 6d, .\ fine edging of lace outlines the neck
and prettily rounded sleeve, and the quality of all the
fabrics used is so fine that the moderate price is doubly
amaÚng,
<\nd the next morning, \\hen the girl from the States
appeared in one of the best cut crêpe de Chine shirts it has
e\'er been my fortune to see, I was not surpnsed to hear
this hailed from the same address, and that 15s, 9d. had been
ib purchasing price, It was made of that good-looking
heavy weight crêpe de Chine which always appears to ach'an-
tage, and has duplicates in black and all colours, .\mongst
the primary features are a semi-militaire collar, and large
pearl
tud fastenings and its other ad\'antagc" can be seen
m Peter Robinson's I atalogue. :\Iuch praise also is de en'eel
by an art silk sports coat in every colouring, cut "ith th,
requisite fulness for the new skirt, and pfluching prettily
at the back over a t,I

elled girelle, And the price is but
33s, /),i.

Copynght, /llaaame L.dlie Charles VISCOUNTESS CURZON
A new portrail of Lady Curzon, who i. renowned for her beaulv and
charm. Her husband, Lord Curzon, i. serving on Ihe Queen
Elizabeth, our talesl and finesl ballle.hip, in Ihe Dardanelle.

On Atmosphere
That night after dinner. and before the masculine element
had emerged from the dining-room, conversation turned on

37

LAND AND WATEk

PRESSING-
PUSHING-
PLOUGH I NG

T HESE three words each picture the amount of Energy
needed to drive a Bicycle according to the amount of
Friction generated by the chain and driving Bearings.
When there is NO
Friction, as in the case
of the Sunbeam, then
the Rider only has to
prm on his pedals,
When there is some
Friction, as in the case
of many so-called high-
grade machines, then
the Cyclist has to push
on his pedals. But when
from various causes
there is much Friction,
then the unfortunate one has to plough along on his pedals.
The point to emphasise is that the Sunbeam's Little
Oil Bath Gear Case saves the Friction and the Pushing
and the Ploughing.
For Easy Cycling, then, get a Sunbeam, Write for
the new Sunbeam Catalogue to-

3SUKBEAMLAND-WOLVERHAMPTON

London Showroom" 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
158 SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Square), S,W.

The tale of the man
who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE FIFTH.
A ND as they eat, the wise man proceeded with
his tale. .. Look thou at this shoe. Mark the
generous proportions. Torture it and learn the
toughness of the fabric which bends but breaks not.
Thou didst observe not long since the marks my beast
had left in the dust, Didst also observe how sure-footed
he was? Place thy finger in this cunning channel.
Dost understand? Consider how yon smith, even in this
small village, had of this shoe. In every spot the length
and breadth of this our land it is the same. So great
a name has it attained that more ",ould buy than shoes
there are to satisfy them. What, thou wouldstsatisfr
thy hunger a little? Thou art right. Perchance we
would then be in better case to deal with so important
a matter. JJ (To be continued. I

MORAL: A demand which exceeds the supply and
always has, is a perpetual and unans",erable argument
for the goods.
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
Founders of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry throughout the World,
Para Mills, Aston Cross, Birmingham.
LONDOr.:' H. Re
ent Street, S. W. PARIS, 4, Rue dn Colonel Moll.

April 17, 1915

An Officer who fought
in the battle at Neuve
Chapelle writes to
say that he borrowed
a Waterman's Ideal
from a friend and in
spite of all the knocks
and shakes it received
during the battle it
was just as good as
before.

l\lessages from the Front

He adds: .. No praise
was too great to
bestow upon the
Waterman's Idea!."

J
l
"
,
,,,.
:- ' ' /
, ..., ".
..,
'
\ '\' 1
[I,
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\. Á

,. ...
,'';- ), 1; '" Jil. J
P ..1Ò j:.J/'j,
I if ''I
I > 1,
Waterman"s e fòuntainPen

(N.B.-This pen had been
used continuously for a
nU?lber of )fears before its
OWller ;oilled the forces.)

For friends on Active Service, the .. Safety" type is recommended. It
can be carried in any position and will not leak. Every pen guaranteed.
10/6 and upwards for regular and Self. Filling Types.
12/6 and upwards for Safety and Pump.Fllling Types.
Of Stationer! and Jewellen everywhere.
AVOID S.'ECIOUS IMITATIONS I BOOKLET FREE PROM

L. G. SLOAN, chelJen: <torner: Kingsway, London

HOTEL CECIL

THE

COST of LIVING REDUCED

DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Telephone: GERRARD 60. Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

3 8

pril17, 1915.

LAND AND mATER.

THE
By

WAR
HILAIRE

BY LAND.
BELLOC.

l'iOTB,-Thls artlde has becn submitted to the Press Bureau, which docs not object to the publication as censored, aad takcs DO
responsibility for the correctncss of the statemeuts.
In accordance "lIh the requlrö:ments of the Press Bureau, the positious of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only bl
regarded as approximate, and no detinUe streugth at auy point is Indicated.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE IN NUMBERS,
T HE tide in numbers has aheady turned
fully upon the 'Vest. It is not far from
turning upon the East,
That is the explanation of the whole
situation during the last fortnight,
Numbers in men, numbers in material, decide
8. war in its largest aspect. Their power is par-
ticularly clear in such a war as this, where the
whole efforts of whole nations are being put forth,
each to a void the permanent wounding of the
national soul.
If this simple, but fundamental, truth, that
numbers are at the root of all, had been kept in
mind, opinion would have been less confused in
the past than it has been. 'Ve should not have
heard the "organising power JJ of the enemy
treated as something miraculous, nor should we
have heard exaggerated the unpreparedness of
the Allies,
The truth is, and has been from the beginning,
that upon the moral side the enemy had but one
clear advantage. In a number of his subsidiary
guesses as to how modern war would turn out,
particularly in his own tactical e"{periments, he
was right, And this gave him, as I shall show in
a moment, a great superioritv in certain forms of
material at the outset, But
in nothing else was
he the superior of his foes-least of all in grand
strategy.
His one asset-the one great thing that really
counted-was numbers.
Take the theories of modern war in which he
proved right; his power to maintain close forma-
tion; the effect of high explosive shell ranged by
air-work upon permanent fortifica.tion; the use
of heavy pieæs in the field, &c., &c. The fact
that the enemy was right in his theories on these
things and that the Allies were, on the whole,
wrong, gave him at once the advantage of numbers
in the right material against his opponents, He
had prepared an immensely larger supply of
machine guns, a weapon closely allied to the use
of close formation in attack. He had prepared
a vastly superior number of heavy pieces distin-
guished for their mobility and a vastly greater
amount of munitioning for them.
But it was the other element of numbers, the
mere numbers in men, that made most difference,
And the greater part of the self-reproach the
Allies address to themselves for the unexpected
but necessary trials of the opening campaign in
the West is simply a misunderstanding of what
must almo
t certainly happen when sixteen men
are attackmg ten. The business of the smaller
number in that rude trial is not to win, for it
cannot, but to hold out in spite of the hammerinO'-
t!lat is, if time proposes to be ultimately upon their
sIde.
r . Kow til!le .was ultimately upon !he side of the
1\.lhes. BrItam "as not a conscript country, and
l1,er reserYes of men, of potential numbers. needed
tIme to appear, If time could be gained, it "ould

be possible to train and equip them. The great
reserve in numbers of Russia would similarlv.
appear when sufficient time had been gained.
:1Iuch the greatest effect of time in favour of the
Allies was that after enough time had passed to
allow for the making of heavy artillery and of
munitions therefor by the French (with their
natural genius for this arm, and with their readi-
ness to learn any new thing), and after the corre-
sponding, though necessarily lesser, effort on the
same. lines, in this country, superiority would
defimtely pass from the enemy to us,
There "Was a second factor in which time was
going to be on the side of the Allies, if that time
could be sufficiently extended without the enemy's
getting, through his superiority in numbers, a
decision, It was the factor of political attitude,
and it appeared in all sorts of ways. The enemy
began by being cocksure; failure was bound to
depress him. The French in all their history haye
fought better in the latter stages of a campaign
than in the earlier. Air-work, mainly under
British example, everywhere advanced upon its
moral side. It was not a superiority in material
that ultimately gave the Allies in the 'Vest the
preponderance they now enjoy in the air: it was
skill and daring. ..
Finally, there was one last factor which put'
time upon the side of the Allies, and that was the
enormous enemy wastage.
EverJ-thing combined to swell that factor: the
enemy's tactical tradition; his necessitv for win-
ning quickly; his use of new levies very rapidlYj
raised; his becoming involved in a winter cam-
paign for which he had not prepared, and whicIi
in places broke down his medical organisation (e.g.,
his ambulances in Poland during Dccember), It is
certain that when the full statistics of the fighting
are published, we shall find that the higher
estimates of the enemy losses bave been more nearly
accurate than the 10"Wer. And I believe that when

ever the end comes the comparative figures, especi 4
ally in the J\- est, will surprise official opinion at
home,
Had all parties to the war pursued the same
policy in respect to the publication of numbers the
truth I am here emphasising, that the enemYj
wastage "as, and is, startlingly greater in propor-
tion than that of the Allies, would have stood out
very clearly, But they do not pursue the same
policy, and therefore the image of the truth is con-
fused in the mind of manv.
The Germans, for iñstance, publish lOTIO' Jist3
of killed in which names appear often very late,
and sometimes months aftf'r the casualties they
refer to. They publish long lists of wounded "hicÏi
certainly do not give every case-and no wonder.
They do not publish lists of sick. They give in
details, down to the last unit, the numbers of thos'3
they call their prisoners, sometimes adding tie
civilians to the soldiers, sometimes confusing the
two categories, sometimes separating them, or men..
tioning one only'.
1*

LAND AND ;WAT
ll

The Austrians supply us with hardly any in-
formation, 'Ve have to deduce from chance utter-
tLP-ces or private reports all that we know,
The Russians publish nothing official, save,
very rarely, a few big facts: as, that they had at
one moment (some months ago) rather over 100,000
German prisoners; that thry lmd about a fortnight
ago oyer 800,000 Austrian prisoners.
The French have deliberately pursued a policy
of complete reticence, varied only by occasional
purely local pieces_ of information: .. In taking
lìuch and such a trench we captured 100 prisoners
and a machine gun." Of their own losses they
publish no casualty lists. 'Ve have had just one
Btatement, about four months ago, with regard to
the number of "Wounded men who have been
received in hospital, and the proportion that have
been discharged. 'Ve can guess from their method
of conducting the war, and from their use of
reserves, certain maxima and minima of losses, but
we can do no more. The British publish full
<"-3.sualty lists in which ultimately every kind of
Joss, except that through sickness, is recorded. But
they do not publish the numbers of the prisoners
they take.
'Vith methods so various obtaining in t1ie five
Gn
at Powers at war, there has, I repeat, been a
("onfusion in the public mind upon this great main
fact of numbers, and in particular upon the im-
mense German and Austrian wastage which has
brought about a turn of affairs in our favour
earlier than the best judgment had thought
possible.
'Ve can be rid of that confusion if we bear
dearly in mind the leading fact with which I
openeù this article: the tide has turned strongly in
t he 'Vest; in the East it is already nearly slack
water,
The tide in numbers having turned has, short
of the entry of further enemies into the field
against us, tllrned for good.
Germany and Austria bave still a certain
amount of untrained material to hand, which they
(".an put into the field bet"Ween this and midsummer,
But they have not more than the full British
reSCITe òf men coupled with the young recruits
which the French have trained and have not yet
used. Buperiority in numbers of actually equipped
and present men in the 'Vest is already establisbed,
and it is now only a question of tbe completion of
t'lluipmC'nt for that superiority to go on increasing
6teadily. The same is true of munitions for the
)}ca '"Y guns; the sa me is true of a j r-machines; the
same is true of the numbers of the l1eavy pieces
themselves.
In the East, the long-lasting numerical in-
feriority of the Russians to tbe coalition opposing
them began to cbange (presumably) about a fort-
night or thrre "eeks aft{'r Vladivostock was open.
At first a dribhle and later a stream of equipment
nnd munitioning then became available at the
Russian front. Had it been possible to force the
DardaneHes tbat stream would already have
become a flood.
Russia was blockaded by two things: the
enemy and winter. 'Vinter has raised the blockade
in the }'ar East. She maintains it in the 'Vhite
8('-3. But she will not maintain it indefinitely even
there. Tbe twenty-eight miles of river between
Archangel and the open sea will be free by tbe
middle of :May at late
t: perhaps earlier. 'Vo
know, of course, that if the ice-breakers had

April 17, 1915.

remained undamaged Archangel wight have hern
partial1y kept open throughout the wint.er. As a
fact it has been closed for fully four months,
,'Vhether the narrow gauge railway to Vologda has
been broadened yet in its whole length we do not
know; but if it has another stream of munitioning
will in some four weeks begin to pour in to the Rus-
sian front from the north. 'Ve may take it that
on the Eastern front the problem of numbers is
solved,
Now let us see bow this factor of numbers
is working in the tyW fields which bave been most
prominently before the public during the last
week-the St. Hihiel Wedge and the Carpathian,
F1'ont.

THE ST. !\UHIEL WEDGE,

The French are hammering at either lin
b
of the great salient in front of 1Ietz which has
its apex at St..
Iihiel upon the Meuse. They are
attempting, by threatening tbe communication
'which runs tbrough the centre of this wedge, to
compel the enemy to withdraw from St. Mihiel
and to straighten his line.
That is their objective.
But it would be a great {'rror to read into
this attempt some mysterious efficacy in the mere
shape of that salient.
Tbe Frene-h are not hammering at tbe 8t,
1\Iihiel wedge simply beca use it sticks out.
If the :French reach the lines of communica-
tion, the railway which has been continued b('yoml
Thiaucourt to the river, and thus compel tbe
enemy to withdraw, they will have acbieved :t
great local success. They will be cheered, and
we shaIl have the papers full of a new tone for
a day or two. So people were cheered by the
pounding of the advanced German trenches at
Keuve Chapelle and thcir occupation by British
troops, So people were cheered by tbe heavy
work in the Champagne district, which advanceJ
the French line by an average (perhaps) of the
distance between Hyde Park Corner and St.
Paul's. But neither at Keuye ChapelIe, nor in
the Champngne, nor here in the 'V oevre was the
end in view a mere advance, whetber of one mil0
or of twenty, The end in view was the wearing
down of the enemy's numhers and the frrtting of
tbat long line of his until it should he too thin
to hold, Supposing the enemy thought of
St. Mihie! as something all-important to his pres-
tige-strat.egically it is no longer of importance
to him, for by this time be knows very well that
he cannot make the strap meet the buckle and
tbat he \.. ill not invest Yerdun-well, supposing
2-

l\pril17, 1915.

LAN DAN D YV. ATE R.

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that he continues to make St, }'fihiel a point of
honour. Can he save it?
Of course he can, It is only a question of
men. He has only to run a greater and a greater
risk of h3.ving his line pierced somewhere else.
He has only to withdraw men from Flanders, from
the Vosges, from the Plain of Alsace, from the
Aisne, and keep on pouring them in to hold either
limb of the wedge which the French are thus
imperilling.
There is in this matter not a little misunder-
standing due to the traditional meaning and effect
of the word "attack." "This attack," men say,
" will necessarily be far more expensive to us than
the old defensive was," Or, again: " We must
expect very great losses, for we shall be the attack-
ing party." But under the conditions now estab-
lished upon the Western front, those terms hardly
apply, , The attack does not take the form of a
number of men in the open rushing to swarm over
a well-defended obstacle, and suffering in propor-
tion to the difficulty of that attempt, The defeat
of the enemy does not take the form of their having,
after a long defence behind earth where they have
suffered little, fallen back in order and defended
some new position. If that were the form of the
present fighting along the 'Vest ern front the attack
would, indeed, be enormously more expensive than
the defence, But it is not the form. ,The form is
this:
The Allies being fairly free from enemy obser-
vation (a freedom they owe to their established
superiority in the air) concentrate munitions for
their heavy guns upon a. particular point; they.
then, after a certain delay for such concentration,
deluge a narrow sector of the enemy's front with
heavy gun fire (in which they also have a marked

superiority, and the accuracy of which again
depends on superiority in the air). They then,
the moment that tornado of fire ceases, rush the
most advanced trenches of the enemy.
Fighting of that kind does not mean that the
attack spends more men than the defence. The
attack spends enormously more ammunition, and
it subjects its artillery to much morc wear and
tear, but not more than it can replace.
The second chapter in these efforts is still less
an example of expenditure in men by the attack.
It consists in the rallying of the enemy in a.
counter-offensive, and in his attempt wit/tOut a
superiority in heavy guns or in a"ir work to take
back what he has lost, or at the worst to hold that
part of his second or third line of trenches which
he had presened. And this counter-offensive is
normally far more expensive to him than to the
Allies whose pressure he is trying to stem. He can
always stem it, as I have said, if hc chooses to bring
up more men; but only by losing, day after da.y,
great numbers of thCìse men over and above the
corresponding losses of 11Ís opponent, and the men
must come from somewhere.
Every one of these bits of worl\:-that at Leg
Eparges the other day; that at Rcgnieville; that
at the wood of Montmare; that at GoussainvilJe
-does its bit in slightly increasing the numerical
superiority of the Allies on the line against thcÎl
enemy,
Àt Keuve ChapeUe weath('r and certain mis-
calculations made the German counter-offensive
particularly severe for the British, Nevertheless
the total German losses "cre far heavier upon that
narrow front than the total British losses. In
the Champagne three solid weeks of tremendous
work with something like half a million men en-

i

1r

-
1*

LAND AND
ATER.

April 17, 1915.

gaged first and last in ferritory the size of South
I.A>ndon resulted in no conspicuous advance,
thouah ad\'ance there \\ as. The Germans saved
the r
ilway line behind their trencbes, Tbey lost
tbe crest of the watersbed and some hundreds of
yards of ground. But they came out of the
6truq'
le mucb \\""eakcr in proportion to tbe French
than'" they v. cnt in, and that was the object of our
Allies in initiating the actions they tbus took
between Souain and V ille-sur- Tourbe.
It is the same story along the whole front
from Altkircb to the North Sea, and it is a story
that can have but one ending unless ciÜlian
opinion is misle""d and fails the armies.
Let us turn next to the details of tbe attack
on the St. Mihiel wedge.
The ground npon which tbis struggle for the
wedge of ::-\t.
lihiel is being decided is singularly
simple. It consists in two clearly-marked dis-
tricts: The rolling plain, caUed the \Vocvre, on
the East (an average height of some 700 feet above
the sea), and the range of hiHs, c.alled tbe
.. Heigbts of the
.feuse," on the \Vest. These
latter consist in a ridge wbieh slopes up from tbe

leuse River to an aYl'rage height of oycr 300 feet
and an average width eastward of about eigbt
miles. It then fa lIs extremely rapidly in a sort
of wall-500 to 600 feet high at the nortbern end
and nearly 1,000 at the southern-do",n on to
the plain. And the plain, the Woevre proper,
stretches to the Moselle, and is a district of
numerous ,,'oods, meres, and small watercourses
amid large open ploughed fields. The wbole dis-
trict is, therefore, the belt betwecn Meuse and
.Moselle.

,::
IJi

,r t!

(f\

This wall forms one of the very sharp 1 r-
defined landscapes of Europe, and may be com-
pared to the escarpment of the North or Sout It
Downs or of the Cotswo1d in tbis country, ;\Vbile
tbe summits of tbe bins along this escarpment
dominate tbe plain, eycn in tbe north, by 600 feet,
&.he saddles often fall to less iLan 400; but as one

looks along tbat chain of heights from some viHage
at tbe foot, such as Ilattonville, it presents an
almost artificial appearance of regularity,
This conspicuous feature in tbe ground of the
present effort is transverse to the fronts of both
armies, The wedge or buckle of wbicb tbe apex
is at 81. Mibiel cuts the escarpment of tbe heights
of the Meuse in two points-tbe nortbern one near
Les Eparges, the other on the south near Apre-
mont.
But eYen if there were no bil1s here at an
the problem "\'\""ould be much the same. It simply!
consists in the effort of the :FreDch to reach t1
e
single line of communication upon which the hold-
ing of St, Mihiel depends, and tbe efforts of the
Germans to prevent their reaching it,
That single line of communication is, as hag
been pointed out in past articles, the old sing-Je--
line railway wbich runs from Metz up the ra
1ne
of tbe little River Mad to Thiaucourt, and the con-
tinuation whicb the Germans are reported to ba, e
built on to it in the last six months from Thiau-
court to St, Mihie!. I believe it will be found,
when the thing can be examined in detail, that
this continuation has been run (as I sbow it upon
tbe accompanying sketch) up out of tbe Mad valley;

10 t1'-(W

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:rtt

to Vigneulles, anù then over the comparatively
low saddle to the village of Creue, and so down
tbe ravine called the Rupt de Creue to the :Meuse,
and so to St, Mihie!. The last part of this guess
may be wrong, because it would bring the railway
rather close to the :French lines, and it is possible
that tbe new rails are laid 0\,(,1' tbe higher wooded
country to the south and more directly: towarà;;
8t, Mihiel, as at A-B on the sketch. At any
rate, the piercing of this line at any point v\Quld
make tbe position at St, Mihiel impossible.
Now, tbe place "here it is most immediately
threatened is Thiaucourt, where it comes nearest
to the :French aJmnce, which has thrust trenches
out north of Regnieyille, as we know. And it
mav thrrf'fore be asked why the position of the
::;pur of Les Epargcs on the north is of such
importance.
The vnlue of a spcciíll cffort at this latter
point consists in this: That so long as tbe :French
T(,l!ì
Ün in pOS!':c<';3 i on of the spur or Les Eparges
they can from behind the riðge and on its western
f>loÌ)cs in wooded country <,<;tablish positions for
tlwir heavy guns whieh "ill comrr.and at known
a :Hl fixf'd ranges all the nearer part of the plain
now open to thcir complete observation.
The position to be captured at Les Eparges
was the rounùed boss of a summit upon a plate.al1
which stands out cnriow
ly from the mass of the
hills parallel to their main axis, and i::; separated
4*

:A.pril17, 1915.

LAND AND ;KATER.

from them by very steep-sided ravines in vdîich the
village of Les Eparges lies. To the west of this
ra, ine the hills, long held by the French, are a mass
of woods, and the summits of these hills top a

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contour 400 feet above the stream which runs
through the valley. A rounded plateau on the
eastern side, to the capture of which the Frencb
bent all their efforts, is only 300 feet above the
water in the village,
This plateau is fairly free of wood, and the
view from it commands the whole plain of the
L\Voevre. Beyond it and below, on the edge of the
plain, is the little village of Combres. It is fairly
clear that the capture of this height must have
been effected by a concentration of heavy gun fire
from bebind the ridge of the forest of Amblonville,
to tbe 'Vest, and tbat here, as in every other case

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v

along this front, it is the new superiority in heavy
pieces and their munitionment which is wearing
down the German line,
The local importance of the plateau above
Combres is peculiar and worthy of study, for it led
at once to the bitter tenacity of the defence, and
the continuous concentration of the assault, with
the very heavy losses involved upon either side.
It was not a case of capturing an elevated gun
position, for tbe plateau is dominated more and
more by tbe rising crest of the spur southward

1\01' was it, as it would have been in the old days.
the obtaining of a commanding height, whence the
plain below could be shelled, for a gun position
of this sort is but a disadvantage in the present
trench warfare against any well-bidden rosition
from which heavy gun fire can be directed by air
work.
But the point of the plateau between Lcs
Eparges and Combres was that it thrust out
a hill in front of future heavy gun pos
tions
to be established in the forest to the west,
it permitted batteries there establisbed to
shell positions in the plain, their effect per-
petually observed from the new summit, and
themselves shielded by it. Therefore, tbe enemy
had erected regular fortifications upon this
plateau, now long-established, and attack on it
had the effect of compelling the enemy to concen.
trate upon that onc spot great numbers of men.
The narrow hill between Combres and Les Eparges
was, as it were, the nucleus of the defence wbich
the Germans had established from the line of their
railway up to the neighbourhood of Fresnes.
The line is not cut by the occupation of the
plateau. Tbere is plenty of opportunity for the
enemy to entrench to the east of the captured
position, but here, as e,'erywhere, the object to be
attained was the compelling him to bring up
renewed masses of men, and to sacrifice them in the

7ó M'd'z

Wóod of

" 'PONT
A MOUSSON

VI

Ait

LAND AND JVATER.

attempt to keep a. point to which he attached pecu-
liar importance.
On the south limb of the wedge the French

ffort is complicated by the chanc.e there is there of
possibly dominating the railway, but meanwhile
this effort necessarily draws great masses of the
enemy to the threatened points, and, therefore,
achieves mnch the same numerical result as the
attacks on the north.
The conformation of the ground is such that
it is not possible for the rails leading from Tbiau-
court to St. ::\lihiel to go at first ,ery far away
from the course of tbe little River Mad. ror the
Mad runs after its first part in a very steep
trench, the sides of which can only be negotiated
by tunnelling or th(' use of a light railway and
break of gauge, The wood of
fontmare, in front of
,Thiaucourt, the \ Illage of Regnieyille, the western
part of the Bois du Prêtre, in front of Pont à

foussonl bet,yeen tbcm giye the line of tbe French
trenches, about a third of the way from the high
J'03.d to the
rad, or, measured in ranges, you haye
from the Frcnch trenches to the :\Iaù no more now
than 5,000 yards; if anything, the trench
s of the
wood of
Iontmare, though we do not qUIte know
\, here they cut that wood, are a little closer to the
ra vine than those of Hegnieyille,
THE CARPA THIA:'J FRO:\fT.
On the Eastern front the new business is also
a matter of numbers, though after a rather dif-
ferent fashion from the vVest. 'Yhy are the Rus-
8ians thus able to press slowly mile" by mile on to
the crest of thE' main range and down the further
slopes of the Hungarian side of the mountains?
Bc>cauee their numhers ha'
e here increased and are
8till increasing. The fall of Przemysl released
another quarter of a million; much more, it freed
the whole Galil'ian railway system and permitted
new streams of equipped men to be fed and muni-
tioned upon the mounfain front from the admnce
passes in Galicia and from the main passes in
Russia itsel f. ::\Ieanwhile the new munitioning
(If Russia 'fith the end of the" inter still swelled
the numlJers, and the pressure upon the Car-
pathian barrier may be compared to the pressure
of water upon some containing wall when that
water rises higher and higher by continued addi-
tion.
How was this threat to HUIJgary to be met?
Only by a pouring in of corresponding numbers
upon the other side. Germany must lend her
desperate ally first three Bavarian corps, then
four more corps, making seyen in all; yet the

Iow Russian advance continued. It is said that
t;he will attempt to find somewhere yet another
100,000 men, and see whether the dam can be
mended, But those men must come from some-
where, and eycry man taken round to the Car-
pathian front weakens Germany in every other
part of the field.
Throughout the war until the present pbase
the Germans and tbe Austrians met the local pres-
sure of the numerically inferior Russian forces in
tbe same way, They massed tbeir greatly superior
numbers by the use of their superior railway
t;ystem in some unexpected direction anù struck
a blow at a point which the Russians could not
afford to lose,
\Vben at the end of November, just as the
attempt of the Germans to break out in Flanùers
had failed. the Russians were at the gates of

April 17, 1915.

Cracow, emjnentlv sU I )crior numbers ,yert" 8wunO'
. 0
up north and the blow was struck at \\Tarsaw
,ybich came within an ace of succcedinO'. Tbe
_.. . b
pressure on Cracow was rehen'd.
As, towards the end of the winter the Rus-
,
sians had perceptibly incl'{'ased, anù as the direct
attack on "TaJ'saw ha.d failed, a TIew and a last
concentration of great German numbers was
made in East Prussia, and the month of February
was full of this rene"ed surprise attack from the
north to cut the railways behind 'Varsaw. It
failed in its turn, But it created a diversion,
It employed vast numbers of the Russians upon
what was for the moment a purely defensive
scheme.
Here we are in the middle of April, the snow
is already melting upon the southern slope of the
Carpatluans, the pressure of the Russians there
gets he-avier and heavier, the danger is extreme.
:\\'hy does not some nrw diversion relieve that
pressure and conjure that peril? :Because the
cnemy no longer has a superiority in men where-
with to effect such a divcrsion.
On both fronts, then, it is thc samc story. The
tide in numbers has turneù,

\.s to the exact positions of the Russians on
the critical part of the Carpathian frol1t, l1ear
Lupkow, by the last telegram receiwd on Tuesdav,
it is as follmys : "

'1!.....

Ûlnnel

Ì

........ ......,j..... (
.
)C ... 'ë-
)C ....,_ Q
+ _ t ....'" esfC-
esC'uwcrcz '.
.-i.-:p
'Prok. 909
_ -' ....
.
.

:I()
':10.
. \......
...,...c<">

_.,-...c:;,. .
'..
0-
..
1'.<.1'
o.

.
Wcla.'M'Ldwwa.

-
o I
'

.,.

11

'MZles
7èussia:n 'Front ..................

On the Carpathian front it is il1teresting to
note that the Height 909, whieh is situated just
south-east of the summit of the Lupkow, remained
in the hands of the enemy until last Thursday, and
was the last point of this front upon the main
ridge to remain till the general Russian capture
of'that ridge bet\\""een the Rustok and the district
west of the Dukla,
The point 909-tIIe highest peak in this dis-
trict-tLus forming an f'xception to the general
Russian grip upon the watershed, having fallen,
something like fort.y miles of this line, or a little
more, is now in the hands of the Russians.
It would be an error to regard the mere sur-
mounting of the ridge, cven upon so broad a sector.
as the conquest of the range.
It is here, as everywhere, a question of num-
bel's,' Could the enemy by some miracle pour in
great masses of new numbers, he would check the
adnlnce as securely upon the Hungarian as upon
the Galician side, for the broad belt of woodeù
slopes on the Hungarian side offcr as good oppor-
tunities for resistance as does the corresponding
belt on the castern slope of the mountains. It is
true tllat the snow has ùisappeared more largely
from the Hungarian slope tLan fl'Om t.he Galieian,
for it is the slope turned a way from the wet" inds
6*

April 17, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

and it is the slope that looks towards the south.
But this is not whollv a disadvant.age to the defen-
sive. It gives better "opporhmities for trench work
and much better opportunities for c.oncealment,
JVhat the gradual. disappearance of the sn
w
In the whole range durmg the next few weeks wIll
accomplish is the provision of pasture for the Rus-
sian irregular cavalry, and the freeing of separate
bodies from being tied to the few roads across the
hills. and in particular the horsemen will be able
t.o come into action,
It is probable that the defensive along the
rano-e has been verv far from continuous. It has
bee; concentrated Ù:pon the points where the roads
cross. because during the winter all advance on the
part of the Rus8ians has been tied t.o these roads,
But as the weather moderates, the defensive will
have to be spread out more evenly along the whole
line, and this is a factor in weakening that line
which must not be neglected.
Meanwhile. the efforts to check the slow
ad\ance of our ally over these mountains are not
always without fruit,
"-here the Lupkow Pass Railway comes down
from the summit on the Hungarian side, round
about the station of :Mesolaborcz (at X X on the
above sketch), there has been a series of sharp
actions which have quite helJ up the Russian
advance in that district, and have probahly in-
:Hicted a local reverse upon our ally, for the
Austrian claims to 10,000 unwounded prisoners
remain uncontradicted, and the Hussian line has
here been quite stationary for three weeks past.
But it is not a local success of this kind, nor
the more numerous small and steady adnmces of
the Russians upon the whole of this course, which
really decides the issue, The whole thing is a
furious corps à corps; a swaying, now just upon,
now just over. the summits of the hills; a wrestlirg

bout in which superiority of numbers will be Hið
ultimately deciding factor, and which ewry new
week's further equipment of the Rusi;Ïans incline.s
in their favour.
A NOTE ON NEUVE CHAPELL
.
There has been a tendency, as the exact truth
about Keuve Chapelle began to come through, not
from the Press, but from the great numbers of
men who have returned wounded from that action,
to under-rate its effect and to misunderstand its
character, It is therefore worth while to re-
emphasise both. As it has been Yery well put in
the phrase of one corrc::;pondcnt, to whose experi-
ence I ha -re had access, " The thing for the public
in England to note is not llOW much might have
been done, but how much was,"
Kow what was done may be briefly tabulated
as follows:
1. Through superiority in air-work now ful1y
established, great quantities of munitions were
concealed for several days "ithmlt the enemy's
gue5sing what was happening. It i$ the fil.st
time this 'taS been don-e l1pon the JVestern front.
2. The local weakness of the enemy through
the same superiority and through the co-ordina-
tion of this effort with the attacks in Champagno
was equally cstaLli:;hed,
3. At a heavy expense, especially during the
counter-offensive, to our own side, it inflicted a
still greater 10s3 upon the enemy" ho could afford
it far less.
4. It discovered the contjnued or rather im-
proved capacit
? for a -vigorous offensive in men
\", ho have passed months under the strain of trench
".ork,
5. In general, it showed that, with a sufficient
preparation, the piercing of the line or its shorten

ing under the threat of piercing was certain.

COTTON.

I ML"ST beg my readers to permit me Jet
another reference to cotton. and that for
the purpose of giving more details upon
the subject.
Everyone by this time knows in a general way
that cotton is gunpowder, and that yet cotton has
been allowed to come freely into German)' through
the blockading cordon; which is exactly as though
guns and submarines and consignments of shell
had been aHowed to get through the cordon.
save for this difference: that Germanv and
Austria-Hungary can, at a certain rate,
make
guns and sbells and submarines, v. hereas for
cotton they are absolutely dependent upon supply
from over thE' sea-that is, upon the goodwill of
C re:tt Britain among the Allies.
But wbile this yery startling- fart jg now
publiC' property, tbe preeise significance of it in
detail is 1('315 general 1 ! &ppreciated. How much
cotton there is, what it is worth, how muc h the
enemy probably use, the diffeJ.encp that even at
this date the pre\-euiing of his gc-tting this
material \....0U'1d make-all these points arc left
vague in the public mind, If the pul'lic can get
a grip of them it will h('lp to strengthen opinion,
There are probahly in Cerm
Ul:V now, in re-
sern>. as I 8aid b<;t week, one million bales of
cotton. It is douhtfnl whether Au:;
ria 1m,s any

reserve. Supposing, theæforc, tbat all suppJy
from neutrals in Europe and all supply fr3m oycr-
sea were to stop at this very moment, tbe en('my
would presumably Lave to fall back upon rather
less than 500 million pounds. or. in round
nurnhers, 250,000 tons of colton.
lt is believed that hitberto he has used about
half his cott-on imports for textile fabrics and
nbout half for making wbat I shall continue to
call his gunpou'der, because tJ13t inaccurate, old-
fashioned term giyes the quickest impression of
the truth.
He has therefore in reserve, having accumu.
lated it during these months during \\ hich W6
have permitted him to obtain it in spite of tlJ

blockade, about 125,000 tons of gunpowder, which,
if be could afford to stop all his ci\ilian \\eaYinl1
and to tLrow immense numbers of men out or
employment, couItl possibly be increased to a
u:.aximum of something less than 200.000 tons in
round numbers,
I gin' these figures first and insist npon them
b('C'au
e the e,tri:lordinary situation by which
enemies working for the destruction of this
CPlmtry ar{' silPl"
rtcd in obtaining tho matcrj:LI
with whidl to df"stroy it can only be defended
UPOll the pIca that co
tC'n has ah-cadv come in in
J;
l('h quaT1tit,i
s th:tt belated adioñ taken now

'j-

LAND AND J
ATER.

April 17, 1915.

has been quitc out of proportion to what even the
enemy expected, Again, the heavy gun, which is,
of course, the great glutton of cotton, "Was relied
upon by the enemy in this war in a fashion whicll
the Allies had not foreseen, and was used by them
with a prodigality which has called forth at last
a similar or eyen superior effort upon our side in
the "r est.
In the East, apart from what were until quite
lately his superior numbers, the enemy still relies
upon the much greater supply he has of heavy(
The cstimates of what the enemy is using pieces and of munitions for them. While-most
:vary, of course, enormously. It is an exceedingly significant and most calculable of all the proofs-
difficult problem to work out eyen as a conjec- we have the fact that the enemy, although he pre

ture, Austria, for instance, uses a powder in pared this war for so long, is, and has long been,

hicb there is a proportion of glycerine higher damouring for cotton; a truth easily proved by the
than that in the German powder. But both of rate of his recent import and his willingness to pay,
these are higber than the proportion in tlle French as we shan see in a moment, at a ,'ery high price for
service, and in the American (among others). the cotton he does get.

gain, we do not know ",hat secret modifications Let us now recall the estimates of reserve
may not have been introduced in the period during which have already been given-125,000 t<>ns
whICh Germany was actively preparing for tbis reckoned for, 200,000 tons available at a pinch-
.war-that is, between 1911 and 1914-three yea.rs and we can easily see the result. The enemy now
Iwhich, as we know, were given up to the designing has gunpowder for about another three months of
and munitioning of the great campaign tbat was war, or at the most another nine months or so.
to be entered on just after the harvest of 1914. That is, supposing the war to go on at its present
It is, further, ",ery difficult to guess nearer rate and the enemy to lose no stores,
Ulan a maximum and a minimum very widely The first thing we have to remark upon stating
separated what the average expenditure is per these figures is that even upon the estimate most
day, tbough we know accurately enougb the ex- favourable to ourselyes the immediate cessation of
Renditure in cotton of any particular "'capon. cotton import would still leave the enemy able to
,The French 75, for instance, would shoot away continue at the present rate to the end of the year.
n bale of cotton in four hundred rounds, and the That is the basis, of course, of the argument in

argest existing guns would shoot it away in less favour of despairing of future action on account
than two. The small arm ammunition, the ex- of results of the past action, That is the argument
penditure of which is perhaps the most difficult for not shutting the stable door because the horse
thing to calculate, uses up about a bale of cotton, has certainly been stolen, But we should pause a
[{ beheve, in about 80,000 rounds, rather less than moment at this stage in the consideration of our
more. A machine gun actually in the field is matter to consider certain further aspects of it.
provided first and last with about half a bale of In tbe first place, no one can guarantee t.hat
cotton, and every company in tbe field, apar
from the war is to go on at the present rate, If"\\e allow
its machine guns, is provided first and last witb the enemy to obtain great masses of cotton in the
about three bales of cotton. immediate future, he will be able to develop in the
By this I do not mean that your machine gun ;\Vest perhaps a renewed lavish expenditure of
"Dr your company will not get rid "of more cotton heavy gun ammunition such as that which marked
than that in the war: it will get rid of enormously, his first bid for the victory that he so narrowly,
more. But I mean that
-our first provision is at missed.
least upon that scale. In the second place, tJle moment the siege of
The lowest estimate-and I fear it was once any place in the enemy's hands begins, we shall
the official one, too-Ims put the total expenditure have a sudden leap up of expenditure, on his part,
of cotton by the enemy at 3QO tons a day, The most of cotton. The same is true of the defence of any,
f'xpert estimate I have seen puts it at over three obstacle behind which he may lie, such as the
times that, at 1,000 t<>ns a day. Rhine.
Now, it is wise to keep one's estimates ah,ays Then, again, "\\e must remember that in all
below the figure that most helps one's argument, calculations of this sort, tbough it is wise to
tyen though one has good ground for accepting take a moderate estimate against our own wishes,
I;uch a figure. We will, therefore, heavily scale it is also wise to lea,'e no chances to the enemy/
ùown the maximum of 1,000 tons antI stay at 750 If his real reserye is smaller than we imagine-----
tons. ,,;-hich it wen may be-if his real expenditure is
Three hundred tons cannot be accepted for a much higher than we think; if, for instance, he is
moment. It is based upon tlJOsc older calculations using cotton at a rate 50 pf'r c.ent. greater than we
I;\hich this war has completely upset. E\-en 750 have alloW"rd for, his reserve is already smaller. It
lons is less likely than 1,000. There are a number would hardJy la<;t out the summer, and any chances
of obseryations all pointing to tbe larger rat bel' of our heing able to stan-e him in gunpowder at
Lhan the smaller figure, Both Germany and tIle earliest'- possible moment should obviously be
'Austria uset! from the beginning an enormously taken, even if hy our OWI1 aetion we have allowed
grcater number of machine guns in proportion to him to accumulate this great store.
their forces than the Allies hat! allowed for, The Anain, the action of your enemy becomes
attack throughout this war has everywhere been so embarI
ssed long before his last munitions are ex-
persistent, the losses before an attack failed 80 hausted, The mere condemning of him to husban'd
})cavy, that the expenditure of small arm ammuni- his am:nunition would be equivalent to putting
tion by the soldier, as wen as hy tIle mac-hine gun, him under a n'r)' heavy handicap.
e*

'Would be uscless. In other words, the groom may
plead against being asked to shut the stable door
now that the horse bas been stolen,
;\VelI, if Germany has a maximum potential
resen-c of less tban 200,000 tons of propellant
explosive and a practical reserve of not more than
i125,000 tons, let us next ask ourselws bow long
tbis would last, and whether it could be supple-
mented in any way supposing that after all these
months of war we did stop the public from going
on.

pril17, 1915.

EAND AND WATER,

Again, we must allow for the possibility of his im'pose
upon a neutral country. We preyent wool
losing stores. He must have lost, for instance, the gOlllg lllto Germany, anù wool is an Australian
other day, in Przem)-sl, a huge quantity of accumu- product. I understand that we preyent Indian
lated propellant explosive. A future success of cot
on and. Egyptian cotton going into Germany.
the same sort on our 'Yestern side, in Belgium, for It IS AmerIcan cotton that goes in alone.
instance, would have a similar result, But there is
o need--or a
least th
re appears
All these considerations point one way, and none, to one havmg no more mformatIon than is
ßhow the utility-I should have thought the im- open to the general public-to inflict any hardship
perative necessity--of stopping the supply at once, upon this powerful neutral.
But let us next see" hat chance of supply he has The cotton we buy at the present moment in
through neutrals. open m
rket for British use we get to-day for just
There are two sets of neutrals. ,Wbat may: under sIxpence the pound. Germanv in her need
be called tbe Korth Sea group and Italy, The is willing to pay, I believe, about double this, Had
neutral Balkan frontier cannot be used for tbe we adopted the policy of preYenting this resen-e
importation of cotton on any large scale. Now, of ammunition from growing up in Germany (and
from Italy tbe enemy is not at tbe present moment if we had, the war might well be over now) we
obtaining cotton, and bas not obtained it for some co.uld have paid for the total of bel' present reserye
time past, I believe-a significant indication, by wIth a sum of somewhat more than ten million
tbe way, of the policy of that country, From tbe poun
s, Eyen if we had compensated the
North 8ea neutrals the enemy has been obtainincr AmerIcan exporte
at the rate Germany is now
every kind of munition wbicb we have allowed t
ready to pay (a tlung we need never have done if
go through. we had begun early), twenty millions would haye
.

must always re
lemher, by the way, tbat met tbe bill.
tJll
IS III no way an unfrIendly or Illegal act upon So it c.omes to this, that somethin cr which
tbCl
J?art.. The neutral sells you provisions and woul? ha,-e ended the war perl1aps alre:rdy, and
munItIons, If be can reach your market. It is tbe cer
alIJy would have. appreciably shortened it,
enemy's business to prewnt his doing so if be wIllIe at the same tIme ensurinO' victory has
can, but not the neutral's business to diminisb his not been done, alth
:mgh tbat sometllng would'only
own chances of trade. If we are right in elimin- llaye cost the AllIes much less than 1 per cent.
atin
the Italian cotton stopped in transit-as I of expenditure tlley baye already had to meet =
am informed we are-we may probably estimate would ha"e cost Britain alone less than a week of
the t,?tal a-!llount ,,-hich the remaining neutrals, war.
the )\orth :Sea group of neutrals, could now spare Bef?re leaving tl
e subject tbere are two
to Germany,
f further effort were regulated so as more pOInts to be mentIOned. The first is the use
to supply thc11' own needs alone, at about another of substitutes for cotton, the second is the supply
25 per cent. added to the present German reserw., for the future, '
In other words, supposinO' Germany and Austria. The most obvious substitute wbicb occurs to
could now carryon for fOl
r months \vith what they one, whic
has already been mentioned in these
have, the neutral countries in Europe which are columns, IS wood-pulp, But I am informed tbat
willing to provide tbem could extend that four there could be no question of the substitution of
months to fiYe
if for eigbt months, then to ten; ,\""Ood-pulp for cotton in the course of the present
hut no more. Such, at least, wouM seem to be, in "a
. The results obtained by experiment are un-
a matter necessarily conjectural, the situation. satIsfactory, The change would be, in the course
Tbe argument on that side, tberefore that the of <1: great struggle, impossible. Cotton with im-
horse is stolen and that the stable doo
does not purItIes or already made up into stuffs is also out
need shutting is not yery strong, And we may of the que
ti
n. 'Ye may t;ake it tbat if we st.opped
conclude at onC-e the whole of tbis part of the dis- the enemy s Import of thIS raw material nothing
eussion by saying that if we were perfectly free to Cûuld replace it.
stop tbe gunpowder going in now we obyiously L?stly, let us note tbc supply. There" ill be
ought to do so and tbat it would be of yery areat no
oÌlon of t
e. next cr?p :1v
lllable for Germany
practical effect. 1:1 durlllg the (,1'1tlcal perIOd of stress immediately
If we are not free that lack of freedom must I.efore us, The picking of cotton is a summer and
be due to one of two calculations or to a combina- early autumn business, and it is wit.h the winter
!ion o! botb. First, it may be put forward that that the ne
surplies .come in. Therefore, apart
If we lll
erfer,cd with Germany's imports of cotton from supplIes stIll ayallable, tbe critical period of
the Umted States would reO'ard this as an un- the war for the enemy and for ourselws \\hich is
friendly act, and tbat what
Ye obtain from that approaching, will also be one in whicb tbe restric-
source would fail us. It is for those who ba,e tion of cotton import concerns a lessening stream
all the available official knowledae in tbe matter of commerce.
which no rrï-yate critic can pret
nd to, to decid
CONCLUSION O
Kli:\JBEHS.
"hether tbIS IS the e.ase or no. But meanwhile the I began my notes of this week" ith the c:mital
pri,ate critic and the public in general are pos- statement that the tide in numbers had tu;ned.
Ees
d of ce
tain ,-eIT obvious facts in the matter ;\Ve shall see during tbe remainder of the war how
WbICh ccrtamly do not rua
e the argument any; tbat prime factor will affect the enemy's decision.
6tr?nger.
Ve know. for mstance, that for :El It must be remembered (and it is foro-otten
paId by .Germany for German munitions the Allies per
laps more in this country than among our
are paymg a great deal more than
10, and one _\ll1es) .that th

nemy has nen:r presuppo
ed iu
does n?t see a man giying up
10 or
15 wortb of hls
mhtary wntmg:
, in his strategiml schoo], in
traùe III orùer to &.'tye
1 worth. the mmost of his militaIT milld-" bich aJfeds th('
, Further,. w
may remark tbat "\\e have not ,cry training of his recI
uits and tlle "ho]e moral
hesItated to mfhct upon our own Dominions and standpoint of bis armies--t]l{' po
sihiJity of fiml-
our Allies restridions whicb this policy has not ing himself in an inferiorify of J1mnhl>r. lIe has
9*

LAND AND "W.ATER.

worked on the presumption of superiority,
ioulrs masked that presumption under a number
p ea'olish titles, indicating a moral rather than a
nOJìerical ascendancy. But a numerical ascend-
J.cy it was in his mind, and a numerical ascend-
!ncy it remains, All his plans of war prove it.
His whole scheme of fortification proves it, How
will he behave when he in his turn bas to figbt
under the conditions which the French, the British,
and the Russians su1Ïered throughout the autumn
:md winter? What plans will he make correspond-
ing to the plans of the French for saving all that
could be saved during the extreme peril of the first
days of the wad 'Yith what coolness will he
deiiberately sacrifice his Lilles and his Lodzs
,,'hen the time comes for such sacrifices 1 How will
he condlict a retreat in the face of superior
numbers? How will he act when here and there he
has to fight his Le C'atraus with one gun to his
opponent's four? 'Yhat effect upon his Govern-
ment will it have when superior forces with heavier
arms are as near to anyone of his half-dozen vital
centres as Yon Kluck was to Paris on Sedan day 1
Kothing but the future can tell us how he ",'ill
behave under circumstances of this kind, which he
never believed possible, and to which for nearly
fifty years he has deliberately shut his eyes,
He may show an unexpected tenacit)T, quite
unlike anything he has shown in the historical past.
lIe may even display that supreme quality in
generalship which exactly weighs the political
against the militar
T objective, and at once, without
so much aR :1 (by's hesitation, sacrifices the first to
the second. He may':' resurrect Buonaparte to
save Napoleon." .
On the other hand, he mav suffer from thi'
bewilderment which eo commonir overtakes those
who deliberately cherish illusion 'and who imagine
that by SOTl1e v, itchcraft a blind confidence in
success produces it,
But whichever of these two spirits he sbows-
the first, wbich will prolong the war, and perhaps
secure his more lasting defeat, but save him in his
own eyes before history; or the second, which

April 17, 1915.

would bring the war to a very rapid conclusion
and leave the Allies immediate and very difficult
tasks of settlement--one thing is certain: before
he is under the necessity of attempting the better
attitude at all, before his peril threatens him wltli
bewilderment or braces him to resistance, he wiU
get some powerful influence t.o bid for peace,
There is a formula going round, more com..
monly accepted among the Nortl1ern than among
the Southern of our enemies, but diffused through-
out their whole body, that may be translated as
follows:
" 'Ve have not been victorious, but we cannof
be defeated."
Treated as a military formula, such a sentence
is simply meaningless. it is as meaningless as that
other phrase dear to many a politician, U Defence,
not defiance." There is no such thing in military,
history or in military fact as the mere defensive,
saw as a prelude to disaster, If you are convinced
that you can never pass from the defensive to the
offensive, then you are convinced tbat you are
beaten,
But though the phrase and the idea are mean-
ingless in a military sense, it is not for nothing
that tbey bave been spwn broadcast throughout the
Germanic body, Tbe harvest to be reaped from
that seed is, the enemy hopes, a " draw."
It is desired that opinion among the Allies,
civilian opinion, should come to regard the whole
thing as a deadlock, and to believe that they have
in front of them an enemy who, while he bas failed
in his attempt at conquest, will never himself be
conquered. It is designed to produce an opinion
which will regard the prolongation of the struggle
as useless for eit.her side and as imperilling the
whole of our ch-ilisation without achieving any
further definite result. If this opinion prevails,
and if, just as onr superiority in number begins to
telL the enemy obtains his inconclusive peace, it
will mean for the future, and perhaps for the im-
mediate future, no further conflict upon the Con-
tinent, but action specially directed against this
country, That is quite sure.

WAR BY WAT E R.
BLOCKADE AND LEGAL ISSUES.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE,-Thll Article has be=n submitted to the Press Bureau. which don Dot obfect to the publlcatioi1 as censored, aDd takes at!
relpoDllbilUy lor the correctness 01 the statements.
T HE submarine" blockade" etill continues to be th!J Now, here at the outset it is necessary to say something
main topic of interest in the naval war. If half to counteract the prevailing impression that the Germans are
the rumours one hears be correct, the blockade (off employing some kind of "wondl'rcrafL" with which the,.
60me of our ports, at any rate) is sufficiently It in etole a march on us. Idea!! of this kind are all right {er the
being" to have acquired the appearance of a lega.l sensational Press, or for wind-bag German na,al exp",r4-
,
.tatus, or something approaching thereunto. like Count von Reventlow. Tho Geìman sùbmarine tT36 and
! If we are going clearly to understand this naval war, others of her kind have been described as remarkably large,
its real meaning, and know how we actually stand, it is of the mysterious ('raítj but, a9 a l'1atter of f:<ct, U36 chances to
.fIrst importance to discard undue froth and verbiago nboul; have been photographf'd by the capbin of one of her victims,
,0' pirates," It paper blockades," and so on, and eo forth, and (unless fahe numbers were
mrloyed) she is to an :ntenb
These thingJ! merely come in t.he zone of thought and senti- and purposes a replica of a11 her predeces
m
, irom t:17
ment: they do not enter practically the realms of solid fact, onwaràd, and an e:xact sister to U25 and latr.r beats.
For the last week or two I have endeavoured to irnpre3s Quite apart from measurements which can be worked
Upon my readers that the submarine is & 'flew arm, and to out {rom the photograph that v:as taken, we l1ave to rem'3ffi-
Indicata how and why on that account it must necessarily her that ever since Germany made a bid for Sea Power hel'
continually rise and {all in imporlance unlil it arrives at its policy has been consistently con<:crvative, consi,tently a C;1!'8
proper level. of going slew. Startling or even considerable in\lo\-ationa
In conwderin" the blockade t.herefore the first tllin a to have imariably been left to ot1wr n:ivies-Gcrmany watcb-

kð into account is not so much' what the
ubmarine is g
i
!l iug and following cautiously and methodically, cnangi:lg hel'
'0 be &t lome future date, which we cannot definite1y deter- designs very slightly and very gra.ùually.
mine, 'but rather what it ia at thi& actual momen
in t.hiB This policy lefL her oohiud in the adoption of t!19 turhin...
lI.Iout.h of April, 1915. the adopl:.ion of the largest possiblo gU!13, the best t.ypes of
10.

THE

SUBMi-\RINE

pril17, 1915.

LAND

AND

ATER.

amall cmisers and dc!-troyers for modern naval ne
ds, and is unlikely to be ignored OWl' the greater issues in\"olved iD
it kept hack her submarine development-that is to say, she the methods of de:jtruction which are employed.
did not h&
ten to adopt the sea-going submarine, and our Here, when we come to examine the subject as ß whole,
E class had been in existence some two years before Germany I think we shall find that the German official statement was
followed with boats of about the S&!lle size (i.e., somewhere careful to say vaguely that it might -not always be possible to
around 800 tons). There was, therefore, never any serious save the crews, or words to that effect--in any case, loopholes
reason to suppose that the six boats of the 1914 pro- were left for possihle future arguments on the lines of
gramnlC, U30 onward, would differ materially from other .. thought this was one of the merchantmen which carries
predecessors. guns for defensive purposes." Further, it will be noted that
As for the fifty or sixty boats laid down on the outbreak it is only in the minority of cases that destruction without
of war, it is as certain as anything can be that they will warning (i.e., piracy) has taken place; in many cases, taking
be exactly replicas of U36, for the simple reason that no circumstances into consideration, a good deal of calculated
Jlation, let alone so methodical a nation as Germany, would courtesy has been shown.
in war time embark on anything in the nature of wholesale 'Ve may, if we choose, attribute this to the circumstance
construction of craft in any way experimental. The risk of that German naval officers able to slaugl1ter non-combatants
failure is obviously all too great to be undertaken. A naval in cold blood are few and far between. An equally probable
war is clearly not the time for experiments on a grand scale. hypothesis is that (this fact being realised) no general order
'Ye may take it, therefore, that Germany is conducting about sinking without warning was ever issued, though one
the blockade with boats of the type that she has produced in or two officers may perhaps privately have been allowed to
the immediate past, and put all stories of super-submarines understand that such actions would not be disapproved of.
oul; of court. This absence of orders in black and white can, of cour!'e,
Now, the German boats are quite good boats--inferior be used to give ß clear field for official disavowals of com-
to ours of eqlwl date, because our Navy has been consistently plexity at any suitable date; the offenders being made scape-
progressive, while the Germans have been content to proceed goats as convenient, or allowed to plead as best they may, the
on more consen-ative lines. As boats, however, these Ger- .. thought she had a gun trained on us" excuse. In support
mans are very good, well designed, and of considerable of this hypothesis is the fact that where a submarine has beeu
radius. That--coupled with some system of supply-has seen after a sinking without warning incident, the circum-
rendered them capable of reaching places and remaining off stance of her number being painted out is generally or always
places which before the war would have been considered noted. This renders it impossible to bring the crime home to
unattainable and impossible. In fine, the Germg,ns ha\'e any particular boat.
demonstrated to their own satisfaction their ability to To the above must be added the further important
Hockade, in so far as appearing to keep just within the letter question of the exact legal status of a merchant ship which
of the law can be pleaded. attempts to ram a submarine; especially when the matter i,
In strict International Law the blockade is, of course, further complicat
d by the fact of rewards having been
not effective, because the area claimed to be blockaded is offered for sucæss III such attempts.
altogether out of proportion to the means available. That International Law is quite clear on the subject of re-
no blockade can be expected to stop all vessels from breaking sistanee. The merchant ship may (we are considering the
in or out has a,lways been accepted; but it has always been legal position only, he it remembered) try to escape, but any
btrictly laid down that for a blockade to be deemed effective act of resistance renders her a legitimate prize, even though
prevention of ingress to or egress from the blockaded ports she be otherwise innocent.
mu
t in the vast majority of cases he effectual. That is a Now, the ram, or u
ing the ship for ramming purposes, is
condition of affairs which most certainly has not obtained. a weapon as old as the Battle of Salamis. To attempt to ram
So far as can be gathered, the practice of German sub- ß submarine is, thereiore, technically, 3S well as actually,
marines is to show themselves eff a port with set purpose- " resistance," and any such action apparently places the mer-
this has the effect of temporarily stopping all ingoings and chant ship in the combatant category-that is to say, legally
outgoings. The submarines then apparently secretly move off entitles the submarine to destroy her without notice! Ai'
elsewhere, leaving it to our patrols to hunt vainly for them. rammings, or attempts to ram, ha\'e undoubtedly taken place,
This is not the invariable rule, but it seems to be a fairly any ordinary police-court lawyer, to say llothing of a special-
common event, and to it even may partly be due the circum- ising international jurist, could make out a quite plausible
stance that our losses only average about one merchallt ship case for every act of "piracy" which has taken place. The
a day. submarine captain has merely to swear that the quarry
Now, if a hostile submarine deliberately shows herself, appeared to be about to attack him or was attempting to
she must be doing so \\ith some definite object in view. The attack.
object would appear to be a vague attempt to comply (or, at So it is, therefore, that though German" piracy" may
any rate, appear to comply) with the letter of International be utterly foreign to the spirit of the law or all ideas of inter-
Law. Under this a blockade is not raised if the blockaders national morality, we are still faced with the fact of some
withdraw for a time on account of #rtS8 of w,atlu.T. It is possible technical legal justification-in German eyes perfect
raised if the blockaders are driven off by the other side or if justification-if properly manipulated.
they t'Dlulltarily u'itlulraw. In this connection the at first sight apparently merely
The voluntary withdrawal of surface ships can he childish and hysterical outburst in the presumably inspired
observed and proved; the voluntary withdrawal of sub- German Press over the destruction of U29 takes on some con-
marines cannot be observed, and is hard to prove; while siderable significance. 'Vithout waiting for any informat:C'
J
II stress of weather" is just sufficiently vague to be capable. on the matter, the Germans romldly &5Sert that U29 was
in the hands of a clever lawyer, of being translated into aU treacherously sunk, decoyed to doom, slaughtered while
kinds of things on the lines of "circumstances alter cases," sa\ing life (this last being presumably due to the fact that
plus the argument that when the hws of blockade conditions Captain Weddingen, of U29, had earned a name for carry-
under which they act are not allowed for. Ì11g out his unpleasant duties with humanity and courtesy).
At any rate, the point is that there do exi!-t obscure issues The outcry is important as further evidence of German
which could be argued about; and it is of very great import- desire to drag in legal issues; in this case to manufacture an
ance to note that the Germans are evidt:ntly making an effort argument of the" Even if our actions ha\"e not been quite
to secure some kind of legal case for thcmselves. If that legal, neither have yours" type.
means anything at aU, it can only mean that they realise Now, from all the above two central facts emerae. Of
. '"
the prospect of having to explain their actions to the world these the first--already alluded to-IS that, for reasons of
at some future date, and this again implies that the possibility lIeI' own, Germany has not ignored legal issnes to anything
of ulimate defeat enters into their l)re5ent calculations, A like the extent that she is supposed to have hy the British
victorious Germany would have no qualms about Inter- public. The second point-one to which I drew attention two
national Law. So much for one phase of the question. or three weeks ag
is that neither psychologically nor finan-

. e now come to the other side of the matter-the cially has the blockade been a German success, N one the
!linking of merchant ships without warning, leaving the crews less, it is being per
isted in. The natural question i<<-'Yhy

t<J dro\\n. l)lausible explanations are fairly plentiful. As simple
Our \ iew of this procedure is clear enough, we regard Itnd plau
ible a one as any, and the most aenerally
it as piracy, and \\anton, murderous piracy at that. But it accepted one, is that it satisfies the German publi; that its
"ill enahle u
to form a clearer conc
ption of the exact expensive N a\'}' is " doing something "-at any rate, in one
situation if v. e endea\'our to \ isuali"e the matter for a direction. 'rhis explanation, however, seems rather far-
moment from the German point of view, always bealing in fetched. German puùlic opinion is mrinly concentrated OD
mind that if-as seems establishcd-a shadow of justification military matters, and military rather than naval men appeal
for the hlocLaJe itself is b
ing sought, sirrilar " justification" to have the chief control of the German Fleet. It is, there:
11*

The dearth of news from this area of operations more or
le
s continues. \Vhether it be due to suspended action or to
the withholding of news till some tangible result can be re-
ported it is idle to speculate too deeply, though the former
may I,e sa,;pected because of the bad weather just now pre-
vailing, Mostly we have to be content with more or less
reliable stories of a large French expeditiollary force and the D. C. T. (London, N,W.),-If a submarine has been
Pl'csumption of considerable military operations in the eady rhmmed or fired at and oil is subsequently seen on the water,
future. the assumption is that she has been disposed of, but this
Mine-sweeping i., proceeding, but large-scale bombard- assumption is not necessarily invariably correct.
ments are no longer reported, and we may take it that any HIBERNICUS,-(l) Your scheme is not novel. (2) You
attempt to emulate what Sir John Duckworth did by rushing may take it th:l.l. the Admiralty knows what it is doing, and
in the past is now definitely abandoned, if, indeed, it were there is no reason to believe that the apparent waste of time
ever contemplated, Forts-owing to their extraordinary re- is anything more than apparent.
cuperative power-have, as the more thoughtful generally E. N. B. (Lendon, N,E.).-Arming merchantmen
anticipated, proved themselves a match for ships, despite the against privateers was a common practice in the old days. To
advances of modern gunnery. be frank, I do not think that it would answer to-day against
There is some reason, ho\\ever, to hope that the Tuddsh German submarines, except fer the first time or two. The
mDra!t' has suffered somewhat during the last month; so that best safety for merchantmen is for Beveral to travel in
a gradual wearing-down of resistance may be anticipated, company, and even if one is submarined the odds are even
This, perhaps, is evidenced most by the curious preceedings that one of the survivors will ram the submarine. See, how.
of the Goeben. She ha3 been patched up in some way, and ever, the legal point alluded to in the text.
was sent into the Black Sea recently-presumably as a species IGKORAMus.-(l) It is practically impossible for either
of bogey ral;her than aughl; else. At any rate, on meeting side to lay a minefield without, the other Bide coming to know
Bome of the Russian Black Sea Fleet-which theoretically she of its location tolerably quickly. The chances of trapping a
should have been able to destroy in detail-she turned tail German submarine into a minefield are consequently small.
and ran for iI;, being under fire for some hours without doinG (2) The same answer applies; the sea is too big a place for
or receiving (apparently) any particular damage.
'he pr
- any entire closure to be possible. (3) It is not advi.9able to
Bumption is that owing to injuries previously received her answer this question. (4) The first two answers explain why
Bpeed has considiJrably deteriorated-for she seems to have the idea, though ingenious, is somewhat outside the zone of
been only just able to get away. The Russian guns were practicability.
probably outranged. The bad shooting of the Goeben may be L.\NDLUBBJ:R (Cork).-Unfortunately, German BUb-
attrihuted in part to damaged turrets, in part to deteriorated marines possess an intelligence which is not shared with the
mDrale. whale I Everything else which you suggest has been tried
How far her crew are Tur1:i
h and how far German is Bince the war began, bul; the results achieved have been very
not known, but it is fairly apparent that this flhip is incapable slight.
of securing for Turkey the command of the Black Sea. C. ],I, (Dulverton) ,-I trust you will forgive my disagree-
It rcmaill3 to be seen how far tho Russians will use their ing with you, but I am afraid that the only chance of &
command of the sea. Their reported exploit of havin'" pene- merclJant ship against a submarine is being able to ram her..
tratcd mine fields in order to engage forts at close ran
e doe3 You may taka it for certain that if fired at, a hostile sub-
12*

AND

AND

fore. nol; v;,;ry probable that these soldiers would go out of
th
ir way to continuo or dem:llld na'..al operations which
-bt'ing devoid of military signific3nce in t.he way of assets-
would merdy be a sert of free advertiæment of the existence
of t.be German Navy.
Similarly we can discard as rather improbable the theory
of the German Fleel; dri\Tcn desperate and prepared to
re.,ort to any and every expedi.:nt. There are no indications
that the German Fleet is yet so driven; while experience has
now taught us that several seemingly (from the war stand-
point..) purposeless movements had really considerable method
in their apparent madness. And so we shall not go far wrong
if we suspect that the apparently futile submarine blockade,
with its curions occasional strhing:! to observe some kind of
technical legality, is devised with some ulterior object in view.
Place this alongside the fifty or sixty odd new sub-
marines w!Ji...b. are now nearing completion, and it needs no
gl'eat stretch of imagination to see in the submarine blockade
something of the nature of a feint intended to cover a future
great and concerted submarine attack on our warships.
At any rate, this is by far the safest hypothesis t-o adopt:
thß tendency to regard the German Fleet as a more or less
negligible factor, which prevails in so Plany quarters, being a
very dangerous one. The battle fleet is intact and has been
aùded to since war was declared. It is too much to hope that
the big battIe cruisers are damaged ùeyond repair; there are
certainly as many new destroyers added as those which have
been losl;, while submarines are on the verge of being very
cOllsiderably increased numerically. Ouly in light cruisers
is there any deficiency that matters.
This deficiency has its serious side, for the German Fleet
is to tLat extent deprived of "eye;;. OJ But since all the
indications are that the intention is to rely upon the sub-
marine as the capilal arm, the lack of light cruisers should
not be built on too much. Substantially the German :Fleet
remains " in being" just 2S much as it was six months ago.
By all the lessons of history its mora/I', from confinement to
harbour, should have deteriorate
; but here again we will
be wiser to assume too little rathcr than too much. The
German Navy, manned mainly from an inland population, JS
not and never has been permeated with " sea sense." In the
past the confinement to harbour of a shut-in squadron gener-
ally worked Oùt at a deterioration of " sea sense. JJ The nou-
exi
tent, however, cannot be liable to deterioration.

D.\RD.-\.NELLES AND BLACK SEA.

W ATE R.

April 17, 1915.

not impress one as having been either useful or particularly
reasonable, For the rest, without a land force in co-operation
it is clear that the ships alone cannot accomplIsh anything
against even merely moderate resÍJitance in the Bosphoru5.

ere, then, 'matters as regards Constantinople may
remam for sOUJe considerable while--possibly till as in the
Crimean \Var and iJ] the American Civil \V ar, 'vessels are
extem'porised capable of dealin", with the particular situation
involved. In both thcse campaigns forts were dealt with
by towing, or slowly propelling, what were virtuaily heavily-
protected floating forts into clDse proÚmity with the worb
to be destroyed,

THE

HIGH

SEAS

GE
ERALL y,

. The armed German liner Eittl Frit'drich is now definitely
mterned at Newport News, U,8,A., where the solitary
remaining corsair, Kronpr'inz TITilhdm, has since put in-her
Bupplies ha\ing been cut eli, TIere she, too, will pl'Obably be
interncd, as once having been located she has little or no
cha
ce of leaving harbour without encountering a British
crUIser.
So ends ingloriously tbe great Commeræ War from which
Germany at one time hoped so much. Though immature, to
the extent that the number of ships participating was less
than had been hoped, il; was conducted with a skill, thorough-
ness, and forethought beyond repro::ch. Supply ships were
everywhere, and the means of conveying information were
remarkable. Hetiring to unknown bases was brought to ..
fine art. But out of it aU only about sixty merchant ships
were accounted for, at a cost which one way and another must
have equalled the damage done, Mahan's dictum as to the
folly of commerce warfare has been fully borne out.
In concluding remarks on this phase of the war, a passing
reference may be made to the statement that the Eitel Fried-
rich had run out of 8,2 ammunition, and interned hersell
because this was unprocurable in America. So large a gun
sounds very improbable for a merchant ship, but it Í8 worth
recording. that before the war there were plenty of circam-
stantial statements as to German liners being fitted to mount
such gun
. How and in what way the Eitel Priu7ric/r used
up her he
vy ammunition has not transpired. So far as is
known, she sank very few merchant ships, and that cannot
have consumed much in the way of projectiles, even suppos-
ing them to have been used, Probably British naval activi-
ties prevent-eJ her from ever obtaining her necessary supplies
of ammunition. The mounting of 8,2's would suggest an
intention to render armed liners capable of decisive action
not only against British armed liners }-,)I
.uso atrainst small
13ritish cruiser!!.

ANSWEHS TO CORRESPONDENTS.

:April 17, 1915.

LAND

ASD

marine would instantly submerge and torpedo without
further notice-probably "ithout being 8een, and in doing
10 she would be quite within her legal rights. I am endeavour-
ing to deal with this very complicated question in the text.
but you must understand that to a great extent we are faced
with the unknown, and consequently, though suitable anti-
dotes will eventually be evolved, they can only be arrived
at; by trial and error.
0, M, (Cheltenham)'.-A submarine attacking a
merchant s1llp would fire the torpedo at the ship's broadside,
and EO tho bow defence would be of no avail.
E. M. B. (JIove).-{l) The idea that German eub-
marines are superior to ours is entirely incorrect. The latest
German boats are very good, but so al:;o are our lat.est boats.
The rest of your question about submar
nes was dealt with
in last week's article, which appeareJ a day or two after your
letter was received. (2) This question is beUer not answered.
You may take it that our Gørrison AItillery know what they
are doing.
H. E. C. (Baling)".-The " decoy duck" is an idea which
in some form or other is as old as naval warfare itself.
J. R. B. {Nanchester).-Your invention, or what is
mbstantially the same thing, was anticipated by David
Bushnell in America in the year 1773.
C. P. S. (Bath).-The scheme you suggest has been in
use ever since. the war began.
J, W. M. (Earlscolne).-See answers to " H. E. C." and
,. C. P. S."
T. B. (Bizerta).-There is nothing novel in the sugges-
tion of your FreI'ch friend.
M.
. O. (London, S,E.).-(l) Whether or not it i,
wiser for a merchant ship to go for a submarine or to attempt
to evade her by a zig-zag course must dept:.nd upon a variety

'5\
ATE R.

of drcumstances and the judgment of the Cal)tain of thð
merchant
hip. It is impossible for anyone to lay down a
general rule to be followed in all circumstances. (2) An
elephant gUll against a submarine would be little more effec-
tive than a pea-shooter.
E. S. (Frome).-See first sentence of reply to "Land.
lubber JJ above.
C. T. (London, VlT,).-You may depend upon it that
the Admiralty is fully alive to the submarine men
.3, The
arming of merchant ships is a moot point to some extent, for
rer.sons that are dealt with in the text. Ail through this war
the situation has been more serious than the public elects to
believe.
A. H. A. (Schatzalp-Davos. Switzerland).-(l) It is
not to the public interest to make any slatement whatever as
to new warships that the .Admiralty may have in hand. (2)
A similar answer applies. The enemy is equally curious on
the same subject. (3) I think you may safely put the alleged
German apparatus for enabliug submarines to look about
them Huder the water in the same category as the inventions
of the late Baron Munchauscn. The German sLory is not even
original, as some years ago an Italian inventor floalej, or
attempted to float, 8 comlJany with a submarine which was
to cruise at great depths and discover hidden treasure with
a powerful searchlight, But even he did not go to the length
of claiming to see tl>rough a brick wall, w1llch is about what
the German claim amount.s to.
I. S. A. (London, E.C.),-You wiI1 see that I have
endeavoured to deal with the legal poser v;hich you raise in
the text of this Í8sue.
IKQlJIRER.-YoU are mistaken. The Guman shooting at
the Falklaud Island action was, in tLe circumstauces, un-
commonly good.

INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.-IV.
THE AERIAL DILEMMA.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

!TH few exception!!, arising from very special
circumstances, vidory for a na,-al country has
always been the result of the assistance given by
her llavy to her land foræs. A navy has, by
itself, hardly ever won a campaign; but, on
'he other hand. many a war would not have been a victorious
one to a naval country had it not been for the influence and
pressure of her sea-power. History, therefore, emphasises
Ul., value of co-operation between the army and Lhe navy
of a country. Thís is not, however, its only lesson. A clos'Jr
examination of the contributions of armies and of navies ci
the past to final victories shows thRt, besides the co-operation
of tho two Services, there must also be the individual inde-
pðDdence of each.
Tbese teachiugs of history are very valuable a:J a guide
in the development of air pewer, whose influence upon the
destinies of nations is now at its dawn. But for the fact that
there is associated with air fleets a distinctive military feature
which is not a characteristic of naval forces, it would be
possible to adapt, bodily, all the teachings of the 11Ïstory of
navies to the rising air power-a power whiC'h can alreaùy
exercise a direct, ag well as l1U indirect, influence on the
de"tinies of nations. 'l'here ii', therefore, a paralle1i
m
between air and sea power. Rllt., uulike llavie'l, air fleets can
remain in continuous touch with any opel.ating army, and,
before many years arc over, they win, no dou bt. be in a similar
po:!ition as regards high Sfa fleets, 'This capahility of air
fleets, ",hich can he, and, to a cl'rtai.n drgrec
lrcady has bepn,
made of gr
a.L military value to both armic!\ and navif's, i
the
reMOn why the entire teac
ings of naval hi,[ol")' cannot b

grafted on to the growing air power. \';hercas a nay,}' always
exercises its inJ1uem,e, ,..hether direct or indil'ect. by the
power wh.i<:h it pOS3e3Se'l as a
erarate and ind"pendent
Servioo, an air fleet cannot give the best possible as:;istance to
the force with w1idl it is operating if it be indep
ndent of
that force. The iudirect infh
cn('e of s
a power demands co-
operation, w1llht the indirect influence of air power necessi-
tates co-ordination, and. to a cerlain degree, 5ubordination.
The soundness of tms asserLion win be fully grasped by
considcring some examples of the respective indirect in1luence
of Ilea and of air power.
\%en a na..y ernploy
a part of its org?nisation for the
k&D
t of troops. or of amnlUniLion, or of supplies to any

desired place, or ",hen it uses iLs iufluence to permit of such
transport, being made by merchant '-es
eb, it exercises its force
only in an indirect manner. TLe sea power is then u;:ed to
assist the land forces, and the navy simply co-operat.es wilh the
army. 'Vhen the army has received a sufficient supply of men,
arms, ammunition, and supplies, it calTies on the war on land
according to its own plans and independently of the navy. It is
true that it may be required of the navy to see that U'e expedi-
tionary force is continuously supplied with aU itß nec(';:sarÌes,
This, however, does not alter the re1atiye position of the army
and of the na,"y. It only makes their co-operation a con-
tinuous one for a specific purpose, and there is no need, on
that account, to place tbe navy under the authority of the
Commander of the expeditiouary forces. In fllct, such a sub-
ordination would be inadyisablp, and the necessary arrange-
ments for an efficient co-operation between the army and the
navy are, in consequence, entirely left to the authorities in
office.
An air Beet, on the other hand, can produce an important
indirect influence on1y if its work is co-ordiuat-ed with that of
the force with which it, is co,operating, aud iî that co'ordina-
tion is made on the spot a8 and when circumstances demaud.
Tlùs is due to the nature of the assi
tance "..hiC'h aircraft can
render to a land or to a sea force. It is ob,iou!', for ill
taIlCf',
that it must rest with the commander of a force whether, on a
p:trlicular day, or ill particular circumstances, he \\ ot:ld use
his aircraft for reconnaissatJre in conjUJ1C't.ion with the cavalry
or for t]le purpose of assisting the arliilery, or for any other
suitable work. \\-'hen an air squadron is co-operating wÍlh
cavalry, lhe assi.òtance which it can reTider to that fo)'C'e is, of
course. of a difIereut nature t..o that which it can gi, e by co-
operating with another arm, tbe artillery, for instance.
Neither does it foUo" that, both as regncds machilles and
11trSOllnFl, the air squadron be
t sui led for co-operating with
the cavalry i'l also the best one to be employed for as
i
ling the
artillery; but neither of DIem may be the best for dealiIJO'
wit.h hostile air squadrons trying to prevent such co-operatio:'

l'hat certain air-squadrons are epeci41ly suited to p"rform
('ertain duties ia a feature which, to fome degree, i>> also to be
found in the navy. Hut there is this difference between the
co-operaticn of sea and air power "ith the land force, that
wllereas the former, from the uatl1re of ita work, as
exornplifl((1 above, always exerci!'es its influence, howeveJ:
n*

LAND

:AND

Indirect, as a Savic
, the latter must, for the maximum
efficiency, be used as an Arm. Considered as such, an air
fleet must, therefore, be subordinated to the commander of
the force with which it is operating, whether it be a land or
a sea fcrce. An aerial squadron may be a cavalry arm, or an
artillery arm, or a naval arm. In days to come both navies
and armies will, no doubt, be provided with air squadrons,
specially equipped and manned, for these three, and very
likely for other purposes. A study, therefore--even such an
incomplet.e one as is being made in these Notes on
the I!Jfluence of Air Power-shows that, in order
to derive the fullest advantage of the indirect influence
of air power, it is neæssary to subordinate the work
of air fleets to that of the various arms they may be employed
to assi3t. But, in the present war, on account of the fact
that the aerial arm is being seriously employed for the first
time, it has not been found possible to give the amount of
co-ordination and subordination which is necessary for maxi-
mum effici:mcy. The present campaign has witnessed an im-
provised utilisation of the new arm, and in that improvisa-
tion Great Britain has shown adaptability to such an extent
that !'he has acquired, over her opponents, an ascendancy of
the greatest value.
Such direct influence of air power, however, as would re-
mIt from aerial attacks, aerial bombardments, and other
offensive operations can only be obtained by the organisation
of aerial forces as a Sat:ice, with the same liberty for inti/)-
pendent action as is enjoyed to-day by navies.
'fhe primal difference that exists between naval and aerial
power i
the following: A navy exercises its maximum direct,
as well as its maximum indirect, influence by being an
independent Serviæ, whereas an aerial force exercises its
greatest indirect influence by being considered as a supple-

YV ATE R,

April 17, 1915,

mentary arm, and 'Would exercise its maximum dired
influence were it, like the Army and the Navy, an inde-
pendent Service.
Previous to this war the lack of knowledge and experi-
ence with regard to the military capability of aircraft led to
a very crude system of dividing service aeronautics into (i,)
military and (ii.) naval aeronautics. Now, experience in the
employment of aircraft in actual warfare demands the more
scientific and truer division of: (i.) Service, (ii.) Arm. This
latter would itself be subdivided into (a) the military aerial
arm and (b) the naval aerial arm. The present organisation
of aerial forces does not permit the fullest advantage being
t.aken of the direct as well as of the indirect influence of air
power, because an aerial force is, at present, a hybrid which
has to perform both the duties of an arm and those of a
Service. In consequence there arises an aerial dilemma of
great intered, to which attention has already been drawn in
the previous article on the Influence of Air Power. This
dilemma is the following: Shall a commander look upon hi,
air fleet as a urâce and employ it to exert direct influence,
in which case he would hava to forgo the advantages
resulting from the co-ordination of his aircraft with the
other arms, or shall he employ his aerial force as an arm to
exert the indirect influence of air power, in which case he
would have to renounce the possible effect of the direct in-
fluence of air powed No solution has yet been offered to this
aerial dilemma now facing commanders, who have had, there-
fore, to content themselves with a compromise, the result of
this compromise being that the only effort to use the direct
influence of air power has been the carrying out of a number
of timid raids. But to this dilemma, as far as it concerns
Great Britain, the writer hopes to be able to offer a solution
in his next article.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. IIILi\IRE BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Pre&tmt............,Town Hall............. Wednesday,..... 28 April, 3 &: 8.
RlackpooL,.......Winter G.mJen
...... 'Ihurs
ay........ 291\pril, 3.30 [( a.
J,i
crpooL........I'h.ilharmonic Hall... Friday............ 30 ,April, 8,30.
Liverpool..........Philharmonic Hall.. &.turd.'ly.,....... 1 May, 3.
London.............Queen." Hal!..,....... Wednesday,..... 5 May, 8,30.
GUN EMPLACEMENTS, MR. FRED T. JANE ON TIlE N\.VAL WAR.
To lhe Edilor of LA::!;D AND W ATEB. Sbeffield........... Victoria HalL....... Friday............ 16 Apnl, 8,
S I h d h tI th b d'ffi iIarrogate,........ KUfS38L,...,.......... Saturday......... 17 April, 3,30.
IR,- ave rea somew ere lat ere roay e a 1 - Blackpool..........Winter Gardem...... Mû
da1....,......19 April, 8.
cuIty in providing emplacements for guns as our troops Liverpool......... Philharmonic Hall.. Tue
day.....,..., 20 April, 8.
advance, owing to the time it takes for ordinary concrete to Southport....,_...Cambr:dge HalL,.., WedncsJay...... 21 Apr}l, B,
set or become solid, Bo.xton..,.._...... pPera House.......... 'lhUl;;i.W,.....,..2:2 April, 3.
A quick-settin g cement i9 P robabl y known to t118 M:ancheøte1'........Free Trade nall...., Friday..:........, 23 April, 8.
. Scarborough,..... Üpel'a House,.......... &turoay.........24 April, Õ,
authonties, but in case it is not, I would inform you that suc11
a æment exists in a mixture of maana.site and magnesium MR. CRA WFURD PRICB ON II SERBIA."
chloride. co Southport...__"C-ambrid
HaIl...... Friday....,....... 16 Aprn, 8.
I have never used this cement to make a concrete , but Torquay............Pavilion,........__ Wedneøday..
.. 21 Apri1, 3-
1. Weymonth........ Barden RooInJ!l.._ 'l'huraday........ 22 Apri1, 8.
,..ave csed it as a quick-setting mortar. I may say thall n"'urnemouth.... Winter Gardens._ Friday............ 23 April, ?i &: a.
14'

ANTI SlJHMARINll TACTICS,
To the Editor of LA.YD A
D WATER.
SIR,-My letter, which you published a few weeks ago,
has resulted in an interesting discussion on the subject of anti-
su bmarine taelics. Your two correspondents have described
the types of submarine chasers which they recommend, and,
from their technical knowledge, as naval architects, their
views on the various points at issue are evidently
valuable. There is, however, one important point which
I raised in my letter, which neither .. J. R. " nor
.. J. D. C." has referred t
viz" the desirability
of attacking the submarine by the method of ramming.
Both your correspondents, apparently, rely for their
offensive entirely on the gun and the torpedo. .Either
of these weapons would doubtless be effective against a sub-
marine on the surface, but I fail to see how thev could be
used with advantage against a submerged subm
rine, the
periscope only being visible above the surface of the water. I
presume that the only objection to endowing a submarine
chaser with ramming power is that she would have to be more
strongly constructed, and that consequently she would have
less speed for a given length of water-line-in other words,
she must be a longer and larger boat for a given rate of
speed.
All these point!!, howevPr, must clearly be left in the
hands of the Admiralty, who, of conrse, will consult com-
manders of our own submarines and commanders of those
destroyers who have had opportunities of attacking the
enemy's
ubmarines. \Vhat we want is that the AdmiraJty
should build as quickly as possible, and if they are uncertain
as to the best type of boat, that they should build a few boat

of different types. For instance, they might build a few
boats designed to ram, with a speed of 20 to 24 knots, and a
few other
of lighter construction with a speed of 28 to
30 knots.-Yours failhfully,

DCSU:.\TU.

within twelve hours this mortar becomes as hard all, ordinary
Portland cement mortar does in three or four days.
I do not ask for any acknowledgment of this in your
columns, but in case any further information is desired on
this subject I am willing to give it.-Yours faithfully,
FR.
NCIS DRAKE.
:Mining and Metallurgical Club, London 'Vall Buildings,
London Wall, London, E.C.

WAR LECTURES.

MaJ1Y add:tional inquiries with regard to the I
,\YD \ND WU'Ka
lecture I3Cheme ha
been received by Queen Alexandra's Field Foroe
Fund M a reeult of our recent article. Arran:;ementß are
ing mad.
for kctures well into May, and there is still ample time to fix up datu
befon
the season is over for indoor meetings.
Both as a means of patriotic propaganda. and as practical aid to the
fund that supplies, on propell
' or:;anised IÍ1Ies, tho comfúrts 80 Drl;en.tly
Deeded by our soldieril in France, the scheme has proved a gratifymg
IiUCCe.
S.
Cler!!Ymen members of politic.a.l bodies, and public men genecal1y
ATe earn;tJv i
vit<-d to write for pal"t,icuw.rs and texts of t,he led,ureø t

the bon. sè<:retarv, Queen Alexandra'a Field :Foroo Fund, 24A, Hill
S!.rÐCt., Ku.i
htsbrid&e, London, S.W.

SMALL FIRMS.

We have received a letter from a firm of aeronautical engin
n
wbo would like to get in touch with some of the emall fil'IIU whose plant
at the pre.;;enl time is idle. If the principals of lhcae firm
will kindly
communicate with the Editor of LAND ANI' WATER he will put them
in communication with the corre"pondent. Envelopes &bould be marked
.. Small Ifirnu. JJ

April 17, 1915.

tAND

AND

A TEn.

OUR

AMBULANCE

APPEAL.

By ATHERTON

A s we l?0 to ,press Ule total amount of su?scr:ptions
receIved IS l:621 115. 3d" a figure wInch 15 very
satisfactory indeed. An order has been placed
for a chassis, to cost l:430, and it is estimated
that the cost of the body-which is being built to
the design of Mr. Amos, the consulting engineer to the Hector
Munro Ambulance Corps-will be about E60. :Mr. Amos is
intimately acquainted with the many and varied requirements
of a thoroughly efficient motor-ambulance, and many fittings
will be added which Dr. Munro's experience at the front
has shown to be neæssary. A great deal of trouble
has been experienced in procuring a chassis for almo'<t
immediate delivery, but we have been fortunate in obtaining
the co-operation of the Napier Co., who are doing their best
to obtain an exemption order from the "Tar Office, and may
be able to deliver in about a fortnight or three weeks. In the
meantime, the body is being built, and, under favourable
circumstances, the complete ambulance ought to be handed
over to Dr. Munro within one month.
One of the most interestinø letters I haT"e rec.eived in con-
nection with the fund is repri':.ted hereunder, and I wi"h to
assure the writer that his subscription is none the le"s welcome
because of its size, and that it is sincerely hoped that when our
ambulance goes on active service, it will help in some little
way to alleviate the sufferings of many of the bra\ e Belgian

:C
},Jr. Frank Ga.;kell ..........'..........._. 100
111'. \V. Dell ...............'..... ......... 25
Mrs, J. 31. Hichal'd!!On .... 20
},!r3. GC6'>agE'S .......'............,......... 20
Mr. G. B. Richardson ...................'. 10
Mrs. G. Ronald ,..........,........,....,.. 10
}.JiM Cox ..................."..........' 10
Mr. Wm. W. l\I, Parkin :!IIcore,..... 10
Mr. E. l\I. Qæn .........................,. n

"lbOnvmeus .......,.......................... 5
Mrs. .S. D. A. RJuquctte",............ 5
Miss E, )1. R
rie....,.. .. .. 5
111'. F. V. Philip ...............'..........' 5
Commander R. G. Fan
, R.N.,.......,)
" e. I
,
Iacle
n, R.
..... ,
., H. A. G!os!!Op, R.
'''''' J - 5
U.-Comm:md
r L. G, D. Way, R.
.
I.ieut. !tJart:n, R.N,V.R.......,..........
'j'be Countess of Radnor. ................ 5 5 0
Co!on
l Chas. McInroy' .................. 5 5 0
Mr3. J. P. )Iorgan,............... 5 0 0
Mr. Alfred Steele Perkiru!......,......, 5 0 0
Mr. W. Wi!s8n Greg.......... 5 0 0
Mr. H. S, Hall..,.............,............. 5 0 0
}of!,,,. A, Mounbin .......,..,............. 5 0 0
!>lr.. W. Richardson .....,............'.. 5 0 0
:r.tÜls E. J, Wallace ..,..,.... 5 0 0
}.frs. L, W. Hellyer.............. 5 0 0
('<II. C. F, Pollock ..................,.... 5 0 0
Mr. S. n" Ceols
n ........,......,........ 5 0 0
J.ord Ki!maine ..............,............... 5 0 0
Capt. W. HigBon,
1.F,H................ 5 0 0
1\Irs. H. De\an ........,.............,......, 5 0 0
Capt, Gen. W. Tay!er,...., 5 0 0
Mr. D, Watson.........., .. ............ 5 0 0
AnClnmous ................................. 5 0 0
Mr. C. W, B!('XJ!oOm,........,.............. 5 0 0
Capt. G. W. Liddell, D.S,O. } 5 0 0
Mrs. Ethel Liddell ............ ....'....
\-lillS Helen M. Atkinson ............... 5 0 0
1>lrs. G. Singer .......,......'..'............ 5 0 0
Mrs. A. Gn"sgpe1ius ..............,...... 3 3 0
Mr. G. E. G. Bowen ..................... 3 0 0
Mr3. Bov.man ..................'........... 3 0 0
Mr. W. W. Kettle
e!l ....... 3 0 0
:MrL M. .T, De Lottilliere.... .. 3 0 0
Mrs. E. F. makeney ............ ... 2 2 0
Mr. n. H. BagnalL......,......,........ 2 2 0
),f:-. ß. Arthur Steward..............,... 2 2 0
!ofr, W. H, l\racLeod ..................... 2 2 0
(apt. A. H. )Iaæn,....................... 2 2 0
Mrs. Alexi3 Doxal ...............,........ 2 2 0
.. A R"ader" ........,..,...........,...... 2 2 0
Mr, and Mr3. T, H. Valentine..,...... 2 2 0
1újor B. Ed
ard 1"reamc,........,..... 2 2 0

FLE
/IING.

f'oldiery, IInd then the purpose of our fund has been
achie\ed.

16, Buckingham Palace Gardens,
London, 'V"

Iarch 30, 1915.
SIR,-1 learnt with much pleasure that your e
timable
magazin
has opened a subscription to provide the Belgian
Army with a n(Jw ambulance car. I am glad to send you my
emall offering, knowing eo well what it means to be without
sufficient help for the wounded, since I was myself lying a
whole clay helpless on the battlefield. Notwithstanding their
llerois::n and devotion, the stretcher-bearers-who had to carrv
the wounded right back to the ambulance train-were forced
to leave hundreds of them expose::! to the cross-fires of friend
2nd foe. This ii! the most terrible experience that a soIdir can
be called upon to suffer, the Dnly remedy for which is a well-
equipped service of motor-ambulances.
I am sure that all Belgian soldiers will feel deeply grate-
ful to you for your great kindness in opening this
ubscriptioll
list.-I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
G. VAN VeFFEL,
Sergent,Reformé du 2e de Ligne Relg6.
P.S.-I hope you will be able to read this bad]y,written
lett.er. but, since I have lost the use of my right hand, I lia\ e
to write wiLh my left one.

LIST

OF

SUBSCRIPTIONS.

s. d.
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
o 0
5 0
5 0
5 0
5 0

Irs, Dunn Patt;sDn .............,..'....
!llis.
A. )1. \, hidooTl1o
!lh'ö;. (;..rtmde :.lcGroben ..'....'
!\IIS, E. ,I. Puci\al ...'..........,......
:\I.1
. H. J. Hoare '.......................
Anon\mous ... ......,..,.........
'lr. :Ïnd
1r3. Cheese .................,...
Capt. :Bligh .............,...

li<5 Y!O'f't Donne .........,....
)11'. E. "'ilson .....................,..,.....
:'11'. G. and 'Ii
s L. Shelden .......,.

frs, ,0\, )1. Xeild,....__.., .....__.....___
)li63 'I, Z, Hollish ,..
I":r Malbv ('whon. ...,....................
I,. 8. anl E. G. Foote.............,.......
)11'9. \Y, H. WatsOJDB ...........,..,......
"u. \\,.., ..'.................................
!.lrs, Gillcl!p:e ..............,.....' '...,.
:\Irs. T. B.
eI8:10 .................,..,...
Capt. Da"!!On ...,................,.......,.
\[rs. Parkins .............,...................
Mr, J. R GUII'1ing Moore.......,..,.....
Mr. .0\, E. !>[pllprsh .......
rl
)

,

rd:

} ..,.......,.............
!\Irs.
. Dugard
Lt.-Com. H. FeiliEn
. R.
....,....,...
\11'. ChaÙ's A. Kn:ght...........,......
?tIn, E. dl' P.i.Jdpr.........,..............
!\!r3. A. Dou,:la
FarmE'r..,.,..........
!\fr. L
ollard 'Hall ........................
;\11'. E. )L Wells ...,.......................
('ilnon "ils
n, D,P. (\yorcesteT......
Mr, E, L,
:mon '.... ....... ,..,.........
"A. ,-.'J ...................................._
)11'. :m

lril. Hugh G. Cunning..
!\Iiss Pmt .'.........................,.... '..
!Ill'. .T. !'m:th .....................'...,....

[r. W, H. l'erranù
l\[r. ,y, D. Sales ...........................
1\11'. Geoffre\ C. Cobb.....................
!\[j..s II, X. .'Ia,k...........................
1111', R. 13, Durnab".,.............,....,....
!Ill', Hcrbl'rt A. D
gard..,......,........
lIfr, H. \Yade Deacon...................,.
!Ill', John G. Philpot ......
)Ir
. Home R;gg ..............
)11'. H, E. F. Robuts..........
Mr
. H.."kin3 ..................,.....
:\11'. D. I,. Clarke ....'......................
)liss Julia CrOl;sTcy ...'............,..,..,.
!\fl'. W, J. Hud.9on ....... ..............
'l;ss Landon 'I11Omas ..................,..
Mr. .TuEan G, I.onsacla ..................
The Ro-, F. G. Suìli.,::.n..................

5 0

15 Jt

Ð a. d.
220
220
220
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
2 0 0
200
200
200
200
200
2 Û 0
200
200
200
200
200
160

'II', S Godfn'\ B:rd.....................
!'Ills. Hl'nham ...............................
:\11', Lienel f), S,,:ft,..............., ...,
':\frs. G. }'onl Hutehimum }

Ii:;;:s Fergut300n ............... ..........u
)11'. Geo. T. Hpnderson,.................
)[rs. ,,"', Philip ..............................
rrai1k I'enro.se. &q" !ll.D.............
)1,33 Christine \\}-,\te........,...........
)11'. H. Parker....,
..........,.............

ES3
Iarv ButlEr .....,.............,...
!Ill', and
hs, ('\aooe Bal'hm......
The HOIl, H, Parker .,..'....'...........
!'Ill', Jf1<), P. Fox ...'......................
)Irs. II, Pilkington .........,......
!lfr. F, .T, Dyson ........,.......
!lJr. T, W, þ'letche1'.............
Mrs. Tapply ..........................,......

Ir. (', II. Tapp!y .......,................
'\Ir
. Hotson .................,........,......
Tllrs. M. .0\., Robinson ,....................
'[1'. and :\Irs, W. K. g, K:ng..,.
)11'. C. \Y. Dixon,......, ........ ......
!\Ir, G. lI, Pilkington...........,.........
'\[1'. P. '''" Payne ................,....,..
l\Ii
3 Rose ................,........,..........
1111'. R. Guest ..........................,...
1 2 0 !lIra. E, A, El'uttoll ..............,..,..
1 1 0 1-11'. G, V. Pound .............
1 1 0 JIf'S3 RlJss
ll ............................,
1 1 0 \11'. Arthur Bdfield..,..,.....,.......
1 1 0 !Ill'. H, J. E. flurrell................
1 1 0
[r. E. Harold Wood ,..,
1 1 0 Mrs. G:lbel't
tra{:ey ..........
1 1 0 Anon
mous .. m....., '".. ...........
1 1 0 Mrs. Land., ....,.............,.........,
1 1 0 MI'S. Walt<:>n Cohen........................
1 1 0 IL-('ol. H. Lowth
r ...'..,.......,....,.
1 1 0 !'Iladame Le BoulJ de Xaus............
1 1 0 Mr. F. H. Anson .......,................
1 1 0 Mrs. R. C. Atkins'Jn .....................
1 1 0 Dr. and l\1J'S. de :\Iolìtmorenc\ '......,.
1 1 0 lIIi.o;
Chamh
rI;n ................
..........
1 1 0 .. C. B. \V." .......,...,.....................
1 1 0 Anemmous .... ....'.........
1 1 0 Mr. n. A, ('.o:'
"11S .................
1 1 0 !'IIiR3 E. CalJllE:1l ...,
1 1 0 "R. B." .. .....................
1 1 0 Anon,mous .......'..................... .
1 1 0 Miss .E, JI, O"
n ..............,.....:::.
1 1 0 !\Ii!S FIla Erov.n .........,.....,...........
1 10MI'. Jnlm H, !\IerrÍ\-ale ..,...............
1 1 0 I.t, '('om. and !\JIS, Hf.J-ver ............
1 1 0 liliES E. and )Ii
F. ll;u;k ............
1 1 0 Anonymnn:
(I.r..ds) .. ....'...........
1 1 0 Ml'3. R. E. FO!lter,..,..........,.........

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100
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109

)Ir,
<\Ured ß, Ben ........................

[r, J. Platt" ..............................
"A. G, S," (Tun bridge Wells)..,...
I1Ir. Alfred James .........,..............
!\Ir. J"hn Hargrea\-ea ..................
Mra, J(,hn Wisdom ........................
1\[1'. John Wiikins"l1 ..........,..........
1\[1'. ,Yo F, l
rank ..,.....................
Miss Thorr.ehv .........................._,..
Mrs. KaipuitÌl ..............................
!lIr, Ernest JI, Browne ...........
1\[1', J, l\I, G:ieg .........'.................
Mrs. O. C. Marston .....................
::\Ir, Hone\' ...... ..,..........................
1\[1'. A, C'. Tr
nch ........,...............
Mr. John \\'. Denham ..................
]\[1', J, :\L Tankard ....'.......'.......,...
1\1 iss ;\ [ur'l'r ............,............,.......
lIIiss p, Jull ..................,..,...........
1,t.,Col. W. W, Rùthl'ram, R.E.......
"2 Constaut Rcad
u" ...............
Sir Clifford Alllmtt ........................
IIIrs. Duncan ........,......,...,..,..,..,....
:Surgeon-Gen. H, F. Lilly, RX..,....
Lt.,Col. B. G, (raw ford, 1,;\I.:s.......
IIIiss LCI'dì1.l1ll ,......'...............,....,.
1\Iiss Madl'!lIIð Barrett ....,..
Miss Finne\" ..'.......... ..
Miss A, G!
dstcne.. ......'....,..,....
Mrs. R, BelT;)" ......' '...............'.....
"R. IlL" .. ..'..'.......,.'................
l\Irs. Lingard ......'..,..,.....,...........
1\[iss EditlJ E, Inglis .....................
Mr. Ernest ]Jrown ...........'............
Mr. Arthur Rcdfern .....................
1111'. .John R. HobhOl:se .........,........
Tho L.dy Antrim .......................,
1\lr. I" r-;. ('al"\'all1o....,.,.................
:J\Ir. E, P. \\'orth ..'........................
Miss Kera .T, BIa;r ....,.........,.........
Mr. .1, E. Monk ....,...............,......
Miss Oldings ..,..........,...................
Mr, 1", Fa\H'ett ............'.....,........
!Ill'. Horace Field .................,....'
Miss E, Ade!a ;\larshall........,
I\[iss ;\[arian Hopkinson ..........
Miss Oli\ e I.apage ... ...., .......,......
1\lrs. K. Tetlev ...,.....................,....
Mr. J.
, Hi
nett ...............'........
1\[1'. P. Yere 'Turner ..............,......
1\[rs. 'Vimbush ....,.........................
I1[rs. Bluy ....................................

Ir. A. B. Sampson ........................
Mr. H, L. II, Mander ...............,..,..
l\[i.>3 Perrin ....,..................,.........
Mr. and :\frs. Hugh lIIaxwelL..........
1\[rs, A, E. Kichoh;on ......,..............
Mr. Hu"h!ino-s Davies ..................
1\1rs. E\
),L" Mellersh ............,...,.
Dr. W, Bevan Lewis .....................
lItr. G. \\', 0, l' ..............................
c'L. and F. t. ...............................
.. W. .J. R," ...... ......................'...
1\[rs. F. SdJ\'lahe ...'..,....................
l\Ir. Chades 'Villia.mson ...........,...
1\[iss Barker .................................
Mr. E. M. Smvthies ...........'.........
Mr, :FrOO J. g..'lån ...........................
Miss Gertn:de _\. FrFr ..................
I1Iiss ]\[urph
' ...........................'.....
lIliss I..aird ........,...................,.......
Capt. K. H, Hl'IlCe ........................
Messrs, A. B. Collins and :M. H.
Fenwick .""......,......,.........,....,..
!'o[r. J. It, k,kett,..,....................
Mr. HenI')' G, Tempest ..................
"10 P.eaders" ........,.....................
.c Slamil1a" .......a..a......................
Anonvmous ....,.. .........._. ..........,...
Rir F: Denys ..'.... ............ .........
Miss Steele' ....,............... ..............
!\[!ss ('amp bell ..........................,...

Ir. H, S:mndel'3 ...........................
]\[1'. C, F. Horton ...........................
1\fr, John Gil! ..............................
l\la;or N>ccorr.13e ....,......................
Capt. H. McD, WilliaIl13 ...............
Mrs. K. L. Johnson ...............,.....
"10 Sub
cribers" ........................
!I[rs. Kott ..............................,.....
Miss Eo 1\L Hewson ...............,....,
Mr. Walter G, Scott ,.....,..............
1\lr. S. EIl.!ter ..............................
1\[1', G. A. Pawson ............ .........
l'.[r, C. F. Shears on ......,..'..............
neaders ...,..."....,..,..,..,..,....,........
!\frs, and H,c !\Iisse.!l Darley,...........
!I[es. Dickenson .._..'........................
!oIl'. Jas. Ll)gan ...... ,..,.......,.......
:Misses Kemble ..................,...........

[iss Balfour ....,.........,.....,............
Master and
Irs, A. F. Hargreaves,..

nlL'î
. ,..:::: :::::::::::::::: ::::::::::
Mr. W, R. ltUchell .....................
t.L;;s Perry ....................................
,. OrchilÙ" ...............,.................

t- ,

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017 6
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o 6 10
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LAND

AND

LW;ATER.

pri117J 1915.

I: II, d,
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042

" A Reader" .................................
Miss Guthrie Smith .........'...........
lITr. W. J. Watson .....................
IIII'. A. S, Hosset .. ,........ ...........
"H, B. D." ...,.............................
Miss T\'mms ......,...............,..........
1\[1'. Clifford R. Akers....,..........,..,..
Miss Mar'Donald ...'.......,...............
IIIessl's. F. and :::. Sher\\'in...............
lIIiss Barnet ..................,..............
1I1r. B. P. Lascelles ...........,..........,.
Sir Frederick Hogg ........................
IIIr. Maurice G. Hannay.....,............
1\[r, 'V, B. Fent.on ...,....................
III 1', Richard Hilliard .....................
Mrs. Denis de \ïtre & Fuur Children
IIIr. Samuel S. lIlartvn ............,...,.
IIlrs. Tador .......,..:...................,..
Mrs, 1Il0
tgomery ....,..,.......... .......
1111's. M. G, B.mister ..........
IIIr. Gilbert A, Winson ..,
"A Soldier's Mother" ........,....,...,
Miss :\1. (,leverlE'\, Prke ..'...............
1\[rs. ilL 'V. Do;'e ........................
Mrs. 1\e....ton .................................
l\lr, Fred K. Harland .....................
41 AnOflVß1(JU3" ...........................
Dr. Gu.rney Thompson ..................
IIII'. Jas. D. Birchall ......,..............
lIIiss Leake .....,..............................
":\1. G, :\r." .......,............,............
"E. :\r. II," ...........,........'............
1\Irs. Elear.or :\1. H.lrny ...............
Miss D;Ilon '......,..,........'..
1I1!S3 Vera Esposito ....,........,..,..,...
Miss Fredin!! ..........,..'
1\[1', .1, J, Ho,lges __ ..
.'Fa B." a..................... .........a.....
l\liS3 Louise :\laitland .....................
Mr5, Gordon Canning ..,..................
Mr, and
Irs. If, U, .Joseph............
Major C. S, B, Monel' .......,..,.......
1\[iss A, F. Stewart .........,..,..'........
lIliss W, Hopkin ...........................
IIIr. W. 111. Glasgow.....,...............
IIlr. and :\Irs. J. 1,. Behrend .........
IIlr. K S. Chattock ........................
lIliss I. P..v13erts ..,...........,...............
Mr. F. Stanton Barnes ..,...............
1\[r. M. D. Dublin ........................
11["8. Jean Macwilliam ..................
1\[iEs f;tubbs ................,..,.....,.......
" Pot! erie<> ..
II M. C. G. U _..........
l\lis.
J. Hulburt ...........................'..
1I1rs, Furley ......,...........,...............
Anonymol.l.3 (Stirling) .............,.......
IIII'. E. Bennett ............................,.
Mr. T. 'Vood .................................
Mißs Ritcbie ...,...............,.............
lI[iss Henderson ..............................
Mr. A. C. Dutton ....,..,...................
c. Rifleman" ............,.....................
1\[Ï3g F. 'Vallas ..............................
lIIißs K. Wa1la.s .....................,........
Mr. and )lrs. C. Wykeham Perry......
)Irs, N. B. Cunn .........................,.
Anonvmowl ................ ..... '..............

Irg. 'Wilkins.on ..,....,..,...................
Mrs. G. Matthews ..,.....................
Mrs. Tillie ..,...........,..,..................
lIIißs Clare G. Br:lùford ..... ............
Mrs. Cl'igbt-on Si.!npson ...................
Mr. and 1\1rs, :\Iendl '.......................
Miss Esther Swainson .....................
Mr. John Re\'erj
ge and t.hree mem,
bers of Ho
hoid ........................
Anonvmous ...,....,....,.. ,...., ......,..,....
Miss'l\f, n. Smith ,..........,............'..
1111'" Mrs" and )[!sses Fhrence and
Aliee Ba.rker .............................. 0 4 0
Mr
, Henry Grcen ...........,.,............. 0 3 6
"E. T. "'.... ..............................'.. 0 3 0
Mißs IlL X. Strouts ........................ 0 3 0
1\[1'. A. E, Revias-Hol'kil1s .............. 0 3 0
!\[rs.
iecks ................,..............'... 0 3 0
Anonvmow ...'............................... 0 3 0
1Iliss Ì-Ielen n. Scott .........'............'. 0 3 0
1\lrs 1L'\r\'ev ..'.................,....,....... 0 3 0
The'Misses k aud K, Ro)'d ........,.... 0 3 0
Miss E. Rowen ................,............. 0 3 0
Mr. H. T. Honam ..........' 0 3 0
Anonymous ....,.. ,.....'...... 0 3 0
3 Readers ,.. ..............,.......,... 0 3 0
Miss Robson ....'...........,................, 0 3 0
Miss J. B1<1ck ..,.............................. 0 3 0
1\11'. A. A. PeytolJ ........,..,...........,... 0 3 0
Anonvmous .
..., ........,................... 0 3 0
MiÆ 'Randle ........,........................ 0 3 0
Mr.
L J. A, Diekensun .................. 0 2 6
:t:n

,:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: g

1111'. D. S, 1\bckenzie ...................... 0 2 6
"A. E, A." ...............,..,.............. 0 2 6
Sercrt. II. S, ("haWs ........................ 0 2 6
An
lym()us ................................,... 0 2 6
"ß. I.... .........'............................. 0 2 6

040
040
040

I: II. d.
:\11', J, L..'V ..,............................,.... 0 2 6
lIl:s:!! Man: 'Vake .........,.................. 0 2 6
Miss C. Horton .............................. 0 2 6
Miss Vera Larminie ........................ 0 2 6
Mr. Alfred Griffith ......................... 0 2 6
1\[rs. 'V. .1, Evan.'! ........................... 0 2 6
Anonymous .................................... 0 2 6
Anonymous .................................... 0 2 6
lIh'. Jas. Davidson ..,..............'...... 0 2 6
Mrs. Parker ..,........'.............,....... 0 2 6
l\lrs, Jamesun .........,....................... 0 2 6
Anon)'mous ........................'.........., 0 2 6
Miss Helen lIIarriage ..................... 0 2 6
Mr. G. P. Ritchie ........................... 0 2 6
"'1'. C. '1'." ......,............................. 0 2 6
Anonymous .................................... 0 2 6
Prof. Johnstone ..'.................,......... 0 2 6
A Reader (Dunblane) ,.................... 0 2 6
Mr. A. J. Downing ...,..'...............,.. 0 2 6
AnonYmous ..................,........,........ 0 2 6
1\[r, R. 1\1. Stevenson .....,..,......,..... 0 2 6
Miss KatlJ<Jrine Grandage ................ 0 2 6
IIrr, Henry N. WhoeJ.e.r ................... 0 2 6
Miss A. Bere ..........................,...... 0 2 6
J\Irs, Yander Kisto .....................,.. 0 2 6
1\[1', I
. W. Waill\uigbt ..,......,........ 0 2 6
"C. E. W." '..'.. 0 2 6
Miss A. Hod.;e ...' 0 2 6
"D. 111," ..........'..........., 0 2 6
1111'. E. H. G. Miller ....,........'.......... 0 2 6
III. M, (Dundee) ..,........................... 0 2 6
IIlr. W, G, Wallace ......'..........,..'... 0 2 3
1\[jg
Violet Jacob ...,..............,........ 0 2 0
"I. I. P." ............,.........,............... 0 2 0
l\IiS3 C. Ill. Williams ...............,....... 0 2 0
"F. III. Y." ..,..'....................'...'... 0 2 0
Miss Jacomb ........,.............,......,.., 0 2 0
MiS3 L, Beattie ....................,.......'. 0 2 0
IIIiss E. Beattie ..,..'..,..................... 0 2 0
lIll's. A. Thorthan ........................... 0 2 0
J\(r, and IIIrs, C. E. Fl"eding ........... 0 2 0
.. 2 Readers" ..,....,..,.................'.... 0 2 0

[iss Lucas ........................... 0 2 0
" Auld LanO" Svne" 0 2 0
Ilk Dor.ald" (";awford ......,........,..... 0 2 0
1111'. Chas, Tarrant ...................,..... 0 2 0
IIlr, C. M. II, JlJaeJeley ..................... 0 2 0
.. A. B. and L, K." ......'........,...,.... 0 2 0
1\[rs. Carruthers ............,................ 0 2 0
1111's. C. RulherfOId ........................ 0 2 0
1I1iss Semple .................................. 0 2 0
.. E. A." ............'..,........,............... 0 2 0
lIIiss Muriel Skinner ...............,.....'.. 0 2 0
Ilk i\I. ShaUwcll '......,............,...... 0 2 0
Anonvmúu.
.......................,............ 0 2 0
lITr:1. 'Stmnge ................................. 0 2 0
l\[iss l\I. F. 'Brownjolm .........'........... 0 2 0
Anonymous .........'.................... ..... 0 2 0
lITiss "f\mrza &'arllon ..................... 0 2 0
Mrs. Gra.ham Whitê ..................... 0 2 0
1\[rs, Ha,rdrl's.
Chaplin .................... 0 I 0
lITr:!, A, J. Pl'osser ......................... 0 1 0
I1lrs. C, A. Baily............................. 0 1 0
"E, 111. L" .............................'.... 0 1 0
" V. R. .. (X01'wieh) ........................ 0 1 0
1111'. W. G. Sa\ago ........................... 0 1 0
1\[1'. D. S. Sa\'age ..........'................ 0 1 0
The J\Iis.
ell Ad,), and Mary Tarling... 0 1 0
Anonymoull ......,..,..,...............,..,.... 0 1 0
.. C. (j, W." .................................. 0 1 0
lI[is:; Newman .....'............,.............. 0 1 0
Dr. Barrie Dow .............,................ 0 1 0
Anonymous ............... .............,..... 0 1 0
Mr. james
[arsh ........' ,..,.........'.. 0 1 0
Mm. James :\Iarsh ...,.................... 0 1 0
.. A Reader" ....,...........'................ 0 1 0
Mr, H. V. R. Milne ........................ 0 1 0
.. P. C." ....................................... 0 1 0
lI[r. A, Anderson ........................... 0 1 0
l\Tr, G. Van Vulfe! ........,................. 0 1 0
,
liss Elgar ......,.........................".. 0 1 0
Mr. Wm. C, Young ..................,..... 0 1 0
Miss Edith Lloyd ........................... 0 1 0
IIlrs. "'hiles .................................. 0 1 0
Anon\'mo:J.s .................................... 0 1 0
IIlis, 'Garnett, ...................,.....,....... 0 1 0
" A Reader" ............................,.., 0 1 0
Anollvmollß ...............................,.... 0 1 0
Mrs. 'HalT\' Clarke ........................ 0 1 0
Miss Fr:wiÜ Rhind ..........,...,......... 0 1 0
lIliss K. O'Brien ..,.......,.....,.......... 0 1 0
.!\[iss (\"ral ..................................... 0 1 0
Miss A: Ja.cob ................................ 0 1 0
Miss E. Rhind ........................,..... 0 1 0
lIT 1', F, \V\"lis ...........................,..... 0 1 0
Mr, O. Sheppard ........................... 0 1 0
11[1'. T. Kolan ................'................ 0 1 0
1\[1'. A, l\[ollo
' .............................. 0 1 0
1\fr. .J. "Yard ...................,............. 0 1 0
Mr. H, C'lalke .............................. 0 1 0
1\[1'. T. Kinsella ...,.......................... 0 1 0
Mr, C, Williams .....................,..... 0 1 0
Mi.u E. Rhind .........,..................., 0 1 0

E621 17 3

---- - --

Printed by TUE 'TICXOlUA HOUSE PIUN:IllIO Co., LTD" Tudor Street, WhitefriaI'B, Lond(.n, E.C.

-

17, [9 1 5

LAND AND VlATER

-

lens

are the. only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with'
British Capital and
Labour.

THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., LTD.

[F. knowing
you know.
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
Iinaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

"SIR IS"

a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as Apollin-
aris and similar to it in taste.

Rep<!. Quarts.
PerDoz. 6/-

Rep4
Pin[s.
2 6 Per Doz.

Reod. Pints.

36

Carriage }'aiti.

..... Sample 'Bottle FREE on receIpt o/Coupon --
Nameu

Address,...._. ..._...............,.., .. L.. ,....____.._..___....... 00_'

Usual Purveyor of
Mineral fVaters,

A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenles Street Works, LONDON; Chapel Field \\orks, NOilWICU,

"'
"'
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Penscope extended to 2 feet,

ady for use.

t

I.

Closed to 41 mch sq uare by 2 Inch thick.

\

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Packed in Khaki case for
attacbmg to belt

39

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b.

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A Perfect Periscope at last I
approved by the Wat Office.
" Lifeguard"
Patent Collapsible
Pocket Periscop
is a scientifically constructed i
strument fulfilling every possit
requirement and entirely SUP{
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Light, Strong, Compact,
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It weighs only 220zs., measures 4

square by 2in. thick, and INSTANT
extends with a single movement to

ready for use, without the slightest adjl
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sight any desired elevation from 6 to 20
giving clear cover from rifle fire up to U
Horizontal field 25 yards at 100 yards.
Perfectly Rigid
in any position

Exceedingly durable-the frame is m,
of tough steel, practically unbreakal
heavily coppered and dull nickel pIa
to render it rustproof, The mirrors
best British THIN PLATE glass (repla
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the silvering protected by waterti
Aluminium cases finished dull bla

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MANCHESTER, S.

Also from Opticians, Military Outfit!
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LAND AND \'\ATER

MONTHLY
LITERARY REVIE'V

By R, A. ::COTT-JAMES

M R. JOSEPH COKRAD has conferred this
immeasurable boon upon us; he, a Pole, with
thf' temperament, instinct, and antecedents of
a Slay, has written great Slavonic literature
for us (Slavonic, that is, in all but language
and subject-matter); he has written it for us in our language,
at its best, in terms of things and images that we know, thus
naturalising amongst us not only himself, but a classic ex-
ample of literature Sla\'onic in temper, inspiration, and
method, His ne\\ book contains four short stories :-

.. \\'ithin the Tides: Tales." By Joseph Conrad.
(Dent.) 6s.
These tales, being slighter, llaye not the all-compelling,
concentrated force of the three stories in " Youth," and in
personal interest they fall short of " 'Twixt Land and Sea."

evertheless, all but the first of the four are as good as
they could be, for the point is made, the effect attained, the
thrill, the horror, the mocking tragedy i,> achieved. And
the first story only falls short in that the author is long in
getting to the business. The gist of the tale is all in the
concluding sections, when the explorer brings the girl, her
father, and her aunt to his island, knowing that the long-
lost, mediocre youth-whom the girl has idealised and sought
-lies dead there, He, the explorer, inflamed by this lovely,
reserved, conventional girl, deeming himself worthy of her,
and knowing the worthlessness of the youth whom she seeks,
confronts her with the other's grave and his own passion;
and sees her "in the pose of simple grief-mourning for
herself,' convf'ntionally "surprised" at his passion, and
offended, "I had nothing to offer to her vanitv." Certainly
Mr. Conrad abhors an anti-climax,
In the other stories we are in the affair from the start.
One tells of how an old ship was wrecked for the sake of the
insurance money, and how grimly everything went awry.
Another is a grùesome story of 1813, the scene an inn in a
desolate region in Spain, where an English naval officer
discovers his comrade's bod\' in a wardrobe, and escapes
from the horrid contrivance "by which the other had been
done to death, The fourth defies description in a sentence;
we are back again in the Eastern atmosphere of " Almayer's
Folly"; but l\1r. Conrad has grown more cynical, and the
" good" man who has saved his cargo and his life ff(?m
treacherous assassins, is brought home to a wife green wIth
jealousy,
I have often heard it said that for 1\1r. Conrad "the
tale is the thing"; he is just a teller of tales. !n a sense
he is, The plot, the situation, the climax, are all-Important.
But his tales are much more than narratives. Everyone
knows that a good ghost story is nothing if it does not
produce the" feel" of the ghost and the horror itself, What
the teller of good ghost stories does with the uncanny Mr.
Conrad can do for the more varied and far more subtle
realities of life. The persons are real and complex, the
situation is tense, dramatic, charged with emotion, and t?e
scenery enters into ,the draII1:a and becomes. a. part of Its
life. \Vhat matters 111 a tale IS not the bare I11cldents, how-
ever ingeniously contrived, but how
ou conceive. them,
imagine them, present th
m. to yourself I
terms of
Ife and
feeling. In the long run It IS l\Ir, Conrad s personality that
matters; by mastery of language his imagination dominates
the plot,

.. The Invisible Event." By J. D. Beresford.
(Sidgwkk &. Jackson.) 6s.
Just before I read this book I was e?,amining the preface
to "Fanny's First Play" (now pu?lIshe? by "Con
table,
IS. 6d. net), and found :\Ir. Shaw reiteratIng: Is
t any
wonder that I am driven to offer to young people 111 our
suburbs the desperate advice: Do something that will get
you into trouble?" I do not intend to discuss "Fanny's
First Play" in these columns; it was sufficiently discussed
when the play was produced four years ago. But Mr. Shaw
has set the problem,: Ho
v t
"c.ombi!1e. loss of resp
ct-
ability" (respectabihty be111g 111 hIs op111lOn the besettmg
sin of our age) " with integrity of self-respect and reasonable
consideration for other people's feelings and interests?"
It may - em surpri;;ing that such a novelist as l\Ir. Beresford,
who ha" ten timet; as much interest in human nature as
1\Ir. Shaw ha<:, ten times the capacity to make characters
real and ali\e, "hould yet be so hypnotised by his ideas as

A pril I 7, 1915

to let these ready-made problems dominate his novels.
However, the problem is not everything, Mr. Beresford
may have used the fashionable situation, but his characters
are all his own, they work out their destinies in his way,
and this book is a powerful conclusion to the trilogy which
began with" The Earlv History of Jacob Stahl."
The novel opens abruptly at the point where Stahl is
completely convinced that he cannot do anything in life
without Betty Gale, 1\Iarriage is impossible, for a wife from
whom he had been long separated is still living, and refusps
to divorce him. To Stahl the situation presents no difficulties;
he needs Betty, she needs him; the ceremony of marriage is
a ritual hinding only those who fear public opinion, But
Betty docs fear public opinion. She shrinks from the
hostility of her selfish relatives at the Rectorv;' she shrinks
even from the horror of old l\Irs, Parmenter, - whose partner
she is in running a boarding establishment," I hate to see
dead people walking ahout," says 1\Ir. Shaw. "To Jacob
she (1\Irs. Parmenter) appeared as a dying woman, to Betty
as the representative of public opinion."
Betty does run away with Stahl, and joins him in a
cottage in Cornwall. But her difficulties are not at an end,
She had not merely feared public opinion; her conscience
confirmed her fears, It is here that l\Ir. Beresford breaks
away entirely from :\Ir. Shaw, Stahl argues; but argument
is nothing to Betty, "I shall be all right if you'll only let
me alone," she says, evading the earnest arguments that to
her" wore an air of sophistry."

.. \-Vell," you are coming round to my point of view, anyway,"
he says,
.. I've got to, if I'm to have any peace of mind," said Betty,
pointing the essetJ.tial he had O\.erlooked,
Betty Gale is a character whom the reader will not
easily forget - strong, active, impulsive, honest, lovable,
The personality of Stahl, too, is drawn with great power;
and 1\Ir. Beresford is equally skilful in living in the characters
of the selfish, respectable people who are such poor supports,
and Betty's wavering conscience. 1\1r. Beresford is one of
the most interesting, suggestive. and impressive novelists
now writing, and his book is a rare example of fine, animate.
stimulating fiction.

u Peter Para2'on: A Tale of Youth." By John
Palmer. (Seeker.' 6s.
We have hitherto known :\Ir. Palmer as a clever, incisive,
discriminating critic of literature and drama, and in this
first novel he shows that he can be no less skilful as a critic
of life. .. Skilful," perhaps, is the word that first comes to
the lips-the sentences and the chapters are so neatly
trimmed, the whole story arranged with exquisite precision,
But he has not refined away the flesh and blood in the process.
Peter Paragon is a kiIid of diminutive Faust, and he
shares that quality with so many modern heroes of fiction I
They are nearly all little Fausts, plumbing the depths of
experience in their cradles, at school, at the university, in
London, and at length in some happier :\Iargaret's arms.
Peter plumbs and plumbs all these little depths.
But, to be fair to Peter, he is a nice boy at school, and in
love with :'o1iranda; he is a really spirited, live, original
undergraduate at Oxford (in an Oxford far more real than
" Verdant Green's," more interesting even than Mr. Compton
Mackenzie's); he is an eager, masculine adventurer in the
adult cosmopolis; and Miranda, at the best, is not merely
Miranda, but an eternal ideal. 1\Ir. Palmer stands out head
and shoulders above the other dozens of creators of Peters
homunculi,

THE "NIl':ETEENTH CENTL'RY"

THE April number of the .. Nineteenth Century .. contains a very
timely article by Sir Harry johnston, There are few persons w
o
understand African administration as Sir Harry understands it, and In
the past none could have accused hi
of being an, anti-GermaÐ;' But
he is now urging strongly the necessIty of captunng and holdmg the
German African colonies, and of refusing to restore them after the
'Var. Dr, S, T. Pruen's article, .. 'Vhat the Germans did in East
Africa," gives a few ilIuminating facts in this connection, In the
same number of the Review Sir Francis Piggott discusses neutral
trading and the acute questions involved in it: M. Emile Vandervelde
contributes an important article (in French) on the Belgium of To-day
and the Bel<>ium of To-morrow, An exceptionally interesting con,
tribution is that from MT. Havelock Ellis on .. Richard Graves and
, the Spiritual Quixote.' "

MESSRS, jARROLD & SONS have supplied a much felt
ant in their
weekly publication" Foreign Opinion," the first issue of whIch appe
red
the latter end of March, It is valuable to be able to read the vanous
opinions by "ell,known foreign writers as to the different phases of
the war and of the various attitudes with which it is regarded when
looked at through foreign eyes, The first number contains articles
by "Ion der Goltz, Max Lenz, Theodore'Voolsey, Gabriel Hanotau
,
Count Reventlow. and Ramiro de '\Jaeztu, A feature of t
e number IS
the" Comment and Caricature,"

4 0

Bell. s
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April 17, 19 1 5

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A true friend will bring you at all times r-..
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the priceless gift of comradeship, encourage- , ,.
ment and sympathy.
There is no truer friend than a well- \
seasoned pipe carefully filled with U THREE
- NUNS" tobacco -for that is the only mix- --
-
ture whose delicious flavour, pleasant light
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the need of a smoker of real discernment. .......
.

A Testin&, Sample will be forwarded on apphcatlon to
Stephen Mitchell & Son, Branch of the Imperial Tobacco
Co. (of Great Britain and Ireland), Limited, Glasgow '>+-".

-=
I U King's Head" is similar but stronger.
BOTH ARE OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE. -
PER 6
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No. 392,

CIGARETTES.

" THREE NUNS "
MEDIUM.

4 1

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fValChlllo.kerr

10 Admiralty

Mappin' s Famed
II Campaign"
Watch

This fine movement wristlet watch was first
used in great numbers at Omdurman, And
desert-experience is the severest test a watch
can have.

During the last Boer War it renewed its
high reputation for reliability under trying
conditions.

It is compensated and jewelled. In silver
case with stout inner dome, it is absolutely
dust and damp-proof.

It is fitted with a luminous dial, which shows
the time on the blackest of nights.

E2

10

e
.

o

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&Webb

LTD.

Silversm,ths to HIS MaJesty Kme George V.

158-162 Oxford St., W. 2 Queen Victoria St.. E.C.
220 Regent St., W.

The Royal Work"' -

Sheffield

-
..

-
..

April 17, 19 1 5

.

THE "GIEVE"
LIFE-SAVING WAISTCOAT

The Peril of the Submarine

An Officer lately on H,M. Auxiliary Cruiser

"BA Y ANO"

which \Vas recently torpedoed and sunk (in a few minutes)
with few survivors, states that, he owes his life to the fact
that he was wearing the" GIEVE" Lif
-Saving \Vaistcoat
at the time of the disaster. Of the 12 officers taken from
the water on the sinking of H.l\I.S, FORMIDABLE, ten were
wearing this waistcoat,
The "GIEvE" I.ife-Saving \Vaistcoat is the only life-saving
apparatus that is really reliable under all conditions-
because it is the only device of ita kind that can be worn
continuously with comfort at all hours oj the day or nigh!,
and under every conceivable circumstance of life at SM.
Being worn (deflated) as an ordinary waistcoat, in absolute
comfo,rt
nd without bulging or hampering tbe wearer in any
way, It IS ready at any moment for use and can be inflated
in 20 seconds, when it is buoyant enough to support wearer
head-and-81wulders clear of water, indefinitely,

Made to any Size, 50/ - net. Flannel lined,

On vie.. and on
sale at .

GIEVE'S

(Giuvu, Matthews & Sea grove, Ltd.)

10NDON-66 South Molton Street.
PORTSMOUTH-The Hard,
DEVON PORT -44 Fore Street.
CHATHA"1-Railway Street

WEY"10UTH-l & 2 Crosvenor Plaoe,
SHEERNESS-72 High St., Blue Town.
EDINBUijCH-30a Ceorge Street.
HARWICI( - Kingsway, Doverçourt.

2f
!

@5
..... ....
OFFICERS' KIT.
The House of Pope and Bradley holds a pre-eminent position amongst
the few exclusive \Vest End military tailors, and their service con,
nection includes practically every commissioned rank and regiment in
the Army,
The making of Officers' Uniforms for active service is an art entirely
distinct from mufti tailoring, for unless each garment is cut and fitted
by experienced military cutters, it is impossible to obtain the correct
military style.
The policy of the House is to supply only the finest quality Khaki
procurable, and considers its reputation at stake over every military
garment produced during the war.
Service Jacket (Khaki Serge or Whipcord).., .f:3 3 0
Do. (Guards' Barathea) ... ;E4 4 0
Bedford Cord Breeches (Buckskin strapped) ;E2 12 6
Slacks ;E 1 5 0
British Warm ... ;E3 15 0
Service Greatcoat ;E 4 10 0
Kilts (Regimental Tartan) .f:5 5 0
Trews ;E2 17 6
F uIl Kit List on application.

MUFTI.
The average price for a Pope and Bradley Lounge Suit is between
five and six guineas, but in view of the economic conditions of the
present time, the House has decided during the ensuing season to make
a special feature of lounge suits at four guineas.
This moderate price, which is, of course, quoted for nett cash,
represents'the minimum at which it is possible to supply a really well
cut and tailored West End suit. The new materials for the Spring
designed by H. Dennis Bradley are confined exclusively to our House,
and cannot therefore be duplicated by the me(hocre tailor.
Lounge Suits from ;E4 4 0
Spring Overcoats ;E3 13 6
Dre.... Suits ,. ;E6 6 0
Upon application, we shall be pleased to forw..,.d our book, .. THE MAN OF
TO-DAY I " dealing exhaustively with men's dress in ever}. phase

TWO ESTAUL/SHMENTS ONLY

14 OLD BOND STREET."Wf&
11-1:5 SOUTHAMPTON !3P VVoWC
.....

- .....

42

The County Gentleman

_\
D

LAND&WATER

YoJ. LXV Xo. 2ï63

S.\TCRDA Y, APRIL 24. 19 1 5

[ PI'ßlI<'HED -\S ] PRICE ';IXPEVCI
-\ '\H\SPAPER PCßLISHED \\EEJ..LY

--
--

.

-...

I

I I .sea

CAPTAIN 'Yo A. H. KELLY, C.B.
In command of I I.:\I.S, "Gloucester" during the chase of the German cruisers
" Goeben" and H Breslau "

LAND

i\ N 0 \\:-\ T E R

April 24, 1915

.

.

'.v
I
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.... ,'1:iJ
, ,
I "
"ì'
- vE3
'
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'

The Regent Street H
use of
Peter Robinson is tàmous for
Distinctive Headwear

L ADIES who desire individual Style
and Distinctiveness in their Head-
"'ear, but who are disinclined to pay the
high prices that usually go with e,clusi
cne's, will do
well to pay a visit to the REGENT S ['REEl' House
of I't:ter .l{obinson and inspect the new and beautiful
Morle1s they are showing
in Spring Millinery. Their
:'\ ew Hats arc di.tincti\'e in
c
.ery scn'c of the word, but
Ihey are al,o ve,y moderately
priced. Nute the three i1Iu.-
Irate",

({, S, X.2, Charming IIat in
W'
711
< A hl,lck Taffeta., with lace edge,
"1" _ prett\, Farly Victori In tlil11l11lng
;' .. J of Silk Flo\\er" and loop< of
, ""
'
/ .ibhon falling at bac\... 49/6
<-.;<<
\ x
i " ,,
_ I_

fjjJ.

R,S, X,3, New Sailor in T"tTeta., R S. '(, t. This useful and becol11in o
-,. ='" . rf!
"ilh kilted hem"itched frill on brim lb' can be had in any colour, in 'o

IÍ '-
' -
Taff I'" lined sl.a" , wil h no\'<1 t rl m -
t \ ' <
!, '"Ø an I crown, trimme,J I au rei leaves of
II ........--
M,- min
of Shepherd's I laid rihbon: pearl
\\\
\I , ) .'r P)' j' : ,

:).::;
:
";;
;
.

::;:: '0 b

:;:'
;;,

"'o ore or <b, 0'" "
9.

A B"",'d if ", ..
\'/,

^' , r The Regent Street House
be foywm drd post Jree to ' ,
) if P R b
allY 1"e'lder of "LaJld and

0 e t e r 0 i 11 SO n
TVater'
who requests it.

í R..\, .\",3.

/
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11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

Are

Run-down

you

'Yh
n YOUT S) stem is undermined by worry or over-work
_ "hclI your ,.itality is 10\1 ereù-" hen JOu feel "any
hO\l" "-\\hCIi yvur n"l\"e
are "on edge"-when the lea
t
(>xerlion tires )"ou-)-'01.1 are in R U Hun-down" londition.
\""ur ')stem is like a ßm\er ùrooping for \lant of "ater,
Ali<I just a
water re,.i\"es a drooping flo\ler-
o '\Yillearlli
'
gÎ\'es new life tn a "rnn,down" constitution. From e\en
the tirst winegla<sful JOu can jftl it Fti,?uJating awl ill-
,'i!,;oraUlig
'nn, alld as you continue, you can feel it sur,
(.harging your whole sJ
tem with lIew he'tlth-1ww
trength
-1lfW
'igour amI new life. \Yil1 you try just one hot Ie!

Begin

get

well

FR EE.

to

Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wincaml. '-not a mere ta.t p ,
but enough to ,10 ) ou lZood, Euelu,e three penllY .tamps (to Jay
po-tal"'). COLI-;" -\X & ('0., Ltd" ":!I:!, Wincarllis" orks, :\.on\ich.

R S, l.r.

Ld

.

Garrould's

To H.'1. W.m OFFTC'E, H.
r. COLONUL OFFICI",
}YDB. OFFICE, ST, JOllY A)()H LA'i"CE o\"OCIATW'i",
LONDOY COUNTY COUNOIL, (iUy'S HOSPITAL, ,I:c.

I

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Ladles are Invited to visit the

HOSPITAL NURSES' SALO
N
Com,J'f'te fqui,unent of Ntll'ses for
Home Detachments and the

HOT WATER
BOTTLES.

SEAT OF WAR.

(r-

['

Each
Bott]e
Guan:Dteed
Model 55.
Strong Portable

Canv..
Camp

7 ; peu, ,.. Folder, 9 6.

_ With Pil'OW, 12/-.

LenR"th, 6ft,;
width, "rt. Sin,
We have ð1tppfied a
ClOled laroe nmnb I of tlLt.

-. ('a.:lp FoldeJ. for the
U
ou mltd.

All Surgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock.

Write 'for
GARROULD'S NURSES' CATALOGUE.
POST FREE, containing
Nu rses' Uniforms, Surgical Instruments and Appliances,

r.

Q

10>< 6 ill. 3/-
12X ßin. 3 9
14X 8in, 4 6
12X 10m, 4/9
HX lOin. 53
lfi X 10 in, 6/2

ì

LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.

CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS, various BODY & LIMB 8ED FRAMES, from 4 3i
slze<, 7/6,8,9,9 II, 109, &C. DRESSING SCISSORS, from 1,6
, WATER BEDS, AIR BEDS AND MAT- INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very light
TRESSES, 29,6, 52,6, 26/9 and strong. 17'6
AIR & WATER PILLOWS, 3h 10 6, &c. INV ALID BED TABLES, from 6/6
FEEDING CUP, 4
d. each. INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
BED PANS, from 39 every descrtptton.
LEG & ARM BATHS, from 25,6 & 86 FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
STRETCHER, War Office pattern. special prices.
Complete with Webb Straps and INVALID BED RESTS, 6{11
P How, 2 Gns. Without Straps and WAR D BED S TEA D S, 3 ft. t3,9;
Pillow, 35/6 2 tt. 61n. 129
GARROULD'S MOTOR AMBULANCES AND
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of Invalids by Road, Rail or Sea. Estimates Free.

E. & R. GARROULD, 150 to 162, Edgware Rd" LONDON, W.
Te1epbonC8: 5;3:!:(), ;:",321, & 6297 Paddingtlln.

'J'elegrams: II GARROULD, LONDO:W:"

=-,

"-\pril .:q, 1915

LAN D .-\ N D \Y ATE R

THROUGH

THE

EYES

OF

A

WOMAN

By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER,

"'pmen in Congress
A P}{OPOS.-\L has recenth' been made, which has
set many people a-talking, I t is suggested that
a Conference of \\"omen should take place at the
Hague, before many more da\"s ha\'e elapsed,
It \\ ill deal \\ ith the question of peace, Womf'n
from many countries are to be there, \\'onlf'n from England,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, ïelgium, and var ou, neutral
countries, There \\ ill be no
Frenchwomen, for the simple
reason that the women of
France ha\'e flatl) refused to
ha\'e anything to do with the
idea. TheY will not even C.m-
,..ider the iJution of meeting
women from GLrmanyat pre-
sent. It is a suggestion they
("annot tolerate, The feeling
in France runs far too hish for
that, Her suflerings arc too
great, and the knowledge d
the German menace too
')re.

is easy and prompt, because it has the advantage of cl free yass
from the .-\dmiraltv, and the package
are met tIlt' other end
bv Belgian officials, This, indeed, is one of the chief points
about the Fund. Xot only ha5 it the support and gratitude of
e\'ery member of the Belgian Government, from the King and
Prime
linister downwards, but it has the approval of our own
\Yar Office and Admiraltv as well, The working of the ';und
is one of complete harmony. It is a triumph of. sOl
nd,
common sense orgal11sahnn.
All that is wanted is sufficient
support, The briefest re\"Ïe\\
of the object for which it e"\.ists
will servë-it is indeed all that
is possible here,
The Friend in :\eed
E\-ervone who has gi\ en
the matter a moment'" thought
kno\\s that the words .. our
debt to Belgium" are no mere
formula, I t is the clearC'-'t of
realities, The debt \\'e 0\\ e
Belgium is an immense one,
the se\-en da\"" she gained for
us of such \'ast \'alue, that it
cannrt be reckoned in \H'rds,
The 1:::I::st wa\' in which we Lan
show our gratitude i
by deeds,
The Belgian Soldiers' Fund is
the means through which we
can act, The keynote of this
Fund is one of friendship,
People in England are asked
to befriend the Belgian soldiers
who 'ha\'e borne and sUll.:red
so much during the last few
months, The catastrophe \\ hich
has o\-ertaken Belgium has re-
sulted in families being parted
and di\ ided, and many a "01-
dier in the Belgian .-\rm\' to-
da\" has not the smallest idea
\\ lìere his wife and famih' are,
As a consequene<< he ha" no
one to send him tho"e comforts
which hearten him, and m 'qn

o much to hi" \\ell-being.
Through the good "en'icE of
the Fund, many pe 'pie J.re
sending gifts to the Bel
iln
soldier, but more friend
<Te
e\'er wanted, The ca
eo; and
hale" sent out by the Fund
contain article.. of food and clothing, If people "send mr>nc.\
instead of gifts in kind. articles are bought at whole...ale
price.. by an experienceJ buyer. The demands upon e\'en',
body'.... purse clre hccl\'Y in thc..;e da.\s, but the Fund make no
big requests, It is grateful for the gift of one pound of sugar
or rice weekly It is the regular weeklv gift -howe\'er smJ.ll
-that is most appreciated, because then there is a working
knowledge of the probable amount that can be dispatched
week by week.

Various Opinion"
()pinion is by no means
unanimou
in England, There
seems, indeed, a great depth of
feeling about it, and not onh
critici"m but controvers\' i"
I ife, The' women, howe\'er, -who
ha \'e made up their minds that
it is the right thing to go have
probably made up their minds
to face a \'ast amount of criti-
cism also. That, they nofIoubt
recognise, is ine\ itable, The
first mo\'ement connecting
\\ omen and peace came from
,\mcrica in the n
ry eady
,:,tages of tll(' war. A ßTeàt
demf'nstration of \\omen took
place to protest against the
,..cn5ele!>" destruction and bar-
harih of war. From all ac-
counts it \\ a5 a \'ery fine pro-
.-eeding, and made ,I great
impression upon the mÌ.1d of
L"\ dyone who saw it. It \\ as C"/,y'iglll, ""dame Lalhe, 4ar/, THE COUNTESS OF LISBURNE
the outcr\" of woman a'- ",ife,
,lI1d woman as mother, al;ainst
thi
rutIle,." slclying of men,
,md the smashing of homes
and Jiws, The American
woman can look at the question from a more or le"s unbiasseJ
}>l1int of view. Circumstancb aid her to be an impartÙI
critic, and she can regard the questIOn as a whole, and free
from personal feelings, .-\merican women ha\'e come to the
conclusic>l1 that war is the most destructive enem\" that
\\oman can ha\'e, "aluable though it is to both, they yet
con
ider that peace is infinitely more \ aluable to women
than to men, It is almost impossible not to wonder whether
the \\omen at the Hague can meet under ('aIm conditions
as the .-\mericans did. If women of cnemy countries
can di..;cuss burning questions without heat a-nd \\ithout
bitternðs, it must surely approach a miracle, One glance at
the names of those who \\ ill act in the English deputation must
c011\'ince e\'er\"bodv that the task has not been lightl\" under-
taken, It is "to bi- carried out b\" those who only act from
h'\ed cOll\'ictions, and \\ hose opinIons ha\ e long bpen quoted.
I ord Robert Cecil's criticism of the proposal is that it is
premature, and \\ith this many \\ill agree, When peace is in
....ight a \\omen's congres'-' is bound to be infiniteh' more sati<;-
factorv than it could possibh' be at the pre:.ent moment,
Then it ran be of immense importance.

Who is the wife of one of the newly-appoint d officers in the Welsh
Guards, Lord Lisburne having been just gazened amongst the
lieutenants, Ladv Lisburne is the daughter of Don
Julio de Biuencourt. of the Chilian Embassy

The Belgian Soldiers' Fund
Ju;,t behind the" Times Br>ok ílub" a wonderful work
is being carried out, It is kno\\n as the Belgian Soldiers'
Fund, and the object is to prO\'ide comforts for Belgian
,-oldiers on acti\'e senice. The addre,..s of the Fund i
I7-H),
J ame" Street, O::dord Strf'et, and the premisl :; ran be Llsil\"
recogniséd, becau"f' a large Belgian flag i" fl.\ ing from then].
The Belgian Soldiers' Fund send" out a great number, f ca'"
and bales to the Belgian Army on :\Jonda\' of every \\el'k.
These pack.lges are shipped to Dunkerque, and the shippin!::"

Pure \\'ater for Be'gium
The ß.'lgian Army appreciate so warmly the pJ.cka':;l;
from James Street,. th1.t the \'arious commanding officI r"
draw up lists of their spe, ial rL'quirements, .111d for", ard them
to Dunkerque, During the past month a tremendous sueo l 'S
has been srored b
' the portable field kitchens, \\hich, under
the Fund'
direction, ha\l been conve\"ing soup and coffel
to the Belgian troops, Though they rarry fifty gallons,
they are so light that they can pas,. O\'er many a shell-
torn road, which could not be cros,,'d by hea\ ier traffic.
The great prohlem in front of Belgium is the water ,.upply,
rhe floods have. made hur.\ ing of dnd men and animal,;: an
impo;,,;ibilit
; when thev substde and the presf'l1t mud turn
into dust, the condition" in Belgium ",ill be indC"crib? ble,
It is proposed to rai"L a forcl:: of 150 field kitchen
, each of
which \\ ill carn' fifty gallons of sterili"ed \\ ater. \\'hat thi"
"ill m. an to thL Pelgian Army no tongue can tell, By their
aid the nightmare of t
phus that threatens Belgium as fully
as Serbia \\Ìll be laid, E\'ery pent1\' that can he ,..pared should
find it;, W.IV to the Pure \Yater Fund, full particulars of \\l.ich
\\ill alwa;!> be forwarded on request from Jame
::::'trl'et
though the worth of the work almo"t speclks for itself,

5,1

LAND AND WATER

April 24 19 1 5

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A PARABLE
OF PARA.

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The tale of the man
who bought not
wisely but coo well.
CHA,J>TF.R THE SIXTH.
A ND when they had eaten, the wise man said, "Thou
seest the condition of my beast's
hoes. Innurnerabll'
journeys have I undertaken since last I shod him. And
note well, thcirfirst life is not their last. for when thou comest
to shoe thy beast again, this shoe can be re-fashioned in
such a manner that thou hdSt a new shoe and naught but a
few pieces to pay. But have a care that thou suffcre5t none
but the makers to work th..:ir will upon it, or thou wilt be
SOre disappointed. The price? What paye5tthou for thine
own foot-wear? They are from Hassan's shop methinks;
not dear nor cheap; a fair price and full value. Is it not so?
Well, here also thou obtaineth full measure, and art well
treated. No hucksterers arc they. Lastly, as a mdn pOSSl:SS-
ing the finer sentiments, hast considered that this shoe is
fashioned by men of our own race? What sayest thou?
Of a surety I nave reason, and one day thou wilt speak
unto another even as I have spoken unto thee." (The end.)
MORAL: "Do not buy more tyres than you need by
buying other tyres than Dunlops."
Published by
DUNLOP RUBBER CO., L TO"
Founders of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry throughout the World,
Pard Mills. Aston Cross, Birmingham
LONDON: 14, Regent Streel, S, W. PARIS: 4, Rue du Colonel Moll,

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Abolishing Cycle Friction

T HIS is an illustr.,Iion of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
Wheel in action inside its dirtproof Gear-case.
See how the moving chain picks up the Oil and sprays it
into the Speed,gear Mechanism. The same action takes
place in the Free Wheel and in the Rear Hub. So the
whole Driving
Bearings of Sun-
beam Bicycles
are always dean,
and alwa} soiled.
In consequence
they run with-
out Friction, and
. are guaranteed
not to 1vear,
much less wear
out. This simple
Invention has
helped to m:lke
the Sunbeam hy
f,lr the most im-
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grade Bicycle in
the\\'urld, Futile
and vain at-
tempts have often been made to imitate it, especially by
Foreigners, The Sunbeam's aholition of cycle Friction is
one of those Triumphs of British Workmanship of which
this Country can indeed be proud, Ride a Sunbeam.

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THE LITTLE OIL BATH

TVrite for tIle New Catalogue to

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London Showrooms: 57 IIOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
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quare" S.W,

54

April 24, 191[;.

LAXD AND JV.ATER.

THE
By

'VAR
HILAIRE

BY LAND.
BELLOC.

NOï E.-Tbis article has be
D submitted to tbe Press nurc.
:In, ",hich doell oot ohJect to the publl
aUoD u c:easored, and taket a.
rcspolliiblilt}" lor the correctol:ss 01 the stl/tements,
Iu acc3rliance wllh the reqlllremeob 01 the Pres:! Bureal!, the posltloos 01 troops 00 Plans IIIlIstrating tbis Article must ooly 'e
regarded as approximate, aod 00 dellnite strength at aoy pdot is iodicated.

t l <' "' HE new:,; of the past week has be6n so slight
that there is no pa rt.icular commentary
to be made (or at least none" hieh v'.'Quld
be useful to the general study of the war)
upon the details.
I shall therefore take the opportunity, with
my readers' lea, e, of considering as thoroughly as
mày be the problem presented by the Carpathian
fighting,
There have indC'ed been a couple of points
in the 'Vest which have excited interest in the
French and English Press, The first is the cap-
ture of the hill marked "60 metres" on the
Fels:ian ordnance map just south of Zillebecke by
the Britieh contingent, The second is the fact
that the French ha ve in th(' V osgC's pushed forward
upon one of the ridges of the lateral valley leading
down upon the Alsatian plain north of the height
(.aptü.reò a fortnight ago.
But llrit11er of these local moyements is more
than typical of the initiati,ye possessed along the
",,-Lolc line by the A1ìics in the 'Vest. There is
nothing to be learned from them beyond what we
all'ead,"- know-that, with sufficient preparation,
the .ABies can attack where they like, and that
where they attack they will almost invariably
draw upon the enemy a higher loss than he inflicts
upon them,
The matter ha.s been repeated so often in
these columns that I do not labour it; but it is
of the fìr
t importance to the understanding of
that attrition which, though people are getting
rather tired of the term, remains the foundation
of military policy between tl13 Swiss mountains
and the
orth Sea. It may be summed up in
these maxims. The a ttack is less expensive than
tlle defence. This paradox depends upon the
allied superiority in Leavy artillery, That artil-
lery is snperior on accouut of superior airwork.
In those three points you ha ve the whole business,
and there is no more to be said upon them until
the moment shall come for putting them to the
test upon a far larger scale.
In Northern Central Poland nothing has
happened, and in the Carpathians themselves
little more than the intrnsive actions confined to a
few hundred yards which mark the slow aclvance
of the RussiÐn occupation from the crest.
But the general problem presented by the
Carpathians will remain for some weeks a capital
element in the campaign, and perhaps the chief
clement. It may even become the determining
thing of the whole war.
It is therefore amply worth our while to pause
in this lull and analyæ the conditions of the
front between the Dunajec and the frontiers of
Roumania.

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF A MOUN.
TAIN CHAIN AS AI\; OBSTACLE.
All obstacles to a straterric advance have this
û
in common, that their ('haractcri::;tie is to impose
delay.

Each type of obstacle, however, differs from
the rest in the fashion whereby it must be sur-
mounted and defended, Thus marsh invoh'es the
building of a causeway; a belt of sea is defended
by a fleet and can only be surmounted by a fleet; a
river is usually to be cros
ed anywhere when once
the opportunity of throwing a bridge is acquired.
A range of mountains commonly presents a
particular type, both in the methods of surrr.ount-
ing it, and in the methods of defending it, which
give to the strategic problem connected with it a
special character capable of definition and
analy:Üs; and one range differs fr0m another
according to the height, the breadth, tbe character
of artificial communications across it, and so
forth. As the Carpathian front h:1s become for
the moment the principal field of the war, I
propose this week to describe the general charadeI'
of a mountain chain as an obsta.cle, aud next to
analyse the particular conditions of the Car-
pathians.
A mountain chain opposes the rapid progress
of an army in three ways, all inter-connected.
,First, and least important, you }-Jave the mere
fact of the slope, The attacking party has nor-
mally to a.dyance up hilI until the crrst of the
chain is acquired, .
Second, and much more important, mountain
districts are, by their forests and their crags,
difficult of access save by certain well-determined
avenues, commonly those of the main valleys, an<.t
these a.\"enues are made a.ccessible in various
degrees by the artificial work of roads and rail-
ways.
Thirdly, a mountain chain is commonly a
deserted territory, with few inhabit:mts, few
towns, and, therefore, few opportunities f
lr
shelter and storage.
Certain consequences flow immediately from
these three main characteristics. The most im-
portant is that frequent and good communiea.tions
will be discovered in the Plain upon either side,
and will usually grow rarer and rarer as the crest
is a pproached, A consequence of this is that the
defence of the chain becomes increasingly easy,
and the attempt to cross it incre3.<;ingly difficult
as the belt of mountain country from foothil1:;
to foothills is traversed by the attack.
The problem, therefore, of mastering the
obstacle of a mountain Qlmin is bv no means the
problem of merely reaching its mo"st deserted and
highest portion. the crest, after which ope may
expect the task of the ad\Tance to become easier.
Students sometimes fall into this error on the
analogy of lesser elevations. If you are trying,
for instance, to master a range of hills such as the
Cotswolds, when YOll are in possession of the crest
you ha\'e done your work. Supposing an army
coming up from the Plain of Oxford along the
gradual Eastern approach of the Cotswc1ds, and
another army concerned to pre\'{
nt their crossing
this chain and appearing in the Plain of the
Severn-the decisiye fighting ,',ould take r1acc on
1.

I..AND A
D 'YATER.

the Eastern slope; and if the im-ading army
carried the crest it would be impossible to defend
t.he short, steep escarpment down on to the Severn
Y alley.
But with a great mountain range the dis-
tances involved are so considerable that this
analogy does not apply.
"\Vith the crest already in one's hands, one
still has a belt of territory at least a day's march
broad, and usually much more, to pass before one
is out of the wild country and free to use the
numerous and easy communications,
Consequently, the real strain upon
n army
which is trying to force a belt of mountam terrI-
tory comes at the end of its effort, so far as com-
munications are concerned, and just as it is reach-
ing the further plain it is putting the maximum
shain upon its columns of supply,

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T L A I 1-.J' Ea.:rg comlzuuzli:aføfl
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Next we must note that when once the Plains
are reached the army reaching them has a very
great ad'mntage at once mer his opponent. This
advantage is not only due to the fact that once the
ohstacle has heen surmounted, and once the
.. bridge heads," so to speak, have been established
on the further side of it-that state of affairs
applies to the successful crossing of any obstacle-
the particular advantage given by the forcing of a
mountain chain and arriyal upon the plain beyond
may be compared to bursting of water through a
dam. So much effort and such numbers are required
for the difficult pas!'age (which,remePlber,can only
necessarily he conducted by a large body upon a
certain breadth of front), that iî it is successful,
by the time its effort reaches the plains the
enemy is probably already beaten. This does
not apply to the case of a deliberate retire-
ment behind a mountain range on the part
of the defence, when the defence feels itgelf
unequal to the ta sk of holding the hills; but
it does apply to such a battle as this which is
raging in the Carpathians on the Hungarian side.
An army which shall have been forced down the
2*

A pl'il 24, 1915.

Hungarian slope on to the plains will hardly be in
a posture to defend those plains against the masses
that have been accumulateù against it, and that
have forced it from the hills.
This consideration, though it is very vague
and general in its character, explains, I think,
more than one of the successful irruptions over a
mountain chain in history, At first blush it would
seem as though the army in the plain had every
advantage. It has good communications behind
it, whereas the army coming across the mountain
has bad communications. It has probably als

shorter communications behind it. It can move
large bodies "",iLh r:1pidity lateraHy, whereas the
army tbat has only just arrived on the plains can
only move small bodies laterally, and probably not
\\ ith rapidity. It has destroyed or impeded the
communications which it left bebind, whereas it
has kept intact the communications upon"" hich it
reposes.
From all these causes it would seem that the
army which has been pressed back across the
mountains should be in a better posture than the
army which has forced the obstacle. But the his-
torical cases which in practice prove the contr
Jl'Y
are so numerous that they mIl for an explan[!,tion,
and I believe the explanation to be 'v hat I have
said-that the effort to force such ::m obst
cle
being "hat it is, when it is successful has all the
eITed of the bll
'.)tíng of ,,,ateI' through a darn,
and, the plains being rrached, the momentum of
rictory counts for more than aU the rest.
I repeat, ho\\ever, that this does not apply
to the case of the ùefens: ve voluntarily abandon-
ing a belt of mountain district before a superior
offensive "hich it thinks it is not able to meet. In
this latter case the defensive, having fal1cn back
on to the plains, is in a very good posture to mect
the offensive proceeding from over the mountains.
It compels that offensive to fight with ,an obstac
e
at its back, and that is always a handlcap, and It
has the advantages above enumerated wbil'h the
plain can give.

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April 24, 1915, LA
D AXD WATER.
THE PARTICUL<\.R POINT OF TIlE LATERAL sketch, The four columns which are pressing
VALLEYS. down tbe four valleys a, b. c. d, will baye various
fortunes. Some will probably be able to go
forward faster tb...'tn others. Let us suppose
that for some reason the progress is moro
rapid towards the X end than towards tho
Y end, and that after a few more days'
fighting the front is represented b:- such a line
as the line of dots on the accompanring sketch. It
will be obsened that the force whieh is fighting
its way down valley a is ycry dose to the point e,
where the two streams a and b join. "'hen the
advance gets to e it 1.cill cut off the "ctreat of tlls
enemy still operating in 'wlley b, For that enemy
to try to get away towards valley r acr083 the
lateral ridge which serarates the two valleys will
be difficult or impossible. Therefore, as the
ad,-ancing force coming down ,-alley a gets nearer
and nearer to e, the enemy force in 'alle
T b is in
greater and greafer peril of finding itself cut off
from food and munitions altogether. If it is to
save itself it must fall back; and under the mere
threat it would do so rapidly.
Therefore a successful ad,'anre along valley
a is enough, when it has been sufficient Iy pushed
forward, to clear at once valley a and valley b
of opposition. Even, therefore, if the enemy in
valley b has been able to keep up a much bf'tter
defence than in valley a, the lack of success of the
enemy in valley a has the effect of neutrali
ing his
success in valley b, and the last state of the front of
both armies will be that of the dashes. The appea r

ance of the inyaders at e only from the one valley.
a will automatically give control to the im-ader ot
both passes 1 and 2 and of both the roads leading
down from them.
The process continucs. Xo matter how well
the defensive keeps its end up at the í end of tIle
chain, if the invader at the X end pushes down to
the point G, where the streams all unite. hð
threatens with destruction the dpfensive far up
vaHey c and valley d, and it must fall back rapidly'
if it 1S not to be destroyed. In efTed. the mere pre

senee of fhe invader at E will a Imost ecrtailllyj
make the defensive towards Y begin falling b:H'k
rapidly, and long before the im'ader is at G his
advance will have automatically uncovered tJ18
whole of the mountain belt and the defensive will
have been forced back to the line K-K.

A mountain range nearly always has a par-
ticular character which renders the problem of
offence and defence within its limits different from
that of any other obstacle, and this character must
be explained diagrammatically.
From the crest of a range of mountains X- Y
(as shown on plan II.) there descend to the
plain upon either side a system of valleys
which usually run more or less perpendicular
to the crest. Thus you will have on ono
side of X-Y the streams 1, Z, 3, 4, and on the
other side the streams a, b, c, d. These streams will
commonly run through deep gorges, and will be
separated by difficult secondary ranges (repre-
sented by the dotted lines), across which it is very
difficult to move men and material, and a line
across which it is difficult to keep in touch,

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The streams on either side especially mark the
lines along " hich communication across the
moun
ains is possible by road or by railway,

ow. as the streams proceed down towards
the foot-hills they unite in larger streams and more
open valleys as at the points 5-6, e-f, and later
on these new main streams unite in their turn
before reaching the plain, as at the points g and 7.
Now it is evident that an army forcing its
''tay across the mountains from the plains at

I-X towards the plains K-K, when it has
reached the crest X-Y and passed the four passes
at the heads of the streams, is hampered in its
movements because each portion has for some time
been separated from the rest by the lateral or
secondary ridges which come do" n from the cen-
tral range towards the plains on either side.
'Vhen it begins to go down the further slope
towards 1\:.-K, pressing the defensive before It,
these conditions remain unaltered until the first
of those points is readied at which tile streams
join.
Supposing, for ,instance, in the above
dia
ram the enemy, adyancing from a direction
A. nas made itself the master of all four paE'ses
-1, 2, 3, and 4, and is already beginning to get down
on the further slope. And supposing the front it
has managed to occupy by a certain date is repre-
sented by the line of crosses in the accompanying

THE II DOUBLE THRUST" OF THE
OPPOSING ARMIES.
Bearing aU these principles in mind, we c:tn,
by examining the actual points in the Carpathians

x

N

during the last three weeks, discover how matters
stand. The Russian and Austro-German armieg
now at issue in these mountains lie opposing each
other upon a line which makes an angle" ith and
i-

LAND AND
V A TER.

April 24, 1915.

('rosses the main crest, The position may be ex-
pressed in the foregoing sketch, " here X - Y repre-
sents the crest of the Carpathians, the shaded area
the mountain belt. the part left "blank on either side
the plains, and the brackets (1), (2), (3), (4), the
four main passes of the Dükla, the Lupkow, the
Uzsok, and the Jablonitza, of which the la.st
:thl'ee are railway as well as road passes, ",'bile the
thick line running transversely through the whole
represents the front of the two armies. In such a
scheme the most salient point and that which
leayes the issue most in doubt is this:-
That the Austro-Germans are in possession
nf a great deal of the plain upon the far side of
the mountains in the district I haye marked with
the letter A; while the Russians are only in posses-
sion of a narrow mountain district beyond the
crest, which I have marked with the letter B.
If the effort of either combatant were pre-
cisely the same in character and in strength, it
would be obvious that this possession of the plain
on the Eastern flank by the Austro-Germans would
gi\'e them the advantage oyer the Russians, and a
f:iituat ion such as that representpd in the diagram
would mean that the Russians could not hope to
force the Carpathians. For although they lmd
crossed at one place, they would appeal' to haye
heen badly beaten in the race for the plains by
their opponents cro::'<:lllg at another, a nd the

ustro-Gerll1ans, with their advantage of roads
and railways in the plain, could bring such an
effort to bear there that those plains at A--A
would become the principal field of action, and the
Uussians could not moye with safety until theÜ.'
enemies had been dri,-en out of the flat country.
But, as a fact, the effort has not been of the
same character upon the tw"o sides. The Austro-
Gprmans occupying the plains at A-A, and the
belt of mountains between those plains and the
main crest, han
been where they are for seYeral
months past. They did not .slowly beat tha
Russians back. The Russians ,'oluntarily retired
before greatly superior numbers long before
'rrzemysl bad fallen, and long before their new
munitioning and equipment had permitted them
to bring forward reinforcements.
The Uussians are not upon this Eastern flank
in the IJosition of a force in front of which the
dam of pressed inyasìon has burst. They are on
a caJculated àefensim, long drawn up and held

yith sufficient numbers,
At the other end of the line, the X end J
a.lthough the Russians are still far from the
plains, their advance into the belt B-B has been
the result of steady and heavy fighting against a

defensive which has been slowly beaten hack. and
which may at any moment betJ':Ìy signs of exhaus-
tion.
Xor is this the onh' matÜ'r in which the
apparently superior po
ition of the Austro-
Germans must be qualified.
The Carpathian belt is not of ewn ,,-idth, nor
its difficulties of ground of equal character, nor
its passes equally easy to use in the maintenance
of communications. Its actual shape is not the
}ìamllf>logram repre&ented in diagram IY." but
rather something like that of diagram Y..
in which the ÌIh'rea!'ing widt.h of the range
3<> one goes south,east is inùicateù by the
shape of the shaded portion and the increasing
difficulty of the ground indicated by the increas-
ing closeness of the shading as one goes from north-
west toward south-east. Tl1Ough, therefore, the
Austro-German line coY(
rs a good deal of the
northern plain, that is, a portion of Galicia and all
the Bukovina, while the Russian line only CO\ ers a
sma n mountain portion beyond the main
J'Îdge. yet
tbe Uussian advance represcnts an easier field of
action 2nd less perilous communÜ:ations upon its
side of the cr('st than the Austro-German effort
upon theirs.
IoreO\Ter. the increasing difficulty of
the ground as one goes south-cast rueans higher
mountains, both lateral and ma in. deeppr ra\ ines,
far more extensive woods, and, I beliC\Tc, a rarer
popuktion.
The modification of the position is further
cTHphasiscd by the nature of the passes \\ hich,
\\ hen they are studied, will be seen to be at onæ
easier and closer together wl!l'l'e the Russians arc
I ) ressi ng for" a I'd t ha n \\ here t he A ustro- Germa ns
wId them in check.
In order to appreciate this tbe follo"ing
sketch map ma.y be useful.

A

,VI

-,:z

Taking as the l
mits of the plai
c.ountr,r the
principal towns whIch stand .at the ISSU
S. of the
\al1eys and markinO' these wIth dots, gl\TIllg the
l'aih
ays in the u5u
1 c?n\'ention (t.he singJc li
les
single and the double hnes double), all.d
ho\\'mg
the principal road passes by brackets, It IS appa-
rent that every facility for cro:3sing the range
increases as one goes to the left-that is, north-
ward rrlld westward-and tbat ,\'hoever is pressing
on in the rep'ion A-
\. hvs ad\'antage 0\ ('1' his
opronent pre
sing on in tbe region B-B.
It is upon this general advantage that tte
Ru!'sians are now counting, in spite of the fact
that their enemies Jwxe a gooù footing on the
plaIns, which t!ley hayc not; the actual front
beil1n' very much wha.t the thick line is on the same
sket
h. Should the Russians, for instance, succeed
in foreinO' their way òown to the point H (whkÌl
is 1:I.omo
a, and at the gate of the plains), they.
4

1\pril24, 1915.

LAND 1\ND l%A TER.

.

12

u

'"'.
"'
.
J
.

\'t\

ç-

ú'

'-

N
Deoreczen.

c

will be in a better ro
ition to adyance southward feet. Beyond the Jablonitza Pass the Pop I\an is
than "ill the Austro-Germans to advance nOl'th- over 6,000, and immediately O\-erlooking Dornn.
ward. 1-;'01' they will have behind them short, 'Yatra itself and the Roumanian frontier is a peak
c:.tsy, and numerous communications, ,vhile their nearer 8,000 than 7,000 feet in height.
enemies will have long, difficult, and few commulli- As 'with the peaks. so with the passes. They:
cations. climb lligher and higher as one goes from the
I.et us conclude ihis survey of the mere posi- region of Cracow towards the frontier of Rou-
tions by c'Camining the ground and the communi, mania. The Lupkow and the Dukla are not 2.000
cations in some detail. and for that purpose I will feet above the sea; the U zsok is nearly 3,000. The
append another sketch map, Bçskid Pass between Stryj and
Iunkacs is a little
Kotice in the fir:;t place upon this m:.tp the lower, but the .Jablonitza is well oyer 3,000, aUtl
length of the front. The .Âustro-German defence the road pass of Stiol, which is the highe&t of all,
of Cracow holds the vaHey of the Duuajec in its is, I believe, nearly 4,000.
lower part, and the yalley of its tributary, the '\I' e ha\ c already seell that with the gl'adllaJ
Biala, up to the summit
of the mountains. In rise and broadening of the Chain as it got's south-
other words, the railway from Tarnow to Kascbau wards the country gets more deserted, the forest
cannot be u:3ed by the enemy. but he has probably larger, and the communications more rare. 'Yithin
by this time built a subsidiary line linking up the first sixty miles of rolyanka the pDSses.
Neu Sandec with the main Cracow line. From this all of which are in t
le hands of the Russians now,
front along the Dunajec and the Biala. from, say, number no less than six high roads and one doublo
such a point as Jaslo to Dorna "\Yatra on the line of railway, In the next sixty miles yúu hayc
Roumanian frontier, is a line near to which, but in but three road passes and two single lines of mil-
a bow slightly bending eastward of which, runs way, unless one counts as two separate avenues for
the full length of the Carpathian chain, or, rather, advance the two roads which diverge from the
of that part of it concerning the present opera- Beskid Pass. one towards rng-mr, the other
tions. The direction is but a little eastward of due towards M:unkacs. In the remaining distance of
south-east; the distance is 410 kilometres, or just over 120 miles there are only two road passe
, one
under 255 miles. Connting the sinuosities of the of which, along the Delatin or Jablonitza, is
front and the curve of the mountain chain, we arC' accompanied by a single line of railway.
dealing with something rather oyer 300 miles of In connection with these passes it may be of
country. In this stretch the range continually interest to delay for a moment upon a point
rises. The height of the mountain mass above which bas been discussed recently in the papers :'
Bartfeld is about 3.800 feet high. Immediately the accuracy of the term "
Iag'yar 'Yav."
to the east the whole range sinks, and there is n, Tradition points to the invasion of the Hl;n.
sort of natural saddle, the lowest point of which is garian Plain by the :Magyars in the ninth
the Dnkla Pass; for about that point tbe rise century over the cornpar
tiYCly open gap
begins. There is a peak, before the Uzsok Pass is which leads from Stry.i to l\.Iunkacs, and is to-
reached, already nearer 4,600 than 4,500 feet. In day generally known as the Beskid Pass. This tra-
the midst of the ,ast woods forty miles away to the dition is accepted, I bclieye by the learned bodies
south-east there is a peak not far short of 6,000 of modern Hungary, and the natioTI...'l.1 monument
5*

LAND :AND
A TER.

,.

\p G J1 .6 /'

f \

,.?

,
_ .._ _ So..'\i\ ê' /

.... \J 'J )'\' _ '
y
"'-'-- " ,\, ,-,
--.... ' , '" , I
J --
"
...".......
í
....
II
'
, I,
.fTI

,
,

, '

\, '---,
,
;.
:'"
,

rected in memory of this arrival of the TIun-
garian nation to its present seat stanòs upon the
plateau of :Munkacs itself, But there is another
tradition which gives the name to the next pass,
the Jablonitza, and this is the one followed in the
map issued by Messrs. Dobson and Molle under
my name.
In the exmnination of this part of the Car-

BarEfield-

fl(L'JÿG..4

I
:Jv

.
.

r..
3 :/f L 7v'

pathians as a strategic field, even more important
than their gradual rise and broadening to the
south and east, and the increasing rarity of com-
munications in the same direction, is the orienta-
,tion of the valleys. It so happens that the Car-
pathians not only bend gently outward towards
íhe east-a fact that would, in any case, make the
}laSSeS over them tend to converge from the east
tmyards the west-but also have a system of water-
courses upon the western or Hungarian side which
converges the valleys yery rapidly on to the Hun-
garian plain.
It is exceedingly important to note this,.
because upon it will depend the whole plan of the

ussian invasion if the war turns in its next
rlevelopment into a pressing of the Russians into
lIungary. The "alleys on the Hungarian side all
lead down to the main stream of the Theiss, and
Lunch together in the I!lOSt rapid fashion upon a
short sector, which I haye indicated on the sketch
map hy the line A B. The crest of the Car-
pathians, running roughly as does the dotteò line,
is upon the eastern side marked by a number of
'ateral valleys, leading down normaIly enough to
the Galician plain. As, for instance, that at the
mouth of which is Stanislau (S), the two at the
mouth of which are Czernowitz (C), that of the
Pruth, at the mouth of which is Kolomea (K),
that at the mouth of which is Stryj (Str), that of
6.

'A p
à 24, 1915.

the mouth of which is Sambo (Sam); tbe t"\"\"'o at
the junction of which is Sanok, and, further on
that of Dukla and that of Jaslo. '
But while the valleys on the Galician side
thus follow a normal course and come down
parallel one to the other from the crest of the
mountains, those on the Hungarian Bide aU
U bunch," as I have described, into one com para-

st'C
f ,
, ,
, .
" ,
, .-
, ,
, ,
L:

;t:J
.ç
7
.?'0:>-

" s
, -""
. ,
, .
: '

,
"
\
,
\
I
I
,
\

c

......--

( \-
, .

.

\

f.\.
r:
.
,-.J

.

I
'.

"
.,

, ,
, ,
......

,
..

- ----
, ....
, -
'--'

v.rn

tively small space, and the strategic effects of such
an arrangement are considerable. The railways
follow the valleys, and so do the roads, Szollos
(1), 1Iunkacs (2), Ungvar (3), Homonna (4), the
towns at the valley mouths on the Hungarian side,
stand upon a line only eighty miles in length. The
corresponding towns upon the Galician side
stand upon a line three times as long.
The effect of this is that a successful advance
from Galicia into Hungary will, if it is pressed
llOrne upon the left or west of the line. decide the
fate of the eastern end of the line.
Supposing, for instance, that the Russian
advance from the left in the above sketch map
got as far as the shaded bar C- D, the invaders
\Yould then be in pos3ession of all the issues into
the Hungarian plain. They might hoM not forty
miles of front and yet be cutting all the lines of
retreat for all the enemy forces on the crest of the
mountains and beyond them from the U zok rigbt
up to the Roumanian frontier.
Put all this together, and the lesson is plain.
Of two things, one, either the Russians intend to
make the Carpathian front the chief seat of their
activity during the next few weeks, or they are
only clearing out the pressure upon them in this
retreat and intend their main effort to be made
across the Dunajec and on towards Cracow.
In the second case the conformation of the

April 24, 1915.

L...\,KD AKD

valleys is of
10 particu.lar iml?ortance.
aving
got a good gnp of the ( arpatluans. they wIll not
proceed further towards the Hungarian plaill.
But in the first case the conformation of the valle\'s
is very important indeed, for upon tbe way Ìn
which they" bunch" together towards Hungary
TIussian success woulJ depenrL And. further, the
effort which has captured the Dukla and the
Lupkow, and which is now menacing the U zok,
would become explicable.
If it is the Hungarian plain which is the
objective of the main Russian forces (and the
chances are that this is their objective), then it is
manifest upon the argument developed, and from
the lie of the roads, the railways, the valleys, the
width of the chain at various parts, its difIiculties
of ground, and its varying height, that a success-
ful passage over the narrower, lower, and better
traverse northern and eastern end automatically
masters the southern and western.
It is manifest, in other words, that in attempt-
ing an invasion of Hungary under modern condi-
tions, \\'ith troops so numerous that the front of
the whole ridge O\er 200 miles long can be
defended, is best accomplished by hammering hard
upon the right of the invaders, and that the
attempt at the defence to COU'l tel' this by an
advance upon the broader part of the illOlmtains
against the invader's left is handicapped in every
\v:,p:.
" "-hethel' the Russians are aiming at tIle in-
\'asion of Hungary or no \w cannot tell. They
ha\e the initiati\'e, and thpir commanders know
wh
t we do not. But if they are, then pressure
upon the north and west is the wry fashion in
which to attain their end, and th(' command of the
passes of that IGwer end of the chain, including
the U zük. "'ill determine the struggle.
The immediate future will show whether this
objeet is theirs or 119. If it is their object it is
best obtainable in the manner they ha\ e chosen
during the Ja
,t six we(.ks of the preSl:'llt fighting.
So far we lwvc be<,:,n examining the whole
problem of the Carpathians
tatieally upon the
assumpt.ion of an equality in numbC'rs and in
munitions uuon either side.
But the' problems of 'war, like all problems of
hUTi1dn actÏ\'itv, are not stat.ic, but dynmnic, and
an appreci:tt.iòn of the position on this Eastern
front can only he arrived at "llen we have trans-
f('rred our f'stimate frÒm static to dynamic t{'rms.
In less pedantic words, the problem of the
Carpathians "ould be 80h-ed not only and in part

WATER.

by the ad\ ant.age of positions, but also, and mucJì
more, by the aùvantagc of numbers.
Sow, here direct evidence fails us.
"
e have no statistics to guide us. But we
can adopt certain general conclusions based upon
the " feeling" which each side has made of its
opponent, and also upon the knowledge of tbe
reeent Russian munitioning, of the recent German
efforts in this region, and of the recent German
weakening upon the 'Ve8tern front.
It is no unfair estimate to gauge the opposing
forces between the Dukla and the frontier of
Bukovina as approximately equal since the fall of
Przemysl. The extreme severity of the struggle,
its doubtful fortune, and the tenacity of the
counter-offensive beyond the mountains all point
to such an estimate,
Further, \ye know that there has been a come
para.tively slow, a rather reluctant, but recently a
considerable lending of German troops to the
Austrians here. We have been given the estimate
of three army corps, rising to seven, and possibly
la tel' to ten,
Kow, all that points to a very special effort
made by the enemy, and yet that effort hardh- holù-
ing its own. 'Ve know, on the other hand, that tbe
Russians have been receiving munitions in an in-
creasing stream during the last month, and per-
haps during the last six weeks. 'Ye furt.her know
that the numbers of the Russians in this region
have been increasing during precisely the same
period, and we know that the total numbers
they can put in the fielJ are chiefly limited by
this power of munitioning' and equipping, in
which they have been handicapped during the
" inter.
The conclusion is clear, If the Russians are
m
king the Hungarian plain their ohjecti-,'e, they
can, to the strategical condition analysed aboye,
add, as the season proceeds, the d) namic clement
of numbers.
I repeat: One may not presuppose in the
course of a war which of two alternati\e objectives
is in the mind of a commander who has captured
and retaÏJls the initiative. L\nd that is the posi-
tion of the Grand Duke to-day. If his objective
shall be Cracow or any other, the arguments given
above lose, not their COD'E'ilCY in resrect to the
Carpathian chain, but tLeir importance in the
study of the campaign. But if his objecth'e is the
Hungarian plain, then this analysis of the obstacle
which covers that plain will prove its value in the
operations in the near future.

--

INFLUE
CE OF AIR
.
THE AERIÂ1
DILEl\1l\1A: A SOLU.fI()N.
By L. ßLIN DESBLEDS.

E,\ DEHS of the noh's on the Influence of
i
Air 1'0\\"('1' \..hid. ha\e already appeared
..I.. '- in these eolw,ms \
ill, perhaps, remem-
:)
l' that the
\riter, in Lis preyious
a llides, ha
endeavoured to show t.hat. v. hr-n ana-
l) sed. it j, found that the capa 1ditie; of aire, aft
in adual \\arfarc at pre
ent gi\c lÌse to a difiì( ult
situation, wltj("h amounts L a rLd I dilf'llIl1la.
That difficulty is due to tJ}(' fi1
t tbat air f1eelr as
\H' no\-\ tuo ,\ th"nl. (';'u 1.'(' P >d helh as :in (l! m
aIlù as a . 1'/.;".. As an .UP-I, 3 1 1 a[,l'i ,I forcc is
u
,'d to :HH'I)]Ci:IC::t otb'l' al'll
-":, "
Il\'h :lS th
Cilya!rv,

, .

PO\VER.- V.

the artillery, &.c., and, in consf'quf-nce, it must he
subJrdinat.cJ to tlip commanù
ld of those "arious
arms. TIme;, it' an air squ:J.di'On is workinO' in
co-operation with the' artillery with a ,ic
to
assistiuu or cOl'r('olÏlw o"unfire OJ. to di<;c o v e r I .nt7
On,." , 0
thp position and :urange!lu.>nt of hostile batteries.
or to carr) ing out other kindred tasks, it is e,'i-
(lent that, for maximum cl!ìeienev. that air souaJ-
, 1.
rün must l-e suhon1inated to the artillc:y con'-
mander. SubordinatioTl and co-ordination are
equally neccssar
in tJJe e:
of co-operation
between the aerial arm and :':'11.) other arm, be it the
7*

LAXD

AND

cavalry, the iufantry. or the f'nginepr
. It is to
their suc(;ess in closely co-ordinating t be employ-
ment of their aerial arm in co-operation with the
other arms that the writer tJas becn kd to ascrihe
the principal cause of the aerial a5cenJaney w-hich
the British have now obtaincd, and which has
already praved of such ctinj;cquence that Yery glPat
care siiould be exercised in order that it may not
be impaired. Although to that close co-opera-
tion amI eo-ordination the efficiency of British
air work is directly traceab1f', j-et it Inu:;t
be kept in view that there arc other very
important cause.:; whieh haye contributed to
Great Britain's acrid ascendancy. Among
these an' (i.) the efficiency of the machines
themseh'cs, resulting from good design, careful
manufacture, efficient repairing and supervising
staff, and adequate transport service; (ii.) a very
careful training of the aerial pilots and of the
aerial observers, rendering their piloting safe and
reliablf' and their observations of real value; and
(iii.) the personal factor, which has rcsulted in the
Brit.ish airmen malnns a bette)' use of their
machines than their aJycrt:al'ies aud p-mploying
them with sucppss in circumstances in which their
opponents ,.ould not d2.fe risk themselves aloft.
'Vhen, howeyer, Great Britain's aerial
ascendancy is careïully 3,11(1 cooH.}' scrutini
ed
and only incontrovertible facts arc allowed
t.hrough the
ievc of exacting criiicism, one is
forced to the conclusion tbat as a sen-ice, calJable
of independellt action like the
aYy, for instance,
110 country has, as yet. obtained any marked
ascendancy, although to he strictly accurate it
would seem that, at present, so far as its offensive
or d i reet value is concerned, the a(h-antages of.
aerial power lie, perlmps, with the enemy. The
writer would not draw public attention to this
stab
of afiairs if he L:ould not at the same time
propose a remedy, which is not a\"ailable to our
opponents. But, before doing so, he would like
once more to state dearly tbe nature of the aerial
dileIIlma now facing the belligerent Powers. Shall
a commander look upon his air fleet as a service
and employ it to exert direct inlluence, in which
case he "ould have to forgo the advantages result-
ing from the co-ordination of his aircraft
ith tbe
other arms, or shall he employ his aerial force as
an arm to exert tbe indirect influence of air power,
in \\hich case he would h
Ye to renounce the pos-
sible direct effect of the influence of air power 1
The tendency, both among the Allies and the
enemy, has been, up to the present, to employ their
aerial force mainly as an arm. But, the offensiye
,alue of aircraft having been recognised, several
air rvids have been undertaken both by the Allies
and the enemy, Those air raids which have lacked-
in boldness so far as the number of machines is con-
cerneù have not had very lasting effects for \ê.1rions
l'easons. An these l'eaS011S, hm\ eyer, can be traced
directly to the fact that the present organisation
(of <'1.:1 aeri
l force does not allow
t to operate as a

e
V:lce! wlth freedom to act entlrely on its own
lllluatlYC as and when circumstaflces demand. In
this connection it is very important to note that the
('neIllY, not froP1 any special ef-fort uf their own,
but throu
h the force of events and, to a yery great

1('6r
e, through Great Britain's ycry ascendancy
III the employment of the aerial arm, has, in part,
('::;ca perl from the 1101'nS of the aerial dilemma
f'llunciated aboye, This is a point worth consider-
ing \' ith care.

YVATER.

April 24, 1915.

The readers of this pllh1ication will pt'rhaps
remember that in 0i1è of h;s IHT:,-ious articlesii' the
writpl' cXljlained why the Zeppelin airships were
ullsuitc,:J for hnjd fighting but were valuable for
n3V(] 1 warfare. The asccndancy ,..hi{.h the Allied
airmen have ohtainetl since the writing of that
artil'le further increases the unsuitability of the
Zeppelin airship as au :1('}'ia1 arm for lane} opera-
tions, and, thcj'('foI'f', th(' German 3rtillen or
cayalry commanders ilc,.cr !la\ c recour
e to t.h.e co-
operation of their Zeppelins. V{hile the useless-
ness of the Zep!1c1ills as nil ann fur bud opera-
tions has had th(' result of )'eleasing them to an
independcnce of action of their own, so fa l' as land
warfare is concerned. yet, as a naval a('rial arm,
they are still of poteùiial value. In this respect
aga-in tlwir utility ha:
not been in evidence, but,
in this ease, throngh no deff'ct in the airships them-
selves. This is a point worth l.mder:;t:mding
funy. As regaJ'd
tIle war on land the Zeppelin,
as an arm, is of no 1'('31 ,aluc -in ,iew of the anti-
aircra ft organisati()ns of the AJlif's and of tfJeir
aerial a

enJmwy obtained by a judi
ious nnd bold
employment of their aeroplanes; wit.h referenee to
sca ,,-arfare. the Zeppelin, as an arm, is, again, of
no real value, !lot through any anti-aircraft
superiority or aerial asceIHhHlCY of the Allies, but
through tlic enforced seclusion of the Gf'rman
fleets in thpir harhoHT's. There beino' no German
<:)
naval operations of allY importance, tbere is no
use for the Zeppelin airships as a na\"al ::erial
arm. The net rpsnlt of tbe:;e yarious circum-
stances is that the Germans are now in possession
of an aerial force capable of entirely illdepi:ndcllt
action-that is. one ,vhich, within restl'ietions im-
posed by the m:lcJÚnes and t,beir pC'rsonnel, can, for
all intents and purposes, he considered as a se1'-
"ire and the!,phy capable of C'xerri::;Ín cr its illflue:ace
directly. Thus it is that the encmy, on account
of t.lIe unsuitability of their airships for co-ordi-
natIOn in land warfare and of their inabj1itv to
co-operate with na'ml opera.tions, haye not, at
t.he
present moment, to consider the diìf'nm1a in
exactly t.he saiìle light as the Allies. In consc-
quence t.hey ha\-e somewhat evaded a djfficult
situation, and are f'v('n able to turn it to their
advantage. Thus tìwy have carried out recent
airship raids in the neighbourhood of Paris and
on the Korth-East and East coast.s of England.
It is ,'ery likely tha t, "ith tl1e coming fine season,
the Zeppelin seT\'ice will attempt to exel'cise direct
influcnce of air power on a more comprehcnsiYð
and more sustained scale.
Now it is necessary that the Allies should
possess meal1S of exercising the direct influence
of air power to at least the same degree as their
adycrsaries. In other words, it is imperative fur
them to devise some method whereby to escape
from the dllemma, and, as regards Great Britain,
the writer yentures to suggest a simple plan
whereby this can be done.
Great Britain's direct influence of air power,
at the present juncture, should possess three char-
acteristics: (a) It shoulá be at least as great as
that of the enemy; (b) it must be capable of v>ard-
ing off the enemy's menace; and (c) it must not be
detrimental to the aerial ascendancy which Great
Britain already possesses, It is not a very easYj
matter to calculate the number and exact poten.
tiality of the existing Zeppelins for ofIen-

... The Mvdern Military Zep11<'lin:' Lu.'D &Y]) Wu:t:n. Deo. 26. lSl4.

13.

I\pril 24, 1915.

LAND

AND

:Jvórálwrlà .

.. a- ,..., LI
a ,T '7\ ' ND
J:i 1:, 'u J..,..t"\.
and DUNE

IIkJtJ SOð "
. . I".

WATER.

. 'lùpz:uenð positLm

Zepl'elin. s/td.

\
\\

,'

'I
'/
"
J.'

:E

V"

Scale ofúeé'

5(100

On this map òf Hc.li::;oland is 5bown the position of a Zeppelin sbed, oompleted IU'd rumded over to the German
&utbontiCð since the outbreak of h08tiliti<'s, In vlew of the rcoent acti10ity of the Zeppelin airnh;ps the exact position of the
Zeppelin base in tho Korth Sea carm,ot but be of very great intere
t to our naval authorities. A description of that mo
t
up,t.o--date aerial base was gi,'en in the issuo of LA!\D AKD \V ATER, dated Janu2.ry 16, 1915. The shed is about 625ft. long
and 180ft. "ide, and like the ('ne nea? Cm.haven, it is of the .. rc,-oh ing" and .. collapsible" t
'pe. Close to it is a
fad.ory for the manufacture üf the neceSò3ry hydrogen. It is estimated that the Zeppelin b<u;e of He!l:;o!alld, v.hich,
normaU
', ocutalls two aiIships, has been built and equipped at a co.st of ;E20,OOO.

f!iye purposes, so that, for complete safC'ty, the
plan must allow for a liberal estimate of the
enemy's ùirect aerial potentiality. Since the
enemy can acria1Jy menace a great number of
places the plan must proyiùe for prcp
ration an.d
readiness at a great number of pomts. It IS
evident that this cannot be done by employing, at
va.rious places, the machines or military pilots who
are necessary for the maintenance of the British
aerial ascenda.ncy.
The plan which the writer proposes, and
",hich fulfils all the preceding desiderata, is the
formation of a National
\.ir Service by arousing
local illitiati\e, especially ill the sea-coast towns.
The National Air Sen-ice could only be successful
if it received Government sanction and if it
worked in consultation with the official aeronauti-
cal denartments. In accordance with the sug'

.
gested plan every seaslùe town would be asked to
be responsible for the construction, 10caUy or other-

wise, of one or two aeroplanes and for the tl'ainin(.{
of one or two pilots. Every seaside town woulù,
besides, undertake to ha\-e al\\ays under construc-
tion and training onc or more machincs and pilots.
In this manner there would be, in a ,cry short
time, a number of aeroplanes distributed along the
coast of Great Britain in constant readiness to
ward off a Zeppelin visit. After a short tim

there would be a nucleus of an ofi'ensi\ e ail' service
ready for illdepenùent offensive operations, Such
a fleet \\ould not only be a suitable one for carry-
ing on war, on a large scale, iJìw the heart of the
enemy's country, hut also would be especially "\'alu-
able for coping with the German submarinc war-
fare on commerce. There are, of course, rnanv
details that \\ould have to be settled \.. ith regard
to rendering efficient such a Xational
\ir Service
as outlined above; but in principle the scheme, as
a solution of the dilemma facing us, is simple and
practical.

THE

WAR
By FRED

BY WATER.
T. JANE.

NOTI,-This Article has bC
!l luilmittfd to tile Prus Bcrc:m, whkh does Dot object to nu: plIbli
3ti(JD :15 cccsore!!, ;!cd tahes no
responsibility for the c.orrec.tness ()f the statements.

THE NORTH SEt\.-THE POSITION OF
HOLLAND.
A LTHOUGH it yet seems early days to !'peculate 11.9
to Holland being dragged into the war, there
are not wanting yarious recent indicatiuns th.1t
Germany is seel:ing a pretex.t to cstablish herself
in the Netherlands.
German ideals as to posses
ing the Rhine down to the
øea are, of coune, neither noyel nor secret; but we appear to

on the vergo of 8 situation created by thc naval war which

has no connection wÜh past s!'ntiment, but \\hich has been
entirely brought about by modf'rn ueeds.
On the outbreak of war Germany had a yery restricted
Eea front. This restricted sea front was then and 'before lh;
t
time genen.lly regarded in Germany (and here al-;o for U1J.t
matter) a"l a German asset. We are all familiar wÏU] t118
comparali\""a diagrams which used to be pl'Oduccd: .. \Vhat
Germany has to deJellll," reprC'scnted by a 8pe
ies of dot;
': What Britain has to defend," indicated by a wry loni
linc.
In its W'ay 111e diagram was DlliteaJiJ"1g, because

9-

LAND

AND

)' defence" is an incorrect tcrm to use in relation to warfare-
espccially naval warfare, of which the be-all and end-all (if
lucce!'s is to be hoped for) is attack.
However, this coastal question obtained as a classic, and
It is merely quoting ancient history to say that Germany
reD'arded her small coast line as a valuable asset. She more
or "less fortified every yard of her coast line at a cost which
would certainly, if otherwise expended, have provided her
with a fleet fully equal in strength to that British Fleet which
the war found her faced with.
Approximately the ideal adopted was an impregnable
Inyerted V, in the centre of which lies Heligoland. It is to
be expressed diagrammatically as indicated in ::I!'igure 1, " x II

.
,
,
,
,

.

ý..
O I \
\

representing the passive shore defence, the arrows the active
local naval defence based mainly on Heligoland,
From the impregnable barrier thus created the German
Fleet was theoretically to emerge as convenient-being able
to fight or retire to safety when desirable, as circumstances
might dictate.
On the face of it this seemed a very strong and alluring
position, especially when contrasted with the relatively vast
and undefendable (by complete shore defences) Briti:òh coast
line. There-till the war broke out-the matter remained.
A very short experience of war, however, revealed the
now obvious fact that the smaller the coast line the easier it
i3 for a superior enemy to establish an efficient watch over it,
limiting all egress to the range of the local defences. Para-
doxical as it may at first sight appear, Germany's weakness
lies in the very strength of her inshore defences.
Her tardy recognition of this is evidenced by her frantic
efforts to reach the sea at places beyond the German coast
line. From the military point of view (using militalY in the
strict Army sense) there was, we may take it, no very special
advantage in securing Calais. Yet Calais was Bought for at
extravagant cost. Similarly large efforts in Belgium were
directed to establi'ìhing control of a sea front-that is to say,
operations for naval rather than strict.ly army purposes-the
obvious objective being the creation of a more extended sea
front, and 90 a corresponding increase ðf the area to be
watched by the British Fleet.
'Ve can see the advantages of an extended front in our
own case in the failure of the German submarine blockade,
It is impossible for the available hosWe force to watch more
than a small fraction of the total area j on the bulk of the
mileage merchant ships can come and go with impunity,
\Vith Germany the exact conditions are different; but
tDe main principle involved remains the same. So far, 80
good. But, the mouth of the ScheIdt is closed to German
war shipping. The submarines which she is putting together
at Hoboken can hardly re1!ch the sea exccpt through what are
now neutral Dutch waters. Every really suitabb harbour
en the coast is Dutch, not Belgian. The Dutch fleet is insuf-
ficient to offer any effective resistance in defence of its b
ses.
and it happens to consist of ships which, being de
igned to
operate in Dutch and contiguous waters, would be a useful
reinforcement to Germany if captured.
To this add facts as they have happened during the last
few days. Dutch vessels have made their nationality abun-
dantly clear. Not content with names and nationality
Fainted in huge letters on their sides, they have been veritable

."\YA TER,

April 24, 191ft

1:.

sea picture palaces of Dutch flagH and other evidences of
neutral nationality. The very stupidest of German sub.
marine captains could not possibly have sunk any Dutch
vessel" by mistake. JJ Such slaughter of the innocents as has
taken place must IWl'e been elltirelv dclibuate, entirely in
the category of .. things ordered. JJ
There is no other possible hypothesis under which this
matter can be explained. Wherefrom we are driven to assume
that, for purposes of her own, Germany is bent on driving
Holland into war, and that a war against her is well inside
the probabilities, maiuly or entirely in order to secure for
Germany an effective extended North Sea coast line and bases
which Belgium, despite Zeebrugge, has been unable to afford.
Holland-once a great Sea Power-can, however, provide
them. Not to put too fine a point upon it, Holland is Ger-
many's best trump in the war by water. By driving lIolland
into the Allied Camp, Germany has everything to gain and
nothing to lose. Holland is equally useful either as friend or
foe. But as a neutral she is a hindrance and a nuisance to
Teutonic schemes.
Military matters are not my province; but I take it
that we are in no position to assure Holland much more im-
munity on land than we were able to afford to Belgium. On
which account we may yet see the Dutch driven to accept a
German alliance. If they do, we cannot blame them-we can
only put it down to our lack of military power to back up our
Sea Power. So far as Sea Power alone is concerned, we may
safely rely upon it that the British Navy has the possible situa-
tion well in hand. But, whichever way this particular cat
jumps, we must remember that Roll,md is gradually being
forced into an invidious position, and we shall do well to
remember that, since Germany is obviously endeavouring to
force her to side with us, it will probably app(')ar to Dutch
statesmen that the lesser evil will be to take sides with
Germany. On the whole, it may be the lesser evil for us also.
Our main business is to see to it that Germany does not
extend her sea front. The rest-pregnant as it may seem-is
a matter of relatively small importance. III the coming sub-
marine warfare every extra mile of coast that can be utilised
will have a value far above anything that could have been con-
ceived of in the old days, when warships operaLell in consider-
able groups and were always easily located. 'ViLh submarines
the groups are much smaller, and single action is not un-
common, while location is very difficult, Equally difficult will
shutting them ill be, a very hi,';h numerical pr.eponderance of
blockaders being essential to any snccess.
One way and another l it looks as though fl'tnre North
Sea operations are going to be coastal affairs, having for their
prime objective the curtailment of hostile bases, as oppoFed to
the old idea of endeavouring to entice the c:J.emy out and then
fight him on the open sea.
Of course, there never was a timp when it, wa
not
recogni"ed that, given tha dc
truciion of the base, the sequel
would be the annihilation of the fleet operatil'g from it; hut
co-incident with this, there was ever tIle fortification of bases
to an extent \V3ich more or less rendered them impregnable
to or
inary warship attack. Bases have been captured by in-
vestment from the land side, as in the ca
e of Port Arthur,
but such opera lions 8re neces'3arily Vel'Y lengthy, and they
are not possible in many cases.
Submarines, however, from thpir ability to lIse ex.tem-
porised bases, will, of neces
ity, force tbe pace and render it
more end more imperative for us to curtail iu every possible
way Germany's accf'SS to the North Spa. On that, more than
anythin 6 else, the main issue dE'pends.

THE ß.\L TIC.

Comiderable importance may be attached 10 the Swedi,.h
report that a large German fleet 11a9 be:)n seen in the Abo
dÜ'ection. If there be any truth whatever id the report (and
it has a circumstantial sound) it would look 8'3 though the
pres5ure of Russian sea power in the DaHic has made itself
felt., and that Germany has seriously elnJ,al'læd upi'n an
atiefl"lpt to destroy the euemy at her I. bacK door,"
Such an attempt would naturally be made in very con-
siderable force, for the Ru
sian Fleet haR lately Leen added to
by the completion of some or all of the Dreadnoughts of t,he
GaT/rlvot class, Equally naturally, there will be nothing for
it but for the Rm;sians to retire to some protected hase where
the Germans will have to contain them-an operation not to
be car/'Íed out without depleting the High Sea Fleet of sonle 01
its best capital ships-half a d07en at the very least.
The alLernati ve is to allow the Baltic to uccorr.e a. Ru
sian
lake, with the more or less total cutting off of all such sllpplie.
from Scandinavia as at preseut reach Germany.
POl' the Russians to attempt any fleet action agaiu.>t odds
is quite unnecessary: they can acromplish more by cOPlpe!ling
lO:'t

Apl'i124, 1915.

LAND

Ä
D

the Germ:J.n
to contain them, the containing force bcing
aubjected to {,he perpctual menacc of
ubmarine and destroyer
attack at a considerable distance from any satisfactory basé.
It has to be remembered in this conne('tion that all the
main development of German bases during the last few years
has been on the North Sea front. Even Kiel has sunk con-
riderably in importance during the last few years, while
Danzig has vegetated for years, Its status is about equal to
that of our dockyard at Pembroke, less the fine anchorage
which Milford Haven affords. Kiel is, or was, the Portsmouth
of Germany, but from Kiel to the retiring places of the
Russian Fleet is a far cry. Swinemund is to all intents and
purposes an open roadstead, and the German Ealtic Coast
offers nothing to be compared with the bases and estuaries
which are available for our Grand Fleet.
Admiral Jellicoe's task is hard enough, but it is child's
play to the task of the Germans if they seriously attempt to
bottle the Russians, and if the attempt be made, it means the
virtual withdrawal of all such menace as the High Sea Fleet
may have represented where we are concerned. It means that
Get1I!any, compelled to a
sert the mastery of the Baltic, is
giving up all ideas of contesting the sovereignty of the North
Sea, at any rate so far as big ships are concerned.
Very early in the war, in one of the early issues of these
K otes, I ventured to prophesy that. the Baltic might very
probably become the keynote of the major naval operations
owing to the fact that Russia possessed a .. fleet in being"
which had been underestimated in German calculations, and
which Germany dared not ignore any longer,
All the present indications are to the effect t1lat, numeric-
ally small though the Russian Fleet is, it is yet sufficiently
powerful to constitute a ,,'ery selÍous strategical menace in
Germany's rear.
Feints are, of course, no more uncommon in sea !'otrategy
than on land. But allowing for all possibilities in that
direction, the probabilities at pre
ent all point to the Baltic
8.S the scene of future big ship activities, leaving the North
Sea to submarine and coastal craft operations, plus, perhaps,
a determined effort on the part of the German battle cruisers
to get on to our trade routes.

THE DARDANELLES.
The vague rl'porb which come from here emanate chiefly
from Turkish source q , and so need not be too fully relied upon.
For what they are worth they indicate that progress, if any,
ÏB very slow.
That the forts are carable of giving a very good account
of themselves now seems clearly establilhed; and every day
..ill see improvements effected. How much real damage
they can inflict is a matter of speculation. Danger would be
not w much from dircct fire as from high-angle guns and
howitzers, the projectiles from which, falling on the decks,
are liable to go right down through if sufficiently heavy.
The ll-inch howit.zers employed by the Japanese at Port
Arthur on seyeral occasions penetrated the armour decks of
t.he Russian battleships and made their cxits through the
bottoms, The damage thus done was altogether out of pro-
portion to anything inflicted on the same fleet by ordinary
gunfire, which ships are normally constructed to resist.
.A,pparently the Turks are fairly well supplied with
howitzers, and the Germans ha't'"e taught them the art of
keeping these conceal cd till the psychological moment. Evi-
dence as to this is that at long range the {'nemy has never
aucceeded in doing any damage; all the mischief having been
done when the ships han closed in to finish off forts which
have appeared to be more or less out of action. All this
damage is suggestive of howitzers, which on account of their
high trajectory are relati.ely speaking too short-ranged to be
a.ailable for anything of the nature of long bowls fighting.
For the rest, we have had the misfortune to lose sub-
marine E15, and as a set-off a Turkish torpe.do-boat has been
destroyed in the Ægean.
As regards the first, E15 ran a<;hore, and the majority of
her crew were taken prisoners by the Turls. As some loss of
life occurred the presumption is that she was under fire before
or after her wreck-more probably before, though the currents
in the Dardanelles 2.re bad enough to account for anything
unaided.
The Turkish torpedo-boat accounted for attacked the
tran
port Manitov, ""hich had British troops on board. She
was lJubsequently cha
ed by thc Minfrva and destroyers, and
driven a<;hore.

ATER.

unqualified apology to the Chilean Government from Sir
Edward Grey. I 52.Y .. practically unqualified," because care
is taken to point out that the British Go\'ernment is still not in
posses<;ion of the full facts.
\Ve may expect to see a good deal of spurious c2pilal
made out of the circumstance by the Germans, who are great
sticklers for the letter of the law when any adyantage is to be
secured therefrom for themselves.
As a matt-er of fact, however, if ever International Law
were a dead letter, and if e,,-er circumstances justifil'd cases
e"\oen from the legal standpoint, this incident of the Dresden
is a case in point.
Although all the facts as to the Dresdm are still un-
known, we have ample e\idence t.hat Chilean neutrality has
in the past been persistently outraged by Germany, and so
far as can be gathered the island of Juan Fernandez was to
all intents and purposes 8 German base-a base, too, not
tnade use of owing to the exigencies of the nayal war, but
Itpparently arranged for long ago. Indeed, in some quarters
it has been argued that Juan Fernandez is no more Chilean
than Kiao-Chau was Chinese, on the grounds that the
Chilean Go't'"ernment had leased it to a German. This a.rgu-
ment is not on the face of it correct; because the Kiao-Chau
lease was a Government affair, whereas the lessee of Juan Fer-
nandez was, or purported to be, a private German subject.
interested in Robinson Crusoe's Island.
But--unless my memory deceives me--it was airily put
forward by the late Admiral von Spee as a reply to questions
raised as to his abuse of Chilean neutrality. Along these
lines Germany at any rate has no case--she cannot expect to
hM'e things both ways. '
The Chilean Government was inevitably plac.ed in a very
awkward position. Juan Fernandez is the other end of no-
where, unconnected with the maiqlallll by cable, and wit.h 8
Chilean governor in no position to assert his neutrality-even
8.!'suming Chilean sovereignty to be undenied, There were
no means of interning the Dusden, and so far there is not
the remotest proof that she ever intended to intern herself,
except, perhaps, as a temporary measure.
Consequently, for our cruisers to ha\e acted other than
they did would have been rank folly.
International Law is really International Custom rat.her
than Law. It was Captain Marryat who long a,go described
an armed neutrality as .. generally meaning a charge of
bayonets "-an apt illustration of the position of a strong
neutral. A weak neutral, on the other hand, is compelled to
trust to t.he obsen ance of custom, and the Chileans were thus
very much placed between the devil and the deep sea. They
had no means of enforcing neutrality with a "charge of
bayonets JJ while von Spee commanded the victorious fleet in
being, and it is to say the least of it wildly improbable that
the captain of the Dresden informed the Governor of Juan
Fernandez of the circumstance that von Spee had ceased to
exist.
From every point of vi('w, therefore, the action of the
Briti5h cruisers in destroying the Drt'sduJ was logical and
jusLifiable, while Sir Edward Grey's apology to the Chilean
Government was at onc.e dignified and diplomatic.
Finally, it may be worth while drawing at.tention to the
extraordinarily small amount of friction with neutrals whieh
our war against the German corsairs has produced. In one
way and another every weak neutral has been fully exploited
by Germany, and it is to the lasting crcdit of our Government
and our Navy-the latter especially-that this fact has heen
recognised, and that no neutral haa ever bad cause toO complain
that we have misused our naval power to sacrifice a neutral to
our own ends. By this prodecure we have at times, perhaps,
lost certain small advantages; but the circumstance should
stand well to our credit in the peaceful, but fierce, trade com-
petition war which will follow the cessation of hostilities. If
we have shown that we do not hesitate to disregard neutrality
where t.he enemy has previously done the same thing, we have
lIone the less consistently indicaled the possession of a sense of
justice which should ever be reruclI'bered in our favour.

We vel'Y 1nud" regret tlwt, owing to ind;s.
position, Colonel iUaude has been unfJble tll is -week
to cont1'Íbute his usual w'tÏcle on Tactics and
Strategy. The large circulation of L-\ND AND
'VATER compels u.<; to go to press u'ith the cover
and advertisement l)([ges some days before publica-
tion; as a result Colonel JIll/de's name 'll"aS l '}]'inted
Apparently there W
<;
ome t:.re to the ",moke of tlle
German protest that the lJrt<dtn was sunk in neutral waters, on the corer beflJl'e the news of !tis indisposition
u the circun,
tanC6 bas now been tLe subject of a practicaJ1y reached !lS.-EDiTOR.
11.

AFTER
IATH OF THE CO\IMERCE "TAR.

LA
D

AND

WATER.

í\príl24,1915.

A

GIJI
1PSE OF
'V
L\ TER.
By 'V. L. GEORGE.

\V AR.

T HE hattalion h:ld sbrted long before d:i\Vll. At if to remove an im:cct. There was no insect, but tha
first it had be
n night, blue, mysterious night, rr-ovement, so different from the steady tramping, brought
pale and fugitive and h'lllg with litUe goldca him ont into a he:J.vy S\'leat. Private N orIey called himself a
stars, the night of the East. made fòr white fool, i.ut it was too late. "\\'ater seemed to rnsh from hi3 head
courts and the spinning of Scheherazade's tales, into Lis hair and under his helmet to steam. He found hi!!
a night like hlue silk flecked with gems. And then it had fingers so clammy tiu.t the wooden but{, of his rifle blipped
pa
sed away hurriedly, as if afraid of the day, of the away; he dared not touch the burning steel. For a long time
thunderous sun, like a ny.nph surprised, leaving behind her he thought of nothing. but just weut on with the water run-
2'J a trail the rose and the maU\'e of dawn, sweet heralds of ning down from that metal ring about his forehead, hot
a fiercer air. water that soaked hi!'! moustache, soaked his eyelashes until
Private Nodey rvised his llelld towards the dawn, lIe he had to blink them free. And even tIlen there was a veil :1!1
had grown tired of the night, for it had been long, and after of steam before his eyeballs. One thought only came to him
a while h;>d thought of nothing save the sand which bad then: water. As he went he slipped his hand under his coat,
mYi'teriously penetrated between his sock and his foot, nut touching as he did so his neighbour, ,\!to shrank away 8
he loved the familiar dawn, for it was not as the brooding little without speaking, knowing that any contact would
night; it was passing, For a moment Private Nodey.thought increase his heat. C,-refully Private Norley drew forward
of dawH as he IJad often seen it before, when he had gone of the bottle, raic:!d it to his mouth, He could have spat the
night.s to feed some calving cow. It had come up sometimes liquid out., so great was }lis di5gu
t, for, oFier-covered anà then
just like that on "\Vinche1sea marshes, making their grey into felt-covered, and then she!tered by his coat, it was hot. And
opal, and little Rye, upon its tiny hill, into a rosebud. He yet as he sW2.11owed, hating the tinnish taste, the àisgusting
thought of the marshes for a little while, of the fresh, cold sugge',i.ion oÏ weak ROUp, he was gluttonous.
wind full of Channel salt. It hurt his mouth to think of the Suddenly he thoug
t or water, real cold water, as it
feel of that wet wind, for his tongue was so dry. The beat flows out between t".o stc.nes from the sp1'Íng by rùimore
was cOIning; he knew that, for already the dawn was dying, Hill. lIe remembered that place where in April there always
sun,
laughtered, and on the eastern horizon a ball of fire, grew so many prinir05ss, ßnd a spa3m of rage .öhook him as he
zoned in flame, soared into the Egyptian sky. thought that thi3 very minute oxen and horses were drinking
He felt very hot suddenly. And he was afraid. He their fill of that water, so dear, so cold.
looked at his wrist-watch; he tried to re:uember the time- IIis pal upon the left had seen him drink:
hble which the sergeant-major had discussed with the ser- .. Pretty fair muek, ain't it 'I" he remarked,
geant tbe night before. They were late evidently; already Private N olley
pat without replying. He heard behind
they should be in si
ht of EI Arish, And for a n,oment him another man making a feeble joke about lining up at the
Privat.e Nodey wondered what it all was for, why they were bar when they
ot to El Ari;:h. Somebody said wmething
going east of the canal, why they had gone so far and seen l'rivats Norh>.y did not eat!:h, but il awakened an immediatd
nothing, neither :Englishman nor Turk, what there was be- edlO, and a precise priv<J.te, a schoolma
.ter in civil IiÎe, said
yond the oasis. The bewilderment of the private who can they oug
t to have SOIl'e water from the wati!r cart. In a
range through empires, ignorant as a horse in blinkers, was minute tl>e whole battalion was talking of wat.{'r, and Privat

upon him. But Private Norley did not long wonder; he was Nodey could think of nothing but the water carts between
a good-tempered, healthy young animal, who had never be- the two platooll3, that looked so queer, swaddled up ill
fore thought of life in general: eating, drinking, sleeping, canvas, like fat old men, to keep off the sun,
making love and dyiug as late as possible. that was the SUffi- In front of Private NorIey marched Lis lieutenll!1t. He
total of him. And he was ready enough to do it all decently. was a slender young man, and he went with an air alert and
So at once he abandoned speculation, sea.rched the horizon for di
dainful, as if he did not hear the growinO' murmurs arr.onO'
the palm trees which promised water and shade, the men. Private N orley did not remembc; tllat this was on;
Then he remembered: a full two hours had been wa
ted of the poplrlar officprs, a good fellow who ne;er punished a
at a dry oued, Th6 ammunition carts had, one after the man wit.hout making him feel in the wrong: he thou!;ht. of
other, stuck in the river-bed, and it had been endless, helping that way of his and IH
ted him t.herefor; his persuasi..-ene,,,,
the little oxen, half unloading the carts, shoring up the added to his rare severity, hecamc an insult. For it was hot,
wheels, so that the beasts might struggle up the crumbling so hot, that Private Norley thought only of fceling hot. He
bank of pehble and sand. As the battalion turned t.owards found himself cursillg quietly, and then grumbling hali,aloud,
the south Pri,.ate N orley caught a glimpse of the c:irts, wit.h five hundred others who grumbled also:
massed between the second and third platoon, ammunition "\Ve must have water. "\';'e must have wat.er off the
wagon!!, provision carts, ambulances, officers' wagons, can- cart. "
teen, the vast impedimenta of armies. Reflective and im-
partial, he damned everything on wheels. The battalion was halted, faced to the right. The ::.\Iajor
The strap of his rifle hurt him a little now as it cut into came to quell the mutiny, trotting along the line on his little
his moist shoulder. He changed it to the right, and for a black horse, whose swe:lting flanks shone bluish. He stopped,
long time thought of nothing. There was hardly
nything and upon the yellow sand the shadow was blacker than the
to arouse a thought, for the desert unrolled to the nght and horse.
to the left, to the front and to the back, without beginning, .. I Ileal' murmurs in the ranks. They must stop, The
without end, not quite flat, just like a dirty blanket, with next man who complains will be shot," The voice was Quiet,
crumples here and there. Sticking ()ut, it seemed, of the not very loud, and yet, 50 light was the air, every syÎlable
horizon a few rocks that looked black against the felty sand; came clean and audible. Then the tone softened: .. But,
near the track sometimes a few gleaming white bones, cameh', boys, I don't want it to come to that. You've got to under-
no doubt. Notable only, upon the right and left of the bat- stand. "\Ve're two hours late, we may be attacked any
talion, were the flanking parties, watchful little patrols of minute. 'We may not get to El Arish at all, and if we don'í;
the camel corps, 50 far away that even through a field glass we'll need our water. So I must ask you to be patient."
they looked like little brown toys. Private N orIey was too The Major added, with an amiable smile: .. I'm feeling
used to them to notice that they were there. Besides, there pretty dry myself, you know!"
was something else to help the silence that had now come The last words were human and the battaliou laughed.
upon the marching troops; they had left their bivouac at They went on. But it was still hotter now, nearly half-past
'Abu Dam singing the inevitable" Tipperary," but, little by ten and the sun above invisible, for all the sky was as the
little, the song had died down long before the order came blue flame of a gas-fire and as burning. Upon the s1.-y-line
that th:Jre must be no talking now. For the heat had come Private N orIey could see four or five palm trees. The oasis 1
and was growing round them. Yes, but he had seen those palms an hour before and they
He nalised it, and suddenly there was nothing but heat. looked no nearer. Hi3 tongue was thick and large in hi3
The pith helmet made a ring about his forehead; this was mouth; he parted his lips to breathe and his tongue tried to
wet, CLnd yet hard and hot, as if his head were bound in metal. come out, while he panted like a dog. The sweat upon hi.
Re felt the sun upon hi3 cheek, a steady burn, and a sting as eyelashes had caught the dUcit, his eyes were full of grit, and
of a pin-prick upon hi!! upper lip. He brnslJCd it angrily as he wondered vaguely, when he moved his eyelids, why they
12*

:April 24, 1915.

LAND

aid not crackle. He did not look up towards the palms. ITe
merely thought: If 'Ve shall never get there," and went on,
He thought: If My big toe's blistering." Then again: .. We
.hall never get there I"
A littIe later he saw a mirage, a village upside down 011
tne tOI} of its own picture riO'ht side up, lie did not care.
He did not know that he car
d very much whether they got
to EI Arish or not. TIe only knew they never would, liis
belt hurt his llip. He mo.-ed it a little and burnt his finger
upon the buckle.
'fhe battalion was lined up in front of HIe oa
is. Private
Xorìey and his neighbour quietly shoved each otlIer: thcy
were fighting in deacily e&rDest for the 8crap of shadow
affcrded by the stem -of a palm tree. But discipline endured:
no man moved out of the ranks while water was drawn fr01J1
the well, and squad after squad st.t!pped forward to fill its
wat-er-boUles. 'l'lle officers, fearin6' mutiny, dared not delay
and risked colic. At last Private N orley drank. . _ .

AXD

,W A TER.

His mouth was full ()f somethilJg that felt solid, some

thing ncw, something he gulped at savagely, tried to bite.
lie choked and still fiercely he bit on at the cold
thiug y:hich filled his mouth. He could hardly breathe, for
he could l!et tear his lips away from the bottIe-neck. He
had known what it was to eat when hungry, he had known
praise, and love, but now his sweating, burning body was
racked to the very entrails by the passionate wedding of his
flesh in a ccld embrace with this water that pene-
trated him, lie felt his lungs swell and an exquisite fresh-
ness rh:e from his breath. It was agony, for his teeth
froze; and his head ached abo\"e the eyes as if he had bitten
ice. But still he could not stop, as if he were in the grasp
()f some frightful sensual de.3ire that imperiously bade him
go on to his deliglit through the pain.
He stopped, threw down the water-bottle, and, clasping
both hands upon his belt where he felt all swollen and cold,
he breathed greedily of the hot air. The bottle was empty.

PI{OJECTILES.

By "A.i\'1.I.C.E."

P RO,TE\?TILES employed in modern wa , rfare may be
classIfied a'3 follows:-(l) ShrapI!d shell; (2)
Common sheIi, which may be either the ordinary
commen or high explosive she]]; (3) Universal
.
?ell, a combination of the shmpnd and high ex-
plcSlve, \\"l.ach has been developed to a considêrahle extent
by tlJe Germans; (4) Arn
o:lr-piercing shell.
SHi
ArNEL SHELL.
, Shrapn;>l was, first proposed in 1792 by l\Ia;or Shrapnel
of t,be Royal Artillery and WI'S introdu
d into the English
Army abcut 1808. 'fhe long wars in U\e beO'inninJ7 oi t1,e
. h .
""
nmeteen
ce
t.U1'y g2.ve lnventors several ()pportunities
of studymg artIllery problems, and it was during this period
that the shrapnel !'hell was developed.

ufkés a:,"in
Shrapnel consists of a hollow shell filled with bullets
&nd a fmall bursting charge, ignited either by a time or
percllssion fme.
h
object of the bUl'.òtiùg charge is to rup-
ture only the shellm ()rder to release the bullets. Each bullet
will then proceed by iwelf according to the velocity and
direction given to it by the bursting charge. When a shrap-
nel shdl bursts in flight the bullets will spread out in a cone
which is tedmical1y known as .. the cone of dispersion."
The thickness ()f metal of which the shell is made "hould
be strong enough to withst.and the explcsion of t he charge
in t.he bore of the gun, but at the same time it fhould be easily
rle:jtroyeJ by the bursting charge, which should be sufficient
only
open the shell, In case the bursting charge is too
powerful, the disturbing effect produced 011 the bullets when
the shell bursts would be too great and the bullets would be
dispel'sed over too wide an
rea, In the I'hrapnel Hhell used
with the IS-pounder quick-firing gun there are 230 bullets
per sheil. The body of the "hell consists of forged steel,
y; hìle tIle head contains Ole fuse and the base the burstiHg
cha.rge consi<;ting of 1
oz. of gunpowder, which is placed in
II tm cup, A central tuhe passes through the centre of the

hpll in order to communicate the flash from the fuse to the
burst:ng charge. After the bullets have been packed into the
Ehen, wdted resin is poured in which, when
olidifìed, keeps
the bullets f\'Om rattling. It is usual t-o place a smoke C01l1-
!'o
ition among the buIicts, con
istìng cit-lIBr of coar
e black
powder or a mixture of red phosphorus and black powder,
the object l)eing to render the bursting of VIe shell mot e
:isiblc. Apart from its usefulness when ranging it is also
Important bccau.3e a dense c10ud of E:noke ill front Df the
enemy mav preveut him from obtaininO' an accurate raIlaI.'.
T.N.T. lll
Ited and poured info tho shell combines the fu
c-
tion" 'JÍ a packer of bul!ets and sJr.oke producer.
'1'he ex1'ct moment when the shell is eJ1pkded nl3Y he
varied from the instant when the _shell leaveo.; the gun to any
distance up to several thousand yards. This variation is
obtained by means e,f a time fuse, which may ùe looked upon
&3 a small automatic apparatus for igniting the bursting

charge. It can be 1'0 adjuded as to come into vperation at
any predf'termined time, \\hich varies, of course, with the
I'i.wge. Shrapnel fitted with 8 pcrcussion fuse differs from
.. time" !3hrapnel, for the shell does not open in flight
but only after COEt;lct with the target. It is chiefly used f::.r
range finding, In the olden days, when shells consisted of
spherical balls filled with gunpowder, a piece of slow burning
match was inserted, having such a length that it would burn
aboat the !'ame time the sheH would take to reach its destina-
tion, when it would explode. Shrapnel is the principal sheH
used by field artillery. It is mainly employed against living
targets as it is the most efficient" man-killing" type of shell
known. \Vhen bur.3t by a time fuse in the air, it sends a hail
of bullets over a fairly large area, having a deadly effect
against infantry in the open. Against entrenched detach-
ments it has, however, very little effect.

COMMUN SHELL.

A commen shell is a hDllow projectile filled with a Lurst-
ing charge, which is ignit.ed either by a time or a perGUs1'icn
fusa. Common shell occupies a place between the shrapnel
and nrmour piercing shell. It is of very little use against
living targets, and its proper fif'ld of employment is agaiTlst
earLhworks, unarmoured fortifications, and trenches. When
made of forged steel it will penetrate thin armour, but would
be scattered ag1in
,t modern armour.
Ordinary common shell filled with glll'powd;:r has now
become obwlete.
A high explosive shell is simply a common sheU filled witti
lydàitoJ, Jl1elilJite, 'l',N.T., or any other high explosive. It
is m:;,de in two types-t.hin and thick walled. The thin
wall03d shells are not employed in field gúns, but to a cert.lin
extent in howitzers,
Thiele walled high e
pl():,ive shells conr.ist of forged steel
filled with pieric acid or T.N,T. One of the difficulties
encountered with high explosive shells is to obtain complete
detonation of the burstil,g clwrge without using a large
quantit,y of fulminate of mercury. The IIse of a large
quantity of fuln.inate of mercury as a detonator would bo
too dangerous, a.s the
heil might eafi!y be expl"ded before it
leaves the gua owing to the gl'eat faciliry witl) which fulminate
or r'tercury can he dÜonated, As a rule }JÌcric or nitro-
glycerine pow{ler is used as an intennellil1m (which in turTi is
ùc.tonat-cd by a smail quantity of fulL!Ínate of lJiercllr.r) to
cxplodt! the maiu eharge,
In the Kl'IÁ}'p high pyp1r,si\"e
hell the fìr
t ch
r!;e con-
8; J fir flue grdin nitro-glyc(rìne pO\\'ÛLr 1 ,\.hieh i
{:-nLlû

d in a
small
teel cyliadp,. and i
;.r,:o.l by H'eans of the filse, 'l'be
\'iolent bur;,til l ';; of t
tÎs s.nall ('ylind(.r dftonaks th
pi iJl
er
con
i
lii1g of T,N.T, or picrie pl'\\,ù"r, whieh ill tHI'llllûtonate3
tl>,
main bur3ting chart, '1'èd1l1ic
Iiy tlus r H,e -" is l.nown
a: .. J )"Ol{l
e i,-e d t."'la1i.:'
1. It
High ,
'J}J(J;-: Ýl, !,1u'!l
1'''
>"n"!";:1!y made to bur.,t by
In('ans cf ß pereu'-_îon fU,8. The Pi .'eh high cApI,,' i.-I' :hell
used with tJJe field aT t
J' ry ha- \\ ic::l>t of 141ùs., c8n;l i a
blJr
ting charg p of abOl.:t lÿl
1 of I.,elinite, and is made of
thick steel which, when e
;rioùcd, i" J'roht'u iuto t-hùus:w,l<; of
small pieces.
Quick-firiug guus fire fixed ammunition; the }JrL'j _ -tIle
complete with fuse and b'Jl'3ting ch,r1;e, the l..rass cartridge
Cd
e containing the proFiling ch2.rge and primer are COlll-

13*

LAKD

AXD

bin...] as a complete unit like a rifla cartriðge. The bra
s
cartricl,;e caco contains in the baso the percussion cap, which
is fired by the striker of the lock. After firing, the empty
<'a5e remains behiud, and is thrown out automatically when
the Lrecch is opcn8ù.
Ui\IVER
AL SHELL.

In the univer8Ð.l shell an effort l1as been made to combine
the qualities of bGth high explosi\-e and shrapnel shells.
1<
or :field guns such a combination 'would be ad,'antageous,
115 at prese']t it is necessary to carry two classes of shells, and
in the excitemellt of an engagement it is a very easy matter
to use the wrong kind of ammunition, In order to introduce
one type of shell many military invelltors attacked the prob-
lem. In February, 1903, Major van Essen, of the Dut.ch
Àrmy, pabnt.ed a fairly satisfactory design of universal shell,
which was taken up by l\Ies.!'rs. Ebrhardt lmd brought out in
the next year, The universal shell was lat{!r on taken up by
Messrs, Krul'P and Schneider, while the German Army
adoptfed it for their field howitzers.
The universal shell consists of a shrapnel body fitted with
a high explosive head, The head contains the fuse, detonator,
exploder, and main bursting charge of picric acid, which are
enclosed ill a steel cI1ambCI', entirely separated frow the body

(,ãrtrufge

Síz.elL

]}rcáSsi01'l.
Cap

UNIVER5AL SHELL

of the shell, which is of the 1lsual shrapnel type. The bullets
are not packed in resin, but in T.N,T., which at the same
time acts as an explosive. The bullets are blown out in the
usual Viay by 8 small bursting charge, placed in the base of
the shell, When the projectile is used for obtaining a high
explosive effect the fuse is set for percussion. The high ex-
plosive head detonates violently on striking an object, while
immediately afterwards the burster and T.N.T. explode,
throwing shell fragments and bullets with great force oyer a
fairly wide area.
:1-'01' shrapnel effect the fuse is set so that the shell bursts
in flight. The bullets are blown out while the head fiie3
forward to explode on impact.
This type of shell is especially useful agaimt gunshields.
When vunshields were introduced the high explosive shell
o "
tlas developed, as the ordinary shrapnel has lIttle effect agamst
gnnshield!!. When the universal shell strikes B gunshield
it generalty tears large holes in it, while at the
ame time the
ilhrapnel effect immediately following the high explosivð action
is liaùle to cause great havoc among the gun detachment.

ARMOUR-PIERCING SHELL.
Armour-piercing shell!! are mainly employed in lhe Navy
for penetrating the heavy armour of battleships. The late
Sir \V. Palliser introduced the first eatisfactory armour-
piercing shells in 1863. They were made of cast iron, the
pointJd head being cast in 8 metal mould and the cylindrical
portion in ordinary refractory sand. By this means it was
endeavoured to gh.e extreme ha,rdness to the head, which i,
the part required to perform the piercing of the armour. They
had the advantage of being yery cheap, and were succes3ful
against wrought iron and 80ft stee} armour, 1JUt broke into
fl'agments against hardened steel armour.
The Holtzer projectiles, which were introduced in 1886,
had a great reputation, and were made of chromium steel.
The addition of chromium increases the hardness anù tough-
ness of the steel without increa!'in a its brittleness. \Vhen,
however, improyed steel' armour c
me to be employed the
chromium steel projecliles, tempered and hardened as they
we:e to a vl'ry l1igh degree, could not pierce the plates, The
introduction of the soft steel cap gave the adv
mtage to the
projectile in the struggle armour versus projectile.
The term capped projectile applies to 8 projectile tbe
point of which has been covered by a cap of soft metal with
a view of increasing its penetrative effect. In 1873 the
Rt' ,ians carried out certain experiments with capped pro-
jectiles, but no reliable information was published. Captain
Engli
h, a Brilidl enf'ineer, observed that the penetrative
powers again
t a IIarOvey armoured plate were increased
25 pt'r cent, when a comparatively thin wronght iron plate
was placed in front of it. He came to the conclusion that the

,V A TEn.

April 24, 1915,

soft iron rJate acted IL'I a sort of cu'hion, preventing the
point from being broken off and steadying it previous t

penetration.
.A,s soon as tho nð;
essit,y of capping projectiles became
apparent, various experiments in different countries were
carried out., but it was not ulltil1901 that the utility of cap-
ping was fully recognised. The difference between capped
and uncapped projectiles iò a
tonishillg, In a trial 6-inch
capped and uncapped projectiles were fired agaimt 11.8-inch
Krupp cemented armour plate. "Cn
pped projectiles 1ìred
with a striking velocity of 2,827 feet per second broke Up 011

Þu'tUftOUR 'PIERCING SHELL

cA
\t)/ol lfO

the face of the plate without perforating it, while capped pro-
jectiles with striking velocities a3 low as 2,799 feet per second
complettly perforated the plate without breaking up. Àt
the moment of impact the nose of the projectile is embedded
in the soft iron anù thus obtains additional support, prevent-
ing it from being fractured. Modern armour-piercing shell,
are cast from a special mixture of chrome steel, and are su

øequently forged into shape in order to secure a better grain.
The chief difficulty consists in hardening and tempering
the projectile, especially the point, 'l'here are generally t. wo
hardening processes-the first by quenching iu oil, followed
by tempering, and the second after all mechanical work upon
the projectile is completely finished. The point of the pro-
jectile obtains ib required hardness in the final process, but
the remainder of the shell doe3 not have the same degree of
hardness, as when once the point of the projectile has pene-
trated, the body passes the hole without difficulty, Fiually,
the finished projectile is suùmitted to a gentle heat treatment,
which to a certain extent ensures it against fracture due to
sudden changes in temperature.
The projectiles have a small cavity to contain the bursting
cl1arge, which, as a rule, does not exceed 3 per cent. of the
total weight of the projectile. They are stored for three
months before being fìlled with the explosive owing to their
liability to split from the strains set up in the metal by ths
hardening process.
We have briefly dealt with the principal projectiles used
in modern warfare. There are, however, some special type of
sheIls which are used at night time fOl' illuminating pl
rposes.
Star shells are employed with field artillery. They are
made more or le!'s on the same basis as the shrapnel shell,
but instead of u;:oing bullets, cylinders of some light-giving
composition are employed, which are ignited when tho shell
bursts.
In another typt' of shell a numLer of sman parachules are
fol<led together, which open out after the shell has explodeJ.
In the centre of the pa.rachute an illuminating charge Ì3 carried
which is antomat.ically ignited when the shell bursts. Krupp
has devoted special attention to this type of shell.

_ _--:J

QUEEl\' ALEXANDRA'S FIELD FORCE FUND,
T HE proposal for a. WclIingt<Jn, Watcrloo, and Napot
n Loa.n Exhibi-
tion of pictllr
s, tropbie.'!, &e" in aid of tbe above fund, deòcribcd
in L\ND A'I;D \r.
TER of Marcb 20 by Mr. J. Lar.dloo.r IAlc.1.I, of th.
Spectacle MaJ.
ers' Ccmpany, is now un.j
v conskl
l<J.tion in detail by th.
GoWlt-eSS of Bect:\'e, Chairm,an of the FUJld,
Offers of historÏc relica and objects for the Exhibition are aJreadl
to Land.
lhe Hon. Cöarlotlo Knl'l!.\"3 has aga;n ..riUen to Mr. Lu{'&ß, lItating
that she has eXplained thð present positil,n of W'fa.iu to Hill' Ma.j
ty
Queen .Alexandra.

!\IR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Prcston,............ Town RaIL........... Wednesclay...... 28 Arril, :3 & 8.
ElackpooL......... Wj!1ter Ga
ù,.nq...... Th.nrsday......., 29 c\pri.l, 3)15 & 8.
LiverpooL......... Pll!lharmomr Hall.., Fnday..,......... 30 April L B.:3O".
Liverpool.......... I'bilhannonic H:..IL Satllnla:y.........l ;\lay, 6.
Doumcmollth... Winter G.UÙCrul ...,. l\bnday,..,.......3 May, 3,30 &: 8.
L-ondon,............ Queen's HulL....,.... \\'ednc!day...... 5 ?lay, B.30.
MR, FRED T, JANE ON THE NA \-'AL '\\ All,
Manchcster..,.....Frco Tr"r1e HalL... Friday..........., 23 _\pril, 8.
SCaroorough...... Opera HOU.5e.........., Saturday......... 21 April. 3,
Dover............... Town HalL......,.... Tue!!Ùay......... 27 --\Vri1, 8.
Folke.stcne........ To\\n Ha.ll........,... \\'ødne.sd"y......23 ..ipr:l, 8,
MR. CRA WFURD PRICB ON ",SERBIA,"
TIourncmonth.... Winter Gardclla..... Friday...,........ 23 April, 3 & 8.
COl\l
IANDER BELLAIRS, R.N" M.P., WILL LECTURB AT
BoumcmoyLh.. ul
rlda.y',..,......., gO Arrll, ð.30 " I.

14-

April 24, 1915,

LAND

AND

",. ATE R .

TALES OF
DRAMr\S OF

THE UNTAMEDa
TI-IE ANIMAL \VORLD.

Adapted from the French of Louis Pcrg.md by Douglas English.
I.-ROUSSARD.

T WILIGHT had called to Roussard, Roussard the
Brown Jack Hare. He snuffed the drowsy evening
scents, the alsikés, the clovers. He stretched him-
self within his form; backwards from fixed fore-
paws until his scut broke through the flimsy roof-
fpg; forwards from fix.ed hind-paws, until his ears and head
atood clear.
Daylong he had been drowsing, for the most time with
opened eyes as though he feared his sentinel ears might sleep;
with rounded, terror-haunted eyes that mirrored every rustle;
with drooping, hollowed shells of ears that twitched at every
twig-snap.
The glimmering, whispering undergrowth was back-
ground to his dreams. Never a lilting course by night, but
brought its pauic-flight with it; never a day of drowsing ease,
but brought night's panic back in dreams.
The stiffened forward stretch relaxed. Roussard, with
begging paws, sat up to listen, E.wivelling his ebon-pointed ears
to north and e:lst and south to west.
Roussard dropt back to wash his face, to comb his
whiskers, clean his fcet. His furry hands danced past his
ll""oistened lips, and fluttercd do",n his cheeks, and fanned his
muzzle.
TIe pulled his ears down to his mouth and preened their
80ft grey linings. He nibbled at his body-fur tiJl evcry hair
gleamed like a strand of silk. He glossed the pointing bristles
of his whiskers; he furbished up his pads.
Then, with a little shake, he stretched himself. Like
w.urior armed, like traveller girt, Roussard, Jack Hare of
Valri'1lond, was ready for the night.
Spring-heeled he leapt, his long ears forward tilted, his
white scut drooped, his baek a rounded curve.
He landed five yards eastw3.l'd of his thicket. lIe claimed
that thicket wholly, tbough Valrimond lies bali a league away.
Moon after moon be stabli"l1ed it, as his inviola"ble domain.
Tbe woodland hares, tbough curious at tbe first, had, instinct,
taught, allowed him fuB posses
ion-had left him Lord and
Master of the Combe.
One bare, one form, one qU:l.rter of the wood-wch was
hare-law.
Yet chance b:;.d given the combe to him, c11ance and the
fprtune of the bunt. A bunt by two wire-sinewed bounds,
double on double, s\\erve on !'"\"erve, and, at. tbe end, wben
breatb had almost left bim, a lucky ccuch between two plough-
turned ridges, with e3.rs drooped back, and fur wind-
'mooth
d,
A night and day JJe couched-like 11 grey stone; and,
wben the gloaming calle,I, set course for bome, and passed tbe
combe, and found tbe combe untenanted,
lIe owed his life to that. The owner of the combe had
arossed his line-and fallen to the doge.
So Rou..;sard gaincd his kingdom, a l.ingdoll1 t.hicketed
with bramble cover, a v.indìcss kingdom, flanked by clo\"er
fields,
LiHing on feather-balanccd fed. as though lIe fe-arel) the
.ound of them, Hous!'arJ dallced Ir.otb-like to tbe gap.
A south wind crept to meet him, with k;s
es for the
parched June leaves, with fig};ing, I'UStlillg whisper frOld the
cloyer,
He slipped without and pau!'e<1, This "ay and Dlat lIe
IInuffed the air, this w
'y 2nd that s,,,ung anxious ears to !:oiít
the tangled rhythm of the niglIt. The twiligbt deepem:d in a
veh'et silence. The south wi"d sighpd itself away. \ViUljn
the supple ramparts of the dusk, Ulere was no sU
!J"'cl wUilll,
no SUSPt'ct scent.
R
ussard let droop his silky cars, and kicked, and bucked,
and pranced, for joy of living.
ilis play,time, feeding-time had ('orne,
lie nibbled hel'e amI thel'e, a cloyer-head, a dandelion;
but, for tbe most t.ime, played.
}<'rom cJump to clump be bOlJJ1ded like a mlt; he leapt at
bis own du
J.. y leaping shadow; IJe ran the hedgrows end t.o
end; even towards tbe \illah"e street to brave its human
turmoil.
But he was quickly b:o.ck again. hack to the dewy do\"er-
llelds, the hOlwy-sweetened clover-fields.

For here he had been wont to meet his kin, Jack Hares
as crazy as himself, who nosed his nose, and dared him to
run races.
Yet for two moons he had not seen a hare.
A smaller race had quartered on the slope, a dark-furred,
sulky-tempered race, a pushing, jostling, upstart race, wbo
met his greetings with a scowl, who eyed bis passing wickedly,
g'ibbering in uncoutb tongue, and crinkling muzzles.
Roussard was half afraid of them, sbort-eared, squat-
bodied, gnomish things who burrowed under earth.
IT e lo
thed their prc'sence, yet he failed to link it with
the absence of bis kin.
Roussard was very perfect knight; he scorned a quarrel
",;.ith tbese dwarfs, whose strength and swiftness were not haH
hlB own.
So this nigbt, as he sped afield, be took small heed of
countless scuttling sbapes, wbich leapt, and stamped, and
gruntPd at his coming.
A waning moon climbed slowly up the sky, dulling the
rainbow sparkle of the star-shine, revealing earth in shimmery
n;ist of grey,
Roussard stared round-eyed at the moon, half,fearful,
half-perplexed.
Roussard sat 011 a mole-hilI.
Beneath him was a dip of ground.
Roussard's eres left tbe moon, and travelling sidelong up
the slope, lit on the rubble heap.
Dark shadows jerked about it, and, as the moon climbed
higher, shaped themselves.
It was a rabbit parliament.
Some squatted, Borne sat up. Thej heaved and tIll'onged
and jostled one anctber. Some shregged their shoulders,
some upreared their scuts, some p!'icked tbeir ears, some
lowered them, as though to voice their ayeB and noes, and
shalls and won'ts by gesture.
The moonshine lit them doubtfully-a reel and rout of
glistening tails and leaping, swaying bodies.
Stub, crinkly, wbiskered muzzles twitcbed grimacing;
white chisel-teetb gleamed threatening through cleft lips;
short fore-paws drummed 011 testy, beaving waistcoats; now
and again a hind-paw struck t.he ground with menacing thud,
with vicious stamp, whicb double-scored its arguI1lent.
To Roussard, f'olitary, like all his kind, such concourse,
such palaver, waR prodigious.
He stared at it wi!'h glassy eye, ",ith rounded frigid
vacant eye, with ey
belJind wbose soullessness there seemed to
lurk presentiment of ill.
'fiJl the SUll rose be stared at it; tben, as they scattered,
h
, too, ma.de for home.
He <:hose tbe wind he used the most, the wind whicb
crossed the stubble to the dyke, and tunnelled to t.he hayfield,
find fkirted the we3t side of this, and pierced Lhe hedge close
to tbe gate, and so into the lucerne fidd, and, downwards, tc
the (o:'lbe,
He quickly reached the tunnel through the dyke, and
r",aching it,
topped dead, T"..o raLbit'! barred his bolt- l lOle.
Boured-faced they stared at him, grat.ing their teelh, Guttcr-
ing their pl1ctered lUuzzles.
T;ley gave way sulkily, one eit.her side.
HGu
sard pl-e

cd on, to thrt'2.d the run thd crept along
tIle hedge. The gap was h
if-w;.y dOVdl its length, hut
}
umsard whisked about before he reacbed it, From near the
g'Ü
",hiffed mUf:tiness-:.1Ore ubbits, many r
bbib'. At least
1 hese hlld not !'ighted hiill, and there wps yet anotber bolt-
hole lover.
He made a circEng ca
t afield aud ùre\V towards it
cantiously. Two ra.bbits watcbed its ('ntnalce,
lit.ussard retraced his
tcps, far back this time, towards
tþe dyke, aud found the !'qualting sentinels still on guard.
Then, ea<;tward, by a ll2.1f,fLrgottl'H trod, ""hidl swerv
d
ahout in widened are, and reached t.he con. he on its south side.
Thi, was ur.tl"'lmelled highway, with one
If"out only
hr(,3.kin 6 it. a tunnel thl'Oueh the thorn hetlge flecked with fur.
UOllssard swept down it like the wind, with heaù IH'cs:ed
hack and flattencd ears, ::nd wlÚte !'C'ut tilted frrward. And
J'ilbbits started every fide, and gIGWUL,I, . ...1 . ta',lJ"'l'ù
\\ift

ignals as be passed.

15*

L..:\.
D

AND

He reached the amout, and crouched to slither through
i
, and found it choked wit.h rabbits.
The sun had riscn, Man had risen. too.
It W
3 no time for flights afield. The smout was blocked;
thcn be must leap the hedge.
He Lacked av;ay and held his strength as he drew to it in
an easy canter. I.ike deer he leapt and d
ared it by a yard;
and landed in his enemies' headquarters. The slope beyond
W,lS brown wit.h th!)m.
H.ous"ard was desperate now, He thrusted through, and
n'3ched bis combe, and flung into bis thicket.
His gra.
s'pile rose dose-moulded to his sides beneath
the b:<i'bed entanglement of bramhle. Slowly he gained his
breath again. His nose ceaseJ it:> quick snuffling, his ears
drooped back aud f-tillencd. In the half-light below the criss-
cross tanglc he seen:;ellli1{e weather,beaten stone sunk deep of
its own weight.
He. slept the sleep tInt was his daily port.ion, broken by
every whi.,per of the wccd, brokan by eVf'ry long-drawn spell
d r.ilf'nce, broken by every straying beam which searched his
thicket's shadow.
Aud, when sleep clai"led him wholly, hc dr::;amed dreams.
nis ears pricked sharp, his frightened eyes dilated, he
trembkd SYIOUt to SC'lt, and woke a-treh1ble,
This day, of all òays, he slept ill. 'The ni
ht'1! adven-
turc weighed on him, thc broken course, the rabbit folk. Each
rustlø was a tl1Under-peal, each sunbea.m a -heath fire.
So the slow, restle
s, hauntpd hours trailed their long
courso to sllnòû\\n.
Once n
ore he idly stretched 11Ìmse1f, once more he listened
fearfully. Th
re was no m.te discordant. The wind sm.red
through the trammel of the briar, anù fluttering leaf and
daneing bud waved farewell to the light.
Roussard If'apt fort.h aCloóS tIle bOUlldi:.ry wall, acr035 the
leaf-c1wked ditc
that bordered it.
A llOneyed scent was w,dted to his l'cstÚIs, sCl"nt of dew-
bden clover, J,ife's ecstasy was his once more. Twilight with
rounded, sGOtLing lips had kissed tÌ1e h
unting terror from
hi
eyes.
He tripped, he danced, he caracoled, he gambolled, rejoic-
ing in his solit.ude, rejoicing in the glamour of the night.
And pre
enlIy he sped afield, and crossed the rise, and,
of a sudden, checked.
Ris ears had caught a t.umult of small voices, a mumble-
soulld that he had heard befor('--but where? and when?
The fox's bark he knpw, the ermine's spit. the badger's
snuff, the shrill of mous
, the whimper of the hunt. But it
was none of these,

CORRESPONDENCE.
TO A TT ACK SUB
fARINES.
To the Editor of L....ND AND WATER,
DEAR SIR,-Lord Dunleath in his late>!t letter recom-
mends the Admiralty to build fast vessels, of speed 20-24
knots., dcsigned to ram submarines, or of light
r construction
and speed, 28-30 knots.
I am afraiù this sllggestion shows a failure to understand
the following points;-
1. Tbe difficl11ty of designillg such craft.
2. The capabilities of a f'ubmarine.
\Vilh regard to 1, it would be impossible to de"i.gn a boat
sm:\ller than a. d
st.royer which would be able to ram a sub-
marine at any speed over 10 knots without seriously damaging,
and, perhap3, sinking, herself. The nece%ary stren/;th ",ould
entúil the sacrifico of high speed and casy manæuvring.
\Vith regard to 2, no submarine submerged with ,the
periscope showing would allow her:>eli to be rammed by a
hostile craft, as she could dÏ\'e to any df'p1.h up to 100 feet or
60 in a very f
w secollùs.
Should ille submarine be on the surface, she would notice
the approacb of the attacking \"e::sel in plenty of time to
5Ubmerge.
A 6 ain:t th;s may be cited tbe fåct that submarines have
bepn sunk by ramming during the present war; but it i3
e
tremely li1.ely tbat they were either II caught napping" or
forced to the surface b:r some contri',-ance of which we kno-,v
nothing.
The Adr..iralty have doubtle::s adopted the plan which
our ov.n -abmarine experts consider the most efficient.-I
rf'måin, Sir, yours faithfully,

K,O,

WATER.

April 24, 1915.

The answer stabbed his memory like a knife.
It was the rabbits' c:\ll-note,
It circled him. It closed on him. From east and west
apd north and south it spat its vicious menace. Could h8 break
through Y
This way and that he slewed his head, this way and tIai
his quivering ears crossed and recrossed like swords.
But Fear had chained his feet. Fear of tbe nearing
skirmishel'!', grey shadow spla:;;hes dancing tuft to tuft. I"ear
of the serried black beyond, the stamping, grunting, jostling
horde, which surged and swayed towards him.
There was no chance of flight.; Roussard, perforce, must
Ilse his second weapon. Rou5sard dropt limp to eartb and
closed his eyes.
A huge buck rabbit drove at him, and butted him a.nd
sought to overturn him.
Anotber followed quickly, with bared teeth.
Another le'tping, lashed with his hind-feet and scored a
crimson furrow ou his back.
Roussard sprang five feet up, and left a slr
p of white-
furred skin behind. '
Like ants they swarmed about him as be landed.
Vainly hc dmmmed and buffeted, vain!y be dodg
d and
swerved.
The sharp-clawed vermin fastened to his flanks, tran

pie
eed bis ears, tore at his eyes, mouthed at his silk-furred
grom.
He stagg('red with fierc
gnashing teeth ahout him, and
murderous blood-sbot eyes aflame, and crimson-dripping
muzÛe",
TIe rose and fe]], and rose alId fe]], and pr
sent1y, t.hel
pinned him on his back.

* * * *
A scream of agony vibrant through the l1ight--vC'icing
a sbame mupeó!kablE', an unendurable pain: and t1!f'n, ;u
though fiends st.amped applause. tile double-thud of feet up'3n
the turf, and gibber-not.es, and chuckl.ings; and tbf'n, t.h.
slow alternate tread of Mall.
Tbe Man passed on his way.
Roussard rose quivering, bleeding, maimed,
His torturers had dropped off him, had scuttled to their
holes.
. He
t.ill could craw!-but whither 1
Not to the combe--he kuew now v.hy the combe was
cursed of hares.
- To Valrimond 1
To Valrimond slunk Roussard, Rous.card the Brown Gib
Hare.

-"I

OUR rvlOrOR AMBULANCE FUND.
By ATIIPRTO:>l FLEM:NG,
E have pleasure in annollncing that .he total
a1Jlount receivpd for the LAND AND WATER
4 l\Iotor Ambulance l"und to date it
;(:691 148. 6d. The following errors have
crept into our list, and we take this opportunity
of rectifying them. A donation of ;f;5 from Mrs. Crighton
Simpson was entered as 5s.; 121'. from a Scottisb reader is
now acknowledgpd; and a subscription from Mr. James B.
Greig, of Laurencekirk, was entered under the wrong name.
Our apologies are due to these subscribpr1!. The Fund 11
now closed, and a full account of expenditure will be published
later.
Anonymou
, E10; Mrs. Bainbridge, !:10; :Mr. D. C.
Rutherford Lindsay Carnegie, ES 5s,; Mr. \Valter Neves,
Jl.Ir. Frank H. Cauty, Mr. A. JJ. V\Tin
ate, ;(:5 each; Misl
M. E. Freeman, E3; II Kiddington Yillage," E2 13s.; Mrs,
n
rold Gordon, Mrs. Diarmid Nûël Paton, E2 2s. each; Mr.
II. Knox-Shaw, ;(:2; Mr. \y, Harold Fraser, ;(:lls. 6d.; Mr.
Sholto Doug!as, Mr. R. M. Blake-Smith, Mrs. A, M. Hedley,
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Asgood, :Mbs May Stokes, E1 each; :Miss E. B. Sparrow,
Miss J. Lambert, Mr. J. H. Cox, 10s. eacb; Mr. H. Clifford
Davis, .. Q. E. D.," :Miss A. G. Simson, Miss Jackson, Mrs.
Murray N. Phelps, Mr. J. Collen, 5s. each; the Missps Eva
and Edith Godman, :Mr. R. llenry, 4s. each; Miss S. Tbomp-
son, Mr. p, J. Egan, :Mi
3 M. Finlay, 2s. 6d. each; :Mrs,
J, M. Latham, 2s. 3d.; Captain Arthur St. John, Mr. J,
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mOllS, 2s. each; Miss M. Meek, Miss S, "\Vildsmith, :Master
Jack Hender"on, the Rev. E. J. Janson-Smith, Is. each,

,
P1Ï',t
ù b;y 'LIS \ J["TLI,U\ 1l01::sI:: l'nmTllia ('0" L:m" Tudor Street, \Yl:it.efciara, Londo:J., D.C.

----.

April 24, 1915

L. \ N 0 \ N 0 \\ ATE R

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are the only Standard
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Milne.r Rusfs, SfaÍns, nor TarnÍslzes.

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-i.d..st
h-u.1.-\:s, v 1.:n.eSa:r;e.t.c.,w"\ll'be
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rulva:n-l:-a.se i.ñh.otels,
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m.a.chine -is now necessa.ry
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THOS. FIRTH & SONS.LTP
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I

IF, knowing !!!! you know,
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

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a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
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aris and similar to it In taste.

Repd. Quarts. Repd. Pinta.
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Cat t ia I'aid,

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..... Sample 'Bottle FREE on receIpt 0/ Coupon -.r

Namen

Address

Usual Purveyor of
AHnet al I Valers.n___n_________nn...

A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenles Street Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.

55

L-\ND

\. N D \\' -\ T E R

\pril 24. IqI5

THE
ORIGIN OF

GOUT

HOW TO DETECT CIUC KID SY:\IPTO:\IS,

U RIC .-\CID, the fundamental cause of all gouty
suffeIing, is in reality a normal product of the
human s\"stem, owing its e"\:istence partly to its
introduction into the bod\' as a constituent of
certain cldsses of food, and 'partly as a result of the
natural tissue changes- the wearing out and repairing processes
constantly going on,
,-\.s soon almost as Ulic acid gets into your circulation from
either of these sources it gives you evidence of its disturbing
presencr by certain wdl,defined symptom,"" which arc nature's
signals of impending
out
outbreaks" You feel ?ut ?f sorts,
heavy, and dull, espeCially m the morn1l1gs: your hver IS out of
order; you are'restless, e.lsily irritated, and
.
p badly, You
sufter from dyspepsia, flatulence, and heartburn. You are
depressed, and trifling little affairs
...orry you, You have, per-
sistent and se\'ere headaches, \ ou frequently e).penence
sensations of burning and irritation in th{' "kin, or occasional
t\\inges of pain in your joints, or there may be stiffness in both
joints and muscles, and dull aches in \'arious parts of your body.
GOCTY PIWGRESS.
When the uric acid becomes embedded in the mu"cles, gouty
rheumatism or lumbago results. At first there is only a sli{.;ht
sensation of stiffness, and an occasional catch of pain, (
radually,
as the atoms congregate, and the sharp crystals bore their resist-
less way into the substancr of the muscle, they increase tlJP
stiffness, and the piercing of the penetrating acicular crystals
Cduses the sharp, cutting pain that tortures sufferers from gouty
rheumatism, This is the term employed when the muscles of the
limbs and shoulders are affected, whilst lumbago is the name
applied when the loin muscles particularly are il
\'ol\"Cd, ,
Other varieties of gouty sufferer;:; are chronIC, or rheumatIC,
gout arising from the clogging uratic depos
ts in the joints, and
,Ittended by swelling, inflammation, pain and stiftness; sciatica
,1Ild neuritis when the nerve sheaths are penetrated by the sharp
crystals, which causp the ho
, stabbi
g pain in t
lÌghs or arm
;
kidney stone and gra\'el, which are simply deposits of urates 111
the organs; and gouty eC7ema, the inevitable result of uric acid
forcing its way into the skin,
HOW TO ESCAPE Gm'T.
As long as uric acid rem
ins in the systel
, so long will tI
e
pain and agony caused by ItS presence contmue, The uratic
masses must be converted into soluble substancð, and swept out
of the hody before relid can be obtained, It has been con-
du"i\'elv dëmonstrated that Bishop's Varalcttes are the most
gener.llíy effecti\'e uric acid solvents and elimÌI
ants: They go
directly to the root of the matter, and expel unc aCid from the
system The rational and scientific mode of action of Bishop's
Varalettes is bound to result in successful alle\'iation of gouty
sufferinn",
Bisl1Op's Varalettes are made by an old-{'stabli--hed firm of
mdnufacturing chemists of the highest standing, who ha\'e for
\'ery many years made uric acid soh'ellts a
ubject of special
stud\'. Their investigations into this branch of therapy ha\'e
enabled them to place in the hands of the medical profession and
gouty subjects a rf'medy that is at once reliable, safe, and sure,
Physicians recognise and acknowledge this by prescribing Bishop's
Varalette;, daily Bishop's \'aralettf's are free from any harmful
ingredients, such as colchicum, iodides, mercury, potash,
sdliq'ldte;" and du not contain dny purgati\'e, narcotic, or anod\'ne
drugs. so that even delicate subjects can take them \\Ïth aJ:>solute
confidence. They du nut depre;,<; or lower the system In any
way.

DIET A:\D GOlT
There is scarcely any subject that gin's, rise to more dis-
cussion, or, at times, proves mon' pcrple"\lIlg. than the all
('Jlgrossing one of fooe
s and dri
k
s
itable fur the guut!ly
inclined, Popular opimons on thl
subject arc so often qmte
erroneous that it \\ill be welcome news to \'ou that a bouklet has
heen recently published dealing with the
\ hole question of diet
in a clear, authoritative, and comprehensive manner.
^,O difficult\' in future need arise in arranging pleasant,
varied, and satisfying menus, made up wholly of uric-acid-free
dishes, Classified lists arc published of allowable amI non-
.tllowable foods and the booklet forms a perfect guide for the
..;outy. It cont
ins, in addition, a mass of useful informatiun on
the whole subject of uric acid disorders, "
.-\ ('op
' will be sent, post free, o!1 applIcatIon, to the s,ole
makers of Bi<;hop's \'aralettes, Alfred BI<;hop. Ltd" :\Ianuf.lctunng
Chemi<.,t<; (Est. 185ï). -1-8 Spelman Street, Londun, X,E, Pleds P
write for booklet ^"
Bi.,hop'<; Varalettes are sold by a
l chemists .in vi,Lls, at IS"
2S" and 5". (25 days' tre.ltment\, or dlre:t fro::] th::, sole m:tkers,

LITERARY REVIEW

By R. A SCOTT-JAMES

.. The Place-Names of England and 'Vales," By

ev. James B. Johnston, J\l.A.. B.O, "Uurray.)
1 5s. net.
Any man who loves walking tours, anyone, in fact,
who takes an intelligent interest in his u\\ n locality
will find untold \\'ealth of information in :\Ir. Johnston's
\'olume, Most of the place-names of England, whether
the\' be the names of to\\ n, \ iJbg-e, rin'[. hill. or bog,
ha\:e their long historical assOo ia'tion and their ul igin'
-their interesting and baffling origin, :\Ir. Johnston
dispels many 10ng-treasure(1 illusions, The termination
" Caster" or .. Chester," for instance, is no proof of
tl](' former existence of a Roman camp. "O"\:ford" has
probablv nothing to do \\ith "(hen," the first part rA the
word being- the old Celtic uisc (meaning water). and is thus
not unly the same word as OUSI>, but also Isis, The arrange-
mrnt òf name, is alphabeticaL If we refer to this work
carefully \H' may follow the place-names of England to thtir
probable Celtic, Sa'\.on, or Scandinavian origins, and k.1rn
at the same time much about language, history, and
geography.

.. A Life of Robert Cecil, First Earl of Salis-
bury," By Aig-ernon Cecil. I \\urray.) 125. net.
It would be hard for us to concei\'e modern England
without the familv of the Cecils, It has handed on an intact
tradition from the time of Lord Burghley, and his son, I
ubert
Cecil, the first Earl of Salisbm v, dm\ n to the 1.1 te Lord
Salisburv and the Cecils of to:'da\'. 'Ir. .\Igcrnon Cecil
him<;elf Ìs essentially one of them, He ha'\ thl characteristic
hrf'adth of mind ànd grasp of dff.1irs, the ,en"l' of the
l'on"titutional order of things, and its importance, tlle
"hrcwdness, the subtle feeling of what i., fitting .lIld not fittin
,
,llong with thf' humane tr,tÏts which han been den'loped III
"ome members of hi" familv-.lI1 'interest in religion, in
literature and the subtleties of pS\Thology,
Hr 11.]<; been able to understand Robert Cecil, the first
earl and "how him from within and \\ ithout. I doubt if
am'
ne els
would have made so interesting a book out of so
uu'inspiring a subject-so uninspiIing,
indeed, that no
hiogr.lpher ha<; hitherto attempted the ta,sk, th<;JU,gh for
fourteen critical years he was practically PrII
e :\hmster of
Enn"land. Oueen Elizabeth, Essex, Raleigh, Bacon-
the
e 'are tJ;è alluring figures whom the biographer loves.
Rut Lord Burghlcy and Lord Salisbury-\\"hat were tl <'ÿ ?
Bureaucrats, employers of spies, widders of patrona
e, -the
indi"'pens,lble but uninteresting props of Crown and
tate.
But not uninteresting in 1\11'. Cecil's hands, Hf' has not
been content merelv to ransack the Record Of!i("e and the
archi\'l .; of Hatfield" House. He has studied this industrious
admini"trator with the coolne-." of a :\Iachiavel1i examining
the methods of maintaining a pIincipality.

.. The Great Ag-e." By J, C. Snaith. (Hutchin-
son.1 6s.
:\11'. Snaith has been as bold as the most romantic of
no\"elists may bp, He has not mprely introduced Queen
Elizabeth. Fr.mcis Bacon, Cecil, Ralci
h, etc., but the far more
remote and difficult character of "ïlliam Shahspeare, The
fantasy is ingenious and neat, .\ young heiress of incomparable
be,lUty and courage rescues f
om a dungeon ,a youth wrong-
full\' condemned to death,
he wanders \\ïth her Orlando
mer the fields and wuods of England till, in the city of O).ford,
"he meets for a second time one "ïlliam Shakespeare, How

hl' comes to act the part of " Rosalind OJ in " .
s Yuu Like
It," and how Shakespeare constructs a play settmg forth the
fortunes of hi-- protég{'s, and recitLs the story to the Queen-
all thi<; must be left to the reader to disco\ er. Improbable,
fantastic. as it all is-as it is meant to be-it is saying- much
for :\Ir. Snaith that if he has not created a character for the
gentle dramatist he has n?t made him stiff, or, undignified" or
bookish, or ridiculous: m fact, he has outhned sometlnng
into which the part of Shakespeare might be fitte,d. ,
The following arc novels or books of "tones to \\lnch
I should like to 'call the reader's attention.
. The Empty Bou
e," (Short Stories). Bv Algernon Black\\ood,
{
ash\.
" The Good Soldier." B} Ford Mad ox BucHer. (Lane,)
" Brunei'!, Tower." By Eden Phillpotts. {Heinemann\.
"The \oice of the Turtle," By Frederick \\.ttson, {l\Iethuen\
"The Family," fiy Eleanor :\Ionlaunt. (:\Iethuen),
" The Titan." Dy Theodore nrei
er. (Lane)
" A Lover's Talc." By Maurice Hewlett, (\\'.Ird. r ock\,

56

_--\pril 2-\-, I9 I =,

L.\ N D \ N D \\" --\ T E R

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Beam 40 ft, Horse,Power 17,500. Speed 25.2 knots. Guns, 9 of 4 in, 2 torpedo tubes. Max. Coal 380 tons. Crew 260.
(From the Ori inal by Montague Dawson.)
Copyright of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO" DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH

LAN DAN D \\ -\ T E R

Apnl 24 ItjT 5

THE "GIEVE"
LIFE-SAVING WAISTCOAT

The Peril of the Submarine

An Officer lately on H.M. Auxiliary Cruiser

"BA Y ANO"

which wa
recentlJ' torpedoed and sunk (in a few minutes)
with few survh ors, states that he owes his life to the fact
that he was "earing the" GIE\'E" Lift',Sa\Ïng \Vaistcoat
at the time of the disO\Ster. Of the 12 officers taken from
the water on the sinking of H,I\L
, FOH.\IIDABLE, ten were
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The County Gentlenlan
,\:\D

LAND&WATER

Vo1. LXV 1\0. 2ï65

S.-\TU RDA Y, :\1 A Y 8, 1915

[ Pl:BU.,HED AS ] PRICF SIXPFNCE
A l'FWSPAPER PUBLISH/!.V WEEKLY

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[B) /D"I" SimþsDJr, R,B.A.

A l\IASTEI{ OF STRATEGY

GENERAL ]OFFRE

Commander-in-Chief of the Armies in France

LA\JD AND W'\TER

May 8, 1915

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H,M,S. SWIFT, Destroyer. Displacement 1,825 tons. Length 345 ft. Beam 341 ft. Draught tOi ft. Horse-Power 30,000.
Speed (max,) 39 knots, Built by Cammell Laird: Completed 1907. Guns, 4 of 4 in. 2 18 m. torpedo tubes. Cost J:2EO,500,
(From the Original by Montague Dawson.)
Coh'-;ght of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH,
(Established a Century,)

\ra\" 8. IQIj

LAND AND WATER

WAR

GLIMPSE OF
6-in. Q.F.

A

By W, L,
C ORPUR.\.L
UAURI
G, at the telephone, stared
into the feeder, so dark and mysterious as it
passed through the floor of the turret into the
ammunition room, There was a noise of ma-
chinery in his ears and yet he was alert, quiet,
at his ordinary business. His free ear, aloof from the in-
sinuating sound that the carrier made as the shells slowly
tra,'elled and rose in the feeder, aloof 'even from the rumble
and crackle of the distant firing which he heard when the
cupola rose, was given to his lieutenant who sat there, three
feet away, still as a wax figure, listening at that other telephone
linked with the heart of the fort, the fire control. He had
nothing to do but just to listen and to wait for sounds, for
orders, for events in this atmosphere of strange business.
The fire was slow, three shots a minute only, And auto-
matically, from time to time, as the little voice below said:
" Stead
: !" he replied' "Steady!"
Xothing was happening yet, but he knew that something
must soon happen. Things were not going \\ell with the
fortress, He wondered where the French were, whether
that field artillery on the right could be theirs; he wondered
wl1\' in those bursts of sound when the cupola rose he heard
so 'little musketry, Xo doubt the Germans were within
fi,'e miles, But then? Why were they not yet being battered?
He was lost in the enonnous strife. The lieutenant was
talking now:
" Control! D'you hear me? Control'. Yes, sir' ,
.\.eruplane wrecked? . What shall I do, sir? Yes,
sira "'
Then to the sergeant:
.. Range nine four fifty." ,-\nd to Quadring: "Speed
up,"
" Speed up!" cried Quadring into the telephone.
The machinery ",ent a little faster. Slowly before
his eves a shell rose in the black void, hannonious,
beautiful in lines, e
quisitely polished, As he listened he
stared at the sergeant, grizzled but alert, watched the shell
slide into the hands of four men and travel as if on velvet
towards the breech: quick-opened, it swallowed the shell,

napped it up like a greedy mouth, He saw the sergeant
push aside a gun-layer, infinitesimally alter the direction.
"Speed up!" said the lieutenant, sharply.
They were firing fOl:lr a minute now, rather blindly
towards that place where the German ho", itzers might be,
to show that the fort was fighting rather than to fight. Then
the small shell began to fall. , , .
Corporal Quadring listened, interested and. calm. He
knew the sound: every fifteen seconds, \\ hen the cupola
ruse, he recognised the- Krupp fifteen-pounders, " Small
fry,' he thought, disdainfully, He did not know where
they were falling, hidden in the circular chamber of steel
that whirred under his feet, the small, crowded room, in-
tolerably light; he feIt comfortable and secure behind the
walls of grey metal. The lieutenant was talking again,
Quadring understood: another aeroplane had located the
howitzers, The range was altered,
"Speed up! Speed up
.. said the lieutenant, authori-
tati'.L rather than impatient.
They were firing at twelve-second intervals now, and
there was a gritting sound, It bothered him, this sound,
so neaI: him, It dominated the more frequent bark of the
fifteen-pounders outside, ".here were they falling? . . ,
They sounded nearer now, Then r orporal Quadring heard
a large splosh. Oh, they had hit the glacis then! "Fluke,"
he thought. But there came another shell and then, as the
6,inch fired again, two or three simultaneously, quite close:
shrilling through the exploo.,ions he heard a cry. He grew
taut: "That must have been on the infantry parapet!
Poor devils!" thought Corporal Quadring, And then
smugly reflected that he was better off inside. Still, the sound
\\orried him, Ah! this was it.
" Oil can," said the sergeant,
., Oil can," repeated Quadring, through the telephone.
" Oil can," said the little voice.
-\nd, as if by magic, the oil can rose in the feeder. A
note of excitement had come into the lieutenant's voice:
"Ye
, sir, I understand." Then to the sergeant: "Nine
one fifty, Get all you can out of her."
(!u'adring's heart gave just one beat more and then
bccame nonnal. Thev were in for it now.
Suddenly, on his õrder, the feeder came alive. It r<lsped

GEORGE
and it whirred, running at top speed, for indeed the quick-firer
was giving all it could and the four men seemed to seize the
new shells as fast as they fed them, Corporal Quadring was
all bewildered outside that calm spot where lay his duty.
His first excitement increased, for at last. . Yes, here
it was . . . a dull heavy sound upon the cupola; the Germans
had the range, unless it was another fluke, . , . Ko, not a
fluke: as the cupola closed down two shells fell together on
the steel roof. The lieutenant smiled:
"That's the first," he said, " but we
Corporal Ouadring did not hear the rest, for this was not
a fifteen-pound shell that had fallen so close over his head
that he sank it into his shoulders, The whole turret had
quivered under the heavy impact. And now it was indeed:
"Speed up!" Hands were feverish as they grasped the
shells . . ,for the turret had begun to move. . . the
cupola rose. . . the 6-inch fired into the gleam of blue sky.
The cupola blotted out the blue sky and, rumbling upon its
rails while with a swish water escaped from the pipes, the
turret moved along the trench to take up a new position.
It could take no risks now. .
In front, behind, Quadring heard the explosions, Yes,
they were being battered now, The gun was pushed to its
utmost, it seemed; the sergeant in one movement tore off
his coat, wiped his face upon his shirt-sleeve, And yet it
was not fast enough.
.. Speed up! Speed up!" shouted Quadring.
The lieutenant murmured: "Too slow! Go below,
give 'em hell! "
I t seemed curiously cool and dark below. The store-
keeper was sulky, harèUy listened. Quadring just noticed
the wounded hydraulicist who had been hit in the trench
and brought in, rather to clear the rails than to save him.
He lay, a small khaki bundle, folded up as if to get him out
of the way, under a mask of red, his coat black-dyed with
blood, half-stunned by a scalp wound,
Then from above came a sound hea \ ier than he had heard
before, a ,'ast boom, and for a second everything tottered
as if the wall and the feeder itself swawd. The turret shook
like a man who has been struck. "Got us full!" he thought,
while he stumbled up the stairs tripping on the iron treads,
shving back from the electric globes like a nervous horse,
.\bove, all was urgency and yet calm, Still the feeder was
belching shells, still the cupola, a little askew from the blow
of the eleven inch shell, rose and fell as the quick-firer replied.
He was seized bv movement. . . minute after minute passed,
lengthened into
an hour of heat and fire, ., He was con-
scious only of the swaving of the turret as it rushed along
its trench, fired, rushed back and fired again. It was all
action, it was all haste, mechanical as if the men with the gun
and the steel walls formed an automatic trinity. Sound
was all about him like a black blanket shot with red streaks.
Every rise of the cupola let in the growing roar of the Gennan
guns: like a wedge, then closed it out. He felt rather than
heard the sound grow. He understood,
othing would
help them, now their range was found, save perhaps some lucky
shots unlimbering those howitzers hidden behind hill 44 or
45, or, he thought bitterly. 48, who could tell ?
He exclaimed, .\.s the cupola rose a shell burst on the
edue of the work and for a second all was invisible, for the
tu
ret was filled by a cloud of concrete. Corporal Quadring
retched a mouthfùl of dust . fierce, he forced his stung
throat, murmured :
" Speed up! ",
Thicker and thicker came the sounds, Boom upon
boom ringing on the cupola. "It'll buckle," he thought.
Then again: "It'll buckle'-' And as he thought the ,'oice
below spoke:
" Bearings jammed! "
" Go on " said the lieutenant.
The gu
still raged into the strip of sky; the cupola
""as doomed and would soon protect it no more, Right,
left, fire . . . then left, fire and right again , . . the turret,
half-e
posed, was fighting still, But a heavy shell fell
upon the edge and suddenly the three inches of steel bent,
crumpled like a fan, Rig,ht, left " ,then a paus
. It
synchronised "ith the burstmg of a shellm the trench Itself.
üuadring knew, he could imagine the rails and road\, ay twisted
{î'p: the turret "ould never mo,'e a
ain . , . it would only
wait. Wait? For "hat?

(CO",II11lttl on þag
IUO.)

'(;7

,

L.-\ND AND WATER

Imitation

1a tbe ainccrcst form of
t1atter\?, ant'! tbat is wb\?
\?O11l' frícnt'!s lnl\? tbc
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88

w..A TER"
D AND
LAN
May, 0, 1915. BY LAND.
THE W A
RE BELLOC. .. _..............
By HIL f f. !be ..,,,,,_
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"hleb docs S tJltemcuts. . rU d. .lIlt Dn 1
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N BLO W IN :'he first and iiP".:"ll that m: 11a ë cIe can be com"
O-GERMA only should.. e art of" tlus ar if furth
,. ne,,;s
'H E AUSTR GAllCIA. before the ma.m.f unavOIdable. commumqué"

T "'ESTERN "ll be in lered. But It I Ii.t Germ
fa postsCTfP h
"". W ATEn WI "" P t'" the r. h ddltIOn 0 " I dd sue
f L'''D A.'ffi n tbe momma corree ID", time for tea nin" I WJI a
T HIS issue 0 f th
publie uP I D 's probable received m (W ednesday) mor 0
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that by that biow delivcre
t
rdaV, m;>d First of all, we ncentration ?f
tI Austro-
rmanupon Friday,
and 2, will in" points:- has been a lon

front. Tbat IS,

. ch took P """I 30 and May . a (1) There "ust tbe DunaJe on the extreme
W f last ApT! , h's artJcle troops oRaJ f our ally up
Sundb
pubÍic propert
t of writ
ng tthin" upon e:i!st tbe positi?ns ii. Galicia.
tben B t at the mome . n") there JS n? fro;;' past an t of their armIes
] . h\s Tuesda.Y d e

tsave analys
nfortunate wes" .
(W h
l(' h to base a; ju gm t ure . It is an
W lC simIlar na
news of a

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LA ,:'{ D A X D 'Y ATE R .

:May 8, 1915.

(2) This copcentration was not effected
secretly. The Intelligenee Department of our
ally w-arned their commanders of great numbers
massinO' against them for the attack.
(3) It is certain that the force thus conC(,11-
traterl contained great numbers of the new troops
which, as has been pointed out in these columns
more than once, constitute the third and last
batch of eJ1emy resen es.
(4) It is equally certain that the cOJ1_æntra-
tion thus effeded and thus launched upon the '''es-
tern front of our any's positions in Galicia glance at the Inap ,yonld be su1ficient to prove it,
resulted in a considerable success for the enemr. But to make quite certain of the point. we may
(5) It is equally certain that the enemy, put it diagmmrnatically bere. Thus, an army
in thus forcing certain points of a line entrench.ed desires to master a certain obstacle, 0 O. It is
Ilnd prepared for monips, has lost very beavIly disposed in a rectangular form, ABC. Its
indeed, and that l1rdess he bas quite broken enemies are exercising the power for a thrust
through he has lost more than the Russians. against it towards C (represented by the arrow
(6) Bu.t he has attnined a measure of succeS8, there), but it has been exercising an equally
to be estimated rrob
bly fairly enough in his powerful thrust at the B end (represented by the
figures: 21,000 wounded and unwounded priso- arrow there) and has there cros:-:>('d the obstacle in
ners of the enemy and 16 guns; out of a forte of, part, and can, with the adyance of the season, hope
say, 200,000 to 250,000 and, say, 800 guns. to master it entirely.
(7) According to the TIle:lsure of that success 1'h('re is also, in the direction E F, a certain
-i,e., according to how far he has pu
hed back number of enemy forces able to strike against the
tIle Russian line-will prove the gravity of the turned back side A B. It is self-evident that the
position immediatc1y de\'eloping. In any C3:;e, security of all the work being done on the line B C
unless our ally's old line is restored, his grip upon depends upon tbe force there operating being quite
tDe northern Carpathians is threatened, and if secure from interference on their right and
till' blow he has suffered is as heavy as the enemy adequately scre('ued by the force at A B. If the
pretends (which is not likely) he could not per- force at A B is broken, or bent back, the people
manently retain his hold upon the mountains at going along the arrow 2 will be in peril, and, as the
alL and might not be able to maintain himself in country in which they are operating is mountain
tile Galician plain. country, and has few roads, and very difficult COnl-
In order to appreciate what has happened, munications, A B has only got to be bent back somo
vl'e Illay consult the elements of the sketch Ulap on little way as towards B D for all the people who
the preceding rage, and reproduced opposite. are working on the thrust of the arrow 2 to be in
The main line of communication running grave peril of being cut off, and, in a military
through Galicia is that marked C C C C upon the sense, destroyed.
sIætch, and proceeding from tl4e depots in Russia Now we shall know, perhaps by the time these
through the adyanee pass at Lemberg, through the lines are in print, but unfortunately not at the
junction of Przemysl, and through Tarnow across moment they are written, how far this protecting
the Dunajec. line A B has suffered. That it has suffered, and
'Vith the rest of the gridiron of Galician rail- had dents knocked in it here and there, we may
ways, mostly single lines, we are not for tbe take without fear of error.
moment concerned. save that the lateral line rUIl- The Berlin communiqués were, on the face of
ning through Gorlice, Sanok, Sambor, and Stryj them, extravagant, and the public rejoicings
to Stanislau and Kolomea (marked on the sketch ridiculously on a par with the premature celebra-
with the letters D D D D) is obviously his main tions of victory before Warsaw last December.
road for the transfer of troops from east to west But however exaggerated enemy reports may
:,md west to east: in other words, for the concen- be, serious fighting has taken place, and the
tration of the Russians against attempts their enemy has advanced.
enemies are making to dislodge them from the If we turn a.gain to the first map reprinted
Galirian plain. opposite we shall se
that this claim of t
e
Now, the position v;ohich tbe Russians held, Germans, apart from Its flamboyant language, IS
just before this great attack upon their western one which is not made without foundation. They;
front was delivered, is to be followed in the line would not say they had forced the Dlmajec unless
of dots upon the sketch map A. they had forced it at certain points, and they
It "ill be perceived that the frontiers of the would not say that the enemy ,:a:5 retiring ea
t-
Russian occupation were roughly in the shape of a wards unless he were also retIrmg at certam
right angle; from between StryJ and Stanislau to points. The Russian line was simple and united.
the neighbourhood of Bartfeld on the Hungarian It was based on one continuous line of river, and
side of the mountains was one limb of this right if it is pierced at all it may have .to fall bark,
angle, and from the corner in the neighbourhood The ?rigina
line .ran
rom the VI.stula
p t
e
of Bartfeld up to the Vistula was the other, and Duna]ec until the JunctIOn of the flver wIth Its
shorter, limb of the angle. tributary, the Biala, and thus ran from Tarnow
Upon the power of resistance of this shorter up the Biala in front of Gorlice, past Grybow,
limb, which power of resistance was taken for and so to the Hungarian frontier, which is
granted till the last few days, it is clear that the on the cre
t of the mountains, just above Bartfeld.
possession of the Carpathians by our ally That line no longer, at the moment of writing,
depended. stands intact. We have a further claim to regard
The matter is so ob
'ious that most critics in the matter as serious from the very fact that we

he Press have said. rightly enough, that a mere have received no news from the other side,
2-

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Iay 8, 1915.

LAND AND
ATEB.

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although it is now nearly three days since the
matter was decided, or, at any rate, more than
forty-eight hours, And we cannot but remember
that similar silence has marked difficult passages
upon the Eastern field in previous months,
On the other side of the account we must set
certain c.onsiderations of which the immediate
future will test the value, though we cannot yet teU
whether they are of great weight or of small.
\Ve know, in the first place, that Bcrlin has
invariably exaggerated in the last few months the
successes of the German troops and has been par-
ticularly prone to lend decisive value to what have
been proved in the issue to be subsidiary things-
for instance, the fighting at Soissons, and the de-
struction of the 20th Russian Army Corps a.t
Augnstowo,
Again, we know that the moment is extremely
critical in the matter of neutral intervention. At
any mom
nt one of the greater neutrals-Italy-
and possIbly another-Roum
nia-may enter tl1('
field-witb results which will be sllO'gested later
in this article. There is not the IcaRt doubt that,
at such a critical moment, it will be \\ ell "Worth the
while of the enemy to exaggerate his success, and
particularly to give it a sort of lurid character
which would impress foreign opinion.
Again, we know from the example of what

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happened in front of \Var
aw, last December, that
if the position is still undecided, it may yet be
retrieved. Berlin has in the last few months been
in the habit of crying Yictory at the very first
opportunity it C'ould find, and always before things
were conc1uded.
In front of Warsaw the Russian line wa!'-1
pierced. and it seemed as certain as anything c.ould
be that \Var!':aw would fall. In spite of that, we
know Russian reinforcements arrived, the breach
was healed on the second day, and not only was the
breach healed, but the Germans, who had broken
through, were very nearly enveloped and only cut
their way out with the greatest difficulty.
\Ve are not yet justified at the moment of
writing, therefore, in regarding the success which
the enemy certainly has had as either being upon
the scale he claims or of the decisive character
which be also claims: but ",e shall do well wbile
waiting further news to appreciate how very criti-
cal a II that corner is.
L pon the rough sketch on the following page
you have the elements of the situation.
The Russian line runs from the Vistula up
the Dunajec to the point A; it is continued through
Tarnow, re
osìng upon the River Biala and the
railway whIch follows that valley. It passes-
or, rather, p'assed-through Ciezkowioo (upon tbQ
;s-

r.AND
ND i\tA TER.,

May 8, 1915.

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eastern side of the yallcy, and already in the foot-
hills of the Carpathians) and went on up into the
JÜgher hills between Grybow and Gorlice, and
then crossed the crest of the Carpathians about
half-way between the towns of Gorlice and Bart-
feld. It held the whole belt south of the crest of
the Carpathians within the mountains them-
seh-es, as we know: the three road Pass of Poly-
anka, of the Dukla Pass and of the Jasliska, and
the railway and road Pass of Lupkow, after
"hich point it held a very narrow belt of the
southern slope and, a few miles further on, no
longer held the ridge of the Carpathians, failing
as yet to master the Uzog. Now, the protect-
ing front between the point B and the point F,
where the Dunajec falls into the Vistula, the
i\Yestern Russian line, based upon the Dunajec and
the Biala, has apparently been attacked at various
points upon its whole length; most seriously at
Ciezkowice, and elsewhere below Tarnow and on
the Jower Dunajec. The communications with the
Carpathian pass, which the Russians still hold,
are onJy one long day's marching behind this pro-
tecting screen of the western wing; and if that
wing cannot be re-established quickly it is obvious
that the positions between the point B on the
accompanying sketch and the Lupkow Pass will
bewme impossible.

o 5
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The actual position on which the enemy claims
(in tbe Austrian connnuniqué, at least) to ha \-e
struck his chief blow is, as we have seen, that which
defended the town of Ciezkowice. This town is
upon the Biala, just in the foothil1s of the Car-
pathians where the hil1s have summits from three
to four hundred feet above the level of the water. It
is not difficult country, nor is it a point lending it-
self in any particular way to the atta(;k. If the
Russian line broke there (which is still doubtful),
it was merely a break in one place out of many
that might, have gone under the strain. The real
interest will be here, as everywhere else on the
line, to know how far back the Russians len.
Gorlice (see plan C1 on next page) is about 10
miles to the south-east, and the positions behind
the passes-the points from which retreat
through the passes could be cut off-rather morc
than 20 and less than 30 miles in the same
direction.
'Vith this said, we are unfortunately com-
pelled to close our analysis midway, because we
have for the moment no further material. We
do not know whether the blow struck is a final
one-that is, whether it has produced an irre-
trievable effect and pushed the Russians right
back, or whether the whole position may be re

stored by the arriyal of Russian reinforcements.
.4*

May 8. 1915.

LAND AND
ATER.

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Cont:ours of 100 feet. C1

'\Ye are similarly ignorant as to whether. if
this decisÏ\-e effect. bas been produced the fallIng
back of tbe line has been sufficient to endanger the
positions on the Carpathians.
It is unfortunately cert.ain that behind the
line there is no immediate further position to be
easily taken up, After the line of the Dunajec

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and the Biala the next defensive position is that
of the Wisloka river, which passes through Jasno
on its way to the Vistula. But the River Wisloka
js a long way behind the Dunajec-Biala line. peri-

5

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lously near the Dukla, and at Jaslo actuaHy across
the communicat.ions of the Polvanka Pass.
It will hardly be possible
while hanging on
to the Wisloka line, to prot.ect the hold upon the
Carpathians which the Russians now have. It is
t.oo far retired. The accompanying lit.tle sketch D
shows the r roportion of distances involved and the
relation 0 t.he old line to tbe new, supposing that
new one to be taken up upon the Wisloka.
There is a further very unpleasant effect fol.
lowing upon this blow if it is nearly as decisive as
the enemy pretend, which is that the line nort.h of
the Vistula will also be partly bent back. At present
-or, rather. just before this blow was delivered-
the relation of the line t.o "'
arsaw and Russian
Poland was roughly what is shown marked with
dashes upon the accompanying sketch E, and in
that the portion south of the V istula A B represents
the Western Galician front, which the enemy has
just been hammering, But if it is neces
ary to
fall back even further than tbe 'Visloka line it
would mean that all the northern part A C beyond
the Vistula would have tù fall back verv heavily
and very hurriedly, as along t.he line of d
ts, into ;:
position probably not prepared, abandoning the
important town of Kielce, and leaving too narrow
a belt altogether between the foremost positions of
our ally and the Vistula river, But. I repeat,
5.

LAND ÄND WATER.

t.here is no dctf'rmi
1ing the thing at all until
furthcr news is recei\-ed. only a",aiting that uews
"e must be careful not to belittle too much the
ene:ny's claim. He has done something certainly
unexpected, certainly of considerable moment,
though not, so far as "e now know, either de
isive
or upon the scale which his rumour "\íarrants.

THE PROBLEft,1 OF THE DARDA-
NELLES.

In order to understaTld what has happened in
the Darùanelles we must first of all seize the heart
of the problem, which is the mastery of the
Narrows.
There is indeed much else besides this capital
mr.. tter.

l1Iay 8, 1915.

f)f the Narrows, may on o('pasion go as fast as four
knots and runs npon an avera.ge at two.
The large permanent works all stand round
about the two sides, the European and Asiatic, of
the Narrows, round the two projecting capes,
that upon the European side at E being known as
Kiljdbahr and that on the Asiatic side as the town
of Chanak at F. The projecting tongue of land
covering all the European side of the Straits is
known as the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Its
narrowest point is at the Isthmus of Bulair.
This tongue of land has certain features,
,vhich it is important to note carefully if we are
to grasp the main problem.
I will tabulate them in their order.
(1) It is, topographically, a somewhat con-
fused tangle of hills which commoIÙY rise to sum-

G u {f or S a. r 0 S

The enemy can establish temporary batteries;
he can, as we know from past and unfortunate
experience, devise unexpected forms of attack
against the ships advancing along the waterway.
But the pith of the whole affair is the mastery;
of the Narrows, because there, within a compara-
tively small area, are established the permanent
works and the large guns which make the action
of the fleet so difficult.
It is true that torpedo tubes nnder water and
floating mines and, as I haye said, the temporary
batteries could molest the fleet even if the per-
manent works were destroyed, but supposing these
works to be destroyed, the resistance of temporary
forms of offence could not last very long. If the
Expeditionary Force obtains possession of the
K arrows it will be able to clear both banks of any
such temporary weapons of offence, and the fleet
w ill be able to go through,
Now, the Dardanel1es as a whole run after
the fashion apparent in the accompanying sketch.
Our readers are already familIar with the main
features. In a 30 miles stretch of water aver-
aging, say, 2 to 4 miles across, there is a gut at C
a mile across at its narrowest or southern end (a)
and a little more than a mile across at its northern
end (b), which is the centre of resistance to anYi
hostile passage up tbe straits. From the straits,
running from North to South in the direction of
the arrow, runs a stream which, just 3t the strain

f

mits of 3,4,5, and 600 feet, but which in one long
stretch coming steep on to the Gulf of Saros touch
at one point, fl, over 1,300 feet. It is therefore a
country very well situated for the erection of tem-
porary defences and possessed of a number of
natural positions for defence.
(2) Its water supply is ample-at any rate,
at this season of the year. A number of little
streams run in between the confused series of
ridges and summits. Nothing, therefore, is to be
feared by an invading force upon that score.
(3) Its communications by land are veryj
poor. One fairly good road runs down as far as
Gallipoli itself from the North. After that there
is only, running southwards towards Maidos, a
road which bifurcates into two, one running more
easterly than the other, Both branches are bad,
the eastern. nearest the Straits, being roughly;
paved only.
On from Maidos to the lighthouse at Sedd el-
bahr there is a somewhat better road, which bulges
out towards the west through Krithia (K) in order
to avoid the high plateau of the Pasha Dagh, or
hill of Kilidbahr,
Unless some temporary line has been laid in
all these months of warning, some rough light rail-
way or other, by the Germans, there is no artificial
means of communication, and even petrol traffic
would have a very rough time south of Gallipoli.
There are numerous tracks up and down the
peninsula, but they are tracks and no more.

G*

}..Iay 8, 1915.

LAND AND
A TER.

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RoéRy 6.7 'Bad
Úl.nàilll Places

The gist of all this point upon the communi-
cations is that unless the enemy has already estab-
lished a considerable railway within the hills of
the peninsula, apart from tbat which is near the
permanent works of the Karrows, he will not be
able to bring up a reinforc8ment of this sort
quickly, not c.an he easily feed very large numbers
of men. In other words, we are fighting an artil-
lery already present and not one which can be
rapidly increased.
(4) Till some way past the Narrows t11e Euro-
pean side dominates the Asiatic side, There-
fore, it is enough for a force to be completely
master of the Gallipoli Peninsula and it can
ensure the retirement, at last, of an enemy from the
opposing shore.
(5) The landing-places upon the peninsula
from the open sea are few and have to be carefully
chosen, and this is particularly the case with
regard to the southern end, where most of the
coast is steep to the water and rocky,
There is here but one really good landing-
place of considerable extent, which is Morto Bay.
This lies at a ranç;e of 5.000 yards opposite the
Asiatic mouth of tne DardanefIes, the Cape Kum
Kale, and therefore is under the fire of small
mobile artillery from that point, which must be
OC'Cupied before a landing at
Iorto Bay can be
efl'ected.

All along the inner side of the peninsula, be-
tween the Narrows and the mouth of the Dardan-
elles, are hills falling quite steep down into the
water in a line of bluffs and sharp slopes-
broken only by three or foUl' valleys of waterw
courses,
On the side of the open sea or Gu1f of Saros

?i

2

.3
there is a little more chance of landing, because the
hills fall for the main part less steeply down to the
water: but everywhere a landing force finds a de-
fensive position immediately in front of it. No-
where is this the case more than at the extreme
point of the peninsula at
I N, where ther
is a
rocky little natural position between 100 and 200
feet in height, running right across, and this must
be forced or turned before the landing party
occupies the extreme of the tongue of land.
The particular problem of attacking the
Narrows thus can be judged upon a smaller area.
If we take the aboye sketch we shall have before us
all th8t is essential to our judgment.
The first thinc:r to be noted in this area is tbe
presence of two m
in defensive positions for the
defence of the Narrows against any force
approaching from the open sea and from the
south. These two positions, of which I have very
roughly indicated the contours in the accompany-
ing sketch (the exact contours are only known to
those who possess confidential information), may
be called the positions of Atchi Baba and the posi-
tions of Soghan Dere. I have expressed the first
by a line marked A B, the second by a line marked
C D. A landing baving been effected upon the
point of the peninsula, and the British force so
landed advancing towards the Narrows in the
direction of the arrow (1) will necessarily stand
first well dug in along the Atchi Baba position A
B. The slopes leading away from this position
towards the point of the Gallipoli Pensinsula are
easy. They form a sort of glacis with an cxcellrnt
field of fire, but they are not escarpcù. At K, the
village of K.rithia upon the only road (the ond
which goes round the hill:; to Maiùos), we have the
principal concentration at this moment of the
allied troops. and they will attempt with the he
vy
pieces at their disposal for bombardment and wIth
the numbers at their di3posal for storming to carry
this first defensive position A B before wbat will
presumably be the heaviest part of the work, tlmt
against the line C D, can be attempted.
Whether this bombardment and storming will

7"

LAND AND SV-A TER.

!lay 8, 1915.

be successfully accomplished or no, only the future
can show, but that must necessarily be the first
itep in the operations,
It may be asked "Why tbe co-operation of tbe
fleet cannot determine the issue--the ranges are
comparatively short (the whole peninsula along tbe
line A B is only a little m-er 4 miles across)-and
,why the Turkish line cannot be taken in reyerse.
U'he reply to this lies in tbe conformation of the
land towards tbe Ægean at the .A, end of the A B
line. Tbere the land goes so steep down on to the
sea that ships have to lie far out in order to have
any effect upon the Turkish lines above.
It is none tbe less true that their co-operation
will have a certain weight at this end, and may
llelp so to weaken the defensive as to permit the
storming of the line.
Let us grant this :first position A B to haye
fallen-which it has not vet done. There remains
the much more formidahie position of the Soghan
Dere, which may also be called, from the big hill
round which it is grouped, the position of the
'Pasha Dagh.
The Pasha Dagh is a plateau with yery steep
escarpments upon the west, and possessing a.
southern outlier, also with very steep CSCal'pmcnts,
which oyerlooks the valley of the stream Soghan
Dere and the village of :!\Iaghram (?vI). These
escarpments, at the soutbern or C end of the bent
]ine C D, run to about 600 feet in height, at least
their chief summits are of that elevation.
The slope is about that of one of our chalk
escarpments at home, like that of the Cotswolds,
for instance, above the Seyern Valley, or that of
the Surrey Hills upon their southern side.
The position is thus a formidable one. lUld
eyen if A B is carried, C D may give the Expedi-
tionary Force a task greater than it can perform.
:Meanwhile, v.itb command of the sea, there is
8tiU the possibility of the last and stronger line
C D being turned, For this to occur it will be
necessary for a separate force of the Allies to
advance successfully towards 11aidos (along the
arrow 2).
The British have already landed a force at E
{Gaba Tepe), which occupies an entrenched posi-
tion upon the flat of the seashore, and will be ready
to co-operate against the northern or right flank
of th
entrenched Turkish position C D "hen
occaSIOn serves,
But it cannot move, of course, until the pres-
ßUre upon the enemy from the south becomes very
serious. For the forces are too evenly matched to
permit of a comparatively small and isolated de-
tachment risking itself until the enemy is engaged
heavily as a whole.
"\Vben that engagement takes place, however,
it would seem certain that an advance from E
towards 1Iaidos will be undertaken, The country
between the two is easy. The advance can be sup-
ported by fire from the sea (the whole distance
across the peninsula from the open sea to 1Iaidos
being not much more than 8,000 yards range) and
the road between the open sea and the Straits riBes
not much more than a hundred feet.
If the Expeditionary Force should succeea
not only in storming the first defensive line, the
Atchi Baba line A B, but also in breaking the
second defensive line C D and establishing itself
upon the Pasha Dagh, then the permanent works
in the Narrows would be at its mercy, and that
for the following reasons.
(a) It would have swept free of

batteries and submarine torpedo tubes (if such
have been established) all the shore of the Dar-
danelles up to the Sarrows.
(b) It would be in possession of the domi-
nating heights upon the European side, which
would at the worst keep <lown the fire of, and at
the best completely clear, the Asiatic shore.
(c) It would haye the permanent works on
either side of the Narrows at its mercy, and this
particularly from the fact that the Expeditionary
:Force has at its disposal very numerous air
machines, which are a weak point in the enemy's
equipment.
Indeed, did the Expeditionary Force succeed
in setting foot permanently upon tile plateau and
summits of the Pasha Dagh, the main task of this
difficult venture would have been accomplished.
The ships could freely use aU the lower Dar-
daneIles up to the Karrows, and the only fear
"Would be that of drifting mines. There would be
no fire from either shore.
As to what llas been actuaIly accomplis}lCd of
this task so far, one can only give the most general
lines, because the details since more than a week
ago have not been given us, at least at the moment
of writing (Tuesday evening), but the following
points are clear.
(1) In order to use the little bay marked F
upon the accompanying sketch (called :Morto Bay),
which is controlled by fire from the point G on the
Asiatic side (which is the Cape of Kum I{ale), the
latter point haù tD be occupied_
The French-only a division of their Colonial
troops were employed-developed a strong attack
upon the whole of that ground, which is, by the
war, the Plain of Troy and the scene of the Iliad.
ThIS attack was a feint, and while they were doing
it a portion of the force, screened by the attack,
entrenched t.hemselves 011 Kum Kale. The for"ffard
bodies in the Plain of Troy then retired, remaining
in occupation only of the extreme point G, from
which the opposite bay F is threatened.
But upon the security of this bay depended
the landing of the Expeditionary Force on tlle
extreme of the Gallipoli Peninsula, because there
lay, as we have remarked, a good defensive posi-
tion along the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula below
the point where I have marked the double line
MN.
With the landing of the bay thus covered, this
defensive position was turned and the invading
force could advance up the main road to Krithia
at K, where apparently it lies at the moment of
writing.
A further advance along the Asiatic shore
would be quite useless and will presumably not be
attempted, and all that we have to watch is the
progress and, let us hope, the success of the assault
upon the first enemy position of Atchibaba, A B.
It should be said in closing this department
of our subject that the Turkish communiqués with
regard to all this piece of fighting bave been very
unreliable and that the German conclusions
drawn therefrom are certainly too optimistic.
The task is an exceedingly difficult one, it
may well end in faiJure, but it has not so far pro-
ceeded upon the fantastic lines indicated from
Berlin; and the critics of the campaign in the Ger-
man Press, whose opinions have been quoted, are
altogether too confident of the result--or, rather,
altogether misread the extent of the progress al-
ready achieved.
c.oncealed l.t is further necessary to reiterate the yefZ
8-

May 8, 1915.

LAND

elementary point which was as true of t1l j
attack that biled two months ago as it is nuw:
the ultimate success of the Allies will depend
more than anything else upon the number and
calibre of their heavy pieces-that is, of their
siege traÌn, If both are sufficient they will suc-
ceed; if insufficient they will fail. For both the
prep,aration of the attack upon the two main
posItions, and-given both attacks to be suc-
cessful-the reduction of the permanent works
of the Narrows will depend upon the big gun
&Ild the big howitzer,

THE HINDENBERG METHOD IN
THE WES1:

The fact that Field-Marshal ,on Hinden-
berg was present in the 'Vest! during t1?-e recent
violent atta.ck upon and faIlure agamst the
junction of the British and French lines north
of Ypres, might seem to indic
te, to the s
ude
t
of this war, the appearance m the fightmg m
Flanders of certain features with which that
name has made us familiar in the East.
It is not well to .exaggerate the effect of any
one man in general operations of this kind. The
commanders of the German armies in front of
Dixmude, Ypres, and Al'mentières will retain
to the full their responsibilities and know. tht:)
war in this quarter after so
any months m.a
fashion forbidden to von Hmdenberg, even If
that aged and successful General be put
directly over them. !,hat he has thus been P,:t
in direct command IS doubtful enough. It IS
more likely that he 'was sent into this field
merely for the effect that his name might pro-
duce, and that he did no more than inspect.
But let us take the point for what it is
worth, and ask ourselves what the method of
this Commander has beBn in the East.
It will not lead U8 to the expectation of any
startling noyelties upon the Belgian front.
Von Hindenberg's point was a careful
study of the :Masurian Lake region upon the
southern and eastern boundaries of East
Prussia. Using his iocal knowledge, not to say
his hobby, in the early part of the war, he did
achiüve a very striking SUCCPf-q against the
Russians at Tannenberg, He en veloped with a
force, possibly inferior, certainly not largely
superior, the Russian Army of invasion and
nearly destroyed two of its army corps out of
five-thoroughly defeating the whole
Since that success he has had in the eyes of
the civilian German nation a label attached to
him which the German Government has used
for all it was worth. His name alone heartens
Berlin-and, for that matter, the rank and :file
of the troops-whenever it is mentioned; and
therefore the presence of von Hindenberg is
expected to work a miracle,
But all that hr..s nothing to do with either
strategy or tactics, and what this Commander
has done in point of fact since his local and
very striking success for his country on the
Masurian Lakes, ha
not perceptibly differed
from the action w1}ich we can predicate of any
Prussian General officer acting anywhere.
He has massed men with successful
secrecy. He has used them, once concentrated,

'Xl) 'VATER.

. L b tt . f h . H 1-. an anything
III t;
a ermg ram as IOn. e L
so r'lpidly
pendent always uJ?on the tactical Í1". C1'
nd it
his service, with Its enormous wasta
;:
:nt was
he has failed. His use of the railway sY
tJ'... t
behind him in the East was nothing eiihel
original or unexpected, and if he has any say
in what is going on, or to go on in the immedi-
ate future in the \Vest, he ceI'tainly d02s not
mean enveloping movements such as those
which he practised in the East, because in the
'Vest those are not possible. It means no moro
than what we have already seen, unexpectedly
rapid co
centraUon, an unexpectedly heavy
blow (delIvered at enormous expen3c) upon a
scleeted point and hitherto, on the Rzura, at
Przasnych, the checking of that blow before it
has had any definite effect.
There is no other feature in the "T est.ern
fighting worth new comment thi
wef\k, unless
it be the dropping of bombs upon Dunkirk.
That piece of futility will stand in the history
of this war in the same category with fifty
others. There ÌJ3 nothing remarkable iù dis-
charging a large missile over the trajectory in-
volved. Anyone can work out a ballistic for-
mula of initial velocity, air resistanc3, and
the rest, and discover what gun it is, with what
charge, and what elevation, that would drop
a missile, of what weight, at what range,
and everybody knows that any gun such
as there are many hundreds of in the modern
world, can fire a missile from behind Dixmude
or behind Nieuport which "Would fall some-
where within the large area of Dunkirk.
'Yhat you cannot do at those ranges is to
take useful aim, or to keep your gun safe. All
you can do is to drop a missile within some
rather large area and trust to Providence for
the result.'""' And meanwhile you must cmplÐce
your gun in some imlllobile fashion which
l'enders it liable to discovery and to destruc-
tion. If anyone asks what object the enemy
had in view when he thus dropped shells into
Dunkirk at a maximum range and without
aiming, the answer is simple enough. He" as
after moral effect. It is exactly what he did'
when he dropped bombs on Scarborough or
when he dropped them the other day on Nancv,
or when he dropped them on two occasioÌls
upon Paris. It is a perfectly legitimate method
of warfare, as is the Chinese method (now
abandoned) of imitating the cries of wild beasts.
In attempting these "moral" effects, all you
have to do is to gauge three things. The ex-
pense to yourself, the intelligence of tho enemy,
and the nerves of your enemy. Upon the first
of t.hese throe things an accurate calculation
can be made; to the two others no exact calcu-
lation applies. It is a matter of judgment, and
perhaps of a sense of humour.
At any rate, the bomharÙ1nent of Dunkirk,
while imperilling three German heavy guns
(probably naval) will have as much effect
upon the war as though the shells had been
sent out to sea.
One last point in the ne\\"s of the we('k, the
raid into the 13altic prodnces of Russia, I shall
deal with later, if, as is not proba ble, it comes to
anything considerable. So far it is mainly
ca\-alry work, it has no effect upon the rnam
dispositions of the campaign, and its fruit is
yet to be discovered. It is probably an isolated
effort.

9*

LAND AND JV A TER.

,lay 8, 1915)

besuccessftÙ 1dE INTERVENTION OF ITALY.
can show. .
Iitep I ' l' seems quite clear that the next few days dustry. She is in a position which no ot.her Power
".rill decide whether the pivot of neutral connected with this "ar can boast: a position of
intenention, Italy, will come into the \var or preparation undertakcn after the lesson of the war
not. had been learned. She k'1.ows, for instance, the
There are three neutrals worth considering- supreme importance to-dilY of vast quantities of
and oõlly three (no one outside the newspaper artillery ammunition, and that is why she has
owners in this country imagines intervention from stopped so much cotton on its way to Germany. It
elsewhere). These three are the Northern Balkan will be a pretty pier>e of historical irony if the
group - that is, the Bulgaro-Roumanian, the American cotton, which the imperfection of the
Grcek
, and the Italians; and of these by far the British blockade designed for ou-r enemies, should
most important is, of course, the Italian neutral. after aU be turned against them and should be
In a certain fashion Bulgaria and Roumania discharging missiles to our profit. Italy has also
balal1ce e:1cb other, but Roumania was always had ample time to acquaint herself through the
more rC'ady to engage upon the side of the Allies Intelligence Department of her Government with
th:m was Bulgaria to engage upon the side of the dispositions of the German Puwers. She
the Austro-Germans. The intervention of Rou- knows in a wav that we can never know what their
mania ,.hen it came, or if it carne, vwuld have a public opinion is and what their abilities are for
positive object, not indeed independent of the vic- meeting her upon her own frontier, for she Las
tory of the Allies, but progressively obtainable as been neutral and the recipient of not a few truth-
that victory was gradually approached. Roumania ful communications all tbls long time. The enemy
had for her object (and still has) the occupation has told her things not aìways falRe, with the ob-
of territory governed by Hungary though in- ject of persuading her of his ultim
te victory.
habited by Roumanians. She further lives in She knows tbe worst. Her govermng men are
a lively fear that if she does not intervene, this under no danger of exaggerating, as are those of
capital popular object of redeeming what is cer- France, Britain, or Russia, but particularly of
tainly national territory will be lost. The Court Britain, the strength of the enemy. Italy has fur-
of Roumania is Prussian, and that is the main ther the very great advantage of being able to
force against the intervention of Roumania. choose her own moment. Lastly, she has the ad-
Bulgaria also wants territory which is nation- vantage of entering fresh into the struggle at a
ally Bulgarian and which Austrian policy de- time when her enemy, if she chooses to bave an
flected after the second Bdkan 'Var into the hands enemy, is approaching exhaustion.
of Serbia. But this territory which Bulgaria de- The arguments against Italy's intervention are
sires to occupy is close to the Grecian boundary and political arguments clearly appreciable. There is
close to the Ægean, and a quarrel with the Allies first of all the obvious truth that anyone who can
would further cut off Bulgarian territory during keep out of this tornado is well out of it. The
t-hf> war from all access to the outer sea, Italian people have been immensely enriched by
The temptation of Bulgaria depended much the power to produce peacefuHy and to trade while
more upon passion than upon reason. She had a nearly all the rest of Europe had sunk its energies
great deal to Jose if she made a mistake and in a violent conflict for life. The Italian popula-
jumped too eaI'ly, for she would have ma<Ìe of tion, monuments, and treasures have remained
.Hussia a permanent and implacable enemy, and intact.
the Al1ies, once ,ictorious, would have left her :More important than this nègatiYe factor was
no opportunity for such tl"eason in the future. the highly positive factor that Italy could get one
She had very little to gain unless she moved after great part of what bel' people desired without loss
it was perfectly safe to move. by mere occupation of adjoining territory at the
The Greeks, had they intervened early, under end of the war upon the defeat of the Austrians
the leadership of the man who is perhaps the best and the Germans. Heavy fighting would not be
statesman in Europe (and almost the only man of likely until an army reached tbe hills, but what
outstanding ability which the Parliamentary sys- the Italian people and the tradition of their
tern has produced in our time), would have had modern resurrection really desire is not tbe defeat
immediate and definite advantages. They would of an enemy beyond the mountains. It is the re-
have had a claim to all that doubtful land, Greek construction of a complete Italy upon this side of
in soul and language, but politically a prey to any the mountains, The Istrian Peninsula, Pola,
intervener, which rings all round the Ægean. Trieste, and even Fil.lme. are upon the hither side
'Vith every week tbat passes the reward they of the hills: part of the Italian plain.
can hope for grows less. The balance against Now, it is conceivable that at the end of a
their intervention was the certainty of very con- great campaign, in which the combatants
siderable losses in a population already tried by a were exhausted, even upon the victorious
double war and in an adventure which is ad- side, the Italians would have no more to
mittedly one of extreme difficulty. Their smaller do than to walk in and occupy this northern
craft would be useful upon the sea, their numbers corner of the Adriatic. The valley of the
against the Dardanelles, but had the experiment Trentino, or at least the lower Italian-speaking
failed, even with their aid, that aid would have part of it, would follow as a matter of course. And
been wasted. Italy would appear at the end of the struggle play-
Now, in the matter of Italy th
qU
8tion of ing upon a rather smaner scale the part Roumania
intervention is something altogether different. played after the second Balkan War: demanding
Italy is a Great Power. Italy has had months in a moderate accession of territory, to which she was
which to prepare, and during the latter part of really attached, and no more-and that without
those months has been preparing with great in- fighting.
10*

:May' 8, 1915.

A .

But the Italian tradition demands a great
deal more than that. It demands with a natural
appetite the permanent establishment of Italy as
a great Power. It is important for the Italians,
if the unity and cohesion of their State and
the permanence of its influence are to be
secure, that they should enter the councils of
Europe upon an equal footing with nations poli-
tically older than their own. It was this feeling
which gave rise to the enthusiasm-soon checked-
for Colonial expansion, half a lifetime ago. It was
this feeling which led to the attack en Turkey, the
occupation of Tripoli, and the naval work in the
Ægean quite recently.
There is more than this. ,];he Italians feel of
the Adriatic that it should by right be an Italian
sea, and, in the background, is that feeling which,
whatever academically minded men in this country
may say to the contrary, is present elerywhere
throughout civilisation: the feeling tha t a Ger-
man, when he has the power to make war, is im-
possible: the feeling that this war is, in spite of
all the triteness of the phrase, re.ally a war for
civilisation against blunderers who are capable in
their brutal simplicity of destroying civilisation,
All these things move Italy to intervene, and,
incidentally, Italy has the very great asset of a
Court which is national. Her monarchy. parlia-
mentary and a compromise though it is, is at least
Dot a German monarchy, Her Court is not an
international Court, There is a great deal more
in that than the conventions of our modern politi-
cal caution are disposed to allow.
If Italy comes in she would bring up for the
first great actions (supposing the enemy to accept
her challenge) about a million men. This force
would be properly gunned and would have behind
it munitions upon a larger scale than any corre-
sponding number of any other Power in the field.
It would be new to modern war and therefore un-
tried. Possibly, or probably, it would meet in the
first actions with local unexpected reverses, but it

---

THE

WAR

.

.

<f

would be so much more numerous than anything
that could be brought against it, it could so rapidlJ
acquire the lesson of all this new fighting, and It
would be of such importance-once the conflict was
joined-to make good that the move could not but
change to our advantage, and that almost immedi-
ately, the whole character of the war, It may be
safely prophesied the military spirit would spring
suddenly in Italy to an unexpected height. The
nation has desired for very long something that
it lacked, not only native territory but a military,
name, and the trial once undertaken that appetite
would become very vivid indeed. Anyone doubt-
ing that is ignorant of the Latin temper. It is a
spirit not prompt to war, yet nourished by 'Yar.
Italy thus intervening would probably,
though not certainly, determine the intervention of
Roumania, and there would come upon the Austro-
Hungarian forces a pressure too strong to be borne.
Would there be a corresponding increase of
tension upon the Western line of the enemy, so
that he would be compelled to shorten that line:
in other words, to evacuate Northern France and
most of Belgium before the English and the French
deliver their blow 1
It is to be doubted. Austria would bleed
first. The German Empire would lend her against
this new peril no more forces than it has already
lent, for there are no more to lend.
But after the intervention of Italy has pro-
duced its full effect, after the Austrian Empire has
begun to weaken its defence and that defence to
II crack" at anyone vital point upon the ring,
then with the advance of no matter what enemy
force into the interior of Hungary or the Slav
provinces of the South-East, the German position
would be logically desperate. The time remain-
ing would be appreciable, but short, and a blow in
the West, even a breaking of the containing line
there, would no longer be able to save the German
Empire from complete defeat. Its commanders
would shorten their line.

BY

WATER.

GREAT LANDING.
By A. H. POLLEN.

THE

NOTE..-ThlI artIcle has been 5t1bmitted to the Presl Bureau, which does aot object to the publication al ceasored, and takes no
respoDslbiJity for the correctaess 01 the ltatements,

I T will probably be found, when the full details tions is under the naval command. I believe that I
of the great landing on the Gallipoli Penin- am right in saying that, technically, every man in
sula are published. that the most remarkable a boat is under the naval officer in charge, and even
combined naval and military operation ever when disembarked, under comJYIand of the
a'ml
carried out in face of strong opposition has been II officer of the beach "until paraded under his own
accomplished. The official account, no doubt, tells officers, when authority over him passes from naval
us all the facts which are strictly material to our into military hands. The task put upon the
having a fair grasp of the situation on April 29. admiral commanding and his officers is, therefore,
But it is pardonable to say that the more we know a stupendous one.. Where there is no port, no
of the success that attended them, the more we wish wharves, and no pIers, the mere transport of the
to know of the methods by which that success was men from ships t.o the land and then their disem-
attamed. The difficulties in disembarking troops barkation constitute a vastly complicated affair.
on a shore which is well defended are, of course, so Everything that can float and can carry men
great as to be almost insuperable, and until the or stores must be requisitioned, not only from
landing force is not only on the beach, but has been every transport, but from every man-of-war. This
able
establjs
itself in
enable positions and in numerous a
d variegated flpet, divided up into
fightmg formatIon, the entIre conduct of the opera- separate flotIllas, each told off to its special unit

11*

LAND AND W A TERa

May 8, 1915.

must be pulled, sailed, or towed in proper order to
the section of beach which each nnit is designat.ed
to attack. As a staff opcrat.ion, the organisation of
boat work on this scale is a noteworthy perform-
ance. As. a feat of S('
manship, the effective land-
ing, as near si.multan('ously ns possible, of such
ht
gc forces and in six different places is quit.e un-
prcced('nted. And the boat work would not be
limiteel to:1 :'3ingle e'i.pedition for each beat. There
obvious1y could not ha\'e been boats or rafts enough
-nor, for that matter. beach enough-to land
more than a fra.ction of tbe exp('ditionary force at
anyone time. So fast as boats were emptied. steam
pinnaces, destroyers, and oth('r craft would have
towed them bark to the transports for fresh loads.
R:Jt the Navy's duties were not ended when it
had delivered the Army safely at the beach. It
would Ì1.n'e to maintain an offen::;i\'e of the utmost
intensity on every enemy force within reach, so
as to reduce hostile atta.ck on t.he disembarked in-
fantry to a minimum. 'Vhen one looks at the
liug{'st a\Tailable charts of the waters round the
Gallipoli Peninsula. onc is not surprised that the
Admiral in Command reports that the Fleet is
filled with an intense admiration for the achieve-
me!1ts of their military comrades. For, as far as
onc can see, almost the whole of the northern coast
of the peninsula is continuous cliffs. The five
separate beaches mentioned in the offieial state-
ment would appea,r at best to be exceedingly con-
fined spaces, the defence of which by well-placed
infantry, machine guns, artillery, and wire should
not have been difficult. That a whole army has
been landed with success on such unpromising
ground is undoubtedly a thing of which that Army
may be proud. It suggests a. repetition of Wolfe's
adventt1re on the Heights of Abraham, but on an
incredible scale. And we may be sure that had the
work of the Navy been carried out with anything
Òort of perfection the thing would have been nut
only costly-it had to be that-but impossible.
By far the most difficult of all operations on
a coast of this character is the landing of artillery
and horses. It is a thing that puts the resource-
fulnes3 of seamen to the hardest test. No mention
at all is made in t.he official report of artillery being
used in the first five days" fighting, but the corre-
spondents from Athens and elsewhere assert tbat
the guns were landed and employed by the
Australians and New Zealanders in their advanc.e
from Sari Bahr. But that the attack on Sedd-el-
Bahr made on the afternoon of the 25th was I!1ade
through undamaged wire entanglements would
seem to show-first, that by the evening of the 25th
no sufficient artillery for destroying these obstacles
were available at Cape Teke; and secondly, that
the lines defended by them were not exposed to
the ships' ordnance. The artillery, we may per- This is an exceedingly attractive programme,
haps take it, was not landed until the subsequent but it is as well to remember that, vast as is the
days. The official report speaks of its disembarka- artillery force engaged, the difficulties to be sur-
tion with stores as being continued on the 28th and mounted in using it with effect are enormous also.
29th, so that some of the guns may, therefore, have That using guns at long range against a ship
been landed on the 26th and 27th. Anyway, by presents problems of a kind totally different from
the 29th, the whole of tbe end of the peninsula was using them against land positions is already a
in our ha.nds and entrenched, while the Australians familiar truth. It is more difficult to keep the
and New Zealanders held a second position ten range of a ship when you have found it, because
miles to the north, at the end of the gap in the hills the ship is free to move at any speed it likes, and

hat runs through to :Maidos from the Gulf of in any dir
ction; but it is more difficult to find the
3al'0H. range of a fort, because, first, it is an object far less
The Fleet, having got the Army under its distinct from its surrOlmdings than is a ship; and
eharge, with its gUllS, stores, horses, &c., safely on secondly, the projectiles that miss do not mark
Jhore, still has to motber tbis force. for the Fleet their positions by well-defined columns of wateJ.'
U.

must continue to be, in a military sense, the Army's
base. It is probable, indeed, that the troops will
be dependent on the sLips and transports for liter-
ally everything, It is doubtful, for inst.ance, if
they could even find water enough anywhere in the
peninsula, and this state of dependence must con-
tinue long after the whole of it is conquered. And
the Fleet must do more than this. The immediate
objective of the expedit.ion is the opening up of
the Dardanelles-in other words, the subjection
of the forts on both sides of this historic waterway,
The taking of forts is a military, and not a navål,
operation. By this I mean that a properly
equipped army can subdue and take any fort in
the world in time, while no navy, however well
equipped it may be, can, without an army, take
and subdue forts at all, unless it carries 80 manv
men as to be, in fact, a navy and an army too. Iil
the taking of the Dardanelles the function of the
ships will be to do for Sir Ian Hamilton's army
what the 17-inch howitzers did for the German
army in the taking of Liége, Maubeuge, and Ant-
werp. The ships on the spot actually carry the
greatest number of powerful guns ever brought
into use in any military operation. In range, in
numbers, and in mobility they surpass any artil-
lery foræ that could conceivably be used from land
positions. Tpe ships' batteries include at least
fifty of the most powerful pieces. running from
Queen Elizabetlt's eight 15-inch (which in a single
salvo can hurl-to an incredible dista.nce-no less
than sixteen t011S of high explosive shell) to
Tl'iumph and Swiftsure's four 10-inch. There
are besides thf'se A qomemnon and Lord N elson's
broadsides of ten 9.2's, Triumph anc1 Swiftsure.s
fourteen 7.5's, and probahly at least fifty 6-inch
guns as well. This vast battery can be employed
at long or short range. It can be moved up the
Straits as fast as forts are subdued, mines cleared.
and torpedo stations destroyed. It will be the
first function of the Army to facilitate the use of
these guns by helping to ensure the accuracy of
the ships' fire. The Army's own artillery will
have the important function of taking the forts
in reverse and, as far as possible, preventing the
enemy from returning to the forts when driven out
by the ships' fire. Finally, by occupying and de-
stroying the battered forts, the Army will open the
way for the Fleet to enter the Sea of Marmora.
And this is the objective of the expedition, because
if half of them get through uninjured, and the
Army is able to prevent the enemy from closing the
Straits behind them, the fate of Turkey will be
sealed,

THE ARTILLERY PROBLEM.

Bpouting 100 fef't up in the air, whose position
relationship to the target can easily be detected
from the ship's fighting tops. A projectile that
misses a fort may be 500 yards short, and secm
from the ship to be a hit. It may be 500
yards over and appe.'1.r to be exactly where
it is wanted-namely, just over the parapet.
You can find the range of a ship by spot-
ting from the masthead, because the column
of water is so plainly visiblc. But, a.gainst
a fort, all spotting, to be effective, must be done
from some point at a distance from the firing ship.
Where a second ship ca.n stand off, at any angle
greater than 30 degrees from the line of fire <11,-d
doser to the target, the second shi p can spot for the
first. The recent attacks on all the Turkish forts
except those at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale were
i))effective because there was sea room here for
spotting ships almost at right angles to the line of
fir
the ideal position-while, once in the Dar-
danelles, the Straits are not wide enough to permit
an advance ship to spot for the others. And aero-
planes are not a satisfactory substitute. At best
an aeroplane can help one ship only. If the
troops can seize good observation positions 0;1. I he
hi& above the forts, it should not be long before a
bombardment of greatly iruproyed accuracy is
brought to bear upon them.
But, even with such positions, there will still
be considerable difficuUies. It would, for instance,
be a mistake to suppose that the guns I have
enumerated could ever be brought simultaneously
to bear upon the same target. Guns of separate
ships cannot be controlled together in groups as
the guns of a battery can be on land. At sea, where
it can very seldom happen that more than three
ships desire to concentrate on a single target, the T HE past week has been remarka.ble for a
difficulty of spotting independently for each unit vigorous revival of the submarine attacks
ship is yery great, but not insuperable. The on British and neutral shipping, and the
Germans use an ingenious device for simplifying first exchange of shots that has occurred
this procedure. The spotting ofHcer has a press in the North Sea for a hundred days. This last
button under his hand, which is started the was a small affair of outposts, and is chiefly
moment the salvo is firf'd. This controls a timing intere.sting for the fact that the Germans had
element, which is set tu '1C number of seconds the actually rescued a Brit.ish officer and two men
projectiles composing the salvo should take to from a sunken trawler; but only to confine
carry to the range set upon the sights. Half a tbem below in their own boat., and to keep tbem
second before tbe eud of this interval a striker there while that boat "as being attacked and
within tLe device is brougllt sharply against a loud finally sunk by the British de5troyers. On Monday
gong. The salvo of the spotter's ship, therefore, the Admiralty had published our having saved
should strike the target or the water wbile the over 40 German officers and men and their having
gong is still sounding. If several ships are engag- failed to save any of ours, and on Tuesday added
iug the S3me target, the spotter ignores every salvo the eyideIlce of the disgraceful proce.edings I have
except tbe one that coincides váth the gong. But recounted. Both announccments have been made
this method could not, of course, be employed UIl- without comment, nor is comment required. Apart
less the spotter were in the firing ship itself from the brutality of the GeTman {'onduct, the en-
It is, of course, a cOf!lmonplace that in- cmmter seems to \)e witllout any pal'ticular
creased fire effect may be got either by a gre..'tter strategic importance. By their own account, the
accuracy of a small number of pieces or by the German fleet, well prot('tted from any sudden
concentration of a larger number of pieces on the Httack by a scrC'pn of Zeppelins and destroyers,
same tar
et, If the arrangements for the correc- }rld made a parade the week before in the
tion of fire are sufficiently good, and if the ships
orth Se.a., and the Y 1 boastcd of it as if there
can without danger c,)me within such range that v,ere no British ",lrships of any kind in that
a high average of hits may be e"\:pected, th('n, so area. The torpedo-toat captains, pel"ha ps taking
powerful is the battery of e\Jcn the sma nest of the the German Admiralty at its word, pushed a little
ships,. 110 Îort can 11(' cxpected to surviY8 very long. too far on Satur\.lav, with the result we know. But
TIut, If concentration and accuracy can be com- neither the parade nor the adventure of the
bined together, tbe rapidity with which the dcsirC'd torpedo-boats gi, es rise to any hope that Gerr1ìany
effect is obtained vvill naturally be much greater. will put the command of the s('a in disputp by
The difficulty in correcting the fire of a mul- coming out in force to attack Sir ,Jehn Jellicoe.
titude of ships is, it may be added, two-fold, Nm> will the suhmarine attacks on neutra1s alter
because each salvo must be identified as coming radically, though they may embitter. a situation
from a particular ship, and then that ship l:!e in- already complicated enough,
13*

May 8, 1915.

A ' t

. "I .

I '

formed of the correction. There is a pparently no
escape from the necessity of having a separate
spotter for each ship. If the spotter is in an
independent position, tbe obstacles in the way of
this double task are considerable. Neither identifi-
cation nor communicating the correction will be
easy. And it is not only the concentration of many;
ships on a single target that creates the difficulty.
It "ill be almost as great when seyeral ships en-
gage in a simultaneous attack on contiguous forts,
The final solution can take one of t"o forms.
Either concentration will be abandoned alto-
gether, or two or three ships may be combined
against a single fort, and tbe forts selected as
targets be taken from different groups. EÀperi-
ence will show the better way, and no fleet has had
such experience of long-range fire as that now at
the Dardanelles. Indeed, this experience appears
to be the onl
asset which the attempt to force the
Straits by ShIpS alone has yielded.
In the official report there was nothing to say
whether the gunfire which Queen Elizabeth and
Triumph directed on to J\Iaidos was indirect-that
is, over the land, or direct up the Straits from some
spot above Kephez Point. The only detail given
was that Queen Elizabeth had sunk a transport
after the third round. And to hit a transport by
indirect fire seemed almost impossible. Sub5e-
quent unofficial reports, how
ver, speak as if all
the shooting had been indirect. Should this prove
true, an amazing thing has been done.

A

THE
SEA.

BRUSH IN
NORTH

.6.1.

A _ )

Yl.A TER.

1Yfay 8, 1915.

A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE.

THE

GREA. T

By

L,

BLIN

N Oone will, to-day, deny the invaluable services
rendered by the aeroplane since the opening of
hostilities. Yet. when the war broke out, there
were numerous persons-and among them high
military authorities-who were unable to fore-
see the great part aircraft were gcing to perform. In spite
of the accumulated e\idence pointing to the great importance
of the aeroplane for offensive purposes and showing in what
manI!er Viis weapon must be used if it is to be of real value,
there is as y.et no sign of its being employed as it ought to be,
It can be affirmed that the aercplane is a sufficiently
powerful weapon to force the German .Fleet to come out into
the open sea, at our bidding, to accept combat with our
Fleet, or to be destroyed in the seclusion of its harbours and
under the very nose of their guns and in spite of the protec-
tion of their forts. The expert knows that there is in the
aeroplane a potentiality, capable of immediate application,
whereby the fifteen odd railway bridges on the Rhine could
be destroyed in the course of a few hours, and thereby cut
the German Army in the 'Vestern field of operations from
rapid communication with Germany. But no advantage has
yet been taken of this knowledge.
People are discussing whether the advent of aircraft in
milit:try and naval operations has, to any considerable degree,
modified the principles of war; and it is the general opinion
that aeroplanes and airships have not revolutionised warfare,
But why have they not done so 1 Simply because we have
not permitted it. And this can be proved as clearly as a
proposition of Euclid.
If a Commander-in-Chief had some means at his dis-
posal by which he could prevent the enemy from using their
guns and their rifles, all along the line, from the North Se'!
to AIsace, would not that method be considered revolutionary 1
If you could prevent the enemy from using their weapons by
the employment of your aircraft, would you not consider that
your air fleets have revolutionised your ordinary, tedious,
long, and costly methods of carrying on wad If, therefore,
it can be shown that aircraft can render the enemy's guns
and rifles valueless to them, it must aho be admitted that
aircraft are capable of revolutionising the present methods
Df warfare.
It is estimated that, every ten minutes, a military train,
carrying reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies, passes
over each of the fifteen principal railway bridges over the
Rhino. This means that 144 train-loads of ammunition, sup-
plies, or reinforcements passes over each of the bridges in
twenty-four hou1"!!, or that it requires 2,140 train-loads a day
to keep the German Army operating in the Western field pro-
vided with war material. To keep the German Army well
supplied it is necessary that these 2,140 trains should cross
the Rhine evcry day, and on the regular running of these
2,140 trains the German Army in the 'Western theatre of war
depends.
It is computed that the German Army in Belgium and in
the North of France has ammunition and supplies sufficient
for four days only. If, therefore, you suddenly prevent the
2,140 trains from crossing the Rhine the German Army will,
even after twenty-four hours, find itself in a very serious
predicament indeed. If only a third of the number of
trains crossing the Rhine-that is, 714 trains-were continu-
ously stopped from running for a few days, the German
Westel'll Army would find itself considerably handicapped as
regards arms, ammunit,ion, reinforcement, supplies, &c.
Can aeroplanes be used to hamper, to any considerable
degree, the German railway traffic to the t'xtent of preventing
some 700 trains from daily crossing the Rhine 1 This
que..tion the writer proposes to examine.
'Ve have read lately, both in the reports issued by Sir John
Frt'nch and by the French ""ar Office, that the Allies' air-
men have been busy dl'stroying a number of railway junction:]
some little distance behind the enemy's trenches. That this
could be done the writer had shown in one of his previous
articl
s*, and in it he has also foreseen the reason why the
recent aerial offensive of the Allies' airmen against the
railway junctions behind the enemy's trenches has not been
followed by direct permanent results. This kind of aerial
attack on railways is, however, of a quite different character

OPPORTUNITY.

DESBLEDS.

and carried out with a quite different object from the aerial
oITensive we are now considerinD'.
The recent aerial offensive aOgainst railway junctions had
for its object the hampering of the distribution of men,
supplies, ammunition, &c., in the theatre of war, whilst the
aerial offensivp now under consideration would be to prevent
reinforcements, ammunition, supplies, &c" from ever reach-
ing that theatre. The first kind of offensive aims at the
destruction of nodal points on the railway system almost
immediately behind the enemy's lines, whilst the object of
the second is to prevent trains from passing from Germany
into Belgium or France.
To be successful this second kind of aerial offensive
against railways should result in a simultaneous and pro-
longed int
rruption or in repeated interruptions on all, or
some, of the lines from Germany into Belgium or France.
It is clear that a single aeroplane or a small number of
flying-machines, of the existing types, cannot produce any
permanent destruction of railway engineering works su
h
as bridges, culverts, &c, Besides, it is very probable that
such works are protected against possible aerial raids. Thill
would force aircraft to fly over them at a great altitude, and
one would hardly expect that, dropped from a height of
7,000 to 8,000 feet, the few bombs that could be carried by a
small number of aeroplanes, destined to a journey of some
c.onsiderable duration and to fly at a great altitude, would
hit the mark. But if, instead of a few machines, a large
number, say 150 or 200, set out to destroy a bridge, the
chances are that they would Bucceed. If they did not suc-
ceed once, they would certainly succeed if the operation were
repeated. The necessity, therefore, of employing a large
number of aeroplanes for offensive operatiolli! aO'ainst railway
lines from Germany is made apparent. 0
Besides attacking the engineering works of the permanent
way, aeroplanes operating simultaneously in numbers of 40
or 50 could also bomb running trains. Such destruction of
trains would be of especial value if it were performed at
points where they enter into, or emerge from, tunnels, for,
in such cases, the aE-rial attack, if successful, would produce
considerable delay in th9 traffic.
It will thus be seen that aeroplanes on the cffensive, pro-
vidpd there be a great number of Ulem, could, without doubt.
considerably di!'locate the railway traffic from Germany into
France or Belgium. They could do this in three ways:
(a) By destroying, or seriously injuring, railway bridges ove

tIle Rhine; (b) by attacking running trains, especially as they
enter, or emerge from, tunnels; (c) by causing damage to
local stations, junctions, &c. The writer estimates that the
possession by tho Allies of an offensive air fleet, 1,000 aero-
planes strong, and kept at this strength, would, in a very
short time, render the maintenance of the German Army in
the Western theatre of war a matter of extreme difficulty, if
not of impoS8ibility. Add to this the fact th3.t with a dis-
organised railway traffic the enemy would be unable to
transfer quickly troops from the Western to the Eastern
theatre of war, and vice-versa, and that the damage which a
strong offensive air fleet could do the German arsenals, and
you will come to the conclusion that a powerful air fleet
could now not only prevent men, ammunition, and arms from
being sent to the German front, but could also actually int-er-
fere with the manufacture of those arms and ammunition.
Just as a large number of machines is nece!'sary for the
destruction of railway permanent works, so it is indispen-
sable for the destruction of the ent'my's arsenals. In one of
his previous articles tIle writer estimated that some 1,000
aeroplanes were required to de!'troy for good Krupp's
works at E
sen, and, after careful inve!'tigation, he ex-
pressed the opinion that that number of machines could be
produced in Great Britain in the course of about five months
without in the slightest degree interfering with the estab-
li!'hed aeronautical industry, He arrived at that number of
machines as he had calculated that it would require some 70
tons of explosives to annihilate for ever the great ar!'enal.
Now, if aeroplanes could render guns and rifles useless in
the hands of the enemy through lack of ammunition, is it too
much to say that they could revolutionise warfare'
." The Vertical Battle," L.\..'iD A..'iD WAnB, February 13
1915."

U*

ay 8) 1915.

.

.. ' .

., ..

.

THE

MORAL
THE

EFFECT OF
STRAITS.

By COLONEL F.
T HE incidents that have occurred in the Dardanelles
furnish a useful illustration of the methods
adopted by the Allied GovernmentB for prose-
cuting the war, fUI compared with those u8ed by
the Germans. While the Government of Germany
endeavours by acts of terrorism, submarine blockade,
bombardment of expo!!ed localities, and eo forth, to stir up
discontent amongst the electorate, and thus bring pressure
to bear upon the directing organs of the fighting forces, we
bave Sj'Etematically refrained from directly molesting the
people, but have concentrated our effort;., on operations
intended to impress and dishearlen the enemy's Cfflvernment
and General Staff, leaving them to break gently to their
suffering dependents what has happened.
The threat of a submarine blockade had no effect what-
ever in disconcerting our responsible Heads of Administra-
tion, but the threat against the Dardanelles, in spite of the
many delays that have at.tended its execution, will be shown
(when accurate documentary evidence is forthcoming) to have
spread consternation throughout the countries of the Dual
Alliance, and to have modified the whole situation far more
than the direct introduction of many Army Corps and the
expenditure of many millions of shells.
H there is one operation of war that the German General
Staff has of late years studied more thoroughly Lhan any
other, it is the quest.ion of disembarkations on an enemy's
sbore, and, like everyone else who has really gone into the
matter, they bad arrived at the general conclusion that, given
adequate artillery support from t.he fleet-i.e., tlle facility of
fairly close approach to the coast-and efficient numbers dis-
tributed over a ",ide enough front, success in such movements
could be more certainly guaranteed th&Il it could be in any
other operation. It was e.en more certain than the passag3
of a river.
They more than probably experienced a temporary feel-
ing of relief when our first attempt to rush the Straits broke
down, but the Headquarters SL.a.ff knew that we possessed
both the means and the determination to concentrate the
forces required to effect a successful landing, and also that, in
the uncertainty of the spot against which a first effort would
be made and the well-known condition to which the Turkish
Army had been reduced, it was impossible to guarantee øuffi-
cient opposing numbers at each and all of the many points we
might select.
The still neutral nations of t.he East grasped the situa-
tion at once, and their intervention, previously very doubtful,

FORCING

N. 1.-1 A U DE, C. B.
became so inimical that reinforcement, not bithart-o dreamed
of, had to be sent from Germany to meet the threatened
danger that was clearly gathering momentum. The longei'
the delay accorded, the greater the forcæ we were concen-

rating, and correspondingly greater the growing anxiety at
the enemy Headquarters, which is clearly to be traced in the
increasing mendacity of the official cOlIlIDnniqués, in which
no intelligent Staff officer in any army could be found to be-
lieve any more than would those of the Allies or even their own.
Our education has been conducted on such uniform lines
ever since 1870 that there is no room in us fot' misapprehension
on that point. All this effect was gained by
e mere threat
cf forcing the Straits. Now, what will follow as a consequence
of our having actually landed t
The Turks cannot hope to get together more than 300,000
men for the defence of the areas immediately threatened,
and of these some 60,000 are now securely locked up in the
Peninsula of Gallipoli itself, where they can neither be rem..
forced nor withdrawn, as already the Isthmu
of Bula.ir is
completely covered by our fire.
One hundred thousand Turks, at the least, are held up
by the threat of a Russian descent from the North, of which
we may expect to hear almost at any time. This leaves about;
140,000 available for dGtribution between the French on the
Asiatio side of the Straits and along the coast; from Bulair
towards the Greek frontier.
There is also the garrison of Constantinople it.self to be
provided, and the city is certainly not in a oondition safe
enough to allow it to be left to its civil population alone.
AP, regards the details of the landings effected, they
remind one of those employed in the disembarkation of Aber-
crombie's troops at Aboukir in 1801, except that in the latter
case, owing to the short range of ahips' guns, a hundred and
odd years ago, there was no artillery 8upport fot' the assailants..
Abercrombie's boats had to row iu for .five miles. and the
enemy opposed them with heavy guns and most vigoroWi
charges of both foot and cavalzy, delivered u our men were
forming up on the beach, One battalif"!1 was. in fact, charged
by horsemen while still knee-deep in water.
There seeIDS to have been a similar absence of surprise
in the present instance, and all the resources of field engineer-
ing and wire entanglement had been liberally provided for our
reception, but so terrific is the power of modern ships' arma

ments that all those obstacles which could be reached by them
were shot to pieces on a front sufficiently wide to allow ow:
men to attack under favourable conditions.

TALES

OF THE UNTAMED.
III.-RANA.

Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas English.

J UNE'S noonday Slln weighed heavy on the pool.
Across it stretched a gossamer haze, 10ft, filmy,
evauescent, its edges t:;,cked to stiff upstanding reeds.
The massing of the slimy growth of thread-
weed, the twisted green of water-thyme and star-
wort, the overspread of lily leaves, had each been toll paid
gladly to the season-toll from a silver treasury, toll paid to
the Blow course of days, to ardent sun, or dreamy moon, as
each compelled the exchange.
The willows drooped green tre
se8 to the water, as though
11;0 shield their daintv feet from sunshine's wanton kisses.
Slow, fretful, Jgurgling bubbles lIighed from under,
creeping the length of lily stalks, which, by the curling of
their leaves, seemed treacherously to abet the mirrored blue.
And then came heaviu6.'<s once more. and torpor of the
heated air, without a threading breath of wind, without a
petulant bird-note-its lullaby a cricket's churr. borne from
the sun-burnt !II ope.
The concert of the frogs had ceased at dawn. Yet,
ho
r by ho
r, lIome soloist had voiced his futile passion.
Twm bubbling øpheres swelled from his throat, and shrunk,
and swelled again, &Ild so made music.
Now even these mad minstrels ceased lamenting.

sat immobile on his leaf (as the Bun's heat had ordered)"
staring with steadfast gold-rimmed eyes, breathing full-
lunged the infinite air, disdaining wind-flung grasshoppers r
and lazy, amber-tinted flies, which melted in the haze.
The pool lay lifeless, spell-bound.
It was the drowsy witching-time, which turns frog-font
to stone--the hour when frog-folk, come what may, mm:b
bask. A few had left their element, and lay flat-bellied in
the grass. These too paid homage to the sun. To dream of
life contented them. No footfall shook the ground; no
danger threatened.
Head high, hump-backed, !'Iat Rana on her leaf-llana,
the portliest matron in the pool, High Priestess of her tribe.
Her legs were doubled under her; her speckled pauncl!
drooped flaccid either side. Her colouring, emerald Blashed
w:ith gold, commingled with the colouring of her throne.
Six times had Rana known the heat of the summer-the
letbargy that came with it, the weariness, the numbing or
the veins.
Six times had Rana known the heat of autumn-the
gathering of the water frogs, the palsying of Uleir Blackened
nerves and sinew!'l, the struggling through the gloomy m.id

Each depth weeds, the plunge into the ooze of the abyss,
15*

.

The land frogs gave tIt!! signaL These-left t.he pool when
spawning-time was pust. and. through midsummer. roamed
nfield. and fatwned on the grasshoppers. But autumn
brought the truant.s homo. for they. too, wintered in the
mud.
Tha silence of the pool grew heavier. tenser; as thou
h
Borne crisis threatened it, as though some pent-up energy
sought outlet from its depths,
Yet life r
trained itself. till Rana blinked.
'Vas, it a sign 7 Or answer to a sign 1
A wind-sped ripple danced across the water; a finch
Bcreawrd from her cloister in the willows; a footfall half a
field away stole vibrant to lhe hollowed bank, and scared tho
adventurers ::;tranded in the grass.
The pool roused from its slumbers, and, thrilling with
new springs of life, with sense of strife perpetual, with dread
of danger unforeseen, dragged slowly from the quagmire of
oblivion.
Plop! fell a great green grasshopper past Rana'!! nose.
His feelers streamed behind him, He dropped with shins
hinged to his fleshy thighs, with network of his leaf-green
wings spread sodùen on the water.
Before they snappcd together, Rana had him,
She launched with one quick back-thrust from her leaf,
and gulped him with a tongue-flick, and rode at ease. with
balanced If'ga, rocked on her buoyant element.
The feeding hour had come again.
Gay dragon-flies sped to and fro, darting, reversing,
wheeling; with rainbow-tinted wings a-whirr to match the
rainbow shimmer.
Dull splashes munded from the reeds, and flops, and
throbs, and gurglings.
The swallow's flight tbat flecked tho blue, trailed mir-
rored shadows criss-cross on the ripples.
'rIle air was thron
cd "lith life's redundant echoes--the
gossip of the haymake;a, the neighing of the stallion in the
close, t!te drowsy lowing of the driven kine.
Rana, still idly flo
ting, stared goggle-eyed and listened.
The distant voices Lad no message for her; but presently
came notes of inst,ant menace, the flip and flop of friohtened
froo-folk divinO' t>
t> ö'
Rana sank quietly downwards, until her nostrils only
cleared the water,
ViThat sound was thi.s 1
The yap of fox she knew, the grunt of hem, the squeaks
of stoat and rat. But it \Va" none of these-softer it was, and
more sudained, a lecherous, sibilant love,now. It chained
her, fascinated her. She slewed about to search for it, and,
O!l a sudden, checked and froze to stone.
V-lith browning rhannel in his wake, with muddied
sme:tr across the weed (as though his trail were tainted), the
Water Snake slid from the swaying reeds.
His eyes were fixed on Rana's eyes. He made soft
surring music, nis tail was hitched about a thickened reed-
Btem.
Rana stared back, Her hind-lers slowly rose awash,
then slowly stretched behind her. Her forelegs strekhed
opposed to them, She flo....ted like a stick upon the water;
and, like a stick, drew Elowly to the bank.
The snake's flat head swayed balancing. The primrose
collar on his neck had w"-rmFd to foxy orange; the olive of
his back and sides matched the rank pond-weeds under him;
his Llue-g!"FY belly melted in the ripples.
And Rana, floating wilh her legs a-wash, Ler paddle-feet
immovabl
, drew shorewards like a needle to a lodestone.
The Enake's head steadied over her. He seemed to
bahnce mot.ionless, but, from the anchored tail of him, crept
shuddering ripples sC31e to E'cale, and spent thelllfelves in his
thin forkiHg tongue.
Rana had stranded close insJ1Ore.
Her pool, her leaf, her kindred were forgotten.
The tongne benumbed her consciousness, constrained her
course, efiared hH personality.
Just liS a power outside hersdf compelled her in the
autumn to the mud, so now an impulse from without com-
pelled h3r passi.'e to the jaws which gaped their hideous
summons.
Yet, in some sense, she felt the menacing difference.
No safe retreat awaited her, no !"anctuary of oozc,
Her instinct warned her of annihilation. Her brain
forestalled the inevitable, foretasted the unknown.
The snake's ja-.
s widened slowly. They Lid the steely
glitter of the eyes; they loosed the twist and flicker of the
tongue,
Wider they stretched and wider stilI, and lengt.hened
out towards her. The reeds were lost behind them. tLo
shelving bank, the sky itself.

. ..l' .

,.
L

.

ay 8, 1915.

Rana Bat up, crooked both hind-legs, leftpt, and, like
arrow deftly aimed, dropped head-first in the gape,
The jaws clicked to, luxated bono from bone, spread lat-
ticed to em brace her head and Moulders.
Her hind-legs, brandished wide apart, waved their lad
message to the world.
A gluey slime enveloped her. A worming of the gullet'.
walls dragged her with screwing down-pull to the belly.
The imprisoned air drummed in her stifled lungs. A
surge of frothing bubbles lapped her face. It crept between
her tightened lipB. It ate into her close-veiled eyes. It
stung and scalaed, rotted flesh and bone, The seme of
death stole over her, or, rather. of life's slow disintegration
-a lethugy distinct from stroke of sun, in that its dull
imaginings were crystaII.ißed in pain.
And sudden1y the darkness leapt, and pitched, and
reeled gyrating. Rer dangling legs lashed to and fro. Her
palsied nerves awoke to quickened feeling.
The down-pull of the gullet ceased abruptly. Ita
muscle-tautened walls relaxed.
As her feet swayed, the wt-igbt of them tugged at her
slime-smeared body, and dragged her slowly backwards from
the abyss.
She kicked to find a purchase. She squirmed and
writhed and met no check.
Her head !\lipped clear, Her hands slipped clear. SM
dropped into the void.
A tilt of Nature's balance had released her,
The !lnake had lllin exposed to gorge his meal--th.
scales about his yellow throat stretched on the drawn ilia
clear of one another; his lower jaws disjointed from their
hinging; his upper jaws loosed from the palate bone.
nis head was a broad target.
From towering pine the buzzard f'ighted him, and,
Bwooping, drove her taloD!! at his back, and soared wi.th him
on high.
'Vith broken Epine he dangled from her claws, and Rana
dangled from his mouth, and, of her own weight, slipped
adrift and fell.
She had not seen a feather of her ally.
She fell feet-spread, and E'quelched like flattened egg.
The air whooped from her lungs; her tongue protruded.
And yet she was not dead, Long hours she lay, dead to
all outer seeming, but, in the healing shades of night, a
miracle was wrought.
Her tongue crept slowly back to its set station, Hor
lungs once more drank air. Her belly filled and rounded
like a bladder. Her pupils, which had closed to slitB,
widened to gold-rimmed spheres again, She bliuked, she
closed her triple lids, and gathered up her feet beneath her
body. The world was homing to her':"'-light in her eyes, sound
in her ears, a livelier t.int about. her sweat-drenched skin.
She woke to sudden consciousness, and listened to the
night.
She gazed at the star'spangled sky.
'What were these glittering points of gold which flecked
th3 infinite blue 1 Did frogs celesti2-1 blink at her, or glo1r
worms of a world beyond her reach 7
She gazed at tbe stone-laden ground.
What was this dusty grit beneath her feet 7 This !'un-
baked sand which clul'g' to her moist skin 7 Where were
her palares of reed 1 Where the soft oozy mud 7 Could
Borne mad chase of grasshoppers have brought her to this
desert 1 But instinct checked her questionings. A single
thought obsessed her brain-how she might come to water:
Round her were earthy-smelling plants, and voices un-
familiar-the cheep of partridges astray, the churring of the
night jar.
But suddenly, from westward, came, faint with di
tance,
strains which had a meaning.
BreJ.'-e1,-ek-e1.:-ek-ek-(k-e1.-ex I K Q,a:r:. K oux. K ro-ez.
Kro-ah!
They floated wind-borne up the slope, zigzagged through
stiffened grass-stems, through net tie-beds, through parsley-
green, through a ma.ze of vetch and bindweed. The campion!
caught the echo of them, and flung it to the ox-eyes, They
spent themselves in undertones against the sand-cliff wall.
Rana sat up with ears agog.
The past was blotted from her mind. She made no efforfl
to unite the severed strands of memory. She hopped straight.
way towards the beckoning sound. Night-long she hopped.
At times she paused, took bearings, and pressed on. She
reached her goal at daybreak, circled the four-square bed of
reeds, and, from the overhanging bank, gazed rapturously
at the throng of heads whieh peeped white-throated from the
rippled 8urface.
Then. with a leap magnificent. she plunged back to h

world.

J?rir.t-cd by Tm \'ICIORIA llovss PBDfrUIQ Co., LTD' A Tudor St.reet, Whit.efri&r8, London. E.c.

r

:\Iay 8, 1915

.
LAND AND WATER

r

--

e Ð

Pens

are the only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.

THOMAS DE LA RUE 61 CO., L TD,

FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL
ForCUTLERY.etc.
HeiÞl1er .Rusfs. Sfajns 1 nor làrnjslzes.

.

.

Àrlicl..es Tru:Û.\e From. -this
s-tee1.,'"bei1ì.8 entirely u.n.-
a+
ecl:ectby Fooëi CLC-i.d..s,
h-u.,-ts. vin.eBa-r;etc.,wiILbe
fòuñCl i::-õbe óf' en.ormous
a.dvaT\.-t-age i
otels,
clubs. -r-es-taura:nt-s and.
ca; rn "p's:-Ne1iher 1:hêl.n
e-
board. nor- -the clea..ni n

machi.ne is noW' necessary
G.iÜer\:j of this steel m

be ha..d. of'aU the lea.J...

m.a.n#a.c.tur-ers. 5 ee -tha..

knl.vcs bear- This mark.-.

I I
Original and Sole Makers
THOS. FIRTH&SONS.,LTP
SHEFFIELD.

THE BURBERRY
MILIT ARY
WEATHERPROOF
Lined Proofed Wool
or Detachable Fleece
Keeps its wearer dry and
comfortable in rain or
damp, and survives long
and rough wear, because
the cloth is especially
woven and proofed by
Burberry processes.
Owing to the density of its
materials, The Burberry
provides hygienic warmth
and protection against
cold nr windy weather.
Airy ligh t, it obviates
fatigue and all tendency
to overheating-even on
the mildest day.
Faultlessly self-ventilat-
ing, it maintains equab!e
temperature, and IS
healthful to wear under
all conditions,

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'aI II BurbeTrYs."

SHORT NOTICE SERVICE KIT

"J'ai III tr,'S siitisfait du Bl/rberr)'.
II 1/l'a rcndu II's mcillcurs services
þendant la camþaign/', J/' vous þne
de m'cn faile filire un þllre;1 de la
nOl/
'e1le nl/allCe riglemenlaire."
-Giniral d'Urbal. MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE

ßurberrys keep Tunics. Slacks,
Breeches. Great Coats a \\'arms,
ready to try on: so that litting
Is done when ordering, either
In London or Paris, and the
kit completed In a lew hours,

BURBERRYS Haymarket s.w. LONDON
8 & 10 Boul. Malesherbes PARIS: Basingstoke & Provincial Agents

IF, knowing
you know,
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask yoú
to leave off drinking Apol-
Iinaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of

"51 RIS"

a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as Apollin-
aris and similar to it in taste.

Ropd. Quarts.
Per Do.. 6/-

Ropd, Pints.
36

Carriage Paid

Ropd. i Pints.
2 / 6 PorDo..

__ Sample 'Bottle FREE on receipt o/Coupon -..

Name __

Address.

Usual Purveyor of
Mineral Waters

A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Cheoles Street Works, LONDON; Chapel FIeld Works, NORWICH.

89

LAN DAN D \V \ T E R

Garrould's

To H.
1. "AR OFFICE, H.
1. ('OLONIAL OFFICE,
]"'1l1A OFFlOE, ST. JOHN AMBULANCE ASSOCIATION,
Lox DON ('OUNTY COUNCIL, GUl'S HOSPITAL, &0.

Ladles are In..lted to visit the

HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON
COmlJlete EQuilJment of NUI'ses for
Home Detachments and the

HOT WATER
BOTTLES.

SEAT OF WAR.

All Surgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock,

r-

EDglbh
Manufac-
ture.

Write -for
GARROULD'S NURSES' CATALOGUE.
POST FREE, conta'ning
Nurses' Uniforms, Surgical Instruments and Appliances,

racb
Batt1e
Guaranteed L
Model 55.
Strong Portable '
Canvas Camp
(OPenJ ""WJ Folder, 9/6.
\\ith Pillow, 12/-.
Length, 6ft.;
widtll ,
ft. Sin.
lYe ],at'e 8Upplied a

IClolod) Larg.numh....of am.
_
J Cab'p Fold..... for the
, Wound.d,

w.....

lOX 6in, 3,-
12x 6in,39
H>< 8 in, 4 6
12 <lOin, 4/9
I4 X 10 in, 5,3
16X 10 in, 6,2

',
'--

LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING,
CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS, various BODY & LIMB BED FRAMES, from 4:31
sizes, 7/6,8/9,9 t1, 10 9, &c. DRESSING SCISSORS, from 1/6
WATER BEDS, AIR BEDS AND MAT- INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very light
TRESSES, 29:6, 52/6, 26'9 and strong. 17/6
AIR & WATER PILLOWS. 3t-. 10,6, &c. INVALID BED TABLES, from 6/6
FEEDING CUP, 4'd. each. INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
BED PANS, from 39 every description.
LEG & ARM BATHS, from 766& 86 FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
STRETCHER, War Office pattern. special prices.
Complete with Webb Straps and INV ALID BED RESTS, 6, t1
Pillow, 2 Gns. Without Straps and WAR D BED S TEA D S, 3 ft. 139;
Pillow, 35/6 2 It. 61n. 12/9
GARROULD'S MOTOR AMBULANCES AND
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of Invalids by Road, Rail or Sea. Estimates Free.

E. 6. R. GARROULD. 150 to 162 Edgware Rd" LONDON, W.
rl'eleg..ams: II GARROULD. LOSDO
: 1'dephouC8: 53
O, 5321, & 6297 P addlngton.

":"
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BY AI"''''UANTHENT

The "Military"
Luminous Watch

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.

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THE Goldsmiths and Sihersmiths Company's
Luminous \Vatch has a patent solid one-piece
silver case into which the entire movement screws,
thus making the watch securely dust and damp
proof. Fully visible at night and accuratel) ads
justed, with fine lever movement, it is the most
satisfactory Luminous \Vatch, and is unequalled
for Naval and J\\ilitary service, for which it is
specially adapted.
cE3 3 0

A large .electloD of Lumlllous Watches available from 4i:2 2 0
THE
Goldsmiths & Silversmiths
Company, Ltd.,
Watchmaker. to the Admiralty,
112 Regent Street, London, W.

J

May 8, 1915

The House
of

....
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,

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Yrederick
Gorringe

LIMITED
BUCKINCJHAIII PALACE ROAD, S.W"
is renowned for refined taste,
especially in Dainty Coats and
Skirts, One example is here
illustrated,

.. LILAH"
(M anll. Dept)
THIS CHAR\HNG SUIT of Navy
Garby COld. Collar of ivory silk,
edged contrasting s
3des of taffeta, and
pearl studs, Coat ha_ a long back
slightly draped over a full circular Skin.
Also in Llack,

5..7 7 0

I

YOU

GET

IN

WET

CAN'T

The Guinea

A Feather Welt'ht Waterpro()f
For Civilians and Soldiers _\like.
.. You can put it in your pocket when the .un .hin..,"

Warmth without Weight
Weighs only :H oz,
The Guinea ., \J"ttalllae" i
1II",le from
a
pecially woven feather,wei"ht nl<Ltla.
t..Lhric of intense strength, and i
gnar-
anteed ab.olutely waterpro'lf. In
appe.tr.lIH'e it i< illlli.til",uishable from
the.OI'uinary ,weatherp,.gof, but it is
earneù as easIly as a ne" spaper or will
go into an OI'uillary pocket,

Practically Untearable.
Not Transparent.

In a .. Mottl.un 'c" you ean't get wet"
Thoroughly wen cut anù ma,le. Storm
collar amI aùju<table wind eulT.. Smart,
roomy, free-for every outdoor purpose.
Lasts ye,"'" any climate, In fawn,
khaki, or gre.y,

.

9 0

l\1ay 8, 1915

LAN 0 AND \YA TER

THE

N E "r

TONE

IN

DRESS

By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER,

A WELL-known Engltshwoman, who has just
returned from some months spent in France, is
of opinion that the whole atmosphere here has
changcd in a wry subtle fashion. She declares
there is a ,'isible difference between the countrv
as it is to-day and as it was in August and September of last
vear. There is a growing fixity of purpose, a gra,'er apprecia-
tion of the serious problem before us; an intensity of tone
which several critics fonnerly
found lacking. The woman
in question was one of the
many who, from time to time,
have wa

d indignant upon
this theme. .' If people in
England could only see
France," she has written,
.. then YOU would at last
realise
,'hat war really is,
and how wholeheartedly the
French are meeting it.
When ''" ill England wake
up ? "
But at last it seems we
are to have this reproach
removed from us. To all
intents and purposes the
country is going on much the
same a<; usual, but there is all
the same an underlying in-
fluence shovñng the changes
at work. It is something
that cannot be seen so much
as felt. Theatres are open,
so are the restaurants. The
inveterate race-goer can still
take the train-always allow-
ing for it being delayed-to
Gatwick or Xewmarket. It
is true that after ten at night
nobody, howcwr thirsty and
however temperate, can slake
their thirst by anything
alcoholic. It is true that
anybody who makps any
engagements at all does so
on the spur of the moment.
We live too much from dav
to day, fearing yet alwa,:s
hoping to allow of any other
course. Our day" and their
disposal lie at the mercy of
an official telegram or a
name in the dread list in the
paper, and in consequence we
make but a few plans. Social
entertaining, in the ordinary
sense of the ,,"ord, is dead
naturally enough, It is true that there is an unusual number
of men wearing unifonn, At any evening, at any play, it
will be found that a great proportion of seats are occupied
by men in blue or men in khaki, It was, however, none of
these things that gave the impression of our altered point of
,"iew, but the general aspect of things as a whole. And
foremost amongst these must be counted the way in which
nine women out of ten are dressing themselves at the
present time.

best, It is the outward and visible sign of her feelings.
The war has had many indirect influences, but the one
it ,Üelds over dress is amongst the strongest of all.
It has killcd vulgarit) at one fell swoop, and nobody
is a penny the ',"orsc, but on the contrary infinitely
ette.r.
It is to be hoped that even the strongest reactIon m
days to come will not revi\ e blatancy of fashion once
more. We have surely learnt to eschew anything so
ugly.

Studied Simplicity.
In the meanwhile everv-
body is agreed that womèn
have rarely appeared to
better advantage than at
the moment, Clothes being
stamped with the hall-mark
of good taste are more be-
coming than they have been
for a long while, and every
tendency towards undue ex-
aggeration is slowly but surely
being curbcd. Exaggeration
might easily have crept in
with the new outline, but up
till now it is conspicuous by
its absence. When the first
new coats and skirts were
launched in the leading ateliers
there was but the smallest
difference between them and
the crinoline modes of our
grandmothers, It was felt
that while full skirts are
delightfully practical, half
their comfort is gone ",ith
any suggestion of the hoop.
Numbers of women, who
allowed a stiffening of whale-
bone to be sewn inside the
hem of their dress, had it
promptly removed, and not a
few had folds of material
takcn away, leaving only a
reasonable fulncss-one more
proof, if proof ,,"ere necded,
that moderation is the goal
aimed at by most folk just
now,
Since women have proved
the utility of the wide skirt it
is likely to remain, othef\\ ise
it is more than possible that
such a radical change of
fashion at this crisis of historv
would not have been tolerated
for a moment. As it is the
relief from the day of shackled gannents is great, and again
the war influence makes itself felt. :\lany women are on their
feet from morning to night, planning, organising, and helping
some fund or work in one direction or another. The wide
skirt is a boon to all industrious people without doubt. So,
too, is the disappearance of flambo\ ant headgear. The almost
severely plain hats presented to our notice amply fulfil the
needs of the moment. And that being so, it is kind of them
to be attractive at one and the same time.
The Cause and the Effect.
\Yomen are grave, and, as a natural result, their clothes
are grave also. It is a cheering sign that in spite of this
tendency to sombreness there is no tendency to neglect the
personal appearance. The fact that there are still some
women amongst us who continue to take an interest in
clothes is not a proof of what was neatly tenned .. our in-
curable levity." The true answer lies in the charactcr of the
clothes themselves. They are practical, they are subdued,
they are free from any taint of aggression, Thcse at lcast
are the mdin points of clothes chosen and worn bv the
women who matter. The mere idea that Englishwomen
should dress flauntingly and unbecomingly at this time is a
painful one. It is not, hO\\ ever, carried out in reality as
anyone can see at any gathering of responsible women, The
country is the gainer by this tendency on the part of Its
daughters.

,

Co
!:1ot MadaJJle Lallie Clonrles
THE COUNTESS OF STRADBROKE

Who has lurned Henham Hall. her husband's place in Suffolk, into a
hospital for wounded soldiers, Lady Stradbroke has been in charge
herself since the war began. It is nol 80 very long ago that
Henham was visited by Zeppelins. Several bombs were
dropped without any serious damage being done,

Suhdued Note.
It was a case of this tenth woman, a morning or two
ago in Bond Street. In the distance appeared a patch of
vivid, unusually aggressi,'e, pillar-box red. As it grew nearer
it resolved itsclf into a girl who looked nice enough to know
better. She was dressed in a suit of this flaming hue, and,
without exception, she was the one ,,"oman in all that crowded
thoroughfare \\ ho wore any strident hue. E,'cry other woman
was quietly garbed, that is t() say, e,.ery woman whose dress
in any way merited notice.
o imprcssion of poverty was
given-in the greater number of cases ver\' much the re,'erse--
but there wa'i an absence of colour that ",às almost remarkable.
Everything worn \\as of neutral tone, or ,erging on the
dark side in colouring, It needs but thc briefest thought to
see that this lack of ostentation, of anything gldring, blaring,
or unduly striking, is symbolical of the Englishwoman at her

9 1

LAND AND WATER

-=--

I

Our Country needs us
and these are what we need.

"'
.,

-

HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

;&

It is our privilege and duty to sce that our
fighting mcn are prO\'ided \\ ith all thc
ask fin
ami need, and lettcrs hOlllc frcquently t('11 ho\\
grateful Ollil'CN and men un' for ha\ iug n
l'l'in'll
a supply of the
e delicious Food Tablets, and
they eagerly ask for more. A fcw di..soln'{l in
the mouth gÏ\'c and maintain stIl:ngth ami
\ i
our, a.lft al
o pre\"('nt. f.Hti
uc and relieve
thir
t, and thus enahle the soldier or
ailor
to be at his best when his hest is call cd for.

:
::::..

....

We will send post free to ANY address a flask of
these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat
vest pocket case on receipt of 1 6.
If on active se...,ice be particular to I\ive rel\imental number, rank, name, squad,
ron or company, battajion, battery, rel\iment (or other unit), staff appointment
or department, State whether se...,inl\ with British Expeditionary Force or
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; or, if not with either, I\.ve name of place
at which unit is stationed, In the case of a sailor I\ive the name of his ship.

I
I

I I
II

"w..'\

D

Of all Chemi
ts and Stores, in convenient pocket
lIasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1 6, 2 6 and 11 .

o
o

, ,

Liberal Sample Bottle sent post free for 3d. in stamps.

/
7
7

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,0

HORLICK'S MALTED M'LK CO.. SLOUGH. BUCKS,

. ."'''''"'''..\.''''''_....".....'''''...,.',...'''''...'''''.',..."...'''\.'''''1 D
fl'Il'1III II
....

,

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/l1/111/111/1111111111/IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIUIUI U

I I111111111111

READY TO WEAR
FROCA,
S

All our Ready-made Coso
tumes are of an exceptionally
interesting character, They
are copied and adapted from
the most exclusive Paris
models by our own highly
skilled workers, and are
quite different from the
ordinary ready-to-wear frock,
The materials of which they
are made are invariably of
excellent quality, "hile the
fit and finish are invari.1bly
excellent.

A Vainly Afternoon Gown
(as sketch). in rich quality Silk
Broché, designed with full skirt,
m'lde on a Joke. bodi\..'"C \I. ith
revers and embr
idered lawn
collar.

69/6

THE RA7AGES OF
MOTH.

Store ynJir Fu;-"s ill ollr
F,"uzi"C Challl"ers. Par-
ticlliars 0./ our new Combilled
Fur Stora;re alld b,s7lrance
a
ainst nil t,,,tI e1'ery rls

Stll' pod free on QI'P/ica/ion.

Debenharn
& Free,þ
u
Y'
Wif:!more Street.
,Covendi,h Square) London W

May 15. 1915

,
5r
/

,,-:?

: THE ì
LIfjCHER
t
CROSS"
Motor Tyre
Made from finest
PLANTATION RUBBER
in the largest rubber
factory In the British
Empire.

Wellington.
its radio - active Waters and
sunny climate is now bringing
health and strength to the
wounded and invalided
from our Great War,
BAT H is delightful
Mayan d ] u n e.

As

in

the

days

of (}(lar/borough
BATH

in

Write 10 Ihe Dirrclor 0/ the Rathin,
E.labli.hm,nl. BATH. for Baokl,',
., A Bri/i.h Cu<<," Lid of Hal.I., .tc,

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and
with
bright.

II

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A Tyre that, again and again, has proved
ita superiority to all others, for strength,
durability, and security.
Used extensively by the War Office, the
Admiralty, the British Red Cross Society,
and the Governments of France, BeI.,;um,
and Greece,
THE NOIHH BRITISH RUBBER co., Ltd.
.69 Great Portland St., LONlJON, W.
Faclori..: Ca"l. Mill., EdinbwlI
.

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BUICK MODELS:
15,18 h,p, 2-seater ..'
245
15-1 j h,p. 5-.eater ,_, ..,
255
Complete Equipment, including
Michelin Tyresa

your chauf-
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and buy a
self-startin

Send
feur

\tUiCIC
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BEDFORD BUICK MODELS:

,Our British-built Coachwork)
15,18 h_p, Empre.. ...
295
15,18 h,p_ Sireamline Torpedo
305
15-18hp, Arcadian Cabriolet
375

BUICK VALVE-IN-HEAD MOTOR.
GENERAL MOTORS (Europe), Ltd., 135 Long Acre. London, W.C.
T elepbone: Gen-ard 962) (3 lioe,), T elell1'.m,: .. Buicka.n, Londan." 33

10 4

.:\lay IS, 19 1 5

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

A

GLIMPSE

OF

'VAR

A LA BA YONETTE

By W. L. GEORGE

T HE word went round. It was shouted, and yet in
the storm of sound was as a whisper. Private
Denny just nodded; his neighbour bellowed into
his ear and handed on to the right the ne\\ s
they all guessed, though tI:ey knew i.t not y
t.

very little ms heart began to beat WIth an excitement m
which there was haste, lust, and a little fear. As he filled
his magazine he smiled, It was a broad smile, a smile of
memory, for as he secured the bayonet more firmly he noticed
a long black streak upon the stock which had dried there in
the night and stained the wood dark. For tms wa
not the
first time he had used the bayonet, and he looked at It fondly.
trying the point. He thought of the French who called it
La Rosalie. .. Sentimental tosh!" he thought, and then
50ftly caressed the blade. Readiness increased: his neigh-
bour on the left cast away his overcoat; another felt nervously
at his puttees. They looked knowing, they laughed a little
nervouslv; they did not try to speak, for the broken roar of
the guns which it seemed could not increase... yet
increased.
Already the sun had risen in the pale morning, gay with
laughter, balmy with soft airs. Private Denny's cheek was
<:aressed by a wind tenderer than any woman's hand. He
breathed of that air full of the sweet scents of new grass,
breathed deep as if to gain strength from earth. But all the
time he was conscious of the things wmch passed over ms head,
invisible and yet present in movement and in sound, little
eighteen-pound shells, glittering no doubt in the sun for the
angels to see, not presences but half hisses, half screems,
little tmngs that burst not far away, hardly a hundred yards,
in a fume of green smoke and a spatter of stars . . . and
bigger things, too, of wmch he was just conscious by the
-rusmng of their wind, tmngs that fell just ahead there, in the
German trench, fell wetly and dully, raising a pillar of smoke
and earth. He knew, and he knew, and still his heart was
beating. As if with ears not his he heard the sergeant at the
periscope who watched the fall of the explosive shells:
" That's got 'em! Good! Got 'em again! Half a dozen
more like that. Steady boys! Steady! It won't be
a minute before.. "
He did not hear the voice any more, for his body was
filled by the sound of the wmstle. It came, sudden, im-
perative, So shrill that it burst through the dullness of
heavier sounds just like, thought Private Denny, a
bayonet, . .
The wmstling did not last a second and it lasted hours,
for it was born in a wilderness, an earth on which all other
-sounds had died. For quite suddenly the little shrapnel
and the big shells that swung overhead, as the ghosts of birds,
flew no more, and in the emptiness was nothing now but the
needle sting of the wmstle, Private Denny did not know
how it happened: perhaps the whistle had jerked him to his
feet, seized him by the neck, with all those others of his
battalion, hurled him out of the trench upon that soil in front,
-so oddly pock-marked everywhere with holes.
He was running in the silence. He was separate from
his body, and hardly knew what he did; ms feet registered
a crumbling of the earth all torn with shell, rose up painfully
from steel shards. The light sun was in his eyes and he was
all aglow as he ran on stumbling, by instinct rather than
intent maintaining his place, There were men to the right
and left, brown shadows, ordinary men \\ho played billiards
and went to church, and got drunk, just like Private Denny;
but here they were, running on, rather bent, hardly thinking
of the wheezing 5iound the bullets made as they buried them-
selves at their feet. A man fell in front of him .. he
5tepped over and forgot him, It seemed so far, so long,
though only twenty seconds, and he ran on as if bound for a
p
radise, anxious to see, to feel something other than this soft
aIr.
And then, at his feet, so near that he almost fell, he saw
the German trench. Its trim edges torn like a saw, its roofs
of timber and turf fallen in, the timbers, shuffled and knotted
together like ropes, a ruin of black holes full of \\ater, mounds
of earth shored up into incredible pillars. He leapt. With
all those other brown shapes he struggled as in a dream, lost
among the walls that hung over him ready to fall, angry
because here was nothin
for him in this place, pricked evcry-

where with bullets, laid bare to its very entrails by explosive
shell. He stepped forward, he recognised a difference of
ground. He understood, he had trampled a body that lay
there, and before him was another. Driven on, without
knowing why or how, he made for the traverse. He tott
red
in this lake of water and earth where many grey coated thmgs
lay still or rolled uneasily, broken, blood-soaked, unlike men.
An order came to him; he seized his spade to begin repairing
his section of the parapet. He stuck it into a mound of earth
at his feet to clear it away. He started back, for half the
mound fell away, and there came out a grey-clad arm with a
hand that, straight-fingered, clutched at the air.
But he did not dig, for from the left he heard the crackle
of rifles. He obeyed an order that he half understood. A
trap then! The trench not wholly dominated! A spurt of
rage filled his heart and a sudden heat filmed his eyes.
They could not get into the traverse this way, for the
earth had fallen in. The sound of musketry in his ears,
Private Denny found himself following his sergeant, cautiously
crawling along the ground towards the traverse on the left.
I t seemed so long, and stones and steel shards hurt his hands,
tried to stab mm in the breast. But nearer and nearer they
came, silently. His heart leapt, for here was the edge of the
traverse, . ' he saw the long line of spiked helmets a little
below.
There was a cry, a shout, and Private Denny had joined
in it, felt it come out of him, solid and sonorous as stricken
brass. And now with the others he had flung himself into
the traverse. It was narrow, he fell almost against his enemy,
so close that he could not use ms bayonet; he had a confused
sense of rifle fire suddenly dying away, of a new atmosphere
that was all heat and effort, hand to hand. He could hardly
see anything because he saw too much, flying shapes. things
that struck at mm, things at which he struck. He was
conscious only of movements and of feelings, of being thrust
against a wall, of striking back at some heavy phantom and
hearing the crunch of bone against the butt of his rifle. They
were all about mm, grey shapes and brown shapes. A bullet
hissed past ms ear. He struck out savagely into space, and
his bayonet entered the wall of the trench . , . he swore.
There were things about his feet too, soft things that struggled
and moved . . . then the air seemed to clear, and, quite
suddenly, as if he had taken a section of the battle, he was
alone \\ith a single enemy. An extraordinary clarity came
into his mind, and for an interminable second the long English-
man with the hard mouth, and the Bavarian, much shorter,
much heavier, gazed into each other's eyes. They were
watchful, they were nimble, they were like cats about to
spring. Private Denny felt mmself dodge from right foot to
left foot as if he were sparring.
The Bavarian struck straight out, Denny got the
bayonet upon the barrel of ms rifle, and it fled aside past him,
incredibly fast and brilliant, like a pike in a stream. And
automatically he lunged back, straight towards the tmck grey
body that stooped. He failed as the other leapt aside . . .
he cried out, for carried away he had fallen right against his
antagonist. so near that he could see the different colours
in his eyes, feel the heavy warm weight of him. For a second
they remained gripped and swaying. Jaws locked, with eye-
bro\\s knotted, they sprang apart, still watchful, feinting
with their weapons, heads down. They struck again, and
the rattle of the rifle barrels was as that of castanets. Private
Denny gave a little growl, for suddenly the Bavarian, lunging
on, pierced his sleeve, and he felt the sharp sting of the bayonet
along ms skin. He was not sparring now, but as the other
half-fell, carried away by his rush, Private Dennv stepped
aside and, raising his weapon, brought it down straight against
the fleeting grey side.
He was thrillEd with an excitement that held hardly .lny
horror d.S the speared body re<;isted. He thrust on, deeper
and deeper, desIring only one thing, to drive in the steel yet
deeper., and for a second he held him pinned, all his
body shaking with the quiver that ran through from his
!--tricken foe up the knife and along into his arms, He
was taut, w.lnted to hold the thing so pinned for ever. His
lungs quite narrow, his hands rigid as dry bones in the
intensity of his clutch, he so remained for a set and, Then
suddenly la, and ..;hivering, he withdrew the ba\'onet.

LAND AND WATER

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And after the fight-
\vhat then?

,

., 1 ,
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I. "
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'

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\Vhy, naturally, he wants to tell
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106

May 15, 1915.

LAND AND S'l.A TEK.

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE.-This article has been submitted to the preø Bureaa, "hicb dotl aot object to tbe publicatioa al ceolored, aad takes a.
respoolibUity 'or tile correctaess o' the "atements.
In accordauce wltb tbe reqniremeatø of tbe Presl Bureau, tbe posltleal of troops oa Plllni mastrafiug tbls Article mllit ooly bl
regarded al approximate, aod ao delìaito streogt.. at aoy ,olat is indicated.

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T HE news this week ill repays analysis,
because while it is of great importance,
it is not yet definitive, The great Austro-
German movement in Western Galicia is
still upon a confused front, and we cannc.,t even
be quite certain what that front is,
The French movement north of Arras is in
full progress at the moment when these notes
must cease, and beyond the bare statement of the
official communiqués there is no general result to
determine.
Of the Dardanelles
perhaps the most impor-
tant point of all in the campaign at this moment,
and certainly the most important from the British
point of view alone, we have been t{)ld nothing
since the landing, or, rather, nothing of a sort
\" hich enables us to define positions and to anal)'se
movements. The last òeclaration of Lord Crewe
in the House of Lords upon Tuesday night, just
before sending this paper to press, was no more
than a reaffirmation of the success of the landing
and the repelling of the enemy's attacks upon the
line already formed.

.: _."'f--...:. ....

:.
P."

.....

"-

The German raid into Courland, probabl:r.
a purely political move, offers no ground for
analysis either. It is not directed towards anyj
definite result as yet. Libau is occupied, but with
what object this cavalry movement (for it is in
essence no more than a ca,alry movement, though
supported by a brigade of infantry, probahlyj
dependent upon motor traffic) has been under...
taken there has been no sign, and, as I have jus

said, it probably has no direct military object at
all.
'VLat is of real importance this week, and
what I shall attempt to go into fully, is the
orientation of the enemy's energies at this mom('nd
towards a moral effect: Lis increasin
relianc6
upon what he bdieves will check the intervention
of neutrals and produce a moral disarray in the
ciyilian opinion of the Allies, That is of real
importance for us to grasp. It connotes a certain
state of mind in the enemy's higher command
which is well worth recognising, a.nd it must be
stated plainly with details before we can gras!)
its full significance. I shall deal briefly, tbcrc-

. Prz
mlj51

· Sanok

I.

GE'I,ERAL PLA.""i OF THE OPERATIOXS IN GALICIA..
J.*

LAND AND JV A TER.

The concentration of so many of the new
lpvies, Austrian and German, with older forces
(;rawn from elsewhere, upon the front east of
Cracoe, and the blow they are delivering against
the Russian "screen" which was defending
operations in the Carpathians to the east, is
proving, as the ùays pass, of greater and of
greater importance.
The conjectures to which the first news of
this great action in Galicia gave rise have proved
accurate enough. The Western front of the Rus-
sian armies in that province has retired over a
l,elt of thirty to thirty-five miles, more towards
the south than towards the north. The northern
passes of the Carpathians have consequently been
abandoned, at least the three road passes of the
[Polyanka, the Dukla, and the J aliska. The Lupkow
road and double line of railway pass and the ridge
on as far as the Rostok is still apparently, at the
moment of writing, in the hands of our Ally. How
far the abandonment of the crest of the mountains
I1JUst proceed will obviously depend upon the
3imits to which this retirement of the Russian
l\"\T estern front continues. But the margin is not
a very wide one, as the map on the preceding page
"ill show.
The original line held by the Russians ran,
liS my readers know, from the Vistula up the
}}unajec to the point where the Biala falls in.
[It then ran up the Biala to the crest of the Car-
pathians, corresponùing to the line marked 1 on
this sketch map. The next defensive position
bchind this was the line of the 'Yisloka, marked
2, and it was pointed out in a previous article
that if the line of the Wisloka were taken up by
the Russians after their retirement, that would
certainly mean the loss of the Polyanka, and
probably of the Dukla. Now it appeared from the
last communiqués that the line of the Wisloka
bad been passed-upon the south at least-and
that at one point, the next parallel valley, that of
the \Vislok, and had been reached by the Austro-
,German advance, and that these are attempting
to reach Sanok.
But the 'Yislok does not form a true position
at all for the purposes of guarding the Uussian
armies in Galicia. It bends right back eastward. the Russians would have to recover as a whole the
lIt falls into the San, not the Vistula, and it is the lower line of the Wisloka.
line marked on Plan I. with the number 3. Now we do not know exactly where their line
It would therefore seem as though the check runs in connection with the lower part of this
v. hich our Ally will attempt to give to the advance stream-that is why I have upon my second sketch
of the enemy would not follow a river line at all, marked two lines of dots, one fairly close to the
InIt would cut across the two valleys in some such river, the other well behind, and put to each a note
fashion as tbat indicated bv the dots on the of interrogation. If they have been thrust Lack
second sketch map. That our Any will be able as far as the second line they could hardly recover
to hold this line and remain upon it is doubtful. so broad a belt against an advancing superior
([t is a fluctuating line not prepared, It could only force, with a particular superiority in heavy guns,
be held in a few selected places by rapid entrench. or, after having advanced across it, consolidate the
ment. It would hardly stand agaiu"t the supe- whole ground lost between this and the 'Yisloka,
riority of heavy artillery upon the enemy's side (of or hold it firmly after such a counter-offensive.
w-hich more in a moment) when the big pieces Yet if the Russians do not hold the Lowe?' Wis-
should have been brought up over the interVf'uing lok
, at least, and the Upper Wislok, it is difficult
belt. But what would be a perfectly po
gible lin
to see what natural feature they can adopt as a
is all the line of the Lower Wisloka, then a cut foundation for tlìeir ne
line. The Wislok itself
a
ross to the Upper Wislok, and the following bends so far east that it tUTns the Galician Plain
2*

fore, this week with the military movements, in-
conclusive as they stIll are, and which lend them-
selves very little to illustration. I shall deal at
some greater length with the point I have just
Illentioned.

THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIA.

May 15. 1915.

...

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of that !-\tream ill the mopntains so as to bar the
way to
anok. Such a Ene would run as the line
of cros:
t'
runs on the subjoined sketch, and might
be tem,t,le. But befm'c snch a ]ine could be held,

1'rzenwst
.

.
Sanalt

III

!ay 15, 1915.

LAND AND WA TER.

.Wislok near Krosno, but no more, while the
Austrians do not appear to have crossed the
Upper Wislok nor to have approached nearer
to Sanok than the line of that river.
It is evident from all this. that the strength
of the blow has been delivered by the German
right against the Russian left of the line, anù
that the whole front has swung round from north
and south to north-west anù south-cast. The
retirement has not greatly affected as yet the
position of the Russian line north of the Yistula,
but it has rendered untenable the positions of
which we have spoken, rendered extremely pre-
carious the remaining hold upon the ridge between
the Lupkow and the Rostok, and has not yet
established itself in any permanent fashion.
:More important, to our judgment, than the
future of the campaign on this front and the exact
line held for the moment by the two belligerents
is the nature of tbe Austro-German success, and
this, it cannot be doubted, is due to a great
superiority in heavy artillery upon the side of the
enemy.
Now let us examine the causes of this and see
what chances there are of the situation being
reversed for the future.
The superiority of the enemy in hra,y artil-
lery on this front is due to two things.
First, that he has heen able, just as we have,
during the ,",'inter months, to construct further
beavy pieces.
Secondly, that be has been able to munition
these and tò provide an accumulation of shell
with which to effect his p'cat bombardment of the
la6t two days of April and the first of .May. Tho
Rus3ians han
not been in that position. They
ha,-e suffered from lack of equipment of e,'eryj
kind and from lack of munitions right through
the winter under a rigorous blockade, and from
the fact that tlwir own powers of construction
were more limited than those of the industrialised
western and central nations of Europe, as well as
from the fact that their more limit{'d railway com-
munications hampered the bringing up of such
supplies aJ> they had.
The situntion, due to this starmtion in nnmi

tions, which had been very serious indeed in
February, was somewhat relieved during Mardi
anù April by the 3 ppearance of munitions pro-
cured through the Far Ea:::tE'rn ports and coming
in by the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Now, in the middle of .J\1ay Archangel is alro
open. But Archangel, though not so far off as the
Far Eastern ports, is a good thousand miles away,
from the chief front, and of thé'se thousand miles
300 were, when the war broke out, a narro,," gauge
railway'" ith ycry little rolling stock-the section
which runs fl'Om Archangel to V oIogda.
That is half the me.aning of the great f''{peri-
ment in the Da rdanelles.
If the Dardanelles c.ould be forced n ussia
could, in a far shorter time than through any other
IV avenue, be munitioned. Until she is fully muni-
tioned (especially in heavy artillery and shen
starteel at that morncIlt from thE' Vi::;tula N. OJ' therefor) the handicap against her is exceedinglJj
K.E. of 1lielec. It then ran back almost due south hl'3.\-Y.
until it approached the "\\' isloka in the neip'hbour- (; n fortunately, it is not only in heavy artillery;
hooù of Debie-a, df'fendeù portions of th
t river munition that this handicap is apparent. The
line, but abandoned it before Jaslo was reached first full accounts of the fighting, as they have
<.:r aslo was in
\ubtrian hands on the Friday appeared in the Hungarian papers. reached Eng-
mght), and struck the "\Vislok near Krosno. The land only two days ago, and one of the most strik-
Germans established a crossing beyond the Upper ing features in those accounts was the descriptiOll
3*

altogether, and though it is true that any well
prepared line of trenches is nowadays a position in
itself, without any natural feature to support it,
on account of the strength of the modern defensive,
we have no indication that such a line has been
prepared across the peninsula between the Vistula
and the San, and in the country north of the Lower
Wislok,
If any position has been prepared in this
piece of country we shall see the Russian line
gradually consolidate upon it and check the for-
ward movement of the enemy. If none has been
prepared there are only two alternatives: a fluc-
tuating battle as the Russian reinforcements
arrive, the recovery of the Wisloka line, and the
consequent protection of the Russian positions
upon a portion at least of the crest of the moun-
tain west, or a falling back of the whole line, the
abandonment of all the crest and of half of Galicia
as well. And which of these two events we shall
see, only the future can determine.
It must, of course, be insisted upon here, as it
has been insisted upon in the case of every retire-
ment or fluctuation of the line npon the east or
upon the west, that the problem before the enemy
is not the clearing of a particular bit of territory,
or the relieving of the pressure upon a particular
line, even upon a line so important as the crest of
the Carpathians; the one essential which he must
do, and which, for his own success, he must do in
quite the near future, is to break the eastern or the
western line. Until he has done that his strategy,
in the ]argest sense, has failed.
The exact position of the fluctuating double
front betv.een the Austro-German ad,-ance a.nd
the Rn
ian retirement upon Saturday, :May 8,
would seem to be somewhat as may be gathered
from the accompanying sketch. The line

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'7v1Zles

5:1

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LAND AND 'V A TER.

lfay 15, 1915.

Upon Sunday and Monday, beginning prob-
ably with tbe Saturday before, the French
developed very beavy pressure upon the line just
south of the British position-that is, upon the
line between La Bassée and Arras. The Germans
believed them to have adva.nced with something
well over a hundred thousand men, and possibly as
much as four corps, and the effect of that ad vance
so far has been the gain of a belt whIch at its ma.xi-
mum is over two miles broad, and of some three
thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number
of machine guns-50. Of :field guns only quite a
small number has fallen into the hands of the
Allies at the moment of writing: less than a dozen,
but even this means tbat the fir8t positions of the
enemy were carried. There cannot be, in this par-
ticular rebion, any intention of breaking through.
It is not the place for such an attempt, The
character of the operations does not point to it at
We have this week upon the Dardanelles no all. What is probably the object of the move is to
news upon which any judgment of the advance of relieve the rather serious pressure which was
the operations can be based. There is no British beginning to be felt just to the north upon the
official communiqué which gives us the Sillallest British trenches. Into what it will develop we
d(>
ail, . W
m3:Y conjecture, therefore, that the cannot tell, but the engagement is proceeding at
all1ed hne IS stIll upon the slopes at the foot of the time of writing, It cannot but draw down

.

of how, in the original crossing of the DUTlajec,
:''h.
Russian :field guns failed from lack of ammu-
nition within forty-eight hours.
The difficulty of equipment of the Russian
reserves-which is perhaps the most crucial diffi-
culty of all-has befn in part got mer, but the
Dlunitioning of field guns, as we have seen, and
particularly of heavy guns in a sufficient quantity,
IS a problem apparently still unsolved; and it is
this which lends its gravity to the struggle now
taking place in Galicia,
\Ve must further remember that one feature
present in the depth of winter has now, happily,
been eliminated, and that is the inferiority in mere
total numbers of the Russians to the enemy along
this Eastern front. The equipment of reserves in
sufficient numbers to redress the balance was
already apparent by the end of April.
It is not everything, but it renders the position
less acute than it was when the great German con-
c.entration was descending upon "Tarsaw in the
middle of February,
..

THE CAVALRY RAID ON LIBAU.

otbing has been said in these notes bitherto
of the new German raid through Courland-that
is, along the Baltic Coast-because no military
importance appeared to attach to it. This ju

-
ment-or, rather, conjecture-still holds, .No
critic can say that a movement of c.avalry and horse
artillery, with a small proportion of infantry-
probably dependent upon motor traffic-operating
at a great distance from the main armies, attack-
ing nothing vital, even politically, in the enemy's
state, is an operation of war which can possibly
be read in conjunction with the general military
aims of the campaign, It is a raid.
If we try to estimate the subsidiary objects
in view when this raid was planned they seem
to be three,
First: The impressing of Russian civilian
opinion, through the coincidence of so deep a
thrust, with the new violent and succoosful effort
of the Au.stro-Germans in the southern part of
the Eastern field.
Secondly: The impressing of neutral, and
especially of uninstructed neutral, opinion in the
same direction.
Thirdly: The obtaining of munitions and
fmpplies.
X'o Russian artery of communicaticn is cut
by an offenaive of this kind; no forces sufficient
to effect any permanent work are present, but
with these three objects, and especially with the
second, tbe whole thing exactly fits.
It must be remembered that the towns of the
rlistrict raided arc very largely inhabited by
German Jews, with sympathies naturally strong
iu favour of Germany and opposed to Russia, and
this is particularly true of Libau, That is a state
of affairs which would facilitate the temporary
occupation and the material results expected from
it. Beyond this there is really no more to be said.

THE

D. \.RDAN ELLES.

the Ach.ibaha position, passing through Kritbia,
or at least we have no news t.hat this position has
yet been carried.
It is evident from tbc nature of tbe opera-
tions that the greatest possible secrecy must be
ûbserved. The aut.horities have permitted very
fun accounts to come to Endand of all that accom-
plished first stage in th
husiness-which was
also, perhaps, the most difficult--the landing and
the getting a footing upon all the southcrn end
of the peninsula. There is nothing to do but to
wait paticntlv for fUTther official news, whi(.h will
give us the progress of the operations later on.
:f\tleanwhile it may be suggested that probably the
interval corresp
mds to the landing of further
munitions and part,icularJy of heavy pieces.
The great difficulty in an operation of this
kinù is the landing of the first advance troops.
Once these, supported by the fleet, can establish a
position from sea to sea across the narrovV' piece
of land, the transports can at their leisure put on
shore the heavy pieres of munitions and all that
the expedition will need, acting securely behind
the screen of the troops that ha'"e established
themselves.
It is remarkable enough that we do not receive
news of the operations from German sources
either. After the first few days, when the usual
accuracy of judgment in Berlin upon military
afTairs in this war was misled by the absurd
Turkish communiqués, there seems to have set in a
mood of caut.ion, and the last German newspapers
available will not commit. themselves to the future
of the experiment in the Gallipoli Peninsula, upon
which so much of the future of the war should
turn.
The summary of the Dardanelles posit.i, n
remains exactly what it "Was last week. The end of
the GaIlipoli Peninsula is solidly held. Krit-hia
is the centre of the allied position upon the slopes
of the Achibaba ridge. The cDemy position along
the crest of the ridge stillstands. Until the attack
upon this enemy position has developed, until we
know the result of that attack, our analysis cannot
proceed,

THE OPERATIONS NORTH OF AURAS.

May 15, 1915,

LAND AND NY A TER.

from the north some portion of the enemy forces
now operating east and south of Y pres, anù when
it has thus relieved tbe prc3sure npon tbe northern
part of the allied line its task will presumably. he
accomplished. But it is ,not he!,e that. the commg
offensiye wilJ fall, and, vIewed m the bght of that
great expectation, the whole of this considerable
piece of work is of minor importance.

THE ENEMY'S ESTIM.\TE OF THE
NEWL Y- f.HAINED BRITISH LEVIES.
Amon 0' the most important factors in the
future of the war is the estimate the enemy may
make of the new British formations. More impor-
tant still, of course, is the real value of thpse new
formations, because events will in any case correct
any erroneous estimate the enemy may make. But
the enemy's estimates are none t
e less of val.ue
because according to them will hIs plans be laId.
It must be remembered that these new formations
are just becoming a principal charact
r in the war.
They will, hencefor
ard, b
the cln

source ?f
recruitment in the Vv est. It IS the BrItish recrUIt-
ing field (in which term o
e includes, of c.ourse,
the Colonial troops) which IS the most elastIc and
the largest, for the French have put in every
ne
they could, and their recruiting field on!J: consIsts
now of the young men growing up to mIlItary age
this veal'.
Now, it is important to note that the German
estimate of the new British material seems to have
changed very sharply in the )ast few wee
s, a!ld
that the enemy's respect for It has as rapIdly In-
creased. There ha s already been wasted during
this war so much ink in the alternate efforts (no
doubt with laudable objects) to raise and to depress
the spirit of civilians, according as it was thougH
that a certain spirit was neede

o win the war, or
another spirit to promote recrUItmg, that. one feels
a natural reaction aO'ainst anything whICh could
savour of rhetoric i
this connection. But it is
the sober truth that the new British formations
appearing in the field, with whom
)lle includes
the Colonials have haù an effect In Germany
which is appreciable not only through J?rivate
reports but also through the printed descrIptions
of the fighting. , 1
It is not remarkable that thIS sllould be the
case, but it is extremely important for us to
appreciate that it is the case.
It is no wonder that this change between the
German opinion unexperienced and the German
opinion experienced should ha
-e taken pla.ce;
nd
at the junction of the two national orgams.:'1tlOns
north (If Ypres three weeks ago, where there was
a, medley of races and units more heterogeneous
than upon any other front in the whole w:ar
(Zouaves, Belgians, Coloured French Colomal
troops, French Ma.rines, British Colo
ial troops.
&c,), it was the action of the Canadians whIch
necessarily impressed itself most upon German
observers.
The story is now an old one. Until we had
Ie Eye-'Vitness's JJ full description it was not
quite clear what had happened, but now we all
know the story pretty thoroughly. The French
retirement, under the effect of the new gases, left
a great breach in the line. The Canadian left wa.s
completely isolated, and at one moment there r.J.ust
have been a gap of many hundred yards, perhaps
a thousand ya.rds or m en more, rãpidly increas-

ing. between the extreme Canadian left and the
riO'ht of the French line. There had not been a
hole torn through the line at
h
junctio,: of the
two organisatiom;, but the posItIOn was lIke that
cre.ated when a blow breaks a slat of wood. The
part receiving the blow breaks back and away
from the part just below the point of impact,
which part still stands on the old line. The old
line had faced roughly east and west, and the gap
between the Canadians and the French troops
faced north and south. If the Germans could
have rushed that gap they would h3:ve broken the
first line round Ypres, Th3;t they d.ld not
o rush
it was due to the promptItude wIth wInch the
Colonial troops swung: round, b
lt muc
J?ore to
the tenacity they dIsplayed In resIstIng an
enorruously superior enemy when almost en-
veloped.
If two points may suffice to illustmte the
quality of this action they may be cited as
follows :-
First: The heavy guns abandoned in the
retirement far beyond the line w
re recaptured-
that is, a strong counter-offensIve, assumed on
tbe field itself immediately after the first blow
and acrainst grea.tly superior numbers, wa") unè.er-
taken 1:>and successfully carried.
Secondly, and much more important: 'Vhile
certain units suffered losses up to seventy per cent.
in killed, wounded, and missing, the organisation
as a whole remained and the line was not broken.
Yon get much the same thing in the case:
f
the Dardanelles. Though it was a regular dIVI-
sion that did perhaps the ha.rdest work, the land-
in rr (upon the impossibility of which Berlin had
re
ny seriously counted) was also effected by
great. numbers of the new troops. .
Thoucrh it will be a very heavy asset In our
favour if this opinion is maintainpd-and every-
thing points to its being maintained-we must
remember to estimate its causes and to see its real
nature. It is partly due to the excellent physic.al
quality of the human material emplo,y:ed,
o one
could have looked at the new armIes wIthout
appreciating that point. It. is partly due to. t.he
fact that this siege work luckIly demands qua!l.t.
eg
in which old and new troops do not greatly dIf'fer
so long as the moral
s sounù, an.d.. further, has the
advantaO'e of seasomng anù trammg the men ,"\"ho
1:> ,
have recently come In.
Next, we note that if the provir,ion of officers
for very large new for:m
tions is the grea.t diffi-
culty, which we know It IS, yet these new forma-
tions are coming to the war at a m('ment when the
enemy's losses in officers have been fa
great
r tha.n
anything he h
,d allowed for, and III whIch IllS
cadl'es are serIOusly and unexpectedly weakened,
To some extent the very delay in equipment and the
corresponding length of time during which ma.ny
of the npw formations had to be kept under tram..
ing was an ad mntage in seasoning. . .
Lastly-a factor not to be despIsed, though It
is often exaggerated in the his
ory o
war---
he
spirit with which new troops wIll .go mto ad Ion
is increased by every blunùer. wInch th
l'UeIllY
makes in what I have called m an earlIer part
of this article his" political policy,"

THE POLITICAL ODJECT OF THE
ENE\1Y.
It is in this deart.h of rt..ally decisive news
throughout the whole field of the campaign that

5*

LAND AND
ATER.

Dne naturally turns to the sensational and, in &
military sense, useless actions of the last few
"eeks, and particularly of the last ten days.
The public mind naturally and instinctively
turns to them, as, indeed, the enemy intended that
it should. But it might be imagined that an analy-
t>is which deals only with the purely military con-
ditions of the campaign should leave aside acts
which are less and less military in their cDnception
and execution, In what way (it may be asked)
does such an action as the shelling of Dunkirk, or
the raid on Libau, or the German Emperor's tele-
gram to his sister, or the sinking of the Lusitania
l.:oncern military history 1 One might as well, it
would seem, drag in the guillotine at Arras, or the
speeches of Robespierre into a military narratiye
of the early revolutionary war,
I do not think this criticism is sound. As it
seeUlS to me, the enemy's recent actions, which have
quite evidently no military object proportionate
ei ther to the expense of their undertaking or the
risk he runs by them, and many of which haye no
direct military object at all, are none the less well
worthy of note, and very useful in the analysis of
the purely military side of this campaign.
'Ve are always to ask ourselves whenever an
enemy command does anyt.hing, from the movement
uf a battery to the sending of a political telegram,
\"."hy he does it, and how his action can pos
ibly tear
upon the conduct of the war. His action may
often be foolish; we may often see it to have been
a blunder; but it is never quite meaningless.
Let us, therefore, begin by oontrasting the
operations of the Allies in the 'Vest with those of
the German forces, segregating these two oppo-
nents because it is behreen their methods that the
contrast most sevCl'e1y applies.
The Allies in the \Vest, as the turn in their
numbers has gradually come about, as thev have
provided themselves with more and more"heavy
artillery and with a larger and larger accumu-
lation of munitions for the same, have with every
passing week concentrated more and more clearly
upon the purely military objects of the war,
1.'01' instance, the first use made by the French
of their new security in heavy pieces was to push
forward in a belt of the Champagne until they com-
manded the lateral communications of the enemy
between Argonne and Lille. That done, they
baIted. Next they worked south and north of the

t. Mihiel wedge, up to Les Eparges on the one side
and the neighbourhood of Freilu on the other. They
here also oould bombard the points of junction of
his lateral communications. They pushed forward
to the heights north and east of Pont à Moussan
until from those heights they were in range, though
'distant range, of the chief southern oolllmunica-
tions of Metz. In the Vosges, at very heavy
expense, very slowly, but with continuous deter-
mination, they pushed on until they occupied simi-

ar positions, from which they dominated at long
range the main raihvays of the Alsatian plain.
Cl'hat done, they fell back upon the defensive.
Their air service, over and above its main work
o
observation and of " spotting" for the hea\1'
pIeces, dropped bombs upon certain headquarters
(especially the great general headquarters at
M.eiières), npon the railway junctions (work done

Vlth peculiar success by the British Flying Corps
m Belgium), npon the a.irship sheds, and upon
8tO
S and munitions. It is particularly to be
notlced that all this proca3s of purely military

May 15, 1915.

work became more and more restrained, as it
were, was more and more exactly directed towards
purely military objects as the winter passed into
spring and as the moment far an offensive
approached. The whole thing has been aptly com-
pared by Colonel Maude to the laying of founda-
tions by an engineer before he builds, and the
nearer the moment has come for erecting the walls
upon the foundations the more minutely and
thoroughly has the allied work concerned itBelf
with those foundations alone. There has been less
and less, as the weeks passed, of chance blows or
of tentative adventure. There has been a steadier
accumulation of men and of munitions, a somewhat
increased rigour in the blockade by sea, and, as
wa
perfectly right, a somewhat increased severity:
in the censorship. '
Now, oompare with this process and its cumu-
lative character the corresponding action of the
enemy,
He begins as early as December with announc-
ing an indecisiye action before 'tV arsaw, which all
but ended in a disaster for himself, as comparable
to a defeat of the Persians by the Greeks. He later
announces, after the local dèfeat of one ai'D1Y corps,
the total destruction of the tenth Russian Army.
He proclaims that the special bombardment of
Rheims is an act of retaliation, He drops bombs
upún watering-places along the East Coast, where
-as almost everywhere in England nowadays-
there were troops billeted, but which he carefully
style-s as being" fortified places." He announces
that he will sink merchantmen by submarine, but
at first he attempts to save the crews. He proceeds
to a policy of sinking them with or ",ithout saving
the crews, indifferently. He announces his great
offensive in Galicia in terms of extreme rhetoric
which do not correspond "With the facts. He makes
a raid upon the Baltic ooast of Russia which c.an
have no direct effect upon the campaign as a whole.
He sends out more than one bombastic telegram to
reigning families allied with his reigning house
and takes care that they shall be published abroad.
He shoots at extreme range, without aiming, large
shells into Dunkirk, hitting at random, and with
no oonceivable military object. He sinks the Lusi-
tania, producing an cffect, one side of which, its
horror and its novelty, must bear no relation to the
comparatively small carbo of munitions thereby
prevented from reaching his foe, and his Press,
which, even where it is purely financial and cos-
mopolitan, like the Cologne Gazette, acts under
orders, and particularly emphasises that side of all
these actions which is calcul:1ted to affect, not
military, but civilian opinion.
I would even go so far as to say that the use of
poisonous gases, which he has developed, falls
under the same category. That they are efficacious
in driving men from trenches we know. But there
is something else. The thing could have been done
with chemical agents that would Ilot 1m \'e the pecu-
liar effect of these poisons. Again, it is an agency
expensive in preparation and in time. Again, it
can only be used under special circumstances of
weather, Again, it is an ai!ency that has only been
used on one tiny fraction of his whole line.
Now, I am not denying that in all this the
enemy is putting his ,cry fuHe'3t milita ry effort
forward as well. My point is that the most
remarkable part of his recent aetivity has bel3n
this appeal to the nerve of neutrals and of belli-
gerent civilians. Jrhen he dropped a few
hells

6*

:May 15, 1915.

LAND

AND

.wATER.

attack on Britain would follow only as a natural
course. But the attack on Britain, once conceived
as a form of slow and necessary successful mari-
time and economic competition, has now become
the onl). feasible part of the national ambition. It
can be pursued at the price of an inconclusive
peace. If the German organism is spared, if the
Prussian Empire remains in being after the war.
nothing else of the programme will stand, but an
attack on Britain segregated from all the other
lost ambitions is still permitted. It would be an
attack delivered no longer by the chief Power in
Europe, only by one Power among many, and that
Power degraded and weakened as compared with
its greJ,t Continental neighbours. But the attack
could be delivered if an inconclusive peace were
patched up, and that inconclusive peace, the
enemy believes, can best be served by concentrat-
ing his moral effects upon neutral and civilian
people, but particularlv against the opinion of this
country, That is the -;1101'al of all that crescendo
of horrification which has used poÜ-;onous
gases against the extreme of the British line,
,"hich has shelled Dunkirk at twenty-two miles
(and lost a gun), and yet not shelled Sancy at
fifteen, which has sunk the Lusitania, and which
proposes to burn, one after another, a group of
civilian habitations in these islands, and anyone
who chooses can draw his military lesson from so
strange a perversion of the mind. It is in clear
lineal descent from those lesser massacres of
civilians and those e"periments in terror whicb
marked the campaign of 1870-71.
1J1)lf/
'

intû Dunkirk the other day from a range of over
twe.nty miles, with his guns at an eÀtrerne eleva-
tion, with no earthly chance of hitting anyone
milita ry target, he produced in our Press exactly
the effect which be desired. There was first a
neITOUS fear le5t his fleet might not be in ihe North
Sea. Next, that exceedingly naïf astonishment
that heavy guns could deliver shells at range so
great. V/ben he sank the Lusitania he excluded
for the moment from the attention of most neutrals
and of all civilians the \ery much more important
military developments of the few days succeE."ding
that tr3gedy. And no wonder, for it was a thing
Thore awful by far in its effect upon the imagina-
tion than the milch more disquieting advance of
the Austro-Germans into Galicia.
. The whole thing may be compared to the
actIOn of t\"'O boxers, one of ",horn should confine
the whole of his energy to the boxing while the
other produced appeals time and again during the
match, or sought to impress the spectators by blows
that drew blood. The expert would, perhaps, in
too great a degree confine himself in such a match
to the way in which the mere chances of the game,
according to the rules of its art, were turning; but
the spectators, in proportion to their ignorance of
that art, would ha ,-e thcir attention directed tû the
side issues of dis
ust or of protest.
'Vhat does this obvious and increasing orien-
tation of the enemy's efforts towards politil'al f>1Tect
mean 1 It means that Prussia, of the two weapons
upon which she has always relied, is now relying
more upon the terror of the civilian population
than upon the purely military art. She is still
relying upon both, out relying more than e\'er upon
the first. And that me.ans, in its turn, that she
believes this mor
ll effect upon the civilian popula-
tion to be becoming more and more her best chance
of obta.ining an inconclusive peace.
I am not here concerned with whether her AN ELEMENTARY
calculation is wise or unwise, still less a!D I con- J.
cerned with an estimate of its morality. I am only GLOSSARY.
regarding the matter as an inde"{ of how the war ( Continued. )
stands in the mind of the German General Staff
and of what they probably conceive the future to T dE chief w
apon in mo.dern war is the mi8sil
, just
be. And I discover that ind
x to P oint towards an as the chIef weapon In au<,ient war ",as the arm
properly so called, t!le thing held in the hand
increasing doubt whether they can by military the lance or the sword. '
means alone achieve wh:l,t has become their some- The missile is obviously an extension of the
what modest aim, of saving the State. To acquire lauce or the sword. It strikes a blow as does the lance or the
an hegemony in Europe, to eliminate the French I!Iword. The ouly difference in its action is that it strikes
from the list of the e-reat neutral Powers , to for-
blo.w beyond the reach of the human agent responsible for
<J Its dIscharge.
bid Russia future influence in the Balkans, to . With the insignificant exception of certain trench de-
keep the Italian forces vassal or ally, to exploit VICes,. the modern missile is dischsrged by the explosion 01
economically the Turkish territory in Asia-to cl!emiCal compounds of a sort varying in the different ser-
do anyone of these things in even the remote VIceS, but roughly combined in English uuder the term
f powder.
uture, no one of their directine- minds is so h
f I
T. e c?arge thus u!!ed for driving the missile forward and
00 ish as to hope. The whole plan, carefully thro
In.g It .at
he enemy is called U the propellant c/lUrge It
matured and diligently prepared, has failed. In
to di:>tmgUlsh It from a bursting charge, &c., of which more
one respect, indeed, and a most important one, In a moment).
that plan may still conceivably be pursued, I mean The basis of thil!l explosion is everywhere nowad:>ys
the outlet of en erg v which would C()T}cern itself cotton, though the proportion of cotton differs with the <Iif-
, J ferent services. It is highest, ill the French and American,
with a special duel against Great Britain: the and lowest, I believe, in the Austrian.
surpassing of British feaborne commerce by Ger- .The Mis,'!iles thus discharged by the use of propellant ex-
man, the acquirement of Colonial possessions at p!OSlves
re nowadays! save in the case of certain very large
!he e"{pense of Britain, and the exploitation for :pIeces, stIll boun
up In on
piece with the propellant charge,
tl f t f tl . I . fi Id . Just as the shot In a gun 13 bound up in one cartridge with
Ie. u ure 0 lose partlcu ar economIC e s In the powder and the cap, and this form of constructinD' ammu-
whIch England has gained supre:nacy. It was but ni
ion is k?own aa fiud ammu1Jitioll. Among the other
one chapter of the whole programme, and, save to pOInt.'!. whIch render copper so essential t<> modern war-
t
ose \,,
O had least grasp of reality among the fare, is one connected with this matter of fued ammuni-

orth Germans of our generation. not the most tion., It
8 important that the lower part of the
P t t h t TI . h . cartrIdge whIch holds the propellant explmri"Q and grips the
nTI or an c ap er. I
most Important t mg by base of the miqsile should be seamless. Brass can be pre.-"d
far was to become the chIef Pow
r in Europe. The from Olie whole piece into the required shape so that the
7*

LAND

AND

._ 01
ne cartridge is all of one substance with tIle sides,
but apparently no s
bstit
te for brass, with i
s d
9 propor-
t.:.-::.a of copper, can give qUite t.he same resul
s m tlns respe
t.
Missiles U1Ub discharged arc of two kmds--those dis-
charged from small arms, called 81lwll arm ammunition, or
generally bullets, and those dischJ.rged by artiHery, generally
called sltell. Both the bullet and the shell, both the ammu-
nition discharged from the rifle and that. discharged from the
gun, are in longitudinal sect-ion parallelograms, terminating
in ogives. Iu cubical shape, cylindro-conical. In more
simple language each is a round barrel, tapered off to a point
in frollt. but \\ith a circular base. With this shape, though
it i3 quite modern in conception, everyone is now very
familiar. It has been adopted for two rea"ons. It is the
shape that flies most steadily and gives the hest results in
activity; it is aho that which, on the whole, offers Ule least
re3i5tance to the air, and would therefore travel furthest
with the same propellant charge.
As betwepn the bullet and the shell, between the small
arm ammunition and the ammunition for artillery, there are
three radical differences of dimension, construction, and ob-
ject in use.
The modern bullet averages round about a Ulird of an
inch in diameter, the size varying slightly with the different
services, but the shell begins round about three inches in
diameter, and increases indefinitely with the calibre of the
gun discharging it, the largest shells at the present moment
beinO' over 16 inches in diameter. It is obvious that tho
size
f the shell varies not with the diameter but wit,h the
cube of the diameter. The two characteristics which dif-
ferentiate the two kinds of misgilcs are first and most obviously
their size-small arm ammunition is handled; a quantity of
it gOC3 into a light packet; it is insignificant in weight com-
pared with man's strength. Artillery ammunition must be
lifted, and after quite the first and smallest specimens cannot
be lifted hy man without the aid of mechanical contrivances.
But much more important a distinction nowadays is the
nature of the blow struck. SW211 arm ammunition has for its
object the dicablement of an ene.ny with one wound. It is
but rarely that a bullet will strike more than one man, and
it is ob-.ious that, in comparison with the total number of
bullets discharged, only a small number of men will be hit.
The shell,
ave in certain exceptional cases, is de-
ilÎgneJ to explode at that p;jint in its career where
it will do most damage to the enemy, and the
fragments of the exploded shell and the bullet'i which it in
particular cases contains di
perse and may strike a number
of men or inflict many wounds upon one man. Artillery am-
munition is essentially an ammunit.ion which is not intendcd
to strike with solid effect., hut to act by explosion upon reach-
ing its most ussful point, either upon impact or in tile air
just over the object to be attained, Shell, therefore, is pro-
vided with a bursting cl.arge, end the bursting charge is of
different composition from the propellant charge which drives
the TlÙssile out of the ""/eapon. This bursting charge is not
based upon cotton, and can be composed of such different
materials that almost any nation can decide upon one type
the materials for which will be found within its boundariß9
in spite of any pos8ible blockade. Thus, most of the bursting
charges in the German service are bas8d upon the by-products
of the distillation of coal, of which, of course, Germany pos-
sesses an inexhaustible quantity.
Roughly speaking, the reason that the bursting charge
and the propellant charge are made of different materials
is this: In a hursting charge what you want is imme-
diate action of the most violent kind, or, as it is technically
called, rapid combustion, but in the propellant charge you
want gradual action. You want the pressure upon the pro-
jectile within the bore of the piece to be exercised with a
sort of increasing push; only thus can you get the maximum
efficiency of a gun with the minimum of material. Of course,
the combustion is really inconceivably rapid in both cases,
but if we could put time under a microscope, as we can put
dimensions in space under a microscope, and turn the seconds
into hOUTS we should see a bursting charge acting all at once
as an explosion of gunpowder does in the actual time of our
experien,J, while we should see the propellant charge in the
shape of a much slower and cumulatively increasing expan-
sion of gas from the dissolution of the solid chemical corn-
poünd forming the original explosive.
The bursting charge in a shell is brought into action by
a device known as a fus
. This fuse is fixed upon the point
of the shell, thl' conicel slmpe of which has just been de-
scribed, because that is Ule part of the shell most likely first
to strike an object at which the shell is aimed, and, there-
fore, a fuse there situated can be used for exploding the shell
on impact as well as for exrlodilJg it in the air.

YV A TER.

May 15, 1915.

TIle fl1
e tùat pxplodes t.he !;beH on impact acts in a
fashion which everyone understands and which need not be
explained. The same fuse acting in a different fashion,
which explodes the shell while it is still in the air, has been
brought to extraordinary perfection in our time, and the
nicety with wl.ich the exact moment of explosion can be cal-
culated has made a tot.ally different thing of modern field
artillery from what the same arm was within living memory.
This action of the fuse which explodes the shell while
it is still in the air is known as time-fusing, and the fuse
wIlen it so acts is a tiTll
-fuse. The principle of its action is
the same as that which worked in the extremely crude fuse
of an older period. It is essentially a train of combustible
material, which is set alight at the discharge of the missile
from the piece, which is timed to burn for a certain period,
at the end of which it will explode the bursting charge, and
the fuse is " set" to such and such a number of seconds and
fractions of seconds as will cause the explosion to take place
just over the point where the effeet of that explosion will be
most damaging.
When a shell tI1Us explodes at a particular time chosen
in its flight it creates what is technically known as .. a cone
of dispersion." If the projectile were to be stationary at
the moment it exploded its fragments would disperse through
a sphere on all sides; as it is in rapid movement, they dis-
perse as a fact through a cone, the apex of which is at the
point of the explosion. In timing a fuse t.he ohject is to get
the shell 1.-0 explode just where this .. cone of dispersion"
will do most executicu against the enen'y.
For instance, if you are shooting against a swarm of
men charging against you across the open, you try to set your
t.ime-fuse so that the shell shall explode rather above the
heads of the men and a little in front of the advancing mass.
In this way the cone of dispersion, coming down upon them,
win cover the greatest area of the target at which it is aimed.
If, on the other hand, you are trying to search a trench (a
thing which the shell does most imperfectly, unless it is of
high angle fire) you time it 60 that it...5hall burst just abo
e
the trench and a little in front of it, hut so nearly upon It
that th" cone of dispersion will take effect entirely within the
trench.
Shells are fitted with fuses which """ill dways explode on
impact, and may, if it is so desired, explode to time instead-
that is, in the air he fore impact takes place. But, generally
Bpeaking, shells are of two kinds: those which are intended
to explode on impact and the work of which is done up
n
their striking the target, and those which are normaIly m-
tended to be exploded with a time-fuse. Of the former sort
are high explosive shells, the object of which is to de
troy
earthwork, and to stun, bewilder, kill, and wouud men
shelterillu hehind earth aud in trenches. Of the latter sort
are the ;hells of field-guus, which, with the exception of a
small proportion to be uged for the destruction of the target
aimed at, are
hrap/
el-that is, shells which not only bur"t
into a number of fraO'ments but also discharge on bursting a
ureat number of mis
jes in the shape of rounded or slightly
., .
flattened bullets which they contam.

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Derby..................Assernbly Rooms.. ThuL,sday.............13 May, 3,
Sheffield.......,...... Town Hall.......... Thursday.............13 May, 8.
york...................Opcra Houa.e....... Friday.................14 May, 3.
llarrogate,...........Km.B.'1.11............... Saturoay.............15 May, 3.
Do\-er..................Town lIa!l..........Wednesday..........19 May, 3.
Folkcstone....,...... TO\-\ß HalL.......... Wednesday,......... 19 May, 8.
Next lecture, Quc>cn's 1Li.ll, Wed., June 2, 8.30,

OUR FRONTISPIECE.

Copies on A rt Paper of the series of JVa1'
Portraits, specially drawn for LAND AND WATER
by Joseph Simpson, R.B.A " may be had, p1'ïcø.
2s. 6d. eaclt, on applicat'ion to the Publisher, IA.''iD
AND WATER, Central House, Kingsway, London..
lW,C,
Last week's p01'trait, General J offre.
This week's, General Fock.

8*

May 15, 1915.

LAND AND YV.A TER.

THE WAR BY WATER.
TI-IE "LUSITANIA" AND THE SUBMARINE WAR.
By A. H. POLLEN.

"NOTE.-l'his article lI::!s been snbmitted to the Press Bureau, wbicb does not object to tbe publication as cenzored, and tales no
responsibility lor the correctness 01 the statements.

T HE sinking of the Lusitania is an event
which strikes the imagination with
extraordinary force. No disaster in the
long history of men's conquest of the sea,
save the loss of the Titanic, compares with it.
But tbe Titanic kept aIioat for several hours, and
the Lusitania s<'"tllk, it seems, twenty minutes after
she was struck. It is the awful suddenness of the
thing that horrifIes. It was this that cost so dearly
in lives, There were boats enough for all, but no
t.ime to lower them, It is a singular comment that
the number of the boats was dictated by the lesson
of the Titanic loss and was prescribed by the Inter-
national CommissIOn-called at the Kaiser's in-
itiative I That over one thousand civilians, some
t.wo hundred of them neutral, should have been
murdered in cold blood bu
excited an emotion
simultaneously expressed in widely separated
countries in almost identical terms. I do not pro-
pose to discuss the moral aspect of this singular
crime. Ko one needs conversion to right views on
the subject, except those to whom moral appeals
have no meaning, I propose, therefore, to deal
with it solely as an incident in the new kind of war
which Germany has declared upon our seaborne
t1'a de.
It is perhaps as well to remind ourselves how
it was that hostilities took this form. On Decem-
ber 10 last came the news that the whole of
Von Spee's squadron, except the Dresden, had
been sunk at the Falkland Islands. The blow was
a heavy one to Germany, and it became immf'r
diately necessary to rest-ore her prestige. Within
a week a powerful squadron had been sent across
the North Sea, had bombarded Sc.arborough,
'Vhitby, and the Hartlepools, and had escaped
home again unengaged by any British ship. The
event "as hailed in the German Press as a great
victory, and a Eroof that Great Britain did not
mmmand the North Sea. Great Britain, though
indignant, showed no signs of fear or panic. The
rest of tbe world, partie-ularly America, spoke of
the bombardment of unfortified places as a lapse
into barbarism, and jeered at the runaways. As an
assertion of Germany's sea prestige the raid was
not a success. A new situation seems then to bave
arisen. To strike those who could not strike back,
to run away as soon as the chance of a fight
showed, and then to proclaim this 3S a victory
had made the German Navy ridiculous in the eyes
of the world. "\Vhat was there to do 1 It was
suicide to seek a fleet action. To sit down under
tbe domination of the English Fleet was equally
impossible. In a spasm of anger Von Tirpitz
taunted the Americans with stopping their trade
with Germany at England's dictation, and asked
them how they woulJ like to see aU trade with
Britain stopped by submarines 1 There would at
least be nothing ridiculous a.hout that. This was
within a. "eek of the HartJepool raid. The threat
was receIved by the American Press with the com-
ment we should expect from those whose business it

is to give educated expression to the judgment of a
civilised people. The answer seems to have been
exasperating to those to whom it was addressed.
But, if I remember right, no more was beard of
the threat until after tbe affair of the Dogger
Bank, wben the German Fleet suffered tbat fina]
eclipse of reputation that must follow flight-
and unsuccessful flight-in action. Had raiding
been given another chance? Was it the loss of
the Bliicher that determined the German Emperor
to turn the submarine threat into an actuality 1
Tbe terms in which the new blockade was decJared,
no less than President "Tilson's repIJ', will be
fresb in the reader's mind. Both have been ex-
tensively quoted during the last few days. The
point to remember is tbat the threat arose out of
the defeat at tbe Falkland Islands and the failure
of the cross-ravaging raids, It was resolved upon
aft
r the great discredit of the Dogger Bank. Its
execution was only delared until Germany could
c.onstruct a justification. A Government mono-
poly of corn and flour was fortbwith put into
effect, and it was proclaimed that as tbe German
people were on the point of famine no mercy could
be shown to tbe Power tbat was staning them.
The blockade itself came into effect on
February 18 and has now been in force for the best
part of three months, As a means of reducing
our food supply or of diminishing our willingness
to continue the war it has been a complete failure.
Hardly one in every 400 of our sbJps has been
sunk, and until Friday last no big ship had been
sunk at all,
Is tLere anything in tbe sinking of the L1.I.si-
tania to make us fear that tbe submarine is a more
effective weapon than we all thought 1 1\Iore effec-
tive than its past failure would indicate 1 Is any
greater success in the attack on our trade to be
expected 1
The time has been ample to prove t.bat, so far,
the judgment of every competent critic, expresæd
before the campaign began, was correct. Between
August and February the only successes of any
note which the enemy's submarines had scored
against our fighting fleet were the sinking of the
three cruisers on September 22, of Hawke on Octo-
ber 15, and of Formidable on the night of New
Year's Day, No other warsbip bad been touched.
It is generally agreed that rational precautions
would have saved these five ships also. On each
of the three occasions the victims had been going
at slow speed, or were stationary; on two they
were said to have been cruising in neighbourhoods
tbey had been frequenting for some days; in none
was there any destroyer protection.
During the whole of this period a yery
crowded traffic had plied daily between tbe
Southern ports of England and the Northern ports
of Franæ, Some hundreds of thousands of men
had been sent across to fight, and a constant
stream of supply ships, hospital ships, and trans-
ports bad bccn in regular passage, from one end
9*

LAND

A
D :\Y A TER.

:May 15, 1915.

of the C'l
'1TJ.r
d to the 0tlE
r. "\"'ot a sii1:':;:':
Rtt
ck passengers who laughed at the threat did so
was !"UC'C'P ;fullv directf'd again
t auy one of t!'P!H. bCf':1llse tbe'y had absolute confidence in the pro-
AmI :13'ain
t
all---c-.;:cept ho
pit31 ships-c;ub- tcC'tion that the British
avy (ould give them. To
marine attaC'ks, C,;CH without warpi
lg, ,nm!d b:l'T
ac('ef't thcm as p:JsseT'gers vas an implied under-
been within the accepted rules of war, and ju::>ti- taking that this l:unfidence was not misplaced. If
fied by a dire
t mil ;tary purpose. The absen('
we could not spare thf'm destroyers, could we not
of attnC'k on the transports and warships ,'.-heJI nt lm.,t ha..-e seen that, once off the coast of
prop
rly' plütcl'tf'd; th.e failure of the Dtt::H:k (in
re1and, tlw ship had an escort of patrol vessels 1
the Hcligobnd af!air) on the fa:,;t battle-cluiser
uch vessels had, in fact, accompanied the Gulf-
QUCt>lI Jl.U"!/, confil'H1fd the conclusions put for- liff/ll, and though they were not ahle to save her
ward lwforc the war. The submarine is a sloví- from being torpedoed, it was one of these vessels
moving sort of a.s

ssin, and can do his work only tbat took every soul off bel' alive before ghe sank.
if he can stalk a slow prey or l.vfJylay a fa.st onc. Might not an escort have saved a thousand lives
He is d

fencelef8 against attack, and finds safety on Friday last?
onlv in evasion. The situation could be sum- Cantain Turner admits tbat he was WaI'1l1 1
marised thus: :3u.bmarines could not frequent of the presence of suLmarines, though not that he
waters ?atrolled by destroyers, tha.t they could net wac; told of the sinking of the three steamers I have
show themselves in tl'e neighbourhood of ships, if named. And in following his old route and in
destrC'j"prs ,vere ip th{'ir company; l
stly, that in dropping his specd to seventeen and eighteen
daylight a big Rhip at high speed might be safe knots, he says he was acting, so far a:;; he was able
from ('ven a doc;e-range attack if she were to, under" instructions." Did the Admiralty in-
efficipntly conned :md skilfully handled. struct him to follow the usual homeward course, on
It would seem, tl 1 en, that no fast liner, e,ifliPr the supposition that the pir
tes, after all the warn-
going at its top speed or avoiding an habitual ings they }lad given, would certainly be looking for
or expected route, or with a destroyer or two in him elsewhere ? 'Vas he told to go slow because it
company, should èe in any danger whatever. It would be a greater risk to wait for a pilot in tbe
is the fact that these precautionary measures Mersey than to be at the mercy of
l1Y waylaying
\\e:oe at once so ohyious and so well known that submarine in the danger zone? Would not both
makes the omissi::m to adopt anyone of them so forms of danger haw been averted had the ship
startling in the CRSC of the Ll.Isitania,
\1thcugh n1ade a detour at twenty-five knots, and so arrived
c3pa!)le of twenty-fi"e knots, she was going barely at the prescribed hour, after a longer journey
two-thirds d this speed when torpedoed off the through safer waters, at a speed which has been
01n Head of Kin
ale. She was apparently passing proved to be protective?
within a mile or two of the route which, time out of It is clear that we do not yet know the full
mind. every home-nound Atlantic liner has fol- story, and what we do know is not very satis-
lowed. Although su1:Jmarines were known to be act- factory. No new fact is disclosed that should alter
iflg off the South Irish coast, no destroyer preceded our judgment on the submarine. 'Ve only know
or 3f'companied the doomed liner. that precautions hitherto proyed effective were not
The recent sinking.;; of the Earl of Latlwrn, of taken. \Ve do not know why not. The Admiralty
the Candid 'te, and of the Centurion, and the at.- has done so well for the merchant service that the
tempt to sink two others in these waters might present disaster is doubly conspicuous. And it is
have been J
otice enou2'h that the Lusitonia was in the rr:.ore regrettable from the fact that, while the
a d.'ms-er zone. But
to make sure, the German criminality of Germany ca.nnot be disputed, our
Amba
sadar in America had given e\<ery poséble comretl
nre to combat it ca.;} be.
publicity to the intention to sink h8r, if it could
be done. The warning v.as repeated to individual THE DARD.\NELLES.
pm.sengers by telegrams addressed to them pe
on - Since I wrote last week, no official news of the
ally. Kate that the urgency of this effort. to deter progress in the Dardanclles has thrown any fresh
Americans from travelling in her afforded no light on the Naval share in tbose operations, but of
reason for supposing that, if a submarine got with- lUlOfficial ncws we have a good dpal of an extra-
in
triking range, the Lusitania would be stopped ordinarily important and interesting character.
and told to disembark her passengers. Two in- 1fr. Ashmead-Ba.rtI.Jtt, who viewed the operations
ferenees only were possible. The thing was a bluff at Ga.pa Tepe from H.M.S. London, bas cabled the
or murder on an unt.o!cl scale was in prospect. most brilliant description of tbe landing of the
Neither Mr. Churchill's answers in th{> House Australians and New Zealanders on the 25tb and
of Commons on Monday, nor Captain Turner's 26th. The story is necessarily far from complete,
evidence at the Irish inquest explained why none and deals only with what a single observer on board
of tbe three precautionary measures I have men- one ship could see. On Tuesday was pub-
tioned were taken either to save the sbip or to pre- lished an almost equally interesting account of
wnt a hideous loss of life. 'Ve are told that a the landing at the Five Beacbes at the point of the
destroyer escort is only given to merchant sbips Peninsula. The two reports amply justify the
that are " vitally needed" by the Government. forecast made last week that this la!lding would
The LWlitania was the only one of the world's tnrTl out to be the greatest operation of combined
great liners in commission. She exceeded in dis- military and na.val forces ever recorded.
placement by over 12 000 tons any other passenger Every step in the difficult and complicated
ship in use. Her c0ntinuance in the Atlantic ser- job of disembarking troops into boats, of towing
vice was perhaps the most striking of all visible tbem to the shore, and all of this by night. had, it
evidences of our command of the sea. "Tas there seems, been rehearsed day after day until everr-
no " vital need" to safeguard so trcmendous an one was step-perfect, but heartily sick of the
embodiment of our naval prestige 1 drin. The rapidity with which the operation
But more Ulan cur naval prestige was at stake. was actually performed on the 25th is the be
t
The warnings that murder was intended had been justification of thes
arduous rehearsals. It is
openly and ubiquitously given. The American characteristic of the 1\avy to leave nothing to
10*

May 15, 1915.

LAND A
D YV A TER.

chance in an affair of this kind, and, indeed, so
great are the difficulties that to ha, e attempted the
thing without every detail ha, ing be
n le
rned
would have been a mere court.ing of disaster. The
speed at which all these vital manæuvres were
worked out and mastered is little short of extra-
ordinary. Early in April Sir Ian Hamilton was
reviewing the French troops in Egypt, By the
21st every transport at :hlurdos Bay and every
officer and man on board was apparently ready for
action. There must have been a ,cry strenuous
fortnight's work, though no doubt many of the
more ingenious arra.ngement1;-such, for instance,
as the conversion of the Ri\er Clyde into tbe
modern equivalent of the Horse of Troy-must
haye been put in hand a long time before.
Our most pressing curiosity at the moment,
however, is not to do with the past, but with the
present position and the future prospect. We
know more of the present position since Mr.
Asquith's statement in the House of Commons on
Thursday last. Of the future we can say this with
confidence, that the suce:ess of the entire operation
will depend upon the extent to which the artillery
of the Fleet is able to co-operate with the infantry
and artillery npon shore. Last week I dwelt upon
BOlle of the limits of tbis co-operation-sucb as
the inability of ships' guns to give the infantry the
advantage of the search illg effect that can only be
got by high-angle fire, the virtual impossibility of
combming the fire of more than one ship on a
single target; the necessity of each ship being
served by a separate obscf\'cr in every long-range
bombardment of a fort, and, finally, the difficul-
ties of keeping up quick and accurate communica-
tion between each obseryation statton and the ship
it serves. But there is one limitation to which I
did not draw attention at all, and it is perhaps
the most obvious of any of them- I mcan the fact
that thic-k weather may, at any moment, depriye
the Army of the Fleet's assistance, and that it may
remain so deprived for a considerable perioù. One

athers, for instance, from one of :Mr. Ashmead-
Bartlett's letters that, from the 12th to the 20th
of April, perfect weather co:1ditions, both for
landing and for IOTlg-range artillery, prevailed;
but that from the 20th to the afternoon of the
23rd the conditions wpre altC'gcthcr un favourable.
A Murdos telegra.m of Friday last teUs us that
there was a. gale blowing on the 5th, 6th, and 7th.
It seem3 that these gales generally bring with them
low-hanging clouds and a grey mi!'òt, which make
long-range lire impossible, bCC'3use the gunners
cannot pick up the target through their sights.
There were many intermptions to the bombard-
ment in February and March owing to this cause-.
The weather was not so bad that the ships could
not co-operate on the 6th, and there is no inti-
mation that there was any thick wf'..ather

between April 25 nnd :Ma.y 5, so that there
should have beeT} ten clear days in which to
make tbe most of the offensive of the comhinC'd
Senices. It seems clear that the naval gunfire,
both diI-ect and indirect, was of vital moment in
the momentous actions of the 26th, 27th, and 28th.
The capacity of the Army to stand safely on the
defensive, if "Weatber should throw the na-val guns
out of action, \\ould naturalIy depend upon two
factors-first, how far the offensive bad beeJ..l car-
ried wbile the help of tl
e nayal gur.s ViaS avail-
able, and, next, upon the number and \\cight of
tbe artillery which it bas been possible to land,
emplace, and to supply with ammunition. It was
no doubt realised from tbe first that the gre..1.te
;t
weakness of the position lay in the possibility of
a sudden divorce between the two Services. But it
should be remembered that, with the adyance of
the summer, the spells of bad weather should be
at once less frequent and shorter when they come,

AN AFFAIR OFF THE BELGIAN
COAST.

The Secretary of the A<1miralty made an
announcement on Saturday la.5t to the effect that
the T,B.D. ,MaoJ'Í had struck a mine off the Bel-
gian coast, that the crew bad taken to the boats,
and that the T.B.D. Crusader's boats had been
lowered to assist. The enemy then opened fire, and
Crusader, after being under fire for an hour and a
half, had to retire, leaving her Q"\Yn and 'Maori's
boat.s behind her, Seven officers and eighty-eight
men were in them and were taken prisont'rs. It is
not stated that either the C 1'1lsoder or the boaL

suffered any casualties, and to most people the
story has appeared exceedingly puzzlin 6 _ 'Yas
the mine stru02k befure di:lylight
'Vhy was
Crusader unable to pick up any of the boats
It
IS possible that Cf'1IWlder drew the fire of the forts,
in the hope that tbe boats would be able to pull
out of danger, and n 1 anceuvred quickly to avoid
being hit herself 1 rerhaps after an hour and
a half of this it was found impractiæble for
the boats to make way enough to ha.ve any hopes
of getting to sa fety. To take in tbe crews,
Clusader must have stopped and become too easy
a mark. To stay any longer '"\as to take a useless
risk, possiblj" involving the ri:ok of losses alììC'ngst
tbe beats as "ell. VlJmt the llestroyers were òoinO'
within range of the forts is not èxplaincd. Th

German vessels that tool;: our men apparently caITle
out a.nd returned without being engaged. "\Vrat
kind of vessels were they 1 Perh
ps the mùst in-
credible part of the st,)!'}' is that our bf'ats were
taken find IltJt sunk. The kss of a desboH,'r apd
so many officers and men is a sel ions ntatt

, and it
is to be hoped that the _\dmi!'ulty '" ill gì\'e us
further particulars. .

TIlE

STRONG LINE
By CAPTAIN

FOI{
CLARENCE 'VIENER.

AIvIERICA.

, (CaI'Ulin Wienn --ill the "el l ,kT1OW1l American military expert and of absolute deva!'tation. Yet this lil){'rt.y from the horrors of
orn
r. H<;
ld a ('(,u,m'S8ioll :01 tilt> BritIsh Ar",y during the oouth
Afucan
ar, v.hen he \<að t"ico menti'>I1cd in d' .telles. His ,iewlI conflict may well be but a lJ](),I1en:d T Y re
pile. Shoul,1 tbe
all an Amcric.:!n <:It.i:z.t:n he .e f, '..! intcr
st. at tho 'p
l$cnt moment.J Teutonic races win through on th
ir p;:;licy c:;f "hJord :md
I T would be well ii Americans cea5ed to gaze on the !õur- iron," Awcrica will have but a few brief ye
rs of cuìp'lble
fai'e of things only--it would be well if they looked peace; in the end Prussian II'iliLary domim.tioll \\ ill hold her
clo
dy into tIle }Irltlue of the great cataclysm that is in its gra:;p as the ice holds the polar
'a8.
takl!lg place not only on the plains of Europe, but in It would be well, ..hile there is yet tin.e, to t:;l,e tbe!'e
rr.any other quarti'rB of the inhabited globe. For the tllÏngs to heart, And tQ act. For na-..er again-if true ci"ili-
moment the "Cnited States wight be
tY!f>d the playground of sation and enlightened rrogre is tlltottled 110\';-will WP. the
the world,
cr th, re no soumis of guns fired in anger are citi 7 eu'I of the Unite,] F:tat..
, ha.(' IIch !:r.:,&t fl -
,
ting
heard, no cnes of outraged 'Ploillanbood, none of the miserit's ill unity wi
h o4rsd.es. TÌJat fFa)' i.., 'pt.::.r a
CJ 'ì"h .ie""-p.Jint
11*

LAND

AND

to take. But policy is destiny in tim, as in all el
. Still.
Jet ua look at the other side of the picture. If we Americana
now stand aside and allow other Powers to fight our battles, 8.1
well u their own, what will be the result' Will these nations,
as victors, look np to Americans' Will they even regard
them u friendly equals' Why .mould they' They will
have suffered much hardship, much travail; the agony and
borror they have passed through will take many years to
beal. If America selfishly and superficially stand!! øside, it is
true she may not BUffer loss in the field; but will she not be
made to feel in time to come how cowardly and how un-
friendly her action has been'
The world is out of joint. It Ì9 no time to fall back
upon II quack cures," if true understanding Ì9 to be preserved
among peoples; and if the Germanic race is to be I!aved from
itself, there is now but one cure, and one alone-it is by appli-
cation of the surgeon's knife.
We of the United States are far too apt to boast of manly
qualities, the freedom of our institutions, the liberty of our
personalities, and let it end thus in windy and futile pratings.
Such exhibitions will cause us little benefit in time to come,
unless backed by resolute and virile r.ction. We must not
let pa.B!! this golden opportunity of aiding in the righting of
the world's affairs. of doing our share in cutting out the
c:anker of a malignant growth in the side of universal friend-
ahip and true brotherhood.
We are fond of talking of efÏete Europe, but where would
the United States be if England, France, ønd Russia-not
forgetting valiant little Belgium-had BUnk into a state of
atrophy' For is there really a sane statesman, even a sane
citizen, among ua who could truthfully state that in his
Ðpinion the Teutonic races would have waited to cross the
!Atlantic in order to occupy Canada and Brazil' Waited for

hat, forsooth' The pleasure of the United States I No;
;we would bave been trampled nnder the iron heel of Potsdam
Dust as ruthlessly as was Belgium and Poland. Are we
!Americans such fools that we won't admit these things even
to ourselves'
Why, tben. do we try to screen ourselves behind a wall
ef evasion' If we were such dullard!! a few brief months
ago u to believe the Germanic races loved WI better than
ether nations, surely the scales have by now fallen from our
eyes' We need only to look at the scurvy and virulent car-
toons in their public Press to see how we are regarded now
that our neutrality cannot be used as a catspaw in their
favonr. Nor is even thi!! neutrality respected. The German
;Ambassador and his entire stafÏ are implicated in the mos'
damnable underhand acts against WI; nor does it 8top at that.

his gentleman and his stafÏ are engaged in trying to bolster
up, both officially and privately, & pestiferous propaganda in
onr country and against friendly Powers in a most mendacious
and improper manner. What wonder if we finally insut

YV A TER..

May 15. 1915.

upon his immediate recall' Of the extraordinary trio, Bern-
stod, Mñnsterberg, and Dernberg, the latter alone will then
remain to sway American public opinion improperly by
gaseoWi lies and su hterfuges.
The Govel'l1IT'ent at Berlin not only laughs at the impro-
priety of the conduct of t,heir representatives in America--
it insults and allows to be insulted publicly in Berlin the
U.S, Ambassadcr. All this l.:Jight be set down to temporary
and rabid madness. Rut there ia no excuse for their pre-
sumptuous and murùerous dictation in regard to the conduct
of the war. They are without the pale of civiIisation, outlaws
of humanity. and must be treated as one treats a mad dog.
They must be destroyed. Civilisation and barbarism, Rome
and Carthage, cannot both exist.
These perfidious exponents of a brutal doctrine first of an
declare a blockade that they can in no way enforce. They
then affirm, against all accepted rules of International
law, that they will sink all ships whatsoever found within a
tremendous sea area, which they are good enough to tt'rm a
" war zone. JJ The United States protests against this entirely
novel and iniquitous treatment. Berlin laughs at us and our
" quack" measures; she sinks two of our ships flying the
national emblem. 'Vhat do we do Y Talk I We might be even
forced to say something quite severe òid the occasion arise
again I And now she has sunk without warilÍng of any kind I),
trans-Atlantic liner, involving the murder of many American
citizens. Certainly it cannot be said that tbe II threats JJ
delivered to the passengers in N ew York were proper ,. warn-
ing." It will not mitigate the sentence civilisat.ion will pass on
the wholesale murder of undefended .. neutrals. JJ Yet it is
proposed that the Executive in Washington should send a
query to Berlin asking if this ghoulish deed WM, in fact, in-
tended I No wonder that Europe is taking us for a useless lot
of money-grubbers; this is what we are certainly degenerat-
ing into. \Yhy not take our stancl-a manly and a chivalrous
stand' I'm afraid that if we do not there will be but few that
will remain proud of being Americans. That is not a pleasant
prospect to true patriots.
So if we finally wake up t
a proper serne of our honour
and declare war on these brutal buccaneers, what will
trarnpire' First and foremost we shall be doing our duty to
civilisation. We shall be doing our apportioned ahare in
bringing to a close within the speediest time a conflict of great
sUfÏering. We shall at the close of this conflict be on an equal
footing with the other friendly natiom. Politically, we shall
be in a position of tremendous and almost unequallt'.d
strength. Is this not worth while' But far and away
more important, mere advantagt'ous, and greater for us in 0.
myriad ways will be the comradeship and federated under-
standing between ourselves and the friendly nations-a rea.!
contribution towards the peace of the world.

THE BIG
ITS VALUE

AER OPLANE.
FOR THE OFFENSIVE.

By

BLIN

L.

B OYB-THROWING from aircraft can be considered
an efficient and reliable method of bombardment
only when the number of bombs dropped in a
given time is large. The importance of the
number of bombs in carrying out an aerial attack
ha.s on several occasions been shown in this publication. A
large number of bomb!' can at present be carried only by a
large number of aeroplanes, at least so far að the French and

he British are concerned. AB regards the Russians, they
have for the last year or so been experimenting with an aero-
plane of very large dimensions and having a great lifting
capacity. Reports which have recently been published wonld
tend to show that the SykorsI..-y biplane has now been succeSð-
fully applied to military uses. If snch were really the caae
&be advent of the large military aeroplane wonld give 1<> the
Ruæians a wcapon of considerable offensive value,

THE "LIFTING" AND THE "FLYING"
QUALITIES OF AEROPLANES.

There are many reasons why the large aeroplane is a
lIn1
h more powerful weapon than the muùl one. and ÍII com-
r:
the large and the small machine it is nec::essary 1<> keel.
mind some technical deta.iIa. suæ as the If ",t
ual4I>, I
aDd
e "{lllinU-IJ.uali" .. of aeroplanea.
1.a-

DESBLEDS.

By "lifti'flg-guality" of an aeroplane is meant the
amount of weight it can lift with reference to t,he power con-
I!uml!d. The greater the weight lifted, for a given amount
of power, the greater is the II lifting-quality JJ of the machine.
The term II flying-qual-itll " is used to dimote the weiO'ht an
aeroplane can carry, at a given speed, with reference Oto the
power consumed. The greater the weight that can be carried.
at a given speed, for a given amount of power, the greater
is the II filling-quality JJ of a machine.
It is evident that in considering the value of an aeroplane
for ofÏensive purposes it i.s very important that its II lifting-
quality" as well as its "flying-quality" should be taken
into account. An aeroplane with a great II lifting-quality"
can, relatively, carry a large weight for a small amount of
power-that is, of fuel-{:onsumed. If, besides. it has a grea'
II flying-quality." the machine will be able to carry that large
weight. at a required speed, with a relatively small consump-
tion of petrol.
AD. investigation of the86 two qualities of an aeroplane
shoWII that they are alwap more pronounced ÍII large
machines. It follows, therefore, that from an ofÏensive poin'
of view the large aeroplane ia mnch more valuable than the
small one, because of ita much greater .. liftinJ JJ and II tir-
ing " qnalitieø. This conclusion is now definitely established.
Such was not the case, however. a year or so ago, and were

Iay 15, 1915.

LAND

it not for that lack of knowledge it is very likely that we
would 1l0W be in poss
!I!1ion of a large number of offensive
aeroplanes of great dimensions, of large carrying capacity,
and of gcod " lifting" and If flying" qualities.

T\VO LARGE AEROPLANES.
It was to\\>ards the end of 1913 or the beginning of 1914
that the advantagE's of tlw large machine over the.small one
began to be reccgnil!Cd. In France the engineer CollieJl:
was about that timo experimenting with the Je
nson-Colliex
seaplane-a machine of huge proportions. In Russia,
Sykcrsky, with the asÛstauc;c of his Government, was develop-
ing tbe cnormous aeroplane which, two or three weeks ago,
was used at the frod fer the first ti:ne.
The Jeanscu.CoIlicx hydro-aeroplane has a span of 89
feet and a liiting surfacE' of 1,560 square feet. It is fitted
with two Chenu motors of 200 h. p. each and driving a pro-
peller 16ft. in diameter. The total weight it can lift is
10,340lb., the If useful" weight beillg about 4,400lb. Its
speed is about 60 miles per hour. The offensive potentiality
of ,!Uch a machine, especially as regards bomb-carrying
capacity, is enormous, aI!.d it is a great pity that when the
war broke out the J eamon-Colliex machine was not suffi-
ciently If developed" for immediate military application. It
may be added that its trials were carried out with great
IiUC.reSS.
The Sykorsky biplane is driven by five motors of 100 h.p.
each, Its s
n, from wing-tip to wing-tip, measures 121ft.,
and its lellgth from nose to tail 66 feet. It has a lifting sur-
face of 1,958 square feet, Rnd has already taken, to a height
of nearly 1,000 feet, a load of sixteen passengers.
The emp1cyment of the Bykorsky biplane in military
operations will, in the hands of our Russian Allies, be a
weapon of considerahle offensive ,,-alue, and if the report be
true that th,s biplane has now been successfully adapted for
use on the Eastern front we may expect 60me considerable
devE'lopment in the matter of aerial attacks.
Both the Jeamon-Colliex seaplane and the Sykorsky
aeroplane could carry a load of l,OOOlb, of bombs over a dis-
tance of 250 or 300 I"J.iles, and fly back to their starting base.

T

AND

WATER

OFFENSIVE AEROPLANES FOR
SIEGE WORK.

The large aeroplane, besides being ..en ønitecl for fJ&l'f"1'-
ing out such offensive operatioIlA &8 have been .heady ø.-
&mined in the columns of this publication, ..ould be especiaDy
Taluable for siege work.
It has been estimated that, up to the present. 80me 5.000
shells have been fired by the Germans on the Ruman fortifiecl
town of Ossowiec.z without having reduced it. Now a fleet 01
300 large aeroplanes, consisting of 150 machinea in actual use.
and of the same number in reserve or in t.he repair øho

could drop daily, or several times daily. 6,000 shells of 251b.
each; tbat is, 150,OOOlb. of shell and high explosives.
In view of this enormous potentiality of Ule Sykorsky
biplane, it would !!Cem that our Government, &8 well u that!
of the }<'rench, would do well to adopt the Russian type .f
aeroplane (if its success is such as it has been report.ed) a
conjunction with the types already in use.

A NEW MEANS OF DEFENCE
AGAINST AIR RAIDS.

In view of the recent airship raid" into this country. and
"f the possibility of more visits from Zeppelins, the writer
would like to call the attention of all those connected with
aerial defence to a note read by Professor Dran1y at a meeting
of the Académie des Sciences held in Paris on March 29.
1915. In his note Professor Bran1y. to whom the world ow

wireless telegraphy, shows that by mean
of a emall motor,
!!Uch as that of a motor-bicycle, it i
possible to obtain a ligh

of 40,000 candle power. This is a more powerful light than
that obtained from any other BOurce. A
Professor Bran1y
Bays in his communication, one can with such luminous
sources possess" a mobile defensive belt against night attacb
of an kinds." It would tIoCem that the most efficient defence
against aircraft operating in darkness is to dazzle them by the
employment of an intense light.

HONOURS OF WAR.
A STUDY IN GERM-CULTURE.
By JOSEPH THORP.

T ilE Comr.:andant of Fort A, stood in the laboratory
cupola of the poison-control watching through his
mica monocle the Ober-Proiessor Hauptmann
von Strafenberg putting the finishing touches to
an important experiment in germ kultur. The
air was hushed with mystery. The experimenter trembled
like a chronic dipsomaniac.
The Commandant nel"Vously raised his rubber-gloved
hand as if to brush an upturned moustache, and, encounter-
ing the cello.loid vizor of his helmet, made a gesture and a
guttural exclamation of profound impatience.
History was being made.
The eminent Rriego-biologist was on the eve of the
greatest discovery of thð Great Wal'-the second or third of
the Beries of Great Wan that was definitely to end War.
From the minced fragmenw of babies' comforters (\vhich
had been collected by volunteer corps of frightful, armed
nursemaids throughout the empire. and, of course. ruth-
lessly commandeered in occupied territory). rrJ.xed with the
tertiary ga..
of hyper-oxidised taxi-cab lUbricating oil, dis-
t.illed by the Hauptman.n-Professor's own pet processes from
the Imperial dustbillB of the All-Absorbing's own pet suburb,
he had compounded a medium in which the baciHus of (,-8re-
bro-pneumo-typhrn (first bred in the famous State germ-
kennels of von KalbRkopf) multiplied at an indecently ter-
rific rate.
The Professor. overwhelmed with emotion, staggered
to a clldir. tore off &is prismatic lenses and ama]gamoid in-
øuJ.aton. IL.!d, waving the sealed test tube in his hand,
ex.claimed triumphantly, .. It is finished I I open. And
there ÌJI no longer an enemy I II
. .. Good I II
id the Commandant on & not,e of anxiety,
eyemg the waggmg tube, .. But are you quite sure that there
will be any garrison' Not, of course, that it matters," he

ded in loyal apology.
The Profesgor dived into the pocket of his aluminiumised
overall "If Excellency will but mill this powder, he can
Jrith impunity face the a.l1-removing test tube,"
.. Ah ( 80," replied the other, II But perb.1ps a mere

formality; of course it would be more in accordance witJi
the regulations ü I-" and here he touched the bell.
II Precisely," Mid the Ober-Professor Hauptmann,
An orderly answered witb uncanny promptness.
II The Lieutenant commanding the Filth Typhoid Bat-
tery will attend in five minutes with twelve of his men for
testing purposes j also the Engineer-Asphyxiator will presen'
a repo:t on the controls of his new hyperæsthetic plant."
But, in fact, the report arrived before the Engineer-
Asphyxiator, for it was just at that moment that an enemy
howitzer that had been doing BOrne inconclusive searchin:
lIuddenly landed a lucky shell in the E.-A!ø department.
The outraged officer a few minutes later rushed in
breathless, carrying a smoking germ-mauser in his hand.
If I have the honour to report to your Excellency that a !!hell
h
s exp10ded in my battery; that the main retort has been
ahattered, and the new ,000042 c.m, germ-brood has escaped;
and that my dogs of men have broken and disgraced my
regiment. "
"A abelll" cried the Commandant. .. Barbarians I
Swine-dogs I They do not fight; they batter. And your
men' .. said tlle Commandant, fiercely.
If They will break no more I" said the Lieutenant
grimly. "Have I YOllr Excellency's permission to join
them'" he added, holding the barrel of his mauser under
his nose and preparing to inhale.
II It will be more in accordance with the Imperial regu"
lations if this ceremony is performed in your own quartel'i'.'.
r.l.'he Lieutenant Baluted, clicked, and was going when
the Ober-Professor detained him.
If It will be still more in accordance with the ultimate

tness of things if the Herr Lieutenant will postpone this
ceremony. Ho will live to see the triumph and honour of
our arms. I open this--pouf I aud the enemy is no more,
Bo." And Ober-Professor Hauptmann von Btrafenber o
hugged himself in a bland eC>!taay. 0
It was at this moment that the Engineer-Asphyxiator
presented himself. If I have to report, sir, that the main
barrel of the C.-P.-T. has been split and damaged beyond

LAND

AND

repair, I have no material (the last fupply of tri-pnlped
gramophon!J records h'!s baen exhausted), and! as the Pro-
fe"or is doubtless aware, the effect of the leak IS that I have
no 1\'en, or at least none worth
eriou
ly considering."
Tùe Pmf
ssor blanched; the Commandant reflected.
,. This is rr.ore than unforlul'ate, gentlemen. The gal-
Ian!; d.:fcllce can 110 longer be continued. The Herr Haupt-
in:nm Professor carries in his hands the 63.1vation of our
couuhy. It is neçe5!'ary that he leave the fort. I
is con-
venient that we go with him. 'Ve have made an meffably
brave dêfence. The twi
ted and so beautifully coloured corpses
of our ra3h enemy te"tify to it," He point.ed to some terrible
thill!:"s out on the glacis. "The savour of our deeds shall
smelÌ to h.:o:Jven for all time. Meanwhile we can count
upon the u'lculturcd chivalry of a profoun
ly stupid enen:y.
'Ye will de,nancl the honours of war, t.he nght to leave wlth
our weapons, and our litHe personal possessions-such,. for
in!'tance, as this test-tube, eh, Professor 1 You, Herr LH'u-
tenant, will now carry out a flag of trUCl'. You will take also
these tE'bnoid C<J.
sule3. Scattered with di
crction, they will
no douht cause h:onble later.
"EnO'ineer, you win, alco wi
h discretion, connect an
emergency tube from the main typhoid batt-ery with the
prisoners' quarters.

WATEIL

1.fay 15, 1915.

" Herr Profe:!sor, I can leave the welh in your excellent
hands. "
It was a little later in the day tIlat a Major of Artillery
of a stupid and guileless race returned to the fort with the
Licutenant to discuss tIle terms of capitulation. They boiled
down into the granting of a safe conduct to the Commandant,
the Herr Ober-Professor Hauptmann, the Engineer.
Asphyxiator, and the Lieutenant of the Typhoid Battery.
The :Major's signature was fixed to the authentic parch:'
ment. A Budden faintness overcame him. The Professor
examined him with professional detachment. "It is un-
fortunate," said he, "that he will not live."
.. A tetanoid capsule, if I mistake not," said the Com-
mandant, sniffing cautiously.
.. Precisely," said the Profes
or.
.. They will always be fools."
.. And we shall never be gentlemen," said the Lieu-
tenant, not without emotion, as he gave the last salute to the
incomparably stupid Major,
.. As this amming gentleman has so illconsiderat-e!y re-
moved himself," se.id the Commandant, emitting a cultured
laugh, .. it will hardly be necessary to await the entry of the
enemy . We will leave by aeroplane at once."

BERNI-IARDI'S
By ADlVIIRAL SIR

A SUFFICIENT comment.ary on this rather
whining apology of General v. Bernhardi wou1d
be a comparison of the date of publication of his
.- .. Gennany a'Id the Next 'Val''' and the date
of his prcfatOl'y letter, of which a facó-imile is
prefixed to the present apologetic volume,
}3ernhardi's .. Germany and the Next 'Val''' was pub-
lished, I believe, in 1911, I do not know the date of the
first publio:'ation of the English translation, but e"t'eryone is
aware that the book was reviewed in many English news-
paper:! and periodicals long bdOl'e the present war began.
The opinion then formed of the meaning of the work was
virtu
<lly unanimous here and identical with the opinion of
it still prevailing.
No lwowledge of any attempt on General v. Bernhardi'

part to explain away or apologise for the sentiments expressed
in the book ever reached the reading public in this country
or-appe.renUy-in the United States. It was, and still is,
impof;sible to escape the conviction that, at any rate until
after tho BattIe of the Marne, General v. Bernhardi saw no
reason why anything that he had written three years earlier
called for recantation or apology. The change which the
result of that battle imposed upon German hopes is reflected
as in a mirror in General v. llernhardi's new statements.
The letter in \':hich he asked the Emperor William's permis-
sion to publi"h his present recantation is dated November 20,
1914, by \\hich time eyen the most stupid and sanguine
German mU>ot have been convinced that the result of the
Ue.ttle of the l\[arne was not likely to be reversed in a hurry.
It is, tllerefore, quite easy t{) understand why General v.
Bernhardi found it advisable to try to explain away towards
the end of 1914 sentiments and statements which he had pro-
mulgated in 1911, and to which, in spite of unfavourable
criticism, he had sturdily adhered throughout almost the
whole of the int{!rveninO' time. The Batlie of the :Mal'lle,
foHowing on the heroic <>and ne..-er-to-be-forgotten re!'htanee
of t.he Belgians, capsized the whole German strategic plan.
and General \'. Bcrnhardi's earlier notions went overboard
wit h the Te3t of the Pots-dam prognostications.
How much of his new statements comes from General v.
.Beruhardi himself Y It certainly looks as if the" one or two
article!'," which he asked tht' Emperor's permission to write-
a
rillis
ion on which he count-ed with confidence-it certainly
looks as if thc-;e " one or two articles," now published in an
Englisl1 translation, had been submitted to illmtrious inspcc-
tion and been imprO\ ed by the interpolation of statements
emanating from or inspired by the highest authorities.
The r
'proaches cast at England are in the true Viilhelm-
stra:,o;;e-Potsdam style. The intolerable' tyranny which
Berahardi or hi,; inspirer imputes to British policy--e
pecially
in South Africa and in India-has been rewarded, not as
those personages exped!!d, by disaffection and revolt, but by
spontaneous oITers of Princes, Feudatory Chiefs, and ppople
in India of thcir property and even their lives for the support
of that policy; whilst in South Africa hostiliti
against the
most important oversea German possession are being con-

VOL1"'E

FACE.

CYPRIAN BRIDGE.

duct
d by South Africåns en their own part, the General in
Command and most of them being Boers.
I do not know wh::ther it is General v, Bernhardi him-
self or someone else more continnously in touch with the
highest German authorities who coined the word "Naval-
ism." It is, of course, a mere tIt ljuu'lue to be hurled at
anyone who speaks of Prussian Militarism. The coinage \3
regarded, in Germanophile circles, as a brilliant sped men
of Pots-dam wit. 'l'he word was exported to the United
States and distributed widel)' to be used by interrupten at
public meetings at which GerlT'an diplomatic anù belligerent
method3 were discussed.
Of course there is no parallelism between Prussian
Militarism and so-called British "N avalism." Everybody
understands the first and knows what it is, and it would not
be General v. Bernhardi's fault if it was not understood and
known. His former book makes that quite clear. British
"Navalism," according to the new German view, is that,
because the widely-scattered British Empire-with its cûm-
ponent parts separateJ by great tracts of sea-possesse3 d
great Navy-not so powerful relat.ively as the German Army
is on land--our naval power must be used for the oppression
or restriction of other countries. Not one word in proof of
this is attempted, If any were possible we may be sure that
it would be thrust befcre our eyes, The truth is t11e exact
opposite of what General v. llernhardi and his inspirers assert
or intimate. Here is one sufficient demonstration of it. No
economic or il!du
trial factor in Germany has been mom
highly dcvelol)cd sin{'e the establishment of the EIJ1pire than
the German mercantile marine and German commercial
interests overseas. It would be possible to show "graplIÌ
-
ally" that increase of tile BriLish Navy has been accompanied
by an increase of Gerrna'1 mercantile tonnage and in the vzlue
of German overseas tr2.de. In many parts of t.he world, down
to the very outbre3.k of the "'
Ir, British naval power 1'1'0-
t,l'cted German illt
re..ts. Accusations against Britis 1 1
" Navalism JJ tht'l'cfore are but empty and insincere
vitu peration,
It is hardly possihle that General v, Bernhardi can be
i
norant of the fact that the so-called" convention JJ between
Great Britain and Belgium for tb defence of the lalter liWe
eç,t1lltry if its neutraEty W3S ,iolated was c.ommnnicated by
King Albert to the Gcrman offici
lls and con
e<]u(ntIy was not
kept s{.cret. ALo it Î3 not "llarclly possible," but quite
impossible, that Lhe
o-can('d "conveut.ion" was e-,er
entered into. The w0rJ "convf'ntion" i'3 a forgery of tÌ;:J
German Governr.
ent i'l a l'.!::3. doculllcnt which contained
no 8u
h word, but did contain the word II con,'cr3ation, OJ
for which "eoI1Vcnticll" was fraudulently snbstitut
d. A
facsimile of t!w document \Va" puùli'3hed some months ligu by
the Field ne
vspaper, in whi.;h German handwriting and (1'0
forgi'ry are at onc
perceptible, W.ay does not G
nér.ù
v. Bemhardi kll hia l'êaders of this'

"The New Beniliardij Hi.. .L&t-e.ñ Vi_II on War.'! (LondOllI
Prioo h. net.)
14*

Hay 16, 1915.

LAND

AND

WATER.

TALES

OF

THE

UNT AMED.

IV.-FOSELINE.

Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas English.

D EEP gloom and a Blow-dripping thaw. But for the
drip, deep silence.
A click, a swish of steel. A scream which
I!Icythed across the gloom; which mowed long
swath of silence down; which burst torrential on
the void across the shattered Bood-gate!! of the night.
The Marten Cat was caught.
The dainty, nimble Marten Cat; the brown-furred, whit
-
frilled Marten Cat; the come-by-chance of last year's fickle
pairing.
This night, as most nigh
, she had roamed afield; had
left the moss-clad alder-stump in which she Mntered solitary.
The cold had come betimes. The migrants had long since
winged south, in serried, wedged battalions.
The food had dwindled, vani!!hed. Fuseline, hunger-
maddened, prowled nightly round the village.
More prudent than her kin, maybe, maybe less bold, she
f'hunned the straw-roofed wheat-st.acks, the holes and corners
of the loft!!, the cob-webbed, angled rafter!!.
Each morning found her snuggkd in her nest, far from
the villag6, far from :Man.
Six moons had passed, since, with a moon abetting, she
dragged her last hen-blackbird from it!! brood, Few birds
remained with the forest border; and t.hese were !',easoned
veteran!!, who clung, despite the snow. to their old haunts;
whose cunning, equal to her own, was proof against surprise.
A week of fruitless stalking, of biting, gnawing hunger-
pangs, steeled her to her first raid on human dwelling.
Through broken tile, stufied clum
ily with straw, through
('hink, where dry worm-rotted beam shrunk from its mortared
setting, she crept into the cowehed loft, thence down the hay-
<;hoot to the ground, thence by a cat-hole to the whitewa!'hecl
hen-house.
Lightly she vaulted to the roost on which six melancholy
birds drowsed with their legs crooked under them.
She slew them, everyone.
A single cunning bite sufficed, a bite which loosed a jerk
of blood, Her clawed feet pinned her victim down. She
pursed her lips and sucked it,s neck. She dropped its limp,
lake corpse when it was drained. Blood was good meat, good
It''ink. \Vhy trouble to tear bones apart, to mumble throbbing
flesh Y
Drunk with her mea1, 1Ier white friU crimson-dotted,
",ith matted fur, with beBy like a drum, she homed uncon-
scious of her teB-tale 1'poor.
Long hours she slept, and, in those hours, Fate f'pun
her si1cnt web.
Each night she grew more daring. She braved the shut-
tered houses of the viBage, wit.hin whose courts growled
watch-dogs tushed like boars. She braved the full mcon's
radiance, when Man lurked in his ambush armed, and spurt
of flame, and thunder-peal, brought to one luck1ess prowler
death, to aB that prowled a warning.
Often the night's exeurfion failed, comumed itself in
wander-hours, aimless, monctonous wander-hours, past
garden-waBs, through h(>dgcrow gaps, up sloping thatch and
tiling.
But one, a gloomy, moon1ess night, brought welcome
change of fortune. A
entinel !'tar gleamed through a b! eak
of cloud, like candle twinkling from a cottage casement, a;
d,
in the dim half light of it, came Fus(>lille to the drain-hole
in the wall.
She passed down a dear avenue, 'l'he road was f!'llci'd
about with littered bavins; dried pea-sticks of the year, whose
darkened lines converged across tbe snow to the drain outlet.
Within this lay an egg, a cracked egg, oozing yenow yoke.
She leapt at it, and gulped it, and licked h(>r
tickicd lips.
A great find tlmt. Cou1d there be more Y All night she
nosed about the walL
Next night the same path beckoned. She fcuml :m(Jlher
egg within the drain. Ne
t night, another,
* * * * * *
The winter's day dosed sullenly, under a leaden sky. The
hummocked snow clung weak1y to the boughs. At times, Blow-
melting, water-laden masses splo'<h(>d to th(> parth and ebbed
away in muddied riUs and trickles. Fate brooded on the

forest, mothering the slow birth of the thaw beneath the un-
easy rustling of her wings.
Rose to the window-opening of the alder. a
th.Jugh OJ.
splash of snow had caught its le(l g e, a wbit.e-frill
d, eager-
questioning, small face.
On easy, 8Ínuous, gliding feet slid Fu
eline to earth, She
must be quick. The day had dragged. and two days' hunger
gripped her. She ran her course apaC'e. Her stout-clawed,
sinewy, splayed feet danced feather-light across the melting
drifts; her p1umed tail balanced after her; down silent sludge-
scored runs she crept, past rough-set walls of weathered stone,
past hedgerows blanketed with white. whose endless measured
dripping marked the hours.
Hope fired ber blood, Hope winged her feet, towardr the
expected meal.
Straight to the bavin road she came. and found it fenced
with flanking baulks of timber.
Had these been there befOl'e Y
The melting of the snow had b1urred her landmarks. The
egg \Vas there; she smelt it, caught it.s whitenefs--this time a
little deeper in the drain.
And one road only led to it-between smooth walls of
wood,
Had these been there before i
A sno\V'
plash fell, and, under it. the end of one wan
vanished.
The snow, then, might have hidden them.
With groping feet, with snuffing nose, she picked her
dainty, cautious way, and, as she neared the egg, smelt Man.
She paused, she listened, pricked her ears, half dubious, half
afraid.
The scent hung close to grou
d; it needed but a lift of
neck to dear it.
The scent was stale-and she was very hungry.
Si'f. inches more!
The little paw stole venturing out, one inch, two inches,
three-
Aud jaws of steel, fanged, murderous, whipped from their
m1..ddied ambuscade, and snapped across the wrist.
The Marten Cat was caught.
Her scream died in a wailing bleat whose echoing
shuddered down the aisles of darkness.
Twigs snapped, leaves danccd, quick
tamps and thud,j
proclaimed the panic flight of thieveF four-footed.
The \\-Tist, the hand was sh&tterecl-bone, tendo!!, liga-
ment crushed to pulp. Yet her first impulse was to rescue it.
Vainly she writhed, and tugged, and plunged. and bit the
IIi tiless steel.
Her twists, her strugglil1gs spcnt themselves-ended lU
piteous moanings.
Yet she fought on-five hours she fougM.
FrOTlI eastward crept a dim half light, a yellowing of the
cloud bank.
A
hot rang out, That meant. a Man abroad. And she
\\"3S i'l His power, and He was con-iug.
She flung her head back, dmmmed the glound, arched,
tautf'nf'd like a bow.
A cock crew close at hand,
:Backwards she tugged, to rid,t, to left. }'orrards S}IO
plunged, until the chain, with sa, arc jerk, restraiIH'd her.
T]
e teeth bit deeper in her f!e
h. She lie-ked the weBing
cnmscn.
H'}r head drooped limp; 15}-H'! seemeJ to !'leep,
Hut secoud cock-crow roused her, and dank of chain from
01..'S stalL
The ea.-teI11 ridge was yeHo",ing. TJ,e dawn was close
at hand, And Man would come with da\\rn.
It "a" her lifo again
t her limb, Her l:mb mu
t "'0.
\V rithing, contort-e r ), )a,qhing lik
a "lla1re, she flung her h
1d
fe-et off the ground, and twirled alld spun her bcdy's weif!ht
against her arm's cohe,,ion. -
The imprisoned wrist was twisted like a rope.
The wnst-bollPs cracked and splint-ered. The arm-bones.
f'napping like dried twigs, thru
t their jagged ends through
15*

LAND

AND

WATER.

May 15, 1915.

flesh and skin. Courage I The cord was fraying, stretching, checked and closed her eyes. What was Bhe but a Bhadow i.D
parting. Her eyes swam in ß mist of blood; froth slaver
d the tangle; B thickening of the knotted t,runk to which she
from her lips; her fur was matted, Bweat-drenched, Agam clung close-welded'
the ghastly spinning of herself. The twisted tendons roped as And presently she gauged her leap, and seized her scream.
one, and once more the cock crew. Her teeth 1 Her teeth ing prey, and stilled ita screaming,
were her last hope. Fiercely, magnificently, she turned them Yet for such chase her skill was sorely hampered.
on herself, sawed her own living flesh with t.hem, mumbled The loss of limb meant slower leap, meant balance leBS
and gnawed till the trapped wrist hung by one silver tendon. assured. Often she missed, and screech of fright alarumed
A last fierce bite, a last fierce wrench-Man would noli through the wood-tbe prelude of long weary wait in ambush.
take her this time. Three,legged she vanished in the gloom. The last slow blossoms of the oak yielded to MaY'B warm
nor cast a glance behind. Bun. In robe of green the Forest met her Lord, in robe vI

* * * * * green ablaze with virid gems, with emeralds, beryls, chry8O'
Dawn rose from yellow shroud of mist, a wrinkled, lit-es, with tourmalines, with jacinths.
haggard, spectre dawn. The gin held fast its spoil-the I The insect hum innumerable, the whisper of the burgeon-
twist,!'d pulp of flesh and fur, the oblation to Man's ing leaf, echoed, in drowsy undertones, the music of Spring'.
sovereignt,y. wooing.
Down mournful hedgerows dripping tears of snow, The birds' Bong was a livelier acclamation.
dragged Fuseline, three-footed, smudging a crimson trail. They filled the air with pipings, twitterings, churrings.
Now that the

rifice was past, her force, her energy with whistle-calls. with bubblings, chirruping!', sizzlings,
co!laps('ù. And Fuseline picked her course unheard, and reached the
Blindly she dragged, unconsciously, until acrof'ls the thrush's nest unseen.
clouding of her brain flashed Instinct's lightning warning- The mother bird, deep sunk in the nest's hollow, spread
Sleep or Die. ruffling feathers to conceal her brood. But not for fear of
She checked her perilous open course; she whipped Fuseline, though fear stared from her haunted eyes. A bird
through thorny hedgcgap; t.hrough trellis-work of leafless, of prey had sightRd her. He rode at anchor in the blue, sway-
trailing bramble. ing, yet holding station, Her eyes had felt his eyes. Instinct
She reached a snow-capped drift of leaves, in whose soft, restrained her motionless, and bade her shield her brood with
feathery pile her feet sank deep. her own body.
She coiled on it to lick her wound, and then to doze, and A pipe of call-notes from the wood proclaimed the enemy
thpn to sleep-a sl('ep profound, nerve-, tendon-, muscle- sighted.
laxing; a sleep in which her warm young blood coursed hea1- The stragglers flocl,ed together. The crows cawed hoarse-
ing, scothing, mending. toned signals tree to tree, made plain the danger, shirked
attack. Let him attack them first-and they would meet him.
Twelve hours she slept, and, waking, licked her wound The Buzzard took no hecd of them. His eyes were on
afresh, and crept to the hedge-border. S]Je gazed: she the thrush, He swooped, but never reached her.
listened; instinct-taught rohe mapped a bee-line t.o her home.
He checked to grip the nearest branch. One claw held
Softly l;be moved, bent low to earth, snaking her head him in station, its fellow twitched in air, His neck stretched
between the tufts of grass. h ' . I
out, his curving beak gaped challcnge at IS nva .
And, wllpn she reached her alder-stump, she swarmed it. - And Fuseline reared face of hate against him, and snarled
Despit
the crippling of her limbs, despite the weakening loss her lips, and bared her teeth, and flashed his challenge back.
of blood, she gained her hole, and flung to its embrace, as Between them cowered the mother tlll'ush, deep in the
tired-out child flings to a woman's lap.
hollow of her nest, a beak, a tail, two frozen eyes, shielding
Six days the alder held her. Hour after hour she licked her brood beneath herself, stilling the pipings of distress which
her stump-and fever was her food. her own heart-throbs warranted.
At last she issued, grid of sldn and bone, owl-eyed, droop- So Grcek met Greek, the bird of prey, the beast of prey,
shouldered, pitiable, like cripple whose infirmity strengthens across a common victim. Their eyes glanced hatred, clashed
his prayer for alms. like swords.
But nothing now could drag her to the village, nor even And Fuseline struck home the first,
to the common waste, where fowls ran riot after food. and arit Like dart she loosed in air. like dart she bedded in the
to build their eggs from. ., mark.
Her forest was sufficient, She waited for the Spring, Full weight she struck the breast-bone of the Buzzard,
The Spring would bring the buds again, and, with the buds, and jerked him, like a squirrel, from his bough.
t.he birds. h '
His wings swayed flailing in the air, plunged cras mg
And, in two tepid nights, Spring came. through the twigs. His talons forced her hold and gripped
Each sunrise she had f'canned the sky, bad listened for the her back.
swish of wings. She hpard them now, high overhead, like Sl,ywards he slanted heavily, his burden dragging at hi!
surr ')f floating silken train, like murmur of incoming tide, fli.ght.
voicing desire and hope. His vengeance should come latE'r.
The vanguard 600n sped northward, But after them Whirlè:d, shaken, spun in dizzying, airy spirals, tossed on
would tr:ovel the main army, to quarter on the forest, end to the windy ocpan of the sIry, the beast would surely sicken.
end, to plot a web of joy, and love, and music. Then his crooked beak should drive at it.
MeU'ories of spring-time feastings rose to mind; of But this was not to be.
thrushes ambushed in their leafy hidings; of pine-trunks At first the p6ndulous rocking swing, the parting from
scaled to attack bewildered doves; of crows' nests Btormed and earth's solid base, bewildered, palsied Fuseline.
pillaged, Eyes closed, she dangled limply, unconscious of the
As yet her spoils were meagre. She must await the deep.:ming gulf between her and her world.
pairing-time, the nuptial flights, the scoldings, wranglings. But presently she writhed about, infuriate, gnashing at
combats, the claws, and, before beak could aim at her, reached the
The weeks would shape their ordered course. She looked broad breast, and fastened with her teeth.
for easy feast.in
, for feastings morning-sl","Ilted, evening- A gush of blood jerked spouting from the wound. As
stalked. one who feels a mortal stroke, the Buzzard threw his head
I.('af raced with leaf, f'hoot swelled to !Jud. The green back. and Fuseline
gained mastery of thB wild, gained mastery of the sunshine. His hlons slackened, loosed their grip,
Each thicket held it-s nursery, each briar, eaeh thorn was hung dangling from her tooth-hold.
tenanted, But, wit.h a twist, she swung aloft, and, planting claws
deep i'l the feathered flanks, mumbled thB bleeding, quivering
As whim impeIled 11er, Fuseline fed. fle
h. and burrowf'd t,o the lleart.
Sometimes along the !'kirting fence of bramble, sometimes Once more the talons clinched on her, stiffened tIlÌs time
aloft, in pine, or fir. in t.hroes of death, stabbing her lungs, her entrails.
Blackbirds were easy twilight prey. They perched low in Upward,; the huge bird soared, his supreme effort spent Î11
the thickets. They sang full-toned, in stations predisposed, ßiaht, up, up, towards the Suu,
their challenging passionate love-notes; love-notes which ., And suddenly his pinions drooped. He swayed, he
broke, and swelled, and broke. swung, he foundered.
Unseen she slipped beneath them. The bird sang on; Swirling from the high firmament, two crimsoned corpse.
t.h e wormed SlX inches further; the shri1ling ceased; she struck the earth as one.
Printed by THB: \'IC'IO.lU.1 RausK l'lUN'UNG Co., WD., Tudor Street., Whit.efriarø, London. E.C.

Iav IS, I9 I S

L A
D -\
D \\T ATE R

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are the only Standard I
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All British Made by a I
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BURBERRY

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Teleph_: GERRARD 60. Apply, MANAGER,
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BADGES 6: BUTTO
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BRITISH WAR\!S. 551-. 63/- LØcd f1eece. .
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47 CORN HILL 60 MOORGATE STREET.
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Tt',"7

LAND AND WATER

"CHEESE IS THE BEST
AFTER ALL."

An old 'Vest Country saying which conveys the
truth that cheese is the best food of all, and that
cheese is the best finish to all good meals.

But some people cannot eat cheese-a hard cheese
may not digest-and the mould in hlue cheese some-
times causes alimentary troubles.

St. I vel Lactic Cheese is digested easily b)' every-
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It is the only cheese that corrects evil effects caused
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promotes health in every way. It contains the germ
of long life.
A delicious light lunch for the Spring is a cup of
hot I vcleon, biscuits and St. I vel Lactic Cheese.

Thousands of these wonderful little cheeses are
sent daily to all towns in the Kingdom, direct from
Yeovil in the West Countrie.

\Il grocers and dairymen sell them at the popular
price of 6!d. each.

St. hel Lactic Cheese-the cheese of activo? goo,l

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COAT'S

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They arc made by highly-skilled
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have now in stock a wonde. ful
assortment of Coats in pure
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Debenham
& Freeh9u2Y
\1Çi
rnore Street,
C8vendish S<juare) London

May 15, 1915

Garrould's

To H,III. WAR OFFICE. H,'1. COlONIAL OFFICE,
[YDH OFFICE, ST, JOHY AM"UL
NCE ASSOCIATtOY,
LONDON CO UNTY COUNOIL. GUY'S H OSPITAL, &c,
Ladles are Invited to visit the
HOS
IT AL NURSES' SAL09N
Complete Equipment of Nurses for
Home Detachments and the

HOT WATER
BOTTLES.

SEAT OF WAR.

I)r

All S urgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock.
I GA RROULD'S N
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POST FREE, containing
Nur
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Model 66.
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, ',- -- With Pillow, 12/-.
....... Lenl(th, 6ft.:
width,
ft. 8in.
We have aupplied a
. Clole4J large number of that

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CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS, various BODY & LIMB BED FRAMES, from 4/3i
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WATER BEDS, AIR BEDS AND MAT- INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very light
TRESSES, 29/8, 62/6, 26/9 and strong, 17/8
AIR & WATER PILLOWS, at-. 10/8, &e. INVALID BED 1;ABLES, from 8/6
FEEDING CUP, 4!d. each. INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
BED PANS, from 3/9 every descrlptton.
LEG & ARM BATHS, from 26/8 & 818 FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
special prices.
STRETCHER, War Offlce pattern. IN V ALID BED RESTS , 8 /1 1
Complete with Webb Straps and
P,lIow, '2 Gns. Without Straps and WARD BEDSTEADS. S n, 13/9;
Pll1ow, 36/6 2 ft. 61n. 12/9
GARROULD'S MOTOR AMBULANCES AND
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of Invalids by Road, Rail or Sea. Estimates Free.

E. It R. GARROULD. 150 to 162, Edgware Rd., LONDON, W.
T.legr-&J>a: .. G
""OULD. LOIfDO)r:' Telephones: 6320, 6321, & 6297 Paddington.

To get rid of Acidity

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ENGLISH BROS.. WISBECH

108

11 a \. IS, 1 q I 5

L '\
DAN D \V ATE R

FEMINA

THE

BREAKING

By MRS. ERIC
S LO'YL Y, but very unmistakably, a change is coming
over our entire social system. We are undoubtedly
gro\\-ing less aloof. The icy remoteness that dothed
us as a nation genenlly and as indi\'iduals in particular

is \'isibly melting Of that there can be no shadow of
doubt. Asking questions is apt to be a profitless game, when
there can be no satisfactory, or at test only a partial, answer.

e\'ertheless, it is a fascinating pursuit, and we are likely to
continue askin
them, )Ianv
people are asking m'1.ny ques-
tions at the moment, but
only a \'ery few are finding
any solutions, These, when
foùnd, generally admit of in,
finite argument, It is plain
that the England of the future
can ne\'er be the England that
existed before August -I-th,
1914, We have been brought
out of ourseh'es, forced to
look at things through un-
prejudiced eyes, shaken and
battered 011t of preconceived
habits and ideas, I t is all
profoundly interesting, but
how and when \\ ill it all end?
One of the immediate
results of the war has been
the hringing together of the
classes, Men of vastly differ-
ent social position are fighting
side by side in the ranks of the
arm\'. Great ladies and tat-
terdemalions - the feminine
gender-have worked in the
same room, cutting-out, bast
ing and making the historic
shirts for soldiers and sundry
other garments. The uppèr
ten ha\e come into contact
with the submerged ninety
more closely during the past
few months than at anv other
period of their lives, - This,
perhaps, is particularly true
where women are concerned,
for schemes for the common
weal arc occupying most
people's attention just now,
People, who formerly had little
thought beyond themseh'es,
go out of their way to bring interest into the lives of those
less fortunately placed, [t is an astonishing mix-up, brought
about by the forcing-house of e\'Cnts, the result of which
cannot at present be even remotely seen,
The New Charity,
:\Iany women must ha\'e realised for the first time in their
li\'es that there are no more se\'ere critics of the well-to-do than
their poorer sisters, and that great efforts must be made and
maintained to keep these critics' approval. For that reason
the old system of charitable help is O\'er and done with. ladies
spending their time n1dking .. ugly garments for the deserving
poor" can no longer be satirised. Charity to be of any use
at all must be clothed in an up-to-date guise. It must be a
workable and welcome propo,-ition, otherwise it must fail to
hit the mark and be worse than u-;des<;. The most successful
charities at the moment are those which do not mask them-
selves beneath a charitable cloak. This may be paradoxical,
but, like many paradoxes, it is undoubtedly true. One of the
most successful works now being done in the East End amongst
people affected by the war is that of a week Iv entertainment
and tea to which a penny admission is charged, This, of course
by no manner of means covers the expenses of the entertain-
ment that is pro\'ided for by private enterprise, but the idea
of getting something for nothing is forth"ith abolished, From
all points of view it is an e
cellent proposition; both classes
meeting are giving something. The people who sing, play,
act, supply the tea, and make all necessary arrangements, not
only prO\'ide a certain amount of money. but gi\'e a con'iider-
able slice of their time, Xot only does it mean an afternoon's
occupation, but the difficulty of reaching the spot is no small
matter. By no manner of means is it "ithin the shilling
taxi-fare radius,

OF

BARRIERS

DE RIDDER
One main factor affecting charitable enterprise is the
prosperity of the working classes at the present. It is not a
matter of providing mdterial necessities and little else. It
is a far more subtle thing than that, The object behind all
works of this kind is that of education. It is hoped that those
benefiting will gain a sounder outlook, and be able to stand
firmly on their feet throughout all the changes or vicissi-
tudes fate may have in store. This education does not begin
and end with the penny visi
tors. Those in control are
always learning, they say, and
many are making careful
studv of a matter to which in
da.'s of yore they hardly gave
a thought.

The Criticism of the East End
One effect of this small
admission charge is the fact
that the audience thereby is
entitled to criticise. And criti
cise they certainlv do, I t is
far morë difficult to please an
audience in Lambeth or Hox,
ton than one sitting on
spindle-legged gilt chairs in a
house in Grosvenor Square,
The reason no doubt is the
forcible one that while the first
listen the second in all prob-
abilitv do not, but whatever
it mãy be, the result is the
same. The consequence is
that infinite care is taken by
those responsible for the en-
tertainment, If the enter-
tainers do not please the
entertained, they feel they
have lost the main object of
their li\'Cs. It is one of the
signs of the times, and yet
another proof that "the old
order changeth, JJ People in
one section of society are learn,
ing to respect and consider the
opinion of those in another.
And those in " the other .. are
proving that the leisured
classes are bv no manner of
means so selfish as they are
made out to be, but willing to
be sympathetic and helpful in a wholly unexpected way.
X umbers of women will never forget the lessons the last few
months have taught.
The great fa'ctor at work behind the scenes is that of the
common burden. E\'ery woman in the country to-day, be
she high or low, rich or poor, has the same hopes, the same
fears, the same maddening feeling of powerles'iness, It is
fortunate that there are outside interests to which we can
devote om;;selves; that we can do a great deal of useful work
for the country, indirect though it be, Othef\\ise we are back
in the position of the lady of medieval times, who, having
bade farewell to her lord departing for the wars, sat down \\ith
folded hands to await his return. Inaction and the Ì\\entieth-
century temperament are bound to be at \'ariance.
Cosmopolitan London.
Our insular character is also departing, London, and
indeed the whole of England, is the home for countless people
of different nationality to our own, \\'e hear French spoken
almost as generally as English, we are brought into daily
contact with people of different customs and ideas. It is also
worthy of note that we are \\illing to help other nations as well
as our own, Some of the best supported works are those
intended to benefit one or another of our Allies. '\"e ha\'e
pro\"pd that though chdrit.', may begin at home, it is not bv
any man!ler of means, obliged to stay there, Insularity Ís
bemg slam on everv sIde, and there must be few "ho "ill
regret its burial.
\Ye have often been warned, frequentlv "ith great truth,
against the dangers of undue optimism. The most confirmed
pessimist, howP\'er, "ill surely admit that there is a marked
spirit of friendship in the country to-dav '\"e are fortunate
in many things, but in nonc more so than -this,

Cc;yrwl<. Jo,;la Marl;"

LADY MURIEL PAGET
Who hu made a successful study of Invalid Cookery,
and is busily en
agd looking
fler the
sick an J woundeJ

10 9

LAND AND WATER

BOOKS

OF

May IS, 1915

THE

WEEK

A LITERARY REVIEW

M R. NOEL BUXTON and his brother have written
an unpretentious but extremely important
book. It deserves the widest notice, for it
broaches an urgent question of policy upon
which they have a unique claim to pronounce
an opinion. The events in the Dardanelles have brought
home to average Britons the important part which the Near
East is playing in the War. Those who had made a long study
of the Balkans knew from the first that the attack upon
Serbia was something more than a pretext; that for years
Gennany and Austria had aimed at expansion towards
Turkey, across Macedonia and the Balkan States. Austro-
Gennan diplomacy has had its gaze fixed upon a not too
distant future when the decaying Turkish Empire should
become an Austro-Gennan dependency. Macedonia was on
the road to Asia. Nearly twelve years ago, returning after a
tour of inquiry in those regions, I had occasion to report t
at
agents of Austria, political and commercial, were penneatmg
Macedonia. Later, when the whole of that region was par-
titioned among the victorious Balkan States, it became alm<;>st
certain that Gennanyand Austria would endeavour to seIze
by force what they had failed to win by intrigue.
THE EAST.
It is safe to assert that if the Gennans could have been
victorious in the war, the Balkan States would have fallen
entirely under their influence, Macedonia would haye be
n
annexed, and in a short time the whole of Turkey m ASIa,
and probably Persia also, would have become parts of the
Gennan Empire, That has now become unthinkable. If
we would understand what a tremendous asset the Balkan
States may yet prove to the Entente Powers we should turn to
"The War and the Balkans." By Noel Buxton,
M.P., and Charles Roden Buxton. (Allen and
Unwin.) 2S, 6d. net,
Even high diplomacy cannot ignore a I?easured
tate-
ment on this subject by Mr. Noel Buxton. HIS extrao
dinary
prestige in the Near East is not generally known In this
country. For thirteen years he has travelled to and fro
between England and the Balkans. In London, throug
the
Balkan Committee, he brought together nearly all av
ilable
expert opinion, and focussed it upon the
as
of cl
anng up
misunderstandings. He was in commumcatIon With those
similarly interested in foreign capi

s! and so closely was he
in touch with the people and politICIans of th
Near East,
so completely was his disinterestedness recogmsed, t
at
e
attained a prestige there which would be hardly c
edited m
this country. Since the war broke out, he and hIS brot
er
have spent four months in Roumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia,
and they are, therefore, at this moment, possessed of the latest
infonnation. I mention these personal matters to show that
this book must not be regarded merely on i
s merits as
piece
of literature, but as a statement with an Immense weIght of
authority behind it. .
The military situation at present dommates all others.
The first question that will .be asked is, wha
have we, Great
Britain and our Allies, to gam from the adhesIOn of the Balka!l
States? The answer is: .. the forces of the Balkans, If
united, are equal to the force of a great Power." ,!,h
authors
estimate these forces at I,300,OOO bayonets. ThIS IS a very
cautious and conservative estimate. The real I1'Um?e! of
effective troops would probably be nearer two mIlhons,
composed of some of the best trained fighting men in Europe,
many of them veterans who have served in two strenuo':ls
campaigns, It might be added that a neutral Roumama
affords the enemy their only economic o':ltlet in. the Ea
t.
Secondly, what is the means ?f secunn
theIr adhesIOn?
The stumbling-block at present IS ?3ulgana. All of these
States desire to expand, but Bulgana can only expand at
the expense of the others, who stripped her of territory
at the end of the lac:;t war. But how can Roumania, Serbia,
and Greece be induced to part with territory to Bulgaria?
Here again the answer is simple. They can be doubly and
trebly compensated at the expense of Austria-Hungary anci
Turkey, who together mle large territori<:s properly Rou-
manian, Serbian, and Greek. Transylvamalshould go ,t,)
Roumania; Bosnia, Her7egovina, Dalmatia. <l;nd. C.roatIa,
to Serbia; Smyrna, and other districts on thp7AsIatIc lIttoral,
to Greece. Here we have the gist of the argument :-
It is beyond question that there are .terms which., while not
alienating Serbia or Greece, are sufficient to mduce BuJgana to range
herself on the side of the Entente . . .
The attempt to persuade the Balkan States to make voluntary
agreements with one another should be abandoned . .

The arrangement contemplated must be dictated from without,
England must take an equally prominent part with France and
Russia in dictating the terms. . . ,
Germany and Austria have already made definite promises.
It is not too much to say that the diplomatist might take a leaf
out of the book of the soldier and the sailor, At present. while military
and naval action is being pressed forward with determination and high
technical intelligence. it is entitled to more adequate support from
diplomacy than it has hitherto received.
The lac:;t sentence i<; important. Diplomacy has a chance to
rontribute to success 1'n war. \Vhen such issues are at stake
the Foreign Office can no more afford to be idle than the War
Office or the Admiralty.

"A History of Persia." By Lieut.-Col, P. M,
Sykes. (Macmillan.) 50S, net.
It is impossible to resist the fascination of this book at a
moment when Constantinople, the ancient centre of civilisa-
tion, is again threatened by an invading anny, and the countries
of western Asia, which through thousands of years have been
tossed about from conqueror to conqueror, are again to be
re-shuffled. Needless to say, in writing the history of Persia,
Colonel Sykes has not attempted to confine himself to the
country which now goes by that name. The Persian Empire
at one time included nearly all that is now Turkey, and much
besides; its history cannot be separated from that oftheHittites,
the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the ancient Greeks, the
Romans, the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks. Colonel
Sykes has indeed erred on the side of covering too wide a field.
He has told us so much about contiguous Empires which have
figured prominently in history, that he has often failed to
disentangle the features of the distinctively Persian, or
Iranian, peoples. He has lived and travelled for twenty-one
years in the country, and he, if anyone, should be able to
trace the genesis of what is characteristically Persian in the
habits, customs and institutions of the people. He justly
claims" to have acquired to some extent the Persian point of
view," but there are times when this excellence proves a
weakness, and leads him to over-estimate the glory of terri-
torial conquests and eastern despotisms, and to think too
little of racial customs and traditions. .
Of course it is no easy task to unravel these obscure pages
of history. The cuneiform inscriptions do not tell us much of
the lives of the people. Ancient records busied themselves
with the affairs of Kings and Courts. and ignored the things
which are more important to the scientific historian. It is-
only hy reading between the lines that modern research can
re-constmct ancient civilisations. Colonel Sykes has followed
the more straightforward course, but even so, the record is-
valuable as well as romanticallv interesting,
There is no other completë history of Persia embodying
the results of recent researches. He has described the natural
features of the country as no one unfamiliar with it
could have done. He has begun from the very beginning,
showing us a primitive, predatory people existing close to the
mightv Empire of the Assyrians, and falling under their sway.
He contrasts the civilisation of Babylon with the brutalising
influence of Assyria. He describes the appearance of the
l\'Iedes and the Persians, who over-ran the older Empires-
under the leadership of Cyrus and Darius, and there is a short
but particularly interesting chapter on the refining religion of
Zoroaster. There were great epochs of revolutionary change
which are not all of equal importance in their effects upon
civilisation. The conquests of Alexander were large, but
their effects were less lasting than the arrival of Christianity,
and, for Persia, far less convulsive than the arrival of
Mohammed and the Arabs, who effected more lasting changes
by their religion than by their swo
ds, .We must ref!1em
er
that the Persians who preserved theIr racIal character m spIte
of an apparently endless succession of despotisms, were
Aryans,' They first figure in written history as men who
were taught .. to ride, to draw the bo
v, and to speak the
tmth." In the ninth and tenth centunes, as the author re-
minds us, learning, literature and art flourished in Persia
when Europe was plunged in barbarism. Firdawsi, Nizami

Sadi, Hafiz, and Omar arc only a few of the great names
which make Persian literature glorious, and can we find a
more interesting definition of poetry than that given by

izami ?
Poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary proposit
ons
and adapts the deductions with the result that he can make a httle
thing appear great and a great thing small, or cause good. to appear
in the garb of evil and evil in the garb of good BY,actmg ,on the
imagination he excites the faculties of anger and concupIscence m such
a way that by his suggestion men's temperaments become affected

110

The County Gentleman
AND

LAND&W ATER

Vol. LXV
o. 276ï

SATURDAY, :\IAY :22, l<}lS

l PUBLI<,HED AS ] PRICE SIXPESC
'
-\ NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED WEEKLY

"

..

,.

cOþyrirltl, .' La.na and IVa/er."J

(By.løseÞlo S,,,, 60". R,8 A,

GENERAL

RENNENKAMPF

Commander of the Russian Armies
Russo-German campaign and, later, in
series of brilliant victories

in East Prussia at the beginning of the
command of the Russian troops during their
over the Turks in the Caucasus.

LAND AND

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122

11ay 22, 1915

LAND AND WATER

A

GLIMPSE OF
THE BRIDGE

WAR

By W. L,
P RIVATE BRADD EN was conscious of haste and
grievance. With three other Stoursmres, he knelt
upon the soft, sweet-smelling bank, clumsily nailing
on the driven pegs the boards to make the platfonp..
All about him was a crowd that seemed without
order or purpose, for the Stoursmres were not practical
engineers and, rather like locusts, swanned clumsily about the
bridging train wmch the R.E.'s had left behind, going off
with their bigger pieces to build the main bridge for the
artillery a little further up stream; they had left to the
despised infantrymen the rough bridge that was to carry the
ammunition carts. As Private Bradden banged down the
boards, and mt his thumb, and swore, he observed the vast
litter made round mm, of beams for trestling, of short pieces
marked with a mysterious" T," rolled lengths of rope, and of
incomprehensible tmn lathes which poured out of the waggons
when their slides were pulled down. The Stoursmres were
furious because they were left in support and on menial en-
gineers' work, with their puzzled officers who anxiously helped.
their memories of bridge-building with little pink books.
.. Ain't no job for a man," he repeated from time to time,
gloomily. Then two boards ingeniously nipped his knee.
He swore at everytmng in general.
The Stourshires were paying the penalty of victory, for
quite unexpectedly their division had rushed the third line
()f the Gennan position and now, far beyond the little river,
Private Bradden could hear the steady crackle of rifle fire.
From time to time he heard above ms head the squeal of

hrapnel, bound for the fighting lines three miles ahead.
" And we here! JJ he thought, angrily, .. messing about on the
other side of fifty feet of mud!" He was unjust, for the
unexpected. victory demanded a supply of ammunition, and
a hint of the need for the bridge was to be found in the motor
field-kitchen wmch, three yards off, had stuck in the mud over
the axles, impotent, its fires out.
He went on nailing. The platfonn was nearly done.
And those blighters not ready with the trestles! Ah ! There
they were: from the confused crowd upon the bank came at
last six men, carrying the first transom lashed to its supports,
the lieutenant following proudly ms work of art. Then he
was in the river: quite suddenly as the water ceased below his
knees, so shallow was it, and as he felt the suck of liquid mud,
Private Bradden understood and was ashamed. The beam
was in his anns; more than heavy, it felt bulky, a gigantic
thing under wmch he staggered with ms pal, shoulder against
shoulder, their faces hot and sweating, their legs already cold
and sticky with ooze. There was a swaying in this big tmng
he carried that was hard against ms cheek. And yet he
staggered on a foot or two, breatWess, just able to gasp,
" Yes sir," in reply to orders. The base of the supports
seemed held in the mud as in glue: it was in glue he struggled,
desperately kicking with ms feet to find sometmng to shove
against, and somehow, it seemed, sinking deeper with the
mud rising higher, freezing mm up to the waist. He knew
()nly then that he must cling and cling blindly to tms trestle.
He felt hasty hands above, tugging it into place. And
then, as he stood so fixed, thinking of nothing, holding
()nly, no longer a man but 'a swaying, limp vice, he felt them
nail the road bearers into place. between trestle and platfonn,
He could only hold, not think, for every blow of the hammer
went through the beam into his body, jarred his head. It
seemed. to last a very long time. Little objects distracted.
him, a half-company of A.S.C., deserting their waggons and
floundering through the mud, carrying upon their shoulders
small cases of cartridges. He saw a hussar smothered in
bandoliers. The horseman fell, rose again, like a pillar of
grey slime. They could not wait for the bridge, then, and
suddenly Private Bradden felt proud of what he did.
" Tms'll save 'em a wetting," he thought.
The shells still passed over his head and it seemed to him
in ms dulness that the sound was more distant, as if the British
line were driving on. It comforted mm, this sound, and yet
it angered him to tmnk that it should so swiftly draw away,
With enonnous efforts, as if tearing himself from a
grave, he hauled himself out of the mud, climbed up the
trestle, half sick with the struggle, ms legs all clogged and
sticky with slush, but at once he was nailing on the road
bearers, His limbs trembled, he was exhausted by the
powerful clinging of the river's miry hands. As he nailed
and cast the road bearers towards the next trestle, he could
see the water between the lathes, grey and slow, malignant,
as if it watched and regretted not having sucked him under.
'\ll about him was still the fever of haste, men at the head of

GEORGE
the bridge, throwing out the road bearers, men below his feet
securing the trestles by driving supports round their base,
men in front of him, half in water, half in air, driving the
further wooden outpost into the mud with heavy, clumsy blows.
The bridge was growing, it was magical. Now four
trestles were lashed. and bore the road, wlùle the chesses
were already laid across the first twelve feet. And yet it
was not fast enough, so greed.y a mouth was there at the other
end, clamouring for cartridges. An endless line of the A.S,C.
floundered into the water, clumsy as it fell, with its little
bundles of ammunition. A little further up stream he could
see the North Wessex, unable to wait, hurling itself into the
water, half-swimming, half-wallowing, and, it looked, drowning
a little. . . .
Head down to the bridge he nailed. the chesses into place,
little lathes that seemed too tmn to bear a cart, he nailed
urgently, silent now when he struck his hand, like a puncmng
machine rather than a man. A voice next to him said:
.. One of their airyplanes."
Private Bradden did not look up, though mixed. in with
the distant firing he now heard the rattle round mm of hundreds
of rifles and the scurrying barks of the macmne-guns. He
knew what it meant if the observer was not brought down,
and still went on nailing, by instinct rather than will. He
was conscious of an officer by ms side, by his leggings only,
impatient leggings that stamped with eagerness, as if afraid
the bridge would never be built. There was fever in all their
bloods. On the bank he could hear quarrels among the
transport men, as waggon after waggon arrived at the river-
side and the horses backed away from the water, guessing the
mud, refusing with lowered ears. Then came the first shell.
Ah! So they had not brought that aeroplane down. Private
Bradden put out a hand bemnd him, seized a road bearer,
and flung it out towards the next trestle where another hand
caught it. A shell burst in the water a few yards off. It
was pretty, like the waterspout in the pond in Municipal
Park. Private Bradden thought swiftly of the nursemaids
in Municipal Park at Stourton, so far away. A shell fell ahead
upon the bank; he saw the mud fly like a wet brown leaf.
He worked faster now. Behind him he heard a gurgle and a
groan, something fall into the water heavily. "One gone,"
he thought, and struck in a nail. Then for a second he stopped
as, very slowly, under his eyes, through the slit between two
chesses, he saw one of the Stourshires floating past, greeny-
wmte under the water, with a zone of pinkish water
round his peaceful face. Nail... hit, hit , . . nail, wipe
the sweat from your eye and mt again. He thought only of
that though now the shrapnel fell tmcker. He could hear it
squeal, then burst in an exultant roar. ,he heard it spit as,
here and there, a bullet chipped the wood. Though he could
not see it he guessed the transport upon the bank waiting for
mm, Private Bradden, organiser of its victory, to finish its
bridge.
On the other bank, men h6lding out their hands to mm
in appeal, men got into ms way, they s,hoved, their faces were
hot, their limbs felt heavy and wet with gluey mud. He
turned. to leave the bridge. Already it was pitted everywhere
with bullets. He laughed; it was as if the wood had had
smallpox. He ran back along the bridge, the others behind
him. In the river were half a dozen bodies that had fallen
in, head first, and stuck in the mud oddly, their feet in the air.
One leg was kicking feebly. Private Bradden bent down
across the trestle, half in the water, to draw the man out.
Above the sound of the shrapnel he heard the rumbling
of the waggons as the first two flung themselves on the bridge,
so fast as they dared, towards the safety of the other bank.
Everytmng seemed to shake round mm, the lapping water,
the writhing limb he clasped, the sodden timbers to wmch he
clung with one hand and both feet. He heard curses, and
blood rushed into his lowered head, dimming his eyes. Then
something struck his feet and he fell into the water on the top
of the creature that struggled so feebly, It was crowded and
crusmng in the water, for things fell all about him, large things
that plunged and struggled, beasts that screamed. His hand
touched a horse, and he felt it grow wann and wet For a
moment he was living in a world where all was heavy and wet.
When at last he half-stood, half-knelt, in the stream
that flowed on unruffled, with its burden of mud and blood,
he saw just beyond the place where the waggon had fallen,
with its horses plunging and half-drowning, the place where he
had stoo
upon the
ric;lge as he leant down, ,blown a.way by
an explosiVe shell as If It had been cut out With a kmfe bv a
gigantic hand.

12 3

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1 2 4

AJay 22, 1915.

LAND

AND YV A TER.

THE

WAR

BY

LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE,-Tbis article has been submitted to tbe Press Bureau, wblcb docs not object to tbe publication as censored, and takes ne
respIJusibilit} for tbe correctness of tbe statements.
In accordance "itb the requirements of the Press Bureau, tbe positions of troops on Plans illustrating this .\rtide mllst cnly be
regarded liS IIppr01imate, and no definite strength at auy point is indicated,

M DCH the more important of the two
gl'eat series of operations which we
have witnessed during the last few
days is that which has thrust back the
Hussians from the Carpathians in the East and
threatens, as a matter of sentiment, the re-entry of
the enemy into Przemvsl; and saves. a matter of
strategicãl importancè, Hungary from invasion.
But the 'Vestern operations, as they concern us
more nearly, will be dealt with first.
They have a certain connection because, large
as are the last new le\'ies of the enemy, the greater
part have been thro\\n into the Eastèrn field, and
have left the \\-estern line for the most part not in
strength to resist the attacks delivered upon it;
or, rather, not in sufficient strength to }Jt:'rmit so
great a concentration as "as attempted against
Ypres without \yeakening dangeroush' other p
lfts
of the line.

It by no means foHows that grt:'at enem
' rein-
forcements will not reach the enemy line shortlv.
It is, on the contrary, highl.\" probable that tlÌe
enemy will attempt a determined ofÏensiYe here
the moment he discovers either that Ilf' cannot
break the Russians in the E3st or that he has the
good fnrtune to pin his aùversary there behind

ome line. ::\Ieanwhile the stony of what has
happened in the 'Yest is a story of; upon the whole,
a superior Allied offensive.

THE ALLIES' SCCCESS I
THE 'VEST.

In order to understand the wry considerablc
success attained in the 'Ve3t during the last few
days against the German lines that run from the
neighbourhood of
\rras to that of Ypres, we must
first seize the territory as a whole.
'Ve are here concerned with a line approxi-
mately fifty miles long-perhaps, counting all its
sinuosities, more than fifty miles. It has behind

z

N

w

it a greater accumulati?
of German am
1Un
tion
in depôts, a better grIdIron of commulllcatlOns,
and, in proportion to its length, a far greater
body of men than any other sE;'c-tion of t.he Germa.n
trenches in France and Be1O'lUm comhllled. It IS
o
also the point where the British and the Fre
ch
forces join. It is therefore the sector upon whIch
the enelllV has both been able to develop his
strenO'th to a maximum and has desired to obtain
a de
ision oyer and OWl'
lgain. He is still
occupied in that attempt,
The Briti
h contingent holds on this line,
roughly, the sector A B. To the north, Le
.olld A,
there is a sector _\ Z. which is continued up to
the sea by a mixture of Freneh and Belgian
troops. To the south of the British contingent,
from B to C near Arras. passing in front of the
line in front of Lens, the line is French again. held
mainly by R
gulars, and continues French all the
way to the Swiss mountains, 400 miles a way.
Kow, the pressure exercised by the Germans
upon this line was first delivered \"Cry violently
and with the use of poisonous gases in the la
t
week of April against the dent which corresponds
to the thrust of thp arrow (1). It had the effect
of pushing in the line dangefOl1s1y from the old
position, marked by dots. to the new position,
marked with a full line. The objf'rt was to cut
off, if possible. the projecting piecC' or " salient"
round Ypres, and, if fortune "as wry fayourable.
to break through the line just where the British
and the Allied forces joineù. {"nder the pressure
of that attack the line ga,e ",1,". as 1 said. from
the dotted position to the position A Z,
Iean-
"hile the old British line, which I have marked
with crosses, in front of Ypres, had also to faU
back to where the full line stands in the sketch.
,n1Ïle the British line thus fell back nearf'r Ypres,
the enemy deliwred a verr violent assault indeed

. Lens

J..

r

LAND

AND WATER.

May: 22; Ì915:

npon it during and aftcr its
eti.rement._ During
the first days of May he contmûally attacked
Hill 60 from the south and south-e
st (along tbe
arrows (2) (2)), and meanwhile prepared his
principal attack, which he launched upon Satur-
day, May 8, along the l\Ienin road, in thc direc-
tion of the, arrow (3).
For the purpose of thus concentrating all his
Viciuht against the British salicnt and attempting
to c
ush it in, he had, in spite of his considerable
reinforccments of winter-traineù men, to concen-
trate large bodies of troops.
The whole thing was a repetition of what has
happened over and oyer again in this trench war-
fa reo 'Vhether the enemy draws men from up tbe
Ene for the purpose of attacking or for the pur-
pose of defending the second point, he is bound
to be weakening himself somewhere, and the better
3ir\\ork of the Allies, their more rapid concentra-
tion, and, recently, their superiority in numbers,
both of men and of heay)" guns, permits them to
t?ke advantage of that weakness, and such an
enemy concentration is always followed by sharp
counter-attacks upon the v,eakened point.
.rhat is exactiy "hat happened after the
enemy had thus drawn men round Ypres during
this first ,,,eek in May. There follo"Wed at once,
,yith the second week, sharp counter-attacks
:1t;ainst him to the soutb. The second of t"hese in
order of time, but the one 'which 'we will take first
hecause it concerns the British contingent, was the
British counter of1'ellsivc against the enemy's own
salil"nt of I
:.1 Bas
ée. It began with an attac.k
upon thc ridge of Aubel's. This ridge stands just
in Ìront of that beJt of grounù at Xeuve Chapelle
which had been occupied in the memorable conflict
of some" eeks ago. The British attack all but car-
ried the summit, but failed to hold it, on account,
;;s it was said, of lack of sufficient munition.
Had the ridge of Aubel's been held a point would
liave iJeen thrust up north of La Bassée ,,-ÌÚ(h
might hme endanh'ered the German hold upon
that important junction. But while the attèmpt
to capture the ridge of Aubel's upon the whole
failed, the next British mow aPlply sUf'ceeded.
The original Ene had lain, as do the crosses in
the above sketch, in front of I
a Bassée, forming a
Yery pronounced indentation of our line. Attacks
launched at the end of last ,,'eel in the direction of
the arrows (4) (4) from the ,illages of Ricbebourg
r..'h-oué, and :Festhubert recovered an the belt
m:uked with àiagonal shading, and gave the line
the shape it now holds.
I\Ieanwhile, much further to the south, the There comes down all the way through the
French were taking action upon a very large scale. Artois from the sea., starting at Cape Cris
'ez,
All the way froill near Arras at C to about the passing through 8t. Orner, and ending just north
point E, but with especial vigonr in front of Lens, of Arras, an irregular line of heights, the last of
thl"y were attacking with the particular object of which have their base upon the plain, roughly
seizing the point marked X, which crowns a spur corresponding to the line of dot.s on the aceoIY1-
of land 300 feet above the plain, and marked, panying sketch.
before its ruin, by a chapel of Our Ladv of Lorett-o. Everywhere from these heights one m erlooks
From this spur of land one looks dov,-n upon the flat country to the east, which flat country hold3
plain beneath all the way to the important railway the main communications of the enemy.
dunction of JJens and beyond, and to hold that The }'reneh line through this ralÌ very much
Epur is to dominate the railways of the plain and as the line of crosses runs on the accompanying
ultimately Lens itself, sketch, leaving a pronounced dent opposite the
. I:r: five days' fighting, from May 8-9 to May 12 important railway junction of Lens, in \'1hieh dent
mcluslve, the French managed to carryall the the most impOl'taIlt point was that n
al'ked I
D,
shaded portion here between the line of dots repre- the chapel of
otre Dame de Lorette upon the
sellting their old position, and the full line, repre- projecting spur of the hills overlooking the plain.
senting their present advance trenches. The Germans had Yer)1 hf3\"ily fortified this spur,
2*

Their first e110rt "as directed along the arrow
(5), to\\"ards the village of Loos. It was at first suc-
cessful, but later it failed, But their group of
assaults (6) (6) (6), delivered upon and to the south
of Our Lady of Loretto amply succeeded, not only'
in inflicting \-ery heavy loss upon the enemy (in-
cluding several thousand prisoners and seventeen
guns), but what is, as we shall see in a moment,
equally important, in esta.blishing a future com-
mand OWl' the German lateral communications in
the plain below, and their operations here mcrit a
particular description.
The spur of Our Lady of Loretto and its
neighbourhood may be best understood by such a
rough sketch map as the following.

1C
)
\irmelks 0
+
...
.\"

j ;If 7ó La Basse'e

Loos

'. ... \& )(

, 'C
o
"- )(
070'
.
*....6 "', J(
G

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ü:-
ND:
'Øo
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J(' j@it
, renCtl

"J.
"1-
"*"
.,.
+

,
,
I
,
\.. \ dØNeuville Gt.Vaa,st
... J,.,a Targette
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1 '.tt '
o 1 '.Z. "3
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!ish
!ües.

Jc' .
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ß

May' 22, 1915,

L
'\.ND AXD yr A TER.

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3

les

round the ruins of the chapel, and all the vaHey
bdo"," in the shaded district of which the three
corners are the three ,-i11ages of Souchez, Ablain,
and Carency, The French had made repeated
attempts to take this fortified area Lccause. until
it was taken, they could not properly watch. and
later submit to heavy gun fire, the railway com-
munications of the plain and their junction at
I
ens.
In this last ('!Tort, May 8.9-!\Iay 12 the\"
were successful. The detail's of this a"dion may
best Le followed upon the accompanying sketch, .
They Legan in the night betv;een .May 8 and
May 9 by attacking to the north and to the south
of the positions. Thev attacked on the north,
a
ong the direction of the arrow (1) towaras the
"dlage of Loos. They appear to haw ach-a.nced
about as far as the line A B, and then to pan' lost
-on 11ay II-the trenches there c.aptured.
But on the south, alopg the arrow (2), a Her

\
'\
\
\

A

>

.
Loos

AJlt?rage ,
lze{glæ
r '.
if'P!all

.5()

-"'"

>'

neady four hours' preparation upon the n'orning
of Sunday, l\Iay 9. they carried fir:::t the hamlet of
La TargèUe, ànd then beyond it a part of the
yillage of NeuvilJe St. Yaast. They wade about
2,000 priE'one-rs, captured seH'n gnns, and occupieJ
a belt of territ.ory about two miles in extent.
Their ne-..:t effort was to fürce the fort.ified
area Sourhez, Ablain, Carency, iying in the ,alleYI
llelow the spur of Our Lndr of JJÛretto, which:
spur, with it.s ruined chapel, is marked '\\ ith the
Idler A on the abm-e sketch.
Thev first 3ttacked l,etwern .Ab1ain and
('arellcy,
and at the saIne time along the spur
towards A. Ther pursued this attack on the night
between tbe 11th and the 12t.h, that is. between
the Tuesdav and 'Vednesdav of last week.
Aga.inst ('àl
encr they failed, btit they carried t.he
height A, on which the ruined chapel standg. As
they already had pos
('ssion of La Targette and
most of Ncuyille to the sou
h they had already got
3-

LAND

A
D

past Ablain and Care-Hey on both sides and were
nearly abreast of Souchez. In the course of that
Sc:'tme day, 'Vednesday, and in the following night,
they carried the wood to the west of and in front
of Careney, the hill mal'kpd 125 metres to the
north of Carency, and ultimately the fortified
village itself, accounting for four battalions of the
enemy which were as garrison, and taking,
apparently, over and above the killed and
wounded, about a thousand prisoners.
It is curious to note that the German com-
muniqué instead of being silent upon this success,
admits only a tenth of the garrison of Carency,
using the words" we lost" in that place from 600
to 700 men. But all communiqués of a rcyerse
naturally minimise its defect, and it is possible
that these figures refer to unwounded prisoners.
At the end of the 'whole operation the French
were in Dossession of all the fortified area between
the tllre
villages along the stream of the spur of
the chapd above, of part of Souchez, and of nearly
all the village of Neuville, their line being approxi-
mately that of the dashes in the preceding sketch.

fHE OBJECT OF THESE OPERATIONS

,V 4\ TEn.

May 22, 1915.

the encmy lcill be compelled to slwrtcn his line or
to run the risk of seeing it break?
Now, no one can estimate the fun .alue of an
operation judged by this st:llldard, saye the com-
manders upon the spot, who have before them the
evidence of the enemy's losses and of their own,
who can judge of the enemy's moral, of his shoot-
ing, of his air work, and aU the rest of it, and
who can estimate the number of men the enemy
can stin put up in front of him.
Roughly speaking, the question we ought to
ask in an this struggle in the West and about
each part.icular operation is two-fold, each por-
tion of the answer being directed towards the
general reply upon the approach "\\e have made to
pompelling the enemy to shorten his line; and the
two questions are, first, what effect has the opera-
tion had as a preparation for a final offensive?
Secondly, what losses have we compelled the
enemy to sustain compared with our own?
As to the second of these two questions, "\Ie
wiB for the moment neglect it, because it is diffi-
cult to apply to particular actions. 'Ve only get
the answer in general results after an the evi-
dence has been co-ordinated. It is published with
some accuracy by the French General Staff from
time to time; or, at least, the conjectured enemy
losses are published. This unknown factor is, of
course, the most important, because tbe Com-
manders of the AUies in the 'Vest win not under-
t::tke a general offensive until t.hey find that the
enemy is nearing the breaking point. To attack
too early would be exactly like buying a stock
before it has reached its lowest quotation. It
would be a waste of energy. There is only one
thing that will make them launch a strong offen-
sive before this critical moment, and that would
be so decisive a defeat of the Russians in the East
as to threaten the approaching return of numerous
enemies towards the Western front a week or ten
days later. Such an event would indeed pre-
cipitate what would otherwise be a premature
offensive; but in the absence of such an event,
the offensive wiU certainly be delayed until the
critical moment of which I speak.
But the first question, " How far does our
action advan8e us in our preparation towards the
final attack? " is easier to ans\ver.
Colonel :Maude has very aptly compared all
this preliminary work to the action of an engineer
who is at pains and great expense of tin!e in
laying down strong foundations which, when tbey
are once achieved, will permit of rapid and secure
building.
Of what nature are these "foundations"
which the Allied Commanders in the West are lay-
ing down and the efforts in the preparation òf
which have now spread over so many months?
It is a point very wen worth considering in
detail, because it is perhaps that which is least
apprehended in general conversation upon the
war.

The question has certainly occurred to nearly
all those who read the ne\ys in this country, " How
a re we to estimate the i r
rportance of such a
success as this of the British near Festhubert or
the French at Carency? "
The first, the most obvious, and, unfortunately,
the most erroneous suggestion is tbat one should
measure success by the belt of territory gained,
and correspondingly measure a reverse by the belt
of territory lost, and esti'11ate the credit and debit
in the width of such gains and losses of ground.
It is inevitable that this sort of reply should
suggest itself to the mind, because, roughly
speaking, in all fighting the successful force
advances and the unsuccessful force retires.
But it is, as has been frequently pointed out
ill these columns, a complete misconception of the
trench work in the '
N est to estimate it in t1iese
U'rms.
The next less obvious suggestion which occu.rs
ro those who watch such mm ements is to estimate
suc
e
g or failure by the sha pc of the line held.
They notice a prominent salient and connect
it WiLh the idea of danger. They notice a dent
in the line and connect it with the idea of a break
at that point.
Kow, this reply to the question is not so false
a
the first one, but it is still erroneous, from the
simple fact that the " line" in question is not
compar:lble in texture to a thin cord, but rather
to a rather tough and blOad sandb3f,'. It is per-
fectly true that if yc.u see the Allied linf', for
illst8nce, give way badly at one point and see a
" V " in it very rapidly and dangerously broaden-
ing and deepening, you might argue a tolerably
bad breach of the line at that point. Common
sense tells everyone that a breach in a line, if it LATERAL COi\ll\IUNICATIONS.
he sufficiently ,vide and inflicted by a sufficient In order to understand this point, it is
force, means the turning of what was one large essential to grasp what is meant by lat.eral com-
qrmy int.o two smaller ones, and the rolling up munications.
and defeat of the lesser portion. A fixed line held with a certain minimum
. nut this watching of the shape of the line, number of men (as is the German line across
uuless the shape varies very much indeed, is not a France and Flanders from the Swiss mountains to
true gauge to apply. The real test of success or the North Sea) and so placed (as is this line) that
failure is simply this: How far has s'uclt and such it cannot be turned at either end (reposing, as it
an operation, adüancedus towards tltat point wRcn does, one end upon neutral territory and the other
4*

Iay 22, 1915,

LAND AND WATER.

'Upon the water) must not only be defended. by the
number of men which are the least reqUIred to
hold it, but must also be able to concentrate men

A
C
P
ii;
<D{Dro

a dc!,

'Diagramß

rapidly here or there, 'It'herever an attack upon a
particular point is delirered. This is particularly
the case when those who are preparing an offensive
are superior in number both of men and of
weapons to those awaiting, and that is the case at
this moment in Flanders and France, so long as
the Eastern field draws the enemy away in great
numbers.
The enemy hoMs his line, which we will
suppose divided into a number of ideal sections,
A, B, C, D, E, &c. He is threatened by an attack
in force against him on, say, the sector C, along the
a.rrows (1) (1) (1). He must concentrate as quickly
as he can large bodies of men upon C to withstand
the shock. He must draw men up quickly from,
sav, A, B, E, and F, And that, as a fact, is what
the enemy has continually done since his defensive
campaign in the VVest opened. 'Vhenever the
attack has produced a dent in his lines, he has, at
intervals of from twenty-four to forty-eight hours,
and sometimes a little more, brought up from
other parts of the line reinforcements which have
strengthened the threatened place, and often
recovered the territory lost,
Kow, to bring men thus up and down the line
continually there are needed good communica-
tions, which nowadays means railways (as well
as good roads for petrol traffic) running every-
where a little behind the line of the trenches, and
roughly parallel to that line. These communica-
tions are called lateral com1nunications,
The military correspondent of the Times has
very well described the strength of the German
positions by the metaphor of a " crust," which, if
it is broken, has behind it a far less persistent
resisting medium. To keep that crust intact the
enemy must, whenever a blow is delivered against
it, mass men by using these lateral communica-
tions.
Now, supposing that a commander opposed to
a defensive line of this kind intended to strike
his blow for breaking it upon a particular date,
towards which date he was accumulating great
masses of ammunition, and in view of which he was
"disposing his men and reinforcing as largely as
possible the armies at his disposal. Supposing, for
instance, that date were roughly tIle first half of
October, how would he proceed. in the period pre-
ceding that date 1 What would his preparations
be against the enemy during September, August.
and Julv1
It IS obvious that when he struck he would
not strike in one place only, It would be im-
portant for him to embarrass the enemy materially
by engaging him in many points at once, so that
he should have difficulty in reinforcing anyone
point at the expense of another, and to embarrass
him morally by leaving him during such a com-

bined attack bewildered as fo where the main
blow would fall.
Therefore we might expect that on a selected
number of sectors, perhaps half a dozen, sporadio
activitv would be displayed by the offensive,
thouglÌ he had no infention of breaking through,
as the effect of any of these partial attacks would
have the intention of leaving the enemy nervoUl
about every one of these half-dozen threatened
points, and that is exactly what we have seen
happening during the past few months.
But apart from that he would have a much
more complete and detailed object in his attacks.
He would desire to seize, as the ultimate result of
each such effort, points from which he could com--
1Jwnd tlte lateral communications of the enemy.
Observe the effects of this.
Supposing the line to consist of tweh e soo-

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tors, numbered in the above diagram 1 to 12. In
the preparation for the offensi,-e, sectors 3, 6, 8,
and 10 have been particularly attacked, but at
different times. Now 3, after that 10, later on 6,
then 3 again, then 8, then 10 again, and so on. '
The effect of all these attacks has been to
make the enemy continually move men up and
down the line along his lateral commllnication8.
the raÍlways (and roads) A B, and organise the
whole system which has rendered these lateral
communications, with their depôts of ammunitioll
and their hospital arrangements and all the rest..
essential to him,
Now, when the main attack is delivered
at the end of all this preparation, if up

these sectors 3, 6, 8, and 10 the offensive haI
-secured points a, b, c, and d, from which he ca.
gravely incommode the lateral communications b,
slteU fire, what is the result? The result is that
the enemy, already bewildered and confused by &
general attack in several places at once, and begin-
nino to move his troops according to his guess as
to
here the most violent attack will ultimately
develop, finds his power of moving them gravely,
embarrassed, or, perhaps, in one or two places,
actually cut. The offensive meanwhile knows at
what point he has been most succe
sful in
threatening or even severing the lateral communi-
cations and what effect this has had in starving
of men one of the sectors to the north or to the
south of such a place. If he finds a grave weak-
ness developing on the enemy's side on another
sector on account of this interference with the
lateral communications, he will at once direct a
special effort against that point, and, in general,
his success in breaking the enemy's line or so
threatening it that it must withdraw, will mainly
depend not only upon the previous reduction of
the enemy's forces through loss during the months
of fighting past, but also upon the command of
the enemy's lateral communications which that
fighting has gained.
5*

LAXD

AND ,'YATER.

May 22, 1915.

It is true that the enemy will ne\-er be
entirely dependent upon one line of lateral com-
munieations. He will, for instance, be able to say,
.. If you cut my main line of lateral communica-
tions (A, B) or embarrass them seriously in two
critical points, such as X and Y, so that I cannot
bring up men to help sector 3, for instance, from
the other sectors between 3 and 12, as quickly as
before, yet I can always bring them rather more
slowly in a roundabout method by using c,om-
munication lines' C', D, E, F, which ultimately
effect the same object. You cut my lateral com-
munications or gravely embarrass them at X and
Y from the positions which you gainpd during
the fighting of the last few months, but I
can get away beyond your shell fire hy bringing
my troops round along the lines, C, D, E, and F,
to the secondary lateral communications G, H,
with which these lines join up." All extende{l
railway systems show such lines lying one behind
another and connected by cross lines.
This is tme; with vour first lateral c
nJJmuni-
c.ations interrupted you can still, in any country
well provided with railways, use secondary round-
about lines behind the first. But in war e\ erything
depend'3, after the factor of numbers, upon the
factor of time, and in thus imposing delay upon the
enemy's concentration you he..'1.vily handicap him,
so that he already. by hypothesis, is only just strong
enough, if that, to hold the line at all, and when
you thus secure that he could not bring up men
1Il forty-eight hours, but only in four days, say,
to the threatened section, it mav well be tbat you
will attain your object before 'his concentration
can be effected.
Xow, if you wiH take a railway map of
Eastern France and compare it with a con-
tour map you will perceive that the action of
the French ever since December has been
aimed at securing points from which tlwy can
dominate tlte main lateral communications oj tile
Germans.
In all save one distrid, that of Soissons
(VI here a stroI\g attempt to reach the ridge domi-
nating the lateral communications behind the
hills of Craonne failed, as we know), the French
are now in a position to attack the lateral com-
nUUlications all the way along, and that at the
critical points.
They have the outliers of the Vosges above the
A
satian Plain and its railways. They haye the
heIghts of Les Eparges above the '\Yoeuvre, and its
railwavs. They have the crest of the ridO'e at
B,eanséjour, above the Rheims-Argonne Haiï'\ay.
1hey have only the other d:1Y secured the heights
above Lens, and the fight for Kotre Dame de
I..orctte was essentially a fight to get hold of the
point from which the junction of Lens and the
railways of that plain could be observed and ulti-
mately dùminated by distant shell fire.
This point must not be misunderstood to
nH'3 n that the holding of a height nowadays gives
rJ}rect artillery domination, as it u
ed to formerly.
1\? one can place guns in a conspicuous position
wI.thout havmg them destroyed; but to dominate
tlllS lower ground over which communieations nass
is to have a l
eight bf'hind which rou can hide
your hem-y artillery, from" hieh you ean judge its
efTC'cts, and the attack upon which by infantry is
more difficult than su('h an attack would be across
le\'c1 or faUing ground.

THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIA.

'Ve are now in a position, with more than a
fortnig
t 's fragmentary news, to pie?e together
the varIOUS parts of the great RussIan retreat
from '\Vestern Galicia, and of the less important
Russian counter-offensive in the east of that
province, and I propose to describe with
elemental)' plans the nature of this very important
operation.
The main Austro-German offensive against
the Russian positions in Galicia opens upon the
last two days of April, the Thursday and the
.Friday, the 29th and 30th of that month. It was
somewhat upon the following plan.
The Russians, who, some months ago, had in
their second general offenÛve nearly reached
Cracow, the key of Silesia, ",,-ere, by a powerful
counter-effort of the enemy, thrust back on to the
line of the Dunajec and. the Biala, the Riwr
Dunajec being the principal tributary fa]]ing
from the south into the -Cpper Vistula, and the
Uiver Biala a sub-tributary falling from HIe crest
of the Carpafhian Mountains into the Dunajec
before the latter river joms the YistuJa. This
position to which the Russian armies were thrust
back from before C'rac-Ow months abo, [ have indi-
cated upon tbe subjoined sketch by a series of dots
following the streams which give the position its
name. It might also be called the position of
Tarnow, because Tarnow is the principal town
through which the line passed.
"Xow the spccial function of tll(' line thus
thrown from the crest of the Carpathians to the
Vistula (it was continued beyond the Yistula by
further lines up through Russian Poland, drawn
in front of the town of Kielce, which continuation
I have indicated by dots on the accompanying
map) was to protect the operations of the

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13

Russian armies in Oa licia against the Carpa-
thians and tile pffort of these armies to cross the
Nest of that range and to imade the plains of
Hungary. Protected by this screen, as it were,
of the lines at Tarnow, the Uussians were able
by slow pressure to make themseh cs masters of
the three road passes marked 1. 2, 3 on the sketch
(the rolianka, the Dukl.1, and the Jaliska respec.
6*

May 22, 1915.

LAND AND ,W A TER.

tively). of the Lupha road and railway pass (4),
and ultimately of the Lusko road pass (5); while
they seemed on the point of seizing them, they
had not yet quite mastered the r LOg road and
railway pass (6). Beyond this point of the Uzog
their line fell away from the mOlmtains north-
wards and was subjected to considerable pressure
from the Austro-Germans, who had there estab-
lished a solid footing on the Galician side of the
hills. The Russian line, as it stood before this
great offensive on the part of the enemy and
retreat 011 the part of the Russians, which we are
about to follow, lay therefore along the solid line
from A to B on the above sketch,
Now, the enemy conc.entrated in great force
against this slow, but successful, Russian advance,
bringing up as well as his old formations very
large numbers of new winter-trained troops, both
Austrian and German, which may roughly be said
to constitute his last resetTe. Some portion of
these bad been sent 'Yest, as we know, but the
greater part were undoubtedly used upon the Gali-
cian front, But the enemy did not mass the
greater part of his forces against the most
{,hreatened point-that is, against the passes
"hich had fallen into the hands of the Russians.
He attackeJ., uron the contrary, along the line of
the Dunajec and the Biala, and maintained his
rrssauIt all during the last two days of April, the
Thursday and the Friday, and upon the critical
day, the Saturday, :May 1, he attacked in parti-
cular strength at two or tÓree points upon the
Lo"er Dunajec and at the point of Cestowice at
C upon the Biala.
By Sunday,
Iay 2, he bad succeeded in his
attempt. ::\ot indeed that be completed the full
task of breaking the enemy's front anù of piercing
through, still less of reducing to chaos its
cohesion.
The German comn
uniqué. issued with the
political object of preventing Italy from coming
into the war, grossly exaggerated the effects of
these general actions a.long the Dunajec and Biala
front, but, neglecting the political side of th(}
matter, we must remark that the attempt to
compel a Russian retreat along this front was
successful, and we may further add that it was
successful because the Russian munitions for
heavy artillery and for field artillery had, as we
remarked last week, given out.
This running dry of munìtions compelled the
Russians to a rapid retirement, which went
through the following stages. Upon Monday,
May 3, the positions seized by the enemy upon the
further banks of the two rivers, the Dlmajec and
the Biala, were consolidated, and a belt a few
miles wide
as occupied, in most places npon the
further side of the streams, The Russians were
compelled, of course, to abandon many of their
wOlmded and a certain number of their guns
which had lost their teams or had been wrecked.
In other "\Yords, they suffered all the consequences
inc
dental to a retreat, but that retreat was per-
fectly orderly, They left behind them a compara-
tively thin line of rearguard to permit of the con-
tinuance of the retreat unmolested, and it was not
until Thursday, May 6, that the enemy were in
full possession of Tarnow, the principal town
upon the other side of the rivers and the centre
of \\hat had been the nhole RU&3iall defensive
line.

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II

On the same day (Thursday, May 6) the last
positions that were being clung to by the Rus-
sians on the Lower Dlmajec, just before it falls
into the Vistula, were given up. The reasons for
the greater t.enacity of the Russians on the north
of their line while they were giving way to"\\ards
the south will be explained in a moment. On the
same day (Thursday, May 6), v.hile the Russians
were but just abandoning the extreme northern
positions of the line along the Yistula, the enemy
upon the south had got as far as the upper water:;
of the River 'Yisloka, and the general position
upon that day was that the Russian line had
fallen back from ifs old position along the
Dunajec to the Bialrr to a position indicated on
the accompanying map II. by the line of crosses.
Jaslo, on the Wisloka, had just fallen into the
possession of the enemy, and it was with great
difficulty that the 48th Russian Division, retreat-
ing across the Dukla pass (2), managed to sa \ e
itself from being cut off.
By Saturday, May 8, this giving way of the
Russians upon the south of their line had gone so
far that they had already lost the Upper 'Yisloka
altogether, and were back upon the upper waters
of the 'Vislok, a river which bends right round
eastward, as we saw last week, and is a tributary
of the San.
Krasno fell upon this day into the hands of
the Austro-Germans, but the northern end of the
line still held fairly strong, and the position on
this Saturday, :May 8, was that indicated upon the
above sketch map by the line of dots, which line
also indicates the belt through which the retreat
had passed in the course of three days. It will
be apparent that by this time all the passes 1, 2,
3, and 4, and possibly 5 as well, had had to be
abandoned bv the Russians. On the 9th the enemy;
seized the point of Debica, upon the Wislùka;
which point upon the day before had still been
covered by the retiring Russian line, and by the
11th he had actually pushed up to the upper
waters of the San, and though not yet in posses-
sion of Sanok, he had crossed the river just above
that town at the point marked A on the above
sketch map.
On the same day the northern end of the Rus.
sian line, which had been holding out fairly,
stoutly, began to retire and fall back to Szezucim
(lllarked S upon the sketch map), and by :Friday
last, the 13th, the Russian retreat had straightened

7*

LAND AND 'V A TER.

fay 22, 1915.

m

out into tJ1C line indicated on the sketch map above
by the line of dashes, which I haye further indi-
cated on the sketch by the letters A and B, at the
two ends.
The full retreat Sl) far, bcwever, had fallen
npon the north, onlf a EiattCl' rtf about twenty miles
from the mouth of the Dunajec at C, to A, but
upon t.he south from the head waters of the Biala at
D to B, a matter of more like ninety miles.
'\
hat "as the cause of this greater tenacity
in the north compared with this rapid retirement
upon the south of the line 1
The rèason that the Russians thus hung on to
the northern positions as long as they could was
that a too rapid retirement there would haye left
a gap between their positions on the north and
on the south of the Yistula, and that the thing
that was most important to prevent, the piercing
of a hole through the general Russian line, might
ha\e been accomplished by the enemy. The
danger \\ ill be appreciated by a glance at the next
I!kekh.
The original line along the Dunajec and the
Biala being rE'presented on this sketch by the line
A B, the Russian positions were continued north
of the V istula along the lines of the River
Nida, and so up following the line B C covering
the Russian-Polish town of Kelice, and ulti-
mately reaching to in front of :Warsaw in the
north.

ow, as A B retrE'ated towards the San, unless
the retirement of B C could keep pace with that
retreat, there would appear along the Vistula a
bad gap between the two halves of the Russian
line, of which the enemy could have taken advan-
tage to break through. It was, therefore, very
important that the retirement of the Russian line
in Galicia, at the B, or V istula, end should be slow,
and that the rapid falling back should not be per-
mitted until the corresponding line north of the
iVistula, in Russian Poland, had had time to
prepare its own retirement.
By last Saturday this retirement on the north
of the V istula had been effected. Kielce,
appa;entlr, had been cvacuated, uncovering the
RussIan lme through Northern Poland, running
now rather in the direction E :F, and the Russian
S*

retirement upon the San could be effected towards
the north as it had already been towards the south.
It would seem that by thë evening of Sunday last
the Russian line, probably reposing upon the
Lower San, had reached some such position as
E F G upon the above sketch.
Jaroslav, we know, had fallen into the hands
of the enemy a day or two before, and while it was
not cert.ain how far the Russians might have to
fall back north of the Vistula, it was fairly clear
that south of that river they would repose upon
the Lower San and there make a stand.
Roughly speaking, they had fallen back in
rather less than a fortnight at an average pace of
five or six miles a day and at the extreme of their
line somewhat faster. They had, presumably.
abandoned in wounded and stragglers and a cer-
tain proportion of unwounded prisoners, inevit-
able from such a retreat, well over 100,000 men,
and they had lost in one way or another perhaps
fifty or sixty field guns. They had at the same
time, of course, entirely lost their grip upon the
northern Carpa tInans and the easy passes across
those mountains, and their immediate opportuni-
ties of invading Hungary with the approach of
summer were lost. And all this considerable
check to the plans of the Allies we must ascribe to
tlìe difficulty the Russians find in equipment.
and still more in the munitioning of their artil-
lery, particularly of their heavy guns,

THE LINE OF THE SAN.

'Ye find the Russians, then, at the end of
this great retreat, standing upon what they them-
selves called the line of the San; but here arises
an interesting and as yet doubtful point.
Properly speaking, this" Line of the San"
is not a line at all. As was pointed out in these
notes last week, a prepared position a.long the
Wisloka carried across the narrowest part of the
intervening space between that river and the Wis-
lok, and then carried along the Upper vVislok,
would have proved a true defensive line reposing
upon strong natural features, covering all the
,Galician positions behind it, and, though com-
pelling a certain withdrawal of the Russian line
north of the Vistula, not rendering that with-
drawal too pronounced. But the line of the San
River fails as a protective screen south of
Jaroslav, and can hardly be continued north of
the Vistula at all.
To fall back upon the San is to leave quite
uncertain the position of Przemysl, and above that
town the positions in the foothills of the Carpa-

\
(ì)
\.

fV

thians, for south of J aroslav the San comes in
from the mountains in a great bend we::;tward,

May 22, 1915,

LAXD

AXD

forming a line far too long to be held by the re-
treating troops and apparently already forced in
more than one place.
It is probable that the mere name Przemysl
wiU have a great effect upon the situation, and
that our Allies "Will be at great pains to prevent
the re-entry of the enemy into that town, although
it is no longer a fortress. But in so doing they
are producing a very dangerous salient in the
defensive line, which it is the enemy's whole
object to break through. "
To put the matter as a mere strategic
problem without any considerations of sentiment
of any memories of the immediate past: suppose a
force, badly hampered for munitions, as is cer-
tainly the Russian Army at this moment, and con-
cerned with arresting the advance of an enemy
"ell provided, coming upon it from the west and
east across the Galician Plain, what line would
such a defensi\'e presumably take up?
L ndoubteclly it would take up the line of the
San from its junction with the Vistula. to some-
where in the neighbourhood of Jaroslav. But not
far from that railway junction it would leave the
San to follow the 'Visznia, and continue the same
direction as the Lower San does north-west by
south-east on to\vards the Dniester. It would thus
defend Lemberg and the two main lincs of rail-
way (1) and (2) leading from the Russian bases;
it would concern itself with protecting the
adyance base of Lemberg: but it would not bother
about the pronounced salient of Przemysl and the
big bend of the San westward beyond that point.
Our Allies may be able to hold the salient
of Przemysl, or they may not hate had time to get
away the heavy guns of that fortress. They may
have munitions for these guns. but to attempt to
hold Przemrsl quite clearly weakens their line as
a whole.
All conjecture upon the probable line that
will be adopted, whether Przemysl will be held or
no, is the less easy from the fact that the Russian
communiqués e\"èr since the beginning of the
retreat have been quite insufticient for the
formation of opinion. We have had to depend
almost entirely upon the statements of the vic-
torious Austro-Hungarians, and these, though

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they rrobably sometimes exaggerate the number
uf pnsoners, are accurate in the statement of
pla.ces reached and of crossinO's effected ('vel' the
various rivers which run par
llel O!le I::ehind the
other across the Galician Plain.

,V
\ T E R .

THE RU
SIAN COUNTER.OFFENSIVE
IN THE EAST.

Mea.nwhile, upon the extreme left, or eastern.
wing of this long Galician Russian front, our
Allies were taking the counter-offensive. Theil'
probable object in this I will deal with in 3-
moment. The first thing to appreciate is what
the precise movements were.
During the whole ten days of the main retreat
of the right wing (A-B in the sketch below) from
the Dunajec towards the San, the Russian left
wing (C-D) seems to have lain quiescent. But
four or five days before the line of the San was
reached by the right wing (A-B) of the Russian
armies iT} Galicia the left wing of the same
(C-D) began its counter-offensive, Sunday,
:May 9, being the first day of this operation.
It is significant that the pressure exercise.1
here took five full days to de\'elop, and presumabl;y
means what we noticed upon the right wmg-the
lack on the Rus
ian side of heavy artillery
ammunition. The Russians effected against their
enemies to the east of Galicia (and on a smaller
scale) in fire days what the Austro-Germans had
effected upon a larger scale in the west of Galicia
in tu'o days and a half-to wit, the compellinO' of
their ad\
ersary to retire from a defensive line
long occupied. This defensive line was that of
the Riwr Dniester, from the borders of the
Russian Empire up, presumably, to a point about

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ten or fifteen miles as the crow flies down the
river below Halicz. 'Ve have no information as
to the exact point '" hich the Austrian defensive
line alon
the Dniester reached, but the point
marked wIth a cross on the accompanying sketch
is a fair guess, seeing what followed.
,y c may take it, therefore, that the counter-
offensive of the Russians on their left wing struck
at an Austrian line which bent round from where
the Dnie
teI.' entèrs Hussian territory, went north
at 1\adworna, and got into the foothills of the
Carpathians about fifteen miles south-east of
Stanislau. Such a line would, with its main
sinuosities, he about what the Russians claim it to
be--to wit, a frent of a hundred miles.
By the 14th the Austrian front, though no
more re..'llly broken than the Russian front alon cy
the Dniester had heen a fortnight before, was i

full retreat, leaving behind it its wounded and
st.ragglC'rs, exactly as the Russians had left theirs
behind during their retreat upon the right wing.
Q*

LAND AND
ATER.

May 22, 1915.

OBJECT OF THIÇ; RUS3IAN COUNTER.
OFFENSIVE.
On this point the question will be asked,
:\Vhat object our Ally had in thus assuming the
counter-offensive against the Austro-German
right and from his own left?
The answer to such a question must, of
course, bc purely conjectural, and I do no more
t
an :put before my readers the conjectures the
sItuatIOn suggests to me.
In the first place, just as the original occu-
pation of the Buko\\ ina by the enemy's forces four
or five months ago was largely a political under-
taking, aimed at pre\ enting the Roumanian
Government from deciding in favour of intenen-
tion, so this Russian move back again into the
Bukowina m
,y hase primarily a politic-al ohject.
;Whether there is any chance, proximate or JleBlote,
of the
oumanian GO\'ernment deciding upon
intervention is a thing only known to those in
authority, and necessarily unknown to the IH'esent
writer; but it is conceivable that the obvious
approach of Italy towards intervention is pro-
ducing a parallel movement in Roumania, and
that in any case the Russian mOTe prf'supposes
the possibility of Roumanian action. That is the
Hrst point.
The second and more obvious point, of which
there can be no doubt, is that this counter-offensive
had the character we always get in any counter-
offensive along any line. Finding yourself em-
barrassed in one sector of your line, you try to
relieve the pressure by attacking up(\n another
sector. That is a very simple principle common
to all warfare at all times. But it is only just to
north, in ,,'hieh our Allies have been compelled to remark, if we de3ire to arrive at a sound judg-
retreat, it must necessarily be judged by the pro- ment upon the position in Galicia, that the Rus-
portion of prisoners in the two cases, for prisonf'rs sian counter-offensive upon their left has 1l0thinO'
lllean (in an operation of this kind) mainly the like the same effect in checking embarrassment
,,"ounded and stragglers abandoned in the retreat, upon their right and centre that similar strokes
and the proportion to the total numbers engaged at a distance from the threatened T>oint would
would not be very different in the different armies. ha\"e in :Flanders, for instanee, or in the plains of
By this rule the Russian counter-offensive on the Central Polant!.
r.J\.treme left of their Galician line woult! seem to The Carpathians, as has been frequently
dcal, so far as the enemy was concerned, with described in these columns, rise in height and
10*

Somewhere about last Friday or Thursday
night the rearguards of their retreating columns
had reached the left bank of the Pruth, and
during the Friday the Russian effort was concen-
trated upon the crossing of that ri\'er. Already,
upon the Thursday evening, the bridge-head
established at Sniatyn had fallen into the hands
of our Ally, and during the Friday the river was
crossed, so far as we can discover, in several
places.
It will be seen, howe,'er, from the above sketch
map that the higher reaches of the Pruth, before
it becomes a mountain torrent, curl round south-
ward, and the Russian advance, the Austrian
retreat parallel to that advance, did not impinge
upon the line of the Pruth north-westward of the
town of Kolomea. This town remained, as late as
last Saturday, in the hands of the Austrians, as also
did Czernowitz, lower down; and the line was con-
tinued up north-westward in the direction of Nad-
worna, But Nadworna itself was carried by the
Russian advance in the course of last Friday. It
will be particularly interesting to see whether
that advance can master the railway junction at
Delatyn, because if it does our Ally will have
blocked the main avenue of retreat across the
mountains to their adversaries. No railway
crosses the Carpathians south,,-ard of this pass,
and, as will be seen on the above sketch, the rail-
way junction at Delatyn ends the communication
of this pass with the Galician Plain.
Roughly speaking, this counter-offenf:ive has
hat! the effect, in the course of last week, between
Sunday moming. the mh, and Sunday night, the
16th, of forcing the Austrian front back from a
line, such as tltat of the dots in the above diagram,
to a line such as that of the crosses immediately
to the south of them, and, by the latest addces it
would seem that the Russian pursuit is con-
tinuing.
As to the scale of the whole operation in com-
parison to tbe much larger business towards the

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i Ùwlille (MayJ6 tA )
õï.Fli;;;ZM;;j,7j

about a sixth of tho total forces at work in
Galicia. The effect of that counter-offensive, com-
bined with the Russian retreat upon the north,
may best be gauged, perhaps, by some such general
sketch as the following. It will be seen that the
line approximately occupied last Sunday is not a
settled one. It fluctuates very considerably, and
im'olved at that moment a dangerous salient
round Przemysl and discussed above. But it will
also be seen that as a line it is still intact. The
territory lost in this particular retirement by the
Russians is marked with horizontal lines-that is,
the territory lost since the beginning of May; that
regained by them is marked with stippling.
It will be seen how much upon the balance the
enemy have gained, but it need hardly be repeated
that the final result of such operations is not to be
measured in the belt of adva.nce or retirement, but
it has two main strategical effects. The first, a
lesser effect, the fact that the Austro-Germans
have compelled our Ally to lose their hold of the
Carpathian passes in the north; the second, a
more important point, that they have none the
less failed to break the Russian line, and to
recoyer their liberty of manæuvre in the largest
sense,

May 22, 1915.

LAND

AND WATER.

broaden in \\ idth and increase in difficulty of COIll-
munications as one goes from north-west
to south-
east, If all this were taking place in a flat
country, with excellent lateral communications-
that is, communications parallel to the Austro-
German front-then applying great pressure on
to the Bukowina end of the line would no doubt
tempt the Austro-Germans to bring round their
troops from the north and so relieye the difficul-
ties of the Russian line on the right, communi-
cating upon the San. But these lateral communi-
cations are lacking. The troops would have to be
brought a long way round by rail from Hungary,
along the railway line which follows the Galician
foothills of the Carpathians. But this line
is not in _\.ustro-German hands, save at its
western extremity. For the Russians have the
important junction of Stanislas, and possess
many other sections of the line further west,
Therefore all that the heavy pressure against the
Bukowina, now being exercised by the Russians,
c.an do at the best is to compel the withdrawal of
the Austro-German troops now occupying that
province, and perha ps to dra w to the front cerhin
local resenes lurking behind the Bukowina across
the passes in Hungary, But it \, ill certainly not
ha ve the effect of bringing men and guns down
from the north to sa\'e the threatened point in the
south, The Austro-German effort against the San
and against the salient of Przemysl, and in
general the Austro-German attempt to take the
whole of north Galicia from the Russian
, will
hardly be affected bv this counter-move in the
south:

Thirdlv, it mav be asked: Doés the Russian
counter-offènsin' here presume an attempt to get
ultimately into Hungary over the Southern Car-
pathian passes if the northern Carpathian passes
are lost
The answer to this question would seem
to be almost certainly. Ko. The distance is too
great and the commuÌ:1Ïcations too difficult at the
moment for such a stroke to expect success. If,
indeed, the Austro-German advance on the north
mn be checked amI thoroughly held, if in the
fruitless attempt to prosecute it the enemy were
to waste great numbers of men and tû emplace
more or le:,s permanently great numbers of guns
along the
an. then"by the time considerable bodies
of l'ese1'\'es could be equipped, and by the time the
artillery could be properJ}' munitioned-which is
the great \\eakness of the Russians-it is conceiv-
able that the new attempt towards Hungary might
be made
H-,ross the higher, broader, and wilder
Carpathian country of the south-east, close to the
Roumanian border. If the Roumanian Army
intervenes, it is ohvious that a blow would ulti-
mately be struck in that direction. but for the
moment the Russian admnce into the Bukowina
does not seem to be aiming at crossing the moun-
tains.

THE D,\RD_\ì\ELLES.

"Te h3\e from the Dardanelles news confirm-
ing the strength of the Achibaba position, and
showing that the enemy still maintains himself
along the Aehibaba ridge and is continuously
resisting the attack delivered by the Allies from
beyond K.rithia.
On May 6, 7. and 8, the British attacking up
the slopes below Krithia on the left, the Frcnch

making for the buildings of Halar on the riaht,
failed to carry the ridge. I:>
:\Ieanwhile it may be of interest to the readers
of LAXD A!\D "\V ATER to e}..amine the exact con-
figuration of this first main position, the Achibaba.
Ridge, upon the carrying of which" ill depend all
the first part of the campaign in the Gallipoli
Peninsula. On the ne}..t page I append a sketch of
the contours defining this strong position. The
heights of the contours are glyen III metres, and
the probable contour lines (the important ones oyer
100 metres) are given at 120, 140, and 150 metres
aboye the land. The contours are giYel1 at dis-
tances of 15 metres from the only two points at
which such contours may be shown-to wit, the
summits of the ridge of the cliff at the south-
eastern end above the Dardanelles,
I giye the scale in ranges of 1,000 metres,
8,000 metres being approximately five miles,
It will be seen from the above sketch that the
position is a very strong one as against attack
coming from the south-west-that is, from the
direction of K.rithia and from the slopes there
falling towards the extremity of the peninsula,
upon" hich slopes the main allied force now lies.
The main line of the position, which from the
contours would seem to be that which the enemy
would occupy (though, of course, all this is only
conjecture, for nothing but obsenation on the spot
can tell one exactly where upon the ridge the
trenches will be drawn) is indicated on the sketch
by the dotted lines. In front of it on the slope
nearly as far as K.rithia are parallel enemy
trenches. Below the ridge is hidden the enemy's
artillery.
It will be observed that both ends of this
line, the north-western end on the
Egean Sea
and the south-ea
tern end upon the Dardanelles,
reposes upon a very precipitous descent towards
the sea, while it is further remarkable that the
difficulty of turning the extremities of such a line
are increased by the presence running inland from
the Dardanelles at A and from the
Egean Sea at
B of two rayines with precipitous sides, which
protect from direct assault any position drawn
above them.
The vulnerable part of the hne is therefore
to be disco\'ered a pparently only.in its centre. It
is true that the extreme steepness of the sides of
the ra\Îne at B, and probably also that at A, will
create a cert.ain amount of dead ground upon the
slopes. That is a ground whic.h cannot be searched
by rifle fire from the ridge aboye the point. A
glance at these contours shows that each of these
ravines can be searched thoroughly by enfilade
fire from that part of the position which lies at
the head of each. Tbus radne _\ is commanded
entirely by the spur of the 150 metre contour in
front of the buildings at Ralar, which spur is
seen projecting at tbe point C, while the ravine
at B is similarly commanded by the spur marked
D at the north-"e:3tel'n end unon the 130 metre
contour. In general, and so fa"r as mcre observa-
tion from the air is of any yalne in sue.h conjec-
tures, it would seem that the position is not to be
taken by force sa\e some" here in its central por-
tion bet"een D and C, and \\Îth regard to that
portion it must again be admitted the1t the oppor-
tunities for defence are ycry great. It is true that
the saddle at the lowcst point of the ridge, just
opposite K.rithia, at the point marked E E is low.
It is not much more, if an,}' more, than 10 metres,
W I

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or 33 feet, above the upper houses of Krithia, and
lies only a mile in front of that place. But, on
'the other hand, this saddle is completely com-
manded by rocky slopes rising upon either side to
north-west, the lesser summit of 144 metres to the
south-east, the high summit of Achibaba itself
marked by an X and 216 metres above the sea.
U'be wbole 'saddle is commanded at ranges of less

x ..

..._--------'D.-=-,....,.- _-

, ,..- . -----
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-:..-;..

--........ .
-.....
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than 2,000 yards from the slopes of these twin
hills.

Yl.A TER.

May 22, 1915.

CD
r

s

'D

In a word the depression in front of Krithia
cannot be used by the assault until the summits
commanding it from either side are carried and
the Achibaba position will not be in the hands of
the Allies until the points D and X have both been
seized.
A further matter to note is that the slopes
towards the Æge.:'ln are so precipitous that, while
the plateau, with its culminating ridge along
which the position lies, can indeed be she1!ed in
reverse from the sea, yet the ships will have to lie
far out to effect their purpose.
While the troops on land arc attacking from
the Krithia side, the ships will be able to shell
the position from the north-eastern side as :tlon

tho arrow 1, and it is notorious that fire thus

120.

)fay. 22, 1915.

LAND

eoming in reverse renders any position exceerl-
ingly perilous, but this steepness of the fall of the
land toward the Ægean renders the fire of the
ships one that can only be delivered at very long

range and one that may c.onsequently be less
effective. The point will be clear enough from the
following diagram.
Supposing the section of tbe land to be
roughly what appears in this diagram, witb tbe
lesser peak D at D and the higher Achibaba peak
at X, it is clear that, save from quite a long way
out at sea, or by tbe aid of aircraft from above,
one could get no view of the falling of the shells:
even tbe slopes of the summit of Achibaba would
not be visible save from many miles out into the
_Egean, while the ships would also have to stand
well out in order that the trajectory of the fire
indicated by the dotted lines and arrows should
surmount the steep slopes which fall down to the
water 011 this side,
The real opportullities afforded to a fleet can,
of course, only be tested by those who have the
ground under tbeir own eyes, but a study of the
ûontours makes such conclusions as those I have
suggested seem fairly cedain.
One may sum up, therefore, and say that a
study of the map alone impresses one with the great
strength of this position and with the very intense
efforts that ,,,ill have to be made if it is to be forced
at all. Once forced, upon the other hand, the
ret.irement of the enemy beyond it over lower
ground will expose them to severe punishment.
The north-eastern slope of the ridge towards the
valley which lies between it and the second
position-the escarpment of the Pasha Dagh sur-
rounding the Xarrows-is a series of long, easy
stretches of falling land entirely eÀposed to fire
from those who may have acquired the summits of
the Achibaba ridge. Troops falling back from
that ridge across the Sog-han Dere-that is, fall-
ing Lack from the position A B on the above
sketch to the semi-circular position C D on the
escarpments of the Pasha Dagh and covering the
Karrow s-w ill , during the first part of thcir re-
tirement, be completely exposed to fire following
them from the ri,lge they ha'
e jm;t abandoned.

ave in the neighbourhooù of the buildings at
Arpeton (see Diagram D), there \\ould seem to be
no cover afforded, either by natural features or by

AND
V A TER.

the contours of the ground, though it may be that
rockv scars or what not of a sort which the contom
map
does not show occasionally afford sucb cover,
It must not be forgotten either that once the
ridge is taken it will be under fire from heavy
artillery posted on the Pasha Dagh or its neigh-
bourhood, as also under fire at long range from the
permanent works and mobile barriers of heavy
guns upon the Asiatic coast.

THE PRESENT GERMAN TE
IPER.

f

;\Vhile it is an error to exaggerate the mora)
factor represented by the temper of the enemy at
any moment, it is well to appreciate what that
temper is, for it has its effect upon each phase 01
the war, and the reader may be recommended to a
very excellent summary of that temper which

ppeared in the Times of last :Monday. It was
there pointed out that German confidence in vie.
tory-meaning, presumably, the confidence of the
populace, not of those trained to war and able to
weigh the international situation-was perhaps
higher now than it had been since the winter. The
cause of this state of mind is simple enough. It
has been produced by the great Austro-German
adyance in Galicia, and those of us who are wise
enough to put ourselyes into the shoes of the enemy
and to imagine how we should feel if we read in
the course of a fortnight of an advance over some-
thing like fifty miles and the presence of our
troops at the very gates of a recently-fallen
fortress, of great captures of prisoners, and of
more moderate but appreciable captures of gum
will understand perhaps why uninstructed
opinion of the enemy is affected by similar news.
At the same time we shall do well to re-
member that all those strivings after a moral
effe
t which haTe distinguished the enemy's action
durmg the last month and more remain fruitfuJ
in his eyes. The Lusitania, for instance, has been
sunk with a certain moral result which, probably,
the enemy does not yet appreciate. But the imme-
diate effect has not been to throw into the scale
any tangible and measurable weight against him,
for expressions of disgust, of horror, or of hatred
produced by such acts, as also by the minor exist-
ence of the same temper which is to be found in
the use of the new poisonous gases, the bombard-
ment ?f Dunkirk, the attempting to burn English
watermg-places, and the rest of it, will neces-
sarily seem to those who ha'
e approved and sup-
ported such conduct only so many tributes to their

ucces
. The impartial obsener of the campaign,
mdudmg, of course, the cnem) 's own General
Staff, distinguishes clearly betwcen what is a mili-
tary and what is not a military action. You would
probably find, if you could hear the discussions
of the commander
, civil and military, of the
enemy armies at this moment, that there was a
party, consisting, presumably, of the more sol-
dierly and better read or better travelled men,
who doubted the ,"alue of sueh peculiarly civil
expE'riments, just as during the l,'rcnch Revolu-
tion the more soldierJv-minrled a r 110110"t-t those who

..

conducted the
tate trJed to make of thc terror an
instrument merely of martial law and tried to
rest rid its expansion into an instrument of
torture.
, To take the sp.ecific instance just quoted, it
IS probable that qUIte a number of men, either a
13*

L
\
D A X D

mim)rity or le
:5 powerful than the rest al110IJgst
those ("<
nducting German affairs, see that a crime
such as that committed against the Lusitanin,
while it hà3 very littl
direct. military value, in-
dircctly 10\, e1'3 the chances of a succ-essful issue, in
bO fa r as purdy moral agencies can tend towards
t hat result. But \\ e cannot expect the mass of the
German population to follow reasoning of this
kind, and we should do well to remember that
e..-ery new accretion to this pressure of terror
upon enemy civilians is supported by the mass of
German opinion,
In the same way, not only the most soldierly,
but all of those who are occupieù in purely mili-
tary direction upon the side of the enemy, know
perfectly well what the retirement or the Russian
Army from Galici3 means. They set down on the
credit side the Russian loss of the passes, the
security of HllIlgary for the moment (and a most
important monJcnt it is), and the Russian losses
in mE'Il and material; but they set on the debit
side the failure to break the Rilssian line, which
was necessarily the ultimate object of so consider-
able an attempt.
They know that Russia is fighting upon two
fronts at Ollce, or, if the Eastern front be divided
into its two natural sections, then upon three
fronts, and that the Austro-German coalition
cannot undertake a great offensive with its last
re
erves of this kind without correspondinglv
weah.ening, and ultimately dangerously weakeñ-
ing, the forces in the re:;t of the field. In other
word<;, every impartial student of the campaign,
whether hostile or friendly to the Austro-
Germans, recognises that a great expense in men
and munitions of this kind is in the long run worse
than immobility, unless it succeeds in its main
object.
But here, again, } ou cannot expect the man
of uninstructeù German opinion to have any such
detached and purely intellectual standpoint. "\Ve
have only to remember how opinion at home is
moved bv the news of a small advance and
depressed by the news or a sI:1all retirement to
judge thE' like leakage in this, as in most other
affairs of popular emotions during the strain of a
war.
'Vhat is the practical effect upon our analysis
of the operations of this judgment-if it he
correct (as 1 belie,-e it is) that the enemy's civilian
opinion is now more confident by far than it was a
few weeks ago?
So far as I can judge, the main effect "Would
seem to be this: that this opinion will be prepared
for very heavy losses indeed during the heavy fight-
ing that is bound to come with the early summer.
It would seem to me to mean that what the French
call the" va-tout" upon the part of the enemy,
an expenditure of men more la vish than even he
has yet attempted, will be the result of the
reaction of this civilian temper upon the military
commanders. And with regard to this judgment,
if it be sound, we may further say, as "We have said
throughout this campaign, that two alternatives
present themseh"es, the second far more probable
than the first.
Either by deliberately incurring a quite
abnormal wastage in men the enemy will achieve
his main object, "Which is the piercing of the line
containing him to the east or to the west, the
recovery of his liberty of manæuvre, and the

'VATER.

Iay 22, 1915.

defeat upon a large scale of some considerable
body of those pierced and turned-a main success
"hieh would be followed by the drawn peace at
"hich he is aiming, including the retention (of
course) of the Belgian ports: that is the first alter-
native. Or-the second alternative, and the more
probable if we are to judge by the analogy of the
whole campaign from the battle of Y pres in
October and November to the present day-this
vast expenditure of men for which he is preparing
opinion at home will fail in its object. If it does so.
then it will have precisely the effect which the
Allies would most desire. For, at the risk of very
tedious repetition, it must again be insisted upon
here, as it has been insisted upon so often in these
columns, that this siege warfare is ultimately a.
warfare of wearing down. The enemy deliberately
chooses to lose more men in proportion than he
can make his opponenfs lose. He deliberately
choo:;es this expensive policy, enormously more ex.
pensive in the 'Vest, and probably somewhat more
expensive in the East, because he believes that
sooner or later it will bear fruit which will make
the expense worth while; but with every failure the
depletion of his numbers makes it less and less
probable that the next attack will succeed, and
there is a certain limit after which his losses will,
if he does not break the containing lines, produce,
as a mere arithmetical certainty, a state of affairs
in which he can no longer hold his own lines at
their present length.
V/hat will be the effect of all this on neutral
intervention and what would happen to the
enemy's numbers anù to his u::;e of men if Italy
should declare war, or, bptter still, Italy and
Roumania between them should declare war?
'Vithout attempting to prophesy, which is
manifestly futile, one may suggest a consequence
which is almost certain. The arrival of Italv into
the field would draw away from the Easter
and
Western fronts not less than ten corps. The arrival
of Roumania as well into the field would make
that ten grow to not less than fifteen.
Let no one imagine that these numbers are to
be drawn from some supposed reserves of men
already trained which the enemy has not yet
thrown into the fighting line. It is the very
characteristic of the present situation, it is the
very root of the German confidence and of the
fury of the Austl'o-German attack in the East,
that the enemy is putting into the fighting line
at this moment every atom of fighting power he
has at his command.
The intervention of a neutral at this moment
would not presumably be felt upon the West,
though it would prevent anything more than a
very brief attempt at attack towards the West. It
would probably be felt upon the Eastern line. For
there the insufficiency of Russian equipment and
munition presents a better hope of holding tbe
results already acquired with a lesser number of
men than those now occupied in pressing forward.
HILAIRE BELLOC.

MR. HILAIRE BEL! OC'S WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Belloc's next lecture at Queen's Hall, London, will b.
on W cdnesday. June 2nd. It will bc illustrated by coloured slideJ
of the rccent fighting and will deal with the present position oJ
the War.
Mr. Belloc's r.ext lecture at the Winter Gardens, Boll11U-
mouth, is at 3.30. Tuesday, May 25th.
14*

May' 22, 1915..

LAND AND WATER.

THE

WAR

BY

WATER.

THE AMERICAN NOTE.
By A. H. POLLEN.

NOTE.-Tbls artIcic has bcellllubmittcd to thc Prcls Burcau, ..hich dOCIi Dot ohjcct to thc pubHcatiob at ceusorcd, aDd takcli O.
rcspoollibility for the c:orrutoess of the statcmcutll,

S EVERAL events of great naval importance
have occurred in the past week. H.:M.S.
Goliath (Captain Shelford) has been t.or-
pedoed in the Dardanelles. The British
Legation at Atbens has offered liberal sums to
those wbo give information of tbe wbereabouts of
tbe German submarines. The Russian Fleet bas
had an inconclusive engagement witb tbe Turkish
}'leet-beaded by tbe Sultan Janus Selim (late
Goeben). It was inconclusive because tbe Turks
retired. But for its ultimate influence on the
naval war, President 'Vilson's Kote to Berlin is
likely to be tbe most important of them alL
At tbe time of writing there is no indication
of tbe sort of reception the German Government
bas given to tbis exceedingly explicit document.
Tbe Press, however, is in a very unrelenting
mood. :K or is there any indication of the course
President Wilson will take if tbat reception
proves unfriendly. It may, therefore, appear
premature to discuss its possible results; but it
does not seem so to me, for Germany must either
promise to desist from wbolesale sinkings or
refuse to desist, and if sbe refuses, America must
either submit to a most outrageous snub or bel'
relations witb Germany must cease altogether to
be friendly. If they cease to be friendly, those
relations must be either tbose of open war or of
passive hostility. In any event, then, the Presi-
dent's Xote cannot leave things as it found tbem,
and, for obvious reasons, it is the war at sea that
will be most affected by tbe change.
Tbe real interest of the Persident's Kote is
not that it c
lls upon Germany to c.ease offending
America; it is a definite demand that she shall
cease from bel' crimes against humanity. This is
to take a very high line, and seems to create a
situation whicb does not permit of an ambiguous
reply. If Germany accepts the reproof, the
simplification of the naval position bardly needs
to be demonstrated. The Germans cannot, how-
ever', be asked to abandon their right to stop con-
traband in neutral ships or to capture enemy
ships. And as submarines are the only craft
she has available for either purpose sbe can
only search and capture as far as a sub-
marine crew can do tbese tbings. The ex-
periment would be interesting. If 10yalIy
attempted, of course, withúut illegal sinking, a
certain success could be possible, but only if tbe
captains respected the fragility of tbe submarine.
Great Britain would have no hesitation, one sup-
poses, in undertaking that merchantmen should
not attack them in return for a Uerman promise
to abandon the sinking of merchantmen. But the
undertaking would have to include sinking after
search as well as sinking before search. Is it
likely tbat Germany will invite us to enter into
any such bargain? It is more probahle that sh('
will reject America's claim to direct her method
of conduct. ,VY-hat, then, will America do?
.There seems to be a choice of three courses

open. She can break off friendly relations with..
out going to 'Yar. This, from a naval point of
view, will leave things much as they are, except
in one important particular. It is tbat the
Americans will probably take strenuous steps to
prevent goods being sbipped from tbe States to
Germany througb neutral countries. If tbis were
done, tbe task of patrolling tbe Korth Sea and of
searcbing the trade now making for Danish,
Swedish t and Xorwegian ports would be greatly
eased.
It is more probable that public opinion in
America will insist upon active hostilities, and
if these were confined to naval hostilities the
gain to the Allies would be very great indeed.
Obviously if an efrort were made to raise and
equip a military force, industrial resources now
devoted to making munitions for us might be
deflected to making them for the national army.
This would be a development bighly deleterious
to us, for no American army could be ready in
any useful time. Xor would tbis deflection of
munitions be tbe only disadvantage. Tbe effort
would so strain American financial resources as to
make it impossible for tbe European Allies to
expect assistance there. But with America at war,
but not committed to a land campaign, the Allies
who are so c?mmitted might, in addition to shells.
guns, and rIfles, bave the benefit of the sympa-
thetic support of the only great neutral money
market in the world.
It i
, however, to tbe direct help of the United
Stat-es l\avy that we sbould look for the most im-
portant and the most direct results. The United
States :Kavy is powerful in fighting units of the
fir
t class. It pos
esses no less tban ten completed

lllpS of the Drea.anought type. They can bring
mto battle broadsIdes amounting to eighty 12-inch
guns and twenty 14-inch guns. And the Okla-
homa a
d Ne1Jada were within ten per cent, of
completIOn on March 1. Tbese two ships would
raise the total of tbe Dreadnoughts to twelve, and
add a further twenty 14-inch guns to tbe broad-
side. The Pennsylvania and the A rizona are
some wayoff from completion. Of pre-Dread-
noughts there are five of the Kansas, two of the
Ll!uisiana, a
d five of the ),"ew Jersey classes, all
laId down m 1904, 1905-6. These constitute
twelve ships of reasonable speed and verv consider-
able gun power, There are, indeed," no twelve
pr
-Dreaùn?ughts .in Europe more beavily armed.
\V Ith the stIll earher types, the three Jlaines, the
three Alabamas, the Ke.arsage and Kentucky and
the four old battleshIps of :Mr. "\\ itney's pro-
gramme we need not concern ourselves. Americ.:"
possesses no battle-cruÜ:ers, but there are ten
armoured cruisers, five armed with 10-inch and
6-incb, and six armed with 8-ineh and 6-inch gun
,
all nomina
ly capable of twenty-two knots. But
these, .agam, are of no great mlue except for
patrollmg purposes. Of fast cruisers America.
has very few; in point of fact, three only, tbo

1S*

LAND AND WATER.

Salem, Birmingnam, and Cliester. It is more to
the point that of destroyers of a modern type-
that is, of seven hundred tons and over, and cap-
able of 29 or 30 knots-she has thirtv-four com-
pleted and a further six that were very near com-
pletion on March 1.
This is clearly a very formidable force. It
is manifestly impossible for America to employ it
in a campaign of her own. If she declares war
against Germany, this force must co-operate with
the naval forces of the Allies. How should it be
used 1 The prospect opens up a great number of
strategical possibilities. For one thing, the
junction between the British Grand Fleet and the
American battle fleet would put an end once and
for all to any likelihood of the German fleet
attempting to come out. Slender as the prospect
is to-day of the High Seas fleet being able to main-
tain itself successfully against the King's ships
under Sir John J ellicoe, all hopes of doing so
would have to be abandoned if it was known
that we had been strengthened by a new
squadron of such strength as the latest eight
American Dreadnoughts would prove to be. If
only eight came into the North Sea there would be
two more available for the Dardanelles. The pre-
Dreadnoughts would be retained as a reserve
within home waters, or to reinforce the Allies when
wanted. 'Vhat is perhaps more to the point is the
gain to the Allies in the reduced necessity for
supervising the merchant ships crossing the
Atlantic, and the larger number of ships that
would be available for protecting them from sub-
marines. In this matter the American destrovers
and three fast cruisers would be of the utlnost
value. Indeed, there is no reason whv the six.teen
older boats should not join in pròtecting the
Atlantic traffic. In many respects these fifty-six
destroyers would, indeed, be the most valuable re-
inforcement we could have,

THE WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Two pieces of information. to which I have
already alluded, from the Mediterranean, have
reached us in the course of the past week, which
ha.ve added considerably to the anxiety with
which the public has awaited the sequence of
e\'ents in the Dardanelles. When H.M.S. Golint/l,
(Captain Shelford) was sunk by a torpedo fired
from a destroyer on the night of the 12th-13th inst.,
Captain Shelford, nineteen officers and about 500
men lost their lives-a very grievous blow, The
officers and men are irreplaceable. The ship repre-
sented perhaps one-twentieth of our naval force
in the Straits. The loss gains in signilicance by
the news from Athens. In discussing the perils to
which the allied bombarding fleet was exposed,
we have generally counted gun-fire, mines-obser-
vation, contact, and drifting-and torpedoes fired
from tubes submerged by the shore, as the only
dangers to be expected. 'tVe must now expect
active sea attack as well.
E\'idently we must not measure the efficiency
of the Turkish destroyers by the inefficiency o'f
her bigger ships. The attack of the ßla'llvenet-
i-Jlillet could only have been made at night. It
is rather surprising to find that the Goliatl/' was
cO\-ering the Freneh advance in darkness. The
difficulty that would be experienced by a ship
under way doing anything useful in the way of
gunnery, against targets which cannot be seen,
must have h('cn very great.

.May 22, 1915.

THE SUB
IARINE AT THE STRAITS.
The sinking of Goliat/t makes the fact of
German submarines having reached the Mediter-
rancal! o
acute interest, 8even weeks ago, when
the SInkIng of U39 was announced by the
Admiralty, I pointed out tha.t these boats had a
sufficient fuel capacity to carry them to the Dar-
daneHes and leave them a considerable radius of
action when they arrived. It has, indeed. been

mystery to manJ: observers why Germany
should be .squandermg on a perfectly futile form
of sea brIgandage forces that must be of vital
necessity to her elsewhere.
There can be little doubt now that the first
of the large submarines was completed for the
German fleet in the month of Februarv, and that
they have .been coming into commÌssion" at the rate
of
wo-If not three-every month. 'Vith a
straIght run at fifteen knots-a moderate surface
speed-these boats could get from Zeebrugge to
the D
rdanenes in about ten days' time. If allow-
ance IS made for periodical submersions to avoid
at
ac
, the journey might occupy three weeks. By
thIS tIme, had aU the new submarines been sent to
the 1\fediterranean, half a dozen might be there.
There would, of course, be serious difficulties
in getting very valuable results out of them. Th

only well-equipped naval base available ,,'c,nld he
Pola, and from Pola to the Straits 1S ì"w<uly
twelve hundred miles. The alternative to such a
base would be an arrangement by which
apparently neutral supply ships were provided
somewhere in the Greek Archipelago. But it does
not seem safe to assume that neither Smyrna nor
any other seaboard Turkish town in Asia Minor
could be used. No doubt Sir RÌchard Pierce's
squadron will keep the sharpest possible kind of
look-out, But German submarines have been able
to evade the British patrols and destrovers that
infest the Channel, so that however close the in

vest
en
of Smyrna may be from the sea, the diffi-
cultIes III the way of submarines using this, or
some other Turkish town, should not be insu per.
able.
At any rate, the threat is a formidable one.
One has only to read Mr, Ashmead-Bartlett"s last
despatch to realisc what a target our transports
must afford. The tlueat emphasises what perhaps

la.rdJx n
eds emphasis-
he truth that every delay,
III brmgIng these operatIons to a successful issue
makes success more difficult and more hazardous
to the forces engaged.

THE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPS.

It brings home to us also the crucial necessitYj
for the protection of the bombarding fleet. ."\Vhen,
on J\.farch 18, Irresistible, Ocean, and BO'llut were
sunk by drifting mines, the Admiralty made the
somewhat naif statement that immediate steps
would be taken to protect the ships in future; so
that we were driven to ask whether this particlùar
danger was unforeseen, AB a fact, there are few
subjects about which naval opinion has chopped
and changed so curiously as on the question of net
defence. When the first official tri
ls of the
Luppis- Whitehead torpedo in British waters Vi"cre
made, experiments with nets to protect ships from
them formed an integral part of the practical in-
vestigations carried out. .AP, a consequence,
from the earliest date of the adoption of H!6
torpedo, stout nets were carried on all armoured
16*

:May 22, 1915.

LAND

AND

ships to protect them "When lying at anchor or
going dead slow, But nets were not a complete
defence, even in these conditions, and were quite
useles
with the ship going faster than three or
four knots. :Moreover, the nets, the booms, and the
apparatus for raising and 10weI'ing the nets were
a great weight. There were, in addItion, many
other reasons for finding them a serious nuisance
in a ship. Ten years ago the opinion had
gained that they might be discarded. The \Vhite-
head torpedo had done practically nothing in the
Spanish-American \Var, nor in the war between
China and Japan, and by 1905 naval opinion "Was
practically agreed on giving up nets altogether.
The sensational opening of the Russo-Japanese
\Var caused a complete revulsion--once more nets
were treated as absolutely necessary for the equip-
ment of a ship.
But in 1908 and 1909 the high-speed, 1011g-
ran6'e torpedo came into use. This put a com-
pletely new aspect on things. At short range a
torpedo going fìïty k
lOts can cut its way through
any net, so that agamst the latest weapon, fired
at short range, the net was no protection at all,
even in the limited conditions in which it had
}-.Jecn such with the older and slower "Weapon. But
this is by no means the only reason why nets fell
into disrepute. \Vith a long-range weapon, it
seemed clear that the torpedo vms destined to play

v A TER.

I
a great part in :fleet actions, and in fleet actions
with ships under way nets of course could not be
used. The necessity of protecting fleets at anchor
"Was forgotten in the larger question. The old nets
might be useless against the new torpedo; but no
new method of defence was worked out.
Had it ever been contemplated to employ the
pre-Dreadnought battle :fleet as it is now being
employed in the Straits, "We may be sure that every
net would have been replaced. That they were
not replaced is perhaps a measure of the extreme
haste with which these ships had to be sent upon
their new duties. The lesson of the omission must
have come home with great force after the e,ents
of March 18, and no doubt nets and booms have
long since been sent to make good the deficiencies
that ma.y have existed, In the case of
Goliath it is not at all certain tbat nets could
have defended her. In the Dardanelles current
it would have been almost impossible to have kept
them in place even with the ship stationary over
tbe ground.
It is not to be supposed that re-netting the
ship is the only precaution that ought or has been
taken to protect the fleet from drifting mines or
from torpedoes, either from the f.hore stations
and destroyers or submarines. Provision must
certainly have been made for more active
measures.

'"

THE LIl\1IT A TIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

By COLONEL F. N. l\1AUDE, C.B.

F OR the past forty years at least all
oldiers who blaming the officers would not prevent their men selling theù
,'
have made a sericus study of their profession have lives as dearly as it was possible for them to do.
-, been warning the members of the various Peace The framers of this code, of course, recogni!:ed the!18
Societies of the dangers and difficulties they were cases of supreme necessity by limiting its application to
cre::>ting for this country by endeavouring to " civilised II nations only, and in so doing provided cpportuni-c
codify certain customs which had grown up during centuries ties for the revolting outrages we are now witnessing; lor.
of warfHc and to confer upon this codex the status of " Inter- though every thoughtful soldier realised that when fightina
nat.ional Law. II with their backs to the "wall all races instinctively Bhed theiJr
The position in which we were placed by the various dvilisation, the nation as a whole declined to believe in the
Hague Conventions, at which these new laws were accepted, realities of warfare, and, in spite of the experiences of the
was a most difficult one, because from the nature of our Napoleonic wan, failed to perceive the loopholes which The
duties a.s an ancient Colonial Empire we had to be prepared Hague attempt at legiglation provided for the advaI!.t::.
e of
to fight all varieties of races, oftpn under conditions of such an un
crnpulous enemy.
extreme danger and responsibility for other lives and greater The result has been a series of very nnplea
ant surprises
interests that it was futile to prescribe or limit in any way lor the navies and troops equipped only for the prosecutioa
any use which the men on the spot might make of the re- of civilised warfare, of which the recent use oÎ poisoncus, no'
sources at their command. merely asphyxiating, fumes is far the worst and mo
t cruel.
For example, if a British steamer carrying many white The use of all kinds of gaseous fumes and of other
women and children (a mission expedition, let us Bay) were poisons has been studied for years and years, and 8.lmo
t aU
beset by Chinese pirates, would the missionary in charge ob- have tIleir antidotes and can be guarded again<:t, prcvided
ject t
the captain's turning the steam hose on to their the possibility of encountering them is admitted. Speakinø
assailants and beating them off with superheated steam, when generally, however, military commonsense, quite apart from
the ship might be unprovided with any other adequate means human consideration, has rejected such things as far leg
of dealing with the situation 1 Such steam produces results effective than the means which can be provided of equal locat
many times worse than a
phyxiation, and death from its in- efficiency and more general application.
juries is quite as painful as that of chlorine vapour; but, But since all parties in the present war had signed a
judging from the outrages committed by German officers on declaration binding them to refrain from the employment of
Engli<jh schoolgirls and Belgian nuns, the fate of white the before-mentioned and similar means, such as I!quirting
women falling into Chinese hands could be no worse, for burniug petrol, &c., the Germans promptly took advantage
nothing this side of hell could be more terrible than the Ger- of the opportunity afforded them by their knowledge of our
man atrocities. no crime more deserving of such drastic reputation for adhering to our given word, and, with the
punishment;. absolute unscrupulousness e.nd lack of truth on which they
Again, an officer holding an outpost of vital importance pride themselves, proceeded to Icore here and there tern..
against the rush of hordes of .. Fu
zies " could not be blamed porary successes.
for using fire-smoke, dum-dum bullets, or any other means at Had they believed that we were prepared with the øame
his command in order to prolong resistance and gain time for appliances the chances are million!! to one that they would
the troops he is covering to coucentrate j and, by the W3.Y, not have employed any such expedients, for when the ad'van..
17*

I.
\.
n

ASD

tagc oÎ 6urprise does not ":UJl the mean!! which eJ:perÌlmcl:\
bas shown to be most effective in the IO!lg run woulù ollIf
tave been i.!"ed by all combatants.
In fighting day by day, 8 ton of high explo:;ive divitled
anl
ng
t many sllel!s and di!!charged from mohi1
weapuns
v:ill do far Jõ10re damage t.han a ton of chloriw" and ta"e

far h
3
hau1age and trouble genera}]] elan will the appliances
Df'oded to di9charge the g,H
; henei', beyond c('l'lain lin:iLNl
surpri3e9, the G
rmans have gained but little in tbe theatre
of war and have lost incOlr.parahly mor
ol1t9ide i(,-name!
',
th!' la9t rag'! of cow-;idi'raiion whicll tbeir first o'ltrag'
3 and
crin;
s might, have left them to coyer the di
fìgurf'{l and naked
body oÎ tlleir race. 111ey have forgotten t,ho dic
um of
Clau':iewih, that the u'le of ahsüJute foroe in war nm"t be
tel"p:'H'íl by eXl'"diency; in other word,.. t1wt it does not p
y
t:I outrage t
1e gel:eral sen;;e of di'ooHcJ' anù !lIe feetinw' of
the Luman race by methods mOl'ð rutble
3 and CHlel thau those
B3nctiot,ed by CustOTII. .
_\1td, further, t 1 1ey have done tbis at the most inopT'or-
tune !r.ome'1t for their own ('aH
C. l'1Ie re"entmmlt. arol1
ed
by tl1:-1r atrocities in Be!gium W3S beginning to die down,
and in the gen<:>ral feeling of war,wearine
s it. W:1.3 in danger
ci being forgotten. It. i;:; more tban possil)le that the 5ym-
pathy of all neutrah (inelnding. of cour"'l'. the Cnited Stat.es)
might ha,'e been Dgaiust the Allics in tl:eir determination t'l
f'"1:act temul of peace that 8b9.11 ensure the root destruction. of
Pru
sia'1. militarism. But the siukiug of the Lllsi!anil1 ha:!
oj>ened the half-bìÌnd eyes of some parh' of t.he world to what
8 renewal of war wIth G<-rmany, following on a p
riod of
a
n)cd truce, would mean to aU on whom sÌH' could by her
}land", and [ doubt Vlhel,lt
r at the present moment there Ì!!
a nl'utral Power in exi
tenc.e which will have eyeD a word of
sympat1l}" for Germany':! inevitable punishment when the end
arnves.
FarLunate
y the conJuct of h
r !.Oca piratcg bas shown
lB the practical way to altain our purpc::!6 in a n:.al1uer tbat
will en 1 ist tbe gyrnp::..
Lies of all neutral people
.

"7 A TElL

May 22. 1915.

It W3:1 cas]" to tlll
"I d.."troying' " Prussiau rnilitarÏ3m."
but, as t!t
att.empts of N aroleon afl.er Ji'lla proved most con-
clu:,i.ely. it WM by no Jl.teaTI3 easy to Buggest a practical
method of doing so.
But iL will be wen for an co
mLrles to remember that HIs
GenT'an A!'my can never again be formidable witbout it ha3
Be3 power behind it.
The pre'lßnt. wal' hag proved U,is up to the }.;Jt.
Once normal conditioll'l llave been restored the Sociali
t
Party ill Germany will he quilt' strong enough to prevent any
c:Ipeu,1ilnre on a 'Val' Nayy unless it can be Bhown that, Buch
a tlect sel'\-e

ome other purpose tban that of 8uppDrt,in

e.
gl'e"'sjan, "'hl..'n it had, at, tho beginning of its exi3t.
ncl'.
t!le p
au
ihle e5:CliSe of protecting its oCt'an-goiug commerce,
it po"",p""
ed a moti,-c strong euough to eaYJture I10Lh COllEl1Cr-
cial alld lahoUl' vote'l.
If 1I"e in tho fut.ure l'igidl
r prohihit any German-owned
ve33el flyillg the ('crman merchant fla'" from enterina any
port, in Úw C'Ïvili!'C'd wflrld (eveu in those
f tbe Bl'iti3h E
I1I)ire
would suffice). then thl:.' argument, of " CO'1,merce Pl'otedion "
would at once cea;.e to exi
t, and comeqmmUy n.oney would
be l:::,eking for a '\-ar Navy.
S'lch prohibit.ion woulù not illfli.-,t lIny injury en legiii-
l1
at; (
erm:.m trade filer merchant. mn'y, of C'onr<,e. eXCBpteù),
for It IS all the :-ame to the iL11aud mercb31lL who tr::Hl
pol'l3
hi., gOl\ds "ver-?eas. provided that. freight age is reaconabìp,
and the compdition for t.he carrying lraùe betwep!1 BrÜ,j
h.
:Xorwegian, Swedish, Ðani
h, and ltus
!an shi.ns, &.::., would
6uffice to keep that Jown to aboui. it.'I proppr lc;el.
Incidentally, it. would gi\e Lack to tbe neul-ral naLloJH
t1wir sh
re in that trade which the German Bubsidise<l lincl'3
had t.aken a"i'ay from them.
Depriyed of h
r fleets, Oerwany would Ulen bo in much
t-h8 same poaition as Swit.zerland. No one would t.hreaten
he", for no one covets ono acre of her legilimate possession
,
and since, shorn oi her weapo'ls of ag!!;ress!on, she could not
threaten in her turn, no m8.tter l,ow lar..e her Armv miaht
M .... 0
be, aud the peace of ('e 1 ltral }::urope would be "'ðcured for very
many gelieratioUi; by this device.

TI-IE D.L
NGEROUS T ALI( OF PEACE.

By FREDERICK GRl.TNDl r .

u
VV TIl" no
c1i::{,U3
the terms of peac2
" Such
'l'.""ere the word" that appeai"ed o,er a long
artide by a disLingui:::hed writer a short
tiflle ago. No more depr{'s
ing thought
could well occur than such a discu<:sion at
mch a 11 1 0rr>ellt as th!
.
After ni.ne ll10nH1S of warfatc on a scale hitherto un-
imagined. in whic-h the uuits engaged are not mere annie!l,
to:lt nation::! in arms, and those the greatest nations of Europe;
",lIen for three part!! of a yev.r such countrie1! oÎ
Europe liS have not already be2u drawn into tho
bloody ycrtn haye be::'n shudùering on ils brink;
when an entire kingdo
h:lS been laid wa
te aud
UlOse of its ci,'il population w
,o arB not refug
c3 in
foreign lands are depeIlden
for their 15(':1111, daily bread uI'L,n
the charity of strang<-r3; when five-s,ixths of Poland is in e\'e11
a more pitiable and desperate condition, aftpr waging a war-
fare which. in the words of that great patriot raderew
ki, La:!
"been "Parricide, Fratricide, and compulsory Suicide" ;
"hen for mont.h after mon
h the ears of tbe world ha\'e beC'u
imllÌt9d and
tllnr-ed hy storieg of inhnn'an cruelty and bestial
lllst, incredihle 1mt for the overwhelming evidence of their
truth; when tbe killed, the wounded, and tbe captun.d are
alreadv numbered hv the million-when t.hese and a hundrell
other tbing q are con
idered, it may seem strange to fillJ any-
thing deprcs8ing in the thought of peace.
A3 a fact, there h much that is depre:::.3ing, even alaruing.
in the
:ay in which the idea oi pearl> is being pul; forw<,rd at
the prese'lt moment. The danger is not lEssened but rathel'
il'crea
f'd by the fad that at the moment tbe majority perhap3
vi tl:e nl'itish people will say, .. \Ve ar(\ not thinking of pea(',""
and will not tbink of it until the Allied Armies have acùieved
complete victory and the Allied Nations cm imp030 HUn;
tC'riflS. Be:!ide3 that, wo are being w"-Tned with inc.reasing
imi
,teacy of lalc in 1Jle daily rl'L_S not
o be dece.!I'ed hy the

r03Y oI'tiDìi
m whieL pen'3des the official reports, We are
told tbat . the changes of line in the last six months "Would
badly be noticed by a map-maker,' and sce the Government
beÌIlg' nrg
d 'to use e-{ery effort to make tho nation under-
BÌ!t1Id how amaH is tbe progress yet aUained on land, and
how great and manifoJd are the sacrific.es which must be
faced.' If t.his be true. iB it likely that Germany. any more
than oursd...es, will be willillg to lis Len to peace talk ye

awhile?"
This h not difficult to anSWE'r. It is some litt.1e time a"o
now that" the directing mind" of Germany, as Mr, nel1
o
has well called it, had bern forced to tbe point of admitting,
o We are prepared to mecl; a reasonable d
ma:ad upon us and
to di'3cUS3 terms."
It must not Le t1lOught tbat the recent unspcakablt' con-
duct of the German::!, both on land and sea, betokens any idea
on their part-or, ratber, on t.he part of the "directing
minds "-that tbey will ult.imately secure complete victory
oyer Ole AHie:! by the steady purs-uit of their policy of
" frightfulness," The murder of harmless fishermen,
ai'phyxiating ga"es. and the torpedoing of peaceful lineri
differ nothing in malluor or degree from the horrors of
:Belgium and Poland. If uner the latter Germ:my Baw some
llOpc of B1ICe
:;.s in approaching Europe aDd the neutral
e:n.ntl'Íes with what amounted to a request for" ß draw," it
i. not lihly tb
t
he wiU he deterred from that object because
in the meantime she has committed fresh atrocities.
Indeed, when 'l'.""e consider the strange ramificJ.tions and
pen-ertl'd logic of tho German mind. Ule very opposite i3
lJlOre likely to he the cage. II If all these atrocities have not
made it impossible, Lul; only ratller difficult, to float the idea
of a draw," Buch a mind would argue, <I then lel; us try
oll.:.el'.:I." 'ILia. Bùrely, ÍB the Lasic idea of tJw German policy
of II friú'htfulnes8,"
It
this idea of ... draw," or even something sUghLI.J.

18.

}vlay 22, 1915.

1,AXD

AXD 'WATER,'

J,etter for the Allies, .. a win on pÐints," thät j
,sd cìish'e!'bing
in the recent talk of peace, :1:'01' the Jnoment it }Jas, perhap="

een suppressed. Rut il has not been h-illed, and not.hing
could be more dangerous--or, rather, fatal-to the future
peace and welfare of Europe in general and lliis country in
particular. This should be abundantly evident to all clea:--
thinking minùs. .. A win on points" is invariably followpd
by another contest when the loser has been .. readied" again.
It may be argued that the ways of t.he prize-ring are n'Jt
those of the great nations of the world. There are already
many, and presently their numbers will be increased, who
place their confidence in the show of .. sweet reasonableness '
that has of late marked the propagandist wOlk of Count
Eernstorff and llerr Dernburg ill America, and similar effort'!
by means of numerous articles and inteniews now to be
fûund in the German Press. These, perhaps sincere, but cer-
tainly misguided, people profess t
believe that a peace made
in the immediate future would be a gOf>d, a jmt, and la
tin>;
peace, and will stigmatise as brutal and uncivilised any wish
to beat to its knees a foe that is ., prepared to meet a reaWfi-
able demand."
Before saying anJthing of the danger that undoubtedly
exists of these sentimentalist and opportunist views spreadit:g
and increasing in power until they may actually threaten to
rob the Allies, and indeed the whole civilisEd world, of the re-
ward they shoulù gain for the vast sacrifices they have ma,Je,
and have yet to make, in this "'aI", Jet us consider just one
great and unanswerable reason against even listening to a'lY
talk of peace until Germany has been decisively and completely
beaten. There are wany argumcnts agaimt a pren:ature
peace, and all of them should be strongly impressed upon the
minds of the public, but in this article it is only proposed to
deal with one. It ('an be doue in very few words.
It is no longer necessary to spend time in pointing out
how this war was long prepared by the Prus
ian militarist
party, and hew plainly a few ycars ago the very year, eYCIl
the .ery month, for its outhreak WitS decided u}Jcn, N cr is it
necesary to dilate upon the fact that the German Elrpire ;s
working and fighting as one man with the Prussian militari
ts.
The prophets who foretold that the Saxom or the Bdvarians
would !ooon tire of sacrificing their bloed and tr<,aSUl'e for
Prussia have been falsified, Those who put their faith in the
German Sociali
ts, even by revolution, putting an end to the
war unle
s victory were rapid and compll"tl' have b('eu de,
ceived. There is not the slightest sign ;t!. lJ!'e
('nt of any
breaking away from the Prussian dO'llinance, nor is there any
sign eVl'n that if, for their own end
, the" directing" IJòilitary
minds of Prussia can now secure an inconclmive peace the
German nation as a whole, or any parts of it, would rise
against the men who have cheated them with false hopes and
hurl them from power, Ever} thing, indeed, points to tJ1ð
contrary and suggC!'ts that Germany would be as acquiescent
in such a conclusion to the war as it has been in everything else
offered to it by its" directing minds,"
And here lies the greatest danger of a premature peace.
It is this which affords the most de}Jl'esin
g thought when
one turns the mind towards the end of the war. So long "5
Germany is content to submit to the domination of the
Prussian militarists, so long as she cOI!tinues to suffer her
present form of government, the peace of Europe cannot be
reasonably assured, No matter what terms of peace the Allies
may eventually be able to impose, one thing they cannot do.
lt is impm;
ible to impose upon a nation its form of gûvern-
mcnt. This can he done with conquered and inferior nation'!
as we have done it in the case cf various co]oured races, Jt
l'an be done with a conquerèd and vassal nation 2S Gern 1 any,
A ustria, and Russia have done it in the case of P;;land. Jbt
it would surely be impos
ib]e in the case of Germany. Yet
if after peace has been made Germany r"mains, as she is now,
a milit.ary autocracy, that peace wiJl be but a truce, a long
one perhaps, but still a truce, The only cure for this is some
democratic form of government for Germany. A democracy
can never prepare a war in the sense that Germany has pre-
pared this war, A democracy will fight, as this country and
Prance are fighting now, hut it can never prepare for lcng
years and t.hen say " In such and such a year w:! shall be
ready," and when that year comes draw the sword, There
is not, and cannot be, in a democracy sufficient continuity of
policy or administration for such an undertaking, Even con-
tinuity ill the policy of necessary preparation for defeilce is for
a demoeracy a difficult maller to secure, as we have just seen
hoth at home and in France. But with a military autocracy
such as Germany's it is perfectly easy. Her l>arliament is
merely a glorified debating society upon wlJÌch the " direclin

minds" can impose their will, and, while maintaining their
continuous war policy, can keep the balk of the people con-
tenlr.d by not ne:;l!:_,ting the country's trade and Cf'mmeree

anù' material welf;,.re generally, as c!,rtail1ly tIle)' h2.YC nc.t
becn neglected hv Gel'many's autocräts.
Ho"" tll-:I, can a reformed system of goyernmpnt. be
secUl ed fcr Gprmany 1 The only way seems to be hy inHieting
such a defe&t upon her as will n
ake the Gernl3n peuple reali
e
into "hat evil:; a milItary autocracy mu
t plungð them at
com'talltly recurring inten'als. Then they n ay the;) sel;'es bø
stirred to effect a change. But t.his will certainly not he dona
"hile Germany is stiB waging war entirely upon the t.erritory
of her enemies. Not until the Fatherland itself is threateued
is the German people likely to realise the truth.
Here, then, is one compelling reascn which, whatever
sa('rifices it may f'ntail, makes the crushing defeat of Germany
ä st::nl necessity and no merè act of vindictiveness.
But is therc any'real danger of this pren 1 ature and incon-
clusive peace? At present, it may be urged, an talk of it ;!'
confined to America. Our own weak one'I--Cven 111', Shaw-
seem to have been silenced. They IEay be silent, but, un-
happily. they still exist. There is, undoubtedly, a real danger.
At a cf'rtain point in a great war neutral pressure has often
hElped to bring about what has been repugnant to one of the
belligerents. The termination of the Russo-,J apanese 'Val' i,
('onsideleJ by many to have been such a case.
rhis neutral
plessure may, indeed, need something to work upon. Can we
be sure that it will not be found in our own country?
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and at
pres:?Ilt the Allies ha....e not experienced the maximum strain
that wiB be put upon them if this war is to be pushed to the
bitter and necessary finish. Especially is this true of cur-
sdvf's. There are no very obvious signs here as yet of the
!)inch of war. One se:?s little evidence of reduction in luxury
or other enforced sacrifices caused by the war. Those who ar

suffering most, as ypt, belong t.o the c1a Q <; that always suffers
in silence as long as they suffer alone, but they are liable to
add the weight of their influenee to that of other sufferers who
are not so paLient of the pinch when it comes. "'V ar money"
is plentiful to-day with the working classe
, and the wcll,to-d0
are not yet realJy hurt. But a people cannot spend
E700,OOO,OOO per annum on war without feeling t.he pinch,
aud feeling it very severely, sooner or 12.ter, Many as ha\'e
alr<,ady been killed and wounded, we have not yet suffered our
sp
'ere'3t losses in the field. It is fooEsh, thereforp, to dose
one's eyes to the danger th?t the time may comf' ,,,hOl more
and more wil! be inclined to listen to the voice of the tempt
r
rayÜlg "You can put an end to it now," It i, 110t too early
to look forward to such a possibility. If the .Allies "I"':eaken in
their present strong resolve, then ail their sacrifices will have
been in vain, This country must not prove the wEak lin'- in
the chain, must not even show the slightest sign of bending,
for even that might entail ruin. If, then, merely the appear-
ance of readiness t.o sheathe our sword bpfore our task is fuHv
completed he a danger, as surely it will be, then to guar
l
again
t it is only simple commOllseme, This can be
t be done
by keeping constantly before the minds of the people the un-
answerable reasons for fighting on until our enemies are not
only rpduced but reformed.

Owing to tlte exceptional importance of rerent
m ilital'Y aents-whiclt are fully analysed ,oil tl/ is
issue of LA
D AND "\V ATER, it has been jound il1l-
lJossible, although e:.etm pages !trwe been aàdpd,
to inrlude all our uSlwl ferLtures. eonsequputly
the continuation of II-lr. L. B. Desbled's articles on
" The Wrtr by A iI'," and Mr. DOllgl.1s ETlfllislt.s
" Tales of the
Tnta1lled," iJ'ill appeal' in our nut
iSSl1 e.-EDIToR.

OUR FRONTISPIECE.

Copies on A rt Paper of tl/e series oj Tr at
Portraits, specially dm/cn jor LA
D AXD 'VATER
by Joseplt Simpson, R.B..1., may be hfJ.d, price
2s. Gd. each, on application to the Publisher, LA
m
A
D 'V.\TER, Celltral Ilouse, ]{ingswa!J, London,
,W.C.
Precious portraits, General Joffre, General
Foeh.
1'1/:s 'lceek's, General Ren71e:lk.Jmr!.

19*

LA
D

A
D

THE

HAPPY

,V A TER,

May 22, 1915.

WARRIORS.

By J. D. SYMON.

I N this war of surprises, itself so great a surprise to the
unready majority, the private soldier has come into
his own in a way that not even his growing recogni-
tion durin'" the South African \Var seemed to fore-
tell. It is little more than twenty years since Kipling
could write with bitter irony:
"H's I Tommy this' and' Tommy that' and' Tommy, go
away';
Dut it's' Thank you, :Mi.-;ter Atkins,' when the band begins
to play."
And the balladi<t went on, not without truth, to enlarge
upon the private's unacceptability in public places, which he
summed up in the ugly phrase, " Chuck him out, the brute! "
That scorn of the common soldier was a legacy from the
bad old days of the Pr.ess Gang, Our grandfathers
and great-grandfathers, in spite of their debt to
the fighting man, thought no shame of their dismal old
saying that the rank and file of the Army was the "off-
scourings cf the earth." The feeling lingered on through
piping times of reace, until the author of " Soldiers Three"
and the " Barrack Hoom Ballads" pulled us up sharp and
showed us in Learoyd, Ortheris, and Mulvaney, the modern
Porthos, Athos, and D' Artagnan (the exquisite Aramis has
no counterpart here), the gold that we were trampling under
foot. The movement was dist.inct from the outset. Almost
as soon as the new point of view had been indicated a song in
one of the earliest of the musical comedies ran riot through
t.he country. Every barrel-organ and every whistling errand-
boy united in the praise of" Tommy, Tommy Atkins." 1t was
a poor thiug of a song, jejune and spasmodic, not to be com-
pared for a moment to the verse that inspired its sentilllf'nt;
but it did its work, and before its Cockney accents, verbal and
musical (for thel'e is a Cockney accent in music as well as in
words), had been quite forgotten, South Africa went ablaze,
and the public shouldered for the first time with real purpose
and conviction its duty to the soldier in the field. In the
Crimea, it is true, after many scandalous initial blunders, a
great work had been accomplished; but the soldier of the
'fifties was still, in the popular view, a fellow who risked his
none too ,-aluable life for fixpence a day. It was his job, like
any other man's, and there the matter ended. No man cared
overmuch for the 801dier's soul or took the trouble to realise
that lie had one, And his body did not cause much concern
until it had been wounded.
To,day we have changed all that; and the change has re-
acted with the happiest results upon the soldier himself. He
has always been a cheerful being, even in the limes when he
had least encouragement he was a mad wag, but his present
light-heartedness is a finer t.hing, He showed it from the
first moment of his landing, when his daft,. inconsequential,
and quite un warlike ditty about an Irishman adrift in
London won the heart cf La Belle France and atoned to her
for the loss of the expected red,coat. Since then a new
development of tbe happy warrior has risen into view, an
amiable by,product of the altered personnel of our new
armies, A phrase, old as the times of Gustavus Adolphus, has
come back to its own, \Ve forget t.hat t.he word" private" is
an abbreviation. It has become almost a noun. Historically,
it is an adjective, and its originally attendant noun is full of
meaning for us to-day. No; it is not "soldier," as the
majority suppose, Let us hear what that doughty free-lance
and former follûwer of Gustavus, Captain Dugald Dalgetty,
has to say on the subject: "My lord, I found myself trail-
ing a pike as a private gentleman under old Sir Lud{}viek
Leslie, where I learned the rules of service 50 tightly that I
will not forget them in a hurry." And again, "Sir, I was
six years first private gentleman of the company and three
years lance-speisade, JJ Promotion came "dooms slow" to
Dalgetty, partly because the" private gentleman" had nicE"
ideas of his own dignity and" disdained to receive a halberd, JJ
'rhis by the way, Our present point is the originally
honourable position of the rank and file and the wonderful
return to that gentlemanly ideal in the bearing and character
of the men who have flocked, in what numbers we are not
told. to answer Lord Kitchener's call. Thoy are the blithest
lads that you could meet on a spring holiday, if a Words-
worthian parody be permi
sible; happy warriors, indeed, and

in their chance intercourse with the civilian world most
gentle and courteous comrades of the way. There is no better
tonic than an hour, or hours, for choice, spent with them in
the railway carriage. Fun, as refreshing as it is clean, goes
rollicking from side to side, and their laughter, that
revealing thing, is heart-whole and wholesome. The diverse
elements that go to the composition of the new forces have
produced a curious amalgam. The man of little education
and the man of much education act and react on one another
with the happiest results and often with unexpected effect.
The talk that ranges over pay and accoutrements, the peculi-
arities of comrades and of the powers that be, sometimes takes
a higher flight, and one is reminded of that young Scottish
sailor, a brother of Robert :Ferguson, the poet, who
discussed with 50 much knowledge and insiglIt technical
questions of verse-making. Only the other evening, in
the last train, I fell among artillerymen returning
in force after a few hours' leave to the pretty village of wbich
they are at present the everlasting wonder and delight.. They
were aU delightfully young, full of " push and go " enough
to satisfy even the Chancellor himself, alive to every passing
humour, and still schoolboys at heart. Every type was there
-the ex-clerk, the Board school boy, the public school boy,
the man who had gone further than the public school before
his release from tutors and governors. At first the talk was
professionally critical, of careless driving on somebody's part
and an overturned limber, wherein lurked jokes hidàen from
the layman; there was sport, too, of some non-com, whose
speciality, amounting to a craze, was extra stable ord
r1ies.
But the plum of the talk came with a reference to the
battery's tame poet. \Vhether the bard was of the company
one could not discover. If he were. he restrained his blushes
nobly, He had reason to blush. Hearty admiration of hi:i
powers did not prevent ruthless quot:J.tion for the ears of all
and sundry of his priceless lines. As a lampoonist he seemed
to shine. Most of his couplets were strictly personal anll
carried a sting in their tail, but they were never coarse or ill-
natured. 'rhe rbymes to difficult names clinked ingeniously.
lÏ not always perfect, they were at least adequate to the pur-
pose .md so far promising of immortality that they seemed to
bear endless repetition. But the 8]lOrt epigram, it appeared.
did not exhaust tbe powers of genius. The corporal in the
corner had recently caught the sneer !"Gtn in the awful act of
composition. In less than no time the poet had slung 011
something of almost epic dimensions. "And jolly good verse
it is, too; not a bit broken in the what d 'ye call it?" "The
rhythm," interposed a gunner with the indefinable hall-mark
of the university upon him. " Yes, the rhythm; that's tha
baIly thing I mean. It just streams from him JJ__
"As fast as he can put it down! JJ said another
voice. And therewith they praised their famous man
once more and bandied his glowing lines about lIntil
their station came past the window and it was tin:e
to say good-night. Singing, tbey left the station, and 50 to
billets and to bed. Enviable fellows! If the young shirkers
knew what they are missing they would be with you to-day.

he songs may have nothing to do with war; perhaps our
happy warriors themselves do not consciously realise why
it is that they cannot keep from singing at every "march
at ease." But it is the light-heartedness of men who
have found a work lying to their hand and are daing
it with their might. Equally determined are those over-age
men who fill the ranks of the volunteer training corps. They
have not the younger men's blessed sense of certain usefulness,
but, on the chance, they mean to be ready in their limited way.
And the greybeards, too, count kin with the happy warriors
and have still a good song left in them to cheer the route
march, But it is the day of the young men, and such
young men! Already the enemy knows that the
tale of guttersnipe recruits is a lie. We have got
the very best. Salute them as they go singing by. 'rhe
toll is fearful and will be heavier still, but they do not think
of that, for they are, as never before in our history, " gentle-
men unafraid. JJ 'rhese notes began with Kipling; with
Kipling, it seems, they are to end. Again a phrase of his,
taken from a different context, has supplied just the right
description for our happy warriors from the highest to those
who trail the rifle as " private gentlemen."

Priul.eù by THII \'ICI:onn HousE PanUING Co., LrD,. Tudor Street, Whitefriar8. Londau, E,C,

LAND AND WATER

.:\la) 22, 11)15

lens

are the. obly Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labóur.

THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., L TD,

FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL
ForCUTLERY.etc.
Neifb.e.l' .Rusfs, Sfains, nor mrnislzes.

.

.

Entirely unaffected by Damp,
Food-Acids, Fruits, Vinegar,
&c.

Do not apply to us, but
Ask your Cutler,

and to avoid disappointment,
insist that the knives bear thir;
Mark.

,

,

I I
Original and Sole Makers
THOS. FIRTH&SONS,LTP
SHEFFIELD.

YOU CAN'T GET WET IN

The Guinea

A Feather Wel
ht Waterproor
For Civilians and Soldiers Alike.
.. You can put It in your pocket w
en the .un .hine.."

Weighs only 21 oz.

Thc (
uinea .. Mattamac" is maùe from
a
pecially wo\'"en feather-weight maUa
laloric of intense strength, and is guar-
antee,l ab,olutely waterproof. In
appearance it is indistinguishable from
the orrliuary weatherproof, but it is
car
ie,l as easily as a newspaper or will
go Into an orùinary pocket,

Practically Untearable.
Not Transparent,

In a. .. Mattamac" you can't get wet,
Thoroughly well cut and mar1e. Storm
collar and adjustable wind cuffs. Smart,
roomy, free-for every 'outdoor purpose.
Lasts years, any climate. In fawn,
khaki, or grey. Also for Ladies.

íf-\ ' )
'If'
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l/ I / I

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RARE ALREADY

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Dch pour lell'raDc&1a."
Toby Jug orBtr Jolm FrODCh.
about ten inches htah.
1LImI"'. to 3ðO <opt.,,)

\
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The best tributes to a hero are alwayø
those that are paid In his lifetime, It is a
delicate complIment then, to present the
heroes of the War In the gnise of the
immortal Sir Toby Philpot, the original
Toby Jug,
And so Jugs ha\e hepn made from cartoons
by Sir }', Carruthers Gould, representing
Lorrl Kitchener, Sir John French. General
Joftre. and Admiral Sir John Jell1coe, Only

50 of the first, and 350 of each of the
remaining thrpe "III be made, after which
the mouIrls "m be destroyed,
The already rare" Rib'hener" JUI( ts almost
entirety disposerl oi. but subscriptions for
the three other Tobies are now invIted.

U F · C · G '.
TOBY JUGS

Lord Kitchener-
ir John French-General
Joffre :>Ir John Jelhl'oe,
J)rice 2 Cuinea. each.

Telephone-
!ISM P044.

Controlled e
clush ety by
SOANE & SMITH, Ltd,.
.speciali..t.. in China and Gla.....
462 OXFORD ST., LONDON, W.

Telf'lI"'lUa--
.. E"rtbeb.
IAndQI1. .

125

LAND AND WATER

May 22, 1915

FEMINA

By MRS, ERIC DE RIDDER
" B ILLETING is over here," ran my letter, "but yet the women of this country are more than willing-are
I feel I cannot sit at home doing nothing but even anxious to serve their land in some tangible fashion.
read the horrors in the papers; what can I do Not by tilling the land alone, but in scores of other wavs.
ne..xt ?.. The writer of the letter is one of the Full use is not made of this great depth of purpose. Thère
busiest women in the world, with a large family, is a hitch somewhere, a hitch that badly wants finding, and
and many household cares. These have been intensified remedying without loss of time.
during the past few months by the introduction of a great
number of troops into the neighbouring district. Four Women and War Service
officers have been billeted'in the house, and twentv-four
non-commissioned officers and men billeted elsewhere on
the estate. As the house
and its surroundings are
many miles from a railway
station and shops, and in the
heart of a country district,
this incursion was none too
easy to deal with. It meant
I?uch thought and prepara-
tIon on the part of the
owners, and quite a con-
siderable amount of work in
one way or another.
Now this is all over, the
troops have gone, and nobody
so far has taken their place,
And the sole wish of those
left behind is to get busy
over something else, It Ís
felt that inaction-even the
comparative inaction that is
all ever falling to mv friend's
lot-is unbearable. The great
need is to be up and doing.
Anything that is useful, any-
thing that is needed, anv,
thing that will serve to keèp
the mind from dwelling on
horrors that sadden it inex,
pressibly. This wish for
occupation is a feeling that is
growing with every day that
passes. Strong though it is
already, there is no doubt
but that it must grow
stronger with the passing of
time. Numbers of women in
every rank of life have this
common desire. It is one of
which those in authority might surely take a fuller advan-
tage than they are at present doing. But the ways of such
are apt to be passing strange.
A Form to Fill

ot so very long ago, every woman in the country who
wanted occupation was invited by the Government to register
her name at the nearest Labour Exchange. Forms of
application were prepared, each containing the customary
categorical catechism, and to await the applicants was all
that remained. Whether the Labour Exchanges are not the
popular resorts they possibly ought to be, whether the scheme
was not published widely enough, has yet to be divulged.
In any case, the response, from all accounts, is not an over-
whelming one, and by no manner of means in proportion
to the great number of women living in these islands,
I am told by those who ought to know that this idea
was designed for women in general, not for anyone class in
particular. The object was' to make a register of available
women who could be called upon, whenever it was necessary,
to release men for active service by taking their place, The
principle of this is such an excellent one that it can only be
hoped it will be pushed to its far limits, with much more energy
than has heretofore been the case. Judging from the
Government application form, it would seem that women
and agriculture are more closely linked together in the official
mind than anything else. Touching though they do upon
leather-stitching, brush-making, clothing-machining, and light
machining for armament, it is with regard to a
ricultural
'work that a special set of questions is framed. Women in
France, and those in Germany also, started to work on the
land in place of men, almost the first day war was declared,
Here, though one or two whollv praiseworthy experiments
have been made, there is no such definite movement. And

WHAT

CAN

I DO

NEXT?

.....

Just before Christmas of last year it was decided to
obtain a return of all the men still remaining who were
eligible for active service,
This was done by the means
of forms, which were distri-
buted at the door of every
householder with a polite
request that it might be filled
up at his early convenience.
If those in seats of authoritv
really desire the services, on à
largè scale, of women, they
might reasonably go to a like
amount of trouble to gain the
necessary information; it
would sã ve the walk to the
nearest Labour Exchange,
which is surely an aggrava-
tion of circumstance. Person-
ally, I have never been within
thé sacred portals of such an
institution, but I would in-
finitely sooner struggle with
the intricacies of an official
form within my own domicile
than beneath the glassy eye
of aloof officialdom. It may
of course be an error of taste,
but it, I believe, is a feeling
shared by many. Safely
seated at one's own writing
desk, personal possibilities
would unfold in an aston-
ishing way, and the form be
returned full of information
upon which the Government
could draw. There can really
be no reason why the women
of this country should not
be circularised as well as the
men. If they were, there ca,n be no doubt it would call
forth an astonishingly strong response.
One Side of the Question
A number of well-known women have signed their names
to a letter which has just appeared in the Press on the subject
of soldiers who do women's work. Taking for granted that
the main object at the present time is to raise every man
available for active service, they comment upon the fact
that military clerks are being occupied in Flanders, as well
as in England, upon
ork which women could do equally
well. There is also a suggestion that women should be
employed as hospital orderlies instead of men, thereby liber-
ating many active youths who are now fulfilling this part.
Women are acting as orderlies in the hospital units which the
Scottish women have sent to France and Serbia, and the
work, it is claimed, has been perfectly carried out, hard and
arduous though it often is,
There are heaps of men doing other forms of women's
work in England to-day. In times such as these, it surely
does not take a stalwart young man, six foot in his socks, to
sell manicure cases, or dilate upon the latest thing in neckwear.
He can undoubtedly be more profitably employed elsewhere,
If the whole country, men and women alike, could be formed
into one great business organisation with the crushing of
this German menace as its sole aim and object, it would move
forward the halcyon days of peace by leaps and bounds.
Since it is man's business to go and fight, it is equally woman's
business to perform the tasks he leaves behind. Few women
will be found who dispute this corollary, but it remains
that their services have yet been barelv requisitioned, Signs
are not lacking that this omission will have to be remedied
before much more water has run under the bridge, and the.
sooner it happens the better will it be for everyone concerned.

COP) rif{lli Rita Mar/it:

LADY M\CHELHAM

Who has been nursing wounded soldiers in the South of France,
a:td together with her husband has presented a luxurious
ambu\ .nee train for the use of the Allies

126

.l\hy 22, 1915

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LAND AND WATER

SHANTUNG
SUITS

\Vith the advent of the warm
weather r\ atural Shantung
Suits similar in character to
the gar,uent ilIustrated, will
he in great demand. These
Suits are adapted from the
most exclusive Paris Models
by our own hi
hly skilled
men tailors, and are made in
rich heavy Natural Silk
which tailors exceptionally
wdL
Smart Suit (as sketch), in be-.
quality hea\
weight Natural

hantun
Silk. Sacque Coat,
and well cut full -skirt, bound silk
braid to match.

7 t Gns.

THE RAVAGES OF
JIlOTH,

Store your Furs iN O"Y
FruzinK Chamóers. Par-
ticulars 0/ our new Comhined
Fur 'storage and Insurance
".."inst 01/ and e'l'ery.' rIsk
s;'" pDd free 011 a,/JticalioN_

Debenham
& Free/!?!?u
Y!
\Vil1more Street,
ICovendish Squord London.W

A Delightful Beverage
Just try "Milkmaid Brand" Café au Lait-
see how truly French it is, in fragrance and
in flavour! Of course it is-it is matk just
the same-freshly roasted coffee, fine_t dairy
milk, refined sugar, all expertly mixed.
All that is needed to make a delicious
and sustaining beverage is boiling water.

C MJL
D

, 'iiiW.

PI
-O-'-"'v

.. Leave. DO 'Iround.' for complatn\.:"
Sold hyal/ G.-oa.-s &< Stores in tins, 6ld. (suf1iâetJt
for 8 to 10 cuþs) and IOid. (...f1i<<ent for 16 to :10
cuþs). Samþle 011 receipt of "ame and address
0./ Grocer a1:d zd in stamps to cover postagt.
Try the new "Ideal MU k " Biseuit-
delightful with a cup of Café au Lait.
"MILKMAID BRAND,"K,D, DEPOT,
6-8 Eastcheap, London. and Branches.

.Iun
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111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

"
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Are

you

Run-down

"-hen your system is undermined by worry or over-work
-when your vitality is 1m, ered-when you feel .. any-
how "-"hen
'uur nerves are "on edge"-when the least
exertion tires you-you are in a "Run-down" condition.
Your system is like a flower drooping for want of "ater.
Aud just as water revives s.droopin
flower-so 'Wincarnis'
gi,'es new life to a. .. run-down" constitution. From even
the first wineglassful you can feel it stimulating and in,
vigoratil1g yuu, aud as you continue, you can feel it sur-
charging your whole system with new health-new strength
-new vigour and new life.
lll you try just one Lottie!

Begin

well

FREE.

to

get

Send for a liberal free trial bottle of . Wlncarnia . -not a mere taste,
but enough to do you good, EncJo8Ð three penny stamps (to pay
postage). COLEMAN & CO" Ltd., W:!12, Wincarnia Works, Norwich.

THE "LISTER-BRUSTON" AUTOMATIC
ELECTRIC LIGHTING it PUMPING PLANT

Ideal
for
Red Cross
Hospitals.
&c.

r

.[ ,) -c
J CJ\' : ' l!l
rf
- -- -

.

Over
1000
Plants
in
operation.

STARTS
ITSELF.

You simply switch the
lig-ht on or off.

STOPS
ITSELF.

\Yrite for Catalogue and full particulars to SOLE MAKERS:

R. A. LISTER it CO. Ltd., Bursley, GLOS.

.

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Garden Design and Landscape Gardening in all its brar.ches undertaken in any part of the Kingdom by
J. CHEAL {;j SONS. Ltd.. THE NURSERIES, CRAWLEY. SUSSEX.

12 7

LAND AND WATER

BY SPECIAL _ APPOINTMENT
TO H,M. THE KING.

Every Officer now needs Protection from the Sun.
THE NEW
"Lincoln Bennett"
SOFT SUMMER SERVICE CAP
MEETS THIS REQUIREMENT.

,

Price 19/6 Net,
Grease-Proof Shield, 11-,
Po.' Free tn the Front.

Made of special material which is scientifically SUN PROOF.
Fitted with the patent .. Lincoln Bennett" ventilation which
ensure. a cooling current of air over and round the head.
The protective back curtain hangs from the edge of the crown instead
of from the bottom of the band and ,he dare falls well away from the back
of the head, leaving a cool air space between the curtain and the head.
When the curtain is folded up lhis cap IS exactly the same in appear-
ance as the soft cap nOw so largely wOrn.
Selections sent free on approval.

LINCOLN BENNETT & CO., Ltd., 40 Piccadilly, LONDON, W,
Telephone :-REGENT 636.

)laof í!151

---
r""'r

To thosegoÙzgo1Z
ctiveService

You know thai Safely, Health and Fitness
depend upon a wise choice of footwear.
National as well as personal economy is found
in the use of the most lasting leather - the
scarceness of hides considered.
CONSULT MANFIELD'S and let your
responsibility be theirs. You must not take
the risk of campaigning with boots in the lea5f
inferior or unsuited to the task.

.. Âeti1Jt StTVia" pria list on af/liea/ion - a /.fliea!
esam/I. /h,r (rom in Wat.rproof
.
::::::::.::
:

.
' -- , - '.
1l1&229PlcCAD,LLY,.' , J '. ,'..'" ï \
London, W. / j
Branc;hes thl'ouJ.:'hout
London & Umted
-
)

M489
32/-

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Mav 22, 1915

The "QUORN"
RIDING SHIRT

(Rell. De,illn No. 645175,)
Made of Khaki, Flannel, and all Material.
in varying weights and colour..
T HE" QUORN" RIDING SHIRT has been specially designed for
long days in the saddle. By means of a tail-piece attached to the
back of the shirt which is passed between the lEgs and fast<ned in
front, it is impossible for the skirts of the shirt to get out of place, Or for
the shirt itself to ruck up. A bsolute comfort and additional warmth is
Ihus assured.

..,.

PRICE
14/6

\

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-:J

! c:::3;r
i

.

.,...-

Pure Cashmere Underclothing and Body Belts in different
weights. Beautifully soft, warm and comfortable.

TURNBULL & ASSER

Sporting ffosiers and Underwear Spec/alists
71-72 JERMYN ST., LONDON, S.W.
(6 doors from 5t, James's Street.)
Telegrams: .. Paddywhack, London." Telephone: 4628 Gerrard.

THE NORWEGIAI PATTERN TRENCH BOOT.

Specially designed for Officers at the Front
by

MAXWELL

),

(EST. 175 0 )
1 8 DOVE
STREET.

PICCADILl Y. LO
DON. W.
.

'

.' Field and Service 800t$ 0/ ,
,

,. every Description, . ,
Active Service Kit
Accessories of a \I Kind. -::..\(
Telephone: --- I
1097 REGENT.

fI'

Officer's

Ideal Water Bottle

FOR THOSE ON ACTIVE SERVICE
Improved shape, does not absorb wet.
Will stand the hardship of the campaign.
Nickel Silver. Non-Corrosive,
Silver Plated Jn
idf'.
Co\'cred with I\haki T\\III.
ScrC\\ Stopper, or lIa)'onct TOfl,
SupplIed \\ ith S\\ i \'cls or Shoulder Straps
CAPACITY U PINTS, 18 '6
CO,\1PLETE. FuO\1

g\
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,?E
Q

Ii 21 -

Ohldinahlt: u I} I II
STUDD 6: MILLlNúTON
.....
Ci'ilaF"U ( ulfitter!f.
51 CflNIH;11" -"1 RFF.T, I U'\iOON, W,

128

The County Gentlenlan
AXD

LAND&WATER

---"

Vol. LXV No, 2768

SATURDAY, l\IA Y 29. 1915

[ PUBLI
HED AS ]
A NEWSPAPER

PRICE SIXPENOE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

----

-----

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[Cøþyri....At. HørlUl Nidu/II,

GENERAL SIR IAN HA
nLTON, G.C.B., D.S.O.,

General Officer Commanding the Allied Troops in the Dardanelles

LAND AND WATER

May 29, 19 1 5

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J. B. Dunlop, Esquire.

WHY ON EARTH

should the demand for Dunlop Tyres
always exceed the supply unless your fellow-
motorists have proved to their satisfaction
that Dunlop covers and tubes are practically
and financially the safest proposition?
Our output is huge, and ever growing, and yet
like Oliver Twist the public asks for more

DUN LOPS

" The tyre that taught the Trade:'

THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
FOUNDERS OF THE PNEUMATIC TYRE
INDUSTRY THROUGHOUT THE WORU'
ASTON CROSS, BIRMINGHAM.
LO\'DON: I4 REGEKT STREET, S.W.
PARIS: 4 RUE DLT COLOI\EL I\10LL.

13 8

.Mav 29. 19 1 5

LAN D A 1\ D \Y ATE R

THE

S P I RI T

OF

G lYE the English people a chance, and they can
adapt themselves to anything, within reason.
And the war appeals to them, pace the pacifists,
as being eminently within reason. As a scientific
writer of some eminence has lately said, they
.. seem rather to like war with Gennany." Pulled and
pushed by the politicians and the papers, they have yielded
remarkably little to the alternate impulses of blind optimism
and pessimism that they have been told should be the patriot's
part; that they have kept on so even a keel has been in spite
of the majority of their instructors. For the most part they
leave the speech-makers and the leader-writers severely alone,
and devote themselves to an attempt to dig out all the meaning
that may lie embedded in the calm, terse language of com-
muniqués from the front. The efforts of politicians or news-
paper proprietors to attract or deflect their attention
seem comically puny; you figure a giant who is the
People, studiously porin
over the latest news, while
on either side diminutlve orators and wire-pullers are
shouting admonitions to him through megaphones. It
would make a subject for the satirical genius of 1\Ir. Will
Dyson.
Perhaps we expected too much in the way of light
and leading from those who seck to control the state of
mind of the nation. We get a fallacious notion into our
heads-magazine stories have done much to foster it-of
a strong, silent man who sits, spider-like, in the centre
of a vast web of telegraph and telephone wires, and whose
finger is on every pulse in the country. This is true enough
of financiers, in so far as their doings are purely (if the adverb
is appropriate)' concerned with money; but these go wrong
directly they touch human issues. Equally, it is true enough of
a commander-in-chief at the front (in so far as his wires remain
intact) to the extent to which purely military matters are
concerned. But it is far from true of Government depart-
ments and newspaper offices, except in so far as their pro-
ceedings are a matter of simple mathematics. And even then
they have been known to make mistakes in adding up the
figures. A newspaper is often convinc d that "a great
wave of popular feeling" has arisen in the country by the
receipt of a great flood of angry and incoherent letters-the
work of some minority that has temporarily lost its head-
and in any case is about as .. popular" as the National Liberal
Club. What it is that chiefly convinces a Government
department that" the country is calling out" for this action
or that, is a mystery into which it is beyond the scope of till.s
brief article to probe; in any case it is, or one may hope that
it will become, a peace time question. One could hardly in
reason have expected that most of these walled-in offìce-
dwellers would at once comprehend and direct the new stir-
rings of the national spirit.
What stands as the forefront of the people's spirit is
the people's army; behind this stretch further ranks, from
the much focussed munition workers to the wives and mothers
whose brave patience is not the least factor of national
stability. Few of the talkers who run up and down the ranks
have much part or lot in the great movement that has assured
our victory. The portrait which, of those at home, the people
most often recall to their mind's eye is not of any gesticulating
orator, but of the quiet figure of Lord Kitchener. He says
very little, but they know that he .. thinks a thundering
lot," and they feel that his thoughts are their thoughts.
1IIr. Asquith, though, is in another case from the would-be
directors of public thought. He has been big enough in
spirit to see the national spirit as something far bigger.
Humbly constituting himself the mouthpiece of the people,
he has let the national inspiration blow through him to fine
purpose, and has given us perhaps the only utterance from
high places that is worthy to go down in history. Also, a
negative but a notable achievement, he has refrained with
characteristic dignity from the movement to bullyrag the
people about " realising the war."
This remarkably stupid insult to the enonnous majority
of the people made one glad that they had no ear for the
megaphones, being too busily employed in seeking out the

are grains of fact upon which their realisation supported
Its half-starved existence. It was a relief when the movement
turned again into a fitting internecine warfare between the office-
dwellers, and the papers, finding that the people were out of
range, were led by one or two more perspicacious among

THE

FUTURE

their number to renew their fire upon the real culprits,
a few men who were magnifying their vocation into
concealment for concealment's sake. This, at least, did
solid good. The problem of spreading enough news for
realisation, and of spreading it in a fonn concrete enough to
cause some stirring of the blood, while keeping the enemy
effectually in the dark, was and is difficult enough, though the
wisest should have it in hand. The people's realisation,
like the people's army, had perforce to come slowly. We
shall prove to have done none the worse for that. An island
nation with a powerful fleet can afford to deal even with the
cataclysm of Europe by a gradual and organic process of
growth. Gennany knows well enough the meaning of our
ascending curve of power and purpose. That is why the
Hymn of Hate was written.
An unspoken consciousness may be felt, now, to be at
the back of many minds, that after the natural period of
human gestation a new soul of our country has indeed come
to the birth. I t is a birth too gigantic to be known at once
for what it is, too vast to be visible. And the more than
Gargantuan infant is naturally inarticulate as yet. But his
thunderous crowing is heard from the troop-trains, as he
reaches out to strangle the serpents that menace his cradle,
even as did the infant Hercules. In another mood, he can
show an infantile destructiveness at times; he must not be
allowed, nor will the People allow him if we may judge by the
talk of sensible men and women who can distinguish between
patriotism and destructiveness, to smash those of his toy shops
that are labelled" l\Iade in Gennany," and guzzle the sweets
that they contain. He has much to learn, as have all babes,
even the most prodigious. But we cannot instruct him-
save by keeping him out of mischief-any more than we can
instruct the individual infants who lord it over us until their
time comes to take our place. As in their case, a wise provision
of Nature puts his earliest education into his own hands, not
into ours. Wide-eyed, this new-born, inarticulate soul of
the nation absorbs, wonders and watches. Later, he will
begin to criticise; his" Why ?" will resound in the land.
\Ve may reflect with trepidation that our answers will need
some preparing. He is the" insurgent bigness" of l\1r. Wells'
brilliant fancy, "The Food of the Gods;" but his giant
size is the outcome not of invention, as in that book, but of
her mother Necessity.
Meanwhile, the people who are in the pre-war generation
of thought and feeling, the people regarded as a conscious,
articulate mind, not yet readjusted to the huge implications
of what is to come, is as sparing of speech and as inscrutable
of eye as ever. And of that abstract People, since all abstrac-
tions are no more, really, than figures of speech, it may be
well to remember that the people who read this paper are
a concrete, realisable part. When we ask the question as the
office-dwellers so often ask it in vain, " What are the people
about? " or, in the words of the philosopher Caddles, " What's
it all for ? " there is something to be said for narrowing down
the enquiry into the fonn of " What am I about? What do I
mean? What do my fanùly, my business, my interests mean? "
Or, for that matter, " What does' Land and \Vater ' mean? "
To the last question the consistent reader will return a
simple answer: It means among other things the best
critical analysis of the momentous operations on land and
sea which are shapin/{ the destinies of Europe-an analysis
that is free from bias and uncoloured by controversy:
it means facts, and clear, straightforward reasoning about
facts, When we connect this idea of a meaning with
our part responsibility for the parenthood, small though
that part may be, of the nation's new spirit, we may reflect
that our small share is not unpractical. The finer the child,
the greater its destiny, the more it needs, in the first stages,
simply-nourishment. And fact, properly presented and
co-ordinated, is the nourishment of reason, even as reason is
the stuff of which the things of the spirit are built up. The
new spirit of the nation, the spirit, for instance, to take the
clearest and the most cogent case, of the men who return
when the long job is done, will be a spirit that knows, and
seeks to know, new things, and a spirit that thinks, We
must be prepared; we must be ready to see many old shells
broken, many unforeseen products of "insurgent bigness"
arising. But we shall not be unworthy of the new life. Give
the English people a chance, and they can adapt themselyes
to anything, within reason.

139

May 29, 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

THE Pen Gift
for SOL DIE R,
SAILOR or
civilian friend IS
the GENUINE
Wa1
r'S

.:' liGlt
ê\i I
- <
'
-1
\

n
foUß
ren
used and eulogised
by Mr. Hilaire Belloc

10/6 and upward. lor Regular & Sell-Filling Types
12/6 and upward. for Safety & Pump-Filling Types:

Of Slatio"n-s and Jewellers everywhere.

ILLUSTRATED EOOKLET FREE FROM:

L. G. SLOAN, C
-:p'en.(tOTtteT'.
Kingsway, London, W.e.

HOTEL CECIL

THE

COST of LIVING REDUCED

DURING THE WAR

Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.

Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.

Telephone: GERRARD 60. Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.

"WHAT I TELL YOU THREE
TIMES IS TRUE."

T HIS may be said to be the German \Vayof clinching
an Argument. But Englishmen ask something
more than mere Assertion even in Advertisements.
And the Value of these JJ Sunbeam" Advertisements is
that they have mor
behind them than mere Assertion.
There are tens of thousands of Sunbeam Bicvcles in use
in England at the present time. They were not built
last year, nor the year before, nor the year bdore that.
Many of them are twenty years old and still running-
running as easily as ever and running as Reliably as ever,
Each of these Bicycles is a Witness to the Truth of
these Advertisements. Each goes to Prove the assertion
that the U SUNBEAM" is the Best Bicycle there has
ever been, and that the Best is far the Cheapest in the
long run.

THE
ALL B
\\
-0
"

GOL"""'t.N

\ SUNBEAM
\\

'\

....-

Write for the new Sun'beam Cata10gue to-

3 SUNBEAMLAND-WOLVERHAMPTON
London ShOWToom.:' 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E,C.
158 SLOANE STREET (by Sloane Square), S,W,

AVIEMORE

STATION

HOTEL

r

STRATHSPEY,
No part of Great
Britain is more famed
for its invigorating
and health - giving
qualities than the
Strathspey Plateau.
The Aviemore Station
Hotel is 900 feet above
sea le,'el. It has a
pri\ ate Nine,hole Golf
Course, Tennis and
Croquet La\\ns, Trout
Fishing-, and is an
Ideal Touring Centre,
The Medical Report in "Health Resorts of the British
I sles," dealing with Strathspey, states: "It produces
in man a feeling of exhilaration, of added capacity
for exertion, increased appetite, and sounder sleep."

The Ideal Summer Season
is MAY, JUNE, and JULY,
_ ,En pension terms up to July 15.-
Aviemore is on the main line of the Highland Railway, and
is easy of access. Leave Euston or King's Cross at 8 p,m.,
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Apply for Booklet to-
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Aviemore Station Hotel, Strath8pey,

14 0

Iay 29, 1915.

LAND

AND YV..A TER.

THE
By HILAIRE BELLOC.

WAR

BY

LAND.

NOTE,-Tbis artide has been subDÛUed to tbe Press Burean, which does not object to the publkation as c:n!ored, and ta'-es ne
responsibility lor tbe correctness 01 tbe statements,
I. accordance with tbe requirements 01 the Press Bureau, tbe positions 01 troops on Plans iIIustratillg this Artide mllst IInly be
regarded as approximate, and no definite Itrengtb at any point is indicated,

ITALY.

T HE intervention of Italy will bring into
the actual fighting, within a few weeks,
perhaps 800,000 additional men. That
is, we shall have equipped and present
in any area of operations that may be chosen, and
near enough to the front for immediate opera-
tions or the immediate reinforcement of the same,
twenty ne'.... army corps on the @ide of the Allies.
Curiositv is eaaer to suggest the many ways
in which this newh
arrived force might operate.
There is a form of vanity which is satisfied by
attemptinO' to forecast future events, to profit by
the accur
cy of such a forecast, and to be silent
upon its errors.
All this spirit is quite valueless in the forma-
tion of a sound judgment ,Üth regard to the cam-
paign as a whole, which sound judgment is the
sole leaitimate object of such notes as these.
,,ge can only bring to the formation of such
a judgment certain known truths anù show what
conclusions mav be built upon them. Of alterna-
tive plans or rèsults built on such conclusions one
can sav no more than that anyone of them is
possiblè, none of the:n certain.
.Kow, what are the known facts connected
with the inteITention of Italy?
The great, the salient fact, is connected with
that point upon which I have insisted so con-
tinually in these columns - the question of
numbers.
The tide had already turned against the
enemy, but it had turned in an unequal way.
There was a superiority in the numbers of men
against him upon the "est. There was already
a slight superiority in weapons and in muni-
tions, and particularly in those heavy guns
which are the determinant factors of the pre-
sent campaign. But while the total of the
Allies was already superior to the total that the
enemy could put into the field, C\-en with his last
resen-es, the inequality of distribution gravely
affected the situation. .For in the East it had not
been possible to equip a sufficient number of
'''eapons to make the opposed numbers in men
there more than equal, while in munitions, especi-
ally for artillery, and particularly heavy artillery,
the enemy enormously outweighed our Ally upon
that front.
Kow, the entry of Italy into the field throws
a new weight into the scale in this mere point of
numbers, and that weight is of the very highest
strategic importance.
Theorist::; may discuss, and the future will
prove, the respecih e values of the new fighting
force and its enemy, but what is absolutely cer-
tain is that it accounts for and displaces great
numbers of that enemy.
The situation may be compared to the case
of ten men trying to break out of a corridor
against tweh-e. They could not break out if all

twelve were opposed to them at on.e end of tl
e
corridor which should be the only Issue; but If
there ar
two issues, and if you have eight oppo-
nents at one and only four àt the other, it might
well be that, by a pròper distribution of force, the
ten men, leaving only just enough at one end. to
contain the eight against them there, could. with
the remainder of their force break through the
four at the weaker issue of the corridor.
But supposing while you were making this
attempt a door opened in the side wall of the co
-
ridor and three new opponents appeared! It. ]s
obvious that such an appearance would heaVIly
weight the chances against the ten men breaking
out. It is probable that it would turn the scale.
They mi
ht affect. to desrise. the ne\y oppo-
nent; they mIght be hIS superIOr m experIence of
the fighting; they might in any. number of ways
boast of real advantage o"er hIm; but the un-
doubted fact would remain that they would bave
to detach some part of their strength to deal with
him at a moment when that strength was
whittled down to an already dangerous inferiority
against their original enemy as a whole.
Now, if we try to put the thing numeric
lly
we discover that the advent of the Itahan
mobilised army intû the field would at once fix:
at least ten enemy armv corps. It cannot possibly
do less than thàt. Àllowing the maximum of
natural advantage and of war experience to the
enemy, an offensive strength of 800,000 cannot
conceivably be contained by less than 400,000 men
under eyen the best geographical conditions. The
French-under worse geographical conditions, it
is true-could only just meet an offensive in the
proportion of sixteen to ten last _\.ugust, and ten
corps on the Austrian-Italian frontier would be
sixteen to eight. As a fact, the intervention of
Italy will cost the enemy more than that. I
deliberately put the minimum number conceivable.
The next elementarv truth we must nl)tice in
this connection is that
this fixing of so much
enemy strength is quite independent of the first
chances in the field. In the clash of armies before
a decision is arrived at, or before the establish-
ment of a prolonged defensiye, delaying a
decision, is achieved, everything is at a venture.
l\Ve do not know, until the action de"elops, even
the trend of the war; but the e
sentia I thing from
the point of view of the Allies as a ",-hole is the
effect upon that numerical estimate which has
been continually insisted upon in these pages
because it is fundamental t
any sound judgment
upon the war. Ten army corps must come from
somewhere. They '" ill not come from the "-est.
for they are not present in the 'Vest; they will
not come from some great reserve, for there is no
such great reserve in the hands of the enemy.
He is now in the very act of using his great
winter-trained reserve, his third batch, and, save
for the frills and the boys growing up to man-
hood, his last. They must come from the East
1*

LAXD

A
D

..... .._
- .r 7"'.
.
._ ';:
......._ _
w
...

.,.... -1
...

.-:'

100.A111es

feeùing the
. s bdoind 3I
d. has bce

the force f t Ius force 1'" In
aud fro,!, Much 0 . f 'üntier. for .a. I
Polish front. resent upon the'li
. for months, a

a I ready long ks been a poss
b
cI; mOl e of I t
Itil
jnterYel1t b
ú l
y for weeks., I

e and waltID? n
'iII
1 1roba 1 I'd the first 1 h re<:stll e
a l\ 'inO' hehm d where t.e p.
of Italy,
been L discovere 1i ml deelSlo . in.
't shaU B e t a t any rate, the _. I front , dries up I t e hat
u , 'b' enemy 't down

':Ùng thíse

e:::,nand on':,lf
r

r;,:'e the enemy
forcement e Ital will especI {he East. , j.
the entry of ain.{ 11u<sia upo der is the !1",:graKi
h
! )ressure ag t P oint to conSl 1 '. n frontIel, "
T I'e ne). A st ro-Ita 1:1
. f the u
ml nature 0 w enemy front.
forms the nc . F RONTIEU. .
THE IT.\.LrA
front \vhH:h
. re working upo

ntageous t3
The Ita
:n:t
tegicaIlY

Id have allow
e
is every,;h
it otherwise;, one} army COll)8
t re
them. Wele mher of enen y has every" .e k
mnrh larger nu The enemy sea to La e

b their actIOn. 0' from the .. h O p en-
fixed y . I ad\"Uutane . t all t e
th e g eographl h c
fa
't will ùomm h a f e h <>r Austria h
r
.I t IS. . W e.. . t t IS
Garda, an. f the campaIgn, To appreOla e
in
phases 0 offensive here. frontier.
It
ly takes th
et us analyse th

three sectors,
capital trut i .Jy divIded ID .I CG.
n is e eal 1.) AA. BB, an Trentino, or
arked on sketch ( ) is that of the in German
m 1. The first (Al
"Æge (corrupted of frontier,
basin of tile UP.f:tly illogical pl
ithin what IS
El tc;h ) a pel . a sahent . P on the
to
'. I t down ID t IS u of
coming rig Ì, Italian-tha But it has none
eocrrapillca Y f the Alps.
!foutJlCrn slope 0 of a saJien
. lish, a thmst.
the disadvantag
h t is in phun Eng as J ou can
A sahen
- _ an I in proportIOn 2.
d cr -IS \\eu {
out "e, bC

'V_\TER.

May 29, 1915.

p' ....._.r-
.. "'J..

"",. .

,... -#" .".

--'
-.
'"-"'
1

,n ke l )eople
ù so D.a ,
. 1 r side, an T _ to retJ reo
attack it flû
\.:-

;
c alout t
eir a;;:' I
:lIed from
t th e po mt l,e t ' th .
Tre!hlDO \'. l- a sin ) has
art n . - "'d'
e " .
'U t1 t the sa Jen t H' Upper
J l b I , which are
II f Tren , t wa >, .
the to\'\"O 0 ; d of it two grca. t\.l l )ine chal
.
'ther s
e f the mam ... It IS
npon CI uttrc
scs 0 im as.oahle.
the lateral
buttresses are no
bl/cireumstanc
:
Tbese latera der famnra expected SUI
imble tbat nn;, e of rome nn . east or
conce 'th the advan
ag P asses on thâ If this
and \\1 ('1' more , ht be turne . T nt ino
,'
e one . I nuO' tIe rc _
pI" . , 's trmnf( e t lished, !
west of t 11 '
full y accomp_
' e succes:s
wel

I.

:II

M:I
' 29,
915,

L .\ S D

A X D "r 4\ T I
R ,

hulwarks of the Julien _\lrs to the I'!a;n of
YeTlf'lia, and ae-ross that plain to the gea.
In the mounta ins ,"\'here tÌ1í' front :('1' foHows,
for the most pa rt, Olle of the la tern ì spur
of thð
main Alpine chain, the comlitiom: stiil :11'C those
of t he first t wo sector
, but ,\- hell the lillE' l'omes
down on to the lowf'r kvel
ìld taward
the nbin,
tÌJe defensi, e has, indeerl. no adyantage apr::ul'nt
upon ordinary maps. But l,:,ok at the di
tri(.t 011
any maps of fairly large scale. and yon 'will sre
the way in whil'h the frontier has lõe{.n dea\\1l so
as. to p'rotect the all-ilJ1portant Istrian Penim-,u1a.
from inva<;Ìon. in a fashion \':hich ùrlih'ratt.-].; or
accidel}tall
- has gireu aíhantag('s to' the
defensl\ e.
T}lf' frontirr fit'
t fo1}(,\\-S the Hin:,'r .TlIadi,
which hac;. as it approal'he
the plain, dden"'>d

positions aU along its eastern, or _\ust dew, hlllk.
There is only a tiny front on this Íl"onll('r. of less
than twent,- miles (nearer fifteen), llnon ,,,JÙ.h an
insufljcient' force could deploy. :lll,j thourrh tIle
COlmtI'\' behind it is not mouIlÚÙnou'i. thl'rc"coHies
immediately paraBd with tbe frontier. 3niJ dose
behind it. the drfen!':i,e line of the I
on,:o). wÎih
hill country follll\\.ÍDg ('\'er:. where the r:I
!ern
bank of that riH'r.
.Kow, this, the' olJly VU1nl'1'<tble sretc.I', dt"
;'af}dä
doseI' examination.
TLe political frontier issue's from tbr LiH
cOUDt
'y in ÍIWit of C'
yida1t.... at the, iJl:<gl' of
l\Icrmco. It then contmues dO\\"n tlJf' vaUrv of
force by armieS upon the scale engaged in this the Jua.rli. Thew it cuts across to the KatÜ
()li{"
i:reat war against any adequate modern aefence. pas,::;es immediately in front of ri.l.lmanoyi.\, and
3

k1ûw such a flanking movement would have to
be abandoned by the enemy. TIut, with normal
prevision upon t.!w pHrt of the enemy, such a mme
wOl.1d be impossiLlc. On the w<.'::;t the Steh-i.o
Pass-{l) on the for
goÜig &keteh- -i3 quite im-
pas:;J,ble against a most. mOlteratedefC'llsiw : a true
mountain road and still lalockell \\ it.h mow. The
Tonalr (2), south of the gl'eat. frozen mass of the
Ort leI', is in no brUef cond i t ion. There is ::m
easier pass (3) on],\' a few mile<; to the left of
Lake Garda, but it is still a single mountain foa41
through a defile, :md on eithrl' the ma in Adige'
Yalley or up the .:\rco Yalley from Lake Garda
therc is no 1'0010 for any deployment. The ra ilway
11('gotiates the Yal Sugana o.er tlw pass at Tezæ
(4), hut there is no true l'a,,
age here of any C011-
sidC'rable force.
There is, indeed. onl)' one a venue up the
Trentino, which is that of the nmin .Adige Yalley,
anù an admnce up the Adige Yalle
' would be the
mere forcing of one narrow rOi.HI.
ow we know
how immensely powerful the 11lodern defensive is,
and on the top of that the town of Trent. a cou}Jle
of days' mêll'CU from the yalley, is a strong
fortre..;
.
It lI1av f
id\' 1)e said that the Trentino is for
the Austrians à defensive asset of the first
quality, a.nd that if Italy ,call fl
r
e it she. -v:ilJ
bave a.('h1E
\-ed a task which mIlItary opmlOn
throughout :Europe reganls as one of the utmo:;t
difficulty, and will correspondingly raise her
pre5lige.
Bnt the furcing of the Trentino. supposing
any npprecia.hle strength ]a.
' behind, would _he
barren euough of re
ult. The \alley of the
\(hge
lea.ds only, like all those tributarie!'i of the Po, to
the main chain of the Alp!':, and though the
Brenner Pass (which is its conclusion across the
main ridge) is the easie<;t of the great Alpine
hicrhwavs and the historic roa.d over t.he moun-
tains, modern defensiye opportunities n:ake it
:impregnable to any force save one 0\ er"\\ hehn-
ingly superior to the defendf'T'g. . .
II. The second sector of tIlls front IS that
of the C'arnatic Alps. These form a ridge quite
unbroken saye at the Pa
s which leads from t.he
:Fel1a Yalley past Pontebbo, to the source.:; of the
River SaY('. That gate, though high, is cros
{'d
bv a railway, and is, like the Brenner, one of the
IÙstoric roàd:; of inva<;ion; it was Kapoleon's
road, but it is far too narrow for an attack in
,

'-

C,,)
z':-\
tz.'A

m

Here again then, the defensivC' h
s an o....er-
'whelming oPl'ortuI1ilr, whieh n(lthin,
but siifer
e"'\.11austion or crude mcompett--nc-e v. onhl f<>rego.
and betweði this 1'l':;S and the rpver Adicie
Yalley. a H"liter of ninety mile:;. there is the hicrh
C'arnài ic ..:\Jr,ine wa!I. which no hr
e bod.\' ùi
men could surmount agaiust a def('n"i\
worthy
oÏ ('onsider
t iou.
Iff. There F';.)[lÌns thL' tl.irll Sí'ctÜl' of the
f . ,., 1 1 . I
ronÌler. Willen run", Hawn sout 1 agam across t ie

-::.

"""'
t-ùt.l\

t-\
'7.

.....-
'2.,>>

IV

LAND

A
D

reaches just south of that town the sea marshes
beyond which nothing can be. done, The total
distance from the issue of the lnlls to the marshes
is as the crow flies, no more than fourteen miles,
, All the first part of this-that is, all .the left
bank of the Juarli as far as Brazzano--glYes the
Austrian defensive an excellent series of posi-
tions, though there are places where the right
bank dominates the left, while south of Brazzano
and half-\Hty between that point and Palmanova
there is a knuclde of high land-X-nmth of
Medea, on which any delaying action fought by
the Austrians a<rainst the Italians on this narrow
a
gate would find a point d'appui. .
But let us suppose no attempt IS made to saye
the merel
i political line. The AU8trian
can
readily abandon it, and discO\-er immechately
behind it (not three hours' march away) the
parallel and much more formidable line of the
Isonzo.
This ri,er issues from a gorge which can be
defended with the utmost ease as far as Salc3no,
while the southern part of the line towards the
sea is dominated everywhere by clearly marked
heights from Rubbia to
Ionfalcone on the sea
itself. These heights I have indicated on the
sketch by the letters C-D.
There remain bet' ween the t" 0 positions the
plain and town of Gorizia. This plain is not
more than six miles acr05S, encircled every\vhere
"ith hills, and in a situation for artificial defence
as good as any to be discovered on the frontier.
The line of the Isonzo is a really formidable
line. Until it is carried Trieste and the J strian
Peninsula are safe, unless, indeed, a naval argu-
ment modifies all these conclusions, drawn from
Continental conditions only. It is the point of
sea power. The se
t road towards Trieste is but a
ribbon, everywhere confined between hill country
and the water, úut it is evel',ljwl'lere under tlte guns
of tlle Jtrtlirm Fleet. That fleet is, by far,
superior to the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic.
On the other hand, this war has shown that
a fleet cannot cover a coast aga inst the danger oÎ
submarine attack.
, The modification of tlJe land strategy pro-
duced by this consideration I must leave to my
eolleagne who dpals with naval affairs upon this
papPI', for I am not competent to discuss it. I
merely note it in passing as conceivably nf
ativ-
jng all that is to be said upon t.he strength of the
T strian frontier regarded merely as a military
line h.r land.
To sum up: In all three sectors, though for
different reason:; in each, an Austrian defensive
has very heavy opportunities against an Italian
attack. In the fir:3t sector, the î'rentino, because
the Austrians hold the mouth of an enclosed
yalley. In the second, because they have a v.-all,
the Carnatic Alps. III the third, becau
e thpy
ha\-e on the frontier itself, but much more 011 the
!sonzo, a good natural defensi\e line. Those who
conceive of the campaign as a mere occnp3tion of
the flat country below the ..\Ips by the Italians,
accompanied by a voluntary retirement of the
enemy until the watershf'd is rcaehf'd, have not
paid attention to the details of the ground.
The Italian offensive all along this stretch,
then, from the Lake of Garda to the Istrian
Pcninsula, is heavily handicapped. It has only
ope l
al advantaO'e over the defensive-a serious
. ð ,
one, It posse"ses a first-rate lateral communica-

\V A TER.

1\1 ay 29, 1915.

tion in the railway running on the Italian side
along the foot of the Alps from Verona, through
Trcvezo, to U dine, \\ hich raihvay throws out
branches to the north. Tbe defensive in the hills
has, of course, no such po\\er of moving from right
to left, or of sendipg J1lunitions at will from point
to point. But it is so governed by natural cir-
cmnstances that this Italian ad\antae'e in arti-
ficial lateral communications is far out" eighed.
Meanwhile we must carefu]]y note that thf're
does not cxi::>t on the Italian side corresponding
advantages for the defensive against an offensiyc
undertaken from the Austrian side of the
frontier.
The defensive is so strong 110\\adays when it
is properly entrenched that, with suAicient pre-
paration, almost any line can be held. These
remarks must, therefore, not be taken to mean
that an offensive in equal numbers from Ow
Austrian
ide would be successful. It might or
might not be. But it would only be acting under
the difficulties that eyery otiensi\'e acts under in
modern "ar unless it is backed by yery superior
heavy artillery.
So far as purely natural features are con-
cerned, tile 'wllole frontier is, strategically speak-
in!l, as much a temptation to the el1emy to advance
as it is the threat against an Italian attempt at
tlle offellSite.
AU this is supposing that the enemy can
really spare the men for a proper deÎensive, or
e\Ten for an offensive. 'VhetÌler he can spare them
or no we cannot tell until the action has developed.
But as I write this-upon Tuesùay e\ening-
there comes the news that skirmishes hayc already
taken place upon the third of these three sectors,
the front behind which lies the position of the
Isonzo.

THE HEAVY GUN.
But this discussion of geographical ùetails
and the artificial strel 1 gthening of specified
points is subsiJ.iary in the present campaign
to that one factor which is now known to be
f'verywbere the decisi\e thing-the beayy gun and
its munitionment.
Does Italy propose to force the extremely
strong defensive line of her enemy? Only a
superior concentration of heavy artiHery deliver-
ing

tornado of high explosi\"e ::;hell will be of
efIed.
'Vill she find herself in a position to force
the permanent work:; round Trent? They \\ ill
re:;ist for months, just as Przemysl resisted for
months, unless there is brought against them in
grf'at numbers the heavy mobile howitzer and
with it masses of munition, That modern instru-
ment of war, supplied foJ' ewn forty-eight hours
with an uninterrupted stn
am of projectiles and
charges, wiJI, as we know, dominate most per-
manent ,,,'orks. In a y,cek or ten days it wiU
tÏo:llinate any permanent work. Fiye days nearly
di\.l for Troyo:n; ten d:lYs entirely did for Manoll-
yj Hiers; I'D thc.r more than a week for the perma-
nent works of
.Iaubeugc; a ch
y or t\1'O for
/lntwcrp; and a few hours for ::'\amur. But in
the absenc.c of the weapon aJ1d its pro\'ision thc
permanent work resists indf'finitely.
The lesson is sueh a simpJe one, it was so
rarly seizt'tl by the Frendl General StaIr, it is so
clearly the great tadie-al jS'3ue of the campaign,
that one is almost 3f:hameù to insist on it again.
4*

May 29, 1915.

LAN DAN D J\'" ATE R.

though public opinion still needs that informa-
tion.
The heavy piece decides. And wlmt the for-
tunes of Italy may be in the next few days or
weeks is a question almost certainly to be
answered in the words that answer the question
of Russian resistance upon the line of the San
and the supreme question about what fate will
attend the ultimate offensive in the West. It is
the answer to the question why the enemy swept
Galicia as he did. It will be more and mure
the answer to every remaining problem in t11Ïs
war,
Given the proportion of heavy guns, and of
shell between two combatants at such and such a
criticaJ moment (and shell in the case of heavy
pieces nearly always means, of course, high ex-
plosive shell--everybody has known that except
a few sensational journalists), and you can with
fair certainty predict the result.
The Italian State has had many months in
which to prepare, She has had even more time
t.han since she first began to interfere with
German supplies in December. She has had
time to produce new heavy pieces in great
number. Her engineers are the most skilful in the
world; her modern industrial power in the north
is formidable indeed.
\Vhether full use has been made of aU the
opportunities thus present, particularly in this
crucial matter of the hea "y piece, the immediate
future alone can show.
One last point must be remembered in con-
uection with the entry of Italy into the war: it
limits the avenues of enemy supply to the Xorth
Reil. and the Xorth Sea is now at last strictly
gua rded. It eliminates the only Great Power in
Europe concerned as a neutral to trade with the
enemy, It is true that Italy had ceased to send
war munitions through since December and
January last. But now we know that nothing
will go through. The neutrality of Switzerland

.... Opa.t'CW

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;
...
''.1. .

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i"'.

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.

is, indeed, guarant('ed, but in the matter of com-
mercial supplies Switzerland will have to be
(whatever oflicial term may be used) rationed by
the French and the Italians, for Germany will
gi ve her nothing.
(P.S.-As the above was written on Tuesday,
erenmg the news came through that the Italian
corning troops had advanced towards the line of
tlLe Isonzo upon ,Monday, the 24th, 'IT:eeting but
little resistance, but nothing had developeâ at thø
moment of going to press u'orth!J of comment.)

THE BATTLE OF THE SAN.

"
e knew last week, by the latest adyices
upon which the article in these columns was then
written, that the Russian rf'treat to the San and
the Russian proposal to hold the line of that
river, the continuation of that line northward
through Russian Poland, and south\\ard to the
Dneister, had in part failed and in part suc-
ceeded, as follows:
(1) The enemy had managed to cross the Sãn
upon a sector about eleven miles in length, begin-
ning at Jaroslav and going up to Lela
how,
(2) The Russians had determ ined to hold on
to the very dangerous salient of Przemysl-wh

it was dangerous and the consequences of thUi
holding it we shall see in a moment.
(3) Upon the extreme south of the line thø
Russians had advanced over a belt of about eleven
or twelve miles between the Dneister and the
Pruth. They had there inflicted very heavy losses
upon the Austrians in this region, but had not
succeeded in going further than the Pruth,
(4) They had a similar success upon the ex.
treme right or northern end of their line in
Russian Poland, aavancing by a belt of about
similar width from the river running through
Opatow (I do not know the name of it) to the
parallel river running through I waniska.

.

ef

I
I

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..cvelU
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Tü;obr%.eg

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'1 3 4 5 10

f I I I .

MilLs
Skttch of tht Ad.van.ce of Russian Right Wing-
North of \istWa, in Russian Poland_

.
.
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Ni6kc-..
':i-.
1õ j.!.t'Os1a.w '.
50 MiUe

. .
,...

LAND AND :w A TER.

kind, but has left upon the southern edge of the
." neck" of this salient, at D, an extremely Hllner-
able sector in the Russian defence. The main
railway line, which has come south from Jaroslav,
runs eastward here from Przcmysl towards the
main base at Lemberg, and this railway lies but
a very short distance indeed behind the positions
to which the Russians have been pressed, at D.
To cut that railway would be for the enemy, not
indeed equivalent to the breaking of the Russian
line, but the next best thing to it, and perha ps a
preliminary to it, too. The whole district
of Przemysl would fall into his hands, a multi-
tude of unwounded prisoners would be cut off, and
there would be such an indentation made in the
here curiously twisted profile of the Russian front
that it might very well give way altogether.
The enemy, perceiving this, struck blow aîter
blow at D for the possession of the railway. He
is still striking those blows.
He is restricted here to a comparatively
narrow front, because upon his right, between the
f VI twõ towns of K.omarno and Drohobycz, is
is the San; P is Przemysl; T -J the main railway an extensive marshy district (M), in which troo1's
line from Tarnow to Jaroslav; the shaded oblong cannot operate.
represents the .. bolt"; the shaded line the It is lucky for the Russians that this natural
enemy, and the white the Russians. These obstacle exists, for it prevents the enemy from
last are perpetually retiring before the ad- extending the area of his attacks east of Przemy.;l
vance, and day by day, as they retire, just save and it gives the Russian line here something to
themseh-es from breaking at the centre under repose upon. But the enemy, to prevf'nt a RussÜm
the repeated blows of the" bolt," which is tied concentration against him and to hold the ma>..i-
to, and launched alonO', the main railway. The mum number of troops elsewhere, is attacking
process continues untiî this bolt reaches the San with almost {'qual violence beyond the marshes in
(8-8) at Jaroslav (J). Jaroslav is carried and front of and to the east of StrJ'j,
6*

1n the week that has passed we have seen the
development of this situation, and we have also
had information which helps to explain it. The
great main elements of the whole thing are these:
The entire enemy movement from its incep-
tion upon the Dunajec four weeks ago to the
present day has had for its object the breaking of
the Russian line.
The instrument for effecting this was a very
large body of men, amounting altogether to
perhaps a third of all the enemy's numbers in this
southel'n part of the Eastern front, and mainly
consisting of German troops. In artillery they
massed no less than 4,000 pieces, of which (in-
credible as it may seem) 2,000 are estimated to
have been heavy pieces of various kinds.
This gigantic "bolt" was very dense in
general formation, and in its tactical action
struck day after day in swarms denser even than
has previously been seen upon the German side in
this war,
On this account the Austro-German losses
were extremely heavy: though the enemy had the
advantage of retaining as prisoners most of those
who fell upon the Russian side during these great
operations, yet his total losses are almost cer-
tainly twice as heavy as the Russians, and
perhaps more.
"\Ve discover that a concentration so enor-
mous and the use of heavy shell to the extent,
perhaps, of two million rounas, necessitated the
ad\'ance of this main body strictly along the
('hief railway line, Tarnow-Jaroslav, All the in-
dentation in the Russian line throughout the re-
treat lies upon that railway line, and the supply
proceeding along it is the explanation of the whole
central advance of the Germans and Austrians.
Meanwhile, above and below this central
"bolt," the whole enemy line was advancing
northward as far as beyond Kielce (K), south-
ward from across the Carpathians nearly as far
as Stanislau (8- T).
The whole thing may be roughly represented
thus, where V -V is the line of the V istula; S-S

-.... -r#

R-'

, '1

:Mny 29, 1915,

certain pas&'lges of the San forced. It looks for a
moment as though the Russian centre was going
to break at last.
The critical day "e now see to ha,e been
Ion-
day, the 17th of .May; but the German forces across
the San were unable to hold more than a na lTOW
belt, Russian reinforcements arrived in sufficient
numbers for the moment, the expenditure of
enemy ammunition had partially exhausted his
supply, and for rather more than a week the bolt
was checked, and the Russians, as a whole, stood
to the positions upon which they had been forced.
Meanwhile the retention of Przemsyl had
given an opportunity to the enemy elsewhere than
at the point where the" bolt" was acting-that
is, elsewhere than in the neighbourhood of Jaro-
slav. Of that opportunity the enemy at once took
advantage. He is, at the moment of writing, still
pressing that advantage with all his might.
In the accompanying sketch of the whole line
it will be seen that the retention of Przemysl has
not only produced a salient of a very peculiar

/ .

tOO :MiIU.

vn

May 29, 1915.

LA
D

AND

\V ATE R .

\Ve hav('. then. proc<.'edin
at this moment.,
apart from the general fight. nll alnn
t.he line
nd
from Russia.n Poland right down to the Bukonna,
three special centres of effort: (1) The now
dwindling effort of what was the main bolt, north
of Jarosl
v. It has crossed the San, but has not
got much further. (2) The effort in front of Strr.i,
which is subsidiary to the whole plan, and. indeed,
princi pally directed to " holding" the Russian3
in front of it. (3) What is undoubtedly, for the
moment, the main effort, that noW" being pressed
with all the vigour the enemy can command
against the main Lemberg railway line east of the
Przemysl salient.
It is upon this last that we must concentrate
our attention during the next few d:lYs; it is here
that the success or failure of the enemy's great
effort in its last phase will probably be deter- !

0 7
mined. Rc..'!.9t's in. 1000 MdJ?s...

The details of all this are as follows : f%f:
-'/,
'?--
U F . d 1\1 I G d
ä

/........

pon · nay, 1.. ay 14, t 1e ermans un er ....v
<>;..;

1Iackensen reached the outskirts of Jaroslav and .....:
V;;. }Ý.
began their attack upon the outskirts of that Litle on /Leiglzl/z..eld
' .

f(;

bridge-head, behind which the Russian eolumns f:g :Russia:7- 1JÙisÍOtL " L
zowlta ........-
were retreating on to the other bank of the San. 11-
-1.5!!!: Afa.!j " al
.E

2
.:C:
The Russian trenches followed the crests to the f{gktitl11 del'EJillg ,
t . 'J I
'west of the town, the Meierk0f, the J upaszowka ac LD
ð.:J a I
Hill, and the Château of ChemiansL..i. The Rus- 'Rear;gr.:.a.rd ---t\ + 1.Æ..1Ierkof

, 2W hd aw"" ó1
si:tn rear gu ard nosted here was not strong. It .....!h, water

. -...

consisted of a smgle division, and its functIon ..._-
_ Jal'oslav
""as apparently no more than to fight a delaying V'"
action while the passage to t
e right bank of the this region, as do the dots upon the above sketch,
San was being effected by t e mass of its com- and has been able to maintain this position for a
rades. It succeeded in achieving its Ltsk, holding -week.
up Mackensen's Germans during the whole of the :Meanwhile, on the extreme north of the line
Friday and Saturday, long after (l
rk. on the in Russian Poland the Russians had successfully
latter day-the 15th; but before mldmght the advanced on the Monday. and on this same Tues-
heights were carried and Jaroslav was in th,) day were consolidating their admnce at Iwaniska.
enemy's hands. Their total line upon this day foHowed the stream
During all this fighting and in the previous from Iwaniska to the Yistula; uncovered Tar-
days, the Russians bad bern able to ascertain what nobrzeg; cut across the Peninsula between the Vig-
units had been withdrawn from the "'-estern tula and the San to the neighbourhood of Nisko.
front for this main enemy effort in Galicia. They and then ran up covering the river and lying on
would seem to have been the 1st and 2nd Division the left bank as high as Lezachow. The whole Ella
of the Guard, the 10th active and the 41st Reserve is shown on sketch VII. on the preceding page.
Corps; two more composite divisions formed of After Lezachow it yielded both banks for a
regiments specially picked for this work, and stretch of eleven miles down to above ,Jaroslav.
sundry detached units over and above these. The after which point it ran to, and corre-
very high proportion of heavy artillery accom- sponded with, the works surrounding PrzemysJ,
panving and permitting the advance of the whole went round by the south of that ring of
greãt force along the railway may be judged hy forts, but came up dangerously far nort.h on the
the fact that the Guards alone were backed by east, only just covering the railway at D, then
fifty heavy pieces. coming down sharply to the marshes of the
On Monchy, the 17th, the critical day in this Dneister. Beyond these it is not very clear how it
area, the San "Was crossed in se\reral places. The ran, but apparently corresponded roughly to the
river offers, along the ten or eleven miles below Dnei::;ter line until the approaches of the Buko
Jaroslav, several opportunities for forcing such a vina, where the success of a fortnight ago put it
passage under the cover of heavy bombardment. -well to the south again, occupying :Kadworna. but
The chief passage seems to have been effected failing to include the important junction of
at the fords of Lezachow. It "Would seem as Delatyn, failing to cut the railway bet.wecn Dpb-
though the enemy, once in possession oÎ points tyn and Kolome3:' failing to occupy the bridp{a-
upon the right bank of the San, had pushed down head of Kolorrea Itself, but further do"\\n crosslTI þ
it, clearing the whole bank, for there was fighting the Pruth and occupying the point of Sniatyn. A
in which certain Russian bodies were pushed little below the latter it went round n(\rth of the
across the Lubaczo"Wska, ,,,here the enemy line Pruth aO'ain, just failed to occupy Cærnowitz.
touched Pradawa. and so re
ched the frontier.
By the Tuesday morning, the 18th, it was Such was the shape of the Russian front on
fairly clear that the Russian line parallel with, May 17. This shape it stiìl retains at the
but behind the San, at this point, would hold. It moment of writing (Tuesday, the 25th). and,
is true the Austrian body captured Sieniawa upon as bas been pointed out above, the danger-point
that day, but tbe enemy advance got no furth,
l'. is probably no longer th
sector just north of
Roughly speaking, the Russian line now lies in Jaroslav, but the dent D, east of Pr7emysl.
7*

-- - -

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Xow let u
sre what has happened there at
D. _-\1l the eud of the \,'eek-FridaT, the 14th,
Saturday, the 15th, Sunday, the 16th-a bombard-
ment "as being kept up abme the western \\orks
of PrzcInysl, which the Hussians had elected to
defend. But it was not here that the main effort
was to be looked for: that came ten miles away,
to the east, at Hussakow, to which point the
enemy got in his yiolent effort of the :Monday and
the Tuesday, the 17th and 18th.
It would seem that he captured Hussakow
upon Tuesday, the 18th, towards the end of the
day. But he "as driven out of it: apparently,
upon the Wednesday, the 19th, He thereupon did
'what he has done throughout this campaign-
attempted a flanking movement, and struck hard
at Lutkow-and Lutkow the enemy carried and
held. Beyond this point he could not proceed, but
the following rather more detailed sketch will
I>how how dangerously close he is to tbe railway
at this short Rector of the front.
M('anwhile, away beyond the marshes, forc.es
under Linsinger were fighting between Stryj and
Stanislau, trying to occupy the Russians in front
of them and preyent their sending reinforcements
to the lleighbourhood of Przemysl. They were.
further, attempting to push the Russians before
them beyond the line of the Dniester.
In 'the Bukovina the Archduke Eugene was
doing no more than hold his own after the retire-
ments to\'mrds the Pruth, which has been lately
mentioned.
THE ENEMY ON THE EASTERN
FRONT HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED.

o\\, the whole of this great battle, which is

May 29, 1915.

still in process, has clearly for its ('nemy object
the piercing of the Russian line, while the object
of our ally IS to preserve the cohesion of his line,
in spite of grave lack of supply and in face of
what has hitherto been the far superior munition-
ing of the enemy.
The whole meaning of this battle, therefore.
lies in the two alternatives. Either the Russian
line will remain intact or it wiU not.
If it remains intact the enemy is, strategic-
ally speaking, beaten. The fact that he has
advanced; the fact that he has nearly cleared
Galicia of the enemy; the fact that he has reduced
the Russian forces originally present in Galicia
by a sixth or even a fifth; the fact that he has
destroyed or captured of their field artillery a
twentieth or a tenth; his possible entry into
Przemysl-all these matters, which are so many
scores on his side and which will necessarily, and
perhaps rightly, impress general opinion, are in a
difierent category altogether from the major busi-
ness of his strategic objective-the piercing of
tbe line.
As to losses, though he has the advantage of
taking prisoner the stragglers and wounded of
the retiring enemy, his actual loss of strength is
certainly very much heayier than that of the Rus-
sians, for he has attacked in the most compact
shape and every succeeding day with the intention
on that day of breaking, at no matter what ex-
pense, his opponent's line. As to his geographical
advance, it gives him strategically only this
advantage-that the good railw:ry system of
,Galicia passes more and more into his hands,
while his foemen are more dependent as they retire
npon the inéfficient railway system of Russia,

.f
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e.

1
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2
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''!óS.A2f11OR

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a*

Iay 29, 1915.

LA
D AND

As to tLe purely moral effect of certain 113mes
such as that of Przemysl, unl..ss a garrison and a
great deal of material were captured at the same
time, it may be neglected,
But the piercing of the Russian line would be
quite another matter, It would be a decision.
Now the clements which decide the chances
of this event are numerous. They include, among
the more important, the numbers of men engaged.
and the equipment of the infantry and its muni-
tion. But far and away the greatest of all the
factor3 in the issue is the munitioning of the
artillery, and particularly of the big guns and
howitzer
. Upon that, more than upon anything
else, the Issue will turn.
"'.,. e are not yet in possession of known facts
which permit onr judgment to repose upon a
secure foundation. But we can estimate the pro-
babilities of the situation.
Power of artiUery. and particularly of heavy
artillery, obviou3ly depend upon these fonr
factors:
(1) The number of pieces.
(2) The munitions present-that is, the
at;1ount of shell pres(>nt for discharge from those
pIeces.
(3) The rate at which communications can
send up supply to the front (which rate governs
the rate of discharge).
(4) The rate at which heavy munitions can he
produced or purchas('d at the sources of supply,
which ultimately governs the whole problem.
To these four factors one might add two
more: The power of .. spotting," through air-
work or otherwise, BO as to determine the range,
and the general efficicncy in tbe handling of the
pieces. But these last two points may be elimin-
ated, as they are pretty well equal on both sides
upon the Eastern front.

Kow, these four factors being the deciding
things we must first of aU recognise that in the
number of pieces between Central Poland and the
Bukovina-that is, upon the three-hundl'ed-mile
line which is the scene of the pre:;ent great battle
-the enemy has certainly an advantage. He can
produce heaYf pieces in greater numbers tl1an the
Russians can. And since he has been able to keep
hig heavy artilJery going forward at thp rate of
a.bcut five miles a day, he will, during the check
impose\.l upon his advance for a whole week or
more, have certainly got eyerything into line.
Again. on the fourth point, the ultimate
power of producing munitions, t.he enemy dearly
has an a(lvantage. He is far more highly indus-
trialised than Russia. and Uussia's power of pur-
chasing from outside is limited h
' the blockade,
including the dosing of the D:"lrdanclles, ìì hich
leave,; her no a\'enues of SUPt1ly
aye the little gate
r!.Ænd the north of the Baltic, the port of Arch-
an;eL anJ the very distant ports of the Far East.
The issue really lies. thcI'Pfore, in the se
ond
an.l thir,l poin
s:w the' supply of nmmnnition
pre::'.èl1t 0n t.he front and tht' ra.tp at \\ hie!! the com-
munications can pa.::;s it up. Sooner or bteI' tll;>
grmt surpl:' of heavy artiller:" ammunition can
l,c rea('cumulat
d \w the ell('"'11Y in gre3ter amount
than h... om,' aìlv. hit can lIt'
nòdni"'e it in tht' nisi,;;
of t.hi

partièu1;u hattle in sl'JIìeit>nt [PY\ount

\nd are the a(h'.lI1t
ge::> of CdîlHI1Unie3,t!on l,-.'ing

..} ind hi" line st ill so superior tn th(".st' l."ing
behi:ld tht> Rus
ia.n line that he wiH müint.ain a.
sec-nft' 3ur
rinrity in the ('ri
i
of the l,
ttIE"?

\V
\ T E R .

It Play be doubte{l, and for the following
rea
ons :
The expenditure of heavy artillery ammuni-
tion during the last month upon the enemy's side
in Galicia has been like nothing hitherto
attempted in the war. The dozen or so great pre-
liminary actions by which the French have laid
their foundation in tbe \Vest, and the two or three
in which the British have supported them, in-
volved a concentrated fire of from half an hour to
four hours at a time, with long intervals bet\yeen
each outburst. The interval
were thus prolonged
because the Allies in the "-est rightly believed
that time was upon their side, and were deter-
mined, if they must shoot away very large amounts
in these preliminary actions of the last three, or
four months, yet to shoot it away at a rate less
than the rate of accumulation that was going 011
behind the line. They are rightly determined that
when the biggest moyement of all comes there shall
be an overwhelming reserve of shell.
But the enemy in Galicia was, during an
:May, fighting against time and determined. for
political as well as for purely military reasons, to
do his very utmost. The enem,}' in Galicia was
doil1g with his munitions what the _\.llies in the
.\Vest will only do with thei i' munitions when they
choose to pro
'oke and to init.iate the crisis of the
Vy
3r.
Therefore the enemy in Galicia ,,-as perfectly
lavi:3h with heavy artillery munitions day after
day.
. The intervals between each outburst of his
concentrated fire ,,-ere not interml3 of ''rceks, but
only of days, and sometimes of hours. Thf're was
a deluging of the DUllajec aud Biala line for three
whole da
's-the last two days of April and the
first of ,Ma.v. T\,,-eIve miles further on, in the
middle of Hie first \vet:k of Mav. t)wre was another
sueh deluge of shell. At t.he
e!Jd of the week. a
third upon the r pper Yïslock aTld across the
plain to the Yistula; two more in t.he next week-
and so forth. 'Vhilc, upon reaching the line of
the San, at the end of three weeks. the forcing
of that river above Jaroslav was accomplished
e'!{actl,v as the forcing of the Duna.jec l)ad been
accomplisheù 1\\enty days before--by a riot of
heavv sheIl.
ÌÆt it be noted. further, that althoue'h the
San was forced under this immense expenàiture
of ammunition, there did not follo,,- a Russian
retirement such as took place upon the Dlmajec.

\ sc\'tor of the River San, a full day's march
in length from the Jaroslav northwards, was
possessed and held. But after that feat the Rus-
sians forbaùe a further moyement forward. They
continued securely to hold the lower reaches of the
ri\-er. To the north, beyond the Vistula, they
ar.tualIr ;uJvanced, as they diJ to the soutb
between the Dneistcr and the Pruth. Meam..hile,
such immediate visible supply of heavy ammuni-
tion as the Russians could command had app
l-
rently bæn coming up from the b:lscS in Russia.
The raih\<1v system behind the Russians is ill-
sufih:ient, but It incrmscs in power as tbe Rus-
sian c('mmunic-atiollS shorten.
One may put the matter-quite hypothetic-
aìly. of course-in terms of given spaces of time.
Supro
e the enemy has largely exhausted his
snpplic-; at the front, and cannot renew tbem for,
say, .1 fortnight or more, that would be ample
time for the consolidation of the new Russian

g"

LAND AND ;1YATER.

line, and tl1(' attempt to break it would have
failed.
Xow, supposing the Russian line--on account
of this gradual depletion o.f munitions on the
enemy's side and correspondmgly gradual accre-
tion on the Russian side-to stand, why would
such a dull result be equiyalent to a strategic
defeat for the enemy 1 '
Because in these moments, which are tLe
critical moments of the whole campaign, there can
be no such thing as the establishmcnt of a dead-
lock.
The enemy is fighting in the East in order to
get his decision, and, haying got his decision, he
would re\"erse the machinf' and put all his energy
into an a ttack on the 'Vest. He must hope to
deliwr that attack with his full weight before
the Allies strike th{'ir main blow. Quite apart
from the intpfYention of Ital
T, that must neces-
sarily be his general pIan. There is no other.
This being the case, he is under the necessity
of achie, ing his object in the East within certain
limits of time, or of !<acrificing himself again in
the East "hen he turns back westward. If he
attempts to hold the ground he has conquered in
Galicia-as prC'babl,v he l'ìiIl-he is thereby
weakening his oncoming \York in the \Yest, and
he is C'xposing himself to a counter-offensive
whenever the accumulation of RussÜm supply
permits it. In a word, if t.he Russian line stands,
then the enemy is Rimpl
', for all his efforts in
Galicia, coming back to the strategic conditions
eÀisting befOIc he
tru('k his great blow.
He has achiewd a great deal. He has saved
Hungary f 1'Om inYa
ion, and he has raised, for
"hat that is worth, the already determined spirit
of the civilian population behind his armies. But
he has not done what is necei"sary to the prosecu-
tion of his plan. He has not released the full
reserves of energy which lie will require immedi-
ately upon the 'Vestern front.
.When I speak thus of "reversing the
machine" and " turning its reseryes of energy
towards the \Yestern front," I do not only mean
an accretion of the enemy in numerical strennth
of men upon the vVestern front. I lllean even m
re
the relmsing of munitions and guns for the work
there; and the direction of his productive
capacity, of his streams of shell, westward, after
their outpouring for a month past towards the
East.
Let us sum up, therefore-or, rather, repeat--.
and say that we are stilI 3'\aiting in this great
hattle of the San one of two issues: Either the
Hu:,;sian line breaks or it does not. And if it doe3
not break t1,e enemy is a great deal further frOtH
his chances of an inconclusive peace, and a great
deal nearer thorough defeat than he was ,,, hen he
crossed the Dunajec.
But let us not forgpt the alternative. If the
Austro-German forces under the effect of superior
nmnitionment for the heavy pieces do pierce their
opponent's line, they ha\Te all the southern part of
it at their me!'('y, they compel the Russians to lose
the line of the Y istula; they will be in a position
to ad quite soon with very heavy reinforcements
on the "\\T est, and they \ViII be nearer to the goal of
"hat they term .. an honourable peace" and to the
saving of Prussia than they have been since the
Decemher morning when they pierced the Russian
front before 'Varsaw in that terrible crisis of
which. in this country, "c heard nothing, ana the

lIfay 29, 1915.

extreme peril of which was but just barely con-
jured by the restoration of the Russian line upon
the third day.
THE DARDANELLES.
Of the operations upon the DardaneHes we
know nothing save that "e have the casualty lists,
as yet incomplete, and that the first enemy posi-
tion, that of Achibaoa, is not yet taken. It is clear
that the general plan connotes as great an inter-
ference as possible "With the enemy.s munitioning
in shell and reinforcement in numbers from the
Asiatic side across the Straits, :md the hope that
this interfercnce may prove fatal ultimately to his
continual resistance. How far this hope is justi-
fied only the future can tell.
THE 'VEST.
The rcally important point about the \Yestf'rn
front during the last ,veek, if we regard the war
as a whole, is purely negative. It is the refusal of
the offensive until the chosen moment. There has
heen local work on the lower slopes of the Notre
Dame de Lorette position, but what happens here
does not VelY ]}}uc.h matter, for now the junction
of the lateral communications at Lens is weII jn
range.
There has been more imporfant 'work
straightening out the dent between the two
salients oCèupieù in the admnce of a few days ago,
the one in front of l;'estuhert, the other in front
or Richeboul'g I'A\'oué, each rather under a mile
in depth. It was in this straightening out of the
dent betlyeen the two f'.alients that the incident
occurred ,\ hich is worthy of comment in a separate
note.

A NOTE.
There are two perfectly well 3uthenticated
pieces of news of which we have the best evi-
dence this week, :lnq, which, though thcy only
concern slight details, are most significant.
They are of a nature which those ,,\ ho con-
cern thcmsehes with the moral issues of this
war are more concerned with, perhaps, than is
military criticism; but that criticism also can
learn a uscfullcsson from them.
The first piece of nev\'s is this-we have all
read it in the papers under the best authority,
_\. budy of Saxons (presumably without
officers) were ad..-ancillg to surrcnder to the
British the other day. They h.?ld up their
hands in sign of their desire to be m3 de pri-
soners and to be relieved of the strain of \\ar-
for they wpre in a ,ery perilous position.
As, rightly or \H(mgly, it is admissible in
North German morals to use such methods as
a ruse, the British troops continued to fire upon
the men thus desiring to surrender, because
they could not teU whether the holding up of
hands was an action done in good faith or was
what our forefathers ,,"ould have called a piece
of treachery.
Meanwhile this body of presumably
officer less Germans "as obser...('(1 by other
bodies of the enemy whose oflìcers ,\ ere stiIl
present to control them, and tllf'se at once
poured in a fhe which JJ1a
::,acretl the ,yould-be
surrenderers.
Throughout thi!': "ar the great military
"irtues of the enemy have been dearly apparent:
his patient preparation and his discipline
('hief, l)(>}'haps, among the rest. But there has
10'+

been a tendency, especial1y in this country, to
forget that the particular type of military excel-
]ence the enemy displays carries with it and
connotes corresponding "eaknesses. The French
:ue fully aware of this truth; and it would
be well iî puhlic opinion in this country
would seize it also, because upon it must
largely be founded any just forecast of the
future.
Concei,-e of a body of British troops, even
though deprived of their officers, thus a(h-anc-
illg, when they were not surrounded, simply
Leea use they were feeling the strain too much,
and proposing to surrender! Further conceiye
other bodies of British troops at the orders of
oft-Jcers surviving among them shooting down
these defaulting members of their own body!
The story would not be credible.
In the case of the Xorth German it is pe!'-
fectIy credihle, and, indeed, we all know it to be
true.
\Yhy is this? It is because the type of (lis-
cipline produced by Prussian tradition is
mechanical. The fact that the men massacred
"ere Saxons and the men massacrin,
them pre-
sumably Prussians is of some weight, because
the inability of the yarious German tribes to
coalesce (although they are perpetually shift-
ing and changing) is one of the chief marks
of European history for 2,000 years. But
we know well enough that exactly the same
thing would haye happened if the surrendering
hoops had been Pmssians. \Yhat happened
\\ as that a body of modern German soldiers,
haying lost their officers, turned at once into an
utterly difierellt organism from the same body
posses
ed of its offieers. That means, among
other things, that a break-up, when it began,
would be e
l'eedingly rapid. It means, of
course, a great deal more than the mere func-
tion of the officer in the Prussian system. Th

whole anecdote is enormously significant and
must be carefully weighed for its full value to
a!)pear. It must be weighed especially by
tho
e who know the opposite pole of European
ciYilisation and "ho are acquainted -with the
promotion from the ranks which in the French
servi
e has been continuous throughout this
war. The words u8ed by the English officer
des
rihing this f'urious scene merit textual re-
proJucti01l :
.. The remains of a battalion of Saxons . . ,
thrown into the t1ghting, haYing decided to
surrender en bloc . . . some hundreùs
st!'ong , . :'
The seco'HI aneedote, equally wen authen-
t ieateJ, is t ha t of a l.ody of siÜ" Germans w h.)
behaved as follows, ob, Iously ptîrsuant to some
ge 1 1er[ll order:-
They first (If all stripped the Briti
h dead of
their uniforms. Theil they put on these uni-
forms. Then one of tlteir number "ho knew
]
I!gli
h thoronghly was ordered to advance to-
". ald
a Rritish tr(,rJch and to call out: "Don't

hoot, we are the GrenadIer Guards." An Eng-
lish of.rì.r'er thereupon left the British trene-h,
appro<Jch('J the di:<glli::;ed Gèl'll'ans. and "'a
at
(ìl1Cf" ...:hot at - luckilv he v, as mis
ed. Thf'
Briti
h then. after }))'eliminary fire. charged
\\ ith the hayonet and killpd C\ ery one of the
Germcllls \\ hõ had aded in this fasl;ion.
)\'0\\, it would be ea!-ov to wa
t(' rI.etoric

May 29, 1915.

LAND

AND ,W A TER.

upon this second e
amrJ
of the enemy's
methods, but for the purposes of thest:"' notes I
am con.cerneq. only with the military lesson to
be drawn from them. It is of a piece "VI- ith a
thousand other details in the war. all of which
may be combined under some such formula as
this, upon "hich all the enemy's mind reposes:
" "Tar is nothing in itself. It is but a
means to an end. All restraint upon it
due to the isolated military temper is a cause of
weakness."
That is exactly the Prussian tradition. The
chivalric side of war (which proceeds from an
isolation of the military temper and is a pro-
duct of soldierly living) is regarded by the
Prussian tradition just as a chemist regards
some bye-product in a process of manufacture,
which bye-product is due to the isolation of his
material and hurtful to the object he has in view.
That the spirit of the soldier should per-
meate the State, as it did in Rome or in Revolu-
tionary France, is the last thing the Prussian
theorist desires. It would breed what are, in
his eyes, romantic excrescences of sentiment,
hampering the progress of the State and strang-
ling its gro\\'th. The soldiers are, in the Prus-
sian scheme, instruments conformable to
mechanical formulæ in the sen-ice of the State:
they must never produce an organ ism develop-
ing virtues and a savour of its own-once they
do that they deflect the aim of the State as a
whole.
Xow, one of the most interesting (and
purely military) questions which the war will
decide is whether this fashion of treat-
ing warfare is ultimately successful. It has
given us example after example of actions
which have no direct militarv effect, which are
intended only to impress cï-vilians or neutrals.
It has given us the use of poison, and may very
wen before the campaign is o,'er give us an ex-
ample of massacre.
As a mere conjecture I ".ould suggest that
this spirit would betray a very great weakness
in defeat, not because it is compatible with
courage---on the contrary, we see it permeating
men "ho display the utmost courage in facing
death-but beè<1use it is the very opposite of
instincti,,-e. Laborious calculation is a neces-
sity of its existence, and in the di::;arrav of de-
feàt it would go to pieces; at lea
t, so I surmise.
Helice, if a
oldier can help the State best
by spying, he lllUSt spy: by poisoning, he must
poison: by treason, he must betray: by death,
he must be wining and ready to die.
It is a system producti,-e of yery great re-
sults. as we have seen for t\\O hundred years.
The principal objection is tha.t it is too simpÌe and
omits the incalculable part in the human affairs.
Also, it "astes energy enormou
ly in the repres-
sion or elimination of subconscious, instinctive
things: especially of tho
e produced most
naturally in I!1ilit
Hr life. from the profound,

l1ch as Honour, to the sllperfir'ia 1, sueh as the
Pa Ii qch P.

H. BELLOC'.

M

, HILAIRE n:-L'O':::" "AU LECITRES,
,'IIr. Belloe's not lecture at Queen's Hull, London, u'ill be
on Wednesday, June 2nd. It u'ill be illustrafed b.Y co loured shdes
of the leeent fighting and will deal u'ith the present position of
the [far.
"'Ir. Belloe's nej.t leclwe at the H'ill!el Gardens, Boume-
mouth. is at 3.30, Monday, June 28th.
11*

LAND AND "W..A TER.

?\Iay 29, 1915.

THE

WAR

BY

WATER.

By A. H. POLLEN.

NOIE,-This article has been submitted to the Press Barean, which does not object to the publication as censored, Ind takes no
responsibility for the correctness .f the statements.

of the hands of :Mr, Churchill and Lord Fisher
and confided to others.
It is no part of my duty here to àiscuss this
exceedingly important event. But it is right that
the public should be reminded of a thing which
has been completely lost sight of, where it has not
been misrepresented.. in recent discussions. Much
has been said of the splendid services and eminent
talents of the veteran Admiral of the Fleet who
has retired from the arduous office of chief naval
member of the Board of Admiralty. U
fortu-
nately, enthusiasm has carried many of his
admirers far beyond the limits of useful apprecia-
tion. They injure the person they are trying to
serve, and they imply that the British "Kavy, de-
prived of a particular leader, must lose much of
its ficrhtinO' value. Tbis is grave injustice to
flag clncer
who are now serving. To those who
know anything of the professional estimate of the
outstand'ing figures in the three Admiral lists
nothing can appear more ludicrous than to sup-
pose that there could be any serious difficuJty in
finding a competent First Sea Lord. If there were
:my difficultv, it would be limited to the em-
barrassment .of tbose who bad to choose the most
worthy who could best be spared f
om
ther
duties. Tha.t there are manv worthv IS ObVIOUS.
It is one of the most curim;s of our'" charactpris-
tics as a nation that while public curiosity has
brought every other class into the gl
re of new.s-
paper notoriety the officers of the !\avy remaI?
unknown. Accidental circumstances have fanu-
liarised us with a few n::lmes-all of men long
since retired. Of the younger generation the
reader of ne
V8rapers knows nothing. It looks,
therefore, to some as if to pass the supreme com-
mand from a known to an unknown man were
equivalent to exchanging the leadership of i1
g,:mius for that of an incompetent. The sooner
this delusion ends, the better for us all. The
Nayy has men of talent, knowledge, courage, and
experience not onlv to fill all the commands, but
to make at least t
m alternative Boards as well.
It is no service to the nation or its AHies to speak
as if this were not the case.

A 'VEEK OF CHANGES.
T HE past week has been
lmost barr
n of
nayal news. No operatIOn at sea IS re-
ported. There appears to be no material
change in the position in the Dardan
lles
-none, at least, affecting the sha
e th
Navy,
is ultimately to take in th3-t exceedmgly Import-
ant field. There have been, as so often before,
rumours that the German High Seas Fleet was
on several d::lYs west of Heligoland. But even an
excursion in force to the Dogger Bank hardly
justifies its sonorous title, and certainly
oes not
prove any intention to seek a general actIOn. It
IS free to " come out" when it likes. For a cer-
tain radius, its ::Idion is not, and in modern con-
ditions apparently cannot be, interfered wit
by
tbe capital ships under ei
h
r Sir Jo
n Jelhc?e
or Sir David Beatty. But It 18 a restflcted cham
that tethers it to Heligoland. It dare not .get
beyond the range of a safe run back to the mme-
fieÌds, unless it is ,villing to dare
Yerythin.g. If
it could lure our faster squadrons llltO fightlllg on
ground prepared by mines; where st
bmarines are
waitinO'; into which destroyer flotIllas can be
poured
a partial battle in conditions of German
choosing-{)ur enemy have always bee
ready to
offer us. But it seems that we may walt for ever
to the decisive fight.
There is a lull, wbether intentional or not
we cannot yet tell, in the submarine war. Ol!ly
two ships have been attacked and sunk; two ShIpS
and a few trawlers. Has the American Kote
brought reflection to the 'Vilhelmstr
sse 1 It is
not impossible. Keutrals are becomlllg scarce.
,'Ihe pirate campaign has been in every sense a
failure, No future sucæss can compensate for
the loss of rf'putation it has brought; for nothing
short of seriously crippling British trade and
food supplies is a SUCf'ess at all-and three
months of brigandage have shown both t
ese
objects to be unattainable. And the submarmes
are wanted elsewhere. The Kaiser might intend
to m::lke an American virtue of a German neces-
sitv and call the whole thing off. He must do so
soõner or 13t('r. It is not inconsistent ,'vith the
facts that it has been called off ::Ilready. It will THE ITALIAN NA. VY.
take some time to O'ive new orders to åu the sub-
marines. Many
ust be away on long-spell T HE intervention of the Italian Kayy
hould
cruises in distant grounds-and their wireless have a profound effect, not. only l!l, t.he
is not good for more than one or two hundred 1\fediterranean but ehewhere, Its mntcnel
miles. Eyen if piracy and murder were officially consists of four Dreadnougln.ci complett'å t-cforc
and publicly renounced - a
d nothing else can 1915, and two an> due 1'01' comrl
tion this
ensu.re the Americans kceplI1g the peace-we rca.r
and, for all one knows,
o the C'?11trary.
should expect sporadic attacks to be made nntil may be completed already. I he3e
hlrs a,re
all the U boats had returned within a cOH1T1lUni- armcd with e'Cceptional1y heay:v broachm!es. !'IJC
{'ating radius. first fpur can brin;; no les!'> tha.n fift
'-olle 12-111Ch
But for all the dearth of news, the week has guns to bear in a fleet action. T.
e last two add
been an eventful one. Xo eight days s:w'c twcntv-six more to the lattle ioI'cc. Of pre-
August may, eventuaIl:v, be found to have affected Drca.clnoughts there are ten of eomp

atiydy
the naval asprct of the war more profoundly. l'rcent date, and some older :md slower
IIIpS, for
Italy, possessing the most po\-\crful of the neutral whom a \,tIne mar be found. There is a certain
navies, has joined the Allies; and the supreme number of pTotecte
cruiser!'>, but th(' nominal
command of the British Navy has been ta}\.en out speed of the fastest IS only 22 knots. But there
12"

:May 29, 1915,

LA
D AND WATER,

are three very fast cruisers, and, besides, twenty
submarines, forty destroyers, and sixty sea-going
torpedo-boats.
One may assume that, in the first instance, the
Italian Xan- will take over from the French the
task which" the French Dreadnought squadron
have so far discharged, that of holding the Allria-
tic against Austria. It may seem at first sight as
if, now that the Italian arsenals and ports from
Venice to Taranto have become available, that
holding in the Austrian fleet should become
greatly simplified. But it must be remembered
that the ,,'hole Italian coast now becomes subject
to Austrian attack. Indeed, it was attacked at
certain places within an hour or two of the
declaration of war. It follows, then, that Italy
does not simply take over from France the task of
holding the Adriatic, because it is no longer the
same task. It will probably be highly desira.ble
that some of the French units should join up with
the Italian fleet to ensure that the display of
strength shall be overwhelming. It is true that
the Austrians, held so far by the French alone,
ha ve shown no greater anxiety to break out of the
Adriatic than the Germans ha ve shown to break
out of the
orth Sea. And so long as the contain-
ing squadrons-whether purely Italian or purely
French, as they are now, or Italian with French
reinforcements, as one supposes it is likely to be-
remain at their present strength, it might be sup-
posed that the main units of the Austrian Xavy
would not di:5turb the naval situation. But Yenice
is very close to Pola, and the situation at Trieste
is exceedingly critical. Circumstances may force
one side or the other to force an action. And until
this action is fought, it is unlikely that many of
the capital ships, French or Italian, will be avail-
able in any other field.
But .if any fleet action is brought on, two
highly important results should follow. The
events should be certain. The Allies ought to
w in. The Austrians should be no match for the
Italians backed by a F rellLh squadron, But, as
in Kelson's time, so now, nothing is sure in a
fleet action. Torpedoes, mines, submarines-a
lucky chance may make such changes in relative
strength where the total numbers are so small.
Still, the Allies have the reserves and the
Austrians have none_ They cannot be reinforced
from Kiel or Cuxhaven. And if the Austrian
Fleet is crippled or sunk. we should get a new
force available for the Xorth Sea. 'Ve can
hardly be too strong there. It is not only a ques-
tion 'Of a general action. There is the ri,sk of
im-asion aO'ainst which our shores must stIll be
b
guarded.
But, whatever the course of events in the
Adriatic, it seems at any rate reasonable to sup-
pose that Italy's destroyers and torpedo-boats
should suffice fòr purely Àdriatic needs, and con-
sequently, that a considerable number of FIench
destroyers should be freed for other fields. As I
pointed out in these pages last "Week, by far tlte
greatest naval anxiety that faces us at th
moment
is the threat which the German submarmes hold
over the allied fleet and transports at the Dar-
danelles. These are, after all, our army's only
base and there seems no other way of defending
this 'base against submarines except to patrol it
with the utmost vigour with flotillas of destroyers,
as numerous, as fast, and as "Well handled as they
can possibly be. If, then, Italy's destroyers anù

sea-going torpedo-boats can relieve the :French
destroyers now in the Adriatic, these will form a
reinforcement of the most vital possible kind.
Highly important as the inten-ention of Italy
must be in a military sense, if it results in securing
the continued safety of our ships at the Straits
and so ensures the success of the operations at
the Dardanelles, this intervention may be decisiye.
Although the Italian Navy had no ship-to-
ship fighting in its war with Turkey over Tiipoli,
it is nevertheless to be remembered that the Italian
Navy has had a very considerable and quite recent
war experience. K umerous and prolonged bom-
bardments were made of different towns on the
coast, and, as at the Dardanelles, all the opera-
tions connected with the transport and diseI:l-
barkation of the forces sent to Tripoli were
directed by naval officers. And all these opera-
tions were carried through w-ith the utmost pro-
fessional skill and dash.
THE DARDANELLES.
It is rather a singular thing that, w-hile we
have had two oftìcial communiqués concerning the
course of operations at the Dardanelles, neither
of these make any mention whatever of the Kavy's
contribution to the operations. Oî unofIi.cial flews
there is enough and to spare, and IT!ost of it a ppa-
rently utterly unreliable. There is samcthing ric-
turesque in the story of the Allies and the Turks
fighting on the Isthmus of Bulair : the Turks sup-
ported by the Goeben in the Sea of Marmara, the
Allies supported by the Queen Elizabeth in the
Gulf of Saros. An aeroplane, it is said, was em-
ployed to mark the Queen Elizabetli's shots wbile
she felt for the Goeben over the hill-tops. If a ship
cruising about were hit by indirect fire it could
only be the result of an absolute fluke,
The special corresponùents who have watched
the different attacks on Krithia speak of the ter-
rific apparent effect of the shrapnel and lyd-
dite from the ships' guns. But. it is noticeable
that the only direct hit made on the enemy's bat-
teries that Sir Ian Hamilton alludes to was made
by one of the howitzer batteries. One suspects
that the truth of the matter is that the Turks
and Germans have taken very good care to make
their chief gun emplacements where none of the
ships can get a direct aim at them, and a well-
placed land battery 'would be far too small a mark
to be hit by indirect fire. In these infantry en-
gagements, therefore, the support of the ships'
guns is of greater moral than military \alue.

SUB
lARINES AND SPEED.
C ERTAIN correspondents have written to ask
me if I can explain in simple language
exactly why it is that the speed of a ship is a pro-
tection against submarine attack. One correspon-
dent points out to me that, if a submarine fires at a
ship or the length of the Lusitania-the length
being about 230 yards-it would be aln ,..I:. impos-
sible to miss her, whatever her speed. 1\0 miscalcu-
lation either of the speed of the ship or of the
speed of the torpedo "ould make much difference
when the target was so large.
This would be perfectly true if the tDrpedo
were being fired eit!ler from a destroyer or from
a submarine lying on the surface, so that the
officer in charge had an uninterrupted view of the
target and could make a roughly correct estimate
13*

LAND

AND

".".I.f1.,.
-

-.
/QI

rlc.1.

of the angle of LeI' course and speed. But the
making of these estimates becomes very much
more difficult when the target is viewed through
a periscope. Unless the water is perfectly smooth
the view of the target cannot be continuous. In
any case, visibility will be poor, and it will be
exceedingly easy to make mistakes, So that even
with a ship as long as the Lusitania speed adds
very matf'fially to the difficulty of hitting.
But the main protective quality of speed is
not the difficulties added to hitting wben within
a thousand yards range, but the difficulties it puts
in the "Way of the submarine getti
g to within a
thousand yards. If the reader wIll look at the
two diagrams, he will see that in Figure 1 the
submarine is supposed to see the Lusitania at a
distance of 7,000 yards, in this' sense, that it is
not until she has come within 7,000 yards that
she is able to estimate the course she is on. He
perceives that to get within a thousand yards he
must take a certain course. It will be seen that>>

A TER.

lIay 29>> 1915.

J
J
I
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I ;
_,.;,;;-1
f
Þ
I .,
I !.....--!!_#

'.
t / ..;
-
I / -_..
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.
proceeding under water at cleven knots, he can
get within 1,000 yards of the Lusitania, so long
as she is going at 18 knots. But if, as in the
second figure, the Lusitania is going 25 knots, he
will not be able to get nearer than 2,900 yards
before firing. It comes, then, to this, If sub-
marines were placed five miles apart across a
certain channel, no 18-knot ship whose course
could be estimated bv a submarine from a distance
of 7,000 yards could get through this cordon
wi thout at least one of them being able to get a
shot at her at a range of 1,000 yards less; but
that a 25-knot ship could pass at an equal dis-
tánce between any two of them and neither be
able to get a shot at less than 3,000 yards. The
risk, therefore, has been enormously reduced.
Speed is thus a double protection. It not
only diminishes the chances of a fa vourably
placed submarine making a hit-still more
greatly it reduæs the submarine's capacity to
place itself favourably,

A GLIMPSE OF WAR.
TI-IE SNIPER.
By W. L. GEORGE.
S ECOND-LIEUTENANT MARLOWES stared into sulky. He stood well over six feet, and at once ,Marlowe.
the periscope. From time to time he shifted it a grew taut; be lost his temper.
very little, so as to alter his field of vision. About .. You idiot! II he shouted. .. Keep down your-"
But lYefore he could finish the phrase he heard a shot.
him all was peace. It was morning and a P ale sun,
Arie took another step forward, then two uncertain littl.
silvery rather than golden, made the moist air stumbles. For a moment he swayed ou one leg, whirling his
luminous. It had rained in the night, and every blade of arms in the air. Then, with a long wet smack, he fell forward,
grass calTied on its tip a water jewel. In the trench some of shot just over the right ear.
the men slept; some wrote letters, while others, lazily puffing A mad fury rose in the breast of the young second-
at pipes, read fortnight-old newspapers. And in the area he lieutenant:" Two to-day! Fools! TIley do it, on purpose,"
mirrored in the periscope all, too, was peace; across the ragged he thought. And he reflected: ., Two on Tuesday, one on
mead.ows a soft wind blew, curling the grass; a field-mouse Wednesday; Thursday we lost three like that. Damned
IIcurrled and startled him, for any movement now could shake idiots! And this is the second this morning." He heard
t
e young man's nerves. Beyond that emptiness, beyond that them dragging the body in the traverse; he thoaght no more
Bl]ence, three hundred yards away, the Germans in their of what had been Private Arie, All his facuIt:.es were con-
trenches skirted the wood, invisible and yet certain, silent, centrated on the sniper, somewhere in one of those trees, who
wat<;hful, ever-present, ever-threatening. Marlowes heard had already cost his half-company eight men. As he !'tared
a VOIce, the sergeant's: "Filling up again. Arie, go and dig into the periscope, striving to pen
trate the green thickn
!ls
that drain up a bit.'>> He grew aware that a little water of the leaves, he wondered about the sniper. He imagined him
sloosbed about his feet; no doubt the drainpipe was choked. as 80me fat German shopkeeper who had made shooting into
He heard Aria's feet doop in the mud; instinctively he 8 hobby, who was very proud of the silver mugs and golden
dropped the periscope and turned. The big \Viltshireman medal3 he had won on Sunday afternoons. "Marlowf's thought
øame towards him, careless, hauds in pockets, obedient, but; of the trophies; he swore. 'J It can't go on," he thought.
14"

t1ay 29, 1915.

LAND

AND

.. Got to do something. Can't. see the beggar." He tapped the
mirror of the periscope angrily, as one taps the barometer to
try and make the weather change. Evidently the fellow wao;
in a tree, but which tree 1 Th
re were quite twenty or thirty
trees big enough and thick enough to hide a man. He st<,rcd ;
there was no movement, nothing; just then not eyen the wind
stirred a leaf. Second-Lieutenant Marlowes's meditat.ion
became profound; be was a rather exquisite young man, and
in other days made a living by deciphering hieroglyphs at the
British Museum. He held a firm little chin in an agreeably
manicured hand, but he stared no longer into the mirror; he
now wore the air of abstraction that came to him when he ha:l
to decide whether a new inscription was of the period of
Rameses L or of that of Sesostris. Round l1Ìm the men went
on reading and smoking in the peace of life that is so near
deat.h.
It was a very Ion'" time later when l\Iarlowes's face lit up,
grew almost laughing
lIe signed to a man, half whispered.
.. Yes, sÍ1'," said the man, rather blankly.
. . You quite understand 1 Melons if you like-anything
of that sort. ..
.. Yes,
ir,"
The half-company watched their officer at some very
eurious work. '\Vith his own manicured hands he drove two
boards into the side of the trench; the first two feet from the
ground, the second about five. Then he bored in each a
mysterious hole, and passed through the two holes a stiH more
incomprehensible stake. He did that again, some fifty yard!!
further along, An excitement passed along the line, and the
lergeant-major, who had not been in London for twenty year."
murmured something about Maskelyne and Cooke. Conver-
lations grew fervid; eyes foHowed, and discipline alone
forbade questions, The war was forgotten. There wa!!
nothing of war in the air, only now and then the crack of a
rifle, far away on the right or left, and tbe rumble, so distant
as to be only the ordinary accompaniment of life, of the
Fi'ench artillery some seven or eight miles to the north.
MarIowes, sitting by the side of his apparatus, looked irritat-
h,gly like the sphinx.
The feeling in the trench grew teme. A man
as
IIpeaking to l\Iarlowes, offering him two large, \'ery (11rty
objects. .. The best I could do, sir," said the man. .. You
aee, sir, J didn't know the French for melon."
.. Oh, this'll do very well," said "llarIowes, fingering the
earthy lumps. .. '\Vhat are they 1 Big potatoes 1 ..
The pri\ate smiled. "No, sir; they call 'em swedes,"
" Ah !" said l\Iarlowes. "I'll remember that, But
now for some fun."
The whole half-company stared, Even tbe !'oentries

ew negligent and went unreproved, for the sergeants
too.
could not keep their eyes away from the extraordmary
picture of their officer, who was imp!tling the swedes upon
the stakes and moving these up ar..d down through the holel!
in the boards. They were beginning to understand. Then,
L'> Marlowes stuck upon the first bg vegetable a forage cap,
they gra!'ped. With infinite caution, hugging the wall, :Mar-
lowes raised the stake and its burden in the air so that no
more than a moving gleam of khaki cloth could be seen over
the edge of the trench.
The sergcant,major snet"red. .. He's fa
hing himself a
lot to draw their fire,"
Marl owes raised the stake a little higher, There wa
a
flharp crack. A quiver went througb him a8 if h8 were hold-
ing that stake very hard. The forvge cap descended; there
was a hole on the extreme left of the swede,
II Sergeant," said the officer, "see that nobody touches
tl1at.. "
Half an bour later, at the second point, it wa!! II. cap that
rose above the other swede, The sniper wall waiting, it
seemed, for 3S soon as it roge the crack came and the bulleL,
boring through t,he centre of the sw
de, buried itseJf in t.he
further wall. A suspicion ran through the trench that in thi;;
was something odd, tbat tlle strange young man with the
dandy air wa!! plotting, But wbat 1 In that minute from end to
end the question was whispei'ed, II \Vhat's he up to 1" And
the mydE-ry became still more myst-erious, for Second-Lieu-
tenant Marlowes, aiter measuring the distauce between t.he
two stakes wit.h strange accuracy, sat upon the ground, a
piece of paper between his feet wbich he decorated with the
most inc')mprebensible lin
s. They radiated, intersected,
rn'oàucing points v.hich MarIowes, after a !Jtare through the
periscope, marked II No tree, JJ There were figure8, too, things
t bat looked like division sums, and three words, "fifty-one
degrees," At last the young officer made at the intersection
of two lines a convincing dot. Periscope in hand, he rose t..o
his feet; he !!tared a very long time; he fumbled with strips
of paper held at varying angle!!. At la8t he exclaimed

WATER.

shacl-'ly, "!\ear HIe inters!'ction of the line made by the
b',1l1.,t whic,h ha.d !'otruck the first swede on the eAtreme leu

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with the direction of the bullet embedded in the centre of
the second swede stood a tree, a low, very leafy oak, And
there wall no mistaking it; over to the right were three or
four small oak trees that offered no cover, and on the left; was
nothing for four or five yards, Marlowes gazed at his tree,
Lis heart beating with ghouli
h delight. II So," he thought,
.. that's where you are!" For a minute or two he examined
the tree. There was no movement in the leaves, nothing to
show that it hid watchful eyes and unerring hands, \Vithout
motion, without life, it was sinister; it was like tall grass in
which lurks a snake, nimble, able and anxious to strike.
\Vithin hvlf an hour l\Iarlo\Ve
, h
ving obtained from
his captain relief at the price of a confidence which made his
Repior scoff, cautiously groped along the wall of a ruined
fermhouse, halï a mile beyond the lines. Near by two men
noiselessly erected a machine gun, They hugged the wall,
all of them, and the muzzle of the gun slid forward by im-
perceptible degrees until it slewed round. the corn
r of broken
brick. Tlie young man's heart was beatillg with excitement,
and as he sighted the gun his hands caresst"d the black barrel
as if he loved it. Three times he checked the direction, then
drew back. II Now!" he whispered. There was a click.
Then for half a minute a seriel! of rasps, of sbarp explosions
that deafened him, so near were they, as the maxim spat out
its two hundred and fifty bullets int,o the di
tant leaf. He
watched it., fascinated by its quick, purposeful action, the
regular unwinding of the ca.rtridge band, He stopped it, re-
sighted, and then, for a minute, t{) various points, playing
as from a ho.,e, buHet after buUet went forth. To make sure,
he put a fEW ,"oHeys into t.he " possible trees." Through hi

field-glass he saw leaves fly into the air as feathers from a
'" ounded pheasant.
It was two days later, just after dawn, A grey drizzle
fell slowly into the field, now no longer green, but all
trampled and shell-torn, blaC'k wherever the exposed earth
was sodden with rain, Before Marlowes lay the wood, from
which he could hear English voices as bis men dug themselves
in. The German trench was in their hands, and feverishly
they were making ready for the cOIPlter-attack, lie was
busy; the parapet had 1,0 be rebuilt, and that swiftly, but

burning desire filled his heart. He had to see. he must
see. He took a
tep away, then returned, half-ashamed, as
if he \\ere deserting. But no, he cou]d not bear it. He
must see. lIe ran along the trench, He diwbcd out, rrn
crouching among the trec!', leaping o\'er trunks that had been
Rrnashed by sliell SudJenly he
topped, Here it was, the
lonely oak tree. He looked up, he couId not see very \\ ell.
TIut dawn was hreaking, and sl'ddenly it came up ro!'y
throuo-h the branclles. Touched here and there wilh tender
mauv
, its face glowing in the .first rays of. the SUII, somethina
grey and torn hung quite
t.iff, caught hy one foot bet.wee

two branches. }o'or a moment l\Tarlowe!! watched it, hanaina
there so quiet. He ft'lL touched with pity. Then pity "'fled
and he reproached }Iimself: ., Th
.t's wIlat COIIIF
," he
l,hought, II of ùeing scientific."

15*

LAND

A
D

YlA TER.

May 29, 1915.

THE SOUL OF IT AL Y.
By GUGLIELMO EMANUEL.

London Correspondent of the "Corr'iere della Sera."

T HE soul of Italy is aflame.
Italy, entering on the war, sees in it for her
a war of liberation and defence; liberation of
her lands and her 60ns from the domination of an
alien race; defence against the menace to all the
Latin peoples, which would be the penn anent outcome of a
German victory. Not only is Italy fighting to free those
!Italians who alone of all Austrian subjects were denied the
sacred right of their nationality, but she is fighting to defend
,what Italy is now, what Italy possesses already, from the
danger of a Teutonic hegemony.
Serbia had been attacked-and Russia through her;
France had been assailed and England menaced when the
land frontier of Belgium was invaded by the German bordes.
But it would be childish to consider as defensive wars only
those conflicts in which the enemy suddenly invades the
territory oi a country. Defensive wars are all that are
waged in defence of threatened freedom, and the threat
against Italian independence has been urgent and continuou'J
from the day in which Italy entered the Triple Alliance.

hat unfortunate pact has never been rightly understood in
this country; for Italy it was the only way to postpone the
inevitable attack from Austria. Prince Bülow himself in
his memoirs has clearly stated the problem in admitting that
.. Italy and Austria can only be allies or enemies." Just
because Italy could not afford to be the open enemy of the
Dual Monarchy, she had to accept the position of an ally.
For more than three decades Italy lived in the dread of an
ally in whom she plainly saw an enemy; defence had to
be discreet as it was permanent, under the perennial veiled
threat. Austria openly and insolently made armed prepara-
tions on the Italian north-eabtern frontier, coldly calcu-
lating that it was-toget.her with the persistent suppression
of Italian nationality among her subjects-the best way to
cow Italy into submission and renunciation of her dream
of complete national unity. It was quite clear that the Haps-
burg Monarchy was not simply taking excusable measures of
preparation against the time that her neighbour 6hould
grow tired of subjection. Austria wall in reality preparing
to attack Italy when the opportunity should be favourable,
The strange thing about the Triple Alliance was this, that i

had already ceased to guarantee that security from an Aus.
trian menace for which alone we had entered the compact.
Twice, though we had not offered to Austria any cause of
offence, Italy had been in immediate danger of invasion by
her ally: once when the country was visited by one of the
greatest dÜiasters that ever befell a country, tbe Messina
earthquake; the second time when the young kingdom was
engaged in the Tripoli campaign. It is no exaggeration to
say that at every moment Italy was open to attack, because
.he had not those strategic frontiers on the Alps and the
Adriatic which the present war is going to assure her.
Behind Austria was the mighty danger of Germany.
The march on Salonica through Serbia not only spelt the end
of the free Balkan nationalities, but also meant that Italy
should become in the Mediterranean what she was already in
the Adriatic, the humble servant of the Teutonic powers.
Such was the situation when the ultimatum launched
against Serbia plunged Europe into the greatest war
that the world has known. Italy could not be asked to fight
on the side of Germany and Austria to help her own further
subjugation and accomplish her own final downfall. Not
even the stolid, unimaginative German could advance such a
pretence. Italian neutrality was proclaimed and accepted
by her allies. But that eventful day made an empty formula
of the Triple Alliance, and prepared the way for the partici

pation of Italy in the war on the side of the nations fighting
for freedom and right.
Neutrality has lasted nine months. They were not
wasted months. It is no longer a secret that last August
Italian military preparations were not such as to allow her to
enter the field with reasonable chances of success. Those
adventurous spil'its who immediately understood the call of
destiny had to wait patiently for her workshops and arsenals
to pile up the arms which were sorely needed. The out-
break of war had caught Italy just while she was in the
process of renewing her artillery armament; to rush into
host.ilities before such all-important businl'ss had been com-
fletNl would have been sheer madness. But the long vigil

has been a blessing, because during the suspense the national
consciousness has developed, and every hour has afforded new
reasons why the Italian people should enter the fray with an
invincible purpose.
From the purely national problem of accomplishing the
final nnity of the country, and conquerinD' her natura)
frontiers on land and sea, the people has b
en slowly but
surely brought to consider another aspect of the struggle:
the huma.a--or inhuman-aspect. In this Italy has been
helpeJ by the way Germany has chosen to wage war. The
Latin soul has been shocked and revolted by the ruthless
devastation of B.elgium, by the systematic frightfulness of
the German armIes, by the slaughter of non-combatants on
board the Lusitanìa, and the unscrupulous use of poison D'aSð3
blown against a most chivalrous opponent. "
It is just because Italy knows now what a modern war
means--and nobody of those who were involved in it last
August knew-it is just because she does not ignore t.he cost.
the sacrifices, the appalling losses she is going to incur, that
her decision is equivalent to national regeneration.
The resolve to fight has been maturing slowly but deeply
in the conscience of the Italian masses, who visualised what
a German hegemony over Europe would mean. Even among
the most simple of Italian peasants, as amonD' the fiery
nationalists, the aim of Italy became twofold; ;ot only wå's
war necessary to make Italy greater, but to make her
greater in a better Europe, where such horrors would be made
impossible, and a more just, more human order of things
would be inaugurated,
One could not gauge U1Ìs deep working in the people's
soul in term of numbers or of Parliamentary majcrities.
German and Austrian diplomatÜits, of course, were quite
unable, for psychological reasons, to understand the strong
and ever-increasing determination of the Italian people to
share in the great defence of civilisation against barbarism.
But, happily, the Italian Government of Signor Salandra--
probably the most national and representative one that t
'.l
kingdom ever had from the days of the Risorgimento--was
quite alive to the real feelings of the country.
And the people felt sure, by their wonderful prophetic
instinct, that the Cabinet was in accord with them, and
worthy of the honour and the responsibility of leading the
nation in this supreme hour. The spiritual preparation for
the sacrifice was going on unobserved, perhaps unconsciously,
all those long months of vigil. Now the decision is irrevoc-
able, and the conviction from which it arises lends it a sort
of religious exaltation.
All the events of the last two weeks, from the day in
which Italy's poet, after five years of voluntary exile, came
back
o clarion the dawn of a new Italy, to the day when two
bundred thousand people marched to the Quirinal after Par-
liament had sanctioned war, were marked not only by enthu-
siasm but also by a kind of vivid romantic glow. Every
assertion of Italian feelin
was marked by expressions of
singular beauty. There was nothing prearranged or
organised in the demonstrations, with the exception of the
Quarto celebrations, but a sort of ritual full of subtle mean-
ings was unconsciously created every time the crowd gathered
-a natural outcome of the stirring of the national soul.
When the processions started, very often they were pre-
ceded by wagons laden with garlands which the citizens took
to bang as votive offerings before the statues of the illus-
trions dead who gave their lives to the making of Italy; it was
very like a propitiatory ceremony of ancient Rome, bu'
nobody thought of this, for it was utterly spontaneous.
Surely it has been fortunate that Italy should have
found the voice of a supreme poet like D' AnnunzÏo to expresa
the emotions of the nation in those days of 6piritual militia.,
when every citizen felt himself a soldier even before the war.
The mob was moved by his eloquence, from the roughÐBt of
navvies that acclaimed him when he reached the first Italian
frontier town, to the crowds who begged for speeches from
him, in Turin, in Genoa, in Rome, every day, and would noli
be satisfied. There is something angust in this adoration of
a whole people for the man who more tban any other has the
gift of creating noble words-fit to celebrate noble deedø;
surely this recognition of the creative energy of poetry is .
testimony to t,he pure motiVM of the Italian people in entuo
ing

ar.. All the country is aflame for 14 bella gfU,.,.ø.
16-

May 29, 1915,

LA
D

AND

BONIBS
By

USED
L. BLIN

S INCE the outbreak of hostilities bombs have been
dropped, almost daily, from aircraft on railway
, junction
and stations, trenches, batteries, food and
ammunition depôts, reinforcement convoys, engineer-
ing works and workshops, shipyards, warships and
Fubmsrines, military, naval, and aerial base." defended and
undE-fended towns and villages, and, in most C2.geS, the bombs
ha,-e had a c(msideraÞle dt!structive effect. In view of the
success which has attended the numerous offensive uses to
which aircraft have all'eady been put, it is very difficult, if
not impo
sible, to understand why they are not, for offensive
operations, used on a really comprehensive and sustained
scale,
To the deIPand for more shrapnel and explosive shelh
for our field baiteries should be added another plea, just as
e
rne
t and every hit as pressing, for bombs for our aircraft.
In fact, it should "J>Je ever kept in mind that we have already
in the aeroplane and in the airship the equivalent to guns
of 150 and 300 miles range respectively,
For obvious reasons the writer cannot deal witb all the
aerial bombs tbat bave been proposed or used. In tbe first
place, the number of air bombs tbat bas already beeninventeù
and patented is so large that they would require, for even
their bridE-st description, a volume rather than an article.
Also, tbe fact that some of those bombs whicb bave been a
subject for the inspiration of our inventors, and some of
which inventions are of really great wortb, precludes any
description being given wbich may pI:Ove of value to the
enemy. For these two reasons the writer will confine the
grea.ter part of his article to tbe German aerial bombs.
Bo:nbs employed by aircraft may be divided into tw'J
great classes: (i.) the explosiu, and (ii.} the incendiary
bomb.
The Explosive Aerial Bomb.
The explosive aerial bomb may belong to cne of two
categories: (i.) It may be designed witb a view to being
dropped from the aircraft witb no initial velocity of its own;
or (ii.) it may have provision for being propelled witb a bigh
initial velocity of the order of that of a bullet leaving tbo
muzÛe of a gun.
Explosive aerial bombs of the fir;t kind are generally
very silPple in construction. Tbey are nea,rly all of the
type illustrated by the sketcb sb
wll in Fig. 1, wh
cb repre-
I!fnts the cross section of an aerial bomb greatly 1D favour
with the enemy.
An examination of the skekh ....oJ M, 't---t
shows that the aerial bomb consists ' /
of a bollow vessel V made of iron.

'his vessel, which is somewhat
pear-shaped and is open at its top, C . è
constitutes the bomb proper. \
F
Through the open top of the ,

hellow pear-shaped iron bomb is)of
6crewed a detonating device to the 'B û
upper part of which are fixed four ,'P \ 5
smaH metal wings which are. ^ 1).
Eligbtly inclined to the vertical
axis of the bomb, and which, in _
effect, constitute a small aerial ,1:. ,
'.,,(, ".,'.
V
propeller. \Vhen the bomb is , Lr"
.<"- '
dropped the pressure of the air on FrJ7.1 ," -
'
tbese small wings, or blades, causes i,;)' ·
the bomb to rotate at a great SEC'l'IOXAL SKETCH 01<'
d . th tb It tl t tl EXPLOSIYE AERIAL BOMB
8pee ,Wl e resu la le
bomb is not very greatly affected by the wind and keeps its
downward course fairly well. Another important functiou
of these blades is explaiued a little further on. Two of the
e
blades, marked C C, are shown in the sectional sketch.
The four blades v.-}lich impart a rotation to the bomb are
protected from injury by means of a number of stout ste':!l
wires, n', curved round them. In some models of aerial
bombs tbese steel wires are absent, and the bomb is carried
ty means of a handle, as shown in Fig, 2,
The sketch shown in Fig. 1 can also be used to eX"plain
the working of an aerial bomb. The pointed portion, marked
P, is the one which causes the percussion. It is kept, by
Irieans of a spring. S, at some di
tance above the capsule, A,
which, when struck by the percussion point, P, sets fire to
the detonator, D, the inflammation of whicb cau!<es the
princira1 cbarge, E, to ell pi ode, with the result that the

JV A TER.

BY AIRCRAFT.
DESBLEDS.

body, fT, of tbe bomb is burst into many pieces, wroch are
scattered witb great force.
It will be easily understood that the bandling of an
aerial bomb, such as the one which bas been described, would
be a very dangerous operation, were it not possible to ensure
tbat the pin, P, would not accidentally strike against .the
detonating cap, A. The object of the I!pring, S, is to keep
tbe percussion pin, P, away from the detonating cap A. To
make sure that no accidental shock will cause tbe spring S to
move down, tbere is a hole, H, througb the axis, M, to which

'Balls 319

7)etb
tafiJr .

Ifg.2.

Exphsive Sprö{gs
C1íaI;ge

'&rtdl' Hæzd14
'J3í::1e$ .

8ECTIOKAL SKETCH OF SHRAP:-\EL BOMB.

the blades, 0 0, are attacbed. Through that hole, H, a pin.
F, is passed, and so long as the pin, F, is through the hole, H,
the axis, M, whicb is screwed, at B, on to the percussioD
pin, cannot move down. The presence of the pin, F. there-
fore, ensures that it is impossible for tbe detonating cap, A,
to be struck by the percussion :pin, P.
At th'3 moment of dropping the bomb the safety pin, F,
is remo,.ed.
As !!Oon as the bomb begins to fall the action of the air
causes the small fOUl'-bladed aerial screw, C C, to rotaw.
'l'bis rotation uns-::rews the slIis, B, and sets free the per-
cus
ien point, P, which, being rectangular, and placed in a
rectangular hole, G, cannot rotate.
When the bomb hits the ground or the aimed object.
the shock causes the point, P, to strike against the detonating
cap, A, thereby csusing the ellplosive charge, E, to explode
and tbe bomb to burst.

The Shrapnel Aerial Bomb.
Tile bomb shown in section in Fig. 2 works on the same
pripciple as tbe one already described, It contains 340 steel
balls and is, in truth, a sort of shrapnel.
The employment of this type of explosive aerial bomb
is especially effective against troops in clo!<e formation, as is
u
ually the case, for inctance, of troops held in reserve a
b(lr

distance behind the firina line.
When' the exp!osiv
charge is fired the parts of tbe
shrapnel aerial bomb, as well a.s the bullet.s it centaius, 8y
raùially in all directions wit.h conoiJerable fcrce.
The two kinds of bombs already described are made of
various sizes and are used both on aeroplanes and on airships.
They are either dropped by ba:-.d or by means of an apparatus
ca!!cd a " bom b-d repp
r . JJ
Some of the bomb w,hi,
l the Gsrmam drGpped during
tIle aerial bombanlmeut of Al
tw::n'p by the Zeppdin ...irships
àifÏcreJ from the preceding ones beth in :õhape ..nd in
construction.
They were not pear-shapEð, but circular. They were
made up of tlree dist
nct circ:.:!ar sheIJs inside one ancther.
These three she!!s "-ere soldered at various places with bra:\.!
seldering with a view, prcbaL!], to causing three pieces of
E]lell to fly off from cach bur
tinb-point,
A number of rivet., went through tbe three shells. Theso
rivet.s bad circular heads, which rrec ed agaimt the inner
surface of the inuermcst !<hell. They were 0.58in. in
diameter and were placed O,78in. apalt. These be-mbs were
provided with a number of percussion needles, and at least
one of them was ezpcctcd t-o act aDd set fire t-o tbe eX"plo!<ive
charge in the inmost
hen what.c\"er :might be the manner in
which t.he bomb dropped.
Several of the shells which were dropped on Ant.werp did
not, however, explode, and this is bow it ha., come to pass
that the conQt.ruction of the Zeppelin Antwerp bombs is DO
longer a I:\ecret of the German \Var Office.
17*

LAXD

AXD

The Aerial Torpedo: A Shorl Hi.:.tory Wilh a Moral
Tho writer unJer<<tand:; th::.t, t.owarcb the end of 1907, an
acrial t.orpedo was snbmitt
d to Olìr aut.
l(òritie
, How it w:.s
dealt wit.h bv our offieja1$ t he writ
r doe3 not pri'tend to know;
but wha.t is
]ear is tlnt the British Govern.nent did not con-
Eider it, worth while troubling about.. Had Ollr Government
acquired the Ullge's p::tent, it i3 very likeiy Lhat the Germa'l!!
would havo been deprivcd of the pos"ibiliLY of armiug their
aircraft with aerial t.orpedoes,
The Un"o's aerial torpNb i:; tho inw'lt:on of CoIonel
1:Jnge, of the Swedish Army, and the serreL of it was cai'eÍullJ
kepi;.
In the b

6n'ling of 1908 ths "Mars Ge
enf('hafl "
acquired the rióhLs of manufacturing the l'nge's aeI'ial t.or,
pedo, and, a few mouths afterwards, eoM them to the Krupr
Companv.
In i909 one hunJreJ "Gllge aerial torpedoe:; were built in
Stû('kholm and despatched to E

en for experimental pur-
pOfeB. It was announced at the time that these aerial tor-
pedoo8 had an initial
peed of 16:J n./sec.. which i!1ereX'ecl
up to 984 n./sec. duriug its flight of 2,79 mile!'.
Since then, and lip to the time of the outhreak of hosti1i-
t.ie'!, there is, so far a3 the writer is aware, no ment.ion maàp.
()f the lIerial torpedo, But is it not probalole thaI; it is Unge'

im'cntion which Krupp's haye now developed for the German
GoV'ernment 1

'he mora! which the writer would like to draw f!'Om t nð
rr
ceding lines-and he (lees it with a full knowledge of wlllif:
11e i'l saying---is that the newly'org<mjs
J Government shouhl
not forgE't tho J{reat net'd of strengthening the staff t.o which,
lit the Admiralt.y or at the \Yar Offirc. is entrusted tite e
-
tremely rcspoll3ible duly oi exarfl.Íning new id
aß and llew
inventions concer.lling aeronautics.

Description of the Aerial Torpedo.
The shape of the aerial torpedo, as can he !'eNl from thð
.ketch (Fig, 3), Ïi! a cylinder, agllin3t one e.xti'emity oi which
rests a con9.

W .\ TElL

LJ:: 29. 1m:).

Tllð aerial torpedû c.:msi:-ts of thrM distind earh, In
f!,GHt there Ì3 the e3:plo
ive portion, which i'l provided with
a conical apex with a detonator and which cont.i\Ìns a power-
ful explosive; thrn comCii a cylindrical portion of the torped:},
whi.::h Ï3 fili.ed with some rowd
r of such a composition that,
w:H,'n ig.ait
d, it d0e
nnt burn with any ß'}IDe, but produces

Tr!rCü..SS!OIl
rC!Pll!sive Charge
'PilZ E

.sive 'lã.rbtlle
. ClzaIye I
v

1::' ""P

75::>.
DH.Gi
,\\nU,TIC S3:E7'CH OJ!' ASR!!.L TORPEDO.

during it, combu"tion a
Teat q1lantity of ga1 and of sm()
e;
and. la...Uv, at its rear oIt,I'i'mitv thi're is a small turbine.
'h"
aerial tùrÏ)cdo i.. :fired r.i.-om a Ú)1'peclo lube whil.
h h moun
ed
011 a tmpport with a universal joint, 50 that it, may be pointed
in any required direction.
Bi meall.'I of an ele.-h-ic sI>:Jr
the propulsive charge i

i;l1il
l.l, and the gasð emanaling from the ignitiún of the
propnhi ve charge escape at the ri):l.r of Lhg torpedo, cau
ing
the proruhioll of the aerial torpedo by the worki!lg oí t.lIt
small t.uI'bine.
Bd
ides having a grea::' speed gi,,'en to it by the tur1)i'le,
t
ð aerial torpedo has ahQ a conÚderable Bpe..d Of rotatiou
whi,'h enabfes i[ to ke
p \'lell \'r iLhin its trajectory.
TJle writer hope:; 'to be abia to cleal w;.:h the inct''JJiary
a,td the anti-8uhmarine aerial bomh ill a subsequeùt articla,

I-IIGI-I EXPLOSI"E Sl-IELLS.
By COLO
EL F. N. l\L-\UDE, C.B.

T HE wllOle troulo13 with regard to high explosive 5he!!

originates in the fact tIlat tlle British nation ha"
always reru!'!' 1 to believe in t118 possihility of ;J.
struggle for e"ì:i!'tence on the present scale, amI con-
tinued its di"belief up to August 4, 1914, if not
beyonò, and ha!' never been willing to accept tlle l'i-<.ks which
are inqeparable from a òue prepantion for such an occnrre!!ce,
High e3:plosi\"e shells came first into importance about
1885, when we learnt of SOllie terrible acciJents, both in
France alh1 Germany, ari
ing from experiments with new
nphsi\'e9, to be used a!' bursting charges instead of the old
black powder wilh \'!hich c!)mmon shell had up to then beeu
filled. These accid
nts made people nervous,
I happened to be in Germany, staying with some Gnman
.. comrades "-as we used to call one another in those d:I.Ys-
when some very important e
periment.s were made with tile!'e
Ill''\\'' projectiles against a targd fort, copied fuIl sizE.' from the
works then being erect.ed by the :French between TouI and
Verdun. :My hosts made no
ccret about the matt-er, though
they begg
d me Lo keep away from the practice range3 in on1-:r
to amid u.1pleasantn'ó'3:! for thfm. All day long I heard the
e
plosions, which were verv diff
rent in note from throe to
which Shoeburyne3s and I
di3 had accu
tomed me, anJ in
the ev
nillg I was told about everything that had happened
and been done. IL was iomosBiL!e to mi
take the tremend0l13
i:npression made upon all' who took part in or h,\d mere1y
observed tho exp(jriment
.
The tal'gcL fort had been practically razed to the ground,
and they all believed that wIlen war came-owln" to certain
frontier incilknts, it seemed very near at tIle time - they
!Would be able t.o surprise and demolish the :Frenrh fronti('r
iiefen
es when and where they pleased, exactly as they ha\'e ill
fact elnce destroyed tho
of Li
ae, N amur M&ubeu"'e and
other.phces, I abo learnt that th
same exp
05ive8 we;'e beill!{
used In field guns as well-a point of importance in the present
<<:ase.
Returninq-
o :England, I placed my iniormatian WiLh the
,roper authoritIes, who knew all ahout the explosi...es used,

but could not find a sli.isfac
Grv fme "ith w;l:dl to 1!m!1H'8
,: detoliation," - .
For yean I wrGte a.1Jout the matter in t.ech1J.lo:-al paper},
and worried e..ery artill
ry officer of my aC'luailltanc(' as to the
need for consi.dering it. All the respome I could get was that;
e.pry attempt to devise a reliable Îu"e had so far failed. That
this 'was tru""e enough was made clear in Sout:l Africa. wh
re
our high explo,;i\'e shells most signaHy failed to come up to
e:ocp<,ctations.
One of tIle h
ghe!'t antLorilies of his day ultimately toM
we that tho real secret of t,he deb-vB and failures lay in tb.
dan&erolls naLure of the nperime
lts. Th!>.y could' get the
Iyddite to ddonate perfectly. IJUt only by uÛng a propor-
tion of fulminate which made tl.H' handling of the sheil" exceecl-
illcily dangerous. Shol!!d a F:erious ac
id'mt occur from thi:t
caw',=,-say, the e1:plosion of a liInber-box in transit by railway
or on board ship-such difEcuHie!' might he raised b.Y' the
owners, the ci\'il :H

hor;lii's. anl.l th'3 pl
:,lic a3 to p:1.!'alyse
troop mO\'l'ment" elltirdy iu time of peace.
llow tbe French, Ci'rman. Au..trian, and Ru!'sian gunners
man I;,ed to transpor-t tLl'se particular :;};ells with 6afety we
did 1 1 0t know then, But ail tbe high explosive shell
thrn I',ri;sfed in our sen'ice for field artillery, and all
in v:ew of the batt,le-woÙ of the future CCJl1mon
t,) all armies
hrapnel wa:o uu.louhtedly the Lelt
r "man-
kieeI'," our arlillprymen were p
rf
dly jm,tified i:1
d>,cidir:g t.o retain thi, b.tter as the pri!lcip
l projectilc fot
field sen'ice.
It \\'as onlv after H.l9 t. Immortal JJ 7th I>i"ision had
broTIght about. à complete change in the character of the war,
through saving the whole "itll
.tion by their heroic resi3tance
i'l the great gap of Yp!'es, that the d!>.ID:.nd for high explo-
6ives becamlJ urge!!t, E,-en then t.he extraordinary and
v:hoHy unprec!'dented quantit:es that would be required could
n(lt in reaSOn k(ve h..en fare.
een. And no one who is not
intimately a('qllaint
d with the whole ma.::hinery of ordering
elieIts, h,ying down an:! in('rea.'!ing the neces3ary [!ew p]anl;,
&c,. &r,. caa possibly h
Ye any idea of the magnitude of the
strain which W:I.3 thus thrown tlI>on our re3ources.

18)(-

MaJ 29, 1915.

CANADA.
YPR.ES, April 22 2
, 1915.

[Rl"produCfd by ..ptci.aZ permif
ion
of the l'roprÚtors of PUl,CII,

I SAT beneath the great dome of St. Paul's, and all about
me gathered the people who had come to do homage to
Canada's dead. Statt!smen, men of high place,
Admirals of the Fleet, generals of division, soldier

from the field, Royal ladies, Sisters of :Mercy, al
d
women and girls from the factory and the shop-they came,
an endless throng, to pay their tribute to the fallen. Cana-
dians in the flush and vigour of health had COJ'le from their
camps; and from the hospitals, with shattered bodies and
crippled limbs, came the wounded and the broken.
Fathers, whose hopes lay buried in the grave; mothers,
whose only sons had been taken; brides widowed in their
bloom, met together to share their grief. And the high and
low, the great and the huwble, the strong and the weak, tl16
bereaved and the anxious and the distressed, in that solemn
hour stood side by side as members of one great family,
&baring a common fealty to each other, to their country, and
to their King.
* * *
The glorious music rose and fell" and rose again, as if it
would say: .. Honour tIle bra\'c. chant for the dead! Exalt
.,hem who pass to thEir reward I JJ and organ and drums, amI

brasses and cymbal", and pipes and reeds and strings,
thundered and rolled and sang in a mighty unison st{:'p, the
symbols of their faith borne in front of them, passed the long
procession of choir and priests and bishops. The mu<,io
faltered, hushed and dicd, and the solemn ritual began.
Glory of mu
ic rose and beauty of words, homage of
people and tribute of King! How shall these comfort us 1-
for they, our beloved, are dead. They are gone, in the fulnes!!
of their strength, and their hopes and their dreams are lying
in the dust. For them the promise of the years is not, and in
all the days to come we shall know them no more.
.. II e that belitL,eth in Jb, tllOv!/h ILe u'ue dead, '!Itt shall
he lire."

011, stricken father, lift up your head I The son of your
youlh has pas
ed beyond our mortal vision, yet still he lives
and presses forward the banner of his Lord.
* * *
Rut our hearts are heavy, In the morning and in the
night they are tortured and cry out, remembering how,
though our love stretched ('ut its arms, it could not reach Jlúr
19.

LAXD

AND

8uccour, a!!, in blood and agony, they, the brave, went from
the liaht and
weetne!!s of life to the silence of their lonely
""
gra\'es.
.. l'lwll!l'
I 'Il'all.: tnrollyll tll
1:all
!! of tllC shadow of dwtlt,
TllOU art 'It,itA me,"
Take comfort, poor widowed girl and desolate mother,
They were not left alone, Love, greater than yours, upheld
them, and around them was the everlasting mercy.
* it *
Sorrow multiplies on sorrow! To-day and to,morrow the
",eight of our woe increases &nd the earth groans with our
anguish, \Ve remember the land across the sea where, even
to the borders of another sea, they weep with us for those whi>
will not come aaain, And to what end 1 To what end do we
bear the burdpl
that presses upon us 1 For what avails valour
and glory and conquest if tIlese our sons are slain 7
.. Blest art the de parted !rho in tne Lord are sleeping. Th
!!
r
st from their lalJollrs and their 1/Jorks do follou' th
m."
Oh, sorrowing souh, look up! Not alone for valour and
glory, for country and King were the lives laid down, It i!!
the battle of Christ we fight! That His message of mercy and
love miaht be preserved to a stricken world, they, your gallant
ell";:. e
dl1red I1nd agonised and died! Rise up! \Vith
streamina eyes but steadfast hearts, rise up, and leave them,
the con .:;"rated, in their l.'ather's gracious keeping,
Through the vast cathedral poured the sonorous measurps

"r .A T E R .

May 29, 1915.

of the Dead March. Wave upon wave it soared to the
distant arches and ecl
oed about the tombs of the mighty
dead, The piercing call of the .. Last Post JJ shrilled out,
and in the pause we seemed to hear the cry come back: .. Yea,
we are here, we, whose bodies lie around you! \Ve, who of
old fought and died that you who came after might enter into
your heritage, Son!! of our son!!, keep faith." Surely the]
thrilled, those spirits of the departed, when we lifted up our
voices and hailed you: "Oh, Canada! .. land of our birth,
young mother of brave men. And surply they rejoiced, the
glorious company of soldiers, saints, and martyrs, as we sang
anew our fathers' song, our battle cry of old: .. For Christ
and King."
* * *
Oh, men of Canada, true descendants of the race which
bred you, well have you proved your right to sing that song.
The sacred love of altar and of throne flames in you as it
flamed in your fathers before you, And against it the legions
of fear and torment and death hurl themselves in vain. And
behind your steadfast fortitude, as behind a rampart, your
people stand and look forward unafraid. For they know that
the loyalty and the faith and the honour of their country,
and all that they cherish and hold dear, are safe in your
hands.

ELEA
OR M('LARE
BRO\HI.
H
prodllct'd b,'1 spedal permi.
ð-ion of tl
e propridoTS of
tlte C.
N.
DI.\N GAZETTE.

A DAY \VITH l'HE FRENCH AIVIBULANCE SERVICE

G OOD news flie!! fast, even when it is not true. It
must have been long before the atta.ck had
beaun that the rumour reached us at Mont-
dicÏier that the French had carried a strongly
entrenched position at Andechy. We received
no orders then and there, but we were told to be ready early
next day and to set out wit,h every available car. All that
night at intervals we heard the prolonged roll of di
tant guns.
The morTling was cold and cl
ar and brilliant, a day in har-
mony with news of victory and the excitement which tha
prospect of fresh work brought to us, whose routine had been
for weeks to ply tetween hospital and station, station and
hospital, to wait and loaf about far behind the line in case we
should be want
d. Vle knew that the capture of Andechy
meant that the Germans would have to fall back some miles;
back, in fact, to some such lJosition as they at pres
nt occupy
at this part of the line, one far nearer Roye than Montdidier.
\Ve knew it must have been a tough piece of work and that
the casualties must be heavy, for not only our cars but those
of the American hospital had all been ordered out to supple-
ment the Service d!' Santé. The road was running with
water as we swished across the high open plat
au and on
rlown into the woods below, The woods, all glittering wet,
were fuIl of soldiers; red breeches and blue coats could be
seen everywhere moving about in between the bare poles of
the undergrowth, and the smoke of wood fires rose and curled
imong the trees. Some of the men were dragging branches

o throw on the flames, others were drying their clothes, flap-
ping them in the smoke; some were lying, huddled up or
stretched out, asleep upon the dead leaves. By the roadside
a group of officers were munching their breakfast, with maps
upon their knees, and here and there a horse was tethered to
a tree. There seemed to be a gaiety and animation in the
scene which freed the spirits. It was a fresh side of war to
U!!, a very different one from the wards of hospitals, or the
sheds and offices of railway stations, where men lay upon
floors bandaged and inert, or sat disconsolate in rows, their
arms in slings, with pink tickets tied on to their buttons,
waiting, interminably waiting, to be hoisted into trains.
But these soldiers did not hail us demonstratively, as those
going into action invariably hailed us. On the contrary, they
stared gravely at us as we passed; an except an Arab, tur-
baned and white-robed, with a lúgh yellow forehead and the
face of a laughing philosopher, who was driving a hooded
waggon packed with loaves; he grinned at us with all his
teeth and called out II Ingleesh. "
Presently we stopped to ask the way to Warsy of a
bespattered cyclist, and from him we learnt that the troops
i
th4 woods were not men resting after a victory, but sur-
Vlvorllo who had lost half their comrades in a gallant but un-
Bucc8lisful attack. It had been a terrible affair. There was
dist..'Css in .his expression. II But we will drive the grey moles
rut next time," he said as he hopped on his machine again.

'Warsy was almost axle deep in Elu
h and full of soldiers.
Soldiers were beating linen uuder the arch of the well where
the women used to do the village washing; they sat in rows
along the churchyard wall, and stood about lisUessly in
groups, Perhaps their listlessness sprang from that relief at
having come out of danger, which is really an intense form of
living, making a man content with the stone he touches or
the sight of the sky and the graf-S, and mere nearness t.o
another human being a deep kind of satisfying intercourse.
The wounded had been taken to two places in "\Varsy, the
château and the church, but it was only in the château that
there were surgical appliances; the floor of the church had
only been clpared and straw put down for the wounded to li'J
on until they could be taken away. \Ve went to the château
first,
The sid", of war that the surgeon or the Red Cros!! worker
seC3 is the side which the imagination is most reluctant to
contemplate, In well-appointed hospitals the proofs on
every side that everything that it is possible for human
skill to do is being done is extraordinarily quieting both
to the onlooker's distress and t{) the wounded themselves;
but in such places as these so little is possible. The salon of
the château had been hurriedly turned into an operating
room. The pictures, books, and ornaments were as their
owners had left them. The grand piano served as a second
dressing-table, Several cars were quickly fiIled up here with
wounded, some of whom it would have been better not to
move, but room had to be made for more desperate cases.
The rest of our cars went round to the church. It was a large
church, and the floor of it was covered with wounded men,
up to the altar. Some seemed too exhausted to care, some
were propped up, sitting against the walls, some were
frightened about themselves, as well as in pain, some were
smoking cigarettes, some were sleeping, some were dead, It
took many journeys to empty. When night came the huge,
shadowy place was lit by the little flames, no bigger than a
penknife, of voti ve candles; ar:d with the dark the gu ns
began again, It might be thought that such scenes of dis-
tress must shake the nerves, at least of men who kn3w that
to-morrow or the day after they may also be among the
victim!!. But it seems in the magnitude of the disaster there
is something which steadies. Into each man is borne a sense
of his own insignificance, The clearing hospital at Montdidier
Station, where the cases were taken and swiftly examined and
distributed, some to go by train, some to remain in the hos-
pitals in the town, was crowded to overflowing, At one time
there were more than thirteen hundred wounded there. They
lay side by side in the lean-to shelters of tarpaulin a!! clo;:e
together as men sleeping in tent. There had been engage-
ments at other points on the line, and the cars had been
bringing them in from all sides. Yet in twenty-four hours
it, too, was once again quite empty, The French organisa-
tion is certainly very prompt in emergencies.
DEs
wND )I
CCARTllY.

Printoo by THE \'lCIonn HOUSE PRINTING Co,. LTD... Tudor Street. Whitefriars, London, E.C.

May 29, 19 1 5

L-\ND AND WATER

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.. I Would .strongly urge officer.s
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In light Serge or Ga-
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Drcssand Eqnipment.

4.DVANTAGES OF GABARDINE FOR OFFICERS
-
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Far superior to Khaki drills-much lighter and
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Gabardine is available in every shade of Khaki,
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BURBERRYS Haymarket LONDON
ti & 10 Bllul. Malesberbes I' A.RIS; al511 PrllvlDclsl AgeDts

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141

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For nearly one hundred years
we have been making foods
for dogs a.nd poultry, and I
'O
"OLD I :
CALABAR I j

Þ-

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Add'-Iss your r
ql(ut to
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LIVERPOOL. E.VGLAND I

Typ.. of Jogs: No, I. lri.h T.rri.r.

Two thousand years ago the
officers of the 1(oman Legions
found restored health and strength in
the Hot Springs of BATH.
These same Springs are
still carrying on their
beneficent work.
BATH-The British Spa
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II

i.

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Wril. 10 Ih. Dir.<lor of Ih. Balhin,
E.lahli.hm.nl. BA TH, for BooJele!,
., A Briti.h Cur.... Lis! of Holel.. .Ie,

:By Sp.cial Jlppoinlm.nl
'1::0 Hi. .7I(o),,'y The Kinl/,

,

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REGULATION SERVICE CAPS FOR OFFICERS
SOFT FITTING WITH FLEXIBLE SOFT TOP.

Combination 01 ear and back-PIece.

1 16/6
18'6
J I DETACHABLE
/" CURT "II

r'>ROVED I'I'
R OFFICE
\ "0>.'

1"1
I01AKI SEiCE
OR
DRILl
:VC5

For Ollie... or M.n.
Very .erviceable again.t bad lDealher and thoroughly walerproof,
al.o a protection from the 'un.
BADGES & BUITONS EXTRA
GREASE-PRO OF LININGS. 1,6 EXTRA.
SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS. from 30,- per dozen.
BRITISH WARMS. 55/-, 63/- Lined Fleece. iD all Size..

1 0 5, 1 07,

109 OXFORD STREET,
62a PICCADILLY,
60 MOORGATE STREET.
LONDON.

47 CORN HILL

L
N DAN D \V ATE R

l\Iay 29, 1915

.

.

Garrould's

The Burden of
the Death Duties.

To H,M, WAll OFFICE, H.M, COLONIAL OFFlOE,
INDIA OFFICE, ST, JOHN AIIIBL'LANOE ASSOCIATION,
LONDON COUNTY COUNOIL. GUY'S HOSPITAL, &0.

Ladles are In"lt
d to visit the
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON
Complete Equipment of Nurses for
Home Detachments and the

HOT WATER
BOTTLES.

SEAT OF WAR.

THE wisdom of making provision for
the payment of the Death Duties
by means of Life Assurance IS now
generally recognised in financial circles.

All Surgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock.

CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS. various BODY" LIMB BED FRAMES. 4/3! "4(116
sizes, 7/8,8/9,9/11, to,8, Itc. DRESSING SCISSORS, from 1/6
WATER BEDS, AIR BEDS AND MAT- INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very Uebt
TRESSES. 29/8, 62/6, 28/9 and strong. 17/6
AIR It WATER PILLOWS, 3[-,10:6, Itc. INV ALID BED TABLES, from 6/6
FEEDING CUP. 4id. eacb. INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
BED PANS. from 3/9 every descriptIon.
LEG It ARM BATHS, 25/8 It 8/6 FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
specl...1 prices.
STRETCHER. War OfficI! pattern. INVALID BED RESTS , 8/11
Complete with Webb Straps and
Pillow,2Gns. WitboutStrapsand WARD BEDSTEADS. Sfi. 13/9;
Pillow, 36/6 2 ft. 61n. 12/9
GARROULD'S MOTOR AMBULANCES AND
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of In'l'alids by Road, Rail or Sea. Estimates Free.

W HI LE providing immediate cover
for this liability, a SCOTTISH
WIDOWS FUND policy is in itself
an excellent Investment, combining
Substantial Profit with complete freedom
from risk of Loss or Depreciation.

.
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FUNDS 22 MILLIONS STERLING.

Write for Boo/elet:-

U BIG BURDENS and HOW TO BEAR THEM."

HEAD OFFICE: 9 St. Andrew SQuar
Edinburgh,
G, J, LIDSTONE, Manager & Actuary.
LONDON: 28 Comhill, E,C" and 5 Waterloo Place, S,W,

ElI&ilAh
lIuufac
ture_

Write f'or
GARROULD'S NURSES' CATALOGUE.
POST FREE, contalnin&"
Nurses' Uniforms, Surgical Instruments and Appliances,

Ea.ch
Bottle
Gua.rantnd

lOX Bin,3/-
lOx 8in,3/_
12x Bin.3/_
It x 8 in, 4/.
12 X lOin, 4/8
It X 10 in, B/3
16 X 10 in. 8/2

.

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A. Suitable for & youth, 15 ill. scat. tin. rubber-
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2 12 8
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"*- tyred wheell. 28 in, and 12 in,

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2 19 0
" Llrge eize, 17in, eoat, tin, rubber.
tyred wheels, 28 in. and J2in,
diameter.
3 7 ø
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.

"

Model 117

,

'I!
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:;J --- CROSS 97
Tyre

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Made from finest
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in the largest rubber
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A T yre that, again and again, bal proved
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Used extensively by tbe War Office, the
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and the Governments of France, Belgium.
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THE NOIITH URITI.5H RUBBER CO., LU.

14 2

Are

Run-down

you

\Vhen your sJ'stem is undenJlined by worry or over-work
-when your \'itality is 1m, ered-when you feel "any,
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excl tion tires Jou-Jou are in 8. "Run-down "
on,Jitioí.l.
Your sJstem is like a flower drooping for wanL of water,
And just as wate.' revi\es a drooping flower-so '\Vin<:arnis'
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Begin

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FR EE.

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Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wmcarnis '-not a mere taste,
but enough to do you good. Enclose three penny stamps (to pay
postage), COLEJlIAN,
CO.. Ltd , W
l
. Winca!nis Works, Xorwich,

May 29, 1915

LAN DAN D V\T ATE R

Q ..........................
.. -
.. -.
.- .
(J
.

. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
· 0 Fil"
$-. ,\IRs. ERIC DE RIDDER
'.
-'.
'.. -..
...........
..

LANDMARKS
OF THE SEASON

I N the usual order of things and in the accepted phrase,
the London Season would now have been at its height.
Debu!ant
daughters would have been first presented,
or gOIng In the near future to make their curtsey at
Court. The Opera House would have opened its
great doors, :<\scc;>t house parties have been arranged, Hurling-

a.m attractIng Its gay throng, and shoWIng good polo. As
It IS, most of the old landmarks of the Season have disappeared,
and even those which exist have a very different countenance
from that of ye
rs past. There is an influence underlying
them all, breathIng aloud the fact that we are chin-deep
in the greatest of all wars. Things that are the same are yet
not the same, indeed one doubts if they can ever be the same
again, with the war's steady influence finding its way into
e\"Cry home, and always leaving its indelible mark.
The Academy is a case in ,Point. It is amongst the land-
marks that
em
n, and we, b
ng a conservative race, grate-
fully r
cogmze It as such. It IS nothing short of a relief to
t':lrn
sIde out o
the traffic, away from sensational newspaper
bills mto the qUIet courtyard of Burlington House, and mount
the short flight of stairs into the Central Hall. For it is the
sam
:\c.ademy, to all intents and purposes, that we used
!o VISIt In the days gone by, before destruction raged loose
In the world.
he same
and fet is.it the same? Apart

rom the war pIct.ur
s WIth theIr obVIously topical interest,
In other respects It IS not. There are numbers of visitors
in black, there are many with that strained look of anxiety
on the
r faces. to which we have grown sadly accustomed.
There IS the pIcture of two great white oxen, called" Plough-
ing." ,It is by F: E. F. Crisp, the Academy student of great
promIse, who will never use palette or brush again. There is
Lavery's fine London Hospital picture with its sense of
broken men, yet its wonderful atmosphere of cheer. Old
landmark though the Academy is, and one of the last left to
us, it is yet a landmark with a difference.
The World at Large
London is full, quite as full as it ever is at tilis time of
year. The superficial observer \Üth no knowledge that social
engagements in the ordinary sense of the word have ceased
to exist might be excused for tilinking that tilings are going
much as usual. Any morning in Bond Street, the all too-
narrow thoroughfare is full of people driving and people
on foot. The Park has lost its deserted look, the restaurants
are full, and s
are the theatres whose productions have
caught the public taste. And yet, though outwardly things
may appear the same, everybody's inner life is changed as
by an aval
nche. Everybody's field of activity has changed.
P
ople are Just as busy as ever they were, but it is for vastly
different r
asons they are remaining in town. The fixtures
of. the SOCIal calendar have been replaced by those dealing
wIth helpful works of every kind and description. :Many
people must, r
ard t.hemselves, with amazement, as they
cont
a
t theIr life thIS year wIth that of those preceding.
For It IS as opposed as the poles, the habits of years have been
rooted up, and an entirely new programme substituted.
No longer are invitation cards sent out with fonnal
biddings to dinner or ball many weeks ahead. Now a few

o
ds
m a card, or a ring of the telephone bell, and a verbal
mvItatlOn .are all that are ever expected or desired. And there
is no qu
stion of noti.ce a
all.
he
e is no such tiling as
ent
rta.Imng on anythIng like a digmfied scale. The social
. honzon has narrowed until it has become the smallest of
dots, in fact one is puzzled to discover it at all.
Present-Day Hospitalit)
While entertaining, however, has died a violent death
hospitality in the truest sense of the word has never been mor

flourisiling.
o matter how much we may each practise
household economy it has not yet prompted us to close our
doors against our neighbours. And it can only be hoped that
the necessity for such a day will be slow in dawning. People
have never felt more strongly than at the present time that it is
not good for man to live alone. There is a strong feeling
of human companionsilip bound up with every stage of the
great tragedy. It is among the most human signs of the
times. Since the days of wholesale parties have passed,
when so many hundred of cards were dispatched, and friends
and mere acquaintances met in one heterogeneous throng,
we have made more effort to meet each other. Much more
care is being taken over the minor entertaining which has
replaced the" crush." A luncheon party of six or eight women,
for example, takes a certain amount of careful planning if it is to
fulfil a hostess's expectations. In these days, when everybody's
nerves are strained to breaking point, it is no manner of use
asking people who are likely to be uncongenial to meet
each other. Indeed, for that matter, nobody is inclined to
meet uncongenial spirits at lunch or any other times. \\" e
see the people we like, avoid those we do not, and everybody
is infinitely better in consequence.
Dinner parties as social functions have ceased to exist.
There will be no regimental dinners this year, no great dinners
of forty or fifty people as a prelude to some monster ball.
We still dine out, it is true, but we do so in a spirit of
infonnality, and more often than not arrangements are
disturbed at the last moment on acccount of guests being
called away on public duties elsewhere. Nothing is fixed,
nothing definitely settled under the existing scheme of tilings.
We live from day to day, many of us indeed not daring to
look forward as far as that, lest it be too long a stretch of
time to treat with impunity.

The Change in Things
With everytiling else that in the days long ago made
up the sum total of the Season, it is the same. How can tilings
in all possibility be as in days of yore? It is not only im-
possible, it is unthinkable at present at any rate, whatever
the future may hold. Too many familiar figures will never
be seen again at Lord's, too many well-known faces have
vanished from the river. Lovers of tennis, who followed
the game at the \Vimbledon Tournament, or at Nice or Cannes,
during the Riviera season, must remember with sorrow one
of the great lights of the tennis-world, whose steady clean
play was a joy to behold, Regrets will lurk wherever the
polo ponies are to be found, memories find a place in many
a corner. Such a catastrophe as a war of tilis magnitude
was bound to mean the complete upheaval of things in
general, and of the Season in particular, with its r
o-ular
schedule of circumscribed event!'.

"STRAIGHT TIPS FOR 'SUBS':

Many newly-gazetted subalterns will welcome Captain A. H. Trap-
mann's little book, .. Straight Tips for' Subs' " In a few simple words
it explains what he must do In His Majesty's Army, and how he
must behave as a commissioned officer.
The chapter descnbing .. \Vho's \Vho in the Regiment" is calculated
to save many a subaltern from a snubbing and worse, for, as Captain
Trapmann says, " the junior subaltern (yourself) is a blot on the earth
untIl he justifies his existence," As for the other officers, the author
sagely remarks to the subaltern, "You will feel awkward if you find
yourself saluting the bandmaster or treating the colonel as a long-
lost brother,"
Messrs, Samuel Brothers, Ltd" the well-known outfitters of
Ludgate Hill and Oxford Circus, will supply free of charge a copy of
this useful little booklet on receipt of a postcard.

143

LAND AND WATER

BOOKS

OF

:v1ay 29, 1915

THE

WEEK

A LITERARY REVIEW

\\'e necessarily turn to Mr. Roosevelt's book when con-
fronted with the pronouncements of President Wilson. Mr.
Roosevelt has been absolutely frank about his own country
and about us, and he and other Americans have no wish that
Englishmen, in their turn, should be unduly reticent. Alluding
to his own famous speech at the Guildhall, he once said to the
present writer: "It would be better for all parties if there
were a more candid interchange of honest opinions upon
national and international matters." We have appreciated
American sympathy, and have gained from it moral support,
but on the other hand, there is no use glossing over the
prevailing British opinion that official America, early in the
war, missed a golden opportunity of protesting against the
German breach of the Hague Conventions. Mr. Roosevelt
assures us that if he had been at the White House this
opportunity would not have been lost.
.. America and the World W
r.JJ By Theodore
Roosevelt. Murray. 5s, net,
In part Mr. Roosevelt's book is one mainly for Americans,
and in part it is a book for all the world. In so far as his
general position gives him the opportunity to bludgeon
President Wilson, it has little concern for us. I t is much
better that we should not discuss his comments on what he
calls the "milk and water" policy of the President. It is
better that we should leave Americans to deal with the
charges he brings against the present administration: that
it has neglected the navy, that it has not provided a big
enough army, and that it ought to have insisted on fortifying
the Panama Canal.
There is enough to consider in his more general pronounce-
ments about the rights and wrongs of the present war, and
the value of treaties and armaments. He is not pessimistic
about the future. He believes that we are very slowly pro-
gressing toward " a more real feeling of brotherhood among
the nations." But the time for disarmament is not yet;
mere pacificism will retard the ends of "righteousness."
" Events have clearly demonstrated "-and this is his main
contention-" that in any serious crisis treaties un backed by
force are not worth the paper upon which they are written,"
"Peace treaties and arbitration treaties unbacked by force
are not merely useless but mischievous in any serious crisis."
He takes up the standpoint of an impartial American,
and of one who is on the side of "righteousness" before
peace. He has no animus against Germany. He simply
asserts that he would throw his weight against any Power
which had put itself in the wrong by violating treaty rights
and common obligations. He does not doubt the patriotism
of Germans. He merely declares that it was Germany who,
from whatever motives, actually violated the neutrality of
Belgium; that it w'as Germany who ill-treated French and
particularly Belgian civilians, contrary to the Hague Con-
ventions signed by the United States; that it was Germany
who dropped bombs on unfortified cities contrary to the same
conventions. "All of these offences," he says, after setting
forth a catalogue of illegalities, "have been committed by
Germany. . . . . If I had for one moment supposed that
signing these Hague Conventions meant literally nothing
whatever beyond the expression of a pious wish which any
power was at liberty to disregard with impunity, in accordance
with the dictation of self-interest, I would certainly not have
pennitted the United States to be a party to such a mis-
chievous farce."
He states emphatically his view that America ought to
have protested, at the very beginning, against these violations
of treaties and conventions, He goes on to urge that America
should prepare herself with the armed force without which
treaties and conventions are valueless. And finally he insists
that any future agreements on the lines of the Hague Con-
ventions will prove worthless,
The one permanent move for obtaining peace, which has yet been
suggested. with any reasonable chance of attaining its object. is by an
agreement among the great powers, in which each should pledge itself
not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back
with force the decisions of that common tribunaL
What Mr. Roosevelt says is of importance, not only bv
reason of his personal views and his great influence in Americà,
but because he may yet again be a President of the Republic.
There is much repetition in the book, but this serves to make
his view unmistakable. We appreciate his friendliness
towards England all the more because he seeks to be just to
Germany. We agree with him that it would be very unwise

to assume that the present war will be the last of all wars;
but, th
gen.eral. question of big national armaments, to be
maIntaIned m tIme of peace, opens more subtle complicated
ques!ions whi
h he does not touch upon. We wo'uld commend
to his attentIOn a little book which deserves to be widely
read:

"Krupp's and the International Armaments
Ring." By H. Rob.:rtson Murray. Holden and
Hardingham. 2S. 6d. net.
, Mr. Murray exposes the manner in which Krupp's and
kmrn:ed firms have been built up, and the hold they have
aC9.Ulr
d over I?odern civilisation, "Kruppism and Modern

i1htarlsI? are mterdependent." Most people have a vague,
ge
eral i
ea as to the vast political and economic power
whIch this monster business corporation has brought to
bear upon Germa
y. Mr. Murr
y traces the history
of the firm from Its humble ongm, and describes the
stages of its growth since the Franco-Prussian War,
The Emperor is on
of the largest shareholders. Krupp's
has been able to mfect the Press, and has set itself to
stimulate Jingoism, But though Germany has been "the
cradle of Kruppism," and it was a Krupp who produced the
first gun made of crucible steel, Mr. Murray insists that since
the formation of the Harvey United Steel Company in IgoI
the
rI?ament firms have been in league the world over,
explOItmg for profit the fears and ambitions ot nations.
Even in Great Britain the Government has preferred to place
orders wit
private firms rather than use the Royal Arsenal
at \yoolWIch.
e
ges that there can be no possible im-
mumty from mihtansm and war except by " the sweeping
away of a
cha
ce of private profit to be gained in the arming
of the natIOns. There can be no safeguard against war as
long as there are Krupp's and similar finns-that is to say, as

ong, as there are vast vested interests dependent on the
Immmence of war. 1\Ir. Murray's book is important.
Speaking of Mr. Roosevelt's book, it is of interest to
mention a slender volume just issued;-
" When a Man Comes to Himself," By Woodrow
Wilson. Harper. 2S. net.

This is no more than a short essay un the generalities of
life.
nd conduct, and ,has no bearing whatever upon current
politIcal events. It is a moral application of the maxim
to " see life steadily and see it whole." We see in this essay
the
ame traits which distinguished his, Life of George

ashmgton, Most st::tesmen wo
ld be pnmarily concerned
WIth the statesmanship of Was,hmgton; President Wilson
emphasised especially his goodness-and that indeed is the
traditional schoolroom critIcism. An edifying if somewhat
conventional study in right behaviour and successful morals.
.. The Little Man and Other Satires." By John
Galsworthy. Heinemann.

, It
s almost inevitab
e,that s
ch a ,,:it
r as 1\11'. Gals\\'orthy,
with
iS pronounced opmlOns, his special mterests, his definite
techmque, should come to be regarded as a sort of fixed star.
We already speak of a "Galsworthian subject," a "Gals,
worthian character," a " Galsworthian type of Englishman ..
-and we could not do so if he had not familiarised us with
these types in "A Man of Property,"" Justice," " Strife"
and elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is unsafe to label 1\11'.
Galsworthy too exactly. In whatever he writes we may be
sure that there will always be a serious undercurrent. He
will aJways
ean something as .well as observ
something.
And, III techmque, he seldom resists that effectlve device of
contrasting apparent opposites, sometimes in order to show
the underlying unity of human nature, sometimes merely to
throw his subject into relief.
But in the first sketch in this book he shows us that a
subject which lends
tself b
th to reflection and to pathos
can also be treated WIth the lightest humour and not without
a touch of genuine farce. The." Galsworthian" feeling is
there; but also a good deal which could never be covered
by
hat label. In the first scene we have several persons
talkmg at the refreshment buffet of an Austrian railway
station-an Englishman and woman, an American, a German,
a Dutchman, and a .. Little Man." They discuss, each with
h
s
wn national .ïdi
syncrasies, the question of chivalry,
kmdhness, and Qmxotlsm. (It should be mentioned that it
was written nine months before the war began,) The German

144

The County Gentleman
AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LXV

No. 2769

SATURDAY. JUKE 5. H)I5

[ PUBLISHED AS ]
A NEWSPAPER

PRICE SIXPENC
:
PUBLISHED WEEKLY

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MILITARY TAILORS

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156

June 5, 19 1 5

LAN D AND \VA TER

AN INLAND MARKET TOWN

By J. D, SYMON

I T lies within easy reach of London, but it is in no sense
suburban, for it retains its ancient traditions, its busy
corporate life, most keenly individual, and although
the builder of these latter days has not been kept
wholly at bay, the town still holds many quaint and
charming relics of the domestic architecture of an older
England.
From the long High Street you can turn aside in
fifty places, and passing under a low-browed archway find
yourself in yards and open spaces where buildings of the
mellowest warm brick huddle in a delightful confusion of
half-timbered gables and casements that were made before
the days of devotion to fresh air. The hand of modernity
has been too intrusive at certain places in the High Street,
but enough remains to uphold the character of an English
market town, and at favoured spots the architect, as distinct
from the builder, has done his later work well. He has
contrived things which, a hundred years hence, will give our
descendants no cause to blame their forefathers.
One or two inns retain the right Georgian character,
and over the door of one of them hangs what may
be taken as a survival. the last survival I know, of
an ancient vintner's custom, and one that has been
enshrined in a familiar proverb, whereof the meaning
is little reflected upon by the majority. "Good wine
needs no bush" comes glibly to the tongue, but if you
asked the philosopher what he meant by" the bush," he would
very likely answer, "Well, just the bush, you know." Here
in my market town he would find the visible symbol ready
to his eye in explanation, but alas, for purity of the antique
thing.
Here again, the hand of the twentieth or perhaps the
late nineteenth century has forced its inevitable modifica-
tions. The bush is a bush no longer, but a colossal hanging
flower-basket, about which, however, ivy has been made to
twine so cunningly that when it is in full leaf, you do not
suspect the \\-ire sub-structure to the clustering folié'ge. It
may not be the bush pure and simple, but it is a noble and
pleasing variation of the old symbol, and it has this advantage
over the original sign that whereas that was sometimes severed
from its root, and doomed to wither soon, this bunch of
ivy is upgrowing evergreen, perennial, and suffers not, like
its prototype, a constant interchange of growth and blight.
Manufacture has laid a light hand upon the township,
not always to the beautifying of the outshirts, but at least
one factory has she\\ n unwonted signs of grace, and has painted
its long low sheds a delicious green on the \\aUs and the
pleasantest of old tile-red upon the roofs, The chimney has
to be endured, but the buildings fall snugly into the landscape,
and cannot be called a blot. Not every industry is so praise-
worthy. There are other places of commercial output, the
effect of which, to say the least of it, does not make for harmony
but to these it is possible to turn a blind eye. They offend
you for a moment only as you seek the open fields in certain
directions.
Thank heaven, there are some unsullied approaches
to the country. At heart this Borough is still a country
market to\\-n, and on market-days the square is filled with
the bleating of sheep and the lowing of oxen, when the white-
washed pens are up and full, and round about stand the
bargaining farmers-sturdy yeomen, who have, most of them,
in these later months, sent their sons to other business than
that of peace, for our County Yeomanry has made a na,me
in Flanders. War has laid its hand upon the to\\n, but there
are moments" about full market time," as Xenophon says
by way of introduction to a memorable battle-piece, when
there is'little to suggest that anything has broken the peace
of rural England. The market is ablaze with flower stalls,
which on sunny days-are almost Continental in their vividness,
and this fairy merchandise is neighboured by stalls of drab
commodities, pieces of sole leather for the cobbler, odds and
ends of scrap iron, and, most fascinating to the youthful eye,
a complete emporium of cheap accessories for the bicycle.
One sign of war there is, visible only to those who know the
life of the to\\n intimately and can feel the pulse of the market,
for here in the'ie dltered times the townsfolk are buying most
of their ngetables. to the loss, perhaps, of the establisll(d
greengrocer. He, honest man, is rather handicapped;
(m.
of his young men who formerly took orders at the tradEs-
men's entrance, are taking orders of a different sort else\\l ere,
and there is a hint, too, of a lack of horse transport. But
otherwisp, to the outward eye, at certain hours this inldnd
marhet to\\n might not even have bald of the prc
(I1t
struggle,

But this aloofness is only apparent. Loiter a little
longer in the market place, and you will catch a glimpse of
inevitable khaki, and by and by a string of Army Sen'ice
wagons will lumber into view, turn the corner, and disapfear ;
and again, at stated hours, the chaffering business of farmers
and townsfolk will pause for a moment while a regiment s,...ings
into view, stepping smartly from the drill ground to its mid-
day meal. for, during these months since August, wave after
wave of khaki has beaten against our unwalled citadel, and
sometimes has subsided and come to rest there for a time,
The soldiers have been encamped for the most part beyond
the town, and there is a little bridge some way out that has
cut them off almost entirely from the townsfolk, except during
their hours of leave; but if their presence has not been
obtruded to the eye, it has not been without its effect upon the
community. There has been an inevitable come and go
between the warriors and an unwarlike population. The
town, for all its apparent calm, is really throbbing \\ith the
pulse of war; it has had, in truth, a great shaking up, Hitherto
its acquaintance with the military caste has been of the
slightest, and some of its good folk, mingling for the first time
with officers, have not yet quite realised that " 1\Ir. " is the
only title for a subaltern. They roll the reallv fine \\ ord
"Lieutenant," unctuously about the tongue, and tãke such jov
of the invocation that one almost regrets that so nobly sound1l1g
a title should be taboo,
Then in the auxiliary organisations for the care of
the wounded and the soldiers' dependents, and in the provi-
sion of recreation for the soldiers' hours off duty, the women
have found a new interest in life. ThEY
peak in terms of
war, they have become learned, many of them, in the
elements of the nurse's craft, and the horizon of a quiet
life has widened, The thoughts of many who last year found
the next tennis party or the next game of golf sufficient
centre for their days, are now on distant fields with those who
have gone out from our immediate circle, and there has been
an extension of military acquaintance among the members of
those stranger battalions that have sojourned for a "hile
beside our more or less rural ways.
For the reflective elder people there is sume harking
back to times of which our fathers and grandsires have told
us--to those Napoleonic days when English marhet-tu\\-ns
were alive with the tramp of marching regiments, and when
the billet-master might any day knock at the door. These
were the hours of life and colour, of scarlet coats and glittering
accoutrements, lending to military presence a fascmation
which is not likely to return, But the spirit is the Sdme, and
there is still martial music to supply in sound what is lacking
in colour.
The town, never perhaps exactly sleepy but intent
on the affairs of the mart, industrial and agricultural, has
experienced at its hours of awakening a new and bracing
sensation from the mingling of the pealing bugles of reveille
with the strident siren of the factory. EYery morning while
a regiment is at hand, the townsfolk are reminded bv a
drifting echo of martial music that these times are not as other
times, and that when tyrants rage, life becomes more than a
mere matter of profit and loss.
But there is romance, too, in the sound of the bugles-
romance that thrills the girls of to-day, just as their
great-grandmothers thrilled when they peeped shyly from
behind their early window curtains to wave a farewell
to last night's partner at the ball as he marched
perhaps to Waterloo or some Peninsular field. Thus, still
earlier, in northern dawns, the girls looked out to catch a
gl"mpse of Bonnie Prince Charlie, With these cls
ociations
is bound up the sentiment of a whole body of our national
lyric u!ter
ce, . which. finds, perhaps, its most poignant
expressIOn m Robm Adair. It breathes through many an earlier
nowl, and fiction it seems to me is never more gracious than
when it floats in the atmosphere of an ancient \\ell-ordered
township, with fair old houses of the better sort, where the
furniture came from the hand of great artists and the girls
were the girls Jane Austen knew.
It was into surroundings like these, a world of lclvender
and roses and old formal gardens standing back from the'
street behind warm-red brick \\alls that the adn:nt of the
marching regiments brought so piquant a note of contrast
and of romance, and in an age when the redcoats hJ.ve
ginn place to a duller hue, it is this that still survives
in the thoughts and fe
lings of our English marhet to\\ n,
touched to a new excItement, and it nM\, be to a new
purpose, by the transforming hand of war. -

1--
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LAN DAN D \\T ATE R

WHY ON
EARTH

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should the demand for
Dunlop Tyres always
exceed the supply unless
your fellow - motcrists
have proved to their satis-
faction that Dunlop covers
and tubes are practically
and financially the safest
proposition?
Our output is huge, and
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like Oliver Twist, the
public asks for more

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J, B, Dunlop, Esq.

DUNLOPS

.. Th
tyrc that taught the
Trade,"

Dunlop Rubber Co., Ld.,
Founders of the Pneumatic
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the World,

A ston Cross, B irmi ngham,
LONDO
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PARIS: 4 RUE DU COLONEL MOLL

Abolishing Cycle Friction

T HIS is an illustration of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
Wheel in action inside its dirtproof Gear-case.
See how the moving chain picks up the Oil and sprays it
into the Speed-gear Mechanism, The same action takes
place in the Free Wheel and in the Rear Hub. So the
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and alwa
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In consequence
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and vain at-
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Foreigners. The Sunbeam's abolition of cycle Friction is
one of those Triumphs of British Workmanship of which
this Country can indeed be proud. Ride a Sunbeam.

ì

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8
:1

June 5, 1915.

LAND

THE

WAR

AND YV..A TER.

BY

LAND.

By I-IILAIRE BELLOC.

NOIE,-Tbis article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, whicb doel not object to the publication as censored, and takes ae
responsibility for the correctness oJ the statemeut
.
In accordance with the requirements oJ the Press Hurean. the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this ,.\rticle must only be
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indiL3ted.

their existing fighting line, bad not tbis numeri.
cal superiority over the enemy opposed to them..
The Allies, as a wholc, were already III
numerical superiority over the enemy, and one
that was absolutely certain to increase as time
went on. But the Allies, being divided int? t
vo
widely distant fields of action, that superIorIty
could' not be used as a whole, and there was still
an opportunity for the enemy to show his
superiority locallv upon the Eastern front.
In the mattèr of munitions, which are the
other limb of the numerical calculation, the
divergence was less proIlmInccll in the 'Vest, but
probably in the rate. of production and accumula-
tion of shell the Allies here had also some ad,-an-
t
}O'e over tl1(' enemv, and. with neutral sources of
supply open to
hem an

n unhampered supply
of material, thIS superlOnty would presumably
grow. But on the Eastern front the enemy pos-
sessed a verr heavy superiority of munitionment
over our AU,'.
r pon sùch a situa tion there enters upon. the
side of the Allies a force ,....hich will reach In :t
comparativel
' short time the figure of
OO,OOO
men, and behind these are resenes ultImately
totalling at least another 800,000.
"\Vhat will be the eft'ect of this addition?
In thc first place, to stn tf' the thing in round
figures, you haw probaùlJ; seven units ?f the
enemy distributed thus: Two on the Western
front; three on the Eastern front; two, all told,
within the area contained by these two fronts and
ultimatelv availablc-counting the classes of 1916
and 1917: or, rather, that part of those classes
which has not yet been used.
As aO'ainst these YOU had on the Allied
ð
.
Western side three; on the Allied Eastern sIde
three. Beh ind the Allied Eastern side you had
Call tbe total numbers of men fighting on the anv number YOU like-two. three, or four-which
two fronts, Eastern and 'Vestern, thirteen. Then onÏy waited
quipment to appear in the field, and
on the same scale Italy brings in during the first which could gradually replace wastage; and on
phase a further one. How can so slight an addi- the 'Vestern side alreadv two, ultimately three, in
tion greatly aft'ect the issue? process of rapid equipment and able 'in a very
Because this immediate addition of one (with short time to appear in the field.
another one in reserve) challenges the narrowing In the same proportion, the adwnt of Italy
margin of man-supply remaining to the enemy, brinO's in, as I have said, one upon the south, and
To appreciate this truth, the argument may tha{'at first sight seems a small figure. But the
be tabulated as follows: eft'ect it may produce, while depending largelYj
Roughly speaking, before Italy came into the upon the form which fighting takes upon this
field the position was this: new front, can quite rapidly become consider-
Of the cnemy's total possible numbers of men able.
of useful age, efficient for service and available To appreciate the way in which this new
for the fighting line, as distinguished from all the factor will aft'ect the enemy's numbers, although
services auxiliary to the actual fighting, rather that new factor is only the addition of one to th5
more than half remained. other thirteen units mentioned, let us see tile.
The Allies in the West had suffered far less effect of that one upon the enemy's reserve of man-
severely in proportion to their numbers, and had l)ou
er-taking that reserve of man-power at tile
in the new voluntary armies of the British a figure suggested, Either against this one which
perpetually growing reserve. Italy brings in a purely defensive attitude is
The AI.lies in t
e Eas
-
hat is,
he Russians adopted. the excellence of the enemy's frontier
-from a dIfficulty m eqUIppmg theIr very large depended upon, and only half is sent forward to
potential resenes, and feeding and munitioning stand against the one.
1-

THE NEW ITALIAN FRONT.

T HE work upon the Italian frontier is so
far preliminary only to main operations:
covering troops at work in front of an
. army still mobilising. When these main
operatIOns dewlop, we shall not understand them
unless we seize clearly two main points, which are
of far greater importance than the success or ill-
success of the outpost fighting, the seizing of
passes and the sheUing of permanent works
during the period of mobilisation.
The3e two points are. first, the 1/umerical
effect which the intervention of Italy will have
upon the campaign, whether our new Ally is suc-
cessful or unsuccessful in the main operations;
secondly, the fact that success in these main opera-
tions will very largely depend upon the railwa.ys
which either party commands.
Kowhere in Europe, savc upon the frontiers
.,f Russian Poland and the Pyrenees, is there so
great a contrast between two railway systems as
upon this new front. To great modern armies the
railway is everything. Not only does it actually
feed them, but it supplies in a fashion quite im-
possible to any other form of transport those im-
mense masses of heavy artillery munitions upon
which all work against the modern defensive is
now proved to depend.
Let us begin, then, by analysing the condi-
tions under which the entry of Italy into the field
will aft'ect that numerical factor which is the basis
of everr sound judgment npon the war as a wbole.

THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF
ITALIAN INTERVENTION.

LA
D

AND 'VATER,

June 5, 1915.

That is t.he first r-
ssible p.
;}jcy.
It will Iìil'an that. tbe Jefensive must suhr:lÏt
to what is I'I'e
umaNy a Imn.ìericaIJy r.u!ch
superiur heary artillery attack. That dcfcllSl\'C
is particularly ,';eak just "ìhere the Italian offen-
si, e would do Blost damage. ..A, purely defensive
attitude of this sort would probably mean, after the
la pse of a few weeks, the loss of the Istrian coast,
anù, though the ene;ny would have weakened him-
seïf by no more than the figure one-half, he would
have gained nothing ultimately by so weakening
himsclf. He might almost as well have sent no one
to adopt that purely defensive attitude, for there
is in tmth no such thing in war as the unqualified
defensive: it ",ould be expenditure without fruit.
One might as well have merely abandoned the
territory thus ultimately lost.
But su\.h a developmcnt is excecdingly un-
likely. It is far more probable that you wiil have
oue d the re::ìaining possibilities of the situation
developing, and of these the next is a strong offen-
6ive unJertah.en by the enemy to see ,yhether he
can get a decisiGIl (,11 this new SüutLern front
which will riJ him of t"eril there for some tÜ;1e to
corne.
"\Vell, if he docs that the calculation is very
simple. Such an attitude disposes at once of r.1ost
of the men of any kind r{'maining to the enemy.
It would be impGssible for him to undertake a
strong ofl'ensi,-e against the Italians unless he
were to cease sÍI
mltanecusly his offensi,-e upon
the East and to f
rgo any reinforcement of the
JVestern line.
But he C<1nnot, upon the Eastern front,
simply drop the ofiensiye. If he d.oes not main-
tain it, and even maintain it at its present rate
of expense, he must go back. The Eastern front
is not a centinuous line. It is subject to fluctua-
t.ion on account of its great length, and when the
pressure which makes it fluctuate one way ceases
to be applied, it begins at once to fiuctt.Ìate the
other.
The German phrase about "tIle Russian
olTensive being broken" is meaningless. You
break the offensive of a man, or of an army, when
you have hurt him so much that he cannot recover
his strength. But though the equipment and
munitioning of the endless Russian reserves is
slow, it i
not non-existent, and the moment the
,-iolent and expensive hammering at the Russian
front relilxcs, the tardy process of Russian
accnmulatIOn begins to be felt again by the enemy.
I'Ve have had at least a dozen instances of this in
the course of the "mr, and we are all the more
certain to see future ones, because the pOl t8 "hich
are ice-bound in winter, though distant. are now
open, and a certain measure of supply can reach
our Ally from abroad,
Suppose a third de,-elopment on the Italian
front-and quite a pos
ible one. The enemy will
not risk remaining weak in the West and abandon-
ing his own ofiensiye in tbe East for the sake of a
,iolent and perhaps unsuccessful effort upon thc
new front. On the other hand, he dare not risk a
purely defensiye attitude there with insufficient
men: He compromises, and sends there, as he sent
òurmg months into East Prussia, forces which
keep up a sort of. ding-dong alternate resistance
and counter-offensn'e along the Italian front. He
attempts no dt"'cision, but simply kecì)S his foe
occupIeò from the TrentiTIo to the Adriatic. Then
be is occupying, pcrlJaps, one-Lalf of his rE-p.1ain-

ing rescrye of men and suffering an additional
wastage nlollth after month, to no definite end,
He might count, perhaps, on losing by death,
capture, sickness, and evacuation of wounded not
more than 100,000 men a month, but he would be
losing that, and he would be having to supply the
gaps at that rate, running the risk all the time of
seeing this form of defensi,-e break do"\\'n at any
moment, and his main A.driatic ports and arsenals
fall into the enePIY's bands. It would mean that
he would have taken :.lbout half his reserve of
men for this new front and that of the remain-
ing half the drafts which he would otherwise
have been s
ntling in full strength East and West
would he diminished by about 25 per cent.
All this emphasis I give to the grave numeri-
cal effect of Italy's coming in supposing the fight-
ing to be confined to the Austro-Italian frontier
alone, Italian troops not to be used upon points
where the defensiye has far less strength. (The
Au.stro-Italian frontier is the strongest defellsÌ\e
line in the whole of the fighting-much stronger
than the Carpathians, aDd stronger, eyen, than
the :Masurian border.) And it is, further, an
analysis 'which leaves out of calculation the im-
mensely superior facilities of the Italians for
bringing up hcavy pieccs and tbeir munitionment.
It is, therefore, an a fortiori argument.
It is taking the worst conditions for one's
own side aud leaving out many elements that are
in one's favour; and the conclm:ion is that" hat-
ever form the fighting takes upon the new fron-
tier, the enemy, if he does not want ultimately to
abandon his territory on this new front, will, at
the least, suffer to the extent of one-half his
reserve power to begin with, and about a quarter
of the remainder, and at the most would suffer the
expendit.ure of nearly all his reserve power.
It is difHcult to see any way out of this
arithmetical conclusion: That the entry of Italy
into the field cannot ha,-e any other than a very
powerful effect upon the contrast in numbers
between the Allies and the enemy at this moment,
an effect far greater than the mere addition of a
twelfth or thirteenth (for that is about what it
is) might suggest-it is nearly a sÜ;th of the
allied force actually in the field-and an effect
thus disproportionately great because the entry
of tltCse new numbers immediately affects the
enemy's small remaining reserve of man-pou'er.

THE RAIL'VAY PROBLEM O
THE
ITALIAN FRONT.

The war, whatever form it takes upon this
front, will be mainly conditioned, as I said at the
outset of this, by the contrast bctwcen the rail-
ways upon eithor side of the front, and that, in
its turn, will mainly affect the war through the
supply of munit.ions for heavy pieccs.
The Austro-Italian front is essentially a
mountain barrier upon ,vhich, by their political
action of half a century ago, the Austrians
obtained the advantage-that is, the frontier
between their own territory and that of Italy
commanded tbe exits from the valleys of the Alps,
On account of this it would in any case be
necessary, even if there were no such thing as
Leayy g'!-ns and no s

h things as railways, for
any ItalIan force JeSIrlllg to operate acrainst tho
Istrian Peninsula to secure it!"elf a
ainst an
attack upon its communications from the north.

2*

:June 5, 191
.

LAND AND WATER.

I
A certain point (1') and its territory (Trieste
and the Istrian Peninsula) being of political im-
portance and the objective of an Italian advance
(1), is defended by a certain strategical frontier,
A B, which is the line of the Isonzo, with its
principal nucleus at Gorzg (G); but the political
frontier, turning round by the north along A C D,
has given to the enemy openings which are the
mouths of the valleys at E and F, from which
enemy forces can come down right upon the flank only bring up munitions to his front along one of
of the main line of the Italian offensive (1), anù two lines, that marked (3) passing through Ta
interfere with its communications. The line (Tarvis), that marked (4), and passing Tr (Trent),
A FeE D is the mountain line of the frontier, and his only means of concentrating munitions
the bulge at C is the point of the Trentino, and and men at will from one of these lines to the
the gates upon either side, E and F, are the passes other is the narruw mountain communieation
out of the Trentino on to the Italian plain, (2 2), a good railway line with plenty of rolling
notably by the Val Sugana and over the Tornal{'. stock, but unrelieved by any branching lines.
It is obvious that under any conditions of :Further, it is evident that the capture hy the
warfare a force acting along the line (1) against Italians of three points, nodal points, or junc-
A B would have to protect its flank thus menaced tions, in this system, wOliJd nccesmrily have the
from the north. greatest effect upon the war. These three points
But the factor of railways, especiaIly as are Tarvis (Ta), Trent (1'1'), and, most import.ant
supplying the munitions for artillery, and par- of all, the mountain jl.mction of Franzensfeste
ticularIy for heavy artillery, adds something to (F), There arc altogether three. and onlv three,
the problem of this frontier which was not pre- rai!way lines of advance out of the ..:\lps on to
sent when the great campaigns of the past the Italian plain upon this front. and these arc
-notably the victorious advance of the young the Pass uf Pontebba above Tarvis, which I have
Napoleon-established the military study of the marked P (1); the Val Sugana, which I hayo
district, marked P (2); and t.he Yalley of the Adige, whieh
The contrast between the railway systems in I have marked P (3). Now the capture and
this region is a product of the Alps, To some retaining of Tarvis ('fa) blocks all entry by the
extent it redresses the disadvantage under which pass P (1). It renders circuitous and difiieult the
Italy suffered from the way in which the frontier supply of munitions for the capture of that pass.
is traced; but, apart from any advantage or dis- The capture of Trent (1'1') closes the two railway
advantage upon either side, it makes the posses- entries P (2) and P (3), but for a counter-attack'
sion of certain nodal points absolutely essential down the Adige Valley you would still have the
to the campaign. How this is so the following whole railway system of Alpine Austria coneen-
sketch wiII show, trated upon them. For though munitions and
The Italian plain has running through it a men could not use the pass P (1), blocked by the
line (111), serving Verona (V), Vicenza (v), Tre- occupation of Tarvis (1'a) , yet the full communi-
viso (T), Ddine {U), which permits of rapid cations on the east with t.he Austrian basin, the
lateral transports of men and munitions from East railways (3 3), could add their effect to the rail-
to West, or vice versâ, at wilL Further, this main way from Innsbruck (4 4), and, so far as a single
backbone is supplemented by, and relieved by, double-line railway could be used, the line dmm
sundry other lines, some of which are shown in the Adige towards Trent (1'1') would be a perfect
the sketch, and which, all between them, form a avenue of supply. The railways do not join again
perfect network of communications available to save sixty miles away and more behind the grcat
the Italian commanders for the supply of muni- mountain masses.
tions laterally to any point of coneentration and Franzensfest.e itse1f is onh' the naml' of a
back towarJs their main bases. This is because fort, but it is the junction of thë railwa) s here in
this system of railways is the system of a p]ail1, the neighhourhood of the village Aicha. It wouhl
and of a plain very densely populated and highly be no good holding the mere town and station of
deyeJoped by modern industry. But once we have Brixa.n, half an hour's walk away, unless the
passed the frontiers we ha\"e upon the Austrian junction were seized,
3!t

Here is the matter in its simplest diagram-
matic form.

side a totally different state of things. There for
the whole distance of this front we have but one
lateral line, marked (2 2) upon the sketch, confined
strictly to a narrow mountain valley, and not pos-
sessing any branch lines at all. The enemy would

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LA
D A
D "'V A TER.

June 5, 1915.

The frontier at this point fol1ow
the W"ate
-
fihéd of the Carnic Alps, and the heIght of thIs
"Wall at the critical point is not formidable, and
the shape, which is more important than its
height, is not formidable either. In. the. twenty
miles or so from the Terglou mass (whICh IS where
the Julian and Carnic Alps join) to the railway
frontier at Pontebba there are numerous passages

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over the wooded hi1ls, and one good high road over
the Predil Pass, which is only 3,800 feet above the
sea and 1,400 above the railway.
Vhile, there-
fore, a main force shall be adyancing up the valley.
from Pontebba past the fortified point of M:a.lbor-
ghetto towards the junction of Tarvis, other
bodies could be turning the line by coming in
from the south and beyond the Predil all the way
to the Terglou, and thcre are opportunities for com-
paratiyely large bodies of infantry to come down
upon the railway over the Save Valley. Ko good
roads, I believe, but tracks, and the ridge, save in
the immediate ncighbourhood of the Terglou, is
not formidable.
The seizing of the second group of Austrian
:Alpine railways is a more difficult matter. The

unction of Trent itself is heavily fortified, and
jt is but the first of the nodal points, and the least
important. The point Bozen (3. branch railway
which leads up a side ya.lley, but (:lees not join on
with any further railway system) could be reached
along a comparatively open road by anyone who
!had possession of the Tonale Pass to the south-
;west, but the all-important junction above Brixen

Main Line over
the 13pe/ULer Pass
to I nn.shpuek.

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nale

- Pass
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1. Trent
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at Franzensfeste (F) could not be reached save by
a. frontal effort up the gorge of the Eisack. There
is no way over the mountains for an army, or, at
l
ast, no "Way which quite a small force could not
block.
There is, indeed, upon the map-at least,
upon a map on a large scale-an apparently easy
[I ttack upon the lateral railway where the Italian
frontier comes close to it, in the region of the
Dolomites. It is obyious that cutting this hteral
railway would have the same effect as seizing the
junction at F. But between the valley in vdlÌch
the lateral railway runs (called the Pusther Valley)
and the Italian streams on the Cortina side is the
ridge of a main range, and all that Dolomite region
is abominable fighting country, There are three
roads, one on either side of the Cristallo, the great
mountain to the north of Cortina, and a third just
where the frontier comes closest to the railway
over the Kreuzberg. Against an insufficient de-
fence, of course, anyone of the three might be used,
but it is not a rt'gion in which great numbers of
men could act against any considerable opposition.

THE PRZE
IYSL SALIENT.
The fighting round the salient of Przemysl
continues undecided, and, vast as is the import-
ance of the issue, there is very little analysis of
the position to be usefully attempted until some-
thing like a decision appears on one side or the
other.
The preliminaries of this struggle and the
reason that the particular point of Przemysl has
become of such moment is already familiar to the
readers of these columns. The successful advance
of the enemy through Galicia, chiefly possible
through the dearth of Russian munitions, particu-
larly in heavy shell, exhausted itself at the line
of the San. A portion of that line in the imme-
diate neighbourhood of J aroslav was forced in
the middle of :May, the enemy obtaining a belt
beyond the riyer which reached ultimately as far
!lS Sienawa, and was in places four or five miles
broad. But the enemy W:IS unable to advance
further than this, and the Rus
ian line remained
unbroken.
:Meanwhile the Russians had chosen to hang
on to the salient of Przemysl, thus creating a
situation apparent in the sketch of the line here
shown.
The salient was full of danger to the Rus.
sians because a sufficient concentration of the
enemy upon either side of its" neck" at D might
cut that neck, destroy all the forces witùin the
salient, and possibly pierce the Russian line as
well.
This latter and major peril attaching to the

N

O:;lti!Ø-

4*

June 5, 1915.

Lr\XD

\ X D 1Y.\ T E R

A

ì@

E
At

salient must not be forgotten. If in my general
line A E I allow a salient BCD, and if mv
enemy, hammering along the arrows 1 and 2, cuts
off my salient, he may not only enjoy the im-
portant results of capturing ev
rything that lies
within the shaded portion, but it is also yeIY

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To
Leinher;g

likely that in his push he would get right through
as along the arrow (3).
If, therefore, the Austro-Germans could suc-
ceed in cutting the neck at D they woulù stand a.
very good chance of piercing the Russian line as
well as capturing whatever was within.the salient
Sit

it::-elf. That is why the enemy is making the very'
vigorous effort he is to cut that neck at D. How
far he has progressed in this task anù w hat l'Ü
k
he runs of failure may be seen in the following
two diagrams. Here, first, is the detail of his
po
ition round Pl'zemysl itself.
The Russian line having been forced back
in front of Jaroslav (J) across the San, a
further violent effort was made by the enemy,
based upon the railway, and he forced the
San again in front of Radymno (R) and a
little above that point as well. Just abO\o
Radymno comes in the River .1Yisnia, and be-
tWE'Cn it and the San the string of four
villages, Stubiento (8t), Stubno (8), .ì\aklo (.N)
(upon which we must particularly fix: our atten-
tion), and lastly Pozdziacz (P). They are united
by a road which comes in from Radymno and runs
on to Przemysl. Just behind the two last of them
lie the marshes of the 'Visnia, which are here
drained bv that river, canalised between A and B.
Now the German effort at one moment got as far
as the village of J\aklo, hut the Uussians have so
fJ.r stopped its getting further. From I\aklo to
the railway is about six miles. On the south of
Przemysl, at about the same distance, the enemy
is attacking in precisely the same fashion in the
neighbourhood of Hussakow (H), so tha: the
whole salient is about twelve miles across.
The situation is still quite undecided, but it
is worth noting t.hat meanwhile north (If Jaro-
slav the Russians haye begun to advance per.
ceptibly against the enem} 's flank. They hav6
retaken 8ienawa, also Lezachow, where the enemy,
crossed it before a fortnight ago. They have cyen
crossed the Lubaczowka, and are advancing to
threaten the operations bet\\'een Jaroslav and
Radymno. Our Ally is able to act thus in the north
probably because every concentration of effort has
been made against tbe salient of Przemysl itsclÎ by;

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7

LAND AND
ATER.

June 5, 1915,

lhe enemv, and he has wrokened himself elsewbere.
It C
lll only be insisted upon once more that
this critiml point of the Eastern front has not
at the moment of writing (Tuesday ewning) pro-
duced any decision one way or the other.
P.S.-As this paper goes to press news comes
that the enemy has forced the outer works of
przemyslon the north (German communiqué) but

failed to force the principal work on the west, as
yet (RUBsian eommuniqué), This success was
obtained by him last Sunday, and on Monday he
was turned out of the western fort (Xo. 7).
Should Przemysl be forced thus Lv dired attack
it will, of course, not have the effeèt which would
be producf'd by cuting the neck of the sa.lient: it
would stillleaye the Hussian centrc intact.

.
THE
lILITARY ARGUMENT FOR AND
AGAINST CONSCRIPTION.

B EC
\."CSE men who have the power both to
promote anù to burk discussion have re-
centh- worked hard in favour of immediate
compulsory
('nice, and becau

the matter is, in
the course of sueh a war as thIS, to be regarded
mainly from its military side, I must beg my
I'radel's' lcaye to set up, as well as I call, the argu-
ments for and aga.inst the system; I mean the
purely military t1.rgulilents. The political and
moral arguments for and against are not suitable
for these pages.
'Ye must first of an deady distinguish
hetwecll a system of conscription established in
time of peace and in prC'paration for ,,-aI',
ma tured and ol'ganiseù in all its details (a task
of some years), }waring its fruit in the shape of
trained resenes, &e., "e must distinguish, I say,
hetween this anti compulsory senice (what the
men of the J:'rench Re\ olution called .. Levée en

!asse ") suùdenly ùecrecd in the midst of a war,
The t" 0 methods have widely different
("lIarac1,e1's anù are of widely different military
efIe(:t.

ARGL'
lE
T FOR CONSCRIPTIO

WHEN LONG PREPARED.

In fayour of conscription, as organiseJ
during peace, with leisure for the scheme to
mature, and as a preparation for war, the purely
military arguIlwnts are so strong that they hardly
need stating, Briefly, they are these:
(1) Conscription gives you the maximum
'/lumbcr of men.
(2) Conscription giyes )-oU perfect l'CfJular'ity
in your recruitment.
(3) Conscription permits you to organise the
whole State for war with the maximumsimpZ.icit!l.
jY ou know just what men of just what age you
,,-ill get and in just what numbers, if you call up
Euch and sueh a number of classes-that is, yearly
contingents. The" class 1915," for instance, means
the young men who will have reached and passed
the age of twenty in the course of 1915. You know
,what reserves you have behind, whatever number
of" classes" you have chosen to caU up, You know
in what trades (and in what numbers in those
trades) your reserves are employed. You exactly
allow for the men who must remain behind as
miners, on the railway, as ship-buiIders--even
for agriculture.
(4) Conscription lowers tbe cJ.'pense of an
army-
(a) By the simplification of all its machinery;
6*

(b) By giving you men whom you need not
tempt with the promise of a special wage;
(c) By prmTiding you with a reg-ular1y work-
ing machine for assembling men, feeding them,
transporting them, &c., which is obviously a
cheaper machine to work than tbe rapidly impro-
vised and unexpectedly and ca priciously expand-
ing organisation "hich the yoluntary systcm
clamours for suddenly in time of war.
One of the maT)y reasons why the expenditure
of Great Britain has been so greatly out of pro-
portion to her military effort (compared with the
other Allies) has been the fact that no such simple
machine was readv.
(5) FillaJ]y, c.onscription lwovides a group of
minor adyantages such as these:
(fl) It anows you to drill and train your men
in large known Hllits, for which your in;:;tructors,
training grounds, housing, &c., arc all marked
uown;
(b) It tens you what equipments you must
ha YC ready for your rcsen-es;
(c) It enables you to keC'p your ex.act propor-
tion between all arms;
(á) To draft men at ",ill from one unit to
another, &c., &c,
On the other side of the account all that can
be set is the undoubted truth that a professional
army (not any sort of yoluntary force) is, number
Îür number, superior to a corrscript army. But as
against this one must always remember that a
professional army can only form quite a small
proportion of the total available material.
Connected with-or, rather, a part of-this
same argument is the fact that esprit de corps-
that very valuable traditional spirit differentiat-
ing one unit from another, stimulating competi-
tion between all, and promoting a sort of local
patriotism of the utmost moral effect-tends to be
swamped in a conscript army, and is always much
more lively in a voluntary or professional one.
But, I repeat, there is no comparison bet\veen
the purely military arguments in fayour of and
against a system of conscription, as established
during some long period of peace, in preparation
for war. The weight of argument is all in favour.
Roughly speaking, such a system reaches its
maximum of utility after a trial of about twenty-
five years. Men are first drilled (when they have
passed their medical examination) after or about
their twentieth birthda}T, Th<,y are, in the bulk.
quite unfit for even the last military duties after
forty-five. In twenty-five years, therefore, you
have a national system with all its last reserves
e::;tablisbed.

June 5. 1915.

LAND AND W _\ TER.

"

CO
IPULSORY SERVICE ESTAB-
LISHED DURING THE COURSE
OF A CAMPAIGN.
But while the arguments for and against con-
scription on its purely military side must thus be
stated strongly in favour of the system, when there
is time for preparation, and when it is being
established under peace conditions-with presum-
ably a long time before one in which to mature it
--quite another set of arguments attach to the
application of compulsory service during the
actual process of a great campaign.
The two great examples, of course, are the
French Revolutionary 'Vars and the action of the
Northern States during the Civil 'Var in
America. The analogy of these examples in the
past is imperfect, but so far as they teach us any-
thing we shall discover from them exactly what
we find upon an examination of the conditions
applying to Britain to-day-to wit, these two
main propositions:
(1) Compulsory service thus applied in the
midst of a war is valuable or necessarv in inverse
proportion to the established rate of voluntary
enlistment.
(2) Compulsory service is valuable or neces-
sary III proportion to the expected duration of the
campaign after the policy is adopted, compareù
with the time through which the campaign has
run before the policy was adopted.
To exa mine these fundamental propositions:
L-et us first eliminate those arguments in
favour of a long-matured scheme of conscription
which obviously do not apply to universal rom-
pulsor} service during the course of a war.
Next let us state the military argum
nts
against the adoption of such a policy in the midst
of a war, and, lasHy, let us state the arguments in
its favour.
When we have thus surveyed the field we
shall see that tbe two propositions laid down
above are true and are the main truths that we
have to consider at this moment.

I.-THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT
AGAINST.
(0) The advantages of a conscript system
which do not and cannot apply to compulsory
service inaugurated in the midst of a war are,
first, and mogt important, the provision of older
reserves, A long matured conscript system gives,
as we have SE'en, an exactly calculable reserve
of older men behind the existing young men of tbe
active army. 'Ve c.an call up for thc purpose of a
small war so many men; of a larg('l' war, so many
more. If we have only trained a certain propor-
tion of our total manhood, yet under a conscript
system we know exactly how many of the re-
mainder could pass the doctor, where each is to be
.found, what hid tmde is, and wh:tt his rlgc.
A eonscript system applied in the midst of a
war d!'es not enjoy thes
fruits of long pJcpara-
tion. An the wOlk of rcgi:
tration, I..
'e., has to be
undertake'll in the midst of tlle oth[,l' very he.:'tvy
work of the campJ.igl1; the rescne of previously
trained men docs not exist, anù, preSUTIl:1, bly a
great proportion of the men a va i h hIe b:t ye
alre:!tÌy yoluntrel'ctÌ.
(b)
p"\:t. \,,(' have not that ('1emelt of sim-
r,Jil'itv \'.hi...-h a c,)!}seri p t
',Tstcm lon a est<
blished,
J.' e/ .. C1
during pt"'ace would ba,3
i'; en r

. Many units

are formed; the new levy will add bodies varying
in character from those we already possess.
The" cadres "-that is, the body of profes-
sional officers and non-commissioned officers which
form the framework within which the new units
are organised are not in existence.

II.-THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT
AGAINST.
With these two negative points go. of cours(\
the positive arguments directly opposed to com-
pulsion in the course of a campaign, as follows:
(a) A compulsory levy suddenly calls for
the tr
injng of a great body of new officers, the
material for which you may not be able to find.
(b) It calls for new equipment which you will
not have ready.
(c) It shårply differentiates within the body
of your army between the men who have already
volunteered and the men who have been summone;j
-the moral effect of this upon any.armed force
must be very seriously weighed, and is one of the
principal checks against a rash and unconsidered
application of the policy.
. (d) Lastl
., you have-and vastly the most
Impor:tant pomt-the fa
t tI
at the compulsory
pnnclple suddenly applwd zn tlw midst of {l,
flreat campaign involves the setting up of new
1naclÛnery by u'lÛch to decide who is required for
work at home and who can best be sent to tlle
front. To segregate men into these two ( .tegories,
to make
.ertain .that you will be making the most
of your mdustnal power, to turn out the maxi-
mum !lillount of ammunition, and of weapons, an.1
of ShIPS, and of clothing, and the rest of it, is a
business at oncc lengthy and laborious. It will
thro
ch.aos into every brand
of public service,
and It Will, as a mere mechanical task. be one of
months. Finally :
(e) (An argument which has its military
side). If of many allies one in particular is of
use to its fellows in spheres other than the field
itself-e.g., as holding the sea, commerce bearing,
transport work, coal supply, finance (which re-
poses
n pro
uction and commerce), manufacture
of eqmpment, &c. Then the arguments in favour
of restricting the total body of men to be used in
the field obviously apply to that ally as a m,ember
of the whole. If it put too many men into the
field at the expense of other activities necessary
to the whole alliance that alliance would lose fa
r
more than it would gain.
III.-THE ARGUMENTS IN FA VOVR.
The merely military arguments in favour of
adopting the compulsory principle in the midst of
a war are simpl
, an
may be put very briefly.
. (1) It provIdes m thp long run (supposiu6' all
its dlsadvantrtges can be got over) the fun rn
xi-
mum of fighting power. Sooner or h.ter a eO!ll-
p1.l1sory
ystem, even though it be applied after
a camp::l1gn has already run a grer.t part of its
course. ,\ill give you all the men avaiI.ìole for the
completion of it.
(2) It gin's you a simple machine eaIculaLle
in all its numerical relations and freed from e\'('rv
:1îlXlet
. upon reeruitment as a whole, or the ex e58
of mpn in one sen'ice at the expeTlS
of another.
(3) J t ultimately pnmitg
:('u tD al ra!l
TO
C'i:<1ct1y the mnn-power ill m.anufa{'tui'e and trañ
-
po
t required behind yonI' ar;'lY for its supply aYlù
malnt;>nance.

7
'

LA
D

AND W..:\ TER.

June 5, 1915,

(4) It leaves y?u fre? to fa
e an indcfin;.tely
long future secure m an mcrc?-slIlg stream of re-
cruitment. calcuJahle (',,-a('tly III amount.
(5) It provides a uni,'ersal
ystem ewl'Y-
where equally cemented by the strongest sort of
discipline. There are no patches.
SUl\lMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.
Xow. it is quite e,-ident from such an exam-
ination of the full arguments for and against that
the two main propositions we ha ,'e put forward
abo, e can be established.
(1) The compulsory principle appl1'ed in the
midst of a campaign is willable in incerse pro-
l}ortion to tile 1'llte of roluntary enlistment
already de1:eloped and continui'1lg.
8upposing that a nation has in adult males
of military age a total of eight millions. Suppos-
ing that of these eight millions six millions at the
outside are efficient; I supposing that of these six
millions (under the particular conditions of the
country in question) the number of men who--
though efficient for military sen-ice and of
military age-,yill be required for transport, for
manufacture of munitions, clothing, &c., for
carrying on the foreign trade, for supplying
ot
only its own arm ips hut also, perhaps, those of Its
Allies, three million nmst remain behind. You
have then a maximum of three million left.
Supposing that of these three n
illion two
million have voluntarih- enlistfd. It IS presum-
able or certain that thèse two-thirds 'will physic-
ally 1Je a pick of t he wilde; that the strict regula-
tions fur their enlÜ;tment will have eliminated the
older men and the less fit, who will only be taken in
the last emergency. It may justly be postulated
that with two million thus l'oluntarilv enlisted the
grave dangers and disorder and delay occasioned
by the sudden adoption vf a compulsory principle
would not be compensated by a correspondmg
admntage. You might get another half-million
equal, as material, to the two miHion you had
already obtained, but half a million will be the
outside figure. The l:han
es are that most of those
not enlisted would be men somewhat over the age
or somewhat less efiìcient than your mluntarily
enlisted material, or (as the state of the labour
market proved) required for the civilian work. of
making provisions, of transport, &c., upon whIch
every army in the field reposes, or for some purpose
of commerce, or exchange vital to the alliance.
Supposing, upon the contrary, that with three
million really available, only a million or less had
enlisted. Then you "ould be justified in running
the risks and suffering the disadyantages of a
belated application of the compulsory principle
even during the st1'3 in of a great war.
The whole thing is a balance, a compromise
hetween the admntages and t.he disadvantages d
getting the greatest possible number upon the one
hand-and lack of homogeneity in the forces, the
immensely laborious business of segregating
those "vho may go from those who may stay, find-
ing new cadres and new equipment, the con-
f\equent vast confusion and delay, &c., &c., upon
the other.
,\\There exactly the balance must be struck
only those who study existing conditions in all
their details and who have all the statistics (many
oÏ them secret) before their eyes are in a position
to judge. But one can repeat tbat wide margin
between a certain minimum and a certain maxi-
mum, and say that if an) thing like two-thirds of

the total maximum are obtainable by voluntary
recruitment, the difìicu1ties attaching t.o a com-
pulsory principle for the remaining third out-
weighs the advantages. 'Yhile at the other end
of the seale one can say, with equal certitude,
that am'thÏIlg like a third, or, at any rate, much
less th.Ìn half, of the total available strength
a ppearing on the voluntary principle during the
first part of a c3Inpa ign shows that the compul-
sory policy, with all its drawbacks, is \\'orth
applving.
One may add tbat t.he compulsory principle
bas better arguments on its side if the higher figure
be nearly, but not quitf' reached, than has the
voluntp,ry principle on its side if little more than
the lower figure has been reached.
'Yith yerv high figures of voluntary enlist-
ment (such as'three-quarters of the men available
having already appeared in the first months of the
war), the belated application of compulsion would
manifestly be a folly. If only a third-or, at any
rate, less than a half-of the available numbers
ha\Te appeareJ, it, would as manifestly be wisdom
-that is, it would be wisdom in a great war
inmlYin cr the very existence of the nation.
(2) But the second proposi
ion is of at least
equal importance with the first. The value of
compulsory ser'vice npplied in the midst of a cam-
lJaign varies with tlle expectation of tlte length of
tlte war and with II com.parison betu'een tlwt ex-
pectatio'n and the time elrl]Jsed siuce its outbreak,
If, from the course of a campaign, it seems
probable that the first part, w
ich has a
ready
seen a verv large voluntary enhstment, wIll not
be followed by many more months of hostili-
ties, then the tardy a pplieation of compulsion
would not be worth the disadvantages attach-
ing to it. You would find yourself at the end of
the war suffering from all the friction between
\'olunteers and conscripts, with masses of men
on your hands whom YOU would have to dis-
ban"d and who would have been called up for
nothing, whom you had yet but. imperfectly
trained and probably had not eqUlpp
d at all.
You would have struck a blow in the vOId.
If, on the other hand, the war seemed des-
tined to long duration, and the lapse of time
between its outbreak and the application of
compulsion was little compared with .the. prob-
able lapse of time between the ap
I.IC.atlOn of
that principle and the close of hostilIties, then
the argument for co.mpulsion . would become
stronger and stronger In proportIOn to )-our ex-
pectations of the length of the campaIgn-and
tha t for two reasons :-
First, that the compulsory principle would
call in veal' after veal' men who had just
reached niilitan r age, ãnd in regular numbers.
Secondly, that, tardy as equipment must be
for great imprm ised armies, and slow as must
be the provision of officers for them, the lapse of no
more than six months would set this right. If
the war ,,,ere destined to continue one, two, or
three years after the compulsory principle bad
been adopted, then its adoption would be
amply justified.
REGISTRATION.
In thus presenting
he merely milit3;I'J.
arguments for or against the compul
ory prlll-
ciple at this moment in the campaIgn, there
must not be omitted a certain third course for
which the strongest arguments exist and
*8

June 5, 1915.

LAND :AND YiATER

against which no appreciable arguments (of
the military character at least) can be put for-
ward: This is the course of registration.
The adoption of a register upon which all
men of military age, or, indeed, beyond what is
commonly called the military age, should be
set down: their physical efficiency, their place
of residence, their occupation and aptitudes,
"ould not only be a step necessarily prelimin-
ary to any general enrolment, but of the utmost
'mlue to the voluntary system itself should it
be continued, and an instrument indispensable

to any future organisation, voluntary or com-
pulsory, of the total national fighting po"'er.
The drawing up of such a register ",as ad-
voeated by the present writer many months
ago, in the first phase of the war. He can see
no military argument against it. Its military
value is obvious, and though it would þave
been far more useful had it come into existence
last summer, it can still be of high Talue even
at this late turning-point of the campaign-for
the turning-point we have, without doubt,
reached and are now in the act of passing,
H. BELLOC.

THE

WAR

BY

WATER.

By A. H. POLLEN.

l'ìOTE.-This article bas been submitted to the Press Bureau, "hich does not object to the publication 8S censo red, and takes no
responsibility for the corredne5.
of the statements,
t;UBf\1ARINES-& CO
1MUNICATIONS. sank in nine minutes. She must ha,-e been expecf-
ing trouble, for all the officers but three and
nearly all the crew were saved, The Turks give
great credit to the German officers for not ha\-ing
shelled the destroyers and other craft that hurried
up to saye Triulllpli's crew, It would have been so
easy, the acc-ount sayS, to have killed the sailors
strùggling in the wãter by shrapnel and to have
blown up the rescuing British boats, The noble
feelings of the German officers made them forbear
from so cruel a proceeding. The account goes on
to say, as if in strong contrast to this becoming
humanity, that the submarine was pursued for a
long time by British destro)-ers, but esroped un-
damaged. Perhaps the pursuit is a better ex-
planat.ion of the German forbearance than this
alleged humanity. According to this account,
Triumph, was accompanied by
nother battleship,
and was preceded by two destroyers, while other
destroyers and scouts were cruismg in the neigh-
bourhood to cover the battleship against sub-
marine attack, This is partly confirmed by the
Admiralty's note of
fay 26, which says that
the submarine was unsuecessfully chased by!
destroyers and patrolling craft until after clark.
Of the loss of :Majcstic we have no details at all,
eÀcept that she was supporting the army on the
Gallipoli Peninsula and was torpedoed in the
course of the morning. This also, then, seems, as
one ",ould suppose, to have been a daylight attack.
THE NEW SITUATION.
It has, of eourse, for a long time been obvious
that the Germans could and would send sub-
marines to the :l\fediterranean, and for at least
three weeks their presence there has been so well
known that large rewards ha ye been publicly!
offered for information that would lead to the dis-
covery of their bases. Readers of the daily papers
will have noticed that the Eclw de Pm'is announced
last week that Tchesne, quite .near Smyrna, was
known to be a German submarme ba
e. Another,
it was reported from :Mitylene, on Tuesday, has
been discovered, There have been frequent:
bombardments of the Asia Minor coast in the
neighbourhood-no doubt all suspected bases have
been receiving attention, The Jeanne ä'.A rc is
reported, in the course of a reconnoitring expedi-
tion, to have seized a large Turkish craft having
many thousands of cases of benzine on board, and,
further, to have destroyed several benzine depôts
on shore, A blockade of Smyrna and the Adriatic

D "C"RING the past week we have suffered
the heavy loss of two battleships-
T1'iuTIl'plt and Jlajestic-by submarine
attack at the Straits. The mine-layer
Princess l1'cne blew up in Sheerness Harbour with
a lamentable loss of life, practically all the officers
and men being killed. The German war on mer-
chantmen has been quite extraordinarily virulent,
a dozen ships having been torpedoed-one Ameri-
can ship, the Nebraskan, and five other neutrals
among them. The previous week's lun betokened,
then, no weakcning of this unscrupulous cam-
paign, The shifty reply to President Wilson's

ote was received just as the news of the attack
on the Nebraskan arrived, so that the whole ques-
tion has become dangerously acute. :Finally, E 11
has repeated the achievement of E 14 by crossing
the Sea of Marmora, sinking transports, and ex-
ploding a torpedo right amongst the quays of Con-
stantinople.
Both this and thf" sinking of our battleships
were singularly brilliant performances. But it
would be a mistake to limit our interest in them by
looking only at the skill and enterprise displayed.
The submarine here plays a new rôle. Each side is
using it to attack the communications of the other.
Our transports and warships are the base of the
forces on shore. If they can be sunk or driven off,
the army" ill be isolated. The communications of
the German Turkish Army lie across the Sea of

farmora. There are no suitable roads overland
into the Peninsula. Reinforcements, ammunition,
supplies, must come, and the wounded must go
back, by water transport. .Which side stands to
lose most by its communications being disturbed?
Surely not ours. The moral of the Turks, both at
the front and at borne, is poor. It seems that the
German domination has not become sweeter with
the failure of all Turkish military effort. If our
submarines can continue their ravages, the enemy
should be faced with a position at least at difficult
and disconcerting as our 0" n.

THE LOSS OF THE BATTLESHIPS.

Triumph, according to the Turkish reports,
was steaming slowly with her nets out, soon
after midday on Tuesdav,
fay 25, when she was
sighted and fired at by a
German submarine. The
torpedo, it is said, tore through the nets and,
striking the ship amidships, exploded. Triumph
9*

LAND AND WATER.

June 5, 1915.

coast, as from June 2, has been announced.
Ht'pleni
hing with f
lel and food
hould be the
main problem to the German submarmes, and these
actiyities will, in all likelihood, make the finding
of a safe base more and more difficult as time goes
on. One supposes that it will be impossible for
them to use Constantinople without risking the
passage of the Turkish mine-fields, a task which
the English submarines certainly have compassed;
but they possess better facilities for ascertaining
where the mines are than the German officers, even
,", ith such Turkish information as they can get.
If the presence of these boats were a complete
Eurprise, it would be easier to look upon their
success with equanimity, Eut the situation
,,;hich exists to-day is not unexpected, and we
have reason to suppose that every possible pre-
caution has been taken to meet it, both by the
Admiralty and by the Commander-in-Chief on
the spot. It is precisely the fact of this attack
having been anticipated that makes the loss of
these two ships so disturbing a matter, It seems
only too certain that we must prepare ourselves
to hear of other losses, and those not less serious,
'Eut there is no reason to anticipate these losses
occurring with extraordinary frequency; we shall
not lose a ship e"ery three days, With so many
'destroyers about, with surrounding waters so Altogether, tbe successes of the German sub-
actively patrolled. and with everyone so especially marines at the Dardanelles have added consider-
on the qui vive, there must have been a lot of bad ably to the dangers and difficulties of that alrealy
luck to make this double loss possible, anxious situation. Eut it is not a situation which
Can anything be suggested that has not been justifies any sort of panic or unbalanced
'done? For all practical purposes there exists but fear. The submarines have simply added to
one form of passive defence to torpedo attacks, the difficulties of an already exceedingly difficult
and that is the use of nets, If the Turkish undertaking. And it is fortunate that for the
account of the loss of tbe Triumph is correct, the solution of tbese difficulties the Government bas
torpedo cut through the net. The Admiralty now the help of two of the best minds which the
notes make no mentIOn of nets at all. I pointed country possesses. After my notes a ppeared last
out a fortnight ago that when the hot-air torpedo week, it was definitely stated-what, indeed, we had
was first introduced it was realised that at top every reason to expect at the time of writing-that
speed-that is, at short range-its cutters could 1\ir. Ealfour and Sir Henry Jackson had taken
certainly force their way through any net then .Mr. Churchill's and Lord :Fisher's places at the
in existencf". Eut, of course, nets can be mad
Eóard of Admiralty. Mr. Ealfour brings to his
much stronger than the old nets were, and it is duties an unrivalled knowledge of affairs and a
quite possible that, even though TriumEh had her wide experience, if not of departmental adminis-
nets out, they were drifting surface high. Had tration, yet of the supervision of the administra-
she been going more than fcur knots this must tion of the whole Empire. For the first time a
certainly bave been the case. The torpedo that man good enough to be Prime Minister is not too
struck her, therefore, may have passed under, anlI good ror the Navy, No statesman of the first rank
not througlï, 7ter defencès. has given a closer or more continuous study to the
The only other means of prote-cting ships is problems that arise out of the defence of the
either to drive off the submarines by destroyers- Empire. It was, indeed, he who took these
and in this line it would, indeed, only remain to problems out of purely departmenta.l hands and
get as many more destroyers as possible-or for the constituted an amJ?hibious and non-party body for
ship to make the task of the submarine impossible their special consIderation, And he h:1s been a
by maintaining a high speed. member of this body since its formation. Those
The reader knows from previous discussions who know him best say that he is conspicuous for
that: a characteristic that certainly endeared his pl'e-
(1) \Vhen a ship is at high speed the capacity decessor as First Lord to the Naval Service. Like
of a submarine to place itself favourably for Mr, Churchill, he has a fine fightiIìg spirit, a
attack is very greatly diminished, and quality of which those at the head of a great fight-
(2) That a fast ship is much more difficult to ing department can never have too much. In :Mr.
hit than a slow one. And, as may be gathered from Balfour's case the fighting spirit will be accom-
the instructions given to merchantmen, that panied by perhaps a greater patience, a greater
(3) A fast ship on a zig-z{zg course is a more wilJingm:ss to leaye the professional
to do wbat
puzzling target than one on a straight course. all agree is wanted in their own "Way. IIe v, ill
Can, then, the battleships at the DardanelIes certainly trust, and bave every reason to trust, tIle
protect themselves by speed and manæuvring 1 quite exceptionally gifted officer whom he 1m3 made
Undoubtedly they can, but-unless the fire control his first adviser. Just ac; Sir Arthur 1\ T ilson was
in use is ,:,ery di.fferent from any adopted by most undoubtedly the greatest tactician the .Kavy pos-
oth
r navies-only at the cost of diminishing the sessed in the passing generation; just as Llrd
efficIency of the guns. This is because all move- Fisher revolutionised the collstruction of all con-
10*

ment by a firing ship introduces great difficulties
in keeping the range, and in some cases presents
an insurmountable obstacle to keeping the line of
fire. All these difficulties become greater in pro-
portion as the ship's speed increases and as her
course is varied. In short, any manænvres adopted
by a ship to bailie the enemy submarine will baffie
her own gunners even more completely.
I have attempted below to explain this crucial
matter without being too technical, And if I fail
to make it as lucid as it should be, I am yet going
to appeal to the reader to take some trouble to
understand what I say, because in this matter we
have the best possible illustration of the truth that
all schemes of naval strategy, and every end which
it is proposed to gain by the tactical use of ships,
ultimately turns upon the methods that are
adopted for tile employment of naval weapons. If
these methods are defective, tactics must be
restricted and many strategical objects made im-
possible of attainment. Hence the fortunes of a
whole campaign may turn upon certain minutiæ
of fire control, which ardent and impatient spirits
in time of peace have thought far too insignificant
for consideration.

THE SUPREl\1E CO
IMAND.

.June 5, 1915.

LAND

A
D

temporary nayies, and so placed himself, at the
normal finish of his career, in a c-ategory by him-
self, so is Sir Henry Jackson a type of officer the
times most dal110rously demand-a man who can
bring to the administration of the Xavy a mastery
of its teehnical problems tbat is quite unparal-
leled, and broadened and illumined by a eon-
tinuous study of its higher strategies. The

r A TEn.

new administration is being put to an im.
mediate and 11105t f':ewre test. But "hateyer
losses and set-backs there may be-and both are
to be expected-
Ir. Balfour and Sir Henry Jack-
son can be looked to with absolute confidence to
bandle the situation '\yitb the coolness, the
cour
ge, tbe judgment, and the knowledge that it
reqUIres.

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THE

CRUX

OF

I F two sLips are
tationary at. any distance apart, HIe range
remains constant; if botb adyance in the same direction
and at the same speed, the range remains constant. B'Jt
if either manæUl'TCS, the range reflects tbe difference oi
ll'ovement,. Suppo.>e a ship advances in a straiglJt line
t.owards a fixed ti'rget at an eyen speed, t.he range
must decrease at tbat speed; such a manæuyre would
represent no difficulti
s to gunnery. The sights would
f,impl:r be lowercd at the rate at which the ship was moving.
If !'be wa:; going 12 knots, at 400 yards a minute; at 15 knot",
500 yard
a minute, and won. Gi,'cn a reliable speedometer,
good communications, and an efficient <;ight-setting service,
it "ould be cxactly as if the ship was stationary.
nut if the ship went on a l'OUTse not directly towards or
away from the target, the rat.e at which the range altered
would not be constallt--it would Y3ry. As the range in-
creased, the cbange in each successive minute would becomo
It'ss-as it diminished the change would become greater, On
the other hand, the rate woulLI change very little amI ,!!('Y
dowly. If the target were visible, with the il'str,
:1L5
generally in use, this changi!1g rate could be ascertained;
and if the
peed of tIle ship \\as not very Ligll, the <'ights
r.çuld still be corre r .lIv altered.
If the fil'iug shill, how(;\'e1', hC[Jn to n'anæm re-tlu't

A TirLnß Ship
'B Fort
C I
rvetÚ.n8 Hill.
1) Ai.mwB 'Point
'E Coast LÚ1e
r SpottU.
'Pos-ltton.
'DAB = Deflection An3l.e

is, make sudden and large turns-th
n the range \\Tould jump
up and dowe. Suppose, for instance, a ship was R!l\"ancillg
at a h.igb speed with a target bearinO' 45 deg:ees from the
port bow-th3.t is, before the beam
and
uddenly turn
II
90 degrecs to starboard. If before the turn the range wa

decreasing at 500 yards a minute, it would now be increa:sÏncy
at practically the same rate. The turn, therefore, would hav

çon\'erted a decreasing rate into an i,/creaÛng rate.
The rea
er will ba,e perceived from the foregoing tbat;
ranges are eIther constal,t-when the ship :md target are at

NA VJ\L

GUNNERY.

rest or on parallel courses; or cha1l!Jing,
hen eit.her mov
s
differently from tbe other. Next, tbat the rate at which
the range changes is eitber constant-which is rare, because
limitEd to movement in certain fixed relative directions-or
'I..'aT!Jin!l. Finally, that the 1'aTiatio1/.s of the rate reflect the
manæunc,> of the ship. If the ship is going slow and
changes her course only by small turns-a few degrees at a
time-then the varia\.ions in the rat.e will be small; while if
the ship is fast and makes large turns, the variation will be
large, As we ha,-e seen in a givcn case
ith a fixed target, a
turn of 90 degrees, made in 90 seconds, can com'ert a de-
creasing rate of 500 yards int-o an increaÚng rate of a like
amount-a t-otal change in rat.e of no less than 1,000 yards a
minute and a hali !
How can the nmge be kept in such conditions 1 Ob-
viously, the only way would be to lJ'ake the sights move a;!
the range cbanges. It an turns on continuous knowledge of
the rate, or, rather, on the rate being anticipated and con-
tinuolls 1 :J conii'ollwg the sights.
The rate-finding ill
trl1ments used in most navies ar

bascd unon a formula that was first embodied in an instru-
ment n;
de and patented, some t.en or ele\'t'n years ago,
y
Cari.aill Dumaresq, of the Royal Na\"y. This instrument,
when set to the firir'g
hip's spe
d and. to the speed and

E

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,

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,
'-"
'-0
'0
'

, .
,
,
,
,
,
,

3

FÍß'!.

course of the target if \.he target is mO\"Ìng, must first be
beld in such a position on board ship that its zero line i" in
coincidence with that of the firing ship.s course-no easy
matter when a ship is yawing, and almost illlpos
ible if thð
ship is turning. A pointer has then to be direct
d at tLe
target. V;hen aU tbis is done, the rate at "hicb the range
is changing at that moment is indicated. :Mes rs. Barr md
Stroud have introduced an impro, ed instrument, "hidl i ,
in fact, a mechanical equivalent to Captain DUlIIareoG' ill-
dic;;.tür. It sho\\ s the rate on a dial in<tead of 011 ;J. table,

11*

In fh.e 30.seconds between 1 and. 2. the. r
ehas cIutnßed 325 Eels
2 II 3.. .. .. .. 225' .
3 . 4 - -.' .. . .!QQ. .
650 ..

At 1 thtr
ofcha.n
e was .375
ds. per30secoJJJ.s
..2..... _ .300..
... 3. _ . _ .. 1 rS .. I
Haa these rates bun appú.e.d. for 30 seconds
ccntfuuous!g.there wouId.h.aYe been. an error of
5'0 Bds in f:h2 1

30 seco11ds
75. . . 2
. .-
75. .. .. 3 m ..
200.
=--

"
"-
....
""'4:. :;
""... 4
,_ .I
-. :-- .. -'<<: _ _ _ _ <:.::::> -A1

! A

LAND

AND

and can be made to operate a transmitt-er, so that the in-
stantaneous rate, when flsærtained as above, can be trans-
mitted to the place where the orders to raise or lower the
sicrhts at the Bpeed required fire being given.
., Note with regard to both these instrumenu that ,they
indicate the rate at tile moment, that they must be pomted
Dt tl
e target, and must be kept in coincidence with the
course line. N either can give a continuous indication of a

'F

--
..-

....

A

tL,9.2.

hanging rate, neither can be used when the firing ship is
turning. Both require the target to be visible. Let us see
how these limitations affect the Dardanelles problem.
Our ships there are engaged in two tasks-to support
the infantry in their advance to tho Gallipoli heighu and
to destroy the forts when the heights are won, and the Army
can correct the ships' fire. In each task they have to engage
their targets, either direct-that is, with the target visible-
or indirut, when the target is concealed by intervening hills.
Let us take the last case first.
The sketches, Figures 1, 2, and 3, will make the neces-
sary procedure clear. Figure 1 shows a ship, A, lying out
at sea engaging a target, B, on shore, which is concealed from
fA. by an intervening hill, C. At F (to the left of C) is a
higher hill in the possession of A's troops, from which A'a
fire is observed. E represents the coast line, and D is Bome
conspicuous object-a rock or ruin on the coast, which is a
convenient aiming point for the gunlayers in A. The general
position of B in relation to A would have been ascertained
by plans, maps, and charts; so that an approximate range
can be put upon A's guns, and at the same time an approxi-
mate deflection angle, DAB, put upon the sighu, which
then will be pointing at D, while the bore of the gun will be
pointing towards B. The observers on the hill F (or in ae1'O-
I1Ianes) will correct A's fire both for deflection and range; so
that the angle, DAB, and the range, A B, will in a few
rounds be ascertained with precision.

N
W l

1" ·
$
I

AO
II
.

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.
,
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\
,
\
\
.

.

-

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.

I

:

'

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,
I
.
,
I
.

.
,
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2
,

WATER,

June 5, 1915.

A can now ccntinue firing with confidence so long as i

position is not altered; but if A proceeds to start at a high

F

'B

c

,
,
"

. .t.'. ./

A

,
,

Ctfj,3.

speed on a wavy course, coming in due time to A2 and then
to A3, the range will have changed in all from 15,000 yards
to 15,500; but there will be many gradations up and down.
Now, as A cannot keep the bearing of B, B being invisible, it
"ill be impossible to know the rata at which the range is
changing, and consequently it will be impossible to keep an
accurate range. But, further, the angle, DAB, will, 01
course, change monstrously. D therefore becomes valuelesa
8S an aiming point and the direction, as well as the range.
of the target will become lost the moment A moves.
Now, supposing that there were no hill at C, and B was
visible from A wherever A proceeded to, then it would theo-
retically be possible, by means of instrumenu built on the
principle of Captain Dumaresq's, to have a constant indica-
tion of the actual rate of change. But unless that rate ia
impressed upon the sight synchronously with its occurring,
very serious errors int-crvene, as would appear, for instanoo,
from Figure 4. In Figure 4 the upper f>hip, A, is suppos
d
to be descending from north to south towards the lower ship,
B, which is proceeding from west to east. When at a range
oi 10,650 yards, A proceeds to make a 90 degrees turn, so aa
to come on a course parallel with B. This turn, we will sup-
pose, takes one minute find a half to execute. In that minute
and a half the range will alter from 10,650 yards to 10,000
yards. In the first half-minute the range is diminished by
325 yards, in the second by 225 yards, in the third by 100
yards. But the rate at the beginning of the first half-minute
is 375 yards per half-minute; at the beginning of the second
half-minute is 300 per half-minute, and at the beginning d
the third is 175 yards per half-minute. If, then, these rates
had been persisted in for the whole of each half-minute, there
\\ould have been an error of SO yards in the first half-minute

..

.

",

-

,
..

A total of

- ---- <::>-:)Þ-

.
-
t
:B C::>

,,'

;

I

,
] C::>

ti.g.+

12-

June 5, 1915.

LAND

A
D

and of .5 in each of the last. In 90 seconds, while making
a single quarter-turn, therefore, the gunlayers in A would
have got the range wrong by no less than 200 yards, and
would probably have ceased hitting befere the first minute
",as over.
There is noth
ng novel or unexpected in war haYing
brought this problem to the front. It, is at least six years
since the fire-control experts of the British Navy realised that
no rate-finding or rate-keeping device would be adequate to
the requiremeuts of modern action unless it could automatic-
ally deal with a t'ar!l'ing rate, alter the Bight, automa.tically
as the rat
varied, and, above everything else, be capable of
generating the fut':Jre bearings of the target-and tllli
whether it was stationary or maintain
ng a previously known
course at a previously known speed. The grounds put for-
ward six years ago for maintaining that such a device was an
elementary necessity of war were that in action it would often
be necessary to manæuvre, and that the target would be oft:.cn,
and for considerable periods, obscured by smoke. If, then,
the IOS5 of bearings Dleant the loss of the range, gun-fire
.-ould be inefficient because intermittent,
But when, aft
r many years of patient and costly experi-
ment, an automatic rate-finding and rate-keeping device was
produced to meet these requirements, it was very early
realised that, though evolved princ-ipal1y in view of the neoes-
aities of naval action, it would be invaluable for either direct
or indirect bombardment, where the attacks of destroyers or
lubmarines would make proteclive evolutions necessary.
Indeed, the demand for a folution of the rate problem
arose largely out of the perfecting of the long-range torpedo.
For it was this tha.t made it quite certain that destroyers
armed with these weapons would in the future take part in
Fleet actions. A threefold corollary would follow on their
participation. In the first place, battleships would have to
be sub-divided into smaller squadrons-say, four ships in-
.tead of eight, so as to shorten the target front presented

YlATER,

by a line of ships. Secondly, all evolutions would have to
be carried out at the highest practicable speed, so a.s to i!l-
crease the difficulty of aiming the torpedo correctly. And,
lastly, Budden and large changes of course would be nccc
s2.ry
so as to avoid or disconcert torpedo attack, '" hen it was knO\, n
to be immiuent.
At the time of which I am speaking it was axiomatic tlw.t
the moment a squadron changed course gunfire would hava
to cease because the rate of chauge could neither ba accu.mtdy
calculated, nor, if calculated, kept accuratdy on the !'ight
.
The solution called for by these conditioIl.'! was rea])y a de-
mand that ships should be able to keep the range w:th exactly
the same accuracy when manæuvring as they could do when
they were standing still. It is one of the curiosities of modem
naval history that when a solution in concrete form of the
most obvious of all artillery problems was produced the mono-
poly of it, which the Admiralty had paid heavily to make
possible, was abandoned before the device itself was tried.
At the Dardanell
s, where the targets are stationa;y,
only one-half of the fire control problem come.s into play--
\iz., mJ.lång the ship's helm free once the range and bearing
of the target have been ascertained. If ever a Fleet action
takes place, the necessity for a solution of the other half of
the problem will arise. 'Ve shall then ha\'e to find out the
speed and course of the target, as well as its range and bear-
ing. The range of any target at sea or on land must, at gl'eat
distances, ultimately be found by the observation of fire.
Obtaining its bearing is a comparati\'ely simple, but not
quite a simple business. But ascertaining its speed and course
presents difficulties very similar to those presented by ascer-
taining and keeping a variable rat
. They become greater
in proportion as the ship manæuvres or goes faster. And no
means are of the least use unless they give an imtantaneous
and accurate result in all conditions. Like the rate-keeping
system, no manæuvring by the firing ship must check or
impede the necessary operations,

A, H. POLLEN.

ROUMANIA

THE

WAR.

AND

By COUNT CHEDDO l\IIYATOVITCH.

Late Serbian Minister to the Court of St. James,

P UBLIC opinion in Britain, as well as in some other
countries, gives evidence of disappointment that
Roumania, the youngest member of the Latin
group. has not entered into the war simu1-
taneously with Italy, her elder and more powerful
sister. In some quart-ers, even, the opinion is held that
Roumania is sitting on the fen
waiting to act on the side
of the group of l'owers to which victory inclines. Such an
oplni&n is a great injustice t.o Roumania, lI.nd we ought

t
once to recognise that her situation is far more complicated
and åifficult tIlan that of Itdy has ever been.
Italy had only one Italia Irredenta, but for the Rou-
manian people there e.:Jist two Roumaniæ Irredentæ: Transyl-
vania and the Tarnish Banat under the crown of Hungary,
and Bessarabia under the sceptre of the Tsar. Until quite
ld
ly RounlJ.nian statesmen were divided into two groups:
one group was of opinion that the problem of greate
t. urgency
was the delivery of BesEarabia from Russian rule, while the
other group thought it more urgent tI'at Tl'aI1$ylvania should
be delivered from Hungary. It is not surrrising that of lat,e
a new group has been forll1ed of opportunists pure and
øimple, who thought that the problem as to which plan
øhould first be put in execution \Çould be determined by cir-
cun:stances. Under King Carol, the first of the three groups
was decidedly predominant, but during the last ten years tho
second and third groups were gaining in inßuencp, and sinco
the declaration of war they are apparently in the a
ocndent,
although t1ere is still a con;;iderable number of Rcumanir.a
politicians who distrust Russia to a greater e:x.t-ent than they
distrust Austria and Germany. TheEe m",n are nl)t inacti"e,
eVl'n to,day, when the un!'heatll!ng d ItaJy's sword gives
great
r probability of victory to the Allies; the Roumanian
!Iituation is C(\mpJex, because opinions are
O far removed from
unau imi t y .
But, even if opinian had been unanimous on the
ide úf
the Transyh'auian programme, it would bl:' l1ece

ary to
secure the Eucce!'s of that programme not only d iring the
war but. al
o during the negotiations for and the condusion
of pe:l
o It was abl'oIutely necessary to make ;\0 arrônge-
ment with Ru""ia, and that arr:iJ1gement i
:10 ,:r. pIe Rff..ir.

The eventual annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina, and
Banat by Roumania affects the interests of Russia, Bulgaria,
and Serbia. Russia, in negotiating with Roumania, has to
consider not only her own interests but also those of her
two protigées, Serbia and Bulgaria. Put differently, it
might be said tllat Roumania has to consider every detail
of her immediate future, and to take into consideration the
harmonising of her interests with tho.'Ie of Rus
ia, Bul6'aria,
and Serbia. Negotiations are
difficult matt
r, for they are
affected by very complex quest,lOns, and I am not at all sur-
prised that they are liOt vet concluded.
I must say, and that with sincere regret, that a certain
responsibility rest
on the Roumanian Government. for the
Elow progress of the negotiations, owing to her claims having
been exces;;Ïve at the outset. These claims included not only
Transylvania and Bukovina, but with Banat was claimed the
w}loJe left shore of the Danube from the Turnu-Severi!l up
to a point opposite Belbrad::!, the capital of Serbia, and this
in utter disregard of the fact that a large part. of Banat and.
the wide Danubian zene, from Baziah to Panchevo, is Serbian
country, inhabited by Serbs in overwhelming majerity. :For-
tllnat,ely, there Ï3 now a fair prospect that the interesls of
Sernia and Roumania. can be harmollÜed in that particular
zone.
But the gre3.test difficult.y in tIte way of a speedy dec1aJ'a-
tion of war on Au"tria-Hungary by Rcum:mia has been pro-
"ided by the attitude of Bulgaria, Only Bu!gJ.ria!ls can
\l'lderstand that attitude fully, but no doubt they are the best
judges of their own interest!!. They strenuously deny the
accusdtion wllieh has been made ag
imt
hem to the effect
t hat they have writt
n compacts with Amtria aud Turby
"inding them to re''lain strictly neutral, ilnd they ha\t!
d
('lared that tlley will remain neut,ral even if Houmani J.
attacks HU1Jg3.Ty. nut as they are at tbe BaUle timp. com-
p!aining bitterly agaimt the il1jU Lice done to them hy (he
tlorm'l of the Tr....it.; ef Buc1!:J.re
t, 2ud YOW Lo redless th::t
inju;;;tice at the fi
: ppportunity, th"y are reg'J.rded di4rust.
fully by all their nei
hbouI"!l--Rou'T!ania'1.', Greeks, an:l
Serbs alike.
.í. Yenil.elos, an a('ute
nd :iar-
eeiJ:<f state,'
n,an, cou!'idered th'lt it
Gu1d be np."'esp:;,ry to
e
t:rc lhe

13*

LAND

AND

neutrality of Bulgaria by the cession of K
valla ?efore Greece
conld join ill the war on the side of the Alhes, as IS her fervent

ish. Roumania, for this same reason of the doubtful
neutrality of Bulgaria., could not venture to invade Transyl-
va.nia until some security against attack by Bulgaria had
been obtained-for Bulaaria looks forward to the reconquest
of Silistria, and not only the territory ceded by virtue of the
Treaty of Bucharest, but the entire Dobrutcha. Roumania
seems to be willing to buy security by the cessi?n of some t
r-
ritory to Bulgaria, but wants not only a specIal treaty With
iBulgaria, but also a guarantee from the Entente Powers that
Ðulgaria should in no case occupy Dobrutcha. Bulgaria, a
proud country, considers a foreign guarantee of her own
formal engagements a supedluity, and at the same time the
:Entente l'owers do not see how they could guarantee to
Roumania the attitude of Bulaaria in all circumstances.
I wish to state only the lifficulties which Roumania has
to overcome before she can join in the war on the side of the
Allies. These difficulties are great, but not insuperable; for

'9lA TER.

;J une 5, 1915,

Roumanian diplomacy is very able, and is assisted by Russian
diplomacy, the ablest and most resourceful statecraft of the
world. The sentiments of the Roumanian people have always
been in full sympathy with the aspirations of France and
Italy, and they have never been more in sympathy than now,
when these two countries are fighting for the highest ideals of
humanity and for a permanent peace in Europe. But, apart
from sentiment, the political and economic interests of
Roumania-indeed, her duty to Roumanians outside the
bounds of her rule-are clearly pointing to the one possible
policy-intervention on the side of the Allies, and the render-
ing of assistance in the task of securing freedom, justice, and
permanent peace, which means a new organisation of Europe
on the basis of nationalities. Roumania will undoubtedly
join the Allies as soon as her diplõmatic relations with Russia,
Bulaaria, and Serbia are completed, and we shall not have to
wait very much longer for the successful conclusion of
a full and reliable unde,r5tanding between these four
countries.

THE

THE

VALUE
GREAT

OF ITALY TO
ALLIANCE.

By COLONEL F.

D URING the critical weeks preceding the declara-
tion of hostilities between Italy and the Dual
Alliance, it seemed to me that her ultimate
decision was so inevitable that not even the
dullest of diplomats could fail to perceive the
canger of delaying preparations to meet her entry into the
struggle on the side of the GI.eat Alliance. Yet the news
which has come through during these first few days is sufficient
to show that Germany is very far from ready to afford substan-
tial assistance to the Austrians, who, on their own pal.t, are
already so pressed by the Russians in the North that the troops
already in position to meet the Italian invasion are far from
adequate to the occasion. This only serves to throw into
stronger relief the desperate nature of the German offensive
against the \\"estern Carpathians and to expose tIle motives
underlying the extraordinary exaggeration of the first
bulletins announcing glorious victories. Clearly the whole
unùertaking was set on foot to impress the Italian diplom-
atists, and so all-important was this end to German policy
that she concentrated every available man and gun for the
purpose, hoping that the first gain of ground, which wag
inevitable in view of the forces she had assembled, might
stave off the danger of Italian intervention, even at the
eleventh hour.
I doubt whether the German General Staff ever ex-
pected more from their blow, for no men in the world
have been better trained to understand the fatal dangers
which arise from lessening in any way the mobility of 1\
l'ield Army, and the veriest beginnel. among
t them must
have seen fmm the first that if an expenditure of between two
million and three million shell a day was an essential element
of the plan, the momentum must die out from their attempt as
scon as the Army had advanced more than fifty miles or less
than one hundred from their last railway depots. After
which the rate of advance would be limited to the rapidity

ith which the railways and roads destroyed by the Russia
g
m retreat could be reconstructed-say to four or five miles a
day; whereas the Russians, on the win!1'S of the great
.. phalanJl:," still retain their full freedom oof movement at
the rate of between twelve to fifteen miles a day, and it ap-
pears very clearly from the most recent reports that they are
using this advantage most thoroughly.

ince the Defence of the Realm Act applies not only to
our own future movements but to those of our Allies, any

t
empt
forecas
t.he stra
egy that the Italians will adopt
l.i unpoEslble, but It IS permItted to us to speculate freely on
Ot
r enemy's mea?-s and m
vements, and the followinJ figures
wIll suffice to gne a gUIde to our readers. It is worth
whil.e re
apitulating them because 8Ilhough published
()
cIa
ly .DY the FrEnch Go....ernment in January last, their
fUll .slgmficance seems to have been lost upon the British
public,
According to these figures, the GtJrmallii in January last,

N. 1\fAUDE, C.B.

over and above the 4,000,000 men (the approximate strength
of the armies actually at the front), had only 2,000,000 mea
fit for the field, comprising the 1915-16-17 classes, as well
as untrained LandstUl.m. At the rate at which their armies
had been wasting through killed, wounded, and prisoners-
not sickness-it would have taken rather under than over
ten months to exhaust them. Aft-er that dat-e the armies at the
fmnt could no longer be maintained at their full numerical
strength and collapse would be inevitable and speedy.
Now the established rate of wastage, making due allow-
ance for wounded rejoining from hospital, but still not for the
sick, was 260,000 a month, and since the fighting has con-
stantly been growing in intensity and will continue to do so
amazingly in a very short time, it is reasonably certain that
this rate of wastage has been maintained at least, and will
certainly have been found to exceed it during the two months
which have just gone by.
It is clear, therefore, that Germany can have no new
formations to send against Italy, and therefore, unless f\he
leaves her ally in the lurch altogether-in which case Austria
",ill collapse - she must build up a new army from troops
already cngaged on her several frontiErs, and it seems to me
beyond the wit of man even to suggest whence they are to be
taken.
It is a case of " catching a Tartar" literally and on the
grandest scale, for certainly the Russians will not let go their
hold either in Galicia or Poland, nor does it seem probable
that General J offre or General Frcnch will allow such a
.weakening of the line in front of them to take place
unpunished,
To be of any use to their hard-pressed ally at least
ten German Army Corps will be required, for not
only can the Italians keep aJ1 army of at least a
million in the field, but they have more than a million
behind to replace their casualties, and thanks to the lateral
railways which connect the two wings of the Army-one on
the Isonzo, the other on the Adige-they can play upon their
enemy the same game by which the Germans in Poland and
Galicia have for 80 long been able to hold in check the
Russians, notwitlIstanding the fact that the latU!r had con-
vincingly asserted the superiority over them in each of the
three arms-cavalry, infantry, and artillery.
There is no such superiority here in the case of the
Äustrians, for in fighting records the Italians stand much on
a par with their opponents, even when both start fresh and
equally equipped. Austrian victories in Italy have invariably
been due to superior readiness and superior generalship, but;
now the readiness is on the Italian side and the Austrians
have no Radetsky to rely upon.
'When the fresh redistribution of German troops can be
ascertained the apparent deadlock which has for 80 long di!l-
heartened the public will be broken and decisive events wil\
begin to crowd on one another.

14*

June 5, 1915.

LAND

AND

SV A TER..

TALES

OF THE UNT AMEDa
MARGOT.

Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas English.

C ROONI
G one sing-song plaint from morn to eve,
like some old beldame, drivelling in her dotage j
crammed, morn to eve, \'vith glutting, noisome
offal; forgetful of the savage dignity with which
at first she had repellcd her gaolers; Margot, her
every natural impulse curbed and stifled, had ceased to care.
Gone were the leafy corridors of green; gone the slow-
billowing sea of forest verdure; gone the broad-bosomed
kindly oaks, on which her youth had wantoned.
The snare, the gun, the birdlime, the decoy-all had
been aimed at her in vain; and this-this was the end.
The first short troubled flutter from the nest had brought
to Margot her new life.
She was full-fledged. Her parents had forsaken her.
No longer might she expect their hourly service-seeds, in-
Beets, grubs, thrust down her gaping throat.
She had not turned a feather at the parting. She had
not felt the unnerving diffidence which young things, fronted
with life's problems, dumbly suffer.
Some instinct told her life was very good.
Before her lay the forest, rainbow-tinted; a brimming
store of warmth, and light, and revelry-a treasury inex-
haustible.
Borne on the happy tide of circumstance, she drifted, in
light-hearted ease, towards a sunny sea.
Full ecstasy of life was hers, full ecstasy of careless
mirth, shared with her chattering kin.
This sisterhood, this union in a common life and kncw-
ledge, was the keynote of her being.
By this, the life of her community, she judged the other
winged folk of the thickets, their likeness to, and difference
from, herself,
The ties of kinship disciplined her life, but no such bond
as links the migrant hordes to fly, to plunder, or to fight, as
one; no such community of lot as fires the crows to help
their kin in battling with the hawks.
The mainspring of such interest is the need of it-to
fight a common danger.
Nor hawk, nor buzzard dreamt of eating Margot-risky
to chase and hard to kil1, and bitter flesh at that. The
amaller fry were juicier, the finches, whose one weapon was
their .flight, the squabby, nestling game-birds.
Margot had fed herself at once-for little came amiss
to her. She gulped down seeds or berries, worms or insects.
She ate whole nests of fledglings, driving the tiny mother ofi,
vr even kil1ing her with one fierce peck.
Her shot-silk plumage, ebony faced with whit,e, her
narrowing tail that almost overbalanced her, were counted
cheap as ornament; her bitter leathery flesh was not worth
eating; all that she really had to fear (though this she had
to learn) was the chance fancy of some prowling gunner, who
fired, of wantonness, to keep his eye in.
The glut of food made jealousy unthinkable, Margot's
call,note resounded every hour, a chattering gurgle, tuneful,
almost tender, which summoned all her kinsfolk to a feast:
acorns gigantic on the broad-backed oak which sentinelled
the clearing; or sugary berries on the rowan-tree, close to the
four-way crossing of the rides. All crammed their fill, first
come, fil'st served, and clacked like men whose tongues are
loosed by liquor.
Jacquot the Jay came sometimes, a handsome bird,
though heavy, puce-vested, cinnamon-coated, with azure
pipings on his wings. He was a gallant trencherman and
crammed his gizzard manfully.
Each evening, after thirst was quen('hed (3 social rite
at coppice spring, or at the boundary pcol) and after short,
capl"icious bUl'sLs of flight had stretched their wings and left
them widely I>undered, rang clear the sUIl'mons of their
chieft.ainess, the Mother Margot, olde
t of them all, And
all winged straight towal'ds her elm or oak, whose urgent
claims as roosting-pl1i.ce were judged by her wise prescience
of wind, or moon, or rain.
Their greetings were soft fizzles of endearment. From
branch to bran;'h they tripred and jerked 1i.nd .fluttered, each
in her turn e"icted from her perch, each in her turn the
mischievous aggressor. The treo itself seemed animate. Its
boughs and leaves, continually astir, rejoiced in harboUl'ing
tho sprightly chatter, the bubbling mirth of comrade
hip
J;6newed.

Then, as the !!Iun sank red behind the trees, and day-
light waned, and night's mysterious gloom brought warning
of night's dangers, the voices, one by one, died down.
A few disjointed peevish notes dropped lightly branch
to branch-the last good wishes for the night, the last appeab
for quietude. And then carne silence.
The joy of summer sunshine! Long days of feasting
and of chattering: days spent in palaces of green, whoge
galleries stretched endless: days spent in clearings bathed
in gold, beneath an azure canopy: days spent with flippant,
saucy merles; with loutish jays; with cynic crows; with ped
or cringing mavises.
She learnt the t.rees whose branches were t.he steadiest;
the sheltered dips and hollows; the fresh, cool springs; the
friends, the foes, the rivds of her world.
Slowly, insensibly she learnt the mystery of the fûrest.
The passing of the jays concerned her first.
Morn after morn a silent host of them traversed the
forest south-bound. At set appointed hour they checked,
and dropped as one on wizened leafle:<s oak, as though tllis
were a predetermined halt. They restcd, then pursued their
course.
The first day Margot followed them, but as they reached
the forest boundaries, and fined away in smoky streamers
south, lost heart and sought her trees again.
Eight days their passage la
ted, and fight days Margot,
curious, fascinated, escoIted their interminable columns.
'Yhere were they bound for 1 Did some aU-powerful f03
pursue? Some æonstrous gluttonous biI'd of pI'ey 1 Did tha
same fear obsess the silent ring-doves, or the grey hordes of
starling folk who swung and curled in srirals to the zenith,
then, li
e a cloud-burst, dropped on stubble-field or fre!>hly
upturned tilth 1
She stared at their battalion movements wondering,
Nor did she scorn small trivial happenings. She hungered
always for the strange, the new. She hugged the Sill of
magpie folk, insatiate curiosity.
SquilTeI had utterly dumbfounded her. Squirrel
flashed wingless twig to twig; spun like a crazy top from
bough to bough; looped branches, rippled down the trunk,
and suddenly flung skywards, like an arrow. Squirrel had
seen the hare and smelt t,he dog. As Squirrel reached the
topmost twig, boomed (the first time) on Margot's cars the
thunder of the gun.
Margot took little heed of it. Her curious eyes wcro
fastened on the Man. She watched without misgiving, and
unsuspicious of their fateful meaning, the twist which sImJg
the smoking tube behind his turning shouldel's, the stoop to
lift the slaughtered hare, the busying of his hands about the
body.
The smell of powder jangled on her senses, and almo
t
brought distrGst with it. Still she kept
tation on her
branch, not troubling to conceal herself, while blackbirds f!f'd
with shrilling screams, and crows winged quickly out of range
with angry squawks of warning.
l\Iargot had yet to learn that Nan meant Danger.
The hare, that dangled limp between his hand<;, per.
ph'xed yet hardly frightened her. The lesson was but dimly
comprehended. She could not yet conceive herself the hare.
She was a creature of the skies, far, far beyond Man's
grasp, Her sence of circumstance was like the squirrel's.
Squirrel pelts up his tree at :Man's appro:>ch, ",hiskg
round the trunk at some cOll\-enient fork, and, "ith his body
hidden, thrusts his nose out. He is too high for Man to
harm. He waits for threatening ge<;ture, stares
pell-bound
at the slow uplifting weapon.
The passing of the south-bound jays was warning of the
fall. There was still food abundant; the same fresh springs
gushed water: but, with September, carr.e the rains, and,
after these, chill, lengthening nights, which draped the trees
in mourning.
Daily the throng of birds decreased. The sunless,
moisture-laden air condensed in clinging mist, a wcolly mist
that wrapped about the trees in mournful swathes of silence.
'The foliage was no longer weather-proof; it chinked and
crannied as the yellowing leaves peeled one by one from their
frost-shrivelled stalks. The treacherous rain-drops found I
way between them, and dripped and splashed in spattering
shutes and falls, dulling the plumage, soddening the \\ in:;:,;,

15*

L..:\
D

Soon thera were few leaves left.
S0me fell "ithuut a b'eath to quicken theTn (their hue
alone foreshadowing their fde), slowly, reluctantly, on wind-
less evenings,
Othel's wcre whirled on high by northern gales, and
swept to earth with swish and crack and rattle, which drove
the red hares headlong from their forms out to the open
l)lough.
Sadness and Heaviness and Pain had CI'eDt into the
forest-and :\IaI'gOt and her sisters heard their .voices. In-
stinctinly they huddled up together. Dawn found t.hem
pI'eelling milled, steamy plumes in l'eadiness for flight
Dawn, d!<>:1 them East and scattered them, like wide-
flung seed, ou L , plough, and stubble. The change
of season brou;ht ii. change of habit. They sought afield. by
choice deliberate, food they might yet have found within the
forest, The open ground was sunniest, But there was other
cause of melancholy, which saddened them and warped their
joyous round,
The fates had leagued against them with the times, and
brouO'ht a niO'ht disastrous to Lhe race.
!Iargot had winged belated to the pool, whose bank'!
were shadowed by the curtseying willows, whose surface mir-
rored, in a ccpper glow, the passing of the sun.
Her beak still stickied with the haws, she dropped
among the sisterhood, to drink her fill, and there await the
summons to the roosting'place, She lit on strange commo-
tion, took flight to view it belter, and poised abm'e a tumult
of her kin,
Something' was wl"Ong with one of them-with two-
with three. 'riley could not take to wing,
Their whipcord legs crooked under them, then lashed
out straight to fling their bodies upward, But no light hop
or forward flutter followed. Their feet were glued to earth,
They bobbed and eurbied pitiably, with flapping wings, with
screaming, angui
hed cries.
2.\fargot dl'ew closer, curious.
What horror had befallen them 1
By slow degrees and painfully one prisoner raised a foot.
The claws lay close together, stiffened downwards. and from
tl:J extrem(' :md of them a slimy tentacle reached earth, fining
or thickening as the leg compelled, but never whoIly SUll-
del'ed. The other leg stayed fast. To lift it needed le\'erage
from its fellow, To lower this meant glueing it afresh.
The ill,fated three had reached the pond the first, had
chosen the three ob\,ious shelving bays.
The othel's, :Margot with them, dispersed about a circling
stone-built rampart, new margin to the pool since yesterday.
On this they hunched themselves, and with strained necks
and over-
oppling bodies, risked drowning in the straggling
weeds whIch masked the muddy depths.
, They quenched their thirst laboriously! with cough and
cho.:e and splutter, then turned to gaze III wonder at the
captives. Yainly they circled round and over them. Their
presence brought no comfort, no relief. The luckless one3
s
ilI Yoice
their woes incessantly, still danced, left-right, left-
t'Ight, theIr mad mark-time,
Behind a spur of purpling cloud a blood-red sun went
down. Clear from the fórest rang the nightly summ011!!.
They must be gone, must quit the pool, and seek the cllOsen
shelter.
lowly, unwillingly they turned, and, as they left
the pool-sIde one by one, the abandoned capti\'es whirred
their helpless wings, and daL.ced distraught, and screamed
forlorn,
At sUlll'i q e they were back again, A touz]ed feather here

d. ther
, a nibbled bone
a skull, a claw, toJd of grim hap-
pemngs III the murk of lllght.
_ liencef
rt.h, for all the magpie race, the pool was cursed.
1'ijo summer s heat could tempt them to its coolness. to dibble,
or to preen themselves, or bathe their glossy feather5.
The days lagged past, each with new trials and set,backs.
For. now the food was dwindling. The ripened fruits were
rottIng on the ground. The insects died or hid themseh'es
behind the frost-proof armour of the bark.
l\1ar þ ot and Margot's sisters must need support them-
selves wIth chance-found gleanings. Yet self was never
?ppermost. Above self towered in paramount strength the
lllterest of the race. It was as though some shrill-voiced imp
was spokesman of their conscience. Each find was ad\-ertised
at large, with strident call inviting aU and sundry. From
every quarter of the wild winged up the starved communitv.

Then and then only might the meal begin-with squab-
bungs round a food-scrap.
A fog ob<;cured day's passing. Alert upon her leaBes9
bo
gh sat
argot,
ickencd of hel' fruitless hunting. Her head
tWItched slde to sIde. This way and that her beady eyes

AND

WATER.

June 5, 1915.

peered curious. The call-note sounded fmm a brake of thorn,
\"h
se foliage, sheltered by
he hulm oak's strength, still clung
to It forlol'llly. Margot slzzed instant answer; then soared
abo\'e the network of the boughs, and marked two others of
her kind, who quickened to the sound.
She tacked hel' flight to theirs, and, as she crossed the
clearing after them, met smoke-wreath and the musty stench
of powder. The thundel'-clap had had no meaning for her:
the stinking sllloke was ominous. It bl'Ought back memorie9
of the hal'e.
Onward she flew. Again the thunder crashed. Again
the slow stench met her,
She pressed her flight; the three sped on in line; and,
for the third time, boomed the deafening roar,
But this time there was more than stench and sound.
There was a lurid spurt of flame, which lit the darkening
coppice: a whizz of hail about the three, who now flew c1o
e
together. The foremost of them checked, and spun, and
dropped.
A whip-lash cut at Margot's breast, and swept her off
her balance. Instinctively she swerved to right herself, and
with changed course flew on,
But she had seen.
Two visions pieced together in her mind; two stooping
men with smoking tubes slung round them: two soft limp
fonns picked up by callous hands. The fil'st had been a hare j
the second was a magpie.
And Margot understood.
Never before had she seen her own blood, It welled up
slowly, crimson drops of it, like berries of the rowan. She
watched lieI' clean breast feathers mat together, and staunch
the clotting flow,
From flesh wound she learnt fear of Man, Must she fear
magpie also 7 \Vhat of the sister, whose call-note had lured
her to such welcome 7 She heard her still, and from the self-
same brake-clear, unmistakable, No sigh of wind disturbed
the evening's calm.; no rustle of slow-dying leaf waved from
the bough's extremity its message of farewell.
The call sped forth untrammelled. Pyets and jays and
blac1..birds flocked towards it, At quickened intervals rang
out the thunder of the gun, Only the wary vet.erans held
aloof, and Cl'OWS, whose ears discerned the man-made decoy.
Margot had not the wit of crow, nor even veteran mag-
pie's wit. To her henceforth all men were surely gunner:>,
all sticks and staves their implements of murder.
Sportsman she shunned, and wayfarer alike.
Daily her mind bl'Ought knowledge of fresh danger9.
There \\'as the owl, an enemy of all nestlings, and so an enemy
of the race. And oh! the mobbing of him. Shipwrecked in
broadest daylight, rolling his eyes, wing-spreading, backed
against the trunk. The day-birds flocked to haze him, wit.h
whirl' of wing, with mocking, strident screams. The red-
breast all aflame with insolence; the ebon crows wit.h hungry,
prying eyes; the linnets, finches, tit-mice-all letting " dare
not" wait on " will."
And suddenly the racket of them ceased. Their circling
widened to a prudent distance, and, in a moment, fined afield.
A crow had signalled danger. Thundered the gun, and two
that loitered, dropped-the victims of .Man's guile once more,
the dupes of a stuffed enemy.
The sameness of the dreary, trailing days was broken
by the snow. All night it fell, slow, feathery, dreamy,
noÌ5eless. It shrouded earth; it choked the water-holes; it
limned each bough in white, against the morrow's blue,
Margot could find no food in it, so winged towards the
\-illage. She sneaked behind the orcllard fence, she scanned
the paths, she pried about the walls,
Pakhes of soil the snow had not yet mantled lay on the
hedge's shelter'side. She flew to these at first, glancing
askance towards the shuttered houses, A fresh turned mole-
hill starred the white, and from it whiffed the scent of flesh.
Good fortune tIlls-a lump of bacon-fat, food for one day at
least. She drove her beak at it and tugged.
(To be cont;II11::d,)

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Hilaire Bel/oc will give a fwther series of three lectureJ
on the War at Queen's Hal/, London, on TuesdaJ}, June 22 ;
TuesJaJ}, JulJ} 13; TuesJaJ}, JulJ} 27. Seats maJ} now be booked.
I\-IR. L. BLiN DESHLED'S LECTURES.
Two illustrated lectures on .. The Role of Aircraft in the
TV ar" will be given at the PolJ}technic, Regent Street, as fol/ows :
Lecture I., June 17, on .. Aircraft as an AuxiliarJ} Arm." Lec

ture II., June 24, on "Aircraft on the Offensive." Both lectureJ
u'il/ begin at 8 p.m. Tickets can be obtained at the PolJ}technic.

l'...nted Ly the "ICTOIUA liulI
PR.!:oI'Ill'/G CQ., L:w., ludor ::5treet, \\ hitefrw&, Lolld(Jn, KC.

June 5, 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

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Store )'Of4T PUIS in our Free.-
z',,
C ha",h
rs. r articu/ars
of our Ne'ltl Cmnbinecl rur
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agaInst all and every risll
se",t post free 011 IlpjJlinlti01S.

Debenham
& Fl"ee,
9Ay,
\\"gmore Street,
,C,,"endi.h Squ..re) Lon.Jo

June 5, 19 1 5

GARROULD'S

To H,Y. War Office, H.M, Colonial Office, India Office,
8t. John's Ambulance Association, London County Council,
GUY's Hospital, &c,
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON.
Complete Equipment of Nurses for Home
Detachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Implements and Appliances
in Stock.
Illustrated Catalogues of Nurses Uniforms. ðc.. Post Fr...
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.
Circular AiI CushIons (various sizes), 7/6, Invalid Carrying Chair (light and strona),
8/9, 9:11, 10/9, &c, 17/6
Wal er Beds, Air Beds, and Mattresses, Invalid Chairs and Carriages of every
29 6. 52/6, 26 '9 de3cription (see catalogue),
Air and Water Pillows, 3/0, 10/6 First AId Cases and Cabinets at specIal
Feedmg Cups, 4ld. each, prices.
Bed Pans from 3/1! Imahd Bed Rests, 6/11
Leg and Arm Boths from 25/6 and 8/6 Ward Beds,e..ds: 3ft" 13/9 i 2ft, 6ID., 12/9
111\ ..lid Bed fables from 6/6 Camp Folders: 6ft., 9/6; WIth pillow, 12/0
E & R C ARRO U lO Telegrams: .. Garrould, London."
.. , 150 to 162 EoCWARE RD., LONDON, W,

BENSON'S
Luminous "Active Service" Wristlet Watch
VISIBLE AT NIGHT.

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Largest stock of
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from ;E2: 10 : 0

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25 OLD BOND STREET, W.
and 62 & 64 LUDGATE HILL, E.C.

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.

160

lUlL J' It) I ;J

J _ \
0 .-\:-J 1) \ \' .-\ T E R

O XCE upon a time a great poet bracketed England
and .\pril in an e"\.qui.:;te snatch of verse, one
which we all know so well, that it is needles3 to
repeat it here, .\nd by redson of the beauty of
his words England and April will always be
associated together. Yet if most of us were given the choice
we should probably not object. to the spending of April far
away from our native shores in a place of less capricious
clim"ate than that vouchsafed by the tearful month.
But in June-when June behaves-it is a very different
matter. June and England are synonymous terms of 1?eauty.
In the early days of June, when the trees are strong \\Îth their
fresh \'oung foliage, when the chestnuts are in perfect cande-
bhr.l -fonn, when lilacs, near the e\'e of waning, gi\'e their
:,ubtlest fragrance, nothing can approach our land. It is
unique, it is a priceless possession, it is good to li\"e in,
With ghastliness past all description as part of our daily
e),istence, it is a relief to turn, no matter for how short a time,
from the thoughts of war, and nothing but the war. Kot
for the space of one half second are we allowed to do so in
London. If we want to gi\'e our minds and hearts a rest in
this, or indeed. in any other great town, we must take our
telephone off its stand, refuse to admit callers, and by no
manner of means go forth into the streets, for the streets
"impl\" serve as vast hoardings for \\ar news, Even if the
grue
òme side of war does not for the moment present itself,
it is ,tIll with thoughts of war that we are presented, \\ e
can " e groups of khaki-clad men drilling in the parks, men
that possibly in the shortest space of time from now will
.Ibandon these fair scenes for ones of destruction in Flanders.
\Ve meet at every turn things that echo the war. It is
impossibl,e to escape the all-pervading thought in all its
many gUIses.

The Contrast
That is the reason why the inveterate country-lover
finds that he had yet much to learn about the scenes in which
he delights. l\Iuch though in year
gone by he appreciated
rural things, it has been left for this year of sharp contrasts
to teach him their fullest value. .And those to whom formerly
country matters were as a sealed book, ha\'e opened the
\'olume and started to turn its pages. They find peace there,
or at any rate the comparative peace, which is all most of ':Is
at this moment can hope for. The country stands out 111
welcome relief from the strident clatter of great towns. It has
come into its own at last. There is no agitation amongst the
,.;reat forests of trees, with their galaxy in varying shades
(If green. They stand immovable; even the. strong,est gust
of \\ ind serves but slightly to ruffle them, fhere IS peace
dnd strength in the \'ery sight of the great trunks, ,and \\ l
en
as in favoured beauty spots, they -are embedded 111 a \\Ide
carpet of bluebells, or in a thick undergrowth of moss and
brad.en, nothing is omitted to please the imagination:
.\n American woman, who li\'ed on her nen'es If any
woman ever did, once gave me the following informdtion,
When she found, or fancied she found, things had grown I?ast
hearing, she took a first-da"s railway ticket, secured a
arnagc
to herself. by fair mLans or foul. and started forth on a Journev
through "orne 100'elv part of England, or \\!lCre\'er Shl
happened to be. Th
re
ipe always worked. She returned
linm onCL more a rea on,lble being, and in infinitd\ b,ttl r
1èmpd and spirit". Be,.ide"" ,what, is mor: to the point, she
\\ lS bLlrable oncp morc tn 11\., \\Ith, which slIP herself was
the first to admit wa>> not the ca",e beforL At tlH plesent
mom nt, were m\ \merican an E/lp"li"hw. îlan and \\ re she
in Fm:hnd, she -would probabl
.. 1 c tr '\ e 1 ling all 1... long,
\\1' t1 _ pn' -nt chim" upon our raih\a\' system wPo ma

be thankful the United States in general, and Washington
D.C. in particular, have once more claimed her as their own.
But this has nothing to do with the subject in hand,

The Rural Life
I have another woman in my mind's eye, who since the
war began has started chicken-farming, In days, which
in reality are such a brief while ago, but seem to be separated
from us by hundreds of years, her life was madl7 up of one
continuous round of social engagements. She was seen
everywhere, at places at home during the season, and at
places abroad where people congregate at other times of the
vear. The usual life of the woman of leisure and means,
\vho enjoys the society of her fellow-creature!:>, seemed to
have become second nature to her. She has three sons,
all of whom are serving their King and Country in some
capacity or another, and no other children,
As soon as they scattered to different parts of the 5ghting
area, she took to a small house \\ith large garden in a remote
part of England, and incidentally to chickens. These she
declares she is rearing not only for pleasure, but for profit.
How these profits are arrived at it is past me to imagine, for
the chickens seem to the unsophisticated mind to be lodged
in a kind of palace de luxe, and the egg,laying to be dis-
appointingly small. Their owner, however, a\ ow!:> that
these profits exist, and since she is de\'oting them to three or
four different charities, and I have reason to know that these
have received cheques from her in the course of the last few
months, one must assume that they do. At any rate they do
in her fertile imagination. And since the charities benefit,
and she herself is gi\'en distraction in the intervals of waiting
for news from the front, all gets \\hat they require.
Not excluding the chickens themselves, who until the day
of reckoning, when they leave their feathered nest for food,
and all undoubtedly live in fatness and contentment.

A Peaceful Spot
In the meanwhile, the small house is all that a smal
house in the countrv should be. The lattice windO\\s have
leaded panes, and tílOse of the rooms upstairs open to show
a vista of far off wooded hills \\ ith a gleam of water in between,
where the river runs its sil\"Crv wav. Inside there are all
kinds of quaintly patterned coÏ:t.lge chintzes, \\ith just the
amount of bright colouring that one looks for in a. country
chint7, and is disappointed to find lach.ing. Were it not for the
sword of Damocles hanging O\'erhead, June in this quiet spot
\\ ould gi\ e an id:dlic e"\.istence, As it is life is made more toler-
able. And for the smallc::.t of mercie>> \\e ha\-e learnt to be
duly grateful.
* * * .. .. *

A short while ago, in one of my article::" I sug:;ested that
an organisation should be started, enabling women to take
the place of men, called away on active sen ice, A corn
spondent has h.indly written to tell me that one e),ists It is
called the \romen's Defence Relief Corps, and ha" bI;
n "tal ted
by
Irs. Da\\son Scott, To help the country in its hour of
need is th<> one aim and object of all belonging to the Corps,
and the name that ha r been agre d upon for its members,
is the <;impl<> and ( 'p'icit one of Helper." A farnlcr has
just eng 1-. 'd a hdnd of :\l1s. Da\\.;on Scott's Help 'rs" for
hay in
liddlesL'X at men's wa:-es, She hopt;, to get many
women in England rou<;ed to the fact that they can be of
great help \\ith thL ha) and corn harvest, that is .so \Îtal a
matter. The He dqual'us of the Corps are at "Hardln,"
(.. Kin
Street, Southal
, :\liddlesQx, and from here a h,l1lù-
book \
ith full infonnation is issued.

I ()f

LAN 0 AND \\' A '1 E R

Silversmiths to His Majesty 1{ing George V

CONTRACTORS TO H.M. GOVERNMENT.

LTD.

1 5 8- 1 62

OXFORD

STREET

220 REGENT ST., 2 QUEEN VICTORIA ST" LONDON.
ROYAL WORKS, SHEFFIELD.

,
\ ".
\, r-_
I ---- ,

. ...
;. "
.. "'

-

OFFICERS'

FIELD

KIT

OJ"

.:a

,

S

:,l
-
7 : 10: 0

The Officers' Field Kit consists of 8 Articles, as detailed below :-
Green \\Tillesden Canvas Compactum Bed (size 6 ft. 6 x 2 ft. 6)
.. .' .. Pillow, stuffed horsehair
Brown Canvas \\T ar Office Bed Sack ,
Green Willesden Canvas Folding Bath and \Vashstand in Sack
Bucket
Folding Chair
Brown \\' ar Office Ground Sheet
.. .. Leather Bound Kit-bag to take all the 'above,
with secure lock
If the Bed is supplied with hook joints
Large size Bed 7 ft. x 3 ft. ...
" .. Pi 110\\

.fl

19 0
G 0
3 6
í G
.. 0
,)
8 6
18 6

1

..

..

..

2 15 0

.. 4/- extra,
... 8/- ..
4/- ..

Painting Name and Regiment in \\Thite Block Letters on Outside of Kit-bag 5/-

SEND FOR PHOTO-ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUE

161

June 5, 19 1 5

=Ï"

The County Gentleman
AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LÀ V No. 2770

SATURDAY, JUNE 12, 1915

[ PUBLI
HED AS ] PRICE SIXPENCE
A NEWSPAPER PüBLISHED WEEKLY

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, ,

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'

, .,

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--

,

.
l

'"

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,....

'-

...

Cøþyright. II La,," ana Wat",,.
"J

[By J#SI!" SiJnþso,., R.B,A.

GENERAL CADORNA

Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army

L_\ND AKD \YATER

.....

":

iWÒ'O

OJ

June 12, 1915

'-.

-.

o

y
,

,.,T
,
'.

=-

'I) Market Street.
MANCHESTER.
8 Cas.le Street.
LIVhrtPOOL.

46 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.
PHONE REGENT 189.

-.

Also 1"1 Gordon Street.
Branches at GLASGOW.
8 DBËë't'
Àl,,
ce. b
BLiÑ
reland SL.
And 43 CORNHILL, LONDON. H.C.

1\1ILIT ARY & SPORTING
HAT SPECIALIST

,.

HAT

MANUFACTURERS

<<

.
,

Soft and Flexible Field Service Cap \\ ith Curtain. Ligbt
in weight and Comfortable, 17 6
This shape also made in Patent Sun.pr....of Cloth, 18í6
All Raò

.. cUPDIi...rl (rom 3 8

BY APPOINTMENT
To THE KING,

oJ

t
/

I

Woodrow's flex:ble Cap is the correct Headwear for Officers.

Soft and Flexible Field Service Cap without Curtain, 1 15/-
Celluloid Grease,proof Shield, 1 6

.@
(9:

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A T considerable expense we have produced the crests
and badges of nearly all the regiments in His
Majesty's Army on our wel!-known .. CON AMORE"
Cigarettes, and we venture to think that no more accept-
able gift could be sent to your friends or relatives serving
either at home or abroad than a box of these well-known
cigarettes bearing the bJ.dge of his Regiment.
We make no additional charge for the crests, which are
also accurately reproduced on each box of cigarettes. We
have the crests of over 10:> regiments ready.
.. CON AMORE" Cigarettes are obtainable at all the
leading tobacconists and stores, at the following prices :-
Per box Per box Per box
of IDO. of 50. of 25.
Egyptian blend 7 6 3 9 2 '
Turkish 7,- 3 6 1 9
Virginia 6,- 3 - 16
Boxes of ICO or 50 Cigarettes sent post free. Boxes of 25 postage 2d, extra,
Should any difficulty be experienced in obtaining U CON
AMORE' cigarettes, kindly write direct to the manufac-
turers, MARCOVITCH & CO., LTD., 13 REGENT
STREET, S.W., and per return you will receive a box of
cigarettes.
NOTE.-SpecÌal Wholesale Terms to Messes,
A reduction of 1/- per 100 on quantities of 2CO or more
,. CON AMORE" Cigarettes sent to members of the
Expeditionary Force.

Officer
s Ideal Water Bottle

FOR THOSE ON ACTIVE SERVICE
Improved shape, does nof: absorb wet:.
Will sf:and f:he hardship of f:he campaign.
Nickel Silver. Non-Corrosive.
Silver Plated Inside.
Co\ered with hhaki T\\III,
Screw Stopper, or Ba)onet Top.
Supplted with S\\ ivels or Shoulder Straps
CAPACITY II PINTS, 18 í 6
COVIPLETE, FKOM

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TO HOLD A QUART, 21/
COMPLETE. FRO\1 -

O\.tainable only from-
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...?Jli/itorlj Culfilte,!.
!II CONDUIT STREET. LONDON, W.

01"T ADI

SO
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By AppoIntment.

i i 5 & i i 5a REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.
Specialists in
Regimental Highland Outfits.
b s. d,
Service Jacket (collar badges extra) 3 13 6
British Warm (unlined) 3 13 6
Do. do. (lined camel hair fleece) 4 14 6
Service Great Coat (unlined) 4 14 6
Do. do. do, (lined camel hair fleece) ... 5 15 6
Regimental Kilts bS 15s. 6d. and 6 6 0
Khaki Kilts '" b4 45. od. and 4 14 6
Regimental Slacks 2 5 0
Khaki do. '., from I 5 6
Kilt Trews lOS, 6d. and 16 6
Apron (front) ... 6 6
Do. (all round) 9 6
Regimental Hose Tops (1st quality) 7 9
Do. do. d.:>. (2nd quality) 5 6
Khaki do, do. (1St quality) 4 9
Spats from 6 6
Garters I 9
Glengarry (plain blue) 5s. 6d, and 14 6
Do. (diced borders) ... 14 6
Sam Browne Belt '" from 2 5 0
Natural Camel Hair Sleeping Bag 2 2 0
Sporran, Claymore, Sgian Dhu, Bonnet Brooch, Safety Pin, etc.
ESTIMATES OIVEN FOR ANY REOIMENT.

LICHT SPRINC OVERCOATS
from 3 Cns,
SPRINC SUlTINCS, COLF OR
FISHINC do, ," from 5 Cns,

NORFOLK and other SPORTINC
COATS from 58/6
DRESSINC COWNS

from 52,6

"R
])FôR1\
V CARS

bbicK

Appreciation!

Quite a big percen-
tage of Bedford and
Bedford-Buick Cars
are sold entirely by
the recommendation
of one owner to
another.
BUICK MODELS: BEDFORD BUICK MODELS:
15-18 h,p, Z-seater ... ,.. oE245 (Our British-built Coachwork),
15-18 h.p, S-seater ,.. ... oE255 15-18 h,p. Empress ... oE295
Complete Equipment includes 15-18 h,p, Streamline Torpedo oE305
DELCO Self Starting and Lighting
and Michelin Tyres,' IS-18h.p. Arcadian Cabriolet oE375
The Ideal Chassis lor Ambulance Work-BUICK ONE-TON. BuIck Vatve-
In-Head Motor. Full Elliptic Rear Springs and Pneumatic Tyres. As
supplied to the British Red Cross Society.
GENERAL MOTORS (Europe), Ltd.. 135 Long Acre. London. w.e.
T elepbone: Gerrord 9626 (3 line.). T elear.mt: .. BuickueI1, London," 37

174

June 12, 19 1 5

L
-\ N DAN D \V ATE R

AN

ISLAND

UTOPIA

By K, RIC
l\-1ùND

I T would be interesting to know how the England of to-day
would strIke an observer who could come amongst us
ignorant of all that has happened in the last ten months.
:t\ational change has to proceed by steps, though the
steps be of the swiftest; it has to be, in "the strict sense
of the word, gradual. Even a revolution of thought, a complete
vo/te face of public opinion, has always been prepared by a
long series of small and often unperceived changes, slowly
accumulating until the balance tips over. And revolutions
of thought are essentially foreign to the English genius.
We take things as they come, and adjust them as they come
-a practice which has long made us the despair of the would-
be-picturesque demagogue, who lives for, and by, the moment
of crisis, And for that reason we are perhaps the slowest
people in Europe (with the possible exception of the Russians)
to realise exactly where we are at any given moment. It is
always open to our public men, as in these days, to hold and
to utter diametrically opposite views upon the state of mind
of the nation; and we are so used to the absurdity that it
seldom raises a smile.

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

It might be an advantage to us to employ a public
servant whose dutv it would be to live out of England,
returning periodically to receive his impressions and to
record them for the general benefit. This function has
at times been admirably performed by Irishmen; but
some Irish critics suffer the disability of being too clear-
sighted. When a man's mind is so luminous that all the
facts are transparent to him, it is only a step further to
forget that the facts are there at all-to" see through" them
with that piercing insight which discO\-ers precisely what the
critic expects and \\ishes to see. The candidate for our
imagined office of
ational Critic would have to be of pure
English blood, a student of history, and a man who had been,
in his time, familiar with every rank in the social scale.
He should belong to no party, and should have no particular
financial or class interests, And most certainly he ought not
to be too clever; he should be " able" -a word whIch has
come to characterise a typically English form of mental
competence. Even in war time such a man might be
spared from other forms of national service; indeed, in war
time his function would have a doubled and redoubled value.
I t is another question where, in war time, he could go for
that complete dissociation from daily detail which would be
part of his duty; he needs entire freedom for thought and
refte::tion, as \\ell as unsophisticated surroundings.

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

There i<; a little island in the \tb.ntic, set, as though by
an im'ersion of the jeweller's art, like a spot of gold in a sheet
of sapphire; it is unknown to the tourist, and its name is kept
secret by the few who know and love its unspoiled beauties.
Here we will send our seeker for the unsophisticated. After
a night's voyage, from the liner's port of call, in a tiny steamer
that appears to be made of japanned tin, from whose deck
he has watched the leaping phosphorescence flv past like
\\Tcaths and coils of luminous smoke, hc is carried through
the surf and to the shme by an islander; an islander dark-
skinned but grey-eyed, of surprising lankiness and still more
surprising strength. He is assured that mules shall be dulv
saddled and laden for his journey to the hills by the time his
simple breakfast is eaten; but the heat has grown to its
sweltering climax of noon and begun to decline again before
the cavalcade is on the mo\'e. Later, he will learn that
the Island is blissfully devoid of the time sense; its" now"
means, usually, to-morrow; its" to-morrow" means never.
But long before completing this discovery he \\ÎII himself
be under the spell, and the rich days will be flowing past
unpartitioned and unnumbered. He first touches upon the
bedrock of old human wisdom in the laconic talk of the
grey-haired muleteer who trudges by his side; and upon the
bedrock of natural wisdom in the behaviour of his im inciblv
opinionated mule. "Y ou would now both be dead, if he
had obeyed you," is the muleteer's quiet comment on one
occasion when the mulc, open-mouthed but imperturbable,
has disregarded the dragging rein; and our tra...-eller views
the chasm with a shudder, and the mule with a new respect,

The crest of the pass attained, the western sky beyond is
aflame with that afterglow peculiar to the horizon of the
suo-tropical Atlantic: gilded crags sweep down three thousand
feet to a sheh-ing plam \,
i'.:'h is a sea of almond blossom;
twenty miles further, and six thousand feet below, the veritable
ocean basks and gleams. The descent into fairyland, through
gradually enshrouding night, becomes mysterious, and the
sure-footed mule a magician disguised. Carrier women,
basket on head, come swinging, bare-footed, dO\\n the pre-
carious path; at a word from the muleteer they light small
torches made from resinous pine-splinters, \\Tapped round
with leaves that burning may be slow. Thus revealed,
they stand out against the darkness as glowing portraits of
womanhood, broad of brow and hip, and deep of bosom,
erect and quiet-eyed. At the foot of the crags they take a
side-path for their own village, calling out good-nights.
By midnight our traveller is on the path that leads to his
minute inn, inhaling deeply a faint breeze that comes, now
fresh and cool as spring water, now warmly laden with per-
fume from the orange trees on either side; and soon the
awakened host ani hostess, welcoming but drowsy, have
fed him with omelette and light wine, and he is asleep-
and as far from the fret of civilisation, in body and in spirit,
as we could wish.

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

His sojourn in the Island will not rub off the bloom of the
first impression. It is a place whose natural beauties do not
cloy, but quietly sink deeper and ever more memorably into
the consciousness. And it is the home of an extraordinary and
an abounding human simplicity. He will discover that -there
are no rich in the Island; and no poor. From time to time
he will meet with men and women, old and outworn, who
have no younger relations to support them in their decline;
these are the newsbearers of the community, and they totter
from village to village with tidings of birth and death, pros-
perity and vicissitude, always finding a hospitable roof and
a welcome for their wise garrulity. He ",,-ill find no traces
of government that anyone need bother about ; ,no crime,
and no police, In the course of long and rambling discussions
with the innkeeper he will begin to realise a philosophy
that concerns itself but little \\-ith any but the essentials
of life, and will find as much difficulty in explaining or justi-
fying to him many of the preoccupations of Europe as did
Gulliver in parrying the questions and criticisms of the horse-
King. He \\-ill discover a courtesy that knows neither sub-
servience nor condescension, and an openness of speech that
is wholly unconscious of its apparent daring, He \\-ill redis-
cover the essential human subsoil-and that discovery is
the main purpose of his exile, It is needless to labour the
fact that in the process he will also rediscover himself, an
achievement which \\-ill not t>e \\ithout effect upon his sub-
sequent usefulness.

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

'"

Then he \\ill return, his mind untramm
lIed and impression-
able, all equipped to diagnose and interpret the national
s
'mptoms of his own people. ., All this is no more than
an airy speculation; for the business of our imagined official
is everybody's business, and it is no good giving everybody's
job to one man, All can in some degrec, if it be only in
thought and imagination, escape the trammels of the crowded
hour, when their dutv is not calling them to sterner tasks.
Beneath all the anxietÌes and urgencies of the day there flows
the quiet, purposeful current of English life; and in the English
countryside there is peace and beaut v and the magic of human
tradition to be realised, no less than among sub-tropical
hills. Some are ashamed of being normal in war time,
and would have us all in hysterics if they could have their
way. .. Be different, somehow," they seem to say, " even
if you cannot be useful." :\Ieanwhile, it is the men who think
less of their emotions than of their heritage who are doing
our country's share in the \\-inning of the war, and the
nation is realising its purpose and its selfhood through those
to whom the meadO\\ s and moors, the homesteads and
haml
ts of England, are full of a still and an eternal
meamng,

1--
1':1

June 12, 1915

LAN DAN D \Y -\ T E R

THE SUNBEAM CYCLE'S
FREE WHEEL
Ever Clean and always Oiled.
T o be able to use such expressions about the
Driving Bearings of any piece of Mechanism
is calculated to make an Engineer's Mouth water.
Yet the wonderful Little Oil Bath Gear Case
enables all Sunbeam Driving Bearings to run
under these ideal me-
chanical conditions-For
example here is the Free
\\Theel- ,-

The arrows indicate Oil
Holes that pierce the
Base of the Chain Cogs
of the outer Shell of the
Free Wheel.

The Oil carried up by the
Chain from the Little
Oil Bath is squeezed by
the Cogs through these
holes into the delicate
pawl Mechanism inside
the Free Wheel.

Þ
..i..

..-. i
, '----'
V"

Write for the New Sunbeam Catalo;;ue to-
3 SUNBEAMLA!\D- \YOL VERHAMPTON
London Showrooms: 57 HOLBORN VIADUC r, E.C.
15 8 SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Squar
), S. W.

.. .

KERNEL
J 0 U N LOP rubber,
toughened under a special
formula, gives but does
not give way, and there-
fore wears,

T HE
Ifi
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J. ß, Dunlop, Eoq.

OF

IT

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up in a particular way,
has extreme resiliency,
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it can be retreaded.
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and the result is true
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This will Protect Y 00

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cendiary Bombs contain petrol or spirit,
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!! 7f%;::;"< simply means spreading the flames instead
of putting them out.
IC Kyl-Fyre OJ Extinguisher contains Dry
Powder which instantly extinguishes
burning petrol or whatever is alight. It
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1
(",

June 12, 1915.

LAND AND :WATER.

THE 'V AR BY LAND..
By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE,-Th;s IIrticle has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does Dot object to the pobHcation 115 c:enso.ed, and takea ..
responsibility lor the correctness of the statements,
In IIccord:lDce with the requIrements 01 the Press Bureau, the positions 01 troops on Pla95 illustrating this Article must only bo
regarded as approximate, IInd no definite litrengtb at any point is inJicated.

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T HE really important thing which has
happened in the campaign this week-
that is, up to the news received upon the
evening of June 8-is the cyacuation
wit bout disaster of the salient of Przemvsl.
If the campaign upon every froÌ1t be re-
garded soberly in its largest aspect, no other
event connected witb it during the last few days
bears comparison with this very considerable
feature. For it was doubtful during a whole fort-
night whether the salient of Przemysl held by the
Russians right in front of their general line might
not lead to thc piercing of that line.
Next to this matter we must note in order of
importance the violent effort proceeding from
Stryj ,,,hereby the enemy is attempting fo force
the Russian line on its left centre. having failed
to force its right centre at the salient of Przemys1.

Yith regard to this enemy success we only
h-now that German and Austrian forces have
established themselves just beyond the line of the
Dniçster. There is, of conrse, no sort of cIaiTa as
.Jet that this forcing of the river threatens the
whole line. But we shall do "Well to fasten our
attention UDon the enemy's success here in front
J. .
of Zurawno because it may lead to bigger things
in the near future.
upon the analogy of the similar effort nearly
a month ago in front of J arosla v and the crossing
of the San, we might discount this new enemy

success, But all that is conjecture. It is our busi

ness rather to appreciate exactly how much the
enemv bas here donc.
Ìn the other theatres of operations there bas
been a very violent and quite inconclusive action in
the Gallipoli peninsula. I ,vill deal with this in
its order, though briefly, for it needs no diagram
and is simply a case of an assault directed against
a line which is not yet pierced and against a posi-
tion which still stands firmlv.
It would seem, as we shàll see later, ttat the
real problem in the Dardanelles is the possibility
or impossibility of cutting off the supplies for the
cnemy in the Galli noli from the Asiatic share.
. J.
Upon the Austro-Italjan frontier nothing
bas 'been doing upon which one c[J.n base any effec-
tive account of the oper:ltions. Upon the side of
our Ally mobili&'1tion is still proceeding; upon
the side of the enemv no considerable forces have
yet been gathered, c
en for purely defensive pur-
poses, All that can be discovered-as we shall
see later-is that the Ita1ian covcring troops bave
occupied, as they were bound to do, the passes
leading into the projecting "bastion" of the
Trentino: Lave, with rather less advance, pro-
ceeded against the passes in the second sector of
the frontier, the Carnic Alps, and have attempted
their chief preliminary effort
gainst the line of
the Isonzo, occupying the Monte Kero, and
attempting to turn the whole line of the Isonzo,

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LA}J'Ð

AND

WATER.

June 12, 1915.

THE EV.\CU.-\ TIO
OF THE S_\LIE
T or less what happened. For a fortnight the
OF PRZE \lYSL. enemy forces chietly concentrated to the north
It was pointed out in these columns many and south of the." neck" of the Przemysl salient,
weeks ago that the salit'nt of Prz(.mY:31 was a somewhat exposmg themselves to att.acks upon
serious danger-point upon the general Russian their communications upon the north, at least
line. If We. regard that line in its entirety, as it round. .Jaroslav, Such an attack the Russians
was taken up at the enù of the great Hussi
ll could not press suflìciently to itnperil the enemy's
retrc;1.t through Galicia-that is, as it lay in the aÙY3: nce , but, o.n. the otIler band, tbe enemy
middle of J.Iay, three weeks abo-it is, roughly obtam
d no decIsive result against the neck of
speaking, the line also of the San -and of tbe the sahent. He lost very large numbers of men in
]}níester Rivers, which Í\ro l,atcrcourSfS
ue direct a:::sault against the southern and the
join,
d ge,JgJ aphically IJY the course of the northern face of the" neck," and could not have
.\Viznla, a
tream not shO"\Vn in the accompanying reduced it to a less width than twelve miles. He
sketch, but running into the San above Jaroslav, claims to have dropped shells on the railway
pointÌilg with its Cf'urse dÜectly at the Dniestel', le.ading out of Przemysl, but it is unlikely that be
anJ fílling tbe gal) between that ì'iver and the
an. did any damage by this long-distance fire, because
The line of the San, the 'Viznia, and the '''e know that the mass of the material within the
Dniester is one continuous defensivc natural line town and surronnding it was :mcressfully with-
which, ;;taI:ds in
ront of Le:nberg,
lld protect
drawn,
the raIlways leadmg from the Husslan bases up In the last days of May the Russians had
to the front. allowed to remain, apparentJy, no more than a thin
Fro:n that line the semicircle round coY
ring line coincident with tbe heights upon
Przemysl projected in a dangerous salient. "-hy wInch the old permanent fortifications had stood
6u(;h a salÜmt was dang
rous ,....2.S discussed in before their destruction.
tile la:st two numbers of this journal. A salient During the Saturday and the Sunday, the
al\\"a} s requircs for the protection of its long con- 29th and 30th of :May, the last remaining defence
tour a tn'ger number of men tlum would be of the field works established upon,or just eÀterior
required for the protection of the direct line to, the old permanent works of Przemysl gave
across its neck. It is vulilf'l':!ble to attack aO'aillst \\-BY before the direct pressure from the west,
either side of that neek. If the neck is pierced nortb, and south. It was late in the afternoon of
t]1(' wlw]e of the salient and of t.he men and aUTIS :Mond
y,

ay 31, that the fort ll1arked 9 upon
and material cOllt.1Ìned in it fall into the cne
y's the follm, mg sketch was E'yacu.ated; but it
hanùs, and it is even possible that the double was recaptured and held until nightfall. The
pressure npon either side of t]le neck, if it be "hole process was obviously no more than the
SUC.cèFS[U1. IlIay carry the enemy rio'ht throucrh eowring of the general Russian retirement. In.
t.he mam li:le behind it, and pierce tJ
e resistan
e the same ewning the works marked 2, 3, and 4 in
of these v\
om he is attacl-.ing. That is why, in the abm-e sketch were carried bv Bavarian in",
the forcgomg sketch, the neck of the salient at fantry and permanently held. "Vith the next
przcmJsI "<lS marked \\-ith a D, as indicating afternoon, Tuesday, June 1, the southern forts (7,
the danger-point existing during the last three 6, and 5) were e,acuated, and before dawn on
weeks upon the Russian line as a whole. 'Vednesday the enemy entered. The Russian line
. When this salient first appeared in tbe by the week-end bad straightened out and
middle of "May upon the Hussian line, it was sbortened beyond
he San, p
.ssing thrOl.
gh
admitted in these columns that the writer could :ßfedyka, as does the Ime of crosses In the followmg
discern no sufficient reason for the retention of so sketcb, and tbe salient of Przemysl, the rolling
very perilous an extension to the general defcnsi,e stock, stores, and probably the gre<ìter part of the
position of our Ally. Further news enables us to
rti1lery witbin it being now ,yithdrawn, was
fm up tbis gap in our knowledge, antI we can dis- abandoned by our Any.
{:Oyer why the salient of Przemysl was retained. I will not further labour the point that the
It was beld, not for sentimental reasons (which straightening of the line and the giving up of this
t;hould surely be of no effect in a campaign of this salient is str
,tegicany of no adyantage to the
Illabllituùe, and threatening such ùangers, and enemy whatsoever. The enemy not only bas not
promising snch fruits as does the great war !), but pierced tbrough the Russian line at this point, but
III order that there should be ample tillle to has given up the attempt to pierce through here.
remove fro!l1
,.ithin that railway junction all His real effort is now being directed at a point
E>tOl'es and rolhng stoek, and, i'm'ther, in order to some forty miles away to the south and east beyond
be able to .remove (a mucb lengthier business) such the marshes of the Dniester, to "hich point we will
heavy artIllery as the enemy may haye left intact next turn.
wlien he capitulated upon tb8 22nd of March. . It is an effort based upon the town of Stryj.
It must be clearly understood that tbere were whICh he captured the other day (getting at the
no munitions for these guns, the enemy having, same time, unfortunately, control of tbe great oiI-
as a matter of obvious necessity destroyed his field), and it is for the moment in front of Stryj
munitions before capitulating..' And it must and against the Dniester line t11<lt IJe is attacking
further be understood that tbe permanent works for the third time (the first 'was in front of Jaro-
of t?e fo
tress bad also been t 1 estroyed before the slav, the sccond was at the salient of Przemysl) to
capItulatIon, so that Przemrsl was not a strong- pierce our Ally's line. Unless he pierces -it, let us
hold at the moment ",hen the Hussians decided always rcmcmbCl', ,!te lws jfliled in !tis strategic
s
,ill to presel'ye it as a s
licnt in their general objcctire.
lme. S
ch defences as the Hussians t.hrew up This effort, based UpC1l Stryj. stands to the
were. eVIdently. field defences extcrior to, 01' im 4 whole line in a fashion characteristic of every
prO\ I,,;ed U I )on , the old rnÍ:lc.j n e , l ' T. ... L . tI ' Jen t. \ ' oI ' ks IT
tb I 1 E t '\ T t ]

W' , ,j - '. . f.' or., e enemy 13S mn,r c _as or es. '.-very
, lib all tbis clear, we can appreciate mOle one ûf his great efforts to brt'
lk tbe containing
2*

June 12, 1915,

CAND AND \
ATER.

[0 I larger 'Ær1llr.Z(if
rzf' UbrÆs (desfrOJleá)
o Smaller Perm.a.nent Ubrks( ckstrfj'e:f)
.0 7émporary Hbr.ks (dtsfr'2YaZ)
.'-.........-.. Contour Lin.es
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!ge ): of 10 00 j 'ds.
to i ao o oJ' ds.

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line, wbetber in Flanders or in France to the
soutb, or in Northern or Central Poland, or in
Galicia, has had this feature in common-tbat it
has been a sort of alternative striking, first bere,
"tben, finding he could not break tbe line, there.
,Take tbe line as a whole from, say, Czernowitz
(C) to a point beyond the Vistula at B, a matter
altogether of nearly three hundred miles, and you
.will discover that the enemy's efforts have been
made successively in one point after another of
the Russian centre. First he strikes against
ITaroslav (1), gets over the river, but does not go

ß

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more than a mile or two; that is the effort or
:May 14-1
, Then he notes the salient of Przcmysl
and tries to cut it off from the north and the south
(the arrows 2 2); the Russians foiled him bYi
evacua ting the salient in good order in the last
few days. Next he strikes the other side of the
marshes from Stryj at the crossing of the
Dniester at Zurawno (3). Here, again, he gets
across the river, as, nearly a month ago, be got
across the San at Jaroslav: but whether he will go
further we have yet to sec.
This crossing of the Dniester at Zurawno is
worth detailed examination.
I The great marshes of the Dniestrr block all
! attack across the upper course of that stream. If
below them you try to cross the Dniester from tùe
I base of Stryj, you are curiously invohed ill a
I double crossing; for the rail wllÍeh sÜpplies you,
and the road also, runs in such a fashion that it
crosses both streams, the Stryj and the Dniester,
near where they join. So if you try to fight your
way across the line there by Zydaczow you have
two obstacles to surmount successively. But if you
attack a little lower down, at Zurawno (not a day's
march ofi), you have the advantage of missing
another small belt of marsh, you have a good road
from the rail-bead, and high ground jU:3t llerond

3*

LAND AND YlATER.

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40 '}y1iles

the river upon which to establish yourself if you
succeed in forcing the stream. It is an excellent
choice for forcing tLe line of the Dniester, an.l it
is only about forty miles off from Lemberg, though
the communications by road are not rood.
The details of this crossing at Zurawno may
be appreciated from the subjoined sketch. The
Dniester flo
s, immediately above the town,
through marshy dist!icts which make a
ap,proach
difficult, and a footwg UpOl1 the far sIde Impos-
sible. But just at the town itself you have a tract
of dry ground across which leads the road from

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Stryj and the railw::lY only a short distance ofT,
not more than a day's tlanspol't for the munitions
of the heavy artillery that prepares your cross-
ing. Further, upon the ea!':tern bank beyond, you
have high ground, the contours of which are
roughly indicated in t.he above sketch in feet
above the sea. The river being here some 740 feet
alJOve the sea, the first contour line represents t.he
hcginning of t"e hiU!'=, y;h('s
summits are from 200
to 400 feet or Inc.re 3.hQve tl1ð wat.er. The
e
f;uml11its, or t.he f:lopes of the hi11s, the enemy has
Ill"W g;....ined. It. remains to be seen POY. far
e
"in he al.lc to press forward beyond the obstacle
"hieh he has successfully surmounted. Hitherto
it has ah\a ,'s been disC()\-cred that upon his
getting more. than one ea!':y day's journey flOm
tr.e railway, with the power of munitionment
to bis great superiority in heavy guns on this
front, \\ hil:h the railway giveR, the enemy c.an no
longer go forv.ard_ We must hope that it win be
anotller example of the samé holding up of bis

{h ant-e.

June 12, 1915.

o

THE DARDANELLES.
It is significant of the extreme difficulty of
solving the problem of the Dardanelles that the
second great assault was not delivered until
exactly a month after the first attack upon the
Achibaba position, which, as will be remembered,
took place upon May 4-6.
All that can be said about this second effort
is that it has left the position intact. What losses
it may have inflicted upon the enemy, how far the
bombardment may have shaken his defences, only
those upon the spot can tel1. But the line still
stands unbroken; the first of the two great posi-
tions with which the enemy defends the Narrows
is intact; the Aliies have not even reached
Krithia village upon the slopes of the Achibaba,
al1d we must wait for a further effort before a
decision eyen as regards tbe first position is in
sight.
Meanwhile it may be worth noting that the
crux of the problem lies in the ability the
Allies may discover of cutting the enemy's supply
across the Straits. Th0 British submarines have
already rendered transport through the Sea of
l\farmúra impossible. It remains to be seen how
far their effort. or that of the indirect fire from
the Fleet, C8n interfere with the pas
age of rein-
forcements and muni
i(ìns for the enemy from the
mainland to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the
Narrows. In the ...bsellce of a real1y large sicge
train, wherewith to reduce the positions directly,
such a l1ampering of communications, though
tardy, "Would seem to be the only solution.

THE IfALI\
ATTACK tJPO
THE
ISTRIAN FRO
TIER.

The covering troops of the Italians, behind
"hose action the main army is mobilising, proceed
methodically to occupy the passes which dominate
the Lombard plain. 'Vhether they will be able
to hold these or not when the enemy has brought
up his own ma in force only the future can show.
As we know, the Italian covering troops have
alrcady occupied the summit of Monte Nero, on
the far side of the Isonzo, in the mountain
country, from which summit:; their artillery

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June 12, 1915.

IJ .\
D

largely commands t
e valll',;'s to the south and east
beyond the tm'vn of Tolrnino. ,\Yhy ha\'c thC'y at-
tempted this turning of the line of the Isonzo
tJlfOugh the mountains upon the nOl tb ?
In ord
r to answer th:>.t question one mu
t
reca.ll the point which "as emphasi
ed bere la:;t
week, that tlLl' u:ar on the A Ilstro-I talian Iron t
er
'lJ.'ill 7i,ecessarily be a 'War lor milUJays.
Now, observe how the railways run just here
upon the frontiers of Istria.
From the Austrian bases to T6estc tàere are
two lines-one earning through !.aibach, far off
to the east., at pre2ent out of reach of the Italians
(and marked A A on the precedin b diagmm) ; the
other comes directly do\"n by the shortest road
from the north, thr0l1gh the long tunnel und('r the
J elower "\Vald at C, and so comes down by
n D B to Trieste.
.Kow, an attempt to cut this line by attacking
anywhere along the lower Isonzo would mean
trying to force the very diflicult positi0ns in that
"alley, which are probably "ell defended. Corz
and its fortification protects the main junctions
. at the foot of the Alps and closes the gaps. But
Ly getting right up into the hill country and
coming down upon the railway to Tolmino at such
a point. say, as D, it is hoped to cut the railway,

A
D

WATER,

to parJ.!ysl
tbe bUppJy of Gorz, anù to halve the
supply of Trie:5te. All that district is highly
mountainous-the summit of the ,Monte Nero
(which the .Austrians call the Krn) is 6,OÛO feet
above Tolmino in tbe vaHey-and it is probable
that the vigorous effort by the vangnard of the
Italian force is made hcre becau;:e they found
hardly any def
nce prepared in these northern
hills.
It is evidcTJ.t thaI to cut the raih.....ay at D
would be to destroy iLs value for Trieste alto-
gether. The other line comin
in from E comes
in from and is heM by Itali::m territory. It
does not communicate with the Aust.rian basea
at all.
To cut the railway B B at D or there.aboutl
is not to isolate Trieste, beeause there exists th(.
alternative road A A; but it prevents Trieste
h
lving two avenues of communication and it cuts
the shorter and more important one-so impor--
tant that in the creation of it the Austrians have
been at the pains of tunnelling under the main
range (the \Vochein Tunnel-four miles long).
Further, the danger to the railway at D is diflìcult
to meet. Reinforcement ca.n only come up from
Gorz by the narrow gorge of the Isonzo--a
dangprous and insufficient avenue of approach.

A

GENER,AI

F OR some reason or other, in part because
, the siege work in the 'Vest has lasted
. just long enough to try public opinion,
there has appeared in the last week
or so an uneasv sT)irit which ,,,as absent duriD

" L

the earlier spring months. The first conæquence
of this uneasiness has been a disarmy of judg-
ment. The firm major lines upon which all sound
opinion should base itself have got blurred. You
hear people asking perfectly meal1ingless ques-
tions, such as, " I.; it true we haye not enough
shell? "-one can ne\er have enough shell. Or,
.. "\Vhen will the war come to an end? "-to which
on fhe face of it anv :lllswer wouìd be ridiculous.
In a v:ord, edu"cateJ opinion in this country
has quite latterly fallen into something of the
mood which you will find present in men who
have undertaken some financial speculation whrQ
tha.t speculation has not yet decided itself, but
lw,s lasted longer in its development th'ln they
Ind exoectecl. Cummercial men so situated often
show this same vaeillation of emotion and suffer
thi'3 san'e lü2s of grip which general opinion
to-day is in d.Hlger of suffering in connection with
the vital matter of the great campaign.
V
-e all know that in such commercial "en-
tures the rule is to brar steadily in mind the
m
in factors which moved our judgment when we
fIr.st {,l1tcT'cd the speculation, and that the most
important point of :111 it not only to face reality
where reality appears adverse to our sehemf's, but
to appreci
Üe it as a whole: favourable, adver.:3e,
or n2utra1. :Mere delay (and \cry often tl:.e debv
is not great('r than exprrience warrant('d) should
not be ::llloY.'Nl to di:j
urb our conclusions.
TÌ1is dÜ:
rr:lY of civili
n judgment having
sr.t i:1 (the proee
s arises by mnch irresponsible
",riting and t::dking from men not competent to
jld
p\ the l
e<;;t way to che('k iL is to rerapitulate,
for the pur' poses of the presrnt mornC'nt, those
5-

SUR VEY.

main elements in the campaign upon which alone
any ordered judgment ("an repo
e.
Only when we have grasped this once aaain
can we proceed to a true estim3t
of the pre
,lt
position.
.J s
lall beg my read"rs' lea ve in this and suc-
ceedIng numbers of LA
D AXD V/.\TER to present.
as I see it, tbe whole :;ituation at this moment. It
may be that Ín the course of snch a presentation
\"Cry great happenings will make the drab pre-
sentation of the campaign as a whole seem un-
worthy of the momeTJ.t. It may be that a COIl-
tinued and wise postponement of the great Offf'!l-
sive willlea",e room tor such a summarv. But in
any case a summary of such a kind is es...<;
ntial as a
corrective to too great a doubt bred Ly d.elay, as it
is to too great a hope bred by the very vigorous
action immediately before us.
For the purposes of pre
enting such a suney
I will begin at the bf'ginning, and, at the risk of
some repetition, first lay down the political
foundations upon which all our calculations upon
the war must be built.
There were three great political milit.a.ry
idé'as upon ,"",hieh the enemy acteå when he pro-
posed this enormous conflict.
There was first his intt'lltion to take the offen-
sive agaiD
t Russia and l."ranc.e, aftel' a prepara-
tion of three years-a dccisic l 1l taken nearly four
J'ears ago. There was, secondly, tbe enemy's c
n-
ception of how alliances for and against him
would stand this adventure of his when he took
the field. There was, thirdly. his judgment, not
nearly so lillwise as opinion in the 'Vest at first
imagined-that is, that hi
attark would be im-
mediately successful.
I will deal with these in their order.
1. The enemy consists in a certain group.
generally ca]]eJ .. the Germanic Powers," a!ld
consisting politically of 123-5 millions \'Iho are

LA
D AND WATER.

subject to the two ruling houses of liobenzollern
and Habsburg-Lorraine. Though called "the
,Germanic Powers" (for the whole effort is a
Germö.n effort) the enemy includes gre
t bodies of
Slavs and :\:fagyars, and can command the military
seniee of a ccrí.ain number of Italians as well,
who happen to lie within the artificial frontier of
Austria, They, further, can conscript into their
armies more or less unwilling Roumanians, to the
number of about 300,000, who also lie within their
frontiers, and a smaller number of even more un-
willing Serbs.
This combination of the tv\o Governments,
that of the German Empire and that of Austro-
Hungary, which was almost the servant of the
German Empire in the matter, proposed to chal-
lenge, aft<>r the harvest of 1914, the :Franco-
Russian allies.
This determination was arri\"ed at in the
snmmer of 1911, the time required for the pre-
paration for such a great modern campaign at
onf"S O\,n chosen nloment being roughly of three
yem's.
In e)..,pedation of this campaign the II Ger-
manic Powers" in question made ready not only
those materials anù forms of org.:wisations ""hich
Ilre t:Tjver
al1y kno,,-n to be necessary to modern
war, but alst) nmJe ready in a special fashion cer-
tain materials :md forms of organisation pecu-
liar to those theories of war which they had
espou
cd, and which their chosen enemies had
upon tbe "hole discouraged.
"That those theories of W:11' were and how the
.. Cermanic 1'0\\ ers " "'ere aided by special pre-
paration we :,hall see in a moment.
Ieanwhile
we fcund our gencral sUlTey of the present situa-
tion upon this funlÌamental truth, which I repeat.
The " Germanic 1'O\"ers," under the direc-
tion of Ecrlin, determined three years ago (in the
Ehmmer of 191:!..-Agadir) to ehaUenge and to
ddrat the Franco-Russian combination upon the
ContineTlt of Europe, and they :Lxed the date upon
which this yictory of theirs should be entered as
the period immedÌateJy after the harvest of 1914.
It is in a sense true to say that their chief
ohjecti,-e "..as not France, but Russia.. They feared
.the grO\\ th of Russian power, for they feIt Russia
to be a new country rapidly developing, and their
domination oyer the Slav populations, of which
Russia is the champion, urged them to strike
before she should ha \'e developed her communica-
tions and all her other military resources.
But on the other hand it was necessary for
them, from their standpoint, to get France out of
t
e way, because, fro
that same point of view (a
dIstortion the absurdity of which we are not here
concerned with), France, though an aged and
dec
epit society, would be an impediment to them
untIl she was con\ inced by defeat that she
cotùd
o_longer count in Europe. Further. tho
immediate defeat of France upon the 'Vest was a
prospect reasonably probable. A highly organised
country very much inferior in numbers to the
'" Germanic Powers," and with its capital a week
0: so from the f
'
niier, could surely be imme-
diately and decIsIvely defeated. This done,
Ru
sia would be alone in the struggle and could
ultimately be convinced of her inability to disturb
the hegemony in Europe of the Germanic
Colliederation.
2. This c,alculation, matured durÎ1lC1 tbe
course of the three veal'S between the sum:
er of
..

J nne 12, 1915.

1911 and that of 1914, wisely discounted the aid
of I
ly. It was judged that Italy would remain
neutral; Jt was also hoped, rather than jud
ed,
th::J.t Great Britain would remain neutral. AgaInSt
the possible entry of Great Britain into the field
the enemy. however, did make every J?recaution. He
organised a financia.l situation destIned to hit the
City of London very bard shonld Great Britain
support those who were virtually her Allies when
the war broke out, and while he did not act as he
could have done, distribute commerce destroyers
with exact care in tbat period immediately before
the outbreak of war, he yet took every precaution
to sßfeguard his nayal power and organised his
machinery for the production of the main instru-
ments, from the submarine to the airship, where-
with Great Britain should be attacked. He also,
though in characteristically clumsy fashion, pre-.
pared the ground for anti-British manæuvres in
neutral countri
s, particularly in the United
States of America.
The entry of Great Britain into the campaign
was a surprise to the enemy, but it had to some
extent been discounted. Tha.t the Italians, ,\ ith
their conscript system, their considerabl{' reputa-
tion as engineers and producers of material, their
excellent field arti11ery, and their hvo millions of
trained men, ,,,ouM enter the field before the end
of the \V:!or against the enemy-t1Lis the enemy
ne, er beliewd at all,
3, The enemy took the field \, ith the moral
certitude of victory from the mo
t impartial
standpoint, and with a still further cNtitude of
victory from his own particular standpoint.
His whole certitude was based upon the
fartor of numbers. He would attack in the \Yest
with an immense numeriml superiority. He
would almost cert.ainly arrive at his deeisic,n in
the "rest, therefore, in the first three or four
weeks of the c.ampaign. :Meanwhile he had
resenes of man power at lea:òt equiyalent to his
large trained body, which reserves of lUall power
he could train and put in the field in successive
batches as the power of Russia upon the East
might sI0\'11y mature and become menacing.
Russia would gather her forces very slowly,
because she had bad communications, an unde-
veloped indust.rial plant and material, and vms,
further. a poor country in proportion to the size
of lier population, And while Russia ""as thus
very slowly gathering her resources France would
be defeated, the winter would be coming on
(during which Russia could get no aid from
abroad), and before that "inter was half-way
through the whole campaign should nOl'maJ]y,
have heen decided.
\Ve must remember, in this connection, tbat
the (I Germanic Powers" were certain enough of
forbidding the proYÏsioning of Russia through
the Dardanelles, because they were certain enou
h
before the full winter f:et in oî procuring by pur-
cl 1 ase the adhesion of the cosmopolitan financial
clique which has governed the Turkish Empire
since its late reyolution.
This attitude of the enemy was based. we
must remember, not only upon the fa1.:;e analogy
of 1870, with its rapid and crushing successes,
but also upon a sobel' analysis of the situation as
far as it could be numerica11y estimated.
To every trained man of useful age-from
20, say, to 35 or 38-which the French Republic
could put into the field. the enemy could put into
6*

June 12. 1915.

LA
D

AXD

the field nearly two men, with :mother two J:d1Ïnr!
them ready f(.r tr:1ining as the \\ar proceeded.
Their superiority in gans was upon the f.ame
scale. ltussia,. they calculated, woul.i. r.ut
into the fbld, during theæ first weeks of
war, when France was being defeated, only
so many as could be chf'cked without too gre It
an effort upon the Eastern frontier, and
held until the destruction of the French arm\" was
completed. But, as I have remarked above, the
enemy's confidence reposed not only in his numeri-
cal superiority, coupled with the peculiar vulner-
ability of France upon the 'Vest, and the peculiar
tardiness of Russian concentration upon the East,
but also upon certain c.alculations peculiar to his
own theories of war, and what those were will be
examined in the ne
t number of this journal.
It wiìl be seen that the enew'T's theory of the
C'oming war vms not, as an unbR1anced and very
hasty journalistic judgment in this country con-
ceives, a marvel of preparation, of organisation,
and of decision, but what one might e-x:pect after

\V ATE n .

so maTlY years of peac-c, and what was discover-
able in the military opinions of every other servic.e
in Europe, a mixture of wisd(1ìll and unwisdom.
a patchwork of guesses which proved in some
things e\:act; in others muddled; in others, aga in.
merelv disastrous errors.
t shall turn to an examination of those
theories with the more interest ,,;hen I resume
this ana 1 vsis next week, from the fact, to which
allusion 'has already been ma.de, that in tlÜs
country alone a.mong all the Allies there has been
conducted, during the last few days, a very
vigorous, but quite uninstructed, effort to amaze
public opinion by an over-praise of the enemy,
and by the representation of his strength as some-
thing, both in scale and in quality, different from
the strength of those whose approaching task in
the 'Vest it is to break his bac-kbone and to have
done with his influence in Europe.
II. BELLOC.
(To be continued.)

THE

WAR
By A. II.

BY WATER.
POLLEN.

rjOTr.-T
!1I art:clc hu teen su:';nitted to the I'r::ss Bureau, wbkh does not object t!l the puNicatian as cecso:ed, aud takes ae
respons.i>iHty IOf the correctness of the statcmeút!i,

THE DARDANELLES. The direct military value, therefore, of thesf't
F ' ROM th
Dardanelles we have this week submarine enterprises can hardly be exag-
.H t,,;o exceedingly important pieces of ger
ted. But there seems good rea"son for sup-
news. A German steamer employed as posæg that the moral value can searcely he less.
a tranSDort bv the Turks has been sunk It has always been \-ery doubtful if the "majority
by a.n unnamed L Briti;h submarine, and in the of the inhabitants of Constantinople are in svrn-
operatÏC'ns of the 3rd and 4th of June the British pathy with En-ær Pasha and those who li'ave
forces co-operated witb the land forces, as on all brought the Ottoman EmDire under the heel of
previous occasions where such co-operation was Berlin. The appcêlmnce "of E14 alP10st at the
possible. These two facts are signific
nt as show- quays of Constantinople ib,eIf is credibly reported
ing that onr sub.-narine att.:'1ck on the Turkish to haye caused a brief but really serious panic.
communications is continuously maintained, and Several transports bave been lost already, and
that the German submarine attacks on our ships now by far the largest the Turks could command
have not in :my way whatever interfered with is gone. The moral value of this action is in-
the norm::!.l course of our operations. crensed by the fact that we have already lost one
There are, it seems, onlv two German submarine in the Sea of :Marmara in circum-
steamers of considera!.>le tonnagè known to be in stanC'eg not vet disclosed to us, if indeed they are
the Sea of Marm3ra or at ConstanLinople, and officially known, and another in the Dardanelles"
as one of these-the General-is accounted for, Persistence with the submarine campaiO'n in face
the ship tbat is lost must be the COTCOí(1do, a of these losses way well impress the T
rks quite
North German Lloyd boat of 8,000 tons burden. 38 much as our perÛstenæ in usinO' the ships to
She was apparently plying as a sort of ferry Lombard them in the p
"ninsula, de
pite the suc-
between the Asiatic and the European shores of cesscs of the German U boats.
the Dardanelles. On the Asiatic side the Turks And, in the meantime. the German F boats
have the benefit of railway communications, and, have no more successes to their credit. And {Ole
if the Dardanelles can be ferried, Constantinorle this
e can probably thank the activity of our
is in close touch with the front. But if the feorv scoutmg craft anù the thoroughness with wInch
is made un
afe, and trans p orts mnnot pJ
r nil possible German submarine b3ses are bein cr
11 . b
direct across the Sea of f\1armara. thrn there is searC' e(1 out and shelled. Each side, indeed, is
no alternative channel of communication to the faced with peculiar difficulties in t 1 1Ís C'urious
long overland route which is entirely withont mil- underwater war. To get into the
ca of lIfarmam
ways, and the roads of which are reputed extr:t- at :-Ill, our submarines have to pass the l\arrows
ordinarily bad. Moreover, the rwd leads over tlJe and then to tranc>] between h"ent
. and thirty
Isthmus of Bulair, where the convoYs would be miles of the Dan 1 anelIe3 Lefore they' reach hosti!

singularly exposed to attacks from" the Allies.
mrlland-locked waters, where no sùpplies or help
.This being so, so long as we ean maintain our can possibly reach them. The bottle-neck, throu n h
submarines in the eastern section of the Dar- which they ent-er the narrow channel that ]ea

s
danelles and in the Sea of Marmara, so long shan to the field of their work, is heavily mined
low
we put the enemy forces in the Peninsula of the surface. It is by this time no new expel'ienl..'o
.Gallipoli into an exceedingly unenviable position. for submarines to thread their way through min
..
7"

LAND AND WA TER.

fields, but except at the Dardanelles, when tlìe
passage of th.e min
-fields is completed, the sub-
marine finds Itself III open waters. In darkness,
therefore, its progress, except for the risk of
collision, is safe. But darkness "Would only add
to the danger of the Dardanelles passage. More-
O\.er, the surface itself is for some miles domi-
nated by an extraordinary array of all sizes of
guns, from 14-inch to quick-firers. For a boat to
show its conning-tower above water would be to
risk detection should searchlights suddenly be
thrown on. It would seem, then, that the long,
and not too easy, channel of the Dardanelles-for
a three to four 'knots current adds considerably to
the dangers of na\'igation where the sea",ay is so
narrow-would h.1 ve to be negotiated for the
most part by an undcnyater run. The difficuHies,
therefore, must be enormous, and constitute a test
{)f nerye and skill of the highest possible order.
:But once in the Sea of :Marmara, it is possible
that the British submarine's task will be easier
than that of the German submarine when in the
neighbourhood of Gallipoli. The total number of
üestroyers at the disposal of the Turks is not
large, and few, if any, of them are real1y fast.
Such as they are, they must probably be kept to

uard the batIeships. But it must not be supposed
that the transports are left to look after them-
selves. The Turks haye plenty of small craft, not
so fast or perhaps so well armed as de
tro.rers, but
all formidable to the submarine,
The task of thc German submarine presents
öifficu1ties of quite a diíferent order, They ha, e
fìrst to find a secure base. and ne
t., to a\'oid our
destroyers' counter-attack in making 3I1Y effort
3gainst our ships and transports. As I havc
8aid, all presumed or possible hases are, no doubt,
by this time bcing n
ercilessly hunted out and
Ehelle\.1. That is,
ìl bases but Constantinople.
And thol1 o "h, if they reat'h the field of their
o

work, they will fina more targets than our
boats will find in the Sea of :Marmara, those
targets will ha,-e the benefit of a far mor

numerous and far morc adive protection. As
things have gone, the honours in numbers of
,-ietims are with us, although in the military
,'alue of the victims bagged, the honours are with
the enemy. It would certainly take many
Turkish transports to counterbalance Triumph
and Majestic, uld as those gaHant ships were.
]3ut if we look, not to the direct military value,
1mt to the moral ,-alue of the successes gained, it
is prohable that the adY
,ntage is entirely <:m our
Eide. \Ve }I:lye not only heard thron
h SIr Ian
Hamilton.s report that the sinking 01 Triumph

nd Majestic bas not deterred our battleships
from joining in the operations, but there have
been unoflìcial report
, both from Athens and elsE'-
"here. that reinforcements have been reaching
the .-\llies continuou
ly during the week.
It is the Briti
h public t.hat has not stood the
loss of the battleships quite so weB. But t.he
]3ritish public was hardly in the right mood for
60 severe a test. :For three weeks, at lC<'lst., it has
been subjected to a continuous bombardment of
high explosive journalistic pessimism. And, as
this bombardment may continue, and as it is cer-
tainly possible that more ships-transports, if not
war vessels-may be lost, it may not be altogether
out of place to state again the simple facts of the
l3ituation, even though it be a thrice-told tale.
First, then, we must realise that, while there
*8

June 12, 1915.

exists no means whatever by which ships and
fleets can be absolutely protected against sub-
marines, a screen of fast craft, moving at higa
s{>eed, anù exerclsmg the keenest possible
vIgilance, ean maKe operations so dangerous to
the submarine itself as almost of necessity to
drive it away, or keep it so far under water
as to be powerless. I say almost because the cases
of Triumph and lJIajestic do show that the vigi-
lance of destroyers can be evaded. But, as these
are the ònly occasions on which this vigilance bas
been evaded, it seems unreasonable to suprose
that such a success c.an be often repeated.
If subnl2.rines cannot be driven from the
neighbcurhod of ships by de
troy('rs c;' f.l
:t
craft, the ship has no defence except to
make itself a difficult target by moving
quickly anù on a changing course-measures
'" hich also reduce the chances of submarines
getting within striking distance. But even
speed is far from being an absolute protection,
although, except in the case of the L'llsitania,
which "as nearly 800 feet long, there is, I believe,
no kno"n case of any ship faster than fifteen
knots being hit, At the Dardanelles, bombarding
ships and transports engaged in disembarking
troops would have to rely for protection upon the
Ügilance and activity of destroyers, because the
eharacter of their duties ",ould make it necessarYJ
to remain absolutely or nearly stationary,

THE ALLIED FLEETS.

In the Baltic there seems to have been a
lin.:'ly exchanp.:e of submarine amenities. The
HU5'3ic:lns have lost a transport, the Germans three
war ves:3els. From the Adriatic there is much
more news, and the stratC'gic importance of it is
manifest. The cross-ra\ages of the aircraft can
be ignored, first because experience shows us now
that the permanent militaty damage which air-
craft may inflict is small, but mainly because
neither side is eYer likely to tell us the truth as to
the damaO'e actually done. One wishes one could
believe the Roman report that the dirigible's
att.ack on Pola not onlv caused a considerable fire
in the naphtha stores,"but drove the ships out of
harbour in some sort of panic, so that a battleship
rammed and sank a destroyer. In the kind of
fighting that is likely to take place in the Adriatic
a loss of dest royers by the Awstrians would be
serious indeed. But it is ,,,iser to keep our specu-
lations for the more reserved statements of the
official buIletins,
From these it appears that at least two
squadrons of the Italian fleet a.nd one squadron of
destrovers ha ye been busily at work since tho
beO'inñing of the month. Three separate bombard-
m
YJ.ts otMollîalcone-an important minor dock-
yard and ùestroyer base-have been carried out
by destroyer flotillas, one on the 1st and the other
on the 5th of June. The newer Italian destroyers,
be it noted, carry even heavier guns than ours--
4.7, instead of 4 inch. Anù on the second occasion
a squadron of larger ships were in attendance.
:Uollfalcone is surrounded by shaIlow
atcr and
no deep-draught ships can get within range. The
work, therefore, had to be left to the destroyers
only, and it is to be supposed that after tbe first
bombardment the Italians fuBy expected the
Austrians to a.ttempt to cut off the fiotiiIa wlwn it
withdrew. But no such attempt "'as made.

June 12, 1915.

LAND AXD "r A TER.

Meanwhile another fleet has been operating
in the Dalmatian Archipelago, destroying light-
houses, wireless stations, and obseryation points,
on Lissa, Curzola, and other islands, and cutting
the telegraph cables between all the islands and
the mainland. l.fore than this, the coast railway
between Ragusa and Cattaro has been shelled and
is reported to have been destroj ed. As this railway
is apparently the only military line of communi-
cation by which troops and supplies can be sellt
to Cattaro other than by sea, the importance of
destroying the railway, if it is really destroyeù.
would be considerable. But railways are proverbi-
any almost as easy to repair as they are to destroy.
The significance of these operations is not to be
measured by the actual dam3.ge they haye done, as
if f':uch damage ,,-ere a kind of final asset, but
rather by the fact that they illustra!e Italy's as
cr-
tion of the command of the Adriatic, And what
she can do once she can do again. For here, as at
:Monfalcone, the Austrian fleet has not ventured
on any counter-attack.
The Austrian fleet has to soh-e much the
Mille problem as faces the Germans in the Xorth
Sea and the Russians in the Baltic. 'Vhat is the
function of an inferior fleet 1 An army in inferior
numbers can fight successfuIJy on the defensive
for a yery considerable time, but the rôle of an
inferior fleet is still to seek. In this war, at any
ra te, it is seemingly "ithout a mission. The
Aùriatic situation, how-ewr, is not quite so simp1e
as it seem'
. The Austrians, we must f':uppose,
will not of set purpose seek a general action. The
odds are too much against them for that. But,
unlike the Germans in the Xorth Sea, they may be
(;Ornpelled to action.
The probability of a fleet action, then, turns
primarily upon the land caTnpaign, and the
charadeI' of this, ill turn, may to a great extent
be determined by the action of the Italian
fleet. Ahvays assuming that Russia and the
,'Vestern Allies can keep the Austro-GermaTl
forces suH1cient.ly occupied, so that the Italians
will be able to inyade htria, it is "Well within the
region of possibilities that the first fleet action of
the war would take place in the Adriatic,
All we can say for the moment, however, is
that, far from following up their raid on Ancona,
the Austrians haw now retreated to their ports,
and the Italian fleet holds undisputed command
of these waters. It is a command that Austria
may dispute at any moment. But I submit that
she is unlikely to do so until compelled.

THE COURAGE OF l\IR. CHURCHILL.

[r. Churchill's speech at Dundee is really
almost a nayal ewnt of importance. Its value lies
in this: To the great scandal of the Empire, to the
confusion of ourselves and the amazement of our
Allies, we have bad to reconstruct our Government
in the middle of a war, and primarily owing to
disagreements on the chief command of the "Kayy.
Upon Mr. Churchill has fallen the humiliation of
relinquishing the post of First Lord just when
the British Fleet was discharging the main pur-
pose of its being-namely, the complete command
of the sea, "With a thoroughness unparalleled in
history. The as:::ertion of supremacy w:;s made
on the first day of the war, and aU our sub
equent
military operations haye been made possible by it.
Mr. Churchill has been the leader through all this
time, and is surely entitled to some of the credit
9*

of so overwhelming a success. The minor set-backs
in the first five months of war hardly affected
that success at all, It is the unsuccess of the expe-
dition in the DardaneHcs and the disagreement
with Lord Fisher that ha,-e brought him down,
In speaking at Dundee, therefore, he came
before his constituents in the character of a
beaten man, and he spoke at a crisis when the
country has been more depre
sed in spirit than
perhaps at any time since last Augu:st. A man
who at such a moment as that can deliwr the best
of his fighting speeches, indeed the best fighting
f':peech that we haye had in ten months, is some-
thing more than able, deyer, or brilliant.
Throughout this crisis
f r. Churchill has shown
the loftiest sort of moral braYery.
The time has not yet com
e to estimate the
value of '}'lr. Churchill's work as First Lord, but
in justice to him two things should be borne in
mind. Kot for one moment since "War became
either imminent, or an accomplished fact, has he
been otherwise than a fearless and intrepid
leader. The qualities he stipulates in our chiefs,
" courage, energy, audacity, the readiness to take
all risks and shoulder all responsibilities," he
exemplifies splendidly in his own person. He
may not always have been wise, but he never was
afraid. And the Xavy loves him because its heart
goes out more to c-ourage than to any other quality.
Mr, Churchill bec.ame First Lord at a
moment of transition. The British Xayy had just
been reconstructed by Lord }'i!l.her. The monster
ship, long-range gun-fire, the long-range torpedo,
the high speed capital ship, the submarine, the
aeroplane, all were novelties úf the la
t ten Jears.
Each novelty had its enthusiasts, each trying to
push the qualities of size and power anù speed to
their utmost limits. And tIle enthusiasts defeated
the experts, They had a simpler game to play.
All they had to do was to ask for more-
speed, size, range, &c. Thus, between 1907 and
1914 we pass from the last mark of the 12-inch
gun, through two stages of the 13.5, and reach
the 15-inch, Between 1908 and 1914 the speed,
range, and power of torpedoes, and the size and
radius of submarines was doubled and almost
trebled. But no recognition "Was given to the
fact that, as guns increase in po";er and range,
and as ships grow in speed and mobility, there
must be developed a technique of gunnery so that
the new weapons can be adapted to the new con-
ditions. And no systematic official effort was
made to "Work out how the existence of these fast
long-radiused submarines would affect the grave
problem of the defence of flects, or how the long-
range torpedo would mould the tactics of fleet
action, As for the problems invohed in bombard-
ing shore positions, they were ignored altogether.
:Method was forgotten in the general devotion to
mass. Those limits could only be ascertained by
patient investigation and experiment, In the
rush for size-that could be advertised - there
was no time for the dull and disillusioning pro-
cesses of thought. Thus it '"fas )'1r. Churchill's
misfortune never to bave the eternal truth brought
home to him that the Xavy is an instrument that
can only be used riglltly if used u'itllin the limit3
of its mastery O'I:er the U'ealJOllS tliat it employs,
The expert" no asked how all these fine big things
were to be used struck a note of douLt; the enthu.
sia:;f, strud... the note of sanguine c,)nfidC'nce.
A. II. rOLI,E
.

LAND AND WATER,

June 12, 1915.

l\fACHINES
By JOHN

I ITA VE been asked by the Editor to set QOwn
my impressions of the cbaracter of the pre-
sent stage of the ,\Var in the ",!\Vest. Let it
be understood that they are my own personal
'impressions. They have no kind of official. sanc-
tion. and I do not !mow whether any soldIer of
a(,ithority agrees with them. But they are first-
hand, and I give them for what they are worth.
Every ,,'ar is a contest of two factors-men
vlus maèhines. The one without the other is
{-alueless. An unarmed soldier and an unmanned
{;un arc things of equal futility. As matters
srand at present the Germans are our superiors in
one thing only. They have the better and stronger
machine, and they use it to keep our man-power at
arm's length. 'Ve believe, and we have cause to
kl ie\ e, that the quality of our figbting manhood
:1s, on the whole, better tlìan theirs. They seem to
realise this, for they are striving to make it a long-
range 'War, Our business is to devise as quickly as
possible a counter-machine of at least equal
strength which will give us a chance of " in-fight-
ing." On that depends our success, for it is closc-
qua.rter fighting that alone will give us the
complete victory, which is the only kind that can
be contemplated. The German machine is so good
that it is unlikely that we shall be able to better it,
at the most we can create something equally!
strong, But our fighting stuff is so good that even
in the IllOst desperate war à outmnce when the
Cermans were fighting in direct defence of their
llomes, I do not think they could equal it. There
lies our hope of superiority. Our business is to
find some ,,,ay of giving our manhood its chance.
Q
'ALITY v QUA
lITY.
To put it in another way,
e are equal or
8uperior in quality, but inferior in quantity, Our
guns and our gunnery are as good as the German,
our field guns better. Perhaps they are more
skilful in tbe tactical use of IPachine guns, for
they ba.e made a speciality of them and have five
to our one, But in air work, in intelligence, in
leading, we arc certainly thcir superiors. Weare
clearly superior, too, in the quality of our Armies.
I do not mf>an that there are not thousands of
Cerman soldiers as brave, as well-trained, and. as
,well-disciplined as any in our own ranks. But
'their armies are no longer homogeneous, The
terrible gaps have been filled up with very raw
material which has not been absorbed and cannot
be absorbed. You have only to talk to a German
prisoner of the first line to learn the quality of
many of the new drafts. The most notable fact,
on the other hand, about our present front is its
high qualjty aU round. The famous old regi-
ments that have been in the field since "Mons aTe
now largely made up from reser"cs, but it ,çoulJ
be rash to say that the Guards Brig:tde, for
:example, is less good now tban it vms on the
'Aisne, The Territorials and Yeomanry hayc
been lately fighting alongside our best in-
fantry and cavalry, and doin
maryels. The
New Army, to anyone who has watched its
growth, is not less efficient. The result is that
our new troops do not mak
an ugly patchwork,
but seem part of the olù pattern, and the same is

AND MEN.
BUCHAN.

true of the French, Again, as fo officers, we are
better supplied with the right kind. The mor.
tality in the German officer class has been terrible,
and since that class is a caste the losses are hard
to replace without a violent breach of tbe whole
service tradition.
e are far better oft in this
respect than most people at borne realise. There
is a type of man in England wbom the Germans
overlooked in their calculations-the man who
spends a few years in the Army and then leaves
it to take the hounds somewhere or travel abroad.
Nearly all that class is available now. Besides,
in a peculiar degree the war in its present pbase
is a subalterns' war. Young men with half a
year's service are as efficient for trench warfa re
as veterans of severnl wars. They have all the
knowledge that is relevant, and are young and
keen and cheerful to boot. One bears people com-
plain that boys fresh from Sandhurst or Oxford
are being" sacrificed." But they are not saCl'i-
ficed, for, if they only learn a little caution, they
are precisely the men wanted for the 'Work. 1 ha"e
in mind a famous battalion which won great glcJY
at the first Battle of Y pres and in many recent
actions. After tbe colonel the next senior officer
has eighteen months' commission-ed service, and
none of the others more than a year. Yet the
battalion is in as good fighting trim as in Odobel.'.
THE l'\EED OF QUANTITY.
These reflections make for optimism. But
the time for optimism will nJt arrive till we have
got our quantity to a level with our quality.
There is a long road to be travelled before we can
make certain of a decisive victory. Our quantity
needs to be increased, largely increased, under
two heads-men and mechanism.
1, .ðfen.-Probably at this moment the
Allies outnumber their opponents on the
:Western front. To estimate the British number
might give information to the Germa.ns, who, I
understand, are sedulous students of LAND AND
,WATER and :Mr. Belloe's articles. But it may
safely be said that for the thirty miles of
line which we are holding oar numbers are
ample. :Why, then, the need of more men? For
two reasons, one particular and one general.
The French Army since August has been under-
going a strain which only those who have
seen these splendid troops at close quarters can
realise. British officers have had leave; the
French have had little or none. The whole of
France has been stretcbed taut in one mighty;
effort. Now it seems pretty certain that we must
look forward to a second winter of trench war-
fn,re- I hope on a different and much more
easterly line of trenches. If that happens it is im-
perative that the British sbould hold an adequate
share of the front. We bave a greater population
than France, but we are at present holding less
than a tenth of the line. No doubt it is a very
critical part, and we have had some of the hardest'
fighting of the war.
In the second place, it is men-the human
frctor-by which a campaign is ultimately won.
A machine does the preparation, but the soldier
completes the job. Our business is to get a
10*

:rune 12, 1915.

LAND AND

-.achine which will nullify the enemy's, and then
use the weight and q;uality of our man-po
er.
Since we are not fightmg for an equivocal peace
but for the unconditional surrender of Germany,
we must have the men to hunch on her when we
have shattered her defences. Exaggerated notions
about the value of sea- po'wer ha ve tended to
obscure in the minds of many people what such
a decision as we are aiming at reany involres. We
are not .fighting for insular security but for vic-
tory, and therefore it is not enough to sweep
German merchantmen from the seas or even to
destroy her Navy, Germany will not be beaten
by shortage of food or shortage of munitions, but
by shortage of men, and her decisive crushing can
only take place by land. ,\\T e must shatter her
power in her own element.; otherwise the war is
as indecisive as the tradit.ional combat of violf
and
hark.
2. Tile ..llachille.-Here we haye a long lee.
"ay to make up in certain breaches. There i
,
first of all, machine gmls. The Gennans are be-
lieved to ha,-e at least t
eh-e to a battalion; our
maximum is four, and that is not often reached.
In aU the trench fighting machine guns are highly
important., as important a3 the bombs and
grenades which 'YC have learned to use most skil-
fu]]y. The German line when it is attacked tends
to :. bunch ,. and col!ect into fortresses
hich
bristle \\ iih maehine guns, and the erred of this
equii'JJ1ent is as if their troops "ere armed with
a "on<lcriul nf'W autúmatic rifle,
.Another deaòly part of their machine is their
púi,,<.med gas. I am inclined to think that "\\e are
(In the way to get eyen ,;ith this dcyilry ",ithout
using a. Cfmnlèr,poison. Our latf'st tnJe of res-
p;rator is ycr
' good, and it was found in the fight
Ht Ypl'l'S on l\Iay 24 that tlw.::c troops who had
hecB practised ill their use till they were handy
with them got off Vïonderfu1!y lightly. :Most
people would prefer that
e should not use a
similar 'H'apon in reply. "r e can probably
rleyise a gas as deadly and as practicable as the
German chlorine.
)lost important of all is the supply of high
explosive shells. It is u
eless to indulge in re-
(
riminations on this subject, Probably it will be
found that none of the experts till quitc recently
were quite clear on the matter, and if expcrts
spe.ak with a divided voice the administrator at
home is helpless, But t.c-day there is no ques-
tion about the need, A German artillery or gas
attack can only be met by a counter-bombard-
ment. At the second battle of Ypres,
hich be-gan
on April 22, our line was IT.aintained against im-
possible odds and with very great expenditure of
lifc. Again, infantry cannot advance against
trenches and entanglements, as the enemy con-
f,tructS them to-day, unless an artillery prepara-
t ion has broken theÌn down. The French movement
the other day to\yards Lens succeeded, berause for
four miles they had sterilised a.nd flattened out
the grOlmd with their g1lIÚÌre. The sight of that
tremendous performance-great gUllS firing all
clay with the rapidity of maxims--was a lesson
in the practical business of war. For miles thcre
"as nothing left of hostile parapets and entang!c-
mcnts-only a ploughed countryside. 2nd frag-
ments of wire and humanity, After it tbo
infantry could adyance as safely as on parade.
It is uselcss to labour tbis point, for we are
all agreed. The ID('lancL(lJy rdleetion is tbat we
11-

WATER.

have not yet. got the adequate machine, and until
we get it we fight at a disadvantage. The
bright spot is that once we have got it we have
a dear superiority. Germany has trusted too mucb
to her machine. Under cover of it her soldiers
have dealt out death at long range, and they are so
familiarised with this method of fighting that it
may be doubted if they will do
el1 at close range.
Certainly in the last month their infantry attacks
have been fiascos, Von :Mackensen's thrust on the
San, so far as we can judge, has been chiefly an
affair of artillery, Counter their artillery "ith
an equal or stronger "eapon and tbe Allies are
free to get to grips with them, I do not think there
is a single case where,
hen we got to close
quarters, we ha ye not succeeded.

THE STRATEGIC PCRPOSE.
There are three ways in which an enemy can
be defeated, You may outflank him, roll in his
wings, and compel a wholesale surrend('r, Or
you ma y wear hm down in a series of small
actions where his losses are on the aver3ge much
higher than yours, till a point is reached where
his resistance crumples from sheer lack of
numbers. Or, fina]]y, you can make in bis line a
rent wide enough for your wedge to mo,-e in, roll
up the ragged ends, and break his cohesion.
The first plan is impossible in the 'Yest,
"here the flanks of the armies rest on the Alps
and the sea. The old manæuue-battle is hope-
less, since you cannot alter tbe configuration of
Europe. The second is the plan the Allies have
pursued during the winter. A 'war of attrition
is successful vìhen the enemy's n01'mal rate of

astage is grea ter than yours: and this has been,
generally 8peaking, the case wbichever side
initiated the attack. But attrition is a slow
business, anù a decision reacbed by exhaustion
is not as valuable for our purpo
e as a series of
crushing defeats in the field. For onc thing, it
costs the vie-tor too much. Besides, if Germany
is beaten by a slow "Tastagc she may stiU t.rust
in her military machine a,lld beJie,.e that later,
under more favourable conditions, it may suc-
æed. But if the wry gods in ,\hich she has
confided play her false she may turn to more
wholesome deities.
The third plan-to tear a great rent in her
line-is tbe most hODcful. If that rent is wide
and deep enough "c
may succeed in cutting the
communications of a large section of her front,
and so forcing ber to shorten it and take up a new
line. The same æanæuvrc renf'ated may drivo
her back inside her own bordcr.s, and givè us th

first stage towards victory-a campaign within
German territory. But to make the rent npcds
a machine the ('qual of her OWIl-more gun!':, far
greater resenTS of ammunition, and a grea.t
weight of men. 'Ye can proyide all these things if
we choose, and so the issue is in our mm hands.
One last word. Gf)rmany is formidable llot
bf'cause she is more wickeù and unscrnnulúns
L
than oursehcs. Her "lccs and follies are in the,
long run hinùra.nces to her, not assets. :3he is
formidabJe because of her ,iJ'tuC's-hf'r p:lticnco
and science and forcsig-ht, tbe astonishing unan-
imity and discipli])e of Ler pcopln, t.he cndurauc'o
and self-sacrifice of her armies. "r e can win onlv
by showing superior \irtucs, anù that is an eñ

couraging reflection for honest men. The Devil
has not
T('t got his o\\n way \\Ïth tbe '\urlJ.

SONGS

LAND

OF

AND

SY.A TER..

June 12, 1915.

T I-I E

ENEMY.

By DES
10
D MacCARTHY.

T HE two little bocks I am about to review were given
me by a wounded Prussian ooldier. They feU
int.o my hands in this way: One misty morning the
French launched a small attack in the direction
of Bixschoote. It had been a very brief affair,
eas.ily successful, and costing them little. When our ambu-
lances arrived on the sc
ne it was all over. A few prisoners
were being conducted across the fields, not more than eigbt
or nine altogether. They came along stolidly enough, great
grey louts, looking very big and thick beside th9 French
soldiers on e
lCh side of them. The moment they got into the
village street-or, rather, the rnins which remained of it-
we swarmed about them, josiJing to have a look and to
examine the things whi
h had been taken from their pockeLs,
letters, paper-money, tobacco, &c. They appeared-there
is no other word which describes their demE'anour-
nncommonly shy. One or two were grinning in an
apprehen"ive, propitiatory way, otÌlers stood sullen and
a
ent-minùed.
The scene reminded me of the ,mddi'n disco\oery of a bat-ch
of new bOY3 in a school-yard at the beginning of term-tim
.
QLle3tions were shied at them, which provoked laughter, but,
of coursE', no answers, and there was the same sort of mis-
chievous enjoyment. among \is of PIC fact that tba new,comer

did not know how to beh.1ve or w 1 lat might. not be going to
happen to tho'll next. Presently the ling broke to make
way for an cruceI', who tcok the papers and ask
d iî anyone
could speak German, I said I thought I cO<1ld manage to
make them under<;tand, and beg:m to act 'is interpreter for
the 11311al question;;;, ,,,'hat rf'
in:e'1ts did tbey b<:>1ong t.o 1
How long had they bee'l there? How many of them had
there been 1 Had they suffered much in tbeir feet
(The
French h'Ld suffer
d themselves a grc3.t deal from inf!'unma-
t.ion and frost.,bit.e owin'! to sbn,ling' lenD' in watÆJrv trenches,)
To th;s b.,t qucstion tiley repEcd, .. No," w}li
h made H3
kok- with envy at th?ir boots, wJI:ch, sure enough, were
h
avily !'Oled and ca
c hi.gh up the leg,
After this interrogatory was O\"er t.Leywere ruarchedaway
to a cottage with four walh iiltact, on the doorstep of wllich
two FrellC'h soldiers sat down with their rifle:! acress their
knees and began rolling cigarettes, .. Now M, Ie Majeur,"
uid the officer, .. CO"!le and see what's the matter wit1J. thi"
beggar over here. The surgcon is down at the other post." lex-
p
ained that I was net a doc
,or. "VrTell, you can talk to him,
He makes out he cannot move," 'Ve went. together into a
cottage kitchen, where, in the sePli-obscurity an enormous
G"rman was lying on the floor. He had a short scrubby
beard and small black eyes which caught the light from the
window. 1 knelt down beside him. .. Wie geM's
"
II Schlecht. " Yet he ga..e an imprcssion of great health
and strength and an immense inùifferent, indolence, sprawling
there on his back. Was he in pain 1 No. Where had he
been hit 7 He didn't quite know. He said he was very
cold and couldn't feel hi:! legs. We slowly turned him on
hi8 side with some difficult.y, to see if he bad been hit in tits
&pine. His back was so caked with mud it was hard to dis-
cover whether or not there was a hole in his coat. But since we
could do nothing it was better not to disturb him further, so
we proppßd him up and he settled himself stimly,
Rising from my knees 1 saw that a few yard::; from hi:! feet.
the door into a side room was open and that the head and
moulders of another German were visible. This man's mouth
was open and bis t
mple was smashed in, His face was yellow,
and he had been dead some time. I got up and pulled the door
to. The officer nodded. Oui, ça n'est pas beau," and he went
outi, while I sat down by the prisoner to wait till the ambu-
lance should come back to pick us up. Enemy or not, one feel!l
a respect for a øeriously wounded man which makes one em-
barrassed and often at a loss to know what to say. I thought
t.hia man was done for, though he loo
ed placid and robust.
n is easiest to ask questions.
II What is your name 7 "
He told me, but his 8peech was thick and I could not
øatch it. I did not a.ak again..
.. Married t '!
I' No.'f.

.. What are you' "
.. Arbeitu-in a factory.'!
co Where do you live 7 "
co East Prussia."
" How long have you been at the war 7 ..
co Four months."
., Had a hard time' Ha.ve you been in many battles' ..
.. Ach, ja." He spoke as though it was wearisome to
look back on such things.
.. What are t.hey going t{) do with me' " he said, after a
pause.
I< Taks }":>U to a hospital and pnt you to bed,"
He made a feeble movement wit,h his hand towards th

door I had shut. A French soldier came in with a tin mug
of hot coffee, which seemed a sufficient answer to his Buspicions.
Afur he had drunk it, I asked him if he would like to write
a letter, If he gave me an address and told me what he
wanted to Bay, I might be able to get it through, but I had
no paper. H", pointed to a pocket, and in it I found a torn
note book and two olher thin books Lound in blue canvas. I
had some difficulty in understanding the address, He sent;
his greetings to hi:! mother and said he was wounded and &
pri
oner, Se.eing me turning over the pages of one of the
little books, he said I could keep them.
One was a lI'annal of prayers for men at the iront and the
ot her a I< \Var Song Book." The most noticeable feature of
the prayer-book is its systemat,ic provision for every sort of
occasion, There is a prayer for recruits, a prayer for setting
out on the march, another for going int{) action, one of t.hanks-
giving for victory, another to be read after a defeat. There
are prayers asking for courag-e and patience, also for tll8
Christian ch 1 1rches, fer the Fatherland and one for "our
dear n;l
rs and the Im1)eri
1 house." It is a dianified little
manual, written in th; sterling old Biblical Ge
man which
shows the language to advantage, and it has e-vidently bt-CIJ
compiled by men who regard war in a solemn, self-dedicatory
spirit. The song-book was a gcod de!'l u
ore thumbed, and if
the first book, read iu the lig
t of the Report cn the atrocities.
produce:! a strange confusion in one's mind, this book, too,
stirs unexpect
d reflections.
In the first plac!J they are sterling patriotic songs, though
not goed poetry-indef'd, m(Jst of them are far from it. But
the words of a song need not be poetry; thf"Y need only be the
stuff out of which poetry is made; then the music comes ani
turns them into poetry. Such are thf"se 80ngs. "'hat i.
st,artIing is that the emotion t.hey express is not the menacing,
aggressive patriotism which would consort with t.heir actions,
but the kind which is equivalent to love of home. It is odd
to find t.hat even " Dwt,
cl;/_'l1uJ übu aUu," the first phrasa
of which seems so exactly appropriate to the s
)il'it of modern
Germany, is, aftN all, only an appeal (writtpn in 1841) to
Germans to put the common traditions of the race before
local patriotism, and not to be divided by their ri\'crs an:!
princes.
The e.sscn"C of patriotism i3 the love of an id<,al whi"b &
man feels inherent. in the civiiisation, the phces and tradi-
tions, out of w}ÜCù he drew his liie. No literary skill in
adjectives i::; necessary tl) express this quality in thilJg
, :For
the Englishman, Frcnchman, German, the word Eng1i;ID,
li'rench, German will s!)rve best to express that particular
uniqueness in them which mysteriously satisfies. Where the
ski!! of the writer comes in is in simply mentioning the thin
!I
in whic1J. this uniqueness is most ccürl:ant.ly feit, and iu tbe..

tongs this is done wen. Th!J Germans have come tnm,pling
and ravaging into other people's countries, intensifying every
brutality po
sil>le in war, yet heart,clling themselves an the
time with 81'ngs about their own pine-woods nnd water-milh,
the peace of their homes, their sweethearts, their wivcs, thcir
wine, their good-fellowship, theit- friendships, and, above a!1.,
their longing to Lc free and unit.eò. And, stronger contrallt,
still, the fighting SN1.gS of these inventon of ga.ses, born-
barders of seaside pìer.sure places, skut.tIers of slùps, are fun
of the spirit of a romantic chivalry.
One feels after reading them there was never a Diore
foolish thing said than: "JoeL who will govern them, if I may
writ-e the songs of a people. II
12"-

June 12, 1915.

LAND

AKD WATER.

BOl\1BS

USED

BY AIRCRAFT.-II.

By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.

E XP1'OSIVE bombs are very rarely the direct causo
of a fire, but where a building is injured or col-
lapses, as a result of an explo
ion, a conflagration
is often started by open lightß or fires inside tbe
building, anJ is assisted by escaping gas from
broken mains or by arcs from broken electric wires.
The incendiary bomb, on the other hand, is designed
with a view readily to set fire to buildiùgs and their contents.
A number of such bombs were dropped from the hostile air-
craft which recently visited Southend, Deal, and Rarnsgate.
Some of these bombs were carefully examined by the British
Fire Prevention Committee, ",hie!! ha.q prepared BevHal
leaflets giving valuable ad\ioe to the public as to the manner
in which fires caused by incendiary bombs could be stopped
or circumscribed.

Description of a German Incendiary Bomb.
The incendiary bomb, used by the Germans, has the
(eneral external appe<'lrance shoVln in the sketch (Fig. 1).
It is coniC11 in shape, and is of about lOin. in diameter at the
base. A rope, which has been saturated with some inflam-
n1able Fubstanc6, is coiled round its outside, and binds
together the various part.s of the bomb.

Thue is at the apex
of the bomb a
trO!1'F
wire handle by wllich tì.
is held O\-er the n3ct:lle
of the aircraft b03fore
being dropped. So as t.o
prE\cnt any prf'mature
operation of the bomb,
a safdy-pin is inserted
in the ignition mechall-
i
m, and is only re-
movEd at the moment
when the bomb is to be
used.
The base of t
1e
bou.b is sometimes flat
and sometimes cup-
F
, 1, shaped as IIhown i.a tLe
flRETCH OF A GER1U.
sketch (see Fig. 2), On
INCENDiARY AERIAL HOMB. that base, which is of
llheet metal, there is fitted a funnel, also of fòheet n:etal,
conical in shape and pierced with a number of hol68. At the
top of this funnel are fixed tbe hanàle and the mechani
lD
for igniting the bomb,
The funnel is generally filled with Thermit, which upon
ignition generates int
nse heat, and by the time of the con-
cu88ion has taken the form of molt
n metal of the ntra-

SafttIJ-.-
Pin

MmLliandk I
"
"'-C.-.iL of'
!in/lamm..
jabú C"
e

f
,1)úmutiTcfb4$e'

lD ius.

I

Handle I

r Ignifi<:n
'Devlee

Safety
Pin

c:p

r 1:, 2.
n'C!'!('
"'L f:Jf}<
T(,R (\}o' A;" JXC}':1-T:IRY EOJ.'B.

ordinarily high ten p
rature of over S,OOOdeg, Fi!hr. The
molten metal is spread by the concussion, and its temperatura
enables it to cut its \ny ttrcugh a-
heet of metal one-
quarter of an inch thick. OutÚde the funnel is a padding
of a highly inflammable or resinous material, which is bound
on by the inflammable rope already mentioned. The re
in-
ous material creates a pungent smoke. There is g6nerall]
some melted wLit-e phos-
phorus in the bott{)m
of the bomb which de-
velops nauseous fumes.
In some cases celluloid
chipping!! are adùed
and occasionally a !'ruall
quantity of petrul.
The .. Guerre" In-
cendiary Arrow.
The ABies aLo
have a number of in,
cendiary bombs. It, i!',
of cotin:e, impossible 1,0
explain in an articlp.
meant for publication
the devices v.-hich we
or our Allies may po<-
!'ess, There is, how,
eyer, a French i!lcen-
di
.ry bomb abcut which
so many articles h:t\'e
already been written
that the Censor cannot
object to a !;hort descrip-
tion of it being made in
this publication.
The" Guerre JJ incendiary arrow, a sectional sketch cf
which is shown in Fig, 3, del
n's itg name from that of ;t'l
inventor, M, Guerre. H \\ei
hs oI}ly 2lib" acd is about
16in. in It'ngth anù 3in, in diametP-r.
It consist!! essentially of two part.", one of which carrie!!
a r
l'voir containing petrol, or
ny other infl
mmab!e sub-
stance, and the other slid
relatively to the nl'5t one, Besides
n,eans for perforating the re"6l"\'oir. this latter p;>,rt ('ontains
a device for igniting the inflammable material.
The !'hock prcduces the
!iding of the two r
.l is reh-
tiyely t{) each other, which prod'Jces an incendialY refùlt.
M. Guerre's incendiary anow b..s alreó.dy }Jl'ûVEÙ very
successful.

Safdi.: Fizz.
v\
'&SeI"J'tJU"

l'U1òrafu->l
ll'erfèraftr:9
'Poitz/: 1 1
Jmr l'.J.1

]
I
I
T

F .:g. III.

Fi;r. 3,

Srf'T1OYAI. SKETCH (IF 'fP.E
.. m:EIiRE" INCENDiARY LRBOW

J

The British Fire Prevention Committee's
\!gge:;tions.
To cope wiLh lhe po
sible d
nger arising fmru incendiary
bombs, the above Cc.mmiltee has suggestt'd sonJe pmcautions
to be t.aken wherever there lDay be a likelihood of an aerial
bombardment. A knowledge of t!:ese precautions, as well
a" the met-hcd 6uggt'st<=d by the Committee to deal \\ith the
effect of illcenàiary bombs, may I'rO\e so ust;:ful that. the
writer has Bummarised tbëiD below:
1. E
ould definite infOl'malion h reCt'i\"ed of the ap-
proach of ho
t;le aircraft" or actual bombardn:cont
OOJ.ìmence in the \-icinity, refuge
hould be pl"Omptly
tal:en in the celiaI', basement,. or lower floor.
2, All gas lights or stoves should be tumed out, antI
the gas suprly turned off at the meter.
3. All electric lights should be sy, itched off, aliLI th

5upply tùrned ef! at the J':b.in swil:,ch near the meter,
4. A:l oil lamps should be extingùi<b.ed and taken into
tLe cellar or ba!'oement" and <Ill CI)en fires abCr\ e base-
ment levd should be put out. '
5, AH ùeor", winù(,wf, and >Ì1ùttcr c
b()uld bp de!'ed,
6, Bucket.. of ,,"'8.ter are the most
uit.able émù the mo"t
(Of >lio.Joic..l fì,e arplia.nce
, 'Vhen oil or sp
rit is
I t>pL 011 the I" ""j"eb bm'ket< of "and may prove of
gll'at val.le.
7. DOII't \',ait 1m ;1 a fir,' oc.cms t.o fnd Gut how it is
J.o ;ilAe to get out il' the Lhnk. Think 01 a L"Ùuple
oj \\a\., cul b"fGl'ehanù,
8, 1t there i", dell
e sn'oJ.e frelll /I fire, remember
i.llat the ail' i
dtarer Real' the ;;rcund, so crawl on
the r,<OI', with a Ì1anè\.:e!:,I,ief, "'t:1. rag, or i'6"I,irat()l
in hOllt (Jf ,}(.ur lrcuth.

13*

I,AND

AND

9, _\. '
Tt:lin th
quickest me:w!' of ohtaining assi5tance
from the Fire Briga,Je and Police. Post up the
nece-,ary p:tTti(,
llars, Ileare,;t fire-alarm, &c., on
the grou:]d floor.
10, Don't Tun or shout, Keep calm.
Fires caused by incendiary bombs may be prevenled
from spreading, regardless of the high temperature generated
at the actual seat of the outbreak, if water be promptly
applied in fair bulk, force, and continuity,

The Bragg-Smith Anti-Suhmarine Aerial Bomb.
It is very rig1ltly queslicned whelher a moving aircraft
i.i capable of dropping a bomb straight on to a moving sub-
marine. Besides, it is very likely that a submarine, when
seen from an aircraft., would be moving a few feet below th'3
!'urface of the waler; so tb..'tt an ordinal'y aerial bomb, even if
it fell orCT tbe submarine, would, on striking the water, im-
mediately explode, while the submarine itself would remain
uninjured, and be free to continue it-s career.
An anti,submarine air bomb must, therefore, be de-
signed to damage the submarine, wbether it actually Etrikes
the submarine or not, provided it falls within 20 or 30 yards
of the submarine, and it must not explode on impact with
the water.
Such anti-submarine air bombs have now been designed.
There is, for instance, the Bragg-Smit,h air bomb that will
liot explode until it has penetrated into
he water to a pre-
delermined depth. Such a bomb, bZI il,
explosion under the
?l'ata, would deslroy or would capsir.e a submarine, whether
it aetnally struck the submarine or fell some 30 yard3
from it.

WATER.

June 12, 1915.

W E reprint from the Triblinf dt: Gmè"e the following
letter writen by Professor de Wilde àpropos of a
recent art.icle by i\fr. Desbleds in L,,"YD AND
\VA.TER:
I have read "it1] keen inten'st an article in your paper Ly Mr. BI.in
Desble<h on .. a. schemo to revoluliúnise warfare."
I venture to point out that the 2,140 trains which, according to
the author of the schem
, must every day cross the fì{l
n principal
bridges over the Rhine in order to re-victual tbe Getman anny operating
in Belgium and ilie North and North,East of France, must also paaa
over the bridges of the river Meuse at the fúllowing points: Visé, Liège,
lIuy, Na.J"Ilur, Af'3eremme nea.r Dinant, Cha.r1e...ille, and Sedan, which
m&kes onl)' &even bridges in.st.ead of fifteen.
All these hridges aro in the h.1nds of the Germans. Tho5e at Huy
and Anseremme cannot he of much nse as they only serve to connect.
small railways cOll5isling of but a single line. If the traffic on the other
five bridJes were stopped the German army, at the end of a few daYjJ,
would he without food and withúut munitions,
The great railroad from Cologne to Paris, via Aix,la-Cha.peIle,
Liège, Kamur, C'lw.rleroi, Ma.ubeuge, runs through the valley of the
Vesdre between Verviers and Liège, and through the VaHey of the
Sa.mbre, between Namlll and Maubeuge. In these two valleys there
aIe a.t least thirty bridges w h<4Se destruction would be fa.tal to the
Cennans.
Also, if the aerop1a.nes were to start from DouUens or from Amien!!
(Departement de la 50=e) the length of the flight would be reduced
by ha.lI.
In modifying Mr. Blin Desbled's scheme in the manner I have ju

indica.t-ed it wmlld be rende.red milch {:asier of execution and much mora
econùmica1. wh.ile, at the same lime, it.s full efficacy would be preaerved.
P. DE WILDE,
Honorary Profe.ssor of the University of Eru5IIcls.,

THE VALUE OF THE INITIATIVE.

By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
T HE principal cause of the confusion which exists in Soissons, Perthe!!, I,es Eparges, the Vosges, to cite only a
many mind:! as to the relati,'e strength or weak- few examples. To defend these the enemy was compelled to
ness of the military situation arises from the loose rush his reserves about by rail, concentrating and attacking
and inaccurate way in which technical terms are first one point and then another, and always sacrificing men
being U3l"d by those never trained to appreciate i
the ratio of from 3 to 1 to 4 to 1, thus gradually bleeding
the exact sense in which they are employed by experts. The himself to death.
experts themselves are abo a good deal to blame in the matter, Then, when to end this annoyance onc.e and for all, the
because out of sheer intdlectual slothfulness they have con- Germans brought up the great rêÍnforcements they had been
tinned to eTJ1ploy words which, owing to the rapid change in preparing throughout the winter, we, hearing of their concen-
conditions, no longer give a correct picture of the phenomena trations, primarily thanks to our aircraft, began a series of
they are intended to describe and ignore entirely that these a.ttacks at Neuve Chapelle, Hill 60, Arras, &c., which com-
meanings also vary with the rank and position of the men pelled him to disseminate his forCGS inst.ead of assailing us
who use them. with a great concentrated effort.
\Vriting from the strategist's point of view, it is technic- Except through the use of poisonous gases, he has gained
ally correct to speak of the Allies in France as the attacking nothing at all by this vast expenditure of energy, and, though
party, and the men in the trenches are equally correct in con- we know, with a fair approach to accuracy, the numbers of his
sidering themselves essentially as defenders, though by their army corps which have been shaken and demoralised by their
defensive action they are in reality furthering the cause of repeated failures, it is not yet certain whether more remain
the offensive just as materially when repulsing German behind or not.
counter-attacks as when storming the opposing trenches with If his furious attacks now cease, the conclusion that there
the bayonet"
are no longer fresh re"erves to be drawn upon follows, and !f
If stralegi
ts had thought out their subjects with greater there i!l any doubt on the matter, a further application of
precision, I think they would long since have limited the use
of the word" attack JJ in their field of action. and substiluted pressure in anyone of tbe many sectors open to us should
the word "initiative JJ to cover all cases where in fact one settle the point beyond dispute.
side exerciæ3 by free choice the power of compelling his enemy This is the main line of thought which must be
to assail him. I am dwelling 011 this point because it seems held fast in spit-e of all distractions, for distractions, of
to me that the main cause of the wave of pessimism that is course, tbere must always be as long as one is dealing with
passing over us is due to the fact tIlat the public neither human factors. Great masses of stores, artillery, and troops
understands cr believes how thoroughly the Allies now possess cannot be moved by enchantment, but time and all the
this power of " initiative JJ or how, though llle Germans per- vicissitudes of active service have to be taken int-o account.,
sistently attack us locally, we ha,-e in fact thrown them on and it would represent an inconccivable degree of perfection
the defensive, and their only form of defence is the local if, in the execution of such movements, troops were not sub-
counter-attack, which they are compelled to deliver in the jected locally to very high strains, being, in fact, called upon
hope of holding us at arm's length for as long as possible. to purchase wilh their lives the time needed to overcome the
\Ve have obtained this initiative not only because our internal friction of the whole machinery involved, which
resources in men and material are greater than those opposed stretches back, say, from the gun at the front, through count-
to us, but because our leaders have the wiII and the skill to less factories and workmen's hands, till we reach the crude or

use them to better advantage. At first, after the closing of or other raw material from which the fiuished article-shell,
the gap at Ypres, we were thrown purely on the defen- boots, &c.-is made.
E'ive-that is to say, that we had to await passively the Such moments of exceptional strain on the men have been
delivery of the enemy's attacks at points of his own frequent lately, and one can well understand the depressing
choice, for at the moment he was still superior in avail- effect of heavy casualty li<òts on their friends and relations;
abll" resourcss. But presenlly, as our aircraft and the French but the mere fact of these great efforts of endurance being
artillery established their sUIJremacy, a gradual progress was demanded is proof positive that the superior command under-
apparent, beginning in November, and continuing on unto stands and appreciates the value of the material he employs,
the present ti:ne; and wð-í.(" the Allies-hy degrees and is exercising a wise economy in its expenditure, so as to
a
serled our power of attack ao-ainst ceTtain well chosen ke!'p in his hands the most crushing superiority possible wheD
poinLg in thð enemy's line which he ha<'l to huìù at all C03t;:, the time comes for the knock-out blow,
U.

June 12, 1915.

LAND

AND

YV.A TER.

TALES OF THE UNT AI\1ED.
MARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the French by Douglas English.

I T lifted on a treacherous wire, and loosed from either

de a whip of steel, which cut into her neck. So fierce,
80 sudden was the grip that she dropped limp with
sprawling limbs. She woke to find herself fast held,
to hear the crunch of human tread, to see a mODBtrou.
two'legged thing loom up in ominous black.
And Instinct whispered counsel
She felt that she was trapped, that she must somehow
free herself before the monster reached her. She arched her
body like a bow, and, with firIll-planted claws and lashing
wings, pulled back wit.b frenzied strength ngainst the grip.
Her beak, her head, her tautened neck were as one cord which
stretched to breaking-point. The trap's jaws eased-her ean
.lipped past the catch of them. Anotber maddened pull, a
eel' ape which rasped six feathers from their roots, and she was
free.
Ten seconds more and she had met her fate. The Man
came running as she writhed, and flung himself to grip her,
She slipped like oil between his fumbling fingers, and winged
her screaming flight aloft to cross the ridge on which tbe
.now lay thawing. Hi" fat bewildered face, upturned, Btared
after bel' until she passed the skyline. She had escaped once
mora from Man, and mastered one more lesson.
The hoar-frost danced and twinkled on the trees; the
plough was one vast iris-tinted brilliant, whose myriad facets
caught the sun's white flame, and mirrored it in pink, and
gold, and azure. .No snare, no enemy was in sight. One
sound, and one soulld only, broke the stillness--the cry of
magpie in distress, and Margot and her sisters sped towards it.
Did some faint memory of the pool still haunt them î
There was no water here, no tree; a waste of snow-clad earth,
a waste of sky, save where a grey smoke spiral told of tbe
cottage hidden by the rise.
But there was something which "brought back the pool-
a sister voicing her distress, and that distress a riddle.
She lay upon a wooden board, breast upwards. Her feet
clawed at the empty air. She wailed and øcreamed inces-
tantly.
}'rom every side, from forest, wood, and copse, flocked
IÐngs in twos and threes to stare at her.
The bird was crucified. Two st,aples driven t11rough her
fleshy wing-bolles racked her wit,h pain unspeakable. But
.he felt torture worse than this-the inversion of her world.
With feet and belly uprennost, it was as though the heavens
had capsized. Her dizzied brain reeled to and fro, her head
boat dully, Údeways on the wood, as, with one rounded terror-
stricken eye, she searched the abyss that hung above her
head, and saw the plumage of her sisters' breasts above her.
They screamed and wheeled and screamed again, and,
one by one, approached in lowering spirals, and so dropped to
earth. They circled round her, tripping, strutting, prancing,
with pointing beaks, with necks outstretched. Their orbits
narrowed gradually. Margot was boldest of them all. She
danced across the prisoner, whose claws, now clenched, now
wide outspread, sought point for thrust, or grapple.
Her Eisters, too, drew near. Not one of them could
understand.
There was a babel rout of birds, a jostlipg, cackling horde
e>f them, wing,flapping, sideways leaping, with eyes &.nd
tongues adrift in wonderment.
Alld, suddenly, a tragedy.
Margot had skimmed, for once, too near. The groping
claws entangled her. Like drowning hands they fast,ened
on her neck, and Iter screams joined the captive's screams, and
both were hardened to short, gasping sobs, to stifled, gurgling
discords, which, for an instant, struck the audience mute.
An eerie duel this.
The prisoner's claws gripped, strangling, and Margot
tugged against them, wings awhirl'. Her feet, which rage haJ
I!t,celed, slipped sideways on the ice-gl1lzed board. She fell,
recovered, slipped again, and lunging fiercely with her
hampered beak, sought to pierce heart or eye. She brought
her claws to bear at last, and drove into her rival's quivering
body, &.nd tugged, the while, against the grip. In vain she
c l awcd, in vain she stamped. Her rival was insensible to
pain, and clinched her hold the tight-cr.
Margot was st..rallgling fast. Her eyes were shot with
blood; her beak gaped \\ ide to ease her lungs; Ler heart raced
puls;I'g, throbbing.

And round Ler stalked the
sterhood, and clucked, and
IÍzzed, and giggled.
The screams grew weirder, wilder. The combatants had
plumbed the depths of hate, They fought for life, and \oiced
their agony, fighting.
But suddenly came swish of soaring pinions, and, I"Ound
the duel, stillness.
Clear-marked against the skyline rose a Man.
Margot had seen him instantly. She checked her screams.
and wrestled on in silence.
Her ravil could see nothing but her enemy, and miauled
and screamed at l'andom.
The Man loomed higher, higher still. He towered colossal
over them, shapeless, fantastic, terrible.
His foot.steps crunched the hoar-frost jewels to powder.
and left broad muddy smears behind. His breath steamed
on the frosted air, and hung impure about his clumsy going.
And Margot.knew that Death minced ill his wake.
His shadow crept across her. His vastness blotted oui
the sky. He fixed celd, pitiless eyes on her, and, on ..
sudden, shook and rocked with peal on peal of laughter.
A droll bied this. The draggled plumage tickled him;
the terror-haunted eyes; the treading feet.
He stopped and Margot shinred.
She felt her feet clutched by his horny fingfrs, her head.
racked from her body, her windpipe tautened, strictured.
It was the end. Her wings dropped limp t.o either side.
The death,sob jerhd and rattled in her throat. Her mind
reeled into darkness.
But suddenly the lo\\er grip relaxed. Her riyal's claWl
were roughly forced apart. lIer neck was freed. Sl>...
breathed.
The Man alone now 11eld her.
He gripped her feet, held her brea:;t-high, an] stared at
her with goggle eyes and thin-lipped, sneering mouth.
And Margot, screwing round her head, stared back, She
could not understand. She ollly knew that she was p1Ìsoner.
that she had lost her forest.
Yet she made bid for freedom. She wrestled with hit
I!t.urdy grip. She stabbed her bedk agaimt his fist, wita
litrength born of despair.
The Man's fist was hard as oak.
He jerked her head away from him, Gnd mocked hel'
frantic writhings. But soon he tired, swung off his back ..
cage of latticed wire, unhao;ped ilie door, and thrust the
prisoner in.
Margot had felt the unloosing of his fiugers, and, for.
moment, thought herself at large.
She flung at the unyielding wires, and stabbed and pecked
and scratched at them. Her feet slipped past their barrier
and clawed the air beyond. With wings a-whirl' she leapt,
and fell back stunned. She bruised her head, her feet, in
vain. The rigid wires defied her strength; she could llClt bend
a strand of them.
And over her the invulnerable hand, the pitilese, mock.
ing, terrible hand swung on its swiyelled ring the jolting cage
v.hich held her unknown destiny.
Strange J;ounds, and diverse, drummed upon her ean,
She paid no heed. One thought beset her mind-to get nway l
one hope possessed her senses-to break or bend the wires.
A wall of nightmare faces rose about her. She knew no

how the wall came into being, or how the crowd which formed
it multiplied. She grasped no differences in men, no
individuality, of height, or face, or gesture.
All smelt the same; all were her captor's friends, friends
leagued with him to compass her destruction. The circle
moved along with her, with shouts, wit,h boisterous laughter.
And Margot, who knew nothing of Man's voice, thought!
every cry a menace, a call to others of the tribe to øhare an
easy kill. So had she seen a flight of croWl wing screaming to
a crippled hare, and peck her eyes, and eat her where they
found her.
Each shout, each laughter-peal from human i.hroat.
stabbed at her heart, and froze her young warm blood.
And suddenly the day was blotted out-in chaos 01
fantastic sounds, of heavy airs, of noisome, musty odoura,
'Vith rounded, terror-haunted eyoa ahe cowered before
thi"l darknese in the noonday.
The stench, the gloom of four-walled room at fir!:>1i

15*

LAND

AXD

b
mu
c.J her mind, Her vi.ion cleared to probe a 1
:J.d'grey
murk, w
lÍch was halÏ ll:ght, half day,
She was a priõoner in Man's lair, the frowsy parhur of
the villaae pot-hause. Halî-kitchen this, hali lounging place
for tope
s who had credit. 'Ihe slate hung obvious on .the
wall. It was ill-lit. ill-ful'llished, Low tables flush ag:llust
the walls, littered with b
er'stained tumblers; low benches
running past them; a sink; two greasy roller towels; a cOPI: er
with a blazi:1 a wood fire under it; the walls hung randomvnse
with aear, wi"th pans, with sieves, with colanders. 1'he ceiling
cross:'d with rods of iron, from which iron hangers dangled,
and bore the weight of bacon-sides, and sausages, and ham.s.
The chimncy'piece was dominant. It rose pyramIdal
from a twelve-foat base, with hinging flaps to ease or loose
he
draught, with st<:n-e and elbow'jointed flue. A scent of cUrIng
tltickened in t,he air, the junip
r that had embrowned tho
hams.
'Three loafers sprawled hali-fuddled round a table. :Man's
mate, full,brea!'ted, red of face and arm, made racket at the
sink. 'The crocke
y chinked, the tin-ware clashed and jangled.
Husband and children helped-and hindered her. Margat
was for the childrøn-at a price.
The cage was dumped down roughly, rattling the dr
g-
fouled, 1ìnger-pïinted tumblers; and Man lurched round lll-
quisitive,
Arms swung, hands clapped together; and Margot's
terror-stricken eyes froze in a rounded stare. .
The children's fingers ventured through the bars, offering,
imploring friendship: But Margot saw a threat in them, aud
backed away, and cnnged.
Though baby fingers had no claws, fear kept her sharp-
ed"'ed beak tiaht closed-fear of the chink and jangle of t:lt

gl
s, fear of
he drowsy lolling heads, the bulldog necks, thd
L.'1uor-swollen bellies.
Vlhat bird of prey wa3 terrible as Man'
'These ogre mouths drained at one gulp the measure of an
ox's brimming mud-print; these gobbling jaws would bolt her
whole, enaulf her in a maw unfathomable,
That"'Man was enemy she knew. \\-'hat of Man's tools
and implement.s 1 'The flashing knives, his in
truments of
d",ath, whose blades dove crHzted slabs of bread hke lard; the
copper-ware which jangled at a touch; the grids j the high-
susp9nded tube of iron, from which she seemed to catch the
stench of smoke, and memory of soft bodies dangling limp.
So fear of the unknown joined strength with fear of the
unseen; but worse than these, more singular, more torturing,
was the unnervina sense of her own smallness. These sprawl-
ina lounaina bcdies towered colossal; the y surged gigantic
0' 0 c
from the void. they fined away in mystery. Above them hung
the heavy-cloistered darkness, which seemed to totter over her,
the darkness of the impenetrable ceiling. With head
nnched
back between her win as, she shuddered at each gnnce of
plate or tumbler; she "'sbuddered at each scraping, creakin

footfall which marked the lurchjng come and go of
:Man. 'But, in this nameless stress of mind, this vague
delirium of fear, she found a grain of comfort. The cage it
elf
was, in a sense. protection j the mesh-work ramparto!the W1
e3
was proof agaill
t assault. She had not long to waI
for dIS-
illusion, but for the moment this strange Lope sustallled her.
'The day trailed past, its every moment haunted, Man
came, swung gl:lsS to mouth, and went his way; and Margot
only saw his smackin ó lips. . .
Yet no one sou'7ht to hann her. A few, the mIschIevous,
caught up her cage'" and twirled it round and laughed at her
b9wilderment.
This strange a
sault made whirlpool vf bel' senses.
It was the w:J.lh that spun about, the tables thaI.. up-
reared themselves, the rr:en who sw
yed and danced like
wind-bent boug
9, the pots and pans which leapt at her, in
dizzying whorl:! :md spiral;;, ,
Night came at last, and Margot's eyelIds droop
d. Sh'l
was worn out. TIer roosting-time was past. Hunger and
fear and wearin
ss drowsed iuto broken sleep.
But suddenly she started. A drauglIt. of air had swept
across her eyes. A human hand was near her! was gropin;:;
round her body! wa3 fingering her! was grasping her I
'Then came a dick-the prison door reclosed. And
Terror gri:1nd afresh at her-across the futile bars, and
turned her Llood t,o water, and swept her mind adrift from
il:.3 shect anchol":)ge.
The caae her fancied stronahold, had been breached.
Rer mind r
eíed under this fresh torment.
She backed and cowered a3 gleam and spurt of fhme
flung blaze of gold and crimson to the roof, and framed a
vault of flickering liJht.s and spectre-haunted shadows.
(To be continued.)

Yl.ATEIL

J llne 12, 1915.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SUB
I.\ r..I:'IíES,
To the Editor of L.'U>D A
D WATER.
Sm,-'The activity of enemy suhmarines has no doubt
drawn considerable attention to this stde of craft. That some
efficient means may be found to locatc. submerged vessels and
thereby assail their comparative security from attack may be
inferred from the fact t,hat it is possible by microph
nio
means to hear the beat of their propellers. It remains to
discover some system by which, either from variation. in in-
tcnsity of sound received or some other different}al, an
accurate detennination of their position can be found.
A point, however, which has to be considered is the case
of a submarine which, having taken up its po,;ition, silently
await-s the approach of its iutended victim. In such instanC'ð
this method fails. The remedy nccessitates the change from
the measurement of direct to reflected sounds, and the effec-
tiveness of such method will be appreciated by those who.
travelling by train or car, have observed t
le variation in
intensit.y of sound produced by such reflectmg surfaces 8:1
walls and trees,
A further improvement in the means of determining the
slight differences in intensity of scund from subm
rged sur-
faces consi;ots in the measurement of their cumulative effects.
On such principles it is suggested that a rt'liable instru-
ment could be constructed which would take from the sub-
marine h
r means of self-defence and thwart the" frightful-
ness" it was her mission to inspire.-Your3 truly,
DZTEC'IOa.

CU:'Ií-DEAFNESS.
To the Editor of LAXD A
m 'VAna,
D:Õ,\R Sm,-In a recent i
sue an interesting letter ap-
peared from Mr. Oldfield Thomas, with whom I have since
been in correspondence, relatillg to gun-deafness. He recom-
I'lend.9 as " beyond comparison the best" preventivc an ear-
plug made as follows.: . ..
" Take a little pIece of muslIn, scrape off mto It some of
the wax of a candle, fold it up into a little pill the size of n.UJ
e3.r opening, tie it round close above the p.ilI \\ ith som
tIun
thread, leaving tags j cut off the spare musllll, and that 13 alL
The re.mlting plug, which looks li1;:e a miniature grenade, can
be pushed into the ear at any' time,. fit.s .itself
ccurately
owina to the warmth of the body keepmg It Just neIther h3.rd
nor s
ft, and can be pulled out again re3.diIy by the tags, JJ
I Jlave consulted an eminent ear specialist, who entirely
approves of the idea of supplying th
se ear-plugs to the Army
and to the Fleet, and I am willing to arrange for tbem to be
made in considerable quantities if I can first be assured of a
demand for them. I should therefore be glad to hear from
officers in command of regiments and ships before putt-ing the
Viork in hand. I should also like to hear from any ladieJ
who would care to help me shoulJ the scheme be taken up,-
Yours faithfully,

(:Yrs.) AN
E F. MAssy.

Hazelhurst, Sway, Hants.

THE SAIl.OaS' AND SOLDìERS' TOB,\.CCO FU:'IíD.
To the Editor of LA
D AXD W.\TE
.
DEAR Sm,-VIe should be extremely obliged if t1iJ
officeT3 in command of hospitals where there are wounded
soldiers would kindly communicate with us in the event of a
donation of tobacco being acceptabl;:o.
It is a rule of this fund oilly to supply at the request of
commanding officers, &c" in order that we may be quite sure
that there is no wa!>te.
DonatioU9 will be th::nkfully received to enable us still
further to extend the scope of our work, as we have great
difficulty in keepiug pace with the demands that are ruadll
\.J.pon us.-Yours faithfull)',
nOY Hi)R
nI\N, Chairman..

MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Hilaire Be1l0c will gi.e a fllrtbr 8
rics of three lectures at the
Q<leell's Hall on Tuesday, June 22, 1uc3J"y, JuJy 13, and Tu
scLy,
J wy 27. Scats may now be booked,
Mr. Belloc will lecture at the Town nan, Hove, at ß o'c
ock on
lIIond.1v, JUDe 21, and .at tbe 'Viot-ex Cardcr...'5, Bournemoath. at 3.30.
on :\I(ò
jav, June 28.
!\Ir. Jk!loc Yo ill lecture at Edinbur'!;h (lhe Ussher If.111), June 16;
A!:>erdeen, June 17; Stirlin;;-, June 18; A
'T (afternoon),
une 19;
Pai3ley (evenin...) J one 19; the Town HÜI, Ho,.e, at 8 0 clock 0'1
Monday, JUDe
h'; and at the Winter Gardens, Bouraemouth, a
3,30
on lIonday, June 23.

Priatoo Ly the VlC'rQau HOL"sJ> PIGN:'1NO Co., LTD., Tudvr Street, 'VhildriAra. L-ond\.>n, E.G.

June 12, 19 I 5

LAND AND WATER

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For . the

NAVY

The small size Onoto Pen is specially suit-
able for use on active service. It fills
itself rapidly without the need of a glass
filler, and can be carried anywhere in any
pocket because when closed it never leaks.
Besides, Onoto Pens are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens all British made by a
British Company with British Capital and
Labour.

THOMAS DE LA RU
cI CO,. LTD.. LONDON,

The Self-filling
Safety Fountain

:ÐJ/ Special .Ilppolnlmenl

o Hi. .7J[aj"'J/ The Kin..

- - - -

:Jlli!i
r1f
!Q'

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REGULATION SERVICE CAPS FOR OFFICERS
SOFT FITTING WITH FLEXIBLE SOFT TOP.

Comhinalion 01 eat and hack,piece.

}18/6

DETACHABLE
CURTAIN
APPROVED WAR OFFICE
PATTERN

16/6

IN
IOiAKJ SÐ/(;f
011
DRiU.
2'(5

For Olliee,. or Men.
Very serviceable against bad weather and thoroughly waterproof,
also a protection from the sun,
BADGES & BUTTONS EXTRA,
GREASE,PRO OF LININGS. 16 EXTRA.
SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS, from 30/- per dozen.
BRITISH WARMS, 55,-. 63/- Lined Fleece. in all Sizes.

105, 107, 109 OXFORD STREET,
62a PICCADILLY,
47 CORNHILL 60 MOORGATE STREET.
LONDON.

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BARLEY
WATER

should be the National Bever-
age in these strenuous times,
when every Citizen i
called
upon to do his utmost for his
country, Barley 'Vater in-
vigorates both mind and body,
imparts endurance and makes
good the expenditure of energy
occasioned by physical exer-
tion. But it

:=::: ......... -

"'\

which contains aU the nutritive and sustaining qualities of
the Barley Grain and is guaranteed pure.
Rec;lpe by a Famous Cbef (Mr. H. HAMMOND 1 M.C.A.. Cbef de Cuisine,
Tbatched House Club] :-
Put the outside
el o(two lemons into t\\O quart5 of water, add eight lumps o(sugar
and boil (or ten minutes. To this add two dessert spoonfuls of Robinson"s II Patent II
Barley, previously mixed to a smooth paste with a lil.tle cold water. Continue to
boil for five minutes and allow to cool. When cold stram off through fine muslm and
add ice and lemon juice to taste.
N.B.-PF.ARL /Jarley should on NO IUco-unt hI used a$ it IS fregulntly adulterated
with French chalk" wAle/' is Illost injurious to tlte system.
KEEN. ROBINSON & CO" Ltd., LONDO
.
'jlllllllllllllllllli II J I' )/1 , I I
..(.. ..' .,,' .' ,.

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BURBERRY

KIT

WAR

Cool in Summer Heat
y;;; Warm when it is Chilly
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Dry in Rainy Weather
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THE BURBERRY _ ,,' ProYÍdes double protection
over the vulnerable
Made in air y I i g h I air, r Fastens. with a strap.and,
free cloths, lined Prooferl
r,' /

huckle in place of huttons.
Wool or Detachable Fleece.:--:' BRITISH WARMS
KHAKI UNIFORMS & GREAT COATS
Serge, Drill, or "Gabardine" ;''.r:;
:;
/};
;r;:::;::,.?1'l.Ct'J, Light Serge or" Gabardine";
(or Sum
er} densely-woven, ;:;:
::. :.ø
:
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a
well as every detail of Ser-
self,venlllatmg and durable, ".".rø/cD"Iftrl,. C. R, s. vI ce Dress and Equipment.
lIIu.lratedr- SHORT-NOTICEACTIVEB ERV ICE KIT I Gr.."i...
MTI ,_, . l:"rberry
I I ary Burberry. keep Tunic., Slacks, Breeche., Great Coat. aud Garmr..ts
Catalo
ue Warm., ready to try on; so thaUlttlng i. doue when orderln". are lab.ll.d
Po.t Free. eIther In London or Part.. and the kit completed In a fe.... bOUl.. 'Burb.rrys.'
BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON
8 & 10 BouI. Male.berbes PARIS; Basingstoke and Provincial Agents.

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177

L _-\ N DAN D \Y ATE R

The FASHIO,V for
PETTICOATS '\.
Owing to the remarkable
change of fashion that has
recently taken place, Under-
skirts have agam become
an absolute necessity. We
have now in stock a very \
large variety of dainty and
, . Petticoats all
mexpenslve .
cut in the new fu!l shape. . -, "' t\
Dainty Lingerie Pelticoal,
especially designed for wear under
light Summer frocks, with deep I
Hounce of very fine Swiss em- ,l
broidery, and finished with bead-
ing and slotted ribbon.
Stocked in 34, 36 & 38 ins. long,
10/6 . I
.. !
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THE RAVAGES OF JlIOTH .
... '. .:;..
Store you, Fu.rs in Our Fruzing .
Chaml'ers. Particulars 0./ our .

,', "
"e7Q Combillld Fur Storage a"d "
Insurance against all and every .,
. ,

risk SIll' þosl/ru on nþþ/iclltion. 00:..... . y ..
,
,
.
Debenham
& Free,!?
E
Y
\"'\'idmore Street.
tCo
endish Square) London,W \

....

SHANTUNG
G'OArS

\\'ith the ad,'ent of the warm
weather Natural Shantung
Silk Coats, similar In
character to the garment
illustrated, will be in great
demand. These Coats are
adapted from the most ex.
clusive Paris :\lode1s hy our
o"n highly skilled men
tailors, and are made in
rich heavy Natural Silk
which tailors exceptionally
well,
SUMMER COAT (a.r .ketch)
in rich quality Shautung, de-
.. gned With belt and box p
eat
back, new military collar, lined
black.

59/6

TIte RAVAGES of MOTH,
Store J'01lr Fllrs in our Fruz
'"11/[ Chambers. Particulars
of our New Combined Fur
Siorare and bU'lran.c

again
t all and ri'ery risk
sent þost /rll Ðn aþþliLation.

Debenham
& Free/!?
u4y,

= ,
Wigmore Street, /\

A'
Cevend..h SGuare) London
-

June 12, 1915

GARROULD'S'

To H III. War Office, H III. Colonial Office, Inrlla Office,
St. John's Ambulance Association, London County Council,
Gny's I105pit.ll, &c,
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON.
Complete Equipment of Nurses for Home
[)etachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Implements and Appliances
in Stock.
Illustrated Catalogue of Nurses Uniforms. ðc.. 'Post Free.
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.
Circlllar Air Cus"ions (various sizes), 7/6, Invalid Carrying Chair (light and strong),
S/!I, 9/((. 10, \1, &c, 17/6
Water fleds, Air Beds, and Mattresses, Invalid Chairs and Carriages of every

9,6, 5
/(j, 26 9 de<cription (see catalogue),
Air and Water Pillows, 3/0, 10/6 First AId Cases and Cabinets at special
Feeding CIIP
. 4ld. each. pricD.s.
Bed Pans from 3/11 Invalid Bed Rests, 6/11
Leg alld Arm Baths from

'(\ and 8/6 Ward Berlsteads: 3ft" 13/!); 2ft, !\in" 12/9
Invalid Bed Tables from 6,ß Camp Folders: 6ft., 9/6; wIth pillow, 12/0
E & R C A R R 0 U LO Telegrams: " Garrould, London:'
.. , 150 to 162 EOCWARE RD., lo.'400N, W,
WATERLOO CENTENARY,
JUNE 18th, 1915.

Just Published.

2nd Edition Revised.

WATERLOO

BY

HILAIRE

BELLOC,

With Coloured
Iap and Numerous Diagrams.
1/- NET.
HUGH REES. Ltd., 5 Regent Street, London, S.W.

:?

.IIIII!
-
--
..

,/

/ ;
. 1'...

- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
= -
æ Are Run-down æ
_ you _
- -
= When your system is undermined by worry or over,work æ
_ -when your ,"itality is lowered-when you feel "any, _
= how "-when
yùur nerves are" on edge "-when the least =
- exertion tires Jou-Jou are in a "Run,down" condition. -
- -
_ Your sJstem is like a flower drooping for want of water, _
= And just as water revives a drooping flower-so '\Vincarnis' =
- g Í\'es new life to a .. run-down" constitution. From even -
- -
- the first wineglassful you can feel it stimulating and in- _
- -
_ vigorating you, and as you continue, you can feel it sur- _
5 charging your whole system with new health-new strength =
_ -new vigour and new life. "ïll you try just one Lottie! _
- -
- -
æ Begin to get well FREE. æ
- -
- -
_ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wlncarnis '-not a mere taste, _
- but enough w do you good Enclose three penny .tamps (to pay _
= postage). COLEMAN & CO" Ltd" W212, Wincarnls Works, NorwIch. _
= =
I

I
= -
- -
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178

June 12, 1915

L .-\ X D A:\ D \Y . \. T E R

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'II:t\ C'

E \'ERYTHIXG in daily existence has undergone
a radical change, but nothing has been aJtered
so fundamentally as the life of the girl of eighteen
or twenty. For the first time for years she finds
herself in a world making no special arrangements
for her benefit, The events of a "coming-out" season,
which many a girl had grown to regard as a matter of course,
and her rightful due, are simply swept away. The customary
course of life has been altered out of all recognition; there are
no precedents to guide, little to steer by, We are all living
a life which bears no resemblance to anything anybody has
liwd before.. Older people learn adaptability \\ith every
passing year, but it is not such an eJ.sy lesson for the younger
generation to digest. It has to be learnt, however, willy-nilly,
at the moment--{)Í that there is no shadow of doubt.
To do the girl of the present day justice, however, she is
trying in every possible way to adapt herself to these new
conditions of life. Things are too terrible, e\'ents too momen-
tous to pennit of small considerations, The vista of a first
season has vanished for ever for numbers of girls, but what
does it matter? An event which in past years would have
been of great magnitude has vanished away to a minute speck.
In less dread days it would seem a pity. In these it simply
does not count, All that counts is happening within sound
of the guns. All that is worth doing at home is to help the
country in one form or another. This is true now, but it
will become more true yet as days progress. Every girl now
has a chance she did not ah....ays possess in times of yore.
She can be of tangible use in the" scheme of things entire."

On Occupation
The most superficial observer must see that the main idea
of the great majority of girls is to be occupied. The gospel
of work is one, which has been preached for some time to
womenkind; often in the past we have heard of some girl,
born of parents of comfortable means, who has left her home
to launch forth on her own elsewhere. \Ve have shrugged our
shoulders, murmured somethmg about the restlessness of
the age, perhaps gone a little further in thought and considered
it a pity that well-to-do people should compete with those
having their o\\n bread to earn. But without doubt it was
a sign of the times, a reaching out for the realities of life,
Occupation is a blessing and a boon; it always has been so at
all times and seasons, but now it is a veritable necessity.
\\ïthout occupation most women at this time would go out
of their minds. And if they are not seeking for it for them-
sekes they are most certainly obliged to do so for their
daughters. Youth is an energetic thing; vent must be found
for this energy, otherwise the results are bound to be harmful.
The wish for occupation is one thing, the finding of it another.
There are many signs, however, to show that opportunities
are increasing, and that every girl \\ill have a chance of
proving her practical worth. \\"ar is a primiti\'e thing,
and we are back in primitive times. It is with the very simplest,
yet withal the most important matters that every girl has to
concern herself. If she is an expert at invalid cookery she
should be hailed as a ram avis-she is a valuable asset to the
nation at large. If she can sew, if she can scrub a floor well,
if she can stay cheerfully at home. releasing a more valuable
member of the family for service abroad, she is a help to her
country; there is occupation in abundance for those \\ho have
the wit to see in which direction their OW11 special talents lie,
but it is occupation having little glamour about it. It is
a case of sheer hard work. In nO other way is a girl of any
u,<e at the present time, nor, indeed, from that point of view,
j,; anyone else.

From Small Beginnings
Once having made up her mind, however, that she m
st
start from the beginning, and gain experience, the English
girl is a power in the land, We are waking up to the fact
that all that matters is efficiency, It is a pity we did not do
so ten months ago, but it is betÌt:r now than never. The day
of the cheerful young creature, who did some .. good work II
to help pass away her time is O\'er and gone. It is, surely
not too optimistic to hope it \\ill ne\'er return. GirlS are
going into hospitals, and working until their backs ache,
and they are limp with fatigue; they are running coffee
canteens at home and abroad, and nut shrinking one iota
from the inevitable fatigue. From all accounts, life in a coffee
canteen at the big military centres (Rouen, for example),
is one of infinite variety, For a while there may be nothing
to do, then there is a rush of business, and a girl's po\\
r
is taxed to the uttennost. But all \yorkers are agreed that It
is splendid work, well worth the doing, and with the gratitude
of customers for its cro\\ning reward,
The need for training is one that most girls are sensible
enough to recognize, and if they do not do so themseh-es,
others arè quick to recognize it for them. Heaps of girls
who had left schoolroom davs behind ha\'e practically gone
to school again since the outbreak of war. The difference is
that instead of learning many things, which fail to do them
one ounce of practical good, they have gained most valuable
knowledge. The intricacies of a custard pudding have
baffled many an intelligence which made mincemeat of 'ologies
in the past. Heaps of girls have gained a practical training
of a kind, which would never ha\'e appealed to them before
the world was turned upside down. And those who are
still meandering in the old path of amiable inefficiency will
ere long be forced to see the error of their ways.

The Girl of the Future
There is no one whom the present course of events will
affect more deeply than the girls of a family. At such a time
as this it is difficult to look for the briefest \\hile ahead;
everything is in the melting-pot, and the mahing of pre-
dictions is likely to be a \\aste of time, It is obvious, however,
that it is the generation just growing into womanhood who
\\ill feel the change of crnditions most, It also seems likely
that many a girl who in the ordinary course of e\'ents would
have married and had a hrme provided \\ill now have to
li\'e her life alene, and defend upon her o\\n resources. The
carnage amongst our manhood can mean no other thing.
.-\nd this being so, it is fortunate that it is the spirit of work
that is being spread broadcast amongst girls to-day. As
this year progresses we shall undoubtedly see girls in many
fields of acti\'itv, \\hich were either closed to them formerlv.
or in which they themselves had no previous interest. \\"omën
will engage in much whicq has been considered exclusively
man's work. They \\iII, from the sheer force of necessity,
start many businesses on their own, \\hich pre\'iousl.,. the.,.
would not have d3red to attempt unaided. Posts ,\"ill b-p
offered them for which in the past no women need ha\"e
applied. Already there arc policewomen and messenger girls
as a sign of the times, and it is impossible to say \\Ïth \\hat
further de\ iations from custom we shall be confronted any
moment of the day.
Life \\ ill OpLll In some directions for women e\'en though
it closes in others. At any rate, the girl of the future will
be far removed from the hèlpless being she was apt to be in
the past, and the knowledge she has gained of nursing,
cooking, and such like occupations \\ill be a pern1anent asset
to her.

179

LAND AND WATER

June 12, 1915

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180

The County Gentlenlan
AND

LAND&WATER

Vol. LA. V No. '2ï7 I

SATURDAY, JUNE 19. 19 1 5

[ PUBLI
HED AS ] PRICE SIXPENOE
A NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED WEEKLY

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ADMIRAL JOHN M. DE ROBECK

In charge of the Naval Operations in the Dardanelles

LAND AND \VATER

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1 9 0

June 19, 1915

June 19, 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

THE

LAKE

By J. D. SYMON

S OMEWHERE in the home counties it lies, sparkling
in the June sunshine, the very eye of the landscape
and an everlasting refreshment to the sight of the
wayfarer. To the obvious charms of e\'ery pleasant
expanse of water it adds one more, of curious and
even whimsical suggestion, for this lake is not as other lakes.
Although it falls into the picture with perfect harmony, so
perfect as to proclaim it immemorial, this lake of ours is none
of Nature's making. Two years ago it was not. A gently
rolling countryside, sufficiently beautiful in itself, still lacked
the relief of water, save for one or two streams, too slender
to give any marked accent to the valley as viewed from the
neighbouring heights. It was the one thing wanting; but
some genius of the Urban District Council-a body not usually
associated with genius, except in the practice of refined and
cumulative extortion-saw what the landscape required and
how it lent itself to this adaptation, worthy for once in a way
of the name " improvement," A wide marshy basin at the
confluence of several little rivers lay handily inviting. Per-
haps, although local tradition is
ilent on the point, a lake
may have shimmered here long ago. Probability lies that
way, for the appropriateness of the lake to its surroundings
makes it appear rather a skilful restoration than an arbitrary
device, Artificial waters, styled "ornamental" in guide-
books, seldom conquer their original sin of artificiality, Be
they never so venerable, they bear their characters on their
faces; but this little inland sea flings no challenge to the critical
observer. He takes it for granted as a proper natural feature,
If it lies, it lies splendidly.
The engineer's task was simple, It sufficed merely to
remove some low barriers, and the waters of the neighbouring
streams overflowed the basin just to the right depth, A
little skilful embanking here and there did the rest. But
the new embankment left no scar. The oozy ground already
held clumps and lines of osiers in plenty, Up to their roots
the flood lapped and paused, knm\Ìng its duty. Shy willow-
screened backwaters, tempting as those by Isis and by Cherwell
of happy memory, formed themselves without guidance;
and the lake added to its seductions the sweetest attribute
of boating rivers. Its charm became twofold, And there in
peaceful days, dwellers among the Chiltern uplands, far
removed from "Thames' broode backe," as Spenser sings,
recovered with new zest an ancient sport too long denied,
For the District Council aforesaid, ever thrifty amid its
enlightenment, did not omit to furnish the lake with toler-
able craft, wherein for a modest fee, on SU!ll1Y afternoons
or moonlit eves, you might "ply the oar with lusty limb"
and with small stretch of the imagination fancy yourself at
Pangbourne, The illusion is less fanciful than might appear,
for the waters creep up almost to the base of ,\-ooded heights,
very suggestive of Father Thames, and the configuration of
the lake, irregular and deeply indented, yields many a pleasant
surprise of vista, Here the oarsman is bound to no monotonous
course as on the Serpentine (not that we hd n' ever condescended
to that rather dreary grind) and other less venerable" boating
lakes "; he finds endless twists and turns, e\'ery one of which
affords
ome new grouping of hill and wood or meadowland,

'nd always there is welcome retreat, when a bout of strenuous
practice has earned an hour \\ ith book and pipe under the
willows,
But these are of the things that were. The mood of
flannels has small place to-day in our scheme of life. So
sensitive have we become on that head that some, it is whis-
pered, are afraid even to be seen beneath that oriflamme of
jubilant summer, the straw hat, Hence in these bright hours
the lake is lonelier than it was this time last year. Civilians
who put out upon its waters no longer seek after dolce
Jar nie;'/te, the willows whisper their enchantments to deaf
ears, Those who row, row in the strict meaning of the term,
and the exercise is made contributory to one end, physic.ll
fitness,
)therwise it "ould not be approved or undertaken,
The drowsy charm of moored craft, rocking lightly in the
breeze, is pre-eminently an indulgence of peace. To,dav it is
grotesque. unseemly, a scandal in the able-bodied, Yet a
little" slacking" still lingers by the lake-side-do not make
haste to cry .. shame! " it is perfectly lawful. For the
slackers have earned their little hour of ease, of undisiciplincd
paddling, of tea, tobacco, and chaff under the \\-illo\\s, They
1rc not in flannels, no gaudy blazer proclaims them butterflies,

they would be none the worse of the abandoned straw hat.
All the same they are hall-marked by their clothes, hall-
marked and thereby enfranchised, You will have guessed
who the\' arc.
It is their hour of relief from the work that most of all
matters in these critical days, when the nation's fortunes
tremble on the razor's edge, All day these amateur water-
men have toiled on land under the strict eye of the instructor.
They are of that arm of the service with which in the first
instance victory rests, it is theirs to lay the gun and direct
the puissant shell to the battering down of defences too long
opposed at fearful cost. They are, by the chief paradox of
this strange war, the life-saving corps, in very truth the life-
guards of the army. By the lake-side nestles the pretty village,
where for the moment these artillerymen have their home;
the thin shaft of its church spire rises white against the
wooded hills, lending the last touch of the picturesque to a
landscape typically English and rural. The township took
on a new beauty when its spire and red roofs found their
reflection in these quiet waters. Over all broods the very
spirit of peace. Yet here, too, there is \\-ar, urgent and
imperious, emergent at certain hours upon those rural ways,
.-\t early morn the guns and the ammunition column thread
the lanes, moving with a brisk jolt and jingle, \'ery different
from the leisurely progress of the farm waggon, hitherto the
usual disturber of the fields. And bv the woodside above the
lake, a sudden turn may bring you on a halted troop of horse,
intent on map-reading, They pore upon their ch.lrts, com-
pare the ground, dispute a little perhaps, and then it is .. files
about," and they are gone, phantoms of the summer afternoon,
left once more to its rightful owners, the questing bee and the
clamorous cuckoo, whose voice is now grown a trifle languid.
" In June he changes tune." Next June will he shout to a
,'alley restored to its ancestral peace, himself, rude bird, the
only peace-breaker? Perchance, by the grace of God and the
gunner, it will be peace. So mote it be.
Leave the lake-side now (for none of us is in any mood
for boating, and the boats are of right our artillerymen's}
and come with me to the hill-side, to that very break in the
coppice where the other day I surprised my map-reading
troopers at their work. The view rewards the climb, It is
one of the fairest and perhaps the least known in all the
twenty miles around London, for the path that leads to this
precious coign of vantage is labelled" Private." It is very
wrong, no doubt, to commit trespass, but so you keep the path
and do not stray into the coverts on either hand, the keeper
winks at your iniquity and even condescends to a pleasant
" good,day " as he passes on his lawful occasions, The view,
with the happy trick of its kind, breaks upon the wayfarer as
a surprise, The screening coppice ends suddenly, the ground
falls away, and the eye ranges unfettered over many miles
of delicious hill and dale. On the left twinkle the extreme
northern heights of greater London, then from the spur of the
Hill par excellence, rolling woodland sweeps encircling until
;t fades into the distance that holds Windsor undescried,
:\1idWdY lies the wide valley where three rivers, flowing from
diverse uplands, at length make common cause, And for
centre and focus to the picture rises, embowered in foliage,
thdt keen shaft of village spire, warden of the little town,
whose name, if you are a curious student of Anglo-Saxon, will
record for you the meeting of the waters, Up through the still
air float chimes that mimic the very intervals and cadences
of :\
3.gdalen bells, whose lazy notes to-day have sounded the
tocSlll for sO many of her sons, -\mid this rural peace the
suggestion of war will not be denied, Even this Eng-lish valley
is a perpetual reminder of the strife, for it resembles, with a
likene'is more than fanciful, the valley of the Aisne. Line
for line, from this view-point, it reproduces the contours of that
hard-contested ground, The river, perhaps, is less insistent
here, hut its thin silver thread, fitfully seen through fringing
pollards, is reinforced, right in the middle distance by what
might well be the arm of a noble strcdm. For yonder beneath
the spire glitters, long and irregular, a broader belt of water,
the very jewel of the landscape, the last touch of its perfection,
so harmonious in its flTose, so well-accordant with the scene,
that ()
ly. the informed may
now, a
d knm\Ìng gladly forget,
that It IS none of Nature s handiwork, but the gracious
arti
ce of rate-gathering men, to whom much shall be
forgIven for their lovely lake.

19 1

LAND AND WATER

June 19 19 1 5

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19 2

une 19, 1915.

LAND

AND

WATER.

THE WAR BY LAND.
By I-IILi-\IRE BELLOC.

NOIf.-Ihis article has been sub:nitted to tbe Press Bureau, which does Dot object to the publication as censored, nnd takes n.
responsibility for the correctness of the statements.
III accordance with tIle requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans iIlllstr:ding this \rtide mnst onl}' be
regarded as approxiw:lte, and no dc:ìnite strength at any point is indicate.!.

THE PAST 'VEEK.

T HERE has been no decisive action, eyen
of the smallest kind, during the course
of the past week.
The considerable moyements to be
expected in Italy have not yet matured. The work
there is still the work of comparatiyely small
bodies, well provided with artillery, preparing the
way for the main forces which are to come up
after full concentration is effected. Such as it is,
that work consists in an alh ance against the
Austrian railways system, as we shall see in a
moment.
"U pOll the Galician front there has been a
thrust back and forth that results in an undecided
position. At one moment-upon June 10 and 11
-it looked as though matters here had reached
their turning-point, the last enemy offensiye across
the Dniester having been thrust back with very
considerable losses of men and guns, but the effect
of this success is lessened by a counter-stroke
which took place within forty-eight hours to the
north, and brought the enemy forces well aeross
the San. The enemy even profess that our Ally is
upon this front in fun retreat towards Lemberg.
But the situation had not sufficiently developed by
Tuesday evening to merit any conclusion.
In the V\T est there has been no more than a
continuation of the slow but continually admnc-
ing pressure of the French concentration north of
Arras and east of Soissons, unless we except 3-
minor success in Lorraine. The Belgians have
thrown a certain force forward on Dixmude. The
rôle of the British containing the considerable
German concentration in front of them remains
the same.
I n the Dardanelles there has been no cbange
at all up to the news last recei\-ecl at the moment
of writing; but the French Government ha\"e
thought it advisahlc to issue an üfIì('ial document
,vhich tells us much" hat thf' general criticism of
that campa ign had already decided-to wit.. that
the task is verv much more formidable than the too
facile cxpert:.Ùions formed in this countl')' at its
origin expected.
A sta tement of tot.al ('a '
l1a1t ies made by
the
rime Minister in the course of the wrek is
one of the most noticeaUe piect's of e\id.enee \\e
have npon which to hase onr estimate of the
present plMse of the war,
The chief of these points wi1l be dealt with
in more detail later on. but we ma...., perhaps, as a
preliminary, tllis week consider the chances of
that reuewetl offensive in the 're
t upon the part
of the enemy, whieh has spread like a sort of
rumour, though without direct evidence to back
it, during th
last few days.

A RENE'VED ENE
IY OFFENSIVE IN
THE 'YEST.
The chanc
s of the enemy's abandoning quite
shortly his long-maintainèd and now perilous
defensiyc attitude upon the 'V cstern line h
l\ e
been discussed much more among the general
public of 'Vestern Europe during the last "rel.::
than has been the case for many months past.
There is no official warrant v fur such an attitudr.
It is not a case of expert .01' secretly instructed
opinion leaking out and informing the mass of
opinion. The expectation is rather due to the
great length of time that has pa8sed since th

fuller operations of the dry weather be
!an and
the absence during all that time of any big
German moye in the 'Ve51. This, coupled with
the continued post.poning of a corresponding offcll-
sive on the part of the
\.llies (which was expef'ted,
by opinion geneml and particular, to he due at an
earlier date than the pref:cnt), has led tu the sug-
gestion mentioned aboye.
\Yhat the intentions oÏ the enemy may be' in
the matter no mortal can tell. A mere prophecy
upon it woulù be inane. But wr can at least esti-
mate the conditions under whi\'ll such an offpnsi\'e
would be undertaken, anfi show what it won It!
connote clse,...here. The chief points seem to Le
thesc :
(1) The enemy can unJcrtake such an offen-
sive without u'lwlly abanduning his effort upon
the Eastern front, though he w0111J have to give
up his hope of a deci;:;ion there. The ae-cumulation
of shell which he has expl'ndcrl in that effort
cannot represent his total accumulation, for even
though, as is probable, the enemy is producing le:-:s
shell in proportion to his numbers than are the
\Vestern Allies, vet the three millions odd whieh
he is supposed. to have accounted for in the
Galicillm movement, even if this refers only to
heavy shell, b..- no means l'r[resents his tütal pos-
sible accumulation of the winter and sì.ìring
months.
(2) Since it is not lack of munitions th:lfj
will prewnt his attempting a renewal of tll;S
offensive upon the ""est. r.lthough. unlik{' his
Eastern effort, he will there be m.et by ,,,hat our
R1.1Ssian Allv can unfortunately not meet him
with-that i
, a weight of heav
r 'gun fire superior
to his own-the matter is rather a problem of
men.
Kow we know prettr aecurately what the
enemy's reserves of men are-at least. of men at
all useful for his purpose. and excluding the ho} s
and middle-aged people, "horn popular jour-
nalism summons up to swell Us fi
ures; and from
these known figures it is cel'tain that if he
attempts an,y great offensive in the 'Vest he must
do so entirelv at the ex.pense t}f the Italian fron-
tier, He mÌl onlv concentrate men, sufficient for
an attaek on evèn one principal sector of the
I,'ranco-Belgian lines, by leaying eyerything south
1-

LAND

AND

of tl 1 c ""atersh
d of thc
\..lps to drift gradually
into Italian hands. An offensive in the \V cst
must be the product of a deliberate policy-to
give up trying to bre.ak Russia and to l\t Ita
y
have her 0\\ n way. ::;hort of such a polley, hIs
main strategy must still consist in attempting to
hreak the Hussian lines and to get at last his long-
deferred decision in the East: when, and only
"hen, t:an he move men b:1Ck in sufficient strength
to use them against both the Southern and the
'\Yestern fronts.
(3) 'Ye must not mistake the \'igorous local
eounter-ofi'ensive such as he win be yirtua lly com-
pelled to undertake (if he has not already begun
it) by the increasing French menace to his main
lines of communication.
This local counter-offensive would be no more
than a defensive mf'asure intended to maintain
the 'Vestern line, and not intended to achieve a
decision against those who contain him there--
not intended, that is, to break through.
A main offensive against the \Vestern line
would mean the conccntration upon one single
sector of it of certainly not less than ten, and
better, fifteen, corps m-èr and beyond those that
a.re now standing from the Jura to the sea. That
he can in the course of the summer obtain such
forces by drawing upon an possible resenes and
by maintaining the rcsults of his Eastern advance
without further attemptin
to pierce the Russia11
line is concf'iyable. That 11e can make this effort
and at the e;am3 time undertake a sufficient defen-
sh-c, let alone an offensive, on the Austro-Italian
frontier is illconceivable. .And ,,"hen I say" he .,
J mean, of course, the enemy as a whole, for there
is no distinction in this between the German and
the Austrian forces, the moying of many men to
one place meaning inevitably their absence from
another, whether for the purpose of Germany 01'
Austria is quite immaterial. Even in the matter
of a siege train, where Austria had such a gl'eat
advantage oyer Germany at the beginning of the
war, things must now be equalised; but there is
no proof that the human material of the Austrian
service at this stage of the war is inferior to that
of its aI1y.
THE ITALIAN F:{ONTIER: THE PRE-
LI'1I.'\1AR Y
IOVE
lENT FOR THE
R,\IL\\'A YS.
Though it is already nearer a month than
three weeks since the Italian declaration of war,
the mass of the Italian Army has not yet brought
its pressure to bear upon the frontiers. \Ye are
still only dealing with the movements of what it
m3Y not be technic
1lly correct stilI to call " cover-
ing ., troops, but what are in numbers and pur-
pose little more.
It is the business of this screen, as has been
repeatedly explained in these columns, to make
itself master of the Ü::sues from which the enemy
c.ould threaten the main Italian ad\ance upon
Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula. These issucs
-the passes out of the Trentino and oyer the
Carnic Alps-were, when the frontier was <.Jrawn
up half a century ago, numerous, and each sen'ed
by a road. To-Jay they a re still in their last
srgmcnts the same and still dependent mainly
upon road trnffic. But these last segments are of
no use unless the much rarer milways behind
them arc contilluou:;ly open to receive men and
munitions from tI
c A'ustrian b:1.3es.

W A TEn,

June 19, H)15.

E

M

N

-..&J::""
____
.

_ ---

You cannot supply a modern army" ith its
proyision. especially of heavy ammunition, saye
by a. railway. If, therefore, you haye roads, A,
B, C, D, issuing from mountain valleys and
enabling you to attack your enemy's communica-
tions M-N, these roa.ds, A, B, C, D, are no use
to you unless the railway E-F behind them lead-
ing to your ba.ses of supply is intact. If the enemy
works round and cuts it, as, say, at G, your rO<1ðs
are useless. In other words, wherever the Ikllians
isolate any particu]3l' road system of the Aus-
trians from the railway system of Austria they
dose that ayenue of attack against themseh-es.
As was explained last week and the \\eek
before, tlòere are three main groups of railway
with" hich the Italians must concern tbemselves.
First, that "hieh feeds the Trentino; secondly,
the main line to Yimwa and its tributaries
through the Pontebba. frontier point; and thirdly,
the s):Stem serving the Jstrian Peninsula.
The first is isolated if the Italians can isolate
the junction of Franzenfeste; the second is iso-
lated in some de
ree if they can isolate the junc-
tion of Tarvis; a.nd tbe union between these two
systems whereby one can help the other and troops
and munitions can be massed laterally upon one
or the other at will is destroyed if the line through
the Pusterthal is cut.
As to the third system, that which serves
the Istrian Peninsula and the towns of Trieste
and Pola, it is a rather more difficult proposition.
The Istrian Peninsula and Trieste are served
by three main lines, eaeh reaching to enemy bases
of supply. They may be put diagrammatically as
in plan III. The first runs up the Isonzo Valley,
through Goerz, past Tolmino, under the new great
\V ochein Tunnel, and so up to the direct line to
Vienna. At Goerz itself- is a bifurcation; two
lines sene Goerz in its communication with
Trieste, the one through
lonfalcolle, the other
up the Branica Valley and across the plateau
which the Austrians call the Karst. The first line
is cut altoß'ether if you cut it anywhere above
Goerz, but Goerz can be proyisioned by the lines
reaching Trieste from the east unless both ra.il-
ways south of Go
rz are also cnt.
2-11

June 19, 1915.

LAND AND WATER.

'1ó l zizisb ruck'
azzd neaz
se
'Nortlzern
73ases of
AllSt'rians

7ó Vænna and
"áJ ûntral a.nd
Easærn 13ases
, of Aastrians
".-
.---- . TarVLS
[NO /
fJ 6 1'ontebbã.
Ie \
/.0\
o
,...... /.
ZViet'

\ to '6 11
· (r 1"
--r\ \.
r\\
.

>
1dáÚL Italian wllltUWlicdwlZS

So far, the line as a whole has been cut at
Plava. The Itahan advanced troops have there
crossed the River Isonzo, as well as seized the rail-
way (which at this point runs on the western
side of the stream). Trieste and Goerz and Pola
can therefore no longer use the main and most
direct line to Yicnna. But Trieste is not cut off,
because the Eastcrn railways by Laibaeh remain,
and Goerz is not cut off from Trieste because,

1ó Vienna
/
T"lmino . _.-

ct
Í ,t ç
'Plava.
Cline cut-
bv ltaliaJr.S)
- Ûoerz.

.

'\

although :MonfaIcone has been occupied by the
Italians, who have. indeed, proceeded as far ItS
Duino, the second line across the plateau is still
open. The line serving Tl'ieste from the east will
remain open until the junction at St. Peter i

held, and that is still a long wa.yoff. If that wC'I'e
seized the wh(']e Jstrian Peninsul<t '\".
ould be
isolated. But there is no gett ing there until the
works at (;ocr7. are reduced. and even then
the alhalH.:e will have to be made for nearly forty
miles O\'CI' rather diflifUlt country. lrnding itself
to a strJllg defell:>i\'e. It i
trllc that the seizing of
3"

11

a nearer junction at Divazza would isolate Fob
and Trieste, though it would not isolate }'inm
.
but it is probable or certain that this last junction
is protected by the works which, temporary and
permanent, will defend Trieste. It is only six or
seven miles away from the outskirts of that to\'" n.
We may sum up, then, and say that on this
third sector, that of the Istrian Peninsula, wha.t
the Italians have done so far is to cut the main
northern line from Vienna serving Gocrz and
,Trieste, but they have not as yet isolated the first
of these places with its depôts and garrison, still
served by the plateau railway; still less have tiler,
cut off Trieste, which is still amply supplied by
the great line from the east and Laibach.
In the second sector, that of the C\trnic Alps,
the Italian advance along the railway has reached
1Ialbor!{hetto. That fortified position must be

-.
1bnûbba e

.".fl:;
"'

"
"q"
J,. . tho... Ta.rvls
'-. " : W.1rzen L .r. 1&
;...... l f.. . eugerJe
C"'...') -', :.
n3il PIUS .
1
.
....,
('

A' ".--'1:. -<'{. .I /
s
'Y
-L - .,............ oZJø.
+/C' Ilf(;.tt
h
... ,/"
<Al.. Ifs '{/' ....Terglou

m

!

"':r:'..."
" 1'-,

;

..
!I "\,
ï:"
s

..
Ï[
ï: i
i-
e?:
l

UI,\,

reduced or ma
ked before a dired advance ('
n
f'Ontinue upon the junction of TaiTis. But tlwre
may ùe repeated what was said in these colmnns
three weeks ago, that every point upon the 1'e1l,\
y..lley can be turned by comparatively easy
ma rches across the southern boundarv ,,,all of that
vallry. All mountain positions lCll(l'themselvcs to
the drfen:öi \L
,

T, A
D

Thf're rem;] ins t11e third sector, the prime
object.i\'e in which is the .Franzenfpste, th.e two
subsidiary ohjecti,'es in which are the cuttmg of
the Ii nes dtHVn the Valley of the A rlige, abO\'e
Trent, anù through the Pustertbal. At this point
we must c.arefully note, but nüt be misled by, th

position of Cortina. Cortina. lIas been occupied
by the ad\anced Italian forces-in what
trength
we do not know. Two roads lead from it. The
one to the AdiO'e Y.allev, through the Falzarego
C1 ,. L-
Valley, and across the Tresassi Pass; another to
the Pusterthal Dorth-wards. The mere distanæ
from Cortina to the railways is tv\entv-five miles
in the one case, as the crow flies, and ón]y t"\yelYe
miles in the other, and the obseryation of !':uch
short interyals has led to hopes which may be di
-
appointed, or at least may be premature. The

'-
,þ
..

...
\-

fv.Þ
Z ENfr sn
Iimlw. . tJ..rouq1z thL Ptutzr
'td
CP"""'. .
} "" ,......
1-fØ
s\'
/"--"

,\-.1t' w&....../ ø':.
cSC>"
/ )1-'
\tt>F "1/ '
Qi

!clP-

t;$- COR-TIN A
'1 "t:l Fd"'t:.''''!J.
:I
I ..

.

....

.

... I..
\:... .f3

W'

:

f

1

'
...,1
_
'\0

Italian aùyance pests have, indeed, penetrated up
both these roads for a few miles, but all the heavy
VlOl'k still lies before them. It is as has been twice
repeated here, the worst possiùÍe country for an
oITensive: a tangle of high mountains, and the
main ridge of these still in front of our ally in
either case. It is to be presumed that a wry
vigorous effort ,,.,-ill be made to reach the Puster-
thaI and cut its all-important railway. There
are positions not six miles from Cortina whence
that line could conceivably be sheJIcd, and a 511C-
ce3sful action upon the pass at the head of th:3
Ruffredo would 1ea\>e the admncing troops v, ith a
clear road before them down into the yalley. But
the task will be a hard one, and it is ÌlOt ,et
a('cornDli
hed. w
The other, much longer, road to the "\Vest has
ti'lS double ùra\yba(:k, that t"o rid!!es haye to be
cro
sed; that under the Pordoi Pe
k, as "en as
the Tresassi, and that e\en when tl:ie "hole moun-
tain road is forced and the raÜna.y reached, one
only comes on to that mjlw

y at the lowrr end of
the Eisach gorge, Deady thirty miles b
lo"\Y tbe
point of :Franzenfe
te, "jth no chance of a tUì n-
ing movement upon either 'òide of that òe('p l'Ut
through the hills.

AXD

,V ATE R .

.T nne 19, 1915.

To get upon the railway llrar Bozen wou1d,
indeed, isolate Trent, but it would leave the enemy
free to moye troops from anyone of his great bases
towards the Adige again. To cut the railway in
the Pustertl'al ",ould be to do much InQfe, for it
would prevent the two main lines from backing
-e8(,h other up, but it "ould 8ti11le.:'1.\e ea.ch of them
independently able to act. To seize the Franzen-
feste would l'araly:;;e tIle enemy altogether. hut the
:Franzenfeste is pre
isc1y what it is mo
t diûkult
to rf'èlch in all tbis system.

THE GALICIA
POSITI0
";.

Iv.

It is too eady yet to say wh(l,t cxact]y has
happcfled on the Galieian front., but the 11(>"\"3
J'('cciycd up to Tuesday cH'ning }JrebcnteJ tbe
following situation:
(1) The main crossing of the Dniester at
Zurawno, ,..hich t he enemy had forced upon
J llnc 6, hroke do\"..-n badly, aDd the cil'cum:::t;) nces
()f its breakdown point to a muse pre:;isely
similar to that \yhich has affected the succcss('s
s
much as the cLeås of the en('
nr throug-hout the
whole of this gre-<.lt ofiensi'e in tbe East-the
factor of heayy artilkry.
'When his great gHn
are on a railv,è.1Y or dose
to a railwa
T. and ha, e behind them short good
mads fmm railhe
d, the enemy can at regular
inteITah impcsed by the l1crc."s;ty of brlnf;ing' un
shell, pursue his nd
'an.('p, He dòes not brea!2 th'è
Russian line, as is his o
)jed, but he pu:;;hes it
fmtller and fll!tlicr back with the Sp3.5::ì
odjc
pffort nf he(l\ Y al'î.il1elY :l.ctiJ)ç.; ('wry few days
nftcr it I
us tinle to -acquire a further local <1C;CU-
'tl,ll:J.t.ion of mUl1itil..lllS.

But OTJce yon put. all oustade !:'e
'\epn railway
[lnd gun (men if it be only that of the Upper
Dnie
ter, "ith it;;; nmdày banks and bottom,
nd
the :Jbsence of a !!ood road upon the further sidf'),
so that his tr
.n:::port of hig shcll is hampered, the
C't1ort keaks don n. '\-e k1ve lwd ('xact]v the
""une thing l'(Tcated ha1f a d07en times
in
c the
great Gillie-ian offem;ive began.
(2) :Meanwhile, to the north, in front of
.J;lrm
l:tv, anrl a" far H(.rtll as Sien;l,HL and as fat'
!>Outh :-IS l\Iosciska. there has b{'f'!] a sharp a d\"ance
unon the part of the epewv. He claims as many
p
'i
ol1ers as the RussÜms 'counter-claim in thei'f
more southern SllCCCSS at Zurawno. But the im-
portant thing is not the number of wounded men
picked up as one admnces oyer the belt through
which one's enemy hü.s retired, but the strategical
efft'ct one has protluced by one's advance.

ow, in this little
ector in front of Jaroslav
there is no Q'001..1 natural obstaele between the Selll
3!ld the district of Lemberg. The Ri\Tcr Lubae-
z
wka d, 'es not. hf'nd down southward enough to
form a harrier. The true li:1e here, as VIas pointed
out when we v. na1ysed th is front more t.han a
month ago, is the line (If the San continued by
the line
f the 'Viznia. But thc line of the "\Viznia.
is turned once the San is crossed in force at Jaro-
slav, and to the north of that towll, and the up-
shot of tbe matter is t
at if tbe German claim is
\yell founded it
ll1ounts to this:
Tbe atteì11pt t.o force the approaches to Lem-
bC1'g from the s,-Ilüh by Zura ,';no have failed.
Troops mId mm1!ti0ns hë.1Ye been brought round to
t!.Ie HortÌìem
ed(lr. and a yigorous advance,
""hi\..h is in pI'c.'L""Css 0f sl1cceeding, and has not

Tt fuBy suc-cef'J:
d. is taking place there. The

ter up(.n which the attad, has been deli'>crcd
4

June 19, 1915.

LAND

AND

LEr-r
ERG
.

---....._---..... -
A-.-:"Mh:Fnmt' af

D

' r_1..'_'

Sl.01ZS lZZ v='U1/
Oll,S
Jæze '.J

---'--'-_------ Ot.:l:?lu.J::,-ituz.
Tror.f 6eiiJ
Jaros:av. June lOtb.
1t>C,IC)l.Jt)l.xxJl.Jt)O.)C O!ii
'FrdZZl'
hefõre Zm'a.wr.,ow. áeid Jaze ó.ç{z.
st' JUJ1C lOf i 12

,\'
\ T E R .

v

is further from L!-mberg than the Zu"'awTIO
sector; but, on the oth
r Land, there are no con-
siderable obstacles such as the Dnicster in t!le
way.
(3) A long way off-nearJy seventy miles to
the south-another crossing of the Dniester has
been effected at Zaleszky, backed up by the railway
from Czernowitz, and the whole Ullss1an line büs
retreated from the Pruth to the Dnieater, and, in
the immediate TIeigbbourhoo\.I of Czernm"itz, to
the frontier. But action down there. apart from
its political effect of separating the l:ussian from
the Roumanian forces and presum3"bly delaying
the entry into the field of tbe latter, has very littl6
effect upon the general situ:ltion. The ultirnat6
objective is still the breaking of the Russian line,
or, alternatively. the getting ",dl behind the Ene
of the Vistub. The immediate objective is Lem-
berg, and action on the fü'r south-cast will not
greatly effect either of these ccntral Objêcts sa.ve
m so far as they retain troops occupied v.ho might
have been useJ by the Russians ill the centre.

f\.1UNI"fIONS

T 1\ the columns of this journal, tmder the date
of :March 6 (that is, three months ago),
w there appe
red four pages of dose matter
....... under the title " The Can for Ammuni-
tion," and these columns contained among other
phrases the following:
If you were to a
k off-band a man of goed observation
. . "'WI'at is the prime factor in the problem of tùe
tr;)nc
e
1". . a solllier anywhere near the higher
commapd would almoct certainly rE'}Jly: "A r m I.L litwn, auJ

'p
f'ial'!l h
al'!! gllll ammunitioll. JJ
... I .
J:ill( agaIn:
This is the point \'fe have to consider most car-cfuny from
now o.ùwards, and it is onc of tbc.36 points in which public
opinion and a gra
p by civilians of the conditions abro
d is
of g!'C:lt value.
_'Ì.nd again:
Public ojJi !lion , confused or ignorant upon the 'Ie
essentials, leaves the auttlorities w
thout driving power
behind them.
And again:
TLere i" needed fer the proper supply of the heavy guns
and, ther.;;fore, for the chief factor to a decision upon tlls
\Vest, all th
lU:Ol'J gun ammunition tliat tli
tJ'-"rl
rcsourus
of tJt
natwn ca
tl/rn. out at t"
utnust spud a.d. willt the
1nnat 1.Ì!JDrous resolutior. ard skill.
And again:
There can only too e
..!'ily be an insufficiency or a h;tch,
and yet, on tho continual increase of supply. 07& th
Iwtlllllg
and furtlia lu
llin!J of its 8tr
am, deperdll the future of tlÚ4
COllll'T!! mOTe than 1/pulI an!! othtT fact(J-T.
And a
ain :
Oue could wi
h that hzIf the f'uergy deyoted to voluntary
recruitment could be tUflPÙ on to errphasisiug and re-
emph.a..:sing this all-importance ûf the supply for \\hich tll8
heavy gun3 are hungry. . fr.,r there li
3 tIt:) key,.
ITJ. the courEe of those four pagE's much ITJ.ore
was saId to make clear and n'asonable these very
emphatic pronouTJ.cements. Tbey appeared, 'f
repeat, more than three month
3g0, and so much
being s,lid, perhap5 there is r.o rl..::t....on to say more
upon that particular hmrl, so far as this journal
i;:; cr>ncerncd.
.But my readêr
",ill rightly demand that
rea
}nable critiri "rl of the campaign sÞall include
sorne e"'\:
)lanc!ri)n of t!'e situation at pres?nt
readlcd in the supply of big
hdl, v, hi(:
l mean
,
of \.. '
U't', big shell charged \Ùth high explo::;ive,

AND

PANIC.

The elements are perïectly simple. I will
tabulate them:
(1) The prep.1ration of an advance against
an entrenched enemy is mainly a matter of high
explosive shell. '',.
hen you b:n'c thoroughly
drenched a belt of such and such a width bv a
crushing bombardment, your illfa.ntry can occ-úpy
that belt.
(2) In this preparation you not only enter,
but weaken, yonr enemy's liTle, for you make your
enemy lose very heavily in mC3.
(3) The actual keaking of an entrenched
line (a thing not ) et achieved in this w(!r sa-re
once-in December, before '"rarsaw-and then
r
piàly rep3ired) is depenèent upon hea.,,-y shell
charged with high explosive b
!ng di
Lhargetl
continuouJ'ly for n,any days n6"ainst the enemy,
after a fashion to which he cannot reply on
aceount of his lliferior suppl,ì' of si
ilar muni-
tions.
(4) Even if you do not break your enemy,
but only Jri\e him Lack .from entrenched position
to entre'::ìChed position, Jour effort d
pen..l
upon
the same factor.
(5) If you can so dri\e him back, C\T'n with

out at first bre;:JJÜng him, you le:lve him but littlo
timc to prepar<:> ne\v positions: you rr.:ay hope to
break him at the enJ of the efiort. TII:'.Í is what
the enemJ" has been tr:rin
to do in Calicia again,:;t
the Ru::,;:;ians for
i.x wce1i:s past.
The \',hole thing, tLcn, is a question of high
explosi\"e large shelL
.Kow, once a ste
l.lly admnce begins you get.
as the Austro-Germans have found in Galicia,
and as I ha\'e describell el
e"bere this week, a.
\ery difficult problem, which is that of coml1l1!7li-
cations. It is not enough to ha \,] gre.lt quantities
of Lig shell; you must alba be able to mo\"e it
forward as 1'3 pidly as your enemy retreats-and
that is :t big business. For hanciling Lig stell is
like handiing kitchen ranges or mill-stones. TIut
for the initial efiort, what you have to consider is
)'our power of accumuIating great masses of shell,
which in number shall be something to which tbe
enemy cannot reply, suppo.sing, of coarse, thatï

sa

LAND AND WATER.

June 19. 1915.

you ha\'e sufficient "capons for the discharge of obyioosly a margin for the increased production
so much munition. It takes so very much longer of shell. What that margin is only the
to make, turn. fill, and fit a shell than it does authorities know. '
to fire it off that the whole process of these Again, can the encmy obtain supplies from
II deluges" of bombardment is necessa rily spa
- outside l1Ìs own territory for the production of
modic. To borrow a metaphor from hydraulIc shell? If he Ciln it is the fault of tbe blockade.
engineering, you have to get a .. head" of shell. That he has got cott.on through for his propellant
i fYou haye to accumulate sbell for very Illany days explosiycs "-e know, Why it has becn allowed we
twhich will be discharged in a very few hours, do not know, But has he also got his material for
jmefore undertaking a great offensi
e effort s,uch shell 1 Italy has allowed nothing to go in since
as the Germans and Austro-Hungarmns haye Just December, and if the enemy is getting for his pro..
'undertaken in Galicia, you must spcnd "eeks or duct ion what he cannot find within his own
months in stocking up shell at your advanced boundaries, then it comes in through the Xortli
bases of supply. The more you stock up
he better Sea, and the answer to that question is therefore
chance you have of a('hi.eyi
g your object. There- political. It will not be discussed here, because it
fore the 10nO'cr vou ,..alt-Ill reason, and always IS also highly controversial. and depends upon
supposing that the enemy is still tangled up else- elements in the international problem of which
,1\'here-the wiser you are. no la
Tman has cognÜ:ance,
It follows from all this that to press the But the situation is quite clear. If the
proJuction of shell to the utmost limits is the blockade is fully enforced the enemy callnot get
chief and ob,-ious duty of a community engaged supplies from outside his own territory, whereas
in modC'rn ,,<11' "hen met by siege conditions. the \Yestern Allies can, and do.
\Vhether it is wise to stimulate this produc- But the production of shell does not only con-
tioTl In. Jull ofiicial l'hdoric, newspaper panic, or sist in the supply of shell cases, of copper bands,
any other :1lhelltitious method I will ll'ayc it to and fuses. It also consists in the high explosive
otller:; to discuss. At any rate, you cannot haye for the bursting charge of a large
hell. .
too mUl:h supply. . Is there a shortage among the \Vestern AllIes
'Ican\\hiJe, those who see the cmnpalgn as a in these high explosiyes

who1e are asking themsdyes such questions as the In order to answer that question it can only
foHo\'. ing. and c,.el'yone who desires to j1!dge the be :-:uggested that one form of high explosiye, and
pv-.:ition must ask hÏ1)lSe1f the same questlOns : one alone, can show some shortage, and that is
Ha\'e we allY proof that the enemy can pro- T.!\.T. It is not the most yiolent, but it is the
òlwe she1] , new iiJJings for guns as tho
e linings safest form. It is that mainly used in the British.
(!'et worn out. JJew big pieces, (.
-c., can fill and fit German, and Austrian services. Its basis is the
the'
3me at any greater rate than can the Western destructive distillation of coal. In this country

Hies
It i
. to !'dY tlH> lea-,t of it, doubtful; and it has not paid manufacturers and coal-owners in
until one has' n"'ry good proof to the contrary one time of peace to produce the raw material for this
wouìd-knm\ Ìllg the character of the various explosi, e in sufiicient quantitics. That there is
nations imoh-ed-doubt it. The enemy has made any shortage in other forms of high explosive is
8 mighty effort in Galicia. In spite of that doubtful in the (':\.treme. and no shadow of proof
ctTurt he has not succeeded in breaking the that there is an.v such shortage has appeared,
]
USSiilll line. and therefore he has lost enor- \Vithout some evidence, we do weU to disbelieve it.
mow.Jy in n
e!l-certainly not less than half a I repeat that a belated newspaper panic or
miI1ioJl-" ithout so far haYÏng obtained anything the commoner kind of political rhetoric may. or

ike a de::ision. and he has expenJed in six" eeks may not, be necessary here as a spur to the produc-
nmmunition ,yhich it to
k him, perhaps, twentr tion of high explosive sbell. One would haYehoped
weeks to produce. Hal:v alone has heen for fiye not. They are not necessary else,vherC'. If such
months produeing munií.ions with a dea r compre- means are necessary, by all means let them be e111-
hension of ",hat this type of warfare has become ployed for those upon "hom they havc useful
ßnd of what is needed for it. The :French people effect. But let sober judgment recognise that
have devoted their whole energy to the same end. "bile you Cilnnot have too much of these munitions
lIaye "e any proof that the enemy have done -always supposing that the guns and their
more
That they had an adnmtage oyer Russia repair keep pace wit.h the possible rate of dis-
in this matter, seeing that Russia can only with charge-the probability is against the enemy.s
f"iifficulty obtain supplies from abroad, that her hayinO' in thc \Vest a superiority in munitions.
industrialisation is not that of the \Vest, that her It is probable-I have not the authority to
communications and the roBing stock upon her sav it is certain-that in this, fl.S in c"ery other
railways is not that of the 'Vest, \"\""e all know. mãtter, the more developed and the more active
But "ould the higher command in the 'Vest nations have the advantage over the enemy.
Tegard the enemy's supply and accumulation of :\Vhether this judgment is right or not only the
J3hell as superior to its own? I doubt it. development of the offensive in the ",Vest, when it

ext we must ask the question, can the pro- takes place, can decide.
'rluction, such as it is, be increased in the 'Vest 1 l\Iean,,'hile we may note that e,pry ,ery
i'Yhether it can be increased in France or in Italy beavy and successful bombardment in the West,
may be doubted. Those nations are conscript for followed by an advance, has come fl'07n the Allies
war and are prepared with their utmost energies. amI has been agal7lst the enemy for "eeks and
:That i
can be increased in this country is ob-fious. months past, while the single example of a con-
for thIS country is highly industrialised, and is 6iderable enemy ad\'ance-that north of Y pres-
making a great many things. apart from those has taken place, not through superiority of high
ne
ded for the war, The economic support which explosive munitions, but throngh the unexpected
thl
country can give to the great alliance demands use of poisonous gases. which novel method is
actIve production in every field. But there is now comprehended and met.
i lt

Jun
19, 1915.

LAND

AKD

"\V .\ T E R .

AN ANALYSIS OF NUf\1BERS.

U PON Wednesday, June 9, the Prime
Minister made a statement in the
House of Commons of the utmost im-
portance for the comprehension of tbe
war in its present phase. He gave at once the
numbers and nature of tbe casualties suffered bv
tbe British forces in France from the beginning
of the war to :May 31.
Upon the wisdom or un wisdom of this pub-
lication of casualty lists no judgment is possible.
The matter is a very close one for or against. The
argument for is that a nation at war should know
and underst.and its sacrifice. The p_rgument
against is that the enemy learns how it stands.
That the arguments are strongly against such a
policy is clear enough from the decision of the
French and of the Russians to keep the enemy in
ignorance. That the arguments in favour of su;,-.h
a policy are strong is clear from the fact that the
Germans, and in a lesser degree the Austrians
(who act under orders from Berlin), give their
casualties-though in a belated form, arrd with a
good deal of cooking and holding back of impor-
tant cases.
At any rate, the practical value of such
figures is that from them we can do something to
estimate the real position of the enemy, for the
British lists are rigidly accurate :md brought
fight up to date. \Ve know that there is
such and such a rvtio normallV' of wounded
to killed, of missing to wounded, and though
the lists tell us nothing of sick (who are
at le'\st equ3.l to the sli 6 htly wounded in numbers
at any gi"en lr.oment) they enable us to judge the
1ItÏnirnum of the enemy losses from his own im-
perfect figures. For the enemy is absolutely cer-
tainly suffering, counting the Epstern and the
.Western fighting, Pìore than the Allies, and im-
mensely more than France and England.
Having said so much let us see what this
offic:a 1 statement teaches us.
The vcry first thiTlg we note is that the trencb
work of the lpst six months is much more expen-
sive than work in the open field. The proportion
of one in eight which was taken in an the earlier
calculations of this journal as roughly accurate
for the proportion of killed to total c
,sualties
was a true estimate, and, indeed, an under-esti-
mate, before the war in the 'Vest became a matter
of siege work. It will still be found probably a
true multiple for the Eastern warfare during the
recent Russian retirement and enemy advanc.e in
Galicia. But it clearly does not appi y to the con-
ditions of t.rench warfare, pure and simple, in
which the- sheUing of marked positions does, in
proportion to the tot.al number of people accounted
for, a larger execution in disabled and dead than
does fire in the open field.
I believe it will be found true when Pon
analysis is made that the multiple of one in eight
for dead to total casualties up to, say, the middle
of Kovember, was fairly accurate, Since then the
multiple has obviously lowered, And, I repeat,

he pra
tica.l value of establishing this multiple
IS that It enables us to b O'auO'e the eneJmT's fio-urE's
C ., 4....-'
-for upon a due comprehension of the enormOU3
enemy wastage our judgment of the campaign
and its chances must principally be based.
Since the trench work began, the multiple, aq
1 say, has fallen. How far has it fal1en
How

many men are really being put out of action as
judged by the number of killed in the trench
work upon eirher side 1
The total number of casualties officially giyen
to May 31 in the Expeditionary Force as a "hole
is 259,069, that is to date rather less tbm a third,
Of these one-fifth are killed, four-fifths the re-
maining casualties. The multiple is, therefore,
at the present day one to five in the particu.lar
forces in question, and the total casualties are
exactly what general calculation has made tl'em,
Already somewhat over a quarter, but far less
than a third, of the total forces engaged in e.ery
field.
At this point we shall do wen-since our only
practical object in dealing thus coldly with such
sacred things is to judge the cnemy's position-
to note that a general list thus given after ten
months' leisure for the establishment of statistics
and with the very rapid final figures available to
the British Government (the Germans are often
months behindhand) gives the full total of tboee
who have died, and therefore includes all those
who have died of wounds or ewn of sickness in
hospital, and appreciably raises the proportion of
dead to wounded and missing compared with lists
drawn up in the field as are the German lists,
published most imperfectly after a great lapse of
time.
'Ve have, I say, a multiple of dead to other
casualties of almost exact-ly one in fi,-e.
"Then we go into a further anal.fsis we find
that of the ofl1cers the killed make UD nearly a
third of the officer casualties, of the ra
k and"fi1e
just less than a fifth. Such a disproportion is
not abnormal and may pass without comment. It
is to be adversely judged in one of three cascs :
(1) "
hen the men need leadership beyond
the ordinary-in which ease the officer losses are
e
,;:aggerated.
t2) vrhen, during a great retreat, an army
breaks down and the missing show Wry fe 'v
officers in proportion to the rank and file.

(3) When there is heavy mortality from
c.auses other than battle casualties, such morta1ity
c.ommonly falling more heavily upon the rank aud
file than upon the officers.
None of these three elements haye Leen pre-
sent in the ease of the British ]
xpeditiOl;ary
Force, and those w}JO read these íìbll:-l'
ha\'o
reason to be proud of them.
The next point we note is t11:-.t the ratc' of
loss is declining in proportion to the number of
men employed. There ""as a mom('nt in mid-
winter, perhaps, when it was rising in proportion
to the number of men employed. Bnt the curTa
passed its maximum in the course of the winter,
Thus, it is instructive to note that a
eady as the
end of October more than a fifth of the rrp3rnt
casualties had been experienced. although up to
that time the very larg::! reinforcement of' the
E:x:pedit.ionar:,," Force had hard1y bC':5lUl.
The following thrc(' months nuly double!"! thl'
c,'1,su.1,Uies. In other "\\ord8, twic"-' the :In,ount. of
time accounted for t..., icc> t
;(' amount of
casualties. nlihough the
mOl1nt of llIen pr('
!"nt
was incre.:1sing continu;ll1y The suc{'(>(',ìing fmlI'
months 1':1 ther more tlw n (1ouh]ed the (":1
t:f11-
ties noted nI"> to just aftpr the end of Janu:1I'
.,
and the rate thus estahlisr.eù wn,s more or les.:i

7"

LAXD AND WATER.

Dormal to the type of -v.-arfare, for the reinforce-
ments prO\Tided were at about the ratio of the
increasing casualty 1'011. The latter period in-
cluded 1."\\0 or three considerable local offensive
mm-ements with their hea vy toll of men, and
(it is important to remember this) the deaths
in hospital of men "ounded earlier, wheTl
the larger reinforcements were just beginning to
corne out,
\\T e next turn to the proportion of missing.
æhese are yery nearly exactly one in fiw, and giye
us, as to tbe whole force, something like one in
seventeen. That also is important, because, in
estimating the results of tbe compaign, it is yalu-
able to calculate as best \, e may the enemy miss-
ing, remembering that on tbe \Vestern front the
form of capture is precisely the same upon both
sides, consisting, as it does, of wounded men
picked up by the opposing sides when eyer the line
Huctuates and of small b:::.tches of unwounded
men surrounded amI cut off. Though eyen here
we must make the remark tbat the great pre-
ponderance is in fa your of tbe Allies. \Vith the
f'xception of the surprise due to tbe use of poisons
north of Ypres upon one particular day, tbe in-
diyidual actions upon the whole \Vestern front
]lave resulted in the capture of perhaps two Ger-
mans to one of the Allies.
This result has not been apparent upon the
British front, where thinj:;s have lain more or less
('yen. But if you consider all the local French
actions in fr011t of Alsace, in the \\T oeuvrc, in
('hampagne, and latterly north of Arras, I think
this estimate will be found 'fairly accurate when
Etatistics are available.
Now let us put our conclusions together.
They mean, with regard tD missing, that the
enemy cannot have lost less in his driblets of
prisoners upon the '"\T estern front since tbe trench
"arfare began than 100,000 men. He has prob-
ably lost more, but he has not lost less.
They mean that he may safely multiply his
admitted killed in the cfficial lists by six to get
his tobl casualties-there is no doubt tbat this
multiple of six is too low, for the names of his
kiIIed often come in in very belated fashion. And
on the Eastern front the great mass of his work
lms been done in the open field. Well, to appre-
ciate losses from this cause alone--wounded and
missing, excluding sidi:-we have only to discover
tbe Prussian lists of killed (wbich are puhlished),
to add rather less than one-fifth for tbe non-
Prussian lists of the German Empire (which are
also published, though less easily obtainable), to
add eighty per cent. more to this total for the

June 19, lÐ15,

Austro-Hungarian contingents (for that is about
the proportion these Allies furnisb to tbe Ger-
manic Pow-ers as a wbole), multiply the re.3ult by
six, and we sball get tbe enemy casua.lties, exclud-
ing sick, upon the basis of tbe Britisb casualties,
which are the most accurate, detailed, and up to
date of any giwn in this great campaign.
I repeat, v. ithout fear of being belied by
actual statistics when these shall be funy avail-
able, that such a multiple of six is, for the enemy,
insufficient. The Austro-Hungarians have lost
cTlOrmously more in prisoners in proportion than
have the British; the German lists are belated,
and the lists of killed refer mainly on their side
to those immediately killed in action, &c., &c.
But take a multiple of six as a consenatiye esti-
mate, and excluding sick you have, before the big
and enormously expensive Galician adventure
was undertaken, about a miHion and a third in the
Prussian lists with ki11ed to total c
sualties one-
fifth under the true ratio. Call the Prussian lists
a million and a half up to the big Galician effort
and
'ou are net in any great error. And, say,
300,000, or a trifle less, for the rest of the German
Empire, and you are Ileal' 1,800,000. Add eighty
per cent. for the
\.ustro-Hungarians, and you get
about three millions and a quarter.
1\ow, that is excluding sick. It is cutting
do"\\n the ,ery high rate of Viounded in HIe open
manæuning of all the Eastern Vi'ar. It is exclud-
ing the mass of the great GaEcian cffort, which
cannot possibly a.ccount for less than half a million
men upon the em'my's side, counting the lighter
casualties and sick, and it is excluding the very
large proportion of Austro-Huugarian missinO'
through disaffection and capture in erery stag

of the campaign, and particularly in tbe earlier
part of it.
Condude that the pnemy as a whole has at
the present moment much nearer four million than
three million men permanently out of tbe field and
you are making what is called in commerce a COIl-
servative estimate.
The mood of those who desire to control
public opinion in this country at this moment-
for what object I know not-is adverse to the
milùest and most just conclusions upon what is
called" the optimistic side." I cannot help tbat,
Arithmetic is arithmetic, and a sound judgment
based upon real things is worth all the sensa-
tionalism in the world. The enemy's potential
manhood for actual fighting within the first year
has p1"Obably been diminished by nearly one-Ìmlf
from all cause3. But it bas quite certainly been
that I baye quoted.

A GENERAL SURVEY.

(Continued.)
I
AID last week tl1at after the German and and of his general failure, and each must be
Austrian motive in preparing and launch- numbered so that we may refer to each and show
ing this war the next point to be considered in what it was a just judgment or the reverse.
"as the tlleories of tbe coming war-i.e., the Those theories are as follows:
guesses as to its probable nature-with which the (1) Under the political conditions of tIle
enemy entered it, For on the rightness and French a blow struck at Paris would necessarily
:wrongness of these guesses depended the issue, have one of three effects, either of them fatal

'he enemy's theories with regard to modern upon the numerically inferior French forces.

ar III general and the coming campaign in par- Either (a) it would lure the French Army as a
hcular must be distinctly tabulated if we are to whole to the defence of Paris, and therefore bring
grasp both the measure of his particular success it up against the numerical superiority of the in-
*8

June 19, 1915.

LAXD

A
D 'YATER.

'\""arler; or (b) it "ùuld divide tr.e French forces
into an army attempting to hold the frontier and
Ïorces attempting to sa YC the ca pital ; or, "hat is
most likely of all, {c) a plan having been finally
decided upon by the :Frelleh General Staff and in-
,oh'ing the abandonment of Paris "ould, when
danger actual1y threatened, be overruled by poli-
tical considerations and "ould fall into chaos.
In either of these three contingencies the
French Army was doomed to destruction. In the
first it woufd be destroyed as an inferior force
pitted against a superior one. In tlle second", those
forces used for the defence of Paris would Le
separated from the rest of the army and earh
would be defeated in detail. (It was, in fact, this
situation upon 'which the Germans gambled and
lost just before the battle of the :Marne.) In the
third, they would simply be an easy prey, which
they had been in 1870, at the mercy of a resolute,
superior, and united enemy.
(2) The march on Paris is ob,-iously best
e.chieved through the Belgian plain from the
frontiers of Lm:emburg to those of Switzerland,
the French having a fortified frontier, a reduction
of which would check an invasion ,,, hose success
"as essential to the general scheme. :Ko obstacles
as formidable threatened an advance tbrough tbe
Belgian plain, r:Ul,ther, there was here the best
set of raihmy communications in especial, and
tbe whole advance was backed by tbe best railway
communications in Germany-to wit, those
through the industrial distrids and flat country
which forms the nortb of the German Empire.
Xow to this adyance through the Belgian
plain there existeJ as obstacles the fortrcsses of
Liége aTld Xamur, and possibly some resistance
from the armed forces of Belgium in tbe open
field. But, in the first place, the enemy did not
believe that the Belgian trained forces, such as
they were, "Would offer resistance. In the second
place, supposing Belgium to make some sort of
resistance, he was aware that no sufficient body of
trained troops, particularly gunners witb their
munitions, pxistcd for the defence of the Belgian
frontiers. In the tbird place l he believed be could
deal with those fronticrs after a fasbion, wbich
concerns the next point in this table.
(3) The third theory upon which the war was
waged by tbe cnerny was that modern permanent
fortifications would give way ,'ery rapidly-in
a matter of a .few bours or days-in the bom-
bardment from great mobile bo,,,it zer:::, sucb as
the Austrian service especially had designed
and produced. All that v.-as required was
a sufJicient concentration of such fire upon one
sector of the ring defending the fortress, the long
range of the large mobile howitzer-Austrian, re-
member, not Prussian in its conception and design
-rendering it almost invulnerable to the flat
trajectory of the guns of the fort.
(4) The fourth theory of the war upon v.hicb
the enemy relied was the po"Wer of modern
machinery, notably that of petrol tra
c using
good roads, It seemed to the enemy ObVIOUS that
your modern a(h-allf"e, bolding the enemy unit for
unit, would, with a superiority of numbers to
spare, al"Ways be able to come round in flank ".ith
a good road system and
Tith ample provision of
petrol vehicles v, ilb "Which to mo,'e troops.
(f?) Tbe fifth theory of the enemy was of a
negatIve tyre, and cnncerned botb rifle and field-
gun fire. :\Ve J:
LA n::,t e>.aggerate this theory,
g*

Jm
it is wortb study in its true and moderate
form. In sucb a fOl:m it may be put thus: The
superiority of a really quick-firing field-pieæ, such
as the French seyenty-fiyc; the superiority of good
fire discipline in your infantry and accurately
aimed sbots from tbe same is an a
set of the de-
fel}-siye rather than offcnsiye type. Other tbings
hemg equal, of course, the more ra
)Íd your de-
li:ery ?f sbrapnel against the enemy manæmTillg
"ltb lIberty, and the more accurate your Úfie fire
against him the better for you, BOut these will
not be the deciding factors if, in reliance upon
them, one sacrifices that conception of attack
"bich is the soul of the Prussian system, and
wbich is at bottom tbe idea of a swal
m. Better
a "orse field-gun, "ith slower rate of firing and
a less accurate selTice; better infantry imperfect
in their training as riflemen, but withal men
trained to !':tand wry heavy losses ill dose forma-
tion, than the yery best field artillery in the world
and the mo:::t pel:fect fire disciplinè in the hands
of men" ho are compelled to deploy thinly and
who fear the heavy losses of massed attack.
(6) Get your men to stand wry heavy tem-
porary losses while they attack in s"WarlllS, and
those losse.s will be met amply, for they will be
a good in\estment. Because, though the trial will
ÍJe ver
severe while it lasts, it will be brief, and
such a form of attack will be decisive.
(1) Finally, eveD against troops in the open
and for general purposes of \\""ar, as, for instance,
against trencbes, let alone against more or less
permanent "ork and the more elabomte field for-
tifications, see that you have an ample supply of
high explosive shell. It will do more against
troops in the open than the French theorists have
allowed, and it is a sort of reserye power for an
sort.s of unexpected conditions that ma.y arise,
(8) On the defensive a weB-bandIed and large
supply of machine guns will be your best stq.nd-
by. Those were the main tbeories upon which the
enemy relied as be went into action ,,'ith, I repeat,
the moral certitude of immediate and decisive
victory.
As we shall see, he was right in some of these
theories, wrong in others, and those in which be
was wrong were precisely those v,hÜ:h caused
his failure, but those in which he was right
brought gra ye embarrassment to tbe Allies,
strengthened his own power of resistance, and pro-
longed the war in the fashion \\e all know. 'Yhere
he was right and where wrong we win next dis-
cuss. After that we will proceed to the new and
unðpected developments of the campaiO"n after
the enemy had failed in his first stroke,O notably;
to the development of trencb warfare or siege
work, and to the corresponding nOYeI necessity of
heavy al,tillery supply, three, fiw, tcn times as
great within a given time as any prc' ious student
of war bad allowed for.

H. BEILOC.
(To be continued.)

MR. EELLOC'S I ECTURES O
TIlE WAR.
!-Ir. n;laire llelloc will give a series of three lectures on the War
a.t Queen's H"ll on Tuesùay, June 22; TUf:
day, July 13; and Tuesday,
July 27. Scats may now be booked at 1'eduC<.d prices for the series.
:Ur. llolloc vdl lecture at the Tov.n HøIl, Hove, at 8 o'dvck OD
MonJ:1Y, June 21.
At 3.30, the "-;nte1' Garden.!',
, 1mf';)lOl' -h, Men bv June 28.
At 8 o'clock, tbe
pe(
b H.Jl!, ,y
, ";.' c .\l,J; y, lÌ:
h Wy,'o:nbe.
on "
,Ir'Lorlay, July 7.

D -AND WATER.

THE

WAR

June Hì, 1915.

BY

,V A TER.

By A. H. POLLEN.

i'lOTE.-Tbis :uti.!c h:u been s.!bmitted to tbe Press Bureau, whkh does not object to the pllbl!catioD as censored, and t;:kes n,
responsibility for the corredaess 01 the statemcliU,

We have now some further information as to
what took place north or Libau and between Goth-
land and the Gulf of Riga, on June 3, 4, and 6.
The first stories that reacheù us led one to hope
that quite serious Jamage might have been clone
to certain units of the German battle fleet. TIut,
while it is not siJecifically contradicted that no
ba.ttleship was but, it Seê'lliS more probable that
the only casualties suffered by the respeeti ve sides
v.-ere the loss of the former mine-layer renesci by
the Russians, and the loss of the transport Jl in-
den burg and a destroyer by the Germans, and the
wounding of one other Gerrr..an destroyer a:3ù a
cruiser. The German occupation of Libau creates
a som{'wllat an8malous position, and seems to have
led the temporary holders of what is neither a.
naval port nor an arse.."lal into certain adn'ntures
which have not turn
d out wry successfully. On
J"une 3 and 4 a squadron of ten battlc
hips were
sent to operate in the neighbourhood of the Gulf
of Riga. This squadron was aeoompanied by
destroyers, cruise
s, and other auxiliaries. But
the approaches to the GuU were protected by
Russian submarines, who, on meeting this
Armada, fired several torpedoes at the ships and
dropped mines over the courses it was assuIPed
they were going to take. The suLrnarines had to
dive before they were able to verify the effects of
their torpedoes. But explosions were heard, and
it is believed some battleships were struck. On
the following day a second encounter between sub- Since writing last week ,Monfalcone has been
marines and German vf'ssels took plac.e due north occupied by the Itali:llls, so that the destroyer
of Libau, between the Island of Gothland and the bombardment mav bc assumed to have given efiec-
small coast town of 'Yindau. In this encounter tive hdp in tJ1is
peratio
, The only
ther n
w

one German destrover and transr>ort were sunk, Ü: of the ItalIan mtcrventlOn at San GlOvanm dl
a small cruiser añd another d,-.-;troyer hit and Uedua, undertaken to make the Albanians release
damaged. The damaged cruiser was towed baé: a coavoy of }'IonteneO'rin corn ships. Vigorous
to Libau. Two days later, on the 6th, a German shelling appears to ha
e brought the Albanians to
reconnaissanc{>, support.ed by rc units of great their senses, and the ships were released. The
power," found submarines in its ccurse and with- operation is inter
sting to us for the re,as
m that
drew, but not before the Yenl'sl'i had been tor- a cruiser of the Lnerpool class was assIstmg the
pedord. So muc'h for the news. Italians, and from the fact that an Austrian sub-
It is difficult to give any connected ex:plan'l- marine appeared to interfere with the operations.
10.

S IXCE H3.ly became a belligerent, and en-
" tirely altered the prospective rôle of the
Austrian fleet by threatening the territory
in ,,,hich its ports are situated with inva-
sion, t.here has been no other change of any
moment in the nanll situation. If the United
ßtates becomes a belligerent, there will be an im-
portant change, because the strength of the Allies
in the North 8ea will have reached a point as will
relieve the English military command of aU
anxiety as to raids or invasions. And President
,'\ïlso
's Kote seems to make the belligerency of
the United States far more likeh- - a Question
that I will discuss at greater leñgth b{'low. In
the meantime, tk're has been a certain amount of
activity in the Baltic, in the Adriatic and in the
Black Sea, but none of the actions haye been of
first-class importance.

THE GERMAN THREAT TO JUGA.

tion of what these different manæuYres may sig-
nify, If the German battleship squadron con-
sisted only of pre-Dreadnoughts, it W"o
lld hardly,
have ventured to enter the Gulf of RIga, "\" here
the more powerful Russian fleet could apparently
have trapped it. And one does not quite undei

st.and why the Germans would risk their :r:ain
Dreadnought fleet in waters that are mined and
frequented by submarines, unless the military
object were of extreme importance. But the
occupation of Libau and its rumoured conversion
into a submarine base does seem to show that the
German invasion of Courland was intended to be
something more than a demonstration. It is pos-
sible, therefore, tb.at Germany may be contem-
plating combined operations with a view to turn-
ing the Russian right. It is characteristic of the
extreme secrecy with which all naval operations,
if they are to be effective, should be conducted,
that neither side gives more than the slenderest
scraps of information about these exceedingly im-
portant events.

THE BLACK SEA.

The Russians ha"fe raised the Turkish cruiser
!.ledjidiell, which they sank just over two months
ago, and have taken her into Odessa. The 111 cd j i-
dieh is a ten-year-old American-built cruiser,
armed like our (;lasgO'll' class, but with a speed of
onl? 22 knots. It is ql1ite possible that within a
very few months she will turn out to be a yalnable
acquisition. In the meaptime, the fastest of the
cruisers on the Turkish side, the B,'eslrw, fell in
with two Russian destroyers on the night of the
11th, and was vigorously engaged. One officer and
six men were wounded in OTle of the destrovers,
and the Bl'eslau was hit several times. A succes-
8ion of explosions was observed on board, and the
bows were in flames before the action was broken
off. The general campaign against the smaller
Turkish ports, which has been carried on ever
since Russia got command of these waters by
putting the Goeben out of action, with a view to
cutting off Constantinople from aU sea supplies,
continues vigorously. Samsun, Zunguldach, and
Kosla ha.ve bpcn in succession bomba rded and the
shipping sunk.

THE ADRIATIC.

3"une 19, 1915.

LAND

AND WATER.

The cruiser appears to have been struck by a tor-
pedo in the ensuing encounter, but does not seem
to bave been seriously damaged, as sbe was able
to make the journey across the Adriatic at seyen-
teen knots, and is reported by the Italians to be
safely in harbour.

THE DARDANELLES.

From tbe Dardanelles there is no official
nayal news at all, nor for that matter any mili-
tary news, except what is to be found in the
l'rench official reports. Tbey are silent as t{) the
eo-operation of the Fleet. An Athens rum our
btatcs that an enemy submarine bas been sunk.
But a remarkåble reference to the Dardan-
elles operations has been made in Parliament.
Speaking last Saturday week at Dundee, Mr.
Churchill. it "Will be remembered, spoke of Sir Ian
Hamilton's army as being separated only by a few
miles from" such a yict{)ry as has not been seen in
this war." Mr. Runciman: spe
king five days later
in the House of Commons, said he trusted that

, the reopening of the Dardanelles would lead to a
rush of supplies into this country." Taking the
hm statements together, there seems to be a very
optimistic feeling in official eireles as to the course
which operations are taking.

GER
JA
Y AND THE U.S.

President 'Vilson's final .:\ote brings war
hetween America and Germany nearer, just
because it is final. The wording of the Sate dis-
appointed many who gathered from 1\11'. Bryan's
resignation that it must contain some yery per-
Clìlptory sort of threat. Indeed. since the text
was published the resignation has been repre-
sented as inexplic.able, for the
ote contains
nothing that was not in tbe preyious conmmnica-
tion. But there is really no mysterv in the matter.

lr. Bryan has been "nourished "on words and
phrases-=--the "flapdoodle" of the immortal
O'Brien. In the mouth of the mob orator it is not
the mcaning of words, but thcir comforting sound
that makes merit. But in tbe mouth of a states-
man speaking for a great country words mean
action. This is the uhpleasant truth tbat )Ir,
Bryan has discovered. So long as the subm::>.rine
calilpaiO'n could be kept in the region of t81k, the
late Secfretary of State was in his element. It was
only when he discoyered that ::VII'. "-ilson meant
\ybat he said that he resigned. Berlin may be par-
doncd for not taking America seriously, ",.-hen
America's own spokesman was so little serious
himself, Berlin is probably as astonished as )11'.
Bryan at finding that the comedy is oyer. It is not
surprising that Herr Dcrnburg should be on his
"av to Berlin-under a British safe conduct-
or that the Chancellor is delaying his reply until
that
ctiYe soul has arriyed safely. The decision
to be taken is a moment{)U3 one. The answer must
be explicit-as explicit as the Xote itself. Ger-
manv- must surrender or face a ne,...- belligerent.
'The elements that will decide her one way or
tbe otber are familiar. Desperate as Germany's
military position appears to be, tbe hopelessness of
her case at sea is beyond sneculiltion. To add
another combatant ",here the.J.strength again<;t her
is already oyerwhelming might appear t{) le
Ye
the main issue entirely unafiected. She could not
be worse of[ if all the ,,-ar1<1 joined in against her.
[Ihe submarine campaign is undoubtedly of a cer-
U.

tain yalue. It is rausing us a continuous and 8.
6erious loss. In shipping alone" e are losing a
million pounds a month. Tbe cargoes may easily
be "Worth at least as much as the ships. It is true
that if we look at the yast total of the cost of the
war, twenty-four million pounds a ye:.11' is a tiny
percentaO'e
Yieweù as a reduction of our ship-
ping, ou
losses are but 75 per cent. of our normal
annual output of new tonnage. It is not a serious
percentage of our sea-borne trade that is sunk, so
that ,,'hether we regard the thing as a tax 011 our
financial resources, as a diminution of Ollr trade,
or as an effort to reducc our shipping, tbe
blockade, as a war measure, is really h
rmless
enough. Still, it is a financial loss ; it docs reduce
our sbipping; it docs rob us of many yaluable
freight,s; it has, therefore, a cCltain war yalue. If
Ameriæn belligerency cannot gre
t1r affect the
results of tbe land fighting in Europe, and if, as
one supposes, the German General Staff must IlOW
realise, nothing, in any eyent., is to be hoped from
fighting at sea, then the German answer may be
an emphatic negatiyc. let the consequence be what
it may. Other c.onsiderations will help to her
deciding in this direction.
It is to be remembered that Germ:'ìnv is extra-
ordinarily addicted to basing her policy' on specu-
lations which are generally recondite and inw,ri-
nbly wrong. There is in the "Gnited States a
large and extremely powerful section of the in-
habitants that i
German-born or of German bIooLI
in the first gc!}eration. This section contains
many house'3 antI firms, both Gentile anù Jew, of
great wealtb, and a considerable proportion of
them haye maintained the closest kind of rela-
tions, not only wit h the Berlin financiers. but" ith
the Court. For the last ten months they ha,e been
actiye propao>andists of the Gernuln ease in
_-\lllerica. 1I{' the ea--tern States it is not their
numbers, but their wealth anJ influence, that is
l'emarkable. But in the middle west their
numbers are Yel'\" considerable-some cities and
country districts' being as German as almost any
part of Germany. So long as America was
Ileutml, tbey h3xe been able to do a great deal,
both indirectly and dire
t1y, to help the country
of their origin. It is possible that Berlin has been
le<l into supposing, first. that the number of pro-
Germans in the L nitcd States is yery much larger
than it is-pcrlw ps eyen into belieying that all
persons of German descent are pro-Germans,
Secondly, they may suppo::;e that those who haye
been pro-Germans up to now will r('main p1'O-
German-and so actiye]y opposed to the national
Government-if war is declared between the t\\O
countries. Both of these \ iews I belieye to be as
profoundly erroneous as the suppositions that
Ireland would rebel, that India would nlUtim-,
that the South African Dutch ".ouItI ri
e as one
Boer, and that AU5traiia and C'au8.da would
throw off the alleuianæ to the
Iother Country
rather than face the inconn
niences of being in ã
,...ar not of their own n1aking. On the other banJ,
Herr Dernburg has left for Germany, and it is
possible that be is charged "ith the mission of
cooling tbe undeceiyed but swollen heads of
German statecraft. If, then, the Germans were
inclined to risk a quarrel in the hope of internal
schisms in America di5arming Americans, H f'rr
Dernburg might sa, e her from so gross a blundrr,
and bring her to a compliance with the American
demand.
One political consideration, and that Ileither

LAND

relOndltc nor wrong, should certaillly make the
GerrÐan lea.<ltc'rs pause before looklllg on the
brea.th with .America as inevitable. it i3 that
sooner or later shc will 1m ye to trea L or sue for
peace. It ,\ iìl be an ill day for her if she Ims no
onc in the world to act as go-betv,een.
On the other lland, an acceptance of :Mr.
\Vilson's claim goes much further than an admis.
sion of an American right and a willingness to
pay the .financial penalty for an invasion of it.
The is
ne rais
d by America is quite properly
raised out of the injuries inflicted on American
ships and American passengers. But it. is not 11
demand for compem,ation, nor merely a demand
that
\.n
el'iean ships and American passengers
shall not l;e injured in the future. From the
nature of thc case, America bas to ask for more.
She has to ask that this whole method of making
war bv submarines on e,oll-bellÜ:erent traffic shall
cea
t'." Jt is onlv so tbat Americans can safely
exerc-j

their right to trawl in the trading ship"s
of bellig
r
nts. And she asks for it on the ground,
not th,
,t such warfare is incompatible with inter-
national law-although it admittedly is---=-but
because it is incompatible witb the Ten Com-
mandments. If Cermany, then, s;}rrenders she
woulJ admit a great deal mOf{' than that she
had proclaimed. herself false to the honour sàe
had pledged in treaties and international com-en-
tions. She \Hmld. be proclaiming tha.t she had
becn false to the most elementary of all social
laws, " Thou shalt commit no murdcr:' Can Ger-
mnny make snell an admission now
As it. seems
almo
t impossible, it is a reasonable thing to con-
template the appearance of the r nitrd. States ns
a belligerent as inevitable, and to inquire into the
nature and character of the forcê,:; ,..hich
hc can
con lribüte to helD the Al1 ies.
J.

THE U.S. NAVY.
.What is the fighting value of the American
ì\a\-'}"
Its only experience of modern war was
against the Spaniards in the war for Cuba in
1898. It was, of course, completely successful.
But, take it for all in all, it was something of a
humiliating success. All tbe glory of Santiago
was quenched in an ignoble quarrel between the
admirals. The fleet's gunnery T'.as appallingly
inefficient. The ratio of hits to rounds fired was
derisive. But it is doubtful if any other navy,
had it been tested at that date, would have come
out of the ordeal any better. The gunners
of our own Kavy were not put to the proof
till the 4.7's "\íere sent to defend Ladvsmith.
So that they were not tested at sea
The
truth of the "matter is that the great revival of
national interest in our Navy, which we owe to
Mr. Stead's agitation in the middle 'eighties, was
alwi\Y':; limited to material, and never occupied
itself with m{'thods. Mr. 'YhitT1ey's navy, which
fought the Spanish-American 'Val', wàs really
just as much a produc. of the Stead campaign as
t
lC ships of our Spencer programme or of the
.\aval DeÎence Act. But :Mr. 'Vhitney not onlv
huilt ships, but discovered Captain Mahan, and
by that discovel'Y produced an influence which
afïC':,tcd thc futurc of navies far n:ore than any
k 30.!? that T could be .culled from the Spanish-
AmerIcan "ar. Bul It was not an illi1J.uence on
technÍf}ue. There was an efiective demand
for more ammunition and better facilities
for pr:1ctice. Eut it was left for Sir Percv
"

AND

\V ATE R.

J
..l:J 1
, 1915.

Scott to realise that neither lavish ammunition.
endless opportunity, nor boundless energy were
sufficient unless right met/wds were der
loped.
As all tbe world knows, it was on the China.
station and after the Boer ;War that Sir Percy
Scott, still in command of the Pou.erful, worked
out with his torpedo-lieutenant-the late Captaia
Frederick Ogilvy-the mechanical devires for
tramin
men to keep tbeir guns steadily laid
while the ship W3.S rolling. Lieutenant Sims, of
tbe American Kavy, was on this station at tbe
same time. A friendship arose between the t\\,o
men, and a common iuterest in the gunnery
problem led ,to many an exchange of opinion. At
any rate, it was not long before the pro')-ress of
gun-IayiT1g skill in the United States K:fvy was
quite as marked as in our O"\yn. "{hen we t{)ok
up long-range battle practice, in the fùUl,th and
flfth years of this century, it fell to Lieutenant
Bims to introduce similar methods in America.
Tbe two navies, therefore, have proceeded lJari
passll, botb in gun-laying and fire control, aT1d
('
"C('pt that tbe "Cnited SLateö ha,\"c not aùopted
any form of director, I shoulù imagine that in
gunnery there is very little to choose between
them.
Al\IElnCA
OFFICERS.
The Nayal College at Annapolis, through
which almost all the oilÌcers enter the rnited
States Kavy, is recruited by a system of Congres-
sional nomination. Each member of the Lower
House appoints in turn to the vacancies that
arise. Certain edllcational qualifications are
required, but the elementary teaching in America
is at once so thorough and so accessible to all, that.
this rule hardly imposes a.ny restriction at alL
The majority of COllgressmen exercise their rights
very conscientiously, and. nominate their candi-
dates after an informal. but very effective,
examination. The lads so chosen corne from eyery
class of the population, and ent.er b.:-tween the
ages of eight.een anù nineteen, and remain four
)ears at the college. The education is very
thorough in all the technical subjects, and every
encouragement is giycn to tbe study of literature
and history. Tbe type of young mãn produced is
of a bigh order, accompli'shed in mechanical and
scientific attainments, and, by the wise social
organisatioll of tbe college, tràined to a level of
good breedin f O' that astonishes those ,,
ho think
the graces 0 life are a peculiarity of certain
social classes. It is not an nncommon thing, for
ill3tance, t{) find that the midshipman who, quite
naturall)T, takes the lead in young society, is the
son of some thrifty mechanic, of ycry humble
station indeed. The truth of the matter is that
the professional impress is f
u stronger than the
family impress. In tbe early days there is much
to be gained by being first on the register. A keen
competition is set up, "hich loses nothing of its
zest from the fact that the private origins of the
contestants ::'.re so dissimilar.
The weakness of the American Navy ic; that
once a lad is entered a midshipman, alÌ further
promotion is by seniority only. In our own Navy
there is accelerated promotion from midsbipman
to lieutenant for those who pass brilliant
examinations. Bdt from the Lieutenant-com-
mander's lists to Commander, and from Com-
mander to Captain, promotion i3 by s
lection only.
Aftt>r that, s<,nioT'ity be('QT}1CS the rule.
In America the-i'c are no facilities for

12*

J Ilnc 19, 19!b.

LAND

AND

rromoting promising officers young. AU have to
h'tire at the age of sixty-two. The admirals' and
capt:lins' lists are s;}}all. There are few unem-
ployed, but no one reaches the c.aptains' list till
late, and no one stays in it long, :Men may still be
('(.mmar.defs at aT} ãge when many British officers
are rear admirals, lieutenant-commanders at the
age of our senior captains, and there are many
lieutenants older than our junior captains. The
system is a tholOughly had one, because it means
that the senior oftÌcers haye exceedingly little ex-
perience of command. A man may become
capt.ain, get Lis flag, and retire in a third of the
period durinJ ",hich an English officer stays on
the c8ntains' li
t. It also means that the senior

comma:lders and lieutenant-commanders have tD
be a 10nO' time unem
)loYed before aettine- com-
o 1. ., "" '""
mand:; a.s captains.
It is possibly another defect in the American
f!Y8tem that there is les3 specialisation. Every
c.apibl 5hip in the British Kav)" carries specialist
ofticei's for gunnery, torpedoes, and navigation.
These ofiìcers have been sent., as young lieutenants,
to the nayigatioD, gunnery, or torpedo establish-
ments îor courses of one or two years, and "hen
qualified, serve the remainder of their time before
becoming c-ommanders, in charge of the activities
of their d
l'3.rtmcn
s. This systcm results in the
production of a numerous class of C'xperts, "ith
the highest qualification in their particular line.
From thes
specialists are chosen the experts who
man the trainiTlg establishments, ordnance depart-
ments, &C'., and their existenc.e guamntees a high
standard of scien
jfic mastery of these subjects-
an a <:set which wou!..l be invaluable to any Board of
Admiralt.v that chose to em hark upon the inno\a-
tion of letting expert opinion gOYern its policy in
expert matters. In the American Xayy all offic.ers
receive more or let;s the same training. "-hen a
ship is commissioned, tne duties of looking after
special branches are 2.ssigned to particular officers,
who master the problems of their task as best they
can. It is probable th!!t the general resourceful-
ness is ratber increased by this system. but it also
follows that the kig.11,est erper[ ise is l<1cking.
Finalh'. tDE' officers, as a 'whole, get fill' less sea.
e.\ periènce than do our 0\"01.

WATER.

THE ENLISTED
lEN.
On the other hand, no nayal officers in the
world exceed America.ns in general keenness, in
the thoroughness of their mastery in the scientific
side of their profession. The American officer has
one constant task before him, which is a liberal
education both in the understanding and the
manaO'ement of men, The personnel-blue-
jackets, stokers, &c.-is enlisted for short
terms. It is seldom that a newly-commis-
sioned ship puts to sea with more than a
very small proportion of ratings who know
much about their business. There is, of eourse,
an established list of ",arrant offic.ers. But
for the most part the commissioning of the ship
means a long and arduous task of converting
landsmen into seamen, and not only landsmen,
but men who have not the elementary conc.eptions
either of wbat the sea is like or of what discipline
meailS. But, in spite of these difficulties, eÀpcri-
f'need American offic.ers who know the inner work-
ing, both of the British and of other navies, will
tell you that aÎter eight or nine months' training
an Àmerican crew, though extraordinariJy hetero-
geneous in its origin, shakes down into a \Cry
e-!lìcient ship's compa.ny. For one thing, everyone
who is there is a volunteer. He is bound for that
commission only. He has joined for the sake of
seeing something of the world, to try a new life,
to Imve a taste of ad\-enture. The pay is good,
the food excellent, and the discipline, though efiec-
ti\.e, is not burdensome. Three things contribute
to make this system succeed. The first is the
thorough understanding of th8 American ofl"1cer
of the American enlisted man, The nexf is ],
certain keenness to master technical problems,
which is a national characteristic. La
t1v,
public opinion demands that anyone v.1Ìo
undertakes a job shall, in the slang of the day,
"make good." The enlisted man is turned
into a good sailor becau:3c he is at least as
anxious to become one as the officer is anxious to
make him so.
The weakest feature of the U.S. Xa,y is
the supreme command anfl the organisation
for ,,""ar-subjects I propose to discuss at a later
date.

A G L I
'1 P S E 0 F 'V A R .
TI-IE GROUSER.
By \V. L. GEORGE.

T HE st':geant, "':11.0 was impeding th: trench .
ith t() shore up t.he roof with a slanting prop. As he woried h43
an all' of smplClOn, st.opped by the
lde of Pr1\ at.? talked:
Langl
y. His duhious thumb and finger felt for " Just like 'im, n05in' about seén' if 'e can't find soml
, tbe edge of the ccttage door ",l1i..h, covered dawage. Call tLis wldjering1 It's more like jai1, tbr..t'.
with turf, formed the roof of ihe t.renc-h. It gave what .it is, except that in jail you do get a bit 0' quiet now
a little to his hanJ, IDe.J,acingly BO : and then, and you know when you're coroin' out 0' jug,
"That.!! shaky," he Baid, "get a cour
e of props and which you don't 'ere," The prop, which was wet, slipped
through his hands. He puBed it up again; "'What am I
.hore it up." d " 1 1 I ' k
om 'ere That's w lat want t -now. ""hat's the good
Private J,anO'ley scowled and the 8erge
"t, who knew oi it 1 I arsk you-what's the good of it t ..
Lis ways, emil<!d
.. It.n be down on your head in half a II I don't lenow," eaid Private Bradden.
tick if you don't," .. Didn't ex pee' you would," said Private Langley.
Private Bradden, who stooclnext to J.an
h'y, was tickled, II Then
hat d'you arsk me fod" said Private EraddcD
.. Shan I fetch tht'II pmps for :rou t " he asled. .. Kice nastilv.
liltJe job, ain't it V" . J To exp()
e your gen'ral ig'lorance," said Pri\'ate
Private Lan....lay.s f&ce BSI!umecl an air in which was too Langley, with increa<:ing gloom.
much gloom fore anger (.0 creep in. EpeaJ..;ng to himself The prop slipped again, and the roof irritably sub-
rat.hr'r than to HradJen, b b",&an in the nncertain twilight 5iùed on tbe t.("p of h;
head; he put it back patiently. II.
13"

L .\
\ 1J

_\ 1.'\11

drove into th
"A"aU of tll" trc:Jch a li.ll.
loarel into which
he cut a nolch. Then with inlìIlile car
, having set the ua
e
of the prop in the notch, he once more <;hor<'d up the 1"O',f
which he still bCI'e upon the top cf hi" he
d like a despondent
Atlas, and, as he so did, remarked:
.; I didn't Oit t' be 'er
. I art t' be in Stourton, that's
where I ort ti' be, 'avin' a 'at bath,"
" That's what we aJI say about yon," remarked a distant
voice. Private Langley could find nothi.ng to reply to tl1i3
immlt and went on steadily mut.lering under hi3 breath,
When at last the roof wa3 fixed and P1"Ïvate LanglE'y,
who had no illmions left, wai.ted for it to subside again under
shrapnel, a rnmour r<!ached him,
., D'you know what Sergeant says?" Braddell remarked,
"He says we're going to cut the wire,entanglemeuts to-night.
You know. crawl out on the q,t, wbile they'r
not looking.
They're going to call for volunteE'1'3 to do the job,"
"011, al'e they?" said Private Langl
y with delibera-
tion, "'VeIl, I know one man Voho won't go," (Life to him
was so grave that he never swore.) "\Vhat do they take
rue fod I ain't a plumber, 'tain't my job; wire-cutting'3
obsole"ete, "
., Goed word, obclcesete," said lhe ironic and anonymous
voice further down,
" 'Wire didn't ort t' be cut," Private Langley went on,
" it ort t' be brort down with explosive shell.
\n' if there
ain't no shell, it's an engineer's Job, that's what it is, and
any'ow it ain't my job, and I ain't goin'; too scratchy fer
me, an' they say the groun's fuìl of titanic germs,"
An officer walked along the trench, The men watched
him excitedly, He wa3 a populal' li,mteu:mt, ralher bluff,
very familial', and as he had been wounded four times wa3
obviously destined to be hanged,
"Well, boys, we're going to have a litHe picnic in t.he
barbed wire, There's room for ten, don't all talk at once!
You, Bradden
one, And Jones 1 two. And-yes, thr<!e,
four. Good! Ðe1my, too"! That'" five, six, zevcn, \\That 1
Is that all 1 You t.oo 1 " ha said to the, olco further down.
.. Eight and, I c2n't see your face, that's nine,"
There was a pause.
.. Put me down, sir," saiJ Langley darkly,
H;e was crawling in the absolute blackness of a mooD-
less night, slowly, so that not even a little stone should
rumble under him, He panted forward, face lIpon tlle
ground, painfully dragging himself along with hooked
nngers and gripping toes. He was faintly aware of Bradden
upon hi" left, of other men almost noiseless near by. It
seemed a very long way to the entanglement, and, a3 he
went quiet as some velvel;y weasel, he thought:
.. Can't even talk. I:1tick a man in the mud on his
stomach and don't even give 'im a chance to express 'is feel-
ings. Call that a. liie 1" He removed a large stone which
suddcnly chucked him under the chin. .. It's a dirty
country; where it ain't too soft, it's too 'ard," He rubbed
the place on his chin and crawled on,
It seemed endless, for they went so slowly. and it wa

so difficult to keep a straight line; sometimes he drew too
il
ar to llradden and then thought:
., Look at 'im, can't e..-en crorl st.raight; it ain't a man,
it's a crab," Theu a wire-cutter, which was slung across hÜ
shouldel"3, stuck oue of it3 handles in his ear, TIe shifted
the ear: .. Great, lumping thing," he thought. .. I'd do it
with my pocket-knife, I would, if it weren't against regu-
latioll3," _\.nd the!l, as he crawled on, he was filled with
venom at the thought of the King's regulations.
It was very silent out there by the cnlanglement
, He
could just see them, their posts blacker than the night,
and the strand
of barhed wire, with the spirals loose in the
middl
, shining a little in the dark, Like ghosts r0U11d him,
the other men, flat upon the ground as he, unobserved
r.::.de the tiniest little clicks as they snipped wire after wire.
J." l te Germans did not know; there was no firing, except thaI;
l
(W and then came a bullet sent on the chance from the
German trench towards the anywhere. Stolidly, one by one
he cut the wires. The manual work sooth
d him, and he
cc.uld not think whi!
he had the pleasure of feeling th9
metal grow soft and part in the wire-cuttÆr. The enemy
seemed un3uspicious, yet t!ley fired a little more often; a
vullet buried itself bdliud him. He nearly exclaimed, for

nother uullet had grazed his left hand; he feIt the sting on
It. It, was nothing. of COUl'"e, for i!' had not even taken off
the .skin, Bu!' as l'1'Ìvate Langley methodically went on
cuttlllg he thought:
"Them Germam! Them blighten! Firing at you on
the chanc'e without knowing- if yer there ain't playin' the
f
me,
Vhen. I ,want to 'it a man I pick 'im out. They
51"
me t,le [,111'
ll'k, th
y do," And a
he went 011 cutting,

A T E l
.

June 19, 1915,

he elaborat
d in hi
mi:Jd increasiu"lv horrihle hrtures to
which he woult! subject the Kai"cI' whe-l1 he caught him.
Suddenly Private Langley dropped his wire-cutter, and,
halï-blind, fumbled for it in th2 loose soil. He wa3 stru"-
gling: it wa:! horrible, for he could hardly open his eye!!.
o
blinded. was he v:ith light. ,He turned hi3 head away, only
to see Ins hand vlOlentIy wlnte under the searchlight, Head
down to keep his eyes away from the blui"h ray, he fumble.l
for his wire'cutt
r, strugaling. exposed, as if knocked down
by this violent light, haltdazed, like a moth aaainst an elec-
,- .,
tnc bulb. Every now and then he glimpsed t.he men near
bim; they, too, violently lit up as they hugged the soil. Hs
SD"': them as he had never seen them before, every detail of
their faces-wrinkle:., new expres5iol13-in this light so much
n,ore brutal than the sun's, He was all inst.inct as he struggled

<?, and he did 110t think of the bullets which were now pock-
lIlg the ground all about. him with a soft, wet sound, He
was I=ght-mad m,d conscious only of one dpsire-to find a
darkness wl.ich e.....en his lowel'ed eyelids could not give hi'll,
'lhe bluish light seemed to pierce right through to his brain.
He h()ud cries through the firing, for there wa.s no rea;;on for
silence now. A bur<t of shrapn
l a litHe way off, and thf'1l
above t.he din the whistling that recalled his parly, With
a
imal suppleness he turned, trying to sink himself into the
solI as he crawled. He could see the British trench a3 the
searchlight touched it, like a long hutch with a black pole.
Then he he3.rd hi3 name called. lie sLopp
d.
.. What's up? " he shou1Æd.
. .. Hit in the l
g! Give us a lift," It was BradJen's
VOice,
Langley said: .. 'It in the leg, are you 1 SCI've YOLl
right! '''hat d'you wùnt to wave ycr leg abou!' for? ..
.. Oh, hold yer jaw! " Bradden roared.
"That's what I'll do," said Lanalev, with are1.t
dignity. .. Some fe!Jers are arskin' for it, \Vh&t did yo
lift
yer leg fod To scratcll yer 'ead! An' 'ew am i t' git
t,here1 "There are you
Not. that. I'm com in'; it aill't. my
job. Net fer me to bring in tl1' wounded; I'll tell th

R.A.1I.C.-that's all I can do for you. I
ain't, fair; I
aill't no odd-jobs man,"
The eigh
men of the party who had regained t.he tren('h
watched the ent.anglement, Under the searchlight it shon6
like frosted silver, 'rIle officer slared into his periscope.
.. \Ve seem to have lost two, sir," said the sergeant.
They were all very watchful in t.he trench. They could
now see in the middle of the entanglement a molionles,i
figure, black ill the blue rays, That was one of them. Then
a littIa quiver of excitement went along the line, for they
8aw a movement in the wires as if something at the edge of
the enÍ?nglement were struggling wi[,h them, pushing them
away, something that, crawling over the sharp spikes, wCI'ked
its way along the ground towards the wounded man, They
gasped; it was impossible. But, no; it was true, Thera
grovelled a man unhurt: he looked like a black snake worm-
ing its way under the full glare of the blue light, through
steady firing that som!'how spared him. They could see the
bullets now and then st.rike the post
which had carried the
entanglement. sometimes a few inches from the man's head.
And sti!J he went on, somehow ull3cathed, bu!' ltllcertail1
as if blinded by the light that was heavy as metal. They
6aw him as if in full sunlight seize the wounded man'>!
shoulders and draw him along the ground through the cu:;
wires, and on, and still on, under t.he searchlight that fol-
lowed him like a malignant eye, and yet still on through th

storm of bullets that struck to t.he righl; and left, an,}
magically spared him and his charge.
They nearly fell int-o the trench, rescuer and rescued;
their clothes torn to rags by the wires, their faces soiled with
earth and sweat.
.. 'VeU done, Langley!" ::raid the officer. .. That's
Bradden you brought in, isn't it 1 ..
.. Yes, sir," said Langley, and sat down exhaust.ed, But
he leaped up and remarked, as he felt his trousers, .. Of
course I picked the wettest place; they can't even drain their
trenches properly," He addressed the half company ill
general: .. What d'you think I'm up to' Taking the cold-
water cure, or what 1 Tell you what; this ain't fight.in'. n
ain't a man's job--ar
kiDg 'im to wallow about in the mud
like a bloomin' buffalo, Tell you what, I'm goin' to buy
my"elf out; that's what I'm goin' to do."
Two days later Private Langley was inform
_d tInt he
would be recommended for the V,C. Some week;; later,
after the investiture, he st.ood on the steps of the depot at
StoUl'Lon, a halfpenny picture paper in his hand. It relaled
briefly what it called the greatest deed of bravery of the wa.r;
also it printed his photograph. Private Langley gazed at
that phot-ograph with growing fury and deepening gloom, II"
was wondering whether he could sue the editor for lihel.
1-t*

J tine 19, HnS.

LAND

AND ',,- ATE R .

tvlR. BELLOC'S BOOK ON THE \V AR.

By, PROFESSOR SECCO
lBE.
(Profcssor 0/ l:lI[JlÙJ1l, l
.JfoC., SamlllUTSt.)

T ilE present war has at last elicited a tract of EngliEh
prose comparable in many re!'pects to some of the
books evoked by the great war of a hundred yenrs
ago. National and racial contrasts, military his-
tory, topography and road-fa ring-these are Mr.
DeUoc's subjects; he has not many subjects really, but within
the range of them he is versatile, his grip is sure, and his
vision su bUe and penetrating. How people do love the im-
possible! (Do not the proprietors of our weekly illustrated
papers thrive on t1IÏs fact 1) They love to think that this
unique war has produced a miraculous author. I
ong before
the w&r, after a strenuous apprenticeship, Mr. Belloc had
.hown himself one of the greatest masters of English idiom,
whether in prose or metre, that our country has ever pro-
duced. Like a well known comedian, whose son one has been
grieyed to notice among the long roll of the wounded, he may
well say, "I was quite as good, perhaps bett
r, for years
befcre they found me out."
Envy, hatred, and all uncharitableness in regard to Sir
Edward Grey, I more than suspect" precluded one section
from perceiving what it was !'pccially to their own and to
the general interest that they should perceive, namely-that
class interest was not going to transcend nationality; and,
øeccndly, that some form of senice insurance (the only re-
liable form) was becoming general everywhere. Instead of
noticing this they biuied their heads and sought to nourish
democratic jealou"y of the ari
tocratic talent for war. Some
of the politicians rea!:sed, but failcd to communicate, the
danger. They provoked the E:ai"er's risibility by 5ending
to Bedin 1.0 learn how to organise cur army" a lawyer, a
man who could not ride." 'Yhen he got back he had little
choice but 1.0 acquiesce in the sentiment that the Germans would
Ð3rdly be so ulireasonable as to anticipate the next election
and one or two aholutely indispensable domestic alterations.
To return to Mr, Belloe. In the first part of his book he
en....iEages the general or historical causes of tlle war in a
manner which will cOllimand almost univerml assent. He
il,terprets Germany's challenge couvincingly. The data are
not new. 'VeIl-informed people had t,hem at their fingers'
ends five YEan ago. Is it, the I'tmosphere of the i,;land that
makes us so myopic and retarò.s the action of our hiEtorians
aud }JuUicisis--cogent only afiLT the event
Now, here i'l
the German brief. .. Sad accidents, into which we need not
e<1ter here, retarded our growth to nationhood. France, a
nation healihier formerly than now, but 8till of much baser
etock than our o\\n, has played the leading part in ',estern
Europe up to 1815; then came England, a Teutonic country
really, over-capitalised lilæ Prance, "ilh her vast 0"\'"er5ea
Empire, pos
essing a far great.er hold o\"er the modern world
than her real strength warrants. Even the Slavs profited by
our disunion t() generate power Rnd endanger our Culture,
"hieh, it need hardly be said, is by far the highest Culture
of aU. Fiity yeaT9 since our Etatesmen achiend that un-
realised dream of centurics-German unity-defeating in the
most fundamental fashion the French whom the rest of
Europe then conceived to be the chief military power." It
"ill do less than justice to the author to continue the bri
f
in any but his own words:
"From tllat moment [1870] we have incontestably
!!tood in the sight of all as the strongeEt people in the world,
r.nd yet because other and lesser n&tions had the start of us,
our actual International position, our foreign posse8sions, the
I!ccurity that should be due to 50 supreme an achievement,
did not correspond to our real strength and abilities, England
had vast dependencies, and h:ld 8taked out the unoccupied
world as her colonies. :France, though decadent, was ß
menace to our peace upon the "\Yest, ',e could have achieved
the thorough conquest and dismemberment of France at any
time in the last forty years, and yet during the whole of that
time France was adding t.o her foreign possessions, while we
1\"'He obtaining nothing, The barba.rous RussÍ:1ns were increas-
ÏDg constantly in numbers, and somewhat perfecting their iu-
Fufficient military machine without any interference from us,
gra.e as was the menace from them upon our Eastern frontier.
.. It "as evident that such a sw.te of things could not
f'ndure. A nation so unit.ed and so ilT'mensely strong could
not rerr.ain in a pcsition of artificial inftriorit V 0 The whole
e<jlÚliLrium of l-:urope "'a'l umt1:.ble tbrough tLi
contra!;t he-
t.
eeD \',; at G
rmal''y mi
ht be and v.hat Fhe waF, end a

truggIe to n:ake her what she n::ight be from what
he v. a,
could not be a"\'"oided.
.. Germany must, in fulfilment of a duty to herself,
obtain colonial possesEions at the expense of France, obtain
both colonial possessions and sea-power at the expense of
England, and put an end by calIllJaigns, perhaps defens!\e,
but at any rate vigorous, to the menace of Slav barbari
m
upon the East."
To this luminous challenge Enbland responds:
.. Pnless we are all-powerful at sea our very existence is
imperilled (and if we do not stand up to this what will oùr
children say and think of us 1): if you esk whether we will
allow any part of our colonies or dependencies to beco1'1e
German the answer is in the negative," :France ohserves:
" \Ve are by no meal's convinced as to ollr decadence, COrl'UP-
tion, and the rest; but, if you ask will we submit to you as
masters and leave Alsace at your mercy, the amwer is in the
negative." Russia protests: .. \Ye cannot help beinD' nume-
rically the stronger; we are not proposing to red;ce our-
5f:lves, thank you; we are not really so veloy barb:i.ric, and,
if you per:;ist in a!-king us to relinquish the Slav hegemony
and leave our co,racials and co-religiollc,ts in the lurch, the
answer is in the negatÏ\.e,"
So there is a real ant'lgoniFm, no doubt. "\Vas I'n a.rpeal
fea",ible to anytlling mif;hlier tb&11 the sword 1 The lawyer
and trader States were incli1'ed to F:lY "Yes." But Germany
said" No," and, in spite of &oIl the pf:ace-pipe-smokers in the
world, Germany \\"as right.
The precision of Mr. Belloc in regard to tLis particular
war has been proved up t() the hill over and o\-er again. He
has used the divining rod before in rclaticn to politics and
other domestic a!iairs, and his di&gno.,tic has nearly always
been proved sound. LA"D AXD 'VATER is not the first p::per
of which he has been the weekly oracle. nut he has no'
always used di aet.ion-generally, il!deEd. preferring, aìour
-and he h3s not foreseen sllloot,h things; and ",hen
he has disclosed things, they ha,'c not always been
tbings agreeable for pcwerful people to hear. It
i'l littI
me telling plain people un[leasant thing!!
they are not gradually and insemibly prepared to
hear-the
hock of novelty may easily 11c too mucb
for t1lem. But he would go on anticipating history, as he
does in this book, and would never ab:mdon his own stri,lo
to please either the demagogues or their political p3yma
ters.
He was, in fact, a prophet without honour, until the out-
break of the war put such a premium upon infcrmation H1ch
as he (almost alone among laymen who could give expreF!:>ion
to their knowlcdge) possessed that h8 became fin 110m 1 e
17,iclssairr, an oracle that no man could afford to ianore. lle
has certainly tempered strength with mercy al1l used his
power with moderation. The grasp, thc proportion. the
justt:Su of his work as a war-guide and chronicler has beE'n
appreciated at home and abroad, by Eng!isb and French
readers. At the time of the fall of Namur he was, perhaps,
the one un,uniformed man in this counlry who realised the
full gravity of the situation. Happily, he never gave way to
despair; his weekly appreciations have given comfort to
thousands of half-despairing souls, whereby he ha'i rendered
a service to this nation that neither of two generations can
ever possibly forget.
After giving the immediate occasion of the \\ar-the
()bstacle offered by Serbia to the German policy of the three
B's (Berlin, Byzantium, Bagdad), tbe author goes on (pp.
80-315) to illustrate, upon lines familiar to readers of LA:SD
AND 'VATER, the resources of the beUigerent
and the "\'"alue8
of the forces opposed. Then in Part III. (316-377), he de-
ECl'ibes the first mock, down to September 5 last. But the
5urprise of the book comes ÏD the last few pages, where, in a
passage characteri.sed by superb historical vision, deep con-
,iction, and emotional energy, Mr. Belloe deploys forces tbat
only an historian and a prosemast
r, who is also a poet, can
ever dispose of. In this passage be describes not the causes
or questions in dispute, but the issues fundamentally at stake.
There i" no room to do justice to the beauty and insight of
this pHoration here and now, but it raises questions of BUch
deep import that, with t.he permission of the editor, I DlUst
revert to it next week.

A G EJ\-:EIlAL ShETCR oJ' TH 11: ErllcF:E
!; ,\ AR. Th
First I'h:-_q(\,-
By lii1aire ßcl1oc. Nds\ n, 6a.

15*

LAND

AND

WATER.

J nne 19, 1915.

TALES

OF

THE

UNT AM ED.

J\IARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the French by Douglas English.

T HE lamplight dazed and blinded her, transpierced
the triple curtains of her eyes, whose thin trans-
lucent inner lids betrayed the fear behind them.
The lamplight filled her brain with night-
mare horrors, t.ossed sleep on swirls and eddyings
of unrest, mocked :1t her waking helplessness. By fitful turns,
she dozed, and woke, and dozed again.
At last camc darlme::s, and she slept profoundly, and
dreamt of forest lullabies, the nigh[;-songs of the sisterhood,
the surr and rustIe of green leaves.
Her mind had no sense of contingencies; no instinct
counselled wakefulne
iI, lest she should miss some loophole of
escape.
She woke with daybreak in a silent house; watched the
IIlow bil'lh of form from formless shade; took stock of things
inanimate, on floor and wall and ceiling. Nan's lair had
th
in common wi[;h her forest. It sheltered moving
tilings and motionless-and moving things alone were to be
feared. So by slow reasoning worked her mind-a lifeless
room was harmless.
On this, her first long curious inquiry, a linger:" '": fear
intruded. It left her as she ate. As though the fort'"" still
was round about her, not caring why, nor caring whence they
came, she gulped the food,scraps littered in her prison. She
pecked indifferently at seeds she knew, at tempting morseh
which were unfamiliar, at sugar, cake-scraps, biscuits, which
lame strange chanc'e had garnered in the cage,
She found drink ready also, A pannikin of water, stag-
nant, luke, on which a floating dust-film scrawled a spiral.
She crouched and stretched her neck to meet its level,
lipread wide her beak, and gulped; then, with dosed mouth
Bnd eyes upturned in ecstasy, gazed heavenward as she
Iwallowed.
So had she quaffed the fore5t spring.;; and puddles on the
waY3ide,
1Vith thirst a:J.d hunger slaked her hopes revived. Per-
hap
these noisy humans yet might spare her, 'Yere they
80 terrible indeed 1 At least they brought her food ar.d drink
in plenty. 'Yas it some trap' Some scheme to capture her
afresh 1
\Yithout cocks crew, dogs barked, She hastened to dlJ-
vour the la
t small scraps, for fear they might be snatched
from her.
She knew dogs well enough-noisy, four-footed, shaggy-
plumaged things, who, in their maddest, wildest cour"e, kept
muzzle close to ground. They were no foes to winged folk.
She feared the voice of Chanticleer far more; this, close
at hand, was strange, and so disquieting.
But other soundd swept both these voices from her; the
growl, the heavy tread of Man behind the parly wall,
And presently Nan entered, boisterous, menacing.
For Margot he was simply Mail-the counterfeit of hiyn
who captured her, Even with lapse of time, when she knew
every patron of th:J tavern, she could not mark with cer-
tainty the one who had laid hands on her the first and tugged
her from her ri\'al and borne her from the frosted field to
the llOt, sm01;:e-grimed kitchen,
She eyed him cross-ways, curious, defiant, with beak
øgape and halI-curled daw. lIe paid small heed to her
effrontery. He saw the food had gone and laughed, _\.nd
laugltter grated hal">'h on :Margot's ears. The feathen
bristled on her neck, her beaded eye grew rounder, brighter,
fiercer.
The 1Ian brought further &tore of grain, and tit-bits,
which he forced between the wires.
And :Margot, with wide-sundered, flapping ;ving;!,
bac!;:ed, beak in re
t, against her farther wall.
The :ì\Ian set to his work, plied busy broom. He flung
aide-glances at the cage to note if she was tempted by the
food. But Margot sulked. The dust-clouds surged and
I!eetled. They puzzled her, but riddle more profound lay in
the !\ran's quiet eyes.
She thought herself the object of his toiling, anel !'ought,
by scrutiny of his acts and gestures, to learn hoW' the,}' COil-
c:erned herself.
'The problem seemed alternative.
Either the Man would kill her or wouH loose her.
His movements must be peaceable or hostile, Tlle
e
.., no third solution. Imprisonment was unimaginal..1e,

Her present case was transitory, impermanentr-a res

a halting-station on the road which led to death or liberty.
But there was ground for hopefulness. The Man would
surely loose her. He had not tried to capture her. He
brought her food-food which her forest sisters sought In
vain. 'Vhat use was freedom if one starved 1
The door flung opeil, and the 'Yornan entered.
Her mind once more swunO' dubious,
'Yhat marked thi3 uncouth <> monster from i13 mate 1 Its
size' Its form 1 Its plumage 1
There seemed no sure distinction. Was one less dan-
gerous than the other 1
Hearing and scent inclined her to the Woman, No reek
of shag exhaled from her. Her voice, for all its harshness,
was gentler than the Man's. It had a bird,note ring in it,
The children met with kindlier recoO'nition.
Their heads were barely table'high. She need nob
thrust and stretch her neck to follow their bright eyes.
She had no fear lest they should fall and crush her.
So stood, at first, her knoweId(Te of the househcld,
The children prattled round h;'r cage, thrust tit-bits 1!1
betw
en the bars, cajoled her with endearments.
She listened with her head aslant, half-frightened, ha1f-
coquettish.
Sometimes she pecked the food,scraps, and merry
laughter rippled out, and made her pause dumbfounded, But
no one tried to harm her.
:Man came and went throughout the day, 10Ilcd on the
benches, swilled his drink, and sang and laughed and gos-
siped. He left her unmolested,
She soon gained confidence in thoö:e she knew.
By evening she took scraps of food from grimy, toil-
stained fingers. She tasted them and droppcd them, for she
l.ad crammed her full. Some fell into the drinking-trough.
Some she disposed in corners of her cage, a cage,born instinct
guiding her, an imurmountable distruö:
.
Days passed in slow accllstomment to )Ian.
She soon knew all the i:J.mates of the house, the adults
by their voices, the children by their height, She gave to
eaeh a different rr:eed of confidc'1ce. She trusted more to
manners than appearance. She liked the Girl the be!'t, the
'Voman next, The Boy's wild mi
ehief scared her, the .Man':!
gmff voice, and, worse than this, the stench of smoke whieh
oozed from every pore of him.
It; brought to mind the powder smell, and dripping,
clotting blood,
She counted always on escape, Youth's sanguine voice
forbade despair, and hope found new-born energy in fierce
di:"cordant longing;!. Hourly she pecked and rattIed at the
bars. Hourly she read, in trivial happenings, a mes.;;age of
deliverance.
A single thought obsessed her mind, a passionate instinct
fevered her, and lent her sprightliness and voice.
Her gaolers misconstrued the change, thought that t1li"
gaiety was real, that she wad reconcileù to fate, that sho
would settle down.
So dan(Ter "Tew fl'om want of understanding ant!
hastened the'" ine;ltal:le end.
A dorm from westward swept acro
s the snow, and flung
a ari\,inO' rain at it, and smirched its virgin whiteness.
'Ihi; way and that the muddying thaw trailed zig-zag
down the plotl"h, like toner who h;;s fouildered in the ditch,
and nbnts unsteadv feet \0 saye himseli.
it drove man!;:ind to shelter-and to boredom,
The leaden skv was mddled bv leaden faces. Margot
alone wa3 lively. She danced and dacked, and so compelled
altculion,

\.l!c1, suddenly, her pri
on doer \"as opened.
". as this l
er chance 1 She leapt toward.;; the gap, A
hand out!'pread it,elf and barred the way. Five crooking
f.n(Ter9 (TrOD I ed for her, fiye m01l3trous fle
hy fingers. They
<> <> S .
forced her bac\n'lardö:, pinned her to the bars. creanung,
sÌ1e dro\'e at elcm with be:!!;: aUel claw. Thev fixed, like
eagle's tal0113, ruund her body. gripped 1>rea;t and back,
and tightened like a girlh, The trough capsized aUlI
drenched her, head to taiL The cage tiptilted, dropped away
from her.

(Tv b
COr-''-lil':'./.)

Pri,.t!Xl L,) I.hð VICTORLl llQUSJi: l'ffi'\n'ic; Co),. Lw" Tud0r SLleet, \Vhitefr;ars, London, Lt.:.

June 19. 19 1 5

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SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS, from 30,- per dozen.
BRITISH WARMS, 55/-, 63/- Lined Fleece, in all Sizes.

105, 107, 109 OXFORD STREET,
62a PICCADILLY,
47 CORN HILL. 60 MOORGATE STREET.
LONDON.

193

LAND

AND

THE

"ALLIES " WALLET

The" Sunday Tlm"s" says :-" The neatest, handiest, and safest Wallet for
one pound and ten sll1lhnjt not<s in the "orld, Such is the claim put forward on
"ehalf of the" Allips .. \\ aUet. And the mak
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the most puZ?ling. for nil you h,lve to do is to p]ace your notee loose in the wallet,
close it, and "hen you open It a
tin - hey, pre.to. the notes are flrmlyeecured by tbe
bands In eucb a manner 'bat tbey cannot possiLly faU out, n", "alleto make most
intere.twg and useiul gift. "

These Wallets are made in
two sizes: one to take the
notee without folding, 61 ^ 3t
inches
AI!!O in a half-size to tnke the
notf"S folded ODCf:'. in n C'on-
\enient sIZe for w8ist("O
lt
pocket. 3i x 31: Inches,

- -- --- 6.
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I ::;___ -.:-:,.-,

r siiJ1Ø,..)
\ !i'::
- -'

You place the
notes tn the
wallet as shown
here.

/
\:

PRICES.
Large Size -

e. d,

Polished French Levant 3 6
... rench Morocco 3 0

II" ow close
wallet and turn
it OVl'r,

Half" Size-

Polished French Le\ ant
French Morocco ..' .__
Stiff Linen Grain. in
\ariety of colonr',
'\ pry 8E'!r\ icealJle and
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2 6

Open It and the
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found to be
secured by the
bands, Whlcb,
e'\ er way the
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now opened the
notes cannot

fall out.

Iade in Fawn Velvet Calf with silk linln
, Half" Size for waistcoat Pocket "ith

1 0

f ..

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This 1IIIIer !lhould brinK th e
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any three letters blocked in gold on face.
Large Size
or U blocked 1n gold with letters in own hand\niting to form anyone
word not exceeding nine letter
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Half" Size ..,
Lar&"e Size
or If blocked in gold wit II any three letters on one side and any regl.
mental badge in gold on reverse side-
Half" Size no
Larce Size

Price

12/6
14/-

176
19/-

To be had from-

LA WRENCE & JELLICOE, Ltd.,
34 HENRIETTA STREET, COVE NT CARDEN, LONDON, W,C,

--

F2'

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HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

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Think what a blessing these delicious Food Tablets
are to m
n on
ctive service. -They are al ways
ready for ImmedIate use, and a few dissolved in the
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ment 10 ,sus!ain for hours; give ;ncteasl'd body
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Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.
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sustaininl food tablets and a neat vest pocket caBe on receipt of 1/8.
., on .CtJV8 service be particular to give regimental numbe.. rank
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unit), .taft appointment Or department. State whether .ervlng with
BrJt.ah Expeditionary Force or Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
or, If not wIth either, give name of place at which unit i. atationed:
Of all Chemists and
tor
. in convenient POCkCl
flasks, 1/- each, Larger SizeS, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

Liberal Sample Bottle eent poet -free f"or 3d. in etamp..

HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., SloUKh, Buck..

WATER

June 19, 19 1 5

Garrould's

To H.J\1. WAR OFFICE, H.
1. f"OLDXI.!L OFFICE
hDIA OFFICE. ST, JOHX ,
'I!nULAXCE ASSOCUTION'
BRITISII ItFD ('ROS< :-;OClETY. I o
mos COUNTY
COUNCIL, GUY's HOSPIT.!L, &<J.

.

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"t

P, Y

HOSPIT AL NURSES' SALOON

COIfJIJIf'te EquilJment of Nurses for
Home Detachments and the

SEAT OF WARe
All Surgicallnplements and Appliances in Stock.
Write for Garronll\'s Catalogue of Nurses' Uniforms,
Surgical Instruments and Appliances Post Free,

"

RESPI RA TOR

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194

June 19, 19 1 5

LAND AND WATER

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MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER

" I A:\I leading the simple life," said an erstwhile
Frivolous Being in hackneyed phrase the other
day. .. I like it, and it likes me, and I will never
lead any other as long as I live." People's ideas of
simplicity are as widely removed as the Poles, but the
Frivolous Being's notion of simplicity unravelled itself, after
some while, into a shortening of dinner, and a lengthening
of day. _\ domestic crisis from all accounts precipitated the
first, and the difficulty of spending the night anywhere but
in bed the second. No longer do these fine June mornings
witness a return from rout and ball and a seeking of bed
\\ith the clear rays of daylight stealing into the room, Ko
longer is an after noon rising not only a necessity, but a
logical consequence.
This latest convert to the simple life finds she is ready to
leave her bed at an hour when fonnerly she was fast asleep,
and is delighted with the eJ..perience. Otherwise to all intents
and purposes she is the same Frivolous Being still. One of
the few who remain. The fact that she has a husband en-
sconced in the safest of safe shore billets, and nobody fighting
of any moment to her helps to keep her so. That, and a
remarkably unimaginative disposition into the bargain.
This simplifying of life, however, by no manner of means
begins and ends where she is concerned. \Ve are all doing it.
Some from choice and others from necessity. It is becoming
the most regular of rules, and cannot but become more marked
as time proceeds.

The Simple Facts
Facts are simple enough things in all conscience, and it is
with facts we are confronted now, In consequence life has
automatically become a more simple thing. The complicated
existence most people were leading this time twelve months
back has been simply obliterated. It is as if it never were.
It is with realities we are dealing, not with chimera. It has
been brought home to numbers that the countless little petty
annoyances, which in days gone past had such power to irritate
now do not matter. They are dwarfed in the sight of far
greater issues. :No longer do we spend our days going here,
there, and everywhere, passing from one engagement to
another, few of which ever mattered a jot. Our lives have
undoubtedly been straightened out and simplified, A purpose
has been supplied to many people who never knew the meaning
of the word before. It is indeed one of the saving clauses of
the times that everything everyone is doing is on behalf of
some particular object, and the aim as a rule is clear and
definite.
Then again, everybody's outlets are narrowed and simpli-
fied, The richest man in the world has perforce to acknow-
ledge the many things his money will not buy. No longer can
he travel wherever his fancy takes him, many happy hunting
grounds abroad are denied him, scores of things which had
become a matter of course are now ruled out of being. The
power of money makes no difference, they are not there to
huv, So for the first time for years, to many, life has been
I educed to an almost incredihle simplicity, Where we are we
stav. if we wander our wanderings are within a very curtailed
radius, and in any case rarely prolonged. Our activities and
interests revolve round very few, and those very simple
mattelS. E\'erything is at last condensed,

The Old Story
Look \\ here we will, it is the same even"where. There is
a touch of simplicity about everything peoplé wear, everything
th.,v do, everything they say. A few minutes in the Park,
in tl1(' morning alom:,"irk tJw Ro\\', in tJw ;Jftc>rnoon h\" 'tan-

hope Gate, shows the truth of tins, Things being as
hey are
the Park is the main place for meeting one's fellow kll1d. It
is depleted nevertheless, all that is bright in it rests with the
flowers, and the girls who pass th.rough in pale c?loured frock,s,
The English girl can still be seen at her best 111 the Park l,n
June. She is more attractive than ever this year, for she IS
simplicity personified. Elaborate dressing being voted bad
taste is all in her favour. As she \\alks by in her cool summer
dress in a flutter of pale blue, pale pink or green, she is like
a breath of the peaceful past renewed. Almost, but not
quite, for with her there is often a companion who wears a
white cover on his dark blue cap, or is clad in khaki. Or
again it is someone, who walks rather slowly \\--:ith the aid of
a stick or has an arm strapped to one side. Occasionally
it happens that such a couple are stopped by a passer-by, and
one hears sentences in which" congratulations" and" wed-
ding," and" \Vhen is it to be? .. occur. And generally the
bride-to-be is heard to say" Oh no! Quite quiet OJ before
she takes her leave. That sentence is an almost inevitable
one. It sums up the present day marriage in a nutshell,
it is yet another sign of the simplification we are all under-
going under the stress of circumstances.
And thus the pair pass on to the future and the quiet
wedding, which will make them husband and wife, She in
her pretty frock and flower-trimmed hat, he in his navy blue or
khaki, the simplest of all stories is being enacted once again,
Time is being found for love and marriage though nations
rage and roar. There is still a moment for an idyll.

The Ultimate Hope
Then there is the simplicity of good fellowship as a power
in the land. \Ve are more willing to extend the hand of
comradeship, more anxious to shoulder our brother's burden,
We are already without doubt infinitely superior to the ract;
of captious mortals, who existed but a few months ago. Our
soldiers out in France have shown us the value of the helping
hand. Stories have reached us of devoted attention given
bv men hard pressed themselves to others all but done for.
.\ tale was told only the other day of a man looked upon as the
black sheep of a regiment, rough, brutal, and insubordinate.
Badly wounded himself, he nevertheless nursed a dying
comrade in the ambulance waggon, .. as tenderly," said my
informant, .. as a woman. I never could have believed the
red-headed ruffian had it in him."
Poor" red-headed ruffian." He is since dead and man\'
another like him. They have retrieved their misdeeds during
life, by the great manner of their dying. They are amongst
the many who are teaching us, who remain an endless lesson
of courage and simplicity.
It is simple enough to go out abroad .. to some place
unknown," obey orders, bear the burden and heat of the day,
face the uncertain morrow, Simple as many heroic things
are. As far as that goes, it is a simple proceeding for us at
home to help the country and its cause in every \\ay we can,
keep going, be brave, cheer and look after our men, Simple
but not always easy, That is the paradox of the thing.
Life, simplified though it be, does not grow any the easier.
But it is infinitely better worth the living. and \\ill be so in
the future, which is all so many of us are living for or lool-.ing,
\\'c have the Hope that makes-

.1 ()ur ollis) ) t::ar'\ -:om IHoment 1n th,..
uf the eternal S,I"n rp ' truth tl.11 '
To perish ne\ er :
\\ hich neilher li_tle'-n p 'lor mail '.. " ,..
floor
Ian nor lIo},
Xor all that i, an enmit} nith '''}.
(', n ntl. rh at-....li,h .r òe-Ir' \
..

195

LAND AND \VATER

BOOKS

OF

June 19, 1915

THE

WEEK

A LITERARY REVIEW

II The English Countryside." By Ernest C, Pul-
brook. (Batsford.) 7s. öd. net.
Mr. Pulbrook's book is assuredly a labour of love. He
does not tell us in what way he explored so many villages
and country towns, and the remoter hills and rivers and coasts,
but we may be sure that many a time he has wandered on foot,
travelling from day to day to new places, and lingering
where the attraction was strong. He is familiar with foot-
paths; he knows the charm of ancient inns; he has traced
rivers from their moorland origins to their outlets on the sea,
He h<,s covered indeed a large subject, for England is a big
place for the man who tra\'els on foot, who dallies for hours
in some inland creek or by the parapet of an old bridge, for
whom each new field and village is a fresh adventure, who
marks in his memory each stile, each stone-cross, and village
green, He has not attempted to take one locality after another,
exhausting each. In that way he might have filled a hundred
volumes. And yet, in generalising, he is aware that the charm
of England lies in its infinite variety: that the flats of the Fen,
land are not the flats of Somerset; that the hills of Derby-
shire are not the hills of Surrey; that the Severn and the
Thames, incomparable rivers both, are extraordinarily different.
He has started from the coast of England, playing on the
topic of its many varieties and its history, thence he has
pursued .. quiet creeks," and lakes, to the . running waters"
of rivers and streams, He considers in turn fords, bridges,

elds, sheep-pas,tures, foot-paths, by-roads, villages, towns,
mns, and wayside houses, and discourses on the seasons,
He makes the transition from generality to detail with skill,
If it is fair to mention faults in a book so pleasing as this,
we should say that he too often bids us .. pause and admire,"
that the wonder and sweetness of the country are too seldom
appreciated in silence. It is a book which, gentle and genuine
and intimate as it is, will charm those who know their country-
?ide, and should tell much to those who, living abroad, know
It rather through literature and hearsay. The illustrations
are a particularly attractive feature, They are mostly horn
photographs which show characteristic landscapes-woodland,
field, river, hill and coast-and they are excellently nproduced.

II Napoleon in Exile: St. Helena (1815 18111)." By
Norwood Young, Illustrated. (Stanley Paul.)
11 vols, 311s, net.

I t might have been supposed that there was no more
to be said about those last dismal years in which Napoleon
dragged out a mean existence in St. Helena. They have
attracted the attention of many eminent historians, includin

our own Lord Rosebery; but there is no longer much grounJ
for serious controversy. Forsyth vindicated the reput<, ,on
of Sir Hudson Lowe more than sixty years ago, and xlr.
Norwood Young, after ransacking the reports in the Record
Office, and examining the contemporary evidence of diaries,
letters, and reports of the Foreign Commissioners, makes the
case for Napoleon worse rather than better. He has collected
every anecdote, every shred of evidence that any reasonable
person interested in the decaying prodigy can ever want;
he has visited the island of St. Helena, spent five weeks at
Longwood, and prepared elaborate plans of the island and
of Napoleon's house. He has drawn largely upon the collec-
tions of I\Ir. A. 1\1. Broadley and others who have enabled him
to reproduce prints and caricatures, Here then is the whole
of that" last phase," with every little detail set down I.lhor-
iously and without ornament; Napoleon playing reversi and
cheating at cards; shutting himself up in his room and
giving himself airs when visited by the Governor; making
his attendants stand till they were ready to drop, or revolt';
plotting through O'Meara or any other wretch who would
lend himself to futile conspiracy; drawing out elaborate
lists of petty complaints; dictating his letters and losing his
temper, stewing for hours in a hot bath; making himself
troublesome and ridiculous to everyone, In the later years
of his Empire Kapoleon had demeaned himself by monstrou<;
vanities and follies; but the man-of-action dominated the
peacock in him, At the end it was the peacock only that
remained. -

U The Germans and Africa." By Evans Lewin.
With Introduction by R.t. Hon. Earl Grey. (Cassell,)
10S. 6d. net.

The question of the German colonies in South Africa is
o,:!e which deserves more attention than it has yet received,
SIr Harry Johnston has urged the necessity of stripping
Germany of her African Colonies; Mr. Arnold Tovnbee has
urged, the contrary. Mr. Evans Le.win propounds ÌI0 policy,
He g1Ves us
he facts. ,He d
scnhes the founding of the
German colomal system 111 Afnca and the .. diplomatic and
sometim

pecu
ia
processes hy which it was constantly
enlarged. He mSlsts that the Germans have failed in their
native policy, because they have adhered to the .. mailed
fist methods and sledge-hammer proceedings of the military,"
and because their colonial officials have not attempted to
understand or sympathise with the people, The results have
been incessant revolts, bloodshed, and a depletion of the native
labour reserves. On the other hand Herr Dernburg has
infused a new energy into Germany colonial policv which has
led to a revival of their South African trade, .. Less money
has been spent upon the trafl
ings of officialdom: more money
has been devoted to provldmg a\.cnues of trade." -\n im-
portant point to bear in mind is this: .. Unlike the British

The

Next

War

breeds
money. "
"The infection of war IS with
us from the nursery."
"The invested Interests of war
are gigantic."
"The price of nationality is war.
The boundaries of nations are
drawn In blood."

" \\1 ar
begets

war

as

money

""- he next war IS fixed by the
life of the generation now being
born."

From Israel Zangwill's powerful
article in the July number of" Nash's
Magazine" - Out to-day. Sixpence.

New Edition (18th), Cloth, 18, 6d" Boar<19 Is, or all Booksellers, or post free from
the I'u blishers,
THE DIETETIC CURE OF OBESITY.
WITH a CHAPTER on GOUT nnd Its DIETETIC TREAfMENT.
By Dr, YORKE,DA VIES.
CONTENTB.-Evlls of Corpulency. Dangerous conditions due to Corpulency, such &II
Weak Heart, Gout, &c. Diet the only safe and permanent CUre at any age, Quack
I\le(licines to reduce weight dangerou< and useless. Evils of Over-eating and
Sedentary Habits Food 10 its relation to Work, Exercise, &c, Analysis and com,
position of 80me largely advertised secret preparations for reducing weIght
LONDON: CHATTO & \VINOUS, 111. St. Martln'8 Lane, w.e

19 D

The County Gentleman
AI'\D

LAND&WATER

Vol. LXV No. 2772

SATCRDAY, JUNE 26, 1<)15

[ PI'BLI'HED AS ] PRICE SIXPENCE
A :'IIEWSPAPER PUBLISHED WEEKLY

,

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THE KING OF ROUMANIA

LAND AND WATER

June 26, 1915

./
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:
8 Castle St...eet,
LIVERPOOL

46 PICCAUILLY, LON.)ON, W,
PHONE REGENT 189

""""::----

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Also II Gordon Street.
Branches at GLASGOW.
8 DB

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ce. bt%

reland St..
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MANUFACTURERS

,., \

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BY APPOINTMENT

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To THE KING.

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MILITARY & SPORTING
HAT SPECIALIST

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Soft and Fl
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This shape also made in Patent Sun-proof aoth, 16 6
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Soft and FI..ibl. Fi.ld ServIC. Cap without Curtain HIl-
l his shape also made in Pate. t Sun-proof Cloth, 16/6
Detachable Sun Curtain, 2/6
Celluloid or Oil",i11c
reao;;e.prOl")f S1-:ietrl. 1/6

\V oodrow' s Flexible Cap is the corrrct Headwear for Officers.

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To be worn in place of ordinary Puttees.
Combine the GREATEST COMFORT
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Price

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All Military Requirements supplied at Close Prices.

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Telephone: 1213 Mayfair.

Officer's Ideal Water Bottle

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Improved shape, does not: absorb wet:.
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CAPACITY H PINTS. 18/6
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51 CONDUIT STREET. LONDON, W.

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Specialists in
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1; s. d,
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British Warm (unlined) 3 13 6
Do. do. (lined camel hair fleece) 4 14 6
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Do. do. do. (lined camel hair fleece) ... 5 15 6
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Do. (all round) 9 6
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208

June 26, 1915

LAN DAN D \V ATE R

OF CERTAIN GARDENS
By J. D. SYMON

I F the subject seem inappropriate to these days of
strife, defence may be found in the reflection that
it was in a garden that strife began, when a serpent
vain of his Kultur, talked of .. science over all,"
and found a listener. But the old story may rest for
the moment-enough of its consequences elsewhere-the
garden, even with the sword at the gate, remains true to its
immemorial fascinations, and this year, either by some
unwonted and compensating lavishness of summer or by
some trick of minds disturbed, it seems doubly delightful and
precious. Its spell is not to be denied amid the clash of
arms. We are told that in the very trenches, our soldiers
are making the wilderness to blossom as the rose; and one
recalls from the earlier days of battle a snatch of verse written
by an officer on the Aisne, in praise of a garden he knew and
loved by the bridge-head of Venizel. No fragment of our recent
war-poetry rings more true, none carries with it a more
poignant note of contrast, In time of war, laws may be
silent, but the gardener's gentle legislation still flourishes and
becomes vocal in the poet's song.
Perhaps the most magical gardens of all are those we
shall never enter. The known enCIO:iures are sweet enough,
but they always fall just one degree short of the unknown,
The variety, if not the fragrance of the known can be exhau
ted,
the unknown are inexhaustible, perennial in their wonder and
surprise. They need not be great and stately, the walled
sanctuaries of noble houses, it IS enough th.lt they lc ot
\Jme
age and somewhat retired. London is Iich in these retreats,
even in her districts accounted less fa,'oured. As the train
whirls you through unpromising suburbs, there are continual
glimpses, at the most unlikely corners, of well-tended little
oases, A gap between unlovely lines of brick will suddenly
reveal a cloud of bloom, as thrilling as Wordsworth's sudden
vision of the daffodils, but far less enduring. For in a moment
it is gone, a memory only. Next time you pass, the distin-
guishing flower, cherry, or plum or May, will have fallen;
you cannot recognise your garden any more. Next year
perhaps, with luck, you may find the place again, if you are
not reading your paper. For that garden's sake, it were weìl
to absent thee from publicity awhile.
Others less hopelessly inaccessible, are inaccessible all the
same. Although one may come very near them, year in anù
year out, they hover always on the verge ot the unknown,
or rather the imperfectly known. Such are those of a litLc
country town, still unspoiled in its quaint irregularity.
It is the very irregularity of its plan (or lack of plan), that
makes its gardens so happily mysterious. To one who has
not a single acquaintance there, they must remain perpetual
mysteries. That is, mysteries in the sum of their charm.
They reveal themselves in part at odd corners, they push
some of their clustering beauties over the edge of mellow-
toned old walls, their ancient trees break the red line of
gabled roofs with fine masses of contrast, especially at sun
ct,
when the greens are olive-deep and the reds a tawny gold;
but still the paradise withholds itself. Try what coigns of
vantage you will, climb this little height or that, for the town
leans against a hill-side, and try for a better view, the
gardens keep their secret. You can only guess their
perfection, but you know it is there; for gE.nerations,
ay, centuries sometimes, have gone to its making.
Your new garden is hardly worth the name, except
for what it holds of promise. That the gardener may
never enjoy, but to-day he toils with better heart, for his work
has become a symbol of the times. It is the hour when men
have learned to sow gladly for others to reap. And on the
scarred soil of Flanders they drive their trenches and water
them with blood that the tree of Liberty may come to new
strength and beauty. That, in effect, is the burden of
.. La Brabançonne." But let us cry the reader's mercy for
this digression. Truce, it would seem, is impossible, even
with the gentlest of themes. It is part of the bargain of
these papers that they keep the echoe, of war remote, and we
are consc
ous of lamentable failure hitherto. Yet the essay,
although It be only, as here, an essay of sorts, is permitted to
digress down any alley that offers, and the best of gardens
ar
those where the walks and alleys take the least expected
tWIsts and turns. Thereby, with good patience, the wanderer
m.ay g
in some new glimpses, no matter if they be, as a wicked
WIt saId of Jowett's philosophy, .. glimpses into the obvious,"
Whereby, it would seem, we have regained at length the
thread of our discoursf'
For the next divi,ion of the
ubject, now deviously reached,
wa..; to have been the praise of another pleasant trick of un-

known gardens. Such are ,hose that lie c ose to the high-
way, but are jealously screened from the highwayman's
sight by high walls. Yet they are not quite obdura:e in their
reserve, for they concede a single point to the inquisitive.
Therein they are happily distinguished from their fellows
who add to the blankness of their guardian wall the added
blankness of a closely boarded door, that last touch of the
inhospitable. But the kind I have in mind are kindlier and
great i their merit, for they permit some little glimpses of
their treasure through a fair and graceful gate of old wrought
iron, Much they may not give, but their little is a thing of
price, The path is, at the best, narrow and of irregular paving
stones, or, almost as good, of smooth brick, worn, it may be,
into occasional hollows by feet of many generations. If the
gate be a postern, and not an entrance of greater or less
ceremony, such a path may even be of velvet turf, the most
pleasing of all paths to eye and foot, although the gardener
mislikes it and will tell you it is the breeding-place of slugs.
But the brick or paved app oach lends perhaps a
finer accent to the skirting flowers. It goes best with lines of
standard roses, backed by a high hedge of sweet peas on either
hand, And it is of the essence of such vistas that they be
self-contained. To right or left they should not give away
the further secrets of the ground, but lead the eye right
onwards to an indefinite end, or if definite, let it be but a
suggestion of the house which is the heart of the sanctuary.
That is good, but better still if the path ends in a
maze of flower and foliage, the shimmering intricacies of the
pergola, where the rambler twines luxuriant. Or the path
may widen for an instant, before it loses itself into a little
circular space centring on a lichened sundial. You can never
go close enough, stranger that you are, to read the warning
motto on that silent chronicler, but you may before you pass
on try to imagine it, or if you are in the mood invent one for
yourself. Try as you will you will never better that suggested
by D'Annunzio for a friend's sundial. Me lumen, vos umbra
regit.
Putting aside the tempting morality of that epigram,
which is its own best exposition, let us by way of relief turn
from the ordered sweetness of formal gardens to another
kin:!, equally pleasant in its way, but charming also in its
arìmired disorder, the garden of childhood. Stevenson
undcFtood it well, when with deft implication he called his
mcs
delicious medley of lyrics" A Child's Garden of Y erses."
The child's garden is the medley in excelsis. No matter how
the little gardener toils, the result is always haphazard, here
a tuft of London Pride, there of pansies, and always the
pathetic failure of the attempt to trace a name in marjorar.l
or cress. The story books of another day had a beautiful
fable that told how on George's birthday, punctual to the
hour, George's name grew up clear and legible in his garden.
How many vanished springs saw small imitators of
George looking in vain for the perfect lettering of the picture!
But the experiment was always tried, the eternal hopefulness
of youth refused to be discouraged. If not this year then
next, And sometimes a few letters and parts of letters
rewarded faith and patience. In the child's garden, little
girls succeed best. The boy's garden is usually a joke. One
recalls how that joke appeared in its most amiable form at a
certain preparatory school, where prizes were given for the
finest efforts. One or two plots were, by rather more than
courtesy, gardens recognisable. But a passion for meretricious
ornament undid the rest. Stones of every sort, even the
roughest stones of the field, bits of broken bottles and shells
were introduced by way of decoration, and the result resembled
nothing so much as Zulu graves. And in one case, assiduous
digging left little or no space for horticulture. That garden
was like an abandoned field-work, torn by high-explosive
shells, and so it remained when the judges came round,
Yet to give the human boy his due, ingenuity sometimes
finds its account even here in unexpected "avs. Once
upon a time, a handy youth, fascinated by the" Japanese
garden at the White City, set about reproducing it in miniature.
The scheme succeeded, and the arrangement of the ornamental
waters did credit to a budding engineer, and showed a bent
that might one day guide the choice of a profession, But
in his garden the child sees far more than the blind grown up.
I t is a microcosm. His scale is not the scale of his elders.
Here Stevenson has his word again, not of child's gardens
made with hands but of natural landscape in miniatur!',
.. The very tiny dell" he found" beside a shining water well,"
was in itself a world. It became, was, actual and in relief,
a little picture; in the original sense, an idyll,

20 9

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210

Jane 26. 1915.

LAXD

AND

THE

WAR

By

HILAIRE

WATER.

BY

LAND.

BELLOC.

NOfE,-This article has been submitted to the Pre.
Bureau, 1\hkh does uot objed to tb;: publication IS cen
ored, and tak.es ...
responsibility lor the currectness of the statements.
In accordance "ith the requirement! of the Pr
S5 Bureau. the positions of trøops on Plans illustrating this ,""rUele must only bl
regarded as approtimate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated,

T HE fighting upon the "-e:-:t this week.
very.important in
ts ultimate effect of
wearmg down the hue of the enemy and
proving the coming pmwr of the as
yet undeveloped offensive in the \Y cst. is not yet
upon a scale, does not yet comprise movements so
considerable as to permit of a geucral analysis.
;w- e have. perhaps. not long to waIt before the
Nf est will provide all the material for these pages,
The same is true of the new Italian front,
upon which in the pa;,;t week no considemble
change has happened, because there has been no
massing '1" yet of the main ltalian concentration.
Tht- pnn
lpal material oi the week is stiB upon
the Eastern front., and concerns the fate of Lem-
berg.
THE BATTLE FO'{ LEMBERG.
The evacuation of Lemberg and the with-
drawal of the Russian line behind that to""n must
not be representell. as has right ly been every pre-
vious retirement through Galicia upon the part of
our Ally, as a mere withdra""al from a geographi-
cal area. Lemberg is politimlly the capital of
Galicia, and particularly of that sole portion of

c

J

-

Galicia which is partly Russian by tradition.
Strategically, Lemberg is much more than this.
H is the point upon which all the railways
serving the Eastern section of Galicia con-
verge. He who has Lemberg possesses the power
of moving troops from north-west to south-east at
will. A commander defending Lemberg from the
east against an enemy advancing from the west
can moye troops from Tomasow (1) through the
Rawa Ruska J unction, or. aga in. along the railway
which comes into that same junction from the
west (2); or, again, through the Jaworow Rail-
way, through Lemberg itself. (3); thence, south-
ward and we;;;tward b,. the main line towards
Grodek (4); b
' the next line (5), "hich ultimately
leads to Samh1l': by the next line again (6), which
ultimately, lea cIs to Stryj i : and by the great main
lateral line (7) (it is true it is only a single one),
which goes all along the defensiye line of the
Dniester as far as Halicz. Further, he c.an mIl
in men and munitions from behind his line by the
little railw:lY to Sokal (8) : by the lorlger one to the
frontier pas:;ing through K.avionka (9); by both
the great main lines fron
the RlIs
ian b:J.ses: that
passing through Brody (10) and that coming

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June
6J 191.&.

from Tarnopol (11):
hiJ(' his m<<:vemellt. of
troops is further "ased hy the eress hne lea:dmg
from TarnopoI (12) to line 'n. 7 ånd b
- the ]unc-
tion between it and the main Lemberg line (13).
One has but to look at sHch a. diagram as the
foregoiuO' to note its position towards tbe frontier
and to o'&ser\e tbe faet tbat beyond that frontier
there are only tu:o sillGle lil,ès, A and B. con-
necting the Russian bases, to see what Lemberg
means in a modern war conducted upon Galician
wit It is the Yen" heart of the wbole
"stem {If
('@f1!ll'Iuni('.àtions, àÍ1ù the pa.ssage of it :f'rom one
C(I)InTliander to another Jil
ans, after the brief
delay required for the restoring of broken bridges
and
cut culverts, the passa,ge of power over all
eommunieations from one side t.o tbe other. A
Jl&UI possessing rougW
- tbe line C-D, ,Üth Lem-
berg at its. centre, against a tbrust coming from
aloJ!l.g the arrow is, so far a$ c.ommunieations can
:makfi' him so, master of the movements required
f(j)r defence back and forth. Let him lose that line
C-D, and with it Lemberg, let him be eomp
ll\;>j
to' fall back to the line E-F, and he has at once
lOl5t his power of lateral mo-ç-ement and handed
t.hat advantage over to his enemy.
That is tbe really great strategical import- f . S
aB.ce of Lember2' which distin g uishes this nodal only, that to Tomasow, crosses the rontler. .:. ,?W,

beyond that frontier there i8 absolutely nothHig
point from all the merely
ographical points in" the- way of railwav communication until
h.itherto acquired bv the enemy in his advance - " h . I 1 ..J . 1 whI ' ch, fro m
tb h Gr' " we get to t e smg e me ral way
rou
,a .lcI t a. I . I th ' t t Ivangorod, upon tbe Yistula (1), rÙns down pâEt

'-1.S agams t llS, lOwever, , ere IS one ma er LubÜn (Lu). and so joins up to the first of t
e r<til-
worthy of remark. HeaT'yas is the blow dealt to "avs to the R.ussian bases (1). In other ,,'ords,
the Russian forces by an enemy occupation of JOu have- all round Lemberg a sort of spidtr-'B \,,
b
Lemberg, tbere does not lie behind that position of railways. (single lines, it is true, save t.he mam
any considerable opportunity for a furtber one throùgh Przemysl, Grodek. and Lemberg
Austro-Germ:lll advance. itself) which make the mü\ements o
troops and
How true this is a further consideration of ammunitions easy. Beyond the frontIer you have
the territory over a somewhat "ider area will nothing but this' one single line from hangor0d
easil , v P rove. L ) h f . fi d . . t
(1), past Lublin ( u, to t e ortl e ]l:mctlOn a
Lemberg is Galicia. But the enemy's main Rowno (R). .
objed must still be to brl
ak the Russian line,
ow, it is dearly e\'ident that a force which
and that task, when or if the Russians fall back has had to fall back from the line of the River
yet further behind IÆmberg, is not made easier San and rouo'hly. from what we called in the first
by such a success, but, on the contrary, more diagram? the
ìe{ensiYe position Ç-D to th
de,-
difficult, as will appear from tbe following fensiye pøsition, E-F, thougb It

s sacrIficcd
argnmpnt :- the immense ad,antages of tbe Gahclan networ.k
The Austro-GernuJU offensiye against the of railways conYerging on LEmberg (L), yet IS
Russian line bas, as all the world knows.
ucceeòed retirÍJlg parallel to, and ultimat
ly supported by,
,,-holly through an immense suppriority in heavy the main Rns

m railways commg up from the
guns and the ammunition therefor. The bring- south-east. 3.nd in partieular by the liI?e through
ing fOr\,ard of munitions for these pieces, and, the junction of Rowno (R), past Lublm (Lu), to
for th
t matter, the moying of the heavy pieces hangorod (1.)
themselYes, demanded raih, an. All tbe main This disposition is particularly important.
a.dvancf' has taken place along the great double \\ hen we reme,nber that once the line falls back
line rr.ih'Jav, wlÜch is the backbone of Galicia, yet further. 3S along the line of dashes in the
and divorced from railwa.ys the German \\a1'
lia.gram. it is in ground full
f woo.ds and. marsThes
madÜne can do nothing. and offering the greatest possIble dI
eultles .t? the
Xow, ,vhile the possession of I.embprg brings adyance of heavy guns and t!leI
' mumtlo
s.
the enemy a complete and concentrating system of \VIÜle the falling back upon tills lme and stIll
l'aihvays for his supplies, the moment you reach further retirement, dragging with it increasingly
lhe frontier of GaJicia not only does that advan- difficult communications for the enemy-exactly
tage disappear, but cwry accident of groancl in- like the direct communications on the J\lemen six
creases the handicap. months ago-brings th.e Russians nearer and
How true thrs is will appear from the nearer to the railway" l11Ch ean supply them aloIlg
ar.nexed diagram. Thp frontier is here indicated a line almost eÀactly parallel" ith their front.
fly dotteù lines, and it" ill be seen how, across that And the matter is further to he examineáTñ
frontier, come the two main railw3\'s "..hich lead the light of the position of 'Varsaw, It has been
to the Russian baF:es in lhe south ànd east, and sufficiently eluphasised ill these columns for many
cnIwerging upon Lemberg it:.::elf at L. months past tbat "
arsaw, vátb its bridges and
l.'rom Lemberg, as \\e hayc ju
t seen, run <J.ll the conwnJ'pnee thereupon of so many lines, of
those subsidiarv Iailwa'Ys \\hich haye been de- railway fr
Pl the inferior óf Rus3Ía, ìs thc'Òlpital
JCl'j}Je'ù jn th(' l
st few l
arabl'aphs, one of '",hich strategic point (for Hussia upon the'defe.%1ve) of
2*

:\0-

,I:."
,\,

.'\'-'

g

June 26. 1915,

LA
D

AXD

W
\ T J
R .

the whole EagterIl front. ju
t ag ('racow is the he will quite certainly .find himself with every
capital strategic point (for the Austro-Germans mile of his proO're
s more and more Imm-
on the defensi,'e) of the who]{:' Eastern front. pered in the use oof his heavy artillery, whi!e
hehind the Russian tront there wi1l run the nmm
Russia.. adnmcing, could only test the succe

Jine from the fortified junction of Royno (R), past
(If her offensive by the taking or pa!'-sing of the provinl'Îal capitalllf Lublin (Lu). to the forti-
('racow, SLe failpd. The Austria-us and Gernw,w
, fi 1 . f 1 d (1) I 1 fl 1 .,.,
h I . e( pomt 0 \"angoro . " tic I
I!IJ';:" n-:Hsaw
advancing. can only test t eir real suc('{'s::;-t leiI' (W) on toe south, just as the fortIÜed pomt ?f
(lower to preH'nt Russia from quickl
- coming Neo Georo-ien,k flanks it on the north. It 1:3,
IJa(-k-by their hold upon "Tar
a \V. or
hould tw, CJuite dear that. such a line a
, for
If the _\.ustro-Germans c(luld
{I turn the line instance, the dotted line on the foregoing diagram
c,f the. Yistula t.hat their capture of \\Tars.tw could ,...ould gi\'e a Hust'ian front strong against
at last be aeeomplislled. then, a It-hough the,\T should a superiority of the enemy's hea"y pi
ces, and
lIot have broken the RlIs
ian line, but should only confidentìy l )rotecting the \rars;1w crOSSlllg from
ha\Te I HIshed it back be , yond ";-ar
aw, they woulel -
'
I being turned by the south.
have done something almost as deeisiw as t Ie

hreaking of that line. Ent the pushing back of tht:.
Ie;]nwhile, before conc-1uding with the
Russian forces from Galicia dues 110! lillCOl'Cl' details of the attack on J.emberg, one can only
;Wal'sow. reiterate the oln-ious strategic-a I truth. \yhieh
is none the less true because it has grown weari-
That is the reaIl,v important thing to seize. h .
The Yistula line, as it is called, but what it is more some. that the enemy ha.s not effeete(t 13 l,urpose
in the Ea,,;t until he has separated the Hussiall
proper to term the great fortifi{'d YÜ,tula ero
sing forces and broken theil' line.
(which is \Val'!,(aw flanked hy j \'angorod on the
south and 1'\eo Georgien,k on the nort.h). is not He has, as a political asset. by the c1eari.ng of
turned by this atlvanc'e through Galicia unless, 01' Galicia, deJa-wt\' iì it were {'"'(peeted, the mtef-
until, the line of railway l'UmlÌJ]g from the forti- wntion of Roumania. He ha,.;. as a material
fled }JoÍllt RO\'llO, in the south, núrth-,-yestward to asset, got baek his sources of petrol suppl
:-

Ivangoroù, pa
t. t.he proyin('ial e-apital of Lublin. is r(..al1)T important point. He
a.
, for "\-\
at It l

in t.he hands of the ellem,v. The point will be ('.agil
T worth, afiedell newspaper opmlOll. partleular
r.
gfâ.!'iped from the diagram ah'eady given. "Te st-e it i::. to be feared, in this countr.". But luelnl
T
in this t,he great nexus of railways, of which Lem- tbe ('.onduct of the Vial' is in t11e hands not oi
herg (L) is the centre, and how the loss of Lem- new spa pel' owners. nor {','en of politicians, but
herg means, as we ltaH' just been cll'seribing, the of the great t:eneml Staff.
I05s of Galicia: hut we also see beyond the fronti{'r, Now, in doing this he has a lready lost, for
once the Galie-jan rajhnw systenÌ is frankh- aban- t h(' moment.. at leët:;t 600,000 men, and perma-
(ioned. a. great helt. (of lfnsslan Poland ab
olutely nellt.]y, say, 400.000. He has al
1 e'\:pended some
denuded of railwan:l. It i!'i also, b,' tbe way. yen T l:ll'O'e prorortion-rerh
l's half--of the
largely denuded of'road8, and. a.!': t.he'summer in gre;tt hC'e-
mu!at ion of shell, tbe" head ..
If shell
this EasLern corner of Europe has been as wet a
it with which he undertook the task not qUIte two
Las been dry in the \Y cst. we may rega td that 1wlt. months ago. ff he does at la.st suecee.d .in clivid-
of ('ounl-ry as onc O\Ter which Lhp enemy could onlv inO' the Hussiall ...\.rillY and o[ obtallllllg some
advanc
with tIll;" grr-att'
t pos.,:il.le tliìfieulty. Ilc definite \ ic-tory again:st it, then that e"\.eeptio
al
i
depending. a!'i we have seen. entirely upon his eX:l'ensl' may jut:t han' been worth wlule,
superior nnmitiomnent f('r he;n.\' gun:;. That is UeInember, it. is still going on, and at what a
the O1]e as!'-ct he has. His soltliel'
. as so1dier$, rate the cIa ily lists in our own Pre:;s of our own
have no longer 1.b<, mOI'al \'alue of the renewer.! l'3suaHies m
ìy gi\-e us, in th<,ir much smaller pro-
Russian Ie, ies which come from younger men portions, some sort of idea. If he dol'S not obtain
and whid. feel indefinitpl,\ large support behind his lI1ain stratrgicnl ob.ieet, then h(' ha!': made the
them. His
eneralship has ui\(1 no cause to extlenditure in \ain. 1 will deal with that point
('üme into play sinee he has had nothing to do (I( the enemy's expense in men further in :to
hut batter, amI whether iL Le snnerior or in moment.
t
anV\hile, It't, liS eoudude with the
fel'ior to that. of the ordel'lv UU3sia;' retl'f'at onh T details of the battle for I,emberg.
an opportunity for his maÌl<.euvring would
ho\',:. The genera 1 situation of the front defended fot'
,,,rhether hi
propol'lioll of sick i" higher or lower some da n; In' the Hnssians in front of 1.emherg- i:{
we ca.nnot tell. The OIlt' and the only ft1rm of that e:\,pres:-:ed in the ft1llowing- map. TIÌerf'
Buperiority he crrtaillly h[tCi-and it is decisi,e nms in front of Lemberg. rather morc than fiÙ('en
- i
tllÏs immenS{' numerical superiority in miles away on the awrag(>, a long chain or lake

Hmnitions for his hpfI\TY gUDs, and lI1ar
hes. gellerally "-Ihlwn at-; the 1'0sitiol1 of
Hnt he ha
never been a\,le to make u:,{' of t1li
Grodt'k. from thC' tOKn stnndin
about midwH"
superiority at. 11101'(' than a da,\"s mal'(,h f1'om a in the system; tIu' largest agglom('I'atio 1 1 of hon::or:>
c1fJuhlf> line of ra it Win'. Thpre is no ('a.<;(' in the iu that l'ilther df'serted di
trict. T}li
to" n of
"aI', e\en npon the f'aslern front.. of a <":f'l'mall Ul'(Jllek oC
lIpies an isthmus 1,<,t.',\eeu tvm of tÌle

lw('ess at: any appreciatJl{' di:;tant'c from
,OI11l'
hallnw. s.,antpy l:-tke:; whid] u<,rl' affol't! a \el'r
gooll dl)nh\
main line. "Tito{'ss lIle faillll'e of WlITOW pas<;age of dry ground. 1t is this pas
age
the fir,.;t ad"al!Ce against the l\ïemeH. the faihll'(' whieh C',HTies the main wad tt! Le/nlwrg. Tltl

against the [r pper DHie<;ter, the failure a.
ainst railway gOl'!; up by the north. through a gimilar
the Low('l' S
n. &\'. His prp:>('nt mov('nJPnt (,It narm" l'(1%il
e bel wet....n two other of this chain
Lemberg has !..een enlirely d('pf'ndt'Jlt upon the of lakl'
. The "holc (-hain (.f lak('s awl m:H'shes
main line tJa'ongh .ra.ro
hw (.T) and Pl'<':c-mpl (1'): from aho\e .JauoW' in the north to the 11{'gi1tnin

even in this last huni.ng mO\Tement. 11(' is mlt a of the n-{'eat Dniester mal'she
in the south is a
day's luarcL from that ljul", tü the north. mattel'
f t.wt'nty-ftw miles. It is an cÀcccdingly
Kow, if he aHempllo get heyr'lld tht, fl'ont!ef btl'cong po
itioll; in fact, it i
iml'assal..1e to au
3*

LAKD

-

==-

KOM.ÞJlliO O

&

=-==::

t:::..-

;;:---; lv!..ar
fie s' a. ll tÞ..e walj
== t:4J-t.h
Vnjester:

c

==:"4:=_

s
. ,
Miles.

army attacking any properly equipped defensive.
,There is a pa<;
age at Komarno, then no reason-
n b1e crossing for eight miles; for at the humor-
ously named \ iHage of Grunt, upon the drainage
Ftream of the ',"'hole system there is only a path.
It iH not till
'ou get to
Ialovanka that you get
a ,ery narrow bridge of dry land carrying the
fouthern high road to Lemberg; four or five miles
further to the north you have the main town of
Grodek, carrying the main, or northern, high
road to Lemberg; then at the top of the shallow,
and largely s\vampy, lake of Grodek you have a
place where, though the marshes are continuous
(at A), the dry land comes sufficiently close on
either side to carry the railway across on an
artificial crossing. Beyond this the lakes extend
Jet another four or five miles, and at their
extremity they are continued, rather to one side, by.
a further little chain of lakes and marshes. Here,
then, is a front upon which a quarter of a million
men could deploy, and yet with only three roads
by very narrow defiles through the bogs and
shallow lakes and only one railway for supply.
[[t is as strong a position as any other which has
come into this great campaign, and resembles in
some of its difficulties the lake district where
Hindenburg won his great victory of Tannenberg
in the autumn of last )"ear.
Now, unfortunately, it can be turned from

AND 'V A TER.

Junc 26, 1915.

the north, where the adnuicing line is sufficiently
stropg in numbers. There runs here on the north
a line of hills which I ha\e marked A A, on tbe
diagram below, alllÌ l:-ehind them the road from
Lemberg. through Zolbev to Rmm Ruska (and
ultimately Tomasow on the frontier). Zo1kiev was
at the time oj writing (Tuesday even in;) reported
by the enemy to have been in his hands since last
Sundúv, and therefore Rawa Ruska as well. It is
e\Îdent that the whole of this northern road was
already grasped by the enemy upon that date (the
20th), and that the line of the Grodek lakes was
t.hor
ugh]y turned. In other words, the only

To Toma.5ow
Rawa Ruska

.h/'I;"

."
% _ '""...40''''

--

wt
,
...

:::-

%;"". ';."

"'1"..;'.
".

'/"':
''''''' ...,,

r. \

lt;"((I'.'.
%;;" "

-j, .'.. 'T .,,
-

....

;'''''
!
_, _%"
/ '/t'IIo ;;=-1-
0 :\... . 'II"/"II#
.1'.r.; . \.

Ih.
'7, .....

o

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_
V, 1'1 j...d
'

'<. 0
'<- '!, '{ :.

"1"....

"'-"

'I J
?'I..
:-

' =, 1!. aoow '11,,'i'_,
J
q-
">",'

dek

20

:T13

:0

-

-
;;-::.'
..

"::..:=- -
--....--......
Gn 'at: -bnlesie r
Afarshes

o
. J

,
,

:10

.D

Z}'dacZðW
lY

natural position for the defence of Lemberg had
gone.
There has not been received at the moment of
writing the news of the enemy's occupation of
the city.
A NOTE ON ENErvlY LOSSES.
I bave been approached by several correspon-
dents in the matter of what they belieyc to be an
exaggeration upon my part of the enemy's losses.
I fear that the mood which now tends to belittle
these losses is part of that uncalculating depres-
sion which has been created in this country mainly,
by one very insincere section of the Press, anù
which is as significant in the eyes of serious study,
and criticism as was the foolishly extravagant
hope months ago, when the Russians were tò hayc
been in Berlin by October.
The calculation of enemy' losses is, of course,
not an exact science, but it is something in which
4*

you can have two quite exact limits-a ma"{imum the figures far below even the strictest minimum.
and a minimum. I do not know how many people It seems to me certain that they must be over
died in London last year, but I remember that four. .
Grea.ter London has, roughly, six to seven millions, THE HYPOTHESIS OF I
V ASION.
the death-rate, roughly, fourteen to fifteen per
thousand, and I conclude that the dea ths in London Cur
ent talk in the l
st fortnight and reports
must be less than thev would be if the death-rate from prIvate travellers 1Il the enemv's country
were sixteen per thousand for a maximum popula- 1m \-
bro
ght ?-gain under discussiOIi the bypõ

tion of seven and a half millions and less than thev thesIs of inVaSIOn. It may be worth whae, there-
would be for a death-rate of twelve per thousaufl fore, t? 'consider very briefly the political and
with a population of only six millions. I have a strategIcal position of the enenn- in this connee-
maximum and a minimum such that abote the one tion. \Yith the naval problem ï'nvolved I cannot
and beloll-' the other I am not guessing, but am abso- deal. But the general military problem is simple
lutely certain the figures cannot extend. The truth enough.
must be somewhere within the limits. . 1. TI
e principal military object of the enemy'
It is exactlv the same with enemy casualties. III proposing an invasion of this country would
i\Vehan'notoffièialstatisticsbeforeus
Thefactors be the interruption of the aid this couñtry can
for our judgment are various-the enemy's own afford to the general alliance. This "internlption
lists, our own known rate of wastage in compari- would take four forms:
son with our own average numbers, our type of (a) The retention within the i
land of forces
fighting compared with his, the known rate at that might otherwise be sent abroad.
which men return to the front from hospital, the (b) The hampering, in a greater or less
known number of prisoners, degree, according to tbe confusion created in the
Germanv has not armed less than six million public mind and in Government arrangements,
men since the beginning of the war; she has not of supply to the Army abroad.
armed more than seven and a half millions. The (c) The Hame with regard to financial assi
t-
maximum that Austna-Hunga ry can add to Ger- ance to the Allies.
many in man power is 80 per cènt. Shp has cer- (d) The same with rpgard to the production
tainly not added less than 60 per ccnt. The Allies of munitionment. of equipment. and of Goods for
hold about a million and a quarter prisoners, at e
rort, which maintain the economic p
sition of
the very least, but not more than a million and:t this countn'.
half at the most. The figures of wounded and 2. Thè object of such an attack would I
e
missing to dead are, eyen in the severest trench partly attained if it could be maintained as a
fighting, not lower than four to one. Of wounded serious threat without e\"Cr bein.... put into execu-
admitted to hospital and of some sick about tion. Xow, this truth, which i
almost self-f'vi,
ha.lf are discharged as fit to fight again some day dent, is. paradoxically enough, an argument in
or other, but of wounded only "ou cannot count fa\-our of an actual attempt at invasion. For it
on more than a fifth getting ba
'k'on the ayerage of
s manifes
fro!!l experience that public opinion
all services within, say, two months. 1Il genPI:a I In thIs country doe:, not rf'
ard invasion
Xow put all this together, and ,\hat do you as a s:nous threat, and nothmg but ItS successful
fmd
. practlce would have the effect
just enumrrated.
The average number of men in the British Therefore, those in thp em'mv's country who
Expeditionary Force is not a twelfth of the perceive the advantages which r11ight a('.cfue to
numbers Germany has passed through in this them from t
le mere threat of in
'asion will equally
war. \Ye had less than a hundred thousand men b
armed wIth arguments for Its aetual prosecu-
in the field when Germanv had more than thirtv tIOn. In other words, we m3\" decide immediatel\'
times as much. 'Ve have I;erhaps now in tbe field that, unlike the cOlTespondlu"" doctrine in fOli-
a sixth of what Germany has altogether put for- nection with aerial raids, the O mere moral eITed
ward. The average is certainly, I rppeat, fa r less of a threat is n0t in contempiaLion, but either a.
than a twelfth. The Germa.n forces have been com- sCI'ious attempt at invasion or none. For it i::;
pelled, or have chosen to undertake, the most furth
r o
yious that an al;ortive attempt, wlwtllt'r
\-iolent and prolonged offensive actions. They re:mltmg m the dpfeat of the eneun"s fleet and t1:lt:
have fought in the most expensive tactical fashioll. end of the whole business, or in the landin a of a
Our casualties give 50.000 dpad. 'Yho can small force which should he quickly destroyed OJ'
doubt that the total German dead must be over rrpellell. would have a. purely neg;ltive eITeC't. ana
600.000! It is absolutely certainly a.n under- would hl
rt the enemy by in('reasin
public ('011-
estimate: less than the lowest possible minimum. fidence after sue:h a sucrl
::;S against him.
Austria-Hungary e:annot conceivably have less . 3. Tl
e argumen,t that snch an attempt wouM
than 60 per cent. of that total. It is certain that be Impossible. or unhkely, on account of the um in
she has added more than 60 per cent. In other of men it would entail hold
under the immediate
words, it is absolutelv certain that your minimum circumstances of the campaign, but does not hold
of enemy dead must-absolutely \vithout escape ",:ith the same force in c
se of c
rtain future pos-
from the simplest laws of arithmetic-be mer a sIble developments. It IS eoncen-:.lble that c1urin rr
million. You have certainly well OWl' a million or after a period of temporary defensi\-e upo:;'
prisoners. Is it conceivable that disablpment from the East as upon the 'Vest thp ('nemy miO'ht
wounds and prolonged sickness should be less than detach a sufficient force to effect in his jndam
nt
double the nnmber of dead? It is inconceivable. the degree of disturbance which lIe rega;;'i
as
\Ven, then, the figure of four millions, so far sufficient, \Ve IllUSt remember here that \\e are
from being a.n extravagant fignre. is an extremely dealing not with our own pswholooy Lmt with
modest one, And when I said that the total the enemy's, and it is certa in th
lt he st
ll est imates
number of enpl1lY permanently out of action was too low the power of resistance that can be o!ff'I'f.d

. nearer four than three millions " I was putting ouce a landing is effected, and he rat('s the disturb-
S'

a.nce it would creat.e in all public plans too high.
4. The matcrÜll for I'Udl an ,lttempt is known
to be prcpa red and has been prepa r('d for m!1 n y
months, nor is it of any very complicated kmd,
seeing that the attempt, if made, would prohably
be made b" B.n in:mfticient number of men.
1\ow, 'it is self-e\-Ü!('nt that no im'asion could
be of the least \'(11ue, <,"en as a raid. unln,s the
ea
\H're dear behind it for some considerable space
of time. A landing force c('Hld hring with it
munitions for all the earlier part of the fighting
and could establish itself if it had command of
the sea, whether hy a trick or by a Ùctory, for
{'ven three days. But unless that command were
more or les
pèrmanent.. or at any rate could e"tend
OH'r a calculable period of wepks rather than days.
the raiders \'\"ould be doomed. Thev could dù an
enormous n
lOunt of damage, and tlip,,- could. per-
haps, t.hrow into collfusion most of thp national
plans; but the effect \\ould he slight, he
ause it
wculd be ephemeral. and the ultimate destruction
of the force landed would be, in tIle fif'ld of mere
moral eUed, an 8.sset of those against whom it had
hCf'n directed and a permanent loss to thp enemy.
But if the sea Wf're kept open for a time sufficicnt
to permit e\-en a mere raid to effect its purpose and
to retire. then the :Hhantage ,,"ould he all in the
enemv'::; favour.
it is to the enemy's advantagp that the blow.
if struck, should be struck late. Hf' call hal'Jly
strike it unt.il there is: something of a lull in his
Continental operations-until he has organist'd :t,
general dpfcn
iYe, for the moment at least. 'And
the later he .strikes the better, bec:ause he is

staking his fleet. If he is <'OmpJetely defeated on
land in the long run his fleet is certainly forfeit;
hut until he is completely defeated his fleet retains
its full value. It is, for instance, at the present
momf'nt inconceivable even to his higher command
that his defeat shall be so complete as to invoh-e
the surrender (If his ships,
An this set of considerationc:; tends to post-
pone and further to postpone any such attempt as
1 hat which we are considering.
On the other hand, the building power of
Great Britain as against that of the German
Empire is such that with every passing month the
disproportion bet"een the two fleets increases.
The enemy must be balanced in this scheme of
invasion, Letwèen the picture of a desperate stroke
"hich would have its maximum effect quite late in
the war and a pidure of a defeat which then
occurring would be more thorough than what he
might h;ne suffered earlier in the campaign.
On the one hand, the enemy would at the very
end of a lost campaign rather risk his fled in a.
gaIl1bler's throw than spe it disappear by the dun
method of a shameful treaty. On the other h:Uld,
i t
proportionate power for offence, v. hen we con-
tra<;t the building potential of the two nations,
les::,.ens regularly as the campaign draws on.
The argument is strongly in favour of delay
rat/wI' than an immediate trial. But that
such an experiment, \yith tbe odds admittedly
f'Tlormous against its success, may be risked as a
last desperate mo\"e does actually present it
('lf to
the German ('ommanders is probable.

A GENER\L SURVEY.

(C out i II/l ",/.)

I HA YE in last week's issue tabulated tbe
enemy's \iew of the struggle he deiiberatc1y
pro\'oked under eight heads:
I ne}".t propose to show how his right
guesses and wrong led up to the present situation.
1. The most important guess of all, the guess
which was at the bottom of the enemy's grand
strategy as a "hole, was wildly wrong. It was as
"Tong as the idea the Freneh He\ olution had about
the state of .England and of .English political
opinion in the year 1793: and it "as the (,Bemy's
uttpr miscalculation in this regard which, a" much
as anything eJse, defeat.ed his obje.t and forbade
his final victory in the \'ar he had promked.
So far from the Frendl General
taff beil1g
in peril of political confusif'n through the
trokf'
which would undoubtedly menace Paris. the enemy
were dealing, in the càse of that :--:taff. \\"ith :t
nody of men, who, more than any other in Europe,
"ere determined to l,e utterly rid of the Parlia-
mentarians the moment" ar b('gan, and to saC'fifice

Yery ci\Îlian consideration whatsoe\er to purely
military end
.
Pa'l'is did not act as a lure. The Frrl1l'h Phpl
was perfectly ready to s,H:rificc Paris. i r hý tlwt
sacrifice the campaigil as a whole could he \\on.
All threc contingencif's, therefore. "hich the Ger-
mans regp.J'ded as ('"hau
ti\'e. a.nd a<; e,)HTiug the
\\ hole field (d' pOfo:::;;ibilitie
, \\ ere in rea 1 it
, elimi-
nated before WHI' bee'an.
(a) The J.'r('nd
Arm\' had no intf'ntion of
directinO" its plan to the 1J1ere defenæ of l'aris.
(b) 1t thoroughly weB fore:,;a\\ the danger of

dividing its inferior forces. amI had no intclItioll
under any
tl'e
s of falling into that trap.
(e) The nd.ion was so organi!':ed. it was so
Illilitary in temper that, once ho:-.tilities had bf'gun,
no politicians, eyeTI if any had had the df'sire to
counsf>l a bad military operation, would haw be(,11
listened to.
The major consequf'nce
of this errol' in the
enemy's judgment moulded the whole war. It led
the enem
' to driw the mass of his men
traight on
Paris. It compelled him, when too near the forti-
fications of that fortre:;s, to swprve. He \\as
caught in tbe act of swerving. The disaster he
th('feby
nfi'ered hroke do\'> n al] his proyision of
rapid SUCèes
in tI,e "Test, whic-h was essential to
IJi
gellf'ral victory.
2, In ("hoosing the Belgian Plain as the line
of an adm})cc on Paris, the enemy was. in the
military scnse, ju
tified. This line would gi\'e
him ample railway cOlluuunications and the most
direct a\enUf of approach to the French Capital.
In IIi::; ,guess as to the nature of Belgium's l'esist-
uncf' the enemy was both right and wrong; right
in the calculation whi
h depended upon material
and nUUieri
al fadors. wrong. as he has always
he('II, in \"hat ut'i-wnded upon psychology. The
fortr('

es could not resist him, the BeJgian Army
cou!d but slightly and impel'fe
tly detain him in
the fidd, nut on the otlwr hanu he met with so
\ i
oroHs a :\utionall"f'si'-'Ìance, he waR so far from
attaining all <.IdvaìJce SCC'lll'e nnder :1 mere prot('!'t
(al-; at Luxl
mh\JlIrg) tÌlat Hll his military a(.tion
from the outhreal-.. of the war to the present day

6 11

.J unc 26, 1915.

LAND

hag been hampered by the ne.('e

it
of In:ating
Belgium as a conquered l'OlWt.l'Y. Ther
are tll,)SC
who have excused upon lJufply military ground

t.he whoIly novel anJ <lwazing procedure of
massacre, pillage, rape --and wor:-;e- -with which
the German Authoritie
tre.ated a '\"ation who
c
security t.hey had themselves sW"orn to presene.
These apologists, aJmittiIlg. of course, whate\ l'r
moml blame YOU ,.;iU in such conduct, maintain
that in the" purely milital'!! sense it haH
st.rengthened the German hands. They' are quite
wrong. The yiolation of Belgium a nù the policy
of wholesale massacre and savagery h:ls had three
most important consequences, each adverse in
their various degree to the German arms:
(a) It delayed at first by hampering com-
munications the deli\ery of munitions, pi\rticu-
larly of heav:y shell at the very end of the advan('e
on Paris:
(b) It has locked up in one way or another in
Belgium not less than 100,000 men as a garrispn
of that unhappy country throughout the whole
period of hostilities;
(c) (most important of all) it lws stratl''Ji-
call!! tied the Germans through all tlle future of
this C(l'rnpaign to tile corpse of tliaf [3elg.i ' !1lL
l.chiclt tlleY have killed. A reluctance 01' mabllity
to retire with safety and rapidity through
Belgium, a growing necessity or desire to pretend
the annexation of tliat countr.", leaves their grand
strategy to thÜ
day clogged, they are not free to
shorten their line where t.hey will. They must

.AXD

\V A TER.

hang on in the north. Compare the effect in
('entral and Eastern Spain upon t.he Marsha!s ot

apoleon a hundred years ago, especially when
the necessity for ref reat appeared.
3, In this third thCOT'Y the enemy was right
and the Allies were wrong. Permanent fortifica-
tiuns were easily dominated hy the modern siege
train, when that siege train and its munitionment
were in sufficient force, Xnte that it was to the
lusfl'irtn arsenals mainly, and to the Austrian
engineers that the enemy 'here owed his power.
4. In tt),e fonrth point, the power of modern
ra pid. roa<1 transit made good the \'Cry largest
flankmg movement, the enemy was wrong,
Perhaps it. was because the provision of suf-
ficient art.illery was irnpos8ible; but at any
nte, with an enormous superiority in number, the
cnemy's theory of enveloping here quite broke
down. I will suggest that it may perhaps have
been mainly due to his error in the fift.h point-
the use of dense masses in attack-which is of an
importance meriting longer discusion and which
I will anal:-se next week.

H. BELLOC.
(To be continued.)

MR BELLOC'S [ECTL'HES O
THE'" AR.

lr. H;laITo Beiloc will lecture on tbe War
t Queen'. Ha.ll 011
TlIeJ;.lay, July 13; and TU<!sda:y, July 2:7.

at8 013)' now be booked,
.At 3,30, the ".;nter Garden.q, Bournp'I\ouìb, !.f/md
y, June 28.
At 8 o'clock, tbo SpeKh Hill, \V)cembe .Abbey, High Wycombe,
011 Wedn
y, July 7,

THE

WAR
By A. H.

BY WATER.
POLLEN.

THE NAVAL SITUATION.

r.OTE,-This artide bas been submitted to tbe Press Dureau. \yllich does not object to the public.atioll as ceoso red. and takes DO
resp9nsibilit" for tbi: correctness of tbe statements.

T HE account of tbe aùvance of the Allied
forces in the GaHipoli Peninsula. pub-
iished on "T ednesdav morning. mentions
the services of the F
rench battleship, St.
Lou is, in keeping do\\ n t he fire from the forts on
the Asiatic side, but it makes 110 mefJ.tion of any
co-operation of the ship's guns with the land forces
in the actual advance. The fart that the St. LOll is
was engaged shows that it. was not from any fear
of German submarines that the battleships have
abstained from participation, The probability is
that the fighting took place on ground that the
na val guns could not reach.
Tuesday's Temps announced that t.he Allied
fleet had bombarded the town of Gallipoli, but it is
not officially confirmed. It is possible that this
bombardment coincidcd with the successful ad-
vance officially announced on Tuesday. From
Callipoli to Duhut Iskalessi, off which thp ships
might lie, is well within the range of 12-inch guns,
:>.nd as the town occupies a great dea.l of ground,
there is no reason why, with the assistance of air-
craft, a verveffective indirect bombardment should
not have ken carried out. There are no hills pro-
tecting Gallipoli from such fire. To the ordinary
members of the public, the principal interest of
both items of news lies in the fact that it is evidcnt
tha.t Admiral de Robeck has the submarine menace
well in hand.

Beyond this, the official news of naval activity
from all quarters is slender. In the Baltic,
a German auxiliary cruiser has hcld up the
Sweàisb cruiser 1'1101"sten. There is an uncon-
firmed report from Petrograd that the II amadieh
has been b[ldIy injured in an encûlmter with the
Black
ea Fleet. Beyond this t.here have only been
SOIl1e minor events in the Adriatic. One is dis-
tinctly curious. The Ita.lian submarine 111 cdusa
had the ill-luck to come to the surface in the im-
mediate neighbourhood of an Austrian submarine
that was showing her periscope only. The
Austrian had time to fire a torpedo before it was
itself detected, and the torpedo unfortunately;
proved fatal. It. is almost inconceivable that on

submarine could torpedo anot.her in anv other cir-
cumstances than these. It is well th;'t this ex-
planat.ion ha:;; been giwn, for I notice ibat in an
article in the Nautical Magazine, a merchant
service officer holding a fir:;t mate's certificate
describes how a ship he was on was submarined.
He declares that. the subrna rine fired when sub-
merged, without. her periscope being abo,-e water,
and conjectures that the conning tower of the sub-
marine was fitted with a P late-O'lass window
ð ,
through which an obserwr could see to fire without
using any visible optical device. If any such feat
as this were possible, the submarine wOlllrl be a far
more formidable weapon than it is: But under
wat.er, even in the bright.est ligbt, it is not possible
to see more tha.n a very few feet, certainly not a.
7-

8.

J:AND

AND

t

t('nth part of the tli:"-tancc m ('I' which this offic('r
Lad thc torpedo under \ iew t.bat sank bis ship.
Thf're hayc been two small Aust.rian raids:
one on the CO:1!:>t railway between Rimini and
Ancona, the other at Togliamento, at. the mouth of
the river of that name, which is opposite Trieste,
and about. fhe-and-t\\('nty miles away from it. In
neither .:ase ";ere the
\.ustrian råiding forces
destroyed.
The Fl'eu(:h A<lmira1t\- has announeed that
the English. French, :md Italian naval forces are
eo-operating in the Adriatic with a speeia 1 \ iew
to hunting out and destroying German and
Austrian submarine bases. but beyond this there
is no news, either of am' suceess 'by the German
submarines at the narda'nelle-;, nor àm' suCCPSSflll
1'ai(ls on the Turkish communications 'bv our sub-
marines. Thele is, indeed. a st(ll'Y puhlishetl in
l
ome of the
uccessful expedition of a Brit.ish sub-
marine in the
ea of
rr.rmara. But. there has been
no oflìcial aJIu:->ion to it, and it is probabl

merely
a repetition of t.he achiewments either of .E14 or
of Ell. There is a touch in the report of the land
attacks on the Turkish positions of .Tune 6th that
is of naval iptere.st. It. seems that. amongst othel'
utptures. on!ccrs of the (
'oeb(,lI anù Eres/au \\"ere
taken, togcther ,yith a Jllaehille gun from the
Jatter ship. This is a litt1e confu:>,ing, berau:<e we
know from HU:'>sian source" that the B1'(",;;1 f!/ "-as
engaged on .J l1lJè 11 "ith some de:>'troyers. If .my
naval aC'hil'wHlC'l1ts had becn looked fvr from
('ither of these sh ips, surely neither a gun nor a
man ,..ould 11;1\-e been removed from them,
I drew attention last. week to the fact that.
judgi.ng b
' )Ir. Churchill's Dundee sp('e
h an,l

fr. HUIlciman's ParliamentalT reference to the
forthcoming wheat supplies 'ft-om Odessa, tIle
?\finister!';
c('m to be "Cl'Y optimistit, about the
Dardanelles. This optimism has sinl'c been
Ftrongl
- c!lJl'lJ<l!:;!sed by the Prime )!inist(']'. On
t he 15th
lr. lu;quith dedared that he was Hot in
the least inJiHr()
;('d, in due course. to explain aJ1I1
justify what had hecn done (or was being done) at
the Dardanelles, but he asked the House to cxcuse
his doing so, bec-a use suc.h a discussion was not in
the best interest of the country,

s

,
(
)

THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN.

The inquiry into the loss of the Lllsitallio
and the extraordinary increase in the numb('l' of
submarine victims in" the first two weeks of June
ma
3 it worth while to examine the whole of t.his
question a little more closely. There is, there-
fore, published on the opposIte page a gra phic
statement in chronological order of the
total number of submarine victims, ships and
trawlers, British, Allied, and neutral, each loss
being set down to its approximate date. I belie\"e
both the numbers and the dates to be substantiaHy
accurate, but it is impossible to make tbem abso-
Jutely so. T he record includes a great many more
ships than figure in the weekly return issùed by
the Admiralty, \\ hich is limited to Brit.ish ship's
(,nly, a
d exdudcs the t.wenty-four allied ships
and thlrtY-Se\-en neutrals that bave been either
attacked or sunk.
For this idea I am largely indebted to
fr,
Cl llkley, the editor of the Motor Boat, who was
the first. to draw G.Hention t.o the periodicity of the
Bubmarme attacks, and to suggest an explanation.
To understand the extraordinary intensity
*8

,V ATE R .

June 26, 1915.

of the submarin(' aUac'k on our nlf'rchant ships
and trawlers in the first. fortnight in June it is,
it seems to me, nr.('e

ar:r to bear in mind the main
facts of the naval po"ition, for it is out of these
facts that this campaign arose. If Gernumy, pos-
srssing an infcrior number of the capital shins
on u.ltidt C07l11lVlìïd 01 thp sea depends, had clet;r-
lIlinC'd to make \\'a l' on (;rea t Britain. as we II as
('n ,France and HUt'sia, she would have taken
tw.o precautions. Tll{'fc are certain measures
that she would hayc taken ::>.s a preliminary
to making war. and she woulJ have waited
to make war unt.il circumstances were favour-
able. She would haw secured. if it. had becn
possible t.o do so, a. c<..'n('eTLtration of the nayal
forces avail;) ble to her and to her Allies. Some
excuse would have been made for bringing the
three Austrian Dreadnoughts to 'Vilhelmshaven,
for their junetion ,,-ith the German tied, 'would
ha\'e ma.de a \'aT nw teJ'ial differenc'e to the rela.-
tive :5trcngth of (he battle
quadrons. Besides this
!She would have seen that e"cn cruiser she could
spare was placed on the trarle routes, and she
"ould have armed e\-e1T liner for which she could
spa.re guns and men. arid distribut.ed t.hese scien-
tific-ally oyer the world. Haying made these pre-
limin:uy preparations, she would have chosen a
mument for making WilT when the British battIe
tieets were scattered. so that a snrpri:'e attack of
the GC'rBl:1ll High Seas Fleet, reinforced by the
A m:trian ])readnougIJt.s, could haw fallen upon
one or more of our f;quadro 1 }s and annihilatp<l
f'wry ship. A siJ1lnltalleon
atta.:k would have
l
en made upon rur trading ships the world oyer.
y\
e should th(,11 haye fouud our
elvcs suddenly
jJ\voly('(l in a nand war. \\"ith our strength in
l:attleships reduced either to equalitr or below
it, and \\ ith the whole comm
nd ('f the sea, and
with it securit,- for our trade and conlInunicè1.-
tions. still to wi'n.
o immediate military expedi-
tion a l )road 'would han been possible. 'Ye should
ha \-e been use I('ss as all i ('s.
But. what the German and Austrian staffs
intended in July la.st was not war on Great
Britain, but war on Europe, with Great Britain
remaining neutral. So confident were tbey of our
neutrality that they precipitated the crisis at a
moment when, as the\' had known for some
months would be the càse, t.he British Xavy was
JJlobilised on a scale and with a completeness
entirely unprecedented in our history. It was not
necessary for the Chancellor Hollweg to express
his terrified incredulity when the Brit.ish Ambas-
sador in Berlin infornÌcd him t.han an ill"asion of
Belgium would mean our participat.ion in the war.
It was not due to any sudden ad of genius by our
Admiralty. It followed inevitably from the situa-
tion. The German High Seas }'leet was illstantlYj
and for t.he rest. of the war confmed to its harbours.
The fate of such cruisers as were at large, includ-
ing yon Spee's China squadron and the Goeben,
wa.s theoretically sealeù. How soon t.hey met their
fate, anù what mischief they would be able to do
before meeting it, depended on the dispositions
of the British Admiralty and the skill and deter-
mination of the ,'arious British commanders-in.
chief. If the thing wa<; ballIy blundered, their run
might be longer. But the final issue was never in
doubt. It came with the battle of the Falkland
Islands. Germany thpn had to face the naked
fact that the war found bel' without effective
naval foræ and faced b J ' an unexpected enemy: on
land as well.

June 26, 1915.

L.A !\ D

AND

.W .\ T E R .

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19 Jð ,}l I t 2. J .oJ. S 6r 7 I '9 I
II .1 I.,} !oC !; .It> '7
May 1st Ju.ne ,.t
,
I
1
t ,
plJWlers rJ I rR .
: ' A--n
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t
19"''JJ 2"ZJ)f'i
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I
1
1
1

BJt-ITISH. .ALLIED, A.!'I'D NEUTlU.L VESfaELS SU
K BY &1:"B)'[..uu.
:ES,

J

VON TIRPITZ v. VO
HOLLWEG.

It is not at all improbable that from the very
beginning .of things the milita.ry stalls of Ger-
many and Austria took the direction of national
afia.irs entirely out of the ha.nds of t.he Chancellor
a.nd :!\-linisters. There were many indications that
the political m"ersights which w so affected the
German policy were the owrsights. not of tbe
dipillmats and
rinh.1ers, but of the soldiers. It
st"eIIIS quite certain that it \1\-as the disappointed
rage of the sailors that resulted in the astonish-
ing
eparture which we now know as the .. sub-
marine campaign:' Von Tirpitz's threat of
December became settled poliQ' early in the Sew
lear, and, in spite of American protests. the -sub-
mal'ine campaign began on-the appointed date in
FebI'uarv. If we a.re to understand the cour

1\hich this campaign has tai.-en
ve must realise
tbat it originated as a stroke of na"\:tl revenge.
Its professed object was to threaten an embargo
on tbe importation of foo&tuffs into England;
it was used &s a ie,yet' to get us to raise our eID-
ba.rgo on wheat enterin v German ports. But it
mnst always have been ob,-ious that it could ne\er
be a.n effèctive embargo(), and it is difficult to
believe that the CbanceHor ever supposed that the
threat would achieve a diplomatic suCX'ess.
This being the position, \\e should e
pect
the submarine campaign to haye been in all it

earlier stages tentative. the nayal party pushing
for the blind use of force, the statesmen urging
moderatiûn in a course that was regarded as an
exneriment, the effect {)f which "ras to be w
t.ched.
.. A superficial gla.nce at the graphic anti
chronological p
rrress of the submarine campaign
seems to confirm this theOIT.
ote, fGr insULnce,
that there is a considerablê pause aft{>l' the first
-opeumg of tbe campaign in the last ten da
-3 or
February. That campaign has iTIt-er
tillg
features .of its o"n.
ine ships v.ere atlach.OO.
bl"tween. Febrnarv 19 and Fe-hruarT" 26, indu:-.i \-e.
All the attacks bÙ.t two '''ere macle "in the Cha.nnel
between Folkestone and the (,hmr:el Islïmd:;. The

other two Wffe made in the neighbourhood of
Li ,"ecpool. From the 26t.h to the 7th there \1\-:15
a ten days. pause. Was this pause made with a
view to watching the effect? There is another of
four days at the end of the second week in April,
and but for two atta.cks in the Korth Sea, almost
a total cessation between April 18 and 28. There
is a lo
g pause of nine days after the Lusitania
campaIgn.

THE PERIODICITY THEORIES.

A theory has been propounded that these
pa uses are due to the submarines being recalled t{)
fill up "ith stores. fuel. and torpedoes. But if
refitting only were in questiC'n. there 'YGuld be no
oceasion to recall all the boats together. If a
speÓal effort had been made, as was the case with
tbe LusitanÙl, to capture a particular ship,
00" iouslv tlie more ðubmarines that were deyoted
to the pUrpGse tbe greater tbe chances of success.
But if it is
imply a question of running amok
nothing is gained by submarines working
together. They cannot support each other as sur-
face craft can do. They are exposed to less risk in
proporti-on as t.hey arc isolated. The daI\,c--er
from hostile destrGvers must obviously be less.
A second tbeòry has been propounded that
these IC'ug pauses are to Le explained by the ocC'tl-
f:.i()!lal recall either of all the boats or all e-x:cel't
one or two. so tJlat they could be availahle for
tbe disch3rge of their true military duties. TI,e
prima:ry duty of Ger;nan suhTllHrines is, of cour&t",
tf) atta!.,:k the main units {\f t hf' Báfish battle flf'{"t.
Oll:'e aI13tt
i("k "-'l m
LJ
Oil the I\udarleHes tho
e
w?ters ot:wionsh' leeame a fif'IJ for at. If'ast sonle
oÎ thr.m. Tpe attack:; GTI the English hattle fleets
in h011"!e wat-ers have fmm th.(' ,ery beginnir.g of
th
\'.ar until t.<3-d;Jy teen :>Lsolutch- frnitl('ss.
Bllt the!"" \\ë':5 tit !o:ecònda,ry fUll(.tion--=-to prote,,-t
th{"ir o
n ft("{'t 1'1 its ocr.a<:ional parades in the
:,orth
,'I.. In
'(1irg into the
orth Se.'t at aH,
the Genc:m F!e;:-t linð"''..il'

Jly tak
s risl
s, and it

,

9-

LA
D

AND

would net take those risks unless it were
guarded by mine-fields, Zeppelins, destroyers,
anlI subnH'.rines. The mines and the sub-
marines can be, and have undouhtedly been,
tlisposed 80 that a British squadron attack-
ing the German Fleet could be drawn into their
zone as into an ambush. Whether the theory that
the submarines bave been caned off to act in this
way is true or not cannot. be decided without know-
ledge of the dates on which the German Fleet has
come out--knowledge which is not available from
any public sources.
The knowledge which is available cert.ainly
lenùs c.olour t.o the supposition that for the first
three months of the war diplomatists were hold-
ing the sailors back and limiting the activity of
the submarines 80 as to gi,-e diplomacy a chance of
using the situation which their successes had
created. Two things seem to be almost conclusiye
on this point, First, the long pause after the sink-
ing of the Lusitania; next, the unpreceùented
ferocit.y of the work carried through in the first
fortnight in June. After the L'llsitania was sunk,
ever
thing depended upon the action which
America would take. 'Vas she serious in saying
that she would hold Germany to strict account '!
It. looks as if the diplomatist.s had insisted upon
time for these questions to answer themseh'es. By
June it had hecome obvious that the American
situation had become serious. An insolent reply
had been sent, and had been recogllised as insolent.
It was obvious that GNman prestige I1lUst be kept
up. Germany has only one prescription in this
matter. The campaign must be made more fright-
ful. Pi racy and murder, t.hen, were enlisted once
more to lwIÌ)-or embarrass-diplomacy.
During t.he first nill{'ty-sen>TI dars of the
campaign nineLy-five ships were attacked. In
the next twenty-two days fift.y-four. From some-
thing less than a rate of oTIe ship per day, it had
gone up to two and a half. HiO'h a
this rate is
compared with ,,,hat it was, the actual ratio of

hips lost to the Hhipping coming in and leaving
British ports is
tin unimportant. ,From the point
)f view of an at.tack on the national wealth or on
the national Rource of supplies, the campaign
['emains as it began-completely ineffecti,-e as a
nulital'Y measure. But. it. is worth asking our-
,elves if this rate wilJ he maintained or increai:.ed.
It depends upon two things-first, the political
'Hoti,-e which may actuate to supreme direction of
German policy; next, th{' facilities that Germany
possesses for carrying on the campaign.

THE FUTURE OF THE CA
lPAIGN.

On thp politicê\l side, a great deal win turn
upon the action of America. Sothing in the last
"eek throws any further light upon the state of
American opinion, which, on the whole, seems
resolute to support the President.
Ir, Brvan's
efforts to create' a peace pa.rty do not seem to be
succeeding. The situation remains, therefore, that
America would ha,e no ehoice between war and
the s:!rrifice of ::;clf-rpspect, so that the issue is not
in doubt. Germany must eitheL' cpase tbe cam

paign or be prer;,ue(! to fight America as well.

upposing she elects to fight, can she continue
the submarine campaign
Can she make it more
intense
rndoubteJh- it seems to me she can do
, , ,
both. There is no douht that her facilities for
manufacturing submarines will increase, and not

WATER.

June 26, 1915.

diminish, with time. But, while this is so, certain
facts are reassuring.
Practically no ship has been attacked in the
Channel - that is, between east of a line from
Portland to the Channel Islands and west of the
Straits of DmTer-sinc.e the beginning of the
second week in Apri1. In this limited area,
therefore, the defensi,-e measures taken by the
Admiralty seem to have been perfectly successful.
The fact that not a single transport or Channel
steamer has been successfully attacked, since the
beginning of the war has always been eloquent of
the effectiveness of the men.sùres taken by the
Admiralty in these waters. But the public might
naturally suppose that these measures were
limited specifically to the protection of the trans-
ports and Channel steamers and not to making a
given area immune from submarine attention.
Alt.hough the Channel passenger traffic and the
Army transports ha-\-{' escaped, there was in the
first seven weeks of the campaign a very heavy;
toll taken of ships in tbe eastern haIr" of the'
English Channel. Indeed. the waters between a
line drawn from Dover to Calais and another
from Havre to Portsmouth "itnessed attacks
of no less than eighteen ships between February
] 9 and April 8. But from April 8 on this part
of the Channel appears to have been perfectly
c1
ar, It is also gratifying that, except for two
ShIpS on June 12 that were sunk between Liver-
pool and the Isle of Man, there has been no
casualty in the Irish Sea north of St. George's
Channel since the 8econd week in March,
I t is, of COlll'S{" obvious that precautions can
he taken in narrow waters which cannot be taken
where waters are more open. It will be remem-
bered that in the earlier days of the" Blockade ,.
the Admiralty announced that the North Channel
-that is, from :Fair Head to the Mull of Can

tYl'e-was closed t.o all traffic. Any submarine,
therefore, wishing to operate off Liverpool would
have to enter by
t. George's Channel, which is
not fifty-three miles across, and would have to
make good its exit by the same way. Similarly.
the Straits of Dover were announced to be closed.
so that submarines, to operate in the Channel,
would have to go right round Scotland and Ire

land and enter from the Atlant.ic. From La
Hogue to Portland Bill is about the same distance
as across St. George's Channel. For practical pur

poses, therefore, traffic between England and
France and between England and Ireland is safe.
But it is equally obvious that no preventive
measures have succeeùed generally in mitigatino.
the operations of submarines either in the
orth
Sea or on the,'Vest Coast of Scotland and Ireland,
or in the approaches to the English and St.
George's Channels.

THE NEW WAR LOAN

The ,new War Lua!1 is bound to be a
ncoess, Cor it appeal!! to e\'erJ,
class of IIl\'ßstor, and IS Counded on the lllghest security in the ,,"orld--
the"Eriti
h Empi
e.
t ("arries intere.st,at 4! per
nt., and provides fo

optIOnaL )"cdpmpbon III ten, or certam redemptIon in t.wenty Y&rB.
Holders of the First \Var ],03n, of Consols, and certain Government
annuities cn.n connrt th
ir llOlòillgs into New War Loan Stock-but the
E-oundest Ceature ill this gign.ntic S<.'heme i!! the opportunity it affords to
the small imestor to share in the great obligat.iolUl whicÌÍ the war ha.I
imposed on the eountr
'. There can be no better or more a.cceptab1ø

orm,oC thift for tho working classes, whose inco
e has, generally apeak.
lIlg, lIlcreased more than that of any other claas 111 the community and
no better employment of capital than in the supreme interest. of the
Sta t.e.
Those who knew Mr, McKenna'ø financial abiIity were gnatlJ
pleased when he bocame Chancellor oC the Exchequer, and the wodd at
large will approve the stat.esman1ike h3.'lis of his finance at a time "'_
England ha.s gra\e n
d oC st,,-te
meD. -
10*

June 26, 1915.

.

SEEN

AT

I.-NIGHT ON
By a

I T was time to start, N or had I ever so reluctantly left
a squalid place. How warmly the firelight flickered
on the walls and beams of that wayside farm-kit-chen in
Picardy I How comfortable even the fì1thy farmyard
looked amid its enclosing lofts and byres! And the
two mis-shapen rooms where we had billeted four days, Dirty
they were and difficult and cavernous, yet to-night 60 enticing.
Outside there had sprung up a little chilly evening wind. But
yesterday I should have sat by the window, reading. And
now there lies before us the three-mile walk to the t.renches, n
long night's watching, four days and four nights in the firing
line. ,
'We march off.
Into a wintry sun
et. For it is t,he season of early
"pring. The road is yet muddy aft-er
cent rains. The dank
fields lie cold and uninviting on either hand, Approaching
the cross-roads, we quicken step, for are not they marked by
the German artillery
'
And of all the dreary places in all the dreary lands that
I have seen I picture this group of wayside houses as the
r;adde!'t. Always-except when the working parties hurry by
-an unnat.ural stillness reigns. Roofless skeletons of hous..s
and houses broken in a score of places; people creeping in
and out, French pea!'ants who cling pitifully to the relics of '
their llOmes; children peering out of the windows and door-
ways, too scared to play; heaps of ruins, and everywhere a
great lonely emptiness.
We turn off into the fields. Yet the sunset is still in
tbe sky, and it is too light to cross the open lands. We must
wait. The men smoke cigarettes a'nd fãll t<J talking after their
inconsequent fashion about the prospects of the night, also 3f
professional football, and-their suppers. Now darkness
creeps up and the sun dips beyond the grey rim of the
Flanders plain. It is twilight. We move on across the
ploughed field. Not a sound, not a murmur of war. Until of
a sudden we are in the road again, a road congested with
troops. Battalion headquarters are here, and many transport
wagons unloading by the wayside. Long files of men in hoods
and caps and heavy equipment, the rifle slung over the
shoulder, move slowly along towards the trenches. There
are orderlies on horseback, sitting their horses like statues
silhouetted against the evening sky,
We crawl forward presently at mail's pace until clear
of the congested trench parties, then turn off to the left
down a path, following a light ammunition railway. On the
one hand are overhanging trees, on the other gbastly wreck'!
of houses. Soon we come to the little cemetery where our
comrades lie, H. T" with the unfailing laugh, and C. 0., wID
fen in action on the night of December 19, winning his
D.S,O. He was only eighteen. And many others, bearing
humbler names-they rest there, amid the shell-pits and the
ruined houses, under white wooden crosses, Nor can I pass
by tbat spot, melancholy as it is, without recalling the com-
pany sergeant-major's sly humour. Never would he brim

the nervous newlj-joined subaltern down that way but he
showed him with unction, with emphasis-and a twinkle in
his eye-that little cemetery of nameless graves.
Tha occasional bullet" ping-ing JJ across our path tells WI
Low near we are to the t
nches. Some desultory rifle-fire in
front gives additional warning. Soon we are in the machine-
gun zone and, stooping low, we hurry along the ditch beside
the white strip of road, then across an open bit of plough
towards the sheltH of a parapet. Suddenly a machine-gun
opens. 'Ve fall flat, and the bullets whistle o\'"erhead as the
devilish thing sweeps round. Then we creep along behind
the parapet which leads rather steeply to a ruined barn. Here
the troops in resen-e are crouching over the fires they bave
kindled, cooking their supper. The fire casts a strange glare
around. It is a place of shadows and passages and creeping
ermed men. The company whom we are to relieve files out
of the trenches and we file in.
I place my sentries. I lay down my pack and equipment
in tbe dug-out. Carrying only my revolver, I walk along the
line of the breastwork, noting here an improvement, there a
defect. Climbing the rear face of a little hill, I sit
down behind the machine-gun emplacement, whien is safe
and a vantage-point. From there towards the enemy I can
look across the plain.
I see a wide and shadowy country. Tbe moon is rising
out of the calm night. A little wind whines and whi
per9
11*

, .

.&J ...." .

THE

FRONT.
HILL.

THE
Sub.

among the sandbagg. I 5ee dimly a land of poplars and 5DlaD
trees (dwarf oaks), orchards, and plentiful willow!. I øee
flat fields and ditches and stagnant water, and red fal'Dl5
",hose roofs are gone, stark skeletons in the moonlight. I
see broad flat spaces and then a ridge-the ridge of Auber8.
Only the German lines are hidden from sight.
No sign of life. Silence and desolation reign. :But here
and there the faint glimmer of a fire indicates the presence
of the enemy. Afar off, rockets, red and gr
en and white,

hoot up to the sky, star shells bursting above our t
ncheø
cast their baleful light around. Strange tv.isted figures of
trees stand out against the horizon. There is no sound bub
an occasional home-like mating-call of partridges in the fields
and the peculiar laughing cry of the little speckled owl which
here, liS in England, dwells amongst the orchards.
How many nights have I wa
d that scene from my
post on the hill! And suddenly out of the long silence t.here
llave come t,he obscure reminders, the swift 1>tirrings of war.
The faint clink of spades away down in the trench, stertorous
masculine breathing, a muttered exclamation. Sometimes a
lOt ray bullet whistled out of the darkness and went singing
on its way; sometimes a part.y of IOoldiers, heavily burdened,
t,ramped by, crouching low. Oft.en-about the middle of the
night---a machine-gun spoke with its metanic .. clack-clack JJ
or th
sharp crack of a rifle came from near at hand or Bome-
where afar off a great gun boomed sullenly. Then silence, and
I would listen int-entIy. Only the" clink-clink, clink-clink-
clink," of our own picks and shovels at work and eighty
yards away the answering "thud-thud" of the German
wiring parties driving in their stakes.
Then I would rise, and, creeping to the parapet of the
fort, peer o\'"er, my head and body partly concealed by the
machine'gun. The ground sloped sharply away to the oon4
fused region of moonlight and shadows. At first the eyes
could not probe this dusky space. Yet after a few moments
one found them out-flitting here and there, fetching, carry"
ing, digging, working like little demons of men, bent figuret
IOilhouetted in the moonlight. And occa!'ion
lly the non-com-c
missioned officers could be heard cursing those grey soldiers of
the Empire. There was a part.ial truce between us. By nigh(
we all worked at that part of the line i by day we fough'
desultorily.
And night by night., as I watched, the strange silent'
mystery of it all o\'"erwhelmeù me. Now anù again a riff..
cracked and at int.ervals there came to the ear the inferna(
" clack-clack" of the machine-gun, than which there is n8
sound more terrible in war. It was on such a clear moonlit
night, when a fresh wind blew to the nostrils the first 8centA
of spring, that a man working in the midst of his fellows fell
silently to the ground-dripping bIood-nor ever spoke again..
And thereafter I could not re
t alone on the hill but t,h8
horror of such things crept over me. The interminable lines
of watching men stret.ching away into the dim distance
towards the battlefield of Ypres, where the gUlls boomed and
the crackle of rifle-fire went on all night long-the intermin.
able lines of watching men awaiting their chance to kill, to
wound-for why 1 None knew, none cared. The same blood,
the same God, the same humanity, the same mentality, the
IOarne leve of life, the same dread of death-I did not hate
then, but I pitied.
And sometimes, as I watched, there would come on the
wings of the night a weird low sound of singing, Strangely
it rose and fell and trembled on the wind, then died away..
The Bolemn cadences of .. The Watch on the Rhine," tbe
triumphal pæan of the Austrian National Hymn, and often
strains of wild windy music, like the soughing of pine forestJr
-such songs as the Southern Germans love-these floa
d
across when all else was Irtill, And often there came the
sound of a mouth-organ, cheap and bizarre, to remind me of
a café chantant in Paris, or-why, I know notr--of the hot!
midday in some London street.
Then would I make a tour of my posts and see the working
parties home to bed. And time and time again, as I crossed
the moonlit patches or the littIe plank-bridge near by, a rine
cracked close at hand and a playful bullet whistled past my
head. The
saw me, they waited for me i one day they woul

get me. Fmally the dawn broke across that dreary plain
more fresh, more beautiful than a woman's face. The night
wind sank, the moonbeams and the shadows fled away. And,
creeping into my little den, I fell asleep. -

LAND

AND

YV..ATER.

June 26, 1915.

i\lR.

BELLOC'S

BOOK
II.

WAR.

By THOMAS
(Proft.Ssor of English,
T HE point:! left over from my last week's considera-
tion of Mr. Belloc's General Sketch of the
European 'Val' were mainly two. First, his
treatment of the numerical factor, and, secondly,
his eloquent vision in the form of a peroration, in
which he treats of the historical continuity of the German
menace, Like Napoleon and most other lIoldiers, he Is
profoundly persuaded of t.b.e validity of big battalions,
Gltimately all Enropeans have much the same potential
moral. "The most remarkable general diBcovery in the
war hlis been the endurance and steadiness under los:l
of conscript soldiers." It had been Mid during the long
peace that short-service conscripts would not stand up to
professional or long-service soldiers, To this theory the
Manchurian and Balkan campaigns gave a sufficient answer
if men would only have heeded it. Tbe present war leaves
no donbt on the matter. "The short-service conscript army
has in tlus matter dOM better than anything that was known
in the past. " No; it is left to the priest and the politician
to repeat tbe cynical old fable about the volunteer being
worth ten pressed men, Truly, as Matthew Arnold said,
Britain is a country invented for the beatification of cant and
claptrap--cant about "militarism," claptrap about th9
" volunteer." A breath of candour about onr historic armies
and the met,hod'l used in recruiting them would blow away
for ever this cynical and enervating twaddle. When a small
band of genuine volunteers from the City of London, inspired
by heroic motive, went to the place of embarkation to take
shipping to defend Antwerp three and a quarter centuries
ago they were confronted by a crowd of sweepings from the
gaols, men recruited in Falst.aff's fashion. A lett-er from
the front asking for more intimated that "our men perish
like flies, but our need for more is great; see that they may
be sent with dispatch, for it is urgent, and I pray thee tllat
these be not so lousy as the last." It was the same with
the" volunteers" for Blenheim, who had to be kept in hulks
to prevent desertion. And what a.bout genuine volunteers
for our American wars of the eighteenth century, among the
r"nk and file 1 It would need a microscope to diecern them.
The two most dangerous armies we have ever had, Cromwell's
and "'ellington's, can only be termed volunteer armies by
courte!')'. 'They were replenished by pressed men, hardly, if
at all, less than was the na\'Y. .. They have given me an
infamoas army, by God," said tbe victor of '\1"aterloo. By
"they" apparently be meant. the Justices of the Peace and
the subsidised allies. For if it has not been the compulsiou
of the law that has given us our volunt
ers, past and present.,
it hail assuredly been the compulsion of brute circumstance
or a confidence trick based upon the most humiliating
cajolery, such as the assurance tacitly given to the T,F. that
Saturday afternoon soldiering would be all that God or man
could conceivably demand of them. On BUch maxims as
these, then, the revolting fallacy of which is exposed with
withering accuracy in .. The Green Curve" [" The Limit JJ],
Ï8 the imposing fabric of our British Pacifism grounded and
reared. 'Ve satirise the unfairnesil of taxation and the privi-
leged class under the ancien rtgime, but what other nation
in the world has granted the privilege of exemption from the
supreme tax to all who merely take the tradesman like pre-
caution of protesting against war on principle, but have never
exhibited even a glimmer of aversion to grasping any conceiv-
able profit that the chances of war may throw in their way 1
The God of Blood and Iron is repulsive: agreed. But
have we not cllerished the peace-idol too much in our hearts
for some time past 1 Cant against war and cant against
soldiering bas creared an impres!'Iion among presuming
folk that our feet were cold aud that, what-ever hap-
pened, we were not "for war. .. Yet, as a matter
of fact, we had already been in a state of war for a
period considerably anterior to August, 1914. Germany had
for a long time been bent upon our destruction, and from the
moment that a state of war is decreed by the predominant
aeMe of a nation it cannot end, really, until the will to war
ceases mutually and by consent. This we ought to have dis-
cerned, Rnd our Western politicians cannot ea."ily be forgiven
for tbe fact. that they did their utmost to the last moment to
keep us blindfolded, But some said, " Yet a little more sleep,"
..hile others, like the great farceur Pélissier, were convinced

at the absence of a tariff wall had cut away the ground from

ON

THE

SECCOMBE.
R,M,C., Sandlwrst,)
an invader. When the Germans penetrated t.he English Home
in his delightful travesty they found it richly
uruished and
inhabited by compatriots who damned them for their pains--
England was theirs already! ,Every object in the house Wa!i
promptly turned upside down and discovered to be " made in
Germany," with the exception of a BecÌ1stein piano.
The book ends with a :Michelet-flight of historical synthesis
recalling t.he fine work, unrivalled, so far as I know, that Mr.
Belloc has done in books like his" Marie Antoinet.te, JJ "The
Girondin," and" The Eye-Witness," This war compels him
to conjure up the returning again of those conflicting spirits
-spirits like those in "The Dynasts "-which had bee:!
seen over the multitudes in the dust of the Rhone Valley when
Marius came up from Italy and met the chaos in the N orth--
the clash between the ancient European civilisation and the
quickly growing, quickly dissolving ou
r mass which con-
tinually learns its lesson from civiliied men and yet can never
perfectly learn that lesson. They had come this time in over-
whelming numerical superiority, in a flood, in a sweep that
has no parallel in the monstrous things of hiswry. . .
II And all along the belt of that march the things that
were the sacrament of civilisation had gone. Rheims wag
possessed, the village churches of the' Island of France' and
of Artois were ruins or desolations. The peasantry already
knew the destruction of something more than such material
things, the end of a certain social pact which war in Christen-
dom had spared. They had been massacred in droves, with no
purpose save that of terror; they had been net.ted in drove
,
the lit.tle children and the women with the men, into captivit.y.
The track of the invasion was a wound struck not, as other
invasions have been, at BOrne territory or some dynasty; it
was a wound right home to the heart of whatever is the West,
or whatever has made our lett
rs and our buildings and our
humour between theUL There was a death and an ending in
it which promised no kind of reconstruction, and the fools
who had wasted words for now fifty years upon some imagined
excellence in the t.hings ext-erior to the tradition of Europe
were dumb and appalled at the sight of barbarism in action-
in its last action after the divisions of Europe had permitted
its meaningless triumpb for so long. Were Paris entered,
whether immediately or after that approaching envelopment
of the armies, it would be for destruction, and all that is not
replaceable in man's work would be lost to our children at
the hands of men who cannot make. JJ
There was something in them always-tllese Germans-
of the back forest, averse to the life of the walled city. In
their moods there was often something pathetic as of Cali bans
",ho alllpired to lick the hands of Culture, or in sentimental
mood warbled bird notes and sought to catch and tame the
pret.Ly grey squirrel of the pine woods. Their genius was in
the back rather than the brain, but their diligence and their
laborioullness was limitless, and they tbought by intellect
alone to 801ve the intimate riddle of the universe. Dii-
cipline, the Drill Sergeant, and the Science. which they
adaptJd rather than created, became their gods. The neutrals,
who knew them not, were dazed by tbe prosperity of this cult
of success and forgot to ask, when they propounded their Will
to Power doctrine, The Will to POlV
r to fL'/tat? And t.heir idol
befitted them well: Bismarck, tbe grand carnivore, the worst
of the century after Napoleon. The man without scruple, to
whom all means were good in the national lawsuit, who bent
the corn
rs of the cards when luck did not serve him
(" Blessed be the hand that falsified the Ems telegram "),
vindictive, cruel, insensible, jealous, already ready to invoke
the Frederick tradition. .. Trust me to find a CasUI belli
within twenty-four hours. The sycophants of the study will
always justify a fait accompli. \Vhatever is, is might." II;
ii! with the psychology of a people bred in this faith, wantonly
arrogant and aggressively rude by nature, that the Spil'it of
the West in Europe is remorselessly at war.
After a vivid survey of the horrors of invasion by thi.
eJ<.ulting horde last September, the author is in a position to
give to his Di.urat just a Swiftian touch of the terrible, with
an added vauueness all Ius own. .. That is the vision that
should remai
",ith those who desire to understand the future
the war must breed, and that is the white heat of energy
which will explain very terrible things, still ma
ked by the
fut.ure, and undreamt of here.'

THv\IAS SECCOMBB.

12-

June 26, 1915, LAND AND WATER.
THE WAR IN THE AIR.
IS THE ZEPPELIN INVINCIBLE?
By F. A. Talbot.

T HE recrudescence of a certain Zeppelin li\"eliness bolts holding the framework together. The various girdenl
upon the Eastern coast, and the e
cape of the are induced to move so seriou!'ly as to cut the heads and nut!!
aerial invader, has 0111'1' more revin'd the parrot- off the rivets as cleanly as if severed by a pair of shears.
cry, ""There are our defending aeroplanes and An ideal position for attacking an airship which i..
anti-aircraft gnns 1" The fact that these corsairs moving in the vertical l)lace is one immediately below the
IIf the skies invariably complete their fell work of di
tributing airship, since the gnns and rifles on the latter cannot be
death and destruction without suffering any mauling in the depressl'd sufficiently to hit the comparatively small target
process has created a distinct feeling of uneasin
ss in the offered by the heavier,than,air machine. On the other hand,
minds of the more timorons, who are beginning to wonder the men in the Jatter are not particularly hampered by being

hether, after aU, the Zeppelin is not invested with extra- forced to fire directly npwards; it is no more tr}'ing than
or<Î':nary properties of invulnerability, and wi}} be able to shooting at pheasants pa3sing overhead. So far as the
exercise the command of the air! As a matter of fact, it has men in the aeroplane are concelned, their objective, when
come to be regarded in some quarters as a kind of super- attacking from this position, is rather the disablement of the
dirigible, and a meed of abuse is being meted out concerning propening machinery and the killing of the crew than the
t.he supiness of our anthorities in acc
pting the general hitting of the gasbag itself. TI,E lattcr con not be damafled
opinion of this craft as a "mechanical monstrosity," and uriQu
l!l by fll/ll'frre. 'rhe system of compartmenting, or sub-
thereby underestimating its qnalities. dividing the vl'Ssel into eighteen compartment
, eadl of which
The briHiant exploit of the late Lientenant 'Yarneford, contains a hydrogen-inflated balloon, nuUifies this form of
V,C" in successfnUy sending a Zeppelin and its crew to their attack very complet.ely. A bnJlet \\il1 merely make two punc-
last account has sen'ed to revive drooping spirits to a certain tures-one where it ent.ers a 1 ld the other where it emerges
degree, and has proved that the Zeppelin is no more immune from the baUoon respectively. In its flight the missile will
from attack than any other ves
el. Incidenta]]y, it has been not fire the gas. The punctures in the envelope will be so
reöponsible for the inquiry as to why our defending airmen slUaU that, although a gas lpak will be precipitated, the
cannot do likewise. exudation of the inflating agent will proceed so
lowly as to

o ves
el is easier to de.,troy in theory than tlle Zeppelin, affect the airship very slightly, and even this loss can be
owing to its enormous bulk. The latest craft mea5Ul'e 525 connterbalanced by the di!>charge of banast.
feet in length, by some 30 feet beam, so that a huge target On the ot,h('r hand, if the machinery can be put out of
is cffered to hostile fire. In actnal pract.ice, no air<;hip is so action, even only partially, snccess is imminent. Directly
difficllÌt to put hors tiE combat, the !>ize of t.he target notwith- the airship bel'on'es deprind of its independent speed-that
!'tanding. As a matter of fact. Lieutpnant \\Tarneford in his is, the speed developed by t.he motors, and which exceeds the
feat demon<;trated the only effective means of sending theso velocity of the air-currents, thereby enabling the vessel to
ve"sels to destruetion-bg [/t:ff;ng 0"01'(' t!t('m, and l
lIIncl,;nfl mo.e in any àirection-it re\'erts to the status of the ordinary
II bomb to ;gTÚfc tile flG""QIl8 dWI'flC 11'ith ll'hicll the IWff" flas- baUoon. It becomes the sport of the wind. Its pursuit,
bag Í-ð inflated, which, owing to its pronounced lifting power, atta(:k, and ultimate destruction are siml)lified very appreci-
is hydrogen, Parenthetically, it may be observed that ably. It cannot dodge its pursuers because it is ahle to move
"-arneford in his aèhiévement exposed another German bluff, only in one direction-that of tlle wind. Its position i

'The vessel he de
troyed was one of the lat6t" which, accord- rendered additionally precarious because, under such con-
iug to sedulously disseminated Teuton intenigelJce, was in- ditions, its immense dimensions and weight conh'ibute to its
flat-ed with a non-inflammable gas! peril. It win plunge and ron to such an extent as to set up
From the meagre details which have been published, it is d""tntcti\"e int.ernal stnins, and, if it does not break its back,
difficnlt to realise how Lieutenant Warneford succeeded in it will tumble head foremost to the ground. The first Zep-
gaining the advantage of position-that is, a point above the pelin less in the war, which occurred in the Y osges as a result
airship. It appears to be a straightforward operation to race of direct attack, was attributable to the disablement of the
upwards through the air to gain paramount position. The machinery. Absolnti;ly ullcontronable, the monster plunged
average individual wonld lay the odds npon the aeroplane, finany into a forest t<J roll over and spra"l itself among the
in view of the extreme altitnde to which a pilot has driven trees.
his machine, as, for instance, Hawker's record of 20,000 feet, But if the attacking aeroplane secures command of
and from the fact that the heavier-than-air machine can position so that it get
immediately abo\-e the Zeppelin, the
attain a far greater altitude than the Zeppelin, the safe limits latter can I!carcely hope to escape destruction, because it is
of whi:
h are about 12,000 feet. Bnt in " climbing," if such exposed to the only missile which is capable of firing the
a term may be used, the speed advantage is with the airship. bydrogen wit,h which it is inflated-the bomb. Even in this

l'1.E dimen,si01l in u'hic1l thE airship e:rnZ8 is thE one Ï1
which extremity the Zeppelin has one possible avenue of escape, but
thE P01UrtJ of tlle aeroplane fall to the minimu11I. In other it is of a desperate cllaracter. This is to take a\'ail of it!!
words, the airship is able to take the utmost advantage of the speed in the vertical plane in the reverse dired.ion-to
aeroplane's most pronounced weakness. The latest t}'pes of descend rapidly. This end can be consummated only by
Zeppeiin ha\"e an ascensional speed of 3,000 feet per minute, releasing a vast volume of gas, and must be carried out 1'31'1'-
which is equi\'alent to an average of thirty-four miles an fuHy so as nol; to disturb the dynamic equilibrium or longi-
hour. The mention of the latter figure may seem superfluous, tudinal stability of the vessel. It must descend upon an e.en
Lut the reason therefor I will explain lat-er. Moreover, it keel. But this finalmo\'e is made in the hope of cat.ching the
moves in this plane in a direct vertical line-that is, upon au aeroplane overhead napping. Fearing that his prey may
even keel. On the other hand, when the aeroplane desires to escape him, the aviator, in his attempt to keep within easy
make a rapid ascent, resort must be made to "spiralling," distance or point-blank bomb-droPFing range of his foe, may
and in this operation, although the speed may be maintained, overshoot the mark and thus lose his command of position.
progress in the vertical direction is relatively slow, as those Should this occur, the Zeppelin is arrested in its downward
who have att
mded an aerodrome have obsen'ed when an air- descent, and by hurriedly discharging objects overboard pell-
man sets out deliberately to climb as fast as possible to a mell, a snfficient reascending effort may be imp:irted to enabla
certain height, in order to "loop the loop." the airship to regain superior position. This was evidently
The Germans 11a"e always recognised that the tactical the ruse which was pnt into execution by the commander of
position for effective attack upon a Zeppelin is directly above, the Zeppelin destroyed by J.ieutenant \Varneford. "Gnior-
and accordingly special attention has been devoted to nnllify tunately for the Zeppelin the aviator kept llis head, and
the attainment of this position as mnch as possible. The merely descended sufficiently to make sure of his bomb.
Zeppelins have been given as high an ascensional velocity as :But manæuning under and also above a Zeppelin must
tJle structure of the metal framework win permit, and, be it be condncted with extreme caution. In flying upwards at
noted, this maximum speed must not be approached except in the speed of 3,000 feet per second, a terriiying vortex is pro-
instances of dire emergency, inasmuch as the vessel, when duced beneath the air"hip, and, if the aeroplane should be
flying upwards at such a velocity, is submitted to enormous engulfed, its own de
truction is certain. Some idea of the
Etrains, which exert severe shearing stresses upon t.he metallic character of this vortex may be readily gathered by standing
framework. AH vessels are submitted t<J the ascensional test, upon the platform of a railway station to watch a traiH pa!;s-
and these are of sufficient severity, according to my source of ing at the sl)eed of 34 miles an hour, which is equivalent to
information, aa to canse, oCèasionaHy. severe
hearing of the that of a Zeppelin ascending at 3.000 feet per minule. The
13*

I
A N D

t,umõlIt hehind th!' train i.. !'ufficiput to whirl paper and other
lighl artide:< iu all direClion
, owing to the rllPh of the mole.-
cules (,f air to fi:l the vacl\l;m created imm!.'diatcly behind the
last carriage, I f such au ag;tation find rush of air prevail
behind a rail'way train where the o\Yer-aH area is ouly about
10 feet in height by 6 feet in width, what must it be im-
mediat-ely beneath an airship travelling at identical speed, but
where the surface Plea&ures 525 feet by 30 feet! It is safe to
assert that no aeroplane could live wit,hin a considerable radill

of the centre of di"turbance; it would be drawn into the vortex.
If the a\iator be immediately above the airship when a
rapd descent, is made by the latter, the aeroplane would
e
drawn downward;!, and its equilibrium would be destroyed,
as in the c
e of Lieutenant Warneford's machine.
When the vulnerability of th
Zeppelin from overhead
attack was first appreciated, an effort to remedy this di!'ad-
vantage was made by mounting a quick-firing gun upon the
top of the vesseL 'rrials were made with this weapon, but it
was found that the recoil of the weapon caused a pronounced
vibration of the structural members of the l"igid framework.
Af'cOlodingly, the fixed quick-firer was abandoned, altbough
the poÚtion was preserved for the convenience of one or two
wembers of the crew ar\Jled with magazine rifles, which it
was maintained would be adequate to repel hostile attack
during the period the airship was being prepared for a
hurried descent. This fact is worthy of mention, becau
e it
is claimed that the gun position upon the top of the airship
was abandoned owing to the danger of the flashes from the
arm firing the hydrogen gas exuding from the envelopes of
the halloons within, but this escape of gas is just as observable
below as above the airshipo
Until such time as artillery science produces a mis.qil

which will ad in a similar manner to the bomb depending
upon the force of gravity for its volition, and which upon
st.riking the envelope will disrupt t.he latter and fire the in-
flammable gaseous contents, the only means of bringing a

ANU

,W ATE TL

June 26, 1915.

Zeppelin down is by securing a position overhead, Thi3 fal't
has been appreciated by ('ount von Zeppelin and the Gêrman
military department from the very fin:t, But there has
alway'! b('en one I!aving fador. 'I'he aeroplanf' does not
püssess the capacity to hover; it must travel at an appreciable
speed to maintain dynamic equilibl'ium in the air, Hurling
a bomb from a rapidly moving vehicle at a definite target i5
one of the most difficult tasIrs; a miss is more likely to be
recorded than a hit, The possibility of a dirigible being
pitt.ed a
ail\st a ditOigible i!l too remcte to be entertained, but
if one such vessel should get the position above another vessel
of this type, then the fate of the uuder,dog is sealed. COD!Ie-
quent.ly, all things considered, it was accepted in Teul;on
military circle!' that it would be an extremely difficult task
for the hostile aeroplane to secure the dominating position;
the possession of the speed gauge was against the enemy.
The desb'uctioll of the ZE'ppelin in Bêlgium has precipitated
a snarl of int.ense rage through Germany, not so much
because the Zeppelin was destroye.l, but. for the plain reason
that the British had discovered the tactical point of attack
and had proved the vulnerability of the mechanical mon-
I!trosity when assailed from such a point. In a word, the
Allies have learned the true significance oÍ !lFtting ahol'e the
Z:;,ppelin, and one may rest assured that in all future opera-
tions less effort will be expended upon the firing of rifles and
machine guns in the hope of disabling the l'ropêlling
machinery; the wain object. of attack will be to force the air-
ship to the under po!-ition, so as to bring it within bomb
range, because the bomb dropped from overhead is the only
known means of consummating the complete destruction of
this vessel.
To assail a Zeppelin from the ground wi.th shrapnel, or
from a point. below the airship with guns mounted upon
aeroplanes and firi:lg the common type of projectile, is a
waste of en
rgy and ammunition, as I will explain in a future
article,

1'HE

AERIAL

M Il, L. JJll.V DESJJLEDS IMS the first tt'riter to s1Ifj9ut
a CO,I' prel!e:!sil'c and sllstailled aaial olfcrlsil'l', as tlli:'
mo,;t l"lfecth'c 7IleanS of sl.ortcnillfj tilt' war,
TVe Pllblish 0/1 al1oth,.,' patll'. a letter from Mr, II. C',
TVells, 1/.110 shares JI r. J)esbhds's vielVs 011 thi-8 important
sllbject,
The following e"tracts from Mr, Desbleds's artieles l!1
LA:s"D A:S-D 'VATER are of interest at the present time:
"Without in the slightest degree critici&iug what has
been done by our commanders, to whom the State has en-
tru<;ted fhe task of carrying out the operat.ions to enforce our
views and those of our Allies, the writer desires to press
home tlie point which he has already, on two occasions,
brcught forward in these columnc;-namely, that a strong,
comprehensive, and sustained aerial offensive might result H!
a much earlier victory than would otherwise be the case."-
L\:s"D A
;D 'VATER, F"ehrllary 13,
" \Ve are now, as regards military aeronautics, in
posses5ion of data which were not a\"ailable when the war
broke 0,11. Some preconceived ideas concerning the value of
aviation have received terrible blows and have met with a
quick df'
truction, Unforeseen uses of the aeroplane have
come into prominence. Our airmen have shown a greatf']'
\'alour an,] adaptability than e....en the most enthusiastic sup-
porter of the new arm could have expected,
., Å most impol'tant quality of the aeroplane has beE'1I
brought to light, This quality is its value for offensive
operations. . . , For offensive work, of permanent. value,
it is not an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is required,
but one of about a thou.;and, or more, strong. . . . .
" Now the question which presents itself is whether it
would he possible for thi!' country to build, in the space ;,f
a few months, 2,000 aeroplanes, train the men necessary to
pilot them, form the necessary contingent of mechanics which
would be required to accompany them at tIle front, and
organiof' an adequate tran<;port sèrviceo The writer has gone
carefully into these questions, and he is convinced that,
though the effort would have to be a considerable one, the
for
ation of a powerful offpnsive aerial fleet, thoroughly
eqUl
ped and manned, could be produced in this countr:-{ in
the hme stated, It can, hesides, be asserted that such a fleet

nld
.e br?ught in
o exi!'tcnce without interfering with, O/"
hmdeTl::Jg, III the shghtest degree, the development of the

OFFENSIVE.

present air fleet which is so necessary to our arrmes for
reconnaissance and kindred work.
.. If. therefore, the country decides to endeavour to
obtain an aerial supremacy which would enable U3, almost
immediately, to carry the war right into the heart of tb"
enemy's territ.ory, a special offensive air fleet must be created
at once."-L_\
D AXD \\-TATER, Marcl
(J, 1915.
"In her ability to produce aircraft Britain stands
alone, . . . The occupation by the Germans of the highly
industrial district.c; of N orthern
'rance . . . . has reduced
the industrial resources of our Ally. . . . . It is upon U3
that the burden rests of creating such a fleet. It is a duty
which we are bound to perform, since it may, w
ihout inter-
fering with our other arrangements, lead to a much shorter
war an,] to a smaller sacrifice of lives,
" The writer estimates that the po!'scssion by
the Allies of an offensive air fll'et, 1,000 aeroplanes strong.
and kept at this strength, would, in a \'ery short time, render
the maintenance of the German Army in the Western theatre
of war a matter of extreme difficulty, if not of impossibility.
Add to this the fact that with a disorganised railway traflìc
the enemy would be unable to transfer quickly troops from
the "Testern to the Eastern thpatre of war, and t'Ï!:f' v('rsa, and
the damage which a strong offensive air fleet could do to the
German arsenals, and you will come to the conclusion that
a powerful air fleet could now not only prevent men, ammo-
nit.ion, and arms from being sent to the German front. bu

could also interfere with the manufacture of those arms and
ammunition. ."-L\ND AND \V\.TER, May 8, 1915.

TIlE ßLERIOT l\!Al\:UFACTURING AIRCRAFT
COI\IP,\l\. Y.

We publish on another page the prospectus of the above company, ill
"l.:eh El00,OOO shares are offered for public subocription at par, The
object of this company, which is to pro\ide additional aeropla.nes for tlwt
use of the War Oftice and Admiralty, iø one which must meet with
universal approval. It is, moreover, a need which bas repeatedly been
emphasised in this journ
L Probably no one has done more for the
cause of aviation th:m M. Bleriot, and fortunately for the company he
combines practical ability with inventive geninø. This is shown by the
remukable and increasing success which the busine.sa of 1\1. Bleriot haa
achieved in tha last five yea.rs, the EnglÌBh busineBS alone having
made ne:\rly E40,OOO profit for the twehe monthø ending March 31.
1915. With the addition of further capital the comp:\nj' is likely to
make good nøe of the unique opportunit,)o awaiting it..

1-1*

IMAGINA TION

IN

THE

WAR.

By H. G. Wells.

To the Editor of LAND AXD WATER.
DEAR 8JR,-1 am entirely 1'i"ith :Mr, Blin De
bleds upon
the que!'tion of a big effort to bring off a sustained
aerial offensive; t.o anyone with any imagination it is
the obvious thin" íor us to do now. It could be done.
It could end the war and it would end it decisively.
:But IìÚtl1er our politicians nor our military anthoritiès
8re J,repared to attempt aJ1ything so novel. By trial
Bnd experience the Germans, after a :year of warfare.
are fighting exactly as any imaginative person intere
ted in
such things in 1900, Fay, could have told them they would
have to fight. Onr side is. of course, rather behind that and
fiobtin o in the fashion of 1899, If you doubt this, read what
f
'uows
* It was written in 1899 and published in 1900, It
puts balloon for aeroplane, because in those days aeroplane:!
were too edravagant an idea for sen
ible people to swallow,
and the whole pas
age is obvionsly .. toned down JJ to the
digesti\-e capacit,y of !'ensible people.
Tbe great change that is 1'o0rkin
itself out in "ariare is the same
dlluwe th..t is "orking itself out in the substanc-e of the social fabric.
The "essential "hange in the social fabric, as \\1' ha\e anal)!òed it, is
'be progress; \ I' supersession of the old broad I..bour base byelahoralÆly
..-ganised mechanism, and the obsole,s<:ence of the once \"II,hd and neccs-

y d;stirx.'\ion of gentle and simple. In warfare, ...'I 1 ha\e already
indicated, tbis takes the fOI-m of the progressi\e supelsession of the
horse and the pri\ate solòier-which "ere the 1i,'ing and .sole engines
of the old time- by machines, and the obliteration of the old distinc-
tion between leaders, "ho pi anced in a conspicuous]) dan!:erol1.S and
encouraging way into the picturesque ir.cidents of battle, and the I
.
"ho .:hecred ..nd chalged and fill
the ditcbes and "ell' slaughterw
in a whGksa!e dramatic manner. The old "ai' "as a matter of long.
dreary marche.!'. gre..t hardships of campaigning. but. also of heroic
conclusi,e moments, Long periods of campings-almost al"ays with
an outbrCàk of pestilence-of marchings and retreatll. much crude
business of feeding and iorai;e, culminated at last. with an effect. of
infinilÆ lelief, in an hour or 80 of ., battle," The battle \\as alwa
's a
very imimate tumultuous affair, the men "pre flung at one another in
vast, excited masses, in li
ing fil{htmg nlalhine.s as it "ere, I!pears or
bayoneb flashed, one side or the other cea...d to prolong the climax,
and tIte thing was over. The beaten force crumpled as a whole. and
the victors as a "hole pre$sed upon it. ('aval; y with I!lashing sabres
m..rked the clOwniug point of victory, In the later stages of the old
...alfare musketry vo\l('y.s ....ere added \0 the physical impact of the
contending rp((iments, and at last cannon, as a quite accessory method
of breaking these maSses of men, So you ,. gave battle" to and
d..feated ,our enemv's forcclI wMrever encountered. and ....ben \OU
reached võur objecti
e in his capital the "ar ...aø done,. . The
new 1\ ar'" ill plobóJ.b];) ha\e none of the.<e features of the old sptem of
fighting.
The re\'olution that is :n progress from the o'd war to a new Wllr,
clifferent in it.s entire nature from the old, is m..lrked prim...ily b) tbe
.teady progress in range and efficiency of the rifle and of t.he field-gun
----;wd more partiC'ularly of the I ilk The rifte develop.s
rsistently
from a clumsy implement, that any do"n may learn to use in balf a
day. towards a ,-ery intricllte mechanism. e<U!ily put out of order a.nd
easiiy mis\Lged, but of the most exl.aordinary possibilities in the hands
of men of courage. character, aud high intellig('nce. Ill! prKision at
long range has made the busiue88 ol itl! care, loadin
. and aim subsi-
dial'Y to the far mo
intricate matter of its use in relation to the
coutour of the ground ...ithin its reach. E\en its elaboration as an
instrumeDt is probably stiH iocomplelÆ. One can conc-eive it provided
in the fut.tre ",ith crOlll-thread te\escopic sigbtø, tbe focussing of
which, correded by 110mI' ingenioull use of h)'grOllCopic materiaJ, might
even find the rdugf'. alid so enable it tQ be used "jth assurance up to
II mile 0. more. It will probably all!O take on Sfjme of the characters
of tbe moichine-gun. It will be used either for lIin,:!'le IIhot.s or to
quÏ\er and sl:nd .. spiay of allLost .simultanl'l)u!l bullet.. out of a
ma
azine 1'\ enly and C<'rtainl
', 0\ er any .small area the rifleman thinks
B<hisable. It will probably he poltolbJe b) one man, but there is no
reason really, except the ba
'ouet traclitiQn, the demands of which may
be met. in (>t!w>r ways, why it I!bould be tOO in.trumeut of one sole
man, It will, ju"t as probably, be
luDg witb its ..mmunition and
equipment. uþOn bi
ycle wheel.. anù b
the common ,'are of t"o or
more assocÍ3ted I!oldiers. Equipped "ith such a \\"capon, a singJe
couple of marksmen eyl'"!, by reason of Bmokell'!!l! powder and care,
fully cbOllen cover, might make themsehes pradical1y invisible, and
cap..ble of sllrpri.!!i'lg, stopping, and deøtro:-ing a visible enemy in
quite consider,.ble nwnbers who blundered within a mile of t.hem.
And a series of sueh groups of marksmen .so arranged as to co\er
the arrival of reliefs. pro\'i9ion
, and fresh ammunition from the rear,
mi
M, hoJd ou' against any visible attack for an indefinite period.
uuless the ground they occupied Wall .searched very ably and 1!1lbt1y
by IIOme !lOll of gnn ha,ing a range in execSIl of their rifle fire. If
the ground tbey occupied "ere to be properly tunneHed and trench
,
e\en that might not a\ail, and there would be nothing for it but. to
atta
k them by an achance under co\pr either of t.he night or of d.rk-
nl'!!II caused b
smoke-sbell.s, or by the burning of cover about their
position. E\en then they m;qht be deadly with magazine fire at close
CjÐarterll, 8a\ I' for their liability to IInch attacks, a few hundreds of
atrh men could hold poøitions of a qwk vut extent, and a few
thou.sand might hold a frontier, AlISuredly a mere handful of such
men could s&.op tbe most. multitudinous attack or cover the most dis-
orderl)' retreat in the "'orld. and e\ en when BOrne ingenious, d..ring,
and htt'ky night 8S
anlt had at Ia.llt. ejel.-ted tbem fFllm a p6sit,ion,

dawn would simply restore to them the proepect of reconstituting ÍII
'1<)'" positions their enormous ad\ antage of defence.
. .

Prob..bly between contiguous nations that ha,e mastered the art
of "ar, instead of the pouring clouds of cayalry of the old dispenea-
tion, this will be the opening phase of the I!truggle, a vast duel all along
the frontier between
roups of skilled marksmen, continually being
relie'-ed and rdreshed fl'om the rear. For a time quite possibly there
"ill be no definite arm v here or there. there will be no cconh ollable
battle, there will be no' Gre<lt Genera! in the field at. a1\. But 5ome-
where far in the rear the central or
3ni.er ...-ill sit at the telephonic
centre of his vast front, and he will strengthen here and feed thpre
and "atcb, ... atch perpetually the pressure, the ince8sant. remorse\ees
pressme t.hat is seeking to "ear do"n his countenailing thruHt.
Behind the thin firing line that is actually engaged, the country for
many miies wi'l be lapidly cleared and devot.cd to the business of war,
big machines ...ill be at "ork making second. third, and fourth line8
of trenches that may be needed if presently the firing line is forc

back, spreading out trans\e.'se paths for the !>wift lateral monment of
the cyclists who will be in perpetual alertnetts to relieve sudden local
pressures, and all along tho!òe great motor roads our firnt " Ant;cipa-
t:ons" sketched, there will be a va&t and rapid shifting to and fro
of big and very lonl; range guns. These guns will probably be fought
"ith the help of balloons. The latter will hang above the firing line
all along the front. inces
antly ascending and withdrawn; trey "ill
be continu..ll)' determining the distribution of the antagonist's forûts.
direding the fi,e of continually shifting great gUI!S upon the apparatus
and I!upports in the r
ar oi his fighting line, forecailting his night plalls
and seeking some t..ctieal or I!trategic ..-edkr.e5s in that sinewy line of
battle,
It "ill be evident that such warfare as tb;s ine\ i
able precisian
of g"n and lifte forees upon humanity \\111 becon 1 6 less and ]e
s
dlamatic as a wh01e, more and mOi'e a
a "hole a monstrous thnlst
a"!rJ pre83ure of people against pt'Ople. The battalion commar>der 'Wi!! he
replaced in effect b
' the organÏger of the balloons and gUlls by which
his few hundreds of splendid indi\ iduals "ill be guided and reinfol'ced,
In th!' place of hundreds of thOUi
andß of more or less untrained young
men Uldrching into battle, there will he thousands of sober men braced
up to their highe
possibilities, intensely doing t.heir best; in the
place of ch..rging battalions, sliatlÆring impacts of squadrons and ...-ide
harvest-fields of death, there "ill be hundr
s of 1ittle l'ifte ballics
fought. up to the hilt, gallant dashes here, night surprises there, the
lIudden sinislÆr faint g]eam of nocturnal bayonets, brilliant gues!les
that will drop catastrophic shell and death 0\ er hills and forests sud-
denly into carelessl
exposed ma.ses of men. For eight miles on eithe

side of the firing line
-" hose fire" ill pl'Obably ne\"er aJtogether die
away "hill' the war lasts-men ...ill li\"e ..nd eat and sleep under the
imminence of unanticipated death. Such will be the opening
ph.....e of the "ar th...t is speedily to come.
And behind the thin tiling line on either side a va"t mnltitude of
people "ill be at work; indeed, the whole mass of tbe efficients in the
!'tat
...iII ha\'e to be at ...ork, and m08t of them "ill be l!impl) at
the same work or l!;milar work to that done in pellct! time-only no'v
as combat:mts upon the line.s of communicat.io"!. The organised I!taff!l
of the big road managements, now bocome a part of the military
scheme, v.iU be deporting women and ehildren ;wd feeble people and
bringing up supplies and supports; the doctors will be dropping fl'om
their ci. il dut.ies into pre appointed official p1, acel! directing the feed-
ing and treatment of the sbifting masses of people and guarding the
,aluable manhood of the fighting apparatus most. sedulously from
disease; the engineers ... ill be entrenching and bringing up a \ as

\ ariety of complicated alJd ingenious apparatus designed to surpri.e
and inconvenience the enemv in novel wa\s; the dealers in food and
clothing, the m..nufacturers" of all Eorts. of necessary .stuff, will be
com-ert
by the mere declaration of war into public lIervants: a
practical realiøation of øociali.stic conceptions will quite ine\"itab]y be
forced up<.Jn the lighting State. The State that !Las not incorpor:;.ted
...ilh its lighting org..nisatioll all its able-bodied manhood and all it.
material substance, it.s read"" vehiclell, enginell, foundriell, and all its
rp-sources of food and clotbing; tbe
tate which at the outbrf'ak of
"ar has to bargain "ith railway and shippin!; companie.s, replace eX-
perienced .station-masters by inexperienced officers, and haggle against
..lien interests for e,ery IIOrt of supply, will be at an o\er...helming
di
ad\anta
e against a State whi..h has emerged from the social con-
fusion of too plesent time, got rid of e\ery vestige of our presen

r1ivtinction between official and govern
, and oq:mised eyery element
in itll being.
I imagine that in this ideal war aA compared ...itb the ....ar of to day,
there 10 ill be 1010 very coI1S"Ïderable re.striction of the right.s of the non-
combatants.

If the things that. were obvious to imaginative people in
1900 He only ta1.en up slowly and reluct-antly by practical
people in 1915, what earthly good is it for anyone of imagi-
nation to put his facnlty at such problems at all' If onr
people will not deal with imagination t.hey must work out
things in t.oi1 and bloo<hhed Our people are not goinl'\" to
at
mpt an aerial offensive at the suggestion of Mr. Blin
I>e"bleds; they will never attempt it until the German
have
tried it and made successes with it. Then and then only v..iH
it. appeal to them as a rational proposition.-Very sincerely
youn,

H, G. WELlS.

--- --
v A qu.,\.a,i....n kom "Anticipation.s," by J:i. Û, Wella, }1uL!Í.1!ìl...J
if! 1900,

IS"*

THE

COLLAPSE

OF

FORTIFICA TION.

By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.

O NE of the great surprises this war has brought to
the uninitiated is the sudden and complete
collapse of the many fortresses on wh.ich bo
h
money and intellect have
een lavlshed III
Belgium, :France, and Amtna.
To th
lay mind there is something majestic in the frown-
in.. maSSES of masonry which normally form the charac-
t<

istics of all permañent fortifications, a
d i
needs an
dfort of imauination to realise that the
e lmposlllg feature;!
have so completely lost their defensive value iu face of
modern artillery and high explosive shells that at present only
those fortresses still hold out in which the defeuders have
succeeded, by means of hastily,constructed
eld entrench-
mcnt.s, in keeping the enemy out of range of thelr actual. wans.
No one, however, notices that by so doing they have III fact
given avny the whole case for expenditure in peace on per.
JIIanent works, by increasing enormously the numbers of men
required to defend the nucleus which the permanent wOrld

ere designed originally to prot,ect, , .
The object of surrounding a certain town or JunctIOn
point of many communications (the two ideas are generally
identical) wit,h permanent de
ences. has alw.ays b
en,
primarily, to enable the few to dlspute lts possessiOn agamst
the many, If ElOO,OOO spent on great walls and .-I.itches
made it possible fer, say, two battalions of men to re,mt as
loug as ten could have done witheut their support,. its ex-
penditure was economically jmtifiable, because the mtere3t
and depreciation of the capital sum sunk in such works wa;
very much less than the pay of the eight thousand men or s.o
which would have been needed to defend an unprotected pO
l-
tion. Not thirty years ago we still applied this reasoning to
the problems of defence arising in our coaliñg stations and
Colonial ports, and essentially the same idea underlay th'3
construction of the Belgian, as, indeed, of all other
defences.
But already the writing was on the wall for those to real
,\ ho had knowledge enough to perceive its interpretation.
The history of the evolution of warfare showed that the
ratio bet ween the cost of construction and the cost of the
garrison which could be served by sinking capital in fixe,}
defences had been steadily falling ever since the iuvention of
gunpowder as a propulsive agent. \Vith every yard gaine.]
by the artillery in range we were approximating to a point
where the advantaue of the defence would vanish and the
attack wo,:id finally secure the upper hand.
In other words, it became clear that a time was comin

when it would pay better to spend all money available from
the nati,:m's revenUES on the maintenance of mobile armies
which could carry war into the enemy's country rather than
ou unproductive works intended to re"ist aggres
ion,
The coming of the high explosive shell settled the que.'!-
tion. As a. nation the Gel'mans wel'e the first to understand
what its arrival must mean, Seeing t.hat the time was near
at hand when no amount of masonry, or armour plating, or
e\-en deep earthwork trenches confined to a fixed position
could avail against the destructive power of the shells that
('ould be lrought
gainst them, they began to abandon the
eonstruction of new fods or fortresses and spent all moneys
they could obtain for engineer services on the construction
of roads and railways within tlleir frontiers by which gum
heavy enough to destroy in a few hour:! the defensl\"e
works they knew existed in their possible enemy's country
('ould be brought into action at t.he earliest moment possible.
J n so doiug they solved one of the most important problems
in national economy - namely, substituting productive
investment of capital for the unproductive sinking of huge
funds on wbich both interest and depreciation had to be paid,
for their strategic railways belonged to the State, as did
the commercial network of those already existing,that acted
as fepàers to tIle main lines, bt'sides developing the districts
which they traversed, aud thus becoming paying propositions
themsel\'es in thpir t.urn. S'lb
tantially, though not quite '30
thoroughly, we have pursued the same policy in India for th.&
last twenty-five years without finding a scientific explanation
for our practice.
It is thanks to this far-seeing policy that the Germans
have bl'en able to develop the enormous power of auuression
and resistance which has so long held the Allies at b:; They
bave substituted everywhere the idea of 11len insfwd of stone
tlIolls, and but for the immense di!'proporlion in numbers of

troops and resources which the Allies are by degrees develop-
ing against them (a disproportiou which never came any.
where within their calculations), they might well have SÐC-
ceeded in their dream of world conquest. They only did nol
allow for their adversaries' pO.3sible equation. Fortunately,
neither the Russians nor the "French were quite unprepared for
what has happened, and both have adopted a policy adapted
each to the special topographical conditions of their respective
frontiers, policies which discount t.o the utmost the advan-
tages their superior preparations had conferred upon the
Germ:I. T ls.
Had we succeeded in penetrating the enemy's territory
at an early period of the campaign we should have found OUf-
selves confronted by all the disadvantages that a want of
mobility entails, for the Germans, whilst keepin u all their
own liues, would have destroyed eyerything as theÿ retreated.
and we should have had difficulties to contend against which
now they are encountering in their raids into Poland and
Galicia,
Now, the fighting power of an army is never to be arrived
at by counting heads done, but is always a product of many
factors, the chief of which are numbers and mobility. Tims
in South Africa, because t.he Boers could at need cover twelve
miles in an hour against our four-or average thirty miles in
a day as against our ten - we had to maintain in round
numbers about nine British soldiers in the field for each
mount.ed Boer. Hence if we had invaded Germany whilst she
was still in possession of, say, four million men capable of
moving twice as fast as ours by means of her strategic rail-
ways, we should have required somewhere about sixteen mil-
lions of men to complete her overthrow.
Since. however, and viewing the problem in bulk, Wd
could not destroy her power of mobility without inva"ion,
there was nothing left for us to do but to cOnlpel/ter to destro!/
her own nllnlerim! 8I1periorit!/ ['!I frltitlus aftael,s which in
the nature of things could never succeed. This well explains
the long delay that has occurred in bringing her to decisive
action,
We have bad to suit our methods of warfare to the
different topographical conditions of each frontier and to
employ diplomacy as well to ensure her response to our cal!.
In the \\'est, having checked her invasion, the rapidly
acquired ascendancy of our aircraft has been one of the most
important fact.ors in our success.
Thanks to the bett-er means of observation thus secured
-i,('" thanks to our airmen-the power of our artillery ha..
been n(arly, if not quite, trebled, Secure in this superiority.
we next. set about the approach, by siE'ge methods, to points
from which we can at any time sever the enemy's lateral rail-
ways by which reinforcements can be rushed from one point
of the frontier to the other, and since the possession of tbi:t
power of lateral transmission is vital for the Germans, they
have been compelled to attael. 1/8 ova alld ol'er again at
poi1lts of ollr ourn c/!Oic,. to prevent its destruction, In <;0
doing they have been uniformly losing men in the proportioll
of not less than three to one, and this proportion, it is clear
from all t
e latest French reports, has been steadily growing.
Thu!' recently the French have beeu killing them off at the
rate of five to one,
On tIle East the Russians have had to adopt another
method, but one which is equally efficacious. Having hun-
dreds of miles of ten-itory behind them, the temporary lo!'s
of which matt.ers nothing to t.he cause as a whole, they have
met the furious German offensive precisely as the Boers dealt
with our advances in South Africa, They have stood to draw
the German attacks, and then, since the possession of a par-
ticular trench was of no value to them one way or the ot-her,
they have withdrawn, exactly as the Boers used to retirð
before us, Thus the Russians have gradually lengthened
the lines of the German communications, until these are be-
coming suitable targets for raids by their mounted infantry,
which, when the time comes, they will use as De 'Wet and
Botha used their commandos on the veldt.
Had we endeavoured to emulate our antagoni.3k3 by trv-
ing to II hack our way through" in their brutal a,;d
blunderinu fashion, we might very well haye taken three
years ov
; tIle task, or more; but analysing the problem
skilfully and concentrating on the decisive factor, I think I
may safely prophesy on a speedy decision in our fa\-our.
16*

June 26, 1915.

LAND

AND

LIFE

THE

IN

W
\ T E R ,

DARDANELLES.

From an Officer's Letter.

.10 the Editor o'r LA
D A'l:D 'VATER.
. SIR,-I send you the following account of my eJ:peri-
PDces in tÌIe Dardanelles. I am writing this stretched out full
length, \\-atching a battle line some six miles long. I am Ilot
in the fight to-day, but an occasional 8hèn comes nlong just
as a reminder. Before I describe this wonderfully inte-
resting sight I must tell you sometbng of our landing
in Gallipoli. We gained a footing at four point.. on
the toe of the peninsula (simult
neously), each spct a little
Etretch of sandy beach some one mile apart.
The I&nding was most bloody w{)rk. No troops in
the world f;ave our oym would have faced the ÜQrm
of 8hot and 8hell poured on them from row upon row
of Turkish trenches. The guns of our Fleet smashed up
all the fortq, but had little or no effed on the men
in the trenches. Little damage \'.as done, so far as I
could see, to any Turkish trench by the !'hipa' fire. Our men
had to do all the trench clearing with Iifle and bayonet, and
they did it in fine style, too, But the cost was great.
Personally I had several narrow squeaks while super-
vising the disembarkation of my men, as shells dropped
all round, and at my feet almost, but by a miracle
neither I nor anybody else was touched. I could gi1;e
you some interesting personal experiences, but as I am
now trying to give you a general idea of the whole landing,
I will leave personal things out.
To remme my story, the landing on the other thre"J
points, W and X and Y Beaches, was carried out iu
the face of fierce opposition by the Inniskillings, K.O,S,B.'s,
Berder, and Worcester Regiments. For the first two
days, a steady advance was made, and we held the
peninsula right across from the Dardanelles to the Ægean
Sea, and in those two days won some three miles inland (up
the peninsula). All the way we had to face trench after
trench, and our fellows did extremely well in progressing so
f<Jr. Th
geography of the country is very interesting. Ex-
cept f't the landing-places the cliffs ri
e abruptly from the
shore to a height of 100 to 150 feet, and from the cliffs the

country rises gently for about. llalf a mile. Then you look down
a3 it were from the rim of a saucer upon a beautiful green
vaHey full of olive trees, vineyards, and. young green corn.
There are many wells like those we see in pictures in illustrated
Bibles, but there were no Rachels drawing water-all the
people have fled before us, not a man, woman, or child is t,(\
be seen. \Vell, imagine, if you can, a great tree-dotted
saucer some five miles in diameter, rising gradually on the
far side from where we landed to a considerable height, some
600 feet or thereabouts. It makes a grand stage for a fight.,
and we can watch every move of man and gun.
The French are away on the right, and I wzkh them
Dlass in hollows and ravines, then advance under the pound-
ing shelter of the 75 guns. The latter are sen'cd mag-
nificently. The French infantry, as they deploy, find
the ground to their immediate front swept yard by yard
by the guns fired by their comrades a mile or two in
rear of them. It is a stirring sight t.o watch the OffiCHS
dash out and lead the men into a storm of fire, Then the
Turks run like hares. Now the French are retiIillg over the
hill, pelted by the Turks, The latter are in great force
apparently, ,and too strong for the French. The latter are
again reformed in the shelter of a cliff, and now Lhey advance
again over the hill. Fortune go with them I
I must now look at the British. The 88th Brigade is in
touch with the French left and is neal' the right centre of the
saucer. The 87th and 86th Brigades cf the 29th Division
extends across the rest of the saucer to the Ægean Sea. AU
face the hill I have already mentioned, called" Achi Baba JJ
(good father), and march towards it in the face of f.erce
<Jpposition. The Turks are entrenched on Achi I3aba and on
the slope up to it, and we barely hold half of the saucer, The
rattle of the rifles makes a continuous roll and crackle, The
Ghurkas are attacking the village now. I hope they will win
it, but it is growing dusk and tt>e shells burst all round the
village. It is now on fire and looks well as a picture. It will
be my guide to-night, as I have to go out to the front trenches
with ammunition after dark,

ëÆ:4 :l.OS. 0/ 0
..A..:B, L<:>>.A..:&T ,1925-1945..
ISSUE OF STOCK OR BONDS,
BEARING INTEREST AT 4
% PEit ANNU,,",. PAYABLE HALF.YEARLY ON TII
tst "U!II
AND THE 1s
D:::CEMCER.

PRICE OF ISSUE FIXED BY H.M. TREASURY AT :e100 PER CENT
A FULL H
LI::-YEAR'a DIVIDEND WILL B:S PAID ON THE tst DECEMBER, 915.
The Stock is an im,edmcnt autlwrifCd 1>11 .. The ,Tru.tce Act, lE93." and Trustc
8 mall inred Ihe,C:n nolu'itl.stapdi"g tllal thc price lIIay at thc lime 01
, Invest",e..t e.t:ccld the redemptoon "l:ill"e 0/ LI00 per unt,
AJ;plicz:tions, whic!, Ir.U!!t be a
companied by 8 deposit.ef 1:5 per cent,. will be reuived
t the B
k of, England, Threlldneeóle Strut, Lond
n,
E.C" and clay be fon.&rded elllier direct. or throullh the me.hum of a.ny Hanker or St{}{'kbroker In t1:e Umted K>nllclom, Appli
atiCins must be Ilir enn
humlreds of þ:n,"ds.
Arrangements a..re being mrde for tloe re<>eipt of epplicatio:!ð fer smaller amounts than EI00 through the Post Office,
Further l'ayme:c.ts ..iil bo rellu;red a" fo']0..-5 ,-
&=;10 per oont, on Tuesday. thð 20th July. I 5'1!) peor oent, on Tueßday. the 14th Eeptember,
,Lj5 per oont. on Tu<>8d"y, the 3rd Augusl, i:l0 per 00>"1. on Tuesday, t,he
6tp September,
.L15 pcr cenl. on 'Tue..."<lay, the 17th August. J;10 per...,,,1. on Tue<;day. tbe 12th Odober.
E1S 1>o'r oe..1. on Tu""day, t-lJe 31..t August,
10 per cent. on Tu....day. th", 26th October,
'THE GOVERKOR AND COMPAJI;Y OF THE BANK OF ENGLAXD "'e author:Sed to recei"e applications for this Loan. which \'I'm take !I:e lorl/]
.,,;toor of IMCribed SLock. or Bm:da t<> Bootei'. at the option of the Subsonbers.
If not prericu..)y rooeømoed the Lean will ba "",..id at par on the 1st Drcemoor. 19(5, but His )fajes!y'.. Gm"rnme"t .......'''e 1<> t',..m"..I".", t'J..
right t<1 red
11"" Loan at pa-r at any time on. or dtcr, the 1st
mber, 1925. 0:1 givinll threoe cal..ndar re.onths' nôtke in tlle Lo
do.. Gn::ette, Both
Capi....l and Inter...t win bo a cbarge on th.. Consolid"ted
'und of the United Kingdom,
Tho books of {,h.. Lc",,, ..ill be kept et t.he Bn.Lk of E
I"l'd and 31. th.. Bank of Ireland. Divid..n<à win"" pøjd hRlf-\Eu!y on the 1,;1. of June acd
1.òt Dcoember, Div;cenðe on Steck will bo paid by Warran.t ...hich will be seLl. by P<>6t. Di, 'dends on Bonds wi!! be PB:d by C<1upon,
ID3cl"ibcd Stock wi!l be cO-'l"ertible into :!?o!'d.. to ß<o.arer o.t any 1.ime without payment of any fee; acd Bonds to Besr"r will be ucl1aDgeab'e f<<
IlU!Cribed Stock on payment of .. fee of ono alull.n!! I>I"l' Bond,
The ic.;t.almenta may be pa.id in f-..n on or after the ZOth July, 1915. ut,der dioC()unt et t.he rat.. of 4: p.r cel1t, per a,nnum. In caee of d..
ault in t,he
paym..nt of any instalment by it.. prOI*r cat.., the deposit and th" inatalments previously paid will be liable to for
eiture,
Scrip Certificates to Bearer, "ith COUpOD attacbed f(}r tt.,.. di"idend p'lyab!e <>n the let December, 1915. ..ill t.. is.sueè in e:I:Chan
e for the pr...
..ia:onal reoaipt..., Ae 6Con "8 t,he::e Scrip Certificates have been paid in full they can be in"<,ribed (i,e.. can 1><> eom'er:eè inlo Stock); 'or, tbe.. clln ioe
';:u:bangeè for I3<>nda to B<:.arer (aa &con as tob...... can be I>repared) in deoomin..tions of El00, %.200, .t500. El,OOO. i:5,OOO, and El0,OOO, ILscribed 1'rtock w;n
be tænsf_b1ø in any sums which ...... multjp!es of . penny.

COKVERSION OF
E3 lOs, P<'r Cent, War J.oan, 1925-1928, I E2 15..Q, per ('ent. Annuities.
E2 10.. per C<>nt. CODoIiOla. E2 !lie, pe-r Cent. Annuil;es,
Ho1derø of .E4 10
, per C<>nt. WRr Loan. 1915-1945. ...ill h....e the additional right. in respect ðf eBch 01:100 St?Ck (or Bonds) held by them. and
fully-pe.id in ell
h, to exereise One or ot:b..r 01 the fc,ur following opt:o"" of con"er"ion. provided 8þplic:!lion 'or c!lnversion is mlide not later than the
3Gth October, 1915.
OPTION 1, CONYERSIO!il or E3 lOs, PER CEN'I'. WAR LOAN. 1925-1928, OPTION 3. CO
VERJION OF oC2 150, "ra CB'lT A"'IU'TIES,
To eIdj3.nge 8t
k (or Boode\ of t3 to!!
(".e
t. War Lnan. 1925.1Q28, toO ." To exrb.,nl'8 S' elr (or
tCl'k ('f'rtifintea) of &.? l!:!I. J)f'r ("('.-)t Anrllftff".,c:: "0
amount not exceedmg &.100 nomin31. for (ull:r-n3id Sf()"k (er :DOJJ&) (,1 &.4 10.. fM"r an al'!JOunt rolJt e:J:e,ee1i...... c67 non 1f'1I1. fer ful1y-n:'lid P:t<<'k (or Bond.) c' l:4 )f'\!I.
C{>nt. War Loan, 1925-1945. at the rate of &.100 of the formei'. wUb a cub pa.7mw.t p..:r C nt. War Loan, 1925.1945. at the rate 01 &7 of the former for .1:50 of U..
or .1:5 Pf'f'
T.lt. t.b""80n. for &.100 01 t'he laHer. lalf('l'.
PerllOf1. wli.o m:erCI8ð tbLa option wUI recel1"e tta", dl.lcleT\cI of Æ:l 10. lId
r h"
J::. who
J:errl... thl. option _III !'pr I
f' fhe UI'11al Ql1"\,:"t*,r'. diyM".,.1 t'r
('('ont. JHI)'able ()n the lat SePl
mbcr. 1915. In rM')'Jo<<'t of t11e &.3 1011. JlPr cent. Wil1" ]
5 9d per oe.nt.. paY"'ble On the 5fh Or t ('l1::rr, 1915. tn r6t:JW"C' (:II f"ro
2 I5fI
r
Loa.n. 1925-1928, .uT1"6Dd&f"(I..!. ftnd a full ha1t-yroT'. d1TJ
ncl of
2 58.
t'PJlt, (\ent. Annl..itlOi lIuM"'"ndered. .nd 3. full Ilal'
"f"3r.8 cll"'! '
nd or ,:2 58 J)E'!' nll"--
})aJ'able on t!14 Ie\. De'JlMlbcr, 1915. in re&peCt. (If the 1:.4 lOa:. pee oeut. Wa.r Lo&.:J.. 'h..ble on (be IAt J)ec
mÞer. 1915. In re&p-ct o' tile
4 lOa. per C
llt. War LoaD.
1925-1945. Ia8t-ed tn u
u tb roof. 1925-1945. tesrJed tn h
u tllPreof.
OPTION 2. CO'lVERSION OF E2 In., PFa CE'""T, CO"
(\Lq, OM"!ON 4, CO",VFR"O'l OF E2 lOe. "FR CE'<1', A ''IN"UITIF9,
ToO eJ:ohance St..x:k (or Stock On-hflca.tee) of &.2 Ie... per oeont. ('oJlA(llø. toO ,,, To 6J:
I
aD.e
ock (or Stock Cer1;hC':at.u) of
2 10.. IKr r....t. .Arrultt
. '0 !II,,!
ann.I't not eJ:
fQIIr 1.75 nominal. tQr 'IInY-PHtd St.()('k for Bofld.) o'
4 lOti Ð4'1' Jllroolõn&. nc;,t *,x eedlnR .tì8 Ilonlh,"1I. for 'ul1v n-wl Stock (.or Bùn".'t nf 1'::4 10". T1l'r
Offit War Lo.."U1. 1925-19
5. at tÞe rate of &.75 of Lhe fOlln
r for 1:.':'0 of t'he Jatt
r. Ct-nt. War L<\ø.n. 1925-1945 at U...e rate (Þt Æ:78 0' the torPlf'r for &.
O of the III
'(T.
Pt'IWC:
whe Ne,...iae thla oJ'l'tlon ..III r<'C
l're tM usual Q,u..rte:'. dh1.Mlld of P*,reone ..b') e:J:erc
ð8, tbUli oþtinft _m N('e:\"e the ulnlloJ Q,uartf''''.
hidl'J1d (Iof
121. 64. per
-.t.. Il3J'a\..lo en the 5t'1. Ck-tober. 1915. in rl'aJ)f'Ct. 01 the
3 10.. 12
6d. per rent.. 'pa7ab
e GD tile 5th ('1(o.t h<rr. 1915. In rfJaJ)e'Ct of tbfo &.2 10s
r
Vó" Mnt. Oc.neo'- lEUJ"'!'enooed. lI.I'Jd a full "alf
,.f' r'. dl..-tdnld of
2 511. Dell" ufll.. Omt.. Annulttel IIU!TðI1m-re-d. anlt a 'uu t..-If-YeAr". dl..-idf-nd of
2 5..
r OP<."lt..
J>a7aJ.1<> <>II the 18& D<>o<mber'. 1915, In _
01 Lb, L4 10., J>Ol' <eat, 1\"or Loa,,- nayabl.. nn Ih., I_I D<<><>mber, 1915. .. _pe<:t of tbD L4 10., per
.t. 1'"2r 1.0..,
1925,1945, "sueo! In 1"'" th
reot. 1925,1945, IuDM f. n.u Ih
r""',
In tne .."cnt of futu.... issues Cother than ia
n8 mad.. abroed or M""'" of Exc1:<>Iluer Bonda. 'f""....ury B;l\s, Or aimilar ",lIort-datcd 8ecuritic
) hsil'C
m....1e by Hia Maieety's Go..ernment, for tho purpo."" ill carrying on the War, Stock and Bonde of thie illsu.. will 00 ac<<pted at par. pIns accrued inter<'f!t,.
a.a th.. e<;juivalent CJf cash for the purpose CJf subscriDtions. to such issues,
. A ""mm;,...;on of one-eil!1,t.h peT Oðnt, wiU be allowed to Banke..., Broke.... and Finandal HOll<Ee.g on "Hotm..nls l'Ia.1o in t\?sped of cub af\plÏC-atiorø
lor Uliø is"".. bearing their Stsm!); bnt no oornmie.ion...ill 00 allcwed in t"eflped of
pplicali"n.. for <on....n;on.
A"pliutio" Forma for Cash Sub<eript>ona may he obt.wed ..I. th.. Bank of England and t,"" Bank pf Ir
1and; at a1: 7 na"\ 0' Mon81 ONer Office
lit t.he United KinRdom; of Meserl!, Mullens. 1lanhall &. C..,. 13. C....r<<.. Street, Ya
ion HOUl... E,C,; and or the I ril1o;pa St.<<kbrok..rs,
.Application Forma for eoo....roion ..ill be for"a,ded ..ilb ..uh 1...I....r 01 A!1otn,,'nt,
The List ðf Appllcatlom will be cto-ed on er be'ore Saturday, the 11th .July, 1515.
BANI[ O. ENGUND. LONDON, 21ET J(;,NII, 1915.
17*

LASD

AND

W-ATEH.

June 26, 1915.

A copy of this Prospe ctus h3S been filed with the Reg istrar of Joint Stock Comp:tnie:>,
The Subscription List will open To-day, Thursday, the 24th day of June, and will close on or before
the following Monday.

THE BLERIOT

i
COMPANY,

ANUF ACTURING AIRCRAFT

LIIVIITED.

(In<o
oraled unde' the Compani"o Acto. 1908 h 1913.)
fl,lanufactur2rs of Aeroplanes, Se3.-planel. War-planes, Biplanes and Monoplanes.
C.\PIT.\I.: ;{,200,OOO, di\-ided into 180.000 Ten per cent. Cumu\ati\'e and Pallieipating Oldinary Share.:; of ,;(,1 each,
and ,;(,20,000 Dcferr
d Ordinary Sharö of !s. eaL'h {400,OûOj.

The Union of London and Smiths B3.nk, Limited, Head Office, 2, Princes
Street, London, E.C., are authorised, as Bankers to the Company, to receive Appli-
cations for the ;(100,000 now offered for Subscription at Par, as follows:
95,000 10 per cent. Cunu:1ati\ e and P
trtieipating O!'d;nary
nares of ,;(,1 cach, pal able as follows, viL., 2.:;, 6û. per share
oa [Ipplication. 7:>. 6d. per shar
on allotment, and the Inbnce as and when required.
;{S,OOO in Deferred Ordi'lal)"
hare", of one
hillilJg l'.Il.:h, pa} able :1.:> foHo\\":>. ,-iz. : 3d. per Share on application a'ld lhe
l..tlance on allotment.
The 10 per cent. Cümulati\e
lfid Participatin;;- Ordinary Shares are entitled out of the [l\'ailahle profit:> made in any
year to a Cumulative PreFen'ntial Di,'idead at the rate of ten per cent. per aanum (10";,) on the capital paid up thereon, and
also to thirty per cent. t30"J) of the further profits in any} ear a\ .I.:.tbìe for di
trilJUtjon anw:1g the member,;, tI->c remainder
belolwinO' to th
holders of the Deferred Ordinary SÞ..res. .
<> Applicants for the 10 per cenl. CUlTJul.lti\'c and Partic
pat:ng- O;'dinar
Shares are entitled to apply for Fifty Is.
Deferred Ordinary Shares (part of the ah_" e-mentil.ned i.
5,000 Deferred Ordinary Share:,), in respel't of each 100 10 per
Ci:nt, CUtllul.ttive a:.d l'artit:ipating Ordinary ;!;'1 Shares aI:otted to them,

DIRECTORS.
LIE FT. IllS GRACE TIlE Dl"KE OF
1.\
CHì'::->TEI':', P.C., KimholtO!1 Ca"I1e, HuntingJònshire, ?rt'si.ll'nl, !I,:a'io'i..1
A cr., IJt'fc'lICl' Lt'aglll'.
\\:H,LL\
1 .\, C.\
SO
, Harri
ter-at-Ll\\- (La!.:' LoCI! (;e:"L'r!'mCIII Bell/'ll .1 '"litor), Clun House, Surrey Street, Straad.
london.
A.D\HR.\L THE HO
L SIR En
Il'
D R. FRE\L\NTI.E, (i,C.n., c.
I.G., 4-1-. Lower Sloane Street, London, S.\Y.
SIR ,\LGER
ON GFI

E
S, IhRT., .. Aranmor," Kingston Hill, Surrey.
). H. S\\ï::-':BLIR
, F.C.LS., 49, Old Húnd Street, Lond,;a, \";., Direcf(.r; .trmy {.... l\:a
'}' C.mtracl Corp..ratÏé,PI, Lid.
Bankers.
THE l'
IOX OF LOXDOS &
:\f1THS B.\
K, LDIITElJ, 6ô, Charing Cro,,:-. London, S,'\"., Head Offrce, 2, PLincai
Street, London, E.C., and BI'alH:he",
Solicitors.
:.It:S5RS. J, J. ED\\'.\RDS &: cu., 28, S.t(;k\ille Slreet, London, \\",
AuJitors.
MI.:S<;R';. Tl"RQl':\:\"U "\. OlJ
G
&. CO., Chal tered Accountant,. ,n, Colèman
treet. London, E.C.
Accountants.
ML,,5RC;. H. H.\CKETT & CO., ChartereJ :\CcouHtants, 44. Bedford Row, Lcnllon, 'V.C.
Secretary and Offices (pro tern.).
G. T. Hl'XT, ('tun HOllse, S'.irrey Street, Strand, I (,ndon, \\".c.

.A.B:R.Z:DQ-EX>> E-.B.OSFÞEOT"US.
'1 lit' ohje.:t (f th;,; (';.Hlpany ;$ to pnH ;,j" a 1]1<lch hr
cp mlll1l'i'r of .\f'I"O>,lâP{,S !(. tl1l' Ndl'r of Ii;:; l\tajl'st.V's (;(....<<,.f1l!!l'1'It tor t!H
l"j.v!og

t'
i':'{"ð
f the ....\..ÌIn:l....Hl 31\'; lh
V.r:lI' Offioo b)r .a{"ql1il
hg ah.d a::d.e..u.ltog tha well-kno1.'rn ....\i.t.<.fai't.
1
Ull,tt(.t.U.f.iHri bu:;incss ill t.bid. CO')I.tl',r ûf A-L
E'e
i()t (a C'o'l
cact-or !.t)
.he ßj.iti"ll Uo,'ernmEn!!.
'1'11" C'ompan;: ? ill ha\'e t,Le right t<> 'll.\nuh"
llrl' :md 5<,
1 E.'..r;,

A
N,p
:.loe5 in t 1 ", lTnito{'d Kjn:;:,iom of G
e..,t Brita;n and J"l'la'I'\ and tilt
Briti
h lIom;nion
, C'oloni
". and l"-,s;rt'SSi'-'''5. whiLst :\1. ß!("" "t HI deLarr
d i!'Ow comppling With lhi3 CorupaT'l in t!l" Unit-ed King.hlU or Ï!1
the ßl'itish lJ"oJÏ..hns, ('u!on;es, or P"ssffi
io"iI.
The rocent vid..;r;es O\'N 7.q'pelin3 sho,... that tll.. secnr'ty of Er;!i.';h I.om'NI Î3 best pres
rv2'<1 by b' ,;c1:' il'('uarlin ó the II
EIlI)
r of 011' A>:-
craft. 'rh;s '3 the supreme need of the hOllt'.
'lite War Offil'e L
no\... t.lkiro:
tlu
en.tire outpu!, IV {l it. i,
Ìlotl'fidíl,j
.lr
1'1y to ;,wre',e th
o1.otpnt b,: mcans of t'1:\-ep..:;io",,, a.,d oew work:!,
dæi711w for th
pn.dllf",il.n of aU types of &:11.\ane5, W.Hphp

, Rip!.''''''!!' and Mon<>pi'mes. '
co 11>6 field open fur Ihe oppratiol'.s of the C'.>lllp:>.ny L' pradic.aU.v tl11!;"lit"d, both ùur;r..
'W<11' ai'll P-e-:H'{', M. Bleri(\!'s 5irlr
s pro.{' il.t
rapidly ;ncrea
ing p.nsperity il'der,pnùenUy of the '....ar. The i,,!JII('hf't' of .\ill'r:>n "'I tlis \\",'1' [,,-.:1 th,' ,it., ,:,'.
I'.
":iI,vl L.y !"
o;id" r>-'
<;f5
;"'

8 I jlJJ.I-')rt ".. \.f('T
,it h '
"'" d.,;Iv ,It.H.....n-:;tr3-t
r1. Aa r;

(.t-;'.t.(-f:)!I.\
h:r
f't.h,. ....I'CUC 1 l jri..1o U.:';'JIMh:
1 \'.rit.eð:-
, , "I leel lIur
that
o e rto rt should b.: Kpued to iucr
ase their nnmbef3 and perlect tbelr ell:.ll'noeut nlld effidellcy."--Q'I')
..d Ï1
I 'fllfl and Warn of the 3rd A.l'ril, 1915. .
GOYFW,\mXT nr'f,\Xn.
.. We \\':1111
t"re \ero'p!aaeJ . The GermallJ I.ave mall! m:>:e tÙdU we I.ave. O!le Br;!i
h \.iator
MJ 3'1 lar 81 two Of
three ( ierma!1
. But We Wallt ;\I'Þre 'fachinel , 8nd the more you CO!!! tom ont Ute better it will be for -our brllve lellowil In
France."-RI. H ., D. 1.j "j" / l;,
,'I'gP, :-"." l1,,;I
1 J{a;I, Ju!'c I-1th, 1915.
F.very!.!oin
poi'1ts to ;'1lmen3e forward st, ;ues for thil Aircraft lnò,
<;!q in 1915, a'I,1 th.. ï,res
nt i
3'1 opporhm!! 0I0.1P'1t. fc.r eI
e'J,I;ng
ami deve l ,,!,' n; th;::; blli!;n.....
in order t-o manufach.re Ii' t\ hinps as sl'(,l'<\ily 33 1'033.l>l e . Thil iodll3t' y ;s n;-,w 00 u. \)('tl'lanem ba..i3. gò..;O!;
effinJ"VffiPnt t.... thous:>'71dll <If woÙí'rs,
. ' 1h e l ' vllll'....ny L ,L:) a i. lt.,uJ, I f:t..-e;voo prl)p(\::;.."\.'a a..d (.;'fí'?J of ....-\;t.rol)auLil:"

('c!'
1.fB..ti....n.a1
rQ{'k ior otþcl' ('ont
r
:}lal ai',1 .!.ril
r
(.a!! t.ypf'S
of Air<'raft, of v:hic-h 11.:1-31"'1.<1/;6 will be t.aken ",I)"n the pp... workB 111'1' (,,'7l1plete.
'fhe f
!i10U4 b!ls;ne.s.i of l\{, Rler:(-t, ;
I'rob:.h!y tilt' o
deilt cnta:.t..,It
1 in t.1l6 ;\\ 'at!,.'1 ind'1stry. To h:!! ",eli.kno.. ,I i'1,'e"\;"'l'l must now
be added hi
tat..:,:!! improv{,ll biplane a<'[al';OO witL twv -eT';;'''ES, ikJ t'nt the t'Ïli.'< of iìtoppa
'-'
" tI;gh
i.; guarded IIg"iIlli!, OP
el'g:ne .:oul;nu;ug
to opera
-& should tlte oth9l' st-op. .
Whilst. tho hnsinel!iI of t.he C'omp:my, fr,-,m having b
{'n OtiS or PIe 1'iOnpe.r3 of aviat!{On, i.:; now firmly est.\bliiIhêd, tbe av.a!.oo iudtL
t
!
may, neverlhelpjB, be Mid to be y{'t, in i!<J infancy.
Bj' reaðon of the experißuce tbat. ha3 t.
n oh:ain
ll 1\1'<1, flu
c3p;lal t-o be empbyNl. this Company sb,,1.I.1J be in a f'<Iili.:l)n (0) l.ak

&dvanta
e of any imprÜVemI'liLò wh;("h the fuh,pi! ma)' 6h')..., It i3 well k...,
:n t:'3! \'a.1
impnk'6ffi<,nfll have alrea,1y b5en effed-ed s.nc".
M. Blf:riot. made h'3-t.hen---grp.a.
n;ght., a litllo c,vel (i
'e j'P3i'i! 8':;0. shl-ti,.
at C ,I.,:. 81.,1 ali
hl;p
on the Ciiff.:; a!. Ð#l'r, Tup flPWiI tbat
," a. mao hM! aetually flown from France t-o Engld!'",J" Wa:! c.a"kd all Over !hê W{.!",I, Ordl'rs
,'r .. p'\'r;ots " h"g:m to ponr ir., and !-hiJ s:>.I,...
in thl) first year (ail shown in
f, Eler;l)t's letter below) amon"t(,d ill ",slul' t._. no 1,.6d a PI'm tb3:. í:1U,6ó-3, 1'11,.5'.1 ha:lj st
.adi;! i'lerpa,'j('-d

toM 1\1. Bleriot, now finds himself innlldaL....:l wit!! ord..n for apr"l'la',;os, a.'1d a;n:mft of v,sriQWI kind",
'fl1<t foUo...-ing lelt-t'r 10..3 been ({'O!'i.&d Ú'om M, B!eriol;-
." Gentlemen,
. .. In S6('nri'1J the formation of an E'qr
1t C'omp..1ny u'1,lpt' the lille of t;,ð P'J,.r.,,!- '!,sliiof.I!t!Jr:ni; .\;..'r.\
t ('om-panl, L;m;teJ,
I ,!,ah to pr?vide for l.he extpru;Ìi)n of thl' Work& I {'Bldbli.h,.d in England in ord'\r th
t 3dvar.!.a
6 Ma
' b" lak,.n ûf the ol'!,ortun:ti

,which &f6 bem:; offered to mø by tbe ß.-iti3h Government to m:m'ifadure lar!;:! numbers of A"ror.tanPB,
:',1 am deøirolu of a;;3i.
ting in every way th
SU0C'(,.&3r
t f..-rll1:>.l;:.>n vf this ('O!ltp<4,'
' foJr (arrj';n
Jut tb"
1!
r.s',:n" an.:J de1
.)p"

n!.i wll.J.
h are '}Ow ItO urgently needed,

la-It

Jun
26, 1915.

AWU

J

L.h

.. I undera;tand it would be more in accordance with the practice of the British Admiralty and 'W War Office to give tht-,r CTGeft
to an Eugli..b Company, than to a ,Branch of,my ,Fr
nch business. _ '
.. The following fig9rea I am. pl_d to gm 30U as 5howing the gradnaJ increaM and aaeONS of my French busifJe5s sinee m
' fligh
,hm:n ('will to IXn er.

S ALES OF "BLERIOT .
EROPJ,ANES,
ir
:'::.::::.
.::::::':.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: im:
!
1914 .. ........, ,........, ..,........... .....,............. E322,920
.. The last period conrs 18 month" ..nding Januar,)' 31st of t.he prHen
year, 1915.
, .. rn c011dus;,?n, I have pleuure in sayinj! that in roncurring in placing my pract.ica1 kno1tled:;e and expert. experience at yaup
chsposaJ, I do IJO ,utb the utmost ronJìdt'nce in the future brillia.nt. 6UCCes3 of )'our Company
.. Yours faithfu1ly,
(Signed) .. L. BLERIOT. JJ
&me of the abo>e-mentioned figures comprise sale" {)f machines. parh< of machines, and acce5sorieø deliHred tu the Eoghsh ....-orh. TI!e
Ic"nlll ha"e been \eri5ed by M
ssr.;!. 1\I.rwick, Mitcbell. Pe.t " Co., Chartl'red Accountant<!. and are -akulated at. the rate of :?!> frf!, to tbe 1;1.
MeauL U. Hackett ..d Ce., ("bartend Acoountant.., of 44, Bedford Ro'l'\", London, 'V.C.,
rti'l) a.a follows :-
.. To the ,Directors of tbe Bleriot MalwfactUling Aircraft. Company, Ltd" London.
.. Dear Sirs, "
{ay 28th, 1915.
"In acrorda
-e with your in.strnctions, we ha\'e examined the Books of Acc{)unts of th
BLERIOT b1l
ir,ess canied on in England,
and fiRcI that Arne b3ye been reg1llarly kept, and show di'Ql'ly the conduct, and gro..-tb of the busineB since its fü.mdation, and wo} haHI
o:....efuJly alliÚyøed all capital outlay. _
.. The ,!tainea., which was utablished in EngLwd in 1910 at tbe cornmen'::f'ment of the a\iation industr)", increased to I!uch

flItent, and the demand became BO great for Bleriot Aeroplaues, that, in Older 1.0 8a-ve packing, freight, caniage a.nd risk. and the del
y
cOItaCqu('f!t on t,ransmiil8ion of goods from France, works were ellta.blished a.nd equipped in this country in 1913, and the oosinesll of
aaJlJJfacturil1g was in full" orking or
r in 'larch of last Har.
.. We cutil, tbat tile act prott. lor the reri" 0'-12 ..eatbs eDdiag 31st Marcil, 1915, amouated to A:39.393 Ii.. I'd.
.. YOUIS faithiully,
(Signed) .. H. HACOTr AXÐ ('0.,
"Chartt-r
Accountant!!, OJ
'!'be Dir<<:t
r& are of the opm.on that, ha\Ïng regard to the working capital to be int-Toduced from this i:5Sue, allo1ting' '()I'

loC'nsÏio"
of worb and la) 109 down of ad(l"lional macbinery, the turno.,er 1'riH be materiaUy increased ",ithout adding appreciab!
' to the administrat:on
apcm.ses. 1ha future profits therefore should be J.argel
' in excus of tho
e certified, hut. the DÏredol1l are content t
base thtiI e<tiJ1"ate8
on the actca.! proiits made dur;Jlg the 12 mOJlth.
ending 3ht Mart.h, 191.5.
The returrul to shareho!dcIS would tberefore be
Certified profita ...
Le. FroÜaiOll fer D,rcdors' Feu

KOTE.-Theße figures are prior to and
'iuite inrlependcnt of tbe "ar.

E-39,39.J 0 0
El,OOJ 0 0

One quarter of su<:h profits payable to
f, Bleriot. 80 long
he it! the reg;
tered proprit:t-or of
sharf'll of the t.otal nominal "alne (;f 1:-40,000 in t.he capital of the Company... '" E9,473
CllmWa.ti'\"e diÙdend of 10% on say 95000 c'nmulat'"e and t
parlic;pating ordinary shares ..' E9,[,()() 0 O J - E15,176
Parti('ipating di\idend on suc'h Shares ES,676 0 0
Ði"tdclld on the Deferreel Ordinary ShaHs ... E13,2'14 ,

1;37,003 () 0
0 0
o ( EQUALS A
0 RETURN OF
l OVER 15

"
0 0
E37,003 0 0

Tbe above fignres "ho,"" to f',e.y shareho'der ",bo appl;l's for the proportion d
ferred ûld:nary ShaHs to 'fI'bilh he is entit'c:.1. a n.nrn {)f
eur liftee. aDd one balf per ceDt, (15
'}o) on the !:1 Shares, and (;\'er sh:ty the per unto on the Deff'rred Ordinary Share!!.
Tbeae substantial profits earned b) the English busines!!, \ iz,: :B39.393 17 10 for the) ear endin
314
lar. h. 1915. v. ithcut the pr"pc6ed
extensions Iiliow full and ample se<:urity to the Shareholders for pa\'ment of the Priority òi\idend; su,;h fixed di\ idend b<ing a!.uaù) coHrEd
nearly three times o'\"er b
' tbe prCðEnt earnings. .
Bleliot aeroplanes ha..-e established a gn'at reputatwn. It is da;mcd by tbis Ccmpan;y that thf' late
t impronJ Bleliot birl:Ine ",'iIl hHe
no superior, and with the excellence of the British and AUied fI
'ing llYn extraorùinary results are confiù
nll
' expe, ted.
Agreeably with the terms of the sanction gi.'en by the TI'ea.<nry to tJ.i.. Capital IsstM!, applicat;on will be made after tbc d,;;tribmion of the
ohare certificates for the permission of tbe Committee of the LJl!ïLn SIO(.1. Exchange for dcalinj:(s in tbe sbares now offl'red for subs:ripti"n,
Th. Treasur) has been coosult-ed undf'r the !\otification cf the 18th Januar
', 1915, and raÎscs 110 objf'Ct;on to this Js
..e. It m\l
t bc dis.-
tinctly under!;tood tha.t in cons:derin
whether th"y ha'e or have not an)' obje<tions to X
W 1;;5\1('s the T'UI
ur) d,xs not take any re.r-or.pi-
hility (or tbe financia.l 8oundnci13 of any &bemt's, or for the correctness of :m)- of the statement3 made or opinions expres

d with rq;ard io
th"m,

ACHI EVEM ENTS.
The Royal Aero Clnb for the L'nitcd Kingdom report states that Bleliot ma{'hinf'S fla..-e madf' rf'{'ords for the highest altitude (n:>rn("y,
1".928It. last, year) and :op
in Great, Britain. In the Paris to Rome flight Bleriot machines finished fir
t &nd 8eC()T)11. II' the ,i,eo;t of GHat.
Br;t.ain of 1,010 miles a Bleriot machine gained the Dail!! Mail prize, and in thf' Petrograd t<> '\fosco" flight a B'eriat, ma("hine finisned fi..t.
M, Chereau, of the Engli.b Bleriot Work.. atatee:- And a tb;<d c<0'3sing of the lrisb Cl1a1>Jlel w.... made by Mr. Me]!ir.. ":..0
The first l11"n to cr<>9l! tbe En.,-JjBb Cbannel ...as M. Louiø B1eriot. on a on a DLElllOT
BLERIOT. fitted witb a 25 H,P, EngÜ'e, The Record FI;:;',t from I..o"d,," to Pari, øtands ont_ten in tb
roame c,f
Tbe N>COnd erauinlr "f t11e Channel w&ø made by Count de Leseep., on a Mr. H, !:-a.!met. on a BLERIOl'_
BLERIOT. 50 H,P, Engine, The Circuit of Grent Britain ler t}.e .í1Ð,C
O Da,lv \Ia'I l'r>:.e ...... .1"",
The fìm man \0 crosa tJ,,, Eng:isb Cbannel with a pae.enger was Yr, roon on a BLEIUOT by y, Bca,U'nOl.t, "'\:0 \" as aller...ards '..,...',.,.j
Moieant, a\"o on a BLERI0T. by Hi
MaJ<'.3ty, King George. at BacJ.;.u,:\'r.m Pa'ßc..,
The first Non,Stop Journey from LoDdon to Par;s was made on a BLER10T The C;rcuit of Europe w&8 .ho ,,"on by M.
um(nt on a RLER10.. 5nd
by Mr. Prier. he ai
o wnn the Great Race r....Gill J..{.'ndc,.n to TUT"n. .
Tho. fjrst cr"""h,g of the Irish Channel w..... made by Wr Coròett Wil!!(;n. The BI,ERJOT ,,"'3" ..1.0 t}.e ti....l ruacbin<> to .lea;.n
!rat.. :1-e pc .b i:.etI
on a BLERI0T of .. Loop'nlf the Loop" and" I'l>s.ide Do...n Fh'n!:,"
The Æ<:oT'd cro.,.;n
'..."" &Iso made by },fr, Corbett Wn.on on a BLERI0T, The 'great Non-Stop FJigl,t Irom Don'r to tJ-e 2,ppel'n Sh'f1.
t r,,'c:';lJe
T-he tiNt c.....in<< Õf the Alp. wa" also made on a BLERI0T, "'1108 al"" 3r
;.,u'ù by:\!, H"..,...el with a P8E
en"..r. on " BLF,RJOT,
The tii"3t cT035ing of tl,e North Sea from Ensla.nd to Norway w&ø made by All 1 " <1 BLEP.IO.rS "n
BJ
ERrOT built l!'Rd'-
r.e... bc!h, Hll'!H
' and
Lieut, Gran "" a BLERIOT, MonoplaJ!e3. are bem!,: taken by the A!""" and u"",! 'n h.. V; ar >D
The first Lady Pilot \0 CroM the Channel w&8 Miss Quimby also on a inc,re....ing numbers, '.fh..y are Ci"ed:fed ,,"ith man
....enè... ul aå-..,...
BLERIOT, ' m..nt,., .... ""en in tl:e Daih' P
per3.

Tbis Appiication Form may b
used for Ten Per Cent. Cumulative and Participating Ordinuy Sbues of 1:1 each.
THE BLJi:RIOT MANUFACTURING AIRCRAFT CO., LTD.
(l
rþ(Jr.:Jtf!d t ..4er 1M (%.tllp
.in .Arts. ,fIW _4 "13 .

Ca.p:i. "t.a.1
Divided inlo 180,000 Ten Per CcnL Cumulative & Participating Ordinary S!.ares of 1: 1 each,and
20,OO\) in D .ferred O;-dinary Share; of) - c&cb
ISSUE 01 95.()()() 10% CUMULA.TIVR cnd PARTICIP.\TI
G ORDI'HRY SIJAR
:B Ob' .tI E\CH.
To tlle DirectOT.. (If TUI!: BU:RIOT
lu.unCT{;RING AIRCRAFT CO)ll'ANY, Ln,{lTED,
GEJo."1'L!:],[ES, Ha.'\"ing paid tu your Bankers tbe Bum of E,..,..,.......,....,..,....,.............,.,..,......-,.............. bcin
a dcpo
it of 2 6 pC'r SI,arf' on
....................;....................................10% Cumnlative and Participating O.dinarJ Shales of J;1 each in the abD\f'-l'amed Cúmrlln
, I ."1'q'...Et
you to allot me t,hat number of Shares on tbe terms of the Pro
pectus i8llued b
' you, datpd 2l!1t, June. 1915, an I of thE' \I"IDorandum and A.tideø
of
a.tion of the Campanj', and I bereby agree to accept the same, or anj' smailI" number that may be all
tt('d
;) 11'1', :Ind ,1.0 pa
tl:e
balance of 17}6 per Sbare as pro\ided by the said Prospel.tus, and I authorise )'ou to place my l'a.me on tbe Reg.
t"r (\1
f"rnbers In l'l
"'ect of
the Sbares so allotted.
XUfM- (in full) .........................

200.000_

(Mr_. Mn",or Mi",,)

I'lease
Write
Distinctly,

A.údre"3 ,..,..,. ,.................... ,...........

Dacrip/ion

Usual Signature .. ...,.................... .......'

.......

Drlte .......... ....... ...,... :... ..... .....".".. ...,.....,-...c...."...... 19'1
.
Full Prospectusel and Forms of Applicalion c.e.n be obta'ned at the Offices of' the COinJ?'IDJ' ,or from the 'Ean

rs' or Solicitors.

fl.' J'M
lfj

. :-".. ..: I -. - ..-.

,19*

...

AND

WATER.

June 26, 1915.

TALES

OF

THE

UNT AMED

l\IARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the Prench by Douglas English.
B UT, as tlls enveloping hand squeezed past the open- boards; appraised with care meticulous, the chance-found
ing, the grip of it relaxed, Her wings slipped treasures of the littered floors.
clear; she made full use of them, dug beak deep V; ere these close scrutinies casual or ordered by some
down into the palm, and, with one supreme effort, my
tic sense of profit 1
wriggled free, and winged towards the sky, From time to time, no doubt, she chanced on foed, but
A stunning crashing jar cut short, her flight. \\-ith glistening things allured her most. She worshipped these
wounded breast, with splintered beak, she fell, wings sprearl a" idob, caressed them, lingered by them, in morbid, spell-
across the sink. bound ecstasy.
The crockery danced and rattled, glasses spun round and Most finds she quickly tired of. She prized them for
shattered on the floor-and she wa:! once more prisoner, The their novelty, their opportune presentment, their momentary
hand had pounced on her afresh and gripped her like a vic!"', use.
'Vindows were things undreamt, of in her world, The
he chose the serving-counter for headquarters.
outer sky had beekoned her. An unseen barrier, permeable Reneath it dropped tit-bits of fcod; behind it was the
by sight, was past her understanding. dres8er, And this was lit with gleam of polished metal,
The Man was irritated, He gripped as though to knife-blades with steely sheen on them, dish-covers, spoom,
strangle her, and Margot strove against him, and forks.
She writhed and twisted in his hands, she sought to She quicldy learnt Man's feeding times. She musterE'd
use her beak again, her best manners then, and with coquettidl beaks and nods,
Her puny force was chilled and quenched hy fear-fear sought and compelled attention.
of the scissors lw"ndished by the Woman, She quickly learnt 1\lan's call-note-the syllables of her
They poi!l[
: heir fierce blaùes at her, They opened name-and lin1;,ed it in her mind with food.
out and clo:;i'd again, their edges grinning. rasping, She fixed its distance instantly, and with giant lu,p!
,,, ould this 'cold, pitiless beak of steel be plunged into and fluttery wings made bee-line to its source,
her flesh 1 And she had other company than Man: the dog whose
She was flung backwards, pinned by hands confederate; presence she took little heed of; the cat whom she distrusted.
and scream of agony proclaimed the wrenching of her tail- The eat's advances frightened her, She feared the twikhing
quills from their sockets. of his ears, his lashing tail, his sleepy-stretching claws, the
So steering power was torn from her. down-drawn cornel'S of his whiskered muzzle, Yet there
The wings were crippled ne'lt. Nipped right and left was truce between them, truce after strenuous contest, where
they numbed in pain, and right and left, clicked scissor-snip, e:1ch }lad learnt the other's qualities-and weapons.
and pit-a-pat of feathers, lightly falling, The days trailed by monotonous,
A stifled gurgle burst from her dumb lungs. She glue-ked rnder two deadening influences, the frousty, heated
like blooded fowl. She waited for the finishing stroke, the atmosphere, the incessant glut of food, her senses dulled.
plunging of the steel into her throat; the last, the supreme The outer world had almost passed from her, though
torture. f'very dawn she flapped her stumps of wings, as though some
But suddenly the hands were lifted from her, She sat sleeping instinct weke in her and called her to the sky,
dumb on the table's edge, her every nerve ajar with paiu. She learnt the quiet corners of the kitchen-behind the
her eveI'y mu"cle smarting. And round her laughter spent stove, beneath the baking-range,
itself, and mockery, and railling. She knew safe spots from which to scold the cat, or tea
e
l\fan and :Man's friends had grouped to pay her homage. the dog without fear of reprisal. The latter sport wa

The sky at least was there, the beckoning "ky, friendly. The dog had smelt her dubiously at first; had
She spread hf'r wings and leapt towards the wind',)w, thrust a curious muzzle at her plumage, and, by some mystio
The leap was limit of her course. test, been satisfied.
Like stone she fell and raised a mocking laugh again, The strange wild captive thing was of the hou
ehold.
Yet she did not despair, It was uneatable. It could not harm him. Then why not
She flapped her crippled stumps of wing
, and time and let it live? A game-bird mÍ!;-ht have tempLed him (for-want
time and time again essayed the lilting glide which leads to of hare or rabbit), but blackbirds, magpies, jackùaws, crows,
flight. were no fit food for dog of quality,
The grace of it was gone, She toppled, stumbled piti- So, when from stress of boredom or excitement, Margot
ably, Feet, body, neck were out of gear, and mocking was stirred to mischief, she crept behind the dog and tweaked
laughter waited on her always, his tail: He swung a drowsy head at her, and with round,
She understood at last,; she knew that her whole world serioas eyes and upcurled lip, growled disapproval.
was changed, that an abyss impas!'able had sundered her As his head turned she nipped again, and so the game
from freedom; that flight was now denied her, that she Wa:l went on.
prisoner for life, He never lost his temper, He büre her teasing gladly.
She shrunk behind the cage-its door was closed-she like the children's.
circled it, she crouched against the side of it. She ducked But it was different with the cat.. The cat sneaked food,
her head beneath her crippled wing, and till that day had scraps which were hers by right. and, scorning her indignant
passed she neither ate, nor drank, nor moved. outcry, ate them,
Man, Woman, Child took curious note of her, like Strangers she st.ill was nel'VOUS of. She feared their
visitors round a sick'bed. They whispered, argued, threat- hands, feared handling altogether; for, every week at first,
cned. She paid no heed, Despair had laid a hand on her, then every fortnight, the ordeal of the scissors was renewed,
8 chilly, numbing hand. A momentary rustle of her feather::!. The menace of their crunching blades drove her di.:l-
a momentary flicker of her eyes, were the sole signs of life traught to cover.
in her maimed body. She dived beneath the furniture, crouched in dark holes
But she was young, Her thoughts Werf' fugitive, They and corners, She even squeezed through wire-work of a
skimmed her brain and left small trace behind them. She mattress, which meant unmaking of the bed and littering of
woke from sleep to find her troubles soft.ened, the bedroom.
The pain was gone, and, in its place, two mastering in- And then she fooled the clutching hands, and slipped
stincts held her, the need for food, the need for sheltered dowll3tairs, and for full fifteen minutes mocked pursuit.
roosting-place, At length, worn out, she let the Girl lay hands on her.
She ate the scraps and morsels that lay near her; she The Girl had shown her kindness, but piteous upturned
drank fresh water from her pannikin, and, with her strength eyes were unavailing, The Girl betrayed her to the Man.
renewed, commenced her search. Once more she had to face the pain, t.he indignity of
From bench to bE'nch, from room to room she tripped. clipping,
Her innatf' curiosity now ordered all her goings. \\ïnter, diloputing every inch of ground, at last retreated
She qUE'stioned every stick and stone she met., She pried beaten. The sun burst. through the sullen clouds and flung
in corners, sounded holes. \Vith head aslant she eved f'ach his lusty beams about, the house.
cleft and crevice; t.ook measure of the chinks bet;'een the (To be C01'(;1l1l
d,)
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LAND AND 'VATER

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are the outcome of tests of all available traps
and all ideas for traps. These tests were
made at the Zoological Society's Gardens.

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2. The Bags are 3-ply.
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ß!l;t

212

June 26, 1915

LAND AND WATER

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ETCETERAS

BY

\1RS. ERIC DE RIDDER

F RO:\I a feminine point of yiew there are few things
more interesting than finishing touches. Speaking
broadly, women may be divided into two classes-
those who deal in etceteras and those who disdain
them, And the latter, as a general rule, can
hardly be counted amongst the decorative portion 0' the

ommunity. Soldiers' wives are frequently past mistresses
In the art, anyhow where th ir habitation is concerned.

Iany a woman has arrived in a garrison town and been
conf!onted wi h the inevitable furnished house or lodgings
?f ,hideous aspect. At first the
ight is apt to appal, later on
It I
taken. as all part of the day's work and simply as a call
for Immediate transformation, And here is where the finish ng
touch comes in. Clump of attractively coloured cushions,
bowls and pots of flowers, a few readable books. and a judicious
c?l
e.cf o.n of photographs have converted many a room to
cIvIlIzatIon. That, and a careful weeding out of existing
hor ors.
T
is .weeding ou
, however, essential though it is, is not
th
pnnclpa,l, factor I.n the creatio
of a temporary home.
It IS the addl,tlOn of tnfle
that seem Inseparably mingled with
the personalIty of certam people. There are a few gifted
women who have the enviable knack of creating a home-l"ke
atmosphere anywhere. One may be very certain that they
would succeed in this object in a tent in the Sahara or a hut in
Labrador. It is a
pecial facuIty, just as it is the special
faculty of a cheeky little midinette in Paris to buy a hat for
one franc fifty, trim it scantily, or not at all, slant it on her
head to the psychological angle, and at once be well-hatted.
At this time numbers of women are concentrating their energies
on making a home far from their usual quarters. The creation
of the new army, and the turning of the civilian into the soldier,
has made many a woman "follow 1 he drum' who never
dreamt of such a possibil ty, For the first time she has
realised what being moved from pillar to pos: really means,
and t,hat the process, amusing though it often is, is yet an
exactIng one. It demands adaptability and the intelligent
use of the 'nsignificant trifle.

The Small Accessory

\Vhere clothe are concerned, of cour
e, accessor:es are an
all-iml?ortant matter. Just at this time, perhaps, they are
more .Important . th
n ever, for most people now-a-days are
s udYIng the pnnClples of economy. It is wonderful what
can be
mpar
ed to a gown by just the right waistbeIt, and the
latest Idea In spotlessly white lawn collars. Something
th
t is a I ttle ou of
he o
dinary in the way of a veil ",ill
bnng a moderate hat mto hne once again; a clever note of
colour given by a parasol, a pendant, or a corsage bouquet,
deliver a toilet from insignificance,
The woman who has a keen eye to detail is bound to
present an attractive appearance. She can hardly do other-
wise, It is !"lot a ma
ter <?f pounds, shillings, and pence alone,
as many thmgs are m this work-a-day world, but a question
of taste and discernment. There are some fortunate mortals
who have a knack of imparting distinc1ion to everything
they wear, They pos"ess uncommon things, things which
ha\'e often been picked up at odd moments in unexpected
places, and are unlike anything owned by anybody else. It
may be a handbag of some uncommon bead or leather work.
a pair of quaint 0 iginal hatpins, a long neck chain of beads
in "orne exquisite colour or modelling. It may be
ome other
trifle of the sort, sometimes of intrinsic value sometimes
worth nothing beyond its beautv in the eye of the beho'der.
At any rate, there they are, and by their Claim to more than

ordinary distinction, they ticket their owner with the same
hall mark.

On Gardens and Gardeners
The small details in a garden al
o are delightful to study.
The interest over a new cutting, the gain of a fresh carnation,
or the latest ype of rose, the continual fight against green fly
and a myr:ad other pests, is a ceaseless entertainment.
And here again individuality makes itself felt. There are
some people with acres of gardens, and, even n these days
of war, an army of gardeners. Yet their gardens are
stereotyped, and give the beholder no particular pleasure,
on the contrary, often a feeling of positive dislike. And then
there are the people who manage 0 create a thing of beauty
out of nothing. In a garden hardly larger than the palm of
your hand they will have something of interest and charm,
something unusual and attractive in the way of bedding-out,
just the right kind of garden chairs, chairs that invite the weary
visitor to sink into them ",ith a sigh of content, and not the
knobby, uncomfortable sort that greet one on many a palatial
lawn. Once again it is a question of the all-important detail
-minor matter though it be.
Quite one of the most successful gardeners for creating
something out of nothing lived in a London flat, and her
medium was a roof-garden. She had green painted boxes
filled with geraniums and daisies, and what is more astonishing,
some standard roses, which had unexpectedly taken it into their
beautiful but obstinate heads to thrive in London. On sunny
days she rigged up a green and white striped awning, and ",ith
a couple of white enamelled wicker chairs and a table to
match, the garden was as comfortable and shady a spot as
could be desired. It was at any rate an infinite delight to the
owner and her friends, and through its means one of the hottest
Summers ever known to London was made tolerable.
The Things That Tell
If we are honest with ourselves, most of us will admit
that it is the extra things in life we appreciate, not the mere
bread and butter of every-day existence. It is dull work
paying the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker for
the bare necessities of life; the money we appreciate spending
goes on far less mundane considerations than these. It goes,
in fact, on the tiny extras which mean so much and yet so
little, and make life worth living to a greater proportion
than the severely practical party would have us believe.
Our wounded soldiers and sailors are a case in point.
Any visitor to any hospital will tell us that the things the
men delight in are not those falling to their lot as a regular
rule, but the tiny extras that come their way. Even the most
taciturn Tommy finds words of thanks for a bunch of roses,
newspapers, or games. As for the jig-saw puzzle, it is a com-
plete passport to favour, inconsiderable trifle though it is.
The care of the wounded, therefore, though it certainly
begins, does not end with housing, food, and nursing. These
are the big things, of course, but the little things count as
well, in the way they always have and always will to the end
of time unless human nature fundamentally alters. So the
people with stores of magazines, books, puzz-Ies, and such like
distractions cannot do better than make a big bundle of
them at once, and dispatch them to the nearest military
hospital. Several of these in various parts of the country
would be grateful for gifts of the kind, and it is quite certain
this want needs but to be known to be immediately answered.
As for the inventive genius with a special facility for thinking
of new games suitable for con\alcscents, the chance of a life-
time has arrived. For there arc many claimants for his wares
in e\'ery direction, and a ready-made market to his hand,

21 3

LAND AND WATER

HOW URIC ACID
WORKS.

GOUTY DEVELOPMENT.
G OUT is latent in every human being by means of the
fact that uric acid, its pr
m
l cause, oCCurs nat1!rally
J in every system. Thus It IS that gouty suffenng IS
the most prevalent of all maladies in this country ;

and why anyone escapes gout at all is because
Nature, by means of the liver and kidneys, destroys and eliminates
the noxious poison as soon as it is produced.
A very slight cause, however, exposure to cold or damp, a
chill, an accidental blow or knock, even worry, mental distress,
or a sudden shock, may result in the retention of the uric acid
in the bodv to the detriment of the whole economy.
I t impedes the circulation and contaminates the blood, The
results are seen in attacks of indigestion, with the distressing
attendant symptoms of flatulence, acidity, heartburn, headache,
and constipation. Scattered about here and there just under the
skin may be seen little hard lumps, which are simply collections
of solidified uric acid.
Accompanying this early stage of gouty development a
burning sensation in the skin with irritation is experienced,
twinges of pain in the joints frequently occur, and there is a
feeling of stiffness, pain, and tenderness in both joints and
muscles,
One of the most frequently occurring forms of gout is gouty
eczema, the direct result of the burrowing of uric acid into the
skin. There can be no more irritating or distressing ailment
than gouty eczema, and, strangely enough, it often attacks
persons apparently healthy and vigorous.
Another, and perhaps the most familiar of all forms of
gouty suffering, is that known as chronic or rheumatic gout, or
rheumatoid arthritis, when uric acid insinuates itself between
the articulations, buries itself in the crevices, and invests the
cartilages and li
aments of the joints, setting up pain, enlarge-
ment, inflammation, and stiffness. Uric acid is the one common
cause of all other forms of gout, whether they appear in gouty
rheumatism or lumbago, sciatica or neuritis, kidney stone or
gravel.

RATIONAL TREATMENT OF GOUT.
To overcome and expel uric acid naturally requires the
assistance of an agent even stronger than the poison itself,
Scientific research into the whole subject of uric acid solvents
and eliminants, conducted for many years by an old-established
firm of manufacturing chemists of the highest repute, resulted
in the perfecting of Bishop's Varalettes, a remedy acknowledged
by the medical profession to be the most generally powerful
solvents and eliminants of uric acid known. Bishop's Varalettes
are a reliable and successful remedy for gouty suffering, because
their action is at once rational and scientific. When administered
they are rapidly absorbed by the blood, and so are enabled to
follow uric acid into its remotest hiding places. The poisonous
acid is neutralized by the chemical action of Bishop's Varalettes,
the cement-like masses are softened and broken down, finally
dissolved, and swept right out of the body. With this removal
the nervous depression, the irritation, the low condition, and
the pain, stiffness, and inflammation pass away, and in their
place come a sense of the most grateful relief, and a raising of
the whole tone of the system.
Bishop's Vara1ettes are perfectly safe. No harmful in-
gredient enters into their composition. They do not interfere
with the normal action of any organ of the body. Thev are a
preventive as well as a remedy, and prolonged use does not
lessen their effect or produce any ill results.

CHOICE OF DIET.
Discrimination is practically all that is required in this
respect. No self-denial of any sort is necessary, for the number
and variety of foods that the gouty may eat with impunity are
sufficiently extensive to satisfy the most fastidious palate or the
most exacting appetite. Confirmation of this welcome fact will
be found in a booklet recently issued, which deals with the subject
of gouty foods in an interesting and authoritative manner.
Classified lists of foods are set forth, so that it may be seen at a
glance what to eat and what to avoid. A section of this booklet
IS devoted to the discussion of uric acid disorders, their nature

nd treatment, and contains a mass of useful information of the
greatest value to all who suffer from or are threatened by uric
acid. A copy of the booklet will be sent post free by the sole
makers of Bishop's Varalettes, Alfred Bishop, Ltd., Manu-
facturing Chemists (Est. I8S7), 48 Spelman Street, London, N.E.
Please ask for Booklet N.
Bishop's Varalettes are sold in vials at IS., 2S., and 5 s .
(25 days' treatment), or may be had direct from the sole makers,
as above.

June 26, 1915

BOOKS OF THE \VEEK

A LITERARY REYIE'Y

.. The Audacious War." By Clarence W. Barron.
(Constable.) 4S, 6d, net.
.. The World in Crucible," By Sir Gilbert
Parker, M.P, (Murray.) 6s, net.
In Sir Gilbert Parker's book we see the lure of modern
history attracting an author away from his more usual
pursuit of fiction. Sir Gilbert has a command of popular
rhetoric which enables him to say with considerable vehemence
what we have all been saying about Germany. There is not
very much that is new. He rightly emphasises the importance
of Asia and the Near East in causing the war. From time to
time his quotations are apt, as when he reminds us that
Froissart " laments that it was impossible to teach the German
knights the principles of true knightliness;" and when he
quotes Sir Ian Hamilton on the Russo-Japanese War: "The
Muscovites have not lifted so much as an egg even during the
demoralisation of a defeat,"
Mr. Barron's book is more interesting, and more original.
He is not attempting to cover the whole ground, but is present-
ing a few aspects of the war as they occurred to him, an
American, writing from Europe. He has been in close touch
with diplomatic and government circles, and he is an expert
on finance. He is entirely sympathetic with the British and
the French, and states our case for the American public as
vigorously as it could possibly be stated, He argues that
the immediate causes of the war are" connected with com-
mercial treaties, protective tariffs, and financial progress."
" Kultur" means "German progress," commercially and
financially, and it is this which German armies and armaments
exist, to support. During the Russo-Japanese War Germany
thrust commercial treaties upon Russia wholly unfavourable
to the latter. In I9I4 these treaties had nearly expired.
Mr. Barron asserts that it was the policy and intention of
Germany to defeat the European Powers in succession with a
view to dictating tariff terms to the rest of the world, including
America. He urges upon his own country, .. the home of
protective tariffs," that .. tariffs should be neighbourly."
We could wish that he had developed the financial side of
his argument-with the information at his disposal he might
advantageously have filled a volume. The book is well worth
reading, Incidentally we light upon certain facts which
British newspapers are not as a rule permitted to publish.

The English Essay and Essayists. By Hugh
Walker, M,A., LL.D. (Dent,) 5S. net,
Professor Walker is perhaps a little too much inclined to
think that Lamb is the only kind of essayist who is really an
essayist, and the examples which he considers in this volume
are practically subjected to the one test: To what extent do
they conform to the model of Lamb? But literature is large,
and he is compelled also, in order to bring so many other
writers within his scope, to give place to essayists in a
secondary sense; thus he includes all .. compositions to
which custom has assigned the . . . . name, but which agree
only in being comparatively short. . . . and in being more
or less incomplete." Bacon is the first author whom he
treats at length; and it is worthy of note that in this and in
all cases Professor Walker has discussed the thought of his
writers, as well as their technique and historical place. Steele
he prefers to Addison. To Goldsmith, as essayist, he gives
the place that he deserves; to Walter Pater, Jefferies, and
Savage he is less, and to Richard Middleton more, than
kind. The book is thorough, and it has the merit-rare in
historico-critical works-of being really interesting and
appreciative.

.. A Lady of Russia." By Robert Bowman. (Heine-
mann.) 6s.
1\1r. Bowman is an Englishman who has lived long in
Russia. He has not only become intimate with Russian life;
he has also evidently steeped himself in Russian fiction.
for we can trace the unmistakable influence in his style. 1 t
is a very simple, direct story of the tragic fate of a gifted
Russian woman, interested in the welfare of the peasants and
the progress of her country, whom her husband, a high official,
misunderstands, and whom the authorities consign to a
Siberian prison. The book is worth reading as an example
of an English nove] about Russian life. written under Russian
influencpo;,

21 4

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